QUEEN’S BENCH FOR SASKATCHEWAN Citation: 2007 SKQB 99 Date: 2007 03 14 Docket: DIV. No. 07124/2005 Judicial Centre: Prince Albert, Family Law Division BETWEEN: CORY WADE PATRICK, Petitioner (Respondent by Counterpetition) and LOUISE VALERIE PROULX PATRICK, Respondent (Petitioner by Counterpetition) Counsel: Dale N. Blenner‑Hassett for the petitioner (respondent by counterpetition), Cory Wade Patrick Trent E. Forsyth for the respondent (petitioner by counterpetition), Louise Valerie Proulx Patrick JUDGMENT GOLDENBERG J. March 14, 2007 [1] The parties were recently before me in an action for custody, access, support, divorce and division of family property. Due to change in circumstances, it was necessary to sever of the matters of custody, access and support. This judgment deals with divorce and division of family property. DIVORCE [2] Grounds for divorce having been proven, it is ordered that Cory Wade Patrick and Louise Valerie Proulx Patrick who were married on the 17th day of August, 2002, are divorced and, unless appealed, this judgment takes effect and the marriage is dissolved on the 31st day after the date of this judgment. DIVISION OF FAMILY PROPERTY [3] Cory and Louise are young couple who, when together, resided in the family home on the SE¼‑27‑52‑05‑W3rd, in the Debden district, in the Province of Saskatchewan. [4] They met and dated when Louise was still in high school. lasting relationship was not formed at that time. [5] After completing grade 12, Louise moved to Saskatoon where she worked for period of time. She then returned to Prince Albert and obtained employment there. [6] The parties began seeing each other again at the end of May or the beginning of June 1999. Upon finding out that Louise was pregnant, they moved in together. The date they moved in together is uncertain from the evidence. However, find that they would have been living together by August 1, 1999. They resided in the home on the SE¼‑27‑52‑05‑W3rd (162 acres). [7] Upon his father’s death in 1996, Cory had inherited the SE¼ along with Ptn. NE¼‑27‑52‑05‑W3rd (23 acres). [8] The parties’ first child was born March 18, 2000. They had planned to marry thereafter, but upon Louise becoming pregnant again, the wedding was postponed. Their second child was born October 20, 2001. Cory and Louise were married August 17, 2002. [9] Cory began working at the Weyerhaeuser saw mill in Big River in January 2000. This continued until he was laid off by Weyerhaeuser in April 2006. He then took up employment as municipal labourer and also at waste management site. [10] Louise remained at home with the children until the youngest was about two years of age. In approximately October 2003, Louise began cosmetology course in Saskatoon. She would leave the farm home Tuesday mornings at about a.m. and return immediately after Saturday classes. Cory did not contribute to her tuition costs. To save costs Louise stayed with relatives in Saskatoon. Upon completion of the cosmetology course, Louise began working in hair salon in Debden in July 2004. This proved to be unprofitable. Louise terminated this in July 2005. She worked at Weyerhaeuser at Prince Albert from mid‑July to December 2005 and for few days in January 2006. [11] The parties separated on May 21, 2005. Louise left the family home and moved into vacant house on her parent’s farm in the Shell Lake district. Cory continued to live in the family home. [12] The principle asset is the family home, that is to say the SE¼‑27‑52‑05‑W3rd. In his evidence at trial, Cory indicated that he was willing to put it up for sale. specifically find that prior thereto, Cory never indicated that he was prepared to sell the SE¼‑27‑52‑05‑W3rd. The outset issue [13] One of the issues arising from the trial is the value of SE¼‑27‑52‑05‑W3rd. The parties arranged for an appraisal of the SE¼‑27‑52‑05‑W3rd and the Ptn. NE¼‑27‑52‑05‑W3rd and split the costs of same. As agreed, the appraisal was placed into evidence before me. The appraisal is what will simply call the usual type of appraisal that is accepted in this Court. The appraiser physically inspected the property with Cory in attendance. The Direct Comparison Approach to Value was utilized based on market data obtained as explained therein. Highest and best use was also analysed as explained therein. The appraised value as of the date of application, July 19, 2005, is $101,600. In cross‑examination Cory agreed that the appraised value for the SE¼‑27‑52‑05‑W3rd, including the house and yard site, was $95,100. [14] As part of Cory’s evidence, and as agreed, letter from real estate agent was placed into evidence. In the letter the real estate agent valued the SE¼‑27‑52‑05‑W3rd at $65,000 to $70,000 as of April 17, 2006. [15] The trial was held in November and December 2006. [16] can well understand why, given the limited value of the family property and the limited means of the parties, the evidence was placed before me as it was. However, must determine value. The appraisal is in format and follows procedure long recognized by this Court. The letter is simply that, letter from real estate agent. Cory’s counsel acknowledges that have no evidence as to the real estate agent’s knowledge or expertise in the area of land appraisal. There is no explanation as to how the value was arrived at other than an inspection of the property. There is no evidence before me as to any factors that would result in reduction, in the intervening nine months, from the application date value set out in the appraisal. [17] consider it appropriate to value the SE¼‑27‑52‑05‑W3rd as of the date of application, July 19, 2005, and find the value to be $95,100. [18] That, however, is not the end of the matter. Cory’s counsel, in his written submission, raises an issue which now refer to as the “outset issue”. Counsel, in effect, says that the value of the SE¼‑27‑52‑05‑W3rd is not material, that the SE¼‑27‑52‑05‑W3rd should be sold and from the sale price, be it “much or little”, the net proceeds is what is to be divided by the parties. With all due respect to learned counsel, this position is not in accordance with the legislation and the practice of this Court. [19] In Benson v. Benson (1994), 1994 CanLII 4554 (SK CA), 120 Sask. R. 17 (C.A.), the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal set out the approach to be taken by judge when rendering decisions pursuant to The Family Property Act, S.S. 1997, c. F‑6.3. At paras. 18 and 19 of that decision, Justice Cameron set out the methodology as follows: [18] Section 21(1) of the Act requires that the “matrimonial property or its value”, both as defined in s. 2, be distributed and distributed equally, subject only to the exceptions, exemptions, and equitable considerations mentioned elsewhere in the statute. “Matrimonial property” is defined by s. 2(h) to mean all manner of property that, “at the time an application is made under this Act”, is owned by one or other of the spouses or in which either has an interest. “Value” on the other hand is defined by s. 2(1) to mean the fair market value “at the time an application is made under this Act, or at the time of adjudication, whichever the court thinks fit”. [19] In the light of these and other provisions of the Act, the practice is to resolve these cases along the lines suggested by Carter, J., in Rathie v. Rathie (1980), 1980 CanLII 2016 (SK QB), Sask.R. 361, 17 R.F.L. (2d) 265 (Q.B.), determining, first, the property and its value subject to distribution. This ordinarily entails compiling an inventory of the property owned by the spouses as of the time of application and establishing the net value of that property