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U.S. District Court Eastern District of Michigan (Detroit) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 2:20-cv-12363-LJM-DRG

Detroit Will Breathe et al v. Detroit, City of et al Assigned to: District Judge Laurie J. Michelson Referred to: Magistrate Judge David R. Grand Cause: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

Date Filed: 08/31/2020 Jury Demand: Plaintiff Nature of Suit: 440 Civil Rights: Other Jurisdiction: Federal Question

Plaintiff Detroit Will Breathe

represented by Amanda M. Ghannam Pitt McGehee Palmer & Rivers PC 117 W 4th St Suite 200 Royal Oak, MI 48067 249-398-9800 Email: aghannam@pittlawpc.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Beth M. Rivers Pitt McGehee Palmer & Rivers 117 W. Fourth Street Suite 200 Royal Oak, MI 48067-3804 248-398-9800 Email: brivers@pittlawpc.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Julie H. Hurwitz Goodman and Hurwitz, P.C. 1394 E. Jefferson Avenue Detroit, MI 48207 313-567-6170 Fax: 313-567-4827 Email: jhurwitz@goodmanhurwitz.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Melissa A. Brown 1394 E. Jefferson Detroit, MI 48207 313-567-6170 Email: mbrown@goodmanhurwitz.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sean A. Riddell The Riddell Law Firm PLLC 400 Renaissance Center Suite 2600 Detroit, MI 48243 313-497-0074 Fax: 313-497-0074 Email: sriddell@riddelllawfirm.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William H. Goodman Goodman and Hurwitz 1394 E. Jefferson Avenue Detroit, MI 48207 313-567-6170 Fax: 313-567-4827 Email: bgoodman@goodmanhurwitz.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jack W. Schulz Schulz Gotham PLC PO Box 44855 Detroit, MI 48244 (313) 246-3590 Email: jackwschulz@gmail.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Tristan Taylor
Plaintiff Nakia Wallace

represented by Amanda M. Ghannam (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Beth M. Rivers (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Julie H. Hurwitz (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Melissa A. Brown (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sean A. Riddell (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William H. Goodman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jack W. Schulz (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Amanda M. Ghannam (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Beth M. Rivers (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Julie H. Hurwitz (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Melissa A. Brown (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Jazten Bass
Plaintiff Lauren Rosen

Sean A. Riddell (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William H. Goodman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jack W. Schulz (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Amanda M. Ghannam (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Beth M. Rivers (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Julie H. Hurwitz (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Melissa A. Brown (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sean A. Riddell (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William H. Goodman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jack W. Schulz (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Amanda M. Ghannam (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Lauryn Brennan

Beth M. Rivers (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Julie H. Hurwitz (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Melissa A. Brown (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sean A. Riddell (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William H. Goodman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jack W. Schulz (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Amanda M. Ghannam (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Beth M. Rivers (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Julie H. Hurwitz (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Melissa A. Brown (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sean A. Riddell (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William H. Goodman

Plaintiff Amy Nahabedian
Plaintiff Zachary Kolodziej

(See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jack W. Schulz (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Amanda M. Ghannam (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Beth M. Rivers (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Julie H. Hurwitz (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Melissa A. Brown (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sean A. Riddell (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William H. Goodman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jack W. Schulz (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Amanda M. Ghannam (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Beth M. Rivers (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Julie H. Hurwitz

Plaintiff Lauren Branch

(See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Melissa A. Brown (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sean A. Riddell (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William H. Goodman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jack W. Schulz (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Amanda M. Ghannam (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Beth M. Rivers (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Julie H. Hurwitz (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Melissa A. Brown (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sean A. Riddell (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William H. Goodman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jack W. Schulz

Plaintiff Lillian Ellis
Plaintiff Olivia Puente

(See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Amanda M. Ghannam (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Beth M. Rivers (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Julie H. Hurwitz (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Melissa A. Brown (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sean A. Riddell (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William H. Goodman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jack W. Schulz (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Amanda M. Ghannam (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Beth M. Rivers (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Julie H. Hurwitz (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Melissa A. Brown

Plaintiff Iman Saleh
Plaintiff

(See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sean A. Riddell (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William H. Goodman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jack W. Schulz (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Amanda M. Ghannam (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Beth M. Rivers (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Julie H. Hurwitz (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Melissa A. Brown (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sean A. Riddell (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William H. Goodman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jack W. Schulz (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Margaret Henige
Plaintiff Caylee Arnold

represented by Amanda M. Ghannam (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Beth M. Rivers (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Julie H. Hurwitz (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Melissa A. Brown (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sean A. Riddell (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William H. Goodman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jack W. Schulz (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Amanda M. Ghannam (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Beth M. Rivers (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Julie H. Hurwitz (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Melissa A. Brown (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sean A. Riddell

Plaintiff Alexander Anest
V. Defendant Detroit, City of

(See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William H. Goodman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jack W. Schulz (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Amanda M. Ghannam (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Beth M. Rivers (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Julie H. Hurwitz (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Melissa A. Brown (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sean A. Riddell (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William H. Goodman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jack W. Schulz (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Christopher M. Trebilcock Clark Hill PLC 500 Woodward Avenue

Defendant Michael Duggan

Suite 3500 Detroit, MI 48226 (313) 965-8575 Fax: (313) 309-6910 Email: ctrebilcock@clarkhill.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lawrence T. Garcia City of Detroit Law Department 2 Woodward Avenue Suite 500 Detroit, MI 48226 313-237-3018 Fax: 313-224-5505 Email: garcial@detroitmi.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Maria Fracassa Dwyer Clark Hill 500 Woodward Avenue Suite 3500 Detroit, MI 48226 248-642-9692 Fax: 313 988-2339 Email: mdwyer@clarkhill.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Reginald M. Turner , Jr. Clark Hill 500 Woodward Avenue Suite 3500 Detroit, MI 48226-3435 (313) 965-8300 Email: rturner@clarkhill.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Christopher M. Trebilcock (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lawrence T. Garcia (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Maria Fracassa Dwyer

Defendant James Craig
Defendant Stephen Anouti
Defendant Timothy Barr

(See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Reginald M. Turner , Jr. (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Christopher M. Trebilcock (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lawrence T. Garcia (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Maria Fracassa Dwyer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Reginald M. Turner , Jr. (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Christopher M. Trebilcock (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lawrence T. Garcia (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Maria Fracassa Dwyer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Reginald M. Turner , Jr. (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Christopher M. Trebilcock (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lawrence T. Garcia

Defendant David Hornshaw
Defendant Mariah Erard
Defendant

(See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Maria Fracassa Dwyer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Reginald M. Turner , Jr. (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Christopher M. Trebilcock (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lawrence T. Garcia (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Maria Fracassa Dwyer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Reginald M. Turner , Jr. (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Christopher M. Trebilcock (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lawrence T. Garcia (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Maria Fracassa Dwyer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Reginald M. Turner , Jr. (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Officer Does 1-100
Amicus American Civil Liberties Union of Michigan
Amicus American Civil Liberties Union
Amicus Protect the Protest Task Force

represented by Christopher M. Trebilcock (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Maria Fracassa Dwyer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Reginald M. Turner , Jr. (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Daniel S. Korobkin American Civil Liberties Union Fund of Michigan 2966 Woodward Ave. Detroit, MI 48201 (313) 578-6824 Fax: (313) 578-6811 Email: dkorobkin@aclumich.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Philip Edwin Mayor ACLU of Michigan 2966 Woodward Ave. Detroit, MI 48201 313-578-6803+ Email: pmayor@aclumich.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Daniel S. Korobkin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Philip Edwin Mayor (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Marianne G. Dugan Marianne Dugan, P.C. # 359 1430 Willamette St. Eugene, OR 97401 541-338-7072

Amicus National Police Association
Counter Claimant David Hornshaw
Counter Claimant Michael Duggan

Fax: 866-650-5213 Email: mdugan@mdugan.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Courtney Turner Milbank The Bopp Law Firm, PC 1 South Sixth Street Terre Haute, IN 47807 812-232-2434 Email: cmilbank@bopplaw.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Christopher M. Trebilcock (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lawrence T. Garcia (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Maria Fracassa Dwyer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Reginald M. Turner , Jr. (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Christopher M. Trebilcock (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lawrence T. Garcia (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Maria Fracassa Dwyer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Reginald M. Turner , Jr. (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Counter Claimant Mariah Erard
Counter Claimant James Craig
Counter Claimant Detroit, City of

represented by Christopher M. Trebilcock (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lawrence T. Garcia (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Maria Fracassa Dwyer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Reginald M. Turner , Jr. (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Christopher M. Trebilcock (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lawrence T. Garcia (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Maria Fracassa Dwyer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Reginald M. Turner , Jr. (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Christopher M. Trebilcock (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lawrence T. Garcia (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Maria Fracassa Dwyer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Counter Claimant Officer Does 1-100
Counter Claimant Timothy Barr
Counter Claimant Stephen Anouti

Reginald M. Turner , Jr. (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Christopher M. Trebilcock (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Maria Fracassa Dwyer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Reginald M. Turner , Jr. (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Christopher M. Trebilcock (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lawrence T. Garcia (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Maria Fracassa Dwyer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Reginald M. Turner , Jr. (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Christopher M. Trebilcock (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lawrence T. Garcia (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Maria Fracassa Dwyer (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V. Counter Defendant Alexander Anest
Counter Defendant Caylee Arnold

Reginald M. Turner , Jr. (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Amanda M. Ghannam (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Julie H. Hurwitz (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Melissa A. Brown (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sean A. Riddell (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William H. Goodman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jack W. Schulz (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Amanda M. Ghannam (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Julie H. Hurwitz (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Melissa A. Brown (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sean A. Riddell

Counter Defendant Jazten Bass
Counter Defendant Lauren Branch

(See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William H. Goodman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jack W. Schulz (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Amanda M. Ghannam (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Julie H. Hurwitz (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Melissa A. Brown (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sean A. Riddell (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William H. Goodman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jack W. Schulz (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Amanda M. Ghannam (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Julie H. Hurwitz (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Melissa A. Brown

Counter Defendant Lauryn Brennan
Counter Defendant Detroit Will Breathe

(See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sean A. Riddell (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William H. Goodman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jack W. Schulz (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Amanda M. Ghannam (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Julie H. Hurwitz (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Melissa A. Brown (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sean A. Riddell (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William H. Goodman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jack W. Schulz (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Amanda M. Ghannam (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Julie H. Hurwitz

Counter Defendant Lillian Ellis
Counter Defendant

(See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Melissa A. Brown (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sean A. Riddell (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William H. Goodman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jack W. Schulz (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Amanda M. Ghannam (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Julie H. Hurwitz (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Melissa A. Brown (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sean A. Riddell (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William H. Goodman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jack W. Schulz (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Margaret Henige
Counter Defendant Zachary Kolodziej

represented by Amanda M. Ghannam (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Julie H. Hurwitz (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Melissa A. Brown (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sean A. Riddell (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William H. Goodman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jack W. Schulz (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Amanda M. Ghannam (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Julie H. Hurwitz (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Melissa A. Brown (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sean A. Riddell (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William H. Goodman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jack W. Schulz

Counter Defendant Amy Nahabedian
Counter Defendant Olivia Puente

(See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Amanda M. Ghannam (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Julie H. Hurwitz (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Melissa A. Brown (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sean A. Riddell (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William H. Goodman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jack W. Schulz (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Amanda M. Ghannam (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Julie H. Hurwitz (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Melissa A. Brown (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sean A. Riddell (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William H. Goodman

Counter Defendant Lauren Rosen
Counter Defendant Iman Saleh

(See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jack W. Schulz (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Amanda M. Ghannam (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Julie H. Hurwitz (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Melissa A. Brown (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sean A. Riddell (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William H. Goodman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jack W. Schulz (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Amanda M. Ghannam (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Julie H. Hurwitz (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Melissa A. Brown (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sean A. Riddell

Counter Defendant Tristan Taylor
Counter Defendant Nakia Wallace

(See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William H. Goodman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jack W. Schulz (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Amanda M. Ghannam (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Julie H. Hurwitz (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Melissa A. Brown (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sean A. Riddell (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William H. Goodman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jack W. Schulz (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Amanda M. Ghannam (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Julie H. Hurwitz (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Melissa A. Brown

(See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sean A. Riddell (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William H. Goodman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jack W. Schulz (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 08/31/2020
08/31/2020 08/31/2020 08/31/2020 08/31/2020
08/31/2020

# Docket Text

COMPLAINT filed by All Plaintiffs against All Defendants with Jury

1

Demand. Plaintiff requests summons issued. Receipt No: AMIEDC-

8017294 - Fee: $ 400. County of 1st Plaintiff: Wayne - County Where

Action Arose: Wayne - County of 1st Defendant: Wayne. [Previously

dismissed case: No] [Possible companion case(s): Federal Court for

Eastern District of Michigan, 20-cv-11697, Judge Hon. Laurie J.

Michelson] (Schulz, Jack) (Entered: 08/31/2020)

Emergency MOTION for Temporary Restraining Order and

2

Preliminary Injunction by All Plaintiffs. (Schulz, Jack) (Entered:

08/31/2020)

A United States Magistrate Judge of this Court is available to conduct all proceedings in this civil action in accordance with 28 U.S.C. 636c and FRCP 73. The Notice, Consent, and Reference of a Civil Action to a Magistrate Judge form is available for download at http://www.mied.uscourts.gov (LGra) (Entered: 08/31/2020)

3 SUMMONS Issued for * All Defendants * (LGra) (Entered: 08/31/2020)

4 Emergency MOTION for Temporary Restraining Order by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit A, # 3 Exhibit B, # 4 Exhibit C, # 5 Exhibit D, # 6 Exhibit E, # 7 Exhibit F, # 8 Exhibit G, # 9 Exhibit H, # 10 Exhibit I, # 11 Exhibit J, # 12 Exhibit K, # 13 Exhibit L, # 14 Exhibit M, # 15 Exhibit N, # 16 Exhibit O, # 17 Exhibit P, # 18 Exhibit Q, # 19 Exhibit R, # 20 Exhibit S, # 21 Exhibit T) (Schulz, Jack) (Entered: 08/31/2020)

5 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE: Sean A. Riddell appearing on behalf of All Plaintiffs (Riddell, Sean) (Entered: 08/31/2020)

09/01/2020

6 ORDER for Status Conference on Plaintiffs' Motion for Temporary Restraining Order. (TELEPHONIC Status Conference set for 9/2/2020 at 09:00 AM before District Judge Laurie J. Michelson) Signed by District Judge Laurie J. Michelson. (EKar) (Entered: 09/01/2020)

09/01/2020

7 ORDER REASSIGNING CASE from District Judge Robert H. Cleland and Magistrate Judge Anthony P. Patti in Port Huron to District Judge Laurie J. Michelson and Magistrate Judge David R. Grand in Detroit. (NAhm) (Entered: 09/01/2020)

09/01/2020

8 NOTICE of Appearance by Amanda M. Ghannam on behalf of All Plaintiffs. (Ghannam, Amanda) (Entered: 09/01/2020)

09/01/2020

9 CERTIFICATE of Service/Summons Returned Executed. Detroit, City of served on 9/1/2020, answer due 9/22/2020. (Schulz, Jack) (Entered: 09/01/2020)

09/01/2020

10 CERTIFICATE of Service/Summons Returned Executed. Michael Duggan served on 9/1/2020, answer due 9/22/2020. (Schulz, Jack) (Entered: 09/01/2020)

09/01/2020

11 NOTICE of Appearance by William H. Goodman on behalf of All Plaintiffs. (Goodman, William) (Entered: 09/01/2020)

09/01/2020 12

NOTICE of Appearance by Julie H. Hurwitz on behalf of All Plaintiffs. (Hurwitz, Julie) (Entered: 09/01/2020)

09/01/2020

13 NOTICE of Appearance by Melissa A. Brown on behalf of All Plaintiffs. (Brown, Melissa) (Entered: 09/01/2020)

09/01/2020

14 NOTICE of Appearance by Maria Fracassa Dwyer on behalf of Detroit, City of, Michael Duggan. (Dwyer, Maria) (Entered: 09/01/2020)

09/01/2020

15 NOTICE of Appearance by Christopher M. Trebilcock on behalf of Detroit, City of, Michael Duggan. (Trebilcock, Christopher) (Entered: 09/01/2020)

09/01/2020

16 NOTICE of Appearance by Reginald M. Turner, Jr on behalf of Detroit, City of, Michael Duggan. (Turner, Reginald) (Entered: 09/01/2020)

09/02/2020

Minute Entry for proceedings before District Judge Laurie J. Michelson: Telephonic Status Conference held on 9/2/2020. A followup telephonic status conference regarding the motion for TRO is set for 9/4/2020 at 03:30 PM before District Judge Laurie J. Michelson, parties will receive an email with the call-in information. (Court Reporter: None Present, Not on the Record) (EKar) (Entered: 09/02/2020)

09/02/2020

17 CERTIFICATE of Service/Summons Returned Executed. James Craig served on 9/2/2020, answer due 9/23/2020. (Schulz, Jack) (Entered: 09/02/2020)

09/04/2020 18

OPINION and ORDER Granting in Part Plaintiffs' 4 MOTION for a Temporary Restraining Order. Signed by District Judge Laurie J. Michelson. (EKar) (Entered: 09/04/2020)

09/04/2020

19 SCHEDULING ORDER for Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction. (Defendants' Response due by 9/18/2020; TELEPHONIC Status Conference set for 9/25/2020 at 10:00 AM ; and Motion Hearing set for 9/29/2020 at 08:30 AM before District Judge Laurie J. Michelson) [Refer to Image for Additional Deadlines] Signed by District Judge Laurie J. Michelson. (EKar) (Entered: 09/04/2020)

09/10/2020

20 NOTICE TO APPEAR BY TELEPHONE: Status Conference set for 9/18/2020 at 01:00 PM before District Judge Laurie J. Michelson. (EKar) (Entered: 09/10/2020)

09/10/2020

21 CERTIFICATE of Service/Summons Returned Executed. Stephen Anouti served on 9/10/2020, answer due 10/1/2020. (Riddell, Sean) (Entered: 09/10/2020)

09/10/2020

22 CERTIFICATE of Service/Summons Returned Executed. Mariah Erard served on 9/10/2020, answer due 10/1/2020. (Riddell, Sean) (Entered: 09/10/2020)

09/10/2020

23 CERTIFICATE of Service/Summons Returned Executed. David Hornshaw served on 9/10/2020, answer due 10/1/2020. (Riddell, Sean) (Entered: 09/10/2020)

09/10/2020

24 MOTION for Temporary Restraining Order To Modify Temporary Restraining Order and to Protect Public Safety by Stephen Anouti, James Craig, Detroit, City of, Michael Duggan, Mariah Erard, David Hornshaw, Officer Does 1-100. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits For Defendants' Motion to Modify TRO, # 2 Exhibit 1 - Photos 9, 10 Macomb Statue, # 3 Exhibit 2 - Photos 8, 15, 21 protesters at Calexico, # 4 Exhibit 3 - Affidavit of Todd Bettison, # 5 Exhibit 4 - Detroit Activist Tristan Taylor, # 6 Exhibit 5 - Det News 84 Arrested, # 7 Exhibit 6 - Angry Protesters, # 8 Exhibit 7 - Wanted Photo, # 9 Exhibit 8 - Marking 100 Days of Protests, # 10 Exhibit 9 - Tweet 9-5-20, # 11 Exhibit 10 - Photo - Protesters throw tear gas, # 12 Exhibit 11 - Tweet 8-22-20) (Turner, Reginald) (Entered: 09/10/2020)

09/10/2020

25 NOTICE of Appearance by Reginald M. Turner, Jr on behalf of Stephen Anouti, James Craig, Detroit, City of, Michael Duggan, Mariah Erard, David Hornshaw, Officer Does 1-100. (Turner, Reginald) (Entered: 09/10/2020)

09/10/2020 09/10/2020 09/11/2020 09/11/2020 09/11/2020 09/14/2020 09/14/2020 09/14/2020 09/15/2020
09/15/2020

26 NOTICE of Appearance by Christopher M. Trebilcock on behalf of Stephen Anouti, James Craig, Detroit, City of, Michael Duggan, Mariah Erard, David Hornshaw, Officer Does 1-100. (Trebilcock, Christopher) (Entered: 09/10/2020)
27 NOTICE of Appearance by Maria Fracassa Dwyer on behalf of Stephen Anouti, James Craig, Detroit, City of, Michael Duggan, Mariah Erard, David Hornshaw, Officer Does 1-100. (Dwyer, Maria) (Entered: 09/10/2020)
28 ORDER Requiring Response to 24 Motion to Modify Temporary Restraining Order and to Protect Public Saftey. Response due by 9/15/2020 Signed by District Judge Laurie J. Michelson. (EKar) (Entered: 09/11/2020)
29 MOTION for Order Allowing Limited Expedited Discovery by All Plaintiffs. (Schulz, Jack) (Entered: 09/11/2020)
30 ORDER Granting in Part Limited Expedited Discovery 29 . Signed by District Judge Laurie J. Michelson. (EKar) (Entered: 09/11/2020)
31 ATTORNEY APPEARANCE: Lawrence T. Garcia appearing on behalf of Stephen Anouti, Timothy Barr, James Craig, Detroit, City of, Michael Duggan, Mariah Erard, David Hornshaw (Garcia, Lawrence) (Entered: 09/14/2020)
32 CERTIFICATE of Service/Summons Returned Executed. Timothy Barr served on 9/14/2020, answer due 10/5/2020. (Riddell, Sean) (Entered: 09/14/2020)
33 Emergency MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 28 Order Requiring Responsive Pleading by All Plaintiffs. (Schulz, Jack) Modified on 9/15/2020 (EKar). (Entered: 09/14/2020)
TEXT-ONLY ORDER: Plaintiffs have filed an emergency motion to extend their time for responding to Defendants motion to modify the TRO. 33 While the Court still believes the parties should be able to reach agreement on language to preserve the status quo while the case is litigated, it understands that counsel are busy with other aspects of this case. Thus, while the Court is inclined to grant the extension, upon more extensive review of the underlying motion, the Court believes it can enter an appropriate order without a response from Plaintiffs. Issued by District Judge Laurie J. Michelson. (EKar) (Entered: 09/15/2020)
34 MOTION To Modify Scheduling Order for Plaintiff' Motion for Preliminary Injunction to Allow for Additional Witnesses re 19 Order,, Set Motion and R&R Deadlines/Hearings,, Set Deadlines/Hearings, by All Plaintiffs. (Hurwitz, Julie) (Entered: 09/15/2020)

09/15/2020

35 MOTION for Reconsideration re 30 Order on Motion for Order , MOTION for Protective Order by All Defendants. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits Index, # 2 Exhibit A - Declaration of Art Thompson, # 3 Exhibit B - Policies) (Dwyer, Maria) (Entered: 09/15/2020)

09/15/2020

36 MOTION to Expedite Discovery by All Defendants. (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits Index, # 2 Exhibit 1 - Articles of Incorporation) (Dwyer, Maria) (Entered: 09/15/2020)

09/16/2020

RESET Hearing: **TIME CHANGE ONLY** TELEPHONIC Status Conference RESET for 9/18/2020 at 10:00 AM before District Judge Laurie J. Michelson. (EKar) (Entered: 09/16/2020)

09/16/2020 37

ORDER on Defendants' Motion to Modify Temporary Restraining Order 24 . Signed by District Judge Laurie J. Michelson. (EKar) (Entered: 09/16/2020)

09/16/2020

38 ORDER on Discovery Motions 34 35 36 . Signed by District Judge Laurie J. Michelson. (EKar) (Entered: 09/16/2020)

09/17/2020

39 NOTICE of Appearance by Maria Fracassa Dwyer on behalf of Timothy Barr. (Dwyer, Maria) (Entered: 09/17/2020)

09/17/2020

40 NOTICE of Appearance by Christopher M. Trebilcock on behalf of Timothy Barr. (Trebilcock, Christopher) (Entered: 09/17/2020)

09/17/2020

41 NOTICE of Appearance by Reginald M. Turner, Jr on behalf of Timothy Barr. (Turner, Reginald) (Entered: 09/17/2020)

09/18/2020

Minute Entry for proceedings before District Judge Laurie J. Michelson: Telephonic Status Conference held on 9/18/2020. (Court Reporter: None Present, Not on the Record) (EKar) (Entered: 09/18/2020)

09/18/2020 42

JOINT ORDER to Preserve the Status Quo. Signed by District Judge Laurie J. Michelson. (EKar) (Entered: 09/18/2020)

09/18/2020

TEXT-ONLY ORDER: As a result of the Joint Order to Preserve the

09/25/2020 43

Status Quo (ECF No. 42 ), the status conference scheduled for September 25, 2020 and the preliminary injunction hearing scheduled for September 29, 2020 are hereby CANCELLED. And the motions pending at ECF Nos. 4 , 34 , 35 , and 36 are DISMISSED AS MOOT. The Defendants have advised that they will be filing an answer to the complaint on September 25, 2020. Thereafter, the Court will set this matter for a scheduling conference. Issued by District Judge Laurie J. Michelson. (EKar) (Entered: 09/18/2020)
ANSWER to Complaint with Affirmative Defenses , COUNTERCLAIM filed by All Defendants against All Plaintiffs by All Defendants. (Turner, Reginald) (Entered: 09/25/2020)

10/01/2020 44

ORDER TO ATTEND SCHEDULING CONFERENCE AND NOTICE OF REQUIREMENTS FOR SUBMISSION OF DISCOVERY PLAN. (TELEPHONIC Scheduling Conference set for 10/22/2020 at 02:00 PM before District Judge Laurie J. Michelson) Signed by District Judge Laurie J. Michelson. (EKar) (Entered: 10/01/2020)

10/07/2020 45

STIPULATION AND ORDER to File a Responsive Pleading to Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs Counterclaim Against Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants. (Response due by 10/30/2020) Signed by District Judge Laurie J. Michelson. (EKar) (Entered: 10/07/2020)

10/07/2020

RESET Hearing: TELEPHONIC Scheduling Conference RESET for 11/13/2020 at 10:00 AM before District Judge Laurie J. Michelson. (EKar) (Entered: 10/07/2020)

10/30/2020 46

MOTION to Dismiss Defendants' Counterclaim by All Plaintiffs.
(Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit Ex. 1, # 3 Exhibit Ex. 2, # 4 Exhibit Ex. 3, # 5 Exhibit Ex. 4, # 6 Exhibit Ex. 5) (Ghannam, Amanda) (Entered: 10/30/2020)

11/06/2020

47 MOTION for Leave to File Amici Curiae Brief by American Civil Liberties Union of Michigan, American Civil Liberties Union. (Mayor, Philip) (Entered: 11/06/2020)

11/06/2020 48

Amicus Curiae BRIEF by American Civil Liberties Union, American Civil Liberties Union of Michigan (Mayor, Philip) (Entered: 11/06/2020)

11/06/2020 49

MOTION for Leave to File Amicus Brief re 46 MOTION to Dismiss Defendants' Counterclaim by Protect the Protest Task Force. (Dugan, Marianne) Modified on 11/12/2020 (TTho). [APPENDIX A HAS AN ERROR, CORRECTED DOCUMENT WILL BE UPLOADED] (Entered: 11/06/2020)

11/06/2020

50 NOTICE of Appearance by Daniel S. Korobkin on behalf of American Civil Liberties Union, American Civil Liberties Union of Michigan. (Korobkin, Daniel) (Entered: 11/06/2020)

11/09/2020 51

DISCOVERY plan jointly filed pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26(f) (Ghannam, Amanda) (Entered: 11/09/2020)

11/12/2020

52 APPENDIX re: 49

MOTION for Leave to File Amicus Brief

re 46 MOTION to Dismiss Defendants' Counterclaim filed by Protect the Protest Task Force. by Protect the Protest Task Force (Corrected) (Dugan, Marianne) (Entered: 11/12/2020)

11/13/2020

Minute Entry for proceedings before District Judge Laurie J. Michelson: Telephonic Scheduling Conference held on 11/13/2020. (Court Reporter: None Present, Not on the Record) (EKar) (Entered: 11/13/2020)

11/13/2020 53

CASE MANAGEMENT REQUIREMENTS AND SCHEDULING ORDER: Interim Status Conference set for 4/6/2021 at 02:00 PM before District Judge Laurie J. Michelson; Expert Discovery due by 1/28/2022; and Dispositive Motion Cut-off set for 2/28/2022. Signed by District Judge Laurie J. Michelson. (Refer to image for additional dates) (EKar) (Entered: 11/13/2020)

12/04/2020 54

RESPONSE to 46 MOTION to Dismiss Defendants' Counterclaim Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs' Response in Opposition to Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Counterclaim filed by All Defendants. (Turner, Reginald) (Entered: 12/04/2020)

12/11/2020

55 MOTION for Leave to File Amicus Brief by National Police Association. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Brief of Amicus Curiae National Police Association) (Milbank, Courtney) (Entered: 12/11/2020)

12/18/2020 56

REPLY to Response re 46 MOTION to Dismiss Defendants' Counterclaim filed by All Plaintiffs. (Ghannam, Amanda) (Entered: 12/18/2020)

01/08/2021

57 NOTICE of Change of Address/Contact Information by Amanda M. Ghannam on behalf of All Plaintiffs. (Ghannam, Amanda) (Entered: 01/08/2021)

01/13/2021

58 NOTICE of Appearance by Beth M. Rivers on behalf of All Plaintiffs. (Rivers, Beth) (Entered: 01/13/2021)

02/16/2021

59 NOTICE TO APPEAR BY TELEPHONE: Status Conference set for 2/18/2021 at 02:30 PM before District Judge Laurie J. Michelson. (EKar) (Entered: 02/16/2021)

02/18/2021

Minute Entry for proceedings before District Judge Laurie J. Michelson: Telephonic Status Conference held to discuss discovery dispute on 2/18/2021. (Court Reporter: None Present, Not on the Record) (EKar) (Entered: 02/19/2021)

02/19/2021

60 NOTICE TO APPEAR BY TELEPHONE: Status Conference set for 3/26/2021 at 02:00 PM before District Judge Laurie J. Michelson. (EKar) (Entered: 02/19/2021)

03/10/2021 61

OPINION and ORDER Granting Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss Counterclaim 46 . Signed by District Judge Laurie J. Michelson. (EKar) (Entered: 03/10/2021)

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 </s> Case 2:20-cv-12363-LJM-DRG ECF No. 1 filed 08/31/20 PageID.1 Page 1 of 81

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

DETROIT WILL BREATHE, TRISTAN TAYLOR, NAKIA WALLACE, JAZTEN BASS, LAUREN ROSEN, LAURYN BRENNAN, AMY NAHABEDIAN, ZACHARY KOLODZIEJ, LAUREN BRANCH, LILLIAN ELLIS, OLIVIA PUENTE, IMAN SALEH, MARGARET HENIGE, CAYLEE ARNOLD, and ALEXANDER ANEST,

Case No. Hon:

Plaintiffs, vs.

