D. H. Hill had been discouraged by the failure of the Confederate artillery, and asked Stonewall Jackson to supplement Chilton's draft.
Jackson's response was that Hill should obey the original orders: charge with a yell after Armistead's brigade.
No yell was heard for hours, and Hill's men began building bivouac shelters to sleep in.
Around 6 pm Hill and his five brigade commanders had assumed that the lack of a signal meant their army would not attempt any assault.
They were conferring together about Chilton's order when they heard yells and the commotion of a charge from their right flank, roughly where Armistead was supposed to be.
Hill took the yell as the signal and shouted to his commanders, "That must be the general advance.
Bring up your brigades as soon as possible and join in it."
D. H. Hill's five brigades, with some 8,200 men, had to contend with the dense woodlands around the Quaker Road and Western Run, which destroyed any order they may have had.
Men advanced out of the woods towards the Union line in five separate, uncoordinated attacks, and each brigade charged up the hill alone: "We crossed one fence, went through another piece of woods, then over another fence [and] into an open field on the other side of which was a long line of Yankees", wrote William Calder of the 2nd Regiment, North Carolina Infantry. "
Our men charged gallantly at them.
The enemy mowed us down by fifties."
Some brigades in Hill's division made it close enough to exchange musket fire and engage in hand-to-hand combat, but these were driven back.
The artillery response on the Federal side to Hill's charge was particularly withering, and soon, Hill's men needed support just to hold their ground.
In Extraordinary Circumstances: The Seven Days Battles, Brian K. Burton called Hill's charge "unnecessary and costly".
The successive assaults of Hill's brigades on the well-entrenched Federals were short-lived, and achieved little.
D. H. Hill had been discouraged by the failure of the Confederate artillery, and asked Stonewall Jackson to supplement Chilton's draft. Jackson's response was that Hill should obey the original orders: charge with a yell after Armistead's brigade. No yell was heard for hours, and Hill's men began building bivouac shelters to sleep in. Around 6 pm Hill and his five brigade commanders had assumed that the lack of a signal meant their army would not attempt any assault. They were conferring together about Chilton's order when they heard yells and the commotion of a charge from their right flank, roughly where Armistead was supposed to be. Hill took the yell as the signal and shouted to his commanders, "That must be the general advance. Bring up your brigades as soon as possible and join in it." D. H. Hill's five brigades, with some 8,200 men, had to contend with the dense woodlands around the Quaker Road and Western Run, which destroyed any order they may have had. Men advanced out of the woods towards the Union line in five separate, uncoordinated attacks, and each brigade charged up the hill alone: "We crossed one fence, went through another piece of woods, then over another fence [and] into an open field on the other side of which was a long line of Yankees", wrote William Calder of the 2nd Regiment, North Carolina Infantry. "Our men charged gallantly at them. The enemy mowed us down by fifties." Some brigades in Hill's division made it close enough to exchange musket fire and engage in hand-to-hand combat, but these were driven back. The artillery response on the Federal side to Hill's charge was particularly withering, and soon, Hill's men needed support just to hold their ground. In Extraordinary Circumstances: The Seven Days Battles, Brian K. Burton called Hill's charge "unnecessary and costly". The successive assaults of Hill's brigades on the well-entrenched Federals were short-lived, and achieved little.
Battle of Malvern Hill