ears of the Air Force," according to Major Harry Brosofsky, who was in the Operations Center on September 11. [36] In the Operations Center, therefore, Jumper would have been in an ideal position to help organize the Air Force's response to the attacks.

But by taking time out to walk up to the fourth floor and fetch Roche down to the basement, Jumper may have left himself "out of the loop"--such that he could not receive the most accurate and timely updates on the crisis, and other officials could not communicate with him--during a critical period in the middle of the attacks.

COLLEAGUES ALLOWED CHIEF OF STAFF TO LEAVE THE OPERATIONS CENTER, DESPITE SAFETY CONCERNS

It is surprising too that Jumper's colleagues allowed such an important official to leave the safetyof the basement and go up to the more vulnerable fourth floor of the building when the U.S. was in the middle of a serious terrorist attack and anything could have happened next.

Tim Green, for example, who had been in the staff meeting with Jumper, "knew his main directive was to secure Jumper and make sure he could communicate with other officials" after the Pentagon was attacked at 9:37 a.m., according to the Midland Reporter-Telegram. [37] But surely if he genuinely realized the U.S. was under attack earlier on, when he learned of the crashes at the World Trade Center during Jumper's meeting, Green would have made sure that Jumper stayed in the Operations Center after his staff meeting ended, for his safety and so he could communicate