CITY OF DETROIT, a municipal corporation, MAYOR MICHAEL DUGGAN, acting in his official and individual capacities, CHIEF JAMES CRAIG, acting in his official and individual capacities, OFFICER STEPHEN ANOUTI, SERGEANT TIMOTHY BARR, OFFICER DAVID HORNSHAW, OFFICER MARIAH ERARD, and OFFICER DOES 1-100 inclusive, acting in their respective individual capacities, all jointly and severally,

Defendants.

__________________________________________________________________/

Jack W. Schulz (P78078)

GOODMAN HURWITZ & JAMES, PC

Amanda M. Ghannam (P83065)

Julie H. Hurwitz (P34720)

SCHULZ LAW PLC

William H. Goodman (P14173)

PO Box 44855

Melissa A. Brown (P79127)

Detroit, MI 48244

1394 E. Jefferson Ave.

(313) 246-3590

Detroit, MI 48207

jackwschulz@gmail.com

(313) 567-6170

amandamghannam@gmail.com

jhurwitz@goodmanhurwitz.com

On behalf of the National Lawyers bgoodman@goodmanhurwitz.com

Guild, Detroit/Michigan Chapter

mbrown@goodmanhurwitz.com

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

On behalf of the National Lawyers

Guild, Detroit/Michigan Chapter

Co-counsel for Plaintiffs

Case 2:20-cv-12363-LJM-DRG ECF No. 1 filed 08/31/20 PageID.2 Page 2 of 81
Sean Riddell (P81302) The Riddell Law Firm PLLC 400 Renaissance Center, Ste. 2600 Detroit, MI 48243 (313) 497-0074 sriddell@riddelllawfirm.com On behalf of the National Lawyers Guild, Detroit/Michigan Chapter Co-counsel for Plaintiffs __________________________________________________________________/
VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES AND FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
There is no other civil action pending in this Honorable Court or any other Court arising out of the same transaction and occurrence.
NOW COME Plaintiffs, Detroit Will Breathe, Tristan Taylor, Nakia Wallace,
Jazten Bass, Lauren Rosen, Lauryn Brennan, Amy Nahabedian, Zachary Kolodziej,
Lauren “Graham” Branch, Lillian Ellis, Olivia Puente, Iman Saleh, Margaret
Henige, Caylee Arnold, and Alexander Anest (“Plaintiffs”) for their Complaint
against the Defendants City of Detroit, Mayor Michael Duggan, Chief James Craig,
Officer Stephen Anouti, Officer David Hornshaw, Officer Mariah Erard, Sergeant
Timothy Barr, and Officer Does 1-100 inclusive, in their individual capacities and
official capacities pursuant to Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658
(1978) and state as follows:
2

Case 2:20-cv-12363-LJM-DRG ECF No. 1 filed 08/31/20 PageID.3 Page 3 of 81
INTRODUCTION 1. The death of George Floyd at the hands of Minneapolis police officers on May 25, 2020 sparked ongoing nationwide protests against unjustified police violence and systemic racism. Since May 29, 2020, Plaintiffs, along with hundreds of others, have participated in daily demonstrations in Detroit. Defendant Police Officers, all acting in their individual capacities and pursuant to the customs, policies and/or practices of Defendant City of Detroit, by and through the Detroit Police Department (hereafter “DPD”), and Defendants Duggan and Craig, who authorize and condone the use of unnecessary, unreasonable, and excessive force, have repeatedly responded with violence and brutality. 2. Beginning on May 29, 2020, the first night of protests, peaceful protesters, including Plaintiffs, were, among other things, tear-gassed, peppersprayed, beaten and otherwise subjected to unconstitutional excessive force, shot with rubber bullets, blasted with deafening and disorienting sound cannons and flash grenades, put in chokeholds, cordoned off in small groups (“kettled”), and arrested en masse without probable cause, by Defendant Officers, all acting within the scope of their respective authorities and pursuant to the customs, policies or practices of Defendants City of Detroit, Duggan and/or Craig and all in violation of Plaintiffs’ rights under the United States Constitution and laws of the State of Michigan.
3

Case 2:20-cv-12363-LJM-DRG ECF No. 1 filed 08/31/20 PageID.4 Page 4 of 81
3. In the months since, Plaintiff Detroit Will Breathe has continued to lead peaceful protests on a near-daily basis. Each of the more than 90 protests have been widely publicized on social media and some have been widely broadcast on live television and social media by local news organizations.
4. DPD has repeatedly reverted to brutal tactics to punish and abuse peaceful protesters, including Plaintiffs, all pursuant to the customs, policies and/or practices of Defendants City of Detroit, Duggan and/or Craig.
5. In response to the continued protests, Defendants escalated their use of unlawful force with new and increasingly violent tactics.
6. On June 28, 2020, several Defendant Officers Doe drove their police vehicles into a group of highly recognizable protest leaders, including Plaintiff Jazten Bass, causing injury.
7. On July 10, 2020, Defendant Doe Officers, all acting within the scope of their respective authorities and pursuant to the customs, policies or practices of Defendants City of Detroit, Duggan and/or Craig, again resorted to the use of dangerous chokeholds, teargas, and other excessively forceful means of crowd control and unlawful arrests in response to peaceful protests over the killing of Hakim Littleton, a Black civilian, by members of the DPD.
8. On August 22, 2020, Defendants again responded to the presence of peaceful demonstrators, including Plaintiffs, with pepper spray, tear gas,
4

Case 2:20-cv-12363-LJM-DRG ECF No. 1 filed 08/31/20 PageID.5 Page 5 of 81
chokeholds, brutal beatings, and mass arrests. Multiple demonstrators were hospitalized, and legal observers, members of the press, and bystanders were severely beaten and arrested, prompting numerous calls for an independent investigation.
9. Defendants responded with unjustified violence to these protests in direct reaction to the fact that the protests confront the racial disparity in police violence and the systemic racism that pervades our society. By contrast, DPD has protected other protesters in recent history — including protests led by white supremacists -- rather than subjecting them to arbitrary curfews, excessive force, and unlawful arrests. Defendants’ treatment of racial justice demonstrators based on the racial content of their message violates their rights pursuant to the First Amendment, Fourth Amendment, and 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
10. This civil rights action arises out of Defendants’ unlawful practices as described above. Plaintiffs seek relief for violations, under color of state law, of their rights, privileges and immunities secured by the First, Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, pursuant to the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. §1981 and 1983.
11. Plaintiffs seek declaratory relief and immediate temporary and permanent injunctive relief prohibiting Defendants from continuing their patterns and/or practices of perpetrating illegal and unconstitutional violence and unlawful
5

Case 2:20-cv-12363-LJM-DRG ECF No. 1 filed 08/31/20 PageID.6 Page 6 of 81
arrests against peaceful protesters seeking police accountability and racial justice. The failure to provide such relief will result in these unlawful practices continuing, thereby causing irreparable harm to Plaintiffs, for which no plain, adequate, or complete remedy at law is otherwise available.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 12. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over the Plaintiffs’ claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question) and 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (civil rights jurisdiction). 13. This Court has jurisdiction to issue injunctive and declaratory relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201 and 2202 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 57 and 65. 14. Venue is proper in the Eastern District of Michigan pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391, as most or all events giving rise to the claims herein occurred in the Eastern District of Michigan.
PARTIES 15. Plaintiff Detroit Will Breathe (“DWB”) is a domestic nonprofit corporation organized under the laws of the State of Michigan. DWB is one of the organizers of the protests subjected to unconstitutional violence and continues to organize daily protests at which the ongoing risk of similar violence is ever present.
6

Case 2:20-cv-12363-LJM-DRG ECF No. 1 filed 08/31/20 PageID.7 Page 7 of 81
16. Plaintiff Tristan Taylor (“T. Taylor”) is an individual and a resident of Detroit, MI. T. Taylor is a leader and member of DWB. At all relevant times, T. Taylor has participated in and been one of the organizers of the demonstrations.
17. Plaintiff Nakia Wallace (“N. Wallace”) is an individual and a resident of Detroit, MI. N. Wallace is a leader and member of DWB. At all relevant times, N. Wallace has participated in and been one of the organizers of the demonstrations.
18. Plaintiff Jazten Bass (“J. Bass”) is an individual and a resident of Detroit, MI. J. Bass is a leader and member of DWB. At all relevant times, J. Bass has participated in and been one of the organizers of the demonstrations.
19. Plaintiff Lauren Rosen (“L. Rosen”) is an individual and a resident of Oak Park, MI. L. Rosen is a leader and member of DWB. At all relevant times, L. Rosen has participated in and been one of the organizers of the demonstrations.
20. Plaintiff Lauryn Brennan (“L. Brennan”) is an individual and Michigan resident. L. Brennan has participated in the demonstrations starting on or about June 4, 2020.
21. Plaintiff Amy Nahabedian (“A. Nahabedian”) is an individual and a resident of Highland Park, MI. At all relevant times, A. Nahabedian has participated in the demonstrations as a volunteer medic.
7

Case 2:20-cv-12363-LJM-DRG ECF No. 1 filed 08/31/20 PageID.8 Page 8 of 81
22. Plaintiff Zachary Kolodziej (“Z. Kolodziej”) is an individual and a resident of Detroit, MI. Z. Kolodziej participated in the demonstrations starting on or about May 29, 2020.
23. Plaintiff Lauren Branch (a/k/a and hereinafter “Graham Branch” or “G. Branch”) is an individual and a resident of Saline, MI. At all relevant times, G. Branch has participated in the demonstrations as a volunteer medic.
24. Plaintiff Lillian Ellis (“L. Ellis”) is an individual and a resident of Ypsilanti, MI. At all relevant times, L. Ellis has participated in the demonstrations.
25. Plaintiff Olivia Puente (“O. Puente”) is an individual and a resident of Detroit, MI. O. Puente participated in the demonstrations starting on or about July 10, 2020.
26. Plaintiff Iman Saleh (“I. Saleh”) is an individual and a resident of Dearborn, MI. At all relevant times, I. Saleh has participated in the demonstrations.
27. Plaintiff Margaret Henige (“M. Henige”) is an individual and a resident of Detroit, MI. At all relevant times, M. Henige has participated in the demonstrations.
28. Plaintiff Caylee Arnold (“C. Arnold”) is an individual and a resident of Southeast Michigan. C. Arnold participated in the demonstration starting on or about August 22, 2020.
8

Case 2:20-cv-12363-LJM-DRG ECF No. 1 filed 08/31/20 PageID.9 Page 9 of 81
29. Plaintiff Alexander Anest (“A. Anest”) is an individual and a resident of Southeast Michigan. A. Anest served as a volunteer medic at the demonstration on August 22, 2020.
30. Defendant City of Detroit is a municipal corporation duly organized and existing under the Constitution and laws of the State of Michigan. It is, and has been at all times relevant hereto, authorized by law to maintain and operate the Detroit Police Department (“DPD”). By and through its agents, including but not limited to the Mayor, the Chief of Police, its supervisors, operating officers, Boards, Commissions, and Committees and its final policymakers, Defendant City, at all times relevant hereto, acting through its official policy makers, established, promulgated and implemented the policies, customs and practices, written and unwritten, of the DPD, with regard to hiring, training, supervision, discipline of the employees of said department, as well as the Departmental response to protected protest activity.
31. Defendant Mayor Michael Duggan is and was, at all relevant times, the Mayor of Detroit and an official policymaker for Defendant City of Detroit and was personally involved in the decisions that caused the harm giving rise to this litigation. He is sued in his individual and official capacities.
32. Defendant Chief James Craig is and was, at all relevant times, the Police Chief for the Detroit Police Department, an official policymaker for DPD,
9

Case 2:20-cv-12363-LJM-DRG ECF No. 1 filed 08/31/20 PageID.10 Page 10 of 81
and was personally involved in the decisions that caused the harm giving rise to this litigation. He is sued in his individual and official capacities.
33. Defendant Officer Stephen Anouti is a police officer with the DPD. Upon information and belief, he is a resident of Wayne County, Michigan and at all relevant times was employed by the City of Detroit, specifically DPD, as a police officer, and acting pursuant to his authority on its behalf. He is sued in his individual capacity.
34. Defendant Sergeant Timothy Barr is a police sergeant with the DPD. Upon information and belief, he is a resident of Wayne County, Michigan, and at all relevant times was employed by the City of Detroit, specifically DPD, as a police officer, and acting pursuant to his authority on its behalf. He is sued in his individual capacity.
35. Defendant Officer David Hornshaw is a police officer with the DPD. Upon information and belief, he is a resident of Wayne County, Michigan and at all relevant times was employed by the City of Detroit, specifically DPD, as a police officer, and acting pursuant to his authority on its behalf. He is sued in his individual capacity.
36. Defendant Officer Mariah Erard is a police officer with the DPD. Upon information and belief, she is a resident of Wayne County, Michigan and at all relevant times was employed by the City of Detroit, specifically DPD, as a police
10

Case 2:20-cv-12363-LJM-DRG ECF No. 1 filed 08/31/20 PageID.11 Page 11 of 81
officer, and acting pursuant to her authority on its behalf. She is sued in her individual capacity.
37. Plaintiffs are informed, believe, and thereupon allege that Officers Doe 1 through 100 were the agents, servants, and employees of Defendant City of Detroit and/or the DPD. Plaintiffs are unaware of the true names and capacities of Defendants sued herein as Does 1 through 100, inclusive, and therefore sue these Defendants by such fictitious names. Plaintiffs will amend this Complaint to allege their true names and capacities when ascertained. Upon information and belief, they are residents of Wayne County, Michigan, and at all relevant times were employed by the City of Detroit, specifically DPD, as police officers, and acting pursuant to their authority on its behalf. The individual Doe Defendants are sued in their individual capacities. The Doe Officers were, at all times relevant to this lawsuit, deployed by Defendant City of Detroit at the demonstrations, and engaged in the unconstitutional conduct alleged herein.
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS Black Lives Matter: Context of Current Demonstrations 38. The pursuit of equal justice under law for Black residents of the City of Detroit (“Detroit” or “the City”) has a long, storied past. The current demonstrations against systemic violence and racism are a continuation of Detroit’s history of
11

Case 2:20-cv-12363-LJM-DRG ECF No. 1 filed 08/31/20 PageID.12 Page 12 of 81
residents rising up to protest egregious mistreatment of Black residents by the City and its law enforcement.
39. More broadly, police violence in America is disproportionately deployed against Black Americans. The demonstrations at issue in this matter arose out of some of the most egregious and widely publicized police killings in recent months and are a continuation of the widespread “Black Lives Matter” protests that have occurred around the country in response to innumerable police killings over approximately the past decade.
40. In March 2020, Breonna Taylor, a Black woman, was shot eight times and killed as she slept by three plainclothes Louisville police officers who used a battering ram to force their way into her home in the middle of the night to execute a no-knock warrant for two unrelated individuals. The officers then attempted to cover up Ms. Taylor’s death by filing an incident report stating that she had no injuries and no forced entry had occurred. They were not punished.
41. Breonna Taylor’s death resonated particularly strongly with Detroiters due to its similarity to the death of Aiyana Stanley-Jones, a seven-year-old AfricanAmerican girl who was shot in the head by a Detroit police officer as she slept at her grandmother’s home on May 16, 2010.
42. On May 25, 2020, George Floyd was murdered by Minneapolis police. Mr. Floyd, a Black man, was arrested after being accused of a non-violent, petty
12

