Case 5:07-cv-00928-FB Document 1 Filed 11/15/2007 Page 1 of 15

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
SAN ANTONIO DIVISION

2001 NOV 15 \0: 50

JULIA ANN JACKSON, individually and on behalf of a class of others similarly situated

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

Plaintiffs,

v. THE COUNTY OF BEXAR

:SA07CA092SFB

Defendant.

INTRODUCTION This is a class action brought to redress the deprivation by Defendant of rights secured to the Plaintiff and the proposed Class by the United States Constitution· and the laws of the United States of America. For at least the past five years, the Bexar County Detention Center (the "Detention Center") has had a policy and practice of stripsearching all individuals regardless of the crime upon which they are charged. In addition, such policy and practice does not call for any reasonable suspicion analysis before conducting a strip search. Upon information and belief, this policy is, in part, derived from the written procedures of the Bexar County Detention Center and was promulgated by senior officials of the County of Bexar, acting through the Bexar County Sheriff s Office. It has been well established in this judicial circuit for many years that individuals charged with misdemeanors or violations cannot be strip-searched absent particularized suspicion that they possess weapons or contraband. In short, the policy of Bexar County

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and the Bexar County Detention Center to force those charged with minor crimes to undergo the indignities of a strip search upon detention is not only clearly illegal, but is insensitive and unnecessary.
Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of herself and on behalf of a class of thousands of others (together, "Plaintiffs") who were strip searched after being charged with petty crimes to vindicate the clear and unnecessary violation of their civil rights and those of the class members they propose to represent. Plaintiffs were charged with misdemeanor and/or violation offenses and were subjected to a strip search, in violation of their right against unreasonable searches under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Plaintiff seeks monetary damages for herself and each member of the proposed class, a declaration that the Bexar County Detention Center's policies are unconstitutional, and an injunction precluding Bexar County and the Bexar County Detention Center from continuing to violate the rights of those placed into their custody. With this as a background, Plaintiffs complain as follows:
JURISDICTION 1. This Court has jurisdiction over this action under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1341 & 1343 because it is filed to obtain compensatory damages and injunctive relief for the deprivation, under color of state law, of the rights of citizens of the United States secured by the Constitution and federal law pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 & 1983. This Court also has jurisdiction over this action under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 2201, as it is filed to obtain declaratory relief relative to the constitutionality of the policies of a local government. 2. Venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)(2) because the events giving rise to Plaintiffs' claims occurred in this judicial district.
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PARTIES 3. Plaintiff Julia Ann Jackson ("Jackson" or "Plaintiff Jackson") is a 29 year old female who resides in Behar County, Texas. On or about April 14, 2006, Jackson was arrested by the Converse Police Department after they were called to a scene because of a noise violation concern and discovered that Jackson had a warrant out for her arrest for driving with an invalid license, a misdemeanor offense. After being held by the Converse Police Department for a period of several hours, Jackson was transported to and held by the Bexar County Detention Center. 4. Defendant County of Bexar (the "County") is a county government organized and existing under the laws of the State of Texas. At all times relevant hereto, the County, acting through the Bexar County Sheriff s Office and the Bexar County Detention Center, was responsible for the policies, practices, supervision, implementation and conduct of all matters pertaining to the center and was responsible for the appointment, training, supervision and conduct of all personnel, including those working in the Bexar County Detention Center (the "Detention Center"). In addition, at all relevant times, the County, acting through the Bexar County Sheriffs Office and the Detention Center, was responsible for enforcing the rules of the Detention Center and for ensuring that detention personnel obeyed the Constitution and laws of the United States and of the State of Texas.
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CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS
5. Plaintiff Jackson brings this action pursuant to Rules 23(b)(1), 23(b)(2)
and 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of herself and a class of
similarly situated individuals who were charged with misdemeanors or minor crimes and
were strip searched upon their entry into the Bexar County Detention Center.
6. The class that Plaintiff Jackson seeks to represent is defined as follows:
All persons who have been or will be placed into the custody of the Bexar County Detention Center after being charged with misdemeanors, violations, violations of probation or parole, traffic infractions, civil commitments or other minor crimes and were or will be strip searched upon their entry into the Bexar County Detention Center pursuant to the policy, custom and practice of Bexar County. The class period commences on November 15,2005, and extends to the date on which Bexar County and the Detention Center are enjoined from, or otherwise ceases, enforcing its unconstitutional policy, practice and custom of conducting strip searches absent reasonable suspicion. Specifically excluded from the class are Defendant and any and all of their respective affiliates, legal representatives, heirs, successors, employees or assignees.
7. This action has been brought and may properly be maintained as a class
action under Federal law and satisfies the numerosity, commonality, typicality and
adequacy requirements for maintaining a class action under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
8. The members of the class are so numerous as to render joinder
impracticable. Upon information and belief, there are hundreds of people arrested for
misdemeanors and violations who are placed into the custody of the Detention Center
every month .- all of whom are members of the proposed class. Upon information and
belief, the size of the proposed class totals at least 10,000 individuals, some of whom
have had their civil rights violated on multiple occasions.
9. Upon information and belief, joinder of all of these individuals is
impracticable because of the large number of class members and the fact that class
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members are likely dispersed over a large geographical area, with some members presently residing outside of Bexar County and this Judicial District. Furthermore, upon information and belief, many members of the class are low-income persons, may not speak English, and likely would have great difficulty in pursuing their rights individually.
10. Common questions of law and fact exist as to all members of the class, in that they all had their right to be free from unreasonable searches violated by Detention Officers conducting strip searches absent particularized suspicion. All members of the class were charged with misdemeanors or violations when placed into the custody of the Detention Center, and all were illegally strip searched in violation of the established law in this judicial circuit.
11. Plaintiff Jackson's claims are typical of the claims ofthe members of the class. Plaintiff Jackson and all members of the class sustained damages arising out of Defendant's course of conduct. The harms suffered by the Plaintiffs are typical of the harms suffered by the class members.
12. The representative Plaintiff, Julia Ann Jackson, has the requisite personal interest in the outcome of this action and will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. Plaintiff Jackson has no interests that are adverse to the interests of the members of the class.
13. Plaintiff Jackson has retained counsel who have substantial experience and success in the prosecution of class action and civil rights litigation. The named Plaintiff, Julia Ann Jackson, is being represented by Charles LaDuca of Cuneo Gilbert & LaDuca, LLP; Sam H. Lock of The Law Offices of Sam H. Lock; James Harrington of the Texas Civil Rights Project; Bob Keach of the Law Offices of Elmer Keach; Gary Mason and
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Alexander Barnett of the Mason Law Firm; and Kerissa Chelkowski of the Law Offices of Kerissa Chelkowski.
14. In short, Plaintiff Jackson's counsel has the resources, expertise and experience to successfully prosecute this action against Bexar County. Counsel for Plaintiff Jackson know of no conflicts among members of the class, or between counsel and members of the class.
15. This action, in part, seeks declaratory and injunctive relief. As such, Plaintiffs seek class certification under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2), in that all class members were subject to the same policy requiring the illegal strip searches of individuals charged with misdemeanor or minor crimes and placed into the custody of the Detention Center. In short, the County of Bexar and Detention Center Officers acted on grounds generally applicable to all class members.
16. In addition to certification under Rule 23(b) (2), and in the alternative, Plaintiffs seek certification under Rule 23(b)(3).
17. Common questions of law and fact exist as to all members of the class, and predominate over any questions that affect only individual members of the class. These common questions of law and fact include, without limitation, the common and predominate question of whether the Defendant's written andlor de facto policy of strip searching all individuals charged with misdemeanors or minor crimes and committed to the Detention Center is a violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and whether such a written andlor de facto policy existed during the class period.
18. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy, since joinder of all of the individual members
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of the class is impracticable given the large number of class members and the fact that they are dispersed over a large geographical area. Furthermore, the expense and burden of individual litigation would make it difficult or impossible for individual members of the class to redress the wrongs done to them. The cost to the federal court system of adjudicating thousands of individual cases would be enormous. Individualized litigation would also magnify the delay and expense to all parties and the court system. By contrast, the conduct of this action as a class action in this District presents far fewer management difficulties, conserves the resources of the parties and the court system, and protects the rights of each member of the class.
19. Upon information and belief, there are no other actions pending to address the Defendant's flagrant violation of the civil rights of thousands of individuals, even though the Defendant has maintained the illegal strip search regimen for at least the past two (2) years.
20. In the alternative to certification under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3), Plaintiffs also seek partial certification under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4).
FACTS Facts Applicable to the Class Generally 21. The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution prohibits state officials, such as the Detention Center Corrections Officers, from performing strip searches of arrestees who have been charged with misdemeanors or other minor crimes unless the officer has reasonable suspicion to believe that the arrestee is concealing a weapon or contraband.
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22. Upon information and belief, the County of Bexar and the Bexar County Detention Center have instituted a written and/or de facto policy, custom or practice of strip searching all individuals who enter the custody of the Detention Center and are placed into jail clothing, regardless of the nature of their charged crime and without the presence of reasonable suspicion to believe that the individual was concealing a weapon or contraband.
23. Upon information and belief, Bexar County and the Bexar County Detention Center have instituted a written and/or de facto policy, custom or practice of conducting visual body cavity searches (visual inspection of the vaginal and rectal cavities) on all individuals who enter the custody of the Detention Center, regardless of the individual characteristics or the nature of their charged crime. These strip searches occur in front of other pretrial detainees, not in a private setting. For purposes ofthis Complaint, strip and visual cavity searches are collectively referred to as ("strip searches") .
24. The Bexar County Sheriffs Office Search Policy, a true and correct copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit A, specifically provides that routine strip searches will be conducted "[u]pon the admissions process, during the issuance of the inmate uniform." Ex. A at 2.
25. The County of Bexar knows that it may not institute, enforce or permit enforcement of a policy or practice of conducting strip searches without particularized, reasonable suspicion.
26. The Defendant's written and/or de facto policy, practice and custom mandating wholesale strip searches of all misdemeanor and violation arrestees has been
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promulgated, effectuated and/or enforced in bad faith and contrary to clearly established law.
27. Reasonable suspicion to conduct a strip search may only emanate from the particular circumstances antecedent to the search, such as the nature of the crime charged, the particular characteristics of the arrestees, and/or the circumstances of the arrest.
28. Upon information and belief, Bexar County and the Bexar County Detention Center have promulgated, implemented, enforced, and/or failed to rectify a written and/or de facto policy, practice or custom of strip searching all individuals placed into the custody of the Detention Center and placed into jail clothing without any requirement of reasonable suspicion, or indeed suspicion of any sort. This written and/or de facto policy made the strip searching of pre-trial detainees routine; neither the nature of the offense charged, the characteristics of the arrestee, nor the circumstances of a particular arrest were relevant to the enforcement of the policy, practice and custom of routine strip searches.
29. Pursuant to this written and/or de facto policy, each member of the class, including the named Plaintiff, was the victim of a routine strip search upon their entry into the Bexar County Detention Center. These searches were conducted without inquiry into or establishment of reasonable suspicion, and in fact were not supported by reasonable suspicion. Strip searches are conducted for individuals arrested for, among other innocuous offenses, Driving While Intoxicated, Harassment and Trespassing.
30. As a direct and proximate result of the unlawful strip search conducted pursuant to this written and/or de facto policy, the victims of the unlawful strip searches- each member of the class, including the named Plaintiffs -- have suffered or will suffer psychological pain, humiliation, suffering and mental anguish.
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Facts Applicable to the Named Plaintiff 31. Plaintiff Julia Ann Jackson was arrested on misdemeanor charges and admitted to the Bexar County Detention Center. The charges for which Jackson was arrested did not, in and of themselves, provide Detention Center Corrections Officers with reasonable suspicion to believe that Jackson was harboring any weapons or contraband. 32. Jackson was strip searched after her admission to the Detention Center. After being held in a holding cell for almost two days, she, along with approximately 25 other female pre-trial detainees, was taken into a changing room to remove her street clothes and change into a Detention Center uniform. Immediately prior to providing Jackson with the Detention Center uniform, a female Corrections Officer required Jackson to submit to a strip search whereby the Officer and another detainee were able to view Jackson while she was in a state of complete undress. 33. Jackson was later released from the Detention Center after she was able to pay bail. 34. As a direct and proximate result of the unlawful strip search conducted pursuant to Defendant's policy, practice and custom, Jackson has suffered and continues to suffer psychological pain, humiliation, suffering and mental anguish.
CAUSES OF ACTION AS AND FOR A FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION Violation of Constitutional Rights Under Color of State Law -- Unreasonable Search and Failure to Implement Municipal Policies to Avoid Constitutional Deprivations Under Color of State Law-
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35. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference and reallege each and every allegation stated in paragraphs 1 through 34.
36. The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects citizens from unreasonable searches by law enforcement officers, and prohibits officers from conducting strip searches of individuals arrested for misdemeanors or violations absent some particularized suspicion that the individual in question has either contraband or weapons.
37. The actions of Defendant detailed above violated Plaintiffs' rights under the United States Constitution. Simply put, it was not objectively reasonable for Detention Center Officers to strip search Plaintiff Jackson and Class members based on their arrests for misdemeanor/violation charges.
38. These strip searches were conducted pursuant to the policy, custom or practice of Bexar County and the Bexar County Detention Center. As such, Bexar County is directly liable for the damages of Plaintiff and members of the Class.
39. This conduct on the part of Defendant represents a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, given that the actions of the Detention Center Officers were undertaken under color of state law.
40. As a direct and proximate result of the unconstitutional acts described above, Plaintiffs have been irreparably injured.
AS AND FOR A SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION -- Demand for Declaratory Judgment --
41. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference and reallege each and every allegation stated in paragraphs 1 through 40.
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42. The policy, custom and practice of the Bexar County Detention Center and the County of Bexar is clearly unconstitutional, in that these entities and individuals are directing/conducting the strip searches of all individuals placed into the Detention Center without any particularized suspicion that the individuals in question have either contraband or weapons.
43. Plaintiffs and members of the class request that this Court issue a declaratory judgment, and that it declare the strip search policy of Bexar County and the Bexar County Detention Center to be unconstitutional.
AS AND FOR A THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION -- Demand for Preliminary and Permanent Injunction -44. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference and reallege each and every allegation stated in paragraphs 1 through 43. 45. The policy, custom and practice of the Bexar County Detention Center and Bexar County is clearly unconstitutional, in that these entities and individuals are directing/conducting the strip searches of all individuals placed into the Detention Center without any particularized suspicion that the individuals in question have either contraband or weapons. 46. Upon infonnation and belief, this policy is currently in place at the Detention Center, with new and/or prospective members of the class being subjected to the harms that have already been inflicted upon the Plaintiffs. 47. The continuing pattern of strip searching individuals charged with minor crimes will cause irreparable hann to the new and/or prospective members of the class, an adequate remedy for which does not exist at law.
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48. Plaintiffs demand that the Bexar County, the Detention Center, and Bexar County Corrections Officers immediately desist from strip searching individuals placed into the custody of the Detention Center absent any particularized suspicion that the individuals in question have either contraband or weapons, and seek both a preliminary and permanent injunction from this Court ordering as much.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Julia Ann Jackson, on behalf of herself and on behalf of a class of others similarly situated, requests that this Honorable Court grant them the following relief: 1. An order certifying this action as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
23. 2. A judgment against Defendant awarding compensatory damages to
Plaintiff and each member of the proposed class in an amount to be determined by a Jury and/or the Court on both an individual and a class wide basis. 3. A declaratory judgment against Defendant declaring the Bexar County Detention Center's policy, practice and custom of strip and visual cavity searching all detainees entering the Detention Center, regardless of the crime charged or suspicion of contraband, to be unconstitutional and improper. 4. A preliminary and permanent injunction enjoining Defendant and the Bexar County Detention Center from continuing to strip and visual cavity search individuals charged with misdemeanors or minor crimes absent
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particularized. reasonable suspicion that the arrestee subjected to the search is concealing weapons or other contraband. 5. A monetary award for attorney's fees and the costs of this action, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.

Dated: November 15,2007

S . 0 squire Law es of Sam H. Lock 1011 S. Alamo San Antonio, TX 78210 Telephone: (210) 226-0965 Telecopier: (202) 226-7540 Electronic Mail: sam@locklawfirm.com
Charles J. LaDuca, Esquire Brent Walton, Esquire Alexandra C. Warren, Esquire Cuneo Gilbert & LaDuca, LLP 507 C Street, NE Washington, DC 20002 Telephone: (202) 789-3960 Telecopier: (202) 789-1813 Electronic Mail: charlesl@cuneolaw.com bwalton@cuneolaw.com awarren@cuneolaw.com
Elmer Robert Keach, III, Esquire Law Offices of Elmer Robert Keach III, PC 1040 Riverfront Center P.O. Box 70 Amsterdam, NY 12010 Telephone: (518) 434-1718 Telecopier: (518) 770-1558 Electronic Mail: bobkeach@keachlawafirm.com

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Gary E. Mason, Esquire Nicholas A. Migliaccio, Esquire THE MASON LAW FIRM, PLLC 1225 19th Street, NW Suite 600 Washington, DC 20036 Telephone: (202) 421-2290 Telecopier: (202) 429-2294 Electronic Mail: gmason@masonlawdc.com nmiglicaccio@masonlaw.dc.com
Alexander E. Barnett, Esquire THE MASON LAW FIRM, PLLC 1120 Avenue ofthe Americas Suite 4019 New York, NY 10036 Telephone: (212) 362-5770 Telecopier: (917) 591-5227 Electronic Mail: abarnett@masonlawdc.com
James C. Harrington Texas Civil Rights Project 1405 Montopolis Drive Austin, TX 78741 Telephone: (512) 474-5073 Telecopier: (512) 474-0726 Electronic Mail: jch@mail.utexas.edu
Kerrisa Chelkowski, Esquire Law Office of Kerrisa Chelkowski 1011 South Alamo Street San Antonio, TX 78210 Telephone: (210) 228-9393 Telecopier: (210) 226-7450
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFFS AND PROPOSED CLASS
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
SAN ANTONIO DIVISION

mLIAANN JACKSON, ERICA BERNAL, and MARTIN MARTINEZ, Individually and on Behalf of a Class of Others Similarly Situated,
Plaintiffs,
v.
THE COUNTY OF BEXAR,
Defendant.

) ) ) SECOND AMENDED ) CLASS ACTION ) COMPLAINT ) ) ) CIVIL ACTION NO. SA-07-CA-928 ) ) ) )

INTRODUCTION This is a class action brought to redress the deprivation by Defendant of rights secured to the Plaintiffs and the proposed Class by the United States Constitution and the laws of the United States of America. For at least the past five years, the Bexar County Detention Center (the "Detention Center") has had a policy and practice of stripsearching all individuals regardless of the crime upon which they are charged. In addition, such policy and practice does not call for any reasonable suspicion analysis before conducting a strip search. Upon information and belief, this policy is, in part, derived from the written procedures of the Bexar County Detention Center and was promulgated by senior officials of the County of Bexar, acting through the Bexar County Sheriff s Office. It has been well established in this judicial circuit for many years that individuals charged with misdemeanors or violations cannot be strip-searched absent particularized suspicion that they possess weapons or contraband. In short, the policy of Bexar County and the Bexar County Detention Center to force those charged with minor crimes to

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undergo the indignities of a strip search upon detention is not only clearly illegal, but is insensitive and unnecessary.
Plaintiffs Julia Ann Jackson, Erica Bernal, and Martin Martinez brings this action on behalf of themselves and on behalf of a class of thousands of others (together, "Plaintiffs") who were strip searched after being charged with petty crimes to vindicate the clear and unnecessary violation of their civil rights and those of the class members they propose to represent. Plaintiffs were charged with misdemeanor and/or violation offenses and were subjected to a strip search, in violation of their right against unreasonable searches under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Plaintiffs seek monetary damages for themselves and each member of the proposed class, a declaration that the Bexar County Detention Center's policies are unconstitutional, and an injunction precluding Bexar County and the Bexar County Detention Center from continuing to violate the rights of those placed into their custody. With this as a background, Plaintiffs complain as follows:
JURISDICTION 1. This Court has jurisdiction over this action under the provisions of 28 U.S.c. §§ 1331, 1341 & 1343 because it is filed to obtain compensatory damages and injunctive relief for the deprivation, under color of state law, of the rights of citizens of the United States secured by the Constitution and federal law pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 & 1983. This Court also has jurisdiction over this action under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 2201, as it is filed to obtain declaratory relief relative to the constitutionality of the policies of a local government. 2. Venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)(2) because the events giving rise to Plaintiffs' claims occurred in this judicial district.
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PARTIES 3. Plaintiff Julia Ann Jackson ("Jackson" or "Plaintiff Jackson") is a 29 year old female who resides in Bexar County, Texas. On or about April 14, 2006, Jackson was arrested by the Converse Police Department after they were called to a scene because of a noise violation concern and discovered that Jackson had a warrant out for her arrest for driving with an invalid license, a misdemeanor offense. After being held by the Converse Police Department for a period of several hours, Jackson was transported to and held by the Bexar County Detention Center. 4. Plaintiff Erica Bernal ("Bernal" or "Plaintiff Bernal") is a 24 year old female who resides in Somerset, Texas. On or about February 22, 2007, Bernal was arrested on charges of Driving While License Invalid, a misdemeanor offense. After being held by the San Antonio Policy Department, she was transported to the Bexar County Detention Center. 5. Plaintiff Martin Martinez ("Martinez" or "Plaintiff Martinez") is a 45 male who resides in San Antonio, Texas. On or about November 27, 2005, Martinez was arrested on charges of DWI-2, a misdemeanor offense. He was admitted to the Bexar County Detention Center on the same date. 6. Defendant County of Bexar (the "County") is a county government organized and existing under the laws of the State of Texas. At all times relevant hereto, the County, acting through the Bexar County Sheriffs Office and the Bexar County Detention Center, was responsible for the policies, practices, supervision, implementation and conduct of all matters pertaining to the center and was responsible for the appointment, training, supervision and conduct of all personnel, including those working in the Bexar County Detention Center (the "Detention Center"). In addition, at all
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relevant times, the County, acting through the Bexar County Sheriffs Office and the
Detention Center, was responsible for enforcing the rules of the Detention Center and for
ensuring that detention personnel obeyed the Constitution and laws of the United States
and of the State of Texas.
CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS
7. Plaintiffs brings this action pursuant to Rules 23(b)(I), 23(b)(2) and
23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of themselves and a class of
similarly situated individuals who were charged with misdemeanors or minor crimes and
were strip searched upon their entry into the Bexar County Detention Center.
8. The class that Plaintiffs seek to represent is defined as follows:
All persons who have been or will be placed into the custody of the Bexar County Detention Center after being charged with misdemeanors, violations, violations of probation or parole, traffic infractions, civil commitments or other minor crimes and were or will be strip searched upon their entry into the Bexar County Detention Center pursuant to the policy, custom and practice of Bexar County. The class period commences on November 15,2005, and extends to the date on which Bexar County and the Detention Center are enjoined from, or otherwise ceases, enforcing its unconstitutional policy, practice and custom of conducting strip searches absent reasonable suspicion. Specifically excluded from the class are Defendant and any and all of their respective affiliates, legal representatives, heirs, successors, employees or assignees.
9. This action has been brought and may properly be maintained as a class
action under Federal law and satisfies the numerosity, commonality, typicality and
adequacy requirements for maintaining a class action under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
10. The members of the class are so numerous as to render joinder
impracticable. Upon information and belief, there are hundreds of people arrested for
misdemeanors and violations who are placed into the custody of the Detention Center
every month -- all of whom are members of the proposed class. Upon information and
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belief, the size of the proposed class totals at least 10,000 individuals, some of whom have had their civil rights violated on multiple occasions.
11. Upon information and belief, joinder of all of these individuals is impracticable because of the large number of class members and the fact that class members are likely dispersed over a large geographical area, with some members presently residing outside of Bexar County and this Judicial District. Furthermore, upon information and belief, many members of the class are low-income persons, may not speak English, and likely would have great difficulty in pursuing their rights individually.
12. Common questions oflaw and fact exist as to all members ofthe class, in that they all had their right to be free from unreasonable searches violated by Detention Officers conducting strip searches absent particularized suspicion. All members of the class were charged with misdemeanors or violations when placed into the custody of the Detention Center, and all were illegally strip searched in violation of the established law in this judicial circuit.
13. Plaintiffs' claims are typical of the claims of the members of the class. Plaintiffs and all members of the class sustained damages arising out of Defendant's course of conduct. The harms suffered by the Plaintiffs are typical of the harms suffered by the class members.
14. The representative Plaintiffs have the requisite personal interest in the outcome of this action and will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. Plaintiffs have no interests that are adverse to the interests of the members of the class.
15. Plaintiffs have retained counsel who have substantial experience and success in the prosecution of class action and civil rights litigation. The named Plaintiffs are being represented by Charles LaDuca of Cuneo Gilbert & LaDuca, LLP; Sam H.
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Lock of The Law Offices of Sam H. Lock; James Harrington of the Texas Civil Rights Project; Bob Keach of the Law Offices of Elmer Keach; Gary Mason and Alexander Barnett of the Mason Law Firm; and Kerrisa Chelkowski of the Law Offices of Kerrisa Chelkowski.
16. In short, Plaintiffs' counsel has the resources, expertise and experience to successfully prosecute this action against Bexar County. Counsel for Plaintiffs know of no conflicts among members of the class, or between counsel and members of the class.
17. This action, in part, seeks declaratory and injunctive relief. As such, Plaintiffs seek class certification under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2), in that all class members were subject to the same policy requiring the illegal strip searches of individuals charged with misdemeanor or minor crimes and placed into the custody of the Detention Center. In short, the County of Bexar and Detention Center Officers acted on grounds generally applicable to all class members.
18. In addition to certification under Rule 23(b) (2), and in the alternative, Plaintiffs seek certification under Rule 23(b)(3).
19. Common questions of law and fact exist as to all members of the class, and predominate over any questions that affect only individual members of the class. These common questions of law and fact include, without limitation, the common and predominate question of whether the Defendant's written and/or de facto policy of strip searching all individuals charged with misdemeanors or minor crimes and committed to the Detention Center is a violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and whether such a written and/or de facto policy existed during the class period.
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20. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy, since joinder of all of the individual members of the class is impracticable given the large number of class members and the fact that they are dispersed over a large geographical area. Furthermore, the expense and burden of individual litigation would make it difficult or impossible for individual members of the class to redress the wrongs done to them. The cost to the federal court system of adjudicating thousands of individual cases would be enormous. Individualized litigation would also magnify the delay and expense to all parties and the court system. By contrast, the conduct of this action as a class action in this District presents far fewer management difficulties, conserves the resources of the parties and the court system, and protects the rights of each member of the class.
21. Upon information and belief, there are no other actions pending to address the Defendant's flagrant violation of the civil rights of thousands of individuals, even though the Defendant has maintained the illegal strip search regimen for at least the past two (2) years.
22. In the alternative to certification under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3), Plaintiffs also seek partial certification under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4).
FACTS Facts Applicable to the Class Generally 23. The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution prohibits state officials, such as the Detention Center Corrections Officers, from performing strip searches of arrestees who have been charged with misdemeanors or other minor crimes unless the officer has reasonable suspicion to believe that the arrestee is concealing a weapon or contraband.
7

Case 5:07-cv-00928-FB Document 92 Filed 11/16/09 Page 8 of 16
24. Upon information and belief, the County of Bexar and the Bexar County Detention Center have instituted a written and/or de facto policy, custom or practice of strip searching all individuals who enter the custody of the Detention Center and are placed into jail clothing, regardless ofthe nature of their charged crime and without the presence of reasonable suspicion to believe that the individual was concealing a weapon or contraband.
25. Upon information and belief, Bexar County and the Bexar County Detention Center have instituted a written and/or defacto policy, custom or practice of conducting visual body cavity searches (visual inspection of the vaginal and rectal cavities) on all individuals who enter the custody of the Detention Center, regardless of the individual characteristics or the nature of their charged crime. These strip searches occur in front of other pretrial detainees, not in a private setting. For purposes of this Complaint, strip and visual cavity searches are collectively referred to as ("strip searches").
26. The strip searches were conducted intentionally, knowingly, and/or recklessly, causing Plaintiffs and Class members to have a reasonable apprehension of imminent harmful or offensive contact. Defendant knew, or should have reasonably believed, that Plaintiffs and Class members would regard the contact as offensive or provocative.
27. The Bexar County Sheriff's Office Search Policy, a true and correct copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit A, specifically provides that routine strip searches will be· conducted "[u]pon the admissions process, during the issuance of the inmate uniform." Ex. A at 2.
8

