the German moral reputation but served to increase her political clout also in the North. The League of Nations- and UK-orientated foreign policy of the despised Finnish foreign minister Holsti and came under attack by the still formidable conservative opposition. His position seemed increasingly unstable. A renewed commitment to western values by the Finnish Prime Minister in the run-up to the Sudeten crisis did not save him. The German minister seized upon the political constellation and helped to bring Holsti down. The minister’s subsequent euphoria was understandable in light of his long-harboured aversion against Holsti and close relationship with Holsti’s successor, Erkko. Such euphoria, however, proved not justifiable. Instead the German minister had to avoid inconsequential criticism of Erkko’s anglophile policies as he was told frankly that Englishdesire for increased exports was well founded.

The British had no reason to worry. Erkko promised to defend the independence of the Finnish media against German pressure and put all his considerable clout behind supporting Finnish purchase of English goods.

The gross predominance of economic issues in British reports is contrasted by the German ministers almost complete disinterest in the issue. British economic difficulties in the thirties made trade a contentious issue that received much more attention than politics. Most noted was the contribution of trade with Finland to the general trade-deficit which seemed enormous considering the size of the countries’ respective markets. Meanwhile German-Finnish trade grew in volume while British-Finnish trade stagnated.

British industrialists highlighted the unfair methods that Germany employed for steering trade. The possibility of their subsequent demands