on the US mainland in 2001. In its interaction with the potentates of the Gulf, the United States, it seems, has rarely been less true to its principles. With energy independence looming on the American horizon, a reset in relationships is bound to happen. Free from the bondage of oil, the United States may finally be able to disengage from this conflicted relationship.

The preceding narrative is accepted by two very different constituencies. In the United States, it informs a well-rooted popular animosity towards the Gulf, the Middle East, and the Islamic world in general. This attitude adopts tough political postures against the region and severely questions attempts at accommodating its interests. The 2006 Dubai Ports World controversy - which saw this UAE corporation pressured to relinquish its newly-acquiredsubsidiary, formerly a British ports management entity in charge of numerous US facilities - illustrates the potency of the impact of this interest group. The narrative’s second constituency is the decision-making circles in the Gulf region itself. Fully cognizant of the potentially disruptive use of their region’s image in the United States, Gulf leaders have gently re-oriented their international policies towards a dilution of the primacy of their partnership with Washington.

Image questions notwithstanding, GCC countries have served as strategic allies of the United States - housing its Fifth Fleet (in Bahrain) ; hosting the forward headquarters of the US Central Command, the US Air Forces Central, and other US military assets (in Qatar) ; helping stabilize oil markets ; injecting considerable amounts into the US economy in capital