On August 12, General Walton Walker, in command of the Eighth Army, dispatched part of the 27th Infantry Regiment, 25th Infantry Division, to attack north from the 25th Division's zone to drive off KPA 4th Division troops moving into Yongsan.
Simultaneously, Church assembled all the combat service support soldiers he could and formed them into a combat unit to block further penetration of KPA forces, which were setting up roadblocks on the roads from Yongsan.

Additional reinforcements poured in.
The rest of the 27th Infantry moved in, as well as a battalion from the 23rd Infantry Regiment, 2nd Infantry Division.
These were able to push KPA infiltrators out of Yongsan and back to their firmly held positions at Cloverleaf Hill.
On August 14, following an artillery barrage, Task Force Hill launched a direct assault on these positions.
Fighting continued the entire day in a fierce series of attacks and counterattacks in which both sides, already at far reduced strength, inflicted large numbers of casualties.
However, Task Force Hill's second attack was just as unsuccessful as its first.
Casualties among officers was high in the fight, and the disorganization that followed meant most of the units in the fight could not communicate to coordinate any large actions.
It became a battle of attrition by August 15 as neither the KPA 4th Division nor Task Force Hill were able to get the upper hand in the fight, which in several cases erupted in desperate hand-to-hand combat.
Casualties mounted and a frustrated Walker ordered the 5,000-man 1st Provisional Marine Brigade to the area to turn the tide.
The brigade moved from the Masan region in the middle of a counteroffensive being conducted by the 25th US Infantry.

The KPA 4th Division in the meantime was suffering serious logistical setbacks from lack of food, equipment, ammunition and, weapons.
Conscripts from local South Korean villages were brought in to replace mounting losses.
There was also virtually no provision for the wounded in the division, and the KPA forces began to come apart under these stresses.
Still, the division's morale remained relatively high and General Lee refused to withdraw.
On August 12, General Walton Walker, in command of the Eighth Army, dispatched part of the 27th Infantry Regiment, 25th Infantry Division, to attack north from the 25th Division's zone to drive off KPA 4th Division troops moving into Yongsan. Simultaneously, Church assembled all the combat service support soldiers he could and formed them into a combat unit to block further penetration of KPA forces, which were setting up roadblocks on the roads from Yongsan.
Additional reinforcements poured in. The rest of the 27th Infantry moved in, as well as a battalion from the 23rd Infantry Regiment, 2nd Infantry Division. These were able to push KPA infiltrators out of Yongsan and back to their firmly held positions at Cloverleaf Hill. On August 14, following an artillery barrage, Task Force Hill launched a direct assault on these positions. Fighting continued the entire day in a fierce series of attacks and counterattacks in which both sides, already at far reduced strength, inflicted large numbers of casualties. However, Task Force Hill's second attack was just as unsuccessful as its first. Casualties among officers was high in the fight, and the disorganization that followed meant most of the units in the fight could not communicate to coordinate any large actions. It became a battle of attrition by August 15 as neither the KPA 4th Division nor Task Force Hill were able to get the upper hand in the fight, which in several cases erupted in desperate hand-to-hand combat. Casualties mounted and a frustrated Walker ordered the 5,000-man 1st Provisional Marine Brigade to the area to turn the tide. The brigade moved from the Masan region in the middle of a counteroffensive being conducted by the 25th US Infantry.
The KPA 4th Division in the meantime was suffering serious logistical setbacks from lack of food, equipment, ammunition and, weapons. Conscripts from local South Korean villages were brought in to replace mounting losses. There was also virtually no provision for the wounded in the division, and the KPA forces began to come apart under these stresses. Still, the division's morale remained relatively high and General Lee refused to withdraw.
First Battle of Naktong Bulge