APPEAL,NOMDL
U.S. District Court [LIVE AREA] Middle District of Georgia (Columbus) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 4:18−cv−00070−CDL

BARRIENTOS et al v. CORECIVIC INC Assigned to: US DISTRICT JUDGE CLAY D LAND Case in other court: Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals,
18−90025
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, 18−90025 Cause: 28:1331 Fed. Question: Tort Action
Plaintiff

Date Filed: 04/17/2018 Jury Demand: Plaintiff Nature of Suit: 790 Labor: Other Jurisdiction: Federal Question

WILHEN HILL BARRIENTOS

represented by AZADEH N SHAHSHAHANI 1900 THE EXCHANGE STE 425 ATLANTA, GA 30339 770−303−8111 Email: azadeh@projectsouth.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

DANIEL H CHAREST BURNS CHAREST LLP 900 JACKSON ST STE 500 DALLAS, TX 75202 469−904−4555 Email: dcharest@burnscharest.com LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

KOREY ARTHUR NELSON BURNS CHAREST LLP 365 CANAL ST STE 1170 NEW ORLEANS, LA 70130 504−799−2848 Email: knelson@burnscharest.com LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

LAURA G RIVERA 150 E PONCE DE LEON AVE STE 340 DECATUR, GA 30030 404−521−6700 Fax: 404−221−5857 Email: laura.rivera@splcenter.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

LYDIA ANNE WRIGHT BURNS CHAREST LLP 365 CANAL ST STE 1170 NEW ORLEANS, LA 70130 504−799−2844 Email: lwright@burnscharest.com LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

MEREDITH BLAKE STEWART 201 ST CHARLES AVE STE 2000

Plaintiff
MARGARITO VELAZQUEZ−GALICIA

NEW ORLEANS, LA 70170 504−526−1497 Email: meredith.stewart@splcenter.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
PRIYANKA BHATT PROJECT SOUTH 9 GAMMON AVE SE ATLANTA, GA 31315 404−622−0602 Email: priyanka.n.bhatt@gmail.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
R ANDREW FREE LAW OFFICE OF R ANDREW FREE PO BOX 90568 NASHVILLE, TN 37209 844−321−3221 X1 Email: andrew@immigrantcivilrights.com LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
WARREN T BURNS BURNS CHAREST LLP 900 JACKSON ST STE 500 DALLAS, TX 75202 469−904−4551 Email: wburns@burnscharest.com LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
BRYAN LOPEZ SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER 201 ST CHARLES AVE STE 2000 NEW ORLEANS, LA 70170 504−486−8982 Email: bryan.lopez@splcenter.org TERMINATED: 03/03/2020
DANIEL WERNER 150 E PONCE DE LEON AVE STE 340 DECATUR, GA 30030 404−521−6700 Email: daniel.werner@splcenter.org TERMINATED: 03/03/2020
DANIEL WERNER PO BOX 1287 DECATUR, GA 30031 404−521−6700 Email: daniel.werner@splcenter.org TERMINATED: 03/03/2020
represented by AZADEH N SHAHSHAHANI (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
DANIEL H CHAREST

Plaintiff SHOAIB AHMED

(See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
KOREY ARTHUR NELSON (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
LAURA G RIVERA (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
LYDIA ANNE WRIGHT (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
MEREDITH BLAKE STEWART (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
PRIYANKA BHATT (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
R ANDREW FREE (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
WARREN T BURNS (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
BRYAN LOPEZ (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/03/2020
DANIEL WERNER (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/03/2020
DANIEL WERNER (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/03/2020
represented by AZADEH N SHAHSHAHANI (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
DANIEL H CHAREST (See above for address)

LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
KOREY ARTHUR NELSON (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
LAURA G RIVERA SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER 150 E PONCE DE LEON AVE STE 340 DECATUR, GA 30030 404−521−6700 Fax: 404−221−5857 Email: laura.rivera@splcenter.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
LYDIA ANNE WRIGHT (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
MEREDITH BLAKE STEWART SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER 201 ST CHARLES AVE STE 2000 NEW ORLEANS, LA 70170 504−526−1497 Email: meredith.stewart@splcenter.org LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
PRIYANKA BHATT (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
R ANDREW FREE (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
WARREN T BURNS (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
BRYAN LOPEZ (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/03/2020
DANIEL WERNER SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER 150 E PONCE DE LEON AVE STE 340 DECATUR, GA 30030 404−521−6700 Email: daniel.werner@splcenter.org TERMINATED: 03/03/2020

V. Defendant CORECIVIC INC

DANIEL WERNER (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/03/2020
represented by ASHLEE B HESMAN STRUCK LOVE BAJANOWSKI & ACEDO 3100 W RAY RD #300 CHANDLER, AZ 85226 480−420−1600 Email: ahesman@strucklove.com LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
DANIEL P STRUCK STRUCK LOVE BAJANOWSKI & ACEDO 3100 W RAY RD #300 CHANDLER, AZ 85226 480−420−1600 Email: dstruck@strucklove.com LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
NICHOLAS D ACEDO STRUCK LOVE BAJANOWSKI & ACEDO 3100 W RAY RD #300 CHANDLER, AZ 85226 480−420−1600 Email: nacedo@strucklove.com LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
RACHEL LOVE STRUCK LOVE BAJANOWSKI & ACEDO 3100 W RAY RD #300 CHANDLER, AZ 85226 480−420−1600 Email: rlove@strucklove.com LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
JACOB B LEE 3100 W RAY RD #300 CHANDLER, AZ 85226 480−420−1600 Email: jlee@strucklove.com PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Stephen E Curry 3508 PROFESSIONAL CIR MARTINEZ, GA 30907−8231 706−724−0022 Fax: 866−337−3859

Email: securry@currylawfirm.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 04/17/2018 04/17/2018
04/17/2018
04/17/2018 04/19/2018 04/19/2018 04/25/2018
04/27/2018 04/27/2018 04/27/2018 04/27/2018 04/30/2018 04/30/2018 04/30/2018

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT against CoreCivic, Inc. Fee paid: Receipt # 113G−2855391, $400
filed by All Plaintiffs (Attachments: # 1 Civil Cover Sheet, # 2 Summons)(WERNER, DANIEL) (Entered: 04/17/2018)
Notice of Deficiency (related document(s): 1 Complaint filed by Margarito Velazquez Galicia, Shoaib Ahmed, Wilhen Hill Barrientos ); Attorney Case Opening − Parties were added using punctuation AND/OR title capitalization − The case opening guide states ***REMINDER*** all parties must be added using ALL CAPS (ie LISA SMITH or DELTA AIRLINES) − Do not use ANY punctuation when adding new parties − For instructions on adding parties, please refer to the Style Guide located on the website for the Middle District of Georgia − NO NEED TO REFILE. (glg) (Entered: 04/17/2018)
NOTICE TO COUNSEL PRIYANKA BHATT, MEREDITH BLAKE STEWART, BRYAN LOPEZ, R ANDREW FREE, KOREY ARTHUR NELSON, LYDIA ANNE WRIGHT, WARREN T BURNS, DANIEL H CHAREST − Counsel is notified that they do not show in the court records that they meet the required attorney admissions policies of this court. If within 14 days of this notice all requirements, including the payment of Pro Hac Vice or admissions fees, have not been met, a show cause hearing will be scheduled. (glg) (Entered: 04/17/2018)
2 Summons Issued as to CoreCivic, Inc. (glg) (Entered: 04/17/2018)
3 Order granting Petition for Admission Pro Hac Vice (Petition Attached); Attorney Admission Fee Met by BRYAN LOPEZ (nop) (Entered: 04/19/2018)
4 Order granting Petition for Admission Pro Hac Vice (Petition Attached); Attorney Admission Fee Met by MEREDITH BLAKE STEWART (nop) (Entered: 04/19/2018)
5 Order granting Petition for Admission Pro Hac Vice (Petition Attached); Attorney Admission Fee Met by PRIYANKA BHATT, KOREY ARTHUR NELSON, LYDIA ANNE WRIGHT, WARREN T BURNS, DANIEL H CHAREST (Attachments: # 1 Pro Hac Vice Admission, # 2 Pro Hac Vice Admission, # 3 Pro Hac Vice Admission, # 4 Pro Hac Vice Admission) (nop) (Entered: 04/25/2018)
6 NOTICE of Attorney Appearance by KOREY ARTHUR NELSON on behalf of SHOAIB AHMED, WILHEN HILL BARRIENTOS, MARGARITO VELAZQUEZ−GALICIA (NELSON, KOREY) (Entered: 04/27/2018)
7 NOTICE of Attorney Appearance by LYDIA ANNE WRIGHT on behalf of SHOAIB AHMED, WILHEN HILL BARRIENTOS, MARGARITO VELAZQUEZ−GALICIA (WRIGHT, LYDIA) (Entered: 04/27/2018)
8 NOTICE of Attorney Appearance by DANIEL H CHAREST on behalf of SHOAIB AHMED, WILHEN HILL BARRIENTOS, MARGARITO VELAZQUEZ−GALICIA (CHAREST, DANIEL) (Entered: 04/27/2018)
9 NOTICE of Attorney Appearance by WARREN T BURNS on behalf of SHOAIB AHMED, WILHEN HILL BARRIENTOS, MARGARITO VELAZQUEZ−GALICIA (BURNS, WARREN) (Entered: 04/27/2018)
10 NOTICE of Attorney Appearance by MEREDITH BLAKE STEWART on behalf of SHOAIB AHMED, WILHEN HILL BARRIENTOS, MARGARITO VELAZQUEZ−GALICIA (STEWART, MEREDITH) (Entered: 04/30/2018)
11 NOTICE of Attorney Appearance by DANIEL WERNER on behalf of All Plaintiffs (WERNER, DANIEL) (Entered: 04/30/2018)
12 NOTICE of Attorney Appearance by BRYAN LOPEZ on behalf of All Plaintiffs (LOPEZ, BRYAN) (Entered: 04/30/2018)

04/30/2018 05/01/2018 05/02/2018 05/03/2018 05/07/2018 05/09/2018 05/10/2018 05/15/2018 05/15/2018 05/15/2018 05/15/2018 05/15/2018 05/15/2018 05/15/2018
05/15/2018
05/17/2018

13 NOTICE of Attorney Appearance by LAURA G RIVERA on behalf of All Plaintiffs (RIVERA, LAURA) (Entered: 04/30/2018)
14 NOTICE of Attorney Appearance by PRIYANKA BHATT on behalf of All Plaintiffs (BHATT, PRIYANKA) (Entered: 05/01/2018)
Notice of Deficiency (related document(s): 14 Notice of Attorney Appearance filed by SHOAIB AHMED, WILHEN HILL BARRIENTOS, MARGARITO VELAZQUEZ−GALICIA ); Document must be converted into text−searchable PDF format. No need to refile. (glg) (Entered: 05/02/2018)
15 Order granting Petition for Admission Pro Hac Vice (Petition Attached); Attorney Admission Fee Met by R ANDREW FREE (nop) (Entered: 05/03/2018)
16 NOTICE of Attorney Appearance by AZADEH N SHAHSHAHANI on behalf of All Plaintiffs (SHAHSHAHANI, AZADEH) (Entered: 05/07/2018)
17 NOTICE of Attorney Appearance by Stephen E Curry on behalf of CORECIVIC INC Attorney Stephen E Curry added to party CORECIVIC INC(pty:dft) (Curry, Stephen) (Entered: 05/09/2018)
18 SUMMONS Returned Executed by WILHEN HILL BARRIENTOS, SHOAIB AHMED, MARGARITO VELAZQUEZ−GALICIA as to All Defendants. (RIVERA, LAURA) (Entered: 05/10/2018)
19 NOTICE of Attorney Appearance by DANIEL P STRUCK on behalf of CORECIVIC INC (STRUCK, DANIEL) (Entered: 05/15/2018)
20 NOTICE of Attorney Appearance by RACHEL LOVE on behalf of CORECIVIC INC (LOVE, RACHEL) (Entered: 05/15/2018)
21 NOTICE of Attorney Appearance by NICHOLAS D ACEDO on behalf of CORECIVIC INC (ACEDO, NICHOLAS) (Entered: 05/15/2018)
22 NOTICE of Attorney Appearance by ASHLEE B HESMAN on behalf of CORECIVIC INC (HESMAN, ASHLEE) (Entered: 05/15/2018)
23 STIPULATION for Extension of Time to Respond to Plaintiffs' Complaint re 1 Complaint by CORECIVIC INC (STRUCK, DANIEL) (Entered: 05/15/2018)
24 Corporate Disclosure Statement by CORECIVIC INC (STRUCK, DANIEL) (Entered: 05/15/2018)
Notice of Deficiency (related document(s): 24 Corporate Disclosure Statement filed by CORECIVIC INC. Document must be re−filed to add corporate parents, subsidiary corporations and/or any publicly held corporation that owns 10% or more of its stock to the case, during the filing process in CM/ECF. It is not sufficient to simply have them listed on the document attached, they must also be entered into CM/ECF. During the filing process, the following user message appeared: "Corporate disclosures statement must be filed with any corporate parents, subsidiary corporations, and/or any publicly held corporation that owns 10% or more of its stock added in CM/ECF during the filing of the document. Failure to add the corporate parents and/or any publicly held corporation identified in your corporate disclosure statement will result in a request to re−file. (glg) (Entered: 05/15/2018)
25 Corporate Disclosure Statement by CORECIVIC INC identifying Other Affiliate HOOSIER ONE INVESTMENTS LLC, Other Affiliate CORECIVIC LLC, Other Affiliate AVALON CORRECTIONAL SERVICES INC, Other Affiliate CORRECTIONAL MANAGEMENT INC, Other Affiliate CORRECTIONAL ALTERNATIVES LLC, Other Affiliate CCA SOUTH TEXAS LLC, Other Affiliate CORECIVIC OF KANSAS LLC, Other Affiliate CORECIVIC OF TALLAHASSEE LLC, Other Affiliate CCA UK LTD, Other Affiliate CORECIVIC TRS LLC, Other Affiliate TIME TO CHANGE INC for CORECIVIC INC. (STRUCK, DANIEL) (Entered: 05/15/2018)
26 Order granting Petition for Admission Pro Hac Vice (Petition Attached); Attorney Admission Fee Met by NICHOLAS D ACEDO (nop) (Entered: 05/17/2018)

05/17/2018 05/17/2018 05/17/2018 06/21/2018 07/02/2018 07/09/2018 07/09/2018 07/12/2018 07/18/2018
07/19/2018 07/19/2018
07/20/2018
08/02/2018 08/17/2018
12/12/2018 12/12/2018 12/12/2018 12/12/2018

