<story><title>Identifying backdoors, attack points, and surveillance mechanisms in iOS devices</title><url>http://www.zdziarski.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/iOS_Backdoors_Attack_Points_Surveillance_Mechanisms.pdf</url></story><parent_chain></parent_chain><comment><author>majke</author><text>Mr Zdziarski gave this talk also at the HOPE conference yesterday. It&amp;#x27;s highly recommended. Slides:&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.zdziarski.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/iOS_Backdoors_Attack_Points_Surveillance_Mechanisms.pdf&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;http:&amp;#x2F;&amp;#x2F;www.zdziarski.com&amp;#x2F;blog&amp;#x2F;wp-content&amp;#x2F;uploads&amp;#x2F;2014&amp;#x2F;07&amp;#x2F;iOS...&lt;/a&gt;&lt;p&gt;For the people wanting to secure their iphone, go to the end to the slide &amp;quot;Apple Configurator&amp;quot; and follow the described steps to disable your iphone from paring with anything.</text></comment>
<story><title>Identifying backdoors, attack points, and surveillance mechanisms in iOS devices</title><url>http://www.zdziarski.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/iOS_Backdoors_Attack_Points_Surveillance_Mechanisms.pdf</url></story><parent_chain></parent_chain><comment><author>wyager</author><text>&amp;gt;This is due to iOS&amp;#x27; behavior of automatically joining networks whose name (not MAC address) it recognizes, such as “linksys” or “attwifi”.&lt;p&gt;Discriminating by MAC addresses would not help at all. MAC addresses are trivial to spoof, even though they are &amp;quot;in hardware&amp;quot;.&lt;p&gt;It would be cool if we had a standardized trust-on-first-use cryptographic authentication model for wireless APs, like we do with SSH right now. You connect to the AP, it sends you its pubkey, your phone says &amp;quot;Do you want to trust AP with key AB:CD:BE:EF...&amp;quot;. The discriminating paranoid person can choose to make sure this is the right key hash, and the average person gets at least limited protection from later AP spoofing attacks.</text></comment>