and Chicago, whereas L&N operated between Louisville and the southern region of the United States. Thus, the merger would allow L&N to operate between Chicago and the south via Louisville.
During the Commission hearings evidence was introduced that Southern Railway, a competitor of L&N throughout an extensive area in the south, had been interchanging traffic with Monon at Louisville, just as L&N had done. Southern contended that as a result of the merger, it would now have great difficulty interchanging traffic at Louisville, and would therefore suffer traffic diversion losses of over $900,000.00 per year.
Milwaukee Railroad, which operates north of Louisville between Bedford, Indiana and Chicago and points west thereof, showed that it had participated to some extent in the traffic that Southern formerly interchanged with Monon at Louisville.a new competitive route between southern points and Chicago. Heretofore a large, rapidly growing area of the South has been served through interline arrangements at the several gateways, including Evansville, Louisville and Cincinnati. For a substantial part of the area, the route via Louisville provides the most direct access to and from Chicago; and many shippers and localities therein are wholly dependent upon Southern for rail transportation, while others have available both L&N and Southern. Under these circumstances, absolute domination of the Louisville gateway would accord L&N an undue competitive edge which could be used to the detriment not only of the Southern but also the shippers, industries, and localities it serves. A proficient Milwaukee-Southern route would tend to offset such anticompetitive effects. In addition, the improved service