PROVINCIAL COURT OF SASKATCHEWAN PRINCE ALBERT IN THE MATTER OF INFORMATION #40000538 HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN Kopperud T.B. Bekolay, P.C.J J. Syrniuk, CROWN PROSECUTORS, Prince Albert, SK. FOR THE CROWN. M. Popescul, SANDERSON, BALICKI, POPESCUL FORSYTH LAW OFFICE, Prince Albert, SK. FOR THE DEFENCE. 1. After the Crown withdrew one count at the opening of the trial, the accused stands charged that on or about the 27th day of October, 2000 at or near Prince Albert, in the Province of Saskatchewan did having consumed alcohol in such quantity that the concentration thereof in his blood exceeded 80 milligrams of alcohol in one hundred millilitres of blood, have the care and control of motor vehicle contrary to Section 253(b) and Section 255(1) of the Criminal Code. 2. The Crown called as witnesses, Randy Persicke, the boyfriend of the accused's sister-in-law, Dawn Marie Anderson, the accused's sister-in-law, John Gary Ross, civilian who at the time of trial was an inmate, Cst. Brent McDonald, and Dr. Felix Depadua. The accused testified on his own behalf and called as witnesses, Randy Hurd, fireman, and Susan Kopperud, his wife. 3. In making my findings of fact, accept the evidence of Cst. Brent McDonald in respect to the time of day of the various events. In doing so note that both Randy Persicke and Dawn Anderson's recollection of the time of day of the accident was one-and-a-half to two hours out. also note that Dawn Anderson said that she remembered that they left the acreage about 11:00-ish and that the accident was about 11:00 to 11:30 because she had to work the next day and "so was kind of keeping track of the time". Her willingness to give this explanation under oath, when she was so clearly wrong raises the question as to what weight should give the balance of her evidence. However, am also mindful that she did not deny that there could have been an open bottle of beer in the vehicle but testified that she "doesn't recall [one]". She also stated quite frankly in cross-examination when asked if she noted whether the accused's eyes were red or blood-shot that: "I would not notice, red, blood-shot eyes or watery eyes". 4. In assessing Randy Persicke's evidence am mindful that of all the witnesses to the events of the evening in question, he had consumed the most alcohol. He had consumed from to 12 beer. His recollection of the time of the accident was also as noted some two hours out. He regarded the accused's driving as normal when Ross and even the accused suggested otherwise. This is significant to the assessment of his evidence and suggests either that his memory of events was significantly affected by his alcohol consumption on the night in question, or, degree of partiality in favour of the accused or combination of both. 5. There is nothing in the evidence to suggest that John Ross had any connection to the accused or his friends. There is nothing in the evidence to suggest that he had any reason whatsoever to taint his evidence by favouring either the Crown or the accused. He gave his evidence in straight-forward manner without hesitation. He had an excellent recollection of the events of the night in connection with this case. accept his evidence. 6. On the night in question, Dr. Felix Depadua's mind was directed to the medical needs of this patient. His evidence disclosed good memory of these matters. His mind and efforts were not directed to criminal law enforcement and its requirements. His evidence suggests very limited memory of what was done on the night in question and subsequently in regard to matters peculiar to the requirements for the enforcement of criminal law. His evidence is based on normal practise not specific memory. In assessing his evidence am also mindful of his statement that in these matters he relies on the police officers, whom he trusts. 7. In assessing Randy Hurd's evidence am mindful that his attention was to his job. That is, he was focused on rescuing the accused and securing his safe transport to the hospital. The degree of this focus is emphasized by the fact that Mr. Hurd testified that he did not smell alcohol. This in context where all three passengers in the vehicle testified that they had been consuming alcoholic beverages. As Mr. Hurd testified, he could not comment on the degree of intoxication as this was not his function. 8. In assessing the evidence of the accused am mindful of his admission that the accident did affect his memory of the events following it. am also mindful of the fact that the accused had no recollection of having passed the Ross vehicle just before the accident. On the other hand, note that the accused admitted that he was not driving like he would normally drive. He was perhaps going too fast for the road conditions, showing off his new vehicle. 