As the war escalated, foreign support became vital for the survival of Obote's government.
The Tanzanians initially helped to defend his regime and kept some order through the presence of about 10,000 Tanzania People's Defence Force soldiers and 1,000 policemen.
Nevertheless, the unsustainable costs of these troops led Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere to gradually withdraw most of his forces from Uganda.
By June of 1981, just 800 to 1,000 Tanzanian advisors remained in the country.
These advisors remained of crucial importance for the UNLA, but the Tanzanian withdrawal greatly weakened Obote's position.
To compensate, he tried to enlist further foreign aid: He hired a British private military company, and convinced the Commonwealth of Nations as well as the United States to send small teams of security advisors.

One of Obote's most important allies was North Korea.
The Ugandan President visited the country in late 1981 and signed a cooperation agreement which included military support for his regime.
At least 30 North Korean officers were subsequently sent to Gulu in northern Uganda, where they trained UNLA soldiers and repaired military equipment.
By 1984, the number had risen to about 50 North Koreans who acted as security, intelligence, and military advisors.
Museveni claimed that over 700 North Koreans were ultimately used by the UNLA; Obote maintained that only about 170 were present in Uganda.
According to one study, the North Korean officers actively participated in and even led counter-insurgency operations for Obote.
A Central Intelligence Agency report stated, however, that the North Koreans refused to actually venture to the frontlines.
The Ugandan military also sent some officers and non-commissioned officer to North Korea for advanced trainings.
Obote's government also organized various paramilitary groups to assist the UNLA.
The "People's Militia" consisted of Langi, Acholi and Teso tribesmen, and was mostly loyal to UNLA chief of staff David Oyite-Ojok.
It became increasingly powerful, and garnered a reputation as a fierce and brutal force.
In addition, there was the "National Youth Army" (NYA), various tribal militias, and the UPC youth paramilitaries.

Meanwhile, the conflict in the south became more serious.
Another rebel group emerged, the so-called "Uganda Liberation Movement" which threatened to kidnap and kill United Nations personnel, as the latter was supporting Obote's attempts at restabilizing Uganda.
The threats worked, and the U.N. stopped its training programme for the Ugandan police.
The PRA also continued its hit-and-run operations with mixed successes: It overran a UNLA outpost at Kakiri on 5 April 1981, and captured important weaponry, but had to hastily retreat when a TPDF unit responded to the attack.
The Tanzanian forces consequently conducted a counter-insurgency sweep, catching a PRA column under Elly Tumwine off-guard and recapturing some of the captured guns.
Despite this, the PRA successfully recruited more volunteers, growing to about 200 fighters by early May. In the next month, Museveni travelled to Nairobi where he met with Lule; the two agreed to unite the PRA and UFF into a unified opposition group.
The umbrella organization was dubbed the "National Resistance Movement" (NRM) and its armed wing was termed the "National Resistance Army" (NRA).
Lule was appointed overall NRM Chairman, while Museveni became Vice-Chairman of the National Resistance Council and Chairman of the High Command of the NRA.
The merger profited both sides: The UFF was extremely weak, and Lule finally gained an actual armed following, while Lule remained much respected among Uganda's southern population and thus granted Museveni important legitimacy.
This was especially important because a stragically important region near Kampala, known as Luwero Triangle, was mostly inhabited by Baganda.
For far, the PRA had mostly consisted of non-Baganda, but Lule provided the newly formed NRA with backing from the Baganda, allowing Museveni to expand his envisoned "people's war".
Libya's leader Muammar Gaddafi also
As the war escalated, foreign support became vital for the survival of Obote's government. The Tanzanians initially helped to defend his regime and kept some order through the presence of about 10,000 Tanzania People's Defence Force soldiers and 1,000 policemen. Nevertheless, the unsustainable costs of these troops led Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere to gradually withdraw most of his forces from Uganda. By June of 1981, just 800 to 1,000 Tanzanian advisors remained in the country. These advisors remained of crucial importance for the UNLA, but the Tanzanian withdrawal greatly weakened Obote's position. To compensate, he tried to enlist further foreign aid: He hired a British private military company, and convinced the Commonwealth of Nations as well as the United States to send small teams of security advisors.
One of Obote's most important allies was North Korea. The Ugandan President visited the country in late 1981 and signed a cooperation agreement which included military support for his regime. At least 30 North Korean officers were subsequently sent to Gulu in northern Uganda, where they trained UNLA soldiers and repaired military equipment. By 1984, the number had risen to about 50 North Koreans who acted as security, intelligence, and military advisors. Museveni claimed that over 700 North Koreans were ultimately used by the UNLA; Obote maintained that only about 170 were present in Uganda. According to one study, the North Korean officers actively participated in and even led counter-insurgency operations for Obote. A Central Intelligence Agency report stated, however, that the North Koreans refused to actually venture to the frontlines. The Ugandan military also sent some officers and non-commissioned officer to North Korea for advanced trainings. Obote's government also organized various paramilitary groups to assist the UNLA. The "People's Militia" consisted of Langi, Acholi and Teso tribesmen, and was mostly loyal to UNLA chief of staff David Oyite-Ojok. It became increasingly powerful, and garnered a reputation as a fierce and brutal force. In addition, there was the "National Youth Army" (NYA), various tribal militias, and the UPC youth paramilitaries.
Meanwhile, the conflict in the south became more serious. Another rebel group emerged, the so-called "Uganda Liberation Movement" which threatened to kidnap and kill United Nations personnel, as the latter was supporting Obote's attempts at restabilizing Uganda. The threats worked, and the U.N. stopped its training programme for the Ugandan police. The PRA also continued its hit-and-run operations with mixed successes: It overran a UNLA outpost at Kakiri on 5 April 1981, and captured important weaponry, but had to hastily retreat when a TPDF unit responded to the attack. The Tanzanian forces consequently conducted a counter-insurgency sweep, catching a PRA column under Elly Tumwine off-guard and recapturing some of the captured guns. Despite this, the PRA successfully recruited more volunteers, growing to about 200 fighters by early May. In the next month, Museveni travelled to Nairobi where he met with Lule; the two agreed to unite the PRA and UFF into a unified opposition group. The umbrella organization was dubbed the "National Resistance Movement" (NRM) and its armed wing was termed the "National Resistance Army" (NRA). Lule was appointed overall NRM Chairman, while Museveni became Vice-Chairman of the National Resistance Council and Chairman of the High Command of the NRA. The merger profited both sides: The UFF was extremely weak, and Lule finally gained an actual armed following, while Lule remained much respected among Uganda's southern population and thus granted Museveni important legitimacy. This was especially important because a stragically important region near Kampala, known as Luwero Triangle, was mostly inhabited by Baganda. For far, the PRA had mostly consisted of non-Baganda, but Lule provided the newly formed NRA with backing from the Baganda, allowing Museveni to expand his envisoned "people's war". Libya's leader Muammar Gaddafi also
Ugandan Bush War