J. _Editor's Note: Addendum released June 27, 1996. Original judgment has been corrected with text of addendum appended. Q.B.G. A.D. 1995 No. 2983 J.C.R. IN THE QUEEN'S BENCH JUDICIAL CENTRE OF REGINA IN THE MATTER OF THE LEAGUE OF EDUCATIONAL ADMINISTRATORS, DIRECTORS AND SUPERINTENDENTS ACT, 1991, S.S. 1990-9l, c. L- 9.02 AND EUGENE PAQUIN, DIRECTOR OF EDUCATION FOR THE LAST MOUNTAIN SCHOOL DIVISION, IN THE PROVINCE OF SASKATCHEWAN BETWEEN: EUGENE PAQUIN and THE LEAGUE OF EDUCATIONAL ADMINISTRATORS, DIRECTORS AND SUPERINTENDENTS OF SASKATCHEWAN RESPONDENT A. A. Fox for the appellant R. A. Robertson for the respondent JUDGMENT GROTSKY J. May 31, 1996 PREAMBLE Pursuant to Rules 15 and 171 of the Rules of Practice and Procedure of this Court, the style of cause in the within proceedings is amended to read: IN THE MATTER OF THE LEAGUE OF EDUCATIONAL ADMINISTRATORS, DIRECTORS AND SUPERINTENDENTS ACT, 1991, S.S. 1990-91, c. L-9.02 AND EUGENE PAQUIN, DIRECTOR OF EDUCATION FOR THE LAST MOUNTAIN SCHOOL DIVISION, IN THE PROVINCE OF SASKATCHEWAN NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS This is an appeal, pursuant to the provisions of s. 51 of said The League of Educational Administrators, Directors and Superintendents Act, 1991, S.S. 1990-91, c. L-9.02, from the decisions of the Discipline Committee, and Executive Committee, of the League of Educational Administrators, Directors and Superintendents which found the appellant guilty of professional misconduct respecting the following particulars: 1.The Committee finds that Mr. E. Paquin intentionally caused Mr. D. Bonner to believe that he was conveying the substance of the written report prepared by Mrs. G. Dueck on the School Effectiveness Process at the meeting of April 10. The Committee is satisfied that by both his actions and the oral statements made at this meeting, Mr. E. Paquin misrepresented to Mr. D. Bonner that the report was critical of his leadership and recommended that he be transferred, when in fact this was not true. 2.The Discipline Committee finds that Mr. E. Paquin did threaten Mr. P. Bedier that if he did not submit his transfer request and resignation from the principalship that the matter would be dealt with at the Board table and that "it could get ugly". and, on August 8, 1995, imposed the following penalties on the 1. That Mr. Eugene Paquin be formally reprimanded through letter transmitted by the President and the Executive Director of LEADS and that the letter be maintained on file with LEADS for period of five years. 2. That Mr. Eugene Paquin be fined $2,500.00 with full payment to be made by October 31, 1995. 3. That the LEADS Executive Director contact Mr. Paquin by September 1, 1995 to offer on-going counsel and support. The grounds upon which this appeal is brought are: 1.The decision is against the law, the evidence and the weight of evidence; 2.The Discipline Committee erred in finding that the conduct of the Appellant constituted professional misconduct; 3.The Discipline Committee erred in finding that the Appellant intentionally misrepresented to Dale Bonner the contents of the SPDU report; 4.The Discipline Committee erred in its determination that the Appellant threatened Paul Bedier when he requested transfer and resignation from the principalship; 5.The Discipline Committee erred in its determination that the identified acts of the Appellant, in isolation, constituted coercion and thereby constituted professional misconduct; 6.The Discipline Committee made overriding and palpable errors in its findings of fact and (sic) application of those facts and otherwise erred in its application of the burden and standard of proof; 7.In the alternative, that the disposition imposed by the Respondent Executive Committee was excessive. RELIEF SOUGHT BY APPELLANT The appellant seeks an order that: a.The findings of guilt by the Discipline Committee, and the sentence imposed by the Executive Committee, be set aside; b. Alternatively, that new hearing be granted; c.In the further alternative, that the sentence be reduced. The appellant, at all times material, was the director of the Last Mountain School Division (hereafter "the division") and member of the League of Educational Administrators, Directors and Superintendents of Saskatchewan, (hereafter "LEADS"). At all times material said Dale Bonner was the principal of the Punnichy Saskatchewan Elementary School and said Paul Bedier was the principal of the Bulyea Saskatchewan Elementary School both of which said schools were part of the division. The appellant was charged that on, or about, the 11th day of April, 1995, at the said Town of Punnichy, he did coerce the resignation of said Dale Bonner from his principalship of said Punnichy Elementary School through the use of untrue statements, misrepresentations of report and threats, particulars whereof are as follows: 1.Communicating to said Dale Bonner that the Band Committee, the Local Punnichy Board and the Division Board wanted him gone; 2.Misrepresenting to said Dale Bonner that the school improvement process report for the division dated March, 1995, made by the Saskatchewan Professional Development Unit was critical of his leadership and recommended that he be transferred; 3.Threatening said Dale Bonner that if he remained as principal of the said Punnichy Elementary School there would be discrimination suit filed against the said school; 4.Threatening said Dale Bonner that if he did not resign as principal, and sign request for transfer, he would be intensely supervised with the Director or Assistant Director in his classroom at least once week, and further, some time before the end of May, 1995, the Division Board would transfer him anyway; and 5.Threatening said Dale Bonner with termination of his contract if, during his supervision period he was found to be incompetent. The appellant was also charged that he did on, or about, the 12th day of April, 1995, at the Town of Bulyea, Saskatchewan, coerce the resignation of said Paul Bedier from his principalship of said Bulyea school through the making of an untrue statement, and threat, particulars of which are as follows: 1.Communicating to said Paul Bedier that the Local Bulyea Board wanted him transferred; and 2.Threatening said Paul Bedier that if he did not apply for transfer and resign as principal, that the matter would be dealt with at the board table and that "it could