1993 File No. 1201‑47245 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NOVA SCOTIA BETWEEN: ALICE BERYL HICKEY and THOMAS EARLE HICKEY, JR. DECISION HEARD: at Halifax, Nova Scotia before the Honourable Justice Margaret J. Stewart on March 21 and 22, 1994 DECISION: May 25, 1994 COUNSEL: Graydon Lally, for the petitioner Kay L. Rhodenizer, for the respondent Stewart, J.: On August 29, 1980, Alice Beryl Hickey and Thomas Earl Hickey, Jr. were married in Moncton, New Brunswick. They have two children, Conor Andrew Hickey, born January 27, 1989 (7 years) and Braden James Hickey, born September 13, 1988 (51/2 years). The parties separated in June of 1992, and Mr. Hickey voluntarily left the matrimonial home in late November, 1992. am satisfied that all procedure and jurisdictional matters have been properly proven. There has been marriage breakdown and the divorce is granted. The parties\' claim under the Matrimonial Property Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 275 and for Corollary Relief under the Divorce Act, R.S.C. 1985 (2nd Supp), c. 3 was resolved by agreement, prior to trial, except for1. how the children\'s investments, in the approximate amount of $2,000.00 each, should be administered;2. custodial alternatives ‑ sole or joint custody;3. specific access;4. quantum of child maintenance. 1. The Children's Investments Investments in Canada Savings Bonds and Mutual Funds exist in the children's names in the approximate amount of $2,000.00 each. Mr. Hickey disagrees with the investment strategy of using Canada Savings Bonds as he questions whether they yield an appropriate return. He proposes that the investments be jointly administered and controlled by the parties or alternatively that half the investments be transferred to his control to hold in trust and to administer, and the other half be held and administered by Mrs. Hickey. After hearing each other's positions, this issue was resolved at trial. The Corollary Relief order shall reflect the parties' agreement for each parent to hold in trust and administer one‑half the investments. would remind the parties that this is the children's money and they are responsible and accountable to the children for the monies. 2. The Custodial Alternatives sole or joint custody Mr. Hickey seeks equal parental control and responsibility by an order for joint custody under s. 16(4) of the Divorce Act. Mrs. Hickey, proposes sole custody, wishing to be the final decision maker in matters relating to the children\'s welfare, growth and development while being prepared to promote maximum contact between the children and their father to the extent that this is consistent with the best interests of the children. She is not adverse to consulting and seeking his input prior to making important or major decisions affecting the children. The day to day physical custody, and decision making during this period are her greatest concerns. am required to consider the best interests of the children of the marriage, having reference to their conditions, means, needs and other circumstances. (s. 16(a)). have reviewed and considered the extensive case law provided by counsel. (Zwicker v. Morine (1980), 1980 CanLII 2547 (NS SC), 38 N.S.R. (2d) 236 (N.S.S.C., AD.); McCann v. McCann (1993), 1993 CanLII 4675 (NS SC), 120 N.S.R. (2d) 59 (N.S.S.C., T.D.); Hines v. Hines (1992), 40 R.F.L. (3d) 274 (N.S.S.C., T.D.); Kruger v. Kruger (1979), 1979 CanLII 1663 (ON CA), 11 R.F.L. (2d) 52 (Ont. CA.); Fry v. Silkalns (1993), 1993 CanLII 254 (BC SC), 47 R.F.L. (3d) 169 (B.C.S.C.); Donnelly v. Donnelly (1988), 85 N.S.R. (2d) 257 (N.S.S.C., T.D.); Buckroyd v. Garratt (1990), 98 N.S.R. (2d) 29 (N.S.F.C.) ;Baker v. Baker (1978), R.F.L. (2d) 193 (Ont. H.C.); Baker v. Baker (1979), 1979 CanLII 1962 (ON CA), R.F.L. (2d) 236 (Ont. C.A.); Kaemmle v. Jewson (1993), 50 R.F.L. (3d) 70 (Ont. H.C.); Parsons v. Parsons (1985), 48 R.F.L. (2d) 84 (Nfld. S.C., Unified Family Court); S.C.C. v. P.P.C. (1993), 122 N.S.R. (2d) 205 (N.S.F.C.); Glasgow v. Glasgow (1983), 57 N.S.R. (2d) 355 (N.S.S.C., A.D.); MacKinnon v. MacKinnon (1988), 84 N.S.R. (2d) 363 (N.S.F.C.); Carruthers v. Carruthers (1982), 55 N.S.R. (2d) 88 (S.C., T.D.); Sullivan v. Sullivan (1989), 91 N.S.R. (2d) 404 (S.C., T.D.); Turner v. Turner (1991), 102 N.S.R. (2d) 316 (S.C., T.D.) There is no issue as to parenting abilities. Each acknowledges the other as fit and proper parent with appropriate and, for the most part, equatable philosophies and approaches to child development. They are both caring, capable and equally acceptable parents who are involved and proud of their children. Employed at Dalhousie University Killam library for the past fourteen years, as librarian assistant, Mrs. Hickey has worked part‑time since 1987, on three day week basis from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. She presently has Mondays and Fridays off. The decision to work part‑time was mutual one and permitted her to spend more time with the children and to assume responsibility for the scheduling and organizing