of an owner-occupied private home would effect such a change, for arson is a paradigmatic common-law state crime. Pp. 8_9.

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 99_5739

DEWEY J. JONES, PETITIONERv.UNITED STATES

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ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

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[May 22, 2000]

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Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court.

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It is a federal crime under 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) (1994 ed., Supp. IV) to damage or destroy,No. 91_1549, pp. 69_70 (1970)).

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6. The defendants in Mennuti destroyed two buildings. One was the residence of the owner and her family, the other was a rental property. See 639 F.2d, at 108_109, n. 1. The Second Circuit affirmed the District Court's dismissal of the entire indictment. Our decision in Russell v. United States, 471 U.S. 858 (1985), supersedes Mennuti with respect to the building held for rental. Regarding the family residence, we find Mennuti's reasoning persuasive.

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7. In Ryan, Chief Judge Arnold dissented from a panel decision holding that the arson of a permanently closed fitness center fell within §844(i)'s prohibition. The panel majority considered adequate either of two interstate commerce connections: the building was owned and leased by out-of-state parties, and received natural gas from across state