

A Preliminary Study on Using Large Language Models in Software Pentesting

Kumar Shashwat
University of South Florida
kshashwat@usf.edu

Francis Hahn
University of South Florida
fhahn@usf.edu

Xinming Ou
University of South Florida
xou@usf.edu

Dmitry Goldgof
University of South Florida
goldgof@usf.edu

Lawrence Hall
University of South Florida
lohall@usf.edu

Jay Ligatti
University of South Florida
ligatti@usf.edu

S. Raj Rajagopalan
Resideo
siva.rajagopalan@resideo.com

Armin Ziaie Tabari
CipherArmor
tabari@Cipherarmor.com

Abstract—Large language models (LLM) are perceived to offer promising potentials for automating security tasks, such as those found in security operation centers (SOCs). As a first step towards evaluating this perceived potential, we investigate the use of LLMs in software pentesting, where the main task is to automatically identify software security vulnerabilities in source code. We hypothesize that an LLM-based AI agent can be improved over time for a specific security task as human operators interact with it. Such improvement can be made, as a first step, by engineering prompts fed to the LLM based on the responses produced, to include relevant contexts and structures so that the model provides more accurate results. Such engineering efforts become sustainable if the prompts that are engineered to produce better results on current tasks, also produce better results on future unknown tasks. To examine this hypothesis, we utilize the OWASP Benchmark Project 1.2 which contains 2,740 hand-crafted source code test cases containing various types of vulnerabilities. We divide the test cases into training and testing data, where we engineer the prompts based on the training data (only), and evaluate the final system on the testing data. We compare the AI agent’s performance on the testing data against the performance of the agent without the prompt engineering. We also compare the AI agent’s results against those from SonarQube, a widely used static code analyzer for security testing. We built and tested multiple versions of the AI agent using different off-the-shelf LLMs – Google’s Gemini-pro, as well as OpenAI’s GPT-3.5-Turbo and GPT-4-Turbo (with both chat completion and assistant APIs). The results show that using LLMs is a viable approach to build an AI agent for software pentesting that can improve through repeated use and prompt engineering.

I. INTRODUCTION

Large language models (LLMs) have made massive advancements in recent years. It has been hoped that LLMs can play a pivotal role in automating cyber security operations, denting the asymmetric advantages enjoyed by adversaries. LLMs have demonstrated human-like reasoning capabilities that are likely useful for analyzing security events, such as those found in a security operations center (SOC). Companies are racing to embrace LLMs in security service offerings, e.g., Microsoft’s Security Co-pilot¹. However, there is currently very little information available regarding how these systems

are designed and very little evidence regarding the effectiveness of using LLMs in the security domain. Recently, using LLMs in security pentesting has attracted some interest [2], [3]. Using LLMs in pentesting shares many similarities using LLMs in SOC operations. Both need to address the large amounts of false alarms, and the ability of “hunting” for attacks/vulnerabilities that are not readily reported by existing tools. The reasoning involved in these security operations is often nuanced and context-relevant. It is hard to build a one-size-fit-all tool that can handle all situations, and thus human involvement is needed for the reasoning to move forward and for making a final decision. The challenge is that human’s brains, while more capable handling the nuanced situations than a computer program, are bandwidth-limited and can easily succumb to burnout [7] from repeated tasks with similar structures. Unlike a traditional computer program, an LLM can be trained on large amounts of data and produce responses to queries (prompts) that often times demonstrate the type of nuanced reasoning capability of a human brain. Thus using LLMs in these security tasks has the potential to automate those tasks that are hard to automate using traditional computer programs.

