collective weight of this propaganda could become the most difficult issue for the government to deal with, especially since breakthroughs in Armenia’s socio-economic situation are unlikely in the short term.

As the trial of former president Robert Kocharyan (in office: 1998–2008) approaches, the propaganda against the government has been intensifying. Involved local media focus on such familiar accusations as “selling out Karabakh” (meaning the alleged intention to make unilateral concessions) and the “betrayal of traditional values” (see EDM, December 10, 2018). The informational onslaught has also targeted some key figures in Pashinyan’s cabinet. The Russian daily Komsomolskaya Pravda called Kocharyan “the first political prisoner in the post-Soviet space” (Komsomolskaya Pravda, February 14). While Russian state-run RT ran a report alleging that a member of the Armenian parliament and severaldearly for taking Russian channels off the air” (Lragir.am, April 10). Later, Pashinyan simply called upon the TV companies in question to behave “decently” but conceded that their broadcasts would not be limited (Aravot.am, April 15).

Recent analysis by senior researchers at the National Endowment for Democracy concluded that overwhelming domestic popular support for last year’s Velvet Revolution had prevented Russia from undertaking overt action against Armenia during and immediately afterward. However, after waiting for some time, until the popularity of the Pashinyan government begins to wane, it may be easier for Russia to undermine the new regime. Therefore, the Armenian government only has a short window of opportunity to carry out profound governance and economic reforms (Journal of Democracy, April 2019). Pashinyan’s team also has to consider whether