The EEF's strength, once enough for an advance into Palestine, had been decimated by the two battles for Gaza.
The 52nd (Lowland), the 53rd (Welsh), and the 54th (East Anglian) Divisions, which had been reported to be about 1,500 below establishment before the first battle, lost a further 10,000 casualties during the two battles.
Three months later, they would still be 5,150 infantry and 400 yeomanry below strength.
A much larger force would be needed to defeat the strongly entrenched and newly reinforced Ottoman positions.

Permanent defences were constructed from the sea at Gaza to Shellal on the Wadi Ghazza.
From Shellal a lightly entrenched line extended to El Gamli, before continuing south 7 miles (11 km) to Tel el Fara.
The western sector stretched almost to Tel el Jemmi, and was strongly entrenched and wired, and defended by infantry.
The Desert Column was responsible for outposts and patrols in the open plain stretching east and south of the eastern flank, and for harassing Ottoman forces at every opportunity, while wells and cisterns were mapped.

The open eastern flank was dominated by the Wadi Ghazza, which could only be crossed at four places, apart from the beach on the Mediterranean coast.
These were the main Deir el Belah to Gaza road crossing; the Tel el Jemmi crossing, which had been used during the first battle of Gaza; the Shellal crossing on the Khan Yunis to Beersheba road; and the Tel el Fara crossing on the Rafa to Beersheba road.
Difficulties crossing elsewhere along the wadi were due to the 50–60 feet (15–18 m) perpendicular banks cut into the Gaza–Beersheba plain by flooding two or three times a year.
During the stalemate numerous additional crossings were constructed.

Viewing across the open eastern flank was possible from the top of the "curiously shaped heaps of broken earth" near Shellal.
Two tels, indicating possible sites of ancient cities, stood high above the plain and also provided excellent views.
The spectacular, flat-topped Tel el Jemmi, with its perpendicular sides, one side dropping into the Wadi Ghazza, could be seen for miles.
It had been used as a lookout during the first battle of Gaza.
Tel el Fara, on the Rafa to Beersheba road, was a flat-topped prominence with conical sides 7 miles (11 km) further south, and was approximately 16 miles (26 km) inland from the coast in the centre of the Gaza to Beersheba front line.
This large mound, near the Wadi Ghazza at Shellal, was thought to have been built by the crusaders in the 13th century as an observation post; and it gave an "uninterrupted view for several miles northward and eastward."
At the base of Tel el Fara huge stone buttresses and several courses of cut stone could be seen at water level.

To the west of the Wadi Ghazza a reserve line along the old battle line was held by one infantry brigade.
To the east of the Wadi Ghazza, the front line consisted of 25 redoubts manned by one platoon in each redoubt, except redoubts 2, 11, and 12, which each had two platoons.
These redoubts, fronted by continuous wire entanglements, formed the firing line between Gamli and Hiseia 12,000 yards (11,000 m) to the north.
In addition, the front line was strengthened by a support line of trenches, located 300 yards (270 m) behind the firing line, along the east bank of the Wadi Ghazza.
Continuous wire entanglements with gaps for the main roads stretched for 11,000 yards (10,000 m) south.
This battle line was held by one infantry division, which deployed in the front line one brigade and one artillery brigade, the latter located along the west bank of the Wadi Ghazza, from which the guns could "sweep the ground in front of the battle line."

Attacks were to be resisted strongly.
Each garrison of front line infantry was to be reinforced from the support line in sufficient numbers to replace casualties.
If a redoubt was lost, it was to be retaken "at once," either by a bombing attack or an assault across open ground.

Chauvel's Desert Column became responsible for the open eastern flank which extended the front line across no-man's-land to the south–w
The EEF's strength, once enough for an advance into Palestine, had been decimated by the two battles for Gaza. The 52nd (Lowland), the 53rd (Welsh), and the 54th (East Anglian) Divisions, which had been reported to be about 1,500 below establishment before the first battle, lost a further 10,000 casualties during the two battles. Three months later, they would still be 5,150 infantry and 400 yeomanry below strength. A much larger force would be needed to defeat the strongly entrenched and newly reinforced Ottoman positions.
Permanent defences were constructed from the sea at Gaza to Shellal on the Wadi Ghazza. From Shellal a lightly entrenched line extended to El Gamli, before continuing south 7 miles (11 km) to Tel el Fara. The western sector stretched almost to Tel el Jemmi, and was strongly entrenched and wired, and defended by infantry. The Desert Column was responsible for outposts and patrols in the open plain stretching east and south of the eastern flank, and for harassing Ottoman forces at every opportunity, while wells and cisterns were mapped.
The open eastern flank was dominated by the Wadi Ghazza, which could only be crossed at four places, apart from the beach on the Mediterranean coast. These were the main Deir el Belah to Gaza road crossing; the Tel el Jemmi crossing, which had been used during the first battle of Gaza; the Shellal crossing on the Khan Yunis to Beersheba road; and the Tel el Fara crossing on the Rafa to Beersheba road. Difficulties crossing elsewhere along the wadi were due to the 50–60 feet (15–18 m) perpendicular banks cut into the Gaza–Beersheba plain by flooding two or three times a year. During the stalemate numerous additional crossings were constructed.
Viewing across the open eastern flank was possible from the top of the "curiously shaped heaps of broken earth" near Shellal. Two tels, indicating possible sites of ancient cities, stood high above the plain and also provided excellent views. The spectacular, flat-topped Tel el Jemmi, with its perpendicular sides, one side dropping into the Wadi Ghazza, could be seen for miles. It had been used as a lookout during the first battle of Gaza. Tel el Fara, on the Rafa to Beersheba road, was a flat-topped prominence with conical sides 7 miles (11 km) further south, and was approximately 16 miles (26 km) inland from the coast in the centre of the Gaza to Beersheba front line. This large mound, near the Wadi Ghazza at Shellal, was thought to have been built by the crusaders in the 13th century as an observation post; and it gave an "uninterrupted view for several miles northward and eastward." At the base of Tel el Fara huge stone buttresses and several courses of cut stone could be seen at water level.
To the west of the Wadi Ghazza a reserve line along the old battle line was held by one infantry brigade. To the east of the Wadi Ghazza, the front line consisted of 25 redoubts manned by one platoon in each redoubt, except redoubts 2, 11, and 12, which each had two platoons. These redoubts, fronted by continuous wire entanglements, formed the firing line between Gamli and Hiseia 12,000 yards (11,000 m) to the north. In addition, the front line was strengthened by a support line of trenches, located 300 yards (270 m) behind the firing line, along the east bank of the Wadi Ghazza. Continuous wire entanglements with gaps for the main roads stretched for 11,000 yards (10,000 m) south. This battle line was held by one infantry division, which deployed in the front line one brigade and one artillery brigade, the latter located along the west bank of the Wadi Ghazza, from which the guns could "sweep the ground in front of the battle line."
Attacks were to be resisted strongly. Each garrison of front line infantry was to be reinforced from the support line in sufficient numbers to replace casualties. If a redoubt was lost, it was to be retaken "at once," either by a bombing attack or an assault across open ground.
Chauvel's Desert Column became responsible for the open eastern flank which extended the front line across no-man's-land to the south–w
Stalemate in Southern Palestine