By 11 March, Thiệu concluded that there was no hope of receiving the $300 million supplemental aid package from the U.S. On that basis he called a meeting attended by Generals Quang and Viên.
After reviewing the situation, Thiệu pulled out a small-scale map of South Vietnam and discussed the possible redeployment of the armed forces to "hold and defend only those populous and flourishing areas which were really most important".

Thiệu sketched on the map those areas which he considered most important, all of the III and IV Corps Tactical Zones.
He also pointed out those areas that were currently under communist control which would have to be retaken.
The key to the location of these operations were concentrations of natural resources such as rice, rubber and industries.
The necessary territory included coastal areas where oil had been discovered on the continental shelf.
These areas were to become, in Thiệu's words: "Our untouchable heartland, the irreducible national stronghold."
With respect to the I and II Corps Zones, he drew a series of phase lines on the map indicating that South Vietnamese forces should hold what they could, but that they could redeploy southward if needed.
Thiệu declared this new strategy as "Light at the top, heavy on the bottom."

The critical decision was made on 14 March when Thiệu met with Phu.
Thiệu had decided to abandon Pleiku and Kon Tum so that the II Corps forces could concentrate on retaking Buôn Ma Thuột, which he considered more important.
Phu then decided that the only possible means of doing this was to retreat to the coast along Interprovincial Route 7B, a dilapidated, rough track with several downed bridges, before recuperating and counterattacking back into the highlands.

The large-scale retreat of hundreds of thousands of military personnel and civilians would be dangerous.
However, it was poorly planned, many senior officers were not kept informed, and some units were left behind or retreated incoherently.
This was exacerbated by a three-day delay when the convoy encountered a broken bridge and had to rebuild it.
The communist forces caught up, surrounded the convoy, and attacked it.

Heavy losses were incurred against the numerically dominant communists, who shelled and rocketed the soldiers and peasants alike.
More bridge delays played into communist hands, and by the time the convoy reached Tuy Hòa on 27 March, it was estimated by the ARVN that only 20,000 of the 60,000 troops had survived, while only 25% of the estimated 180,000 civilians had escaped.
Thiệu's order to evacuate, which was too late, had resulted in chaos and a bloodbath that left more than 150,000 dead.
The planned operation to retake Buôn Ma Thuột never materialized because II Corps had been reduced to only 25% strength.
Buoyed by their easy triumph the North Vietnamese overran the whole region.
By 11 March, Thiệu concluded that there was no hope of receiving the $300 million supplemental aid package from the U.S. On that basis he called a meeting attended by Generals Quang and Viên. After reviewing the situation, Thiệu pulled out a small-scale map of South Vietnam and discussed the possible redeployment of the armed forces to "hold and defend only those populous and flourishing areas which were really most important".
Thiệu sketched on the map those areas which he considered most important, all of the III and IV Corps Tactical Zones. He also pointed out those areas that were currently under communist control which would have to be retaken. The key to the location of these operations were concentrations of natural resources such as rice, rubber and industries. The necessary territory included coastal areas where oil had been discovered on the continental shelf. These areas were to become, in Thiệu's words: "Our untouchable heartland, the irreducible national stronghold." With respect to the I and II Corps Zones, he drew a series of phase lines on the map indicating that South Vietnamese forces should hold what they could, but that they could redeploy southward if needed. Thiệu declared this new strategy as "Light at the top, heavy on the bottom."
The critical decision was made on 14 March when Thiệu met with Phu. Thiệu had decided to abandon Pleiku and Kon Tum so that the II Corps forces could concentrate on retaking Buôn Ma Thuột, which he considered more important. Phu then decided that the only possible means of doing this was to retreat to the coast along Interprovincial Route 7B, a dilapidated, rough track with several downed bridges, before recuperating and counterattacking back into the highlands.
The large-scale retreat of hundreds of thousands of military personnel and civilians would be dangerous. However, it was poorly planned, many senior officers were not kept informed, and some units were left behind or retreated incoherently. This was exacerbated by a three-day delay when the convoy encountered a broken bridge and had to rebuild it. The communist forces caught up, surrounded the convoy, and attacked it.
Heavy losses were incurred against the numerically dominant communists, who shelled and rocketed the soldiers and peasants alike. More bridge delays played into communist hands, and by the time the convoy reached Tuy Hòa on 27 March, it was estimated by the ARVN that only 20,000 of the 60,000 troops had survived, while only 25% of the estimated 180,000 civilians had escaped. Thiệu's order to evacuate, which was too late, had resulted in chaos and a bloodbath that left more than 150,000 dead. The planned operation to retake Buôn Ma Thuột never materialized because II Corps had been reduced to only 25% strength. Buoyed by their easy triumph the North Vietnamese overran the whole region.
Nguyễn Văn Thiệu