Galland's position as General der Jagdflieger brought him into gradual conflict with Göring as the war continued.
Galland was often at odds with Göring and Hitler on how to prosecute the air war.
In 1942–44, the German fighter forces on all fronts in the European Theatre of Operations (ETO) came under increasing pressure and Galland's relationship with Göring began to turn sour.
The first distinct cracks began to appear in the spring, 1943.
Galland suggested that the fighter forces defending Germany should limit the number of interceptions flown to allow sufficient time for re-grouping and to conserve air strength.
Only by conserving its strength and its precious resources—the fighter pilots—could the Luftwaffe hope to inflict damage on the bombers.
Göring found the suggestion unacceptable.
He demanded every raid be countered in maximum strength regardless of the size of the Allied fighter escort.
According to head of production and procurement Erhard Milch, who was also present at the meeting, "Göring just could not grasp it."

The combination of declining production and attrition left Galland with a thin resource-base with which to defend Germany.
While the pressure eased somewhat in November, Galland and his command faced a formidable threat.
The shadow of American escort fighters and the gradual extension of their range covered all of the zones occupied by German fighter units engaged in anti-bomber operations.
By early October, German intelligence had reported that American fighters were accompanying bombers as far as Hamburg.

Several American fighter aircraft crashed near Aachen on the cusp of Germany's west border.
Galland presented these wrecks as proof that the Luftwaffe was facing an enemy that could soon escort its heavy bombers with fighter aircraft to industrial targets inside Germany.
Galland submitted his findings to Göring.
Göring was livid with Galland and the fighter force.
He called the report the "rantings of a worn-out defeatist", and gave Galland an "order", that no Allied fighters had crossed into Germany.
Göring reasoned the only possible reason could have been that short range fighters ran out of fuel at high altitude and "they were shot down much further west... and glided quite a distance before they crashed."
Galland questioned why an Allied pilot would choose to glide east instead of west.
Both men also argued that they must increase fighter production to reach a three or fourfold advantage over the attackers immediately to prepare for this new threat.
Göring even at this time, was biased in favour of bombers, to maintain the offensive on all fronts.
It was a policy he persisted with until the autumn, 1943.

By October 1943, the fractious relationship came to the surface again.
Galland met with Göring at Göring's estate, Schloss Veldenstein.
During the conversation the need for new and improved interceptor aircraft arose.
Göring, demanded heavily cannon-armed fighters be used en masse.
Göring, prompted by the desires of Hitler, wanted cannons of some 2,000 lb in weight.
Galland explained that such a weapon could not be used effectively in an aircraft; the cannon would be prone to jamming and the aircraft would be too difficult to manoeuvre.
Galland also asserted the use of inappropriate weaponry such as the Messerschmitt Me 410, a favourite of Hitler's, had caused heavy losses.
Galland argued such measures were deplorable and irresponsible.
Göring disregarded Galland's arguments and continued his frequent attacks on the fighter force, accusing them of cowardice.
Galland, as he always did, defended them, risking his career and, near the end of the war, his life in doing so.
Galland stated that he could not agree to follow Göring's plans and requested to be dismissed from his post and sent back to his unit.
Göring accepted, but two weeks later he apologised to Galland and attributed his behaviour to stress.
Galland continued in his post.

Nonetheless, the arguments ultimately continued, mainly over aircraft procurement and armament for the defence of Germany from Allied bombing, and began to give
Galland's position as General der Jagdflieger brought him into gradual conflict with Göring as the war continued. Galland was often at odds with Göring and Hitler on how to prosecute the air war. In 1942–44, the German fighter forces on all fronts in the European Theatre of Operations (ETO) came under increasing pressure and Galland's relationship with Göring began to turn sour. The first distinct cracks began to appear in the spring, 1943. Galland suggested that the fighter forces defending Germany should limit the number of interceptions flown to allow sufficient time for re-grouping and to conserve air strength. Only by conserving its strength and its precious resources—the fighter pilots—could the Luftwaffe hope to inflict damage on the bombers. Göring found the suggestion unacceptable. He demanded every raid be countered in maximum strength regardless of the size of the Allied fighter escort. According to head of production and procurement Erhard Milch, who was also present at the meeting, "Göring just could not grasp it."
The combination of declining production and attrition left Galland with a thin resource-base with which to defend Germany. While the pressure eased somewhat in November, Galland and his command faced a formidable threat. The shadow of American escort fighters and the gradual extension of their range covered all of the zones occupied by German fighter units engaged in anti-bomber operations. By early October, German intelligence had reported that American fighters were accompanying bombers as far as Hamburg.
Several American fighter aircraft crashed near Aachen on the cusp of Germany's west border. Galland presented these wrecks as proof that the Luftwaffe was facing an enemy that could soon escort its heavy bombers with fighter aircraft to industrial targets inside Germany. Galland submitted his findings to Göring. Göring was livid with Galland and the fighter force. He called the report the "rantings of a worn-out defeatist", and gave Galland an "order", that no Allied fighters had crossed into Germany. Göring reasoned the only possible reason could have been that short range fighters ran out of fuel at high altitude and "they were shot down much further west... and glided quite a distance before they crashed." Galland questioned why an Allied pilot would choose to glide east instead of west. Both men also argued that they must increase fighter production to reach a three or fourfold advantage over the attackers immediately to prepare for this new threat. Göring even at this time, was biased in favour of bombers, to maintain the offensive on all fronts. It was a policy he persisted with until the autumn, 1943.
By October 1943, the fractious relationship came to the surface again. Galland met with Göring at Göring's estate, Schloss Veldenstein. During the conversation the need for new and improved interceptor aircraft arose. Göring, demanded heavily cannon-armed fighters be used en masse. Göring, prompted by the desires of Hitler, wanted cannons of some 2,000 lb in weight. Galland explained that such a weapon could not be used effectively in an aircraft; the cannon would be prone to jamming and the aircraft would be too difficult to manoeuvre. Galland also asserted the use of inappropriate weaponry such as the Messerschmitt Me 410, a favourite of Hitler's, had caused heavy losses. Galland argued such measures were deplorable and irresponsible. Göring disregarded Galland's arguments and continued his frequent attacks on the fighter force, accusing them of cowardice. Galland, as he always did, defended them, risking his career and, near the end of the war, his life in doing so. Galland stated that he could not agree to follow Göring's plans and requested to be dismissed from his post and sent back to his unit. Göring accepted, but two weeks later he apologised to Galland and attributed his behaviour to stress. Galland continued in his post.
Nonetheless, the arguments ultimately continued, mainly over aircraft procurement and armament for the defence of Germany from Allied bombing, and began to give 
Adolf Galland