THE COURT OF APPEAL FOR SASKATCHEWAN Citation: 2009 SKCA 133 Date: 20091125 Between: Docket: 1662 Lori Ann Olszewski (Willick) Appellant (Petitioner) and Bryan Douglas Albert Willick Respondent (Respondent) Coram: Lane, Smith and Ottenbreit JJ.A. Counsel: James J. Vogel and Joanne C. Moser for the Appellant Gregory G. Walen, Q.C. and Deidre L. Aldcorn for the Respondent Appeal: From: 2008 SKQB 296 (CanLII) Heard: September 15, 2009 Disposition: Appeal Allowed Written Reasons: November 25, 2009 By: The Honourable Mr. Justice Ottenbreit In Concurrence: The Honourable Mr. Justice Lane The Honourable Madam Justice Smith Ottenbreit J.A. I. Introduction [1] Lori Ann Olszewski (Willick) (the mother) in January 2007 applied to vary an order for maintenance dated January 9, 1992, for her daughters Nicole and Kirsti (the daughters). She also applied for determination that Bryan Willick (the father) was in arrears of maintenance and that he provide to her years of retroactive child support. [2] This appeal is about: (i) whether Nicole and Kirsti, who were over the age of 18, had withdrawn from the father’s charge and were no longer children of the marriage within the meaning of the Divorce Act[1] (the “Act”) and therefore disentitled to maintenance after September 2006 when they attended post-secondary education; and (ii) whether the maintenance the father paid in the past for them was sufficient and appropriate. [3] For the following reasons we have concluded that the learned trial judge made no palpable and overriding error in his finding that the father was not in arrears of maintenance and that there would be no order for retroactive child support. Nevertheless, we have also concluded that he was in error in determining that Nicole and Kirsti were no longer children of the marriage within the meaning of the Act. [4] The parties married on August 25, 1979, separated in March of 1989, and divorced in November of 1989. At the time of the separation Nicole was years old and Kirsti mere months old. At the date of trial Nicole and Kirsti were nearly 23 and 20 respectively. The father was an airline pilot and subsequently moved to Hong Kong where he resided with his new wife while the daughters were growing up. The daughters lived with and were raised by the mother in Saskatchewan. Pursuant to an inter-spousal agreement dated July 29, 1989, the mother had sole custody of them. The agreement provided that the father was to get generous access on reasonable notice, the father was to pay the mother child support in the amount of $450 per month for each child and among other provisions, the father would maintain scholarship fund for the daughters’ education until they were 18. The father cashed in any RESPs when he left Canada and no further scholarship fund was established by him for either of the daughters thereafter. [5] On January 9, 1992, Carter J. made an order varying the child support from $450 per month to $850 per month per child. Her decision was appealed and eventually confirmed by the Supreme Court of Canada. The mother filed the order with the Saskatchewan Maintenance Enforcement Office (“Sask. MEO”). [6] In 1997 the father, who was still living in Hong Kong, became aware of the Federal Child Support Guidelines[2] (“the Guidelines”) through his lawyer who had received request from the mother’s lawyer to look into variation of child support. After reading the Guidelines the father was co-operative and in letter dated November 10, 1997, he sent the mother his salary statement and calculated what he owed pursuant to the Guidelines based on his salary in Hong Kong dollars divided by the then exchange rate. That amount was $3,133.63 per month. He provided post-dated cheques for this amount in Hong Kong dollars to the Hong Kong District Court. [7] In December of 1997 the father’s then counsel wrote to the mother’s counsel indicating that he would advise his client that the existing order of 1992 would remain in effect until varied and requested the mother’s counsel prepare short written agreement between the parties to reflect the new maintenance payments. [8] After request by the mother for s. expenses, the father indicated in February 1998 that he would pay an additional $510.00 per month and increased the child support to $3,644.00 per month for the next 12 months. He told the mother at that time that he would get his lawyer to write up new child support agreement to that effect. Between December of 1997 and June of 1998 letters between their respective counsel regarding who would do the work to draft the agreement went back and forth, but no written maintenance agreement was ever formalized. [9] Each year between 1998 and 2006, after receiving salary statement from his employer, the father would calculate the monthly amount of child