In order to effectively neutralise the Würzburg system by developing countermeasures against it, Jones and his team needed to study one of the systems, or at least the more vital pieces of technology of which the system was composed.
One such site had recently been sighted by an RAF reconnaissance Spitfire from the Photographic Reconnaissance Unit during a flight over part of the French English Channel coast near Le Havre.

The site was found on a clifftop immediately north of the village of Bruneval, which was itself 12 miles (19 km) north of Le Havre, and was the most accessible German radar site that had been found so far by the British; several other installations were further inland in France, and others were as far away as Romania and Bulgaria.
A request for a raid on the Bruneval site to capture a Würzburg system was passed on to Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten, the commander of Combined Operations.
Mountbatten, in turn, took the proposal to the Chiefs of Staff Committee, who approved the raid after a brief debate.

Having received permission to conduct the raid, Mountbatten and his staff studied the Bruneval installation and its defences, rapidly coming to the conclusion that due to the extensive coastal defences in the area around the installation it was too well-guarded to permit a seaborne commando raid.
They considered that such a raid would result in high casualties among the attacking troops and would not be fast enough to capture the Würzburg radar before it was destroyed by the Germans.
Believing that surprise and speed were to be the essential requirements of any raid against the installation to ensure the radar was captured, Mountbatten saw an airborne assault as the only viable method.
On 8 January 1942, he therefore contacted the headquarters of 1st Airborne Division and 38 Wing RAF, asking if they were able to conduct the raid.
The division's commander, Major-General Frederick Browning, was particularly enthusiastic, as a successful operation would be an excellent morale boost to the airborne troops under his command, as well as a good demonstration of their value.

The two commanders believed that training by both airborne troops and aircrews could be completed by the end of February when there would be suitable meteorological conditions for such an operation to take place.
Training for the raid was begun immediately but encountered several problems.
38 Wing was a new unit still in the process of formation, so No.
51 Squadron RAF under Wing Commander Percy Charles Pickard was selected to provide the aircraft and aircrew needed for the operation, although Group Captain Nigel Norman of 38 Wing would remain in overall command.
Another problem encountered was the state of training of the unit of airborne troops chosen to raid the installation.

During this period, 1st Airborne Division was composed of only two parachute battalions, of which only one (1st Parachute Battalion), was fully trained.
Browning, wishing to keep 1st Parachute Battalion intact for any larger operation the division might be selected for, ordered 2nd Parachute Battalion to provide a company for the operation. '
C' Company commanded by Frost was selected, but the company had been so recently formed that Frost and many of his men had not yet completed their parachute jumping course.

The level of security imposed on the planning for the raid was so high that when Major Frost was first briefed by a liaison officer from the headquarters of 1st Airborne Division, he was informed that his company was to take part in an airborne warfare demonstration for the War Cabinet.
He was also informed that C Company would be divided into four sections for the exercise, which was contrary to a plan Frost had devised for the exercise and confused him.
It was only after Frost raised several objections with a more senior officer at headquarters that he was informed of the intended raid, after which the Major dropped his objections and turned his attention to training the company.
In order to effectively neutralise the Würzburg system by developing countermeasures against it, Jones and his team needed to study one of the systems, or at least the more vital pieces of technology of which the system was composed. One such site had recently been sighted by an RAF reconnaissance Spitfire from the Photographic Reconnaissance Unit during a flight over part of the French English Channel coast near Le Havre.
The site was found on a clifftop immediately north of the village of Bruneval, which was itself 12 miles (19 km) north of Le Havre, and was the most accessible German radar site that had been found so far by the British; several other installations were further inland in France, and others were as far away as Romania and Bulgaria. A request for a raid on the Bruneval site to capture a Würzburg system was passed on to Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten, the commander of Combined Operations. Mountbatten, in turn, took the proposal to the Chiefs of Staff Committee, who approved the raid after a brief debate.
Having received permission to conduct the raid, Mountbatten and his staff studied the Bruneval installation and its defences, rapidly coming to the conclusion that due to the extensive coastal defences in the area around the installation it was too well-guarded to permit a seaborne commando raid. They considered that such a raid would result in high casualties among the attacking troops and would not be fast enough to capture the Würzburg radar before it was destroyed by the Germans. Believing that surprise and speed were to be the essential requirements of any raid against the installation to ensure the radar was captured, Mountbatten saw an airborne assault as the only viable method. On 8 January 1942, he therefore contacted the headquarters of 1st Airborne Division and 38 Wing RAF, asking if they were able to conduct the raid. The division's commander, Major-General Frederick Browning, was particularly enthusiastic, as a successful operation would be an excellent morale boost to the airborne troops under his command, as well as a good demonstration of their value.
The two commanders believed that training by both airborne troops and aircrews could be completed by the end of February when there would be suitable meteorological conditions for such an operation to take place. Training for the raid was begun immediately but encountered several problems. 38 Wing was a new unit still in the process of formation, so No. 51 Squadron RAF under Wing Commander Percy Charles Pickard was selected to provide the aircraft and aircrew needed for the operation, although Group Captain Nigel Norman of 38 Wing would remain in overall command. Another problem encountered was the state of training of the unit of airborne troops chosen to raid the installation.
During this period, 1st Airborne Division was composed of only two parachute battalions, of which only one (1st Parachute Battalion), was fully trained. Browning, wishing to keep 1st Parachute Battalion intact for any larger operation the division might be selected for, ordered 2nd Parachute Battalion to provide a company for the operation. 'C' Company commanded by Frost was selected, but the company had been so recently formed that Frost and many of his men had not yet completed their parachute jumping course.
The level of security imposed on the planning for the raid was so high that when Major Frost was first briefed by a liaison officer from the headquarters of 1st Airborne Division, he was informed that his company was to take part in an airborne warfare demonstration for the War Cabinet. He was also informed that C Company would be divided into four sections for the exercise, which was contrary to a plan Frost had devised for the exercise and confused him. It was only after Frost raised several objections with a more senior officer at headquarters that he was informed of the intended raid, after which the Major dropped his objections and turned his attention to training the company.
Operation Biting