9. Keeping these assessments of the witnesses in mind, find the facts to be as follows: 10. The accused arrived home from Moose Jaw between 10:15 and 10:30 p.m.. Shortly thereafter he went into Prince Albert, to bar where he had three or four regular beer. He returned home about 11:15 to 11:30 p.m. He consumed one beer at home. His wife asked him to go to town for milk and cigarettes. He invited Randy Persicke to come and see his new Jeep. His sister-in-law decided to go too. He drove into town to the store via Paulsen Road. Purchased his items and started for home along the same road. 11. This road is gravel road that is always wash-board. accept Cst. McDonald's evidence that on the night in question it was wash-board but that it was not at its worst condition. The accused was showing off his new vehicle. He was driving faster than he should have given the condition of the road. He passed the Ross vehicle. The accused's vehicle was bouncing on the wash-board. The accused lost control of his vehicle which went sideways on the road then hit the ditch; rolled up the bank and back down again. The vehicle ended up resting on the driver's side. 12. John Ross saw this accident occur. He got out of his vehicle, yelled to the occupants of the accused's vehicle that he would go for help, and proceeded to the pay phone at Fast Gas on 16th Avenue West. He spotted police vehicle and at 1:10 am. flagged down Cst. Brent McDonald. He informed Cst. McDonald that there had been single vehicle accident on Paulsen Road with people who he believed to be hurt in the vehicle. He did not then or at any time that evening advise Cst. McDonald of the nature of the driving of the driver of the Kopperud vehicle. 13. As Cst. McDonald proceeded immediately to the scene of the accident, he requested an ambulance. As he approached he saw Randy Persicke walking from the vehicle towards him waving his arms. Randy Persicke advised him that the guy behind the wheel was hurt bad. Cst. McDonald observed the accused to be in the driver's compartment laying on the driver's door panel with his left leg pinned by the steering wheel. The accused's head was being held by Dawn Reid- Anderson who was in the rear compartment behind the driver's seat. 14. After the ambulance arrived, the ambulance attendant kicked out the window. When Cst. McDonald got to the vehicle, he detected strong odour of liquor from the vehicle. At 1:34 a.m. the accused was extracted from the vehicle and placed on spine board. The officer found one OV bottle of beer laying on the driver's door panel in the vehicle. This bottle contained about 1/16 of liquid that smelled to the officer like beer. note that none of the occupants of the vehicle could recall seeing this bottle of beer on the night in question but accept the officer's testimony that he did find the bottle as he related. 15. At 1:41 a.m. the accused arrived at the hospital. He was having great trouble breathing and was supplied with ventilator part of the time. Cst. McDonald observed strong smell of alcohol from the accused's breath when he was face to face with the accused. He noted the accused's eyes to be bloodshot. The accused was understanding the nurses and doctors caring for him. 16. Based on the following observations the officer reached the conclusion that the accused had been operating motor vehicle while impaired: (1) the accused was located in the driving compartment behind the driver's wheel; (2) an odour of alcohol emanated from the vehicle as soon as the officer could get close enough to smell the same; (3) the officer found an open OV bottle of beer in the vehicle's driver compartment which was about 1/16 full of liquid which smelled like beer; (4) having noted the position of the accused's vehicle and the nature of the accident, knowing that he had no difficulty staying on the road with the police vehicle, nor had the fire or ambulance attendants had any difficulty, he concluded that it was inexplicable as to why sober driver would leave the road; (5) once face to face with the accused at the hospital, he noted and confirmed the smell of alcohol on the breath of the accused and that the accused's eyes were red and bloodshot. 17. Cst. McDonald then spoke with Dr. Depadua who informed the constable that the accused would be held in hospital. The officer then asked the doctor if he could speak to the accused in regard to blood demand. The doctor advised him he could go ahead. The accused was having trouble breathing, x-rays were being taken. But by 1:55 a.m. the officer went into the emergency room and read the demand for sample of the accused's blood from his card. The accused acknowledged that he understood saying, "go for it, but don't forget that wash-board road when you write that report". The accused was advised of his arrest. The officer read the accused his Charter Rights, reading again from his police card. The officer said that the accused acknowledged he understood and declined to call lawyer. 