as of that time or the time of adjudication. Exceptions aside, this is the property and its value which is subject to distribution. It is the practice to go on from there to next determine whether any of that property or its value is exempt from distribution; then to determine whether any of it ought not to be distributed equally having regard for the equitable considerations mentioned in the statute; and finally to decide how the distribution should be effected. [20] That certainly is the practice followed by the Court. See for example Crowe v. Crowe, 2001 SKQB 202 (CanLII), 205 Sask. R. 241, cited by Cory’s counsel and also the recent decision of Guderyan v. Meyers, 2006 SKQB 535 (CanLII), [2006] S.J. No. 797 (QL). [21] The Family Property Act, S.S. 1997, c. F‑6.3, as amended, provides in part: 2(1) In this Act: ... “family home” means, subject to subsection (2), property: (a) that is: (i) owned by ... one or both spouses, ... (ii) ... and (b) that is or has been occupied by one or both spouses as the family home ... and that is: (c) house or part of house, including the land appurtenant to it consisting of not more than 65 hectares; ... “family property” means any real or personal property, regardless of its source, kind or nature, that, at the time an application is made pursuant to this Act, is owned, or in which an interest is held, by one or both spouses, ... ... “household goods” means personal property that is ordinarily used, acquired or enjoyed by one or both spouses for transportation, household, educational, recreational, social or aesthetic purposes, but does not include heirlooms, antiques, works of art, clothing, jewellery or other articles of personal use, necessity or ornament or any personal property acquired or used in connection with trade, business, calling, profession, occupation, hobby or investment; ... “spouse” means either of two persons who: (a) at the time an application is made pursuant to this Act, is legally married to the other or is married to the other by marriage that is voidable and has not been voided by judgment of nullity; ... (c) is cohabiting or has cohabited with the other person as spouses continuously for period of not less than two years; ... “value” means: (a) the fair market value at the time an application is made pursuant to this Act, or at the time of adjudication, whichever the court thinks fit; or (b) if fair market value cannot be determined, any value at the time an application is made pursuant to this Act, or at the time of adjudication, that the court considers reasonable. ... 20 The purpose of this Act, and in particular of this Part, is to recognize that child care, household management and financial provision are the joint and mutual responsibilities of spouses, and that inherent in the spousal relationship there is joint contribution, whether financial or otherwise, by the spouses to the assumption of these responsibilities that entitles each spouse to an equal distribution of the family property, subject to the exceptions, exemptions and equitable considerations mentioned in this Act. 21(1) On application by spouse for the distribution of family property, the court shall, subject to any exceptions, exemptions and equitable considerations mentioned in this Act, order that the family property or its value be distributed equally between the spouses. (2) Subject to section 22, where, having regard to the matters mentioned in subsection (3), the court is satisfied that it would be unfair and inequitable to make an equal distribution of family property or its value, the court may: (a) refuse to order any distribution; (b) order that all the family property or its value be vested in one spouse; or (c) make any other order that it considers fair and equitable. (3) For the purposes of subsection (2), the court shall have regard to the following: (a) any written agreement between the spouses or between one or both spouses and third party; (b) the length of time that the spouses have cohabited; (c) the duration of the period during which the spouses have lived separate and apart; (d) the date when the family property was acquired; (e) the contribution, whether financial or in some other form, made directly or indirectly by third party on behalf of spouse to the acquisition, disposition, operation, management or use of the family property; (f) any direct or indirect contribution made by one spouse to the career or career potential of the other spouse; (g) the extent to which the financial means and earning capacity of each spouse have been affected by the responsibilities and other circumstances of the spousal relationship; (h) the fact that spouse has made: (i) substantial gift of property to third party; or (ii) transfer of property to third party other than bona fide purchaser for value; (i) previous distribution of family property between the spouses by gift or agreement or pursuant to an order of any court of competent jurisdiction made before or after the coming into force of this Act or The Miscellaneous Statutes (Domestic Relations) Amendment Act, 2001 (No. 2); (j) tax liability that may be incurred by spouse as result of the transfer or sale of family property or any order made by the court; (k) the fact that spouse has dissipated family property; (l) subject to subsection 30(3), any benefit received or receivable by the surviving spouse as result of the death of his or her spouse; (m) any maintenance payments payable for the support of child; (n) interests of third parties in the family property; (o) any debts or liabilities of spouse, including debts paid during the course of the spousal relationship; (p) the value of family property situated outside Saskatchewan; (q) any other relevant fact or circumstance. 22(1) Where family home is the subject of an application for an order pursuant to subsection 21(1), the court, having regard to any tax liability, encumbrance or other debt or liability pertaining to the family home, shall distribute the family home or its value equally between the spouses, except where the court is satisfied that it would be: (a) unfair and inequitable to do so, having regard only to any extraordinary circumstance; or (b) unfair and inequitable to the spouse who has custody of the children. (2) Where clause (1)(a) or (b) applies, the court may: (a) refuse to order any distribution; (b) order that the entire family home or its value be vested in one spouse; or (c) order any distribution that the court considers fair and equitable. 