Despite the commercial success of the Brooklyn Navy Yard, the former shipyard was also beset by accusations of corruption and racketeering.
Additionally, the introduction of large container ships, which were too big to access the Brooklyn Navy Yard, meant that potential tenants operated in New Jersey instead, which had been investing in container shipping terminals As a result, most of the 30,000 to 40,000 jobs never materialized.

Seatrain endured a $13.5 million financial loss in 1978 because of various strikes and a decline in demand for oil tankers.
In January 1979, Seatrain Lines suddenly closed down.
More than 1,300 employees were fired, and only 150 were retained to finish any remaining projects.
This caused a sharp decrease in the number of employees at the yard, and after Seatrain's employees had been terminated, the Brooklyn Navy Yard employed 3,970 people.
After Seatrain closed down, Coastal Dry Dock became the largest tenant in the yard, with 600 to 1,000 workers at any given time.

The New York City Comptroller, Harrison J. Goldin, published a report on his office's audit of Brooklyn Navy Yard operations in July 1980.
He concluded that the yard had been the victim of "a combination of fraud, mismanagement and waste" because of unnecessary or high expenses incurred by CLICK employees.
After Goldin's report was published, CLICK's director was forced to resign.
In subsequent reports, Goldin found that contracts were poorly managed, and that the city was not getting rent money from the Brooklyn Navy Yard.
The number of people working at the yard continued to decline, and by October 1980, the yard hired 2,900 people, of which nearly half worked at Coastal Dry Dock.
The most optimistic estimates proposed that the Navy Yard would see 10,000 new jobs added if its redevelopment were to peak.
Local residents expressed frustration about the lack of job creation in the Brooklyn Navy Yard, as well as concerns about CLICK's lack of transparency, since residents were prohibited from attending CLICK meetings.
In addition, companies at the Navy Yard were accused of having exceedingly high job standards that disqualified most residents from positions at the yard.
CLICK was replaced by the nonprofit Brooklyn Navy Yard Development Corporation in 1981.

Coastal Dry Dock filed for bankruptcy in May 1986, and closed the following year.
With the loss of Coastal Dry Dock, Brooklyn Navy Yard's revenue decreased by more than half.
By 1987, the Brooklyn Navy Yard Development Corporation failed in all attempts to lease any of the six dry docks and buildings to any shipbuilding or ship-repair company.
However, the Navy Yard did have 83 tenants and 2,600 employees, who generated a combined $2.7 million per year for the yard.
Another ship-repair company, Brooklyn Ship Repair, had a tentative contract to lease space at the Navy Yard, but withdrew in 1988.
On the other hand, after a city bailout of the yard in 1986, the Brooklyn Navy Yard Development Corporation started making its first-ever profit.
Despite the commercial success of the Brooklyn Navy Yard, the former shipyard was also beset by accusations of corruption and racketeering. Additionally, the introduction of large container ships, which were too big to access the Brooklyn Navy Yard, meant that potential tenants operated in New Jersey instead, which had been investing in container shipping terminals As a result, most of the 30,000 to 40,000 jobs never materialized.
Seatrain endured a $13.5 million financial loss in 1978 because of various strikes and a decline in demand for oil tankers. In January 1979, Seatrain Lines suddenly closed down. More than 1,300 employees were fired, and only 150 were retained to finish any remaining projects. This caused a sharp decrease in the number of employees at the yard, and after Seatrain's employees had been terminated, the Brooklyn Navy Yard employed 3,970 people. After Seatrain closed down, Coastal Dry Dock became the largest tenant in the yard, with 600 to 1,000 workers at any given time.
The New York City Comptroller, Harrison J. Goldin, published a report on his office's audit of Brooklyn Navy Yard operations in July 1980. He concluded that the yard had been the victim of "a combination of fraud, mismanagement and waste" because of unnecessary or high expenses incurred by CLICK employees. After Goldin's report was published, CLICK's director was forced to resign. In subsequent reports, Goldin found that contracts were poorly managed, and that the city was not getting rent money from the Brooklyn Navy Yard. The number of people working at the yard continued to decline, and by October 1980, the yard hired 2,900 people, of which nearly half worked at Coastal Dry Dock. The most optimistic estimates proposed that the Navy Yard would see 10,000 new jobs added if its redevelopment were to peak. Local residents expressed frustration about the lack of job creation in the Brooklyn Navy Yard, as well as concerns about CLICK's lack of transparency, since residents were prohibited from attending CLICK meetings. In addition, companies at the Navy Yard were accused of having exceedingly high job standards that disqualified most residents from positions at the yard. CLICK was replaced by the nonprofit Brooklyn Navy Yard Development Corporation in 1981.
Coastal Dry Dock filed for bankruptcy in May 1986, and closed the following year. With the loss of Coastal Dry Dock, Brooklyn Navy Yard's revenue decreased by more than half. By 1987, the Brooklyn Navy Yard Development Corporation failed in all attempts to lease any of the six dry docks and buildings to any shipbuilding or ship-repair company. However, the Navy Yard did have 83 tenants and 2,600 employees, who generated a combined $2.7 million per year for the yard. Another ship-repair company, Brooklyn Ship Repair, had a tentative contract to lease space at the Navy Yard, but withdrew in 1988. On the other hand, after a city bailout of the yard in 1986, the Brooklyn Navy Yard Development Corporation started making its first-ever profit.
Brooklyn Navy Yard