of their activities, including health care appointments. Her employer has proved to be flexible and allows her to use vacation days on short notice when the children are ill. During the marriage, she was the parent to respond to any emergencies during the work day and reserved one week of her vacation time for such emergencies. Mr. Hickey works full time as an environmental consultant with Jacques Whitford Association Limited and is able to schedule his work schedule for the most part around the children. He is not as immediately accessible during the day as Mrs. Hickey. During the marriage, he was actively involved in caring for the children including such things as meal preparation, putting them to bed and attending at sporting activities. Throughout their lives, the children have had the benefit of one constant, outside the home, sitter, whom the parties continue to use. Both children now attend school and they are dropped off and picked up at the sitters during the school year. As of trial date, the parties were separated for sixteen months. Mrs. Hickey and the two children continue to reside in the matrimonial home and since June, 1993, Mr. Neil Stover widow and long‑time family friend, and his two boys, ages four and five have resided with them. Since August, 1993, Mr. Hickey has been renting three bedroom townhouse ten minutes from the matrimonial home and the sitter's home. For the first six months following the physical separation in November of 1992, Mr. Hickey attended at the matrimonial home on Tuesday and Wednesday evenings to care for and interact with the children as well as to bathe and put them to bed. Split weekend access was shared by the parents for the first month or so and then changed to alternating weekends. Justice Gruchy, in an oral decision on June 30, 1993, following an interim custody hearing, ordered joint custody of the children, with maximum exposure to each parent through, among other provisions, regular alternating weekend contact by the father from Friday evening until Sunday and during the week, while the children engage in their regular activities, on two consecutive overnights from Tuesday after school until Thursday, when they are to be picked up by their mother. In ordering this joint custody, Justice Gruchy made specific to "access" the following comments: again emphasize that my decision, especially with respect to access, is intended to be interim only. do so, because as the children get older, it would be foolhardy to have them going from home to home during the week. Children in the school need stability of one home and uniformity of approach with respect to school work, bedtime hours, television watching and many other activities. At their present ages, that need may not be as pressing as it will be in year or so; therefore, subject to such changes make below, will order that the respondent will have access. He also provided that the joint custody would only continue to January, 1994, in the hope that the trial would by then have moved along. Mrs. Hickey notes regressive behaviour by the children since this interim order. She describes them as being more subdued, clingy and wanting to be with her upon their return home. Unclear as to whether it was during the summer or the fall, she observes Conor has commenced carrying his blanket with him again and guidelines had to be set as to when and where he can have it. Braden commenced crying spells at daycare and in the fall when he first started school. This is now ceased. She specifically finds Conor, at times, to be more aggressive towards her, rude and inclined to answer back. Since the fall, she notes the evening ritual of going to bed has become prolonged with requests by both for back rubs and having difficulty in getting to sleep. She observes their sleep pattern appears disturbed. She cites one incident of Conor falling asleep on the school bus. She raises concern that the children find the week day overnight schedule confusing and points to them regularly asking her the where, whom and when's of their times with each parent. Under cross‑examination, she agreed she had not resorted to colored calendar setting out the particulars to assist them with concepts and times. She also agreed that nothing to date has caused her to seek counselling for the children. Mr. Hickey sees no significant difference in the children during the last eight and half months of functioning under the parenting schedule set out in the interim custody order. The children appear to be happy and content to be with him. He is unaware of any sleep difficulties and usually has them in bed by 8:15 or 8:30 p.m. This is approximately fifteen minutes to half an hour later than Mrs. Hickey. Although they can call their mother, at any time they wish, he observes that usually it is she who calls them. He places no significance on Conor's recent re‑attachment to his blanket. Through his counsel, he points to the order coinciding with Mr. Stover and his two young boys moving into the matrimonial home and an obvious need for