an ongoing Soviet effort to drive a wedge between the United States and our NATO allies. U.S. missiles, as agreed by all NATO members, were scheduled to be deployed beginning in late 1983 on European soil as a counter to these Soviet deployments. Crucial negotiations would determine whether the arms race would be speeded up or scaled back. The pressing need for coherence and unity in the alliance would be practically impossible to manage, I knew, unless we could dissipate the acrimonious atmosphere with the Europeans created by the pipeline dispute.

U.S.-Soviet relations had gone into the deep freeze when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan just after Christmas of 1979. Now the Soviet-backed crackdown in Poland further deepened the cold. Relations between the two superpowers were not simply bad; theyTaiwan with its defense while standing behind our agreements with Beijing when U.S.-China relations were reestablished. With our important economic and political interests in Asia, I saw an uneasy state in our relationship with Japan. Trade issues were endless and difficult, and we were pressing Japan, somewhat against their better judgment, to undertake greater defense efforts. As a marine, I had fought the Japanese in World War II, and I was uneasy with encouraging Japan’s renewal as a military power. Elsewhere in the Asia-Pacific region, I knew concern about a rearmed Japan was widespread.

Turning to Africa, the scene all across the southern continent was grim. Apartheid in South Africa was abhorrent and oppressive. Could the United States fashion a policy to slow the expansion of communism beyond Angola