A few years later, Russia learned that the United States was preparing an expedition to be led by Commodore Matthew Perry, to open Japan by gunboat diplomacy if necessary.
If successful, it was feared that this would provide more American influence in the Pacific region and Asia, and to give America the most advantage position in Japan.
Russia immediately recommenced plans to send a mission to the Far East.
Russian minister of Foreign Affairs Karl Nesselrode assigned Vice-Admiral Euphimy Vasil'evich Putiatin to head the Russian mission.
The expedition included several notable Sinologists and a number of scientists and engineers, as well as the noted author Ivan Goncharov, and the Pallada under the command of Ivan Unkovsky was selected as the flagship.
Goncharov would use the experience in his Fregat Pallada (1858), in which he described the details of the voyage and the negotiations.
It is a valuable description of how the Japanese received and processed foreign trade vessels and the perception of the experience of the Russians.

Pallada departed Kronstadt on October 7, 1852 under orders to return only with a treaty at least as good as the one the Americans had obtained.
Also on the Russian agenda was a delimitation of the borders between Japan and Russia in Sakhalin and the Kurile islands.

However it became clear during the long voyage that the vessel was unsuited for the expedition, and the newer 52-gun frigate Diana was subsequently dispatched, but Perry and his fleet of Black Ships reached Japan while Putiatin was still between Hong Kong and the Bonin Islands.
Despite years of debate on the isolation policy, Perry's visit created great controversy within the highest levels of the Tokugawa shogunate.

Eventually, Putiatin arrived in Japan with his four vessels on August 21, 1853, but at Nagasaki rather than attempting to force his way into Edo Bay as Perry had done.
Putiatin and Perry had a somewhat differing approach to negotiating with the Japanese.
Perry stressed the firepower of his warships and the possible consequences for Japan.
Putiatin chose a more diplomatic and strategic approach in the hopes of undermining the American efforts, advising that he had chosen Nagasaki despite his orders to go to Edo out of respect for Japanese laws and the ardent desire of the Russian Emperor for good relations.
Officials sent word to Edo, and while waiting for a response, Putiatin sailed to Shanghai for supplies and for news from home.
On his return to Nagasaki, there was still no reply, so he renewed his threat to go directly to Edo.
The alarmed Nagasaki bugyō urged Edo to accept Putiatin's terms, as the Russians seemed more accommodating that the Americans, and their huge empire might be used to offset threat posed by Perry.
Again, there was no response, partly because Shōgun himself, Tokugawa Ieyoshi died days after Perry's departure, and was succeeded by his sickly young son, Tokugawa Iesada, leaving effective administration in the hands of the Council of Elders (rōjū) led by Hotta Masayoshi, which was paralyzed with indecision.
Putiatin grew increasingly impatient and renewed his threat to sail to Edo, when a response came in the form of the officials Kawaji Toshiakira and Tsutsui Masanori, asking for a delay of three to five years for a counter-proposal.
 Disappointed, Putiatin left Japan in November 1853 promising to return in the spring.

Putiatin was not able to return until November 7, 1854.
In the meantime, he had surveyed the coast of Korea and the Russian Maritime Province and had learned of the outbreak of the Crimean War, and that the British Royal Navy was hunting for his squadron in the Sea of Okhotsk and the seas around Japan, including Nagasaki.
Problems with Pallada caused him to change his flag to the Diana.
By the time Putiatin returned, the Americans had already succeeded in opening Japan with the Treaty of Kanagawa in early 1854.
To prevent a Russian treaty limit Russian influence the British approached Japan to ask for Japanese neutrality in the war.
Because of a bad translation, the British obtained an
A few years later, Russia learned that the United States was preparing an expedition to be led by Commodore Matthew Perry, to open Japan by gunboat diplomacy if necessary. If successful, it was feared that this would provide more American influence in the Pacific region and Asia, and to give America the most advantage position in Japan. Russia immediately recommenced plans to send a mission to the Far East. Russian minister of Foreign Affairs Karl Nesselrode assigned Vice-Admiral Euphimy Vasil'evich Putiatin to head the Russian mission. The expedition included several notable Sinologists and a number of scientists and engineers, as well as the noted author Ivan Goncharov, and the Pallada under the command of Ivan Unkovsky was selected as the flagship. Goncharov would use the experience in his Fregat Pallada (1858), in which he described the details of the voyage and the negotiations. It is a valuable description of how the Japanese received and processed foreign trade vessels and the perception of the experience of the Russians.
Pallada departed Kronstadt on October 7, 1852 under orders to return only with a treaty at least as good as the one the Americans had obtained. Also on the Russian agenda was a delimitation of the borders between Japan and Russia in Sakhalin and the Kurile islands.
However it became clear during the long voyage that the vessel was unsuited for the expedition, and the newer 52-gun frigate Diana was subsequently dispatched, but Perry and his fleet of Black Ships reached Japan while Putiatin was still between Hong Kong and the Bonin Islands. Despite years of debate on the isolation policy, Perry's visit created great controversy within the highest levels of the Tokugawa shogunate. 
Eventually, Putiatin arrived in Japan with his four vessels on August 21, 1853, but at Nagasaki rather than attempting to force his way into Edo Bay as Perry had done. Putiatin and Perry had a somewhat differing approach to negotiating with the Japanese. Perry stressed the firepower of his warships and the possible consequences for Japan. Putiatin chose a more diplomatic and strategic approach in the hopes of undermining the American efforts, advising that he had chosen Nagasaki despite his orders to go to Edo out of respect for Japanese laws and the ardent desire of the Russian Emperor for good relations. Officials sent word to Edo, and while waiting for a response, Putiatin sailed to Shanghai for supplies and for news from home. On his return to Nagasaki, there was still no reply, so he renewed his threat to go directly to Edo. The alarmed Nagasaki bugyō urged Edo to accept Putiatin's terms, as the Russians seemed more accommodating that the Americans, and their huge empire might be used to offset threat posed by Perry. Again, there was no response, partly because Shōgun himself, Tokugawa Ieyoshi died days after Perry's departure, and was succeeded by his sickly young son, Tokugawa Iesada, leaving effective administration in the hands of the Council of Elders (rōjū) led by Hotta Masayoshi, which was paralyzed with indecision. Putiatin grew increasingly impatient and renewed his threat to sail to Edo, when a response came in the form of the officials Kawaji Toshiakira and Tsutsui Masanori, asking for a delay of three to five years for a counter-proposal.  Disappointed, Putiatin left Japan in November 1853 promising to return in the spring.
Putiatin was not able to return until November 7, 1854. In the meantime, he had surveyed the coast of Korea and the Russian Maritime Province and had learned of the outbreak of the Crimean War, and that the British Royal Navy was hunting for his squadron in the Sea of Okhotsk and the seas around Japan, including Nagasaki. Problems with Pallada caused him to change his flag to the Diana. By the time Putiatin returned, the Americans had already succeeded in opening Japan with the Treaty of Kanagawa in early 1854. To prevent a Russian treaty limit Russian influence the British approached Japan to ask for Japanese neutrality in the war. Because of a bad translation, the British obtained an
Treaty of Shimoda