making adjustments and learning to share, despite the children's life‑long friendship with the Stover children. The February, 1994 school report cards reflect no behavioral problems by either child, and Conor's card reports him functioning at highly satisfactory level. Mr. Hickey expresses concerns that the primary focus of the time he will have with the children, without week day overnights, will end up being the activities they are enrolled in rather than allowing him, at the same time, to foster meaningful relationship through basic normal family functioning and interaction such as homework completion, bath time, story time, sharing of breakfast, etc. He does not want to react to the children's needs but rather to be part of the nurturing and channelling of their potential attributes. Without the specifics set out in parenting. plan, allowing him to be decision maker during the times the children are scheduled to be with him, he is not confident that Mrs. Hickey will acknowledge the children's need to benefit from having both parents' guidance and input; rather she will always make their scheduled activities the necessary primary focus during the week nights they are with him. He cites as examples, soccer and day camp scheduling during March break. He notes that her failure to communicate the latter resulted in him having two less days in which to go away with the children during the break. Mr. Hickey points to some demonstrable evidence of past co‑operation prior to the interim order which shows the parties' ability to agree for the benefit of the children. For example, he notes the free flow of toys between households, Mrs. Hickey's placement of school notices into the children's overnight bag for his information, the regular uninterrupted telephone access between the children and the other parent and their ability to change from split weekends to alternating weekends when they realized this was better for everyone. Mrs. Hickey expresses confusion as to what Mr. Hickey is proposing in terms of the specific rights and obligations of each parent when the children are in the specific care of the other. Is she to be excluded from the decision making process respecting the children's care while in their father's care or is it implicit that both parents must co‑operate in joint decision making regardless of which parent has physical custody of the children? She cites babysitting arrangements as an example. Besides being comment on the inadequate communication level between them, her confusion is understandable given Mr. Hickey's response on cross‑examination concerning who would make the sitter arrangements. His response was not totally in keeping with joint cooperative decision making theme. While confirming his responsibility for the children, while in his care on weekdays, he stated that at present, he would not be looking for or making different day care arrangements. He then, however, qualified it with "but might" before proceeding to indicate his satisfaction with the present sitter who had been mutual choice and then later spoke in terms of them both possibly seeking alternative day care arrangements in the future. accept that both parents are willing and able to facilitate and encourage close and continuing parent‑child relationship between the children and the other parent. They vary in how this is to be achieved. There is nothing calculated or agenda setting in either of their approaches which is intended to interfere with the other parent. They are motivated by their interest in and concern for the children and not by desire to intentionally interfere or usurp the other parent's relationship with the children. am satisfied that both parents have been advised by their lawyers of the advisability of resolving custody access and support disputes by negotiation or mediation pursuant to s. (2) of the Divorce Act and are aware of the inherent limitations of the adversarial legal process through this application and their various prior court appearances. As parents, they are intelligent, civil individuals who have made an effort to avoid drawing their children into their own stressful relationship. This they achieve by avoiding total contact with one another and unfortunately it has flowed over into how they deal with concerns for the children. This lack of contact concerning the children is truly problematic. Joint custody is complex and there are many details of logistics, timing and notices to be discussed and worked out. It demands frequent contact and people who are flexible, accommodating, trusting and motivated to make it work. Although it can be judicially encouraged and endorsed, parental cooperation cannot be easily ordered. Common sense tells us that parental cooperation and ability to communicate is central to its success. (RE: J. and C.; Catholic Children's Aid Society of Metropolitan Toronto v. S. and S. (1985), 48 R.F.L. (2d) 371 at 381 (Ont. Prov. CO. The specifics of this case lead me to believe that the parties, who have functioned under joint custody order for