Case 2:20-cv-12363-LJM-DRG ECF No. 1 filed 08/31/20 PageID.13 Page 13 of 81
offense. For nearly nine minutes, then-Officer Derek Chauvin placed his knee—and the weight of his body—on Mr. Floyd’s neck as Mr. Floyd lay handcuffed and pinned to the ground and three other officers stood by. In his dying moments, Mr. Floyd struggled to breathe, pleaded for mercy, and called out to his deceased mother. Among Mr. Floyd’s last words were “I can’t breathe.”
43. Video footage of George Floyd’s death was widely publicized, and images of Mr. Floyd and Breonna Taylor joined countless others as symbols of the ongoing fight for police accountability and equality for Black Americans.
44. Against this backdrop of police killings of Black people across the country, thousands of Americans have joined together in massive nationwide demonstrations calling for justice and have been consistently met with brutal force by police.
45. Beginning May 29, 2020, hundreds of people in Detroit, including Plaintiffs, have participated in near-daily demonstrations to peacefully protest police brutality against Black people in Detroit, as well as nationwide. Plaintiff Detroit Will Breathe has joined numerous other community organizations in Detroit to organize marches, rallies, teach-ins, and other events to educate their communities, confront racism, and demand systemic change.
46. Notably, demonstrators have exercised their constitutional rights to voice their concerns during a global pandemic. Attendees of the demonstrations have
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acted to participate safely by wearing masks, social distancing, and providing widespread access to hand sanitizer.
47. These demonstrations have been overwhelmingly peaceful. However, Defendants have responded with grossly disproportionate violence. DPD, with the endorsement of Defendants Duggan and Craig and additional mid-level police commanders, including Defendant Anouti and Defendant Barr, has arrested hundreds of peaceful demonstrators and used unnecessary, unreasonable, and excessive force against hundreds more.
48. The weapons DPD has utilized for “crowd control” purposes during demonstrations, sometimes referred to as “non-lethal” weapons, indisputably have the ability to injure and cause great bodily harm, and have done so to Plaintiffs and innumerable other demonstrators. In addition to mass arrests without probable cause, the types of crowd control weapons and techniques utilized by DPD include the use of batons, riot shields, officers’ own fists, chemical irritants such as tear gas and pepper spray, rubber bullets, zip ties, chokeholds, and police vehicles to inflict unreasonable, unnecessary, and excessive force and deter demonstrators, including Plaintiffs, from exercising their constitutional rights.
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Defendants Used Batons, Riot Shields, and Excessive Physical Force to Brutalize Demonstrators
49. On May 29, 2020, the first night of demonstrations in Detroit, demonstrators gathered outside of DPD’s Third Precinct at approximately 4:00 P.M. and proceeded to march throughout the downtown area.
50. At approximately 6:00-7:00 P.M., police officers accelerated their vehicles towards demonstrators and stopped suddenly on several occasions, alarming and intimidating demonstrators.
51. At approximately 11:00 P.M., DPD began to deploy chemical agents including tear gas and pepper spray, riot shields, and batons against the demonstrators, without audible warning.
52. Plaintiff Lauren “Graham” Branch (“G. Branch”) attended the demonstration as a field medic for the purpose of assisting with injuries caused by police violence. They1 carried several water bottles and a first aid kit.
53. When G. Branch arrived at approximately 10:00 P.M., DPD had already begun to surround or “kettle” a group of demonstrators in between a parking structure and a lot for police cars and equipment. The only way to escape the kettle was through a line of police officers in riot gear.
1 G. Branch is a transgender person who goes by the pronoun “they.”
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54. About half of the group of demonstrators, mostly teenagers and young adults, attempted to leave by marching up an incline towards the road. As they progressed, DPD officers in riot gear formed a line to prevent the group from being able to move in any direction and began to advance upon them while striking their shields with batons in unison.
55. Unknown Doe Officers began to physically push the demonstrators back, without audible warning, yelling, cheering, and whooping when they struck one of the young demonstrators and calling the demonstrators “animals.”
56. As G. Branch tried to protect the young people by physically placing their body in between the police and the youth, Doe Officers struck G. Branch directly in the face with shields three times then shoved them backwards into the street.
57. While on the ground, unknown Doe Officers repeatedly and forcefully kicked G. Branch all over their body while calling G. Branch a “bitch,” and snarling “you aren’t even from here.” G. Branch was in extreme pain and could not breathe as police officers repeatedly kicked their arms, legs, abdomen, and lower back.
58. An officer kneeled on G. Branch’s back while another one grabbed for their arms, screaming “STOP RESISTING!” and “GIVE ME YOUR HANDS!” despite the fact that G. Branch had gone limp from pain. The pressure to G. Branch’s
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body from the officers on top of them was so intense that G. Branch believed they were going to die. G. Branch finally uttered “I’m trying!”
59. An officer then grabbed their left hand so hard that G. Branch’s pinky finger was dislocated, handcuffed them, and left them in the street.
60. G. Branch then heard an officer growl, “Welcome to Detroit, bitch!” directly into their ear.
61. When G. Branch was able to sit up and orient themselves with their surroundings, they realized that the officers had removed their mask with no regard for the deadly coronavirus pandemic. They saw several other handcuffed demonstrators whose masks had also been pulled down.
62. G. Branch, along with the other handcuffed demonstrators, was left in the street for approximately one hour as the police rounded up more demonstrators and brought them back. While they waited, another officer took G. Branch’s water bottles and threw them with such force that one exploded against the concrete.
63. Police eventually loaded the group of handcuffed demonstrators onto a bus. G. Branch was sent onto the bus, then removed. It soon became clear that detained people perceived to be women, who were predominantly Caucasian, were being removed from the bus and ticketed and released, while detained men, who were predominantly Black, were kept on the bus.
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64. The officers grouped G. Branch with the female demonstrators despite the fact that G. Branch is transgender and does not identify as a woman.
65. The officers led G. Branch and four female demonstrators to a garage and issued G. Branch a Disorderly Conduct misdemeanor ticket that had been prepared in advance -- the officers merely filled in G. Branch’s name and address. An officer then called for another officer to “unleash” G. Branch, and threatened that if they were arrested again, they would be facing felony charges.
66. That night, DPD stalked the remaining demonstrators throughout the streets of Detroit, launching tear gas at small groups of fleeing demonstrators, and arrested approximately 60 people.
67. Despite this show of force by DPD, hundreds of residents of Detroit and the surrounding area returned the next day to continue the demonstrations. However, G. Branch was not among them. The events of May 29, 2020 had a significant emotional effect on G. Branch and have deterred them from attending subsequent demonstrations and exercising their First Amendment rights. G. Branch has not attended a demonstration since.
68. DPD again responded to the demonstrators with weaponry including tear gas, pepper spray, flash grenades, and rubber bullets, without audible warning.
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69. On May 31, 2020, Defendant Duggan declared a state of emergency and implemented a citywide curfew of 8:00 P.M. in an attempt to deter and silence the demonstrators.
70. Plaintiff Lillian Ellis2 (“L. Ellis”) attended the demonstration on May 31, 2020.
71. After marching around the city, the demonstrators stopped at the Detroit Police headquarters at the intersection of Third Street and Michigan Avenue at approximately 7:00 P.M.
72. As the peaceful demonstration concluded, L. Ellis witnessed DPD Doe Officers suddenly advance on demonstrators with no audible warning or discernible provocation and launch tear gas into the crowd. No demonstrator had approached or threatened police in any way.
73. L. Ellis attempted to avoid the cloud of tear gas and DPD officers as they advanced upon the demonstrators. L. Ellis was standing off to the side, away from the larger group, when a number of Doe Officers accosted them. L. Ellis had not approached or provoked any officers.
74. A Doe Officer pushed L. Ellis to the ground and zip tied their hands behind their back, then pulled them up and dragged them to a DPD vehicle.
2Plaintiff L. Ellis uses the pronouns “they” and “them.”
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75. Doe Officers placed L. Ellis with a group of women in the police vehicle for an unknown amount of time as they were taken to an unknown location that turned out to be the basement of Little Caesar’s Arena. During this time, L. Ellis and the others had their hands zip-tied behind their backs and were unable to reposition their protective face masks, which Doe Officers had removed or pulled down, again without regard for the deadly pandemic.
76. L. Ellis, along with many others, was eventually transported to the Detroit Detention Center, then released without their phone or a way to get home.
77. The demonstrations continued, Plaintiffs continued to participate along with hundreds of others, and Defendants continued to brutally beat demonstrators.
78. On July 10, 2020, Detroit police shot and killed Hakim Littleton, a young Black man. The demonstrations grew to demand justice for Mr. Littleton.
79. Plaintiff L. Brennan attended the demonstration on July 10, 2020. When she arrived at around 4:15 P.M., she was near a group of approximately 15-20 DPD officers; after about thirty minutes, they were joined by a number of additional DPD officers wearing helmets and carrying shields and batons, including Defendant Officers Hornshaw and Erard.
80. With no audible warning to disperse, the second group of DPD officers began to approach the demonstrators, banging their batons on their shields in unison in a frightening and intimidating manner.
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81. When the DPD officers reached the demonstrators, they immediately attacked, beating demonstrators with their batons.
82. Demonstrators did not engage in any provocation prior to the attack. As on the previous days, demonstrators merely stood together, with the situation safe, contained, and under control, until the police officers pounced on them.
83. Defendant Officer Erard ran into the crowd and intentionally struck L. Brennan on her forehead with her baton, gritting her teeth as she did so.
84. Defendant Erard then shoved L. Brennan to the ground and began to strike another demonstrator in the back of the head.
85. L. Brennan got back to her feet and pulled the other demonstrator out of the crowd and attempted to flee. Both L. Brennan and the other demonstrator had gotten pepper spray in their eyes during the police-initiated melee, presumably sprayed by another officer.
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86. L. Brennan later rejoined the demonstration and approached Defendant Erard to demonstrate the severity of her injuries. Defendant Erard merely laughed.
87. L. Brennan experienced headaches, dizziness, clumsiness, and confusion after Defendant Erard struck her. She sought medical attention after approximately five days of continuous headaches and was diagnosed with both a concussion and a hematoma on her arm where Defendant Erard had hit her.
88. Plaintiffs also observed Defendant Hornshaw beating and brutalizing demonstrators with excessive and unnecessary force on July 10, 2020.
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89. Plaintiff Olivia Puente also attended the demonstration in response to the death of Hakim Littleton on July 10, 2020.
90. Upon her arrival, O. Puente watched as a group of police in riot gear advanced upon the demonstration at approximately 4:00 P.M.
91. Like L. Brennan, O. Puente was unarmed, not engaging with police, and not refusing to comply with any audible police commands when she was attacked by Defendant Erard. Defendant Erard beat O. Puente over the head with her baton, striking O. Puente’s left temple twice, and used her shield to push and shove O. Puente backwards.
92. O. Puente fell backwards and saw an arc of pepper spray descending from above. The spray covered O. Puente’s face, causing a painful burning sensation in her eyes, nose, and mouth.
93. O. Puente scrambled to escape the chaos and avoid further injury. She subsequently experienced concussion symptoms, including a consistent headache that lasted for days, nausea, difficulty sleeping, confusion, forgetfulness, and an intense sensitivity to light and sound.
94. Plaintiff Iman Saleh also attended the demonstration on July 10, 2020. I. Saleh had attended demonstrations on a regular basis since they began in May 2020. Like other Plaintiffs, I. Saleh had already been beaten, pepper sprayed, and tear gassed by Defendants on multiple occasions by July 10, 2020.
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95. Approximately 20 minutes after I. Saleh’s arrival, DPD officers in riot gear began to push and shove demonstrators backwards, beat them with batons, and trample on those who fell to the ground.
96. As I. Saleh attempted to avoid the wave of police violence, an unknown Doe Officer struck I. Saleh on her right hip with a baton with such force that I. Saleh buckled and fell to the ground.
97. Other demonstrators were able to quickly remove I. Saleh from the crowd and transport her to the hospital, where her treating physicians determined that her pelvis had been fractured. I. Saleh’s treating physician instructed her that her injury would take several months to heal and not to walk again until she could do so without pain.
98. Plaintiff Jazten Bass (“J. Bass”) also attended the demonstration on July 10, 2020, as he had on a near-daily basis since June 2, 2020.
99. As police officers converged upon the demonstrators, a Doe Officer approached J. Bass, striking his riot shield with his baton and shouting “COME ON!” in an attempt to antagonize and provoke J. Bass.
100. When that attempt failed, the Doe Officer slammed his riot shield directly into J. Bass’s face two consecutive times. Like the other Plaintiffs, J. Bass was unarmed, had not responded to the officer’s provocations, and posed no threat to the officer or anyone else at the time of the attack (or any other time).
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101. Plaintiff Tristan Taylor (“T. Taylor”) also attended the demonstration on July 10, 2020, as he had on a near-daily basis since May 29, 2020.
102. After advancing upon the demonstrators, DPD officers threw T. Taylor to the ground, where a Doe Officer intentionally kicked T. Taylor’s head and trampled over him. T. Taylor was unarmed, subdued, and posed no threat to the officer or anyone else at that or any other point in time.
103. The Doe Officer then struck Plaintiff T. Taylor in his abdomen with the tip of his baton, knocking the wind out of T. Taylor as he lay helpless on the ground.
104. On August 22, 2020, Plaintiff Detroit Will Breathe organized a peaceful sit-in in downtown Detroit at the intersection of Woodward and John R -- a public intersection where groups frequently congregate. For example, Detroit sports fans gather there on a regular basis to celebrate their teams’ victories (or mourn their losses).
105. Approximately 100 demonstrators, including Plaintiffs T. Taylor, J. Bass, N. Wallace, I. Saleh, L. Rosen, O. Puente, M. Henige, A. Nahabedian, C. Arnold, and A. Anest, were present at the gathering, which attendees described as “relaxed,” “jovial,” “festive,” and “like a block party.” Participants danced, blew bubbles, played music, read books, and chatted with one another.
106. The relaxed and jovial atmosphere was destroyed when Defendants once again sent a number of officers in riot gear to attack the group. Demonstrators
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did not engage in any provocation prior to the attack. As on the previous days, demonstrators merely stood together, with the situation safe, contained, and under control, until the police officers pounced on them.
107. The officers charged into the crowd, deployed chemical weapons (described infra), and began tackling demonstrators to the ground and beating demonstrators with their batons, shields, and fists.
108. Defendant Stephen Anouti was observed directing and instructing DPD officers as they attacked the demonstrators.
109. Plaintiffs observed DPD officers aiming for demonstrators’ knees with their batons to incapacitate demonstrators and prevent them from marching in future protests.
110. DPD officers attacked demonstrators (including Plaintiffs), legal observers, members of the press, and bystanders. Officers beat multiple people so severely that they had to be hospitalized.
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111. One bystander (pictured below), who lives on Woodward Avenue, simply opened his front door to provide respite to demonstrators as they dispersed. Multiple Doe Officers seized him, held him down, punched him in the face over ten times (leaving him with two black eyes) and arrested him.
112. Plaintiff Alexander Anest (“A. Anest”) attended the demonstration on August 22 as a volunteer street medic; he carried first aid supplies and wore a red cross emblazoned on his clothing and helmet.
113. Not long after the DPD officers rushed into the crowd, A. Anest observed three officers violently tackling another street medic; one appeared to grab her in a chokehold and threw her to the ground.
114. As A. Anest tried to approach the fallen medic to offer help, a Doe Officer struck A. Anest’s back with his baton several consecutive times with an extreme amount of force, knocking him to the ground.
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115. A. Anest was blinded with pain as the Doe Officer dragged him approximately fifteen feet across the pavement, handcuffed him, and tossed him to the curb with several other arrestees.
116. A. Anest begged the DPD officers to call an ambulance, but they ignored him. One ambulance had already arrived, but the DPD officers refused to permit the EMT to examine A. Anest, saying that they had already done so – which was a blatant lie.
117. Eventually, A. Anest was able to pull his cell phone out of his pocket and dial 911 himself. But before he could complete the call, a Doe Officer took the phone and hung up.
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118. After some more time, the officers placed A. Anest and the others in a van, then transferred them to a bus full of other arrestees, again with no regard for social distancing or masks during the global COVID-19 pandemic.
119. Only after the other medics insisted that A. Anest needed immediate medical attention did the police finally call an ambulance.
120. When the ambulance arrived, the police made A. Anest wait for another hour for an officer to accompany him to the hospital. That officer never arrived, so the police finally released A. Anest at approximately 3:30 A.M. – three hours after he had been beaten.
121. A. Anest was lost, disoriented, and in severe pain. Other demonstrators found him and drove him to the emergency room at approximately 4:00 A.M.
122. A. Anest suffered severe injury as a result of the Doe Officer’s attack, including being hospitalized with a broken rib, a collapsed right lung, and a tube in his chest (pictured below).
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Defendants Fired Rubber Bullets at Demonstrators 123. Rubber bullets (also referred to as baton rounds), despite their lesslethal-sounding name, are often composed of a metal core and thin polymer coating or hardened plastic. They are significantly larger than average bullets and indisputably have the capacity to cause serious and permanent injury.3
3 https://www.thecut.com/2020/06/rubber-bullets-are-not-rubber.html; https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidhambling/2020/06/08/the-deadly-truth-behind-rubberbullets/#2c5e0ae21f8a
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124. Defendants shot rubber bullets at fleeing demonstrators beginning on May 29, 2020, and on multiple occasions since.
125. Plaintiff A. Nahabedian attended the demonstration on May 31, 2020. As the demonstration reached DPD Headquarters, A. Nahabedian witnessed a line of police officers wearing gas masks and holding zip ties, pistols, and rifles.
126. As demonstrators kneeled and chanted peacefully, posing no threat of danger whatsoever, the police suddenly advanced and began to beat and pepper spray demonstrators. Demonstrators did not engage in any provocation prior to the attack.
127. Four unknown Doe Officers approached A. Nahabedian as she knelt on the ground, posing no threat to any officer, and lifted her up, one officer holding each of her arms and legs, then dropped her back to the ground.
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128. A. Nahabedian was then surrounded on three sides by lines of Doe Officers. Defendants deployed tear gas, which engulfed A. Nahabedian.
129. Next, Doe Officers approached A. Nahabedian from behind, shouting at her to back up. A. Nahabedian attempted to comply, but a Doe Officer used his shield to shove A. Nahabedian with an unnecessary amount of force, causing her to fly forwards and up into the air and lose her footing. The Doe Officers shoved A. Nahabedian forward in this manner approximately four times, causing her to sustain bruises to her shoulders and numbness in her left hand.
130. A. Nahabedian was eventually able to disperse from this group of officers and escape the cloud of tear gas. However, she and another handful of demonstrators were then approached by officers who launched tear gas canisters directly at them—despite the protest having disintegrated and demonstrators fleeing in different directions.
131. As A. Nahabedian attempted to flee the cloud of tear gas, she was suddenly and without warning struck above her left breast with a rubber bullet.
132. For the next several hours, A. Nahabedian walked around the city of Detroit in an attempt to return to her car while avoiding police, who continued to hunt down, beat, arrest, and indiscriminately fire tear gas, rubber bullets, and other projectiles at fleeing demonstrators.
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133. A. Nahabedian was alone, terrified, and in a great deal of pain from the beatings, tear gas, and rubber bullet. After eventually reaching safety, she was unable to stand up straight for several days; could not cough without doubling over in pain for a week; and had bruises on her shoulder and numbness in her hand for days. The rubber bullet had torn her skin and pierced the tissue between her skin and ribs, causing the sensation of cracked ribs and a painful, swollen lump that lasted over two months.
134. Since May 31, 2020, A. Nahabedian has experienced anxiety, panic attacks, and difficulty sleeping on a regular basis as a direct result of the trauma caused by Defendants’ actions.
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135. On July 30, 2020, felony assault charges were issued against DPD officer Daniel Debono after he openly fired rubber bullets at three journalists without provocation. All three suffered injuries.4
Defendants Used Chokeholds Against Demonstrators 136. Plaintiff Nakia Wallace attended the July 10 demonstration in response to the death of Hakim Littleton. As a member of Detroit Will Breathe, N. Wallace has organized and participated in the demonstrations on a regular basis since they began in May and had already been detained, beaten, pepper sprayed, tear gassed, and arrested. 137. On July 10, 2020, N. Wallace witnessed a group of DPD officers rush into the crowd and begin to beat, detain, and arrest demonstrators without provocation. 138. N. Wallace witnessed several Doe Officers detaining a young man. One Doe Officer pressed his knee on the young man’s neck as others held the young man down. Reminded instantly of the murder of George Floyd, N. Wallace shouted, “Get off his neck, get off his neck!” 139. As officers swarmed around her and shouted at her to move, N. Wallace stated, “I live here!” A male Doe officer then approached N. Wallace and shouted, “arrest her!”
4 https://www.cnn.com/2020/07/21/us/detroit-police-officer-charged-three-journalists/index.html
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140. Used to this aggressive treatment, N. Wallace placed her hands behind her back.
141. A female Doe Officer then approached N. Wallace, screamed “get on the ground!” and unsuccessfully attempted to trip N. Wallace to cause her to fall to the ground.
142. N. Wallace shouted: “I am not resisting.” 143. The female Doe Officer then grabbed N. Wallace from behind and slammed her to the ground, placing her in a chokehold.
144. After holding N. Wallace in a chokehold for some time, pulling her head back, the Doe Officer snatched N. Wallace’s keys and wallet and left.
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145. Another Doe Officer in plainclothes, wearing blue jeans and a blue shirt bearing the emblem “Detroit” in the shape of a gun (pictured infra handcuffing Plaintiff T. Taylor) then grabbed N. Wallace, pulled her roughly to her feet, and escorted her up San Juan.
146. N. Wallace asked him: “Do they pay you enough to defend murderers and attack demonstrators?” In response, the Doe Officer screamed “Yes they do, and shut the fuck up before I make you the next victim!”
Defendants Drove Police Vehicles Into Crowds and Demonstrators 147. Defendants utilized their police vehicles to assault demonstrators, first blocking off demonstrators’ path and then driving their vehicles directly into the crowds. These vehicular assaults have caused physical injury to multiple demonstrators, including Plaintiff Jazten Bass (“J. Bass”). 148. On June 28, 2020, Plaintiff J. Bass attended the nightly demonstrations against racism and police violence, as he had every night for the past month. After a month of organizing and participating in demonstrations, Mr. Bass, too, had already been detained, beaten, pepper sprayed, tear gassed, and arrested on multiple occasions. 149. On June 28, DPD continued their attempts to silence the demonstrators by driving through the crowd (even hitting one biker) and attempting to unplug sound systems.
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150. Towards the end of the demonstration that night, J. Bass noticed five police vehicles blocking the demonstrators’ route back to Patton Park, where the group had parked their cars and began their march. With no choice but to make their way back to Patton Park despite the roadblock, demonstrators marched down Vernor towards the DPD vehicles so they could end their demonstration and go home.
151. As the demonstrators walked alongside the vehicles, two Doe Officers (pictured below) began to slowly and simultaneously drive their SUVs through the group without provocation and without making an announcement asking demonstrators to disperse to allow the vehicle to pass.
152. About 30 demonstrators, including J. Bass, who was at the front of the group carrying a microphone, had passed the DPD vehicles when J. Bass turned around and saw a DPD vehicle hit a demonstrator from behind and cause the
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demonstrator to roll onto the hood of the vehicle. Shocked and concerned, J. Bass stopped marching.
153. The DPD vehicle continued to accelerate and then hit J. Bass, who had no choice but to try to roll onto the hood of the vehicle to avoid being completely run over, along with the other demonstrator. The vehicle hit approximately 4-5 other demonstrators, who were either thrown to the ground or forced to jump out of the way.
154. The Doe Officer driving the DPD vehicle then slammed on the gas, almost running over the head of another demonstrator who had been thrown to the ground, jerking the car forward, and causing J. Bass and the other organizer to spin wildly on the hood of the vehicle.
155. J. Bass grabbed the grill on the front of the vehicle to avoid being thrown to the ground and run over and held on as the driver of the vehicle continued to drive, alternating accelerating and braking, causing the DPD vehicle to jerk back and forth. J. Bass was eventually able to roll off the side of the vehicle, slamming into the ground and sustaining scrapes and bruises to his knee and hip.
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156. J. Bass posed no immediate threat to the officers or others to warrant the use of deadly force by the officers.
157. The DPD officers who ran over J. Bass were followed in a second police vehicle by Defendant Hornshaw, who also drove through the crowd of demonstrators.
158. Defendant Craig later publicly claimed that J. Bass and the other organizer had “damaged” the police vehicle, despite the overwhelming video evidence to the contrary.
Defendants Deployed Chemical Irritants to Injure and Deter Demonstrators 159. Since the demonstrations began, Defendants have deployed chemical irritants against demonstrators, including tear gas and pepper spray, both by targeting specific protesters with handheld devices and by launching canisters of
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chemical irritants into a crowd, releasing the irritants indiscriminately in every direction.
160. The Sixth Circuit has recognized the significant damage caused by irritants such as tear gas: the gas “burns the face [and] nostrils, restricts breathing passages, and causes blindness. It causes a burning sensation that causes mucus to come out of the nose, and involuntary closing of the eyes, a gagging reflex, and temporary paralysis of the larynx.” United States v. Mosley, 635 F.3d 859, 862 (6th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
161. Not only is tear gas painful, it can be lethal. High-dose exposure in an enclosed space can “lead to the development of airway edema, non-cardiogenic pulmonary edema, and possibly respiratory arrest.5” Exposure can trigger a fatal asthma attack and increases the risk of developing acute respiratory illnesses.6 In 1993, the United Nations General Assembly banned the use of tear gas in warfare due to the severity of its adverse health effects.
162. The use of chemical irritants during the ongoing novel coronavirus-19 (COVID-19) pandemic creates additional risks for those exposed. By design, the incapacitating effects of tear gas and pepper spray cause immediate increased nasal
5 See Toxic Syndrome Description, Riot Control Poisoning, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, https://emergency.cdc.gov/agent/riotcontrol/agentpoisoning.asp. 6 Joseph J. Hout, et al., o-Chlorobenzylidene Malonotrile (CS Riot Control Agent) Associated Acute Respiratory Illnesses in a U.S. Army Basic Combat Training Cohort, 179 Military Medicine 7:793 (2014), https://academic.oup.com/milmed/article/179/7/793/4259353#101149356.
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secretions, eye irritation, coughing, spitting, sneezing, and/or vomiting. Coughing, spitting, vomiting, and rubbing eyes all spread respiratory droplets and bodily fluids that carry viruses.
163. Defendants have subjected each and every Plaintiff, and hundreds of other demonstrators, to both tear gas and pepper spray on multiple occasions, including on May 29, May 30, May 31, June 1, June 2, July 10, 2020, and August 22-23, 2020.
164. On at least one day (June 2, 2020), DPD teargassed demonstrators after preventing them from dispersing and ensuring they had no means to escape.
165. On July 10, 2020, Plaintiff M. Henige attended the demonstration after the death of Hakim Littleton at the hands of Detroit police.
166. Like other Plaintiffs, M. Henige witnessed a line of DPD officers in riot gear converge upon the demonstration without provocation, pushing down demonstrators with their clubs and shields.
167. Defendant Stephen Anouti was observed pepper-spraying demonstrators who had not engaged in any provocation.
168. Doe Officers knocked M. Henige to the ground, with her head hitting the pavement. Once on the ground, she was trampled by several Doe Officers as she screamed for her life.
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169. M. Henige was eventually lifted up by another demonstrator; however, she had severe head trauma and was experiencing blurred vision.
170. Next, M. Henige attempted to take a photograph of the Doe Officers’ badges. At that point, a Doe Officer charged into the crowd of people and shoved her aside again with his shield.
171. Shortly after, the DPD officers began firing tear gas into the crowd. M. Henige was trapped and inhaled the tear gas heavily.
172. Once the DPD officers dispersed, M. Henige dry heaved. She continued to experience headaches, nausea, vomiting, and blurred vision after leaving the demonstration.
173. M. Henige rested for four days, but the symptoms only intensified. She visited Detroit Receiving Hospital where she was diagnosed with a post-traumatic concussion and a closed head injury. Her treating physicians provided a shot of Toradol for the pain, Prochlorperazine for the nausea, and a Benadryl to help offset any jitters that may come from the Toradol, and prescribed prescription-strength Tylenol and anti-nausea medication.
174. M. Henige’s treating physician instructed her to make an appointment with a neurology clinic. There, M. Henige was prescribed Gabapentin, an antiseizure medication, because she was still suffering from severe headaches and
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migraines. As of the date of this filing, she is required to attend follow-up appointments to determine the full extent of her head injuries.
175. M. Henige also experienced abnormal heavy menstrual bleeding and spotting for approximately 30 days straight immediately after her exposure to tear gas, and has had irregular or nonexistent periods since.
176. On August 22, 2020, Defendants again deployed tear gas and pepper spray against approximately 100 demonstrators without issuing an audible warning to disperse.
177. Plaintiff Caylee Arnold (“C. Arnold”) attended the demonstration on August 22, 2020.
178. C. Arnold was standing by, not approaching, speaking to, or engaging with any police officers in any way, when an officer shoved her from behind with his riot shield. C. Arnold put her hands in the air and shouted, “I am leaving” and “I am walking away.”
179. Despite C. Arnold clearly trying to walk away and not approaching or threatening anyone, the officer began to beat her with his baton.
180. Multiple Doe Officers then tackled C. Arnold, threw her to the ground, and handcuffed her hands behind her back.
181. A Doe Officer then sprayed C. Arnold directly in her face with pepper spray as she was completely subdued by multiple officers holding her down – a
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blatantly punitive and unnecessary use of a dangerous chemical agent. C. Arnold’s mask and goggles were completely filled with pepper spray; she gagged and was unable to see or breathe.
182. As C. Arnold lay on the ground in agony, she heard the Doe Officers laughing and saw them smiling, high-fiving, and hugging one another. In her own words, the officers looked at C. Arnold and the other arrestees “like they were the predators and we were the prey.”
Defendants Deployed a Long Range Acoustic Device (LRAD) to Injure and Deter Demonstrators
183. On June 2, 2020, Defendants utilized a Long Range Acoustic Device (“LRAD”) on demonstrators, including Plaintiffs.
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184. The LRAD emits a sound referred to as a “deterrent tone” that causes immediate pain, disorientation, dizziness, and panic and can cause permanent hearing loss in a matter of seconds.
185. On June 2, 2020, Plaintiff Lauren Rosen attended the nightly demonstrations. The group of demonstrators marched on Gratiot Street, a public street, at approximately 8:00 P.M.
186. As the demonstrators marched down Gratiot, police surrounded them from all sides, kettling the demonstrators to prevent their escape.
187. L. Rosen could not clearly hear any audible warning to disperse or any comments which could be conceived as a warning an LRAD Sound Cannon would be deployed.
188. DPD officers were again dressed in riot gear and carrying shields and batons. Further, they were accompanied by armored vehicles.
189. The officers who had kettled L. Rosen and other demonstrators approached the demonstrators, striking their shields with their batons in unison. As L. Rosen linked arms with other demonstrators to form a protective circle, DPD deployed the LRAD, or sound cannon.
190. L. Rosen was exposed to the LRAD’s sound for several minutes. By the time the police reached the demonstrators, she was in severe discomfort as the
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LRAD’s sound radiated throughout her body; she was very dizzy and nauseous and could no longer remain standing, causing her to tumble backwards and fall.
191. From the ground, L. Rosen watched as DPD officers then approached her and other demonstrators and began to beat, detain, and arrest those around her, despite the fact that they posed no threat whatsoever to officers. In fact, demonstrators chanted in unison: “We do not approach” as they stood together and did not approach the officers.
192. Next, L. Rosen attempted to help another demonstrator off the ground. 193. A Doe Officer grabbed L. Rosen roughly by her left arm and pulled her aside, bruising her and causing her to fall to the ground again. As she attempted to get back up, another Doe Officer grabbed her by the shirt and arm and threw her back down to the ground, then screamed at her to “GET UP!” 194. L. Rosen assumed a fetal position in an attempt to protect herself, but to no avail; a male Doe Officer stomped on her right foot and then grabbed L. Rosen around her chest and torso, groping her breasts in the process, while yelling “WHY DIDN’T YOU JUST LEAVE?” 195. Still disoriented from the LRAD, and terrified by the sounds of demonstrators screaming around her as they too were beaten and arrested, L. Rosen began to cry. The male Doe Officer eventually left, and L. Rosen was able to leave
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the scene, as the officers had instructed demonstrators to do, and reach a place of relative safety.
196. For approximately two weeks after June 2, 2020, L. Rosen experienced severe vertigo, dizziness, nausea, tinnitus, and difficulty eating, sleeping, and hearing as a direct result of Defendants’ actions; she lost a significant amount of weight as a result. As of the date of this filing, L. Rosen is still experiencing tinnitus. She sought medical attention, and her treating physician confirmed damage to her right ear.
197. Despite the brutality Plaintiff L. Ellis had experienced at the hands of Detroit Police on May 31, L. Ellis also attended the demonstration again on June 2, 2020.
198. Like L. Rosen, L. Ellis was part of the group that marched down Gratiot at approximately 8:00 P.M. and was surrounded by hundreds of DPD officers.
199. Upon hearing the LRAD emit its sound, L. Ellis was frightened, confused, disoriented, and in pain when police officers suddenly charged at them.
200. L. Ellis witnessed a DPD Doe Officer grab a demonstrator, remove her goggles, and spray her directly in the face with pepper spray, some of which hit L. Ellis’s eyes, clothes, and hair, causing stinging pain.
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201. A Doe Officer then grabbed L. Ellis, dragged them out of the crowd, zip-tied their hands behind their back, and threw them to the ground, displacing L. Ellis’s mask in the process.
202. When L. Ellis asked a Doe Officer to replace their mask, the officer mocked them, saying, “if you’re worried about coronavirus, why did you come out here?”
203. For the second time, L. Ellis was shepherded towards a bus along with a group of demonstrators many of whom were in pain from too-tight zip ties, pepper spray, tear gas, and DPD dragging and shoving them around. During this time, the DPD officers found an opportunity to pose for a “solidarity” photo, portraying themselves as supportive of the protests, as the arrestees suffered.
204. The demonstrators were then loaded onto a bus. Many demonstrators’ masks had been displaced or removed by DPD. Because all of the arrestees had their hands zip-tied behind their back, they had no way to address these conditions. Approximately 127 people had been arrested.
205. L. Ellis and the group were transported to Little Caesar’s Arena. When L. Ellis stated that they did not want to speak to police without an attorney present, the Doe Officer attempting to speak to them began to shout and scream at them.
206. After hours in Little Caesar’s Arena, L. Ellis and one other demonstrator were driven to the Detroit Detention Center.
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207. Doe Officers left L. Ellis in the car for at least an hour with their hands zip-tied and, again, the heat inexplicably turned on. As L. Ellis began to sweat, their sweat interacted with the chemical irritants found in tear gas and pepper spray, causing a painful burning sensation.
208. The officers eventually processed and jailed L. Ellis, referring to them as female and using she/her pronouns the entire time, despite the fact that L. Ellis does not identify as a woman and does not use those pronouns.
209. L. Ellis was jailed from approximately 1:30 A.M. to 7:30 A.M. They were placed into a solitary cell with blood smeared on the walls, a fluorescent overhead light that could not be turned off, and a sleeping pad with no pillow or blanket; they could hear other detainees screaming throughout the night.
Defendants Restrained Demonstrators with Intentionally Tightened Zip Ties to Cause Injury and Deter Protests
210. Defendants have placed numerous demonstrators, including Plaintiffs J. Bass and Z. Kolodziej, in zip ties that were intentionally tightened more than is necessary to immobilize, in a manner that serves no purpose other than to inflict punishment by causing pain and discomfort.
211. Plaintiff Zachary Kolodziej attended the demonstration on July 10, 2020. Like other Plaintiffs, he arrived at approximately 4:30 P.M.
212. Z. Kolodziej was standing at the front of the protest when he witnessed a line of riot police converge upon the demonstrators, beating their shields with
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batons in unison. The police rammed their shields into Z. Kolodziej and the other demonstrators at the front line.
213. As police surrounded and kettled the demonstrators, Doe Officers pushed Z. Kolodziej back with their shields and beat him back with blows to his torso and legs. Z. Kolodziej had not approached, provoked, or engaged with police; he posed no threat to justify their use of force.
214. A Doe Officer made eye contact with Z. Kolodziej, shouted something indiscernible, then grabbed Z. Kolodziej’s neck in a chokehold and threw him to the ground.
215. Z. Kolodziej stood up, only for the same Doe Officer to seize him around the neck and throw him to the ground a second time.
216. When Z. Kolodziej stood up again, multiple Doe Officers tackled him, ripping his shirt and raincoat off of his body and his mask from his face. Other demonstrators attempted to pull Z. Kolodziej away from the brutality, but the Doe Officers seized Z. Kolodziej and threw him to the ground a third time.
217. A Doe Officer then placed his knee on Z. Kolodziej’s neck, twisted his arms behind his back, handcuffed him, and dragged him across the road for approximately 30-50 feet before handing him off to another officer who placed him in a police vehicle.
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218. Before transferring Z. Kolodziej from the police cruiser to a bus, the Doe Officer exchanged his handcuffs for zip ties, and intentionally tightened the zip ties so as to cut off circulation to Z. Kolodziej’s hands.
219. Once placed in the tight zipties, the Doe Officer roughly moved Z. Kolodziej in a manner to place additional force on his wrists.
220. Defendant Officer Timothy Barr was the arresting officer who issued Z. Kolodziej’s misdemeanor ticket.
221. Z. Kolodziej told the officer that the zip ties were too tight, but the officer told Z. Kolodziej that his circulation was “fine,” ignoring his pleas.
222. For the next few hours, the police kept Z. Kolodziej on the bus with several other demonstrators as he bled from a head injury. None of the demonstrators were given masks or water.
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223. The officers eventually brought Z. Kolodziej and the others to DPD’s 12th Precinct and processed them to be jailed. When Z. Kolodziej alerted the officers to his head injury, he was taken to Detroit Receiving Hospital, where a physical examination revealed that Z. Kolodziej had sustained bruising to his back, sides, and vertebrae; bloody abrasions to his knees, elbows, and head; and bruising, abrasions, and a loss of sensation indicating nerve injury to both of his hands.
224. After receiving medical treatment, officers brought Z. Kolodziej back to the jail for processing, and released around 3:30 A.M.
225. Since his arrest, Z. Kolodziej has experienced symptoms of lasting nerve damage to his right hand, including numbness, pain, and sensitivity. Further, after Defendants kept him and others on a bus for hours without their protective masks, Z. Kolodziej experienced symptoms of COVID-19 including headaches, fatigue, sore throat, fever, coughing, and shortness of breath that have continued for weeks.
226. On August 22, 2020, after DPD had arrested over 40 demonstrators, Plaintiffs, including C. Arnold, T. Taylor, and N. Wallace, witnessed demonstrators screaming and sobbing in pain as their hands turned blue and gray from overtightened zip ties.
227. One demonstrator inexplicably had no less than five zip ties placed around his wrists and intentionally over-tightened, cutting off circulation to his
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hands. (He had also been beaten so severely that he had to be hospitalized, and received stitches in his face).
228. Another demonstrator’s zip ties had been tightened so severely that multiple arrestees begged and insisted on her behalf that the DPD officers remove them, and when the officers finally relented, it took several minutes to fit scissors underneath to cut them off. The demonstrator screamed in pain the entire time.
Defendants Detained Demonstrators in Punitive, Unnecessary, and Torturous Conditions
229. In addition to the punitive, unnecessary, and torturous conditions of Plaintiff L. Ellis’s detention in a police cruiser and jail and Plaintiff Z. Kolodziej’s detention in tightened zip ties, described above, Defendants arrested and detained demonstrators, including Plaintiffs T. Taylor and J. Bass, on repurposed buses with the windows up and the heat turned on while the outside temperature was greater than 90 degrees.
230. Plaintiff T. Taylor, a publicly recognized protest leader, was one of the first demonstrators to be arrested without probable cause on June 2, 2020. After his arrest, DPD officers placed T. Taylor in the back of a police vehicle that, in T. Taylor’s own words, “was like being in a windowless iron box.”
231. The officers detained T. Taylor in the vehicle, handcuffed with his hands behind his back, for approximately twenty-five minutes as they steadily filled the vehicle with other arrestees.
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232. T. Taylor and the other arrestees felt hot air coming from the vehicle’s air vents. Defendants had turned on the heat in the windowless vehicle on a 90degree summer day.
233. Defendants also arrested Plaintiff J. Bass, along with over one hundred other demonstrators, on June 2, 2020. DPD officers had already pepper-sprayed and tear-gassed the crowd when they tacked J. Bass to the ground and arrested him.
234. The officers poured water on arrestees, including J. Bass, and then loaded them onto a bus. Water activates the chemical irritants contained in tear gas, causing severe and painful stinging and burning of the affected areas.
235. The officers kept the windows closed and the heat on the bus turned on. J. Bass and the others were sweating, their skin burning from tear gas, with their hands cuffed behind their back. The zip ties on J. Bass’s wrists had been intentionally tightened to cause pain and discomfort; J. Bass asked the officers to loosen the ties, but they refused.
236. J. Bass asked the officers to open the windows or turn on the air conditioning, and the officers refused. The officers detained J. Bass and the others in these excruciating conditions for approximately one hour before taking them to Little Caesar’s Arena for processing, where they were left on the bus in the heat again for another twenty to thirty minutes.
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237. On August 22, 2020, DPD officers arrested over 40 demonstrators, including Plaintiffs T. Taylor, N. Wallace, J. Bass, M. Henige, A. Nahabedian, C. Arnold, and A. Anest.
238. After holding arrestees in various conditions of injury on buses, as described above, the officers brought the arrestees to the Detroit Detention Center, then kept them detained outside in a small fenced-in concrete area until approximately 8:00 in the morning.
239. The officers refused repeated requests for water. One officer approached M. Henige with a bag of snacks, then pulled the bag away from her, laughing.
240. One demonstrator showed signs of heatstroke as she slipped in and out of consciousness and was unable to speak in coherent sentences. The officers refused the other arrestees’ requests for water and medical attention for her.
241. Several officers used their cell phones to take photo and video of the arrestees, laughing to one another and mocking the injured and suffering demonstrators.
Defendants Arrested Demonstrators En Masse Without Probable Cause in an Attempt to Silence and Deter Demonstrators
242. Throughout the demonstrations, DPD has arrested hundreds of peaceful demonstrators without probable cause, including Plaintiffs T. Taylor, G. Branch, N. Wallace, J. Bass, L. Ellis, M. Henige, and Z. Kolodziej, as described above.
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243. As of the date of this filing, DPD has made approximately 500 arrests of peaceful demonstrators, without issuing an audible warning to disperse prior to making arrests. Defendants targeted highly recognizable protest leaders and organizers, including Plaintiffs T. Taylor, N. Wallace, and J. Bass, for repeated arrests on multiple days.
244. DPD officers issued cookie-cutter misdemeanor tickets that appeared to have been filled out in advance. Among the charges brought against demonstrators were “disorderly conduct” and “loitering.”
245. DPD purported to arrest many demonstrators for violating the curfew between May 29-June 2, 2020. However, DPD allowed other people in Detroit, who were not participating in the demonstrations, to violate the curfew. Further, DPD has in recent history protected other demonstrators – including at protests led by white supremacists – rather than subjecting them to unconstitutional violence7.
246. Plaintiffs did not at any time during any of the demonstrations act violently or pose any danger whatsoever to DPD officers.
247. On June 2, 2020, after DPD arrested Plaintiff T. Taylor and detained him in the punitive conditions described above, plainclothes officers informed him
7 On June 8, 2019, a protest was held in Detroit by armed Neo Nazis who, among other things, screamed racist epitaphs and openly urinated on an Israeli flag. Not only did DPD refrain from any tactics deployed against Plaintiffs, they provided protection to the demonstrators. https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2019/06/armed-neo-nazis-police-escort-detroit-pride.html https://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/local/detroit-city/2019/06/11/pride-fest-attendees-blastdetroit-police-handling-nazis/1418432001/
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that he faced felony charges of “inciting a riot” -- a blatant attempt to silence a protest leader and shut down the demonstrations.
248. On July 10, 2020, DPD targeted T. Taylor for arrest a second time (pictured below). When T. Taylor asked for the name and badge number of the arresting officer, the officer told him to “shut the fuck up.”
249. Plaintiff N. Wallace was also arrested on July 10, 2020, along with many other demonstrators. Defendant Officer Timothy Barr was inexplicably named as the arresting officer on the misdemeanor tickets issued to T. Taylor, N. Wallace, Z. Kolodziej, and the majority of arrestees on July 10, 2020.
250. On August 22, 2020, DPD officers again arrested Plaintiffs T. Taylor, N. Wallace, J. Bass, A. Nahabedian, M. Henige, and L. Ellis, along with approximately 40 others, without probable cause and in retaliation for their continued lawful exercise of their First Amendment right to protest.
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251. Upon information and belief, large groups of sports fans occupy the space at the intersection of Woodward Avenue and John R in downtown Detroit on a regular basis to celebrate the victories (or mourn the losses) of Detroit’s sports teams. In stark contrast to Defendants’ treatment of Plaintiff Detroit Will Breathe’s gathering of August 22, 2020, Defendants do not shut down those gatherings, which do not convey a message of racial justice, nor arrest their attendees, who are predominantly non-Black.
252. The curfew and ensuing arrests, as well as DPD’s other tactics described above, were a blatant attempt to retaliate against Plaintiffs for exercising their First Amendment rights and to chill and deter the demonstrators’ exercise of constitutionally protected activity. Persons of reasonable firmness, including G. Branch, have been, and will continue to be, deterred from joining the demonstrations after the widely publicized police brutality and arrests described above.
253. Further, Plaintiffs have heard Doe Officers make racially motivated remarks to demonstrators, including calling non-Black demonstrators “white trash” and stating “you’re not even from here” to non-Black demonstrators for participating in protests supportive of Black equality (despite the fact that over 80% of DPD officers do not reside in the City of Detroit).
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254. Defendants’ actions were motivated by retaliation against Plaintiffs and other demonstrators for exercising their First Amendment rights and specifically in retaliation for their support of racial justice.
The City’s Policy, Practice, and Custom (Monell Allegations) 255. Plaintiffs bring each claim against Defendants Duggan and Craig in their official capacities pursuant to Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). 256. The above-described violations of Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights are a direct result of the City’s policy, practice, and custom of authorizing DPD to use less-lethal weapons to control and suppress protests. 257. Defendant Mayor Michael Duggan and Defendant Police Chief James Craig are final decision-makers with respect to authorization of the use of force against protesters. 258. The City, through Defendants Duggan, Craig, and the DPD, has failed to train its officers in constitutional responses to peaceful demonstrations. 259. The City has a custom and policy of using excessive force against peaceful demonstrators; using chemical irritants and LRAD sound cannons to disperse peaceful demonstrators; kettling lawful assemblies and subjecting kettled demonstrators to collective corporal punishment and detention without individualized suspicion; assaulting and/or arresting participants without legal
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justification; conducting seizures lacking in reasonable suspicion and arrests lacking in probable cause; and using excessive force when detaining and restraining demonstrators including the use of painful and unnecessary use of restraints such as zip ties, causing injury. The unlawful crowd control and use-of-force policies and the long-standing customs and practices of the Defendants do not meet constitutional requirements.
260. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and thereon allege that the DPD officers acted in accordance with orders given by supervisors from the highest command positions, in accordance with policies and procedures instituted by the DPD and the City of Detroit. Moreover, the sheer frequency with which such techniques have been used—at different times, in different places, by different officers, and after prior publicized uses of such methods—makes it clear that what occurred to Plaintiffs reflects a pattern and practice of misconduct rather than isolated incidents.
261. DPD’s pattern and practice of using excessive force against peaceful demonstrators has been on display since the demonstrations began, as officers have repeatedly coordinated with each other to march in formation towards demonstrators, strike their riot shields with batons in unison in a synchronized attempt at intimidation, kettle groups of demonstrators to prevent their escape, and drive straight into demonstrators on multiple occasions.
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262. Defendants Duggan and Craig have each vocalized support of the Doe Officers’ decision to hit J. Bass with a police vehicle.
263. DPD policymakers including Mayor Duggan and Chief Craig have acted with utter disregard for the constitutional rights of protesters and would-be protesters by authorizing, both explicitly and implicitly, the use of less-lethal force against protesters who do not pose any safety threat; by failing to properly train, supervise, condemn, and discipline DPD officers regarding appropriate use of force against protesters; and by failing to rectify the DPD’s unconstitutional custom of using less-lethal force to control and suppress demonstrations.
264. Defendants Duggan and Craig have received ample notice that the DPD is using force against protesters to control and suppress demonstrations in the absence of any imminent threat to safety, including a public tribunal held by Plaintiff Detroit Will Breathe, widely publicized videos, and firsthand accounts circulated through the local, state, and international press.
265. Despite receiving ample notice that DPD officers were using “nonlethal force” to control and suppress demonstrations in the absence of any immediate threat to safety, Defendants Duggan, and Craig failed to act to remedy the ongoing violations of protesters’ constitutional rights by DPD officers, including by failing to train, supervise, or discipline DPD officers or issue corrective policies to prevent further violations.
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266. Defendants have continued to authorize the use of force and weaponry to control demonstrations even while acknowledging that the majority of protesters have been peaceful.
267. Not only has Defendant Craig continuously authorized the use of force against peaceful demonstrators, he has publicly endorsed the above-described brutality, stating on July 28, 2020 that he is “just ecstatic over the men and women in the Detroit Police Department”8 and on August 24, 2020 that he was “very proud” of the DPD officers.
268. Also on August 24, 2020, DPD Deputy Chief Todd Bettison stated at a press conference regarding the brutality of August 22: “To Detroit Will Breathe: You’re not welcome. Go.”9
269. As officers brutalized and arrested approximately 40 demonstrators on August 22-23, 2020, multiple Doe Officers told arrestees that they were “just following orders” and that the above-described actions were “just orders that they had to follow.”
270. As a direct and proximate cause of the conduct described herein, the named individual Plaintiffs (and countless other protesters) have been denied their
8https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2020/jul/29/james-craig-detroit-police-chief-on-whycity-isnt-/ 9 https://www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/detroit/2020/08/24/detroit-police-chiefjames-craig-black-lives-matter-protests/3431311001/
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constitutional, statutory, and legal rights as stated herein, and have suffered general and special damages, including but not limited to, physical injuries and bodily harm, pain, fear, humiliation, embarrassment, discomfort, anxiety, mental and emotional distress, and other damages in an amount according to proof.
271. Defendants’ acts were willful, wanton, malicious, and oppressive, and done with conscious or reckless disregard for Plaintiffs’ rights.
272. Defendants’ policies, practices, customs, conduct and acts alleged herein resulted in, and will continue to result in, irreparable injury to the Plaintiffs, including but not limited to violation of their constitutional and statutory rights. Plaintiffs have no plain, adequate, or complete remedy at law to address the wrong described herein. The Plaintiffs were subjected to police violence as described above at times when they were engaged in peaceful protest and intend in the future to exercise their constitutional rights of freedom of speech and association by continuing to engage in such expressive activities in the City of Detroit. Defendants’ conduct described herein has created uncertainty among Plaintiffs with respect to their exercise now and in the future of these constitutional rights. Plaintiffs therefore seek injunctive relief from this court to ensure that Plaintiffs and persons similarly situated will not suffer violations of their rights from Defendants’ illegal and unconstitutional policies, customs, and practices described herein.
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273. An actual controversy exists between Plaintiffs and Defendants in that Plaintiffs contend that the policies, practices, and conduct of Defendants alleged herein are unlawful and unconstitutional, whereas Plaintiffs are informed and believe that Defendants contend that said policies, practices, and conduct are lawful and constitutional. Plaintiffs seek a declaration of rights with respect to this controversy.
274. The purpose and effect of the excessive force described herein has been to restrict, frustrate, and deter protesters from exercising their rights under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution to peacefully assemble, petition for redress of grievances, exercise freedom of speech, and exercise freedom of the press, and the Fourth Amendment to be free from unwarranted seizures by the government.
Plaintiffs Seek Injunctive Relief because Defendants’ Actions Have Caused and Continue to Cause Harm
275. Detroit Will Breathe, as well as the individually named Plaintiffs, plan to assist, plan, participate in, and hold similar events in the future, on their own or in conjunction with others, and are fearful that the police actions in response to these and similar protests will be repeated absent injunctive relief to prohibit the practices, policies, and customs of the DPD that resulted in the unlawful action in response to the recent protests throughout the City.
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276. Plaintiffs want to participate in these demonstrations without being exposed to the excessive force and “non-lethal” weapons regularly deployed by the DPD against protesters as a method of crowd control.
277. Plaintiffs fear for their safety from Defendants’ violence because they have been attacked and injured repeatedly and without warning throughout their demonstrations.
278. Given the degree of risk that merely attending a protest presents to protesters, many would-be protest attendees, including G. Branch, choose not to participate, or leave earlier than they wish to, for fear that they will not have access to medical care in the likely event the police hurt them.
279. If this Court issues an injunction prohibiting Defendants from continuing the unlawful practices described above, Plaintiff G. Branch would return to the daily demonstrations.
280. Plaintiffs bring this action to enjoin the City of Detroit from continuing to respond to peaceful protest with unconstitutional and indiscriminate force.
281. Without an injunction restraining their unconstitutional use of force, DPD will continue to deploy the same abusive and illegal tactics, threatening the constitutional rights and physical safety of Plaintiffs.
282. All of the following claims for relief are asserted against all Defendants.
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COUNT I First Amendment to the United States Constitution:
Free Speech and Assembly 42 U.S.C. § 1983
283. All preceding paragraphs are incorporated by reference 284. At all relevant times, Defendants have acted—and continue to act— under color of state law. 285. Defendants’ above-described conduct violated Plaintiffs’ rights to freedom of speech, assembly, and association under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. Lawful protests that posed no threat were interrupted by police declaring unlawful assemblies without justification. 286. In dispersing such assemblies, Defendants repeatedly relied on violence and excessive force despite the peaceful nature of Plaintiffs’ actions. The DPD’s tactics and methods would, and in fact did, deter protesters of reasonable firmness from participating in future protests. 287. The Defendants’ repeated use of violence and excessive force against peaceful demonstrators can reasonably be expected to chill a reasonable person from engaging in activity protected by the First Amendment, and in fact has deterred demonstrators from participating in future events. Indeed, this has proven to be the obvious intent of Defendants’ tactics. 288. Defendants’ policy, practice, and custom of using “non-lethal” weapons and the types of force described in this lawsuit to control and suppress
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demonstrations is not a reasonable regulation of the time, place, or manner of Plaintiffs’ First Amendment protected activity.
289. Defendants have acted with deliberate indifference to Plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights.
290. Plaintiffs suffered and will continue to suffer harm as a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ actions, including but not limited to physical injury and pain and suffering.
291. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ unlawful actions, Plaintiffs have sustained injuries and damages including, physical injury, mental anguish and emotional distress, humiliation and embarrassment, and have incurred attorney fees.
COUNT II Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution:
Unreasonable and Excessive Force 42 U.S.C. 1983
292. All preceding paragraphs are incorporated by reference. 293. At all relevant times, Defendants have acted—and continue to act— under color of state law. 294. Defendants’ above-described conduct violated Plaintiffs’ clearly established rights pursuant to the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution to be free from unreasonable, excessive and arbitrary force and seizures under color of law.
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295. The arbitrary and indiscriminate use of force against Plaintiffs and other peaceful protesters, described in detail above, was excessive and objectively unreasonable, in direct violation of Plaintiffs’ rights under the Fourth Amendment.
296. Defendants engaged in the indiscriminate use of “non-lethal” weapons including zip ties, chokeholds, baton strikes, rubber bullets, teargas, pepper spray, the LRAD Sound Cannon, and fisticuffs, against peaceful demonstrators who did not present a physical threat to police officers or any member of the public, contrary to law.
297. Defendants deployed these “non-lethal” tactics largely without an audible prior notice or warning.
298. No Plaintiffs have been accused of any crimes severe enough to justify such egregious, and sometimes deadly, force.
299. In many instances, Plaintiffs were subjected to violent force despite not being accused of a crime at all.
300. The Plaintiffs have not posed any reasonable immediate threat to the safety of any officer nor have Defendants provided sufficient evidence asserting so.
301. The Defendants were not met with split second decisions as in almost each incident they were present on the scene observing for a substantial period of time prior to deploying chemical irritants, the LRAD Sound Cannon, rubber bullets, and other methods of physical force.
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302. Defendants intentionally removed the facemasks of demonstrators, including Plaintiffs, without any purpose beyond increasing the potency of their chemical weapons and/or to expose them to a deadly virus.
303. Defendants intentionally hit demonstrators, including Plaintiff J. Bass, with a police vehicle for the purpose of causing great bodily injury or with willful indifference to his wellbeing.
304. Defendants’ attacks were done not to compel Plaintiffs to retreat, but to injure and punish them on site. Many individuals were attempting to disperse the scene or helping an injured citizen at the scene. In some cases, Plaintiffs and others had force inflicted upon them while they were already detained or subdued.
305. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ unlawful actions, Plaintiffs have sustained injuries and damages including, physical injury, mental anguish and emotional distress, humiliation and embarrassment, and have incurred attorney fees.
COUNT III Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution:
Arrests Without Probable Cause 42 U.S.C. 1983
306. All preceding paragraphs are incorporated by reference. 307. At all relevant times, Defendants have acted—and continue to act— under color of state law.
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308. Defendants detained, seized, handcuffed, arrested, and searched Plaintiffs’ persons and their personal property despite the lack of any individualized probable cause or reasonable suspicion that Plaintiffs committed any crime.
309. Defendants issued “cookie cutter” misdemeanor tickets that had been filled out prior to the arrests, simply filling in the names of arrestees as they were rounded up.
310. The “arresting officers” did not actually witness or assert any facts describing Plaintiffs’ alleged violations of law.
311. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ unlawful actions, Plaintiffs have sustained injuries and damages including physical injury, mental anguish and emotional distress, humiliation and embarrassment, and have incurred attorney fees.
COUNT IV Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution:
False Imprisonment/Conditions of Confinement/ Failure to Provide Medical Attention
312. All preceding paragraphs are incorporated by reference. 313. At all relevant times, Defendants have acted—and continue to act— under color of state law. 314. Defendants placed several demonstrators, including Plaintiffs T. Taylor, L. Ellis, and J. Bass, on repurposed school buses and/or police cruisers for prolonged periods of time with the windows up and heat turned on during days in
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which the temperature was over 90 degrees without access to bathrooms, water, food, or medical attention. In some cases, Plaintiffs also still had pepper spray in their eyes.
315. Defendants removed and displaced Plaintiffs’ protective face masks, exposing them to great risk of contracting the deadly COVID-19 in the midst of a global pandemic.
316. Defendants fired tear gas canisters into crowds of non-violent demonstrators, including Plaintiffs, while preventing them from dispersing.
317. Defendants have denied or otherwise significantly delayed medical attention to Plaintiffs while holding them in custody, including A. Anest, who experienced serious injuries requiring hospitalization.
318. Conditions of confinement under which Plaintiffs were held violated their rights to due process of the law, were knowingly and objectively unreasonable, and were punitive, with no rational relationship to any lawful purpose for which Plaintiffs were being detained.
319. Defendants acted with deliberate and reckless indifference towards Plaintiffs’ health, safety, and medical needs.
320. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ unlawful actions, Plaintiffs have sustained injuries and damages including physical injury, mental
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anguish and emotional distress, humiliation and embarrassment, and have incurred attorney fees.
COUNT V First, Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution: Free Speech and Assembly/Curfew Orders 321. All preceding and subsequent paragraphs are incorporated by reference. 322. At all relevant times, Defendants have acted—and continue to act— under color of state law. 323. The curfew order was not narrowly tailored, insofar as it suppressed far more speech, assembly, and other protected First Amendment activity than necessary to deal with any emergency that was currently in existence. 324. The imposition of a curfew to the entire City of Detroit which was only enforced against Plaintiffs and those others who were peacefully protesting racist violence by law enforcement was not a reasonable regulation of the time, place, or manner of Plaintiffs’ First Amendment protected activity. 325. Defendants have acted with deliberate indifference to Plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights. 326. Plaintiffs suffered and will continue to suffer harm as a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ actions, including but not limited to physical injury and pain and suffering.
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COUNT VI 42 U.S.C. § 1981 - Retaliation 327. All preceding paragraphs are incorporated by reference. 328. The Plaintiffs have engaged in activity protected by 42 U.S.C. § 1981 when they vocalized, marched, and demonstrated in support of Black people’s rights to the full access to and equal benefit of all laws, particularly at the hands of law enforcement personnel. 329. Defendants, both individually and pursuant to the customs, policies and/or practices of Defendants City of Detroit, Craig and Duggan, retaliated against Plaintiffs by utilizing the excessive force and unlawful arrests described within this Complaint. 330. Defendants retaliated against Plaintiffs by using both force, ticketing, and arresting Plaintiffs in a manner completely dissimilar to methods used by DPD Officers in response to other similar protests that do not directly address the equal rights of Black citizens to the full and equal benefit of all laws. 331. There is no valid explanation for the disparate treatment of Plaintiffs and other demonstrators other than the fact that Plaintiffs’ message is one that specifically seeks to protect Black people in Detroit and America from the disproportionately excessive use of violence and unlawful criminal process by officers of the law.
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332. Defendants’ treatment of and egregious actions against Plaintiffs violate Plaintiffs’ rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
333. Defendants knowingly acted with malice and/or with reckless indifference to Plaintiffs’ federally protected rights.
334. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ unlawful actions, Plaintiffs have sustained injuries and damages including, physical injury, mental anguish and emotional distress, humiliation and embarrassment, and have incurred attorney fees.
COUNT VII 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Monell Liability 335. All preceding and subsequent paragraphs are incorporated by reference. 336. At all times herein, Defendant City of Detroit, through its Police Department, supervisors and/or policymakers, established and/or maintained the following customs, usages, policies and/or practices: a) Deploying chemical weapons, including tear gas and pepper spray, against demonstrators without warning or justification; b) Deploying LRADs against demonstrators without warning; c) Beating, shoving, tackling, and brutalizing demonstrators with batons and riot shields, including aiming for demonstrators’ legs to incapacitate them;
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d) Using chokeholds to detain demonstrators; e) Arresting demonstrators en masse without probable cause; f) Detaining demonstrators in intentionally overtightened zip ties and
heated police vehicles; g) Using police vehicles to run through and over demonstrators; and h) Shooting rubber bullets at fleeing demonstrators. 337. In particular, Defendant City of Detroit, acting through its Police Department, supervisors and/or policymakers, was on actual notice that its police officers, including Defendants Anouti, Erard, Hornshaw, Barr, and Does 1-100, engaged in the above-listed practices, thereby condoning and/or acquiescing in Defendants Anouti, Erard, Hornshaw, Barr, and Officer Does’ unconstitutional use of force, arrests, detentions, invasion of First and Fourth Amendment rights, and retaliatory conduct in violation of 42 USC §1981; 338. Each of the aforementioned policies, customs, and/or practices was known to Defendant City of Detroit, and Defendants Craig and Duggan, each acting in their official capacities, as being highly likely and probable to cause violations of the constitutional rights of members of the public, including but not limited to Plaintiffs herein.
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339. The conduct of the individually named Defendants herein was committed pursuant to the customs, policies and/or practices of Defendant City of Detroit.
340. Each such custom, policy and/or practice, referenced above, was a moving force in the violations of Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights, as set forth herein.
341. DPD policymakers including Mayor Duggan and Chief Craig have acted with utter disregard for the constitutional rights of protesters and would-be protesters by authorizing, both explicitly and implicitly, the use of less-lethal force against protesters who do not pose any safety threat; by failing to properly train, supervise, condemn, and discipline DPD officers regarding appropriate use of force against protesters; and by failing to rectify the DPD’s unconstitutional custom of using less-lethal force to control and suppress demonstrations.
342. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ unlawful actions, Plaintiffs have sustained injuries and damages including, physical injury, mental anguish and emotional distress, humiliation and embarrassment, and have incurred attorney fees.
REQUEST FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully request this Court to: A. Enter an injunction restraining Defendants from engaging in the unlawful and unconstitutional practices described above, including enjoining
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Defendants from using chemical irritants, deploying LRAD sound cannons, arresting demonstrators without probable cause, placing demonstrators in chokeholds, restraining demonstrators in dangerously tight zip ties, shooting rubber bullets at demonstrators, and using batons and riot shields as tools of excessive force;
B. Enter a declaratory judgment that Defendants’ conduct detailed herein was a violation of the rights under the Constitution and laws of the United States and of Plaintiffs;
C. Award general and compensatory damages for Plaintiffs for the violations of their federal constitutional and statutory rights, pain and suffering, all to be determined according to proof;
D. Award punitive damages as available, pursuant to both 42 U.S.C. §1983 and 42 U.S.C. §1981;
E. Award attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988; F. Award costs of suit; G. Award pre- and post-judgment interest as permitted by law; and H. Such other and further relief as the Court may deem just and proper.
Respectfully submitted, By: /s/ Jack W. Schulz /s/ Amanda M. Ghannam Jack W. Schulz (P78078) Amanda M. Ghannam (P83065) SCHULZ LAW PLC PO Box 44855 77

