on September 28, 1945. The Company then ceased operations, except to guard the shipyard.
Many circumstances tend to indicate that the Company was itself an agent or agency of the United States, but all its contracts expressly state that it was to act not as agent, but as an independent contractor. Its treasurer testifies this to be his understanding; many other circumstances support that view, and the Company makes no contrary contention before us. So assuming, the plaintiffs are the Company's employees and not employees of the United States, and may be under the Fair Labor Standards Act if producing goods for commerce. None claims to have been engaged in commerce. The petition alleges the Company was engaged in commerce, but it is well settled that not the employer'sfrom the Coast Guard, having 45 defects, including want of proper quarters for crews, and equipment for safety, so that only crews from the navy could operate them under a special permit. They were turned over directly to the navy at the Company's dock. They became "expendibles" at the battle front. They were goods produced for war, not for commerce. War is not commerce. There can be commerce in war equipment, but when the government itself in the midst of war has produced for immediate use in war at its own expense and in its own shipyard special type vessels as auxiliaries for its navy and to be manned by navy crews, commerce is not involved at all. The Company and its employees knew it was not. The