eight and half months, need more than the tool or the guide that is being suggested by Mr. Hickey in his detailed proposal. Communications are so strained, Mr. Hickey really wants daily road maps to tell each of them exactly what to do with and for the children in order to accommodate the parents' inability to communicate. They lack flexibility to discuss and communicate and the will to resolve without regular court interference. Of the two parents, find that Mrs. Hickey appears to be more flexible and accommodating. Since the interim order for joint custody, in June of 1993, it has been necessary for the parties to return to Court to resolve Christmas access, as they were not able to agree on the interpretation of the order or resolve the holiday visitation between themselves. This application, before Justice Saunders, coincided with an application to vary the interim maintenance and was before pending appeal by both parties early in the new year of the interim joint custody order itself. Both the Supreme Court and the Appeal Court dismissed the matters and Justice Saunders clarified for the parties visitation over the 1993 holiday season. During the trial, it was necessary for me to make inquiries about the parties' position on the appropriate arrangements for Easter vacation and then having to order it rather than being presented with their agreement. The decision consisted of Mrs. Hickey having Easter weekend 1994 as Mr. Hickey had it the year before when it was suppose to be Mrs. Hickey's turn. This pattern so early on does not fair well for continued joint custodial arrangement. To date, it has not been the "occasional resort" to the Court referred to by Wilson, J. in her dissent at p. 73 in Krugger v. Krugger (1980 ), 1979 CanLII 1663 (ON CA), 11 R.F.L. (2d) 52. It is impossible to determine the source or the reason why the symptoms or responses of the children as described by Mrs. Hickey are occurring. It could be any single or combination of factors that have occurred since June 30, 1993. It is possible that two consecutive week day overnights with their father are causing disruption and discontinuity to the children's developmental needs. cannot lightly dismiss the children's reaction. accept them as fact and not as fabrication by parent who is strongly opposed to joint custody. have also considered the possibility, among many others, that the week day overnights with their father provides them the benefit of one parent's concentrated focus. On the other band, at their mother's home they have the constant presence of two other young boys. am conscious of the benefit to be derived from both parents' guidance and input on regular basis. Having heard the evidence specific to these children, do, however, agree with and give substantial weight to Justice Gruchy's comments in his interim order about it being foolhardy to have the children going from home to home during the week. Children of this age need security, stability, continuity and the confidence engendered by regularity, particularly during the school year. Their present schedule allows for only five consecutive nights in one bed over fourteen day span. am left to weigh among other factors, the need of the children for an on‑going relationship with two equally responsible parents who will contribute to their emotional and developmental needs and help them mitigate the obvious effects of the parental separation, the potential for disruption and discontinuity in their developmental needs by certain joint custody arrangements, and the effect upon the children of exposure to on‑going custody litigation. Having in mind the best interests of the children, I am satisfied the present joint custody arrangement is not working on a day‑to‑day decision making basis. I order that both parents continue to share equal rights and responsibilities for major matters affecting the children\'s welfare specifically in the areas of formal education, religion and major health issues, while ordering the mother to have sole responsibility and decision making authority for the day‑to‑day physical care and control of the children and the father generous access. The evidence did not reveal any pressing or immediate differences of philosophy or opinion between the parties in these major areas. Both are supportive of French emersion and express no strong religious preferences or concerns. At present, these do not appear to be areas of conflict between the parties, that would require immediate dialogue or open communication. These are areas of significant importances to the children's development and they should have the benefit of both parents' thoughts and input. When the need arises for decisions in these major areas, the parties will have to dialogue to achieve solutions for the benefit of the children. If the present communication impasse has not been overcome in the meantime then, in the interest of the children, one of the parties will have to be given the responsibility of making final decision in these areas. One of the factors that may be considered on any future review will undoubtedly be the willingness of each party to work at achieving meaningful dialogue in order to reach solution most beneficial to the children. am concerned about the lack of dialogue between the parties to date. With respect to these major areas, in view of the lack of immediate urgency, am continuing with the spirit of joint decision making because of its obvious desirability in promoting the interests of the children. If, by the time some decisions in these areas are required, the impasse has not been overcome, then the interest of the children will dictate the need for decision maker. 