the clear intention of permanently removing Cunag from the room, as demonstrated by the simultaneous filing of the crime report with the police. Here, Young was placed on electronic lockout only as a temporary measure, in accordance with the hotel's weapons policy, and hotel management was unaware of the possibility that Young had procured the room through fraud. The district court correctly took note of Hilton's security policy, which states that when a room has been e-keyed and the guest returns, "he or she is to be advised that the room will not be cleaned or serviced while the weapon is left in the room unattended," and then offered a "secured location on company hotel property, if available, for the storage of such weapon until the time ofhis or her departure." The policy says nothing about evicting a guest whose room is found to contain a weapon.
The Government itself acknowledges that the hotel security staff could have taken affirmative acts of dispossession against defendant, including removing Young's backpack from the room and leaving a note on his door that he had been evicted from the room. After reviewing the written policy and declarations, the district court did not clearly err in holding that the Hilton security guards intended to secure the room for safety purposes, not to evict Young, and therefore correctly discredited Marweg's single statement to the contrary. In other words, the intent apparent to Young critically distinguishes Cunag from the circumstances before us now. Had the Hilton hotel staff genuinely intended to evict