In this paper we evaluate the viability of using LLMs in software pentesting. In the software development life cycle, pentesting is often considered one of the last steps [9]. The development team and the pentesting team often work separately – remotely or in different locations, which adds a barrier to communication between them. Given the workload of a regular pentester it is hard for them to go through the code files line by line and craft a software pentesting plan curated just for a specific codebase. They often end up testing things that are limited to their information and expertise. Software pentesters use a number of tools for checking program source code and identifying vulnerabilities, such as Fortify² and SonarQube³. These tools often report a large number of findings that turn out to be false alarms. Large numbers of false alarms lead to pentester fatigue, and eventually ignoring code analyzer’s

¹<https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/business/ai-machine-learning/microsoft-security-co-pilot>

²<https://www.microfocus.com/en-us/cyberres/application-security/static-code-analyzer>

³<https://www.sonarsource.com/lp/products/sonarqube/static-code-analysis/>

output altogether. It would be ideal if these automated tools can “learn from” the pentesters as to why certain findings are false alarms, and use the learned knowledge to refine future output for the pentesters. This would only be possible for a traditional computer program if the developer of the tool is involved in its usage and modify the tool based on the observed deficiencies. However this is unrealistic since developers of tools and the tools’ users (pentesters) work under quite different constraints and paces. The feedback loop from users to developers and back to users (revised tool) is too long to produce any practical impact. LLMs, on the other hand, can be “trained” on the fly in various ways. One approach is through providing more prompts that offer the needed knowledge and context, so that the same LLM model can produce responses that match better with users’ expectations. This may lead to a dynamic AI security agent that can adapt to the specific usage environment and become more efficient as it interacts with the human user.

To evaluate this hypothesis, we built a number of AI agents using OpenAI’s GPT models [1], [6] and Google’s Gemini model [8]. Specifically, we used the LLMs GPT-3.5-Turbo, GPT-4-Turbo, and Gemini-pro. For the GPT models, we built two agents for each model, one using the Chat Completions API⁴ and the other using the Assistants API⁵. We designed prompts for these LLMs and feed the program source code to them. We then ask a question to the LLMs about what vulnerabilities are present in the source code and the location (line number) of the vulnerability. We use the test cases published in the OWASP Benchmark Project⁶ to evaluate the accuracy of these AI agents. The benchmark contains 2740 Java programs with a variety of vulnerabilities such as SQL injection, cross-site scripting, weak hashing algorithm, and so on. We compare the results against SonarQube which is a widely tool used in software industry for checking software source code for vulnerabilities. SonarQube also performs better on the OWASP benchmark than the majority of other static software pentesting tools. To examine the capability for the AI agent to be improved through prompt engineering, we divided the benchmark’s test cases into training and testing set. The prompts used in the agents are augmented based on observing the agents’ responses on the training set. The goal of augmenting the prompts is to add guidance specific to the category of the task the LLM is currently trying to accomplish so that higher accuracy can be achieved. The new prompts are then tested on the testing set, which has never been seen during the prompt engineering process. We compare the performance of the AI agents using the original base prompts, and the agents using the augmented prompts. We observed the following.

- 1) Without prompt engineering, the LLMs’ accuracy is either below or on par with that of SonarQube.
- 2) With prompt engineering, GPT-4-Turbo using the Assis-

⁴<https://platform.openai.com/docs/guides/text-generation>

⁵<https://platform.openai.com/docs/assistants/overview>

⁶<https://owasp.org/www-project-benchmark/>

tants API demonstrated substantial improvements on the accuracy, outperforming or being on par with SonarQube in most of the vulnerability categories.

These results show that there is a viable path for using LLM to build an AI agent that can be constantly improved through prompt engineering driven by usage. We further compared the cases where an LLM model performs differently. The analysis shows that a key reason why LLMs cannot perform better is the insufficient understanding of program code flow.

II. BACKGROUND

A. Software Pentesting

Software pentesting’s goal is to identify security vulnerabilities in program code. It is widely used as part of a company’s secure software development life cycle [4]. Tools used in software pentesting are divided into two categories: static application security testing (SAST) tools and dynamic application security testing (DAST) tools. The work described in this paper focuses on SAST only.

