<story><title>Google open sourced PSP (hardware cryptographic offload)</title><url>https://cloud.google.com/blog/products/identity-security/announcing-psp-security-protocol-is-now-open-source</url></story><parent_chain></parent_chain><comment><author>oxplot</author><text>&amp;gt; Almost a decade ago, we started encrypting traffic between our data centers to help protect user privacy.&lt;p&gt;That should be around mid 2013 after Ed Snowden revelations. I remember some frustrated Google engineers on G+ commenting on the leaked slides from NSA where a packet capture of Google cross data center traffic was shown.</text></comment>
<story><title>Google open sourced PSP (hardware cryptographic offload)</title><url>https://cloud.google.com/blog/products/identity-security/announcing-psp-security-protocol-is-now-open-source</url></story><parent_chain></parent_chain><comment><author>kccqzy</author><text>&amp;gt; it took ~0.7% of Google&amp;#x27;s processing power to encrypt and decrypt RPCs&lt;p&gt;This figure is lower than I thought. Granted, I deal a lot with memcache style workloads, where each RPC basically just does some hash table lookup&amp;#x2F;insert and a memcpy of hundreds of kilobytes. I personally see up to 5% of CPU time spent on cryptographic operations (mainly AES-NI instructions). If you aren&amp;#x27;t Google and can&amp;#x27;t afford custom silicon to do hardware offload, but you can&amp;#x27;t drop the encryption-in-transit requirement either, what would you do to improve performance?</text></comment>