J. Q.B. A.D. 1994 No. 2980 J.C.S. IN THE COURT OF QUEEN'S BENCH JUDICIAL CENTRE OF SASKATOON BETWEEN: RICHARD ALLEN KLASSEN and HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN RESPONDENT Richard Klassen for himself W. Holmes for the Crown FIAT BAYNTON J. September 30, 1994 The accused applicant applies for a review of theterms of his judicial interim release. Although he has referred to his Charter rights in his application, he acknowledges that the required notice has not been given and that he is not seeking Charter remedy. He declined an adjournment to enable him to bring Charter application and with the co-operation of the Crown, copies of the record were produced and filed with the court to enable the accused's review hearing under s. 520 of the Code to proceed. The accused is charged with four counts of defamatory libel under ss. 300 and 301 of the Code. He and his counsel consented to judicial interim release order containing certain terms. The term objected to by the accused is that he "refrain from picketing of any kind or carrying placards of any kind". He seeks an amendment by adding thephrase "regarding Sgt. Brian Dueck or Carol Bunko-Ruys". These two individuals are the complainants named in the four charges. The charges arose as result of picketing by the accused while carrying placard exhibiting words that allegedly constitute defamatory libel. Presumably the picketing prohibition term of the accused's release from custody was considered necessary by the justice who made the order to address the issue of the substantial likelihood that the accused would commit criminal offence if he were not prohibited from picketing prior to his trial. In his submission, the accused indicated that he wants to be permitted to continue to picket or carry placards pending his trial. He stated that if the desiredamendment is made he will restrict his picketing to lawfulactivity. Yet he maintains that the picketing he did, which resulted in the charges on which he now has been released pending trial, was lawful. I am satisfied in the circumstances and nature ofthis case, that the picketing prohibition term imposed by thejustice with the consent of the accused, was reasonablyjustified as a condition of the release of the accused fromcustody. But for this condition the justice might well have ordered that the accused be detained in custody on the ground that there was substantial likelihood that the accused would commit criminal offence pending his trial. I am also satisfied that if the amendment isgranted as sought by the accused, there still remains asubstantial likelihood he will commit a criminal offence or aninterference with the administration of justice. have come to this conclusion on consideration of the nature of the offences with which the accused has been charged, on the circumstances surrounding the alleged commission of the offences, on the accused's stated intention to continue picketing, and on his view of what is lawful activity. Theapplication is denied and the existing order stands.
FIAT The accused was charged with four counts of defamatory libel. The alleged defamatory words were on a placard he exhibited while picketing in a public place. He was released from custody on his consent to a term that prohibited him from picketing or carrying placards pending his trial. He later applied for a review of the order and sought an amendment permitting him to picket lawfully. HELD: Application dismissed. Amendment refused. If the accused was permitted to picket there was a substantial likelihood that he would commit another offence while on bail pending his trial on the four existing charges. The justice granting the judicial interim release order was therefore correct to impose a complete prohibition on picketing.