B. OWASP Benchmark

Vulnerability Area	True Positive	False Positive	Total
Command Injection	126	125	251
Weak Cryptography	130	116	246
Weak Hashing	129	107	236
LDAP Injection	27	32	59
Path Traversal	133	135	268
Secure Cookie Flag	36	31	67
SQL Injection	272	232	504
Trust Boundary Violation	83	43	126
Weak Randomness	218	275	493
XPATH Injection	15	20	35
Cross-Site Scripting	246	209	455
Total	1415	1325	2740

TABLE I: OWASP Benchmark v1.2 Test Cases

The OWASP Benchmark is a Java test suite for evaluating automated software vulnerability detection tools, including both SAST and DAST. We used the test cases in v1.2, which is a fully executable web application. The benchmark consists of 2740 test cases, each of which is a separate webpage inside the web app. All the vulnerabilities present in the benchmark are fully exploitable. The benchmark organizes the test cases based on the type of vulnerability present in the code. Each test case has either zero or one vulnerability present. Ground truth is given for each test case – true positive (vulnerability present) or false positive (vulnerability not present). Table I shows the distribution of test cases across vulnerability types and ground truth.

C. SonarQube

SonarQube is a widely used SAST tool in industry. In this work we used the SonarQube Community Edition⁷ test results present inside the benchmark and compared them against the LLMs’ results.

D. Large Language Models Used

Shorthand Name	Model Name	API Used
GPT-3.5-Turbo	gpt-3.5-turbo	ChatCompletion
GPT-4-Turbo	gpt-4-1106-preview	ChatCompletion
Gemini-Pro	gemini-pro	google-generativeai
GPT-3.5-Turbo Assistant	gpt-3.5-turbo	AssistantsAPI
GPT-4-Turbo Assistant	gpt-4-1106-preview	AssistantsAPI

TABLE II: LLMs Used in the Research

We used three LLMs: Google’s Gemini Pro [8], OpenAI’s GPT-3.5-Turbo [1], and GPT-4-Turbo [6]. For each GPT model OpenAI provides two versions of APIs to interact with the models: the Chat Completions API and the Assistants API. In the paper we use a shorthand name to refer to a combination of LLM model and API used in the AI agent (Table II).

III. PROMPT ENGINEERING

We divide the test cases in the OWASP Benchmark into a training set and a testing set. The division is done randomly within each vulnerability category, to have 20% of the test cases in each category in the training, and the rest in testing. Only the code in the training set was seen in the prompt engineering process.

A. Base Prompts

The goal of the base prompt is to provide just enough guidance and context to the LLM to accurately portray the knowledge and direction an entry level software penetration tester would have when analyzing code. This can be seen in the format of the prompt where it provides a role

“You are a security code analysis tool. Your job is to find security vulnerabilities in the code ...”,

it also provides additional mandates that model how one would perform due diligence when working in the field such as, “**Double check your report.**” and “**Only report something ... if you are 100 percent confident ...**”. We also provide in the base prompt, working directives which explain what to look for and when to report,

“Look at the following code and tell me what vulnerabilities are present in it if any.”

and at the end of the prompt we go on to provide the types of vulnerabilities present and how to report them.

⁷<https://docs.sonarsource.com/sonarqube/latest/>

You are a security code analysis tool. Your job is to find security vulnerabilities in the code with minimum noise. Double check what your report. Only report something as a vulnerability if you are 100 percent confident that it can be exploited now or in the near future. Look the following code and tell me what vulnerabilities are present in it if any. Mention the type of the vulnerability as one of the following: cmdi for Command Injection, crypto for Weak Cryptography, hash for Weak Hashing, ldapi for LDAP Injection, pathtraver for Path Traversal, secure-cookie for Secure Cookie Flag, sqli for SQL Injection, trustbound for Trust Boundary Violation, weakrand for Weak Randomness, xpathi for XPATH Injection, xss for Cross-site scripting, none for None of these vulnerabilities. **CODE_GOES_HERE**. All output must be in CSV format. You should output the category of the vulnerability from the above mentioned list. The line number of vuln and the reason. Don’t output the header for CSV. Eg: weakhash,51,MD5 hash function is used for hashing. MD5 is a weak hashing algorithm.

Fig. 1: Base Prompt

B. LLM Errors on Benchmark Cases under Base Prompts

After going through the prompt training set, we noticed that the cases where LLMs tend to make mistakes are false positives and that they can be broadly classified into two types.

