The 32nd Division's destination changed during the voyage from Shanghai to Manila.
Imperial General Headquarters was concerned that the increasing difficulty of shipping units towards the front line meant that it would not be possible to complete the planned reinforcement of the "absolute zone of national defense" before Allied forces reached the area.
As a result, it was decided to use the division to reinforce the Second Army in western New Guinea and the eastern Netherlands East Indies (NEI)—which were under direct threat of attack—rather than send it to Mindanao.

The Take Ichi convoy resumed its journey to New Guinea on 1 May. Its composition was now eight transports (one of the Manila-bound transports having replaced Yoshida Maru) under the protection of Shirataka, Asakaze, Shiratsuyu, minesweeper W-22, CH-37 and CH-38.
The convoy took a special route planned by the Third Southern Expeditionary Fleet to reduce the risk of submarine attack.

U.S. signals intelligence operators again detected the convoy's departure.
On 2 May, analysts estimated its size as nine transports and seven escorts carrying 12,784 troops of the 32nd Division and an unknown number of men from the 35th Division.
Decoded Japanese Army Water Transport Code messages also provided the Allies with the convoy's route, speed, daily noon positions and destination.
This "extraordinary intelligence coup" was passed to the relevant commands on 2 May and the USN positioned submarines to ambush the Japanese ships.

The Take Ichi convoy suffered a devastating submarine attack on 6 May. On that day, USS Gurnard intercepted the Japanese ships in the Celebes Sea near the northeastern tip of Celebes.
Gurnard's captain—Commander Herb Andrews—submerged his boat and made a cautious approach to avoid detection by aircraft.
He reached a firing position four hours later and fired six torpedoes at two transports.
Only one of these torpedoes struck its mark, and a second salvo missed its intended targets but hit another transport.
Andrews then turned his boat and fired further torpedoes from Gurnard's stern torpedo tubes which hit a third transport.
One of the Japanese destroyers counterattacked Gurnard and forced Andrews to break off his attack.
The destroyer was traveling at too great a speed for its detection gear to function, however, and did not damage the submarine, despite dropping approximately 100 depth charges.

Gurnard rose to periscope depth two hours later and found that a major effort to rescue troops and equipment from the torpedoed transports was under way.
That night, the submarine torpedoed one of the crippled transports which was still afloat.
Gurnard's attack sank transports Aden Maru (5,825 tons) and Taijima Maru (6,995 tons) as well as the cargo ship Tenshinzan Marau (6,886 tons).
While the rescue effort was relatively successful, 1,290 troops were killed and much of their equipment was lost.

Due to its heavy losses, the Take Ichi convoy was ordered to dock at Halmahera in the eastern NEI rather than continue to New Guinea.
The surviving ships arrived there on 9 May. Both divisions and their equipment were unloaded and the convoy sailed for Manila on 13 May, arriving on 20 May without further loss.
The 32nd Division's destination changed during the voyage from Shanghai to Manila. Imperial General Headquarters was concerned that the increasing difficulty of shipping units towards the front line meant that it would not be possible to complete the planned reinforcement of the "absolute zone of national defense" before Allied forces reached the area. As a result, it was decided to use the division to reinforce the Second Army in western New Guinea and the eastern Netherlands East Indies (NEI)—which were under direct threat of attack—rather than send it to Mindanao.
The Take Ichi convoy resumed its journey to New Guinea on 1 May. Its composition was now eight transports (one of the Manila-bound transports having replaced Yoshida Maru) under the protection of Shirataka, Asakaze, Shiratsuyu, minesweeper W-22, CH-37 and CH-38. The convoy took a special route planned by the Third Southern Expeditionary Fleet to reduce the risk of submarine attack.
U.S. signals intelligence operators again detected the convoy's departure. On 2 May, analysts estimated its size as nine transports and seven escorts carrying 12,784 troops of the 32nd Division and an unknown number of men from the 35th Division. Decoded Japanese Army Water Transport Code messages also provided the Allies with the convoy's route, speed, daily noon positions and destination. This "extraordinary intelligence coup" was passed to the relevant commands on 2 May and the USN positioned submarines to ambush the Japanese ships.
The Take Ichi convoy suffered a devastating submarine attack on 6 May. On that day, USS Gurnard intercepted the Japanese ships in the Celebes Sea near the northeastern tip of Celebes. Gurnard's captain—Commander Herb Andrews—submerged his boat and made a cautious approach to avoid detection by aircraft. He reached a firing position four hours later and fired six torpedoes at two transports. Only one of these torpedoes struck its mark, and a second salvo missed its intended targets but hit another transport. Andrews then turned his boat and fired further torpedoes from Gurnard's stern torpedo tubes which hit a third transport. One of the Japanese destroyers counterattacked Gurnard and forced Andrews to break off his attack. The destroyer was traveling at too great a speed for its detection gear to function, however, and did not damage the submarine, despite dropping approximately 100 depth charges.
Gurnard rose to periscope depth two hours later and found that a major effort to rescue troops and equipment from the torpedoed transports was under way. That night, the submarine torpedoed one of the crippled transports which was still afloat. Gurnard's attack sank transports Aden Maru (5,825 tons) and Taijima Maru (6,995 tons) as well as the cargo ship Tenshinzan Marau (6,886 tons). While the rescue effort was relatively successful, 1,290 troops were killed and much of their equipment was lost.
Due to its heavy losses, the Take Ichi convoy was ordered to dock at Halmahera in the eastern NEI rather than continue to New Guinea. The surviving ships arrived there on 9 May. Both divisions and their equipment were unloaded and the convoy sailed for Manila on 13 May, arriving on 20 May without further loss.
Take Ichi convoy