J.C. R. IN THE QUEEN'S BENCH (FAMILY LAW DIVISION) JUDICIAL CENTRE OF REGINA BETWEEN: MARY HELENE HALEY and JOHN CAMERON HALEY RESPONDENT M.C. Phillips for the petitioner L.E. Leslie for the respondent JUDGMENT ARCHAMBAULT J. February 15, 1996 The petitioner, Mary Helene Haley ("Mary"), launched this divorce action against the respondent, John Cameron Haley ("John"), in January, 1990. In addition to dissolution of the marriage she claimed custody of their children, Courtney Haley and Chelsea Haley, support for both herself and the children, an equal division of the matrimonial property and costs. THE ISSUES At the commencement of the trial it was indicated that the parties were agreed on the divorce based on their separation in excess of one year and that Mary be granted custody of the children with reasonable access to John upon reasonable notice. While the liability of John to pay maintenance for the children is not disputed, the parties were not fully agreed on the quantum thereof, which requires determination of John's income. They agreed, however, thatthe amount of the maintenance should be based on the"Federal/Provincial/Territorial Family Law Committee's Reportand Recommendations on Child Support" (January, 1995)guidelines. There remains for determination the quantum ofmaintenance for the children, the issue of spousal maintenanceand the division of matrimonial property. BACKGROUND INFORMATION AND HISTORY Mary and John were married at Antigonish, Nova Scotia, on August 30, 1975. Mary was 18 years old at the time and John was 21. They had two children, Chelsea, born September 4, 1985, and Courtney, born January 24, 1988. They have been living separate and apart for approximately six years, having ceased cohabitation at the beginning of 1990. At the time of their marriage, John was member of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, having started employment with the force in November, 1974, at age 19. His first posting was in Yorkton, Saskatchewan. The year prior to their marriage, Mary, aged 17 years, attended Dalhousie University (Academic year, fall 74/spring 75) where she completed the first year of Bachelor of Science program. Immediately after their marriage, the parties moved to Yorkton, Saskatchewan, where John had been posted. That interrupted Mary's university education. Mary secured employment at the Bank of Commerce in Yorkton very shortly after their arrival there. She progressed very well and became branch accountant, performing the duties of loans officer and assistant manager. She was transferred to the main branch of the bank in Yorkton where she was promoted to branch administrator. She remained there until December, 1979. In September, 1979, John was transferred to Imperial, Saskatchewan. As the parties had already started experiencing marital problems, Mary initially hesitated in following him but finally decided to do so. In December, 1979, they moved to Imperial, town with population of approximately 500. Mary, of course, had to resign her job at the bank. She endeavoured, without success, to obtain employment at the Royal Bank in Imperial; she was told that they would not hire persons who were transient as members of the R.C.M.P. are wont to be. Mary managed to eventually (in 1982) get part-time employment at the Post Office. She, in addition, qualified herself and conducted life support courses (cardiopulmonary resuscitation CPR) through the Community College. She completed six month course granting her an Emergency Medical Technician certificate. She did volunteer work with the Imperial Ambulance Service. Prior to the birth of Chelsea, John and Mary did fair bit of travelling, including trip to Europe (1982) and Australia (1985). They purchased house in Imperial which they subsequently had difficulty selling. In the summer of 1986 Mary secured employment at the Imperial Union Hospital, however, the house, after four years of effort, was finally sold and the parties moved to Grenfell, Saskatchewan. Although John had been transferred to Broadview in 1986 he was allowed to reside in Grenfell. There were no job opportunities there for Mary. She took course and conducted workshops in emergency medical services and casualty simulation. In 1988 the parties moved to Broadview. With the birth of their second child, Courtney, Mary became full-time housewife and mother. There were ongoing marital problems which Mary attributed largely to John's extramarital affairs. Their relationship deteriorated to the point where the parties decided to separate in December, 1989, although John left the matrimonial home later in February, 1990. Following the separation Mary was able to secure some temporary employment through work development program sponsored by Canada Employment. By order dated February 14, 1990, she obtained exclusive possession of their matrimonial home situated in Broadview. John paid the rent on this house. In mid-April Mary moved to Yorkton. She was on social assistance for few months and obtained low income housing. It is worthy