<story><title>ETS Isn&apos;t TLS and You Shouldn&apos;t Use It</title><url>https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2019/02/ets-isnt-tls-and-you-shouldnt-use-it</url></story><parent_chain></parent_chain><comment><author>Animats</author><text>We need a big budget cut in the &amp;quot;homeland security&amp;quot; area. All this interception is not paying off. The biggest &amp;quot;terrorist event&amp;quot; in the US since 2001 was the guy who shot up a gay nightclub in Orlando FL in 2017. That was a solo nutcase; there was no planning chatter to intercept. The Boston Marathon bombing was two brothers. The San Bernardino shooting was a husband and wife.&lt;p&gt;What&amp;#x27;s discouraging terrorism is the US&amp;#x27;s overreaction outside the US.  It&amp;#x27;s become very clear to terrorist organizations that if they attack the US, the US is going to hit back, even if it&amp;#x27;s insanely expensive and causes collateral damage. The people in charge, and many people around them, end up dead.&lt;p&gt;Remember ISIS, the Islamic State?  ISIS is down to 1.5 square miles, surrounded, and everybody but the most fanatical fighters is surrendering. The holdouts have days to live.&lt;p&gt;We don&amp;#x27;t need more Big Brother.</text></comment>
<story><title>ETS Isn&apos;t TLS and You Shouldn&apos;t Use It</title><url>https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2019/02/ets-isnt-tls-and-you-shouldnt-use-it</url></story><parent_chain></parent_chain><comment><author>nneonneo</author><text>It’s worth reading the mailing list posts by BITS (the main proponent of ETS) here: &lt;a href=&quot;https:&amp;#x2F;&amp;#x2F;mailarchive.ietf.org&amp;#x2F;arch&amp;#x2F;msg&amp;#x2F;tls&amp;#x2F;KQIyNhPk8K6jOoe2ScdPZ8E08RE&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;https:&amp;#x2F;&amp;#x2F;mailarchive.ietf.org&amp;#x2F;arch&amp;#x2F;msg&amp;#x2F;tls&amp;#x2F;KQIyNhPk8K6jOoe2Sc...&lt;/a&gt;. The replies are pretty informative. You can see here the message in which BITS starts to consider fixed DH keys, which were implemented in ETS: &lt;a href=&quot;https:&amp;#x2F;&amp;#x2F;mailarchive.ietf.org&amp;#x2F;arch&amp;#x2F;msg&amp;#x2F;tls&amp;#x2F;3d7TM0g_EdtMzhgmcPn_Xb-ZFjY&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;https:&amp;#x2F;&amp;#x2F;mailarchive.ietf.org&amp;#x2F;arch&amp;#x2F;msg&amp;#x2F;tls&amp;#x2F;3d7TM0g_EdtMzhgmcP...&lt;/a&gt;&lt;p&gt;&amp;gt; Tue, 27 September 2016 18:21 UTC&lt;p&gt;&amp;gt; The various suggestions for creating fixed&amp;#x2F;static Diffie Hellman keys raise interesting possibilities.  We would like to understand these ideas better at a technical level and are initiating research into this potential solution.&lt;p&gt;The core argument made by BITS is that they need a way to log TLS traffic such that it can be decrypted later, in order to provide data retention in line with regulations. While this could be done by logging all ephemeral keys generated by the servers, BITS argues that this isn’t practical due to their use of dedicated packet logging hardware that is key-ignorant. Instead they want to use non-forward-secret TLS so they can decrypt past messages easily. Their beef with TLS 1.3 is that it removes all non-FS key exchange methods, and further that by explicitly obsoleting TLS 1.2 as a standard pushes them to have to adopt 1.3 in an enterprise environment (or risk current&amp;#x2F;future regulatory scrutiny over their use of an obsoleted standard). Hence why they want to develop a competing, active standard with non-FS key exchange.</text></comment>