she was told to do, focusing, and completing her work in a timely
manner; she also mentioned having problems interacting with others in the workplace.
But she did not offer medical evidence to support a finding that her limitations in
those areas were "marked" or rose to a degree that prevented her from functioning
satisfactorily. Thus we reject Ms. Roberson's contention that the evidence compels
the conclusion that she met a listing.

                                         II.
       Ms. Roberson also maintains that the ALJ erred in several respects in step four
ofmedical evidence. In support of this contention, she refers to evidence from
Dr. Howard Ilivicky, her treating psychiatrist; Dr. F. Timothy Leonberger, the SSA's
consulting psychologist who examined her; and Dr. R. Rocco Cottone, a psychologist
who evaluated Ms. Roberson, without examining her, at the initial stage of her claim.
In his decision, the ALJ referred to the opinions of all of these experts.

       Dr. Ilivicky began treating Ms. Roberson in 2000. At one point in her
treatment, he found that she had "extreme mood swings, uncontrollable anxiety, [and
an] inability to interact with people or handle stressful situations." Ms. Roberson
contends that Dr. Ilivicky found that she was disabled, and she relies on a Family
Medical Leave Act (FMLA) form that he completed in early August, 2002, about the
time