<story><title>Typed Programs Don&apos;t Leak Data</title><url>https://dodisturb.me/posts/2021-06-27-Typed-Programs-Dont-Leak-Data.html</url></story><parent_chain><item><author>titzer</author><text>That&amp;#x27;s great, but microarchitectural sidechannels in all modern hardware allow a program to read every byte in its entire address space.</text></item></parent_chain><comment><author>gwbas1c</author><text>You&amp;#x27;re confusing two different concepts.&lt;p&gt;I once encountered a situation where a junior programmer just wrote the password to the log file.&lt;p&gt;The point of using a separate type for secure data is to allow the compiler to try to trap situations where sensitive data is used incorrectly. (Yes, a dedicated moron could probably work around this kind of trap, but there is no such thing as a 100% perfect safety net.)&lt;p&gt;Trying to prevent data leaks at the hardware level is a completely different problem with a completely different solution.</text></comment>
<story><title>Typed Programs Don&apos;t Leak Data</title><url>https://dodisturb.me/posts/2021-06-27-Typed-Programs-Dont-Leak-Data.html</url></story><parent_chain><item><author>titzer</author><text>That&amp;#x27;s great, but microarchitectural sidechannels in all modern hardware allow a program to read every byte in its entire address space.</text></item></parent_chain><comment><author>wyldfire</author><text>That&amp;#x27;s a risk that should be independently assessed. This could mitigate accidental design decisions that would emit data that&amp;#x27;s not intended to be revealed. It would force designers to explicitly cast data as having been transformed to be safely emitted.</text></comment>