motions in limine and motions for a directed verdict, Disney argued Cry Wolf was only entitled to a royalty on the gross receipts of the "Purchaser," identified as Walt Disney Productions, its successor, privies and assigns, not Disney's subsidiaries. The trial court, over Disney's objection, submitted that issue to the jury. The jury found in Cry Wolfs favor, concluding the term "Purchaser" included Disney's then-present and future subsidiaries.[16]
Disney contends the trial court erred in submitting that question of contract interpretation to the jury and argues the court was required to decide the meaning of the term "Purchaser" in the 1983 Agreement as a matter of law. Cry Wolf, on the other hand, contends the issue was properly submitted to the jury because the term "Purchaser" is ambiguous, asDisney Productions, its successors and assigns and does not mention subsidiaries. The plain meaning of the actual language used by the parties is emphatically reinforced by paragraph 21 of the same agreement, which delineates the royalties Cry Wolf is to receive when Disney exploits the characters or licenses others to exploit the characters. Paragraph 21 provides, "Purchaser agrees to pay to Seller a sum equal to five percent (5%) of Purchaser's gross receipts derived from the exercise of such rights, which, in the event of Purchaser's licensing of any such rights to others, shall be composed of Purchaser's royalties so derived from the licensee. In the event that such a licensee is a subsidiary of Purchaser, then such royalties received by Purchaser from such subsidiary shall be deemed