mid-90s .

The Russians have stubbornly resisted U.S. pressure to cancel the
project. Russia, perennially strapped for cash, desperately needs the
foreign exchange. One Minatom official claimed that the project had
already generated 20,000 Russian jobs, with the promise of more to
come. The Russians foresee an expanding nuclear relationship, and have
rejected U.S. enticements. Moscow clearly regards its commerce with
Iran as a matter of national pride/prestige.

Russia has also refused the U.S. demand for special inspections.
The Russians point out that the reactor will be subject to
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) oversight. The IAEA visited
Bushehr and other suspect sites after the first Gulf War, and as
recently as February 2003, with no violations reported. Washington
remains unconvinced, however. While all of Iranís nuclear facilities
are subject to IAEA oversight, Iran has refused, thus far, to accept
the new safeguardsintroduced in 1993 to overcome past failings. The
strengthened protocols are "capable of detecting future Iraqs,"
according to Khidhir Hamza, a former Iraqi nuclear scientist. Iranís
refusal has undermined confidence. (Khidhir Hamza, "Inside
Saddam's secret nuclear program," Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists, September/October 1998)

Russia did agree to drop the most objectionable part of the deal,
the transfer of gas centrifuge technology. The light water reactor
will be fueled with low enriched uranium (LEU) supplied by Russia. LEU
fuel is not suitable for bombs. Moscow also made another concession:
it agreed to return the reactorís spent fuel to Russia for storage.
This will greatly reduce the risk of a diversion of plutonium. To
allow for this the Russian government had to modify existing Russian
law. (Christine Kucia, "Russia, Iran Finalize Spent Fuel
Agreement," Arms Control Today, January/February 2003)

After failing to block the