the second or third ranked person on the list. Because of this inaction Kiel was promoted to Investigator by operation of law on the ninetieth day, October 6, 1969. Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann.art. 1269m § 8 (1963). Despite this fact, Kiel continued to be assigned and paid as a Chauffeur.
On November 8, 1972 the City Council adopted an ordinance which, among other things, reduced the number of Investigator positions by fourteen.
On October 4, 1973, following an unsuccessful demand on the City, Kiel filed a suit seeking recognition of his promotion, recovery of the difference between what he received in pay as a Chauffeur and what he was entitled to as an Investigator, and interest on that amount. The trial court held that he had been promoted by operation of law onOctober 6, 1969, but held that the November 8, 1972 ordinance abolished his position as Investigator, operated to demote him to Chauffeur, and limited his recovery for the pay difference to the intervening period. Both parties have appealed from this judgment, the City contending that Kiel's suit was barred by his delay in seeking recovery, and Kiel arguing that the November 8, 1972 ordinance did not abolish his position.
Kiel's cause of action accrued on the day he was promoted, October 6, 1969; he filed suit on October 4, 1973. The City asserts that his action is basically one for indebtedness, that he can produce no writing which evidences his contract for promotion, and that the two-year statute of limitations, Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 5526 (1958), applies. Kiel, in turn, argues