of note that upon her return to Yorkton she was unable to obtain employment with CIBC. Despite her good track record with the bank, after 11 years her experience was outdated. There had been technological changes in banking operations and reduction of their employee force which militated against her resuming employment with the bank. Some time after she moved to Yorkton, John commenced paying her maintenance in the sum of $1,000.00 per month, being $400.00 per month for each of the two children and $200.00 per month spousal support. This was formalized by an order for spousal and child support in May, 1991. John continued to pay that amount of maintenance until the trial. Meanwhile, Mary obtained temporary and part-time jobs and studied part time. In October, 1992, she decided to return to school on full-time basis. It is her intention to complete the training program to become Certified Management Accountant (CMA). However, she was not able to afford full- time attendance at SIAST and had to resort to part-time study. She recently secured employment with the territorial accounting office of the Saskatchewan Housing Authority, which pays her salary of $23,800.00 per annum. If she was able to study full time she would expect to complete her course in 1998 but on part-time basis (three classes per year) she anticipates it will take until 2001. She expects that she would receive income at the internship stage of her training, after June, 1999. Throughout John had maintained and progressed in his employment with the R.C.M.P. He has taken every professional development course offered by the R.C.M.P. His income has increased substantially over the years. Currently his basic salary is $50,508.00 per annum. However, he has consistently made more than that in recent years from overtime pay, various supplementary allowances as well as business income. His yearly income for the years 1991 to 1994 as reported in his yearly income tax returns is as follows: 1991 $52,981.00; 1992 $52,400.00; 1993 $54,891.00; 1994 $57,395.00 ($55,693.00 after deduction of business loss of $1,702.00). Cara Brown indicated that John earns 8.5% more income than the average police officer in circumstances similar to his. In May, 1984, John met Ann M. Callaghan with whom he commenced living, as man and wife, in August, 1990, and continued to do so at the time of trial. She is registered nurse with specialization in advanced clinical practice and public health. She is currently employed as community health co-ordinator. Her take home pay is $2,600.00 per month from gross salary of $51,000.00 per year. John and Ms. Callaghan purchased home in Montmartre, Saskatchewan, for $46,000.00. The purchase was financed by way of loan of $6,000.00 for the downpayment and mortgage of $40,000.00. Ms. Callaghan is repaying the $6,000.00 downpayment loan. They share living expenses. Ms. Callaghan is assisting her daughter, Michelle, who is 20 years of age and in attendance at the University of Saskatchewan in Saskatoon. Mary lives in home owned by David Neibergall. She assumes and pays the costs for the maintenance of herself and the children, including rent payment of $400.00 per month to Mr. Neibergall. David Neibergall resides in the house. They share the entire house. Their relationship is one of companionship, including sexual relations. It is modified common-law relationship with each party paying her or his own way. In my view, Mary's situation in this regard does provide her with adequate housing at reasonable cost. Otherwise the situation does not, in my view, significantly affect decisions to be made herein. DETERMINATION OF MATTERS IN ISSUE 1. Respondent's income. In order to determine the quantum of child support and the issue of spousal support John's income level for this purpose must be determined. It is common ground that his basic salary is currently $50,508.00 per year. However, he has consistently since 1991 made in excess of that amount. Hewas injured early in 1995 and has been on light duty servicesince. He will require another operation in early 1996 which will result in extending his time on light duty. John indicated that while he has not suffered any reduction in basic pay he, as result of his injury and light duty assignment, is not in position to earn the supplementary allowances he did in the past. While he may not be in position to work overtime, he has failed to convince me that his other supplementary allowances, such as clothing, senior constable differential and shift differential pay will not continue. Obviously, the moving allowance of $4,209.00 which he received in 1994 cannot be taken into account in the determination of salary for the purposes of maintenance. This allowance is contingent on John being transferred. John was not always forthcoming in answering questions about his income; he tended to be evasive, skate around and what appeared to me to be obvious admissions had to be pressed out of him. In the result it is my view that the reasonable and realistic figure to use for the