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Dated: August 31, 2020

Detroit, MI 48244 (313) 246-3590 jackwschulz@gmail.com amandamghannam@gmail.com Attorneys for Plaintiffs

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Case 2:20-cv-12363-LJM-DRG ECF No. 1 filed 08/31/20 PageID.80 Page 80 of 81

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

DETROIT WILL BREATHE, TRISTAN TAYLOR, NAKIA WALLACE, JAZTEN BASS, LAUREN ROSEN, LAURYN BRENNAN, AMY NAHABEDIAN, ZACH KOLODZIEJ, LAUREN BRANCH, LILLIAN ELLIS, OLIVIA PUENTE, IMAN SALEH, MARGARET HENIGE, CAYLEE ARNOLD, AND ALEXANDER ANEST,

Case No. Hon:

Plaintiffs, vs.

CITY OF DETROIT, a municipal corporation, MAYOR MICHAEL DUGGAN, acting in his official and individual capacities, CHIEF JAMES CRAIG, acting in his official and individual capacities, OFFICER STEPHEN ANOUTI, SERGEANT TIMOTHY BARR, OFFICER DAVID HORNSHAW, OFFICER MARIAH ERARD, and OFFICER DOES 1-100 inclusive, acting in their respective individual capacities, all jointly and severally,

Defendants.

__________________________________________________________________/

Jack W. Schulz (P78078)

GOODMAN HURWITZ & JAMES, PC

Amanda M. Ghannam (P83065)

Julie H. Hurwitz (P34720)

SCHULZ LAW PLC

William H. Goodman (P14173)

PO Box 44855

Melissa A. Brown (P79127)

Detroit, MI 48244

1394 E. Jefferson Ave.

(313) 246-3590

Detroit, MI 48207

jackwschulz@gmail.com

(313) 567-6170

amandamghannam@gmail.com

jhurwitz@goodmanhurwitz.com

On behalf of the National Lawyers

bgoodman@goodmanhurwitz.com

Guild, Detroit/Michigan Chapter

mbrown@goodmanhurwitz.com

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

On behalf of the National Lawyers

Guild, Detroit/Michigan Chapter

Co-counsel for Plaintiffs

Case 2:20-cv-12363-LJM-DRG ECF No. 1 filed 08/31/20 PageID.81 Page 81 of 81

Sean Riddell (P81302) The Riddell Law Firm PLLC 400 Renaissance Center, Ste. 2600 Detroit, MI 48243 (313) 497-0074 sriddell@riddelllawfirm.com On behalf of the National Lawyers Guild, Detroit/Michigan Chapter Co-counsel for Plaintiffs __________________________________________________________________/

DEMAND FOR TRIAL BY JURY

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 38 and 39, and to the Eastern District LR 38.1,

Plaintiffs demand a trial by jury on each and every one of their claims at law which

seek compensatory and/or punitive damages.