27 Order granting Petition for Admission Pro Hac Vice (Petition Attached); Attorney Admission Fee Met by RACHEL LOVE (nop) (Entered: 05/17/2018)
28 Order granting Petition for Admission Pro Hac Vice (Petition Attached); Attorney Admission Fee Met by ASHLEE B HESMAN (nop) (Entered: 05/17/2018)
29 Order granting Petition for Admission Pro Hac Vice (Petition Attached); Attorney Admission Fee Met by DANIEL P STRUCK (nop) (Entered: 05/17/2018)
30 MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM by CORECIVIC INC filed by DANIEL P STRUCK. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support)(STRUCK, DANIEL) (Entered: 06/21/2018)
31 Jurisdictional Statement by CORECIVIC INC (STRUCK, DANIEL) (Entered: 07/02/2018)
32 Order granting Petition for Admission Pro Hac Vice (Petition Attached); Attorney Admission Fee Met by JACOB B LEE (nop) (Entered: 07/09/2018)
33 NOTICE of Attorney Appearance by JACOB B LEE on behalf of CORECIVIC INC (LEE, JACOB) (Entered: 07/09/2018)
34 RESPONSE filed by SHOAIB AHMED, WILHEN HILL BARRIENTOS, MARGARITO VELAZQUEZ−GALICIA re 30 MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM (STEWART, MEREDITH) (Entered: 07/12/2018)
35 STIPULATION for Extension of Time to File Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss Complaint re 30 MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM , 34 Response to Motion by CORECIVIC INC (STRUCK, DANIEL) (Entered: 07/18/2018)
Notice of Deficiency (related document(s): 35 Stipulation filed by CORECIVIC INC ). Parties can not file a STIPULATION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME. You must file a Motion for such an extension. Please file a Motion. (glg) (Entered: 07/19/2018)
36 CONSENT MOTION for Extension of Time to File REPLY TO RESPONSE as to 30 MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM by CORECIVIC INC filed by DANIEL P STRUCK. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(STRUCK, DANIEL) (Entered: 07/19/2018)
Notice of Clerk's Granting of Extension re: 36 MOTION for Extension of Time to File REPLY TO RESPONSE as to 30 MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM filed by CORECIVIC INC, 30 MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM filed by CORECIVIC INC. The reply is now due Aug 2, 2018. (glg) (Entered: 07/20/2018)
37 REPLY to Response filed by CORECIVIC INC re 30 MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM (STRUCK, DANIEL) (Entered: 08/02/2018)
38 ORDER denying 30 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim, certifying issue
for interlocutory appeal, and staying proceedings in this Court pending resolution of any application for interlocutory appeal. Ordered by US DISTRICT JUDGE CLAY D LAND on 8/17/2018 (tlp) (Entered: 08/17/2018)
39 USCA Order granting petition to appeal IAW 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (Attachments: # 1 Cover Letter)(tlf). (Entered: 12/12/2018)
40 NOTICE OF APPEAL (filed in CCA−11) as to 38 Order on Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim by CORECIVIC INC (tlf). (Entered: 12/12/2018)
41 Transmission of Notice of Appeal and Docket Sheet to US Court of Appeals re: 40 Notice of Appeal, 38 Order on Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim, Judge Appealed: Land. Court Reporter: None. Fee: Not Paid (tlf). (Entered: 12/12/2018)
Appeal Instructions re 40 Notice of Appeal. The Transcript Information Form and instructions are available on the District Court website under Forms & Guides. **PLEASE NOTE** Separate forms must be filed for each court reporter. Transcript Order Form due by 1/2/2019 (tlf). (Entered: 12/12/2018)

12/13/2018 01/14/2019
02/28/2020 03/02/2020 03/03/2020

Appeal Fee paid Receipt # 113G−3042786, $505 (STRUCK, DANIEL) (Entered: 12/13/2018)
Pursuant to F.R.A.P 11(c) the Clerk of the District Court for the Middle District of Georgia certifies that the record is complete for purposes of this appeal re: 40 Notice of Appeal. The entire record on appeal is available electronically. Counsel failed to file the transcript information form as instructed on December 12, 2018 (tlf). (Entered: 01/14/2019)
42 USCA Order/Opinion as to 40 Notice of Appeal filed by CORECIVIC INC − USCA AFFIRMS USDC denial of MTD complaint. (Attachments: # 1 Cover Letter)(esl) (Entered: 02/28/2020)
43 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney by SHOAIB AHMED, WILHEN HILL BARRIENTOS, MARGARITO VELAZQUEZ−GALICIA filed by DANIEL WERNER. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order Proposed Order Granting Motion to Withdraw as Counsel)(WERNER, DANIEL) (Entered: 03/02/2020)
44 ORDER granting 43 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. Attorney DANIEL WERNER
and BRYAN LOPEZ terminated. Ordered by US DISTRICT JUDGE CLAY D LAND on 3/3/2020 (tlp) (Entered: 03/03/2020)

 </s> Case 4:18-cv-00070-CDL Document 1 Filed 04/17/18 Page 1 of 32

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA COLUMBUS DIVISION

WILHEN HILL BARRIENTOS, MARGARITO VELAZQUEZ GALICIA, and SHOAIB AHMED individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,

Civil Action No. __________________

Plaintiffs, v.
CORECIVIC, INC.,
Defendant.

COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF AND DAMAGES
CLASS ACTION
JURY DEMAND

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 1. Individuals detained at the Stewart Detention Center (“Stewart”) in Lumpkin, Georgia work because they have no other meaningful choice. Defendant CoreCivic, Inc., (“CoreCivic”), the billion-dollar private prison corporation that owns and operates Stewart, maintains a deprivation scheme intended to force detained immigrants1 to work for nearly free. CoreCivic deprives detained immigrants of basic necessities like food, toothpaste, toilet paper, and soap  and contact with loved ones  so that they have to work in order to purchase those items and costly phone cards at CoreCivic’s commissary. CoreCivic then threatens detained immigrants who refuse to work with serious harm, including the deprivation of privacy and safety in open living quarters, referral for criminal prosecution, and, ultimately, the sensory and

1 This Complaint refers to individuals detained in Stewart as “detained immigrants” with the caveat that there are United States citizens detained in Stewart and in other civil immigration detention centers across the nation. See, e.g., William Finnegan, The Deportation Machine, The New Yorker, Apr. 29, 2013, https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2013/04/29/the-deportation-machine (reporting on the case of Mark Lyttle, a U.S. Citizen who was wrongfully detained in Stewart and deported to Mexico).
1

Case 4:18-cv-00070-CDL Document 1 Filed 04/17/18 Page 2 of 32
psychological deprivation of their humanity resulting from solitary confinement. Under these circumstances, no labor is voluntary – it is forced.
2. CoreCivic’s deprivation scheme ensures that the individuals detained in Stewart provide the billion-dollar corporation with a ready supply of available labor needed to operate the facility. Detained immigrants mop, sweep, and wax floors; scrub toilets and showers; wash dishes; do laundry; clean medical facilities; and cook and prepare food and beverages daily for the nearly 2,000 individuals locked inside Stewart. For this labor, CoreCivic pays detained immigrants between $1 and $4 per day and occasionally slightly more for double shifts. When CoreCivic needs “volunteers” to work double shifts in the kitchen or to work more than five days per week, as it often does to run Stewart, it employs a policy of threatening detained immigrants until they comply. Under no circumstances does CoreCivic pay the detained immigrant workers anything close to the federal minimum wage.
3. Plaintiffs are current or former detained immigrants who were forced to work for CoreCivic at Stewart. Individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs bring this class action lawsuit to end CoreCivic’s forced labor scheme and remedy the unjust enrichment resulting from CoreCivic’s illegal labor practices.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 4. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 because this action arises under the Trafficking Victims Protection Act,2 18 U.S.C. §§ 1589, 1594, and 1595.
2 The Trafficking Victims Protection Act was enacted in 2000, see Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114 Stat. 1486 (Oct. 28, 2000), and has been amended on three different occasions since then. See Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-193, 117 Stat. 2878 (Dec. 19, 2003); William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-457, 122 Stat. 5044 (Dec. 23, 2008); Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-22, 129 Stat. 227.
2

Case 4:18-cv-00070-CDL Document 1 Filed 04/17/18 Page 3 of 32
5. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d), because at least one class member is of diverse citizenship from one defendant; there are more than 100 class members; and the aggregate amount in controversy exceeds $5,000,000.
6. Venue is proper in this District under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2) because the events or omissions giving rise to the claims occurred in this District.
7. This Court has personal jurisdiction over CoreCivic because the corporation regularly conducts business in and has sufficient minimum contacts with the Middle District of Georgia.
8. Plaintiffs request that this Court exercise supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367 over their state law claim of unjust enrichment.
PARTIES A. Plaintiffs 9. Plaintiff Wilhen Hill Barrientos is currently detained at Stewart. He has been detained at Stewart intermittently since on or about July 2015. Mr. Barrientos is a citizen of Guatemala seeking asylum in the United States. He is currently working for CoreCivic as a kitchen worker and is generally paid between $1 and $4 per day as part of the “Voluntary Work Program.” When CoreCivic requires him to work twelve hours or more in one day, he makes up to $8 per day. 10. Plaintiff Margarito Velazquez Galicia is currently detained at Stewart. He has been detained there since on or about January 2018. Mr. Velazquez is a citizen of Mexico and intends to seek relief from deportation in the form of cancellation of removal. His wife and two
(May 29, 2015). This complaint refers to the provisions of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1589, 1594, and 1595, including all amendments, as the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (“TVPA”).
3

Case 4:18-cv-00070-CDL Document 1 Filed 04/17/18 Page 4 of 32
children are United States citizens. Mr. Velazquez is currently employed as a kitchen worker and is generally paid between $1 and 4 per day as part of the “Voluntary Work Program.” When CoreCivic requires him to work twelve hours or more in one day, he makes up to $8 per day.
11. Plaintiff Shoaib Ahmed was detained at Stewart from approximately August 2017 to February 2018. He is a citizen of Bangladesh who gave up his right to fight his asylum case due to the poor living conditions at Stewart, threats, and retaliation by CoreCivic. Mr. Shoaib worked for CoreCivic as a kitchen worker and was paid $4 per day. If he worked twelve hours or more, he was paid an additional $1 per day as part of the “Voluntary Work Program.”
B. Defendant 12. Defendant CoreCivic, formerly the Corrections Corporation of America, is a forprofit corporation providing correctional and detention services. CoreCivic is a Maryland corporation operating under federal tax laws as a Real Estate Investment Trust (“REIT”), with its principal office located at 10 Burton Hills Boulevard, Nashville, Tennessee 37215. CoreCivic owns and operates Stewart, where Plaintiffs were or are detained, located at 146 CCA Road, Lumpkin, Georgia 31815. 13. At all relevant times, CoreCivic owned and operated Stewart under contract with Stewart County, Georgia (“Stewart County”). Stewart County maintains an Intergovernmental Service Agreement (“IGSA”) with U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) to detain immigrants on behalf of ICE.
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS A. Immigration Detention is Civil – Not Criminal. 14. Each year, hundreds of thousands of individuals are locked up in civil immigration detention facilities while awaiting immigration or citizenship status determinations.
4

