BEA soon selected the D.H.121 as the basis for detailed negotiations, but these talks were protracted due to multiple factors, including wider policy decisions of the British government and indecision within BEA itself.
During the time that the D.H.121 had emerged in the late 1950s, the British government came to view the airframe and aeroengine industries as too fragmented into small companies; accordingly, a policy favouring mergers into a few large groups was adopted.
 De Havilland was keen to retain their independence and leadership of the D.H.121, and thus approached the government with a proposal to form a consortium under which de Havilland would produce the fuselage, Bristol would manufacture the wings, and various other companies, including Hunting Aircraft and Fairey Aviation, would be responsible for other elements; however, Bristol strongly opposed this arrangement and chose to work with Hawker Siddeley in competition against de Havilland.

Companies vigorously competed to be selected by BEA due to the lure of its £30 million contract (equivalent to £706,044,000 in 2019), as well as the likelihood of lucrative overseas export sales.
On 4 February 1958, de Havilland, along with Hunting and Fairey, announced that they had agreed to form a partnership for the purpose of manufacturing and marketing the D.H.121; the consortium adopted the corporate name of the defunct Airco company, which had been Geoffrey de Havilland's employer during the First World War.
The Minister of Supply stated of the Airco consortium that "this is not quite what [he] had in mind".
Nevertheless, both Airco and the rival Bristol-Hawker Siddeley team proceeded to conduct their own approaches to various overseas airlines; sufficiently interested, American airline Pan American World Airways invited both teams to present their proposed airliners in January 1958.
Sir Matthew Slattery, chairman of Bristol and Short Brothers, appealed for BEA to delay any decision until after one of the competing firms had already secured an export order for their airliner.
In response, Lord Douglas stated that BEA wished to order the D.H.121 and was awaiting approval from the government; Douglas's reply has been viewed as the death knell for the rival Type 200 proposal.

Meanwhile, a rival airliner emerged, this time from Boeing in the United States, in the form of the 727, which also had a tri-jet configuration.
Boeing had begun its studies into this sector of the market in 1956, and elected to launch its own tri-jet programme in 1959.
Airco executives, who were at the time intensely exploring various alternatives and further partnerships with other aircraft companies, considered the possibility that Boeing might choose to drop the 727 project and instead co-manufacture the D.H.121 in the USA; Lord Douglas was one of the proponents of this initiative.
As a result, Airco invited a team of Boeing engineers and executives to Hatfield; (Boeing later permitted a return visit by de Havilland representatives to Seattle); however, Boeing revealed few details of their plans for the 727, while virtually all information on the D.H.121 had been shared with Boeing, an openness that had allegedly "amazed" them.
British commentators have tended to interpret this episode as involving the acquisition of sensitive proprietary data on the D.H.121 by a direct competitor.
Woods remarked that "de Havilland solemnly handed all its research over to its rivals...the crowning piece of stupidity".

On 12 February 1958, the British government authorised BEA to commence contractual negotiations along with the issuing of a letter of intent for 24 aircraft.
Accordingly, that same month, BEA announced that the D.H.121 had come closest to its requirements and that it would proceed to order 24 with options on 12 more.
It took a further six months for the government to approve a formal BEA order for the D.H.121; the government had favoured the Bristol 200 for industrial policy reasons.
Reportedly, BEA had a considerable interest in the Caravelle itself, however this would have been a politically un
BEA soon selected the D.H.121 as the basis for detailed negotiations, but these talks were protracted due to multiple factors, including wider policy decisions of the British government and indecision within BEA itself. During the time that the D.H.121 had emerged in the late 1950s, the British government came to view the airframe and aeroengine industries as too fragmented into small companies; accordingly, a policy favouring mergers into a few large groups was adopted.  De Havilland was keen to retain their independence and leadership of the D.H.121, and thus approached the government with a proposal to form a consortium under which de Havilland would produce the fuselage, Bristol would manufacture the wings, and various other companies, including Hunting Aircraft and Fairey Aviation, would be responsible for other elements; however, Bristol strongly opposed this arrangement and chose to work with Hawker Siddeley in competition against de Havilland.
Companies vigorously competed to be selected by BEA due to the lure of its £30 million contract (equivalent to £706,044,000 in 2019), as well as the likelihood of lucrative overseas export sales. On 4 February 1958, de Havilland, along with Hunting and Fairey, announced that they had agreed to form a partnership for the purpose of manufacturing and marketing the D.H.121; the consortium adopted the corporate name of the defunct Airco company, which had been Geoffrey de Havilland's employer during the First World War. The Minister of Supply stated of the Airco consortium that "this is not quite what [he] had in mind". Nevertheless, both Airco and the rival Bristol-Hawker Siddeley team proceeded to conduct their own approaches to various overseas airlines; sufficiently interested, American airline Pan American World Airways invited both teams to present their proposed airliners in January 1958. Sir Matthew Slattery, chairman of Bristol and Short Brothers, appealed for BEA to delay any decision until after one of the competing firms had already secured an export order for their airliner. In response, Lord Douglas stated that BEA wished to order the D.H.121 and was awaiting approval from the government; Douglas's reply has been viewed as the death knell for the rival Type 200 proposal.
Meanwhile, a rival airliner emerged, this time from Boeing in the United States, in the form of the 727, which also had a tri-jet configuration. Boeing had begun its studies into this sector of the market in 1956, and elected to launch its own tri-jet programme in 1959. Airco executives, who were at the time intensely exploring various alternatives and further partnerships with other aircraft companies, considered the possibility that Boeing might choose to drop the 727 project and instead co-manufacture the D.H.121 in the USA; Lord Douglas was one of the proponents of this initiative. As a result, Airco invited a team of Boeing engineers and executives to Hatfield; (Boeing later permitted a return visit by de Havilland representatives to Seattle); however, Boeing revealed few details of their plans for the 727, while virtually all information on the D.H.121 had been shared with Boeing, an openness that had allegedly "amazed" them. British commentators have tended to interpret this episode as involving the acquisition of sensitive proprietary data on the D.H.121 by a direct competitor. Woods remarked that "de Havilland solemnly handed all its research over to its rivals...the crowning piece of stupidity".
On 12 February 1958, the British government authorised BEA to commence contractual negotiations along with the issuing of a letter of intent for 24 aircraft. Accordingly, that same month, BEA announced that the D.H.121 had come closest to its requirements and that it would proceed to order 24 with options on 12 more. It took a further six months for the government to approve a formal BEA order for the D.H.121; the government had favoured the Bristol 200 for industrial policy reasons. Reportedly, BEA had a considerable interest in the Caravelle itself, however this would have been a politically un
Hawker Siddeley Trident