<story><title>Boeing Passenger Jet Nearly Crashes Because of Known Software Bug</title><url>https://www.independent.co.uk/travel/tui-boeing-flight-bristol-disaster-avoided-b2558536.html</url></story><parent_chain></parent_chain><comment><author>HL33tibCe7</author><text>&lt;a href=&quot;https:&amp;#x2F;&amp;#x2F;avherald.com&amp;#x2F;h?article=5194536c&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;https:&amp;#x2F;&amp;#x2F;avherald.com&amp;#x2F;h?article=5194536c&lt;/a&gt;&lt;p&gt;and &lt;a href=&quot;https:&amp;#x2F;&amp;#x2F;www.gov.uk&amp;#x2F;aaib-reports&amp;#x2F;aaib-special-bulletin-s1-slash-2024-boeing-737-8k5-g-fdzs&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;https:&amp;#x2F;&amp;#x2F;www.gov.uk&amp;#x2F;aaib-reports&amp;#x2F;aaib-special-bulletin-s1-sla...&lt;/a&gt; is the AAIB report&lt;p&gt;Summary:&lt;p&gt;&amp;gt; The aircraft took off from Runway 09 with a thrust setting significantly below that required to
achieve the correct takeoff performance. Rotation for the takeoff occurred only 260 m before
the end of the runway and the aircraft passed over the end at a height of approximately
10 ft. The N1
 required to achieve the required takeoff performance was 92.8% but, following
an A&amp;#x2F;T disconnect when the crew selected TOGA, 84.5% was manually set instead. Despite
an SOP requirement to check the thrust setting on takeoff, the crew did not realise that the
thrust was not set correctly until after the takeoff although they had noted how close to the
end of the runway they were.
The A&amp;#x2F;T had disconnected when the TOGA switch was pressed due to a fault with the ASM
associated with the thrust lever for engine 1. This disconnect was a known issue with the
older type ASMs fitted to the aircraft type. The manufacturer has issued a Fleet Team Digest
for operators detailing the issue and the SB for replacing the ASMs with a newer model.</text></comment>
<story><title>Boeing Passenger Jet Nearly Crashes Because of Known Software Bug</title><url>https://www.independent.co.uk/travel/tui-boeing-flight-bristol-disaster-avoided-b2558536.html</url></story><parent_chain></parent_chain><comment><author>kashunstva</author><text>The title here and the text of TFA reduce the incident to a single point of failure. There are conditions in which the TO&amp;#x2F;GA mode when engaged will fail to set the calculated and the crew is required to manually set the takeoff thrust. Confirmation of takeoff thrust set should be called out. Was that done? Boeing is under justifiably intense scrutiny for many of its manufacturing and engineering practices but the press needs to apply intellectual honesty in reporting incidents like this. It seems that the crew may have known that the thrust was not properly set when TO&amp;#x2F;GA was engaged and then manually set an incorrect thrust. Like many incidents, this is likely to have layered causes. Why not report that upfront?</text></comment>