Case: 1:05-cv-06583 Document #: 407 Filed: 08/09/10 Page 1 of 18 PageID #:16114

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

GEORGE MCREYNOLDS, MAROC HOWARD, )

LARUE GIBSON, JENNIFER MADRID,

)

FRANKIE ROSS, MARVA YORK, LESLIE

)

BROWNE, HENRY WILSON, LEROY BROWN, )

GLENN CAPEL, CHRISTINA COLEMAN,

J. YVES LABORDE, MARSHELL MILLER, )

CARNELL MOORE, MARK JOHNSON,

)

CATHY BENDER-JACKSON, and STEPHEN )

SMARTT, individually on behalf of themselves )

and all others similarly situated,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

v.

)

)

MERRILL LYNCH, PIERCE, FENNER &

)

SMITH INCORPORATED,

)

)

Defendant.

)

)
No. 05 C 6583 Judge Robert W. Gettleman

AMENDED MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiffs George McReynolds, Maroc Howard, Larue Gibson, Jennifer Madrid, Frankie

Ross, Marva York, Leslie Browne, Henry Wilson, Leroy Brown, Glenn Capel, Christina

Coleman, J. Yves Laborde, Marshell Miller, Carnell Moore, Mark Johnson, Cathy Bender-

Jackson, and Stephen Smartt, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, have

brought a two count second amended putative class action complaint against defendant Merrill

Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., alleging racial discrimination in violation of Title VII of

the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) et seq. (Count I), and 42 U.S.C. §

1981 (Count II). Plaintiffs have moved pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 to certify a class, defined

as:

African-American financial advisors (“FAs”) and FA Trainees (“Trainees”) who are or were employed in the retail brokerage unit, referred to as Global Private

Case: 1:05-cv-06583 Document #: 407 Filed: 08/09/10 Page 2 of 18 PageID #:16115
Client (“GPC”) of defendant Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., from January 2001 to the present. The parties have engaged in lengthy and often contentious discovery proceedings including both factual and expert discovery. Not surprisingly, this has resulted in overly lengthy briefs with countless unnecessary citations and footnotes.1 For the reasons discussed below, the motion is denied.
FACTS Defendant is the largest provider of brokerage and brokerage related services in the United States. It employs over approximately 15,000 FAs to aid clients in identifying and reaching their financial goals. The company employs 135 Complex Directors (“Directors”) each of whom manages the operation of a number of branch offices within his or her complex. There are over 600 branch offices within the 135 complexes, employing the approximate 15,000 FAs. The Directors report to 30 Regional Managing Directors, most of whom are also Directors themselves, and who in turn report to 5 Divisional Managing Directors (“DMDs”). The five DMDs report to a Senior Vice-President (“SVP”) for the Advisory Division, who reports to the President of defendant’s Global Wealth Management (“GWM”) business. Each Director manages his or her complex as a stand alone business. The Directors monitor profits and losses of their complexes and make individualized employment decisions
1Although the court allowed the parties to exceed the 15 page limit provided by LR 7.1, the court did not expect the parties to abuse this allowance. For example, plaintiffs’ opening brief is 55 pages (the “Argument” section does not begin until page 43) with 86 footnotes, many of which contain as much or more text than the page on which they appear. Worse yet, many of the footnotes in both parties’ briefs contain argument or substantive factual points that belong in the text. Added to the hundreds of pages of exhibits submitted with the instant motions, the burden placed on the court was as taxing as it was unnecessary.
2

Case: 1:05-cv-06583 Document #: 407 Filed: 08/09/10 Page 3 of 18 PageID #:16116
regarding FAs, constrained only by national policies. Each FA basically operates his or her own business within a business. Each FA is responsible for building a book of business by soliciting clients in the community, although some accounts are distributed by management. Each FA is paid based on an objective grid. Compensation is increased based on increased production. In addition, defendant’s compensation plan pays different rates based on the size of the customer’s “household,” which is not a single client but includes all related individuals. For example, the adult children of a client are grouped in a “household” even if they do not live under one roof or have joint investment accounts. Since 2001 FAs received compensation for accounts under $100,000 only if those accounts belong to a “household” with wealth in excess of $100,000.
As each FA reaches increased length of service levels (“LOS”), the FA must meet certain production hurdles or else earn a lower rate of payout. This requirement is referred to as the “penalty box.” Once in the penalty box the FA remains in until he or she meets certain minimum production or revenue requirements. Thus, the longer an FA is employed at defendant, the more business that FA is expected to generate.
DISCUSSION “The class-action device was designed as `an exception to the usual rule that litigation is conducted by and on behalf of the individual named parties only.’” General Telephone Co. of Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 155 (1982) (quoting Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 700-01 (1979)). Class relief is particularly appropriate when the issues involved are common to the class as a whole and when the issues turn on questions of law applicable in the same manner to each member of the class. Id. The court has broad discretion in determining whether to
3

Case: 1:05-cv-06583 Document #: 407 Filed: 08/09/10 Page 4 of 18 PageID #:16117
certify a class, and the proponent bears the burden of showing that certification is warranted. Sandoval v. City of Chicago, 2007 WL 3087136 (N.D. Ill. 2007).
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, which governs class actions, requires a two step analysis to determine whether class certification is appropriate. First, plaintiffs must satisfy all four requirements of Rule 23(a): (1) numerosity; (2) commonality; (3) typicality; and (4) adequacy of representation. Martinez v. Haleas, 2009 WL 2916852 at *2 (N.D. Ill. 2009); Harriston v. Chicago Tribune Co., 992 F.2d 697, 703 (7th Cir. 1993). These requirements are prerequisites to certification, and failure to meet any one of them precludes certification of the class. Parker v. Risk Management Alternatives, Inc., 206 F.R.D. 211, 212 (N.D. Ill. 2002). Additionally, plaintiffs must satisfy one of the conditions of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b).
When evaluating whether a party has met its burden of proving that a class should be certified, the court should not consider the merits of the underlying claim, Eisen v. Carlisle and Jacqueline, 417 U.S. 156, 166 (1974), but may “probe behind the pleadings” to determine whether the named plaintiffs’ claims fairly encompass those of the class they seek to represent. Falcon, 457 U.S. at 160; Szabo v. Bridgeport Machines, Inc., 249 F.3d 672, 673 (7th Cir. 2001). Where factual and legal questions that “would strongly influence the wisdom of class treatment” are disputed, the court will not merely accept plaintiffs’ assertions as true, but will require some evidence before making a decision. Szabo, 249 F.3d at 675-76. That decision, may, at times, require inquiry into any preliminary resolution of disputed issues of fact, even if those same factual issues are also relevant to the merits of the case. Id.
4

Case: 1:05-cv-06583 Document #: 407 Filed: 08/09/10 Page 5 of 18 PageID #:16118
Rule 23(a) Requirements 1. Numerosity Under Rule 23(a)(1), plaintiffs must show that the class is so numerous that joinder of all
members is impracticable. The exact number of class members need not be pleaded or proved, but impracticability of joinder must be positively shown and cannot be speculative. Parker, 206 F.R.D. at 212. Plaintiffs define the proposed class as African-American FAs and FA Trainees who are or were employed in a retail brokerage unit referred to as Global Private Client, from January 1, 2001 to the present. In a footnote, plaintiffs indicate that the class includes brokers, broker trainees and persons hired with intent to enter defendant’s broker training program, even if they never received a broker production number, persons who had production numbers but also performed managerial duties, including sales or producing managers and persons who attended the firms Management Assessment Center (“MAC”). According to plaintiffs, the are approximately 700 class members, which is sufficiently large to satisfy the numerosity requirement.
2. Commonality Rule 23(a)(2) requires the presence of questions of law or fact common to the class. The Rule does not mandate absolute commonality; a common nucleus of operative facts is usually enough to satisfy the requirement. Keele v. Wexler, 149 F.3d 589, 594 (7th Cir. 1998). A common nucleus of operative fact is usually found where “defendants have engaged in standardized conduct towards members of the proposed class . . ..” Id. Thus, racial discrimination in an employment context, arising out of the employer’s standard operating procedure, is generally well-suited to class adjudication. Falcon, 457 U.S. at 157. In a Title VII
5

Case: 1:05-cv-06583 Document #: 407 Filed: 08/09/10 Page 6 of 18 PageID #:16119
action, however, commonality is the “most critical element and one in which the class action and merit inquiries essentially collide.” Stastny v. S. Bell Tel. & Co., 628 F.2d 267, 274 (4th Cir. 1980). As Falcon makes clear, a party attempting to maintain a pattern or practice discrimination class action must demonstrate more than shared membership in a protected class, but must offer sufficient evidence to bridge the gap between his or her own individual claim and those of class members who suffered the same injury.
Conceptually, there is a wide gap between (a) an individual’s claim that he has been denied a promotion on discriminatory grounds, and his otherwise unsupported allegation that the company has a policy of discrimination and (b) the existence of a class of persons who have suffered the same injury as that individual, such that the individual’s claim and the class claims will share common questions of law or fact and that the individual’s claim will be typical of the class claims. For [plaintiffs] to bridge that gap [they] must prove much more than the validity of their own claims. [Falcon, 457 U.S. at 157-58.] Thus, the inquiry into whether plaintiffs meet the commonality requirement necessarily overlaps with the merits of their claim that defendant discriminates against blacks. Count One of plaintiffs’ second amended complaint, which is brought under Title VII, is actually very broad, encompassing both a pattern or practice discriminatory treatment claim and a discriminatory impact claim. Although the parties do not differentiate between the claims, those claims require different proofs. Under a disparate impact theory, plaintiff need not prove intentional discrimination, only that defendants’ facially neutral actions adversely affected a protected group. Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 355 n.15 (1977). To establish a pattern or practice disparate treatment claim, however, plaintiffs must show that intentionally discriminatory practices were defendant’s standard operating procedure, not merely sporadic or isolated occurrences. Id. at 336. To do so plaintiffs may offer direct evidence of intentional discrimination or they may offer evidence of a combination of circumstances from which a court
6

Case: 1:05-cv-06583 Document #: 407 Filed: 08/09/10 Page 7 of 18 PageID #:16120
or jury may infer discriminatory intent. Ellis v. Elgin River Boat Resort, 217 F.R.D. 415, 420 (N.D. Ill. 2003).
Obviously, establishing commonality under a disparate treatment theory is more difficult than doing so under the disparate impact theory. Clayborne v. Omaha Public Power Dist., 211 F.R.D. 573, 592 (D. Neb. 2002). After Falcon, a plaintiff seeking certification of a class alleging pattern or practice discrimination must make “a specific showing of underlying facts which might raise an inference of a common question of pattern and practice through allegations of specific incidents of discrimination, supporting affidavits or statistical evidence.” Ellis, 217 F.R.D. at 423. Subjective employment processes may provide a common basis for a class-wide claim of discrimination if these subjective employment criteria were uniformly “used as a mask for discrimination.” Puffer v. Allstate Ins. Co., 255 F.R.D. 450, 460 (N.D. Ill. 2009).
Plaintiffs allege that defendant has engaged in a pattern or practice of race discrimination and that it has policies and practices that result in a disparate impact on African-Americans. They contend that defendant knows of this “systemic discrimination” which results from a hostile corporate culture, as well as policies and practices that steer business opportunities away from African-American FAs. This “culture” and policy allegedly include maintaining stereotypical views about African-Americans that underlie personnel decisions, impeaches the work environment, and denies African-American FAs the same opportunities and support that other FAs are given. To support their motion for certification plaintiffs identify what they consider to be several issues of common fact that they claim will prove a pattern or practice, including:
1. Defendant has a uniform branch office management and job structure;
7

Case: 1:05-cv-06583 Document #: 407 Filed: 08/09/10 Page 8 of 18 PageID #:16121
2. Defendant has a “strong, uniform, racially-biased corporate culture that ensures uniformity and consistency in practices and attitudes across the country; 3. Defendant has implemented and developed firm-wide employment policies regarding hiring and training, teaming, account distribution and transfer, management assessment and selection and multi-cultural markets; 4. Expert evidence that common employment practices result in statistically significant disparities to the disadvantage of African-Americans; 5. Anecdotal evidence for 16 named plaintiffs and other class members; and 6. Evidence that defendant was aware of race discrimination but refused to take action. After identifying these so-called common issues, however, plaintiffs offer little to establish the “significant proof” required by Falcon, to establish that the asserted discriminatory culture manifested itself in the “same general fashion” as to all putative class members. Falcon, 457 U.S. at 159 n.15. In fact, however, plaintiffs’ attempt to make this showing is undermined by the different experiences of the proposed class members, in terms of length of service with the defendant, income, position levels, the people who made the relevant employment decisions, and the conflicting and unconvincing anecdotal evidence found in their declarations. Commonality is generally easily satisfied when an individual or even a small centralized group makes decisions. Ellis, 217 F.R.D. at 424. It is also more easily satisfied in a disparate impact case where all of the proposed class members have been impacted by a facially neutral policy. Neither situation is present in the instant case.2
2Plaintiffs do allege in conclusory fashion a disparate impact, but the gravamen of their complaint, as well as the evidence presented, is not that neutral policies neutrally applied have a discriminatory impact, but that defendant is subverting its neutral policies by applying them in an intentionally discriminatory fashion.
8

Case: 1:05-cv-06583 Document #: 407 Filed: 08/09/10 Page 9 of 18 PageID #:16122
Instead, plaintiffs allege that defendant has a corporate culture of racial discrimination that it implements through the discretionary decisions of over 15,000 FAs, over 600 branch office managers, 135 complex directors, 30 Regional Managing Directors and 5 Divisional Managers situated across the entire United States. Such decentralized procedures, that allow decision-makers across the country to consider subjective factors makes it far more difficult to establish that the employer engages in a pattern or practice of discrimination as a standard operating procedure, and thus more difficult to establish commonality. Id. (citing Stastny, 628 F.2d at 276).
In the instant case, the putative class members were supervised and reviewed by hundreds of different people, held a wide variety of salary levels and positions and had totally different experiences. For example, some putative plaintiffs claim they were denied access to the management program (MAC) while others were recommended for management and reached at least vice-president levels. Some putative plaintiffs were hugely successful financially, while others never got through the FA training program. Each individual plaintiff’s experience was the result of countless decisions made by themselves, other FAs in their branch offices, their branch managers and so on up the chain of command. Plaintiffs’ position essentially is that all of these decisions were made by racist employees of a racist company. As numerous decisions from this district demonstrate, however, class certification should be denied when the plaintiffs’ class definition implicates numerous, independent decision-makers resulting in the need for numerous individual inquiries. See Puffer, 255 F.R.D. at 460-61 (and cases cited therein).
Plaintiffs place great reliance on statistical evidence to establish commonality. They have provided statistics to demonstrate that for the years in question there was low African-
9

Case: 1:05-cv-06583 Document #: 407 Filed: 08/09/10 Page 10 of 18 PageID #:16123
American representation in the FA workforce; African-American FAs were compensated at lower rates; African-American FAs were less likely than whites to participate in teams; AfricanAmerican trainees were less likely to participate in pools; and white trainees received accounts that had significantly higher average total asset values than those distributed to AfricanAmerican trainees.
Plaintiffs argue that these raw statistics alone are sufficient to establish commonality, and the court might be inclined to agree with plaintiffs if this were a true disparate impact case. As explained above, however, it is not. Take, for example, plaintiffs’ claim that African-American FAs are compensated at lower rates than white FAs. According to plaintiffs, between 2001 and 2004 African-American FAs earned 33 to 42 % less in annual compensation than white FAs. If this were a disparate impact case, that statistic would present a compelling argument for finding commonality and certifying a class. But plaintiffs do not argue that defendant’s facially neutral compensation program applied neutrally leads to the resulting discrepancy in compensation. Instead, plaintiffs argue that all of the factors that lead to the application of the facially neutral compensation program had been applied in an intentionally discriminatory manner, resulting in the discrepancy.
Defendant pays its FAs based on production. It pays FAs based on a percentage of the production credit (“PCs”) and other revenue generated when one of the FA’s clients uses or purchases a Merrill Lynch financial product or security. There is no discretion in calculating FA incentive compensation, which is based on a precise mathematical formula and grids contained in the program. Plaintiffs do not claim that the compensation program itself is discriminatory, but rather that it works to African-American’s disadvantage because the discriminatory culture at
10

Case: 1:05-cv-06583 Document #: 407 Filed: 08/09/10 Page 11 of 18 PageID #:16124
defendant stunts the African-Americans’ ability to produce. For example, because AfricanAmericans are given fewer opportunities to team with high-producing FAs, and thus do not get to inherit shared accounts when those originating FAs retire, the African-Americans FAs tend to have lower production. Lower production means not only lower compensation, but also receipt of fewer of the accounts that are distributed through the firm account distribution program. Receipt of fewer accounts again means less production and less compensation, creating a vicious circle that acts to prevent African-American FAs from succeeding. Thus, it is the individual allegedly discriminatory decisions along the way, such as a white FA’s decision not to team with an African-American FA that leads to the asserted disparity in compensation, not a neutral application of the mathematical formula.
Defendant, of course, has supplied its own statistical experts who, not surprisingly, attack plaintiffs’ evidence.3 In particular, defendant’s experts criticized plaintiffs’ statisticians for failing to take into account that African-American FAs on average have fewer personal social connections with potential clients with wealth. Defendant’s expert performed a study of published available census data and concluded that access to networks of potential clients with substantial wealth varies by race among defendant’s FAs. As a result, customers independently generated by African-American FAs’ participation in the training program early in their careers
3Defendant has also moved to strike the testimony and conclusions of plaintiff’s expert as inadmissible under Fed. R. Evid. 702 and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). The court is mindful of the Seventh Circuit’s instruction that “the district court must perform a full Daubert analysis before certifying the class if the situation warrants.” American Honda Motor Company Inc. v. Allen, 600 F.3d 813, 816 (7th Cir. 2010). In the instant case, however, plaintiffs are unable to establish the requirements for the class certification, even with their experts’ reports and testimony. Therefore, there is no reason to reach defendant’s motion to strike, and it is denied as moot.
11

Case: 1:05-cv-06583 Document #: 407 Filed: 08/09/10 Page 12 of 18 PageID #:16125
come from neighborhoods with significantly higher African-American populations and significantly lower average wealth.
The contrasting statistical evidence and expert testimony demonstrates the danger of relying too heavily on statistical evidence supported by raw data. “It is said that you can find a statistic to prove anything.” Barricks v. Eli Lilly and Co., 481 F.3d 556, 559 (7th Cir. 2007). As Mark Twain put it, “there are three kinds of lies – lies, damned lies and statistics.” Puffer, 255 F.R.D. at 461. That is why although statistical evidence may be a useful tool to prove discrimination, it is rarely sufficient in itself. Adams v. Ameritech Services, Inc., 231 F.3d 414, 423 (7th Cir. 2001). Statistical evidence that fails properly to take into account nondiscriminatory explanations does not permit an inference of discrimination. Puffer, 255 F.R.D. at 461.
To bolster their statistical evidence, plaintiffs present “anecdotal” evidence in the form of declarations from 19 named plaintiffs and 47 putative class members which purport to show that discrimination occurred uniformly company-wide across the country. Defendant has moved to strike the class members’ declarations on the grounds that they lack foundation, are not tied to the class period and are otherwise conclusory and so lacking in specifics as to be worthless.
The court agrees that most of the declarations provide little support on the commonality issue because they are so vague. All 19 named plaintiffs’ declarations and 27 of the 47 putative class members’ declarations are lawyer crafted statements that simply allege the declarants’ general belief that defendant has a history of discriminatory practices toward African-Americans. Each of these declarants indicates that since 1994 they have seen themselves as part of a group acting to advance the interest of African-American FAs at defendant. Such general allegations
12

Case: 1:05-cv-06583 Document #: 407 Filed: 08/09/10 Page 13 of 18 PageID #:16126
unaccompanied by specific discriminatory acts are too vague to be of any use. Puffer, 255 F.R.D. at 467 (citing Mattenson v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 438 F.3d 763, 770 (7th Cir. 2000)). Of the 20 declarations that actually identify a particular instance of alleged discrimination, six contain simple conclusory statements, such as the declarant was denied a management position because of race. Absent first-hand factual support, such declarations are not probative of commonality. Puffer, 255 F.R.D. at 467.
The remaining 14 declarations do provide some anecdotal evidence of discriminatory treatment, but rather than support commonality among the class, they demonstrate the differences and uniqueness of each individual claim. Some of the individual claims are petty in nature while others are more serious. On the more serious side, one declarant states that his manager pressured him into relinquishing his production number and moving to an investment advisor salaried position, and that after returning to a production position he was discouraged from applying for a management position until the instant action was filed. Another stated that when accounts were distributed he always got the African-American accounts while still another alleged that when the largest producing FA in the defendant’s branch office retired, the declarant did not receive an equitable share of that FA’s assets. One other declarant indicated that although he already had Series 7, 31 and 3 licenses from his previous employment at another brokerage firm, he was terminated from the training program at Wayne, Pennsylvania, but given an option to go to a salaried position at the New Jersey Financial Advisory Center (“FAC”). He worked at the FAC from 2005 to early 2007, and while he had been one of the very few AfricanAmericans at Wayne, over 25% of the salaried employees at the FAC were African-American.
13

Case: 1:05-cv-06583 Document #: 407 Filed: 08/09/10 Page 14 of 18 PageID #:16127
On the other end of the spectrum, one declarant stated that he saw and heard a senior FA make an insensitive joke about President Obama. Another indicated that although he had achieved a production level to qualify for a private office he was denied one. Still another indicated that when he went to company sponsored events his office mates did not sit with him. Finally, another declarant stated that he was invited to go to a party at his manager’s home but refused to go because he had heard that the manager had a confederate flag in his house.
As demonstrated by these declarations, the individuals worked in different offices, had different supervisors, and allegedly experienced vastly different forms of discrimination. The declarations serve not to support commonality, but to underscore the lack of commonality in the proposed class. Because commonality is lacking, class certification is inappropriate.
3. Typicality Plaintiffs have also failed to meet their burden of establishing typicality. Rule 23(a)(3) requires plaintiffs to establish that “the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class.” The typicality inquiry is closely related to the commonality inquiry. Keele, 149 F.3d at 595. “‘A plaintiff’s claim is typical if it arises from the same event or practice or course of conduct that gives a rise to the claims of other class members and is based on the same legal theory. Id.’” (quoting De La Fuente v. Stokley-Van Camp, Inc., 713 F.2d 255, 262 (7th Cir. 1985). As with commonality, a comparison of the claims of the named plaintiffs and the declarations of the putative class members show a lack of typicality. The variations among the experiences of the class members would necessitate individual inquires to determine whether the individual suffered racial discrimination.
14

Case: 1:05-cv-06583 Document #: 407 Filed: 08/09/10 Page 15 of 18 PageID #:16128
Additionally, even if individual class members could establish a prima facie case of discrimination, defendant’s defenses would vary between the putative class members. For example, defendant could present arguments of a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for a putative class member’s failure to make it through the training program. Such evidence would necessarily differ for each individual claimant. Consequently, the court would have to examine numerous individual factors to determine the parameters of each individual claim, negating typicality. See Payton v. County of Carroll, 473 F.3d 845, 854 (7th Cir. 2007). Rule 23(b) Requirements
Plaintiffs’ proposed class also fails under Rule 23(b). Plaintiffs seek certification under a hybrid of Rule 23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3). Under Rule 23(b)(2) plaintiff seeks certification for liability, injunctive and equitable relief and common damages issues. Under Rule 23(b)(3), plaintiffs seek compensatory and punitive damages. A Rule 23(b)(2) class is appropriate when “the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2). Certification under Rule 23(b)(2) is generally limited to cases “when the main relief sought is injunctive or declaratory, and the damages are only incidental.” In re Allstate Insurance Co., 400 F.3d 505, 507 (7th Cir. 2005). Rule 23(b)(2) certification is inappropriate where final relief relates exclusively or predominately to money damages. Puffer, 255 F.R.D. at 470. This is because under Rule 23(b)(2) class members are not given a chance to opt out, and employees with significant damage claims may prefer to litigate on their own and have a constitutional right to a jury trial. See Jefferson v. Ingersoll International Inc., 195 F.3d 894 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding that Rule 23(b)(2) may not be used,
15

Case: 1:05-cv-06583 Document #: 407 Filed: 08/09/10 Page 16 of 18 PageID #:16129
even in a pattern or practice suit, unless persons with significant damage claims are allowed to opt out of the class to the extent that the litigation concerns financial relief). In the instant case, the individual putative class members’ financial interests are too high to be considered incidental to the requested equitable relief. Consequently, opt out rights must be extended to the members, and certification under Rule 23(b)(2) is inappropriate.
Certification under Rule 23(b)(3) requires plaintiffs to demonstrate “that the questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). The predominance requirement is similar to the typicality of claims and defenses requirement of Rule 23(a)(3), but is “far more demanding” than Rule 23(a)’s commonality requirement. Amchen Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 623 (1997).
In the instant case, the court has already determined that plaintiffs’ proposed class fails to meet the commonality and typicality requirements. Because plaintiffs’ statistical evidence alone is insufficient to establish company-wide discrimination in a manner that affects each class member in the same way, each individual putative class members’ claim for liability and damages will have to be tried to a jury. These inquiries would involve different witnesses and proofs for each member to determine, among other things, the motivation of each supervisor who made the individual allegedly discriminatory decision. “If the class certification only serves to give rise to hundreds or thousands of individual proceedings requiring individually tailored remedies, it is hard to see how common issues predominate . . . .” Puffer, 255 F.R.D. at 471 (quoting Andrews v. Chevy Chase Bank, 545 F.3d 570, 577 (7th Cir.2008)). For these same
16

Case: 1:05-cv-06583 Document #: 407 Filed: 08/09/10 Page 17 of 18 PageID #:16130
reasons, a divided certification, with certification of a 23(b)(2) class for the equitable issues and certification of a 23(b)(3) class for the damages issues is also inappropriate. There is no predominance of common issues to certify a 23(b)(3) class for any issue, and even if there were, because of the right to a jury trial the damages cases would all have to be tried first, eliminating any advantage to certifying the instant case as a class action.
Finally, certification under Rule 23(b)(2) for all issues, combined with notice and an opportunity to opt out as though certified under Rule 23(b)(3), is also inappropriate. See Lemon v. International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 139, 216 F.3d 577, 580-81 (7th Cir. 2000); Jefferson, 195 F.3d at 898. Obviously, certification under this approach is advantageous to plaintiffs, because it avoids Rule 23(b)(3)’s requirement that common issues predominate and that a class action be the superior method of resolving the dispute. This court agrees with Judge Kennelly, however, that the Seventh Circuit’s suggestion of this approach in Lemon and Jefferson was not intended to permit plaintiffs in a case involving significant damage claims to avoid consideration of whether a class action would be a manageable way to resolve the case. See Adams v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons, 2001 WL 336830 at *16 (N.D. Ill. 2001). Consequently, the court concludes that even if plaintiffs could establish all the requirements of Rule 23(a), which they cannot, they cannot establish the requirements of Rule 23(b).
As Judge Kennelly noted in Adams, although it maybe possible in an appropriate case to certify a company-wide class involving multiple branch offices across the country, this is not the appropriate case. The large number of individual issues involved in trying the individual claims as class claims would completely overwhelm any common issue. As Judge Kennelly noted, if such individual issues were limited to damages, a different conclusion would be reached because
17

Case: 1:05-cv-06583 Document #: 407 Filed: 08/09/10 Page 18 of 18 PageID #:16131
individualality in damages issues does not necessarily undermine the predominance of common issues, and there likely would be a proper way to structure a trial or trials with a minimum of inefficiency without doing violence to the parties’ Seventh Amendment rights. Id. In the instant case, however, as in Adams, there are several separate layers of individual issues, including the variation in personnel practices among the various branch offices, and how various office managers and complex managers handle individualized personnel decisions. These extra layers of individualized issues lead the court to conclude that common issues do not predominate over individual issues, and that trial of the claims as a class action would be unmanageable. Accordingly, plaintiffs’ motion for class certification is denied.4
CONCLUSION For the reasons discussed above, plaintiffs’ motion for class certification is denied.
ENTER: August 9, 2010
__________________________________________ Robert W. Gettleman United States District Judge
4The court rejects plaintiffs’ argument that defendant’s stipulation to certification of a settlement class in Cremin v. Merrill Lynch, No. 96 C 3773 (N.D. Ill. 1998), mandates certification in the instant case. Cremin involved different plaintiffs, different time periods during which different personnel applied different practices, and a different type of alleged discrimination. Defendant never agreed in Cremin or any other case to certification of a litigation class. “Support for settlement class is not inconsistent with Defendant’s current position that class litigation would be a nightmare.” McDaniel v. Qwest Communications Corp., 2006 WL 1476110 at *6 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (emphasis in original).
18

 </s> Case: 1:05-cv-06583 Document #: 585-1 Filed: 08/28/13 Page 2 of 74 PageID #:17609

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

-------------------------------------------------------------x GEORGE MCREYNOLDS, MAROC HOWARD, LARUE GIBSON, JENNIFER MADRID, FRANKIE ROSS, MAR VA YORK, LESLIE BROWNE, HENRY WILSON, LEROY BROWN, GLENN CAPEL, CHRISTINA COLEMAN, J. YVES LABORDE,: MARSHELL MILLER, CARNELL MOORE, MARK JOHNSON, CATHY BENDERJACKSON, and STEPHEN SMARTT, Individually on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,

Case No. 05-C-6583
Hon. Robert W. Gettleman Magistrate Judge Gilbert

- against -

MERRILL LYNCH, PIERCE, FENNER & SMITH, INCORPORATED,

Defendant.

-------------------------------------------------------------

x

SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AND RELEASE

Case: 1:05-cv-06583 Document #: 585-1 Filed: 08/28/13 Page 3 of 74 PageID #:17610

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

I. II.
A.
B. C.
III. IV .
A.
B. C. D.
V. VI .
A. B. C. D. VII. VIII .
A.
B. C.

INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................1 GENERAL TERMS OF SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT ......................................1 Definitions ...............................................................................................................1 Jurisdiction and Duration of Settlement ..................................................................7 Persons Covered by This Settlement Agreement ....................................................7 1. Definition of Settlement Class .....................................................................7 2. Certification .................................................................................................7 NATURE AND RESOLUTION OF THE CASE ...................................................8 COURT APPROVAL ............................................................................................15 Preliminary Approval ............................................................................................15 Preliminary Notice, Objections and Opt Outs .......................................................17 Fairness Hearing and Final Notice ........................................................................20 Effect of Denial of Motion for Preliminary Approval or Non-Occurrence ofthe Effective Date ..............................................................................................21 MUTUAL FULL COOPERATION ......................................................................22 RELEASES ............................................................................................................23 Settlement Class Member Release .........................................................................23 Named Plaintiff Release and Steering Committee Member Release ....................25 Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel .....................................................................26 Materiality of the Releases ....................................................................................26 NO ADMISSION AND NO DETERMINATION ................................................26 MONETARY RELIEF ..........................................................................................27 Settlement Fund .....................................................................................................27 Administration by Trustee .....................................................................................29 Claims Filing Procedures for Settlement of Claims of Named Plaintiffs and Settlement Class Members ..............................................................................29 1. Claims Filing Procedures for Obtaining Monetary Relief ......................... 29 2. Claim Form and Monetary Award Options ...............................................30 3. Simple Claim Form and Expedited Monetary Awards ..............................30 4. Detailed Claim Form Options for Settlement Class Members ..................31 5. Individualized Claims Resolution Process for Settlement Class
Members who Submit a Detailed Claim Form and Reject Expedited Monetary Award Offers ...........................................................32 6. Neutral Evaluation of Claims ....................................................................34

US_ACTIVE:\44320530\1 \63080.0164

Case: 1:05-cv-06583 Document #: 585-1 Filed: 08/28/13 Page 4 of 74 PageID #:17611

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued) Page

7. Extraordinary Claims .................................................................................36

8. Special Master ...........................................................................................38

9. Neutral Administrator ................................................................................ 39

10. Confidentiality of Claims Process and Settlement Administration ...........39

11 Attorneys' Fees and Expenses, Administrative Expenses and Service
AwardPayments ....................................................................................................39

1. Attorneys' Fees and Expenses ...................................................................39

2. Administrative Expenses ...........................................................................41

3. Service Award Payments ...........................................................................41

E. Non-Admissibility of Fact of Award (or Non-Award) ..........................................41

F. TaxTreatment ........................................................................................................42

1. Qualified Tax Status and Tax Responsibilities ..........................................42

2. Payment of Federal State and Local Taxes ................................................42

G Merrill Lynch Has No Further Obligation, Liability or Responsibility ................. 45

IX

PROGRAMMATIC RELIEF ................................................................................45

Duration of the Settlement .....................................................................................45

AccountDistribution .............................................................................................45

1. Distributions to Financial Advisor Trainees in the Practice Management Development Program .........................................................46

2. Householding Review ................................................................................46

C. Teamingand Pooling .............................................................................................47

D PMDRankings .......................................................................................................47

E. AttritionStudy .......................................................................................................48

F. Annual Reports to Class Counsel ..........................................................................49

G. Appointments......................................................................................................... 49

1. Teaming Study ........................................................................................... 49

2. Monitor/Coach for African American Financial Advisors and African American Financial Advisor Trainees ..........................................52

3. Dedicated/Specialized PMD Coaches .......................................................55

4. Leadership Council .................................................................................... 56

H. Mediation in Teaming Dissolution Agreements ....................................................57

I. DiversityFund .......................................................................................................57

J. Voluntary Exit Interviews ...................................................................................... 58

ii
US_ACTI V E:\44320530\ 1 \63080.0164

Case: 1:05-cv-06583 Document #: 585-1 Filed: 08/28/13 Page 5 of 74 PageID #:17612

K.
L. M.
N. X.
XI.
XII.
XIII. XIV. XV. XVI.
XVII. XVIII.
XIX.
XX.
XXI.
XXII. XXIII.
XXIV.
XXV. XXVI. XX VII.

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued) Page
Informational Discussions with Settlement Class Members and Class Counsel ..................................................................................................................59 Manager Evaluations .............................................................................................59 New Manager Selection .........................................................................................59 No Arbitration for Employment Discrimination ...................................................60 MERRILL LYNCH'S RIGHT TO WITHDRAW OR MODIFY THE AGREEMENT.......................................................................................................60 DUTIES OF THE PARTIES FOLLOWING FINAL COURT APPROVAL..........................................................................................................60 PARTIES' AUTHORITY .....................................................................................62 NOTICES ..............................................................................................................62 CONFIDENTIALITY ...........................................................................................63 MODIFICATION ..................................................................................................64 EXHIBITS .............................................................................................................64 ENTIRE AGREEMENT AND INTEGRATION ..................................................64 FAILURE TO INSIST ON STRICT COMPLIANCE ..........................................65 INTERPRETATION ............................................................................................. 65 NO DRAFTING PRESUMPTION ........................................................................65 ENFORCEMENT ..................................................................................................65 CHOICE OF LAW AND JURISDICTION ..........................................................66 PARAGRAPH AND SECTION HEADINGS ......................................................66 COUNTERPARTS ................................................................................................67 SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT IS FINAL AND BINDING ...............................67 COMPUTATION OF TIME .................................................................................67 VOIDING THE AGREEMENT ............................................................................68

iii
US_ACTIV E:\44320530\ 1 \63080.0164

Case: 1:05-cv-06583 Document #: 585-1 Filed: 08/28/13 Page 6 of 74 PageID #:17613
I. INTRODUCTION Subject to approval by the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, this Settlement Agreement sets forth the full and final terms by which the Class Representatives, on behalf of a Settlement Class of themselves and current and former African American Financial Advisors and Financial Advisor Trainees assigned a production number for the period May 6, 2001 through the date of Preliminary Approval in the domestic U.S. retail brokerage unit within the "Global Private Client" division of Merrill Lynch represented by their attorneys, Stowell & Friedman, Ltd., and Defendant Merrill Lynch, represented by its attorneys, Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP and Mayer Brown LLP, have settled and resolved all claims that have been raised or could have been raised in the Civil Action captioned McReynolds, et al. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Incorporated, Case No. 05 C 6583, pending before District Judge Robert W. Gettleman in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. II. GENERAL TERMS OF SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT
A. Definitions The terms described below shall have the meanings defined in this Section wherever used in this Settlement Agreement, and for purposes of this Settlement Agreement only, including in all of its Exhibits and Notice of Class Action Settlement.
1. "Action" or "Civil Action" means the litigation captioned McReynolds, et. al. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Incorporated, Case No. 05 C 6583, pending before Judge Robert W. Gettleman in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois.
2. "Bank of America" means Bank of America Corporation.
1

Case: 1:05-cv-06583 Document #: 585-1 Filed: 08/28/13 Page 7 of 74 PageID #:17614
3. "CAFA Notice" means the notice to be sent by the Claims Administrator to the appropriate federal and state officials pursuant to the requirements of the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 ("CAFA"), 28 U.S.C.§ 1715(b).
4. "Claimant" means a Settlement Class Member who has submitted a timely Claim Form for review by the Claims Administrator.
5. "Claims Administrator" means KCC Class Action Services, LLC ("KCC"), which has been jointly designated by counsel for the Parties to administer the Settlement Fund pursuant to Section IV.B below and orders of the Court.
6. "Claim Form" means the Simple Claim Form or Detailed Claim Form, one of which must be submitted by Settlement Class Members to KCC as part of the claims process.
7. "Class Certification Order" means the order signed by the Court on July 13, 2012 certifying, pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("Federal Rules") 23(b)(2) and 23(c)(4), the disparate impact class of all African Americans employed by Merrill Lynch at any time since July 10, 2004 as Financial Advisors or Financial Advisor Trainees assigned a production number in the domestic U.S. retail brokerage unit within the "Global Private Client" division of Merrill Lynch.
8. "Class Counsel" means the law firm of Stowell & Friedman, Ltd. 9. "Class Representatives" or "Named Plaintiffs" means George McReynolds, Maroc Howard, LaRue Gibson, Jennifer Madrid, Frankie Ross, Marva York, Leslie Browne, Henry Wilson, Leroy Brown, Glenn Capel, Christina Coleman, J. Yves Laborde, Marshell Miller, Carrell Moore, Mark Johnson, Cathy Bender-Jackson, and Stephen Smartt.
N

Case: 1:05-cv-06583 Document #: 585-1 Filed: 08/28/13 Page 8 of 74 PageID #:17615
10. "Complaint" means the Complaint filed in this Action in November 2005.
11. "Court" means the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois.
12. "Defendant" or "Merrill Lynch" or "Firm" or "Company" means Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Incorporated and its predecessors or successors in interest.
13. "Defendant's Counsel" or "Counsel for Merrill Lynch" or "Counsel for Defendant" means the law firms of Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP and Mayer Brown LLP.
14. "Depository Bank" means Bank of America. 15. "Effective Date" means the date on which all of the following have occurred: (1) the Court has granted final approval of this Settlement Agreement and has signed and entered an order so indicating, (2) the Court has entered an Order and Judgment dismissing the Civil Action with prejudice, with continuing jurisdiction limited to enforcing this Settlement Agreement, and (3) the time for appeal has either run without an appeal being filed or any appeal (including any requests for rehearing, en bane review, petitions for certiorari or other appellate review) has been finally resolved. 16. "Final Approval Date" means the date on which the Court grants final approval of the Settlement Agreement. 17. "Financial Advisor" means a person employed in the domestic U.S. retail brokerage unit within the GPC division of Merrill Lynch as a financial advisor.
3

Case: 1:05-cv-06583 Document #: 585-1 Filed: 08/28/13 Page 9 of 74 PageID #:17616
18. "Financial Advisor Trainee" means a person employed in the domestic U.S. retail brokerage unit within the GPC division as a registered financial advisor trainee who has not yet become a Financial Advisor.
19. "First Amended Complaint" means the amended complaint filed in this Action in July 2006.
20. "GPC" means the Global Private Client division of Merrill Lynch. 21. "Lead Class Counsel" means Linda D. Friedman of Stowell & Friedman, Ltd. 22. "Named Plaintiff Release" means the Named Plaintiff General Release Agreement in the form, attached hereto as Exhibit B, to be executed by the Class Representatives. 23. "Notice" or "Preliminary Notice" means the Notice of Class Action, Settlement Agreement, and Settlement Fairness Hearing that is to be mailed directly to Class Members, as approved by the Court, substantially in the form attached hereto as Exhibit A. 24. "Notice of Award" means the letter sent to each Claimant specifying the amount of that Claimant's award. 25. "Parties" means the Class Representatives and Defendant. 26. "Preliminary Approval Date" means the date the Court enters the Preliminary Approval Order. 27. "Preliminary Approval Order" means the Order of the Court preliminarily certifying the Settlement Class solely for the purpose of settlement and
4

Case: 1:05-cv-06583 Document #: 585-1 Filed: 08/28/13 Page 10 of 74 PageID #:17617
preliminarily approving this Settlement Agreement and all Exhibits attached hereto, including the form of Notice to be sent to Class Members.
28. "Programmatic Relief" means the policy reforms and other commitments intended to improve the opportunities available to African American Financial Advisors and Financial Advisor Trainees agreed to by the Parties and set forth in Section IX of this Agreement.
29. "Released Claims" or "Releases" mean the claims released in Section VI.A of this Agreement for the Settlement Class Members; and for Named Plaintiffs and Steering Committee Members who executed such releases, the claims released in the Named Plaintiff and Steering Committee Member Releases, respectively.
30. "Release Date" means the Preliminary Approval Date. 31. "Released Parties" mean Merrill Lynch and Bank of America, including their past, present, future parent corporations, divisions, officers, directors, subsidiaries, affiliates, predecessors, fiduciaries, insurers, employees, agents, employee benefit and pension plans or funds, including qualified and non-qualified plans, funds, and successors and assigns of the foregoing persons and entities. 32. "Second Amended Complaint" means the amended complaint filed in this Civil Action in November 2006. 33. "Settlement," "Agreement," and "Settlement Agreement" each mean the settlement as reflected in this Settlement Agreement and all Exhibits attached hereto. 34. "Settlement Class" or "Class" means a class certified by the Court solely for the purpose of settlement consisting of all African American Financial
5

Case: 1:05-cv-06583 Document #: 585-1 Filed: 08/28/13 Page 11 of 74 PageID #:17618
Advisors and Financial Advisor Trainees who have been assigned a production number in the domestic U.S. retail brokerage unit within the GPC division of Merrill Lynch at any time from May 6, 2001 through the Preliminary Approval Date (the "Settlement Class Members"). In the event that a Settlement Class Member dies or has died prior to completion of the monetary claims resolution process established by this Settlement, the estate andlor executor of the Settlement Class Member's estate may be entitled to seek monetary relief and participate in the claims resolution process in accordance with the terms of the Settlement and after presenting to the Claims Administrator documentation sufficient to establish appropriate legal rights and status, subject to review and approval by the Special Master.
35. "Settlement Class Member Release" means the release described in Section VI.A below.
36. "Settlement Class Period" shall be defined as May 6, 2001 through the Preliminary Approval Date.
37. "Settlement Fairness Hearing" means the hearing at which the Court will consider Final Approval of this Settlement Agreement and related matters.
38. "Settlement Fund" or "Fund" means the settlement monies transferred by Merrill Lynch to the Depository Bank, pursuant to this Settlement Agreement, including all interest earned thereon, to be held, invested, administered, and disbursed pursuant to this Settlement Agreement.
39. "Special Master" means Lynn Cohn, the person recommended by Plaintiffs and appointed by the Court to oversee the Settlement as provided in Section VIILC.8 herein.
0

Case: 1:05-cv-06583 Document #: 585-1 Filed: 08/28/13 Page 12 of 74 PageID #:17619
40. "Steering Committee Member" means the current and former Merrill Lynch Financial Advisors who served on a Steering Committee up to the date of the Class Certification Order and invested considerable time and effort assisting Class Counsel in seeking to achieve the goals of this Action.
41. "Steering Committee Member Release" means the Steering Committee Member General Release Agreement in the form, attached hereto as Exhibit C, to be executed by the Steering Committee Members.
B. Jurisdiction and Duration of Settlement The Parties agree that this Court has jurisdiction, and that venue is proper in this Court, for purposes of enforcing this Settlement Agreement. The Programmatic Relief embodied in this Settlement Agreement and the agreements incorporated in it shall remain binding on the Parties and their agents and successors for a three-year period following the Effective Date. C. Persons Covered by This Settlement Agreement
1. Definition of Settlement Class
The parties stipulate to the certification of the following Settlement Class solely for the purpose of settlement:
all African American Merrill Lynch Financial Advisors and Financial Advisor Trainees who have been assigned a production number in the domestic U.S. retail brokerage unit within the GPC division of Merrill Lynch at any time from May 6, 2001 through the Preliminary Approval Date.
2. Certification
The Settlement Class will be certified pursuant to Federal Rules 23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3). The certification of the Settlement Class is solely for the purpose of settlement. If the Settlement Agreement is terminated or the Effective Date does not occur, this
7

Case: 1:05-cv-06583 Document #: 585-1 Filed: 08/28/13 Page 13 of 74 PageID #:17620
Settlement Class certification will be null and void and of no further force and effect, and the Parties shall proceed as though the Settlement Class had never been certified.
If the Settlement Agreement terminates pursuant to its terms or does not become final for any reason, the previously entered Class Certification Order certifying a disparate impact class shall remain in effect; provided, however, that the foregoing does not limit Merrill Lynch's right to raise objections to the disparate impact class certified in the Class Certification Order, including, but not limited to, filing a motion for decertification, nor limit Plaintiffs' right to seek certification of a disparate treatment and/or monetary relief class. III. NATURE AND RESOLUTION OF THE CASE
In early 2005, pursuant to Merrill Lynch's Employment Dispute Resolution process, George McReynolds ("McReynolds"), a Merrill Lynch Financial Advisor, raised an internal complaint alleging individual and systemic race discrimination. In November 2005, McReynolds filed a Complaint on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated alleging that Merrill Lynch discriminated against them on the basis of race. McReynolds twice amended the Complaint — the First Amended Complaint was filed in July 2006 and the Second Amended Complaint was filed in November 2006. Class Representatives Maroc Howard, Henry Wilson, and Marva York filed representative charges of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") alleging systemic race discrimination and retaliation against Merrill Lynch, and exhausted the administrative filing requirements of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act by receiving a notice of right to sue from the EEOC. Taken together, the Complaint, First Amended Complaint, and Second Amended Complaint allege that Merrill Lynch implemented and

Case: 1:05-cv-06583 Document #: 585-1 Filed: 08/28/13 Page 14 of 74 PageID #:17621
utilized policies that had an unlawful disparate impact against African American Financial Advisors and Financial Advisor Trainees, and that Merrill Lynch engaged in a pattern or practice of racial discrimination against African American Financial Advisors and Financial Advisor Trainees with respect to, among other things, Merrill Lynch's hiring, training, compensation, promotion, teaming, and account distributions policies and practices in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, and 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
Merrill Lynch filed answers and affirmative defenses to the Complaint, First Amended Complaint, and Second Amended Complaint in March 2006, August 2006, and December 2006, respectively, denying the material allegations of the complaints. Merrill Lynch denies any liability under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, or any other federal, state or local laws, and specifically denies that Merrill Lynch unlawfully discriminated against the Named Plaintiffs or Settlement Class Members on the basis of race, that its policies have a disparate impact on African Americans, or that the Named Plaintiffs or Settlement Class Members are otherwise entitled to the relief requested.
After McReynolds informed Merrill Lynch of his claims of individual and systemic race discrimination, Merrill Lynch entered into confidential settlement discussions with a committee of McReynolds and other African American Merrill Lynch Financial Advisors represented by Class Counsel (the "Steering Committee") who wished to reform the Firm's policies and practices and allow African Americans to recover purported losses suffered as a result of these policies and practices. The Steering Committee and Class Counsel met several times with Merrill Lynch executives and its
E

Case: 1:05-cv-06583 Document #: 585-1 Filed: 08/28/13 Page 15 of 74 PageID #:17622
counsel during a six-month period. Merrill Lynch voluntarily provided substantial information regarding its policies and data regarding its workforce to facilitate these discussions, which occurred in New York and in San Francisco. The parties also engaged the services of two mediators. Formal litigation continued after the parties' efforts to resolve the litigation failed.
The Parties engaged in class certification fact and expert discovery from approximately July 2006 through April 2009. During this time, Merrill Lynch produced millions of pages of documents and over two terabytes of data. In addition, Class Counsel took fifteen fact depositions of Merrill Lynch executives and corporate representatives, Counsel for Merrill Lynch conducted sixteen depositions of the Named Plaintiffs, and six experts were deposed following the exchange of expert reports.
Following extensive fact and expert discovery, the Class Representatives filed their motion for class certification in November 2008. Merrill Lynch filed its opposition to class certification in May 2009. The Class Representatives filed their reply to Merrill Lynch's opposition in July 2009. In August 2010, this Court denied class certification. The Class Representatives filed a timely motion for reconsideration, which was denied in February 2011 following extensive oral argument. The Class Representatives subsequently filed an appeal pursuant to Federal Rules 23(f), which was denied by the Seventh Circuit, and thereafter a petition with the U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, which also was denied. Merrill Lynch moved to sever and transfer the Named Plaintiffs' Claims on April 29, 2011, and the motion was fully briefed in June 2011.
The Class Representatives filed an amended motion for class certification in July 2011, arguing that class certification was warranted under the U.S. Supreme Court's
10

Case: 1:05-cv-06583 Document #: 585-1 Filed: 08/28/13 Page 16 of 74 PageID #:17623
decision in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011). This Court denied the Class Representatives' post-Wal-Mart motion for class certification in September 2011. The Class Representatives sought review of the Court's denial of class certification to the Seventh Circuit, which accepted the appeal pursuant to Federal Rules 23(f). Following additional briefing and oral argument, in February 2012, the Seventh Circuit remanded, authorizing the district court to certify the Class Representatives' disparate impact claims regarding Merrill Lynch's teaming and account distribution policies for injunctive and declaratory relief pursuant Federal Rules 23(b)(2) and 23(c)(4). Merrill Lynch's motion for rehearing en bane was denied by the Seventh Circuit on March 27, 2012. Merrill Lynch filed a petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court on July 25, 2012, to which Plaintiffs responded on August 24, 2012, Merrill Lynch replied on September 5, 2012, and Plaintiffs submitted a Supplemental Brief on September 21, 2012. The Supreme Court denied Merrill Lynch's petition for a writ of certiorari on October 1, 2012.
In July 2012, this Court issued the Class Certification Order, certifying a class of all African Americans employed by Merrill Lynch at any time since July 10, 2004 as Financial Advisors or Financial Advisor Trainees assigned a production number in the domestic U.S. retail brokerage unit within the GPC division of Merrill Lynch to determine the issues of: (i) whether Merrill Lynch's teaming and/or account distribution policies have or had an unlawful disparate impact on the certified class; and (ii) if so, the appropriateness of any class-wide final injunctive and corresponding declaratory relief. The Class Certification Order appointed Linda D. Friedman (lead trial attorney), Suzanne E. Bish, George S. Robot, Jennifer Gilbert and Mary Stowell, of Stowell & Friedman,
11

Case: 1:05-cv-06583 Document #: 585-1 Filed: 08/28/13 Page 17 of 74 PageID #:17624
Ltd. as counsel for the class and the Class Representatives as representatives of the class certified by the district court. Pursuant to the Class Certification Order, the Parties sent notice to all members of the certified class and to all former putative class members of the disparate treatment class that was not certified. The Court ordered the class-wide disparate impact liability trial to begin on January 2014. The Court had not resolved Merrill Lynch's Motion to Sever or resolved how or when the individual intentional discrimination claims of the Class Representatives would be tried.
Pursuant to orders of the Court, the statute of limitations for all Settlement Class Members' claims has continued to be tolled after the denial of class certification.
In preparation for the trial, the Parties have engaged in extensive discovery following the Seventh Circuit's February 2012 decision, principally Merrill Lynch's production of documents and updated data and expert analysis. Merrill Lynch produced voluminous documents, data, and electronically stored information ("ESI") regarding its compensation, teaming, account distribution, and other policies and practices from 2007 through 2013.
The Parties initiated settlement discussions in November 2012, and engaged the services of Linda Singer, Esq., a professional mediator with nationwide and significant experience in the mediation and resolution of complex class actions, including employment discrimination class action lawsuits.
As a result of the seven and one-half years the Parties have spent litigating the plaintiffs' claims, counsel for the Parties are familiar with the strengths and weaknesses of their respective positions, and have had a full opportunity to assess the litigation risks presented in this case. All Parties and their counsel recognize that, in the absence of an
12

Case: 1:05-cv-06583 Document #: 585-1 Filed: 08/28/13 Page 18 of 74 PageID #:17625
approved settlement, they would face a lengthy litigation, including motions for decertification, additional document discovery (including extensive ESI), depositions, motions for summary judgment, and trial and appellate proceedings that would consume extensive time and resources and present Defendant and each Settlement Class Member with ongoing litigation risks and uncertainties. If plaintiffs were to prevail at trial on the claims certified, the process for resolving each Settlement Class Member's claim for individual damages would then be separately determined. Each Settlement Class Member might have been required to prove his or her right to recovery on an individual basis. Moreover, absent a global settlement at this juncture, the Parties would also have to litigate hundreds of separate individual trials regarding the intentional discrimination claims, which were not certified for class treatment. The Parties wish to avoid these risks and uncertainties, as well as the enormous consumption of time and resources, and wish to bring the litigation to a final and global conclusion on the terms set forth in this Settlement Agreement. Merrill Lynch, Defendant's Counsel, Class Counsel and the Class Representatives represent that this Settlement Agreement is the product of vigorous, lengthy, and arm's length negotiations and that the terms of the Settlement Agreement are fair, reasonable and adequate, and in the best interests of the Settlement Class based on all of the facts and circumstances.
Without any admission or concession by Merrill Lynch of any liability or wrongdoing with respect to the allegations in any administrative charge or in the Complaint, the First Amended Complaint and the Second Amended Complaint, all Released Claims shall be finally and fully compromised, settled, and released subject to the terms and conditions of this Settlement Agreement, which were the subject of
13

Case: 1:05-cv-06583 Document #: 585-1 Filed: 08/28/13 Page 19 of 74 PageID #:17626
extensive, arm's length negotiation between, and agreement by, the Parties. To the extent this Agreement is deemed void or the Effective Date does not occur, Defendant does not waive, but rather expressly reserves, all rights to challenge any and all claims and allegations asserted by the Class Representatives in the Civil Action upon all procedural and substantive grounds and to assert any and all potential defenses or privileges, including, but not limited to, challenges relating to class certification. The Class Representatives and Class Counsel agree that Defendant retains and reserves these rights, and they agree not to take a position to the contrary. Specifically, the Class Representatives and Class Counsel agree that, if the Civil Action were to proceed, they will not present any argument based on this Settlement or Settlement Agreement, or any exhibit, attachment, act performed, communication exchanged, or document executed pursuant to this Settlement Agreement. Additionally, neither the Settlement Agreement nor any act performed, communication exchanged, or document executed pursuant to, or in furtherance of, the Settlement Agreement: (a) is or may be deemed to be used as an admission or evidence of the validity of any Released Claim, or of any wrongdoing or liability of the Released Parties; (b) is or may be deemed to be or may be used as an admission or evidence of any fault or omission of the Released Parties in any civil, criminal or administrative proceeding in any court, administrative agency or other tribunal; or (c) is or may be deemed to be or may be used as an admission or evidence that class certification is appropriate for any purpose other than this Settlement.
Neither this Agreement nor anything in it, nor any part of the confidential negotiations that occurred in connection with the creation of this Settlement Agreement, shall be evidence with respect to any issue or dispute in any lawsuit, legal proceeding or
14

Case: 1:05-cv-06583 Document #: 585-1 Filed: 08/28/13 Page 20 of 74 PageID #:17627
administrative proceeding, except that this Agreement may be used in any legal proceedings concerning the enforcement or interpretation of this Agreement. IV. COURT APPROVAL
A. Preliminary Approval 1. Within 5 days after the execution of this Settlement Agreement,
the Parties shall jointly file this Settlement Agreement with the Court, and Class Counsel shall petition the Court for the entry of the Preliminary Approval Order:
a. Preliminarily certifying the Settlement Class solely for the purpose of settlement;
b. Preliminarily approving the Settlement Agreement; c. Approving the Notice to be sent to Settlement Class
Members describing the terms of the Settlement and informing them of their rights to submit objections and to opt out of the monetary relief portion of the Settlement Agreement; d. Pending Final Approval, preliminarily enjoining each Settlement Class Member, including any members who made an irrevocable election to opt-out of the monetary relief provisions of the Settlement, from commencing, prosecuting or maintaining in any court or forum other than this Court any claim, action or other proceeding that challenges or seeks review of or relief from any order, judgment, act, decision or ruling of the Court in connection
15

Case: 1:05-cv-06583 Document #: 585-1 Filed: 08/28/13 Page 21 of 74 PageID #:17628
with this Settlement Agreement or otherwise in connection with this Action; e. Effective as of the date specified for Settlement Class Members to opt-out of the Settlement, enjoining Settlement Class Members who have not opted-out of the monetary relief provision of the Settlement from commencing, prosecuting or maintaining either directly, representatively or in any other capacity any Released Claim against any of the Released Parties; and f. Scheduling a Settlement Fairness Hearing as soon as practicable on the question of whether the Settlement Agreement should be finally approved as fair, reasonable and adequate as to the Settlement Class Members; provided, however, that the Settlement Hearing occurs at least ninety (90) days after the CAFA Notice is served on the appropriate federal and state officials. 2. In applying for the entry of the Preliminary Approval Order, Class Counsel will submit to the Court for its approval this Settlement Agreement, Exhibits, and supporting papers, which shall describe the terms of this settlement and will include proposed forms of all notices and other documents as attached hereto necessary to implement the Settlement Agreement. 3. The Court shall conduct a hearing on September 3, 2013 or some time thereafter to be set by the Court to hear evidence and argument regarding whether
16

Case: 1:05-cv-06583 Document #: 585-1 Filed: 08/28/13 Page 22 of 74 PageID #:17629
the Court should approve the Settlement Agreement and relief sought therein ("Preliminary Approval Hearing").
4. At the Preliminary Approval Hearing, the Parties will establish for the Court that the Settlement Agreement is fair, reasonable, and adequate to the Class as a whole, within the meaning of that phrase as contemplated by Rule 23(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Class Counsel and Counsel for Merrill Lynch shall request prompt judicial approval of this Settlement Agreement as written. The Parties agree further to use their best efforts on a joint basis to obtain prompt entry of the Preliminary Approval Order. The Parties, through their respective counsel, also agree to recommend to the Court on a joint basis that, in their respective professional opinions, the Settlement Agreement is reasonable and appropriate, in the best interests of justice, that the Parties have bargained for the terms in the Settlement Agreement, and that no section or subsection of this Settlement Agreement should be modified or stricken.
B. Preliminary Notice, Objections and Opt Outs 1. KCC will be appointed by the Court to serve as the independent
Claims Administrator to perform the following tasks, among others: a. Distribute the Preliminary Notice to Settlement Class Members attached as Exhibit A; b. Receive and forward to the Court, Class Counsel, and Counsel for Merrill Lynch any request for opt-out statements; c. Maintain a website on which the Class Notice, Claim Forms, Court Orders and other documents are available to
17

Case: 1:05-cv-06583 Document #: 585-1 Filed: 08/28/13 Page 23 of 74 PageID #:17630
Class Members, and through which Class Members, following Final Approval of the Settlement can electronically submit Claim Forms and other documents; d. Distribute Notice of Final Approval of Settlement Agreement and distribute and receive all Claim Forms and other documents regarding the Settlement and the claims resolution process for monetary relief; and e. Properly process monetary awards, including for tax purposes as directed in Section VIII.F below. 2. The Claims Administrator, KCC, is experienced and qualified in the administration of class action monetary settlement distribution andlor claims proceedings. 3. No later than 15 days after the Preliminary Approval Date, Merrill Lynch shall provide the Claims Administrator the names, relevant personnel information, and last known addresses of Settlement Class Members in electronic format for the entire Settlement Class Period. No later than 25 days after the Preliminary Approval Date, Class Counsel, through the Claims Administrator, shall issue Preliminary Notice to the last known address of each Settlement Class Member by first-class mail postage prepaid. 4. Any Settlement Class Member may request to be excluded from the monetary relief provisions of the Settlement, described in Section VIII. Any Settlement Class Member who wishes to opt out of the monetary relief provisions of the Settlement must submit a written, SIGNED opt-out statement that includes the following language:
E:

Case: 1:05-cv-06583 Document #: 585-1 Filed: 08/28/13 Page 24 of 74 PageID #:17631
I hereby opt out of the class action settlement in the lawsuit McReynolds v Merrill Lynch, Case No. 05-C-6583 (N.D. Ill.). I understand that, by requesting to be excluded from the monetary settlement in this case, I will receive no money from the Settlement Fund created under the Settlement Agreement. I understand that I may bring a separate legal action seeking damages, but I might receive nothing or less than what I would have received if I had filed a claim under the class monetary settlement procedure in this case. I also understand that I may not seek exclusion from the class with respect to injunctive relief and that I am bound by the injunctive provisions of the Settlement Agreement. Opt-out statements must be received by the Claims Administrator no later than 45 days after Preliminary Notice is mailed. Any risk of non-receipt by 45 days after Preliminary Notice is mailed is on the Settlement Class Member. The Claims Administrator shall provide to all counsel all opt-out statements that are received.
5. No Settlement Class Member may opt out of the Programmatic Relief provisions in Section IX of this Settlement Agreement.
6. Settlement Class Members who have not opted out and wish to object to this Settlement Agreement or any part of the Settlement Agreement must file with this Court and serve on Class Counsel and Counsel for Merrill Lynch a written statement of their objections. Such statement must be received by the Court and Class Counsel no later than 45 days after the Preliminary Notice is mailed; and indicate whether the Settlement Class Members intends to appear at the Settlement Fairness Hearing.
7. The Claims Administrator will maintain a log of its activities, including the dates of mailing of Class Notice and mailing and receipt of Claim Forms, returned mail and other communications and attempted communications with members of the Settlement Class; confirm in writing to Class Counsel and Counsel for Merrill Lynch the substance of its activities and completion of the administration of settlement;
19

