the local level, the Gulf has so far largely averted the threat of terrorism through close intelligence cooperation with US agencies.

The less evident, but equally crucial, benefit from the relationship with the United States is the mitigation of internal GCC differences. In fact, much of the region is conditioned by nested rivalries (Abu Dhabi versus Dubai, within the UAE ; UAE versus Qatar ; UAE and Qatar versus Saudi Arabia ; etc.), and divergent interests and ideological orientations. For example, Qatar’s support of the Muslim Brotherhood movement across the Middle East is viewed with suspicion and animosity in both Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Through its focus on strategic alignment, the United States has served as an agent of synchronization, if not outright mediation, between the tactically divergentof the various options, and has not abandoned the long-standing US commitment to the Gulf. The lack of convincing clarity on Iran and Syria, however, has encouraged Gulf powers to engage in tactical adventurism - in their support of questionable elements - to balance what they see as a regional order tilting against their favor. Only the United States, in actions as well as in words, is in a position to convince them otherwise.