Schofield's advance guard arrived in Franklin at about 4:30 a.m. on November 30.
Jacob Cox, a division commander temporarily commanding the XXIII Corps, immediately began preparing strong defensive positions around the deteriorated entrenchments originally constructed for a previous engagement in 1863.
Schofield decided to defend at Franklin with his back to the river because he had no pontoon bridges available that would enable his men to cross the river.
Schofield needed time to repair the permanent bridges spanning the river, but by mid-afternoon, nearly all the supply wagons were across the Harpeth and on the road to Nashville.
By noon the Union works formed an approximate semicircle around the town.
A gap in the line occurred where the Columbia Pike entered the outskirts of the town, left open to allow passage of the wagons.
Just behind the center of the formidable line stood the Carter House, appropriated as Cox's headquarters.
Two Union brigades from Wagner's division were positioned about a half mile forward of the main line.
Wagner, perhaps misunderstanding his orders, ordered his three brigades to stop halfway to the Union line and dig in as best they could on the flat ground.
Col.
Emerson Opdycke considered Wagner's order to be ridiculous and refused to obey it; he marched his brigade through the Union line and into a reserve position behind the gap through which the Columbia Pike passed, leaving the brigades of Cols.
John Q. Lane, and Joseph Conrad in front.

Hood's army began to arrive on Winstead Hill, two miles (3 km) south of Franklin, around 1 p.m. Hood ordered a frontal assault in the dwindling afternoon light—sunset would be at 4:34 p.m. that day—against the Union force, a decision that caused dismay among his top generals.
Some popular histories assert that Hood acted rashly in a fit of rage, resentful that the Federal army had slipped past his troops the night before at Spring Hill and that he wanted to discipline his army by ordering them to assault against strong odds.
Recent scholarship by Eric Jacobson discounts this as unlikely, as it was not only militarily foolish, but Hood was observed to be determined, not angry, by the time he arrived in Franklin.

Regardless of Hood's personal motivations, his specific objective was to try to crush Schofield before he and his troops could escape to Nashville.
The Confederates began moving forward at 4 p.m., with Cheatham's corps on the left of the assault and Stewart's on the right.
Lee's corps, and almost all of the army's artillery, had not yet arrived from Columbia.
Hood's attacking force, about 19–20,000 men, was arguably understrength for the mission he assigned—traversing two miles of open ground with only two batteries of artillery support and then assaulting prepared fortifications.

Hood's attack initially enveloped the 3,000 men in the two brigades under Lane and Conrad, which attempted to stand their ground behind inadequate fieldworks and without anchored flanks, but quickly collapsed under the pressure.
Many of the veteran soldiers of the two brigades stampeded back on the Columbia Pike to the main breastworks, while some untried replacements were reluctant to move under fire and were captured.
The fleeing troops were closely pursued by the Confederates and the two sides became so intermingled that defenders in the breastworks had to hold their fire to avoid hitting their comrades.

The Union's momentary inability to defend the opening in the works caused a weak spot in its line at the Columbia Pike from the Carter House to the cotton gin.
The Confederate divisions of Cleburne, Brown, and French converged on this front and a number of their troops broke through the now not-so-solid Federal defenses on either side.
In a matter of minutes, the Confederates had penetrated 50 yards through the center of the Federal line.

As the Confederates began their attack, Opdycke's brigade was in reserve.
He quickly positioned his men into line of battle and ordered his brigade forward to the works.
Hand-to-hand fighting around the Carter House and the pike was f
Schofield's advance guard arrived in Franklin at about 4:30 a.m. on November 30. Jacob Cox, a division commander temporarily commanding the XXIII Corps, immediately began preparing strong defensive positions around the deteriorated entrenchments originally constructed for a previous engagement in 1863. Schofield decided to defend at Franklin with his back to the river because he had no pontoon bridges available that would enable his men to cross the river. Schofield needed time to repair the permanent bridges spanning the river, but by mid-afternoon, nearly all the supply wagons were across the Harpeth and on the road to Nashville. By noon the Union works formed an approximate semicircle around the town. A gap in the line occurred where the Columbia Pike entered the outskirts of the town, left open to allow passage of the wagons. Just behind the center of the formidable line stood the Carter House, appropriated as Cox's headquarters. Two Union brigades from Wagner's division were positioned about a half mile forward of the main line. Wagner, perhaps misunderstanding his orders, ordered his three brigades to stop halfway to the Union line and dig in as best they could on the flat ground. Col. Emerson Opdycke considered Wagner's order to be ridiculous and refused to obey it; he marched his brigade through the Union line and into a reserve position behind the gap through which the Columbia Pike passed, leaving the brigades of Cols. John Q. Lane, and Joseph Conrad in front.
Hood's army began to arrive on Winstead Hill, two miles (3 km) south of Franklin, around 1 p.m. Hood ordered a frontal assault in the dwindling afternoon light—sunset would be at 4:34 p.m. that day—against the Union force, a decision that caused dismay among his top generals. Some popular histories assert that Hood acted rashly in a fit of rage, resentful that the Federal army had slipped past his troops the night before at Spring Hill and that he wanted to discipline his army by ordering them to assault against strong odds. Recent scholarship by Eric Jacobson discounts this as unlikely, as it was not only militarily foolish, but Hood was observed to be determined, not angry, by the time he arrived in Franklin.
Regardless of Hood's personal motivations, his specific objective was to try to crush Schofield before he and his troops could escape to Nashville. The Confederates began moving forward at 4 p.m., with Cheatham's corps on the left of the assault and Stewart's on the right. Lee's corps, and almost all of the army's artillery, had not yet arrived from Columbia. Hood's attacking force, about 19–20,000 men, was arguably understrength for the mission he assigned—traversing two miles of open ground with only two batteries of artillery support and then assaulting prepared fortifications.
Hood's attack initially enveloped the 3,000 men in the two brigades under Lane and Conrad, which attempted to stand their ground behind inadequate fieldworks and without anchored flanks, but quickly collapsed under the pressure. Many of the veteran soldiers of the two brigades stampeded back on the Columbia Pike to the main breastworks, while some untried replacements were reluctant to move under fire and were captured. The fleeing troops were closely pursued by the Confederates and the two sides became so intermingled that defenders in the breastworks had to hold their fire to avoid hitting their comrades.
The Union's momentary inability to defend the opening in the works caused a weak spot in its line at the Columbia Pike from the Carter House to the cotton gin. The Confederate divisions of Cleburne, Brown, and French converged on this front and a number of their troops broke through the now not-so-solid Federal defenses on either side. In a matter of minutes, the Confederates had penetrated 50 yards through the center of the Federal line.
As the Confederates began their attack, Opdycke's brigade was in reserve. He quickly positioned his men into line of battle and ordered his brigade forward to the works. Hand-to-hand fighting around the Carter House and the pike was f
Franklin–Nashville Campaign