One conspicuous officer at the Sixth Service Command available for overseas duty was Aurand himself.
While he welcomed the prospect, he felt that with his background the most likely assignment would be in command of an atoll somewhere in the Pacific.
Suddenly, on October 20, 1944, he received a call from Major General Wilhelm D. Styer, the Chief of Staff of the Army Service Forces, as USASOS had been renamed in March 1943.
Aurand was ordered to go to the European Theater of Operations (ETO).
During a stopover in Washington en route, Aurand met with Somervell.
All Somervell could say was that someone had requested his services.
That someone turned out to be Aurand's old classmate, Eisenhower, who now commanded SHAEF.
On arrival in Paris, Eisenhower told Aurand about his problems with the supply of ammunition, and asked Aurand to investigate and report on it.
Aurand would be assigned as the Assistant Chief Ordnance Officer in the ETO and Communications Zone (COMZ).
The Chief Ordnance Officer was Major General Henry B. Sayler, another classmate, but junior in seniority to Aurand.
Aurand assured Eisenhower that he had no objection to such an arrangement.

The causes of the ammunition crisis were many.
The production of ammunition had been curtailed after excess stockpiles had been built up during the North African campaign, but expenditure in Europe, especially in heavy calibers, was greater than forecast, and ETO stocks were consistently below authorized levels.
The increased demand for ammunition was due to the tactical situation, with the American armies attempting to break through the concrete and steel fortifications of the German Siegfried Line.
Due to the failure to capture and develop adequate ports, unloading of ammunition had fallen behind schedule, and the rapid advances of July and August had led to the establishment of dumps and depots being neglected.
Rationing had been imposed in June by the First Army when it was the senior American command on the continent, and this system had been carried over when the 12th Army Group had activated on August 1, 1944, under the command of Aurand's classmate Lieutenant General Omar Bradley, but its defects became apparent when Lieutenant General John C. H. Lee's COMZ had become active, as 12th Army Group was then neither the senior nor the sole command in ETO.

Aurand noted the deviations from the standard procedures.
At Verdun, he spoke to the Chief Ordnance Officer of the 12th Army Group, Brigadier General Harold A., who blamed the situation on Lee and the CMZ.
He then saw the G-4 of the 12th Army Group, Brigadier General Raymond G. Moses, who detailed plans for upcoming operations, and explained that the theater reserves of ammunition were inadequate.
But when Aurand asked about the stocks held by the armies, Moses told him that once ammunition was delivered to the armies by COMZ, it was no longer part of the theater reserves.
Aurand soon located large stockpiles being held by the First Army.
He then visited the Ninth Army headquarters at Maastricht, where he was warmly received by its commander, Lieutenant General William H. Simpson, whom he had known at the Army War College.
Simpson reported that he had a good relationship with COMZ, and the Ninth Army staff were happy to divulge details of their ammunition holdings.
At a dinner with Sayler, Major General Everett Hughes, Maxwell, who now the G-4 of the War Department General Staff, asked Aurand for his opinion of the command setup in ETO, and Aurand told him what he thought of the command arrangements in the ETO.
Word got back to Eisenhower's Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Walter B. Smith, who gave Aurand a severe dressing down, and told him that he would be reduced to his substantive rank of colonel and shipped home.

This did not occur; Aurand still had friends in high places.
Maxwell told McCloy what had happened, and McCloy contacted Eisenhower.
On December 7, Aurand's wife Betty wrote to inform him that he would not be sacked.
Instead, Aurand assumed command of the Normandy Base Section on December 17, vice Major G
One conspicuous officer at the Sixth Service Command available for overseas duty was Aurand himself. While he welcomed the prospect, he felt that with his background the most likely assignment would be in command of an atoll somewhere in the Pacific. Suddenly, on October 20, 1944, he received a call from Major General Wilhelm D. Styer, the Chief of Staff of the Army Service Forces, as USASOS had been renamed in March 1943. Aurand was ordered to go to the European Theater of Operations (ETO). During a stopover in Washington en route, Aurand met with Somervell. All Somervell could say was that someone had requested his services. That someone turned out to be Aurand's old classmate, Eisenhower, who now commanded SHAEF. On arrival in Paris, Eisenhower told Aurand about his problems with the supply of ammunition, and asked Aurand to investigate and report on it. Aurand would be assigned as the Assistant Chief Ordnance Officer in the ETO and Communications Zone (COMZ). The Chief Ordnance Officer was Major General Henry B. Sayler, another classmate, but junior in seniority to Aurand. Aurand assured Eisenhower that he had no objection to such an arrangement.
The causes of the ammunition crisis were many. The production of ammunition had been curtailed after excess stockpiles had been built up during the North African campaign, but expenditure in Europe, especially in heavy calibers, was greater than forecast, and ETO stocks were consistently below authorized levels. The increased demand for ammunition was due to the tactical situation, with the American armies attempting to break through the concrete and steel fortifications of the German Siegfried Line. Due to the failure to capture and develop adequate ports, unloading of ammunition had fallen behind schedule, and the rapid advances of July and August had led to the establishment of dumps and depots being neglected. Rationing had been imposed in June by the First Army when it was the senior American command on the continent, and this system had been carried over when the 12th Army Group had activated on August 1, 1944, under the command of Aurand's classmate Lieutenant General Omar Bradley, but its defects became apparent when Lieutenant General John C. H. Lee's COMZ had become active, as 12th Army Group was then neither the senior nor the sole command in ETO.
Aurand noted the deviations from the standard procedures. At Verdun, he spoke to the Chief Ordnance Officer of the 12th Army Group, Brigadier General Harold A., who blamed the situation on Lee and the CMZ. He then saw the G-4 of the 12th Army Group, Brigadier General Raymond G. Moses, who detailed plans for upcoming operations, and explained that the theater reserves of ammunition were inadequate. But when Aurand asked about the stocks held by the armies, Moses told him that once ammunition was delivered to the armies by COMZ, it was no longer part of the theater reserves. Aurand soon located large stockpiles being held by the First Army. He then visited the Ninth Army headquarters at Maastricht, where he was warmly received by its commander, Lieutenant General William H. Simpson, whom he had known at the Army War College. Simpson reported that he had a good relationship with COMZ, and the Ninth Army staff were happy to divulge details of their ammunition holdings. At a dinner with Sayler, Major General Everett Hughes, Maxwell, who now the G-4 of the War Department General Staff, asked Aurand for his opinion of the command setup in ETO, and Aurand told him what he thought of the command arrangements in the ETO. Word got back to Eisenhower's Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Walter B. Smith, who gave Aurand a severe dressing down, and told him that he would be reduced to his substantive rank of colonel and shipped home.
This did not occur; Aurand still had friends in high places. Maxwell told McCloy what had happened, and McCloy contacted Eisenhower. On December 7, Aurand's wife Betty wrote to inform him that he would not be sacked. Instead, Aurand assumed command of the Normandy Base Section on December 17, vice Major G
Henry Aurand