Case 4:18-cv-00070-CDL Document 1 Filed 04/17/18 Page 5 of 32
Those detained include U.S. citizens, lawful permanent residents (green card holders) with longstanding family and community ties, children, pregnant women, asylum seekers, victims of human trafficking, and survivors of torture. Some detained immigrants were brought to the United States as children. And thousands ultimately have their United States citizenship or legal residency affirmed by an immigration court or federal judge.
15. Immigration violations are civil violations, and immigration detention is civil in nature.3 Many detained immigrants have no criminal history at all.
16. Notwithstanding immigration detention’s civil nature and purpose, detained immigrants are subjected to prison-like conditions at Stewart. According to Dora Schriro, former head of ICE’s Office of Detention Policy and Planning, most detained immigrants are held – systematically and unnecessarily – under punitive circumstances inappropriate for immigration detention’s noncriminal purposes.4 Detained immigrants are frequently subjected to punitive and long-term solitary confinement, inadequate medical care, sexual and physical assault, lack of access to counsel, and other harsh conditions of confinement; all without a right to a speedy trial, a jury, a government-appointed lawyer, or a duly-entered conviction.
17. Many detained immigrants, Plaintiff Ahmed included, accede to deportation simply to escape intolerable conditions of confinement, even when they have valid claims to remain in the United States, including claims for asylum or other discretionary relief.
3 See, e.g., INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038 (1984) (“A deportation proceeding is a purely civil action to determine eligibility to remain in this country, not to punish an unlawful entry”); see also Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 728-30 (1893) (observing that deportation proceedings have “all the elements of a civil case” and are “in no proper sense a trial or sentence for a crime or offense”); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952). 4 Dora Schriro, Immigration Detention Overview and Recommendations, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Immigration and Customs Enforcement 2-3, 21 (Oct. 6, 2009) available at https://www.ice.gov/doclib/about/offices/odpp/pdf/ice-detention-rpt.pdf.
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B. The Privatization of Immigration Detention and CoreCivic’s Economic Windfall.
18. Immigration detention expanded roughly eightfold over the past two decades, from a capacity of 5,532 detention beds in 19945 to a current capacity of over 41,000 beds, and climbing.6
19. During the same period, CoreCivic and other private prison corporations have spent tens of millions of dollars on lobbying efforts.7
20. As immigration detention expanded, private prison corporations, led by CoreCivic,8 gained a rapidly increasing share of the contracts for new detention beds.9
5 Chad C. Haddal & Alison Siskin, Cong. Research Service, RL32369, Immigration-Related Detention: Current Legislative Issues 12 (2010), available at https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1712 &context=key_workplace. 6 Jennie Jarvie, This industry stands to benefit from Trump's crackdown on the border, L.A. Times, Feb. 14, 2017, http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-immigrant-detention-20170214-story.html. 7 Michael Cohen, How for-profit prisons have become the biggest lobby no one is talking about, Wash. Post, Apr. 28, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2015/04/28/ how-for-profitprisons-have-become-the-biggest-lobby-no-one-is-talking-about/?utmterm=.25de04ae71f9.
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21. CoreCivic’s 2017 revenues were approximately $1.765 billion,10 and its stock is publicly traded on the New York Stock Exchange, with a market capitalization of approximately $2.36 billion11
22. Detention centers for which CoreCivic designated ICE as its “primary customer” accounted for 25% of CoreCivic’s total revenues in 2017 ($444.1 million).12 CoreCivic officials expect these lucrative immigration detention contracts to account for a significant percentage of the corporation’s ongoing revenues.13
23. As part of its immigration detention enterprise, CoreCivic owns and operates the Stewart Detention Center.
8 Madison Pauly, A Brief History of America’s Private Prison Industry, Mother Jones, Jul./Aug. 2016, https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2016/06/history-of-americas-private-prison-industry-timeline. 9 Bethany Carson & Eleana Diaz, Payoff: How Congress Ensures Private Prison Profit with an Immigrant Detention Quota, Grassroots Leadership 6, Chart 1-AA (Apr. 2015) https://grassrootsleadership.org/sites/default/files/reports/quota_report_final_digital.pdf. 10 CoreCivic Inc., Form 10-K FY 2017 at F-4, Sec. Exch. Comm’n, https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1070985/000156459018002898/cxw-10k_20171231.htm. [hereinafter “CoreCivic 10-K”]. 11 CoreCivic Inc. Stocks Overview, Reuters, available at https://www.reuters.com/finance/stocks/overview/CXW (last visited Apr. 16, 2018). 12 CoreCivic10-K, at 32. 13 Id.
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24. With nearly 2,000 beds, Stewart is one of the largest immigration detention centers in the nation. During fiscal year 2017, more deportation proceedings began in Stewart than any other immigration detention center in the country.14
25. Pursuant to the IGSA between ICE and Stewart County, ICE pays the County $62.03 per detained immigrant per day.15 Under its 2006 contract with CoreCivic, however, the County keeps only 85 cents per detained immigrant per day for its “administrative costs.” The rest of the money from ICE goes to CoreCivic. In 2016, CoreCivic’s revenue from Stewart was approximately $38 million.16 By contrast, the County’s revenue from Stewart was $589,052 for the same year.17
26. CoreCivic’s economic windfall, and the profitability of its immigration detention enterprise, arises from its corporate scheme, plan, and pattern of systemically withholding basic necessities from detained immigrants to ensure a readily available, captive labor force that cleans, maintains, and operates its facilities for subminimum wages under threat of solitary confinement, criminal prosecution, and other sanctions. Without this nearly free labor, CoreCivic’s windfall from immigrant detention would be substantially decreased.
14 Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse of Syracuse Univ. (“TRAC”), Details on Immigration Proceedings by Immigration Court, http://trac.syr.edu/phptools/immigration/nta/ (last visited Apr. 6, 2018). 15 TRAC, Detention Facility Reports: Transfers, http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/detention/tran.shtml (last visited Apr. 9, 2018). 16 Robin Urevich, Deadly Detention: Hell in the Middle of a Pine Forest, Capital and Main (Mar. 14, 2018), https://capitalandmain.com/deadly-detention-hell-middle-pine-forest-0314. 17 Stewart County, Georgia, Independent Auditors’ Report 59 (2016), http://www.stewartcountyga.gov/PDF-docs/StewartCounty2016Audit.pdf.
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C. CoreCivic Uses Detained Immigrants to Clean, Maintain, and Operate Stewart.
27. CoreCivic operates a so-called Voluntary Work Program (“Work Program”) at Stewart. Through this program, CoreCivic uses detained immigrants to perform work that directly contributes to institutional operations.
28. The Performance Based National Detention Standards (“PBNDS”), issued as guidance by ICE, delegate the site-specific rules for each Work Program to the “facility administrator” but mandate, inter alia, that each Work Program be in compliance with the PBNDS; that all work, other than personal housekeeping, be voluntary and not required; that compensation be “at least $1.00 (USD) per day”; and that work be limited to 8 hours per day, 40 hours per week.18
29. According to CoreCivic’s Detainee Orientation Handbook, which it provides to all detained immigrants at Stewart upon entry, the following work assignments may be available through the Work Program:
a. Administration Porter b. Barber c. Commissary d. Hallway Porter e. Intake Worker f. Kitchen Worker g. Laundry Worker h. Library Worker i. Medical Porter
18 ICE, Performance-Based National Detention Standards 405-409 (2011), https://www.ice.gov/doclib/detention-standards/2011/pbnds2011r2016.pdf.
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j. Night Floor Crew k. Pod Porter l. Recreation/Gym Worker m. Sally port/Chemical Porter n. Shower Porter o. Unit Law Library Helper p. Visitation Porter19 30. In the course of their labor for CoreCivic, detained immigrants in the Work Program perform a wide range of work, including but not limited to: a. Scrubbing bathrooms, showers, toilets, and windows; b. Cleaning and maintaining CoreCivic’s on-site medical center; c. Cleaning patient rooms and medical staff offices; d. Sweeping, mopping, stripping, and waxing floors; e. Washing detained immigrants’ laundry; f. Preparing, cooking, and serving meals; g. Washing dishes; h. Cleaning the kitchen and cafeteria before and after meals; i. Performing clerical work for CoreCivic; j. Providing barber services to detained immigrants; k. Cleaning intake areas and solitary confinement units; and l. Cleaning and maintaining recreational areas.
19 CoreCivic, Detainee Orientation Handbook, Stewart Detention Center 14 (2016) [hereinafter “Stewart Detainee Handbook”].
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31. CoreCivic pays detained immigrants who participate in the Work Program generally between $1 and $4 per day. CoreCivic occasionally increases the wage rate it pays to kitchen workers to up to $8 per day when it needs workers to work twelve hours or more per day. Under no circumstances does CoreCivic pay the detained immigrants the federal minimum wage of $7.25 per hour, or the Service Contract Act wages governing the jobs they perform. In fact, the detained immigrants’ wages generally are well under $1 per hour.
32. The Work Program allows CoreCivic to avoid recruiting from the local labor market, paying minimum wages, providing detained immigrants in the Work Program with any benefits, paying the costs of potential unionization, and paying federal and state payroll taxes, like Medicare, thereby reducing operational costs and increasing its own profits. Further, it reduces the likelihood of former employees acting as whistleblowers regarding the deplorable and unsafe conditions inside Stewart.20
33. Stewart County has the highest poverty rate among all Georgia counties. With a population of roughly 5,900, nearly 40% of families live below the poverty level.21 The County’s average unemployment rate in February 2018 was 5.3%, which is a 1.2% higher than the national average of 4.9%.22 The median family income is $20,882.23 One hundred percent of children in Stewart County public schools are reportedly eligible for free or reduced-price meal programs.24
20 See, e.g., Urevich, supra note 16. 21 U.S. Census Bureau, Stewart County, GA, Quick Facts: Income and Poverty, available at https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/stewartcountygeorgia/IPE120216 (last visited Apr.12, 2018). 22 Georgia Department of Labor, Georgia Labor Force Estimates 8 (2018), https://dol.georgia.gov/sites/dol.georgia.gov/files/related_files/document/laborforce.pdf 23 U.S. Census Bureau, supra note 21. 24 Georgia Department of Early Care and Learning, FY2016 Free and Reduced Lunch School Data, Qualitied Schools, 24, http://decal.ga.gov/documents/attachments/16FreeRedQualSchools.pdf.
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34. According to CoreCivic, it employs around 300 people at Stewart, outside of the Work Program,25 only 96 of whom are Stewart County residents.26 CoreCivic fills a substantial number of jobs at Stewart with detained immigrants in the Work Program who work for nearly free.
35. While CoreCivic profits handsomely from the labor of detained immigrants locked inside Stewart, the company locks out many Stewart County residents from jobs and the economic growth and prosperity that comes with fair-paying work.
D. CoreCivic Withholds Necessary Care from Detained Immigrants at Stewart. 36. Despite its name, the “Voluntary Work Program” is not “voluntary” in any meaningful sense. CoreCivic maintains a corporate scheme, plan, and pattern at Stewart of depriving detained immigrants with basic necessities; outside contact with loved ones; and threatening them with serious harm, isolation, and criminal prosecution. As a result, detained immigrants are forced to submit to CoreCivic’s labor scheme in order to buy necessities from the commissary (including food, hygiene products, and phone cards) and to avoid solitary confinement and other sanctions. 37. CoreCivic owns and operates the commissary inside Stewart. The commissary is the only place at Stewart where detained immigrants can purchase necessities, including hygiene products, clothes, food, and phone cards. Pursuant to corporate policy, CoreCivic is required to use any profits or interest earned from the commissary towards welfare expenditures for detained immigrants.
25 Harry Franklin, Facility to house immigrants Official ink deal to detain inmates to be deported, Columbus Ledger-Enquirer, Jul. 11, 2006 available at 2006 WLNR 11899060; Jeremy Redmon, Detention center is largest in nation, Atlanta Journal-Const., Jan. 16, 2011 available at 2011 WLNR 930948. 26 Caleb Bauer, CoreCivic has history of complaints, violations, S. Bend Trib., Jan. 17, 2018, https://www.southbendtribune.com/news/local/corecivic-has-history-of-complaintsviolations/article_9355aa57-8309-56f6-9072-1e2f8e035a3c.html.
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38. Detained immigrants must use funds from their “inmate fund account” to make
purchases at the commissary. All of the detained immigrants’ wages from the Work Program are
deposited into this account.
39. When detained immigrants in the Work Program make purchases at the
commissary, they are giving their wages directly back to CoreCivic in a “company store”
scenario. This scenario is compounded by CoreCivic’s scheme, plan, and pattern of intentionally
depriving detained immigrants of basic necessities, such as hygiene products, that can only be
purchased at the commissary.
40. CoreCivic’s scheme of intentionally depriving detained immigrants of basic
necessities and its failure to meet federal standards concerning housing, food, and hygiene
products is well-documented.27
41. According to the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of the Inspector
General (OIG), Stewart has “bathrooms that were in poor condition, including mold and peeling
paint on walls, floors, and showers.”28 Some bathrooms at Stewart lack hot water, while some
showers lack cold water.29
27 See Ben Norton, Privatized for-profit immigrant detention centers are a “living nightmare,” investigation shows, Salon (May 16, 2017), https://www.salon.com/2017/05/16/privatized-for-profitimmigrant-detention-centers-are-a-living-nightmare-investigation-shows_partner/; Christie Thompson, Welcome to Stewart Detention Center, the Black Hole of America's Immigration System, VICE (Dec. 11, 2016), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/ypv59j/ welcome-to-stewart-detention-center-the-black-holeof-the-immigration-system; S. Poverty Law Ctr., Shadow Prisons: Immigrant Detention in the South, 36 (Nov. 2016), https://www.splcenter.org/sites/default/files/ leg_ijp_shadow_prisons_immigrant_detention_report.pdf; ACLU of Ga., Prisoners of Profit: Immigrants and Detention in Georgia (May 2012), https://www.acluga.org/sites/default/files/field_documents/prisoners_of_ profit.pdf; Penn. State Law Ctr. For Immigrants’ Rights Clinic, Imprisoned Justice: Inside Two Georgia Immigration Detention Centers (May 2017), https://pennstatelaw.psu.edu/sites/default/files/pictures/Clinics/ImmigrantsRights/Imprisoned_Justice_Report.pdf [hereinafter “Imprisoned Justice”]. 28 U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Office of the Inspector Gen., OIG-18-32, Concerns about ICE Detainee Treatment at Detention Facilities 7 (2017) available at https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2017-12/OIG-18-32-Dec17.pdf [hereinafter “OIG Report”].
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42. The OIG has also found that Stewart fails to provide “basic hygienic products, such as toilet paper, soap, lotion, and toothpaste . . . promptly or at all when detainees ran out of them.”30 Officers instruct detained immigrants to buy these necessities from the commissary when they run out.31
43. The same report from the OIG observes that Stewart stores “spoiled, wilted, and moldy produce and other food in kitchen refrigerators, as well as food past its expiration date.”32 Other food safety issues, according to the federal government, include “expired frozen food, including meat, and thawing meat without labels indicating when it had begun thawing or the date by which it must be used.”33
44. In addition to depriving detained immigrants of basic necessities like safe and sufficient food and hygienic products, CoreCivic has a scheme, plan, and pattern of depriving detained immigrants of outside contact with loved ones to compel detained immigrants to work in order to purchase costly phone cards from the commissary.
45. Stewart is geographically isolated and isolating for detained immigrants. It is outside the town of Lumpkin, Georgia, which has a population of 1,123 (not including the detained immigrants).34 It is a two and one-half hour drive from Atlanta, Georgia. The people who are able to make the trip to the detention center to visit a loved one are limited to noncontact visits. They must view each other through a plate glass window and speak through a closed-circuit telephone. These visits are limited to an hour.
29 Id. 30 Id. (reporting on Stewart and Hudson County Jail). 31 Id. (reporting on Stewart and Hudson County Jail). 32 Id. at 8 (reporting on Stewart and three other facilities). 33 Id. (reporting on Stewart and three other facilities). 34 U.S. Census Bureau, 2012-2016 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates: Lumpkin, Georgia, https://factfinder.census.gov/bkmk/table/1.0/en/ACS/16_5YR/DP05/1600000US1347980 (last visited Apr. 14, 2018).
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46. Talton Communications (“Talton”), the company that provides Stewart’s phone service, provides the only way for detained immigrants to call anyone outside the detention center. Talton takes advantage of this monopoly by charging excessively high rates for detained immigrants to make telephone calls. Therefore, most detained immigrants are not able to speak with family members for more than a few minutes every week, and at great expense.
47. Detained immigrants must purchase Talton phone cards at the commissary to make outside calls. Many detained immigrants submit to the Work Program to purchase these costly phone cards so they can maintain contact with loved ones.35
E. CoreCivic Threatens to Put Detained Immigrants in Solitary Confinement, Among Other Sanctions, for Refusing to Work.
48. CoreCivic maintains a corporate scheme, plan, and pattern at Stewart of threatening detained immigrants who refuse to work, organize a work stoppage, or participate in a work stoppage with “disciplinary segregation” (i.e., solitary confinement), criminal prosecution, downgrading the detained immigrants’ housing, and/or revoking access to the commissary, among other sanctions.
49. CoreCivic’s Stewart Detainee Orientation Handbook, which every individual detained at Stewart receives upon entry, categorizes “[e]ncouraging others to participate in a work stoppage or to refuse to work,” as a High Offense category, the second-highest offense category. As a result, encouraging others to participate in a work stoppage is punishable by, inter alia:
a. “Initiat[ion] [of] criminal proceedings”; b. “Disciplinary Segregation (Up to 30 days)”; c. “Loss of privileges: commissary, movies, recreation, etc.”; and
35 Imprisoned Justice, at 30.
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d. “Chang[ing] housing” or “Restrict[ion] to housing unit.”36 50. CoreCivic maintains a corporate scheme, plan, and pattern at Stewart of threatening Plaintiffs and Class Members who refuse to work with “intiat[ing] criminal proceedings” against them, which constitutes a threatened abuse of the legal process. 51. CoreCivic’s overuse of disciplinary measures such as solitary confinement at Stewart is well-documented.37 52. The OIG has expressed “concerns about a lack of professionalism and inappropriate treatment by Detention Center staff, which fostered a culture of disrespect and disregard for detainees’ basic rights.”38 Detained immigrants have been “disciplined, including being segregated or locked down in their cells, without adequate documentation in the detainee’s file to justify the disciplinary action.”39 53. In June 2017, officials at Stewart held a detained immigrant in solitary confinement for nearly 30 days for allegedly encouraging others to participate in a work stoppage.
36 Stewart Detainee Handbook, at 31-32. 37See Ben Norton, Privatized for-profit immigrant detention centers are a “living nightmare,” investigation shows, Salon (May 16, 2017), https://www.salon.com/2017/05/16/privatized-for-profitimmigrant-detention-centers-are-a-living-nightmare-investigation-shows_partner/; S. Poverty Law Ctr., Shadow Prisons: Immigrant Detention in the South, 41 (Nov. 2016), https://www.splcenter.org/sites/default/files/leg_ijp_shadow_prisons_immigrant _detention_report.pdf; ACLU of Ga., Prisoners of Profit: Immigrants and Detention in Georgia, 67-69 (May 2012), https://www.acluga.org/sites/default/files/field_documents/prisoners_of_profit.pdf; Imprisoned Justice, at 36-37; see also Grae v. Corrections Corporation of America, No. 3:16-cv-2267, 2017 WL 6442145 at *5-8, 15, 21 (M.D. Tenn. Dec. 18, 2017) (citing numerous instances of CoreCivic placing individuals in administrative segregation in Eden Detention Center for inappropriate reasons). 38 OIG Report, at 6 (reporting on Stewart and two other facilities); see also Urevich, supra note 16 (former ICE officer and Stewart guard describing physical abuse and verbal mistreatment of detained immigrants at Stewart). 39 OIG Report, at 6 (reporting on Stewart and two other facilities).
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54. CoreCivic also maintains a corporate scheme, plan, and pattern at Stewart of threatening Plaintiffs and Class Members who refuse to work with “changing housing” to living quarters that are less safe, sanitary, and private.
55. Detained immigrants who submit to the Work Program are often provided with more favorable living quarters, including “pods” that have private two-person cells, access to a common area, a shared bathroom with one cellmate, and a shower with temperature control.