determination of maintenance is gross salary of $53,000.00 per annum. If there is any significant decrease in income in the future, John can always make an application to vary, as indeed Mary can should his income prove to be significantly in excess of $53,000.00 year. There is currently no issue of medical discharge. John is not seeking one and Superintendent Cronchite indicated that no steps had been initiated by the R.C.M.P. seeking his discharge. Should he become disabled to the point that he would have to discontinue his employment with the R.C.M.P. and suffer reduction of income, it would be open to him to make an application to vary. For the time being he continues to be full-time member of the force with regular pay and it is on that basis that decisions ought to be based. 2. Economic Disadvantage Quite apart from the economic disadvantage generally suffered by women as result of marriage breakdown, as was recognized by L'Heureux-Dube J. in Moge v. Moge (1993), 43 R.F.L. (3d) 345 (S.C.C.), it is clear that in this case Mary has in fact personally suffered substantial economic disadvantage. As result of her marriage to John she had to interrupt her university education after successfully completing the first year of bachelor of science program. She secured employment at the CIBC in Yorkton upon moving there in 1975 and progressed rapidly achieving the position of branch administrator at the main branch of the bank in Yorkton in less than four years. She was required to quit her job after her husband was transferred to Imperial, Saskatchewan, where she joined him in December, 1979. From then on employment opportunities were very restricted due to his moving to smaller centres and the transient lifestyle of an R.C.M.P. officer. She worked part time between 1980 and 1986 and was virtually unemployed between 1986 and 1990. The two children, Chelsea and Courtney, born in 1985 and 1988 respectively, further hampered her employment opportunity as she had to fulfil the responsibilities of housewife and mother. Nonetheless she persisted in her efforts to self improvement as best she could in the circumstances and resorted to whatever employment was available in the smaller centres were John was posted. However, she clearly suffered substantial reduction in income and income earning potential as result of the moves required for John to maintain and pursue his career with the R.C.M.P. Her withdrawal from the regular labour force for considerable period of time clearly negatively affected her advancement and current earning capacity. She had no opportunity to acquire security and tenure of employment or to build up fringe benefits such as health care and pension benefits for future security. While Mary's economic disadvantage is obvious from the facts herein, it is, in addition well established in the report (Tab 29 of Exhibit P-1) and evidence of Cara L. Brown, whose expert qualifications were admitted by both parties. She indicated that if Mary had maintained her employment at CIBC she would have been earning in excess of $30,000.00 per annum in 1990 and as much as $40,000.00 in 1995. In contrast, she currently earns $23,800.00 per annum. Cara Brown estimated Mary's economic disadvantage from 1990 to 1995 to be $69,000.00 (see Table 7, p. 29). Based on her obtention of her CMA certificate in the year 2001, her loss of future earning capacity equals $87,000.00. It increases to $17,000.00 if she ceases her present work to obtain her CMA certificate in 1998 based on full-time attendance at SIAST. It should be noted that the likelihood is that she will continue her employment and study on part-time basis, as she indicated at the trial. find that Ms. Brown's findings and conclusions are based on reasonable and realistic assumptions. Of course, while contingencies such as unemployment, disability, mortality and retirement are built in Cara Brown's calculations, it is nonetheless possible that Mary might have discontinued employment for other reasons or been reduced to part-time duties due to downsizing. Cara Brown indicated that that was more likely to happen to lower level personnel rather than to supervisory personnel such as Mary was when she left CIBC. On the other hand Mary has clearly demonstrated her resilience, ability and motivation by securing employment and pursuing her CMA study program following the breakup of the marriage. While it is difficult to accurately ascertain Mary's loss in monetary terms, Ms. Brown's estimates and observations represent realistic and reasonable approach in endeavouring to do so and her report should be taken into account by the court in the determination of spousal maintenance and the division of matrimonial property even though the court is not compelled to accept her exact figures. Future loss of income and earning capacity can never be measured in precise terms given the contingencies of life. Nevertheless, Ms. Brown's report provides the court with useful information which the court should carefully consider. On the other side of the coin the court must also take into account any economic advantage enjoyed by Mary as result of the marriage which necessarily will offset any disadvantage. In this case the parties, through their joint efforts, accumulated modest amount of matrimonial property including the more significant pension plan which John acquired as result of his employment with the R.C.M.P. Mary will receive her share in the distribution of the matrimonial property. That must be taken into account in determining the degree of her economic disadvantage. will now address the question of the division of the matrimonial property. 