Case: 1:08-cv-05908 Document #: 89 Filed: 07/27/10 Page 1 of 33 PageID #:1670

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

CHARLES BROWN, JEFFREY BURKS,

)

ANTONIO COLON, JAMES DEMOSS,

)

JAMESON DIXON, CLARK FAULKNER

)

KENNETH GEORGE, LEONARD

)

GREGORY, MARSHUN HILL, CEDRIC

)

MUSE, LAROY WASHINGTON, DARRELL )

WILLIAMS, CHARLES WOODS,

)

MICHAEL WOODS, MACK LEONARD,

)

on behalf of themselves and similarly

)

situated African-American employees,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

YELLOW TRANSPORTATION, INC., and

)

YRC INC.,

)

)

Defendants.

)

Case No.: 08CV5908 Judge Joan B. Gottschall Magistrate Judge Nan R. Nolan

CORRECTED FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT NATURE OF THE ACTION
This is an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 to correct unlawful discrimination on the basis of race and to provide appropriate relief to Charles Brown, Jeffery Burks, Antonio Colon, James DeMoss, Jameson Dixon, Clark Faulkner, Kenneth George, Leonard Gregory, Marshun Hill, Cedric Muse, Laroy Washington, Darrell Williams, Charles Woods, Michael Woods, Mack Leonard and similarly situated African-American former and current employees of YRC, Inc., and Yellow Transportation , Inc. (hereinafter “Plaintiffs”). Plaintiffs allege that YRC, Inc., and Yellow Transportation, Inc. (hereinafter “Defendants”), created a racially hostile work environment by: (1) failing to respond to Plaintiffs’ repeated complaints about nooses hung at the Chicago Ridge facility, failing to investigate, and failing to take disciplinary action against

1

Case: 1:08-cv-05908 Document #: 89 Filed: 07/27/10 Page 2 of 33 PageID #:1671
those individuals who hung the nooses; (2) failing to respond to Plaintiffs’ repeated complaints about racially hostile graffiti written on bathroom walls, failing to investigate, and failing to take disciplinary action against those individuals who wrote the graffiti, and (3) failing to respond to Plaintiffs’ repeated complaints that coworkers used racial slurs, wore racially hostile clothing, and exposed racially hostile tattoos, failing to investigate, and failing to take disciplinary action against those individuals who used racial slurs, wore racially hostile clothing, and exposed racially hostile tattoos. Plaintiffs also allege that Defendants subjected them to disparate treatment on account of their race by: (1) subjecting Plaintiffs to more stringent disciplinary action than similarly situated Caucasian employees, and (2) promoting Caucasian workers who had worked for less time than Plaintiffs instead of and/or before promoting Plaintiffs. Finally, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants retaliated against Plaintiffs for complaining about the hostile work environment and racially disparate treatment.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 1. This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. This action is authorized and instituted pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981. 2. Venue is proper in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391, because the unlawful conduct alleged herein was committed within the boundaries of the Northern District of Illinois.
PARTIES 3. Plaintiff Charles Brown is an adult African-American male and resident of Cook County, Illinois. 4. Plaintiff Jeffery Burks is an adult African-American male and resident of Cook County, Illinois.
2

Case: 1:08-cv-05908 Document #: 89 Filed: 07/27/10 Page 3 of 33 PageID #:1672
5. Plaintiff Antonio Colon is an adult African-American male and resident of Cook County, Illinois.
6. Plaintiff James DeMoss is an adult African-American male and resident of Cook County, Illinois.
7. Plaintiff Jameson Dixon is an adult African-American male and resident of Cook County, Illinois.
8. Plaintiff Clark Faulkner is an adult African-American male and resident of Cook County, Illinois.
9. Plaintiff Kenneth George is an adult African-American male East Baton Rouge Parish, Louisiana.
10. Plaintiff Leonard Gregory is an adult African-American male and resident of Lake County, Indiana.
11. Plaintiff Marshun Hill is an adult African-American male and resident of Cook County, Illinois.
12. Plaintiff Cedric Muse is an adult African-American male and resident of Cook County, Illinois.
13. Plaintiff Laroy Washington is an adult African-American male and resident of Cook County, Illinois.
14. Plaintiff Darrell Williams is an adult African-American male and resident of Cook County, Illinois.
15. Plaintiff Charles Woods is an adult African-American male and resident of Cook County, Illinois.
3

Case: 1:08-cv-05908 Document #: 89 Filed: 07/27/10 Page 4 of 33 PageID #:1673
16. Plaintiff Michael Woods is an adult African-American male and resident of Cook County, Illinois.
17. Plaintiff Mack Leonard is an adult African-American male and resident of Cook County, Illinois.
18. At all relevant times, YRC Worldwide Inc. was the parent company of Roadway Express and Defendant Yellow Transportation.
19. In or about March 2009, YRC Worldwide Inc. integrated Defendant Yellow Transportation and Roadway Express into YRC, Inc.
20. Defendant Yellow Transportation and Roadway Express now operate as Defendant YRC.
21. Defendant YRC is incorporated in Delaware and employs approximately 59,000 people worldwide.
22. Defendant YRC operates 394 terminals across the United States and several terminals within the state of Illinois.
23. At all relevant times, Defendant YRC and Defendant Yellow Transportation were doing business in Illinois and operating the locations at which the alleged discrimination took place.
24. Until December 2009, Defendant YRC and Defendant Yellow Transportation operated a facility at 10301 S. Harlem Ave., Chicago Ridge, Illinois (hereinafter “Chicago Ridge facility”).
25. At all relevant times, Defendant YRC and Defendant Yellow Transportation operated a facility at 2000 Lincoln Highway, Chicago Heights, IL (hereinafter “Chicago Heights facility”).
4

Case: 1:08-cv-05908 Document #: 89 Filed: 07/27/10 Page 5 of 33 PageID #:1674
26. In or about December 2009, Defendant YRC closed the Chicago Ridge facility. 27. In or about December 2009, several named plaintiffs and class members were transferred to the Chicago Heights facility.
CLASS ALLEGATIONS DEFINITION OF THE CLASS 28. The representative Plaintiffs sue on behalf of themselves and on behalf of all similarly situated African-American employees and former employees employed by Defendants between October 15, 2004, and the present. The Hostile Work Environment Class consists of all current and former African-American employees employed by YRC, Inc., and Yellow Transportation, Inc., at their facility located at 10301 S. Harlem Ave., Chicago Ridge, Illinois and those Chicago Ridge employees transferred to work at the facility located at 2000 Lincoln Highway, Chicago Heights, Illinois. HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT/RACIAL HARASSMENT 29. Defendants subjected Plaintiffs to a racially hostile work environment by tolerating the repeated hanging of nooses in conspicuous places at the Chicago Ridge facility, including on work equipment, in order to intimidate African-American workers. 30. Defendants subjected Plaintiffs to a racially hostile work environment by tolerating the persistent appearance of written racial slurs in the Chicago Ridge facility including but not limited to, “I hate niggers,” “all niggers must die,” “fuck all niggers,” “rotten nigger,” “burn nigger burn,” “fag,” “white power,” and swastikas. 31. Defendants subjected Plaintiffs to a racially hostile work environment by tolerating Caucasian employees’ frequent use of racial slurs, including, but not limited to, “nigger” and “mudcat,” as well as spoken statements including, but not limited to, “I hate black
5

Case: 1:08-cv-05908 Document #: 89 Filed: 07/27/10 Page 6 of 33 PageID #:1675
people,” “I hate niggers,” and, in reference to hurricane Katrina, “they should have put a cage around New Orleans and put a banana in the cage and let all the niggers drown.”
32. Defendants subjected Plaintiffs to a racially hostile work environment by tolerating the display of racially hostile symbols, including, but not limited to, the Confederate flag and the letters “KKK” on Caucasian employees’ apparel and visible tattoos.
33. Defendants subjected Plaintiffs to a racially hostile work environment by tolerating racially hostile comments made over the radio in the Chicago Ridge facility.
34. Defendants subjected Plaintiffs to a racially hostile work environment at the Chicago Ridge facility by allowing Caucasian supervisors to aggressively scrutinize Plaintiffs’ job performances while not subjecting similarly situated Caucasian employees to similar treatment.
35. Defendants failed to adequately address or respond to Plaintiffs’ complaints of racial harassment and the hostile work environment made to company officials, including, but not limited to, direct supervisors, management, and the Human Resources department.
36. Defendants subjected Plaintiffs to disparate treatment due to their race by failing to document Plaintiffs’ repeated complaints of race discrimination.
DISPARATE TREATMENT DUE TO RACE 37. Defendants subjected Plaintiffs to disparate treatment due to their race by allowing supervisors to assign more strenuous work to Plaintiffs than to similarly situated Caucasian employees. 38. Defendants subjected Plaintiffs to disparate treatment due to their race by promoting similarly situated Caucasian employees, as well as Caucasian employees who had worked for Defendants for a shorter time, instead of and/or before promoting Plaintiffs.
6

Case: 1:08-cv-05908 Document #: 89 Filed: 07/27/10 Page 7 of 33 PageID #:1676
39. Defendants subjected Plaintiffs to disparate treatment due to their race by denying Plaintiffs opportunities that would eventually allow them to be promoted while giving such opportunities to similarly situated Caucasian employees.
40. Defendants subjected Plaintiffs to disparate treatment due to their race by forcing injured Plaintiffs to take shorter sick leaves than similarly situated Caucasian employees.
41. Defendants subjected Plaintiffs to disparate treatment due to their race by disciplining them for infractions for which similarly situated Caucasian employees were not disciplined, including, but not limited to, returning late to work after breaks, talking to each other, and going to the bathroom without asking permission.
42. Defendants subjected Plaintiffs to disparate treatment due to their race by disciplining them without proper investigation, which was different than their treatment of similarly situated Caucasian employees.
43. Defendants subjected Plaintiffs to disparate treatment due to their race by allowing similarly situated Caucasian employees to take more time off work than Plaintiffs.
44. Defendants subjected Plaintiffs to disparate treatment due to their race by giving them less desirable work shifts than similarly situated Caucasian employees, and by denying them the opportunity, afforded to similarly situated Caucasian employees, to choose with which colleagues they worked.
45. Defendants subjected Plaintiffs to disparate treatment due to their race by giving Plaintiffs fewer opportunities to work overtime shifts than similarly situated Caucasian employees.
7

Case: 1:08-cv-05908 Document #: 89 Filed: 07/27/10 Page 8 of 33 PageID #:1677
46. Defendants subjected Plaintiffs to disparate treatment due to their race by assigning them less desirable tasks than similarly situated Caucasian employees, including, but not limited to, requiring them to get in and out of their trucks in inclement weather.
47. Defendants subjected Plaintiffs to disparate treatment due to their race by allowing similarly situated Caucasian employees to participate in a gift-certificate program through which they received thousands of dollars in gift certificates while denying Plaintiffs the same opportunity.
48. Defendants subjected Plaintiffs to disparate treatment due to their race by not giving them the same opportunities as similarly situated Caucasian employees to become drivers and spotters.
RETALIATION DUE TO RACE 49. Defendants retaliated against Plaintiffs for complaining about the discriminatory treatment as described in paragraphs 29 – 48 by, among other things, firing Plaintiffs, disciplining Plaintiffs for ordinarily unenforced rules, cutting off Plaintiffs’ medical benefits, and intimidating Plaintiffs while they were working.
CLASS REQUIREMENTS MET 50. The individuals in the Class are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. Plaintiffs estimate that there are more than 300 members of the Class. 51. There are questions of law and fact common to the Class that predominate over questions affecting only individuals. Among these common questions are:
a. Whether Defendants created a racially hostile work environment or failed to remedy and prevent a racially hostile work environment;
8

Case: 1:08-cv-05908 Document #: 89 Filed: 07/27/10 Page 9 of 33 PageID #:1678
b. Whether there was a disparity between when full time employment was awarded to Plaintiffs and when it was awarded to similarly situated Caucasian employees; c. Whether there was a disparity between the extent and gravity of discipline imposed upon Plaintiffs and the extent and gravity of discipline imposed upon similarly situated Caucasian employees; d. Whether Defendants failed to address Plaintiffs’ complaints about racial harassment and discrimination; and e. Whether Defendants failed to give Plaintiffs benefits such as overtime work, desirable work shifts and inclusion in the gift-certificate program yet granted these benefits to similarly situated Caucasian employees. 52. The claims of the representative parties are typical of the claims of the class.
INDIVIDUAL NAMED PLAINTIFFS’ CLAIMS Charles Brown’s Individual Complaints
53. Plaintiff Brown was hired by Defendant Yellow Transportation on July 5, 1991, as a temporary worker. Plaintiff Brown became a full time worker for Defendant Yellow Transportation on September 17, 1991.
54. Prior to December 2009, Plaintiff Brown was employed at the Chicago Ridge facility. He is now employed at the Chicago Heights facility.
55. Plaintiff Brown currently works for Defendants as a dock man; the same position as when he started as a full time employee.
56. During Plaintiff Brown’s employment with Defendants, Defendants subjected Plaintiff Brown to discrimination due to his race by creating and tolerating a racially hostile
9

Case: 1:08-cv-05908 Document #: 89 Filed: 07/27/10 Page 10 of 33 PageID #:1679
work environment, by treating Plaintiff Brown less favorably than similarly situated Caucasian employees, and by retaliating against Plaintiff Brown for complaining about racial discrimination as alleged with regards to the entire class in paragraphs 29 – 48.
57. Plaintiff Brown has been subjected to harassment and discrimination based on race. Examples of this harassment and discrimination include:
a. A picture of a man hanging from a noose hung on Plaintiff Brown’s forklift in June 2005; b. Multiple nooses hung in the Chicago Ridge facility between May 2005 until May 2008; c. Supervisors taking no or minimal action to cover up or erase graffiti of racial slurs and racially hostile phrases in Plaintiff Brown’s workplace at the Chicago Ridge facility; d. Supervisors ignoring and failing to take investigatory or disciplinary action based on Plaintiff Brown’s complaints about the nooses, the racial slurs, and the racially hostile phrases; e. Defendants promoting similarly situated Caucasian workers who had worked at Defendants’ company for a shorter time than Plaintiff Brown to fulltime status before Plaintiff Brown; f. Defendants punishing Plaintiff Brown for infractions for which similarly situated Caucasian employees were not disciplined, including going to the bathroom without asking permission;
10

Case: 1:08-cv-05908 Document #: 89 Filed: 07/27/10 Page 11 of 33 PageID #:1680
g. Defendants demanding that Plaintiff Brown return to work after a break or while talking to a coworker while not demanding that similarly situated Caucasian employees do the same; and h. Plaintiff Brown’s supervisor, Bob Zabonski, disciplining Plaintiff Brown for reading a newspaper in the bathroom without investigating whether Plaintiff Brown was actually reading a newspaper in the bathroom. 58. Similarly situated Caucasian employees were not subjected to such discrimination and received more favorable treatment during their employment with Defendants due to their race. 59. In April 2007, Defendant Yellow Transportation retaliated against Plaintiff Brown by denying Plaintiff Brown benefits under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) when Plaintiff Brown complained about the appearance of nooses in his workplace at the Chicago Ridge facility. 60. During Plaintiff Brown’s employment, Defendants were aware of Plaintiff Brown’s complaints as enumerated above, but failed to take corrective action or prevent further discrimination.
Jeffery Burks’s Individual Claims 61. Plaintiff Burks started working as a temporary employee for Defendant Yellow Transportation in October 1995. He was hired as a full-time dock man on February 13, 1996. 62. Plaintiff Burks is currently laid off from Defendants. 63. During Plaintiff Burks’s employment with Defendants, Defendants subjected Plaintiff Burks to discrimination due to his race by creating and tolerating a racially hostile work environment, by treating Plaintiff Burks less favorably than similarly situated Caucasian
11

Case: 1:08-cv-05908 Document #: 89 Filed: 07/27/10 Page 12 of 33 PageID #:1681
employees, and by retaliating against Plaintiff Burks for complaining about racial discrimination as alleged with regards to the entire class in paragraphs 29 – 48.
64. Similarly situated Caucasian employees were not subjected to such discrimination and received more favorable treatment in the terms and conditions of their employment with Defendants due to their race.
65. During Plaintiff Burks’s employment, Defendants were aware of Plaintiff Burks’s complaints as enumerated above, but failed to take corrective action or prevent further discrimination.
Antonio Colon’s Individual Claims 66. Plaintiff Colon started working as a temporary employee for Defendant Yellow Transportation in 2000. He became a full-time employee approximately two years later, in 2002. 67. Plaintiff Colon is currently laid off from Defendants. 68. During Plaintiff Colon’s employment with Defendants, Defendants subjected Plaintiff Colon to discrimination due to his race by creating and tolerating a racially hostile work environment, by treating Plaintiff Colon less favorably than similarly situated Caucasian employees, and by retaliating against Plaintiff Colon for complaining about racial discrimination as alleged with regards to the entire class in paragraphs 29 – 48 . 69. During his employment with Defendants, Plaintiff Colon was subjected to discrimination due to his race. Examples of this discrimination include:
a. Being subjected to disparate treatment in the enforcement of work rules and policies, such as the rule against standing around and talking after breaks are over, the requirement that workers alert a supervisor when they intend to leave to use the bathroom, and the attendance policy;
12

Case: 1:08-cv-05908 Document #: 89 Filed: 07/27/10 Page 13 of 33 PageID #:1682
b. Being assigned less desirable shifts and tasks than similarly situated Caucasian employees; c. Having to wait a longer time than similarly qualified Caucasian workers to acquire the status of full-time employee; and d. Being called a “mutt” by a coworker in reference to his being half Puerto Rican and half African-American. 70. Similarly situated Caucasian employees were not subjected to such discrimination and received more favorable treatment in the terms and conditions of their employment with Defendants, due to their race. 71. During Plaintiff Colon’s employment, Defendants were aware of Plaintiff Colon’s complaints as enumerated above, but failed to take corrective action or prevent further discrimination.
James DeMoss’s Individual Claims 72. Plaintiff DeMoss was hired by Defendant Yellow Transportation in September 1991 as a temporary worker. He became a full time worker approximately one year later, in September 1992. 73. Prior to December 2009, Plaintiff DeMoss was employed at the Chicago Ridge facility. He is now employed at the Chicago Heights facility. 74. Plaintiff DeMoss currently works for Defendants as a dock man/spotter, but is on soft layoff status. 75. During Plaintiff DeMoss’s employment with Defendants, Defendants have subjected Plaintiff DeMoss to discrimination due to his race by creating and tolerating a racially hostile work environment, by treating Plaintiff DeMoss less favorably than similarly situated
13

Case: 1:08-cv-05908 Document #: 89 Filed: 07/27/10 Page 14 of 33 PageID #:1683
Caucasian employees, and by retaliating against Plaintiff DeMoss for complaining about racial discrimination as alleged with regards to the entire class in paragraphs 29 – 48.
76. During his employment with Defendants, Plaintiff DeMoss was subjected to discrimination due to his race. Examples of this discrimination include:
a. Being denied promotion to full-time status until one day after a similarly situated Caucasian worker was promoted, which resulted in the Caucasian worker receiving seniority status, better work schedules, overtime, and days off; b. Being denied promotion by supervisors who subjected Plaintiff DeMoss to more stringent testing requirements than similarly situated Caucasian employees when he applied to be a driver; c. Receiving less desirable work schedules and more labor-intensive loads than similarly situated Caucasian dock workers; and d. Defendants not responding to Plaintiff DeMoss’s complaints about racial slurs being used at the Chicago Ridge facility, including, but not limited to, a Caucasian employee making racial comments over the radio system. 77. Similarly situated Caucasian employees were not subjected to such discrimination and received more favorable treatment in the terms and conditions of their employment with Defendants, due to their race. 78. During Plaintiff DeMoss’s employment, Defendants were aware of Plaintiff DeMoss’s complaints as enumerated above, but failed to take corrective action or prevent further discrimination.
14

Case: 1:08-cv-05908 Document #: 89 Filed: 07/27/10 Page 15 of 33 PageID #:1684
Jameson Dixon’s Individual Claims 79. Plaintiff Dixon began working for Defendant Yellow Transportation in April 1999 as a temporary worker and became a full time worker in August 1999. 80. Plaintiff Dixon is currently laid off from Defendants. 81. During Plaintiff Dixon’s employment with Defendants, Defendants subjected Plaintiff Dixon to discrimination due to his race by creating and tolerating a racially hostile work environment, by treating Plaintiff Dixon less favorably than similarly situated Caucasian employees, and by retaliating against Plaintiff Dixon for complaining about racial discrimination as alleged with regards to the entire class in paragraphs 29 – 48. 82. During his employment with Defendants, Plaintiff Dixon was subjected to discrimination due to his race. Examples of this discrimination include:
a. Being ordered back to work after a break when similarly situated Caucasian employees were not ordered back to work; and b. Having his complaints about racially charged graffiti and comments ignored by company supervisors. 83. Similarly situated Caucasian employees were not subjected to such discrimination and received more favorable treatment in the terms and conditions of their employment with Defendants. 84. During Plaintiff Dixon’s employment with Defendants, he was retaliated against for complaining about the racially hostile work environment when a supervisor denied him permission to work with certain coworkers for the stated reason that Plaintiff Dixon had filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).
15

Case: 1:08-cv-05908 Document #: 89 Filed: 07/27/10 Page 16 of 33 PageID #:1685
85. During Plaintiff Dixon’s employment, Defendants were aware of Plaintiff Dixon’s complaints as enumerated above, but failed to take corrective action or prevent further discrimination.
Clark Faulkner’s Individual Claims 86. Plaintiff Faulkner began working for Defendant Yellow Transportation in June 1997 as a temporary worker and became a full time worker in December 1997. 87. Plaintiff Faulkner is currently laid off from Defendants. 88. During Plaintiff Faulkner’s employment with Defendants, Defendants subjected Plaintiff Faulkner to discrimination due to his race by creating and tolerating a racially hostile work environment, by treating Plaintiff Faulkner less favorably than similarly situated Caucasian employees, and by retaliating against Plaintiff Faulkner for complaining about racial discrimination as alleged with regards to the entire class in paragraphs 29 – 48. 89. During his employment with Defendants, Plaintiff Faulkner was subject to discrimination due to his race. Examples of this discrimination include:
a. Being denied promotion to full-time status until shortly after a similarly situated Caucasian worker was promoted, which resulted in the Caucasian worker receiving seniority status, better work schedules, overtime, and days off; b. Demeaning treatment including, but not limited to, being ordered to pick up a piece of wood by a Caucasian coworker while the coworker stood over the wood; c. Being denied promotion by being subjected to more stringent requirements than similarly situated Caucasian workers when Plaintiff Faulkner applied to be a driver; and
16

Case: 1:08-cv-05908 Document #: 89 Filed: 07/27/10 Page 17 of 33 PageID #:1686
d. Being subjected to more stringent disciplinary action than similarly situated Caucasian employees, and having company rules applied to him in an arbitrary way. 90. Similarly situated Caucasian employees were not subjected to such discrimination and received more favorable treatment in the terms and conditions of their employment with Defendants, due to their race. 91. During his employment with Defendants, Plaintiff Faulkner was written up for complaining about the hostile work environment. 92. During Plaintiff Faulkner’s employment, Defendants were aware of Plaintiff Faulkner’s complaints as stated above, but failed to take sufficient corrective action or prevent further discrimination. Specific examples of Defendant’s failure to respond to Plaintiff Faulkner’s complaints include but are not limited to: a. In June 2008, “KKK” was written on the wall of the work bathroom. Although Plaintiff Faulkner complained to multiple supervisors, the writing was left on the wall for at least one month. b. In July 2008, Plaintiff Faulkner asked a coworker not to wear a shirt of a tattoo of a confederate flag he had on his arm. When the coworker ignored the request, Plaintiff Faulkner complained to a supervisor who also ignored the request. The coworker continued to wear clothes that revealed the tattoo in violation of work rules but was not disciplined for this action. c. After complaining about confederate flags being worn at the Chicago Ridge facility, coworkers began to tamper with Plaintiff Faulkner’s locker.
17

Case: 1:08-cv-05908 Document #: 89 Filed: 07/27/10 Page 18 of 33 PageID #:1687
Although Plaintiff Faulkner complained about the tampering to supervisors, no investigation was performed or disciplinary action taken. 93. During Plaintiff Faulkner’s employment, Defendants were aware of Plaintiff Faulkner’s complaints as enumerated above, but failed to take corrective action or prevent further discrimination.
Kenneth George’s Individual Claims 94. Plaintiff George began working for Defendant Yellow Transportation in June 2000 as a temporary worker and became a full time worker in June 2008. 95. Plaintiff George’s employment relationship was terminated by Defendant YRC in 2008. 96. During Plaintiff George’s employment with Defendants, Defendants subjected Plaintiff George to discrimination due to his race by creating and tolerating a racially hostile work environment, by treating Plaintiff George less favorably than similarly situated Caucasian employees, and by retaliating against Plaintiff George for complaining about racial discrimination as alleged with regards to the entire class in paragraphs 29 – 48. 97. During his employment with Defendants, Plaintiff George was subject to discrimination due to his race. Examples of this discrimination include:
a. Being promoted to full time status after similarly situated Caucasian employees, thus giving seniority status to Caucasian employees; b. Being subjected to more stringent disciplinary action than similarly situated Caucasian employees, and having company rules applied to him in an arbitrary way;
18

Case: 1:08-cv-05908 Document #: 89 Filed: 07/27/10 Page 19 of 33 PageID #:1688
c. Demeaning treatment by coworkers such as graffiti written on the wall using Plaintiff George’s name along with racial slurs; d. Being denied access to workers’ compensation funds when Plaintiff George was injured at work while similarly situated Caucasian employees were not denied access; e. Being denied the opportunity to work “light duty” after being injured on the job, while similarly situated Caucasian employees were not subject to such treatment. 98. Similarly situated Caucasian employees were not subjected to such discrimination and received more favorable treatment in the terms and conditions of their employment with Defendants. 99. During Plaintiff George’s employment, Defendants were aware of Plaintiff George’s complaints as enumerated above, but failed to take corrective action or prevent further discrimination.
Leonard Gregory’s Individual Claims 100. Plaintiff Gregory was hired as a supervisor for Defendant Yellow Transportation on December 6, 1994. He was promoted to the position of Systems Operations Manager in 1997 and to the position of General Operations Manager in February 2004. Plaintiff Gregory stepped down from his position as General Operations Manager to the position of supervisor in March 2007 because he feared he would be discharged. 101. Plaintiff Gregory is currently on leave because of a work injury. 102. During Plaintiff Gregory’s employment with Defendants, Defendants subjected Plaintiff Gregory to discrimination due to his race by creating and tolerating a racially hostile
19

Case: 1:08-cv-05908 Document #: 89 Filed: 07/27/10 Page 20 of 33 PageID #:1689
work environment, by treating Plaintiff Gregory less favorably than similarly situated Caucasian employees, and by retaliating against Plaintiff Gregory for complaining about racial discrimination as alleged with regards to the entire class in paragraphs 29 – 48.
103. During his employment with Defendants, Plaintiff Gregory was subjected to discrimination due to his race. Examples of this discrimination include:
a. Insubordination by Caucasian employees that Plaintiff Gregory supervised; b. A false accusation by a Caucasian employee that led to Plaintiff Gregory’s arrest; c. Plaintiff Gregory’s tires being slashed immediately after a Caucasian employee threatened him; d. Racially charged phrases spoken at the Chicago Ridge facility and written on workroom walls such as “Leonard is a nigger lover,” “I think I’m going to take Ron Johnson to meet some of my friends at the next KKK rally, burn nigger burn, don’t forget Leonard,” “the white race would be perfect without the black race,” and “[being Black is] worse if you’re a Jehovah’s Witness;” and e. Being constructively demoted from the position of General Operations Manager to the position of supervisor by repeated threats of termination after Plaintiff Gregory took steps as a supervisor to address complaints about the hostile work environment. 104. Similarly situated Caucasian employees were not subjected to such discrimination and received more favorable treatment in the terms and conditions of their employment with Defendants, due to their race.
20

Case: 1:08-cv-05908 Document #: 89 Filed: 07/27/10 Page 21 of 33 PageID #:1690
105. During Plaintiff Gregory’s employment, Defendants were aware of Plaintiff Gregory’s complaints as enumerated above, but failed to take corrective action or prevent further discrimination.
Marshun Hill’s Individual Claims 106. Plaintiff Hill started working as a temporary employee for Defendant Yellow Transportation in June 1991 and was hired as a full-time employee three months later. 107. Prior to December 2009, Plaintiff Brown was employed at the Chicago Ridge facility. He is now employed at the Chicago Heights facility. 108. Plaintiff Hill currently works for Defendants as a dock man; the same position as when he started as a full time employee. 109. During Plaintiff Hill’s employment with Defendants, Defendants subjected Plaintiff Hill to discrimination due to his race by creating and tolerating a racially hostile work environment, by treating Plaintiff Hill less favorably than similarly situated Caucasian employees, and by retaliating against Plaintiff Hill for complaining about racial discrimination as alleged with regards to the entire class in paragraphs 29 – 48. 110. During his employment with Defendants, Plaintiff Hill was subjected to discrimination due to his race. Examples of this discrimination include:
a. Being denied promotion to full-time status until shortly after a similarly situated Caucasian worker was promoted, which resulted in the Caucasian worker receiving seniority status, better work schedules, overtime, and days off; b. Being subjected to disparate treatment with regards to the rule against standing around talking after breaks are over; and
21

Case: 1:08-cv-05908 Document #: 89 Filed: 07/27/10 Page 22 of 33 PageID #:1691
c. Being subjected to disparate treatment by being punished for minor offenses while Caucasians were not punished for comparatively greater offenses. 111. Similarly situated Caucasian employees were not subjected to such discrimination and received more favorable treatment in the terms and conditions of their employment with Defendants, due to their race. 112. During Plaintiff Hill’s employment, Defendants were aware of Plaintiff Hill’s complaints as enumerated above, but failed to take corrective action or prevent further discrimination.
Cedric Muse’s Individual Claims 113. Plaintiff Muse started working for Defendant Yellow Transportation in September 1990 as a temporary worker and became a full time employee in January 1991. 114. Plaintiff Muse is currently laid off from Defendants. 115. Plaintiff Muse was a union steward from 1997 until 1999. During this time, Plaintiff Muse was told by Supervisor Tom Hartman that he was subjected to different rules as a Union Steward because he was black. Plaintiff Muse was the only African-American Union Steward at that time. 116. During Plaintiff Muse’s employment with Defendants, Defendants subjected Plaintiff Muse to discrimination due to his race by creating and tolerating a racially hostile work environment, by treating Plaintiff Muse less favorably than similarly situated Caucasian employees, and by retaliating against Plaintiff Muse for complaining about racial discrimination as alleged with regards to the entire class in paragraphs 29 – 48. 117. Since Plaintiff Muse began working for Defendants he has been subjected to discrimination due to his race. Examples of this discrimination include but are not limited to:
22

Case: 1:08-cv-05908 Document #: 89 Filed: 07/27/10 Page 23 of 33 PageID #:1692
a. Being assigned heavier loads than Caucasian workers; b. Being assigned to physical labor while Caucasian workers were assigned to driving trucks. Plaintiff Muse was certified to drive trucks at this time; and c. Observing writing on the bathroom wall that targeted him while he was a union steward such as “Muse represents the niggers.” 118. Similarly situated Caucasian employees were not subjected to such discrimination and received more favorable treatment in the terms and conditions of their employment with Defendants, due to their race. 119. Plaintiff Muse complained about the hostile work environment to supervisors whose reaction was to tell Plaintiff Muse that they would get back to him about it. Defendants’ supervisors would not report to Plaintiff Muse that they had taken any action to remedy the hostile environment. 120. During Plaintiff Muse’s employment, Defendants were aware of Plaintiff Muse’s complaints as enumerated above, but failed to take corrective action or prevent further discrimination.
Laroy Washington’s Individual Claims 121. Plaintiff Washington began working for Defendant Yellow Transportation in November 1996 and was hired as a full-time dockworker in May 1997. 122. Plaintiff Washington is currently laid off from Defendants. 123. During Plaintiff Washington’s employment with Defendants, Defendants subjected Plaintiff Washington to discrimination due to his race by creating and tolerating a racially hostile work environment, by treating Plaintiff Washington less favorably than similarly
23

Case: 1:08-cv-05908 Document #: 89 Filed: 07/27/10 Page 24 of 33 PageID #:1693
situated Caucasian employees, and by retaliating against Plaintiff Washington for complaining about racial discrimination as alleged with regards to the entire class in paragraphs 29 – 48.
124. During his employment with Defendants, Plaintiff Washington was subjected to discrimination due to his race. Examples of this discrimination include:
a. Being denied promotion to full-time status until shortly after a similarly situated Caucasian worker was promoted, which resulted in the Caucasian worker receiving seniority status, better work schedules, overtime, and days off; and b. Being subjected to disparate treatment with regards to the rule against standing around talking after breaks are over. 125. Similarly situated Caucasian employees were not subjected to such discrimination and received more favorable treatment in the terms and conditions of their employment with Defendants, due to their race. 126. During Plaintiff Washington’s employment, Defendants were aware of Plaintiff Washington’s complaints as enumerated above, but failed to take corrective action or prevent further discrimination.
Darryl Williams’s Individual Claims 127. Plaintiff Williams started working as a temporary employee for Defendant Yellow Transportation in August 2001. He became a full-time dock man on June 25, 2002. 128. Plaintiff Williams is currently laid off from Defendants. 129. During Plaintiff Williams’s employment with Defendants, Defendants subjected Plaintiff Williams to discrimination due to his race by creating and tolerating a racially hostile work environment, by treating Plaintiff Williams less favorably than similarly situated Caucasian
24

Case: 1:08-cv-05908 Document #: 89 Filed: 07/27/10 Page 25 of 33 PageID #:1694
employees, and by retaliating against Plaintiff Williams for complaining about racial discrimination as alleged with regards to the entire class in paragraphs 29 – 48.
130. During his employment with Defendants, Plaintiff Williams was subjected to discrimination due to his race. Examples of this discrimination include:
a. Being subjected to disparate treatment in the enforcement of work rules and policies when a supervisor walked past four Caucasian men violating the rule against talking in order to reprimand Plaintiff Williams for violating the rule against using a cell phone; and b. Being subjected to disparate treatment on account of his race with regard to work assignments and difficulty of work. 131. Similarly situated Caucasian employees were not subjected to such discrimination and received more favorable treatment in the terms and conditions of their employment with Defendants, due to their race. 132. Plaintiff Williams was retaliated against for complaining about discrimination by getting more difficult assignments or by getting no work at all. 133. During Plaintiff Williams’s employment, Defendants were aware of Plaintiff Williams’s complaints as enumerated above, but failed to take corrective action or prevent further discrimination.
Charles Woods’s Individual Claims 134. Plaintiff C. Woods started working as a temporary employee for Defendant Yellow Transportation in July 2002 and became a full time employee in August 2003. 135. Plaintiff C. Woods is currently laid off from Defendants.
25

Case: 1:08-cv-05908 Document #: 89 Filed: 07/27/10 Page 26 of 33 PageID #:1695
136. During Plaintiff C. Woods’s employment with Defendants, Defendants subjected Plaintiff Woods to discrimination due to his race by creating and tolerating a racially hostile work environment, by treating Plaintiff C. Woods less favorably than similarly situated Caucasian employees, and by retaliating against Plaintiff Woods for complaining about racial discrimination as alleged with regards to the entire class in paragraphs 29 – 48.
137. During his employment with Defendants, Plaintiff C. Woods has been subject to discrimination on account of his race. Examples of this discrimination include:
a. Being subject to more stringent requirements than similarly situated Caucasian employees to gain full time status; b. Being given a more difficult driving test than similarly situated Caucasian employees when he applied to be a driver for Defendants; c. Overhearing his supervisor tell his coworkers that he did not like AfricanAmericans and Mexicans; and d. Being disciplined for actions for which similarly situated Caucasian employees were not disciplined, including taking breaks at prohibited times. 138. Similarly situated Caucasian employees were not subjected to such discrimination and received more favorable treatment in the terms and conditions of their employment with Defendants. 139. During Plaintiff C. Woods’s employment, Defendants were aware of Plaintiff Woods’s complaints as enumerated above, but failed to take corrective action or prevent further discrimination.
26

Case: 1:08-cv-05908 Document #: 89 Filed: 07/27/10 Page 27 of 33 PageID #:1696
Michael Woods’s Individual Claims 140. Plaintiff M. Woods started working as a temporary employee for Defendant Yellow Transportation in mid-2001. He became a full-time employee on June 25, 2002. 141. Plaintiff M. Woods’s employment relationship was terminated by Defendant YRC in 2009. 142. During Plaintiff M. Woods’s employment with Defendants, Defendants subjected Plaintiff Woods to discrimination due to his race by creating and tolerating a racially hostile work environment, by treating Plaintiff M. Woods less favorably than similarly situated Caucasian employees, and by retaliating against Plaintiff M. Woods for complaining about racial discrimination as alleged with regards to the entire class in paragraphs 29 – 48. 143. During his employment with Defendants, Plaintiff M. Woods was subjected to discrimination due to his race. Examples of this discrimination include:
a. Being subjected to disparate treatment in the enforcement of work rules and policies, such as the rule against standing around talking after breaks are over and the requirement that workers alert a supervisor when they intend to leave to use the bathroom; b. Being denied promotion to full-time status until shortly after a similarly situated Caucasian worker was promoted, which resulted in the Caucasian worker receiving seniority status, better work schedules, overtime, and days off; and c. Being subjected to a hostile work environment by being specifically named in statements appearing on bathroom walls, such as, “Mike is a rotten nigger,” “Woods you’re a dead mother fucker,” “Michael Woods your dead,” and “Mike isn’t black.”
27

