petitioner called upon to prove by a fair preponderance of the evidence that his waiver was not competently or understandingly made. And, of course, if the State fails to sustain its burden on "affirmative acquiescence," that would end the case.
On May 14, 1943, the petitioner, then sixteen years of age, and three other youths were arrested and charged with a holdup which netted them $41. On the following day he was brought before a magistrate, waived examination and was committed to await grand jury action. A four count indictment was returned on May 25, 1943 charging petitioner and two of the others with robbery in the first degree, robbery in the second degree, grand larceny in the first degree and assault in the second degree. The very nextday he was arraigned and pled guilty to robbery in the first degree. His next appearance before the Court was on June 16, when sentence was imposed. At no time  preliminary hearing, pleading or sentence  was petitioner represented by counsel.
The State, in support of its position that petitioner was fully advised of and waived his right to counsel, relies principally upon a rubber-stamped notation on the back of the indictment, which reads:
"Before pleading to the indictment the defendant was informed of his right to counsel and was asked if he desired the aid of counsel. The defendant did not ask for the aid of counsel. The defendant entered a plea of guilty to * * *."
following which is a handwritten notation that the plea was to