<story><title>CIA malware and hacking tools</title><url>https://wikileaks.org/ciav7p1/</url></story><parent_chain><item><author>pjc50</author><text>While the weapon too secret to use sounds very Dr Strangelove, there have been slightly similar things with real weapons. The one I remember is when radar-triggered proximity shells were invented at the end of WW2 they were only issued for use on ships, so that undetonated shells would fall into the sea, so couldn&amp;#x27;t be recovered and investigated by the enemy.</text></item><item><author>pimlottc</author><text>Obviously there&amp;#x27;s a difference between cyber and conventional weapons, but imagine if the same rationale were extended to physical munitions: &amp;quot;We can&amp;#x27;t drop this bomb on the enemy, it contains classified technology&amp;quot;</text></item><item><author>pjc50</author><text>&amp;gt; Command &amp;amp; Control and Listening Post software were classified, then CIA officers could be prosecuted or dismissed for violating rules that prohibit placing classified information onto the Internet. Consequently the CIA has secretly made most of its cyber spying&amp;#x2F;war code unclassified.&lt;p&gt;This is almost hilarious.&lt;p&gt;Not that being classified would make any difference: cyber-&amp;quot;weapons&amp;quot; have something in common with biological weapons in that they&amp;#x27;re prone to leaking and blowing upwind, but also once used it&amp;#x27;s possible for the enemy to vaccinate against them.</text></item><item><author>apo</author><text>&lt;i&gt;In what is surely one of the most astounding intelligence own goals in living memory, the CIA structured its classification regime such that for the most market valuable part of &amp;quot;Vault 7&amp;quot; — the CIA&amp;#x27;s weaponized malware (implants + zero days), Listening Posts (LP), and Command and Control (C2) systems — the agency has little legal recourse.&lt;/i&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;i&gt;The CIA made these systems unclassified.&lt;/i&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;i&gt;Why the CIA chose to make its cyberarsenal unclassified reveals how concepts developed for military use do not easily crossover to the &amp;#x27;battlefield&amp;#x27; of cyber &amp;#x27;war&amp;#x27;.&lt;/i&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;i&gt;To attack its targets, the CIA usually requires that its implants communicate with their control programs over the internet. If CIA implants, Command &amp;amp; Control and Listening Post software were classified, then CIA officers could be prosecuted or dismissed for violating rules that prohibit placing classified information onto the Internet. Consequently the CIA has secretly made most of its cyber spying&amp;#x2F;war code unclassified. The U.S. government is not able to assert copyright either, due to restrictions in the U.S. Constitution. This means that cyber &amp;#x27;arms&amp;#x27; manufactures and computer hackers can freely &amp;quot;pirate&amp;quot; these &amp;#x27;weapons&amp;#x27; if they are obtained. The CIA has primarily had to rely on obfuscation to protect its malware secrets.&lt;/i&gt;&lt;p&gt;One of the more interesting passages. The arsenal must not be classified to protect those who deploy it from legal action. This cyberwarfare kit, which can just as easily be used to destroy the US as one of its enemies, is public domain software created and released at US taxpayer expense.</text></item></parent_chain><comment><author>roywiggins</author><text>Another case, also WWII:&lt;p&gt;&amp;quot;[U]naware of the opposing air force&amp;#x27;s knowledge of the chaff concept, planners felt that using it was even more dangerous than not, since, as soon as it was used, the enemy could easily duplicate it and use it against them... for over a year the curious situation arose where both sides of the conflict knew how to use chaff to jam the other side&amp;#x27;s radar, but refrained from doing so fearing that if they did so the other side would &amp;#x27;learn the trick&amp;#x27; and use it against themselves.&amp;quot;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https:&amp;#x2F;&amp;#x2F;en.wikipedia.org&amp;#x2F;wiki&amp;#x2F;Chaff_(countermeasure)#Second_World_War&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;https:&amp;#x2F;&amp;#x2F;en.wikipedia.org&amp;#x2F;wiki&amp;#x2F;Chaff_(countermeasure)#Second_...&lt;/a&gt;</text></comment>
<story><title>CIA malware and hacking tools</title><url>https://wikileaks.org/ciav7p1/</url></story><parent_chain><item><author>pjc50</author><text>While the weapon too secret to use sounds very Dr Strangelove, there have been slightly similar things with real weapons. The one I remember is when radar-triggered proximity shells were invented at the end of WW2 they were only issued for use on ships, so that undetonated shells would fall into the sea, so couldn&amp;#x27;t be recovered and investigated by the enemy.</text></item><item><author>pimlottc</author><text>Obviously there&amp;#x27;s a difference between cyber and conventional weapons, but imagine if the same rationale were extended to physical munitions: &amp;quot;We can&amp;#x27;t drop this bomb on the enemy, it contains classified technology&amp;quot;</text></item><item><author>pjc50</author><text>&amp;gt; Command &amp;amp; Control and Listening Post software were classified, then CIA officers could be prosecuted or dismissed for violating rules that prohibit placing classified information onto the Internet. Consequently the CIA has secretly made most of its cyber spying&amp;#x2F;war code unclassified.&lt;p&gt;This is almost hilarious.&lt;p&gt;Not that being classified would make any difference: cyber-&amp;quot;weapons&amp;quot; have something in common with biological weapons in that they&amp;#x27;re prone to leaking and blowing upwind, but also once used it&amp;#x27;s possible for the enemy to vaccinate against them.</text></item><item><author>apo</author><text>&lt;i&gt;In what is surely one of the most astounding intelligence own goals in living memory, the CIA structured its classification regime such that for the most market valuable part of &amp;quot;Vault 7&amp;quot; — the CIA&amp;#x27;s weaponized malware (implants + zero days), Listening Posts (LP), and Command and Control (C2) systems — the agency has little legal recourse.&lt;/i&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;i&gt;The CIA made these systems unclassified.&lt;/i&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;i&gt;Why the CIA chose to make its cyberarsenal unclassified reveals how concepts developed for military use do not easily crossover to the &amp;#x27;battlefield&amp;#x27; of cyber &amp;#x27;war&amp;#x27;.&lt;/i&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;i&gt;To attack its targets, the CIA usually requires that its implants communicate with their control programs over the internet. If CIA implants, Command &amp;amp; Control and Listening Post software were classified, then CIA officers could be prosecuted or dismissed for violating rules that prohibit placing classified information onto the Internet. Consequently the CIA has secretly made most of its cyber spying&amp;#x2F;war code unclassified. The U.S. government is not able to assert copyright either, due to restrictions in the U.S. Constitution. This means that cyber &amp;#x27;arms&amp;#x27; manufactures and computer hackers can freely &amp;quot;pirate&amp;quot; these &amp;#x27;weapons&amp;#x27; if they are obtained. The CIA has primarily had to rely on obfuscation to protect its malware secrets.&lt;/i&gt;&lt;p&gt;One of the more interesting passages. The arsenal must not be classified to protect those who deploy it from legal action. This cyberwarfare kit, which can just as easily be used to destroy the US as one of its enemies, is public domain software created and released at US taxpayer expense.</text></item></parent_chain><comment><author>xherberta</author><text>Wow! I heard that when the UK began using radar to down enemy planes at night during WWII, the gov&amp;#x27;t claimed the pilots had been &amp;quot;eating a lot of carrots.&amp;quot;</text></comment>