Respectfully submitted,

Dated: August 31, 2020

By: /s/ Jack W. Schulz /s/ Amanda M. Ghannam Jack W. Schulz (P78078) Amanda M. Ghannam (P83065) SCHULZ LAW PLC PO Box 44855 Detroit, MI 48244 (313) 246-3590 jackwschulz@gmail.com amandamghannam@gmail.com Attorneys for Plaintiffs

2

 </s> Case 2:20-cv-12363-LJM-DRG ECF No. 18 filed 09/04/20 PageID.303 Page 1 of 12

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

DETROIT WILL BREATHE, et al.,

Plaintiffs, v.

Case No. 20-12363 Honorable Laurie J. Michelson

CITY OF DETROIT, et al.,

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER [4]

Plaintiffs Detroit Will Breathe and 14 individuals have been involved in protest activity in the City of Detroit in response to the death of George Floyd, in a continuation of the “Black Lives Matter” movement. They allege that Detroit police have responded to their demonstrations with excessive force and have violated their First and Fourth Amendment rights. (ECF No. 1, 4.) Plaintiffs seek a temporary restraining order enjoining the City of Detroit, and more specifically, the Detroit Police Department (DPD) and its officers, from using certain tactics, including the use of striking weapons, chemical agents, and rubber bullets against demonstrators, medical support personnel, and legal observers. (ECF No. 4, PageID.146–149.) For the reasons stated below, the motion is granted in part.
I. Protests began in Detroit on May 29, 2020, in response to the death of George Floyd during his arrest by Minneapolis police officers. Daily demonstrations have continued throughout the summer.

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Plaintiffs allege that from the start, police have responded to peaceful demonstrations with beatings, tear gas, pepper spray, rubber bullets, sound cannons, flash grenades, chokeholds, and mass arrests without probable cause. (ECF No. 1, PageID.3.) Although Plaintiffs allege there have been a number of such incidents, their motion for a temporary restraining order focuses principally on clashes that occurred between May 29 and June 2, on July 10, and on August 22, 2020. (ECF No. 4, PageID.166.) Plaintiffs argue that these tactics violate their constitutional rights, including the right to free speech and assembly under the First Amendment and the right to be free from excessive force and arrest without probable cause under the Fourth Amendment. (ECF No. 1.) Plaintiffs now ask this Court to stop the City of Detroit and its agents and employees from using certain tactics against demonstrators and bystanders for fourteen days until the Court is able to decide whether a longer injunction is required. Plaintiffs have served the City of Detroit, Mayor Duggan, and Police Chief James Craig, but the remaining individual Defendant police officers have not been served.
The Court conducted two telephonic status conferences with counsel for the served parties, who worked diligently, but were unable to reach a mutually agreeable resolution to the motion.
II. A temporary restraining order (TRO), like a preliminary injunction, “is an extraordinary remedy reserved only for cases where it is necessary to preserve the status quo until trial.” Enchant Christmas Light Maze & Mkt. Ltd. v. Glowco, LLC, 958 F.3d 532, 535 (6th Cir. 2020) (internal citation omitted); Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Teamsters, 415 U.S. 423, 439 (1974) (The purpose of an ex parte TRO is “preserving the status quo and preventing irreparable harm just so long as is necessary to hold a hearing, and no longer.”). The Court may issue a TRO without notice to the adverse parties only if (1) “specific facts in an affidavit or a verified complaint clearly show that
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immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the movant before the adverse party can be heard in opposition”; and (2) Plaintiffs’ “attorney certifies in writing any efforts made to give notice and the reasons why it should not be required.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1).1
In granting preliminary injunctive relief, the Court must consider and balance four factors: (1) Plaintiffs’ likelihood of success on the merits, (2) whether Plaintiffs will suffer irreparable injury without an injunction, (3) whether granting the injunction will cause substantial harm to others, and (4) whether the public interest would be served by the injunction. S. Glazer’s Distributors of Ohio, LLC v. Great Lakes Brewing Co., 860 F.3d 844, 849 (6th Cir. 2017).
III. The Court takes a short detour before analyzing these factors to stand with many of its sister courts in recognizing the following underlying principles: demonstrators have a right to protest the actions of the police and other members of the government without fear of government retaliation; police officers, especially in their duty to protect person and property, have difficult and often dangerous jobs that require them to make split-second decisions; and just as not all protestors seek destruction, not all officers seek violence. The Court must thus balance the need to protect the sacred rights of speech and assembly from interference and retaliation with that of police to respond appropriately when the safety of the officers and the City’s citizens are threatened. “This Court recognizes the difficulty in drawing an enforceable line that permits police officers to use appropriate means in response to violence and destruction of property but that also does not chill free speech or abuse those who wish to exercise it.” Black Lives Matter Seattle-King Cty. v. City of Seattle, Seattle Police Dep’t, No. 2:20-CV-00887-RAJ, 2020 WL 3128299, at *2
1 The individual police officer defendants have not yet been served. It is unclear whether they have notice of the lawsuit. But because the Plaintiffs did not provide the required written certification, the Court has focused on the served Defendants.
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(W.D. Wash. June 12, 2020); see also Abay v. City of Denver, 445 F. Supp. 3d 1286, 1291 (D. Colo. 2020).
Now to the factors for a temporary restraining order. A.
The first factor, likelihood of success on the merits, is the most important factor in the case of an alleged constitutional violation and is typically determinative. See Obama for America v. Husted, 697 F.3d 423, 436 (6th Cir. 2012).
1. The Court begins with Plaintiffs’ claims under the Fourth Amendment. Plaintiffs bring claims of excessive force, unreasonable detention conditions, and false arrest under the Fourth Amendment. As presently alleged, the claims are asserted against all Defendants.2 Excessive force claims are analyzed under the objective reasonableness standard articulated in Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989). The reasonableness of any individual instance of use of force “must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene,” id. at 396, allowing for the fact that police officers often make split-second decisions in “tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving” circumstances, id. at 397. The Court must balance the “nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the countervailing governmental interests at stake” by considering factors such as the severity of the crime at issue (if any), the potential threat posed by the individual, and whether the individual is attempting to resist or evade arrest. Id. at 396 (internal quotations omitted). In this case, Plaintiffs have provided a verified complaint and a number of affidavits from demonstrators who aver that in response to their peaceful protest activity during the evening of
2 Going forward Plaintiffs will need to be more clear which Defendants are implicated. 4

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August 22, 2020, Detroit police officers beat them with batons, sprayed them with pepper spray, fired tear gas and rubber bullets at them, rammed them with a police car, and more. (See ECF No. 1; ECF No. 4-3; ECF No. 4-4; ECF No. 4-5; ECF No. 4-6; ECF No. 4-8; ECF No. 4-9; ECF No. 4-10; ECF No. 4-11.) All of the demonstrators aver that they were protesting peacefully, chanting and singing in the street without threatening or resisting the police, when the police began using violence against them without provocation. (Id.)
One of the affidavits contains Instagram links to video footage of an encounter between police and protestors on August 22, 2020. (ECF No. 4-8, PageID.205.) This video footage appears to show a line of Detroit police officers, dressed in riot gear and armed with batons, standing several feet away from protestors who can be heard chanting, “we don’t see no riots here, so why are you in riot gear?” This continues for several minutes. Then, suddenly, the officers appear to throw tear gas canisters into the crowd of protestors. (Id.) The police officers then advance on the crowd and grab, shove, and use batons to beat people standing at the front of the group. (Id.) There is also footage of officers pursuing individuals who are running or walking away from the chaos, apparently not posing any threat, and violently shoving them into the ground or a building. (Id.)
These videos, buttressed by the testimonial evidence, establishes that at least some Plaintiffs have a likelihood of success on their claims that the DPD used excessive force against them. True, Plaintiffs’ chances of prevailing could be lessened by a defense of qualified immunity, but that issue has not been briefed and it is premature to address it now.
The Fourth Amendment reasonableness standard also applies when an individual is in the custody of the police. See Phelps v. Coy, 286 F.3d 295, 300 (6th Cir. 2002). A number of the Plaintiffs and affiants allege that after they were detained by police, the officers handcuffed them with zip ties that were fastened so tightly that they were in serious pain, their hands turned blue,
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and they suffered physical injuries. (ECF No. 1, PageID.49–52; ECF No. 4-2, PageID.194; ECF No. 4-4, PageID.197; ECF No. 4-7, PageID.202.) The Sixth Circuit has noted that “applying handcuffs so tightly that the detainee’s hands become numb and turn blue certainly raises concerns of excessive force.” Burchett v. Kiefer, 310 F.3d 937, 944 (6th Cir. 2002). At this stage, Plaintiffs have demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits with respect to their excessive force claim under the Fourth Amendment.3
2. Plaintiffs also allege that Defendants violated their First Amendment rights to speech and assembly by retaliating against them for protesting. “[T]he First Amendment safeguards an individual’s right to participate in the public debate through political expression and political association.” McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Com’n, 572 U.S. 185, 203 (2014). “Organized political protest is a form of ‘classically political speech.’” Don’t Shoot Portland v. City of Portland, No. 3:20-CV-00917-HZ, 2020 WL 3078329, at *3 (D. Or. June 9, 2020) (quoting Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 318 (1988)). And this protection includes criticism of public officials even when it is “vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp.” Leonard v. Robinson, 477 F.3d 347 (6th Cir. 2007) (internal citations omitted). In order to prove retaliation under the First Amendment, Plaintiffs must demonstrate that Defendants took adverse action against them which would deter a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in the protected speech and that Defendants’ actions were motivated at least in part by Plaintiffs’ protected speech. See Maben v. Thelen, 887 F.3d 252, 262 (6th Cir. 2018) (quoting Thaddeus–X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 394 (6th Cir. 1999)).
3 Plaintiffs bring additional claims under the Fourth Amendment related to the treatment of protestors after they have been arrested. The strength of these claims are less clear and will, if necessary, be addressed when the record is better developed.
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The present record suggests Plaintiffs have a likelihood of success in showing that an ordinary person would be deterred from participating in the protests by the actions of Detroit police officers. As discussed above, Plaintiffs may well be able to show that police officers used things like tear gas, pepper spray, and batons against peaceful protestors. At least one Plaintiff stated that they have been deterred from attending further demonstrations and exercising their First Amendment rights after being beaten and detained while acting as a medic at a protest. (ECF No. 1, PageID.16–18.)
In order to succeed on their First Amendment retaliation claim, Plaintiffs will also need to demonstrate Defendants’ conduct was motivated by Plaintiffs’ protected activity. Plaintiffs have provided enough evidence to establish a likelihood of success on this element too. First, the indiscriminate use of tear gas and physical violence against peaceful protestors on August 22, 2020 may alone be enough to support the inference that the police officers were at least partially motivated by Plaintiffs’ protected activity. But Plaintiffs also offer affidavits stating that individual officers made statements to protesters such as “stop protesting or we will f**k you up.” (ECF No. 4-10, PageID.210.) This evidence supports a finding that Plaintiffs have made a showing of a likelihood of success on the merits on their First Amendment claim. Again, Defendants may later assert qualified immunity as a defense to this claim, but at this stage, that issue is not ripe.
3. Plaintiffs also allege that the City of Detroit is liable for violations of Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights under a theory of municipal liability. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). Municipal liability can be demonstrated in a number of ways, including showing that the City has a custom or practice of tolerating or permitting constitutional violations, that it failed to
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properly train and supervise employees, or that a high-ranking policymaker ratified a subordinate’s unconstitutional action. See Burgess v. Fischer, 735 F.3d 462, 478 (6th Cir. 2013). Plaintiffs have the burden of showing a likelihood of success on their claim that Detroit police officers were acting pursuant to a municipal policy or custom. Los Angeles Cty., Cal. v. Humphries, 562 U.S. 29, 31 (2010).
In a similar case brought against the city of Santa Rosa, California, the Court found that a TRO could not be issued against the city because the plaintiffs had failed to make any showing to support municipal liability. Martinez v. City of Santa Rosa, No. 20-CV-04135-VC, 2020 WL 5074262, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 2020). Here, as support for their allegations, Plaintiffs provided news articles quoting Mayor Duggan and Police Chief Craig. (ECF No. 4-15; ECF No. 4-16.) But the articles can cut both ways. For example, one article following the August 22nd incident quoted the police chief as saying he was “just ecstatic over the men and women in the Detroit Police Department,” and praising the mayor for standing with the police. (ECF No. 4-16, PageID.234– 235.) But in another article, the mayor makes clear that he would continue to support peaceful protests. (ECF No. 4-15, PageID.228.)
At this point, it is unclear whether there is any official policy or custom motivating the alleged constitutional violations carried out by individual police officers. But the video and testimonial evidence presented by Plaintiffs suggests that, on at least one occasion, police have used physical violence, and tear gas and pepper spray against peaceful protestors without provocation, and city officials have done nothing to condemn these actions. And the verified complaint contains allegations that police officers told arrestees on August 22 that the officers were “just following orders.” (ECF No. 1, PageID.62.) This evidence leads to the inference that
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Plaintiffs have a likelihood of success in establishing that unconstitutional conduct by police was carried out pursuant to an official policy or custom.
B. In the case of an alleged constitutional violation, “the likelihood of success on the merits often will be the determinative factor.” Obama for America, 697 F.3d at 436 (quoting Jones v. Caruso, 569 F.3d 258, 265 (6th Cir. 2009)). Plaintiffs have shown a likelihood of success on their First and Fourth Amendment claims. And thus irreparable injury has likely already occurred. See, e.g., Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976) (“The loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.”).4 The daily demonstrations in Detroit are ongoing. (ECF No. 4, PageID.182.) Without a TRO, there is nothing in the record that indicates that Plaintiffs will not experience further constitutional deprivations and even physical harm at the hands of the police. Because the Court finds that “a constitutional right is being threatened or impaired, a finding of irreparable injury is mandated.” Bonnell v. Lorenzo, 241 F.3d 800, 809 (6th Cir. 2001).
C. When considering the third factor, balance of equities, a court “must balance the competing claims of injury” and “consider the effect on each party of the granting or withholding of the requested relief.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008) (internal quotations omitted). The Court recognizes that police officers are often faced with dangerous and rapidly evolving situations while trying to enforce the law and maintain the safety of the public. And it is
4 The Court would like to point out that the Plaintiffs’ brief included a different quote from Elrod v. Burns. That quote does not actually appear in the opinion, nor does it appear in any other opinion on Westlaw.
9

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important that police officers have non-lethal options to use to protect themselves and the public when necessary. But the relief that Plaintiffs request leaves open all lawful options for police to use reasonable force when necessary to defend against a threat and to make arrests when supported by probable cause. And any possible benefit police officers could gain from deploying chemical agents, projectiles, or striking weapons against demonstrators who pose no threat and are not resisting lawful commands is outweighed by the irreparable harm peaceful protestors would face.
D. The final factor, the public interest, also weighs in favor of an injunction. “It is always in the public interest to prevent the violation of a party’s constitutional rights.” Connection Distrib. Co. v. Reno, 154 F.3d 281, 288 (6th Cir. 1998) (quoting G & V Lounge, Inc. v. Michigan Liquor Control Comm'n, 23 F.3d 1071, 1079 (6th Cir. 1994). Because the Plaintiffs have established a likelihood of success on the merits for their constitutional claims, an injunction to prevent further irreparable constitutional harm is in the public interest.
E. Finally, while the Court has conducted an independent analysis of the factors for temporary relief, and has focused on the particular facts of this case, the Court notes that in issuing a TRO, it joins the approach taken by its sister courts in a number of cities who have analyzed similar claims and issued similar injunctions. See Don’t Shoot Portland, 2020 WL 3078329, at *4–5; Black Lives Matter Seattle, 2020 WL 3128299, at *5; Abay, 445 F. Supp. at 1294; Anti Police-Terror Project v. City of Oakland, No. 20-CV-03866-JCS, 2020 WL 4584185, at *17 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2020).
10

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IV. Considering the factors discussed above, the Court finds that temporary injunctive relief is warranted and GRANTS IN PART Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order. (ECF No. 4.) For a period of 14 days, to be extended upon a showing of good cause, but not beyond 28 days absent consent by Defendants, the City of Detroit, including the Detroit Police Department, and all officers, agents, and departments under the Police Department’s control (for purposes of this order, “the City”) is enjoined from:
 Using striking weapons (including, but not limited to, batons and shields), chemical agents (including, but not limited to, tear gas and pepper spray), or rubber bullets against any individual peacefully engaging in protest or demonstrations who does not pose a physical threat to the safety of the public or police;
 Deploying chemical agents or a sound cannon against persons peacefully engaging in protest or demonstrations without an audible warning and a reasonable amount of time to disperse;
 Placing in a chokehold or ramming with a vehicle any individual attending a demonstration;
 Tightening the zip ties or handcuffs placed on any individual to the point that the restraints cause physical injury, including loss of circulation or change in color;
 Arresting any demonstrators en masse without probable cause. In the event that Plaintiffs seek relief for an alleged violation of this Order, the City must respond to the motion for relief within 24 hours.
11

Case 2:20-cv-12363-LJM-DRG ECF No. 18 filed 09/04/20 PageID.314 Page 12 of 12 Because this is a non-commercial case, the balance of equities favor Plaintiffs, and there is
no realistic likelihood of harm to Defendants from enjoining their conduct, the Court waives the security bond requirement.
SO ORDERED. Dated: September 4, 2020
s/Laurie J. Michelson LAURIE J. MICHELSON UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
12

 </s> Case 3:20-cv-12363-RHC-APP ECF No. 2 filed 08/31/20 PageID.82 Page 1 of 47

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

DETROIT WILL BREATHE, TRISTAN TAYLOR, NAKIA WALLACE, JAZTEN BASS, LAUREN ROSEN, LAURYN BRENNAN, AMY NAHABEDIAN, ZACH KOLODZIEJ, LAUREN BRANCH, LILLIAN ELLIS, OLIVIA PUENTE, IMAN SALEH, MARGARET HENIGE, CAYLEE ARNOLD, AND ALEXANDER ANEST,

Case No. Hon:

Plaintiffs, vs.

CITY OF DETROIT, a municipal corporation, MAYOR MICHAEL DUGGAN, acting in his official and individual capacities, CHIEF JAMES CRAIG, acting in his official and individual capacities, OFFICER STEPHEN ANOUTI, SERGEANT TIMOTHY BARR, OFFICER DAVID HORNSHAW, OFFICER MARIAH ERARD, and OFFICER DOES 1-100 inclusive, acting in their respective individual capacities, all jointly and severally,

Defendants.

__________________________________________________________________/

Jack W. Schulz (P78078)

Julie H. Hurwitz (P34720)

Amanda M. Ghannam (P83065)

William H. Goodman (P14173)

SCHULZ LAW PLC

Melissa A. Brown (P79127)

PO Box 44855

GOODMAN HURWITZ & JAMES,

Detroit, MI 48244

PC

(313) 246-3590

1394 E. Jefferson Ave.

jackwschulz@gmail.com

Detroit, MI 48207

amandamghannam@gmail.com

(313) 567-6170

On behalf of the National Lawyers

jhurwitz@goodmanhurwitz.com

Guild, Detroit/Michigan Chapter

bgoodman@goodmanhurwitz.com

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

mbrown@goodmanhurwitz.com

On behalf of the National Lawyers

Sean Riddell (P81302)

Guild, Detroit/Michigan Chapter

The Riddell Law Firm PLLC

Co-counsel for Plaintiffs

1

Case 3:20-cv-12363-RHC-APP ECF No. 2 filed 08/31/20 PageID.83 Page 2 of 47
400 Renaissance Center, Ste. 2600 Detroit, MI 48243 (313) 497-0074 sriddell@riddelllawfirm.com On behalf of the National Lawyers Guild, Detroit/Michigan Chapter Co-counsel for Plaintiffs __________________________________________________________________/
PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION (EXPEDITED HEARING REQUESTED)
Plaintiffs, Detroit Will Breathe, Tristan Taylor, Nakia Wallace, Jazten Bass, Lauren Rosen, Lauryn Brennan, Amy Nahabedian, Zachary Kolodziej, Graham Branch, Lillian Ellis, Olivia Puente, Iman Saleh, Margaret Henige, Caylee Arnold, and Alexander Anest (“Plaintiffs”) move for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 and the First and Fourth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Plaintiffs support this motion with the contents of their Verified Complaint, Brief in Support, and affidavits from witnesses and individuals who suffered violations similar to those of Plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs specifically seek an order enjoining Defendant City of Detroit, its police department, and its officers, agents, and employees (collectively “DPD”) as follows:
1. That the DPD be enjoined from utilizing striking weapons, such as batons and shields, against demonstrators who do not pose a threat to any officer and
2

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have not committed any crimes or otherwise been accused of misdemeanors or civil infractions.
2. That the DPD be enjoined from utilizing striking weapons, such as batons and shields, on any individual who is subdued, attempting to disperse, assisting an injured demonstrator, or otherwise not resisting any lawful command.
3. That the DPD be enjoined from using any striking weapons, such as batons or shields, or other forms of physical combat against individuals attending demonstrations for the purpose of providing medical support or to legal observe. To facilitate DPD’s identification of these individuals, Medics will be clearly marked with a large red cross and legal observers will be wearing a National Lawyers’ Guild issued or authorized Legal Observer hat (a neon green hat).
4. That the DPD be enjoined from deploying tear gas against demonstrators without first issuing an audible warning and notice to disperse, and time to comply with a legitimate dispersal order.
5. That the DPD be enjoined from using pepper spray against non-violent demonstrators who have not committed any crimes or otherwise accused of misdemeanors or civil infractions.
6. That the DPD be enjoined from utilizing chemical irritants against individuals who are already subdued or are otherwise attempting to disperse.
3

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7. That the DPD be enjoined from utilizing chemical irritants against individuals who have not been accused of any crimes.
8. That the DPD be enjoined from utilizing rubber bullets against demonstrators who have not committed any crimes or are otherwise accused of misdemeanors or civil infractions.
9. That the DPD be enjoined from placing demonstrators in chokeholds. 10. That the DPD be enjoined from ramming demonstrators with their vehicles or using moving vehicles for crowd control. 11. That the DPD be enjoined from using the LRAD Sound Cannon. 12. That the DPD be enjoined from removing protective face masks from individuals who are shielding themselves from Covid-19 or otherwise denying individuals the ability to replace or reposition their protective facial masks or maintaining social distance. 13. That the DPD be enjoined from tightening zip ties to the point in which an individual’s hands lose circulation, intentionally or to a standard that a reasonable trained police officer would be aware such injury is possible. If an arrestee alerts an officer that they have lost circulation to their hands or are otherwise in pain the officer must give attention and remedy the issue by removing or loosening the zip ties.
4

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14. That the DPD be enjoined from denying timely medical attention to individuals it has arrested or otherwise seized.
15. That the DPD be enjoined from denying arrestees access to water and restrooms for extended periods of time.
16. That the DPD be enjoined from deliberately subjecting arrestees to torturous conditions including, but not limited to, placing arrestees in oppressively hot vehicles for several hours or placing restrained arrestees outdoors in the sun for several hours without shade or water.
17. That the DPD be enjoined from arresting, or otherwise seizing, any demonstrator and/or demonstrators en masse unless they have individualized probable cause to believe that such individual(s) committed a crime justifying arrest.
18. That the DPD be enjoined from arresting individuals attending demonstrations for the purpose of providing medical support or to legal observe. To facilitate DPD’s identification of these individuals, Medics will be clearly marked with a large red cross and legal observers will be wearing a National Lawyers’ Guild issued or authorized Legal Observer hat (a neon green hat).
The materials submitted in support of this motion demonstrate that “immediate injury, loss, or damage will result to the movants before the adverse party can be heard in opposition.” Fed. R. Civ. P 65(b)(1)(A). They demonstrate a threat of irreparable harm to the Plaintiffs, likely to be repeated as to said named
5

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Plaintiffs, and other demonstrators or potential demonstrators who are not parties to

the suit, the Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits, that the balance of this

harm against any harm the TRO may inflict on others parties weighs in favor of

granting the TRO, and that the public interest favors issuing a TRO. There is no

place in Detroit or this County for intentionally brutalizing, injuring, and maiming,

non-violent protestors, medics, and spectators.

If the Court grants the requested relief, Plaintiffs seek an expedited hearing

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(b)(3). To demonstrate the necessity of the

requested relief, Plaintiffs respectfully request the ability to play video footage and

present witnesses.

Respectfully submitted,

SCHULZ LAW PLC

Dated: August 30, 2020

By: /s/ Jack W. Schulz Jack W. Schulz (P78078) Amanda M. Ghannam (P83065) SCHULZ LAW PLC PO Box 44855 Detroit, MI 48244 (313) 246-3590 jackwschulz@gmail.com amandamghannam@gmail.com On behalf of the National Lawyers Guild, Detroit/Michigan Chapter Attorneys for Plaintiff

6

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

DETROIT WILL BREATHE, TRISTAN TAYLOR, NAKIA WALLACE, JAZTEN BASS, LAUREN ROSEN, LAURYN BRENNAN, AMY NAHABEDIAN, ZACH KOLODZIEJ, LAUREN BRANCH, LILLIAN ELLIS, OLIVIA PUENTE, IMAN SALEH, MARGARET HENIGE, CAYLEE ARNOLD, AND ALEXANDER ANEST,

Case No. Hon:

Plaintiffs, vs.

CITY OF DETROIT, a municipal corporation, MAYOR MICHAEL DUGGAN, acting in his official and individual capacities, CHIEF JAMES CRAIG, acting in his official and individual capacities, OFFICER STEPHEN ANOUTI, SERGEANT TIMOTHY BARR, OFFICER DAVID HORNSHAW, OFFICER MARIAH ERARD, and OFFICER DOES 1-100 inclusive, acting in their respective individual capacities, all jointly and severally,

Defendants.

