of the underlying contract. It is a separate agreement between the assignor and assignee which merely transfers the assignor's contract rights, leaving them in full force and effect as to the party charged." Id. at 269.
For these reasons we disagree with the district court's reading of the brokerage agreement as a matter of law and conclude that, as written, the brokerage agreement permitted Century 21 to assign its commission rights to Easton.

B.
The district court alternatively held that, even if the agreement permitted assignment, Easton still could not prevail because the assignment didn't occur until May 2006, when Brelsford's affidavit confirming Century 21's transfer of commission rights to Easton was filed. Citing Thelin v. Intermountain Lumber & Builders Supply, Inc., 80 Nev. 285, 392 P.2d 626 (1964), the districtfurther action or manifestation of intention by the obligee. The manifestation may be made to the other or to a third person on his behalf and, except as provided by statute or by contract, may be made either orally or by a writing.
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 324 (1981); see id. cmt. a. Applying section 324 here, the manifestation of intent to transfer a contract right was by Century 21, as "obligee," to Easton, as "the other." The assignment was complete as of December 8, 2003, the date both Brelsford and Easton say Century 21 accepted payment from Easton in exchange for certain listings and expiration rights, including TES's.
Century 21 did not confirm the transfer of rights in writing until it supplied the Brelsford affidavit in May 2006.