Brian R. Sullivan called Caporetto "the greatest defeat in Italian military history."
John R. Schindler wrote "By any standard, Twelfth Isonzo [Caporetto] and its aftermath represented an unprecedented catastrophe for Italian arms."
The disaster "came as a shock" and "triggered a search for scapegoats," culminating in a 1919 Italian military commission that investigated the causes of the debacle.
At Rapallo, a Supreme War Council was created to improve Allied military co-operation and develop a common strategy.
Luigi Cadorna was forced to resign after the defeat, a final straw according to the Prime Minister, Vittorio Emanuele Orlando.
Cadorna was known to have maintained poor relations with the other generals on his staff and by the start of the battle, had sacked 217 generals, 255 colonels and 355 battalion commanders.
In addition, he was detested by his troops as being too harsh.
Cadorna had been directing the battle 20 miles (32 km) behind the front and retreated another 100 mi (160 km) to Padua when replaced by Armando Diaz and Pietro Badoglio.
Italian propaganda offices were established, promising land and social justice to soldiers.
Italy also accepted a more cautious military strategy from this point on.
Diaz concentrated his efforts on rebuilding his shattered forces while taking advantage of the national rejuvenation that had been spurred by invasion and defeat.
Brian R. Sullivan called Caporetto "the greatest defeat in Italian military history." John R. Schindler wrote "By any standard, Twelfth Isonzo [Caporetto] and its aftermath represented an unprecedented catastrophe for Italian arms." The disaster "came as a shock" and "triggered a search for scapegoats," culminating in a 1919 Italian military commission that investigated the causes of the debacle. At Rapallo, a Supreme War Council was created to improve Allied military co-operation and develop a common strategy. Luigi Cadorna was forced to resign after the defeat, a final straw according to the Prime Minister, Vittorio Emanuele Orlando. Cadorna was known to have maintained poor relations with the other generals on his staff and by the start of the battle, had sacked 217 generals, 255 colonels and 355 battalion commanders. In addition, he was detested by his troops as being too harsh. Cadorna had been directing the battle 20 miles (32 km) behind the front and retreated another 100 mi (160 km) to Padua when replaced by Armando Diaz and Pietro Badoglio. Italian propaganda offices were established, promising land and social justice to soldiers. Italy also accepted a more cautious military strategy from this point on. Diaz concentrated his efforts on rebuilding his shattered forces while taking advantage of the national rejuvenation that had been spurred by invasion and defeat.
Battle of Caporetto