18. There was no blood kit at the hospital so Cst. McDonald had to arrange to have one brought to the hospital. When it arrived he gave it to laboratory technician, Tracy Tumak. There was some difficulty getting blood from the accused. Tumak tried and could not get blood; Nancy Andres, another laboratory technician, and Dr. Depadua were there. Cst. McDonald did not know which of them got the blood sample. But at 2:41 a.m. Cst. McDonald seized two vials of blood from Nancy Andres. She placed the seals on the vials. 19. Tracy Tumak filled out the form Certificate of Qualified Medical Practitioner (P-2 in these proceedings) and Dr. Depadua signed it in the presence of Cst. McDonald. The constable then served the accused in the emergency room with true copy of the Certificate. 20. There is no issue in respect to continuity. Therefore, will not review the facts around the arranging for the analysis of the blood and the obtaining of Certificate of Analysis. 21. On March 1, 2001, the constable was informed by the Crown office that he had had the doctor complete the wrong form (P-2). take it that this advice was given to the officer by the Crown based on an understanding that it was Dr. Depadua who had taken the blood sample. 22. The officer obtained the vials of blood back from Winnipeg. He took the blood vials and what he now understood to be the proper Certificate of Qualified Medical Practitioner (P-5) to Dr. Depadua at his home The officer filled out the new form in the presence of Dr. Depadua. He showed Dr. Depadua the blood vials with the doctor's initials on them. Dr. Depadua signed the new Certificate. am satisfied that the doctor has no real recollection either of who actually took the blood nor of signing the second certificate. The doctor testified as if the officer had brought the second certificate to him at the hospital. accept the officer's evidence that the second certificate was signed at the doctor's home. To the doctor's credit no one drew this scenario to his attention. To have done so may have refreshed his memory. conclude that in signing the second certificate the doctor first looked at the vials, saw his signature, and then wholly trusting the officer signed the second certificate (P-5). 23. The doctor testified that it is standard procedure for the physician to take the blood where police are asking for blood sample. He also testified that "anyone who took blood will sign the test-tube or piece of paper". He was shown the two vials of blood (P-1) and said that it was his signature on the label at the bottom of the vial. But he went on to say that he could not be 100% sure that he had taken the blood himself. conclude that the Crown has established beyond reasonable doubt that the blood was either taken personally by Dr. Depadua or was taken by technician under his supervision. On the evidence as whole, am left with reasonable doubt as to who actually took the blood. However, am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the Crown has proved that the blood is that of the accused. 24. A number of issues were raised in submissions of counsel at trial:(1) whether the police officer had reasonable and probable grounds to make the demand?(2) whether the demand met the requirements of (I) the sample being taken by a medical practitioner or under the supervision of a medical practitioner; (II) whether the officer had actually obtained information from the physician so that he could be confident and advise the accused that the taking of the blood sample would not endanger the life of the accused?3. whether the accused gave a valid consent?4. whether the blood samples were taken as soon as practicable?5. whether the Crown can rely on the Certificate of Qualified Medical Practitioner (P-5) where on the evidence as a whole there is a reasonable doubt as to whether the physician took the sample himself or supervised a technician in the taking of the sample? Issue #1 Whether the Police Officer had Reasonable and Probable Grounds to Make the Demand? 25. I have found that the officer had the following grounds when he made the demand: (1) the accused was in the driver\'s compartment of the vehicle; (2) odour of alcohol from the vehicle and subsequently confirmed to be coming from the accused\'s breath; (3) open 1/16 full OV bottle of beer in the vehicle; and (4) the nature of the accident. In determining whether these facts form the requisite reasonable and probable grounds have reviewed R.v. Knox (1996), 1996 CanLII 171 (SCC), 109 C.C.C. (3d) 481 S.C.C., R.v. Babineaux, (1981) 11 M.V.R. 204 (N.B.C.A.); R.v. Burnshaw [1995] C.C.C., (3d) 93 (S.C.C.); R.v. Hopke, decision of McPherson C.J.Q.B. #575 of 1994; R.v. Wheeler, [1994] N.J. No. 737 Man. P.C.; R.v. Authurs, (1981), 63 C.C.C. (2d), 573, (Sask. C.A.); and Forseburg, decision of my brother Kolenick P.C.J.; upon this review of the case law, I conclude that the facts that were in the mind of the officer at the time he decided to make the demand did amount to reasonable and probable grounds for his doing so. Issue #2 Whether the Demand Met the Requirements of (I) the Sample Being Taken by Medical Practitioner or Under the Supervision of Medical Practitioner (II) Whether the Officer Actually Had Obtained Information From the Physician so that He Could be Confident and Advise the Accused that the Taking of the Blood Sample Would Not Endanger the Life of The Accused? 