Beginning around 1 pm, Union artillery fired first, initially upon infantry in the woods, and later upon any Confederate artillery that attempted to move into firing position.
On the Confederate left flank, two batteries from Whiting's division and one from Jackson's soon began firing from their position upon Darius Couch's division of the IV Corps, who were near the center of the Union line.
This began a fierce firefight, with the Union's eight batteries and 37 guns concentrated against three Confederate batteries and sixteen guns.
The Union fire silenced the Rowan Artillery and made their position untenable.
The other two Confederate batteries, placed by Jackson himself, were in somewhat better positions, and managed to keep firing.
Over a period of more than three hours, a total of six or eight Confederate batteries engaged the Union Army from the Confederate left flank, but they were usually engaged only one at a time.

On the Confederate right flank a total of six batteries engaged the Federals, but they did so one-by-one instead of in unison, and each was consecutively cut to pieces by concentrated Union artillery fire.
Moreover, they engaged the Union artillery later than the guns of the left flank, so the desired crossfire bombardment was never achieved.

In all, the Confederate artillery barrage on both flanks completely failed to achieve its objectives.
Confederate fire did manage to kill Capt.
John E. Beam of the Union's 1st New Jersey Artillery, along with a few others, and several Federal batteries (though none that were actually engaged) had to move to avoid the fire.
Although the barrage by Lee's forces did claim a few lives, Union forces remained unfazed and continued their fearsome barrage.
Indeed, Union Army Lt.
Charles B. Haydon supposedly fell asleep during the artillery fight.
On both the left and right flanks, several of the batteries that did engage lasted no more than minutes before being rendered incapable of fire.
Moreover, in a failure of command that, according to historian Thomas M. Settles, must ultimately be placed on Lee's shoulders, the movements of the two flanks were never coordinated with each other.
D. H. Hill found the failure of the Confederate artillery discouraging and later dismissed the barrage as "most farcical".

Meanwhile, the Union artillery fire was planned and directed nearly flawlessly.
As historian Jennings Cropper Wise notes, Col.
Hunt, McClellan's chief of artillery, continuously refocused Union fire on various fronts, in an "enormous sheaf of fire of more than 50 superior pieces, disabling four of Huger's and several of Jackson's batteries almost the instant they came into action".
This severely hampered the Confederates' ability to respond effectively to the Federal barrage.
The Union artillery subdued a number of the Southerners' batteries; those few that remained attacked piecemeal, and failed to produce any significant result.
Beginning around 1 pm, Union artillery fired first, initially upon infantry in the woods, and later upon any Confederate artillery that attempted to move into firing position. On the Confederate left flank, two batteries from Whiting's division and one from Jackson's soon began firing from their position upon Darius Couch's division of the IV Corps, who were near the center of the Union line. This began a fierce firefight, with the Union's eight batteries and 37 guns concentrated against three Confederate batteries and sixteen guns. The Union fire silenced the Rowan Artillery and made their position untenable. The other two Confederate batteries, placed by Jackson himself, were in somewhat better positions, and managed to keep firing. Over a period of more than three hours, a total of six or eight Confederate batteries engaged the Union Army from the Confederate left flank, but they were usually engaged only one at a time.
On the Confederate right flank a total of six batteries engaged the Federals, but they did so one-by-one instead of in unison, and each was consecutively cut to pieces by concentrated Union artillery fire. Moreover, they engaged the Union artillery later than the guns of the left flank, so the desired crossfire bombardment was never achieved.
In all, the Confederate artillery barrage on both flanks completely failed to achieve its objectives. Confederate fire did manage to kill Capt. John E. Beam of the Union's 1st New Jersey Artillery, along with a few others, and several Federal batteries (though none that were actually engaged) had to move to avoid the fire. Although the barrage by Lee's forces did claim a few lives, Union forces remained unfazed and continued their fearsome barrage. Indeed, Union Army Lt. Charles B. Haydon supposedly fell asleep during the artillery fight. On both the left and right flanks, several of the batteries that did engage lasted no more than minutes before being rendered incapable of fire. Moreover, in a failure of command that, according to historian Thomas M. Settles, must ultimately be placed on Lee's shoulders, the movements of the two flanks were never coordinated with each other. D. H. Hill found the failure of the Confederate artillery discouraging and later dismissed the barrage as "most farcical".
Meanwhile, the Union artillery fire was planned and directed nearly flawlessly. As historian Jennings Cropper Wise notes, Col. Hunt, McClellan's chief of artillery, continuously refocused Union fire on various fronts, in an "enormous sheaf of fire of more than 50 superior pieces, disabling four of Huger's and several of Jackson's batteries almost the instant they came into action". This severely hampered the Confederates' ability to respond effectively to the Federal barrage. The Union artillery subdued a number of the Southerners' batteries; those few that remained attacked piecemeal, and failed to produce any significant result.
Battle of Malvern Hill