support payable pursuant to the Guidelines by converting his income from Hong Kong dollars to Canadian dollars and then using the Guidelines to calculate the amount of child support payable in Canadian dollars, which would then be converted back to Hong Kong dollars at the same rate of exchange. He then provided the Hong Kong District Court 12 post-dated cheques in Hong Kong dollars pursuant to his calculations and the Court would convert the cheques into Canadian dollars and forward that amount to the Sask. MEO. The father maintained approximately the same level of payment in Hong Kong dollars as he had calculated in February 1997, based on his income at that time, over number of years despite incurring series of salary decreases between 1999 and 2003. The exchange rate between the Canadian currency and the Hong Kong currency fluctuated and thus the mother rarely, if ever, received the amount of $3,644.00 Canadian between January 1, 1998 and September 1, 2006. The mother received payments in excess of $3,644.00 for every month except one from January 1998 until February of 2003 and thereafter received monthly amounts of less than $3,644.00. [10] In 2003 the Sask. MEO told the father that he was obligated to pay maintenance in the amount of $3,644.00 per month. The Hong Kong District Court told the Sask. MEO that there was no order or agreement for fixed amount of child support of $3,644.00 per month. The Sask. MEO acknowledged in 2005 that there was no such agreement taken out in 1998 and that it would continue to collect pursuant to the 1992 order of Carter J. In 2006 the Sask. MEO again attempted to enforce payment in the amount of $3,644.00 month. [11] The mother made no applications for variation of the 1992 order and throughout the late 1990s and up to August 2006, accepted and received the fluctuating payments made by the father based on his calculation in Hong Kong dollars. The father discontinued child support in September of 2006. [12] According to the Sask. MEO, assuming constant obligation of $3,644.00 per month, the father was in arrears in the amount of $26,730.54 to the end of August 2006. [13] Nicole went directly from high school to university and attended the University of Regina for 2003, 2004 and 2005. The father paid her complete tuition, books and ancillary expenses of post-secondary education up to the summer of 2006 and her books for the 2006 fall semester. Nicole continued her studies in the fall of 2006 and graduated with Bachelor of Fine Arts degree in December 2007. She was employed thereafter. Kirsti attended the University of Regina in Pre-Police Studies in September of 2006. She continued her university studies until December 2007 at which time she quit and was accepted into SIAST in two-year Resource and Environmental Law diploma program beginning in the fall of 2008. During her 1½ years in Pre-Police Studies, Kirsti failed three classes and abandoned one out of total of 12 she took. [14] The father had kept in contact with the daughters throughout the years. Initially, the father travelled to either Saskatoon or Regina to visit the daughters. The father estimated that he visited the daughters in Regina 10 times after they moved there in 1998/1999. During the visits in Saskatoon and Regina the father attended their dance practices and softball and basketball games as well as other functions in which the daughters participated. He would over the years meet with them couple of times year. He would send them birthday cards and give them presents. He invited them to travel with him. Christmas presents were usually given to the daughters at New Years when they would typically celebrate Christmas with the father at the cottage of his parents. Over the years the daughters continued to have consistent and ongoing relationship with the father’s family, primarily his parents and members of his extended family. [15] The father would call the daughters on almost monthly basis until September of 2006. The father also e-mailed the daughters regularly after e-mail became popular. The father complained that after 2003, his relationship with his daughters changed and became progressively more of financial relationship. Once Nicole went to university the father had difficulties obtaining any information from Nicole as to what and how she was doing at university. In January of 2006 the father, in response to one of Nicole’s demands for money, asked to see her academic records and briefly obtained access to them. [16] Nicole, on her own behalf and Kirsti’s behalf, e-mailed the father on September 4, 2006, asking for tuition and book payments for the fall semester of 2006. The father replied on September requesting that Nicole provide him access to her school records and schedule and talk to him about her educational