Case 1:05-cv-01008-LY Document 353 Filed 03/24/09 Page 1 of 26

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
AUSTIN DIVISION

RAULMEZA,

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PLAINTIFF,

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V.

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BRAD LIVINGSTON, EXECUTIVE

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DIRECTOR OF THE TEXAS

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DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL

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JUSTICE, IN HIS OFFICIAL

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CAPACITY; STUART JENKINS,l

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DIRECTOR OF THE TEXAS

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DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL

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JUSTICE PAROLE DIVISION, IN HIS §

OFFICIAL CAPACITY; AND RISSIE L. §

OWENS, JOSE ALISEDA, CHARLES §

AYCOCK, CONRITH DAVIS, JACKIE §

DENOYELLES, BARBARA

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LORRAINE,2 AND JUANITA M.

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GONZALES, IN THEIR OFFICIAL

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CAPACITIES AS MEMBERS OF THE §

TEXAS BOARD OF PARDONS AND §

PAROLES,

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DEFENDANTS.

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B
CAUSE NO. A-05-CA-1008-LY

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

BE IT REMEMBERED that on November 10,2008, the Court called the above-styled cause for bench trial, which after several re~esses, concluded December 9, 2008. Plaintiff Raul Meza

1 Meza originally sued Bryan Collier, the former Director of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice Parole Division. The Court granted Defendants Brad Livingston and Collier's motion to substitute Stuart Jenkins for Collier on November 10,2008 (Clerk's Document 334).
2Meza originally sued Linda Garcia, in her official capacity as a member of the Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles. The Court granted the Board members' motion to substitute Barbara Lorraine for Garcia on November 10,2008 (Clerk's Document 334).

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appeared in person and by counsel. Defendants Brad Livingston, as Executive Director ofthe Texas Department ofCriminal Justice, and Stuart Jenkins, as Director ofthe Texas Department ofCriminal Justice-Parole Division (collectively, the "Department") appeared by counsel. Defendants Rissie L. Owens, Jose Aliseda, Charles Aycock, Conrith Davis, Jackie DeNoyelles, Barbara Lorraine, and Juanita M. Gonzales, as members of the Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles (collectively, the "Board") appeared by counsel. Meza contends, inter alia, that Defendants denied him the process he was due when they imposed and enforced sex-offender conditions as part of his mandatory supervision following his term of incarceration in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice-Correctional Institutions Division. Having carefully considered the evidence presented at trial, the parties' stipulated facts, the applicable law, the arguments ofcounsel, and the record in this cause, the Court finds and concludes that the procedural protections afforded to Meza pursuant to Coleman v. Dretke were insufficient, and will grant Meza's request for declaratory and injunctive relief to the extent that the State of Texas must afford Meza due process as required by Coleman. See 395 FJd 216 (5th Cir. 2004). In so deciding, the Court makes the following findings offact and conclusions of law.3 Jurisdiction and Venue
The Court has jurisdiction, as Meza's claims arise under the Constitution and laws of the United States. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343 (2006). The Court has authority to grant Plaintiffs claims for declaratory and injunctive relief. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202 (2006); Fed. R. Civ. P. 57, 65. Venue is proper in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, Austin
3All findings offact contained herein that are more appropriately considered conclusions oflaw are to be so deemed. Likewise, any conclusion of law more appropriately considered a finding of fact shall be so deemed.
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Division, because all events and omissions complained of occurred within this district. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) (2006). Backgrountf
On March 8, 1982, Meza pleaded guilty under Texas law to the murder of nine-year-old Kendra Page and admitted to sexually assaulting Page during the course ofthe murder. Meza was sentenced to 30 years imprisonment for the murder. On September 8, 1989, Meza was sentenced to four years additional imprisonment, to be served consecutively to his 30-year term, for possession ofa deadly weapon in a penal institution. Meza's sentence currently will expire January 24,2017.
At the time of Meza's conviction, Texas law provided that a person convicted of a crime must be released from prison on mandatory supervision when the length of the prisoner's calendar time in prison plus good-conduct time the prisoner earned while in prison equaled the total length of the sentence imposed on the prisoner.5 See Act of May 29, 1977, 65th Leg., R.S., ch. 347, § 1, art. 42.12, sec. 15(c), 1965 Tex. Gen. Laws 925, 927-28 (current version at Tex. Govt. Code Ann. §§ 508.147-.149 (West 2004, Supp. 2008». "'Mandatory supervision' ... mean[s] the release of a prisoner from imprisonment but not on parole and not from the legal custody of the State, for rehabilitation outside of prison walls under such conditions and provisions for disciplinary supervision as the Board of Pardons and Paroles may determine." See Act of May 29, 1977, 65th Leg., R.S., ch. 347, § 1, art. 42.12, sec. 2(d), 1965 Tex. Gen. Laws 925,926 (current version at Tex.
4 On October 28,2008, the parties submitted stipulated facts (Clerk's Document 308). The Court incorporates the stipulated facts in this opinion as appropriate. Many ofthe stipulated facts state that an event occurred "on or about" a certain date. For simplicity, the Court omits "on or about." 5The mandatory-supervision law was amended in 1995 to be discretionary. See Act of May 29, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., § 5, art. 42.18, sec. 2(c-l), 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws 2592, 2592-93 (current version at Tex. Govt. Code Ann. § 508.l49(b) (West Supp. 2008».
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Govt. Code Ann. § S08.001(S)). The purpose of mandatory supervision is "to aid all prisoners to readjust to society upon completion oftheir period ofincarceration ...." See Act ofMay 29, 1977,
65th Leg., R.S., ch. 347, § 1, art. 42.12, sec. 1, 1965 Tex. Gen. Laws 925, 92S.
The Board has no discretion and must grant mandatory supervision ofthe type applicable to
Meza. See Act ofMay 29, 1977, 6SthLeg., R.S., ch. 347, § 1, art. 42.12, sec. 15(c), 1965 Tex. Gen.
Laws 925, 927-28; Tex. Govt. Code Ann. § 508.001(5) (West 2004); Coleman v. Dretke, 395 FJd
216,219 n.1 (5th Cir. 2004). Offenders released on either mandatory supervision or parole are called
"releasees." Tex. Govt. Code Ann. § 508.001(9).6 The Department's Parole Division supervises all
parolees.
A panel of the Board sets an offender's conditions of parole. Tex. Govt. Code Ann. §
508.0441. A panel consists of three state officials, including at least one Board member and any combination of Board members and commissioners. Id § 508.045(b). Board members are
appointed by the Texas Governor, while commissioners are Board employees. Id §§ 508.031,
.040(a)(l). The Department's Parole Division enforces the Board-imposed conditions and supervises
parolees. Id § 508.112.7
6In Coleman v. Dretke, 395 F.3d 216 (Sth Cir. 2004), the court ofappeals simplified the terms used in the Texas Government Code: "[b]ecause the distinction between mandatory supervision and parole is not highly relevant to the issues at hand we will use the simpler term 'parole' for the remainder of this opinion." Coleman, 39S FJd at 219, n.l; see also Tex. Govt. Code Ann. § S08.147 ("An inmate released to mandatory supervision is considered to be released on parole."). This Court will do the same and also use the more familiar term "parolee" instead of"releasee." See Coleman, 395 F.3d at 219, n.1. As used in this opinion the term "parolee" includes a releasee on either parole or mandatory supervision. 7The Board and Department attempt to distinguish their responsibilities, and indeed, the agencies perform separate functions. However, the Department and the Board are Texas state agencies that work closely together. In the final analysis, Meza's conditions are imposed and implemented by the State ofTexas. The Court considers all ofMeza's allegations to be against the state. Thus, despite
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On May 19, 1993, after serving 11 years of his sentence, Meza was released from custody and placed on parole as required by existing law. While on parole, Meza lived a relatively normal life within the community. On August 24, 1994, Meza violated the conditions of his parole by returning to his residence 15 minutes after his state-imposed curfew. The State conducted a revocation hearing on September 16, 1994, revoked Meza's parole on October 21, 1994, and incarcerated him again until September 25,2002.
The State was required to release Meza from prison on September 25,2002. See Act of May 29,1977, 65th Leg., R.S., ch. 347, § 1, art. 42.12, sec. 15(c), 1965 Tex. Gen. Laws 925,927-28. The State again set Meza's parole conditions, which are more restrictive than those in 1993 due to changes in state law. Some of Meza' s conditions are statutorily required, while some are "special conditions" imposed by the Board. See Tex. Govt. Code Ann. §§ 508.l81-.191, .221-.226. Meza's current special conditions include the Super Intensive Supervision Program condition ("SISP"); Special Condition 0.06, regarding child-safety zones; Special Condition X, containing sex-offender conditions; and Special Condition 0.99, which prohibits Meza from leaving the Travis County Correctional Complex ("TCCC"), where he is housed, without a supervising parole officer.s Some ofMeza's special conditions contain overlapping components.9
their different responsibilities, the Court will refer throughout this opinion to the Board and the Department as the "State," unless it is important to refer to either specifically. 8 Special Condition 0.99 is a "free text" special condition, meaning a Board panel may use it to impose any type of condition on a parolee. Parolees may have more than one condition 0.99, and very few parolees have a special condition 0 .99 like Meza' s. Meza is the only parolee at TCCC with the parole-officer-supervision condition. Mike Lozito, Parole Division Region IV Director, testified that one parolee in San Antonio has such a condition. 9 Board Administrator Troy Fox testified that the Board purposely overlaps certain conditions such as Meza's stand-alone Special Condition 0.99, requiring a parole-officer escort, and SISP, so that
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Meza's SISP condition includes the requirements that he reside in a community residential facility, or "halfway house," designated by the Department; comply with all facility rules and regulations in effect during his period ofresidence; attend educational and vocational training classes as directed by his parole officer; not go within 500 feet of places children commonly gather (childsafety-zone component); and wear an electronic-monitoring device at all times. lo Special Condition X requires that Meza participate in a sex-offender-treatment program, be evaluated to determine the need for sex-offender counseling, enroll and participate in a treatment program for sex offenders as directed by his supervising parole officer, submit to polygraph examinations, avoid child-safety zones, wear an electronic-monitoring device, and otherwise comply with sex-offender conditions.ll Special Condition 0.06 also prohibits Meza from entering child-safety zones.
Immediately upon his release from State custody in 2002, Meza was placed in the physical custody ofTravis County, Texas. Since then Meza has resided at TCCC, a Travis Countyjail facility in Del Valle, Texas, with which the State contracts to house parolees. While Meza is physically housed at TCCC, the Department retains control over his movements. Meza resides in a bay of TCCC's work-release section with other parolees, surrounded by a razor-wire fence. Meza testified
there will be a backup in case the State ever withdraws SISP as a condition. 10 In Meza's November 13,2003 parole certificate, his SISP condition included a sex-offender-
registration component. The certificate also imposed Special Condition M, requiring him to register as a sex offender. However, Meza's July 19, 2005 Notice of Special Conditions omits Special Condition Mand other sex-offender-registration components. At trial, State witnesses testified that Meza no longer has sex-offender-registration conditions on his parole.
11 In Meza's July 19,2005 Notice of Special Conditions, Special Condition X requires both that Meza "participate in the Sex Offender Treatment Program," and "enroll and participate in a treatment program for sex offenders as directed by the supervising parole officer." The distinction between these components, if there is one, is not clear from the record.
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that other bays in the work-release section house prison inmates, he has been in such bays, and they are identical to the bay in which he is housed. Meza must comply with Teee rules, such as going to bed at 10:30 p.m. and rising at 5:00 a.m. When Meza leaves his residence bay, he must wear a jail uniform. Family may visit once a week, and visits are conducted through a glass partition by telephone. A Teee resident may have one contact visit each month, at which he may hold hands with his guest. Meza's parole officer provides his daily schedule. When the Department allows Meza to leave the jail, it transports him in a cargo van equipped with an interior steel cage. The State throughout the trial argued Meza's living conditions do not amount to confinement; the eourt is unpersuaded.
Meza's parole conditions require that he reside at Teee for the first 180 days ofhis parole. To leave Teee and reside elsewhere, Meza's parole conditions require that he form a viable residence plan. To form/a viable residence plan, Meza must demonstrate that he has the income to live elsewhere. To obtain income, he must secure employment. However, the restrictiveness of Meza's parole conditions have prevented him from securing employment. The ISO-day initial residency period has long since expired, but Meza remains in Teee. Theoretically, Meza's conditions do not prevent him from living in the community, attending church, visiting his family, or obtaining employment, but practically, his conditions prohibit him from leaving Teee, a jail.
Few other parolees have conditions of release as restrictive as Meza's. Meza cannot go within 500 feet ofplaces children commonly gather, including but not limited to, schools, day-care facilities, playgrounds, public or private youth centers, public swimming pools, or video-arcade facilities. Meza's child-safety-zone conditions prevent him from living with his mother, because she
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occasionally cares for children in her home. Meza's child-safety-zone conditions have also caused the State to prevent Meza from accepting job offers he has received.
Meza's conditions include the highest level of monitoring and supervision and the requirement that he be escorted by a parole officer at all times. Special Condition 0.99, the paroleofficer-supervision requirement, is especially restrictive, because the Department controls the availability ofparole officers. At trial, State witnesses could identify but one other parolee in Texas with a comparable parole-officer-supervision condition. The Department assigns a parole officer to escort Meza outside TCCC for only eight hours per week. Between 2002 and 2005, Meza was allowed to leave TCCC only twice; once for a job interview and once to visit a hospital emergency room. Meza must present any request to leave TCCC to his parole officer in writing, and currently, the Department grants only his requests to leave for medical reasons.
In 2005, Meza began visiting Project RIO, or "Reintegration ofOffenders." At Project RIO, Meza may use computers to search for jobs, make collect calls from telephones, and participate in job-training and placement programs. Meza has also participated in resume-writing classes at Project RIO. Sometimes the Department denies his requests to take such classes. Meza was accepted into the Construction Gateway program at Project RIO, which offers former offenders jobtraining opportunities. Through Construction Gateway, Meza attended a seven-week construction class at Austin Community College.
The Department provides a parole officer for Meza to attend Project RIO for only four hours per week, two hours each on Wednesday and Friday. 12 Meza testified that attending Project RIO two
12 The record reflects that the Department allots a parole-officer to accompany Meza for eight hours per week, but that he may spend only four hours per week at Project RIO. It is unclear what occurs in the remaining four hours. Meza's parole conditions do not limit his time away from TCCC. The
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days per week for two hours per day is insufficient to enable him to obtain employment, because he does not have time to follow up onjob leads. He is unable to pursue job leads from the jail, because he has no money with which to make phone calls on the pay telephones, and prospective employers will not accept collect calls from jail.
Sylvester Villarreal, the Program Coordinator at Construction Gateway, testified that for someone in Meza's position to secure employment, seeking employment should be a 40-hour-perweek endeavor. Villarreal stated that, although Meza diligently searches for employment, his conditions have hindered his opportunities. Villarreal explained that jobs are posted on Internet databases early in the week, and the best time for Project RIO attendees to search for employment is Sunday or early in the week. Often jobs have been filled by Wednesday or Thursday. Meza's Department-imposed schedule is problematic for Meza, because the Department only allows him to attend Project Rio on Wednesdays and Fridays. Further, the Department requires that Meza provide his parole officer with information regarding his job leads. He is the only Construction Gateway 'participant who must provide this information. Overall, despite Meza's job-search attempts at Project RIO and participation in the Construction Gateway program, his parole conditions have prevented him from securing employment.
In the years that he has attended Project RIO, Meza has submitted many job prospects to his parole officer for review and approval. Meza's parole officer must communicate up the Department chain of command regarding Meza's opportunities. Usually Meza's parole officer does not inform Meza ofthe results after inquiring with employers about the possibility ofMeza working for them. 13
conditions do require that he be accompanied by a parole officer when away from TCCC. 13 During Meza's time at TCCC he has had between 12 and 15 parole officers.
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The record reflects confusion and delays as inquiries regarding Meza's opportunities make their way through the Department. For example, in April 2007 , Meza was offered a construction-industry job that required that Meza undergo a urinalysis as part of the hiring process. The Department denied Meza's request to have the urinalysis performed. When Meza's attorney complained, no one responded. Mike Lozito, Parole Division Region IV Director, testified that he did not think the complaint needed a response. He passed it to another state official and was uncertain what subsequently occurred. Despite Lozito's lack ofengagement with Meza'sjob search process, Lozito further testified that he would "love" for Meza to find ajob.
Besides the aforementioned construction job, Meza has received three offers of employment since 2002. One required that Meza have a driver's license, but at that time the Department would not allow him to obtain such license.14 Meza was offered a clerical position on the tenth floor of a downtown building, but the Department would not approve the position because a child-safety zone was located across the street. The last offer was a construction position, but the Department would not approve it, because Meza would have had to cross a child-safety zone to reach the job site.
Meza brought this action on December 5, 2005, alleging violations of his Fourteenth Amendment equal-protection and due-process rights. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV, sec. 1. It is undisputed that at all relevant times, Defendants were acting under color of law, pursuant to legal authority, and in their official capacities.
14 Lozito testified that he would not allow Meza to obtain a driver's license when Meza requested one, because Lozito did not see a point in Meza's having one. Lozito denied that he imposed such a "condition" on Meza, because he is not authorized to impose conditions. Meza has since obtained a driver's license.
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Fourth Amended Complaint In his Fourth Amended Complaint, Meza asserts that the Board violated his due-process
rights by imposing sex-offender conditions and other irrational, arbitrary, and capricious conditions on his parole. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV, sec. 1; Civil Rights Act of 1871,42 U.S.C. § 1983
• (2006). Meza asserts the Department and Board are violating his Fourteenth Amendment dueprocess rights by imposing conditions on his parole that are qualitatively different from the punishment typically imposed on similarly situated parolees. See id. Meza further alleges that the Department is violating his Fourteenth Amendment due-process and equal-protection rights by imposing additional informal, unauthorized conditions on his parole and habitually and intentionally treating Meza differently from similarly situated parolees. See id.
Meza seeks an injunction preventing Defendants from imposing sex-offender conditions without due process and from continuing to subject him to qualitatively different conditions of confinement without due process. He also seeks a declaratory judgment that Defendants' conduct constitutes illegal deprivation ofhis due-process rights. Meza finally seeks attorney's fees and costs.
Because the Court determines that the Board did not afford Meza due process in imposing sex-offender conditions as conditions ofhis parole and such conclusion mandates that he be afforded a new hearing before the Board, the Court need not determine Meza's remaining complaints at this time. Analysis
Coleman v. Dretke Meza bases his sex-offender-conditions due-process claim on Coleman v. Dretke, 395 FJd 216,219 (5th Cir. 2004). While Tony Ray Coleman was on parole for a prior offense, a Texas grand
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jury indicted him for aggravated sexual assault of a child and indecency with a child by contact. Coleman, 395 F.3d at 219. Coleman pleaded guilty to and was convicted of only misdemeanor assault, which is not a sex crime. The State revoked his parole for the prior offense, and he was
reincarcerated. fa. The State eventually released Coleman on parole. fa. Acondition ofColeman's parole was that he reside at a halfway house until employed. fa. A month after the State released
Coleman, it imposed two additional conditions on his parole-that he register as a sex offender and
that he receive sex-offender therapy. fa. Coleman registered as a sex offender but failed to enroll or participate in therapy. The State revoked his parole. fa. Coleman petitioned for a writ of habeas
corpus, alleging that "the parole panel's imposition of sex offender registration and therapy as conditions to his parole, without providing him the opportunity to contest his sex offender status,
violated his right to due process." fa. at 221.15 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denied the petition, as did the federal district court. fa. at 219.
The court of appeals determined that Coleman had a liberty interest in not having a sexoffender-therapy condition placed on his parole, because "due to its highly invasive nature, Texas's sex offender therapy program is 'qualitatively different' from other conditions which may attend an
inmate's release." fa. at 223 (analogizing to Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980)). The court held
that the Due Process Clause, as interpreted in Vitek, protected Coleman from such stigma, and "the
state was required to provide procedural protections before imposing such conditions." fa. The
State admitted that it had not provided Coleman with process before imposing sex-offender conditions on his parole. Accordingly, the circuit court held that
15 As a habeas corpus petitioner, Tony Ray Coleman sued Doug Dretke, Director of the Department's Correctional Institutions Division, the state officer with supervision over his incarceration. Coleman, 395 F.3d at 219.
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[t]he Department may condition Coleman's parole on sex offender registration and therapy only if he is determined to constitute a treat to society by reason of his lack of sexual control. Absent a conviction of a sex offense, the Department must afford him an appropriate hearing and find that he possesses this offensive characteristic before imposing such conditions.
Id at 225.16
The State's Coleman Review
Following Coleman, the State implemented procedures to comply with the State's view of
Coleman's mandate. The State's Coleman review does not include a hearing. Instead, the Board
administratively reviews aparolee's file to determine whether the Board should impose sex-offender
conditions. A parolee, such as Meza, who was not convicted of a sex offense, but whose parole
conditions included sex-offender conditions before Coleman, receives a letter titled "Notice and
Opportunity to Respond" from his parole officer, informing the parolee that the prior imposition of
the sex-offender condition is under review ("Coleman notice"). The Coleman notice informs the
parolee why the sex-offender condition was imposed and should be continued and offers the parolee
30 days to submit documentation contesting imposition of the condition.I7 A parolee may submit
such documentation through his parole officer. Department employees assemble a packet of
16 The Department was the only Defendant named in Coleman, and the circuit ordered the Department to afford Coleman an appropriate hearing. This Court notes that it is the Board that conducts parole hearings and establishes conditions of parole. The Court considers Coleman's mandate to extend to both the Board and the Department. The Court concludes that Coleman requires the State to provide due process that adequately protects a parolee's liberty interest in not having sex-offender conditions imposed on his parole. Distinctions between Board and Department roles are immaterial for purposes of Coleman-required due process.
17 The Department's Sex Offender Program Administrative Guidelines delineate Coleman review for parolees who have Special Condition X but have not been convicted of a sex crime. However, the Notice and Opportunity to Respond-Sex Offender Special Condition Review (form SP-502) does not expressly mention Special Condition X; instead it refers to imposition of"sex offender treatment special conditions (sex offender treatment and polygraph)".
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information, including the parolee's and, ifapplicable, his attorney's response, the complete parole file, a psychological evaluation of the parolee, the parolee's polygraph-test results, and a case summary detailing the parolee's social, educational, employment, medical, institutional-adjustment, and behavioral history.
After the Department assembles the packet, a Department Sex Offender Program Specialist or designee presents the packet to a Board panel. Because Department employees perform much of the work before the panel presentation, such presentations typically last between 10 and 30 minutes, depending on the packet's characteristics. The Board panel reviews the items in the packet as well as the parolee's criminal history, police reports, support and protest letters,juvenile record, and the case summary prepared by the parole officer. Department policy dictates that the presenter shall clearly identify the parolee's response for the Board's review. After the Board panel votes on whether to continue the sex-offender-treatment condition, the parole officer is notified ofthe result, the voted "transmittal" is scanned into the State's Offender Information Management System, and the parolee is notified of the State's decision. The parolee is then referred for treatment if appropriate.
Neither a parolee who receives a Coleman notice nor the parolee's attorney is allowed to review the parolee's file or told what information the Board will use in reviewing the condition. Neither the Board nor the Department provides the parolee with his psychological-evaluation, his polygraph results, or a copy ofthe packet that the Department presents to the Board panel. Neither the parolee nor his attorney may appear before the Board panel. The Board produces no written findings.
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Meza argues that Coleman requires a hearing at which the State must demonstrate that Meza lacks sexual control. Meza asserts that such a hearing should include written notice, a hearing sufficiently after the notice to allow Meza to prepare, disclosure of evidence being relied upon, an opportunity to be heard in person and to present documentary evidence, an opportunity at the hearing to present witness testimony and to confront and cross examine State witnesses, an independent decision maker, and a written statement by the fact-finder regarding the evidence relied upon and the reasons for the decision. The State argues that Coleman does not require a hearing or written findings, that the State's Coleman review meets Coleman's requirements, and that Meza was provided adequate due process.
The Conditions To Which Coleman Applies The Department argues Coleman applies only to the treatment requirement of Special Condition X,18 not the entire condition. The Court disagrees and concludes that Coleman's dueprocess requirement applies to any sex-offender condition imposed and thus to all components of Special Condition X. In reaching this conclusion, the Court notes that a parolee's liberty interest in freedom from sex-offender conditions arises not only from the invasive treatment he must undergo, but also from the stigmatizing consequences of being labeled a sex offender. Special Condition X-the "Sex Offender Program" condition-is stigmatizing regardless of its components. Coleman recognizes that "prisoners who have not been convicted of a sex offense have a liberty interest created by the Due Process Clause in freedom from sex offender classification and conditions." Coleman, 395 F.3d at 222 (emphasis added); see also Coleman v. Dretke, 409 FJd 665,668 (5th
18 Presumably the Department is referring to the components that read: "I shall participate in the Sex Offender Treatment Program ..." and "[eJnroll in and participate in a treatment program for sex offenders as directed by the supervising parole officer."
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Cir. 2005) (Coleman 11)(discussing the stigmatizing effect of sex-offender label). The Court also notes that Department Coleman policies refer to Special Condition X generally, not its components.
Meza has not been convicted of a sex crime. He has been convicted of murder. The State does not dispute that Coleman's requirements apply to Meza or that he has a protected liberty interest in freedom from sex-offender conditions. Since 2002, Meza's parole has been conditioned on his compliance with sex-offender conditions, including sex-offender treatment, similar to that at issue in Coleman. Id. at 223. Meza received and signed a Coleman notice on February 23, 2005. Meza's Coleman notice informed him that the State conditioned his parole on sex-offender treatment, because a sex-offender-treatment provider indicated Meza should attend such treatment and should not be allowed contact with children. The Coleman notice offered Meza 30 days to submit documentation contesting imposition of the condition. Meza did not submit a statement or documentation to contest the conditions. 19
The Court concludes that Coleman applies to any State sex-offender condition imposed on a parolee who has not been convicted of a sex crime.
What Process is Due? The requirements ofdue process are flexible and should be tailored to the situation. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1975). To determine the appropriate due process in a given situation, a court considers: [f]irst, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally,
19 Because the Court concludes that the State's Coleman review did not comply with the requirements of due process, the Court also concludes that Meza's failure to respond to the State's constitutionally deficient notice does not result in Meza's waiving his objections to the process.
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the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail. Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 224-25 (2005) (quoting Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335). The Court first considers Meza's private interest in freedom from sex-offender conditions. "[B]y requiring Coleman to attend sex offender therapy, the state labeled him a sex offender-a label which strongly implies that Coleman has been convicted ofa sex offense and which can undoubtedly cause 'adverse social consequences.'" Coleman 11,409 FJd at 668. The same is true ofthe State's treatment of Meza. Meza's interest in freedom from sex-offender conditions is significant. Meza's sex-offender status and related stigma have likely contributed to his inability to secure employment. Despite State witnesses' assertions that they would "love" for Meza to find a job, the record also reflects that the State informs Meza's potential employers he is a sex offender. Without employment, Meza cannot form a viable residence plan, leave TCCC, or "be with family and friends and [] form the other enduring attachments ofnormal life." Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972). The second Mathews factor is the risk oferroneous deprivation ofMeza'sprivate interest and the probable value of additional procedural safeguards. Despite the State's notice to Meza, without the State informing him what evidence would be used against him, Meza was unable to prepare an informed response to the State's position. With more complete information Meza could better respond and through adversary hearings could assure that all relevant issues are considered. "[T]he subtleties and nuances" ofthe expert psychologist and therapist opinions and reports involved in sexoffender determinations justify requiring adversary hearings. Vitek, 445 U.S. at 495. The State's
17

