In October 1914 French and British artillery commanders met to discuss means for supporting infantry attacks, the British practice having been to keep the artillery silent until targets were identified, the French artillery fired a burst of fire (rafale), which ceased as the infantry began the assault.
A moving barrage of fire was proposed as a combination of both methods and became a standard practice once when guns and ammunition were accumulated in sufficient quantity.
Falkenhayn issued memoranda on 7 and 25 January 1915, defining a model of defensive warfare to be used on the Western Front, to enable ground to be held with the fewest possible troops.
By reducing demand for manpower in the west, a larger number of divisions could be sent to the Eastern Front.

The front line was to be fortified, to enable its defence with small numbers of troops indefinitely; areas captured were to be recovered by counter-attacks.
A second trench was to be dug behind the front line, to shelter the trench garrison and to have easy access to the front line, through covered communication trenches.
Should counter-attacks fail to recover the front trench, a rearward line was to be connected to the remaining parts of the front line, limiting the loss of ground to a bend (Ausbeulung) in the line, rather than a breakthrough.
The building of the new defences took until the autumn of 1915 and confronted Franco-British offensives with an evolving system of field fortifications, which was able to absorb the increasing power and sophistication of  attacks.

During the mobile operations of 1914, armies which operated in enemy territory were forced to rely on wireless communication to a far greater extent than anticipated, having expected to use telegraph, telephones and dispatch riders.
None of the armies had established cryptographic systems adequate to protect wireless transmissions from eavesdropping and all of the attacking armies sent messages containing vital information in plain language.
From September to November 1914, the British and French intercepted c. 50 German messages, which showed the disorganisation of the German command in mid-September and the gap between the 1st and 2nd armies on the eve of the Battle of the Marne.
Plain language messages and decodes of crude attempts to disguise German messages gave warnings to the British of the times, places and strengths of eight attacks of four corps or more, during the Race to the Sea and the subsequent battles in Flanders.
In October 1914 French and British artillery commanders met to discuss means for supporting infantry attacks, the British practice having been to keep the artillery silent until targets were identified, the French artillery fired a burst of fire (rafale), which ceased as the infantry began the assault. A moving barrage of fire was proposed as a combination of both methods and became a standard practice once when guns and ammunition were accumulated in sufficient quantity. Falkenhayn issued memoranda on 7 and 25 January 1915, defining a model of defensive warfare to be used on the Western Front, to enable ground to be held with the fewest possible troops. By reducing demand for manpower in the west, a larger number of divisions could be sent to the Eastern Front.
The front line was to be fortified, to enable its defence with small numbers of troops indefinitely; areas captured were to be recovered by counter-attacks. A second trench was to be dug behind the front line, to shelter the trench garrison and to have easy access to the front line, through covered communication trenches. Should counter-attacks fail to recover the front trench, a rearward line was to be connected to the remaining parts of the front line, limiting the loss of ground to a bend (Ausbeulung) in the line, rather than a breakthrough. The building of the new defences took until the autumn of 1915 and confronted Franco-British offensives with an evolving system of field fortifications, which was able to absorb the increasing power and sophistication of  attacks.
During the mobile operations of 1914, armies which operated in enemy territory were forced to rely on wireless communication to a far greater extent than anticipated, having expected to use telegraph, telephones and dispatch riders. None of the armies had established cryptographic systems adequate to protect wireless transmissions from eavesdropping and all of the attacking armies sent messages containing vital information in plain language. From September to November 1914, the British and French intercepted c. 50 German messages, which showed the disorganisation of the German command in mid-September and the gap between the 1st and 2nd armies on the eve of the Battle of the Marne. Plain language messages and decodes of crude attempts to disguise German messages gave warnings to the British of the times, places and strengths of eight attacks of four corps or more, during the Race to the Sea and the subsequent battles in Flanders.
Winter operations 1914–1915