later withdrew and has no interest in the present controversy. The lease and bill of sale contain special covenants (presently quoted) dealing with continued utilization, subject to approval of the State liquor control commission, of the all-important liquor license.
August 14, 1951, by what is termed in the record a notice of renewal, defendant sought of plaintiff Joe Serbinoff a "new lease," not for the lease-stipulated *71 renewal period but for a shorter period to be negotiated. The chancellor states the remaining essential facts, and the principal issues of the case, in language as follows:
"Subsequent to the notice of August 14, 1951, the defendant built a new store building almost directly across the street from the plaintiff's property, held over in possession after the termination of the lease fora period of 21 days for which no rent has been paid and then moved across the street into his own building, taking said S.D.D. license with him. Since moving the defendant has been operating his grocery and meat store at his new location, has been using the liquor license (as renewed) and receiving the benefits of such license.
"Plaintiffs redecorated the store premises formerly leased to the defendant, purchased new fixtures and opened up for business on January 10, 1952, but have been unable to obtain an S.D.D. liquor license. The commission's `policy of proximity' would not permit plaintiffs to have an S.D.D. license when there is one across the street. Plaintiffs were able to get a license for the sale of beer about April 10, 1952.
"The essence