Case 1:05-cv-01008-LY Document 353 Filed 03/24/09 Page 18 of 26
Coleman review therefore creates a risk of erroneous deprivation, and additional procedural protections will help prevent such risk.
Under the final Mathews factor, the Court considers the State's interests and evaluates the fiscal and administrative burdens that additional procedural safeguards would place on the State. The State's interest in identifying, supervising, and rehabilitating sex offenders is obviously significant, but does not obviate the need to protect Meza' s private interest. The State argues it will be financially burdensome to increase procedural protections for offenders whose parole it hopes to condition on sex-offender-conditions.20 The Court rejects the State's analysis. Although adding procedures will cause some administrative and financial burden to the State, the Court finds, based on the record before it, that affording additional procedural protections to Meza and others similarly situated would not be a significant burden on the State.
Relying on Austin, the State urges the Court to find that the State's current Coleman review meets the requirements of due process. See Austin, 545 U.S. at 213. In Austin, the Supreme Court found a liberty interest in Ohio prison inmates' freedom from placement in an Ohio "Supermax"
20 Fox testified that to conduct Coleman reviews in the same format as parole-revocation hearings, the Board would need two additional Board members, four additional commissioners, and greater support staff, at an annual cost of approximately $750,000. Janet Latham, a Department Sex Offender Program Specialist, testified that the Department would need additional staff, and more time spent by existing staff, to conduct such hearings and would need legislative help to do so. Latham concluded the Department would need 113 additional full-time employees, including 38 treatment providers, which would cost approximately $477,000 for start-up and training costs, plus $1.5 million for additional treatment providers. The record does not contain the details on which Fox and Latham based these estimates, but the Court is skeptical so many additional employees would be necessary to add elements to extant procedures. The Court notes that the Board may write and implement rules regarding the conduct of a parole or mandatory-supervision hearing and the conditions to be imposed on a parolee. See Tex. Govt. Code Ann. § 508.441(c).
18

Case 1:05-cv-01008-LY Document 353 Filed 03/24/09 Page 19 of 26
prison facility. Id The court held that Ohio's Supermax-assignment procedures complied with dueprocess requirements. Id. The Court finds Austin distinguishable from this case.
The procedures at issue in Austin provided greater protections than the State's Coleman review. Ohio initiates proceedings by providing the inmate with written notice summarizing the conduct or offense triggering the review and access to the detailed form prepared to initiate proceedings. Id at 216. The inmate may then attend a hearing, present objections to proposed Supermax placement, and submit a written statement. Id After the hearing, if state officials recommend Supermax placement, they document their reasoning in a report that is then reviewed at two more levels, each of which provides written reasons for its findings if it recommends Supermax placement. Id at 216-17. The inmate receives a copy ofthe decision and reasons and has 15 days to file objections, which state officials consider at a final level of review. If state officials finally decide to place the inmate in the Supermax facility, they note the reasons for their decision in a document, which is again provided to the inmate. Id Once an inmate is placed in the Supermax facility, he receives a review 30 days later. Id In comparison, when the State reviewed Meza's sexoffender conditions it did not provide him materials on which to base his response, did not allow him to appear and present evidence at a hearing, produced no written findings, the decision was not subject to any level ofreview, and the only reason provided for the condition's imposition was "[a] sex offender treatment provider has indicated that you should attend sex offender treatment and should not be allowed contact wi children." Compare id 216-17.
Having considered Meza's and the State's interests and the benefit ofadditional procedures, the Court concludes that the "appropriate hearing" called for by Coleman requires more than the State currently provides. Coleman, 395 FJd at 225.
19

Case 1:05-cv-01008-LY Document 353 Filed 03/24/09 Page 20 of 26
The Requirements of Due Process for Meza In the parole-revocation-hearing context, the minimum requirements of due process are: (1) written notice of claimed violations; (2) disclosure of relevant evidence; (3) opportunity for the parolee to appear in person and present witnesses and documentary evidence; (4) the right to confront and cross examine adverse witnesses, unless good cause is shown for not allowing confrontation; (5) an independent hearing body; and (6) a written statement of the evidence relied upon by the fact-finders in reaching their decision and reasons for reaching their decision. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,489 (1972). In Coleman, the Fifth Circuit relied on Vitek v. Jones in determining that parolees have a liberty interest in freedom from sex-offender treatment. Coleman, 395 FJd 223; Coleman 11,409 FJd at 668. In Vitek, the Supreme Court affirmed a district-court opinion mandating procedural protections that substantially mirrored the Morrissey requirements. 445 U.S. at 494-96; see Miller v. Vitek, 437F.Supp. 569, 574 (D. Neb. 1977). Although Coleman did not delineate what procedures are required to protect a parolee's liberty interest in freedom from sex-offender treatment, Vitek required parole-revocation-type procedural protections. See Vitek, 445 U.S. at 494-45; Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 489; Coleman, 395 FJd 223. The State's Coleman review complies with some, but not all, of the Morrissey-Vitek requirements. Through Coleman review, the State provided Meza with notice that it was reviewing his sex-offender-treatment conditions and allowed him to respond. Additionally, the State provides an independent decision maker in the Board. See Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 485-87 (describing parole officer as person too intimately connected with parolee's case to provide the appropriate decision-
20

.,

Case 1:05-cv-01008-LY Document 353 Filed 03/24/09 Page 21 of 26

making objectivity in parole-revocation hearing, but stating some other administrative officer would be appropriate).
The State did not, however, disclose relevant evidence, give Meza an opportunity to appear in person and present witnesses and documentary evidence, to confront and cross examine adverse witnesses, or produce written findings regarding the evidence it relied on and the reasons for its decision. Coleman requires that the State determine Meza constitutes a threat to society by reason of his lack of sexual control. In doing so, it must "afford him an appropriate hearing and find that he possesses this offensive characteristic." Coleman, 395 FJd at 225. The record in this case is utterly devoid offindings regarding Meza. The Court rejects the State's argument that the continued imposition of sex-offender conditions constitutes a sufficient "finding" that Meza possesses the offensive characteristic of lack of sexual control or the basis for such "finding."
The Court notes that prison disciplinary proceedings require fewer due-process protections than parole-revocation procedures. At a minimum, however, due process requires that inmates be afforded advance written notice of the claimed violation and a written statement by fact-finders regarding the evidence relied upon and reasons for the disciplinary action taken. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563 (1973). The Court sees no reason the State cannot afford Meza at least the procedural protections afforded prison inmates and concludes that the State's Coleman findings must be written and specific. See Vitek, 445 U.S. at 494-95; WoW; 418 U.S. at 563. As to the decision to implement sex-offender conditions, "the provision for a written record helps to insure that administrators, faced with possible scrutiny by state officials and the public, and perhaps even the courts, where fundamental constitutional rights may have been abridged, will act fairly." Wolff, 418 U.S. at 565.
21

