The French Armee du Nord (Army of the North) was commanded by veteran officers and headed by Napoleon himself, who had won dozens of battles.
 Directly under him were three Marshals, Grouchy, Ney, and Soult, all generals of renown and bravery.
The corps and division generals were well known for ability and with several campaigns behind them.
 The troops of the Army of the North were, for the most part, experienced veterans who had seen at least one battle.
 While the mix of veterans was higher than in either of the other armies, many of the troops had never worked with one another before nor under their officers.
 Trust in one another and their officers was therefore in short supply.
For all that we may count the veterans, it was noted that there were many in the French formations that had never been under fire.
 In the words of Henri Houssaye, "Napoleon had never held in his hand an instrument so fearsome or fragile".
In equipment and supply, the French were well set with both, although the Guard units had to suffer standard weapons, and the Army of the North had more cavalry than their opponents throughout the four days of battle that would follow and end at Waterloo.

By contrast, the Prussian Army was, at this point, in a state of disorganization and rebuilding.
 According to historian Peter Hofschröer "The armed forces fielded by the Kingdom of Prussia in 1815 were in terms of quality of manpower, equipment, and coherence of organization probably the worst fielded by Prussia in the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars."
The Prussian cavalry was reorganizing and converting the Freecorps and Legions into regular cavalry formations.
 The artillery was lacking guns and needed equipment and guns and equipment continued to arrive from Prussia even as the battles were raging.
 No less than one-third of the Prussian Infantry consisted of Landwehr (militia) and, unlike the Landwehr of 1813/1814, these were untrained.
 Hofschröer says that "they could be counted to go forward in disorder and retreat in chaos".
To further compound the Prussians' problems, the Saxon and Rhinelander contingents were recent additions to the Prussian Army and, having been until recently part of the French Army, they were reluctant to participate.
Some Saxons rebelled and were sent home before the French advanced, and many of the Rhinelanders would also desert and head home during the battle.
The French Armee du Nord (Army of the North) was commanded by veteran officers and headed by Napoleon himself, who had won dozens of battles.  Directly under him were three Marshals, Grouchy, Ney, and Soult, all generals of renown and bravery. The corps and division generals were well known for ability and with several campaigns behind them.  The troops of the Army of the North were, for the most part, experienced veterans who had seen at least one battle.  While the mix of veterans was higher than in either of the other armies, many of the troops had never worked with one another before nor under their officers.  Trust in one another and their officers was therefore in short supply. For all that we may count the veterans, it was noted that there were many in the French formations that had never been under fire.  In the words of Henri Houssaye, "Napoleon had never held in his hand an instrument so fearsome or fragile". In equipment and supply, the French were well set with both, although the Guard units had to suffer standard weapons, and the Army of the North had more cavalry than their opponents throughout the four days of battle that would follow and end at Waterloo.
By contrast, the Prussian Army was, at this point, in a state of disorganization and rebuilding.  According to historian Peter Hofschröer "The armed forces fielded by the Kingdom of Prussia in 1815 were in terms of quality of manpower, equipment, and coherence of organization probably the worst fielded by Prussia in the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars." The Prussian cavalry was reorganizing and converting the Freecorps and Legions into regular cavalry formations.  The artillery was lacking guns and needed equipment and guns and equipment continued to arrive from Prussia even as the battles were raging.  No less than one-third of the Prussian Infantry consisted of Landwehr (militia) and, unlike the Landwehr of 1813/1814, these were untrained.  Hofschröer says that "they could be counted to go forward in disorder and retreat in chaos". To further compound the Prussians' problems, the Saxon and Rhinelander contingents were recent additions to the Prussian Army and, having been until recently part of the French Army, they were reluctant to participate. Some Saxons rebelled and were sent home before the French advanced, and many of the Rhinelanders would also desert and head home during the battle.
Battle of Ligny