manner did not suit the Meese-Baker-Deaver circle, and bureaucratic turf battles were constantly being waged between the White House and the State Department.

This was a different Washington from the one I had experienced a decade earlier as secretary of the treasury. The number of aides that surrounded the president and each of the top appointed officials had ballooned. Staffs of organizations, supposedly following the same administration policy, waged perpetual battle on behalf of—and often without the knowledge of—their principals. And, as I had sensed in the days when Henry Kissinger was national security adviser, a cult of secrecy verging on deception had taken root in the White House and NSC staffs. Beyond that, the secret and spectacular Kissinger trip in July 1971 reopening relations with China cast theNSC adviser in an operational role. When he became secretary of state, he retained for some time the title and role of NSC adviser as well. Henry’s brilliance and skill carried the day, but the potential for conflict between the secretary of state and the NSC adviser was evident.

I had learned a few things over the years about struggles between the White House staff and cabinet officers.² I also knew from my days as Office of Management and Budget director and treasury secretary how easily a White House office can be translated into authority: President Nixon had installed me in a suite of offices on the floor above Henry Kissinger’s to give me a White House perspective to bring to my tasks. Nixon didn’t like budget work or