far as the 1942 essay goes. There is, however, an assumption underlying Dostal's account that does not do justice to the complexity of Heidegger's relation to Plato. Dostal assumes that the 1942 essay on Plato's Doctrine of Truth repeats and summarizes the main points made by Heidegger in his 1931-32 and 1933-34 lectures devoted in Plato's allegory of the cave. This assumption has been rightfully challenged by Gonzalez who suggests that Heidegger's interpretation of Plato in the early 30's undermines the main thesis of the 1942 essay.6 Following Gonzalez's observation, this paper contends that Heidegger's texts from the early 30's are much more open to the ontological insights of Plato's philosophy than the 1942 essay. Contrary to Gonzalez, however, special attention is 2 Stanley Rosen, Nihilism: A PhilosophicalEssay (London: Yale University Press, 1969), 144-145. See also The Question of Being: A Reversal of Heidegger (Indiana: St. Augustine's Press, 2002), 4 ff. 3 Robert Dostal, "Beyond Being: Heidegger's Plato." In Martin Heidegger: Critical Assessments, vol. 2, ed. Christopher E. Maccan (New York: Routledge, 1992), 61-89. 4 Francisco Gonzalez, Plato and Heidegger: A Question of Dialogue (Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2009). 5 Dostal, "Beyond Being: Heidegger's Plato," 73-74. 6 Gonzalez pays attention to the fact that in his 1931-32 and 1933-34 courses on Plato, Heidegger does not insist on the transformation of the essence of truth in the way that he insists on the 1942 essay on "Plato's Doctrine of Truth" (see Gonzalez, Plato and Heidegger: A Question of Dialogue, 112). THE POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF HEIDEGGER'S