The vulnerability of the Laffaux Corner to envelopment was made worse by the proximity of the Ailette and the parallel Canal de l'Oise a l'Aisne (Oise–Aisne Canal) to the north, below the Chemin des Dames.
A retreat to the north of the river and canal would be difficult, despite the number of crossing points, which could be made impassable by artillery-fire, particularly with gas-shell.
Much of the German artillery was south of the canal, from Pinon to Pargny and was cramped for space in patches of woodland, so far back that only long-range fire could reach beyond the French front line.
Reserve positions in the salient ran north-east and the front position had insufficient depth, as it lay partly on and partly behind the Chemin-des-Dames ridge, which had a convex slope at the top.
Ridges radiated down to the Aisne valley, over which the German positions had inadequate observation.
Due to a lack of manpower, constant French artillery-fire and the autumn rains, the condition of the German defences was poor and in some places, only narrow trenches and shell-hole positions existed.
There were few pillboxes and tunnels but numerous underground quarries, which had been equipped with ventilation and lighting systems, for ammunition and food storage.

Behind the Pinonriegel (Pinon trench) in the south-west corner of the salient near Laffaux, work had begun on a reserve line from Pinon to Vaudesson and on rearward defences behind the Canal de l'Oise a l'Aisne for a possible retirement, known as the Gudrun Bewegung (Gudrun Manoeuvre).
From 11 October, the right flank division of Group Vailly was relieved by the 13th Division and on the left the 2nd Guard Division was moved into the line near Malmaison.
The west face of the salient from the Anizy–Vauxaillon railway line to the canal tunnel, the area considered must vulnerable, was held by Group Crépy, the VIII Reserve Corps headquarters (General Georg Wichura), with the 37th Division and the 14th Division, joined by the 52nd Division from 15 October.
In Group Vailly to the east, the ZbV 54 (special duties) headquarters (Lieutenant-General Max von Müller), defended its sector with the 13th Division, 2nd Division, 5th Guards Division and the right flank units of the 47th Reserve Division.
The 43rd Reserve Division and the 9th Division, which was intended mainly to support the left flank adjoining Group Liesse, were in reserve as Eingreif divisions.

The ground-holding divisions held a frontage of about 4.8 km (3 mi) each and to evade French artillery-fire, had moved the reserve and resting battalions far to the rear; about 18 battalions of the Eingreif divisions positioned near the Ailette, were moved closer to the front to compensate.
Another 36 artillery batteries were brought into the area, which increased the number of guns to c. 580, of which 225 were heavy and super-heavy but this did little to compensate for the vast French numerical superiority in guns.
About 220 artillery pieces, particularly those behind the 14th and 13th divisions and some of those behind the 2nd Guard Division, south of the canal were difficult to supply and the new batteries were placed north of the Ailette.

On 15 September, the 7th Army had c. 168 aircraft against 300 French but the Army Group headquarters delayed the dispatch of more air units until mid-October, having expected attacks elsewhere and had also reinforced the Flanders front.
Many of the new air units arrived after the French preliminary bombardment had begun and when the French infantry attack came, were still unfamiliar with the terrain.
By late October, the 7th Army had received 17 squadrons, including four fighter units, which increased the number of aircraft to more than 200, along with support available from the fighter squadrons of the neighbouring 2nd and 1st armies.

Caves and tunnels had been used by the Germans as shelters for reserves, to reinforce the trench garrisons in the network of trenches running from the Ailette valley, over the Soissons–Laon railway, up the western slopes of the Mont des Singes, east of Vauxaillon and alo
The vulnerability of the Laffaux Corner to envelopment was made worse by the proximity of the Ailette and the parallel Canal de l'Oise a l'Aisne (Oise–Aisne Canal) to the north, below the Chemin des Dames. A retreat to the north of the river and canal would be difficult, despite the number of crossing points, which could be made impassable by artillery-fire, particularly with gas-shell. Much of the German artillery was south of the canal, from Pinon to Pargny and was cramped for space in patches of woodland, so far back that only long-range fire could reach beyond the French front line. Reserve positions in the salient ran north-east and the front position had insufficient depth, as it lay partly on and partly behind the Chemin-des-Dames ridge, which had a convex slope at the top. Ridges radiated down to the Aisne valley, over which the German positions had inadequate observation. Due to a lack of manpower, constant French artillery-fire and the autumn rains, the condition of the German defences was poor and in some places, only narrow trenches and shell-hole positions existed. There were few pillboxes and tunnels but numerous underground quarries, which had been equipped with ventilation and lighting systems, for ammunition and food storage.
Behind the Pinonriegel (Pinon trench) in the south-west corner of the salient near Laffaux, work had begun on a reserve line from Pinon to Vaudesson and on rearward defences behind the Canal de l'Oise a l'Aisne for a possible retirement, known as the Gudrun Bewegung (Gudrun Manoeuvre). From 11 October, the right flank division of Group Vailly was relieved by the 13th Division and on the left the 2nd Guard Division was moved into the line near Malmaison. The west face of the salient from the Anizy–Vauxaillon railway line to the canal tunnel, the area considered must vulnerable, was held by Group Crépy, the VIII Reserve Corps headquarters (General Georg Wichura), with the 37th Division and the 14th Division, joined by the 52nd Division from 15 October. In Group Vailly to the east, the ZbV 54 (special duties) headquarters (Lieutenant-General Max von Müller), defended its sector with the 13th Division, 2nd Division, 5th Guards Division and the right flank units of the 47th Reserve Division. The 43rd Reserve Division and the 9th Division, which was intended mainly to support the left flank adjoining Group Liesse, were in reserve as Eingreif divisions.
The ground-holding divisions held a frontage of about 4.8 km (3 mi) each and to evade French artillery-fire, had moved the reserve and resting battalions far to the rear; about 18 battalions of the Eingreif divisions positioned near the Ailette, were moved closer to the front to compensate. Another 36 artillery batteries were brought into the area, which increased the number of guns to c. 580, of which 225 were heavy and super-heavy but this did little to compensate for the vast French numerical superiority in guns. About 220 artillery pieces, particularly those behind the 14th and 13th divisions and some of those behind the 2nd Guard Division, south of the canal were difficult to supply and the new batteries were placed north of the Ailette.
On 15 September, the 7th Army had c. 168 aircraft against 300 French but the Army Group headquarters delayed the dispatch of more air units until mid-October, having expected attacks elsewhere and had also reinforced the Flanders front. Many of the new air units arrived after the French preliminary bombardment had begun and when the French infantry attack came, were still unfamiliar with the terrain. By late October, the 7th Army had received 17 squadrons, including four fighter units, which increased the number of aircraft to more than 200, along with support available from the fighter squadrons of the neighbouring 2nd and 1st armies.
Caves and tunnels had been used by the Germans as shelters for reserves, to reinforce the trench garrisons in the network of trenches running from the Ailette valley, over the Soissons–Laon railway, up the western slopes of the Mont des Singes, east of Vauxaillon and alo
Battle of La Malmaison