<story><title>Firefox Send: Private, Encrypted File Sharing</title><url>https://send.firefox.com/</url></story><parent_chain><item><author>zeveb</author><text>&amp;gt; one has to trust Mozilla not to do that.&lt;p&gt;Exactly.  One has to trust Mozilla &lt;i&gt;every time one visits the page&lt;/i&gt;.  They could &lt;i&gt;easily&lt;/i&gt; configure it to be malicious one time out of a million (say); what are the odds that they would be caught?&lt;p&gt;Web-page-based crypto is fundamentally insecure, and Mozilla is committing an extremely grave error in encouraging users to trust it (as they also do with their Firefox Accounts).  Security is &lt;i&gt;important&lt;/i&gt;, and snake-oil solutions are worse than worthless.</text></item><item><author>KwanEsq</author><text>The key is the hash, which isn&amp;#x27;t sent over the wire when loading a page.  Now granted it&amp;#x27;s accessible via location.hash in the client, but one has to trust Mozilla not to do that.</text></item><item><author>sarabande</author><text>I&amp;#x27;m curious -- Mozilla says it can&amp;#x27;t decrypt the file on their side:&lt;p&gt;&lt;pre&gt;&lt;code&gt;    Mozilla does not have the ability to access the content of your encrypted file [...] 
    https:&amp;#x2F;&amp;#x2F;testpilot.firefox.com&amp;#x2F;experiments&amp;#x2F;send
&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/pre&gt;
How is the receiver able to decrypt the file -- i.e. what is the decryption key if not the URL slug, which presumably Mozilla has as well?</text></item></parent_chain><comment><author>Yoric</author><text>Send is meant to be an improvement on Dropbox &amp;amp; co for a specific use case.&lt;p&gt;Is it perfect? No, it isn&amp;#x27;t. But it is still a considerable improvement.&lt;p&gt;If you have a better solution in mind for the average user crowd, feel free to suggest it, of course.</text></comment>
<story><title>Firefox Send: Private, Encrypted File Sharing</title><url>https://send.firefox.com/</url></story><parent_chain><item><author>zeveb</author><text>&amp;gt; one has to trust Mozilla not to do that.&lt;p&gt;Exactly.  One has to trust Mozilla &lt;i&gt;every time one visits the page&lt;/i&gt;.  They could &lt;i&gt;easily&lt;/i&gt; configure it to be malicious one time out of a million (say); what are the odds that they would be caught?&lt;p&gt;Web-page-based crypto is fundamentally insecure, and Mozilla is committing an extremely grave error in encouraging users to trust it (as they also do with their Firefox Accounts).  Security is &lt;i&gt;important&lt;/i&gt;, and snake-oil solutions are worse than worthless.</text></item><item><author>KwanEsq</author><text>The key is the hash, which isn&amp;#x27;t sent over the wire when loading a page.  Now granted it&amp;#x27;s accessible via location.hash in the client, but one has to trust Mozilla not to do that.</text></item><item><author>sarabande</author><text>I&amp;#x27;m curious -- Mozilla says it can&amp;#x27;t decrypt the file on their side:&lt;p&gt;&lt;pre&gt;&lt;code&gt;    Mozilla does not have the ability to access the content of your encrypted file [...] 
    https:&amp;#x2F;&amp;#x2F;testpilot.firefox.com&amp;#x2F;experiments&amp;#x2F;send
&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/pre&gt;
How is the receiver able to decrypt the file -- i.e. what is the decryption key if not the URL slug, which presumably Mozilla has as well?</text></item></parent_chain><comment><author>edanm</author><text>The way this gets solved in the real world is through contracts - they have a certain contract with you, and if they break it, they can get sued and lose a lot of money.&lt;p&gt;This is one of the goals of the legal system - make it so we usually trust each other. There are no real long-term technical solutions to this problem.&lt;p&gt;So if you want to make sure you&amp;#x27;re safe, read their EULA or equivalent.</text></comment>