assumptions going forward, and cash conservation steps. (Id. at 94). Within a few weeks of 9/11, Calian realized that the cancellations and absence of bookings were "real." (Id.).
Other members of the Debtors' management confirmed Calian's description of the effect of September 11, 2001 on the Debtors' business. In his November 27, 2001 deposition, shortly after the bankruptcy filing, Jordan B. Allen, executive vice president, general counsel and secretary to AMCV, stated:

*513 Prior to September 11th, we felt that we had turned the corner on our business, both on ... the expense side and the revenue side. In fact, the second six months of the year, particularly in Hawaii, but across both brands, was much more positive. And indications for 2002 were also favorable. September 11th was a catastrophicThe Rebuttal Report does not contain a business valuation or insolvency analysis. (Tr. at 558).
In his Adjusted Balance Sheet Approach, Mandarino calculated the "fair saleable value" of AMCV's and DQSC's assets as of June 30, 2001. (Tr. at 382). Although the transfers at issue were not made until August 14, 2001, Mandarino testified that the June 30th date was appropriate because the financial information he reviewed showed that the companies continued to lose money through July and August 2001. (Tr. at 394).
In valuing the companies' ships, Mandarino considered whether the ships were operating as of June 30, 2001, or whether they were sitting in a shipyard under construction. (Tr. at 383-84). He assigned a value of zero to the Project America Ships that were under construction, because he