and other equipment, and it ramped up its work in the country. (The Ex-Im Bank, a US government agency, is supposed to promote US exports by providing loans and credit guarantees to foreign countries that agree to buy products from US companies.)

During this period, Nigeria’s military leaders were borrowing extensively from the West to finance dubious projects, many of which never materialized. The money often disappeared thanks to Nigeria’s institutionalized corruption. The most egregious example was the Ajaokuta steel plant. The project was launched in 1979 and, by the mid-1990s, Nigeria had spent nearly $5 billion on the facility, which never produced a single sheet of steel.

When Ibrahim Babangida seized power in 1985, the country was virtually bankrupt. Unable to service its debt as prices plunged for itsoil exports, Nigeria’s credit dried up, and its creditors started demanding repayment of billions in loans. In 1986, most of the developed world stopped opening new lines of credit to the troubled country. That same year, Nigeria started begging for international debt relief. It won temporary reprieves, but its debt continued to grow. Under pressure from the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, Babangida implemented some economic reforms, including limits on debt-funded imports.

Yet even in this climate, the Export-Import Bank continued loaning Nigeria money, which it used mostly to purchase MWI products. By the time Bush teamed up with Eller in 1988, the Ex-Im Bank had already financed about $87 million of MWI’s sales to Nigeria.

Former MWI employees say that much of the equipment they sold the country