Case 1:05-cv-01008-LY Document 353 Filed 03/24/09 Page 22 of 26
Disclosure ofthe evidence that will be relied upon and opportunity to be heard in person and present documentary evidence have been called "so fundamental that little discussion of them is needed." Miller, 437 F.Supp. at 574, aff'd Vitek, 445 U.S. at 495-96. Regarding the evidence the State will rely upon, Department Sex Offender Program Specialist Janet Latham testified that although the State does not currently provide offenders with their psychological evaluations and polygraph-test results, there is no policy against providing them. The Court sees no reason the State cannot provide the evidence supporting its position to Meza so he may prepare an informed response to such evidence. The State need not provide Meza with his entire parole file, but must allow him access to the information that the State will use in deciding whether to continue to impose sexoffender conditions. Likewise, in the interest of safety, the State may reasonably redact identifying information.
Meza and his attorney must be allowed to appear in person at a hearing at which the State considers whether to continue imposing sex-offender conditions. At such a hearing, Meza must, at a minimum, be afforded an opportunity to be heard and present documentary evidence. He must also be able to call witnesses "when permitting him to do so will not be unduly hazardous to institutional safety or correctional goals." Wolff, 518 U.S. at 566.
Whether Meza should be able to confront and cross examine State witnesses is a slightly different question, and here the Court finds Vitek and Miller persuasive. See Vitek, 445 U.S. at 496; Miller, 437 F.Supp. at 574 ("the nature of the inquiry in a mental hearing holds a sufficiently low possibility of friction that it appears to us there is a right to call witnesses and confront and crossexamine witnesses ...."). Here, the question whether the State may continue to impose sexoffender conditions will most likely not implicate concerns for inmates' or other parolees' safety or
22

1

,

T

Case 1:05-cv-01008-LY Document 353 Filed 03/24/09 Page 23 of 26

outweigh the benefits of allowing confrontation and cross examination. Compare Wolff, 418 U.S. at 567-69 (describing potential for prison disruption if inmates facing discipline could confront and cross examine adverse witnesses). An appropriate hearing must therefore include Meza's opportunity to call witnesses and confront and cross examine adverse witnesses, "except upon a finding, not arbitrarily made, of good cause for not permitting each as to a particular witness." Miller, 437 F.Supp. at 574, aff'd Vitek, 445 U.S. at 496 ("The interests of the State in avoiding disruption was recognized [by the district court] by limiting in appropriate circumstances the prisoner's right to call witnesses, to confront and cross examine.").
In summary, this Court concludes that due process requires that the State afford Meza an appropriate hearing, including: (1) written notice in advance of the hearing; (2) disclosure of the evidence on which the State is relying; (3) a hearing, scheduled sufficiently after the notice to permit Meza to prepare, at which he will have the opportunity to be heard in person, represented by counsel, and to present documentary evidence in his support; (4) an opportunity at the hearing to call witnesses and confront and cross examine State witnesses, "except upon a finding, not arbitrarily made, of good cause for not permitting each as to a particular witness"; (5) an independent decision maker; and (6) a written statement by the fact-finder as to the evidence relied upon and the reasons for the decision. Miller, 437 F.Supp. at 574. The State must afford Meza effective and timely notice ofall these rights. The State may only continue to impose sex-offender conditions on Meza's parole if, through these procedures, it determines that he "constitute[s] a threat to society by reason of his lack of sexual control." Coleman, 395 FJd at 225.
The State has failed to provide Meza this level of process.

23

Case 1:05-cv-01008-LY Document 353 Filed 03/24/09 Page 24 of 26
Meza's Remaining Due-Process and Equal-Protection Claims Meza also argues he has a liberty interest in freedom from certain ofhis other conditions and
their components, specifically Special Condition 0.99 (parole-officer-escort condition), 0.06 (childsafety-zone condition), other child-safety-zone components (within SISP and Special Condition X), and the requirement that he live at TCCC. Meza argues the State violates his equal-protection rights by subjecting him to intentional, irrational treatment.
The Court notes that the record reflects that the State has managed to keep Meza incarcerated since 2002, despite the fact that he is on parole and should be able to use this time to readjust to society before his sentence expires in 2017. The Court has received and considered the Declaration of Linda Scavella, which establishes that even after the trial in this case, the Department resists allowing Meza to live beyond the jail, although housing options exist that comply with Meza's conditions.21 Such evidence, when considered with the record as a whole, causes the Court to question the sincerity of all assertions by the State that it desires Meza to find ajob, create a viable residence plan, or live in the community.
Regardless ofthe State's protestations to the contrary, Mezahas remained incarcerated since his mandatory supervision began in 2002. No reasonable observer may conclude otherwise. To cite but one example, the conditions of Meza's parole, as decreed by the Board, do not restrict his time outside of TCCC. The Board has compelled, however, that Meza always be accompanied by a probation officer. The Department has determined, on its own, to restrict Meza's time outside of
21 On December 23,2008, Meza filed his Opposed Motion to Supplement the Record (Clerk's Document 351), seeking to supplement the record with the Declaration ofLinda Scavella. The State filed no response, and the Court hereby GRANTS the motion to supplement as unopposed. See Loc. R. W.D. Tex. CV-7(d).
24

. " ')

Case 1:05-cv-01008-LY Document 353 Filed 03/24/09 Page 25 of 26

TCCC to eight hours per week and has determined the number ofhours Meza may spend at Project Rio and even the days on which he may visit Project Rio. The Court finds that the Department, through this action alone, is inhibiting or preventing Meza's securing employment. Without employment, Meza may not develop a viable residence plan that would allow him to leave TCCC. Thus, under the State's current practice, he will remain incarcerated in TCCC until the expiration ofhis sentence in 2017, then be released into society, having received none ofthe presumed benefits of gradual reassimilation.
Because the Court has concluded that Coleman's "appropriate hearing" mandate requires more robust procedural protections than the State's current Coleman review, the Court does not today reach these remaining claims and will dismiss them without prejudice. The Court is certain that the State will use the hearing and review process ordered today to reevaluate all of Meza's parole conditions and restrictions on his freedom, whether ordered by the Board or instituted by the Department, and consider such reasonable changes as will enhance Meza's opportunity to safely reintegrate into society. Conclusion
In light ofthe foregoing, the Court renders the following declaration, injunction, and orders: THE COURT DECLARES that the State failed to afford Meza "a hearing meeting the requirements ofdue process" when it imposed sex-offender conditions on his parole. Coleman, 395 FJd at 225. Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that the State shall provide Meza with an appropriate hearing regarding imposition of sex-offender conditions on his parole consistent with the Court's findings and conclusions set forth herein.
25

" ! • .,

Case 1:05-cv-01008-LY Document 353 Filed 03/24/09 Page 26 of 26

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Meza's equal-protection and due-process claims

regarding his other formal and informal conditions of parole are DISMISSED WITHOUT

PREJUDICE.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Meza is awarded costs for the prosecution ofthis cause.

Meza's request for attorney's fees is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to refiling in

accordance with the Local Rule CV-7(i) ofthe Local Rules of the Western District of Texas.

IT IS FINALLY ORDERED that Defendants Livingston and Collier's Motion for Summary

Judgment with Brief in Support filed March 14, 2007 (Clerk's Document 109), Plaintiff s Motion

for Partial Summary Judgment filed March 14, 2007 (Clerk's Document 112), Plaintiff s Motion for

Summary Judgment filed July 17,2008 (Clerk's Document 277), and [The Board's] Motion for

Summary Judgment filed August 4, 2008 (Clerk's Document 279) are DISMISSED.

~ SIGNED this

day of March, 2009.

26

 </s> Case 1:05-cv-01008-LY Document 1 Filed 12/05/05 Page 1 of 9

FILED

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS AUSTIN DIVISION

DEC 5 2005

erKJ:2/",T 'g' CLERK
WESTER

D~A~ ~,,~

BY _

TEXAS

RAULMEZA

§

§

Plaintiff

§

v.

§

§

TRAVIS COUNTY, INDIVIDUAL

§

PAROLE OFFICERS, in their individual §

and official capacities, GREG

§

HAMILTON, SHERIFF OF TRAVIS

§

COUNTY in his official capacity,

§

BRAD LIVINGSTON, executive director §

of the Texas Department of Criminal

§

Justice, in his official capacity, and BRIAN §

COLLIER, director of the Texas

§

Department of Criminal Justice Parole §

Division, in his official and individual

§

capacities

§

§

Defendants

§

CIVIL ACTION NO.

DEPUTY ClERr<-

A05C: 100SlY

COMPLAINT

Plaintiff Raul Meza respectfully files this complaint and will show:

STATEMENT OF FACTS

1. Defendants have imposed a substantial burden on Plaintiff Raul Meza's religious

exercise while he has been incarcerated at the Travis County Correctional Complex (TCCC), Del

Valle facility, in violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000

("RLUIPA"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2000).

2. Pursuant to 42 U.S.c. § 1983, Defendants have, without due process oflaw, imposed

conditions upon Plaintiff Meza's incarceration that are qualitatively different from the punishment

typically imposed on other parolees at the Del Valle facility, in violation of the Fourteenth

Amendment to the U.S. Constitution,

3. Pursuantto 42 U.S.C. § 1983,Mr. Meza elaims that Defendant individual parole officers

\

Case 1:05-cv-01008-LY Document 1 Filed 12/05/05 Page 2 of 9
violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights by imposing additional infonnal, unauthorized conditions on his confinement without due process oflaw.
4. Pursuant to 42 U.S.c. § 1983, Mr. Meza claims that policy and custom of the TCCC's Del Valle facility, described herein, resulted in violations ofhis Fourteenth Amendment due process rights.
5. Mr. Meza seeks damages, declaratory relief, injunctive relief, attorneys' fees and costs as a result of Defendants' violations.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 6. Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court by 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343. 7. Further, Defendants' actions and the events giving rise to the claims occurred in Del Valle, Texas. Accordingly, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1391, venue is proper for this Court.
PARTIES 8. Plaintiff is confined at the TCCC facility in Del Valle. 9. Defendant Sheriff of Travis County can be served with process through 501 W. 11th Street, Austin, TX 78701. He is responsible for the operation ofthe TCCC facility in Del Valle. 10. Defendant Brad Livingston is the executive director of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice ("TDCJ"). 11. Defendant Brian Collier is the director of the TDCJ Parole Division. 12. In all the actions described herein, Defendant parole officers, Defendant Collier and Defendant Livingston ("TDCJ Defendants") each were acting under color of law and pursuant to legal authority. Defendant parole officers and Defendant Collier are each sued in their official and individual capacities; Defendant Livingston is sued only in his official capacity.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
2

Case 1:05-cv-01008-LY Document 1 Filed 12/05/05 Page 3 of 9
13. On or about March 8, 1982, Plaintiff pled guilty to murder and was sentenced to thirty (30) years imprisonment in Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ) facilities.
14. On or about September 8, 1989, Plaintiff was sentenced to four (4) additional years imprisonment, to be served consecutively to the thirty (30) year term, for possession of a deadly weapon in a penal institution.
15. TDCJ released Plaintiff to the custody of Defendant Sheriff of Travis County on or about September 25, 2002, on "mandatory supervision." Plaintiffs release on mandatory supervision was required by statute because his calendar time served plus "good time" credits accumulated totaled the maximum length of his sentence. See Tex. Crim. Pro. Art. 42.18(8)(c) (1987).
16. Mandatory supervision is "the release of a prisoner from imprisonment, but not on parole, and not from the legal custody ofthe state, for rehabilitation outside prison walls under such conditions and provisions for disciplinary supervision as the board may determine." Tex. Crim. Pro. Art. 42. 18(2)(b) (1987). The purpose ofmandatory supervision is "to aid all prisoners to readjust to society upon completion of their period of incarceration." Tex. Crim. Pro. Art. 42.18(1) (1987).
17. Parolees on mandatory supervision at TCCC are allowed to search for a job in the community and to leave the facility to work when they have secured employment. The parolees then return to the facility at night.
18. Defendants have not allowed Plaintiff the same opportunities as other parolees. They have placed him on "lock down" status since his arrival at Tcee in 2002, and have confined him to his room most ofthe time. Other parolees are not on perpetual "lock down" status and may leave their cells with considerably greater freedom.
19. Mr. Meza has made numerous good faith attempts to secure employment, but
3

Case 1:05-cv-01008-LY Document 1 Filed 12/05/05 Page 4 of 9
Defendant parole officers have thwarted him. Since about June of2004, Defendants have allowed Plaintiff only five hours per week of time at Project RIO (Reintegration of Offenders), the parolee employment search program. They allow other parolees virtually unlimited time at Project RIO. Prior to June 2004, Defendants did not allow Mr. Meza any access to these resources.
20. Before Mr. Meza can interview for ajob, employment opportunities must be screened by Defendant parole officers to ensure that potential employment locations meet the conditions of his mandatory supervision. Defendant parole officers habitually delay in screening the potential employers that Plaintiffhas located, causing the identified positions to be filled before Mr. Meza has
the opportunity to interview for them. Other Ieee parolees do not experience these chronic delays
in their job searches. 21. On the rare occasion when Mr. Meza is able to secure ajob interview, several armed
guards accompany him to the interview. On or about November 3, 2004, Mr. Meza had a job interview with Southern Education, and armed guards escorted him there. Unsurprisingly, Plaintiff was unable to secure employment under these conditions. Armed guards do not accompany other
Ieee parolees to job interviews.
22. Defendants have also told Mr. Meza that, should he find a job, an armed parole officer will have to go to the job site with him every day. Potential employers have told Mr. Meza they cannot hire him for this reason. Other parolees do not face this additional obstacle.
23. Because Defendants' actions have prevented him from securing ajob, Mr. Meza's liberty
is considerably more restricted than other parolees on mandatory supervision at Ieee. Defendants
allow other parolees to leave the facility and work in the community. 24. Mr. Meza has been denied educational opportunities that are offered to other parolees
at Ieee. Mr. Meza has not been allowed to attend computer orientation classes, job search classes
4

Case 1:05-cv-01008-LY Document 1 Filed 12/05/05 Page 5 of 9
and resume writing classes offered to other parolees at TCCC. Mr. Meza has only been allowed to attend three one-day seminars offered at Project RIO, and even then has been pulled out of the classes in the middle of the seminars because he is only allowed two and a half hours twice a week at Project RIO.
25. Denying Mr. Meza these educational opportunities also has negatively impacted his job search and thus unduly restrained his liberty. For example, in order to take full advantage ofthe limited amount oftime he has access to Project RIO, Mr. Mezaneeds effective computer skills. Due to his long incarceration and Defendants' refusal to allow him the same educational opportunities they offer other parolees, Plaintiffhas been unable to develop these necessary skills along with other parolees.
26. Mr. Meza has not been allowed to obtain a driver's license, a privilege allowed to other parolees at TCCC. Without a driver's license, certain employment opportunities are unavailable to Mr. Meza (such as auto repair positions). Mr. Meza has been denied employment by auto repair facilities because he does not have a driver's license.
27. Defendants have not afforded Mr. Meza any due process oflaw to justify his disparate treatment at TCCC. No conditions of Plaintiffs mandatory supervision justify this disparate treatment.
28. On February 23,2005, Mr. Meza received a notice informing him that TDCJ was reimposing sex offender conditions on his parole, and that he had one month to respond. Mr. Meza promptly filed a response. This notice was never served on his attorneys, who TDCJ knew represented him, in violation of Rule 4.02(a) of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct.
29. TDCJ ignored Mr. Meza's response, and imposed sex offender conditions on his parole
5

Case 1:05-cv-01008-LY Document 1 Filed 12/05/05 Page 6 of 9
without affording him due process, in violation ofthe holding of Coleman v. Dretke, 395 FJd 216 (5th Cir. 2004). Mr. Meza's attorneys contacted TDCJ regarding this abuse ofdue process, and were ignored. The sex offender conditions remain imposed on Mr. Meza's parole.
30. Mr. Meza is a Christian. His religious faith is sincere and heartfelt, and assisted his efforts to rehabilitate himself.
31. In order to attend worship services at the TCCC, Defendants require parolees to dress in prison uniforms. Plaintiff finds this requirement demeans his religious activities, and acts as a substantial burden on his religious exercise.
CAUSES OF ACTION 1. Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act ("RLUIPA")
(as to Defendant Sheriff of Travis County) 32. Mr. Meza alleges a cause ofaction because agents ofTravis County prohibit him from attending religious services unless he dons a prison uniform. Defendants' actions and policies impose substantial burdens on Mr. Meza's religious freedom. 33. Under RLUIPA, "no government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution" unless the burden furthers a "compelling governmental interest," and does so by "the least restrictive means." 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc-1 (a)(l )-(2). A religious exercise is any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc-5(7)(A). 34. The Act covers government-run institutions, including jails and transitional facilities. TCCC falls under RLUIPA's definition of government, and, therefore, is responsible for accommodating Mr. Meza's religious beliefs.
II. Section 1983 (as to TDCJ Defendants)
6

Case 1:05-cv-01008-LY Document 1 Filed 12/05/05 Page 7 of 9
35. The TDCJ Defendants impose qualitatively different conditions of confinement upon Mr. Meza. The infonnal imposition ofthese additional conditions upon Mr. Meza alone violate his due process rights.
36. The TDCJ Defendants enforce infonnal restrictions on Mr. Meza's liberty that have not been justified by due process. They habitually treat Mr. Meza differently from other parolees on mandatory supervision so as to deny Mr. Meza the opportunities afforded to others.
37. The TDCJ Defendants have imposed sex offender conditions on Mr. Meza's parole without providing him due process, in violation oflaw and his Fourteenth Amendment rights.
DAMAGES 38. Mr. Meza is entitled to compensatory relief from all Defendants, jointly and severally, for lost wages and loss of liberty. 39. Plaintiff also seeks punitive damages from the TDCJ Defendants.
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT 40. Mr. Meza seeks declaratory judgment to vindicate his rights under Section 1983 and RLUIP A with respect to Defendants' violations. 41. Mr. Meza is entitled to declaratory judgment concerning Defendants' violations of his due process rights.
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 42. Mr. Meza seeks injunctive relief, pennanently enjoining Defendants from: a. Failing to reasonably accommodate his religious exercise, including requiring
parolees to wear jail unifonns in order to attend worship services and imposing worship service policies not serving a compelling governmental interest; and, b. Continuing to subject Mr. Meza to qualitatively different conditions of confinement without due process of law; and,
7

Case 1:05-cv-01008-LY Document 1 Filed 12/05/05 Page 8 of 9
c. Imposing sex offender conditions upon his parole without due process oflaw. 43. Inasmuch as Defendants have acted in the events described herein, they will continue to act accordingly. Without injunctive relief, Defendants will continue their outrageous conduct, thereby unduly limiting Mr. Meza's liberty without due process.
ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS 44. Mr. Meza is entitled to reasonable attorneys' fees, litigation costs, and court costs, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF THEREFORE, Mr. Meza respectfully prays that this Court grant the following relief: A. Enter judgment on his behalf against the TDCJ Defendants in their individual
capacities and the Travis County Sheriff, jointly and severally, for monetary damages sufficient to compensate Plaintiff for his lost wages; B. Issue declaratory relief that Defendants' conduct constituted illegal deprivation of Plaintiffs due process rights; C. Order injunctive relief against Defendant Travis County Sheriff to end further prevention of the exercise of religious freedom of Plaintiff and TCCC parolees to prohibit the violation of Mr. Meza's rights under RLUIPA; D. Grant reasonable attorneys' fees, litigation expenses, and court costs; and E. Grant all other and additional relief to which Mr. Meza may be entitled, at law or in equity. DATED: December 2, 2005
Respectfully Submitted,
~~W.0 0+tht~)
, Jaynes C. Harrington I . Sjate Bar No. 09048:00
. ,/
8

Case 1:05-cv-01008-LY Document 1 Filed 12/05/05 Page 9 of 9 Scott Medlock State Bar No. 24044783 TEXAS CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT 1405 Montopolis Dr. Austin, TX 78741 (512) 474-5073 [phone] (512) 474-0726 [fax] ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF
9

 </s> • • Case 1:05-cv-01008-LY Document 24 Filed 06/30/06 Page 1 of 9

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS AUSTIN DIVISION

RAULMEZA

§

§

Plaintiff

§

v.