1) *Code Flow*: In this type, the program being vulnerable or not depends upon code flow and the LLM cannot reason about the code flow correctly. Table III shows two simplified examples of false positives from the benchmark. Both were marked incorrectly by GPT-4-Turbo, and correctly by GPT-4-Turbo Assistant. Under Benchmark #02669, we can see that the value of `bar` is always going to be the string “safe3”, thus the user-provided parameter `param` never gets injected in the `bar` variable and the code is not vulnerable. In Benchmark #007238, we can see the value of `bar` is always going to be the string “safe”, and the user parameter will not be injected.

2) *Use of weak algorithms*: In this type the program being vulnerable or not depends upon whether it uses a weak algorithm, and the LLM fails to determine that the algorithm is actually not weak. Table IV shows two simplified examples from the benchmark, which again are false positive. Under Benchmark #00443, “AES/GCM/NOPADDING” is not a weak algorithm. In Benchmark #00640, the “`getProperty`” function tries to read the property “`hashAlg2`” from a file and if the operation fails it falls back to “SHA-5”. The value of “`hashAlg2`” as stored in the file is SHA-256, not a weak hashing algorithm. Since the LLM is not given the file’s content it is unable to determine what hashing algorithm is used. The value of `hashAlg2` is supplied in the augmented prompt as shown in Table V.

Pathtraver: Benchmark #02669	Command Line Injection: Benchmark #00738
<pre>String bar = ‘safe1’; List<String> valuesList = new ArrayList<>(); valuesList.add(‘safe2’); valuesList.add(param); valuesList.add(‘safe3’); valuesList.remove(0); bar = valuesList.get(1);</pre>	<pre>String bar; int num = 86; bar = ((7*42) - num > 200) ? ‘safe’ : param;</pre>

TABLE III: Code Flow

Weak Cryptography: Benchmark #00443	Weak Hashing: Benchmark #00640
<pre>javax.crypto.Cipher c = javax.crypto.Cipher. getInstance(‘AES/GCM/NOPADDING’)</pre>	<pre>String algorithm = benchmarkprops. getProperty(‘hashAlg2’, ‘SHA5’);</pre>

TABLE IV: Weak Algorithms

C. Augmenting Prompts

Each error made by LLM falls into one of the two categories as discussed above. Prompts are added to correct these errors based on the category they belong to. Weak Cryptography, Weak Hashing, and Weak Randomness fall in the “Use of Weak Algorithms” category. Command Injection, LDAP Injection, Path Traversal, Secure Cookie Flag, SQL Injection, Trust Boundary Violation, XPATH Injection, Cross-site scripting fall in the “Code Flow” category. The added prompts are listed in Table V.

IV. EXPERIMENTATION AND EVALUATION

For evaluation and experimentation purposes, we used the OWASP software testing suite version 1.2. The suite contains 2740 source files designed with a single vulnerability from the 11 categories as listed in Table I. In order to generate the augmented prompts for each vulnerability, we divided the dataset into a 20:80 split of the entire set of data. We only looked at the 20% of the source files to generate the augmented prompts and tested the performance of those prompts on the 80% of the data. This experimentation strategy models a real-world scenario where a pentester would look at the pentesting tool’s result and understand some reported findings are false positives. The pentester then extrapolates the causes of the mistake and provide additional guidance to the LLM in the form of added prompts. Next time when a new program is analyzed, the augmented prompts avoid making the same errors. In our study two types of experiments were performed.

- 1) Our first experiment was performed using Figure 1 as base prompt with limited information about the context of the types of vulnerabilities present. We only provided the categories of vulnerabilities to ensure that the formatting of the LLM’s output fits the scoring engine.

- 2) For the second experiment we appended the added prompt from Table V for each vulnerability category. The augmented prompts contained specific detailed guidance pertaining to each category, based on the observation from the training data.

