On October 21, 1956, the Ba'ath Party won only two seats of the 40 Lower House seats being contested.
However, its ally, the National Socialist Party headed by Sulayman al-Nabulsi, won 12 seats, the most won by any party in the election.
The National Communist Party also won three seats and the three parties formed a left-wing Arab nationalist coalition.
Following the defeat of his loyalists, King Hussein allowed al-Nabulsi, the new Prime Minister, to form a cabinet of his own choosing.
Al-Nabulsi appointed Rimawi to the posts of Minister of State of Foreign Affairs and Deputy Premier.
Rimawi became the most outspoken critic of the royal family and managed to exercise extra power by making alliances with other radical anti-royalists in the cabinet and parliament as well as with dissenting officers in the Jordanian Army who called themselves the "Free Officers."
He openly declared his opposition to the independence of Jordan, favoring a union with its northern neighbor, Syria.

As criticism of the king mounted, the royal family censored the press, parliamentary debates and shut down five news publications.
Rimawi condemned the censorship which he claimed was intended to protect the position of Glubb Pasha, the British commander of the Jordanian Army whose role in the 1948 War was constantly put under scrutiny by the government.
Rimawi was the main force behind al-Nabulsi's efforts to replace the annual British subsidy to Jordan with aid from Arab states.
In 1956, the United Kingdom intended to cease its aid due to financial difficulties and the United States turned down King Hussein's aid request, prompting him to agree to Rimawi and al-Nabulsi's proposal.

Rimawi became increasingly polarized with regards to the royalists, later being described by a member of the cabinet as "not being an asset to the government because he was always throwing the government against the king."
An internal conflict ensued between al-Nabulsi and Rimawi, with the latter advocating a swifter route to pan-Arab unity and the former calling for a more moderate approach.
By 1957, al-Nabulsi had seemingly abandoned his centrist position as the middleman between the king and the anti-royalists and drew closer to Rimawi, adopting most of his policies.
Rimawi, meanwhile, was developing a close relationship with the influential Arab nationalist army chief-of-staff and an ally of the king, Ali Abu Nuwar.
The general mood in the Jordanian political scene was that a coup against the royal family was becoming ever more probable.
King Hussein suggested the dismissal of Rimawi to al-Nabulsi in January 1957 citing concerns of a conspiracy against the monarchy.

During his speech to the Jordanian Parliament in February, Rimawi implicitly stated that the chief policy maker in the country was not the king, but rather the parliament and its government.
Later, he relayed privately to fellow cabinet member Isa Madanat his advocacy of a coup against the king.
The growing divisions between the royal family and the leftist government reached its peak on April 8, 1957; Jordanian Army units led by the Free Officers clashed with troops loyal to King Hussein during a military exercise in az-Zarqa by the former.
As a part of the exercise, army units approached the palace of the king's mother and other key royal institutions in az-Zarqa and the outskirts of Amman.
This was interpreted as a threat by the royal family.
King Hussein reacted forcefully to the incident.
After receiving assurances of loyalty from his traditional support base—the Bedouin core of the army, Bedouin tribal chiefs in Transjordan, and the Islamists represented by the Muslim Brotherhood—he declared martial law.
As a result, Hussein dismissed the cabinet, dissolved parliament, and banned political parties.
Dozens of cabinet members (including al-Nabulsi), army officers, and other leftist politicians were soon arrested, but Rimawi and a number of his allies evaded capture by fleeing to Syria at the height of the crisis.
He, Abu Nuwar, and Abdullah Na'was were all sentenced to 15 years in absentia.
On October 21, 1956, the Ba'ath Party won only two seats of the 40 Lower House seats being contested. However, its ally, the National Socialist Party headed by Sulayman al-Nabulsi, won 12 seats, the most won by any party in the election. The National Communist Party also won three seats and the three parties formed a left-wing Arab nationalist coalition. Following the defeat of his loyalists, King Hussein allowed al-Nabulsi, the new Prime Minister, to form a cabinet of his own choosing. Al-Nabulsi appointed Rimawi to the posts of Minister of State of Foreign Affairs and Deputy Premier. Rimawi became the most outspoken critic of the royal family and managed to exercise extra power by making alliances with other radical anti-royalists in the cabinet and parliament as well as with dissenting officers in the Jordanian Army who called themselves the "Free Officers." He openly declared his opposition to the independence of Jordan, favoring a union with its northern neighbor, Syria.
As criticism of the king mounted, the royal family censored the press, parliamentary debates and shut down five news publications. Rimawi condemned the censorship which he claimed was intended to protect the position of Glubb Pasha, the British commander of the Jordanian Army whose role in the 1948 War was constantly put under scrutiny by the government. Rimawi was the main force behind al-Nabulsi's efforts to replace the annual British subsidy to Jordan with aid from Arab states. In 1956, the United Kingdom intended to cease its aid due to financial difficulties and the United States turned down King Hussein's aid request, prompting him to agree to Rimawi and al-Nabulsi's proposal.
Rimawi became increasingly polarized with regards to the royalists, later being described by a member of the cabinet as "not being an asset to the government because he was always throwing the government against the king." An internal conflict ensued between al-Nabulsi and Rimawi, with the latter advocating a swifter route to pan-Arab unity and the former calling for a more moderate approach. By 1957, al-Nabulsi had seemingly abandoned his centrist position as the middleman between the king and the anti-royalists and drew closer to Rimawi, adopting most of his policies. Rimawi, meanwhile, was developing a close relationship with the influential Arab nationalist army chief-of-staff and an ally of the king, Ali Abu Nuwar. The general mood in the Jordanian political scene was that a coup against the royal family was becoming ever more probable. King Hussein suggested the dismissal of Rimawi to al-Nabulsi in January 1957 citing concerns of a conspiracy against the monarchy.
During his speech to the Jordanian Parliament in February, Rimawi implicitly stated that the chief policy maker in the country was not the king, but rather the parliament and its government. Later, he relayed privately to fellow cabinet member Isa Madanat his advocacy of a coup against the king. The growing divisions between the royal family and the leftist government reached its peak on April 8, 1957; Jordanian Army units led by the Free Officers clashed with troops loyal to King Hussein during a military exercise in az-Zarqa by the former. As a part of the exercise, army units approached the palace of the king's mother and other key royal institutions in az-Zarqa and the outskirts of Amman. This was interpreted as a threat by the royal family. King Hussein reacted forcefully to the incident. After receiving assurances of loyalty from his traditional support base—the Bedouin core of the army, Bedouin tribal chiefs in Transjordan, and the Islamists represented by the Muslim Brotherhood—he declared martial law. As a result, Hussein dismissed the cabinet, dissolved parliament, and banned political parties. Dozens of cabinet members (including al-Nabulsi), army officers, and other leftist politicians were soon arrested, but Rimawi and a number of his allies evaded capture by fleeing to Syria at the height of the crisis. He, Abu Nuwar, and Abdullah Na'was were all sentenced to 15 years in absentia.
Abdullah Rimawi