Case: 1:08-cv-05908 Document #: 89 Filed: 07/27/10 Page 28 of 33 PageID #:1697
144. Plaintiff M. Woods was retaliated against for complaining about discrimination. Examples of this retaliation include but are not limited to:
a. Having axel grease poured on the seat of his forklift after he complained about the hostile work environment; b. Being punished for actions that did not violate any rule; c. Being punished for violating rules that were rarely or never enforced; d. Receiving unusually harsh punishments for violations that typically warranted minimal reprimand; e. Being temporarily terminated for reasons his supervisors refused to state; and f. Plaintiff M. Woods was labeled as a “trouble-maker” by Defendants’ supervisors for complaining about race discrimination. Plaintiff M. Woods was watched and disciplined more strictly than he was before complaining. 145. Similarly situated Caucasian employees were not subjected to such discrimination and received more favorable treatment in the terms and conditions of their employment with Defendants, due to their race. 146. During Plaintiff M. Woods’s employment, Defendants were aware of Plaintiff M. Woods’s complaints as enumerated above, but failed to take corrective action or prevent further discrimination.
Mack Leonard's Individual Claims 147. Plaintiff Leonard was hired by Defendant Yellow Transportation as a janitor in July 2006 as a temporary worker. Plaintiff Leonard became a permanent employee approximately 90 days after his hiring date. 148. Plaintiff Leonard is currently laid off from Defendants.
28

Case: 1:08-cv-05908 Document #: 89 Filed: 07/27/10 Page 29 of 33 PageID #:1698
149. During Plaintiff Leonard’s employment with Defendants, Defendants subjected Plaintiff Leonard to discrimination due to his race by creating and tolerating a racially hostile work environment, by treating Plaintiff Leonard less favorably than similarly situated Caucasian employees, and by retaliating against Plaintiff Leonard for complaining about racial discrimination as alleged with regards to the entire class in paragraphs 29 – 48.
150. During Plaintiff Leonard’s employment with Defendants, Plaintiff Leonard was the subject of harassment and discrimination based on race. Examples of this harassment and discrimination include:
a. Defendants demanding that Plaintiff Leonard clean up graffiti stating “Kill Nigger” covered in feces, although the graffiti had been there for at least two days prior to Plaintiff Leonard’s arrival at work and other Caucasian janitors had been present and available to clean up the graffiti; b. Defendants requesting that Plaintiff Leonard give up a preferred work shift to a Caucasian staffer with less seniority; c. Multiple racial slurs and racially hostile phrases in Plaintiff Leonard’s workplace at the Chicago Ridge facility; d. Supervisors gave Leonard more difficult work than similarly situated Caucasian employees; e. Supervisors ignoring or failing to take investigatory or disciplinary action based on Plaintiff Leonard’s complaints about racial slurs, racially hostile phrases, and graffiti; and
29

Case: 1:08-cv-05908 Document #: 89 Filed: 07/27/10 Page 30 of 33 PageID #:1699
f. Defendants demanding that Plaintiff Leonard return to work after a break or while talking to a coworker while not demanding that similarly situated Caucasian employees do the same. 151. Similarly situated Caucasian employees were not subjected to such discrimination and received more favorable treatment during their employment with Defendants due to their race. 152. During Plaintiff Leonard’s employment, Defendants were aware of Plaintiff Leonard’s complaints as enumerated above, but failed to take corrective action or prevent further discrimination.
COUNT I: VIOLATIONS OF 42 U.S.C. § 1981 153. Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege each allegation above as if set forth herein in full. 154. Defendants has subjected its African-American employees to different terms and conditions of employment than similarly situated Caucasian employees and has intentionally discriminated against Plaintiffs and the Class in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 by: (1) allowing a racially hostile work environment to exist by not taking sufficient actions to stop nooses from being hung at the Chicago Ridge facility, racial slurs and racially hostile statements from being written and spoken, racially hostile symbols from being displayed and racial employees from wearing racially charged clothing and tattoos, racial slurs and racially hostile language being written on workplace walls at the Chicago Ridge and Chicago Heights facilities, and nooses being hung at the Chicago Ridge facility to intimidate African-American employees; (2) applying promotion practices which give seniority to Caucasian workers that have worked for the Defendants for either less or equal time than similarly situated African-American employees; (3) applying disciplinary actions in a discriminatory fashion against African-Americans; (4)
30

Case: 1:08-cv-05908 Document #: 89 Filed: 07/27/10 Page 31 of 33 PageID #:1700
refusing to respond to or not taking sufficient actions about complaints from African-American employees about the hostile work environment; (5) retaliating against African-American employees for complaining about the racially hostile work environment.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 155. WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs and the Class respectfully request that this Court grant the following relief:
a. Certification of a Class consisting of all African-American employees employed at Defendants’ Chicago Ridge facility from October 15, 2004, to December 2009 including those African-American employees who were transferred from the Chicago Ridge facility to work at the Chicago Heights facility; b. Enter judgment that Defendants’ acts and practices as set forth herein are in violation of the laws of the United States; c. Enter preliminary and permanent relief enjoining the discriminatory conduct and requiring Defendants to take steps to end its discriminatory practices and prevent current and future harm to Plaintiffs and the Class, including, but not limited to:
i. Revised procedures which would require that Defendants’ managers use fair and objective criteria when promoting employees; ii. Revised procedures which would require that Defendants’ disciplinary procedures to be applied in a non-discriminatory fashion; iii. Implementation of a meaningful system of oversight to ensure that Defendants’ managers are using objective criteria to assign overtime,
31

Case: 1:08-cv-05908 Document #: 89 Filed: 07/27/10 Page 32 of 33 PageID #:1701

shift schedules, job assignments, and benefits such as hiring and promotions; and iv. Implementation of meaningful procedures to ensure racial harassment at the Chicago Heights facility is eliminated. v. Implementation of meaningful procedures to ensure that racial discrimination at the Chicago Ridge facility is eliminated if it is reopened. d. Award Plaintiffs and the Class lost wages, including back pay for failure to promote, and any lost benefits that would otherwise have been available to the Plaintiffs and Class without the discrimination; e. Award Plaintiffs and the Class compensatory and punitive damages; f. Award reinstatement to class members who resigned due to race discrimination; g. Award Plaintiffs the costs of this action, including the fees and costs of experts, together with reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs; and h. Grant Plaintiffs and the Class such other and further relief as this Court finds necessary and proper.
JURY DEMAND 156. Plaintiffs demand a trial by jury on all issues of facts and damages in this action.
Respectfully Submitted,

Randall D. Schmidt Edwin F. Mandel Legal Aid Clinic 6020 S. University Ave. Chicago, Illinois 60637

By: s/ Randall D. Schmidt One of Plaintiffs’ Attorneys
32

Case: 1:08-cv-05908 Document #: 89 Filed: 07/27/10 Page 33 of 33 PageID #:1702

(773) 702-9611 Fax: (773) 702-2063
Carol Coplan Babbitt Law Offices of Carol Coplan Babbitt 35 East Wacker Drive Suite 650 Chicago, Illinois 60601 (312) 435-9775 Fax: (312) 782-4519
Dated: July 27, 2010

Catherine A. Caporusso Law Offices of Catherine A. Caporusso 53 W. Jackson Suite 504 Chicago, Illinois 60604 (312) 933-0655 Fax: (312) 347-3272

33

 </s> Case: 1:08-cv-05908 Document #: 60 Filed: 10/09/09 Page 1 of 9 PageID #:1410

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

CHARLES BROWN, JEFFREY BURKS,

)

ANTONIO COLON, JAMES DEMOSS,

)

JAMESON DIXON, CLARK FAULKNER,

)

KENNETH GEORGE, LEONARD GREGORY, )

MARSHUN HILL, CEDRIC MUSE, LAROY )

WASHINGTON, DARRELL WILLIAMS,

)

CHARLES WOODS, and MICHAEL WOODS, )

on behalf of themselves and similarly

)

situated African-American employees,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

YELLOW TRANSPORTATION, INC.,

)

)

Defendant.

)

No. 08 C 5908
Judge Joan B. Gottschall Magistrate Judge Nan R. Nolan

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiffs, current and former employees oDf efendant Yellow Transportation, Inc. (“Yellow”),

have filed suit on behalf of themselves and similarly situated African-American employees, seeking

redress for violations of 4 2 U.S.C. § 1981. Spec ifically, Charles Brown, Jeffrey Burks, Antonio

Colon, James DeMoss, Jameson Dixon, Clark Faulkner, Kenneth George, Leonard Gregory,

Marshun Hill, Cedric Muse, Laroy Washington, Darrell Williams, Charles Woods and Mi chael

Woods allege that they were subejcted to an offensive and raciallydiscriminatory work environment,

including racial slurs; racial graffiti; co-workerswearing racially derogatory apparel; disparate terms

of employment; denial of equal opportunity to promotions; racially biased discipline; and retaliation

for complaints of racial bias.

Currently before the court is Plaintiffs’ motion to quash subpoenas and for protective order.

For the reasons stated below, the motion is granted.

Case: 1:08-cv-05908 Document #: 60 Filed: 10/09/09 Page 2 of 9 PageID #:1411
BACKGROUND Plaintiffs filed this laws uit on October 15, 2008, and the parties promptly commenced discovery relating to the issue of class certification. On March 31, 2009, Yellow moved for leave to amend its answer and add the affirmative defense of jud icial estoppel. In that motion, Yellow claims that during the course of discovery, it learned that Plaintiffs JeffreByurks, Antonio Colon and Jameson Dixon were parties to personal bankruptcy proceedings, but failed to disc lose to the bankruptcy court the exis tence of their claims against Yellow. For example, Mr. Burks filed a charge against Yellow with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) on October 4, 2005; he was discharged from bankruptcy on July12, 2007; but he never notified the bankruptcy court of his pending EEOC charge. Mr. Colon, similarly, filed an EEOC charge against Yellow on October 14, 2005, the same day he filed a voluntary petition for Chapter 7 bankruptcy; he was discharged from bankruptcy on March 13, 2006; but he never notified the bankruptcy court of his pending EEOC charge. (Motion to Amend, Doc. 40, ¶¶ 6-15.) Mr. Dixon also filed an EEO C charge against Yellow on O ctober 4, 2005, shortly after petitioning for Chapter 7 bankruptcy on September 9, 2005; he was discharged from bankrup tcy on December 27, 2005; but he never notified the bankruptcy court of his pending EEOC charge. On October 6, 2008, M r. Dixon filed another v oluntary petition for bank ruptcy, this tim e under Chapter 13. (Id. ¶¶ 16-20.) He did notify the bankruptcy courtabout the existence of this lawsuit, but only after Yellow raised the matter with Plaintiffs’ counsel. By May 2009, Yellow believed that it had uncovered facts to support a second affirmative defense – after-acquired evidence . Yellow renewed its motion for leave to amend, adding the following information: Mr. Burks and Laroy Washi ngton both stated on their employment applications that they had never been convicted of a crime when, in fact, Mr. Burks pled guilty to the crime of Theft From Person on November 2, 1981, and Mr. Washington pled guilty to thfelony crime of Possession of a Controlled Substance With Intent to Deliver on February 25, 1987. Mr.
2

Case: 1:08-cv-05908 Document #: 60 Filed: 10/09/09 Page 3 of 9 PageID #:1412
Burks was sentenced to two years probation and two days jail time, and he had to pay $60in court costs and fees. Mr. Washington was sentenced to two years probation. (Id. ¶¶ 22-26.)
The motion to amend remains pending before the district c ourt, but all other discovery matters have been referred to this courftor resolution. This includes Plaintiffs’ July 13, 2009 motion to quash subpoenas and for protective order, which relates to the m otion for leave to amend. Specifically, in March and June 2009, Yellow served 19 subpoenas on Plaintiffs’former employers, requesting, among other things, personnel files, payroll records, performance reviews, disciplinary records, background and reference checks,and complaints or charges. Yellow claims that in light of its independent discovery that Mr. Burks and Mr. Washi ngton were not truthful on their employment applications, they are entitled to di scovery aimed at determining whether there are additional bases for an after-acquired evidence defense with respect to these and the other Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs insist that the requested discov ery is improper and lacking in any probative value, prompting the instant motion.
DISCUSSION “A party has a general right to subpoena any person to . . . produce docum ents for inspection and copying.” Davis v. City of Springfield, Illinois, Nos. 04-3168 and 07-3096, 2009 WL 910204, at *2 (C.D. Ill. Apr. 1, 2009) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 45). “[T]he scope of material obtainable by a Rule 45 subpoena is as broad as permitted underthe discovery rules.” Wallace v. Hounshel, No. 1:06-cv-01560-RLY-TAB, 2008 WL 89933, at *2 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 2, 2008). In other words, “[a] subpoena will survive a motion to quash when it designates topics that are reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence.” Stock v. Integrated Health Plan, Inc., 241 F.R.D. 618, 621 (S.D. Ill. 2007). Yellow argues that the subpoenas seek evidence bearing on Plaintiffs’ credibility, which is relevant in determining their adequacy as class representa tives. Yellow also claims that the
3

Case: 1:08-cv-05908 Document #: 60 Filed: 10/09/09 Page 4 of 9 PageID #:1413

subpoenas may produce documents relevant to its after-acquired evidence defense. The court

considers each theory in turn.

A. Adequacy of Representation

Yellow first focuses on the fact that Plaintiffs are seeking to represent a class of similarly

situated employees. To succeed on a motion for class certification, Plaintiffs must show, among

other things, that they “will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.” Barragan v.

Evanger’s Dog and Cat Food Co., __ F.R.D. __, 2009 WL 2762403, at *1 (N.D. Ill. 2009)(quoting

FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)). Some courts have found that “[b]ecause the lead plaintiffs will act as

fiduciaries for the absent plaintiffs, the court ca n examine their integrity and credibility in

determining whether they are suitable representatives for the class.” Pope v. Harvard Banchares,

Inc., 240 F.R.D. 383, 390 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (citingKaplan v. Pomerantz, 132 F.R.D. 504, 508-10 (N.D.

Ill. 1990)). See also Davidson v. Citizens Gas & Coke Utility, 238 F.R.D. 225, 229 (S.D. Ind. 2006)

(“[P]ersonal characteristics, such as the credibility and integrity of a putative class representative,

have a direct bearing on their ability to adequately represent absent members of the class.”)

Other courts, however, have found that “credibility is not a requirement of a

class

representative, and whether or not a plaintiff is credible is irrelevant to that person’s ability to be a

class representative.” Streeter v. Sheriff of Cook County , 256 F.R.D. 609, 613 (N.D. Ill. 2009)

(quoting Phipps v. Sheriff of Cook County, 249 F.R.D. 298, 301 (N.D. Ill. 2008)). See also Levie

v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 496 F. Supp. 2d 944, 950 (N.D. Ill. 2007) (same ). This court need not

resolve the question, which is a matter for the district court in ruling on Plaintiffs’ anticipatemdotion

for class certification. This court must determine, howe ver, whether discovery on the issue is

warranted here.

Yellow claims that the fact tha t (1) Mr. Burks and Mr. Washington failed to disclose their

criminal convictions on their employment applications; and (2) Mr. Burks, Mr. Colon and Mr. Dixon

failed to disclose their discrimination charges to the bankruptcy court, “severely undermines the

4

Case: 1:08-cv-05908 Document #: 60 Filed: 10/09/09 Page 5 of 9 PageID #:1414
credibility” of these Plaintiffs.1 (Def. Resp., at 8.) The subpoenas, Yellow argues, may reveal other lies in the employment applications of these andother Plaintiffs, which may “bolster Yellow’s claim that the Plaintiffs are inadequate class representatives.” (Id. at 9.)
Assuming that credibility is relevant toa showing of adequate representation, the court has significant doubts that the misrepresentations found in the employment applications of Mr. Burks and Mr. Washington “severely undermine” their ability to represent the class. Mr. Burks applied to work at Yellow nearly 14 yearsafter pleading guilty to the crime of Theft From Person on November 2, 1981. Mr. Washington applied to work at Yellow more than nine years after pleading guilty to the crime of felony Possession of a Controlled Substance With Intent to Deliver. “Where courts have found that credibility issues render the proposed representative inadequate, the representative’s credibility has been dubious with res pect to substantial issues directly relevant to the claim s at issue.” Roe v. Bridgestone Corp., 257 F.R.D. 159, 169 (S.D. Ind. 2009).
Yellow claims the requested documents may s how that Plaintiffs “fail[ed] to disclose the existence of prior employers, the true reasons fortheir past separations from employment,or their prior attendance histories.” (Def. Resp., at 9. ) The court does not see how this inform ation is pertinent to Plaintiffs’ ability to represent a class alleging racial h arassment and discrimination. Compare Brider v. Nationwide Credit, Inc., No. 97 C 3830, 1998 WL 729747, at *3-4 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 14, 1998) (plaintiff was not an adequate class representative in fair debt collection case where, among other things, she repeatedly gave false answers at her deposition). The subpoenas at issue here are unlikely to bolster a claim of inadequacy, and the court declines to find them relevant on this basis. See Lau v. Arrow Fin. Servs., LLC, No. 06 C 3141, 2007 WL 1502118, at *6 (N.D. Ill.

1

Yellow claims that “[i]t also appears that Plaintiff Kenneth George . . . has failed to

file a 2008 Federal Income Tax Return.” (Def. Resp., at 5.) The court does not see how this has

any relevance to Mr. George’s truthfulness in the employment context.

5

Case: 1:08-cv-05908 Document #: 60 Filed: 10/09/09 Page 6 of 9 PageID #:1415
May 22, 2007) (“[T]he burden of d emonstrating that the class representative is adequate is not heavy.”)
B. After-Acquired Evidence Yellow next argues that the subpoenas may uncover information relevant to its afteracquired evidence defense. Under this defense, an employee’s misconductmay limit his recovery of damages. As the Seventh Circuit has explained: [a]n employer may be found liable for emplomy ent discrimination, but if the employer later – typically in discovery – turns up ev idence of employee wrongdoing which would have led to the employee’s discharge, then the employee’s right to back pay is limited to the period before the discovery of this after-acquired evidence. Sheehan v. Donlen Corp. , 173 F.3d 1039, 1047 (7th Cir. 1999) (citing McKennon v. Nashville Banner Pub. Co., 513 U.S. 352, 361 (1995)). Yellow notes that it discovered, through public record searches, that both Mr. Burks and Mr. Washington falselystated on their employment applications that they had never been convictedof crimes. These misrepresentations, Yellow says, “warranted Mr. Burks’ and Mr. Washington’s terminations.”(Def. Resp., at 10.) Yellow now seeks to determine whether these two Plaintiffs “or any of the remaining Plaintiffs have made additional misrepresentations in their employment applications, thus lending further support to Yellow’s afteracquired evidence defense.” (Id.) (emphasis omitted). Plaintiffs respond that the after-acquired evidence defense onlyapplies to former employees seeking back pay for wrongful termination. Yellow disagrees, but all of its cited cases involve former employees who allege constructive discharge or wrongful termination. See Schnidrig v. Columbia Mach., Inc., 80 F.3d 1406, 1412 (9th Cir. 1996) (plaintiff who resigned his employment could not pursue constructivedischarge claim, but employer’s discovery ofafter-acquired evidence “may bear upon” the plaintiff’s remedy upon a finding of liability)M; artin v. Scott & Stringfellow, Inc., No. 3:08-cv-417, 2009 WL 54510, at *1-2 (E.D. Va. Jan. 8, 2009) (where employee resigned due to an allegedly hostile work en vironment and claimed constructive discharge, court allowed
6

Case: 1:08-cv-05908 Document #: 60 Filed: 10/09/09 Page 7 of 9 PageID #:1416

defendant to amend its answer to assert an after-acquired evidence defense);

Newland v.

Stevinson Toyota East, Inc., No. 05-cv-01380-EWN-MEH, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21172, at *6-7

(D. Colo. Apr. 10, 2006) (allowing defendant to amend its answer to assert an after-acquired

evidence defense where the plaintiff cited no authority suggesting that the doctrine “has not been

extended to situations of constructive discharge.”);Gutescu v. Carey Int’l, Inc., No. 01-4026, 2003

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27504, at *7 (S.D. Fla. June 23, 2003) (employee alleging discriminatory discharge

had to respond to discovery requests relating to an after-acquired evidence defense).

Only one Plaintiff, Kenneth George, has a potential claim for back pay for wrongful

termination: Yellow terminated his employment in October 2008, and he claims that it was

discriminatory. The remaining Plaintiffs are all current employees. Yellow has not cited, nor has

the court found any cases applying the after-acquired evidence doctrine to limit the damages of a

current employee. Yellow argues that this is due to the following dilemma: having discovered

evidence meriting discharge, an employer wouldhave to choose between firing the employees and

risking additional discrimination and/or retaliation charges, or keeping the employees on the payroll

and forfeiting an after-acquired evidence defense. Presumably, however, a legitimate termination

would accomplish the same goal as the after-acquired evidence doctrine: limitation of back pay.

It is thus not clear that employers may seek discovery regarding after-acquired evidence in these

circumstances without following through on the termination.

Yellow also stresses that seve ral Plaintiffs are seeking to recover back pay for failure to

promote and/or discriminatory layoff. This includes Charles BrownJ, ames DeMoss, Clark Faulkner,

Antonio Colon, Jameson Dixon, Laroy Washington, Charles Woods andDarrell Williams. (Cmplt.

¶¶ 49(e), 64(b), 75(c); Def. Resp., at 11 n.12.) Plaintiffs claim this is inaccurate, insisting that the

only damages they seek are for“the wrongs caused by the hostile environment.” (Pl. Reply, at 9.)

All of these arguments are more properlyaddressed by the district court in ruling on Yellow’s motion

to amend. Absent the district court’s guidance, the court will take a broad approach and assume

7

Case: 1:08-cv-05908 Document #: 60 Filed: 10/09/09 Page 8 of 9 PageID #:1417

that the doctrine may apply to these employees in addition to Mr. George]. See Sides v. City of

Champaign, 496 F.3d 820, 825 (7th Cir. 2007) (“Courtsare to use their discretion under Rule 15(a)

to liberally grant permission to amend pleadings.”); Cima v. WellPoint Health Networks, Inc., No.

05-cv-4127-JPG, 2008 WL 746916, at *3 (S.D. Ill. Mar. 18, 2 008) (“Rule 26 embodies a liberal

discovery standard.”)

This, however, does not end th e court’s inquiry. Plaintiffs argue that the subpoenas still

should be quashed because defendants cannot seek discovery aimed solely at u ncovering

evidence to support an after-acquired evidence defense. (Pl. Mot. ¶ 13.) In Woods v. Fresenius

Med. Care Group of N. Amer., No. 1:06-cv-1804-RLY-WTL, 2008 WL 151836 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 16,

2008), for ex ample, the court quashed subpoenas issued to the plaintiff’s past and current

employers where the defendant had no basis for believing that she had been untruthful. Id. at *2.

The court explained that “an employment discrimi nation plaintiff does not open her entire work

history up for discovery by the defendant as a matter of c ourse; rather, the defendant must

demonstrate a specific reason why the information is relevantto the particular claims and defenses

in the case at hand.” Id. at *1. See also Perry v. Best Lock Corp,. No. IP 98-C-0936-H/G, 1999 WL

33494858, at *3 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 21, 1999) (“[D]iscovery is not warranted for the sole purpose of

developing a possible after-acquired evidence defense.”) (emphasis in original).

Yellow claims that, unlike the defendants in Woods and Perry, it has identified specific

reasons for issuing subpoenas to Plaintiffs’ former employers – the untruthfulness of Mr. Burks, Mr.

Washington, Mr. Colon and Mr. Dixon. In Yellow’s view, itsdiscovery of “a wide variety of material

misrepresentations” prior to even issuing the subpoenas more than justifies the discovery. (Def.

Resp., at 13.) The court disagrees. Yellow does not claim that it could fire Mr. Burks, Mr. Colon

or Mr. Dixon for failing to make required disclosures to the bankruptcy

court. Thus, these

misrepresentations are not relevant to an after-acquired evidence defense, and cannot justify

Yellow’s subpoenas to their past employers. The court also declines to find that the 1980s

8

Case: 1:08-cv-05908 Document #: 60 Filed: 10/09/09 Page 9 of 9 PageID #:1418

convictions of Mr. Washington and Mr. Burkssupport a review of their employment histories, much less those of the other Plaintiffs. Yellow has not offered any basis for imputing dishonesftryom one plaintiff to another. The McKennon Court recognized that “employers might as a routine matter undertake extensive discovery into an employee’s background or performance on the job to resist [discrimination] claims.” 513 U.S. at 363. The Court also opined, however, that courts can deter most abuses by invoking “the appropriate provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” Id.
Plaintiffs’ motion to quash the subpoenas is granted. To the extent Yellow has already received responses to any of the subpoenas, it must destroy the records and cannot utilize any information contained in them.
CONCLUSION For the reasons set forth abov e, Plaintiffs’ Motion to Quash Subpoenas and Motion for Protective Order [45] is granted.
ENTER:

Dated: October 8, 2009

___________________________________ NAN R. NOLAN United States Magistrate Judge

9

 </s> Case: 1:08-cv-05908 Document #: 128 Filed: 05/11/11 Page 1 of 16 PageID #:11011

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICST OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

CHARLES BROWN, JEFFREY BURKS,

)

ANTONIO COLON, JAMES DEMOSS,

)

JAMESON DIXON, CLARK FAULKNER,

)

KENNETH GEORGE, LEONARD GREGORY, )

MARSHUN HILL, CEDRIC MUSE, LAROY

)

WASHINGTON, DARRELL WILLIAMS,

)

CHARLES WOODS, MICHAEL WOODS, and )

MACK LEONARD, on behalf of themselves and )

similarly situated African-American employees, )

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

YELLOW TRANSPORTATION, INC., and YRC, )

INC.,

)

)

Defendants.

)

Case No. 08 C 5908 Judge Joan B. Gottschall

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER The named Plaintiffs (“Plaint iffs”) have filed a com plaint on behalf of them selves and other similarly situated African-American em ployees (the “putative cla ss”) against defendant freight transportation com panies Yellow Trans portation, Inc. (“Yellow”) and YRC, Inc. (“YRC”). The Plaintiffs allege that both de fendants violated the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, by creating a racially hostile work environment for African-American employees, subjecting those em ployees to di sparate treatment, and retalia ting against the em ployees when they complained about the discriminatory conduct. Presently at issue is the Plaintiffs’ motion for an order certifying this case as a class action. For the reas ons set forth below, the court grants the Plaintiffs’ motion.

Case: 1:08-cv-05908 Document #: 128 Filed: 05/11/11 Page 2 of 16 PageID #:11012

I. BACKGROUND Since October 15, 2004, the Plaintiffs claim that they have suffered racial discrim ination at the hands of Yellow and, later, YRC. All of the Plaintiffs and putative class members initially worked for Yellow or YRC at a distribution facility in Chicago Ridge, Illinois; when this facility closed in 2009, some—but not all—of the class members were transferred to th e YRC facility located in Chicago Heights, Illinois.1 The Plaintiffs allege th at Yellow and YRC failed to ad dress recurring complaints regarding other employees’ racially hostile behavior, including turning a blind eye to (1) nooses repeatedly being displayed at the Chicago Ridge facility, (2) racially hostile graffiti placed in the bathrooms, and (3) other em ployees’ practices of using of r acial slurs, wearing racially hostile clothing, and exposing racially host ile tattoos. In addi tion, the Plaintiffs al lege that Yellow and YRC subjected them to disparate treatm ent on account of th eir race by, inter alia, disciplining African-Americans more stringently than s imilarly situated Caucasian em ployees, and by promoting less senior Caucasians instead of (or prior to) promoting African-Americans. Finally, the Plaintiffs allege th at Yellow an d YRC retalia ted against them and other m embers of the putative class for complaining about the hostil e work environm ent and racially disparate treatment. As a result, the Pla intiffs seek to certif y a class cons isting of the f ollowing individuals:

1

Yellow, together with another freigh t company nam ed Roadway Express, Inc.

(“Roadway”), began operating as YRC in about October 2008. Thus, Yellow operated the

Chicago Ridge location from about October 2004 until October 2008; YRC operated the facility

from that point until the facility closed in December of 2009. The Chicago Heights location was

initially operated by Roadway, but by the tim e the Chicago Ridge employees were transferred to

Chicago Heights, the Chicago Heights location was run by YRC.

2

Case: 1:08-cv-05908 Document #: 128 Filed: 05/11/11 Page 3 of 16 PageID #:11013
All current and former African-American employees employed between October 15, 2004, and the present by YRC, Inc. and Yellow Transportation, Inc. at their facility located at 10301 S. Harlem Av e., Chicago Ridge, Illino is (“Chicago Ridge”) and those Chicago Ridge employees transferred in 2009 to work at the facility located at 2000 Lincoln Highway, Chicago He ights, Illinois (“Chicago Heights”). According to the P laintiffs, this class would encompass approximately 354 people. The court now turns to whether this putative class is ap propriate for cer tification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.
II. LEGAL STANDARD Pursuant to Rule 23, the Plaintiffs bear the burden of proving that : (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all m embers is im practicable; (2) there are ques tions of law or fact common to the class; (3 ) the claims or defenses of the repr esentative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class ; and (4) the re presentative parties will fairly and adequate ly protect the interests of the class. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1)–(4); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 162-63 (1974). In addition, the putative class m ust also satisfy the prerequisites set forth in Rule 23(b). Eisen, 417 U.S. at 163. To satisfy Rule 23(b)(2), th e Plaintiffs m ust establish that “the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corres ponding declaratory relief is appr opriate respecting the class as a whole.” Under Rule 23(b)(3), the Plaintiffs must show that “questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions a ffecting only individual m embers, and that a class action is superior to ot her available m ethods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.” But although the bur den rests with the P laintiffs, the court is rem inded that Rule
3

Case: 1:08-cv-05908 Document #: 128 Filed: 05/11/11 Page 4 of 16 PageID #:11014
23 ought to be liberally construe d so as to favor the m aintenance of class actions where appropriate. In re Evanston Nw. Healthcar e Corp. Antitrust Litig., 268 F.R.D. 56, 60 (N.D. Ill. 2010); see King v. Kansas City Southern Indus. , 519 F.2d 20, 26 (7th Cir. 1975). Here, the Plaintiffs argue that the class is appropriate for cer tification under 23(b)(2); failing that, they argue that the class could be ce rtified under a hybrid approach, so that the clas s would receive equitable relief under Rule 23(b)(2) and dam ages under Rule 23(b)(3). Fi nally, the Plaintiffs claim that the class could be certified under Rule 23(b)(3) alone.
II. DISCUSSION 1. Standing As a preliminary matter, Yellow and YRC state that what they call “the Chicago Heights subclass members” do not have standing to pursue any claim. This argum ent is p redicated in part upon the Defendants’ argument that the Plaintiffs actually seek to certify two subclasses: (1) those current and form er African-American employees employed from October 15, 2004 to the present by YRC and Yellow at the Chicago Ridge location, and (2) all of the Chicago Ridge employees who were transferred to the Chicago Height s location in 2009. In other words, the Defendants would define their “Chicago Heights subclass” to include employees of any race. As it turns out, starting in 2006 the E qual Employment Opportunity Comm ission and others filed three laws uits against YRC and a nother of its predecess or companies, Roadway, alleging racial discrimination at the Chicago Heights location. The cases were recently resolved by a consent decree, w hich provides both m onetary and equitable relief to certain e mployees. See EEOC v. Roadway Express, Inc. , Nos. 06 C 4805, 08 C 5555; Bandy v. Roadway Express, Inc., No. 10 C 5304 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 12, 2011) (“Consen t Decree”). As a result, the Defendants
4

Case: 1:08-cv-05908 Document #: 128 Filed: 05/11/11 Page 5 of 16 PageID #:11015

claim that members of the “Chica go Heights subclass” no longer ha ve standing to m aintain this

action.

Because standing is an antecedent legal issue, the court must address this question before

proceeding to the Rule 2 3 analysis. Arreola v. Godinez, 546 F.3d 788, 794 (7th Cir. 2008); see

Sherman ex rel. Sherman v. Koch , 623 F.3d 501, 506-07 (7th Cir. 2010). The court first notes

that it is unpersuaded by Yellow and YRC’s defi nition of the “Chicago Heights subclass.” The

Plaintiffs have made it unequivocally clear that the class they seek to c ertify consists solely of

those African-American employees who initia lly worked at the Chicago Ridge location and certain of those same employees who were later transferred to Chicago Heights.2

Moreover, “standing and entitlem ent to reli ef are not the sam e thing. Standing is a

prerequisite to filing suit, while the underlying m erits of a claim (and the laws governing its

resolution) determine whether the plaintiff is entitled to relief.” Arreola, 546 F.3d at 795. In this

case, the redress sought by the Plaintiffs enco mpasses a num ber of alleged discrim inatory

practices dating back to Yellow’s 2004 operation of the Chicago Ridge location. These practices

are not—indeed, they could not be—addressed in a consent decree covering R oadway and

YRC’s operation of the Chicago Heights facility. In addition, the putative class is no t identical

to the class of persons covered by the consen t decree. For instan ce, the settlem ent classes

described in the consen t decree are lim ited to particular African-Am erican employees: those

holding the position of dockworker, switcher, or janitor positions in cluding seniority list,

percenter, and casual positions. See Consent Decree at 4-5, ECF No. 118-5. And while some of

2

See, e.g., Pls.’ Mem. In Supp. of Mot. for Class Ce rtification at 2 (“The nam ed Plaintiffs

and the clas s they seek to repres ent are curre nt and for mer African-American employees who

worked at Defendants’ Chicago Ridge location at some point between October 15, 2004, and the

present.”).

5

Case: 1:08-cv-05908 Document #: 128 Filed: 05/11/11 Page 6 of 16 PageID #:11016
the equitable relief described in the consent de cree applies to all Af rican-American employees, see id. at 7, this is no t universally true. For instance, the consent decree requires that a m onitor be appointed “to oversee the implementation by YRC of the terms of [the] Decree,” id. at 22, but this monitor’s scope of duties “pertains only to dockworkers, sw itchers, and janitors at YRC’s [Chicago Heights] location,” id. at 23. Here, by contrast, th e putative class would encom pass “[a]ll current and former African-American employees” who were em ployed at Chicago Ridge since October 15, 2004.
To have standing, a plaintiff need only allege that he “has suffered an injury in fact which is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant and likely . . . to be redressed by a favorable decision.” Arreola, 546 F.3d at 795. There is no ques tion that the putative class satisfies this standard. And even if a plaintiff “may no longer be entitled to all types of relief that he requested, the law does not preclude a plaintiff from filing suit simply because some forms of relief may be unavailable, or indeed because in th e end he cannot prove that he is entitled to an y relief.” Id. Thus, the court declines to carve out those portions of the Plaintiffs’ claims that may not ultimately entitle them to relief. See id. (“When deciding questions of standing, courts m ust look at the case as a w hole, rather than pickin g apart its various com ponents to separate the claims for which the plaintif f will be entitled to relief from those for which he will not.” ). The putative class has stand ing to m aintain a class action if certification is otherwise appropriate under Rule 23, which is all that should be decided at this point in time.
6

Case: 1:08-cv-05908 Document #: 128 Filed: 05/11/11 Page 7 of 16 PageID #:11017
2. Rule 23(a) a) Numerosity
To obtain class certification, the Plain tiffs must show num erosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation. Siegel v. Shell Oil Co. , 612 F.3d 932, 935 (7th Cir. 2010). In this case, the Plaintiffs m ade use of the Defendants’ own em ployee information system to winnow down the list of putative cla ss members and have arrived at the reasonable estimate of about 354 individuals. While Yellow and YRC argue that their “Chicago Height s subclass” does not satisfy the num erosity requirement, as detailed abov e, the court reje cts this attempt to redefine the class, and Yellow and YRC appear to agree th at the class as presently defined is sufficiently numerous. Thus, the Plaintiffs’ good-faith estimate suffices. See Marcial v. Coronet Ins. Co. , 880 F.2d 954, 957 (7th Cir. 1989) (plaintiffs need not specif y the exact number of people in the class, but m ay not rely on conclusory allegations or speculation as to class size); Radmanovich v. Combined Ins. Co. of Am. , 216 F.R.D. 424, 431 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (while an exact number is not required, a plaintiff is “required to provide a good faith estimate of the size of the class”). The court finds that th e numerosity requirement is satisfied because it would be impracticable to join more than 35 0 individuals or to relitigate the § 1981 claims hundreds of times. See Radmanovich, 216 F.R.D. at 431.
b) The Effect of Supervisors in the Class The court next m ust determine whether ther e are comm on questions of law or fact amongst the putative class, whether the claim s and defenses of the Plaintiffs are typical of those in the class , and whether th e Plaintiffs’ coun sel and the named Plaintiffs themselves will adequately protect the interest s of the class. These inqui ries are often interrelated, see, e.g.,
7

Case: 1:08-cv-05908 Document #: 128 Filed: 05/11/11 Page 8 of 16 PageID #:11018
Rosario v. Livaditis, 963 F.2d 1013, 1018 (7th Cir. 1992), but here in particular there is one issue that stands out: whether a class defined to include “all African-American employees”—i.e., both supervisors and non-supervisors—is appropriate for certification given that the com plainedabout conduct was undertaken by supervisors and non-supervis ors alike. Making m atters somewhat more complicated, one of the na med Plaintiffs, Mr. Gregory, held a supervisory role, raising the question as to whether his claims are typical and whether his role creates a conflict of interest so as to render him an inadequate representative under Rule 23(a)(4).
In some cases, the inclusion of supervisors as pa rt of the class when they are also part of the problem renders class certification inapprop riate. This is because in m any discrimination class action suits, th e plaintiffs’ allegations focus solely upon decision s relating to individua l class members: hiring, promotion, discipline, or th e like. In those cases, a supervisor m ay have an actual conflict of interest with the rest of the class. See, e.g., Randall v. Rolls Royce Corp., --F.3d ---, 2011 WL 1163882 (7th Cir. 2011). For instance, in Randall, the Seventh Circuit found that the named plaintiffs—both supervisors—could not adequately represent the interests of the class, because the plaintiffs sought recovery und er Title VII and the Equal Pay Act. The court noted that these plaintiffs had an untenable confli ct of interest, because as superviso rs, they had authority over compensation and could manufacture evidence of discrimination. See id. at *5.
However, there is no per se rule; instead, “[t]he question whether employees at different levels of the internal hierarchy have potential ly conflicting interests is context-sp ecific and depends upon the particular cl aims alleged in a case.” Staton v. Boeing Co., 327 F.3d 938, 95859 (9th Cir. 2003). Here, the nature of the c onduct alleged largely alleviates any concern. Although the Plaintiffs have detaile d instances of disparate treatm ent, they have also m ade it
8

Case: 1:08-cv-05908 Document #: 128 Filed: 05/11/11 Page 9 of 16 PageID #:11019

clear that those incidents are recounted only to support their hostile work environm ent claims— claims that are further supported by allegations of public, frequent,3 conduct, including a number

of noose hangings “in highly v isible places”; an inciden t involving hanging stuffed m onkeys

from a ceiling; racially hostile graffiti placed in the bathrooms, workrooms, and on the outside of

trailers; the open displa y of racially hostile tattoos, clothing, and symbols; and the br oadcasting

of racially disparaging term s over the com pany radio. G iven the particulars of the conduct

alleged, the inclusion of both supervisor and non-supervisor employees in the class does not

destroy commonality, typicality, or adequacy. See Smith v. Nike Retail Servs., Inc. , 234 F.R.D.