Case: 1:05-cv-06583 Document #: 585-1 Filed: 08/28/13 Page 25 of 74 PageID #:17632
timely respond to communications from the Parties or their respective counsel; and perform such other tasks as the Parties mutually agree. The Claims Administrator shall not make any disbursements from the Settlement Fund to Class Representatives and Steering Committee Members until after the Claims Administrator receives a signed Named Plaintiff Release or Steering Committee Member Release, as appropriate, and until after the seven-day revocation period discussed in those releases has expired.
8. No later than ten (10) days following Class Counsel's filing of the proposed Settlement Agreement with the Court, the Claims Administrator shall cause the CAFA Notice, along with the accompanying materials, to be served upon the appropriate state and federal officials, as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1715. For purposes of compliance with CAFA, the Claims Administrator shall be permitted to compile all of the relevant documents into a single compact disc for delivery to federal or state officials. Plaintiffs, Merrill Lynch, and the Claims Administrator shall have no duty to supplement the CAFA Notice. The Claims Administrator shall confirm in writing and provide to Merrill Lynch and Class Counsel proof of service of the CAFA Notice to the appropriate federal and state officials. The Claims Administrator shall indemnify and hold harmless Merrill Lynch and Class Counsel from any liabilities, penalties, costs or losses arising out of an incorrect or untimely served CAFA Notice, except to the extent the Claims Administrator has relied on information provided by Merrill Lynch.
C. Settlement Fairness Hearing and Final Notice 1. Class Counsel shall file with the Court no later than 14 days before
the date of the Fairness Hearing (i) the date-stamped originals for any opt-out statement
20

Case: 1:05-cv-06583 Document #: 585-1 Filed: 08/28/13 Page 26 of 74 PageID #:17633
and (ii) a declaration by the Claims Administrator of due diligence and proof of mailing with regard to the mailing of the Notice.
2. Settlement Class Members who have timely and properly requested exclusion from the Class may not participate in the Fairness Hearing.
3. Settlement Class Members who (i) timely filed and served on Class Counsel and Counsel for Merrill Lynch written objections no later than 45 days after the Preliminary Notice is mailed; and (ii) stated their intent to appear at the Fairness Hearing, may appear at the Fairness Hearing either in person or by counsel. Failure to perform any of these requirements in Section IV.B shall be deemed a waiver of any objections. The Parties may, but need not, respond in writing to objections by filing a response with the Court.
4. If the Court approves the Settlement Agreement at the Fairness Hearing, the Claims Administrator shall mail the Notice of Final Approval of Settlement Agreement within ten (10) business days of the conclusion of the Fairness Hearing to each Settlement Class Member who did not opt out of the class.
D. Effect of Denial of Motion for Preliminary Approval or NonOccurrence of the Effective Date
Other than to effectuate this Settlement Agreement, Merrill Lynch does not agree to the conditional certification of the Settlement Class, the provisional designation of the law firm of Stowell & Friedman, Ltd. as Class Counsel for the Settlement Class, or the provisional designation of the Named Plaintiffs as representatives of the Settlement Class for any purpose. If this Settlement Agreement is terminated pursuant to its terms (including if Merrill Lynch exercises its option to withdraw from the Settlement pursuant to Section X of this Agreement), or if the Effective Date does not occur for any reason,
21

Case: 1:05-cv-06583 Document #: 585-1 Filed: 08/28/13 Page 27 of 74 PageID #:17634
then (i) the conditional certification of the Settlement Class and the provisional designation of Class Representatives and Class Counsel shall be automatically vacated, (ii) the Action shall proceed as though the Settlement Class had never been conditionally certified and as though the provisional designations of Named Plaintiffs and Class Counsel had not been made, (iii) the Parties shall be released from their obligations under this Settlement Agreement, and (iv) the previously entered Class Certification Order certifying a disparate impact class, appointing Stowell & Friedman, Ltd. as Class Counsel, and appointing Named Plaintiffs as Class Representatives shall remain in effect. Provided, however, that no party shall be deemed to have waived any claims, objections, rights or defenses, or legal arguments or positions, including, but not limited to, claims or objections to class certification, including filing a motion for additional certifications or for decertification, or claims or defenses on the merits. Each Party reserves the right to prosecute or defend this Action if this Settlement Agreement is terminated pursuant to its terms (including if Merrill Lynch exercises its option to withdraw from the Settlement pursuant to Section [XI of this Agreement), or if the Effective Date does not occur for any reason. This provision survives the termination of this Settlement Agreement. V. MUTUAL FULL COOPERATION
The Parties agree that they will fully cooperate with each other to effectuate and implement all terms and conditions of this Settlement Agreement, and exercise good faith efforts to accomplish the terms and conditions of this Settlement Agreement.
The Parties further agree to accept non-material and procedural changes to this Settlement Agreement if so required by the Court in connection with Final Approval of the Settlement but are not obligated to accept any changes in the amount of the
22

Case: 1:05-cv-06583 Document #: 585-1 Filed: 08/28/13 Page 28 of 74 PageID #:17635
Settlement Fund, the scope of the Released Claims, or the substantive Programmatic Relief provided herein, or any other substantive change.
The Parties also recognize that from time to time unforeseen events may cause delays in the accomplishment of objectives, no matter how well-intentioned and diligent the Parties may be. Accordingly, with regard to the provisions of this Settlement Agreement that require the Parties to take certain actions within specified time periods (other than deadlines set forth in the Preliminary Approval Order and the deadline for filing claims), the Parties agree that Court approval will not be required for reasonable extensions of deadlines. In the event that any party determines in good faith that an action required by this Settlement Agreement cannot be taken within the specified time period, counsel for that party shall promptly notify counsel for the other party that it anticipates a delay, the reasons for the delay, and a proposed alternative deadline. VI. RELEASES
A. Settlement Class Member Release With the exception of Named Plaintiffs and Steering Committee Members, all Settlement Class Members who do not properly and timely opt out of this Settlement (including their heirs, administrators, representatives, executors, successors, and assigns) waive, release, and discharge the Released Parties, from any and all actions, causes of action, suits, demands, liabilities, and claims (upon any legal or equitable theory, whether contractual, common-law, statutory, federal, state, local, or otherwise) of any nature whatsoever, whether known or unknown, arising at any time up to and including the Preliminary Approval Date, for race and color employment discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. § 1981
23

Case: 1:05-cv-06583 Document #: 585-1 Filed: 08/28/13 Page 29 of 74 PageID #:17636
("Section 1981"), and any other parallel or similar federal, state or local law, and any claims for attorneys' fees and costs with respect to these Released Claims.
Settlement Class Members who fail to timely opt out (including their heirs, administrators, representatives, executors, successors, and assigns) expressly waive any and all provisions, rights and benefits conferred under or by any law of any state or territory of the United States, or principle of common law, which is similar, comparable, or equivalent to, Cal. Civ. Code § 1542, which provides:
A general release does not extend to claims which the creditor does not know or suspect to exist in his or her favor at the time of executing the release, which if known by him or her must have materially affected his or her settlement with the debtor. By way of example only, and without any intent to limit the. scope of the release, the Settlement Class Member Release will bar claims for race discrimination, harassment, and retaliation relating to compensation, training, deferred compensation, long-term contingent awards, retention bonus payments, production credits, account distributions, team or pool formation and dissolution, promotions, the Paths of Achievement Program/Practice Management Development Program, and allocation of support or business opportunities. Following its determination as to the monetary award, if any, that should be paid to each Claimant from the Settlement Fund, the Claims Administrator shall send a check to each such eligible Claimant along with a statement on the check itself expressly stating that, by cashing the check, the Claimant has waived the Released Claims. All Claimants' endorsement of any check from the Settlement Fund shall reconfirm that the Claimant has voluntarily waived and discharged the Released Claims in exchange for receiving monetary relief from the Settlement Fund.
24

Case: 1:05-cv-06583 Document #: 585-1 Filed: 08/28/13 Page 30 of 74 PageID #:17637
B. Named Plaintiff Release and Steering Committee Member Release In consideration of the monetary payments that Named Plaintiffs and Steering Committee Members will receive, including any Service Award Payment that the Court, at its discretion, may approve, Named Plaintiffs and Steering Committee Members will execute and deliver to the Claims Administrator the Named Plaintiff Release or the Steering Committee Member Release, as appropriate, in the form attached hereto as Exhibits B and C, respectively. The Named Plaintiff Release and the Steering Committee Member Release are not limited to a release of claims of race discrimination, harassment, and retaliation but instead release all claims, known or unknown, of any nature against the Released Parties under federal, state and local laws for any period up through the date the Named Plaintiff Release or Steering Committee Member Release is signed, to the full extent permitted by law and any claims for attorneys' fees and costs with respect to the aforementioned claims. Notwithstanding this provision, Named Plaintiffs and Steering Committee Members may participate in and receive monetary relief for class or collective claims resolved by a common fund settlement for which they are eligible. If any Named Plaintiff or Steering Committee Member does not execute and timely deliver a Named Plaintiff Release or Steering Committee Member Release, as appropriate, he or she shall be ineligible for, and forever barred from receiving, any Service Award under this Settlement Agreement, but will remain eligible for a monetary award from the Settlement Fund subject to the Settlement Class Member Release. The terms of the Named Plaintiff Release and the Steering Committee Member Release, which are more specifically described in Exhibits B and C, respectively, are incorporated as if fully set forth in the Settlement Agreement.
25

Case: 1:05-cv-06583 Document #: 585-1 Filed: 08/28/13 Page 31 of 74 PageID #:17638
C. Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel The doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel will apply to the Named Plaintiffs, Steering Committee Members, and Settlement Class Members who do not timely opt out, as provided by this Agreement, with respect to all Released Claims, which are known or unknown, actual or potential. D. Materiality of the Releases The terms of the Releases are a material part of this Settlement Agreement. If these Releases or the Settlement Agreement cannot become effective for any reason and the Settlement set forth in this Settlement Agreement shall terminate as provided in Section X of this Settlement Agreement, then the Releases shall terminate nunc pro tune and be of no force and effect. VII. NO ADMISSION AND NO DETERMINATION This Settlement Agreement does not, and is not intended to constitute, nor shall it be deemed to constitute, an admission by any party as to the merits, validity, or accuracy of any of the allegations, claims, or defenses of any party in this case. The Settlement Class Members continue to assert the merits and validity of their claims under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and any parallel federal, state and local laws prohibiting race discrimination. By entering into this Agreement, Merrill Lynch does not admit or concede, expressly or impliedly, but denies that it has in any way violated Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, or any parallel federal, state and local laws prohibiting race discrimination, the common law of any jurisdiction, or any other federal, state or local law, statute, ordinance, regulation, rule or executive order, or any other obligation or duty at law or in equity. Neither the Court nor any other court has made any findings or
26

Case: 1:05-cv-06583 Document #: 585-1 Filed: 08/28/13 Page 32 of 74 PageID #:17639
expressed any opinion concerning the merits, validity, or accuracy of any of the allegations, claims, or defenses in this Civil Action.
Nothing in this Settlement Agreement, or any action taken in implementation thereof, or any statements, discussions or communications, or any materials prepared, exchanged, issued or used during the course of the mediation or negotiations leading to this Settlement Agreement is intended by the Parties to, nor shall any of the foregoing constitute, be introduced, be used or be admissible in any way in this case or any other judicial, arbitral, administrative, investigative or other proceeding, of whatsoever kind or nature (including, without limitation, the results of the claims process established under this Settlement Agreement) as evidence of discrimination, retaliation or harassment or as evidence of any violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, parallel federal, state and local laws prohibiting race discrimination, the common law of any jurisdiction, or any other federal, state or local law, statute, ordinance, regulation, rule or executive order, or any other obligation or duty at law or in equity. Notwithstanding the foregoing, this Settlement Agreement may be used in any proceeding in the Court or in mediation or arbitration only to enforce or implement any provision of this Settlement Agreement or to implement any orders or judgments of the Court entered in connection herewith. VIII. MONETARY RELIEF
A. Settlement Fund No later than ten (10) days after the Effective Date, Merrill Lynch and/or its parent company Bank of America shall pay by wire transfer to the Depository Bank the sum of One Hundred and Sixty Million Dollars ($160,000,000.00). The $160 million will be placed in an interest bearing account titled in the name of Merrill Lynch Financial Advisor Race Discrimination Settlement Fund intended by the Parties to be a "Qualified
27

Case: 1:05-cv-06583 Document #: 585-1 Filed: 08/28/13 Page 33 of 74 PageID #:17640
Settlement Fund" as described in Section 468B of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended, and Treas. Reg. Section 1.46813-1, et seq., and formed in a manner designed to assure that it will so qualify. The monies so transferred, together with interest subsequently earned thereon, shall constitute the Settlement Fund. Merrill Lynch's payment of the Settlement Fund shall constitute the full, complete, and total settlement cash outlay by Merrill Lynch under the Settlement Agreement, and shall constitute a full and complete satisfaction of the claims of all Named Plaintiffs and Settlement Class Members, including, but not limited to, for all of the following purposes: (1) the resolution of this Civil Action; (2) this Settlement Agreement (and attachments); (3) the dismissal of this Action; (4) all amounts paid to Settlement Class Members, including Named Plaintiffs and Steering Committee Members, which are to be distributed pursuant to Section VIII.0 below; (5) all attorneys' fees and costs, including those in connection with securing court approval of the Settlement, and with monitoring compliance with the terms of the Settlement Agreement, including, but not limited to, compliance with the Programmatic Relief provisions herein; (6) all costs and expenses in connection with the Settlement Fund, including, but not limited to, those related to notice, claims processing and resolution, the costs of administering the Settlement, legal and other advice relating to the establishment of the Qualified Settlement Fund and tax treatment and tax reporting of awards to claimants, preparation of tax returns (and the taxes associated with such tax returns as defined below); and (7) all applicable federal, state and local income taxes, and all federal and state unemployment taxes required to be withheld and/or paid by Merrill Lynch. Without limiting the generality of the foregoing, the Settlement Fund includes, and shall represent complete satisfaction of, Merrill Lynch's share of all required taxes or

Case: 1:05-cv-06583 Document #: 585-1 Filed: 08/28/13 Page 34 of 74 PageID #:17641
contributions, including FICA, FUTA, SUTA and Medicare. Notwithstanding the foregoing, any costs associated with the Programmatic Relief described in Section IX will be incurred by Merrill Lynch, not paid for using the Settlement Fund.
B. Administration by Trustee The Claims Administrator shall serve as Trustee of the Settlement Fund and shall act as a fiduciary with respect to the handling, management, and distribution of the Settlement Fund. For purposes of Section 468B of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, and Treas. Reg. Section 1.468B-1, et seq., the `administrator' shall be the Claims Administrator. The Claims Administrator shall act in a manner necessary to qualify the Settlement Fund, from the earliest permitted date, as a "Qualified Settlement Fund" under Section 468B of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended, and Treas. Reg. Section 1.468B-1, et seq., and to maintain that qualification. C. Claims Filing Procedures for Settlement of Claims of Named
Plaintiffs and Settlement Class Members 1. Claims Filing Procedures for Obtaining Monetary elief All Settlement Class Members may be eligible to receive a monetary award from the Settlement Fund ("Monetary Award"). All Settlement Class Members, including the Named Plaintiffs and Steering Committee Members, who seek to claim a Monetary Award from the Settlement Fund must do so in writing or via secure electronic submission by signing or electronically affirming, under penalty of perjury, and submitting to the Claims Administrator either a Simple Claim Form or a Detailed Claim Form, as described more fully below, which must be electronically submitted or received by the Claims Administrator by the date set by the Court ("Claims Submission Date") Settlement Class Members shall complete either the Simple Claim Form or the Detailed
29

Case: 1:05-cv-06583 Document #: 585-1 Filed: 08/28/13 Page 35 of 74 PageID #:17642
Claim Form in its entirety to the extent applicable and in accordance with the procedures and requirements set forth on the Simple Claim Form or Detailed Claim Form.
The Simple Claim Form and Detailed Claim Form shall be mailed to Settlement Class Members and available electronically on a website maintained by the Claims Administrator, www.merrillracesettlement.com , and on the case website maintained by Class Counsel at www.merrillclassaction.com , following Final Approval of the Settlement. Settlement Class Members will be able to view, access, and submit Simple Claim Forms and Detailed Claim Forms electronically on the website maintained by the Claims Administrator.
2. Claim Form and Monetary Award Options Settlement Class Members, including Named Plaintiffs and Steering Committee Members, who seek to claim a Monetary Award must elect to submit either a (1) Simple Claim Form if they desire an expedited financial payment without an individual assessment of their claims and alleged losses, or (2) a Detailed Claim Form if they desire, or want to preserve the option to pursue, an individual assessment of their claims and alleged losses by qualified, independent Neutrals (the "Neutrals") as part of the Individual Claims Resolution Program ("ICRP"). Any Settlement Class Member who fails to timely file either a Simple Claim Form or a Detailed Claim Form shall not receive a Monetary Award, unless otherwise determined by the Special Master.
3. Simple Claim Form and Expedited Monetary Awards Settlement Class Members who elect to submit the Simple Claim Form will be issued a Monetary Award check within 30 days of the Claims Submission Date ("Expedited Monetary Award"). Settlement Class Members who submit the Simple
30

Case: 1:05-cv-06583 Document #: 585-1 Filed: 08/28/13 Page 36 of 74 PageID #:17643
Claim Form, however, will not have their claims or alleged losses individually assessed as part of the ICRP, nor will their claims be eligible for consideration as Extraordinary Claims, as defined below.
Expedited Monetary Awards will be determined and awarded based on objective factors that include: Merrill Lynch Length of Service ("LOS"), period of employment as a Settlement Class Member within the Class Period, "lateral" status, and average aggregate compensation and attrition disparities among Settlement Class Members based on statistical analysis of Merrill Lynch's workforce data over the class period.
Expedited Monetary Awards are not based on an individualized assessment of any Settlement Class Member's claims. Expedited Monetary Awards will be determined after all Claim Forms are submitted, and will be reviewed and approved by the Special Master appointed by the Court.
4. Detailed Claim Form Options for Settlement Class Members Settlement Class Members who wish to have the option of rejecting an Expedited Monetary Award in favor of an individual assessment of their claims and alleged losses and/or wish to be eligible for Extraordinary Claims consideration must submit a Detailed Claim Form to the Claims Administrator by the Claims Submission Date. The Detailed Claim Form shall be completed in its entirety, including responses to questions seeking specific evidence of alleged race discrimination, financial losses and any alleged emotional distress suffered. In order to seek financial recovery for any period after Merrill Lynch employment, the Settlement Class Member must submit qualified evidence of post-Merrill Lynch income and work history. No later than 30 days after the Claims Submission Date, all Settlement Class Members who submit a Detailed Claim Form will receive an Expedited Monetary Award
31

Case: 1:05-cv-06583 Document #: 585-1 Filed: 08/28/13 Page 37 of 74 PageID #:17644
along with an election form (the "Election Form") setting forth two options from which the Settlement Class Member must elect: (1) accepting the Expedited Monetary Award; or (2) participating in the ICRP.
The Election Form must be signed and identify whether or not the Settlement Class Member is accepting the Expedited Monetary Award or electing to participate in the ICRP, and must be post-marked, or submitted electronically, within 14 days of the date on the Election Form. The Election Form may also be completed on-line and signed electronically. The electronic submission is complete only when the Settlement Class Member receives an online confirmation number.
If the Settlement Class Member elects to accept the Expedited Monetary Award, a check in the amount of the Expedited Monetary Award will be sent to the Settlement Class Member within twenty-one (21) days after the Election Form is received by the Claims Administrator and the Settlement Class Member has completed all required income tax documents.
If the Settlement Class Member rejects the Expedited Monetary Award, he or she will participate in the ICRP and have his or her claims individually assessed by the Neutrals. The amount awarded by the Neutrals to ICRP participants may be more or less than the Expedited Monetary Award.
5. Individualized Claims Resolution Process for Settlement Class
Members who Submit a Detailed Claim Form and Reject Expedited Monetary Awards
All Settlement Class Members who timely submit completed Detailed Claim Forms and reject Expedited Monetary Awards will have their claims reviewed and valued by Neutrals in the ICRP, as described more fully below. The claims of Settlement Class Members who participate in the ICRP will be evaluated by one or more Neutrals from a
32

Case: 1:05-cv-06583 Document #: 585-1 Filed: 08/28/13 Page 38 of 74 PageID #:17645
panel of qualified Neutrals, selected by Class Counsel in consultation with the Neutral Administrator and Special Master.
The Neutrals selected will have substantial training and experience with employment discrimination claims. The Neutrals and Special Master will receive training from Class Counsel regarding Merrill Lynch's policies and practices and the publicly-filed evidentiary record and legal theories supporting the Class Claims. The Neutrals and Special Master will also be briefed regarding the analyses performed and conclusions reached by the experts retained by Class Counsel: labor economists University of Pennsylvania Professor Janice F. Madden and Dr. Alex Vekker, PhD, and sociologist and Professor William Bielby.
Drs. Madden and Vekker will also prepare a statistical analysis of each branch office in which a Settlement Class Member worked who is participating in the ICRP (the "Office Statistical Report"). The Office Statistical Report will include: (1) the racial composition of the office in terms of FA Trainees and FAs; (2) the extent of teaming and pooling and the racial composition of teams and pools in the office; (3) account transfers and distributions in the office; (4) other racial disparities in the office, including compensation and attrition. These statistical reports by office will be provided to the Neutrals to assist in their consideration of claims. The Office Statistical Reports and any other documents created in connection with the claims process will be inadmissible in this Civil Action or any other subsequent proceeding for any purpose. Any additional data provided by Merrill Lynch for the purposes of the ICRP shall be used solely in connection with that process, and shall not be admissible in this Civil Action, or any
33

Case: 1:05-cv-06583 Document #: 585-1 Filed: 08/28/13 Page 39 of 74 PageID #:17646
other subsequent litigation proceeding against Merrill Lynch or the Released Parties for any purpose.
Each Settlement Class Member who participates in the ICRP will also have an opportunity to meet with a Neutral or Neutrals for up to a 90 minute session in order to present aspects of his or her claims and answer questions from the Neutral(s) (the "Interview"). The Interview can take place via an Internet video-conference or in person. Settlement Class Members who wish to attend the Interview in person but cannot afford to travel to the Interview can submit a request for a travel advance against any Monetary Award. Class Counsel shall ensure that an attorney is present at the Interview to assist Settlement Class Members, and Class Counsel shall present the Office Statistical Report to the Neutral(s). The Office Statistical Report shall remain in the sole custody, possession and control of Class Counsel subject to the Protective Order, dated June 27, 2006, and entered in the Civil Action. Nothing in this Settlement prohibits any Settlement Class Member from retaining his or her own attorney, at their own expense, provided that the Neturals may consider any attorneys' fees incurred. Any attorney appearing at the Interview must sign the Protective Order, dated June 27, 2006.
6. Neutral Evaluation of Claims In evaluating individual claims, in addition to Class Counsel's presentation to the Neutrals regarding class wide data and expert reports, the Neutrals shall consider information in the Detailed Claim Form and any supporting documents, the Interview, and the Office Statistical Report. Factors and evidence the Neutrals are expected to weigh include but are not limited to the following:
Length of service at Merrill Lynch; • Number of years in the Class Period;
34

Case: 1:05-cv-06583 Document #: 585-1 Filed: 08/28/13 Page 40 of 74 PageID #:17647
Whether the Settlement Class Member was a lateral or recruit from another company or received "up-front money" via a promissory note or otherwise; Whether the Class Member received a payment under the Firm's Advisor Transition Program and the amount of the payment; Client account distributions available in Settlement Class Member's office; • Teaming rates and opportunities available in the Settlement Class Member's office; • Alleged racial disparities in office composition, compensation, teaming, account transfers, attrition, and other factors; • The Settlement Class Member's own experiences with regard to account transfers and distributions; teaming and pooling; business opportunities; managerial support, office environment and other treatment; • Any alleged racial harassment; • Relative strength of the Settlement Class Member's racial discrimination liability claim; • Whether the Settlement Class Member made a formal or informal complaint of race discrimination and, if so whether the Settlement Class Member allegedly experienced retaliation; • Whether the Settlement Class Member released some but not all of his or her claims and, if so, the date of any such release of claims; • Any alleged emotional distress, and whether any treatment was sought or received for such distress; • Any alleged career or reputational harm;
35

Case: 1:05-cv-06583 Document #: 585-1 Filed: 08/28/13 Page 41 of 74 PageID #:17648
• Any alleged lost opportunities and financial losses; Any alleged lost future earnings;
• Expenses, including attorneys' fees incurred by Settlement Class Members in prosecuting Released Claims; and Mitigation and post-Merrill Lynch earnings.
Any determination made by the Neutral or panel of Neutrals, whether the fact or amount of a Monetary Award, will be inadmissible in this Civil Action or any other subsequent proceeding for any purpose other than to enforce a Named Plaintiff Release, Steering Committee Member Release or Settlement Class Member Release, nor shall it be deemed to be a finding as to the merits of any claim. The Monetary Award is final, binding and non-appealable.
7. Extraordinary Claims A portion of the Settlement Fund, twenty-five million dollars ($25,000,000.00), will be set aside and distributed by the Neutrals as part of certain Settlement Class Members' Monetary Awards for Extraordinary Claims (the "Extraordinary Claim Fund"). This Extraordinary Claim Fund is designed to make funds available for Settlement Class Members the Neutrals deem deserving of such additional Monetary Awards ("Extraordinary Claims") Only the claims of Settlement Class Members who submit Detailed Claim Forms are eligible to have their claims be considered Extraordinary Claims. The Claim of any Settlement Class Member who filed a claim of race discrimination in federal or state court, or before an arbitral body, and who submitted a Detailed Claim Form, will be deemed an Extraordinary Claim.
36

Case: 1:05-cv-06583 Document #: 585-1 Filed: 08/28/13 Page 42 of 74 PageID #:17649
The Neutrals will select other claims as Extraordinary Claims and determine the additional Monetary Award appropriate, if any, from the Extraordinary Claim Fund, based on the information set forth in the Detailed Claim Form and Office Statistical Report and during the Interview.
The Neutrals may select Extraordinary Claims from the Detailed Claim Forms in the following circumstances, and using other criteria they deem appropriate after consideration of all of the Detailed Claim Forms and Interviews:
• Settlement Class Member submitted an internal complaint of race discrimination, or retaliation related to race discrimination;
• Settlement Class Member filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission or an equivalent state or local body charged with administering anti-discrimination laws. Allegations of severe racial harassment;
• Allegations of severe emotional distress; • Allegations of extraordinary financial hardship, such as bankruptcy, loss of
home or inability to find employment for a sustained period of time after terminating from Merrill Lynch. The Special Master will monitor the selection of and awards for Extraordinary Claims in order to ensure fairness and consistency. The decision of the Special Master is final, binding and non-appealable. Any Settlement Class Member whose claim is deemed an Extraordinary Claim will receive a payment that is no less than the average pre-determined ICRP contribution rate of non-Extraordinary Claims in the Settlement Class Member's length of service
37

Case: 1:05-cv-06583 Document #: 585-1 Filed: 08/28/13 Page 43 of 74 PageID #:17650
band. Class Counsel shall present to the Court in camera the pre-determined contribution rates by length of service band. The pre-determined contribution rates are based on anticipated turnout. Should actual turnout exceed the anticipated turnout, the Special Master shall work with Class Counsel to determine final ICRP contribution rates, a copy of which shall be presented to the Court in camera. Should the actual turnout rate not exceed the anticipated rate, the excess funds may revert to the Extraordinary Claims Fund for distribution by the Neutrals and Special Master.
8. Special Master The Court shall appoint a Special Master to monitor and assist with the Settlement. The Special Master shall participate in some of the Interviews and assessment of claims in the ICRP; make reports to Class Counsel and the Court as necessary; review and approve any contracts, the bills of the Neutrals, the bills of experts performing services in the settlement process; and perform other similar duties requested by Class Counsel or the Court. The Special Master shall also review and approve all of the Expedited Monetary Awards and proposed Monetary Awards determined by the Neutrals in the ICRP, including for those deemed Extraordinary Claims, for consistency and fairness. The Special Master shall render a final determination as to the Monetary Award, if any, which should be paid to each participant in the Individualized Claims Resolution Process. There shall be no appeal from the final Monetary Awards approved by the Special Master, which shall be final and binding. The Special Master will also establish, for tax purposes, the allocation of Monetary Awards to wages, interest, compensatory damages or other tax character as are appropriate based on the principles set forth in the IRS Regulations.

Case: 1:05-cv-06583 Document #: 585-1 Filed: 08/28/13 Page 44 of 74 PageID #:17651
After determining the proposed allocation, the Special Master shall prepare a master Report of all Expedited Monetary Awards and all Monetary Awards from the ICRP and provide it to Class Counsel and the Claims Administrator for payment. The Special Master shall also have the discretion to determine whether to allow late claims of Settlement Class Members for good cause shown.
9. Neutral Administrator Class Counsel shall ask the Court to appoint a Neutral Administrator to work with the Neutrals, the Claims Administrator, the Special Master and Class Counsel to administer the Individualized Claims Resolution Process. The Neutral Administrator shall handle scheduling and logistical issues and be available to answer questions from the Neutrals, assist with training, and otherwise act as a liaison with Class Counsel and the Special Master and Claims Administrator. The Neutral Administrator may also serve as a Neutral in the ICRP.
10. Confidentiality of Claims Process and Settlement Administration Before receiving any Confidential or Confidential-Attorneys Eyes Only Information, the Claims Administrator, Special Master, Neutral Administrator, each Neutral, and any other third-party involved in the claims process or the administration of this Settlement Agreement must sign a confidentiality agreement consistent with the Protective Order, dated June 27, 2006, and entered in the Civil Action. D. Attorneys' Fees and Expenses, Administrative Expenses and Service
Award Payments 1. Attorneys' Fees and Expenses Pursuant to Federal Rules 23(h), Class Counsel, in connection with seeking Court approval of the Settlement, shall apply for reasonable attorneys' fees and expenses
39

Case: 1:05-cv-06583 Document #: 585-1 Filed: 08/28/13 Page 45 of 74 PageID #:17652
incurred by Class Counsel, including the fees and expenses in connection with overseeing and assisting Settlement Class Members with the claims process and with monitoring the Settlement Agreement. All such fees and expenses shall be borne out of the Settlement Fund. Merrill Lynch will not object to a motion for attorneys' fees by Class Counsel of up to twenty-five percent (25%) of the Settlement Fund. Merrill Lynch will not object to a motion for expenses by Class Counsel of up to $5,000,000, for costs incurred by Class Counsel up to the date of Final Approval. Class Counsel shall be entitled to seek reimbursement from the Settlement Fund for costs incurred after Final Approval in administering and monitoring the Settlement, including the costs of preparing the Office Statistical Reports, to be reviewed and approved by the Special Master. The amounts set forth herein will constitute full and complete consideration for all work performed and expenses incurred to date by Class Counsel, and for all work to be performed and expenses to be incurred through the resolution of the Civil Action and in connection with this Agreement by Class Counsel.
The application for attorneys' fees, costs and expenses, as set forth herein, is a matter separate and apart from the Settlement among the Parties, and no decision by the Court concerning the granting, in whole or in part, of such attorneys' fees, costs or expenses as set forth herein shall affect the validity of this Agreement or finality of the Settlement in any manner.
Merrill Lynch andlor Bank of America's funding of the Settlement Fund shall relieve Merrill Lynch, Bank of America, and the Released Parties from any other claims or liability to any other attorney or law firm or person for any attorneys' fees, costs and expenses to which any of them may claim to be entitled on behalf of any Settlement Class

Case: 1:05-cv-06583 Document #: 585-1 Filed: 08/28/13 Page 46 of 74 PageID #:17653
Member who does not opt out of the Class that are in any way related to, but not limited to, the Released Claims, this Settlement Agreement, or the settlement claims or objections process.
2. Administrative Expenses
The expenses of administering the Settlement shall be paid out of the Settlement Fund and shall include but not be limited to the cost of Notice to the Class; administering the Settlement Fund and all claims; costs of the ICRP including payments to the Neutrals and experts; and all payments to the Claims Administrator and Special Master. KCC and the Neutral Administrator shall prepare and submit to the Special Master and Class Counsel a summary and reconciliation of all administrative expenses.
3. Service Award Payments
The Class Representatives have invested substantial time and effort assisting and monitoring this Action. As is standard in class action litigation, Class Counsel intends to petition the Court for Service Awards to Class Representatives for their efforts and service to the Class. Defendant shall not object to Plaintiffs' motion for Service Award Payments to Class Representatives up to an amount of $250,000 per Class Representative. Prior to and during portions of this litigation, a Steering Committee of putative class members invested considerable time and effort seeking to achieve the goals of this Action. Defendant shall not object to Plaintiffs moving the Court for Service Award Payments to former Steering Committee Members of up to $75,000 per Steering Committee Member.
E. Non-Admissibility of Fact of Award (or Non -Award) Except to the extent that it would constitute a set-off in an action for damages claimed for any period covered by this Settlement, neither the fact nor amount of an
41

Case: 1:05-cv-06583 Document #: 585-1 Filed: 08/28/13 Page 47 of 74 PageID #:17654
award, nor the fact of any non-award, shall be admissible in any other proceeding for any purpose other than to enforce the Releases executed in accordance with this claims process, nor shall it be deemed to be a finding as to the merits of any claim.
F. Tax Treatment
1. Qualified Tax Status and Tax Responsibilities
The Settlement Fund shall be established as a Qualified Settlement Fund within the meaning of Section 468B of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended, and Treas. Reg. Section 1.468B-1, et seq., and shall be administered by the Claims Administrator under the Court's supervision. Merrill Lynch and/or Bank of America shall timely furnish a statement to the Trustee that complies with Treasury Regulation § 1.468B-3(e) and shall attach a copy of the statement to its federal income tax return that is filed for the taxable year in which Merrill Lynch and/or Bank of America makes the required payment(s) to the Settlement Fund. In addition, at the request of Merrill Lynch, the Claims Administrator shall make the "relation-back election" (as defined in Treas. Reg. 2.468B-1) back to the earlier permitted date. The Parties shall cooperate to ensure such treatment and shall not take a position inconsistent with such treatment in any filing or before any tax authority.
2. Payment of Federal State and Local Taxes
The Parties recognize that the Monetary Awards to Settlement Class Members will be subject to applicable tax withholding and reporting, which will be handled as follows: The Claims Administrator shall serve as the Trustee of the Settlement Fund and shall act as a fiduciary with respect to the handling, management, and distribution of the Settlement Fund, including the handling of tax-related issues and payments. Specifically, the Claims Administrator shall be responsible for the withholding, remitting and
42

Case: 1:05-cv-06583 Document #: 585-1 Filed: 08/28/13 Page 48 of 74 PageID #:17655
reporting of Merrill Lynch's and each Claimant's share of the payroll taxes from the Settlement Fund.
The Special Master will establish and provide to the Claims Administrator for tax purposes the allocation of the payments made to Claimants to wages, interest, compensatory damages, or such other tax character of such payout as the Special Master may determine, based on the principles set forth in Treas. Reg. § 1.468B-4 by reference to the claims pursuant to which distributions are made and as if Merrill Lynch made such payments directly to Claimants.
The Claims Administrator shall be responsible to pay from the Settlement Fund the employer's share of any and all federal, state and local employment and withholding taxes, including, without limitation, federal and state income tax withholding, FICA, FUTA, SUTA, Medicare, and any state employment taxes. The Claims Administrator shall (i) inform Merrill Lynch in writing of the employer's share of any such taxes and contributions; and (ii) provide proof of payment of the employer's share of taxes and contributions paid on Merrill Lynch's behalf from the Settlement Fund. The Claims Administrator shall indemnify Merrill Lynch for any penalty arising out of an incorrect calculation and/or interest with respect to late deposit of any taxes or contributions addressed herein. Subject to the Claims Administrator's obligation to comply with applicable laws, the Parties anticipate that any amounts designated as interest shall not be subject to withholding and shall be reported, if required, to the IRS and to the Claimants on Form 1099-INT. Although Merrill Lynch shall have access to individual allocation amounts for tax and reporting purposes, Merrill Lynch shall not have access to Settlement Class Member Claim Forms.
43

Case: 1:05-cv-06583 Document #: 585-1 Filed: 08/28/13 Page 49 of 74 PageID #:17656
The Claims Administrator shall satisfy all federal, state, local, and other reporting requirements (including any applicable reporting with respect to attorneys' fees and other costs subject to reporting), and any and all taxes, penalties and other obligations with respect to the payments or distributions from the Settlement Fund not otherwise addressed herein. Provided, however, that Claimants are fully responsible for the payment of any and all federal, state or local taxes resulting from or attributable to distributions that they receive from the Settlement Fund, excluding the employer share of employment taxes and unemployment taxes and excluding amounts properly withheld from the distributions.
The Claims Administrator shall be responsible for procuring Form W-4 and Form W-9, and any other required tax forms, from the Named Plaintiffs, Steering Committee Members, and Settlement Class Members prior to making any monetary allocations to such Named Plaintiff, Steering Committee Member or Settlement Class Member.
All (i) taxes (including any estimated taxes, interest or penalties) arising with respect to the income earned by the Settlement Fund, including any taxes or tax detriments that may be imposed on Merrill Lynch with respect to income earned for any period during which the Settlement Fund does not qualify as a "Qualified Settlement Fund" for federal and state income tax purposes (hereinafter "Settlement Fund Taxes"), and (ii) expenses and costs incurred in connection with the operation and implementation of this paragraph (including, without limitation, expenses of tax attorneys and/or accountants and mailing and distribution costs and expenses related to filing (or failing to file) any returns described herein or otherwise required to be filed pursuant to applicable authorities) (hereinafter "Settlement Fund Tax Expenses"), shall be paid out of the

Case: 1:05-cv-06583 Document #: 585-1 Filed: 08/28/13 Page 50 of 74 PageID #:17657
Settlement Fund for the benefit of Merrill Lynch. Furthermore, Settlement Fund Taxes and Settlement Fund Tax Expenses shall be treated as a cost of the administration of the Settlement Fund. The Parties agree to cooperate with the Claims Administrator, each other, and their tax attorneys and accountants to the extent reasonably necessary to carry out the provisions set forth in this paragraph.
G. Merrill Lynch Has No Further Obligation, Liability or Responsibility Merrill Lynch shall have no withholding, reporting, or any other tax reporting or payment responsibilities with regard to the Settlement Fund or its distribution to Settlement Class Members. Moreover, the Settlement Fund shall constitute full and complete satisfaction of Merrill Lynch's monetary obligation to the Settlement Class Members in connection with this Settlement Agreement, and Merrill Lynch shall have no liability, obligation, or responsibility for the administration of the Settlement Fund, the determination of any formulas for disbursement, any claims processing or claims resolution, or the disbursement of any monies from the Settlement Fund except for: (1) its obligation to pay the settlement amount of $160 million no later than ten (10) days following the Effective Date; (2) its agreement to cooperate in providing information that is necessary for the Settlement administration set forth herein; and (3) its obligation to comply with and fund the Programmatic Relief set forth in Section IX herein. IX. PROGRAMMATIC RELIEF A. Duration of the Settlement The Programmatic Relief embodied in this Settlement Agreement and the agreements incorporated in it shall remain binding on the Parties and their agents and successors for three (3) years following the Effective Date. B. Account Distribution
45

Case: 1:05-cv-06583 Document #: 585-1 Filed: 08/28/13 Page 51 of 74 PageID #:17658
1. Distributions to Financial Advisor Trainees in the Practice Management Development Program
Merrill Lynch will eliminate the distribution or receipt of accounts pursuant to the U.S. Wealth Management and Private Banking and Investment Group Account Distribution Policy and Process (the "ADP") to any Financial Advisor Trainee in the Practice Management Development ("PMD") program who has not satisfied the MLOS (monthly length of service) 12 performance hurdles as set by Merrill Lynch as part of the PMD program. A Financial Advisor Trainee who has met his or her MLOS 12 performance hurdles before the twelfth month of the PMD program is, however, eligible to select or receive accounts pursuant to the ADP prior to the twelfth month of the PMD program. This provision will not prohibit any Financial Advisor on a team from receiving account distributions pursuant to the ADP and its Team Distribution Guidelines and team vesting requirements. PMDs who are members of a team with a Financial Advisor who is eligible to receive account distributions under the ADP, but who themselves have not yet met their MLOS 12 performance hurdles, may only share in those distributions up to the same percentage as the PMD's team "split," or percentage of team assets and production, as set forth in the team agreement.
2. Householding Review
Merrill Lynch will require Merrill Lynch managers to review and ensure that accounts subject to distribution through the ADP are properly householded pursuant to applicable policy prior to the distribution of any of the accounts to Financial Advisors or Financial Advisor Trainees through the ADP. Management shall maintain documentation sufficient to confirm and audit that the householding review has been performed.
46

Case: 1:05-cv-06583 Document #: 585-1 Filed: 08/28/13 Page 52 of 74 PageID #:17659
C. Teaming and Pooling Merrill Lynch will maintain a policy that "Teams may not be formed solely for the purpose of selecting a successor in anticipation of an FA's retirement or departure." Likewise, pools may not be used to evade the ADP's prohibition against Financial Advisor to Financial Advisor transfers ("FA to FA transfers"). Any pools formed within 60 days of the departure or retirement of an FA will also be strictly scrutinized by management. Additionally, Merrill Lynch will permit accounts below $250,000 belonging to Financial Advisors to be pooled with a Financial Advisor Trainee in the PMD program only if the split on the account at issue is meaningful to both the Financial Advisor Trainee in the PMD program and the Financial Advisor, as determined by the supervising manager under the particular circumstances. Merrill Lynch shall provide guidelines to help managers determine whether a split is meaningful to both the Financial Advisor Trainee in the PMD program and the Financial Advisor. Merrill Lynch will audit compliance with this provision of the Settlement Agreement. Merrill Lynch will maintain a policy that before approving a team, management will instruct Financial Advisors and Financial Advisor Trainees to consider a variety of potential teammates, offer suggestions at an early point in the formation process, and instruct Financial Advisors and Financial Advisor Trainees that the decision to team or not to team with particular Financial Advisors or Financial Advisor Trainees may not be made on the basis of the individual's gender, race, national origin, religion, age, sexual orientation or gender identity, disability, marital status, veteran status or any other legally protected characteristic. D. PMD Rankings
47

Case: 1:05-cv-06583 Document #: 585-1 Filed: 08/28/13 Page 53 of 74 PageID #:17660
In addition to the current rankings of all PMDs that are based on production credits (regardless of source), Merrill Lynch will also separately rank PMDs who are not on teams by net new households ("New PMD Rankings"). Nothing herein, however, shall be construed as changing any of the actual performance hurdles that all PMDs must meet or their compensation guidelines. Whether a PMD is considered to be on a team for purposes of the New PMD Rankings will be based on Merrill Lynch's definition of teams at the time of ranking.
PMDs in the "first quintile" under the New PMD Rankings will be eligible to participate in the same recognition training programs offered to first quintile PMDs under the standard production measures in the PMD program guide, except that the training for these PMDs shall also include programs that emphasize the Optimal Practice Model and the potential benefits of teaming.
E. Attrition Study Merrill Lynch will conduct an internal study of the impact of pooling and teaming and receipt of accounts through the ADP on PMD performance and attrition rates. This study will be confidential and shared only with Merrill Lynch executives, including those involved in and responsible for PMD and Teaming and Pooling Policies, and the Monitor/Coach, as defined in Section IX.G.2., unless Merrill Lynch deems, in its discretion, that it would be necessary or helpful to share with a wider audience. This study shall be a "look-back" review for a period of no less than 36 months, and Merrill Lynch shall endeavor to complete the study within 12 months of the Effective Date of the Settlement. This Attrition Study will be considered attorney-work product, such that it

Case: 1:05-cv-06583 Document #: 585-1 Filed: 08/28/13 Page 54 of 74 PageID #:17661
will be undiscoverable and inadmissible in this Civil Action for any purpose, or in any other litigation or proceeding against Merrill Lynch or the Released Parties.
F. Annual Reports to Class Counsel Following the Effective Date of this Settlement, Merrill Lynch will provide to Class Counsel an annual report (the "Annual Report") summarizing Merrill Lynch's compliance with the programmatic relief provisions set forth in this Settlement Agreement. The Annual Report shall also set forth any new programs and policies designed by Merrill Lynch to increase the representation and success of African Americans. Merrill Lynch will meet with Class Counsel on an annual basis to respond to any questions regarding the Annual Report. G. Appointments
1. Teaming Study Merrill Lynch will engage and commission two experts (the "Experts"), at Merrill Lynch's cost, to review and evaluate Merrill Lynch's teaming and pooling policies and practices (the "Teaming Study"). Merrill Lynch will select one expert, and Class Counsel and the Named Plaintiffs will select the other expert, to conduct the Teaming Study. The Experts will both sign confidentiality agreements with Merrill Lynch, providing, among other things, that: (i) the Teaming Study will be kept confidential and shared only with Merrill Lynch executives; (ii) except as set forth in this Settlement Agreement, all of the Experts' communications in connection with the Teaming Study will be exclusively with Merrill Lynch or its agents; and (iii) any documents, data, access to individuals, or other information received by the Experts will be kept confidential among the Experts, and used exclusively to conduct the Teaming Study pursuant to this Settlement.
49

Case: 1:05-cv-06583 Document #: 585-1 Filed: 08/28/13 Page 55 of 74 PageID #:17662
Before beginning their review and evaluation of the teaming and pooling policies and practices, the Experts will meet once with Class Counsel, and then once with Counsel for Merrill Lynch to discuss the Parties' respective perspectives in connection with the Teaming Study. The Experts will thereafter meet with each other in order to coordinate and design a plan to conduct the Teaming Study (the "Teaming Study Plan"), and jointly identify any documents, data, access to individuals, or other information they intend to request from Merrill Lynch in connection with conducting the Teaming Study. The Experts will then submit their requests for documents, data, access to individuals, or other information to Merrill Lynch in accordance with the procedure set forth below. Following Merrill Lynch's response to the Experts' requests, and before the Experts commence the Teaming Study, Merrill Lynch and Class Counsel will both have an opportunity to review and discuss the Experts' Teaming Study Plan, and be informed of the extent to which the Experts' requests for documents, data, access to individuals, or other information was approved.
All requests by the Experts for documents, access to individuals, or other information from or with Merrill Lynch will be jointly made by the Experts to Kevin Walsh of Merrill Lynch, such that both Experts will be aware of any request, and will receive the same documents, data, and access to individuals, or other information from Merrill Lynch. Through arrangements to be made through Mr. Walsh, the Experts will be permitted to interview Financial Advisors and Financial Advisor Trainees in up to six (6) Merrill Lynch offices regarding pooling and teaming. The offices will be chosen by the Experts. The Experts may also request to interview representatives of management within Global Wealth Management regarding pooling and teaming. All requests for
50

Case: 1:05-cv-06583 Document #: 585-1 Filed: 08/28/13 Page 56 of 74 PageID #:17663
documents, data, access to individuals, or other information shall be subject to Mr. Walsh's reasonable discretion; the Experts' requests for information will not be unreasonably denied.
After completing their review of Merrill Lynch's pooling and teaming policies and practices, the Experts shall present their preliminary, non-binding recommendations to Merrill Lynch executives and the Monitor/Coach (as defined in Section IX.G.2.) concerning potential improvements to Merrill Lynch's pooling and teaming policies and practices, and will engage in a dialogue regarding the feasibility and appropriateness of the preliminary recommendations. Following this dialogue, the Experts shall issue, either jointly or separately, their final, written, non-binding recommendations (the "Recommendations") to Merrill Lynch executives only (including senior executives from the business and with responsibility for the Firm's teaming practices and diversity and inclusion function). The Monitor/Coach will also review a copy of the Experts' Recommendations, but the written report containing the Experts' Recommendations must remain in the custody of Merrill Lynch executives at all times. Merrill Lynch, thereafter, in its sole discretion, shall determine in good faith and after careful consideration whether and how to implement the Recommendations, or any portion thereof. The Recommendations will be made solely for the purposes of this Settlement, and will not be admissible for any other purpose in this Civil Action or any other litigation against Merrill Lynch or the Released Parties.
If it becomes necessary to replace one or both of the Experts, Merrill Lynch will select the replacement for the expert chosen by Merrill Lynch, and Class Counsel and the
51

Case: 1:05-cv-06583 Document #: 585-1 Filed: 08/28/13 Page 57 of 74 PageID #:17664
Named Plaintiffs will select the replacement for the expert chosen by them. The Experts shall endeavor to complete the Teaming Study within 18 months of the Effective Date.
2. Monitor/Coach for African American Financial Advisors and
African American Financial Advisor Trainees
Merrill Lynch shall appoint, at its expense, an individual (the "Monitor/Coach") to: (a) monitor the performance of African American Financial Advisor Trainees and African American Financial Advisors compared to non-African American Financial Advisor Trainees and non-African American Financial Advisors, including but not limited to comparative rates of attrition and overall success; (b) monitor the quantity and quality of training and support that African American Financial Advisor Trainees and African American Financial Advisors receive at Merrill Lynch as compared to nonAfrican American Financial Advisor Trainees and non-African American Financial Advisors, including but not limited to participation in mentoring and training programs; (c) monitor the receipt of account transfers and participation in pools/teams by African American Financial Advisor Trainees and African American Financial Advisors as compared to non-African American Financial Advisor Trainees and non-African American Financial Advisors; and (d) provide coaching assistance to African American Financial Advisor Trainees and African American Financial Advisors regarding business development. The Monitor/Coach shall also work with Merrill Lynch management in the branch offices and home office to improve their abilities to support African American Financial Advisor Trainees and African American Financial Advisors. The Monitor/Coach will be appointed and begin his or her work as set forth herein, within 30 days of Final Approval. For the avoidance of doubt, Plaintiffs' Counsel is not permitted
52

Case: 1:05-cv-06583 Document #: 585-1 Filed: 08/28/13 Page 58 of 74 PageID #:17665
to communicate with the Monitor/Coach without the express, written consent of Merrill Lynch.
If the Monitor/Coach believes that an African American Financial Advisor Trainee, through no fault of his or her own, is not succeeding in the PMD program, the Monitor/Coach can recommend to management that (a) the African American Financial Advisor Trainee be given additional time to achieve the PMD performance hurdles, and/or (b) that management take steps to provide additional support and resources to the African American Financial Advisor Trainee, if the Monitor/Coach believes such steps are warranted under the individual circumstances.
Merrill Lynch will provide the Monitor/Coach with information on a monthly basis concerning the performance of African American Financial Advisor Trainees in the PMD program (or any successor program), including but not limited to: (a) the progress of the African American Financial Advisor Trainees against the performance hurdles established for continued participation in and graduation from the PMD program, (b) relative attrition rates for African American Financial Advisor Trainees and non-African American Financial Advisor Trainees, (c) PMD Financial Advisor Trainees' participation in pools/teams (both African American PMD Financial Advisor Trainees and nonAfrican American PMD Financial Advisor Trainees), (d) the receipt of account transfers by all Financial Advisor Trainees (both African American PMD Financial Advisor Trainees and non-African American PMD Financial Advisor Trainees), and (e) the participation of all PMD Financial Advisor Trainees in training and mentoring programs (both African American PMD Financial Advisor Trainees and non-African American
a]

Case: 1:05-cv-06583 Document #: 585-1 Filed: 08/28/13 Page 59 of 74 PageID #:17666
PMD Financial Advisor Trainees). The Monitor/Coach will also receive similar information for Financial Advisors outside of the PMD program.
The Monitor/Coach will leverage the existing resources available to Financial Advisor Trainees and Financial Advisors, including the PMD Coaches, the Dedicated PMD Coaches, as discussed below, and the Practice Management Consultants in the home office and in each market by training the PMD Coaches, the Dedicated PMD Coaches, and the Practice Management Consultants, and by providing guidance to them in their work with African American Financial Advisor Trainees and African American Financial Advisors.
For the duration of the Settlement, the Monitor/Coach will also, on an ongoing basis, review Merrill Lynch's current programs, policies and initiatives, and periodically report the results of his or her review to Merrill Lynch. The Monitor/Coach will work with Merrill Lynch to formulate, revise and implement meaningful and state of the art policies, programs and initiatives, and to make non-binding recommendations concerning:
a. Policies and programs to recruit, retain and promote African American Financial Advisors and African American Financial Advisor Trainees;
b. Policies and programs to improve the ranking of African American Financial Advisors and African American Financial Advisor Trainees used to determine receipt of accounts through the ADP;
54

Case: 1:05-cv-06583 Document #: 585-1 Filed: 08/28/13 Page 60 of 74 PageID #:17667
c. Policies and programs to increase the participation of African American Financial Advisors and African American Financial Advisor Trainees in pooling and teaming relationships;
d. Policies and practices with respect to training and mentoring African American Financial Advisors and African American Financial Advisor Trainees to enhance business opportunities for African American Financial Advisors and African American Financial Advisor Trainees.
3. Dedicated/Specialized PMD Coaches Merrill Lynch will assign a dedicated PMD Coach to the East Coast offices, and a dedicated PMD Coach to the West Coast offices (the "Dedicated PMD Coaches") to work exclusively with African American PMDs. The Dedicated PMD Coaches will be appointed and begin the work set forth herein within 30 days of the Final Approval Date. The Dedicated PMD Coaches will report directly to the head of the PMD Program, and will periodically provide reports and input to the Leadership Council, which is to be established pursuant to this Settlement Agreement, as set forth below. The Dedicated PMD Coaches will also coordinate their coaching efforts directly with the Monitor/Coach. For the avoidance of doubt, Plaintiffs' Counsel is not permitted to communicate with the Dedicated PMD Coaches without the express, written consent of Merrill Lynch.
55

Case: 1:05-cv-06583 Document #: 585-1 Filed: 08/28/13 Page 61 of 74 PageID #:17668
The Monitor/Coach and the Dedicated PMDs Coaches are resources provided under this Settlement Agreement to supplement, not supplant, existing resources currently available to all PMDs or FAs regardless of race.
4. Leadership Council Within 30 days of the Final Approval Date, Merrill Lynch will create and maintain a Leadership Council consisting of the Monitor/Coach, current African American Complex Directors, and a select number of Settlement Class Members, which shall at all times include at least two of the Class Representatives who are currently employed at Merrill Lynch, provided that at least two Class Representatives wish to participate in the Leadership Council. Over the course of the three year settlement period, all of the currently employed Class Representatives shall be invited to participate on the Leadership Council on a rotating basis. The Leadership Council will: (i) work with Complex Directors to share best practices in hiring and coaching; (ii) organize a formal, national peer-to-peer mentor program in which successful Financial Advisors will serve as mentors to African American PMDs and African American Financial Advisors; (iii) meet on a quarterly basis to review the progress of the programs identified in the Programmatic Relief section of this Settlement Agreement; (iv) receive periodic progress reports and input from the Dedicated PMD Coaches; (v) review and provide input regarding policies concerning ADP, teaming and pooling; (vi) meet with and report on a quarterly basis to a Merrill Lynch Leadership Council Executive Board, which shall be composed of Merrill Lynch executives selected by Merrill Lynch (including senior executives from the Company and with responsibility for the Company's teaming practices, ADP, and diversity inclusion function); and (vii) through the Merrill Lynch Leadership Council Executive Board, the Leadership Council may request access to
56

Case: 1:05-cv-06583 Document #: 585-1 Filed: 08/28/13 Page 62 of 74 PageID #:17669
certain information that is necessary to perform their function and provide input to management, such requests to be granted at the discretion of the Merrill Lynch Leadership Council Executive Board but not to be unreasonably denied.
H. Mediation in Teaming Dissolution Agreements Merrill Lynch will make available to all Financial Advisors and Financial Advisor Trainees the option of adding a non-binding mediation process with a third-party neutral to their teaming agreements. This non-binding mediation process would serve as a dispute resolution mechanism following the efforts of the Merrill Lynch Complex Director and Merrill Lynch Executive to resolve any disputes concerning the division of team assets in connection with team dissolutions. Such a provision shall be added to team agreements only with every team member's consent. The mediation provision in the team agreements will provide that Merrill Lynch will pay fifty per cent (50%) of the mediator's fees, while the team will pay fifty per cent (50%) of the mediator's fees, to be divided among each team member in proportion to the percentage of production credits that each team member is designated to receive under the team agreement. The mediator will be selected by the team members from the roster of Financial Industry Regulatory Authority mediators. I. Diversity Fund Merrill Lynch will maintain a Diversity Fund that will be available nationwide to any Financial Advisor of color or female Financial Advisor (an "Eligible Financial Advisor") to fund a business development event. For any event funded by this Diversity Fund, the Eligible Financial Advisor must have a speaking opportunity. The event funding will be capped for each participating Financial Advisor at reasonable amounts to be determined by Merrill Lynch. An Eligible Financial Advisor may only request
57

Case: 1:05-cv-06583 Document #: 585-1 Filed: 08/28/13 Page 63 of 74 PageID #:17670
funding for one event per year unless there is a shortage of applicants or excess funding available. Managers must approve the Eligible Financial Advisor's request for funding, and all the Eligible Financial Advisors must provide post-event attendee lists from which Merrill Lynch may measure the effectiveness of the event. The Diversity Fund will be funded at a minimum of $1,000,000 per year for the duration of the Settlement Agreement and will be distributed on a first come, first serve basis. Each year, at least $250,000 of the Diversity Fund shall be available to be distributed to African American Financial Advisors who apply for these funds. This amount is intended as a floor but not a ceiling on grants to African American Financial Advisors. Merrill Lynch may establish appropriate rules concerning the Diversity Fund.
The Monitor/Coach will be responsible for advising African American Financial Advisors regarding their funding requests and proposals, with a particular focus on advising African American Financial Advisors who are LOS 10+.
J. Voluntary Exit Interviews Merrill Lynch will conduct voluntary exit interviews with any departing Financial Advisors and Financial Advisor Trainees, if such an exit interview is requested by a Financial Advisor or Financial Advisor Trainee after being offered the opportunity for such an exit interview. Merrill Lynch may designate the individual members of the Human Resources Department to conduct such interviews. In addition, the Monitor/Coach shall be permitted to participate in the Exit Interviews of any departing African American Financial Advisors or Financial Advisor Trainees. Reports based on the information shared during such Exit Interviews will be made exclusively to Merrill Lynch management (and for African American Financial Advisors or Financial Advisor Trainees, to the Monitor/Coach).