__________________________________________________________________/

Jack W. Schulz (P78078)

Julie H. Hurwitz (P34720)

Amanda M. Ghannam (P83065)

William H. Goodman (P14173)

SCHULZ LAW PLC

Melissa A. Brown (P79127)

PO Box 44855

GOODMAN HURWITZ

Detroit, MI 48244

& JAMES, PC

(313) 246-3590

1394 E. Jefferson Ave.

jackwschulz@gmail.com

Detroit, MI 48207

amandamghannam@gmail.com

(313) 567-6170

On behalf of the National Lawyers

jhurwitz@goodmanhurwitz.com

Guild, Detroit/Michigan Chapter

bgoodman@goodmanhurwitz.com

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

mbrown@goodmanhurwitz.com

On behalf of the National Lawyers

Sean Riddell (P81302)

Guild, Detroit/Michigan Chapter

The Riddell Law Firm PLLC

Co-counsel for Plaintiffs

Case 3:20-cv-12363-RHC-APP ECF No. 2 filed 08/31/20 PageID.89 Page 8 of 47
400 Renaissance Center, Ste. 2600 Detroit, MI 48243 (313) 497-0074 sriddell@riddelllawfirm.com On behalf of the National Lawyers Guild, Detroit/Michigan Chapter Co-counsel for Plaintiffs __________________________________________________________________/
PLAINTIFFS’ BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION FOR A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION (EXPEDITED HEARING REQUESTED)

Case 3:20-cv-12363-RHC-APP ECF No. 2 filed 08/31/20 PageID.90 Page 9 of 47
TABLE OF CONTENTS Index of Authorities…..…………………………………………………………....iv Statement of Issues Presented………………………..…………………………...vii Controlling or Most Appropriate Authority….........................................................xi Introduction…….………………………………….....………………...…………..1 Statement of Facts………………………………….....………………...…………..1 Discussion…...………………………………………...………………..…………..5
I. Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits…………...…………………6 A. Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on their excessive force claims
under the Fourth Amendment…………………………………..…………...6 1. The Plaintiffs were accused of minor crimes of in several cases
no crime at all……………………………………..……………..………7 2. The Plaintiffs posed no immediate threat to the safety of the
officers or others…………………………………………..……………..8 3. The Plaintiffs were not actively resisting or attempting to
evade arrest………………………………………………………...…….8 4. It was a violation of the Fourth Amendment when Defendants
used batons, riot shields, and excessive physical force to brutalize Plaintiffs and other demonstrators…………………………….9 5. It was a violation of the Fourth Amendment when Defendants fired rubber bullets at demonstrators………………………………..…10
i

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6. It was a violation of the Fourth Amendment when Defendants used chokeholds against Plaintiff Nakia Wallace and other demonstrators…………………………………….………………10
7. It was a violation of the Fourth Amendment when Defendants utilized deadly force by ramming Plaintiff Jazten Bass and other demonstrators with a police vehicle…………………………11
8. It was a violation of the Fourth Amendment when Defendants deployed chemical irritants to injure and deter Plaintiffs and other demonstrators…………………………………………….….12
9. It was a violation of the Fourth Amendment when Defendants deployed a Long Range Acoustic Device (“LRAD”) to injure and deter Plaintiffs and other demonstrators…………………………..12
10.It was a violation of the Fourth Amendment when Defendants restrained Plaintiffs and other demonstrators with intentionally tightened zip ties…………………………………………………….…..13
B. Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on claims that they were subjected to punitive, unnecessary, and torturous conditions in violation of the Fourth Amendment………………………………………………………...13
C. Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on claims that they were falsely arrested in violation of the Fourth Amendment……………………….…...14
D. Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on their First Amendment claims……….....15
1. Plaintiffs engaged in activity protected by the First Amendment...….…15
2. The use of force against Plaintiffs and mass arrests of Plaintiffs have chilled their First Amendment Rights………………………..……16
3. Defendants’ conduct was motivated by Plaintiffs’ protected activity…..17
ii

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E. Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on their Monell claims…………….………18 II. Plaintiffs will suffer irreparable harm without the
Court’s intervention……………..…………............................................19 III. The public’s interest and balance of equities weigh strongly in
favor of Plaintiffs………………………………………………………..20 IV. Courts across the country have enjoined similar police conduct
arising from Black Lives Matter protests…………………..……..……..21 Conclusion……………………………...………………..………………………..25
iii

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INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
CASES Southern Glazers Distribs. of Ohio, LLC v. Great Lakes Brewery Co., 860 F.3d 844 (6th Cir. 2017)………………………...……………………………..6
Obama for America v. Husted, 697 F.3d 423 (6th Cir. 2012)……………………………………………………….6
Liberty Coins, LLC v. Goodman, 748 F.3d 682 (6th Cir. 2014)……………………………………………………….6
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989)………………………………………………………..……6, 7
Scott v. Clay County, 205 F.3d 867 (6th Cir. 2000)……………………………………………………....7
Ciminillo v. Streicher, 434 F.3d 461 (6th Cir. 2006)……………………………………………...……7, 10
Grawey v. Drury, 567 F.3d 302 (6th Cir. 2009)…………………………………………………….7, 8
Crawford v. Geiger, 656 Fed. Appx. 190 (6th Cir. 2013)…………………………………………..……7
Solomon v. Auburn Hills Police Dept., 389 F.3d 167 (6th Cir. 2004)…………………………………………………….…9
Jones v. City of Cincinnati, 521 F.3d 555 (6th Cir. 2008)……………………………………………………….9
Schreiber v. Moe, 596 F.3d 323 (6th Cir. 2010)………………………………………………..….9, 10
King v. United States, 917 F.3d 409 (6th Cir. 2019)……………………………………………………...11
iv

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Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985)…………………………………………………………………11
Champion v. Outlook Nashville, Inc., 380 F.3d 893 (6th Cir. 2004)…………………………………………………...…12
Atkins v. Township of Flint, 94 F. App'x 342 (6th Cir. 2004)…………………………………………………..12
Edrei v. Maguire, 892 F.3d 525 (2nd Cir. 2018)…………………………………………..……..12, 13
Vance v. Wade, 546 F.3d 774 (6th Cir. 2008)…………………………………………………..….13
Phelps v. Coy, 286 F.3d 295 (6th Cir. 2002)………………………………………………...……13
Burchett v. Kiefer, 310 F.3d 937 (6th Cir. 2002)…………………………………………………...…14
Estate of Owensby v. City of Cincinnati, 414 F.3d 596 (6th Cir. 2005)……………………………………………………...14
Donovan v. Thames, 105 F.3d 291 (6th Cir. 1997)…………………………………………………..….15
Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250 (2006)………………………………………………………………15
Thaddeus–X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378 (6th Cir. 1999)……………………………………………...15, 16, 17
Leonard v. Robinson, 477 F.3d 347 (6th Cir. 2007)……………………………………………………...16
Glasson v. City of Louisville, 518 F.2d 899 (1975)……………………………………………………………....16
v

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Black Lives Matter Seattle-King County v. City of Seattle, Seattle Police Department, No. 2:20-cv-00887-RAJ, 2020 WL 3128299 (W.D. Wash. June 12, 2020)………………....16, 17, 22, 23, 24
Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978)…………………………………………………………...….18
City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989)…………………………………………………………...….18
Bd. of County Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397 (1997)…………………………………………………………..18, 19
Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976)…………………………………………………..…………..19
Overstreet v. Lexington-Fayette Urban Cty. Govt., 305 F.3d 566 (6th Cir.2002)……………………………………………………....19
Connection Distrib. Co. v. Reno, 154 F.3d 281 (6th Cir. 1998)……………………………………………...………20
Anti Police-Terror Project v. City of Oakland, Case no. 20-cv-03866-JCS, 2020 WL 4584185 (N.D. Cal. 2020)………..21, 23, 24
Abay et al. v. City of Denver, Case no. 20-cv-01616-RBJ, 2020 WL 3034161 (D. Col. 2020)……….…21, 23, 25
Don’t Shoot Portland v. City of Portland, Case no. 3:20-cv-00917-HZ, 2020 WL 3078329 (D. Oreg. 2020)…………….…22
Woodstock et al. v. City of Portland, Case no. 3:20-cv-1035-SI, 2020 WL 3621179 (D. Oreg. 2020)……………….…22
Goyette v. City of Minneapolis, Case no. 20-cv-1302, 2020 WL 3056705 (D. Minn. 2020)……………..…….22, 23
RULES
Fed. R. Civ. P. 65…………………………………………….…………………6, 25
vi

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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED
1. Should the Court enjoin Defendants from utilizing striking weapons such as batons and shields, against demonstrators who do not pose a threat to any officer and have not committed any crimes or otherwise been accused of misdemeanors or civil infractions.
Plaintiffs’ Answer: Yes Defendants’ Answer: No
2. Should the Court enjoin Defendants from utilizing striking weapons, such as batons and shields, on any individual who is subdued, attempting to disperse, assisting an injured demonstrator, or otherwise not resisting any lawful command?
Plaintiffs’ Answer: Yes Defendants’ Answer: No
3. Should the Court enjoin Defendants from using any striking weapons, such as batons or shields, or other forms of physical combat against individuals attending demonstrations for the purpose of providing medical support or to legal observe?
Plaintiffs’ Answer: Yes Defendants’ Answer: No
4. Should the Court enjoin Defendants from deploying tear gas against demonstrators without first issuing an audible warning and notice to disperse, and time to comply with a legitimate dispersal order?
Plaintiffs’ Answer: Yes Defendants’ Answer: No
5. Should the Court enjoin Defendants from using pepper spray against nonviolent demonstrators who have not committed any crimes or otherwise accused of misdemeanors or civil infractions?
Plaintiffs’ Answer: Yes Defendants’ Answer: No
vii

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6. Should the Court enjoin Defendants from utilizing chemical irritants against individuals who are already subdued or are otherwise attempting to disperse?
Plaintiffs’ Answer: Yes Defendants’ Answer: No
7. Should the Court enjoin Defendants from utilizing chemical irritants against individuals who have not been accused of any crimes?
Plaintiffs’ Answer: Yes Defendants’ Answer: No
8. Should the Court enjoin Defendants from utilizing rubber bullets against demonstrators who have not committed any crimes or are otherwise accused of misdemeanors or civil infractions?
Plaintiffs’ Answer: Yes Defendants’ Answer: No
9. Should the Court enjoin Defendants from placing demonstrators in chokeholds?
Plaintiffs’ Answer: Yes Defendants’ Answer: No
10. Should the Court enjoin Defendants from ramming demonstrators with their vehicles or using moving vehicles for crowd control?
Plaintiffs’ Answer: Yes Defendants’ Answer: No
11. Should the Court enjoin Defendants from using the LRAD Sound Cannon?
Plaintiffs’ Answer: Yes Defendants’ Answer: No
12. Should the Court enjoin Defendants from removing protective face masks from individuals who are shielding themselves from Covid-19 or otherwise
viii

Case 3:20-cv-12363-RHC-APP ECF No. 2 filed 08/31/20 PageID.98 Page 17 of 47
denying individuals the ability to replace or reposition their protective facial masks or maintaining social distance?
Plaintiffs’ Answer: Yes Defendants’ Answer: No
13. Should the Court enjoin Defendants from tightening zip ties to the point in which an individual’s hands lose circulation, intentionally or to a standard that a reasonable trained police officer would be aware such injury is possible. If an arrestee alerts an officer that they have lost circulation to their hands or are otherwise in pain the officer must give attention and remedy the issue by removing or loosening the zip ties?
Plaintiffs’ Answer: Yes Defendants’ Answer: No
14. Should the Court enjoin Defendants denying timely medical attention to individuals they have arrested or otherwise seized?
Plaintiffs’ Answer: Yes Defendants’ Answer: No
15. Should the Court enjoin Defendants from denying arrestees access to water and restrooms for extended periods of time?
Plaintiffs’ Answer: Yes Defendants’ Answer: No
16. Should the Court enjoin Defendants from deliberately subjecting arrestees to torturous conditions including, but not limited to, placing arrestees in oppressively hot vehicles for several hours or placing restrained arrestees outdoors in the sun for several hours without shade or water?
Plaintiffs’ Answer: Yes Defendants’ Answer: No
17. Should the Court enjoin Defendants from arresting, or otherwise seizing, any demonstrator and/or demonstrators en masse unless they have individualized probable cause to believe that such individual(s) committed a crime justifying arrest?
ix

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Plaintiffs’ Answer: Yes Defendants’ Answer: No 18. Should the Court enjoin Defendants from arresting individuals attending demonstrations for the purpose of providing medical support or to legal observe. To facilitate DPD’s identification of these individuals, Medics will be clearly marked with a large red cross and legal observers will be wearing a National Lawyers’ Guild issued or authorized Legal Observer hat (a neon green hat)? Plaintiffs’ Answer: Yes Defendants’ Answer: No
x

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CONTROLLING AUTHORITIES PER LOCAL RULE 7.1 Scott v. Clay County, 205 F.3d 867 (6th Cir. 2000) Grawey v. Drury, 567 F.3d 302 (6th Cir. 2009); Ciminillo v. Streicher, 434 F.3d 461 (6th Cir. 2006) Thaddeus–X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378 (6th Cir. 1999) Bd. of County Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397 (1997)
xi

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INTRODUCTION Since May 29, 2020, Defendants (collectively “DPD”) have repeatedly responded to peaceful demonstrations for equal rights under the law for Black Detroiters with unnecessary, unreasonable, and excessive violence, subjecting nonviolent demonstrators to, among other things, tear-gas, pepper-spray, beatings, rubber bullets, deafening and disorienting sound cannons, police vehicles, flash grenades, chokeholds, and cordoning them off in small groups (“kettled”), and arresting en masse without probable cause. DPD has made it clear that it will continue to use violence against peaceful demonstrators without Court intervention. Plaintiffs argue that the DPD’s use of less-lethal, “crowd control” weapons and violates their First Amendment right to protest and their Fourth Amendment right to be free from excessive force. Plaintiffs seek an order enjoining Defendant City of Detroit and their agents and employees from utilizing the specific excessive tactics against demonstrators as listed within the accompanying Motion.
STATEMENT OF FACTS Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the factual allegations contained in their Verified Complaint. (Verified Complaint, Doc. No. 1, hereafter “VC”) Those facts may be summarized as follows: After the death of George Floyd, Plaintiffs, alongside hundreds of residents of Detroit and the surrounding area, joined thousands around the country to demand