648, 661 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (“Here the strength of th e common injury and interest shared by the

named plaintiffs and class members—the harm caused by an allegedly hostile work environm ent

and the inte rest in e liminating that environm ent—plainly overrides any potential conflicts.”);

Radmanovich v. Combined Ins. Co. of Am. , 216 F.R.D. 424, 434 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (noting that

“courts have certified classes that included both supervisory and nonsupervisory personnel where

all employees share the sam e interests and suffered the same injuries” and going on to find that

the plaintiff adequately represented the inte rests of the class); Jefferson v. Windy City

Maintenance, Inc., No. 96 C 7686, 1998 WL 474115, at *8-9

(N.D. Ill. Aug. 4, 1998)

(recognizing that ther e may be a “genera l tension between a superviso r who initia tes and m ay

implement discipline and those who m ay be the obj ects of the disciplin e,” but finding that “any

such tension is overcom e by the supervisor’s personal interest in elim inating the allege d

discrimination as to herself”); see also Palmer v. Combined Ins. Co. of Am., No. 02 C 1764, 2003

WL 466065, *2-3 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 24, 2003). T he court also notes that if an actual conflict of

3

See Pls.’ Mem. In Support of Mot. for Class Certification at 9 (citing multiple plaintiffs’

deposition testimony that racially charged graffiti occurred at least once per week).

9

Case: 1:08-cv-05908 Document #: 128 Filed: 05/11/11 Page 10 of 16 PageID #:11020

interest appears down the road, the court m ay at th at time certify subclasses with sepa rate representation.4 See Kohen v. Pacific Inv. Mgmt. Co. LLC , 571 F.3d 672, 680 (7 th Cir. 2009) (“To deny class certification now, because of a potential conflict of interest that may not become actual, would be premature.”) (citations omitted).
c) Commonality Turning now to the question of commonality, “som e factual variation am ong the class grievances will not def eat a clas s action.” Rosario, 963 F.2d at 1017-18. To satisfy the commonality requirement, the Plaintiffs need only establish a single comm on nucleus of operative law or fact. Rogers v. Baxter Int’l Inc., No. 04 C 6476, 2006 WL 794734, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Mar 22, 2006) (citing Gomez v. Ill. State Bd. of Educ. , 117 F.R.D. 394, 399 (N.D. Ill. 1987)). Where a defendant engages in “standardized conduct” toward members of the proposed class, the commonality requirement is often satisfied. Nike Retail Servs., 234 F.R.D. at 659. The Plaintiffs argue th at YRC and Yellow’ s local m anagement willfully ignored or promoted the hostile work environm ent, and th at corporate m anagement failed to exercise oversight to ensure that its non-discrim ination policies were enforced. In return, the Defendants argue that the Plaintiffs focus solely upon indi vidual complaints and fa il to “bridge the gap” between those complaints and the injuries suffered by the class. Yellow and YRC also argue that

4

For instance, the court notes that an em ployer has an affir mative defense if it can

establish: “(a) that th e employer exercised reasonable care to prevent an d correct promptly any

harassing behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of

any preventive or correctiv e opportunities provided by the em ployer or to avoid harm

otherwise.” Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998); Burlington Indus., Inc. v.

Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998); see also Cerros v. Steel Techs., In c., 398 F.3d 944 (7th Cir.

2005). If the conduct of supervisors becom es a disputed factual issue, the court m ay revisit its

decision to certify the class as presently defined.

10

Case: 1:08-cv-05908 Document #: 128 Filed: 05/11/11 Page 11 of 16 PageID #:11021
their decentralization in decisionmaking allowed supervisors to rely on both objectiv e and subjective factors, which “eviscerate[s] any claim of standardized behavior.” Defs.’ Resp. at 21.
When employers use subjective criteria in employment decisions, would-be class action plaintiffs often have a tougher row to hoe. See McReynolds v. Lynch, No. 05 C 6583, 2010 WL 3184179, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 9, 2010). However, some subjectivity in decisionmaking does not preclude a finding of commonality. For instan ce, even company-wide classes may be appropriate for certification if st atistical evidence supports a patte rn of discriminatory outcomes based on subjective decisionm aking. See Adams v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons , --- F. S upp. 2d ---, 2001 WL 336830, at *3-4, *11 (N.D. Ill. 2001). Yellow and YRC rightly note that the Plaintiffs’ claims implicate a number of supervisors, employees holding dif ferent positions, and tim e periods. W here this type of diversity creates the need f or a m ultitude of individual inquiries, commonality is destroyed. See Puffer v. Allstate Ins. Co. , 255 F.R.D. 450, 460-61 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (collecting cases). But here , the Plaintiffs allege that va rious racially hostile incidents were witnessed first-hand by multiple people, and discussed and shared with m any others. For this reason, the comm onality requirement is satisf ied. See Adams, 2001 W L 336830, at *13 (“The issues of what occurred at a particular venue, whether it rose (or fell) to the level necessary to be actionable under the law, and whether the com pany should be held liable because of the action or inaction of management provide a common nucleus of operative fact and law sufficient to satisfy Rule 23(a)(2)’s commonality requirement.”).
d) Typicality The Plaintiffs must also show that their claims are typical of the class. This inquiry is closely related to commonality, see Keele v. Wexler , 149 F.3d 589, 594 (7th Cir. 1998), and
11

Case: 1:08-cv-05908 Document #: 128 Filed: 05/11/11 Page 12 of 16 PageID #:11022
focuses upon Yellow’s and YRC’s actions, not any particular defenses they may have against the named Plaintiffs. Wagner v. NutraSweet Co., 95 F.3d 527, 534 (7th Cir. 1996). In other words, “[a] claim is typical if it aris es from the sam e event or practice or course of conduct that gives rise to the claims of other class members and [the plaintiffs’] claims are based on the sam e legal theory. Oshana v. Coca-Cola Co., 472 F.3d 506, 514 (7th C ir. 2006). The Plaintiffs describe a number of events that are comm on to, and sh ared across, members of the putative class, including the nam ed Plaintiffs. M oreover, the Plaintiffs assert one overarching hostile work environment claim. W hile the Plain tiffs also describe certain individua lized adverse decisions and disparate treatment, and while Yellow and YRC may establish that their decisions were not made on the basis of race, those are the very types of particularized defenses that are irrelevant to the typicality analysis. See Wagner, 95 F.3d at 534. Here, the Plain tiffs’ claims “have the same essential characteristics as the claims of the class at large,” Muro v. Target Corp., 580 F.3d 485, 492 (7th Cir. 2009), and they have established that their claims are typical.
e) Adequacy Under Rule 23(a)(4), the Plaintiffs must also establish adequacy of representation. T his analysis is composed of two se parate inquiries: “the adequacy of the named plaintiff’s counsel, and the adequacy of representati on provided in protecting the di fferent, separate, and distinct interest of the class m embers.” Retired Chi. Police Ass’n v. City of C hi., 7 F.3d 584, 598 (7th Cir. 1993) (quoting Sec’y of Labor v . Fitzsimmons, 805 F.2d 682, 697 (7th Cir. 1986) (en banc) (quotation marks omitted)). Yellow and YRC do not contest the adequacy of the Pla intiff’s counsel, and the court finds that counsel possess the ne cessary qualifications to prot ect the interests of all class
12

Case: 1:08-cv-05908 Document #: 128 Filed: 05/11/11 Page 13 of 16 PageID #:11023
members. Each of the nam ed counsel have significant experience in both em ployment discrimination litigation and in cl ass action litigation, and the his tory of this litig ation thus far indicates that counsel have devoted significant time and resources to the case.
As to the adequacy of the nam ed Plaintiffs, the crux of Yellow and YRC’s com plaint is that the inclusion of supervisors in the clas s (and of M r. Gregory as a nam ed Plaintiff in particular) renders the class representatives inadequate. Because the court has already explained why the nature of the Plain tiffs’ hostile work e nvironment claim largely elim inates the risk of conflict, the court finds the named Plaintiffs to be adequate representatives for the class.
3. Rule 23(b) The Plaintiffs seek cer tification under Rule 23( b)(2), but go on to arg ue that if this is inappropriate, a hybrid certification or a certific ation under Rule 23(b)(3) will suffice. Finally, they argue that if neither of these two approaches works, the class sho uld be certif ied entirely under Rule 23(b)(3). The court agrees with Yello w and YRC that certifica tion under Rule 23(b)(2) is inappropriate. The Seventh Circuit has made it clear that Rule 23(b)(2) is an option “only when monetary relief is in cidental to the equitable remedy” sought by the Plaintiffs. Jefferson v. Ingersoll Int’l Inc., 195 F.3d 894, 898 (7th Cir. 1999). As the Defendants point out, however, the Chicago Ridge facility—which is where the vast majority of the alleged incidents took place—has been clos ed since Decem ber of 2 009. In ad dition, many of the putative class members are no longer em ployed with YRC and it is not clear when, or whet her, they will ever be rehired. Finally, the type of injunctive relief available at Chicago Heights is debatable in light
13

Case: 1:08-cv-05908 Document #: 128 Filed: 05/11/11 Page 14 of 16 PageID #:11024
of the relief already afforded by th e consent decree. Any injunctive relief obtained by the Plaintiffs may be limited in scope. Although the Yellow and YRC may have “acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class,” the court cannot say that “final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respec t to the class as a whole” is appropriate. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2).
Nor is the monetary relief that the Plaintiffs seek incidental to their dam ages claims. To be “incidental,” the computation of damages must be mechanical; that is, there must be no need for individual evaluations. In re Allstate Ins. Co., 400 F.3d 505, 507 (7th Cir. 2005); see Lemon v. Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs , 216 F.3d 577, 581 (7th Cir. 2000). But the Plaintiffs seek lost wages, “including back pa y for failure to prom ote, and any lost benefits that would otherwise have been available” absent the discrimination, as well as compensatory and punitive damages. These claim s will re quire an individualized analysis of each clas s member’s circumstances, rendering certification under Rule 23(b)(2) inappropriate. While the Plaintiffs are correct that the court m ay consider a divided certification, “[w]hen substantial dam ages have been sought, the most appropriate approach is that of Rule 23(b)(3), because it allows notice and an opportunity to opt out.” Jefferson, 195 F.3d at 898; see Randall, 2011 WL 1163882, at *7 (“It is only when the primary relief sought is injunctive, with m onetary relief if sought at all mechanically computable, that elaborate notice is not required and so Rule 23(b)(2) is applicable because the claims of the class members are uniform . . . .”).
As Rule 23(b)(2) is inappropria te, the question remains whether the Plaintiffs satisfy the requirements of Rule 23(b)(3), i.e., whether “questions of law or fact common to class m embers
14

Case: 1:08-cv-05908 Document #: 128 Filed: 05/11/11 Page 15 of 16 PageID #:11025
predominate over any questions affecting only in dividual members,” and whether “a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.”
The court has already explained why comm on questions of law and fact predom inate over the questions that affect only individual class members. The overarching hostile work environment claim depends in large part upon expe riences shared by a signi ficant percentage of the putative class. W hile individual dam ages determinations may be necessary, “the need for individual damages determinations does not, in a nd of itself, require de nial of [a] motion for certification.” Arreola, 546, F.3d at 801.
As to whether a class action is a superi or method of adjudication, the court should consider the class m embers’ interests in ind ividually controlling the prosecution of separate actions, the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already begun by class members, the desirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum, and any difficulties in managing a class action. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(A)-(D). The court finds that a class action is a superior m ethod of adjudicati on in this instance. The court has not been informed of any currently pe nding litigation invol ving the claims at issue, and the Roadway/YRC litigation was term inated in December of 2010. Nor is there indication that a class member seeks to control individually the prosecution of his or her claim . As to the question of m anageability, the court finds that a class of about 350 indi viduals is manageable even though certain issues, such as damages, will need to be decided separately. And, of course, under Rule 23(b)(3), “[i]f the cer tified class representative does not adequately represent the interests of some of the class members, those class members can opt out of the class action, can seek the creation of a separately represented su bclass, can ask for the replacem ent of the class
15

Case: 1:08-cv-05908 Document #: 128 Filed: 05/11/11 Page 16 of 16 PageID #:11026

representative, or can interven e of right and becom e named plaintiffs themselves, or even clas s representatives, represented by their own law yer.” In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., 115 F.3d 456, 457-58 (7th Cir. 1997).
III. CONCLUSION For the reasons set forth, the Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification is granted pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3).

JOAN United
DATED: May 11, 2011

ENTER:
/s/ B. GOTTSCHALL States District Judge

16

 </s> Case: 1:08-cv-05908 Document #: 181-1 Filed: 09/25/12 Page 1 of 21 PageID #:11318
present and future directors, officers, managers, agents, successors and assigns of YRC. YRC, and any successor(s) of YRC, shall provide a copy of this Decree to any organization or person who proposes to acquire or merge with YRC, or any successor ofYRC, prior to the effectiveness of any such acquisition or merger.
46. Notices. Any notices to be given to the Parties under this Decree will be deemed sufficient if mailed by first class mail to:
Counsel for Plaintiffs The EEOC: Richard J. Mrizek, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 500 West Madison Street, Suite 2000, Chicago, Illinois, 60661. And: Intervenors' Counsel/Section 1981 Class Counsel: Randall Schmidt, Clinical Professor of Law, Director Employment Law Project, Edwin F. Mandel Legal Aid Clinic, University of Chicago Law School, 6020 S. University Ave., Chicago, Illinois 60637. Counsel for YRC: Kevin W. Shaughnessy, Baker & Hostetler LLP, 200 S. Orange Avenue, Suite 2300, Orlando, Florida 32801. 47. Entire Agreement. This Decree constitutes the entire agreement between YRC and Plaintiffs hereto with respect to the matters herein, and it supersedes all negotiations, representations, comments, contracts and writings prior to the date of this Consent Decree. 48. Interpretation and Severability. Whenever possible, each provision and term of this Decree shall be interpreted in such a manner as to be valid and enforceable; provided, however, that in the event any provision or term of this Decree should be determined to be or rendered invalid or unenforceable (by an Act of Congress or otherwise), all other provisions and terms of this Decree shall remain unaffected and in full force and effect to the extent permitted by Jaw. 49. Modifications. YRC, EEOC, and Section 1981 Class Counsel may jointly agree,
Page 20 of23

Case: 1:08-cv-05908 Document #: 181 Filed: 09/25/12 Page 1 of 19 PageID #:11299

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY

)

COMMISSION,

)

Plaintiff,

)

)

CHARLES E. BROWN, JEFFREY BURKS,

)

ANTONIO COLON, JAMES DEMOSS, JAMESON

)

DIXON, CLARK FAULKNER, KENNETH GEORGE, )

LEONARD GREGORY, MARSHUN HILL, MACK

)

LEONARD, CEDRIC MUSE, LAROY

)

WASHINGTON, DARRELL WILLIAMS, CHARLES )

WOODS and MICHAEL WOODS,

)

Intervening Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

YELLOW TRANSPORTATION, INC. and YRC, Inc., )

_____D_e_fe_nd_a_nt_s._______________________

)
)

CHARLES BROWN, JEFFERY BURKS,

)

ANTONIO COLON, JAMES DEMOSS,

)

JAMESON DIXON, CLARK FAULKNER,

)

KENNETH GEORGE, LEONARD GREGORY,

)

MARSHUN HILL, CEDRIC MUSE,

)

LAROY WASHINGTON, DARRELL WILLIAMS,

)

CHARLES WOODS, MICHAEL WOODS, MACK

)

LEONARD, on behalf ofthemselves and similarly

)

situated African-American employees,

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

YELLOW TRANSPORTATION, INC., and YRC, INC., )

Defendants.

)

---------------------------------- )

Case No. 09 CV 7693 Magistrate Judge Cox
Case No. 08 CV 5908 Magistrate Judge Cox

CONSENT DECREE
THE LITIGATION 1. Plaintiff Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the "EEOC") filed suit (case number 09 CV 7693) against Defendants, Yellow Transportation, Inc. and YRC Inc., d/b/a
Page 1 of23

Case: 1:08-cv-05908 Document #: 181 Filed: 09/25/12 Page 2 of 19 PageID #:11300
YRC Freight (collectively "YRC" or the "Defendant"), under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C . § 2000e, et seq., (the "EEOC Chicago Ridge Title VII case"), alleging that YRC discriminated against African-American employees at its Chicago Ridge facility. EEOC alleged that YRC violated Title VII by unlawfully discriminating against a class of Black employees by fostering a hostile work environment based upon race, and unlawfully discriminated against its Black employees in the terms and conditions of employment. On October 6, 2010, current and former YRC employees Charles E. Brown, Jeffrey Burks, Antonio Colon, James DeMoss, Jameson Dixon, Clark Faulkner, Kenneth George, Leonard Gregory, Marshun Hill, Mack Leonard, Cedric Muse, Laroy Washington, Darrell Williams, Charles Woods and Michael Woods ("Intervening Plaintiffs") filed a Complaint in Intervention in EEOC's action alleging that YRC violated Title VII by unlawfully discriminating against them individually by fostering a hostile work environment based upon race, and unlawfully discriminated against them in the terms and conditions of their employment at Chicago Ridge.
2. Prior to the EEOC Chicago Ridge Title VII case, on October 15, 2008, 14 of the 15 Intervening Plaintiffs filed a Complaint (case number 08 CV 5908), alleging that YRC had violated Section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 ("Section 1981"), by discriminating against them and a class of current and former Black employees who worked on the dock or in the yard (as spotters) at Chicago Ridge (the "Chicago Ridge Section 1981 case"). On July 10, 2010, the Court allowed Mack Leonard to join in the Chicago Ridge Section 1981 case as a Named Plaintiff and allowed the Named Plaintiffs to file their Corrected Amended Complaint ("Amended Complaint").
3. On May 11, 2011, the Court in the Chicago Ridge Section 1981 case certified a class of Black employees who had worked at the Chicago Ridge facility under Rule 23(b)(3) of
Page 2 of23

Case: 1:08-cv-05908 Document #: 181 Filed: 09/25/12 Page 3 of 19 PageID #:11301
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, defined as follows: All current and former African-American employees employed between October 15, 2004, and the present by YRC Inc. and Yellow Transportation, Inc., on its docks, in offices located on or near the docks, or in the yard in the positions of dock worker, hostler, spotter, janitor, supervisor, or clerical (including as a "casual," "1 0%," "regular," full-time or other employee) at their facility located at 10301 S. Harlem Ave., Chicago Ridge, Illinois ("Chicago Ridge") and including those Chicago Ridge African-American employees transferred in 2009 to work at the facility located at 2000 Lincoln Highway, Chicago Heights, Illinois ("Chicago Heights").
4. The EEOC Chicago Ridge Title VII case and the Chicago Ridge Section 1981 case have been consolidated for purposes of entering this Consent Decree (the "Decree"). Class Notice was issued to the Chicago Ridge Section 1981 case class on March 15, 2012, and it required any individual desiring to opt-out of the class to notify Section 1981 Class Counsel, before May 15, 2012, of their desire to opt-out. No member of the class opted-out of the certified class, and YRC faces no additional exposure for Section 1981 claims of current or former African-American YRC employees, as described in the certified class, arising on or after October 2004.
5. In the interest of resolving this matter, and as a result of having engaged in comprehensive settlement negotiations, all Parties in all of the above cases have agreed that these actions pertaining to Chicago Ridge should be finally resolved by Entry of this Decree.
6. By entering into this Decree, no party makes any admission regarding any claims or potential claims or any defenses thereto.
7. This Decree fully and finally resolves any and all issues and claims arising out of the Complaints, Amended Complaints, and Complaints in Intervention in the EEOC Chicago Ridge Title VII case and the Chicago Ridge Section 1981 case.
Page 3 of23

Case: 1:08-cv-05908 Document #: 181 Filed: 09/25/12 Page 4 of 19 PageID #:11302
DEFINITIONS 8. In addition to the terms defined elsewhere in the Consent Decree, the following terms shall have the following meanings:
A. "EEOC Settlement Class" shall mean those individuals who submitted claims to EEOC and who also were identified to YRC's Counsel in the EEOC Chicago Ridge Title VII case.
B. "Section 1981 Settlement Class" shall mean all current and former AfricanAmerican employees employed between October 15, 2004, and the present by YRC Inc. and Yellow Transportation, Inc., on its docks, in offices located on or near the docks, or in the yard in the positions of dock worker, hostler, spotter, janitor, supervisor, or clerical (including as a "casual," "10%," "regular," full-time or other employee) at Chicago Ridge and including those Chicago Ridge African-American employees transferred in 2009 to work at Chicago Heights.
C. "Settlement Class" shall mean the combined EEOC Settlement Class and the Section 1981 Settlement Class.
D. "Intervening Plaintiffs" shall mean Charles Brown, Jeffrey Burks, Antonio Colon, James DeMoss, Jameson Dixon, Clark Faulkner, Kenneth George, Leonard Gregory, Marshun Hill, Mack Leonard, Cedric Muse, Laroy Washington, Darrell Williams, Charles Woods, and Michael Woods.
E. "Intervenors' Counsel" refers to Carol Coplan Babbitt, Catherine A. Caporusso, Randall D. Schmidt, and the University of Chicago's Edwin F. Mandel Legal Clinic.
F. "Section 1981 Named Plaintiffs" refers to Charles Brown, Jeffrey Burks, Antonio Colon, James DeMoss, Jameson Dixon, Clark Faulkner, Kenneth George, Leonard
Page 4 of23

Case: 1:08-cv-05908 Document #: 181 Filed: 09/25/12 Page 5 of 19 PageID #:11303

Gregory, Marshun Hill, Mack Leonard, Cedric Muse, Laroy Washington, Darrell Williams,

Charles Woods, and Michael Woods.

G. "Section 1981 Class Counsel" refers to Carol Coplan Babbitt, Catherine

A. Caporusso, Randall D. Schmidt, and the University of Chicago's Edwin F. Mandel Legal

Clinic.

H. "Defendant" or "Company" shall mean Yellow Transportation, Inc. and

YRC, Inc. d/b/a YRC Freight, and any of their predecessors or successors in interest.

I.

"Parties" means EEOC, Intervening Plaintiffs, Section 1981 Named

Plaintiffs, and Defendant.

J.

"Plaintiffs" means EEOC, Intervening Plaintiffs, and the Section 1981

Named Plaintiffs.

K. "Claimant" means each member of the Settlement Class who timely

submits a claim form.

L. "Preliminary Approval" of the Consent Decree means the date when the

United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois has granted conditional approval

of the proposed Consent Decree, subject to notice and a Fairness Hearing with regard to the

Chicago Ridge Section 1981 case class settlement.

M. "Final Approval of the Consent Decree" means the date when notice is

received by the Parties through the Court's ECF system that the United States District Court for

the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division has held a Fairness Hearing with regard to the

settlement, has approved the settlement under Rule 23(e) ofthe Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,

and has granted final approval ofthe Decree.

Page 5 of23

Case: 1:08-cv-05908 Document #: 181 Filed: 09/25/12 Page 6 of 19 PageID #:11304
N. "YRC's Chicago Heights operation" means YRC's existing Chicago Heights break bulk facility located at 2000 East Lincoln Highway, Chicago Heights, Illinois 60411.
0. "Settlement Fund" means the monetary fund set up for the purpose of providing monetary awards to Claimants and out of which Intervening Plaintiffs/Named Plaintiffs and Section 1981 Class Counsel will be paid.
P. "Approval of Distribution" means the date the Parties receive notice through the Court's ECF system that the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division has approved the distribution of the settlement fund.
Q. "YRC's Chicago break bulk dock operation" means (i) YRC's existing Chicago Heights break bulk facility located at 2000 East Lincoln Highway, Chicago Heights, Illinois 60411, and (ii) if the existing Chicago Heights break bulk facility is closed down or substantially moved to another YRC break bulk facility within fifty (50) miles of the existing Chicago Heights facility, then any additional YRC break bulk facility where more than fifty (50) percent of the African-American workers at the YRC break bulk facility are members of the Settlement Class.
FINDINGS 9. Having carefully examined the tenns and provisions ofthis Decree, and based on the pleadings, record, and stipulations of the Parties, the Court finds the following:
a. This Court has jurisdiction of the subject matter of the EEOC Chicago Ridge Title VII case, the Chicago Ridge Section 1981 case, and of the Parties in each case.
Page 6 of23

Case: 1:08-cv-05908 Document #: 181 Filed: 09/25/12 Page 7 of 19 PageID #:11305
b. The terms of this Decree are adequate, fair, reasonable, equitable, and just. The rights of EEOC, YRC, the Intervening Plaintiffs, the EEOC Settlement Class, the Section 1981 Settlement Class, and the public interest are adequately protected by this Decree.
c. This Decree conforms to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Title VII, and Section 1981 , and is not in derogation of the rights or privileges of any person. The Entry of this Decree will further the objectives of Title VII and Section 1981, and will be in the best interests of EEOC, YRC, the Intervening Plaintiffs, the EEOC Settlement Class, the Section 1981 Settlement Class, and the public.
NOW, TIIEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED THAT: MONETARY RELIEF
10. The aggregate sum of Eleven Million Dollars ($11,000,000.00) shall be distributed to the Claimants, Intervening Plaintiffs/Named Plaintiffs, and the Section 1981 Class Counsel in accordance with the terms of this Decree.
ESTABLISHMENT OF SETTLEMENT FUNDS & MONETARY ALLOCATION 11. By July 15, 2012, Defendants shall pay the aggregate sum of Five Million Five
Hundred Thousand Dollars ($5,500,000.00) (the "Initial Payment"). The Initial Payment shall be deposited by wire transfer into an account held in trust as set forth in Paragraph 12 below and administered by EEOC and the Section 1981 Class Counsel under the Court's supervision, which shall constitute the Settlement Fund for the purpose of providing monetary awards to Claimants, Intervening Plaintiffs/Named Plaintiffs, and Section 198 1 Class Counsel. The Settlement Fund shall be established at Seaway National Bank of Chicago (or such other institution identified by EEOC and Section 1981 Class Counsel). Any interest accrued by the Settlement Fund will be
Page 7 of23

Case: 1:08-cv-05908 Document #: 181 Filed: 09/25/12 Page 8 of 19 PageID #:11306
used to pay expenses associated with the administration ofthe Settlement Fund. Any interest in excess of the costs of administration shall be distributed to Claimants and Intervening Plaintiffs/Named Plaintiffs in accordance to the distribution plan approved by the Court. Other than withdrawal of accrued interest to pay expenses associated with the administration of the Settlement Fund, all payments from this Settlement Fund shall go to Claimants, Intervening Plaintiffs/Named Plaintiffs, and Section 1981 Class Counsel only in accord with the distribution approved by the Court pursuant to Paragraphs 16, 36, and 38 below.
12. The Settlement Fund shall be an irrevocable trust under Illinois law and a Qualified Settlement Fund under Section 468B of the Internal Revenue Code and shall be administered by EEOC and the Section 1981 Class Counsel under the Court's supervision.
13. By November 15, 2012, or within 30 days after Final Approval, whichever is later, Defendants shall pay by wire transfer to the Settlement Fund an additional aggregate sum of Five Million Five Hundred Thousand Dollars ($5,500,000.00).
14. Within 5 business days of Approval ofDistribution, Intervenors' Counsel/Section 1981 Class Counsel shall be paid a sum of One Million One Hundred Thousand Dollars ($1,100,000.00) out of the Settlement Fund. This payment is payment in full for Intervenors' Counsel/Section 1981 Class Counsel claims for attorneys ' fees and costs incurred in connection with their representation of the Intervening Plaintiffs, the Named Plaintiffs, and the Section 1981 Class, including costs and fees associated with the implementation of this Decree.
15. All of the funds payable to the EEOC Settlement Class and the Section 1981 Settlement Class will be distributed in accord with the distribution process described in this Decree at Paragraphs 28-39.
Page 8 of23

Case: 1:08-cv-05908 Document #: 181 Filed: 09/25/12 Page 9 of 19 PageID #:11307
CLAIMS ADMINISTRATOR 16. First Class, Inc., 5410 W. Roosevelt Rd., Unit 222, Chicago, Illinois 60644 shall act as Claims Administrator who shall: (a) verify addresses using the national change of address database and mail notices and forms relating to the settlement, claims forms, and claims notices; (b) receive objections and other communications from Section 1981 Settlement Class members regarding the settlement of the Section 1981 Class Action; (c) receive claims forms for the Settlement Fund; (d) transmit notifications of monetary awards; (e) issue checks to eligible Claimants from the Settlement Fund; (f) issue related tax documents; and (g) perform such other administrative tasks as may facilitate the claims process. 17. Interest accrued by the Settlement Fund will be used to cover costs associated with the distribution of the above funds to Claimants. To the extent accrued interest does not cover these costs, all outstanding Claims Administrator costs shall be paid by YRC, including, without limitation, all costs associated with the creation of the Settlement Fund, all costs to be paid by the Claims Administrator, and all costs related to the issuance and mailing of notices and checks in accordance with this Decree.
FAIRNESS HEARING/APPROVAL OF SETTLEMENT 18. The Section 1981 Class in the Chicago Ridge Section 1981 case has been certified under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3). Notice of the pendency of the Section 1981 Class Action was provided to the class through a notice published in the Chicago Tribune on March 15, 2012, and a Notice mailed to every potential class member on March 16, 2012. The initial Notice thoroughly described the litigation, the claims made by the Named Plaintiffs, the issues involved and the rights of unnamed class members. It also notified unnamed class members oftheir right to opt-out of the class action. The opt-out period ended on May 15, 2012,
Page 9 of23

Case: 1:08-cv-05908 Document #: 181 Filed: 09/25/12 Page 10 of 19 PageID #:11308
and no class member opted-out. 19. Notice to Settlement Class Members. Within 15 days after Preliminary
Approval, the Claims Administrator shall provide notice via first class mail using the updated addresses obtained during the initial notice process to all Settlement Class members in a form approved by the Court. The notice shall: (a) state that there is a proposed settlement of the claims in the EEOC case and the Section 1981 case; (b) describe the cases, the terms of the settlement, and that the eligible members of the Settlement Class may submit a Claim Form in the claims process for monetary relief; (c) indicate that the Court will hold a hearing at which time the Court will consider the fairness, adequacy and reasonableness of the proposed settlement; and (d) indicate that Settlement Class members may submit written comments regarding the settlement or appear at the Fairness Hearing. A copy of the Notice to be submitted to the Court for approval is attached hereto as Exhibit B.
20. YRC shall reasonably cooperate with the Claims Administrator, Section 1981 Class Counsel, and EEOC in identifying and locating Settlement Class members. The Claims Administrator will perform a computer database trace for the current addresses of the Settlement Class members formerly employed by YRC.
21 . Fairness Hearing. A Fairness Hearing to consider the overall fairness, reasonableness and adequacy of the proposed settlement of the EEOC case and the Section 1981 case shall be held approximately 75 days after Preliminary Approval, on a date specified by the Court.
22. Appearance by Settlement Class Members at Fairness Hearing. Any member of the Settlement Class may appear at the Fairness Hearing and be heard in opposition to the overall fairness, reasonableness and adequacy of the proposed. Settlement Class members who
Page 10 of23

Case: 1:08-cv-05908 Document #: 181 Filed: 09/25/12 Page 11 of 19 PageID #:11309
wish to object to this Decree or any part of it may be heard at the Fairness Hearing only: (a) if they file with this Court and serve on the Section 1981 Class Counsel, EEOC, and Counsel for YRC, a written statement of their objection; (b) where such statement is received by the Section 1981 Class Counsel, EEOC, Counsel for YRC, and the Court 15 days prior to the Fairness Hearing; (c) where such statement indicates whether they intend to appear at the Fairness Hearing; and (d) if they contemporaneously notify Section 1981 Class Counsel, EEOC, Counsel for YRC, and the Court, of their intention to appear at the Fairness Hearing.
Such objectors may appear at the Fairness Hearing either in person or by counsel. Failure to perform any of these requirements shall be deemed a waiver of any objections. The Parties may, but need not, respond in writing to objections by fi ling a response with the Court.
23. If the Court approves the Decree at the Fairness Hearing, the Claims Administrator shall mail notice of Final Approval of the Consent Decree to each Settlement Class member within 10 days ofthe Fairness Hearing.
24. Release of Claims by EEOC. Upon Final Approval ofthe Decree, YRC Inc. and Yellow Transportation, Inc., and their current and former shareholders, directors, officers, managers, agents, creditors, employees, attorneys, insurers, and for each of the foregoing, their respective parents, affiliates, subsidiaries, successors and assigns, shall be fully released and forever discharged by EEOC from all issues and claims of EEOC arising from the Complaint filed by EEOC in the EEOC Chicago Ridge Title VII case and the Charges of Discrimination
Page 11 of23

Case: 1:08-cv-05908 Document #: 181 Filed: 09/25/12 Page 12 of 19 PageID #:11310
and Amended Charges of Discrimination underlying this litigation filed by Charles Brown, Jeffrey Burks, Antonio Colon, James DeMoss, Jameson Dixon, Clark Faulkner, Kenneth George, Leonard Gregory, Marshun Hill, Mack Leonard, Laroy Washington, Darrell Williams, Charles Woods, and Michael Woods. This release is final and shall survive the expiration of the Decree's term.
25. Release of Claims by the Section 1981 Settlement Class. Upon Final Approval of the Decree, YRC Inc. and Yellow Transportation, Inc., and their current and former shareholders, directors, officers, managers, agents, creditors, employees, attorneys, insurers, and for each of the foregoing, their respective parents, affiliates, subsidiaries, successors and assigns, shall be fully released and forever discharged from any and all individual and/or class-wide claims, demands, complaints, rights and causes of actions of any kind, known or unknown, by each member of the Section 1981 Settlement Class, including their heirs, assigns and estates, whether seeking monetary and/or equitable relief of any sort, which arise out of or are related to the underlying operative facts in any Charge of Discrimination, Amended Charge of Discrimination, Complaint, Amended Complaint, or Complaint in Intervention filed by the Plaintiffs which were, or could have been asserted, all of which are released, extinguished and dismissed pursuant to this Decree. This release is final and shall survive the expiration of the Decree's term.
CLAIMS PROCESS 26. The Claims Administrator will send out claim forms (Exhibit C) to each member of the Settlement Class, with the notice of settlement via first class mail. Settlement Class members who seek to recover monetary compensation must complete a claim form and cause it to be filed with the Claims Administrator within 75 days after the claim form is mailed. The
Page 12 of23

Case: 1:08-cv-05908 Document #: 181 Filed: 09/25/12 Page 13 of 19 PageID #:11311
claim form must be actually received by the Claims Administrator on or before such date in order to be considered timely. It is the obligation of the Settlement Class member to ensure receipt by the Claims Administrator of the claim form on or before the due date. All claim forms must be signed under penalty of perjury to be considered. All Settlement Class members (including the Intervening Plaintiffs/Section 1981 Named Plaintiffs) who have given a deposition, provided a signed Affidavit, or returned an EEOC Questionnaire in this case shall be considered to have filed a timely claim. EEOC, in its discretion, may require these Claimants to provide additional information in support of their claims.
a. Late Claims. For claims received after the filing deadline, EEOC and Section 1981 Class Counsel shall notifY late-filing Settlement Class members that their claims are untimely and that they are not eligible for any monetary award. EEOC or the Section 1981 Class Counsel may reverse the determination that a claim was not timely filed only if the Settlement Class member proves that the untimeliness determination is erroneous.
b. Claims of Deceased Persons. Claims may be submitted on behalf of Claimants who have died provided that a legally-authorized representative of their estate, possessing appropriate documentation (letters testamentary, Small Estate Affidavit or the equivalent), timely submits the required claim forms. Any claims paid to a deceased Claimant shall be made payable to the estate of the deceased Claimant.
27. The Claims Administrator shall forward claim forms and supporting documentation to EEOC and Section 1981 Class Counsel on a rolling basis.
DETERMINATION OF CLAIMS 28. Within 60 days of the deadline for receiving claim forms, EEOC shall make a determination as to whether the Claimants who filed timely claims are eligible to receive a
Page 13 of23