Case: 1:05-cv-06583 Document #: 585-1 Filed: 08/28/13 Page 64 of 74 PageID #:17671
K. Informational Discussions with Settlement Class Members and Class Counsel
At a mutually convenient time, willing Settlement Class Members, along with Class Counsel, will meet with Merrill Lynch regarding their employment experiences as Financial Advisors or Financial Advisor Trainees. A report based on the information shared during this meeting will be made exclusively to Merrill Lynch management. Merrill Lynch, thereafter, in its discretion, shall determine in good faith and after careful consideration, whether and how any appropriate corrective measures may be implemented in light of the information and what disciplinary action will be taken against anyone who engaged in inappropriate behavior.
L. Manager Evaluations Merrill Lynch will conduct performance assessments of Merrill Lynch Complex Directors and Resident Directors that include a distinct diversity and inclusion category designed to evaluate whether the manager was a leader in promoting diversity and inclusion (people, ideas, solutions), including African American Financial Advisors' inclusion in the allocation of business opportunities and teams, and whether the manager fostered open communications with Financial Advisors, including African American Financial Advisors. M. New Manager Selection Merrill Lynch is committed to actively promoting a diverse and inclusive environment where all employees have the opportunity to achieve management success and contribute to the growth of Merrill Lynch's business. As a standard practice, Merrill Lynch strives to ensure that slates of management candidates include diverse candidates for all posted roles and will continue to do so. Accordingly, for the duration of the
59

Case: 1:05-cv-06583 Document #: 585-1 Filed: 08/28/13 Page 65 of 74 PageID #:17672
Settlement, Merrill Lynch will interview at least one diverse candidate, where available, for any posted Executive or Director position opening in the U.S. Wealth Management business. The Monitor/Coach shall be available to assist African American management candidates by providing advice on management and placement opportunities.
N. No Arbitration for Employment Discrimination Merrill Lynch will not require arbitration of any employment discrimination claims, except as individually negotiated. X. MERRILL LYNCH'S RIGHT TO WITHDRAW OR MODIFY THE AGREEMENT Merrill Lynch shall have the right, in its sole discretion and notwithstanding any other provisions in this Settlement Agreement, to withdraw in writing from this Settlement Agreement or to modify this Settlement Agreement through further negotiations with Class Counsel subject to the provisions of Exhibit D, annexed to this Settlement Agreement, and filed under seal. XI. DUTIES OF THE PARTIES FOLLOWING FINAL COURT APPROVAL In connection with the Final Approval by the Court of the Agreement, Class Counsel and Counsel for Defendant will submit a proposed final order and judgment: A. Granting final approval to the Agreement, adjudging the terms thereof to
be fair, reasonable and adequate, and directing consummation of its terms and provisions; B. Certifying the Settlement Class solely for the purpose of settlement; C. Dismissing the Civil Action with prejudice and permanently barring all members of the Settlement Class who have not timely opted out, including the Class Representatives, from commencing, maintaining, prosecuting,

Case: 1:05-cv-06583 Document #: 585-1 Filed: 08/28/13 Page 66 of 74 PageID #:17673
participating in any action, suit or proceeding (judicial, administrative, arbitral or other) against any Released Parties any of the Released Claims; D. Providing that the promises, agreement, obligations, undertakings, representations, certifications, and warranties set out herein shall survive the closing of this Settlement Agreement, the releases and bar order contained herein, and the judgment of dismissal to be entered in the Action, and that the Court shall have continuing jurisdiction to enforce the Settlement Agreement; and E. Ordering that all materials, unless otherwise publicly available, designated as Confidential or Confidential-Attorneys Eyes Only Information pursuant to the Parties' so-ordered Protective Order, dated June 27, 2006, and entered in the Civil Action (i) may be used solely in connection with the ICRP set forth in Section VIILC herein and (ii) shall be returned to the producing party or destroyed by the party to whom those materials were produced at the conclusion of such Claims Process or one year following the Final Approval Date, whichever comes later; provided, however, that the Parties may retain copies of their work product; copies of all filed documents (whether or not filed under seal or submitted to the court without being officially filed); information necessary to be maintained by counsel under the rules of professional responsibility; and materials necessary to oversee compliance with this Agreement.
61

Case: 1:05-cv-06583 Document #: 585-1 Filed: 08/28/13 Page 67 of 74 PageID #:17674
XII. PARTIES' AUTHORITY The signatories represent that they are fully authorized to enter into this
Settlement Agreement and to bind the Parties and the Settlement Class Members to the terms and conditions hereof.
The Parties acknowledge that through this Settlement Agreement, its Exhibits and its attachments, they and the Settlement Class Members are being advised that they may consult an attorney regarding their participation in this Agreement, and the Parties acknowledge that they in fact have been represented by competent, experienced Counsel throughout all negotiations that preceded the execution of this Agreement, and that this Agreement has been made with the consent and advice of Counsel who have jointly prepared this Agreement.
All of the Parties and Settlement Class Members acknowledge that they are participating voluntarily and knowingly in exchange for the consideration described herein. The Parties and Settlement Class Members further acknowledge that they were provided with a reasonable period of time within which to consider this Settlement Agreement. XIII. NOTICES
Unless otherwise specifically provided herein, all notices, demands or other communications given hereunder shall be in writing and shall be deemed to have been duly given as of the third business day after mailing by United States registered or certified mail, return receipt requested, or via electronic mail, and shall be addressed as follows:
62

Case: 1:05-cv-06583 Document #: 585-1 Filed: 08/28/13 Page 68 of 74 PageID #:17675

To the Class Representatives or to any Settlement Class Member:

STOWELL & FRIEDMAN, LTD. Linda D. Friedman Suzanne E. Bish George S. Robot Jennifer Gilbert 303 W. Madison, 26`' floor Chicago, Illinois 60606 (312) 431-0888 (tel) (312) 431-0228 (fax)
Lfriedman@sfltd.com
Sbish@sfltd.com
Grobot@sfltd.com
Jgilbert@sfltd.com

To the Defendant:

WEIL, GOTSHAL & MANGES LLP Jeffrey S. Klein Nicholas J. Pappas 767 Fifth Avenue New York, NY 10153 (212) 310-8000 (tel) (212) 310-8007 (fax)
ieffrey.klein@ weil.com
nicholas.pappas@weil.com

MAYER BROWN LLP Stephen M. Shapiro Timothy S. Bishop Lori E. Lightfoot 71 S. Wacker Drive Chicago, IL 60606 (312) 782-0600 (tel) (312) 701-7711 (fax) sshapiro@mayerbrown.com
tbishop@mayerbrown.com
lhtfoot@mayerbrown.com

XIV. CONFIDENTIALITY

Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to permit anyone (including Class

Counsel) to make public Merrill Lynch's confidential personnel information. Nor will

any provision require Merrill Lynch to make public such information.

63

Case: 1:05-cv-06583 Document #: 585-1 Filed: 08/28/13 Page 69 of 74 PageID #:17676
Other than necessary disclosures to be made to the Court, the content of the Parties' confidential settlement negotiations shall be kept confidential by Counsel for Merrill Lynch, Merrill Lynch, Class Counsel and the Class Representatives. XV. MODIFICATION
This Agreement and its exhibits may not be terminated or substantively changed, altered or modified, without written agreement of all Parties and prior Court approval.
The Parties shall have the right to seek modification of the Agreement by the Court to ensure that its purposes are fully effectuated. The Parties may jointly agree to modify the Agreement with the approval of the Court. Upon application for modification of the Agreement, the movant shall bear the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that circumstances make such modification necessary. XVI. EXHIBITS
The exhibits to this Settlement Agreement are material and integral parts hereof and are fully incorporated herein by this reference. XVII. ENTIRE AGREEMENT AND INTEGRATION
This Agreement and its exhibits and attachments constitute the entire agreement between the Parties and Settlement Class Members concerning the subject matter hereof. All prior or contemporaneous agreements, understandings, representations and statements, whether oral or written and whether by a party or such party's legal counsel, with respect to matters relating to or addressed in this Settlement Agreement are extinguished.
No extrinsic oral or written representations or terms shall modify, vary or contradict the terms of this Agreement. In the event of any conflict between this
64

Case: 1:05-cv-06583 Document #: 585-1 Filed: 08/28/13 Page 70 of 74 PageID #:17677
Settlement Agreement and any other Settlement-related document, the Parties and Settlement Class Members intend that this Agreement shall be controlling. XVIII. FAILURE TO INSIST ON STRICT COMPLIANCE
The failure of any party to insist in any one or more instances on strict compliance with the terms and conditions hereof shall not be construed to be a waiver of remedies available with respect to any prior or subsequent breach. XIX. INTERPRETATION
This Agreement shall be construed as a whole according to its fair meaning and intent, and not strictly for or against any party, regardless of who drafted or who was principally responsible for drafting this Agreement or any specific term or condition thereof. The Parties shall meet and confer concerning any disputes regarding the interpretation of the Settlement Agreement before seeking resolution from the Court. XX. NO DRAFTING PRESUMPTION
All Parties hereto have participated, through respective counsel, in the drafting of this Settlement Agreement and, therefore, this Settlement Agreement shall not be construed more strictly against one party than another. XXI. ENFORCEMENT AND JURISDICTION
The Court, and any appellate court from which appeals of the Court's decisions may properly be brought, shall retain exclusive jurisdiction relating to any claims arising out of or relating to this Settlement Agreement, including, but not limited to the implementation and enforcement of the terms of this Agreement. Settlement Class Members will have no individual right to enforce the terms of the Settlement Agreement. Rather, only Defendant and Class Representatives, through Class Counsel, may seek to
m

Case: 1:05-cv-06583 Document #: 585-1 Filed: 08/28/13 Page 71 of 74 PageID #:17678
enforce the terms of the Settlement Agreement. Class Counsel and counsel for Merrill Lynch shall meet and confer before the commencement of any enforcement proceedings.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, nothing in this paragraph shall bar Settlement Class Members from bringing to the attention of the Special Master any allegation that the claims process procedures described in Section VIII.0 have not been implemented pursuant to the Settlement Agreement's express terms, provided that Settlement Class Members shall bring no such claims against Merrill Lynch, and Settlement Class Members shall have no claims against Merrill Lynch regarding claims process procedures described in Section VIII.C. The Special Master shall confer with Class Counsel and provide a response to the Settlement Class Member. The Special Master shall also provide a report to the Court regarding the resolution of any such allegations. The Court shall have final, binding and non-appealable jurisdiction to resolve allegations brought by Settlement Class Members under this paragraph. XXII. CHOICE OF LAW
This Agreement and the exhibits thereto shall be considered to have been negotiated, executed and delivered, and to be wholly performed, in the State of Illinois, and the rights and obligations of the Parties to this Settlement Agreement shall be subject to, governed by, construed, enforced, and administered in accordance with the laws of the State of Illinois, without giving effect to that State's or any other state's choice-of-law principles. XXIII. PARAGRAPH AND SECTION HEADINGS
Paragraph and section headings are for convenience of reference only and are not intended to create substantive rights and obligations.

Case: 1:05-cv-06583 Document #: 585-1 Filed: 08/28/13 Page 72 of 74 PageID #:17679
XXIV. COUNTERPARTS This Settlement Agreement may be executed in counterparts, and when each party
has signed and delivered at least one such counterpart, each counterpart shall be deemed an original, and, when taken together with other signed counterparts, shall constitute one Agreement. XXV. SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT IS FINAL AND BINDING
This Settlement Agreement shall inure to the benefit of and be final and binding upon Named Plaintiffs and all other Settlement Class Members who do not opt out pursuant to Section IV.B above, as well as upon their successors, executors, administrators, assigns and heirs, and on Defendant and its successors and assigns. Additionally, only Defendant, Class Counsel and Named Plaintiffs may challenge or seek to enforce the terms of the Settlement Agreement, except that pursuant to Section XXI above, Settlement Class Members can bring to the attention of the Special Master any allegation that the claims process procedures described in Section VIII.0 have not been implemented pursuant to the Settlement Agreement's express terms, provided that Settlement Class Members shall bring no such claims against Merrill Lynch, and Settlement Class Members shall have no claims against Merrill Lynch regarding claims process procedures described in Section VIII.C. XXVI. COMPUTATION OF TIME
In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by this Settlement, unless otherwise stated, such computation or calculation shall be made consistent with Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a).
67

Case: 1:05-cv-06583 Document #: 585-1 Filed: 08/28/13 Page 73 of 74 PageID #:17680

Case: 1:05-cv-06583 Document #: 585-1 Filed: 08/28/13 Page 74 of 74 PageID #:17681
MAYER BROWN LLP Stephen M. Shapiro Timothy S. Bishop Lori E. Lightfoot 71 S. Wacker Drive Chicago, IL 60606 (312) 782-0600 (tel) (312) 701-7711 (fax) sshapiro @ ma_yerbrown.com tbishop @mayerbrown.com Lightfoot@ mayerbrown.com
Counsel for Defendant Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Incorporated

 </s> Case: 1:05-cv-06583 Document #: 513 Filed: 04/04/12 Page 1 of 21 PageID #:17143 Case: 11-3639 Document: 00711734904 Filed: 04/04/2012 Pages: 21
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
No. 11-3639 GEORGE MCREYNOLDS, et al., on behalf
of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
MERRILL LYNCH, PIERCE, FENNER & SMITH, INC., Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 05 C 6583—Robert W. Gettleman, Judge.
ARGUED JANUARY 13, 2012—DECIDED FEBRUARY 24, 2012
Before POSNER, WOOD, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges. POSNER, Circuit Judge. The plaintiffs have filed a class action suit that charges Merrill Lynch with racial discrimination in employment in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The plaintiffs ask that a class be certified for two purposes: deciding a common issue, Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4)—whether

Case: 1:05-cv-06583 Document #: 513 Filed: 04/04/12 Page 2 of 21 PageID #:17144 Case: 11-3639 Document: 00711734904 Filed: 04/04/2012 Pages: 21

2

No. 11-3639

the defendant has engaged and is engaging in practices that have a disparate impact (that is, a discriminatory effect, though it need not be intentional) on the members of the class, in violation of federal antidiscrimination law; and providing injunctive relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2). They also want damages. But while they asked the district court to certify the class for purposes of seeking compensatory and punitive damages, see Rule 23(b)(3), at argument the plaintiffs’ lawyer said she wasn’t asking—not yet anyway—for such certification, though her opening brief had suggested that if we found that the district court had erred in refusing to certify for class treatment the disparate impact issue and injunctive relief, we should order the court to “consider [on remand] the extent to which damages issues also could benefit from class treatment, consistent with Allen v. International Truck & Engine Corp., 358 F.3d 469 (7th Cir. 2004).” We defer that question to the end of our opinion. But we note here that without proof of intentional discrimination, which is not an element of a disparate impact claim, the plaintiffs cannot obtain damages, whether compensatory or punitive, but only equitable relief (which might however include backpay, and thus have a monetary dimension). 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1); Kolstad v. American Dental Association, 527 U.S. 526, 534 (1999). Section 1981a(a)(1) is explicit that damages cannot be awarded in respect of “an employment practice that is unlawful because of its disparate impact.”
The district court denied certification, and the plaintiffs asked this court for leave to appeal the denial. A motions panel granted leave, but the defendant argues

Case: 1:05-cv-06583 Document #: 513 Filed: 04/04/12 Page 3 of 21 PageID #:17145 Case: 11-3639 Document: 00711734904 Filed: 04/04/2012 Pages: 21

No. 11-3639

3

that the panel erred—that the appeal is untimely. We begin with that question.
Rule 23(f) of the civil rules permits appeals from orders granting or denying class certification despite the general policy (though one with many exceptions) against allowing interlocutory appeals in the federal court system. A denial of class certification often dooms the suit—the class members’ claims may be too slight to justify the expense of individual suits. Conversely, because of the astronomical damages potential of many class action suits, a grant of certification may place enormous pressure on the defendant to settle even if the suit has little merit. See, e.g., CE Design Ltd. v. King Architectural Metals, Inc., 637 F.3d 721, 723 (7th Cir. 2011). And because class actions are cumbersome and protracted, an early appellate decision on whether a suit can be maintained as a class action can speed the way to termination of the litigation by abandonment, summary judgment, or settlement. E.g., Blair v. Equifax Check Services, Inc., 181 F.3d 832, 834-35 (7th Cir. 1999); Newton v. Merrill Lynch, 259 F.3d 154, 162-65 (3d Cir. 2001).
But Rule 23(f) requires that leave to appeal be sought from the court of appeals within 14 days of the entry of the order granting or denying certification. The district court denied the plaintiffs’ initial motion for class certification in August 2010. In July 2011 the plaintiffs filed an amended motion for class certification, which the district judge denied in September, and within 14 days of that denial the plaintiffs sought our leave to appeal. The defendant asks us to treat the request for

Case: 1:05-cv-06583 Document #: 513 Filed: 04/04/12 Page 4 of 21 PageID #:17146 Case: 11-3639 Document: 00711734904 Filed: 04/04/2012 Pages: 21

4

No. 11-3639

leave to appeal as an untimely request to appeal the August 2010 denial of certification. That would amount to treating the plaintiffs’ second motion for certification as an untimely motion to reconsider the denial of the first motion.
The question of timeliness may seem to be about jurisdiction, since most deadlines for appeals from a district court have been held to be jurisdictional. But as we noted recently in In re IFC Credit Corp., 663 F.3d 315, 31920 (7th Cir. 2011), the Supreme Court has been moving toward a definition of the subject-matter jurisdiction of the federal courts that includes all cases that these courts are “competent,” in the sense of legally empowered, to decide. This implies that deadlines for appealing are not jurisdictional, since they regulate the movement upward through the judicial hierarchy of litigation that by definition is within federal jurisdiction. Yet appeal deadlines either found in statutes or adopted by courts by direction of a statute continue to be treated as jurisdictional—though not all of them; the Supreme Court recently rejected such a “bright line” rule in favor of requiring a “clear indication” that the deadline was intended by Congress to be jurisdictional. Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. 1197, 1203 (2011). (The power of Congress to impose such limits on the jurisdiction of the federal courts is not questioned.) But because no “clear indication” is to be found in the pertinent statutory texts, see, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 2101(c), 2107(a), (c), the Court has found itself saying such things as that Congress is not required to “use magic words in order to speak clearly on this point” and that “context, including [the Supreme

Case: 1:05-cv-06583 Document #: 513 Filed: 04/04/12 Page 5 of 21 PageID #:17147 Case: 11-3639 Document: 00711734904 Filed: 04/04/2012 Pages: 21

No. 11-3639

5

Court’s] interpretation of similar provisions in many years past, is relevant.” Henderson v. Shinseki, supra, 131 S. Ct. at 1203, quoting Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 130 S. Ct. 1248 (2010).
What we take away from this formula is that if the Court has traditionally treated a particular statutory deadline as jurisdictional it will go on doing so, id. at 1203-06; John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130, 134 (2008); Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 209-10 and n. 2 (2007); In re Caterbone, 640 F.3d 108, 111-13 (3d Cir. 2011), even though doing so doesn’t comport with the new “competence” standard. Deadlines for appealing are just a type of statute of limitations, as acknowledged in John R. Sand & Gravel v. United States, supra, 552 U.S. at 133, and statutes of limitations ordinarily are affirmative defenses rather than jurisdictional bars. A deadline for bringing or appealing a federal case presupposes that the case is within the competence of federal courts to decide.
We declined in Asher v. Baxter Int’l Inc., 505 F.3d 736, 741 (7th Cir. 2007), to rule on whether the deadline in Rule 23(f), though it is promulgated by the Supreme Court under the authority of the Rules Enabling Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2072, rather than found in or directed to be adopted by a statute, is jurisdictional. But by now it is clear that it is not jurisdictional—that the exception to the “competence” standard is limited to statutory deadlines, United States v. Neff, 598 F.3d 320, 322-23 (7th Cir. 2010), for how can a court contract or expand its jurisdiction except by force of a constitutional

Case: 1:05-cv-06583 Document #: 513 Filed: 04/04/12 Page 6 of 21 PageID #:17148 Case: 11-3639 Document: 00711734904 Filed: 04/04/2012 Pages: 21

6

No. 11-3639

or statutory provision? If the deadline was made by Congress, then whether it is jurisdictional depends on congressional intent, and, the Supreme Court appears to be saying, in the absence of any clues to that intent on whether the courts traditionally have treated the deadline as jurisdictional. The time limit in Rule 23(f), having been created by the Court rather than by Congress (no time limits are specified in the Rules Enabling Act—the Act is an enabler, not a specifier), is governed by the “competence” standard and therefore is not jurisdictional, for obviously the suit from which the appeal is sought to be taken is within the jurisdiction of the federal courts.
But suppose our understanding of the evolving Supreme Court doctrine is wrong, and the deadline in Rule 23(f) is jurisdictional. The only difference between a deadline that is jurisdictional and one that is not is that a litigant cannot lose the benefit of the former type (until judgment becomes final after exhaustion of appellate remedies) by failing to assert it, or because the other party’s failure to comply would in nonjurisdictional settings be excused by such doctrines as equitable estoppel or equitable tolling. The defendant has from the outset vigorously contested the timeliness of the appeal, and the plaintiffs are not arguing that they should be excused for having missed the deadline. Even if not jurisdictional, a deadline is mandatory in the sense that if invoked by a party in timely fashion the court is bound by it. Eberhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 12, 19 (2005) (per curiam); Asher v. Baxter Int’l Inc., supra, 505 F.3d at 741; Maxwell v. Dodd, 662 F.3d 418, 421 (6th Cir. 2011); Wilburn v. Robinson, 480 F.3d 1140, 1146-47 (D.C. Cir. 2007).

Case: 1:05-cv-06583 Document #: 513 Filed: 04/04/12 Page 7 of 21 PageID #:17149 Case: 11-3639 Document: 00711734904 Filed: 04/04/2012 Pages: 21

No. 11-3639

7

Rather, the plaintiffs’ argument is that their 14 days to seek leave to appeal ran anew from the denial of their amended motion for class certification. The defendant points out that a deadline for appealing cannot be extended by a motion for reconsideration of a previous appealable order, Asher v. Baxter Int’l Inc., supra, 505 F.3d at 739-40; Gary v. Sheahan, 188 F.3d 891 (7th Cir. 1999); Jenkins v. BellSouth Corp., 491 F.3d 1288, 1290-92 (11th Cir. 2007); McNamara v. Felderhof, 410 F.3d 277, 280-81 and n. 8 (5th Cir. 2005), unless the motion is made within the time allowed for taking the appeal, Blair v. Equifax Check Services, Inc., supra, 181 F.3d at 837, and this rule applies to appeals under Rule 23(f). Id. Otherwise the deadline for taking the appeal would be eviscerated. And this is so even if the motion for reconsideration doesn’t just say “and for the reasons stated in our original motion we ask the court to reverse its ruling” but adds “and by the way we have thought of some clever new arguments for why our motion should have been granted.” Carpenter v. Boeing Co., 456 F.3d 1183, 119091 (10th Cir. 2006). For it is easy to think up new arguments.
But it doesn’t follow that the failure to take a timely appeal from one interlocutory order operates as a forfeiture, jurisdictional or otherwise, of the right to appeal a subsequent order. For the later motion may not be, either in form or, more important, in substance, a motion to reconsider the previous denial. A rule limiting parties to one interlocutory appeal from a grant or denial of class certification would disserve Rule 23(f). It is important that the question whether the case is to

Case: 1:05-cv-06583 Document #: 513 Filed: 04/04/12 Page 8 of 21 PageID #:17150 Case: 11-3639 Document: 00711734904 Filed: 04/04/2012 Pages: 21

8

No. 11-3639

proceed as a class action be resolved sooner rather than later. So if it becomes clear in the course of the lawsuit, as a result of new law or newly learned facts, that the denial of certification was erroneous, and if years of litigation lie ahead before a final judgment can be expected, and if therefore an appeal from the denial of certification may either end the litigation or at least place it on a path to swift resolution, the court of appeals should have discretion to allow the appeal.
The fact that the appellate court has a discretionary jurisdiction over Rule 23(f) appeals is important. Appellate jurisdiction in the federal system ordinarily is mandatory. With few exceptions, we have to decide all appeals that we have jurisdiction to hear; we do not have a discretionary appellate jurisdiction like the Supreme Court. But because our jurisdiction to hear interlocutory appeals under Rule 23(f) is discretionary, there is little danger that the filing in the district court of a second motion for certification based on altered circumstances, followed if it is denied by a motion in this court for leave to appeal, will either delay the district court proceedings (Rule 23(f) provides that “an appeal does not stay proceedings in the district court unless the district judge or the court of appeals so orders”) or burden us or the opposing party. If the movant is playing a delay game, prompt denial by the motions panel of leave to appeal probably will end it; if he persists he will be courting sanctions in both the district court and this court for filing frivolous pleadings. And by the way, we do not permit a party to circumvent the 14-day deadline in Rule 23(f) by appealing a denial of

Case: 1:05-cv-06583 Document #: 513 Filed: 04/04/12 Page 9 of 21 PageID #:17151 Case: 11-3639 Document: 00711734904 Filed: 04/04/2012 Pages: 21

No. 11-3639

9

class certification under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (authorizing interlocutory appeals that present a controlling issue of law on which there is substantial room for disagreement and prompt resolution would expedite the litigation), Richardson Electronics, Ltd. v. Panache Broadcasting, 202 F.3d 957, 959 (7th Cir. 2000), which has no deadline.
Dicta in the Tenth Circuit’s opinion in Carpenter v. Boeing Co., supra, go beyond the unexceptionable proposition that merely presenting “new arguments” does not change a motion for reconsideration of a grant or denial of class certification into a motion that if denied is appealable under Rule 23(f). The opinion states (456 F.3d at 1191) that
given the multifactor analysis that courts must apply in deciding the propriety of class certification, [even appellate review limited to whatever changed circumstances had given rise to the fresh motion for certification] would often require contorted thinking that exceeds the capacities of even appellate courts. How can an appellate court say that one particular new factor would require a different result regardless of how the district court weighed the factors presented originally? In stating that the new factor required a different result, the appellate court must engage in weighing the factors weighed by the district court in its original ruling but cannot know precisely how much weight the district court granted to each. In particular, what if the district court clearly erred in giving dispositive weight to one factor? How is the appellate court to

Case: 1:05-cv-06583 Document #: 513 Filed: 04/04/12 Page 10 of 21 PageID #:17152 Case: 11-3639 Document: 00711734904 Filed: 04/04/2012 Pages: 21

10

No. 11-3639

ignore such error (in keeping with the presumption that the original decision was correct) even when it addresses a motion for reconsideration that raises only a rather inconsequential new factor?. . . We are not inclined to adopt a construction of Rule 23(f) that would regularly require mental gymnastics just for the purpose of giving litigants a second bite at the interlocutory-appellate-review apple. We note that the very absence of a prompt appeal by the party aggrieved by the decision on certification suggests that the concerns justifying Rule 23(f) are, at the least, less significant in the particular case. If the decision whether or not to certify the class was truly outcome determinative, one would not expect the losing party to continue the litigation for months before launching a new challenge to the ruling. Any value in permitting a belated interlocutory appeal is overridden by the desirability of the district court’s proceeding expeditiously.
A court of appeals is never obliged to engage in “contorted thinking” about a Rule 23(f) appeal, for it can always deny leave to appeal, and should do so if it would have to do mental contortions in order to make up its collective mind whether appeal should be allowed. And if the new motion for certification “raises only a rather inconsequential new factor,” then the failure of the plaintiffs to have sought interlocutory review of the denial of the original motion for certification becomes a reason to deny leave to appeal out of hand, without any “mental gymnastics.” As

Case: 1:05-cv-06583 Document #: 513 Filed: 04/04/12 Page 11 of 21 PageID #:17153 Case: 11-3639 Document: 00711734904 Filed: 04/04/2012 Pages: 21

No. 11-3639

11

for “not expect[ing] the losing party to continue the litigation for months before launching a new challenge to the ruling,” the new challenge is timely if filed as soon as the development warranting a new motion for certification occurs, but untimely if the plaintiff dawdles. And if the appeal is not “belated,” but based on developments that may warrant certification, allowing the appeal may very well speed up rather than slow down the litigation. In effect the court held in Carpenter that the new motion for certification was in substance an untimely motion for reconsideration. The holding is unexceptionable, but the dicta are not persuasive.
The basis of the plaintiffs’ renewed motion for class certification in the present case was the Supreme Court’s decision in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011), handed down a month earlier. That was an important development in the law governing class certification in employment discrimination cases—possibly a milestone. It may seem a perverse basis for a renewed motion for class certification, since the Supreme Court reversed a grant of certification in what the defendant in our case insists is a case just like this one. But the district judge, though he again denied certification, didn’t think the plaintiffs were perverse in basing their new motion on Wal-Mart. On the contrary, he said that “Wal-Mart does add a lot to the landscape under Rule 23 . . . . I think this really cries out for a 23(f) appeal, and I would support it. And I’m going to put that in my order [denying the renewed motion for certification—and he did] . . . . [T]his is one [case] that really cries out for [a Rule 23(f) appeal] with the change in the land-

Case: 1:05-cv-06583 Document #: 513 Filed: 04/04/12 Page 12 of 21 PageID #:17154 Case: 11-3639 Document: 00711734904 Filed: 04/04/2012 Pages: 21

12

No. 11-3639

scape by the Wal-Mart opinion. Of course, you know, most defendants think that the change is in their interest, not in the plaintiffs’. But you’ve [the judge was addressing the plaintiffs’ lawyer] made a good argument, and I think it deserves to be put to rest one way or the other.” The judge was right.
Wal-Mart holds that if employment discrimination is practiced by the employing company’s local managers, exercising discretion granted them by top management (granted them as a matter of necessity, in Wal-Mart’s case, because the company has 1.4 million U.S. employees), rather than implementing a uniform policy established by top management to govern the local managers, a class action by more than a million current and former employees is unmanageable; the incidents of discrimination complained of do not present a common issue that could be resolved efficiently in a single proceeding. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2). Not that the employer would be immune from liability even in such a case; if the local managers are acting within the scope of their employment in discriminating against their underlings on a forbidden ground (sex, alleged in Wal-Mart, race in our case), the employer is liable for their unlawful conduct under the doctrine of respondeat superior. But because there was no company-wide policy to challenge in Wal-Mart—the only relevant corporate policies were a policy forbidding sex discrimination and a policy of delegating employment decisions to local managers—there was no common issue to justify class treatment.
The district judge thought this case like Wal-Mart because Merrill Lynch, accused of discriminating against

Case: 1:05-cv-06583 Document #: 513 Filed: 04/04/12 Page 13 of 21 PageID #:17155 Case: 11-3639 Document: 00711734904 Filed: 04/04/2012 Pages: 21

No. 11-3639

13

700 black brokers currently or formerly employed by it, delegates discretion over decisions that influence the compensation of all the company’s 15,000 brokers (“Financial Advisors” is their official title) to 135 “Complex Directors.” Each of the Complex Directors supervises several of the company’s 600 branch offices, and within each branch office the brokers exercise a good deal of autonomy, though only within a framework established by the company.
Two elements of that framework are challenged: the company’s “teaming” policy and its “account distribution” policy. The teaming policy permits brokers in the same office to form teams. They are not required to form or join teams, and many prefer to work by themselves. But many others prefer to work as part of a team. Team members share clients, and the aim in forming or joining a team is to gain access to additional clients, or if one is already rich in clients to share some of them with brokers who have complementary skills that will secure the clients’ loyalty and maybe persuade them to invest more with Merrill Lynch. As we said, there are lone wolves, but there is no doubt that for many brokers team membership is a plus; certainly the plaintiffs think so.
The teams are formed by brokers, and once formed a team decides whom to admit as a new member. Complex Directors and branch-office managers do not select the team’s members.
Account distributions are transfers of customers’ accounts when a broker leaves Merrill Lynch and his cli-

Case: 1:05-cv-06583 Document #: 513 Filed: 04/04/12 Page 14 of 21 PageID #:17156 Case: 11-3639 Document: 00711734904 Filed: 04/04/2012 Pages: 21

14

No. 11-3639

ents’ accounts must therefore be transferred to other brokers. Accounts are transferred within a branch office, and the brokers in that office compete for the accounts. The company establishes criteria for deciding who will win the competition. The criteria include the competing brokers’ records of revenue generated for the company and of the number and investments of clients retained.
The Complex Directors, as well as the branch-office managers, have a measure of discretion with regard to teaming and account distribution; they can veto teams and can supplement the company criteria for distributions. And to the extent that these regional and local managers exercise discretion regarding the compensation of the brokers whom they supervise, the case is indeed like Wal-Mart. But the exercise of that discretion is influenced by the two company-wide policies at issue: authorization to brokers, rather than managers, to form and staff teams; and basing account distributions on the past success of the brokers who are competing for the transfers. Furthermore, team participation and account distribution can affect a broker’s performance evaluation, which under company policy influences the broker’s pay and promotion. The plaintiffs argue that these company-wide policies exacerbate racial discrimination by brokers.
The teams, they say, are little fraternities (our term but their meaning), and as in fraternities the brokers choose as team members people who are like themselves. If they are white, they, or some of them anyway, are more

Case: 1:05-cv-06583 Document #: 513 Filed: 04/04/12 Page 15 of 21 PageID #:17157 Case: 11-3639 Document: 00711734904 Filed: 04/04/2012 Pages: 21

No. 11-3639

15

comfortable teaming with other white brokers. Obviously they have their eyes on the bottom line; they will join a team only if they think it will result in their getting paid more, and they would doubtless ask a superstar broker to join their team regardless of his or her race. But there is bound to be uncertainty about who will be effective in bringing and keeping shared clients; and when there is uncertainty people tend to base decisions on emotions and preconceptions, for want of objective criteria.
Suppose a police department authorizes each police officer to select an officer junior to him to be his partner. And suppose it turns out that male police officers never select female officers as their partners and white officers never select black officers as their partners. There would be no intentional discrimination at the departmental level, but the practice of allowing police officers to choose their partners could be challenged as enabling sexual and racial discrimination—as having in the jargon of discrimination law a “disparate impact” on a protected group—and if a discriminatory effect was proved, then to avoid an adverse judgment the department would have to prove that the policy was essential to the department’s mission. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i); Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2672-73 (2009); Bryant v. City of Chicago, 200 F.3d 1092, 1098-99 (7th Cir. 2000). That case would not be controlled by Wal-Mart (although there is an undoubted resemblance), in which employment decisions were delegated to local managers; it would be an employment decision by top management.

Case: 1:05-cv-06583 Document #: 513 Filed: 04/04/12 Page 16 of 21 PageID #:17158 Case: 11-3639 Document: 00711734904 Filed: 04/04/2012 Pages: 21

16

No. 11-3639

Merrill Lynch’s broker teams are formed by brokers, not managers, just as in our hypothetical example police officers’ partners are chosen by police officers, not supervisors. If the teaming policy causes racial discrimination and is not justified by business necessity, then it violates Title VII as “disparate impact” employment discrimination—and whether it causes racial discrimination and whether it nonetheless is justified by business necessity are issues common to the entire class and therefore appropriate for class-wide determination.
And likewise with regard to account distributions: if as a result of racial preference at the team level black brokers employed by Merrill Lynch find it hard to join teams, or at least good teams, and as a result don’t generate as much revenue or attract and retain as many clients as white brokers do, then they will not do well in the competition for account distributions either; and a kind of vicious cycle will set in. A portion of a team’s pre-existing revenues are transferred within a team to a new recruit, who thus starts out with that much “new” revenue credited to him or her—an advantage, over anyone who is not on a team and thus must generate all of his own “new” revenue, that translates into a larger share of account distributions, which in turn helps the broker do well in the next round of such distributions. This spiral effect attributable to companywide policy and arguably disadvantageous to black brokers presents another question common to the class, along with the question whether, if the team-inflected account distribution system does have this disparate impact, it nevertheless is justified by business necessity.

Case: 1:05-cv-06583 Document #: 513 Filed: 04/04/12 Page 17 of 21 PageID #:17159 Case: 11-3639 Document: 00711734904 Filed: 04/04/2012 Pages: 21

No. 11-3639

17

There is no indication that the corporate level of Merrill Lynch (or its parent, Bank of America) wants to discriminate against black brokers. Probably it just wants to maximize profits. But in a disparate impact case the presence or absence of discriminatory intent is irrelevant; and permitting brokers to form their own teams and prescribing criteria for account distributions that favor the already successful—those who may owe their success to having been invited to join a successful or promising team—are practices of Merrill Lynch, rather than practices that local managers can choose or not at their whim. Therefore challenging those policies in a class action is not forbidden by the Wal-Mart decision; rather that decision helps (as the district judge sensed) to show on which side of the line that separates a company-wide practice from an exercise of discretion by local managers this case falls.
Echoing the district judge, the defendant’s brief states that “any discrimination here would result from local, highly-individualized implementation of policies rather than the policies themselves.” That is too stark a dichotomy. Assume that with no company-wide policy on teaming or account distribution, but instead delegation to local management of the decision whether to allow teaming and the criteria for account distribution, there would be racial discrimination by brokers or local managers, like the discrimination alleged in Wal-Mart. But assume further that company-wide policies authorizing broker-initiated teaming, and basing account distributions on past success, increase the amount of discrimination. The incremental causal effect (overlooked by the district

Case: 1:05-cv-06583 Document #: 513 Filed: 04/04/12 Page 18 of 21 PageID #:17160 Case: 11-3639 Document: 00711734904 Filed: 04/04/2012 Pages: 21

18

No. 11-3639

judge) of those company-wide policies—which is the alleged disparate impact—could be most efficiently determined on a class-wide basis.
We are not suggesting that there is in fact racial discrimination at any level within Merrill Lynch, or that management’s teaming and account distribution policies have a racial effect. The fact that black brokers have on average lower earnings than white brokers may have different causes altogether. The only issue at this stage is whether the plaintiffs’ claim of disparate impact is most efficiently determined on a class-wide basis rather than in 700 individual lawsuits.
The district judge exaggerated the impact on the feasibility and desirability of class action treatment of the fact that the exercise of discretion at the local level is undoubtedly a factor in the differential success of brokers, even if not a factor that overwhelms the effect of the corporate policies on teaming and on account distributions. Obviously a single proceeding, while it might result in an injunction, could not resolve class members’ claims. Each class member would have to prove that his compensation had been adversely affected by the corporate policies, and by how much. So should the claim of disparate impact prevail in the class-wide proceeding, hundreds of separate trials may be necessary to determine which class members were actually adversely affected by one or both of the practices and if so what loss he sustained—and remember that the class has 700 members. But at least it wouldn’t be necessary in each of those trials to determine whether the chal-

Case: 1:05-cv-06583 Document #: 513 Filed: 04/04/12 Page 19 of 21 PageID #:17161 Case: 11-3639 Document: 00711734904 Filed: 04/04/2012 Pages: 21

No. 11-3639

19

lenged practices were unlawful. Rule 23(c)(4) provides that “when appropriate, an action may be brought or maintained as a class action with respect to particular issues.” The practices challenged in this case present a pair of issues that can most efficiently be determined on a class-wide basis, consistent with the rule just quoted.
As said in Mejdrech v. Met-Coil Systems Corp., 319 F.3d 910, 911 (7th Cir. 2003),
class action treatment is appropriate and is permitted by Rule 23 when the judicial economy from consolidation of separate claims outweighs any concern with possible inaccuracies from their being lumped together in a single proceeding for decision by a single judge or jury. Often, and as it seems to us here, these competing considerations can be reconciled in a “mass tort” case by carving at the joints of the parties’ dispute. If there are genuinely common issues, issues identical across all the claimants, issues moreover the accuracy of the resolution of which is unlikely to be enhanced by repeated proceedings, then it makes good sense, especially when the class is large, to resolve those issues in one fell swoop while leaving the remaining, claimant-specific issues to individual follow-on proceedings.
The kicker is whether “the accuracy of the resolution” would be “unlikely to be enhanced by repeated proceedings.” If resisting a class action requires betting one’s company on a single jury verdict, a defendant may be forced to settle; and this is an argument against definitively resolving an issue in a single case if enormous

Case: 1:05-cv-06583 Document #: 513 Filed: 04/04/12 Page 20 of 21 PageID #:17162 Case: 11-3639 Document: 00711734904 Filed: 04/04/2012 Pages: 21

20

No. 11-3639

consequences ride on that resolution. In re Bridgestone/ Firestone, Inc., 288 F.3d 1012, 1020 (7th Cir. 2002); In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1299-1300 (7th Cir. 1995); contra, Klay v. Humana, Inc., 382 F.3d 1241, 1274 (11th Cir. 2004). But Merrill Lynch is in no danger of being destroyed by a binding class-wide determination that it has committed disparate impact discrimination against 700 brokers, although an erroneous injunction against its teaming and account distribution policies could disadvantage it in competition with brokerage firms that employ similar policies—though we have no information on whether others do.
The Mejdrech decision, and Bridgestone/Firestone and Rhone-Poulenc more fully, discuss the danger that resolving an issue common to hundreds of different claimants in a single proceeding may make too much turn on the decision of a single, fallible judge or jury. The alternative is multiple proceedings before different triers of fact, from which a consensus might emerge; a larger sample provides a more robust basis for an inference. But that is an argument for separate trials on pecuniary relief, and the only issue of relief at present is whether to allow the plaintiffs to seek class-wide injunctive relief. There isn’t any feasible method—certainly none has been proposed in this case—for withholding injunctive relief until a series of separate injunctive actions has yielded a consensus for or against the plaintiffs.
As far as pecuniary relief is concerned, there may be no common issues (though then again there may be,

Case: 1:05-cv-06583 Document #: 513 Filed: 04/04/12 Page 21 of 21 PageID #:17163 Case: 11-3639 Document: 00711734904 Filed: 04/04/2012 Pages: 21

No. 11-3639

21

see Allen v. International Truck & Engine Corp., supra, 358 F.3d at 472), and in that event the next stage of the litigation, should the class-wide issue be resolved in favor of the plaintiffs, will be hundreds of separate suits for backpay (or conceivably for compensatory damages and even punitive damages as well, if the plaintiffs augment their disparate-impact claim with proof of intentional discrimination). The stakes in each of the plaintiffs’ claims are great enough to make individual suits feasible. Most of Merrill Lynch’s brokers earn at least $100,000 a year, and many earn much more, and the individual claims involve multiple years. But the lawsuits will be more complex if, until issue or claim preclusion sets in, the question whether Merrill Lynch has violated the antidiscrimination statutes must be determined anew in each case.
We have trouble seeing the downside of the limited class action treatment that we think would be appropriate in this case, and we conclude that the district judge erred in deciding to the contrary (with evident misgivings, however). The denial of class certification under Rules 23(b)(2) and (c)(4) is therefore
REVERSED.

2-24-12

 </s> Case: 1:05-cv-06583 Document #: 534 Filed: 07/13/12 Page 1 of 8 PageID #:17360

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

GEORGE MCREYNOLDS, MAROC HOWARD, )

LARUE GIBSON, JENNIFER MADRID,

)

FRANKIE ROSS, MARVA YORK, LESLIE

)

BROWNE, HENRY WILSON, LEROY BROWN, )

GLENN CAPEL, CHRISTINA COLEMAN,

J. YVES LABORDE, MARSHELL MILLER, )

CARNELL MOORE, MARK JOHNSON,

)

CATHY BENDER-JACKSON, and STEPHEN )

SMARTT, individually on behalf of themselves )

and all others similarly situated,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

v.

)

)

MERRILL LYNCH, PIERCE, FENNER &

)

SMITH INCORPORATED,

)

)

Defendant.

)

)
No. 05 C 6583 Judge Robert W. Gettleman

CLASS CERTIFICATION ORDER

Before this Court is Plaintiffs’ motion for certification pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure (“Fed.R.Civ.P.”) 23. Having considered the parties’ submissions and written and oral

arguments, and in accordance with the February 24, 2012, Opinion of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, the Court finds that the proposed disparate impact class meets

all elements of Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a), as well as Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(c)(4) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(2),

and so grants certification of the disparate impact class and issues the following ruling pursuant

to Fed.R.Civ.P.23(c)(1)(B):

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, that class certification is granted pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P.

23(b)(2) and 23(c)(4) and a class is hereby certified of all African Americans employed by

Merrill Lynch at any time since July 10, 2004 as Financial Advisors or Financial Advisor

Case: 1:05-cv-06583 Document #: 534 Filed: 07/13/12 Page 2 of 8 PageID #:17361
Trainees assigned a production number in the domestic U.S. retail brokerage unit within the “Global Private Client” division of Merrill Lynch; and it is further
ORDERED, that pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(c)(4), the class action certified pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(2) shall be limited to determining the issues of: (I) whether Defendant’s teaming and/or account distribution policies have or had an unlawful disparate impact on the certified class; and (ii) if so, the appropriateness of any class-wide final injunctive and corresponding declaratory relief; and it is further
ORDERED, that pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(c)(1)(B), upon consideration of the factors set forth in Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(g)(1) and (g)(4), Linda D. Friedman (lead trial attorney), Suzanne E. Bish, George S. Robot, and Jennifer Gilbert, Stowell & Friedman, Ltd., and Mary Stowell, Of Counsel to Stowell & Friedman, Ltd., are appointed as counsel for the class (“Class Counsel”); and it is further
ORDERED, that named Plaintiffs George McReynolds, Maroc Howard, LaRue Gibson, Jennifer Madrid, Frankie Ross, Marva York, Leslie Browne, Henry Wilson, Leroy Brown, Glenn Capel, Christina Coleman, Marshell Miller, Carnell Moore, Mark Johnson, Cathy BenderJackson, and Stephen Smartt are appointed as representatives of the certified class (“Class Representatives”). Defendant represents that it waives any objection to the service of the foregoing as Class Representatives on the ground that any Plaintiffs have not filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission but rely instead on representative Charges of Discrimination filed by Plaintiffs Howard, Wilson and York; and it is further
2

Case: 1:05-cv-06583 Document #: 534 Filed: 07/13/12 Page 3 of 8 PageID #:17362
ORDERED, that pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(c)(2)(A), the Court finds that it is appropriate to send notice to the class that has been certified pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(2) in order to ensure due process by making the class members aware of the class and issues that were certified; and pursuant to Rule 23(d)(1)(B)(I), to send notice to all former putative class members of the disparate treatment class; and it is further
ORDERED, that the Court approves the notice in the form attached to this Order as Exhibit A, which shall be sent to all members of the class and all former putative class members of the putative disparate treatment class. Plaintiffs shall retain and pay the costs of an outside service to perform the mailing and other dissemination of the notice. Defendant shall provide to Class Counsel and such outside service the list of persons who will receive each notice no later than July 20, 2012. Class Counsel shall at all times maintain the confidentiality of this list. The mailing of notices to class members and former putative class members shall be completed by August 3, 2012; and it is further
ORDERED, that by agreement of the parties, the stay of all proceedings for absent class members and the toll of the limitations period for their individual claims shall expire on November 13, 2012. Defendant’s motion to lift stay (Doc. 468) is denied as moot.
ENTER: July 13, 2012
__________________________________________ Robert W. Gettleman United States District Judge
3

Case: 1:05-cv-06583 Document #: 534 Filed: 07/13/12 Page 4 of 8 PageID #:17363
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
NOTICE WITH RESPECT TO RACE DISCRIMINATION CLASS ACTION AGAINST MERRILL LYNCH, PIERCE, FENNER & SMITH, INCORPORATED.
A federal court has authorized this Notice. This is not a solicitation from a lawyer.
TO: ALL AFRICAN AMERICANS EMPLOYED AS FINANCIAL ADVISORS OR FINANCIAL ADVISOR TRAINEES BY MERRILL LYNCH, PIERCE, FENNER & SMITH, INCORPORATED AT ANY TIME SINCE MAY 6, 2001.
I. INTRODUCTION
You have received this Notice because the employment records of Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Incorporated (“Merrill Lynch”) show that you meet the definition above and your legal rights may be affected by the race discrimination class action lawsuit, McReynolds et al. v. Merrill Lynch, Case No. 05 C 6583 (N.D. Ill.)(the “Lawsuit”).
II. NATURE AND OVERVIEW OF THE LAWSUIT
In 2005 and 2006, a group of African American Plaintiffs filed claims of race discrimination against Merrill Lynch on behalf of current and former African American Financial Advisors and Financial Advisor Trainees. The Lawsuit alleged that Merrill Lynch was engaged in both intentional and disparate impact, discrimination and denied African Americans business opportunities, including teaming and client account distributions, resulting in the lower pay to and higher attrition of African Americans. Merrill Lynch denies any wrongdoing. The Court has not ruled on the merits of the claims or defenses.
On July 13, 2012, United States District Judge Robert W. Gettleman entered an Order certifying a class action to challenge Merrill Lynch’s account distribution and teaming policies (the “Class Claims”). The class includes African Americans employed as Merrill Lynch Financial Advisors and Financial Advisor Trainees at any time since July 10, 2004 (the “Disparate Impact Class”), as further defined in Section IV below. The Plaintiffs’ intentional discrimination claims were not certified for class treatment.
III. WHAT IS A CLASS ACTION?
In a class action lawsuit, one or more persons called “Class Representatives” sue on behalf of other people (“Class Members”) who have similar claims against the same employer.

Case: 1:05-cv-06583 Document #: 534 Filed: 07/13/12 Page 5 of 8 PageID #:17364
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS IV. CLASS DEFINITION – AM I A CLASS MEMBER?
You are a member of the Disparate Impact Class if you were employed as a Merrill Lynch Financial Advisor or Financial Advisor Trainee and assigned a production number in the domestic U.S. retail brokerage unit within the “Global Private Client” division of Merrill Lynch at any time since July 10, 2004. The class definition includes Financial Advisors or Financial Advisor Trainees who are or were employed in domestic branch offices but also service or serviced non-resident clients.
You are not a member of the Disparate Impact Class if your employment as a Merrill Lynch Financial Advisor or Financial Advisor Trainee ended prior to July 10, 2004. However, you may still be able to pursue claims of race discrimination against Merrill Lynch which will not be prosecuted in this class action. See Sections VIII and IX below.
V. CLASS CLAIMS AND THE RELIEF SOUGHT
The Disparate Impact Class is being pursued under federal law, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e (“Title VII”), and has two primary purposes:
(1) Liability: to determine whether the Merrill Lynch account distribution and teaming polices had or have an unlawful disparate impact on African Americans
(2) Injunctive and Declaratory Relief: If the Court finds Merrill Lynch’s policies of account distribution and teaming are racially discriminatory, it will issue an injunction to reform Merrill Lynch’s policies and to end the discrimination.
If the Court finds Merrill Lynch’s account distribution and teaming policies are discriminatory, then each Class Member may seek relief in subsequent proceedings for the harm caused to them by these unlawful policies. This individual relief may include monetary relief and/or reinstatement as a Financial Advisor or Trainee at Merrill Lynch.
The Class Claims do not include claims of intentional race discrimination or disparate impact discrimination relating to policies of Merrill Lynch other than account distribution or teaming.
2

Case: 1:05-cv-06583 Document #: 534 Filed: 07/13/12 Page 6 of 8 PageID #:17365
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS VI. WHAT ARE MY OPTIONS IF I AM A CLASS MEMBER?
If you are a Class Member you do not need to do anything to remain a part of the Disparate Impact Class. If you are a Class Member you will be bound by the judgment or settlement of the Disparate Impact Class claims, whether it is favorable or unfavorable to you.
Non-Class Claims: If you wish to pursue claims for intentional race discrimination, for disparate impact discrimination relating to policies of Merrill Lynch other than account distribution or teaming, or for other non-class claims, you may do so on your own or with the assistance of a lawyer. See Section VIII.
VII. MAY I OPT OUT OF THE DISPARATE IMPACT CLASS?
You may not opt out of the Disparate Impact Class.
VIII. WHAT IF I HAVE CLAIMS OF INTENTIONAL RACE DISCRIMINATION OR OTHER DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS NOT COVERED BY THE CLASS?
The Disparate Impact Class does not include claims of intentional discrimination or claims of discrimination under state and local laws. Therefore, any claim that you may have against Merrill Lynch for intentional discrimination or disparate impact other than with respect to the two Merrill Lynch policies certified, and/or under state law is not being pursued as part of the Disparate Impact Class.
You may, however, still pursue your non-class claims on your own or with the assistance of a lawyer. The McReynolds Lawsuit acted to “toll,” or stop from running, the statutes of limitations, or deadlines by which to file administrative race discrimination charges and/or lawsuits asserting race discrimination claims under federal law. This “tolling” of your non-class race discrimination claims under federal law will end on November 13, 2012. If you wish to pursue any non-class race discrimination claims, you must act to preserve your rights.
3

Case: 1:05-cv-06583 Document #: 534 Filed: 07/13/12 Page 7 of 8 PageID #:17366
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
IX. MERRILL LYNCH EMPLOYMENT ENDED BEFORE JULY 10, 2004
If your employment as a Merrill Lynch Financial Advisor or Financial Advisor Trainee ended prior to July 10, 2004, you are not a member of the Disparate Impact Class. However, you may still have and be able to pursue claims of race discrimination, including claims of intentional or disparate impact race discrimination, against Merrill Lynch. The Lawsuit “tolled” or halted the statute of limitations, or legal deadlines associated with your discrimination claims under federal law. If you wish to preserve any claims you may have, you must act either on your own or with the assistance of a lawyer. This “tolling” will end on November 13, 2012.
X. COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFFS AND CLASS
The Court appointed the following attorneys as Class Counsel to represent the class:
Linda D. Friedman Suzanne E. Bish George S. Robot Jennifer Gilbert Mary Stowell
STOWELL & FRIEDMAN, LTD. 303 W. Madison, 26th floor Chicago, Illinois 60606 (312) 431-0888 http://stowellfriedman.com
The Court has appointed Stowell & Friedman, Ltd. to represent you only with respect to the issues that have been certified for class-wide treatment. If you have any questions about this Notice, or about the Lawsuit, you may contact Class Counsel at the number and address listed above, or review case information and certain of the Court’s orders and filings available at the case website maintained by Class Counsel at www.merrillclassaction.com.
You may hire your own lawyer to appear in Court for you, but you may be responsible for paying that lawyer’s fees and expenses.
4

Case: 1:05-cv-06583 Document #: 534 Filed: 07/13/12 Page 8 of 8 PageID #:17367

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS XI. COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT MERRILL LYNCH

The attorneys representing Defendant Merrill Lynch are:

MAYER BROWN LLP 71 S. Wacker Drive Chicago, IL 60606 Lori E. Lightfoot

WEIL, GOTSHAL & MANGES LLP 767 Fifth Avenue New York, NY 10153 Nicholas J. Pappas Jeffrey S. Klein Allan Dinkoff

As class members are represented by Counsel for the Class, class members should not contact Merrill Lynch or counsel for Merrill Lynch regarding this Notice or the disparate impact class action lawsuit.

XII. FURTHER INFORMATION

If you have any questions about this Notice, the Lawsuit, or your rights, you may contact Class Counsel at Stowell & Friedman, Ltd., at the number and address listed at Section X, on page 4, or a lawyer of your own choosing. Court filings and the Court’s Orders are available on-line for a fee through the Court’s public access system, known as PACER, at www.pacer.gov.

THIS NOTICE AND ITS CONTENTS HAVE BEEN AUTHORIZED BY THE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT, THE HONORABLE JUDGE ROBERT W. GETTLEMAN. THIS NOTICE SHOULD NOT BE CONSTRUED AS A SUGGESTION THAT YOU SHOULD TAKE ANY FURTHER ACTION, NOR SHOULD IT BE CONSTRUED AS ADVICE BY THE COURT REGARDING THE AMOUNT OF TIME WITHIN WHICH YOU MAY TAKE SUCH ACTION. THE COURT HAS TAKEN NO POSITION IN THIS LAWSUIT REGARDING THE MERITS OF THE PLAINTIFFS’ CLAIMS OR OF THE DEFENDANT’S DEFENSES.

DO NOT CONTACT THE JUDGE, THE COURT OR THE COURT CLERK OR MERRILL LYNCH WITH QUESTIONS ABOUT THIS LAWSUIT OR NOTICE.

5

 </s> Case: 1:05-cv-06583 Document #: 589 Filed: 09/04/13 Page 1 of 8 PageID #:17730

mA-

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

-----------------------------------------------------------)( GEORGE MCREYNOLDS, MAROC

HOWARD, LARUE GIBSON, JENNIFER

MADRID, FRANKIE ROSS, MARVA YORK

LESLIE BROWNE, HENRY WILSON,

LEROY BROWN, GLENN CAPEL,

CHRISTINA COLEMAN, J. YVES LABORDE, :

MARSHELL MILLER, CARNELL MOORE,

MARK JOHNSON, CATHY BENDER-

Case No. 05-C-6583

JACKSON, and STEPHEN SMARTT,

Individually on behalf of themselves

and all others similarly situated,

Hon. Robert W. Gettleman

Magistrate Judge Gilbert

Plaintiffs,

-against-

MERRILL LYNCH, PIERCE, FENNER & SMITH, INCORPORATED,

Defendant. -----------------------------------------------------------)(
rLA-··
[flt8PQBI9B] PRELIMINARY APPROVAL ORDER

Upon consideration of Plaintiffs' Motion for Certification of Settlement Class and

Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement and Notice (the "Motion), and the supporting

materials filed by the Parties, including the Settlement Agreement and the e)(hibits attached

thereto, under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, it is ordered that the Motion is

GRANTED.

The Court further makes the following findings and rulings:

US_ACTIVE:\44316005\1 \63080.0164

Case: 1:05-cv-06583 Document #: 589 Filed: 09/04/13 Page 2 of 8 PageID #:17731
I. DEFINITIONS This Order incorporates by reference the definitions; in the Settlement Agreement, and all
capitalized terms used herein shall have the same meanings as set forth in the Settlement Agreement. II. JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the litigation and over all parties to this litigation, including all members of the Settlement Class as defined below. III. NO DETERMINATION
Neither the Settlement Agreement, nor this preliminary approval order, nor the fact of a settlement, are an admission or concession by Merrill Lynch of any liability or wrongdoing whatsoever. IV. SETTLEMENT CLASS CERTIFICATION
For purposes of settlement only, and pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a), (b)(2), and (b)(3), the Court conditionally certifies a Settlement Class composed of:
All African American Financial Advisors and Financial Advisor Trainees who have been assigned a production number in the domestic U.S. retail brokerage unit within the GPC division of Merrill Lynch at any time from May 6, 2001 through the Preliminary Approval Date. The Settlement Class Members allege claims for race discrimination brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, et seq. ("Title VII"), and 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
2
US_ACTIVE:\44316005\1\63080.0164

Case: 1:05-cv-06583 Document #: 589 Filed: 09/04/13 Page 3 of 8 PageID #:17732
The Court FINDS and CONCLUDES that the Settlement Class set forth above satisfies all of the requirements for certification under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a), 23(b)(2), and 23(b)(3). 1 V. APPOINTMENT OF CLASS REPRESENTATIVES AND CLASS COUNSEL
For the purposes of settlement only, the Court finds that Plaintiffs and their counsel are adequate representatives of the Settlement Class, and appoints George McReynolds, Maroc Howard, LaRue Gibson, Jennifer Madrid, Frankie Ross, Marva York, Leslie Browne, Henry Wilson, Leroy Brown, Glenn Capel, Christina Coleman, J. Yves Laborde, Marshell Miller, Carnell Moore, Mark Johnson, Cathy Bender-Jackson, and Stephen Smartt as Class Representatives. In addition, and also for the purposes of settlement only, the Court appoints the law firm of Stowell & Friedman, Ltd. and Linda D. Friedman, Suzanne E. Bish, and George S. Robot as Class Counsel for the Settlement Class. VI. EFFECT OF TERMINATION OF SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT OR NON-
OCCURRENCE OF THE EFFECTIVE DATE The conditional certification of the Settlement Class, Class Representatives, and Class Counsel is solely for the purposes of effectuating the Settlement. If (a) the Settlement Agreement is terminated or is not consummated for any reason, (b) this Preliminary Approval Order is modified, reversed, or set aside on further judicial review, or (c) if the Effective Date does not occur for any reason, the foregoing conditional certification of the Settlement Class and appointment of Class Representatives and Class Counsel shall be void and of no further effect, the previously entered Class Certification Order certifying a disparate impact class shall remain in effect, and the Parties to the Settlement shall be returned to the status each occupied before 1 Because the proposed certification of the Settlement Class is in connection with the Settlement rather than a trial on the merits, the Court need not resolve any issues of manageability presented by certification of the nationwide classes proposed in the Action.
3
US_ACTIVE:\44316005\1\63080.0164

Case: 1:05-cv-06583 Document #: 589 Filed: 09/04/13 Page 4 of 8 PageID #:17733
entry of this Order without prejudice to any legal argument, position, or privilege that any of the Parties to the Settlement Agreement might have asserted but for the Settlement Agreement, including, but not limited to, filing a motion for additional certifications and Merrill Lynch's right to oppose such additional certifications and to object to the disparate impact class certified in the Class Certification Order. VII. PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT
The Court has reviewed the terms of the proposed Settlement Agreement along with its exhibits, including specifically the injunctive relief provisions and the plan of allocation for the Settlement Fund and the Plaintiffs' motion in support of preliminary approval. Based on a review of those papers, and the Court's familiarity with the case, the Court concludes that the Settlement Agreement is fair, reasonable and adequate and the result of extensive, arm's length negotiations between experienced counsel and parties after years of hard-fought litigation. The assistance of an experienced mediator in the settlement process also confirms that the Settlement is not collusive. Based on the Court's review and familiarity with the issues and history of the case, the Court concludes that the proposed Settlement Agreement is fair, reasonable and adequate and well within the range of preliminary settlement approval, such that notice to the Settlement Class is appropriate.
The Settlement Agreement is therefore PRELIMINARILY APPROVED. Final approval and entry of the Settlement Agreement is subject to the hearing of any objections of Settlement Class Members to the proposed Settlement Agreement. VIII. APPOINTMENT OF CLAIMS ADMINISTRATOR AND SPECIAL MASTER
The Court appoints KCC Class Action Servi¢es, LLC to serve as the Claims Administrator, whose duties are set forth in the Settlement Agreement.
4
US_ACTIVE:\44316005\1\63080.0164

Case: 1:05-cv-06583 Document #: 589 Filed: 09/04/13 Page 5 of 8 PageID #:17734
The Court appoints Lynn Cohn as Special Master to perform the duties set forth in the Settlement Agreement. IX. APPROVAL OF THE FORM AND MANNER OF DISTRIBUTING CLASS
NOTICE AND CLAIM FORMS. A. The Court approves the substance and form of the attached Notice of Class Action, Proposed Settlement Agreement, and Settlement Fairness Hearing ("Notice") as reasonable, and adopts and incorporates them herein. The Court also approves the proposed plan for distributing the Notice, which the Court finds is a reasonable method calculated to reach all Settlement Class Members. B. The Notice fairly, plainly, accurately, and reasonably informs Settlement Class Members of appropriate information about: (1) the nature of this litigation, the Settlement Class, the identity of Class Counsel, and the essential terms of the Settlement Agreement, including injunctive relief and the plan of allocation; (2) Class Counsel's forthcoming application for attorneys' fees, the proposed Service Award Payments to the Class Representatives and Steering Committee Members and other payments that will be deducted from the Settlement Fund; (3) how to participate in the Settlement; (4) this Court's procedures for final approval of the Settlement Agreement and Settlement, and about Settlement Class Members' right to appear through counsel if they desire; and (5) how to challenge or opt-out of the Settlement, if they wish to do so. C. Similarly, the proposed claims process allows Settlement Class Members a full and fair opportunity to submit a claim for proceeds in connection with the Settlement. Moreover, the Notice fairly, accurately, and reasonably informs Settlement Class Members that failure to complete and submit a Claim Form, in the manner and time specified, shall constitute a waiver of any right to obtain monetary relief.
5
US_ACTIVE:\44316005\1\63080.0164

Case: 1:05-cv-06583 Document #: 589 Filed: 09/04/13 Page 6 of 8 PageID #:17735
D. The Court finds and concludes that the proposed plan for distributing the Notice will provide the best notice practicable, satisfies the notice requirements of Rule 23(e), and satisfies all other legal and due process requirements.
E. Accordingly, the Court hereby ORDERS as follows: 1. The form ofthe Notice is approved; 2. The manner of distributing the Notice is approved; 3. Promptly following the entry of this Order, the Claims Administrator shall prepare final versions of the Notice, incorporating into the Notice the relevant dates and deadlines set forth in this Order; 4. No later than fifteen (15) days after the Preliminary Approval Date, Merrill Lynch shall provide the Claims Administrator the names, relevant personnel information, and last known addresses of Settlement Class Members in electronic format for the entire Settlement Class Period; 5. Prior to the mailing of the Notices, the Claims Administrator will update any new address information for potential Settlement Class Members as may be available; 6. No later than 25 days after the Preliminary Approval Date, Class Counsel, through the Claims Administrator, shall issue the Notice to the last known address of each Settlement Class Member by first-class mail, postage prepaid; and 7. The Claims Administrator shall take all other actions in furtherance of claims administration as are specified in the Settlement Agreement.
6
US_ACTIVE:\44316005\1\63080.0164

Case: 1:05-cv-06583 Document #: 589 Filed: 09/04/13 Page 7 of 8 PageID #:17736
X. REQUESTS FOR EXCLUSION The Notice sets forth the procedures Settlement Class Members must follow to exclude
themselves, or opt out, from the monetary benefits of the Settlement. Any request for exclusion must follow the procedures in the Settlement and Notice and be received by the Claims Administrator by November 13, 2013. XI. OBJECTIONS TO THE PROPOSED SETTLEMENT.
The Notice sets forth the procedures Settlement Class Members must follow to comment on or object to the terms of the Settlement Agreement by filing the comment or objection with the Court and serving copies on Lead Class Counsel and Counsel for Merrill Lynch. Any comment or objection must follow the procedures in the Settlement and Notice and be filed and served by November 13, 2013. XII. CLAIM FORMS/PARTICIPATION IN THE PROPOSED SETTLEMENT.
The Notice sets forth the procedures Settlement Class Members must follow to participate in the monetary portion of the proposed Settlement Agreement. Claim Forms must adhere to the procedures set forth in the Settlement and Notice and be signed, completed, and received by the Claims Administrator or submitted electronically by a date to be set by the Court after and in the event of final approval. XIII. PROCEDURES FOR FINAL APPROVAL OF 1HE SETTLEMENT
A. Motion for Final Approval. The deadline for Class Counsel to file a motion for final approval of the proposed class action settlement and to address any objections to the Settlement Agreement, including Class Counsel's motion for an award of attorneys' fees and non-taxable costs, is November 21, 2013.
B. Fairness Hearing. A hearing shall be held in Courtroom 1703, Everett McKinley Dirksen United States Courthouse, 219 South Dearborn Street, Chicago, IL, at 10:00 a.m./p.m.
7
US_ACTIVE:\44316005\1\63080.0164

Case: 1:05-cv-06583 Document #: 589 Filed: 09/04/13 Page 8 of 8 PageID #:17737

on December 6, 2013, to consider motions for final approval of the proposed Settlement Agreement and Class Counsel's motion for an award of attorneys' fees and non-taxable costs. The procedures for Settlement Class Members to comment on and/or object to the Settlement Agreement and to appear at the Settlement Hearing are set forth in the Notice. XIV. CONFIDENTIALITY.
The Court enjoins disclosure to third parties of the documents and information discussed or exchanged during the parties' confidential settlement negotiations and mediation to any third party. XV. OTHER CASES ENJOINED.
Pending Final Approval, the Court preliminarily enjoins each Settlement Class Member, including any members who made an irrevocable election to opt out of the monetary relief provisions of the Settlement, from commencing, prosecuting or maintaining in any court or forum other than this Court any claim, action or other proceeding that challenges or seeks review of or relief from any order, judgment, act, decision or ruling of the Court in connection with this Settlement Agreement or otherwise in connection with this Action.
Effective as of the date specified for Settlement Class Members to opt out of the Settlement, the Court enjoins Settlement Class Members who have not opted out of the monetary relief provision of the Settlement from commencing, prosecuting or maintaining either directly, representatively or in any other capacity any Released Claim against any of the Released Parties.