get ugly". hearing was held before the Discipline Committee of LEADS in Saskatoon, Saskatchewan, on July 10 to 13, l995. In due course decision was rendered by the said Discipline Committee dismissing allegations 1, 3, and concerning said Dale Bonner and allegation concerning said Paul Bedier. The Discipline Committee found the appellant guilty of misrepresenting the school improvement process report involving said Dale Bonner and of threatening said Paul Bedier that if he did not apply for transfer and resign as principal of the said Bulyea School the matter would be dealt with at the board table and that "it could get ugly". The Discipline Committee recommended that reprimand be imposed. The matter of sentence was dealt with by the Executive Committee of LEADS on August 8, l995, and the appellant received reprimand (to be placed on his file for period of five years) and fine of $2,500.00. The issues raised by this application may besuccinctly stated as follows: ISSUE NUMBER 1: -Did the Discipline Committee err in itsfindings of fact as set forth in grounds 3, 4 and 6 of thenotice of appeal? ISSUE NUMBER 2: -If the facts as found by the DisciplineCommittee are in fact true, do they constitute unprofessionalconduct as set forth in grounds 2 and 5 of the notice ofappeal? ISSUE NUMBER 3: -Did the Discipline Committee err in itsapplication of the burden of proof as alleged in ground number6 of the notice of appeal? ISSUE NUMBER 4: -Was the penalty imposed by the ExecutiveCommittee excessive as alleged in ground Number 7 of thenotice of appeal? In order to determine the said issues, the following factors will have to be considered: 1.What standard of review is appropriate, and should be applied to the decision of the Discipline Committee? 2.Applying said standard of review, are any of thegrounds of appeal sustainable? 3. If so, what remedy is available to the appellant? WHAT STANDARD OF REVIEW IS APPROPRIATE TO BE APPLIED TO THE DECISION OF THE DISCIPLINE COMMITTEE? Section 52 of the Act sets forth the jurisdiction of the judge during the review. It states: 52In hearing an appeal pursuant to section 51 the judge shall: (a)dismiss the appeal; (b) vary decision of the discipline committee or an order of the executive; (c) substitute his or her own decision or order for decision of the discipline committee or an order of the executive; (d) quash decision of the discipline committee or an order of the executive; (e) direct new hearing or further inquiries by the discipline committee or the executive; or (f) quash the finding of guilt; and may make any order as to costs that the judge considers appropriate. As one can readily see, the powers of the reviewing judge are broad. However, the section does not comment on the exact nature or extent of the review. In these circumstances, one must have regard for the case law in the area. Both parties have submitted briefs of law in support of their respective positions. Both parties have cited cases in support of their positions. It appears that they agree that the leading cases in the area are Stephen v. College of Physicians and Surgeons (Sask.) (1991), 1991 CanLII 7664 (SK QB), 95 Sask. R. 176 (Sask. Q.B.) and Brand v. College of Physicians and Surgeons (Sask.) (1990), 1990 CanLII 7711 (SK CA), 86 Sask. R. 18 (Sask. C.A.), which have read and considered. Also mentioned by counsel, which have read and considered, were the cases of Huerto v. College of Physicians and Surgeons (1994), 1994 CanLII 4900 (SK QB), 124 Sask. R. 33 (Sask. Q.B.); Sugarman v. Saskatchewan Association of Optometrists (1990), 86 Sask. R. 207 (Sask. Q.B.); Mackey et al v. Chiropractors' Association (Sask.) et al (1991), 1990 CanLII 7407 (SK QB), 88 Sask. R. 274 (Sask. Q.B.); Re Del Core and Ontario College of Pharmacists (1985), 1985 CanLII 119 (ON CA), 51 O.R. (2d) at pp. and (Ont. C.A.); Harper v. R. (1982), 1982 CanLII 11 (SCC), 65 C.C.C. (2d) 193 (S.C.C.); MacDonald v. R. (1976), 1976 CanLII 140 (SCC), 29 C.C.C. (2d) 257 (S.C.C.) and Yebes v. R., [1987] S.C.R. 18 (S.C.C.). In Stephen, considered the standard of review and the power of an appellate court when reviewing decision of disciplinary board. quoted with approval from Re Milstein and Ontario College of Pharmacy et al (No.2) (1976), 13 O.R. (2d) 700 (Ont. H.C. (Div. Ct.)) at p. 707, where at p. 191 stated: The power of self-discipline perpetuated in the enabling legislation must be based on the principle that members of the profession are uniquely and best qualified to establish the standards of professional conduct. Members of the profession can best determine whether the conduct of fellow member has fallen below the requisite standards and determine the consequences. The peers of the professional person are deemed to have and, indeed, they must have special knowledge, training and skill that particularly adapts them to formulate their own professional standards and to judge the conduct of member of their profession. No other body could appreciate as well the problems and frustrations that beset fellow member. In Stephen, at pp. 191-92, also stated: As was observed in the case of Re Singh and College of Nurses of Ontario (1981), 1981 CanLII 1717 (ON SC), 123 D.L.R. (3d) 713 (Div. Ct.), at p. 714, however wide may be the powers of the appellate court, they do not amount to general warrant to retry cases decided by the Discipline Committee. It was also stated that the appellate court should not attempt to weigh the evidence which formed the basis for the conclusions by the Discipline Committee, unless there was no evidence to support the conclusion or the evidence was contrary to the conclusion which was reached. similar line of reasoning was expressed by the Court of Appeal of Saskatchewan in Brand. In Brand the Court was faced with decision of the Discipline Committee of the College of Physicians and Surgeons. Mr. Justice Wakeling considered the nature of the review that the Court should conduct in these matters and held at p. 34, with the majority of the Court agreeing, that: This Court has also dealt with the issue on several occasions, perhaps most recently in Green v. College of Physicians and Surgeons (1986), 1986 CanLII 3238 (SK CA), 51 Sask. R. 241 at 258: "The matter was not considered in detail during argument, but it is appropriate at this stage that consideration be given to the role which this court ought to play in the determination