Case 5:07-cv-00928-FB Document 92 Filed 11/16/09 Page 9 of 16
28. The County of Bexar knows that it may not institute, enforce or permit enforcement of a policy or practice of conducting strip searches without particularized, reasonable suspicion.
29. The Defendant's written and/or de facto policy, practice and custom mandating wholesale strip searches of all misdemeanor and violation arrestees has been promulgated, effectuated and/or enforced in bad faith and contrary to clearly established law.
30. Reasonable suspicion to conduct a strip search may only emanate from the particular circumstances antecedent to the search, such as the nature of the crime charged, the particular characteristics of the arrestees, and/or the circumstances of the arrest.
31. Upon information and belief, Bexar County and the Bexar County Detention Center have promulgated, implemented, enforced, and/or failed to rectify a written and/or de facto policy, practice or custom of strip searching all individuals placed into the custody of the Detention Center and placed into jail clothing without any requirement of reasonable suspicion, or indeed suspicion of any sort. This written and/or de facto policy made the strip searching of pre-trial detainees routine; neither the nature of the offense charged, the characteristics of the arrestee, nor the circumstances of a particular arrest were relevant to the enforcement of the policy, practice and custom of routine strip searches.
32. Pursuant to this written and/or de facto policy, each member of the class, including the named Plaintiffs, was the victim of a routine strip search upon their entry into the Bexar County Detention Center. These searches were conducted without inquiry into or establishment of reasonable suspicion, and in fact were not supported by
9

Case 5:07-cv-00928-FB Document 92 Filed 11/16/09 Page 10 of 16
reasonable suspicion. Strip searches are conducted for individuals arrested for, among other innocuous offenses, Driving While Intoxicated, Harassment and Trespassing.
33. As a direct and proximate result of the unlawful strip search conducted pursuant to this written and!or de facto policy, the victims of the unlawful strip searches - each member of the class, including the named Plaintiffs -- have suffered or will suffer psychological pain, humiliation, suffering and mental anguish.
Facts Applicable to the Named Plaintiffs 34. Plaintiff Julia Ann Jackson was arrested on misdemeanor charges and admitted to the Bexar County Detention Center. The charges for which Jackson was arrested did not, in and of themselves, provide Detention Center Corrections Officers with reasonable suspicion to believe that Jackson was harboring any weapons or contraband. 35. Jackson was strip searched after her admission to the Detention Center. After being held in a holding cell for almost two days, she, along with approximately 25 other female pre-trial detainees, was taken into a changing room to remove her street clothes and change into a Detention Center uniform. Immediately prior to providing Jackson with the Detention Center uniform, a female Corrections Officer required Jackson to submit to a strip search whereby the Officer and another detainee were able to view Jackson while she was in a state of complete undress. 36. Jackson was later released from the Detention Center after she was able to pay bail. 37. As a direct and proximate result of the unlawful strip search conducted pursuant to Defendant's policy, practice and custom, Jackson has suffered and continues to suffer psychological pain, humiliation, suffering and mental anguish.
10

Case 5:07-cv-00928-FB Document 92 Filed 11/16/09 Page 11 of 16
38. Plaintiff Erica Bernal was arrested on misdemeanor charges and admitted to the Bexar County Detention Center. The charges for which Bernal was arrested did not, in and of themselves, provide Detention Center Corrections Officers with reasonable suspicion to believe that Bernal was harboring any weapons or contraband.
39. Like Jackson, Bernal was strip searched after her admission to the Detention Center, so that a Corrections Officer and other detainees were able to observe her while she was in a state of complete undress.
40. As a direct and proximate result of the unlawful strip search conducted pursuant to Defendant's policy, practice and custom, Bernal has suffered and continues to suffer psychological pain, humiliation, suffering and mental anguish.
41. Plaintiff Martin Martinez was arrested on misdemeanor charges and admitted to the Bexar County Detention Center. The charges for which Martinez was arrested did not, in and of themselves, provide Detention Center Corrections Officers with reasonable suspicion to believe that Martinez was harboring any weapons or contraband.
42. Martinez was strip searched after his admission to the Detention Center whereby a Corrections Officer and other detainees were able to view Martinez while he was in a state of complete undress.
43. As a direct and proximate result of the unlawful strip search conducted pursuant to Defendant's policy, practice and custom, Martinez has suffered and continues to suffer psychological pain, humiliation, suffering and mental anguish.
11

Case 5:07-cv-00928-FB Document 92 Filed 11/16/09 Page 12 of 16

CAUSES OF ACTION

AS AND FOR A FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

Violation of Constitutional Rights Under Color of State Law

-- Unreasonable Search and Failure to Implement Municipal Policies to Avoid Constitutional Deprivations Under Color of State Law -

44. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference and reallege each and every allegation

stated in paragraphs 1 through 43.

45. The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects citizens

from unreasonable searches by law enforcement officers, and prohibits officers from

conducting strip searches of individuals arrested for misdemeanors or violations absent

some particularized suspicion that the individual in question has either contraband or

weapons.

"

46. The actions of Defendant detailed above violated Plaintiffs' rights under

the United States Constitution. Simply put, it was not objectively reasonable for

Detention Center Officers to strip search Plaintiffs and Class members based on their

arrests for misdemeanor/violation charges.

47. These strip searches were conducted pursuant to the policy, custom or

practice of Bexar County and the Bexar County Detention Center. As such, Bexar

County is directly liable for the damages of Plaintiffs and members of the Class.

48. This conduct on the part of Defendant represents a violation of 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983, given that the actions of the Detention Center Officers were undertaken under

color of state law.

49. As a direct and proximate result of the unconstitutional acts described

above, Plaintiffs have been irreparably injured.

12

Case 5:07-cv-00928-FB Document 92 Filed 11/16/09 Page 13 of 16
AS AND FOR A SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION -- Demand for Declaratory Judgment --
50. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference and reallege each and every allegation stated in paragraphs 1 through 49.
51. The policy, custom and practice of the Bexar County Detention Center and the County of Bexar is clearly unconstitutional, in that these entities and individuals are directing/conducting the strip searches of all individuals placed into the Detention Center without any particularized suspicion that the individuals in question have either contraband or weapons.
52. Plaintiffs and members of the class request that this Court issue a declaratory judgment, and that it declare the strip search policy of Bexar County and the Bexar County Detention Center to be unconstitutional.
AS AND FOR A THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION -- Demand for Preliminary and Permanent Injunction -53. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference and reallege each and every allegation stated in paragraphs 1 through 52. 54. The policy, custom and practice of the Bexar County Detention Center and Bexar County is clearly unconstitutional, in that these entities and individuals are directing/conducting the strip searches of all individuals placed into the Detention Center without any particularized suspicion that the individuals in question have either contraband or weapons.
13

Case 5:07-cv-00928-FB Document 92 Filed 11/16/09 Page 14 of 16
55. Upon information and belief, this policy is currently in place at the Detention Center, with new and/or prospective members of the class being subjected to the harms that have already been inflicted upon the Plaintiffs.
56. The continuing pattern of strip searching individuals charged with minor crimes will cause irreparable harm to the new and/or prospective members of the class, an adequate remedy for which does not exist at law.
57. Plaintiffs demand that the Bexar County, the Detention Center, and Bexar County Corrections Officers immediately desist from strip searching individuals placed into the custody of the Detention Center absent any particularized suspicion that the individuals in question have either contraband or weapons, and seek both a preliminary and permanent injunction from this Court ordering as much.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs Julia Ann Jackson, Erica Bernal, and Martin Martinez, on behalf of themselves and on behalf of a class of others similarly situated, request that this Honorable Court grant them the following relief: 1. An order certifying this action as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
23. 2. A judgment against Defendant awarding compensatory damages to
Plaintiffs and each member of the proposed class in an amount to be determined by a Jury and/or the Court on both an individual and a class wide basis. 3. A declaratory judgment against Defendant declaring the Bexar County Detention Center's policy, practice and custom of strip and visual cavity searching all detainees entering the Detention Center, regardless of the
14

Case 5:07-cv-00928-FB Document 92 Filed 11/16/09 Page 15 of 16
cnme charged or suspicion of contraband, to be unconstitutional and Improper. 4. A preliminary and permanent injunction enjoining Defendant and the Bexar County Detention Center from continuing to strip and visual cavity search individuals charged with misdemeanors or minor crimes absent particularized, reasonable suspicion that the arrestee subjected to the search is concealing weapons or other contraband. 5. A monetary award for attorney's fees and the costs of this action, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.

Dated: November 10, 2009

Charles J. LaDuca, Esquire Alexandra C. Warren, Esquire Cuneo Gilbert & LaDuca, LLP 507 C Street, NE Washington, DC 20002 Telephone: (202) 789-3960 Telecopier: (202) 789-1813 Electronic Mail: charlesl@cuneolaw.com awarren@cuneolaw.com
Sam H. Lock, Esquire Law Offices of Sam H. Lock 1017 S. Alamo San Antonio, TX 78210 Telephone: (210) 226-0965 Telecopier: (202) 226-7540 Electronic Mail: sam@locklawfirm.com
Elmer Robert Keach, III, Esquire Law Offices of Elmer Robert Keach III, PC 1040 Riverfront Center P.O. Box 70 Amsterdam, NY 12010
15

Case 5:07-cv-00928-FB Document 92 Filed 11/16/09 Page 16 of 16
Telephone: (518) 434-1718 Telecopier: (518) 770-1558 Electronic Mail: bobkeach@keachlawafirm.com
Gary E. Mason, Esquire Nicholas A. Migliaccio, Esquire THE MASON LAW FIRM, PLLC 1225 19th Street, NW Suite 600 Washington, DC 20036 Telephone: (202) 421-2290 Telecopier: (202) 429-2294 Electronic Mail: gmason@masonlawdc.com nmiglicaccio@masonlaw.dc.com
James C. Harrington Texas Civil Rights Project 1405 Montopolis Drive Austin, TX 78741 Telephone: (512) 474-5073 Telecopier: (512) 474-0726 Electronic Mail: jch@mail.utexas.edu
Kerrisa Chelkowski, Esquire Law Office of Kerrisa Chelkowski 1017 South Alamo Street San Antonio, TX 78210 Telephone: (210) 228-9393 Telecopier: (210) 226-7450
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFFS AND PROPOSED CLASS
16

 </s> Case 5:07-cv-00928-FB Document 181 Filed 01/28/13 Page 1 of 5

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
SAN ANTONIO DIVISION

JULIA ANN JACKSON, ERICA

§

BERAL AND MARTIN MARTINEZ,

§

INDIViDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF §

A CLASS OF OTHERS SIMILARLY

§

SITUATED

§

§

VS.

§

§

§

THE COUNTY OF BEXAR

§

JAN 2 8 2013
(Lr
CLERKS
WStE QIT1CQURT itrrRj(r ti
$ r
CIVIL ACTION SA-07-CV-928-FB

On November 15, 2007, Plaintiffs filed their Class Action Complaint (hereafter "Complaint") alleging the Bexar County Adult Detention Center had a practice and policy which violated 42 U.S.C. §1983 and their constitutional rights by strip searching all pre-trial detainees arrested on misdemeanor charges although there was no individualized suspicion of contraband. Defendant agreed to a Consent Decree granting Permanent Injunctive relief to Plaintiffs, dated April 2, 2009 (Docket 63) ("Consent Decree").
In the Consent Decree, Plaintiffs and Defendant consented to the entry of a Final Judgment on the claim for permanent injunctive relief pleaded as the Third Cause of Action of the Complaint (hereafter "Claim for Injunctive Relief"), without demanding or requiring the adjudication of any issue of fact or law, pursuant to the terms of the Consent Decree.
On April 2, 2012, the United States Supreme Court in Florence v. Board of Chosen
Preeholders ofCounty ofBurlington, 132 S. Ct. 1510 (2012) issued an opinion directly on point with the matters and claims in controversy in the instant case and found there was no Constitutional violation of the prisoner's rights. Specifically, the Court in Florence held that
1665495v.1 IMANAGE 105645

Case 5:07-cv-00928-FB Document 181 Filed 01/28/13 Page 2 of 5

under the Fourth Amendment, jail administrators may require all arrestees committed to the

general population of a jail to undergo no-touch visual strip searches, even if the arrest was for a

minor offense and even in the absence of reasonable suspicion that an arrestee possesses a

concealed weapon or other contraband. Florence, 132 S. Ct. at 1523.

Despite the entry of the Judgment and Consent Decree, the Court still retains jurisdiction

over this matter as the Final Settlement provided for continuing jurisdiction until all settlement

payments were distributed to potential Class members, The Final Settlement provided for a

deposit to the Inmate Commissary Fund of all unclaimed funds and that all amounts paid into the

settlement fund that were not needed based on the number of persons qualifying to participate

rould revert to Bexar County. All settlement proceeds have not been distributed,

On or about August 31, 2011, the Office of the Attorney General of Texas ("OAG") filed

its First Amended Notice of Child Support Liens and Claim for Relief. (Docket 179) In sum,

the OAG claimed a lien (liens) over various settlement proceeds for the payment of class

members' unpaid child support obligations. These settlement proceeds have not all been

distributed or paid, or were paid to the QAG for various costs, fines and fees,

Based upon this significant change in the law, it is hereby agreed upon by the Plaintiffs and

Defendant, and ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED by the Court, as follows:

1.

The Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this case and the Defendant.

2. i'his Auieiidcd ('onscut l)ecree is in ftilt and final resolution of all of llaintiffs'

claims hrouht in this case

hut not limited to their Claims for In junctive RcIiel
inctudmg4

3.

The Court has determined, and the Parties agree that it is appropriate and the Court

has the authority to modify the Judgment and Consent Decree pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure.

1665495',, 1 IMANAGE 05645

Case 5:07-cv-00928-FB Document 181 Filed 01/28/13 Page 3 of 5

4. The above-named parties, without conceding any defects in their claims or defenses,

have determined that resolution of Plaintiffs' Claims, including and not limited to Plaintiffs' Claim

for Injunctive Relief, on the terms and conditions set forth in this Amended Consent Decree is in the

best interests of all parties to this action and the members of the putative Class on whose behalf this

case has been brought.

5.

Certification of the Settlement Class, including all sub-classes certified in the Court's

January 12, 2011 Order (Docket 128) is hereby VACATED and REVOKED.

6. NOTHING IN THIS AMENDED CONSENT DECREE SHALL BE

CONSTRUED AS OBLIGATING THE PLAINTIFFS, CLASS COUNSEL, SETTLEMENT

ah1v 'Al (&

I i i i i rn iwi'.i

I u:iI Iu

as w ri,] i

i

REPRESENTING ANY CLASS MEMBER PRIOR TO THE DATE OF THIS AMENDED

CONSENT DECREE. No further funds, distributions, or payments shall be paid or distributed to

any person or firm, with the exception of the Claimants listed. Any sums held in trust by any person

or firm shall be returned to Bexar County.

7. All liens filed by the OAG over any proceeds in this matter are VACATED arid
r9tRiaI a)

8.

The parties agree the Revised Bexar County Jail Strip Search Policy attached to the

Consent Decree is no longer binding or mandatory upon Bexar County as provided below.

9. This Amended Consent Decree shall be final and binding upon its approval and entry

in the docket.

1665495v.1 IMANAGE 105645

Case 5:07-cv-00928-FB Document 181 Filed 01/28/13 Page 4 of 5
10. Except for those rights and obligations created by this Amended Consent Decree, Plaintiffs release, settle with and forever discharge Defendant, and every employee and
representative of Defendant, from and against any and all claims, demands, controversies, actions or causes of actions, which Plaintiffs brought in the instant cause.
11. It is expressly understood and agreed this Amended Consent Agreement settles and compromises all claims brought in the instant cause, which is hereby dismissed with prejudice to
the refilling of the same.
12. It is expressly understood and agreed this Amended Consent Agreement is limited to all claims brought in the instant cause and does not foreclose on any person or Class member from
bringing any cause of action or claim for damages resulting from any other actions by the Defendant: specifically, the claims and causes of action dismissed by this Amended Consent Decree are limited to those arising out of strip searches of Class Members, even if the Class Member was arrested for a minor offense and even in the absence of reasonable suspicion that the Class Member possessed contraband.
13. The Court has hilly examined the terms of this Amended Consent Decree and finds they are in accordance with law, appropriate, fair, and just and proper, and in furtherance of the
public interest. 14. Defendant, and its officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys,
and those persons in active concert or participation with them who received actual notice of the
Judgment and Consent Decree by personal service or otherwise, are hereby released from the Judgment and Consent Decree, which are hereby VACATED, NULL AND VOID.
15. Bexar County is not obligated to continue to operate in compliance with the Bexar County Jail Strip Search Policy attached to the Consent Decree.
1665495v,1 IMANAGE 105645

Case 5:07-cv-00928-FB Document 181 Filed 01/28/13 Page 5 of 5

16.

Bexar County may adopt or institute any policy or procedure for individual strip

searches that complies with Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of County of Burlington,

132 S. Ct. 1510 (2012).

IT IS SO ORDERED ON THE

DAY OF

13.

FZD BIERY
CHIEF UNITED STES DISTRICT JUDGE

-5-
1665495v.1 IMANAGE 105645

 </s> Case 5:07-cv-00928-FB Document 128 Filed 01/12/11 Page 1 of 11

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
SAN ANTONIO DIVISION

f='! r=n

I

: '''''' ,,,,,.I

JULIA ANN JACKSON, ERICA BERNAL, )

and MARTIN MARTINEZ, Individually )

and on Behalf of a Class of Others

)

Similarly SituaJ~d,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

vs.

)

)

THE COUNTY OF BEXAR,

)

)

Defendant.

)

CIVIL ACTION NO. SA.;07·CA·928·FB

ORDER GRANTING FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT AND JUDGMENT

On January 12, 2011, pursuant to this Court's Order ofOctober 13,2010, and the Court having

conducted a fina,l fairness hearing to detennine whether the proposed Settlement Agreement between

the parties is fair, reasonable and adequate, and to address Class Counsel's application for an award of

attorney's fees and costs. At the time of this hearing the Settlement Class Members having been

represented by Class Counsel, and Defendant having been represented by its attorneys;

The Court having read and considered the Settlement Agreement, the Notice Plan, the

Memorandum of Law submitted by Class Counsel and the Certification of Charles J. LaDuca, one of

the Class Counsel, in support of the Settlement, having received evidence at the hearing, having heard

arguments from Class Counsel and the Defendant and any Obj ector present, and having considered all

matters in this case, now makes the following findings of fact, conclusions of law and ruling:

Case 5:07-cv-00928-FB Document 128 Filed 01/12/11 Page 2 of 11
FINDINGS OF FACT 1. This action was commenced on November 15, 2007, as a class action. 2. Plaintiffs initiated this lawsuit and alleged Bexar County maintained a strip search policy and practice throughout the class period, pursuant to which all newly admitted pre-trial detainees, including those admitted on misdemeanor offenses, were subjected to a strip search, often in a group setting, after being transported to the Bexar County Adult Detention Center. To facilitate an inspection of body cavities, Plaintiffs contend detainees were required to manipulate their genitalia and buttocks, and sometimes "squat and cough" in view of a corrections officer. Female detainees were also required to manipUlate their breasts. The strip search procedure involved an inspection ofdetainees' naked bodies, as well as the visual inspection of their body cavities. Plaintiffs allege that this policy and practice applied to all detainees, without regard to the existence of reasonable suspicion to believe they were concealing contraband. Plaintiffs complain that in practice they were touched in an offensive manner or reasonably believed that they were about to be touched, or subjected to offensive touching. Plaintiffs allege these actions constituted a battery or assault. 3. After the almost three years of litigation, including motion practice and an intensive, arm's length negotiation between Class Counsel and Defendants, including numerous mediation sessions with Michael Curry, Esquire, the parties have reached accord with respect to a Settlement which provides substantial benefits to Settlement Class Members, in return for a release and dismissal of all claims at issue in this case against the Defendant ("Settlement Agreement"). The resulting Settlement Agreement was preliminarily approved by this Court on October 13, 2010, and in the Order Granting Preliminary Approval.
2

Case 5:07-cv-00928-FB Document 128 Filed 01/12/11 Page 3 of 11
4. As part ofthe Order Granting Preliminary Approval, this Court approved a proposed Notice Plan and Class Notice, which provided Settlement Class Members notice of the proposed settlement. The Notice Plan provided an opportunity for Settlement Class Members to file objections to the Class Settlement, and an opportunity to opt-out of the Class Settlement. 5. As of January 4, 2011, the Claims Administrator mailed a total of 34,375 Claim Packets to known and potential Class Members. 6. The Claims Administrator determined a total of 29,602 unique individuals are eligible Class Members. 7. As of January 4,2011, the Claims Administrator received approximately 2,575 Claim Forms. 8. Assuming all of the Claims Forms received to date are valid, the claims rate, out of 29,603 unique individuals, is approximately 8.7%, and this rate is almost certain to rise given that Class Members have until March 16, 2011 to submit claims. 9. Class Counsel anticipate the ultimate valid claims rate will be at least 15%, which is within the typical rate of return of claims in strip search class actions. 1
1 Williams v. County ofLos Angeles, 97-cv-03826 (C.D. Cal.) (approximately 9% claims rate); Craftv. San Bernardino County, 05-cv-0359 (C.D. Cal.) (approximately 14% claims rate); Tyson v. City ofNew York, 97-cv-3762 (S.D.N.Y.) (approximately 12% claims rate); Leyba v. County of Santa Fe Bd. of Commissioners, 05-cv-0036 (D.N.M.) (approximately 17% claims rate); Haney v. County ofMiami Dade, 04-cv-20516 (S.D. Fla.) (approximately 16% claims rate); Connor v. Plymouth County, 00-cv-l0835 (D. Mass.) (approximately 18% claims rate); Boisselle v. County of Mercer, No. 06-2065 (D.N.J. April 20, 2009) (approximately 22% claims rate); Graff v. County ofSalem, 07-2259 (D.N.J.) (approximately 30% claims rate); Hicks v. County ofCamden, No. 05-1857 (D.N.J.) (approximately 16% claims rate); Mitchell v. County ofClinton, No. 06-0254 (N.D.NY) (approximately 20% claims rate); Reynolds v. County of Dauphin, 07- 1688 (M.D. Pa.) (approximately 30% claims rate); Suggs v. County ofCumberland, No. 06-00087 (D.N.J) (approxiinately 32%"claims rate); Wilson v. County ofGloucester, No. 06-01368 (D.N.J.) (approximately 32% claims rate)
3

Case 5:07-cv-00928-FB Document 128 Filed 01/12/11 Page 4 of 11
10. Assuming the ultimate valid claims rate is 15%, with 80% ofthe claims received from members of Subclass 1, and the remaining 20% from members of Subclass 2, the payments to members of Subclass 1 would be approximately $437 and the paYJ1;lents to members of subclass 2 would be $100.2 11. As ofthe deadline for the filing ofobjections, four obj ections were filed. Given the size ofthis Settlement, and the Notice Plan described above, this Court finds that the total of four objections is indicative the plan is fair, reasonable and adequate. 12. Class Counsel has filed with the Court an affidavit from The Garden City Group declaring that the mailing ofthe Court·approved notice, consistent with the Notice Plan, is complete. Additionally, Class Counsel evidenced the establishment of the Court·approved Class Settlement website. 13. The Court finds the Notice Plan, as effectuated, constitutes the best practicable notice of the Fairness Hearing, proposed Settlement, Class Counsel's application for fees and expenses, and other matters set forth in the Class Notice and Short Form Notice. The Court finds the Class Settlement valid, due and sufficient notice to all members of the Settlement Class, and complied fully with the requirements ofRule 23 ofthe Federal Rules ofCivil Procedure, the Constitution ofthe United States, the laws of Texas and any other applicable law. 14. Any persons who wished to be excluded from this action were provided an opportunity to "optout" pursuant to the Notice. Ten individuals opted out of the settlement, though only five of these individuals are Class Members.
2 This figure was calculated based on the current available settlement amount of $3 million, after the deduction of attorneys' fees, expenses, incentive awards, and administration-related expenses.
4

Case 5:07-cv-00928-FB Document 128 Filed 01/12/11 Page 5 of 11
15. Settlement Class Members are bound by the Settlement, Settlement Agreement, releases contained within the Settlement Agreement, and the Final Order and Judgment. Settlement Class Members do not have a further opportunity to opt-out of this Action. 16. Any Settlement Class Member who did not timely file and serve an objection in writing to the Settlement Agreement, to the entry ofFinal Order and Judgment, or to Class Counsel's application for fees, costs, and expenses, in accordance with the procedure set forth in the Class Notice and mandated in the Order Granting Preliminary Approval ofSettlement, is deemed to have waived any such objection by appeal, collateral attack, or otherwise. Four individuals filed objections, and each was considered by the Court prior to the issuance of this Order. 17. On the basis of all of the issues in this litigation, and the provisions of the Settlement Agreement, the Court is of the opinion the Class Settlement is a fair, reasonable and adequate compromise of claims against the Defendant in this case, pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. There are a number offactors which the Court considered in affirming this Settlement, including:
a. The liability issues in this case have been vigorously contested. b. Bexar County has continually asserted its policy has not been adjudged unconstitutional and that it carried out the strip search policy specifically to ensure the safety of detainees, employees of the jail, law enforcement officers and the general public, and for no other objectionable purpose. c~ This Settlement has the benefit of providing relief to Settlement Class Members now, without further litigation, under circumstances where the liability issues are still vigorously contested among the parties to this litigation and among the parties to the individual litigation. This Settlement provides Settlement Class Members with a substantial monetary benefit.
5

Case 5:07-cv-00928-FB Document 128 Filed 01/12/11 Page 6 of 11
d. This Settlement is clearly aproduct ofhard-fought litigation between the parties, and not a result of any collusion on the part of Class Counselor Counsel for the Defendant. 18. The claims procedure established under the Settlement Agreement is fair, a simplified process, and workable. The Court retains jurisdiction to work out any unanticipated problems.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 19. This Court has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of this proceeding. 20. Pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the following Settlement Class is certified for purposes of final settlement:
All pre-trial detainees confined to the Bexar County Adult Detention Center between November 15, 2005 and April 9, 2009 who were subjected to a strip search before being sent to jail housing after being booked on misdemeanor or other minor charges. Specifically excluded from the class are pre-trial detainees who were subjected to strip search before being sent to jail housing after being booked on a felony charge, or a felony charge and misdemeanor charge. The Court also certifies the following two settlement subclasses: Subclass I: All persons in the Settlement Class, not in Subclass II. Subclass II: All persons in the Settlement Class who were admitted on misdemeanor charges of narcotics, shoplifting and weapons violations. The misdemeanor offenses which qualify as those constituting charges of narcotics, shoplifting and weapons violations are defined by the parties in Exhibit G to this Settlement Agreement. 21. The Court finds that, for the purpose of this Settlement, the requirements of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are satisfied, and that a class action is an appropriate method for resolving the disputes in this litigation. All the prerequisites for class certification under Rule 23 are present. The Settlement Class Members are ascertainable and too numerous to be joined. Questions
6

Case 5:07-cv-00928-FB Document 128 Filed 01/12/11 Page 7 of 11
oflaw and fact common to all Settlement Class Members predominate over individual issues and should be determined in one proceeding with respect to all Settlement Class members. The Class Representatives' claims are typical of those of the Class. The Class action mechanism is superior to alternative means for adjudicating and resolving this action. 22. The Settlement Class Representatives, Julia AIm Jackson, Martin Martinez, and Erica Bernal, are entitled to and are each hereby awarded a payment of $15,000, in recognition of the efforts they undertook in connection with this lawsuit. All Settlement Class Members who have made claims on the settlement are entitled to receive their pro rata share of the settlement fund for Subclass I, or Subclass II, after administrative expenses, attorneys' fees and expenses, and incentive awards are deducted from the fund. 23. Class Counsel are qualified, experienced, and have aggressively litigated this case, thereby demonstrating their adequacy as counsel for the Settlement Class. Charles J. LaDuca, Esq. and Alexandra C. Warren, Esq. of Cuneo Gilbert & LaDuca, LLP, Washington, DC; Sam H. Lock, Esq. of the Law Offices ofSam H. Lock, San Antonio, Texas; Elmer Robert Keach, III, Esq. ofthe Law Offices of Elmer Robert Keach, III, Amsterdam, New York; Gary M. Mason, Esq. and Nicholas Migliaccio, Esq. of the Mason Law Firm, LLP, Washington, DC; James C. Harrington, Esq. of the Texas Civil Rights Project, Austin, Texas; and Kerrisa Chelkowski, Esq. ofthe Law Office ofKerrisa Chelkowski, San Antonio, Texas; are hereby appointed as Class Counsel. Class Counsel submitted to the Court and served on Defendant their application for reasonable attorneys' fees, costs, and expenses consistent with the terms of the_Settlement Agreement, in the amount of $900,000. The time spent on this litigation so far by Class Counsel is at least 1,931.3 5 hours oflawyer and legal assistant time. This amounts to a total lodestar of at least $782,025.00. This amount is reasonable given the time spent, the complex
7

