At 09:00 Walker requested the US Air Force (USAF) to make a maximum effort along the Naktong River from Toksong-dong, just above the US 2nd Division boundary, southward and to a depth of 15 miles (24 km) west of the river.
He wanted the Air Force to isolate the battlefield and prevent further KPA reinforcements and supplies from moving across the river in support of the KPA spearhead units.
The Far East Command requested the US Navy to join in the air effort, and the US Seventh Fleet turned back from its strikes in the Inch'on-Seoul area and sped southward at full steam toward the southern battle front.
Walker came to the US 2nd Division front at 12:00 and ordered the division to hold at all costs.
He had already ordered ground reinforcements to the Yongsan area.

During the morning of 1 September, Walker weighed the news coming in from his southern front, wavering in a decision as to which part of the front most needed his Pusan Perimeter reserves.
Since midnight the KPA I Corps had broken his Pusan Perimeter in two places-the KPA 2nd and 9th Divisions in the US 2nd Division sector, and the KPA 7th and 6th Divisions in the US 25th Division sector, below the junction of the Nam and Naktong Rivers.
In the US 2nd Division sector KPA troops were at the edge of Yongsan, the gateway to the corridor leading 12 miles (19 km) eastward to Miryang and the main Pusan-Mukden railroad and highway.

Eighth Army had in reserve three understrength infantry regiments and the 2-battalion British 27th Infantry Brigade which was not yet completely equipped and ready to be placed in line: The 1st Provisional Marine Brigade at Changwon, 6 miles (9.7 km) northeast of Masan, preparing for movement to the port of Pusan; the US 27th Infantry Regiment, 25th Division which had arrived at Masan only the night before at 20:30 to relieve the 5th Regimental Combat Team, which was then to join the 24th Division in the Taegu area; and the US 19th Infantry Regiment, 24th Infantry Division, then with that division's headquarters at Kyongsan southeast of Taegu.
Walker alerted both the 24th Division headquarters, together with its 19th Regiment, and the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade to move at a moment's notice; the 24th Division either to the 2nd or 25th Division fronts, and the Marines to an unannounced destination.

As the morning passed, General Walker decided that the situation was most critical in the Naktong Bulge area of the US 2nd Division sector.
There the KPA threatened Miryang and with it the entire Eighth Army position.
At 11:00 Walker ordered US Marine Corps Brigadier General Edward A. Craig, commanding the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, to prepare the Marines to move at once.
The Marines made ready to depart for the Naktong Bulge at 13:30.
At 09:00 Walker requested the US Air Force (USAF) to make a maximum effort along the Naktong River from Toksong-dong, just above the US 2nd Division boundary, southward and to a depth of 15 miles (24 km) west of the river. He wanted the Air Force to isolate the battlefield and prevent further KPA reinforcements and supplies from moving across the river in support of the KPA spearhead units. The Far East Command requested the US Navy to join in the air effort, and the US Seventh Fleet turned back from its strikes in the Inch'on-Seoul area and sped southward at full steam toward the southern battle front. Walker came to the US 2nd Division front at 12:00 and ordered the division to hold at all costs. He had already ordered ground reinforcements to the Yongsan area.
During the morning of 1 September, Walker weighed the news coming in from his southern front, wavering in a decision as to which part of the front most needed his Pusan Perimeter reserves. Since midnight the KPA I Corps had broken his Pusan Perimeter in two places-the KPA 2nd and 9th Divisions in the US 2nd Division sector, and the KPA 7th and 6th Divisions in the US 25th Division sector, below the junction of the Nam and Naktong Rivers. In the US 2nd Division sector KPA troops were at the edge of Yongsan, the gateway to the corridor leading 12 miles (19 km) eastward to Miryang and the main Pusan-Mukden railroad and highway.
Eighth Army had in reserve three understrength infantry regiments and the 2-battalion British 27th Infantry Brigade which was not yet completely equipped and ready to be placed in line: The 1st Provisional Marine Brigade at Changwon, 6 miles (9.7 km) northeast of Masan, preparing for movement to the port of Pusan; the US 27th Infantry Regiment, 25th Division which had arrived at Masan only the night before at 20:30 to relieve the 5th Regimental Combat Team, which was then to join the 24th Division in the Taegu area; and the US 19th Infantry Regiment, 24th Infantry Division, then with that division's headquarters at Kyongsan southeast of Taegu. Walker alerted both the 24th Division headquarters, together with its 19th Regiment, and the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade to move at a moment's notice; the 24th Division either to the 2nd or 25th Division fronts, and the Marines to an unannounced destination.
As the morning passed, General Walker decided that the situation was most critical in the Naktong Bulge area of the US 2nd Division sector. There the KPA threatened Miryang and with it the entire Eighth Army position. At 11:00 Walker ordered US Marine Corps Brigadier General Edward A. Craig, commanding the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, to prepare the Marines to move at once. The Marines made ready to depart for the Naktong Bulge at 13:30.
Second Battle of Naktong Bulge