Historian Richard Gerber (1975) argues that most authors and historians portray the Liberal Republicans as an aberration, noting the many unresolved issues of the Reconstruction Era.
He groups the historical interpretations of the party that prevailed after 1872 into two main categories.
One historical interpretation emphasizes the Liberal Republican push for the re-establishment of self-government in the South and the restoration of national unity.
The second interpretation sees the Liberal Republicans as primarily motivated by opposition to the corruption of the Grant administration and support for lower tariffs.

Downey (1967) argues Greeley was nominated as a result of a crass political bargain imposed against the will of a convention that really wanted Charles Francis Adams.
Men like Schurz supported Adams, but were inexperienced political idealists and not professional politicians.
They neither acted nor voted as a bloc, particularly after the collapse of a boom for David Davis, a collapse engineered by a group of leading reformist Republican editors.
The shift of particular votes to Greeley was not decisive, but the feeling of the delegates that Adams could not win support among Irish workers, the Western masses, or Democratic voters.

Lunde (1978) argues Grant supporters hailed the Civil War as a great triumph which had bound the United States into a united nation, linked not only by sentiment but by rapidly increasing networks of railroads.
The Democrats and their Liberal Republican allies thought the war was a tragedy, recoiled against centralization and sought to recapture the purity of prewar days through reconciliation and respect for the autonomy of the states.
Greeley's benevolent image of nationalism was defeated by the centralizing, "blood and iron" concept of Grant.

McPherson (1972) argues that three-quarters of ex abolitionists favored Grant, although such antislavery Republicans as Charles Francis Adams, Carl Schurz and Charles Sumner were key supporters of Greeley.
Focused on the welfare of the freedmen, abolitionists were appalled by Greeley's formula for cooperation with "better class" southern whites by granting amnesty to all Confederates and adopting a hands-off policy toward the South.
They supported Grant in the belief that his Southern policy promised the best protection for the African Americans.
Most abolitionists believed that, moral suasion having failed earlier, true equality could be achieved only through relentless law enforcement.

Slap (2006) redeems the reputation of the Liberal Republicans from allegations of opportunism (as presented by Ari Hoogenboom), of elitism (as presented by John G. Sproat) and racism as presented by the neoabolitionists.
 He joins Heather Cox Richardson and David Quigley in concluding that Reconstruction ended not because of politicized violence in the South, but because of the Northern decision that the war goals had been achieved and it would thwart republican ideals to continue Army rule of the South.
Historian Richard Gerber (1975) argues that most authors and historians portray the Liberal Republicans as an aberration, noting the many unresolved issues of the Reconstruction Era. He groups the historical interpretations of the party that prevailed after 1872 into two main categories. One historical interpretation emphasizes the Liberal Republican push for the re-establishment of self-government in the South and the restoration of national unity. The second interpretation sees the Liberal Republicans as primarily motivated by opposition to the corruption of the Grant administration and support for lower tariffs.
Downey (1967) argues Greeley was nominated as a result of a crass political bargain imposed against the will of a convention that really wanted Charles Francis Adams. Men like Schurz supported Adams, but were inexperienced political idealists and not professional politicians. They neither acted nor voted as a bloc, particularly after the collapse of a boom for David Davis, a collapse engineered by a group of leading reformist Republican editors. The shift of particular votes to Greeley was not decisive, but the feeling of the delegates that Adams could not win support among Irish workers, the Western masses, or Democratic voters.
Lunde (1978) argues Grant supporters hailed the Civil War as a great triumph which had bound the United States into a united nation, linked not only by sentiment but by rapidly increasing networks of railroads. The Democrats and their Liberal Republican allies thought the war was a tragedy, recoiled against centralization and sought to recapture the purity of prewar days through reconciliation and respect for the autonomy of the states. Greeley's benevolent image of nationalism was defeated by the centralizing, "blood and iron" concept of Grant.
McPherson (1972) argues that three-quarters of ex abolitionists favored Grant, although such antislavery Republicans as Charles Francis Adams, Carl Schurz and Charles Sumner were key supporters of Greeley. Focused on the welfare of the freedmen, abolitionists were appalled by Greeley's formula for cooperation with "better class" southern whites by granting amnesty to all Confederates and adopting a hands-off policy toward the South. They supported Grant in the belief that his Southern policy promised the best protection for the African Americans. Most abolitionists believed that, moral suasion having failed earlier, true equality could be achieved only through relentless law enforcement.
Slap (2006) redeems the reputation of the Liberal Republicans from allegations of opportunism (as presented by Ari Hoogenboom), of elitism (as presented by John G. Sproat) and racism as presented by the neoabolitionists.  He joins Heather Cox Richardson and David Quigley in concluding that Reconstruction ended not because of politicized violence in the South, but because of the Northern decision that the war goals had been achieved and it would thwart republican ideals to continue Army rule of the South.
Liberal Republican Party (United States)