Case 5:07-cv-00928-FB Document 128 Filed 01/12/11 Page 8 of 11
nature ofthis litigation, the fact that Class Counsel took this case on a contingent fee basis, and the fee is consistent with fees granted in similar cases. Further, it appears that the total lodestar will not lead to any multiplier or will yield a negative multiplier. With respect to expenses, Class Counsel have incurred at least $60,194 in expenses in connection with the prosecution ofthis litigation, further reducing the multiplier. Accordingly; the Court find that final approval ofattorneys' fees and expenses in the amount of $900,000 is warranted. 24. The Court finds the payment ofthe incurred and anticipated expenses of$345,000 ofthe Claims Administrator, the Garden City Group, and the website administrator, as set forth in the Certification of Charles J. LaDuca is reasonable and justified.
Accordingly, on the basis of the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that: 25. The motion for Final Approval of the proposed Settlement is GRANTED. 26. The Class Representatives, Julia Ann Jackson, Martin Martinez, and Erica Bernal, are hereby awarded apayment of$15,000 each, in recognition ofthe efforts each undertook in connection with this lawsuit. All Settlement Class Members who have made claims on the settlement are entitled to receive their pro rata share of Subclass lor Subclass II of the Settlement Fund after administrative expenses, attorneys' fees and expenses, and incentive awards are deducted from the fund. 27. The Class Counsel's application for attorneys' fees and expenses is granted in the amount of $900,000. 28. The costs and expenses incurred to date or hereafter incurred for finalization ofthe Settlement by the Claims Administrator and Website Administrator, estimated to be $395,000 and subjectto
8

Case 5:07-cv-00928-FB Document 128 Filed 01/12/11 Page 9 of 11
approval by Class Counsel, are granted. The Garden City Group can disburse such reasonable administrative costs from the Class Settlement Funds. 29. If a Class Member owes a Medicare lien it must be paid. 3~. If a Class Member who has filed a valid claim owes fines, fees, court costs or restitution by virtue of a court order by a Bexar County Judge, that amount will be subtracted first from any Class Member's check, with the maximum of any such payment being one-half of that Class Member's payment, capped at $500.00 for Subclass I Class Members and $50.00 for Subclass II Class Members. This subtracted amount will be paid directly to Bexar County. 31. If after distribution of Settlement checks to Settlement Class Members, there are unclaimed funds as a result of Settlement checks being issued which are undeliverable or uncashed after 12 months, the Settlement Administrator shall pay these funds to the Bexar County Inmates Commissary Fund. 32. Ifremaining funds exist after the pro rata distribution is made to the Settlement Class, with the maximum payment to Members ofSubclass Ibeing $1,000.00 and the maximum payment to Members of Subclass II being $100.00, then Bexar County will receive a reverter of the remaining funds. 33. The Court will retain jurisdiction over the settlement until all outstanding litigation is concluded regarding the pending insurance coverage action between Bexar County and State National Insurance Company and/or Star Insurance Company, and the settlement will remain open during that litigation. In the event additional funds are to be paid into the settlement, then the Court will revisit an additional distribution ofthose funds at that time. The settling parties may petition this Court to cease jurisdiction and close the file at the completion of the administration of the Settlement Class Fund.
9

Case 5:07-cv-00928-FB Document 128 Filed 01/12/11 Page 10 of 11

34. All Settlement Class Members who have nottimely filed an opt-out request are deemed to have

waived any rights or benefits under the Settlement Agreement and are barred and enjoined from

commencing any claim or action, individually or as a class action, that is based upon or related to the

strip search, booking process and related incidents that are the subject of the Settlement Agreement.

35. Defendant is hereby ORDERED to disclose the personal information of Class Members, to the

reasonable extent necessary, including known address, dates of birth and social security numbers, to

Class Counsel and the Claims Administrator, in order to facilitate the identification ofClass Members

for purposes of mailing notice and assessing the validity of claims.

36. In accordance with the law, only Class Members who object to the Settlement pursuant to the

terms immediately above may appeal this Order Granting Final Approval of Class Action Settlement

and Judgment. Any Class Member who wishes to appeal this Order Granting Final Approval ofClass

Action Settlement and Judgment, which appeal will delay the distribution ofthe Settlement to the Class,

r~ lJe j)£,- I 7:J~

shall post a bond with this Court in th amount of $

. ~

37. Out ofatotal of29, 603 Class Members, only four objections were submitted. Mr. Johnny Vela

and Mr. Ronald Fuller object to the settlement because they believe it does not provide them with

sufficient compensation. Mr. Sterling Allen objects to the Class definition. Ms. Virginia Cooks, though

counsel, objects to the adequacy ofthe notice of the settlement fund, the Class Members' expectation

of benefits, incentive rewards for class representatives, the propriety of attorneys' fees request, and to

the presence of a reverter and a bond requirement. Having considered each objection, the Court finds

that each argument is without merit.

10

•

Case 5:07-cv-00928-FB Document 128 Filed 01/12/11 Page 11 of 11

38. Motions pending with the Court, if any, are Dismissed as Moot.

It is so ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED.

.,pr

Ie;.. SIGNED this

day of January, 2011 .

..... ----'"
I'//~"--
BRBDBIERY ///CHIEF UNITED STATE

11

 </s> Case 5:07-cv-00928-FB Document 58 Filed 01/15/09 Page 1 of 11

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
SAN ANTONIO DIVISION

JULIA ANN JACKSON, ERICA BERNAL, and MARTIN MARTINEZ Individually and on Behalf of a Class of Others Similarly Situated,
Plaintiffs,
v.
THE COUNTY OF BEXAR,
Defendant.

) ) ) ) )
) ) CIVIL ACTION NO. SA-07-CV-928-FB
) ) ) ) )

JOINT MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER

TO THE HONORABLE FEDERAL DISTRICT JUDGE FRED BIERY:

1. Plaintiffs and Defendant are in the process of engaging in discovery in

preparation for the prosecution of the above-styled cause.

2. From time to time in this litigation the parties desire to hold confidential

documents for the eyes only of the counsel in this suit, or for the legitimate purposes only

ofthe progression of the litigation in this matter.

3. The parties request the Court sign the attached Protective Order so as to

safeguard what counsel believe in good faith is classified or privileged infonnation. The

parties further ask for what further relief to which they may be justly entitled.

Respectfully submitted,

CLARK, THOMAS & WINTERS A Professional Corporation
2632 Broadway, 401 S. San Antonio, Texas 78215 (210) 582-0220 (Telephone) (210) 582-0231 (Facsimile)

Case 5:07-cv-00928-FB Document 58 Filed 01/15/09 Page 2 of 11

16:09 FAX 210 582 0231

CLARK THOUAS WINTERS

~005/014

and

300 West 6th Street, 15th Floor

Austin, Texas 78101

(512) 495-8882 - Tclephonc

(512)

2 - Facsimile

Laurence S.Kurth -lsk@ctw.com

State Bar No. 11768450

Lori' W, IJanson - lwh@ctw.com

State Bar No. 21128500

.

Willianl P. Johnson .• wnj@ctw.com

Slate Bar No. 24002367

:~OCljt?ff?-

, '- :. Mi.Charlcs1:LaDuca Mi;. AlexandraC. Warren Mi. R.. Brent Walton . Cun~Q Gilbert & LaDuca, LLP
507 CSlreet NIl . .
Washington, bC 20002 rclephone;.(20;2)78<;1-3960
T~I~OPier: (2;vr9-1813

By:

V~

Jani C. IJanington

Tex s Civil Rights Proje t

5 Mon[cipolis Drive

Auslin, TX 78741

Telephone: (512) 474-5073

Telecopier: (512) 474-0726 .:.; ..

ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFFS AND

PROPOSE:PCLASS' ..

""

:. ,'..

'.;

,;:

Case 5:07-cv-00928-FB Document 58 Filed 01/15/09 Page 3 of 11

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
1.5 I hereby certify that on January 2009, the above pleading was served on the
following counsel of record in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:

Mr. Sam Lock Law Offices of Sam H. Lock 1011 S. Alamo San Antonio, TX 78210

Mr. Elmer Robert Keach, III Law Offices of Ehner Robert Keach, III 1040 Riverfront Center P.O. Box 70 Amsterdam, NY 12010

Mr. Alexander E. Barnett Mr. Gary E. Mason Mr. Nicholas A. Migliaccio The Mason Law Firm, LLP 1120 Avenue of the Americas New York, NY 10036

Mr. Charles J. LaDuca Ms. Alexandra C. Warren Mr. R. Brent Walton Cuneo Gilbert & LaDuca, LLP 507 C Street NE Washington, DC 20002

James C. Harrington Texas Civil Rights Project 1405 Montopolis Drive Austin, TX 78741 Telephone: (512) 474-5073 Telecopier: (512) 474-0726 Ms. Sue Aun Gregory Bexar County Asst. Criminal District Attorney Civil Division 300 Dolorosa, Suite 4049 San Antonio, TX 78205

Kerrisa Chelkowski, Esquire Law Office of Kerrisa Chelkowski 1011 South Alamo Street San Antonio, TX 78210 Telephone: (210) 228-9393 Telecopier: (210) 226-7450

Laurence S. Kurth

Case 5:07-cv-00928-FB Document 58 Filed 01/15/09 Page 4 of 11

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
SAN ANTONIO DIVISION

JULIA ANN JACKSON, ERICA BERNAL, and MARTIN MARTINEZ Individually and on Behalf of a Class of Others Similarly Situated,
Plaintiffs,
v.
THE COUNTY OF BEXAR,
Defendant.

) ) ) ) ) ) ) CIVIL ACTION NO. SA-07-CV-928-FB ) ) ) ) )

AGREED PROTECTIVE ORDER

The Joint Motion for entry of a Protective Order is GRANTED. Upon motion of all the parties for a Protective Order, It is hereby ORDERED that: I. All Classified Information produced or exchanged in the course of this litigation shall be used solely for the purpose of preparation and trial of this litigation and for no other purpose whatsoever, and shall not be disclosed to any person except in accordance with the terms hereof. 2. "Classified Information," as used herein, means any information of any type, kind or character which is designated a "Confidential" or "For Counsel Only" (or "Attorneys' Eyes Only") by any of the supplying or receiving parties, whether it be a document, information contained in a document, information revealed during a deposition, information revealed in an interrogator! answer or othenvise. In designating infonnation as "Confidential" or "For Counsel Only" (or "Attorneys' Eyes Only"), a party will make such designation only as to that information that it in good faith believes contains confidential information. Information or

::ODMAIGRPWISEISA_ Dom.SA]OASA_Lib:3 I 933. I

1

Case 5:07-cv-00928-FB Document 58 Filed 01/15/09 Page 5 of 11

material which is available to the public, including catalogues, advertising materials, and the like
shall not be classified.
3. "Qualified Persons," as used herein means:
(a) Attorneys of record for the parties in this litigation and employees of such attorneys to whom it is necessary that the material be shown for purposes of this litigation;
(b) Actual or potential independent technical experts or consultants, who have been designated in writing by notice to all counsel prior to any disclosure of "Confidential" or "For Counsel Only" (or "Attorneys' Eyes Only") information to such persons, and who have signed a document agreeing to be bound by the terms of this protective order (such signed document to be filed with the Clerk of this Court by the attorney retaining such person);
(c) The party or one party representative (in cases where the party is a legal entity) who shall be designated in writing by the party prior to any disclosure of "Confidential" information to such person and who shall sign a document agreeing to be bound by the terms of this protective order (such signed document to be filed with the Clerk ofthis court by the party designating such person); and
(d) If this Court so elects, any other person may be designated as a Qualified Person by order of this Court, after notice to all parties and hearing.
4. Documents produced in this action may be designated by any party or parties as
"Confidential" or "For Counsel Only" (or "Attorneys' Eyes Only") information by marking each
page of the document(s) so designated with a stamp stating "Confidential" or "For Counsel
Only" (or "Attorneys' Eyes Only").
In lieu of marking the original of a document, if the original is not produced, the
designating party may mark the copies that are produced or exchanged. Originals shall be
provided for inspection.
5. Information disclosed at (a) the deposition of a party or one of its present or

purpose of this litigation, or (b) the deposition of a third party (which information pertains to a party) may be designated by any party as "Confidential" or "For Counsel Only" (or "Attorneys'

"ODMAIGRPWISEISA_Dom.SA]OA.SA_Lib,31933.1

2

Case 5:07-cv-00928-FB Document 58 Filed 01/15/09 Page 6 of 11

Eyes Only") infonnation by indicating on the record at the deposition that the testimony is "Confidential" or "For Counsel Only" (or "Attorneys' Eyes Only") and is subject to the provisions ofthis Order.
Any party may also designate infonnation disclosed at such deposition as "Confidential" or "For Counsel Only" (or "Attorneys' Eyes Only") by notifying all of the parties in writing within ten (10) days of receipt of the transcript, of the specific pages and lines of the transcript which should be treated as "Confidential" or "For Counsel Only" (or "Attorneys' Eyes Only") thereafter. Each party shall attach a copy of such written notice or notices to the face of the transcript and each copy thereof in his possession, custody or control. All deposition transcripts shall be treated as "Confidential" or "For Counsel Only" (or "Attorneys' Eyes Only") for a period often (10) days after the receipt of the transcript.
To the extent possible, the court reporter shall segregate into separate transcripts infonnation designated as "Confidential" or "For Counsel Only" (or "Attorneys' Eyes Only"), with blank, consecutively numbered pages being provided in a non-designated main transcript. The separate transcript containing "Confidential" or "For Counsel Only" (or "Attorneys' Eyes Only") infonnation shall have page numbers that correspond to the blank pages in the main transcript.
6. (a) "Confidential" infonnation shall not be disclosed or made available by the
receiving party to persons other than Qualified Persons. Infonnation designated as "For Counsel Only" (or "Attorneys' Eyes Only") shall be restricted in circulation to Qualified Persons described in Paragraphs 3(a) and (b) above.
(b) Copies of "Confidential" or "For Counsel Only" (or "Attorneys' Eyes Only") infonnation provided to a receiving party shall be maintained in the offices of outside counsel for Plaintiff(s) and Defendant(s). Any documents produced in this litigation, regardless

::ODMAIGRPWISEISA_Dom.SA]OA.SA_Lib:3 I933. I

3

Case 5:07-cv-00928-FB Document 58 Filed 01/15/09 Page 7 of 11

of classification, which are provided to Qualified Persons of Paragraph 3 (b) above, shall be maintained only at the office of such Qualified Person and only working copies shall be made of any such documents. Copies of documents produced under this Protective Order may be made, or exhibits prepared by independent copy services, printers or illustrators for the purpose of this litigation.
(c) Each party's outside counsel shall maintain a log of all copies of "For Counsel Only" (or "Attorneys' Eyes Only") documents which are delivered to anyone or more Qualified Person of Paragraph 3 above.
7. Documents to be inspected shall be treated as "For Counsel Only" (or "Attorneys' Eyes Only") during inspection. At the time of copying for the receiving parties, such inspected documents shall be stamped prominently "Confidential" or "For Counsel Only" (or "Attorneys' Eyes Only") by the producing party.
8. Nothing herein shall prevent disclosure beyond the terms of this order if each party designating the information as "Confidential" or "For Counsel Only" (or "Attorneys' Eyes Only") consents to such disclosure or, if the court, after notice to all affected parties, orders such disclosures. Nor shall anything herein prevent any counsel of record from utilizing "Confidential" or "For Counsel Only" (or "Attorneys' Eyes Only") information in the examination or cross-examination of any person who is indicated on the document as being an author, source or recipient of the "Confidential" or "For Counsel Only" (or "Attorneys' Eyes Only") information, irrespective of which party produced such information.
9. A party shall not be obligated to challenge the proprietary of a designation as "Confidential" or "For Counsel Onlyll (or "Attorneys' Eyes Only") at the time made, and a failure to do so shall not preclude a subsequent challenge thereto. In the event that any party to this litigation disagrees at any state of these proceedings with the designation by the designating

::ODMAIGRPWISEISA_Dom.SA]OA.SA_Lib:31933.1

4

Case 5:07-cv-00928-FB Document 58 Filed 01/15/09 Page 8 of 11

party of any infonnation as "Confidential" or "For Counsel Only" (or "Attorneys' Eyes Only"), or the designation of any person as a Qualified Person, the parties shall first try to resolve such dispute in good faith on an infonnal basis, such as production of redacted copies. If the dispute cannot be resolved, the objecting party may invoke this Protective Order by objecting in writing to the party who has designated the document or infonnation as "Confidential" or "For Counsel Only" (or "Attorneys' Eyes Only"). The designating party shall be required to move the Court for an order preserving the designated status of such infonnation within fourteen (14) days of receipt of the written objection, and failure to do so shall constitute a tennination ofthe restricted status of such item.
The parties may, by stipulation, provide for exceptions to this order and any party may seek an order of this Court modifYing this Protective Order.
10. Nothing shall be designated as "For Counsel Only" (or "Attorneys' Eyes Only") infonnation except infonnation of the most sensitive nature, which is disclosed to persons of expertise in the area would reveal significant technical or business advantages of the producing or designating party, and which includes as a major portion subject matter which is believed to be unknown to the opposing party or parties, or any of the employees of the corporate parties. Nothing shall be regarded as "Confidential" or "For Counsel Only" (or "Attorneys' Eyes Only") infonnation if it is infonnation that either:
(a) is in the public domain at the time of disclosure, as evidenced by a written document;
(b) becomes part of the public domain through no fault of the other party, as evidenced by a written document;

rightful and lawful possession at the time of disclosure; or

(d) the receiving party lawfully receives such infonnation at a later date from a third party without restriction as to disclosure, provided such third party has the right to make the disclosure to the receiving party.

::ODMAIGRPWISEISA_Dom.SA]0A.SA_Lib:31933.1

5

Case 5:07-cv-00928-FB Document 58 Filed 01/15/09 Page 9 of 11

11. In the event a party wishes to use auy "Confidential" or "For Counsel Only" (or

"Attorneys' Eyes Only") information in auy affidavits, briefs, memorauda of law, or other papers

filed in Court in this litigation, such "Confidential" or "For Counsel Only" (or "Attorneys' Eyes

Only") information used therein shall be filed under seal with the Court.

12. The Clerk of this Court is directed to maintain under seal all documents and

trauscripts of deposition testimony aud auswers to interrogatories, admission and other pleadings

filed under seal with the Court in this litigation which have been designated, in whole or in part,

as "Confidential" or "For Counsel Only" (or "Attorneys' Eyes Only") information by a party to

this action.

13. Unless otherwise agreed to in writing by the parties or ordered by the Court, all

proceedings involving or relating to documents or any other information shall be subject to the

provisions of this order.

14. Within thirty (30) days after conclusion of this litigation aud auy appeal thereof,

any document aud all reproductions of documents produced by a party, in the possession of auy

of the persons qualified under Paragraphs 3(a) through (d) shall be returned to the producing

party, except as this Court may otherwise order or to the extent such information was used as

evidence at the trial. As far as the provisions of auy protective orders entered in this action

restrict the communication aud use of the documents produced thereunder, such orders shall

continue to be binding after the conclusion of this litigation, except (a) that there shall be no

restriction on documents that are used as exhibits in Court unless such exhibits were filed under

seal, and (b) that a party may seek the written permission of the producing party or order of the

Court with respect to dissolution or modification of such protective orders.

15. This order shall not bar any attorney herein in the course of rendering advice to

his client with respect to this litigation from conveying to auy party client his evaluation in a

::ODMAIGRPWISEISA_Dom.sA]OA.SA_Lib:31933.1

6

Case 5:07-cv-00928-FB Document 58 Filed 01/15/09 Page 10 of 11

2/2008 16:10 FAX 210 582 0231

CLARK THOMAS WINTERS

Ij!j 013/014

gener,,1 way of "Confidential" or "For Counsel Only" (or "Attorneys' Eyes Only") il1(ol1m,lion

produced or exchanged herein; provided, however (hu( in rendering such advice and otherNise communicating with his client, the al(orney shall not disclose the specific contents of any "Confidential" or "For Coullsel Only" (or "Attorneys' Eyes Only") information producc~ by

another party hmein, which disclosure would be contrary to the tenns ofthis Protective Order,

16. Any party designating any person as a Qualified Person shall have Ihe dULl' 10
reasonably cnsure that such person observes the 'i/;rinso'f this Protective Order and shal ( be

responsible upon breach of such duty for the failure of any such persoll to observe the tenns of

this Protective Order.

,',:. . . '. r;.: .'.'0;::; ,,".,."

srGNED this -,----'-.. day of-,-c-,---_---,,--_,, 2009.

;

',',

.....

.... NON. FRED BIERY.' . ,'.
UNITED STATES D1STRICf JUDGE
::=C't1f£

Charles J. LaDucfl""charlesl@ci.meolaw.com:·· .. i
R. Bren! Walton - bwalton@clmeolaw.com Alexandra C. Warren "'8warrep@Cungolaw;eon1 '.. Clmco Gilbert and LaDuca, LLP 507 C Street, NE Washington, DC 20002 (202)789-3960. Telephone (202)789-1813 - F~csimile

... ; ....

By:

_1--i:-::::>l.......:':::o...J~"H.>W,l'!1/f--~~

lllnes • Hanington

" ..

..

:

,

..

Texas 'vil ghls Project

1405 Mon opolis brive Austin, TX 78741

(512) 474-5073 - Telephone·

(512) 474-0726 - Facsimile.:
>...• :,

ATrORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFFS

.. , : ' , '

,

·'·

0...1...

/13(2009
'."'fGVViJ

1I0D:. I4I9Y CFraAl"slXil.e 251.t:0:0.J3V73-5c:.t2tvi:1:-::5010Vi9::2iJl8-FB

DoDcAHuAmCHIeV~nILt f5HDO8IMVAF8 ileWdIN0TE1R/1S5/09

Page 11 of 11

141002
~014/0'4

By; -----1~~~c."-L-!.~~~~ Sue Ann Gregory - s e 0 alb

Bexar County District Attorney's Office

300 Dolorosa, Suite 4049

San Antcmio, TX 78205 (210) 33~-2139 - Telephone

(210) 3~35-21S1-csi:

By; .

~7• dF

I,aur"Tlce S_ Kurth - Isk@ctw_coll1

State Bar No. 11768450

Lori W. Hanson -lwh@ctw.com

Sj:ate BarNo. 21128500

Clark, Thomas & Winters, P.C

2632 Broadway, 40[ S.

San Antonio, TX 78215

(210) 58+0 0220 - Telephone

(210) 582-0231 - Facsimile

And , By: William P. Johnson - wpj(a),g(W,COfIl State Bar No. 24002367
Clark, Thomas & Winters, p.e.
300 West 6"' Street, J5"' Floor Austin, 'Iiexas 78701 (512) 495-8882·- Telephone (512) 474-1129 -I'acsimile
I
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT

,

;;ODMAIGRl1WISIlISA_Dom,SI\J'OA.SA,.LiboJ 1933.1

8

 </s> Case 5:07-cv-00928-FB Document 113 Filed 08/26/10 Page 1 of 40

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
SAN ANTONIO DIVISION

JULIA ANN JACKSON, ERICA BERNAL, and MARTIN MARTINEZ Individually and on Behalf of a Class of Others Similarly Situated,
Plaintiffs,
v.
THE COUNTY OF BEXAR,
Defendant.

) ) ) ) ) ) ) CIVIL ACTION NO. SA-07-CV-928 ) ) ) ) )

PLAINTIFFS' UNOPPOSED MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT AND BRIEF IN SUPPORT THEREOF

Case 5:07-cv-00928-FB Document 113 Filed 08/26/10 Page 2 of 40

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION

1

II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND OF CASE

3

III. BRIEF FACTUAL BACKGROUND OF CASE

4

IV. THE PROPOSED SETTLEMENT

5

A. The Settlement Fund

5

B. Class Notice and Settlement Administration

8

C. Attorneys' Fees and Class Representative Incentive Awards

8

V. THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT SHOULD BE PRELIMINARILY 9 APPROVED BY THE COURT

A. The Standards and Procedures for Preliminary Approval

9

B. The Settlement is Fair, Reasonable and Adequate

11

1. The Proposed Settlement is the Product of Serious, Informed, 12 Non-Collusive Negotiations

2. The Proposed Settlement Has No Obvious Deficiencies

13

3. The Proposed Settlement Does Not Improperly Grant

13

Preferential Treatment to Class Representatives or Segments of

the Class

4. The Proposed Settlement Falls Within the Range of Possible

14

Judicial Approval

C. Certification of the Proposed Settlement Class is Appropriate to

17

Resolve All Strip Search Claims Against Defendant

1. The Proposed Class Satisfies Rule 23(a)(l)

19

a. Numerosity

19

b. Commonality

20

c. Typicality

21

Case 5:07-cv-00928-FB Document 113 Filed 08/26/10 Page 3 of 40

d. Adequacy

22

2. The Requirements ofRule 23(b)(3) Are Met in the Settlement

24

Context

a. Common Issues Predominate

24

b. Superiority

25

VI. THE COURT SHOULD DIRECT NOTICE TO THE CLASS

27

VII. A FINAL FAIRNESS HEARING SHOULD BE SCHEDULED

28

VIII. CONCLUSION

29

Case 5:07-cv-00928-FB Document 113 Filed 08/26/10 Page 4 of 40
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES:
Allison v. The Geo Group, Inc., 611 F.Supp.2d. 433 (E.D.P.A. 2009) ............................................................. 18
Amchem Prods. Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997) ...................................................................................................passim
Bertulli v. Independent Ass 'n ofCnteniental Pilots, 242 F.3d 290, 299 (5th Cir. 2001) ................................................................23
Bizzarro v. County ofOcean, 2009 WL 1617887 (D.N.J. June 9, 2009) ........................................................ 17
Blihovde v. St. Croix County, Wis., 219 F.R.D. 607 (W.D. Wis. 2003) ............................................................................. 18, 21
Boone v. City ofPhiladelphia, 668 F.Supp.2d 693 (E.D.Pa. November 3, 2009) ................................................ 13,16,17
Bowers v. City ofPhiladelphia, 2006 WL 2818501 (E.D.Pa. 2006) ...................................................................................21
Bradshaw v. McLennan County, Case No. 6:08-cv-0026 (W.D. Tex.).................................................................................. 16
Bull v. City and County ofSan Francisco, 595 F.3d 964 (9th Cir. 2010) ...................................................................... .15
Bynum v. Dist. ofColombia, 217 F.R.D. 43 (D.D.C. 2003) .......................................................................................... 18
Bywaters v. United States, 196 F.R.D. 458 (E.D. Tex. 2000) ..................................................................................... 18
Califano v. Yamaski, 442 U.S. 683 (1979) .................................................................................................... 25,26
Calvin v. Sheriffof Will County, 2004 WL 1125922 (N.D. Ill. May 17, 2004) ................................................................... 18
Carpenter v. Davis, 424 F.2d 257 (5th Cir. 1970) ........................................................................................... 19
City ofSan Antonio v. Hotels. com, 2008 WL 2486043 (W.D. Tex. May 27, 2008) ....................................................... passim
Cotton v. Hinton, 559 F.2d 1326 (5th Cir. 1977) ......................................................................................... 11

Case 5:07-cv-00928-FB Document 113 Filed 08/26/10 Page 5 of 40
Dehoyos v. Allstate Corp., 2006 WL 2329417 (W.D. Tex. June 2, 2006) ................................................................. 11
Doan v. Watson, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8595 (S.D. Ind. March 4, 2000) ................................................. 18
Doan v. Watson, 2002 WL 31730917 (S.D. Ind. Dec. 4, 2002) .................................................................. 16
Dodge v. County ofOrange, 209 F.R.D. 65 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) ....................................................................................... 18
Dodge v. County ofOrange, 226 F.R.D. 177 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) ........................................................................... 18,20,26
Eddleman v. Jefferson Co., Ky., 96 F.3d 1448 (6th Cir. 1996) ........................................................................................... 18
Feder v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp~, 429 F.3d 125 (5th Cir. 2005) ...................................................................................... 21,22
Fisher Brothers v. Phelps Dodge Industries, Inc., 604 F.Supp 446 (E.D. Pa. 1985) ...................................................................................... 12
Florence v. Board ofChosen Freeholders ofthe County ofBurlington, 595 F.Supp. 2d 492 (D.N.J. 2009) .............................................................................. 15,17
Forbush v. J C. Penny Co., 994F.2d 1101 (5thCir.1993) .................................................................................... 19,21
Gary v. Sheahan, 1999 WL 281347 .(N.D. Ill. March 31, 1999) .................................................................. 18
Gen. Tel. Co. ofSouthwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147 (1982)......................................................................................................... 20
Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150F.3d 1011 (91hCir.1998) .......................................................................................... 16
Henry v. Cash Today, Inc~, 199 F.R.D. 566 (S.D. Tex. 2000) ..................................................................................... 25
In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 410 F.Supp. 659 (D.Minn.1974) ..................................................................................... 11
In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., 643 F.2d 195 (51h Cir. 1981) ...................................................................................... 11, 14

Case 5:07-cv-00928-FB Document 113 Filed 08/26/10 Page 6 of 40

In re First Republic Bank Sec. Litig., 1989 WL 108795 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 1, 1989) .................................................................... 25

In re Nissan Motor Corp. Antitrust Litig.,

552

F.2d

1088

(5

1 h

Cir.

