On the dawn of 1 October 1965, six of Indonesia's most senior army generals were kidnapped and murdered by a movement calling themselves the "30 September Movement" (G30S).
Among those killed was Ahmad Yani, while Nasution narrowly escaped, but the movement kidnapped First Lieutenant Pierre Tendean, his military aide; presumably mistaking him for General Nasution in the darkness.
The G30S consisted of members of the Presidential Guards, Brawidjaja Division, and Diponegoro Division, under the command of a Lieutenant-Colonel Untung bin Sjamsuri.
The movement took control of the radio station and Merdeka Square.
They broadcast a statement declaring the kidnappings were meant to protect Sukarno from a coup attempt by CIA-influenced generals.
Later, it broadcast news of the disbandment of Sukarno's cabinet, to be replaced by a "Revolutionary Council".
In Central Java, soldiers associated with the G30S also seized control of Yogyakarta and Solo on 1–2 October, killing two colonels in the process.

Major General Suharto, commander of the military's strategic reserve command, took control of the army the following morning.
Suharto ordered troops to take over the radio station of Radio Republik Indonesia and Merdeka Square itself.
On the afternoon of that day, Suharto issued an ultimatum to the Halim Air Force Base, where the G30S had based themselves and where Sukarno (the reasons for his presence are unclear and were subject of claim and counter-claim), Air Marshal Omar Dhani, and PKI chairman Aidit had gathered.
By the following day, it was clear that the incompetently organised and poorly coordinated coup had failed.
Sukarno took up residence in the Bogor Palace, while Omar Dhani fled to East Java and Aidit to Central Java.
By 2 October, Suharto's soldiers occupied Halim Air Force Base, after a short gunfight.
Sukarno's obedience to Suharto's 1 October ultimatum to leave Halim is seen as changing all power relationships.
Sukarno's fragile balance of power between the military, political Islam, communists, and nationalists that underlay his "Guided Democracy" was now collapsing.
On 3 October, the corpses of the kidnapped generals were discovered near the Halim Air Force Base, and on 5 October they were buried in a public ceremony led by Suharto.

In early October 1965, a military propaganda campaign began to sweep the country, successfully convincing both Indonesian and international audiences that it was a Communist coup, and that the murders were cowardly atrocities against Indonesian heroes since those who were shot were veteran military officers.
PKI's denials of involvement had little effect.
Following the discovery and public burial of the generals' corpses on 5 October, the army along with Islamic organisations Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama led a campaign to purge Indonesian society, government and armed forces of the communist party and other leftist organisations.
Leading PKI members were immediately arrested, some summarily executed.
Aidit was captured and killed in November 1965.
The purge spread across the country with the worst massacres in Java and Bali.
In some areas, the army organised civilian groups and local militias, in other areas communal vigilante action preceded the army.
The most widely accepted estimates are that at least half a million were killed.
It is thought that as many as 1.5 million were imprisoned at one stage or another.

As a result of the purge, one of Sukarno's three pillars of support, the Indonesian Communist Party, had been effectively eliminated by the other two, the military and political Islam.
The killings and the failure of his tenuous "revolution" distressed Sukarno, and he tried unsuccessfully to protect the PKI by referring to the generals' killings as een rimpeltje in de oceaan ("ripple in the sea of the revolution").
He tried to maintain his influence appealing in a January 1966 broadcast for the country to follow him.
Subandrio sought to create a Sukarnoist column (Barisan Sukarno), which was undermined by Suharto's pledge of loyalty to Sukarno and the concurrent instruction
On the dawn of 1 October 1965, six of Indonesia's most senior army generals were kidnapped and murdered by a movement calling themselves the "30 September Movement" (G30S). Among those killed was Ahmad Yani, while Nasution narrowly escaped, but the movement kidnapped First Lieutenant Pierre Tendean, his military aide; presumably mistaking him for General Nasution in the darkness. The G30S consisted of members of the Presidential Guards, Brawidjaja Division, and Diponegoro Division, under the command of a Lieutenant-Colonel Untung bin Sjamsuri. The movement took control of the radio station and Merdeka Square. They broadcast a statement declaring the kidnappings were meant to protect Sukarno from a coup attempt by CIA-influenced generals. Later, it broadcast news of the disbandment of Sukarno's cabinet, to be replaced by a "Revolutionary Council". In Central Java, soldiers associated with the G30S also seized control of Yogyakarta and Solo on 1–2 October, killing two colonels in the process.
Major General Suharto, commander of the military's strategic reserve command, took control of the army the following morning. Suharto ordered troops to take over the radio station of Radio Republik Indonesia and Merdeka Square itself. On the afternoon of that day, Suharto issued an ultimatum to the Halim Air Force Base, where the G30S had based themselves and where Sukarno (the reasons for his presence are unclear and were subject of claim and counter-claim), Air Marshal Omar Dhani, and PKI chairman Aidit had gathered. By the following day, it was clear that the incompetently organised and poorly coordinated coup had failed. Sukarno took up residence in the Bogor Palace, while Omar Dhani fled to East Java and Aidit to Central Java. By 2 October, Suharto's soldiers occupied Halim Air Force Base, after a short gunfight. Sukarno's obedience to Suharto's 1 October ultimatum to leave Halim is seen as changing all power relationships. Sukarno's fragile balance of power between the military, political Islam, communists, and nationalists that underlay his "Guided Democracy" was now collapsing. On 3 October, the corpses of the kidnapped generals were discovered near the Halim Air Force Base, and on 5 October they were buried in a public ceremony led by Suharto.
In early October 1965, a military propaganda campaign began to sweep the country, successfully convincing both Indonesian and international audiences that it was a Communist coup, and that the murders were cowardly atrocities against Indonesian heroes since those who were shot were veteran military officers. PKI's denials of involvement had little effect. Following the discovery and public burial of the generals' corpses on 5 October, the army along with Islamic organisations Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama led a campaign to purge Indonesian society, government and armed forces of the communist party and other leftist organisations. Leading PKI members were immediately arrested, some summarily executed. Aidit was captured and killed in November 1965. The purge spread across the country with the worst massacres in Java and Bali. In some areas, the army organised civilian groups and local militias, in other areas communal vigilante action preceded the army. The most widely accepted estimates are that at least half a million were killed. It is thought that as many as 1.5 million were imprisoned at one stage or another.
As a result of the purge, one of Sukarno's three pillars of support, the Indonesian Communist Party, had been effectively eliminated by the other two, the military and political Islam. The killings and the failure of his tenuous "revolution" distressed Sukarno, and he tried unsuccessfully to protect the PKI by referring to the generals' killings as een rimpeltje in de oceaan ("ripple in the sea of the revolution"). He tried to maintain his influence appealing in a January 1966 broadcast for the country to follow him. Subandrio sought to create a Sukarnoist column (Barisan Sukarno), which was undermined by Suharto's pledge of loyalty to Sukarno and the concurrent instruction
Sukarno