much to do with his having exceeded his authority. Indeed, the Americans looked to the currency reform as a vehicle to relax controls, as opposed to the British, who wanted to tighten them. American opinion prevailed; which was fortunate for the revival of the German economy.

The Friedmans’ whole book is a diatribe against government interference and bureaucracy, yet in Germany after World War II the remarkable reconstruction of the economy could not have occurred without a sound currency and massive aid from the Marshall Plan, both accomplishments of the US bureaucracy so despised by the Friedmans. It was upon this base that Ludwig Erhard was able to make his impressive contributions to the German “economic miracle.”

The Germans themselves have never forgotten US prominence in the currency reform. Throughoutthe years the German press has acknowledged it. In September 1979, an entire issue of Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft was devoted to currency and economic reform in Germany after World War II. Among the many economists who contributed to it were a number of Americans. It seems impossible that the Friedmans were unaware of the vital role played by their own government in halting the inflation and introducing a sound currency in Germany. One is led to believe that the historic facts did not conform to the Friedmans’ theories and prejudices, so they changed the facts to suit themselves, a dangerous practice which casts doubts on their abilities as scholars.