1977)

.......................................................................................... 27

In re OCA, Inc. Securities and Derivative Litig., 2008 WL 4681369 (E.D. La. Oct. 17, 2008) ............................................................ passim

In re Prudential Ins. Co. Am. Sales Practice Litig. Agent Actions, 148 F.3d 283 (3d Cir. 1998) ("Prudential If') ........................................................ ..passim

In re Shell Oil Refinery, 155 F.R.D. 552 (E.D. La. 1993) ....................................................................................... 11

James v. City ofDallas, 254 F.3d 551 (5th Cir. 2001) ........................................................................................... 19

JD. v. Nagin, 255 F.R.D. 415 (E.D.La. 2009) ........................................................................................ 19

Jenkins v. Raymark Industries, Inc., 109 F.R.D. 269 (E.D. Tex. 1985) ..................................................................................... 23

Johnson v. American Credit Co. ofGeorgia, 581 F.2d 526 (5th Cir. 1978) ........................................................................................... 19

Johnson v. United States ofAmerica, 208 F.R.D. 148 (W.D.T.X. 2001) .................................................................................... 19

Jones v. Diamond, 519 F.2d 1090 (5th Cir. 1975)..................................................................... 19

Jones v. Murphy, 256 F.R.D. 519 (D. Md. 2009) ......................................................................................... 17

Kahler v. County ofRensselaer, Civil Action No. 03-CV-1324 (N.D.N.Y. April28, 2004) .............................................. 16

Kurian v. County ofLancaster, Civil Action No. 07-cv-3482 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 1, 2009) .................................................... 16

Mack v. Suffolk Co., 191 F.R.D. 16 (D. Mass. 2000) ........................................................................................ 18

Case 5:07-cv-00928-FB Document 113 Filed 08/26/10 Page 7 of 40
Marriott v. County ofMontgomery, 227 F.R.D. 159 (N.D.N.Y. 2005) .......................................................................... 18,20,22
McBean v. City ofNew York, 233 F.R.D. 377 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) ..................................................................................... 16
McNamara v. Bre-X Minerals Ltd., 214 F.R.D. 424 (E.D. Tex. 2002) ................................................................................ 11,27
Mitchell v. County ofClinton, 2007 WL 1988716 (N.D.N.Y. July 5, 2007) ................................................................... 18
Mullen v. Treasure Chest Casino, LLC, 186 F.3d 620 (5th Cir. 1999) ............................................................................. 19,21,24,25
Nilsen v. York County, 219 F.R.D. 19 (D. Me. 2003) ........................................................................................... 18
0 'Sullivan v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 319 F.3d 732 (5th Cir. 2003) ........................................................................................... 24
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985) ......................................................................................................... 27
Powell v. Barrett, 541 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2008) ..................................................................... 15
Pritchard v. County ofErie, 2010 WL 2431481 (W.D.N.Y. June 11, 2010) ................................................. 17
Protective Comm. For Indep. S'holders ofTMT Trailer Ferry, Inc. v. Anderson, 390 U.S. 414 (1968) .......................................................................................................... 8
Reed v. Gen. Motors Corp., 703 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1983) ............................................................................................ 14
Reynolds v. County ofDauphin, Civil No. 07-cv-1688 (M.D.Pa. December 18, 2009) ................................................. 16,17
San Antonio Hispanic Police Officers' Organization, Inc. v. City ofSan Antonio, 188 F.R.D. 433 (W.D. Tex. 1999) ................................................................................... 23
Smith v. Montgomery Co., 573 F. Supp. 604 (D. Md. 1983) ...................................................................................... 18
State ofAlabama v. Blue Bird Body Co., Inc.,

Case 5:07-cv-00928-FB Document 113 Filed 08/26/10 Page 8 of 40
573 F.2d 309 (5th Cir. 1978) .......................................................................................... 25
Stirman v. Exxon Corp~, 280 F.3d 554 (5th Cir. 2002) ..................................................................................... 21, 22
Sutton v. Hopkins County, 2007 WL 119892 (W.D. Ky. Jan. 11, 2007) ....................................................... 20, 22, 26
Tardiffv. Knox County, 218 F.R.D. 332 (D. Me. 2003) ......................................................................................... 18
Valentino v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 97 F.3d 1227 (9th Cir. 1996) ............................................................................................ 27
Vizena v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 360 F.3d 496 (5th Cir. 2004) ........................................................................................... 17
Watt v. Richardson Police Department, 849F.2d 195 (5thCir.1988) ........................................................................................... 13
Weisfeld v. Sun Chern. Corp., 210 F.R.D. 136 (D.N.J. 2002) ......................................................................................... 21
Williams v. First Nat 'l Bank, 216 U.S. 582 (1910) ........................................................................................................... 8
Williams v. County ofNiagara, 2008 WL 4501918 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2008) ............................................................... 17
Wilson v. County ofGloucester, 256 F.R.D. 479 (D.N.J. 2009) ......................................................................................... 17
Young v. County ofCook, 2007 WL 1238920 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 25, 2007) ............................................................ 18, 20
Young v. County ofCook, 2009 WL 971675 (N.D. Ill. April2, 2009) ...................................................................... 18
RULES:
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 ......................................................... ............................passim

Case 5:07-cv-00928-FB Document 113 Filed 08/26/10 Page 9 of 40

TREATISES:

Herbert B. Newberg & Alba Conte, Newberg on Class Actions, (3rd edo 1992) oooooooooooooooooooooooo 11

Manual for Complex Litigation, Second (Federal Judicial Center 1985) 000000000000000000000000000000000000 11

Manual for Complex Litigation, Third (Federal Judicial Center 1995) ooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooo 26

Manual for Complex Litigation, Fourth (Federal Judicial Center 2004) ooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooo 10

Charles Alan Wright, Arthur Ro Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and

Procedure (2d edo1986)

0

0

00 0

0

0000 00 00 0

oo00

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

00 0

0

00 00 0

00 0

00 0

00 00 000 00 00 0

0

0

0

0

0

0

00 0

0

00 0

000 0

0

00 00 00 0

0

0

0

0

00 00 0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

00 0

0

Oo 0

0

0

0000 0

24

Case 5:07-cv-00928-FB Document 113 Filed 08/26/10 Page 10 of 40
The plaintiffs, Julia Ann Jackson, Martin Martinez, and Erica Bernal, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated ("Plaintiffs") respectfully submit this Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement and Brief in Support Thereof. The defendant, Bexar County ("Defendant"), does not oppose the filing of this Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement and Brief in Support Thereof. 1
I. INTRODUCTION In a Settlement Agreement2 executed on August 5, 2010, a true and correct copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit A, Class Counsel (Charles J. LaDuca and Alexandra C. Warren of Cuneo Gilbert & LaDuca LLP, Washington, DC; Sam H. Lock ofthe Law Offices of Sam H. Lock, San Antonio, Texas; Elmer Robert Keach, III of the Law Offices of Elmer Robert Keach, III, P.C., Amsterdam, New York; Gary E. Mason and Nicholas Migliaccio ofMason LLP, Washington, DC; Kerrisa Chelkowski of the Law Office ofKerrisa Chelkowski, San Antonio, Texas; and Jim Harrington of the Texas Civil Rights Project, Austin Texas)3 and Bexar County and have secured a proposed settlement (the "Settlement") that provides a fair, reasonable and adequate benefit to individuals admitted to the Bexar County Adult Detention Center (the "Detention Center") who were subjected to strip and/or visual cavity searches upon entry to the facility, regardless of the nature of offense or the presence of individualized reasonable suspicion. The Settlement creates a settlement fund of between $3,000,000 and $5,500,000 for
1 Defendant continues to deny liability and damages for its alleged actions or inactions. Defendant has agreed to the attached settlement agreement. 2 The following documents are attached as exhibits to the Settlement Agreement: Exhibit A (Claim Form), Exhibit B (Long Form Notice), Exhibit C (Final Approval Order [Proposed]), Exhibit D (Preliminary Approval ·order [Proposed]), Exhibit E (Short Form Notice), Exhibit F (Plan of Distribution), Exhibit G (Subclass Misdemeanor Offense Listing). 3 Class Counsel's firm resumes are attached hereto as Exhibit B.

Case 5:07-cv-00928-FB Document 113 Filed 08/26/10 Page 11 of 40

the benefit of in excess of approximately 29,400 Class Members. See LaDuca Cert. at ,-r 9. The

specifics of this relief are set forth in a Plan of Distribution, a true and correct copy of which is

attached to the Settlement Agreement as Exhibit F.

This beneficial Settlement was reached over two and a half years after the filing of this

case and represents an efficient and salutary result for the Class on a claim that could have faced

difficulties at trial, and which was obtained from a defendant with a circumscribed ability to pay.

By virtue of the work of mediator Michael Curry, Esq., the parties were able to engage in

numerous arm's-length negotiation sessions that took place over the course of two years and

were aided in their positions by virtue of an efficient exchange of information relative to the

merits of the case. The parties' good-faith efforts to resolve this litigation ultimately resulted in a

settlement representing a thoughtful compromise, which takes into consideration the parties

respective concerns-- a meaningful solution to the constitutional violations incurred by the

members ofthe class and the County's financial status.

In short, Plaintiffs respectfully submit that this Settlement is fair, adequate, and

reasonable for the Class and that the requirements for final approval will be satisfied. In

considering preliminary approval, this is all that the moving party needs to demonstrate in order

for class members to be notified of this settlement and for a fairness hearing to be scheduled.

Finally, Plaintiffs request that, along with granting preliminarily approval of the

Settlement, the Court adopt the schedule set forth below, for the parties to effectuate the various

steps in the settlement approval process under the Settlement Agreement:

1 !Notice Date

Event

2 Deadline for filing Requests for Exclusion
3 Deadline for filing Objections

Timinl( No more than forty-five (45) days after Preliminary Settlement Approval Date. Forty-five (45) days after Notice Date.
Forty-five (45) days after Notice Date.

2

Case 5:07-cv-00928-FB Document 113 Filed 08/26/10 Page 12 of 40

4 Fairness Hearing 5 End of Claims Period

!Approximately One Hundred and Twenty (120) ~ays after Notice Date. One Hundred and Twenty (120) days after
Notice Date.

Accordingly, at this preliminary stage of the settlement process, Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court: (i) grant preliminary approval of the proposed settlement; (ii) schedule a final fairness hearing to consider final approval, pursuant to the schedule set forth above; (iii) direct that notice of the proposed settlement and hearing be provided to absent class members in a manner consistent with the Settlement Agreement and the Notice Plan, as set forth in the above-mentioned schedule; and (iv) enter the proposed Order for Preliminary Approval.
II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND OF CASE On November 15, 2007, Plaintiffs filed this class action lawsuit against Bexar County ("Defendant") regarding the Bexar County Adult Detention Center's strip search policies and practices.4 LaDuca Cert. at ~2. Significant discovery was completed. In addition to written discovery exchanged between the parties, Plaintiffs deposed Col. Earl Griffin, Bexar County's Rule 30(b)(6) designee, as well as nine other Detention Center Officers Defendant, while Defendant deposed each of the three named plaintiffs. LaDuca Cert. at ~3. The parties attended a first mediation session with Michael Curry, Esq., on November 2122, 2008, but were not able to resolve the case. Discovery continued. LaDuca Cert. at ~4. From March 31-April 1, 2009, the parties attended a second mediation session with Mr. Curry. As a result of their negotiations, the parties filed a Joint Motion to Enter Consent Decree

4 The original Complaint named Julia Ann Jackson as the plaintiff. Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint on August 6, 2008 adding Martin Martinez and Erica Bernal as plaintiffs. Dkt. 46. A Second Amended Complaint was filed on November 16, 2009. Dkt. 92.

3

Case 5:07-cv-00928-FB Document 113 Filed 08/26/10 Page 13 of 40
on March 31,2009. Dkt. 62. The Consent Decree, which resolved Plaintiffs' claims for injunctive relief, was entered by the Court on April2, 2009. Dkt. 63. Due in part to the County's coverage dispute with its insurance carriers, the parties were not able to reach an agreement as to a complete settlement at that time. LaDuca Cert. at ~5.
Since Plaintiffs' claims for class-wide damages remained unresolved, the parties continued to litigate the case. Plaintiffs filed a motion for class certification on June 4, 2009, Dkt. 74-7. After class certification motion was fully briefed in July of2009, the parties continued to discuss the possibility of settlement and attended a final mediation session on November 2-3, 2009. The parties spent extensive time continuing their negotiations after the conclusion of the mediation and, on April 6, 2010, the parties executed a Memorandum of Understanding regarding the settlement of this case. LaDuca Cert. at ~6.
The Settlement Agreement was executed on August 5, 2010. LaDuca Cert. at ~7. In connection with the execution of the Agreement, the parties prepared for the administration of the settlement, and drafted the class notices and other papers that are part of and attached to the Settlement Agreement. Through the mediation sessions and under the auspices of Mr. Curry, Plaintiffs learned that Bexar County had limited resources to fund a settlement in this matter. LaDuca Cert. at~ 8. Plaintiffs believe that the monetary amount obtained for the benefit of Class Members through the Settlement Agreement represents the limit of Bexar County's ability to pay. LaDuca Cert. at ~8.
III. BRIEF FACTUAL BACKGROUND OF CASE Plaintiffs claim that Bexar County maintained a strip search policy and practice throughout the class period, pursuant to which all newly admitted pre-trial detainees, including those admitted on misdemeanor offenses, were subjected to a strip search, often in a group
4

Case 5:07-cv-00928-FB Document 113 Filed 08/26/10 Page 14 of 40
setting, after being transported to the Bexar County Adult Detention Center. It is Plaintiffs' position that this policy and practice applied all detainees, without regard to the existence of reasonable suspicion to believe that they were concealing contraband. Plaintiffs believe in some instances this action constituted an assault or threat of assault.
IV. THE PROPOSED SETTLEMENT5 Plaintiffs are pleased to present this application for preliminary approval of the settlement of this litigation to the Court. This Settlement is made on behalf of all persons brought to the Bexar County Adult Detention Center after being charged with misdemeanor offenses (or other minor crimes) and were subsequently strip searched upon their entry into the facility. The Class is defined in the Settlement as:
All pre-trial detainees confined to the Bexar County Adult Detention Center between November 15, 2005 and April 9, 2009, who were subjected to a strip search before being sent to jail housing after being booked on misdemeanor charge(s). Specifically excluded from the class are pre-trial detainees who were subjected to strip search before being sent to jail housing after being booked on a felony charge, or a felony charge and misdemeanor charge. The Settlement Class includes the following two subclasses: Subclass I: All persons in the Settlement Class, not in Subclass II. Subclass II: All persons in the Settlement Class who were admitted on misdemeanor charges of narcotics, shoplifting and weapons violations. The misdemeanor offenses which qualify as those constituting charges of narcotics, shoplifting and weapons violations are defined by the parties in Exhibit G to the Settlement Agreement.
5 If there is a conflict in the phrasing of the statements in this motion, as opposed ot the executed August 3, 2010 Settlement Agreement, the Settlement Agreement controls.
5

Case 5:07-cv-00928-FB Document 113 Filed 08/26/10 Page 15 of 40
As described below, the Settlement Agreement provides for the creation of a fund to compensate class members for these constitutional violations.
A. The Settlement Fund The Settlement creates a fund of between $3,000,000 and $5,500,000 (the "Settlement Fund"). The Settlement is structured so that an initial contribution of $250,000 will be made within 30 days of the entry of a preliminary approval order. After final approval, and no later than 10 days after the Effective Date, the sum of$1,750,000 will be provided by Bexar County's primary insurance carriers. The timing of additional contributions to the Settlement Fund will depend upon Bexar County's resolution of a coverage dispute with its excess
m. surance earn.ers.
It is Bexar County's position that its excess carriers should contribute an additional $3.5 million towards the Settlement, which would result in a total Settlement of $5.5 million. Bexar County has filed litigation to resolve this coverage dispute with its excess carriers. In the event that the coverage dispute is not resolved by 30 days after the Effective Date, or the coverage dispute is resolved against Bexar County prior to the Effective Date, Bexar County will pay the sum of $1 million into the Settlement Fund. Thus, in no event will the Settlement Fund be less than $3 million.
The Settlement Agreement provides that if Bexar County recovers funds from its excess carriers, the money will first be used to reimburse litigation expenses in connection with the insurance coverage litigation. If Bexar County has not made a contribution into the Settlement Fund, all remaining funds will be paid to the Settlement Fund. If Bexar County has made a contribution to the Settlement Fund, then one half ofthe sums recovered from its excess carriers shall be paid to Bexar County until it recovers the sums it paid and the other half, after payment
6

Case 5:07-cv-00928-FB Document 113 Filed 08/26/10 Page 16 of 40
oflitigation expenses incurred in connection with Bexar County's insurance coverage litigation, shall be paid into the Settlement Fund. Further details regarding the distribution of funds is set forth in Section 3 of the Settlement Agreement.
All administrative expenses, including the costs of settlement administration, website administration and the provision of notice to class members, as well as the amount awarded by the Court for attorneys' fees and costs and incentive awards to the class representatives, will be deducted from the Settlement Fund prior to determining the amount of distribution for class members. The exact amount of recovery to each class member, and the timing of such distribution(s), will be determined by the Plan of Distribution.
Subclass I will receive all of the distribution amount from the Settlement Fund after above-mentioned amounts are deducted, except that an additional $100,000 will be deducted to fund Subclass II. Each Class Member within Subclass I who submits a timely Claim Form will receive a pro rata share of the fund, except that the maximum payment to members of Subclass I will be $1,000. Members of Subclass II, in tum, will receive their pro rata share of the $100,000 Subclass II fund, except that their maximum payment will be $100. If a pro rata distribution of the Settlement Fund to members of Subclass II results in funds remaining in the Settlement Fund for Subclass II, those remaining funds will be transferred to the Settlement Fund for Subclass I for distribution. Then, if the pro rata share of the Settlement paid to members of Subclass I would be greater than $1,000, Defendant will receive a reverter ofthe remaining funds. If members of Subclass I or Subclass II have unpaid court ordered fines, fees, costs of court, or restitution ordered by a Bexar county Judge, the amount owed will be subtracted from any payment, with the maximum of any such payment being one-half of that
7

Case 5:07-cv-00928-FB Document 113 Filed 08/26/10 Page 17 of 40
Class Member's payment, capped at $500.00 for Subclass I Members, and $50.00 for Subclass II Members.
B. Class Notice and Settlement Administration Both the Class Notice and Settlement Administration provided for in the Settlement Agreement comport with the requirements of applicable law, Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and due process. First, all costs associated with publishing notice to the class members and the administration of the Settlement shall be deducted directly from the settlement amount before determining the distribution to the Class. Second, notice will be provided to the Class by direct mailing of the Long Form Notice, Short Form Notice and Claim Form, true and correct copies of which are attached to the Settlement Agreement as Exhibits B, E, and A, respectively, to all individuals at their last known or readily ascertainable address (in both Spanish and English) and by publication in the major English and Spanish newspapers in San Antonio on at least one day per week for three consecutive weeks commencing on the Notice date, and on one occasion during the last ten days of the Claims Period. The mailed notice will be provided in Spanish and English, and newspaper advertisements will provide instruction that a Spanish copy of the notice will be provided upon request. Notice will also be provided to the class by way of a limited televised notice campaign on cable television, as well as a radio campmgn.
C. Attorneys' Fees and Class Representative Incentive Awards Class Counsel will petition the Court for reasonable attorneys' fees and expenses payable from the Settlement Fund. The Settlement Agreement currently provides that Class Counsel will
8

Case 5:07-cv-00928-FB Document 113 Filed 08/26/10 Page 18 of 40
seek attorneys' fees and expenses in an amount together not to exceed thirty percent of the total Settlement Fund.
Class Counsel will also petition the Court for incentive awards on behalf of Julia Ann Jackson, Martin Martinez, and Erica Bernal, in the amount of$15,000 each.
V. The Settlement Agreement Should Be Preliminarily Approved By the Court
In this motion, Plaintiffs seek preliminary approval of the Settlement Agreement between Plaintiffs and Defendant. "Compromises of disputed claims are favored by the courts." Williams v. First Nat'! Bank, 216 U.S. 582, 595 (1910). Settlement spares the litigants the uncertainty, delay and expense of a trial, while simultaneously reducing the burden on judicial resources. Federal Rule 23(e) provides that the Court must approve any settlement of a class action. The ultimate determination whether a proposed class action settlement warrants approval resides in the Court's discretion. Protective Comm. for Indep. S'holders ofTMT Trailer Ferry, Inc. v. Anderson, 390 U.S. 414, 424-25 (1968). As discussed more fully below, at this stage of preliminary approval, there is clear evidence that the Settlement Agreement is well within the range of possible approval and thus should be preliminarily approved.
A. The Standards and Procedures for Preliminary Approval
Rule 23(e) ofthe Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides the mechanism for settling a class action, including, as here, through a class certified for settlement purposes:
The claims, issues, or defenses of a certified class may be settled, voluntarily dismissed, or compromised only with the court's approval. The following procedures apply to a proposed settlement, voluntary dismissal, or compromise:
(1) The court must direct notice in a reasonable manner to all class members who would be bound by the proposal. (2) If the proposal would bind class members, the court may
9

Case 5:07-cv-00928-FB Document 113 Filed 08/26/10 Page 19 of 40
approve it only after a hearing and on finding that it is fair, reasonable, and adequate. (3) The parties seeking approval must file a statement identifying any agreement made in connection with the proposal. (4) Ifthe class action was previously certified under Rule 23(b)(3), the court may refuse to approve a settlement unless it affords a new opportunity to request exclusion to individual class members who had an earlier opportunity to request exclusion but did not do so. (5) Any class member may object to the proposal if it requires court approval under this subdivision (e); the objection may be withdrawn only with the court's approval. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e); Amchem Prods. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997). In determining whether preliminary approval is warranted, the sole issue before the Court is whether the proposed settlement is within the range of what might be found fair, reasonable and adequate, so that notice of the proposed settlement should be given to class members, and a hearing scheduled to consider final approval. The Court reviews the proposal preliminarily to determine whether it is sufficient to warrant public notice and a hearing. If so, the final decision on approval is made after the hearing. Manual for Complex Litigation, Fourth,§ 13.14, at 172-73 (Federal Judicial Center 2004) ("Manual Fourth"). The Court is not required at this point to make a final determination: The judge must make a preliminary determination on the fairness, reasonableness, and adequacy of the settlement terms and must direct the preparation of notice ofthe certification, proposed settlement, and date of the final fairness hearing. !d. at § 21.632, at 321. Preliminary approval is the first step in a two-step process required before a class action may be finally settled. !d. at 320. Courts first make a preliminary evaluation of the fairness of the settlement, prior to notice. !d. at 320-21. In some cases this initial assessment can be made on the basis of information already known to the court and then
10

Case 5:07-cv-00928-FB Document 113 Filed 08/26/10 Page 20 of 40
supplemented by briefs, motions and an informal presentation from the settling parties. Id. There is an initial strong presumption that a proposed class action settlement is fair and reasonable when it is the result of arm's length negotiations. In deciding whether a settlement should be approved under Rule 23, Courts look to whether there is a basis to believe that the more rigorous, final approval standard will be satisfied. "Once the judge is satisfied as to the certifiability of the class and the results of the initial inquiry into the fairness, reasonableness, and adequacy of the settlement, notice of a formal Rule 23(e) fairness hearing is given to the class members." Manual Fourth at§ 21.633, at 321. Preliminary approval permits notice ofthe hearing on final settlement approval to be given to the class members, at which time class members and the settling parties may be heard with respect to final approval. Id. at 322.
B. The Settlement is Fair, Reasonable and Adequate The standards for preliminary approval of a settlement "are not as stringent as those applied to a motion for final approval ... If the proposed settlement discloses no reason to doubt its fairness, has no obvious deficiencies, does not improperly grant preferential treatment to class representatives or segments of the class, does not grant excessive compensation to attorneys, and appears to fall within the range of possible approval, the court should grant preliminary approval." In re OCA, Inc. Securities and Derivative Litig., 2008 WL 4681369, *11 (E.D. La. Oct. 17, 2008) (citations omitted). In deciding whether there is good cause to issue notice to the class and to proceed with a fairness hearing, the district court must determine that "the proposed settlement appears to be the product of serious, informed, non-collusive negotiations, has no obvious deficiencies, does not improperly grant preferential treatment to class representatives or segments of the class, and falls within the range of possible [judicial] approval." In re Shell Oil Refinery, 155 F.R.D. 552, 555 (E.D. La. 1993) (citing Manual for Complex Litigation, Second§ 30.44 (Federal Judicial Center, 1985)); see also, Herbert B. Newberg & Alba Conte, Newberg on
11

Case 5:07-cv-00928-FB Document 113 Filed 08/26/10 Page 21 of 40
Class Actions, §§ 11.24-11.25 (3rd ed. 1992); In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., 643 F.2d 195,212 (5th Cir.1981).
1. The Proposed Settlement is the Product of Serious, Informed, Non-Collusive Negotiations
This Settlement is the result of arm's-length negotiations, conducted by experienced counsel for all parties.
This consideration is often shaped by the experience and reputation of counsel. Dehoyos
v. Allstate Corp., 2006 WL 2329417, *1 (W.D. Tex. June 2, 2006) (Biery, J.) (preliminary
approval of settlement where "counsel for all Parties have significant experience in litigating and negotiating settlements of cases involving allegations of racial discrimination"); In re OCA, 2008 WL 4681369, *11; McNamara v. Bre-X Minerals Ltd., 214 F.R.D. 424, 430-31(E.D. Tex. 2002); Cotton v. Hinton, 559 F.2d 1326, 1332-33 (5th Cir. 1977); In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 410 F.Supp. 659, 667 (D.Minn. 1974) ("The recommendation of experienced antitrust counsel is entitled to great weight."); Fisher Brothers v. Phelps Dodge Industries, Inc., 604 F. Supp. 446, 452 (E.D. Pa. 1985) ("The professional judgment of counsel involved in the litigation is entitled to significant weight.").
The Settlement was negotiated on behalf of Plaintiffs by a team of attorneys who have been vigorously prosecuting this and parallel cases for similar claims and were, therefore, well versed in the issues and how to evaluate the claims. This Settlement meets all the requirements of Rule 23 and is designed to provide administrative procedures to assure all Class Members' equal and sufficient due process rights. The parties conducted extensive discovery and research to ensure that all negotiations were informed. Class Counsel believe in the merits of this case and were willing and able to litigate the claims at issue in the event Bexar County failed to agree to a significant and valuable settlement agreement. The Settlement was agreed to after
12

