The British were well aware of these developments through a well-established network of secret agents.
On 19 February the British war cabinet met at Lord Anson's house to discuss the potential invasion.
Both William Pitt and the Prime Minister, the Duke of Newcastle, were extremely bullish about the prospects of the campaign.
A few proposals were made, such as stationing troops on the Isle of Wight, but the consensus was that existing strategy was already sufficient to deal with the invasion threat.
No plans were made for the withdrawal of British troops in Germany or to request that Hanoverian troops be sent to defend Britain.

Pitt was committed to despatching expeditions to French colonies around the world, a policy that had proved successful.
It had, however, deprived Britain of necessary troops to defend itself from a European invasion.
In response to this the government had pushed through a Militia Act which created a large militia to defend Britain.
 The fighting capabilities of this force were untested, though it provided the British with a much larger force on paper than her regular troops alone.
General Ligonier estimated that he would have only 10,000 regular troops immediately available to resist any French landing.

A tight blockade was maintained on major French ports throughout 1759 under the command of Admiral Edward Hawke.
 It proved crippling, as it denied France valuable colonial shipping supplies, and the ease with which the Blockaders kept the French fleet bottled up was shattering to French morale.
Improvements in supply arrangements had enabled the British to maintain a continuous blockade, something they had failed to accomplish previously.
 The British shared conventional wisdom that any invasion would have to involve the Brest fleet, but kept a close watch on all potential departure points.
The British were well aware of these developments through a well-established network of secret agents. On 19 February the British war cabinet met at Lord Anson's house to discuss the potential invasion. Both William Pitt and the Prime Minister, the Duke of Newcastle, were extremely bullish about the prospects of the campaign. A few proposals were made, such as stationing troops on the Isle of Wight, but the consensus was that existing strategy was already sufficient to deal with the invasion threat. No plans were made for the withdrawal of British troops in Germany or to request that Hanoverian troops be sent to defend Britain.
Pitt was committed to despatching expeditions to French colonies around the world, a policy that had proved successful. It had, however, deprived Britain of necessary troops to defend itself from a European invasion. In response to this the government had pushed through a Militia Act which created a large militia to defend Britain.  The fighting capabilities of this force were untested, though it provided the British with a much larger force on paper than her regular troops alone. General Ligonier estimated that he would have only 10,000 regular troops immediately available to resist any French landing.
A tight blockade was maintained on major French ports throughout 1759 under the command of Admiral Edward Hawke.  It proved crippling, as it denied France valuable colonial shipping supplies, and the ease with which the Blockaders kept the French fleet bottled up was shattering to French morale. Improvements in supply arrangements had enabled the British to maintain a continuous blockade, something they had failed to accomplish previously.  The British shared conventional wisdom that any invasion would have to involve the Brest fleet, but kept a close watch on all potential departure points.
Planned French invasion of Britain (1759)