On the entry of the British to the First World War in early August 1914, Germany had two ships in the Mediterranean, forming their Mittelmeerdivision, the battlecruiser SMS Goeben and the light cruiser SMS Breslau.
The German ships, under Rear-Admiral Wilhelm Souchon, had been shadowed by a British battlecruiser force, while Milne deployed his fleet to bottle up the German ships.
After carrying out a shore bombardment, the Germans were observed to coal at Messina, causing Milne to send most of his force to wait west of Sicily, to prevent Souchon from interfering with French troop convoys.
Troubridge and his force of four cruisers were sent to cruise west of Cephalonia in case Souchon should try to enter the Adriatic and join the Austro-Hungarian fleet.
The Germans sailed from Messina on 6 August, and were observed to be making for the Adriatic.
They were shadowed by the light cruiser HMS Gloucester, which reported that the Germans were not intending to enter the Adriatic, but were in fact heading east towards Cape Matapan.
Gloucester carried out an attack on the German ships, hoping to slow them down sufficiently for Troubridge's cruisers to bring them to action.
However, Troubridge had received orders from Milne in late January that, on the instructions of the First Lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill, the British force in the Mediterranean was not to engage superior forces.
Churchill had intended this to mean the Austro-Hungarian and Italian fleets, but Troubridge took it to include the Germans.
The orders transmitted to Milne stated that his primary objective was to support the transport of French troops, with the engagement of individual German ships a secondary objective.
A superior force should only be engaged in combination with the French.


From his experiences in the Russo-Japanese War, Troubridge was aware that modern naval ordnance could devastate his squadron and that the Goeben's 11-inch guns considerably outranged his own, which consisted of 9.2-inch and 7.5-inch guns.
A night attack on the German force using the cruiser HMS Dublin failed when the British ship failed to make contact, so Troubridge attempted to catch the Germans in narrow waters to reduce the range.
Troubridge was still unaware of German intentions, and feared they might double-back to the north east and effect a junction with the Austro-Hungarian fleet.
Troubridge resolved to intercept the German squadron and headed southwards to do so, but his flag captain, Fawcet Wray, argued against seeking battle.
Troubridge was reluctant to do so anyway, knowing that his ships would be both outranged and attacking in daylight, but felt it was the only honourable option.
Wray argued that it would be suicide for the squadron to fight the bigger and longer-ranging guns of the Goeben and as Wray had a particular reputation in the fleet as an expert on gunnery, Troubridge allowed himself to be persuaded.
In tears, Troubridge ordered the chase to be abandoned, a decision that caused Wray to say 'Sir, this is the bravest thing you have ever done.'
Troubridge's signal was transmitted shortly afterwards: 
4.49am, 7/8/14, to Milne:
Being only able to meet Goeben outside the range of our guns and inside his, I have abandoned the chase with my squadron.
Goeben evidently going to the Eastern Mediterranean.

 The chase abandoned, the Germans made it to Constantinople, and the ships were almost immediately turned over to the Turkish Navy.
On the entry of the British to the First World War in early August 1914, Germany had two ships in the Mediterranean, forming their Mittelmeerdivision, the battlecruiser SMS Goeben and the light cruiser SMS Breslau. The German ships, under Rear-Admiral Wilhelm Souchon, had been shadowed by a British battlecruiser force, while Milne deployed his fleet to bottle up the German ships. After carrying out a shore bombardment, the Germans were observed to coal at Messina, causing Milne to send most of his force to wait west of Sicily, to prevent Souchon from interfering with French troop convoys. Troubridge and his force of four cruisers were sent to cruise west of Cephalonia in case Souchon should try to enter the Adriatic and join the Austro-Hungarian fleet. The Germans sailed from Messina on 6 August, and were observed to be making for the Adriatic. They were shadowed by the light cruiser HMS Gloucester, which reported that the Germans were not intending to enter the Adriatic, but were in fact heading east towards Cape Matapan. Gloucester carried out an attack on the German ships, hoping to slow them down sufficiently for Troubridge's cruisers to bring them to action. However, Troubridge had received orders from Milne in late January that, on the instructions of the First Lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill, the British force in the Mediterranean was not to engage superior forces. Churchill had intended this to mean the Austro-Hungarian and Italian fleets, but Troubridge took it to include the Germans. The orders transmitted to Milne stated that his primary objective was to support the transport of French troops, with the engagement of individual German ships a secondary objective. A superior force should only be engaged in combination with the French.

From his experiences in the Russo-Japanese War, Troubridge was aware that modern naval ordnance could devastate his squadron and that the Goeben's 11-inch guns considerably outranged his own, which consisted of 9.2-inch and 7.5-inch guns. A night attack on the German force using the cruiser HMS Dublin failed when the British ship failed to make contact, so Troubridge attempted to catch the Germans in narrow waters to reduce the range. Troubridge was still unaware of German intentions, and feared they might double-back to the north east and effect a junction with the Austro-Hungarian fleet. Troubridge resolved to intercept the German squadron and headed southwards to do so, but his flag captain, Fawcet Wray, argued against seeking battle. Troubridge was reluctant to do so anyway, knowing that his ships would be both outranged and attacking in daylight, but felt it was the only honourable option. Wray argued that it would be suicide for the squadron to fight the bigger and longer-ranging guns of the Goeben and as Wray had a particular reputation in the fleet as an expert on gunnery, Troubridge allowed himself to be persuaded. In tears, Troubridge ordered the chase to be abandoned, a decision that caused Wray to say 'Sir, this is the bravest thing you have ever done.' Troubridge's signal was transmitted shortly afterwards: 
4.49am, 7/8/14, to Milne:
Being only able to meet Goeben outside the range of our guns and inside his, I have abandoned the chase with my squadron. Goeben evidently going to the Eastern Mediterranean.
 The chase abandoned, the Germans made it to Constantinople, and the ships were almost immediately turned over to the Turkish Navy.
Ernest Troubridge