Stalin and his command group, the Stavka, sought to develop strong concentrations of forces which would attack across narrow sectors with heavy assistance from supporting arms.

For example, Kalinin Front was told to 'create a shock group' of no less than 11 rifle divisions and three rifle brigades, eight tank brigades and 10 RGK artillery regiments.
To achieve these high force concentrations the Stavka handed over from its reserve to K front, five rifle divisions, six tank brigades, two RGK artillery regiments of 152mm guns, four antitank artillery regiments, and 10 M-30 battalions.

Support for the operation was to be on a huge scale.
In an attempt to wrest air superiority from the Germans, Colonel General Alexander Novikov, Commander of the Soviet Air Forces, was told to concentrate 1100 aircraft in the attack sectors, including 600 fighters.
They sought to smash through the German front by implementing the idea of 'artillery attack' to maximize firepower using massed collections of guns, mortars and rocket launchers.
30th Army, for example, concentrated 1323 guns and mortars along its 6.2 miles (10.0 kilometres) stretch, achieving a density of 140 tubes per kilometer.
The correlation of infantry in the attack sectors was calculated as between 3–4:1 in the 30th, 31st, and 33rd Army sectors and about 7:1 in 20th and 5th Army sectors.
Artillery advantage was overwhelming with 6–7:1 in all armies except in the 30th where it was calculated at 2:1.

The majority of the Soviet tank strength still lay in separate tank brigades that directly supported the infantry.
30th Army started the offensive with nine tank brigades with 390 tanks, 31st Army had six tank brigades with 274 tanks, and 20th Army had five tank brigades and 255 tanks.
Behind these army-level forces were newly created tank corps, the 6th and 8th to the rear of 20th Army, and 5th Tank Corps behind 33rd Army.

The tank corps had been created between March and May around a kernel of existing tank brigades and new men from the training establishments.
They were supplied with the best tanks available, but lacked artillery and support units.
Initially, even trucks were in short supply.
Although formed around a core of veterans from the winter fighting, these units had supported the infantry armies and were not yet used to independent action, and were not able to fulfill their exploitation role.
Their leaders were experienced commanders, many of whom were cautious of German armored units from the previous years campaigning and tended to overestimate German strength.
Stalin and his command group, the Stavka, sought to develop strong concentrations of forces which would attack across narrow sectors with heavy assistance from supporting arms.
For example, Kalinin Front was told to 'create a shock group' of no less than 11 rifle divisions and three rifle brigades, eight tank brigades and 10 RGK artillery regiments. To achieve these high force concentrations the Stavka handed over from its reserve to K front, five rifle divisions, six tank brigades, two RGK artillery regiments of 152mm guns, four antitank artillery regiments, and 10 M-30 battalions.
Support for the operation was to be on a huge scale. In an attempt to wrest air superiority from the Germans, Colonel General Alexander Novikov, Commander of the Soviet Air Forces, was told to concentrate 1100 aircraft in the attack sectors, including 600 fighters. They sought to smash through the German front by implementing the idea of 'artillery attack' to maximize firepower using massed collections of guns, mortars and rocket launchers. 30th Army, for example, concentrated 1323 guns and mortars along its 6.2 miles (10.0 kilometres) stretch, achieving a density of 140 tubes per kilometer. The correlation of infantry in the attack sectors was calculated as between 3–4:1 in the 30th, 31st, and 33rd Army sectors and about 7:1 in 20th and 5th Army sectors. Artillery advantage was overwhelming with 6–7:1 in all armies except in the 30th where it was calculated at 2:1.
The majority of the Soviet tank strength still lay in separate tank brigades that directly supported the infantry. 30th Army started the offensive with nine tank brigades with 390 tanks, 31st Army had six tank brigades with 274 tanks, and 20th Army had five tank brigades and 255 tanks. Behind these army-level forces were newly created tank corps, the 6th and 8th to the rear of 20th Army, and 5th Tank Corps behind 33rd Army.
The tank corps had been created between March and May around a kernel of existing tank brigades and new men from the training establishments. They were supplied with the best tanks available, but lacked artillery and support units. Initially, even trucks were in short supply. Although formed around a core of veterans from the winter fighting, these units had supported the infantry armies and were not yet used to independent action, and were not able to fulfill their exploitation role. Their leaders were experienced commanders, many of whom were cautious of German armored units from the previous years campaigning and tended to overestimate German strength.
Battle of Rzhev, Summer 1942