Assad turned the presidency, which had been known simply as "head of state" under Jadid, into a position of power during his rule.
In many ways, the presidential authority replaced the Ba'ath Party's failed experiment with organised, military Leninism; Syria became a hybrid of Leninism and Gaullist constitutionalism.
According to Raymond Hinnebusch, "as the president became the main source of initiative in the government, his personality, values, strengths, and weaknesses became decisive for its direction and stability.
Arguably Assad's leadership gave the government an enhanced combination of consistency and flexibility which it hitherto lacked."

Assad institutionalised a system where he had the final say, which weakened the powers of the collegial institutions of the state and party.
As fidelity to the leader replaced ideological conviction later in his presidency, corruption became widespread.
The state-sponsored cult of personality became pervasive; as Assad's authority strengthened at his colleagues' expense, he became the sole symbol of the government.
Because Assad wanted to become an Arab leader, he considered himself a successor to Nasser since he rose to power in November 1970 (a few weeks after Nasser's death).
He modeled his presidential system on Nasser's, hailed Nasser for his pan-Arabic leadership and publicly displayed photographs of Nasser with posters of himself.
Pictures of Assad—often engaged in heroic activities—were ubiquitous in public places.
He named a number of locations and institutions after himself and family members.
In schools, children were taught songs praising Assad.
Teachers began each lesson with the song "Our Eternal Leader, Hafez al-Assad", and he was sometimes portrayed with seemingly divine attributes.
Sculptures and portraits depicted him with the Islamic prophet, Muhammad, and after his mother's death the government produced portraits of her with a halo.
Syrian officials were compelled to call Assad "the sanctified one" ("al-Muqaddas").
This strategy was also pursued by his son, Bashar al-Assad.

While Assad did not rule alone, he increasingly had the last word; those with whom he worked eventually became lieutenants, rather than colleagues.
None of the political elite would question a decision of his, and those who did were dismissed.
General Naji Jamil is an example, being dismissed after he disagreed with Assad's handling of the Islamic uprising.
The two highest decision-making bodies were the Regional Command and the National Command, both part of the Ba'ath Party.
Joint sessions of these bodies resembled politburos in socialist states which espoused communism.
Assad headed the National Command and the Regional Command as Secretary General and Regional Secretary, respectively.
The Regional Command was the highest decision-making body in Syria, appointing the president and (through him) the cabinet.
As presidential authority strengthened, the power of the Regional Command and its members evaporated.
The Regional and National Commands were nominally responsible to the Regional Congress and the National Congress—with the National Congress the de jure superior body—but the Regional Congress had de facto authority.
The National Congress, which included delegates from Ba'athist Regional Branches in other countries, has been compared to the Comintern.
It functioned as a session of the Regional Congress focusing on Syria's foreign policy and party ideology.
The Regional Congress had limited accountability until the 1985 Eighth Regional Congress, the last under Assad.
In 1985, responsibility for leadership accountability was transferred from the Regional Congress to the weaker National Progressive Front.
Assad turned the presidency, which had been known simply as "head of state" under Jadid, into a position of power during his rule. In many ways, the presidential authority replaced the Ba'ath Party's failed experiment with organised, military Leninism; Syria became a hybrid of Leninism and Gaullist constitutionalism. According to Raymond Hinnebusch, "as the president became the main source of initiative in the government, his personality, values, strengths, and weaknesses became decisive for its direction and stability. Arguably Assad's leadership gave the government an enhanced combination of consistency and flexibility which it hitherto lacked."
Assad institutionalised a system where he had the final say, which weakened the powers of the collegial institutions of the state and party. As fidelity to the leader replaced ideological conviction later in his presidency, corruption became widespread. The state-sponsored cult of personality became pervasive; as Assad's authority strengthened at his colleagues' expense, he became the sole symbol of the government. Because Assad wanted to become an Arab leader, he considered himself a successor to Nasser since he rose to power in November 1970 (a few weeks after Nasser's death). He modeled his presidential system on Nasser's, hailed Nasser for his pan-Arabic leadership and publicly displayed photographs of Nasser with posters of himself. Pictures of Assad—often engaged in heroic activities—were ubiquitous in public places. He named a number of locations and institutions after himself and family members. In schools, children were taught songs praising Assad. Teachers began each lesson with the song "Our Eternal Leader, Hafez al-Assad", and he was sometimes portrayed with seemingly divine attributes. Sculptures and portraits depicted him with the Islamic prophet, Muhammad, and after his mother's death the government produced portraits of her with a halo. Syrian officials were compelled to call Assad "the sanctified one" ("al-Muqaddas"). This strategy was also pursued by his son, Bashar al-Assad.
While Assad did not rule alone, he increasingly had the last word; those with whom he worked eventually became lieutenants, rather than colleagues. None of the political elite would question a decision of his, and those who did were dismissed. General Naji Jamil is an example, being dismissed after he disagreed with Assad's handling of the Islamic uprising. The two highest decision-making bodies were the Regional Command and the National Command, both part of the Ba'ath Party. Joint sessions of these bodies resembled politburos in socialist states which espoused communism. Assad headed the National Command and the Regional Command as Secretary General and Regional Secretary, respectively. The Regional Command was the highest decision-making body in Syria, appointing the president and (through him) the cabinet. As presidential authority strengthened, the power of the Regional Command and its members evaporated. The Regional and National Commands were nominally responsible to the Regional Congress and the National Congress—with the National Congress the de jure superior body—but the Regional Congress had de facto authority. The National Congress, which included delegates from Ba'athist Regional Branches in other countries, has been compared to the Comintern. It functioned as a session of the Regional Congress focusing on Syria's foreign policy and party ideology. The Regional Congress had limited accountability until the 1985 Eighth Regional Congress, the last under Assad. In 1985, responsibility for leadership accountability was transferred from the Regional Congress to the weaker National Progressive Front.
Hafez al-Assad