The article indicates a misunderstanding of the utility of bulk data, which is by its very nature backward looking. In order to prevent terror attacks and 'take-out' terrorists, one requires targeted real-time interception and monitoring communications capabilities (signals intelligence), which is provided in our legal framework. Indeed, in the Syria/Iraq theater, intelligence agencies target the communications of IS operatives and leaders (in combination with human intelligence sources). However, this is different than bulk data collection. Its utility in preventing attacks is quite low (e.g., the G&M provides 1 example in the UK). By the time that an algorithm and then an analyst gets around to analyzing a piece of important data in the haystack and moving it up the chain to the relevant authorities, it's likely that the attack has already occurred. Rather, it is useful for connecting the dots and learning about the 'enemy' (which can be short-lived in lone-wolf scenarios)