At 14:05 on 6 October 1973, Egyptian forces (attacking through the Sinai desert) and Syrian forces (attacking the Golan Heights) crossed the border into Israel and penetrated the Israeli defense lines.
The Syrian forces on the Golan Heights met with more intense fighting than their Egyptian counterparts, but by 8 October had broken through the Israeli defenses.
The early successes of the Syrian army were due to its officer corps (where officers were promoted because of merit and not politics) and its ability to handle advanced Soviet weaponry: tanks, artillery batteries, aircraft, man-portable missiles, the Sagger anti-tank weapon and the 2K12 Kub anti-aircraft system on mobile launchers.
With the help of these weapons, Egypt and Syria defeated Israel's armor and air supremacy.
Egypt and Syria announced the war to the world first, accusing Israel of starting it, mindful of the importance of avoiding appearing as the aggressor (Israel accused the Arab powers of starting the Six-Day War when they launched Operation Focus).
In any case, early Syrian successes helped rectify the loss of face they had suffered following the Six-Day War.

The main reason for the reversal of fortune was Egypt's operational pause from 7 to 14 October.
After capturing parts of the Sinai, the Egyptian campaign halted and the Syrians were left fighting the Israelis alone.
The Egyptian leaders, believing their war aims accomplished, dug in.
While their early successes in the war had surprised them, War Minister General Ahmad Ismail Ali advised caution.
In Syria, Assad and his generals waited for the Egyptians to move.
When the Israeli government learned of Egypt's modest war strategy, it ordered an "immediate continuous action" against the Syrian military.
According to Patrick Seale, "For three days, 7, 8, and 9 October, Syrian troops on the Golan faced the full fury of the Israeli air force as, from first light to nightfall, wave after wave of aircraft swooped down to bomb, strafe and napalm their tank concentration and their fuel and ammunition carriers right back to the Purple Line."
By 9 October, the Syrians were retreating behind the Purple Line (the Israeli–Syrian border since the Six-Day War).
By 13 October the war was lost, but (in contrast to the Six-Day War) the Syrians were not crushed; this earned Assad respect in Syria and abroad.

On 14 October, Egypt began a limited offensive against Israel for political reasons.
Sadat needed Assad on his side for his peace policy with Israel to succeed, and military action as a means to an end.
The renewed Egyptian military offensive was ill-conceived.
A week later, due to Egyptian inactivity, the Israelis had organised and the Arabs had lost their most important advantage.
While the military offensive gave Assad hope, this was an illusion; the Arabs had already lost the war militarily.
Egypt's behavior during the war caused friction between Assad and Sadat.
Assad, still inexperienced in foreign policy, believed that the Egyptian–Syrian alliance was based on trust and failed to understand Egypt's duplicity.
Although it was not until after the war that Assad would learn that Sadat was in contact with American National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger almost daily during the war, the seeds of distrust had been sown.
Around this time, Sadat called for an American-led ceasefire agreement between Egypt, Syria, and Israel; however, he was unaware that under Kissinger's tenure the United States had become a staunch supporter of Israel.

On 16 October, Sadat—without telling Assad—called for a ceasefire in a speech to the People's Assembly, the Egyptian legislative body.
Assad was not only surprised but could not comprehend why Sadat trusted "American goodwill for a satisfactory result".
Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin visited Cairo, urging Sadat to accept a ceasefire without the condition of Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories.
While Sadat was reluctant at first, Kosygin returned on 18 October with satellite images showing 300 Israeli tanks in Egyptian territory.
The blow to Sadat's morale was such t
At 14:05 on 6 October 1973, Egyptian forces (attacking through the Sinai desert) and Syrian forces (attacking the Golan Heights) crossed the border into Israel and penetrated the Israeli defense lines. The Syrian forces on the Golan Heights met with more intense fighting than their Egyptian counterparts, but by 8 October had broken through the Israeli defenses. The early successes of the Syrian army were due to its officer corps (where officers were promoted because of merit and not politics) and its ability to handle advanced Soviet weaponry: tanks, artillery batteries, aircraft, man-portable missiles, the Sagger anti-tank weapon and the 2K12 Kub anti-aircraft system on mobile launchers. With the help of these weapons, Egypt and Syria defeated Israel's armor and air supremacy. Egypt and Syria announced the war to the world first, accusing Israel of starting it, mindful of the importance of avoiding appearing as the aggressor (Israel accused the Arab powers of starting the Six-Day War when they launched Operation Focus). In any case, early Syrian successes helped rectify the loss of face they had suffered following the Six-Day War.
The main reason for the reversal of fortune was Egypt's operational pause from 7 to 14 October. After capturing parts of the Sinai, the Egyptian campaign halted and the Syrians were left fighting the Israelis alone. The Egyptian leaders, believing their war aims accomplished, dug in. While their early successes in the war had surprised them, War Minister General Ahmad Ismail Ali advised caution. In Syria, Assad and his generals waited for the Egyptians to move. When the Israeli government learned of Egypt's modest war strategy, it ordered an "immediate continuous action" against the Syrian military. According to Patrick Seale, "For three days, 7, 8, and 9 October, Syrian troops on the Golan faced the full fury of the Israeli air force as, from first light to nightfall, wave after wave of aircraft swooped down to bomb, strafe and napalm their tank concentration and their fuel and ammunition carriers right back to the Purple Line." By 9 October, the Syrians were retreating behind the Purple Line (the Israeli–Syrian border since the Six-Day War). By 13 October the war was lost, but (in contrast to the Six-Day War) the Syrians were not crushed; this earned Assad respect in Syria and abroad.
On 14 October, Egypt began a limited offensive against Israel for political reasons. Sadat needed Assad on his side for his peace policy with Israel to succeed, and military action as a means to an end. The renewed Egyptian military offensive was ill-conceived. A week later, due to Egyptian inactivity, the Israelis had organised and the Arabs had lost their most important advantage. While the military offensive gave Assad hope, this was an illusion; the Arabs had already lost the war militarily. Egypt's behavior during the war caused friction between Assad and Sadat. Assad, still inexperienced in foreign policy, believed that the Egyptian–Syrian alliance was based on trust and failed to understand Egypt's duplicity. Although it was not until after the war that Assad would learn that Sadat was in contact with American National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger almost daily during the war, the seeds of distrust had been sown. Around this time, Sadat called for an American-led ceasefire agreement between Egypt, Syria, and Israel; however, he was unaware that under Kissinger's tenure the United States had become a staunch supporter of Israel.
On 16 October, Sadat—without telling Assad—called for a ceasefire in a speech to the People's Assembly, the Egyptian legislative body. Assad was not only surprised but could not comprehend why Sadat trusted "American goodwill for a satisfactory result". Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin visited Cairo, urging Sadat to accept a ceasefire without the condition of Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories. While Sadat was reluctant at first, Kosygin returned on 18 October with satellite images showing 300 Israeli tanks in Egyptian territory. The blow to Sadat's morale was such t
Hafez al-Assad