Cecil Rhodes, Prime Minister of the Cape Colony and managing director of the British South Africa Company, was eager to extend British dominion to all of South Africa, and encouraged the disenfranchised Uitlanders of the Boer republics to resist Afrikaner domination.
Rhodes hoped that the intervention of the company's private army, assembled in the Pitsani Strip (part of the Bechuanaland Protectorate and bordering the Transvaal, which had been ceded to the British South Africa Company by the Colonial Office, officially for the protection of a railway through the territory, in November 1895), could initiate an Uitlander rebellion and the overthrow of the Transvaal government.
Chamberlain informed Salisbury on Boxing Day that a rebellion was expected, but was not sure when the invasion would be launched.
The subsequent Jameson Raid resulted in the surrender of the invaders.
Chamberlain, at Highbury, received a secret telegram from the Colonial Office on 31 December informing him of the beginning of the Raid.
Chamberlain, sympathetic to the ultimate goals but uncomfortable with the timing, remarked that "if this succeeds it will ruin me.
I'm going up to London to crush it".

Chamberlain ordered Sir Hercules Robinson, Governor-General of the Cape Colony, to repudiate the actions of Leander Starr Jameson and warned Rhodes that the company's Charter would be in danger if it was discovered that the Cape Prime Minister was involved in the Raid.
The prisoners were returned to London for trial, and the Transvaal government received considerable compensation from the company.
During the trial of Jameson, Rhodes' solicitor, Bourchier Hawksley, refused to produce cablegrams that had passed between Rhodes and his agents in London in November and December 1895.
According to Hawksley, these demonstrated that the Colonial Office 'influenced the actions of those in South Africa' who embarked on the Raid, and even that Chamberlain had transferred control of the Pitsani Strip to facilitate an invasion.
Nine days before the Raid, Chamberlain had asked his Assistant Under-Secretary to encourage Rhodes to 'Hurry Up' because of the deteriorating Venezuelan situation.

In June 1896, Chamberlain offered his resignation to Salisbury, having shown the Prime Minister one or more of the cablegrams implicating him in the Raid's planning.
Salisbury refused to accept the offer, possibly reluctant to lose the government's most popular figure.
Salisbury reacted aggressively in support of Chamberlain, endorsing the Colonial Secretary's threat to withdraw the company's charter if the cablegrams were revealed.
Accordingly, Rhodes refused to reveal the cablegrams, and as no evidence was produced, the Select committee appointed to investigate the Jameson Raid had no choice but to absolve Chamberlain of responsibility.
Cecil Rhodes, Prime Minister of the Cape Colony and managing director of the British South Africa Company, was eager to extend British dominion to all of South Africa, and encouraged the disenfranchised Uitlanders of the Boer republics to resist Afrikaner domination. Rhodes hoped that the intervention of the company's private army, assembled in the Pitsani Strip (part of the Bechuanaland Protectorate and bordering the Transvaal, which had been ceded to the British South Africa Company by the Colonial Office, officially for the protection of a railway through the territory, in November 1895), could initiate an Uitlander rebellion and the overthrow of the Transvaal government. Chamberlain informed Salisbury on Boxing Day that a rebellion was expected, but was not sure when the invasion would be launched. The subsequent Jameson Raid resulted in the surrender of the invaders. Chamberlain, at Highbury, received a secret telegram from the Colonial Office on 31 December informing him of the beginning of the Raid. Chamberlain, sympathetic to the ultimate goals but uncomfortable with the timing, remarked that "if this succeeds it will ruin me. I'm going up to London to crush it".
Chamberlain ordered Sir Hercules Robinson, Governor-General of the Cape Colony, to repudiate the actions of Leander Starr Jameson and warned Rhodes that the company's Charter would be in danger if it was discovered that the Cape Prime Minister was involved in the Raid. The prisoners were returned to London for trial, and the Transvaal government received considerable compensation from the company. During the trial of Jameson, Rhodes' solicitor, Bourchier Hawksley, refused to produce cablegrams that had passed between Rhodes and his agents in London in November and December 1895. According to Hawksley, these demonstrated that the Colonial Office 'influenced the actions of those in South Africa' who embarked on the Raid, and even that Chamberlain had transferred control of the Pitsani Strip to facilitate an invasion. Nine days before the Raid, Chamberlain had asked his Assistant Under-Secretary to encourage Rhodes to 'Hurry Up' because of the deteriorating Venezuelan situation.
In June 1896, Chamberlain offered his resignation to Salisbury, having shown the Prime Minister one or more of the cablegrams implicating him in the Raid's planning. Salisbury refused to accept the offer, possibly reluctant to lose the government's most popular figure. Salisbury reacted aggressively in support of Chamberlain, endorsing the Colonial Secretary's threat to withdraw the company's charter if the cablegrams were revealed. Accordingly, Rhodes refused to reveal the cablegrams, and as no evidence was produced, the Select committee appointed to investigate the Jameson Raid had no choice but to absolve Chamberlain of responsibility.
Joseph Chamberlain