<story><title>Russia’s Possible Invasion of Ukraine</title><url>https://www.csis.org/analysis/russias-possible-invasion-ukraine</url></story><parent_chain></parent_chain><comment><author>harryvederci</author><text>Some interesting parts:&lt;p&gt;&amp;gt; Every Kremlin ruler knows that one of the quickest ways to end a Russian dynasty or regime is to lose a war.&lt;p&gt;&amp;gt; In October, Rasputitsa turns firm ground into mud. In March, the frozen steppes thaw, and the land again becomes at best a bog, and at worst a sea of mud.&lt;p&gt;&amp;gt; The key to thwarting Russian ambitions is to prevent Moscow from having a quick victory and to raise the economic, political, and military costs by imposing economic sanctions, ensuring political isolation from the West, and raising the prospect of a prolonged insurgency that grinds away the Russian military. In this war, Russia might have the watches, but the West and Ukraine may have the time.</text></comment>
<story><title>Russia’s Possible Invasion of Ukraine</title><url>https://www.csis.org/analysis/russias-possible-invasion-ukraine</url></story><parent_chain></parent_chain><comment><author>bhaak</author><text>&amp;gt; Once there is a casus belli, cyberattacks will likely follow to degrade Ukraine’s military command and control systems and public communications and electrical grids. Next, kinetic operations will likely begin with air and missile strikes against Ukraine’s air force and air defense systems. Once air superiority is established, Russian ground forces would move forward, slightly preceded by special operations to degrade further command and control capabilities and delay the mobilization of reserves by conducting bombings, assassinations, and sabotage operations.&lt;p&gt;The Russian commandants were so sure about their chances that they didn&amp;#x27;t wait for air superiority.&lt;p&gt;Or, they didn&amp;#x27;t want to be seen as an invader but a liberator and as we know that failed terribly.</text></comment>