PROVINCIAL COURT OF SASKATCHEWAN PRINCE ALBERT IN THE MATTER OF INFORMATION #24039465 HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN and JONATHON STEPHEN ABRAMETZ T.B. Bekolay, P.C.J. John Field, CROWN PROSECUTOR, Prince Albert, Sask. FOR THE CROWN. 1. Jonathon Stephen Abrametz stands charged that on or about the 16th day of December, 1998 at Prince Albert, in the Province of Saskatchewan, he:(1) - did while his ability to operate a motor vehicle was impaired by alcohol or a drug have the care or control of a motor vehicle contrary to Section 255(1) and Section 253(a) of the Criminal Code;(2) - did having consumed alcohol in such quantity that the concentration thereof in his blood exceeded eighty milligrams of alcohol in one hundred milliliters of blood have the care or control of a motor vehicle contrary to Section 253(b) and Section 255(1) of the Criminal Code. 2. At trial, there was only one witness, Cst. Roland Schmidt, an 18 year member of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police currently stationed with the North District Highway Patrol working out of Prince Albert. He testified that on the night in question he was on duty, in uniform, and driving marked police vehicle. He had stopped at the Bank of Montreal at the corner of 2nd Ave. West and 28th St. West, in the City of Prince Albert to conduct some personal banking. At about 11:40 p.m., as he was leaving the bank’s parking lot he observed Ford Bronco, with driver, passenger in the front seat and passenger in the mid rear seat proceeding west on 28th Street. He was suspicious they may have been consuming alcohol and therefore followed the vehicle. The vehicle signaled right turn. The officer observed that the vehicle displayed an out of date sticker on it’s license plate in violation of S. 27(5) of the Highway Traffic Act. Deciding to investigate this infraction of the said Highway Traffic Act, he engaged the police lights, followed the vehicle north on 4th Ave. West, then right on to 27th Street where the vehicle hit the curb, bounced off the curb, then proceeded to stop within 30 feet. The officer approached the driver, who produced photo driver identification in the name of the accused. He asked the driver why he had not stopped. He could not understand the reply. His speech was extremely slurred. There was an overpowering (strong) odour of fresh beer emanating from the vehicle. The accused nearly fell over when he exited the vehicle. The officer concluded, quite reasonably in the circumstances, that the accused’s ability to operate motor vehicle was impaired and arrested him at 11:50 p.m. The officer made the demand for samples of the accused breath, read him his charter rights, asked him if he wished to call lawyer. The accused replied “Yes” and once he was placed in the police vehicle was immediately allowed call. The officer searched the vehicle for open liquor. At 11:58 p.m. he left the scene taking the accused to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Detachment in the City of Prince Albert, trip of about two minutes. The accused was placed in the phone room at the police station where he remained for some twelve minutes. When the officer could hear the beeping sound made by phone off the hook he pounded on the door, the accused advised him he had talked to counsel and received advice. The officer then turned the accused over to the breathalyser technician. The accused blew 170 and 160 respectively on the two tests. 3. If all of the evidence heard at trial can be admitted, the case is straight forward and the Crown has established beyond any reasonable doubt both offences charged. 4. The accused contends that his right to be secure against unreasonable search and seizure guaranteed by Section of the charter and his right not to be arbitrarily detained or imprisoned as guaranteed by Section of the charter were breached. Both submissions depend on the answer to the question of whether Cst. Schmidt was in the lawful execution of his duty in stopping the accused within the urban municipality of Prince Albert for an obvious violation of the Highway Traffic Act. If he was then there were no breaches of the accused’s charter rights; if he was not, there were and the court must then address the issue of what the appropriate remedy for the breaches should be under Section 24 of the charter. 5. It is to be noted that have framed the issue as have because am satisfied that the officer had only suspicion of possible alcohol consumption based on young males in vehicle at 11:40 at night prior to engaging his police lights to stop the accused’s vehicle. After the police lights were engaged to stop the accused, the accused drove his vehicle into the curb. Before that, his driving did not provide the officer with any other basis for his suspicion. 