56. These smaller pods are in stark contrast to the open dormitories. The open dormitories house up to 66 people, in 33 bunk beds. There is no privacy. The lights in these dorms are on all day and night, requiring some detained immigrants to fold socks over their eyes in order to sleep. There is one bathroom in these dorms with three to four toilets, three to four urinals, and four sinks. This shared bathroom is often filthy, to the extent that the pod residents at times gag from the overwhelming and festering stench. The showers in the open dormitories do not have temperature control and provide only extremely hot water. The open dormitories are also the site of frequent conflict and even violence. Indeed, the detained immigrants refer to open dormitories as “El Gallinero,” or “the Chicken Coop,” for both the conditions and overcrowded living quarters.
57. CoreCivic maintains a corporate scheme, plan, and pattern at Stewart of threatening Plaintiffs and Class Members with loss of access to the commissary when they refuse to work.
58. Plaintiffs and Class Members rely on access to the commissary to purchase the basic necessities that CoreCivic does not adequately provide and phone cards to maintain contact with loved ones.
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59. By maintaining this scheme, plan, and pattern of threatening Plaintiffs and Class Members who refuse to work with solitary confinement and other sanctions, CoreCivic ensures an available labor pool of detained immigrants will work for nearly free, thus allowing it to continue operating Stewart at an enormous profit.
60. CoreCivic knowingly benefitted financially, both by way of reduced labor costs and increased commissary revenue, from participating in a venture CoreCivic knew or should have known forced Plaintiffs and Class Members to work, or attempted to force them to work.
F. Plaintiff Barrientos’ Labor at Stewart 61. Mr. Barrientos has performed work for CoreCivic at Stewart as a result of its unlawful forced labor scheme, plan, and pattern. 62. As a kitchen worker, Mr. Barrientos washes dishes, serves meals, and prepares food for detained immigrants at Stewart. He regularly works eight to nine-hour shifts per day, seven days per week. 63. Prior to March 2018, Mr. Barrientos was paid $4 per day. If he worked more than twelve hours in one day, he was paid $5 per day. If Mr. Barrientos worked seven consecutive days in one week, he was compensated with a $5 phone card on top of his weekly wages. 64. After March 2018, CoreCivic’s pay scheme changed. Currently, Mr. Barrientos is paid $1 per day if he works less than six hours, $4 per day if he works for six hours, $5 per day if he works between eight and eleven hours and fifty-nine minutes, and $8 per day if he works twelve hours or more. CoreCivic credits these wages to Mr. Barrientos’ commissary account. 65. As a kitchen worker, Mr. Barrientos has been forced to cook and serve spoiled food to detained immigrants after complaining about the expired food to kitchen supervisors.
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66. CoreCivic denies Mr. Barrientos access to basic necessities that he then has to purchase at Stewart’s commissary with his wages from the Work Program. In one instance, Mr. Barrientos ran out of toilet paper and requested another roll from a CoreCivic officer. The CoreCivic officer told Mr. Barrientos to use his fingers to clean himself.
67. Mr. Barrientos spends his wages on soap, tooth paste, food, clothes, phone cards, and other necessities from the commissary.
68. Mr. Barrientos is housed in a pod with private, two-person cells that contain a bathroom to be shared with his cellmate, and he is provided with access to a shower that has both hot and cold water.
69. Officers at Stewart have threatened to transfer Mr. Barrientos from his pod to the Chicken Coop if he stops working, calls in sick, refuses to change shifts as requested, or encourages others to stop working.
70. On one occasion, a CoreCivic Officer named Garden40 woke up Mr. Barrientos and ordered him to work a 2 a.m. shift, even though he was assigned the 10 a.m. shift that day. When Mr. Barrientos refused, the officer told him to pack his bags because he was being moved to another pod. Mr. Barrientos relented and worked the early shift because he was afraid of being placed back in the Chicken Coop.
71. Officers at Stewart threatened Mr. Barrientos with denial of access to the commissary if he stopped working, called in sick, or encouraged others to stop working.
72. Around late 2015, CoreCivic officers threatened to put Mr. Barrientos in solitary confinement on two different occasions because they thought he and other kitchen workers were organizing a work stoppage.
40 Mr. Barrientos is unsure of the precise spelling of this Officer’s name and therefore acknowledges that this spelling is an approximation.
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73. Around October 2017, CoreCivic officers put Mr. Barrientos in medical segregation, allegedly for chicken pox, soon after he submitted a grievance against an officer who forced Mr. Barrientos to work while he was sick. Mr. Barrientos informed the officers that he had chicken pox as a child and was therefore unlikely to contract it again. CoreCivic detained Mr. Barrientos in medical segregation for two months and, despite a blood test, never informed him whether he had contracted chicken pox so as to justify his segregation.
74. While in segregation, Mr. Barrientos was in a cell by himself and was denied basic necessities and privileges. He was not allowed to see his family. His outdoor yard time was reduced from three to four hours per day to a half hour per day. As a result of his medical segregation, the immigration court had to reschedule a hearing in his immigration case thereby prolonging resolution of his case.
75. Mr. Barrientos provides CoreCivic with his labor because of CoreCivic’s threats of physical restraint, serious harm, and/or abuse of the legal process; and its scheme, plan, and pattern to threaten or inflict physical restraint and serious harm upon him if he refuses to work.
76. CoreCivic has retained and currently retains the value of Mr. Barrientos’ labor as corporate profits instead of using it to provide for safe, minimally humane living conditions for detained immigrants at Stewart or to compensate Mr. Barrientos fairly.
G. Plaintiff Velazquez’s Labor at Stewart 77. Mr. Velazquez has performed work for CoreCivic at Stewart as a result of its unlawful forced labor scheme, plan, and pattern. 78. As a kitchen worker, Mr. Velazquez washes dishes and prepares beverages during meal services for other detained immigrants at Stewart. On average, he works six to eight hours per day, five days per week.
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79. For his labor, Mr. Velazquez is paid $1 per day if he works less than six hours, $4 per day if he works for six hours, $5 per day if he works between eight and eleven hours and fifty-nine minutes, and $8 per day if he works twelve hours or more. CoreCivic credits these wages to Mr. Velazquez’s commissary account.
80. CoreCivic denies Mr. Velazquez access to basic necessities that he then has to purchase at Stewart’s commissary with his wages from the Work Program. Mr. Velazquez uses his wages to purchase phone cards and food at CoreCivic’s commissary, among other necessities.
81. Mr. Velazquez is housed in a pod with private, two-person cells. He shares a bathroom with only one other person, his cellmate, and has access to a shower with temperature control.
82. Mr. Velazquez has witnessed CoreCivic officers threaten to move detained immigrants who decline to work from their small pods like his to the Chicken Coop.
83. Mr. Velazquez provides CoreCivic forced labor because of its threats of physical restraint, serious harm, and/or abuse of the legal process; and its scheme, plan, and pattern to threaten or inflict physical restraint and serious harm upon him if he does not.
84. CoreCivic has retained and currently retains the value of Mr. Velazquez’s labor as corporate profits instead of using it to provide for safer, more humane living conditions for detained immigrants at Stewart or compensate Mr. Velazquez fairly.
H. Plaintiff Ahmed’s Labor at Stewart 85. Mr. Ahmed was detained at Stewart from approximately August 2016 to February 2018.
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86. As a kitchen worker, Mr. Ahmed prepared, cooked, and served meals, washed dishes, and cleaned the kitchen area. He worked eight-hour shifts, starting at 2:00 a.m., up to seven days per week.
87. In return for this labor, Mr. Ahmed was paid $4 per day. If he worked twelve hours or more, he was paid an additional $1 per day. CoreCivic credited these wages to Mr. Ahmed’s commissary account.
88. CoreCivic denied Mr. Ahmed access to basic necessities that he then had to purchase at Stewart’s commissary with his wages from the Work Program. Mr. Ahmed spent his wages on food and phone cards from the commissary, among other necessities.
89. Officers at Stewart threatened to put Mr. Ahmed in solitary confinement, if he stopped working or encouraged other detained immigrants to stop working.
90. In November 2017, officers at Stewart actually put Mr. Ahmed in solitary confinement for threatening a work stoppage after he had not been paid for his work. Specifically, officers at Stewart held Mr. Ahmed in solitary confinement for ten days for allegedly saying “no work tomorrow.”41
91. Mr. Ahmed provided CoreCivic forced labor because of its threats of restraint, serious harm, and/or abuse of the legal process; and its scheme, plan, and practice to threaten or inflict restraint and serious harm upon him if he does not.
92. CoreCivic retained the value of Mr. Ahmed’s labor by realizing this value as corporate profits, rather than using it to provide for safer, more humane living conditions for detained immigrants at Stewart.
41 Spencer Woodman, Private Prison Continues To Send ICE Detainees To Solitary Confinement For Refusing Voluntary Labor, The Intercept (Jan. 11, 2018), https://theintercept.com/2018/01/11/icedetention-solitary-confinement.
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CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS 93. Plaintiffs bring this lawsuit as a class action on behalf of themselves individually and all others similarly situated under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a), (b)(2) for their requests for declaratory and injunctive relief only, and (b)(3) for their requests for damages. This action satisfies the numerosity, commonality, typicality, adequacy, predominance, and superiority requirements of those provisions. A. Class Definition 94. Plaintiffs seek to certify the following two classes:
(a) All civil immigration detainees who performed work for CoreCivic at Stewart in the “Volunteer Work Program” within the past ten years, up to the date the class is certified (“Forced Labor Class”).
(b) All civil immigration detainees who performed work for CoreCivic at Stewart in the “Volunteer Work Program” within the past four years, up to the date the class is certified (“Unjust Enrichment Class”). 95. Excluded from the class definitions are the defendants, their officers, directors, management, employees, subsidiaries, and affiliates, and all federal governmental entities. Plaintiffs reserve the right to revise the class definition based upon information learned subsequent to the filing of this action. B. Class Certification Requirements under Rule 23(a), (b)(2), and (b)(3). 96. Numerosity: The class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. Plaintiffs do not know the exact size of the class because that information is within the control of CoreCivic. However, upon information and belief, the class members number in the thousands. Membership in the class is readily ascertainable from CoreCivic’s detention and Work Program records.
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97. Commonality: There are numerous questions of law or fact common to the Class, and those issues predominate over any question affecting only individual class members. The common legal and factual issues include the following:
a. Whether CoreCivic’s conduct as set forth in Count I violated the forced labor and attempt provisions of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (18 U.S.C. §§ 1589, 1594, and 1595);
b. Whether CoreCivic was unjustly enriched by the Work Program; c. Whether Plaintiffs and Class Members are entitled to equitable relief, including injunctive and declaratory relief; and d. Whether Plaintiffs and the Class Members are entitled to damages and other monetary relief and, if so, in what amount. 98. Typicality: The claims asserted by Plaintiffs are typical of the claims of the Class, in that the representative Plaintiffs, like all Class Members, were subject to and impacted by CoreCivic’s uniform policy. Each member of the proposed Class has been similarly injured by CoreCivic’s misconduct. 99. Adequacy: Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Class. Plaintiffs have retained attorneys experienced in class and complex litigation, including litigation arising under the Trafficking Victims Protection Act. Plaintiffs and their counsel intend to vigorously prosecute this litigation. Neither Plaintiffs nor their counsel have interests that conflict with the interests of the other class members. 100. Predominance of Common Questions: The questions of law or fact common to the class, identified above in paragraph 97, predominate over any questions affecting only
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individual members. Specifically, CoreCivic’s scheme, plan, and pattern to force labor applies to the class as a whole and has resulted in substantially similar injuries to the class.
101. Superiority: Plaintiffs and Class Members have all suffered and will continue to suffer harm and damages as a result of CoreCivic’s wrongful conduct. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. Treatment as a class action will permit a large number of similarly situated persons to adjudicate their common claims in a single forum simultaneously, efficiently, and without the duplication of effort and expense that numerous individual actions would engender. Class treatment will also permit the adjudication of claims by many members of the proposed class who could not individually afford to litigate a claim such as is asserted in this complaint. Additionally, a class action is superior because the Class is comprised of many individuals who do not speak English as their native language and who are geographically dispersed. Finally, this class action likely presents no difficulties in management that would preclude maintenance as a class action.
102. This action satisfies the requirements of Rule 23(b)(2) because CoreCivic has acted and refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive and/or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to each Class Member.
CAUSES OF ACTION COUNT I
THE TRAFFICKING VICTIMS PROTECTION ACT Forced Labor (18 U.S.C. § 1589)
Or, in the Alternative, Attempt to Commit Forced Labor (18 U.S.C. § 1594(a)). On behalf of the Forced Labor Class
103. Plaintiffs and Class Members reallege and incorporate by reference herein all allegations above.
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104. Plaintiffs and Forced Labor Class Members are authorized to bring this claim against CoreCivic pursuant to the civil remedies provision of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (“TVPA”), 18 U.S.C. § 1595, because CoreCivic violated the forced labor provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 1589 or, in the alternative, the attempt provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 1594(a).
105. Plaintiffs and Forced Labor Class Members also are authorized to bring this claim under the TVPA, 18 U.S.C. § 1595, because CoreCivic knowingly benefitted financially from participating in a venture which CoreCivic knew or should have known has engaged in violations of the forced labor or, in the alternative, the attempt provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 1594(a).
106. CoreCivic knowingly obtained the labor or services of Plaintiffs and Forced Labor Class Members by means of physical restraint and threats of physical restraint of Plaintiffs and Members of the Forced Labor Class, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1589(a)(1). Specifically, CoreCivic threatened to or did restrain Plaintiffs and Forced Labor Class Members in solitary confinement when they refused orders to work.
107. CoreCivic knowingly obtained the labor or services of Plaintiffs and Forced Labor Class Members by means of serious harm and threats of serious harm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1589(a)(2).
108. The serious harm CoreCivic caused and threatened was physical and non-physical harm, including psychological, financial, and reputational harm. Specifically,
a. Withholding of Basic Necessities: CoreCivic withheld or threatened to withhold basic necessities from Plaintiffs and Forced Labor Class Members, thereby forcing them to work for subminimum wages to buy those basic necessities at the commissary and avoid hunger, undernourishment, lack of personal hygiene, and lack of contact with loved ones, among other harms;
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b. Threatened and Actual Sanctions: When CoreCivic perceived that Plaintiffs and Forced Labor Class members were refusing to provide their labor, organizing a work stoppage, or participating in a work stoppage, CoreCivic
i. placed or threatened to place them into solitary confinement;
ii. threatened criminal prosecution; iii. threatened to transfer them to unsafe and
unsanitary living quarters, where they would be deprived of privacy, safety, and sanitation; and iv. threatened to deny them access to the commissary where they could buy food, hygiene products, and phone cards, thus denying them basic necessities and isolating them from friends and family.
109. The conduct described in paragraph 108, supra, is “serious harm” as defined in 18
U.S.C. § 1589(c)(2) because it is “sufficiently serious, under all the surrounding circumstances,
to compel a reasonable person of the same background and in the same circumstances [of
Plaintiffs and Forced Labor Class Members] to perform or to continue performing labor or
services in order to avoid incurring that harm.”
110. CoreCivic knowingly obtained the labor or services of Plaintiffs and Forced
Labor Class Members “by means of a scheme, plan, or pattern [CoreCivic] intended to cause …
[Plaintiffs and Forced Labor Class Members] to believe that, if … [Plaintiffs and Forced Labor
Class Members] did not perform such labor or services, … [they] would suffer serious harm or
physical restraint” as described in paragraphs 105-108, supra, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
1589(a)(4).
111. CoreCivic knowingly obtained the labor or services of Plaintiffs and Forced
Labor Class Members by means of abuse or threatened abuse of legal process, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 1589(a)(3). Specifically, CoreCivic threatened to initiate criminal proceedings against
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Plaintiffs and Forced Labor Class Members to obtain their labor and to prevent them from refusing to work.
112. In the alternative, CoreCivic attempted to obtain the labor or services of Plaintiffs and Forced Labor Class Members by the means described paragraphs 105-108, supra, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1594(a).
113. Plaintiffs and Forced Labor Class Members have suffered damages in an amount to be determined at trial.
114. Plaintiffs and Forced Labor Class Members are entitled to recover compensatory and punitive damages.
115. Plaintiffs and Forced Labor Class Members are entitled to recover mandatory restitution in the full amount of their losses.
116. Plaintiffs and Forced Labor Class Members are entitled to recover their costs and reasonable attorney’s fees.
COUNT II On behalf of the Unjust Enrichment Class
UNJUST ENRICHMENT Georgia Common Law
117. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference herein all allegations above. 118. CoreCivic materially and significantly reduced its labor costs and expenses, and increased its corporate profits, by obtaining undercompensated labor from Plaintiffs and Unjust Enrichment Class Members. 119. Plaintiffs and Unjust Enrichment Class Members conferred non-gratuitous benefits upon CoreCivic by performing work for $1 to $4 per day, and up to $8 per day for kitchen workers under certain circumstances, for which CoreCivic would otherwise have had to pay at least the applicable minimum wage or more, thereby significantly and materially
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increasing CoreCivic’s profits and unjustly enriching CoreCivic at the expense of and detriment to Plaintiffs and Unjust Enrichment Class Members.
120. CoreCivic’s retention of any benefit collected directly and indirectly from this undercompensated labor violated principles of justice, equity, and good conscience.
121. As a direct and proximate result of CoreCivic’s forced labor practices, Plaintiffs and Unjust Enrichment Class Members have suffered concrete harm and injury, including physical and emotional injury, and the unlawful violation of their rights.
122. Plaintiffs and Unjust Enrichment Class Members are entitled to recover from CoreCivic all amounts that CoreCivic has wrongfully and improperly obtained, and CoreCivic should be required to disgorge to Plaintiffs and Unjust Enrichment Class Members the benefits it has unjustly obtained. Plaintiffs and Class Members are also entitled to recover exemplary damages.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs, individually and on behalf of the Class, request that the Court: a. Certify this action as a class action, with the classes as defined above; b. Find that Plaintiffs are proper representatives of the classes, and appoint the
undersigned as Class Counsel; c. Order CoreCivic to identify and disclose to Plaintiffs all Class Members; d. Order CoreCivic to pay for notifying Class Members of the pendency of this suit; e. Award declaratory and other equitable relief as is necessary to protect the interests of
Plaintiffs and Class Members; f. Award injunctive relief as is necessary to protect the interests of Plaintiffs and Class
Members, including enjoining CoreCivic from continuing to conduct business through the unlawful and unfair practices alleged herein;
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g. Order disgorgement of CoreCivic’s unjustly-acquired revenue, profits, and other benefits resulting from its unlawful conduct;
h. Award Plaintiffs and Class Members monetary damages for CoreCivic’s forced labor, or in in the alternative, attempted forced labor, and unjust enrichment in an amount to be determined at trial;
i. Award Plaintiffs and Class Members their reasonable litigation expenses and attorney’s fees; and
j. Award any further relief that the Court deems just and equitable.