23(1) Subject to subsection (4), the fair market value, at the commencement of the spousal relationship, of family property, other than family home or household goods, is exempt from distribution pursuant to this Part where that property is: (a) acquired before the commencement of the spousal relationship by spouse by gift from third party, unless it can be shown that the gift was conferred with the intention of benefitting both spouses; (b) acquired before the commencement of the spousal relationship by spouse by inheritance, unless it can be shown that the inheritance was conferred with the intention of benefitting both spouses; or (c) owned by spouse before the commencement of the spousal relationship. (2) Subject to subsection (4), property acquired as result of an exchange of property mentioned in subsection (1) is exempt from distribution pursuant to this Part to the extent of the fair market value of the original property mentioned in subsection (1) at the commencement of the spousal relationship. (3) Subject to subsection (4), family property, other than family home or household goods, is exempt from distribution pursuant to this Part where that property is: (a) an award or settlement of damages in tort in favour of spouse, unless the award or settlement is compensation for loss to both spouses; (b) money paid or payable pursuant to an insurance policy that is not paid or payable with respect to property, unless the proceeds are compensation for loss to both spouses; (c) property acquired after decree nisi of divorce, declaration of nullity of marriage or judgment of judicial separation is made with respect to the spouses or, where the spouses are spouses within the meaning of clause (c) of the definition of “spouse” in subsection 2(1), property acquired more than 24 months after cohabitation ceased; (d) property acquired as result of an exchange of property mentioned in this subsection; or (e) appreciation on or income received from and property acquired by spouse with the appreciation on or income received from property mentioned in this subsection. (4) Where the court is satisfied that to exempt property from distribution would be unfair and inequitable, the court may make any order that it considers fair and equitable with respect to the family property mentioned in this section. (5) In making an order pursuant to this section, the court shall have regard to the following: (a) any of the matters mentioned in clauses 21(3)(a) to (p); (b) contributions in any form made by the spouses to their relationship, children or property prior to the commencement of their spousal relationship; (c) contribution, whether financial or in any other form, made by spouse directly or indirectly to the acquisition, disposition, preservation, maintenance, improvement, operation, management or use of property mentioned in this section; (d) the amount of other property available for distribution; (e) any other relevant fact or circumstance. (6) All family property is presumed to be shareable unless it is established to the satisfaction of the court that it is property mentioned in this section. 40 The court may, in any proceeding pursuant to this Act, take into consideration any agreement, verbal or otherwise, between spouses that is not an interspousal contract and may give that agreement whatever weight it considers reasonable. Determining the Property Subject to Distribution and its Value [22] As set out in Benson, supra, this requires the creation of an inventory of the property owned by either of the parties as of the date of application (July 19, 2005) and establishing its value as of that time or, alternatively, as of the time of adjudication. There is dispute between the parties as to what the assets are and their values. shall now proceed to deal with the various items. (a) What constitutes the family home and its value? [23] As counsel point out, pursuant to s. 22(1)and s. 23(1) of the Act, there is no exemption with respect to the family home. Accordingly it is the entire value of the family home as of application or adjudication that is to be determined. [24] Cory’s counsel takes the position that the “family home” to be divided does not necessarily have to be the entire piece of real property, that the “family home” may include “not more than 65 hectares” (s. 2(1) definition of the Act), and accordingly, the divisible property does not have to be the full piece of property and all the adjoining land. [25] Counsel goes on to cite from Crowe, supra, at paragraph 33, as follows: .. While the matrimonial home may include up to 65 hectares of adjacent land, the focus of the special status is the interest of the spouse in the home itself and not the adjacent land. ... [26] Counsel goes on to state that an “artificial carving out” of portion of section is not desirable, and is not what was contemplated by the legislature. (Crowe, at paragraph 33). Counsel points out that according to the appraisal, only three acres are occupied yard site, including the home itself, the balance of the quarter being comprised of field, grass, bush pasture and waste slough. [27] Cory’s counsel goes on to suggest that the Court order the sale and distribution of proceeds from something less than the entirety of SE¼‑27‑52‑05‑W3rd. By way of example, counsel suggests sale and distribution of 10 acres (including the home and yard site) with the remaining 152 acres being Cory’s to do with as he determines. Cory’s counsel also suggests that if the Court orders the sale of the entirety of the 162 acres of SE¼‑27‑52‑05‑W3rd, then some percentage of the proceeds would be divided 50:50 (not exempt, “family home”, divisible), and the remaining percentage would go to Cory (exempt, not divisible). As understand his submission, he also says that if the Court orders the entirety of the SE¼‑27‑52‑05‑W3rd be sold with the proceeds distributed equally, then an amount should be deducted from Louise’s share and added to Cory’s share to recognize the debt Cory has paid since the separation. [28] The issue then becomes, what is the family home? Cory’s counsel takes the position that while the three acres of occupied yard site constitute “family home” and are thus not exempt from distribution, the balance of the acres or some part of them (up to 159 acres) are not necessarily “family home” and should not be subject to distribution. [29] do note the SE¼‑27‑52‑05‑W3rd contains 162 acres. “Family home” as defined in s. of the Act, refers to “a house or part of house, including the land appurtenant to it consisting of not more than 65 hectares”. calculate 65 hectares to equal 160.62 acres (on the basis of hectare equals 2.4710 acres) Also, on the basis of acre equals 0.4047 hectares, calculate 162 acres to equal 65.5614 hectares. Accordingly, the SE¼‑27‑52‑05‑W3rd is in excess of 65 hectares (160.62 acres) by 0.5614 hectares (1.38 acres). consider Crowe to be distinguishable on its facts. Save for 0.5614 hectares (1.38 acres) and on the basis of what is before me, consider the SE¼‑27‑52‑05‑W3rd to be the family home. The SE¼‑27‑52‑05‑W3rd is to be distributed equally between the parties. The slight overage in the size of the SE¼‑27‑52‑05‑W3rd does not bring into play s. 22(1)(a) of the Act, “unfair and inequitable to do so, having regard only to any extraordinary circumstance”. In my subsequent calculations herein, an adjustment must be first made for the portion of 0.5614 hectares 1.38 acres) that is not the family home. [30] The appraisal fixed value for the land SE¼‑27‑52‑05‑W3rd and Ptn. NE¼‑27‑52‑05‑W3rd of $61,600. The appraisal sets out the yard site as being three acres. Cory agreed the Ptn. NE¼‑27‑52‑05‑W3rd (23 acres) had an appraised value of $6,500. Accordingly take the appraised value of the remaining 159 acres of SE¼‑27‑52‑05‑W3rd to be $55,100 or $346.54 an acre. Cory must receive an adjustment for the value of the 1.38 acres in the sum of $478.23 ($346.54 1.38). [31] There is no preference in The Family Property Act as between the date of application and the date of adjudication. The Courts have indicated generally preference for using the date of application. In Metz v. Metz (1991), 1991 CanLII 7873 (SK QB), 96 Sask. R. 95 at 102 (Q.B.), Dickson J. said: [34] Neither party has said much about the date of valuation, probably because there is not much difference in value of their property on the two dates open for selection: the date action was commenced or the date of adjudication. The date usually selected by the court is the former. The respondent receives notice that day that claim is being made. It follows that the interest of the parties should crystallize then. The court will select the date of adjudication only if some unusual circumstance, like substantial changes in value caused by market