willing to compromise somewhat on the irreducibility of the four different categories of actuality/being, but never on the irreducibility of the first category (Dasein) to the fourth (Geltung). Veritative being (including the holding of relations) is simply irreducible to the existence of things and the occurrence of events. I will therefore focus on the distinction between existence and validity. On Lotze's antipsychologistic view, propositions are not identical to the mental representations by which they are grasped, much less the 18 Cf. Rödl (2012), 31–32. 19 See L §3, §319–20. Cf. Dummett (1982), 96, on Lotze's shifting terminology. Platonism in Lotze and Frege 145 written and verbal marks by which they are expressed. Lotze thinks of mental representations as ultimately events, having actuality/being of type (2). Given the irreducibilityTheoretical Philosophy: 1755–1770. R. Meerbote & D. Walford (Trans. and Ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Reck, E. (1997). "Frege's Influence on Wittgenstein: Reversing Metaphysics via the Context Principle." In Early Analytic Philosophy: Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein. W.W. Tait (Ed.). Chicago, IL: Open Court, 123–185. Reck, E. (2005). "Frege on Numbers: Beyond the Platonist Picture." The Harvard Review of Philosophy 13: 25–40. Reck, E. (2007). "Frege on Truth, Judgment, and Objectivity." Grazer Philosophische Studien 75(1): 149–73. Ricketts, T. (1986). "Objectivity and Objecthood: Frege's Metaphysics of Judgments." In Frege Synthesized. L. Haaparanta & J. Hintikka (Eds.). Dordrecht: Reidel, 65–95. Ricketts, T. (1996). "Frege on Logic and Truth." Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 70: 121–140. Rödl, S. (2012). Categories of the Temporal. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Sluga, H. (1975). "Frege and