C.J.Q.B. THE COURT OF APPEAL FOR SASKATCHEWAN Citation: 2004 SKCA 99 Date: 20040623 Between: Docket: 948 Vanguard Inc. Prospective Appellant and Royal Bank of Canada, Fonds de Solidarite des Travailleurs du Quebec (F.T.Q. and Steven Leakos Prospective Respondents and Peak Manufacturing Inc., Peak Manufacturing (USA) Inc., Bonair Leisure Products Ltd., Oh!Zone RV Inc., 3911331 Canada Inc., Roynat Inc., Banque Larentienne du Canada, GE Commercial Distribution Finance Canada Inc., GE Commercial Distribution Finance Corporation, Transamerica Commercial Finance Corporation, Canada, Bombardier Capital Ltd., Bombardier Capital Inc., Textron Financial Corporation, Key Bank, Ford Credit Canada Limited, Ford Motor Company of Canada, Limited, Nicholson Leasing (1994) Ltd., Fleetwood Credit Corp., doing business as Banc of America RV Finance, Inc., California corporation, Banc of America Specialty Finance, Inc., North Carolina corporation, Bank of America N.A., national banking association, Bank of America, Canada Specialty Group Ltd., an Ontario corporation, The Bank of Nova Scotia, Great American Assurance Company, VHL Management Inc., Chelsea Management Inc., Chartwell Management Inc., 826681 Alberta Inc., 836685 Alberta Inc., La Ville de Thetford Mines, Nexus Holdings Inc., Chaseheld Equity Ltd. and RBT Real Estate Partnership Non-Parties Before: Sherstobitoff J.A. Counsel: Grant M. Currie for the Prospective Appellant Jeffrey M. Lee for George Wilson et al. Gordon Berscheid for Justice Canada Michael W. Milani, Q.C. for Royal Bank Application: From: Q.B. 1578/03, J.C. of Saskatoon Heard: June 23, 2004 Disposition: Dismissed Written Reasons: By: The Honourable Mr. Justice Sherstobitoff SHERSTOBITOFF J.A. (orally) [1] This is an application for an order extending the time to apply for leave to appeal and for leave to appeal. Sections 13 and 14 of the Companies Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, govern the proposed appeal. Subsection (2) of section 14 of the Act says that “. no appeal shall be entertained unless, within twenty-one days of the order or decision being appealed, or within such further time as the court appealed from, allows, the appellant has taken proceedings therein to perfect his or her appeal.” The applicant took no steps to appeal within the twenty-one day period due to an inadvertence of its lawyer. [2] Although the applicant cannot bring itself within s. 14(2), it argues that this court nevertheless has the power to extend the time either under s. 13 of the Companies Creditors Arrangement Act which empowers the appeal court to grant leave to appeal “on such terms as to security and in other respects as the judge or court so directs” or under s. 9(6) of The Court of Appeal Act, 2000, S.S. 2000, c. C-42.1, which empowers judge, on leave to appeal application, to extend an appeal period. [3] Similar arguments were considered and rejected in Gaz Metropolitain Inc. v. Wynden Canada Inc. (1982), 45 C.B.R. (N.S.) 11 (Que. C.A.); Re Cage Logistics Inc. (2003), 2003 ABCA 36 (CanLII), Alta. L.R. (4th) 65 (Alta. C.A.); and Korte v. Deloitte Haskins and Sells (1996), 178 A.R. 209, on the ground that the plain ordinary meaning of the words of s. 14(2) is that only the court appealed from has power to extend the time within which leave must be sought. accept and adopt the reasoning in these judgments. [4] As to the possible application of s. 9(6) of The Court of Appeal Act, 2000, it should be noted that subsection (7) of s. says that where provision of the section conflicts with the provision of an enactment governing an appeal, the provision of the enactment prevails. Accordingly, 14(2) of the Companies Creditors Arrangement Act prevails over s. 9(6) of The Court of Appeal Act, 2000. [5] Both the application for extension of time and the application for leave to appeal are dismissed with costs in the usual way.
This was an application for an order extending the time to apply for leave to appeal and for leave to appeal. Sections 13 and 14 of the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act govern the appeal. The applicant took no steps to appeal within the 21 day period due to an inadvertence of its lawyer. HELD: The appeal was dismissed. The plain and ordinary meaning of the words of s. 14(2) of the Act is that only the court appealed from has power to extend the time within which leave must be sought. Section 14(2) of the Act prevails over s. 9(6) of The Court of Appeal Act, 2000.