forces, will create an artificial result if the date of commencement is selected. ... [32] As to the family home, the evidence that have accepted is as of the date of application. There is nothing in the evidence that would lead to conclusion that the date of adjudication is to be preferred over the date of application. [33] As to the balance of the family property, I am again taken to the date of application. [34] I fixed July 19, 2005 (application date) for the valuation of the family home. For distribution purposes I fix that value at $94,621.77 as follows:Appraised value for SE ¼ & ptn. NE ¼ $101,600.00Less value ptn. NE ¼ ( 6,500.00)Less adjustment for 1.38 acres ( 478.23)Value for distribution $ 94,621.77 (b) Ptn. NE 27‑52‑05‑W3rd [35] Cory inherited this parcel from his father prior to the commencement of the spousal relationship. Cory claims it as exempt from distribution. Louise’s counsel in his written submission advises: “In this case the Respondent is not making any claim against the ptn. NE 27‑52‑05 W3rd”. Accordingly this parcel of land is not included in the family property to be distributed. (c) Division of other property [36] The parties are in agreement that other family property be divided equally between them. However, as indicated, there is dispute as to the composition of the remaining family property and their values. [37] do not have appraisal evidence as to values. have the evidence of Cory and Louise as to what each says is the value of the various items. In some instances Louise based her values on values from persons involved with that type of item, for example, tractor dealer, or from looking in catalogues. [38] Given the limited amounts involved and the costs of appraisals, understand why evidence was not provided in such fashion. accept that. However, must keep in mind that the evidence is not independent evidence; it is the evidence of the parties. Where the value is based on third party information, that party was not produced at trial in order that the value could be tested. Cory’s valuations are basically without explanation. They are his figures. Louise offers some explanation for her valuations, that she researched in order to arrive at the values she testified to at trial, and that this resulted in values higher and lower than those set out in her property statement at the outset of proceedings. (i) Household goods left in the house [39] Cory, in his property statement entered at trial at page 12, lists as divisible family property deepfreeze, kids’ beds, dressers, table and chairs. On the basis of Cory’s cross‑examination, find that he had other items but that he owned them prior to the commencement of the spousal relationship Cory did not give details as to what all these items were and their values. [40] Louise, in her evidence, detailed the items and their values. The items left in the house with Cory total $12,780 by Louise’s valuation. reduce that sum by 25 percent and arrive at valuation of $9,585 for the items of household goods left in the house with Cory. [41] will deal with the exemption claim when have completed my determination of what the family property is and its values. (ii) Household goods taken by Louise [42] Each party testified as to items of household goods that Louise took with her when she left the family home. There is dispute between them as to certain items taken and as to values. Cory arrives at total value, as of the time of the trial, of $8,000. Louise arrives at total value, as of the date of separation (May 21,2005, two months before the application) of $855. [43] Cory valued riding Yardman lawn tractor and bagger at $2,500. From the sales invoice it is clear that the lawn tractor was purchased at the end of May 2001 for $2,199 plus tax. Cory subsequently purchased bagger for it. Cory says the price now for new lawn tractor and bagger is $2,500. The tractor would have been four years old at the time of application. It may well be “practically brand new” now, but it is still used machine. cannot understand why assumably someone would want to pay new price for used machine, no matter how good its condition. While this unit is not household goods item, it certainly calls Cory’s valuations into question. [44] Cory also valued rocking chair at $800. From the sales invoice find the rocking chair was purchased mid December 1999 for $199 plus taxes. cannot accept his valuation. [45] do not consider Cory’s listing of household goods taken by Louise to have an air of reality to it, both as to contested items and as to values. prefer Louise’s evidence. Her value totals $855. increase that sum by 25 percent and arrive at valuation of $1,068.75 for the items of household goods that Louise took with her when she left the family home. (iii) Jewellery [46] Cory places value of $7,000 on Louise’s jewellery. Cory arrives at $7,000 on the basis that he paid $5,000 for her engagement and wedding ring. He made no effort to ascertain the value of her rings or other jewellery. [47] In her property statement filed at the outset of the proceedings, Louise placed value of $3,000 on her jewellery. Louise later made enquires. She says there is no jewellery store market for used engagement and wedding rings and that it would be necessary to go on the internet or to pawn shops to see if there was any such market or to sell the rings at pawn shop. Louise places sentimental value of $500 on the rings. [48] look to Louise’s evidence to find value. However, do not think it is appropriate to proceed by simply adjusting her sentimental value by 25 percent. am of the view that as part of her research, the internet and pawn shops should have been pursued. Doing the best can, fix the value of Louise’s jewellery at $2,000. (iv) Vehicles [49] There is blue F150 ½‑ton truck that Cory had owned prior to the commencement of the spousal relationship. He inherited it from his father. Without explanation he values the truck at $1,000. Louise values the truck at $1,500. She says when they were together, they were looking at trading it off and this is what they were quoted for value. In his written submission, Louise’s counsel acknowledges that the midpoint is $1,250. On that basis value the blue F150 truck at $1,250. [50] There is also 2001 Windstar van, and Cory places value of $10,000 on it. Cory says he was once offered $15,000 for it, and that at the time of their separation, the van was selling in newspapers for $10,000 to $15,000. He made no specific enquiries as to the value of the van. [51] Louise places value of $5,000 on the van. In July 2005, she obtained this value from Tom Naber, sales manager/owner of Ford dealership. Mr. Naber inspected the van. It had 145,000 kilometres on it. He valued it at $5,000. The evidence is silent as to the basis on which he arrived at his value. In her property statement (November 1, 2005) Louise, after “guesstimates from persons” swore value of $8,500 for the van. value the Windstar van at $8,500. (v) Sawmill [52] Cory values the sawmill and gooseneck trailer at $4,000. Louise, in her property statement, valued the sawmill at $2,000. Cory and Louise say they acquired the sawmill by trading truck plus $1,000. The transaction was in the late summer of 2004. Louise says that truck had been purchased for $3,000 and so she values the sawmill at $4,000. Cory acknowledges that the disposition of the truck is shown in his 2004 income tax return. note the value is shown as $3,000. Cory’s 2004 income tax return shows that he acquired sawmill valued at $4,000. Accordingly value the sawmill at $4,000. (vi) Gooseneck trailer [53] As indicated, Cory values the sawmill and the gooseneck