Case: 1:08-cv-05908 Document #: 181 Filed: 09/25/12 Page 14 of 19 PageID #:11312
monetary award and, if so, EEOC shall determine the amount of each monetary award. In making such determinations, EEOC may consider whatever evidence EEOC deems appropriate, including, but not limited to, evidence received by EEOC in its investigation of the charges of discrimination underlying this action, in connection with its litigation of this action, and in connection with the claims process provided by this Decree. If a claim form is determined to be incomplete by EEOC, EEOC may request additional information from the Claimant, if it appears that such additional information would complete the claim form. The Claimant must provide the requested information, signed under penalty of perjury, to EEOC by mail with a postmark no later than 14 days from the date of the mailed request for information.
29. EEOC may ask YRC to provide necessary information and data that has not already been provided to EEOC or to Section 1981 Class Counsel to make award determinations. YRC will respond to all reasonable EEOC requests for information relating to the Claimants within 30 days of the receipt of the request, or as soon as practicable, by providing all responsive documents and information available to YRC. The information requested by EEOC of YRC pursuant to this Paragraph shall be limited to the Claimants' job duties and titles, work histories, dates of termination, dates of leave, and any other information that is reasonably available to YRC relating to the Claimants.
30. EEOC will determine the amount of each Claimant's monetary award based on a point system developed by EEOC and Section 1981 Class Counsel. This point system will take into account several factors, including: (i) length of employment, (ii) dates of employment, (iii) job assignments/classifications, (iv) the severity of the alleged harassment or discrimination, (v) whether the alleged harassment or discrimination was personally directed at the Claimant, (vi) the duration of the alleged harassment or discrimination, (vii) the extent of the alleged harm, (vii)
Page 14 of23

Case: 1:08-cv-05908 Document #: 181 Filed: 09/25/12 Page 15 of 19 PageID #:11313
whether the Claimant alleged to have been actually or constructively discharged, (viii) the managerial status of the persons involved, (ix) whether the Claimant allegedly received more difficult work assignments because of race, (x) whether the Claimant allegedly received shorter breaks because of race, (xi) whether the Claimant allegedly received harsher or more frequent discipline because of race, (xii) whether the Claimant allegedly failed to receive opportunities to be a hostler/spotter, (xiii) whether the Claimant allegedly failed to be timely moved from a casual position to permanent status, (xiv) whether the Claimant allegedly complained of discrimination, (xv) the Claimant's participation and cooperation with EEOC and the Section 1981 Class Counsel in the litigation of these cases, and (xvi) overall strength of the alleged claim as determined by EEOC. The monetary award will constitute non-pecuniary compensatory damages.
31. EEOC's determination of the amount of monetary relief to be received by the Claimants under this Decree shall be submitted to the Section 1981 Class Counsel and approved by the Court. YRC will not participate in or object to EEOC's determinations.
32. Each of the Section 1981 Named Plaintiffs shall receive an incentive payment in an amount to be recommended by the Section 1981 Class Counsel and EEOC, and approved by the Court. These incentive payments will be in the range of $15,000.00 to $35,000.00, and shall be in addition to the amount they are awarded through the claims process.
33. An amount of $100,000.00 will be set aside from the initial distribution in the Settlement Fund to pay out to Claimants who have demonstrated an error in the claims process. EEOC and the Section 1981 Class Counsel, with the approval of the Court, may make additional payments to Claimants to correct errors in the claims process. Any money that remains in the account after this process shall be added to the payments made to the Claimants in proportion to
Page 15 of23

Case: 1:08-cv-05908 Document #: 181 Filed: 09/25/12 Page 16 of 19 PageID #:11314
the amount oftheir award. MOTION FOR APPROVAL OF DISTRIBUTION OF SETTLEMENT FUNDS 34. Within 14 days of the determination of all claims, EEOC and the Section 1981
Class Counsel shall file a motion with the Court seeking Approval of the Distribution of the Settlement Fund among those eligible Claimants who have executed and timely returned their claim forms and the required Release. In connection with this motion, EEOC and the Section 1981 Class Counsel shall (i) seek approval of the process developed by EEOC and Section 1981 Class Counsel pursuant to Paragraph 30, used to determine the distribution, and (ii) file a proposed settlement distribution list, which shall contain the redacted name and proposed gross settlement amount for each eligible Claimant. A non-redacted list shall be submitted to the Court for in camera inspection, and filed under seal. YRC shall not challenge the proposed settlement distribution list. After appropriate review, in connection with which EEOC shall provide any information within EEOC's possession that the Court requests, the Court will enter an Order Approving the Allocation of the Settlement Funds and the distribution thereof pursuant to this Decree.
NOTIFICATION OF AWARDS 35. Within 7 days of the Order Approving the Distribution of the Settlement Funds, EEOC and Section 1981 Class Counsel shall cause the Claims Administrator to notify each Claimant (both eligible Claimants as well as those not receiving a monetary award) via U.S. First Class Mail of the amount of his/her monetary award, if any. 36. Along with the Notification of Award, the Claims Administrator shall mail to each eligible Claimant a Release (a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit A). Each eligible Claimant will be notified that in order to receive monetary payments under this Decree, he/she
Page 16 of23

Case: 1:08-cv-05908 Document #: 181 Filed: 09/25/12 Page 17 of 19 PageID #:11315
must execute and deliver to the Claims Administrator a Release, which will become effective upon the Claimant's receipt of his or her distribution. The letter will inform each eligible Claimant that such Release must be signed and mailed to the Claims Administrator so that it is actually received by the Claims Administrator within 45 days of the mailing of the Notification of Award. Any eligible Claimant whose executed Release is not actually received by the Claims Administrator within 45 days of the mailing of the Notification Award shall be ineligible for and forever barred from receiving any relief under this Decree, unless EEOC and Section 1981 Class Counsel determine that such individual is eligible to be paid out of the administrative error fund (and provided that the Release is executed). The Claims Administrator shall promptly provide all original signed Releases to YRC and provide copies to the Section 1981 Class Counsel and EEOC.
ADJUSTMENT OF AWARDS DUE TO ADMINISTRATIVE ERROR 37. Within 60 days of Approval of Distribution, EEOC and Section 1981 Class Counsel may seek the Court's approval to award money or adjust awards for Claimants due to administrative error as provided in Paragraph 33. Any adjustment must take place within 60 days of Approval of Distribution. After 60 days, EEOC will instruct the Claims Administrator to allocate any of the un-awarded money to the Claimants in proportion to the amount of their award.
DISTRIBUTION OF SETTLEMENT FUND 38. Within 70 days after the Court's Approval of Distribution of Settlement Funds, EEOC and the Section 1981 Class Counsel will send the Claims Administrator the final settlement distribution list, including allocation of any un-awarded money that had been set aside for administrative error. Within 7 days of receipt of the final distribution list, the Claims
Page 17 of23

Case: 1:08-cv-05908 Document #: 181 Filed: 09/25/12 Page 18 of 19 PageID #:11316
Administrator shall issue and mail checks to the eligible Claimants in the amount reflected in the final settlement distribution list. The Claims Administrator will issue an IRS Form 1099 to each Claimant reflecting the amount paid to that individual. The Court finds that the payments shall constitute compensation for non-pecuniary damages and shall not be subject to any payroll deductions. The Parties acknowledge that no party or its attorneys are making any representations regarding the taxability or non-taxability of the payments to Claimants. As directed by EEOC or Section 1981 Class Counsel, the Claims Administrator shall take further steps in a timely manner to reach those Claimants who did not receive and/or deposit their settlement checks.
SURPLUS FUNDS FROM CONSENT DECREE 39. In the event that any portion of the Settlement Fund, including accrued interest, has not been distributed as required by this Decree after a period of 120 days has elapsed from the date on which the settlement checks were mailed by the Claims Administrator, then such remaining amounts from the Settlement Fund shall be provided to the Aurora/Quad County Chapter ofthe Urban League, a non-profit organization jointly identified by EEOC and YRC that serves the area of the YRC's Chicago break bulk dock operation to further the job training and hiring of minority workers.
SPECIFIC INJUNCTIVE PROVISIONS 40. The Court finds that the Chicago Ridge terminal closed on or before December 31, 2009, and that there are no operations currently in place at Chicago Ridge. There are approximately 51 members of the Settlement Class on active status at Chicago Heights. In addition, there are approximately 53 members of the Settlement Class on leave or layoff status at Chicago Heights.
Page 18 of23

Case: 1:08-cv-05908 Document #: 181 Filed: 09/25/12 Page 19 of 19 PageID #:11317
41. Chicago Heights is already subject to a Consent Decree issued by this Court in the consolidated cases of EEOC v. Roadway Express, Inc. and YRC, Inc., Case Nos. 06 CV 4805 and 08 CV 5555 and William Bandy, eta!. v. Roadway Express, Inc. and YRC, Inc., Case No. 10 CV 5305 ("Chicago Heights Consent Decree").
42. The Court has reviewed the Chicago Heights Consent Decree as amended by the Order issued on June 27, 2012 (case no. 06-cv-4805, docket no. 193), and finds that it adequately protects the interests of the Settlement Class and that there is no need for additional injunctive relief concerning the EEOC Settlement Class and the Section 1981 Settlement Class members in this case.
43. Within 10 days after Final Approval of the Consent Decree, YRC shall post copies of the Notice attached as Exhibit D to this Decree at YRC's Chicago break bulk dock operation on the bulletin boards usually used by YRC for posting governmental notices directed to employees. The Notice shall remain posted for the duration of the Chicago Heights Consent Decree. YRC shall take all reasonable steps to ensure that the posting is not altered, defaced or covered by any other material. YRC shall certify to the EEOC in writing within 10 days after Final Approval of the Consent Decree that the Notice has been properly posted. YRC shall permit the Monitor to enter YRC 's Chicago bulk break dock operation premises for purposes of verifying compliance with this Paragraph at any time during normal business hours.
MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS 44. Counterparts. This Decree may be executed by the Parties in one or more counterparts each of which shall be deemed an original but all of which together shall constitute one and the same instrument. An executed photocopy shall be deemed an original. 45. Binding Upon Successors. The terms of this Decree shall be binding upon the
Page 19 of23

Case: 1:08-cv-05908 Document #: 181-1 Filed: 09/25/12 Page 1 of 21 PageID #:11318
present and future directors, officers, managers, agents, successors and assigns of YRC. YRC, and any successor(s) of YRC, shall provide a copy of this Decree to any organization or person who proposes to acquire or merge with YRC, or any successor ofYRC, prior to the effectiveness of any such acquisition or merger.
46. Notices. Any notices to be given to the Parties under this Decree will be deemed sufficient if mailed by first class mail to:
Counsel for Plaintiffs The EEOC: Richard J. Mrizek, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 500 West Madison Street, Suite 2000, Chicago, Illinois, 60661. And: Intervenors' Counsel/Section 1981 Class Counsel: Randall Schmidt, Clinical Professor of Law, Director Employment Law Project, Edwin F. Mandel Legal Aid Clinic, University of Chicago Law School, 6020 S. University Ave., Chicago, Illinois 60637. Counsel for YRC: Kevin W. Shaughnessy, Baker & Hostetler LLP, 200 S. Orange Avenue, Suite 2300, Orlando, Florida 32801. 47. Entire Agreement. This Decree constitutes the entire agreement between YRC and Plaintiffs hereto with respect to the matters herein, and it supersedes all negotiations, representations, comments, contracts and writings prior to the date of this Consent Decree. 48. Interpretation and Severability. Whenever possible, each provision and term of this Decree shall be interpreted in such a manner as to be valid and enforceable; provided, however, that in the event any provision or term of this Decree should be determined to be or rendered invalid or unenforceable (by an Act of Congress or otherwise), all other provisions and terms of this Decree shall remain unaffected and in full force and effect to the extent permitted by Jaw. 49. Modifications. YRC, EEOC, and Section 1981 Class Counsel may jointly agree,
Page 20 of23

Case: 1:08-cv-05908 Document #: 181-1 Filed: 09/25/12 Page 2 of 21 PageID #:11319
in writing, to modify the Consent Decree with the approval of the Court. 50. Enforceability. YRC, EEOC, and Section 1981 Class Counsel shall make a good
faith effort to defend this Decree from any legal challenge whether by appeal, collateral attack, or objection.
DISPUTE RESOLUTION 51. If during the term of this Decree any party to this Decree believes that the other party has failed to comply with any provision(s) of the Decree, the complaining party shall notify the other Parties ofthe alleged non-compliance and shall afford the alleged non-complying party 10 business days to remedy the non-compliance or to satisfy the complaining party that the alleged non-complying party has complied. If the alleged non-complying party has not remedied the alleged non-compliance or satisfied the complaining party that it has complied within I0 business days, the complaining party may apply to the Court for appropriate relief.
DURATION OF THE DECREE AND RETENTION OF JURISDICTION 52. Except as is necessary to enforce the posting requirement in Paragraph 43, this Decree shall be in effect until 30 days after all money has been paid from the Settlement Fund and all disputes, if any, under Paragraph 43 have been resolved. The Court shall retain jurisdiction of the EEOC Chicago Ridge Title VII case only for the purpose of enforcing the posting requirement in Paragraph 43 . Upon the latter ofthe expiration of the 30-day period or 30 days after all disputes, if any, have been resolved, the Court shall dismiss the Chicago Ridge Section 1981 case with prejudice.
Page 21 of23

Case: 1:08-cv-05908 Document #: 181-1 Filed: 09/25/12 Page 3 of 21 PageID #:11320

ENTERED AND APPROVED FOR:
For the EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION 131 M Street, NE Washington, DC 20507
P. DAVID LOPEZ General Counsel
JAMES LEE Deputy General Counsel
GWENDOLYN YOUNG REAMS Associate General Counsel

ForYRC INC.
KEVIN W. SHAUGHNESSY Baker & Hostetler LLP 200 S. Orange Avenue, Suite 2300 Orlando, FL 32801
COUNSEL FOR YRC INC.

JOHN C. HENDRICKSON Regional Attorney
GREGORYGOCHANOUR Supervisory Trial Attorney
RICHARD 1. MRIZEK Trial Attorney
U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 500 W. Madison, Suite 2000 Chicago, Illinois 60661 (312) 869-8117

Page 22 of23

Case: 1:08-cv-05908 Document #: 181-1 Filed: 09/25/12 Page 4 of 21 PageID #:11321
For INTERVENING PLAINTIFFS and the SECTION I98I CLASS
RANDALL D. SCHMIDT Edwin F. Mandel Legal Aid Clinic
ofthe University ofChicago law School 6020 S. University Ave. Chicago, IL 6063 7 (773) 702-96 I I
CAROL COPLAN BABBITT The Law Office of Carol Coplan Babbitt 35 E. Wacker Dr. Suite 650 Chicago, IL 6060 I (312) 435-9775
CATHERINE A. CAPORUSSO Law Office of Catherine Caporusso 53 W. Jackson Suite 505 Chicago, IL 60604 312-933-0655
ENTERED: United States District Court Magistrate Judge Susan Cox
Date:
Page 23 of23

Case: 1:08-cv-05908 Document #: 181-1 Filed: 09/25/12 Page 5 of 21 PageID #:11322

EXHIBIT A

RELEASE AGREEMENT

I,

, for and in consideration of the sum of $

payable to me

pursuant to the terms of the Consent Decree entered by the Court in EEOC v. Yellow Transp., 09

CV 7693 (N.D . Ill.), and Brown, eta!. v. Yellow Transp., 08 CV 5908 (N.D. Ill.), on behalf of

myself, my heirs, assigns, executors, and agents, do hereby forever release, waive, remise,

acquit, and discharge YRC Inc., and Yellow Transportation, Inc., and their current and former

shareholders, directors, officers, managers, agents, creditors, employees, attorneys, insurers, and

for each of the foregoing, their respective parents, affiliates, subsidiaries, successors and assigns

(collectively, the Released Entities), from any and all claims and causes of action of any kind,

known or unknown, which I now have or ever have had under Section 1981 of the Civil Rights

Act of 1866, as amended, 42 U.S .C. § 1981, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as

amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and any other similar or related federal, state, or local

employment discrimination or civil rights law, regulation, or ordinance arising from or related to

the underlying facts and claims which were asserted in EEOC v. Yellow Transp., 09 C 7693

(N.D. Ill.), and Brown, et al. v. Yellow Transp., 08 C 5908 (N.D. Ill.).

I understand that by executing this Agreement, the Released Entities are not admitting any violation of my rights under statutory or common law. I also understand that this release is effective only so long as each of the payments due and owing under the Decree is paid to me. Should any payment fail to be made, the release is null and void.

Date

Signature

Page 1 of23

Case: 1:08-cv-05908 Document #: 181-1 Filed: 09/25/12 Page 6 of 21 PageID #:11323

EXHIBITB

THIS IS A NOTICE OFA PROPOSED CLASS ACTIONSETTLEMENT THIS IS NOT A SUMMONS OR AN ORDER TO COME TO COURT

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

CHARLES BROWN, et al., on behalf of

)

themselves and similarly situated

)

African-American employees,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

YELLOW TRANSPORTATION, INC., and )

YRC, INC.,

)

)

Defendants.

)

Case No.: 08 CV 5908 Magistrate Judge Susan E. Cox

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY )

COMMISSION,

)

)

Plaintiff,

)

)

v.

)

)

YELLOW TRANSPORTATION, INC., and )

YRC, INC.,

)

)

Defendants.

)

Case No.: 09 CV 7693 Magistrate Judge Susan E. Cox

PRELIMINARY NOTICE OF SETTLEMENT OF DISCRIMINATION AND HARASSMENT CLASS ACTION LAWSUIT
This Notice is being sent to you, as ordered by the Court, to advise you of the preliminary approval of the settlement of two employment discrimination cases against the company formerly known as Yellow Transportation and now known as YRC Inc., with regard to its former terminal in Chicago Ridge, Illinois. In Brown v. Yellow, 08 CV 5908, the Plaintiffs (Charles Brown, Jeffrey Burks, Antonio Colon, James DeMoss, Jameson Dixon, Clark Faulkner, Kenneth George, Leonard Gregory, Marshun Hill, Mack Leonard, Cedric Muse, Laroy Washington,
Page 1 of9

Case: 1:08-cv-05908 Document #: 181-1 Filed: 09/25/12 Page 7 of 21 PageID #:11324

Darrell Williams, Charles Woods, and Michael Woods) individually and on behalf of a class of African-American employees and former employees brought suit alleging, among other things, that Yellow Transportation, Inc., and YRC Inc. ("Yellow/YRC") violated the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. §1981 ("Section 1981"), by unlawfully discriminating against a class of African-American employees at Yellow/YRC's facility at 10301 South Harlem Avenue, Chicago Ridge, Illinois ("Chicago Ridge"), by fostering a hostile work environment based upon race, and unlawfully discriminated against its African-American employees in the terms and conditions of employment (the "Section 1981 case"). Plaintiff Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the "EEOC") filed suit (case number 09 CV 7693) against Yellow/YRC under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. §2000e, et seq., (the "EEOC case"), making similar claims. These cases are now consolidated for settlement purposes.

IF YOU ARE A CLASS MEMBER, YOU MUST NOW DECIDE WHAT ACTION YOU WILL TAKE IN RESPONSE TO THE PROPOSED SETTLEMENT OF THE CLASS ACTION.

Your legal rights are affected whether you act or don't act. Read this notice carefully.

-. - - --

·-

>- -

~;(i1'eT~li1{5W,{'fL i~"\ ~~(li'l"BJf(~)~~fR't'Trf(n.~~~L~34\t!~lrt·:

-

--

Sl!Bl\>UT A CLAIM FORM

The only way to get a payment.

OBJECT

Write to the Court about why you don't like the settlement.

GO TO A HEARING

Ask to speak in Court about the fairness ofthe settlement.

DO NOTHING

Get no payment. Give up rights.

These rights and options- and the deadlines to exercise them-are explained in this notice. The Court in charge of this case still has to decide whether to approve the settlement. If the Court approves the settlement, payments will be made after Claim Forms are reviewed. Please be patient.

Page 2 of9

Case: 1:08-cv-05908 Document #: 181-1 Filed: 09/25/12 Page 8 of 21 PageID #:11325
WHAT THIS NOTICE CONTAINS BASIC INFORMATION.........................................................................................4
1. Why Have I Received This Notice?................................................................................. 4 2. What Is This Lawsuit About? .......................................................................................... 4 3. Why Is This Lawsuit A Class Action? ...................................................... ....................... 4 4. Why Is There A Settlement?............................................................................................ 5 5. Who Is In The Settlement? .............................................................................................. 5
THE SETTLEMENT BENEFITS-WHAT YOU GET .....................................5
6. What Does The Settlement Provide? ............................................................................... 5 7. What Can I Get From The Settlement?............................................................................ 5
HOW YOU GET A PAYMENT---SUBMITING A CLAIM FORM
8. How Can I Get A Payment?............................................................................................. 6 9. When Would I Get My Payment?.................................................................................... 6
THE LAWYERS REPRESENTING YOU ...........................................................6
10. Do I Have A Lawyer In This Case?................................................................................. 6 11. How Will The Lawyers Be Paid? .................................................................................... 6
OBJECTING TO THE SETTLEMENT ...............................................................6
12. How Do I Tell The Court That I Don't Like The Settlement? ........................................ 6
THE COURT'S FAIRNESS HEARING ...............................................................7
13. When And Where Will The Court Decide Whether To Approve The Settlement? ........ 7 14. Do I Have To Come To The Hearing? ................................................................................. 7 15. May I Speak At The Hearing? ......................................................................................... 7
IF YOU DO NOTHING ..........................................................................................8
16. What Happens Ifl do Nothing At All? ........................................................................... 8
GETTING MORE INFORMATION.....................................................................8
17. Are There More Details About The Setlement? .............................................................. 8 18. How Do I Get More Information? ................................................................................... 8
Page 3 of9

Case: 1:08-cv-05908 Document #: 181-1 Filed: 09/25/12 Page 9 of 21 PageID #:11326
BASIC INFORMATION
You have received this Notice because YellowNRC's personnel records show that you worked at Chicago Ridge some time on or after October 15, 2004 as a dock worker, hostler, spotter, janitor, supervisor, or clerical employee on the dock, either as a "casual," " 10%," "regular," fulltime or other employee. This notice explains that you have legal rights and options that you may exercise now that a settlement has been proposed.
This lawsuit is about whether YellowNRC discriminated against African-American employees because of their race by fostering a racially hostile work environment at YellowNRC's Chicago Ridge workplace. Plaintiffs and the EEOC claim that the hostile work environment was created by harassing activities, including: the display of racially hostile symbols; racist graffiti; and racial epithets, slurs, and comments uttered by co-workers and supervisors. Plaintiffs and the EEOC also claim that YellowNRC discriminated against African-American employees in many other aspects of employment, that the company did not respond to repeated complaints by African-American employees about the workplace, and that management employees retaliated against employees who made complaints about discrimination.
YellowNRC maintains that this case should not be certified as a class action. YellowNRC also denies that it violated any law, including Section 1981 and Title VII, and denies that it discriminated against or created a hostile working environment for African-American employees at Chicago Ridge or Chicago Heights. YellowNRC has retained legal counsel to represent the company in the Section 1981 and EEOC cases.
The Court has not decided which side is right.
On May 13, 2011, the Court decided that the Section 1981 can go forward as a class action because it meets the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, which governs class actions in federal courts. The Court allowed, or "certified," this lawsuit as a class action because there is a sufficient number of African-American individuals who were employed by YellowNRC at Chicago Ridge between October 15, 2004, and the present to form a Class; there are legal questions and facts that are common to the Class Members; the Class Representatives' claims are typical of the claims ofthe rest ofthe Class; the Class Representatives and the lawyers representing the Class will fairly and adequately represent the Class Members' interests; the claims made by the Plaintiffs against YellowNRC are generally applicable to the Class; there are more important common legal questions and facts in this case than questions that affect only individuals; and this class action will be more efficient than having many individual lawsuits. The EEOC is not required to certify a class in its lawsuit. The EEOC case also sought relief for the group of former and current African-American employees who were victims of racial harassment and discrimination.
Page 4 of9

Case: 1:08-cv-05908 Document #: 181-1 Filed: 09/25/12 Page 10 of 21 PageID #:11327
The Court did not decide in favor of Plaintiffs, the EEOC or Defendants. Instead, all sides agreed to a settlement. That way, the parties avoid the cost of a trial, the risks involved in a trial, and the people affected will get compensation. The attorneys in the Section 1981 case ("Class Counsel") and the EEOC think the settlement is best for all ofthe members ofthe Class.
In a class action lawsuit, one or more people called "Class Representatives" sue on behalf of other people who have similar claims. In this case, the Class Representatives are Charles Brown, Jeffrey Burks, Antonio Colon, James DeMoss, Jameson Dixon, Clark Faulkner, Kenneth George, Leonard Gregory, Marshun Hill, Mack Leonard, Cedric Muse, Laroy Washington, Darrell Williams, Charles Woods, and Michael Woods. The Court has certified one class consisting of all current and former African-American employees who were employed by YellowNRC on its docks, in offices on the docks, or in the yard in the positions of dock worker, hostler, spotter, janitor, supervisor, or clerical (including as a "casual," "10%," "regular," full-time or other employee); and worked at Chicago Ridge at any time on or after October 15, 2004 (the "Class"). The Class also includes those African-American employees who were transferred in 2009 from Chicago Ridge to work at the YellowNRC facility at 2000 East Lincoln Highway, Chicago Heights, Illinois 60411 ("Chicago Heights"). The Class Representatives and individuals who are in the Class certified by the Court are covered by the settlement of these cases. All former and current employees who indicated that they were victims of discrimination and were willing to participate in the EEOC's lawsuit are also covered by the settlement.
THE SETTLEMENT BENEFITS-WHAT YOU GET
The settlement provides that YellowNRC will pay the aggregate sum of Eleven Million Dollars ($11,000,000.00) to settle these cases. The $11,000,000.00 shall be distributed to the Class Representatives, the Class Members, and Class Counsel.
You may be eligible to get a payment from the settlement for the harm you believe you suffered as a result of the alleged racially hostile work environment at YellowNRC' s facility at Chicago Ridge. The EEOC shall determine the amount of each monetary award based on a point system developed by the EEOC and Class Counsel. This point system will take into account several factors, including your length of employment, dates of employment, job assignments, the severity of the alleged harassment or discrimination, the duration of the alleged harassment or discrimination, the extent of the alleged harm, whether you allegedly received more difficult work assignments because of race, whether you allegedly received harsher or more frequent discipline because of race, whether you were allegedly denied opportunities to be a hostler/spotter, whether you complained of discrimination, your participation and cooperation with the EEOC and the Class Counsel in the litigation of these cases, and the overall strength of your claim.
Page 5 of9

Case: 1:08-cv-05908 Document #: 181-1 Filed: 09/25/12 Page 11 of 21 PageID #:11328
HOW YOU GET A PAYMENT-SUBMITTING A CLAIM FORM
To receive a payment from the settlement fund you must submit the enclosed Claim Form on or before _ _, _, 2012, to:
First Class, Inc. 5410 W. Roosevelt Rd. Unit 222 Chicago, Illinois 60644
The Claim Form must be actually received by First Class, Inc., on or before such date in order to be considered timely and for you to be paid. It is your obligation to make sure First Class, Inc., receives your Claim Form before the due date. All Claim Forms must be signed under penalty of perjury to be considered.
If you are determined to be eligible for settlement payment, you will receive a check after the Court reviews all of the proposed payments to Class Members. This process may take some time, and the parties do not expect that payments will be made until sometime in the spring of 2013. Please be patient.
THE LAWYERS REPRESENTING YOU
The Court has decided that the Edwin F. Mandel Legal Aid Clinic of the University of Chicago Law School in Chicago, Illinois, the Law Office of Carol Coplan Babbitt in Chicago, Illinois, and the Law Office of Catherine A. Caporusso in Chicago, Illinois are qualified to represent you and all Class Members. Together, these lawyers are called "Class Counsel." Lawyers for the EEOC also have been seeking relief for those African-American workers who believe they were victims of discrimination or harassment at Chicago Ridge and agreed to participate.
The settlement provides that the Class Counsel will receive $1,100,000.00 in payment to them of their reasonable attorneys' fees and costs in pursuing this litigation on behalf of the Class Representatives and the Class. The Court will be asked to approve the attorneys' fees and costs at the Fairness Hearing described on page 7, in the answer to Question 13. Neither the lawyers for the EEOC nor the government will receive any payment for their involvement in either the EEOC or the Section 1981 case
OBJECTING TO THE SETTLEMENT
You can tell the Court that you don't agree with the settlement or some part of it by "objecting" to the settlement. Objecting is simply telling the Court that you don't like something about the
Page 6 of9

Case: 1:08-cv-05908 Document #: 181-1 Filed: 09/25/12 Page 12 of 21 PageID #:11329

settlement. You must give reasons why you think the Court should not approve the settlement or why you don't like the settlement or some part of it. The Court will consider your views. To object, you must send a letter saying that you object to the settlement in Brown v. Yellow, Case No. 08 CV 5908. Be sure to include your name, address, telephone number, signature, and the reasons you object to the settlement. Mail the objection to these four different places:

Clerk ofthe Court United States District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois 219 S. Dearborn Street 201h Floor
Chicago, Illinois 60604

CLASS COUNSEL: Randall D. Schmidt Edwin F. Mandel Legal Aid Clinic 6020 S. University Ave. Chicago, Illinois 60637

EEOC: Richard J. Mrizek Trial Attorney U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 500 W. Madison, Suite 2000 Chicago, Illinois 60661

DEFENDANTS' COUNSEL: Kevin W. Shaughnessy Baker & Hostetler LLP 200 S. Orange Avenue Suite 2300 Orlando, Florida 32801

You need to make sure that your objections are received by these four different places on or before September___, 2012.

THE COURT'S FAIRNESS HEARING

The Court will hold a hearing at which time the Court will consider the fairness, adequacy and reasonableness ofthe proposed settlement (the "Fairness Hearing"). This hearing will be held on September___, 2012, at _ _.m. in Room 1330, 219 S. Dearborn Street, Chicago, Illinois 60604. At this hearing the Court will consider whether the settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate. If there are objections, the Court will consider them. The Court will listen to people who have asked to speak at the hearing. After the hearing, the Court will decide whether to approve the settlement. The Court will also rule upon the Class Counsel's request for attorneys' fees and costs. We do not know how long these decisions will take.
No. Class Counsel and the EEOC will answer any questions that the Court may have. But, you are welcome to come at your own expense. If you send an objection, you don't have to come to the Court to talk about it. As long as you mailed your written objection on time, the Court will consider it. You may also pay your own lawyer to attend, but it's not necessary.
You may ask the Court for permission to speak at the Fairness Hearing. To do so, you must send a letter saying that it is your "Notice of Intention to Appear in Brown v. Yellow." Be sure to include your name, address, telephone number, and signature. Your Notice of Intention to
Page 7 of9

Case: 1:08-cv-05908 Document #: 181-1 Filed: 09/25/12 Page 13 of 21 PageID #:11330

Appear must be received no later than _ _ _, 2012, and be sent to the Clerk of the Court, Class Counsel, the EEOC and Defense Counsel, at the four addresses on pages 6-7, in the answer to Question 12.
IF YOU DO NOTHING

If you do nothing, you'll get no money from this settlement. But you won't be able to start a lawsuit, continue with a lawsuit, or be part of any other lawsuit against Yellow/YRC about the legal issues in this case, ever again.
GETTING MORE INFORMATION

This Notice summarizes the proposed settlement. More details are in a Consent Decree. You can get a copy of the Consent Decree by writing to Randall D. Schmidt, Edwin F. Mandel Legal Aid Clinic, 6020 S. University Ave., Chicago, Illinois 60637, or by visiting: www.YRCCiassAction.com.

For more information, visit the website YRCCiassAction.com, where you will find the Consent Decree, the Court's Order certifying the Class, the Corrected Amended Complaint that Plaintiffs submitted, and the Defendants' Answer to the Corrected Amended Complaint. You may also call or write to Class Counsel with any questions regarding this class action . The contact information for Class Counsel is:

Randall D. Schmidt Edwin F. Mandel Legal Aid Clinic
6020 S. University Ave. Chicago, IL 60637 (773) 702-9611

Carol Coplan Babbitt Law Office ofCarol Coplan Babbitt
35 E. Wacker Drive, Suite 650 Chicago, IL 60601 (312) 435-9775

Catherine Caporusso Law Office of Catherine Caporusso
53 W. Jackson Blvd., Suite 505 Chicago, IL 60604 (312) 933-0655

Page 8 of9

Case: 1:08-cv-05908 Document #: 181-1 Filed: 09/25/12 Page 14 of 21 PageID #:11331

If you have any questions regarding the EEOC litigation, please contact:
Richard J. Mrizek Trial Attorney
U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 500 W. Madison Street, Suite 2000 Chicago, IL 60661 (312) 869-8117
PLEASE DO NOT TELEPHONE THE CLERK OF THE COURT.

Dated: June ___J 2012

CLERK, U.S. District Court Northern District of Illinois

Page 9 of9

Case: 1:08-cv-05908 Document #: 181-1 Filed: 09/25/12 Page 15 of 21 PageID #:11332
EXlllBITC
CLAIM FORM
IMPORTANT: Your Claim Form MUST ACTUALLY RECEIVED BY THE CLAIMS ADMINISTRATOR by DATE. It is your obligation to make sure that the Claims Administrator actually receives your Claim Form by DATE.
INSTRUCTIONS 1. It is important to read and follow these instructions carefully, as well as those contained in the letter that accompanied this Claim Form. Failure to follow these instructions may result in you being ineligible to receive a monetary award in this case. 2. If the Claims Administrator does not receive this Claim Form by DATE, your claim will be rejected and you will lose all rights to receive any money from this settlement. You must mail or deliver your Claim Form to:
First Class, Inc. 5410 W. Roosevelt Rd. Unit 222 Chicago, IL 60644
3. You must sign, under penalty of perjury, and date the Claim Form on page 12.
4. All questions pertain to your experiences at the Chicago Ridge facility. Do not answer the questions based upon experiences at other YRC facilities.
5. If you have insufficient space to answer a question, you may continue your answer on additional sheets of paper. Please write your name, social security number, and the appropriate question number on any additional sheets of paper you include.
6. Answer all questions as fully and completely as you can, even if you have provided the same or similar information to the EEOC or the Class Counsel in the past. If you are uncertain or cannot fully recall certain information, you may indicate that fact in your answers.
7. You must fill out this form, even if you have sat for a deposition or if you have been previously interviewed by the EEOC or the Class Counsel.
8. Please update us if any ofyour contact information changes.
Page 1 of 12

Case: 1:08-cv-05908 Document #: 181-1 Filed: 09/25/12 Page 16 of 21 PageID #:11333

PERSONAL INFORMATION

1. Name (First, Middle, Last)

2. Street Address (including Apartment Number, if applicable)

3. City

State

Zip Code

4.
Social Security Number

5.
Race

6.
E-mail Address

7. Home Phone Number

Best Time to Call This Number

8. Work Phone Number

Best Time to Call This Number

9. Cell Phone Number

Best Time to Call This Number

I 0. Phone Number of Relative or Other Person Who Knows How to Contact You

II.
Date ofBirth

12. Please list any other name(s) you used while employed at Yellow:

Name

Dates You Used This Name

Name

Dates You Used This Name

Page 2 of 12

Ca•se: 1:08-cv-05908 Document #: 181-1 Filed: 09/25/12 Page 17 of 21 PageID #:11334
EMPLOYMENT WITH YELLOW AT CIDCAGO RIDGE 13. Job titles you worked under while at Yellow's Chicago Ridge facility (for example
"dockworker", "hostler", ')anitor", "supervisor"): 14. Brief description ofjob duties for each position:_ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
15. Dates of employment at Yellow's Chicago Ridge facility: 16. List any extended periods (more than 2 weeks) you were on lay off:

Movement From The Casual Position to a Permanent Position

17. Do you believe that you were ever denied the opportunity to move from the "Casual"

position to the seniority list position or "1 0%" position or delayed in moving from the Casual

position to the seniority list position or 10% position because of your race?

Yes

No

If"yes", please describe the basis for your claim, including when this occurred and the name and

race of who you believe was promoted from the Casual position to the seniority list position or

10% instead ofyou:

Page 3 of 12

Case: 1:08-cv-05908 Document #: 181-1 Filed: 09/25/12 Page 18 of 21 PageID #:11335

Promotion to Hostler or a Spotter

18. Were you interested in becoming a Hostler or Spotter at Chicago Ridge?

Yes

No

If"yes", please describe when you were interested and what you did to seek a position:

19. Do you believe that you ever denied the opportunity to become a Hostler or Spotter or

improperly passed over for the position because of your race?

Yes

No

If "yes", please describe how you were denied the opportunity, including when and whether this

occurred more than once:

CLAIMS OF RACIAL HARASSMENT

20. Did you ever personally see racist graffiti at Yellow's Chicago Ridge facility?

Yes

No

If"yes", describe what you saw, when you saw it, where in the facility you saw it, and how often

you saw it:

Page 4 of 12

Case: 1:08-cv-05908 Document #: 181-1 Filed: 09/25/12 Page 19 of 21 PageID #:11336

21. Did you ever hear about any racist graffiti at Yellow's Chicago Ridge facility when you

were working there?

Yes

No

If"yes", describe what you heard and when you heard about it:

22. Did you ever personally see or hear about any racist drawings or cartoons at Yellow's

Chicago Ridge facility?

Yes

No

If"yes", describe the drawings or cartoons, whether you personally saw them, whether you heard

about them, when they occurred, and where they were located:

23. Did you ever personally see a noose or rope you believed to be a noose at Yellow's

Chicago Ridge facility that you believe was displayed to either intimidate or offend Black

employees?