Li~

(1_

SO ORDERED this _11_ day oU"N. 2013.

~~~
ROBERT W. GETTLEMAN United States District Judge

8
US_ACTIVE:\44316005\1\63080.0164

 </s> George MCREYNOLDS, Maroc Howard, Larue Gibson,..., 2006 WL 3886029...
2006 WL 3886029 (N.D.Ill.) (Trial Pleading) United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division.
George MCREYNOLDS, Maroc Howard, Larue Gibson, Jennifer Madrid, Frankie Ross, Marva York Leslie Browne, Henry Wilson, Leroy Brown, Glenn Capel, Christina Coleman, J. Yves Laborde, Marshell Miller,
Carnell Moore, Mark Johnson, Cathy Bender-Jackson, and Stephen Smartt, Individually on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v.
Merill LYNCH, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Incorporated, Defendant. No. 05C6583.
November 15, 2006. Jury Trial Demanded
Second Amended Complaint
Respectfully submitted, Stowell & Friedman, Ltd. Mary Stowell - Attorney No. 02750015, Linda D. Friedman - Attorney No. 06190092, Stowell & Friedman, Ltd., 321 S. Plymouth Court, Suite 1400, Chicago, Illinois 60604, (312) 431-0888. Judge Gettleman. Magistrate Judge Denlow. Plaintiffs, George McReynolds, Maroc Howard, LaRue Gibson, Jennifer Madrid, Frankie Ross, Marva York, Leslie Browne, Henry Wilson, LeRoy Brown, Glenn Capel, Christina Coleman, J. Yves LaBorde, Marshell Miller, Carnell Moore, Mark Johnson, Cathy Bender-Jackson, and Stephen Smartt, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated (“Plaintiffs”), by and through their attorneys, Stowell & Friedman, Ltd., for their Second Amended Complaint against Defendant, Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. state as follows:
JURISDICTION 1. Jurisdiction is based on 28 U.S.C. §§1331 and 1343, and principles of pendent and supplemental jurisdiction.
PARTIES 2. Plaintiffs and the class of persons they seek to represent are current and former employees of Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Incorporated (“Merrill Lynch” or “the Firm”).
3. Defendant Merrill Lynch is a full service securities firm engaged in the retail and institutional sale of securities, options contracts and various other financial products. Merrill Lynch employs in excess of 15,000 persons nationwide as financial advisors (“FAs” or “brokers”) who sell its products and services at its offices located throughout the country, including in Chicago, Illinois. Merrill Lynch is the country’s largest provider of brokerage and brokerage-related services. Merrill Lynch is a publicly traded, Fortune 100 corporation incorporated in Delaware. In 2005, Merrill Lynch had a net worth of over $37 billion and net earnings exceeding five billion dollars.
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
1

George MCREYNOLDS, Maroc Howard, Larue Gibson,..., 2006 WL 3886029...
Merrill Lynch Systemically Discriminates Against And Excludes African-Americans From Employment Opportunities
4. Merrill Lynch has engaged, and continues to engage, in systemic and pervasive racial discrimination against African-Americans.
5. Merrill Lynch’s discriminatory treatment of African-Americans is evidenced in part by the low representation and high attrition rates of African-Americans. In addition, African-Americans are paid lower wages and denied income-earning and promotional opportunities.
6. Merrill Lynch’s human resources department (“Human Resources”) caters to and perpetuates the white male dominated culture and discrimination at the Firm. Because the Firm has no sincere desire to employ or retain African-Americans on equal terms as non-African-Americans, the Firm does not effectively monitor the treatment of its African-American employees or fully investigate and resolve complaints of racial discrimination. Rather, Merrill Lynch justifies its conduct by reliance on racial stereotypes or by shifting blame to what it presumes are its racist clients. Without evidence to support its belief, Merrill Lynch believes that its African-American Financial Advisors do not have access to wealth as compared to its white brokers and, therefore, will not be as profitable to the Firm in bringing in wealthy clients. In part for that reason, Merrill Lynch does not employ tenured African-American brokers in the majority of states. Further, whatever racial animus or bias that may exist in society is intentionally institutionalized, magnified and perpetuated by Merrill Lynch by its distributing clients and resources in a manner mimicking any societal bias that may exist. As a result of the historical and ongoing discrimination at the Firm and the failings of Human Resources, African-Americans recognize the futility of lodging internal complaints and are driven out or leave the Firm when they can no longer tolerate the ongoing discrimination. Those who complain of racial discrimination are often subjected to retaliation, which reinforces Merrill Lynch’s racist culture.
Pattern Allegations
7. Merrill Lynch’s nationwide pattern or practice of discrimination and retaliatory conduct against African-Americans includes but is not limited to the following practices: a) failing to hire African-Americans;
b) failing to retain African-Americans on the same basis as non-African-Americans;
c) failing to promote African-Americans, including to management;
d) underutilizing African-Americans in high paying jobs;
e) steering African-Americans into clerical positions, investment advisor positions, or other non-producing or lower paid positions;
f) denying African-Americans the opportunity to participate in the Management Assessment Center (“MAC”) and to become managers;
g) taking race into account when making employment decisions, including but not limited to decisions regarding training, partnering brokers, and transferring and assigning walk-ins, leads, referrals, departing brokers’ books and initial public offerings (“IPOs”);
h) targeting the accounts and clients of African-American brokers and reassigning them to non-African-American brokers;
i) failing to credit African-Americans for their experience on the same basis as non-African-Americans and failing to consider African-Americans for timely promotions or title changes on the same basis as non-African-Americans;
j) allocating significant resources to brokers based on “performance” rankings that Merrill Lynch knows are the product of past and ongoing discrimination, including but not limited to policies and practices regarding account distributions and partnerships;
k) promoting the teaming or partnering of brokers in a manner that excludes African-Americans from income-generating opportunities, including but not limited to refusing to include African-Americans in significant partnership opportunities;
2

George MCREYNOLDS, Maroc Howard, Larue Gibson,..., 2006 WL 3886029...
l) using partnerships to target the accounts of African-American brokers;
m) using partnerships to deny African-American brokers the opportunity to receive valuable account distributions or to otherwise participate in lucrative business opportunities;
n) systematically paying African-Americans lower wages and/or denying African-Americans opportunities to increase their earnings, including commissions and stock;
o) negligently hiring and/or retaining individuals with known propensities to discriminate against or harass African-Americans;
p) creating an environment that is hostile and offensive to African-Americans;
q) selecting managers with known propensities to discriminate against African-Americans to serve as assessors at the MAC;
r) retaliating against African-Americans who complain of discrimination by, among other things, subjecting them to further discrimination, retaliation, verbal attacks, discipline, reassignment of their clients or accounts, and/or termination;
s) making employment decisions based on race and/or racial stereotypes;
t) intentionally or knowingly adopting, implementing and retaining policies and practices that have a disparate impact on African-Americans;
u) manipulating the length of service (“LOS”) designation of non-African-Americans to manipulate earnings and performance;
v) terminating African-Americans on account of race and/or due to diminished performance and/or production that was lower than it would have been but for the unlawful conduct of Merrill Lynch;
w) publicizing throughout the Firm under the guise of diversity initiatives the quintile rankings, attrition rates and lower earnings of African-Americans to perpetuate a perception that African-Americans are not competent, will fail at the job and would not make good partners in teams;
x) negligently retaining managers who fail to hire and discriminate against African-Americans;
y) applying standards that are less favorable for disciplining and terminating African-Americans than standards applied to non-African-Americans; and
z) defaming African-Americans to their clients and on their Uniform Termination Notice For Securities Industry Registration Form U-5’s (“Form U-5”), but issuing “clean” Form U-5s to non-African-Americans who were charged with equally or more serious disciplinary violations or for race discrimination.
Merrill Lynch’s Workforce Statistics Have A Zero Chance Of Occurrence In A Random Or Race-Neutral Sampling
8. In 1974, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission sued Merrill Lynch based on its refusal to employ women and minorities as brokers. To resolve the lawsuit, Merrill Lynch agreed to the entry of a Consent Decree (the “O’Bannon Consent Decree”) that required Merrill Lynch to increase its representation of African-American brokers to 6.5%. On information and belief, Merrill Lynch never met the goals to which it agreed in the O’Bannon Consent Decree. Indeed, more than 30 years later when this suit was filed, only 2% of the brokers employed by Merrill Lynch are African-American. The representation of African-American brokers at Merrill Lynch is greater than 20 standard deviations below the goal in the 1978 EEOC Consent Decree and more than 10 standard deviations below the percentage representation in the industry, as reflected in EEOC census data. The probability of these disparities in representation occurring in a race-neutral or random selection is zero. Because of the high attrition resulting from Merrill Lynch’s systemic discrimination, the percentage of Merrill Lynch brokers with tenure in excess often years who are African-American is approximately 0.5%.
3

George MCREYNOLDS, Maroc Howard, Larue Gibson,..., 2006 WL 3886029...
9. In or around 1994, a group of approximately fifty African-American brokers from Merrill Lynch convened in Chicago to discuss the Firm’s failure to hire African-Americans and the differential treatment experienced by those who were hired. After learning of the existence of this group, and to placate its African-American brokers, Merrill Lynch began to hold annual symposia for African-American brokers. Conspicuously absent from the symposia were attendees representing about fifty percent of the states. A review of the lists of employees invited to the symposia revealed the dearth of African-American brokers at Merrill Lynch. For example, at the time that this lawsuit was filed, Merrill Lynch employed no African-American brokers1 in approximately 25 states, including all states between Illinois and California. Moreover, in 2005, there were no African-American brokers working at 552 of the 639 Merrill Lynch office locations.2 The following map reflects the state-by-state representation of African-American brokers across the United States as of year-end 2005; states in which Merrill Lynch employs no African-American brokers are depicted in red:
TABLE
The symposia made clear that Merrill Lynch’s exclusion of African-American brokers was not random but was intentional and systematic.
10. Notwithstanding its persistent refusal to employ African-Americans, Merrill Lynch regularly seeks out and participates in business opportunities with publicly traded comp anies, governmental organizations, not-for-profit entities, and unions that employ and/or represent African-Americans. It also creates racial profiles of its clients and targets and markets its services to affluent African-Americans. Likewise, Merrill Lynch advertises its diversity initiatives and seeks out business opportunities, including managing the assets of publicly traded corporations’ pension and profit-sharing plans and underwriting initial public offerings and other equity and debt offerings. The Firm also seeks out and participates in business opportunities, such as bond transactions, from various municipalities and states. In these business pursuits, Merrill Lynch falsely represents that it is an equal opportunity employer. The Firm also fails to mention that it employs no African-American brokers in many of the states in which these companies do business or that the majority of its African-American brokers do not survive the Firm for more than two years. Instead, Merrill Lynch assembles “diverse” teams to make presentations for the business opportunities that generate commissions almost exclusively for non-diverse Merrill Lynch employees. Through the concept of “virtual teams,” Merrill Lynch uses African-American brokers to create the false impression with clients that Merrill Lynch is an equal opportunity employer. Class members have been asked to participate in these presentations to create a false appearance of inclusion at Merrill Lynch but then have been excluded from receiving the benefits if the presentation is successful. Merrill Lynch also promotes itself as an equal opportunity employer by including African-Americans in commercials airing in states in which Merrill Lynch employs no African-American brokers. As a result, in part of these efforts, Merrill Lynch’s retail business has unjustly netted billions of dollars in profits.
11. The few African-Americans whom Merrill Lynch hires fare worse than Caucasians. For example, in various years in the class period, approximately 75% of African-American trainee brokers were forced to leave Merrill Lynch as a result of discriminatory treatment prior to completing the training program. Merrill Lynch has acknowledged during the African-American symposia over the past decade that the attrition rate for African-American brokers has been and remains significantly higher than the attrition rate for Caucasians.
12. African-American brokers also earn lower wages on account of the Firm’s racial discrimination. Merrill Lynch ranks its brokers by placing them in quintiles. The top 20% in commissions is the “first quintile” and the bottom 20% in commissions is the “fifth quintile.” Merrill Lynch relies on these quintile rankings to distribute a variety of benefits or resources, as explained below. Merrill Lynch has acknowledged at the symposia and/or to its Advisory Council to Management that no fewer than 70% of African-American brokers with a length of service in excess of ten years are in the bottom two quintiles. White brokers, on the other hand, are evenly distributed in these quintiles at or around an expected 20% representation. The underrepresentation of African-American brokers in the top quintiles and over-representation in the bottom quintiles is the result of Merrill Lynch’s ongoing and systemic race discrimination.
13. The following chart reflects that in 2003 there were no African-American brokers with six to nine years tenure in the first quintile but 55% in the fifth quintile:
DISTRIBUTION OF LOS 6-9 FCs BY QUINTILE AND RACE
4

George MCREYNOLDS, Maroc Howard, Larue Gibson,..., 2006 WL 3886029...
TABLE
14. Likewise, in 2003, of the African-Americans who survived the Firm’s discriminatory employment practices for more than 10 years, 50% were in the fifth quintile as compared to 20% of Caucasian brokers:
DISTRIBUTION OF LOS 10* FCs BY QUINTILE AND RACE
TABLE
15. Merrill Lynch relies on this quintile system based on commissions generated to determine eligibility for titles, offices, sales assistance, distributions of accounts of departing brokers, leads, walk-ins, referrals, IPO opportunities, membership in partnerships or teams, recognition clubs, expense allowance, and managerial support. Merrill Lynch relies on this system even though it believes that its customers’ bias impacts the performance of African-American brokers on account of the brokers’ race. Favorable treatment garners commissions, which are then used to justify even more favorable treatment. For example, if a broker is given account distributions that generate commissions, the commissions earned from the donated accounts will entitle him to even more account distributions and other perks. Success breeds success at Merrill Lynch, and African-Americans are excluded from significant income earning opportunities giving rise to greater success due to Merrill Lynch’s discriminatory employment practices, as reflected in the charts above. Through these practices, Merrill Lynch intentionally perpetuates its own discrimination and any bias that may exist in society.
16. A broker who is denied resources will have lower production or commissions and, consequently, will be deemed ineligible for a variety of resources. For example, during the class period, fourth and fifth quintile brokers were often ineligible to receive accounts of departing or retiring brokers. Because approximately 70% of African-American brokers at Merrill Lynch with a tenure in excess of 10 years are in the fourth and fifth quintile due to race discrimination, they have been largely excluded from account distributions. Merrill Lynch’s policy or practice of excluding fourth and fifth quintile brokers from distributions is a pretext to distribute accounts to non-African-Americans. This policy or practice also has a disparate impact on African-Americans.
17. Likewise, during most of the class period, only first or second quintile brokers have been eligible to attend the MAC where sponsored candidates are selected to become managers at the Firm. Thus, the overwhelming majority of African-Americans have been excluded from management opportunities due to the Firm’s discriminatory practices. As a result, there are only a few African-American managers in over 600 branches. Again, the quintile qualification is a pretext for racial discrimination and has served to maintain a managerial workforce that is largely devoid of African-Americans. This policy or practice also has a disparate impact on African-Americans.
Merrill Lynch Does Not Provide A Diverse, Non-Discriminatory Workplace
18. African-Americans are also treated with disrespect and experience a hostile work environment in Merrill Lynch’s branch offices despite proclamations in the Firm’s internal materials and advertisements that it is built on the principle of “Respect for the Individual.” The phrase “Total Merrill” is also used in advertisements, yet the “Total Merrill” experienced by African-Americans is far different from that experienced by non-African-Americans. Although the Firm teaches its managers to use the word “diversity,” its commitment to diversity is illusory. For example: • One manager freely expressed what is widely believed by African-Americans to be common thought within Merrill Lynch, “[t]his whole diversity thing, there isn’t a business case for it; it’s more of a shareholder and public relations thing.” He also commented, “[i]f I were running the Diversity Program, I’d hire a smart white guy and have a black guy for the face.”
• A district manager in San Antonio was offered a promotion after it was alleged in a federal class action gender discrimination complaint that he told African-American trainees to “split up” because they were “forming a ghetto.” When asked at a hearing years later if he made this comment, the district manager admitted, “I could have.”
• The term, “ghetto” was also used in another office to describe a run-down part of that branch office where two African-American brokers were seated.
• In New York, when African-Americans were seen congregating, they were asked, “[y]ou planning an uprising?” Other 5

George MCREYNOLDS, Maroc Howard, Larue Gibson,..., 2006 WL 3886029...
examples of the acceptance of the racist culture abound.
• One class member was handed a pencil emblazoned with a confederate flag to take a Merrill Lynch examination.
• Some class members have been referred to as “niggers,” without repercussion to the individuals making such remarks. One manager even mocked a non-African-American broker by asking, “[a]re you going to let a nigger beat you?” When a client complained to a manager that Merrill Lynch had “niggers” working in the office, the manager apologized to the client, evidencing the Firm’s willingness to accede to customer bias.
• Another manager who was photographing brokers for a bulletin board display told an African-American class member in front of other brokers, words to the effect, “[t]hat’s okay, I can find your picture down at the precinct.”
• Brokers openly make insensitive remarks without fear of repercussions such as one asking a co-worker, “what now, are you gonna grow cornrows?”
• An African-American broker was repeatedly asked, “[w]hat do you think of O.J.?” Another African-American broker was required to endure a barrage of bigoted remarks about Kobe Bryant’s “raping a white woman.”
• Class members have been excluded from golf outings because the club where the event was taking place did not allow African-Americans. Others attended golf functions where the only other African-Americans on the course were caddies.
• A class member in a Southern city was invited to a business dinner at the home of his Sales Manager but did not attend because he was told that the Sales Manager had the “Stars and Bars” (Confederate flag) prominently displayed in his home.
• Managers believe that the diversity initiatives are incompatible with the Firm’s revenue goals and therefore have little or no commitment to the diversity initiatives.
These are but a few of the offensive comments made to or in the presence of class members.
19. As alleged above, African-American brokers are also excluded from lucrative teams or partnerships with other brokers because Merrill Lynch does not support or foster inter-racial partnerships or support partnerships between African-American brokers. Within Merrill Lynch, the excuse, “we cannot arrange marriages,” is offered even by Human Resources personnel as the excuse for the low representation of African-Americans on teams. However, partnerships at Merrill Lynch must be approved by management, who frequently “arrange” such partnerships to the benefit of white brokers and the detriment of African-American brokers. The obvious implication of Merrill Lynch’s purported rationale is that inter-racial partnerships would exist only if they were forced on the non-African-American brokers. This view is consistent with prevailing negative stereotypes regarding African-Americans at Merrill Lynch. Indeed, these pervasive stereotypes infect all employment practices and harm African-Americans. Upon the retirement, death, disability or departure of a team member, the remaining team members inherit assets from the team. African-American brokers are excluded from this form of account distribution, which has dramatically increased with the Firm’s emphasis on teaming from 2001 to the present.
Racial Discrimination And Retaliation At Merrill Lynch Is National In Scope
20. George McReynolds (“McReynolds”) and the other named Plaintiffs are supported in this litigation by over 100 current or former Merrill Lynch brokers from across the country who have requested to join or expressed support for the lawsuit. These putative class members were denied employment or were employed at Merrill Lynch offices across the country. The current employees manage billions of dollars of client assets and range in years of service from a few months to over 25 years. Thus, putative class members fall into five categories: 1) applicants; 2) broker-trainees; 3) brokers with three to nine years of service with Merrill Lynch; 4) brokers with or in excess of ten years of service with Merrill Lynch; and/or 5) brokers who expressed interest in management or were excluded from consideration due to discriminatory practices and policies (the “putative class”). The putative class members are relying on McReynolds, Stowell & Friedman, Ltd., and this lawsuit to protect their rights.
21. Stowell & Friedman, Ltd., and the putative class placed Merrill Lynch on notice of the class-wide allegations of racial discrimination by McReynolds through the Firm’s Employment Dispute Resolution (“EDR”) process. The EDR was enacted
6

George MCREYNOLDS, Maroc Howard, Larue Gibson,..., 2006 WL 3886029...
in response to a class action gender discrimination suit, Cremin et al. v. Merrill Lynch, 96 C 3773 (Castillo, J).
Merrill Lynch’s Discrimination And Retaliation Against African-Americans Is Ongoing
22. Merrill Lynch’s pattern or practice of systematically discriminating and retaliating against African-Americans is ongoing and constitutes a continuing violation of the civil rights laws, that culminated with the filing of McReynolds’ class-based Employment Dispute Resolution (“EDR”) complaint. Plaintiffs Howard, York and Wilson filed charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and received Notice of Rights to Sue.
The Named Plaintiffs Are Class Representatives
23. McReynolds and the other named Plaintiffs have performed their jobs in an impressive manner but were subjected to and harmed by Merrill Lynch’s ongoing, nationwide pattern or practice of systemic and pervasive racial discrimination.
McReynolds’ Experiences Are Typical
24. In early 2005, McReynolds formally raised a complaint of discrimination and retaliation against Merrill Lynch through the Firm’s EDR Process. McReynolds alleged that Merrill Lynch intentionally created a segregated workforce where African-Americans were steered into less desirable positions and were denied income earning and career opportunities routinely extended to non-African-Americans. In his EDR claim, McReynolds cited numerous examples of Merrill Lynch’s discriminatory practices and policies.
25. For example, when McReynolds was hired as a financial advisor in 1983 in Merrill Lynch’s Nashville, Tennessee office, he was one of only two African-American brokers in the state of Tennessee. McReynolds remained the only African-American broker in his office until Cathy Bender (“Bender”) was hired in 1987.3 Despite the growth of the Nashville complex to approximately 65 to 70 brokers, the complex has never employed more than three African-American brokers at any one time.
26. Consistent with the Firm’s discriminatory hiring practices, the Nashville complex recruits almost exclusively at predominantly white colleges and universities. Well-qualified African-American graduates are not welcome at Merrill Lynch. To illustrate, in approximately 2002, white Managing Director of the Nashville-Memphis complex Robert Shaffer (“Shaffer”) refused to interview an African-American graduate of West Point, Jeff Cleveland, who had been recommended by Bender. Having served nine years as an Army officer and having spent four years in management at a large corporation, Cleveland was well qualified and eager to pursue a career at Merrill Lynch. According to Merrill Lynch’s initiative, Shaffer was to interview Cleveland or introduce him to management at another office. Shaffer did neither. Similarly, a Merrill Lynch manager stated that he would consider recruiting at universities with large African-American student populations only if those students had earned Masters degrees. Merrill Lynch had no such requirement for non-African-American candidates.
27. McReynolds’s efforts to enhance diversity at Merrill Lynch were likewise stymied. For example, McReynolds recruited and hired a number of African-American interns. However, Merrill Lynch made no effort to recruit McReynolds’s interns to work for the Firm despite their qualifications. One of these interns ultimately went to work for a sophisticated New York hedge fund after Merrill Lynch made no effort to retain him. Similarly situated white interns were aggressively pursued for employment at Merrill Lynch.
28. Throughout McReynolds’s employment, Merrill Lynch maintained a discriminatory system of account distributions and allocation of referrals, leads, walk-ins, call-ins, and IPOs as part of its pattern or practice of unlawful conduct, including conduct occurring in its Nashville complex. For example, rather than assigning accounts, leads or referrals to the more junior African-American brokers, Merrill Lynch managers told these brokers to prospect in the African-American community. Members of the African-American community were aware that Merrill Lynch offered only a revolving door to African-American brokers and were reluctant to place their assets with brokers who were unlikely to be retained by the Firm.
29. Consistent with its stereotypical views of African-Americans, the only potential clients or referrals Merrill Lynch steered toward McReynolds and other African-American brokers were typically minorities or low net worth individuals.
7

George MCREYNOLDS, Maroc Howard, Larue Gibson,..., 2006 WL 3886029...
30. McReynolds also was denied the same quality or quantity of sales and administrative support as his non-African-American colleagues. McReynolds shared a sales assistant, at times with as many as seven other brokers, including rookie brokers, who often require more of the sales assistants’ time and attention because of their inexperience. As a result, McReynolds has performed a substantial amount of administrative and sales support work, diverting valuable time away from activities to develop his book of business.
31. The experiences of McReynolds are also typical of the Firm’s pattern or practice of discrimination with regard to partnerships, which work to the advantage of white brokers and to the disadvantage of African-American brokers. In October 2001, McReynolds was forced by Robert Kennedy (“Kennedy”), then the Nashville Office Branch Manager, to enter into and surrender his accounts to a partnership with white junior brokers or trainee Professional Development Program (“PDP”) brokers Charles Grummon (“Grummon”) and Jonathon Evans (“Evans”). McReynolds believed that he had no choice but to partner with Grummon and Evans and, relying on Kennedy’s representations that McReynolds would benefit from the partnership, he reluctantly did what he was told.
32. Contrary to Kennedy’s representations, the partnership was highly detrimental to McReynolds. Although McReynolds contributed the vast majority of the assets to the partnership, he received credit for less than half of the partnership’s production. McReynolds’s earnings and production decreased significantly as a result of the partnership. The junior white brokers, however, benefited greatly from the forced partnership with McReynolds.
33. Consistent with its pattern or practice of steering African-Americans into clerical positions, investment advisor positions, or other non-producing roles, Kennedy told McReynolds that he should surrender his broker position to become an investment advisor (“IA”) for the partnership. When McReynolds refused to work for Grumman and Evans as an IA, the partnership among the three was dissolved on terms that were unfavorable to McReynolds. Upon dissolution of this partnership, McReynolds did not receive account transfers to compensate him for his considerable loss of assets.
34. In approximately 1989 or 1990, McReynolds formed a partnership with Lona Spencer (“Spencer”), a white female broker in his office. McReynolds’s white branch manager, Roy Williams (“Williams”), was resistant and hostile to the partnership, although he supported other partnerships composed entirely of non-African-American male brokers.
35. That partnership ended when Spencer left Merrill Lynch. McReynolds was not allowed to retain the accounts in the partnership. At the meeting announcing Spencer’s departure, Williams announced to the entire office that any broker who wanted any of the accounts held by Spencer’s partnership with McReynolds should contact Williams and they would get the account from McReynolds. Williams did not make similar statements when a white broker was the only broker remaining after the dissolution of a partnership. On the contrary, subject to well-established practice, the remaining brokers retained the assets of the partnership upon dissolution. Beneficial partnerships for African-American brokers were not encouraged. Any partnerships allowed were often to the detriment of the African-American broker.
36. Merrill Lynch also employs discriminatory promotional practices. The management assessment process is performed predominantly by white men and is replete with racial stereotypes. As a result of racial bias, the skills of African-Americans are overlooked and undervalued. To illustrate, McReynolds has never reported to an African-American manager during his tenure at Merrill Lynch and no one at Merrill Lynch has ever approached McReynolds regarding opportunities to join management, despite the fact that McReynolds has over ten years of management experience.
37. The experiences of the other named Plaintiffs are consistent with the class wide allegations and the pattern or practice of racial discrimination at Merrill Lynch.
Plaintiffs And The Putative Class Suffered Economic Loss
38. As a result of the Firm’s discriminatory employment practices, Plaintiffs and class members lost opportunities and accounts, as well as the referrals and commissions resulting from those accounts.
Systemic Racism
8

George MCREYNOLDS, Maroc Howard, Larue Gibson,..., 2006 WL 3886029...
39. Plaintiffs, like other African-Americans at Merrill Lynch, also have been subjected to a hostile work environment where African-Americans are treated as inferior and are subjected to abusive and harassing treatment, comments and behavior.
40. Merrill Lynch frequently publishes “metrics” that demonstrate that African-Americans are disproportionately in the bottom quintiles. These public statements reinforce the perception among managers and peers that African-Americans are inferior and incapable of competing as brokers. Merrill Lynch seldom acknowledges that discrimination is the real reason for the lower rankings.
41. Even the African-American brokers who succeed to the first quintile are excluded from the perks and benefits awarded to top performers.
Plaintiffs And The Putative Class Suffered Injury As A Consequence Of The Discrimination
42. Plaintiffs and the putative class lost wages and other benefits, suffered embarrassment and humiliation, and their careers were irreparably injured as a result of Merrill Lynch’s discriminatory conduct.
43. Merrill Lynch’s conduct was reckless and/or in willful violation of the civil rights laws. Indeed, this is the third class action against Merrill Lynch to allege that the Firm favors non-African-American males in hiring over women and minorities. As alleged above, the EEOC found that Merrill Lynch failed to employ African-Americans nearly thirty years ago. The EEOC filed a suit and entered into the O’Bannon Consent Decree, which opened the doors at Merrill Lynch for women and minorities. In 1996, female brokers, many of whom were hired under the O’Bannon Consent Decree, filed a class action lawsuit, Cremin et al. v. Merrill Lynch. Findings were entered in favor of the women that Merrill Lynch engaged in a pattern or practice of discrimination in compensation and promotional opportunities. This suit, like the Cremin action, is brought by employees hired as a result of the O’Bannon Consent Decree. Merrill Lynch’s refusal to hire and equally employ African-Americans is a willful violation of the civil rights laws.
CLASS ALLEGATIONS
44. The class of African-American employees and former employees who have been subjected to discrimination due to their race and who have been subjected to retaliation due to their opposition to discrimination is so numerous and geographically spread that joinder of all members is impracticable.
45. There are questions of law and fact common to the class.
46. The claims of the named Plaintiffs are typical, and the named Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the class. The Plaintiffs represent a cross-section of Merrill Lynch brokers whom they seek to represent. The Plaintiffs work in offices across the country, were ranked in all quintiles and have tenure from first-year rookie to seasoned broker.
47. The questions of law and fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.
COUNT I
RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN VIOLATION OF 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq.
(Against Merrill Lynch)
48. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate paragraphs 1-47 of this Second Amended Complaint as paragraphs 1-47 of Count I.
9

George MCREYNOLDS, Maroc Howard, Larue Gibson,..., 2006 WL 3886029...
49. Plaintiffs Maroc Howard, Marva York and Henry Wilson filed charges of racial discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) and received Notice of Rights to Sue. Merrill Lynch was placed on notice of the representative allegations contained in this Complaint in the EEOC charges.
50. Title VII of the Civil Rights of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq. and amendments thereto (“Title VII”) make it an unlawful employment practice for an employer to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms or conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color or national origin; or to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual’s race, color, or national origin.
51. It is unlawful for an employer to engage in racially biased decision-making and treatment. It is also unlawful for an employer to make decisions infected by stereotypical thinking or other forms of less conscious bias. Employers are not lawfully allowed to engage in racially motivated conduct driven by business concerns, for example, concerns about the effect on employee relations, or the negative reaction of clients or customers. Thus, an employer violates the law when it acquiesces, accedes to or perpetuates perceived customer bias. Nor may race or color ever be a bona fide occupational qualification under the law.
52. Through the conduct alleged in this Second Amended Complaint, Merrill Lynch violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and amendments thereto by subjecting Plaintiffs and all others similarly situated to differential treatment and by adopting policies and practices that had a disparate impact against African-Americans.
53. Merrill Lynch is strictly responsible for the acts and conduct of its managers and knew of should have known of a culture created by its managers and employees that discriminated against and was hostile to African-Americans.
COUNT II
RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN VIOLATION OF 42 U.S.C. SECTION 1981
(Against Merrill Lynch)
54. Plaintiffs and all others similarly situated reallege paragraphs 1 through 53 and incorporate them by reference as though fully stated herein as part of Count II of this Complaint.
55. Section 1977 of the Revised Statutes, 42 U.S.C. Section 1981 as amended guarantees all persons the same right to make and enforce contracts as non-African-Americans. The term “make and enforce” contracts includes the making, performance, modification, and termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of contractual relationship.
56. Merrill Lynch subjected Plaintiffs and all others similarly situated to racial discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. Section 1981.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs and all others similarly situated respectfully request that this Court find in their favor and against Merrill Lynch as follows:
a. Declare that the acts and conduct of Merrill Lynch violate 42 U.S.C. Section 1981;
b. Declare that the acts and conduct of Merrill Lynch violate Title VII;
c. Declare that Merrill Lynch engaged in a pattern and practice of racial discrimination and certify a class of persons similarly situated to Plaintiffs eligible for relief;
10

George MCREYNOLDS, Maroc Howard, Larue Gibson,..., 2006 WL 3886029...

d. Order appropriate equitable and injunctive relief and diversity initiatives to remedy the discrimination; e. Award Plaintiffs and all others similarly situated the value of all compensation and benefits lost as a result of Merrill Lynch’s unlawful conduct; f. Award Plaintiffs and all others similarly situated the value of all compensation and benefits they will lose in the future as a result of Merrill Lynch’s unlawful conduct; g. Award Plaintiffs and all others similarly situated compensatory damages; h. Award Plaintiffs and all others similarly situated punitive damages; i. Award Plaintiffs and all others similarly situated a common fund for make whole relief and statutory, compensatory and punitive damages; j. Award Plaintiffs and all others similarly situated prejudgment interest; k. Award Plaintiffs and all others similarly situated attorneys fees, costs and disbursements; l. Award Plaintiffs and all others similarly situated such other make whole equitable, injunctive and legal relief as this Court deems just and proper to end the discrimination and fairly compensate the class. Respectfully submitted, STOWELL & FRIEDMAN, LTD. By: s/Linda D. Friedman Mary Stowell - Attorney No. 02750015 Linda D. Friedman - Attorney No. 06190092 STOWELL & FRIEDMAN, LTD. 321 S. Plymouth Court Suite 1400 Chicago, Illinois 60604 (312) 431-0888

Footnotes

1

Merrill Lynch’s broker training program is two years; thus, “broker” here refers to a person who has been at the Firm for two years

and excludes trainees.

2

Again, broker here does not include trainees.

3

Bender was hired only as the result of a recommendation by McReynolds’s wife, who was then the Commissioner of Commerce

and Insurance for the State of Tennessee.

11

 </s> IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

GEORGE MCREYNOLDS, MAROC HOWARD, )

LARUE GIBSON, JENNIFER MADRID,

)

FRANKIE ROSS, MARVA YORK, LESLIE

)

BROWNE, HENRY WILSON, LEROY BROWN, )

GLENN CAPEL, CHRISTINA COLEMAN,

J. YVES LABORDE, MARSHELL MILLER, )

CARNELL MOORE, MARK JOHNSON,

)

CATHY BENDER-JACKSON, and STEPHEN )

SMARTT, individually on behalf of themselves )

and all others similarly situated,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

v.

)

)

MERRILL LYNCH, PIERCE, FENNER &

)

SMITH INCORPORATED,

)

)

Defendant.

)

)
No. 05 C 6583 Judge Robert W. Gettleman

AMENDED MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiffs George McReynolds, Maroc Howard, Larue Gibson, Jennifer Madrid, Frankie

Ross, Marva York, Leslie Browne, Henry Wilson, Leroy Brown, Glenn Capel, Christina

Coleman, J. Yves Laborde, Marshell Miller, Carnell Moore, Mark Johnson, Cathy Bender-

Jackson, and Stephen Smartt, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, have

brought a two count second amended putative class action complaint against defendant Merrill

Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., alleging racial discrimination in violation of Title VII of

the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) et seq. (Count I), and 42 U.S.C. §

1981 (Count II). Plaintiffs have moved pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 to certify a class, defined

as:

African-American financial advisors (“FAs”) and FA Trainees (“Trainees”) who are or were employed in the retail brokerage unit, referred to as Global Private

Client (“GPC”) of defendant Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., from January 2001 to the present. The parties have engaged in lengthy and often contentious discovery proceedings including both factual and expert discovery. Not surprisingly, this has resulted in overly lengthy briefs with countless unnecessary citations and footnotes.1 For the reasons discussed below, the motion is denied.
FACTS Defendant is the largest provider of brokerage and brokerage related services in the United States. It employs over approximately 15,000 FAs to aid clients in identifying and reaching their financial goals. The company employs 135 Complex Directors (“Directors”) each of whom manages the operation of a number of branch offices within his or her complex. There are over 600 branch offices within the 135 complexes, employing the approximate 15,000 FAs. The Directors report to 30 Regional Managing Directors, most of whom are also Directors themselves, and who in turn report to 5 Divisional Managing Directors (“DMDs”). The five DMDs report to a Senior Vice-President (“SVP”) for the Advisory Division, who reports to the President of defendant’s Global Wealth Management (“GWM”) business. Each Director manages his or her complex as a stand alone business. The Directors monitor profits and losses of their complexes and make individualized employment decisions
1Although the court allowed the parties to exceed the 15 page limit provided by LR 7.1, the court did not expect the parties to abuse this allowance. For example, plaintiffs’ opening brief is 55 pages (the “Argument” section does not begin until page 43) with 86 footnotes, many of which contain as much or more text than the page on which they appear. Worse yet, many of the footnotes in both parties’ briefs contain argument or substantive factual points that belong in the text. Added to the hundreds of pages of exhibits submitted with the instant motions, the burden placed on the court was as taxing as it was unnecessary.
2

regarding FAs, constrained only by national policies. Each FA basically operates his or her own business within a business. Each FA is responsible for building a book of business by soliciting clients in the community, although some accounts are distributed by management. Each FA is paid based on an objective grid. Compensation is increased based on increased production. In addition, defendant’s compensation plan pays different rates based on the size of the customer’s “household,” which is not a single client but includes all related individuals. For example, the adult children of a client are grouped in a “household” even if they do not live under one roof or have joint investment accounts. Since 2001 FAs received compensation for accounts under $100,000 only if those accounts belong to a “household” with wealth in excess of $100,000.
As each FA reaches increased length of service levels (“LOS”), the FA must meet certain production hurdles or else earn a lower rate of payout. This requirement is referred to as the “penalty box.” Once in the penalty box the FA remains in until he or she meets certain minimum production or revenue requirements. Thus, the longer an FA is employed at defendant, the more business that FA is expected to generate.
DISCUSSION “The class-action device was designed as `an exception to the usual rule that litigation is conducted by and on behalf of the individual named parties only.’” General Telephone Co. of Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 155 (1982) (quoting Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 700-01 (1979)). Class relief is particularly appropriate when the issues involved are common to the class as a whole and when the issues turn on questions of law applicable in the same manner to each member of the class. Id. The court has broad discretion in determining whether to
3

certify a class, and the proponent bears the burden of showing that certification is warranted. Sandoval v. City of Chicago, 2007 WL 3087136 (N.D. Ill. 2007).
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, which governs class actions, requires a two step analysis to determine whether class certification is appropriate. First, plaintiffs must satisfy all four requirements of Rule 23(a): (1) numerosity; (2) commonality; (3) typicality; and (4) adequacy of representation. Martinez v. Haleas, 2009 WL 2916852 at *2 (N.D. Ill. 2009); Harriston v. Chicago Tribune Co., 992 F.2d 697, 703 (7th Cir. 1993). These requirements are prerequisites to certification, and failure to meet any one of them precludes certification of the class. Parker v. Risk Management Alternatives, Inc., 206 F.R.D. 211, 212 (N.D. Ill. 2002). Additionally, plaintiffs must satisfy one of the conditions of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b).
When evaluating whether a party has met its burden of proving that a class should be certified, the court should not consider the merits of the underlying claim, Eisen v. Carlisle and Jacqueline, 417 U.S. 156, 166 (1974), but may “probe behind the pleadings” to determine whether the named plaintiffs’ claims fairly encompass those of the class they seek to represent. Falcon, 457 U.S. at 160; Szabo v. Bridgeport Machines, Inc., 249 F.3d 672, 673 (7th Cir. 2001). Where factual and legal questions that “would strongly influence the wisdom of class treatment” are disputed, the court will not merely accept plaintiffs’ assertions as true, but will require some evidence before making a decision. Szabo, 249 F.3d at 675-76. That decision, may, at times, require inquiry into any preliminary resolution of disputed issues of fact, even if those same factual issues are also relevant to the merits of the case. Id.
4

Rule 23(a) Requirements 1. Numerosity Under Rule 23(a)(1), plaintiffs must show that the class is so numerous that joinder of all
members is impracticable. The exact number of class members need not be pleaded or proved, but impracticability of joinder must be positively shown and cannot be speculative. Parker, 206 F.R.D. at 212. Plaintiffs define the proposed class as African-American FAs and FA Trainees who are or were employed in a retail brokerage unit referred to as Global Private Client, from January 1, 2001 to the present. In a footnote, plaintiffs indicate that the class includes brokers, broker trainees and persons hired with intent to enter defendant’s broker training program, even if they never received a broker production number, persons who had production numbers but also performed managerial duties, including sales or producing managers and persons who attended the firms Management Assessment Center (“MAC”). According to plaintiffs, the are approximately 700 class members, which is sufficiently large to satisfy the numerosity requirement.
2. Commonality Rule 23(a)(2) requires the presence of questions of law or fact common to the class. The Rule does not mandate absolute commonality; a common nucleus of operative facts is usually enough to satisfy the requirement. Keele v. Wexler, 149 F.3d 589, 594 (7th Cir. 1998). A common nucleus of operative fact is usually found where “defendants have engaged in standardized conduct towards members of the proposed class . . ..” Id. Thus, racial discrimination in an employment context, arising out of the employer’s standard operating procedure, is generally well-suited to class adjudication. Falcon, 457 U.S. at 157. In a Title VII
5

action, however, commonality is the “most critical element and one in which the class action and
merit inquiries essentially collide.” Stastny v. S. Bell Tel. & Co., 628 F.2d 267, 274 (4th Cir.
1980). As Falcon makes clear, a party attempting to maintain a pattern or practice
discrimination class action must demonstrate more than shared membership in a protected class,
but must offer sufficient evidence to bridge the gap between his or her own individual claim and
those of class members who suffered the same injury.
Conceptually, there is a wide gap between (a) an individual’s claim that he has been denied a promotion on discriminatory grounds, and his otherwise unsupported allegation that the company has a policy of discrimination and (b) the existence of a class of persons who have suffered the same injury as that individual, such that the individual’s claim and the class claims will share common questions of law or fact and that the individual’s claim will be typical of the class claims. For [plaintiffs] to bridge that gap [they] must prove much more than the validity of their own claims. [Falcon, 457 U.S. at 157-58.]
Thus, the inquiry into whether plaintiffs meet the commonality requirement necessarily
overlaps with the merits of their claim that defendant discriminates against blacks. Count One of
plaintiffs’ second amended complaint, which is brought under Title VII, is actually very broad,
encompassing both a pattern or practice discriminatory treatment claim and a discriminatory
impact claim. Although the parties do not differentiate between the claims, those claims require
different proofs. Under a disparate impact theory, plaintiff need not prove intentional
discrimination, only that defendants’ facially neutral actions adversely affected a protected
group. Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 355 n.15 (1977). To establish a pattern or
practice disparate treatment claim, however, plaintiffs must show that intentionally
discriminatory practices were defendant’s standard operating procedure, not merely sporadic or
isolated occurrences. Id. at 336. To do so plaintiffs may offer direct evidence of intentional
discrimination or they may offer evidence of a combination of circumstances from which a court
6

or jury may infer discriminatory intent. Ellis v. Elgin River Boat Resort, 217 F.R.D. 415, 420 (N.D. Ill. 2003).
Obviously, establishing commonality under a disparate treatment theory is more difficult than doing so under the disparate impact theory. Clayborne v. Omaha Public Power Dist., 211 F.R.D. 573, 592 (D. Neb. 2002). After Falcon, a plaintiff seeking certification of a class alleging pattern or practice discrimination must make “a specific showing of underlying facts which might raise an inference of a common question of pattern and practice through allegations of specific incidents of discrimination, supporting affidavits or statistical evidence.” Ellis, 217 F.R.D. at 423. Subjective employment processes may provide a common basis for a class-wide claim of discrimination if these subjective employment criteria were uniformly “used as a mask for discrimination.” Puffer v. Allstate Ins. Co., 255 F.R.D. 450, 460 (N.D. Ill. 2009).
Plaintiffs allege that defendant has engaged in a pattern or practice of race discrimination and that it has policies and practices that result in a disparate impact on African-Americans. They contend that defendant knows of this “systemic discrimination” which results from a hostile corporate culture, as well as policies and practices that steer business opportunities away from African-American FAs. This “culture” and policy allegedly include maintaining stereotypical views about African-Americans that underlie personnel decisions, impeaches the work environment, and denies African-American FAs the same opportunities and support that other FAs are given. To support their motion for certification plaintiffs identify what they consider to be several issues of common fact that they claim will prove a pattern or practice, including:
1. Defendant has a uniform branch office management and job structure;
7

2. Defendant has a “strong, uniform, racially-biased corporate culture that ensures uniformity and consistency in practices and attitudes across the country; 3. Defendant has implemented and developed firm-wide employment policies regarding hiring and training, teaming, account distribution and transfer, management assessment and selection and multi-cultural markets; 4. Expert evidence that common employment practices result in statistically significant disparities to the disadvantage of African-Americans; 5. Anecdotal evidence for 16 named plaintiffs and other class members; and 6. Evidence that defendant was aware of race discrimination but refused to take action. After identifying these so-called common issues, however, plaintiffs offer little to establish the “significant proof” required by Falcon, to establish that the asserted discriminatory culture manifested itself in the “same general fashion” as to all putative class members. Falcon, 457 U.S. at 159 n.15. In fact, however, plaintiffs’ attempt to make this showing is undermined by the different experiences of the proposed class members, in terms of length of service with the defendant, income, position levels, the people who made the relevant employment decisions, and the conflicting and unconvincing anecdotal evidence found in their declarations. Commonality is generally easily satisfied when an individual or even a small centralized group makes decisions. Ellis, 217 F.R.D. at 424. It is also more easily satisfied in a disparate impact case where all of the proposed class members have been impacted by a facially neutral policy. Neither situation is present in the instant case.2
2Plaintiffs do allege in conclusory fashion a disparate impact, but the gravamen of their complaint, as well as the evidence presented, is not that neutral policies neutrally applied have a discriminatory impact, but that defendant is subverting its neutral policies by applying them in an intentionally discriminatory fashion.
8

Instead, plaintiffs allege that defendant has a corporate culture of racial discrimination that it implements through the discretionary decisions of over 15,000 FAs, over 600 branch office managers, 135 complex directors, 30 Regional Managing Directors and 5 Divisional Managers situated across the entire United States. Such decentralized procedures, that allow decision-makers across the country to consider subjective factors makes it far more difficult to establish that the employer engages in a pattern or practice of discrimination as a standard operating procedure, and thus more difficult to establish commonality. Id. (citing Stastny, 628 F.2d at 276).
In the instant case, the putative class members were supervised and reviewed by hundreds of different people, held a wide variety of salary levels and positions and had totally different experiences. For example, some putative plaintiffs claim they were denied access to the management program (MAC) while others were recommended for management and reached at least vice-president levels. Some putative plaintiffs were hugely successful financially, while others never got through the FA training program. Each individual plaintiff’s experience was the result of countless decisions made by themselves, other FAs in their branch offices, their branch managers and so on up the chain of command. Plaintiffs’ position essentially is that all of these decisions were made by racist employees of a racist company. As numerous decisions from this district demonstrate, however, class certification should be denied when the plaintiffs’ class definition implicates numerous, independent decision-makers resulting in the need for numerous individual inquiries. See Puffer, 255 F.R.D. at 460-61 (and cases cited therein).
Plaintiffs place great reliance on statistical evidence to establish commonality. They have provided statistics to demonstrate that for the years in question there was low African-
9

American representation in the FA workforce; African-American FAs were compensated at lower rates; African-American FAs were less likely than whites to participate in teams; AfricanAmerican trainees were less likely to participate in pools; and white trainees received accounts that had significantly higher average total asset values than those distributed to AfricanAmerican trainees.
Plaintiffs argue that these raw statistics alone are sufficient to establish commonality, and the court might be inclined to agree with plaintiffs if this were a true disparate impact case. As explained above, however, it is not. Take, for example, plaintiffs’ claim that African-American FAs are compensated at lower rates than white FAs. According to plaintiffs, between 2001 and 2004 African-American FAs earned 33 to 42 % less in annual compensation than white FAs. If this were a disparate impact case, that statistic would present a compelling argument for finding commonality and certifying a class. But plaintiffs do not argue that defendant’s facially neutral compensation program applied neutrally leads to the resulting discrepancy in compensation. Instead, plaintiffs argue that all of the factors that lead to the application of the facially neutral compensation program had been applied in an intentionally discriminatory manner, resulting in the discrepancy.
Defendant pays its FAs based on production. It pays FAs based on a percentage of the production credit (“PCs”) and other revenue generated when one of the FA’s clients uses or purchases a Merrill Lynch financial product or security. There is no discretion in calculating FA incentive compensation, which is based on a precise mathematical formula and grids contained in the program. Plaintiffs do not claim that the compensation program itself is discriminatory, but rather that it works to African-American’s disadvantage because the discriminatory culture at
10

defendant stunts the African-Americans’ ability to produce. For example, because AfricanAmericans are given fewer opportunities to team with high-producing FAs, and thus do not get to inherit shared accounts when those originating FAs retire, the African-Americans FAs tend to have lower production. Lower production means not only lower compensation, but also receipt of fewer of the accounts that are distributed through the firm account distribution program. Receipt of fewer accounts again means less production and less compensation, creating a vicious circle that acts to prevent African-American FAs from succeeding. Thus, it is the individual allegedly discriminatory decisions along the way, such as a white FA’s decision not to team with an African-American FA that leads to the asserted disparity in compensation, not a neutral application of the mathematical formula.
Defendant, of course, has supplied its own statistical experts who, not surprisingly, attack plaintiffs’ evidence.3 In particular, defendant’s experts criticized plaintiffs’ statisticians for failing to take into account that African-American FAs on average have fewer personal social connections with potential clients with wealth. Defendant’s expert performed a study of published available census data and concluded that access to networks of potential clients with substantial wealth varies by race among defendant’s FAs. As a result, customers independently generated by African-American FAs’ participation in the training program early in their careers
3Defendant has also moved to strike the testimony and conclusions of plaintiff’s expert as inadmissible under Fed. R. Evid. 702 and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). The court is mindful of the Seventh Circuit’s instruction that “the district court must perform a full Daubert analysis before certifying the class if the situation warrants.” American Honda Motor Company Inc. v. Allen, 600 F.3d 813, 816 (7th Cir. 2010). In the instant case, however, plaintiffs are unable to establish the requirements for the class certification, even with their experts’ reports and testimony. Therefore, there is no reason to reach defendant’s motion to strike, and it is denied as moot.
11

come from neighborhoods with significantly higher African-American populations and significantly lower average wealth.
The contrasting statistical evidence and expert testimony demonstrates the danger of relying too heavily on statistical evidence supported by raw data. “It is said that you can find a statistic to prove anything.” Barricks v. Eli Lilly and Co., 481 F.3d 556, 559 (7th Cir. 2007). As Mark Twain put it, “there are three kinds of lies – lies, damned lies and statistics.” Puffer, 255 F.R.D. at 461. That is why although statistical evidence may be a useful tool to prove discrimination, it is rarely sufficient in itself. Adams v. Ameritech Services, Inc., 231 F.3d 414, 423 (7th Cir. 2001). Statistical evidence that fails properly to take into account nondiscriminatory explanations does not permit an inference of discrimination. Puffer, 255 F.R.D. at 461.
