Even as orders were going out to implement Plan X, Mielke had already thrown his support behind the anti-Honecker faction in the SED's Politburo.
Although he was of the same generation as Honecker and had matured in an environment where following orders was the rule, he was sober enough and politically savvy enough to realize this approach no longer worked.
During a session on 10 October 1989, Mielke delivered a report attacking Honecker's desire to violently suppress the demonstrations rather than offer concessions.

In what Edward N. Peterson has called "a remarkable disclaimer of responsibility for the violence," Mielke declared that Honecker's orders to him "were built on false situation judgments."
He added that Honecker's commands on 7 and 8 October "were false and undifferentiated condemnations of those who think differently.
Despite this evaluation, there was never any instructions to use violence against persons.
There is nothing in our basic principles to consider a demonstration as part of a possible counterrevolutionary coup."

Mielke also claimed that "the Party judged the situation falsely.
We tried to tell them the true situation, but enough was not done."
Mielke argued in favor of solving the demonstrations politically and giving "every DDR citizen the right to travel."

On 17 October 1989, Mielke and the rest of the GDR's Politburo met to follow Gorbachev's demand, voiced in August, for Honecker be removed as General Secretary of the SED and State Council chairman.
Suspecting that Honecker's personal bodyguards might try to arrest the members of the Central Committee when they met to vote Honecker out in favour of Egon Krenz, Mielke saw to it that Stasi agents who were loyal to him were stationed near the meeting room.
While deliberations were underway, Mielke told Honecker that "we simply cannot start shooting with tanks," and tried to impress upon Honecker that it was "the end".

After the vote to oust Honecker passed, Mielke "got nasty," and accused Honecker of corruption.
Honecker responded that Mielke should not open his mouth so much.
Mielke responded by putting the last nail into Honecker's coffin.
He announced that the MfS had a file on the now-ousted leader.
It contained proof of Honecker's corrupt business practices, sexual activities, and how, as a member of the underground Communist Party of Germany during the Nazi years, he had been arrested by the Gestapo and had named names.

To the shock of both the Politburo and the Stasi, Krenz's first televised addresses failed to win popular support.
Despite his assurances that the SED was at last ready to embrace Gorbachev's policies of Glasnost and Perestroika, Krenz's approval ratings remained extremely low.

Former Politburo member Günter Schabowski later recalled, "We made a palace revolution without offering a real alternative... We had not quickly and thoroughly enough whittled away from Stalin's methods."
Even as orders were going out to implement Plan X, Mielke had already thrown his support behind the anti-Honecker faction in the SED's Politburo. Although he was of the same generation as Honecker and had matured in an environment where following orders was the rule, he was sober enough and politically savvy enough to realize this approach no longer worked. During a session on 10 October 1989, Mielke delivered a report attacking Honecker's desire to violently suppress the demonstrations rather than offer concessions.
In what Edward N. Peterson has called "a remarkable disclaimer of responsibility for the violence," Mielke declared that Honecker's orders to him "were built on false situation judgments." He added that Honecker's commands on 7 and 8 October "were false and undifferentiated condemnations of those who think differently. Despite this evaluation, there was never any instructions to use violence against persons. There is nothing in our basic principles to consider a demonstration as part of a possible counterrevolutionary coup."
Mielke also claimed that "the Party judged the situation falsely. We tried to tell them the true situation, but enough was not done." Mielke argued in favor of solving the demonstrations politically and giving "every DDR citizen the right to travel."
On 17 October 1989, Mielke and the rest of the GDR's Politburo met to follow Gorbachev's demand, voiced in August, for Honecker be removed as General Secretary of the SED and State Council chairman. Suspecting that Honecker's personal bodyguards might try to arrest the members of the Central Committee when they met to vote Honecker out in favour of Egon Krenz, Mielke saw to it that Stasi agents who were loyal to him were stationed near the meeting room. While deliberations were underway, Mielke told Honecker that "we simply cannot start shooting with tanks," and tried to impress upon Honecker that it was "the end".
After the vote to oust Honecker passed, Mielke "got nasty," and accused Honecker of corruption. Honecker responded that Mielke should not open his mouth so much. Mielke responded by putting the last nail into Honecker's coffin. He announced that the MfS had a file on the now-ousted leader. It contained proof of Honecker's corrupt business practices, sexual activities, and how, as a member of the underground Communist Party of Germany during the Nazi years, he had been arrested by the Gestapo and had named names.
To the shock of both the Politburo and the Stasi, Krenz's first televised addresses failed to win popular support. Despite his assurances that the SED was at last ready to embrace Gorbachev's policies of Glasnost and Perestroika, Krenz's approval ratings remained extremely low.
Former Politburo member Günter Schabowski later recalled, "We made a palace revolution without offering a real alternative... We had not quickly and thoroughly enough whittled away from Stalin's methods."
Erich Mielke