appreciated by quoting
directly from the October 4, 1873 edition of The Economist:

"The failure ...was known in London to the most important American houses,
we believe, the very evening of its occurrence, and to all the world next
morning."

As Cooke was a huge underwriter and distributor of bonds, the failure was
serious. The article mentioned "cable transfers", which The Economist pointed
out was the same as if "an indefinite amount" of liquidity had actually arrived.

The article observed that without this assistance the distress would have
been greater than at anytime in the past. The words almost glowed:

"The contrast between what has happened now and what has happened in
1857, when there was no telegraph, is sufficiently striking. The American
crisis of that year broke out at the end of September, but news did not
reach England tillany problem.

The ironies with and subsequent to the appearance of financial stringency
in that fateful September of 1873 are worth reviewing. The stock market crashed
through October such that Western Union plunged from $90 in mid-September to
$46 at the end of October. The instruction is that even with instantaneous "cable
transfers" a highly speculative financial market recorded yet another typical
September to November catastrophe.

Then, despite more time for more assistance, the global bear market endured
until 1878.

This was accompanied by a global business contraction that lasted to 1879,
afflicting most standards of living.

In 1874, the New York Commercial Chronicle reviewed the damage and The Economist
summarized the study, in part, with:

"The almost universal excitement of 1871-73 had thoroughly disorganized
both labour and commerce. The working people became intoxicated and unrestrained
under rapid advances of wages and rapid