defendant's intent to influence an official act. See Schaffer, 183 F.3d at 843-45.[4] In that case, Schaffer, a Tyson Foods executive, gave the Secretary of Agriculture several $1,500 tickets to a presidential inaugural dinner. The tickets were purchased prior to the dinner, and given to the Secretary the day of the event. On the same day as the dinner, the Department of Agriculture became aware of an E coli outbreak. The government alleged that, under Schaffer's influence, the Secretary subsequently revised USDA policies in response to the outbreak. Schaffer was convicted for providing the tickets to the Secretary as an illegal gratuity. The district court granted a post-trial judgment of acquittal, and D.C. Circuit affirmed, concluding that there was insufficient evidence from which "the jury could infer thatSchaffer and Tyson Foods were aware of the USDA's intent to act on the relevant issue at the time of the inaugural dinner." Id. at 844 n. 11.
Schaffer is inapposite. There, the intent to influence an official act did not motivate the gift because the USDA policy revisions were sought after the inaugural dinner. In the present case, Hoffmann asked Schwening for an ACASS rating in January, July, and August 2003, before he provided the clubs in October 2003. A reasonable juror could conclude that Hoffmann gave the clubs to Schwening with the requisite intent to reward future performance. The November 2004 email is *878 not attenuated; it could be viewed as Hoffmann's reminder to Schwening to submit an ACASS rating.
Hoffmann finally argues that the November 2004 email