3. The Access Plan During the course of the direct and cross‑examination, the parties indicated their agreement to number of provisions concerning the children, being incorporated into the Corollary Relief Judgement. The following shall be reflected in the order: A. Neither party shall change the children's surnames, either legally or by common usage without prior mutual consent. B. Neither party will apply to obtain passport for the children without the prior written consent of the other, such consent shall not be unreasonably withheld. C. Each parent shall appoint the other as guardian of the children in any will they execute. D. If Mrs. Hickey intends to move more than fifty kilometres from her present residence, she shall give Mr. Hickey minimum of ninety days notice of her intention to move and if Mr. Hickey disagrees with the proposed move, he may apply to court of competent jurisdiction for review of the custody and access. have reviewed the access provisions submitted for my consideration at hearing by Mr. Hickey. Following his format, am prepared to adopt the provisions as agreed by the parties and order pursuant to s. 16 as the minimum access to the father, the following: GENERAL PROVISIONS 1. The parties may, as required in the best interest of the children, from time to time, agree to adhoc variations of the access terms by mutual agreement. Such adhoc variations shall not be deemed to establish precedent for ongoing variations of the access terms. 2. All notice shall be given by telephone or in person. 3. Each parent shall have reasonable telephone access to the children at reasonable times when the children are not in their care. Where either parent is going to remove the children from their residence, overnight, the other parent shall be advised of the telephone number where the children may be reached during that period. For the purposes of establishing the sequence of alternating weekend access, it is confirmed that the father's next access weekend commences in accordance with the existing schedule. WEEKENDS AND LONG WEEKENDS 4. Except where otherwise specified, the children will visit with their father every second weekend. The father will pick the children up at the mother's home at 4:30 p.m. on Friday and return them to the mother's home at 7:00 p.m. on Sundays. This access shall hereafter be referred to as "regular weekend access". 5. If statutory holiday or children's school holiday (such as, but not limited to, an in‑service day) falls immediately before the regular access weekend, the children may spend that holiday commencing at 9:00 a.m. with the father in addition to the regular weekend access. The father will notify the mother at least fourteen days before the holiday whether he intends to add this extra day to the regular weekend access. 6. Where holiday or children's school holiday (including but not limited to in‑service days) does not fall immediately before or after regular weekend access, the parent who would otherwise have the children with them, shall have the children with them on that holiday. Where the holiday falls during the time the children would be with the father, the father may spend that day with the children rather than sending the children to day care or an extra curricular activity. 7. Paragraphs do not apply to any holidays which occur during the summer vacation, March break, Easter, Thanksgiving or Christmas week. WEEK DAY ACCESS 8. From September to June 30 of each year, the children shall spend each Tuesday and Wednesday evening from 4:30 to 7:30 with their father who shall accommodate their activities, if any. The father will pick the children at 4:30 p.m. on Tuesday and Wednesday from either the mother's home or their place of normal activity (such as, but not limited to, day care, school or sport's field, etc.) and shall return the children to their mother's home at 7:30 p.m. each Tuesday and Wednesday evenings. 