Assad called his domestic reforms a corrective movement, and it achieved some results.
He tried to modernize Syria's agricultural and industrial sectors; one of his main achievements was the completion of the Tabqa Dam on the Euphrates River in 1974.
One of the world's largest dams, its reservoir was called Lake Assad.
The reservoir increased the irrigation of arable land, provided electricity, and encouraged industrial and technical development in Syria.
Many peasants and workers received increased income, social security, and better health and educational services.
The urban middle class, which had been hurt by the Jadid government's policy, had new economic opportunities.

By 1977 it was apparent that despite some success, Assad's political reforms had largely failed.
This was partly due to Assad's foreign policy, failed policies, natural phenomena, and corruption.
Chronic socioeconomic difficulties remained, and new ones appeared.
Inefficiency, mismanagement, and corruption in the government, public, and private sectors, illiteracy, poor education (particularly in rural areas), increasing emigration by professionals, inflation, a growing trade deficit, a high cost of living and shortages of consumer goods were among problems faced by the country.
The financial burden of Syria's involvement in Lebanon since 1976 contributed to worsening economic problems, encouraging corruption and a black market.
The emerging class of entrepreneurs and brokers became involved with senior military officers—including Assad's brother Rifaat—in smuggling from Lebanon, which affected government revenue and encouraged corruption among senior government officials.

During the early 1980s, Syria's economy worsened; by mid-1984, the food crisis was severe, and the press was full of complaints.
Assad's government sought a solution, arguing that food shortages could be avoided with careful economic planning.
The food crisis continued through August, despite government measures.
Syria lacked sugar, bread, flour, wood, iron, and construction equipment; this resulted in soaring prices, long queues and rampant black marketeering.
Smuggling goods from Lebanon became common.
Assad's government tried to combat the smuggling, encountering difficulties due to the involvement of his brother Rifaat in the corruption.
In July 1984, the government formed an effective anti-smuggling squad to control the Lebanon–Syria borders.
The Defense Detachment commanded by Rifaat al-Assad played a leading role in the smuggling, importing $400,000 worth of goods a day.
The anti-smuggling squad seized $3.8 million in goods during its first week.

The Syrian economy grew five to seven percent during the early 1990s; exports increased, the balance of trade improved, inflation remained moderate (15–18 percent) and oil exports increased.
In May 1991 Assad's government liberalised the Syrian economy, which stimulated domestic and foreign private investment.
Most foreign investors were Arab states around the Persian Gulf since Western countries still had political and economic issues with the country.
The Gulf states invested in infrastructure and development projects; because of the Ba'ath Party's socialist ideology, Assad's government did not privatize state-owned companies.

Syria fell into recession during the mid-1990s.
Several years later, its economic growth was about 1.5 percent.
This was insufficient since population growth was between 3 and 3.5 percent.
Another symptom of the crisis was statism in foreign trade.
Syria's economic crisis coincided with a recession in world markets.
A 1998 drop in oil prices dealt a major blow to Syria's economy; when oil prices rose the following year, the Syrian economy partially recovered.
In 1999, one of the worst droughts in a century caused a drop of 25–30 percent in crop yields compared with 1997 and 1998.
Assad's government implemented emergency measures, including loans and compensation to farmers and the distribution of free fodder to save sheep and cattle.
However, those steps were limited and had no measurable effect on the econo
Assad called his domestic reforms a corrective movement, and it achieved some results. He tried to modernize Syria's agricultural and industrial sectors; one of his main achievements was the completion of the Tabqa Dam on the Euphrates River in 1974. One of the world's largest dams, its reservoir was called Lake Assad. The reservoir increased the irrigation of arable land, provided electricity, and encouraged industrial and technical development in Syria. Many peasants and workers received increased income, social security, and better health and educational services. The urban middle class, which had been hurt by the Jadid government's policy, had new economic opportunities.
By 1977 it was apparent that despite some success, Assad's political reforms had largely failed. This was partly due to Assad's foreign policy, failed policies, natural phenomena, and corruption. Chronic socioeconomic difficulties remained, and new ones appeared. Inefficiency, mismanagement, and corruption in the government, public, and private sectors, illiteracy, poor education (particularly in rural areas), increasing emigration by professionals, inflation, a growing trade deficit, a high cost of living and shortages of consumer goods were among problems faced by the country. The financial burden of Syria's involvement in Lebanon since 1976 contributed to worsening economic problems, encouraging corruption and a black market. The emerging class of entrepreneurs and brokers became involved with senior military officers—including Assad's brother Rifaat—in smuggling from Lebanon, which affected government revenue and encouraged corruption among senior government officials.
During the early 1980s, Syria's economy worsened; by mid-1984, the food crisis was severe, and the press was full of complaints. Assad's government sought a solution, arguing that food shortages could be avoided with careful economic planning. The food crisis continued through August, despite government measures. Syria lacked sugar, bread, flour, wood, iron, and construction equipment; this resulted in soaring prices, long queues and rampant black marketeering. Smuggling goods from Lebanon became common. Assad's government tried to combat the smuggling, encountering difficulties due to the involvement of his brother Rifaat in the corruption. In July 1984, the government formed an effective anti-smuggling squad to control the Lebanon–Syria borders. The Defense Detachment commanded by Rifaat al-Assad played a leading role in the smuggling, importing $400,000 worth of goods a day. The anti-smuggling squad seized $3.8 million in goods during its first week.
The Syrian economy grew five to seven percent during the early 1990s; exports increased, the balance of trade improved, inflation remained moderate (15–18 percent) and oil exports increased. In May 1991 Assad's government liberalised the Syrian economy, which stimulated domestic and foreign private investment. Most foreign investors were Arab states around the Persian Gulf since Western countries still had political and economic issues with the country. The Gulf states invested in infrastructure and development projects; because of the Ba'ath Party's socialist ideology, Assad's government did not privatize state-owned companies.
Syria fell into recession during the mid-1990s. Several years later, its economic growth was about 1.5 percent. This was insufficient since population growth was between 3 and 3.5 percent. Another symptom of the crisis was statism in foreign trade. Syria's economic crisis coincided with a recession in world markets. A 1998 drop in oil prices dealt a major blow to Syria's economy; when oil prices rose the following year, the Syrian economy partially recovered. In 1999, one of the worst droughts in a century caused a drop of 25–30 percent in crop yields compared with 1997 and 1998. Assad's government implemented emergency measures, including loans and compensation to farmers and the distribution of free fodder to save sheep and cattle. However, those steps were limited and had no measurable effect on the econo
Hafez al-Assad