trailer at $4,000. He says he has the bill of sale receipt for at home. He did not produce it at trial or disclose the document prior to trial. In cross‑examination Cory said he got fair deal on the trailer purchase and that the gooseneck trailer was worth $2,500 at the time of the purchase. He based this value on looking in newspapers. Based on the condition of the deck, Cory did not think the gooseneck trailer was worth $3,500 as of trial. [54] In her 2005 property statement, Louise valued the gooseneck trailer at $2,500. Louise examined the deck’s condition prior to their separation. She examined it again in October when she took photographs of the trailer. She took the photographs to the trailer dealership and told them about the trailer including the condition of the deck. She obtained value of $3,500 (November 14, 2006). Louise says that she values the gooseneck trailer at that value as of date of separation. reduce that sum by 25 percent and value the gooseneck trailer at $2,425. (vii) MF 135 285 tractors [55] Cory owned these tractors prior to the commencement of the spousal relationship. He claims them as exempt. The tractors had been in the family since Cory was child and he got them from his father. Counsel for Louise does not include these tractors in his written submission. take it therefore that there is no contest as to them being exempt, and do not include them in family property to be distributed. (viii) 1070 Case tractor [56] Cory purchased this tractor, used, from neighbour friend in 2003 for $8,500. He was aware that there was some “blow by”problem with the engine. Cory says the tractor has engine and tire problems. It was used around the farm for hauling hay for animal bedding, and for landscaping. It was also used in the field to pull cultivator. After separation it was used around the yard to move dirt and for landscaping. Cory placed value on the tractor as of time of trial at $3,000. [57] At trial Louise placed value of $9,000 on the tractor. Just prior to trial Louise attended at Martodam Motors to obtain value for the tractor. She told the salesman the year of and the hours on the 1070 Case tractor, that there was some “blow by” and that the tires were worn. Louise showed him photographs of the tractor and of the hours on the hour meter. These photographs were entered at trial. She was given written valuation of $9,000 which was entered into evidence. Louise adopted that valuation as the value she placed on the tractor. [58] The Martodam valuation is based on the tractor having been used for 5,979 hours. Five thousand nine hundred seventy‑nine is certainly the number of hours shown on the tractor’s hour meter as is set out in the photograph shown to the salesman. In cross‑examination Cory initially said that the hour meter had between 8,000 and 9,000 hours on it and that the meter was broken. Later in cross‑examination Cory said that when he bought the tractor from his neighbour, he was told that the hour meter had been broken for long time and the neighbour figured the tractor had between 8,000 to 9,000 hours on it when Cory purchased it from him. have reviewed my notes of Cory’s evidence. am unable to determine the number of hours that Cory says would have been on the tractor either at the time of application or at trial. do accept that the meter was broken. [59] Cory’s valuation is simply that. His value is without explanation as to how he arrived at that value. note that he never had anyone value the tractor for him, and never took it to repair shop to be looked at or repaired. [60] In her November 1, 2005, property statement, Louise swore to value of $5,000 for the tractor. At trial Louise explained this lower value on the basis that she had access to Cory’s statement at the time, she looked at his numbers and tried to put her numbers close to or halfway equal to his, and that she did subsequent research, and this proved not to be the case. [61] am unable to accept either party’s value for the tractor. Under the circumstances must determine fair market value that consider to be reasonable. do note that in his written submission, Cory’s counsel acknowledges that Cory’s $3,000 value may be low and that value of $5,000 or $6,000 was appropriate. place value of $6,000 on the tractor. (ix) Riding Yardman lawn tractor [62] Cory valued riding Yardman lawn tractor and bagger at $2,500. From the sales invoice it is clear that the lawn tractor was purchased at the end of May 2001 for $2,199 plus tax. Cory subsequently purchased bagger for it. Cory says the price now for new lawn tractor and bagger is $2500. The tractor would have been four years old at the time of application. Louise says that at the date they separated she sought information from the store where the riding Yardman lawn tractor was purchased as to its value. She was given value of $500 and that is the amount she values the tractor at. have no evidence from anyone as to the original cost of the bagger or of its subsequent value. Doing the best can, determine the value of the riding Yardman lawn tractor and bagger, by increasing the Louise’s value for the tractor by 25 percent and then adding on $100 for the bagger. therefore value the riding Yardman lawn tractor and bagger at $725. (x) Ice auger [63] In cross‑examination Cory acknowledged the existence of an ice auger. He agreed it was worth around the $400 mark somewhere. Louise values it at $400. increase the value by 25 percent and value the ice auger at $500. (xi) Boat motor and trailer [64] Cory made no mention of the boat, motor and trailer in the property portion of his financial statement, nor in his evidence‑in‑chief. In cross‑examination he acknowledged the existence of this item. He had bought SeaDoo in 1997 and had traded it for the boat and motor in 2001. He later made trailer for it. Cory says the boat, motor and trailer are probably worth $2,000 to $2,500. [65] Louise, in her 2005 property statement, valued the boat and motor at $1,500. She acknowledges that this value of $1,500 was to the best of her knowledge and belief. have no evidence as to how she arrived at this value. Louise took photographs of the boat, motor and trailer in October 2006 and then obtained information from boat dealer that the approximate value of the unit was $2,500. Louise values the unit at $2,500. In light of Cory valuing the unit as of trial at $2,000 to $2,500, value the unit as of date of application at $2,250. [66] Arising from the written submission of Cory’s counsel, there is an exemption issue which will deal with later on. (xii) Cory’s income tax refund from his 2004 return and received in 2005 [67] In the spring of 2005 Cory received an income tax refund of $5,647.11. Included in this refund was the sum of $1,350 as result of Louise transferring educational credits to him. Cory’s counsel, in his written submission, says that the tax refund was used to pay down debt owed by them. The evidence is clear that subsequent to separation, Cory certainly payed debts. However, the evidence is not clear as to role, if any, that this income tax refund played in the payment of debt. On balance of probabilities, am unable to find that the income tax refund was used for or had role in the payment of debt. consider the income tax refund of $5,647.11 to be family property. (xiii) Cheque from Weyerhaeuser [68] In cross‑examination Cory acknowledged that he had delivered lumber to Weyerhaeuser and month or so later got cheque for it. Cory initially said that the delivery was prior to their separation. He then said he did not know if the delivery was before or after separation. Cory did not recall Louise being with him