that the term be interpreted to include use of the Roger Rabbit characters as walk-around characters at theme parks. In fact, the evidence in the record is to the contrary. Wolf testified *606 he understood the 1983 Agreement did not confer any right to a royalty for the nonmerchandising use of the Roger Rabbit characters at Disney theme parks.[14] Colden similarly testified that receipt of a royalty for theme park uses was a new negotiation point in the 1989 Settlement Agreement. Absent any conflicting evidence as to the meaning of "commercial activities" in paragraph 2(h) of the 1983 Agreement, the interpretation of that term in connection with the use of the Roger Rabbit characters for nonmerchandising purposes at theme parks was properly decided by the court as awas based on the jury's findings concerning the 1983 Agreement. Because the 1983 Agreement provided the basis for Cry Wolfs claims at trial, the trial court properly awarded Cry Wolf prejudgment interest on those claims at a rate of 7 percent.

Disney's Cross-Appeal

1. The Trial Court Erred in Allowing the Jury To Interpret the Term "Purchaser" in the 1983 Agreement

The 1983 Agreement states it embodies the agreement between Gary Wolf, "referred to as `Seller,'" on the one hand, and "Walt Disney Productions," "referred to as 'Purchaser,'" on the other hand. Paragraph 9 of the 1983 Agreement clarifies that the term "`Purchaser' as used herein shall include the Purchaser herein named [Walt Disney Productions], and also its successors, privies and assigns."
Throughout this litigation, in motions for summary judgment or adjudication,