principle.
In Clark v. Smith, 13 Pet. 195, 201, which was here in 1839, the patent under which the complainant became the owner in fee of certain lands was issued by the Commonwealth of Kentucky in 1795, when the lands were in possession of the Chickasaw Indians, whose title was not extinguished until 1819. It *68 was objected that the patent was void because it was issued for lands within a country claimed by Indians, but the court replied, "That the colonial charters, a great portion of the individual grants by the proprietary and royal governments, and a still greater portion by the States of this Union after the revolution, were made for lands within the Indian hunting-grounds. North Carolina and Virginia, to a great extent, paid their officersand soldiers of the revolutionary war by such grants; and extinguished the arrears due the army by similar means. It was one of the great resources that sustained the war, not only by these States but by others. The ultimate fee (encumbered with the Indian right of occupancy) was in the crown previous to the revolution, and in the States of the Union afterwards, and subject to grant. This right of occupancy was protected by the political power and respected by the courts until extinguished; when the patentee took the unencumbered fee. So this court, and the State courts, have uniformly and often holden."
In the grant to the Railroad Company now before us, Congress was not unmindful of the title of the Indians to the lands granted, and