on one thing. They had the deepest hatred for the social revolt. Imre Nagy’s path torpedoed the Hungarian Revolution with his conciliatory role and a policy course against the Soviet Union full of half-measures: he paid for this shady and miserable course with his life — but so did the workers in revolt.

An internationalist consciousness and the idea that international wage-workers’ solidarity, the unity of the international class of workers and a revolution reaching across countries is the sole basis for the self-emancipation of the workers was missing in Hungary, or at least was present only briefly, spontaneously, and in its initial stages. Solidarity with Polish workers and directed work with the aim of speaking to the Soviet soldiers was at best spontaneous. Solidarity between workers in Easternthe other hand, also attempted to carry out its own national projects, and consequently followed a zigzagging course, led to the Soviet tanks drawing back on 28 October. This was a ruse which massively weakened the Revolution at an especially critical point, and was nothing other than a tactic of war. For the government, this was a helpless and pointless attempt to bring the country back under control, which did happen, but not under them. Restoration! The feigned retreat was only the prelude to the definitive defeat of the revolutionary uprising, whose timing could not have been chosen with more skill. The Suez Crisis, with the military intervention of Britain, France and Israel in Egypt, kept the Western Powers busy. On 2 November, Imre Nagy, after failed threats