A recent way to interpret Either/Or is to read it as an applied Kantian text.
Scholars for this interpretation include Alasdair MacIntyre and Ronald M. Green.
In After Virtue, MacIntyre claims Kierkegaard is continuing the Enlightenment project set forward by Hume and Kant.
Green notes several points of contact with Kant in Either/Or: Here is one example from his journals regarding Immanuel Kant and the categorical imperative.

Kant thought that man was his own legislator (autonomy); that is, subjecting himself to the law that he gives to himself.
Properly understood, that is to postulate lawlessness or experimentation.
There will be as little seriousness in this as in the mighty blows Sancho Panza dealt himself on the back.
It is impossible for me, in A, really to be stricter than I am in B, or wish to be that.
There must be a constraint if there is to be earnest.
When nothing higher than myself is binding, if it is simply that I am to bind myself, then where as A, the one who binds, am I to acquire the strictness I do not possess as B, the one to be bound, if A and B are the same self?

This is evident these days, especially in all religious realms.
The conversion which is properly from immediacy to spirit, that dying away, will not be serious, will be an illusion, experimentation, if there is no factor, which is not the individual itself.
That is why all eminent individualities  are also compelled, they are instruments.
Not only is there no law that I give myself as a maxim, it is the case that there is a law given me by a higher authority.
And not just that: the legislator makes so free as to take part in the capacity of education and exerts the compulsion.
If someone never acts so decisively that this educator can get hold of him; yes, then he gets  to live on in comfortable illusion, fantasy, and experimentation.

But this also implies he is in the very highest disfavor.
A person can at least be strict enough with himself to grasp that this business of my own strictness amounts to nothing; I must have another to help, one who can be severe even if he can also be lenient.
But to have dealings with this other does not mean giving assurance upon assurance, it means acting.
As soon as one acts decisively and emerges into actuality, existence can get hold of one and guidance bring one up.

Papers and Journals of Soren Kierkegaard, 50 X 2 A 396 - Hannay 1996, p. 467
However, other scholars think Kierkegaard adopts Kantian themes in order to criticize them, while yet others think that although Kierkegaard adopts some Kantian themes, their final ethical positions are substantially different.
George Stack argues for this latter interpretation, writing, "Despite the occasional echoes of Kantian sentiments in Kierkegaard's writings (especially in Either/Or), the bifurcation between his ethics of self-becoming and Kant's formalistic, meta-empirical ethics is, mutatis mutandis, complete ... Since radical individuation, specificity, inwardness, and the development of subjectivity are central to Kierkegaard's existential ethics, it is clear, essentially, that the spirit and intention of his practical ethics is divorced from the formalism of Kant."
A recent way to interpret Either/Or is to read it as an applied Kantian text. Scholars for this interpretation include Alasdair MacIntyre and Ronald M. Green. In After Virtue, MacIntyre claims Kierkegaard is continuing the Enlightenment project set forward by Hume and Kant. Green notes several points of contact with Kant in Either/Or: Here is one example from his journals regarding Immanuel Kant and the categorical imperative. 
Kant thought that man was his own legislator (autonomy); that is, subjecting himself to the law that he gives to himself. Properly understood, that is to postulate lawlessness or experimentation. There will be as little seriousness in this as in the mighty blows Sancho Panza dealt himself on the back. It is impossible for me, in A, really to be stricter than I am in B, or wish to be that. There must be a constraint if there is to be earnest. When nothing higher than myself is binding, if it is simply that I am to bind myself, then where as A, the one who binds, am I to acquire the strictness I do not possess as B, the one to be bound, if A and B are the same self?
This is evident these days, especially in all religious realms. The conversion which is properly from immediacy to spirit, that dying away, will not be serious, will be an illusion, experimentation, if there is no factor, which is not the individual itself. That is why all eminent individualities  are also compelled, they are instruments. Not only is there no law that I give myself as a maxim, it is the case that there is a law given me by a higher authority. And not just that: the legislator makes so free as to take part in the capacity of education and exerts the compulsion. If someone never acts so decisively that this educator can get hold of him; yes, then he gets  to live on in comfortable illusion, fantasy, and experimentation.
But this also implies he is in the very highest disfavor. A person can at least be strict enough with himself to grasp that this business of my own strictness amounts to nothing; I must have another to help, one who can be severe even if he can also be lenient. But to have dealings with this other does not mean giving assurance upon assurance, it means acting. As soon as one acts decisively and emerges into actuality, existence can get hold of one and guidance bring one up.
Papers and Journals of Soren Kierkegaard, 50 X 2 A 396 - Hannay 1996, p. 467
However, other scholars think Kierkegaard adopts Kantian themes in order to criticize them, while yet others think that although Kierkegaard adopts some Kantian themes, their final ethical positions are substantially different. George Stack argues for this latter interpretation, writing, "Despite the occasional echoes of Kantian sentiments in Kierkegaard's writings (especially in Either/Or), the bifurcation between his ethics of self-becoming and Kant's formalistic, meta-empirical ethics is, mutatis mutandis, complete ... Since radical individuation, specificity, inwardness, and the development of subjectivity are central to Kierkegaard's existential ethics, it is clear, essentially, that the spirit and intention of his practical ethics is divorced from the formalism of Kant."
Either/Or