To bolster their statistical evidence, plaintiffs present “anecdotal” evidence in the form of declarations from 19 named plaintiffs and 47 putative class members which purport to show that discrimination occurred uniformly company-wide across the country. Defendant has moved to strike the class members’ declarations on the grounds that they lack foundation, are not tied to the class period and are otherwise conclusory and so lacking in specifics as to be worthless.
The court agrees that most of the declarations provide little support on the commonality issue because they are so vague. All 19 named plaintiffs’ declarations and 27 of the 47 putative class members’ declarations are lawyer crafted statements that simply allege the declarants’ general belief that defendant has a history of discriminatory practices toward African-Americans. Each of these declarants indicates that since 1994 they have seen themselves as part of a group acting to advance the interest of African-American FAs at defendant. Such general allegations
12

unaccompanied by specific discriminatory acts are too vague to be of any use. Puffer, 255 F.R.D. at 467 (citing Mattenson v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 438 F.3d 763, 770 (7th Cir. 2000)). Of the 20 declarations that actually identify a particular instance of alleged discrimination, six contain simple conclusory statements, such as the declarant was denied a management position because of race. Absent first-hand factual support, such declarations are not probative of commonality. Puffer, 255 F.R.D. at 467.
The remaining 14 declarations do provide some anecdotal evidence of discriminatory treatment, but rather than support commonality among the class, they demonstrate the differences and uniqueness of each individual claim. Some of the individual claims are petty in nature while others are more serious. On the more serious side, one declarant states that his manager pressured him into relinquishing his production number and moving to an investment advisor salaried position, and that after returning to a production position he was discouraged from applying for a management position until the instant action was filed. Another stated that when accounts were distributed he always got the African-American accounts while still another alleged that when the largest producing FA in the defendant’s branch office retired, the declarant did not receive an equitable share of that FA’s assets. One other declarant indicated that although he already had Series 7, 31 and 3 licenses from his previous employment at another brokerage firm, he was terminated from the training program at Wayne, Pennsylvania, but given an option to go to a salaried position at the New Jersey Financial Advisory Center (“FAC”). He worked at the FAC from 2005 to early 2007, and while he had been one of the very few AfricanAmericans at Wayne, over 25% of the salaried employees at the FAC were African-American.
13

On the other end of the spectrum, one declarant stated that he saw and heard a senior FA make an insensitive joke about President Obama. Another indicated that although he had achieved a production level to qualify for a private office he was denied one. Still another indicated that when he went to company sponsored events his office mates did not sit with him. Finally, another declarant stated that he was invited to go to a party at his manager’s home but refused to go because he had heard that the manager had a confederate flag in his house.
As demonstrated by these declarations, the individuals worked in different offices, had different supervisors, and allegedly experienced vastly different forms of discrimination. The declarations serve not to support commonality, but to underscore the lack of commonality in the proposed class. Because commonality is lacking, class certification is inappropriate.
3. Typicality Plaintiffs have also failed to meet their burden of establishing typicality. Rule 23(a)(3) requires plaintiffs to establish that “the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class.” The typicality inquiry is closely related to the commonality inquiry. Keele, 149 F.3d at 595. “‘A plaintiff’s claim is typical if it arises from the same event or practice or course of conduct that gives a rise to the claims of other class members and is based on the same legal theory. Id.’” (quoting De La Fuente v. Stokley-Van Camp, Inc., 713 F.2d 255, 262 (7th Cir. 1985). As with commonality, a comparison of the claims of the named plaintiffs and the declarations of the putative class members show a lack of typicality. The variations among the experiences of the class members would necessitate individual inquires to determine whether the individual suffered racial discrimination.
14

Additionally, even if individual class members could establish a prima facie case of discrimination, defendant’s defenses would vary between the putative class members. For example, defendant could present arguments of a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for a putative class member’s failure to make it through the training program. Such evidence would necessarily differ for each individual claimant. Consequently, the court would have to examine numerous individual factors to determine the parameters of each individual claim, negating typicality. See Payton v. County of Carroll, 473 F.3d 845, 854 (7th Cir. 2007). Rule 23(b) Requirements
Plaintiffs’ proposed class also fails under Rule 23(b). Plaintiffs seek certification under a hybrid of Rule 23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3). Under Rule 23(b)(2) plaintiff seeks certification for liability, injunctive and equitable relief and common damages issues. Under Rule 23(b)(3), plaintiffs seek compensatory and punitive damages. A Rule 23(b)(2) class is appropriate when “the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2). Certification under Rule 23(b)(2) is generally limited to cases “when the main relief sought is injunctive or declaratory, and the damages are only incidental.” In re Allstate Insurance Co., 400 F.3d 505, 507 (7th Cir. 2005). Rule 23(b)(2) certification is inappropriate where final relief relates exclusively or predominately to money damages. Puffer, 255 F.R.D. at 470. This is because under Rule 23(b)(2) class members are not given a chance to opt out, and employees with significant damage claims may prefer to litigate on their own and have a constitutional right to a jury trial. See Jefferson v. Ingersoll International Inc., 195 F.3d 894 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding that Rule 23(b)(2) may not be used,
15

even in a pattern or practice suit, unless persons with significant damage claims are allowed to opt out of the class to the extent that the litigation concerns financial relief). In the instant case, the individual putative class members’ financial interests are too high to be considered incidental to the requested equitable relief. Consequently, opt out rights must be extended to the members, and certification under Rule 23(b)(2) is inappropriate.
Certification under Rule 23(b)(3) requires plaintiffs to demonstrate “that the questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). The predominance requirement is similar to the typicality of claims and defenses requirement of Rule 23(a)(3), but is “far more demanding” than Rule 23(a)’s commonality requirement. Amchen Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 623 (1997).
In the instant case, the court has already determined that plaintiffs’ proposed class fails to meet the commonality and typicality requirements. Because plaintiffs’ statistical evidence alone is insufficient to establish company-wide discrimination in a manner that affects each class member in the same way, each individual putative class members’ claim for liability and damages will have to be tried to a jury. These inquiries would involve different witnesses and proofs for each member to determine, among other things, the motivation of each supervisor who made the individual allegedly discriminatory decision. “If the class certification only serves to give rise to hundreds or thousands of individual proceedings requiring individually tailored remedies, it is hard to see how common issues predominate . . . .” Puffer, 255 F.R.D. at 471 (quoting Andrews v. Chevy Chase Bank, 545 F.3d 570, 577 (7th Cir.2008)). For these same
16

reasons, a divided certification, with certification of a 23(b)(2) class for the equitable issues and certification of a 23(b)(3) class for the damages issues is also inappropriate. There is no predominance of common issues to certify a 23(b)(3) class for any issue, and even if there were, because of the right to a jury trial the damages cases would all have to be tried first, eliminating any advantage to certifying the instant case as a class action.
Finally, certification under Rule 23(b)(2) for all issues, combined with notice and an opportunity to opt out as though certified under Rule 23(b)(3), is also inappropriate. See Lemon v. International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 139, 216 F.3d 577, 580-81 (7th Cir. 2000); Jefferson, 195 F.3d at 898. Obviously, certification under this approach is advantageous to plaintiffs, because it avoids Rule 23(b)(3)’s requirement that common issues predominate and that a class action be the superior method of resolving the dispute. This court agrees with Judge Kennelly, however, that the Seventh Circuit’s suggestion of this approach in Lemon and Jefferson was not intended to permit plaintiffs in a case involving significant damage claims to avoid consideration of whether a class action would be a manageable way to resolve the case. See Adams v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons, 2001 WL 336830 at *16 (N.D. Ill. 2001). Consequently, the court concludes that even if plaintiffs could establish all the requirements of Rule 23(a), which they cannot, they cannot establish the requirements of Rule 23(b).
As Judge Kennelly noted in Adams, although it maybe possible in an appropriate case to certify a company-wide class involving multiple branch offices across the country, this is not the appropriate case. The large number of individual issues involved in trying the individual claims as class claims would completely overwhelm any common issue. As Judge Kennelly noted, if such individual issues were limited to damages, a different conclusion would be reached because
17

individualality in damages issues does not necessarily undermine the predominance of common issues, and there likely would be a proper way to structure a trial or trials with a minimum of inefficiency without doing violence to the parties’ Seventh Amendment rights. Id. In the instant case, however, as in Adams, there are several separate layers of individual issues, including the variation in personnel practices among the various branch offices, and how various office managers and complex managers handle individualized personnel decisions. These extra layers of individualized issues lead the court to conclude that common issues do not predominate over individual issues, and that trial of the claims as a class action would be unmanageable. Accordingly, plaintiffs’ motion for class certification is denied.4
CONCLUSION For the reasons discussed above, plaintiffs’ motion for class certification is denied.
ENTER: August 9, 2010
__________________________________________ Robert W. Gettleman United States District Judge
4The court rejects plaintiffs’ argument that defendant’s stipulation to certification of a settlement class in Cremin v. Merrill Lynch, No. 96 C 3773 (N.D. Ill. 1998), mandates certification in the instant case. Cremin involved different plaintiffs, different time periods during which different personnel applied different practices, and a different type of alleged discrimination. Defendant never agreed in Cremin or any other case to certification of a litigation class. “Support for settlement class is not inconsistent with Defendant’s current position that class litigation would be a nightmare.” McDaniel v. Qwest Communications Corp., 2006 WL 1476110 at *6 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (emphasis in original).
18

 </s> IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

GEORGE MCREYNOLDS, MAROC HOWARD, )

LARUE GIBSON, JENNIFER MADRID,

)

FRANKIE ROSS, MARVA YORK, LESLIE

)

BROWNE, HENRY WILSON, LEROY BROWN, )

GLENN CAPEL, CHRISTINA COLEMAN,

J. YVES LABORDE, MARSHELL MILLER, )

CARNELL MOORE, MARK JOHNSON,

)

CATHY BENDER-JACKSON, and STEPHEN )

SMARTT, individually on behalf of themselves )

and all others similarly situated,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

v.

)

)

MERRILL LYNCH, PIERCE, FENNER &

)

SMITH INCORPORATED,

)

)

Defendant.

)

)
No. 05 C 6583 Judge Robert W. Gettleman

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiffs George McReynolds, Maroc Howard, Larue Gibson, Jennifer Madrid, Frankie

Ross, Marva York, Leslie Browne, Henry Wilson, Leroy Brown, Glenn Capel, Christina

Coleman, J. Yves Laborde, Marshell Miller, Carnell Moore, Mark Johnson, Cathy Bender-

Jackson, and Stephen Smartt, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, have

brought a two count second amended putative class action complaint on behalf of themselves

and all others similarly situated against defendant Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,

alleging racial discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as

amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (Count I), and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (Count II). The parties

engaged in lengthy and often contentious discovery, after which plaintiffs moved to certify a

class defined as:

African-American financial advisors (“FAs”) and FA Trainees (“Trainees”) who are or were employed in the retail brokerage unit, referred to as Global Private Client (“GPC”) of defendant Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., from January 2001 to the present. In a comprehensive opinion issued on August 9, 2010, the court denied plaintiffs’ motion for class certification, concluding that plaintiffs had failed to established the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2), (3) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b). McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, 2010 WL 3184179 (N.D. Ill. 2010). Plaintiffs seek reconsideration of that decision, and also seek to clarify and/or narrow their class definition. After another round of briefing the court heard oral argument, after which the parties submitted yet another round of briefing outlining a “trial plan” should the court agree with plaintiffs and certify a class. After reviewing everything the parties have submitted the court remains convinced that this case is not appropriate for class treatment and denies plaintiffs’ motion to reconsider. Plaintiffs’ motion seeks reconsideration on two primary issues. First, plaintiffs argue that the court misunderstood aspects of their disparate impact claim and improperly held that to state a claim for disparate impact plaintiffs must establish a facially neutral policy that was also neutrally applied. Next, plaintiffs argue that the court rejected their expert evidence without ruling on defendant’s motion under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). With respect to the first issue, plaintiffs have misread the court’s opinion. In that opinion the court recognized that Count I, which simply realleges the previous 47 paragraphs detailing numerous acts of intentional discrimination, was potentially broad enough to encompass both a pattern or practice discriminatory treatment claim and a discriminatory impact claim. The court then discussed the differences between the two types of claims, particularly with respect to the issue of commonality under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2). When determining whether plaintiffs could
2

establish commonality, the court first looked to the allegations of the complaint. The operative

paragraphs of Count I allege that defendant engaged in “racially biased decision-making and

treatment” and that defendant “is strictly responsible for the acts and conduct of its managers and

knew [or] should have known of a culture created by its managers and employees that

discriminated against and was hostile to African-Americans.” Indeed, the complaint revolves

around allegations of intentional discrimination:

C

Approximately 75% of African-American trainee brokers were forced to leave

Merrill Lynch as a result of discriminatory treatment prior to completing the

training program. (¶ 11).

C

Merrill Lynch intentionally perpetuates its own discrimination and any bias that

may exist in society. (¶ 15).

C

African-Americans are also treated with disrespect and experience a hostile work

environment in Merrill Lynch’s branch offices despite proclamations in the firm’s

internal materials and advertisements that it is built on the principal of “Respect

for the Individual.” (¶ 18).

C

McReynolds and the other named plaintiffs have performed their jobs in an

impressive manner but were subjected to and harmed by Merrill Lynch’s ongoing,

nationwide pattern or practice of systemic and pervasive racial discrimination.

(¶ 23).

C

The Nashville Complex recruits almost exclusively at predominately white

colleges and universities. Well-qualified African-American graduates are not

welcome at Merrill Lynch. (¶ 26).

C

Plaintiffs, like other African-Americans at Merrill Lynch, also have been

subjected to a hostile work environment where African-Americans are treated as

inferior and are subjected to abusive and harassing treatment, comments and

behavior. (¶ 39).

It was against this background that the court indicated that plaintiffs’ statistics would be

more compelling if plaintiffs were attacking the neutral application of a neutral policy. The

court did not hold that a plaintiff cannot bring a disparate impact claim unless a neutral policy is

neutrally applied. Obviously, Watson v. Forth Worth Bank and Trust, 487 U.S. 977 (1988),

3

holds that in an appropriate case a disparate impact claim can be based on subjective or discretionary employment practices. But the mere fact that a plaintiff can state a disparate impact claim based on subjective employment practices does not mean that class treatment is always appropriate, particularly when those subjective decisions are made by hundreds of different individuals under different circumstances across the country.
Thus, contrary to plaintiffs’ assertion, the court did not hold that plaintiffs cannot state a disparate impact claim. Instead, the court indicated that plaintiffs’ statistical evidence would make a more compelling case for commonality and class certification if they were arguing that a neutral policy neutrally applied resulted in an adverse impact. That would indicate that the African-American FAs across the country all suffered from that same application or that the alleged policy manifested itself in the same general fashion as to all putative class members. See Puffer v. Allstate Insurance Co., 255 F.R.D. 450, 460-61 (N.D. Ill. 2009).
Accordingly, for the reasons indicated above and those discussed in the court’s original opinion, the court remains convinced that plaintiffs’ have failed to establish commonality.
In addition, the court remains convinced that plaintiffs are unable to satisfy Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b). Certification under Rule 23(b)(2) is inappropriate because the individual putative class members’ financial interests are too high to be considered incidental to any requested equitable relief. Consequently, the members must be extended opt-out rights, leaving Rule 23(b)(2) certification inappropriate. See Jefferson v. Ingersoll International Inc., 195 F.3d 894 (7th Cir. 1999).
Nor is certification under Rule 23(b)(3) appropriate. Plaintiffs cannot establish that questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting
4

only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for thoroughly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy. Even under plaintiffs’ proposed trial plan, the court would conduct an initial trial to resolve one issue – whether defendant’s employment policies and practices are discriminatory. If they are, according to plaintiff’s own trial plan the court would then have to conduct close to 1000 follow-on jury trials to determine whether each individual class member suffered discrimination as a result of those policies and, if so, the amount of damages. This prospect would be entirely inefficient. See Puffer, 255 F.R.D. at 472. Because each of the proposed plaintiffs worked in separate branch offices spread out across the country, each trial would involve different witnesses, leaving it impossible even to combine the cases in to smaller groups. Consequently, litigation of the follow-on trials would be unmanageable.
Next, plaintiffs complain that the court implicitly rejected their expert evidence without ruling on defendant’s motions under Daubert. Once again plaintiffs misread the court’s opinion. In fact, the court accepted all of plaintiff’s statistical evidence but concluded that it was insufficient to support class certification for the reasons stated above.
Plaintiffs provided expert statistical opinions from Dr. Janice Madden and Dr. William Bielby. Contrary to plaintiff’s assertion in their brief in support of their motion to reconsider (p. 8), this court did not hold that:
Defendant’s expert performed a study of published available census data and concluded that access to networks or potential clients with substantial wealth varies by race among defendant’s FAs. As a result, customers independently generated by African-American FAs’ participation in the training program early in their careers come from neighborhoods with significantly higher AfricanAmerican populations and significantly lower average wealth.
5

Actually, the opinion first described plaintiffs’ statistical evidence (2010 WL 3184179 @ *5-6), and then noted that defendant “of course, has supplied its own statistical expert who, not surprisingly, attacked plaintiffs’ evidence.” In the paragraph quoted above the court simply described generally defendant’s statistical evidence and the conclusion that defendant’s experts drew from the data. The court then noted that the contrasting statistical evidence and expert testimony demonstrated the dangers of relying too heavily on statistics supported by raw data.
The opinion also noted that the Seventh Circuit had recently cautioned that district courts must perform a full Daubert analysis before certifying a class if the situation warranted. Id. at *6, n. 3 (citing American Honda Motor Co. Inc. v. Allen, 600 F.l3d 813, 816 (7th Cir. 2010)). Only defendant had brought motions to bar under Daubert; plaintiffs did not challenge defendant’s experts’ qualifications or submissions. Had the court relied on plaintiffs’ statistical evidence to certify a class, under American Honda it would have had to perform a full Daubert hearing on defendant’s motions. Instead, the court accepted plaintiffs’ statistics and denied certification for failure to establish the requirements of Rule 23(a) and (b). Only defendant could complain about the court’s decision not to rule on its motion, and defendant is not complaining.
Plaintiffs are also incorrect that the court relied on defendant’s expert Dr. Saad’s criticism of plaintiffs’ expert Madden. Again, the court’s opinion simply described Dr. Saad’s criticism of plaintiffs’ expert and then noted the danger in relying solely on statistics.1 The court did not endorse Dr. Saad’s nor any other expert’s opinion, and has not held that racial differences in access to wealth caused disparate outcomes. The court simply concluded that plaintiffs’
1Plaintiffs did not move to bar Dr. Saad’s testimony (but did move to strike his affidavit) and expressly told the court that the “debate between Saad and Madden is a battle of the experts that needs not be resolved in conjunction with the motion for class certification.”
6

statistics in conjunction with their anecdotal evidence were insufficient to support class certification.
Accordingly, for the reasons described above, plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration is denied. ENTER: February 14, 2011
__________________________________________ Robert W. Gettleman United States District Judge
7

 </s> Case: 1:05-cv-06583 Document #: 482 Filed: 09/19/11 Page 1 of 4 PageID #:16809

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

GEORGE MCREYNOLDS, MAROC HOWARD, )

LARUE GIBSON, JENNIFER MADRID,

)

FRANKIE ROSS, MARVA YORK, LESLIE

)

BROWNE, HENRY WILSON, LEROY BROWN, )

GLENN CAPEL, CHRISTINA COLEMAN,

J. YVES LABORDE, MARSHELL MILLER, )

CARNELL MOORE, MARK JOHNSON,

)

CATHY BENDER-JACKSON, and STEPHEN )

SMARTT, individually on behalf of themselves )

and all others similarly situated,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

v.

)

)

MERRILL LYNCH, PIERCE, FENNER &

)

SMITH INCORPORATED,

)

)

Defendant.

)

)
No. 05 C 6583 Judge Robert W. Gettleman

ORDER

After this court’s August 9, 2010, amended memorandum opinion and order denying

plaintiff’s motion to certify the class,1 and its February 14, 2011, memorandum opinion and

order denying plaintiff’s motion to reconsider,2 the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Wal-

Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, __ U.S. __, 131 S.Ct. 2541 (June 20, 2011). Although the Wal-Mart

decision has been described as the death knell of employment class actions,3 plaintiffs’ counsel,

being the fine lawyers they are, persuaded this court to allow them to file an “amended post-Wal-

Mart motion for class certification,” in which they argue that the Wal-Mart decision actually

1McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, 2010 WL 3184179 (N.D. Ill. 2010).
2McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, 2011 WL 658155 (N.D. Ill. 2011).
3Defendant’s paraphrase, citing John C. Coffee, Jr., “You Just Can’t Get There From Here”: A Primer on Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 80 U.S. Law Week 93 (July 19, 2011).

Case: 1:05-cv-06583 Document #: 482 Filed: 09/19/11 Page 2 of 4 PageID #:16810
supports the certification of a class alleging strictly a disparate impact claim in this litigation. Thus, the court allowed the parties to brief the issue of whether Wal-Mart actually changes the conclusion that this court had reached on two prior occasions that the class could not be certified in this litigation under either plaintiff’s original disparate treatment/impact claim or a new strictly disparate impact claim.
Having considered this court’s prior opinions and the rationale supporting those opinions, the parties’ excellent briefs on plaintiff’s amended post-Wal-Mart motion, and the Wal-Mart decision itself, the court concludes that plaintiff’s amended motion for class certification must be denied.
Without belaboring the point or repeating the analyses that this court has previously articulated, the parties appear to agree that in a strictly disparate impact case plaintiffs must identify a specific, uniform employment policy and offer sufficient evidence of disparate impact in order to certify a class under Fed R. Civ. P. 23. In the instant motion, plaintiffs argue that the court should certify a hybrid class employing both Rule 23(b)(2) (injunctive and declaratory relief only) and 23(b)(3) (to allow subsequent recovery of back wages) in a bench trial on the issue of liability, followed (if successful) by the appointment of a special master to conduct individual damages proceedings.
Plaintiffs appear to have identified two specific employment policies: the so-called National Teaming Policy; and the National Account Distribution Policy. In addition, they have offered statistical evidence to show that African-American Financial Advisors (“FAs”) earned far less on a company-wide basis than their white counterparts, thus demonstrating a disparate impact. This, plaintiffs argue, is enough to compel the certification of a disparate impact class.
2

Case: 1:05-cv-06583 Document #: 482 Filed: 09/19/11 Page 3 of 4 PageID #:16811
The court disagrees. In the context of this case, even assuming that plaintiffs have
identified a specific employment policy and a disparate impact, the nature of the employment
relationship at issue does not permit the certification of a class because plaintiffs cannot establish
that “there are questions of law or fact common to the class,” as a threshold requirement of Rule
23(a)(2).
As Judge Scalia held in Wal-Mart (131 S.Ct. at 2551):
Quite obviously, the mere claim by employees of the same company that they have suffered a Title VII injury, or even a disparate -impact Title VII injury, gives no cause to believe that all their claims can productively be litigated at once. Their claims must depend upon a common contention–for example, the assertion of discriminatory bias on the part of the same supervisor. That common contention, moreover, must be of such a nature that it is capable of classwide resolution–which means that determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke.
“What matters to class certification . . . is not the raising of common`questions’–even in droves–but, rather the capacity of a classwide proceeding to generate common answers apt to drive the resolution of the litigation. Dissimilarities within the proposed class are what have the potential to impede the generation of common answers.” [Quoting Nagareda, Class Certification in the Age of Aggregate Proof, 84 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 97, 132 (2009).]
The Wal-Mart Court denied class certification because Wal-Mart’s “policy” of allowing
discretion by local supervisors over employment matters “[o]n its face . . . is just the opposite of
a uniform employment practice that would provide the commonality needed for a class action; it
is a policy against having uniform employment practices.” Id. at 2554 (emphasis in original).
The problem with plaintiffs’ analysis of the Wal-Mart decision is their failure to account
for the requirement that the identified policy must have caused the disparate impact. The two
policies in question in the instant case depend in their implementation on discretionary decisions
that affect each of the class members. Thus, with respect to the National Teaming Policy, the
3

Case: 1:05-cv-06583 Document #: 482 Filed: 09/19/11 Page 4 of 4 PageID #:16812
decision on whether to join a team or to be invited to join a team would depend on a myriad other decisions by supervisors and the FAs themselves. For example, a manager might choose to suggest a particular FA to a team and the FA may decline for personal or professional reasons. Similarly, an FA and an FA’s teammates might balk at his or her joining a team for discriminatory reasons. Each such decision would have to be examined to determine whether the particular FA was the victim of discrimination. Consequently, even though plaintiffs might be able to raise a common question or questions, there is no “capacity of a class-wide proceeding to generate common answers apt to drive the resolution of the litigation.” Thus, “the [d]issimilarities within the proposed class . . . impede the generation of common answers,” id. at 2551, and preclude class certification.
The problems and impediments to certifying a class in this case that were identified in the court’s previous opinions were therefore confirmed by the Supreme Court’s holding in WalMart, which was a disparate treatment and disparate impact case. Despite plaintiffs’ counsels’ heroic efforts, the court denies their amended motion for class certification. Because of the importance of this decision, and the potential influence of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Wal-Mart, this court would support a motion for an interlocutory appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(f) or 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).
ENTER: September 19, 2011
__________________________________________ Robert W. Gettleman United States District Judge
4

 </s> 10/26/2017

CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 6.1.1.2 - U.S. District Court, Northern Illinois
GILBERT,PROTO,TERMED
United States District Court Northern District of Illinois - CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 6.1.1.2 (Chicago)
CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:05-cv-06583

McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. Assigned to: Honorable Robert W. Gettleman Case in other court: 11-03639
14-01205 Cause: 42:1983 Civil Rights (Employment Discrimination)

Date Filed: 11/18/2005 Date Terminated: 12/06/2013 Jury Demand: Both Nature of Suit: 442 Civil Rights: Jobs Jurisdiction: Federal Question

Plaintiff
George McReynolds on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated

represented by Linda Debra Friedman Stowell & Friedman, Ltd. 303 W. Madison Street Suite 2600 Chicago, IL 60606 312-431-0888 Email: lfriedman@sﬂtd.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mary Stowell Stowell & Friedman, Ltd. 303 W. Madison Suite 2600 Chicago, IL 60606 312-431-0888 Email: mstowell@sﬂtd.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ethan G Zelizer Littler Mendelson, P.C. 321 North Clark Street Suite 1000 Chicago, IL 60654 312-795-3265 Email: ethan@hrlawcounsel.com TERMINATED: 12/17/2010

George S. Robot Stowell & Friedman, Ltd. 303 W. Madison Street Suite 2600 Chicago, IL 60606 312-431-0888 Email: grobot@sﬂtd.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James Bryan Wood

https://ecf.ilnd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?743598400534567-L_1_0-1

1/64

10/26/2017

CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 6.1.1.2 - U.S. District Court, Northern Illinois
The Wood Law Ofﬁce, LLC 303 W. Madison Suite 2650 Chicago, IL 60606 312-544-8600 Email: bryan@jbryanwoodlaw.com TERMINATED: 09/19/2007

Jennifer Schoen Gilbert Stowell & Friedman, LTD. 303 W. Madison Street Suite 2600 Chicago, IL 60606 (312) 431-0888 Email: jgilbert@sﬂtd.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Patricia Ann Bronte Stowell & Friedman, Ltd. 303 W. Madison Street Suite 2600 Chicago, IL 60606 (312) 431-0888 Email: pbronte@sﬂtd.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rafael Eduardo Lazaro Lazaro Law Group 321 S. Plymouth Court Suite 1400 Chicago, IL 60604 (773) 655-7011 Email: rafalazaro1@gmail.com TERMINATED: 12/22/2010

Plaintiff Cathy Bender-Jackson

Suzanne E. Bish Stowell & Friedman, Ltd. 303 W. Madison Street Suite 2600 Chicago, IL 60606 312-431-0888 Email: sbish@sﬂtd.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Jennifer Schoen Gilbert (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Linda Debra Friedman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Patricia Ann Bronte

https://ecf.ilnd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?743598400534567-L_1_0-1

2/64

10/26/2017

CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 6.1.1.2 - U.S. District Court, Northern Illinois
(See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Leroy Brown

Rafael Eduardo Lazaro (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/22/2010
represented by Jennifer Schoen Gilbert (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Linda Debra Friedman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Patricia Ann Bronte (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Leslie Browne

Rafael Eduardo Lazaro (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/22/2010
represented by Jennifer Schoen Gilbert (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Linda Debra Friedman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Patricia Ann Bronte (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Glenn Capel

Rafael Eduardo Lazaro (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/22/2010
represented by Jennifer Schoen Gilbert (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Linda Debra Friedman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Patricia Ann Bronte (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

https://ecf.ilnd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?743598400534567-L_1_0-1

3/64

10/26/2017
Plaintiff Christina Coleman
Plaintiff Larue Gibson
Plaintiff Maroc Howard

CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 6.1.1.2 - U.S. District Court, Northern Illinois
Rafael Eduardo Lazaro (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/22/2010
represented by Jennifer Schoen Gilbert (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Linda Debra Friedman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Patricia Ann Bronte (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Rafael Eduardo Lazaro (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/22/2010
represented by Jennifer Schoen Gilbert (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Linda Debra Friedman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Patricia Ann Bronte (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Rafael Eduardo Lazaro (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/22/2010 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Jennifer Schoen Gilbert (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Linda Debra Friedman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Patricia Ann Bronte (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

https://ecf.ilnd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?743598400534567-L_1_0-1

4/64

10/26/2017
Plaintiff Mark Johnson
Plaintiff J. Yves Laborde
Plaintiff Jennifer Madrid

CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 6.1.1.2 - U.S. District Court, Northern Illinois
Rafael Eduardo Lazaro (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/22/2010
represented by Jennifer Schoen Gilbert (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Linda Debra Friedman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Patricia Ann Bronte (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Rafael Eduardo Lazaro (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/22/2010
represented by Jennifer Schoen Gilbert (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Linda Debra Friedman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Patricia Ann Bronte (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Rafael Eduardo Lazaro (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/22/2010
represented by Jennifer Schoen Gilbert (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Linda Debra Friedman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Patricia Ann Bronte (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Rafael Eduardo Lazaro

https://ecf.ilnd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?743598400534567-L_1_0-1

5/64

10/26/2017
Plaintiff Marshell Miller

CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 6.1.1.2 - U.S. District Court, Northern Illinois
(See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/22/2010
represented by Jennifer Schoen Gilbert (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Linda Debra Friedman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Patricia Ann Bronte (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Carnell Moore

Rafael Eduardo Lazaro (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/22/2010
represented by Jennifer Schoen Gilbert (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Linda Debra Friedman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Patricia Ann Bronte (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Frankie Ross

Rafael Eduardo Lazaro (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/22/2010 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Jennifer Schoen Gilbert (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Linda Debra Friedman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Patricia Ann Bronte (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rafael Eduardo Lazaro (See above for address)

https://ecf.ilnd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?743598400534567-L_1_0-1

6/64

10/26/2017

CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 6.1.1.2 - U.S. District Court, Northern Illinois
TERMINATED: 12/22/2010 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Stephen Smartt Individually on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated

represented by Jennifer Schoen Gilbert (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Linda Debra Friedman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Patricia Ann Bronte (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Henry Wilson

Rafael Eduardo Lazaro (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/22/2010
represented by Jennifer Schoen Gilbert (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Linda Debra Friedman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Patricia Ann Bronte (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Marva York

Rafael Eduardo Lazaro (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/22/2010
represented by Jennifer Schoen Gilbert (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Linda Debra Friedman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Patricia Ann Bronte (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Rafael Eduardo Lazaro (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/22/2010

https://ecf.ilnd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?743598400534567-L_1_0-1

7/64

10/26/2017

CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 6.1.1.2 - U.S. District Court, Northern Illinois

V. Defendant Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc.

represented by Adam K. Grant Weil, Gotshal & Manges, LLP 767 5th Avenue New York, NY 10028 (212) 310-8223 TERMINATED: 04/24/2009

Allan David Dinkoff Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP 767 Fifth Avenue Suite 3441 New York, NY 10153 (212) 310-6771 Email: allan.dinkoff@weil.com PRO HAC VICE

Gina M Diomedi Adler Murphy & McQuillen LLP One N. La Salle St. Suite 2300 Chicago, IL 60602 (312) 477-7680 Email: gdiomedi@amm-law.com TERMINATED: 06/11/2010

Jason B. Bonk Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP 767 Fifth Avenue New York, NY 10153 212-310-8000 Email: jason.bonk@weil.com

Jeffrey S. Klein Weil, Gotshal & Manges 767 Fifth Avenue New York, NY 10153 (212)310-8000 Email: jeffrey.klein@weil.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joseph S. Allerhand Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP 767 Fifth Avenue New York, NY 10153 (212) 310-8725 Email: joseph.allerhand@weil.com

https://ecf.ilnd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?743598400534567-L_1_0-1

Kim Ann Leffert Mayer Brown LLP 71 South Wacker Drive
8/64

10/26/2017

CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 6.1.1.2 - U.S. District Court, Northern Illinois
Chicago, IL 60606 (312) 782-0600 Email: kleffert@mayerbrown.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Laura Lehman Dray Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP 1395 Brickell Avenue 12th Floor Miami, FL 33131 (305) 577-3100 TERMINATED: 04/24/2009

Lori E. Lightfoot Mayer Brown LLP 71 South Wacker Drive Chicago, IL 60606 (312) 782-0600 Email: llightfoot@mayerbrown.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Lori Ann Zahalka Mayer Brown LLP 71 South Wacker Drive Chicago, IL 60606 (312) 701-7921 Email: courtnotiﬁcation@mayerbrown.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mark McLaughlin Mayer Brown LLP 71 South Wacker Drive Chicago, IL 60606 (312) 782-0600 Email: mmclaughlin@mayerbrown.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mindy J. Spector Weil, Gotshal & Manges 767 Fifth Avenue New York, NY 10153 (212)310-8000 TERMINATED: 04/24/2009

Nicholas J. Pappas Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP 767 Fifth Avenue New York, NY 10153 (212) 310-8669 Email: nicholas.pappas@weil.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

https://ecf.ilnd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?743598400534567-L_1_0-1

Salvatore A. Romanello Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP
9/64

10/26/2017

CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 6.1.1.2 - U.S. District Court, Northern Illinois
767 Fifth Avenue New York, NY 10153 (212) 310-8000 Email: salvatore.romanello@weil.com

Defendant
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.

Therese King Nohos Kaye Scholer 3 First National Plaza 70 West Madison Chicago, IL 60602 312-583-2453 Email: therese.nohos@kayescholer.com TERMINATED: 07/17/2007
represented by Jared R. Friedman Weil, Gotsha & Manges LLP 767 5th Avenue Room 3422 New York, NY 10153 (212) 310-8828

Jeffrey Scott Piell Quarles & Brady LLP 300 N. LaSalle St. Suite 4000 Chicago, IL 60654 (312) 715-5216 Email: jeffrey.piell@quarles.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Noah A Finkel Seyfarth Shaw LLP 131 South Dearborn Street Suite 2400 Chicago, IL 60603 (312) 460-5000 Email: nﬁnkel@seyfarth.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Stephen Michael Shapiro Mayer Brown LLP 71 South Wacker Drive Chicago, IL 60606 (312) 782-0600 Email: sshapiro@mayerbrown.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Timothy Simon Bishop Mayer Brown LLP 71 South Wacker Drive Chicago, IL 60606 (312) 782-0600

https://ecf.ilnd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?743598400534567-L_1_0-1

10/64

10/26/2017
Movant La Mar Gunn
Movant Doreen Ernandez

CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 6.1.1.2 - U.S. District Court, Northern Illinois
Email: tbishop@mayerbrown.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by La Mar Gunn Pro Se 2 Old North Road, #502 Dover, DE 19934 (302) 218-6407 Email: lamargunn@me.com PRO SE

Date Filed 11/18/2005 11/18/2005 11/18/2005 01/20/2006 01/20/2006 01/31/2006 01/31/2006 01/31/2006 01/31/2006 02/09/2006
02/17/2006
02/17/2006
02/17/2006

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT ﬁled by George McReynolds; Jury Demand.(mb, ) (Entered: 11/22/2005)
2 CIVIL Cover Sheet (mb, ) (Entered: 11/22/2005)
3 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiff George McReynolds by Linda Debra Friedman (mb, ) (Entered: 11/22/2005)
5 SUMMONS Returned Executed by George McReynolds as to Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. on 1/20/2006, answer due 2/9/2006. (cdy, ) (Entered: 01/24/2006)
6 SUMMONS Issued as to Defendant Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. (cdy, ) (Entered: 01/24/2006)
7 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiff George McReynolds by Mary Stowell (Stowell, Mary) (Entered: 01/31/2006)
8 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiff George McReynolds by James Bryan Wood (Wood, James) (Entered: 01/31/2006)
9 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiff George McReynolds by Suzanne E. Bish (Bish, Suzanne) (Entered: 01/31/2006)
10 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiff George McReynolds by George S. Robot (Robot, George) (Entered: 01/31/2006)
11 MINUTE entry before Judge Robert W. Gettleman : Defendant is given an extension of time to 3/13/2006 to ﬁle answer to the complaint. Joint status Report is due by 3/13/2006. Status hearing set for 3/15/2006 at 09:00 AM. Mailed notice (gds, ) (Entered: 02/09/2006)
12 APPLICATION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice on behalf of Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. by Nicholas J. Pappas; Order entered granting leave by Robert W. Gettleman. Filing fee $50 paid, receipt number 10425234 (cdy, ) (Entered: 02/23/2006)
13 APPLICATION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice on behalf of Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. by Mindy J. Spector; Order entered granting leave by Robert W. Gettleman. Filing fee $50 paid, receipt number 12425234 (cdy, ) (Entered: 02/23/2006)
14 APPLICATION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice on behalf of Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. by Adam K. Grant; Order entered granting leave by Robert W. Gettleman. Filing fee $50 paid, receipt number 10425234 (cdy, ) (Entered: 02/23/2006)

https://ecf.ilnd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?743598400534567-L_1_0-1

11/64

10/26/2017
02/17/2006

CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 6.1.1.2 - U.S. District Court, Northern Illinois
15 APPLICATION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice on behalf of Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. by Jeffrey S. Klein; Order entered granting leave by Robert W. Gettleman. Filing fee $50 paid, receipt number 10425234 (cdy, ) (Entered: 02/23/2006)

03/03/2006

16 MINUTE entry before Judge Robert W. Gettleman : Status Report due by 4/10/2006. Status hearing is re-set to 4/12/2006 at 09:00 AM. Mailed notice (gds, ) (Entered: 03/03/2006)

03/09/2006

17 MOTION by Plaintiff George McReynolds, Defendant Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. for protective order (Leffert, Kim) (Entered: 03/09/2006)

03/09/2006

18 NOTICE of Motion by Kim Ann Leffert for presentment of motion for protective order 17 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 3/14/2006 at 09:15 AM. (Leffert, Kim) (Entered: 03/09/2006)

03/10/2006

19 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendant Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. by Kim Ann Leffert (Leffert, Kim) (Entered: 03/10/2006)

03/10/2006

20 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendant Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. by Lori E. Lightfoot (cdy, ) (Entered: 03/14/2006)

03/10/2006 21 ANSWER to Complaint by Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc.(cdy, ) (Entered: 03/14/2006)

03/13/2006 22 RULE 7.1 CERTIFICATION by Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. (cdy, ) (Entered: 03/15/2006)

03/14/2006

23 MINUTE entry before Judge Robert W. Gettleman : Stipulation for entry of protective order 17 is granted. Agreed protective order entered. [For further detail see separate order] Mail notice. (cdy, ) (Entered: 03/16/2006)

03/14/2006

24 AGREED PROTECTIVE ORDER. Signed by Judge Robert W. Gettleman on 3/14/2006. (cdy, ) (Entered: 03/16/2006)

04/06/2006

25 MINUTE entry before Judge Robert W. Gettleman : Status Report due by 4/28/2006. Status hearing re-set to 5/9/2006 at 09:00 AM. Telephone notice (gds, ) (Entered: 04/06/2006)

04/26/2006

26 MOTION by Plaintiff George McReynolds for extension of time Agreed Motion To Vacate Status Report Date And Initial Status Hearing Date (Friedman, Linda) (Entered: 04/26/2006)

04/26/2006

27 NOTICE of Motion by Linda Debra Friedman for presentment of motion for extension of time 26 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 5/2/2006 at 09:15 AM. (Friedman, Linda) (Entered: 04/26/2006)

05/03/2006

28 MINUTE entry before Judge Robert W. Gettleman : Motion for extension of time 26 is granted. Status Report due by 5/10/2006. Status hearing re-set to 5/16/2006 at 09:00 AM. Telephone notice (gds, ) (Entered: 05/03/2006)

05/10/2006

29 STATUS Report by George McReynolds, Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. (Lightfoot, Lori) (Entered: 05/10/2006)

05/16/2006

30 MINUTE entry before Judge Robert W. Gettleman : Status hearing held on 5/16/2006 Discovery ordered closed by 3/15/2007. Status hearing set for 3/15/2007 at 09:00 AM. Mailed notice (gds, ) (Entered: 05/17/2006)

05/18/2006

31 EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE ORDER:Case referred to Magistrate Judge Michael T. Mason to conduct hearings and enter appropriate orders on the following pretrial motion/matter: discovery supervision; settlement conference. Signed by Executive Committee on 5/18/06. (cdy, ) (Entered: 05/22/2006)

06/04/2006 32 MINUTE entry before Judge Michael T. Mason : This matter having been referred to

https://ecf.ilnd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?743598400534567-L_1_0-1

12/64

10/26/2017

CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 6.1.1.2 - U.S. District Court, Northern Illinois
Magistrate Judge Mason, an initial status hearing is set for 6/21/06 at 9:00 a.m. in courtroom 2214. The parties shall deliver courtesy copy of an initial status report providing the information required by this Court's Order Setting Initial Status Report to chambers, room 2206, by 6/16/06. Mailed notice (smm, ) (Entered: 06/04/2006)

06/19/2006

33 MINUTE entry before Judge Michael T. Mason : Judge Mason having to recuse himself, initial status hearing set for 6/21/06 is stricken. Another magistrate judge will be reassigned once the recusal order is approved. (kef, ) (Entered: 06/19/2006)

06/20/2006

37 EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE ORDER:Case referred to Magistrate Judge Morton Denlow for discovery supervision and settlement conference, signed on 06/19/06 by Judge Michael T. Mason who recused himself pursuant to IOP 14(B), signed by Executive Committee on 06/20/06. (See order for further detail). Mailed notice.(ar, ) (Entered: 06/22/2006)

06/21/2006

34 MINUTE entry before Judge Morton Denlow : Status hearing set for 7/27/2006 at 10:00 AM. in Courtroom 1350. Parties shall deliver a copy of an initial status report to chambers, Room 1356, two business days before the initial status hearing. If the parties have recently prepared and ﬁled an initial status report, the submission of the previously ﬁled initial status report is sufﬁcient. The parties are directed to review and to comply with Judge Denlow's standing order setting initial status report. Copies are available in chambers or through Judge Denlow's web page at www.ilnd.uscourts.gov. Mailed notice (dmk, ) (Entered: 06/21/2006)

06/21/2006

35 MOTION by Plaintiff George McReynolds, Defendant Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. for protective order Joint Motion for Protective Order (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibit 1) (Friedman, Linda) (Entered: 06/21/2006)

06/21/2006

36 Notice of Motion NOTICE of Motion by Linda Debra Friedman for presentment of motion for protective order 35 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 6/27/2006 at 09:15 AM. (Friedman, Linda) (Entered: 06/21/2006)

06/26/2006

38 NOTICE of Motion by Linda Debra Friedman for presentment of motion for protective order 35 before Honorable Morton Denlow on 6/28/2006 at 09:15 AM. (Friedman, Linda) (Entered: 06/26/2006)

06/27/2006

39 MOTION by Plaintiff George McReynolds, Defendant Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. to clarify (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit (Proposed)Order# 2 Certiﬁcate of Service)(Lightfoot, Lori) (Entered: 06/27/2006)

06/27/2006

40 Agreed NOTICE of Motion by Lori E. Lightfoot for presentment of motion by plaintiff to clarify 39 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 7/5/2006 at 09:15 AM. (Attachments: # 1 Certiﬁcate of Service)(Lightfoot, Lori) (Entered: 06/27/2006)

06/27/2006

41 MINUTE entry before Judge Morton Denlow : Joint Motion for entry of protective order 35 is granted. Enter agreed protective order. Mailed notices (gcy, ) (Entered: 06/30/2006)

06/27/2006

42 AGREED PROTECTIVE ORDER Signed by Judge Morton Denlow on 6/27/2006:(gcy, ) (Entered: 06/30/2006)

07/05/2006

43 MINUTE entry before Judge Robert W. Gettleman : Agreed motion to clarify 39 is granted. Mailed notice (gds, ) (Entered: 07/06/2006)

07/13/2006

44 MOTION by Plaintiff George McReynolds for leave to ﬁle First Amended Complaint Instanter (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibit A - First Amended Complaint)(Friedman, Linda) (Entered: 07/13/2006)

07/13/2006

45 NOTICE of Motion by Linda Debra Friedman for presentment of motion for leave to ﬁle 44 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 7/19/2006 at 09:15 AM. (Friedman, Linda)

https://ecf.ilnd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?743598400534567-L_1_0-1

13/64

10/26/2017

CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 6.1.1.2 - U.S. District Court, Northern Illinois
(Entered: 07/13/2006)

07/13/2006

46 (Duplicate Entry of Document# 45) (Friedman, Linda) Modiﬁed on 7/14/2006 (gma, ). (Entered: 07/13/2006)

07/14/2006

47 NOTICE of Correction regarding notice of motion 46 (Duplicate Entry of Document# 45) (gma, ) (Entered: 07/14/2006)

07/18/2006

48 MEMORANDUM by Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. in Opposition to motion for leave to ﬁle 44 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Lightfoot, Lori) (Entered: 07/18/2006)

07/19/2006

49 MINUTE entry before Judge Robert W. Gettleman : Plaintiff's motion to ﬁle ﬁrst amended complaint is granted. Mailed notices (gcy, ) (Entered: 07/20/2006)

07/19/2006

51 FIRST AMENDED complaint by George McReynolds against Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. (cdy, ) (Entered: 08/02/2006)

07/27/2006

50 MINUTE entry before Judge Morton Denlow : Magistrate Judge Status hearing held on 7/27/2006. Status hearing set for 9/7/2006 at 10:00 AM. (dmk, ) (Entered: 07/27/2006)

08/01/2006

53 APPLICATION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice on behalf of Defendant Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. by Laura Lehman Dray; Order entered granting leave by Judge Robert W. Gettleman. Filing fee $ 50.00 paid, receipt number 10718040. (vkd, ) (Entered: 08/04/2006)

08/02/2006

52 ANSWER to amended complaint by Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc.(Lightfoot, Lori) (Entered: 08/02/2006)

08/30/2006

54 MINUTE entry before Judge Morton Denlow : Status hearing reset for 10/3/2006 at 10:00 AM. on request of the parties. Status hearing set for 9/7/06 is stricken. Mailed notice (dmk, ) (Entered: 08/30/2006)

09/05/2006

55 MINUTE entry before Judge Morton Denlow : Status hearing reset for 10/10/2006 at 10:00 AM. on request of the parties. Status hearing set for 10/3/06 is stricken. Mailed notice (dmk, ) (Entered: 09/05/2006)

10/10/2006

56 MINUTE entry before Judge Morton Denlow : Magistrate Judge Status hearing held on 10/10/2006. Status hearing set for 12/12/2006 at 10:00 AM. Mailed notice (dmk, ) (Entered: 10/10/2006)

10/12/2006

57 TRANSCRIPT of proceedings for the following dates: 7/19/06; Before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman (vmj, ) (Entered: 10/13/2006)

10/17/2006

58 MOTION by Defendant Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. for protective order (Attachments: # 1 Afﬁdavit Local Rule 37.2 Certiﬁcation# 2 Certiﬁcate of Service # 3 Exhibit A# 4 Exhibit B# 5 Exhibit C# 6 Exhibit D# 7 Exhibit E)(Lightfoot, Lori) (Entered: 10/17/2006)

10/17/2006

59 NOTICE of Motion by Lori E. Lightfoot for presentment of motion for protective order 58 before Honorable Morton Denlow on 10/23/2006 at 09:15 AM. (Attachments: # 1 Certiﬁcate of Service)(Lightfoot, Lori) (Entered: 10/17/2006)

10/20/2006

60 Amended NOTICE of Motion by Lori E. Lightfoot for presentment of motion for protective order 58 before Honorable Morton Denlow on 10/25/2006 at 09:15 AM. (Attachments: # 1 Certiﬁcate of Service)(Lightfoot, Lori) (Entered: 10/20/2006)

10/23/2006

61 MOTION by Defendant Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. for protective order (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Exhibit B# 3 Exhibit C# 4 Declaration - Local Rule 37.2 Certiﬁcation# 5 Certiﬁcate of Service)(Lightfoot, Lori) (Entered: 10/23/2006)

10/23/2006

62 NOTICE of Motion by Lori E. Lightfoot for presentment of motion for protective order 61 before Honorable Morton Denlow on 10/25/2006 at 09:15 AM. (Attachments: # 1

https://ecf.ilnd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?743598400534567-L_1_0-1

14/64

10/26/2017
10/24/2006
10/24/2006 10/30/2006 11/06/2006 11/06/2006 11/09/2006 11/09/2006 11/13/2006
11/13/2006 11/15/2006 11/15/2006
12/04/2006

CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 6.1.1.2 - U.S. District Court, Northern Illinois
Certiﬁcate of Service)(Lightfoot, Lori) (Entered: 10/23/2006)
63 MINUTE entry before Judge Morton Denlow : Motion for protective order 58 is withdrawn, Motion for protective order 61 is withdrawn. Motions terminated: MOTION by Defendant Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. for protective order 61 , MOTION by Defendant Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. for protective order 58 Mailed notice (dmk, ) (Entered: 10/24/2006)
64 TRANSCRIPT of proceedings for the following dates: 05/16/2006; Before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman (hp, ) (Entered: 10/25/2006)
65 APPLICATION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice on behalf of Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. by Joseph S. Allerhand; Order entered granting leave by Judge Robert W. Gettleman. Filing fee $ 50 paid, receipt number 1098734. (td, ) (Entered: 11/02/2006)
66 MOTION by Plaintiff George McReynolds to ﬁle instanter Motion For Leave To File Second Amended Complaint Instanter (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Second Amended Complaint)(Friedman, Linda) (Entered: 11/06/2006)
67 Motion To Leave To File Second Amended Complaint Instanter NOTICE of Motion by Linda Debra Friedman for presentment of motion to ﬁle instanter 66 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 11/14/2006 at 09:15 AM. (Friedman, Linda) (Entered: 11/06/2006)
68 MOTION by Defendant Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. for protective order (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Exhibit B# 3 Exhibit C# 4 Exhibit D# 5 Exhibit E# 6 Exhibit F# 7 Exhibit G# 8 Exhibit H# 9 Exhibit I# 10 Exhibit J# 11 Exhibit K# 12 Exhibit L# 13 Exhibit M# 14 Exhibit N# 15 Certiﬁcate of Service)(Lightfoot, Lori) (Entered: 11/09/2006)
69 NOTICE of Motion by Lori E. Lightfoot for presentment of motion for protective order, 68 before Honorable Morton Denlow on 11/13/2006 at 09:15 AM. (Attachments: # 1 Certiﬁcate of Service)(Lightfoot, Lori) (Entered: 11/09/2006)
70 MINUTE entry before Judge Morton Denlow : Motion hearing held on 11/13/2006 regarding motion for protective order, 68 . Defendant's Motion for protective order 68 is granted as follows: Plaintiff shall provide a list of search terms on or by 11/17/06. Motions terminated: MOTION by Defendant Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. for protective order 68 Status hearing reset to 12/7/2006 at 10:15 AM. Status hearing set for 12/12/06 is stricken. Mailed notice (dmk, ) (Entered: 11/13/2006)
73 APPLICATION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice on behalf of Merill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Incorporated by Salvatore A. Romanello; Order entered granting leave by Judge Robert W. Gettleman. Filing fee $50 paid, receipt number 10336446. (td, ) (Entered: 11/16/2006)
71 MINUTE entry before Judge Robert W. Gettleman : Plaintiff's motion 66 for leave to ﬁle second amended complaint instanter is granted. Defendants' answer thereto is due by 12/1/2006. Telephoned notice (td, ) (Entered: 11/16/2006)
72 SECOND Amended complaint by Cathy Bender-Jackson, Leroy Brown, Leslie Browne, Glenn Capel, Christina Coleman, Larue Gibson, Maroc Howard, Mark Johnson, J. Yves Laborde, Jennifer Madrid, Marshell Miller, Carnell Moore, Frankie Ross, Stephen Smartt, Henry Wilson, Marva York, George McReynolds against Merill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Incorporated. (td, ) (Entered: 11/16/2006)
74 MINUTE entry before Judge Morton Denlow : Status hearing reset to 12/12/2006 at 10:00 AM. on request of the parties. Status hearing set for 12/7/06 is stricken. (dmk, ) (Entered: 12/04/2006)

https://ecf.ilnd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?743598400534567-L_1_0-1

15/64

10/26/2017
12/12/2006

CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 6.1.1.2 - U.S. District Court, Northern Illinois
75 MINUTE entry before Judge Morton Denlow : Magistrate Judge Status hearing held on 12/12/2006. Status hearing set for 2/13/2007 at 10:15 AM. Mailed notice (dmk, ) (Entered: 12/12/2006)

12/15/2006

76 Defendant's ANSWER to amended complaint (Second) by Merill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Incorporated(Lightfoot, Lori) (Entered: 12/15/2006)

01/04/2007

