In ancient China the chariot was used in a primary role from the time of the Shang Dynasty until the early years of the Han Dynasty (c. 1200–200 BCE) when it was replaced by cavalry and fell back into a secondary support role.
For a millennium or more, every chariot borne soldier had used the particular combat tactics that use of the vehicle required.

Chariot-based combat usually took place in wide-open spaces.
When the two sides were within range they would first exchange arrow or crossbow fire, hoping that through superior numbers they would cause disorder and confusion in the enemy ranks.
As the two opponents closed on each other they would stay about four meters apart to avoid the three-meter-long (9.8 ft) dagger-axes of their opponents.
Only when two chariots came closer than this would an actual fight occur.

Only about three meters wide, with infantry riding on both sides, the chariot was highly inflexible as a fighting machine and difficult to turn around.
Coupled with this were restrictions on the use of weapons with opponents seizing the momentary opportunity for victory or trapping their opponent with a pincer movement.
These tactics required fighting in tight formation with good military discipline and control.

When the spring and autumn period began, more attention was paid to troop formations according to the type of battle.
Chariot units were trained to ensure co-ordination with the rest of the army during a military campaign.

During the Western Zhou Era, chariots were deployed on wide-open plains abreast of each other in a single line.
The accompanying infantry would then be deployed forward of the chariot, a broad formation that denied the enemy the opportunity for pincer attacks.
When the two sides clashed, if the chariots remained in strict formation there would be a good opportunity to encircle the enemy.
During this period of chariot warfare, the use of orderly team-based combat to some extent determined the difference between victory and defeat, otherwise fighting would have to stop in order to consolidate the formation.
In this type operation unified command was important.
Senior officers would use drums and flags to command the army's advance and retreat, speed and to make formation adjustments.
However such operations were inherently very slow-paced and the speed of engagement thus hampered.
Furthermore, the infantry had to remain in line which was not conducive to long-distance pursuits of retreating enemies.

A typical example of the importance of disciplined forces occurred during the Zhou overthrow of Shang at the decisive Battle of Muye in 1046 BCE.
As the Zhou army moved forward, the infantry and chariots were commanded to stop and regroup after every six or seven steps to maintain formation.
The Shang army, despite its superior numbers, was largely composed of demoralized and forcibly conscripted troops.
As a result, the troops failed to stay in formation and were defeated.

As the Spring and Autumn period dawned, chariots remained the key to victory.
At the Battle of Yanling in 575 BCE between the States of Chu and Jin the disorganised nature of the Chu army's chariots and infantry led to its defeat.
Both troop formations and the flexibility of the chariot subsequently underwent major developments with infantry placing a much larger role in combat.
Troops were no longer deployed forward of chariots but instead around all four sides thereby increasing the vehicle's flexibility.
Formations no longer involved a single line of chariots; instead they were spread out which brought the advantage of depth.
In this way the chariot's movement was no longer impeded so it could counter enemy attacks as well as provide a fast pursuit vehicle.
In ancient China the chariot was used in a primary role from the time of the Shang Dynasty until the early years of the Han Dynasty (c. 1200–200 BCE) when it was replaced by cavalry and fell back into a secondary support role. For a millennium or more, every chariot borne soldier had used the particular combat tactics that use of the vehicle required.
Chariot-based combat usually took place in wide-open spaces. When the two sides were within range they would first exchange arrow or crossbow fire, hoping that through superior numbers they would cause disorder and confusion in the enemy ranks. As the two opponents closed on each other they would stay about four meters apart to avoid the three-meter-long (9.8 ft) dagger-axes of their opponents. Only when two chariots came closer than this would an actual fight occur.
Only about three meters wide, with infantry riding on both sides, the chariot was highly inflexible as a fighting machine and difficult to turn around. Coupled with this were restrictions on the use of weapons with opponents seizing the momentary opportunity for victory or trapping their opponent with a pincer movement. These tactics required fighting in tight formation with good military discipline and control.
When the spring and autumn period began, more attention was paid to troop formations according to the type of battle. Chariot units were trained to ensure co-ordination with the rest of the army during a military campaign.
During the Western Zhou Era, chariots were deployed on wide-open plains abreast of each other in a single line. The accompanying infantry would then be deployed forward of the chariot, a broad formation that denied the enemy the opportunity for pincer attacks. When the two sides clashed, if the chariots remained in strict formation there would be a good opportunity to encircle the enemy. During this period of chariot warfare, the use of orderly team-based combat to some extent determined the difference between victory and defeat, otherwise fighting would have to stop in order to consolidate the formation. In this type operation unified command was important. Senior officers would use drums and flags to command the army's advance and retreat, speed and to make formation adjustments. However such operations were inherently very slow-paced and the speed of engagement thus hampered. Furthermore, the infantry had to remain in line which was not conducive to long-distance pursuits of retreating enemies.
A typical example of the importance of disciplined forces occurred during the Zhou overthrow of Shang at the decisive Battle of Muye in 1046 BCE. As the Zhou army moved forward, the infantry and chariots were commanded to stop and regroup after every six or seven steps to maintain formation. The Shang army, despite its superior numbers, was largely composed of demoralized and forcibly conscripted troops. As a result, the troops failed to stay in formation and were defeated.
As the Spring and Autumn period dawned, chariots remained the key to victory. At the Battle of Yanling in 575 BCE between the States of Chu and Jin the disorganised nature of the Chu army's chariots and infantry led to its defeat. Both troop formations and the flexibility of the chariot subsequently underwent major developments with infantry placing a much larger role in combat. Troops were no longer deployed forward of chariots but instead around all four sides thereby increasing the vehicle's flexibility. Formations no longer involved a single line of chariots; instead they were spread out which brought the advantage of depth. In this way the chariot's movement was no longer impeded so it could counter enemy attacks as well as provide a fast pursuit vehicle.
Chariots in ancient China