when he delivered this particular load. Cory was uncertain as to the amount of the cheque, but thought it was around $1,500. Cory said he declared all the lumber sales on his 2005 income tax return. When shown the $2,800 line item on his income tax return, Cory said that this must have included lumber sold in the fall. Cory then said that he did not know if the amount he got for wood was included or not, but he was sure he hauled wood after they separated. [69] Louise says Cory was selling trim blocks to Weyerhaeuser. Trim blocks are the square blocks that go in between piles of lumber. Louise says that at the end of April 2005, they hauled load of trim blocks to Weyerhaeuser using the gooseneck trailer. They were not paid for the load at the time, but they knew how much they would be paid for it as they got printout as to how much they had hauled in and the amount they would be paid. That amount was $2,800. She was there when they got the printout. Louise says she does not have the printout, but that is her recollection. [70] must determine if the payment constitutes family property. When was the load delivered, when was payment made, and what was the amount of the payment? [71] In Lisitza Estate v. Van Oirschot (2003), 2003 SKQB 162 (CanLII), 234 Sask. R. (Q.B.), varied in part but appeal otherwise dismissed (2004), 2004 SKCA 21 (CanLII), 241 Sask. R. 300 (C.A.), said: [9] must deal with the conflict in the evidence, the credibility of the witnesses. [10] As have said previously: (Purdy v. Olson, 1996 CarswellSask 164 (Q.B.), at para. 40, [1996] S.J. No. 176, Q.B. No. 960 of 1993, J.C.S.; Hill v. Hill (1990), 1990 CanLII 7548 (SK QB), 88 Sask.R. 170 (Q.B.), at 174; Hannah v. Pollard (1991), 1991 CanLII 7676 (SK QB), 91 Sask.R. 67 (Q.B.), at 70): “Hrabinsky, J., dealt with the matter of assessing credibility in Grimwood v.Grimwood (1988), 1988 CanLII 5291 (SK QB), 68 Sask.R. 179, at p. 184: ‘.. However, where there is conflict of evidence, as is the case here, the credibility of witnesses cannot be determined solely on the demeanour of the witnesses even where they testify before the presiding judge. refer to the decision of O’Halloran, J.A., in Faryna v. Chorny, 1951 CanLII 252 (BC CA), [1952] D.L.R. 354, where at pp. 356‑357 there is the following: “If trial judge’s finding of credibility is to depend solely on which person he thinks made the better appearance of sincerity in the witness box, we are left with purely arbitrary finding and justice would then depend upon the best actors in the witness box. On reflection it becomes almost axiomatic that the appearance of telling the truth is but one of the elements that enter into the credibility of the evidence of witness. Opportunities for knowledge, powers of observation, judgment and memory, ability to describe clearly what he has seen and heard, as well as other factors, combine to produce what is called credibility, and cf. Raymond v. Bosanquet (1919), 1919 CanLII 11 (SCC), 50 D.L.R. 560, at p. 566; 59 S.C.R. 452, at p. 460, 17 O.W.N. 295. witness by his manner may create very unfavourable impression of his truthfulness upon the trial judge, and yet the surrounding circumstances in the case may point decisively to the conclusion that he is actually telling the truth. am not referring to the comparatively infrequent cases in which witness is caught in clumsy lie. “The credibility of interested witnesses, particularly in cases of conflict of evidence, cannot be gauged solely by the test of whether the personal demeanour of the particular witness carried conviction of the truth. The test must reasonably subject his story to an examination of its consistency with the probabilities that surround the currently existing conditions. In short, the real test of the truth of the story of witness in such case must be its harmony with the preponderance of the probabilities which practical and informed person would readily recognize as reasonable in that place and in those conditions. Only thus can court satisfactorily appraise the testimony of quick minded, experienced and confident witnesses, and of those shrewd persons adept in the half‑lie and of long and successful experience in combining skilful exaggeration with partial suppression of the truth. Again witness may testify what he sincerely believes to be true, but he may be quite honestly mistaken. For trial judge to say ‘I believe him because judge him to be telling the truth’, is to come to conclusion on consideration of only half the problem. In truth it may easily be self‑direction of dangerous kind.”’” [72] Louise’s evidence is of specific occasion, with specific events. Cory’s evidence contains uncertainty as to date and amount. find that the delivery took place prior to separation, and that the amount owed to them was $2,800. The payment received by Cory in that amount constitutes family property. (xiv) Cory’s Weyerhaeuser pension [73] Cory started working at the Big River Lumber plant of Weyerhaeuser on January 24, 2000, and continued working there until he was laid off as of April 19, 2006, due to an indefinite plant shut down. Cory contributed to pension plan while working at the plant. He is entitled at age 65 to pension of $339.25 per month based on 5.9 years of credited service. [74] The issue is what portion of the pension is family property. Cory’s counsel submits that: (i) the portion of the pension earned from the date of marriage (August 2002) to date of separation (May 2005) should be divided equally, with 50 percent thereof being transferred to Louise; and (ii) the portion earned before the date of the marriage (August 2002) and after the date of separation (May 2005) should remain in the plan, with Cory only. Louise’s counsel submits that the pension should be divided equally between them from the date Cory commenced working for Weyerhaeuser at the Big River Lumber plant until the date the petition issued. [75] have found that the parties were living together by August 1, 1999. The definition of spouse in the Family Property Act includes: ... ... either of two persons who: ... (c) is cohabiting or has cohabited with the other person as spouses continuously for period of not less than two years; [76] And in Rimmer v. Adshead, 2004 SKQB 536 (CanLII), 259 Sask. R. 161, Dawson J., at page 171‑172, said: [20] One of the issues to be determined is the period of the pension accumulation which is subject to division. The parties commenced cohabiting in March 1984. The Courts have, in number of cases, determined that where parties have cohabited, the appropriate commencement date for calculation of the division of assets is two years from the date the parties starting living together. see no reason to differ from that reasoning in this case. The pension benefits accumulated by John prior to March 1986 are exempt property pursuant to s. 23(1)(c) of The Family Property Act. The period of the pension benefits which are divisible is from March 1986 to the date of application. [21] The other issue is whether the pension should be divided other than equally, having regard to the fact that after the parties separated in October 1996 and John continued to contribute to the pension, thereby increasing its value. ... [23] ... Likewise, although John continued to contribute to the pension after the parties separated, during that period he continued to earn an income that was substantially greater than Donna’s and no spousal support was payable. During the period post‑separation to date John held the majority of the family assets without payment to Donna. In the circumstances of this case, do not find it unfair or inequitable to divide