77 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendant Merill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Incorporated by Therese Colleen King (King, Therese) (Entered: 01/04/2007)

01/08/2007

78 MOTION by Plaintiffs Cathy Bender-Jackson, Leroy Brown, Leslie Browne, Glenn Capel, Christina Coleman, Larue Gibson, Maroc Howard, Mark Johnson, J. Yves Laborde, Jennifer Madrid, Marshell Miller, Carnell Moore, Frankie Ross, Stephen Smartt, Henry Wilson, Marva York, George McReynolds, Defendant Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. for extension of time (Agreed) For Class Certiﬁcation Discovery. (Lightfoot, Lori) (Entered: 01/08/2007)

01/08/2007

79 NOTICE of Motion by Lori E. Lightfoot for presentment of extension of time, 78 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 1/11/2007 at 09:15 AM. (Lightfoot, Lori) (Entered: 01/08/2007)

01/18/2007

80 MINUTE entry before Judge Robert W. Gettleman :Motion for extension of time 78 is granted. Discovery ordered closed by 6/13/2007. Status hearing is re-set to 6/13/2007 at 09:00 AM.Telephone notice (gds, ) (Entered: 01/18/2007)

01/18/2007

81 ATTORNEY Appearance of Jeffrey Piell o/b/o Defendant Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. (Piell, Jeffrey) (Entered: 01/18/2007)

01/22/2007

82 MOTION by Plaintiff George McReynolds for protective order and Extension of Time to Respond to Discovery (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibit A# 2 Exhibit Exhibit B) (Friedman, Linda) (Entered: 01/22/2007)

01/22/2007

83 NOTICE of Motion by Linda Debra Friedman for presentment of motion for protective order 82 before Honorable Morton Denlow on 1/24/2007 at 09:15 AM. (Friedman, Linda) (Entered: 01/22/2007)

01/23/2007

84 RESPONSE by Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. to MOTION by Plaintiff George McReynolds for protective order and Extension of Time to Respond to Discovery 82 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Exhibit B# 3 Exhibit C# 4 Exhibit D# 5 Exhibit E# 6 Exhibit F# 7 Exhibit G# 8 Exhibit H# 9 Exhibit I# 10 Certiﬁcate of Service)(Lightfoot, Lori) (Entered: 01/23/2007)

01/24/2007

85 MINUTE entry before Judge Morton Denlow :Motion hearing held on 1/24/2007 regarding motion for protective order 82 . Plaintiffs' motion for protective order and extension of time to respond to discovery 82 is granted. Plaintiff is to respond to Defendant's third set of interrogatories and Defendant's second set of request for production on or by 2/12/07. Plaintiff to provide defense counsel with a statement with respect to the second set of interrogatories on or by 2/12/07. Status hearing is reset to 3/13/07 at 10:15 a.m. Status hearing set for 2/13/07 is stricken ; Motions terminated: MOTION by Plaintiff George McReynolds for protective order and Extension of Time to Respond to Discovery 82 Mailed notice (dmk, ) (Entered: 01/24/2007)

02/08/2007

86 TRANSCRIPT of proceedings for the following dates: 12/12/2006; Before the Honorable Morton Denlow. (Document not imaged) (td, ) (Entered: 02/12/2007)

03/07/2007

87 APPLICATION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice on behalf of Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. by Jared R. Friedman; Order entered granting leave by Judge Robert W. Gettleman. Filing fee $ 50 paid, receipt number 107 21631. (td, ) (Entered: 03/12/2007)

https://ecf.ilnd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?743598400534567-L_1_0-1

16/64

10/26/2017

CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 6.1.1.2 - U.S. District Court, Northern Illinois

03/12/2007

88 MINUTE entry before Judge Morton Denlow :Status hearing reset for 4/17/2007 at 10:15 AM. on request of the parties. Status hearing set for 3/13/07 is stricken.Mailed notice (dmk, ) (Entered: 03/12/2007)

03/30/2007

89 MOTION by Defendants Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. to compel depositions answers (Exhibits). (Document not scanned) (Entered: 04/03/2007)

03/30/2007

90 NOTICE of Motion by Lori E. Lightfoot for presentment of motion to compel depositions answers 89 before Honorable Morton Denlow on 4/4/2007 at 09:15 AM. (td, ) (Entered: 04/03/2007)

04/04/2007

91 MINUTE entry before Judge Morton Denlow : Motion hearing held regarding Defendant's motion to compel deposition answers 89 . Defendant's motion to compel deposition answers 89 is granted in part and denied in part as stated in open Court. Supplemental answers by Mark Johnson will be provided in conjunction with his review of the deposition and the completion of any errata sheets. Plaintiff's oral motion to remove the Defendant's motion to compel deposition answers 89 from being a restricted document is granted. The Clerk of the Court is directed to remove Defendant's motion to compel deposition answers 89 as a restricted document and make it a public document. Status hearing held. Status hearing set for 6/12/07 at 10:00 a.m. Status hearing set for 4/17/07 is stricken. (td, ) (Entered: 04/05/2007)

04/12/2007

92 MOTION by Defendant Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. to compel Plaintiffs to Verify Responses to Defendant's Third Set of Interrogatories (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Exhibit B# 3 Exhibit C# 4 Exhibit D# 5 Exhibit E# 6 Exhibit F# 7 Exhibit G)(King, Therese) (Entered: 04/12/2007)

04/12/2007

93 NOTICE of Motion by Therese Colleen King for presentment of motion to compel, 92 before Honorable Morton Denlow on 4/16/2007 at 09:15 AM. (King, Therese) (Entered: 04/12/2007)

04/12/2007

94 MOTION by Defendant Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. for protective order (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A-B# 2 Exhibit C-H# 3 Exhibit I)(King, Therese) (Entered: 04/12/2007)

04/12/2007

95 NOTICE of Motion by Therese Colleen King for presentment of motion for protective order 94 before Honorable Morton Denlow on 4/16/2007 at 09:15 AM. (King, Therese) (Entered: 04/12/2007)

04/16/2007

96 MINUTE entry before Judge Morton Denlow : Motion hearing held. Defendant's motion to compel Plaintiffs to verify responses to Defendant's third set of interrogatories 92 is granted. Veriﬁcation is be provided for each class representative within 7 days prior to each of their depositions. Plaintiff is to advise Defendant within 7 days as to when the veriﬁcation of the 6 whose depositions have taken place will be provided. Defendant's motion for protective order 94 is entered and continued to 6/12/07 at 10:15 a.m. Mailed notice (td, ) (Entered: 04/20/2007)

04/23/2007

97 MOTION by Defendant Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. to compel Plaintiffs' Depositions. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1# 2 Exhibit 2# 3 Exhibit 3# 4 Exhibit 4# 5 Exhibit 5# 6 Exhibit 6# 7 Exhibit 7# 8 Exhibit 8# 9 Exhibit 9# 10 Exhibit 10# 11 Certiﬁcate of Service)(Lightfoot, Lori) (Entered: 04/23/2007)

04/23/2007

98 NOTICE of Motion by Lori E. Lightfoot for presentment of motion to compel, 97 before Honorable Morton Denlow on 4/25/2007 at 09:15 AM. (Attachments: # 1 Certiﬁcate of Service)(Lightfoot, Lori) (Entered: 04/23/2007)

04/23/2007 99 MOTION by Plaintiff George McReynolds for protective order To Compel Defendant to

https://ecf.ilnd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?743598400534567-L_1_0-1

17/64

10/26/2017
04/23/2007 04/24/2007 04/24/2007 04/25/2007
04/26/2007 04/27/2007
04/30/2007 05/02/2007 05/03/2007 05/03/2007 05/14/2007

CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 6.1.1.2 - U.S. District Court, Northern Illinois
Identify Documents, and For a Date Certain for Defendant to Complete Production (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1# 2 Exhibit 2# 3 Exhibit 3# 4 Exhibit 4# 5 Exhibit 5# 6 Exhibit 6# 7 Exhibit 7# 8 Exhibit 8# 9 Exhibit 9# 10 Exhibit 10)(Bish, Suzanne) (Entered: 04/23/2007)
100 NOTICE of Motion by Suzanne E. Bish for presentment of motion for protective order, 99 before Honorable Morton Denlow on 4/25/2007 at 09:15 AM. (Bish, Suzanne) (Entered: 04/23/2007)
101 Amended NOTICE of Motion by Lori E. Lightfoot for presentment of motion to compel, 97 before Honorable Morton Denlow on 4/26/2007 at 10:30 AM. (Lightfoot, Lori) (Entered: 04/24/2007)
102 Amended NOTICE of Motion by Linda Debra Friedman for presentment of motion for protective order, 99 before Honorable Morton Denlow on 4/26/2007 at 10:30 AM. (Friedman, Linda) (Entered: 04/24/2007)
103 RESPONSE by Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. to Plaintiff's motion for protective order, 99 to Compel Defendant to Identify Documents, And For a Date Certain For Defendant to Complete Production. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1# 2 Exhibit 2# 3 Exhibit 3# 4 Exhibit 4# 5 Exhibit 5# 6 Exhibit 6# 7 Exhibit 6A# 8 Exhibit 6B# 9 Exhibit 6C# 10 Certiﬁcate of Service)(Lightfoot, Lori) Text modiﬁed on 4/26/2007 (Entered: 04/25/2007)
104 MINUTE entry before Judge Morton Denlow : Motion Hearing reset for 4/27/2007 at 10:00 AM. regarding motion to compel, 97 and motion for protective order, 99 . Motion hearing set for 4/26/07 is stricken.Mailed notice (dmk, ) (Entered: 04/26/2007)
105 MINUTE entry before Judge Morton Denlow :Motion hearing held on 4/27/2007 regarding motion for protective order, 99 , motion to compel, 97 , motion for protective order 94 . Motion for protective order 94 is withdrawn without prejudice; Motion to compel 97 is withdrawn without prejudice; Motion for protective order 99 is withdrawn without prejudice. Motions terminated: MOTION by Plaintiff George McReynolds for protective order To Compel Defendant to Identify Documents, and For a Date Certain for Defendant to Complete Production 99 , MOTION by Defendant Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. to compel Plaintiffs' Depositions. 97 , MOTION by Defendant Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. for protective order 94 . Status hearing set for 5/1/2007 at 10:00 AM.Mailed notice (dmk, ) (Entered: 04/27/2007)
106 MINUTE entry before Judge Morton Denlow :Status hearing reset for 5/2/2007 at 09:15 AM. on request of the parties. Status hearing set for 5/1/07 is stricken.Mailed notice (dmk, ) (Entered: 04/30/2007)
107 MINUTE entry before Judge Morton Denlow :Magistrate Judge Status hearing held on 5/2/2007.Status hearing set for 6/7/2007 at 10:00 AM.Mailed notice (dmk, ) (Entered: 05/02/2007)
108 MOTION by Defendant Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. to compel Discovery Response. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1# 2 Exhibit 2# 3 Exhibit 3# 4 Certiﬁcate of Service) (Lightfoot, Lori) (Entered: 05/03/2007)
109 NOTICE of Motion by Lori E. Lightfoot for presentment of motion to compel 108 before Honorable Morton Denlow on 5/9/2007 at 09:15 AM. (Attachments: # 1 Certiﬁcate of Service)(Lightfoot, Lori) (Entered: 05/03/2007)
110 MOTION by Defendant Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. for hearing to Limit Certain Evidence and For Sanctions For Violating Discovery Order. (Attachments: # 1

https://ecf.ilnd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?743598400534567-L_1_0-1

18/64

10/26/2017
05/14/2007 05/16/2007
05/18/2007 05/21/2007

CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 6.1.1.2 - U.S. District Court, Northern Illinois
Exhibit A# 2 Exhibit B# 3 Exhibit C# 4 Certiﬁcate of Service)(Lightfoot, Lori) (Entered: 05/14/2007)
111 NOTICE of Motion by Lori E. Lightfoot for presentment of motion for hearing, 110 before Honorable Morton Denlow on 5/16/2007 at 09:15 AM. (Attachments: # 1 Certiﬁcate of Service)(Lightfoot, Lori) (Entered: 05/14/2007)
112 MINUTE entry before Judge Morton Denlow : Motion hearing held on 5/16/2007 regarding motion for hearing, 110 and motion to compel 108 . Defendant's motion to limit certain evidence and for sanctions 110 is withdrawn without prejudice. Defendant's motion to compel discovery response 108 is granted in the form of a sampling to be worked out between the parties. Motions terminated: MOTION by Defendant Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. for hearing to Limit Certain Evidence and For Sanctions For Violating Discovery Order. 110 , MOTION by Defendant Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. to compel Discovery Response. 108 Mailed notice (dmk, ) (Entered: 05/16/2007)
113 MINUTE entry before Judge Robert W. Gettleman :Status hearing date of 6/13/2007 is reset to 6/14/2007 at 09:00 AM.Telephone notice (gds, ) (Entered: 05/18/2007)
502 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS held on 4/16/2007 before the Honorable Morton Denlow. Court Reporter Contact Information: Mary M. Hacker 312.435.5564.

IMPORTANT: The transcript may be viewed at the court's public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through the Court Reporter/Transcriber or PACER. For further information on the redaction process, see the Court's web site at www.ilnd.uscourts.gov under Quick Links select Policy Regarding the Availability of Transcripts of Court Proceedings.

05/31/2007 05/31/2007 05/31/2007 05/31/2007 06/01/2007 06/04/2007

Redaction Request due 6/11/2007. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 6/21/2007. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 8/20/2007. (Document not scanned) (Previously Misplaced Document)(td, ) (Entered: 01/04/2012)
114 MOTION by Defendant Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. to compel discovery response (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Exhibit B# 3 Exhibit C# 4 Exhibit D# 5 Exhibit E# 6 Exhibit F# 7 Exhibit G# 8 Exhibit H)(Lightfoot, Lori) (Entered: 05/31/2007)
115 NOTICE of Motion by Lori E. Lightfoot for presentment of motion to compel, 114 before Honorable Morton Denlow on 6/4/2007 at 09:15 AM. (Lightfoot, Lori) (Entered: 05/31/2007)
116 MOTION by Defendant Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. to compel (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A - Filed Under Seal# 2 Exhibit B# 3 Exhibit C# 4 Exhibit D# 5 Exhibit E# 6 Exhibit F# 7 Exhibit G)(Lightfoot, Lori) (Entered: 05/31/2007)
117 NOTICE of Motion by Lori E. Lightfoot for presentment of motion to compel 116 before Honorable Morton Denlow on 6/4/2007 at 09:15 AM. (Lightfoot, Lori) (Entered: 05/31/2007)
118 EXHIBIT A by Defendant Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. to motion to compel. (RESTRICTED) (Document not scanned) (td, ) (Entered: 06/04/2007)
119 MINUTE entry before Judge Morton Denlow :Motion hearing held. Defendant's motion to compel 116 is entered and continued to 6/11/07 at 9:15 a.m. Plaintiff to ﬁle any response on or by 6/8/07. Defendant's motion to compel discovery response 114 is granted in part and denied in part as stated in open Court. Defendants motion to compel discovery response to Interrogatories Nos 2 and 5 is denied. Defendant's motion to

https://ecf.ilnd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?743598400534567-L_1_0-1

19/64

10/26/2017

CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 6.1.1.2 - U.S. District Court, Northern Illinois
compel discovery response to Interrogatory No. 8 is granted. Plaintiff to supplement their response on or by 6/18/07. Status hearing is reset to 6/11/07 at 9:15 a.m. Status hearing set for 6/7/07 is stricken. Motions terminated: MOTION by Defendant Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. to compel discovery response 114 . (dmk, ) (Entered: 06/05/2007)

06/07/2007

120 MOTION by Plaintiff George McReynolds to enforce Compliance By Defendant with the Protective Order in Relation to the Conﬁdentiality of Merrill Lynch E-mails (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Exhibit B# 3 Exhibit C# 4 Exhibit D)(Friedman, Linda) (Entered: 06/07/2007)

06/07/2007 121 NOTICE of Motion by Linda Debra Friedman for presentment of motion to enforce, 120 (Friedman, Linda) (Entered: 06/07/2007)

06/07/2007

122 MOTION by Plaintiff George McReynolds for extension of time to complete discovery Plaintiffs' Motion to Extend Class Certiﬁcation Discovery (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Exhibit B# 3 Exhibit C# 4 Exhibit D# 5 Exhibit E# 6 Exhibit F# 7 Exhibit G# 8 Exhibit H# 9 Exhibit I# 10 Exhibit J# 11 Exhibit K# 12 Exhibit L# 13 Exhibit M)(Friedman, Linda) (Entered: 06/07/2007)

06/07/2007

123 NOTICE of Motion by Linda Debra Friedman for presentment of motion for extension of time to complete discovery, 122 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 6/12/2007 at 09:15 AM. (Friedman, Linda) (Entered: 06/07/2007)

06/08/2007 124 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiff George McReynolds by Ethan G Zelizer (Zelizer, Ethan) (Entered: 06/08/2007)

06/11/2007

125 MINUTE entry before Judge Morton Denlow :Motion hearing held on 6/11/2007 regarding motion to compel 116 . Defendant's Motion to compel 116 is granted. Mr. Brown is directed to reappear for his deposition. Plaintiff is to provide dates and time for the setting of Mr. Browns deposition on or by 6/15/07. Defendant's request for fees and costs for brining this motion is denied. Plaintiff's Motion to enforce 120 is entered and continued to 6/18/07 at 9:15 a.m. Magistrate Judge Status hearing held on 6/11/2007 and continued to 6/18/07 at 9:15 AM. Motions terminated: MOTION by Defendant Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. to compel 116 . Mailed notice (dmk, ) (Entered: 06/11/2007)

06/13/2007

126 RESPONSE by Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc.in Opposition to MOTION by Plaintiff George McReynolds for extension of time to complete discovery Plaintiffs' Motion to Extend Class Certiﬁcation Discovery 122 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibit 1 part A-I# 2 Exhibit Exhibit 2 - Part A# 3 Exhibit Exhibit 2 Part B# 4 Exhibit Exhibit 2 Part C-H# 5 Exhibit # 6 Certiﬁcate of Service)(Lightfoot, Lori) (Entered: 06/13/2007)

06/14/2007 127 MOTION by Plaintiff George McReynolds to continue Plaintiffs' Motion to Enter and Continue (Friedman, Linda) (Incorrect document linked to entry) (Entered: 06/14/2007)

06/14/2007

128 NOTICE of Motion by Linda Debra Friedman for presentment of motion to continue 127 before Honorable Morton Denlow on 6/18/2007 at 09:00 AM. (Friedman, Linda) (Entered: 06/14/2007)

06/14/2007 129 MOTION by Plaintiff George McReynolds to continue Plaintiffs' Motion to Enter and Continue (Friedman, Linda) (Entered: 06/14/2007)

06/14/2007

131 MINUTE entry before Judge Robert W. Gettleman :Status hearing held on 6/14/2007. Plaintiff's motion 122 to extend time to complete discovery is referred to Magistrate Judge Denlow to whom this case has been referred. Status hearing set for 7/31/2007 at 09:00 AM.Mailed notice (gds, ) (Entered: 06/15/2007)

06/15/2007 130 NOTICE of Correction regarding MOTION by Plaintiff George McReynolds to continue

https://ecf.ilnd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?743598400534567-L_1_0-1

20/64

10/26/2017

CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 6.1.1.2 - U.S. District Court, Northern Illinois
Plaintiffs' Motion to Enter and Continue 127 . Incorrect document linked to entry (td, ) (Entered: 06/15/2007)

06/15/2007

132 MEMORANDUM by Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. in Opposition to motion to enforce, 120 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A-C)(Lightfoot, Lori) (Entered: 06/15/2007)

06/15/2007

133 RESPONSE by Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc.in Opposition to MOTION by Plaintiff George McReynolds to continue Plaintiffs' Motion to Enter and Continue 129 Plaintiffs' Motion to Extend Class Certiﬁcation Discovery. (Attachments: # 1 Certiﬁcate of Service) (Lightfoot, Lori) (Entered: 06/15/2007)

06/15/2007

134 EXHIBIT A by Defendant Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. to its memorandum in opposition 132 to Plaintiffs' moton to remove conﬁdentiality designations as to email productions. (Document not scanned). (RESTRICTED). (ar, ) (Entered: 06/18/2007)

06/18/2007

135 MINUTE entry before Judge Morton Denlow :Motion hearing held. Plaintiff's motion to enter and continue Plaintiffs' motion to extend class certiﬁcation discovery 129 is granted. Plaintiff's motion for extension of time to extend class certiﬁcation discovery 122 is entered and continued to 6/25/07 at 3:00 p.m. Plaintiff's brief in support of motion due on or by 6/21/07; Defendant's response due on or by 6/22/07. Plaintiff's motion to enforce compliance by Defendant with the protective order in relation to the conﬁdentiality of Merrill Lynch E-Mails 120 is denied. For reasons stated in open Court, Plaintiff's motion to enforce compliance by Defendant with the protective order in relation to the conﬁdentiality of Merrill Lynch E-Mails 120 is denied. Motions terminated: MOTION by Plaintiff George McReynolds to enforce Compliance By Defendant with the Protective Order in Relation to the Conﬁdentiality of Merrill Lynch E-mails 120 , MOTION by Plaintiff George McReynolds to continue Plaintiffs' Motion to Enter and Continue 129 Status hearing set for 6/25/2007 at 03:00 PM.Mailed notice (dmk, ) (Entered: 06/18/2007)

06/21/2007

136 SUPPLEMENT by George McReynolds to motion for extension of time to complete discovery, 122 Plaintiffs' Supplemental Brief of Outstanding Discovery Issues in Support of Their Motion To Extend Class Certiﬁcation Discovery (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Exhibit B# 3 Exhibit C)(Stowell, Mary) (Entered: 06/21/2007)

06/21/2007

137 NOTICE by George McReynolds Notice of Filing to Plaintiffs' Supplemental Brief of Outstanding Discovery Issues in Support of Their Motion To Extend Class Certiﬁcation Discovery (Stowell, Mary) (Entered: 06/21/2007)

06/22/2007

138 MEMORANDUM by Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. in Opposition to motion for extension of time to complete discovery, 122 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Exhibit B# 3 Exhibit C# 4 Exhibit D# 5 Exhibit E# 6 Exhibit F# 7 Exhibit G# 8 Exhibit H# 9 Exhibit I# 10 Exhibit J# 11 Exhibit K# 12 Exhibit L# 13 Exhibit M# 14 Exhibit N)(Lightfoot, Lori) (Entered: 06/22/2007)

06/22/2007

139 TRANSCRIPT of proceedings for the following dates: 11/13/2006, 1/24/2007, 4/4/2007; Before the Honorable Morton Denlow. (139-1 through 139-3) (Document not scanned) (td, ) (Entered: 06/25/2007)

06/25/2007

142 MINUTE entry before Judge Morton Denlow : Informal discovery motion conference held on 6/25/07. Parties to memorialize rulings made by Judge Denlow at the conference. Plaintiffs' motion to extend class certiﬁcation discovery 122 is granted. Class certiﬁcation discovery extended to 8/27/07. Parties are to contact Judge Denlow's courtroom deputy if they wish to proceed with an additional conference. Motions terminated: Mailed notice (dmk, ) (Entered: 06/26/2007)

06/26/2007 140 MOTION by counsel for Defendant Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. to

https://ecf.ilnd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?743598400534567-L_1_0-1

21/64

10/26/2017
06/26/2007 07/06/2007 07/11/2007 07/13/2007 07/17/2007 07/19/2007 07/26/2007 07/26/2007 07/31/2007 07/31/2007 08/20/2007 08/21/2007 08/24/2007 08/24/2007 08/27/2007
08/27/2007

CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 6.1.1.2 - U.S. District Court, Northern Illinois
withdraw as attorney (withdraw appearance of Therese C. King) (Lightfoot, Lori) (Entered: 06/26/2007)
141 Agreed NOTICE of Motion by Lori E. Lightfoot for presentment of motion to withdraw as attorney 140 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 7/11/2007 at 09:15 AM. (Lightfoot, Lori) (Entered: 06/26/2007)
143 TRANSCRIPT of proceedings for the following dates: 6/11/2007; Before the Honorable Morton Denlow. (Document not scanned) (td, ) (Entered: 07/10/2007)
144 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendant Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. by Gina M Diomedi (Diomedi, Gina) (Entered: 07/11/2007)
145 TRANSCRIPT of proceedings for the following dates: 4/27/2007; Before the Honorable Morton Denlow. (Document not scanned) (td, ) (Entered: 07/16/2007)
146 MINUTE entry before Judge Robert W. Gettleman : Deefndants agreed motion 140 to withdraw appearance of Therese King is granted. Mailed notice (td, ) (Entered: 07/18/2007)
147 TRANSCRIPT of proceedings for the following dates: 6/18/2007; Before the Honorable James F. Holderman. (Document not scanned) (td, ) (Entered: 07/20/2007)
148 MOTION by Defendant Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.To Adopt Defendant's Proposed Scheduling Order (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Exhibit B# 3 Exhibit C)(Lightfoot, Lori) (Entered: 07/26/2007)
149 NOTICE of Motion by Lori E. Lightfoot for presentment of motion for miscellaneous relief 148 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 7/31/2007 at 09:15 AM. (Lightfoot, Lori) (Entered: 07/26/2007)
150 MINUTE entry before Judge Robert W. Gettleman :Status hearing held on 7/31/2007.Status hearing set for 9/6/2007 at 09:30 AM.Mailed notice (gds, ) (Entered: 07/31/2007)
151 MINUTE entry before Judge Morton Denlow :Magistrate Judge Status hearing held on 7/31/2007.Status hearing set for 9/6/2007 at 10:00 AM.Mailed notice (dmk, ) (Entered: 08/07/2007)
152 MOTION by Plaintiff George McReynolds to compel (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Exhibit B)(Friedman, Linda) (Entered: 08/20/2007)
153 NOTICE of Motion by Linda Debra Friedman for presentment of motion to compel 152 before Honorable Morton Denlow on 8/27/2007 at 09:15 AM. (Friedman, Linda) (Entered: 08/21/2007)
154 Amended NOTICE of Motion by Linda Debra Friedman for presentment of motion to compel 152 before Honorable Morton Denlow on 9/6/2007 at 10:00 AM. (Friedman, Linda) (Entered: 08/24/2007)
159 NOTICE by James Bryan Wood of Change of Address. (td, ) (Entered: 08/28/2007)
155 MOTION by Plaintiff George McReynolds to compel Responsive Data and Related Information and Relief (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Exhibit B# 3 Exhibit C# 4 Exhibit D# 5 Exhibit E# 6 Exhibit F# 7 Exhibit G# 8 Exhibit H)(Bish, Suzanne) (Entered: 08/27/2007)
156 NOTICE of Motion by Suzanne E. Bish for presentment of motion to compel, 155 before Honorable Morton Denlow on 9/6/2007 at 10:00 AM. (Bish, Suzanne) (Entered: 08/27/2007)

https://ecf.ilnd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?743598400534567-L_1_0-1

22/64

10/26/2017
08/27/2007

CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 6.1.1.2 - U.S. District Court, Northern Illinois
157 MOTION by Plaintiff George McReynolds to compel Production of documents, data, interrogatory responses and identiﬁcation of responsive information (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Exhibit B# 3 Exhibit C# 4 Exhibit D# 5 Exhibit E# 6 Exhibit F# 7 Exhibit G# 8 Exhibit H# 9 Exhibit I)(Bish, Suzanne) (Entered: 08/27/2007)

08/27/2007

158 NOTICE of Motion by Suzanne E. Bish for presentment of motion to compel, 157 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 9/6/2007 at 10:00 AM. (Bish, Suzanne) (Entered: 08/27/2007)

08/27/2007 162 MINUTE entry before Judge Morton Denlow : Enter agreed scheduling order. Mailed notice (las, ) (Entered: 08/31/2007)

08/27/2007 163 AGREED Scheduling Order Signed by Judge Morton Denlow on 8/27/2007:(las, ) (Entered: 08/31/2007)

08/27/2007

164 EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE ORDER:Case referred to magistrate judge Susan E. Cox. (See order for details). Signed by Judge Executive Committee on 8/27/07. Mailed notice(emd, ) (Entered: 08/31/2007)

08/29/2007 160 MOTION by Defendant Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. for order re: Entry of Rule 16 Scheduling Order (Lightfoot, Lori) (Entered: 08/29/2007)

08/29/2007

161 NOTICE of Motion by Lori E. Lightfoot for presentment of motion for order 160 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 9/6/2007 at 09:15 AM. (Lightfoot, Lori) (Entered: 08/29/2007)

09/04/2007

165 MEMORANDUM by Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. in Opposition to motion to compel, 157 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Exhibit B# 3 Exhibit C# 4 Exhibit D# 5 Exhibit E# 6 Exhibit F# 7 Exhibit G# 8 Exhibit H# 9 Exhibit I# 10 Exhibit J# 11 Exhibit K)(Lightfoot, Lori) (Entered: 09/04/2007)

09/04/2007

166 MEMORANDUM by Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. in Opposition to motion to compel 152 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, Part 1# 2 Exhibit A, Part 2# 3 Exhibit B# 4 Exhibit C# 5 Exhibit D# 6 Exhibit E, Part 1# 7 Exhibit E, Part 2# 8 Exhibit F# 9 Exhibit G# 10 Exhibit H# 11 Exhibit I# 12 Exhibit J)(Lightfoot, Lori) (Entered: 09/04/2007)

09/04/2007

167 MEMORANDUM by Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. in Opposition to motion to compel, 155 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Exhibit B# 3 Exhibit C# 4 Exhibit D# 5 Exhibit E# 6 Exhibit F# 7 Exhibit G# 8 Exhibit H# 9 Exhibit I# 10 Exhibit J) (Lightfoot, Lori) (Entered: 09/04/2007)

09/04/2007 168 TRANSCRIPT of proceedings for the following dates: 6/14/2007; Before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman. (Document not scanned) (td, ) (Entered: 09/05/2007)

09/04/2007

170 EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE ORDER: Case reassigned to Judge Michael T. Mason for all further proceedings. Signed by Executive Committee on 9/4/2007. Mailed Notice. (td, ) (Entered: 09/07/2007)

09/06/2007

169 MINUTE entry before Judge Morton Denlow :Motion hearing held on 9/6/2007 regarding motion to compel 152 , motion to compel, 157 , motion to compel, 155 . Plaintiff's motion to compel responsive data and related information 155 is entered and continued for oral argument regarding Defendant's recent production of Selective Pre-2001 Data. Plaintiff has until 9/27/07 to ﬁle a brief seeking additional documents and Defendant has until 10/11/07 to respond. Oral argument set for 10/18/07 at 10:30 a.m. All other matters in Plaintiff's motion to compel 155 with respect to Defendant's motion to compel responsive data and related information is resolved by the parties as stated in open Court. Plaintiff's motion to compel 152 is granted in part and denied in part. Plaintiff's motion to compel gender data and employee data on FAC is denied. Plaintiff's motion to compel personnel

https://ecf.ilnd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?743598400534567-L_1_0-1

23/64

10/26/2017
09/06/2007 09/07/2007 09/11/2007 09/13/2007 09/13/2007 09/19/2007 09/20/2007 09/28/2007 09/28/2007 09/28/2007 10/03/2007

CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 6.1.1.2 - U.S. District Court, Northern Illinois
and wage information on Financial Advisors employed in the Firm's Financial Advisory Center is denied. Plaintiff's motion to compel racial discrimination complaints against managers who managed during the "class period" is granted in part. Plaintiff to submit up to 5 names of people who already have had complaints against them from the years of 2001 - 2006 to Defendants by 9/7/07. Defendants have until 9/27/07 to check those ﬁle to see if there are any additional race discrimination complaints prior to 2001 against them. Plaintiff's motion to compel production of documents, data, interrogatory responses and identiﬁcation of responsive information 157 is withdrawn in part and denied in part. Item Nos. 1, 2, 3, 5, 6 and 7 have been worked out by the parties as stated in open Court. Plaintiff's motion to compel the production of management assessment ﬁle (Item No. 4) is denied for the reasons stated in open Court. Status hearing held and continued to 10/18/07 at 10:30 a.m. Motions terminated: MOTION by Plaintiff George McReynolds to compel 152 , MOTION by Plaintiff George McReynolds to compel Production of documents, data, interrogatory responses and identiﬁcation of responsive information 157 . (dmk, ) (Entered: 09/06/2007)
171 MINUTE entry before Judge Robert W. Gettleman :Motion for order 160 is granted. Amendments are due by 12/28/2007. Marshall Miller is dismissed as a a named class representative (not as a plaintiff). Status hearing held on 9/6/2007. Status hearing set for 10/4/2007 at 09:00 a.m.Mailed notice (gds, ) (Entered: 09/10/2007)
172 EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE ORDER:Case referred to magistrate judge Morton Denlow. (See order for details) Signed by Judge Executive Committee on 9/7/07. Mailed notices. (amb, ) (Entered: 09/13/2007)
175 STIPULATION and Order Signed by Judge Morton Denlow on 9/11/2007. Mailed notice (td, ) (Entered: 09/14/2007)
173 MOTION by counsel for Plaintiffs Cathy Bender-Jackson, Leroy Brown, Leslie Browne, Glenn Capel, Christina Coleman, Larue Gibson, Maroc Howard, Mark Johnson, J. Yves Laborde, Jennifer Madrid, Marshell Miller, Carnell Moore, Frankie Ross, Stephen Smartt, Henry Wilson, Marva York, George McReynolds to withdraw as attorney nunc pro tunc Unopposed (Wood, James) (Entered: 09/13/2007)
174 NOTICE of Motion by James Bryan Wood for presentment of motion to withdraw as attorney, 173 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 9/19/2007 at 09:15 AM. (Wood, James) (Entered: 09/13/2007)
177 MINUTE entry before Judge Robert W. Gettleman : Plaintiffs' unopposed motion 173 for leave to withdraw the appearance of Attorney J. Bryan Wood nunc pro tunc is granted. Mailed notice (td, ) (Entered: 09/26/2007)
176 MINUTE entry before Judge Robert W. Gettleman :Status hearing is re-set to 10/24/2007 at 09:00 a.m.Mailed notice (gds, ) (Entered: 09/20/2007)
178 MOTION by Plaintiff George McReynolds for extension of time to File Brief (Bish, Suzanne) (Entered: 09/28/2007)
179 NOTICE of Motion by Suzanne E. Bish for presentment of extension of time 178 before Honorable Morton Denlow on 10/4/2007 at 10:00 AM. (Bish, Suzanne) (Entered: 09/28/2007)
180 TRANSCRIPT of proceedings for the following dates: 9/6/2007; Before the Honorable Morton Denlow. (Document not scanned) (td, ) (Entered: 10/01/2007)
181 MINUTE entry before Judge Morton Denlow :Motion for four day extension of time until 10/3/07 to ﬁle brief 178 is granted. Motions terminated: Motion hearing set for 10/4/07 is stricken.Mailed notice (dmk, ) (Entered: 10/03/2007)

https://ecf.ilnd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?743598400534567-L_1_0-1

24/64

10/26/2017
10/03/2007

CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 6.1.1.2 - U.S. District Court, Northern Illinois
182 MEMORANDUM order on motion for extension of time, terminate motions, terminate hearings 181 , order on motion to compel,,, motion hearing, magistrate judge status hearing, set/reset hearings, set motion and R&R deadlines/hearings, terminate motions,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, 169 , motion to compel, 155 by Cathy Bender-Jackson, Leroy Brown, Leslie Browne, Glenn Capel, Christina Coleman, Larue Gibson, Maroc Howard, Mark Johnson, J. Yves Laborde, Jennifer Madrid, Marshell Miller, Carnell Moore, Frankie Ross, Stephen Smartt, Henry Wilson, Marva York, George McReynolds Supplemental Filing in Support of Motion to Compel Production of the Year 2000 Data (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Exhibit B)(Friedman, Linda) (Entered: 10/03/2007)

10/10/2007

183 MINUTE entry before Judge Morton Denlow :By agreement of the parties, Plaintiff George McReynolds Motion to compel Responsive Data and Related Information and Relief 155 is withdrawn. Motions terminated: (dmk, ) (Entered: 10/10/2007)

10/10/2007

184 MINUTE entry before Judge Morton Denlow :Oral argument and status hearing set for 10/18/07 are stricken. Status hearing is reset to 11/13/2007 at 10:00 AM.Mailed notice (dmk, ) (Entered: 10/10/2007)

10/22/2007

186 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiffs Cathy Bender-Jackson, Leroy Brown, Leslie Browne, Glenn Capel, Christina Coleman, Larue Gibson, Maroc Howard, Mark Johnson, J. Yves Laborde, Jennifer Madrid, Marshell Miller, Carnell Moore, Frankie Ross, Stephen Smartt, Henry Wilson, Marva York, George McReynolds by Jennifer Schoen Gilbert. (td, ) (Entered: 10/24/2007)

10/23/2007 185 MINUTE entry before Judge Robert W. Gettleman :Status hearing is re-set to 11/13/2007 at 09:00 AM.Telephone notice (gds, ) (Entered: 10/23/2007)

11/13/2007

187 MINUTE entry before Judge Robert W. Gettleman :Status hearing is re-set tor 12/11/2007 at 09:00 AM.Telephone notice (gds, ) (Entered: 11/13/2007)

11/15/2007

188 MINUTE entry before Judge Morton Denlow :Status hearing set for 12/20/2007 at 10:00 AM.Mailed notice (dmk, ) (Entered: 11/15/2007)

12/06/2007 189 MINUTE entry before Judge Robert W. Gettleman: Status hearing date of 12/11/2007 is stricken. Telephone notice (gds, ) (Entered: 12/06/2007)

12/17/2007 190 MOTION by Defendant Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. for extension of time of Expert Discovery Schedule (Lightfoot, Lori) (Entered: 12/17/2007)

12/17/2007

191 NOTICE of Motion by Lori E. Lightfoot for presentment of extension of time 190 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 12/20/2007 at 10:00 AM. (Lightfoot, Lori) (Entered: 12/17/2007)

12/17/2007

192 NOTICE of Motion by Lori E. Lightfoot for presentment of extension of time 190 before Honorable Morton Denlow on 12/20/2007 at 10:00 AM. (Lightfoot, Lori) (Entered: 12/17/2007)

12/20/2007

193 MINUTE entry before Judge Morton Denlow : Magistrate status hearing held. Defendant's motion for extension of time of expert discovery schedule 190 is withdrawn. Enter agreed order. The 8/27/07 order is vacated and superseded by the schedule set forth in the agreed order dated 12/20/07. Status hearing continued to 2/19/08 at 10:15 a.m. Mailed notice (td, ) (Entered: 12/26/2007)

12/20/2007 194 AGREED ORDER Signed by Judge Morton Denlow on 12/20/2007. (td, ) (Entered: 12/26/2007)

01/04/2008 195 TRANSCRIPT of proceedings for the following dates: 5/2/2007, 5/16/2007; Before the Honorable Morton Denlow. (gej, ) (Entered: 01/07/2008)

https://ecf.ilnd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?743598400534567-L_1_0-1

25/64

10/26/2017
01/18/2008

CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 6.1.1.2 - U.S. District Court, Northern Illinois
196 MOTION by Defendant Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. to set a brieﬁng schedule (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1# 2 Exhibit 2)(Lightfoot, Lori) (Entered: 01/18/2008)

01/18/2008

197 NOTICE of Motion by Lori E. Lightfoot for presentment of motion by ﬁler to set a brieﬁng schedule 196 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 1/24/2008 at 09:15 AM. (Lightfoot, Lori) (Entered: 01/18/2008)

01/23/2008

198 MINUTE entry before Judge Robert W. Gettleman :The date for presentation of the motion to adopt is re-set from 1/24/2008 to 2/7/2008 at 09:15 a.m.Telephone notice (gds, ) (Entered: 01/23/2008)

02/07/2008

199 MINUTE entry before Judge Robert W. Gettleman: Defendant's motion to adopt proposed scheduling order is re-set to 2/20/2008 at 09:15 a.m. Telephone notice (gds,) (Entered: 02/07/2008)

02/19/2008 200 MINUTE entry before Judge Morton Denlow : Status hearing set for 2/19/08 is stricken. (dmk, ) (Entered: 02/19/2008)

02/21/2008

201 MINUTE entry before Judge Robert W. Gettleman: Motion hearing held. Defendant's motion to adopt proposed scheduling order is denied. Status hearing set for 7/22/2008 at 09:30 AM. Mailed notice (gds,) (Entered: 02/21/2008)

02/28/2008 202 MINUTE entry before Judge Morton Denlow :Status hearing set for 7/22/2008 at 10:00 AM.Mailed notice (dmk, ) (Entered: 02/28/2008)

02/28/2008

203 MOTION by Defendants Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. to disqualify counsel Stowell & Friedman, LTD. as Counsel For Plaintiff Jennifer Madrid. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Exhibit B# 3 Exhibit C# 4 Exhibit D# 5 Exhibit E# 6 Exhibit F# 7 Exhibit G# 8 Exhibit H# 9 Certiﬁcate of Service)(Lightfoot, Lori) (Entered: 02/28/2008)

02/28/2008

204 NOTICE of Motion by Lori E. Lightfoot for presentment of motion to disqualify counsel, 203 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 3/18/2008 at 09:15 AM. (Attachments: # 1 Certiﬁcate of Service)(Lightfoot, Lori) (Entered: 02/28/2008)

03/17/2008 205 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendant Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. by Mark McLaughlin (McLaughlin, Mark) (Entered: 03/17/2008)

03/26/2008

206 MINUTE entry before Judge Honorable Robert W. Gettleman:Motion to disqualify counsel 203 is denied; Motion hearing held on 3/26/2008 regarding motion to disqualify counsel, 203 Mailed notice (gds, ) (Entered: 03/26/2008)

04/21/2008 207 MOTION by Plaintiff George McReynolds to compel Information Regarding Data (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Friedman, Linda) (Entered: 04/21/2008)

04/21/2008

208 NOTICE of Motion by Linda Debra Friedman for presentment of motion to compel 207 before Honorable Morton Denlow on 4/23/2008 at 09:15 AM. (Friedman, Linda) (Entered: 04/21/2008)

04/22/2008

209 RESPONSE by Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.in Opposition to MOTION by Plaintiff George McReynolds to compel Information Regarding Data 207 (Diomedi, Gina) (Entered: 04/22/2008)

04/22/2008 210 REPLY by Plaintiff George McReynolds to motion to compel 207 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Ex. A Dec 2, 2007 Order)(Friedman, Linda) (Entered: 04/22/2008)

04/23/2008

211 MINUTE entry before Judge Honorable Morton Denlow:Motion hearing held on 4/23/2008 regarding motion to compel 207 . Motion to compel 207 is granted in part and denied in part as stated in open Court. Motions terminated: MOTION by Plaintiff George

https://ecf.ilnd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?743598400534567-L_1_0-1

26/64

10/26/2017

CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 6.1.1.2 - U.S. District Court, Northern Illinois
McReynolds to compel Information Regarding Data 207 Mailed notice (dmk, ) (Entered: 04/23/2008)

05/08/2008 212 TRANSCRIPT of proceedings for the following dates: 9/6/2007, 3/18/2008; Before the Honorable Honorable Robert W. Gettleman. (2 Volumes) (gej, ) (Entered: 05/09/2008)

05/19/2008 213 MOTION by Defendant Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. for discovery to Revise the Expert Discovery Schedule (Lightfoot, Lori) (Entered: 05/19/2008)

05/19/2008

214 Agreed NOTICE of Motion by Lori E. Lightfoot for presentment of motion for discovery 213 before Honorable Morton Denlow on 5/21/2008 at 09:15 AM. (Lightfoot, Lori) (Entered: 05/19/2008)

05/20/2008

215 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Morton Denlow:Agreed Motion to revise expert discovery schedule 213 is granted. Enter agreed order. The 12/20/08 order is vacated and superseded by the schedule set forth in the agreed order dated 5/20/08. Motion hearing set for 5/21/08 is stricken. Motions terminated: Mailed notice (dmk, ) (Entered: 05/20/2008)

05/20/2008 216 Agreed ORDER Signed by the Honorable Morton Denlow on 5/20/2008:Mailed notice(dmk, ) (Entered: 05/20/2008)

05/29/2008 217 TRANSCRIPT of proceedings for the following dates: 7/31/2007; Before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman. (Document not scanned) (aac, ) (Entered: 05/30/2008)

07/17/2008

218 MOTION by Defendant Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. to set a brieﬁng schedule (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit 4) (Lightfoot, Lori) (Entered: 07/17/2008)

07/17/2008

219 NOTICE of Motion by Lori E. Lightfoot for presentment of motion by ﬁler to set a brieﬁng schedule 218 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 7/22/2008 at 09:15 AM. (Lightfoot, Lori) (Entered: 07/17/2008)

07/17/2008

220 Amended NOTICE of Motion by Lori E. Lightfoot for presentment of motion by ﬁler to set a brieﬁng schedule 218 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 7/22/2008 at 09:15 AM. (Lightfoot, Lori) (Entered: 07/17/2008)

07/22/2008

221 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Morton Denlow:Magistrate Judge Status hearing held on 7/22/2008. Status hearing set for 10/7/2008 at 10:00 AM.Mailed notice (dmk, ) (Entered: 07/22/2008)

07/22/2008

222 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Motion to set a brieﬁng schedule 218 is denied without prejudice. Status hearing held on 7/22/2008. Status hearing set for 10/7/2008 at 9:00 a.m. Mailed notice (gds, ) (Entered: 07/22/2008)

08/26/2008

223 MOTION by Defendant Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. to Revise Expert Discovery Schedule (Attachments: # 1 Certiﬁcate of Service)(Lightfoot, Lori) (Entered: 08/26/2008)

08/26/2008

224 NOTICE of Motion by Lori E. Lightfoot for presentment of motion for miscellaneous relief 223 before Honorable Morton Denlow on 9/4/2008 at 10:30 AM. (Attachments: # 1 Certiﬁcate of Service)(Lightfoot, Lori) (Entered: 08/26/2008)

09/03/2008

225 OBJECTIONS by George McReynolds to MOTION by Defendant Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. to Revise Expert Discovery Schedule 223 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit F-1, # 7 Exhibit F-2, # 8 Exhibit G, # 9 Exhibit H, # 10 Exhibit I, # 11 Exhibit J, # 12 Exhibit K, # 13 Exhibit L, # 14 Exhibit M)(Friedman, Linda) (Entered: 09/03/2008)

09/04/2008 226 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Morton Denlow: Motion hearing held on 9/4/2008 regarding motion to revise expert discovery schedule 223 . Motion to revise expert

https://ecf.ilnd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?743598400534567-L_1_0-1

27/64

10/26/2017
09/04/2008 09/08/2008 09/08/2008 09/10/2008
09/11/2008 09/22/2008 09/22/2008 09/25/2008
09/30/2008 10/03/2008 10/03/2008 10/03/2008 10/06/2008
10/06/2008

CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 6.1.1.2 - U.S. District Court, Northern Illinois
discovery schedule 223 is granted. Enter order. Motions terminated: MOTION by Defendant Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. to Revise Expert Discovery Schedule 223 . (For further details see separate order.)Mailed notice (dmk, ) (Entered: 09/04/2008)
227 ORDER Signed by the Honorable Morton Denlow on 9/4/2008:Mailed notice(dmk, ) (Entered: 09/04/2008)
228 MOTION by Defendant Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. to compel certain documents related to Plaintiffs' expert reports (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D)(Lightfoot, Lori) (Entered: 09/08/2008)
229 NOTICE of Motion by Lori E. Lightfoot for presentment of motion to compel 228 before Honorable Morton Denlow on 9/10/2008 at 09:15 AM. (Lightfoot, Lori) (Entered: 09/08/2008)
230 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Morton Denlow: Motion hearing held on 9/10/2008 regarding motion to compel 228 . Motion to compel 228 is granted as stated in open Court. Motions terminated: MOTION by Defendant Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. to compel certain documents related to Plaintiffs' expert reports 228 . Mailed notice (dmk, ) (Entered: 09/10/2008)
231 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice Filing fee $ 50, receipt number 07520000000003098292. (Bonk, Jason) (Entered: 09/11/2008)
232 MOTION by Defendant Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. for hearing to Change Status Date. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1)(Lightfoot, Lori) (Entered: 09/22/2008)
233 NOTICE of Motion by Lori E. Lightfoot for presentment of motion for hearing 232 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 9/25/2008 at 09:15 AM. (Lightfoot, Lori) (Entered: 09/22/2008)
234 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Motion 232 to reset status hearing is granted. Motion hearing held on 9/25/2008 regarding said motion 232 . Plaintiff's class certiﬁcation motion is due by 10/21/2008. Status hearing is re-set to 10/23/2008 at 9:30 a.m. Mailed notice (gds, ) (Entered: 09/29/2008)
235 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Motion 231 of Jason B. Bonk for leave to appear pro hac vice is granted. Mailed notice (gmr, ) (Entered: 09/30/2008)
236 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Plaintiffs are given an extension of gtime to 10/24/2008 to ﬁle motion for class certiﬁcation. Status hearing is reset to 10/28/2008 at 9:30 a.m. Mailed notice (gds, ) (Entered: 10/03/2008)
237 MOTION by Defendants Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. for partial summary judgment (Attachments: # 1 Certiﬁcate of Service) (Lightfoot, Lori) (Entered: 10/03/2008)
238 NOTICE of Motion by Lori E. Lightfoot for presentment of motion for partial summary judgment 237 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 10/28/2008 at 09:15 AM. (Attachments: # 1 Certiﬁcate of Service)(Lightfoot, Lori) (Entered: 10/03/2008)
241 MEMORANDUM by Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. in support of motion for partial summary judgment 237 (REDACTED) (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 through 3, # 2 Afﬁdavit of Jason B. Bonk in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, # 3 Exhibit A-F to Afﬁdavit of Jason B. Bonk, # 4 Afﬁdavit of John Hogarty, # 5 Certiﬁcate of Service)(Lightfoot, Lori) (Entered: 10/06/2008)
242 RULE 56 Statement by Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. regarding motion for

https://ecf.ilnd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?743598400534567-L_1_0-1

28/64

10/26/2017
10/06/2008 10/17/2008

CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 6.1.1.2 - U.S. District Court, Northern Illinois
partial summary judgment 237 (Redacted) (Attachments: # 1 Certiﬁcate of Service) (Lightfoot, Lori) (Entered: 10/06/2008)
243 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Morton Denlow: Status hearing reset to 10/28/2008 at 10:00 AM. on request of the parties. Status hearing set for 10/7/08 is stricken.Mailed notice (dmk, ) (Entered: 10/06/2008)
244 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS held on 9/10/2008 before the Honorable Morton Denlow. Court Reporter Contact Information: Riki Schatell, 773-728-7281, schatell@sbcglobal.net.

IMPORTANT: The transcript may be viewed at the court's public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through the Court Reporter/Transcriber or PACER. For further information on the redaction process, see the Court's web site at www.ilnd.uscourts.gov under Quick Links select Policy Regarding the Availability of Transcripts of Court Proceedings.

10/21/2008 10/21/2008 10/28/2008 10/28/2008
11/18/2008
11/18/2008
11/18/2008 11/18/2008

Redaction Request due 11/7/2008. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 11/17/2008. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 1/15/2009. (cem, ) (Entered: 10/20/2008)
245 MOTION by Plaintiff George McReynolds to set a brieﬁng schedule Agreed Motion (Bish, Suzanne) (Entered: 10/21/2008)
246 NOTICE of Motion by Suzanne E. Bish for presentment of motion by ﬁler to set a brieﬁng schedule 245 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 10/28/2008 at 09:15 AM. (Bish, Suzanne) (Entered: 10/21/2008)
247 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Morton Denlow:Magistrate Judge Status hearing held on 10/28/2008. Status hearing set for 1/29/2009 at 10:00 AM.Mailed notice (dmk, ) (Entered: 10/28/2008)
248 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Status hearing held on 10/28/2008. Motion to set a brieﬁng schedule 245 is granted in part and denied in part. Plaintiffs' motion for class certiﬁcation is due by 11/18/2008. Plaintiffs' response to defendant's summary judgment motion is due by 11/18/2008. Status hearing set for 12/4/2008 at 11:00 a.m. Mailed notice (gds, ) (Entered: 10/29/2008)
249 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiffs Cathy Bender-Jackson, Leroy Brown, Leslie Browne, Glenn Capel, Christina Coleman, Larue Gibson, Maroc Howard, Mark Johnson, J. Yves Laborde, Jennifer Madrid, Marshell Miller, Carnell Moore, Frankie Ross, Stephen Smartt, Henry Wilson, Marva York, George McReynolds by Rafael Eduardo Lazaro (Lazaro, Rafael) (Entered: 11/18/2008)
250 MOTION by Plaintiffs Cathy Bender-Jackson, Leroy Brown, Leslie Browne, Glenn Capel, Christina Coleman, Larue Gibson, Maroc Howard, Mark Johnson, J. Yves Laborde, Jennifer Madrid, Marshell Miller, Carnell Moore, Frankie Ross, Stephen Smartt, Henry Wilson, Marva York, George McReynolds to strike MOTION by Defendants Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. for partial summary judgment 237 (Friedman, Linda) (Entered: 11/18/2008)
251 NOTICE of Motion by Linda Debra Friedman for presentment of motion to strike, motion for relief,, 250 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 12/4/2008 at 09:15 AM. (Friedman, Linda) (Entered: 11/18/2008)
252 MOTION by Plaintiffs Cathy Bender-Jackson, Leroy Brown, Leslie Browne, Glenn Capel, Christina Coleman, Larue Gibson, Maroc Howard, Mark Johnson, J. Yves Laborde, Jennifer Madrid, Marshell Miller, Carnell Moore, Frankie Ross, Stephen Smartt,

https://ecf.ilnd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?743598400534567-L_1_0-1

29/64

10/26/2017

CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 6.1.1.2 - U.S. District Court, Northern Illinois
Henry Wilson, Marva York, George McReynolds to seal Petition for Class Certiﬁcation, Memorandum of Law in Support thereof and Compendium of Exhibits (Friedman, Linda) (Entered: 11/18/2008)

11/18/2008

253 NOTICE of Motion by Linda Debra Friedman for presentment of motion to seal, 252 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 12/4/2009 at 09:15 AM. (Friedman, Linda) (Entered: 11/18/2008)

11/18/2008

254 MOTION by Plaintiff George McReynolds for leave to ﬁle excess pages (Friedman, Linda) (Entered: 11/18/2008)

11/18/2008

255 NOTICE of Motion by Linda Debra Friedman for presentment of motion for leave to ﬁle excess pages 254 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 12/4/2008 at 09:15 AM. (Friedman, Linda) (Entered: 11/18/2008)

11/18/2008

256 Notice of Motion by Linda Debra Friedman for presentment of Motion for Class Certiﬁcation NOTICE of Motion by Linda Debra Friedman for presentment of before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 12/4/2008 at 09:15 AM. (Friedman, Linda) (Entered: 11/18/2008)

11/18/2008

257 MOTION by Plaintiff George McReynolds to certify class (Friedman, Linda) (Entered: 11/18/2008)

11/18/2008

258 MEMORANDUM of Law by Plaintiffs in support of motion to certify class 257 . (RESTRICTED). (gmr, ) (Entered: 11/19/2008)

11/18/2008

259 EXHIBITS by Plaintiffs regarding memorandum of law in support of motion to certify class 258 . (259-1 through 259-21). (RESTRICTED). (gmr, ) (Entered: 11/19/2008)

11/21/2008

260 MOTION by Plaintiff George McReynolds for leave to ﬁle Corrected Memorandum of Law Under Seal (Friedman, Linda) (Entered: 11/21/2008)

11/21/2008

261 NOTICE of Motion by Linda Debra Friedman for presentment of motion for leave to ﬁle 260 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 12/4/2008 at 09:15 AM. (Friedman, Linda) (Entered: 11/21/2008)

11/21/2008

262 CORRECTED MEMORANDUM of Law by Plaintiffs in support of Plaintiffs' motion for class certiﬁcation 257 . (RESTRICTED). (gmr, ) (Entered: 11/24/2008)

11/26/2008

263 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Plaintiff's unopposed motion 260 for leave to ﬁle corrected memorandum is granted. Mailed notice (ep, ) (Entered: 12/01/2008)

12/04/2008

264 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Status hearing held. Plaintiffs' motion 250 to strike defendants' motion 237 for partial summary judgment is granted. Plaintiffs' motion 252 to seal documents is withdrawn. Plaintiffs' motion 254 to ﬁle brief in excess of 15 pages is granted. Response to plaintiffs' motion 257 for class certiﬁcation is due by 4/30/2009. Reply is due by 5/21/2009. Status hearing continued to 7/16/2009, at 9:00 a.m. Mailed notice (gmr, ) (Entered: 12/08/2008)

12/16/2008

265 MOTION by Plaintiff George McReynolds to compel (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit EX 1 part 1, # 2 Exhibit EX 1 part 2, # 3 Exhibit EX 1 part 3, # 4 Exhibit EX 2, # 5 Exhibit EX 3, # 6 Exhibit EX 4, # 7 Exhibit EX 5, # 8 Exhibit EX 6)(Friedman, Linda) (Entered: 12/16/2008)

12/16/2008

266 NOTICE of Motion by Linda Debra Friedman for presentment of motion to compel, 265 before Honorable Morton Denlow on 12/22/2008 at 09:15 AM. (Friedman, Linda) (Entered: 12/16/2008)

12/19/2008 267 RESPONSE by Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.in Opposition to MOTION by

https://ecf.ilnd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?743598400534567-L_1_0-1

30/64

10/26/2017
12/19/2008 12/19/2008 12/19/2008 12/22/2008
12/22/2008 12/22/2008 12/22/2008 12/31/2008 12/31/2008 01/06/2009 01/08/2009 01/16/2009
01/21/2009

CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 6.1.1.2 - U.S. District Court, Northern Illinois
Plaintiff George McReynolds to compel 265 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit 4)(Lightfoot, Lori) (Entered: 12/19/2008)
268 REPLY by Plaintiff George McReynolds to motion to compel, 265 (Friedman, Linda) (Entered: 12/19/2008)
269 MOTION by Plaintiff George McReynolds for leave to ﬁle Exhibit A to Reply Under Seal (Friedman, Linda) (Entered: 12/19/2008)
270 NOTICE of Motion by Linda Debra Friedman for presentment of motion for leave to ﬁle 269 before Honorable Morton Denlow on 12/24/2008 at 09:15 AM. (Friedman, Linda) (Entered: 12/19/2008)
271 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Morton Denlow:Motion hearing held on 12/22/2008 regarding motion to compel, 265 ; motion for leave to ﬁle 269 . Motion to compel 265 is denied as stated in open Court. Motion for leave to ﬁle Exhibit A to Reply Under Seal 269 is granted. Motions terminated: MOTION by Plaintiff George McReynolds to compel 265 ; MOTION by Plaintiff George McReynolds for leave to ﬁle Exhibit A to Reply Under Seal 269 . Motion hearing set for 12/24/08 is stricken. Mailed notice (dmk, ) (Entered: 12/22/2008)
272 ENTERED in error. (dmk, ) (ar, ). (Entered: 12/22/2008)
273 NOTICE of Correction regarding docket entry no. 272 . (ar, ) (Entered: 12/22/2008)
274 EXHIBIT A by Plaintiff George McReynolds to reply in support of motion to compel 268 . (RESTRICTED). (gmr, ) (Entered: 12/23/2008)
275 Objections to Magistrate Judge Denlow's Order Denying Motion to Compel And/Or Motion For Protective Order by George McReynolds (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A) (Friedman, Linda) (Entered: 12/31/2008)
276 NOTICE of Motion by Linda Debra Friedman for presentment of before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 1/8/2009 at 09:15 AM. (Friedman, Linda) (Entered: 12/31/2008)
277 RESPONSE by Defendant Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. to other 275 (Pappas, Nicholas) (Entered: 01/06/2009)
278 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: In Court hearing on plaintiff's objections to Magistrate Judge's order held and continued to 1/21/2009 at 2:00 p.m. Mailed notice (gds, ) (Entered: 01/08/2009)
279 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS held on 12-22-08 before the Honorable Morton Denlow. Court Reporter Contact Information: KATHLEEN M. FENNELL, (312) 4355569, Kathleen_Fennell@ilnd.uscourts.gov.
IMPORTANT: The transcript may be viewed at the court's public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through the Court Reporter/Transcriber or PACER. For further information on the redaction process, see the Court's web site at www.ilnd.uscourts.gov under Quick Links select Policy Regarding the Availability of Transcripts of Court Proceedings.
Redaction Request due 2/6/2009. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 2/17/2009. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 4/16/2009. (Fennell, Kathleen) (Entered: 01/16/2009)
280 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Status hearing held on 1/21/2009. Plaintiff's objections 275 to Magistrate Judge's order denying motion to

https://ecf.ilnd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?743598400534567-L_1_0-1

31/64

10/26/2017

CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 6.1.1.2 - U.S. District Court, Northern Illinois
compel and/or motion for protective order are denied without prejudice. Mailed notice (gds, ) (Entered: 01/23/2009)

01/28/2009

281 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Morton Denlow: Status hearing reset to 3/5/2009 at 10:00 AM. on request of the parties. Status hearing set for 1/29/09 is stricken.Mailed notice (dmk, ) (Entered: 01/28/2009)

02/20/2009

282 MOTION by Plaintiff George McReynolds, Defendant Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. for extension of time for Class Certiﬁcation Brieﬁng Schedule (Bish, Suzanne) (Entered: 02/20/2009)

02/20/2009

283 NOTICE of Motion by Suzanne E. Bish for presentment of extension of time 282 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 2/26/2009 at 09:15 AM. (Bish, Suzanne) (Entered: 02/20/2009)

02/20/2009 284 MOTION by Plaintiff George McReynolds, Defendant Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. for extension of time for Expert Discovery Schedule (Bish, Suzanne) (Entered: 02/20/2009)

02/20/2009

285 NOTICE of Motion by Suzanne E. Bish for presentment of extension of time 284 before Honorable Morton Denlow on 2/25/2009 at 09:15 AM. (Bish, Suzanne) (Entered: 02/20/2009)

02/24/2009

286 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Morton Denlow:Agreed Motion for one-week extension of expert discovery schedule 284 is granted. Plaintiffs' expert rebuttal reports due on or by 2/23/09. Plaintiffs' production of discovery data and programming as deﬁned in paragraph 3 of the 9/11/07 stipulation and order by 2/23/09. Production of documents and data as deﬁned in paragraph 4 of 9/11/07 stipulation and order by 3/2/09. Completion of expert depositions by 4/6/09. Motions terminated: Motion hearing set for 2/25/09 is stricken.Mailed notice (dmk, ) (Entered: 02/24/2009)

02/26/2009

289 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Plaintiffs' motion 282 for extension of time for class certiﬁcation brieﬁng schedule is granted. Defendant's memorandum is due by 5/7/2009. Plaintiffs' reply is due by 5/28/2009. (For further detail see separate order.) Mailed notice (gmr, ) (Entered: 03/04/2009)

02/26/2009

290 AGREED ORDER For One-Week Extension of Class Certiﬁcation Brieﬁng Schedule Signed by the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 2/26/2009. (gmr, ) (Entered: 03/04/2009)

03/02/2009 287 MOTION by Defendant Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. to reassign case (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B)(Lightfoot, Lori) (Entered: 03/02/2009)

03/02/2009

288 Unopposed NOTICE of Motion by Lori E. Lightfoot for presentment of motion to reassign case 287 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 3/5/2009 at 09:15 AM. (Lightfoot, Lori) (Entered: 03/02/2009)

03/05/2009 291 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Morton Denlow: Status hearing reset to 6/11/2009 at 10:00 AM.Mailed notice (dmk, ) (Entered: 03/05/2009)

03/06/2009 292 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Defendant's unopposed motion to reassign case 287 is granted.Telephone notice (gds, ) (Entered: 03/06/2009)

03/20/2009 293 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice Filing fee $ 50, receipt number 07520000000003608134. (Dinkoff, Allan) (Entered: 03/20/2009)

03/27/2009 294 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Motion 293 of Allan Dinkoff for leave to appear pro hac vice is granted. Mailed notice (gmr, ) (Entered: 03/27/2009)

04/01/2009 295 MOTION by Plaintiff George McReynolds for extension of time to complete discovery Agreed Motion for Extension of Expert Discovery Schedule (Bish, Suzanne) (Entered:

https://ecf.ilnd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?743598400534567-L_1_0-1

32/64

10/26/2017
04/01/2009 04/01/2009 04/01/2009 04/02/2009
04/02/2009 04/06/2009
04/16/2009
04/16/2009 04/24/2009 05/11/2009 05/11/2009 05/15/2009 05/15/2009 05/15/2009

04/01/2009)

CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 6.1.1.2 - U.S. District Court, Northern Illinois

296 Agreed Notice of Motion NOTICE of Motion by Suzanne E. Bish for presentment of motion for extension of time to complete discovery 295 before Honorable Morton Denlow on 4/6/2009 at 09:15 AM. (Bish, Suzanne) (Entered: 04/01/2009)

