to or possession of the children be specified by the Court." A hearing on this motion commenced on April 20, 1983. However, prior to the completion of the testimony, the trial court stopped the proceedings and ordered the preparation of a social study. Temporary orders providing for visitation by the mother were entered on May 17, 1983.
On July 7, 1983, the hearing on the father's motion was resumed and testimony was given by the father, the mother, and a counselor who had been working with the children at the father's request. All the witnesses testified that the week-by-week custody arrangement was unworkable, and generally agreed that specification of regular times for visitation was needed. Although neither party sought to introduce the social study ordered by the trial court,divorce decree and thus the court's order was not a change of managing conservatorship of the younger child but merely a specification of the mother's rights as a joint managing conservator.
We reject the mother's contention that the parties were joint managing conservators of the children. The divorce decree, while reciting the existence of an agreement between the parties for conservatorship and support of the children, did not state that the parties had agreed to be joint managing conservators. On the contrary, the decree appointed the father as managing conservator of both children, and appointed the mother possessory conservator with more limited rights and authority with respect to the children. Since the decree provided that the father was to have greater authority over the children than *424 the mother,