<story><title>Stealing the Enemy&apos;s Urban Advantage: The Battle of Sadr City</title><url>https://mwi.usma.edu/stealing-enemys-urban-advantage-battle-sadr-city/</url></story><parent_chain><item><author>edraferi</author><text>&amp;gt; [JAM] Snipers would also shoot at the crane cable or the lone soldier that was forced to climb a ladder to unhook each concrete wall. Special operations forces snipers were extremely useful in a counter-sniper role. Nevertheless, there were situations where confirmed snipers and fighters that could not be engaged by US snipers had to be targeted with air-delivered, precision-guided bombs or Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS) rounds that could penetrate the buildings’ layers of concrete. One instance that required a concrete-penetrating option was when a JAM sniper occupied and fortified one of the few five-story buildings north of the Gold Wall was being constructed and at a key intersection where he was able to engage the wall-building team. Direct fire placed on the building did not affect the sniper’s fortified position. 1-68 CAB’s solution was to drop the building using the GMLRS. But for the duration of the Battle of Sadr City, coalition forces used fewer than three mortar or artillery fire missions because of the risk of collateral damage, the prospect of injuring civilians, and the potential political ramifications both locally for the government of Iraq and internationally for political support to the coalition forces.&lt;p&gt;Don&amp;#x27;t bring a sniper rifle to a combined-arms fight, I suppose. It&amp;#x27;s interesting &amp;amp; typical of modern war that the politics of the fight constrain the weapons choice much more than the tactical situation.</text></item></parent_chain><comment><author>jcranmer</author><text>&amp;gt; It&amp;#x27;s interesting &amp;amp; typical of modern war that the politics of the fight constrain the weapons choice much more than the tactical situation.&lt;p&gt;Not just modern war, but pretty much for most of history.&lt;p&gt;Clausewitz&amp;#x27;s maxim that &amp;quot;war is a continuation of policy by other means&amp;quot; ought to be interpreted as a reminder that war is (or at least should be) subservient to the political goals that are fueling war, and that the military needs to be a tool, not a driver, of the government&amp;#x27;s foreign policies. Sadly, not all governments do a good job of remembering this fact, and that is often where the great military failures start from.</text></comment>
<story><title>Stealing the Enemy&apos;s Urban Advantage: The Battle of Sadr City</title><url>https://mwi.usma.edu/stealing-enemys-urban-advantage-battle-sadr-city/</url></story><parent_chain><item><author>edraferi</author><text>&amp;gt; [JAM] Snipers would also shoot at the crane cable or the lone soldier that was forced to climb a ladder to unhook each concrete wall. Special operations forces snipers were extremely useful in a counter-sniper role. Nevertheless, there were situations where confirmed snipers and fighters that could not be engaged by US snipers had to be targeted with air-delivered, precision-guided bombs or Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS) rounds that could penetrate the buildings’ layers of concrete. One instance that required a concrete-penetrating option was when a JAM sniper occupied and fortified one of the few five-story buildings north of the Gold Wall was being constructed and at a key intersection where he was able to engage the wall-building team. Direct fire placed on the building did not affect the sniper’s fortified position. 1-68 CAB’s solution was to drop the building using the GMLRS. But for the duration of the Battle of Sadr City, coalition forces used fewer than three mortar or artillery fire missions because of the risk of collateral damage, the prospect of injuring civilians, and the potential political ramifications both locally for the government of Iraq and internationally for political support to the coalition forces.&lt;p&gt;Don&amp;#x27;t bring a sniper rifle to a combined-arms fight, I suppose. It&amp;#x27;s interesting &amp;amp; typical of modern war that the politics of the fight constrain the weapons choice much more than the tactical situation.</text></item></parent_chain><comment><author>RobertoG</author><text>&amp;gt;&amp;gt;&amp;quot;[..] typical of modern war the politics of the fight constrain the weapons choice much more than the tactical situation. &amp;quot;&lt;p&gt;That&amp;#x27;s a luxury that you only can afford when the asymmetry of force is huge and you are going to win anyway.</text></comment>