and weapon purchases ; and, through their sovereign funds, defending the US currency against undue volatility. In exchange, the states of the GCC have reaped three main benefits from their deep relationship with the USA.

The first benefit is naturally the local prosperity that this relationship has fostered. The paternalistic model of development espoused by the GCC monarchies has relied in particular on US public and private expertise, transmitted through direct involvement, training and education, as well as the osmosis resulting from the presence of Americans in the Gulf. To put it most simply, American quality of life is today the standard towards which much of the Gulf still aspires.

The second benefit from this relation has been the creation of a US-led security framework protecting Gulf nations against bothforeign and domestic threats. In 1991, the United States went to war to liberate Kuwait from Iraqi occupation, and in 2003 it essentially removed Iraq as a direct threat to the Gulf. The primary external challenge has since been Iran, which, through its hegemonic tendencies, has turned into the main strategic threat to GCC interests. For both Bahrain, where Iranian meddling has exacerbated the monarchy’s mishandling of the peaceful protest of its population, and Saudi Arabia, where Iranian ties to the unrest in the oil-rich Eastern Province are continuously uncovered, the threat is even beyond strategic ; it is existential. The dependence of the GCC regimes on the US to balance Iran has been the cornerstone of their engagement with Washington in the past decade. Beyond Iran, at