9. From July to August 31 of each year, the children shall spend two consecutive nights with their father on Tuesday and Wednesday evenings. The father shall pick the children up at 4:30 p.m.on Tuesday and Wednesday from either the mother's home or their place of normal activity (such as, but not limited to, day camp, sitter, sport's field, etc.) and drop the children off at 7:00 a.m. on Wednesday and Thursday mornings at either the mother's home or their place of normal activity. As this will only be for four weeks during the summer, in view of the provisions for summer vacation, any plans the father may wish to make for joint activities, between himself and the children during the day on Wednesday and Thursday, shall be accommodated over any day camp/sitter arrangements, provided sufficient notice is given. The children shall be returned to their mother's home at 7:30 p.m. Thursday, if they spend the day with their father. The visits in paragraphs and are hereafter called "regular weekday visits". 10. The period from December 24th until January 1st inclusive in each year is hereafter called "Christmas Week". 11. An even number years commencing in 1994, the children will be with; (a) the father from noon December 24th until 7:00 p.m. December 25th (b) the mother from 7:00 p.m. December 25th until 9:00 a.m. December 27th (c) the father from 9:00 a.m. December 27th until 7:00 p.m. December 29th (d) the mother from 7:00 p.m. December 29th until the next regular access day which would otherwise have occurred after January 1. 12. In odd number years commencing in 1995, the children will be with: (a) the mother from noon December 24th until 7:00 p.m. December 25th (b) the father from 7:00 p.m. December 25th until 9:00 a.m. December 27th (c) the mother from 9:00 a.m. December 27th until 7:00 p.m. December 29th (d) the father from 7:00 p.m. December 29th until 7:00 p.m. January (e) the regular weekend and weekday access schedule will resume on the first day on which the father would otherwise have had regular access after January 1. MARCH BREAK 13. March break means the five days the children are not in school. In odd numbered years commencing in 1995, the children will spend March break with their father. In even number years commencing in 1996, the children will spend March break with their mother. 14. The March break time with the father may be combined with the regular weekend access. If March break follows immediately after regular access weekend, the children will say overnight with the father on the Sunday prior to March break. If March break falls immediately before regular access weekend, he shall pick them up from the mother's home at 9:00 a.m. on the Monday and return them at 7:00 p.m. on the following Sunday. 15. If the children spend March break with their mother and that precedes the father's regular access weekend, he shall pick them up at 4:30 p.m. on the Friday of March break. 16. Easter holiday means from Good Friday to Easter Monday. In odd number years, commencing in 1995, the children will spend the Easter holiday with their mother. In even number years, commencing in 1996, the children will spend Easter holiday with their father. In arriving at the start up date, am conscious that the children spent this Easter with their mother but note the appropriateness of alternating the March break and Easter periods between the parties given the close time proximity. The father's regular weekend and weekday access schedule will resume on the first day on which the father would otherwise have had regular access after Easter Monday. If, however, the Easter holiday is spent with the mother on the father's regular weekend, his regular weekend access schedule shall resume the next weekend. Similarly, if the Easter holiday is spent with the father on the mother's regular weekend, her regular weekend access schedule will resume the next weekend. THANKSGIVING 17. Thanksgiving weekend means from Friday at 4:30 p.m. until Thanksgiving Monday at 7:00 p.m. In odd numbered years, commencing in 1995, the children will spend Thanksgiving weekend with their father. In even numbered years, commencing in 1996, the children will spend Thanksgiving weekend with their mother. The father's regular weekend and weekday access schedule will resume on the first day on which the father would otherwise have had regular access after Thanksgiving Monday. If, however, the Thanksgiving weekend is spent with the mother on the father's regular weekend, his regular weekend access schedule will resume the next weekend. Similarly, if the Thanksgiving weekend is spent with the father on the mothers' regular weekend, her regular weekend access schedule will resume the next weekend. OTHER SPECIAL OCCASIONS 18. Children's birthdays When the children are with the father on their birthdays according to the regular weekend access schedule, the mother may pick up both children from the father and visit with them for two hour period. When the children are with the mother on their birthdays, the father may pick up both children from the mother and visit with them for two hour period. In both cases, the time of the visit shall be mutually agreed upon in advance or failing agreement shall be from 5:00 p.m. until 7:00 p.m. 19. Mother's Day If Mother's Day falls during the father's regular weekend access, the mother shall be entitled to pick the children up from the father at 9:00 a.m. on Mother's Day and the balance of Mother's Day will be spent with her. 20. Father's Day If Father's Day does not fall during the father's regular weekend access, the father shall be entitled to pick the children up from the mother at 9:00 a.m. on Father's Day and shall return the children to the mother at 7:00 p.m. 21. Hickey Family Re‑union If the children would not otherwise be with the father on the weekend of the Hickey Family Re‑union, the mother will adjust her regular weekend schedule to accommodate the children's attendance at the event; provided that, as soon as the event has been scheduled, but in any event no later than thirty days, before the father shall notify the mother of the event. If the re‑union occurs on the mother's regular weekend, her regular weekend access schedule will resume the next weekend. 