§

§

TRAVIS COUNTY, INDIVIDUAL

§

PAROLE OFFICERS, in their individual §

and official capacities, GREG

§

HAMILTON, SHERIFF OF TRAVIS §

COUNTY in his official capacity,

§

BRAD LIVINGSTON, executive director §

of the Texas Department of Criminal

§

Justice, in his official capacity, and BRIAN §

COLLIER, director ofthe Texas

§

Department of Criminal Justice Parole §

Division, in his official and individual §

capacities

§

§

Defendants

§

CIVIL ACTION NO. A-05-CA-I008-LY
f'LED
WCLEESRTKE.RNU'Y~\S::rMt BY _--,Wsi'TTV'ClE1rK

AMENDED COMPLAINT

Plaintiff Raul Meza respectfully files this complaint and will show:

STATEMENT OF FACTS

1. Defendants have imposed a substantial burden on Plaintiff Raul Meza's religious

exercise while he has been incarcerated at the Travis County Correctional Complex (TCCC), Del

Valle facility, in violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000

("RLUIPA"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2000).

2. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Defendants have, without due process of law,

imposed conditions upon Plaintiff Meza's incarceration that are qualitatively different from the

punishment typically imposed on other parolees at the Del Valle facility, in violation of the

Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.

3. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Mr. Meza claims that Defendant individual parole

officers violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights by imposing additional infonnal,

• • Case 1:05-cv-01008-LY Document 24 Filed 06/30/06 Page 2 of 9
unauthorized conditions on his confinement without due process oflaw. 4. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Mr. Meza claims that policy and custom of the
TCCC's Del Valle facility, described herein, resulted in violations of his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights.
5. Mr. Meza seeks damages, declaratory relief, injunctive relief, attorneys' fees and costs as a result of Defendants' violations.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 6. Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court by 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343. 7. Further, Defendants' actions and the events giving rise to the claims occurred in Del Valle, Texas. Accordingly, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1391, venue is proper for this Court.
PARTIES 8. Plaintiff is confined at the TCCC facility in Del Valle. 9. Defendant Sheriffof Travis County can be served with process through 501 W. 11th Street, Austin, TX 78701. He is responsible for the operation of the TCCC facility in Del Valle. 10. Defendant Brad Livingston is the executive director of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice ("TDCJ"). 11. Defendant Brian Collier is the director of the TDCJ Parole Division. 12. In all the actions described herein, Defendant parole officers, Defendant Collier and Defendant Livingston ("TDCJ Defendants") each were acting under color of law and pursuant to legal authority. Defendant parole officers and Defendant Collier are each sued in their official and individual capacities; Defendant Livingston is sued only in his official capacity.
STATEMENT OF FACTS 13. On or about March 8, 1982, Plaintiff pled guilty to murder and was sentenced to thirty (30) years imprisonment in Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ) facilities.
2

• • Case 1:05-cv-01008-LY Document 24 Filed 06/30/06 Page 3 of 9
14. On or about September 8, 1989, Plaintiffwas sentenced to four (4) additional years imprisonment, to be served consecutively to the thirty (30) year term, for possession of a deadly weapon in a penal institution.
15. TDC] released Plaintiff to the custody of Defendant Sheriff of Travis County on or about September 25, 2002, on "mandatory supervision." Plaintiffs release on mandatory supervision was required by statute because his calendar time served plus "good time" credits accumulated totaled the maximum length of his sentence. See Tex. Crim. Pro. Art. 42.18(8)(c) (1987).
16. Mandatory supervision is "the release of a prisoner from imprisonment, but not on parole, and not from the legal custody of the state, for rehabilitation outside prison walls under such conditions and provisions for disciplinary supervision as the board may determine." Tex. Crim. Pro. Art. 42.18(2)(b) (1987). The purpose of mandatory supervision is "to aid all prisoners to readjust to society upon completion of their period of incarceration." Tex. Crim. Pro. Art. 42.18(1) (1987).
17. Parolees on mandatory supervision at TCCC are allowed to search for a job in the community and to leave the facility to work when they have secured employment. The parolees then return to the facility at night.
18. Defendants have not allowed Plaintiff the same opportunities as other parolees. They have placed him on "lock down" status since his arrival at TCCC in 2002, and have confined him in the jail most of the time. Other parolees are not on perpetual "lock down" status and may leave the jail with considerably greater freedom. Other parolees are allowed to formulate a weekly schedule of activities outside of the jail, such as doctors' appointments, job interviews, visits to the Department ofPublic Safety to obtain driver's licenses, etc. Mr. Meza is routinely denied these same opportunities.
3

• • Case 1:05-cv-01008-LY Document 24 Filed 06/30/06 Page 4 of 9
19. Mr. Meza has made numerous good faith attempts to secure employment, but Defendant parole officers have thwarted him. Since about June of 2004, Defendants have allowed Plaintiff only five hours per week of time at Project RIO (Reintegration of Offenders), the parolee employment search program. They allow other parolees virtually unlimited time at Project RIO. Prior to June 2004, Defendants did not allow Mr. Meza any access to these resources.
20. Before Mr. Meza can interview for a job, employment opportunities must be screened by Defendant parole officers to ensure that potential employment locations meet the conditions of his mandatory supervision. Defendant parole officers habitually delay in screening the potential employers that Plaintiff has located, causing the identified positions to be filled before Mr. Meza has the opportunity to interview for them. Other Teee parolees do not experience these chronic delays in their job searches.
21. On the rare occasion when Mr. Meza is able to secure a job interview, several armed guards accompany him to the interview. On or about November 3, 2004, Mr. Meza had a job interview with Southern Education, and armed guards escorted him there. Unsurprisingly, Plaintiff was unable to secure employment under these conditions. Armed guards do not accompany other Teee parolees to job interviews.
22. Defendants have also told Mr. Meza that, should he find a job, an armed parole officer will have to go to the job site with him every day. Potential employers have told Mr. Meza they cannot hire him for this reason. Other parolees do not face this additional obstacle.
23. Because Defendants' actions have prevented him from securing a job, Mr. Meza's liberty is considerably more restricted than other parolees on mandatory supervision at Teee. Defendants allow other parolees to leave the facility and work in the community.
24. Mr. Meza has been denied educational opportunities that are offered to other
4

• • Case 1:05-cv-01008-LY Document 24 Filed 06/30/06 Page 5 of 9
parolees at TCCC. Mr. Meza has not been allowed to attend computer orientation classes, job search classes and resume writing classes offered to other parolees at TCCC. Mr. Meza has only been allowed to attend three one-day seminars offered at Project RIO, and even then has been pulled out of the classes in the middle of the seminars because he is only allowed two and a half hours twice a week at Project RIO.
25. Denying Mr. Meza these educational opportunities also has negatively impacted his job search and thus unduly restrained his liberty. For example, in order to take full advantage of the limited amount of time he has access to Project RIO, Mr. Meza needs effective computer skills. Due to his long incarceration and Defendants' refusal to allow him the same educational opportunities they offer other parolees, Plaintiff has been unable to develop these necessary skills along with other parolees.
26. Mr. Meza has not been allowed to obtain a driver's license, a privilege allowed to other parolees at TCCC. Without a driver's license, certain employment opportunities are unavailable to Mr. Meza (such as auto repair positions). Mr. Meza has been denied employment by auto repair facilities because he does not have a driver's license.
27. Defendants have not afforded Mr. Meza any due process of law to justify his disparate treatment at TCCC. No conditions of Plaintiffs mandatory supervision justify this disparate treatment.
28. On February 23, 2005, Mr. Meza received a notice informing him that TDCJ was reimposing sex offender conditions on his parole, and that he had one month to respond. Mr. Meza promptly filed a response. This notice was never served on his attorneys, who TDCJ knew represented him, in violation of Rule 4.02(a) of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct.
29. TDCJ ignored Mr. Meza's response, and imposed sex offender conditions on his 5

• • Case 1:05-cv-01008-LY Document 24 Filed 06/30/06 Page 6 of 9
parole without affording him due process, in violation of the holding of Coleman v. Dretke, 395 FJd 216 (5th Cir. 2004). Mr. Meza's attorneys contacted TDCJ regarding this abuse of due process, and were ignored. The sex offender conditions remain imposed on Mr. Meza's parole.
30. Mr. Meza is a Christian. His religious faith is sincere and heartfelt, and assisted his efforts to rehabilitate himself.
31. In order to attend worship services at the TCCC, Defendants require inmates to dress in prison uniforms. Plaintiff finds this requirement demeans his religious activities, and acts as a substantial burden on his religious exercise. Other parolees are allowed to leave the jail to attend worship services. Mr. Meza is forced to attend services with inmates at the jail instead of in the community, like other parolees.
CAUSES OF ACTION I. Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act ("RLUIPA") 32. Mr. Meza alleges a cause of action because agents of Travis. County prohibit him from attending religious services unless he dons a prison uniform. Similarly, the TDC] Defendants do not allow Mr. Meza to attend worship services in the community, like other parolees. Defendants' actions and policies impose substantial burdens on Mr. Meza's religious freedom. 33. Under RLUIPA, "no government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution" unless the burden furthers a "compelling governmental interest," and does so by "the least restrictive means." 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc-l(a)(I)-(2). A religious exercise is any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system ofreligious belief. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc-5(7)(A). 34. The Act covers government-run institutions, including jails and transitional facilities. TeCC falls under RLUIPA's definition of government, and, therefore, is responsible for
6

• • Case 1:05-cv-01008-LY Document 24 Filed 06/30/06 Page 7 of 9
accommodating Mr. Meza's religious beliefs. II. Section 1983
35. The TDCJ Defendants impose qualitatively different conditions of confinement upon Mr. Meza. The Travis County Defendants enforce these conditions. The informal imposition of these additional conditions upon Mr. Meza alone violate his due process rights.
36. The TDCJ Defendants enforce informal restrictions on Mr. Meza's liberty that have not been justified by due process. They habitually treat Mr. Meza differently from other parolees on mandatory supervision so as to deny Mr. Meza the opportunities afforded to others.
37. The TDCJ Defendants have imposed sex offender conditions on Mr. Meza's parole without providing him due process, in violation oflaw and his Fourteenth Amendment rights.
DAMAGES 38. Mr. Meza is entitled to compensatory relief from all Defendants, jointly and severally, for lost wages and loss ofliberty. 39. Plaintiff also seeks punitive damages from the TDCJ Defendants.
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT 40. Mr. Meza seeks declaratory judgment to vindicate his rights under Section 1983 and RLUIPA with respect to Defendants' violations. 41. Mr. Meza is entitled to declaratory judgment concerning Defendants' violations of his due process rights.
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 42. Mr. Meza seeks injunctive relief, permanently enjoining Defendants from: a. Failing to reasonably accommodate his religious exercise, including requiring
parolees to wear jail uniforms in order to attend worship services and imposing worship service policies not serving a compelling governmental interest; and, b. Continuing to subject Mr. Meza to qualitatively different conditions of
7

• • Case 1:05-cv-01008-LY Document 24 Filed 06/30/06 Page 8 of 9
confinement without due process of law; and, c. Imposing sex offender conditions upon his parole without due process oflaw. 43. Inasmuch as Defendants have acted in the events described herein, they will continue to act accordingly. Without injunctive relief, Defendants will continue their outrageous conduct, thereby unduly limiting Mr. Meza's liberty without due process.
ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS 44. Mr. Meza is entitled to reasonable attorneys' fees, litigation costs, and court costs, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF THEREFORE, Mr. Meza respectfully prays that this Court grant the following relief: A. Enter judgment on his behalf against the TDCJ Defendants in their individual
capacities and the Travis County Sheriff, jointly and severally, for monetary damages sufficient to compensate Plaintiff for his lost wages; B. Issue declaratory relief that Defendants' conduct constituted illegal deprivation of Plaintiffs due process rights; C. Order injunctive relief against Defendant Travis County Sheriff to end further prevention of the exercise of religious freedom of Plaintiff and TCCe parolees to prohibit the violation of Mr. Meza's rights under RLUIPA; D. Grant reasonable attorneys' fees, litigation expenses, and court costs; and E. Grant all other and additional relief to which Mr. Meza may be entitled, at law or in equity.
DATED: June ~ j ,2006
Respectfully Submitted,
James C. Harrington State Bar No. 09048500
8

• . • Case 1:05-cv-01008-LY Document 24 Filed 06/30/06 Page 9 of 9 ' ., Scott Medlock State Bar No. 24044783 TEXAS CNIL RIGHTS PROJECT 1405 Montopolis Dr. Austin, TX 78741 (512) 474-5073 [phone] (512) 474-0726 [fax] ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF
9

 </s> Case 1:05-cv-01008-LY Document 49 Filed 11/17/06 Page 1 of 1

Fit

RAUL MEZA,

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2006Nav 17 pu

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS CUJ'.

AUSTIN DIVISION

W£STE;~s

8Y-lY

11 2: 19
j COul'>
OF rdXs

§

-'-;'"',:""_. __

§

.'> • -----...

Plaintiff,

§

§

V.

§

§

TRAVIS COUNTY, INDIVIDUAL

§

PAROLE OFFICERS, in their individual §

and official capacities, GREG

§

HAMILTON, SHERIFF OF TRAVIS §

COUNTY, in his official capacity,

§

BRAD LIVINGSTON, executive director §

of the Texas Department of Criminal §

Justice, in his official capacity, and

§

BRIAN COLLIER, director of the

§

Texas Department of Criminal Justice §

Parole Division, in his official and

§

Individual capacities,

§

§

Defendants.

§

A-05-CA-I008-LY

AGREED ORDER OF DISMISSAL

On this day, came on to be considered an Agreed Motion to Dismiss With Prejudice in the

above styled and numbered cause of action. The Court, having considered the same, finds that the

motion has merit and should be granted. It is, therefore,

ORDERED that Plaintiff Raul Meza's and Defendants Travis County and Sheriff Greg

Hamilton's Agreed Motion to Dismiss With Prejudice is hereby GRANTED, and each party is to

bear its own costs and attorneys' fees.

V~/ SIGNEDthis/lllt-dayOf

2006.

151855-1

U.S nfSTIRCT J
/
1

 </s> Case 1:05-cv-01008-LY Document 50 Filed 11/17/06 Page 1 of 1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
AUSTIN DIVISION

RAULMEZA,

§

§

PLAINTIFF,

§

§

".

§ §

BRAD LI"INGSTON, executive director §

ofthe TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF

§

CRIMINAL JUSTICE, in his official

§

capacity, AND BRIAN COLLIER, director §

of the TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF

§

CRIMINAL JUSTICE PAROLE DI"ISION, §

in his official and individual capacities, § §

DEFENDANTS. §

CAUSE NO. A-05-CA-l 008-LY

ORDER

Before the Court is the above-numbered cause. On this date, the Court considered the

Agreed Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendants Travis County and Sheriff Greg Hamilton and

Plaintiff Meza (Clerk's Document 42). This Court signed an Agreed Order dismissing the claims

of Travis County and Sheriff Greg Hamilton. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that this matter is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE
to the rights to refile the same or any part thereof as to Travis County and Sheriff Greg Hamilton. FURTHER IT IS ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court and the parties are instructed to

use the style reflected in this order in all future filings.

17i1( SIGNED this

day ofNovember, 2006,

 </s> Case 1:05-cv-01008-LY Document 52 Filed 12/06/06 Page 1 of 10

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
AUSTIN DIVISION

RAULMEZA,

§

§

PLAINTIFF,

§

§

V.