3. Division of Matrimonial Property (a) Assets other than John's Pension Plan Upon separation the parties divided their personal effects and household goods. While these goods were never appraised John took the position that Mary had received the greater share thereof, while Mary was of the view that the division was pretty well equal. Excluding the 1984 Mazda, which was valued at $7,000.00, it is my view that each party should retain the goods in her or his possession without further adjustment. If indeed Mary did receive the greatershare I am not satisfied that it was of any great significanceand, in any event, it can well be attributed to partialcompensation for her economic disadvantage. In any event, John indicated during his testimony that even if Mary had received more than he did, he did not intend to pursue his claim for equalization of household goods. In addition to the 1984 Mazda, and apart from John's R.C.M.P. pension plan and the Yorkton Restaurant Venture Capital Corporation shares, the parties had investments (in John's name) valued at approximately $15,000.00 at the date the action was commenced (Claude Resources Stock Savings Plan, Templeton Growth Fund and Boulton Tromblay International (Mutual Funds)). To this should be added further $2,860.00 to cover the earned income tax refund and the paid up amount of $820.00 on the Canada Savings Bond, both of which were in existence at the date this action was commenced. This yields total of $25,680.00 available for distribution between the parties. From this amount there must be deducted the sum of $1,000.00, representing the balance of the credit card account existing at that time. That leaves balance of $24,680.00 for equal distribution between the parties, being $12,340.00 each. Mary received the Mazda valued at $7,000.00. The balance of the assets ($17,680.00) were in John's possession. Accordingly, to even out the division John will be required to pay Mary the sum of $5,340.00. The 1,000 shares in the Yorkton Restaurant VentureCapital Corporation are in the joint names of the parties andwill be divided equally between them when and if anything isrealized on the shares. The only remaining item of matrimonial property, and the most significant, is John's R.C.M.P. pension plan which will now deal with. (b) John's R.C.M.P. Pension Plan Cara Brown provided the court with four valuation options in two categories for the purpose of determining Mary's share of John's pension (See Tabs 29, 30, 31, 32, 33 and 34 of Exhibit P-1). They are as follows: Method/Date of Without Survivorship With Survivorship Valuation Benefits Benefits Termination: Date of Application $37,008.00 $41,217.00 Termination: Date of Trial $50,530.00 $56,132.00 Retirement: Date of Application $52,01.00 $57,869.00 Retirement: Date of Trial $61,775.00 $68,368.00 The R.C.M.P. pension plan provides for survivorship benefits for the spouse of the member as long as she/he remains spouse upon the member's death. With the grantingof the divorce as part of this judgment it follows that Marywill be disqualified from ever receiving this benefit. Accordingly, in my view, the fair thing to do is to use theenhanced value of the "With Survivorship Benefits" column indetermining Mary's share of the pension. The advantages and disadvantages to both parties of using the termination or retirement approaches to valuation are discussed by Kurisko J. of the Ontario Court of Justice in Basiello v. Basiello, 1995 CanLII 7231 (ON SC), [1995] O.J. No. 2989 (Q.L.) (Ont. C.J.). Mr. Justice Kurisko presents very enlightening and helpful discussion of the various options available, which do not intend to repeat here. Suffice it to say that, in my view, fairness and equity, dictates that combination of both approaches be used, ie. the midpoint between the retirement and termination methods. As was indicated by Klebuc J. in Knippshild v. Knippshild, 1995 CanLII 5840 (SK QB), [1995] W.W.R. 257 (Sask. Q.B.), the question for determination is which method of evaluation or combination of methods will result in reasonable value having regard to all of the circumstances. He points out that the courts have used variety of approaches to meet varied factual circumstances. He stated at p. 269: Which method of evaluation or combination of methods will result in reasonable value having regard to all of the circumstances? There is no consistent approach as to which valuation method should be