QUEEN’S BENCH FOR SASKATCHEWAN Citation: 2012 SKQB 409 Date: 2012 10 05 Docket: Q.B.C.A. No. 39/2011 Judicial Centre: Saskatoon BETWEEN: ALLAN ENDEN, and HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN, Counsel: Dhugal G. Whitbread for the appellant Tamara A. Rock for the respondent JUDGMENT KRAUS J. October 5, 2012 [1] The appellant appeals against conviction and sentence ($200.00 fine and $50.00 victim surcharge) made by K. Dmytryshyn, Justice of the Peace, at Saskatoon, on October 28, 2011, on the charge under s. 253(2)(b) of The Traffic Safety Act, S.S. 2004, c. T‑18.1. [2] Section 253(2) of the Act provides: (2) Every person in charge of motor vehicle that is involved in an accident shall: (a) notify the following persons as soon as is practicable after the accident: (i) the person in charge of any other motor vehicle that is involved in the accident; (ii) if any property in addition to motor vehicle has been damaged as result of the accident, the person in charge of that property; and (b) provide the persons mentioned in clause (a) with the following information:(i) his or her name and address;(ii) his or her driver’s licence number;(iii) the number of the certificate of registration of the vehicle; and(iv) particulars of any insurance affecting the vehicle. [3] The appeal is taken on the following ground: Judge failed to give proper legal effect to evidence that did not know there was problem until came out of the store was confronted by the owner of the car [Notice of Appeal dated November 23, 2011] [4] The appellant contends that he was unaware that an accident had taken place until he returned from the store and the finding of the trial judge that the appellant must have known an accident had taken place before entering the store is contrary to the preponderance of evidence. The appellant says that the trial judge “gave no articulable reason to prefer the confused and contradictory evidence of [the independent witness] over the clear evidence of the Appellant.” The verdict is unreasonable, the appellant argues, since he had no duty to report an accident which he did not know had happened prior to returning from the store. [Appellant’s memorandum of argument, paragraphs 12 and 13] [5] The respondent submits that the reasons of the trial judge are sufficient, pointing to her assessment of credibility of the independent witness to that of the appellant, supporting the finding by the trial judge that the appellant did have knowledge of the accident before entering the store. [Respondent’s brief of law, paragraph 13, quoting transcript, page 55, lines to 21] [6] I am satisfied that the trial judge did give sufficient reasons for her decision and took into consideration all of the relevant evidence and the law in reaching her decision. She was entitled to assess credibility of the independent witness and the appellant, deciding to prefer the evidence of the independent witness to that of the appellant. In doing so, the trial judge did not rely upon the testimony of any witness that was inherently improbable, and she applied the correct burden of proof, beyond reasonable doubt, in reaching her verdict. The verdict is not unreasonable (see R. v. B. (J.N.), 1991 CanLII 111 (SCC), [1991] S.C.R. 66, 71 Man.R. (2d) 156) and there was no palpable or overriding error. (See R. v. Yebes, 1987 CanLII 17 (SCC), [1987] S.C.R. 168, 43 D.L.R. (4th) 424; R. v. Andres (1979), 1979 CanLII 2238 (SK CA), [1982] W.W.R. 249, Sask.R. 96 (C.A.); and R. v. Kornkven, 2007 SKQB 315 (CanLII), 301 Sask.R. 162.) [7] The appeal is dismissed. “G.M. Kraus” J.
The appellant appealed his conviction under s. 253(2)(b) of The Traffic Safety Act for failing to provide his name, address, licence and registration at the scene of an accident. The appellant argued that he was unaware that an accident had occurred and argued that the trial judge's finding that he must have known the accident had occurred was contrary to the evidence. The appellant also argued that the trial judge erred in preferring the evidence of the Crown's witness over his own. HELD: The appeal was dismissed. The trial judge gave sufficient reasons for her decision and took all of the relevant evidence into consideration. She was entitled to assess the credibility of the independent witness and to prefer it over the evidence of the appellant.