The Midland (as it was colloquially known) was an extraordinarily difficult railroad to operate, in large part because it had very little level track.
In crossing Colorado, the line made three summits – at Hayden Divide, west of Colorado Springs, at Trout Creek Pass, and at Hagerman Pass on the Continental Divide.
 The Hagerman Tunnel was completed in 1887.
In 1891, it was replaced by the Busk-Ivanhoe Tunnel which was at a lower altitude.
This shortened the line and made the grade easier, but the approaches to these summits were severe: eastbound trains faced an ascent of about twenty miles of three percent grades in the climb from Basalt to the western portal of the tunnel at Ivanhoe; westbound trains climbing out of the Arkansas River Valley faced a shorter but still difficult climb of 3.24%.
 The ascent from Colorado Springs to Divide was also severe, with several stretches of 4% grade and significant curvature.

The portion of the line from Leadville to Hagerman Pass provided the setting for some of the finest railroad imagery ever taken.
Especially noteworthy was the work of W. H. Jackson, particularly the photos circa 1890 showing the rise over five levels and the massive wood trestle leading to the final tier.

Even after the boring of the Busk-Ivanhoe Tunnel, much of this trackage was above nine thousand feet, in a district of Colorado where the snow often does not melt entirely until June.
The railroad was difficult to operate at the best of times, and in winter it was often nearly impossible: the 1899 blizzard closed the line over Hagerman Pass for 77 days and cost the company more than $73,000 (approx $2 million in 2013).

As great a problem as topography was, the route and terminals posed a still greater one.
The line was originally projected to connect Colorado Springs, Leadville, and Salt Lake City, Utah, but it eventually stopped at Grand Junction, Colorado.
If the line had been extended to Salt Lake City it would have had access to connections with the Union Pacific and Southern Pacific at Ogden, but at Grand Junction, it connected only with the Denver & Rio Grande, its principal competitor for traffic at Leadville and Colorado Springs.
While the Midland had no choice but to turn over westbound traffic to the D&RGW at Grand Junction, the competing line had no such incentive; it could move eastbound traffic over its own line to any spot the Midland served.
When A.E. Carleton bought the CM, he planned to remedy this situation by extending the railroad across Utah to Salt Lake City, but he was unable to do so, relying instead on his business connections to obtain cars consigned for shipment east at Grand Junction.

Ironically, the situation reversed itself abruptly after the government took control of the railroads, and the USRA decided to route all trans-Colorado traffic onto the Midland.
The railroad suddenly found itself handling a swelling volume of interchange traffic at Colorado Springs and Grand Junction.
The line had neither the motive power nor the physical facilities to deal with this sudden change, and yards and even on-line sidings rapidly filled with cars waiting movement to one of the terminals.
After an investigation, the government reversed its decision, redirecting through traffic to neighboring lines that were more capable of handling it; this was a wise decision, but the business generated by the road's on-line customers was not sufficient to keep it profitable without through traffic, and Carleton was compelled to seek permission from a court to abandon service in the summer of 1918.
The Midland (as it was colloquially known) was an extraordinarily difficult railroad to operate, in large part because it had very little level track. In crossing Colorado, the line made three summits – at Hayden Divide, west of Colorado Springs, at Trout Creek Pass, and at Hagerman Pass on the Continental Divide.  The Hagerman Tunnel was completed in 1887. In 1891, it was replaced by the Busk-Ivanhoe Tunnel which was at a lower altitude. This shortened the line and made the grade easier, but the approaches to these summits were severe: eastbound trains faced an ascent of about twenty miles of three percent grades in the climb from Basalt to the western portal of the tunnel at Ivanhoe; westbound trains climbing out of the Arkansas River Valley faced a shorter but still difficult climb of 3.24%.  The ascent from Colorado Springs to Divide was also severe, with several stretches of 4% grade and significant curvature.
The portion of the line from Leadville to Hagerman Pass provided the setting for some of the finest railroad imagery ever taken. Especially noteworthy was the work of W. H. Jackson, particularly the photos circa 1890 showing the rise over five levels and the massive wood trestle leading to the final tier. 
Even after the boring of the Busk-Ivanhoe Tunnel, much of this trackage was above nine thousand feet, in a district of Colorado where the snow often does not melt entirely until June. The railroad was difficult to operate at the best of times, and in winter it was often nearly impossible: the 1899 blizzard closed the line over Hagerman Pass for 77 days and cost the company more than $73,000 (approx $2 million in 2013). 
As great a problem as topography was, the route and terminals posed a still greater one. The line was originally projected to connect Colorado Springs, Leadville, and Salt Lake City, Utah, but it eventually stopped at Grand Junction, Colorado. If the line had been extended to Salt Lake City it would have had access to connections with the Union Pacific and Southern Pacific at Ogden, but at Grand Junction, it connected only with the Denver & Rio Grande, its principal competitor for traffic at Leadville and Colorado Springs. While the Midland had no choice but to turn over westbound traffic to the D&RGW at Grand Junction, the competing line had no such incentive; it could move eastbound traffic over its own line to any spot the Midland served. When A.E. Carleton bought the CM, he planned to remedy this situation by extending the railroad across Utah to Salt Lake City, but he was unable to do so, relying instead on his business connections to obtain cars consigned for shipment east at Grand Junction.
Ironically, the situation reversed itself abruptly after the government took control of the railroads, and the USRA decided to route all trans-Colorado traffic onto the Midland. The railroad suddenly found itself handling a swelling volume of interchange traffic at Colorado Springs and Grand Junction. The line had neither the motive power nor the physical facilities to deal with this sudden change, and yards and even on-line sidings rapidly filled with cars waiting movement to one of the terminals. After an investigation, the government reversed its decision, redirecting through traffic to neighboring lines that were more capable of handling it; this was a wise decision, but the business generated by the road's on-line customers was not sufficient to keep it profitable without through traffic, and Carleton was compelled to seek permission from a court to abandon service in the summer of 1918.
Colorado Midland Railway