26. The relevant parts of subsections 254(3) and (4) read: "254(3) where peace officer believes on reasonable and probable grounds that person ... at any time within the preceding three hours has committed, as result of consumption of alcohol, an offence under subsection 253, the peace officer may, by demand to that person forthwith or soon as practicable, require that person to provide then or as soon thereafter as is practicable ... (b) where the peace officer has reasonable and probable grounds to believe that, by reason of the physical condition of the person, (i) the person may be incapable in providing sample of his breath; or (ii) it would be impracticable to obtain sample of his breath, such samples of the person's blood, under the conditions referred to in subsection (4), as in the opinion of the qualified medical practitioner or qualified technician taking the samples are necessary to enable proper analysis to be made in order to determine the concentration, if any, of alcohol in the persons' blood, and to accompany the peace officer for the purpose of enabling such samples to be taken. (4) samples of blood may only be taken from person pursuant to demand made by peace officer under subsection (3) if the samples are taken by or under the direction of qualified medical practitioner and the qualified medical practitioner is satisfied that the taking of those samples would not endanger the life or health of the person ... 258(1) In any proceedings under section 255(1) in respect of an offence committed under Section 253 or in any proceedings under subsection 255(2) or (3), ... (d) where sample of the blood of the accused has been taken pursuant to demand made under subsection 254(3) or otherwise with the consent of the accused or pursuant to warrant issued under section 256 if ... (ii) both samples referred to in subparagraph (i) were taken as soon as practicable after the time when the offence was alleged to have been committed and in any event not later than two hours after that time, (iii) both samples referred to in paragraph (i) were taken by qualified medical practitioner or qualified technician under the direction of qualified medical practitioner, ... (v) an analysis was made by an analyst of at least one of the samples that was contained in sealed approved container, evidence of the result of the analysis is, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, proof that the concentration of alcohol in the blood of the accused at the time of when the offence was alleged to have been committed was the concentration determined by the analysis or, where more than one sample was analysed and results of the analyses are the same, the concentration determined by the analyses and, where the results of the analyses are different, the lowest of the concentration determined by the analyses; (d.1) where ... sample of the blood the accused have been taken as described in paragraph ... (d) under the conditions described therein and the results of the analyses show concentration of alcohol in blood exceeding 80 milligrams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood, evidence of the result of the analyses is, in the absence of evidence tending to show that the concentration of alcohol in the blood of the accused at the time when the offence was alleged to have been committed, did not exceed 80 milligrams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood, proof that the concentration of alcohol in the blood of the accused at the time when the offence was alleged to have been committed exceeded 80 milligrams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood; (e) certificate of an analyst stating that the analyst has made an analysis of sample of the blood, ... of the accused and stating the result that the analysis is evidence of the facts alleged in the certificate without proof of the signature or the official character of the person appearing to have signed the certificate; ... (h) where sample of blood of the accused has been taken pursuant to demand made under subparagraph 254(3) or otherwise with the consent of the accused or ... (i) certificate of qualified medical practitioner