in the occupied territories designed to perpetuate Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza by destroying the PLO. . . .  
The war in Lebanon was not about peace to the Galilee [i.e., northern Israel]. The Galilee was not under threat. . . . The evidence on PLO operations . . . suggests that the PLO was exercising considerable restraint along the border.

The central conclusions of Maoz's authoritative study, _Defending the Holy Land_ , which itself is largely a synthesis of the full gamut of relevant monographic literature, also deserve lengthy quotation:

Israel's war experience is a story of folly, recklessness, and self-made traps. None of the wars—with a possible exception of the 1948 War of Independence—was what Israel refers to as Milhemet Ein Brerah ("war ofcommentary. The ensuing remarks will focus on ground not already covered.

Most of the new Morris's relevant remarks bear on the second intifada. However, the new Morris's perverse mindset can also be glimpsed in his retrospective commentary. Whereas the old Morris reported that during and right after the June 1967 war hundreds of thousands of Palestinians "fled or were driven from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip," the new Morris alleges that they "moved" elsewhere. (Did they use _Shalom_ or _Shleppers_ van line?) Whereas the old Morris depicted the first intifada as "not an armed rebellion but a massive, persistent campaign of civil resistance" against the "occupying forces," the new Morris alleges that the first intifada was a "semi-armed revolt against Israel." Why then did he refuse to