used, presumably because of the varied factual circumstances in the cases presented to the courts. In Partridge v. Partridge (1984), 1984 CanLII 2349 (SK QB), 36 Sask. R. 70 (U.F.C.), and Kalytuk v. Kalytuk [(1992), 1992 CanLII 7853 (SK QB), 98 Sask. R. 311 (U.F.C.)] Carter J. and Dickson J., respectively, held the termination method to be the preferred approach since it requires no speculation as to the future contingencies. In Grainger v. Grainger (1985), 1985 CanLII 2461 (SK QB), 39 Sask. R. 294, affirmed by C.A. (1987), 1987 CanLII 4836 (SK CA), 54 Sask. R. 10, and Blackwell v. Blackwell [(1987), 58 Sask. R. 297 (U.F.C.)] Gagne J. and Carter J. applied combination of the termination method and the retirement method in arriving at the value for pension entitlement. In Biblow v. Biblow [(1991), 1991 CanLII 7811 (SK QB), 92 Sask. R. 68 (Q.B.)] Scheibel J. applied the retirement method where the division involved marriage of 24 years and the parties were receptive to an "if and when" approach to distribution. In this case we are dealing with a marriage of anapproximate duration of 15 years. John is currently 41 years of age. He will be able to retire without penalty after 25 years of service (December, 1999). If he wishes to obtain the maximum pension available he must work total of 35 years. He can, therefore, substantially increase his pension by opting to work an additional 10 years. He would then, at age 55, be able to retire on maximum pension (70% of an average of his six best years of service). Based on these considerationsand given the economic disadvantage suffered by Mary, I agreewith Cara Brown that somewhere in between (preferably the mid-point) the termination and retirement method is the route togo in this case. I am persuaded by the Grainger v. Grainger(1985), 1985 CanLII 2461 (SK QB), 39 Sask. R. 294, affirmed by C.A. (1987), 54 Sask. R.10, and Blackwell v. Blackwell (1987), 1987 CanLII 4592 (SK QB), 58 Sask. R. 297(U.F.C.) that the combination method is an acceptable methodof valuation in this case. Finally, there remains to decide which valuation date should be used, the date the action was commenced or the date of adjudication. With respect to the division of the other matrimonial assets and liabilities have used the date of application, which struck me as the most fair in the circumstances. Notwithstanding that, in my view, different date can be used for the valuation and division of the pension plan. While generally all matrimonial property should be valued as of the same date (date of application or date of adjudication ss. 2(1) of The Matrimonial Property Act, S.S. 1979, M-6.1) the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal has recognized and sanctioned the valuation of different assets on different dates where good reason to do so exists. In Tataryn v. Tataryn (1984), 1984 CanLII 2663 (SK CA), 30 Sask. R. 282 at p. 285, Cameron J.A., speaking for the court, stated: Mr. Tataryn complains that, while the trial judge chose to value some items of property as at the date of application, he valued others as at the date of adjudication, an inconsistency which worked to Mr. Tataryn's detriment. His counsel submitted that, as matter of principle, the whole of the property ought to have been valued consistently, as of one date or the other. Generally speaking, agree this should be done although note the Act does not require it. In some cases it may be desirable, even necessary, to value one asset as at the time of application and another as of the time of trial, but would add that whenever this is done it should be explained; otherwise it may appear unfair. And there ought to be good reason for it. See also Mitchell v. Mitchell (1993), 1992 CanLII 8234 (SK CA), 100 Sask. R. 149 (Sask. C.A.) per Vancise J.A. for the court at pp. 154-55: This Court has stated on more than one occasion that the court can use the date of adjudication and the date of application in the same application to value matrimonial property. The date of adjudication can be used for the valuation of some of the assets such as the land, and the date of the application can be used for the valuation of the remaining assets, provided that the change in dates for the purpose of evaluation is applied consistently to the assets of both parties. See Mehling v. Mehling (1989), 1989 CanLII 4775 (SK CA), 75 Sask. R. 195; 1989 CanLII 4775 (SK CA), 20 R.F.L. (3d) 42 (C.A.). In this case, given the length of the marriage and the options open to John to enhance the value of his pension for his personal benefit and, more importantly, the significant economic disadvantage suffered by Mary, am of the view that the date yielding the most generous share of the pension to Mary is the one to be used. Accordingly, set the date of adjudication as the date for valuation of the pension plan. The result is as follows: Amount Termination: Date of Trial 56,132.00 Amount Retirement: Date of Trial 68,568.00 Total $124,700.00 Average ($124,700.00 ï¿½ 2) 62,350.00 Hence, there will be an order providing for transfer by way of rollover of that amount from John's pension plan in Mary's name. 4. Quantum of Child Maintenance John acknowledged his obligation to contribute to the maintenance of the two children, Chelsea and Courtney. Counsel for the parties were in agreement that support for thechildren should be set in accordance with theFederal/Provincial/Territorial guidelines based on John'sgross yearly income as determined by the court, ie.