at the dock.  She was made ready for sea.  She was being turned around for the purpose of leaving.  The lines to the dock were fast not to keep her there, or to continue her stay at the wharf.  They were there solely as an essential step in her navigational maneuvering.  They were no less vital than the hawser to the straining tug off the starboard quarter.  The ship's engines were actively maneuvering to accomplish the swing and officers and men were stationed for simultaneous undocking and departure.  The ship was literally and figuratively in the sole command of the master on the bridge.


12
That this may pose some conceptual difficulties in suppositious cases is not significant.  By its nature theCir., 1911, 185 F. 733, 738.


14
Once it is determined that the hole in the ship's side occurred after the voyage had begun within the meaning of Cogsa Section 3, the failure of the master to inspect and repair damage at Santos was likewise an error in navigation and management and also excused under Section 4.3  This makes it unnecessary for us to pass upon the findings that by reports the master received from the engine room, which he ignored or rejected, and sensations of a collision felt by others on the vessel, the master ought to have known that the impact against the dock was extraordinarily severe and likely caused damage.


15
But we must consider further the activities at Rio de Janeiro.  On this short voyage (arriving