Mr. Tenet, were still on the defensive about the agency's failure to detect possible warning signs of the September 2001 attacks. The Senate report found that the agency was reluctant to underestimate Mr. Hussein or his ties to terrorists.

The pressure at the agency was especially intense on issues related to whether Iraq had ties to Al Qaeda. The report concluded that the agency reported accurately about such ties, based on its limited information.

In one committee interview, the agency's ombudsman, who was not identified by name, described what he called a ''hammering'' in the form of repeated questions by administration officials on Iraq intelligence related to Mr. Hussein's possible links to Al Qaeda. The intensity of the questioning was ''harder than he had previously witnessed in his 32-year careerwith the agency,'' the report quoted the official as saying.

The ombudsman, the report said, had interviewed about two dozen employees who had worked on a June 2002 report entitled ''Iraq and Al Qaeda: Interpreting a Murky Relationship,'' a document that was accompanied by a note that said it was prepared using a ''purposefully aggressive'' approach in assessing possible ties between Al Qaeda and Iraq.

Some frequent visits to the agency were from the White House, including Mr. Cheney, who visited for briefings between five and eight times between September 2001 and February 2003. Jami Miscik, the deputy director for intelligence was quoted in the report saying, ''He was usually in receive mode during the presentation and then asked questions afterwards.''

The report concluded that these visits were not perceived by