characterizes the mode of being of propositions: they are valid or invalid, but they do not "exist" as mental or physical objects. Lotze was by no means the only figure in this period concerned to articulate the ways in which contents of acts of judgement are ontologically distinct from mental and physical events. This was a recurring theme of Brentano's school and of the phenomenological movement that grew out of it. But Lotze's way of drawing this distinction in Book III of the Logik was massively influential. It became a kind of rallying cry for a generation of philosophers who wanted to reject the crude naturalism that had flourished in Germany after the waning of Hegel's influence. Hans-Johann Glock goes so far as to identify Lotze as thefather of the whole German antipsychologistic movement.4 Lotze introduces that famous distinction in the course of explaining that he is a follower of Plato, although not a "Platonist" as that term has come to be understood.5 Early in the reception of Plato, according to Lotze, he was misread as "hypostasizing" the Forms. Properly understood, Plato was merely making the distinction between the content of judgement (atemporal and non-spatial propositions, composed of atemporal and non-spatial concepts/Forms) and our spatially located and temporally extended mental events of judging those contents. Lotze distinguishes between the mistaken hypostatic reading of Plato, on which the Forms (concepts, constituents of truths) are treated as entities in their own right, existing in some kind of platonic heaven, and the "true" Platonism, in which the doctrine