The Islamic uprising began in the mid-to-late 1970s, with attacks on prominent members of the Ba'ath Alawite elite.
As the conflict worsened, a debate in the party between hard-liners (represented by Rifaat al-Assad) and Ba'ath liberals (represented by Mahmoud al-Ayyubi) began.
The Seventh Regional Congress, in 1980, was held in an atmosphere of crisis.
The party leadership—with the exception of Assad and his proteges—were criticised severely by party delegates, who called for an anti-corruption campaign, a new, clean government, curtailing the powers of the military-security apparatus and political liberalization.
With Assad's consent, a new government (headed by the presumably clean Abdul Rauf al-Kasm) was established with new, young technocrats.
The new government failed to assuage critics, and the Sunni middle class and the radical left (believing that Ba'athist rule could be overthrown with an uprising) began collaborating with the Islamists.

Believing they had the upper hand in the conflict, beginning in 1980 the Islamists began a series of campaigns against government installations in Aleppo; the attacks became urban guerrilla warfare.
The government began to lose control in the city and, inspired by events, similar disturbances spread to Hama, Homs, Idlib, Latakia, Deir ez-Zor, Maaret-en-Namen and Jisr esh-Shagour.
Those affected by Ba'athist repression began to rally behind the insurgents; Ba'ath Party co-founder Bitar supported the uprising, rallying the old, anti-military Ba'athists.
The increasing threat to the government's survival strengthened the hard-liners, who favored repression over concessions.
Security forces began to purge all state, party and social institutions in Syria, and were sent to the northern provinces to quell the uprising.
When this failed, the hard-liners began accusing the United States of fomenting the uprising and called for the reinstatement of "revolutionary vigilance".
The hard-liners won the debate after a failed attempt on Assad's life in June 1980, and began responding to the uprising with state terrorism later that year.
Under Rifaat al-Assad Islamic prisoners at the Tadmur prison were massacred, membership in the Muslim Brotherhood became a capital offence and the government sent a death squad to kill Bitar and Attar's former wife.
The military court began condemning captured militants, which "sometimes degenerated into indiscriminate killings".
Little care was taken to distinguish Muslim Brotherhood hard-liners from their passive supporters, and violence was met with violence.

The final showdown, the Hama massacre, took place in February 1982 when the government crushed the uprising.
Helicopter gunships, bulldozers, and artillery bombardment razed the city, killing thousands of people.
The Ba'ath government withstood the uprising, not because of popular support, but because the opposition was disorganised and had little urban support.
Throughout the uprising, the Sunni middle class continued to support the Ba'ath Party because of its dislike of political Islam.
After the uprising the government resumed its version of militaristic Leninism, reverting the liberalization introduced when Assad came to power.
The Ba'ath Party was weakened by the uprising; democratic elections for delegates to the Regional and National Congresses were halted, and open discussion within the party ended.
The uprising made Syria more totalitarian than ever, and strengthened Assad's position as undisputed leader of Syria.
The Islamic uprising began in the mid-to-late 1970s, with attacks on prominent members of the Ba'ath Alawite elite. As the conflict worsened, a debate in the party between hard-liners (represented by Rifaat al-Assad) and Ba'ath liberals (represented by Mahmoud al-Ayyubi) began. The Seventh Regional Congress, in 1980, was held in an atmosphere of crisis. The party leadership—with the exception of Assad and his proteges—were criticised severely by party delegates, who called for an anti-corruption campaign, a new, clean government, curtailing the powers of the military-security apparatus and political liberalization. With Assad's consent, a new government (headed by the presumably clean Abdul Rauf al-Kasm) was established with new, young technocrats. The new government failed to assuage critics, and the Sunni middle class and the radical left (believing that Ba'athist rule could be overthrown with an uprising) began collaborating with the Islamists.
Believing they had the upper hand in the conflict, beginning in 1980 the Islamists began a series of campaigns against government installations in Aleppo; the attacks became urban guerrilla warfare. The government began to lose control in the city and, inspired by events, similar disturbances spread to Hama, Homs, Idlib, Latakia, Deir ez-Zor, Maaret-en-Namen and Jisr esh-Shagour. Those affected by Ba'athist repression began to rally behind the insurgents; Ba'ath Party co-founder Bitar supported the uprising, rallying the old, anti-military Ba'athists. The increasing threat to the government's survival strengthened the hard-liners, who favored repression over concessions. Security forces began to purge all state, party and social institutions in Syria, and were sent to the northern provinces to quell the uprising. When this failed, the hard-liners began accusing the United States of fomenting the uprising and called for the reinstatement of "revolutionary vigilance". The hard-liners won the debate after a failed attempt on Assad's life in June 1980, and began responding to the uprising with state terrorism later that year. Under Rifaat al-Assad Islamic prisoners at the Tadmur prison were massacred, membership in the Muslim Brotherhood became a capital offence and the government sent a death squad to kill Bitar and Attar's former wife. The military court began condemning captured militants, which "sometimes degenerated into indiscriminate killings". Little care was taken to distinguish Muslim Brotherhood hard-liners from their passive supporters, and violence was met with violence.
The final showdown, the Hama massacre, took place in February 1982 when the government crushed the uprising. Helicopter gunships, bulldozers, and artillery bombardment razed the city, killing thousands of people. The Ba'ath government withstood the uprising, not because of popular support, but because the opposition was disorganised and had little urban support. Throughout the uprising, the Sunni middle class continued to support the Ba'ath Party because of its dislike of political Islam. After the uprising the government resumed its version of militaristic Leninism, reverting the liberalization introduced when Assad came to power. The Ba'ath Party was weakened by the uprising; democratic elections for delegates to the Regional and National Congresses were halted, and open discussion within the party ended. The uprising made Syria more totalitarian than ever, and strengthened Assad's position as undisputed leader of Syria.
Hafez al-Assad