of this appeal. It is my view that this appeal is in no sense retrial of the issue but is to be considered on the same basis as any other civil appeal. It is not for this court to substitute its discretion for that of the appeal tribunal. We should leave the appeal tribunal's judgment alone unless we were to conclude that there was no evidence available to reasonably support the conclusions which it reached or that the inferences which were drawn were clearly wrong or it had misdirected itself in respect of point of law so as to warrant the conclusion that the judgment rendered could not be supported." The same factors now prevail in an appeal to Queen's Bench judge. The prime responsibility for the credibility of witnesses, as well as the determination of the facts, remains the function of the Discipline Committee. These functions have traditionally belonged to the trier of the facts: the trial judge, the jury, or entities such as Discipline Committee, who have first hand visual as well as audio contact with the parties and their witnesses. That responsibility is so well accepted and based on such sound reason that it would take clear and compelling legislation to require that such principle of first line responsibility be abandoned or materially diluted. There is no indication in the above legislation which appears to call for change in this traditional approach. The fact that an appellate judge may substitute his or her decision for that of the Discipline Committee or an order of the executive does not mean that the appellate court's view of the facts and credibility of witnesses supersedes in any way the role of the Discipline Committee unless the appellate court finds that there were inappropriate inferences drawn, conclusions reached which were not supported by the evidence, or misdirection on point of law. It simply clothes the appellate court with sufficient authority to overturn decision of the Discipline Committee where any of the factors above noted exist. similar view was expressed by Mr. Justice Halvorson in Huerto v. College of Physicians and Surgeons, supra, where at p. 48 he is reported as follows: Despite the breadth of this authority, the Court will be slow to substitute its opinion on the evidence for that of the committee. These transcript appeals should be considered in much the same fashion as summary conviction appeals. Of these, the court in R. v. Andres, [l982] W.W.R. 249; Sask. R. 96 (C.A.) stated at p. 251: "Thus, while the appeal court may differ with the trial judge as to the facts established by the evidence, it will disturb his findings of fact only if it is satisfied that such findings are not supported by the evidence or that the conclusion reached by the trial judge is so clearly wrong as to make that decision unreasonable." (emphasis added) Therefore, review of the Discipline Committee's decision will require that ensure that there is evidence to support the findings of fact made by the said Committee. It does not allow me to substitute my own views and opinions if they differ from that of the Committee unless the decision of the Committee is so clearly wrong, or not supported by the evidence, or that the conclusions reached by the Committee are so clearly wrong as to make their decision, and this is so with respect to each of the charges against the appellant, unreasonable. also note that the appellant suggests in his brief of law that the powers conferred on the Court by s. 52 of the Act are extremely broad and in fact [are] far more reaching than that found in s. 62(3) of The Medical Profession Act, 1981, c. M-10.1, which is the section relied upon in Stephen and Huerto. review of s. 62(3) of said The Medical Profession Act, 1981, satisfies me that it was, and is, the same today, as it was then. It provides as follows: 62(3) On hearing the appeal, the court may: (a) confirm the decision of the council; (b) vary the decision of the council; (c)substitute its own decision for that of the council; or (d)quash the decision of the council; (4) Where the court quashes the decision of the council, it may direct new hearing or further inquiry by the discipline committee. comparison of s. 52 of the Act, with s. 62 of The Medical Profession Act, l981, satisfies me that the two sections are virtually the same except for minor changes in wording or format. am, therefore, of the view, that the jurisprudence under said The Medical Profession Act, 1981, to the extent of the cases cited, is applicable to the standard of review open to me in this case. APPLYING SAID STANDARD OF REVIEW, ARE ANY OF THE GROUNDS OF APPEAL VALID? The notice of appeal, supra, sets forth several grounds of appeal. Grounds and are general in nature and relate to findings of fact, standard of proof and the decision of the Discipline Committee generally. Grounds and relate to the charges against the appellant respecting Dale Bonner and Paul Bedier. Grounds and relate to the issue of professional misconduct by the appellant. Ground relates to the penalty imposed. propose to deal with these grounds in the order in which have grouped them. GROUNDS AND The Discipline Committee clearly recognized the standard of proof required to be established by the respondent. In its Final Report to the Executive Committee, under the heading "Consideration of the Evidence" it stated, at p. thereof: In their closing submissions, both counsel directed the Committee to court decisions dealing with the burden of proof applicable in disciplinary proceedings alleging professional misconduct. In considering the evidence and reaching its conclusions in this case, the Committee was mindful of the fact that simple balance of probabilities is not sufficient standard, given the gravity of the charges and the serious impact which finding of professional misconduct can have on the career and livelihood of member. The Committee therefore applied the onus of proof as defined by the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal in Camgoz v. College of Physicians and Surgeons (1989), 1989 CanLII 4432 (SK CA), 74 Sask. R. 73, namely: "to establish the allegations by fair and reasonable preponderance of credible testimony" with the standard of proof being "the highest possible standard applicable to civil case." At p. of its said Final Report to the Executive Committee the Discipline Committee clearly identified the evidence, and the standard applied