<story><title>Progress Towards 100% HTTPS, June 2016</title><url>https://letsencrypt.org//2016/06/22/https-progress-june-2016.html</url></story><parent_chain></parent_chain><comment><author>rogerbinns</author><text>I keep hoping they will help address non-Internet TLS.  For example if you run a HTPC, fridge, printer, device controller or anything similar on your LAN and want to talk to it over the same LAN using TLS.  Getting a workable cert is currently not possible: for example the LAN names aren&amp;#x27;t going to be unique.&lt;p&gt;Plex did solve this in conjunction with a certificate authority, but that solution only works for them.  The general approach could work for others if someone like letsencrypt led the effort.  &lt;a href=&quot;https:&amp;#x2F;&amp;#x2F;blog.filippo.io&amp;#x2F;how-plex-is-doing-https-for-all-its-users&amp;#x2F;&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;https:&amp;#x2F;&amp;#x2F;blog.filippo.io&amp;#x2F;how-plex-is-doing-https-for-all-its-...&lt;/a&gt;</text></comment>
<story><title>Progress Towards 100% HTTPS, June 2016</title><url>https://letsencrypt.org//2016/06/22/https-progress-june-2016.html</url></story><parent_chain></parent_chain><comment><author>criddell</author><text>Just at the entire world is going HTTPS, my faith in the system is seriously waning. When Symantec bought Blue Coat, it made me start to think about how fragile this is. How long before Symantec gets an NSL demanding an appliance that can mint bogus certs on the fly for dropbox.com, facebook.com, twitter.com, etc...?&lt;p&gt;How effective is something like certificate pinning against fraudulent certs?</text></comment>