6. In determining whether Cst. Schmidt was acting within his jurisdiction and was in the lawful execution of his duty reference must be had to the relevant provisions of the Highway Traffic Act, the Police Act, 1990 and the R.C.M.P. Act. 7. The relevant sections of the Highway Traffic Act read: S. 2(s) “peace officer” means: (i) member of police force in Saskatchewan; (ii) person or class of persons designated by the Lieutenant Governor in Council as traffic officers; or (iii) any person appointed under The Police Act, 1990 as special constable or peace officer for the enforcement of this Act; S. 27(5) No person shall fail to display or exhibit on licence plates current and valid validation stickers issued to that person pursuant to The Vehicle Administration Act with respect to those licence plates. S. 40(8) peace officer who: (a) is readily identifiable as peace officer; and (b) is in the lawful execution of his or duties and responsibilities; may require the person in charge of or operating motor vehicle to stop that vehicle. The relevant provisions of The Police Act, 1990 read as follows: S. 21(1) Subject to the approval of the Lieutenant Governor in Council, the minister, on behalf of the Government of Saskatchewan, may enter into an agreement with the Government of Canada to employ the Royal Canadian Mounted Police to aid in the administration of justice and the enforcement of the laws in force in Saskatchewan.[emphasis added] (2) Where an agreement has been entered into pursuant to subsection (1), the Royal Canadian Mounted Police are responsible for policing all or any portion of Saskatchewan that may be directed by the minister. (3) Notwithstanding subsection (2), the Royal Canadian Mounted Police are not responsible for policing municipality unless there is an agreement made pursuant to Section 22, 22.1 or 23 respecting that municipality. (4) During the period of an agreement entered into pursuant to subsection (1), members of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police: (a) are peace officers; and (b) shall fulfil the duties and may exercise the powers conferred to any Act or law on peace officers or constables with respect to the preservation of peace, the prevention of crime and the enforcement of laws in force in Saskatchewan. 1990-91, c.P-15.01.s.21; 1997, c.45,s.3. Emergency policing by Royal Canadian Mounted Police S. 24(1) Not withstanding any other provision of this Act or any other Act, where, in the opinion of the minister: (a) an emergency exists: and (b) it is in the best interests of the administration of justice in Saskatchewan that the services of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police be used in any municipality to provide adequate policing services; the Lieutenant Governor in Council, by order, may make provision for the employment of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police to provide policing services to the municipality for any time that the Lieutenant Governor in Council considers advisable. (2) Where an order is made pursuant to subsection (1), the Lieutenant Governor in Council, by order may direct the municipality to pay the Government of Saskatchewan any amount that the Lieutenant Governor in Council considers necessary for the policing services. (3) Where municipality refuses or neglects to pay the amount required pursuant to subsection (2), that amount: (a) may be deducted from any grant payable by the Government of Saskatchewan to the municipality; or (b) may be recovered by an action in any court of competent jurisdiction as debt due to Her Majesty in right of Saskatchewan. 1990-91, c.P-15.01,s.24. MUNICIPAL POLICE Municipality responsible for policing S. 25 municipality: (a) is responsible for the maintenance of law and order within its boundaries; (b) shall provide policing services to maintain reasonable standard of law enforcement; and (c) shall provide adequate and reasonable facilities required for the policing services mentioned in clause (b). 1990-91, c.P-15.01, s.25. S. 26(1) municipality shall: (a) establish its own police service; or (b) enter into an agreement with the Government of Saskatchewan pursuant to Section 22, or the Government of Canada, pursuant to Section 23, to have policing services provided by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. S. 36(1) Before entering on the duties of member, member of police service shall take and subscribe to an oath or affirmation in the form prescribed in the regulations before person authorized to administer an oath or affirmation. (2) Unless other wise indicated in his or her appointment, member has the power and the responsibility to: (a) perform all duties that are assigned to constables or peace officers in relation to: (i) the preservation of peace; (ii) the prevention of crime and offences against the laws in force in the municipality; and (iii) the apprehension of criminals, offenders and others who may lawfully be taken into custody; (b) execute all warrants and perform all duties and services under or in relation to them that, pursuant to the laws in force in the municipality, may lawfully be executed and performed by constables or peace officers; and (c) perform all duties that may lawfully be performed by constables or peace officers in relation to the escorting and conveyance of persons in lawful custody to and from courts, places of confinement, correctional facilities or camps, hospitals or other places. (3) Unless otherwise indicated in the member’s appointment, member has authority to exercise the powers and perform the duties mentioned in subsection (2) throughout Saskatchewan. 1990-91, c.P-1501, s.36. 8. The relevant portions of The Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act read as follows: Police Force for Canada 3. There shall continue to be police force for Canada, which shall consist of officers and other members and be known as the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. R.S., 1985, c.R-10, s.2; R.S., 1985, c.8(2nd Supp.), s.1. Peace Officer 9. Every officer and every person designated as peace officer under subsection 7(1) is peace officer in every part of Canada and has all the powers, authority, protection and privileges that peace officer has by law until the officer or person is dismissed or discharged from the Force as provided in this Act, the regulations or the Commissioner’s standing orders or until the appointment of the officer or person expires or is revoked.