A few weeks after the prince's tour, in November 1860, following the election of Abraham Lincoln to the U.S. presidency, the deepening rift between the nation's slave states and free states erupted into a Secession Crisis.
As he wrote in a letter to Foreign Secretary Lord John Russell, Lyons initially considered it "impossible that the South can be mad enough to dissolve the Union."
 However, as the conflict intensified, Lyons revised his opinion.
He foresaw an increasingly bloody conflict in which the Union would prevail, but after which the Union would disintegrate as a consequence of internal animosities.
Lyons considered Lincoln's policy of reunion to be inept, and preferred a policy of peaceful separation.

He advocated British non-intervention and instructed his staff to be neutral with dealings with both North and South, and had a network of covert spies reporting on the activities of each side.
He considered Lincoln to be a social nobody and an unrefined westerner, and considered U.S. Secretary of State William H. Seward to be an anti-British exhibitionist.
He thus feared that American politicians would attempt to distract public attention from domestic problems by increasing their attacks on foreign powers, such as Britain.
He also rigorously pursued negotiations intended to preclude the occurrence of a conflict between Britain and either the North or the South, and advocated the continual rejection of French invitations for Britain to join in joint-intervention with France.
Lyons successfully resolved numerous other issues, such as the defence of Canada, which he believed would be the first foreign target for a Union military offensive.
Among his sources for information concerning this potential threat were the Royal Engineers, who undertook multiple intelligence-gathering operation across the Canada–United States border during the war.

He was prepared to destabilise the Union, and recognise Confederate independence, in order to ensure the security of the cotton supply to Britain, from the Confederacy, after Lincoln's decision to order a blockade of the southern coast.
However, he also worked to develop a personal friendship with Seward to provide for the eventuality, which proceeded to arise, in which British favour for the North was in Britain's best interests.
Lyons wanted to create what he called a "golden bridge" that would enable the Union to retract the policies that damaged the British cotton trade without humiliating itself.
In the words of Jenkins, "by sidestepping questions of principle, he [Lyons] avoided a collision and reached an understanding with Seward."

Lyons maintained such a convincing semblance of genuine honesty that, after the Civil War, the Union praised him for his honesty.
Lyons's stratagem so deceived Seward that Seward was led, by his perception of Lyons's apparent honesty, to consider an Anglo-American special relationship to be a possibility.
In Britain, Lyons's deceptive powers led the Foreign Office to consider him to be 'one of Britain's most intelligent and skilful diplomats'.
Lyons believed, in the words of Jenkins, that the Union "had to be disabused of the notion that there was no limit to his nation's [Britain's] forbearance."
A few weeks after the prince's tour, in November 1860, following the election of Abraham Lincoln to the U.S. presidency, the deepening rift between the nation's slave states and free states erupted into a Secession Crisis. As he wrote in a letter to Foreign Secretary Lord John Russell, Lyons initially considered it "impossible that the South can be mad enough to dissolve the Union."  However, as the conflict intensified, Lyons revised his opinion. He foresaw an increasingly bloody conflict in which the Union would prevail, but after which the Union would disintegrate as a consequence of internal animosities. Lyons considered Lincoln's policy of reunion to be inept, and preferred a policy of peaceful separation.
He advocated British non-intervention and instructed his staff to be neutral with dealings with both North and South, and had a network of covert spies reporting on the activities of each side. He considered Lincoln to be a social nobody and an unrefined westerner, and considered U.S. Secretary of State William H. Seward to be an anti-British exhibitionist. He thus feared that American politicians would attempt to distract public attention from domestic problems by increasing their attacks on foreign powers, such as Britain. He also rigorously pursued negotiations intended to preclude the occurrence of a conflict between Britain and either the North or the South, and advocated the continual rejection of French invitations for Britain to join in joint-intervention with France. Lyons successfully resolved numerous other issues, such as the defence of Canada, which he believed would be the first foreign target for a Union military offensive. Among his sources for information concerning this potential threat were the Royal Engineers, who undertook multiple intelligence-gathering operation across the Canada–United States border during the war. 
He was prepared to destabilise the Union, and recognise Confederate independence, in order to ensure the security of the cotton supply to Britain, from the Confederacy, after Lincoln's decision to order a blockade of the southern coast. However, he also worked to develop a personal friendship with Seward to provide for the eventuality, which proceeded to arise, in which British favour for the North was in Britain's best interests. Lyons wanted to create what he called a "golden bridge" that would enable the Union to retract the policies that damaged the British cotton trade without humiliating itself. In the words of Jenkins, "by sidestepping questions of principle, he [Lyons] avoided a collision and reached an understanding with Seward."
Lyons maintained such a convincing semblance of genuine honesty that, after the Civil War, the Union praised him for his honesty. Lyons's stratagem so deceived Seward that Seward was led, by his perception of Lyons's apparent honesty, to consider an Anglo-American special relationship to be a possibility. In Britain, Lyons's deceptive powers led the Foreign Office to consider him to be 'one of Britain's most intelligent and skilful diplomats'. Lyons believed, in the words of Jenkins, that the Union "had to be disabused of the notion that there was no limit to his nation's [Britain's] forbearance."
Richard Lyons, 1st Viscount Lyons