plans. He also indicated that he was prepared to pay for the school expenses. He asked Kirsti to discuss her educational plans with him as well. He received no reply to these requests. Despite this the father paid for school books for the daughters for the 2006 fall semester but nothing more. By November 1, 2006, the daughters’ stepfather and mother had paid for their 2006 fall tuition and continued to pay for Nicole’s and Kirsti’s post-secondary education expenses thereafter. [17] After September 2006 there was no contact between Kirsti and the father and only minimal contact between the father and Nicole. The father testified that his daughters were not providing him any information in the fall of 2006 about their post-secondary educational requirements and as result of this and the fact that litigation commenced in January 2007, there was no further communication with them. Nicole tried to phone her father at Christmas 2006 but found his number disconnected. Nicole testified that in the summer of 2007 she attempted to communicate with her father who was then living in Calgary by asking him to meet her in Banff. He did not do so despite the fact that she was working there for six weeks. She indicated that she “hadn’t been great at trying to get hold of him in the last little bit”. Kirsti made no attempt to contact her father. III. Decision of the Trial Judge [18] The learned trial judge determined that there was no agreement that the father would pay fixed amount of child support in the sum of $3,644.00, but that the father’s payments pursuant to the Guidelines fluctuated because of the exchange rate and his salary. He held that the mother failed to provide to the father any evidence of s. expenses after the father ceased paying these expenses and that the arrears of $26,730.54 calculated by the Sask. MEO could only be for s. expenses. He determined that the mother took no steps to collect or account for those expenses and as result it would be inequitable to require the father to pay them. He therefore found no arrears of maintenance existed for the period prior to September 2006 and did not order retroactive maintenance to that date. [19] The trial judge then reviewed the relevant provisions of the Act and the Guidelines and determined that in September of 2006 both daughters were over 18, that they were no longer presumptively entitled to receive child support and that the burden of proving that they were entitled to support lay on the mother. He then applied the factors set out in Zaba v. Bradley[3] and Farden v. Farden[4] relevant to determining if the daughters were “children of the marriage”. [20] The trial judge found that the terms of the parties’ inter-spousal agreement indicated both parents intended the two daughters to enter into post-secondary education some time in the future. He found that neither of the daughters carried full credit load in any semester. He determined that Kirsti never applied for student loan or other financial assistance and questioned whether Nicole had applied. He observed that Nicole switched programs without informing her father. He determined that Kirsti did not advise her father she was going to attend university in the fall of 2006 and did not inform her father at all what her educational intentions were. He found Kirsti’s academic performance was poor. He concluded both daughters obtained part-time employment over the years earning substantial amounts of money and was not satisfied that the daughters did not have the ability to contribute to their own support. [21] The trial judge then did considerable analysis on the last Farden factor, i.e., whether Nicole and Kirsti unilaterally terminated their relationship with their father. He found that from the time of separation the father had desire to maintain relationship with the daughters and not merely be supplier of money. He found that the father would telephone the daughters every month to six weeks and send them e-mails and that he always initiated conversations with the daughters. Although the daughters claimed that they did not have an address or phone number to contact the father or send birthday cards, the trial judge did not accept their evidence. The trial judge found that there was no reciprocity from the two daughters and that it was basically one-way relationship unless the daughters wanted something from their father. He found that there was no substantial contact from Kirsti or Nicole after September of 2006. He determined that despite the efforts made by the father the daughters did not wish to maintain meaningful relationship with the father and that the only relationship they wanted was monetary one. He concluded that the daughters were not entitled to treat him in disdainful manner and yet continue to reach into his