On 5 July 1943, Model led the northern assault on Kursk during Operation Citadel, a plan which had caused great controversy within the German high command.
Günther von Kluge and Erich von Manstein, commanding Army Groups Centre and South respectively, had originally urged that the salient be attacked in May, before the Soviets could prepare their defences.
Others, including Heinz Guderian, felt that attacking was unnecessary, since it would occasion heavy tank losses and thus upset plans for increasing German armored strength.
Model was also skeptical of the plan's chances, pointing out that Konstantin Rokossovsky's Central Front was strongly dug in and outnumbered him two to one in men, tanks and artillery.
Rather than conclude that the offensive be called off, however, he said it should be postponed until he could receive further reinforcements, in particular the new Panther tanks and Ferdinand tank destroyers.

Model's true opinion on the value of the offensive remains unclear.
Manstein took his recommendation at face value, while Guderian said that he was categorically against attacking.
It has similarly been suggested that Model, in fact, hoped to scuttle the operation by causing it to be delayed until the Soviet forces launched their own attack.

Model's assault was a failure, as Ninth Army quickly became enmeshed in the elaborate Soviet fortifications.
The Red Army's strength in the salient was, in fact, growing much faster than that of the attacking force.
Nor did his tactical plan of attack meet with great success.
Having less armour and more artillery than Manstein in the south, and fearing that the deep Soviet defences would stall an armour-heavy attack (the hallmark of the German Blitzkrieg), he decided to use his infantry to breach Rokossovsky's line before unleashing his armour.
It did not work.
The Germans took heavy losses to advance less than 12 km (8 mi) in seven days, and were unable to break through to open ground.
Model threw his armour into the fray, but with little effect, beyond incurring more casualties. (
As mitigating factors, the Red Army had concentrated more of their strength facing Model in the north; and Rokossovsky had correctly anticipated where the attack would come, defending that sector heavily.
Model's use of infantry assaults also meant his losses in armour were lower than those of Manstein.)

Prior to Kursk, Model had anticipated the possibility of a Soviet attack into the Orel Salient, and had (without OKH's knowledge) constructed extensive defensive works to meet such an attack.
Following the stalling of his advance, the Soviet counter-offensive, Operation Kutuzov, duly opened on 12 July.
It involved not just Rokossovsky's Central Front, but also the Bryansk and Western Fronts, a greater concentration of forces than Model had assaulted in Operation Citadel.
For the battle, Kluge placed him in command of Second Panzer Army in addition to Ninth Army—again, a larger total force than he had commanded in Citadel.
The Soviet preponderance of strength was such that Stavka expected it to take only 48 hours to reach Orel, splitting the German forces into three parts; instead, the battle ended three weeks later with Model's orderly withdrawal from the salient.
An idea of the scale of the fighting compared to Citadel can be gained from the combined casualty lists for Second Panzer and Ninth Armies: from 1 to 10 July, the Germans took 21,000 casualties, and from 11 to 31 July, 62,000.
Despite these losses he had inflicted similarly heavy casualties on the three Red Army Fronts, shortened the line, and avoided annihilation.

Similar to Rzhev withdrawal, Model ordered his troops to carry out the same scorched earth policy in the Orel salient, destroying the infrastructure and harvest, and deporting 250,000 civilians in inhuman conditions.

After the loss of Orel, Model withdrew to the Dnieper as the Red Army went on the offensive from Smolensk in the north to Rostov in the south.
He was relieved of command of the Ninth Army at the end of September, and took the opportunity to go on three months' lea
On 5 July 1943, Model led the northern assault on Kursk during Operation Citadel, a plan which had caused great controversy within the German high command. Günther von Kluge and Erich von Manstein, commanding Army Groups Centre and South respectively, had originally urged that the salient be attacked in May, before the Soviets could prepare their defences. Others, including Heinz Guderian, felt that attacking was unnecessary, since it would occasion heavy tank losses and thus upset plans for increasing German armored strength. Model was also skeptical of the plan's chances, pointing out that Konstantin Rokossovsky's Central Front was strongly dug in and outnumbered him two to one in men, tanks and artillery. Rather than conclude that the offensive be called off, however, he said it should be postponed until he could receive further reinforcements, in particular the new Panther tanks and Ferdinand tank destroyers.
Model's true opinion on the value of the offensive remains unclear. Manstein took his recommendation at face value, while Guderian said that he was categorically against attacking. It has similarly been suggested that Model, in fact, hoped to scuttle the operation by causing it to be delayed until the Soviet forces launched their own attack.
Model's assault was a failure, as Ninth Army quickly became enmeshed in the elaborate Soviet fortifications. The Red Army's strength in the salient was, in fact, growing much faster than that of the attacking force. Nor did his tactical plan of attack meet with great success. Having less armour and more artillery than Manstein in the south, and fearing that the deep Soviet defences would stall an armour-heavy attack (the hallmark of the German Blitzkrieg), he decided to use his infantry to breach Rokossovsky's line before unleashing his armour. It did not work. The Germans took heavy losses to advance less than 12 km (8 mi) in seven days, and were unable to break through to open ground. Model threw his armour into the fray, but with little effect, beyond incurring more casualties. (As mitigating factors, the Red Army had concentrated more of their strength facing Model in the north; and Rokossovsky had correctly anticipated where the attack would come, defending that sector heavily. Model's use of infantry assaults also meant his losses in armour were lower than those of Manstein.)
Prior to Kursk, Model had anticipated the possibility of a Soviet attack into the Orel Salient, and had (without OKH's knowledge) constructed extensive defensive works to meet such an attack. Following the stalling of his advance, the Soviet counter-offensive, Operation Kutuzov, duly opened on 12 July. It involved not just Rokossovsky's Central Front, but also the Bryansk and Western Fronts, a greater concentration of forces than Model had assaulted in Operation Citadel. For the battle, Kluge placed him in command of Second Panzer Army in addition to Ninth Army—again, a larger total force than he had commanded in Citadel. The Soviet preponderance of strength was such that Stavka expected it to take only 48 hours to reach Orel, splitting the German forces into three parts; instead, the battle ended three weeks later with Model's orderly withdrawal from the salient. An idea of the scale of the fighting compared to Citadel can be gained from the combined casualty lists for Second Panzer and Ninth Armies: from 1 to 10 July, the Germans took 21,000 casualties, and from 11 to 31 July, 62,000. Despite these losses he had inflicted similarly heavy casualties on the three Red Army Fronts, shortened the line, and avoided annihilation.
Similar to Rzhev withdrawal, Model ordered his troops to carry out the same scorched earth policy in the Orel salient, destroying the infrastructure and harvest, and deporting 250,000 civilians in inhuman conditions.
After the loss of Orel, Model withdrew to the Dnieper as the Red Army went on the offensive from Smolensk in the north to Rostov in the south. He was relieved of command of the Ninth Army at the end of September, and took the opportunity to go on three months' lea
Walter Model