The Soviet Union, eager to make progress on its own atomic weapon development and determined to follow the path that the Manhattan Project had found success with, commissioned a Russian translation of Atomic Energy for Military Purposes.
 It was typeset form by mid-November 1945, and then was published by the State Railway Transportation Publishing House on January 30, 1946.
 Some 30,000 copies were printed and it was widely distributed to the many scientists and engineers working in the Soviet effort.

In a number of cases, the Soviets consulted the Smyth Report to see how they might deal with certain obstacles that had arisen in their project.
 And the aforementioned deletion between the original text and the Princeton version concerning the poisoning effect was soon noticed by the Russian translators, and only served to highlight its importance to the Soviet project.
 
As pioneering French nuclear weapons scientist Bertrand Goldschmidt later said, 
The details revealed in the Smyth report were invaluable for any country launching into atomic work; for nothing is more important, when undertaking technical research over a wide field than knowing in advance which lines of approach can or cannot lead to success, even if this knowledge relates only to basic principles.

Nonetheless, Goldschmidt believed, just as Chadwick had ultimately believed, that publication of the report on balance wise, in that not revealing anything about the new weapon would just lead to a public hunger for information and resultant leaks and unwarranted disclosures of information.
 
Not everyone would agree: in 1947, United States Atomic Energy Commission member Lewis Strauss would call publication of the Smyth Report "a serious breach of security"; and in late 1952, President-elect Dwight D. Eisenhower would say the Smyth Report had given away too much information, including the exact locations of the atomic materials production plants.
The Soviet Union, eager to make progress on its own atomic weapon development and determined to follow the path that the Manhattan Project had found success with, commissioned a Russian translation of Atomic Energy for Military Purposes.  It was typeset form by mid-November 1945, and then was published by the State Railway Transportation Publishing House on January 30, 1946.  Some 30,000 copies were printed and it was widely distributed to the many scientists and engineers working in the Soviet effort.
In a number of cases, the Soviets consulted the Smyth Report to see how they might deal with certain obstacles that had arisen in their project.  And the aforementioned deletion between the original text and the Princeton version concerning the poisoning effect was soon noticed by the Russian translators, and only served to highlight its importance to the Soviet project.  
As pioneering French nuclear weapons scientist Bertrand Goldschmidt later said, 
The details revealed in the Smyth report were invaluable for any country launching into atomic work; for nothing is more important, when undertaking technical research over a wide field than knowing in advance which lines of approach can or cannot lead to success, even if this knowledge relates only to basic principles. 
Nonetheless, Goldschmidt believed, just as Chadwick had ultimately believed, that publication of the report on balance wise, in that not revealing anything about the new weapon would just lead to a public hunger for information and resultant leaks and unwarranted disclosures of information.  
Not everyone would agree: in 1947, United States Atomic Energy Commission member Lewis Strauss would call publication of the Smyth Report "a serious breach of security"; and in late 1952, President-elect Dwight D. Eisenhower would say the Smyth Report had given away too much information, including the exact locations of the atomic materials production plants.
Smyth Report