beliefs and understanding. 8. Thanks to Pamela Robinson. 9. Feldman (2000) Kelly (2002: fn. 30), and Berker (2018) argue that there aren't epistemic reasons for action. 10. See Tidman (1996), Hookway (1999), Friedman (2019), and Jackson (forthcoming-b). 11. See Ahlstrom-Vij (2013a: 134). For a criticism of his account, see Bullock (2018: 440–442). 12. Defenses of epistemic permissivism include Kelly (2013), Meacham (2014), Meacham (2019), Schoenfield (2014), Schoenfield (forthcoming), and Jackson (forthcoming-a). 13. For further examples of ways epistemic standards might differ, see Nolan (2014) and Meacham (2014). 14. There is a question of how often judges employ this sort of reasoning to justify paternalism in real life. In the United States, for instance, the withholding of information is often formal and procedural, for example, juries cannot see abut also Harding (1986), Harding (1993), and Kourany (2009). 24. Thanks to Janine Jones. An interesting area for further research is whether standpoint epistemology could also be linked with diachronic intrapersonal permissivism, if one's standpoint/epistemic standard changed over time. 25. Thanks to Justin D'Ambrosio. 26. Acknowledgments: Thanks to Amiel Bernal, Guy Axtell, Seth Lazar, Justin D'Ambrosio, Nic Southwood, Matthew Kopec, Kirk Lougheed, Klaas Kray, Chris Dragos, and audiences at the 2019 Canadian Philosophical Association, Australian National University, and Michigan State University. Research on this chapter was supported by Australian Research Council Grant D170101394. BIBLIOGRAPHY Ahlstrom-Vij, K. Epistemic Paternalism: A Defence. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013a. Ahlstrom-Vij, K. "Why We Cannot Rely on Ourselves for Epistemic Improvement." Philosophical Issues 23 (2013b) 276–296. Berker, S. "A Combinatorial Argument Against Practical Reasons