Relations between Israel and Britain were hostile during the 1948 Arab–Israeli War, at one point bringing the two countries to the edge of direct military confrontation.
Britain, which had military forces in Egypt and Transjordan and defense agreements with both nations, foresaw possible military intervention on their behalf.
Early in the war, a Royal Air Force base in Amman was hit during an Israeli raid on the city.
The British threatened to attack the Israeli Air Force if such an action was repeated.
During the battles in Sinai, the Royal Air Force conducted almost daily reconnaissance missions over Israel and the Sinai.
RAF reconnaissance aircraft took off from Egyptian airbases and sometimes flew alongside Royal Egyptian Air Force planes, and high-flying British aircraft frequently flew over Haifa and Ramat David Airbase.
The British government planned military action against Israel codenamed Operation Clatter in the event of an Israeli invasion of Egypt and the flights were deployed to discover the strength of the Israeli Air Force and locate its forward bases.
On 20 November 1948, an unarmed RAF photo-reconnaissance de Havilland Mosquito was shot down by an Israeli Air Force P-51 Mustang.
On 7 January 1949, four British Spitfire FR18s flew over an Israeli convoy that had been attacked by five Egyptian Spitfires fifteen minutes earlier.
Fearing an imminent attack, Israeli ground troops opened fire on the British Spitfires, and shot down one with a tank-mounted machine gun.
The remaining three Spitfires were subsequently shot down by Israeli planes, and two pilots were killed.
Two of the surviving pilots were taken to Tel Aviv and interrogated, and were later released.
The Israelis dragged the wrecks of the British planes into Israeli territory, but failed to conceal them before they were photographed by British reconnaissance planes.
In response, the Royal Air Force readied its planes to bomb Israeli airfields, British troops in the Middle East were placed on high alert with all leave cancelled, and British citizens were advised to leave Israel.
Convinced the British would not allow the loss of five aircraft and two pilots go without retaliation, the Israelis were determined to repel any retaliatory airstrike, and made preparations to defend their airbases.
However, British commanders defied pressure from the squadrons involved in the incidents, and refused to authorize any strikes.
Following a British ultimatum to vacate the Sinai,  Israeli forces pulled back.
War between Israel and the United Kingdom was thus avoided.
The United Kingdom recognized Israel de facto on 13 May 1949, and de jure on 28 April 1950.
In the aftermath of the war, Israel—in cooperation with France—successfully worked to oppose Anglo-Iraqi plans for an Iraqi takeover of Syria.

In 1956, Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal and blocked the Straits of Tiran to ships bound to Israel, whilst encouraging violent terror attacks into Israel via Egyptian-controlled Gaza.
Britain and France resolved to secure the Suez Canal by force.
Although Israel had its own problems with Egypt and wanted to attack, Britain was hesitant to fight alongside the Israelis, lest the ensuing backlash in the Arab world threaten London's close allies in Baghdad and Amman.
In the end, the government of Anthony Eden reluctantly included Israel in the war plans, due to French pressure and the need for a local ally.
In November 1956, Israel attacked Egypt, and Britain and France seized most of the Suez Canal before financial and diplomatic intervention by Russia and the United States forced them to halt their advance.
This marked the point where Israeli-British relations were at their best.

Throughout the 1950s and 1960s the UK was seen as pro-Arab, maintaining close relations with Jordan and the Gulf states.
However, in 1975 the UK voted against the motion in the UN that “Zionism is racism.”

Israeli-British relations were strained in the 1980s.
During the 1982 Lebanon War, Britain imposed an arms embargo on Israel, which would not be lifted until 1994.
Relations became strained
Relations between Israel and Britain were hostile during the 1948 Arab–Israeli War, at one point bringing the two countries to the edge of direct military confrontation. Britain, which had military forces in Egypt and Transjordan and defense agreements with both nations, foresaw possible military intervention on their behalf. Early in the war, a Royal Air Force base in Amman was hit during an Israeli raid on the city. The British threatened to attack the Israeli Air Force if such an action was repeated. During the battles in Sinai, the Royal Air Force conducted almost daily reconnaissance missions over Israel and the Sinai. RAF reconnaissance aircraft took off from Egyptian airbases and sometimes flew alongside Royal Egyptian Air Force planes, and high-flying British aircraft frequently flew over Haifa and Ramat David Airbase. The British government planned military action against Israel codenamed Operation Clatter in the event of an Israeli invasion of Egypt and the flights were deployed to discover the strength of the Israeli Air Force and locate its forward bases. On 20 November 1948, an unarmed RAF photo-reconnaissance de Havilland Mosquito was shot down by an Israeli Air Force P-51 Mustang. On 7 January 1949, four British Spitfire FR18s flew over an Israeli convoy that had been attacked by five Egyptian Spitfires fifteen minutes earlier. Fearing an imminent attack, Israeli ground troops opened fire on the British Spitfires, and shot down one with a tank-mounted machine gun. The remaining three Spitfires were subsequently shot down by Israeli planes, and two pilots were killed. Two of the surviving pilots were taken to Tel Aviv and interrogated, and were later released. The Israelis dragged the wrecks of the British planes into Israeli territory, but failed to conceal them before they were photographed by British reconnaissance planes. In response, the Royal Air Force readied its planes to bomb Israeli airfields, British troops in the Middle East were placed on high alert with all leave cancelled, and British citizens were advised to leave Israel. Convinced the British would not allow the loss of five aircraft and two pilots go without retaliation, the Israelis were determined to repel any retaliatory airstrike, and made preparations to defend their airbases. However, British commanders defied pressure from the squadrons involved in the incidents, and refused to authorize any strikes. Following a British ultimatum to vacate the Sinai,  Israeli forces pulled back. War between Israel and the United Kingdom was thus avoided. The United Kingdom recognized Israel de facto on 13 May 1949, and de jure on 28 April 1950. In the aftermath of the war, Israel—in cooperation with France—successfully worked to oppose Anglo-Iraqi plans for an Iraqi takeover of Syria.
In 1956, Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal and blocked the Straits of Tiran to ships bound to Israel, whilst encouraging violent terror attacks into Israel via Egyptian-controlled Gaza. Britain and France resolved to secure the Suez Canal by force. Although Israel had its own problems with Egypt and wanted to attack, Britain was hesitant to fight alongside the Israelis, lest the ensuing backlash in the Arab world threaten London's close allies in Baghdad and Amman. In the end, the government of Anthony Eden reluctantly included Israel in the war plans, due to French pressure and the need for a local ally. In November 1956, Israel attacked Egypt, and Britain and France seized most of the Suez Canal before financial and diplomatic intervention by Russia and the United States forced them to halt their advance. This marked the point where Israeli-British relations were at their best.
Throughout the 1950s and 1960s the UK was seen as pro-Arab, maintaining close relations with Jordan and the Gulf states. However, in 1975 the UK voted against the motion in the UN that “Zionism is racism.”
Israeli-British relations were strained in the 1980s. During the 1982 Lebanon War, Britain imposed an arms embargo on Israel, which would not be lifted until 1994. Relations became strained 
Israel–United Kingdom relations