stating that (A) the medical practitioner took the sample and that before the sample was taken he was of the opinion that the taking of the blood sample from the accused would not endanger the life or health of the accused and, ... (B) at the time the sample was taken an additional sample of the blood of the accused was taken to permit an analysis of one of the samples to be made by or on behalf of the accused, (C) the time when and place where both samples referred to in clause (B) were taken, and (D) both samples referred to in clause (B) were received from the accused directly into or placed directly into approved containers that were subsequently sealed and that are identified in the certificate, (ii) certificate of qualified medical practitioner stating that the medical practitioner caused the sample to be taken by qualified technician under his direction and that before the sample was taken the qualified medical practitioner was of the opinion referred to in clause (i)(A) or (iii) certificate of qualified technician stating that the technician took the sample and the facts referred to in clauses (i)(B) to (D) is evidence to the facts alleged in the certificate without proof of the signature or official character of the person appearing to have signed the certificate; and (i) certificate of an analyst stating that the analyst has made an analysis of sample of blood of the accused that was contained in sealed approved container identified in the certificate, the date on which and place where the sample was analysed and the result of that analysis is evidence of the facts alleged in the certificate without proof the signature or official character of the person appearing to have signed it." 27. These provisions of the Criminal Code create evidentiary rules that assist the Crown in its proof of the essential elements of the offence. Of particular significance in this case, subsection 258(1)(h) (supra.) permits proof by certificate of certain matters as set out in the provision and certified by qualified practitioner. It states that the following may be proved by certificate of qualified medical practitioner: (1) sample was taken by the medical practitioner; (2) the medical practitioner held the opinion that the taking of blood samples would not endanger the life or health of the accused; (3) an additional sample of blood was taken; (4) the time when and place where both samples were taken; and (5) both samples ... were received from the accused directly into approved containers that were subsequently sealed and that are identified in the certificate. 28. In this case the Crown attempted to prove these listed items by filing the certificate of qualified medical practitioner (P-5). The certificate which sets out the particulars was signed by Dr. Depadua and on its face appears to meet the requirements of the section in order to be valid proof of the facts stated in the certificate. However, the evidence at trial disclosed that the document was completed by the police officer; that the doctor had no recollection of having addressed his mind to the facts as set out in the certificate at the time he signed the certificate; nor did he recall signing the certificate. In fact his testimony was in relation to visit by the officer at the hospital and not at his home. P-5, am satisfied on the evidence of the officer, was signed at the doctor's home. The doctor also testified that he relies on police officers and trusts them. His testimony on whole led me to conclude that he would have signed anything placed before him by the police officer. 29. Although have no doubt that the police officer acted with the greatest of integrity in taking the second certificate to the doctor and in obtaining the doctor's signature on it, am left with reasonable doubt as to whether the doctor addressed his mind to the facts and opinions to the truth of which he was certifying. I, therefore, find that the medical certificate (P-5), cannot be accepted as proof of the facts set out therein. 30. In the absence of the certificate has the Crown established beyond reasonable doubt the matters that could have been proved by the certificate? 31. (a) Has the Crown proved beyond reasonable doubt that the samples were taken by medical practitioner or under the supervision of medical practitioner? As set out in my findings of fact, I am satisfied that, although the Crown has not proved whether the doctor or a technician actually took the blood sample, there is no other logical conclusion on the facts than that either the doctor took the samples himself or the technician took them under the supervision of the doctor. 