§

§

INDIVIDUAL PAROLE OFFICERS, IN §

THEIR INDIVIDUAL AND OFFICIAL §

CAPACITIES, BRAD LIVINGSTON, §

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE TEXAS §

DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE §

IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY, AND

§

BRIAN COLLIER, DIRECTOR OF THE §

TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL §

JUSTICE PAROLE DIVISION, IN HIS §

OFFICIAL AND INDIVIDUAL

§

CAPACITIES,

§

CAUSE NO. A-05-CA-I008-LY

DEFENDANTS.

ORDER

Before the Court are Defendants Livingston and Collier's Motion to Dismiss filed May 22,

2006 (Doc. #12); Plaintiffs Response to Defendants Livingston and Collier's Motion to Dismiss

filed June 2, 2006 (Doc. #13); Defendants Livingston and Collier's Supplemental Motion to Dismiss

and Reply to PlaintiffsResponse filed June 20, 2006 (Doc. #14); Plaintiffs Response to Defendants

Livingston and Collier's Supplemental Motion to Dismiss filed July 3, 2006 (Doc. #19); Defendant

Collier's Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Rule 7(a) Reply filed June 27,2006 (Doc. #16), and

PlaintiffsResponse to Defendants Collier's Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Rule 7(a) Reply filed

July 10, 2006 (Doc. #20). The motions and responses were referred to the United States Magistrate

Judge for report and recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(I), Rule 72 of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure, and Rule 1(d) of Appendix C of the Local Rules of the United States

Case 1:05-cv-01008-LY Document 52 Filed 12/06/06 Page 2 of 10
District Court for the Western District ofTexas, as amended. The Magistrate Judge filed his Report and Recommendation on August 28, 2006 (Doc. #26). The parties were notified that objections to the Report and Recommendation were due within ten days after the parties were served with a copy of the Report. On September 11, 2006, Livingston and Collier filed their Objections to the Magistrate's Report and Recommendation (Doc. #29). Plaintiff Raul Meza filed no objection to the Report and Recommendation.
In the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation, the Magistrate Judge recommended that the Court grant Livingston and Collier's Motionto Dismiss (Doc. #12) as to the monetary claims against Livingston and Collier in their official capacities, and deny the motion as to the claims against Livingston and Collier for injunctive relief. The Magistrate Judge further recommended that the Court deny Livingston and Collier's Supplemental Motion to Dismiss (Doc #14). Finally, the Magistrate Judge recommended that the Court deny Collier's motion to dismiss and grant Collier's motion for Rule 7(a) reply (Doc. #16), and order that Meza file a reply in accordance with Rule 7(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. When responding to Livingston and Collier's objections, this Court will undertake a de novo review of the entire case file in this action. For findings and legal conclusions to which the parties did not object, the Court undertakes a plain~error review. After conducting such a review, the Court finds that the Report and Recommendation filed by the Magistrate Judge is correct and should be approved and accepted by the Court for the reasons stated therein, and the issues not addressed by the Magistrate Judge will be referred for further report and recommendation. A. Eleventh amendment immunity
2

Case 1:05-cv-01008-LY Document 52 Filed 12/06/06 Page 3 of 10
Meza does not object to the Magistrate Judge's recommendation that this Court dismiss his claims for monetary relief against Livingston and Collier in their official capacity pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment. Therefore, Meza is barred from attacking on appeal the unobjected-to proposed legal conclusions accepted by the district court, except on grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United Services Auto Ass 'n, 79 FJd 1415 (5th Cir. 1996)(en bane). Having reviewed the record, this Court finds no plain error and accepts the Magistrate Judge's recommendation to deny Meza's request for monetary damages in the official capacity.
B. Collier's qualified immunity
Regarding Collier's assertion of qualified immunity against suits in his individual capacity, the Magistrate Judge recommended that this Court deny Collier's motion to dismiss and grant Collier's motion for a Rule 7(a) reply. The Magistrate Judge found that Meza's First Amended Complaint does not contain the required specific facts demonstrating Collier's personal involvement, and recommended that Meza file a reply. See Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 7(a).
"When a public official pleads the affirmative defense of qualified immunity in his answer, the district court may, on the official's motion or on its own, require the plaintiff to reply to that defense in detail. By definition, the reply must be tailored to the assertion ofqualified immunity and fairly engage its allegations." Schultea v. Wood, 47 FJd 1427, 1433 (5th Cir. 1995). This Court finds no error in the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation and will, therefore, order Meza to submit a reply, which shall be tailored to Collier's qualified immunity defenses. See Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 7(a). In particular, Meza shall support each of his claims against Collier with sufficient particularity to establish Collier's personal involvement in the conduct at the time of the alleged unconstitutional acts.
3

Case 1:05-cv-01008-LY Document 52 Filed 12/06/06 Page 4 of 10
c. Meza's Section 1983 claims are not barred by Heck v. Humphrey.
Livingston and Collier object to the Magistrate Judge's recommendation that the Court deny Livingston and Collier's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. #12) and Supplemental Motion to Dismiss (Doc. #14). Meza has brought a cause of action claiming violations of his constitutional and statutory rights. Civil Rights Act of 1871,42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) ("Section 1983"). Livingston and Collier argue that Meza is barred from using Section 1983 to challenge the conditions of his mandatory supervision and the imposition ofsex-offender conditions. Livingston and Collier therefore request that the Court deny Plaintiff s claims for prospective injunctive relief. They support their assertion with the principles set forth in Heck v. Humphrey, wherein the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff who had been convicted of a crime cannot bring a Section 1983 claim challenging the constitutionality of his conviction or imprisonment unless that conviction had been reversed, expunged, declared invalid, or called into question by federal habeas corpus. 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994) .
. . . [A] state prisoner's § 1983 action is barred (absent prior invalidation)-no matter the relief sought (damages or equitable relief), no matter the target of the prisoner's suit (state conduct leading to conviction or internal prison proceedings)-ifsuccess in that action would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its duration. Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81 (2005). Furthermore, Heck also applies to parole proceedings that call into question the "fact or duration of parole." Jackson v. Vannoy, 49 FJd 175 (5th Cir. 1995). Livingston and Collier assert that the proper method to challenge the fact or duration of parole is through a federal habeas corpus proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000). The Magistrate Judge found that Meza is not challenging the fact or duration ofhis mandatory supervision, because
4

Case 1:05-cv-01008-LY Document 52 Filed 12/06/06 Page 5 of 10
if Meza were to prevail on every argument, it does not appear from his complaint that he would be released earlier from his mandatory supervision. Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge held that because Meza' s success on his claims would not necessitate a finding that his mandatory supervision or its duration is invalid, Meza's claims are cognizable under Section 1983 and are not barred by Heck.
In their objections to the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation, Livingston and Collier cite Coleman v. Dretke, in which the court of appeals granted a prisoner's habeas corpus petition challenging the revocation ofhis release on mandatory supervision. 409 FJd 665, 670 (5th Cir. 2005) (en banc). The parole board had imposed sex-offender conditions on Coleman, and his parole had been revoked for failing to submit to sex-offender therapy. Id. at 666. Although the Court in Coleman granted habeas corpus relief, the circuit did not rule that a claim under Section 1983 would be barred. The circuit specifically noted that the two avenues ofreliefwere not mutually exclusive: "[T]here are undoubtedly some instances where a prisoner has the option of proceeding either by petition for habeas corpus or by suits under § 1983." Id. at 670.
Moreover, the prisoner in Coleman challenged the validity ofhis parole conditions after his parole was revoked for violation ofthe challenged conditions, thereby seeking "release from physical confinement in prison." Id. at 669. In contrast, Meza is preemptively challenging the conditions of his parole, without any revocation. A successful suit in Coleman would "necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of confinement" by challenging the fact or duration in confinement, see Wilkinson, 544 U.S. at 81; in contrast, success in Meza's case would not necessarily challenge the fact or duration of the mandatory supervision.
5

Case 1:05-cv-01008-LY Document 52 Filed 12/06/06 Page 6 of 10
Livingston and Collier argue that unlike prisoners, where the difference between a civil-rights action and a collateral attack is easy to describe, the question for parolees is more "metaphysical." They acknowledge that challenges to the conditions of confinement fall under Section 1983, and attacks on the fact or duration ofthe confinement fall within the realm ofhabeas corpus. They then argue that the conditions ofparole are the confinement, and that it is because ofthe conditions that parolees remain "in custody" on their unexpired sentences and thus may initiate a habeas corpus proceeding while on parole. See Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 242-43 (1963); see also Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 491 (1989); Williams v. Wisconsin, 336 F.3d 576, 579 (7th Cir. 2003); Drollinger v. Milligan, 552 F.2d 1220, 1225 (7th Cir. 1977) (observing that lifting of probation condition frees the prisoner from confinement, "figuratively speaking," by removing restrictive condition).
The cases are inapposite to the case at bar, because both cases exclusively deal with habeas corpus. In Jones the issue before the Supreme Court was whether a parolee was "in custody" such that the parolee was entitled to invoke the "habeas corpus jurisdiction of the United States District Court" to challenge the constitutionality of his conviction. Jones, 371 U.S. at 239. The question in Maleng was "whether a habeas petitioner remains 'in custody' under a conviction after the sentence imposed for it has fully expired, merely because" of the use of the prior conviction for sentence enhancement. Id at 490. Neither case pertains to a Section 1983 action; therefore, the authority cited by Livingston and Collier is not controlling.
In their objections to the Magistrate's Report and Recommendation, Livingston and Collier also cite to Williams v. Wisconsin and Drollinger v. Milligan. These cases were decided prior to the Supreme Court's Wilkinson decision and stand for the proposition that the appropriate avenue for
6

Case 1:05-cv-01008-LY Document 52 Filed 12/06/06 Page 7 of 10
challenging probation or parole conditions is through a federal habeas corpus proceeding, not through a claim under Section 1983. Drollin~er, 552 F.2d at 1225; Williams, 336 FJd at 579. The Drollinger court reasoned:
Because probation is by its nature less confining than incarceration, the distinction between the fact of confinement and the conditions thereof is necessarily blurred. The elimination or substitution, for example, of one of the conditions of . . . probation would free [the probationer] substantially from ... confinement; figuratively speaking, one of the "bars" would be removed from [the probationer's] cell. Drollinger, 552 F.2d at 1225; see also Williams, 336 FJd at 579 ("[T]he conditions of parole are the confinement. ... It is because of these restrictions that parolees remain 'in custody' on their unexpired sentences and thus may initiate a collateral attack while on parole."). Significant to the decisions is the view that probation and parole conditions are part ofthe sentence; by attacking such conditions, the civil-rights plaintiff would essentially be "seeking release from at least part of [the] sentence." See Drollinger, 552 F.2d at 1225. An analysis ofWilkinson is instructive to the issue. Wilkinson holds that aprisoner could use Section 1983 to challenge the constitutionality of state parole procedures, and a prisoner is not required to seek relief exclusively through habeas corpus. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. at 84. The state in Wilkinson contended that bringing a claim under Section 1983 to challenge the procedures used to deny prisoners parole was improper, as "parole proceedings are part of the prisoners' 'sentences'-indeed, an aspect of the 'sentences' that the § 1983 claims, if successful, will invalidate." Id. at 83. The Supreme Court rejected this argument, explaining that Heck "uses the word 'sentence' to refer not to prison procedures, but to substantive determinations as to the length ofthe confinement." Id. (emphasis added). The Wilkinson Court elaborated that it has "repeatedly
7

Case 1:05-cv-01008-LY Document 52 Filed 12/06/06 Page 8 of 10
permitted prisoners to bring § 1983 actions challenging the conditions of their confinement-conditions that, were [the State] right, might be considered part ofthe 'sentence.'" Id. at 84. Wilkinson's reasoning extends to the case at bar, in that the conditions imposed during mandatory supervision are not part of the sentence. Meza will become a free person when his sentence expires, not by removal of a condition of mandatory supervision.
This Court accepts the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation. The Court holds that attacking the conditions of mandatory supervision, including the imposition of sex-offender conditions, is not a challenge to the fact or duration of the mandatory supervision, and Meza's Section 1983 action is not barred by the Heck doctrine. D. Due process as to imposition of sex-offender conditions and conditions of mandatory supervision
Livingston and Collier further object to the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation on the grounds that there is no justiciable interest in Meza' sclaim that the imposition ofsex-offender conditions deprived him of due-process rights. Defendants argue that the Board of Pardons and Paroles gave Meza one month's notice and the opportunity to be heard. See Coleman, 409 FJd at 670. This issue was raised in Livingston and Collier's Supplemental Motion to Dismiss (Doc #14), in what appears to be little more than an afterthought, and did not address what process is due in the context of imposing sex-offender conditions. Furthermore, the issue was not addressed by the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation. The Court will therefore refer the issue of what process is due in the imposition ofsex-offender conditions to the Magistrate Judge for further report and recommendation.
8

Case 1:05-cv-01008-LY Document 52 Filed 12/06/06 Page 9 of 10
In addition, Livingston and Collier object to the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation on the grounds that Meza has failed to state a claim that rises to the level of a constitutional violation. In particular, they point to Meza's claims of not having prospective employment opportunities screened fast enough and the inability to obtain a driver's license. Although not artfully pleaded, Meza appears to be asserting a constitutional violation under the Equal Protection Clause. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. In his Amended Complaint, Meza repeatedly compares his status to that of other parolees. For example, his job screening is delayed compared to other parolees; he receives less time than other parolees to search for jobs; he cannot obtain a drivers license, and he has less freedom in formulating a weekly schedule. The equalprotection arguments have not been adequately briefed to this Court and are not addressed in the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation. The Court will therefore refer the equal-protection issues to the Magistrate Judge for further report and recommendation.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the United States Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation filed in this cause is hereby APPROVED and ACCEPTED AS FOLLOWS:
1. Defendants Livingston and Collier's Objections to Magistrate's Report and Recommendation (Doc. #29) are OVERRULED.
2. Defendants Livingston's and Collier's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. #12) is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART AS FOLLOWS: The Motion is GRANTED as to the monetary claims against Livingston and Collier in their official capacities and DENIED as to the claims against Livingston and Collier for prospective injunctive relief.
3. Defendants Livingston and Collier's Supplemental Motion to Dismiss (Doc. #14) is DENIED, except that the due-process and equal-protection issues raised in Defendants Livingston
9

Case 1:05-cv-01008-LY Document 52 Filed 12/06/06 Page 10 of 10

and Collier's Objections to Magistrate's Report and Recommendation (Doc. #29) are REFERRED

to the Magistrate Judge for further report and recommendation.

4. Collier's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. #16) is DENIED, and Collier's Motion for Rule

7(a) Reply (Doc. #16) is GRANTED.

IT IS FINALLYORDERED that Meza submit his Rule 7(a) reply on or before December

21,2006.
Slit SIGNED this

day of December, 2006.

10

 </s> Case 1:05-cv-01008-LY Document 70 Filed 02/06/07 Page 1 of 2

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT ! t r' n

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TE1tkJ7 p:_

AUSTIN DIVISION

[.8 - 6 AM 9: 48

RAULMEZA,

§

PLAINTIFF,

§

§

V.

§

§

INDIVIDUAL PAROLE OFFICERS, IN §

THEIR INDIVIDUAL AND OFFICIAL §

CAPACITIES, BRAD LIVINGSTON,

§

EXECUTNE DIRECTOR OF THE TEXAS §

DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE §

IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY, AND

§

BRIAN COLLIER, DIRECTOR OF THE §

TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL §

JUSTICE PAROLE DNISION, IN HIS §

OFFICIAL AND INDNIDUAL

§

CAPACITIES,

§

DEFENDANTS. §

;If'. BY ' ,j

t!·,· /l~J4~;:;

---f!Ll/J.--..

CAUSE NO. A-OS-CA-l 008-LY

ORDER

Before the Court in the above-styled cause ofaction is Defendant Collier's Second Opposed

Motion for Protective Order filed September 20, 2006 (Clerk's Document 32) and Plaintiffs

response filed October 2,2007 (Clerk's Document 37). By his motion, Collier requests that this

Court enter a protective order staying discovery as to Collier until resolution of the qualified-

immunity issues, or at least until he has had an opportunity to review PlaintiffMeza's "fact specific

pleading to determine if [Meza] has stated a claim against him in his personal capacity." Upon

review of the motion and the case file, the Court is of the opinion that Collier's motion should be

denied. Defendant Collier filed his first motion for protective order in this Court on July 28, 2006,
this requesting reliefthat was similar to the reliefrequested in the motion now pending before Court.

Collier's first motion for protective order was referred to Magistrate Judge Andrew Austin for

Case 1:05-cv-01008-LY Document 70 Filed 02/06/07 Page 2 of 2

resolution. On August 30, 2006, Magistrate Judge Andrew Austin denied Collier's first motion for

protective order because Magistrate Judge Austin had rendered a Report and Recommendation

(Clerk's Document 26) on Collier's Motion to Dismiss, recommending that Collier's motion be

denied as to Plaintiff s claims for prospective injunctive relief and that such claims against Collier

remain pending for trial. Magistrate Judge Austin advised Collier that, if Judge Yeakel did not

accept the Report and Recommendation regarding Meza's claims for prospective injunctive relief,

Collier could then renew his request for a protective order.

On December 6,2006, this Court signed an Order accepting the Magistrate Judge's Report

and Recommendation as to Meza's claim for prospective injunctive relief (Clerk's Document 52).

Furthermore, this Court ordered Meza to submit a reply to Defendants' Answer that pleads his

allegations against Collier with specificity. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(a). Meza filed his Rule 7(a) reply

on December 21,2006. Accordingly, this Court finds that there is not good cause for a protective

order at this time. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendant Collier's Second Opposed Motion for

htIt Oft:l.~ Protective Order (Clerk's Document 32) is DKr:j.ED.