wallet. At para. 53 of the judgment, the trial judge stated: In this regard, it has been held that: father-child relationship is more than simple economic dependency. The father is burdened with heavy financial responsibilities and the child has very few duties in return. It was reasonable to demand that child who expected to receive support continue some type of relationship with her father in the absence of any conduct by the father which might justify the child’s neglect of filial duties. See: Fernquist v. Garland 2005 SKQB 519 (CanLII), 2005 CarswellSask 821; 22 R.F.L. (6th) 371 where Klebuc J. quoted from Law v. Law (1986), R.F.L. (3d) 458, 1986 CarswellOnt 284 (Ont. H.C.) [23] After considering the issue of unilateral termination and the other relevant Farden factors he found that the daughters were no longer children of the marriage after September of 2006. Although not expressly stated by the trial judge it can be inferred that he concluded that the daughters had unilaterally withdrawn from the relationship with their father. It is clear that among all the other Farden factors canvassed by the trial judge this conclusion was the determining factor and he held that the daughters were no longer entitled to maintenance. Issues [24] The issues in this appeal can be reduced to the following: 1. Was there an agreement in 1997 to pay specified or other maintenance? 2. Was the father in arrears of maintenance payments and is retroactive maintenance payable to September 2006? 3. Were the daughters “children of the marriage” within the meaning of the Divorce Act after September 2006? V. Analysis A. Standard of Review [25] The standard of review in cases concerning maintenance was set out in Hickey v. Hickey[5] as follows: 11 Our Court has often emphasized the rule that appeal courts should not overturn support orders unless the reasons disclose an error in principle, significant misapprehension of the evidence, or unless the award is clearly wrong. These principles were stated by Morden J.A. of the Ontario Court of Appeal in Harrington v. Harrington (1981), 1981 CanLII 1762 (ON CA), 33 O.R. (2d) 150, at p. 154, and approved by the majority of this Court in Pelech v. Pelech, 1987 CanLII 57 (SCC), [1987] S.C.R. 801, per Wilson J.; in Moge v. Moge, 1992 CanLII 25 (SCC), [1992] S.C.R. 813, per L’Heureux-Dubé J.; and in Willick v. Willick, 1994 CanLII 28 (SCC), [1994] S.C.R. 670, at p. 691, per Sopinka J., and at pp. 743-44, per L’Heureux-Dubé J. Because the determination of support involves the trial judge in the exercise of judicial discretion regarding significant factual issues, such determination attracts high level of deference. B. Was there an agreement in 1997 to pay specified or other maintenance? [26] The trial judge found that there was no agreement that the father would pay fixed amount of child support in the sum of $3,644.00. We agree with the trial judge’s analysis of this issue and his conclusion for the reasons that he gave. It is supported by the evidence. We cannot say there is any error in principle or significant misapprehension of the evidence with respect to this issue or that this finding is clearly wrong. C. Was the father in arrears of maintenance payments and is retroactive maintenance payable to September 2006? [27] The trial judge found that it would not be just and equitable to require the father to pay the $26,730.54. We agree with the trial judge’s analysis of this issue and his conclusion for the reasons he gave. It is supported by the evidence. We cannot say that there is any error in principle or significant misapprehension of the evidence with respect to the issue, nor is the finding clearly wrong. D. Were Nicole and Kirsti “children of the marriage” within the meaning of the Divorce Act? [28] Whether any child over the age of majority is still “child of the marriage” for the purpose of the Act is governed by s. 2(1)(b). It reads as follows: (1) In this Act, “child of the marriage” means child of two spouses or former spouses who, at the material time, (b) is the age of majority or over and under their charge but unable, by reason of illness, disability or other cause, to withdraw from their charge or to obtain the necessaries of life; [29] The issue of post-secondary education and its effect on child’s status was addressed in Jackson v. Jackson[6] by Ritchie J. as follows: Many of the conflicting decisions on this question in various provincial Courts are referred to in the reasons for judgment of Ruttan J., which are now reported in 1971 CanLII 987 (BC SC), [1971] W.W.R. 374, but for the purposes of this appeal adopt the reasoning expressed by my brother Laskin when, sitting as judge of the Court of Appeal of Ontario in Tapson v. Tapson [1969 CanLII 541 (ON CA), [1970] O.R. 521, D.L.R. (3d) 727.], he