The augmented prompts provide more context to the base prompt by telling the LLM what is considered a vulnerability with respect to the codebase. For example: under Weak Hashing where we direct the LLM to consider only SHA1 and MD5 to be weak hashing algorithms, variables such as `hashAlg1` and `hashAlg2` are to be MD5 and SHA-256 respectively.

We compare the various LLM models’ performance along side with the performance of SonarQube, an open-source platform used for continuous code inspection and analysis. All LLM models are provided the same base prompt and augmented prompts. In Table VI, the accuracy percentage is calculated by total number of correctly predicted cases (either true positive or false positive) divided by the total number of cases *on the testing data*. The results show that for the GPT-4-Turbo model using the Assistants API, the accuracy of the AI agent outperforms that of SonarQube under the augmented prompts, for most of the vulnerability categories. We also see a consistent improvement of accuracy under the augmented model over the base model, for this combination of LLM model and API. This result indicates that GPT-4-Turbo using Assistants API provides a viable path towards using LLMs in software pentesting. In the next section we provide more detailed discussions on the results.

V. DISCUSSION

As shown in Table VI, we can see that the augmented prompts do not always increase performance. However, the

Vulnerability	Prompt
Command Injection	Before reporting cmdi, carefully look at the value that is being supplied to arglist variable. If the arglist value contains a constant string not containing the param then there is no cmdi vulnerability.
Weak Cryptography	Only DES/CBC/PKCS5Padding is considered a weak crypto algorithm. cryptoAlg1 is DES/ECB/PKCS5Padding and hashAlg2 is AES/CCM/NoPadding. Consider that benchmark file is always read successfully.
Weak Hashing	Only SHA1 and MD5 are considered weak hashing algorithms. hashAlg1 is MD5 and hashAlg2 is SHA-256. Consider that benchmark file is always read successfully.
LDAP Injection	Before reporting ldapi, carefully look at the filter for the ldap client. If the user provided parameter can't be injected into the filter then there is no ldapi security vulnerability.
Path Traversal	Before reporting pathtraver, carefully look at the bar value that is being injected in the filename variable. If user provided parameter isn't being injected in the filename parameter then there then there is no vulnerability.
Secure Cookie Flag	Before reporting securecookie, carefully look at the bar value that is being supplied to the cookie. If user provided parameter isn't being injected in the cookie then there then there is no securecookie vulnerability.
SQL Injection	Before reporting sqli, carefully look at the bar value that is being injected in the sql query. If user provided parameter isn't being injected in the sql query then there then there is no vulnerability. For this codebase, SQL queries without the use of PreparedStatement can be safe from SQL Injection.
Trust Boundary Violation	Before reporting trustbound, carefully look at the value that is being supplied to request.getSession().putValue(var, "ANY NUMBER"); If the var value contains a constant string not containing the param then there is no vulnerability.
Weak Randomness	The use of java.util.Random means a weak cryptography vulnerability is present. For this code base the use of java.security.SecureRandom("SHA1PRNG") implies a strong cryptography is used.
XPATH Injection	Before reporting xpathi, carefully look at the value that is being supplied to the expression which is fed to nodelist.If the expression value contains a constant string not containing the param then there is no xpathi vulnerability.
Cross-Site Scripting	Before reporting xss, carefully look at the bar variable that is specified to response.getWriter function. If the bar variable contains a constant string not containing the param then there is no xss vulnerability.

TABLE V: Added Prompts

augmented prompts perform better for at least one LLM in each category. We rate each LLM based on two criterias:

- 1) Ability to learn from augmented prompts
- 2) Overall performance in each category

A. GPT-3.5-Turbo

GPT-3.5-Turbo with ChatCompletion generally had the poorest accuracy compared with the other LLMs for the base prompt. It showed a significant jump in performance with augmented prompts in most categories. However, the augmented prompts did not yield better results for Path Traversal, SQL Injection, Weak Randomness, and XPATH Injection.

B. GPT-4-Turbo

GPT-4-Turbo with ChatCompletion showed a noticeable increase in performance from GPT-3.5-Turbo in all categories except for Weak Randomness among the base prompts. Performance for the augmented prompts outperformed SonarQube but stayed relatively within the same performance range as the augmented prompts of GPT-3.5-Turbo.

