The king had failed to buy off the popular leaders.
According to Malouet, thirty-seven thousand livres had been paid to Pétion and Santerre for worthless promises to stop the insurrection.
He rejected the last-minute advice, not only of Vergniaud and Guadet, now alarmed by a turn of affairs they brought about and also of his loyal old minister Malesherbes, to abdicate the throne.
He was determined to defend the Tuileries.
His supporters had anticipated and prepared for the attack long beforehand, and were confident of success.
A plan of defense, drawn up by a professional soldier, had been adopted by the Paris department on 25 June: for it was their official duty to safeguard the Executive Power.
The palace was easy to defend.
It was garrisoned by the only regular troops on either side—950 veteran Swiss mercenaries of the Gardes Suisse; these were backed by 930 gendarmes, 2,000 national guards, and 200–300 Chevaliers de Saint Louis, and other royalist volunteers.
Five thousand men should have been an ample defense; though it appears that, by some oversight, they were seriously short of ammunition.
Police spies reported to the commune that underground passages had been constructed by which additional troops could be secretly introduced from their barracks.
Mandat, the commander of the National Guard, was not very sure of his forces, but the tone of his orders was so resolute that it seemed to steady the troops.
He had stationed some troops on the Pont Neuf so as to prevent a junction between the insurgents on the two sides of the river, which could prevent any combined movement on their part.
The king had failed to buy off the popular leaders. According to Malouet, thirty-seven thousand livres had been paid to Pétion and Santerre for worthless promises to stop the insurrection. He rejected the last-minute advice, not only of Vergniaud and Guadet, now alarmed by a turn of affairs they brought about and also of his loyal old minister Malesherbes, to abdicate the throne. He was determined to defend the Tuileries. His supporters had anticipated and prepared for the attack long beforehand, and were confident of success. A plan of defense, drawn up by a professional soldier, had been adopted by the Paris department on 25 June: for it was their official duty to safeguard the Executive Power. The palace was easy to defend. It was garrisoned by the only regular troops on either side—950 veteran Swiss mercenaries of the Gardes Suisse; these were backed by 930 gendarmes, 2,000 national guards, and 200–300 Chevaliers de Saint Louis, and other royalist volunteers. Five thousand men should have been an ample defense; though it appears that, by some oversight, they were seriously short of ammunition. Police spies reported to the commune that underground passages had been constructed by which additional troops could be secretly introduced from their barracks. Mandat, the commander of the National Guard, was not very sure of his forces, but the tone of his orders was so resolute that it seemed to steady the troops. He had stationed some troops on the Pont Neuf so as to prevent a junction between the insurgents on the two sides of the river, which could prevent any combined movement on their part.
Insurrection of 10 August 1792