of inconsistent concepts' (Scharp 2013: 3), such cases provide central examples of conceptual engineering and cannot be set aside as anomalies. In a series of articles (Sawyer 2018, Forthcoming a, Forthcoming b), I have offered a response to Strawson's challenge by drawing on an externalist metasemantic framework that distinguishes language from thought. The framework countenances two semantic elements- the meaning, or intension of a term, which connects the term to an extension, and the concept expressed by a term, which connects the term to a topic. The meaning of a term is determined by communal linguistic practice, which can change over time resulting in a change in both the intension and the extension of the term. In a certain range of cases, the concept expressed by a termof Mind." Journal of Philosophy 83 (12): 697-720. Burge, T. 2005. Truth, Thought, Reason: Essays on Frege. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Cappelen, H. 2018. Fixing Language: An Essay on Conceptual Engineering. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Carnap, R. 1950. The Logical Foundations of Probability. University of Chicago Press. Cartwright, N. 1983. How the Laws of Physics Lie. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Clark, A. and Chalmers, D. 1998. "The Extended Mind." Analysis 58 (1) 7-19. Eklund, M. 2002. "Inconsistent Languages." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (2): 251-275. Epstein, B. 2015. The Ant Trap: Rebuilding the Foundations of the Social Sciences. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 20 Frege, Gottlob. 1884. Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik: Eine logisch-mathematische Untersuching uber den Begriff der Zahl. Breslau: Verlage Wilhelm Koebner. Translated by J. L. Austin as