[emphasis added] R.S., 1985, c. R-10, s.9; R.S., 1985, c.8(2nd Supp.), s. 4. 18. It is the duty of the members who are peace officers, subject to the orders of the Commissioner, (a) to perform all duties that are assigned to peace officers in relation to the preservation of the peace, the prevention of crime and of offences against the laws of Canada and the laws in force in any province in which they may be employed and the apprehension of criminals and offenders and others who may be lawfully taken into custody; (b) to execute all warrants, and perform all duties and services in relation thereto, that may, under this Act or the laws of Canada or the laws in force in any province, be lawfully executed and performed by peace officers; (c) to perform all duties that may be lawfully performed by peace officers in relation to the escort and conveyance of convicts and other persons in custody to or from any courts, places of punishment or confinement, asylums or other places; and (d) to perform such other duties and functions as are prescribed by the Governor in Council or the commissioner Arrangements with provinces (1) The Minister may, with the approval of the Governor in council, enter into an arrangement with the government of any province for the use or employment of the Force, or any portion thereof, in aiding the administration of justice in the province and in carrying into effect the laws in force therein. [emphasis added] Arrangements with municipalities (2) The Minister may, with the approval of the Governor in Council and the lieutenant governor in council of any province, enter into an arrangement with any municipality in the province for the use or employment of the Force, or any portion thereof, in aiding the administration of justice in the municipality and in carrying into effect the laws in force therein.[emphasis added] Payment for services (3) The Minister may, with the approval of the Treasure Board, in any arrangement made under subsection (1) or (2), agree on and determine the amount of money to be paid by the province or municipality for the services of the Force. Taking over other police forces (4) There may be included in any arrangement made under subsection (1) or (2) provision for the taking over by the Force of officers and other members of any provincial or municipal police force. Report to Parliament (5) The Minister shall cause to be laid before Parliament copy of every arrangement made under subsection (1) or (2) within fifteen days after it is made or, if Parliament is not then sitting, on any of the first fifteen days next thereafter that either House of Parliament in sitting. R.S., c.R-9, s.20. 9. In determining the issues of: (1) whether Constable Schmidt, as an R.C.M.P. officer, had the jurisdiction to carry out his duties as a peace officer appointed pursuant to The Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act in the City of Prince Albert? (2) in the circumstances, if he did have the jurisdiction, was Constable Schmidt acting in the lawful execution of his duties in conducting a “random stop” of the accused? This court must examine the foregoing statutes. In doing so the Crown submitted and concur that the following rules of construction as stated in the text, The Construction of Statues, E.A. Driedger, at pages 81 and 82 are relevant: “1. The Act as whole is to be read in its entire context so as to ascertain the intention of Parliament (the law as expressly or impliedly enacted by the words), the object of the Act (the ends sought to be achieved), and the scheme of the Act (the relation between the individual provisions of the Act). 2. The words of the individual provisions to be applied to the particular case under consideration are then to be read in their grammatical and ordinary sense in the light of the intention of Parliament embodied in the Act as whole, the object of the Act and the scheme of the Act, and if they are clear and unambiguous and in harmony with that intention, object and scheme and with the general body of the law, that is the end. 3. If the words are apparently obscure or ambiguous, then meaning that best accords with the intention of Parliament, the object of the Act and the scheme of the Act, but one that the words are reasonably capable of bearing, is to be given them. 4. If, notwithstanding that the words are clear and unambiguous when read in their grammatical and ordinary sense, there is disharmony within the statute or statutes in pari materia, then less grammatical or less ordinary meaning that will produce harmony is to be given the words, if they are reasonably capable of bearing that meaning. 5. If obscurity, ambiguity or disharmony cannot be resolved objectively reference to the intention of Parliament, the object of the Act or the scheme of the Act, then meaning that appears to be the most reasonable may be selected.” and the author goes on to say at page 167: “In Canada there is presumption that legislative body does not exceed its powers under the constitution. Hence, if statute is open to two constructions, one of which would render the statute ultra vires and the other of which would not, the courts will adopt the latter construction, for the obvious reason that an intention to exceed its powers is not to be attributed to legislative body, or, as it was put by Cartwright J. in McKay v. The Queen “if an enactment is capable of receiving meaning according to which its operation is restricted to matters within the power of the enacting body it shall be interpreted accordingly”.