for protectionism and control of trade being adapted by British politicians frightened Finnish industry. Some British officials were willing to employ scare tactics but diplomats on the ground recognised that the competitive disadvantages were home-grown. However, they eagerly supported their exporters. Pressure was exercised to influence public spending whenever the legation learned about planned acquisitions. Finnish politicians tried to meet such demands although this often meant paying more than for comparable German goods.

Diplomats reported correctly that interventions in the public sector worked due to the Finns’ willing co-operation. Germany’s efforts to secure rights of usage to a Finnish harbour in the polar sea were rejected. The most efficient contact person for economic interventions was the new and more powerful foreign minister to whose the Germans ironically had helpedby bringing his predecessor down. Public spending was, however, too small a factor to revert the general trend in favour of German industry. A high frequency of mutual visits by traders and industrialists was a sign of willingness to widen economic relations. They resulted in declarations of good-will but were sometimes overshadowed by protectionist grumbling of English traders.

Given a protectionist penchant in the Foreign Office and the difficulty of directing trade by mere declarations of good will the legation did a superb job in preventing conflict. The legation gave its reports a positive spin, alerted their superiors to the sensibilities of Finnish partners and sometimes meditated carefully between British and Finnish parties. A last high-level political visit of a Finnish cabinet minister in Finland passed smoothly in contrast