Intelligence had indicators of the pending attacks.
On 19 February, a defector surrendered to Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) forces and revealed a large VC force would attack key installations in the Saigon area to include Long Binh Post.
Unfortunately, the reporting was delayed and did not reach Long Binh until the morning of 22 February 1969, the day the defector warned the attacks were set to begin.

After sundown on the 22nd, elements of the VC 274th Regiment, 5th Division made their final preparations while occupying three hills along Highway 15 approximately three kilometers south of the base.
That evening, several ambush squads from the 720th Military Police Battalion, 18th MP Brigade kept watch along potential avenues of approach to Long Binh Post.
One of the MP ambush squads held a position within a kilometer of the VC stronghold.
At 02:00 on 23 February, the 274th VC Regiment initiated their attack with an estimated 78 rounds of rocket and mortar fire from their positions.
The rounds landed on post with some igniting the POL fuel site east of the highway.

The VC made several attempts to advance on the base, but were halted.
Full-scale sweeping operations to secure the perimeter began just after noon that day.
M113 armored personnel carriers and M551 Sheridan armored reconnaissance vehicles supported the forces on the ground while AH-1 Cobra gunships and OH-6 helicopters provided air support.
These units made occasional contact, often with PAVN or VC who fought stubbornly from trenches and spider holes.

In the early morning hours of 26 February, a force of approximately 400 men from the VC 275th Regiment, 5th Division, had infiltrated into the tiny village of Thai Hiep on the outskirts of Bien Hoa.
About 85 per cent of the force was estimated to be PAVN soldiers.
At about 03:00, as reconnaissance elements of the unit were observed and engaged by US Air Force security forces at the perimeter of Bien Hoa Air Base, the villagers began to flee their homes, running down streets and creek beds.
The villagers met elements of the South Vietnamese 5th Marine Battalion, the 3rd Battalion, 48th Infantry Regiment, 18th Division and the 3rd Squadron, 5th Armored Cavalry moving on the road less than a half mile from Thai Hiep in response to the contact at the air base.
The villagers told the ARVN forces how they were driven out of their homes and confined to an area near a creek running alongside the village.
At that time, the air base security forces reported that they had lost contact with the enemy reconnaissance element which withdrew east toward Thai Hiep.
The ARVN units swiftly moved into blocking positions, and by daybreak, the PAVN/VC were surrounded.
Additional South Vietnamese Regional Force elements moved in and the ARVN troops continued to contain the PAVN/VC forces until 11:00 when assault forces, in the form of the ARVN 36th Ranger Battalion, reinforced the contact.
By 15:00 the 36th Ranger Battalion moved into the village attacking the PAVN/VC force.
The series of assaults met heavy resistance by the battalion of PAVN who had turned the villagers sandbagged shelters into a series of well-fortified defensive positions.
ARVN psychological operations units broadcast repeated loud-speaker appeals and warnings, and all of the remaining villagers and several wounded PAVN/VC evacuated out of Thai Riep.
Just after 16:00 US Air Force F-100s and F-4s along with Republic of Vietnam Air Force A-1 Skyraiders were directed against the PAVN/VC positions in the village.
Following the employment of the supporting fires, the 36th Ranger Battalion moved back into the village.
The Rangers met only slight, disorganized resistance.
By 01:00 the next morning, the bodies of 264 PAVN/VC soldiers lay in the village, and 87 had been captured or surrendered.
More than 100 individual and crew-served weapons were captured.
ARVN casualties were 10 killed and 100 wounded and one US Army photographer was killed.
The prisoners revealed that their mission had been to attack Bien Hoa city and the Bien Hoa Air Base.
Intelligence had indicators of the pending attacks. On 19 February, a defector surrendered to Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) forces and revealed a large VC force would attack key installations in the Saigon area to include Long Binh Post. Unfortunately, the reporting was delayed and did not reach Long Binh until the morning of 22 February 1969, the day the defector warned the attacks were set to begin.
After sundown on the 22nd, elements of the VC 274th Regiment, 5th Division made their final preparations while occupying three hills along Highway 15 approximately three kilometers south of the base. That evening, several ambush squads from the 720th Military Police Battalion, 18th MP Brigade kept watch along potential avenues of approach to Long Binh Post. One of the MP ambush squads held a position within a kilometer of the VC stronghold. At 02:00 on 23 February, the 274th VC Regiment initiated their attack with an estimated 78 rounds of rocket and mortar fire from their positions. The rounds landed on post with some igniting the POL fuel site east of the highway.
The VC made several attempts to advance on the base, but were halted. Full-scale sweeping operations to secure the perimeter began just after noon that day. M113 armored personnel carriers and M551 Sheridan armored reconnaissance vehicles supported the forces on the ground while AH-1 Cobra gunships and OH-6 helicopters provided air support. These units made occasional contact, often with PAVN or VC who fought stubbornly from trenches and spider holes.
In the early morning hours of 26 February, a force of approximately 400 men from the VC 275th Regiment, 5th Division, had infiltrated into the tiny village of Thai Hiep on the outskirts of Bien Hoa. About 85 per cent of the force was estimated to be PAVN soldiers. At about 03:00, as reconnaissance elements of the unit were observed and engaged by US Air Force security forces at the perimeter of Bien Hoa Air Base, the villagers began to flee their homes, running down streets and creek beds. The villagers met elements of the South Vietnamese 5th Marine Battalion, the 3rd Battalion, 48th Infantry Regiment, 18th Division and the 3rd Squadron, 5th Armored Cavalry moving on the road less than a half mile from Thai Hiep in response to the contact at the air base. The villagers told the ARVN forces how they were driven out of their homes and confined to an area near a creek running alongside the village. At that time, the air base security forces reported that they had lost contact with the enemy reconnaissance element which withdrew east toward Thai Hiep. The ARVN units swiftly moved into blocking positions, and by daybreak, the PAVN/VC were surrounded. Additional South Vietnamese Regional Force elements moved in and the ARVN troops continued to contain the PAVN/VC forces until 11:00 when assault forces, in the form of the ARVN 36th Ranger Battalion, reinforced the contact. By 15:00 the 36th Ranger Battalion moved into the village attacking the PAVN/VC force. The series of assaults met heavy resistance by the battalion of PAVN who had turned the villagers sandbagged shelters into a series of well-fortified defensive positions. ARVN psychological operations units broadcast repeated loud-speaker appeals and warnings, and all of the remaining villagers and several wounded PAVN/VC evacuated out of Thai Riep. Just after 16:00 US Air Force F-100s and F-4s along with Republic of Vietnam Air Force A-1 Skyraiders were directed against the PAVN/VC positions in the village. Following the employment of the supporting fires, the 36th Ranger Battalion moved back into the village. The Rangers met only slight, disorganized resistance. By 01:00 the next morning, the bodies of 264 PAVN/VC soldiers lay in the village, and 87 had been captured or surrendered. More than 100 individual and crew-served weapons were captured. ARVN casualties were 10 killed and 100 wounded and one US Army photographer was killed. The prisoners revealed that their mission had been to attack Bien Hoa city and the Bien Hoa Air Base.
Tet 1969