$53,000.00. John specifically stated that he was prepared to pay the sum of $600.00 per month per child. That amount is in the ballpark and while somewhat below, is close to the amount recommended by the guidelines. Mary indicated that the costs of maintaining herself and the children was approximately $2,462.00 monthly, two- thirds of which she attributed to the children. Given therelative income of the parties as well as current income taximplications, I find the amount of $600.00 per month per childto be reasonable and fair. note that that amount appeared to be satisfactory to Mary. Child maintenance should, therefore, be set at that level. 5. Spousal maintenance The question and amount of spousal maintenance is more difficult to resolve. In authorizing the court to make an order for spousal support, s. 15 of the Divorce Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. (2nd Supp.) stipulates in ss. (5) and (7) the factors and objectives which the court should consider in making such an order. Subsections 15(5) and (7) provide as 15(5) In making an order under this section, the court shall take into consideration the condition, means, needs and other circumstances of each spouse and of any child of the marriage for whom support is sought, including (a) the length of time the spouses cohabited; (b) the functions performed by the spouse during cohabitation; and (c) any order, agreement or arrangement relating to support of the spouse or child. (7) An order made under this section that provides for the support of spouse should (a) recognize any economic advantages or disadvantages to the spouses arising from the marriage or its breakdown; (b) apportion between the spouses any financial consequences arising from the care of any child of the marriage over and above the obligation apportioned between the spouses pursuant to subsection (8); (c) relieve any economic hardship of the spouses arising from the breakdown of the marriage; and (d) in so far as practicable, promote the economic self- sufficiency of each spouse within reasonable period of time. As previously indicated this was marriage of approximately 15 years in duration which resulted in substantial economic disadvantage to Mary. The breakdown of the marriage has caused her economic hardship. Shortly after their separation she was obliged to go on social assistance for time. John has been less than generous in paying monthly child ($800.00) and spousal ($200.00) support in the total sum of $1,000.00, which is less than he should have been paying for the two children. On that basis Mary is certainly entitled to spousal support. The order for child maintenance which will form part of this judgment will reasonably apportion the contribution of each spouse for child support in accordance with their respective ability to pay. The court in determining the justification for and the amount of spousal support must seek to promote the economic self-sufficiency of each spouse, in this case Mary in particular. Mary's plans for the future are realistic; she is taking concrete steps to ensure her eventual self-sufficiency. She has commenced and is effectively pursuing her CMA program, while maintaining full employment. believe her objective of working and studying part time is realistic and that John should assist her for reasonable length of time to allow her to complete her study program. In my view, spousal maintenance should be paid until she has had reasonable time to obtain her CMA certification in the year 2001. Cara Brown has set out in Table of her report various amounts of loss which she has converted into periodic spousal maintenance payments for five and 10 year periods. The suggested spousal maintenance payments required to offset the loss of potential income are very substantial. The economic disadvantage resulting from loss of potential earnings must, of course, be offset by the share of matrimonial property which Mary will receive. In addition to what she has already received she will get lump sum payment of $5,340.00 plus share of John's pension which have valued at $62,350.00. The amount of spousal maintenance payable must be adjusted to take all of that into account. In the result, John should pay Mary spousalmaintenance in the sum of $800.00 per month until June 1,2001. That will provide Mary with gross income before taxes of $48,000.00 (salary $24,000.00, child maintenance $14,400.00, and spousal maintenance $9,600.00) for three persons. John, on the other hand, after deduction of maintenance payments, will be left with gross income of $29,000.00 ($53,000.00 minus $14,400.00 