<story><title>Evading Airport Security</title><url>https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2013/12/evading_airport.html</url></story><parent_chain><item><author>tokenadult</author><text>The original 9&amp;#x2F;11 attack showed how simple traditional weapons could be used to leverage using four whole airplanes as nontraditional weapons, three of them with devastating effect, all of them with lethal effect. I think Schneier&amp;#x27;s point is correct that spending the same amount of money on intelligence, investigations, and emergency response would keep us safer than screening what innocent passengers bring on to airplanes, but current procedures for airport security are still a reaction to 9&amp;#x2F;11 as it happened then. I look forward to the day when we dial back airport security procedures to the new reality of reinforced cockpit doors and passengers who will fight would-be hijackers to save their lives.</text></item><item><author>pkfrank</author><text>I fundamentally don&amp;#x27;t understand the danger of &amp;quot;traditional&amp;quot; (box cutters, etc.) weapons getting through airport security.  I understand that we need to continue testing for bombs and anything that can actually bring a plane down.&lt;p&gt;It would obviously be tragic and damaging for someone to attack &amp;quot;defenseless&amp;quot; passengers with &amp;quot;traditional&amp;quot; weapons, but -- in my eyes -- it&amp;#x27;s not terribly different from a random attack in the street or a shopping mall.&lt;p&gt;Airline personnel and the typical cohort of passengers would simply never let a terrorist take the cockpit, which effectively removes that entire element of danger.  The only super-substantial potential damage stems from an explosive of some sort, not a box-cutter, knife, or anything of the sort.&lt;p&gt;The cost of TSA (direct and indirect through delays, etc.) is immense, and truly does feel like security theater at this point.  I&amp;#x27;d be all-for doubling down on bomb-sniffing dogs, behavior analysts, and all that; but this apparent focus on &amp;quot;traditional&amp;quot; weapons seems totally asymmetric to the risk it presents.</text></item></parent_chain><comment><author>ArbitraryLimits</author><text>&amp;gt; The original 9&amp;#x2F;11 attack showed how simple traditional weapons could be used to leverage using four whole airplanes as nontraditional weapons, three of them with devastating effect, all of them with lethal effect.&lt;p&gt;Right, but the GP&amp;#x27;s point is that it was only possible to do that _once_, because the success of the 9&amp;#x2F;11 attacks depended on the passengers cooperating with the hijackers.  That was a reasonable assumption because for the previous 30 years, &amp;quot;in the event of a hijacking just cooperate until we can negotiate your release&amp;quot; was the standard advice.  Now it isn&amp;#x27;t.&lt;p&gt;Even in 9&amp;#x2F;11, 25% of the passengers figured out on their own that they shouldn&amp;#x27;t cede the cockpit.  Today the figure would be 100%, plus the cockpit is sealed off for the duration of the flight anyway.  So I really don&amp;#x27;t see a scenario where box-cutters would take out the whole plane any more.</text></comment>
<story><title>Evading Airport Security</title><url>https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2013/12/evading_airport.html</url></story><parent_chain><item><author>tokenadult</author><text>The original 9&amp;#x2F;11 attack showed how simple traditional weapons could be used to leverage using four whole airplanes as nontraditional weapons, three of them with devastating effect, all of them with lethal effect. I think Schneier&amp;#x27;s point is correct that spending the same amount of money on intelligence, investigations, and emergency response would keep us safer than screening what innocent passengers bring on to airplanes, but current procedures for airport security are still a reaction to 9&amp;#x2F;11 as it happened then. I look forward to the day when we dial back airport security procedures to the new reality of reinforced cockpit doors and passengers who will fight would-be hijackers to save their lives.</text></item><item><author>pkfrank</author><text>I fundamentally don&amp;#x27;t understand the danger of &amp;quot;traditional&amp;quot; (box cutters, etc.) weapons getting through airport security.  I understand that we need to continue testing for bombs and anything that can actually bring a plane down.&lt;p&gt;It would obviously be tragic and damaging for someone to attack &amp;quot;defenseless&amp;quot; passengers with &amp;quot;traditional&amp;quot; weapons, but -- in my eyes -- it&amp;#x27;s not terribly different from a random attack in the street or a shopping mall.&lt;p&gt;Airline personnel and the typical cohort of passengers would simply never let a terrorist take the cockpit, which effectively removes that entire element of danger.  The only super-substantial potential damage stems from an explosive of some sort, not a box-cutter, knife, or anything of the sort.&lt;p&gt;The cost of TSA (direct and indirect through delays, etc.) is immense, and truly does feel like security theater at this point.  I&amp;#x27;d be all-for doubling down on bomb-sniffing dogs, behavior analysts, and all that; but this apparent focus on &amp;quot;traditional&amp;quot; weapons seems totally asymmetric to the risk it presents.</text></item></parent_chain><comment><author>aestra</author><text>9&amp;#x2F;11 was different. People cooperated because that was protocol at the time for a plane hijacking. Nobody expected them to use the plane as a weapon with no regard to their own lives. This was an unprecedented attack.&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aircraft_hijacking&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;http:&amp;#x2F;&amp;#x2F;en.wikipedia.org&amp;#x2F;wiki&amp;#x2F;Aircraft_hijacking&lt;/a&gt;&lt;p&gt;&amp;quot;Before the September 11, 2001 attacks, most hijackings involved the plane landing at a certain destination, followed by the hijackers making negotiable demands. Pilots and flight attendants were trained to adopt the &amp;quot;Common Strategy&amp;quot; tactic, which was approved by the FAA. It taught crew members to comply with the hijackers&amp;#x27; demands, get the plane to land safely and then let the security forces handle the situation. Crew members advised passengers to sit quietly in order to increase their chances of survival. They were also trained not to make any &amp;#x27;heroic&amp;#x27; moves that could endanger themselves or other people. The FAA realized that the longer a hijacking persisted, the more likely it would end peacefully with the hijackers reaching their goal.[12] The September 11 attacks presented an unprecedented threat because it involved suicide hijackers who could fly an aircraft and use it to delibrately crash the airplane into buildings for the sole purpose to cause massive casualties with no warning, no demands or negotiations, and no regard for human life. The &amp;quot;Common Strategy&amp;quot; approach was not designed to handle suicide hijackings, and the hijackers were able to exploit a weakness in the civil aviation security system. Since then, the &amp;quot;Common Strategy&amp;quot; policy in the USA and the rest of the world to deal with airplane hijackings has no longer been used.&amp;quot;&lt;p&gt;There was also a change in protocol after the Columbine High School massacre. In that attack the two were able to shoot victims while the police were outside setting up a perimeter. Now as a direct result of that attack police actively charge an active shooter, this is called Immediate Action Rapid Deployment. This is said to have saved dozens of lives in Virgina Tech alone.</text></comment>