Brian A. Jacob
Do Principals Fire the Worst Teachers?
ol:OL24101581M
aarecords_metadata
Brian A. Jacob
HB1
Title from PDF file as viewed on 3/9/2010.

Includes bibliographical references.

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NBER working paper series -- working paper 15715, Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) -- working paper no. 15715., Cambridge, MA, Massachusetts, 2010
2010655731
OL24101581M OL15122122W
en
en
National Bureau of Economic Research
"This paper takes advantage of a unique policy change to examine how principals make decisions regarding teacher dismissal.  In 2004, the Chicago Public Schools (CPS) and Chicago Teachers Union (CTU) signed a new collective bargaining agreement that gave principals the flexibility to dismiss probationary teachers for any reason and without the documentation and hearing process that is typically required for such dismissals.  With the cooperation of the CPS, I matched information on all teachers that were eligible for dismissal with records indicating which teachers were dismissed.  With this data, I estimate the relative weight that school administrators place on a variety of teacher characteristics.  I find evidence that principals do consider teacher absences and value-added measures, along with several demographic characteristics, in determining which teachers to dismiss"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
Do principals fire the worst teachers?
2010
ol:OL24101581M
aarecords_metadata
OL24101581M
external_download meta_explore
book_unknown
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Do principals fire the worst teachers?
Brian A. Jacob
Brian A.  Jacob
NBER working paper series -- working paper 15715, Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) -- working paper no. 15715., Cambridge, MA, Massachusetts, 2010
NBER working paper series -- working paper 15715, Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research :  Online) -- working paper no.  15715. , Cambridge, MA, Massachusetts, 2010
National Bureau of Economic Research

ol:OL24101581M
ol: OL24101581M
OL24101581M ol:OL24101581M
OL15122122W ol:OL15122122W
2010655731 lccn:2010655731
HB1 lcc:HB1
2010