Model's relief is believed not to have been a sign that he had lost Hitler's confidence, but rather that he had gained it, the Führer wanting him available should another emergency break out  which needed his attention.
Thus, on 31 January 1944, he was urgently sent to command Army Group North, which, two weeks earlier, had seen its stranglehold on Leningrad broken by the Volkhov, Leningrad and 2nd Baltic Fronts.

The situation was dire: the Eighteenth Army had been shattered into three parts and on the same time, the front had virtually dissolved.
The army group's previous commander, Georg von Küchler, had pleaded for permission to withdraw to the Panther Line in Estonia, which was still only half-completed at that stage.
Model immediately cracked down on such talk, instituting a new policy he called Shield and Sword (Schild und Schwert).

Under this doctrine, ground would only temporarily be ceded, to gather reserves for an immediate counter-attack that would drive the Red Army back and relieve pressure on other areas of the front.
These statements of aggressive intent won over Hitler and OKH, who had no substantial reserves to send him, but were still unwilling to lose territory.
Historians have since debated their significance, some claiming that Shield and Sword was Hitler's invention, while others say they were a calculated ploy by Model to disguise his true intent—to pull back to the Panther Line.

Regardless, the "temporary" loss of ground usually became permanent, as Model conducted a fighting withdrawal to the Panther Line.
He delegated responsibility for the Narva front to Johannes Friessner commanding Army Detachment Narva, while he concentrated on extricating Eighteenth Army from its predicament.
Without OKH's notice or approval, he constructed a series of interim defensive lines to cover its retreat, slowing down and inflicting heavy losses on the pursuing Soviet forces in the process.

By 1 March, the withdrawal was complete.
His forces were mostly intact, but the fighting had been fierce: his Shield and Sword counter-attacks alone had cost him some 10,000–12,000 men.
These counter-attacks usually failed to recover ground, but they kept the Red Army off-balance and won Model time to pull his units back.
They also allowed him to say to Hitler that he was pursuing an aggressive approach, even as the front moved steadily to the west.

On 1 March Model was promoted to Generalfeldmarschall.
His rise from colonel to field marshal had taken just six years.
Model's relief is believed not to have been a sign that he had lost Hitler's confidence, but rather that he had gained it, the Führer wanting him available should another emergency break out  which needed his attention. Thus, on 31 January 1944, he was urgently sent to command Army Group North, which, two weeks earlier, had seen its stranglehold on Leningrad broken by the Volkhov, Leningrad and 2nd Baltic Fronts.
The situation was dire: the Eighteenth Army had been shattered into three parts and on the same time, the front had virtually dissolved. The army group's previous commander, Georg von Küchler, had pleaded for permission to withdraw to the Panther Line in Estonia, which was still only half-completed at that stage. Model immediately cracked down on such talk, instituting a new policy he called Shield and Sword (Schild und Schwert).
Under this doctrine, ground would only temporarily be ceded, to gather reserves for an immediate counter-attack that would drive the Red Army back and relieve pressure on other areas of the front. These statements of aggressive intent won over Hitler and OKH, who had no substantial reserves to send him, but were still unwilling to lose territory. Historians have since debated their significance, some claiming that Shield and Sword was Hitler's invention, while others say they were a calculated ploy by Model to disguise his true intent—to pull back to the Panther Line.
Regardless, the "temporary" loss of ground usually became permanent, as Model conducted a fighting withdrawal to the Panther Line. He delegated responsibility for the Narva front to Johannes Friessner commanding Army Detachment Narva, while he concentrated on extricating Eighteenth Army from its predicament. Without OKH's notice or approval, he constructed a series of interim defensive lines to cover its retreat, slowing down and inflicting heavy losses on the pursuing Soviet forces in the process.
By 1 March, the withdrawal was complete. His forces were mostly intact, but the fighting had been fierce: his Shield and Sword counter-attacks alone had cost him some 10,000–12,000 men. These counter-attacks usually failed to recover ground, but they kept the Red Army off-balance and won Model time to pull his units back. They also allowed him to say to Hitler that he was pursuing an aggressive approach, even as the front moved steadily to the west.
On 1 March Model was promoted to Generalfeldmarschall. His rise from colonel to field marshal had taken just six years.
Walter Model