SIGNED this

day

2

 </s> • • FILED Case 1:05-cv-01008-LY Document 96 Filed 02/27/07 Page 1 of 12

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS AUSTIN DIVISION

CLlRK...U• •
WIITe"M ..
IY_ _~"""","

RAULMEZA

§

§

Plaintiff

§

v.

§

§

BRIAN COLLIER, director of the Texas §

Department of Criminal Justice Parole §

Division, in his official and individual §

Capacities, BRAD LIVINGSTON,

§

executive director of the Texas Department §

of Criminal Justice, in his official capacity, §

and RISSIE L. OWENS, JOSE ALISEDA, §

CHARLES AYCOCK, CONRITH DAVIS, §

JACKIE DeNOYELLES, LINDA GARCIA,§

and JUANITA M. GONZALES, in their §

official capacities as members of the Texas §

Board of Pardons and Paroles

§

§

Defendants.

§

CIVIL ACTION NO. A-05-CA-I008-LY

THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT

Plaintiff Raul Meza respectfully files this complaint and will show:

STATEMENT OF FACTS

1. Defendants have imposed a substantial burden on Plaintiff Raul Meza's religious

exercise while he has been incarcerated at the Travis County Correctional Complex (TCCC), Del

Valle facility, in violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000

("RLUIPA"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2000).

2. Pursuant to 42 U.S.c. § 1983, Defendants have, without due process of law,

imposed conditions upon Plaintiff Meza's incarceration that are qualitatively different from the

punishment typically imposed on other similarly situated parolees, in violation of the Fourteenth

Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.

3. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Mr. Meza claims that Defendants violated his

Fourteenth Amendment due process rights by imposing additional informal, unauthorized

• Case 1:05-cv-01008-LY Document 96 Filed 02/27/07 Page 2 of 12
conditions on his confinement without due process of law. 4. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Mr. Meza claims that policy and custom of the
TCCC's Del Valle facility, described herein, resulted in violations of his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights.
5. Mr. Meza seeks damages, declaratory relief, injunctive relief, attorneys' fees and costs as a result of Defendants' violations.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 6. Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court by 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343. 7. Further, Defendants' actions and the events giving rise to the claims occurred in Del Valle, Texas. Accordingly, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391, venue is proper for this Court.
PARTIES 8. Plaintiff is confined at the TCCC facility in Del Valle. 9. Defendant Brad Livingston is the executive director of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice ("TDCJ"). 10. Defendant Brian Collier is the director of the TDCJ Parole Division. 11. In all the actions described herein, Defendant Collier and Defendant Livingston ("TDCJ Defendants") each were acting under color of law and pursuant to legal authority. Defendant Collier is sued in his official and individual capacities; Defendant Livingston is sued only in his official capacity. 12. At all relevant times, Rissie L. Owens, Jose Aliseda, Charles Aycock, Conrith Davis, Jackie DeNoyelles, Linda Garcia, and Juanita M. Gonzales (hereinafter collectively "the Board") were members of the Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles, and, as such, were responsible for upholding the laws of the United States and Texas. At all relevant times, the
2

• • Case 1:05-cv-01008-LY Document 96 Filed 02/27/07 Page 3 of 12
Board acted under color of law. The Board is sued in their official capacities for injunctive and declaratory relief.
13. Rissie L. Owens can be served at the Austin offices of the Board of Pardons and Paroles, 209 W. 14th Street, Suite 500, Austin, TX 78701.
14. Jose Aliseda can be served at the San Antonio offices of the Board of Pardons and Paroles, 2902 N.E. Loop 410, Suite 206, San Antonio, TX 78218.
15. Charles Aycock can be served at the Amarillo offices of the Board of Pardons and Paroles, 5809 S. Western, Suite 237, Amarillo, TX 79110.
16. Conrith Davis can be served at the Huntsville offices of the Board of Pardons and Paroles, 1300 11th Street, Suite 520, Huntsville, TX 77342-0599.
17. Jackie DeNoyelles can be served at the Palestine offices of the Board of Pardons and Paroles, 207 E. Reagan, Palestine, TX 75801.
18. Linda Garcia can be served at the Angleton offices of the Board of Pardons and Paroles, 1212 N. Velasco, Suite 201, Angleton, TX 77515.
19. Juanita Gonzales can be served at the Gatesville offices of the Board of Pardons and Paroles, 3408 S. State Highway 36, Gatesville, TX 76528.
STATEMENT OF FACTS 20. On or about March 8, 1982, Plaintiff pled guilty to murder and was sentenced to thirty (30) years imprisonment in Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ) facilities. 21. On or about September 8, 1989, Plaintiff was sentenced to four (4) additional years imprisonment, to be served consecutively to the thirty (30) year term, for possession of a deadly weapon in a penal institution. 22. TDCJ released Plaintiff to the custody of Defendant Sheriff of Travis County on or about September 25, 2002, on "mandatory supervision." Plaintiffs release on mandatory
3

• • Case 1:05-cv-01008-LY Document 96 Filed 02/27/07 Page 4 of 12
supervision was required by statute because his calendar time served plus "good time" credits accumulated totaled the maximum length of his sentence. See Tex. Crim. Pro. Art. 42.18(8)(c) (1987).
23. Mandatory supervision is "the release of a prisoner from imprisonment, but not on parole, and not from the legal custody of the state, for rehabilitation outside prison walls under such conditions and provisions for disciplinary supervision as the board may determine." Tex. Crim. Pro. Art. 42.18(2)(b) (1987). The purpose of mandatory supervision is "to aid all prisoners to readjust to society upon completion of their period of incarceration." Tex. Crim. Pro. Art. 42.18(1) (1987).
24. Parolees on mandatory supervision at TCCC are allowed to search for a job in the community and to leave the facility to work when they have secured employment. The parolees then return to the facility at night.
25. Defendants have not allowed Plaintiff the same opportunities as other parolees. They have placed him on "lock down" status since his arrival at TCCC in 2002, and have confined him in the jail most of the time. Other parolees are not on perpetual "lock down" status and may leave the jail with considerably greater freedom. Other parolees are allowed to formulate a weekly schedule of activities outside of the jail, such as doctors' appointments, job interviews, visits to the Department of Public Safety to obtain driver's licenses, etc. Mr. Meza is routinely denied these same opportunities.
26. Mr. Meza has made numerous good faith attempts to secure employment, but Defendants have thwarted him. Since about June of 2004, Defendants have allowed Plaintiff only five hours per week of time at Project RIO (Reintegration of Offenders), the parolee employment search program. They allow other parolees virtually unlimited time at Project RIO. Prior to June 2004, Defendants did not allow Mr. Meza any access to these resources, even
4

• • Case 1:05-cv-01008-LY Document 96 Filed 02/27/07 Page 5 of 12
though his conditions ofparole explicitly require him to "actively seek employment." 27. Before Mr. Meza can interview for a job, employment opportunities must be
screened by Defendants to ensure potential employment locations meet the conditions of his mandatory supervision. Defendants habitually delay in screening the potential employers that Plaintiff has located, causing the identified positions to be filled before Mr. Meza has the opportunity to interview for them. Other parolees do not experience these chronic delays in their job searches.
28. On the rare occasion when Mr. Meza is able to secure a job interview, several armed guards accompany him to the interview. On or about November 3, 2004, Mr. Meza had a job interview with Southern Education, and armed guards escorted him there. Unsurprisingly, Plaintiff was unable to secure employment under these conditions. Armed guards do not accompany other TCCC parolees to job interviews.
29. Defendants have also told Mr. Meza that, should he find a job, an armed parole officer will have to go to the job site with him every day. The Board has made this requirement a condition of Mr. Meza's mandatory supervision. Potential employers have told Mr. Meza they cannot hire him for this reason. Other parolees do not face this additional obstacle.
30. On August 21,2006, Mr. Meza had a job interview for a construction position with Missions of Hope Ministries. Missions of Hope Ministries offered Mr. Meza the position the next day. TDCJ, Collier and the Board, however, intentionally delayed approving this employment opportunity until the position was no longer available.
31. Before Mr. Meza can accept any job opportunity, the offer of employment must be screened by TDCJ's investigators, and then approved by the Board. No other parolee is required to have his job opportunities approved by the Board. No condition of Mr. Meza's release states that job opportunities will have to be approved by the Board.
5

• • Case 1:05-cv-01008-LY Document 96 Filed 02/27/07 Page 6 of 12
32. As the director of the Parole Division, Collier has personally overseen all decisions regarding Mr. Meza's parole. Over the past three years, Mr. Meza's counsel attempted to negotiate removal of these informal conditions with TDC] officials, including Collier. He was personally aware of the violations of Mr. Meza's due process rights, but deliberately continued to impose these informal, illegal conditions. Collier reasonably should have known he was violating Mr. Meza's due process rights.
33. Because Defendants' actions have prevented him from securing a job, Mr. Meza's liberty is considerably more restricted than other parolees on mandatory supervision at TCCC. Defendants allow other parolees to leave the facility and work in the community.
34. Mr. Meza has been denied educational opportunities that are offered to other parolees at TCCC, even though his conditions of parole require him to "attend educational and vocational training classes." Mr. Meza has not been allowed to attend computer orientation classes, job search classes and resume writing classes offered to other parolees at TCCC. Mr. Meza has only been allowed to attend three onewday seminars offered at Project RIO, and even then has been pulled out of the classes in the middle of the seminars because he is only allowed two and a half hours twice a week at Project RIO.
35. Denying Mr. Meza these educational opportunities also has negatively impacted his job search and thus unduly restrained his liberty. For example, in order to take full advantage of the limited amount of time he has access to Project RIO, Mr. Meza needs effective computer skills. Due to his long incarceration and Defendants' refusal to allow him the same educational opportunities they offer other parolees, Plaintiff has been unable to develop these necessary skills along with other parolees.
36. Mr. Meza has not been allowed to obtain a driver's license, a privilege allowed to other parolees at TeCe. Indeed, Mr. Meza's conditions of parole imply he should be allowed to
6

• • Case 1:05-cv-01008-LY Document 96 Filed 02/27/07 Page 7 of 12
obtain a driver's license, as the conditions explicitly require him to "obey driving restrictions," "obtain and keep in [his] possession a Texas Department of Public Safety (DPS) Personal Identification Card or Driver's License," and "leave all keys to any motor vehicle that [he has] use of with facility staff' of any half-way house he may be allowed to reside at. Without a driver's license, certain employment opportunities are unavailable to Mr. Meza (such as auto repair positions). Mr. Meza has been denied employment by auto repair facilities because he does not have a driver's license.
37. Defendants have not afforded Mr. Meza any due process of law to justify his disparate treatment at TCCe. No conditions of Plaintiffs mandatory supervision justify this disparate treatment.
38. The conditions imposed on Mr. Meza's mandatory supervision by the Board are irrational, arbitrary and capricious. For example, Mr. Meza is required to wear an electronic global positioning tracking monitor at all times. The monitor informs Defendants ofMr. Meza's location at all times. Mr. Meza is also not allowed to leave TCCC without being accompanied by a parole officer, despite the electronic monitor. These conditions are intentionally redundant and thus arbitrary and capricious. These conditions were imposed without due process of law, and have an intentionally discriminatory purpose. Only one other parolee in the state has conditions as onerous as those imposed on Mr. Meza.
39. The Parole Division, at Collier's direction, intentionally refuses to provide Mr. Meza with a parole officer to accompany him so that he may leave the jail. This creates a de facto qualitative restriction on Mr. Meza's liberty, which has been imposed without due process oflaw.
40. On February 23,2005, Mr. Meza received a notice informing him the Board was reimposing sex offender conditions on his parole, and that he had one month to respond. Mr.
7

• • Case 1:05-cv-01008-LY Document 96 Filed 02/27/07 Page 8 of 12
Meza promptly filed a response. This notice was never served on his attorneys, who TDCJ and the Board knew represented him, in violation of Rule 4.02(a) of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct. (Three members of the Board, Aliseda, Aycock and Garcia, are attorneys licensed in the State of Texas who are required to comply with the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct.)
41. TDCJ and the Board ignored Mr. Meza's response, and imposed sex offender conditions on his parole without affording him due process, in violation of the holding of Coleman v. Dretke, 395 F.3d 216 (5th Cir. 2004). Mr. Meza's attorneys contacted TDCJ regarding this abuse of due process, and were ignored. The sex offender conditions remain imposed on Mr. Meza's parole.
42. Mr. Meza is a Christian. His religious faith is sincere and heartfelt, and assisted his efforts to rehabilitate himself.
43. In order to attend worship services at the TCCC, Defendants require inmates to dress in prison uniforms. Plaintiff finds this requirement demeans his religious activities, and acts as a substantial burden on his religious exercise. Other parolees are allowed to leave the jail to attend worship services. Mr. Meza is forced to attend services with inmates at the jail instead of in the community, like other parolees.
44. On September 13, 2006, Mr. Meza's beloved cousin died in an auto accident in Austin. Mr. Meza requested permission to attend her funeral mass and services on September 15, 2006. Prisoners confined by TDCJ are allowed "emergency absence" to "attend a funeral." Tex. Gov't Code § 501.006 (2006). TDCJ denied Mr. Meza the opportunity to participate in these services. Refusing Mr. Meza the opportunity to attend these services was a substantial burden on his religious exercise.
8

• • Case 1:05-cv-01008-LY Document 96 Filed 02/27/07 Page 9 of 12
CAUSES OF ACTION I. Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act ("RLUIPA") 45. Mr. Meza alleges a cause of action because TDCJ and the Board do not allow Mr. Meza to attend worship services in the community, like other parolees, and did not allow him the opportunity to attend his cousin's funeral. Defendants' actions and policies impose substantial burdens on Mr. Meza's religious freedom. 46. Under RLUIPA, "no government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution" unless the burden furthers a "compelling governmental interest," and does so by "the least restrictive means." 42 U.s.c. §§ 2000cc-l(a)(I)-(2). A religious exercise is any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc-5(7)(A). 47. The Act covers government-run institutions, including jails and transitional facilities. TCCC falls under RLUIPA's definition of government, and, therefore, is responsible for accommodating Mr. Meza's religious beliefs.
II. Section 1983 48. The TDCJ Defendants and the Board impose qualitatively different conditions of confinement upon Mr. Meza than other similarly situated parolees. The informal imposition of these additional conditions upon Mr. Meza alone violates his due process rights. 49. The TDCJ Defendants enforce informal restrictions on Mr. Meza's liberty that have not been justified by due process and are not provided for in any of his conditions of parole. They habitually treat Mr. Meza differently from other similarly situated parolees on mandatory supervision so as to deny Mr. Meza the opportunities afforded to others. 50. The Board has imposed sex offender conditions on Mr. Meza's parole without providing him due process, in violation of law and his Fourteenth Amendment rights.
9

• • Case 1:05-cv-01008-LY Document 96 Filed 02/27/07 Page 10 of 12
51. Defendant Collier personally oversees all decisions regarding Mr. Meza's parole. Collier has been informed that the qualitatively different treatment of Mr. Meza violates his due process rights, but continues to enforce the illegal and informal conditions which are unspecified in Mr. Meza's conditions of parole.
52. The Board has imposed irrational, arbitrary and capricious conditions on Mr. Meza's mandatory supervision without affording him due process of law. These conditions are qualitatively different than the conditions imposed on other parolees released after completion of their sentences for similar convictions.
DAMAGES 53. Mr. Meza is entitled to compensatory relief from all Defendants, jointly and severally, for lost wages and loss of liberty. 54. Plaintiff also seeks punitive damages from the rDC] Defendants.
DECLARATORY mDGMENT 55. Mr. Meza seeks declaratory judgment to vindicate his rights under Section 1983 and RLUIPA with respect to Defendants' violations. 56. Mr. Meza is entitled to declaratory judgment concerning Defendants' violations of his due process rights.
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 57. Mr. Meza seeks injunctive relief, permanently enjoining Defendants from: a. Failing to reasonably accommodate his religious exercise, including requiring
parolees to wear jail uniforms in order to attend worship services and imposing worship service policies not serving a compelling governmental interest; and, b. Continuing to subject Mr. Meza to qualitatively different conditions of confinement without due process of law; and, c. Imposing sex offender conditions upon his parole without due process oflaw.
10

• • Case 1:05-cv-01008-LY Document 96 Filed 02/27/07 Page 11 of 12
58. Inasmuch as Defendants have acted in the events described herein, they will continue to act accordingly. Without injunctive relief, Defendants will continue their outrageous conduct, thereby unduly limiting Mr. Meza's liberty without due process.
ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS 59. Mr. Meza is entitled to reasonable attorneys' fees, litigation costs, and court costs, pursuant to 42 U.S.c. § 1988.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF THEREFORE, Mr. Meza respectfully prays that this Court grant the following relief: A. Enter judgment on his behalf against the TDC] Defendants in their individual
capacities and the Travis County Sheriff, jointly and severally, for monetary damages sufficient to compensate Plaintiff for his lost wages; B. Issue declaratory relief that Defendants' conduct constituted illegal deprivation of Plaintiffs due process rights; C. Order injunctive relief against Defendant Collier in his official capacity to end further prevention of the exercise of religious freedom of Plaintiff and TCCC parolees to prohibit the violation of Mr. Meza's rights under RLUIPA; D. Grant reasonable attorneys' fees, litigation expenses, and court costs; and E. Grant all other and additional relief to which Mr. Meza may be entitled, at law or in equity. DATED: February 23, 2007.
Respectfully Submitted,
TEXAS CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT 1405 Montopolis Dr. Austin, TX 78741 11

• • Case 1:05-cv-01008-LY Document 96 Filed 02/27/07 Page 12 of 12

(512) 474-5073 [phone] (512) 474-0726 [fax]
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

A true copy this document was sent to Assistant Attorney General of Texas, Celamaine Cunniff,

P.O. Box 12548, Capitol Station, Austin, TX, 78711, via fax, 512-495-9139, on February 23,

2007.

