(Orally) Dated: 19971103 Docket: 2561 THE COURT OF APPEAL FOR SASKATCHEWAN Coram: Vancise, Sherstobitoff Jackson JJ.A. INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS LOCAL 2067, (I.B.E.W.) (Respondent/Applicant) APPELLANT and SASKATCHEWAN POWER CORPORATION (Applicant/Respondent) RESPONDENT and SASKATCHEWAN LABOUR RELATIONS BOARD COUNSEL: Mr. R.A. Engel for the appellant Mr. B.J. Kenny for the respondent DISPOSITION: On Appeal From: QB 967 of 1996, J.C. of Regina Appeal Heard: November 3, 1997 Appeal Dismissed: November 3, 1997 (orally) Written Reasons: November 18, 1997 Reasons By: The Honourable Mr. Justice Sherstobitoff In Concurrence: The Honourable Mr. Justice Vancise The Honourable Madam Justice Jackson SHERSTOBITOFF J.A. (orally) [1] This appeal is from an order of Barclay J. which quashed an interim order of the Labour Relations Board pending the determination of a grievance by an arbitration board, even though no proceedings were pending before the Labour Relations Board, and even though it had no power to make any final order respecting the proceedings before the arbitration board. The issue is whether s. 5.3 of The Trade Union Act, R.S.S. 1978, c. T-17, authorizes the Board to make such an order. [2] The facts are set out in the judgment of Barclay J. [3] The relevant provisions of the Act are as follows: 5.3 With respect to an application or complaint made pursuant to any provision of this Act or the regulations, the board may, after giving each party to the matter an opportunity to be heard, make an interim order pending the making of final order or decision. 25(1) All differences between the parties to collective bargaining agreement or persons bound by the collective bargaining agreement or on whose behalf the collective bargaining agreement was entered into respecting its meaning, application or alleged violation, including question as to whether matter is arbitrable, are to be settled by arbitration after exhausting any grievance procedure established by the collective bargaining agreement. 42 The board shall exercise such powers and perform such duties as are conferred or imposed on it by this Act, or as may be incidental to the attainment of the objects of this Act including, without limiting the generality of the foregoing, the making of orders requiring compliance with the provisions of this Act, with any regulations made under this Act or with any decision in respect of any matter before the board. [4] Section 5.3 both confers and limits the jurisdiction of the Board to make interim orders. The question decided by the Board, that it had power to make the order in question, was clearly jurisdictional question. The Board recognized it to be jurisdictional question and so treated it. Accordingly, the standard of review is whether the decision was correct, rather than whether it was patently unreasonable. [5] Whether one approaches the question from the point of view of the plain meaning of the words of s. 5.3, or from the point of view of the context of the entire statute, or from the point of view of a purposive approach, the result is the same. The chambers judge arrived at a correct conclusion. [6] The ordinary meaning of the words of s. 5.3 require two conditions for the exercise of the power to make interim orders: the existence of an application or complaint before the Labour Relations Board, and the existence of power in the Labour Relations Board to make final order in respect of the application. The appellant says that because the section contains no words directly limiting the terms "application or complaint" and "final order or decision" in s. 5.3, the conditions may be fulfilled by the existence of grievance before an arbitration board, and the existence of power in the arbitration board to make final order. Settlement of disputes respecting collective agreements by arbitration is now mandatory under s. 25(1) of the Act. It argues that, accordingly, grievance before an arbitration board is "an application under the Act" within the meaning of s. 5.3, and that the final order referred to therein may be an award of an arbitration board. [7] We cannot agree with the appellant's contention for number of reasons. [8] The Labour Relations Board receives applications and makes orders. Arbitration boards are usually said to hear grievances and make awards. If the legislators had intended the meaning contended for by the appellant, they would have used, in drafting s. 5.3, the terms usually used by those participating in the arbitration process, such as grievance in addition to application or complaint, and award, in addition to final order. [9] Section 5.3 refers to one body and one body only, "the board", which is defined by s. 2(c) to be the Labour Relations Board. Accordingly, when the section refers to applications and orders, it refers to applications to and orders of the Labour Relations Board. The operative part of the section, when it empowers the Labour Relations Board "to make an interim order pending the making of final order or decision" predicates the power of the Labour Relations Board to make an interim order upon the power of the same Board to make final order. The interim power is not only based on the final power but is also part of the final power, and both are part of the same process. [10] Furthermore, s. 25(1), when read with ss. (1.1) and (1.2), indicates an intention on the part of the legislators to grant exclusive jurisdiction to arbitration boards to deal with disputes arising out of the interpretation of collective agreements. (We recognize that violations of collective agreements may also, on occasion, constitute unfair labour practices over which the Labour Relations Board has jurisdiction, but that does not change the principle.) The power claimed for the Labour Relations Board to make interim orders in respect of proceedings before arbitration boards is inconsistent with that exclusivity even if used only to aid arbitration boards by supplying power that the arbitration board itself may not have. Nor is there anything in s. 25 or the other sections of the Act dealing with resolution of disputes by arbitration to indicate an intention to grant supervisory or other powers to the Labour Relations Board in respect of the arbitration process. [11] Nor does s. 42 aid the appellant. Whatever the scope of s. 42, it cannot be used to release the restrictions of statutory provision the very purpose of which is to define the jurisdiction of the Labour Relations Board to act in respect of such matters. [12] The appeal is dismissed with costs in the usual way.
An appeal from an order which quashed an interim order of the Labour Relations Board (LRB) pending the determination of a grievance by an arbitration board, even though no proceedings were pending before the LRB and even though it had no power to make a final order respecting the proceedings before the arbitration board. At issue was whether s5.3 of the Trade Union Act authorized the Board to make such an order. HELD: The appeal was dismissed with costs.  1)The Board recognized the question to be a jurisdictional question. The standard of review is whether the decision was correct rather than patently unreasonable. 2)The chambers judge arrived at the correct conclusion whether from the point of view of the plain meaning of the words of s5.3 or the context of the entire statute or a purposive approach.  3)S5.3 refers to the 'board' which is defined by s2(c) to be the LRB and accordingly referred to applications and orders of the LRB. The interim power is not only based on the final power but is also part of the final power and both are part of the same process. 4)S25(1), when read with ss(1.1) and (1.2) indicates an intention on the part of the legislators to grant exclusive jurisdiction to arbitration boards to deal with disputes arising out of the interpretation of collective agreements. 5)Whatever the scope of s42, it cannot be used to release the restrictions of a statutory provision the very purpose of which is to define the jurisdiction of the LRB to act in respect of such matters.