final chapter to deal with the question of individual essence. She argues that Aristotle and Kripke are engaged in fundamentally different projects. Kripke offers an account of essences in terms of necessary properties and trans-world identity, with which Aristotle is not concerned. I am arguing that the mis-reading of Aristotle such as occurs in feminist interpretations of Aristotelian essence is the attribution of a Kripkean-type position which Aristotle does not hold.

Discussing material substances, Witt notes that:

Aristotle acknowledges the importance of its source or origin in the causal history of the substance. Where an object actually 'comes from' seems to be central to our understanding of it. Hence the importance of genealogies for humans, pedigrees for animals, and so on. On a more abstract level, material substances are suchBobbs-Merrill.

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