silencers charge, and the government agreed to dismiss Count I and recommend that Ritsema be given the maximum three-level reduction in his Guidelines offense level for acceptance of responsibility.


7
On February 3, Ritsema appeared before the court and offered his plea of guilty to Count II.   Judge Shabaz accepted the plea and adjudged Ritsema guilty of the unregistered silencers charge, but withheld final acceptance of the plea agreement pending preparation of a presentence report by the Probation Office.


8
After the probation officer conducted a presentence investigation and prepared her report, Ritsema appeared before the court once again for sentencing.   The presentence report disclosed that Ritsema had threatened K.J.L. with a firearm, and at the sentencing hearing, the Probation Officer gave testimony recounting her discussion of thismerely because at a later date the court has second thoughts about a bargain it has already approved.   By the time the court approved the plea bargain here, the nature of the charges against Ritsema, the facts underlying those charges, and the terms of the government's agreement with him were clear.   When it approved the agreement after review of the presentence report, the court no doubt had an expectation, consistent with the determinations it subsequently made under the Sentencing Guidelines, that Ritsema's use of a firearm to threaten K.J.L. into silence about the sexual assault could and would be reflected in the sentence imposed on the unregistered silencers charge.   The government may well have shared that notion.   As our opinion