thereto, by which it had reached its conclusions. It clearly considered only direct evidence and did not consider hearsay evidence in reaching its conclusions. It reported as follows: The Discipline Committee heard and thoroughly considered all of the evidence that was presented by these witnesses. Through that process, the Discipline Committee identified all evidence that was considered to be of significant relevance to determination of the facts alleged in the charges. That evidence is outlined in the sections that follow. All other evidence, although not specifically listed, was considered by the Committee with respect to the other issues raised by counsel and in particular the issues of: (i) Mr. E. Paquin's intention or state of mind, and (ii) whether the conduct alleged, in all of the circumstances, was sufficiently serious to constitute "professional misconduct". Although considerable hearsay evidence was heard during the course of the hearing, the Committee was mindful of the fact that such evidence is not sufficiently reliable to be used as proof of any of the required elements of charge which involves an allegation of professional misconduct. The Committee therefore based its findings, as indicated below, upon the direct evidence of the witnesses testifying and the exhibits as filed by the parties. mine) GROUNDS AND These grounds deal with the charges found against the appellant, and the penalties imposed in respect of each of them. He was found guilty of one count respecting each of Messrs. Bonner and Bedier. propose to deal with each of them separately. CHARGE FOUND AGAINST MR. PAQUIN RE: BONNER The appellant was charged as follows: Misrepresenting to Mr. Bonner that the school improvement process report for the Last Mountain School Division dated March, 1995, made by the Saskatchewan Professional Development Unit was critical of his leadership and recommended that he be transferred, when no such reference was made. The finding of the Discipline Committee was as follows: The Committee finds that Mr. E. Paquin intentionally caused Mr. D. Bonner to believe that he was conveying the substance of the written report prepared by Mrs. G. Dueck on the School Effectiveness Process at the meeting of April 10. The Committee is satisfied that by both his actions and the oral statements made at this meeting, Mr. E. Paquin misrepresented to Mr. D. Bonner that the report was critical of his leadership and recommended that he be transferred, when in fact this was not true. The Discipline Committee noted the significant admissible evidence, produced by the respondent, in coming to its determination and conclusions on this charge. This charge results, in part, from the conducting of "School Effectiveness Process" on the Punnichy, Saskatchewan, elementary school of which Mr. Bonner was principal. Concerns had been raised by parents of children attending the school over the handling of several issues within the school. These included, amongst others, lack of motivation of the students, discipline, resource allocation and leadership. review of the school, in the form of "School Effectiveness Process" was to be conducted to "bring about the necessary changes in school with an end to improving learning outcomes, fostering teacher growth and collegiality and serving as basis for both short and long term goal setting and decision making." Mr. Paquin met with the executive director of the Saskatchewan Professional Development Unit: Mrs. Gwen Dueck, to have this carried out and she conducted the study. In March of 1995 Mrs. Dueck faxed to Mr. Paquin draft report along with list of recommendations. This was followed up by telephone conversation in which Mr. Paquin and Mrs. Dueck discussed the recommendations. This telephone conversation also included general conversation about the leadership of the school. Mr. Paquin then met with Mr. Bonner on April 10, 1995, and read to him from the notes he had earlier made regarding the report and his conversation with Mrs. Dueck. Mr. Paquin then discussed with Mr. Bonner the options of resigning as principal of said elementary school and transferring elsewhere. The Committee found that the written notes of Mr. Bonner misrepresented the School Improvement Process and the fact that he read them during the meeting with Mr. Bonner, without providing Mr. Bonner with copy thereof, increased the impact of the comments and caused Mr. Bonner to accept the comments as formal recommendations of the report. The Discipline Committee further found that this was what Mr. Paquin intended. The Discipline Committee concluded at p. 14 of its Final Report to the Executive Committee that: In order to achieve his desired end of changing the leadership at Punnichy Elementary School, Mr. E. Paquin made improper use of his candid discussions with Mrs. G. Dueck when he discussed the outcome of the study and recommendations in the S.P.D.U. report with Mr. D. Bonner on April 10. He conveyed the substance of these candid discussions to Mr. D. Bonner, while leading Mr. D. Bonner to believe that these were the formal recommendations made in the written report. The Committee is satisfied that in doing so, Mr. E. Paquin intentionally misrepresented the contents and recommendations set out in the written report as indicated in this charge. The appellant contends that when the conversation is considered in context, he had not acted inappropriately. He testified that he had had discussions with Mrs. Dueck which suggested general change of staff to revitalize the school. He further testified that he believed the Division Board, the Local Board, and the Band Committee would support such change at the school, and that the Division Board was considering transfer of Mr. Bonner. He also testified that he believed that the material he reviewed with Mr. Bonner was contained in either the report of Mrs. Dueck or in his discussion with her. He further testified that he never actually opened the draft of the report during his discussion with Mr. Bonner nor did he give it to Mr. Bonner to read. When asked about this charge specifically, he testified that he did discuss the Dueck report in terms of its being critical of Mr. Bonner's leadership but he denied that he suggested transfer. His evidence in this regard varies from that of Mr. Bonner. Mr. Bonner testified that transfer was discussed in the context of the Dueck report and its