Yes

No

If "yes", describe what you saw, when you saw it, where in the facility you saw it, and on how

many occasions. If you saw such a noose or rope more than once, describe each occurrence:

Page 5 of 12

Case: 1:08-cv-05908 Document #: 181-1 Filed: 09/25/12 Page 20 of 21 PageID #:11337

24. While you were working at Yellow's Chicago Ridge facility, did you ever hear about a

noose or rope you believed to be a noose at Yellow' s Chicago Ridge facility that you believe was

displayed to either intimidate or offend Black employees?

Yes

No

If " yes", describe what you heard, when you heard about it, and where in the facility you were

told it was displayed. If you heard about such a noose or rope more than once, describe each

occurrence:

25. Have you ever personally heard anyone at Yellow's Chicago Ridge facility, either a

coworker or supervisor, make any kind of racist remark?

Yes

No

If "yes", describe what you heard, who said it, whether it was a supervisor or coworker, whether

it was directed at you or overheard by you, and when you heard it, on how many occasions, and

whether you reported it to Yellow, to whom, and Yellow's response. If you heard more than one

racist remark, please describe each occurrence:

CLAIMS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION

Working Conditions

26. Did any Yellow employee at Yellow's Chicago Ridge facility, whether a supervisor or

coworker, ever refuse to work with you because of your race?

Yes

No

If "yes", please provide details of the incident, including who refused to work with you and when

the incident occurred; if this occurred more than once, describe each occurrence:

Page 6 of 12

Case: 1:08-cv-05908 Document #: 181-1 Filed: 09/25/12 Page 21 of 21 PageID #:11338

Discipline and Work Rules

27. Do you believe that you ever received discipline for conduct for which a White employee

was not, or would not have been, disciplined?

Yes

No

If "yes", please provide details of the incident(s), including when the incident occurred, and if

this occurred more than once:

28. While employed at Yellow's Chicago Ridge facility, did you ever observe any

differences in the way Black and White employees were treated in regards to discipline?

Yes

No

lf"yes", please describe:

29. Do you believe that you were treated differently than White employees regarding access

to and privileges of using the break room and restrooms?

Yes

No

Page 7 of 12

Case: 1:08-cv-05908 Document #: 181-2 Filed: 09/25/12 Page 1 of 6 PageID #:11345
If "yes", please provide details of the incident(s), including when the incident occurred, and if this occurred more than once:

30. While employed at Yellow's Chicago Ridge facility, did you observe any differences between Black and White employees regarding access to and privileges of using the break roorn

and restrooms?

Yes

No

If "yes•·, please provide details of the incident(s), including when the incident occurred, and if

this occurred more than once:

31. Do you believe that you were treated differently than White employees were treated by Yellow regarding behavior on the dock such as talking, smoking, use of cell phones, etc.?
Yes No If "yes", please provide details of the incident(s), including when the incident occurred, and if this occurred more than once:
Page 8 of 12

Case: 1:08-cv-05908 Document #: 181-2 Filed: 09/25/12 Page 2 of 6 PageID #:11346

32. While employed at Yellow's Chicago Ridge facility, did you observe any differences

between how Black and White employees were treated by Yellow regarding behavior on the

dock such as talking, smoking, use of cell phones, etc.?

Yes

No

If "yes", please provide details of the ineident(s), including when th~ incident occurred, and if

this occurred more than once:

Work Assignments

33. Do you believe that you ever received a less desirable type of work assignment because

of your race?

Yes

No

If "yes", please describe the less desirable work, including when the work was assigned, and if

this occurred more than once:

34. While employed at Yellow's Chicago Ridge facility, did you ever observe any

differences between the type or amount of work assigned to Black and White employees?

Yes

t--.o

If "yes", please describe what you observed and approximately when these differences were

Page 9 of 12

Case: 1:08-cv-05908 Document #: 181-2 Filed: 09/25/12 Page 3 of 6 PageID #:11347
observed:

COMPLAfNTS

35. Did you ever complain in writing to Yellow about any racial harassment or discrimination that you experienced, witnessed, or heard about at Yellow's Chicago Ridge

facility?

Yes

No

If «yes", please state what you complained about, to whom you complained and when. Also,

please describe any response you received from Yellow:

36. Did you ever make a verbal complaint to any supervisors, managers, or human resources personnel at Yellow about any racial harassment or discrimination that you experienced,

witnessed, or heard about at Yellow's Chicago Ridge facility?

Yes

No

If "yes'', please state what you complained about, to whom you complained and when. Also,

please describe any response you received from Yellow:

Page 10 of 12

Case: 1:08-cv-05908 Document #: 181-2 Filed: 09/25/12 Page 4 of 6 PageID #:11348

37. Did you ever file a Charge of Discrimination regarding Yellow's Chicago Ridge facility

with the EEOC, the Illinois Department of Human Rights, or any other local government fair

employment agency?

Yes

No

Tf "yes", please state with what agency you filed your Charge, the Charge number of your

complaint, whether your case went to court (and if so, the name of the court where you filed and

your case number) and any relief you received as a result of your Charge:

EFFECT OF Tlffi DISCRIMINATION
38. Describe how the claims ofracial harassment or discrimination you have described above affected you or made you feel (including any emotional pain or sutTering).

PARTICIPATION IN TffiS LITIGATION 39. Describe any effort that you made to participate in thts litigation including time spent looking for documents, attending depositions, or communicating with the EEOC or the Class Counsel.
Page I I of 12

Case: 1:08-cv-05908 Document #: 181-2 Filed: 09/25/12 Page 5 of 6 PageID #:11349

CERTIFICATION

- - - - - - 1

-=----- - declare under penalty of perjury that all ofthe infonnation

(Pnnt r-.fa;;;·e)

on this Claim Form is true and correct.

Signature of Claimant

Date

IMPORTA:'IIT ~OTICE

Your Claim Form must be received on or before

. A Claim Form received

later than

will not be accepted. The Claim Form must be mailed or delivered to:

First Class, Inc. 5410 W. Roosevelt Rd. Unit 222 Chicago, IL 60644

Page 12 of 12

Case: 1:08-cv-05908 Document #: 181-2 Filed: 09/25/12 Page 6 of 6 PageID #:11350

EXHIBITD
NOTICE TO YRC EMPLOYEES
This l\otice is being posted pursuant to a Consent Decree entered by the federal court in the Northern District Court of Illinois in EEOC v. Yellow Transportation, Inc., et al., 09 CV 7693 (N.D. Ill.), and Brown, eta/. v. Yellow Transportation, inc., et al., 08 CV 5908 (N.D. Ill.), resolving litigation filed by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") against YRC.
In its suit, the EEOC alleged that YRC discriminated against African-American dockworkers, spotters, and janitors at YRC's Chicago Ridge facililies on the basis of their race by subjecting them to a hostile work environment and discriminating against them in the terms and conditions of employment including subjecting them to unequal discipline and unequal work assignments. The resolution by YRC of any and all claims or potential claims set forth under the Consent Decree is not an admission of liability on the part of the Company.
To resolve the case, YRC and the EEOC have entered into a Consent Decree that
provides monetary relief to eligible individuals. YRC will not discriminate against any employee on the basis of race or retaliate against any person because (s)he opposed any practice made unlawful by Title Vil, filed a charge of discrimination, participated in any Title VII proceeding, or asserted any rights under the Consent Decree.
If you believe you have been discriminated against, you should contact the Chicago Heights Human Resources Coordinator (currently, Kendall Calhoun), any manager or supervisor, or file a report on EthicsPoint at 1-866-ETHICSP or www.ethicspoint.com immediately. The Company cannot respond to issues that are not brought to its attention. If you believe you have been discriminated against, you also may contact Preston Pugh (312-768-7800), who serves as a monitor at Chicago Heights. Finally, you may contact the EEOC at 312-353-8195. The EEOC enforces the federal Jaws against discrimination in employment on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, sex, age, or disability. The EEOC charges no fee and has a TDD number.
TJflS TS AN OFFICIAL NOTICE AND MUST NOT BE DEFACED BY ANYONE
This Notice must remain posted for the time and in the manner as specified in the Consent Decree and must not be altered, defaced or covered by any other material. Any questions about this Notice or compliance with its terms may be directed to YRC Settlement, EEOC, 500West Madison Street, Suite 2000, Chicago, Jllinois 60661.

Date

Magistrate Judge Susan Cox

United States District Court

Page I ofl

 </s> Case: 1:08-cv-05908 Document #: 1 Filed: 10/15/08 Page 1 of 29 PageID #:1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

CHARLES BROWN, JEFFERY BURKS,

)

ANTONIO COLON, JAMES DEMOSS,

)

JAMESON DIXON, CLARK FAULKNER,

)

KENNETH GEORGE, LEONARD GREGORY, )

MARSHUN HILL, CEDRIC MUSE,

)

LAROY WASHINGTON, DARRELL WILLIAMS, )

CHARLES WOODS, MICHAEL WOODS,

)

on behalf of themselves and similarly

)

situated African-American employees,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

YELLOW TRANSPORTATION, INC.

)

)

Defendant.

)

Case No. FILED: OCTOBER 15, 2008 08CV5908 JUDGE GOTTSCHALL MAGISTRATE JUDGE NOLAN
TC

COMPLAINT

NATURE OF THE ACTION

This is an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 to correct unlawful discrimination on the basis

of race and to provide appropriate relief to Charles Brown, Jeffery Burks, Antonio Colon, James

DeMoss, Jameson Dixon, Clark Faulkner, Kenneth George, Leonard Gregory, Marshun Hill,

Cedric Muse, Laroy Washington, Darrell Williams, Charles Woods, Michael Woods, and

similarly situated African-American former and current employees of Yellow Transportation,

Inc. (hereinafter “Plaintiffs”). Plaintiffs allege that Yellow Transportation, Inc. (hereinafter

“Defendant”) has created a racially hostile work environment by: (1) failing to respond to

Plaintiffs’ repeated complaints about nooses hung in the workplace, failing to investigate, and

failing to take disciplinary action against those individuals who hung the nooses; (2) failing to

1

Case: 1:08-cv-05908 Document #: 1 Filed: 10/15/08 Page 2 of 29 PageID #:2
respond to Plaintiffs’ repeated complaints about racially hostile graffiti written on bathroom walls, failing to investigate, and failing to take disciplinary action against those individuals who wrote the graffiti, and (3) failing to respond to Plaintiffs’ repeated complaints that coworkers used racial slurs, wore racially hostile clothing, and exposed racially hostile tattoos, failing to investigate, and failing to take disciplinary action against those individuals who used racial slurs, wore racially hostile clothing, and exposed racially hostile tattoos. Plaintiffs also allege that Defendant has subjected them to disparate treatment on account of their race by: (1) subjecting Plaintiffs to more stringent disciplinary action than similarly situated Caucasian employees, and (2) promoting Caucasian workers who had worked for less time than Plaintiffs instead of and/or before promoting Plaintiffs. Finally, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant retaliated against Plaintiffs for complaining about the hostile work environment and racially disparate treatment.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 1. This court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. This action is authorized and instituted pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981. 2. Venue is proper in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391, because the unlawful conduct alleged herein was committed and continues to occur within the boundaries of the Northern District of Illinois.
PARTIES 3. Plaintiff Charles Brown is an adult African-American male and resident of Cook County, Illinois. 4. Plaintiff Jeffery Burks is an adult African-American male and resident of Cook County, Illinois.
2

Case: 1:08-cv-05908 Document #: 1 Filed: 10/15/08 Page 3 of 29 PageID #:3
5. Plaintiff Antonio Colon is an adult African-American male and resident of Cook County, Illinois.
6. Plaintiff James DeMoss is an adult African-American male and resident of Cook County, Illinois.
7. Plaintiff Jameson Dixon is an adult African-American male and resident of Cook County, Illinois.
8. Plaintiff Clark Faulkner is an adult African-American male and resident of Cook County, Illinois.
9. Plaintiff Kenneth George is an adult African-American male and resident of Cook County, Illinois.
10. Plaintiff Leonard Gregory is an adult African-American male and resident of Cook County, Illinois.
11. Plaintiff Marshun Hill is an adult African-American male and resident of Cook County, Illinois.
12. Plaintiff Cedric Muse is an adult African-American male and resident of Cook County, Illinois.
13. Plaintiff Laroy Washington is an adult African-American male and resident of Cook County, Illinois.
14. Plaintiff Darrell Williams is an adult African-American male and resident of Cook County, Illinois.
15. Plaintiff Charles Woods is an adult African-American male and resident of Cook County, Illinois.
3

Case: 1:08-cv-05908 Document #: 1 Filed: 10/15/08 Page 4 of 29 PageID #:4
16. Plaintiff Michael Woods is an adult African-American male and resident of Cook County, Illinois.
17. Defendant is incorporated in Indiana and employs approximately 22,000 people worldwide.
18. Defendant had revenue of $3,460,500,000 and operating profit of $208,500,000 during fiscal year 2006. According to Defendant’s website, Yellow Transportation is a “thriving, multibillion dollar corporation.”
19. Defendant operates 590 terminals across the United States and ten terminals within the state of Illinois.
20. At all times relevant to this action, Defendant was doing business in Illinois and operating the location at which the alleged discrimination took place.
21. The allegations in this Complaint took place at Defendant’s facility located at 10301 S. Harlem Ave., Chicago Ridge, Illinois (hereinafter “the workplace”).
CLASS ALLEGATIONS DEFINITION OF THE CLASS 22. The representative Plaintiffs sue on behalf of themselves and on behalf of all similarly situated African-American employees and former employees employed by Defendant between October 15, 2004 and the present. The Hostile Work Environment Class consists of all current and former African-American employees employed by Yellow Transportation at their facility located at 10301 S. Harlem Ave., Chicago Ridge, Illinois, between October 15, 2004, and the present.
4

Case: 1:08-cv-05908 Document #: 1 Filed: 10/15/08 Page 5 of 29 PageID #:5
HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT/RACIAL HARASSMENT 23. Defendant subjected Plaintiffs to a racially hostile work environment by tolerating the repeated hanging of nooses in conspicuous places in the workplace, including on work equipment, in order to intimidate African-American workers. 24. Defendant subjected Plaintiffs to a racially hostile work environment by tolerating the persistent appearance of written racial slurs in the workplace, including, but not limited to, “I hate niggers,” “all niggers must die,” “fuck all niggers,” “rotten nigger,” “burn nigger burn,” “fag,” “white power,” and swastikas. 25. Defendant subjected Plaintiffs to a racially hostile work environment by tolerating Caucasian employees’ frequent use of racial slurs, including, but not limited to, “nigger” and “mudcat,” as well as spoken statements including, but not limited to, “I hate black people,” “I hate niggers,” and, in reference to hurricane Katrina, “they should have put a cage around New Orleans and put a banana in the cage and let all the niggers drown.” 26. Defendant subjected Plaintiffs to a racially hostile work environment by tolerating the display of racially hostile symbols, including, but not limited to, the Confederate flag and the letters “KKK” on Caucasian employees’ apparel and visible tattoos. 27. Defendant subjected Plaintiffs to a racially hostile work environment by tolerating racially hostile comments made over the radio in the workplace. 28. Defendant subjected Plaintiffs to a racially hostile work environment by allowing Caucasian supervisors to aggressively scrutinize Plaintiffs’ job performances while not subjecting similarly situated Caucasian employees to similar treatment.
5

Case: 1:08-cv-05908 Document #: 1 Filed: 10/15/08 Page 6 of 29 PageID #:6
29. Defendant failed to adequately address or respond to Plaintiffs’ complaints of racial harassment and the hostile work environment made to company officials, including, but not limited to, direct supervisors, management, and the Human Resources department.
30. Defendant subjected Plaintiffs to disparate treatment due to their race by failing to document Plaintiffs’ repeated complaints of race discrimination.
DISPARATE TREATMENT DUE TO RACE 31. Defendant subjected Plaintiffs to disparate treatment due to their race by allowing supervisors to assign more strenuous work to Plaintiffs than to similarly situated Caucasian employees. 32. Defendant subjected Plaintiffs to disparate treatment due to their race by promoting similarly situated Caucasian employees, as well as Caucasian employees who had worked for Defendant for a shorter time, instead of and/or before promoting Plaintiffs. 33. Defendant subjected Plaintiffs to disparate treatment due to their race by denying Plaintiffs opportunities that would eventually allow them to be promoted while giving such opportunities to similarly situated Caucasian employees. 34. Defendant subjected Plaintiffs to disparate treatment due to their race by forcing injured Plaintiffs to take shorter sick leaves than similarly situated Caucasian employees. 35. Defendant subjected Plaintiffs to disparate treatment due to their race by disciplining them for infractions for which similarly situated Caucasian employees were not disciplined, including, but not limited to, returning late to work after breaks, talking to each other, and going to the bathroom without asking permission.
6

Case: 1:08-cv-05908 Document #: 1 Filed: 10/15/08 Page 7 of 29 PageID #:7
36. Defendant subjected Plaintiffs to disparate treatment due to their race by disciplining them without proper investigation, which was different than their treatment of similarly situated Caucasian employees.
37. Defendant subjected Plaintiffs to disparate treatment due to their race by allowing similarly situated Caucasian employees to take more time off than Plaintiffs.
38. Defendant subjected Plaintiffs to disparate treatment due to their race by giving them less desirable work shifts than similarly situated Caucasian employees, and by denying them the opportunity, afforded to similarly situated Caucasian employees, to choose with which colleagues they worked.
39. Defendant subjected Plaintiffs to disparate treatment due to their race by giving Plaintiffs fewer opportunities to work overtime shifts than similarly situated Caucasian employees.
40. Defendant subjected Plaintiffs to disparate treatment due to their race by assigning them less desirable tasks than similarly situated Caucasian employees, including, but not limited to, requiring them to get in and out of their trucks in inclement weather.
41. Defendant subjected Plaintiffs to disparate treatment due to their race by allowing similarly situated Caucasian employees to participate in a gift-certificate program through which they received thousands of dollars in gift certificates while denying Plaintiffs the same opportunity.
42. Defendant subjected Plaintiffs to disparate treatment due to their race by not giving them the same opportunities as similarly situated Caucasian employees to become drivers and spotters.
7

Case: 1:08-cv-05908 Document #: 1 Filed: 10/15/08 Page 8 of 29 PageID #:8
RETALIATION DUE TO RACE 43. Defendant retaliated against Plaintiffs for complaining about the discriminatory treatment as described in paragraphs 23-42 by, among other things, firing Plaintiffs, disciplining Plaintiffs for ordinarily unenforced rules, cutting off Plaintiffs’ medical benefits, and intimidating Plaintiffs while they were working.
CLASS REQUIREMENTS MET 44. The individuals in the Class are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. Plaintiffs estimate that there are approximately 160 members of the Class. 45. There are questions of law and fact common to the Class that predominate over questions affecting only individuals. Among these common questions are:
a. Whether Defendant created a racially hostile work environment or failed to remedy and prevent a racially hostile work environment; b. Whether there was a disparity between when full time employment is awarded to Plaintiffs and when it was awarded to similarly situated Caucasian employees; c. Whether there was a disparity between the extent and gravity of discipline imposed upon Plaintiffs and the extent and gravity of discipline imposed upon similarly situated Caucasian employees; d. Whether Defendant failed to address Plaintiffs’ complaints about racial harassment and discrimination; and e. Whether Defendant failed to give Plaintiffs benefits such as overtime work, desirable work shifts and inclusion in the gift-certificate program yet granted these benefits to similarly situated Caucasian employees.
8

Case: 1:08-cv-05908 Document #: 1 Filed: 10/15/08 Page 9 of 29 PageID #:9
46. The claims of the representative parties are typical of the claims of the class. INDIVIDUAL NAMED PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS Charles Brown’s Individual Complaints
47. Plaintiff Brown was hired by Defendant on July 5, 1991, as a temporary worker. Plaintiff became a full time worker for Defendant on September 17, 1991. Plaintiff currently works for Defendant as a dock man; the same position as when he started as a full time employee.
48. During Plaintiff Brown’s employment with Defendant, Defendant subjected Plaintiff Brown to discrimination due to his race by creating and tolerating a racially hostile work environment, by treating Plaintiff Brown less favorably than similarly situated Caucasian employees, and by retaliating against Plaintiff Brown for complaining about racial discrimination as alleged with regards to the entire class in paragraphs 23 – 43.
49. Plaintiff Brown has been and continues to be subject to harassment and discrimination based on race. Examples of this harassment and discrimination include:
a. A picture of a man hanging from a noose hung on Plaintiff’s forklift in June 2005; b. Multiple nooses hung in the workplace between May 2005 until May 2008; c. Supervisors taking no or minimal action to cover up or erase graffiti of racial slurs and racially hostile phrases in Plaintiff Brown’s workplace; d. Supervisors ignoring and failing to take investigatory or disciplinary action based on Plaintiff Brown’s complaints about the nooses, the racial slurs, and the racially hostile phrases;
9

Case: 1:08-cv-05908 Document #: 1 Filed: 10/15/08 Page 10 of 29 PageID #:10
e. Defendant promoting similarly situated Caucasian workers who had worked at Defendant’s company for a shorter time than Plaintiff Brown to fulltime status before Plaintiff Brown; f. Defendant punishing Plaintiff Brown for infractions for which similarly situated Caucasian employees were not disciplined, including going to the bathroom without asking permission; g. Defendant demanding that Plaintiff Brown return to work after a break or while talking to a coworker while not demanding that similarly situated Caucasian employees do the same; and h. Plaintiff Brown’s supervisor, Bob Zabonski, disciplining Plaintiff Brown for reading a newspaper in the bathroom without investigating whether Plaintiff was actually reading a newspaper in the bathroom. 50. Similarly situated Caucasian employees were not subjected to such discrimination and received more favorable treatment during their employment with Defendant due to their race. 51. In April 2007, Defendant retaliated against Plaintiff Brown by denying Plaintiff Brown benefits under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) when Plaintiff Brown complained about the appearance of nooses in his workplace. 52. During Plaintiff Brown’s employment, Defendant was aware of Plaintiff Brown’s complaints as enumerated above, but failed to take corrective action or prevent further discrimination.
10

Case: 1:08-cv-05908 Document #: 1 Filed: 10/15/08 Page 11 of 29 PageID #:11
Jeffery Burks’s Individual Claims 53. Plaintiff Burks started working as a temporary employee for Defendant in October 1995. He was hired as a full-time dock man on February 13, 1996. Plaintiff currently works for Defendant as a dock man; the same position as when he started as a full time employee. 54. During Plaintiff Burks’s employment with Defendant, Defendant subjected Plaintiff Burks to discrimination due to his race by creating and tolerating a racially hostile work environment, by treating Plaintiff Burks less favorably than similarly situated Caucasian employees, and by retaliating against Plaintiff Burks for complaining about racial discrimination as alleged with regards to the entire class in paragraphs 23 – 43. 55. Similarly situated Caucasian employees were not subjected to such discrimination and received more favorable treatment in the terms and conditions of their employment with Defendant due to their race. 56. During Plaintiff Burks’s employment, Defendant was aware of Plaintiff Burks’s complaints as enumerated above, but failed to take corrective action or prevent further discrimination.
Antonio Colon’s Individual Claims 57. Plaintiff Colon started working as a temporary employee for Defendant in 2000. He became a full-time employee approximately one year later, in 2001. Plaintiff currently works for Defendant as a dock man; the same position as when he started as a full time employee. 58. During Plaintiff Colon’s employment with Defendant, Defendant subjected Plaintiff Colon to discrimination due to his race by creating and tolerating a racially hostile work environment, by treating Plaintiff Colon less favorably than similarly situated Caucasian
11

Case: 1:08-cv-05908 Document #: 1 Filed: 10/15/08 Page 12 of 29 PageID #:12
employees, and by retaliating against Plaintiff Colon for complaining about racial discrimination as alleged with regards to the entire class in paragraphs 23 – 43.
59. During his employment with Defendant, Plaintiff Colon was subjected to discrimination due to his race. Examples of this discrimination include:
a. Being subjected to disparate treatment in the enforcement of work rules and policies, such as the rule against standing around talking after breaks are over, the requirement that workers alert a supervisor when they intend to leave to use the bathroom, and the attendance policy; b. Being assigned less desirable shifts and tasks than similarly situated Caucasian employees; c. Having to wait a longer time than similarly qualified Caucasian workers to acquire the status of full-time employee; and d. Being called a “mutt” by a coworker in reference to his being half Puerto Rican and half African-American. 60. Similarly situated Caucasian employees were not subjected to such discrimination and received more favorable treatment in the terms and conditions of their employment with Defendant, due to their race. 61. During Plaintiff Colon’s employment, Defendant was aware of Plaintiff Colon’s complaints as enumerated above, but failed to take corrective action or prevent further discrimination.
James DeMoss’s Individual Claims 62. Plaintiff DeMoss was hired by Defendant in September 1991 as a temporary worker. He became a full time worker approximately one year later, in September 1992.
12

Case: 1:08-cv-05908 Document #: 1 Filed: 10/15/08 Page 13 of 29 PageID #:13
Plaintiff currently works for Defendant as a dock man/spotter; the same position as when he started as a full time employee.
63. During Plaintiff DeMoss’s employment with Defendant, Defendant subjected Plaintiff DeMoss to discrimination due to his race by creating and tolerating a racially hostile work environment, by treating Plaintiff DeMoss less favorably than similarly situated Caucasian employees, and by retaliating against Plaintiff DeMoss for complaining about racial discrimination as alleged with regards to the entire class in paragraphs 23 – 43.
64. During his employment with Defendant, Plaintiff DeMoss was subjected to discrimination due to his race. Examples of this discrimination include:
a. Being denied promotion to full-time status until one day after a similarly situated Caucasian worker was promoted, which resulted in the Caucasian worker receiving seniority status, better work schedules, overtime, and days off; b. Being denied promotion by supervisors who subjected Plaintiff DeMoss to more stringent testing requirements than similarly situated Caucasian employees when he applied to be a driver; c. Receiving less desirable work schedules and more labor-intensive loads than similarly situated Caucasian dock workers; and d. Defendant not responding to Plaintiff DeMoss’s complaints about racial slurs being used in the workplace, including, but not limited to, a Caucasian employee making racial comments over the radio system. 65. Similarly situated Caucasian employees were not subjected to such discrimination and received more favorable treatment in the terms and conditions of their employment with Defendant, due to their race.
13

Case: 1:08-cv-05908 Document #: 1 Filed: 10/15/08 Page 14 of 29 PageID #:14
66. During Plaintiff DeMoss’s employment, Defendant was aware of Plaintiff DeMoss’s complaints as enumerated above, but failed to take corrective action or prevent further discrimination.
Jameson Dixon’s Individual Claims 67. Plaintiff Dixon began working for Defendant in April 1999 as a temporary worker and became a full time worker in August 1999. Plaintiff currently works for Defendant as a dock man; the same position as when he started as a full time employee. 68. During Plaintiff Dixon’s employment with Defendant, Defendant subjected Plaintiff Dixon to discrimination due to his race by creating and tolerating a racially hostile work environment, by treating Plaintiff Dixon less favorably than similarly situated Caucasian employees, and by retaliating against Plaintiff Dixon for complaining about racial discrimination as alleged with regards to the entire class in paragraphs 23 – 43. 69. During his employment with Defendant, Plaintiff Dixon was subjected to discrimination due to his race. Examples of this discrimination include:
a. Being ordered back to work after a break when similarly situated Caucasian employees were not ordered back to work; and b. Having his complaints about racially charged graffiti and comments ignored by company supervisors. 70. Similarly situated Caucasian employees were not subjected to such discrimination and received more favorable treatment in the terms and conditions of their employment with Defendant. 71. During Plaintiff Dixon’s employment with Defendant, he was retaliated against for complaining about the racially hostile work environment when a supervisor denied him
14

Case: 1:08-cv-05908 Document #: 1 Filed: 10/15/08 Page 15 of 29 PageID #:15
permission to work with certain coworkers for the stated reason that Plaintiff Dixon had filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).
72. During Plaintiff Dixon’s employment, Defendant was aware of Plaintiff Dixon’s complaints as enumerated above, but failed to take corrective action or prevent further discrimination.
Clark Faulkner’s Individual Claims 73. Plaintiff Faulkner began working for Defendant in June 1997 as a temporary worker and became a full time worker in December 1997. Plaintiff currently works for Defendant as a dock man; the same position as when he started as a full time employee. 74. During Plaintiff Faulkner’s employment with Defendant, Defendant subjected Plaintiff Faulkner to discrimination due to his race by creating and tolerating a racially hostile work environment, by treating Plaintiff Faulkner less favorably than similarly situated Caucasian employees, and by retaliating against Plaintiff Faulkner for complaining about racial discrimination as alleged with regards to the entire class in paragraphs 23 – 43. 75. During his employment with Defendant, Plaintiff Faulkner was and continues to be subject to discrimination due to his race. Examples of this discrimination include:
a. Being denied promotion to full-time status until shortly after a similarly situated Caucasian worker was promoted, which resulted in the Caucasian worker receiving seniority status, better work schedules, overtime, and days off; b. Demeaning treatment including, but not limited to, being ordered to pick up a piece of wood by a Caucasian coworker while the coworker stood over the wood;
15

Case: 1:08-cv-05908 Document #: 1 Filed: 10/15/08 Page 16 of 29 PageID #:16
c. Being denied promotion by being subjected to more stringent requirements than similarly situated Caucasian workers when Plaintiff applied to be a driver; and d. Being subjected to more stringent disciplinary action than similarly situated Caucasian employees, and having company rules applied to him in an arbitrary way. 76. Similarly situated Caucasian employees were not subjected to such discrimination and received more favorable treatment in the terms and conditions of their employment with Defendant, due to their race. 77. During his employment with Defendant, Plaintiff Faulkner was written up for complaining about the hostile work environment. 78. During Plaintiff’s employment, Defendant was aware of Plaintiff’s complaints as stated above, but failed to take sufficient corrective action or prevent further discrimination. Specific examples of Defendant’s failure to respond to Plaintiff’s complaints include but are not limited to: a. In June 2008, “KKK” was written on the wall of the work bathroom. Although Plaintiff complained to multiple supervisors, the writing was left on the wall for at least one month. b. In July 2008, Plaintiff asked a coworker to wear a shirt of a tattoo of a confederate flag he had on his arm. When the coworker ignored the request, Plaintiff complained to a supervisor who also ignored the request. The coworker continues to wear clothes that reveal the tattoo in violation of work rules but is not disciplined for this action.
16

Case: 1:08-cv-05908 Document #: 1 Filed: 10/15/08 Page 17 of 29 PageID #:17
c. After complaining about confederate flags being warn in the workplace, coworkers began to tamper with Plaintiff’s locker. Although Plaintiff complained about the tampering to supervisors, no investigation was performed or disciplinary action taken. 79. During Plaintiff Faulkner’s employment, Defendant was aware of Plaintiff Faulkner’s complaints as enumerated above, but failed to take corrective action or prevent further discrimination.
Kenneth George’s Individual Claims 80. Plaintiff George began working for Defendant in June 2000 as a temporary worker and became a full time worker in June 2008. Plaintiff currently works for Defendant as a dock man; the same position as when he started as a full time employee. 81. During Plaintiff George’s employment with Defendant, Defendant subjected Plaintiff George to discrimination due to his race by creating and tolerating a racially hostile work environment, by treating Plaintiff George less favorably than similarly situated Caucasian employees, and by retaliating against Plaintiff George for complaining about racial discrimination as alleged with regards to the entire class in paragraphs 23 – 43. 82. During his employment with Defendant, Plaintiff George was and continues to be subject to discrimination due to his race. Examples of this discrimination include:
a. Being promoted to full time status after similarly situated Caucasian employees, thus giving seniority status to Caucasian employees; b. Being subjected to more stringent disciplinary action than similarly situated Caucasian employees, and having company rules applied to him in an arbitrary way;
17

Case: 1:08-cv-05908 Document #: 1 Filed: 10/15/08 Page 18 of 29 PageID #:18
c. Demeaning treatment by coworkers such as graffiti written on the wall using Plaintiff George’s name along with racial slurs; d. Being denied access to workers compensation funds when Plaintiff George was injured at work while similarly situated Caucasian employees were not denied access; e. Being denied the opportunity to work “light duty” after being injured on the job, while similarly situated Caucasian employees were not subject to such treatment. 83. Similarly situated Caucasian employees were not subjected to such discrimination and received more favorable treatment in the terms and conditions of their employment with Defendant. 84. During Plaintiff George’s employment, Defendant was aware of Plaintiff George’s complaints as enumerated above, but failed to take corrective action or prevent further discrimination.
Leonard Gregory’s Individual Claims 85. Plaintiff Gregory was hired as a supervisor for Defendant on December 6, 1994. He was promoted to the position of Systems Operations Manager in 1997 and to the position of General Operations Manager in February 2004. Plaintiff stepped down from his position as General Operations Manager to the position of supervisor in March 2007 because he feared he would be discharged. 86. During Plaintiff Gregory’s employment with Defendant, Defendant subjected Plaintiff Gregory to discrimination due to his race by creating and tolerating a racially hostile work environment, by treating Plaintiff Gregory less favorably than similarly situated Caucasian
18

Case: 1:08-cv-05908 Document #: 1 Filed: 10/15/08 Page 19 of 29 PageID #:19
employees, and by retaliating against Plaintiff Gregory for complaining about racial discrimination as alleged with regards to the entire class in paragraphs 23 – 43.
87. During his employment with Defendant, Plaintiff was subjected to discrimination due to his race. Examples of this discrimination include:
a. Insubordination by Caucasian employees that Plaintiff supervised; b. A false accusation by a Caucasian employee that led to Plaintiff’s arrest; c. Plaintiff’s tires being slashed immediately after a Caucasian employee threatened him; d. Racially charged phrases spoken in the workplace and written on workroom walls such as “Leonard is a nigger lover,” “I think I’m going to take Ron Johnson to meet some of my friends at the next KKK rally, burn nigger burn, don’t forget Leonard,” “the white race would be perfect without the black race,” and “[being Black is] worse if you’re a Jehovah’s Witness;” and e. Being constructively demoted from the position of General Operations Manager to the position of supervisor by repeated threats of termination after Plaintiff Gregory took steps as a supervisor to address complaints about the hostile work environment. 88. Similarly situated Caucasian employees were not subjected to such discrimination and received more favorable treatment in the terms and conditions of their employment with Defendant, due to their race. 89. During Plaintiff Gregory’s employment, Defendant was aware of Plaintiff Gregory’s complaints as enumerated above, but failed to take corrective action or prevent further discrimination.
19

Case: 1:08-cv-05908 Document #: 1 Filed: 10/15/08 Page 20 of 29 PageID #:20
Marshun Hill’s Individual Claims 90. Plaintiff Hill started working as a temporary employee for Defendant in June 1991 and was hired as a full-time employee three months later. Plaintiff currently works for Defendant as a dock man; the same position as when he started as a full time employee. 91. During Plaintiff Hill’s employment with Defendant, Defendant subjected Plaintiff Hill to discrimination due to his race by creating and tolerating a racially hostile work environment, by treating Plaintiff Hill less favorably than similarly situated Caucasian employees, and by retaliating against Plaintiff Hill for complaining about racial discrimination as alleged with regards to the entire class in paragraphs 23 – 43. 92. During his employment with Defendant, Plaintiff was subjected to discrimination due to his race. Examples of this discrimination include:
a. Being denied promotion to full-time status until shortly after a similarly situated Caucasian worker was promoted, which resulted in the Caucasian worker receiving seniority status, better work schedules, overtime, and days off; b. Being subjected to disparate treatment with regards to the rule against standing around talking after breaks are over; and c. Being subjected to disparate treatment by being punished for minor offenses while Caucasians were not punished for comparatively greater offenses. 93. Similarly situated Caucasian employees were not subjected to such discrimination and received more favorable treatment in the terms and conditions of their employment with Defendant, due to their race.
20

Case: 1:08-cv-05908 Document #: 1 Filed: 10/15/08 Page 21 of 29 PageID #:21
94. During Plaintiff Hill’s employment, Defendant was aware of Plaintiff Hill’s complaints as enumerated above, but failed to take corrective action or prevent further discrimination.
Cedric Muse’s Individual Claims
95. Plaintiff Muse started working for defendant in September 1990 as a temporary worker and became a full time employee in January 1991.
96. Plaintiff was a union steward from 1996 until 1999. During this time, Plaintiff was told by Defendant Supervisor Tom Hartman that he was subjected to different rules as a Union Steward because he was black. Plaintiff was the only African-American Union Steward at that time.
97. During Plaintiff Muse’s employment with Defendant, Defendant subjected Plaintiff Muse to discrimination due to his race by creating and tolerating a racially hostile work environment, by treating Plaintiff Muse less favorably than similarly situated Caucasian employees, and by retaliating against Plaintiff Muse for complaining about racial discrimination as alleged with regards to the entire class in paragraphs 23 – 43.
98. Since Plaintiff began working for Defendant he has been subject to discrimination due to his race. Examples of this discrimination include but are not limited to:
a. Being assigned heavier loads than Caucasian workers. b. Being assigned to physical labor while Caucasian workers were assigned to driving trucks. Plaintiff was certified to drive trucks at this time. c. Observing writing on the bathroom wall that targeted him while he was a union steward such as “Muse represents the niggers.”
21

