degrees than by one fell swoop.
For these reasons I concur in the judgment of the Court vacating the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanding the case with directions to enter judgment setting aside the Board's order.
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, whom MR. JUSTICE STEWART joins, dissenting.
The question in this case is whether a union involved in a labor dispute with an employer may lawfully engage in peaceful picketing at the premises of another employer in order to dissuade its customers from purchasing products of the first employer dealt in by the picketed establishment. Such activity, in the parlance of labor law, is known as secondary consumer picketing, the picketed employer being called the "secondary employer" and the other the "primary employer."
The question is controlled by § 8 (b)in favor of the Conference bill and pointed out that in contrast to the Senate bill, which he had opposed, "[t]he House bill . . . closed up every loophole in the boycott section of the law including the use of a secondary consumer picket line . . . ." 105 Cong. Rec. 17904, II Leg. Hist. 1437.
The Court points out that the Senate had no Conference Report when it passed the compromise bill and that it had only Senator Kennedy's statement of the purpose of the proviso. (Ante, pp. 69-70.) But I am wholly at a loss to understand how on that premise (particularly when Senator Kennedy's remarks are supplemented by the comments of one Senator (Morse) who thought the final bill too harsh and those of