recommendations. Mr. Bonner also testified that he was not aware of Mr. Paquin having had conversation with Mrs. Dueck. He testified that he believed the notes Mr. Paquin was referring to were the report itself or notes from the report. The Discipline Committee after hearing, and seeing, both the appellant, and Mr. Bonner, (and others), testify, chose to accept the evidence of Mr. Bonner over that of the appellant. full and complete review of the transcript of the proceedings before the Discipline Committee satisfies me that its findings of fact, vis-ï¿½-vis the evidence of the appellant and Mrs. Gwen Dueck, is supported by the admissible evidence. Mrs. Dueck repeatedly stated in her evidence that she was not conducting staff evaluation. The appellant was well aware of her role. She also testified that while candid conversations took place between her and the appellant she did not make any specific comments on the nature of Mr. Bonner's leadership at the Punnichy school. That comments on leadership were general in nature and any conversation regarding the transferring of Mr. Bonner, she understood, were related to multitude of reasons which she was not privy to and were not related to her report or comments. This conflicts with the notes made by the appellant regarding his understanding of their conversation. Again, the Discipline Committee chose to accept the evidence of Mrs. Dueck over that of the appellant. This was finding of credibility. It is amply supported by the evidence. Taken as whole, cannot find that there were any inappropriate inferences drawn, conclusions reached which were not supported by the evidence, or, misdirection on point of law with respect to this charge against the appellant. There is therefore no basis upon which this ground of appeal can succeed. CHARGE FOUND AGAINST MR. PAQUIN RE: BEDIER This charge reads as follows: Threatening Mr. Bedier that if he did not apply for transfer and resign as principal, that the matter would be dealt with at the board table and that "it could get ugly". The Discipline Committee found, at p. 21 of its Final Report to the Executive Committee, that: The Discipline Committee finds that Mr. E. Paquin did threaten Mr. P. Bedier that if he did not submit his transfer request and resignation from the principalship that the matter would be dealt with at the Board table and that "it could get ugly". Mr. Bedier, at all times material, was the principal of the Bulyea, Saskatchewan, elementary school. He acknowledged that lack of confidence in him had developed in the 1994/95 school year. Several issues regarding his administrative duties had been raised. Mrs. Meyers, the Assistant Director, had suggested on March 31, l995 that he should consider applying for transfer to Strasbourg, Saskatchewan, where position for French teacher was open. This suggestion was made again by Mrs. Meyers on April 4, 1995. Mr. Bedier said he would consider such transfer. On April 5, 1995, the appellant telephoned and spoke with Mr. Bedier. Mr. Bedier testified that he was advised that he should apply for transfer within week. If he did not transfer, the matter would be dealt with at the board table and that it could get ugly. Mr. Bedier further testified that the appellant had stated to him that this was an opportunity for him to save face. After conversations with other persons, Mr. Bedier submitted his resignation. The appellant does not appeal from the finding of fact that he made the statement "it could get ugly". He, however, submits that there was no evidence to support the interpretation placed thereon by the Discipline Committee. The appellant submits that there was no evidence that he had any personal problem with Mr. Bedier and that [he said] the period of intensive supervision that would follow if transfer was not received would be an unpleasant process. The Discipline Committee accepted the evidence of Mr. Bedier regarding the April 5, 1995 telephone conversation. They accepted that the appellant had not discussed the actual process of not transferring and the intensive supervision that would follow. They accepted that the appellant said things "would become ugly" if Mr. Bedier did not transfer. They accepted the evidence of Mr. Bedier over that of the appellant. When considering the evidence which the Discipline Committee accepted, the nature of the telephone conversation of April 5, 1995, and the reaction of Mr. Bedier thereto, they concluded that the appellant was threatening Mr. Bedier in order to receive the transfer request and further concluded that he intended that result. Accepting the evidence as it did, it logically follows that it inferred that the conversation was designed to pressure Mr. Bedier into tendering his resignation and requesting transfer. That the impugned statement was not made in the context of future supervision that Mr. Bedier would face and the Discipline Committee had evidence that the appellant was anxious to receive the resignation in order to recruit new principal. The Discipline Committee in its Final Report to the Executive Committee, at p. 22, had this to say: In making this finding, the Committee takes note that the statements made by Mr. E. Paquin were not made professionally that is, in the context of discussing the established process which would normally be followed in the event that Mr. P. Bedier's resignation and request for transfer were not forthcoming. Rather, Mr. E. Paquin intended to convey that it would get uncomfortable or embarrassing for Mr. P. Bedier personally if he did not comply with the request for his resignation and transfer. [The Committee finds that Mr. E. Paquin's comments were not formal and professional] but were personal, suggesting harm to Mr. P. Bedier's personal and professional reputation through exposure of wrongdoing if he did not comply with the request. The Committee is satisfied, not only that Mr. P. Bedier did feel threatened and intimidated, but that it was Mr. E. Paquin's intention that he should feel threatened and intimidated with the objective of pressuring him into submitting his resignation and request for transfer sooner than he otherwise might have on his own initiative. Taken as whole, cannot find that there were any inappropriate inferences drawn, conclusions reached which were not supported by the evidence, or, misdirection on point of law with respect to this charge against the appellant. There