Chuikov was placed in command of the 64th Army, a reserve unit in Tula that was sent to the west of the Don River in August to block Hermann Hoth's 4th Panzer Army south of Stalingrad.
 This defensive stand allowed the remnants of the 62nd Army to break encirclement west of Kalach and escape over the Don River.
In September, Chuikov was placed in command of the remains of the 62nd Army, reinforced with the shattered remnants of the 1st Tank Army, to defend the city of Stalingrad itself.
 
Upon being given his orders, Chuikov was asked by Nikita Khrushchev, the political commissar, and Andrey Yeryomenko, the commander of the Southeastern Front, of his thoughts.
 To which he replied, "I understand my orders just fine, and I’ll carry them out.
I’ll do what I can.
I’ll either keep them out of Stalingrad or die trying."

He placed his command posts on the west bank of the Volga and stayed there throughout the battle.
 He strictly enforced Stalin's "not one step back" order.
 In an interview during the later phase of the battle on 5 January 1943 from his headquarters near the Red October steelworks,  Chuikov told Soviet war correspondent A. A. Belkin that early in the battle, he had summarily executed several officers and commissars for cowardice.

To be honest, most of the divisional commanders didn’t really want to die in Stalingrad.
The second something went wrong, they’d start saying: 'Permit me to cross the Volga.'
I would yell 'I’m still here' and send a telegram: 'One step back and I’ll shoot you!'

The determination that Chuikov instilled in his men enabled the 62nd Army to defend the city against all odds.

Stalingrad will decide the fate of the motherland.
The men understood this.
The men were in such a mood that if they’d been wounded, even with a broken spine, they had tears in their eyes as they were being taken to the east bank.
They’d say to their comrades who had brought them out: I don’t want to go.
Better to be buried here.
They considered it shameful to go wounded to the other bank.

Chuikov was concerned about maintaining communications with his troops.

We moved to another command post closer to where the enemy would be attacking.
And we stayed there.
We knew that every extra meter of telephone wires increased the risk of our communications being broken.
The most criminal, most dangerous thing for a commander, especially a senior commander, is when you lose control and communications.
Most of all, we were afraid of losing control of our troops.
I may not be able to send one of my commanders any reinforcements, but it’s enough for me to grab the phone and say the right thing, that’s all he needs.

It was at Stalingrad that Chuikov developed the important tactic of "hugging the enemy", by which Soviet soldiers kept the German army so close to them as to minimize the airpower enjoyed by the Wehrmacht.
Chuikov had witnessed firsthand the blitzkrieg tactics the Wehrmacht had used to sweep across the Russian steppe, so he used the Germans' carpet-bombing of the city to draw panzer units into the rubble and chaos, where their progress was impeded.
Here they could be destroyed with Molotov cocktails, antitank rifles, and Soviet artillery operating at close range.
This tactic also rendered the Luftwaffe ineffective, since Stuka dive-bombers could not attack Red Army positions without endangering their own forces.

[O]ur soldiers knew that the closer they were to the enemy, the better.
They stopped being afraid of tanks.
The infantrymen would get in a trench, ravine, or building, and start shooting the enemy infantry who were advancing behind the tanks.
The tanks would move through, and we’d leave them to our artillery, which was two to three hundred meters back from the front lines and would fire when they came within twenty to fifty meters.
And we didn’t let their infantry through.
The Germans would think that this area was already cleared, that it was dead ground.
But that dead ground came back to life.

The fierce defense of Stalingrad by the 62nd Army slowed the German advance and forced Axis forces to pull units from
Chuikov was placed in command of the 64th Army, a reserve unit in Tula that was sent to the west of the Don River in August to block Hermann Hoth's 4th Panzer Army south of Stalingrad.  This defensive stand allowed the remnants of the 62nd Army to break encirclement west of Kalach and escape over the Don River. In September, Chuikov was placed in command of the remains of the 62nd Army, reinforced with the shattered remnants of the 1st Tank Army, to defend the city of Stalingrad itself.  
Upon being given his orders, Chuikov was asked by Nikita Khrushchev, the political commissar, and Andrey Yeryomenko, the commander of the Southeastern Front, of his thoughts.  To which he replied, "I understand my orders just fine, and I’ll carry them out. I’ll do what I can. I’ll either keep them out of Stalingrad or die trying."
He placed his command posts on the west bank of the Volga and stayed there throughout the battle.  He strictly enforced Stalin's "not one step back" order.  In an interview during the later phase of the battle on 5 January 1943 from his headquarters near the Red October steelworks,  Chuikov told Soviet war correspondent A. A. Belkin that early in the battle, he had summarily executed several officers and commissars for cowardice.
To be honest, most of the divisional commanders didn’t really want to die in Stalingrad. The second something went wrong, they’d start saying: 'Permit me to cross the Volga.' I would yell 'I’m still here' and send a telegram: 'One step back and I’ll shoot you!'
The determination that Chuikov instilled in his men enabled the 62nd Army to defend the city against all odds.
Stalingrad will decide the fate of the motherland. The men understood this. The men were in such a mood that if they’d been wounded, even with a broken spine, they had tears in their eyes as they were being taken to the east bank. They’d say to their comrades who had brought them out: I don’t want to go. Better to be buried here. They considered it shameful to go wounded to the other bank. 
Chuikov was concerned about maintaining communications with his troops.
We moved to another command post closer to where the enemy would be attacking. And we stayed there. We knew that every extra meter of telephone wires increased the risk of our communications being broken. The most criminal, most dangerous thing for a commander, especially a senior commander, is when you lose control and communications. Most of all, we were afraid of losing control of our troops. I may not be able to send one of my commanders any reinforcements, but it’s enough for me to grab the phone and say the right thing, that’s all he needs. 
It was at Stalingrad that Chuikov developed the important tactic of "hugging the enemy", by which Soviet soldiers kept the German army so close to them as to minimize the airpower enjoyed by the Wehrmacht. Chuikov had witnessed firsthand the blitzkrieg tactics the Wehrmacht had used to sweep across the Russian steppe, so he used the Germans' carpet-bombing of the city to draw panzer units into the rubble and chaos, where their progress was impeded. Here they could be destroyed with Molotov cocktails, antitank rifles, and Soviet artillery operating at close range. This tactic also rendered the Luftwaffe ineffective, since Stuka dive-bombers could not attack Red Army positions without endangering their own forces.
[O]ur soldiers knew that the closer they were to the enemy, the better. They stopped being afraid of tanks. The infantrymen would get in a trench, ravine, or building, and start shooting the enemy infantry who were advancing behind the tanks. The tanks would move through, and we’d leave them to our artillery, which was two to three hundred meters back from the front lines and would fire when they came within twenty to fifty meters. And we didn’t let their infantry through. The Germans would think that this area was already cleared, that it was dead ground. But that dead ground came back to life.
The fierce defense of Stalingrad by the 62nd Army slowed the German advance and forced Axis forces to pull units from
Vasily Chuikov