Q.B. A.D. 1993 No. 488 J.C.S. IN THE QUEEN'S BENCH JUDICIAL CENTRE OF SASKATOON BETWEEN: HELEN CHRISTENSEN and PRO-MED ENVIRONMENT INTERIOR DESIGN INC. PLAINTIFF (RESPONDENT) and KELLY KOCAY DEFENDANT (APPLICANT) M. Hinds for the defendant (applicant) J. Bailey for the defendant (applicant) K. Stevenson, Q.C. for the plaintiff (respondent) FIAT WRIGHT J. April 15, 1998 [1] The endorsement in the file indicates that Mr. Justice Hrabinsky reserved his decision with respect to the hearing of this motion in conjunction with the proposed trial of the action. Judge Hrabinsky advises, however, that he did not intend to do so and there was no impediment to the matter being reargued and disposed of by me. Counsel are agreed that that is the appropriate course to follow. There is considerable urgency in this matter as the trial is imminent. [2] advised counsel would not have sufficient time to give reasons for my rulings on the applicant's motion because of the scheduling of possible further pre-trial conference. The parties will decide after my ruling if the conference is to proceed. [3] will deal with the various aspects of the motion as counsel did in their briefs. The issues raised in the application are complicated and not at all clear in their implications. Negotiations and Settlement of the May 3, 1985 Accident [4] The jury may be advised of the prior accident, thedate of the accident, that proceedings were commenced in thisCourt, the date of those proceedings and that the accidentultimately was settled, and the action discontinued. [5] After reviewing the authorities, I am satisfied thatthe terms of the settlement should not be disclosed nor thesum paid to settle the applicant\'s claim. Similarly the release completed by her should not be referred to as it is part and parcel of the settlement. Beyond the issue of privilege, which in itself is complete answer to the applicant's request, is the more critical problem of revisiting that action. There is no doubt in my mind that if the amount and terms of the settlement were to be reviewed that the jury would ultimately be obligated to revisit the whole entire matter as preliminary to making decision with respect to the present action. The sum paid to settlethe first action was not allocated to any head of damages sothat those issues would have to be traversed also. The Applicant\'s Prior Medical Records WithRespect to the 1985 Accident (May 1985-July 1991) [6] The applicant may introduce these records intoevidence subject to compliance with the usual rules as tonotice and admissibility. In that respect the applicant may choose to require the medical witnesses in question to appear to testify in person, subject to the usual rules as to costs. [7] Some question was raised as to the sufficiency of notice to the respondent but am satisfied from the course the proceedings have taken that the respondent has been fully apprised of the applicant's intentions in this respect for some little time. The Statement of Claim in Queen's Bench Action 1408/86 [8] The statement of claim in that action may not beentered at this trial. It is not evidence. At best it is aseries of allegations made by the respondent against the priordefendant. [9] The applicant may, however, examine the respondent as to the particulars of her claim in the earlier action and if need be refer to the material paragraphs in the previous statement of claim. The Respondent's Examination for Discovery in Queen's Bench Action 1408/86 [10] The applicant will be restricted to using therespondent\'s examination for discovery in the prior action forthe purpose of cross-examination. agree with the authorities cited by the respondent on this question also. [11] If counsel require it, might add to or extend my reasons for my decision in this respect but trust the above comments will be sufficient to indicate the rationale for my [12] The matter of costs of this application will be reserved to the trial judge.
FIAT. At issue was what evidence of a prior action could be put before the jury. The trial was imminent. HELD: 1)The jury may be advised of the prior accident, its date, that proceedings were commenced in this Court and date of those proceedings and that the accident was ultimately settled and the action discontinued. The terms of the settlement and the sum paid were not to be disclosed. Beyond the issue of privilege which was a complete answer to the request, revisiting that action was a more critical problem. The sum paid to settle the first action was not allocated to any head of damages so those issues would have to be transversed as well. 2)The applicant may introduce his prior medical records with respect to the 1985 accident subject to compliance with the usual rules as to notice and admissibility. 3)The statement of claim in that action could not be entered at this trial as it was not evidence.  At best it was a series of allegations made against the prior defendant. The applicant could examine the respondent as to particulars of her claim in the earlier action and refer to material paragraphs. 4)The applicant was restricted to using the respondent's examination for discovery in the prior action for the purpose of cross-examination.  5)Costs were reserved to the trial judge. 6)The previous judge did not intend to reserve his decision with respect to the hearing of this motion and there was no impediment to the matter being reargued and disposed of.