<story><title>Design and evaluation of IPFS: a storage layer for the decentralized web</title><url>https://dl.acm.org/doi/abs/10.1145/3544216.3544232</url></story><parent_chain></parent_chain><comment><author>noasaservice</author><text>Lets remind everyone:&lt;p&gt;1. IPFS attaches ALL network interfaces (internal and external) to your identity.&lt;p&gt;2. Tor is still &amp;quot;experimental&amp;quot; done by 3rd parties. &lt;a href=&quot;https:&amp;#x2F;&amp;#x2F;flyingzumwalt.gitbooks.io&amp;#x2F;decentralized-web-primer&amp;#x2F;content&amp;#x2F;avenues-for-access&amp;#x2F;lessons&amp;#x2F;tor-transport.html&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;https:&amp;#x2F;&amp;#x2F;flyingzumwalt.gitbooks.io&amp;#x2F;decentralized-web-primer&amp;#x2F;c...&lt;/a&gt;&lt;p&gt;3. Due to 1 and 2, any hosted content is EASILY trackable to a user&amp;#x27;s computer, even behind NATs. A machine cryptokey also helps cement that (but can be changed). This allows easy DDoS&amp;#x27;ing of any and all endpoints hosting content you don&amp;#x27;t like.&lt;p&gt;4. It is trivial to ask the dHT for *who* has a certain content key, and get all (or the top 50?) computers hosting that content. (this matters with regards to &amp;quot;sensitive&amp;quot; content)&lt;p&gt;5. Running a node is still high cpu, ram, and network chattiness - so using a VPS to keep IPFS off your local network is still tenuous to run.</text></comment>
<story><title>Design and evaluation of IPFS: a storage layer for the decentralized web</title><url>https://dl.acm.org/doi/abs/10.1145/3544216.3544232</url></story><parent_chain></parent_chain><comment><author>eminence32</author><text>3 of the authors work for Protocol Labs (the company that develops IPFS), which is likely why the paper is able to analyze data from the ipfs.io gateways</text></comment>