Case 5:07-cv-00928-FB Document 113 Filed 08/26/10 Page 22 of 40
considering all key factors, including the range ofjudgments that would likely be obtained by Class members, the risk that judgments could be reversed or delayed by appeals, the time required to litigate this case through trial, and Defendant's financial situation. Accordingly, the settlement was not the product of collusive dealings, but, rather, was informed by the vigorous prosecution of the case by the experienced and qualified counsel.
2. The Proposed Settlement Has No Obvious Deficiencies The Settlement provides valuable consideration to pretrial detainees who were strip searched absent reasonable suspicion and addresses the problem at the heart of Plaintiffs' claims. There are no deficiencies. See In re OCA, 2008 WL 4681369, *11.
3. The Proposed Settlement Does not Improperly Grant Preferential Treatment to Class Representatives or Segments of the Class
The economic terms of the settlement are fair. The proposed Settlement does not unduly grant preferential treatment to the proposed Class Representative or to segments of the Settlement Class, and it does not provide excessive compensation to counsel.
Other than an incentive award in recognition of their considerable participation in this litigation- including being deposed and participating in drafting responses to Defendant's discovery requests - the settlement accords no special treatment whatsoever to Class Representatives.
The Settlement Agreement provides for the certification of two Subclasses. Subclass I consists of all persons admitted to the Bexar County Adult Detention Center during the proposed class period who are not members of Subclass II. Subclass II consists of all persons in the Settlement Class who were admitted on misdemeanor charges of narcotics, shoplifting and weapons violations. Members of Subclass I are expected to receive higher distributions than
13

Case 5:07-cv-00928-FB Document 113 Filed 08/26/10 Page 23 of 40
members of Subclass II. Members of the subclasses are compensated differently because, while Class Counsel believes that it is clear under Fifth Circuit precedent that blanket strip searches of persons arrested on minor offenses absent reasonable suspicion are improper, the case law also suggests that individuals arrested on offenses involving charges of narcotics, shoplifting, and weapons violations may be constitutionally strip searched. See Watt v. Richardson Police Department, 849 F.2d 195, 199 (5th Cir. 1988) (policy of strip searching arrestees detained on weapons, shoplifting, or narcotics charges not invalidated). Thus, a different allocation is appropriate. See e.g. In re OCA, 2008 WL 4681369, *12 (preliminary approval granted where allocation plan differentiated between class members based on when they purchased shares of stock); see also Boone v. City ofPhiladelphia, 668 F.Supp. 2d 693 (E.D. Pa. 2009) (two subclasses, with members of Subclass I receiving approximately $1,321 and members of Subclass II receiving $85).
4. The Proposed Settlement Falls Within the Range of Possible Judicial Approval
Although the Court is only making a preliminary evaluation of the Settlement at this point and need only evaluate the four criteria discussed above, the Court may also look at the factors it will consider at the final fairness hearing on order to preliminarily assess whether the Settlement falls within the range of possible approval. In the Fifth Circuit, courts consider the following factors in assessing the fairness of a settlement: (1) the existence of fraud or collusion behind the settlement; (2) the complexity, expense, and likely duration of the litigation; (3) the stage of the proceedings and the amount of discovery completed; (4) the probability of plaintiffs' success on the merits; (5) the range of possible recovery; and (6) the opinions ofthe class counsel, class representatives, and absent class members." Reed v. Gen. Motors Corp., 703 F.2d 170, 172 (5th Cir. 1983) (citations omitted); see also In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig.,
14

Case 5:07-cv-00928-FB Document 113 Filed 08/26/10 Page 24 of 40
643 F.2d at 217. As stated above, there was no fraud or collusion whatsoever involved in the negotiation of the Settlement. See LaDuca Cert. at ~8.
Given the nature of this case, continued litigation (up to and including trial and any appeals) will likely be complex, expensive, and lengthy. A trial would last for weeks, with scores of Detention Center employees being examined about their search practices and numerous class members appearing to testify regarding their experiences.
The parties are in the late stages of these proceedings and, as explained above, a significant amount of discovery has been conducted. Written discovery was exchanged, many depositions were completed, various discovery motions were filed, and motions for class certification and to exclude expert testimony were fully briefed.
The range of possible recovery strongly supports approval of this Settlement because it provides the Class with a significant package of relief. Based on the data provided, Class Counsel estimates that there are approximately 23,520 members of Subclass I and 5,880 members of Subclass II. The approximate pro rata share of the Settlement Fund assuming a 20% claims rate and a total settlement of $5.5 million is $734 for members of Subclass I and $93 for members of Subclass II. The approximate pro rata share of the Settlement Fund assuming a 20% claims rate and a total settlement of $3 million is $325 for members of Subclass I and $93 for members of Subclass II. The approximate pro rata share of the Settlement Fund assuming a 15% claims rate and a total settlement of $5.5 million is $979 for members of Subclass I and $100 for members of Subclass II. The approximate pro rata share of the Settlement Fund assuming a 15% claims rate and a total settlement of $3 million is $434 for members of Subclass
15

Case 5:07-cv-00928-FB Document 113 Filed 08/26/10 Page 25 of 40
I and $100 for members of Subclass II.6 This payment is quite fair and reasonable given the
inherent risks of litigation, and awards in similar cases. 7 Class Members will receive
meaningful compensation for the damages they sustained.
The likely amount to be received by Class Members is fair and reasonable given the
inherent risks of litigation and in light of settlement awards in similar cases. See e.g. Boone, 668
F.Supp. 2d 693 (settlement award ranging from $85 to $1,321 depending upon subclass
membership); Reynolds v. County ofDauphin, 1:07-cv-01688 (M.D. Pa.) (final approval of class
action settlement paying victims of illegal strip searches approximately $600 each); Kurian v.
County ofLancaster, 07-cv-3482 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 1, 2009) (payments ranging from $50 to $900,
depending on claimants' classification in one of five categories); Doan v. Watson, 2002 WL
31730917 (S.D. Ind. Dec. 4, 2002) (approximately $1,000 per claimant); Kahler v. County of
Rensselaer, No. 03-cv-1324 (N.D.N.Y. April28, 2004) (approximately $1,000 per claimant);
6 These figures represent a rough approximation of the class size data and may be revised upon further review. 7 The Ninth and Eleventh Circuits recently held that under certain circumstances blanket strip searches of pretrial detainees are constitutional See Bull v. City and County ofSan Francisco, 595 F.3d 964, 968 (91h Cir. 2010)(en banc)(finding that San Francisco's blanket strip search policy was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment where the policy provided that searches must be "conducted in a professional manner in an area of privacy so that the search cannot be observed by persons not participating in the search"); Powell v. Barrett, 541 F.3d 1298, 1314 (11th Cir. 2008)(en bane)(holding that rights of pretrial detainees placed in custodial housing with the general jail population "are not violated by a policy or practice of strip searching each one of them as part of the booking process, provided that the searches are no more intrusive on privacy interests than those upheld in the Bell case" and the searches are "not conducted in an abusive manner."). The Third Circuit is currently considering the issue. See Florence v. Bd. Of Chosen Freeholders ofBurlington, 657 F.Supp.2d 504,508 n. 4 (D.N.J. 2009) (certifying the following question for interlocatory appeal: "whether a blanket policy of strip searching all nonindictable arrestees admitted to a jail facility without first articulating reasonable suspicion violates the Fourth Amendment to the united States Constitution as applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment."). Further, by Order dated October 30, 2009, a district court in the Western District of Texas denied a motion for class certification in a strip search class action. See Bradshaw, et al. v. McLennan County, et al., Case No. 6:08-cv-0026 (W.D. Tex.).
16

Case 5:07-cv-00928-FB Document 113 Filed 08/26/10 Page 26 of 40

McBean v. City ofNew York, 233 F.R.D. 377, 388 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (payments of$750 or

$1,000, depending on number of strip searches).

Class Counsel and all of the proposed Class Representatives support the Settlement.

Class Counsel are unaware of any opposition from absent Class Members and anticipate that,

once the Settlement is preliminarily approved and notice is given to all Class Members, the

support for the Settlement will far outweigh any opposition.

C.

Certification of the Proposed Settlement Class is Appropriate to

Resolve All Strip Search Claims Against Defendant

Both the Supreme Court and various circuit courts have recognized the benefits of the

proposed settlement can only be realized through the certification of a settlement class. See

Amchem, 521 U.S. at 591; In re Prudential Ins. Co. America Sales Practice Litig. Agent Actions

("Prudential II"), 148 F.3d 283, 283 (3d Cir. 1998); Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011 (91h Cir. 1998). Rule 23's requirements apply when certification is for settlement purposes. See

Amchem, 521 U.S. 591; In re OCA, 2008 WL 4681369, *6.

A case can be certified as a class action where a plaintiff demonstrates that the threshold

requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) (numerosity, commonality, typicality and adequacy of

representation) are satisfied, and also demonstrates that the class satisfies one of three criteria set

forth in Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b). City ofSan Antonio v. Hotels. com, 2008 WL 2486043, *3 (W.D.

Tex. May 27, 2008); Vizena v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 360 F.3d 496, 502-503 (5th Cir.

2004). Other federal courts, in considering the situation where cities or counties have employed

blanket strip search policies, have consistently recognized the propriety of certifying such cases

as class actions and the decisions certifying such cases are legion. See e.g. Boone, 668 F.Supp.2d

693 (granting final approval to strip search settlement); Bizzarro v. County of Ocean, 2009 WL

1617887 (D.N.J. June 9, 2009) (class certification of strip search class action against Ocean

17

Case 5:07-cv-00928-FB Document 113 Filed 08/26/10 Page 27 of 40
County, NJ); Reynolds v. County of Dauphin, Civ. No. 07-cv-1688 (M.D.P.A. December 18, 2009) (granting final approval of strip search class action); Wilson v. County of Gloucester, 256 F.R.D. 479 (D.N.J. March 30, 2009) (certifying strip search class action against Gloucester County, NJ); Jones v. Murphy, 256 F.R.D. 519 (D. Md. 2009) (D. Md. March 19, 2009) (certifying strip search class against Baltimore County); Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of the County of Burlington, 595 F.Supp. 2d 492 (D.N.J. 2009) (granting summary judgment on a class-wide basis as to liability on behalf of strip search plaintiffs against the Counties of Burlington and Essex, NJ; currently on appeal in the Third Circuit); Pritchard v. County ofErie, 2010 WL 2431481 (W.D.N.Y. June 11, 2010) (certifying two classes of pretrial detainees in a strip search class action); Williams v. County of Niagara, 2008 WL 4501918 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2008) (certifying two classes of pretrial detainees in a strip search class action); Mitchell v. County of Clinton, 2007 WL 1988716 (N.D.N.Y. July 5, 2007) (class certification in strip search action); Allison v. The Geo Group, Inc., 611 F.Supp.2d 433 (E.D.P.A. 2009) (denying motion to dismiss a case challenging the legality of blanket strip search policy); Marriott v. County of Montgomery, 227 F.R.D. 159, 169-170 (N.D.N.Y. 2005), aff'd 2005 WL 3117194 (2d Cir. 2005) (class certification and preliminary injunction in strip search class action); Young v. County of Cook, 2007 WL 1238920 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 25, 2007) (certification of strip search class action); Young v. County of Cook, 2009 WL 971675 (N.D. Ill. April 2, 2009) (summary judgment on liability entered on behalf of strip search class of plaintiffs); Dodge v. County ofOrange, 209 F.R.D. 65 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); Dodge v. County ofOrange, 226 F.R.D. 177 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); Calvin v. Sheriff of Will County, 2004 WL 1125922 (N.D. Ill. May 17, 2004); Blihovde v. St. Croix County, Wis., 219 F.R.D. 607 (W.D. Wis. 2003); Tardiffv. Knox County, 218 F.R.D. 332 (D. Me. 2003), aff'd, 365 F.3d 1 (1 51 Cir. 2004); Nilsen v. York County, 219
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Case 5:07-cv-00928-FB Document 113 Filed 08/26/10 Page 28 of 40

F.R.D. 19 (D. Me. 2003); Bynum v. Dist. ofColombia, 217 F.R.D. 43 (D.D.C. 2003); Mack v. Suffolk Co., 191 F.R.D. 16 (D. Mass. 2000); Gary v. Sheahan, 1999 WL 281347 (N.D. Ill. March 31, 1999); Eddleman v. Jefferson Co., Ky., 96 F.3d 1448 (6th Cir. 1996); Smith v. Montgomery Co., 573 F. Supp. 604 (D. Md. 1983); Doan v. Watson, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8595 (S.D. Ind. March 4, 2000).

1. The Proposed Class Satisfies Rule 23(a)(l)

a. Numerosity

Rule 23(a)(l) requires that the class be "so numerous that joinder of all members is

impracticable." To satisfy the requirement, "joinder need not be impossible, merely

impracticable." Bywaters v. United States, 196 F.R.D. 458, 466 (E.D. Tex. 2000). A plaintiff is

not required to detail, to the person, the exact size ofthe class or to demonstrate that joinder of

all class members is impossible. Carpenter v. Davis, 424 F.2d 257, 260 (5th Cir. 1970). The

Fifth Circuit has held that though the number of class members alone is not determinative of

whether joinder is impracticable, a class consisting of 100 to 150 members is within the "range

that generally satisfies the numerosity requirement." Mullen v. Treasure Chest Casino, LLC, 186

F.3d

620,

624

(5

1 h

Cir.

1999).

The general rule encouraging liberal construction of civil rights class action "applies with

equal force to the numerosity requirement ofRule 23(a)." Jones v. Diamond, 519 F.2d 1090, 1100 (51h Cir. 1975). Thus, courts, in applying the numerosity requirement, must consider "the

nature and intent of the Civil Rights Act, whose purpose is to provide a broad remedy for all who

fit the plaintiffs class." Id.

Given that the Settlement Class consists of approximately 29,400 individuals, there is no

question that the element of numerosity has been met. The booking records produced by Bexar

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Case 5:07-cv-00928-FB Document 113 Filed 08/26/10 Page 29 of 40
County confirm that thousands of individuals were arrested and detained in Bexar County Adult Detention Center facilities during the class period, and the numerosity requirement for certification is easily satisfied.
b. Commonality Rule 23(a)(2) requires that there be "questions of law or fact common to the class." The test of commonality "is not demanding." Mullen, 186 F.3d at 625; Forbush v. JC. Penny Co., 994 F.2d 1101, 1106 (5th Cir. 1993); JD. v. Nagin, 255 F.R.D. 414,414-15 (E.D. La. 2009). The plaintiff need only show that there is one common question of law or fact; the interests and claims of each plaintiff need not be identical. James v. City ofDallas, 254 F.3d 551,570 (5th Cir. 2001); City ofSan Antonio, 2008 WL 2486043 at *5; Johnson v. United States o.fAmerica, 208 F.R.D. 167-168 (W.D.T.X. 2001); I Newberg on Class Actions, §3:10 at 3-50; Johnson v. American Credit Co. ofGeorgia, 581 F.2d 526, 532 (5th Cir. 1978). The central issues posed by this litigation are whether Bexar County's search regimen constitutes an unconstitutional blanket strip search policy and/or practice during the class period and whether Defendant is responsible for these constitutional violations. Given the presence of these common questions central to this litigation, Rule 23(a)(2)'s requirement of common questions of fact or law is met. See e.g. Dodge, 226 F.R.D. at 180-181 (commonality exists where all members of the class contend that a blanket strip search policy exists, where all members contend that the policy is illegal, and where all members of the class claim they were searched pursuant to the policy which was uniformly applied to all detainees); Marriott, 227 F.R.D. at 172 (finding commonality where the representative parties and the members of the proposed class had the same legal claims based upon the same official procedure); see also Sutton v. Hopkins County, 2007 WL 119892, *4 (W.D. Ky. Jan. 11, 2007) ("Plaintiffs have
20

Case 5:07-cv-00928-FB Document 113 Filed 08/26/10 Page 30 of 40

alleged that the Defendants had a policy, custom, or practice of strip-searching persons on

admission to and/or just prior to release from the Hopkins County Jail without regard to whether

there existed the requisite individual, reasonable suspicion required by law. Given this allegation,

the existence and constitutionality of the county's policy, custom or practice are common

questions."); Young v. County ofCook, 2007 WL 1238920 at *5 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 25, 2007)

("Courts have consistently held that class actions challenging blanket strip search policies satisfy

Rule 23(a)(2)'s commonality requirement.").

c.

Typicality

Rule 23(a)(3) also requires that the representative plaintiffs claims be "typical" of those

of other class members. The commonality and typicality requirements of Rule 23(a) "tend to

merge." Gen. Tel. Co. ofSouthwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157 n.13 (1982). The test "is not

demanding", Mullen, 186 F.3d at 625; Forbush, 994 F.2d at 1105; JD., 255 F.R.D. at 415, and

"focuses on the similarity between the named plaintiffs legal and remedial theories and the

theories of those whom they purport to represent." Stirman v. Exxon Corp., 280 F.3d 554, 562

(5th Cir. 2002); James, 254 F.3d at 571. "Typicality does not require a complete identity of

claims." Stirman, 280 F.3d at 562; James, 254 F.3d at 571. Instead, the question is whether the

class representative's claims have "the same essential characteristics of the putative class."

Stirman, 280 F.3d at 562. '"Even relatively pronounced factual differences' between the

individual claims will not defeat typicality as long as the claims are woven from the same legal

fabric and arise from the same event, practice or course of conduct." City ofSan Antonio, 2008

WL 2486043 at *6; Feder v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 429 F.3d 125, 129-130 (5th Cir. 2005).

Here, the Representative Plaintiffs' claims against Defendant are typical of the claims of

the Class. They arise from the same course of events and Plaintiffs must make the same

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Case 5:07-cv-00928-FB Document 113 Filed 08/26/10 Page 31 of 40
arguments to prosecute their claims as would be made by the members of the proposed Class in any individual case. There are no special or unique features of the named Plaintiffs' claims that make them different in any fundamental way from those of other Class members. Typicality is satisfied because the Defendant "acted pursuant to a policy that called for indiscriminate searches. If this allegation is true, then the named [P]laintiffs would be similarly situated to the other members of the class." Blihovde, 29 F.R.D. at 617; Bowers v. City ofPhiladelphia, 2006 WL 2818501 *2-3 (E.D.Pa. 2006) ("A plaintiffs claim is typical if it arises from the same event or course of conduct that gives rise to the claims of other class members and is based on the same legal theory."); see also Weisfeld v. Sun Chern. Corp., 210 F.R.D. 136, 140 (D.N.J. 2002) ("[I]n instances wherein it is alleged that the defendants engaged in a common scheme relative to all members of the class there is a strong assumption that the claims of the representative parties will be typical ofthe absent class members.")(citation omitted); Marriott, 227 F.R.D. at 172 (finding typicality even where the claims of the representative parties involved a more detailed search than other class members, because they were conducted pursuant to the same policy); Sutton, 2007 WL 117892 at *4 ("Because each named Plaintiff alleges an unconstitutional strip search after arrest for a minor violation or before release from jail, the claims of the representatives are typical of the class as a whole.").
d. Adequacy Rule 23(a)(4) requires the class representative to "fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class." "To satisfy this requirement, the interests of the class representative must not conflict with the interests of the putative class, and class counsel must be able to competently represent the class." City ofSan Antonio, 2008 WL 2486043 at *7. When evaluating whether the interests of the class will be adequately represented by the class representative and class
22

Case 5:07-cv-00928-FB Document 113 Filed 08/26/10 Page 32 of 40
counsel, a court must consider the zeal and competence of the representative's counsel and the willingness and ability of the representative to take an active role in and control the litigation and to protect the interests of absentees. Stirman, 280 F.3d at 563; Feder, 429 F.3d 125, 129-130.
Plaintiffs and Class Counsel have fairly and adequately represented the Class here, especially judging by the excellent settlement achieved in this litigation. Class Counsel are competent and experienced attorneys who have invested considerable time and resources into the prosecution of this action and who have extensive experience in successfully litigating various forms of class actions (including strip search class actions) and other complex matters, including strip search cases around the country. (LaDuca Cert. Ex.2, Firm Resumes).
The adequacy of the representation element is satisfied if the named plaintiffs interests are "sufficiently aligned with those of other class members." Jenkins v. Raymark Industries, Inc., 109 F.R.D. 269,273 (E.D. Tex. 1985). Stated differently, as long as "all class members are united in asserting a common right, such as achieving the maximum possible recovery for the class, the class interest are not antagonistic for representative purposes." San Antonio Hispanic Police Officers' Organization, Inc. v. City ofSan Antonio, 188 F.R.D. 433, 444 (W.D. Tex. 1999). Here, the Plaintiffs initiated this lawsuit to put and end to blanket strip searches at Bexar County's facilities and are committed to obtaining appropriate compensation from Defendant for themselves and the members of the proposed Settlement Class. See JD., 255 F.R.D. at 416 (adequacy met where the claims of the named and unnamed plaintiffs rested "upon the practices and policies of the uuvenile detention center] as a whole, and as such apply to both named and unmade class members alike"). Plaintiffs' interests in this case coincide with those of potential Class members in that Plaintiffs seek compensation for victims of Bexar County's strip search policy, as they have already succeeded in changing Bexar County's strip search policies going
23

Case 5:07-cv-00928-FB Document 113 Filed 08/26/10 Page 33 of 40

forward. Because Plaintiffs' claims are typical of the claims of the members of the proposed Class, their interests are aligned with those of the Class.
With respect to the conflicts issue, there are none. Indeed, the claims of the Plaintiffs, far from conflicting with the Class, are identical to the Class and are based on the same factual and legal issues. Bertulli v. Independent Ass 'n ofCnteniental Pilots, 242 F.3d 290, 299 (5th Cir. 2001) (adequacy satisfied where plaintiffs share the same theories of liability and the class representatives' interest are aligned with, not antagonist to, the unnamed class members.).
Accordingly, Plaintiffs are adequate representatives and have retained experienced class counsel that has aggressively litigated this case.

2. The Requirements of Rule 23(b)(3) Are Met in the Settlement Context

a.

Common Issues Predominate

Rule 23(b)(3) requires that the party proposing a class action establish that issues

common to the class predominate over the individual issues of particular class members. See

Amchem Prod., 521 U.S. at 591, 623. The Rule 23(b)(3) predominance inquiry "tests whether

proposed classes are sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by representation." Id. "In

order to predominate, common issues must constitute a significant part of the individual cases."

Mullen, 186 F.3d at 626; O'Sullivan v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 319 F.3d 732,742 (5th

Cir. 2003).

This analysis requires an examination of relative significance or weight of the issues, and

whether the issues are likely to become a major focus of the litigation. City ofSan Antonio, 2008

WL 2486043 at *6; Mullen, 186 F.3d at 626. The most pragmatic way for the court to make this

determination is to evaluate whether "common or 'generalized' proof, as opposed to individual

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Case 5:07-cv-00928-FB Document 113 Filed 08/26/10 Page 34 of 40
proof' will predominate at trial. City ofSan Antonio, 2008 WL 2486043 at *9. In other words, "the court should ask whether the 'addition or subtraction of plaintiffs to or from the class will have a substantial effect on the substance or quality ofthe evidence offered."' !d. at *9 (citation omitted). If the claims "would require generalized or common proof, then a class action would certainly be the most efficient method oflitigating the claims." !d. Moreover, the common questions need not be dispositive of all issues. See 7B Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1778 (2d ed.1986). When one or more of the central issues in the action "are common to the class and can be said to predominate, the action will be considered proper ... even though other important matters will have to be tried separately." !d.
Here, the proposed Class Members' claims involve one central legal issue: was Bexar County's policy of strip searching every pretrial detainee admitted to the facility constitutional where these detainees are made to disrobe in the presence of a Detention Officer absent any consideration of the crime charged or the circumstances of the arrest? Plaintiffs' claims also share common factual issues- did such practices exist during the Class period? Proof of these class wide issues would be the focus of any trial. Thus, the legal and factual issues relating to the strip search policy in this litigation predominate over any of the individual issues.
b. Superiority In addition to proving predominance, a plaintiff in a 23(b)(3) case must also show that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. Class actions are considered superior when individual actions would be wasteful, duplicative, present managerial difficult and are adverse to judicial economy. Mullen, 186 F.3d at 627. Courts also consider whether class treatment of a case will "achieve economics of time,
25

Case 5:07-cv-00928-FB Document 113 Filed 08/26/10 Page 35 of 40
effort and expense, and promote uniformity of decisions as to persons similarly situated without sacrificing procedural fairness or bringing about other undesirable results." Id.; Henry v. Cash Today, Inc., 199 F.R.D. 566, 570 (S.D. Tex. 2000); State ofAlabama v. Blue Bird Body Co., Inc., 573 F.2d 309, 315 (5th Cir. 1978). This is because to require hundreds or thousands of identical individual, repetitive cases to be filed to address the claims in this- all with the attendant possibility of inconsistent adjudications- verges on absurd. See Califano v. Yamaski, 442 U.S. 683, 700-01 (1979); see also In re First Republic Bank Sec. Litig., Nos. 3-88-0641-H and 3-881251-H, 1989 WL 108795 *15 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 1, 1989) ("any administrative difficulties in handling this class action are preferable to duplicating judicial resources in several individual lawsuits and denying access to the courts for class members."). In fact, the class action devise is designed for this very situation where an individual seeks to vindicate "the rights of groups of people who individually would be without effective strength to bring their opponents into court at all." Amchem Prods., 521 U.S. at 617. "The policy at the very core of the class action mechanism is to overcome the problem that small recoveries do not provide the incentive for any individual to bring a solo action prosecuting his or her rights. A class action solves this problem by aggregating the relatively paltry potential recoveries into something worth someone's (usually an attorney's) labor." !d.
Here, the identity of the factual and legal issues between all proposed Class Members makes the notion that they should be required to file hundreds or thousands of individual lawsuits illogical, and forcing them to do so would encourage a waste ofjudicial and private resources. All Class Members' claims arise from the same course of conduct and are based upon the same legal theories. Resolution of these claims will affect each member similarly, and it would be economically prohibitive for many Class Members who suffered smaller losses to
26

Case 5:07-cv-00928-FB Document 113 Filed 08/26/10 Page 36 of 40

prosecute individual actions. The prosecution of this case as a class action is superior to thousands of individual cases being filed in this Court, each of which would be repetitious, possibly yield inconsistent results, and would be onerous on the limited resources of the Court. See Califano, 42 U.S. 682, 700-70; Dodge, 226 F.R.D. at 183; Sutton, 2007 WL 119892, *9. There are no overlapping cases pending in any other jurisdiction. A class action is the superior method to prosecute this action.

VI. The Court Should Direct Notice to the Class

Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e), class members are entitled to notice of any proposed

settlement before it is ultimately approved by the Court. Manual for Complex Litigation Third

(Federal Judicial Center, 1995) §30.212. "The notice must 'contain an adequate description of

the proceedings written in objective, neutral terms that, insofar as possible, may be understood

by the average absentee class member,"' McNamara, 214 F.R.D. at 432 (quoting In re Nissan

Motor

Corp.

Antitrust Litig.,

552

F.2d

1088,

1103

(5

1 h

Cir.

1977)),

and

"'must

contain

information that a reasonable person would consider to be material in making an informed,

intelligent decision of whether to opt out or remain a member of the class and be bound by the

final judgment."' !d. (quoting In re Nissan Motor Corp. Antitrust Litig., 552 F.2d at 11 05); see

also In re OCA, 2008 WL 4681368, *15. The Settlement Agreement provides for reasonable

notice to prospective Class Members in that it requires notice to be provided by mail, newspaper,

television, radio, and the Internet.

