little time in exerting pressure.27

General Bandholtz informed Governor Morgan, and later the two union leaders, that he was indifferent to the merits of the dispute between miners and coal operators, but was concerned only with the president's directive to restore law and order without delay and preferably without bloodshed. During his meeting with Bandholtz, Morgan claimed that the southern counties were at the mercy of an army of rabble, and insisted that army intervention alone would prevent loss of life and destruction of property. Convinced that the miners were in the wrong, Bandholtz warned Keeney and Mooney that he considered them personally responsible for the march and any problems caused by the miners, as well as any consequences that might ensue if the army stepped in. Bandholtz stated:permission from Secretary of War Weeks to continue preparations for the deployment of troops equipped with tear gas dispensed from mortars.29

Major General James G. Harbord, Deputy Chief of Staff, wired Bandholtz complimenting him for his "great skill" in handling matters. Harbord further directed Bandholtz to have Governor Morgan rewrite the formal request for military aid, originally submitted on August 25, to include both a statement that the governor would try to convene the state legislature and a list of measures that he would use to reassert state authority against the insurgents. This would place Morgan in compliance with RS 5297. Harbord, however, referred specifically to what he called West Virginia's egregious failure to accept money available to the states for the establishment of a National Guard, inferring this