297 MOTION by Plaintiff George McReynolds for extension of time Agreed Motion for Extension of Class Certiﬁcation Brieﬁng Schedule (Bish, Suzanne) (Entered: 04/01/2009)

298 Agreed Notice of Motion NOTICE of Motion by Suzanne E. Bish for presentment of extension of time 297 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 4/7/2009 at 09:15 AM. (Bish, Suzanne) (Entered: 04/01/2009)

299 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Morton Denlow:Motion for extension of time to complete expert discovery schedule 295 is granted. Completion of expert depositons by or on 4/30/09. Motion hearing set for 4/6/09 is stricken. Enter order. (For further details see separate order.)Mailed notice (dmk, ) (Entered: 04/02/2009)

300 AGREED ORDER to extend the schedule for expert discovery. Signed by the Honorable Morton Denlow on 4/2/2009:Mailed notice(dmk, ) (Entered: 04/02/2009)

301 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Agreed motion for extension 297 of class certiﬁcation brieﬁng schedule is granted. Response is due by 5/15/2009. Reply is due by 6/12/2009. Status hearing is re-set to 8/11/2009 at 9:00 a.m. Mailed notice (gds, ) (Entered: 04/06/2009)

302 MOTION by counsel for Defendants Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. to withdraw as attorney (Agreed Motion to Withdraw the Appearances of Adam K. Grant, Laura Lehman Dray and Mindy J. Spector) (Lightfoot, Lori) (Entered: 04/16/2009)

303 Agreed NOTICE of Motion by Lori E. Lightfoot for presentment of motion to withdraw as attorney, 302 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 4/23/2009 at 09:15 AM. (Lightfoot, Lori) (Entered: 04/16/2009)

304 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Defendant's motion 302 to withdraw the appearances of Adam K. Grant, Laura Lehman Dray and Mindy J. Spector as counsel for defendant is granted. Mailed notice (vcf, ) (Entered: 04/27/2009)

305 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendant Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. by Stephen Michael Shapiro (Shapiro, Stephen) (Entered: 05/11/2009)

306 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendant Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. by Timothy Simon Bishop. (gmr, ) (Entered: 05/13/2009)

307 MOTION by Defendant Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. to Exclude the Testimony and Opinions of Plaintiffs' Expert William T. Bielby, Ph.D. (Lightfoot, Lori) (Entered: 05/15/2009)

308 NOTICE of Motion by Lori E. Lightfoot for presentment of motion for miscellaneous relief 307 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 6/2/2009 at 09:15 AM. (Lightfoot, Lori) (Entered: 05/15/2009)

309 MOTION by Defendant Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. for leave to ﬁle excess pages (Attachments: # 1 Merril Lynch's Memorandum in Support of Its Motion to Exclude the Testimony and Opinions of Plainitffs' Expert William T. Bielby, Ph.D., # 2 Exhibit Part 1, # 3 Exhibit Part 2, # 4 Exhibit Part 3, # 5 Exhibit Part 4, # 6 Exhibit Part 5, # 7 Exhibit Part 6, # 8 Exhibit Part 7, # 9 Exhibit Part 8, # 10 Exhibit Part 9)(Lightfoot, Lori) (Entered: 05/15/2009)

https://ecf.ilnd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?743598400534567-L_1_0-1

33/64

10/26/2017
05/15/2009

CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 6.1.1.2 - U.S. District Court, Northern Illinois
310 NOTICE of Motion by Lori E. Lightfoot for presentment of motion for leave to ﬁle excess pages, 309 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 5/26/2009 at 09:15 AM. (Lightfoot, Lori) (Entered: 05/15/2009)

05/15/2009

311 Amended NOTICE of Motion by Lori E. Lightfoot for presentment of motion for miscellaneous relief 307 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 5/26/2009 at 09:15 AM. (Lightfoot, Lori) (Entered: 05/15/2009)

05/15/2009

312 MOTION by Defendant Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. for leave to ﬁle excess pages (Attachments: # 1 Merrill Lynch's Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certiﬁcation, # 2 Appendix Expert Reports - Part 1, # 3 Bielby Rebuttal Report, # 4 Bielby Report, # 5 Eriksen Report, # 6 Fernandez Report - Part 1, # 7 Fernandez Report - Part 2, # 8 Fernandez Report- Part 3, # 9 Fernandez Report - Part 4, # 10 Appendix Expert Reports - Part 2, # 11 Jones Report, # 12 Madden Rebuttal Report, # 13 Madden Report, # 14 Outtz Report - Part 1, # 15 Outtz Report - Part 2, # 16 Appendix Expert Reports - Part 3, # 17 Saad Report - Part 1, # 18 Saad Report - Part 2, # 19 Saad Report - Part 3)(Lightfoot, Lori) (Entered: 05/15/2009)

05/15/2009

313 APPENDIX motion for leave to ﬁle excess pages,,, 312 (Attachments: # 1 TAB A, # 2 TAB B, # 3 Andersen Afﬁdavit (Redacted), # 4 Armondo Afﬁdavit (Redacted), # 5 Barry Afﬁdavit, # 6 Back Afﬁdavit (Redacted), # 7 Bell Afﬁdavit (Redacted), # 8 Removed per Court order, # 9 Bettencourt Afﬁdavit (Redacted), # 10 Blanche Afﬁdavit (Redacted), # 11 Bowman Afﬁdavit (Redacted), # 12 Appendix II - Part 2, # 13 Casey Afﬁdavit (Redacted), # 14 Cassidy Afﬁdavit, # 15 Chahine Afﬁdavit (Redacted), # 16 Removed per Court order, # 17 Cunningham Afﬁdavit (Redacted), # 18 Etheridge Afﬁdavit (Redacted), # 19 Flippin Afﬁdavit (Redacted0, # 20 Foley Afﬁdavit (Redacted), # 21 Fonner Afﬁdavit (Redacted), # 22 Garcia Afﬁdavit (Redacted), # 23 Gaynor Afﬁdavit (Redacted), # 24 Good Afﬁdavit (Redacted), # 25 Halpin Afﬁdavit (Redacted), # 26 Henley Afﬁdavit (Redacted), # 27 Henry Afﬁdavit, # 28 Hornberger Afﬁdavit (Redacted), # 29 Hotham Afﬁdavit (Redacted), # 30 Houston Afﬁdavit (Redacted), # 31 King Afﬁdavit (Redacted), # 32 Appendix II - Part 3, # 33 Leigh Afﬁdavit (Redacted), # 34 Lowery Afﬁdavit (Redacted), # 35 Markham Afﬁdavit (Redacted), # 36 McGauley Afﬁdavit (Redacted), # 37 McLaughlin Afﬁdavit (Redacted), # 38 Miska Afﬁdavit (Redacted), # 39 Removed per Court order, # 40 Packard Afﬁdavit (Redacted), # 41 Ransdell Afﬁdavit (Redacted), # 42 Redmond Afﬁdavit, # 43 Roccanova Afﬁdavit (Redacted), # 44 Rolland Afﬁdavit (Redacted0, # 45 Appendix II - Part 4, # 46 Root Afﬁdavit (Redacted), # 47 Ross Afﬁdavit, # 48 Schimpf Afﬁdavit (Redacted), # 49 Removed per Court order, # 50 Sieg Afﬁdavit (Redacted) - Part 1, # 51 Sieg Afﬁdavit (Redacted) - Part 2, # 52 Sieg Afﬁdavit (Redacted) - Part 3, # 53 Appendix II - Part 5, # 54 Tate Afﬁdavit (Redacted), # 55 Thelander Afﬁdavit (Redacted), # 56 Walsh Afﬁdavit (Redacted), # 57 Woodliff Afﬁdavit (Redacted0, # 58 Woodlock Afﬁdavit (Redacted))(Lightfoot, Lori) Modiﬁed on 6/11/2009 (gmr, ). (Entered: 05/15/2009)

05/15/2009

314 APPENDIX motion for leave to ﬁle excess pages,,, 312 (Appendix III) (Attachments: # 1 Bender-Jackson Deposition (Redacted), # 2 Bielby Deposition, # 3 Brown Deposition (Redacted), # 4 Browne Deposition (Redacted0, # 5 Capel Deposition (Redacted), # 6 Coleman Deposition (Redacted), # 7 Gardner Deposition (Redacted), # 8 Gibson Deposition (Redacted), # 9 Hogarty Deposition (Redacted), # 10 Removed per Court order, # 11 Johnson Deposition (Redacted), # 12 LaBorde Deposition (Redacted), # 13 Appendix III - Part 2, # 14 Madden Deposition, # 15 Removed per Court order, # 16 McCann Deposition (Redacted), # 17 Removed per Court order, # 18 Removed per Court order, # 19 O'Neal Deposition (Redacted), # 20 Ross Deposition (Redacted), # 21 Sieg 01/16/07 Depposition (Redacted), # 22 Sieg 06/01/07 Deposition (Redacted), # 23 Sieg 11/29/06 Deposition (Redacted), # 24 Sieg 12/01/06 Deposition (Redacted), # 25 Smartt Deposition, # 26 Wilson Deposition (Redacted), # 27 Removed per Court order) (Lightfoot, Lori) Modiﬁed on 6/11/2009 (gmr,). (Entered: 05/15/2009)

https://ecf.ilnd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?743598400534567-L_1_0-1

34/64

10/26/2017

CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 6.1.1.2 - U.S. District Court, Northern Illinois

05/15/2009
05/15/2009 05/15/2009 05/15/2009
05/15/2009 05/15/2009 05/15/2009 05/15/2009 05/15/2009 05/15/2009 05/15/2009 05/15/2009 05/15/2009

315 APPENDIX motion for leave to ﬁle excess pages,,, 312 (APPENDIX IV) (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit 4 - Part 1, # 5 Exhibit 4 - Part 2, # 6 Exhibit 5, # 7 Appendix IV - Part 2, # 8 Exhibit 6, # 9 Exhibit 7, # 10 Exhibit 8 - Part 1, # 11 Exhibit 8 - Part 2, # 12 Exhibit 9, # 13 Exhibit 10)(Lightfoot, Lori) (Entered: 05/15/2009)
316 APPENDIX motion for leave to ﬁle excess pages,,, 312 (APPENDIX V) (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit 4)(Lightfoot, Lori) (Entered: 05/15/2009)
317 MOTION by Defendant Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. to bar Certain Opinions of Plaintiffs' Expert Janice Fanning Madden, Ph.D. and Alexander Vekker, Ph.D. (Lightfoot, Lori) (Entered: 05/15/2009)
318 MEMORANDUM by Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. in support of motion to bar 317 (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit A - Part 1, # 3 Exhibit A - Part 2, # 4 Exhibit B - Part 1, # 5 Exhibit B - Part 2, # 6 Exhibit C, # 7 Exhibit D - Part 1, # 8 Exhibit D - Part 2, # 9 Exhibit D - Part 3, # 10 Exhibit D - Part 4, # 11 Exhibit D - Part 5, # 12 Exhibit D - Part 6, # 13 Exhibit D - Part 7, # 14 Exhibit D - Part 8, # 15 Exhibit D Part 9, # 16 Exhibit D - Part 10, # 17 Exhibit D - Part 11, # 18 Exhibit D - Part 12, # 19 Exhibit D - Part 13, # 20 Exhibit E - Part 1, # 21 Exhibit E - Part 2, # 22 Exhibit F, # 23 Exhibit G, # 24 Exhibit H, # 25 Exhibit I, # 26 Exhibit J, # 27 Exhibit K, # 28 Exhibit L, # 29 Exhibit M, # 30 Exhibit N, # 31 Exhibit O, # 32 Exhibit P, # 33 Exhibit Q, # 34 Exhibit R)(Lightfoot, Lori) (Entered: 05/15/2009)
319 NOTICE of Motion by Lori E. Lightfoot for presentment of motion to bar 317 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 6/2/2009 at 09:15 AM. (Lightfoot, Lori) (Entered: 05/15/2009)
320 MOTION by Defendant Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. to strike Declarations of Current and Former Merrill Lynch Employees (Lightfoot, Lori) (Entered: 05/15/2009)
321 MEMORANDUM by Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. in support of motion to strike 320 (Lightfoot, Lori) (Entered: 05/15/2009)
322 NOTICE of Motion by Lori E. Lightfoot for presentment of motion to strike 320 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 6/2/2009 at 09:15 AM. (Lightfoot, Lori) (Entered: 05/15/2009)
323 MOTION by Defendant Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. for leave to ﬁle Redacted Exhibits Attached to Merrill Lynch's Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certiﬁcation (Lightfoot, Lori) (Entered: 05/15/2009)
324 Agreed NOTICE of Motion by Lori E. Lightfoot for presentment of motion for leave to ﬁle 323 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 6/2/2009 at 09:15 AM. (Lightfoot, Lori) (Entered: 05/15/2009)
325 MOTION by Defendant Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. for leave to ﬁle Redacted Version of Its Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike Declarations of Current and Former Merrill Lynch Employees (Lightfoot, Lori) (Entered: 05/15/2009)
326 NOTICE of Motion by Lori E. Lightfoot for presentment of motion for leave to ﬁle 325 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 6/2/2009 at 09:15 AM. (Lightfoot, Lori) (Entered: 05/15/2009)
327 Amended NOTICE of Motion by Lori E. Lightfoot for presentment of motion for miscellaneous relief 307 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 6/2/2009 at 09:15

https://ecf.ilnd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?743598400534567-L_1_0-1

35/64

10/26/2017
05/15/2009 05/20/2009 05/21/2009
05/21/2009 05/26/2009 05/26/2009 05/27/2009
06/04/2009 06/08/2009 06/08/2009
06/08/2009

CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 6.1.1.2 - U.S. District Court, Northern Illinois
AM. (Lightfoot, Lori) (Entered: 05/15/2009)
328 Amended NOTICE of Motion by Lori E. Lightfoot for presentment of motion for leave to ﬁle excess pages, 309 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 6/2/2009 at 09:15 AM. (Lightfoot, Lori) (Entered: 05/15/2009)
329 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Notice of presentment of motions 3078 309 312 317 320 323 325 is re-set to 5/27/2009 at 9:15 a.m. Mailed notice (gds, ) (Entered: 05/20/2009)
330 MOTION by Plaintiff George McReynolds to strike memorandum in support of motion,,, 318 , MOTION by Defendant Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. to bar Certain Opinions of Plaintiffs' Expert Janice Fanning Madden, Ph.D. and Alexander Vekker, Ph.D. 317 Motion to Strike Supplemental Declaration and Studies of Merrill Lynch's Expert, Dr. Saad, Which Form the Basis of Defendant's Daubert Motion Regarding Various Opinions of Janice Madden, Ph. D. and Alex Vekker, Ph. D. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit F, # 7 Exhibit G)(Friedman, Linda) (Entered: 05/21/2009)
331 NOTICE of Motion by Linda Debra Friedman for presentment of motion to strike, motion for relief,,,,,,, 330 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 5/27/2009 at 09:15 AM. (Friedman, Linda) (Entered: 05/21/2009)
332 OBJECTIONS Consolidated Objections to Defendant's Various Motions for Leave to File Opposition Papers to Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certiﬁcation (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit F, # 7 Exhibit G, # 8 Exhibit H)(Friedman, Linda) (Entered: 05/26/2009)
333 NOTICE by George McReynolds re objections, 332 Notice of Filing (Friedman, Linda) (Entered: 05/26/2009)
334 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Motions for leave to ﬁle 309 312 323 325 are granted. Defendants's response to plaintiff's motion 330 is due by 6/26/2009. Plaintiff's response to defendant's motions 307 320 is to be included in its reply brief in support of class certiﬁcation, which is now due 6/26/2009. Defendant is given leave to ﬁle unredacted version of motion in opposition to class certiﬁcation and related exhibits under seal. Mailed notice (hp, ) (Entered: 06/01/2009)
335 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman:The Clerk is directed to remove attachments #8, #16, #39 and #49 from docket entry no. 313 and attachments#10, #15, #17, #18 and #27 from docket entry no. 314.Counsel is granted leave to ﬁle redacted versions of those.Mailed notice (rp, ) (Entered: 06/05/2009)
336 EXHIBIT by Defendant Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. - Corrected regarding appendix,,,,,,,, 313 (Attachments: # 1 Afﬁdavit of Brett Bernard (Redacted), # 2 Afﬁdavit of David P. Conrad (Redacted), # 3 Afﬁdavit of Carol Nevins (Redacted), # 4 Afﬁdavit of Deborah L. Shepherd (Redacted))(Lightfoot, Lori) (Entered: 06/08/2009)
337 EXHIBIT by Defendant Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. - Corrected regarding appendix,,,, 314 (Attachments: # 1 Howard Deposition - Part 1 (Redacted), # 2 Howard Deposition - Part 2 (Redacted), # 3 Madrid Deposition - Part 1 (Redacted), # 4 Madrid Deposition - Part 2 (Redacted), # 5 McReynolds Deposition (Redacted), # 6 Moore Deposition (Redacted), # 7 York Deposition - Part 1 (Redacted), # 8 York Deposition - Part 2 (Redacted))(Lightfoot, Lori) (Entered: 06/08/2009)
338 UNREDACTED Version of Motion and Memorandum in Opposition to Class Certiﬁcation and Related Exhibits; Motion and Memorandum to Strike Declarations of

https://ecf.ilnd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?743598400534567-L_1_0-1

36/64

10/26/2017
06/09/2009 06/09/2009 06/26/2009
06/26/2009 06/26/2009
06/26/2009
06/26/2009 06/26/2009 06/26/2009 06/26/2009 06/26/2009

CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 6.1.1.2 - U.S. District Court, Northern Illinois
Current and Former Merrill Lynch Employees and Related Exhibits by Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. (RESTRICTED). (gmr, ) (Entered: 06/09/2009)
339 NOTICE by Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. re other, 338 (Lightfoot, Lori) (Entered: 06/09/2009)
340 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Morton Denlow: Status hearing reset to 8/11/2009 at 10:00 AM. on request of the parties. Status hearing set for 6/11/09 is stricken.Mailed notice (dmk, ) (Entered: 06/09/2009)
341 MOTION by Plaintiffs Cathy Bender-Jackson, Leroy Brown, Leslie Browne, Glenn Capel, Christina Coleman, Larue Gibson, Maroc Howard, Mark Johnson, J. Yves Laborde, Jennifer Madrid, Marshell Miller, Carnell Moore, Frankie Ross, Stephen Smartt, Henry Wilson, Marva York, George McReynolds for leave to ﬁle a 54 Page Reply Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Class Certiﬁcation (Friedman, Linda) (Entered: 06/26/2009)
342 NOTICE of Motion by Linda Debra Friedman for presentment of motion for leave to ﬁle, 341 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 7/7/2009 at 09:15 AM. (Friedman, Linda) (Entered: 06/26/2009)
343 REPLY by Plaintiff George McReynolds to memorandum in support of motion 262 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit 4, # 5 Exhibit 5, # 6 Exhibit 6, # 7 Exhibit 7, # 8 Exhibit 8, # 9 Exhibit 9, # 10 Exhibit 10, # 11 Exhibit 11, # 12 Exhibit 12, # 13 Exhibit 13, # 14 Exhibit 14, # 15 Exhibit 15, # 16 Exhibit 16, # 17 Exhibit 17, # 18 Exhibit 18, # 19 Exhibit 19, # 20 Exhibit 19A, # 21 Exhibit 20, # 22 Exhibit 21, # 23 Exhibit 22, # 24 Exhibit 23 (Redacted), # 25 Exhibit 24 (Redacted), # 26 Exhibit 25, # 27 Exhibit 26 (Redacted), # 28 Exhibit 27, # 29 Exhibit 28, # 30 Exhibit 29 (Redacted), # 31 Exhibit 30 (Redacted), # 32 Exhibit 31 (Redacted), # 33 Exhibit 32 (Redacted), # 34 Exhibit 33, # 35 Exhibit 34, # 36 Exhibit 35)(Friedman, Linda) (Entered: 06/26/2009)
344 Exhibit List and attached exhibits 36-55 by Cathy Bender-Jackson, Leroy Brown, Leslie Browne, Glenn Capel, Christina Coleman, Larue Gibson, Maroc Howard, Mark Johnson, J. Yves Laborde, Jennifer Madrid, Marshell Miller, Carnell Moore, Frankie Ross, Stephen Smartt, Henry Wilson, Marva York, George McReynolds. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 36, # 2 Exhibit 37, # 3 Exhibit 38, # 4 Exhibit 39, # 5 Exhibit 40, # 6 Exhibit 41, # 7 Exhibit 42, # 8 Exhibit 43, # 9 Exhibit 44, # 10 Exhibit 45, # 11 Exhibit 46, # 12 Exhibit 47, # 13 Exhibit 48, # 14 Exhibit 49, # 15 Exhibit 50, # 16 Exhibit 51, # 17 Exhibit 52, # 18 Exhibit 53, # 19 Exhibit 54, # 20 Exhibit 55)(Bish, Suzanne) (Entered: 06/26/2009)
345 SEALED EXHIBIT by Plaintiff George McReynolds regarding reply,,, 343 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 64, # 2 Exhibit 65, # 3 Exhibit 80, # 4 Exhibit 82, # 5 Exhibit 83, # 6 Exhibit 84, # 7 Exhibit 85, # 8 Exhibit 86, # 9 Exhibit 87, # 10 Exhibit 88, # 11 Exhibit 89, # 12 Exhibit 90, # 13 Exhibit 91, # 14 Exhibit 92)(Friedman, Linda) (Entered: 06/26/2009)
346 DOCUMENT Entered in Error (Bish, Suzanne) Modiﬁed on 6/29/2009 (td, ). (Entered: 06/26/2009)
347 SEALED EXHIBIT by Plaintiff George McReynolds regarding reply,,, 343 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 93, # 2 Exhibit 94, # 3 Exhibit 95, # 4 Exhibit 97, # 5 Exhibit 98, # 6 Exhibit 99, # 7 Exhibit 100, # 8 Exhibit 101, # 9 Exhibit 102, # 10 Exhibit 103, # 11 Exhibit 104, # 12 Exhibit 105)(Friedman, Linda) (Entered: 06/26/2009)
348 DOCUMENT Entered in Error (Bish, Suzanne) Modiﬁed on 6/29/2009 (td, ). (Entered: 06/26/2009)
349 DOCUMENT Entered in Error (Bish, Suzanne) Modiﬁed on 6/29/2009 (td, ). (Entered:

https://ecf.ilnd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?743598400534567-L_1_0-1

37/64

10/26/2017

06/26/2009)

CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 6.1.1.2 - U.S. District Court, Northern Illinois

06/26/2009

350 SEALED EXHIBIT by Plaintiff George McReynolds regarding reply,,, 343 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 107, # 2 Exhibit 112, # 3 Exhibit 113, # 4 Exhibit 114, # 5 Exhibit 118, # 6 Exhibit 123, # 7 Exhibit 124, # 8 Exhibit 126, # 9 Exhibit 131, # 10 Exhibit 133, # 11 Exhibit 135)(Friedman, Linda) (Entered: 06/26/2009)

06/26/2009

351 SEALED EXHIBIT by Plaintiff George McReynolds regarding reply,,, 343 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 145, # 2 Exhibit 146, # 3 Exhibit 147, # 4 Exhibit 148, # 5 Exhibit 149, # 6 Exhibit 150, # 7 Exhibit 151, # 8 Exhibit 152, # 9 Exhibit 153, # 10 Exhibit 154, # 11 Exhibit 155, # 12 Exhibit 156, # 13 Exhibit 157, # 14 Exhibit 158, # 15 Exhibit 159, # 16 Exhibit 160, # 17 Exhibit 161, # 18 Exhibit 162, # 19 Exhibit 163)(Friedman, Linda) (Entered: 06/26/2009)

06/26/2009 352 DOCUMENT Entered in Error (Bish, Suzanne) Modiﬁed on 6/29/2009 (td, ). (Entered: 06/26/2009)

06/26/2009

353 SEALED EXHIBIT by Plaintiff George McReynolds regarding reply,,, 343 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 171, # 2 Exhibit 172, # 3 Exhibit 173, # 4 Exhibit 174, # 5 Exhibit 175, # 6 Exhibit 176, # 7 Exhibit 177, # 8 Exhibit 178, # 9 Exhibit 179, # 10 Exhibit 181, # 11 Exhibit 186, # 12 Exhibit 188, # 13 Exhibit 189 Part 1, # 14 Exhibit 189 Part 2, # 15 Exhibit 197, # 16 Exhibit 198, # 17 Exhibit 199, # 18 Exhibit 200, # 19 Exhibit 201, # 20 Exhibit 202, # 21 Exhibit 225, # 22 Exhibit 240)(Friedman, Linda) (Entered: 06/26/2009)

06/26/2009 354 DOCUMENT Entered in Error (Bish, Suzanne) Modiﬁed on 6/29/2009 (td, ). (Entered: 06/26/2009)

06/26/2009 355 DOCUMENT Entered in Error (Bish, Suzanne) Modiﬁed on 6/29/2009 (td, ). (Entered: 06/26/2009)

06/26/2009

356 EXHIBIT by Plaintiff George McReynolds 36-55 regarding reply,,, 343 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 36, # 2 Exhibit 37, # 3 Exhibit 38, # 4 Exhibit 39, # 5 Exhibit 40, # 6 Exhibit 41, # 7 Exhibit 42, # 8 Exhibit 43, # 9 Exhibit 44, # 10 Exhibit 45, # 11 Exhibit 46, # 12 Exhibit 47, # 13 Exhibit 48, # 14 Exhibit 49, # 15 Exhibit 50, # 16 Exhibit 51, # 17 Exhibit 52, # 18 Exhibit 53, # 19 Exhibit 54, # 20 Exhibit 55)(Bish, Suzanne) (Entered: 06/26/2009)

06/26/2009

357 EXHIBIT by Plaintiff George McReynolds 76-79, 81, 96, 106, 108-110, 115 regarding reply,,, 343 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 76, # 2 Exhibit 77, # 3 Exhibit 78, # 4 Exhibit 79, # 5 Exhibit 81, # 6 Exhibit 96, # 7 Exhibit 106, # 8 Exhibit 108, # 9 Exhibit 109, # 10 Exhibit 110, # 11 Exhibit 115)(Friedman, Linda) (Entered: 06/26/2009)

06/26/2009

358 EXHIBIT by Plaintiff George McReynolds 56-66 regarding reply,,, 343 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 56, # 2 Exhibit 57, # 3 Exhibit 58, # 4 Exhibit 59, # 5 Exhibit 60, # 6 Exhibit 61, # 7 Exhibit 62, # 8 Exhibit 63)(Bish, Suzanne) (Entered: 06/26/2009)

06/26/2009

359 EXHIBIT by Plaintiff George McReynolds 66-75 regarding reply,,, 343 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 66, # 2 Exhibit 67, # 3 Exhibit 68, # 4 Exhibit 69, # 5 Exhibit 70, # 6 Exhibit 71, # 7 Exhibit 72, # 8 Exhibit 73, # 9 Exhibit 74, # 10 Exhibit 75)(Bish, Suzanne) (Entered: 06/26/2009)

06/26/2009

360 EXHIBIT by Plaintiff George McReynolds Exhibits regarding reply,,, 343 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 116, # 2 Exhibit 117, # 3 Exhibit 119, # 4 Exhibit 120, # 5 Exhibit 121, # 6 Exhibit 122 Redacted, # 7 Exhibit 125, # 8 Exhibit 127, # 9 Exhibit 128, # 10 Exhibit 129, # 11 Exhibit 130, # 12 Exhibit 132, # 13 Exhibit 134)(Friedman, Linda) (Entered: 06/26/2009)

06/26/2009 361 EXHIBIT by Plaintiff George McReynolds 136-144 regarding reply,,, 343 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 136, # 2 Exhibit 137, # 3 Exhibit 138, # 4 Exhibit 139, # 5 Exhibit 140, # 6

https://ecf.ilnd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?743598400534567-L_1_0-1

38/64

10/26/2017
06/26/2009 06/26/2009 06/26/2009
06/26/2009 06/26/2009
06/26/2009 06/26/2009
06/26/2009 06/26/2009

CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 6.1.1.2 - U.S. District Court, Northern Illinois
Exhibit 141, # 7 Exhibit 142, # 8 Exhibit 143, # 9 Exhibit 144)(Bish, Suzanne) (Entered: 06/26/2009)
362 EXHIBIT by Plaintiff George McReynolds Exhibits regarding reply,,, 343 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 182, # 2 Exhibit 183, # 3 Exhibit 184, # 4 Exhibit 185, # 5 Exhibit 187, # 6 Exhibit 190, # 7 Exhibit 191, # 8 Exhibit 192, # 9 Exhibit 193, # 10 Exhibit 194, # 11 Exhibit 195, # 12 Exhibit 196, # 13 Exhibit 203, # 14 Exhibit 204, # 15 Exhibit 205) (Friedman, Linda) (Entered: 06/26/2009)
363 EXHIBIT by Plaintiff George McReynolds 164-170 regarding reply,,, 343 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 164, # 2 Exhibit 165, # 3 Exhibit 166, # 4 Exhibit 167, # 5 Exhibit 168, # 6 Exhibit 169, # 7 Exhibit 170)(Bish, Suzanne) (Entered: 06/26/2009)
364 EXHIBIT by Plaintiff George McReynolds Exhibits regarding reply,,, 343 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 226, # 2 Exhibit 227, # 3 Exhibit 228, # 4 Exhibit 229, # 5 Exhibit 230, # 6 Exhibit 231, # 7 Exhibit 232, # 8 Exhibit 233, # 9 Exhibit 234, # 10 Exhibit 235, # 11 Exhibit 236, # 12 Exhibit 237, # 13 Exhibit 238, # 14 Exhibit 239, # 15 Exhibit 241, # 16 Exhibit 242 Chart A, # 17 Exhibit 243 Chart B Part 1 of 3, # 18 Exhibit 243 Chart B Redacted part 2 of 3, # 19 Exhibit 243 Chart B Redacted part 3 of 3)(Friedman, Linda) (Entered: 06/26/2009)
365 EXHIBIT by Plaintiff George McReynolds 206-224 regarding reply,,, 343 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 206, # 2 Exhibit 207, # 3 Exhibit 208, # 4 Exhibit 209, # 5 Exhibit 210, # 6 Exhibit 211, # 7 Exhibit 212, # 8 Exhibit 213, # 9 Exhibit 214, # 10 Exhibit 215, # 11 Exhibit 216, # 12 Exhibit 217, # 13 Exhibit 218, # 14 Exhibit 219, # 15 Exhibit 220, # 16 Exhibit 221, # 17 Exhibit 222, # 18 Exhibit 223, # 19 Exhibit 224)(Bish, Suzanne) (Entered: 06/26/2009)
366 SEALED EXHIBIT by Plaintiff George McReynolds regarding reply,,, 343 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 23 (Unredacted version), # 2 Exhibit 24 (Unredacted version), # 3 Exhibit 26 (Unredacted version), # 4 Exhibit 29 (Unredacted version), # 5 Exhibit 30 (Unredacted version), # 6 Exhibit 31 (Unredacted version), # 7 Exhibit 32 (Unredacted version), # 8 Exhibit 42 (Unredacted version), # 9 Exhibit 43 (Unredacted version), # 10 Exhibit 44 (Unredacted version), # 11 Exhibit 45 (Unredacted version), # 12 Exhibit 46 (Unredacted version))(Friedman, Linda) (Entered: 06/26/2009)
367 MEMORANDUM by Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. in Opposition to motion to strike,,, motion for relief,,,,, 330 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B) (Lightfoot, Lori) (Entered: 06/26/2009)
368 SEALED EXHIBIT by Plaintiff George McReynolds regarding reply,,, 343 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 47 (Unredacted version), # 2 Exhibit 48 (Unredacted version), # 3 Exhibit 49 (Unredacted version), # 4 Exhibit 50 (Unredacted version), # 5 Exhibit 51 (Unredacted version), # 6 Exhibit 52 (Unredacted version), # 7 Exhibit 53 (Unredacted version), # 8 Exhibit 54 (Unredacted version), # 9 Exhibit 62 (Unredacted version), # 10 Exhibit 63 (Unredacted version), # 11 Exhibit 122 (Unredacted version), # 12 Exhibit 243 Chart B Unredacted version part 1 of 3, # 13 Exhibit 243 Chart B Unredacted version part 2 of 3, # 14 Exhibit 243 Chart B Unredacted version part 3 of 3)(Friedman, Linda) (Entered: 06/26/2009)
369 EXHIBITS by Plaintiffs to Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Motion for Class Certiﬁcation 262 and Reply Memorandum in Support of Class Certiﬁcation 343 . (RESTRICTED). (gmr, ) (Entered: 06/29/2009)
370 EXHIBITS by Plaintiffs to Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Motion for Class Certiﬁcation 262 and Reply Memorandum in Support of Class Certiﬁcation 343 . (RESTRICTED). (gmr, ) (Entered: 06/29/2009)

https://ecf.ilnd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?743598400534567-L_1_0-1

39/64

10/26/2017
06/29/2009 07/02/2009
07/02/2009 07/02/2009 07/09/2009 07/09/2009 07/23/2009 07/23/2009 07/23/2009 07/23/2009 07/24/2009 08/03/2009
08/03/2009 08/03/2009 08/03/2009

CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 6.1.1.2 - U.S. District Court, Northern Illinois
371 NOTICE of Correction regarding exhibit list 354 , exhibit list 355 , exhibit list 349 , exhibit list 352 , exhibit list 348 , exhibit list 346 (td, ) (Entered: 06/29/2009)
372 SEALED EXHIBIT by Plaintiff George McReynolds Ex. 244, Chart C to their Reply Memorandum of Law in Support of Their Motion for Class Certiﬁcation regarding reply,,, 343 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Tab A, # 2 Exhibit Tab B, # 3 Exhibit Tab C, # 4 Exhibit Tab D, # 5 Exhibit Tab E)(Friedman, Linda) (Entered: 07/02/2009)
373 MOTION by Plaintiff George McReynolds for leave to ﬁle Ex. 244, Chart C to their Reply Memorandum of Law in Support of Their Motion for Class Certiﬁcation (Friedman, Linda) (Entered: 07/02/2009)
374 NOTICE of Motion by Linda Debra Friedman for presentment of motion for leave to ﬁle 373 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 7/7/2009 at 09:15 AM. (Friedman, Linda) (Entered: 07/02/2009)
375 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Presentment of plaintiffs' motion 341 for leave to ﬁle a 54 page memorandum is re-set to 7/23/2009 at 9:15 a.m. Telephone notice (gds, ) (Entered: 07/09/2009)
376 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Plaintiffs' motion 373 for leave to ﬁle exhibit to reply memorandum in support of motion for class certiﬁcation is granted. Mailed notice (gmr, ) (Entered: 07/10/2009)
377 REPLY by George McReynolds to memorandum in support of motion for Class Certiﬁcation and Plaintiffs Response to Defendants Motions to Strike 312 , 307 , 309 , 318 and 321 (Friedman, Linda) Modiﬁed on 7/23/2009 (cdy, ). (Entered: 07/23/2009)
378 NOTICE by George McReynolds re reply to response to motion 377 Notice of Filing (Friedman, Linda) (Entered: 07/23/2009)
379 NOTICE by George McReynolds re reply to response to motion 377 Corrected Notice of Filing (Friedman, Linda) (Entered: 07/23/2009)
381 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Plaintiffs' motion 341 for leave to ﬁle reply memorandum in excess of 15 pages is granted to 37 pages. Mailed notice (gmr, ) (Entered: 07/24/2009)
380 MEMORANDUM by George McReynolds in support of motion to certify class 257 (Friedman, Linda) (Entered: 07/24/2009)
382 REPLY by George McReynolds to memorandum in support of motion,,, 318 , MOTION by Defendant Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. to Exclude the Testimony and Opinions of Plaintiffs' Expert William T. Bielby, Ph.D. 307 , MOTION by Defendant Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. for leave to ﬁle excess pages 309 , memorandum in support of motion 321 , MOTION by Defendant Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. for leave to ﬁle excess pages 312 Plaintiffs' Reply in Support of Motion for Class Certiﬁcation and Plaintiffs' Response to Defendant's Motions to Strike (Friedman, Linda) (Entered: 08/03/2009)
383 SEALED EXHIBIT by Plaintiff George McReynolds Exhibit 245 regarding reply,,, 343 (Friedman, Linda) (Entered: 08/03/2009)
384 EXHIBIT by Plaintiff George McReynolds Exhibit 234 regarding reply,,, 343 (Friedman, Linda) (Entered: 08/03/2009)
385 EXHIBIT by Plaintiff George McReynolds Index of Compendium of Exhibits to Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Motion for Class Certiﬁcation and Reply Memorandum in

https://ecf.ilnd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?743598400534567-L_1_0-1

40/64

10/26/2017

CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 6.1.1.2 - U.S. District Court, Northern Illinois
Support of Class Certiﬁcation (EXHIBIT LIST) regarding reply,,, 343 (Friedman, Linda) (Entered: 08/03/2009)

08/07/2009

386 MEMORANDUM other, 338 by Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. Corrected Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certiﬁcation (Lightfoot, Lori) (Entered: 08/07/2009)

08/07/2009

387 NOTICE by Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. of Corrected Filing 312 (Attachments: # 1 Appendix I - Expert Reports Revised Index, # 2 Expert Report of Jerome D. Williams - Part 1, # 3 Expert Report of Jerome D. Williams - Part 2)(Lightfoot, Lori) (Entered: 08/07/2009)

08/07/2009

388 NOTICE by Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. of Corrected Filing 314 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 - Deposition of Cathy Bender-Jackson (corrected redacted), # 2 Exhibit 4 - Deposition of Leslie Brown (corrected redacted), # 3 Exhibit 11 - Deposition of Mark E. Johnson (corrected redacted))(Lightfoot, Lori) (Entered: 08/07/2009)

08/11/2009

389 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Morton Denlow: Status hearing reset to 9/10/2009 at 10:00 AM. on request of the parties. Status hearing set for 8/11/09 is stricken.Mailed notice (dmk, ) (Entered: 08/11/2009)

08/11/2009

390 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Status hearing date of 8/11/2009 is stricken. The Court will rule by mail. Telephone notice (gds, ) (Entered: 08/19/2009)

09/09/2009

391 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Morton Denlow: Status hearing reset to 12/15/2009 at 10:00 AM. Status hearing set for 9/10/09 is stricken.Mailed notice (dmk, ) Modiﬁed on 9/9/2009 (dmk, ). (Entered: 09/09/2009)

12/08/2009

392 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Morton Denlow:Status hearing reset for 2/16/2010 at 10:00 AM. on request of the parties. Status hearing set for 12/15/09 is stricken.Mailed notice (dmk, ) (Entered: 12/08/2009)

02/09/2010

393 MINUTE entry before Honorable Morton Denlow: Status hearing reset to 3/16/2010 at 10:00 AM. on request of the parties. Status hearing set for 2/16/2010 is stricken.Mailed notice (dmk, ) (Entered: 02/09/2010)

03/16/2010

394 MINUTE entry before Honorable Morton Denlow:Magistrate Judge Status hearing held on 3/16/2010. Status hearing set for 6/17/2010 at 10:00 AM.Mailed notice (dmk, ) (Entered: 03/16/2010)

04/19/2010 395 MOTION by counsel for Defendant Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. to withdraw as attorney Gina Diomedi (Lightfoot, Lori) (Entered: 04/19/2010)

04/19/2010

396 Agreed NOTICE of Motion by Lori E. Lightfoot for presentment of motion to withdraw as attorney 395 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 4/27/2010 at 09:15 AM. (Lightfoot, Lori) (Entered: 04/19/2010)

05/07/2010

398 EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE ORDER: It appearing that Jeffrey T. Gilbert has been appointed as a United States Magistrate Judge for the Northern District of Illinois, and It further appearing that Internal Operating Procedure 17(a) provides for the creation of an initial calendar for a newly-appointed magistrate judge; therefore IT is hereby ordered that the attached list of civil consent cases and civil referrals be and they are hereby reassigned to form the initial calendar of the Honorable Jeffrey T. Gilbert. Case referred to the Honorable Jeffrey T. Gilbert for the purpose of holding proceedings related to: discovery supervision and settlement conference. Signed by Executive Committee on 5/7/10. Mailed notice. (td, ) (Entered: 05/10/2010)

05/10/2010 397 MINUTE entry before Honorable Morton Denlow: This case having been reassigned to

https://ecf.ilnd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?743598400534567-L_1_0-1

41/64

10/26/2017

CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 6.1.1.2 - U.S. District Court, Northern Illinois
Magistrate Judge Jeffrey Gilbert, all pending status or hearing dates before Magistrate Judge Denlow are vacated. All other dates to stand pending further orderMailed notice (dmk, ) (Entered: 05/10/2010)

05/17/2010

399 MINUTE entry before Honorable Jeffrey T. Gilbert: This case has been reassigned to Magistrate Judge Gilbert. Status hearing set for 6/14/2010 at 2:00 p.m. in Courtroom 1386. Parties shall deliver a copy of the initial status report to chambers, Room 1366, ﬁve business days before the initial status hearing. The parties are directed to review and to comply with Judge Gilbert's standing order for initial status report. Copies are available in chambers or through Judge Gilbert's web page at www.ilnd.uscourts.gov. Mailed notice (ep, ) (Entered: 05/17/2010)

06/07/2010 400 STATUS Report (Initial) by Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. (Hart, James) (Entered: 06/07/2010)

06/11/2010

401 MINUTE entry before Honorable Jeffrey T. Gilbert: The Court has reviewed the parties initial status report. The status hearing scheduled for 6/14/2010 at 2:00 p.m. is stricken. Status hearing set before Magistrate Judge Gilbert for 8/17/2010 at 9:45 a.m. The parties shall advise Magistrate Judge Gilbert's courtroom deputy the week before the next status hearing if they do not believe a status hearing is necessary. Mailed notice (ep, ) (Entered: 06/11/2010)

06/11/2010

402 MINUTE entry before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Motion 395 for leave to withdraw the appearance of Gina Diomedi as attorney for defendant is granted. Mailed notice (gmr, ) (Entered: 06/14/2010)

08/05/2010 403 MINUTE entry before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Plaintiffs' motion to certify class 257 is denied. Mailed notice (gds, ) (Entered: 08/06/2010)

08/05/2010 404 Memorandum Opinion and Order signed by the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 8/5/2010: Mailed notice (gds, ) (Entered: 08/06/2010)

08/05/2010

405 MINUTE entry before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: For the reasons discussed in the court's Memorandum Opinion and Order issued this date, the court denies plaintiffs' motion to certify class (Doc. 257 ), and further denies as moot defendant's motion to exclude certain testimony and opinions (Doc. 307 ), to bar certain opinions (Docs. 317 , 318 ), and to strike certain declarations (Doc. 320 ), and plaintiffs' motion to strike (Doc. 330 ). This matter is set for a report on status 8/26/2010, at 9:30 a.m. Mailed notice. (jj, ) (Entered: 08/09/2010)

08/09/2010 406 MINUTE entry before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Enter amended memorandum opinion and order. Mailed notice (gds, ) (Entered: 08/09/2010)

08/09/2010 407 Memorandum Opinion and Order signed by the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 8/9/2010: Mailed notice(gds, ) (Entered: 08/09/2010)

08/16/2010

408 MINUTE entry before Honorable Jeffrey T. Gilbert: The status hearing set for 8/17/10 at 9:45 a.m. is stricken and re-set to 8/26/10 at 9:45 a.m. Mailed notice (ep, ) (Entered: 08/16/2010)

08/16/2010

409 MOTION by Plaintiffs Cathy Bender-Jackson, Leroy Brown, Leslie Browne, Glenn Capel, Christina Coleman, Larue Gibson, Maroc Howard, Mark Johnson, J. Yves Laborde, Jennifer Madrid, George McReynolds, Marshell Miller, Carnell Moore, Frankie Ross, Stephen Smartt, Henry Wilson, Marva York for reconsideration regarding memorandum in support of motion 380 Motion and Memorandum to Reconsider or in the Alternative to Clarify and/or Narrow the Deﬁnition of the Class (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibit A)(Friedman, Linda) (Entered: 08/16/2010)

08/16/2010 410 NOTICE of Motion by Linda Debra Friedman for presentment of motion for

https://ecf.ilnd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?743598400534567-L_1_0-1

42/64

10/26/2017

CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 6.1.1.2 - U.S. District Court, Northern Illinois
reconsideration, motion for relief,,,, 409 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 8/19/2010 at 09:15 AM. (Friedman, Linda) (Entered: 08/16/2010)

08/17/2010

411 MOTION by Defendant Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. to set a brieﬁng schedule in Response to Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider or in The Alternative Clarify and/or Narrow The Deﬁnition of the Class. (Lightfoot, Lori) (Entered: 08/17/2010)

08/17/2010

412 NOTICE of Motion by Lori E. Lightfoot for presentment of motion by ﬁler to set a brieﬁng schedule 411 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 8/24/2010 at 09:15 AM. (Lightfoot, Lori) (Entered: 08/17/2010)

08/18/2010

413 Notice of Withdrawal by Cathy Bender-Jackson, Leroy Brown, Leslie Browne, Glenn Capel, Christina Coleman, Larue Gibson, Maroc Howard, Mark Johnson, J. Yves Laborde, Jennifer Madrid, George McReynolds, Marshell Miller, Carnell Moore, Frankie Ross, Stephen Smartt, Henry Wilson, Marva York Plaintiffs' Notice of Withdrawal of Their Motion to Reconsider or To Clarify and/or Narrow the Deﬁnition of the Class (Friedman, Linda) (Entered: 08/18/2010)

08/18/2010

414 MOTION by Plaintiffs Cathy Bender-Jackson, Leroy Brown, Leslie Browne, Glenn Capel, Christina Coleman, Larue Gibson, Maroc Howard, Mark Johnson, J. Yves Laborde, Jennifer Madrid, George McReynolds, Marshell Miller, Carnell Moore, Frankie Ross, Stephen Smartt, Henry Wilson, Marva York for reconsideration regarding memorandum opinion and order 407 (Friedman, Linda) (Entered: 08/18/2010)

08/18/2010

415 MEMORANDUM by Cathy Bender-Jackson, Leroy Brown, Leslie Browne, Glenn Capel, Christina Coleman, Larue Gibson, Maroc Howard, Mark Johnson, J. Yves Laborde, Jennifer Madrid, George McReynolds, Marshell Miller, Carnell Moore, Frankie Ross, Stephen Smartt, Henry Wilson, Marva York in support of motion for reconsideration, motion for relief,, 414 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Friedman, Linda) (Entered: 08/18/2010)

08/18/2010

416 NOTICE of Motion by Linda Debra Friedman for presentment of motion for reconsideration, motion for relief,, 414 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 8/24/2010 at 09:15 AM. (Friedman, Linda) (Entered: 08/18/2010)

08/19/2010

417 MINUTE entry before Honorable Jeffrey T. Gilbert: The status hearing set for 8/26/10 at 9:45 is stricken and reset to 8/24/10 at 9:45 a.m. Mailed notice (ep, ) (Entered: 08/19/2010)

08/24/2010

418 MINUTE entry before Honorable Jeffrey T. Gilbert: Status hearing held. Status hearing set for 10/18/10 at 2:00 p.m. following Judge Gettleman's status hearing. Mailed notice (ep, ) (Entered: 08/24/2010)

08/24/2010

419 MINUTE entry before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Motion hearing held on 8/24/2010 regarding plaintiff's motion for reconsideration 414 . Response is due by 8/31/2010. reply is due by 9/10/2010. Status hearing is re-set to 10/18/2010 at 1:30 p.m. Mailed notice (gds, ) (Entered: 08/27/2010)

08/31/2010

420 MEMORANDUM by Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. in Opposition to motion for reconsideration, motion for relief,, 414 (Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider and/or Narrow the Class Deﬁnition) (Lightfoot, Lori) (Entered: 08/31/2010)

09/07/2010

421 MINUTE entry before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Plaintiff is given an extension of time to 9/15/2010 to ﬁle reply brief in support of motion to reconsider and clarify. Telephone notice (gds, ) (Entered: 09/07/2010)

09/15/2010 422 REPLY by George McReynolds to memorandum in support of motion, 415 Reply in support of motion to reconsider (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B)(Friedman,

https://ecf.ilnd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?743598400534567-L_1_0-1

43/64

10/26/2017
09/15/2010 10/18/2010 10/18/2010 10/25/2010
11/01/2010 11/01/2010
11/01/2010 11/03/2010 11/03/2010 11/03/2010 11/03/2010 11/08/2010 11/16/2010 11/23/2010 11/29/2010

CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 6.1.1.2 - U.S. District Court, Northern Illinois
Linda) (Entered: 09/15/2010)
423 SEALED EXHIBIT by Plaintiff George McReynolds regarding reply to response to motion 422 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit C, # 2 Exhibit D, # 3 Exhibit E, # 4 Exhibit F) (Friedman, Linda) (Entered: 09/15/2010)
424 MINUTE entry before Honorable Jeffrey T. Gilbert: Status hearing held. Status hearing set for 11/18/10 at 10:00 a.m. Mailed notice (ep, ) (Entered: 10/18/2010)
425 MINUTE entry before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Status hearing held on 10/18/2010. Oral argument heard on plaintiffs' motion to reconsider. The matter is taken under advisement. Mailed notice (gds, ) (Entered: 10/19/2010)
426 Plaintiffs' Statement Regarding Daubert Hearing STATEMENT by Cathy BenderJackson, Leroy Brown, Leslie Browne, Glenn Capel, Christina Coleman, Larue Gibson, Maroc Howard, Mark Johnson, J. Yves Laborde, Jennifer Madrid, George McReynolds, Marshell Miller, Carnell Moore, Frankie Ross, Stephen Smartt, Henry Wilson, Marva York (Friedman, Linda) (Entered: 10/25/2010)
427 (Defendant's Statement Regarding Plaintiffs' Belated Request for a Daubert Hearing) STATEMENT by Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. (Lightfoot, Lori) (Entered: 11/01/2010)
428 MOTION by Plaintiffs Cathy Bender-Jackson, Leroy Brown, Leslie Browne, Glenn Capel, Christina Coleman, Larue Gibson, Maroc Howard, Mark Johnson, J. Yves Laborde, Jennifer Madrid, George McReynolds, Marshell Miller, Carnell Moore, Frankie Ross, Stephen Smartt, Henry Wilson, Marva York for leave to ﬁle Proposed Trial Plan (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1)(Friedman, Linda) (Entered: 11/01/2010)
429 NOTICE of Motion by Linda Debra Friedman for presentment of motion for leave to ﬁle, 428 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 11/9/2010 at 09:15 AM. (Friedman, Linda) (Entered: 11/01/2010)
430 MOTION by Defendant Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. for leave to ﬁle a Response to Plaintiffs' Trial Plan, Document #428. (Lightfoot, Lori) (Entered: 11/03/2010)
431 NOTICE of Motion by Lori E. Lightfoot for presentment of motion for leave to ﬁle 430 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 11/9/2010 at 09:15 AM. (Lightfoot, Lori) (Entered: 11/03/2010)
432 MINUTE entry before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Plaintiffs' motion 428 for leave to ﬁle a proposed trial plan is granted. Mailed notice (hp, ) (Entered: 11/05/2010)
433 PROPOSED TRIAL PLAN by Plaintiffs (hp, ) (Entered: 11/05/2010)
434 MINUTE entry before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Motion for leave to ﬁle 430 a response to plaintiffs' trial plan is granted. Mailed notice (gds, ) (Entered: 11/08/2010)
435 MINUTE entry before Honorable Jeffrey T. Gilbert: The status hearing set for 11/18/10 at 10:00 a.m. is stricken and will be reset to a different date in a future minute order. Mailed notice (ep, ) (Entered: 11/16/2010)
436 RESPONSE by Defendant Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. to trial brief 433 (Lightfoot, Lori) (Entered: 11/23/2010)
437 MOTION by Plaintiffs Cathy Bender-Jackson, Leroy Brown, Leslie Browne, Glenn Capel, Christina Coleman, Larue Gibson, Maroc Howard, Mark Johnson, J. Yves Laborde, Jennifer Madrid, George McReynolds, Marshell Miller, Carnell Moore, Frankie Ross, Stephen Smartt, Henry Wilson, Marva York for leave to ﬁle Instanter a Reply to Defendant's Response to Plaintiffs' Trial Plan (Friedman, Linda) (Entered: 11/29/2010)

https://ecf.ilnd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?743598400534567-L_1_0-1

44/64

10/26/2017
11/29/2010
11/29/2010 11/30/2010
12/01/2010 12/17/2010 12/21/2010
12/21/2010 12/22/2010 02/14/2011 02/14/2011 02/25/2011 03/22/2011 03/30/2011

CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 6.1.1.2 - U.S. District Court, Northern Illinois
438 REPLY by Plaintiffs Cathy Bender-Jackson, Leroy Brown, Leslie Browne, Glenn Capel, Christina Coleman, Larue Gibson, Maroc Howard, Mark Johnson, J. Yves Laborde, Jennifer Madrid, George McReynolds, Marshell Miller, Carnell Moore, Frankie Ross, Stephen Smartt, Henry Wilson, Marva York to motion for leave to ﬁle, 437 Instanter a Reply to Defendant's Response to Plaintiffs' Trial Plan (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit 4)(Friedman, Linda) (Entered: 11/29/2010)
439 NOTICE of Motion by Linda Debra Friedman for presentment of motion for leave to ﬁle, 437 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 12/2/2010 at 09:15 AM. (Friedman, Linda) (Entered: 11/29/2010)
440 REPLY by Plaintiffs Cathy Bender-Jackson, Leroy Brown, Leslie Browne, Glenn Capel, Christina Coleman, Larue Gibson, Maroc Howard, Mark Johnson, J. Yves Laborde, Jennifer Madrid, George McReynolds, Marshell Miller, Carnell Moore, Frankie Ross, Stephen Smartt, Henry Wilson, Marva York to motion for leave to ﬁle, 437 Corrected Reply Memorandum to Defendant's Response to Plaintiffs' Trial Plan (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit 4)(Friedman, Linda) (Entered: 11/30/2010)
441 MINUTE entry before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Plaintiffs' motion for leave to ﬁle 437 a reply to defendant's response to plaintiff's trial plan is granted. Mailed notice (gds, ) (Entered: 12/01/2010)
442 MINUTE entry before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Ethan G. Zelizer is granted leave to withdraw as counsel for plaintiffs. Mailed notice (nf, ) (Entered: 12/20/2010)
443 MOTION by counsel for Plaintiffs Cathy Bender-Jackson, Leroy Brown, Leslie Browne, Glenn Capel, Christina Coleman, Larue Gibson, Maroc Howard, Mark Johnson, J. Yves Laborde, Jennifer Madrid, George McReynolds, Marshell Miller, Carnell Moore, Frankie Ross, Stephen Smartt, Henry Wilson, Marva York to withdraw as attorney Agreed Motion to Withdraw the Appearance of Rafael Lazaro (Bish, Suzanne) (Entered: 12/21/2010)
444 Notice of Agreed Motion to Withdraw Attorney NOTICE of Motion by Suzanne E. Bish for presentment of motion to withdraw as attorney, 443 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 1/13/2011 at 09:15 AM. (Bish, Suzanne) (Entered: 12/21/2010)
445 MINUTE entry before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Agreed motion 443 to withdraw the appearance of Rafael Lazaro as an attorney for plaintiffs is granted. Mailed notice (nf, ) (Entered: 12/23/2010)
446 MINUTE entry before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration 414 is denied. Mailed notice (gds, ) (Entered: 02/14/2011)
447 Memorandum Opinion and Order signed by the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 2/14/2011: Mailed notice (gds, ) (Entered: 02/14/2011)
448 MINUTE entry before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Status hearing is set for 3/30/2011 at 9:30 a.m. Mailed notice (gds, ) (Entered: 02/25/2011)
449 STATUS Report Joint Status Report by George McReynolds, Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. (Friedman, Linda) (Entered: 03/22/2011)
450 MINUTE entry before Honorable Jeffrey T. Gilbert: Status hearing held. The parties shall meet and confer regarding a Rule 26(f) discovery plan consistent with the District Judge's directive that discovery shall proceed in this case. The parties shall meet and confer and ﬁle a Rule 26(f) plan by 5/17/11. The Court will review the discovery plan and either set a status hearing or enter an order consistent with the parties' proposed discovery schedule. Mailed notice (ep, ) (Entered: 03/30/2011)

https://ecf.ilnd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?743598400534567-L_1_0-1

45/64

10/26/2017
03/30/2011

CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 6.1.1.2 - U.S. District Court, Northern Illinois
453 MINUTE entry before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Status hearing held on 3/30/2011. Defendants' motion to sever and transfer is due by 4/28/2011. Status hearing set for 4/27/2011 at 9:15 a.m. Mailed notice (gds, ) (Entered: 04/04/2011)

04/01/2011

451 MOTION by Plaintiffs Cathy Bender-Jackson, Leroy Brown, Leslie Browne, Glenn Capel, Christina Coleman, Larue Gibson, Maroc Howard, Mark Johnson, J. Yves Laborde, Jennifer Madrid, George McReynolds, Marshell Miller, Carnell Moore, Frankie Ross, Stephen Smartt, Henry Wilson, Marva York to stay Unopposed Motion for Stay of Class Claims (Robot, George) (Entered: 04/01/2011)

04/01/2011

452 NOTICE of Motion by George S. Robot for presentment of motion to stay, 451 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 4/21/2011 at 09:15 AM. (Robot, George) (Entered: 04/01/2011)

04/07/2011

454 MINUTE entry before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Status hearing date of 4/27/2011 is re-set to 4/28/2011 at 9:15 a.m. Mailed notice (gds, ) (Entered: 04/07/2011)

04/20/2011

455 ORDER dated 4/20/2011 from the Seventh Circuit; Appellate case no.: 11-8008; It is ordered that #1 is denied. (ma, ) (Entered: 04/22/2011)

04/21/2011

456 MINUTE entry before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Motion hearing held on 4/21/2011. Plaintiff's unopposed motion to stay 451 class claims is granted through 5/4/2011. Status hearing date of 4/28/2011 is re-set to 5/4/2011 at 9:00 a.m. Mailed notice (gds, ) (Entered: 04/26/2011)

04/29/2011

457 MOTION by Defendant Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. to sever and Transfer The Plaintiffs' Claims. (Lightfoot, Lori) (Entered: 04/29/2011)

04/29/2011

458 NOTICE of Motion by Lori E. Lightfoot for presentment of motion to sever 457 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 5/4/2011 at 09:15 AM. (Lightfoot, Lori) (Entered: 04/29/2011)

04/29/2011

459 MEMORANDUM by Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. in support of motion to sever 457 and Transfer The Plaintiffs' Claims. (Lightfoot, Lori) (Entered: 04/29/2011)

05/04/2011

460 MINUTE entry before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Status hearing held on 5/4/2011. Plaintiffs' response to defendant's motion 457 to sever and transfer the plaintiffs' claims is due by 5/25/2011. Reply is due by 6/8/2011. Argument and ruling are set for 7/19/2011 at 10:00 a.m. The Court continues the stay of class claims to 7/19/2011. Mailed notice (gds, ) (Entered: 05/06/2011)

05/11/2011

461 MINUTE entry before Honorable Jeffrey T. Gilbert: Consistent with the results of the parties' status hearing before the District Judge on 5/4/11, and the brieﬁng and hearing schedule for Defendant's motion to sever and transfer 457 set at that time, the date previously set for submission of a Rule 26(f) discovery plan is stricken. The Court will revisit discovery issues after a ruling on Defendant's motion to sever or transfer. Mailed notice (ep, ) (Entered: 05/11/2011)

05/23/2011

462 MOTION by Plaintiffs Cathy Bender-Jackson, Leroy Brown, Leslie Browne, Glenn Capel, Christina Coleman, Larue Gibson, Maroc Howard, Mark Johnson, J. Yves Laborde, Jennifer Madrid, George McReynolds, Marshell Miller, Carnell Moore, Frankie Ross, Stephen Smartt, Henry Wilson, Marva York for extension of time Agreed Motion to Extend Brieﬁng Schedule on Defendant's Motion to Sever and Transfer the Plaintiffs' Claims (Gilbert, Jennifer) (Entered: 05/23/2011)

05/23/2011

463 Notice of Motion to Agreed Motion to Extend Brieﬁng Schedule NOTICE of Motion by Jennifer Schoen Gilbert for presentment of extension of time, 462 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 5/26/2011 at 09:15 AM. (Gilbert, Jennifer) (Entered: 05/23/2011)

https://ecf.ilnd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?743598400534567-L_1_0-1

46/64

10/26/2017
06/01/2011 06/02/2011
06/06/2011 06/15/2011 07/13/2011 07/13/2011 07/13/2011 07/18/2011
07/18/2011 07/19/2011 08/11/2011 08/11/2011 08/16/2011

CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 6.1.1.2 - U.S. District Court, Northern Illinois
464 MEMORANDUM by Cathy Bender-Jackson, Leroy Brown, Leslie Browne, Glenn Capel, Christina Coleman, Larue Gibson, Maroc Howard, Mark Johnson, J. Yves Laborde, Jennifer Madrid, George McReynolds in Opposition to motion to sever 457 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Exhibit)(Friedman, Linda) (Entered: 06/01/2011)
465 EXHIBIT by Plaintiffs Cathy Bender-Jackson, Leroy Brown, Leslie Browne, Glenn Capel, Christina Coleman, Larue Gibson, Maroc Howard, Mark Johnson, J. Yves Laborde, Jennifer Madrid, George McReynolds, Marshell Miller, Carnell Moore, Frankie Ross, Stephen Smartt, Henry Wilson, Marva York Exhibit B regarding memorandum in opposition to motion, 464 (Friedman, Linda) (Entered: 06/02/2011)
466 MINUTE entry before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Agreed motion for extension of time 462 to 6/1/2011 for plaintiffs' response to defendant's motion to sever and transfer, and to 6/15 for defendant's reply is granted. Telephone notice (gds, ) (Entered: 06/06/2011)
467 REPLY by Defendant Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. to motion to sever 457 (in support of) (Attachments: # 1 Declaration Declaration of Tanika Hooten I, # 2 Declaration Declaration of Tanika Hooten II, # 3 Declaration Declaration of James Hart) (Lightfoot, Lori) (Entered: 06/15/2011)
468 MOTION by Defendant Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. to Lift Stay of Absent Class Members' Claims (Lightfoot, Lori) (Entered: 07/13/2011)
469 NOTICE of Motion by Lori E. Lightfoot for presentment of motion for miscellaneous relief 468 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 7/19/2011 at 10:00 AM. (Lightfoot, Lori) (Entered: 07/13/2011)
470 MEMORANDUM by Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. in support of motion for miscellaneous relief 468 (Memorandum of Law in Support of its Motion to Lift the Stay of the Absent Class Members' Claims) (Lightfoot, Lori) (Entered: 07/13/2011)
471 MOTION by Plaintiffs Cathy Bender-Jackson, Leroy Brown, Leslie Browne, Glenn Capel, Christina Coleman, Larue Gibson, Maroc Howard, Mark Johnson, J. Yves Laborde, Jennifer Madrid, George McReynolds, Marshell Miller, Carnell Moore, Frankie Ross, Stephen Smartt, Henry Wilson, Marva York to certify class Plaintiffs' Amended Post-Walmart Motion for Class Certiﬁcation Responses due by 8/1/2011 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Friedman, Linda) (Entered: 07/18/2011)
472 NOTICE of Motion by Linda Debra Friedman for presentment of motion to certify class, 471 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 7/21/2011 at 09:15 AM. (Friedman, Linda) (Entered: 07/18/2011)
473 MINUTE entry before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Status hearing held on 7/19/2011. Status hearing set for 9/14/2011 at 2:00 p.m. Mailed notice (gds, ) (Entered: 07/20/2011)
474 MOTION by Defendant Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. for leave to ﬁle excess pages an Oversized Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Amended PostWalmart Motion for Class Certiﬁcation (Lightfoot, Lori) (Entered: 08/11/2011)
475 NOTICE of Motion by Lori E. Lightfoot for presentment of motion for leave to ﬁle excess pages 474 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 8/16/2011 at 09:15 AM. (Lightfoot, Lori) (Entered: 08/11/2011)
476 RESPONSE by Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.in Opposition to MOTION by Plaintiffs Cathy Bender-Jackson, Leroy Brown, Leslie Browne, Glenn Capel, Christina Coleman, Larue Gibson, Maroc Howard, Mark Johnson, J. Yves Laborde, Jennifer

https://ecf.ilnd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?743598400534567-L_1_0-1

47/64

10/26/2017
08/16/2011 08/26/2011 09/08/2011 09/14/2011 09/19/2011 09/19/2011 09/27/2011 09/28/2011 09/28/2011
09/28/2011

CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 6.1.1.2 - U.S. District Court, Northern Illinois
Madrid, George McReynolds, Marshell Miller, Carnell Moore, Frankie Ross, Stephen S 471 for Class Certiﬁcation (Amended Motion) (Lightfoot, Lori) (Entered: 08/16/2011)
477 MINUTE entry before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Defendant's motion for leave to ﬁle excess pages brief 474 is granted. Mailed notice (gds, ) (Entered: 08/17/2011)
478 MINUTE entry before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Plaintiffs are given an extension of time to 9/8/2011 within which to ﬁle reply brief in support of motion for class certiﬁcation. Telephone notice (gds, ) (Entered: 08/26/2011)
479 REPLY by Plaintiffs Cathy Bender-Jackson, Leroy Brown, Leslie Browne, Glenn Capel, Christina Coleman, Larue Gibson, Maroc Howard, Mark Johnson, J. Yves Laborde, Jennifer Madrid, George McReynolds to motion to certify class, 471 (Bish, Suzanne) (Entered: 09/08/2011)
480 MINUTE entry before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Status hearing held on 9/14/2011. Status hearing set for 9/27/2011 at 9:30 a.m. The court continues the stay. Mailed notice (gds, ) (Entered: 09/19/2011)
481 MINUTE entry before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Plaintiffs' amended motion to certify class 471 is denied. This court would support a motion for an interlocutory appeal to the USCA for the 7th Cir. under Fed. R. Civ. P. §23(f) or 28.S.C. §1292(b). Mailed notice (gds, ) (Entered: 09/19/2011)
482 ORDER signed by the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 9/19/2011: Mailed notice (gds, ) (Entered: 09/19/2011)
483 MINUTE entry before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Status hearing held on 9/27/2011. Status hearing set for 11/10/2011 at 9:30 a.m. The stay is continued to that date. Mailed notice (gds, ) (Entered: 09/28/2011)
484 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendant Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. by Lori Ann Zahalka (Zahalka, Lori) (Entered: 09/28/2011)
485 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS held on 10/18/10 before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman. Court Reporter Contact Information: Jennifer Costales, CRR, RMR jennifer_costales@ilnd.uscourts.gov (312)427-5351. <P>IMPORTANT: The transcript may be viewed at the court's public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through the Court Reporter/Transcriber or PACER. For further information on the redaction process, see the Court's web site at www.ilnd.uscourts.gov under Quick Links select Policy Regarding the Availability of Transcripts of Court Proceedings.</P> Redaction Request due 10/19/2011. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 10/31/2011. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 12/27/2011. (Costales, Jennifer) (Entered: 09/28/2011)
486 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS held on 03/30/11 before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman. Court Reporter Contact Information: Jennifer Costales, CRR, RMR jennifer_costales@ilnd.uscourts.gov (312)427-5351. <P>IMPORTANT: The transcript may be viewed at the court's public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through the Court Reporter/Transcriber or PACER. For further information on the redaction process, see the Court's web site at www.ilnd.uscourts.gov under Quick Links select Policy Regarding the Availability of Transcripts of Court Proceedings.</P> Redaction Request due 10/19/2011. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 10/31/2011. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 12/27/2011. (Costales, Jennifer) (Entered: 09/28/2011)

https://ecf.ilnd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?743598400534567-L_1_0-1

48/64

10/26/2017
09/28/2011

CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 6.1.1.2 - U.S. District Court, Northern Illinois
487 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS held on 05/04/11 before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman. Court Reporter Contact Information: Jennifer Costales, CRR, RMR jennifer_costales@ilnd.uscourts.gov (312)427-5351. <P>IMPORTANT: The transcript may be viewed at the court's public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through the Court Reporter/Transcriber or PACER. For further information on the redaction process, see the Court's web site at www.ilnd.uscourts.gov under Quick Links select Policy Regarding the Availability of Transcripts of Court Proceedings.</P> Redaction Request due 10/19/2011. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 10/31/2011. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 12/27/2011. (Costales, Jennifer) (Entered: 09/28/2011)

09/28/2011

