purity; egotism comes from the illusion of self (Lang). Śāntideva, by contrast, is not relying on a stock list of inversions and does not systematize them as a list of four. His text is in many respects more innovative. As we will see, he has a different list of illusions and their consequences, and his ethical exhortations are therefore quite different (though not necessarily incompatible). Roughly, Śāntideva shares a critique of attachment and lust with Āryadeva and Candrakīrti. But he adds a critique of anger, based on causality, and his critique of selfishness is more far-reaching. Candrakīrti limits that critique to the political sphere, against the egotism of a king; Śāntideva urges an attack on all self-concern. Moreover, Śāntideva's four claims are structured differently from Candrakīrti's: they areperfections in order (see Meadows). Journal of Buddhist Ethics 261 am referring to the "canonical" recension of the BCA, the one known to later Indian and Tibetan tradition, rather than the earlier recension found at Dunhuang (on which see Saitō). I use the name "Śāntideva" to refer to the redactor of this recension, as opposed to the author of the older version who went by Akṣayamati.11 This article relies generally on P. L. Vaidya's edition of the BCA (which is based on Louis de la Vallée Poussin's), with one significant exception: the numbering of verses in the BCA's key ninth chapter. Crosby and Skilton (113) claim that Vaidya and Poussin numbered the verses based on a mistake made in one Sanskrit manuscript of the text, which had copied