<story><title>What the CIA WikiLeaks Dump Tells Us: Encryption Works</title><url>https://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2017/03/11/technology/ap-us-tec-wikileaks-cia-tech-encryption.html</url></story><parent_chain><item><author>dingaling</author><text>It&amp;#x27;s not just that they&amp;#x27;re performing encryption, but also assurance that (1) they&amp;#x27;re using the keys they declare and (2) they aren&amp;#x27;t sending other data over unannounced side-channels.&lt;p&gt;You can&amp;#x27;t just insert yourself in the message stream since the client and server use pinned, mutual certificate authentication.  So you have to start from first-principles and step through decompiled code.</text></item><item><author>mjg59</author><text>It&amp;#x27;s not hard to demonstrate that apps are performing end-to-end encryption even if you don&amp;#x27;t have access to the source code. Reverse engineering this stuff is really pretty straightforward.</text></item><item><author>dromenkoning</author><text>The article mentions WhatsApp multiple times as a service that successfully made the transition to end-to-end encryption, but it always seemed to me that this claim is rather meaningless when we don&amp;#x27;t have the possibility of auditing their source code.</text></item></parent_chain><comment><author>mjg59</author><text>&amp;gt; they&amp;#x27;re using the keys they declare&lt;p&gt;I&amp;#x27;m not sure what you mean here. It&amp;#x27;s easy to identify where the key comes from and whether the ciphertext is what you&amp;#x27;d expect it to be in that case.&lt;p&gt;&amp;gt; they aren&amp;#x27;t sending other data over unannounced side-channels.&lt;p&gt;It&amp;#x27;s not straightforward to determine that even if you &lt;i&gt;do&lt;/i&gt; have the source - you could imagine an implementation that deliberately leaks information through timing details without that being obvious from the code. At some point you have to trust that authors aren&amp;#x27;t doing something awful.&lt;p&gt;&amp;gt; So you have to start from first-principles and step through decompiled code.&lt;p&gt;Well no, because the first thing you can do there is just disable certificate pinning. But really, the difficulty of stepping through decompiled code is vastly overrated.</text></comment>
<story><title>What the CIA WikiLeaks Dump Tells Us: Encryption Works</title><url>https://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2017/03/11/technology/ap-us-tec-wikileaks-cia-tech-encryption.html</url></story><parent_chain><item><author>dingaling</author><text>It&amp;#x27;s not just that they&amp;#x27;re performing encryption, but also assurance that (1) they&amp;#x27;re using the keys they declare and (2) they aren&amp;#x27;t sending other data over unannounced side-channels.&lt;p&gt;You can&amp;#x27;t just insert yourself in the message stream since the client and server use pinned, mutual certificate authentication.  So you have to start from first-principles and step through decompiled code.</text></item><item><author>mjg59</author><text>It&amp;#x27;s not hard to demonstrate that apps are performing end-to-end encryption even if you don&amp;#x27;t have access to the source code. Reverse engineering this stuff is really pretty straightforward.</text></item><item><author>dromenkoning</author><text>The article mentions WhatsApp multiple times as a service that successfully made the transition to end-to-end encryption, but it always seemed to me that this claim is rather meaningless when we don&amp;#x27;t have the possibility of auditing their source code.</text></item></parent_chain><comment><author>7952</author><text>This is actually an area where web apps have some advantage.  You can inspect the network traffic using developer tools.  You have cross domain rules that restrict traffic.  And the encryption is performed by the browser rather than in the apps black box.</text></comment>