Lord Chelmsford, the Commander-in-Chief of British forces during the war, initially planned a five-pronged invasion of Zululand consisting of over 16,500 troops in five columns and designed to encircle the Zulu army and force it to fight as he was concerned that the Zulus would avoid battle, slip around the invaders and over the Tugela, and strike at Natal.
Lord Chelmsford settled on three invading columns, with the main centre column - now consisting of some 7,800 men - comprising the previously called No.
3 Column, commanded by the Colonel of the 24th Richard Glynn, and Durnford's No.
2 Column, under his direct command.
He moved his troops from Pietermaritzburg to a forward camp at Helpmekaar, past Greytown.
On 9 January 1879 they moved to Rorke's Drift, and early on 11 January commenced crossing the Buffalo River into Zululand.

The backbone of the British force under Lord Chelmsford consisted of twelve regular infantry companies: six each of the 1st and 2nd Battalions, 24th Regiment of Foot (2nd Warwickshire Regiment), which were hardened and reliable troops.
In addition, there were approximately 2,500 local African auxiliaries of the Natal Native Contingent, many of whom were exiled or refugee Zulu.
They were led by European officers, but were considered generally of poor quality by the British as they were prohibited from using their traditional fighting technique and inadequately trained in the European method as well as being indifferently armed.
Also, there were some irregular colonial cavalry units, and a detachment of artillery consisting of six field guns and several Congreve rockets.
Adding on wagon drivers, camp followers and servants, there were around 4,700 men in the No.
3 Column, not including Durnford's No.
2 Column.
Because of the urgency required to accomplish their scheme, Bartle Frere and Chelmsford began the invasion during the rainy season.
This had the consequence of slowing the British advance to a crawl.

The Zulu army, while a product of a warrior culture, was essentially a militia force which could be called out in time of national danger.
It had a very limited logistical capacity and could only stay in the field a few weeks before the troops would be obliged to return to their civilian duties.
Zulu warriors were armed primarily with assegai thrusting spears, known in Zulu as iklwa, knobkierrie clubs, some throwing spears and shields made of cowhide.
The Zulu warrior, his regiment and the army drilled in the personal and tactical use and coordination of this weapons system.
Some Zulus also had old muskets and antiquated rifles stockpiled, a relatively few of which were carried by Zulu impi.
However, their marksmanship was very poor, quality and supply of powder and shot dreadful, maintenance non-existent and attitude towards firearms summed up in the observation that: "The generality of Zulu warriors, however, would not have firearms – the arms of a coward, as they said, for they enable the poltroon to kill the brave without awaiting his attack."
The British had timed the invasion to coincide with the harvest, intending to catch the Zulu warrior-farmers dispersed.
Fortuitously for Cetshwayo, the Zulu army had already begun to assemble at Ulundi, as it did every year for the First Fruits ceremony when all warriors were duty-bound to report to their regimental barracks near Ulundi.

Cetshwayo sent the 24,000 strong main Zulu impi from near present-day Ulundi, on 17 January, across the White Umfolozi River with the following command to his warriors: "March slowly, attack at dawn and eat up the red soldiers."

On 18 January, some 4,000 warriors were detached from the main body to attack Charles Pearson's No.
1 Column near Eshowe.
The remaining 20,000 Zulus camped at the isiPhezi ikhanda.
The next day, the main force arrived and camped near Babanango Mountain, then moved the next day to a camp near Siphezi Mountain.
Finally, on 21 January they moved into the Ngwebeni Valley, where they remained concealed, planning to attack the British on 23 January, but they were discovered by a scouting party on 22
Lord Chelmsford, the Commander-in-Chief of British forces during the war, initially planned a five-pronged invasion of Zululand consisting of over 16,500 troops in five columns and designed to encircle the Zulu army and force it to fight as he was concerned that the Zulus would avoid battle, slip around the invaders and over the Tugela, and strike at Natal. Lord Chelmsford settled on three invading columns, with the main centre column - now consisting of some 7,800 men - comprising the previously called No. 3 Column, commanded by the Colonel of the 24th Richard Glynn, and Durnford's No. 2 Column, under his direct command. He moved his troops from Pietermaritzburg to a forward camp at Helpmekaar, past Greytown. On 9 January 1879 they moved to Rorke's Drift, and early on 11 January commenced crossing the Buffalo River into Zululand.
The backbone of the British force under Lord Chelmsford consisted of twelve regular infantry companies: six each of the 1st and 2nd Battalions, 24th Regiment of Foot (2nd Warwickshire Regiment), which were hardened and reliable troops. In addition, there were approximately 2,500 local African auxiliaries of the Natal Native Contingent, many of whom were exiled or refugee Zulu. They were led by European officers, but were considered generally of poor quality by the British as they were prohibited from using their traditional fighting technique and inadequately trained in the European method as well as being indifferently armed. Also, there were some irregular colonial cavalry units, and a detachment of artillery consisting of six field guns and several Congreve rockets. Adding on wagon drivers, camp followers and servants, there were around 4,700 men in the No. 3 Column, not including Durnford's No. 2 Column. Because of the urgency required to accomplish their scheme, Bartle Frere and Chelmsford began the invasion during the rainy season. This had the consequence of slowing the British advance to a crawl.
The Zulu army, while a product of a warrior culture, was essentially a militia force which could be called out in time of national danger. It had a very limited logistical capacity and could only stay in the field a few weeks before the troops would be obliged to return to their civilian duties. Zulu warriors were armed primarily with assegai thrusting spears, known in Zulu as iklwa, knobkierrie clubs, some throwing spears and shields made of cowhide. The Zulu warrior, his regiment and the army drilled in the personal and tactical use and coordination of this weapons system. Some Zulus also had old muskets and antiquated rifles stockpiled, a relatively few of which were carried by Zulu impi. However, their marksmanship was very poor, quality and supply of powder and shot dreadful, maintenance non-existent and attitude towards firearms summed up in the observation that: "The generality of Zulu warriors, however, would not have firearms – the arms of a coward, as they said, for they enable the poltroon to kill the brave without awaiting his attack." The British had timed the invasion to coincide with the harvest, intending to catch the Zulu warrior-farmers dispersed. Fortuitously for Cetshwayo, the Zulu army had already begun to assemble at Ulundi, as it did every year for the First Fruits ceremony when all warriors were duty-bound to report to their regimental barracks near Ulundi.
Cetshwayo sent the 24,000 strong main Zulu impi from near present-day Ulundi, on 17 January, across the White Umfolozi River with the following command to his warriors: "March slowly, attack at dawn and eat up the red soldiers."
On 18 January, some 4,000 warriors were detached from the main body to attack Charles Pearson's No. 1 Column near Eshowe. The remaining 20,000 Zulus camped at the isiPhezi ikhanda. The next day, the main force arrived and camped near Babanango Mountain, then moved the next day to a camp near Siphezi Mountain. Finally, on 21 January they moved into the Ngwebeni Valley, where they remained concealed, planning to attack the British on 23 January, but they were discovered by a scouting party on 22
Battle of Isandlwana