Under Rule 23(e) and the relevant due process considerations, adequate notice must be

given to all absent class members and potential class members to enable them to make an

intelligent choice as to whether to opt-out of the class. Prudential IL 148 F.3d at 326-27;

Valentino v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 97 F.3d 1227 (9th Cir. 1996). However, neither Rule 23 nor

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Case 5:07-cv-00928-FB Document 113 Filed 08/26/10 Page 37 of 40
due process considerations requires actual notice to every class member in every case, Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812 (1985), but simply call for "notice reasonably certain to reach most of those interested in objecting is likely to safeguard the interests of all." Id; In re
OCA, 2008 WL 4681369, *15 ("due process does not require actual notice to all class
members who may be bound by the litigation"). Nevertheless, the proposed notice plan has been developed with the thought of providing notice possible to "reach" all Class Members and in a form of notice that has been approved on several occasions by this and other Courts.
Counsel for the Settlement Class will obtain a last known address, date of birth, and social security number (if possible) for each Class Member. Notice will be provided to the Class by direct mailing of Class Notice and a Claim Form to all individuals at their last known or readily ascertainable address. There will be, in addition, publication notice, as described previously. Moreover, the Settlement Administrator will also provide a copy of the Class Notice and Claim Form to anyone who requests notice through written communication, through a dedicated internet website, and through a toll-free number to be established. Through these extensive efforts, absent Class Members will receive adequate notice of the Settlement. Finally, this Notice will include all necessary legal requirements and provide a comprehensive explanation of the Settlement in simple, non-legalistic terms.
VII. A FINAL FAIRNESS HEARING SHOULD BE SCHEDULED The Court should schedule a final fairness hearing approximately 120 days after the
Notice Date, to determine that class certification is proper and to approve the settlement. The fairness hearing will provide a forum to explain, describe or challenge the terms and conditions of the class certification and settlement, including the fairness, adequacy and reasonableness of
28

Case 5:07-cv-00928-FB Document 113 Filed 08/26/10 Page 38 of 40

the settlement. Accordingly, Plaintiffs request that the Court schedule the time, date, and place of the final fairness hearing. VIII. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court enter an Order: (1) preliminarily approving a class settlement with Defendant; (2) directing notice to Class members regarding settlement of certain claims against Defendant on a final and complete basis; and (3) scheduling a final fairness hearing.

Dated: August 26, 201 0

Respectfully submitted,
CUNEO GILBERT & LaDUCA, LLP 507 C Street NE Washington, DC 20002 Telephone: (202) 789-3960 Telecopier: (202) 789-1813
-&-
106-A South Columbus Street Alexandria, VA 22314 Telephone: (202) 789-3960 Telecopier: (202) 789-1813
/s/ Charles J. LaDuca By:
Charles J. LaDuca Alexandra C. Warren
Sam H. Lock Law Offices of Sam H. Lock 1011 S. Alamo San Antonio, TX 7821 0 Telephone: (21 0) 226-0965 Telecopier: (210) 226-7540
Elmer Robert Keach, III Law Offices of Elmer Robert Keach, III
29

Case 5:07-cv-00928-FB Document 113 Filed 08/26/10 Page 39 of 40
1040 Riverfront Center P.O. Box 70 Amsterdam, NY 12010 Telephone: (518) 434-1718 Telecopier: (518) 770-1558 Gary E. Mason Nicholas A. Migliaccio MasonLLP 1625 Massachusetts Avenue, NW Suite 605 Washington, DC 20036 Telephone: (202) 421-2290 Telecopier: (202) 429-2294 James C. Harrington Texas Civil Rights Project 1405 Montopolis Drive Austin, TX 78741 Telephone: (512) 474-5073 Telecopier: (512) 474-0726 Kerrisa Chelkowski, Esquire Law Office of Kerrisa Chelkowski 1011 South Alamo Street San Antonio, TX 7821 0 Telephone: (210) 228-9393 Telecopier: (210) 226-7450 ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFFS AND PROPOSED CLASS
30

Case 5:07-cv-00928-FB Document 113 Filed 08/26/10 Page 40 of 40

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
SAN ANTONIO DIVISION

JULIA ANN JACKSON, et al., Plaintiffs,
v. THE COUNTY OF BEXAR,
Defendant.

) ) ) ) ) CIVIL ACTION NO. SA-07-CA-928 ) ) ) )

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that on August 26, 2010, a copy of the foregoing Plaintiffs' Unopposed Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement was filed electronically. Notice of this filing will be sent to all parties by operation of the Court's electronic filing system. Parties may access this filing through the Court's system.

s/ Alexandra C. Warren
Alexandra C. Warren Cuneo Gilbert & LaDuca, LLP 507 C Street, NE Washington, DC 20002 Telephone: (202) 789-3960 Telecopier: (202) 789-1813 awarren@cuneolaw.com

 </s> Case 5:07-cv-00928-FB Document 116 Filed 10/13/10 Page 1 of 7
FtlED

JULIA ANN JACKSON, ERICA BERNAL, and MARTIN MARTINEZ Individually and on Behalf of a Class of Others Similarly Situated,
Plaintiffs,
v.
THE COUNTY OF BEXAR, Defendant.

§ § § § CIVIL ACTION NO. SA-07-CV-928 § § § § §

ORDER PRELIMINARILY APPROVING SETTLEMENT THIS MATTER having come before the Court on the Plaintiffs' Motion for Approval of the Settlement Agreement; and the parties having filed the Settlement Agreement executed 8/2 6/2 01 9 , as Exhibit A to the Motion for Approval of the Settlement Agreement in satisfaction of Rule 23(e)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; and the Court having reviewed and considered the terms and conditions of the proposed settlement as set forth in the Settlement Agreement; and the Court finding it has subject matter jurisdiction over this matter; and for good cause appearing that the terms and conditions set forth in the Settlement Agreement were the result of good faith, ann's length settlement negotiations between competent and experienced counsel for both Plaintiffs and Defendant, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AS FOLLOWS: 1. Capitalized terms used in this Order have the meanings assigned to them in the Settlement Agreement and this Order. 2. The terms of the parties' Settlement Agreement are hereby conditionally approved, subject to further consideration thereof at the Final Approval Hearing provided for below. The

Exhibit D- Preliminary Approval Order

Pagel

Case 5:07-cv-00928-FB Document 116 Filed 10/13/10 Page 2 of 7

Court finds that said settlement is sufficiently withln the range of reasonableness and that notice
of the proposed settlement should be given as provided in this Order.
3. Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 34, pending final approval by this Court of the Settlement
Agreement, the Court certifies the following settlement class:
All pre-trial detainees confined to the Bexar County Adult Detention Center between November 15, 2005 and April 9, 2009 who were subjected to a strip search before being sent to jail housing after being booked on misdemeanor or other minor charges. Specifically excluded from the class are pre-trial detainees who were subjected to strip search before being sent to jail housing after being booked on a felony charge, or a felony charge and misdemeanor charge.
The Court also certifies the following two settlement subclasses:
Subclass I: All persons in the Settlement Class, not in Subclass ll.
Subclass ll: All persons in the Settlement Class who were admitted on misdemeanor charges of narcotics, shoplifting and weapons violations. The misdemeanor offenses which qualify as those constituting charges of narcotics, shoplifting and weapons violations are defined by the parties in Exhibit G to this Settlement Agreement.
4. The Court approves the Class Notice of Settlement attached hereto as Exhibit A and the
Summary Notice for Publication attached hereto as Exhibit B. The Court also approves the
Notice Program as set forth in Section 4 of the Settlement Agreement.
5. If the Settlement Agreement is terminated or not consummated for any reason
whatsoever, the parties reserve all of their rights, including the right to continue with the
litigation pending at the time of the settlement should the Settlement Agreement not be
consummated.
6. Beginning no later than forty-five (45) days from the date of this Order Preliminarily
Approving Settlement (the commencement of which shall constitute the ''Notice Date"), Class
Counsel shall cause to be disseminated the notices, substantially in the fonn attached as Exhibits

Exhibit D- Preliminary Approval Order

Page2

Case 5:07-cv-00928-FB Document 116 Filed 10/13/10 Page 3 of 7

A and B hereto, in the manner set forth in Section 4 of the Settlement Agreement. Such Notice

Program will be completed expeditiously pursuant to the terms of the Settlement Agreement.

Settlement Class Members will have forty-five (45) days from the Notice Date to opt out or to

object) and one hundred and twenty (120) days from the Notice Date to file claims. At or before

the Final Approval Hearing, Plaintiff and/or the Claims Administrator shall serve and file a

sworn statement attesting to compliance with the required notice dissemination.

7. The notice to be provided as set forth in the Settlement Agreement as filed with the Court

is hereby found to be the best practicable means of providing notice under the circumstances and,

when completed, shall constitute due and sufficient notice of the proposed settlement and the

Final Approval Hearing to all persons and entities affected by and/or entitled to participate in the

settlement, in full compliance with the notice requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, due process, the

Constitution of the United States, the laws of Texas and all other applicable laws. The Notices

are accurate, objective, informative and provide Settlement Class Members with all of the

information necessary to make an informed decision regarding their participation in the

Settlement and its fairness.

8. Class Counsel is authorized to retain The Garden City Group as the Claims Administrator

and I Partners as the Website Administrator in accordance with the terms of the Settlement

Agreement and this Order.

Requests for Exclusion from the Settlement Class

9. Any member of the Settlement Class that wishes to be excluded ('~opt out") from the

Settlement Class must send a written Request for Exclusion to the Claims Administrator, so that

it is received by the Claims Administrator at the address indicated in the Notice on or before the

close of the opt out period. The Request for Exclusion shall fully comply with the requirements

Exhibit D- Preliminary Approval Order

Page3

Case 5:07-cv-00928-FB Document 116 Filed 10/13/10 Page 4 of 7

set forth in the Settlement Agreement. Members of the Settlement Class may not exclude themselves by filing Requests for Exclusion as a group or· class, but must in each instance individually and personally execute a Request for Exclusion and timely transmit it to the Claims Administrator. 10. Any member of the Settlement Class who does not properly and timely request exclusion from the Settlement Class shall be bound by all the tenns and provisions of the Settlement Agreement, whether or not such person objected to the Settlement and whether or not such person made a claim upon, or participated in, the Settlement Fund pursuant to the Settlement Agreement. The Final Approval Hearing 1L A hearing on final settlement approval (the "Final Approval Hearing") is hereby scheduled to be held before this Court on .Ian u a ry 12, 2o11 , at 10 o'clock a.m., to consider the fairness~ the reasonableness, and adequacy of the proposed settlement, the dismissal with prejudice of this class action with respect to the Released Parties that are Defendants herein, and the entry of final judgment in this class action. Class Counsel's application for award of attorney's fees and costs shall be heard at the time of the Final Approval Hearing. 12. The date and time of the Final Approval Hearing shall be set forth in the Notice, but the Final Approval Hearing shall be subject to adjournment by the Court without further notice to the members of the Settlement Class other than that which may be posted by the Court. Class Counsel will advise members of the Settlement Class of any scheduling issues by way of the settlement website.

Exhibit D- Preliminary Approval Order

Page4

Case 5:07-cv-00928-FB Document 116 Filed 10/13/10 Page 5 of 7

13. Any person or entity that does not elect to be excluded from the Settlement Class may, but need not, enter an appearance through his or her own attorney. Settlement Class Members who do not enter an appearance through their own attorneys will be represented by Class Counsel. 14. Any person who does not elect to be excluded from the Settlement Class may, but need not, submit comments or objections to the proposed Settlement. Any Settlement Class Member may object to the proposed Settlement, entry of Final Order and Judgment approving the settlement, and Class Counsers application for fees and expenses by serving a written objection. 15. Any Settlement Class Member making the objection (an "objector") must sign the objection personally. An objection must state why the objector objects to the proposed Settlement and provide the basis to support such position. If an objector intends to appear personally at the Final Approval Hearing, the objector must include with the objection a notice of the objector's intent to appear at the hearing. 16. Objections, along with any notices of intent to appear, must be filed no later than fortyfive (45) days from the Notice Date. If counsel is appearing on behalf of more than one Settlement Class Member, counsel must identify each such Settlement Class Member and each Settlement Class Member must have complied with the requirements of this Order. These documents must be filed with the Clerk of the Court at the following address:
Mr. William G. Putnicki, U.S. District Clerk U.S. District Clerk1s Office 655 East Durango Blvd., Room G65 San Antonio, Texas 78206 17. Objections, along with any notices of intent to appear, must also be mailed to Class Counsel and counsel for Defendant at the address listed below:

Exhibit D- Preliminary Approval Order

PageS

Case 5:07-cv-00928-FB Document 116 Filed 10/13/10 Page 6 of 7

CLASS COUNSEL:

Mr. Charles J. LaDuca Cuneo Gilbert & LaDuca, LLP 507 C Street, NE Wasbington, DC 20002

DEFENSE COUNSEL:

Mr. Laurence S. Kurth Clark Thomas & Winters, PC 2632 Broadway, 401 S SanAntonio, Texas 78215

18. Only Settlement Class Members who have filed and served valid and timely notices of

objection shall be entitled to be heard at the Final Approval Hearing. Any Settlement Class

Member who does not .timely file and serve an objection in writing to the Settlement, entry of

Final Judgment, or to Class Counsel's application for fees, costs, and expenses, in accordance

with the procedure set forth in the Class Notice and mandated in this Order, shall be deemed to

have waived any such objection by appeal, collateral attack, or otherwise.

19. Persons wishing to be heard at the Final Approval Hearing are required to file written

comments or objections and indicate in their written comments or objections their intention to

appear at the Final Approval Hearing. Settlement Class members need not appear at the hearing

or take any other action to indicate their approval.

20. All members of the Settlement Class who do not personally and timely request to be

excluded from the Class are enjoined from proceeding against the Defendants for the claims

made in the Complaint.

Other Provisions

21. Upon approval of the settlement provided for in this Settlement Agreement, each and

every time period and provision thereof shall be deemed incorporated herein as if expressly set

Exhibit D- Preliminary Approval Order

Page6

Case 5:07-cv-00928-FB Document 116 Filed 10/13/10 Page 7 of 7
forth and shall have the full force and effect of an Order of this Court. 22. All reasonable costs incurred in notifying members of the Settlement Class, as well as administering the Settlement Agreement, shall be paid as set forth in the Settlement Agreement. 23. Defendant is hereby ORDERED to disclose the personal infonnation of Class Members, to the extent necessary, including known address, dates of birth and social security numbers, to Class Counsel and the Claims Administrator, in order to facilitate the identification of Class Members for purposes ofmailing notice and assessing the validity of claims.
IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: 0 ct obe r 1 3 , 2 01 0

