The strength of 9th Army varied considerably during mid-1942, as the Army Group shifted forces between its armies for use in different operations and defensive commitments.

In early July the 9th Army was reinforced so that it could conduct Operation Seydlitz.
It reached a total of 22 divisions, including four panzer divisions organised in five higher corps headquarters.
After the successful conclusion of the operation the army group shifted many of its offensive-capable divisions southward for its next planned attack against the Sukhimchi bulge, leaving the 9th Army at the end of July with 16 infantry divisions, organised in three corps, with 14 divisions in the line, one in reserve and another in transit.

Nearly all the divisions of Army Group Center had seen heavy winter fighting, which had sapped away their fighting strength.
According to rehabilitation reports, the necessity to hold the line, and the 'unabated intensity of defensive fighting', meant that Army Group Center's divisions could only be partially restored to strength.
They would have limited mobility and reduced combat efficiency, with the greatest gap being the shortage of motor vehicles and horses.

Following the collapse of its front east of Rzhev, the Army was rapidly reinforced, but the continual strain of persistent Russian attacks led General Model to demand further support.
By the end of September, the army commanded 25 divisions—half the army group strength—including 20 infantry and four panzer, as well as the Großdeutschland division.
The strength of 9th Army varied considerably during mid-1942, as the Army Group shifted forces between its armies for use in different operations and defensive commitments.
In early July the 9th Army was reinforced so that it could conduct Operation Seydlitz. It reached a total of 22 divisions, including four panzer divisions organised in five higher corps headquarters. After the successful conclusion of the operation the army group shifted many of its offensive-capable divisions southward for its next planned attack against the Sukhimchi bulge, leaving the 9th Army at the end of July with 16 infantry divisions, organised in three corps, with 14 divisions in the line, one in reserve and another in transit.
Nearly all the divisions of Army Group Center had seen heavy winter fighting, which had sapped away their fighting strength. According to rehabilitation reports, the necessity to hold the line, and the 'unabated intensity of defensive fighting', meant that Army Group Center's divisions could only be partially restored to strength. They would have limited mobility and reduced combat efficiency, with the greatest gap being the shortage of motor vehicles and horses.
Following the collapse of its front east of Rzhev, the Army was rapidly reinforced, but the continual strain of persistent Russian attacks led General Model to demand further support. By the end of September, the army commanded 25 divisions—half the army group strength—including 20 infantry and four panzer, as well as the Großdeutschland division.
Battle of Rzhev, Summer 1942