Belgian military planning was based on the assumption that other powers would oust an invader but the likelihood of a German invasion did not lead to France and Britain being seen as allies or for the Belgian government to do more than protect its independence.
The Anglo-French Entente (1904) had led the Belgians to perceive that the British attitude to Belgium had changed and that it was now seen as a protectorate.
A Belgian General Staff was formed in 1910 but the Chef d'État-Major Général de l'Armée, Lieutenant-Général Harry Jungbluth was retired on 30 June 1912 and not replaced until May 1914 by Lieutenant-General Chevalier Antonin de Selliers de Moranville.
Moranville began planning for the concentration of the army and met railway officials on 29 July.

Belgian troops were to be massed in central Belgium, in front of the National Redoubt at Antwerp ready to face any border, while the Fortified Position of Liège and Fortified Position of Namur were left to secure the frontiers.
On mobilisation, the King became Commander-in-Chief and chose where the army was to concentrate.
Amid the disruption of the new rearmament plan the disorganised and poorly trained Belgian conscripts would benefit from a central position to delay contact with an invader.
The army would also need fortifications for defence but these had been built on the frontier.
Another school of thought wanted a return to a frontier deployment, in line with French theories of the offensive.
The Belgian plan that emerged was a compromise in which the field army concentrated behind the Gete river with two divisions forward at Liège and Namur.
Belgian military planning was based on the assumption that other powers would oust an invader but the likelihood of a German invasion did not lead to France and Britain being seen as allies or for the Belgian government to do more than protect its independence. The Anglo-French Entente (1904) had led the Belgians to perceive that the British attitude to Belgium had changed and that it was now seen as a protectorate. A Belgian General Staff was formed in 1910 but the Chef d'État-Major Général de l'Armée, Lieutenant-Général Harry Jungbluth was retired on 30 June 1912 and not replaced until May 1914 by Lieutenant-General Chevalier Antonin de Selliers de Moranville. Moranville began planning for the concentration of the army and met railway officials on 29 July.
Belgian troops were to be massed in central Belgium, in front of the National Redoubt at Antwerp ready to face any border, while the Fortified Position of Liège and Fortified Position of Namur were left to secure the frontiers. On mobilisation, the King became Commander-in-Chief and chose where the army was to concentrate. Amid the disruption of the new rearmament plan the disorganised and poorly trained Belgian conscripts would benefit from a central position to delay contact with an invader. The army would also need fortifications for defence but these had been built on the frontier. Another school of thought wanted a return to a frontier deployment, in line with French theories of the offensive. The Belgian plan that emerged was a compromise in which the field army concentrated behind the Gete river with two divisions forward at Liège and Namur.
German invasion of Belgium