of
these workers had contributed to Libya’s wealth, but many Libyans blamed them
for the country’s social problems, leading to race riots in the year 2000.

In February 2011, there was a wave of anti-Gaddafi protests in many
Libyan cities, inspired by the protests which had succeeded in overthrowing
repressive governments in Tunisia and Egypt. In Tripoli the protests were
suppressed by the regime, but in a number of other cities and towns the rebels
took control. Benghazi, Libya’s second largest city, and Misrata, the third
largest, were among them.

The
rebel movement was portrayed in the Western media as a movement for democracy. But
in reality it was more complicated than that. No doubt the February protests
included many who were sincere in their desire for democracy. But many of the
leaders of the movement were prepared to act inan undemocratic manner to
promote their own interests, and those of the anti-Gaddafi wing of the
capitalist class. The most blatant example of this was the promotion of violent
racism by the rebel leadership.

The
rebel leaders were generally neoliberal in their economic outlook, but varied
politically. Some were regarded as Islamists, others not. Some were recent
defectors from the Gaddafi regime, including former high officials; some were
people who had campaigned peacefully for human rights (e.g. lawyers who had
defended political prisoners); and some were longstanding opponents of Gaddafi
who had attempted to overthrow him by violent means in the past.

Some
of Gaddafi’s opponents were veterans of war in Afghanistan. Many anti-Gaddafi
Libyans went to Afghanistan in the 1980s as part of the US-backed war against
the government of the Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan, which was backed
by the Soviet