Dated: April 17, 2018

Respectfully Submitted,
/s/ Daniel Werner Daniel Werner (GA Bar No. 422070) Laura Rivera (GA Bar No. 143762) SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER 150 E. Ponce de Leon Avenue, Suite 340 Decatur, GA, 300030 Telephone: (404) 521-6700 Facsimile: (404) 221-5857 daniel.werner@splcenter.org laura.rivera@splcenter.org
/s/ Meredith B. Stewart Meredith B. Stewart* Bryan Lopez* SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER 201 Saint Charles Avenue, Suite 2000 New Orleans, LA 70170 Telephone: (504) 486-8982 Facsimile: (504) 486-8947 meredith.stewart@splcenter.org bryan.lopez@splcenter.org
R. Andrew Free* LAW OFFICE OF R. ANDREW FREE P.O. Box 90568 Nashville, TN 37209 Telephone: (844) 321-3221x1 Facsimile: (615) 829-8959 andrew@immigrantcivilrights.com

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Azadeh Shahshahani (GA Bar No. 509008) Priyanka Bhatt (GA Bar No. 307315) PROJECT SOUTH 9 Gammon Avenue SE Atlanta, GA 30315 Telephone: (404) 622-0602 Facsimile: (404) 622-4137 azadeh@projectsouth.org Korey A. Nelson* Lydia A. Wright* BURNS CHAREST LLP 365 Canal Street, Suite 1170 New Orleans, LA 70130 Telephone: (504) 799-2845 Facsimile: (504) 881-1765 knelson@burnscharest.com lwright@burnscharest.com Warren T. Burns* Daniel H. Charest* BURNS CHAREST LLP 900 Jackson St., Suite 500 Dallas, Texas 75202 Telephone: (469) 904-4550 Facsimile: (469) 444-5002 wburns@burnscharest.com dcharest@burnscharest.com
*Application for admission pro hac vice forthcoming. Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this date the foregoing and accompanying documents were filed through the Court’s CM/ECF filing system, and will be served on the defendants listed below with the summons. When service is complete a Proof of Service form will be filed with the Court, which Proof of Service will list the date, method, and documents served.
CoreCivic, Inc. 10 Burton Hills Blvd. Nashville, TN 37215

Dated: April 17, 2018

/s/ Daniel Werner

32

BARRIENTOS et al v. CORECIVIC INC, Docket No. 4:18-cv-00070 (M.D. Ga. Apr 17, 2018), Court Docket
General Information

Court
Federal Nature of Suit Docket Number

United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia; United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia
Labor - Other Litigation[790]
4:18-cv-00070

© 2019 The Bureau of National Affairs, Inc. All Rights Reserved. Terms of Service // PAGE 33

 </s> Case 4:18-cv-00070-CDL Document 38 Filed 08/17/18 Page 1 of 17

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
COLUMBUS DIVISION

WILHEN HILL BARRIENTOS,

*

MARGARITO VELAZQUEZ-GALICIA,

and SHOAIB AHMED, individually *

and on behalf of all others

similarly situated,

*

Plaintiffs,

*

CASE NO. 4:18-CV-70 (CDL)

vs.

*

CORECIVIC, INC.,

*

Defendant.

*

O R D E R

Stewart Detention Center (“Stewart”) is an immigration

detention facility in Stewart County, Georgia operated by

CoreCivic, Inc.

Plaintiffs Wilhen Barrientos, Margarito

Velazquez-Galicia, and Shoaib Ahmed are current and former Stewart

detainees. They bring this class action, asserting claims against

CoreCivic under the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (“TVPA”),

as amended, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1589, 1594-95, and under Georgia law.

They allege that CoreCivic operates a “deprivation scheme” in which

it forces detainees to work through threats of physical violence,

solitary confinement, and deprivation of basic necessities.

CoreCivic moved to dismiss the action (ECF No. 30). For the

following reasons, CoreCivic’s motion to dismiss is denied.

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STANDARD “To survive a motion to dismiss” under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). The complaint must include enough factual allegations “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. In other words, the factual allegations must “raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of” the plaintiff’s claims. Id. at 556. But “Rule 12(b)(6) does not permit dismissal of a well-pleaded complaint simply because ‘it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of those facts is improbable.’” Watts v. Fla. Int’l Univ., 495 F.3d 1289, 1295 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS The Court accepts the allegations in Plaintiffs’ Complaint as true for purposes of the pending motion. Plaintiffs allege the following: I. Conditions in Stewart Detention Center Stewart County, Georgia has an intergovernmental services agreement with United States Immigration and Custom Enforcement to house immigration detainees like Plaintiffs. Compl. ¶ 13, ECF No. 1. Stewart County contracts with CoreCivic, a for-profit
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corporation, to operate the Stewart Detention Center (“Stewart”). Id. ¶ 12. Stewart has nearly 2,000 beds and is one of the largest immigration detention centers in the nation. Id. ¶ 24.
Plaintiffs allege that the conditions at Stewart are deplorable. The bathrooms are in poor condition. Id. ¶ 41. Some showers have no hot water, while other showers have no cold water. Id. The open dormitories house 66 people in bunk beds with no privacy. Id. ¶ 56. Each dormitory has one bathroom with several sinks and toilets. Id. The showers in the shared bathroom do not have temperature control. Id. Conflict and violence occur frequently in the open dormitories. Id. Detainees refer to the open dormitories as the “Chicken Coop” because of the unsanitary conditions and overcrowding. Id.
CoreCivic does not adequately furnish detainees with basic hygiene products like toilet paper, soap, lotion, or toothpaste. Id. ¶ 42. Instead, CoreCivic instructs detainees to buy these basic necessities from the commissary. Id. CoreCivic also provides no means for detainees to contact people outside Stewart other than expensive phone cards available for purchase at the commissary. Id. ¶¶ 45-47. The commissary is the only place detainees can purchase hygiene products, clothes, or phone cards. Id. ¶ 37. Detainees must use funds from their inmate fund accounts to make purchases. Id. ¶ 38. Detainees therefore rely on access
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to the commissary to purchase basic necessities and phone cards. Id. ¶ 58. II. Stewart’s “Voluntary Work Program”
CoreCivic operates a “voluntary work program” at Stewart. Id. ¶ 27. CoreCivic assigns program participants to various jobs in the facility. Id. ¶ 29. Responsibilities include scrubbing bathrooms, cleaning the medical center, preparing meals, washing detainees’ laundry, and cleaning floors. Id. ¶ 30. CoreCivic generally pays detainees in the program between $1 and $4 per day. Id. ¶ 31. CoreCivic deposits detainees’ wages into their inmate fund accounts so the detainees may purchase items at the commissary. Id. ¶ 38.
Detainees in the voluntary work program are spared from some of Stewart’s more unfavorable conditions. Program participants are not housed in the Chicken Coop. Instead, they are provided more favorable living quarters with private two-person cells, a shared common area, a bathroom shared with only one other cellmate, and a shower with temperature control. Id. ¶ 55. But when participants refuse to work, CoreCivic threatens to transfer them back to the Chicken Coop, id. ¶ 54, revoke their access to the commissary, id. ¶ 57, transfer them to solitary confinement, id. ¶ 59, or initiate criminal proceedings against them, id. ¶ 50.
Plaintiffs allege that CoreCivic maintains deplorable conditions as part of a “deprivation scheme” that provides
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CoreCivic with a cheap supply of labor to operate the facility, thereby enabling CoreCivic to increase its profits. Id. ¶¶ 1-2, 59-60. According to Plaintiffs, this scheme operates as follows: (1) CoreCivic deprives detainees of basic necessities, including toothpaste, soap, toilet paper, privacy, safety, and contact with loved ones; (2) detainees must participate in the voluntary work program to move to humane accommodations and to earn money to purchase necessities at the commissary; and (3) once detainees are in the program, CoreCivic threatens to harm or actually harms those who refuse to work. Id. ¶ 1. Therefore, according to Plaintiffs, participation in the “voluntary” work program is “not ‘voluntary’ in any meaningful sense.” Id. ¶ 36. III. Named Plaintiffs
Barrientos, Velazques-Galicia, and Ahmed either are working or previously worked as kitchen workers in the program. Id. ¶¶ 62, 78, 86. Specifically, Barrientos alleges CoreCivic threatened to transfer him to the Chicken Coop, id. ¶¶ 69-70, revoke his access to the commissary, id. ¶ 71, and put him in solitary confinement, id. ¶ 72, when he refused to work or when CoreCivic believed he was organizing a work stoppage. Velazquez-Galicia alleges that he witnessed CoreCivic threaten to transfer detainees who decline to work from the preferable two-person cells to the Chicken Coop. Id. ¶ 82. Ahmed alleges that CoreCivic threatened to put him in solitary confinement if he stopped working. Id. ¶ 89. He also
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alleges that CoreCivic actually put him in solitary confinement for ten days for threatening a work stoppage after he had not been paid. Id. ¶ 90. All three allege that they participate (or participated) in the work program because of CoreCivic’s threats of harm and because of CoreCivic’s deprivation scheme. Id. ¶¶ 75, 83, 91. They bring this action on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated. Plaintiffs’ proposed classes are limited to detainees who actually participate or participated in the voluntary work program. Id.
DISCUSSION Plaintiffs assert two categories of claims against CoreCivic: (1) civil liability for violations of the TVPA and (2) claims for unjust enrichment under Georgia law. CoreCivic moved to dismiss all of Plaintiffs’ claims. For the following reasons, CoreCivic’s motion is denied. I. TVPA Claims As to Plaintiffs’ TVPA claims, the question presented is whether Plaintiffs have alleged sufficient facts in their Complaint, which if ultimately proven to be true, could subject CoreCivic to civil liability under the TVPA. The TVPA provides a private cause of action against anyone:
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(a) Who[] knowingly provides or obtains the labor or services of a person by any one of, or by any combination of, the following means— (1) by means of force, threats of force, physical restraint, or threats of physical restraint to that person or another person; (2) by means of serious harm or threats of serious harm to that person or another person; (3) by means of the abuse or threatened abuse of law or legal process; or (4) by means of any scheme . . . intended to cause the person to believe that, if that person did not perform such labor or services, that person or another person would suffer serious harm or physical restraint[.]
18 U.S.C. § 1589(a). The TVPA defines “serious harm” as “any harm, whether physical or nonphysical, including psychological, financial, or reputational harm, that is sufficiently serious, under all the surrounding circumstances, to compel a reasonable person of the same background and in the same circumstances to perform or to continue performing labor or services in order to avoid incurring that harm.” Id. § 1589(c)(2).
CoreCivic contends that Plaintiffs fail to state a claim under the TVPA because Congress did not intend the statute to apply to lawfully held detainees. In the alternative, CoreCivic argues that Plaintiffs failed to allege sufficient facts to state a claim under the “abuse of legal process” prong. Id. § 1589(a)(3). Finally, CoreCivic contends that Plaintiffs’ TVPA claims for
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conduct prior to December 23, 2008 are barred. These arguments are addressed in turn.
A. Plaintiffs Stated Claims under the Plain Language of the TVPA
CoreCivic argues that the TVPA is intended to apply narrowly to forced labor in the human trafficking context and that applying it to detainee work programs is “absurd” and contrary to the intentions of Congress. CoreCivic’s argument has superficial appeal and some support from the TVPA’s legislative history. But it ignores the plain language of the statute. It also misunderstands “the absurdity doctrine,” which is a narrow exception to the fundamental principle that statutory interpretation must be anchored to the plain language of the statute.
CoreCivic points to evidence of congressional intent in support of its position. See 22 U.S.C. § 7101 (setting forth the congressional purposes and findings regarding the TVPA); id. § 7101(a) (“The purposes of this chapter are to combat trafficking in persons, a contemporary manifestation of slavery whose victims are predominantly women and children, to ensure just and effective punishment of traffickers, and to protect their victims.”). But when interpreting a statute, the Court must presume that Congress says what it means and means what it says. Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992). If Congress intended the
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TVPA to apply narrowly to human traffickers or human traffickingrelated labor only, it could have easily limited § 1589 or § 1595 to those circumstances by saying so in those sections of the Act. Congress placed no such restriction in the statute but chose instead to broadly prohibit “whoever” from “obtain[ing] labor” by any of the proscribed means. 18 U.S.C. § 1589(a). The Court thus declines to read an implied exclusion for lawfully confined victims into the statute. Of course, the lawful force necessary to detain the detainees cannot be the source for the TVPA claims. But Plaintiffs allege that although they may be lawfully detained, they cannot be forced to labor in violation of the TVPA.1
To the extent CoreCivic relies on the “absurdity doctrine” as an exception to the fundamental principle that courts must apply statutes as written, the Court finds that this exception does not apply here. The “absurdity doctrine” can be traced back to the English common law. As Blackstone explained in his Commentaries, “[W]here words bear . . . a very absurd signification, if literally understood, we must a little deviate from the received sense of them.” William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England § 2, at 60 (4th ed. 1770). As understood in the English common law: “[I]n construing . . . all written instruments, the
1 CoreCivic points to other textual “clues” that bolster its position that the statute did not intend to apply to immigrant detainees. But these textual clues from other statutes do nothing to undermine the plain language of the TVPA.
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grammatical and ordinary sense of the words is to be adhered to, unless that would lead to some absurdity, or some repugnance or inconsistency with the rest of the instrument, in which case the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words may be modified so as to avoid that absurdity and inconsistency, but no farther.” Grey v. Pearson, (1857) 10 Eng. Rep. 1216, 1234; 6 H.L. Cas. 61, 106 (Lord Wensleydale).
The absurdity doctrine, however, does not authorize “judicial revision of public and private texts to make them (in the judge’s view) more reasonable.” Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 237 (2012). To avoid such judicial mischief, the doctrine has two limiting conditions: (1) ”[t]he absurdity must consist of a disposition that no reasonable person could intend;” and (2) ”[t]he absurdity must be reparable by changing or supplying a particular word or phrase whose inclusion or omission was obviously a technical or ministerial error.” Id. at 237-38. The drafter’s failure to fully appreciate the effect of a plainly written statute does not bring it within the absurdity doctrine. Id. at 238.
CoreCivic points to no particular word or phrase in the TVPA that it claims must be corrected. Instead, it argues that the statute does not apply to persons who are held lawfully as detainees by the government. It relies upon no language in the statute for this broad assertion. It simply points to legislative
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history outlining the motivation for the enactment of the statute. Thus, it asks the Court rewrite the statute by effectively adding a provision stating, “this statute shall not apply to anyone who uses labor of detainees who are lawfully detained pursuant to a contract with a governmental agency.” The absurdity doctrine does not authorize the Court to re-draft a statute. CoreCivic may find it absurd that Congress drafted the TVPA in such a way that it theoretically reaches the conduct alleged here. And one can speculate that Congress did not foresee the application of its plain language to these circumstances. But this Court cannot rewrite statutes to avoid what it may perceive to be an unintended consequence or even an absurd public policy result. Congress is alone responsible for any such absurdities and lack of legislative foresight. Moreover, the Constitution gives it the exclusive power to fix them.
The Court’s ruling today that Plaintiffs have stated a claim for relief under the TVPA certainly does not mean they will ultimately prevail. They must of course still prove their allegations. And in doing so, they will be required to point to evidence that supports the reasonable conclusion that CoreCivic threatened them with a serious risk of harm if they did not persist as laborers. That burden will be a heavy one. But they have today
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plausibly stated such allegations to overcome CoreCivic’s motion

