No’s second morning in South Korea, the U.S. Far East Command had not yet been apprised of Eisenhower’s views. This was largely a function of time zones. When the president dictated his letter on Monday night in Boston, it was already Tuesday morning in Korea.

Having heard nothing to the contrary from Washington, Air Force officers in Seoul were of the opinion that the stolen MiG and its pilot constituted a great victory in America’s propaganda war against Communism. They decided to put No on immediate public display—at a press conference in Seoul.

But before they showed him off to reporters, they decided he needed some coaching. On one especially touchy subject, they coached him to lie. A well-dressed American in civilian clothes (whose name No never heard) asked ifhe had ever seen American fighter jets in Chinese airspace. Of course, No replied, he had seen many American Sabres shoot down MiGs on takeoff and landing from Manchurian airfields. The well-dressed man said that if a reporter asked about these incursions in Manchuria, No must say he had seen nothing.

***

Lies were nothing new to No Kum Sok. Had he not been an experienced and convincing liar, he would never have been in a position to steal a MiG. Moreover, the Korean War, as he witnessed it unfold, was made of lies. The Soviet Union lied about its pilots fighting over MiG Alley. Kim Il Sung lied about who started the war and then lied about who won it. If anyone dared tell the truth about how catastrophically