The Zulu Army was  commanded by ESA (Princes) Ntshingwayo kaMahole Khoza and Mavumengwana kaNdlela Ntuli.
The inDuna Dabulamanzi kaMpande, half brother of Cetshwayo, commanded the Undi Corps after Zibhebhu kaMaphitha, the regular inkhosi, or commander, was wounded.

While Chelmsford was in the field seeking them, the entire Zulu army had outmanoeuvred him, moving behind his force with the intention of attacking the British Army on the 23rd.
Pulleine had received reports of large forces of Zulus throughout the morning of the 22nd from 8:00am on.
Vedettes had observed Zulus on the hills to the left front, and Lt.
Chard, while he was at the camp, observed a large force of several thousand Zulu moving to the British left around the hill of Isandlwana.
Pulleine sent word to Chelmsford, which was received by the General between 9:00am and 10:00am.
The main Zulu force was discovered at around 11:00am by men of Lt.
Charles Raw's troop of scouts, who chased a number of Zulus into a valley, only then seeing most of the 20,000 men of the main enemy force sitting in total quiet.
This valley has generally been thought to be the Ngwebeni some 7 miles (11 km) from the British camp but may have been closer in the area of the spurs of Nqutu hill.
Having been discovered, the Zulu force leapt to the offensive.
Raw's men began a fighting retreat back to the camp and a messenger was sent to warn Pulleine.

The Zulu attack then developed in the traditional horns and chest of the buffalo, with the aim of encircling the British position.
From Pulleine's vantage point in the camp, at first only the right horn and then the chest (centre) of the attack seemed to be developing.
Pulleine sent out first one, then all six companies of the 24th Foot into an extended firing line, with the aim of meeting the Zulu attack head-on and checking it with firepower.
Durnford's men, upon meeting elements of the Zulu centre, had retreated to a donga, a dried-out watercourse, on the British right flank where they formed a defensive line.
The Rocket Battery under Durnford's command, which was not mounted and dropped behind the rest of the force, was isolated and overrun very early in the engagement.
The two battalions of native troops were in Durnford's line; while all the officers and NCOs carried rifles, only one in 10 in the ranks was armed with a muzzle-loading musket with limited ammunition and many of them started to leave the battlefield at this point.

Pulleine only made one change to the original disposition after about 20 minutes of firing, bringing in the companies in the firing line slightly closer to the camp.
For an hour or so until after noon, the disciplined British volleys pinned down the Zulu centre, inflicting many casualties and causing the advance to stall.
Indeed, morale remained high within the British line.
The Martini–Henry rifle was a powerful weapon and the men were experienced.
Additionally, the shell fire of the Royal Artillery forced some Zulu regiments to take cover behind the reverse slope of a hill.
Nevertheless, the left horn of the Zulu advance was moving to outflank and envelop the British right.

Durnford's men, who had been fighting the longest, began to withdraw and their rate of fire diminished.
Durnford's withdrawal exposed the right flank of the British regulars, which, with the general threat of the Zulu encirclement, caused Pulleine to order a withdrawal back to the camp.
The regulars' retreat was performed with order and discipline and the men of the 24th conducted a fighting withdrawal into the camp.
Durnford's retreat, however, exposed the flank of G Company, 2nd/24th, which was overrun relatively quickly.

An officer in advance of Chelmsford's force gave this eyewitness account of the final stage of the battle at about 3:00 pm:
In a few seconds we distinctly saw the guns fired again, one after the other, sharp.
This was done several times – a pause, and then a flash – flash!
The sun was shining on the camp at the time, and then the camp looked dark, just as if a shadow was passing over it.
The guns did not fire after that,
The Zulu Army was  commanded by ESA (Princes) Ntshingwayo kaMahole Khoza and Mavumengwana kaNdlela Ntuli. The inDuna Dabulamanzi kaMpande, half brother of Cetshwayo, commanded the Undi Corps after Zibhebhu kaMaphitha, the regular inkhosi, or commander, was wounded.
While Chelmsford was in the field seeking them, the entire Zulu army had outmanoeuvred him, moving behind his force with the intention of attacking the British Army on the 23rd. Pulleine had received reports of large forces of Zulus throughout the morning of the 22nd from 8:00am on. Vedettes had observed Zulus on the hills to the left front, and Lt. Chard, while he was at the camp, observed a large force of several thousand Zulu moving to the British left around the hill of Isandlwana. Pulleine sent word to Chelmsford, which was received by the General between 9:00am and 10:00am. The main Zulu force was discovered at around 11:00am by men of Lt. Charles Raw's troop of scouts, who chased a number of Zulus into a valley, only then seeing most of the 20,000 men of the main enemy force sitting in total quiet. This valley has generally been thought to be the Ngwebeni some 7 miles (11 km) from the British camp but may have been closer in the area of the spurs of Nqutu hill. Having been discovered, the Zulu force leapt to the offensive. Raw's men began a fighting retreat back to the camp and a messenger was sent to warn Pulleine.
The Zulu attack then developed in the traditional horns and chest of the buffalo, with the aim of encircling the British position. From Pulleine's vantage point in the camp, at first only the right horn and then the chest (centre) of the attack seemed to be developing. Pulleine sent out first one, then all six companies of the 24th Foot into an extended firing line, with the aim of meeting the Zulu attack head-on and checking it with firepower. Durnford's men, upon meeting elements of the Zulu centre, had retreated to a donga, a dried-out watercourse, on the British right flank where they formed a defensive line. The Rocket Battery under Durnford's command, which was not mounted and dropped behind the rest of the force, was isolated and overrun very early in the engagement. The two battalions of native troops were in Durnford's line; while all the officers and NCOs carried rifles, only one in 10 in the ranks was armed with a muzzle-loading musket with limited ammunition and many of them started to leave the battlefield at this point.
Pulleine only made one change to the original disposition after about 20 minutes of firing, bringing in the companies in the firing line slightly closer to the camp. For an hour or so until after noon, the disciplined British volleys pinned down the Zulu centre, inflicting many casualties and causing the advance to stall. Indeed, morale remained high within the British line. The Martini–Henry rifle was a powerful weapon and the men were experienced. Additionally, the shell fire of the Royal Artillery forced some Zulu regiments to take cover behind the reverse slope of a hill. Nevertheless, the left horn of the Zulu advance was moving to outflank and envelop the British right.
Durnford's men, who had been fighting the longest, began to withdraw and their rate of fire diminished. Durnford's withdrawal exposed the right flank of the British regulars, which, with the general threat of the Zulu encirclement, caused Pulleine to order a withdrawal back to the camp. The regulars' retreat was performed with order and discipline and the men of the 24th conducted a fighting withdrawal into the camp. Durnford's retreat, however, exposed the flank of G Company, 2nd/24th, which was overrun relatively quickly.
An officer in advance of Chelmsford's force gave this eyewitness account of the final stage of the battle at about 3:00 pm:
In a few seconds we distinctly saw the guns fired again, one after the other, sharp. This was done several times – a pause, and then a flash – flash! The sun was shining on the camp at the time, and then the camp looked dark, just as if a shadow was passing over it. The guns did not fire after that,
Battle of Isandlwana