<story><title>NSO Group Hacked</title><url>https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2021/07/nso-group-hacked.html</url></story><parent_chain></parent_chain><comment><author>Shank</author><text>I suppose that broadly, the takeaway here (and in all of this) that I’ve missed is that fundamentally, this list of phones that were targeted shouldn’t exist, or shouldn’t be leakable in this way, if we want to believe that NSO Group is targeting the most genuine targets.&lt;p&gt;To frame it differently: NSO Group sells tools to governments that are apparently trustworthy. Its security and system architecture should be decentralized enough that a list of all targets should be extremely difficult to obtain. If the list is obtainable, then what else is? Are their exploit toolkits just as leakable? Are the internal controls not sufficient to stop these leaks?&lt;p&gt;How can we continue to allow orgs like NSO Group to exist if they surely can’t keep something like their entire target list safe? Even if we assume of the targets are legitimate threats (which, again, requires enough suspension of disbelief to hold a small army at this point), why would we want that list leakable? If they’re all the most legitimate targets, then that list is essentially 50k people who can now discover this fact and change their patterns to hide. It’s pretty bad to tip off “all the people who we find important enough to 0-day” if that assumption holds.&lt;p&gt;Now the real question? I’m not sure I know what we can do, actionably. Call Congress and ask them to care?</text></comment>
<story><title>NSO Group Hacked</title><url>https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2021/07/nso-group-hacked.html</url></story><parent_chain></parent_chain><comment><author>rollulus</author><text>The &amp;quot;hacked&amp;quot; part is only an assumption, isn&amp;#x27;t it? The leaked information could also come from, say, a whistleblower. An employee that suddenly developed a sense of ethics.</text></comment>