two years since the Dickerson incident was reported to the FBI, and
more than two years since this information was confirmed by the United States
Congress and reported by the press, these administrators in charge of FBI
personnel security and language departments in the FBI remain in their
positions and in charge of translation quality and translation departments'
security. Melek Can Dickerson and several FBI targets of investigation hastily
left the United States in 2002, and the case still remains uninvestigated
criminally. Not only does the supervisor facilitating these criminal
conducts remain in a supervisory position, he has been promoted to
supervising Arabic language units of the FBI's Counterterrorism and
Counterintelligence investigations.

Your report has omitted these significant incidents, has foregone any
accountability what so ever, and your recommendations have refrained from
addressing this serious information security breach and highly likely
espionageasset/informant was previously a high-level
intelligence officer in Iran in charge of intelligence from Afghanistan.
Through his contacts in Afghanistan he received information that: 1) Osama
Bin Laden was planning a major terrorist attack in the United States
targeting 4-5 major cities, 2) the attack was going to involve airplanes, 3)
some of the individuals in charge of carrying out this attack were already in
place in the United States, 4) the attack was going to be carried out soon,
in a few months.

The
agents who received this information reported it to their superior, Special
Agent in Charge of Counterterrorism, Thomas Frields, at the FBI Washington
Field Office, by filing "302" forms, and the translator translated
and documented this information. No action was taken by the Special Agent
in Charge, and after 9/11, the agents and the translators were told