that region than in Northeast Asia. Whereas the United States has specific treaty commitments with clear triggers to defend Japan and South Korea and nurtures a strategic ambiguity that leaves little doubt that under the right circumstances the U.S. would come to the defense of Taiwan, it has no corresponding commitments with most of the claimants to the South China Sea.

In the case of the Philippines, while the U.S.–Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty is generally understood as not covering attacks on disputed claims in the South China Sea, the text of the treaty clearly covers an attack on “the metropolitan territory” of the Philippines, “the island territories under its jurisdiction in the Pacific or on its armed forces, public vessels or aircraft in the Pacific.” The ambiguity arises fromthe fact that there are disputed “island territories” clearly under the active “jurisdiction” of the Philippines. Consequently, the American response to any aggression will depend on the circumstances. Meanwhile, Thailand, a U.S. ally (by virtue of the Manila Pact, the Thanat–Rusk communique, and the 2012 Joint Vision Statement) agreement, is not a party to the various South China Sea disputes. Therefore, China could theoretically act against one or more of the dispute parties (e.g., Vietnam or Malaysia) and not draw in the United States.

It is precisely this ambiguity that could lead to miscalculation, much as the North Korean belief that the United States would not respond ultimately led to the Korean War. Given the stakes in the South China Sea, which include some of the busiest shipping lanes