noticed of the trustee's intent to sell the Glynwood property at public auction, free and clear of liens?
2. Did Pelican's failure to object to the sale as directed by the notice constitute the consent to the sale within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. 363(f)(2)?
3. Was the price paid at the sale a "fair equivalent value" for the property?

I. Notice:

As was stated, Pelican claims that it never received the trustee's notice of intent nor did it receive the clerk's combined notice of filing and scheduling of the first meeting of creditors. The evidence before me clearly indicates that both the clerk and the trustee mailed their respective notices to everyone listed on the mailing matrix. The evidence and testimony additionally show that Pelican's name and address is properly listedPelican had actual knowledge of the impending sale and yet for some inexplicable reason, failed to act to protect its interest. The court was particularly impressed by the testimony of Karen Anderson, a witness called by the trustee. Ms. Anderson stated that she was interested in purchasing the property herself and in an effort to obtain information regarding the existing mortgage she contacted Pelican's office several times prior to the sale. During the course of her conversation with various Pelican employees she, on numerous occasions, told them that she had been informed that the property was involved in a bankruptcy proceeding and that the trustee was planning to sell it at public auction. She also testified that because the people at Pelican were having difficulty locating the file