C. Gemini-Pro

Gemini-Pro showed consistent performance between the base and augmented prompts for most categories and matches the capabilities of the GPT-3.5-Turbo and GPT-4-Turbo models with ChatCompletion. It is also noted that Gemini-Pro had the highest performance among all of the experiments in the Trustboundary category with 71% accuracy for the base prompt and 70% accuracy for the augmented prompts.

D. GPT-3.5-Turbo-Assistant

GPT-3.5-Turbo with the Assistant API showed similar results to GPT-3.5-Turbo with ChatCompletion and Gemini-Pro. However, there were a few instances where the base prompts outperformed all previous tests. The augmented prompts showed a similar behavior as with the previous models, but overall increased performance was seen with this model and API pairing. However, with this experiment we saw a unique occurrence where the augmented prompt had three cases of lower performance in the augmented prompts, in particular for the SQL Injection, Weak Randomness, and XPATH Injection categories.

E. GPT-4-Turbo-Assistant

GPT-4-Turbo with the Assistant API showed the best performance among all of the LLMs and API pairings, aside from Trustboundary where Gemini-Pro performed the best in testing. The base prompts showed a significant increase in performance across all categories aside from Trustboundary and LDAP injections which had comparable performance to the GPT-3.5-Turbo and Assistant API pairing. The augmented prompts showed similar behavior to all other experiments with regards to showing improvements to performance from base to augmented prompts. This came with an exception Secure Cookie Flag category where the GPT-4-Turbo with Assistant API showed similar results of lower performance in the augmented prompts as with the GPT-3.5-Turbo and Assistant API pairing.

Vulnerability	SonarQube	Prompt	GPT-3.5-Turbo	GPT-4-Turbo	Gemini Pro	GPT-3.5-Turbo Assistant	GPT-4-Turbo Assistant
Command Line Injection	49.8%	Base	38.2%	49.2%	50.2%	53.8%	70.3%
		Augmented	49.2%	47.7%	50.2%	50.2%	74.3%
Weak Cryptography	89.0%	Base	28.0%	50.0%	53.0%	46.5%	74.5%
		Augmented	53.0%	52.5%	53.5%	54.5%	89.7%
Weak Hashing	83.0%	Base	32.6%	51.5%	32.9%	44.5%	71.8%
		Augmented	54.2%	55.3%	53.7%	50.0%	85.1%
LDAP Injection	54.2%	Base	11.8%	42.5%	44.6%	53.1%	51.0%
		Augmented	42.5%	40.4%	44.6%	51.0%	57.4%
Path Traversal	100%	Base	50.3%	48.5%	50.0%	56.7%	62.6%
		Augmented	49.0%	47.6%	49.5%	53.0%	70.5%
Secure Cookie Flag	46.2%	Base	46.2%	52.8%	56.6%	64.5%	94.3%
		Augmented	54.7%	52.8%	54.7%	41.1%	84.9%
SQL Injection	50.4%	Base	52.7%	53.9%	54.4%	51.0%	62.4%
		Augmented	50.7%	51.4%	54.9%	45.0%	67.8%
Trust Boundary Violation	34.1%	Base	34.1%	54.0%	71.0%	45.0%	56.0%
		Augmented	61.0%	66.0%	70.0%	42.1%	53.0%
Weak Randomness	100%	Base	44.8%	39.6%	43.0%	55.4%	93.1%
		Augmented	40.9%	40.9%	42.7%	47.2%	98.7%
XPATH Injection	57.1%	Base	45.7%	40.7%	40.7%	33.3%	59.2%
		Augmented	45.7%	40.7%	40.7%	14.8%	74.0%
Cross-Site Scripting	45.9%	Base	45.4%	50.6%	58.4%	52.1%	78.7%
		Augmented	50.1%	49.5%	55.0%	53.6%	76.0%

TABLE VI: Experimentation Results

F. On Evaluation Strategy

In our evaluation we used the same prompts for all the LLMs. In reality it makes more sense to adopt a more tailored approach, where prompts are engineered based on the specific LLM's responses and the improvements seen. A single one-size-fit-all process for prompt engineering, while removing human bias in the evaluation process, does not reflect how LLMs are used and tailored. A more human-centered approach for evaluation could potentially address this limitation.