~ ~

;;;::?c-:;Medlock

Scott Medlock

12

 </s> Case 1:05-cv-01008-LY Document 131 Filed 04/12/07 Page 1 of 8

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT f'll ED

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEX1fiol APR t 2 PM I2t 11

RAULMEZA,

AUSTIN DIVISION §

i'CT CL£Rl( us ClSTR!CT COURT

W::TERN

Of TEXAS

PLAINTIFF,

§

PUTY

§

V.

§

§

BRAD LIVINGSTON,

§

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE TEXAS §

DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, § CAUSE NO. A-05-CA-I008-LY

IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY;

§

BRIAN COLLIER, DIRECTOR OF THE §

TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL §

JUSTICE PAROLE DIVISION, IN HIS §

OFFICIAL AND INDIVIDUAL

§

CAPACITIES; AND RISSIE 1. OWENS, §

JOSE ALISEDA, CHARLES AYCOCK, §

CONRITH DAVIS, JACKIE

§

DENOYELLES, LINDA GARCIA, AND §

JUANITA M. GONZALES, IN THEIR §

OFFICIAL CAPACITIES AS MEMBERS §

OF THE TEXAS BOARD OF PARDONS §

AND PAROLES,

§

DEFENDANTS. §

ORDER

Before the Court is Defendants Livingston and Collier's Motion to Quash or for Protective

Order filed December 15, 2006 (Clerk's Document 53), Plaintiffs Response to Defendants

Livingston and Collier's Motion to Quash and for Protective Order and Plaintiff s Motion to Compel

filed December 22, 2006 (Clerk's Document 56), Plaintiffs Briefin Support of Motion to Compel

Documents Responsive to Plaintiffs Subpoena to Orion Treatment Center filed January 26,2007

(Clerk's Document 68), Defendants Livingston and Collier's Supplement to Motion to Quash or for

Protective Order filed January 26, 2007 (Clerk's Document 67), Plaintiff s Response to Defendants'

Supplement to their Motion to Quash or for Protective Order filed February 8, 2007 (Clerk's

Document 79), Defendants Livingston and Collier's Second Supplement to Motion to Quash or for

Case 1:05-cv-01008-LY Document 131 Filed 04/12/07 Page 2 of 8
Protective Order filed February 14, 2007 (Clerk's Document 80), Defendants Collier and livingston's Letter Brief in Support of Motion to Quash or for Protective Order filed February 27, 2007 (Clerk's Document 95), and PlaintiffMeza's letter briefin support ofits argument filed March 2, 2007 (Clerk's Document 98). On February 20, 2007, the Court conducted a hearing on the parties' motions at which all parties were represented by counsel. Having considered the motions, the supplemental briefing, the case file, the oral arguments ofcounsel, and the applicable law, the Court will deny Livingston and Collier's motion to quash or for protective order in part and grant in part, and will grant Meza's motion to compel Orion to produce the subpoenaed documents in part by ordering Orion to produce the documents for in camera inspection.
On December 6, 2006, counsel for Meza served Orion Treatment Center ("Orion") with a subpoena commanding Orion to produce and permit inspection and copying of Meza's complete patient file. Orion was under contract with the Texas Department of Criminal Justice ("TDCJ") between December 1,2000, and February 28,2006, to provide sexwoffender treatment to parolees residing at the Travis County Corrections Center. The Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles ("the Parole Board") determined by majority vote on September 24, 2002, that Meza was required to receive sex-offender treatment. Following the Parole Board's decision, the TDCJ contracted with Orion to provide the mandated sex-offender treatment to Meza, which Meza subsequently attended. Orion remains in possession of Meza's patient file from his treatment period at Orion, although copies of some documents in Orion's file were delivered to the Parole Board and are being kept by TDCJ-Parole Division in Meza's parole file. Meza contends that the records in Orion's possession are relevant because the records were relied on by Defendants to determine Meza's parole conditions, the legality of which form the basis of Meza' s lawsuit.
2

Case 1:05-cv-01008-LY Document 131 Filed 04/12/07 Page 3 of 8
Livingston and Collier move to quash the subpoena, or in the alternative, for the Court to conduct an in camera inspection of the subpoenaed documents. In the event the Court denies their motion, Livingston and Collier ask this Court to render a protective order prohibiting Meza' s counsel from disclosing any part ofthe patient file to Meza. Livingston and Collier contend that the patient file is part of Meza's parole file and is therefore protected under the state-law privilege protecting information relating to a parolee. See Tex. Gov't. Code Ann. § 5080313 (West 2004). Meza opposes Livingston and Collier's motion and moves this Court to compel Orion to produce the requested patient file. Privileged Matters in the Federal Rules
Generally, the Federal Rules ofCivil Procedure provide that "[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the claim or defense of any party ...." Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b). "When considering a federal claim, federal courts apply federal common law, rather than state law, to determine the existence and scope ofa privilege." Coughlin v. Lee, 946 F.2d 1152,1159 (5th Cir. 1991); see also Gilbreath v. Guadalupe Hasp. Found, Inc., 5 Fo3d 785 (5th Cir. 1993) (party is "seeking to enforce subpoenas issued under federal statutory authority .... [The] right to assert a privilege is therefore dictated by federal law"); United States v. Moore, 970 F.2d 48, 49-50 (5th Cir. 1992). The term "privilege," protecting entities from discovery under the rules of procedure, "refers to 'privileges' as that term is understood in the law of evidence." United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1,6 (1953). The law ofevidence calls for the federal court to apply privileges according to "the principles of the common law ... in the light of reason and experience." Fed. R. Evid.501. A federal court, in determining whether to introduce a privilege from state law into a federal proceeding, considers whether the privilege "promotes sufficiently important interests to
3

Case 1:05-cv-01008-LY Document 131 Filed 04/12/07 Page 4 of 8
outweigh the need for probative evidence ... [guided by] [bloth 'reason and experience.'" Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1,9-10 (1996).
Livingston and Collier ask for this Court to recognize a federal privilege under Rule 501 that protects parole files from discovery. Before determining whether to recognize a federal privilege for parole files, however, the Court will consider whether Texas's statutory privilege would apply to the documents sought in this case from Orion. Livingston and Collier's Standing
Meza argues that Livingston and Collier do not have standing to move this Court to quash the subpoena served on Orion, a third party. A party does not have standing to raise the issue of a third-party's amenability to a subpoena if the party is "not in the possession of the materials subpoenaed and [has] not alleged any personal right or privilege with respect to the materials subpoenaed." Brown v. Braddick, 595 F.2d 961, 967 (5th Cir. 1979). "The case law on what constitutes a 'personal right or privilege' is scarce; the courts that have considered the issue have generally found standing when the party had an evidentiary privilege as to the documents." Jez v. Dow Chern. Co., 402 F. Supp. 2d 783, 785 (S.D. Tex. 2005). As Livingston and Collier have claimed a privilege regarding the subpoenaed documents, the question of their standing to move to quash the subpoenas appears to converge with the question ofwhether or not such a privilege applies to the patient file requested from Orion. The Court will therefore consider whether the state-law statutory privilege protecting parole files applies to the patient file that Meza seeks from Orion. Texas's Statutory Parole-File Privilege
Under Texas law, "[a]ny party who seeks to deny the production of evidence must claim a specific privilege against such production." In re Union Pac. Resources Co., 22 S.W.3d 338,340
4

Case 1:05-cv-01008-LY Document 131 Filed 04/12/07 Page 5 of 8
(1999). Only those privileges prescribed under the Rules ofEvidence, the constitution, a statute, or by other rules pursuant to statutory authority are recognized under Texas law. Tex. R. Evid. 501. The privilege relied on by Livingston and Collier is contained in Chapter 58 of the Texas
Government Code and provides: [a]11 information obtained and maintained, including a victim protest letter or other correspondence, a victim impact statement, a list of inmates eligible for release on parole, and an arrest record of an inmate, is confidential and privileged if the information relates to ... a releasee....
Tex. Gov'tCodeAnn. § 508.313(a). A releasee includes a person released on parole. Id. at 508.001.
Meza argues that this privilege does not apply to the patient file held by Orion because it is "obtained and maintained" by Orion, while section 508.313 is directed only to the "machinations of the Parole Board."! This Court agrees that the file held by Orion is not necessarily protected by Texas's statutory privilege. The mere fact that Orion has turned some ofMeza' s records over to the
TDCJ for inclusion in Meza's parole file may not justify application of the statutory privilege to a request ofthe records from Orion itself. However, Texas law is sketchy here. One Texas court has rejected the contention that a document requested from a source other than the parole file, "by virtue of [also] being in the parole file[,] takes on the sanctity of the parole file itself," reasoning that
[c]arried to its logical extreme, appellant's argument would preclude the introduction ofany evidence obtained from any source just by the fortuitous circumstance of it also appearing in the defendant's parole file. We do not believe that this was the intent ofthe confidentiality
! The Court presumes that Meza refers to TDCJ rather than the Parole Board in making this argument. Although the statute is not clear as to what entity "obtain[s] and maintain[s]" information protected in section 508.313, TDCJ is the only entity referenced in the section. See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 508.313(c); see also id. at § 491.001 (defining "department" as TDCJ throughout Title 2, Subtitle G of Texas Government Code).
5

Case 1:05-cv-01008-LY Document 131 Filed 04/12/07 Page 6 of 8
provisions of [Section 508313f [Section 508.313] was enacted to encourage frank and candid disclosures in the parolee's file. . . . It in no way implies that information obtained from a different source should be made confidential by its inclusion in the file. Wilburn v. State, 636 S.W.2d 771, 777 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1982, no writ). In the present case, TDC} contracted with Orion to provide treatment to Meza. The contract between TDC} and Orion includes a provision prohibiting a third party's access to records without written authorization from the Director of Specialized Programs at TDC}, but grants the TDCJ unlimited access to the records. The fact that portions of Orion's patient file on Meza are also included in Meza's parole
file is therefore more than "fortuitous." Livingston and Collier, however, provide no support for
their contention that the statutory privilege was intended to be construed so broadly to prevent document production from an entity other than the TDCJ itself.
Although Livingston and Collier contend that it is not in the public interest to reveal to a patient who is also a parolee the notes a counselor has written about him in his treatment file, the
Texas Legislature has enacted no statute declaring such records privileged in the hands ofatreatment
center, thus denying the patient files to the patient himself. This Court is not convinced that the Section 508.313 is so broad in its scope as to reach records beyond those held by TDC}.
Furthermore, the Texas courts have noted that the privilege protecting parole files at times conflicts with "fundamental principles of due process of law in the fair administration ofjustice." Texas Dep't ojCorrections v. Dalehite, 623 S.W.2d 420,424 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981). In those
2 Prior to 1985, the Texas statute concerning the parole-file privilege was codified at article 42.12 ofthe Code of Criminal Procedure. From 1985 to 1997, the provision was found in article 42.18 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In a nonsubstantive act effective September 1, 1997, the Texas Legislature repealed article 42.18 and relocated the provision to section 508313 of the Texas Government Code. The provision has remained substantially unchanged regarding the confidentiality ofparole files, and the case law cited in this Order interpreting the earlier provisions is equally applicable, despite the later amendments to the provision.
6

Case 1:05-cv-01008-LY Document 131 Filed 04/12/07 Page 7 of 8
situations, the "determination of what will or will not be made available to either party from the parole records [is placed] within the discretion of the trial court." The presumption in favor of upholding the parole-file privilege can be rebutted if there is "demonstration of the need and relevancy of the requested documents." Id at 423.
Meza contends that the contents of his patient file will dispute Livingston and Collier's contention that Meza's parole conditions are justified because Meza is a continuing threat to the community. Meza has also alleged that Collier "personally communicated with Mr. Meza's sex offender counselors employed by Orion in furtherance of the campaign to deny Mr. Meza release from TCCC." Livingston and Collier admit that portions of the patient file were admitted to the Parole Board to be considered in determining the conditions to be imposed on Meza during his parole. Meza's claims are based on the "qualitatively different conditions ofconfinement" imposed on him by Defendants from other parolees similarly situated. Accordingly, the information considered by Defendants in determining Meza's conditions of parole is likely relevant to whether Defendants are imposing conditions that are "irrational, arbitrary, and capricious," as Meza claims.
The state-law privilege may not apply to information concerning Meza in whomever's hands, to the extent that it is relevant and necessary to adjudication of Meza' s claims. Meza has demonstrated that information maintained by Orion may prove relevant in adjudicating his constitutional due-process claims. The Court will order in camera inspection of the subpoenaed documents to determine their relevance and necessity before determining whether to order production of the subpoenaed documents. See Dalehite, 623 S.W.2d at 423; Texas Bd o/Pardons & Paroles v. Miller, 590 S.W.2d 142, 145 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979). This Court will therefore grant Livingston and Collier's motion as to their request for the Court to conduct an in camera review of
7

Case 1:05-cv-01008-LY Document 131 Filed 04/12/07 Page 8 of 8

the subpoenaed documents, will deny Livingston and Collier's motion in all other respects, and will

grant in part Meza's motion to compel Orion to produce the subpoenaed documents.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendants Livingston and Collier's Motion to

Quash or for Protective Order (Clerk's Document 53) is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN

PART and Plaintiffs motion to compel (Clerk's Document 56) is GRANTED IN PART AND

DENIED IN PART to the following extent:

IT IS ORDERED that Orion Treatment Center shall deliver to the Chambers of United

States District Judge Lee Yeakel, Second Floor of the United States Courthouse, 200 West 8th

Street, Austin, Texas, on or before April 27, 2007, the complete patient file of Raul Meza, Jr., to

the extent that such documents are in the possession or under the control ofOrion Treatment Center.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of this Court shall mail a copy of this Order

to Orion Treatment Center, 3625 Manchaca Road, Austin, Texas, 78704, and the United States

Marshals Service, in accordance with Federal Rule ofCivil Procedure 4.1, shall effect service ofthis

Order on Orion Treatment Center, 3625 Manchaca Road, Austin, Texas, 78704.

/lth SIGNED this

day of April, 2007.

8

 </s> Case 1:05-cv-01008-LY Document 164 Filed 05/04/07 Page 1 of 2

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

fILED

RAULMEZA,

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS AUSTIN DIVISION
§

" 'lIlftAY -4 PH 2:01
WCELSETREKRNU0, Olrr~~.TFCOrUERx.1... S

PLAINTIFF,

§

§

BY

OEPt)T V

V.

§

§

BRAD LIVINGSTON,

§

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE TEXAS §

DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, § CAUSE NO. A-OS-CA-1 008-LY

IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY;

§

BRIAN COLLIER, DIRECTOR OF THE §

TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL §

JUSTICE PAROLE DIVISION, IN HIS §

OFFICIAL AND INDIVIDUAL

§

CAPACITIES; AND RISSIE L. OWENS, §

JOSE ALISEDA, CHARLES AYCOCK, §

CONRITH DAVIS, JACKIE

§

DENOYELLES, LINDA GARCIA, AND §

JUANITA M. GONZALES, IN THEIR §

OFFICIAL CAPACITIES AS MEMBERS §

OF THE TEXAS BOARD OF PARDONS §

AND PAROLES,

§

DEFENDANTS. §

ORDER

Before the Court is Plaintiff Meza's Motion to Exclude Testimony of Defendants' Experts filed April 20, 2007 (Clerk's Document 147). By his motion, Meza requests that this Court exclude the testimony of Defendants Livingston and Collier's expert witnesses pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(c). In the alternative, Meza requests that this Court order Livingston and Collier to produce a written report prepared and signed by each expert witness designated by Livingston and Collier pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2)(B).
Livingston and Collier's response to Meza's motion was due on May 1, 2007. See W.D. Tex. Local R. CV-7(d) (requiring party opposed to motion to respond within eleven days of service of

Case 1:05-cv-01008-LY Document 164 Filed 05/04/07 Page 2 of 2

motion and allowing district court to grant motion as unopposed ifno timely response is filed). To

date, however, Livingston and Collier have filed no response to Meza's motion. Thus, pursuant to

Local Rule CV-7(d), Meza's motion may be granted as unopposed. Id Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 26(a)(2)(B) requires that a party's disclosure of witnesses be accompanied by "a written

report prepared and signed by the witness" in the case of any "witness who is retained or specially

employed to provide expert testimony in the case or whose duties as an employee of the party

regularly involve giving expert testimony," unless otherwise ordered by the court. Having

considered the motion, the case file, and the applicable law, this Court is of the opinion that the

motion should be granted as follows.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Meza' sMotion to Exclude Testimony ofDefendants'

Experts (Clerk's Document 147) is GRANTED to the extent that Livingston and Collier shall

provide written reports containing the information set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

26(a)(2)(B) to all parties on or before May 18,2007, for each witness designated in Livingston and

Collier's April 18, 2007 Designation of Expert Witnesses to the extent that such witness will be

asked at trial to express an opinion on any matter. In all other respects, Meza's motion is DENIED.

~ SIGNED this

day of May, 2007.

2

 </s> IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
AUSTIN DIVISION

RAUL MEZA, v. BRIAN COLLIER, et al.