said: It was strenuously argued by counsel for the father that the relevant words of s. 2(b) of the Divorce Act must be given an ejusdem generis construction… do not think that the Divorce Act should be given, in any of its provisions, constricted construction. hold that child is unable, for cause within the terms of the Divorce Act, to provide for herself or to withdraw herself from the charge of parent if that child is in regular attendance, as in this case, in secondary school, pursuing an education in the ordinary course designed to fit her for years of life ahead. Ritchie J. also indicated that where to draw the line on this issue is left to the discretion of the trial judge in the particular circumstances of the case subject to appeal. This issue simply put is ultimately whether child is still dependent and to what extent. This requires the inquiry set out in Zaba and Farden and the factors outlined therein including unilateral termination of the relationship. [30] The case law indicates that the threshold is high for finding that child’s termination of the relationship with the parent is determinative of the child’s status and entitlement to maintenance. [31] In Hamel v. Hamel[7] the father sought to terminate child support for his 20-year-old daughter on the basis that she had terminated the relationship with him. In that case the father’s efforts to contact the daughter were no greater than those of the daughter to contact the father. This Court found the daughter was still entitled to support. The Court stated: [17] The father asserts that Christine unilaterally terminated the relationship, but it must be remembered that Mr. Hamel was absent from the country for six months, having not informed his family that he was going to be absent. Upon his return, he did not contact the daughter and when asked to contribute to her support he advised the daughter to contact him. This she did on one occasion, but when they were unable to fix time neither she nor he made any further efforts. It would have been premature to make an order that she had unilaterally withdrawn from his charge, even assuming that is the applicable law in case such as this. [18] In light of the case law, the evidence does not demonstrate that she unilaterally withdrew from her father. Indeed, the father’s efforts to contact the daughter have been no greater than those of the child. [32] In Saunders v. Saunders[8] this Court dismissed the argument that 20-year-old university student was not child under parental charge. In that case the father had no communication with his child for approximately five years and educational decisions were made without consulting him. [33] In Rebenchuk v. Rebenchuk[9] Scott C.J.M. observed at para. [56] Termination of the parent/child relationship is particularly difficult issue. In my view, selfish or ungrateful children who reject the non-custodial parent without justification should not expect to be supported through their years of higher education. But this factor rarely stands alone as the sole ground for denying support unless the situation is “extremely grave” (Pepin v. Jung, [2003] O.T.C. 401 (Sup. Ct.); 2003 CanLII 2048 (ON SC), [2003] O.J. No. 1779 (S.C.J.)). [34] Counsel for the mother argued that in order for rejection of parent alone to be determinative factor, the circumstances must be unilateral, unjustifiable and extremely grave. Whether all of these factors need to be present in order for withdrawal to be determining factor is not necessary to decide in this case. We agree however that unilateral withdrawal rarely stands alone as factor disentitling an adult child to maintenance and that the threshold for such finding is high. [35] As an initial observation, what is clear from all the evidence in this case is that the father and the daughters did not have conventional father-daughter relationship. This is because the father separated from the mother and daughters early on and he could at best have only long-distance relationship since he lived in Hong Kong. Over the years as the daughters were growing up, the father and daughters continued to have contact with one another by phone, e-mails and in person right up to September of 2006. The trial judge found that from the time of separation the father had desire to maintain relationship with the daughters. On the evidence as whole the father and daughters through the years had reached kind of equilibrium although it was devoid of many of the usual filial elements. [36] There was, prior to 2003, what can be described as consistent relationship between father and daughters if not an overly filial relationship. It had deteriorated by September 2006. It is clear from the e-mails between the father and the daughters tendered to the Court that the father was expecting