be four months before the damage was repaired and a minor refit completed, though, happily for Japan, she missed no significant action.



Such a catalogue of events is not remarkable. Any ship at sea in wartime is likely to he open to submarine attack and the hit on Yamato was simply one more example to add to many others. What was far more significant for the leaders of the Imperial Japanese Navy was the extent of the damage. The explosion had occurred on the starboard side beneath the after l8in main triple gun turret. Quoting from her Captains report to the Navy Ministry the damage was as follows:



"A hole about l6ft (5m) deep extending downwards from the



MIDSHIP SECTION OF YAMATO CLASS BATTLESHIP top of the bulge connection and S2ftbattleship excellence and one certainly capable of stopping a single torpedo. From the time the, Japanese Naval General Staff ordered the Bureau of Naval Construction to study such a proposal in the autumn of 1934 it was clear the vessel would he enormous since the only sure way of building in superiority in the three key elements of speed, firepower and protection, was to increase the size of the vessel. The first calculations of her principal designers, Yuzura Hiraga and Keiji Fukuda, proved too ambitious even for the Admirals of the Naval General Staff It was speed that was sacrificed since the length and depth of the hull proposed, which were vital prerequisites for high speed, would simply not fit Japanese parts without unacceptable additional expense. On the