(who have not been tainted by an introductory course in normative ethics), but also we have the observations reported by, for example, the authors of Habits of the Heart as well as empirical research on moral development by, for example, Carol Gilligan." One of the interviewees featured in Habits of the Heart (quoted in the second epigraph), when asked about some of his general moral beliefs that he was using to justify more particular moral beliefs, gave what I suspect would be a pretty typical answer: he was dumbfounded by the question and took his general moral beliefs in question to be obvious. Another sort of response to questions about a person's general moral beliefs is to be found in Gilligan's work. The responses she tended to getin Ethics (New York: Atheneum, 1961). 14. Alan Gewirth, Reason and Morality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978). 15. Alan Donagan, The Theory of Morality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977). 16. Richard B. Brandt, A Theory of the Good and the Right (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979). 17. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971). 18. R. M. Hare, Moral Thinking: Its Levels, Method, and Point (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981). 19. For more on the distinction between questions about doxastic justification and questions about nondoxastic justification in ethics, see Norman Daniels, "Wide Reflective Equilibrium and Theory Acceptance in Ethics," Journal of Philosophy 76 (1979), 257 n. 1; David Copp, "Considered Judgments and Moral Justification: Conservatism in Moral Theory," in D. Copp