to dismiss.2

B. Plaintiffs Alleged Sufficient Facts to State a Claim under § 1589(a)(3)

CoreCivic alternatively contends that Plaintiffs have not

plausibly alleged that CoreCivic obtained their labor through

actual or threatened abuse of the legal process under § 1589(a)(3).

Under the statute, “[t]he term ‘abuse or threatened abuse of the

legal process’ means the use or threatened use of a law or legal

process, whether administrative, civil, or criminal, in any manner

or for any purpose for which the law was not designed, in order to

exert pressure on another person to cause that person to take some

action

or

refrain

from

taking

some

action.”

18 U.S.C. § 1589(c)(1). According to the Complaint, CoreCivic

provided each detainee with a “detainee orientation handbook,”

which explains that refusing to work or organizing a work stoppage

is punishable by initiation of criminal proceedings. Compl. ¶ 50.

And Plaintiffs clearly allege that CoreCivic threatened to

2 CoreCivic does not argue that Plaintiffs have failed to allege a sufficient threat of harm under the TVPA. Thus, the Court leaves for another day whether Plaintiffs must prove that the conditions in the Chicken Coop do not meet the constitutional conditions of confinement standard in order to show a serious threat of harm for TVPA purposes. For prison conditions of confinement claims, deprivations must be objectively and sufficiently serious or extreme such that they constitute a denial of the “minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Thomas v. Bryant, 614 F.3d 1288, 1304 (11th Cir. 2010). The same standard applies in the pretrial detainee context. Keith v. Dekalb Cty., 749 F.3d 1034, 1044 n.35 (11th Cir. 2014).
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initiate criminal proceedings against detainees when detainees refused to work. Id. ¶ 111. If discovery reveals that CoreCivic made no such threats, then summary judgment will be proper. But at this stage, Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged a claim under the “legal process” prong of the TVPA.
C. Plaintiffs Stated TVPA Claims for Conduct Prior to December 23, 2008
When Congress first enacted the TVPA in 2000, it did not authorize a private right of action for violation of its provisions. See generally Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114 Stat. 1464. Congress amended the TVPA in 2003 to provide a private right of action against “perpetrators” of TVPA violations. Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108193, 117 Stat. 2875. Congress amended the TVPA again in December 2008 to expand the class of individuals against whom a private right of action could be brought. After the 2008 amendments, a plaintiff could bring a TVPA claim not only against “perpetrators,” but also against “whoever knowingly benefits” financially or otherwise from a scheme they knew or should have known violated the TVPA. William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-457, 122 Stat. 5044.
CoreCivic characterizes Plaintiffs’ TVPA claims as arising exclusively under this “financial benefit” prong of the TVPA’s
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private right of action provision. See 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a). Therefore, it contends that Plaintiffs cannot state a TVPA claim for conduct prior to December 23, 2008 (the date Congress expanded the TVPA’s private right of action). But Plaintiffs’ Complaint arguably alleges a cause of action against CoreCivic as both a perpetrator and as a financial beneficiary. See Compl. ¶ 104 (“Plaintiffs are authorized to bring this [TVPA] claim . . . because CoreCivic violated the forced labor provisions of [§ 1589].”); id. ¶ 105 (“Plaintiffs . . . also are authorized to bring this [TVPA] claim . . . because CoreCivic knowingly benefitted financially” from the deprivation scheme (emphasis added)). Therefore, to the extent Plaintiffs’ TVPA claim is premised on CoreCivic actually perpetrating TVPA violations as opposed to only benefitting financially from violations, this claim may encompass conduct as early as 2003, subject to the applicable statute of limitations. But CoreCivic cannot be liable for only knowingly benefitting from the deprivation scheme until after December 23, 2008.3
3 The Court notes that Plaintiffs’ proposed TVPA class is defined as all participants in the voluntary work program “within the past ten years up to the date the class is certified.” Compl. ¶ 94(a). Plaintiffs filed this action on April 17, 2018. And the Court has not yet certified the class. Therefore, unless the class is certified before December 23 of this year, Plaintiffs’ TVPA claims will effectively be limited to conduct occurring after the 2008 amendments anyway.
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II. Unjust Enrichment Claims Plaintiffs assert claims under Georgia law for unjust
enrichment. “The concept of unjust enrichment in law is premised upon the principle that a party cannot induce, accept, or encourage another to furnish or render something of value to such party and avoid payment for the value received.” Vernon v. Assurance Forensic Accounting, LLC, 774 S.E.2d 197, 212 (Ga. Ct. App. 2015) (quoting Jones v. White, 717 S.E.2d322, 328 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011)) (explaining that for purposes of an unjust enrichment claim conferring a “benefit” means providing “any form of advantage” even if it was not “earned”); see also Reynolds v. CB&T, 805 S.E.2d 472, 478-79 (Ga. Ct. App. 2017) (reversing grant of summary judgment on unjust enrichment claim based upon lender inducing borrower to finish construction of home and nevertheless foreclosing on the home when construction complete). Although most unjust enrichment claims are based on the party being induced into some transaction with a reasonable expectation of receiving something in return, the Georgia courts have recognized that an unjust enrichment claim can be based on allegations of coercion. See Estate of Crook v. Foster, 775 S.E.2d 286, 287-90 (Ga. Ct. App. 2015) (reversing trial court’s grant of summary judgment on unjust enrichment claim where plaintiff claimed defendant coerced her into putting defendant’s name on deed).
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Here, Plaintiffs allege that CoreCivic coerced them to provide labor to CoreCivic, that CoreCivic benefitted from that labor, and that CoreCivic should compensate Plaintiffs for the benefit they conferred on CoreCivic because allowing CoreCivic to keep that benefit would be unjust. The Court cannot say that Georgia would not recognize an unjust enrichment claim under these circumstances. Accordingly, CoreCivic’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ unjust enrichment claims is denied.
CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing, CoreCivic’s motion to dismiss (ECF No. 30) is denied.
CERTIFICATE FOR IMMEDIATE APPEAL Whether the TVPA applies to work programs in federal immigration detention facilities operated by private for-profit contractors is a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion. The Court today finds that the TVPA does apply under the circumstances alleged in Plaintiffs’ Complaint. This determination thus allows this litigation to proceed which will not only involve extensive fact discovery but also class certification proceedings. If the Court’s conclusion is wrong and the primary (maybe only) basis for federal jurisdiction is removed, these subsequent proceedings will have been for naught. Therefore, an immediate appeal may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation. Of course, if
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Case 4:18-cv-00070-CDL Document 38 Filed 08/17/18 Page 17 of 17 today’s order is affirmed, these proceedings will have arguably been unnecessarily delayed. But given the nature of the issue to be decided on appeal and the implications of today’s ruling, the undersigned is of the opinion that an immediate appeal is appropriate pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). All proceedings in this Court are stayed pending resolution of any application for interlocutory appeal.
IT IS SO ORDERED, this 17th day of August, 2018. S/Clay D. Land CLAY D. LAND CHIEF U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
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[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ________________________ No. 18-15081 ________________________
D.C. Docket No. 4:18-cv-00070-CDL
WILHEN HILL BARRIENTOS, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, MARGARITO VELAZQUEZ-GALICIA, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, SHOAIB AHMED, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs-Appellees, versus CORECIVIC, INC.,
Defendant-Appellant. ________________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia ________________________
(February 28, 2020)