Case: 1:08-cv-05908 Document #: 1 Filed: 10/15/08 Page 22 of 29 PageID #:22
99. Similarly situated Caucasian employees were not subjected to such discrimination and received more favorable treatment in the terms and conditions of their employment with Defendant, due to their race.
100. Plaintiff Muse complained about the hostile work environment to supervisors whose reaction was to tell Plaintiff Muse that they would get back to him about it. Defendant’s supervisors would not report to Plaintiff Muse that they had taken any action to remedy the hostile environment.
101. During Plaintiff Muse’s employment, Defendant was aware of Plaintiff Muse’s complaints as enumerated above, but failed to take corrective action or prevent further discrimination.
Laroy Washington’s Individual Claims 102. Plaintiff Washington began working for Defendant in October or November 1996 and was hired as a full-time dockworker in May 1997. Plaintiff currently works for Defendant as a dock man; the same position as when he started as a full time employee. 103. During Plaintiff Washington’s employment with Defendant, Defendant subjected Plaintiff Washington to discrimination due to his race by creating and tolerating a racially hostile work environment, by treating Plaintiff Washington less favorably than similarly situated Caucasian employees, and by retaliating against Plaintiff Washington for complaining about racial discrimination as alleged with regards to the entire class in paragraphs 23 – 43. 104. During his employment with Defendant, Plaintiff Washington was subjected to discrimination due to his race. Examples of this discrimination include:
22

Case: 1:08-cv-05908 Document #: 1 Filed: 10/15/08 Page 23 of 29 PageID #:23
a. Being denied promotion to full-time status until shortly after a similarly situated Caucasian worker was promoted, which resulted in the Caucasian worker receiving seniority status, better work schedules, overtime, and days off; and b. Being subjected to disparate treatment with regards to the rule against standing around talking after breaks are over. 105. Similarly situated Caucasian employees were not subjected to such discrimination and received more favorable treatment in the terms and conditions of their employment with Defendant, due to their race. 106. During Plaintiff Washington’s employment, Defendant was aware of Plaintiff Washington’s complaints as enumerated above, but failed to take corrective action or prevent further discrimination.
Darryl Williams’s Individual Claims 107. Plaintiff Williams started working as a temporary employee for Defendant in August 2001. He became a full-time dock man on June 25, 2002. 108. During Plaintiff Williams’s employment with Defendant, Defendant subjected Plaintiff Williams to discrimination due to his race by creating and tolerating a racially hostile work environment, by treating Plaintiff Williams less favorably than similarly situated Caucasian employees, and by retaliating against Plaintiff Williams for complaining about racial discrimination as alleged with regards to the entire class in paragraphs 23 – 43. 109. During his employment with Defendant, Plaintiff was subjected to discrimination due to his race. Examples of this discrimination include:
a. Being subjected to disparate treatment in the enforcement of work rules and policies when a supervisor walked past four Caucasian men violating the rule
23

Case: 1:08-cv-05908 Document #: 1 Filed: 10/15/08 Page 24 of 29 PageID #:24
against talking in order to reprimand Plaintiff Williams for violating the rule against using a cell phone; and b. Being subjected to disparate treatment on account of his race with regard to work assignments and difficulty of work. 110. Similarly situated Caucasian employees were not subjected to such discrimination and received more favorable treatment in the terms and conditions of their employment with Defendant, due to their race. 111. Plaintiff was retaliated against for complaining about discrimination by getting more difficult assignments or by getting no work at all. 112. During Plaintiff Williams’s employment, Defendant was aware of Plaintiff Williams’s complaints as enumerated above, but failed to take corrective action or prevent further discrimination.
Charles Woods’s Individual Claims 113. Plaintiff Woods started working as a temporary employee for Defendant in July 2002 and became a full time employee in August 2003. Plaintiff Woods currently works for Defendant as a dock man; the same position as when he started as a full time employee. 114. During Plaintiff Woods’s employment with Defendant, Defendant subjected Plaintiff Woods to discrimination due to his race by creating and tolerating a racially hostile work environment, by treating Plaintiff Woods less favorably than similarly situated Caucasian employees, and by retaliating against Plaintiff Woods for complaining about racial discrimination as alleged with regards to the entire class in paragraphs 23 – 43. 115. During his employment with Defendant, Plaintiff has been subject to discrimination on account of his race. Examples of this discrimination include:
24

Case: 1:08-cv-05908 Document #: 1 Filed: 10/15/08 Page 25 of 29 PageID #:25
a. Being subject to more stringent requirements than similarly situated Caucasian employees to gain full time status; b. Being given a more difficult driving test than similarly situated Caucasian employees when he applied to be a driver for Defendant; c. Overhearing his supervisor tell his coworkers that he did not like AfricanAmericans and Mexicans; and d. Being disciplined for actions for which similarly situated Caucasian employees were not disciplined, including taking breaks at prohibited times. 116. Similarly situated Caucasian employees were not subjected to such discrimination and received more favorable treatment in the terms and conditions of their employment with Defendant. 117. During Plaintiff Woods’s employment, Defendant was aware of Plaintiff Woods’s complaints as enumerated above, but failed to take corrective action or prevent further discrimination.
Michael Woods’s Individual Claims 118. Plaintiff Woods started working as a temporary employee for Defendant in mid2001. He became a full-time employee on June 25, 2002. Plaintiff Woods currently works for Defendant as a dock man; the same position as when he started as a full time employee. 119. During Plaintiff Woods’s employment with Defendant, Defendant subjected Plaintiff Woods to discrimination due to his race by creating and tolerating a racially hostile work environment, by treating Plaintiff Woods less favorably than similarly situated Caucasian employees, and by retaliating against Plaintiff Woods for complaining about racial discrimination as alleged with regards to the entire class in paragraphs 23 – 43.
25

Case: 1:08-cv-05908 Document #: 1 Filed: 10/15/08 Page 26 of 29 PageID #:26
120. During his employment with Defendant, Plaintiff Woods was subjected to discrimination due to his race. Examples of this discrimination include:
a. Being subjected to disparate treatment in the enforcement of work rules and policies, such as the rule against standing around talking after breaks are over and the requirement that workers alert a supervisor when they intend to leave to use the bathroom; b. Being denied promotion to full-time status until shortly after a similarly situated Caucasian worker was promoted, which resulted in the Caucasian worker receiving seniority status, better work schedules, overtime, and days off; and c. Being subjected to a hostile work environment by being specifically named in statements appearing on bathroom walls, such as, “Mike is a rotten nigger,” and “Mike isn’t black.” 121. Plaintiff Woods was retaliated against for complaining about discrimination. Examples of this retaliation include but are not limited to: a. Having axel grease poured on the seat of his forklift after he complained about the hostile work environment; b. Being punished for actions that did not violate any rule; c. Being punished for violating a rule that was rarely or never enforced; d. Receiving unusually harsh punishments for violations that typically warranted minimal reprimand; e. Being temporarily terminated for reasons his supervisors refused to state; and
26

Case: 1:08-cv-05908 Document #: 1 Filed: 10/15/08 Page 27 of 29 PageID #:27
f. Plaintiff Woods is now labeled as a “trouble-maker” by Defendant’s supervisors for complaining about race discrimination. Plaintiff Woods is watched and disciplined more strictly than he was before complaining. 122. Similarly situated Caucasian employees were not subjected to such discrimination and received more favorable treatment in the terms and conditions of their employment with Defendant, due to their race. 123. During Plaintiff Woods’s employment, Defendant was aware of Plaintiff Woods’s complaints as enumerated above, but failed to take corrective action or prevent further discrimination.
COUNT I: VIOLATIONS OF 42 U.S.C. § 1981 124. Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege each allegation above as if set forth herein in full. 125. Defendant has subjected its African-American employees to different terms and conditions of employment than similarly situated Caucasian employees and has intentionally discriminated against Plaintiffs and the Class in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 by: (1) allowing a racially hostile work environment to exist by not taking sufficient actions to stop nooses from being hung in the workplace, racial slurs and racially hostile statements from being written and spoken, racially hostile symbols from being displayed and racial employees from wearing racially charged clothing and tattoos, racial slurs being written on workplace walls, and nooses being hung in the workplace to intimidate African-American employees; (2) applying promotion practices which give seniority to Caucasian workers that have worked for the Defendant for either less or equal time than similarly situated African-American employees; (3) applying disciplinary actions in a discriminatory fashion against African-Americans; (4) refusing to respond to or not taking sufficient actions about complaints from African-American employees
27

Case: 1:08-cv-05908 Document #: 1 Filed: 10/15/08 Page 28 of 29 PageID #:28
about the hostile work environment; (5) retaliating against African-American employees for complaining about the racially hostile work environment.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 126. WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs and the Class respectfully request that this Court grant the following relief:
a. Certification of a Class consisting of all African-American employees employed at Defendant’s facility from October 15, 2004, to present; b. Enter judgment that Defendant’s acts and practices as set forth herein are in violation of the laws of the United States; c. Enter preliminary and permanent relief enjoining the discriminatory conduct and requiring Defendant to take steps to end its discriminatory practices and prevent current and future harm to Plaintiffs and the Class, including, but not limited to:
i. Revised procedures which would require that Defendant’s managers use fair and objective criteria when promoting employees; ii. Revised procedures which would require that Defendant’s disciplinary procedures to be applied in a non-discriminatory fashion; iii. Implementation of a meaningful system of oversight to ensure that Defendant managers are using objective criteria to assign overtime, shift schedules, job assignments, and benefits such as hiring and promotions; and iv. Implementation of meaningful procedures to ensure racial harassment in the workplace is eliminated.
28

Case: 1:08-cv-05908 Document #: 1 Filed: 10/15/08 Page 29 of 29 PageID #:29

d. Award Plaintiffs and the Class lost wages, including back pay for failure to promote, and any lost benefits that would otherwise have been available to the Plaintiffs and Class without the discrimination; e. Award Plaintiffs and the Class compensatory and punitive damages; f. Award reinstatement to class members who resigned due to race discrimination; g. Award Plaintiffs the costs of this action, including the fees and costs of experts, together with reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs; and h. Grant Plaintiffs and the Class such other and further relief as this Court finds necessary and proper.
JURY DEMAND 127. Plaintiffs demand a trial by jury on all issues of facts and damages in this action.
Respectfully Submitted,

Randall D. Schmidt Edwin F. Mandel Legal Aid Clinic 6020 S. University Ave. Chicago, Illinois 60637 (773) 702-9611 Fax: (773) 702-2063
Carol Coplan Babbitt Law Offices of Carol Coplan Babbitt 35 East Wacker Drive Suite 650 Chicago, Illinois 60601 (312) 435-9775 Fax: (312) 782-4519
Dated: October 15, 2008

By: s/ Randall D. Schmidt One of Plaintiffs’ Attorneys
Catherine A. Caporusso Law Offices of Catherine A. Caporusso 220 S. Halsted St. Suite 200 Chicago, Illinois 60661 (312) 933-0655 (Fax: (312) 427-9552
29

 </s> UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

CHARLES BROWN, JEFFREY BURKS,

)

ANTONIO COLON, JAMES DEMOSS,

)

JAMESON DIXON, CLARK FAULKNER,

)

KENNETH GEORGE, LEONARD GREGORY, )

MARSHUN HILL, CEDRIC MUSE,

)

LAROY WASHINGTON, DARRELL

)

WILLIAMS, CHARLES WOODS, and

)

MICHAEL WOODS, on behalf of themselves )

and others similarly situated,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

v.

)

)

YELLOW TRANSPORTATION, INC.,

)

)

Defendant.

)

Case No. 08 C 5908 Judge Joan B. Gottschall

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER

Plaintiffs Charles Brown, Jeffrey Burk s, Antonio Colon, James Demoss, Jameson

Dixon, Clark Faulkner, Kenneth George, Leona rd Gregory, Marshun Hill, Cedric Muse,

Laroy Washington, Darrell Williams, Charles Woods, and Michael W oods (collectively

“Brown”) filed a class -action Complaint (th e “Complaint”) alleging that defendant

Yellow Transportation, Inc. (“Yell ow”) violated 42 U.S.C. § 1981 by, inter alia,

subjecting Brown to disparat e treatment, a hostile work e nvironment, and retaliation

based on B rown’s race. The Complaint also alleges claim s specific to individual

plaintiffs. Yellow now m oves for leave to amend its Answer and Defenses (the

“Answer”) to the Complaint in order to add th e affirmative defenses of judicial estoppel

and after-acquired evidence over Brown’s opposition.

I. BACKGROUND
Yellow proposes to amend the Answer to plead the following affirmative
defenses:
Fourteenth Defense: Some of the Pla intiffs failed to disclose their claims against Defendant as part of filings in bankruptcy proceedings despite Plain tiffs having knowledge of their alleged claims against Yellow. Therefore, Plaintiffs are judi cially estopped from pursuing this action against Yellow.
Am. Answer 50 (Mot., Ex. S).
Fifteenth Defense: Some of Plaintiffs failed to disc lose criminal convictions on their employment applications with Yellow. T o the extent th at Yellow learns, through the course of discovery, that a ny Plaintiff has a crim inal conviction that was not disc losed on an application for employment with Yellow, or has engaged in any activity that would preclude their em ployment, such Plaintiffs’ damages are lim ited by the doc trine of after-acquired evidence.
Id.
II. ANALYSIS
Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a party m ay amend
its pleading after a responsive pleading has b een served with the opposing party’s written
consent or the court’s leave. Fed. R. Ci v. P. 15(a). A court “s hould freely give leave
when justice so requires.” Id. Rule 15 perm its liberal am endment of pleadings, but
courts may deny a proposed amendment if the moving party has unduly delayed in filing
the motion, if the opposing party would suffer undue prejudice, or if the pleading is futile.
Campania Mgmt. Co., Inc. v. Rooks, Pitts & Poust, 290 F.3d 843, 849-50 (7th Cir. 2002)
(citing Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 181-82 (1962)).
2

Brown objects to Yellow’s proposed affirmative defenses urging that they “do not apply in this case” and woul d unnecessarily expand the scope of litigation. Resp. 6-11. Put in the language of the standard set out above, Brown appears to contend that Yellow’s proposed affirmative defenses w ould be futile an d would cause Brown undue prejudice. The court considers these arguments in turn.
A. Futility: Judicial Estoppel An amended pleading is f utile under Rule 15(a) where it f ails to s tate a cla im under Rule 12(b)(6). See Gen. Elec. Capital C orp. v. Lease Resolution Corp., 128 F.3d 1074 (7th Cir. 1997). Brown ar gues that Yellow will not pr evail on its judicial estoppel theory because (1) judicial estoppel is “an extraordinary remedy,” (2) precedent does not support the application of judicial estoppel in claims for relief under § 1981, (3) m any of the acts alleged in the Com plaint arose after the conclusion of plaintiffs’ bankruptcy proceedings, (4) applying judicial estoppel would allow a “technical def ense [to] . . . rob Plaintiffs . . . of their m eritorious claim.” Resp. 6-9. Finally, in th e event Yellow ultimately prevails on its judicial es toppel theory, Brown urges the co urt to apply the doctrine in a way that would protect the relevant plai ntiffs’ bankruptcy creditors, not Yellow. Resp. 6-9. All of these argum ents improperly challenge the m erits of Brown’s affirmative defense (or the scope of relief the defense confers), rather than its sufficiency under Rule 12(b)(6), and are therefore unavailing. Non etheless, the court con siders whether Yellow’s judicial estoppel defense is futile in light of applicable precedent. Judicial estoppel is “an equitable doctrin e to be applied flexibly with an eye toward protecting the integrity of the judicial process . . .[t] herefore, no precise or rigid formula guides the application of judicial estoppel.” Jarrard v. CDI Telecomm., Inc., 408
3

F.3d 905, 914 (7th Cir. 2005). Yellow’s proposed affirmative defense alleges that som e of the plaintiffs filed for bankruptcy and fa iled to disclose pending claims against Yellow to the bankruptcy court, and consequently those plaintiffs s hould be estopped from asserting their discrimination claims in this suit. The Seventh Circuit has upheld a district court’s application of judicial estopp el to bar a plaintiff’s recovery where the plaintiff failed to disclose a $300,000 adm inistrative claim pending against the postal service to the bankruptcy cour t and then late r filed a law suit against the pos tal service under the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 791. See generally Cannon-Stokes v. Potter, 453 F.3d 446 (7th Cir. 2006). Sim ilarly here, some plaintiffs have filed adm inistrative claims with the EEOC agains t Yellow which they a llegedly failed to disc lose to the bankruptcy court and now seek recovery in th is lawsuit under § 1981. As alleged, these facts could support an applicati on of judicial estoppel. Yell ow’s affirmative defense is therefore well-pled.
Brown’s contention that judicial estoppel is inapplicable because this lawsu it under § 1981 does not com pletely overlap with the non-disclosed EEOC charges (w hich Brown contends form the basis of Yellow’s estoppel theory 1) is p remature. W hile the court may ultimately find the EEOC charges distinct from Brown’s claims under § 19 81 and deny judicial estoppel on that or som e other basis, the court cannot m ake such a determination at this stage. Moreover, Brown’s tacit admission that there is some overlap between the EEOC charges and B rown’s § 1981 suit ( see Resp. 8) underm ines his argument that they are legally s everable. The court acco rdingly grants Yellow leav e to amend its answer to plead the affirmative defense of judicial estoppel.
1 As pled, Yellow’s estoppel defense is not limited to an EEOC charge theory, providing yet another reason to reject plaintiff’s arguments.
4

B. Futility: After-Acquired Evidence Yellow also seeks to am end its answer to assert the affirmative defense of afteracquired evidence, which could lim it Brown’s r ecovery if he failed to disclose a prior criminal conviction on an e mployment application or engaged in any activity that would “preclude [his] e mployment.” Am. Answer 15 (Mot., Ex. S). Af ter-acquired evidence that would have resulted in an em ployment discrimination plaintiff’s lawful dism issal from his job can bar that plai ntiff’s reinstatement and recovery of front pay, and reduce his damages for back pay. See McKennon v. Nashville Banner Pub. Co. , 513 U.S. 352, 361-63 (1995). The Complaint seeks lost wage s, including back pay on behalf of the plaintiff class. See Compl. ¶ 126(d). Here again, Brown does not object to the sufficiency of Yellow’s af firmative defense of after-acquired evidence, but rather urges that (1) two of the plaintiffs, Burks and Washington, are still employed by Yellow and therefore do not seek back pay, front pay or rein statement, and (2) apply ing the after-acquired evidence ru le in a case that alleges a hostile work environm ent is “inappropriate.” Resp. 10. The Complaint belies the first contention: the prayer for relief requests back pay and lost wages as a remedy for Yellow’s alleged wrongs and Yellow may accordingly seek to reduce its liability based on after-acquired evidence. Co mpl. ¶ 126(d). As for the second, the proper question is not whether asserting th e after-acquired evidence defense is “inappropriate,” but rather whether it is legally p ermitted. Brown has pr ovide no legal au thority in support of its position that the defense of af ter-acquired evidence is impe rmissible where a plaintiff alleges that he endured a hostile work environm ent, and the court rejects Brown’s
5

arguments on this basis. Yellow’s defense of after-acquired evidence is, consequently, not futile.
C. Undue Prejudice Brown argues that perm itting Yellow to assert the above-discussed affirm ative defenses would “unnecessarily expand the scope of this litigation” (Resp. 10), but cites no authority for the proposition that asserting a well-pled affirmative defense may cause a plaintiff undue prejudice. A nd Brown’s sole citation to McKennon is unavailing. McKennon established the propriety of the after-acquired evidence defense in the employment discrimination context and held th at courts were capable of deterring abuse of it. McKennon, 513 U.S. at 363. Brown’s objection to the potentially unlimited scope of Yellow’s after-acquired evidence discovery, then, is one McKennon dismissed when it entrusted the court to m anage the implications of the defens e using the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. Brown has failed to show he would be unduly prejudiced by Yellow’s amendment of its Answer.
III. CONCLUSION Defendants’ Motion for Leave to Am end Answer and Defenses to Add Affirmative Defenses is granted.
ENTER:

JOAN United
DATED: January 14, 2010

/s/ B. GOTTSCHALL States District Judge

6

 </s> IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

CHARLES BROWN, JEFFREY BURKS,

)

ANTONIO COLON, JAMES DEMOSS,

)

JAMESON DIXON, CLARK FAULKNER,

)

KENNETH GEORGE, LEONARD GREGORY, )

MARSHUN HILL, CEDRIC MUSE, LAROY )

WASHINGTON, DARRELL WILLIAMS,

)

CHARLES WOODS, and MICHAEL WOODS, )

on behalf of themselves and similarly

)

situated African-American employees,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

YELLOW TRANSPORTATION, INC.,

)

)

Defendant.

)

No. 08 C 5908
Judge Joan B. Gottschall Magistrate Judge Nan R. Nolan

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiffs, current and former employees of Defendant Yellow Transportation, Inc. (“Yellow”),

have filed suit on behalf of themselves and similarly situated African-American employees, seeking

redress for violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that they were subjected

to an offensive and racially discriminatory work environment, including racial slurs; racial graffiti;

co-workers wearing racially derogatory apparel; disparate terms of employment; denial of equal

opportunity to promotions; racially biased discipline; and retaliation for complaints of racial bias.

Currently before the court is Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to amend the complaint. For the

reasons stated below, the motion is granted.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit on October 15, 2008, seeking to represent a class of African-

American employees working at Yellow’s facility in Chicago Ridge, Illinois from October 15, 2004

to the present. The parties promptly commenced oral and written discovery relating to the issue

of class certification, focusing on Plaintiffs’ allegations of wrongdoing at Chicago Ridge. In or about

March 2009, YRC, Inc. (“YRC”), Yellow’s parent company, merged Yellow’s operations with another YRC company, Roadway Express, Inc. (“Roadway”). In December 2009, the Chicago Ridge facility was closed, and all Plaintiffs and putative class members who were not on lay-off status and who had active work shifts were transferred to a former Roadway facility in Chicago Heights, Illinois.
With two minor exceptions, class discovery closed nearly a year ago on July 31, 2009. On April 12, 2010, Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint adding Mack Leonard as a named Plaintiff; adding YRC as a named Defendant; and redefining the class to include individuals employed at both the Chicago Ridge and Chicago Heights facilities. (Doc. 71.) Defendants objected that the class definition was overly broad, prompting Plaintiffs to seek leave to file a corrected amended complaint with the following new class definition: “all current and former African-American employees employed . . . at [Defendants’] facility [in] Chicago Ridge, Illinois and those Chicago Ridge employees transferred to work at the facility located [in] Chicago Heights, Illinois.”
Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification is due on July 31, 2010, but the parties cannot agree on the proper scope of the amended complaint. Yellow does not object to adding Mr. Leonard as a Plaintiff, or to adding YRC as a Defendant. Both of those changes are granted. Yellow does, however, object to expanding the putative class to include claims arising after Chicago Ridge employees transferred to Chicago Heights.
DISCUSSION Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) provides that leave to amend a complaint “shall be freely given when justice so requires,” so long as there is no harm to the other party. FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(2); Smithkline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., No. 98 C 3952, 2000 WL 116082, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 24, 2000). “Reasons for finding that leave should not be granted include ‘undue delay [and] undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment.’” Airborne Beepers & Video, Inc. v. AT & T Mobility LLC, 499 F.3d 663, 666 (7th Cir. 2007) (quoting
2

Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)). Yellow argues that it will suffer undue prejudice and delay if the court accepts Plaintiffs’ new class definition. The company also objects that allegations relating to the Chicago Heights facility are the subject of another lawsuit pending in this district, and should not be duplicated here. See E.E.O.C. v. Roadway Express, Inc. and YRC, Inc., Nos. 06 C 4805, 08 C 5555 (N.D. Ill.) (Judge Cox) (the “Roadway Litigation”). Plaintiffs argue that the transferred individuals continue to experience race discrimination and harassment at Chicago Heights, and that they should be allowed to obtain injunctive relief and recover damages for this ongoing mistreatment.
A. Undue Prejudice and Delay Yellow sees Plaintiffs’ new class definition as an improper attempt to add new claims arising out of an entirely separate facility. Yellow stresses that class discovery is closed, and that it has not been able to conduct any discovery to identify: (1) what the Chicago Heights claims may be, (2) who, if anyone, may have been the alleged bad actors, (3) who among the Chicago Heights’ supervisors and which of Chicago Heights’ policies and procedures might be relevant to the alleged new claims, and (4) what, if any, similarity exists between the Chicago Heights claims and the Chicago Ridge claims. (Doc. 83, at 7.) Plaintiffs respond that they are merely “adapt[ing] their Complaint to the changed circumstances that Defendant has occasioned by its transfer of Plaintiffs to the Chicago Heights facility and its ongoing racial harassment of Plaintiffs at that facility.” (Doc. 84, at 4.) Plaintiffs note that the original complaint always sought to recover for race discrimination and harassment occurring from October 15, 2004 to the present, and emphasize that Yellow (or YRC) itself is responsible for the mid-litigation transfer of employees to a new facility. (Id. at 5.) In the court’s view, Yellow has not met its burden of establishing that it will suffer undue prejudice by virtue of the amended class definition. The definition arguably contemplates new incidents of race discrimination and harassment occurring at a separate Chicago Heights facility,
3

which may involve different conduct, actors and procedures. Nevertheless, the parties have not yet taken any merits discovery in this case, no trial date has been set, and Plaintiffs promptly sought leave to amend within four months of learning of the employee transfers. In addition, Plaintiffs’ amendment stems from Yellow’s (or YRC’s) own actions in transferring employees to a new facility, which Plaintiffs could not have anticipated at the time they filed their initial lawsuit.
Yellow’s cited cases are easily distinguishable. In Sides v. City of Champaign, 496 F.3d 820, 825-26 (7th Cir. 2007), for example, the district court denied the plaintiff’s request for leave to amend his complaint to add a new defendant. Id. at 825. In affirming this decision, the Seventh Circuit noted that the plaintiff “was on notice of his possible claim” against the new defendant, but “for no reason other than a failure to investigate the possible legal basis of his claim delayed any attempt to bring that claim for seven months.” Id. By then, discovery was set to close in only 20 days. Id. See also Ferguson v. Roberts, 11 F.3d 696, 706-07 (7th Cir. 1993) (in securities fraud case, court properly denied plaintiffs’ request to file third amended complaint where plaintiffs were aware of the new allegations but failed to mention them until one month before discovery closed, raising concerns that it was a delay tactic to postpone an impending trial date); Conner v. Illinois Dep’t of Natural Resources, 413 F.3d 675, 679-80 (7th Cir. 2005) (district court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff’s request to amend where she was aware of the new claim prior to filing the lawsuit but first raised it in a response brief in opposition to summary judgment).
Yellow concedes that the amended class definition “does not necessarily increase the size of the potential class.” (Doc. 83, at 4.) Yet the company objects that “there will be . . ., potentially, multiple new plaintiffs with varying factual and legal claims.” (Id. at 8.) Yellow directs the court to Davis v. United States, 961 F.2d 53 (5th Cir. 1991), in which the plaintiff executed a promissory note with PetroBank National Association (“PetroBank”), secured by a one-half interest in a parcel of land. Id. at 55. A few years later, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency declared PetroBank insolvent and appointed the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation as receiver. Id.
4

The plaintiff subsequently defaulted on the promissory note, and a successor trustee conducted a nonjudicial foreclosure on the plaintiff’s one-half interest in the parcel of land. Id.
The plaintiff filed suit against the United States, claiming that his interest in the land was sold for some $6 million less than the actual value. He initially alleged violation of the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b), and asserted claims for conversion, breach of fiduciary obligation and misrepresentation. The plaintiff later sought leave to amend the complaint to allege constitutional violations and a claim under the Quiet Title Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2409a. Id. The Fifth Circuit agreed that such an amendment was improper, in part because “the Quiet Title claim involved the rights of other parties who held interests in the property in question.” Id. at 57. As a result, the claim “would apparently have required the joinder of additional parties,” and “[t]his joinder would have complicated the district court proceedings, as well as the Government’s ability to prepare a case which initially involved fewer parties.” Id.
Unlike in Davis, there are already some 15 named Plaintiffs in this case, and they seek to represent a class of similarly situated individuals, all with similar grievances. Contrary to Yellow’s suggestion, the mere possibility of adding new plaintiffs under such circumstances is not sufficient to demonstrate undue prejudice. Nor has Yellow adequately explained its conclusory assertion that new claims arising out of the Chicago Heights facility “will unduly prejudice Yellow and its impending opposition to class certification.” (Doc. 83, at 7.) To certify a class, the court must find that “each requirement of Rule 23(a) (numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation) is satisfied as well as one subsection of Rule 23(b).” Harper v. Sheriff of Cook County, 581 F.3d 511, 513 (7th Cir. 2009). Yellow asserts that it needs discovery as to the alleged bad actors, supervisors, relevant policies and procedures, and “what, if any, similarity exists between the Chicago Heights claims and the Chicago Ridge claims.” (Doc. 83, at 7.) Yellow has not articulated, however, how this additional information is necessary to respond to a motion for class certification. See Judge v. Quinn, __ F.3d __, 2010 WL 2652204, at *18 (7th Cir. 2010) (“It
5

is not the obligation of this court to research and construct legal arguments open to parties . . . and perfunctory and undeveloped arguments, and arguments that are unsupported by pertinent authority, are waived.”) (internal quotations omitted).
Yellow objects that it is improper to inject entirely new and separate claims into pending litigation. In support of this position, Yellow cites Chaveriat v. Williams Pipe Line Co., 11 F.3d 1420 (7th Cir. 1993), in which the plaintiffs sought to recover for damages to their land caused by petroleum contamination. Id. at 1423. They initially argued that the contamination was due to a spill of unleaded gasoline that occurred in 1944, presumably to take advantage of more lax cleanup standards than for lead contamination. Two years into the litigation, however, the plaintiffs sought to “reverse course and recover their clean-up costs by persuading a court that what was really cleaned up was a much later diesel-fuel spill.” Id. at 1427. The Seventh Circuit agreed with the district court that the suit should not be expanded to include a claim of diesel-fuel contamination. The court reasoned that “the plaintiffs were seeking to make a fundamental change in the theory of their case after two years of litigation, including extensive pretrial discovery.” Id. at 1428.
In this case, Plaintiffs are not seeking to inject an entirely new theory of recovery. They continue to allege ongoing race discrimination and harassment, including racial slurs; racially hostile statements, symbols and language; and racially discriminatory promotion and disciplinary practices. (Corrected Amended Cmplt., Doc. 79-1, ¶ 154.) The only difference is that the period “October 15, 2004 to the present” now includes behavior occurring when Yellow’s African-American employees were transferred to the Chicago Heights facility in or about December 2009. As noted, Yellow and/or YRC is responsible for that changed circumstance. On these facts, Yellow has not demonstrated undue prejudice sufficient to preclude the amended class definition. As for Yellow’s claim of undue delay, “delay by itself is normally an insufficient reason to deny a motion for leave to amend. . . . Delay must be coupled with some other reason,” typically prejudice to the non-
6

moving party. Dubicz v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 377 F.3d 787, 793 (7th Cir. 2004). Yellow’s undue prejudice and delay objections are both overruled.
B. Duplication Yellow argues that the amended class definition is nonetheless improper given that there is another pending lawsuit that seeks to recover for allegedly discriminatory acts occurring at the Chicago Heights facility – i.e., the Roadway Litigation. Yellow objects that Plaintiffs “should not be permitted to heap their duplicative claims onto this separate action pending before this Court.” (Doc. 83, at 9.) See Alchemist Jet Air, LLC v. Century Jets Aviation, LLC, No. 08 C 5386, 2009 WL 1657570, at *2 (N.D. Ill. June 12, 2009) (quoting Asset Allocation and Mgmt. Co. v. Western Employers Ins. Co., 892 F.2d 566, 573 (7th Cir. 1990)) (courts “should not ‘countenance the simultaneous litigation of identical claims in two federal courts.’”) The Roadway Litigation began in September 2006 when the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) filed suit against Roadway seeking to correct race discrimination suffered by Kenneth Comer and a class of African-American employees working at the Roadway facility in Chicago Heights since at least 2000 (Case No. 06 C 4805). Two years later in September 2008, the EEOC filed a second lawsuit on behalf of Clarence Stokes and a class of African-American employees working at a Roadway facility in Elk Grove Village, Illinois, charging Roadway with race discrimination and harassment since at least 2005 (Case No. 08 C 5555). At the time Plaintiffs filed their separate lawsuit in October 2008, there was no overlap whatsoever between the allegations set forth against Yellow and those at issue in the Roadway Litigation. As Plaintiffs note, Yellow and Roadway employees worked for different companies at different facilities. The EEOC filed amended complaints in Case Nos. 06 C 4805 and 08 C 5555 on September 29 and December 15, 2009, respectively, alleging that Roadway and Yellow merged into YRC, and that YRC succeeded Roadway in operating the Chicago Heights facility. The EEOC added YRC
7

as a defendant and affirmatively seeks to redress, among other things, discriminatory acts occurring against African-American employees at the Chicago Heights facility from at least March 13, 2009 to the present.
Plaintiffs concede that there is a potential overlap between these claims and those they seek to add through the amended class definition, acknowledging that “there may be some situations that have occurred since December 2009 that affect both [Yellow and Roadway] employees, and are thus shared between this litigation and the Roadway litigation.” (Doc. 84, at 10, 11.) Plaintiffs argue, however, that “[t]his potential for overlap . . . certainly does not translate into any certainty that Plaintiffs here will be able to recover in the Roadway actions.” Plaintiffs stress that they “were simply not contemplated” when the Roadway actions were filed, and note that no Roadway employees are included in the class definition proposed here. (Id. at 10.) Plaintiffs also represent that they will not seek any duplicative relief. (Id. at 11.)
The court disagrees with Yellow’s contention that Plaintiffs are attempting to engage in forum shopping. This case is easily distinguishable from Pieleanu v. Mortgage Electronic Registration Sys., Inc., No. 08 C 7404, 2010 WL 1251445 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 24, 2010), which involved plaintiffs who filed counterclaims in state court, and then filed a federal lawsuit alleging the same claims against defendants who could have been joined in the state case. None of the Plaintiffs in this case have themselves filed multiple, identical claims, in multiple fora. In addition, at the time Plaintiffs filed their lawsuit, they had no hope of recovering anything in the Roadway Litigation. Nor does Yellow suggest that this case involves a compulsory counterclaim under Rule 13. Cf. Alchemist Jet Air, 2009 WL 1657570, at *2-4.
To be sure, the court should enjoin a proceeding “if it will conserve judicial resources, avoid conflicting rulings, and facilitate the economical management of complex litigation.” Id. at *2. At this stage of the proceedings, however, it is not clear that both Yellow and Roadway employees are complaining of the same events from December 2009 forward, or that former Yellow employees
8

will recover in the Roadway Litigation for those events. Moreover, Plaintiffs affirmatively disclaim any intent to seek double recovery. As noted, leave to amend a complaint “shall be freely given,” and Yellow has not demonstrated adequately that Plaintiffs’ allegations are improperly duplicative.
CONCLUSION For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiffs’ Motion Pursuant to 15(a) for Leave to Withdraw Amended Complaint and for Leave to File Corrected Amended Complaint Instanter [79] is granted.
ENTER:

Dated: July 26, 2010

___________________________________ NAN R. NOLAN United States Magistrate Judge

9

 </s> Case: 1:08-cv-5908 As of: 07/24/2013 04:05 PM CDT 1 of 21
COX
United States District Court Northern District of Illinois − CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 5.1.1 (Chicago)
CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:08−cv−05908

Brown et al v. Yellow Transportation, Inc. Assigned to: Honorable Susan E. Cox Cause: 42:1981 Job Discrimination (Race) Plaintiff Charles Brown
Plaintiff Jeffrey Burks
Plaintiff Antonio Colon

Date Filed: 10/15/2008 Jury Demand: Both Nature of Suit: 442 Civil Rights: Jobs Jurisdiction: Federal Question
represented by Randall D. Schmidt Edwin F. Mandel Legal Aid Clinic 6020 South University Avenue Chicago, IL 60637 (312) 702−9611 Email: r−schmidt@uchicago.edu LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Carol Coplan Babbitt The Law Office of Carol Coplan Babbitt 35 E. Wacker Dr. Suite 650 Chicago, IL 60601 (312) 435−9775 Fax: (312) 782−4519 Email: carol@ccbabbittlaw.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Catherine A. Caporusso Law Office of Catherine Caporusso 53 W. Jackson Suite 505 Chicago, IL 60604 312−933−0655 Fax: 312−347−3272 Email: ccaporusso@yahoo.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Randall D. Schmidt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Carol Coplan Babbitt (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Catherine A. Caporusso (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Randall D. Schmidt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Carol Coplan Babbitt (See above for address)

Case: 1:08-cv-5908 As of: 07/24/2013 04:05 PM CDT 2 of 21

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Catherine A. Caporusso (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff James Demoss

represented by Randall D. Schmidt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Carol Coplan Babbitt (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Catherine A. Caporusso (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Jameson Dixon

represented by Randall D. Schmidt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Carol Coplan Babbitt (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Catherine A. Caporusso (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Clark Faulkner

represented by Randall D. Schmidt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Carol Coplan Babbitt (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Catherine A. Caporusso (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Kenneth George

represented by Randall D. Schmidt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Carol Coplan Babbitt (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Catherine A. Caporusso (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:08-cv-5908 As of: 07/24/2013 04:05 PM CDT 3 of 21

Plaintiff Leonard Gregory

represented by Randall D. Schmidt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Carol Coplan Babbitt (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Catherine A. Caporusso (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Marshun Hill

represented by Randall D. Schmidt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Carol Coplan Babbitt (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Catherine A. Caporusso (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Laroy Washington

represented by Randall D. Schmidt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Carol Coplan Babbitt (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Catherine A. Caporusso (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Darrell Williams

represented by Randall D. Schmidt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Carol Coplan Babbitt (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Catherine A. Caporusso (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Charles Woods

represented by Randall D. Schmidt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:08-cv-5908 As of: 07/24/2013 04:05 PM CDT 4 of 21