[emphasis added] 10. In reviewing the scheme and object of The Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act it clear that section and section of that Act operate to render the Royal Canadian Mounted Police officers part of “police force for Canada” and peace officers “for every part of Canada” with “all the powers, authority, protection and privileges that peace officer has by law”. The language used by parliament is clear, broad and unambiguous as it was their obvious intention to create a police force that operates without jurisdictional barriers throughout the entire country of Canada. There is nothing in the scheme or object of The Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act that derogates from that basic presumption. This court notes that when there is limitation on their duties it is clearly stated. For example, section 18 of The Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act limits the Royal Canadian Mounted Police to enforcing only the provincial laws of the province in which they are employed. 11. Further, section 18 of The Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act clearly outlines the duties of members who are peace officers. That section states that members of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police who happen to be peace officers must perform all duties that are assigned to peace officers in relation to three distinct objects. It is clear that in their grammatical and ordinary meaning of the words “are assigned” refer to the three distinct objects and not to specific areas of jurisdiction where Royal Canadian Mounted Police officers are employed within the province, as council for the defence would suggest. For the words “are assigned” to refer to something specific, rather than the three objects, that specific thing would have to be stated in the space right after the words “are assigned”. This interpretation is also born out when one reviews section 36 of The Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act, which is framed with colon and the subheadings. As well, one notes that in that section jurisdiction is specifically relegated to separate paragraph. 12. There are very few reported decisions which have examined the issue of the jurisdiction of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police to police throughout Canada. In the decision of R. v. Soucy, (1975) 1975 CanLII 1238 (NB CA), 23 C.C.C. (2d) 561, the appeal division of the New Brunswick Supreme Court stated as follows in the context of examining whether peace officer appointed in the Town of Rothesay, while on holidays in Montreal or Vancouver, could make demand on person in either of those cities: “A member of the R.C.M.P. could make such demand anywhere in Canada as his territorial jurisdiction extends throughout Canada underthe Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. R-9. It is of interest to note that by s. 18 of the said Act, R.C.M.P. constables are restricted in enforcing the laws in force in any Province in that they are given jurisdiction only in relation to provincial laws of the Province in which they are employed.” 13. In the Soucy decision the court found that demand made by town constable outside town limits would be demand made without jurisdiction and the demand would therefore be invalid. The decision in R. v. Young (1981), 34 A.R. 214 (Albert Court of Queen’s Bench) also touches on the issue. In that decision, member of the R.C.M.P. followed the accused into service station at 8:20 p.m. in Edmonton. The officer was on his way out of town. The officer called an R.C.M.P. detachment and asked that the city police be called and therefore no demand was immediately made. In fact the officer thought he could not act because he was within the jurisdiction of the city police. The court then went on to find the R.C.M.P. officer was mistaken and had the jurisdiction to make the demand and quoted the above noted quotation from the Soucy decision with approval. 14. This case is also of note as it illustrates the principle that it is up to the courts to determine whether or not the R.C.M.P. officer is in the lawful execution of his duty, and what the officer believes is not entirely relevant at this stage. While the good faith of the officer would be an important consideration in the Section 24(2) charter argument, it is not helpful in determining what the law is. Therefore, even if Cst. Schmidt admitted that he wasn’t acting in the lawful scope of his duties and responsibilities when he pulled over the accused, this does not determine the matter of what the law actually is and what the scope of his duties and responsibilities are. 15. The decision in Soucy also examined the problems dealing with municipal police and the limits of their territorial jurisdiction in their appointment. The Crown referred the court to several cases dealing with the jurisdiction involving provincial and municipal jurisdiction as examples of the different issues and problems that arise in the cases of municipal and provincial police forces from case involving an R.C.M.P. officer. The court reviewed in this regard Harvey v. R. 20 A.R. 266 (Alberta Court of Appeal), R. v. Rutherford (1994 CarswellB.C. 1274), R. v. Giancarlo (1992), 55 O.A.C. 226, R. v. Schroeder 22 M.V.R. (2d) 307, R. v. Stephens 1995 CanLII 626 (ON CA), [1996] C.N.L.R. 200, R. v. Polchies (1981) 35 N.B.R. (2d) 185, R. v. White B.C.L.R. 179, R. v. Burke (1992) 39 M.V.R. (2d) 121, Anderson v. R. (1986) 40 M.V.R. 164. 