United States Army. For the first time many miners realized that their march was interpreted by federal authorities as a rebellion against the West Virginia and federal governments and not as a justified and righteous struggle against what miners perceived as greedy coal operators, corrupt sheriffs, or ruthless Baldwin-Felts "thugs." As the marchers began to disperse, Keeney and Mooney hurriedly made arrangements with local railroads on August 27 to return the miners to their homes.32

Upon learning of these events, General Bandholtz, accompanied by Major Thompson and Bill Blizzard among others, visited the positions previously occupied by the miners. Satisfied that the emergency was over, the general wired the War Department that while all alerted units could stand down, they should remain prepared for future use. Bandholtz had noconfidence in the ability of Governor Morgan and the legislature to maintain order, stating, "the State had made only a feeble attempt to check the growth of the insurgent movement or to keep reasonable touch with its progress." That same day Bandholtz boarded a train for Washington, while General Mitchell flew back to Bolling Field. Despite the outward appearance of calm, actions by state authorities almost immediately stirred further unrest.33

At midnight, August 27, 1921, in an ill-advised move to arrest leaders of the miners' march and union miners involved in a recent fracas with state police, a posse of from seventy to one hundred deputies and state police, led by Sheriff Don Chafin and Captain James Brockus, went to the small mining community of Sharples north of Blair