While the main South Vietnamese column stalled at A Luoi for three weeks and the Ranger and Airborne elements were fighting for their lives, President Thieu and General Lãm decided to launch a face-saving airborne assault on Tchepone itself.
Although American leaders and news correspondents had focused on the town as one of Lam Son 719's main objectives, the PAVN logistical network actually bypassed the ruined town to the west.
If South Vietnamese forces could at least occupy Tchepone, however, Thieu would have a political excuse for declaring "victory" and withdrawing his forces to South Vietnam.

There has been some historical speculation as to Thieu's original intentions for Lam Son 719.
Some believed that he may have originally ordered his commanders to halt the operation when casualties reached 3,000 and that he had always wanted to pull out at the moment of "victory", presumably the taking of Tchepone, in order to gain political capital for the upcoming fall general and presidential elections.
Regardless, the decision was made to conduct the assault not with the armored task force, but with elements of the 1st Division.
That meant that the occupation of the firebases south of Route 9 had to be taken over by Marine Corps forces, which lost even more valuable time.

Both Abrams and Sutherland wanted the South Vietnamese to remain in Laos, reinforce the embattled units, and fight a major battle then and there.
General Alexander Haig, Nixon's personal military adviser, visited Sutherland in the field and noted Washington's agreement on this point as American fire support might not be available in some later battle, but the Vietnamese were hesitant.

The assault began on 3 March, when elements of the 1st Division were helilifted into two firebases (Lolo and Sophia) and LZ Liz, all south of Route 9.
Eleven helicopters were shot down and another 44 were damaged as they carried one battalion into FSB Lolo (16.615°N 106.338°E) Three days later, 276 UH-1 helicopters protected by Cobra gunships and fighter aircraft, lifted the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 2nd Regiment from Khe Sanh to Tchepone – the largest helicopter assault of the Vietnam War.
Only one helicopter was downed by anti-aircraft fire as the troops combat assaulted into LZ Hope, four kilometers northeast of Tchepone.
For two days the two battalions searched Tchepone and the immediate vicinity, but found little but the bodies of PAVN soldiers killed by air strikes.
PAVN responded by increasing its daily artillery bombardments of the firebases, notably Lolo and Hope.
While the main South Vietnamese column stalled at A Luoi for three weeks and the Ranger and Airborne elements were fighting for their lives, President Thieu and General Lãm decided to launch a face-saving airborne assault on Tchepone itself. Although American leaders and news correspondents had focused on the town as one of Lam Son 719's main objectives, the PAVN logistical network actually bypassed the ruined town to the west. If South Vietnamese forces could at least occupy Tchepone, however, Thieu would have a political excuse for declaring "victory" and withdrawing his forces to South Vietnam.
There has been some historical speculation as to Thieu's original intentions for Lam Son 719. Some believed that he may have originally ordered his commanders to halt the operation when casualties reached 3,000 and that he had always wanted to pull out at the moment of "victory", presumably the taking of Tchepone, in order to gain political capital for the upcoming fall general and presidential elections. Regardless, the decision was made to conduct the assault not with the armored task force, but with elements of the 1st Division. That meant that the occupation of the firebases south of Route 9 had to be taken over by Marine Corps forces, which lost even more valuable time.
Both Abrams and Sutherland wanted the South Vietnamese to remain in Laos, reinforce the embattled units, and fight a major battle then and there. General Alexander Haig, Nixon's personal military adviser, visited Sutherland in the field and noted Washington's agreement on this point as American fire support might not be available in some later battle, but the Vietnamese were hesitant.
The assault began on 3 March, when elements of the 1st Division were helilifted into two firebases (Lolo and Sophia) and LZ Liz, all south of Route 9. Eleven helicopters were shot down and another 44 were damaged as they carried one battalion into FSB Lolo (16.615°N 106.338°E) Three days later, 276 UH-1 helicopters protected by Cobra gunships and fighter aircraft, lifted the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 2nd Regiment from Khe Sanh to Tchepone – the largest helicopter assault of the Vietnam War. Only one helicopter was downed by anti-aircraft fire as the troops combat assaulted into LZ Hope, four kilometers northeast of Tchepone. For two days the two battalions searched Tchepone and the immediate vicinity, but found little but the bodies of PAVN soldiers killed by air strikes. PAVN responded by increasing its daily artillery bombardments of the firebases, notably Lolo and Hope.
Operation Lam Son 719