Exhibit D- Preliminary Approval Order

Page7

 </s> Case 5:07-cv-00928-FB Document 63 Filed 04/02/09 Page 1 of 11

FILED IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

SAN ANTONIO DIVISION ... . APR . . 2 2009

JULIA ANN JACKSON, ERICA

)

~~~Rrsk'b W.S. Ul T"IC1' COUXRA~

IY lllJ nN 01

T OF TE ...,

BERNAL, and MARTIN MARTINEZ )

Individually and on Behalf of a Class )

of Others Similarly Situated,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

) SA-07-CV-928-FB

v.

)

)

THE COUNTY OF BEXAR,

)

)

Defendant.

)

CONSENT DECREE On November 15, 2007, Plaintiffs filed their Class Action Complaint (hereafter "Complaint").1 Plaintiffs and Defendant have consented to the entry of final judgment on the claim for permanent injunctive relief pleaded as the Third Cause of Action of the Complaint (hereafter "Claim for Injunctive RelieP'), without demanding or requiring the adjudication of any issue of fact or law, pursuant to the terms of this Consent Decree. The parties have also consented to the entry of the Judgment that accompanies this Consent Decree. It is hereby agreed upon by the parties, and ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED by the Court, as follows:
Jurisdiction and Background 1. The court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this case and the Defendant.

1 The complaint was subsequently amended on August 6, 2008 to add additional proposed class representatives.
1

Case 5:07-cv-00928-FB Document 63 Filed 04/02/09 Page 2 of 11
2. This Consent Decree is in full and final resolution of Plaintiffs' Claim for Injunctive Relief.
3. The Court has determined, pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, that it is appropriate to enter judgment on less than all of Plaintiffs' claims and that there is no just reason for delaying the entry of judgment on Plaintiffs' Claim for Injunctive Relief.
4. The above-named parties, without conceding any defects in their claims or defenses, have determined that resolution of Plaintiffs' Claim for Injunctive Relief on the terms and conditions set forth in this Consent Decree is in the best interests of all parties to this action and the members of the putative Class on whose behalf this case has been brought.
5. Nothing in this Consent Decree shall be construed as an admission by Defendants of a violation of any provision of the United States Constitution, any statute, or otherwise. The parties further agree the Consent Decree, the revised Bexar County Jail Strip Search Policy attached as Exhibit "A", and Bexar County's changes of its strip search policy shall not be admissible to prove Defendants' liability with respect to allegations made in this lawsuit.
6. This consent Decree shall be final and binding upon its approval and entry in the docket.
7. The Court has fully examined the terms of this consent Decree and finds that they are in accordance with law, appropriate, fair, and just and proper, and in furtherance ofthe public interest.
2

Case 5:07-cv-00928-FB Document 63 Filed 04/02/09 Page 3 of 11
Conduct Enjoined
8. Defendant, and its officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys,
and those persons in active concert or participation with them who receive actual notice
of this Consent Decree by personal service or otherwise (collectively "Defendant"), are
hereby PERMANETLY ENJOINED AND RESTRAINED, until further order of the
court, as follow:
a. Defendant shall not allow, authorize, conduct or sanction the strip search or visual cavity search of persons who are placed into the custody of the Bexar County Jail after being charged with misdemeanors absent reasonable suspicion that such individual is concealing contraband. See revised Bexar County Adult Detention Center Strip Search Policy attached as Exhibit "A".
b. Defendant shall promptly take all necessary and proper actions to ensure that all corrections officers and other personnel of the Bexar County jail responsible for the administration, operation, or supervision of the Jail are fully notified of, the terms of this Consent Decree; shall distribute Exhibit A to all corrections officers and other personnel of the Bexar County Jail responsible for the administration, operation or supervision of the Jail within one week of the entry of this Consent Decree; shall provide proper training to all Bexar County Jail corrections officers with respect to the obligations imposed by this Consent Decree and Exhibit A within 60 days of the entry of this Consent Decree; shall incorporate this training into the basic training of corrections officers and all staff of the Bexar County Jail~ as well as into the Jail's in-service training programs on an annual basis and that all such corrections officers and other personnel otherwise abide by this Consent Decree.
c. Bexar County shall provide Plaintiffs' Counsel with a detailed report of their implementation of the Consent Decree on an annual basis until final adjudication of this case.
9. Plaintiffs reserve the right to petition the Court to order, and the Court
reserves the right to order, any additional and specific relief that may be necessary to
carry out the terms of this Consent Decree, including the establishment and
administration of a special training program for corrections officers; and the imposition
ofrecordkeeping, supervisory, and other requirements.
3

Case 5:07-cv-00928-FB Document 63 Filed 04/02/09 Page 4 of 11
Resolution of Disputes and Retention of Jurisdiction 10.. The parties to this consent Decree shall confer in good faith in an attempt to resolve any dispute arising under the terms before seeking the Court's intervention. 11. Jurisdiction is retained for the purpose of allowing any of the parties hereto to apply to the Court at any time until fmal adjudication for such further orders and directions as may be necessary or appropriate to carry out or construe this Consent Decree; to modify or tenninate any of its provisions; or to enforce compliance with it, including by contempt.
Plaintiffs' Claim for Damages and Attorneys' Fees 12. Nothing in this Consent Decree addresses or resolves Plaintiffs' claims for compensatory damages, punitive damages, or any relief sought in the Complaint other than permanent injunctive relief. 13. Plaintiffs reserve the right to move the court for an award of attorneys' fees and costs at or before the conclusion of this case. Plaintiff need not move the Court for an award of attorneys' fees within 14 days of the entry of judgment on Plaintiffs' Claim for Injunctive Relief, as Fed.RCiv.P. 54(d)(2)(A) would otherwise require. 14. The parties reserve the right to petition the Court to incorporate this Consent Decree into any other that may be entered disposing of the claims not addressed by this Consent Decree. 15. The parties agree that mandatory venue for any future claims, suits, or disputes relating to this Consent Decree or the amended policy attached as Exhibit "A" is the United States District Court in the Western District of Texas San Antonio Division.
4

Case 5:07-cv-00928-FB Document 63 Filed 04/02/09 Page 5 of 11
16. The Defendant is given thirty (30) days from the Court,s signature to implement the provisions of the Bexar County Jail Strip Search Policy attached as Exhibit HA."
It is so ORDERED
d.-
SIGNED April ;;).., 2009
DBIERY UNITED STATES D
By and through their undersigned counsel, the parties consent to the entry of this Consent Decree:
Counsel for Defendant
AGREED
{2Ji;~
Mr. Charles J. LaDuca Counsel for Plaintiffs
5

Case 5:07-cv-00928-FB Document 63 Filed 04/02/09 Page 6 of 11
.EXHIBIT A

Case 5:07-cv-00928-FB Document 63 Filed 04/02/09 Page 7 of 11

Bexar County Sberifrs Offh:e Detention Division
Manual of PoUcy and Procedures Chapter 9: Security and Control
Reviewed by:

BC No: 900.08-02

Page 1 of' 3

TCJS: 265.2 (b)

Date: 11-01-89, 04-23-98 Revised: 03-20~09

Subject: Strip Search

Approved for Implementation:

Debra A. Jordan Deputy Chief, Support Services

Roger DovaUna Deputy Chief, Jail Administrator

I.

POLICY: The Bexar County Sheriffs Office (BCSO) desires to maintain and operate a safe and secure detention facility to

ensure the welfare of inmates and staff. Strip Searches will not be conducted for harassment or punishment, but rather to

detect, reduce and prevent the introduction of weapons or contraband inside the Bexar County Adult Detention Center

(BCADC) system. When detention staff have reasonable suspicion, as defmed in Part l1IB below, inmates should undergo a

thorough strip search for weapons and contraband which may pose a threat to the security and safety of the detention facility.

n. PURPOSE: This policy provides guidelines for officers of the BCSO regarding Strip Searches of inmates upon initial intake
and subsequently in the custody ofthe BCADC system.

III. DEFINITIONS:

A. Strip Search: In a strip search the inmate is required to remove all clothing. An officer will then visually inspect the inmate's nude body, including the outer areas of orifices and cavities. All clothing items of the inmate shall also be searched thoroughly in the process. Strip searches shall be conducted in a suitably private area by an officer of the same sex as the inmate.

B. Reasonable Suspicion: An officer's rational belief, based on creditable and articulate information and circumstances, that an offense may have occurred or that a particular person may have committed an offense (carrying or concealing contraband). (Bexar County Sheriff's Manual of Policy and Procedures, Chapter 28)

IV. CRITERIA FOR STRIP SEARCHES (Booking Intake Process): Inmates that have been arrested but not yet assigned or moved to housing in the BCADC, may be subject to a strip search ONLY after the authorization from the Section Sergeant and when there is reasonable suspicion to believe that the inmate possesses weapons, drugs or other contraband. With regard to inmates being processed in the Intake/Release Section, reasonable suspicion of possession of contraband must be detennined on a case-by-case basis. Reasonable suspicion shall not be based on race, ethnic origin, gender, or other subjective factors which indicate prejudice or an irrational predisposition to suspect persons solely as a result of their being a part of an otherwise legitimate organization or group.

A. Reasonable suspicion can be based on information available to the searching officer including, but not limited to:

1. Current charges or previous convictions involving escape, drugs, weapons, or violence. 2. History of possession of contraband or prohibited property while in custody. 3. Institutional history of escape attempts. 4. Contact with the public or exposure to public areas or transport to the hospital after arrest and before
entering the custody of the Detention Center. 5. Refusal or resistance to being frisk (Pat Down) searched (BC No: 900.08-1, Frisk Search). 6. Discovery of weapons or drugs during the frisk search. 7. Alerted by electronic detection devices. 8. Furtive movements, behavior or gestures that raise reasonable suspicion that the inmate is attempting to
conceal contraband on his/her person. 9. Receipt of other reliable information that the arrestee may be in possession of weapons or drugs.

B. ELECTRONIC DETECTION DEVICES: Any electronic control detection device (i.e. Hand-Held Metal Detectors
and Body Orifice Security Scanners, B.O.S.S.) may be used to detect contraband as deemed necessary by the Intake
. /Release Section Sergeant/Supervisor.

C. Written JUSTIFICATION for a strip search !I!!!! be documented on a Facility Incident Report (FIR) and in a Strip
Search Authorization Log Book located in the Booking (Intake/Release) Section.

1. Facility Incident Report shall include:

Case 5:07-cv-00928-FB Document 63 Filed 04/02/09 Page 8 of 11

BC No: 900.08-02

Revised: 03-20-09 Page 2 of3

a.

Officers must be able to articulate not only which factors were relied upon, but should also

indicate how and why the factor(s) create the requisite level of suspicion, if not obvious.

b.

The Section Sergeant's name that gave the authorization or denied it.

c.

The date, approximate time, inmates name and SID number shall be annotated.

2.

Strip Search Authorization Log Book shall include:

a.

The FIR assignment number, date, approximate time, inmates name and SID number shall be

annotated.

b.

The Section Sergeant shall acknowledge the search with their signature of approval

c.

The log book shall be monitored and reviewed by the Senior Captain of Security Operations.

D. Pending authorization, the inmate should be isolated.

E. When contraband is discovered on an inmate as a result of a strip search, the Intake/Release Section Sergeant/Supervisor and Shift Supervisor shall be immediately notified and the appropriate reports shall be prepared
in accordance with (BC No: 900.22, Incident Report Processing).

F.

If contraband is suspected or discovered inside an inmate's body cavity the inspecting officer shall not touch the

inmate in order to obtain the suspected contraband. The officer shall innnediately notify the Intake/Release Section

Sergeant/Supervisor to request a body cavity search by medical staff. (BC No: 900.08-03, Body Cavity Search)

G. Upon completion of the strip search, a systematic inspection of all clothing removed by the inmate shall be conducted by the officer. Inspect the seams, folds and pockets on all clothing. As each item is inspected relinquish
the item back to the inmate.

H. The strip searches shall be conducted in a reasonable and dignified manner and place. All officers shall make sure the search is conducted out of the view of other iwnates or non-authorized staff. The privacy partitions provided in the clothing room areas (Main Jail and Annex) shall be utilized. Officer(s) will direct one inmate per stall in order to perform the searches in the least offensive manner possible. Iwnates who are not subject to be strip searched will
be allowed to change clothes behind a privacy shield.

V. CRITERIA FOR STRIP SEARCHES OF INMATES HOUSED IN THE BCADC SYSTEM:

A. Circumstances in which inmates in custody may be subject to strip searches include the following:

1.

After the inmate has been in contact with the public or upon re-entry into the facility. (i.e. Work Release

Program inmates, Inmate Workers, inmates returning from outside medical appointments, funeral viewings

Volunteers, MATCHIPATCH Program inmates.)

2.

After the inmate has had access to tools, cleaning equipment, medical instruments, or kitchen utensils

within the facility. (i.e. Inmate Workers assigned to the kitchen, laundry, jail industries, medical sections,

booking, and other areas of the facility.)

3. On discovery of contraband in the inmate's cell or living area.

4. On refusal of a less intrusive search.

5. After inmate involvement in a serious incident in the facility.

6.

On placement in segregation for disciplinary reasons or for the inmate's protection.

7.

During Contraband, Health and Sanitation Inspections.

8.

On receipt ofreliable information that the inmate may possess contraband.

B. When minor contraband (which does not seriously threaten facility security or the safety of others) is discovered on an inmate as a result of a strip search, the Section Sergeant/Supervisor shall be immediately notified and the
appropriate reports shall be prepared in accordance with policy.

C. When major contraband (which seriously threatens facility security or the safety of others) is discovered on an inmate as a result of a strip search, the Section Sergeant/Supervisor and Shift Supervisor shall be immediately
notified and the appropriate reports shall be prepared in accordance with policy.

Case 5:07-cv-00928-FB Document 63 Filed 04/02/09 Page 9 of 11
BC No: 900.08-02
D. If contraband is suspected or discovered inside an inmate's body cavity the inspecting officer shall not touch the inmate in order to obtain the suspected contraband. The officer shall immediately notifY the Section Sergeant/Supervisor to request a body cavity search by medical staff. (BC No: 900,08-03, Body Cavity Search)
E. Before and after the strip search, officers shall permit inmates to wear underwear unless it is suspected that the inmate is in possession of contraband or ifcontraband in the nature of drugs, instruments for administration of drugs or a weapon is found in their cell or area of confmement.
F. Upon completion of the strip search, a systematic inspection of all clothing removed by the inmate shall be conducted by the officer. Inspect the seams, folds and pockets on all clothing. As each item is inspected relinquish the item back to the inmate.

Case 5:07-cv-00928-FB Document 63 Filed 04/02/09 Page 10 of 11

Post Order No:
Post Affected: Main Jail and Annex Facilities

Bexar County Sberifrs Office Adult Detention Center System
By Order of:

Roger Dovalina Chief Deputy, Jail Administrator Post: All Uniform Detention Staff (Strip Search Guidelines)

.Page 1 of 1 Date: 3-20-09 Revised:

L

General guidelines for all BCSO uniform detention staff regarding Strip Searches of inmates upon initial intake and

subsequently in the custody of the Bexar County Adult Detention Center (BCADC) System. Strip searches at the

Bexar County Adult Detention Facility will be conducted on the basis of reasonable suspicion, as defmed in BCNo:

900.08-02, Strip Searches.

A. All strip searches shall be conducted by officers of the same gender in a dignified, efficient and professional manner.

1. Officers should maintain a safe distance and position themselves in order to observe all areas of

the body.

2. Verbal instructions shall be constantly given to the imnate, enabling staff to ensure the inspection

is thorough and efficient without the requirement of touch.

3. Instruct the inmate to remove all clothing on their person (outerwear and undergarments).

4.

Instruct the inmate to lower their head and run their fmgers through their hair.

5.

Inspect the inside of the inmate's mouth. Ask the inmate to lift their tongue.

6.

Inspect the inside and behind the inmate's ears.

7.

Instruct the inmate to lift their arms to check their armpits and any body folds of skin.

8. Gender specific:

1. Strip searches for males:

a.

Instruct the inmate to lift his testicles. Visually inspect them.

b.

If the inmate is uncircumcised instruct him to pull back the foreskin of his penis.

c.

Instruct the inmate to turn around not facing you and to bend at the waist and

spread his buttocks with his hands. Visually inspect the anus.

d. Instruct the inmate to lift their feet one at a time in order to check the bottom of

their feet and between their toes.

2. Strip searches for females (generally the procedures for searching females are the same as males with the fo11owing exceptions):

a.

Instruct the inmate to lift her breast. Visually inspect them.

b. Instruct the inmate to remove tampon, ifpresent and visually inspect.

B. Booking Intake strip searches shall be conducted by utilizing the privacy partitions provided in the clothing room areas (Main Jail and Annex). Officer(s) will direct one inmate per stall in order to perform the searches in the least offensive manner possible.
C. When contraband is discovered on an inmate as a result of a strip search, the Section Sergeant/Supervisor and Shift Supervisor shall be immediately notified according with (BC No: 900.08-02, Strip Search) and the appropriate reports shall be prepared in accordance with (BC No: 900.22, Incident Report Processing).

D. If contraband is suspected or found inside an inmate's body cavity the inspecting officer shall not touch the inmate in order to obtain the suspected contraband. The officer shall inunediately notify the Section Sergeant/Supervisor to request a body cavity search by medical staff. (BC No: 900.08-3, Body Cavity Search)

Case 5:07-cv-00928-FB Document 63 Filed 04/02/09 Page 11 of 11
E. Upon completion of the strip search, a systematic inspection of all clothing removed by the inmate shall be conducted by the officer. Inspect the seams, folds and pockets on all clothing. As each item is inspected relinquish the item back to the inmate.
F. Inmates who are not subject to be strip searched will be allowed to change clothes behind a privacy shield.

 </s> Case: 5:07-cv-928 As of: 03/13/2017 10:50 AM CDT 1 of 15
U.S. District Court [LIVE] Western District of Texas (San Antonio) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 5:07−cv−00928−FB

STAYED

Jackson v. The County of Bexar Assigned to: Judge Fred Biery Case in other court: 5CCA, 11−50147 Cause: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act
Plaintiff
Julia Ann Jackson individually and on behalf of others similarly situated

Date Filed: 11/15/2007 Date Terminated: 01/12/2011 Jury Demand: Plaintiff Nature of Suit: 440 Civil Rights: Other Jurisdiction: Federal Question
represented by Alexander E. Barnett 144 W. 72nd Street #3D New York, NY 10023 212−362−6174 Fax: 917−591−5227 Email: abarnett20@hotmail.com TERMINATED: 05/27/2009 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Alexandra C. Warren Cuneo Gilbert & LaDuca LLP 106−A S. Columbus Street Alexandria, VA 22314 202−789−3960 Fax: 202−789−1813 Email: awarren@cuneolaw.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Charles J. LaDuca Cuneo Gilbert & LaDuca, LLP 4725 Wisconsin Avenue NW Suite 200 Washington, DC 20016 202−789−3960 Fax: 202−789−1813 Email: charlesl@cuneolaw.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Elmer Robert Keach , III Law Offices of Elmer Robert Keach, III, PC 1040 Riverfront Center P.O. Box 70 Amsterdam, NY 12010 518−434−1718 Fax: 518−770−1558 Email: bobkeach@keachlawfirm.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Gary E. Mason Whitfield Bryson & Mason LLP 1625 Massachusetts Avenue, NW Suite 605 Washington, DC 20036 (202) 429−2290 Fax: 202/429−2294 Email: gmason@wbmllp.com

Case: 5:07-cv-928 As of: 03/13/2017 10:50 AM CDT 2 of 15

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James C. Harrington 1405 Montopolis Drive Austin, TX 78741 (512) 771−1759 Email: jch@utexas.edu LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kerrisa Chelkowski Law Office of Kerrisa Chelkowski 1017 South Alamo San Antonio, TX 78210 (210) 228−9393 Fax: (210) 226−7540 Email: kerrisa@defendtexas.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Nicholas A. Migliaccio Whitfield Bryson & Mason LLP 1625 Massachusetts Avenue, NW Suite 605 Washington, DC 20036 202−429−2290 Fax: 202−429−2294 Email: nmigliaccio@wbmllp.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

R. Brent Walton Cuneo Gilbert & LaDuca, LLP 507 C Street NE Washington, DC 20002 202−789−3960 Fax: 202−789−1813 Email: bwalton@cuneolaw.com TERMINATED: 03/24/2010 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sam Howard Lock Law Office of Sam H. Lock 1017 S. Alamo St. San Antonio, TX 78210 (210) 226−0965 Fax: (210) 226−7540 Email: sam@locklawfirm.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Erica Bernal

represented by Alexandra C. Warren (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Charles J. LaDuca (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 5:07-cv-928 As of: 03/13/2017 10:50 AM CDT 3 of 15

Elmer Robert Keach , III (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Gary E. Mason (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sam Howard Lock (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Martin Martinez

represented by Alexandra C. Warren (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Charles J. LaDuca (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Elmer Robert Keach , III (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Gary E. Mason (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sam Howard Lock (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V. Defendant The County of Bexar

represented by Laurence S. Kurth Akerman LLP The Weston Centre 112 E. Pecan, Suite 2750 San Antonio, TX 78205 (210) 582−0220 Fax: (210) 582−0231 Email: laurence.kurth@akerman.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lori W. Hanson Akerman LLP The Weston Centre 112 E. Pecan, Suite 2750 San Antonio, TX 78205 (210) 582−0220 Fax: 210/582−0231 Email: lori.hanson@akerman.com

Case: 5:07-cv-928 As of: 03/13/2017 10:50 AM CDT 4 of 15

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sue Ann Gregory McKamie Krueger LLP 941 Proton Road San Antonio, TX 78258 (210) 546−2122 Fax: 210/546−2130 Email: sue@mckamiekrueger.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

William P. Johnson Duggins Wren Mann & Romero, LLP P.O. Box 1149 Austin, TX 78767 (512) 744−9300 Fax: (512) 744−9399 Email: bjohnson@dwmrlaw.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Movant Sterling Allen, Jr.

represented by Sterling Allen, Jr. #10228−03 Guadalupe County Adult Detention Center 2615 N. Guadalupe St. Seguin, TX 78155 PRO SE

Movant Virginia Cooks

represented by Jason J. Thompson The Thompson Law Firm 10107 McAllister Fwy San Antonio, TX 78216 United Sta (210) 410−4077 Fax: (855)410−4077 Email: Jason@JJThompsonLaw.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Movant Ronald Fuller

represented by Ronald Fuller 4227 Algruth Dr. San Antonio, TX 78220 PRO SE

Movant Attorney General of Texas

represented by Randolph V. Gonzalez Attorney General of Texas Child Support Division 106 S. St. Mary's Street, Suite 445 San Antonio, TX 78240 (210)804−6416 Fax: 210/930−3625 Email: randolph.gonzalez@texasattorneygeneral.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Movant

Case: 5:07-cv-928 As of: 03/13/2017 10:50 AM CDT 5 of 15

Pete O. Torres, Jr.

represented by Pete O. Torres, Jr. #1653285 H7−06 Bartlett State Jail 1018 Arnold Dr. Bartlett, TX 76511 PRO SE

Movant Emilio Martinez

represented by Emilio Martinez #635040 Byrd Unit 21 FM 247 Huntsville, TX 77320 PRO SE

Date Filed 11/15/2007 11/15/2007
11/15/2007 11/19/2007 11/19/2007 11/19/2007 11/20/2007 11/26/2007 12/07/2007 12/10/2007 12/10/2007 12/11/2007 12/12/2007
12/12/2007
12/13/2007 12/13/2007

# Docket Text
If ordered by the court, all referrals will be assigned to Magistrate Judge Primomo (ga) (Entered: 11/15/2007)
1 COMPLAINT ( Filing fee $ 350 receipt number 20938), filed by Julia Ann Jackson. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A and # 2 Civil Cover Sheet plus receipt)(ga) (Entered: 11/15/2007)
2 Summons Issued as to The County of Bexar. (ga) (Entered: 11/15/2007)
3 MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice by Charles J. LaDuca by on behalf of Julia Ann Jackson. (Attachments: # 1 proposed order)(rf) (Entered: 11/19/2007)
4 MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice by Alexandra C. Warren by on behalf of Julia Ann Jackson. (Attachments: # 1 proposed order)(rf) (Entered: 11/19/2007)
5 Pro Hac Vice Fee Paid by Charles J. LaDuca; Filing fee $ 25, receipt number 209427. (ga) (Entered: 11/20/2007)
6 Pro Hac Vice Fee Paid by Alexandra C. Warren; Filing fee $ 25, receipt number 209428. (ga) (Entered: 11/20/2007)
7 Letter/Correspondence to Attorney Gary E. Mason regarding admission status. (ga) (Entered: 11/26/2007)
8 MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice by R. Brent Walton by on behalf of Julia Ann Jackson. (Attachments: # 1 proposed order)(rf) (Entered: 12/07/2007)
9 ANSWER to Complaint by The County of Bexar.(rf) (Entered: 12/10/2007)
10 NOTICE of Vacation by The County of Bexar (Gregory, Sue) (Entered: 12/10/2007)
11 Pro Hac Vice Fee Paid by R. Brent Walton; Filing fee $ 25, receipt number 209727. (pjr, ) (Entered: 12/11/2007)
12 ORDER for Scheduling Recommendations And Advisory Concerning Assignment of Magistrate Judge. The Parties shall submit a proposed scheduling order to the Court within sixty (60) days after the appearance of any defendant., Notice of right to consent to disposition of a civil case by a U.S. Magistrate Judge. Signed by Judge Fred Biery. (rf) (Entered: 12/12/2007)
13 ORDER granting 3 Motion to Appear Pro Hac Vice; granting 4 Motion to Appear Pro Hac Vice; granting 8 Motion to Appear Pro Hac Vice. Signed by Judge Fred Biery. (rf) (Entered: 12/12/2007)
14 MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice by Alexander E. Barnett by on behalf of Julia Ann Jackson. (rf) (Entered: 12/13/2007)
15 MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice by Gary E. Mason by on behalf of Julia Ann Jackson. (rf) (Entered: 12/13/2007)

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12/13/2007 12/13/2007 12/14/2007 12/14/2007 12/14/2007 12/17/2007 01/02/2008 01/02/2008 01/04/2008 01/08/2008 01/18/2008 01/18/2008 02/06/2008
02/12/2008
02/14/2008 02/15/2008 02/15/2008 02/15/2008 02/20/2008 02/20/2008

16 MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice by Nicholas A. Migliaccio by on behalf of Julia Ann Jackson. (rf) (Entered: 12/13/2007)
17 Pro Hac Vice Fee Paid by Alexander E. Barnett, Gary E. Mason, Nicholas A. Migliaccio; Filing fee $ 75. (rf) (Entered: 12/13/2007)
19 Pro Hac Vice Fee Paid by Gary E. Mason; Filing fee $ 25, receipt number 209811. (ep, ) (Entered: 12/17/2007)
20 Pro Hac Vice Fee Paid by Alexander E. Barnett; Filing fee $ 25, receipt number 209812. (ep, ) (Entered: 12/17/2007)
21 Pro Hac Vice Fee Paid by Nicholas A. Migliaccio; Filing fee $ 25, receipt number 209813. (ep, ) (Entered: 12/17/2007)
18 ORDER granting 14 Motion to Appear Pro Hac Vice; granting 15 Motion to Appear Pro Hac Vice; granting 16 Motion to Appear Pro Hac Vice. Signed by Judge Fred Biery. (rf) (Entered: 12/17/2007)
22 MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice by Elmer Robert Keach, III on behalf of Julia Ann Jackson. (Warren, Alexandra) Modified on 1/2/2008, to reflect correct counsel (rf). (Entered: 01/02/2008)
Notice of Correction: **NOTIFIED COUNSEL OF MODIFICATION OF TEXT TO REFLECT PROPOER COUNSEL FILING MOTION**** re 22 MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice by Alexandra C. Warren. (rf) (Entered: 01/02/2008)
23 ORDER granting 22 Motion of Robert Keach, III, to Appear Pro Hac Vice. Signed by Judge Fred Biery. (rf) (Entered: 01/04/2008)
24 Pro Hac Vice Fee Paid by Elmer Robert Keach, III; Filing fee $ 25 recvd. 1/7/08, receipt number 210105. (ga) (Entered: 01/08/2008)
25 Scheduling Recommendations by Julia Ann Jackson, The County of Bexar. (Warren, Alexandra) Modified on 1/18/2008, to add filer (rf). (Entered: 01/18/2008)
Notice of Correction: ***NOTIFIED COUNSEL OF ADDITION OF FILER − The County of Bexar***** re 25 Scheduling Recommendations/Proposed Scheduling Order. (rf) (Entered: 01/18/2008)
26 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 12 Order for Scheduling Recommendations/Proposed Scheduling Order, Notice of Right to Consent to Magistrate Trial,, by The County of Bexar. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Gregory, Sue) (Entered: 02/06/2008)
27 ORDER dismissing as moot 25 Scheduling Recommendations/Proposed Scheduling Order ( Scheduling Recommendations/Proposed Scheduling Order due by 2/15/2008.), granting 26 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time. Signed by Judge Fred Biery. (rf) (Entered: 02/12/2008)
28 NOTICE of Attorney Appearance by Laurence S. Kurth on behalf of The County of Bexar (Kurth, Laurence) (Entered: 02/14/2008)
29 Scheduling Recommendations of All Parties by The County of Bexar, Julia Ann Jackson. (Kurth, Laurence) Modified on 2/15/2008, to add filer (rf). (Entered: 02/15/2008)
Notice of Correction: ***NOTIFIED COUNSEL OF ADDITION OF FILER − Julia Ann Jackson***** re 29 Scheduling Recommendations/Proposed Scheduling Order. (rf) (Entered: 02/15/2008)
30 NOTICE of Attorney Appearance by Lori W. Hanson on behalf of The County of Bexar (Hanson, Lori) (Entered: 02/15/2008)
31 CLASS CERTIFICATION SCHEDULING ORDER AND RELATED ORDERS OF THE COURT: ADR Report Deadline due by 4/24/2008. Discovery due by 9/2/2008.. Signed by Judge Fred Biery. (rg1, ) (Entered: 02/20/2008)
32 Court Advisory Concerning Discovery. Signed by Judge Fred Biery. (rg1, ) (Entered: 02/20/2008)

Case: 5:07-cv-928 As of: 03/13/2017 10:50 AM CDT 7 of 15

03/14/2008
03/14/2008
03/17/2008 03/25/2008 04/23/2008 04/24/2008 04/30/2008
04/30/2008
04/30/2008 06/02/2008
06/03/2008 06/05/2008 08/06/2008 08/06/2008 09/03/2008 09/15/2008 09/22/2008
09/25/2008 09/29/2008
10/08/2008 10/17/2008 12/01/2008

33 ***DOCUMENT IS DEFICIENT − CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE IS REQUIRED**** NOTICE Change of Firm Affiliation by Julia Ann Jackson (Barnett, Alexander) Modified on 3/14/2008, to designate deficiency (rf). (Entered: 03/14/2008)
34 DEFICIENCY NOTICE: ***NOTIFIED COUNSEL THAT DOCUMENT IS DEFICIENT − A CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE IS REQUIRED**** re 33 Notice (Other) (rf) (Entered: 03/14/2008)
35 NOTICE Change of Firm Affiliation by Julia Ann Jackson (Barnett, Alexander) (Entered: 03/17/2008)
36 NOTICE of Vacation by The County of Bexar (Gregory, Sue) (Entered: 03/25/2008)
37 ADR Report Filed − by The County of Bexar(Kurth, Laurence) (Entered: 04/23/2008)
38 ADR Report Filed − by Julia Ann Jackson(Warren, Alexandra) (Entered: 04/24/2008)
39 ****DOCUMENT IS DEFICIENT − INCORRECT CASE STYLE AND CASE NUMBER IS REFLECTED*****NOTICE of Change of Firm Affiliation and Change of Address for Alexander E. Barnett by Julia Ann Jackson (Barnett, Alexander) Modified on 4/30/2008, to designate deficiency (rf). (Entered: 04/30/2008)
40 DEFICIENCY NOTICE:****NOTIFIED COUNSEL THAT DOCUMENT IS DEFICIENT − INCORRECT CASE STYLE AND CASE NUMBER IS REFLECTED******re 39 Notice (Other) (rf) (Entered: 04/30/2008)
41 NOTICE Corrected Notice of Change of Firm Affiliation and Change of Address for Alexander E. Barnett by Julia Ann Jackson (Barnett, Alexander) (Entered: 04/30/2008)
42 * MOTION to Intervene Two Additional Named Plaintiffs and Proposed Class Representatives by Julia Ann Jackson. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order, # 2 Brief)(Warren, Alexandra) (Entered: 06/02/2008)
43 DEFICIENCY NOTICE to Alexandra C. Warren: **Document must be filed Traditionally** (ep, ) (Entered: 06/03/2008)
44 MOTION to Intervene Two Additional Named Plaintiffs and Proposed Class Representatives by Julia Ann Jackson. (rg1, ) (Entered: 06/05/2008)
45 ORDER GRANTING 44 Motion to Intervene Two Additional named Plaintiffs. Signed by Judge Fred Biery. (rf, ) (Entered: 08/06/2008)
46 AMENDED COMPLAINT against The County of Bexar amending 1 Complaint., filed by Erica Bernal, Martin Martinez, Julia Ann Jackson.(rf, ) (Entered: 08/06/2008)