32. (b) Has the Crown proved beyond reasonable doubt that before the samples of blood were taken, the doctor was of the opinion that the taking of the blood samples from the accused would not endanger his life or health? As stated in my findings of fact, am satisfied that Dr. Depadua's attention on the night in question was wholly directed to the care and treatment of his patient. I am satisfied that the doctor would have acted to prevent any occurrence that would have endangered the life or health of his patient. Given that the doctor was present when the blood was taken either taking it himself or supervising its taking conclude that the doctor was of the opinion that the taking of the sample would not endanger the accused's life or health. have no doubt in drawing this conclusion despite the fact that the doctor had no recollection of telling the officer that there would be no danger to the life or health of the accused in taking the blood sample. To reiterate, the doctor's attention was not focused on the legal requirements of the Criminal Code. However, he was focused on the needs of his patient. In re-examination the doctor testified that if he said it was okay to take the sample then the taking of the sample would not endanger the life or health of the accused. have found that indeed the officer did ask the permission of the doctor to take the samples and have no doubt in accepting the officer's testimony that the doctor advised him that it was okay to do so. The doctor clearly would not have done so if he were of the opinion that in doing so there would be any danger to the life or health of his patient. 33. Was the doctor's opinion that the taking of the sample would not endanger the life or health of the accused communicated to the officer? The officer testified that after he formed the opinion that he had reasonable and probable grounds to make demand, he spoke with the doctor. The doctor advised him that the accused would be kept in hospital. The officer testified that he asked the doctor for permission to get blood in respect to impaired driving. The doctor subsequently told him "now you can talk to him now". The officer then proceeded to make the demand reading from the card supplied by his police force for such purpose. 34. Although the officer could have communicated his request of permission from the doctor to make the demand in more explicit language in respect to the question of any danger to the life or health of the accused, am satisfied that in receiving permission from the doctor, the officer was of the view that the doctor was granting such permission because the doctor held the opinion that the taking of the blood samples for law enforcement reasons would not endanger the life or health of the accused. am assisted in reaching this conclusion, when review the evidence as whole and see how careful the officer was in not jumping to conclusions that he had reasonable and probable grounds. 35. (c) Has the Crown established that an additional sample was taken, the time when and place where both samples were taken, and that both samples were received from the accused directly into approved containers that were subsequently sealed and that are identified as being the blood of the accused. The two vials of blood were entered in evidence. Each vial has the accused's name, the date and time of taking of the samples, the initials of the doctor and police officer. The police officer testified to receiving both these vials on the date in question from the technician who was working with the doctor to care for the accused. accept this evidence as establishing that the blood was taken at the specific time and place as stated on the vial and that the said blood was taken from the accused. accept the evidence of the officer and doctor that the samples were taken from the accused while at the Victoria Hospital, Prince Albert. There is no evidence before me to suggest that the vials entered into evidence are not approved containers. Each vial is sealed. I conclude that the Crown has proved beyond a reasonable doubt by other evidence all of the matters that could have been proved by the certificate, P-5, if it could have been relied upon. Issue #3 Whether the Accused Gave Valid Consent 36. Having found that the officer has reasonable and probable grounds to make a demand for a sample of the accused\'s blood pursuant to the requirements of Sections 254 and 258 of the Criminal Code, the accused\'s consent was not required. See: R.v. Knox, (1966), 1996 CanLII 171 (SCC), 109 C.C.C. (3d) 481 at para. 8. Issue #4 Whether the Blood Samples Were Taken as Soon as Practicable? 