<story><title>Remembering Roger Boisjoly: He Tried to Stop Shuttle Challenger Launch</title><url>https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2012/02/06/146490064/remembering-roger-boisjoly-he-tried-to-stop-shuttle-challenger-launch</url></story><parent_chain></parent_chain><comment><author>mannykannot</author><text>In many ways, this is an update of the Titanic story of technological hubris, with the twist that the man who was right, who fought hard to prevent what he foresaw, who was briefly relieved when his dire predictions seemed to be wrong, was still dogged by the event for the rest of his life.&lt;p&gt;We don&amp;#x27;t know how those who were on the wrong side of the issue coped, and they should not be pressured to make public anything beyond what the inquiry required, but it seems plausible to me that those who could persuade themselves that they made the right decision, given the circumstances and despite the outcome, probably fared best. That is usually the case.&lt;p&gt;Edward Tufte tried to suggest that Boisjoly could have presented his case more effectively. Tufte may have been thinking purely pedagogically, but regardless, the implied criticism was unjustified, as Boisjoly&amp;#x27;s point should have been clear to anyone familiar with the issue, and in fact it was clear to quite a few, though unfortunately not to the few who mattered, and I doubt that, for them, a different presentation would have made a difference.&lt;p&gt;We can&amp;#x27;t always be right, and we can&amp;#x27;t all be heroes, but I hope we can all avoid being the person who said to Boisjoly, when it appeared that Boisjoly&amp;#x27;s testimony might be fatal to Morton Thiokol, that he would leave his children for Boisjoly to raise if he lost his job.</text></comment>
<story><title>Remembering Roger Boisjoly: He Tried to Stop Shuttle Challenger Launch</title><url>https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2012/02/06/146490064/remembering-roger-boisjoly-he-tried-to-stop-shuttle-challenger-launch</url></story><parent_chain></parent_chain><comment><author>albntomat0</author><text>My main unanswered question here (I admit I haven&amp;#x27;t looked particularly hard for the answer) is what the false positive rate was. How many times have similarly major concerns raised, about things that were not ultimately an issue? Where the NASA administrators bombarded with such concerns for every launch, or were reports a relatively rare occurrence?&lt;p&gt;Designing processes to appropriately address such concerns seems to hinge on the answer.&lt;p&gt;[edit for grammar]</text></comment>