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justice for Mr. Floyd in a continuation of the “Black Lives Matter” movement. The demonstrations have been overwhelmingly peaceful. However, DPD, with the endorsement of Defendants Michael Duggan and James Craig, immediately and consistently responded with unreasonable, unnecessary, and excessive force.
On the first night of demonstrations (May 29, 2020) Detroit police deployed officers in riot gear, who attacked and beat demonstrators using their batons and shields. They pepper-sprayed demonstrators and launched canisters of tear gas indiscriminately into the crowd. Officers brutally beat and arrested Plaintiff G. Branch, who attended as a volunteer medic, while growling “welcome to Detroit, bitch” into their ear, then threatened them with felony charges if they returned to protest again. Approximately 60 people were arrested and many more were beaten, pepper-sprayed, and tear-gassed. G. Branch has not attended a demonstration since.
Despite DPD’s show of force, hundreds more demonstrators returned to the streets the next day -- and almost every day since. As the demonstrations continued, Defendants’ violence escalated. Every night between May 29 and June 2, 2020, DPD responded to the demonstrations with beatings, tear gas, pepper spray, and mass arrests. On May 31, 2020, Defendant Duggan implemented a citywide curfew of 8:00 P.M., which DPD enforced exclusively against Black Lives Matter demonstrators. That night, in addition to the tactics and weaponry described above, officers shot indiscriminately at demonstrators, including Plaintiff A. Nahabedian,
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with rubber bullets. On June 2, 2020, DPD officers deployed an LRAD sound cannon, causing injury and possibly permanent hearing loss to demonstrators including Plaintiffs L. Rosen and L. Ellis. On June 28, 2020, officers plowed through a group of demonstrators, including Plaintiff J. Bass, with their police SUVS.
On July 10, 2020, DPD shot and killed Hakim Littleton. As the demonstrations grew to include calls for an investigation, police again escalated their use of excessive force. Officers, including Defendant Officers Hornshaw and Erard, pepper-sprayed, tear-gassed, and brutally beat Plaintiffs T. Taylor, O. Puente, L. Brennan, Z. Kolodziej, I. Saleh and N. Wallace. I. Saleh was left with a fractured hip. T. Taylor, Z. Kolodziej, and N. Wallace were arrested. One officer held N. Wallace with an extended chokehold. When N. Wallace asked an officer “do they pay you enough to defend murderers?”, he told her to “shut the fuck up before I make you the next victim.”
On August 22, 2020, Plaintiff Detroit Will Breathe hosted a gathering at the intersection of Woodward and John R in downtown Detroit. Participants danced, sang, played music, blew bubbles, read books, and chatted with one another. They described the atmosphere as relaxed, festive, and jovial - “like a block party” -- until Defendants, continuing their pattern and practice of using excessive force against nonviolent demonstrators, deployed officers in riot gear to attack the group. Officers again deployed pepper spray, tear gas, and smoke canisters, charged into the crowd,
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and began to tackle and beat demonstrators with their batons, shields, and fists. As
on the prior days, the officers -- not the demonstrators -- initiated the chaos. Multiple
people, including demonstrators, bystanders, and legal observers, were beaten and
arrested. Plaintiff A. Anest was beaten so severely that he was hospitalized for five
days with a collapsed lung and broken rib. Plaintiff C. Arnold was tackled, detained,
handcuffed, and then pepper-sprayed directly in the face as she lay helpless, pinned
to the ground by multiple officers. Plaintiff M. Henige was dragged down
Woodward Avenue by her feet and legs.
Plaintiffs also incorporate by reference the factual allegations contained in the
attached declarations which consistently confirm that it was DPD officers who
initiated violence against Plaintiffs and the other demonstrators and that they have
done so as a matter of policy and practice. Some notable excerpts include:
● “I saw someone (who I couldn’t at first identify) with multiple officers on top of him, we all screamed, pleading for them to get off of him (he ended up in the hospital for stitches on his face, which was covered in blood when I finally identified him.” - M. Henige (Exhibit A)
● “It was clear that riot police took joy and amusement in causing major bodily damage and pain to demonstrators...I have been marching with DWB since about day #2 and can confirm this is a pattern with Detroit Police Department.” - L. Rosen (Exhibit B)
● “...One protestor...doubled over and wailed in pain. I have never heard another human make a noise like I heard her make. It was guttural and it brought tears to my eyes. Once she was finally able to speak, she told us it was her zip ties that were causing her so much pain...her hands were somewhere between grey, blue, and purple….her zip ties were so tight that it took them several
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minutes to cut them off. This poor young woman continued to cry out in pain the entire time.” - C. Arnold (Exhibit C)
● “The police never addressed the crowd, immediately approaching, I saw them assault people next to me who were not resisting.” - A. Kaplowitz (Exhibit D)
● “A 4’11” woman who has also been with us since June was repeatedly beaten in the face and is now streaming blood. I have never seen anything like this… All around us people are being hit, shoved to the ground, piled on by multiple officers.” - B. K. Saginaw (Exhibit E)
● “I pulled my car away from the curb to leave...the officer nearest me opened my driver’s side door and grabbed my left arm to try to pull me out of the car...I told them I was caught in my seat belt and they continued to pull on my twisted arm to drag me out of the vehicle...We were also mocked, laughed at, and bullied by nearly every one of the officers.” - C. Sumbler (Exhibit F)
● “Myself and the other demonstrators stood in line in solidarity chanting “we don’t see no riot here, why are you in riot gear” with no intention of moving forwards towards the police and made no actions that could have been interpreted as such.” - K. Waterman (Exhibit G)
● “I was just standing still. I didn’t touch any officer nor did I throw anything and yet an officer singled me out and sprayed my face with the red liquid (pepper spray). The look in this man’s face was pure anger and hatred.” - A. Loper (Exhibit H)
● “Being injured and asking for help, one officer spit and said “you volunteered, you deserve it”...another officer... [said] “stop protesting or we will fuck you up” and pointing to his private part location.” - F. Muthana (Exhibit I)
● “I saw nobody on the riot line reach for a zip tie, attempt to take a protestor’s arm, or turn anyone around to make an arrest. The first and only actions i saw on their approach were riot shields and batons hitting still non-violent demonstrators.” - B. Vanderveen (Exhibit J)
DISCUSSION
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In issuing the requested injunctive relief, the Court must consider Fed. R. Civ. P. 65, as well as the following four factors: (1) the likelihood of the plaintiff’s success on the merits; (2) whether the plaintiff will suffer irreparable injury without the injunction; (3) whether granting the injunction will cause substantial harm to others; and (4) the injunction’s impact on the public interest. Southern Glazers Distribs. of Ohio, LLC v. Great Lakes Brewery Co., 860 F.3d 844, 849 (6th Cir. 2017). These four considerations are factors to be balanced, not prerequisites that must be met. Id. Here, all four factors favor granting preliminary injunctive relief.
I. PLAINTIFFS ARE LIKELY TO SUCCEED ON THE MERITS “When a party seeks a preliminary injunction on the basis of a potential constitutional violation, ‘the likelihood of success on the merits often will be the determinative factor.” Obama for America v. Husted, 697 F.3d 423, 436 (6th Cir. 2012). In such cases, “the likelihood of success on the merits is a legal question and there is little dispute of the facts in the record.” Liberty Coins, LLC v. Goodman, 748 F.3d 682, 689 (6th Cir. 2014). The facts alleged by Plaintiffs herein have been routinely documented through the press and social media and are supported through the allegations in the Verified Complaint and attached declarations. A. Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on their excessive force claims under the
Fourth Amendment The success of Fourth Amendment claims under 42 U.S.C 1983 generally depends on whether the DPD officer’s use of force was objectively reasonable.
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Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 392-399 (1989). To determine whether the force used to affect a seizure is permissible under the Fourth Amendment, courts weigh “the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the countervailing governmental interests at stake.” Id. at 396. This balancing analysis requires an assessment of the particular facts and circumstances surrounding the seizure, including “[1] the severity of the crime at issue, [2] whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and [3] whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Scott v. Clay County, 205 F.3d 867, 876–77 (6th Cir. 2000) (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396–97). In the absence of these three factors, the Sixth Circuit has consistently held that a police officer’s use of disproportionate force is unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, even where circumstances involve an unruly crowd. See, e.g., Ciminillo v. Streicher, 434 F.3d 461 (6th Cir. 2006); Grawey v. Drury, 567 F.3d 302 (6th Cir. 2009); Crawford v. Geiger, 656 Fed. Appx. 190 (6th Cir. 2013).
1. The Plaintiffs were accused of minor crimes or no crime at all The commission of a minor crime by an unarmed person is not sufficient to weigh in favor of unreasonable use of force in a Graham analysis. See Grawey, 567 F.3d at 311-312. In Grawey, a police officer pepper-sprayed the plaintiff after the plaintiff first attempted to flee the scene of a domestic altercation but then stopped running. Id. at 306-307. The court held that the officer’s use of pepper-spray was
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unreasonable because the plaintiff’s crime, disturbing the peace, was “relatively minor,” and the plaintiff was not actively resisting arrest at the time the officer sprayed him. Id. at 311. Here, Plaintiffs, if accused of a crime at all, were accused of disturbing the peace or lesser civil infractions. No Plaintiff has actively resisted arrest. Yet DPD, unprovoked, has utilized unreasonable force and deployed “nonlethal” weapons against unarmed demonstrators on a regular basis.
2. The Plaintiffs posed no immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others
Throughout months of demonstrations, no Plaintiff (or demonstrator on information and belief) has been charged with assaulting a DPD officer. In fact, demonstrators were sitting, dancing, playing instruments, blowing bubbles, and chanting “Why are you in riot gear? We don’t see a riot here” prior to DPD officers charging them at full speed, batons swinging rather than even attempting to make arrests. Others who were beaten attended the demonstration as non-participant medics or simply were standing on the sidewalk observing. Defendant Chief James Craig’s obtuse attempt at justifying the brutality of August 22, 2020 was a claim that a demonstrator shined a laser pointer at an officer. (Exhibit K)
3. The Plaintiffs were not actively resisting or attempting to evade arrest As stated throughout the Verified Complaint and attached affidavits, the Plaintiffs were not actively resisting or attempting to evade arrest. (See VC and Exhibits A-J) DPD’s first move was force and the use of “non-lethal” weapons prior
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to attempting to make arrests in each relevant encounter with Plaintiffs. In fact, many Plaintiffs were actively attempting to comply with officers by voluntarily placing their hands behind their back and standing still when officers used force on them.
4. It was a violation of the Fourth Amendment when Defendants used batons, riot shields, and excessive physical force to brutalize Plaintiffs and other demonstrators.
Within their Verified Complaint, Plaintiffs have provided ample evidence that DPD viciously beat them with batons, riots shields, and other physical force without provocation, without any Plaintiff posing a threat to officers, without resistance, and without warning. DPD took these extreme actions knowing that Plaintiffs were unarmed and were either accused of minor crimes or no crime at all.
The Sixth Circuit has routinely found equal or lesser brutality to be a valid Fourth Amendment claim. In Solomon v. Auburn Hills Police Dept., a Fourth Amendment excessive force claim was allowed to proceed when a police officer shoved an individual into a wall, injuring her, when the suspect was arrested on a minor charge, did not pose a threat to the safety of officers or others, and did not attempt to flee or resist arrest. 389 F.3d 167 (6th Cir. 2004); see also Jones v. City of Cincinnati, 521 F.3d 555 (6th Cir. 2008) (plaintiff established viable claims for excessive force and failure to provide medical care where police officers beat decedent with batons, used pepper spray after handcuffing him, and used their combined weight to hold him down). In Schreiber v. Moe, the court acknowledged
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"it is difficult to conceive of a law-enforcement interest that would have been served by punching [plaintiff] in the face over 20 times with enough force to fracture his facial bones." 596 F.3d 323, 332 (6th Cir. 2010). Here, it is difficult to conceive the law-enforcement interest in routinely beating non-resisting demonstrators with batons and riot shields prior to even attempting to place them under arrest. Rather than facing an arrest for incidents of civil disobedience, if even valid, Plaintiffs have suffered concussions, fractures, broken ribs, bruises, hospitalization, and other shocking injuries without justification.
5. It was a violation of the Fourth Amendment when Defendants fired rubber bullets at demonstrators
In Ciminillo, the Sixth Circuit found that a jury could find an officer liable for excessive force for shooting with a beanbag propellant an unarmed individual who was slowly approaching officer with hands in a "surrender" position. 434 F.3d 461. Here, DPD shot at demonstrators just standing nearby or dispersing as ordered without any warning. Plaintiff Nahabedian was shot in the chest by a rubber bullet, without warning or provocation, while attempting to disperse after being engulfed in tear gas. (VC at 123-133). She was not arrested or accused of a crime. Notably, felony assault with a dangerous weapon charges have been issued against DPD officer D. Debono after he fired rubber bullets at three journalists. (Exhibit L)
6. It was a violation of the Fourth Amendment when Defendants used chokeholds against Plaintiff Nakia Wallace and other demonstrators
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Plaintiff Nakia Wallace witnessed a DPD officer placing his knee on a young demonstrator’s neck in a technique eerily reminiscent of that used to murder George Floyd. After N. Wallace shouted, “Get off his neck!” a DPD officer, in some kind of sick irony, seized and placed N. Wallace herself in a chokehold. (VC at 136-146) The use of a chokehold constitutes deadly force as a matter of law. King v. United States, 917 F.3d 409, 431 (6th Cir. 2019). DPD later issued a baseless “disorderly conduct” misdemeanor ticket to N. Wallace – a minor crime. Even if the arrest and ticket were legitimate, they would not justify the officer’s use of a deadly chokehold, which was excessive and a violation of N. Wallace’s Fourth Amendment rights.
7. It was a violation of the Fourth Amendment when Defendants utilized deadly force by ramming Plaintiff Jazten Bass and other demonstrators with a police vehicle
It has been settled law for a generation that, under the Fourth Amendment, “[w]here a suspect poses no immediate threat to the officer and no threat to others, the harm resulting from failing to apprehend him does not justify the use of deadly force to do so.” Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985). Yet, Defendants drove an SUV directly through a crowd of demonstrators striking Plaintiff Bass and continuing at high speed with him hanging onto the hood for his life. J. Bass, who was simply leading the march back to its starting point so demonstrators could go home, posed no immediate threat to the officer inside the vehicle. (VC at 147-158) There is no objectively reasonable justification for the officers’ use of deadly force.
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8. It was a violation of the Fourth Amendment when Defendants deployed chemical irritants to injure and deter Plaintiffs and other demonstrators
In Champion v. Outlook Nashville, Inc., the Sixth Circuit held that it was clearly established that using pepper spray on an individual already subdued, and putting pressure on his back while he was in a face-down prone position, constitutes excessive force. 380 F.3d 893 (6th Cir. 2004). Yet that was exactly what DPD officers did to Plaintiff Caylee Arnold. (VC at 177-182)
The Sixth Circuit has also allowed Fourth Amendment claims to proceed where officers sprayed an individual with pepper spray but did not inform him that he was under arrest or that he committed any crime, and did not warn him that they would use pepper spray. Atkins v. Township of Flint, 94 F. App'x 342, 349 (6th Cir. 2004). This fact pattern mirrors that of each Plaintiff who has been sprayed.
9. It was a violation of the Fourth Amendment when Defendants deployed a Long Range Acoustic Device (“LRAD”) to injure and deter Plaintiffs and other demonstrators
The use of the LRAD has not been previously tested in the Sixth Circuit. However, the Second Circuit rejected a defendants’ motion to dismiss, a claim of excessive force regarding an LRAD, finding the use of LRAD was unreasonable because the protesters presented minimal security threat beyond traffic disruption, were not actively resisting, and suffered substantial physical injuries – exactly the same circumstances presented in the case at bar. See Edrei v. Maguire, 892 F.3d 525, 537-38 (2nd Cir. 2018). Moreover, the court found that the officers did not
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attempt to temper or limit the amount of force they deployed (for example, with an audible dispersal warning), supporting the proposition that the officer’s use of LRAD was disproportionate to the risks posed by the protesters. Id. at 538.
Here, Plaintiffs’ first notice that the LRAD was being deployed was the screeching wail of the LRAD itself. Like the plaintiffs in Edrei, Plaintiff Rosen has suffered auditory pain, migraines, tinnitus, and hearing loss as a result of the LRAD. (TC 183-196); Edrei at 531.
10.It was a violation of the Fourth Amendment when Defendants restrained Plaintiffs and other demonstrators with intentionally tightened zip ties
In Vance v. Wade, the Sixth Circuit held it to be a triable claim where a Plaintiff alleged that officers handcuffed him excessively and unnecessarily tightly, ignored his pleas that cuffs were too tight, and alleged physical injury. 546 F.3d 774 (6th Cir. 2008). Plaintiff Kolodziej makes this identical claim, begging officers to loosen his zip ties as he was losing feeling in his hands and ultimately suffering from symptoms of lasting nerve damage. (VC at 210-225) Plaintiffs witnessed police officers continuing this practice as recently as August 22, 2020, when C. Arnold saw a young woman doubled over, wailing in pain, as her hands turned blue. (Exhibit C)
B. Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on claims that they were subjected to punitive, unnecessary, and torturous conditions in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
Fourth Amendment standards apply while an arrestee is still within the custody of arresting officers. Phelps v. Coy, 286 F.3d 295 (6th Cir. 2002). As
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discussed throughout their Verified Complaint, Plaintiffs have suffered numerous Fourth Amendment violations while in the custody of DPD. Plaintiffs, some peppersprayed and/or bleeding from blunt force trauma, were intentionally placed in oppressively hot vehicles without ventilation or access to water for several hours in 90-degree summer heat. Additionally, Plaintiffs have alleged DPD turned the heat on and deliberately took their time getting to holding facilities (or Little Caesar’s Arena) – violating their clearly established rights. See Burchett v. Kiefer, 310 F.3d 937 (6th Cir. 2002) (officers not entitled to qualified immunity for detaining plaintiff while they searched a next-door home, where he was held three hours in handcuffs in police cruiser with windows up and air conditioning off on a 90-degree day).
Next, Plaintiffs A. Anest and Z. Kolodziej pleaded with DPD for medical attention as they suffered significant injuries, but their cries fell upon deaf ears. In fact, DPD refused to allow on-site medical staff to examine A. Anest while detaining him for several hours, eventually just leaving him on the street critically injured and disorientated, again violating his clearly established rights. He required five days’ hospitalization. See Estate of Owensby v. City of Cincinnati, 414 F.3d 596 (6th Cir. 2005) (officers not entitled to qualified immunity for failing to provide medical attention to decedent when officers subjected him to beating, close-range pepper spray, body compression and restraints creating obvious need for medical care).
C. Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on claims that they were falsely arrested in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
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“It is clearly established that an arrest without probable cause violates the Fourth Amendment.” Donovan v. Thames, 105 F.3d 291, 297-98 (6th Cir. 1997). Throughout the demonstrations, DPD has arrested hundreds of peaceful demonstrators without probable cause, including Plaintiffs T. Taylor, G. Branch, N. Wallace, J. Bass, L. Ellis, M. Henige, A. Nahabedian, Z. Kolodziej, C. Arnold, and A. Anest. As discussed throughout, numerous demonstrators have been arrested without hearing an audible disbursement order or while attempting to comply with officer instructions. Others were arrested seemingly for being in the area at the time.
D. Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on their First Amendment claims. The First Amendment prohibits government officials from retaliating against individuals for engaging in protected speech. Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 256 (2006). In order to sustain a retaliation claim under the First Amendment, a plaintiff must show that (1) he engaged in a protected conduct, (2) an adverse action was taken against him which would deter a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in the alleged misconduct, and (3) the adverse action was motivated at least in part by the plaintiff's protected conduct. Thaddeus–X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 394 (6th Cir. 1999). These elements are easily satisfied here. 1. Plaintiffs engaged in activity protected by the First Amendment The First Amendment reflects a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open,
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and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials. Leonard v. Robinson, 477 F.3d 347 (6th Cir. 2007). Private citizens’ rights to criticize public officials and policies reflects “the central meaning of the First Amendment.” Glasson v. City of Louisville, 518 F.2d 899, 904 (1975) Here, there is no reasonable dispute that Plaintiffs’ conduct, participating in demonstrations against police abuse and unequal rights under the law for Black citizens, is activity protected under the First Amendment.
2. The use of force against Plaintiffs and mass arrests of Plaintiffs have chilled their First Amendment rights
Plaintiffs need not show they were actually deterred from exercising their right to free speech, but rather must show the actions were “capable of deterring a person of ordinary firmness from exercising his or her right[s].” Thaddeus–X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 398 (6th Cir.1999) (en banc) The threshold for the deterrent effect of retaliation is especially low because “there is no justification for harassing people for exercising their constitutional rights.” Id.
In a recent case also dealing with police use of force against Black Lives Matters activists, a district court held that police officers may not indiscriminately use less-than-lethal force against peaceful protesters, even when other protesters in the crowd may be engaging in violence. See Black Lives Matter Seattle-King County v. City of Seattle, Seattle Police Department, No. 2:20-cv-00887-RAJ, 2020 WL 3128299, at *3 (W.D. Wash. June 12, 2020) (Exhibit M). In Black Lives Matter
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Seattle-King County, police officers faced instances of assault by some in the protest, but the plaintiffs’ conduct was, according to the court, “passionate but peaceful.” Id. While the court acknowledged the difficulty of balancing public safety interests and speech rights, it based its holding on the importance of the plaintiffs’ “constitutional right to protest.” Id.
In the instant case, there have been little to no allegations of assault against DPD officers. Indeed, Plaintiffs’ passionate protesting actions have been overwhelmingly peaceful, and it would be improper for Defendants to suppress the plaintiffs’ First Amendment activities based on speculative conduct of others.
3. Defendants’ conduct was motivated by Plaintiffs’ protected activity. While the Defendants’ subjective motivation is at issue here, Plaintiffs cannot be required to meet a heightened burden of proof simply because this cause of action includes a motive element. Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 386 (6th Cir. 1999). That said, Plaintiffs have produced significant evidence that Defendants’ use of excessive force was motivated by Plaintiffs’ and other demonstrators’ exercise of their First Amendment rights. For example, one officer stated “stop protesting or we will fuck you up” to a demonstrator. (Exhibit I) Another told Plaintiff N. Wallace to “shut the fuck up before [he] made [her] the next victim.” (VC at 146) Officers also called demonstrators “animals” and consistently cheered, laughed, high-fived one
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another, and gleefully took photos and videos of detainees after attacking demonstrators. (VC at 55; Exhibit A; Exhibit B)
E. Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on their Monell claims. The Supreme Court has long held that municipal governments may only be sued under § 1983 for unconstitutional or illegal municipal policies, and not for unconstitutional conduct of their employees. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). Where the established policies of the municipality do not violate the constitution directly, municipalities may incur § 1983 liability where they fail to adequately train their personnel such that a constitutional policy is applied in an unconstitutional manner. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 387 (1989). There, however, the plaintiff must show “the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to [the] rights of persons with whom the police come into contact.” Id. at 388. Notably, the Supreme Court acknowledged that “[a]n act performed pursuant to a ‘custom’ that has not been formally approved by an appropriate decisionmaker may fairly subject a municipality to liability on the theory that the relevant practice is so widespread as to have the force of law.” Bd. of County Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997). Not only has Defendant policymaker Chief Craig continuously authorized the use of force against peaceful demonstrators, he has publicly endorsed the abovedescribed brutality. On June 2, 2020, after DPD, brutalized with batons, teargassed,
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pepper sprayed, and deployed the LRAD on non-violent demonstrators accused of only minor crimes, or no crime at all, Chief Craig was quoted stating "I’m encouraged, I’m confident in this department and in this city. We’re going to get it done" and "[h]ats off to our Detroit Police Department and to our city." (Exhibit N) Similarly, policymaker Mayor Duggan was quoted saying “[DPD] did a beautiful job protecting our city.” Following the August 22-23, Chief Craig stated that he is “just ecstatic over the men and women in the Detroit Police Department” (Exhibit O) and on August 24, 2020 that he was “very proud” of the DPD officers.
Surpassing the egregious conditions in Bd. of County Comm’rs v. Brown, here, the rampant violent acts against Plaintiffs have been approved by Defendant decisionmakers. Indeed, multiple Doe Officers told arrestees that they were “just following orders” and that the above-described actions were “just orders that they had to follow” as they brutalized and arrested approximately 40 demonstrators on August 22-23, 2020. (VC at 269)
II. PLAINTIFFS WILL SUFFER IRREPARABLE HARM WITHOUT THE COURT’S INTERVENTION
“[A]s a matter of law, the continuing deprivation of constitutional rights constitutes irreparable harm.” Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976). The loss of First Amendment rights, for even a minimal period of time, constitutes irreparable harm. Overstreet v. Lexington-Fayette Urban Cty. Govt., 305 F.3d 566, 578 (6th Cir.2002). The Demonstrations in Detroit are ongoing. DPD, with the consistent
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endorsement of Chief Craig and Mayor Duggan, has made it clear that they will continue assaulting, teargassing, pepper spraying, and deploying other “non-lethal” weapons on non-violent demonstrators without court interference. Enough is enough. Abundant video evidence has made it clear that Defendants are not interested in whether there is probable cause that an individual committed a significant crime, whether an individual is resisting, whether an individual is a threat, or even whether an individual has even been warned prior to maiming and brutalizing them. Additionally, some individuals, such as Plaintiff G. Branch, have expressed that they are refraining from exercising their peaceful First Amendment rights out of fear that they will be met with brutal violence. (VC at 278)
There is a likelihood of repetition as these Plaintiffs plan on participating in future demonstrations which are foreseeably ongoing. To the extent that any Plaintiffs have been deterred from participating, there is a likely repetition that there First Amendment rights would be restrained
III. THE PUBLIC’S INTEREST AND BALANCE OF EQUITIES WEIGH STRONGLY IN FAVOR OF PLAINITFFS
“The determination of where the public interest lies [ ] is dependent on a determination of the likelihood of success on the merits of the First Amendment challenge because it is always in the public interest to prevent the violation of a party's constitutional rights.” Connection Distrib. Co. v. Reno, 154 F.3d 281, 288 (6th Cir. 1998). Plaintiffs have established supra their likelihood of success on their
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First Amendment claims. The public’s interest in preserving the constitutional right to protest far outweighs any harm that could be experienced by Defendants were this Court to enjoin them from engaging in the unjustified violence described above.
The balance of equities strongly favors Plaintiffs in regard to Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claims as well. Any hypothetical harm that would come from enjoining Defendants as requested is outweighed by the very real harm experienced by Plaintiffs as described throughout their Verified Complaint and this Motion. Plaintiffs do not seek to stop the police from doing their jobs. They seek an end to the excessive, unjustified, and consistent pattern of violence that has caused serious injury to so many and deterred others from participating in demonstrations at all.
IV. COURTS ACROSS THE COUNTRY HAVE ENJOINED SIMILAR POLICE CONDUCT ARISING FROM BLACK LIVES MATTER PROTESTS
Since the nationwide protests against police violence began in May 2020, courts across the country have entered similar TROs enjoining police departments from responding to protests against police violence with projectiles, chemical weapons, and other force. Anti Police-Terror Project v. City of Oakland, Case no. 20-cv-03866-JCS, 2020 WL 4584185 *57-*58 (N.D. Cal. 2020)(Exhibit P) (after four days of excessive force against peaceful demonstrators, enjoining police from ever using projectiles, and significantly limiting the use of chemical weapons); Abay et al. v. City of Denver, Case no. 20-cv-01616-RBJ, 2020 WL 3034161 *5 (D. Col.
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2020)(Exhibit Q) (after police use of force between May 28 and June 4, enjoining police from use of chemical weapons unless “on-scene supervisor at the rank of Captain or above specifically authorizes such use of force in response to specific acts of violence or destruction of property that the command officer has personally witnessed,” further prohibiting use of chemical weapons without time to disperse, and the firing of projectiles into crowds); Black Lives Matter v. City of Seattle, Case no. 2:20-cv-00887-RAJ, 2020 WL 3128299 *5-*6 (W.D. Wash. 2020)(Exhibit M) (enjoining use of teargas against peaceful demonstrators and also requiring repeated use of alternative de-escalation tactics in the face of violence or property destruction before using teargas); Don’t Shoot Portland v. City of Portland, Case no. 3:20-cv00917-HZ, 2020 WL 3078329 *4 (D. Oreg. 2020)(Exhibit R) (same); Woodstock et al. v. City of Portland, Case no. 3:20-cv-1035-SI, 2020 WL 3621179 (D. Oreg. 2020)(Exhibit S) (enjoining police from arresting, shooting, or beating journalists and legal observers).
In fact, a court has denied a TRO in only one case having to do with the police use of force in response to the recent protests, specifically alleging the targeting of journalists. See Goyette v. City of Minneapolis, Case no. 20-cv-1302, 2020 WL 3056705, *3, *5 (D. Minn. 2020) (Exhibit T). There, a TRO was denied because of the unprecedented—and unlikely to repeat—circumstances under which force was used, including the burning of a police station, because the police had not repeated
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the use of force in any other circumstances, Id. at *3, and because the police had already voluntarily entered into a temporary restraining order prohibiting the complained of tactics. Id. at *5. Here, there have been no such unprecedented circumstances—protests have been almost entirely peaceful—and police have repeatedly used the complained of tactics over many months.
Additionally, unlike the police in these other cases, DPD’s actions have been more violent, more obviously based on a hostility to protesters’ message, and have been used more consistently over a longer period of time. For example, in Oakland and Denver, the police’s actions largely involved the use of tear gas, pepper spray, and rubber bullets. Anti Police-Terror Project v. Oakland, 2020 WL 4584185 at *8*16 (Exhibit P); Abay v. Denver, 2020 WL 3034161 at *1 (Exhibit Q). Here, DPD has not only used tear gas, pepper spray, and rubber bullets—they have choked demonstrators, beaten demonstrators with shields and batons, punched demonstrators, kicked demonstrators, verbally abused demonstrators, deliberately injured them using zip ties, deliberately removed their masks to pepper spray them in the face, left them in heated vehicles, and hit demonstrators with their cars.
Likewise, DPD’s actions have been more clearly motivated by the content of plaintiff’s message. In Black Lives Matter v. Seattle, the court inferred the police’s response was partially motivated by the demonstrators’ message because police targeted gas on peaceful demonstrators, and deployed gas on demonstrators that
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were dispersing. 2020 WL 3128299 at *4 (Exhibit M). Here, not only did DPD use force on peaceful demonstrators, they made statements to demonstrators expressing hostility to their message, and engaged in repeated, needless cruelty against demonstrators, even after they had been arrested or restrained. Further, in other cases, TROs have issued based on only a few nights of police use of teargas and rubber bullets. See e.g. Anti Police-Terror Project v. Oakland, 2020 WL 4584185 at *8-*16 (Exhibit P) (TRO issued after four days). Here, the DPD has engaged in repeated acts of violence against demonstrators over the course of months, from May 29, when protests began, until as recently as August 22, 2020.
A TRO is even more warranted here as protests in Detroit have been almost entirely free of violence or property damage. In other cities, TROs have issued where police responded to property destruction and looting, Id. at *17-*22 (Exhibit P), where demonstrators threw projectiles at police, Black Lives Matter v. Seattle, 2020 WL 3128299 at *4 (Exhibit M); Don’t Shoot Portland v. Portland, 2020 WL 3078329 at *1 (Exhibit R), and even where a government building was damaged with fire. Id. at *4. In each of these cases, courts have recognized that police must engage in preventative measures and targeted, individualized enforcement, not mass repression. Black Lives Matter v. Seattle, 2020 WL 3128299 at *3 (Exhibit M) (“the proper response to potential and actual violence is for the government to ensure an adequate police presence, and to arrest those who actually engage in such conduct,
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rather than to suppress legitimate First Amendment conduct as a prophylactic measure”). As another court noted, “property damage is a small price to pay for constitutional rights—especially the constitutional right of the public to speak against widespread injustice. If a store’s windows must be broken to prevent a protestor’s facial bones from being broken or eye being permanently damaged, that is more than a fair trade. If a building must be graffiti-ed to prevent the suppression of free speech, that is a fair trade. The threat to physical safety and free speech outweighs the threat to property.” Abay, 2020 WL 3034161 at *5 (Exhibit Q)
Yet, here, DPD was not responding to any property destruction by Plaintiffs or demonstrators, nor engaging in targeted arrests. Rather, the DPD was arbitrarily and indiscriminately using force against peaceful demonstrators. Thus, just as courts have done in other jurisdictions, this court should issue a TRO in this case.
CONCLUSION1 WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully request this Court (a) grant this Motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction; and (b) grant Plaintiffs any other such relief as the Court deems just and proper under the circumstances.
1 In addition, while Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c) provides “no restraining order or preliminary injunction shall issue except upon the giving of security by the applicant,” in the Sixth Circuit, “the district court possesses discretion over whether to require the posting of security.” Moltan Co. v. Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc., 55 F.3d 1171 (6th. Cir. 1995) Here, no bond should be required because Defendants will not incur monetary loss as a result of the injunction because the injunction would only require it to comply with Constitutional law and cease the use of excessive force. (see 11A Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice & Procedure 2d ¶ 2954 (2006) (courts may “dispense with security altogether if the grant of an injunction carries no risk of monetary loss to the defendant”).
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Dated: August 30, 2020

Respectfully submitted,
SCHULZ LAW PLC
By: /s/ Jack W. Schulz Jack W. Schulz (P78078) Amanda M. Ghannam (P83065) SCHULZ LAW PLC PO Box 44855 Detroit, MI 48244 (313) 246-3590 jackwschulz@gmail.com amandamghannam@gmail.com On behalf of the National Lawyers Guild, Detroit/Michigan Chapter Attorneys for Plaintiffs

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Case 3:20-cv-12363-RHC-APP ECF No. 2 filed 08/31/20 PageID.127 Page 46 of 47

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

DETROIT WILL BREATHE, TRISTAN TAYLOR, NAKIA WALLACE, JAZTEN BASS, LAUREN ROSEN, LAURYN BRENNAN, AMY NAHABEDIAN, ZACH KOLODZIEJ, LAUREN BRANCH, LILLIAN ELLIS, OLIVIA PUENTE, IMAN SALEH, MARGARET HENIGE, CAYLEE ARNOLD, AND ALEXANDER ANEST,

Case No. Hon:

Plaintiffs, vs.

CITY OF DETROIT, a municipal corporation, MAYOR MICHAEL DUGGAN, acting in his official and individual capacities, CHIEF JAMES CRAIG, acting in his official and individual capacities, OFFICER STEPHEN ANOUTI, SERGEANT TIMOTHY BARR, OFFICER DAVID HORNSHAW, OFFICER MARIAH ERARD, and OFFICER DOES 1-100 inclusive, acting in their respective individual capacities, all jointly and severally,

Defendants.

__________________________________________________________________/

Jack W. Schulz (P78078)

Julie H. Hurwitz (P34720)

Amanda M. Ghannam (P83065)

William H. Goodman (P14173)

SCHULZ LAW PLC

Melissa A. Brown (P79127)

PO Box 44855

GOODMAN HURWITZ & JAMES,

Detroit, MI 48244

PC

(313) 246-3590

1394 E. Jefferson Ave.

jackwschulz@gmail.com

Detroit, MI 48207

amandamghannam@gmail.com

(313) 567-6170

On behalf of the National Lawyers

jhurwitz@goodmanhurwitz.com

Guild, Detroit/Michigan Chapter

bgoodman@goodmanhurwitz.com

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

mbrown@goodmanhurwitz.com

On behalf of the National Lawyers

Sean Riddell (P81302)

Guild, Detroit/Michigan Chapter

The Riddell Law Firm PLLC

Co-counsel for Plaintiffs

Case 3:20-cv-12363-RHC-APP ECF No. 2 filed 08/31/20 PageID.128 Page 47 of 47

400 Renaissance Center, Ste. 2600 Detroit, MI 48243 (313) 497-0074 sriddell@riddelllawfirm.com On behalf of the National Lawyers Guild, Detroit/Michigan Chapter Co-counsel for Plaintiffs __________________________________________________________________/

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on August 31, 2020, I electronically filed the foregoing PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION and BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION with the Clerk of the Court using the ECF system which will send notification to all counsel of appearance. Additionally, I certify that a copy of the foregoing documents was submitted First Class mail to the following: City of Detroit, 2 Woodward Ave., Suite 500 Detroit, MI 48226.
Respectfully submitted,

SCHULZ LAW PLC

Dated: August 30, 2020

By: /s/ Jack W. Schulz . Jack W. Schulz (P78078) Amanda M. Ghannam (P83065) SCHULZ LAW PLC PO Box 44855 Detroit, MI 48244 (313) 246-3590 jackwschulz@gmail.com amandamghannam@gmail.com On behalf of the National Lawyers Guild, Detroit/Michigan Chapter Attorneys for Plaintiffs

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 </s> Case 2:20-cv-12363-LJM-DRG ECF No. 37 filed 09/16/20 PageID.544 Page 1 of 4

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

DETROIT WILL BREATHE, et al.,

Plaintiffs, v.

Case No. 20-12363 Honorable Laurie J. Michelson

CITY OF DETROIT, et al.,

Defendants.

ORDER ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO MODIFY TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER [24]
Plaintiffs Detroit Will Breathe and 14 individuals have been involved in protest activity in the City of Detroit in response to the death of George Floyd. They allege that, on a few occasions, Detroit police have responded to their demonstrations with excessive force and have violated their First and Fourth Amendment rights. Upon filing this case, Plaintiffs sought preliminary relief enjoining Detroit Police from using certain tactics in response to their protests.
Just twelve days ago, on September 4, 2020, the Court entered an order granting in part Plaintiffs’ motion for a temporary restraining order. The Court enjoined Detroit police from, among other things, firing tear gas and rubber bullets at peaceful protesters (“the TRO”). See Detroit Will Breathe v. City of Detroit, — F.3d —, No. 20-12363, 2020 WL 5269789 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 4, 2020).
Defendants have now filed a motion to modify the TRO because they allege that the order disrupted the status quo and encouraged Plaintiffs to act unlawfully. (ECF No. 24.) Defendants

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ask the Court to modify the TRO to enjoin Plaintiffs from taking certain actions, such as defacing property or throwing objects at police officers. (ECF No. 24.)
For a number of reasons the Court finds that it is not necessary to modify the TRO, which, as will be clarified below, already encompasses much of the relief Defendants seek.
First, Defendants lack a legal basis for enjoining Plaintiffs. As the Court explained in its TRO, in order to grant preliminary injunctive relief, the Court must consider, among other factors, whether the party seeking that relief has a likelihood of success on the merits. Detroit Will Breathe, 2020 WL 5269789, at *2 (citing S. Glazer’s Distributors of Ohio, LLC v. Great Lakes Brewing Co., 860 F.3d 844, 849 (6th Cir. 2017)). Defendants seek to enjoin Plaintiffs, but they have not brought any legal claims against Plaintiffs. So Defendants have no claims upon which they are likely to succeed.
Second, Defendants’ lack a factual basis to enjoin Plaintiffs. Defendants’ assertion that the TRO requires modification because it has emboldened protesters to use violence, or otherwise upset the status quo, is not supported by the evidence Defendants have provided. According to Defendants, Detroit police were assailed by projectiles and bottle rockets, had lasers pointed in their eyes, and were attacked by protesters before the TRO issued. (ECF No. 24, PageID.332– 344.) In comparison, Defendants point to just two non-violent incidents that occurred after the TRO was issued: protesters spray-painted a statue and “menaced” patrons at one restaurant by standing on a patio railing and chanting. (Id. at PageID.333.) There are no allegations of violence by protesters on the night those two incidents occurred (September 4). In light of the before and after picture painted by Defendants, the Court does not agree that the TRO “disrupted the existing status quo” (id. at PageID.331) or that the protesters’ “actions have increased in severity” after the TRO was entered (id. at PageID.344).
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Although Defendants have not presented a viable legal or factual basis for modifying the TRO to enjoin Plaintiffs, Defendants’ motion provides an opportunity to make the scope of the TRO clearer. The Court fully appreciates that this case involves multiple sets of interests. Protesters have an interest in voicing their beliefs and seeking reform. The police have an interest in maintaining the peace and enforcing the laws. These interests can co-exist. Both sides recognize this. The Detroit Police have stated that they do not use force against peaceful protesters. And Plaintiffs have expressed that they do not intend to voice their opinion through violence and they undoubtedly recognize that they cannot violate the law without consequences. This Court’s TRO did not go further than what both sides acknowledge.
To the extent this was somehow not clear from the TRO (although the Court believes it was), the Court clarifies that nothing in the TRO (1) suspends any laws that prohibit violent or destructive actions by protesters or (2) prevents Detroit police from (a) reasonably and lawfully protecting themselves and the public against violence perpetrated by protesters that could harm officers or the public (including protesters throwing objects at police, such as frozen water bottles, bricks, bottle rockets, or cherry bombs); or (b) taking reasonable and lawful action against protesters who violate any laws or resist lawful arrest (e.g., ordering protesters to cease unlawful activity, or using reasonable force to arrest a protester if there is probable cause to believe that the protester violated the law).
In sum, most of the restrictions in the TRO only enjoin officers from taking action against “any individual peacefully engaging in protest or demonstration who does not pose a physical threat to the safety of the public or police.” Detroit Will Breathe, 2020 WL 5269789, at *6 (emphasis added). Police officers are still left with a variety of lawful tools when faced with protesters who pose a physical threat or have broken the law. Indeed, as Detroit Police Chief James
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Case 2:20-cv-12363-LJM-DRG ECF No. 37 filed 09/16/20 PageID.547 Page 4 of 4 Craig himself stated, the TRO “is no different than what we’ve always done” and “reinforces” the police department’s policies. Morgan G. Statler, Detroit police chief dismisses judge's ruling on tactics for protests: ‘Nothing has changed’, The Hill, Sept. 5, 2020, https://perma.cc/4CGACUJG.
The notion that “nothing has changed” is the essence of preserving the status quo, and that is the purpose of injunctive relief. For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion to modify temporary restraining order (ECF No. 24) is DENIED.
SO ORDERED. Dated: September 16, 2020
s/Laurie J. Michelson LAURIE J. MICHELSON UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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 </s> Case 2:20-cv-12363-LJM-DRG ECF No. 42 filed 09/18/20 PageID.559 Page 1 of 4

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

DETROIT WILL BREATHE, TRISTAN TAYLOR, NAKIA WALLACE, JAZTEN BASS, LAUREN ROSEN, LAURYN BRENNAN, AMY NAHABEDIAN, ZACHARY KOLODZIEJ, LAUREN BRANCH, LILLIAN ELLIS, OLIVIA PUENTE, IMAN SALEH, MARGARET HENIGE, CAYLEE ARNOLD, and ALEXANDER ANEST,

Case No. 2:20-cv-12363 Hon: Laurie J. Michelson

Plaintiffs, vs.

