<story><title>Boeing&apos;s Dead Whistleblower Spoke the Truth</title><url>https://www.thefp.com/p/boeings-dead-whistleblower-spoke-the-truth</url></story><parent_chain></parent_chain><comment><author>FabHK</author><text>&amp;gt; In an effort to get the plane out quickly, Boeing, with the assent of the FAA, had even told the airlines that their pilots didn’t need to conduct flight simulator tests. That was a critical mistake, because the pilots would have discovered the issue that caused the planes to crash.&lt;p&gt;Is that so? The simulators would have been able so simulate the failure of one of the two AOA sensors, and the simulated MCAS would&amp;#x27;ve kicked in, issuing stabiliser trim nose-down commands, and the pilots would&amp;#x27;ve tried to fix it with the trim nose-up switch on the yoke, and this would&amp;#x27;ve gone back and forth a while until they&amp;#x27;d stopped trimming up for a bit, and it would&amp;#x27;ve simulated a crash?&lt;p&gt;That&amp;#x27;s possible, but news to me. Here&amp;#x27;s a source [0] saying &amp;quot;the simulators have been shown to be incapable of replicating the conditions under which the two 737 MAX aircraft crashed&amp;quot; and &amp;quot;Boeing have discovered that their simulators cannot accurately recreate a fault with the anti-stall system.&amp;quot;&lt;p&gt;Seems to me that (at least) one of the two articles is wrong.&lt;p&gt;[0] &lt;a href=&quot;https:&amp;#x2F;&amp;#x2F;simpleflying.com&amp;#x2F;boeing-737-max-simulator&amp;#x2F;&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;https:&amp;#x2F;&amp;#x2F;simpleflying.com&amp;#x2F;boeing-737-max-simulator&amp;#x2F;&lt;/a&gt;</text></comment>
<story><title>Boeing&apos;s Dead Whistleblower Spoke the Truth</title><url>https://www.thefp.com/p/boeings-dead-whistleblower-spoke-the-truth</url></story><parent_chain></parent_chain><comment><author>Fripplebubby</author><text>I&amp;#x27;ve been thinking about this a lot lately.&lt;p&gt;In my opinion, Boeing is a company that is expected to do something about 10x more difficult than other companies: they build and sell massively complex machines that have to work safely and reliably 100% of the time (discounting planned redundancy), and even a small mistake in design or execution compromises the safety of hundreds or thousands of people, even if it takes years for the flaw to become apparent. If you couple this with all the growth in air traffic in the past few decades, I think failures like we&amp;#x27;ve seen are nearly inevitable.&lt;p&gt;Honestly, even with the tragic MAX crashes, I think it&amp;#x27;s nearly a miracle that air disasters happen as infrequently as they do (Boeing, Airbus, or what have you). People point to mismanagement at Boeing, including lately labor outsourcing &amp;#x2F; labor arbitrage (building plants in SC instead of WA to avoid unions, Spirit Aerosystems, etc) but I see that as part of how Boeing tried to meet the growing demands of air travel. That&amp;#x27;s not to let everybody off the hook, because clearly some changes need to take hold so that this doesn&amp;#x27;t happen again. That&amp;#x27;s the gold standard of the aviation industry, after all - that we can prevent a particular disaster from ever happening again, and we&amp;#x27;re willing to spend the time and money to see it so.&lt;p&gt;I think all the true crime enthusiasts following the John Barnett case is just going to distract from solving the hard problems - getting the design and execution right on every single plane, 100% of the time. Professional class people have gotten used to cheap&amp;#x2F;affordable jet travel anywhere, anytime, that is safe all the time - but I don&amp;#x27;t think many have internalized how difficult this is to do and maintain.</text></comment>