Case: 18-15081 Date Filed: 02/28/2020 Page: 2 of 24
Before HULL and MARCUS, Circuit Judges, and ROTHSTEIN,* District Judge. HULL, Circuit Judge:
In this case, Appellees Wilhen Hill Barrientos, Margarito Velazquez-Galicia, and Shoaib Ahmed, current and former alien detainees, brought a class action lawsuit against Appellant CoreCivic, Inc., a private contractor, which owns and operates the Stewart Detention Center in Lumpkin, Georgia (“Stewart”). Stewart is a federal immigration detention facility where aliens are held during the pendency of removal proceedings or for other reasons related to enforcement of the nation’s immigration laws. At Stewart, CoreCivic, as a private contractor, is required to operate what is referred to as a “voluntary work program,” through which detainees may perform work for compensation.
Appellees’ complaint alleged that, far from operating a “voluntary” work program, CoreCivic coerces alien detainees to perform labor at Stewart by, inter alia, the use or threatened use of serious harm, criminal prosecution, solitary confinement, and the withholding of basic necessities. Appellees’ complaint asserted that CoreCivic’s labor scheme violated, and continues to violate, the forced-labor prohibition in the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (“TVPA”), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1589, 1594–95, and Georgia law. The TVPA subjects to criminal and
*Honorable Barbara J. Rothstein, United States District Judge for the Western District of Washington, sitting by designation.
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civil liability “[w]hoever” knowingly obtains the labor or services of a “person” by any one of the prohibited coercive means explicitly listed in the TVPA. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1589(a), 1595.
CoreCivic moved to dismiss the complaint, contending that the TVPA does not apply to a private government contractor or cover labor performed in work programs by alien detainees in lawful custody of the U.S. government. Although it denied the motion, the district court certified for immediate appeal the narrow, purely legal question of “[w]hether the TVPA applies to work programs in federal immigration detention facilities operated by private for-profit contractors.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). We granted CoreCivic’s petition for permission to immediately appeal the district court’s order.
After review, and with the benefit of oral argument, we conclude that: (1) under the plain language of the statute, the TVPA covers the conduct of private contractors operating federal immigration detention facilities; (2) the TVPA does not bar private contractors from operating the sort of voluntary work programs generally authorized under federal law for aliens held in immigration detention facilities; but (3) private contractors that operate such work programs are not categorically excluded from the TVPA and may be liable if they knowingly obtain or procure the labor or services of a program participant through the illegal coercive means explicitly listed in the TVPA. Because our review is limited to the
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legal question of the TVPA’s applicability to private contractors operating federal immigration detention facilities, we do not at this time address whether the factual allegations in the complaint are sufficient to state a TVPA claim.
I. BACKGROUND The question certified by the district court concerns the TVPA and work programs in federal immigration detention facilities. We review the TVPA, the relevant work programs, and then the district court proceedings. A. The TVPA The TVPA prohibits knowingly “obtain[ing] the labor or services of a person” by any one of, or combination of, the following means: (1) by means of force, threats of force, physical restraint, or threats of physical restraint to that person or another person; (2) by means of serious harm or threats of serious harm to that person or another person; (3) by means of the abuse or threatened abuse of law or legal process; or (4) by means of any scheme, plan, or pattern intended to cause the person to believe that, if that person did not perform such labor or services, that person or another person would suffer serious harm or physical restraint. 18 U.S.C. § 1589(a) (collectively, the “illegal coercive means”). Section 1589(a) applies to “[w]hoever” knowingly provides or obtains such forced labor or services from a “person.” Id.
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In turn, § 1595(a) provides a private cause of action for any victim of a violation of § 1589. 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a). Under § 1595(a), “[a]n individual who is a victim of a violation” of the TVPA “may bring a civil action against the perpetrator,” as well as against anyone who “knowingly benefits, financially or by receiving anything of value,” from any such violation. Id. B. Work Programs in ICE Detention Facilities
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) detains certain aliens during the pendency of removal proceedings or for other reasons related to enforcement of the nation’s immigration laws. ICE detains some of those aliens in facilities operated by private contractors. Appellant CoreCivic is a private contractor that operates several detention centers throughout the country, including the Stewart Detention Center in Lumpkin, Georgia, where Appellees were or are being held.1
CoreCivic, as a private contractor operating an ICE detention facility, is subject to, and required to follow, the Performance-Based National Detention Standards (“PBNDS”), the operative version of which was promulgated in 2011 and revised in 2016. See U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, Performance-Based National Detention Standards 2011 (rev. 2016), available at
1CoreCivic operates the Stewart Detention Center through a contract with Stewart County, Georgia. The County is a party to an Intergovernmental Service Agreement with ICE, pursuant to which it detains aliens on ICE’s behalf.
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https://www.ice.gov/doclib/detention-standards/2011/pbnds2011r2016.pdf. The PBNDS are designed to ensure a safe and secure detention environment that meets detainees’ basic needs and is consistent with applicable legal requirements.
The PBNDS state that detention centers may require all detainees to “maintain their immediate living areas in a neat and orderly manner” through certain “personal housekeeping” tasks such as “making their bunk beds daily,” “stacking loose papers,” and “keeping the floor free of debris.” Id. § 5.8(V)(C). Beyond these basic required tasks, detainees “shall not be required to work,” and all other “[w]ork assignments are voluntary.” Id. §§ 5.8(II)(2), 5.8(V)(C).
As to voluntary work, the PBNDS further state that “[d]etainees shall be provided the opportunity to participate in a voluntary work program” through which they may earn monetary compensation.2 Id. §§ 5.8(I), 5.8(V)(A) (emphasis added). The purpose of such voluntary work programs is to reduce “[t]he negative impact of confinement . . . through decreased idleness, improved morale and fewer disciplinary incidents.” Id. § 5.8(II)(4). However, the facility administrator must operate the voluntary work program in compliance with the PBNDS, which regulate the selection of detainees, the hours of work (no more than 8 hours per day and 40 hours per week), the minimum compensation for completed work (at
2Since 1950, Congress has authorized ICE and its predecessor agencies to pay detained aliens “for work performed” “while held in custody under the immigration laws.” 8 U.S.C. § 1555(d).
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least $1.00 per day), the number of work assignments a detainee can perform, and the conditions under which that work occurs. Id. §§ 5.8(V)(D)–(O). The PBNDS delegate the site-specific rules for each work program to the “facility administrator.” Id. § 5.8(V)(D).
Detainees may be removed from the voluntary work program for causes such as “unsatisfactory performance” or “disruptive behavior,” or as a “sanction imposed . . . for an infraction of a facility rule, regulation or policy.” Id. § 5.8(V)(L). Additionally, the PBNDS specify that participants in the voluntary work program are “expected to be ready to report for work at the required time,” “may not leave an assignment without permission,” and “may not evade attendance and performance standards in assigned activities nor encourage others to do so.” Id. § 5.8(V)(M).
The PBNDS otherwise provide for disciplinary action against detainees outside the context of the voluntary work program. See generally id. § 3.1. The PBNDS identify four categories of offenses and prescribe appropriate sanctions for each category. Id. §§ 3.1(V)(C), 3.1 app. A. Those categories are “greatest,” “high,” “high moderate,” and “low moderate.”3 Id. According to the PBNDS, all
3For example, the PBNDS define “[r]efusing to clean assigned living area” as a “high moderate” offense, while “failing to keep self and living area in accordance with posted standards” is a “low moderate” offense. PBNDS § 3.1 app. A. While the PBNDS define “[e]ncouraging others to participate in a work stoppage or to refuse to work” as a “high” offense, there is no specific offense prescribed in the PBNDS for a detainee who, after signing up for the voluntary work program, refuses to complete his assigned tasks. See generally id.
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four categories of infractions are punishable by a “[l]oss of privileges”—including “commissary, vending machines, movies, recreation, etc.”—and a “[c]hange [in] housing,” among other sanctions. Id. § 3.1 app. A. Additionally, all but the lowest category of infractions are punishable by the initiation of criminal proceedings and “[d]isciplinary segregation” of varying length based on the severity of the infraction. Id.
II. DISTRICT COURT PROCEEDINGS A. Complaint
In their complaint, Appellees alleged that the voluntary work program as implemented by CoreCivic was, in fact, anything but voluntary. Rather, the complaint alleged, aliens detained at Stewart work because they have no other meaningful choice. The complaint alleged CoreCivic was operating, and continues to operate, a “deprivation scheme” by which it forces detainees to participate in the work program through threats of “serious harm” in the form of deprivation of privacy and safety, threats of referral for criminal prosecution, and threats of solitary confinement; through withholding basic necessities like food, toothpaste, toilet paper, and soap; and through deprivation of outside contact with loved ones.
Appellees’ complaint claimed that, by engaging in this alleged forced-labor “scheme,” CoreCivic ran afoul of §§ 1589(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(3), and (a)(4) in that it was knowingly “obtain[ing] . . . labor” by means of: (1) “force, threats of force,
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physical restraint, or threats of physical restraint”; (2) “serious harm or threats of serious harm”; (3) “the abuse or threatened abuse of the law or legal process”; and (4) a “scheme . . . intended to cause [a] person to believe that, if that person did not perform . . . labor or services, that person . . . would suffer serious harm or physical restraint.” 18 U.S.C. §§ 1589(a)(1)–(4). Appellees’ complaint claimed that this forced-labor scheme—which remains ongoing—operates as follows.
The conditions at Stewart are alleged to be poor, particularly in the “open dormitories,” which detainees refer to as the “Chicken Coop” due to the unsanitary conditions and overcrowding. The showers in the Chicken Coop, for example, are said to be moldy and without temperature control. CoreCivic allegedly does not provide detainees with basic hygiene products, including toilet paper, soap, and toothpaste. Detainees must purchase these items from the commissary when they run out. They also must purchase expensive “phone cards” from the commissary if they wish to speak with loved ones who are unable to make the trip to the detention center.
Detainees who participate in CoreCivic’s voluntary work program, however, are spared some of Stewart’s more unfavorable conditions and—because they are paid between $1.00 and $4.00 per day—are able to purchase necessities from the commissary. For example, according to Appellees’ complaint, work program participants are not housed in the “Chicken Coop,” but are provided two-person
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cells, a shared common area, a bathroom shared with only one other cellmate, and a shower with temperature control. Appellees’ complaint alleged that, once detainees are in the work program, CoreCivic threatens to harm or actually harms those who refuse to work.
In short, Appellees’ complaint alleged that CoreCivic subjects detainees to inhumane conditions by depriving them of basic necessities and livable accommodations, detainees join the so-called voluntary work program to alleviate these conditions, and CoreCivic then threatens any program participants who refuse to work. In this way, Appellees claim, CoreCivic effectively forces detainees to continually work and participate in the program. Appellees allege that this provides CoreCivic with a cheap supply of labor to operate the facility with, which enables CoreCivic to increase its profits.
The three named plaintiffs—Barrientos, Velazquez-Galicia, and Ahmed—all either are working or previously worked as kitchen workers as part of the voluntary work program at Stewart. However, they all claimed their participation in the work program was not voluntary in any meaningful sense, as they were subject to the above-described “deprivation scheme.” Additionally, all three alleged they were subject to or witnessed threats from CoreCivic employees once they began participating in the work program.
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Barrientos, a citizen of Guatemala seeking asylum in the United States, earned between $1.00 and $4.00 per day as part of the voluntary work program, though he makes up to $8.00 per day if CoreCivic requires him to work 12 hours or more in one day. He alleged CoreCivic threatened to transfer him to the Chicken Coop, revoke his access to the commissary, and put him in solitary confinement if he stopped working, called in sick, refused to change shifts, or encouraged others to stop working.
Velazquez-Galicia is a citizen of Mexico who intends to seek relief from deportation and whose wife and two children are U.S. citizens. He too is employed as a kitchen worker and is paid between $1.00 and $4.00 per day or up to $8.00 per day if he is required to work more than 12 hours in one day. He alleged he witnessed CoreCivic employees threaten to transfer detainees who declined to work from the preferable two-person cells to the Chicken Coop.
Ahmed is a citizen of Bangladesh who was detained at Stewart until February 2018, when he allegedly opted to give up his asylum case in part due to his desire to escape Stewart’s poor conditions. Ahmed was paid $4.00 per day as a kitchen worker. Like the other plaintiffs, he earned additional money if he worked 12 hours or more. He alleged that CoreCivic employees threatened to place him in solitary confinement if he stopped working, and actually did place him in solitary
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confinement for ten days when he threatened a work stoppage after he was not paid. B. District Court’s Order
CoreCivic moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that Appellees’ complaint failed to state a claim under the TVPA because Congress did not intend the statute to apply at all to alien detainees in the lawful custody of the U.S. Government or to private contractors operating immigration detention facilities. The district court disagreed, finding “the plain language of the statute” clearly encompassed claims brought by alien detainees held in privately run detention facilities. The district court “decline[d] to read an implied exclusion for lawfully confined victims into the statute.”
The district court recognized, however, that “[w]hether the TVPA applies to work programs in federal immigration detention facilities operated by private forprofit contractors is a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion.” We agreed, and granted CoreCivic’s petition for immediate appeal.
III. DISCUSSION A. Our Limited Review
As an initial matter, we clarify the scope of our review. Although the district court identified a discrete legal question in its order, “appellate jurisdiction
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[under § 1292(b)] applies to the order certified to the court of appeals, and is not tied to the particular question formulated by the district court.” Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A. v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199, 205, 116 S. Ct. 619, 623 (1996). Thus, while we “may not reach beyond the certified order,” we “may address any issue fairly included within the certified order.” Id. That said, we think it appropriate to limit our review to the discrete and abstract legal issue the district court identified. See McFarlin v. Conseco Servs., LLC, 381 F.3d 1251, 1259 (11th Cir. 2004) (“The legal question must be stated at a high enough level of abstraction to lift the question out of the details of the evidence or facts of a particular case and give it general relevance to other cases in the same area of law.”).
Because we limit our review to the discrete and abstract legal issue of the TVPA’s applicability to a certain class of cases, we are not concerned with the specific factual allegations in the complaint, apart from the nature of the parties (legally detained immigrants seeking to assert claims against a private, for-profit, government contractor) and, to a lesser extent, the fact that the claims arise out of the operation of a work program required by the PBNDS. In other words, we do not address whether the complaint in this case sufficiently alleged a violation of the TVPA, assuming it applies to private contractors like CoreCivic. We also do not offer any opinion on CoreCivic’s operation of work programs generally. Indeed, we decline to address the adequacy of the complaint—or any other fact-intensive
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inquiry—at this stage in the litigation. See Mamani v. Berzain, 825 F.3d 1304,
1312–13 (11th Cir. 2016) (declining to address, in an interlocutory appeal, whether
a complaint stated a claim for relief under the Torture Victim Protection Act
because the issue did not ask the court “to decide a pure or abstract question about
the TVPA itself”).4
B. Analysis
As to the discrete legal question before us, CoreCivic has not asked us to
adopt a construction of the statute that would exempt federal contractors from any
and all liability under the TVPA. Rather, CoreCivic asks us to hold that the TVPA
(specifically § 1589) can never apply in the specific context of a “federally
mandated voluntary work program in a detention setting,” even where the work
performed through that program is obtained through, for example, force, physical
restraint, or threats of serious harm. CoreCivic insists that its construction of the
4We deny Appellees’ request to set aside the motions panel’s order granting Appellant CoreCivic permission to appeal. We recognize that, like any decision made by a motions panel, a petition for interlocutory review under § 1292(b) may be improvidently granted. See 11th Cir. R. 27-1(g); McFarlin, 381 F.3d at 1253. Appellees insist that CoreCivic essentially asks us to consider fact-driven issues not appropriate for review under § 1292(b) and that, contrary to the district court’s conclusion, the unambiguous language of the statute leaves no room for a substantial difference of opinion.
However, we agree with the district court that its order involves a pure question of law that controls at least a substantial part of the case and about which there is substantial ground for a difference of opinion, and that its resolution may well substantially reduce the amount of litigation necessary on remand. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). A ruling in favor of CoreCivic on this pure question of law would eliminate Appellees’ sole federal claim and leave behind only one state law claim. And our answer to the legal question presented does not depend on any facts or the factual record below. In short, this appeal satisfies § 1292(b)’s requirements.
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statute would be consistent with the text, structure, and purpose of the TVPA. In support of its argument, CoreCivic points to: (1) the text of § 1589, particularly the requirement that one “obtain[] the labor or services of a person”; (2) the fact that, when Congress enacted the TVPA, it had long authorized labor by alien detainees; (3) the fact that courts have consistently held that alien detainees can be required to perform labor while in detention; (4) the express purpose of the TVPA, as well as the legislative history leading to its enactment; and (5) the rule of lenity, which CoreCivic argues favors judicial restraint in the construction of this criminal statute.
The question of statutory interpretation is a legal issue we review de novo. Wiersum v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 785 F.3d 483, 485 (11th Cir. 2015). “The interpretation of a statute begins with its language.” United States v. St. Amour, 886 F.3d 1009, 1013 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 205 (2018); see also Artis v. District of Columbia, 583 U.S. ___, ___, 138 S. Ct. 594, 603 (2018) (“In determining the meaning of a statutory provision, we look first to its language, giving the words used their ordinary meaning.” (quotation marks omitted)). We first “determine whether the language at issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning,” and, “[i]f so, we need go no further.” St. Amour, 886 F.3d at 1013 (quotation marks omitted).
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As laid out above, the TVPA creates a cause of action—both criminal and civil—against “[w]hoever knowingly provides or obtains the labor or services of a person” by various illegal coercive means. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1589(a), 1595(a). We, like the district court, find this language to be “plain and unambiguous.” See St. Amour, 886 F.3d at 1013. The use of the general terms “[w]hoever” and “person” evinces no intent on the part of Congress to restrict the application of the statute to particular actors or particular victims. Instead, the clear and unambiguous language of the statute limits liability only by reference to the actions taken by a would-be violator: it applies to anyone who knowingly “obtains the labor or services of a person” through one of the four illegal coercive means explicitly listed in the statute. No other limiting principle is evident from the plain text.
Indeed, the Dictionary Act—which provides the definition of various terms for courts to use in “determining the meaning of any Act of Congress”—states that the word “whoever” when used in a statute “include[s] corporations, companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as well as individuals.” 1 U.S.C. § 1. Congress’s express inclusion of corporations and companies in the general definition of “whoever” presumptively indicates that a private, for-profit government contractor—like CoreCivic—falls within the meaning of “[w]hoever” for purposes of the TVPA.
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Despite the statute’s use of general terms to describe its coverage, CoreCivic asks us to read into the statute a limiting principle: that Congress could not have intended alien detainees participating in voluntary work programs to sue and make use of this statute. But “the presumed point of using general words is to produce general coverage—not to leave room for courts to recognize ad hoc exceptions.” Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 101 (2012). The primary textual argument CoreCivic makes is that the words “obtains the labor or services of a person” do not naturally encompass federally mandated voluntary work programs for alien detainees of the type run by CoreCivic. This is because CoreCivic, like any contractor operating an immigration detention facility on ICE’s behalf, is required to provide a voluntary work program for detainees, and thus it cannot illegally “obtain[] the labor” of detainees through such a program. See PBNDS § 5.8(V)(A).
But the fact that the PBNDS require CoreCivic to operate a work program for detainees does not mean that such a program can never be operated in a manner—i.e., by forcing labor through illegal coercive means—that violates the TVPA. If CoreCivic, or any other private for-profit contractor, actually forces detainees to provide labor (whether through a work program or not) through any of the illegal coercive means explicitly proscribed by the TVPA, it has “obtain[ed] the labor or services of a person” in violation of the TVPA. Again, nothing in the text
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of the statute excludes federal contractors providing immigration detention services from liability under the TVPA, even when that liability might arise out of the operation of a federally mandated work program. And nothing in the PBNDS permits CoreCivic, or other private contractors operating immigration detention facilities, to force detainees to perform labor (beyond personal housekeeping tasks), and certainly not through the illegal coercive means explicitly listed in the TVPA.
CoreCivic warns us against the unintended consequences of this construction of the statute, implying that this decision could open up criminal liability in any number of custodial settings in which detainees or prisoners are incentivized or required to perform work. As CoreCivic notes, however, Congress itself has long authorized paid work by detained aliens, and federal courts (including this Court) have long held that such detainees or inmates can be required to perform labor while in detention. 8 U.S.C. § 1555(d); see, e.g., Villarreal v. Woodham, 113 F.3d 202, 207 (11th Cir. 1997) (“[N]o Court of Appeals has ever questioned the power of a correctional institution to compel inmates to perform services for the institution without paying the minimum wage.” (quotation marks omitted)). Our decision here does nothing to call this precedent into question.
To be clear, our opinion should not be read to call into question the legality of voluntary work programs in federal immigration detention facilities, or to call
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into question longstanding requirements that detainees or inmates be required to perform basic housekeeping tasks.5 But the mere fact that CoreCivic—or any other private government contractor—is operating a work program at the behest of the federal government does not, in and of itself, shield CoreCivic from liability under the TVPA if it in fact obtains the forced labor of program participants through the illegal coercive means explicitly proscribed by the TVPA. 18 U.S.C. § 1589(a) (listing specific illegal coercive means). All we hold today is that the plain language of the TVPA brings within its scope for-profit government contractors operating work programs in federal immigration detention facilities, and such entities are not categorically excluded or shielded from liability under the TVPA. C. Purpose and Legislative History
Having concluded that the “language at issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning,” “we need go no further.” St. Amour, 886 F.3d at 1013 (quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. Noel, 893 F.3d 1294, 1297 (11th Cir. 2018) (“[I]f the statute’s language is clear, there is no need to go beyond the statute’s plain language into legislative history.” (internal quotation marks omitted)), cert.
5As discussed above, in the interest of maintaining order in an immigration detention facility, the PBNDS authorize punishments for detainees who, among other things, refuse to complete basic personal housekeeping tasks or organize work stoppages. See generally PBNDS § 3.1. Our decision should likewise not be read to imply that these basic disciplinary measures, on their own, give rise to TVPA liability.
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denied, 140 S. Ct. 157 (2019).6 We do acknowledge CoreCivic’s arguments concerning the purpose and legislative history of the TVPA, but where, as here, the statutory text is not ambiguous, “[o]nly the most extraordinary showing of contrary intentions in the legislative history will justify a departure from [the statutory] language.” United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 680, 105 S. Ct. 2897, 2902 (1985) (quotation marks omitted); see also Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 75, 105 S. Ct. 479, 482 (1984) (“When we find the terms of a statute unambiguous, judicial inquiry is complete, except in rare and exceptional circumstances.” (quotation marks omitted)). We do not find any such extraordinary showing of contrary intentions here.
As CoreCivic correctly points out, Congress enacted the TVPA as part of the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000 “to combat trafficking in persons, a contemporary manifestation of slavery whose victims are predominantly women and children, to ensure just and effective punishment of traffickers, and to protect their victims.” Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, § 102(a), 114 Stat. 1464, 1466 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 7101). Congress supported that purpose with 24
6CoreCivic’s argument that the rule of lenity weighs in favor of its preferred construction of the statute is similarly foreclosed by our conclusion that the statutory text is unambiguous. See United States v. Maturin, 499 F.3d 1243, 1246 (11th Cir. 2007) (“Because [the statute] is clear, we need discuss neither legislative history nor the rule of lenity.” (citing Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 66, 118 S. Ct. 469, 478 (1997))).
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legislative findings, all of which focus on human trafficking and involuntary servitude. Id. § 102(b), 114 Stat. at 1466–69. And the legislative history indicates that § 1589 in particular was “intended to address the increasingly subtle methods of traffickers who place their victims in modern-day slavery.” H.R. Rep. No. 106939, at 101 (2000) (Conf. Rep.).
We do not find a private government contractor’s obtaining forced labor through actual or threatened force, restraint, or serious harm to be so far removed from the purpose Congress identified as to cause us to look beyond the plain statutory language. Just because Congress may have had in mind a particular narrow objective—here, combatting human trafficking—does not on its own justify a departure from the principle that we should give general terms their general meaning. See Scalia & Garner, supra, at 103–04 (“The argument most frequently made against giving general terms their general meaning is the one made (and rejected) in the Slaughter-House cases—that those who adopted the provision had in mind a particular narrow objective (equal protection for blacks) though they expressed a more general one (equal protection for ‘any person’).”). As the Supreme Court has remarked, “statutory prohibitions often go beyond the principal evil to cover reasonably comparable evils, and it is ultimately the provisions of our laws rather than the principal concerns of our legislators by
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which we are governed.” Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79, 118 S. Ct. 998, 1002 (1998).7
We also are not persuaded by CoreCivic’s resort to Supreme Court decisions it claims counsel against adopting a construction of a criminal statute, like the TVPA, that may lead to results disconnected from Congress’s purpose. See Marinello v. United States, 584 U.S. ___, 138 S. Ct. 1101 (2018); Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528, 135 S. Ct. 1074 (2015); Bond v. United States, 572 U.S. 844, 134 S. Ct. 2077 (2014). Those cases all involved some disconnect between the purpose of the statute and the nature of the conduct alleged. Here, in contrast, Appellees have alleged that CoreCivic engaged in precisely the type of conduct prohibited by the TVPA: obtaining labor by the specific illegal coercive means explicitly set out in the statute. CoreCivic’s argument is not that it is incapable of carrying out the prohibited conduct; instead, it insists that, even if it—or any other private contractor operating an immigration detention facility—engaged in the proscribed conduct, it cannot be the “[w]hoever” envisioned by the statute. We see
7What’s more, as the government notes in its amicus brief, “Congress has repeatedly emphasized that it seeks to stamp out any use of forced labor by federal contractors.” See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 7. Pointing to this history, along with the text and purpose of the TVPA, the government has adopted the position that “the TVPA does not contain an implicit exception for private providers of immigration detention services” and that Appellees “are not categorically barred from bringing a TVPA suit based on the conduct of a contractor or subcontractor that provides immigration detention services to the United States.” Id. at 8. The government’s position reinforces our conclusion that the results here are not wholly disconnected from Congress’s purpose in enacting the TVPA.
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no reason to read this limiting principle into the statute. Congress wrote this statute plainly, and it is up to Congress, not us, to rewrite it.
We further note that, while none of our sister circuits has addressed the specific application of the TVPA now before us, they have found § 1589 applicable outside the core human-trafficking context to which CoreCivic would apparently have us limit the statute’s reach. See, e.g., Adia v. Grandeur Mgmt., Inc., 933 F.3d 89, 91 (2d Cir. 2019) (concluding that § 1589(a)’s prohibition against obtaining labor through threats of serious harm applied to “an immigrant lawfully in this country on a temporary guest worker visa alleging that his employers threatened to revoke their sponsorship, thereby subjecting him to deportation”); Bistline v. Parker, 918 F.3d 849, 871 (10th Cir. 2019) (concluding that plaintiffs, all former members of a church, had plausibly alleged violations of the TVPA against the church leader by alleging that they “were threatened with force, kidnapped, physically restrained, [and] threatened with other harms” if they failed to follow orders from church leaders); United States v. Callahan, 801 F.3d 606, 617 (6th Cir. 2015) (“The statute’s express terms do not limit its application to immigrant victims or sex workers. Rather, § 1589(a)’s proscription against the exploitation of the labor or services of ‘a person’ by prohibited means encompasses any person, no matter her nationality or place of birth.”). To clarify, we are not hereby approving the specific holdings or analyses in these decisions,
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but cite them to show that federal courts have concluded that § 1589 is not limited to cases of overt human trafficking.
IV. CONCLUSION For the reasons stated above, we affirm the district court’s denial of CoreCivic’s motion to dismiss Appellees’ complaint, and hold that the TVPA applies to private for-profit contractors operating federal immigration detention facilities. We express no opinion on the question of whether the factual allegations in Appellees’ complaint, taken as true, are sufficient to establish a violation of the TVPA. AFFIRMED.
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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