the pension equally. ... [77] consider the above quotations to have application to the matter before me. The parties separated May 21, 2005. The date of application is July 19, 2005. Cory would have contributed to his pension during this short period. From the evidence, the exact date of the commencement of the cohabitation is unknown. have found that the parties were living together by August 1, 1999. Taking all of that into account, do not find it unfair or inequitable to divide Cory’s pension for that period in question equally. [78] Accordingly do order that Cory’s pension accumulation, based on the period from August 1, 1999, to July 19, 2005, be divided equally between Cory and Louise and that Louise’s 50% entitlement be transferred to her at source. Leave is given to either party to apply to me or to any Judge of this Court if anything further is required in that regard. (xv) Severance package [79] The evidence before me is that there is no severance package available to Cory arising from his layoff. Assuming, without deciding that such severance package is family property, leave is granted to either party, upon the granting of severance package to Cory, to bring an application before me or before any Judge of this Court to have the matter determined and, if applicable, divided. (xvi) Equipment [80] Cory says he has miscellaneous equipment, discers, etc. which he valued at $1,000. In his written submission, Cory’s counsel raises an issue of exemption. In the property portion of his financial statement, under property exempt from distribution, Cory did list equipment. Cory did not lead evidence as to the history of the equipment. Louise led no evidence with respect to this equipment. have no knowledge as to condition, age, etc. Louise’s counsel does not deal with equipment in his written submission. Accordingly consider the equipment to be exempt. (xvii) Cory’s tools [81] In the property portion of his financial statement, Cory lists table saw, router table, deepfreeze, kids’ beds, dressers, table and chairs, and places value of $1,500 for all of them as of trial. Cory provided no explanation for his values. Cory’s counsel, in his written submission, says value of $1,500 should be used for the table saw and router table. [82] Louise values the table saw at $1,200, and the router table (router and router mount) at $300. Louise also prepared listing of Cory’s other tools that she says he had and values them at $2,000. Louise says she looked through tool catalogues to arrive at her cash values as of date of separation. As of the date of application, value the table saw at $1,200 and the router table at $300. reduce the other tools value by 25 percent and value the other tools at $1,500. (xviii) Cows and calves [83] must first determine if all of the cattle in question belonged to Cory and Louise. find as fact that four of the cattle bore the brand of Louise’s parents, and that these cattle were not given to Cory and Louise as gift. These cattle were placed with Cory and Louise as breeding stalk, and they were entitled to all offspring. [84] Cory valued all the cattle at $9,500. Reducing this total for these four cattle (two heifers at $1,600 and two cows at $1,000), Cory’s valuation is $6,900 for the remaining cattle. [85] Louise took all the cattle with her upon separation. Louise values the remaining cattle at $4,435 as of the date of separation. She attended at Heartland Livestock Services and told them about the cattle and obtained valuation in that sum from them. [86] am not prepared to fully accept either valuation. Cory has been involved with cattle all his life. He last sold cattle in 2004. He was not familiar with exact cattle prices in May 2005. Louise’s valuation is based on the value she obtained from Heartland. That value, in turn, is based on what Louise told them. do note and accept Louise’s evidence that May 2005 market values were bad due to BSE (mad cow disease). As of the date of application, value the cattle that belonged to Cory and Louise at the midpoint of their values, namely, $5,667.50. (xix) Louise’s horse [87] Louise had horse which she had owned prior to the commencement of the spousal relationship. Cory acknowledges that it is exempt. Accordingly it is not included in the family property. (xx) Chickens and turkeys [88] Chickens and turkeys were purchased from hatchery on April 12, 2005, for $180.67. They were not purchased for resale but were to be butchered at later time for family consumption. [89] Louise took the chickens and turkeys with her upon separation. They were then about six weeks old. Cory, in the property portion of his financial statement, lists the chickens and turkeys and values them at $1,500. The chickens and turkeys are family property. value them as of the date of application at $180.67. Determination of family property (excluding agreed exemptions) Cory Louise has/had has/had Family home (SE 27‑52‑05‑W3rd) 94,621.77 Household goods left in house 9,585.00 Household goods taken by Louise 1,068.75 Jewellery 2,000.00 Blue F150 ton truck 1,500.00 Windstar van 8,500.00 Sawmill 4,000.00 Gooseneck trailer 2,425.00 1070 Case tractor 6,000.00 Riding Yardman lawn tractor 725.00 Ice auger 500.00 Boat, motor trailer 2,250.00 Income tax refund 5,647.11 Weyerhaeuser cheque 2,800.00 Table saw 1,200.00 Router table 300.00 Other tools 1,500.00 Cattle 5,667.50 Chickens turkeys 180.67 $132,328.88 18,141.92 Total $150,470.80 *# (* plus Cory’s pension for the period from Aug 1, 1999 to July 19, 2005) (# leave granted to apply re Cory’s severance package if one comes into being) Determination of opposed exemptions [90] In Gaetz v. Gaetz (1996), 1996 CanLII 5033 (SK CA), 144 Sask. R. 268 (C.A.), the Court of Appeal considered s. 23(1)(c) of The Matrimonial Property Act, S.S. 1979, c. M‑6.1, repealed, and the definition of “household goods” in that Act. The Court held that: (i) as to household goods previously acquired, absent s. 40 agreement, there was no exemption; (ii) vehicles used for transportation came within the definition of household goods and even if previously acquired there was no exemption; (iii) boat, motor and trailer used for recreation came within the definition of household goods and even if the boat, motor and trailer had been obtained as result of trade of boat, motor and trailer previously acquired, there was no exemption. [91] look to the evidence. There is no s. 40 agreement. There is nothing in the evidence before me to suggest that the truck was not used for transportation or that its predominant use was for another purpose. There is nothing in the evidence to suggest that the boat, motor and trailer were not used for recreation or that the predominant use was for another purpose. Cory is the one raising the exemption claims. It is incumbent on him to lead evidence to support his claims. He has not done so. [92] None of the claims for exemption as to the (i) household goods left in the house; (ii) blue F150 ½‑ton truck; or (iii) boat motor and trailer, are made out. The family property remains as have set it out previously. Equitable considerations [93] Cory raises two issues: (a) whether he should be given credit for debt payments in the sum of $19,887.46 that he has made since separation; and (b) what is to be done with the outstanding debt, with Cory suggesting that portions of that debt be assigned to Louise. (a) Whether he should be given credit for debt payments in the sum of $19,887.46 that he has made since separation. [94] firstly look to the $19,887.46 sought to be credited. [95] am not, on balance of probabilities, satisfied that the following have been proven: (a) CIBC