Carol Coplan Babbitt (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Catherine A. Caporusso (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Cedric Muse

represented by Randall D. Schmidt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Carol Coplan Babbitt (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Catherine A. Caporusso (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Michael Woods

represented by Randall D. Schmidt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Carol Coplan Babbitt (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Catherine A. Caporusso (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff
Mack Leonard on behalf of themselves and similarly situated African−Americans employee

represented by Randall D. Schmidt Mandel Legal Aid Clinic 6020 South University Avenue Chicago, IL 60637 (312) 702−9611 Email: r−schmidt@uchicago.edu ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V. Defendant Yellow Transportation, Inc.

represented by Margo Wolf O'Donnell Vedder Price Kaufman &Kammholz P.C. 222 North LaSalle Street Suite 2600 Chicago, IL 60601− (312) 609−7500 Email: modonnell@vedderprice.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Brandon Thomas Crossland Baker &Hostetler, LLP 200 South Orange Avenue Suite 2300

Case: 1:08-cv-5908 As of: 07/24/2013 04:05 PM CDT 5 of 21
Orlando, FL 32802 (407) 649−4687 Email: bcrossland@bakerlaw.com PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Christopher L Nybo Much Shelist PC 191 North wacker Drive Suite 1800 Chicago, IL 60606 (312) 521−2000 Fax: 312−521−2100 Email: cnybo@muchshelist.com TERMINATED: 02/22/2013
Erin Bolan Hines Baker Hostetler LLP 191 N. Wacker Drive Suite 3100 Chicago, IL 60606 (312) 416−6215 Email: ehines@bakerlaw.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Gregory V Mersol Baker &Hostetler 1900 East 9th Street Suite 3200 Cleveland, OH 44114−3482 (216) 861−7935 Email: gmersol@bakerlaw.com PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
James Warren Seegers Baker &Hostetler Llp 200 S. Orange Ave. Suite 2300 Suntrust Center Orlando, FL 32801 (407) 649−4023 Email: jseegers@bakerlaw.com PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joseph L. Chairez Baker &Hostetler Llp 600 Anton Boulevard Suite 900 Costa Mesa, CA 92626 (714) 966−8822 Email: jchairez@bakerlaw.com PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kevin W. Shaughnessy Baker &Hostetler, LLP 200 South Orange Ave Suite 2300 Orlando, FL 32801 (407) 649−4000 Email: kshaughnessy@bakerlaw.com PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:08-cv-5908 As of: 07/24/2013 04:05 PM CDT 6 of 21

Sarah K Newcomer Baker &Hostetler LLP 200 South Orange Ave. Suite 2300 Orlando, FL 32801 (407) 649−4000 Email: snewcomer@bakerlaw.com PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sari M. Alamuddin Morgan Lewis &Bockius, LLP 77 West Wacker Drive 5th Floor Chicago, IL 60601 (312) 324− 1000 Email: salamuddin@morganlewis.com TERMINATED: 02/26/2009

Tiffany Lynn Cummins Baker &Hostetler Llp Suntrust Center, Ste. 2300 200 South Orange Avenue Orlando, FL 32801 (407) 649−4000 Email: tcummins@bakerlaw.com PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Tracey L. Ellerson Baker &Hostetler LLP 200 S. Orange Avenue Suite 2300 Orlando, FL 32801 (407) 649−4000 Email: tellerson@bakerlaw.com PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant YRC Inc.

represented by Kevin W. Shaughnessy (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Erin Bolan Hines (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James Warren Seegers (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 10/15/2008
10/15/2008

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT filed by Clark Faulkner, Kenneth George, Leonard Gregory, Marshun Hill, Laroy Washington, Charles Brown, Darrell Williams, Charles Woods, Michael Woods, Jeffrey Burks, Antonio Colon, James Demoss, Jameson Dixon; Jury Demand. Filing fee $ 350.(kj, ) (Entered: 10/16/2008)
2 CIVIL Cover Sheet. (kj, ) (Entered: 10/16/2008)

Case: 1:08-cv-5908 As of: 07/24/2013 04:05 PM CDT 7 of 21

10/15/2008
10/16/2008
10/20/2008
11/07/2008
11/10/2008
11/19/2008 12/12/2008 12/12/2008 12/12/2008 12/15/2008
12/15/2008 12/17/2008 12/17/2008 01/09/2009 01/09/2009 01/14/2009

3 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiffs Clark Faulkner, Kenneth George, Leonard Gregory, Marshun Hill, Laroy Washington, Charles Brown, Darrell Williams, Charles Woods, Michael Woods, Jeffrey Burks, Antonio Colon, James Demoss, Jameson Dixon by Randall D. Schmidt. (kj, ) (Entered: 10/16/2008)
5 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiffs Clark Faulkner, Kenneth George, Leonard Gregory, Marshun Hill, Laroy Washington, Charles Brown, Darrell Williams, Charles Woods, Michael Woods, Cedric Muse, Jeffrey Burks, Antonio Colon, James Demoss, Jameson Dixon by Carol Coplan Babbitt (Babbitt, Carol) Modified on 10/16/2008 (kj, ). (Entered: 10/16/2008)
6 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiffs Clark Faulkner, Kenneth George, Leonard Gregory, Marshun Hill, Laroy Washington, Charles Brown, Darrell Williams, Charles Woods, Cedric Muse, Jeffrey Burks, Michael Woods, Antonio Colon, James Demoss, Jameson Dixon by Catherine A. Caporusso (Caporusso, Catherine) (Entered: 10/20/2008)
7 WAIVER OF SERVICE returned executed by Clark Faulkner, Kenneth George, Leonard Gregory, Marshun Hill, Laroy Washington, Charles Brown, Darrell Williams, Charles Woods, Cedric Muse, Jeffrey Burks, Michael Woods, Antonio Colon, James Demoss, Jameson Dixon. Yellow Transportation, Inc. waiver sent on 10/16/2008, answer due 12/15/2008. (Schmidt, Randall) (Entered: 11/07/2008)
8 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Joan B. Gottschall: Status hearing set for 12/17/2008 at 09:30 AM. Plaintiff is directed to advise the defendants of the status hearing forthwith. Parties are directed to discuss settlement of case, consent to proceed before the Magistrate Judge and a proposed discovery plan. Mailed notice (rj, ) (Entered: 11/10/2008)
9 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendant Yellow Transportation, Inc. by Sari M. Alamuddin (Alamuddin, Sari) (Entered: 11/19/2008)
10 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendant Yellow Transportation, Inc. by Margo Wolf O'Donnell (O'Donnell, Margo) (Entered: 12/12/2008)
11 MOTION by Defendant Yellow Transportation, Inc. for extension of time to file answer (Unopposed) (O'Donnell, Margo) (Entered: 12/12/2008)
12 NOTICE of Motion by Margo Wolf O'Donnell for presentment of motion for extension of time to file answer 11 before Honorable Joan B. Gottschall on 12/18/2008 at 09:30 AM. (O'Donnell, Margo) (Entered: 12/12/2008)
13 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Joan B. Gottschall:Defendant's unopposed motion for enlargement of time to respond to the Plaintiff's complaint through and including 1/9/2009 11 is granted. ( Status hearing set for 12/17/2008 is stricken and reset to 1/14/2009 at 09:30 AM.) No appearance is required on 12/18/2008. Mailed notice (rj, ) (Entered: 12/15/2008)
14 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice Filing fee $ 50, receipt number 07520000000003357954. (Shaughnessy, Kevin) (Entered: 12/15/2008)
15 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice Filing fee $ 50, receipt number 07520000000003363649. (Newcomer, Sarah) (Entered: 12/17/2008)
16 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice Filing fee $ 50, receipt number 07520000000003363811. (Ellerson, Tracey) (Entered: 12/17/2008)
17 NOTIFICATION of Affiliates pursuant to Local Rule 3.2 by Yellow Transportation, Inc. (O'Donnell, Margo) (Entered: 01/09/2009)
18 ANSWER to Complaint by Yellow Transportation, Inc.(O'Donnell, Margo) (Entered: 01/09/2009)
19 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Joan B. Gottschall: Status hearing held. Motion by Kevin W. Shaughnessy for leave to appear pro hac vice 14 is granted. Motion by Sarah K. Newcomer for leave to appear pro hac vice 15 is granted. Motion by Tracey L. Ellerson for leave to appear pro hac vice 16 is granted. Class discovery is ordered closed 6/15/2009. Oral motion by Plaintiff's counsel for leave to file motion for class certification on or before 7/31/2009 is granted. Mailed

Case: 1:08-cv-5908 As of: 07/24/2013 04:05 PM CDT 8 of 21

02/13/2009 02/13/2009 02/16/2009
02/16/2009 02/18/2009
02/19/2009 02/26/2009 03/31/2009
03/31/2009 04/02/2009 04/02/2009 04/02/2009
04/15/2009

notice. (kj, ) (Entered: 01/15/2009)
20 MOTION by counsel for Defendant Yellow Transportation, Inc. to withdraw as attorney (Alamuddin, Sari) (Entered: 02/13/2009)
21 NOTICE of Motion by Sari M. Alamuddin for presentment of motion to withdraw as attorney 20 before Honorable Joan B. Gottschall on 2/26/2009 at 09:30 AM. (Alamuddin, Sari) (Entered: 02/13/2009)
22 MOTION by Plaintiffs Clark Faulkner, Kenneth George, Leonard Gregory, Marshun Hill, Laroy Washington, Charles Brown, Darrell Williams, Charles Woods, Cedric Muse, Jeffrey Burks, Michael Woods, Antonio Colon, James Demoss, Jameson Dixon for protective order (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Ex. 1, # 2 Exhibit Ex. 2, # 3 Exhibit Ex. 3, # 4 Exhibit Ex. 4)(Babbitt, Carol) (Entered: 02/16/2009)
23 Plaintiffs' NOTICE of Motion by Carol Coplan Babbitt for presentment of motion for protective order, 22 before Honorable Joan B. Gottschall on 2/19/2009 at 09:30 AM. (Babbitt, Carol) (Entered: 02/16/2009)
24 MEMORANDUM by Yellow Transportation, Inc. in Opposition to motion for protective order, 22 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Plaintiffs' Initial Disclosures, # 2 Exhibit B − Correspondence To Plaintiffs' Counsel Dated January 26, 2009, # 3 Exhibit C − Correspondence From Plaintiffs' Counsel Dated January 28, 2009)(Shaughnessy, Kevin) (Entered: 02/18/2009)
25 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Joan B. Gottschall: Motion hearing held on 2/19/2009 regarding motion for protective order, 22 ; Plaintiffs' motion for protective order 22 is granted. ( Status hearing set for 4/15/2009 at 10:00 AM.) Mailed notice (rj, ) (Entered: 02/19/2009)
26 MINUTE entry before the Honorable James T Gottschall: Defendant Yellow Transportation, Inc.'s motion to withdraw the appearance of Sari M. Alamuddin 20 is granted. Mailed notice. (kj, ) (Entered: 03/03/2009)
27 MOTION by Defendant Yellow Transportation, Inc. to amend/correct Answer and Defenses To Add Affirmative Defense (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit F, # 7 Exhibit G, # 8 Exhibit H, # 9 Exhibit I, # 10 Exhibit J, # 11 Exhibit K, # 12 Exhibit L, # 13 Exhibit M, # 14 Exhibit N)(Ellerson, Tracey) (Entered: 03/31/2009)
28 NOTICE of Motion by Tracey L. Ellerson for presentment of motion to amend/correct, 27 before Honorable Joan B. Gottschall on 4/16/2009 at 09:30 AM. (Ellerson, Tracey) (Entered: 03/31/2009)
29 MOTION by Defendant Yellow Transportation, Inc. to withdraw exhibits (Newcomer, Sarah) (Entered: 04/02/2009)
30 NOTICE of Motion by Sarah K Newcomer for presentment of motion to withdraw 29 before Honorable Joan B. Gottschall on 4/16/2009 at 09:30 AM. (Newcomer, Sarah) (Entered: 04/02/2009)
31 NOTICE by Yellow Transportation, Inc. re MOTION by Defendant Yellow Transportation, Inc. to withdraw exhibits 29 , notice of motion 30 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit F, # 7 Exhibit G, # 8 Exhibit H, # 9 Exhibit I, # 10 Exhibit J, # 11 Exhibit K, # 12 Exhibit L, # 13 Exhibit M, # 14 Exhibit N)(Newcomer, Sarah) (Entered: 04/02/2009)
32 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Joan B. Gottschall: Status hearing held on 4/15/2009; MOTION by Defendant Yellow Transportation, Inc. to withdraw exhibits 29 is granted; ( Status hearing set for 8/5/2009 at 10:00 AM.); Briefing schedule as to motion to amend/correct, answer and defenses to add affirmative defense 27 :( Responses due by 5/7/2009, Replies due by 5/18/2009.) Ruling by mail. Discovery extended and ordered closed 7/31/2009. No appearance required 4/16/2009. Mailed notice (rj, ) (Entered: 04/15/2009)

Case: 1:08-cv-5908 As of: 07/24/2013 04:05 PM CDT 9 of 21

05/07/2009 05/07/2009 05/08/2009 05/11/2009 05/12/2009 05/12/2009 05/21/2009
05/22/2009
06/12/2009
06/12/2009 06/22/2009 06/24/2009 07/13/2009

33 MOTION by Plaintiffs Clark Faulkner, Kenneth George, Leonard Gregory, Marshun Hill, Laroy Washington, Charles Brown, Darrell Williams, Charles Woods, Cedric Muse, Jeffrey Burks, Michael Woods, Antonio Colon, James Demoss, Jameson Dixon for extension of time 1 week extension on Brief in Opposition to Motion to Amend (Babbitt, Carol) (Entered: 05/07/2009)
34 NOTICE of Motion by Carol Coplan Babbitt for presentment of extension of time, 33 before Honorable Joan B. Gottschall on 5/14/2009 at 09:30 AM. (Babbitt, Carol) Modified on 5/8/2009 (kj, ). (Entered: 05/07/2009)
35 RESPONSE by Yellow Transportation, Inc. to MOTION by Plaintiffs Clark Faulkner, Kenneth George, Leonard Gregory, Marshun Hill, Laroy Washington, Charles Brown, Darrell Williams, Charles Woods, Cedric Muse, Jeffrey Burks, Michael Woods, Antonio Colon, James Demoss, Jameson Dixon for extension of 33 (Newcomer, Sarah) (Entered: 05/08/2009)
36 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Joan B. Gottschall: Plaintiffs' motion for a one week extension of time to file their response in opposition to Defendant's motion to amend by 5/14/2009 33 is granted. Reply due by 5/25/2009. No appearance required on 5/14/2009. Mailed notice (rj, ) (Entered: 05/11/2009)
37 MOTION by Defendant Yellow Transportation, Inc. for extension of time to Extend Briefing Schedule to Allow Defendant to File a Renewed Motion for Leave to Amend (Newcomer, Sarah) (Entered: 05/12/2009)
38 NOTICE of Motion by Sarah K Newcomer for presentment of extension of time 37 before Honorable Joan B. Gottschall on 5/21/2009 at 09:30 AM. (Newcomer, Sarah) (Entered: 05/12/2009)
39 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Joan B. Gottschall: Defendant's agreed motion to extend briefing schedule to allow defendant to file a renewed motion for leave to amend 37 is granted. Defendant's Renewed motion for leave to amend shall be filed on or before May 22, 2009; Plaintiff's omnibus to Defendant's renewed motion for leave shall be filed on or before June 12, 2009 and Reply shall be filed by June 22, 2009. Ruling by mail. Mailed notice (rj, ) (Entered: 05/22/2009)
40 MOTION by Defendant Yellow Transportation, Inc. for leave to file (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit F, # 7 Exhibit G, # 8 Exhibit H, # 9 Exhibit I, # 10 Exhibit J, # 11 Exhibit K, # 12 Exhibit L, # 13 Exhibit M, # 14 Exhibit N, # 15 Exhibit O, # 16 Exhibit P, # 17 Exhibit Q, # 18 Exhibit R, # 19 Exhibit S)(Ellerson, Tracey) (Entered: 05/22/2009)
41 MEMORANDUM by Clark Faulkner, Kenneth George, Leonard Gregory, Marshun Hill, Laroy Washington, Charles Brown, Darrell Williams, Charles Woods, Cedric Muse, Jeffrey Burks, Michael Woods, Antonio Colon, James Demoss, Jameson Dixonin Opposition to MOTION by Defendant Yellow Transportation, Inc. for leave to file 40 (Attachments: # 1 Plaintiffs' Exhibits 1 − 5)(Schmidt, Randall) Modified on 6/15/2009 (kj, ). (Entered: 06/12/2009)
42 NOTICE by Clark Faulkner, Kenneth George, Leonard Gregory, Marshun Hill, Laroy Washington, Charles Brown, Darrell Williams, Charles Woods, Cedric Muse, Jeffrey Burks, Michael Woods, Antonio Colon, James Demoss, Jameson Dixon re response in opposition to motion, 41 Notice of Filing and Proof of Service (Schmidt, Randall) (Entered: 06/12/2009)
43 REPLY by Defendant Yellow Transportation, Inc. to response in opposition to motion, 41 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B)(Ellerson, Tracey) (Entered: 06/22/2009)
44 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice Filing fee $ 50, receipt number 07520000000003870249. (Crossland, Brandon) (Entered: 06/24/2009)
45 MOTION by Plaintiffs Clark Faulkner, Kenneth George, Leonard Gregory, Marshun Hill, Laroy Washington, Charles Brown, Darrell Williams, Charles Woods, Cedric Muse, Jeffrey Burks, Michael Woods, Antonio Colon, James Demoss, Jameson Dixon to quash Subpoenas and Motion for Protective Order

Case: 1:08-cv-5908 As of: 07/24/2013 04:05 PM CDT 10 of 21

07/13/2009 07/16/2009 07/16/2009 07/16/2009 08/06/2009 08/07/2009
08/10/2009 08/10/2009 08/11/2009
08/31/2009 09/02/2009 09/08/2009

(Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit 4, # 5 Exhibit 5, # 6 Exhibit 6, # 7 Exhibit 7)(Schmidt, Randall) Modified on 7/14/2009 (kj, ). (Entered: 07/13/2009)
46 NOTICE of Motion by Randall D. Schmidt for presentment of motion to quash, 45 before Honorable Joan B. Gottschall on 7/16/2009 at 09:30 AM. (Schmidt, Randall) (Entered: 07/13/2009)
47 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Joan B. Gottschall: Plaintiffs' motion to quash subpoenas and motion for protective order 45 is referred to Magistrate Judge Nolan for hearing and ruling as well as all discovery supervision and settlement conference. Mailed notice (rj, ) (Entered: 07/17/2009)
48 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Joan B. Gottschall: Status hearing set for 8/5/2009 is stricken. A new date will be set when Magistrate Judge Nolan terminates pending referral order. Mailed notice (rj, ) (Entered: 07/17/2009)
49 Pursuant to Local Rule 72.1, this case is hereby referred to the calendar of Honorable Nan R. Nolan for the purpose of holding proceedings related to: discovery supervision, settlement conference and motion to quash, 45 .(rj, )Mailed notice. (Entered: 07/17/2009)
50 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Nan R. Nolan:Initial status hearing set for 8/11/2009 at 09:00 a.m. Briefing schedule previously set regarding Plaintiffs' Motion to Quash Subpoenas and for Protective Order 45 to stand. Defendant's response to be filed by 08/07/09. Plaintiffs' reply brief is due by 08/21/09.Mailed notice (lxs, ) (Entered: 08/06/2009)
51 RESPONSE by Yellow Transportation, Inc.in Opposition to MOTION by Plaintiffs Clark Faulkner, Kenneth George, Leonard Gregory, Marshun Hill, Laroy Washington, Charles Brown, Darrell Williams, Charles Woods, Cedric Muse, Jeffrey Burks, Michael Woods, Antonio Colon, James Demoss, Jameson Dixon to quash Subpo 45 Quash Subpoenas and Motion for Protective Order (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Redacted Ex 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit 4, # 5 Exhibit 5)(Ellerson, Tracey) (Entered: 08/07/2009)
52 STATUS Report Joint Status Report by Clark Faulkner, Kenneth George, Leonard Gregory, Marshun Hill, Laroy Washington, Charles Brown, Darrell Williams, Charles Woods, Cedric Muse, Jeffrey Burks, Michael Woods, Antonio Colon, James Demoss, Jameson Dixon (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A. copy of Complaint, # 2 Exhibit B copy of Def. Answer/AffDef)(Babbitt, Carol) (Entered: 08/10/2009)
53 NOTICE by all plaintiffs re status report, 52 Notice of Filing (Babbitt, Carol) (Entered: 08/10/2009)
54 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Nan R. Nolan:Magistrate Judge Status hearing held on 8/11/2009 and continued to 9/2/2009 at 09:00 AM. Plaintiff's Motion to Quash 45 is entered and continued. Plaintiff's reply brief regarding their Motion to Quash 45 is stayed. Settlement Conference set for 9/8/2009 at 10:00 AM. Prior to the settlement conference, counsel shall review the following Seventh Circuit cases which discuss the retention of federal jurisdiction to enforce the terms of a settlement agreement: Blue Cross and Blue Shield Ass'n v. American Express Co., 467 F.3d 634 (7th Cir. 2006) and Shapo v. Engle, 463 F.3d 641 (7th Cir. 2006). Parties are reminded that Magistrate Judge Nolan requires compliance with her Standing Order Setting Settlement Conference, which is available on the courts website at www.ilnd.uscourts.gov.Mailed notice (lxs, ) (Entered: 08/13/2009)
55 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Nan R. Nolan:Status hearing set for 09/02/09 at 9:00 a.m. to stand. Settlement Conference set for 9/8/2009 is amended to begin at 9:30 a.m.Mailed notice (lxs, ) (Entered: 08/31/2009)
56 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Nan R. Nolan:Magistrate Judge Status hearing held on 9/2/2009. Settlement Conference set for 9/8/2009 at 9:30 a.m. to stand. Mailed notice (lxs, ) (Entered: 09/03/2009)
57 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Nan R. Nolan:Settlement conference held on 9/8/2009. Agreement not reached. Status hearing set for 10/22/2009 at 09:30 AM. Plaintiffs' reply brief regarding their motion to quash and protective order 51 is due

Case: 1:08-cv-5908 As of: 07/24/2013 04:05 PM CDT 11 of 21

09/23/2009
10/09/2009 10/09/2009 10/22/2009 11/24/2009 01/06/2010 01/08/2010 01/14/2010
01/14/2010 01/15/2010 02/04/2010 03/16/2010
03/30/2010

by 09/23/09.Mailed notice (lxs, ) (Entered: 09/09/2009)
58 REPLY by Clark Faulkner, Kenneth George, Leonard Gregory, Marshun Hill, Laroy Washington, Charles Brown, Darrell Williams, Charles Woods, Cedric Muse, Jeffrey Burks, Michael Woods, Antonio Colon, James Demoss, Jameson Dixon to MOTION by Plaintiffs Clark Faulkner, Kenneth George, Leonard Gregory, Marshun Hill, Laroy Washington, Charles Brown, Darrell Williams, Charles Woods, Cedric Muse, Jeffrey Burks, Michael Woods, Antonio Colon, James Demoss, Jameson Dixon to quash Subpo 45 (Attachments: # 1 Notice of Filing Notice of Filing)(Babbitt, Carol) (Entered: 09/23/2009)
59 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Nan R. Nolan:For the reasons set forth in the attached Memorandum Opinion and Order, Plaintiffs Motion to QuashSubpoenas and Motion for Protective Order 45 is granted. [ For further detail see separate order(s).]Mailed notice (lxs, ) (Entered: 10/09/2009)
60 MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by the Honorable Nan R. Nolan on 10/9/2009.Mailed notice(lxs, ) (Entered: 10/09/2009)
61 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Nan R. Nolan:Magistrate Judge Status hearing held on 10/22/2009 and continued to 11/24/2009 at 09:30 AM. Mailed notice (lxs, ) (Entered: 10/22/2009)
62 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Nan R. Nolan:Magistrate Judge Status hearing held on 11/24/2009 and continued to 1/6/2010 at 09:30 AM. Parties are to jointly contact the court if and when there is an interest in scheduling a settlement conference.Mailed notice (lxs, ) (Entered: 11/25/2009)
63 MINUTE entry before Honorable Nan R. Nolan:Magistrate Judge Status hearing held on 1/6/2010 and continued to 2/4/2010 at 09:30 AM.Mailed notice (lxs, ) (Entered: 01/07/2010)
64 NOTICE by Catherine A. Caporusso of Change of Address (Caporusso, Catherine) (Entered: 01/08/2010)
65 MINUTE entry before Honorable Joan B. Gottschall: Defendant's Amended Motion for Leave to Amend Answer and Defenses to Add Affirmative Defenses 40 is granted. Defendant's Motion for Leave to Amend Answer and Defenses to Add Affirmative Defenses 27 is superceded and therefore denied as moot. Brandon T. Crossland's Motion for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice 44 is granted. [For further detail see separate order(s).] Mailed notice. (kj, ) (Entered: 01/15/2010)
66 MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by the Honorable Joan B. Gottschall on 1/14/2010.(kj, ) (Entered: 01/15/2010)
67 AMENDED Answer by Defendant Yellow Transportation, Inc. to complaint, 1 (Shaughnessy, Kevin) (Entered: 01/15/2010)
68 MINUTE entry before Honorable Nan R. Nolan:Magistrate Judge Status hearing held on 2/4/2010 and continued to 3/16/2010 at 09:30 a.m. Counsel reported global settlement conference before Judge Cox is set for 03/11/10.Mailed notice (lxs, ) (Entered: 02/08/2010)
69 MINUTE entry before Honorable Nan R. Nolan:Magistrate Judge Status hearing held on 3/16/2010 and continued to 3/30/2010 at 09:30 a.m. Counsel reported agreement reached, but not global. Counsel are directed to meet and confer as directed regarding pleading dates, discovery, class certification and statistical issues as discussed in court.Mailed notice (lxs, ) (Entered: 03/18/2010)
70 MINUTE entry before Honorable Nan R. Nolan:Magistrate Judge Status hearing held on 3/30/2010 and continued to 6/29/2010 at 09:30 a.m. Court adopts parties proposed scheduling order as follows: Amendment of the complaint by 04/12/10; Answer to amended complaint by 05/01/10; Class action discovery with Respect to Mack Leonard and completion of Leonard Gregory deposition by 05/15/10; Class action briefing − motion for class certification by 07/31/10 − opposition(s) to motion for class certification by 09/15/10.Mailed notice (lxs, ) (Entered: 03/31/2010)

Case: 1:08-cv-5908 As of: 07/24/2013 04:05 PM CDT 12 of 21

04/12/2010 04/12/2010 04/27/2010
04/27/2010 04/29/2010 05/21/2010 05/21/2010 05/25/2010 06/08/2010
06/08/2010 06/10/2010 06/16/2010
06/30/2010

71 AMENDED complaint by Clark Faulkner, Darrell Williams, James Demoss, Marshun Hill, Charles Brown, Charles Woods, Kenneth George, Cedric Muse, Jeffrey Burks, Jameson Dixon, Leonard Gregory, Michael Woods, Laroy Washington, Antonio Colon, Mack Leonard against Yellow Transportation, Inc., YRC Inc. (Schmidt, Randall) (Entered: 04/12/2010)
72 NOTICE by Charles Brown, Jeffrey Burks, Antonio Colon, James Demoss, Jameson Dixon, Clark Faulkner, Kenneth George, Leonard Gregory, Marshun Hill, Mack Leonard, Cedric Muse, Laroy Washington, Darrell Williams, Charles Woods, Michael Woods re amended complaint, 71 Notice of Filing of Amended Complaint (Schmidt, Randall) (Entered: 04/12/2010)
73 MOTION by Plaintiffs Charles Brown, Jeffrey Burks, Antonio Colon, James Demoss, Jameson Dixon, Clark Faulkner, Kenneth George, Leonard Gregory, Marshun Hill, Leonard Mack, Cedric Muse, Laroy Washington, Darrell Williams, Charles Woods, Michael Woods, Defendants YRC Inc., Yellow Transportation, Inc. for extension of time to Respond to Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint (O'Donnell, Margo) (Entered: 04/27/2010)
74 NOTICE of Motion by Margo Wolf O'Donnell for presentment of extension of time, 73 before Honorable Nan R. Nolan on 5/6/2010 at 10:00 AM. (O'Donnell, Margo) (Entered: 04/27/2010)
75 MINUTE entry before Honorable Nan R. Nolan:MOTION by Plaintiffs for extension of time to Respond to Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint 73 is granted to and including 05/21/10. No appearance is required on 05/06/10. Status hearing set for 06/29/10 at 9:30 a.m. to stand.Mailed notice (lxs, ) (Entered: 04/29/2010)
76 MOTION by Defendants YRC Inc., Yellow Transportation, Inc. for extension of time To Respond To Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint (O'Donnell, Margo) (Entered: 05/21/2010)
77 NOTICE of Motion by Margo Wolf O'Donnell for presentment of extension of time 76 before Honorable Nan R. Nolan on 5/26/2010 at 10:00 AM. (O'Donnell, Margo) (Entered: 05/21/2010)
78 MINUTE entry before Honorable Nan R. Nolan:Defendants' MOTION for extension of time To Respond To Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint 76 is granted to and including 06/08/10. Status hearing st for 06/29/10 at 9:30 a.m. to stand.Mailed notice (lxs, ) (Entered: 05/25/2010)
79 MOTION by Plaintiffs Charles Brown, Jeffrey Burks, Antonio Colon, James Demoss, Jameson Dixon, Clark Faulkner, Kenneth George, Leonard Gregory, Marshun Hill, Leonard Mack, Cedric Muse, Laroy Washington, Darrell Williams, Charles Woods, Michael Woods for leave to file Corrected Amended Complaint and to Withdraw Amended Complaint (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Ex.1 Corrected Amended Complaint)(Babbitt, Carol) (Entered: 06/08/2010)
80 Plaintiff's' Notice of Motion NOTICE of Motion by Carol Coplan Babbitt for presentment of motion for leave to file, 79 before Honorable Nan R. Nolan on 6/16/2010 at 10:00 AM. (Babbitt, Carol) (Entered: 06/08/2010)
81 MINUTE entry before Honorable Nan R. Nolan:On the court's own motion, MOTION by Plaintiffs for leave to file Corrected Amended Complaint and to Withdraw Amended Complaint 79 is amended to begin at 9:00 a.m. on 06/16/10.Mailed notice (lxs, ) (Entered: 06/10/2010)
82 MINUTE entry before Honorable Nan R. Nolan:Motion hearing held on 6/16/2010 regarding plaintiffs' motion for leave to file corrected amended complaint 79 . Plaintiff's motion to for leave to file corrected amended complaint 79 shall be briefed as follows: response is due by 06/30/10 − reply brief to be filed by 07/14/10. Status hearing set for 06/29/10 is stricken and reset for 7/27/2010 at 09:00 AM.Mailed notice (lxs, ) (Entered: 06/16/2010)
83 RESPONSE by YRC Inc., Yellow Transportation, Inc.in Opposition to MOTION by Plaintiffs Charles Brown, Jeffrey Burks, Antonio Colon, James Demoss, Jameson Dixon, Clark Faulkner, Kenneth George, Leonard Gregory, Marshun Hill, Leonard Mack, Cedric Muse, Laroy Washington, Darrell Williams, Charles

Case: 1:08-cv-5908 As of: 07/24/2013 04:05 PM CDT 13 of 21

07/14/2010
07/14/2010
07/26/2010
07/26/2010 07/27/2010
07/27/2010
07/27/2010
07/27/2010 07/28/2010 07/28/2010 08/11/2010 08/30/2010
08/30/2010

Woods, Michael Woods for 79 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Ellerson, Tracey) (Entered: 06/30/2010)
84 REPLY by Plaintiffs Charles Brown, Jeffrey Burks, Antonio Colon, James Demoss, Jameson Dixon, Clark Faulkner, Kenneth George, Leonard Gregory, Marshun Hill, Leonard Mack, Cedric Muse, Laroy Washington, Darrell Williams, Charles Woods, Michael Woods in Support of Motion for Leave to Withdraw Amended Complaint and for Leave to File Corrected Amended Complaint (Babbitt, Carol) (Entered: 07/14/2010)
85 NOTICE by Leonard Gregory, Marshun Hill, Leonard Mack, Cedric Muse, Laroy Washington, Darrell Williams, Charles Woods, Michael Woods re reply, 84 of filing or Reply in Support of Motion for Leave to Withdraw Amended Complaint and for Leave to File Corrected Amended Complaint (Babbitt, Carol) (Entered: 07/14/2010)
86 MINUTE entry before Honorable Nan R. Nolan: For the reasons set forth in the attached Memorandum Opinion and Order, Plaintiffs Motion Pursuant to 15(a)for Leave to Withdraw Amended Complaint and for Leave to File Corrected Amended Complaint Instanter 79 is granted. [ For further detail see separate order(s).]Mailed notice (lxs, ) (Entered: 07/26/2010)
87 MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by the Honorable Nan R. Nolan on 7/26/2010.Mailed notice(lxs, ) (Entered: 07/26/2010)
88 MINUTE entry before Honorable Nan R. Nolan:Magistrate Judge Status hearing held on 7/27/2010 and continued to 11/23/2010 at 09:30 AM. Plaintiffs' amended complaint to be filed today. Defendant is given fifteen days from today, to either answer or otherwise plead. Briefing schedule previously entered regarding motion for class certification is amended as follows: Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification is due by 08/30/10, response to be filed by 11/01/10, reply brief is extended to 11/22/10. Parties briefs are not to exceed forty pages.Mailed notice (lxs, ) (Entered: 07/27/2010)
89 Corrected First AMENDED complaint by Clark Faulkner, Darrell Williams, James Demoss, Marshun Hill, Charles Brown, Charles Woods, Kenneth George, Cedric Muse, Jeffrey Burks, Jameson Dixon, Leonard Gregory, Michael Woods, Leonard Mack, Laroy Washington, Antonio Colon against YRC Inc., Yellow Transportation, Inc. (Schmidt, Randall) (Entered: 07/27/2010)
90 NOTICE by Charles Brown, Jeffrey Burks, Antonio Colon, James Demoss, Jameson Dixon, Clark Faulkner, Kenneth George, Leonard Gregory, Marshun Hill, Leonard Mack, Cedric Muse, Laroy Washington, Darrell Williams, Charles Woods, Michael Woods re amended complaint, 89 Notice of Filing of Corrected First Amended Complaint (Schmidt, Randall) (Entered: 07/27/2010)
91 Document entered in error. (kj, ) Modified on 7/28/2010 (kj, ) (Entered: 07/27/2010)
92 NOTICE of Correction regarding 91 . (kj, ) (Entered: 07/28/2010)
93 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendant Yellow Transportation, Inc. by Christopher L Nybo (Nybo, Christopher) (Entered: 07/28/2010)
94 ANSWER to amended complaint (Corrected First Amended Complaint) by YRC Inc., Yellow Transportation, Inc.(Shaughnessy, Kevin) (Entered: 08/11/2010)
95 MOTION by Plaintiffs Charles Brown, Jeffrey Burks, Antonio Colon, James Demoss, Jameson Dixon, Clark Faulkner, Kenneth George, Leonard Gregory, Marshun Hill, Mack Leonard, Cedric Muse, Laroy Washington, Darrell Williams, Charles Woods, Michael Woods to certify class (Schmidt, Randall) (Entered: 08/30/2010)
96 Memorandum in Support of Motion to Certify Class by Charles Brown, Jeffrey Burks, Antonio Colon, James Demoss, Jameson Dixon, Clark Faulkner, Kenneth George, Leonard Gregory, Marshun Hill, Mack Leonard, Cedric Muse, Laroy Washington, Darrell Williams, Charles Woods, Michael Woods (Schmidt, Randall) (Entered: 08/30/2010)

Case: 1:08-cv-5908 As of: 07/24/2013 04:05 PM CDT 14 of 21

08/30/2010
08/30/2010 10/28/2010 10/28/2010 10/28/2010 10/28/2010 11/03/2010
11/23/2010 12/08/2010 12/08/2010 12/15/2010 12/23/2010