and minus $9,600.00) for one person. Looking at it from an income tax implication standpoint, Cara Brown indicated that if the total maintenance payments were set at $2,200.00 per month, John would be left with net after tax amount of $1,717.00 per month for himself, while Mary and the children would have net amount of approximately $3,034.00 per month for three persons. As have determined that the monthly spousal and child maintenance will total $2,000.00 per month, John will be left with higher net monthly amount of at least $1,917.00, while Mary will end up with approximately $2,834.00. In my view, payment of that amount of maintenance is manageable for John. Given the needs of both parties and the children, believe that that is fair distribution of available income during the next five years or so, which should allow all of them to enjoy comparable standard of living. This should, as well, allow Mary the time and resources necessary to achieve self-sufficiency. At the trial the parties indicated their agreement that any maintenance ordered by the court would apply retroactively to the date that the matter was initially set for trial, namely, September 5, 1995. Accordingly, the effective date for the commencement of payment of the child and spousal maintenance ordered herein shall be October 1, 1995. In summary, it is hereby ordered as follows: 1.That John Cameron Haley and Mary Helene Haley who were married at Antigonish, Nova Scotia, on August 30, 1975, are divorced and unless appealed this judgment takes effect on the thirty-first day after the date of this judgment. 2.That Mary Helene Haley shall have sole custody of the children, Chelsea Haley and Courtney Haley, and John Cameron Haley shall have reasonable access to the said children upon reasonable notice. 3.That John Cameron Haley shall pay Mary Helene Haley childmaintenance in the sum of $600.00 per month per child (total$1,200.00 monthly) for the two children, the said amount to bepaid on the first day of each and every month commencing onOctober 1, 1995, and continuing for as long as the saidchildren remain children of the marriage within the meaning ofthe Divorce Act. 4.That John Cameron Haley shall pay Mary Helene Haley spousalmaintenance in the sum of $800.00 per month on the first dayof each and every month commencing on October 1, 1995, andcontinuing up to and including June 1, 2001. 5.In order to finalize the division of matrimonial property:(a)That each party shall retain for his or her ownuse and benefit the household items and personal effectspreviously distributed. (b)That the 1,000 shares in the Yorkton RestaurantVenture Capital Corporation be divided equally between theparties. (c)That John Cameron Haley pay Mary Helene Haley lump sum of $5,340.00 within 60 days of this order. (d)That there shall be spousal rollover in the sum of $62,350.00 from John Cameron Haley's R.C.M.P. pension plan in the name of Mary Helene Haley. 6.That Mary Helene Haley shall have her costs to be taxed against John Cameron Haley, including one-half of the costs for the preparation of the reports and pension valuations by Cara L. Brown.
At issue was the determination of the quantum of spousal and child support and division of matrimonial property. HELD: 1)The respondent's supplementary allowances were taken into consideration in finding a gross salary of $53,000.00 per annum. Due to an injury he was no longer able to work overtime but was working full-time. Should a medical discharge become necessary an application to vary can be brought at that time. 2)The petitioner suffered a substantial economic disadvantage. The frequent moves due to the husband's employment had disrupted the petitioner's employment and university education. However, the court must also take into consideration the economic advantage enjoyed as a result of the marriage including the pension plan of the spouse. 3)If the petitioner did receive the greater share of the household goods it can be attributed to partial compensation for her economic disadvantage. Shares in joint names were divided equally. Other assets were divided equally. 4)Upon the granting of the divorce the petitioner will be disqualified from receiving the pension survivorship benefits. The fair solution was to use the enhanced value of the 'With Survivorship Benefits' column and the date of adjudication was used as the valuation date. The combination method of valuation was used in view of the 15 year marriage and given the economic disadvantage suffered by the petitioner. 5)The parties agreed that child support should be set in accordance with the Federal/Provincial/Territorial guidelines based on the respondent's gross yearly income. $600.00 per month per child was awarded.  6)The court must seek to promote the economic self-sufficiency of each spouse. The petitioner's future plans were realistic. $800 per month until June 1, 2001 was awarded for spousal support.  7)Costs including one-half of the cost of preparing reports and pension valuations were awarded to the petitioner.