against an offensive;

3) That the responsibility for the July defeat rests primarily on the Milyukovs and Maklakovs, the Shul-gins and Rodzyankos, who, in the name of the State Duma, were already "demanding" an "immediate offensive" in the early part of June.

Here are some excerpts from the articles mentioned: 1) Excerpt from Arseny Merich's communication (Delo Naroda, August 16) :

"Why? Why did this disaster befall us, almost simultaneously on two sides—at Tarnopol and Czernowitz? Why did the regiments there suddenly lose heart? What happened? What was the cause of this sudden change of mood?

"Officers and soldiers readily give the answer. And their replies coincide almost verbally, each adding some vivid stroke to the ghastly picture. . . .

"The men at the front consider that those chiefly responsible for themore than twenty of these cars without number plates. . . . Seven of them we detained, and of course we found that the occupants were strangers, totally unconnected with our regiments. . . . But about eighteen of them got away. The companies, stunned by the warning cries and by the recoiling of the companies ahead, turned and fled. . . . The Austrians entered a deserted town, deserted suburbs, and advanced deeper and deeper into our positions as if they were on a Sunday promenade—there was nobody to hinder them. . . .

"The other group is joined by soldier after soldier who had been at Tarnopol, two or three of them wearing university badges. And each supplements the picture of the provoked retreat with some new