also impose speed limits upon drivers of motor vehicles upon that state's public highways. While a sales tax or a speed limit may influence some citizens in their decisions of whether to travel to or reside in our states, those statutes do not constitute a direct impingement upon the fundamental personal right of interstate travel.
Similarly, the diploma privilege does not constitute a direct impingement upon the fundamental right of interstate travel. As evidenced by the uncontested statement of facts, the "plaintiff knew that he would be eligible for admission to the Montana Bar on motion if he graduated from the University of Montana Law School prior to the time he entered the University of Chicago Law School." Yet, the diploma privilege did not in any way impinge upon(as indicated by Rule VI B6 of the Rules of the Supreme Court) than do the requirements of the University of Chicago Law School, the more important fact remains that from its relationships with the law school and from its experience with the graduates of that school, who comprise the greater part of the Montana bar, the Court can empirically determine whether the breadth of the legal education of the Montana Law School measures up to the Court's expectations and whether the graduates do in fact have the requisite proficiency. The fact that as to one set of graduates the Court from its personal experience has a basis of confidence in the breadth and quality of its legal education, which from personal experience it cannot have as to