Shortly thereafter, Model was promoted to General der Panzertruppe (general) and placed in command of XLI Panzer Corps, which was embroiled in Operation Typhoon, the assault on Moscow.
The attack had begun on 2 October 1941, and Model arrived at his new command on 14 November, in the midst of the battle.

The corps, part of Georg-Hans Reinhardt's Third Panzer Group, was located at Kalinin, 160 km (100 mi) northwest of Moscow.
It was worn out, at the end of a long and tenuous supply line (Model had been promoted on 28 October, and needed two weeks just to get to Kalinin), and the cold weather was starting to hamper the Germans.
Nevertheless, morale remained high, and the final push towards Moscow began shortly after his arrival.

Model was a whirlwind of energy, touring the front and exhorting his troops to greater efforts: he also ran roughshod over the niceties of protocol and chains of command, and, in general, left his staff trailing in his wake.
By 5 December, XLI Panzer Corps' 6th Panzer Division had reached Iohnca, just 35 kilometres (22 mi) from the Kremlin.
There, the advance stopped, as the winter took hold.
Temperatures dropped 20 to 40 °C below zero, weapons and vehicles froze solid, and the Germans were forced to call a halt to offensive operations.

Just as the Germans had made the halt decision, the Soviet Kalinin, Western and Southwestern Fronts launched a massive counteroffensive, aimed at driving Army Group Centre back from Moscow.
The attacks were especially strong against Third Panzer Group, which had made some of the closest penetrations to the city.
In three weeks of confused, savage fighting, Reinhardt extricated his troops from potential encirclement and fell back to the Lama River line.

Placed in charge of covering the retreat, Model's harsh, almost brutal, style of leadership now paid dividends as panic threatened to infect the German columns.
On several occasions, he restored order at a congested crossroads with a drawn pistol, but the retreat never became a rout.

During this period, Model noticed that the Soviet attack—human wave attacks with poor tactical coordination—tended to be most successful when the Germans employed a strongpoint defence instead of a continuous line.
Moreover, Soviet logistics were still inadequate to support a fast-moving battle; thus, even if a gap was made, it did not automatically mean a crisis.
Therefore, he ordered his men to spread themselves out, which exploited his corps' advantage in artillery over the Soviets, while he created small mechanized kampfgruppen to deal with any breakthrough.
His tactics were successful, if costly (by the end of 1941, 6th Panzer Division mustered 1,000 men, including all frontline, support and staff personnel).
He would continue to advocate similar tactics throughout the remainder of his career.
Shortly thereafter, Model was promoted to General der Panzertruppe (general) and placed in command of XLI Panzer Corps, which was embroiled in Operation Typhoon, the assault on Moscow. The attack had begun on 2 October 1941, and Model arrived at his new command on 14 November, in the midst of the battle.
The corps, part of Georg-Hans Reinhardt's Third Panzer Group, was located at Kalinin, 160 km (100 mi) northwest of Moscow. It was worn out, at the end of a long and tenuous supply line (Model had been promoted on 28 October, and needed two weeks just to get to Kalinin), and the cold weather was starting to hamper the Germans. Nevertheless, morale remained high, and the final push towards Moscow began shortly after his arrival.
Model was a whirlwind of energy, touring the front and exhorting his troops to greater efforts: he also ran roughshod over the niceties of protocol and chains of command, and, in general, left his staff trailing in his wake. By 5 December, XLI Panzer Corps' 6th Panzer Division had reached Iohnca, just 35 kilometres (22 mi) from the Kremlin. There, the advance stopped, as the winter took hold. Temperatures dropped 20 to 40 °C below zero, weapons and vehicles froze solid, and the Germans were forced to call a halt to offensive operations.
Just as the Germans had made the halt decision, the Soviet Kalinin, Western and Southwestern Fronts launched a massive counteroffensive, aimed at driving Army Group Centre back from Moscow. The attacks were especially strong against Third Panzer Group, which had made some of the closest penetrations to the city. In three weeks of confused, savage fighting, Reinhardt extricated his troops from potential encirclement and fell back to the Lama River line.
Placed in charge of covering the retreat, Model's harsh, almost brutal, style of leadership now paid dividends as panic threatened to infect the German columns. On several occasions, he restored order at a congested crossroads with a drawn pistol, but the retreat never became a rout.
During this period, Model noticed that the Soviet attack—human wave attacks with poor tactical coordination—tended to be most successful when the Germans employed a strongpoint defence instead of a continuous line. Moreover, Soviet logistics were still inadequate to support a fast-moving battle; thus, even if a gap was made, it did not automatically mean a crisis. Therefore, he ordered his men to spread themselves out, which exploited his corps' advantage in artillery over the Soviets, while he created small mechanized kampfgruppen to deal with any breakthrough. His tactics were successful, if costly (by the end of 1941, 6th Panzer Division mustered 1,000 men, including all frontline, support and staff personnel). He would continue to advocate similar tactics throughout the remainder of his career.
Walter Model