attracted more negative revelations.

Indeed, Susilo's criticisms cannot be easily dismissed. A former journalist, he was also head of Commission I, responsible for overseeing information, defence and foreign affairs in Indonesia's parliament. As a legislator, Susilo gained respect as an ardent promoter of democratic values in Indonesia's foreign policy.

Among the most damaging of Susilo's criticisms was that Natalegawa had overseen the death of innovation and reform in the Foreign Ministry instituted by his predecessor, Hassan Wirajuda. Appointed by President Megawati Soekarnoputri in the early stages of Indonesia's democratic transition, Wirajuda initiated a substantial legislative, organisational and ideational reform. He transformed a foreign policy-making culture constrained by the military's political influence and concentration of authority in autocratic President Suharto into one which better reflected the values of Indonesia's 'reformasi' experience.

Inshort, Hassan Wirajuda was an entrepreneur of new ideas who partnered with his cabinet colleagues, key legislators and subordinates to drive a new normative agenda in ASEAN and transform Indonesia's foreign policy making culture.

How does this contrast with Natalegawa?

On balance, Natalegawa has been an erudite and effective foreign minister who has worked hard to champion Indonesia's interests abroad. Key among his recent accomplishments was his success in reaching a consensus following the 2012 Phnom Penh ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, which dissolved in acrimony over South China Sea tensions.

Natalegawa has kept China talking on a South China Sea Code of Conduct and ably articulated Indonesia's vision for the regional order based on his 'dynamic equilibrium' doctrine. In 2011, as ASEAN Chair, he led a highly successful year of Indonesian diplomacy