over the past decade, the United States was caught in a conundrum. In theory, Washington wants to reaffirm full civilian control over the military and keeping the armed forces "confined to barracks" when it came to politics; in practice, however, the military was increasingly seen as one of the remaining bastions of pro-Western, liberal, secular sentiment in the country.

Of course, one of the main problems was that Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood were classic "illiberal democrats"—prepared to accept the necessity of elections and to have some policies put to the voters for validation but in no way inclined to endorse the full panoply of civil and political rights and ready to impose limits on freedom of speech and assembly. They were, in other words, prepared to accept opposition—butonly on their terms.

Morsi, however, had not secured his full control on all the levers of power, and his opposition refused to confine itself to the space he had allotted for them. In a repeat of the 2011 revolution, massive popular unrest combined with the disquiet of the military led to Morsi's overthrow. It now seems that the armed forces, having allowed the political process to unfold without much direction after Mubarak's fall, are now going to play a more controlling role this time around, as the post-Mubarak constitution approved by plebiscite has been suspended, and the timetable for new elections will also be set by the military.

This creates a new dilemma for Washington. Certainly American interests are served by having the Egyptian military—much more of a known