by Oppenheimer's counsel on the grounds that Oppenheimer's in-house and co-counsel should be disqualified. Upon hearing argument, the Magistrate criticized Kempner's counsel for permitting a full day of deposition testimony when he knew that he was going to raise an objection as to cross-examination. The Magistrate ruled that Lovasz, who was no longer under the subpoena power of the Court and about to return to Arizona, was under an obligation to return for cross-examination at his own expense and that there was a genuine question as to whether his deposition of direct examination could be utilized by Kempner if Lovasz failed to return for cross-examination. Nonetheless, Lovasz's unchallenged testimony does serve as a major basis for Kempner's motion.
The Magistrate ordered that, as the disqualification issue had been "kickingaround" for some time, any motion to disqualify be made within thirty days or the grounds for any potential disqualification would be waived and that discovery be stayed. The Magistrate also permitted Oppenheimer, in reply, to seek whatever relief it thought appropriate, including striking Lovasz's deposition. The Magistrate's ruling was confirmed by the Court in a March 21, 1986 conference. The Court, however, directed Oppenheimer to refrain from filing a cross-motion for sanctions until the disqualification motion had been decided.

DISCUSSION

I. The Disqualification Motion

Kempner contends that Oppenheimer's in-house counsel, as well as the Gold firm, must be disqualified as Oppenheimer's counsel. First, Kempner argues that, because Oppenheimer's counsel formerly represented Lovasz in this action, Canon 4 of the Code of Professional Responsibility requires that Oppenheimer's counsel now be disqualified