overdraft of $1,000; and (b) Debden C.U. of $500. [96] The $300 insurance bill for the van is not creditable item. Cory was uncertain what this debt was. Louise wanted Cory to transfer the van to her but he refused to do so for considerable period of time. Cory paid the insurance on the van while it was in his name. The insurance is an ongoing expense item. Further, Cory cannot claim credit for the insurance when he was refusing to transfer the van. [97] The applicable portion of the account at Debden Farm Sales (to May 21, 2005) totals $4,835.80, not $6,000.00 as claimed by Cory and not $4,868.80 as claimed by Louise. [98] consider property taxes ($1,000) and insurance on home and real property ($1,500) to be ongoing expenses and not pre‑existing debt. [99] find that Cory made the following debt payments: CIBC consolidated loan re vehicles 6,357.46 Debden Credit Union 3,230.00 Debden Farm Sales 4,835.80 Total $14,423.26 [100] In Guderyan v. Meyers, supra, Ryan‑Froslie J., commencing at paragraph 32, said: [32] Section 20 of The Family Property Act describes the purpose of the Act which is to distribute family property equally between spouses, subject to the exceptions, exemptions and equitable considerations mentioned in the Act. One of those equitable considerations is debts (s. 21(3)(o)). [33] Justice Jackson of the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal in Russell v. Russell, [(1999), 1999 CanLII 12313 (SK CA), 180 Sask. R. 196 (C.A.)], at paras. 109 to 110, discussed how debts should be dealt with in the division of family property as follows: [109] The phrase “matrimonial debt” does not appear in The Matrimonial Property Act. The only mention of debts in that Act is as factor in making an unequal distribution. Subsection 22(1) of the Act directs the court to have regard to debts or liabilities “pertaining to the matrimonial home,” but debts which do not pertain to the matrimonial home are only factor in making an unequal distribution under s. 21. If the Court is satisfied, having regard for number of factors enumerated in s. 21(2), that it would be unfair and inequitable to make an equal distribution, it may make any order pursuant to s. 21(2)(t) that it considers fair and equitable. The factors which the Court can consider include the following: 21(2) Subject to section 22, where, having regard to: (a) any written agreement between the spouses or between one or both spouses and third party; ... (e) the contribution, whether financial or in some other form, made directly or indirectly by third party on behalf of spouse to the acquisition, disposition, operation, management or use of the matrimonial property; ... (n) interests of third parties in the matrimonial property; (o) any debts or liabilities of spouse, including debts paid during the course of the marriage; ... (q) any other relevant fact or circumstance. Debts could be taken into account under any of the above clauses, but are specifically referred to in s. 21(2)(o). It should be noted that this clause does not mandate that “debts or liabilities” must be divided equally. [110] Like many other considerations under The Matrimonial Property Act, adjusting matrimonial property division for debts incurred during the marriage is matter left solely to the discretion of the trial judge. Obviously, that discretion must be exercised in fair and just fashion. There are, however, few additional constraints. [34] In applying s. 21, the court may make any order “.... it considers fair and equitable ...” in the circumstances. [101] am of the view that no credit should be given to Cory for the payments as have determined them to be, for the following reasons: (a) Cory has had possession of and has lived in the home on SE¼‑27‑52‑05‑W3rd since the date of separation and has paid no occupation rent; (b) Cory has had possession of the bulk of the remainder of the family property since the date of the separation; and (c) Cory has refused to pay and continues to refuse to pay spousal or child support absent court order. (b) What is to be done with the outstanding debt, with Cory suggesting that portions of that debt be assigned to Louise? [102] Louise’s counsel, in his written submission, acknowledges, that in order to obtain fairness the outstanding debt should be taken into account. [103] The outstanding debt is as follows: CIBC consolidated loan re vehicles $10,901.55 Debden Credit Union 2,831.31 Total $13,732.86 [104] The CIBC loan is consolidation of two vehicle loans loan on the Windstar van that Louise has and loan on Ford F250 truck. Cory sold the F250 truck not long after separation with the proceeds going to the consolidated loan. have no evidence as to how much of the $10,901.55 owing to CIBC can be attributed to the Windstar. [105] The matter is best dealt with by an order that Cory shall assume and pay the outstanding debts totalling $13,732.86, being $10,901.55 to the CIBC and $2,831.31 to the Debden Credit Union, and he shall indemnify and save harmless Louise from any liability pertaining thereto. so order. Cory is to be credited with such sum by reducing the value of the family property attributed to him by $13,732.86 as follows: Value of family property attributed to Cory $132,328.88 Less outstanding debt to be paid by Cory 13,732.86 Adjusted value of family property attributed to Cory $118,596.02 Total adjusted value of family property attributed to Cory and Louise: Adjusted value of family property attributed to Cory $118,596.02 Value of family property attributed to Louise 18,141.92 Total adjusted value of family property attributed to Cory and Louise $136,737.94 Equalization payment [106] Each party is entitled to one half of $136,737.94, that is to say, $68,368.97. The amount of family property attributed to Louise is $18,141.92. Accordingly, Louise is to receive from Cory an equalization payment of $50,227.00 ($50,227.05 rounded). [107] Section 26 of The Family Property Act provides for effecting distribution pursuant to Part IV of the Act. am of the view that the appropriate order at this time is that the Cory pay to the Louise the sum of $50,227.00, with interest thereon at the rate of percent per annum, within 90 days of the date of this judgment. In the event that such payment is not made, leave is given to the Louise to bring an application before me or any Judge of this Court for further order directed to ensuring receipt by Louise of the sum of $50,227.00, together with interest as above. [108] To secure the monies so owing to Louise by Cory, Louise is now to register charge against the following land Surface Parcel #133153488, Reference Land Description: SE Sec 27 Twp 52 Rge 05 W3 Extension 0, as described on Certificate of Title 97PA08553. Upon payment of those monies to Louise, the charge created by this judgment is to be removed from the said land. [109] Additionally, and by way of equalization: (a) Louise is to receive one half of Cory’s pension for the period from August 1, 1999, to July 19, 2005, and that entitlement is now to be transferred to her at source; and (b) Leave is granted to either party to apply with respect to Cory’s severance package if one comes into being. [110] There shall be no order as to costs as the results of this action are mixed.
This judgment dealt with divorce and division of family property. At issue was the value of the matrimonial home and the balance of family property. HELD: Decree of divorce issued. Valuations of the family home and property were made, and exemptions and equitable considerations were addressed. Equalization payments were prescribed. As the results of the action were mixed, no costs were ordered.