circumstances. Pedestrian warning signs posted 500 feet ahead of a crosswalk alert motorists to the possible presence of pedestrians in the area. Similarly, crosswalk lighting and reduced speed limit signs in the crosswalk area would provide motorists with adequate visibility and advance warning of pedestrians in the crosswalk and its immediate area. On this record, we do not find the trial court was plainly wrong to hold the DOTD liable for its negligent action which was both a cause-in-fact and legal cause of Donavan's resulting harm.

Riverwood
Riverwood contends it owed no duty to Donavan, and that if it did, it properly discharged that duty. Like the DOTD, Riverwood urges Donavan's negligence was the sole cause of the accident.
The first inquiry is whether Riverwood's negligence was a cause-in-fact of theaccident. Riverwood not only knew about the hazardous crossing situation, but also required the contractor employees to cross the highway to access the plant entrance. The most obvious and effective solution was to eliminate the need to cross the highway. Nevertheless, several other options would have enhanced safety: lighting the parking lot, improving its surface, lighting the crosswalk area, and installing channeling fences. Riverwood's failure to take necessary safety measures was a factor in generating the accident. In sum, the trial court was not plainly wrong to find that Riverwood's conduct was a cause-in-fact of the accident.
Riverwood owed Donavan the duty to exercise reasonable care for his safety and not expose him to unreasonable risks of injury or harm. Mundy; Dupre, supra. This duty extends to employees of