from the state, service thereof was effected upon his agent, the bank which had the note in its possession, and hence the order as effectively bound the husband as though it had been served upon him personally. Furthermore, as we have already noted, the husband was notified of the restraining order and its service upon the bank prior to the time that he attempted to cancel respondents' obligation upon the note.
 As reflected by the findings, the trial court rested its judgment in favor of the defendants solely upon the fact that, as the interlocutory decree in the divorce action by which the note in suit was awarded to appellant was entered subsequent to the time that the husband purported to cancel the note, appellant "took nothing asto her, and she thereupon instituted action against the society to recover the sum so paid by it to the husband. At page 761, the court says:
 "Defendant contends that, it having been determined in the divorce action that the property was the community property of the spouses, the husband had, under the provisions of section 172 of the Civil Code, full power to withdraw the same, at least until the deposit had by a judgment of the court been awarded to the wife. That the husband had such power may be conceded; but that in the face of the restraining order he had not the right to do so against his wife is, we think, equally clear."
 The only inference deducible from the evidence is that the