ELBERT PARR TUTTLE COURT OF APPEALS BUILDING 56 Forsyth Street, N.W. Atlanta, Georgia 30303

David J. Smith Clerk of Court

February 28, 2020

MEMORANDUM TO COUNSEL OR PARTIES
Appeal Number: 18-15081-GG Case Style: Shoaib Ahmed, et al v. CoreCivic Inc District Court Docket No: 4:18-cv-00070-CDL

For rules and forms visit www.ca11.uscourts.gov

This Court requires all counsel to file documents electronically using the Electronic Case Files ("ECF") system, unless exempted for good cause. Enclosed is a copy of the court's decision filed today in this appeal. Judgment has this day been entered pursuant to FRAP 36. The court's mandate will issue at a later date in accordance with FRAP 41(b).

The time for filing a petition for rehearing is governed by 11th Cir. R. 40-3, and the time for filing a petition for rehearing en banc is governed by 11th Cir. R. 35-2. Except as otherwise provided by FRAP 25(a) for inmate filings, a petition for rehearing or for rehearing en banc is timely only if received in the clerk's office within the time specified in the rules. Costs are governed by FRAP 39 and 11th Cir.R. 39-1. The timing, format, and content of a motion for attorney's fees and an objection thereto is governed by 11th Cir. R. 39-2 and 39-3.

Please note that a petition for rehearing en banc must include in the Certificate of Interested Persons a complete list of all persons and entities listed on all certificates previously filed by any party in the appeal. See 11th Cir. R. 26.1-1. In addition, a copy of the opinion sought to be reheard must be included in any petition for rehearing or petition for rehearing en banc. See 11th Cir. R. 35-5(k) and 40-1 .

Counsel appointed under the Criminal Justice Act (CJA) must submit a voucher claiming compensation for time spent on the appeal no later than 60 days after either issuance of mandate or filing with the U.S. Supreme Court of a petition for writ of certiorari (whichever is later) via the eVoucher system. Please contact the CJA Team at (404) 335-6167 or cja_evoucher@ca11.uscourts.gov for questions regarding CJA vouchers or the eVoucher system.

Pursuant to Fed.R.App.P. 39, each party to bear own costs.

Please use the most recent version of the Bill of Costs form available on the court's website at www.ca11.uscourts.gov.

For questions concerning the issuance of the decision of this court, please call the number referenced in the signature block below. For all other questions, please call Joseph Caruso, GG at (404) 335-6177.
Sincerely,
DAVID J. SMITH, Clerk of Court
Reply to: Jeff R. Patch Phone #: 404-335-6151

OPIN-1A Issuance of Opinion With Costs


[CONTENT] April 17, 2018 | three | the U.S. District Court | the Middle District | Georgia ||| CoreCivic, Inc. | the Stewart Detention Center | Stewart | the Trafficking Victims Protection Act | 18 | U.S.C. | § | 1589, 1594 | 1595 ||| the Southern Poverty Law Center |||  |||  ||| TVPA ||| two | 1 | CoreCivic | Stewart | the “ | Volunteer Work Program | the past ten years | Forced Labor Class | 2 | CoreCivic | Stewart | the “ | Volunteer Work Program | the past four years | Unjust Enrichment Class ||| Clay D. Land ||| June 21, 2018 | TVPA | Congress | TVPA | the U.S. Government ||| August 17, 2018 | Land ||| TVPA ||| Land ||| 332 | 1305 ||| the Eleventh Circuit | December 12, 2018 ||| January 2020 | Eleventh Circuit | Frank Hull | Stanley Marcus | District Court | Barbara Rothstein | February 28, 2020 | TVPA ||| 2020 WL 964358 ||| The Eleventh Circuit | TVPA | TVPA ||| The Eleventh Circuit's | TVPA | TVPA ||| March 3, 2020 [SUMMARY] On April 17, 2018, three current or former detained immigrants filed this class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Georgia. The plaintiffs sued CoreCivic, Inc., a private prison corporation that owns and operates the Stewart Detention Center (“Stewart”), under the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1589, 1594, and 1595. The plaintiffs, represented by the Southern Poverty Law Center and private counsel, alleged that the defendant operated a deprivation scheme intended to force detained immigrants to work nearly for free for the detention facility, resulting in a forced labor scheme and an economic windfall for the defendant. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant deprived detainees of basic necessities so that they were forced to work to purchase those items and threatened those who refused to work with serious harm, such as deprivation of privacy, criminal prosecution, or solitary confinement. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as damages. They claimed violations of the TVPA and unjust enrichment under state common law. 

The plaintiffs sought certification of the following two classes: (1) all civil   immigration detainees who performed work for CoreCivic at Stewart in the “Volunteer Work Program” within the past ten years, up to the date the class is  certified (“Forced Labor Class”); and (2) all civil immigration detainees who performed work for CoreCivic at Stewart in the “Volunteer Work Program” within the past four years, up to the date the class is certified (“Unjust Enrichment Class”). 

The case was assigned to Judge Clay D. Land. 

On June 21, 2018, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ entire complaint for failure to state a claim under the TVPA, arguing that Congress did not intend the TVPA to apply to alien detainees in the lawful custody of the U.S. Government or to private contractors operating immigration detention facilities. On August 17, 2018, Judge Land denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss and found that the plaintiffs had alleged sufficient facts to support both their TVPA claim and their unjust enrichment claim. Most significantly, the court found that the TVPA does apply to work programs in federal immigration detention facilities operated by private for-profit contractors. However, Judge Land certified the issue for immediate interlocutory appeal given the substantial ground for difference of opinion on this issue. 332 F.Supp.3d 1305.

The defendant appealed the district court’s denial of its motion to dismiss to the Eleventh Circuit on December 12, 2018.

After holding oral argument in January 2020, an Eleventh Circuit panel (Circuit Judges Frank Hull and Stanley Marcus and District Court Judge Barbara Rothstein) issued an opinion on February 28, 2020, concluding that "the TVPA covers the conduct of private contractors operating federal immigration detention facilities." 2020 WL 964358. The Eleventh Circuit further concluded that the TVPA does not bar private contractors from operating voluntary work programs for persons held in immigration detention facilities but that private contractors who operate such programs "may be liable if they knowingly obtain or procure the labor or services of a program participant through the illegal coercive means explicitly listed in the TVPA." The Eleventh Circuit's review was limited only to the legal question of whether the TVPA applies to private contractors operating immigration detention facilities, so it did not address whether the plaintiffs' complaint sufficiently stated a claim under the TVPA. 

As of March 3, 2020, this case is ongoing in the district court. 