any one of the possible results of an action
Utilitarianism
The objection that `` utilitarianism does not take seriously the distinction between persons '' came to prominence in 1971 with the publication of John Rawls ' A Theory of Justice . The concept is also important in animal rights advocate Richard Ryder 's rejection of utilitarianism , in which he talks of the `` boundary of the individual '' , through which neither pain nor pleasure may pass . However , a similar objection was noted in 1970 by Thomas Nagel ( who claimed that consequentialism `` treats the desires , needs , satisfactions , and dissatisfactions of distinct persons as if they were the desires , etc. , of a mass person '' ) , and even earlier by David Gauthier , who wrote that utilitarianism supposes `` that mankind is a super-person , whose greatest satisfaction is the objective of moral action ... But this is absurd . Individuals have wants , not mankind ; individuals seek satisfaction , not mankind . A person 's satisfaction is not part of any greater satisfaction . '' Thus , the aggregation of utility becomes futile as both pain and happiness are intrinsic to and inseparable from the consciousness in which they are felt , rendering impossible the task of adding up the various pleasures of multiple individuals .
The objection that `` utilitarianism does not take seriously the distinction between persons '' came to prominence in 1971 with the publication of John Rawls ' A Theory of Justice . The concept is also important in animal rights advocate Richard Ryder 's rejection of utilitarianism , in which he talks of the `` boundary of the individual '' , through which neither pain nor pleasure may pass . However , a similar objection was noted in 1970 by Thomas Nagel ( who claimed that consequentialism `` treats the desires , needs , satisfactions , and dissatisfactions of distinct persons as if they were the desires , etc. , of a mass person '' ) , and even earlier by David Gauthier , who wrote that utilitarianism supposes `` that mankind is a super-person , whose greatest satisfaction is the objective of moral action ... But this is absurd . Individuals have wants , not mankind ; individuals seek satisfaction , not mankind . A person 's satisfaction is not part of any greater satisfaction . '' Thus , the aggregation of utility becomes futile as both pain and happiness are intrinsic to and inseparable from the consciousness in which they are felt , rendering impossible the task of adding up the various pleasures of multiple individuals .