22. Summer vacation In even numbered years, commencing 1994, the mother shall have first choice of the time she will vacation with the children, provided that she gives notice of her choice of dates not later than June 1. If she fails to give notice by that date, the father may have first notice of his vacation period with the children. The reverse arrangement will apply in odd numbered years. The party not having first choice of summer vacation date shall notify the other of his or her vacation dates, not later than June 15th. 23. The summer vacation period shall be defined as starting from the day after the children finish school until the sixth day before the children start school in September. The regular weekend and weekday access shall continue except as required to accommodate the following provisions for summer vacation. 24. Each parent may take two separate vacations of one week each (from 9:00 a.m. Monday until 9:00 a.m. the following Monday) or one consecutive two week's vacation (9:00 a.m. Monday until 9:00 a.m. on the second Monday thereafter). 25. When the father's vacation week or weeks follow the regular access weekend, he shall not be obliged to return the children to the mother's home on the Sunday evening before the vacation. 4. The Ouantum of Child Maintenance Mrs. Hickey and Mr. Stover an annual family income of approximately $84,000.00, with Mrs. Hickey earning $16,716.00. Mr. Hickey's annual income is $70,600.00 and in addition, he receives an annual bonus consisting of combination of shares in the company and cash. His after tax bonus for the years 1990, 1991, and 1992 was $2,000.00, $2,400.00 and $850.00 respectively. Pursuant to Justice Gruchy's interim order, Mr. Hickey is paying $1,800.00 per month or $900.00 per child. Mrs. Hickey estimates the children's expenses, before tax, to be in the area of $1,845.00 which includes savings towards education of $176.00 per month. The budget does not appear to reflect many extra‑curricular expenses. She is claiming maintenance in the amount of $2,000.00 per month. Mr. Hickey questions some of Mrs. Hickey's proposed children's expenses as being high. In particular, he notes their share towards the costs of household maintenance, as well as the food and day care costs, given the amount of time the children are residing with him. He proposes monthly amount of $1,200.00 plus direct $100.00 per month payment by him for the children's education. He estimates his expenses for the children, over and above any monthly maintenance, to be $784.00, exclusive of the $174.00 per month, after tax, direct education contribution that he is prepared to pay. have reviewed counsel's detailed submissions and the parties budget and taking into account the tax ramification to Mrs. Hickey, award the sum of $1,500.00 per month for the support of the two children. The first payment shall be due for the month of May. Other The Corollary Relief Judgment shall also reflect the parties' agreement: (a) to divide equally their matrimonial asset with the equalization payment having been paid as of trial date, (b) to divide their respective employment pensions, pursuant to the Pension Benefits Act in Nova Scotia (c) that Mr. Hickey shall maintain life insurance coverage for $137,600.00 for the children for so long as this coverage is available through his employment and further $10,000.00 with Crown Life unconditionally. The trustee of the insurance proceeds for the children while they are minors shall be person of Mr. Hickey's choice.
This was a petition for divorce with an application for settlement of corollary matters, especially custody and access. The mother was the primary caregiver during the marriage, but the father also made significant contributions. The parties had an interim order for joint custody, which the father sought to continue. The mother sought sole custody with generous access. The evidence was that although both parents were good parents, they had difficulty in resolving problems between them, causing a lack of communication. Allowing the mother's application, that because the day to day decision-making was problematic, it was necessary for one of the parties to be given final say. Both parents were to continue to share in rights and responsibilities on major issues. As the parties lacked flexibility, a detailed access plan was incorporated.