respect, acknowledgment of his efforts and information about their lives from the daughters. In the three years prior to 2006 the daughters in their responses to the father, did little to fulfil this expectation and contacted him primarily for money. The trial judge found that they treated him with disdain; supportable conclusion based on all the evidence. [37] Despite the lack of filial respect the father doggedly continued to foster the relationship with his daughters. It is understandable that he would by September of 2006, after receiving little information about Nicole’s academic performance, nothing about Kirsti’s academic intentions and hurried request for money for school, have very high level of exasperation. The father’s last e-mail of September 6, 2006, did not indicate that he was refusing to pay the daughters’ tuition, but rather that he would like information and once he got that he was prepared to pay tuition. The request for career paths and information was reasonable parental request. [38] It is clear from the evidence that the lack of communication after September of 2006 between father and daughters was mutual with each stonewalling the other except for few abortive attempts by Nicole in 2007 to reconnect with her father. However, this does not necessarily mean that the daughters had withdrawn from the relationship with the father unilaterally. The father could have stayed in contact with the daughters despite the litigation and their failure to provide him with academic records and otherwise communicate about their education. The father did not reciprocate Nicole’s attempt at reconnection. As in Hamel, the father’s efforts to contact the daughters were no greater than the daughters’ to contact him. [39] The father considered that he had an obligation to support the daughters post-secondary education right up to September 2006 and despite their disdain he recognized financial dependency if not an emotional one. The father even as late as September 2006 acknowledged in his last e-mail that he was still prepared to pay for their university education. That recognition is consistent with the recognition in Jackson that child who attends post-secondary education to fit themselves for the future may not be able to withdraw the parents’ charge. The financial dependency of the daughters did not suddenly end because of the lack of communication. [40] However, it is understandable why the daughters provided the father no further information on their studies after September 2006. Their mother had intervened by paying for their university. If getting their education paid was motivation for the daughters’ communication with the father in the past, the mother’s intervention certainly removed that motivation. To Nicole’s credit she nevertheless made an attempt thereafter to reconnect without asking for money. [41] With respect, the learned trial judge placed too much emphasis on the daughters’ poor treatment and disdain of the father. His finding that the daughters did not wish to maintain a meaningful relationship with the father misapprehends the evidence respecting the historical and ongoing nature of their relationship. The fact that the emphasis of the relationship after 2003 shifted, does not imply that they had no meaningful relationship in their own way. The quality of the parent/child relationship by itself rarely determines the matter. The proper conclusion to be drawn from all the evidence of the relationship before September 2006 and the relative silence after September 2006 is that father and daughters were fighting and this mutual fight was prolonged and sustained by the litigation and the intervention of the mother. However, all of this does not mean that they had withdrawn from the relationship with him unilaterally. Even if the circumstances as a whole are construed as a unilateral withdrawal by the daughters, the high threshold for a finding that it disentitles the daughters to maintenance has not been met. [42] In our view the other Farden and Zaba factors canvassed by the trial judge do not in and of themselves or together lead to the conclusion that the daughters are no longer “children of the marriage” within the meaning of the Act. It is clear that the daughters were not able to withdraw from the father’s charge for the purposes of their education after all the factors are considered and balanced, and that they are still “children of the marriage” and entitled to some maintenance during their post-secondary education theoretically starting September 2006. [43] Given our conclusion respecting whether the daughters are “children of the marriage”, further factual issues germane to determining the proper amount of maintenance order come into play. The matter will be remitted back to the trial judge to determine