<story><title>What World War I Can Teach Us about Misjudging Tech and Social Change (2020)</title><url>https://www.carnegie.org/topics/topic-articles/emerging-global-order/1920-2020-what-the-history-of-world-war-1-can-teach-us-about-misjudging-tech-social-change/</url></story><parent_chain><item><author>carbonguy</author><text>From my understanding of the period, one might describe WWI as &amp;quot;anticipated, but not comprehended;&amp;quot; one of the catalysts for the war was a general understanding on the European continent that France and Germany were going to re-litigate the Franco-Prussian war at some point, as well as an understanding in Germany that time was not on their side due to the demographic changes in France - higher relative population growth - and economic changes in the Russian Empire allowing for more rapid and effective military deployment.&lt;p&gt;However, the types of wars in which the Great Powers of the time were involved - and from which their military planners derived their assumptions about war with modern weaponry - were mainly colonial conflicts against relatively under-armed opponents, eg. the Boer war, which the Great Powers  typically &amp;quot;won.&amp;quot;  The outcome of the Russo-Japanese war (1904-05) was shocking enough to change the calculus for planning the European war, as Russia was now seen as a less able ally for France... and on and on such analysis could go!&lt;p&gt;With respect to this article, I would take the lesson of the early 20th century and WWI and ask:&lt;p&gt;Is there any major geopolitical development that is generally assumed to be inevitable, and how might modern technology upset the assumptions of the powers-that-be in their planned response to that event?</text></item></parent_chain><comment><author>cpleppert</author><text>&amp;gt;&amp;gt; demographic changes in France - higher relative population growth&lt;p&gt;I think you have it exactly backwards. France had a significantly slower population growth. To give one example of how this impacted the military caculus: Germany was able to easily expand its army in 1911 and 1913 and still have a large reserve pool of manpower but France had to increase the term of service from 2 to 3 years and expand its conscription to almost the entire adult male population of fighting age; which led to riots and political chaos. At the time of the outbreak the French army had been expanded so rapidly that training had to be cut significantly.&lt;p&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt; However, the types of wars in which the Great Powers of the time were involved - and from which their military planners derived their assumptions about war with modern weaponry - were mainly colonial conflicts against relatively under-armed opponents, eg. the Boer war, which the Great Powers typically &amp;quot;won.&amp;quot; The outcome of the Russo-Japanese war (1904-05) was shocking enough to change the calculus for planning the European war, as Russia was now seen as a less able ally for France... and on and on such analysis could go!&lt;p&gt;I would strongly disagree. Russia lost the Russo-Japanese war mostly due to inept military execution and the difficulty of troop transportation through an incomplete Trans-Siberian railway; hardly relevant to a european total war. You could argue( and some less astute observers at the time did) that Japan&amp;#x27;s victory through aggressive assaults on static russian positions &amp;#x27;proved&amp;#x27; that offensive power would carry the day to a decisive conclusion.</text></comment>
<story><title>What World War I Can Teach Us about Misjudging Tech and Social Change (2020)</title><url>https://www.carnegie.org/topics/topic-articles/emerging-global-order/1920-2020-what-the-history-of-world-war-1-can-teach-us-about-misjudging-tech-social-change/</url></story><parent_chain><item><author>carbonguy</author><text>From my understanding of the period, one might describe WWI as &amp;quot;anticipated, but not comprehended;&amp;quot; one of the catalysts for the war was a general understanding on the European continent that France and Germany were going to re-litigate the Franco-Prussian war at some point, as well as an understanding in Germany that time was not on their side due to the demographic changes in France - higher relative population growth - and economic changes in the Russian Empire allowing for more rapid and effective military deployment.&lt;p&gt;However, the types of wars in which the Great Powers of the time were involved - and from which their military planners derived their assumptions about war with modern weaponry - were mainly colonial conflicts against relatively under-armed opponents, eg. the Boer war, which the Great Powers  typically &amp;quot;won.&amp;quot;  The outcome of the Russo-Japanese war (1904-05) was shocking enough to change the calculus for planning the European war, as Russia was now seen as a less able ally for France... and on and on such analysis could go!&lt;p&gt;With respect to this article, I would take the lesson of the early 20th century and WWI and ask:&lt;p&gt;Is there any major geopolitical development that is generally assumed to be inevitable, and how might modern technology upset the assumptions of the powers-that-be in their planned response to that event?</text></item></parent_chain><comment><author>solresol</author><text>Both China and the USA think that any invasion into their territories will inevitably fail because of the strength of their armies and because of the long supply chains that their enemy would need to maintain to hold a position.&lt;p&gt;Both sides also believe that the other side will inevitably fail because the other side&amp;#x27;s political system and ideology is so broken.&lt;p&gt;But because of the first point they both feel confident that the collapse of the other is going to be containable and controllable.&lt;p&gt;The technological developments (even if morally wrong) are autonomous fighting vehicles that rain mayhem and destruction; and engineered viruses. A failed state can still cause the other side to lose a war, leaving no winners.</text></comment>