that cannot be predicted accurately without actual Concorde operations.  Thus, the very dimensions of the most significant environmental drawback of the Concorde are impossible to determine without an adequate test.


14
The 16-month testing period approved by Secretary Coleman is important not only to assure that the federal decision on the Concorde will be a fully informed one; it provides in addition a critical assurance to Britain and France that the United States is determined to afford the Concorde a fair trial.  Secretary Coleman emphasized the massive commitment of their treasury and prestige that the British and French have invested in the Concorde, as well as the economic importance to these hard-pressed nations of reacquiring a competitive position in the world aviation industry.  Our decision on theSST, a matter of such vital importance to two of our closest allies, is certain to affect the structure of our foreign policy.  Indeed, the essential treaty arrangements for international aviation may be undermined by a determination on the Concorde that Britain and France perceive to be unjust, as they surely would a ban without a fair trial.


15
In ordering that a test be permitted at Kennedy Airport, Secretary Coleman considered very carefully the impact of the limited Concorde landings on the airport's neighbors.  He recognized that the Concorde differs from other jets because the sound produced by its engines is of a relatively low pitch.  The plane's deep rumble causes minor structural rattling and an increased likelihood of penetration of the sound into buildings. 