described Turkey's unconditional support for Azerbaijan as
detrimental to long-term prospects of peace and an infringement on OSCE
responsibilities. The economic aid and coercive capabilities the
Armenian regime has received from Russia depend in part on Armenia
facing credible security threats. Creating an atmosphere of perpetual
crisis in the South Caucasus therefore plays right into Sargsyan's
hands.

Armenia's scathing condemnation
of Turkey's recent downing of a Russian jet over its airspace, and
solidarity with Russia's counter-terrorism campaign has also
strengthened the Sargasyan regime's ties to Russia. Sergei Mironov, the
chairman of the upper house of the Russian parliament, submitted a bill
on "holding to account" deniers of the 1915 Armenian genocide. The prospect of a major Russian military buildup on the Turkey-Armenia border has also become more realistic.

Yet
unlike Yanukovych who made integration with Russia or the acceptance of
the EU associationagreement a mutually exclusive choice, Armenia has
been able to balance increased Russian support with a multi-vector
foreign economic policy. Armenia has actively co-opted Chinese
investment, received 30 million euros from the EU
to improve fiscal governance, and has reopened negotiations on a
broad-based bilateral framework agreement with Europe. Sargsyan's
successful free-riding off regional crises has given him flexibility and
leverage that Ukraine's elites lacked in 2013, and has put Putin in a
position in which escalating support for the Armenian regime is the only
way for Russia to maintain its leverage in the South Caucasus.

Sargasyan's
mixture of shrewd concessions, deflection of blame away from Russia to
domestic institutions and exploitation of international crises to curry
Russian support demonstrates that he has learnt the lessons of Maidan.
His successful experience could also provide a powerful role model for
other authoritarian Russian allies