the extent to which the father is obligated to pay maintenance for Nicole and Kirsti after September of 2006, taking into account s. 3(2) of the Guidelines, either applying the table amount plus s. 7 expenses or, if the Court considers that approach to be inappropriate, an amount that it considers to be appropriate having regard to the conditions and means, needs and other circumstances of the daughters and the financial ability of each of the parties to contribute to the support of the daughters. Many of the same factors canvassed by the trial judge in respect of the issue of whether the daughters were “children of the marriage” will again be at play respecting his determination under s. 3(2) of the Guidelines of what is appropriate. Without limiting the scope of the trial judge’s inquiry or discretion in this regard, examples of such factors may include the unjustifiable failure of the daughters to keep their father informed of their educational situation for the 2006 fall semester and how that affects the father’s obligations for that semester as well as the ability of the daughters and mother to contribute to the costs of their education. [44] As indicated at the hearing, the application of the mother for fresh evidence is dismissed. This evidence is more properly dealt with by the trial judge if he deems it appropriate or necessary. Each party will bear their own costs in this Court and the issue of costs in the Court below is left to the trial judge. DATED at the City of Regina, in the Province of Saskatchewan, this 25th day of November, A.D. 2009. “Ottenbreit J.A.” OTTENBREIT J.A. concur “Lane J.A.” LANE J.A. concur “Ottenbreit J.A. for” [1] R.S.C. 1985, c. (2nd Supp.). [2] S.O.R./97-175, as am. [3] (1996), 1996 CanLII 4930 (SK CA), 18 R.F.L. (4th) 1, 137 Sask. R. 295 (C.A.). [4] (1993), 1993 CanLII 2570 (BC SC), 48 R.F.L. (3d) 60 (B.C.S.C.). [5] 1999 CanLII 691 (SCC), [1999] S.C.R. 518. [6] 1972 CanLII 141 (SCC), [1973] S.C.R. 205 at pp. 217-18. [7] 2001 SKCA 115 (CanLII), [2002] W.W.R. 441. [8] (1988), 1988 CanLII 5165 (SK CA), 14 R.F.L. (3d) 225, 66 Sask. R. 115 (C.A.). [9] 2007 MBCA 22 (CanLII), 279 D.L.R. (4th) 448.
The issues on appeal are whether the parties' children, who were over the age of 18, had withdrawn from the father's charge and were no longer children of the marriage within the meaning of the Divorce Act and therefore disentitled to maintenance after September 2006 when they attended post-secondary education and whether the maintenance paid in the past by the father was sufficient and appropriate. HELD: Appeal allowed. The trial judge made no palpable and overriding error in his finding that the father was not in arrears of maintenance and that there would be no order for retroactive child support. Nevertheless, the trial judge was in error in determining that the children were no longer children of the marriage within the meaning of the Act. The matter is remitted to the trial judge to determine the extent to which the father is obligated to pay maintenance for the children after September 2006.  1) The father and daughters did not have a conventional relationship. The father separated from the mother and daughters early and, since he lived in Hong Kong, could only have a long-distance relationship. The relationship deteriorated in 2006. It would be accurate to describe the daughters as treating their father with disdain. However, this does not necessarily mean that the daughters had withdrawn from the relationship with the father unilaterally. The father could have stayed in contact with the daughters despite the litigation and their failure to provide him with academic records. The father's efforts to contact the daughters were no greater than the daughters' to contact him. The father recognized the financial dependency of the daughters. Their dependency did not end because of the lack of communication. 2) The trial judge placed too much emphasis on the daughters' poor treatment and disdain of the father. His finding that the daughters did not wish to maintain a meaningful relationship with the father misapprehends the evidence respecting the historical and ongoing nature of their relationship. The fact that the emphasis of the relationship after 2003 shifted does not imply that they had no meaningful relationship in their own way. The proper conclusion to be drawn from all the evidence of the relationship before September 2006 and the relative silence after that time is that father and daughters were fighting and this mutual fight was prolonged and sustained by the litigation and the intervention of the mother. This does not mean that they had withdrawn from the relationship with him unilaterally. The high threshold for a finding that it disentitles the daughters to maintenance has not been met.