<story><title>RSA Key Extraction via Low-Bandwidth Acoustic Cryptanalysis</title><url>http://www.cs.tau.ac.il/~tromer/acoustic/</url></story><parent_chain></parent_chain><comment><author>wrongc0ntinent</author><text>The single coolest thing in the paper (other than Shamir&amp;#x27;s name): &amp;quot;On many laptops (e.g., most Lenovo ThinkPad models), the chassis potential can be easily reached by a
human hand, through metal connectors and conductive coating on metal surfaces. Thus, an attacker can
measure the chassis potential by merely touching the laptop chassis with his hand. Surreptitiously,
the attacker can simultaneously measure his own body potential relative to the room’s ground potential,
e.g., by having a concealed differential probe touching both his body and some nearby conductive
grounded surface in the room. Perhaps surprisingly, even this circuitous measurement offers sufficient
signal-to-noise ratio for the key extraction attack.&amp;quot;</text></comment>
<story><title>RSA Key Extraction via Low-Bandwidth Acoustic Cryptanalysis</title><url>http://www.cs.tau.ac.il/~tromer/acoustic/</url></story><parent_chain></parent_chain><comment><author>r0muald</author><text>Important stuff:&lt;p&gt;&amp;gt; Q9 How vulnerable is GnuPG now?
We have disclosed our attack to GnuPG developers under CVE-2013-4576, suggested suitable countermeasures, and worked with the developers to test them. New versions of GnuPG 1.x and of libgcrypt (which underlies GnuPG 2.x), containing these countermeasures and resisting our current key-extraction attack, were released concurrently with the first public posting of these results. Some of the effects we found (including RSA key distinguishability) remain present.</text></comment>