At his meeting with Arnold, Chiang warned that the price of China's cooperation with Stilwell to reconquer Burma was a 500-plane air force and delivery by the airlift of 10,000 tons a month.
In May 1943, at the Trident Conference, President Roosevelt ordered ATC to deliver 5,000 tons a month to China by July; 7,500 tons by August; and 10,000 tons by September 1943.
This came about as Marshall and Arnold sent Maj.
Gen. George E. Stratemeyer, the Chief of Air Staff, on a special mission to India to observe ICWATC operations and report back with recommendations.
Similarly, Eddie Rickenbacker flew the Hump in a C-87 to reach China during his fact-finding mission to the Far East and the Soviet Union, and both he and Stratemeyer found ICW's performance seriously deficient.
While ICW was carrying more tonnage by virtue of having nearly ten times as many aircraft as CNAC (and half of those with a larger load capacity), the Chinese carrier was far more efficient in tonnage lifted per aircraft, by a factor of 2.5 to 1.
The primary cause of ATC's failure was the complete inadequacy of its airfield facilities, but other major factors were unsatisfactory performance by overwhelmed aircraft maintenance personnel that grounded a hundred ATC aircraft per day, a predominance of inexperienced pilots (particularly compared to those of CNAC), and a dearth of radio and navigation aids in ATC transports.
Rickenbacker and Tenth Air Force commanding general Clayton L. Bissell recommended return of the operation to theater command, but Stratemeyer disagreed, as did Maj.
Gen. Howard C. Davidson, who was about to replace Bissell in command of 10AF and had made an inspection tour of his own in June.

Frustration at the failure of the ICW to meet the Trident goals led Arnold to dispatch another inspection team to India in September 1943, led by ATC commander Maj.
Gen. Harold L. George.
Accompanying George was Col.
Thomas O. Hardin, an aggressive former airline executive who had already been overseas a year as head of ATC's Central African Sector.
On 16 September, George immediately reassigned Hardin to command the new Eastern Sector of the ICW, to invigorate India-China operations.
Alexander was replaced in command of the ICW by Brig.
Gen. Earl S. Hoag on 15 October.
In addition to the changes in command, George instituted the "Fireball", a weekly C-87 express flight (see External links for photo essay) by the 26th Transport Group carrying critical spare parts for the transports from the Air Service Command Depot at Fairfield, Ohio, to the ATC service depot at Agra, India.

Japanese fighters based in central Burma began to challenge the transport route near Sumprabum at the end of the summer monsoon.
On 13 October 1943, a large number of fighters assisted by ground observers evaded U.S. fighter patrols and shot down a C-46, a C-87, and a CNAC transport while damaging three others.
Despite the doubling of U.S. fighter patrols, similar interceptions on 20, 23, and 27 October shot down five more C-46s.
Japanese pilots referred to the shooting down of vulnerable transport aircraft as tsuji-giri ("cutting down a casually met stranger") or akago no te wo hineru ("twisting a baby's arm").
On the last of the interceptions a formation of B-24s on a reverse Hump mission, mistaken for C-87s, claimed eight fighters shot down.
Tenth Air Force immediately began attacks on Japanese airfields (Myitkyina was attacked 14 times before the end of the year, mostly by strafers and P-40s using 1000-lb bombs) and ICW moved its route to Kunming even farther north.
Only two more C-46s were shot down during the remainder of 1943, both in December.

20 Japanese bombers escorted by 25 fighters bombed the Assam airfields on 13 December 1943 after several days of probing the early warning system without making an attack.
Despite an increase in fighter patrols and an alarm issued, the defenders had only twelve minutes warning.
U.S. interceptors were unable to climb to the 18,000-foot (5,500 m) altitude of the bombers in time to prevent the bombing, but only slight damage resulted.
Th
At his meeting with Arnold, Chiang warned that the price of China's cooperation with Stilwell to reconquer Burma was a 500-plane air force and delivery by the airlift of 10,000 tons a month. In May 1943, at the Trident Conference, President Roosevelt ordered ATC to deliver 5,000 tons a month to China by July; 7,500 tons by August; and 10,000 tons by September 1943. This came about as Marshall and Arnold sent Maj. Gen. George E. Stratemeyer, the Chief of Air Staff, on a special mission to India to observe ICWATC operations and report back with recommendations. Similarly, Eddie Rickenbacker flew the Hump in a C-87 to reach China during his fact-finding mission to the Far East and the Soviet Union, and both he and Stratemeyer found ICW's performance seriously deficient. While ICW was carrying more tonnage by virtue of having nearly ten times as many aircraft as CNAC (and half of those with a larger load capacity), the Chinese carrier was far more efficient in tonnage lifted per aircraft, by a factor of 2.5 to 1. The primary cause of ATC's failure was the complete inadequacy of its airfield facilities, but other major factors were unsatisfactory performance by overwhelmed aircraft maintenance personnel that grounded a hundred ATC aircraft per day, a predominance of inexperienced pilots (particularly compared to those of CNAC), and a dearth of radio and navigation aids in ATC transports. Rickenbacker and Tenth Air Force commanding general Clayton L. Bissell recommended return of the operation to theater command, but Stratemeyer disagreed, as did Maj. Gen. Howard C. Davidson, who was about to replace Bissell in command of 10AF and had made an inspection tour of his own in June.
Frustration at the failure of the ICW to meet the Trident goals led Arnold to dispatch another inspection team to India in September 1943, led by ATC commander Maj. Gen. Harold L. George. Accompanying George was Col. Thomas O. Hardin, an aggressive former airline executive who had already been overseas a year as head of ATC's Central African Sector. On 16 September, George immediately reassigned Hardin to command the new Eastern Sector of the ICW, to invigorate India-China operations. Alexander was replaced in command of the ICW by Brig. Gen. Earl S. Hoag on 15 October. In addition to the changes in command, George instituted the "Fireball", a weekly C-87 express flight (see External links for photo essay) by the 26th Transport Group carrying critical spare parts for the transports from the Air Service Command Depot at Fairfield, Ohio, to the ATC service depot at Agra, India.
Japanese fighters based in central Burma began to challenge the transport route near Sumprabum at the end of the summer monsoon. On 13 October 1943, a large number of fighters assisted by ground observers evaded U.S. fighter patrols and shot down a C-46, a C-87, and a CNAC transport while damaging three others. Despite the doubling of U.S. fighter patrols, similar interceptions on 20, 23, and 27 October shot down five more C-46s. Japanese pilots referred to the shooting down of vulnerable transport aircraft as tsuji-giri ("cutting down a casually met stranger") or akago no te wo hineru ("twisting a baby's arm"). On the last of the interceptions a formation of B-24s on a reverse Hump mission, mistaken for C-87s, claimed eight fighters shot down. Tenth Air Force immediately began attacks on Japanese airfields (Myitkyina was attacked 14 times before the end of the year, mostly by strafers and P-40s using 1000-lb bombs) and ICW moved its route to Kunming even farther north. Only two more C-46s were shot down during the remainder of 1943, both in December.
20 Japanese bombers escorted by 25 fighters bombed the Assam airfields on 13 December 1943 after several days of probing the early warning system without making an attack. Despite an increase in fighter patrols and an alarm issued, the defenders had only twelve minutes warning. U.S. interceptors were unable to climb to the 18,000-foot (5,500 m) altitude of the bombers in time to prevent the bombing, but only slight damage resulted. Th
The Hump