need to collaborate with the latter against the U.S.

Needless to say, the strongest of these countries—Germany, France, and others in Northern Europe—succumbed far more often to the temptation to use the new continental unity to heighten their market dominance over their poorer Southern and Eastern European rivals.

The EU was built on a continent with wildly divergent levels of productivity, technical development, and levels of social spending. In prosperous times marginal efforts at unity were begun. But rather than harmonizing all parts of the country upward to prosperity, the EU became a way for its stronger members to deepen the dependency and subordination of the weaker by forcing open their markets, and taking advantage of cheaper labor (by migration of labor in one direction and capital in another).

But inand a [rating] downgrade.” And French bankers have good reason to be concerned about the fiscal health of the United States.

The high marks France has gotten until now from ratings agencies for its fiscal rectitude is slipping as it tries to keep Italy from going under. Fears of being pulled down by sinking swimmers, as France is now, is why Germany held out so long against providing assistance, and instead sternly demanded austerity from Greece and the weaker countries. But France borrows heavily in the United States to finance its own debt—and now U.S. banks fear coming losses from overexposure to France’s problems.

U.S. banks’ connections to European banks are paralleled by close ties of U.S. manufacturers: Automakers depend on sales in Europe for 30% of their output. The