97 APPENDIX other, 96 In Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification, Exhibits 1−7, and Deposition Excerpts (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Deposition Excerpts of Brown, # 2 Exhibit Deposition Excerpts of Burks, # 3 Exhibit Deposition Excerpts of Colon, # 4 Exhibit Deposition Excerpts of DeMoss, # 5 Exhibit Deposition Excerpts of Dixon, # 6 Exhibit Deposition Excerpts of Faulkner, # 7 Exhibit Deposition Excerpts of George, # 8 Exhibit Deposition Excerpts of Gregory, # 9 Exhibit Deposition Excerpts of Hill, # 10 Exhibit Deposition Excerpts of Leonard, # 11 Exhibit Deposition Excerpts of Muse, # 12 Exhibit Deposition Excerpts of Washington, # 13 Exhibit Deposition Excerpts of Williams, # 14 Exhibit Deposition Excerpts of C. Woods, # 15 Exhibit Deposition Excerpts of M. Woods, # 16 Exhibit Deposition Excerpts of Reifsnyder, # 17 Exhibit Deposition Excerpts of Weber)(Schmidt, Randall) (Entered: 08/30/2010)
98 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs re appendix,,, 97 , MOTION by Plaintiffs Charles Brown, Jeffrey Burks, Antonio Colon, James Demoss, Jameson Dixon, Clark Faulkner, Kenneth George, Leonard Gregory, Marshun Hill, Mack Leonard, Cedric Muse, Laroy Washington, Darrell Williams, Charles Woods, Michael Woods to 95 , other, 96 Notice of Filing of Motion for Class Certification, Memorandum in Support, and Appendix (Schmidt, Randall) (Entered: 08/30/2010)
99 MOTION by Defendants YRC Inc., Yellow Transportation, Inc. for extension of time to file response/reply as to motion to certify class, 95 (UNOPPOSED) (O'Donnell, Margo) (Entered: 10/28/2010)
100 (UNOPPOSED) NOTICE of Motion by Margo Wolf O'Donnell for presentment of motion for extension of time to file response/reply, motion for relief 99 before Honorable Nan R. Nolan on 11/3/2010 at 10:00 AM. (O'Donnell, Margo) (Entered: 10/28/2010)
101 MINUTE entry before Honorable Nan R. Nolan:MOTION by Defendants YRC Inc., Yellow Transportation, Inc. for extension of time to file response/reply as to motion to certify class, 95 (UNOPPOSED), noticed before Judge Nolan is stricken. Motion to Certify Class is before the district court. Counsel shall re notice the motion before Judge Gottschall, but NOT refile the motion.Mailed notice (lxs, ) (Entered: 10/28/2010)
102 (Amended/Unopposed NOTICE of Motion by Margo Wolf O'Donnell for presentment of motion for extension of time to file response/reply, motion for relief 99 before Honorable Joan B. Gottschall on 11/3/2010 at 09:00 AM. (O'Donnell, Margo) (Entered: 10/28/2010)
103 MINUTE entry before Honorable Joan B. Gottschall:Unopposed motion for extension of time to file response regarding MOTION by Plaintiffs Charles Brown, Jeffrey Burks, Antonio Colon, James Demoss, Jameson Dixon, Clark Faulkner, Kenneth George, Leonard Gregory, Marshun Hill, Mack Leonard, Cedric Muse, Laroy Washington, Darrell Williams, Charles Woods, Michael Woods to certify class 95 99 is granted. Responses due by 12/15/2010. Replies due by 1/28/2011. Ruling by mail. Mailed noticeMailed notice (rj, ) (Entered: 11/08/2010)
104 MINUTE entry before Honorable Nan R. Nolan:Magistrate Judge Status hearing held on 11/23/2010 and continued to 4/19/2011 at 09:00 AM. Parties advised discovery is stayed pending ruling for motion for class certification.Mailed notice (lxs, ) (Entered: 11/30/2010)
105 MOTION by Defendants YRC Inc., Yellow Transportation, Inc. for extension of time (UNOPPOSED) to Respond to Plaintiffs' Motion to Certify Class (O'Donnell, Margo) (Entered: 12/08/2010)
106 NOTICE of Motion by Margo Wolf O'Donnell for presentment of extension of time 105 before Honorable Joan B. Gottschall on 12/15/2010 at 09:30 AM. (O'Donnell, Margo) (Entered: 12/08/2010)
107 MINUTE entry before Honorable Joan B. Gottschall: Unopposed motion by Defendants for extension of time to respond to Plaintiffs' motion to certify class by 12/29/2010 105 is granted. Mailed notice (rj, ) (Entered: 12/15/2010)
108 MOTION by Defendants YRC Inc., Yellow Transportation, Inc. for extension of time to file response/reply as to motion to certify class, 95 (UNOPPOSED)

Case: 1:08-cv-5908 As of: 07/24/2013 04:05 PM CDT 15 of 21

12/23/2010 01/05/2011
01/12/2011 01/12/2011 01/12/2011 01/12/2011
01/12/2011 01/12/2011
01/12/2011

(O'Donnell, Margo) (Entered: 12/23/2010)
109 NOTICE of Motion by Margo Wolf O'Donnell for presentment of motion for extension of time to file response/reply, motion for relief 108 before Honorable Joan B. Gottschall on 1/5/2011 at 09:30 AM. (O'Donnell, Margo) (Entered: 12/23/2010)
110 MINUTE entry before Honorable Joan B. Gottschall:Unopposed motion for extension of time to respond to MOTION by Plaintiffs Charles Brown, Jeffrey Burks, Antonio Colon, James Demoss, Jameson Dixon, Clark Faulkner, Kenneth George, Leonard Gregory, Marshun Hill, Mack Leonard, Cedric Muse, Laroy Washington, Darrell Williams, Charles Woods, Michael Woods to certify class 95 108 is granted; Briefing schedule as to motion to certify class 95 : Responses due by 1/12/2011. Replies due by 2/11/2011. Ruling by mail. Mailed notice (rj, ) (Entered: 01/05/2011)
111 MEMORANDUM by YRC Inc., Yellow Transportation, Inc. in Opposition to motion to certify class, 95 (Ellerson, Tracey) (Entered: 01/12/2011)
112 APPENDIX memorandum in opposition to motion 111 Volume 1 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Brown Depo Transcript, # 2 Exhibit 1−18, # 3 Exhibit 19−30, # 4 Exhibit 31−36, # 5 Exhibit Depo Transcript, # 6 Exhibit 1−10, # 7 Exhibit 11−17, # 8 Exhibit 18 Part 1, # 9 Exhibit 18 Part 2, # 10 Exhibit 18 Part 3, # 11 Exhibit 18 Part 4, # 12 Exhibit 18 Part 5, # 13 Exhibit 18 Part 6, # 14 Exhibit 19−24)(Ellerson, Tracey) (Entered: 01/12/2011)
113 APPENDIX memorandum in opposition to motion 111 Volume II (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Colon Depo Transcript, # 2 Exhibit 1−9, # 3 Exhibit 10−16, # 4 Exhibit 17 Part 1, # 5 Exhibit 17 Part 2, # 6 Exhibit 17 Part 3, # 7 Exhibit 17 Part 4, # 8 Exhibit 17 Part 5, # 9 Exhibit 17 Part 6, # 10 Exhibit 17 Part 7, # 11 Exhibit 18, # 12 Exhibit 19−37)(Ellerson, Tracey) (Entered: 01/12/2011)
114 APPENDIX memorandum in opposition to motion 111 Volume III (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit DeMoss Depo Transcript, # 2 Exhibit 1−18, # 3 Exhibit 19−40, # 4 Exhibit 41−47, # 5 Exhibit Dixon Depo Transcript, # 6 Exhibit 1−13, # 7 Exhibit 14−23, # 8 Exhibit 24−33, # 9 Exhibit 34 Part 1, # 10 Exhibit 34 Part 2, # 11 Exhibit 34 Part 3, # 12 Exhibit 34 Part 4, # 13 Exhibit 34 Part 5, # 14 Exhibit 34 Part 6, # 15 Exhibit 34 Part 7, # 16 Exhibit 34 Part 8, # 17 Exhibit 34 Part 9, # 18 Exhibit 34 Part 10, # 19 Exhibit 34 Part 11, # 20 Exhibit 34 Part 12, # 21 Exhibit 35−40)(Ellerson, Tracey) (Entered: 01/12/2011)
115 APPENDIX memorandum in opposition to motion 111 Volume IV (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Faulkner Depo Transcript, # 2 Exhibit 1−15, # 3 Exhibit 16−19, # 4 Exhibit 20 Part 1, # 5 Exhibit 20 Part 2, # 6 Exhibit 20 Part 3, # 7 Exhibit 20 Part 4, # 8 Exhibit 20 Part 5, # 9 Exhibit 20 Part 6, # 10 Exhibit 20 Part 7, # 11 Exhibit 20 Part 8, # 12 Exhibit 21−38, # 13 Exhibit George Depo Transcript, # 14 Exhibit 1−10, # 15 Exhibit 11−21, # 16 Exhibit 22 Part 1, # 17 Exhibit 22 Part 2, # 18 Exhibit 22 Part 3, # 19 Exhibit 22 Part 4)(Ellerson, Tracey) (Entered: 01/12/2011)
116 APPENDIX memorandum in opposition to motion 111 Volume V (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Hill Depo Transcript, # 2 Exhibit 1−13, # 3 Exhibit 14−24, # 4 Exhibit 25−104, # 5 Exhibit L. Gregory 7.2.09 Depo Transcript, # 6 Exhibit L. Gregory 7.2.09 depo exhibits, # 7 Exhibit L. Gregory 7.14.09 Depo Transcript, # 8 Exhibit L. Gregory 7.14.09 depo exhibits, # 9 Exhibit M. Leonard Depo Transcript, # 10 Exhibit M. Leonard depo exhibits, # 11 Exhibit Muse Depo Transcript, # 12 Exhibit Muse depo exhibits 1−15, # 13 Exhibit Muse depo exhibits 16−44)(Ellerson, Tracey) (Entered: 01/12/2011)
117 APPENDIX memorandum in opposition to motion 111 Volume VI (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit D. Williams Depo Transcript, # 2 Exhibit D. Williams depo exhibits 1−11, # 3 Exhibit D. Williams depo exhibits 12−27, # 4 Exhibit L. Washington Depo Transcript, # 5 Exhibit L. Washington depo exhibits, # 6 Exhibit Charles Woods Depo Transcript, # 7 Exhibit Charles Woods depo exhibits 1−15, # 8 Exhibit Charles Woods depo exhibits 16−28, # 9 Exhibit Michael Woods Depo Transcript, # 10 Exhibit Michael Woods depo exhibits 1−31, # 11 Exhibit Michael Woods depo exhibit 32 Part 1, # 12 Exhibit Michael Woods depo exhibit 32 Part 2, # 13 Exhibit Michael Woods depo exhibit 32 Part 3, # 14 Exhibit Michael Woods

Case: 1:08-cv-5908 As of: 07/24/2013 04:05 PM CDT 16 of 21

01/12/2011 02/11/2011
02/11/2011 04/06/2011 04/07/2011 04/28/2011
04/28/2011 05/04/2011 05/04/2011
05/11/2011 05/11/2011 05/16/2011 05/26/2011 06/23/2011 07/01/2011

depo exhibit 32 Part 4, # 15 Exhibit Michael Woods depo exhibits 33−49)(Ellerson, Tracey) (Entered: 01/12/2011)
118 APPENDIX memorandum in opposition to motion 111 Volume VII (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit K. Weber Depo Transcript, # 2 Exhibit K. Weber depo exhibits, # 3 Exhibit B. Reifsnyder Depo Transcript, # 4 Exhibit B. Reifsnyder depo exhibits, # 5 Exhibit 18−22 of the Appendix)(Ellerson, Tracey) (Entered: 01/12/2011)
119 REPLY by Plaintiffs Charles Brown, Jeffrey Burks, Antonio Colon, James Demoss, Jameson Dixon, Clark Faulkner, Kenneth George, Leonard Gregory, Marshun Hill, Mack Leonard, Cedric Muse, Laroy Washington, Darrell Williams, Charles Woods, Michael Woods to motion to certify class, 95 , other, 96 REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION (Schmidt, Randall) (Entered: 02/11/2011)
120 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs re reply, 119 NOTICE OF FILING AND CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE (Schmidt, Randall) (Entered: 02/11/2011)
121 SUPPLEMENT to memorandum in opposition to motion 111 to certify class (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Authority − Randall, et al. v. Rolls−Royce Corp., et al.)(Shaughnessy, Kevin) (Entered: 04/06/2011)
122 MINUTE entry before Honorable Nan R. Nolan: Status hearing set for 4/19/2011 is stricken and reset for 6/23/2011 at 09:30 AM.Mailed notice (lxs, ) (Entered: 04/07/2011)
123 MOTION by Plaintiffs Charles Brown, Jeffrey Burks, Antonio Colon, James Demoss, Jameson Dixon, Clark Faulkner, Kenneth George, Leonard Gregory, Marshun Hill, Mack Leonard, Cedric Muse, Laroy Washington, Darrell Williams, Charles Woods, Michael Woods for leave to file Memorandum in Response to Defendants' Notice of Supplemental Authority (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Memorandum in Response to Defendants' Notice of Supplemental Authority)(Schmidt, Randall) (Entered: 04/28/2011)
124 NOTICE of Motion by Randall D. Schmidt for presentment of motion for leave to file, 123 before Honorable Joan B. Gottschall on 5/4/2011 at 09:30 AM. (Schmidt, Randall) (Entered: 04/28/2011)
125 MINUTE entry before Honorable Joan B. Gottschall: Plaintiffs' motion for leave to file a response to Defendants' notice of supplemental authority 123 is granted. Mailed notice. (kj, ) (Entered: 05/05/2011)
126 MEMORANDUM by Charles Brown, Jeffrey Burks, Antonio Colon, James Demoss, Jameson Dixon, Clark Faulkner, Kenneth George, Leonard Gregory, Marshun Hill, Mack Leonard, Cedric Muse, Laroy Washington, Darrell Williams, Charles Woods, Michael Woods in Response to Defendant's Notice of Supplemental Authority. (kj, ) (Entered: 05/05/2011)
127 MINUTE entry before Honorable Joan B. Gottschall: Plaintiff's motion to certify class 95 is granted. Mail notice. [For further detail see separate order(s).] (kj, ) (Entered: 05/13/2011)
128 MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by the Honorable Joan B. Gottschall on 5/11/2011.(kj, ) (Entered: 05/13/2011)
129 MINUTE entry before Honorable Nan R. Nolan:Status hearing set for 5/26/2011 at 09:30 AM.Mailed notice (lxs, ) (Entered: 05/16/2011)
130 MINUTE entry before Honorable Nan R. Nolan:Magistrate Judge Status hearing held on 5/26/2011 and continued to 6/23/2011 at 09:00 AM.Mailed notice (lxs, ) (Entered: 05/31/2011)
131 MINUTE entry before Honorable Nan R. Nolan:Magistrate Judge Status hearing held and continued to 9/7/2011 at 09:30 AM.Mailed notice (jms, ) (Entered: 06/23/2011)
132 CERTIFIED copy of ORDER from the USCA Appeal no. 11−8014; It is Ordered that the petition for permission to appeal is Denied. (mr, ) (Entered: 07/06/2011)

Case: 1:08-cv-5908 As of: 07/24/2013 04:05 PM CDT 17 of 21

07/15/2011 07/18/2011 07/21/2011 08/16/2011 08/31/2011 10/18/2011 11/07/2011
11/07/2011 11/07/2011
11/08/2011 11/16/2011 11/23/2011
11/23/2011 11/30/2011
12/01/2011

133 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice Filing fee $ 100, receipt number 0752−6191192. (Cummins, Tiffany) (Entered: 07/15/2011)
134 MINUTE entry before Honorable Joan B. Gottschall: Motion by Tiffany L. Cummins for leave to appear pro hac vice 133 is granted. Mailed notice. (kj, ) (Entered: 07/19/2011)
135 MINUTE entry before Honorable Nan R. Nolan: Status hearing set for 8/16/2011 at 09:30 AM.Mailed notice (lxs, ) (Entered: 07/21/2011)
136 MINUTE entry before Honorable Nan R. Nolan:Magistrate Judge Status hearing held on 8/16/2011 and continued to 10/18/2011 at 09:30 a.m. for report on private mediation. Status hearing previously set for 9/7/2011 is stricken. Mailed notice (lxs, ) (Entered: 08/16/2011)
137 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendants YRC Inc., Yellow Transportation, Inc. by Erin Bolan Hines (Hines, Erin) (Entered: 08/31/2011)
138 MINUTE entry before Honorable Nan R. Nolan:Magistrate Judge Status hearing held on 10/18/2011 and continued to 12/13/2011 at 09:00 a.m. regarding status of mediation.Mailed notice (lxs, ) (Entered: 10/19/2011)
139 MOTION by Plaintiffs Charles Brown, Jeffrey Burks, Antonio Colon, James Demoss, Jameson Dixon, Clark Faulkner, Kenneth George, Leonard Gregory, Marshun Hill, Mack Leonard, Cedric Muse, Laroy Washington, Darrell Williams, Charles Woods, Michael Woods to clarify Motion to Modify Class Definition (Schmidt, Randall) (Entered: 11/07/2011)
140 NOTICE of Motion by Randall D. Schmidt for presentment of motion to clarify, 139 before Honorable Joan B. Gottschall on 11/16/2011 at 09:30 AM. (Schmidt, Randall) (Entered: 11/07/2011)
141 MOTION by Plaintiffs Charles Brown, Jeffrey Burks, Antonio Colon, James Demoss, Jameson Dixon, Clark Faulkner, Kenneth George, Leonard Gregory, Marshun Hill, Mack Leonard, Cedric Muse, Laroy Washington, Darrell Williams, Charles Woods, Michael Woods to clarify Motion to Modify Class Definition (Schmidt, Randall) (Entered: 11/07/2011)
142 NOTICE of Motion by Randall D. Schmidt for presentment of motion to clarify, 141 before Honorable Joan B. Gottschall on 11/16/2011 at 09:30 AM. (Schmidt, Randall) (Entered: 11/08/2011)
143 MINUTE entry before Honorable Joan B. Gottschall: Plaintiffs' motion to modify the class definition in this case to exclude those African−American employees that did not work on Defendants' docks, in offices located on or near the docks, or in the yard 141 is granted. Mailed notice (rj, ) (Entered: 11/17/2011)
144 MOTION by Plaintiffs Charles Brown, Jeffrey Burks, Antonio Colon, James Demoss, Jameson Dixon, Clark Faulkner, Kenneth George, Leonard Gregory, Marshun Hill, Mack Leonard, Cedric Muse, Laroy Washington, Darrell Williams, Charles Woods, Michael WoodsApprove Notices to Class (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibits 1 and 2)(Schmidt, Randall) (Entered: 11/23/2011)
145 NOTICE of Motion by Randall D. Schmidt for presentment of motion for miscellaneous relief, 144 before Honorable Joan B. Gottschall on 11/30/2011 at 09:30 AM. (Schmidt, Randall) (Entered: 11/23/2011)
146 MINUTE entry before Honorable Joan B. Gottschall:Briefing schedule as to MOTION by Plaintiffs Charles Brown, Jeffrey Burks, Antonio Colon, James Demoss, Jameson Dixon, Clark Faulkner, Kenneth George, Leonard Gregory, Marshun Hill, Mack Leonard, Cedric Muse, Laroy Washington, Darrell Williams, Charles Woods, Michael Woods Approve Proposed Notices to Class 144 : Responses due by 12/14/2011. Replies due by 11/21/2011. Ruling by mail. Mailed notice (rj, ) (Entered: 11/30/2011)
147 MINUTE entry before Honorable Joan B. Gottschall: Minute entry #146 is amended to reflect that the replies are due by 12/21/2011. Remaining parts of order to stand. Mailed notice (rj, ) (Entered: 12/01/2011)

Case: 1:08-cv-5908 As of: 07/24/2013 04:05 PM CDT 18 of 21

12/12/2011 12/14/2011
12/21/2011
01/17/2012 01/17/2012 01/18/2012 01/18/2012 02/02/2012 02/03/2012 02/23/2012 02/23/2012 03/06/2012
04/17/2012 05/08/2012

148 MINUTE entry before Honorable Nan R. Nolan: Status hearing set for 12/14/2011 is stricken and reset for 1/17/2012 at 09:30 AM.Mailed notice (lxs, ) (Entered: 12/12/2011)
149 RESPONSE by YRC Inc., Yellow Transportation, Inc. to MOTION by Plaintiffs Charles Brown, Jeffrey Burks, Antonio Colon, James Demoss, Jameson Dixon, Clark Faulkner, Kenneth George, Leonard Gregory, Marshun Hill, Mack Leonard, Cedric Muse, Laroy Washington, Darrell Williams, Charles Woods, Michael WoodsAppr 144 Defendant's Response to Plaintiff's Motion to Approve of Proposed Notices to The Class (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D)(Shaughnessy, Kevin) (Entered: 12/14/2011)
150 REPLY by Plaintiffs Charles Brown, Jeffrey Burks, Antonio Colon, James Demoss, Jameson Dixon, Clark Faulkner, Kenneth George, Leonard Gregory, Marshun Hill, Mack Leonard, Cedric Muse, Laroy Washington, Darrell Williams, Charles Woods, Michael Woods to motion for miscellaneous relief, 144 , response to motion,, 149 Reply in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Approval of Proposed Notices to the Class (Schmidt, Randall) (Entered: 12/21/2011)
151 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice Filing fee $ 50, receipt number 0752−6741883. (Seegers, James) (Entered: 01/17/2012)
152 MINUTE entry before Honorable Nan R. Nolan:Magistrate Judge Status hearing held on 1/17/2012 and continued to 4/17/2012 at 09:30 AM. Counsel reported fact depositions scheduled Parties attempting to complete fact discovery with parallel case before Judge Holderman. Mailed notice (lxs, ) (Entered: 01/17/2012)
153 MINUTE entry before Honorable Joan B. Gottschall: Status hearing set for 1/24/2012 at 09:30 AM by request of the parties. Mailed notice (rj, ) (Entered: 01/18/2012)
154 MINUTE entry before Honorable Joan B. Gottschall: Status hearing set for 1/24/2012 is stricken and reset to 2/7/2012 at 09:30 AM by request of the parties. Mailed notice (rj, ) (Entered: 01/18/2012)
155 MINUTE entry before Honorable Joan B. Gottschall: Status hearing set for 2/7/2012 is stricken and reset to 3/6/2012 at 09:30 AM due to scheduling conflict of the court. Mailed notice (rj, ) (Entered: 02/02/2012)
156 MINUTE entry before Honorable Joan B. Gottschall: Motion by James W. Seegers for leave to appear pro hac vice [ 151 ] is granted. Mailed notice. (kj, ) (Entered: 02/06/2012)
157 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice Filing fee $ 50, receipt number 0752−6868546. (Mersol, Gregory) (Entered: 02/23/2012)
158 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice Filing fee $ 50, receipt number 0752−6868727. (Chairez, Joseph) (Entered: 02/23/2012)
159 MINUTE entry before Honorable Joan B. Gottschall: Status hearing held. Plaintiffs' motion for approval of proposed notices to the class [ 144 ] is granted in part, denied in part as to the terms stated of record. Motion by Gregory V. Mersol for leave to appear pro hac vice [ 157 ] is granted. Motion by Joseph L. Chairez for leave to appear pro hac vice [ 158 ] is granted. Mail notice. (kj, ) (Entered: 03/08/2012)
160 MINUTE entry before Honorable Nan R. Nolan:Magistrate Judge Status hearing held on 4/17/2012 and continued 6/26/2012 at 09:30 AM.Mailed notice (lxs, ) (Entered: 04/17/2012)
161 EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE ORDER: It appearing that it is in the interest of efficient judicial administration for Magistrate Judge Susan Cox to preside over settlement proceedings in 08 C 5908, Charles Brown, et al. v. Yellow Transportation, Inc., therefore It is hereby ordered that Judge Cox is to be the designated magistrate judge in 08 C 5908, Charles Brown, et al. v. Yellow Transportation, Inc. It is further ordered that 08 C 5908 is referred to Magistrate Judge Cox for the purpose of conducting settlement proceedings. Case referred to the Honorable Susan E. Cox. Signed by Executive Committee on 05/08/2012. (ef, )

Case: 1:08-cv-5908 As of: 07/24/2013 04:05 PM CDT 19 of 21

05/10/2012 05/17/2012 05/23/2012 06/06/2012 06/11/2012 06/11/2012
06/20/2012 06/26/2012
06/26/2012 06/27/2012
06/27/2012 06/28/2012 07/09/2012 07/09/2012 08/15/2012

(Entered: 05/08/2012)
162 MINUTE entry before Honorable Susan E. Cox: Status hearing set for 5/17/12 at 10:30 a.m. Mailed notice (vkd, ) (Entered: 05/10/2012)
163 MINUTE entry before Honorable Susan E. Cox: Parties appeared for status hearing. Settlement discussions held off the record. Status hearing stricken. Parties to contact the Court on or before 5/21/12 to confirm the proposed date for a continued settlement conference. Mailed notice (vkd, ) (Entered: 05/17/2012)
164 MINUTE entry before Honorable Susan E. Cox: Settlement Conference set for 6/6/12 at 11:00 a.m. Mailed notice (vkd, ) (Entered: 05/23/2012)
165 MINUTE entry before Honorable Susan E. Cox: Settlement conference held. Status hearing set for 6/11/12 at 9:30 a.m. Defendant's counsel given leave to appear by telephone. Mailed notice (vkd, ) (Entered: 06/06/2012)
166 JOINT CONSENT to Exercise of Jurisdiction by a United States Magistrate Judge (Babbitt, Carol) (Entered: 06/11/2012)
167 MINUTE entry before Honorable Susan E. Cox: Status hearing held. Parties informed the Court they have reached a settlement and will need additional time to finalize the settlement documents. The Court was informed of the proposed schedule for final approval of settlement and fairness hearing. Parties to consent. Mailed notice (vkd, ) (Entered: 06/11/2012)
168 JOINT CONSENT to Exercise of Jurisdiction by a United States Magistrate Judge (Ellerson, Tracey) (Entered: 06/20/2012)
169 MOTION by Plaintiffs Charles Brown, Jeffrey Burks, Antonio Colon, James Demoss, Jameson Dixon, Clark Faulkner, Kenneth George, Leonard Gregory, Marshun Hill, Mack Leonard, Cedric Muse, Laroy Washington, Darrell Williams, Charles Woods, Michael Woods, Defendants YRC Inc., Yellow Transportation, Inc. for order for Preliminary Approval of Proposed Consent Decree (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Proposed Consent Decree)(Schmidt, Randall) (Entered: 06/26/2012)
170 NOTICE of Motion by Randall D. Schmidt for presentment of motion for order, 169 before Honorable Susan E. Cox on 6/28/2012 at 09:30 AM. (Schmidt, Randall) (Entered: 06/26/2012)
171 NOTICE by All Parties re MOTION by Plaintiffs Charles Brown, Jeffrey Burks, Antonio Colon, James Demoss, Jameson Dixon, Clark Faulkner, Kenneth George, Leonard Gregory, Marshun Hill, Mack Leonard, Cedric Muse, Laroy Washington, Darrell Williams, Charles Woods, Michael Woods, D 169 to Correct Exhibit 1 of Motion for Preliminary Approval of Consent Decree (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Corrected Proposed Consent Decree)(Schmidt, Randall) (Entered: 06/27/2012)
172 ORDER REASSIGNING Case to the Honorable Susan E. Cox, pursuant to Local Rule 73.1(b) for all further proceedings parties having consented to the reassignment. Signed by Honorable Joan B. Gottschall on 6/27/12. (ef, ) (Entered: 06/28/2012)
173 MINUTE entry before Honorable Susan E. Cox: Joint motion for preliminary approval of proposed consent decree 169 is granted. Parties need not appear on 6/28/12 at 9:30 a.m. for presentment of said motion. Mailed notice (vkd, ) (Entered: 06/29/2012)
174 MINUTE entry before Honorable Susan E. Cox: Enter Order Setting Dates Required by Preliminary Approval of Consent Decree. Fairness hearing set for 9/12/12 at 11:00 a.m. (For further details see separate order). Mailed notice (vkd, ) (Entered: 07/09/2012)
175 ORDER Setting Dates Required by Preliminary Approval of Consent Decree. Signed by the Honorable Susan E. Cox on 7/9/12:(vkd, ) (Entered: 07/09/2012)
176 LETTER from Leonard Gregory dated 8/13/2012. (pcs, ) . Modified on 9/20/2012 (lcw, ). (Entered: 08/17/2012)

Case: 1:08-cv-5908 As of: 07/24/2013 04:05 PM CDT 20 of 21

09/10/2012 09/10/2012 09/12/2012 09/25/2012 09/25/2012 10/02/2012 01/25/2013
01/25/2013 02/07/2013
02/07/2013 02/22/2013
04/04/2013
04/04/2013 04/08/2013

177 PETITION notice of filing, 171 Class Counsel's Unopposed Petition for Attorneys' Fees and Costs (Attachments: # 1 Declaration, # 2 Exhibit, # 3 Exhibit, # 4 Exhibit)(Schmidt, Randall) (Entered: 09/10/2012)
178 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs re petition 177 Notice of Filing of Class Counsel's Unopposed Petition for Attorneys' Fees and Costs (Schmidt, Randall) (Entered: 09/10/2012)
179 MINUTE entry before Honorable Susan E. Cox: Fairness hearing held. Class Counsel's Unopposed Petition for Attorneys' Fees and Costs 177 is granted and Class Counsel is awarded $1,100,000.00 as their reasonable fees and costs. Mailed notice (vkd, ) (Entered: 09/13/2012)
180 MINUTE entry before Honorable Susan E. Cox: Enter Consent Decree. (For further details see separate order.) Mailed notice (ef, ) (Entered: 09/25/2012)
181 CONSENT DECREE Signed by the Honorable Susan E. Cox on 9/25/2012. (Attachments: # 1 Part 2, # 2 Part 3)(ef, ) (Attachment 2 replaced on 10/2/2012) (kj, ). (Entered: 09/25/2012)
182 NOTICE of Correction regarding document number 181. (kj, ) (Entered: 10/02/2012)
183 MOTION by Plaintiffs Charles Brown, Jeffrey Burks, Antonio Colon, James Demoss, Jameson Dixon, Clark Faulkner, Kenneth George, Leonard Gregory, Marshun Hill, Mack Leonard, Cedric Muse, Laroy Washington, Darrell Williams, Charles Woods, Michael WoodsFor Approval of Distribution of Settlement Funds (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C)(Schmidt, Randall) (Entered: 01/25/2013)
184 NOTICE of Motion by Randall D. Schmidt for presentment of motion for miscellaneous relief, 183 before Honorable Susan E. Cox on 2/7/2013 at 09:30 AM. (Schmidt, Randall) (Entered: 01/25/2013)
185 MINUTE entry before Honorable Susan E. Cox: Enter Order Approving of Allocation of Settlement Funds. Upon consideration the EEOC and Section 1981 Class Counsel Joint Motion for Approval of Allocation of Settlement Funds filed on January 25, 2013, it is hereby ordered that the Joint Motion 183 is granted and that the Court 1) approves the Allocation of the Settlement Funds as set forth in Exhibit A to the Joint Motion, 2) approves the proposed Incentive Payments set forth in Exhibit B to the Joint Motion, and 3) approves the proposed Notification of Award and Release attached as Exhibit C to the Joint Motion. Parties need not appear on 2/7/13 at 9:30 a.m. for presentment of motion. (For further detail see separate order). Mailed notice (vkd, ) (Entered: 02/07/2013)
186 ORDER Approving of Allocation of Settlement Funds. Signed by the Honorable Susan E. Cox on 2/7/13: (vkd, ) (Entered: 02/07/2013)
187 MINUTE entry before Honorable Susan E. Cox: Motion by attorney Christopher L. Nybo to withdraw appearance as counsel for defendant Yellow Transportation, Inc. is granted. Parties need not appear on 2/26/13 at 9:30 a.m. for presentment of said motion. Attorney Christopher L. Nybo terminated. Mailed notice (vkd, ) (Entered: 02/22/2013)
188 MOTION by Plaintiffs Charles Brown, Jeffrey Burks, Antonio Colon, James Demoss, Jameson Dixon, Clark Faulkner, Kenneth George, Leonard Gregory, Marshun Hill, Mack Leonard, Cedric Muse, Laroy Washington, Darrell Williams, Charles Woods, Michael Woods for disbursement of funds (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C)(Schmidt, Randall) Modified on 4/5/2013. (Entered: 04/04/2013)
189 NOTICE of Motion by Randall D. Schmidt for presentment of motion for disbursement of funds, 188 before Honorable Susan E. Cox on 4/9/2013 at 09:30 AM. (Schmidt, Randall) (Entered: 04/04/2013)
190 MINUTE entry before Honorable Susan E. Cox: Plaintiffs' joint motion for approval of final distribution of settlement funds 188 is granted. The modification of awards listed on Exhibit A are approved. The final distribution list attached as

Case: 1:08-cv-5908 As of: 07/24/2013 04:05 PM CDT 21 of 21
Exhibit B is approved. The notice of payment attached as Exhibit C is approved.Parties need not appear on 4/9/13 at 9:30 a.m. for presentment of motion. Mailed notice (vkd, ) (Entered: 04/08/2013)


[CONTENT] October 15, 2008 | African-American | Yellow Transportation, Inc. | Yellow | the U.S. District Court | the Northern District | Illinois | the Civil Rights Act | 1866 | 42 | 1981 ||| the Edwin F. Mandel Legal Aid Clinic ||| Yellow | African-American | Yellow | Chicago Ridge | IL | October 15, 2004 ||| Yellow |||  |||  ||| March and June 2009 | Yellow | 19 ||| Yellow |||  ||| The District Court | Magistrate | Nan R. Nolan | October 9. 2009 ||| 2009 | 3270791 | N.D. | Ill. ||| Oct. 9, 2009 |||  ||| Court | Joan B. Gottschall | January 14, 2010 ||| 2010 | 152000 | N.D. | Ill. ||| Jan. 14, 2010 ||| about March 2009 | YRC, Inc. | Yellow | Yellow | Roadway Express, Inc. ||| December 2009 | Roadway | Chicago Heights | IL ||| the same month | the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission | EEOC | Yellow | EEOC | Yellow Transportation | YRC ||| Title VII of the Civil Rights Act | Title VII | 42 | 2000e ||| April 12, 2010 | YRC ||| Ridge | Chicago Heights ||| EEOC | Roadway | EEOC | Roadway Express ||| African-American | Roadway | Chicago Heights |||  ||| Chicago | Ridge ||| Court | Magistrate | Nolan | July 26, 2010 | Court | Yellow | Roadway ||| Yellow Transp | 08 | 5908 | 2010 | 2911786 | N.D. | Ill. ||| July 26, 2010 ||| the next day |||  ||| May 11, 2011 | Court | Gottschall ||| 2011 WL | 1838741 | N.D. | Ill. ||| May 11, 2011 ||| July 1, 2011 ||| June 27, 2012 | Magistrate | Susan E. Cox ||| Brown | EEOC | Magistrate | Cox | September 25, 2012 ||| 11,000,000 | EEOC ||| Chicago | Ridge | Chicago Heights | EEOC | Roadway Express |||  [SUMMARY] On October 15, 2008, African-American employees at the freight transportation company Yellow Transportation, Inc. ("Yellow") filed a class action lawsuit against their employer in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, under the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The plaintiffs, represented by an attorney from the Edwin F. Mandel Legal Aid Clinic and private counsel, sought declaratory, injunctive and monetary relief as well as class certification. They alleged that Yellow created a racially hostile work environment for African-American employees working at Yellow's facility in Chicago Ridge, IL, from October 15, 2004 to the present. They also claimed that Yellow subjected those employees to disparate treatment and retaliated against them when they complained about the discriminatory practice. The named plaintiffs also brought their individual claims against the employer.

The parties started the discovery process with regard to the issue of class certification. During March and June 2009, Yellow served 19 subpoenas on the plaintiffs' former employers, requesting various information regarding their previous employment. Yellow claimed that some of the plaintiffs failed to disclose their claims against it in their filings of bankruptcy proceedings despite their knowledge of the claims, and that some failed to disclose criminal convictions on their job applications with Yellow. The plaintiffs moved to quash subpoenas and for protective order. The District Court (Magistrate Judge Nan R. Nolan) granted the plaintiffs' motion on October 9. 2009. 2009 WL 3270791 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 9, 2009). Yellow then moved for leave to amend its answer and add the affirmative defenses of judicial estoppel and after-acquired evidence. The Court (Judge Joan B. Gottschall) granted the motion on January 14, 2010. 2010 WL 152000 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 14, 2010). 

In the meantime, in or about March 2009, YRC, Inc. ("YRC"), Yellow's parent company, merged Yellow with another YRC company, Roadway Express, Inc. ("Roadway"). In December 2009, the plaintiffs and the proposed class who were still on the job were transferred to a former Roadway facility in Chicago Heights, IL. In the same month, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") started its own lawsuit against Yellow and YRC, <i>EEOC v. Yellow Transportation, Inc. and YRC, Inc.</i>, linked below as a related case (Clearinghouse code: EE-IL-0330). It was filed in the same district court under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq., and the plaintiffs in this case later joined that one, too, as intervenor plaintiffs. 

Back in this case, on April 12, 2010, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, adding YRC as a co-defendant and an individual as a named plaintiff. They also redefined the hostile work environment class to include individuals working at both the Chicago Ridge and Chicago Heights facilities. This modification was in light of a then ongoing case filed by the EEOC originally against Roadway <i>EEOC v. Roadway Express, Inc.</i>, linked below (Clearinghouse code: EE-IL-0189). The action was brought on behalf of African-American employees working at the Roadway facility in Chicago Heights for race discrimination.

Yellow opposed to this last change, arguing that the class definition was too broad. The plaintiffs then moved to withdraw the amended complaint and to file a new one, with a hostile work environment class including only former Chicago Ridge employees. The Court (Magistrate Judge Nolan) granted the motion on July 26, 2010, reasoning that it was not clear yet to the Court that both Yellow and Roadway employees were complaining of the same events. Brown v. Yellow Transp., Inc., 08 C 5908, 2010 WL 2911786 (N.D. Ill. July 26, 2010). The corrected amended complaint was filed the next day. 

Subsequently, the plaintiffs moved to certify class and the defendants filed their opposition. On May 11, 2011, the Court (Judge Gottschall) granted the plaintiffs' motion to certify the class. 2011 WL 1838741 (N.D. Ill. May 11, 2011). The defendants filed a petition for permission to appeal to the appellate court, but it was denied on July 1, 2011. 

On June 27, 2012, the case was reassigned to Magistrate Judge Susan E. Cox, upon both parties' consent, for settlement proceedings. Negotiations were successful, and this Brown case and the EEOC case were consolidated for the purpose of a consent decree, which Magistrate Judge Cox signed on September 25, 2012.

In the decree, the defendants agreed to pay $11,000,000 to the plaintiff class; the EEOC was placed in charge of allocating the award to eligible individuals. No injunction was issued, since the Chicago Ridge facility was closed and the Chicago Heights facility was already subject to a consent decree issued in <i>EEOC v. Roadway Express, Inc.</i> After some court proceedings regarding award allocation, the case ended. 