On 18 August, an ISAF column left FOB Tora in Surobi in order to assess guerrilla activity in the Uzbin valley.
It was composed of some 100 troops in 20 vehicles, mostly French, accompanied by elements of the Afghan National Army and some U.S. Special Forces in charge of coordinating air support.
The patrol was organised in 
Carmin 2 ("Carmine 2"), a platoon of the 8th Marine Infantry Parachute Regiment (four VAB armoured personnel carriers, 31 men)
Rouge 4 ("Red 4"), a platoon of the Régiment de marche du Tchad
a platoon of the Afghan National Army (15 men on 2 pickup trucks) 1st Kandak, 3rd Brigade, 201st Corps
a platoon of the Afghan National Guard (15 men on 2 pickup trucks)
US Special Forces (12 men), composed of a Close Air support team and its escort (3 Humvees).

Rapid Reaction Force
USMC Embedded Training Team 6-3 (18 US Marines 2 US Navy Corpsmen) with elements of 1st Kandak, 3rd Brigade, 201st Corps, ANA
Their mission was to explore the field and make contact with local populations, in an effort to reinforce control of the region.
Uzbin Valley is the most populated valley of the sector, with 30,000 inhabitants.
The patrol was aware that there were enemy combatants in the valley.

Two hours before the patrol reached the mountain pass, Omar Khattab was alerted and phoned local militant commanders Zabihullah Mujahed and Khalid Farooqi for support, as he began making plans for the attack.
This advance warning raised suspicions that Afghan translators, who had deserted at camp Tora, had leaked information, either voluntarily or under coercion; this was later denied both by the French Army and by the guerrilla, who claimed that they had lookouts and guarded weapon caches in the sector.

140 fighters took positions around the pass.
According to official French statements, the group was composed mainly of Non-Afghan elements.
This was denied by the rebel leaders, who nevertheless acknowledge that weapons and funds were provided from abroad.

The ambush was mostly improvised by local leaders of the Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin, later reinforced by Taliban, given the size of the operation, and villagers affiliated with either of these organisations.
The ambush was part of a larger plan to surround Kabul, as it occurred on a road to Jalalabad, on which 70% of NATO supplies transit.
Orders were given by the headquarters of Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin, in Pakistan, in liaison with Taliban.

The Taliban leaders who carried out the operation deny that Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin was involved, and claim that the ambush was prepared in a mere two hours by three Afghan Taliban units.
On 18 August, an ISAF column left FOB Tora in Surobi in order to assess guerrilla activity in the Uzbin valley. It was composed of some 100 troops in 20 vehicles, mostly French, accompanied by elements of the Afghan National Army and some U.S. Special Forces in charge of coordinating air support. The patrol was organised in 
Carmin 2 ("Carmine 2"), a platoon of the 8th Marine Infantry Parachute Regiment (four VAB armoured personnel carriers, 31 men)
Rouge 4 ("Red 4"), a platoon of the Régiment de marche du Tchad
a platoon of the Afghan National Army (15 men on 2 pickup trucks) 1st Kandak, 3rd Brigade, 201st Corps
a platoon of the Afghan National Guard (15 men on 2 pickup trucks)
US Special Forces (12 men), composed of a Close Air support team and its escort (3 Humvees).
Rapid Reaction Force
USMC Embedded Training Team 6-3 (18 US Marines 2 US Navy Corpsmen) with elements of 1st Kandak, 3rd Brigade, 201st Corps, ANA
Their mission was to explore the field and make contact with local populations, in an effort to reinforce control of the region. Uzbin Valley is the most populated valley of the sector, with 30,000 inhabitants. The patrol was aware that there were enemy combatants in the valley.
Two hours before the patrol reached the mountain pass, Omar Khattab was alerted and phoned local militant commanders Zabihullah Mujahed and Khalid Farooqi for support, as he began making plans for the attack. This advance warning raised suspicions that Afghan translators, who had deserted at camp Tora, had leaked information, either voluntarily or under coercion; this was later denied both by the French Army and by the guerrilla, who claimed that they had lookouts and guarded weapon caches in the sector.
140 fighters took positions around the pass. According to official French statements, the group was composed mainly of Non-Afghan elements. This was denied by the rebel leaders, who nevertheless acknowledge that weapons and funds were provided from abroad.
The ambush was mostly improvised by local leaders of the Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin, later reinforced by Taliban, given the size of the operation, and villagers affiliated with either of these organisations. The ambush was part of a larger plan to surround Kabul, as it occurred on a road to Jalalabad, on which 70% of NATO supplies transit. Orders were given by the headquarters of Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin, in Pakistan, in liaison with Taliban.
The Taliban leaders who carried out the operation deny that Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin was involved, and claim that the ambush was prepared in a mere two hours by three Afghan Taliban units.
Uzbin Valley ambush