CITY OF DETROIT, a municipal corporation, MAYOR MICHAEL DUGGAN, acting in his official and individual capacities, CHIEF JAMES CRAIG, acting in his official and individual capacities, OFFICER STEPHEN ANOUTI, SERGEANT TIMOTHY BARR, OFFICER DAVID HORNSHAW, OFFICER MARIAH ERARD, and OFFICER DOES 1-100 inclusive, acting in their respective individual capacities, all jointly and severally,

Defendants. __________________________________________________________________

JOINT ORDER TO PRESERVE THE STATUS QUO

For the reasons stated in prior Orders and by mutual agreement of the parties, the City of Detroit, including the Detroit Police Department, and all other officers, agents, and departments under the Police Department’s control (for purposes of this order, “the City”) is enjoined from:

Case 2:20-cv-12363-LJM-DRG ECF No. 42 filed 09/18/20 PageID.560 Page 2 of 4
 Using striking weapons (including, but not limited to, batons and shields), chemical agents, (including, but not limited to, tear gas and pepper spray), or rubber bullets (aka “baton rounds”) against any individual peacefully engaging in protest or demonstrations who does not pose a physical threat to the safety of the public or police;
 Deploying chemical agents or a sound canon (aka “LRAD” for long-range acoustic device) against persons peacefully engaging in protest or demonstrations without an audible warning and a reasonable amount of time to disperse;
 Placing in a chokehold or ramming with a vehicle any individual attending a demonstration;
 Tightening the zip ties (aka “flex cuffs”) or handcuffs placed on any individual to the point that the restraints cause physical injury, including loss of circulation or change in color;
 Arresting any demonstrators en masse without probable cause.
In the event that Plaintiffs seek relief for an alleged violation of this Order, the City must respond to the motion within 24 hours.
As set forth in ECF No. 37, nothing in this Order (1) suspends any laws that prohibit violent or destructive actions by protesters or (2) prevents Detroit police from (a) reasonably and lawfully protecting themselves and the public against
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violence perpetrated by protesters that could harm officers or the public (including protesters throwing objects at police, such as frozen water bottles, bricks, bottle rockets, or cherry bombs); or (b) taking reasonable and lawful action against protesters who violate any laws or resist arrest (e.g. ordering protesters to cease unlawful activity, or using reasonable force to arrest a protester if there is probable cause to believe that the protester violated the law).
This order will remain in effect until further order of the Court. Dated: September 18, 2020
s/Laurie J. Michelson LAURIE J. MICHELSON UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

/s/ “with consent” Jack Schulz SCHULZ LAW PLC Jack W. Schulz (P78078) Amanda M. Ghannam (P83065) PO Box 44855 Detroit, MI 48244 (313) 246-3590 jackwschulz@gmail.com amandamghannam@gmail.com On behalf of the National Lawyers Guild, Detroit/Michigan Chapter Attorneys for Plaintiffs

/s/ Maria Fracassa Dwyer CLARK HILL PLC Reginald M. Turner (P40543) Maria Fracassa Dwyer (P60946) Christopher M. Trebilcock (P62101) 500 Woodward Avenue, Suite 3500 Detroit, MI 48226 (313) 965-8300 rturner@clarkhill.com mdwyer@clarkhill.com ctrebilcock@clarkhill.com On behalf of City of Detroit and Mayor Michael Duggan, Chief James Craig, Officer Stephen Anouti, Officer David Hornshaw, Officer Mariah Erard, Sergeant Timothy Barr and Officer Does 1-100, inclusive

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/s/ “with consent” Julie H. Hurwitz GOODMAN HURWITZ & JAMES, PC Julie H. Hurwitz (P34720) William H. Goodman (P14173) Melissa A. Brown (P79127) 1394 E. Jefferson Ave. Detroit, MI 48207 (313) 567-6170 jhurwitz@goodmanhurwitz.com bgoodman@goodmanhurwitz.com mbrown@goodmanhurwitz.com On behalf of the National Lawyers Guild, Detroit/Michigan Chapter Co-counsel for Plaintiffs
/s/ “with consent” Sean Riddle THE RIDDELL LAW FIRM PLLC Sean Riddell (P81302) 400 Renaissance Center, Ste. 2600 Detroit, MI 48243 (313) 497-0074 sriddell@riddelllawfirm.com On behalf of the National Lawyers Guild, Detroit/Michigan Chapter Co-counsel for Plaintiffs
Date: September 18, 2020
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 </s> Case 2:20-cv-12363-LJM-DRG ECF No. 61, PageID.875 Filed 03/10/21 Page 1 of 14

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

DETROIT WILL BREATHE, et al.,

Plaintiffs, v.

Case No. 20-12363 Honorable Laurie J. Michelson

CITY OF DETROIT, et al.,

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS/COUNTER-DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS COUNTERCLAIM [46]

Plaintiffs Detroit Will Breathe and 14 individuals (“DWB,” for convenience) brought this case to challenge the response of Detroit police to protest activity in the City of Detroit, seeking both injunctive and monetary relief. After the Court entered a temporary restraining order enjoining the Detroit Police from using certain tactics against peaceful protesters, the parties agreed to a Joint Order to Preserve the Status Quo in lieu of the Court deciding Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction. The City of Detroit and the other defendants (“the City”) then filed a counterclaim for civil conspiracy against all of the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs (aka the CounterDefendants) now seek to dismiss the counterclaim for failure to state a claim. The parties’ positions are fully briefed and are further supported by several amicus briefs, such that oral argument is not necessary. See E.D. Mich. LR 7.1(f). Because the City fails to state a claim for civil conspiracy, the motion to dismiss is GRANTED.
I. Protests began in Detroit in late May 2020, in response to the death of George Floyd during his arrest by Minneapolis police officers. Almost-daily demonstrations continued throughout the

Case 2:20-cv-12363-LJM-DRG ECF No. 61, PageID.876 Filed 03/10/21 Page 2 of 14
summer. DWB alleges that from the start, Detroit police responded to peaceful demonstrations with beatings, tear gas, pepper spray, rubber bullets, sound cannons, flash grenades, chokeholds, and mass arrests without probable cause. (ECF No. 1, PageID.3.) The City provides a different story, alleging that the protests “repeatedly turned violent, endangering the lives of police and the public.” (ECF No. 43, PageID.608.)
There is significant dispute over the details of what happened at these protests. These facts will be pursued during discovery. But for the purposes of deciding the motion to dismiss, the Court must accept the well-pled factual allegations in the City’s countercomplaint as true and draws reasonable inferences from those allegations in the City’s favor. Waskul v. Washtenaw Cty. Cmty. Mental Health, 979 F.3d 426, 440 (6th Cir. 2020).
Detroit Will Breathe was founded on June 4, 2020 and incorporated as a domestic nonprofit corporation on June 23, 2020. (ECF No. 46, PageID.651.) DWB describes itself as “an integrated, youth-led, militant organization fighting against police brutality and systemic racism in Detroit.” Detroit Will Breathe Home Page, https://perma.cc/XW9R-NRRL. DWB regularly organized marches and other protests throughout the summer of 2020 (and continues to do so today). Id. The events are open to the public and advertised on a variety of social-media platforms. (ECF No. 43, PageID.609.) The City alleges that Plaintiffs Nakia Wallace, Tristan Taylor, and Jazten Bass are members of DWB. (ECF No. 43, PageID.609.)
Although protests occurred throughout the summer of 2020, both parties focus principally on clashes at protests that occurred between May 29 and June 2, on July 10, on August 22, and on September 5, 2020. (ECF No. 4, PageID.166; ECF No. 43, PageID.610–624.)
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A. May 29, 2020–June 2, 2020. Again, taking as true the allegations in the counterclaim, the protests in Detroit began on May 29, 2020, in response to the death of George Floyd. (ECF No. 43, PageID.610.) On that day, multiple Detroit police officers sustained injuries as a result of thrown objects, and a number of protestors were arrested. (Id. at PageID.611.) On May 31, Detroit Mayor Mike Duggan declared a state of emergency and implemented an 8:00 p.m. curfew. (Id.) Protests continued after the curfew, and DPD issued a number of warnings to disperse before deploying tear gas. (Id.) Additional police officers suffered injuries from objects thrown at them. (Id. at PageID.611–612.) On June 2, protests again continued after curfew. DPD officers claim they issued at least seven directives to disperse that protestors failed to obey. (Id. at PageID.612–613.) Although DWB did not yet exist at this time, the City alleges that Plaintiffs Taylor, Bass, Lillian Ellis, and Lauren Rosen were in attendance at these protests. (Id. at PageID.612.) June 28, 2020. On this date, DWB organized a protest in southwest Detroit. The City claims that during the protest Plaintiff Bass jumped on the hood of a police car and banged on it in a manner that was threatening to the police officers and damaged the vehicle. (Id. at PageID.614.) July 10, 2020. DWB organized a last-minute protest in response to the shooting of Hakim Littleton in Detroit. (Id.) In publicizing the protest, DWB tweeted “RAPID RESPONSE CALL TO ACTION: Detroit Police Department killed a 19 year old today. Our planned march is cancelled so that the movement can respond to the injustice! Get to 7446 McNichols Rd. as soon as you can!” (Id. at PageID.614–615.) During the protest, the City claims that protestors ignored police directives and threw objects like rocks and bleach at officers. (Id. at PageID.615.) Police
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officers also had physical altercations with some of the plaintiffs while attempting to detain them. (Id. at PageID.615–616.) For example, the City alleges that Zachary Kolodziej lunged at officers multiple times and had to be physically restrained on the ground. (Id.) And while Wallace claims that officers placed her in a chokehold that day (ECF No. 1, PageID.35), the City says, “the Officer taking Counter-Defendant Wallace down lost her hold, which caused her arms to momentarily touch Wallace’s neck.” (Id. at PageID.616.) A final plaintiff, Olivia Puente, allegedly pushed against an officer’s protective shield. (Id. at PageID.617.)
August 22, 2020. On August 22, DWB organized a protest to “occupy[] the intersection of Woodward and John R to demand the immediate end of Operation Legend and the withdrawal of federal agents sent to Detroit by the Trump administration to terrorize Black and Brown communities. We aren’t leaving until the feds leave.” (Id. at PageID.620 (quoting a DWB tweet).) DWB later tweeted “Come down here if you would like to support us and help us hold this space.” (Id.) Plaintiff Taylor also posted a video on Facebook telling people “So if you ain’t doing nothing and you wanna…be a part of the movement that’s taking up space, we’re here. We ain’t leaving until they make us leave.” (Id. at PageID.621.) According to the City, DWB “did not obtain a permit in conjunction with this self-proclaimed ‘occupation’ during which they blocked off streets, obstructed traffic, and stood in the road.” (Id.) The City alleges that the following plaintiffs were present at the protest: Taylor, Bass, Wallace, Puente, Iman Saleh, Lauren Rosen, Margaret Henige, Amy Nahabedian, Caylee Arnold, and Alexander Anest. (Id.)
After protestors blocked all lanes of traffic on Woodward Avenue, DPD officers issued orders to disperse and told the protestors “that their gathering was no longer a lawful assembly.” (Id. at PageID.622.) DPD officers were injured during DPD’s efforts to disperse the crowd. (Id.) The City also alleges that Plaintiffs Taylor, Wallace, Henige, Arnold, Nahabedian, and Lillian Ellis
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were arrested that night for “obstructing police” and “disorderly conduct.” (Id. at PageID.622– 623.)
September 5, 2020. On September 5, DWB called on protestors to gather to celebrate this Court’s temporary restraining order. (Id. at PageID.624.) During the march, some protestors stood on the outside dining barrier of a local restaurant and “disrupted patrons’ dinners.” (Id.) It is not clear from the counterclaim whether the City alleges that any individual plaintiffs were involved in this incident. Later that evening, some individuals, who may have participated in the march, spray painted a city statue. (Id.)
B. The City also pleads facts related to communications made by DWB and its “members” to the media and on social-media platforms. Throughout the summer, DWB and a number of individual plaintiffs made statements to the press and on social media about the protests and the police response. The City first points to the following statement Plaintiff Wallace made on Fox2 News on June 15: I don’t think that there’s a space for Detroit Will Breathe to condone or not condone violence, right? People are angry and people are going to express that anger. Detroit Will Breathe has clearly set forward our program and what it is that we are doing. But what we are never going to do is tell young people who are passionate and who are upset and who are angry that they don’t have a right to be angry and they don’t a right to express that anger. Because this is what happens when you kill people. This is what happens when you make it clear that life is indispensable to you that particularly Black and brown lives don’t matter. There’s going to be a price to pay for that. (ECF No. 43, PageID.610; ECF No. 46, PageID.653 (citing Interview, Fox2 News at 2:44 (June 15, 2020), https://www.fox2detroit.com/video/696779.)).
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The City also quotes Facebook posts from DWB members. On June 28th, Plaintiff Bass posted on his Facebook account after the protest that day: “THIS COP TRIED TO KILL ME AND OTHERS TONIGHT!!!!! FIRE AND JAIL HIM FOR ATTEMPT VEHICULAR MAN SLAUGHTER!!!!” (ECF No. 43, PageID.614.) And in mid-July, Wallace posted on her Facebook page, “Why can [Detroit police officers] run over protestors? . . . CRAIG HAS TO GO!!!!!” (Id. at PageID.618.)
Defendants also claim that videos posted to DWB’s social media accounts show unidentified protestors “encouraging violence or endorsing violence against police officers, promoting the destruction and defacing of property, and disrupting the lives of Detroit residents.” (Id. at PageID.609.) But they do not identify any specific posts.
Finally, the City notes that on August 26th, Plaintiff Taylor stated during a live interview, “That’s why Chief Craig has to go. That’s why he has to go because he reigns over the police department which has given the green light to whatever the officers feel like they want to do.” (Id. at PageID.623.)
C. Based on these allegations, the City filed a counterclaim alleging one count of civil conspiracy. (ECF No. 43.) The City alleges that Plaintiffs “conspired with one another with the intent to and for the illegal purpose of disturbing the peace, engaging in disorderly conduct, inciting riots, destroying public property, resisting or obstructing officers in charge of duty, and committing acts of violence against” Detroit police officers. (ECF No. 43, PageID.625.) DWB now moves to dismiss the counterclaim for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (ECF No. 46.)
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II. In deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court “construes the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, accepts the plaintiff’s factual allegations as true, and determines whether the complaint ‘contain[s] sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Heinrich v. Waiting Angels Adoption Servs., Inc., 668 F.3d 393, 403 (6th Cir. 2012) (alteration in original) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). Under the plausibility framework of Iqbal and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), the Sixth Circuit continues to recognize the “viability of the short and plain language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8.” HDC, LLC v. City of Ann Arbor, 675 F.3d 608, 614 (6th Cir. 2012). Accordingly, detailed factual allegations are not required to survive a motion to dismiss. Id. (citing Hensley Mfg. v. ProPride, Inc., 579 F.3d 603, 609 (6th Cir. 2009)). But they must “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
III. In its counterclaim, the City alleges a single count of civil conspiracy under Michigan law. (ECF No. 43, PageID.625.) DWB argues that several defects doom the City’s counterclaim. The City disagrees.
A. The Court begins with DWB’s argument that the City fails to plead a civil conspiracy claim because the City does not allege an actionable underlying tort. Under Michigan law, “[a] civil conspiracy is a combination of two or more persons, by some concerted action, to accomplish a criminal or unlawful purpose, or to accomplish a lawful purpose by criminal or unlawful means.” Admiral Ins. Co. v. Columbia Cas. Ins. Co., 486 N.W.2d 351 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992). “[T]he plaintiff must show that ‘there is a single plan, that the alleged
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coconspirator shared in the general conspiratorial objective, and that an overt act was committed in furtherance of the conspiracy that caused injury to the complainant.’” Roche Diagnostics Corp. v. Shaya, 427 F. Supp. 3d 905, 924 (E.D. Mich. 2019) (quoting Hooks v. Hooks, 771 F.2d 935, 944 (6th Cir. 1985)). The existence of an agreement may be inferred from the “circumstances, acts and conduct of the parties.” Fremont Reorganizing Corp. v. Duke, 811 F. Supp. 2d 1323, 1341 (E.D. Mich. 2011) (quoting Temborius v. Slatkin, 403 N.W.2d 821, 828 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986)).
Importantly though, “[c]ivil conspiracy is not a claim of its own; ‘it is necessary to prove a separate, actionable tort.’” Prudential Def. Sols., Inc. v. Graham, No. 20-11785, 2020 WL 6382862, at *9 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 30, 2020) (quoting Advoc. Org. for Patients & Providers v. Auto Club Ins. Ass’n, 670 N.W.2d 569, 580 (Mich. Ct. App. 2003) and Early Detection Center, P.C. v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 403 N.W.2d 830, 836 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986)); see also McCarthy v. Sosnick, No. 293482, 2011 WL 4424344 (Mich. Ct. App. Sept. 22, 2011) (reiterating that “any civil conspiracy must be accompanied by a separate, actionable tort.”); Michigan Non-Standard Jury Instr. Civil § 15:1 (listing as an element that must be proved, “The defendant committed a separate, actionable tort as part of the conspiracy.”).
The City does not appear to dispute that it does not plead an underlying actionable tort. Instead, the City argues that it is enough to allege that DWB and its members conspired to “commit unlawful actions.” (ECF No. 54, PageID.810.) So the City seems to argue that a civil conspiracy does not actually require an underlying actionable tort, but simply unlawful activity.
But the City does not offer any cases, nor has the Court been able to find any, that support the proposition that a civil conspiracy claim can be maintained without facts (or at this stage, factual allegations) establishing an underlying actionable tort, i.e., a civil wrong for which a remedy may be obtained. Tort, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). The reason for the
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requirement of an underlying actionable tort becomes clear upon consideration of a few basic principles. A civil conspiracy “[can]not exist in the air,” Early Detection Center, 403 N.W.2d at 836, because the “cause of action does not result from the conspiracy but from the acts done.” Roche v. Blair, 9 N.W.2d 861, 863 (Mich. 1943). So a conspiracy claim is only actionable if the underlying conduct the defendants are accused of is also actionable. In the context of a suit for damages, civil wrongs (i.e. torts) are actionable. But criminal conduct is actionable only if there is a corresponding private right of action.
This distinction is illustrated by two cases from Michigan federal courts. In Mead v. County of St. Joseph, No. 1:06-CV-555, 2008 WL 441129 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 13, 2008), plaintiffs alleged that the defendants conspired to violate the Michigan Strip Search Law. The Court found that, as with most criminal laws, “a person may not bring a private cause of action under the Michigan Strip Search Law, and as a result there is no underlying cause of action in Plaintiff’s civil conspiracy count. Without an underlying cause of action, there can be no claim of civil conspiracy.” Id. at *7. And in Carson Real Estate Companies v. CoStar Group Inc., the court noted that a civil conspiracy claim could be premised on an extortion count because Michigan law recognizes a private right of action for extortion. No. 10-CV-13966, 2011 WL 4360021, at *6 (E.D. Mich. June 30, 2011), report and recommendation adopted sub nom, Carson Real Estate Cos. v. Constar Grp., Inc., No. 10-CV-13966, 2011 WL 4360017 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 19, 2011) (internal citation omitted). But the court ultimately dismissed the plaintiff’s conspiracy claim because the plaintiff failed to plead facts to support the underlying torts of extortion and unfair competition. Id.
The unlawful actions that the City pleads Plaintiffs engaged in include obstructing traffic, failing to obey lawful police orders, disorderly conduct, disturbing the peace, and inciting to riot.
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(ECF No. 54, PageID.811.) These unlawful actions are either misdemeanors or local-ordinance violations. Nowhere in the counterclaim does the City allege that any plaintiffs conspired to commit a tort that is actionable under Michigan law.
So, like the plaintiff in Mead, Defendants here have not established that they have a private right of action against Plaintiffs for, or that Michigan law recognizes any civil torts based on, the alleged criminal offenses. And thus, they cannot establish an underlying cause of action to support their civil conspiracy claims. This is also analogous to the cases that routinely dismiss Michigan civil conspiracy claims after the underlying (tort) claims are dismissed. See, e.g., Admiral Ins. Co. v. Columbia Cas. Ins. Co., 486 N.W.2d 351, 359 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992) (“Because Admiral has failed to state any tortious action, its conspiracy action must also fail.”); Estate of Roush ex rel. Hardy v. Laurels of Carson City, L.L.C., No. 317406, 2014 WL 7004021, at *5 (Mich. Ct. App. Dec. 11, 2014) (“[P]laintiff’s ability to prevail on its claim of civil conspiracy requires it to prevail on at least one of these underlying torts.”); Weingrad v. Jones, No. 342873, 2019 WL 5275032, at *7 (Mich. Ct. App. Oct. 17, 2019), appeal denied, 947 N.W.2d 802 (Mich. 2020) (“[P]laintiff failed to sufficiently allege that any underlying tort occurred and thus did not state a claim for civil conspiracy.”).
Because the City does not allege that any plaintiff committed any underlying tort, their civil conspiracy claim fails.
B. Even if the City could allege an underlying tort or is not required to do so, its civil conspiracy claim would still fail because it does not allege sufficient facts to infer that Plaintiffs conspired to commit any form of unlawful activity—and especially that all of the alleged coconspirators shared in a common conspiratorial objective to engage in such unlawful activity.
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“Pleading requirements governing civil conspiracies are relatively strict.” Fieger v. Cox, 524 F.3d 770, 776 (6th Cir. 2008). “[V]ague and conclusory allegations unsupported by material facts will not be sufficient” to state a claim for conspiracy. Gutierrez v. Lynch, 826 F.2d 1534, 1538 (6th Cir. 1987).
As a general matter, the City does not plead any specific allegations of any specific plaintiff conspiring with another to commit an unlawful act. The City focuses on allegedly unlawful actions that occurred at the protests without alleging that any specific plaintiffs agreed to commit those acts.
For example, the City alleges that during the summer’s protests, public property was defaced, and individual police officers were injured by thrown projectiles. But they do not plead who allegedly did these actions. And they offer no facts to suggest that DWB or any plaintiffs in this case encouraged any protestor to commit these acts. The City argues that they should be given the opportunity to engage in discovery to identify “each individual Plaintiff involved in each specific concerted effort to engage in specific criminal actions.” (ECF No. 54, PageID.818.) But pleadings are not placeholders while a party pursues discovery of wrongdoing. Indeed, “only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss” and thus entitles a counter-plaintiff to “unlock the doors of discovery.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–79 (2009); see also Life For Relief & Dev. v. Charter One Bank, N.A., No. 12-CV-13550, 2013 WL 3810255, at *3 (E.D. Mich. July 23, 2013) (explaining that “Plaintiff cannot use discovery to obtain specific facts necessary to craft a plausible complaint, ‘even when the information needed to establish a claim . . . is solely within the purview of the defendant or a third party.’” (quoting New Albany Tractor, Inc. v. Louisville Tractor, Inc., 650 F.3d 1046, 1051 (6th Cir. 2011))). In order to
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be entitled to discovery, the City must first allege specific facts from which the Court can infer that DWB engaged in a civil conspiracy, which it has not.
And the City is mistaken that their request is analogous to DWB suing “Doe” officers. In their complaint, DWB pled specific conduct by specific officers and simply used “Doe” where they did not know the name of each officer engaging in the pled conduct. On the other hand, the City admittedly is unable to plead facts about any of the specific individuals that allegedly battered the police officers or defaced public property.
The City’s allegations also fail to make a plausible case that Plaintiffs reached the type of agreement required for a civil conspiracy. Their allegations about planning and coordination of the conspiracy are limited to media interviews with individual plaintiffs and posts on social media about attending the protests, but not about any unlawful action. As detailed in the summary of facts above, most of the statements and posts that the City points to in no way suggest an agreement, let alone one to commit unlawful acts. Instead, they simply evidence DWB organizing and publicizing public protests, albeit with occasional strident and passionate language. Moreover, the City alleges in its counterclaim that all Plaintiffs—DWB, and the 14 individual plaintiffs—conspired with one another. (ECF No. 43, PageID.625.) Yet, for the majority of the plaintiffs, the City does not plead a single fact specific to him or her. So the City has not pled sufficient facts that make it plausible to infer that every plaintiff shared in a common conspiratorial objective to engage in unlawful conduct at DWB protests.
The only allegation that could plausibly suggest that Plaintiffs were planning some form of unlawful action is when DWB posted on August 22nd that the group was “occupying the intersection of Woodward and John R” and would not “leav[e] until the feds leave.” (ECF No. 43, PageID.620.) But the City itself admits that the gathering began as a lawful assembly and the
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activity only became unlawful when DPD officers arrived, “instructed [the protestors] that their gathering was no longer a lawful assembly[,]” and ordered them to disperse. (Id. at PageID.622.) The Court cannot draw an inference based on these facts that there was an agreement between Plaintiffs to engage in unlawful activity. Moreover, if protesters fail to heed lawful orders to disperse, law enforcement has recourse. A speculative lawsuit that this may have been the result of a civil conspiracy to commit unlawful acts, with the attendant risks to first amendment freedoms, is not one of them.
In sum, the City fails to establish the essential elements of a civil conspiracy claim under Michigan law.1
IV. Because Defendants fail to plead a plausible claim for civil conspiracy, Plaintiffs’ motion to dismiss (ECF No. 46) is GRANTED. When the Defendants received notice of Plaintiffs’ intention to file a motion to dismiss, they did not seek to amend the counterclaim. Nor did they amend after the motion was filed, as was their right under Rule 15. And in light of their acknowledgments that the conspiracy claim is not based on any speech torts and that they would need discovery to be able to allege sufficient facts concerning all of the alleged co-conspirators, amendment does not seem viable. Thus, the counterclaim (ECF No. 43) is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. The Court considered the amicus briefs. (ECF Nos. 47, 49, 55.) The parties’ briefing also addressed the arguments by amici. As a result of these arguments and the bases of the Court’s ultimate ruling, the Court did not need to rely on the arguments provided by amici and would reach
1 The Court does not need to reach the other arguments for dismissal raised by Plaintiffs. 13

Case 2:20-cv-12363-LJM-DRG ECF No. 61, PageID.888 Filed 03/10/21 Page 14 of 14 the same conclusion without them. But because they were considered, the motions for leave to file amicus briefs (ECF Nos. 47, 49, 55) are GRANTED.
SO ORDERED. Dated: March 10, 2021
s/Laurie J. Michelson LAURIE J. MICHELSON UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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[CONTENT] August 31, 2020 | District Court | the Eastern District | Michigan ||| Detroit | Will Breathe | DWB | fourteen ||| the National Lawyers Guild | Detroit | Michael Duggan | James Craig | Detroit Police Department ||| Between May 29, 2020 | August 22, 2020 | Detroit ||| DPD ||| June 28 | July 10 | August 22 |||  ||| First Amendment | Fourth Amendment ||| under 42 | 1981 | Detroit |||  ||| The same day | DPD |||  ||| District | Robert H. Cleland | Magistrate | Anthony P. Patti | Laurie J. Michelson | Magistrate | David R. Grand | September 1, 2020 ||| September 4, 2020 ||| 2020 WL 5269789 ||| Michelson ||| last 14 days ||| one |||  ||| Michelson ||| September 16 | Michelson | DPD ||| 2020 | 8575150 |||  ||| September 25 |||  ||| Michael Duggan ||| March 10, 2021 ||| Michelson |||  [SUMMARY] This lawsuit was filed on August 31, 2020 in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. The plaintiffs included Detroit Will Breathe (DWB) and fourteen individuals. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel on behalf of the National Lawyers Guild, sued the city of Detroit, Mayor Michael Duggan, Police Chief James Craig, and over one hundred Detroit Police Department (DPD) officers. 

Between May 29, 2020 and August 22, 2020, the plaintiffs participated in protests across Detroit calling for the end of police brutality and racial injustice. The plaintiffs stated that the DPD used excessive force on multiple occasions during the approximately 90 protests that the plaintiffs engaged in during this time period. These instances of excessive force included police driving cars into protest leaders on June 28; using dangerous chokeholds and teargas on peaceful protesters on July 10; and using additional pepper spray, teargas, and chokeholds on protestors on August 22. The plaintiffs also alleged alleged that a curfew imposed by the defendants was only enforced against protesters.

The plaintiffs alleged that these actions violated their First Amendment rights to freedom of speech and assembly, and also violated their Fourth Amendment protection against excessive force, arrest without probable cause, and false imprisonment. They also alleged that defendants' actions represented retaliation forbidden under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and contended that the city of Detroit was liable under the <i>Monell</i> theory of liability. The plaintiffs requested injunctive, monetary, and declaratory relief, including punitive damages, and asked for attorneys' fees and costs. 

The same day that they filed their complaint, the plaintiffs also filed a motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, which would prohibit the DPD from using weapons against peaceful protesters or arresting protesters without probable cause. The plaintiffs also sought basic amenities, such as access to water and the provision of necessary medical attention, be for any protesters that were arrested.

The case was originally assigned to District Judge Robert H. Cleland and Magistrate Judge Anthony P. Patti, but was then reassigned to District Judge Laurie J. Michelson and Magistrate Judge David R. Grand on September 1, 2020.

On September 4, 2020, the court partially granted the request for a temporary restraining order (TRO). 2020 WL 5269789. Judge Michelson enjoined the defendants from using weapons against peaceful protesters, from placing individuals in choke-holds or hitting them with vehicles, from using zip ties or handcuffs in a way that causes injury, and arresting demonstrators without probable cause. The order was to last 14 days. However, the defendants thought that the order was one-sided. They submitted a motion to modify the TRO on the grounds that it would allow protesters to break the law without repercussions. Judge Michelson disagreed. On September 16, Judge Michelson issued an order denying the defendants' request to modify the TRO, holding that the TRO in no way allowed plaintiffs or other protesters to break the law without legal consequences -- DPD was still allowed to arrest those that sought to break the law. 2020 WL 8575150. The parties jointly agreed that police officers would refrain from using weapons (batons, shield, etc.), chemical agents, or chokeholds against protestors, and also agreed not to arrest demonstrators en masse without probable cause.

The defendants answered the complaint and filed a counterclaim on September 25, alleging that the plaintiffs engaged in a civil conspiracy. The defendants sought compensatory damages, punitive damages, and attorneys' fees. The defendants also sought declaratory judgment stating that the plaintiffs defamed Mayor Michael Duggan and multiple police officers.

After the plaintiffs filed a motion to dismiss the defendants' counterclaim, the counterclaim was dismissed on March 10, 2021. Judge Michelson found that the city did not allege that the plaintiffs committed an underlying tort to support the conspiracy allegation, nor did the city allege sufficient factual allegations to sustain a conspiracy charge even if it could proceed without an underlying tort. 

The case remains ongoing.