At the outbreak of the Pacific War, remnants of the United States Asiatic Fleet fled to Australia, on orders from Washington.
The S-boats from the Philippines were organized into a fighting force at Brisbane, and Admiral Ernest King ordered S-boats from the Atlantic Fleet to supplement the force in Australia.
Christie went along, arriving in April 1942, just in time for the Battle of the Coral Sea.
During the Solomon Islands campaign, he ordered his boats to patrol around harbors which, while being key points for shipping, also tended to be heavily patrolled by aircraft and anti-submarine craft.
In step with then-current U.S. Navy submarine doctrine, he made capital ships the prime targets, rather than have his boats focus on merchant shipping.

Almost as soon as the war began, submarine captains indicated there were problems with the Mark 14 torpedo and the influence feature of the Mark 6 exploder.
Torpedoes would fail to explode, or explode prematurely.
Despite these reports, Christie was not fully aware of the impact of the situation, because his S-boats used the older Mark 10 torpedo, with a contact-only pistol.
Christie acknowledged Mark 14s were running deeper than set, but attributed the failures to poor maintenance and errors on the part of the captain and crew.
He was convinced the Mark 6 was satisfactory, and ordered all fleet boats to continue to use it.
In November 1942, Christie was ordered to return to Newport as Inspector of Ordnance at the Torpedo Station.
Newport had become a bottleneck for torpedo manufacture, and the Bureau of Ordnance wanted to advance development of the Mark 18 electric torpedo.
Christie resisted leaving his command at Brisbane, but was considered of more use to resolve the torpedo issue.
He was replaced by Captain James Fife.
For his service at Brisbane, Christie was awarded the Legion of Merit.

Christie was promoted to rear admiral as part of his move back to Newport.
In January 1943, however, Rear Admiral Robert English, Commander, Submarines, U.S. Pacific Fleet, was killed in a plane crash.
Christie hoped to get the position but the job went to Rear Admiral Charles A. Lockwood, commander of submarine operations in Fremantle, and the Bureau of Personnel selected Christie to take over Lockwood's old command.
Christie lobbied Vice Admiral Arthur 'Chips' Carpender, Douglas MacArthur's Commander Allied Naval Forces, to allow him to replace Fife as commander of the larger submarine force at Brisbane.
Carpender refused, and Christie went on to Fremantle.
Nevertheless, Christie continued to try for some time to take the Brisbane force under his control.

By the middle of 1943, Lockwood had received enough reports from submarine officers to convince him the Mark 6 was significantly flawed.
On 24 June 1943, he formally ordered all submarines operating out of Pearl Harbor to deactivate the magnetic influence feature.
However, Christie was still committed to the exploder, and ordered Fremantle boats to continue using the influence feature.
Submarines operating between the two commands were required to either enable or disable it, depending on which command area they were in.
This difference of opinion strained relations between the two admirals.

In November 1943, Carpender was replaced by Vice Admiral Thomas C. Kinkaid, who ordered the final deactivation of the Mark 6 in all combat commands.
Christie abided by the order, commencing on 20 January 1944, but was still convinced the Mark 6 had potential.
He had Commanders Chester Nimitz, Jr. and James McCallum continue technical studies of the Mark 6 and to develop improvements, but these revised exploders were just as unreliable as the earlier versions.
At the outbreak of the Pacific War, remnants of the United States Asiatic Fleet fled to Australia, on orders from Washington. The S-boats from the Philippines were organized into a fighting force at Brisbane, and Admiral Ernest King ordered S-boats from the Atlantic Fleet to supplement the force in Australia. Christie went along, arriving in April 1942, just in time for the Battle of the Coral Sea. During the Solomon Islands campaign, he ordered his boats to patrol around harbors which, while being key points for shipping, also tended to be heavily patrolled by aircraft and anti-submarine craft. In step with then-current U.S. Navy submarine doctrine, he made capital ships the prime targets, rather than have his boats focus on merchant shipping.
Almost as soon as the war began, submarine captains indicated there were problems with the Mark 14 torpedo and the influence feature of the Mark 6 exploder. Torpedoes would fail to explode, or explode prematurely. Despite these reports, Christie was not fully aware of the impact of the situation, because his S-boats used the older Mark 10 torpedo, with a contact-only pistol. Christie acknowledged Mark 14s were running deeper than set, but attributed the failures to poor maintenance and errors on the part of the captain and crew. He was convinced the Mark 6 was satisfactory, and ordered all fleet boats to continue to use it. In November 1942, Christie was ordered to return to Newport as Inspector of Ordnance at the Torpedo Station. Newport had become a bottleneck for torpedo manufacture, and the Bureau of Ordnance wanted to advance development of the Mark 18 electric torpedo. Christie resisted leaving his command at Brisbane, but was considered of more use to resolve the torpedo issue. He was replaced by Captain James Fife. For his service at Brisbane, Christie was awarded the Legion of Merit.
Christie was promoted to rear admiral as part of his move back to Newport. In January 1943, however, Rear Admiral Robert English, Commander, Submarines, U.S. Pacific Fleet, was killed in a plane crash. Christie hoped to get the position but the job went to Rear Admiral Charles A. Lockwood, commander of submarine operations in Fremantle, and the Bureau of Personnel selected Christie to take over Lockwood's old command. Christie lobbied Vice Admiral Arthur 'Chips' Carpender, Douglas MacArthur's Commander Allied Naval Forces, to allow him to replace Fife as commander of the larger submarine force at Brisbane. Carpender refused, and Christie went on to Fremantle. Nevertheless, Christie continued to try for some time to take the Brisbane force under his control.
By the middle of 1943, Lockwood had received enough reports from submarine officers to convince him the Mark 6 was significantly flawed. On 24 June 1943, he formally ordered all submarines operating out of Pearl Harbor to deactivate the magnetic influence feature. However, Christie was still committed to the exploder, and ordered Fremantle boats to continue using the influence feature. Submarines operating between the two commands were required to either enable or disable it, depending on which command area they were in. This difference of opinion strained relations between the two admirals.
In November 1943, Carpender was replaced by Vice Admiral Thomas C. Kinkaid, who ordered the final deactivation of the Mark 6 in all combat commands. Christie abided by the order, commencing on 20 January 1944, but was still convinced the Mark 6 had potential. He had Commanders Chester Nimitz, Jr. and James McCallum continue technical studies of the Mark 6 and to develop improvements, but these revised exploders were just as unreliable as the earlier versions.
Ralph Waldo Christie