The Luftwaffe did not operate over Britain in force until France was on the brink of collapse.
Diversion of effort during the continental campaign ran contrary to the German concept of Schwerpunktprinzip (concentration principle).
When German bomber crews flew over the country they did so at night; sorties were recorded in May and June 1940.
When it became clear that Britain would not accede to Hitler's demands, the Luftwaffe undertook preparations to neutralise the country and end the fighting in Western Europe.
This involved the transfer of Luftflotte 2 (Air Feet 2) and Luftflotte 3 to France and Belgium.
Over the course of June and July, sporadic attacks were carried out at night, inland and along the east and southern coasts to keep English civilians awake and to damage morale.
The attacks were ill-directed and German intentions were not clear to the British.

Night operations gave the Luftwaffe valuable experience in using night navigation equipment, such at the Knickebein (crooked leg).
By taking bearings and cross-bearings on German medium-wave transmitters, aircraft could find their position sufficiently accurately to make the discovery of landmarks easy.
On the night of 6/7 June, the first Luftwaffe bomb to fall on Greater London was dropped on at Addington, and small raids continued through the month.
Thirteen airfields, sixteen factories and fourteen ports were bombed to little effect.
By flying at low altitudes, it was possible for British defences to detect German bombers with searchlights.
Two were shot down in June by anti-aircraft guns.
After this period, the bombers flew too high for anti-aircraft fire to be effective.
Fighter Command claimed 21 German bombers at night over Britain in June.
Seven German aircraft crashed and were credited to fighters.
Fighter Command defences at night were weak.
The British lacked a specialised night fighter or reliable Airborne interception radar.
Coastal radar looked out to sea and when a raider penetrated into the interior, they became difficult to track.
Until the following year, night fighter defences remained ineffective at finding enemy aircraft and shooting them down.
At the beginning of The Blitz in October, the Luftwaffe flew 5,900 sorties and lost 23 aircraft, a 0.4 per cent loss rate.
The failures cost Air Officer Commanding (AOC) Hugh Dowding, his command in November 1940.

Operations against British sea communications did not appeal to Reichsmarschall Hermann Göring.
In Göring's view, the Luftwaffe was not prepared for naval warfare and this strategy was tantamount to Blockade.
Blockade, which was put in effect against Britain from 18 July, required the co-operation of the Luftwaffe with the Kriegsmarine (German navy).
Göring ensured air assistance was not forthcoming.
Göring loathed the navy and its Commander-in-Chief Großadmiral Erich Raeder.
In Göring's eyes, both Raeder and the navy represented the bourgeois clique of German society the National Socialist revolution had pledged to eliminate.
Cooperation would not be easy and the Reichsmarschall consistently refused to accept the navy's calls for assistance in the war against the Royal Navy and British commerce throughout the conflict.
All of the directives issued to the Luftwaffe at this time, by the Oberkommando der Luftwaffe (OKL—High Command of the Air Force) or Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW—Supreme High Command of the Armed Forces), expressly stated that sea attacks on warships and shipping must take second place to "military objectives"; the OKW did not alter this view until February 1941.

Göring and the OKL intended to strike at the RAF and establish air superiority or air supremacy.
This aspect of future operations was clear in Göring's 30 June directive.
The directive stated, "As long as the enemy air force is not destroyed, it is the basic principle of the conduct of air war to attack the enemy air units at every possible favourable opportunity—by day and night, in the air, and on the ground-without regard for other missions."
Göring hoped that a victory in the air battle would preclude an invas
The Luftwaffe did not operate over Britain in force until France was on the brink of collapse. Diversion of effort during the continental campaign ran contrary to the German concept of Schwerpunktprinzip (concentration principle). When German bomber crews flew over the country they did so at night; sorties were recorded in May and June 1940. When it became clear that Britain would not accede to Hitler's demands, the Luftwaffe undertook preparations to neutralise the country and end the fighting in Western Europe. This involved the transfer of Luftflotte 2 (Air Feet 2) and Luftflotte 3 to France and Belgium. Over the course of June and July, sporadic attacks were carried out at night, inland and along the east and southern coasts to keep English civilians awake and to damage morale. The attacks were ill-directed and German intentions were not clear to the British.
Night operations gave the Luftwaffe valuable experience in using night navigation equipment, such at the Knickebein (crooked leg). By taking bearings and cross-bearings on German medium-wave transmitters, aircraft could find their position sufficiently accurately to make the discovery of landmarks easy. On the night of 6/7 June, the first Luftwaffe bomb to fall on Greater London was dropped on at Addington, and small raids continued through the month. Thirteen airfields, sixteen factories and fourteen ports were bombed to little effect. By flying at low altitudes, it was possible for British defences to detect German bombers with searchlights. Two were shot down in June by anti-aircraft guns. After this period, the bombers flew too high for anti-aircraft fire to be effective. Fighter Command claimed 21 German bombers at night over Britain in June. Seven German aircraft crashed and were credited to fighters. Fighter Command defences at night were weak. The British lacked a specialised night fighter or reliable Airborne interception radar. Coastal radar looked out to sea and when a raider penetrated into the interior, they became difficult to track. Until the following year, night fighter defences remained ineffective at finding enemy aircraft and shooting them down. At the beginning of The Blitz in October, the Luftwaffe flew 5,900 sorties and lost 23 aircraft, a 0.4 per cent loss rate. The failures cost Air Officer Commanding (AOC) Hugh Dowding, his command in November 1940.
Operations against British sea communications did not appeal to Reichsmarschall Hermann Göring. In Göring's view, the Luftwaffe was not prepared for naval warfare and this strategy was tantamount to Blockade. Blockade, which was put in effect against Britain from 18 July, required the co-operation of the Luftwaffe with the Kriegsmarine (German navy). Göring ensured air assistance was not forthcoming. Göring loathed the navy and its Commander-in-Chief Großadmiral Erich Raeder. In Göring's eyes, both Raeder and the navy represented the bourgeois clique of German society the National Socialist revolution had pledged to eliminate. Cooperation would not be easy and the Reichsmarschall consistently refused to accept the navy's calls for assistance in the war against the Royal Navy and British commerce throughout the conflict. All of the directives issued to the Luftwaffe at this time, by the Oberkommando der Luftwaffe (OKL—High Command of the Air Force) or Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW—Supreme High Command of the Armed Forces), expressly stated that sea attacks on warships and shipping must take second place to "military objectives"; the OKW did not alter this view until February 1941.
Göring and the OKL intended to strike at the RAF and establish air superiority or air supremacy. This aspect of future operations was clear in Göring's 30 June directive. The directive stated, "As long as the enemy air force is not destroyed, it is the basic principle of the conduct of air war to attack the enemy air units at every possible favourable opportunity—by day and night, in the air, and on the ground-without regard for other missions." Göring hoped that a victory in the air battle would preclude an invas
Kanalkampf