is, therefore, no basis upon which this ground of appeal can succeed. GROUNDS AND This leaves for consideration whether or not the impugned conduct on the part of the appellant amounts to professional misconduct such as to attract the penalty provisions of the Act. This requires careful consideration of: 1.Whether the actions of the appellant coerced the resignations of Messrs. Bonner and Bedier; and if they did 2.Whether such actions amounted to professional misconduct. The Discipline Committee determined that the actions of the appellant were intended by him and had the effect of obtaining the resignations of Messrs. Bonner and Bedier. While noting that Messrs. Bonner and Bedier had had an opportunity to consider their positions, and to discuss same with colleagues, the Committee, however, were satisfied, that notwithstanding these factors, the actions of the appellant had forced them to resign and request transfer when they might otherwise not have done so. The appellant testified that Mr. Bonner was not coerced as he was candidly told of the problems with his principalship and that these concerns were supported by the facts. That, relating these facts to Mr. Bonner, could never be considered coercion. The appellant also testified that Mr. Bedier was well aware of his administrative difficulties and had considered other positions. He was informed by others that he should not submit his resignation unless he felt he wished to. The appellant suggests that these factors militate against any finding of coercion. Important to determining whether Messrs. Bonner and Bedier had been coerced is consideration of the context in which the comments by the appellant were made to them. They were informed by their supervisor, person in authority, that their work was unsatisfactory. He requested that they transfer. He left them with the impression indeed he so told them that they lacked support in their local communities. Mr. Bedier was told threatened that things would "get ugly" if he did not leave. While other options may have been open to them, they may not have appeared realistic in the face of the appellant's their supervisors" comments. On the whole of the evidence that of Messrs. Bonner and Bedier, and others, including the appellant the Committee found that Messrs. Bonner and Bedier felt they had to submit their resignations. This determination is supported by the evidence, and is reasonable one. PROFESSIONAL MISCONDUCT The Discipline Committee, in its Final Report to the Executive Committee, at p. 23, cited the definition of professional misconduct that is found in s. 37 of the Act. It reads as follows: 37 Professional misconduct is question of fact but any matter, conduct or thing, whether or not disgraceful or dishonourable, that: (a) is harmful to the best interests of the public or the members; (b) tends to harm the standing of the profession of educational administration; (c) is breach of this Act or the bylaws; or (d) is failure to comply with an order of the professional relations committee, the discipline committee or the executive; [is professional misconduct within the meaning of this Act.] The Act itself states that "Professional misconduct is question of fact" but any matter or thing, such as those cited, can be construed as being "professional misconduct". The Discipline Committee in its said Final Report noted that this was the first hearing of complaint under the Act. That there was no precedent to rely upon. It stated it relied on the definition in the Act and also referred to the general definition of professional misconduct in cases such as Pierce v. Law Society of British Columbia (1993), 103 D.L.R. (4th) 233 (B.C.S.C.) and Pearlman v. Manitoba Law Society Judicial Committee, [1991] S.C.R. 869 (S.C.C.), which held, at p. 24 of the said Final Report: Professional misconduct is wide and general term. It is conduct which would reasonably be regarded as disgraceful, dishonourable or unbecoming of member of the profession by persons of integrity and good reputation amongst the membership. In determining this issue, the Discipline Committee was also mindful of the limitations inherent in this definition. It held that the term did not include simple errors of judgment or even negligence because neither possessed the character of culpability or moral blameworthiness which is essential to finding of professional misconduct. The Discipline Committee found that the misrepresentation made by the appellant to Mr. Bonner and the threat made by him to Mr. Bedier did constitute professional misconduct. Using the report (of Mrs. Dueck) for purpose for which it was not intended, and misrepresenting its contents, the Discipline Committee found that it caused harm to the professional standing of LEADS and the profession of educational administrators, and that the threat to Mr. Bedier tarnished the image of the profession with teachers and the electors within the school division, and beyond. Considering the evidence as a whole, I am unable tosay that the Discipline Committee erred in its interpretationof "professional misconduct" or its application thereof to thefacts as found by it. Facts, which in my opinion, were reasonably open to it to find. For all of the foregoing reasons I dismiss theappeal. This leaves for consideration the question of penalty. The appellant submits that the "disposition imposed by the Executive Committee was excessive". He requests that the penalty be reduced. The Discipline Committee recommended the following penalty be imposed on the appellant: The Discipline Committee recommends that Mr. E. Paquin be formally reprimanded through letter transmitted by the President and Executive Director of L.E.A.D.S., that letter to be maintained on file with L.E.A.D.S. for period of five years, and that the same letter be copied to Mr. E. Paquin's employer and the complainant. On August 8, 1995 the LEADS Executive met and heard representations from both the representative of the Investigation Committee and Mr. Paquin's counsel. Thereafter, it imposed the penalty, supra. The appellant suggests that the penalty is excessive [considering Mr. Paquin had to travel to Saskatoon and Waskesiu, Saskatchewan, to deal with this matter] and that no written reasons were given for this decision. He also submits that the fine should be set aside as he successfully defended most of the allegations against him, has