37. The officer arrived at the scene of the accident at 1:12 a.m.. The accused arrived at the hospital at 1:41 a.m. The doctor gave the officer permission to make the demand at 1:52 a.m.. The officer made the demand at 1:55 a.m.. Given the condition of the accused and his need for care and, given the limitations on the opportunities to the officer to observe the accused to determine if he had reasonable and probable grounds to make a demand, there is no question in my mind that the officer proceeded with all due diligence and without any unnecessary delay. From the time of the demand to the seizure of the blood by the officer is some 46 minutes. accept the testimony of the officer that there was no blood kit at the hospital. He had to arrange to have kit brought to the hospital. Once it arrived, it took some 20 minutes to get the blood from the accused. The medical staff were having difficulties getting the blood. The accused complained about how long it was taking. Given these facts, I conclude - relying on the approach taken in R.v. Van Der Veen, (1988), 1988 ABCA 277 (CanLII), 44 C.C.C. (3d) 38 (Alberta Court of Appeal), and, R.v. Phillips, (1988), 1988 CanLII 198 (ON CA), 42 C.C.C. (3d) 150 (Ont. Court of Appeal) - the blood was taken within a reasonably prompt time under all of the circumstances. Issue #5 Whether the Crown Can Rely on the Certificate of Qualified Medical Practitioner (P-5) Where on Evidence as Whole There is Reasonable Doubt as to Whether the Physician Took the Sample Himself or Supervised Technician in Taking of the Sample? 38. As indicated in my discussion of the issue under the question of whether the demand met the requirements on issue #2, indicated that found it necessary to say that could not rely upon the certificate of the qualified medical practitioner in all of the circumstances of this case. However, as indicated in the discussions under that issue also concluded that all of the elements that would have otherwise been proved by entry of the certificate, have been proved by the Crown beyond reasonable doubt by other evidence led. 39. There is no basis on the evidence as a whole to exclude the Certificate of Analyst. Therefore, it establishes that the accused\'s blood alcohol level at the time of driving was 159 milligrams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood. 40. On review of the evidence as a whole I have no reasonable doubt that the Crown has established all of the elements of the offence, I find the accused guilty as charged. DATED this 19th day of December, A.D., 2001, at the City of Prince Albert in the Province of Saskatchewan. T.B. Bekolay, Provincial Court Judge
The Crown withdrew one count at the opening of the trial and the accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while having a blood alcohol concentration in excess of .08 contrary to s.253(b) and s.255(1) of the Criminal Code. In issue was whether the police officer had reasonable and probable grounds to make the breath demand; whether the demand met the requirements of the sample being taken by or under supervision of a medical practioner; whether the officer actually obtained information that taking the sample would not endanger the accused's life; whether the accused gave valid consent; whether the blood samples were taken as soon as practicable; whether the Crown could rely on the certificate where there was a reasonable doubt as to whether the physician took the sample himself or supervised a technician. HELD: The accused was found guilty. There was no basis on the evidence as a whole to exclude the Certificate of Analysis, which established the accused's blood alcohol level was 1.59 at the time of driving. 1)The officer had reasonable and probable grounds when he made the demand, including the accused was in the driver's seat; the odour of alcohol; the open bottle of beer; the nature of the accident. 2)Although the medical certificate could not be accepted as proof of the facts set out therein, the Crown did prove beyond a reasonable doubt by other evidence all the matters that could have been proven by the certificate. There was a reasonable doubt as to whether the doctor addressed his mind to the facts and opinion to the truth of what he was certifying. The doctor's mind was directed to the medical needs of the patient. His evidence was based on normal practice - not specific memory. There was no other logical conclusion that either the doctor or technician took the samples. The doctor would not have given permission to take samples if there was any danger to the life or health of his patient. 3)Since the officer had reasonable and probable grounds to make a demand for a sample of blood, the accused's consent was not required. 4)The officer proceeded with all due diligence and without any necessary delay. The blood was taken within a reasonably prompt time under all the circumstances.  5)The accused's admission that the accident affected his memory of the events following it and had no recollection of having passed the other vehicle just prior and that he was not driving like he normally drove and was perhaps going too fast for the road conditions (the gravel road was a wash board but was not at its worst condition) were noted.