488 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS held on 07/19/11 before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman. Court Reporter Contact Information: Jennifer Costales, CRR, RMR jennifer_costales@ilnd.uscourts.gov (312)427-5351. <P>IMPORTANT: The transcript may be viewed at the court's public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through the Court Reporter/Transcriber or PACER. For further information on the redaction process, see the Court's web site at www.ilnd.uscourts.gov under Quick Links select Policy Regarding the Availability of Transcripts of Court Proceedings.</P> Redaction Request due 10/19/2011. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 10/31/2011. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 12/27/2011. (Costales, Jennifer) (Entered: 09/28/2011)

09/28/2011

489 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS held on 09/14/11 before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman. Court Reporter Contact Information: Jennifer Costales, CRR, RMR jennifer_costales@ilnd.uscourts.gov (312)427-5351. <P>IMPORTANT: The transcript may be viewed at the court's public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through the Court Reporter/Transcriber or PACER. For further information on the redaction process, see the Court's web site at www.ilnd.uscourts.gov under Quick Links select Policy Regarding the Availability of Transcripts of Court Proceedings.</P> Redaction Request due 10/19/2011. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 10/31/2011. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 12/27/2011. (Costales, Jennifer) (Entered: 09/28/2011)

11/08/2011

490 MINUTE entry before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Status hearing date of 11/10/2011 is re-set to 11/29/2011 at 9:30 a.m. Mailed notice (gds, ) (Entered: 11/08/2011)

11/16/2011

491 ORDER dated 11/16/2011 from the Seventh Circuit, regarding Seventh Circuit Case No. 11-8027; The following are before the court: 1. Petition for Leave to Appeal Pursuant to Rule 23(F) and 28 U.S.C. § 1292(B), ﬁled on September 29, 2011, by counsel for the Petitioners. 2. Defendant-Respondent Merrill Lynch's Answer in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Petition for Leave to Appeal Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(F) and 28 U.S.C. § 1292(B), ﬁled on October 11, 2011, by counsel for the Respondent. 3. Plaintiffs-Petitioners' Motion for Leave to File a Reply to Defendant-Respondent's Answer in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Petition for Leave to Appeal Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(F) and 28 U.S.C. 1292(B), ﬁled on October 13, 2011, by counsel for the Petitioners. 4. Plaintiffs-Petitioners' Motion for Leave to File a Reply Instanter to Defendant-Respondent's Answer in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Petition for Leave to Appeal Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(F) and 28 U.S.C. 1292(B), ﬁled on October 17, 2011, by counsel for the Petitioners. 5. PlaintiffsPetitioners' Amended Motion for Leave to File a Reply Instanter to DefendantRespondent's Answer in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Petition for Leave to Appeal Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(F) and 28 U.S.C. 1292(B), ﬁled on October 17, 2011, by counsel for the Petitioners. It is Ordered that the petition for leave to appeal is Granted. Petitioners shall

https://ecf.ilnd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?743598400534567-L_1_0-1

49/64

10/26/2017

CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 6.1.1.2 - U.S. District Court, Northern Illinois
pay the required appellate fees to the clerk of the district court within ten days from the entry of this order pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 5(d)(1). Once the district court notiﬁes this court that the fees have been paid, the appeal will be entered on this court's general docket. It is Further Ordered that brieﬁng in the resulting appeal is Expedited and will proceed as follows: 1. Plaintiffs-Appellants' opening brief and required appendix will be due on or before December 8, 2011. 2. Defendant-Appellee's brief will be due on or before December 29, 2011. 3. Plaintiffs-Appellants' reply brief, if any, will be due on or before January 5, 2012, at 12 p.m. Argument will be set by separate court order as soon as possible once brieﬁng is complete. The parties are advised that motions for extensions of time will be considered only in extraordinary circumstances. It is Finally Ordered that the motion for leave to ﬁle a reply, the motion for leave to ﬁle a reply instanter, and the amended motion for leave to ﬁle a reply are Denied.(et, ) (Entered: 11/21/2011)

11/16/2011

493 PURSUANT order dated 11/16/11 from the USCA this document is to be construted as the NOTICE of appeal by George McReynolds regarding orders 482 , 481 Filing fee $ 455.00. Receipt #4624070302 (dj, ) (Entered: 11/23/2011)

11/23/2011 494 NOTICE of Appeal Due letter sent to counsel of record (dj, ) (Entered: 11/23/2011)

11/23/2011

495 TRANSMITTED to the 7th Circuit the short record on notice of appeal 493 . Notiﬁed counsel (dj, ) (Entered: 11/23/2011)

11/23/2011

496 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT of receipt of short record on appeal regarding notice of appeal 493 ; USCA Case No. 11-3639. (et, ) (Entered: 11/28/2011)

11/28/2011

497 MINUTE entry before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Status hearing date of 11/29/2011 is re-set to 2/14/2012 at 9:00 a.m. The stay is continued to 2/14/2012. Telephone notice (gds, ) (Entered: 11/28/2011)

11/29/2011

498 DOCKETING Statement by Cathy Bender-Jackson, Leroy Brown, Leslie Browne, Glenn Capel, Christina Coleman, Larue Gibson, Maroc Howard, Mark Johnson, J. Yves Laborde, Jennifer Madrid, George McReynolds, Marshell Miller, Carnell Moore, Frankie Ross, Stephen Smartt, Henry Wilson, Marva York regarding notice of appeal 493 (Friedman, Linda) (Entered: 11/29/2011)

11/30/2011

499 SEVENTH CIRCUIT transcript information sheet by Cathy Bender-Jackson, Leroy Brown, Leslie Browne, Glenn Capel, Christina Coleman, Larue Gibson, Maroc Howard, Mark Johnson, J. Yves Laborde, Jennifer Madrid, George McReynolds, Marshell Miller, Carnell Moore, Frankie Ross, Stephen Smartt, Henry Wilson, Marva York (Friedman, Linda) (Entered: 11/30/2011)

11/30/2011

500 DESIGNATION by Cathy Bender-Jackson, Leroy Brown, Leslie Browne, Glenn Capel, Christina Coleman, Larue Gibson, Maroc Howard, Mark Johnson, J. Yves Laborde, Jennifer Madrid, George McReynolds, Marshell Miller, Carnell Moore, Frankie Ross, Stephen Smartt, Henry Wilson, Marva York of record on appeal : USCA Case No. 113639 (Friedman, Linda) (Entered: 11/30/2011)

11/30/2011

501 DESIGNATION by Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. of record on appeal : USCA Case No. 113639 (dj, ) (Entered: 12/01/2011)

01/04/2012 503 TRANSMITTED to the USCA for the 7th Circuit the long record on appeal 493 (USCA no. 11-3639) (dj, ) (Entered: 01/04/2012)

01/04/2012 504 USCA RECEIVED on 1/4/12 the long record regarding notice of appeal 493 (dj, ) (Entered: 01/05/2012)

02/09/2012 505 MINUTE entry before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Status hearing date of 2/14/2012 is re-set to 4/10/2012 at 9:00 a.m. Mailed notice (gds, ) (Entered: 02/09/2012)

https://ecf.ilnd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?743598400534567-L_1_0-1

50/64

10/26/2017
03/13/2012 03/13/2012 03/13/2012 03/13/2012 04/04/2012 04/04/2012 04/04/2012
04/04/2012 04/04/2012
04/10/2012
05/04/2012 05/04/2012 05/04/2012 05/14/2012
05/14/2012

CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 6.1.1.2 - U.S. District Court, Northern Illinois
506 NOTICE by Suzanne E. Bish of Change of Address (Bish, Suzanne) (Entered: 03/13/2012)
507 NOTICE by Linda Debra Friedman of Change of Address (Friedman, Linda) (Entered: 03/13/2012)
508 NOTICE by George S. Robot of Change of Address (Robot, George) (Entered: 03/13/2012)
509 NOTICE by Jennifer Schoen Gilbert of Change of Address (Gilbert, Jennifer) (Entered: 03/13/2012)
510 LETTER from the Seventh Circuit returning the record on appeal in USCA no. 11-3639 consisting of 1 Loose Pleading, 16 Transcripts and 7 Sealed Envelopes. (et, ) (Entered: 04/05/2012)
511 BILL of Costs from the USCA. (et, ) (Entered: 04/05/2012)
512 MANDATE of USCA dated 02/24/2012 regarding notice of appeal 493 ; USCA No. 113639 ; The denial of class certiﬁcation under Rules 23(b)(2) and (c)(4) is Reversed, with costs, in accordance with the decision of this court entered on this date. (et, ) (Entered: 04/05/2012)
513 OPINION from the USCA for the Seventh Circuit; Argued 01/13/2012; Decided 02/24/2012 in USCA case no. 11-3639. (et, ) (Entered: 04/05/2012)
514 ORDER dated 03/27/2012 from the Seventh Circuit regarding notice of appeal 493 ; Appellate case no.: 11-3639; On March 9, 2012, defendant-appellee ﬁled a petition for rehearing en banc. Al the judges on the original panel have voted to deny the petition, and none of the judges in regular active service has requested a vote on the petition for rehearing en banc. The petition is therefore Denied. (et, ) (Entered: 04/05/2012)
515 MINUTE entry before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Status hearing held on 4/10/2012. This cause is re-referred to Magistrate Judge Gilbert for discovery supervision and settlement. Proposed notice to class is due by 5/4/2012. The stay of individual claims is continued until further order of court. Status hearing set for 5/16/2012 at 11:00 a.m. Mailed notice (gds) (Entered: 04/18/2012)
516 MOTION by Defendant Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. to Adopt its Proposed Class Notices and Proposed Class Certiﬁcation Order (Lightfoot, Lori) (Entered: 05/04/2012)
517 MEMORANDUM by Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. in support of motion for miscellaneous relief 516 (Lightfoot, Lori) (Entered: 05/04/2012)
518 NOTICE of Motion by Lori E. Lightfoot for presentment of motion for miscellaneous relief 516 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 5/16/2012 at 11:00 AM. (Lightfoot, Lori) (Entered: 05/04/2012)
519 MOTION by Plaintiffs Cathy Bender-Jackson, Leroy Brown, Leslie Browne, Glenn Capel, Christina Coleman, Larue Gibson, Maroc Howard, Mark Johnson, J. Yves Laborde, Jennifer Madrid, George McReynolds to strike Defendant's Motion to Adopt Proposed Class Notices and Order (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2)(Bish, Suzanne) (Entered: 05/14/2012)
520 NOTICE of Motion by Suzanne E. Bish for presentment of motion to strike, 519 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 5/16/2012 at 11:00 AM. (Bish, Suzanne) (Entered: 05/14/2012)

https://ecf.ilnd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?743598400534567-L_1_0-1

51/64

10/26/2017
05/15/2012

CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 6.1.1.2 - U.S. District Court, Northern Illinois
521 MINUTE entry before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: The time of the 5/16/2012 status hearing is re-set to 12:00 p.m. Mailed notice (gds) (Entered: 05/15/2012)

05/16/2012

522 MINUTE entry before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Defendants' motion 516 to adopt is denied. Motion to strike 519 is denied as moot. Status hearing held on 5/16/2012. Status hearing set for 6/5/2012 at 10:00 a.m. Mailed notice (gds) (Entered: 05/23/2012)

05/30/2012

523 MINUTE entry before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Counsel are given an extension of time to 6/1/2012 to submit a proposed class notice. Status hearing date of 6/5/2012 is re-set to 6/7/2012 at 2:00 p.m. Telephone notice (gds) (Entered: 05/30/2012)

06/07/2012

524 MINUTE entry before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Status hearing held on 6/7/2012. Simultaneous briefs on the issue of opt-outs are due by 6/21/2012. Status hearing set for 7/12/2012 at 9:30 a.m. Mailed notice (gds) (Entered: 06/11/2012)

06/21/2012

525 MEMORANDUM status hearing, set/reset hearings 524 by Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. (Memorandum of Law Pursuant to the Court's June 7, 2012 Minute Entry Order) (Lightfoot, Lori) (Entered: 06/21/2012)

06/21/2012

526 Memorandum In Support Of An Opt-Out Provision by Cathy Bender-Jackson, Leroy Brown, Leslie Browne, Glenn Capel, Christina Coleman, Larue Gibson, Maroc Howard, Mark Johnson, J. Yves Laborde, Jennifer Madrid, George McReynolds, Marshell Miller, Carnell Moore, Frankie Ross, Stephen Smartt, Henry Wilson, Marva York (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit F) (Friedman, Linda) (Entered: 06/21/2012)

06/21/2012 527 SEVENTH CIRCUIT transcript information sheet by George McReynolds. (et, ) (Entered: 06/25/2012)

07/09/2012 528 MOTION by Defendant Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. for order (Motion for a Rule 16 Order) (Lightfoot, Lori) (Entered: 07/09/2012)

07/09/2012

529 NOTICE of Motion by Lori E. Lightfoot for presentment of motion for order 528 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 7/12/2012 at 09:30 AM. (Lightfoot, Lori) (Entered: 07/09/2012)

07/09/2012

530 MEMORANDUM by Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. in support of motion for order 528 (Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Rule 16 Order) (Lightfoot, Lori) (Entered: 07/09/2012)

07/12/2012

531 MINUTE entry before Honorable Jeffrey T. Gilbert: This matter is set for a status hearing on 8/7/12 at 10:30 a.m. with respect to discussing a discovery plan. Mailed notice (ep, ) (Entered: 07/12/2012)

07/12/2012

532 MINUTE entry before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Defendant's motion for a Rule 16 order 528 is denied without prejudice as premature. Mailed notice (gds) (Entered: 07/13/2012)

07/12/2012 535 MINUTE entry before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Status hearing held on 7/12/2012. Mailed notice (gds) (Entered: 07/19/2012)

07/13/2012

533 MINUTE entry before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Enter Class Certiﬁcation order. By agreement, the stay of all proceedings for absent class members and the toll of the limitations period for their individual claims shall expire on 11/13/2012. Defendants' motion 468 to lift stay is denied as moot. Mailed notice (gds) (Entered: 07/13/2012)

07/13/2012 534 CLASS CERTIFICATION ORDER Signed by the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 7/13/2012: Mailed notice (gds) (Entered: 07/13/2012)

07/31/2012 536 MINUTE entry before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: The time to issue the class notice

https://ecf.ilnd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?743598400534567-L_1_0-1

52/64

10/26/2017

CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 6.1.1.2 - U.S. District Court, Northern Illinois
is extended to 8/10/2012. Mailed notice (gds) (Entered: 07/31/2012)

08/06/2012 537 MINUTE entry before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Status hearing date of 8/15/2012 is re-set to 8/16/2012 at 11:30 a.m. Mailed notice (gds) (Entered: 08/06/2012)

08/07/2012

538 MINUTE entry before Honorable Jeffrey T. Gilbert: Status hearing held on 8/7/12 with respect to the development of a discovery plan. Continued status hearing and Rule 16 conference set for 9/21/12 at 9:15 a.m. Defendant shall produce the updated compensation and other data requested by Plaintiffs on or before 8/31/12. The topics for discussion on 8/21/12 include, without limitation, the following: (a) a date for Plaintiffs' Rule 26(a)(2) disclosures in support of their disparate impact case; (b) a date for Defendants' Rule 26(a)(2) disclosures in support of (i) their business necessity defense, (ii) their rebuttal of Plaintiffs' disparate impact expert disclosures; (c) dates for expert depositions and discovery to conclude; and (d) date(s) by which written and oral fact discovery will close. Because the parties are producing and analyzing a large volume of electronic data in this case, the Court will enter formally in this case its Standing Order Relating to the Discovery of Electronically Stored Information. The parties shall comply with the principles set forth in that order including, without limitation, principle 2.02 regarding the identiﬁcation of discovery liaisons. Mailed notice (ep, ) (Entered: 08/07/2012)

08/07/2012 539 STANDING Order Relating to the Discovery of Electronically Stored Information. Signed by the Honorable Jeffrey T. Gilbert on 8/7/2012. (ep, ) (Entered: 08/07/2012)

08/08/2012

540 MINUTE entry before Honorable Jeffrey T. Gilbert: The Court's previous minute order 538 is corrected as follows: The topics for discussion on 9/21/12 include, without limitation, the following: (a) a date for Plaintiffs' Rule 26(a)(2) disclosures in support of their disparate impact case; (b) a date for Defendants' Rule 26(a)(2) disclosures in support of (i) their business necessity defense, (ii) their rebuttal of Plaintiffs' disparate impact expert disclosures; (c) dates for expert depositions and discovery to conclude; and (d) date(s) by which written and oral fact discovery will close. Mailed notice (ep, ) (Entered: 08/08/2012)

08/14/2012 541 MINUTE entry before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Status hearing date of 8/16/2012 is stricken. Mailed notice (gds) (Entered: 08/14/2012)

08/21/2012 542 MINUTE entry before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Status hearing is set for 11/21/2012 at 10:00 a.m. Mailed notice (gds) (Entered: 08/21/2012)

08/29/2012

543 MINUTE entry before Honorable Jeffrey T. Gilbert: At the parties' request, the Court extends to 9/7/12 the deadline by which Defendant shall produce the agreed-to data updates as set forth in the Court's previous order issued on 8/7/12 538 . Enter Order. Mailed notice (ep, ) (Entered: 08/30/2012)

08/29/2012 544 AGREED Order to Extend the Schedule for Data Production. Signed by the Honorable Jeffrey T. Gilbert on 8/29/2012. (ep, ) (Entered: 08/30/2012)

09/19/2012

545 MINUTE entry before Honorable Jeffrey T. Gilbert: Conference call held. The Court and counsel have agreed to reschedule the Rule 16 conference set for 9/21/12 at 9:15 a.m. to 10/15/12 at 1:30 p.m. Mailed notice (ep, ) (Entered: 09/19/2012)

10/09/2012

546 MINUTE entry before Honorable Jeffrey T. Gilbert: At the parties' request, the Rule 16 conference set for 10/15/12 at 1:30 p.m. is stricken. Rule 16 conference reset to 11/2/12 at 9:30 a.m. Mailed notice (ep, ) (Entered: 10/09/2012)

10/22/2012 547 MOTION by Plaintiff George McReynolds for extension of time Agreed Motion To Extend Tolling Expiration Period (Bish, Suzanne) (Entered: 10/22/2012)

10/22/2012 548 NOTICE of Motion by Suzanne E. Bish for presentment of extension of time 547 before

https://ecf.ilnd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?743598400534567-L_1_0-1

53/64

10/26/2017

CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 6.1.1.2 - U.S. District Court, Northern Illinois
Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 10/25/2012 at 09:15 AM. (Bish, Suzanne) (Entered: 10/22/2012)

10/24/2012

549 MINUTE entry before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Motion 547 for extension of the tolling expiration period to 12/13/2012 is granted. Status hearing date of 11/21/2012 is reset to 1/7/2013 at 10:30 a.m. Mailed notice (gds) (Entered: 10/24/2012)

10/31/2012

550 MINUTE entry before Honorable Jeffrey T. Gilbert: Telephone conference set for 11/2/12 at 2:30 p.m. The parties shall jointly contact chambers at the appropriate time. Rule 16 conference set for 11/2/12 at 9:30 a.m. is stricken. Mailed notice (ep, ) (Entered: 10/31/2012)

11/02/2012

551 MINUTE entry before Honorable Jeffrey T. Gilbert: Telephone conference held with counsel concerning the rescheduling of the Rule 16 conference. By agreement of the parties and the Court, the Rule 16 conference is rescheduled to 11/28/12. The Court will set the time for that conference in a future minute order. Mailed notice (ep, ) (Entered: 11/02/2012)

11/13/2012

552 MINUTE entry before Honorable Jeffrey T. Gilbert: The Rule 16 Conference set for 11/28/12 will begin at 1:30 p.m. Mailed notice (ep, ) (Entered: 11/13/2012)

11/16/2012

553 MINUTE entry before Honorable Jeffrey T. Gilbert: The parties requested a brief telephonic hearing with the Court. Counsel shall call in to chambers at 11:00 a.m. on 11/19/12. Mailed notice (ep, ) (Entered: 11/16/2012)

11/19/2012

554 MINUTE entry before Honorable Jeffrey T. Gilbert: Telephonic conference held with counsel for Plaintiffs and Defendant. By agreement of the parties and the Court, the Rule 16 conference concerning expert disclosures and discovery is rescheduled to 2/12/13 at 1:30 p.m. The Rule 16 conference previously scheduled for 11/28/12 at 1:30 p.m. is stricken. Status hearing set for 1/30/13 at 10:00 a.m. Mailed notice (ep, ) (Entered: 11/19/2012)

12/03/2012

555 MINUTE entry before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: By agreement of the parties, the tolling period is extended to and including 2/13/2013. Status hearing date of 1/7/2013 is re-set to 2/13/2013 at 9:00 a.m. Mailed notice (gds) (Entered: 12/03/2012)

02/13/2013

556 MINUTE entry before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Status hearing held on 2/13/2013. In-chambers conference is set for 4/5/2013 at 8:30 a.m. Mailed notice (gds) (Entered: 02/14/2013)

02/13/2013

557 MINUTE entry before Honorable Jeffrey T. Gilbert: In accordance with the Court's order, the parties will meet and confer and shall jointly submit by 4/1/13 a protocol identifying the custodians and key word search terms for the next phase of this process. The parties shall submit the protocol to Magistrate Judge Gilbert's Chambers on or before 4/1/13. Status hearing set for 4/2/13 1:30 pm. Enter Order. (For further details see separate order) Mailed notice (mr, ) (Entered: 02/14/2013)

02/13/2013 558 ORDER Signed by the Honorable Jeffrey T. Gilbert on 2/13/2013.(mr, ) (Entered: 02/14/2013)

02/26/2013

559 STIPULATION Agreement with Respect to Individuals Who Are Class Members in the Cases of Scott A Chambers, et al. v. Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., et al. and McReynolds, et al. v. Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc. (Friedman, Linda) (Entered: 02/26/2013)

02/28/2013 560 MINUTE entry before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: The tolling expiration date is extended to 4/13/2013. Mailed notice (gds) (Entered: 02/28/2013)

03/25/2013 561 MOTION by Plaintiffs Cathy Bender-Jackson, Leroy Brown, Leslie Browne, Glenn Capel, Christina Coleman, Larue Gibson, Maroc Howard, Mark Johnson, J. Yves

https://ecf.ilnd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?743598400534567-L_1_0-1

54/64

10/26/2017
03/25/2013
03/25/2013 03/26/2013 04/01/2013 04/01/2013 04/02/2013 04/02/2013
04/03/2013 04/09/2013

CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 6.1.1.2 - U.S. District Court, Northern Illinois
Laborde, Jennifer Madrid, George McReynolds, Marshell Miller, Carnell Moore, Frankie Ross, Stephen Smartt, Henry Wilson, Marva York to compel Motion To Compel Conﬁdential Workplace Advisor Documents (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit D)(Friedman, Linda) (Entered: 03/25/2013)
562 SEALED EXHIBIT by Plaintiffs Cathy Bender-Jackson, Leroy Brown, Leslie Browne, Glenn Capel, Christina Coleman, Larue Gibson, Maroc Howard, Mark Johnson, J. Yves Laborde, Jennifer Madrid, George McReynolds, Marshell Miller, Carnell Moore, Frankie Ross, Stephen Smartt, Henry Wilson, Marva York Exhibit C regarding MOTION by Plaintiffs Cathy Bender-Jackson, Leroy Brown, Leslie Browne, Glenn Capel, Christina Coleman, Larue Gibson, Maroc Howard, Mark Johnson, J. Yves Laborde, Jennifer Madrid, George McReynolds, Marshell Miller, Carnell Moore, Frankie Ross, Stephen 561 (Friedman, Linda) (Entered: 03/25/2013)
563 NOTICE of Motion by Linda Debra Friedman for presentment of motion to compel, 561 before Honorable Jeffrey T. Gilbert on 4/2/2013 at 09:15 AM. (Friedman, Linda) (Entered: 03/25/2013)
564 NOTICE of Motion by Linda Debra Friedman for presentment of motion to compel, 561 before Honorable Jeffrey T. Gilbert on 4/2/2013 at 01:30 PM. (Friedman, Linda) (Entered: 03/26/2013)
565 MINUTE entry before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: In chambers conference date of 4/5/2013 is re-set to 4/9/2013 at 1:30 p.m. Mailed notice (gds) (Entered: 04/01/2013)
566 RESPONSE by Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.in Opposition to MOTION by Plaintiffs Cathy Bender-Jackson, Leroy Brown, Leslie Browne, Glenn Capel, Christina Coleman, Larue Gibson, Maroc Howard, Mark Johnson, J. Yves Laborde, Jennifer Madrid, George McReynolds, Marshell Miller, Carnell Moore, Frankie Ross, Stephen 561 (Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel Conﬁdential Workplace Advisor Documents) (Lightfoot, Lori) (Entered: 04/01/2013)
567 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiffs Cathy Bender-Jackson, Leroy Brown, Leslie Browne, Glenn Capel, Christina Coleman, Larue Gibson, Maroc Howard, Mark Johnson, J. Yves Laborde, Jennifer Madrid, George McReynolds, Marshell Miller, Carnell Moore, Frankie Ross, Stephen Smartt, Henry Wilson, Marva York by Patricia Ann Bronte (mr, ) (Entered: 04/02/2013)
568 MINUTE entry before Honorable Jeffrey T. Gilbert: In-chambers conference held with the parties concerning the status of their ongoing discussions about an ESI protocol and local ofﬁce discovery per the parties' submission dated 4/1/13 [submitted per the Court's prior Order, DE#[ 557 ]. The parties will submit to the Court on or before 4/15/13 an updated report on the ESI issues and, to the extent possible, an update on the status of their discussions concerning local ofﬁce discovery. The report again can be submitted in a letter and need not be ﬁled via the CM/ECF system. Telephone conference call set for 4/19/13 at 10:00 a.m. C.S.T. for continued monitoring and discussion of the ESI issues and the local ofﬁce discovery issues covered during today's session. Plaintiffs are given leave to ﬁle a reply in support of their Motion to Compel Conﬁdential Workplace Advisor Documents [DE# 561 ] on or before 4/9/13. The Court will set a future hearing on that Motion, if necessary, after it reviews the parties' briefs or rule via the CM/ECF system. Mailed notice (mr, ) (Entered: 04/02/2013)
569 MINUTE entry before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: In chambers conference date of 4/9/2013 is re-set to 4/15/2013 at 8:30 a.m. Mailed notice (gds) (Entered: 04/03/2013)
570 REPLY by Plaintiffs Cathy Bender-Jackson, Leroy Brown, Leslie Browne, Glenn Capel, Christina Coleman, Larue Gibson, Maroc Howard, Mark Johnson, J. Yves Laborde,

https://ecf.ilnd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?743598400534567-L_1_0-1

55/64

10/26/2017

CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 6.1.1.2 - U.S. District Court, Northern Illinois
Jennifer Madrid, George McReynolds, Marshell Miller, Carnell Moore, Frankie Ross, Stephen Smartt, Henry Wilson, Marva York to motion to compel, 561 Reply In Support Of Motion To Compel Conﬁdential Workplace Advisor Documents (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit F, # 7 Exhibit G)(Bish, Suzanne) (Entered: 04/09/2013)

04/15/2013

571 MINUTE entry before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: In chambers status hearing held on 4/15/2013. By agreement, the stay of all proceedings for absent class members and the toll of the limitations for the individual claims is continued to 6/13/2013. Status hearing set for 7/24/2013 at 10:00 a.m. Trial on plaintiffs' prima facie case is set for 1/6/2014, at 9:30 a.m. Mailed notice (gds) (Entered: 04/16/2013)

04/18/2013

572 MINUTE entry before Honorable Jeffrey T. Gilbert: At the request of the parties, the telephone status hearing set for 4/19/13 is stricken and reset to 4/22/2013 at 4:00 p.m. Mailed notice (mr, ) (Entered: 04/18/2013)

04/22/2013

573 MINUTE entry before Honorable Jeffrey T. Gilbert: Telephone status conference held with counsel for both parties. Counsel reported on the status of their discussions concerning various discovery issues. Continued telephone status conference set for 5/6/13 at 10:00 a.m. Central Time. Counsel jointly will call chambers at that time. Mailed notice (mr, ) (Entered: 04/22/2013)

05/06/2013

574 MINUTE entry before Honorable Jeffrey T. Gilbert: Telephone status conference held with counsel for both parties. Continued telephone status conference set for 5/17/13 at 9:30 a.m. Central Time. Counsel jointly will call chambers at that time. Mailed notice (mr, ) (Entered: 05/06/2013)

05/13/2013

575 MINUTE entry before Honorable Jeffrey T. Gilbert: At Plaintiffs' request and without objection by Defendant, Plaintiffs' expert disclosures pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P 26(a)(2) are now due on 7/17/13. Mailed notice (mr, ) (Entered: 05/13/2013)

05/13/2013

576 MINUTE entry before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: In chambers conference with Magistrate Judge Gilbert held. Status hearing date of 7/24/2013 is re-set to 8/13/2013 at 1:00 p.m. Mailed notice (gds) (Entered: 05/15/2013)

05/17/2013

577 MINUTE entry before Honorable Jeffrey T. Gilbert: Telephone status hearing held with counsel. In-person discovery conference set for 6/6/13 at 3:00 p.m. for the purpose of resolving certain discovery issues discussed on this morning's call. The parties will submit in chambers on or before 6/4/13 a letter summarizing the issues that need to be resolved and the parties' respective positions concerning same. If the parties' discussions have progressed sufﬁciently before 6/6/13 that they no longer believe an in-person conference is necessary, they shall so advise the Court via its courtroom deputy. Mailed notice (mr, ) (Entered: 05/17/2013)

06/04/2013

578 MINUTE entry before Honorable Jeffrey T. Gilbert: At the Court's request, the discovery conference scheduled for 6/6/13 at 3:00 p.m. [DE# 577 ] is stricken as is the requirement that the parties submit in chambers by 6/4/13 a letter summarizing the issues to be discussed at that conference [DE# 577 ]. Counsel are directed to confer and call the Court's judicial assistant, Patricia Hagenmaier, to conﬁrm a telephonic status hearing on 6/11/13 at 1:00 p.m. or a new date for the discovery conference, all consistent with their schedules and the Court's schedule. Mailed notice (mr, ) (Entered: 06/04/2013)

06/11/2013

579 MINUTE entry before Honorable Jeffrey T. Gilbert: Telephone status conference set for 6/11/13 is stricken and reset to 6/18/2013 at 1:00 p.m. Mailed notice (mr, ) (Entered: 06/11/2013)

06/14/2013 580 MINUTE entry before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: By agreement, the stay of all proceedings for absent class members and the toll of the limitations for the individual

https://ecf.ilnd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?743598400534567-L_1_0-1

56/64

10/26/2017

CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 6.1.1.2 - U.S. District Court, Northern Illinois
claims is continued to 7/13/2013. Mailed notice (gds) (Entered: 06/14/2013)

06/18/2013 581 MINUTE entry before Honorable Jeffrey T. Gilbert: Telephonic status hearing held and continued to 7/18/13 at 2:00 p.m. Mailed notice (mr, ) (Entered: 06/18/2013)

07/12/2013

582 MINUTE entry before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: By agreement, the stay of all proceedings for absent class members and the toll of the limitations for the individual claims is continued to 8/13/2013. Mailed notice (gds) (Entered: 07/12/2013)

07/15/2013

583 MINUTE entry before Honorable Jeffrey T. Gilbert: At the parties' request, the telephonic status conference scheduled for 7/18/13 at 2:00 is stricken. Mailed notice (mr, ) (Entered: 07/16/2013)

08/05/2013 584 MINUTE entry before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Status hearing date of 8/13/2013 is re-set to 9/3/2013 at 2:00 p.m. Mailed notice (gds) (Entered: 08/05/2013)

08/28/2013

585 MOTION by Plaintiffs Cathy Bender-Jackson, Leroy Brown, Leslie Browne, Glenn Capel, Christina Coleman, Larue Gibson, Maroc Howard, Mark Johnson, J. Yves Laborde, Jennifer Madrid, George McReynolds, Marshell Miller, Carnell Moore, Frankie Ross, Stephen Smartt, Henry Wilson, Marva York for settlement Unopposed Motion For Provisional Class Certiﬁcation, Preliminary Approval Of Settlement, And Approval Of Notice (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 Settlement Agreement, # 2 Exhibit A, # 3 Exhibit B, # 4 Exhibit C, # 5 Exhibit 2 Proposed Order)(Friedman, Linda) (Entered: 08/28/2013)

08/28/2013

586 SEALED EXHIBIT by Plaintiffs Cathy Bender-Jackson, Leroy Brown, Leslie Browne, Glenn Capel, Christina Coleman, Larue Gibson, Maroc Howard, Mark Johnson, J. Yves Laborde, Jennifer Madrid, George McReynolds, Marshell Miller, Carnell Moore, Frankie Ross, Stephen Smartt, Henry Wilson, Marva York Exhibit D Filed Under Seal regarding MOTION by Plaintiffs Cathy Bender-Jackson, Leroy Brown, Leslie Browne, Glenn Capel, Christina Coleman, Larue Gibson, Maroc Howard, Mark Johnson, J. Yves Laborde, Jennifer Madrid, George McReynolds, Marshell Miller, Carnell Moore, Frankie Ross, Stephen 585 (Friedman, Linda) (Entered: 08/28/2013)

08/28/2013

587 NOTICE of Motion by Linda Debra Friedman for presentment of motion for settlement,, 585 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 9/3/2013 at 02:00 PM. (Friedman, Linda) (Entered: 08/28/2013)

09/03/2013

588 MINUTE entry before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Status hearing held on 9/3/2013. Opt-outs and objections are due by 11/13/2013. Fee petitions and incentive petitions are due by 11/8/2013. Status hearing set for 12/6/2013 at 10:00 a.m. Mailed notice (gds) (Entered: 09/04/2013)

09/04/2013

589 PRELIMINARY APPROVAL Order Entered by the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 9/4/2013: Upon consideration of Plaintiffs' Motion for Certiﬁcation of Settlement Class and Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement and Notice (the "Motion"), and the supporting materials ﬁled by the Parties, including the Settlement Agreement and the exhibits attached thereto, under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, it is ordered that the Motion is granted. 585 Mailed notice (tlm) (Entered: 09/06/2013)

09/18/2013

590 MINUTE entry before Honorable Jeffrey T. Gilbert: In light of the District Judge's Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement 589 , Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel Conﬁdential Workplace Advisor Documents 561 is denied as moot. Mailed notice (mr, ) (Entered: 09/18/2013)

10/11/2013

591 MINUTE entry before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Settlement conference is set for 10/24/2013 at 11:00 a.m. Mailed notice (gds) (Entered: 10/11/2013)

10/16/2013 592 MINUTE entry before Honorable Jeffrey T. Gilbert: In light of the proceedings before the District Judge relating to the parties' settlement, the referral is terminated and the matter is

https://ecf.ilnd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?743598400534567-L_1_0-1

57/64

10/26/2017
10/24/2013 11/08/2013 11/08/2013
11/08/2013
11/12/2013 11/12/2013 11/12/2013 11/19/2013

CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 6.1.1.2 - U.S. District Court, Northern Illinois
returned to the assigned Judge. Referral terminated. Mailed notice (mr, ) (Entered: 10/16/2013)
593 MINUTE entry before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Status hearing held in chambers on 10/24/2013. Mailed notice (gds) (Entered: 10/28/2013)
594 MOTION by Plaintiffs Cathy Bender-Jackson, Leroy Brown, Leslie Browne, Glenn Capel, Christina Coleman, Larue Gibson, Maroc Howard, Mark Johnson, J. Yves Laborde, Jennifer Madrid, George McReynolds, Marshell Miller, Carnell Moore, Frankie Ross, Stephen Smartt, Henry Wilson, Marva York for leave to ﬁle Class Counsel's Motion for Leave to File a 22-Page Petition for Attorneys' Fees and Costs (Friedman, Linda) (Entered: 11/08/2013)
595 MOTION by Plaintiffs Cathy Bender-Jackson, Leroy Brown, Leslie Browne, Glenn Capel, Christina Coleman, Larue Gibson, Maroc Howard, Mark Johnson, J. Yves Laborde, Jennifer Madrid, George McReynolds, Marshell Miller, Carnell Moore, Frankie Ross, Stephen Smartt, Henry Wilson, Marva YorkPetition for Service Awards for Class Representatives and Steering Committee (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit 4, # 5 Exhibit 5, # 6 Exhibit 6, # 7 Exhibit 7, # 8 Exhibit 8, # 9 Exhibit 9, # 10 Exhibit 10, # 11 Exhibit 11, # 12 Exhibit 12, # 13 Exhibit 13, # 14 Exhibit 14, # 15 Exhibit 15, # 16 Exhibit 16, # 17 Exhibit 17, # 18 Exhibit 18, # 19 Exhibit 19, # 20 Exhibit 20, # 21 Exhibit 21, # 22 Exhibit 22, # 23 Exhibit 23)(Friedman, Linda) (Entered: 11/08/2013)
596 MOTION by Plaintiffs Cathy Bender-Jackson, Leroy Brown, Leslie Browne, Glenn Capel, Christina Coleman, Larue Gibson, Maroc Howard, Mark Johnson, J. Yves Laborde, Jennifer Madrid, George McReynolds, Marshell Miller, Carnell Moore, Frankie Ross, Stephen Smartt, Henry Wilson, Marva York for attorney fees Petition For Attorneys' Fees and Costs (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit F, # 7 Exhibit G, # 8 Exhibit H, # 9 Exhibit I, # 10 Exhibit J, # 11 Exhibit K, # 12 Exhibit L, # 13 Exhibit M, # 14 Exhibit N, # 15 Exhibit O, # 16 Exhibit P, # 17 Exhibit Q)(Bish, Suzanne) (Entered: 11/08/2013)
597 MINUTE entry before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Class counsel's motion 594 for leave to ﬁle a 22 page petition for attorneys' fees and costs is granted. Mailed notice (gds) (Entered: 11/12/2013)
598 Certiﬁcate of Service by Cathy Bender-Jackson, Leroy Brown, Leslie Browne, Glenn Capel, Christina Coleman, Larue Gibson, Maroc Howard, Mark Johnson, J. Yves Laborde, Jennifer Madrid, George McReynolds, Marshell Miller, Carnell Moore, Frankie Ross, Stephen Smartt, Henry Wilson, Marva York to Petition for Service Awards to Class Representatives and Steering Committee ﬁled 11/8/13 (Bish, Suzanne) 595 Modiﬁed on 11/13/2013 (tlm). (Entered: 11/12/2013)
599 Certiﬁcate of Service by Cathy Bender-Jackson, Leroy Brown, Leslie Browne, Glenn Capel, Christina Coleman, Larue Gibson, Maroc Howard, Mark Johnson, J. Yves Laborde, Jennifer Madrid, George McReynolds, Marshell Miller, Carnell Moore, Frankie Ross, Stephen Smartt, Henry Wilson, Marva York to Class Counsel's Petition for Attorneys' Fees and Costs ﬁled 11/8/13 (Bish, Suzanne) 594 Modiﬁed on 11/13/2013 (tlm). (Entered: 11/12/2013)
600 MOTION by Plaintiffs Cathy Bender-Jackson, Leroy Brown, Leslie Browne, Glenn Capel, Christina Coleman, Larue Gibson, Maroc Howard, Mark Johnson, J. Yves Laborde, Jennifer Madrid, George McReynolds, Marshell Miller, Carnell Moore, Frankie Ross, Stephen Smartt, Henry Wilson, Marva York for leave to ﬁle Class Counsel's Motion For Leave To File Corrected Declaration of John C. Coffee, Jr. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Friedman, Linda) (Entered: 11/19/2013)

https://ecf.ilnd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?743598400534567-L_1_0-1

58/64

10/26/2017
11/19/2013

CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 6.1.1.2 - U.S. District Court, Northern Illinois
601 Order For Process to Determine Settlement Class Membership signed by the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 11/19/2013. Mailed notice (gds) (Entered: 11/19/2013)

11/19/2013

602 NOTICE of Motion by Suzanne E. Bish for presentment of motion for leave to ﬁle, 600 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 12/3/2013 at 09:15 AM. (Bish, Suzanne) (Entered: 11/19/2013)

11/20/2013

603 MOTION by Defendant Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. to seal (Motion for Leave to File Exhibits Under Seal) (Lightfoot, Lori) (Entered: 11/20/2013)

11/20/2013

604 NOTICE of Motion by Lori E. Lightfoot for presentment of motion to seal 603 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 12/6/2013 at 09:15 AM. (Lightfoot, Lori) (Entered: 11/20/2013)

11/21/2013

605 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Defendant's motion for leave to ﬁle exhibits under seal 603 is granted. Mailed notice (gds) (Entered: 11/21/2013)

11/21/2013

606 RESPONSE by Defendant Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. to Objection of La Mar Gunn to the Preliminarily Approved Settlement Agreement (Lightfoot, Lori) (Entered: 11/21/2013)

11/21/2013

607 DECLARATION of Joseph Bush regarding Response 606 of Defendant Merrill Lynch to Objection of La Mar Gunn to the Preliminarily Approved Settlement Agreement (Lightfoot, Lori) (Entered: 11/21/2013)

11/21/2013

608 DECLARATION of Jared R. Friedmann regarding Response 606 of Defendant Merrill Lynch to Objection of La Mar Gunn to the Preliminarily Approved Settlement Agreement (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 2)(Lightfoot, Lori) (Entered: 11/21/2013)

11/21/2013

609 SEALED EXHIBIT by Defendant Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. (Exhibit 1 to Declaration of Jared R. Friedmann in Support of Defendant Merrill Lynch's Response to Objection of La Mar Gunn to the Preliminarily Approved Settlement Agreement) regarding declaration 608 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 3)(Lightfoot, Lori) (Entered: 11/21/2013)

11/21/2013

610 MOTION by Plaintiffs Cathy Bender-Jackson, Leroy Brown, Leslie Browne, Glenn Capel, Christina Coleman, Larue Gibson, Maroc Howard, Mark Johnson, J. Yves Laborde, Jennifer Madrid, George McReynolds, Marshell Miller, Carnell Moore, Frankie Ross, Stephen Smartt, Henry Wilson, Marva York for settlement Plaintiffs' Unopposed Motion For Final Approval Of Class Action Settlement (Friedman, Linda) (Entered: 11/21/2013)

11/21/2013

611 MEMORANDUM by Cathy Bender-Jackson, Leroy Brown, Leslie Browne, Glenn Capel, Christina Coleman, Larue Gibson, Maroc Howard, Mark Johnson, J. Yves Laborde, Jennifer Madrid, George McReynolds, Marshell Miller, Carnell Moore, Frankie Ross, Stephen Smartt, Henry Wilson, Marva York in support of motion for settlement, 610 Memorandum In Support of Plaintiffs' Unopposed Motion for Final Approval of Class Action Settlement (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit 4, # 5 Exhibit 5, # 6 Exhibit 6)(Friedman, Linda) (Entered: 11/21/2013)

11/21/2013

612 RESPONSE by Plaintiffs Cathy Bender-Jackson, Leroy Brown, Leslie Browne, Glenn Capel, Christina Coleman, Larue Gibson, Maroc Howard, Mark Johnson, J. Yves Laborde, Jennifer Madrid, George McReynolds, Marshell Miller, Carnell Moore, Frankie Ross, Stephen Smartt, Henry Wilson, Marva York Class Counsel's Response to Objection of LaMar Gunn to the Class Action Settlement (Friedman, Linda) (Entered: 11/21/2013)

12/02/2013

613 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Class counsel's motion 600 for leave to ﬁle corrected declaration of John C. Coffee, Jr. is granted. Mailed notice (gds) (Entered: 12/02/2013)

https://ecf.ilnd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?743598400534567-L_1_0-1

59/64

10/26/2017
12/02/2013 12/06/2013
12/06/2013 12/09/2013 12/09/2013 12/09/2013 12/09/2013 12/09/2013 12/10/2013
01/02/2014

CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 6.1.1.2 - U.S. District Court, Northern Illinois
614 DECLARATION of John C. Coffee, Jr. (ea, ) (Entered: 12/03/2013)
615 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Fairness hearing held on 12/6/2013. The Court overrules Mr. Gunn's objections. Trial date of 1/6/2014 is stricken. Plaintiffs' motion 595 for service awards is granted. Motion 596 for attorney fees and costs is granted. Unopposed motion 610 for ﬁnal approval of class action settlement is granted. Civil case terminated. Mailed notice (gds) (Entered: 12/10/2013)
616 FINAL APPROVAL ORDER Entered by the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 12/6/2013. Mailed notice (tlm) (Entered: 12/11/2013)
618 MOTION by La Mar Gunn for Approval to Issue CM/ECF Log-in and Password. (tlm) (Entered: 12/17/2013)
619 MOTION for Extension of Time to Respond to the Objections of Defendants and Class Counsel. (tlm) (Entered: 12/17/2013)
620 AFFIDAVIT of La Mar Gunn regarding Objecting to the Proposed Settlement of Race Discrimination. 616 (tlm) (Entered: 12/17/2013)
621 MOTION and Notice of Motion to Intervene as of Right by La Mar Gunn (Exhibit). (tlm) (Entered: 12/17/2013)
622 LETTER from La Mar Gunn dated 12/03/2013. (tlm) (Entered: 12/17/2013)
617 ORDER signed by the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 12/10/2013: Mr. Gunn's objections to the proposed class action settlement and his motion to intervene are denied. His motions for approval to issue CM/ECF login and password and for extension of time are also denied. Mailed notice (gds) (Entered: 12/11/2013)
623 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS held on December 6, 2013 before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman. Court Reporter Contact Information: Nancy L. Bistany, nancy_bistany@ilnd.uscourts.gov, 312-435-7626.

IMPORTANT: The transcript may be viewed at the court's public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through the Court Reporter/Transcriber or PACER. For further information on the redaction process, see the Court's web site at www.ilnd.uscourts.gov under Quick Links select Policy Regarding the Availability of Transcripts of Court Proceedings.

01/24/2014 01/24/2014 01/30/2014 01/30/2014 01/30/2014

Redaction Request due 1/23/2014. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 2/3/2014. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 4/2/2014. (Bistany, Nancy) (Entered: 01/02/2014)
624 MOTION by Unknown La Mar Gunn for extension of time to ﬁle Notice of Appeal. (Exhibits) (kj, ) Modiﬁed on 1/31/2014 . (Entered: 01/30/2014)
625 NOTICE of appeal by La Mar Gunn regarding orders 616 , 615 , 617 . (Fee Due) (kj, ) (Entered: 01/30/2014)
626 NOTICE of Appeal Due letter sent to counsel of record. (kj, ) (Entered: 01/30/2014)
627 TRANSMITTED to the 7th Circuit the short record on notice of appeal 625 . Notiﬁed counsel. (kj, ) (Entered: 01/30/2014)
628 RESPONSE by Cathy Bender-Jackson, Leroy Brown, Leslie Browne, Glenn Capel, Christina Coleman, Larue Gibson, Maroc Howard, Mark Johnson, J. Yves Laborde, Jennifer Madrid, George McReynolds, Marshell Miller, Carnell Moore, Frankie Ross, Stephen Smartt, Henry Wilson, Marva York to MOTION by Unknown La Mar Gunn for

https://ecf.ilnd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?743598400534567-L_1_0-1

60/64

10/26/2017

CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 6.1.1.2 - U.S. District Court, Northern Illinois
extension of time to ﬁle 624 notice of appeal of class action settlement (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Bronte, Patricia) (Entered: 01/30/2014)

01/30/2014 629 ACKNOWLEDGMENT of receipt of short record on appeal regarding notice of appeal 625 ; USCA Case No. 14-1205. (tlm) (Entered: 02/03/2014)

01/30/2014 630 CIRCUIT Rule 3(b) Notice. (tlm) (Entered: 02/03/2014)

02/07/2014

631 REPLY by Class Member La Mar Gunn to response to class counsel's response to his motion for an extension of time to appeal the class action settlement (Exhibit). 628 (tlm) (Entered: 02/10/2014)

02/10/2014 632 FIRST NOTICE and Demand for Mandatory Judicial Notice by Class Member La Mar Gunn (Exhibits). (tlm) (Entered: 02/11/2014)

02/13/2014 633 TRANSMITTED to the 7th Circuit the long record on notice of appeal 625 . Notiﬁed counsel. (kj, ) Modiﬁed on 7/17/2014 . (Entered: 02/13/2014)

02/13/2014 634 USCA RECEIVED on 2/13/2014 the long record. (kj, ) (Entered: 02/14/2014)

02/14/2014

635 ORDER signed by the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 2/14/2014: Motion 624 by La Mar Gunn for extension of time to ﬁle a notice of appeal is denied. Mailed notice (gds) (Entered: 02/14/2014)

05/02/2014

636 COPY of order dated 5/1/14 from the 7th Circuit regarding notice of appeal 625 ; Appellate case no. : 14-1205: The clerk of this court shall unseal document no. 586 and shall maintain document no. 609 under seal. The remaining sealed documents will not be transferred to the district court. (tlm) (Entered: 05/02/2014)

05/08/2014 637 AGREED ORDER Entered by the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 5/8/2014. Mailed notice (tlm) (Entered: 05/14/2014)

05/22/2014

639 COPY of order dated 5/22/14 from the 7th Circuit regarding notice of appeal 625 ; Appellate case No. : 14-1205: Upon consideration of the MOTION FOR STAY PENDING APPEAL, ﬁled on May 21, 2014, by the pro se appellant, IT IS ORDERED that the motion is DENIED without prejudice to renewal in a motion that complies with this court's rules. Appellant has not ﬁrst moved for a stay in the district court, see Fed. R. App. P. 8(a)(1), and provides no support for his request, see Fed. R. App. P. 8(a)(2)(B). (tlm) (Entered: 05/28/2014)

05/23/2014 638 MOTION by Movant La Mar Gunn to stay Pending Appeal (Gunn, La Mar) (Entered: 05/23/2014)

06/26/2014

640 MOTION by Plaintiffs Cathy Bender-Jackson, Leroy Brown, Leslie Browne, Glenn Capel, Christina Coleman, Larue Gibson, Maroc Howard, Mark Johnson, J. Yves Laborde, Jennifer Madrid, George McReynolds, Marshell Miller, Carnell Moore, Frankie Ross, Stephen Smartt, Henry Wilson, Marva York to strike MOTION by Movant La Mar Gunn to stay Pending Appeal 638 Class Counsel's Motion to Strike or Deny La Mar Gunn's Motion For Stay Pending Appeal (Friedman, Linda) (Entered: 06/26/2014)

06/26/2014

641 NOTICE of Motion by Linda Debra Friedman for presentment of motion to strike, motion for relief,, 640 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 7/2/2014 at 09:15 AM. (Friedman, Linda) (Entered: 06/26/2014)

07/02/2014

642 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Motion hearing held on 7/2/2014. Class counsel's motion 640 to strike to strike or deny La Mar Gunn's motion to stay pending appeal is granted, and La Mar Gunn's motion 638 to stay pending appeal is denied. Mailed notice (gds) (Entered: 07/08/2014)

07/15/2014 643 PAYMENT by La Mar Gunn for Appeal No. 14-1205 625 of Filing fee $ 505. Receipt

https://ecf.ilnd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?743598400534567-L_1_0-1

61/64

10/26/2017
12/16/2014 12/16/2014 12/16/2014 12/19/2014 12/29/2014
12/29/2014 12/30/2014
12/30/2014 01/05/2015 02/13/2015 02/13/2015 04/19/2016 04/19/2016 04/19/2016 04/19/2016 04/19/2016

CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 6.1.1.2 - U.S. District Court, Northern Illinois
#4624123648. (tlm) (tlm, ). (Entered: 07/17/2014)
644 NOTICE of appeal by Doreen Ernandez regarding orders 616 , 615 . (Fee Due) (gcy, ) (Entered: 12/19/2014)
645 AFFIDAVIT Accompanying Motion for Permission to Appeal in forma pauperis by Movant Doreen Ernandez. (gcy, ) (Entered: 12/19/2014)
647 TRANSMITTED to the 7th Circuit the short record on notice of appeal 644 . Notiﬁed counsel (gcy, ) (Entered: 12/19/2014)
646 NOTICE of Appeal Due letter sent to counsel of record regarding notice of appeal 644 . (gcy, ) (Entered: 12/19/2014)
648 CERTIFIED Copy of MANDATE of USCA dated 12/29/2014 regarding notice of appeal 625 ; USCA No. 14-1205: Upon consideration of the Supplemental Stipulation to Dismiss Appeal With Prejudice, ﬁled on December 29, 2014, by counsel for the appellant and counsel for the Appellees, IT IS ORDERED that this case is Dismissed, pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 42(b). (tlm) (Entered: 12/30/2014)
649 NOTICE of Issuance of Mandate from the Seventh Circuit, Case No. 14-1205, F.R.A.P. 42(b). No record to be returned. (tlm) (Entered: 12/30/2014)
650 MOTION by Plaintiffs Cathy Bender-Jackson, Leroy Brown, Leslie Browne, Glenn Capel, Christina Coleman, Larue Gibson, Maroc Howard, Mark Johnson, J. Yves Laborde, Jennifer Madrid, George McReynolds, Marshell Miller, Carnell Moore, Frankie Ross, Stephen Smartt, Henry Wilson, Marva YorkUnopposed Motion to Approve Opt Out Request (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Friedman, Linda) (Entered: 12/30/2014)
651 NOTICE of Motion by Linda Debra Friedman for presentment of motion for miscellaneous relief, 650 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 1/6/2015 at 09:15 AM. (Friedman, Linda) (Entered: 12/30/2014)
652 Enter Order regarding class member opt out signed by the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 1/5/2015: Plaintiffs' motion 650 for approval of a late opt out by settlement class member La Mar Gunn is granted. Mailed notice (gds) (Entered: 01/05/2015)
653 LETTER from the Seventh Circuit USCA no. 14-3742: No record to be returned. (sxn, ) (Entered: 02/17/2015)
654 MANDATE of USCA dated 1/22/2015 regarding notice of appeal 644 ; USCA No. 143742; IT IS ORDERED that this appeal is DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction. (sxn, ) (Entered: 02/17/2015)
655 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendant Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. by Noah A Finkel (Finkel, Noah) (Entered: 04/19/2016)
656 MOTION by Defendant Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. for permanent injunction [AND DECLARATORY JUDGMENT] (Finkel, Noah) (Entered: 04/19/2016)
657 NOTICE of Motion by Noah A Finkel for presentment of motion for permanent injunction 656 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 5/10/2016 at 09:15 AM. (Finkel, Noah) (Entered: 04/19/2016)
658 MEMORANDUM by Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. in support of motion for permanent injunction 656 [AND DECLARATORY JUDGMENT] (Finkel, Noah) (Entered: 04/19/2016)
659 NOTICE OF EMAIL NOTIFICATION FAILURE, for document # 657 , 658 , 655 , 656 sent to Attorney Jason B. Bonk returned as: Unknown Address Error. Mailed to attorney

https://ecf.ilnd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?743598400534567-L_1_0-1

62/64

10/26/2017
04/19/2016 05/10/2016 05/17/2016

CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 6.1.1.2 - U.S. District Court, Northern Illinois
Jason B. Bonk a Letter re: bounce back email and a Notiﬁcation of Change of Address form. Notices have been set to No. Counsel must email the Clerk's Ofﬁce at Docketing_ILND@uscourts.gov when a Notiﬁcation of Change of Address has been ﬁled to ensure electronic notiﬁcation is reset. (ek, ) (Entered: 04/20/2016)
660 NOTICE OF EMAIL NOTIFICATION FAILURE, for document # 657 , 658 , 655 , 656 sent to Attorney Allan David Dinkoff returned as: Unknown Address Error. Mailed to attorney Allan David Dinkoff a Letter re: bounce back email and a Notiﬁcation of Change of Address form. Notices have been set to No. Counsel must email the Clerk's Ofﬁce at Docketing_ILND@uscourts.gov when a Notiﬁcation of Change of Address has been ﬁled to ensure electronic notiﬁcation is reset. (ek, ) (Entered: 04/20/2016)
661 ORDER: Motion hearing held. Response to defendant's motion for a permanent injunction and declaratory judgment is due by 6/10/2016. Reply is due by 6/24/2016. Said motion 656 , the response and the reply are to be placed UNDER SEAL. Status hearing is set for 7/14/2016, at 9:00 a.m. Signed by the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 5/10/2016. Mailed notice (lf, ) (Entered: 05/16/2016)
662 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS held on May 10, 2016, before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman. Court Reporter Contact Information: Nancy L. Bistany, CSR, RPR, FCRR - 312-435-7626 - nancy_bistany@ilnd.uscourts.gov.

IMPORTANT: The transcript may be viewed at the court's public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through the Court Reporter/Transcriber or PACER. For further information on the redaction process, see the Court's web site at www.ilnd.uscourts.gov under Quick Links select Policy Regarding the Availability of Transcripts of Court Proceedings.

06/08/2016
06/08/2016 06/20/2016 07/21/2016 09/15/2016

Redaction Request due 6/7/2016. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 6/17/2016. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 8/15/2016. (Bistany, Nancy) (Entered: 05/17/2016)
663 MOTION by Plaintiffs Cathy Bender-Jackson, Leroy Brown, Leslie Browne, Glenn Capel, Christina Coleman, Larue Gibson, Maroc Howard, Mark Johnson, J. Yves Laborde, Jennifer Madrid, George McReynolds, Marshell Miller, Carnell Moore, Frankie Ross, Stephen Smartt, Henry Wilson, Marva York, Movant Doreen Ernandez to set a brieﬁng schedule Joint Motion to Extend Brieﬁng Schedule, MOTION by Plaintiffs Cathy Bender-Jackson, Leroy Brown, Leslie Browne, Glenn Capel, Christina Coleman, Larue Gibson, Maroc Howard, Mark Johnson, J. Yves Laborde, Jennifer Madrid, George McReynolds, Marshell Miller, Carnell Moore, Frankie Ross, Stephen Smartt, Henry Wilson, Marva York, Movant Doreen Ernandez for extension of time and by Defendant, Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. (Bronte, Patricia) (Entered: 06/08/2016)
664 NOTICE of Motion by Patricia Ann Bronte for presentment of motion by ﬁler to set a brieﬁng schedule, extension of time,,,,,, 663 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 6/16/2016 at 09:15 AM. (Bronte, Patricia) (Entered: 06/08/2016)
665 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Motion to extend time and set a brieﬁng schedule 663 is granted. Response is due by 6/24/2016. Reply is due by 7/22/2016. Status hearing date of 7/14/2016 is reset to 8/17/2016 at 9:00 a.m. Mailed notice (gds) (Entered: 06/20/2016)
666 AGREED ORDER to extend brieﬁng schedule. Signed by the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 7/21/2016. Mailed notice. (bg, ) (Entered: 07/21/2016)
667 MOTION by Defendant Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. to withdraw [AGREED MOTION] (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2)(Finkel, Noah) (Entered:

https://ecf.ilnd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?743598400534567-L_1_0-1

63/64

10/26/2017
09/15/2016 09/26/2016

09/15/2016)

CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 6.1.1.2 - U.S. District Court, Northern Illinois

668 NOTICE of Motion by Noah A Finkel for presentment of motion to withdraw 667 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 9/20/2016 at 09:15 AM. (Finkel, Noah) (Entered: 09/15/2016)

669 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Motion for permanent injunction 656 is withdrawn. Motion to withdraw 667 is granted. Status hearing date of 9/29/2016 is stricken. Mailed notice (gds) (Entered: 09/26/2016)

PACER Service Center
Transaction Receipt

10/26/2017 19:52:32

PACER Login: hs0328:2563377:0 Client Code:

Description: Docket Report Search Criteria: 1:05-cv-06583

Billable Pages: 30

Cost:

3.00

https://ecf.ilnd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?743598400534567-L_1_0-1

64/64


[CONTENT] Between November 18, 2005 | November 16, 2006 | African-American | Merrill Lynch & Co. | the U.S. District Court | the Northern District | Title VII of the Civil Rights Act | 1964 | 42 | 1981 |||  ||| first | July 19, 2006 ||| November 8, 2008 ||| August 9, 2010 | the District Court | Robert W. Gettleman | hundreds ||| 2010 | 3087483 ||| February 14, 2011 | Gettleman ||| Gettleman ||| 2011 WL | 658155 ||| the U.S Court of Appeals | the Seventh Circuit ||| Richard Posner | Diane Wood | David Hamilton ||| July 2011 | the U.S. Supreme Court | Wal-Mart Stores | Dukes ||| Gettlman | September 19, 2011 ||| 2011 WL | 4471028 ||| the U.S. Court of Appeals | the Seventh Circuit ||| February 24, 2012 | the Seventh Circuit | Posner | Hamilton | District Court ||| The Circuit Court | Merrill Lynch's | African-American | Merrill Lynch ||| 672 | 482 ||| Merrill Lynch's | the Seventh Circuit | March 27, 2012 ||| the U.S. Supreme Court | October 1, 2012 ||| July 13, 2012 | the District Court | the Seventh Circuit's ||| December 6, 2013 | the District Court | Gettleman ||| Merrill Lynch | $160 million | $25 million ||| The District Court | 250,000 | 75,000 | the Steering Committee ||| the District Court | 21.25% | 20% | the first 100 million | 15% ||| African American | African Americans ||| 3 years ||| December 16, 2014 | the District Court's | the Seventh Circuit | Diane P. Wood | Richard D. Cudahy | Diane S. Sykes |||  |||  [SUMMARY] Between November 18, 2005 and November 16, 2006, current and former African-American financial advisor employees and trainees filed a lawsuit against their employer, Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., in the U.S. District Court of the Northern District of Illinois under both Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, asked the court for both monetary damages and injunctive relief, alleging the defendant engaged in race discrimination in terms of hiring, retention, promotion, pay, resource allocation and more. 

The plaintiffs filed their first amended complaint on July 19, 2006.

On November 8, 2008 the plaintiffs filed a motion for class certification. On August 9, 2010, the District Court (Judge Robert W. Gettleman) issued an amended order denying the plaintiffs' motion for class certification on the ground that commonality was not satisfied because the putative class members were supervised by hundreds of different people and had a wide variety of salary levels and positions. 2010 WL 3087483. 

On February 14, 2011, Judge Gettleman denied the plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration for class certification and their request to narrow the class definition. Judge Gettleman held that the plaintiffs' disparate impact claim was not sufficient to satisfy the commonality requirement for class certification and that their class as proposed failed to satisfy either category of class certification because the individual questions of law and claims to relief predominated over those of the class. 2011 WL 658155.

The plaintiffs appealed this decision to the U.S Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. (Judges Richard Posner, Diane Wood, and David Hamilton), which denied the request based on an untimely appeal. 

The plaintiffs filed an amended motion for class certification in July 2011, shortly after the U.S. Supreme Court decided Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes.  Judge Gettlman denied their motion on September 19, 2011, once again on commonality grounds. 2011 WL 4471028.

The employees filed an interlocutory appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. On February 24, 2012, the Seventh Circuit (Judges Posner, Wood, and Hamilton) reversed the District Court decision. The Circuit Court held that the issue of whether Merrill Lynch's policies had a disparate impact on African-American employees was appropriate for class-wide treatment because each of the plaintiffs' claims had the common question of whether Merrill Lynch "violated the antidiscrimination statutes." 672 F.3d 482. 

Merrill Lynch's motion for rehearing en banc was denied by the Seventh Circuit on March 27, 2012.  Its subsequent appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court was denied on October 1, 2012.

On July 13, 2012, the District Court issued certification of the disparate impact class, according to the Seventh Circuit's order.  

On December 6, 2013, the District Court (Judge Gettleman) approved a settlement agreement on all claims proposed by the parties. Pursuant to the agreement, Merrill Lynch would allocate $160 million in a settlement fund, $25 million of which would be designated for extraordinary claims. The District Court also approved service awards of $250,000 for each Class Representative and $75,000 for each member of the Steering Committee. In regards to attorney's fees, the District Court approved the plaintiff's requested attorney's fees of 21.25% (20% of the first 100 million of the settlement fund and 15% of the remainder). The programmatic relief granted by the settlement consisted of several changes to company policies, including changes to the distribution of accounts, as well as the establishment of coaching for African American financial advisors and a diversity fund to assist African Americans in funding business development events. This portion of the settlement lasted for 3 years. 

On December 16, 2014, a named plaintiff filed a motion to appeal the District Court's final approval of the class action settlement, but the Seventh Circuit (Diane P. Wood, Richard D. Cudahy, and Diane S. Sykes) denied the appeal based on an untimely request.

The settlement how now run its course and there has been no further litigation. The case is now closed.