<story><title>The FBI could have broken into San Bernadino shooter&apos;s phone without Apple</title><url>https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2018/04/fbi-could-have-gotten-san-bernardino-shooters-iphone-leadership-didnt-say</url></story><parent_chain><item><author>natch</author><text>&amp;gt;any system that is designed to allow law enforcement agencies all across the country to expeditiously decrypt devices pursuant to court order will be enormously complex, raising the likelihood of serious flaws in implementation.&lt;p&gt;Generally I agree with the EFF but I always find this particular argument specious.&lt;p&gt;If someone were to design such a system but without flaws in its implementation, would EFF be OK with that? I don&amp;#x27;t think so, because those agencies are rife with bad actors. A perfect system, in the hands of bad actors, is already a problem.&lt;p&gt;The problem at the outset is with the context of use. Yes there are other problems that would follow on because the system would not be technically perfect, but even before that, the flawed context of giving these tools to bad actors should not be overlooked. Setting up such a system, &lt;i&gt;perfect or not&lt;/i&gt; is a bad idea, period. Yes it will be imperfect but even if you buy into the mistaken idea that it can be made perfect, the context of use, in agencies with bad actors, is already broken even before the imperfections allow exploits by agency outsiders.&lt;p&gt;No, we don&amp;#x27;t have to assume that the agencies are staffed with only good people. Not even for the sake of argument, and not even for the sake of a polite white paper from the EFF.</text></item></parent_chain><comment><author>pg_bot</author><text>IMO the toothpaste is already out of the tube on this one. We already live in a world where strong encryption exists, and is accessible to the common developer. The DOJ does not get to live in the world that it wants to. I understand this will make their lives more difficult, however I do not care. Currently they are in the &amp;quot;anger and bargaining&amp;quot; stage of grief, I hope they realize that &amp;quot;going dark&amp;quot; isn&amp;#x27;t really that bad.</text></comment>
<story><title>The FBI could have broken into San Bernadino shooter&apos;s phone without Apple</title><url>https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2018/04/fbi-could-have-gotten-san-bernardino-shooters-iphone-leadership-didnt-say</url></story><parent_chain><item><author>natch</author><text>&amp;gt;any system that is designed to allow law enforcement agencies all across the country to expeditiously decrypt devices pursuant to court order will be enormously complex, raising the likelihood of serious flaws in implementation.&lt;p&gt;Generally I agree with the EFF but I always find this particular argument specious.&lt;p&gt;If someone were to design such a system but without flaws in its implementation, would EFF be OK with that? I don&amp;#x27;t think so, because those agencies are rife with bad actors. A perfect system, in the hands of bad actors, is already a problem.&lt;p&gt;The problem at the outset is with the context of use. Yes there are other problems that would follow on because the system would not be technically perfect, but even before that, the flawed context of giving these tools to bad actors should not be overlooked. Setting up such a system, &lt;i&gt;perfect or not&lt;/i&gt; is a bad idea, period. Yes it will be imperfect but even if you buy into the mistaken idea that it can be made perfect, the context of use, in agencies with bad actors, is already broken even before the imperfections allow exploits by agency outsiders.&lt;p&gt;No, we don&amp;#x27;t have to assume that the agencies are staffed with only good people. Not even for the sake of argument, and not even for the sake of a polite white paper from the EFF.</text></item></parent_chain><comment><author>_jal</author><text>Any system with &amp;quot;exceptional&amp;quot;&amp;#x2F;whatever they want to call it this week access mechanisms inherently reduces the security of the system, even your hypothetical flawless system. This is because attackers rationally go for the weakest link, which becomes whatever policy mechanisms gate access to the panty-sniffer mechanism.&lt;p&gt;We&amp;#x27;ve seen a constant stream of stories of folks with access to surveillance mechanisms abusing them. Guards being creepy with cameras, NSA analysts stalking lovers, cops stalking lots of people.&lt;p&gt;And that&amp;#x27;s just what leaks out to the press.&lt;p&gt;Any sensible analysis of this sort of thing has to include the inevitability of abuse. If it doesn&amp;#x27;t include mechanisms for detecting, punishing and &lt;i&gt;alerting the victim&lt;/i&gt;, then the priorities are made quite clear, and are a giant middle finger to the notion of personal autonomy for anyone without special legal status.&lt;p&gt;Enjoy your freedom responsibly, citizen-unit. Or else.</text></comment>