incurred significant costs in defending against these allegations, that the Committee had not recommended [such] fine, that he would be placed under significant amount of hardship if required to pay said fine, this was the first prosecution under the Act, he had no previous record, had only acted in his position for one year and lastly, the fact the Committee had stated its decision was designed to help newly appointed directors goes against the imposition of the fine. In Sugarman v. Saskatchewan Association of Optometrists, supra, Barclay J. of this Court held at p. 213: [32] The fine imposed by the Discipline Committee was the maximum authorized by the statute. In considering the appeal against penalty the courts have consistently held that the court should interfere with decision of the Discipline Committee only where there has been very serious error committed. [33] In the recent decision of Barik v. College of Physicians and Surgeons (Sask.) Q.B. 123/89, J.C. Yorkton, December 7, l989, Osborn, J. (as yet unreported), it was stated as follows: "The attitude the Court should take is demonstrated clearly in the decision Re: Milstein and Ontario College of Pharmacy (No.2) (1977), 1976 CanLII 858 (ON SC), 13 O.R. (2d) 700 (Ont. D.C.), Mr. Justice Cory, speaking for the majority, states at page 707: ". The power of self-discipline perpetuated in the enabling legislation must be based on the principle that members of the profession are uniquely and best qualified to establish the standards of professional conduct. Members of the profession can best determine whether the conduct of fellow member has fallen below the requisite standards and determine the consequences. The peers of the professional person are deemed to have and, indeed, they must have special knowledge, training and skill that particularly adapts them to formulate their own professional standards and to judge the conduct of member of their profession. No other body could appreciate as well the problems and frustrations that beset the fellow. "Given such unique qualifications for judgment and discipline of fellow members, the decisions and penalties of professional discipline committees ought not to be lightly interfered with." "The Ontario Divisional Court expressed similar view in relation to the discipline of lawyers in Spring v. Law Society of Upper Canada (1988), 28 O.A.C. 375, at page 379, Mr. Justice LaBrosse speaking for the majority stated: "I am mindful that the Disciplinary Tribunal is in the best position to determine the appropriate penalty in cases of professional misconduct and where it bases the penalty upon the evidence this Court should not interfere with its decision." "In Percheson v. College of Physicians and Surgeons (Ont.) (1985), 1985 CanLII 2062 (ON SC), 10 O.A.C. 76 (Ont. D.C.), the Court held at page 78 that the Court should interfere with the penalty imposed by Discipline Committee only if it is "very extreme case"." (emphasis added) Further, in Crawford v. Saskatchewan College of Physical Therapists (1986), 1986 CanLII 3566 (SK QB), 48 Sask. R. 155 (Sask. Q.B.) Matheson J. of this Court stated at p. 157 as follows: [13] As was stated in Page v. Saskatchewan Registered Nurses Association (1983), 1983 CanLII 2246 (SK QB), 26 Sask. R. 108, professional council is in the best position to know the seriousness of the misconduct of which member has been found guilty. Consequently, court should not interfere lightly with the sentence imposed by professional tribunal unless it appears that the tribunal has erred in some matter of high degree or principle: Re Solicitor (1924), 93 L.J.K.B. 761. [14] No error in principle by the Council was demonstrated. Although the appellant has complained that, from subjective aspect, the suspension order is harsh, the members of Council must have been aware of the effect which suspension would have on fellow professional. Here, similarly, the members of the Executive Committee of LEADS must have been aware of the effect which its decision would have on the appellant. They, notwithstanding, saw fit to impose it. Have they, in so doing, erred in some matter of high degree or principle? The courts in Manitoba have also held that it is difficult to interfere with the decision of Disciplinary Committee. In Lazar v. Association of Professional Engineers of Manitoba and Council of Association of Professional Engineers of Manitoba, 1971 CanLII 1003 (MB QB), [1971] W.W.R. 614 (Man. Q.B.), Matas J. states at p. 625: In McCoan v. General Medical Council, [1964] W.L.R. 1107, [1964] All E.R. 143, it was held at p. 147: "Their lordships are of opinion that Lord Parker, C.J., may have gone too far in Re Solicitor (No. 8), [1960] Q.B. 212 at 221, [1960] All E.R. 621 at 624, when he said that the appellate court would never differ from sentence in cases of professional misconduct, but their lordships agree with Lord Goddard, C.J., in Re Solicitor (No. 2), [1956] W.L.R. 1312, [1956] All E.R. 51 at 517, when he said that it would require very strong case to interfere with sentence in such case, because the Disciplinary Committee are the best possible people for weighing the seriousness of professional misconduct. No general test can be laid down, for each case must depend entirely on its own particular circumstances. All that can be said is that, if it is to be set aside, the sentence of erasure must appear to their lordships to be wrong and unjustified." (emphasis mine) review of s. 47 of the Act shows that the Executive Committee is given wide latitude in the nature of the punishment that it may impose upon person found guilty of professional misconduct. The Executive Committee are not bound by the recommendations of the Discipline Committee. They are only recommendations guide. The Executive Committee could have invoked the harsher penalty of expulsion from the league and that his name be struck from the register; it could have suspended the appellant for specified period of time; it could have recommended to the Minister that after the time for an appeal has expired or any appeal taken has been dismissed, the minister suspend or cancel the appellant's teaching certificate; it could have imposed fine in specified amount not exceeding $5,000.00; it could have ordered the appellant to pay the investigative and hearing costs; it could have ordered the appellant to pay its legal and witnesses' costs. This it did not