VI. RELATED WORK

Deng et al. [2] presented PentestGPT, an LLM-based AI agent to facilitate penetration testing. The authors created separate GPT sessions focusing on macroscopic and microscopic sub tasks to address the memory loss problem. It also adopts attack trees to guide the multiple GPT sessions towards the goals of the pentesting. PentestGPT does not address the question of whether the engineered prompts can be effective on new pentesting tasks that have not been seen before. Happe and Cito [3] discussed the vision of using LLMs in pentesting. A prototype AgentGPT was constructed that can help a pentester elevate privilege on a local host. There is no systematic study on the effectiveness of AgentGPT and no details were given about the prompts used or the prompt

engineering process. In addition to presenting a vision of using LLM in software pentesting, our work conducted a preliminary study on the efficacy of LLM in this domain, through experimentations on a well established benchmark. Our use of prompt engineering is similar to the work by Espeje et al. [5] which discusses various methods of prompt engineering and how they can be used to improve the performance of LLMs by categorizing the prompts in various formats and then augmenting original proposals with higher performing prompts to test the extent of the generation capabilities of the LLMs. They use these methods of prompt engineering to test the performance of the LLMs abilities for inductive reasoning, deductive reasoning, mathematical reasoning, and multi-hop reasoning.

VII. CONCLUSION

We present preliminary experimentation study on using LLMs in software pentesting. Our results show that through prompt engineering, an LLM can improve its accuracy over usage, and its accuracy is on par or surpassed SonarQube, a widely used static software pentesting.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

This work was partially supported by the National Science Foundation under award no. 2235102, and Office of Naval

Research under award no. N00014-23-1-2538. Any opinions, findings and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the above funding agencies.

REFERENCES

- [1] Tom B. Brown, Benjamin Mann, and et al. Language models are few-shot learners. *arXiv*, 2023.
- [2] Gelei Deng, Yi Liu, Víctor Mayoral-Vilches, Peng Liu, Yuekang Li, Yuan Xu, Tianwei Zhang, Yang Liu, Martin Pinzger, and Stefan Rass. PentestGPT: An LLM-empowered automatic penetration testing tool. *arXiv*, 2023.
- [3] Andreas Happe and Jürgen Cito. Getting pwn'd by AI: Penetration testing with large language models. In *Proceedings of the 31st ACM Joint European Software Engineering Conference and Symposium on the Foundations of Software Engineering, ESEC/FSE 2023*, page 2082–2086, San Francisco, CA, USA, 2023.
- [4] Michael Howard and Steve Lipner. *The security development Lifecycle*, volume 8. Microsoft Press Redmond, 2006.
- [5] Jessica López Espejel, El Hassane Ettifouri, Mahaman Sanoussi Yahaya Alassan, El Mehdi Chouham, and Walid Dahhane. GPT-3.5, GPT-4, or BARD? evaluating LLMs reasoning ability in zero-shot setting and performance boosting through prompts, 2023.
- [6] OpenAI*. GPT-4 technical report. *arXiv*, 2023.
- [7] Sathya Chandran Sundaramurthy, Alexandru G Bardas, Jacob Case, Xinming Ou, Michael Wesch, John McHugh, and S Raj Rajagopalan. A human capital model for mitigating security analyst burnout. In *Eleventh Symposium On Usable Privacy and Security (SOUPS 2015)*, pages 347–359, 2015.
- [8] Google Gemini Team. Gemini: A family of highly capable multimodal models. *arXiv*, 2023.
- [9] Anwesh Tuladhar, Daniel Lende, Jay Ligatti, and Xinming Ou. An analysis of the role of situated learning in starting a security culture in a software company. *USENIX*, 2021.