the PIN number that Allen had used to operate the store's alarm system inoperable. The remaining locks on the front doors, the combination to the lower portion of the safe and the key to activate the dial on the lower safe were not changed. It was determined that Osco's *354 safe was one of "dual custody." Appellant's Br. p. 22. Specifically, the upper portion was available for daily use by the store's employees, and the lower section was for the armored car service. Employees made deposits in the lower portion of the safe during the day by dropping the money in a slot in the upper portion of the safe. There was to be no key to the combination dial for the lower portion of the safe inthe store. Hence, the armored car driver would enter the store, unlock the dial allowing it to be spun, and the store manager would enter the combination to open the bottom portion of the safe so the driver could take the money.
The lower half of the safe had been accessed on Friday, August 24, when the armored car driver, Richard Andrysiak, came to the store. At that time, Andrysiak handed the key to the manager so the dial could be unlocked. The manager then ran the combination to open the bottom part of the safe. Andrysiak turned the handle, locked the safe, spun the dial off and then locked the dial with the key. The bottom part of the safe could not have been opened without a key.