16. Defence counsel referred the court to the recent decision of our brother Judge Kolenick in R. v. Weber. This case involved municipally appointed police officer and in the view of the court is not of much assistance in respect to analyzing the jurisdictional issues in relation to the R.C.M.P. 17. Defence counsel argued strenuously that The Police Act provides that in Section 21 that Saskatchewan must enter into an agreement with Canada to employ the R.C.M.P. and that the R.C.M.P. are only responsible for policing those portions of the province covered by that agreement. Defence strenuously submits that Section 21(3) makes it clear that the R.C.M.P. is not responsible for policing municipality unless there is an agreement made pursuant to Sections 22 or 23 respecting that particular municipality and that in that situation the R.C.M.P. is not responsible for policing in an urban municipality such as the City of Prince Albert. 18. It is the view of this court that when one examines the context of The Police Act 1990, it is clear that the Act deals with how police services are to be provided and who pays for them. The Act recognizes that municipality in Saskatchewan must have police services that provides them with the ability to use the R.C.M.P. provided there is an agreement for payment of services. However, there is no exclusivity mentioned between one force or another. It is important to note that the word “aid” is used in Section 21 of The Police Act 1990 as in Section 20 of The Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act when dealing with the provision of police services. The dictionary definition of “aid” is “help”. There is no exclusivity in assistance. 19. When examing Section 21 of The Police Act 1990 one notes there is no clear language to imply derogation from the rights of an R.C.M.P. peace officer. The Act simply states that the R.C.M.P. are responsible for policing when there is an agreement between the province and the federal government. It further states that they are not responsible for policing municipality unless there is an agreement. They certainly do not use words that the R.C.M.P. officer cannot or shall not provide police services in the municipality. As well, given the ultra vires statute construction doctrine, it would not be appropriate for provincial legislation to take away powers given by Federal legislation. This court therefore reads the provincial legislation in manner in which the legislature is not taken to have exceeded it’s jurisdiction. Therefore clearly The Police Act must be read in context as providing a manner of funding policing not a manner of taking away jurisdiction granted to R.C.M.P. officers by The Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act. 20. In coming to this conclusion the court is of view that there is no good public policy reason for the R.C.M.P. to be excluded from operating in any specific geographic area. It would not make sense for the legislature to limit the opportunity for policing of community by making sure that fewer police officers are able to act in any particular setting within the province. 21. Counsel for the accused also referred the court to number of decisions dealing with municipal police forces and with wildlife officers. This court reviewed those cases with some care but is of the view that they involve different issues than when one is dealing with the jurisdiction of the R.C.M.P. 22. This court concludes that on these facts the stopping of the Abrametz vehicle was stop in respect to enforcement of an infraction of Highway Traffic Act. Both counsel for the accused and for the crown also referred to the stopping as “random stop”. therefore turn to address the issue of whether or not Cst. Schmidt was acting in the lawful execution of his duty if his stopping of the Abrametz vehicle should be regarded as “random stop”. 23. Of course the most relevant section of The Highway Traffic Act in this regard is Section 40(8) which we have quoted in full above. In regard to the constitutionality of random stops the crown referred the court to R. v. Ladouceur (1990) 56 C.C.C. (3d) page 11 and R. v. Duncanson (1992) 1992 CanLII 92 (SCC), S.C.R. 836. 24. In the R. v. Ladouceur, the accused had been stopped for routine check. The police officer acknowledged that there was no basis to suspect the accused had done anything wrong and that the soul purpose was to ensure that the accused’s papers were in order and he had valid driver’s licence. In 5/4 split, the majority of The Supreme Court concluded that this random check was justified. The Supreme Court rejected the argument that it created potential for abuse by police powers, holding that officers can only stop people for legal reasons and in that case reasons related to driving car such as licence, insurance, mechanical fitness and sobriety. 