do. cannot say that the Executive Committee erred in some matter of high degree or principle. I cannot say that bythe penalty it imposed the Executive Committee was wrong andunjustified. The appeal against penalty is dismissed. This raises the issue as to costs. By s. 51(l)(a) of the Act, member who has been found guilty of professional misconduct may appeal to judge of the court by serving the executive director of LEADS with copy of the notice of appeal and filing it with the local registrar of the court. This the appellant did. By s. 51(2) of said Act, on receipt of notice of appeal, the executive director is required ["shall file with the local registrar true copy of"] to file with the local registrar of the court, the several documents, including the formal complaint and the transcript of the evidence, presented to the Discipline Committee or the executive. Then, by s. 51(3) it is provided that the appellant, or his solicitor, may obtain from the executive director copy of the documents filed with the local registrar pursuant to s. 51(2) of the Act on payment of the costs of producing same. The Act is silent as to who shall bear the costs of providing to the court the documents filed pursuant to s. 5l(2) of the Act. Are they costs in the cause? Are they costs to be borne by the executive director of LEADS in any event of the cause? If they are costs in the cause, then why the need for s. 51(3)? Why is it not provided that upon receipt of notice of appeal the executive director of LEADS shall file with the local registrar the documents referred to in s. 51(2) of the Act and shall also provide the appellant with copy thereof, and that the costs of producing said documents shall become costs in the cause unless otherwise ordered? am of the view that if the Legislature had intended the costs of what is statutorily mandated to be provided to the local registrar are to be costs in the cause, the Legislature would have said so. Absent clear and explicit language to that effect, am of the view that ought to hold, and do hold, that the costs of providing the statutorily mandated materials pursuant to s. 51(2) of the Act ought to be borne by, in this case, LEADS. If am in error in so holding, I, in any event, pursuant to the inherent jurisdiction of this Court, and pursuant to s. 52 of the Act that ". may make any order as to costs that the judge considers appropriate", direct that in the particular circumstances, the costs of providing the materials pursuant to s. 51(2) of the Act be borne by the respondent. Subject to what has been stated in the immediately preceding paragraph hereof, the respondent will be entitled to recover its costs of, and incidental to, this appeal from the appellant, to be taxed on Column 3. J. Q.B.G. A.D. 1995 No. 2983 J.C.R. IN THE QUEEN'S BENCH JUDICIAL CENTRE OF REGINA IN THE MATTER OF THE LEAGUE OF EDUCATIONAL ADMINISTRATORS, DIRECTORS AND SUPERINTENDENTS ACT, 1991, S.S. 1990-91, C. l- 9.02 AND EUGENE PAQUIN, DIRECTOR OF EDUCATION FOR THE LAST MOUNTAIN SCHOOL DIVISION, IN THE PROVINCE OF SASKATCHEWAN BETWEEN: EUGENE PAQUIN and THE LEAGUE OF EDUCATIONAL ADMINISTRATORS, DIRECTORS AND SUPERINTENDENTS OF SASKATCHEWAN RESPONDENT K.A. Lang for the appellant R.A. Robertson for the respondent ADDENDUM GROTSKY J. June 27, 1996 The concluding paragraph of my judgment dated May 31, 1996, shall be amended to read as follows: Subject to what has been stated in the immediately preceding paragraph hereof, the respondent will be entitled to recover its costs of, and incidental to this appeal, from the appellant, to be taxed on Column 3.
A Director was charged with professional misconduct for coercing the resignation of two principals in his school division. The Discipline Committee found the appellant guilty of misrepresenting the school process report involving the first principal and of threatening the other principal that if he did not apply for a transfer and resign the matter would be dealt with at the board table and that 'it could get ugly'. The Executive Committee of LEADS issued a reprimand to be placed on his file for five years and a fine of $2,500. At issue was whether the Discipline Committee erred in its findings of fact and the burden of proof, whether the facts, if true, constituted professional misconduct and whether the penalty imposed was excessive. HELD: Appeal dismissed.  1)The legislation does not appear to call for a change in the traditional approach. The fact that an appellate judge can substitute his or her decision for that of the Discipline Committee or order of an executive does not mean that the appellate court's view of the facts and credibility of witnesses supercedes in any way the role of the Discipline Committee unless it finds there were inappropriate inferences drawn, conclusions reached which were not supported by the evidence, or a misdirection on a point of law. None were found in either case. The Discipline Committee did not err in its interpretation of 'professional misconduct' or its application to the facts.  2)Section 52 of the LEADS Act and s62 of the Medical Profession Act, 1981 are virtually the same except for minor changes in wording and format. The jurisprudence under the Medical Profession Act was applicable to the standard of review in this case. 3)The penalty imposed was not wrong or unjustified. Section 47 of the LEADS Act gives the Executive Committee wide latitude in the nature of punishment that it may impose upon a person found guilty of professional misconduct. The Executive is not bound by the recommendations of the Discipline Committee. They are only guidelines. 4)The Act is silent as to who shall bear costs of providing the documents filed pursuant to s51(2) of the Act. If the legislature had intended the statutorily mandated costs to be costs in the cause it would have said so. LEADS should bear the costs in this case. In any event pursuant to the court's inherent jurisdiction and pursuant to s52 of the Act the costs of providing the materials were to be borne by the respondent. 5)Subject to the above the respondent was entitled to costs of and incidental to the appeal.ADDENDUM to TWL QB96220. The concluding paragraph was amended to read: Subject to what has been stated in the immediately preceding paragraph hereof, the respondent will be entitled to recover its costs of, and incidental to this appeal, from the appellant, to be taxed on Column 3.