arguing that she was not shown the contents of the bag "during" the meeting but was instead shown them at the "end" of the meeting. This is, at best, a distinction without a difference. We fail to see any substantive difference in saying the revelation took place "during" the meeting versus at the "end" of the meeting, with all of the same people present and no temporal break in the proceedings. Nevertheless, it is undisputed that Carpenter was shown the contents of the bag on the afternoon of the meeting, with the same people present and with no temporal gap between the meeting and the revelation. That is the paragraph's most salient point. Again, there is no genuine issue of material fact here.
9. Plaintiff claims that she wasinsurance coverage and to let her body "rest" and "recuperate" from various medical conditions that plaintiff had throughout her Wal-Mart employment.
(Doc. 28-2, p. 2). Carpenter disputes this paragraph's characterization of her reasons for returning to the store. She asserts:
Plaintiff testified that she returned because Dr. Iglesias removed her from work because she "was real sick" due to her disabilities: fibromyalgia, lupus, osteoarthritis and irritable bowel and bladder syndrome. Although Plaintiff did testify as to 18 months in her deposition, Defendant is taking that information out of context. Plaintiff in both her deposition taken on November 9, 2006 as well as in her EEOC Questionnaire, completed on April 13, 2005 stated that she was inquiring as to her insurance eligibility and availability. So that her remaining wages could be