47 NOTICE of Vacation of Laurence S. Kurth by The County of Bexar (Kurth, Laurence) (Entered: 09/03/2008)
48 NOTICE of Vacation by Erica Bernal, Martin Martinez, Julia Ann Jackson (Harrington, James) (Entered: 09/15/2008)
49 *Joint MOTION to Amend Class Certification Scheduling Order by Erica Bernal, Martin Martinez, Julia Ann Jackson, The County of Bexar. (Johnson, William) (Entered: 09/22/2008)
50 NOTICE of Change of Address by Lori W. Hanson (Hanson, Lori) (Entered: 09/25/2008)
51 AGREED AMENDED CLASS CERTIFICATION SCHEDULING ORDER GRANTING 49 Motion to Amend Class Certification Schedule. Signed by Judge Fred Biery. (rf) (Entered: 09/30/2008)
52 *Unopposed MOTION for Jury Trial by The County of Bexar. (Kurth, Laurence) (Entered: 10/08/2008)
53 ORDER GRANTING 52 Motion for Jury Trial. Signed by Judge Fred Biery. (rf) (Entered: 10/17/2008)
54 *Joint MOTION to Extend Scheduling Order Deadlines for Class Certification by The County of Bexar, Erica Bernal, Julia Ann Jackson, Martin Martinez. (Kurth, Laurence) Modified on 12/1/2008, to add filers (rf). (Entered: 12/01/2008)

Case: 5:07-cv-928 As of: 03/13/2017 10:50 AM CDT 8 of 15

12/01/2008 12/02/2008 12/03/2008 12/16/2008 01/15/2009 01/16/2009 01/28/2009 01/28/2009 03/31/2009 04/02/2009 04/15/2009 04/29/2009
05/07/2009 05/21/2009 05/27/2009
05/27/2009 05/27/2009 05/29/2009
06/01/2009 06/03/2009

Notice of Correction: ***NOTIFIED COUNSEL THAT THE PLAINTIFFS HAVE BEEN ADDED AS FILERS OF THIS DOCUMENT****re 54 *Joint MOTION to Extend Scheduling Order Deadlines for Class Certification. (rf) (Entered: 12/01/2008)
55 ORDER GRANTING 54 Motion to Extend Class Certification Scheduling Order. Signed by Judge Fred Biery. (rf) (Entered: 12/02/2008)
56 AMENDED CLASS CERTIFICATION SCHEDULING ORDER re 55 Order on Motion to Extend Scheduling Order Deadlines. Signed by Judge Fred Biery. (rf) (Entered: 12/03/2008)
57 NOTICE of Vacation by The County of Bexar (Hanson, Lori) (Entered: 12/16/2008)
58 Joint MOTION for Protective Order by Erica Bernal, Martin Martinez, Julia Ann Jackson, The County of Bexar. (Hanson, Lori) (Entered: 01/15/2009)
59 AGREED PROTECTIVE ORDER. Signed by Judge Fred Biery. (rf) (Entered: 01/16/2009)
60 Agreed MOTION to Extend Deadlines by Erica Bernal, Martin Martinez, Julia Ann Jackson, The County of Bexar. (Hanson, Lori) (Entered: 01/28/2009)
61 ORDER GRANTING 60 Motion to Amend Class Certification Deadlines. Signed by Judge Fred Biery. (rf) (Entered: 01/29/2009)
62 Joint MOTION To Enter Consent Decree by Erica Bernal, Martin Martinez, Julia Ann Jackson, The County of Bexar. (Johnson, William) (Entered: 03/31/2009)
63 CONSENT DECREE GRANTING 62 Joint MOTION To Enter Consent Decree filed by Erica Bernal, The County of Bexar, Julia Ann Jackson, Martin Martinez. Signed by Judge Fred Biery. (rf) (Entered: 04/02/2009)
64 Joint MOTION to Extend Scheduling Order Deadlines by Erica Bernal, Martin Martinez, Julia Ann Jackson. (Warren, Alexandra) (Entered: 04/15/2009)
65 SECOND AGREED AMENDED CLASS CERTIFICATION SCHEDULING ORDER re: 64 Joint MOTION to Extend Scheduling Order Deadlines filed by Erica Bernal, Julia Ann Jackson, Martin Martinez.. Signed by Judge Fred Biery. (rf) (Entered: 04/29/2009)
66 NOTICE of Unavailability of Laurence S. Kurth by The County of Bexar (Kurth, Laurence) (Entered: 05/07/2009)
67 Unopposed MOTION for Leave to Exceed Page Limitation for Class Certification Briefing by Erica Bernal, Martin Martinez, Julia Ann Jackson. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Warren, Alexandra) (Entered: 05/21/2009)
68 ****DOCUMENT IS DEFICIENT − MISSING CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE****NOTICE of Withdrawal of Appearance for Alexander Barnett, Esq. by Erica Bernal, Martin Martinez, Julia Ann Jackson (Warren, Alexandra) Modified on 5/27/2009, to designate deficiency (rf). (Entered: 05/27/2009)
69 DEFICIENCY NOTICE: ***NOTIFIED COUNSEL THAT A CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE IS REQUIRED**** re 68 Notice (Other), Notice (Other) (rf) (Entered: 05/27/2009)
70 NOTICE of Withdrawal of Appearance for Alexander Barnett, Esq. (Corrected) by Erica Bernal, Martin Martinez, Julia Ann Jackson (Warren, Alexandra) (Entered: 05/27/2009)
71 MOTION to Compel Supplemental Discovery Responses by The County of Bexar. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit 1, # 3 Exhibit 2, # 4 Exhibit 3, # 5 Exhibit 4, # 6 Exhibit B, # 7 Exhibit B−1, # 8 Exhibit B−2, # 9 Proposed Order on Defendant's Motion to Compel)(Hanson, Lori) (Entered: 05/29/2009)
72 ORDER GRANTING 67 Motion for Leave to File Class Certification Brief in Excess Pages. Signed by Judge Fred Biery. (rf) (Entered: 06/01/2009)
73 ORDER REFERRING MOTION: 71 MOTION to Compel Supplemental Discovery Responses filed by The County of Bexar. Signed by Judge Fred Biery.. Referral

Case: 5:07-cv-928 As of: 03/13/2017 10:50 AM CDT 9 of 15

06/04/2009 06/04/2009
06/04/2009 06/12/2009 06/17/2009 06/24/2009 06/26/2009 07/02/2009
07/06/2009 07/08/2009 07/16/2009 07/17/2009 07/22/2009 10/01/2009 10/01/2009

Magistrate Judge: John W. Primomo. (rf) (Entered: 06/03/2009)
74 MOTION to Certify Class by Erica Bernal, Martin Martinez, Julia Ann Jackson. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Warren, Alexandra) (Entered: 06/04/2009)
75 AFFIDAVIT in Support of 74 MOTION to Certify Class by Erica Bernal, Martin Martinez, Julia Ann Jackson. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit 4, # 5 Exhibit 5, # 6 Exhibit 6 − Part 1, # 7 Exhibit 6 − Part 2, # 8 Exhibit 7 − Part 1, # 9 Exhibit 7 − Part 2, # 10 Exhibit 7 − Part 3, # 11 Exhibit 8, # 12 Exhibit 9, # 13 Exhibit 10, # 14 Exhibit 11, # 15 Exhibit 12 − Part 1, # 16 Exhibit 12 − Part 2, # 17 Exhibit 13, # 18 Exhibit 14, # 19 Exhibit 15, # 20 Exhibit 16 − Part 1, # 21 Exhibit 16 − Part 2, # 22 Exhibit 17 − Part 1, # 23 Exhibit 17 − Part 2, # 24 Exhibit 18 − Part 1, # 25 Exhibit 18 − Part 2, # 26 Exhibit 19, # 27 Exhibit 20, # 28 Exhibit 21, # 29 Exhibit 22, # 30 Exhibit 23, # 31 Exhibit 24, # 32 Exhibit 25)(Warren, Alexandra) (Entered: 06/04/2009)
76 SUPPLEMENT to 75 Affidavit in Support,,, Certificate of Service by Erica Bernal, Martin Martinez, Julia Ann Jackson. (Warren, Alexandra) (Entered: 06/04/2009)
77 Memorandum in Opposition to Motion, filed by Erica Bernal, Martin Martinez, Julia Ann Jackson, re 71 MOTION to Compel Supplemental Discovery Responses filed by Defendant The County of Bexar (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Letter dated June 3, 2009)(Lock, Sam) (Entered: 06/12/2009)
78 REPLY to Response to Motion, filed by The County of Bexar, re 71 MOTION to Compel Supplemental Discovery Responses filed by Defendant The County of Bexar (Hanson, Lori) (Entered: 06/17/2009)
79 Opposed MOTION to Exclude The Expert Report And Testimony of Professor Lonny Hoffman by Erica Bernal, Martin Martinez, Julia Ann Jackson. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit 4, # 5 Exhibit 5, # 6 Exhibit 6)(Warren, Alexandra) (Entered: 06/24/2009)
80 RESPONSE in Support, filed by The County of Bexar, re 71 MOTION to Compel Supplemental Discovery Responses filed by Defendant The County of Bexar (Hanson, Lori) (Entered: 06/26/2009)
81 Response in Opposition to Motion, filed by The County of Bexar, re 74 MOTION to Certify Class filed by Plaintiff Erica Bernal, Plaintiff Julia Ann Jackson, Plaintiff Martin Martinez And Brief in Support Thereof (Attachments: # 1 Appendix Appendix Supporting Defendant's Response in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification and Brief in Support Thereof)(Johnson, William) (Entered: 07/02/2009)
82 Response in Opposition to Motion, filed by The County of Bexar, re 79 Opposed MOTION to Exclude The Expert Report And Testimony of Professor Lonny Hoffman filed by Plaintiff Erica Bernal, Plaintiff Julia Ann Jackson, Plaintiff Martin Martinez (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order Order)(Johnson, William) (Entered: 07/06/2009)
83 MOTION for Hearing re 81 Response in Opposition to Motion, 74 MOTION to Certify Class by The County of Bexar. (Hanson, Lori) (Entered: 07/08/2009)
84 REPLY to Response to Motion, filed by Erica Bernal, Martin Martinez, Julia Ann Jackson, re 74 MOTION to Certify Class filed by Plaintiff Erica Bernal, Plaintiff Julia Ann Jackson, Plaintiff Martin Martinez (Warren, Alexandra) (Entered: 07/16/2009)
85 REPLY to Response to Motion, filed by Erica Bernal, Martin Martinez, Julia Ann Jackson, re 79 Opposed MOTION to Exclude The Expert Report And Testimony of Professor Lonny Hoffman filed by Plaintiff Erica Bernal, Plaintiff Julia Ann Jackson, Plaintiff Martin Martinez (Warren, Alexandra) (Entered: 07/17/2009)
86 NOTICE of Vacation by The County of Bexar (Johnson, William) (Entered: 07/22/2009)
87 ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART 71 Motion to Compel Signed by Judge John W. Primomo. (rf) (Entered: 10/01/2009)
Motions No Longer Referred: 71 MOTION to Compel Supplemental Discovery Responses (rf) (Entered: 10/01/2009)

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10/27/2009 11/10/2009 11/13/2009 11/16/2009 11/16/2009 11/18/2009 11/18/2009 11/25/2009
12/11/2009
12/18/2009 01/26/2010 02/01/2010 02/01/2010 02/01/2010 02/01/2010 02/03/2010 03/16/2010 03/24/2010 04/06/2010

88 ADVISORY TO THE COURT by Erica Bernal, Martin Martinez, Julia Ann Jackson. (Lock, Sam) (Entered: 10/27/2009)
89 Unopposed MOTION to Amend Complaint by Erica Bernal, Martin Martinez, Julia Ann Jackson. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order, # 2 Exhibit Second Amended Complaint)(Warren, Alexandra) (Entered: 11/10/2009)
90 Second MOTION to Compel and for Sanctions for Failure to Comply with Court Order by The County of Bexar. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibit D, # 2 Proposed Order)(Hanson, Lori) (Entered: 11/13/2009)
91 ORDER GRANTING 89 Motion to Amend Complaint. Signed by Judge Fred Biery. (rf) (Entered: 11/16/2009)
92 SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT against The County of Bexar amending 46 Amended Complaint 1 Complaint filed by Erica Bernal Martin Martinez, Julia Ann Jackson.(rf) (Entered: 11/16/2009)
93 ADVISORY TO THE COURT by The County of Bexar concerning Defendant's Second Motion to Compel and for Sanctions with Order to Abate. (Hanson, Lori) (Entered: 11/18/2009)
94 NOTICE of Unavailability of Lori W. Hanson by The County of Bexar (Hanson, Lori) (Entered: 11/18/2009)
95 Memorandum in Opposition to Motion, filed by Erica Bernal, Martin Martinez, Julia Ann Jackson, re 90 Second MOTION to Compel and for Sanctions for Failure to Comply with Court Order filed by Defendant The County of Bexar (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Warren, Alexandra) (Entered: 11/25/2009)
96 ORDER REFERRING MOTION: 90 Second MOTION to Compel and for Sanctions for Failure to Comply with Court Order filed by The County of Bexar, 79 Opposed MOTION to Exclude The Expert Report And Testimony of Professor Lonny Hoffman filed by Erica Bernal, Julia Ann Jackson, Martin Martinez. Signed by Judge Fred Biery.. Referral Magistrate Judge: John W. Primomo. (rf, ) (Entered: 12/11/2009)
97 ADVISORY TO THE COURT by The County of Bexar re Defendant's Second Motion to Compel and for Sanctions. (Kurth, Laurence) (Entered: 12/18/2009)
98 ORDER GRANTING 79 Motion to exclude the expert report and testimony of Professor Lonny Hoffman. Signed by Judge John W. Primomo. (rf) (Entered: 01/26/2010)
99 ORDER GRANTING 90 Motion to Compel and Sanctions. Signed by Judge John W. Primomo. (rf) (Entered: 02/01/2010)
Motions No Longer Referred: 90 Second MOTION to Compel and for Sanctions for Failure to Comply with Court Order (rf) (Entered: 02/01/2010)
100 Agreed MOTION to Stay Case for 60 Days by Erica Bernal, Martin Martinez, Julia Ann Jackson, The County of Bexar. (Warren, Alexandra) Modified on 2/1/2010, to add filer (rf). (Entered: 02/01/2010)
Notice of Correction: ****NOTIFIED COUNSEL THAT THE DEFENDANT HAS BEEN ADDED AS A FILER OF THIS DOCUMENT*****re 100 Agreed MOTION to Stay Case for 60 Days. (rf) (Entered: 02/01/2010)
101 ORDER OF STAY GRNTING 100 Motion to Stay. The parties shall submit a stipulation of dismissal by 4/5/10. Signed by Judge Fred Biery. (rf) (Entered: 02/03/2010)
102 NOTICE of Change of Address by Alexandra C. Warren (Warren, Alexandra) (Entered: 03/16/2010)
103 NOTICE of Withdrawal of Appearance for R. Brent Walton, Esq. by Erica Bernal, Julia Ann Jackson, Martin Martinez (Warren, Alexandra) (Entered: 03/24/2010)
104 Joint MOTION for Extension of Time to File Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement by Erica Bernal, Julia Ann Jackson, Martin Martinez, The County of Bexar. (Warren, Alexandra) Modified on 4/6/2010, to add filer (rf).

Case: 5:07-cv-928 As of: 03/13/2017 10:50 AM CDT 11 of 15

04/06/2010
04/19/2010 05/03/2010 05/20/2010 06/04/2010 07/06/2010 07/06/2010 07/07/2010 08/06/2010 08/20/2010 08/26/2010 08/26/2010
10/13/2010 10/13/2010 12/27/2010 12/29/2010
12/29/2010 12/29/2010

(Entered: 04/06/2010)
Notice of Correction:****NOTIFIED COUNSEL THAT THE DEFENDANT HAS BEEN ADDED AS A FILER OF THIS DOCUMENT***** re 104 Joint MOTION for Extension of Time to File Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement. (rf) (Entered: 04/06/2010)
105 AGREED SCHEDULING ORDER re: 104 Joint Motion for Extension of Time. Signed by Judge Fred Biery. (rf) (Entered: 04/19/2010)
106 ORDER settlement papers are due by 6/4/10. Signed by Judge Fred Biery. (rf ) (Entered: 05/03/2010)
107 NOTICE of Vacation for Laurence S. Kurth by The County of Bexar (Kurth, Laurence) (Entered: 05/20/2010)
108 ORDER stipulation of dismissal is due by 7/6/10 re 106 Order. Signed by Chief Judge Fred Biery. (rf) (Entered: 06/04/2010)
109 Joint MOTION to Extend Scheduling Order Deadlines by Erica Bernal, Julia Ann Jackson, Martin Martinez, The County of Bexar. (Warren, Alexandra) Modified on 7/6/2010, to add filer (rf). (Entered: 07/06/2010)
Notice of Correction: ***NOTIFIED COUNSEL THAT THE DEFENDANT WAS ADDED AS A FILER OF THIS DOCUMENT**** re 109 Joint MOTION to Extend Scheduling Order Deadlines. (rf) (Entered: 07/06/2010)
110 AGREED SCHEDULING ORDER re 109 Joint MOTION to Extend Scheduling Order Deadlines. Signed by Chief Judge Fred Biery. (rf) (Entered: 07/07/2010)
111 STIPULATION of Settlement by Erica Bernal, Julia Ann Jackson, Martin Martinez, The County of Bexar. (Kurth, Laurence) (Entered: 08/06/2010)
112 ORDER GRANTING AGREED ORAL REQUEST TO EXTEND DEADLINE. Signed by Chief Judge Fred Biery. (rf) (Entered: 08/20/2010)
113 Unopposed MOTION for Settlement for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement and Brief in Support Thereof by Erica Bernal, Julia Ann Jackson, Martin Martinez. (Warren, Alexandra) (Entered: 08/26/2010)
114 AFFIDAVIT in Support of 113 Unopposed MOTION for Settlement for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement and Brief in Support Thereof By Charles J. LaDuca by Erica Bernal, Julia Ann Jackson, Martin Martinez. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 (Settlement Agreement), # 2 Exhibit 2 (Firm Resumes))(Warren, Alexandra) (Entered: 08/26/2010)
115 ADVISORY TO THE COURT by The County of Bexar. (rf) (Entered: 10/13/2010)
116 ORDER re 115 Advisory to the Court filed by The County of Bexar, ( Settlement Conference set for 1/12/2011 10:00 AM before Chief Judge Fred Biery.). Signed by Chief Judge Fred Biery. (rf) (Entered: 10/13/2010)
117 Objections to proposed class action settlement by Sterling Allen, Jr. (tm) (Entered: 12/28/2010)
118 ***DOCUMENT DEFICIENT−NO SIGNATURE ON PLEADING. SEE NOTICE NO. 119*** NOTICE of Objections by Virginia Cooks re 115 Advisory to the Court, 114 Affidavit in Support, 116 Order, Set Hearings, 113 Unopposed MOTION for Settlement for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement and Brief in Support Thereof (Thompson, Jason) Modified on 12/29/2010 (tm). (Entered: 12/29/2010)
119 ***DEFICIENCY NOTICE: re 118 Notice (Other). Objections to Proposed Settlement filed by Virigina Cooks. Pleading is not signed with a /s/ name or digital signature. Please refile pleading.*** (tm) (Entered: 12/29/2010)
120 NOTICE of Objections (Corrected) by Virginia Cooks re 115 Advisory to the Court, 114 Affidavit in Support, 116 Order, Set Hearings, 113 Unopposed MOTION for Settlement for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement and Brief in Support Thereof (Thompson, Jason) (Entered: 12/29/2010)

Case: 5:07-cv-928 As of: 03/13/2017 10:50 AM CDT 12 of 15

01/04/2011 01/07/2011 01/07/2011
01/07/2011
01/11/2011
01/11/2011 01/11/2011 01/12/2011 01/12/2011 01/13/2011 01/13/2011 02/01/2011

121 NOTICE regarding the Class Action Settlement by The County of Bexar (rf) (Entered: 01/04/2011)
122 ORDER CHANGING TIME OF CLASS ACTION FAIRNESS HEARING, ( Settlement Conference reset for 1/12/2011 12:00 PM before Chief Judge Fred Biery.). Signed by Chief Judge Fred Biery. (rf) (Entered: 01/07/2011)
123 Unopposed MOTION for Settlement (For Final Approval of Class Action Settlement, For an Award of Expenses and Attorneys' Fees, and for Approval of Incentive Awards to the Class Representatives, and Brief in Support Thereof) by Erica Bernal, Julia Ann Jackson, Martin Martinez. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit 4, # 5 Exhibit 5, # 6 Exhibit 6, # 7 Exhibit 7, # 8 Exhibit 8, # 9 Exhibit 9, # 10 Exhibit 10, # 11 Exhibit 11, # 12 Exhibit 12, # 13 Proposed Order)(Warren, Alexandra) (Entered: 01/07/2011)
124 AFFIDAVIT in Support of 123 Unopposed MOTION for Settlement (For Final Approval of Class Action Settlement, For an Award of Expenses and Attorneys' Fees, and for Approval of Incentive Awards to the Class Representatives, and Brief in Support Thereof)Unopposed MOTION for Settlement (For Final Approval of Class Action Settlement, For an Award of Expenses and Attorneys' Fees, and for Approval of Incentive Awards to the Class Representatives, and Brief in Support Thereof)Unopposed MOTION for Settlement (For Final Approval of Class Action Settlement, For an Award of Expenses and Attorneys' Fees, and for Approval of Incentive Awards to the Class Representatives, and Brief in Support Thereof) of Charles J. LaDuca by Erica Bernal, Julia Ann Jackson, Martin Martinez. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit F)(Warren, Alexandra) (Entered: 01/07/2011)
125 ***DOCUMENT IS DEFICIENT − MISSING CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE****RESPONSE in Support, filed by Erica Bernal, Julia Ann Jackson, Martin Martinez, re 123 Unopposed MOTION for Settlement (For Final Approval of Class Action Settlement, For an Award of Expenses and Attorneys' Fees, and for Approval of Incentive Awards to the Class Representatives, and Brief in Support Thereof)Unopposed MOTION for Settlement (For Final Approval of Class Action Settlement, For an Award of Expenses and Attorneys' Fees, and for Approval of Incentive Awards to the Class Representatives, and Brief in Support Thereof)Unopposed MOTION for Settlement (For Final Approval of Class Action Settlement, For an Award of Expenses and Attorneys' Fees, and for Approval of Incentive Awards to the Class Representatives, and Brief in Support Thereof) filed by Plaintiff Erica Bernal, Plaintiff Julia Ann Jackson, Plaintiff Martin Martinez Supplemental Fee Affirmation of Elmer Keach (Keach, Elmer) Modified on 1/11/2011, to designate deficiency (rf). (Entered: 01/11/2011)
126 DEFICIENCY NOTICE: ***NOTIFIED COUNSEL THAT DOCUMENT IS DEFICIENT − MISSING CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE****re 125 Response in Support of Motion, (rf) (Entered: 01/11/2011)
127 NOTICE OF CHILD SUPPORT LIENS AND CLAIM FOR RELIEF by Attorney General of Texas (rf) (Entered: 01/11/2011)
128 ORDER GRANTING FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT AND JUDGMENT. Signed by Chief Judge Fred Biery. (rf) (Entered: 01/12/2011)
129 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Chief Judge Fred Biery: Miscellaneous Hearing held on 1/12/2011 (Minute entry documents are not available electronically.). (Court Reporter Chris Poage.)(rf) (Entered: 01/13/2011)
130 ORDER TAKING JUDICIAL NOTICE OF OBJECTIONS re 121 Notice, 120 Notice, 123 Notice, 117 Miscellaneous Objection. Signed by Chief Judge Fred Biery. (rf) (Entered: 01/13/2011)
131 ADVISORY TO THE COURT by Erica Bernal, Julia Ann Jackson, Martin Martinez (Letter to Sterling Allen, Jr.). (Warren, Alexandra) (Entered: 01/13/2011)
134 MOTION for Bond (Motion for Appeal Bond and Incorporated Memorandum of Law) by Erica Bernal, Julia Ann Jackson, Martin Martinez. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Warren, Alexandra) (Entered: 02/01/2011)

Case: 5:07-cv-928 As of: 03/13/2017 10:50 AM CDT 13 of 15

02/08/2011
02/10/2011
02/11/2011
02/11/2011
02/11/2011 02/11/2011 02/14/2011 02/14/2011 02/14/2011
02/22/2011 02/22/2011 02/23/2011 02/25/2011 03/04/2011 03/17/2011

135 RESPONSE to Motion, filed by Virginia Cooks, re 134 MOTION for Bond (Motion for Appeal Bond and Incorporated Memorandum of Law) filed by Plaintiff Erica Bernal, Plaintiff Julia Ann Jackson, Plaintiff Martin Martinez (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Thompson, Jason) (Entered: 02/08/2011)
136 NOTICE OF APPEAL by Virginia Cooks. Per 5th Circuit rules, the appellant has 14 days, from the filing of the Notice of Appeal, to order the transcript. To order a transcript, the appellant should fill out Form DKT−13 (Transcript Order) and follow the instructions set out on the form. This form is available in the Clerk's Office or by clicking the hyperlink above. (rf) (Entered: 02/11/2011)
137 ****DOCUMENT IS DEFICIENT − MISSING CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE****Memorandum in Support, filed by Erica Bernal, Julia Ann Jackson, Martin Martinez, re 134 MOTION for Bond (Motion for Appeal Bond and Incorporated Memorandum of Law) filed by Plaintiff Erica Bernal, Plaintiff Julia Ann Jackson, Plaintiff Martin Martinez Reply Memorandum of Law In Support of Motion for Appeal Bond (Keach, Elmer) Modified on 2/14/2011, to designate deficiency (rf). (Entered: 02/11/2011)
138 REPLY to Response to Motion, filed by Erica Bernal, Julia Ann Jackson, Martin Martinez, re 134 MOTION for Bond (Motion for Appeal Bond and Incorporated Memorandum of Law) filed by Plaintiff Erica Bernal, Plaintiff Julia Ann Jackson, Plaintiff Martin Martinez Reply Affirmation of Elmer Keach, With Exhibits (Keach, Elmer) (Entered: 02/11/2011)
139 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE by Erica Bernal, Julia Ann Jackson, Martin Martinez 137 Memorandum in Support of Motion, 138 Reply to Response to Motion, (Keach, Elmer) (Entered: 02/11/2011)
141 USCA Appeal Fees received $ 455 receipt number 500010930 re 136 Notice of Appeal, filed by Virginia Cooks (rf) (Entered: 02/14/2011)
140 DEFICIENCY NOTICE: ****NOTIFIED COUNSEL THAT DOCUMENT IS DEFICIENT − MISSING CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**** re 137 Memorandum in Support of Motion, (rf) (Entered: 02/14/2011)
Notice of Correction: ***NOTIFIED COUNSEL TO PLEASE DISREGARD 140 DEFICIENCY NOTICE AS DOC #139 HAS REMEDIED THE DEFICIENCY. (rf) (Entered: 02/14/2011)
142 REPLY to Response to Motion, filed by Virginia Cooks, re 134 MOTION for Bond (Motion for Appeal Bond and Incorporated Memorandum of Law) filed by Plaintiff Erica Bernal, Plaintiff Julia Ann Jackson, Plaintiff Martin Martinez Declaration of Jason J. Thompson (Thompson, Jason) (Entered: 02/14/2011)
143 Letter/Correspondence from Pete O. Torres, Jr. (rf) (Entered: 02/22/2011)
144 USCA Appeal Info Sheet received. USCA Case Number 11−50147 for 136 Notice of Appeal, filed by Virginia Cooks. (bn ) (Entered: 02/23/2011)
147 TRANSCRIPT REQUEST by Virginia Cooks for proceedings held on 1/12/11. Proceedings Transcribed: Final Fairness Hearing. Court Reporter: Chris Poage. (bn ) (Entered: 02/28/2011)
146 ORDER GRANTING 134 Motion for Appeal Bond. Signed by Chief Judge Fred Biery. (rf) (Entered: 02/25/2011)
148 MOTION to Intervene by Emilio Martinez. (rf) (Entered: 03/07/2011)
150 Transcript filed of Proceedings held on 1/12/2011, Proceedings Transcribed: Fairness Hearing. Court Reporter/Transcriber: Chris Poage, Telephone number: 210−472−4747. Parties are notified of their duty to review the transcript to ensure compliance with the FRCP 5.2(a)/FRCrP 49.1(a). A copy may be purchased from the court reporter or viewed at the clerk's office public terminal. If redaction is necessary, a Notice of Redaction Request must be filed within 21 days. If no such Notice is filed, the transcript will be made available via PACER without redaction after 90 calendar days. The clerk will mail a copy of this notice to parties not electronically noticed Redaction Request due 4/7/2011. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 4/18/2011. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 6/15/2011. Appeal Record due by 4/1/2011.

Case: 5:07-cv-928 As of: 03/13/2017 10:50 AM CDT 14 of 15

03/18/2011 03/18/2011
04/11/2011 04/11/2011 04/14/2011 04/14/2011 04/25/2011 04/25/2011 05/10/2011 05/25/2011
06/15/2011 06/17/2011 06/27/2011 06/29/2011 07/14/2011 07/14/2011
07/27/2011
08/05/2011 08/17/2011 08/29/2011

(Poage, Chris) (Entered: 03/17/2011)
151 Letter of transmittal from USCA received for 136 Notice of Appeal, filed by Virginia Cooks. (bn ) (Entered: 03/21/2011)
152 Certified copy of USCA JUDGMENT/MANDATE Dismissing. Persuant to the stipulation of the parties. 136 Notice of Appeal, filed by Virginia Cooks. (bn ) (Entered: 03/21/2011)
153 ORDER DENYING 148 Motion to Intervene. Signed by Chief Judge Fred Biery. (rg) (Entered: 04/11/2011)
154 MOTION to Proceed in forma pauperis by Emilio Martinez. (tm) (Entered: 04/12/2011)
155 RESPONSE to Motion, filed by The County of Bexar, re 154 MOTION to Proceed in forma pauperis filed by Movant Emilio Martinez (rf) (Entered: 04/18/2011)
156 NOTICE of Change of E−mail Address by Laurence S. Kurth, Lori W. Hanson (ga) (Entered: 04/18/2011)
158 ORDER DENYING 154 Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis. Signed by Chief Judge Fred Biery. (rf) (Entered: 04/25/2011)
159 MOTION for Reconsideration re 153 Order Denying Motion to Intervene by Emilio Martinez. (rf) (Entered: 04/25/2011)
160 ORDER DENYING 159 Motion for Reconsideration. Signed by Chief Judge Fred Biery. (tm) (Entered: 05/10/2011)
162 NOTICE OF APPEAL by Emilio Martinez. Per 5th Circuit rules, the appellant has 14 days, from the filing of the Notice of Appeal, to order the transcript. To order a transcript, the appellant should fill out Form DKT−13 (Transcript Order) and follow the instructions set out on the form. This form is available in the Clerk's Office or by clicking the hyperlink above. (rf) (Entered: 05/25/2011)
163 MOTION for leave to present additional information by Julia Ann Jackson. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibits)(rg) (Entered: 06/15/2011)
164 ORDER DENYING 163 Motion for Permission to Present Additional Information. Signed by Chief Judge Fred Biery. (rf) (Entered: 06/17/2011)
166 MOTION to proceed In Forma Pauperis on appeal by Emilio Martinez. (rf) (Entered: 06/27/2011)
167 AFFIDAVIT in Support of 166 MOTION to proceed In Forma Pauperis on appeal by Emilio Martinez. (rf) (Entered: 06/29/2011)
168 ORDER DENYING 166 Motion to proceed In Forma Pauperis on Appeal. Signed by Chief Judge Fred Biery. (rf) (Entered: 07/14/2011)
169 ORDER REGARDING CLASS ACTION CLAIM FORMS RECEIVED BY THE ADMINISTRATOR WHICH ARE POSTMAKED AFTER THE COURT−ORDERED DEADLINE FOR MAILING SUCH CLAIMS. Signed by Chief Judge Fred Biery. (rf) (Entered: 07/14/2011)
172 Certified Record on Appeal to US Court of Appeals. E−mailed on 7/27/2011 re 162 Notice of Appeal, (Appeal record held for pickup per 5th circuit instructions). (bn ) (Entered: 07/29/2011)
174 Objection to 168 Order on Motion to proceed In Forma Pauperis on Appeal by Emilio Martinez. (rf) (Entered: 08/05/2011)
175 ORDER re 174 Objection filed by Emilio Martinez. Signed by Chief Judge Fred Biery. (rf) (Entered: 08/18/2011)
177 Letter of transmittal from USCA received for 162 Notice of Appeal, filed by Emilio Martinez. (bn ) (Entered: 08/30/2011)

Case: 5:07-cv-928 As of: 03/13/2017 10:50 AM CDT 15 of 15

08/29/2011 08/31/2011 12/26/2012
01/28/2013

178 Certified copy of USCA JUDGMENT/MANDATE Dismissing 162 Notice of Appeal, filed by Emilio Martinez. (bn ) (Entered: 08/30/2011)
179 NOTICE Child Support Lien (1st Amended) by Attorney General of Texas (Gonzalez, Randolph) (Entered: 08/31/2011)
180 Unopposed MOTION to Modify Consent Decree and Unopposed Motion to Stay the Distribution of Settlement Proceeds by The County of Bexar. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order Amended Unopposed Consent Decree and Final Judgment)(Kurth, Laurence) (Entered: 12/26/2012)
181 AMENDED UNOPPOSED CONSENT DECREE AND FINAL JUDGMENT GRANTING 180 Unopposed MOTION to Modify Consent Decree and Unopposed Motion to Stay the Distribution of Settlement Proceeds filed by The County of Bexar. Signed by Chief Judge Fred Biery. (rf) (Entered: 01/28/2013)


[CONTENT] November 15, 2007 | the U.S. District Court | the Western District | Texas ||| the Texas Civil Rights Project | under 42 | 1983 | Bexar County Detention Center's ||| the Bexar County Detention Center ||| two days | 25 |||  ||| Fourth | Fourteenth Amendment |||  ||| April 2, 2009 ||| the County Detention Center ||| The County Detention Center | annual |||  |||  ||| Fred Biery | the Western District | Texas ||| November 16, 2009 | second |||  ||| August 26, 2010 ||| October 13, 2010 ||| January 12, 2011 ||| Bexar County Detention Center | between November 2005 | April 2009 |||  ||| two ||| subclass II | II |||  ||| 900,000 |||  ||| 395,000 | 15,000 | three |||  ||| up to $1,000 | up to $100 ||| Bexar County | 500 | 50 ||| January 28, 2013 ||| 2012 | the Supreme Court | Florence v. Board ||| County | April 9, 2009 |||  [SUMMARY] On November 15, 2007, an individual who was strip searched after being charged with a petty crime filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas. Represented by the Texas Civil Rights Project and private counsel, the plaintiff sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, challenging as unconstitutional Bexar County Detention Center's policy or custom of strip searching misdemeanant arrestees even where they were not suspected of concealing weapons or contraband.

Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that she was arrested for an outstanding traffic warrant and taken to the Bexar County Detention Center, where she was subjected to a strip search upon admission. The plaintiff further alleged that, after being held for two days, she and 25 other pretrial detainees were ordered to change into jail-issued uniforms, at which time she was again strip searched. The plaintiffs allege that detainees were told to manipulate genitalia and sometimes "squat and cough" regardless of whether there was reasonable suspicion of contraband or weapons. The plaintiff claimed that the strip searches violated her Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights in that they were conducted in the absence of any reasonable suspicion that she was hiding weapons or contraband. To remedy the alleged constitutional violation, the plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as class certification. 

On April 2, 2009, both parties agreed to a consent decree that would provide permanent injunctive relief without further litigation. The decree dictated that the County Detention Center would no longer, absent reasonable suspicion that someone is concealing contraband, engage in the practice of strip searching or visual cavity searching those in their custody who are charged with misdemeanors. The County Detention Center also had to provide the court with an annual report regarding the implementation of the consent decree. Nothing in the consent decree addressed the plaintiff's request for compensatory and punitive damages. The court retained jurisdiction to enforce the decree. The decree was signed by Judge Fred Biery of the Western District of Texas. 

On November 16, 2009, the plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint. The parties continued to engage in discovery and settlement talks to resolve the damages claims. On August 26, 2010, the plaintiffs' submitted a motion of preliminary approval of the class-action settlement. The court preliminarily approved the settlement on October 13, 2010. After a fairness hearing, a final order of approval was granted on January 12, 2011.

The settlement agreement certified a class of plaintiffs composed of all detainees of Bexar County Detention Center between November 2005 and April 2009 who were subjected to strip searches and booked on misdemeanor or other minor charges. Those with felonies were not included. The class also had two subclasses. Subclass I was composed of all detainees not in subclass II, and subclass II included detainees booked on narcotics, shoplifting, and weapons-violation misdemeanors. All members of the class were to receive a pro rata share of the settlement after administrative expenses, attorneys' fees, and other expenses are counted for. 

Attorneys' fees were $900,000 for this case. The court found this reasonable considering the amount of time put in and the complexity of the case. The settlement included $395,000 for the claim administrator, and $15,000 was given to the three class representatives for their work in the lawsuit. The fund was then be used to pay class members. Class members in subclass I could receive up to $1,000, and members of subclass II can receive up to $100. Class members could pay off court fines and fees in Bexar County with their settlement funds, but this was capped at $500 and $50 for the subclasses respectively.

On January 28, 2013, however, the district court dismissed this case, thus vacating and revoking the settlement agreement. In 2012, the Supreme Court decided <i>Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of County of Burlington</i>, holding that jail administrators may require all arrestees committed to the general population of the jail to undergo a no-touch visual strip search, even if the detainees is booked for a minor offense or reasonable suspicion is absent. The plaintiffs, their attorneys, and class members were not required to pay back any fees or funds they were awarded, but the County no longer needed to abide by the consent decree from April 9, 2009, that details how their strip search policy is to be conducted. They were now guided by the decision in <i>Florence</i>.