25. In the R. v. Duncanson decision of the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal Cameron J.A. stated at page 93 as follows: “Section 40(8) empowers police officer to stop vehicle “while in the lawful execution of his duties and responsibilities”. The only qualification apart from that, is that the police officer be readily identifiable as such. Obviously the duties and responsibilities of police offices far exceed the enforcement of The Highway Traffic Act, and so read in it’s ordinary sense, the section empowers the police officer to stop vehicle for any purpose connected with the lawful execution of his or her duties and responsibilities generally, however derived. To construe the provisions in issue in the limited way urged upon us would be inconsistent with their language and the intention, as we see it, of the legislature. It might be noted that s. 40(8) was enacted following, among others, the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Hufsky, [1998] S.C.R. 621, where statutory provisions of this nature (then in existence in Ontario) were thoroughly canvassed in the context of their use in the enforcement of the drinking and driving provisions of the Criminal Code. They were again considered in later decision of the Supreme Court in R. v. Ladouceur, 1990 CanLII 108 (SCC), [1990] S.C.R. 1257 they were taken to authorize the police, without the need even for suspicion of wrongdoing, to stop vehicle and thus detain its driver, and to do so for no purpose other than one connected generally to the lawful execution of the duties and responsibilities of the police. The facts. 40(8) was enacted following the decision in Hufsky is strongly indicative of an intention in the legislature to empower the police in this province (as empowered in Ontario) with the authority to stop vehicle for any purpose associated with lawful execution of their duties and responsibilities generally, and to do so without the need even for suspicion of wrongdoing of any kind by the driver.” 26. Various decisions of Saskatchewan have reviewed these decisions. The crown referred the court to number of them. The court from a review of the same has determined that the law in this area is now clear and the decisions reflect that the police can detain vehicles as long as they do so for the purposes of checking for sobriety, licences, ownership, insurance and mechanical fitness of motor vehicles. Counsel for the accused referred the court to R. v. Lott and R. v. Emke. In the Lott decision the trial judge disbelieved that the police were checking for any of the specified objects and therefore it is of little relevance in this case where the officer was clearly checking the licencing relevant to vehicle insurance. It is this court’s view that the R. v. Emke decision is outdated given more recent case law. 27. In conclusion, given that Cst. Schmidt was checking for vehicle licencing relevant to vehicle insurance and in respect to his suspicion in relation to the sobriety of the accused it is clear on the law as it currently stands that he was well within his duties and responsibilities under The Highway Traffic Act to make this random stop. 28. Having concluded that the officer was acting in the lawful execution of his duty, I find that there has been no breach of the accused’s rights under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and I find him guilty of the charge of driving with a blood alcohol level of greater than eighty milligrams in one hundred millilitres of his blood. Having convicted him in relation to this count enter judicial stay in relation to the impaired driving count although, if it were necessary, clearly would have found him guilty in respect to that count as well. Dated this 4th day of August, A.D. 2000, in the City of Prince Albert, in the Province of Saskatchewan. T.B. Bekolay, Provincial Court Judge
The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired contrary to s.255(1) and s.253(a) of the Criminal Code and with having consumed alcohol in such a quantity that his blood alcohol concentration exceeded .08 contrary to s.253(b) and s.255(1). The accused contended his right to be secure against unreasonable search and seizure as guaranteed by s.8 of the Charter and his right not to be arbitrarily detained or imprisoned as guaranteed by s.9 of the Charter were breached. In issue was whether the RCMP officer had the jurisdiction to carry out his duties as a peace officer in the City of Prince Albert; if so, was he acting in the lawful execution of his duties in conducting random stop. HELD: The accused was found guilty of driving with a blood alcohol level greater than .08. A judicial stay was entered in relation to the impaired count on which he would have been found guilty if it were necessary. 1)The language used by Parliament in the Royal Mounted Police Act is clear, broad and unambiguous as it was their obvious intention to create a police force that operates without jurisdictional barriers throughout the entire country of Canada. When there is a limitation on their duties it is clearly stated. The Police Act does not mention any exclusivity between one force and another. Given the ultra vires statute construction doctrine it would not be appropriate for provincial legislation to take away powers given by the Federal legislation. The Police Act must be read in context as providing a manner of funding policing not a manner of taking away jurisdiction granted to RCMP officers. 2)The law is now clear that the police can detain vehicles as long as they do so for the purposes of checking for sobriety, licences, ownership, insurance and other mechanical fitness of motor vehicles. The R. v. Emke decision is outdated. 3)The officer was acting in the lawful execution of his duty. There was no breach of the accused's rights under the Charter.