§

§

§

A-05-CA-1008 LY

§

§

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

TO: THE HONORABLE LEE YEAKEL UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Before the Court is Defendant Collier’s Third Motion to Dismiss (Clerk’s Doc. No. 162);

Defendant Owens’ Motion to Dismiss (Clerk’s Doc. No. 130) and Defendants Aliseda, Davis,

Denoyelles, Aycock, Garcia, and Gonzales’s Motion to Dismiss (Clerk’s Doc. No. 150).

I. BACKGROUND

On March 9, 1982, Raul Meza pled guilty to murdering a 9 year-old girl and was sentenced

to 30 years imprisonment. On September 8, 1989, Meza was sentenced to an additional,

consecutive, four years of imprisonment for possession of a deadly weapon in a penal institution.

In 1993, Meza was released from prison on mandatory supervision, but violated his parole and was

sent back to prison. Meza was again released on September 25, 2002, on mandatory supervision, as

dictated by statute. Meza filed this lawsuit on December 5, 2005, alleging that Defendant parole

officers, Collier and Livingston, violated the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act

(“RLUIPA”) and his constitutional rights. In his Third Amended Complaint, Meza added the same

charges against various defendants who work for the Texas Board of Pardon and Paroles (“the TBPP

Defendants”).

Defendants Livingston and Collier jointly filed a motion to dismiss the claims against them in their official capacities and Collier filed a motion to dismiss in his individual capacity. In a Report and Recommendation by this Court – adopted by Judge Yeakel – it was recommended that Collier’s and Livingston’s motions should be granted in part and denied in part. While Judge Yeakel adopted the Report and Recommendation, he ordered further briefing on Meza’s nascent due process and equal protection clause claims. (Clerk’s Doc. No. 52 at 8-9.) On January 29, 2007, this Court issued an order establishing a briefing schedule for Livingston and Collier to further brief the due process and equal protection issues. (Clerk’s Doc. No. 69.) They replied by filing their Second Motions to Dismiss on these issues on February 7, 2007. (Clerk’s Doc. No. 73.) Meza responded on February 19, 2007 (Clerk’s Doc. No. 86), and the Defendants replied on March 8, 2007 (Clerk’s Doc. Nos. 103, 104).
A week later, Collier and Livingston – and Plaintiff – also filed summary judgment motions making many of the same arguments. Therefore, Judge Yeakel dismissed Collier and Livingston’s motions to dismiss, see Clerk’s Doc. No. 157, and referred the pending summary judgments motions to this Court for a Report and Recommendation. However, there remain outstanding motions to dismiss that this Report and Recommendation will resolve: the TBPP Defendant’ motions to dismiss and Collier’s Third Motion to Dismiss (filed to address arguments he states he raised in his earlier motion to dismiss, but not in his summary judgment motion).
Meza’s Third Amended Complaint alleges that the Defendants have violated his equal protection and due process rights in a variety of ways. Meza alleges that he has not been given the same opportunities as other supervisees to acquire a job, obtain a driver’s license, or receive education such that his rights under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth
2

Amendment have been violated. He further contends that sex offender conditions were imposed upon him without due process, because his attorneys (who Defendants knew represented him) were not given notice of the intent to impose such conditions, and because his objections to those conditions were ignored. Meza also alleges that while in prison he has become a devout (nondenominational) Christian. He argues that his rights under RLUIPA, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc, are violated by conditions and regulations requiring that: (1) he wear his prison uniform to attend religious services; (2) he is prohibited from leaving the jail to attend church services (unlike other parolees); and (3) he was prohibited from leaving the jail to attend his cousin’s funeral. Meza seeks compensatory and punitive damages, declaratory judgment, and injunctive relief.
II. ANALYSIS The Court will first discuss the Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles Defendants’ motions and then will take up the arguments specific to Collier’s motion to dismiss the claims against him in his individual capacity. A. Standard of Review. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), “a claim will not be dismissed unless the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief.” Gen. Elec. Capital Corp. v. Posey, 415 F.3d 391, 395 (5th Cir. 2005). “A district court cannot dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim ‘unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts that would entitle him to relief.’” United States ex rel. Bain v. Georgia Gulf Corp., 386 F.3d 648, 653-54 (5th Cir. 2004). The complaint must be liberally construed in favor of the plaintiff and all facts pleaded therein must be taken as true. Kane Enters. v. MacGregor (USA) Inc., 322 F.3d 371, 374 (5th Cir. 2003). “However, conclusory allegations or legal conclusions
3

masquerading as factual conclusions will not suffice to prevent a motion to dismiss.” Jones v. Alcoa, Inc., 339 F.3d 359, 362 (5th Cir. 2003). B. Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss
The Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles Defendants (“the TBPP Defendants”) – Rissie Owens, Jose Aliseda, Charles Aycock, Conrith Davis, Jackie DeNoyelles, Linda Garcia, and Juanita M. Gonzales – move to dismiss all of the claims against them, on several grounds. See Clerk’s Doc. No. 130, 150. First, they claim that the equal protection claim is not properly stated. Next, they assert that Meza has failed to state the elements of a RLUIPA claim. Third, they assert that the due process claim is lacking because the restrictions imposed on Meza are permitted, and because he was given notice of the intent to impose sex offender restrictions, and an opportunity to be heard. Finally, the TPBB Defendants assert that they are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity.
1. Equal Protection “Class of One” Claim. In their first argument, the TPBB Defendants’ contend that Meza has failed to state an equal protection claim. Meza is proceeding under the Village of Willowbrook v. Olech “class of one” equal protection theory, which requires that he show he has been intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment. 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000). In his briefing, Collier relies on Bryan v. City of Madison, 213 F.3d 267 (5th Cir. 2000), which puts some gloss on Olech. Bryan held that in “selective enforcement” equal protection claims the plaintiff must show “an improper motive, such as racial animus . . . .” Id. at 277. The TBPP Defendants argue that because Meza has not shown they acted with any improper motive, his claim should be dismissed.
4

This case, however, is not best described as a selective enforcement claim. The Fifth Circuit,
in Mikeska v. City of Galveston, implied in a footnote that it had recognized an additional variety of
class of one equal protection claim, “personal vindictiveness.” 451 F.3d 376, 381 n.4 (5th Cir.
2006).1 While the Fifth Circuit has not squarely addressed the issue, the Seventh Circuit has. In
typically persuasive fashion, Judge Posner noted that if “a merely unexplained difference in police
treatment of similar complaints made by different people established a prima facie case of denial of
equal protection of the laws, the federal courts would be drawn deep into the local enforcement of
petty state and local laws.” Hilton v. City of Wheeling, 209 F.3d 1005, 1008 (7th Cir. 2000).
Utilizing Justice Breyer’s concurrence in Olech, 528 U.S. at 565-66 (agreeing with disposition but
contending that there should be an “extra factor” requirement of “vindictive action” or the like to
proceed under a “class of one” theory) (Breyer, J., concurring), Judge Posner stated that:
to make out a prima facie case the plaintiff must present evidence that the defendant deliberately sought to deprive him of the equal protection of the laws for reasons of a personal nature unrelated to the duties of the defendant’s position. We described the class of equal protection cases illustrated by Olech as ‘vindictive action’ cases and said that they require “proof that the cause of the differential treatment of which the plaintiff complains was a totally illegitimate animus toward the plaintiff by the defendant.”
Id. (citation omitted).2
1A more accurate statement might be that the Fifth Circuit has recognized the possibility of such a claim but never expressly passed on it. Parude v. City of Natchez 72 Fed. App’x 102, 104-05 (5th Cir. 2003) (stating “that personal vindictiveness might be an improper motive in a selective enforcement case, but [we] ha[ve] never specifically addressed whether such a motive would be enough to support an equal protection claim without some other class-based discrimination”); see also Beeler v. Rounsavall, 328 F.3d 813, 817-818 (5th Cir. 2003) (declining to address issue).
2To muddy the waters further, the Fifth Circuit, in an unpublished opinion from 2002, Shipp v. McMahon, cited Hilton – in the context of a §1983 qualified immunity case to determine whether the right was clearly established at the time – for the “personal vindictiveness” equal protection theory, and stated that “the Court’s earlier decision in this case, Shipp I, may or may not have
5

As Meza points out in his Response, in the years 2005 and 2006, TDCJ and TBPP released well over 1,000 individuals who had been convicted of murder. Of those, Meza is one of only two parolees placed under such strict conditions. At this procedural stage, there is nothing the Court can look to to determine the TBPP’s motives in setting Meza’s conditions, and the Court must take Meza’s pleadings as true. Given this, and given the state of the law as just described, the Court believes that Meza has pled enough to continue with his equal protection claim.
2. Religious Exercise Claims under RLUIPA. The TBPP Defendants also contend that Meza’s RLUIPA claim against them must be dismissed because he has failed to plead facts that allege a “substantial burden” on his practice of religion. The relevant section of the RLUIPA states: (a) General rule No government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution . . . even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, unless the government demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that person:
(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling
governmental interest. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc. Initially, it falls to the plaintiff to demonstrate that the government practice complained of imposes a “substantial burden” on his religious exercise. Adkins v. Kaspar, 393 F.3d 559, 567 (5th Cir. 2004). This requires the court to answer two questions: (1) is the burdened activity “religious exercise,” and if so (2) is the burden “substantial?” Id.
extended” the class of one theory to police protection. 54 Fed. App’x 413, (5th Cir. 2002). 6

Under RLUIPA, “exercise of religion” is defined to include “any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-2(4), 2000cc-5(7)(A). The Supreme Court has said that ““[T]he ‘exercise of religion’ often involves not only belief and profession but the performance of . . . physical acts [such as] assembling with others for a worship service [or] participating in sacramental use of bread and wine . . . .” Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 720 (2005) (citation omitted).
It would appear that attending a funeral is a religious exercise as contemplated by RLUIPA. While the Court was unable to locate any cases directly addressing this issue, in the vast majority of well-established religions, funerals have great religious significance, and are marked with a religious ceremony. Accordingly, attending such a ceremony would appear to be as much an exercise of religion as attending normal sabbath services would be, and attendance at these services is plainly an exercise of religion under Cutter. 544 U.S. at 720. This conclusion is also consistent with other cases addressing what is an “exercise” of religion for RLUIPA purposes. See e.g., Adkins v. Kaspar, 393 F.3d 559, 570 (5th Cir. 2000) (sabbath and holy day gatherings qualify as religious exercise); Lovelace v. Lee, 472 F.3d 174, 187 (4th Cir. 2006) (observance of Ramadan a religious exercise); Konikov v. Orange County, Fla., 410 F.3d 1317, 1323 (11th Cir. 2005) (rabbi’s use of property for Torah study and celebration of Jewish holidays a religious exercise); Maria v. Broaddus, 2003 WL 21782633 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (prisoner’s belief in Nation of Gods and Earths religion (aka as the “Five Percenters” aligned with Black Muslim movement) was sincere and religious in nature and therefore was a religious exercise); Mintz v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Springfield, 424 F. Supp.2d 309, 318-19 (D. Mass. 2006) (holding that Catholic church’s application for permit to construct parish center that is central to church programs and services is religious exercise).
7

The more problematic issue for Meza is whether the burden imposed on his exercise of religion when he was prevented from attending his cousin’s funeral was “substantial.” On this issue, Meza’s claim fails. Taking as true all of the facts pled be Meza, the only service he complains he was prevented from attending was his cousin’s funeral. His Third Amended Complaint fails to identify what sort of service the funeral was, other than a “mass.” He identifies himself as a “Christian.” Thus, assuming that the funeral services consisted of a Catholic mass and burial services,3 it is not even clear from the complaint that Meza was prevented from attending services of his own church when he was not allowed to attend the funeral. Regardless, even giving him the benefit of that assumption, the sole service he complains he was prevented from attending was this funeral. His complaint affirmatively establishes that he is permitted to attend other services (Clerk’s Doc. No. 96 at ¶ 43). While there is no case law addressing what the boundaries are regarding when one’s exercise of religion becomes substantially impaired, it is clear where this case falls. The Court can say as a matter of law that a complaint alleging a supervisee was prevented from attending only one religious ceremony over a several year period fails to state a claim that the supervisee’s exercise of religion has suffered a “substantial” burden.
Meza’s other complaint under RLUIPA relates to the requirement that he attend worship services in TCCC – in his prison garb – and not, like other parolees, out in the community. Meza somewhat conflates his complaints here, but the issue is whether his allegation that wearing a prison uniform while attending service at TCCC is a substantial burden on his exercise of religion. The Court finds it is not. Meza’s complaint in this regard is stated in conclusory terms, and he must
3The complaint alleges that Meza was prevented from attending a “funeral mass and services.” Clerk’s Doc. No. 96 at ¶ 44. From the use of the term “mass,” the Court could assume the service was Catholic (or perhaps Anglican or Episcopalian).
8

make more than simple assertions. See Jones v. Alcoa, Inc., 339 F.3d 359, 362 (5th Cir. 2003) (conclusory allegations or legal conclusions masquerading as factual conclusions will not suffice to prevent a motion to dismiss). He has completely failed to plead any facts that his clothing is important to the exercise of his religion (as it might be if he were, for example, an Hassidic Jew), or to explain how wearing prison garb interferes with his religious exercises (other than to assert he considers it to “demean his religious activities”). Again, taking all of the allegations of his complaint as true, as a matter of law Meza’s complaint regarding having to attend services in his prison garb fails to state a claim under RLUIPA.4
3. Due Process Claims. The TBPP Defendants next argue that Meza’s due process claims should be dismissed. Meza contends that collectively, the restrictions placed on him violate his due process rights. Sandin v. Conner is the touchstone case here. 515 U.S. 472 (1995). There, the Court held that States may, under certain circumstances, create liberty interests which are protected by the Due Process Clause. But these interests will generally be limited to freedom from restraints which, while not exceeding the sentence in such an unexpected manner as to give rise to protection by the Due Process Clause of its own force, nonetheless impose atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life. Id. at 483- 484. After Sandin, it is clear that the touchstone of the inquiry is the nature of the challenged conditions “in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Id. at 484. “Prisoners do not shed all constitutional rights at the prison gate.” Coleman v.
4To the extent Meza complains that TBPP refuses to permit him to attend services away from the TCCC, but allows other supervisees to leave for that purpose, that claim is properly considered as part of his equal protection and due process claims. Again, because he is permitted to attend services at TCCC, and because he fails to allege any burden imposed by attending services there as opposed to in the community, this restriction does not state a claim under RLUIPA.
9

Dretke, 395 F.3d 216, 221 (5th Cir. 2004). Despite the restrictions imposed by incarceration, the Due Process Clause guarantees a prisoner some process before the government can impose conditions that are qualitatively different from the punishment characteristically suffered by a prisoner and which have stigmatizing consequences. Id.
Meza complains that sex offender restrictions were placed on him without proper notice and hearing, as required by Coleman. 395 F.3d at 223-24. The TBPP Defendants contend that Meza was indeed given the requisite level of due process because he was notified of the decision and was given an opportunity – which he took advantage of – to respond. They further contend that Coleman does not require that Meza’s attorneys be notified, so it is irrelevant that the Defendants failed to do so here.
This is not an issue that should be resolved at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage of the proceedings. The Coleman Court concluded that:
The Department may condition Coleman's parole on sex offender registration and therapy only if he is determined to constitute a threat to society by reason of his lack of sexual control. Absent a conviction of a sex offense, the Department must afford him an appropriate hearing and find that he possesses this offensive characteristic before imposing such conditions. This court was told at oral argument that evidence of Coleman’s lack of sexual control exists. None appears in the record, however, and no contention is made that Coleman has been afforded a hearing meeting the requirements of due process. Id. at 225. There are too many facts that are not developed at this point to determine whether the process afforded Meza satisfied due process requirements. Coleman seems to require a hearing and it is far from clear from the pleaded facts whether Meza received one. There is also no evidence in the record that a lack of sexual control exists in Meza’s case. Moreover, simply noting, as the TBPP Defendants do, that Coleman did not explicitly say that noticing an attorney was required proves
10

nothing. That was not an issue in that case. All of these issues need factual development and further briefing by the parties.
Tied into this is Meza’s due process claim that covers the other restrictions imposed on him, such as not being given the same opportunities as other supervisees to acquire a job, obtain a driver’s license, receive education, or attend church services. The TBPP Defendants argue, somewhat puzzlingly, that “[s]upervision, then, is a ‘special need’ of the State permitting a degree of impingement upon privacy that would not be constitutional if applied to the public at large” (citing Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 875 (1987)). But of course the issue here is not whether Meza’s parole restrictions comport with due process vis-a-vis the general public; it is whether they violate his constitutional rights vis-a-vis the restrictions placed on other supervisees. Taking Meza’s pleadings as true, Meza has pled enough to hurdle the low bar of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. He has alleged several restrictions that appear qualitatively different than those imposed on other supervisees, thus stating a claim under Sandin v. Conner.
4. Eleventh Amendment. The last issue is whether the TBPP Defendant are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity on Meza’s claims. Meza contends that because he is only seeking injunctive and declaratory relief against the TBPP Defendants, the Eleventh Amendment is inapplicable. See Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-60 (1908). The TBPP Defendants argue that “Meza is requesting that Defendants be enjoined from requiring him to wear a jail uniform in order to attend worship” and they have no authority over TCCC to tell it what to do – therefore, they are immune because it is beyond their authority. See Okpalobi v. Foster, 244 F.3d 405, 417 (5th Cir. 2001) (“Thus, any probe into the existence of a Young exception should gauge: (1) the ability of the official to enforce the statute at
11

issue under his statutory or constitutional powers, and (2) the demonstrated willingness of the official to enforce the statute”).
However, the prison uniform requirement is clearly – as delineated above – not the only constraint about which Meza is complaining. His complaints are numerous and he has properly asked for only declaratory and injunctive relief. Under the Eleventh Amendment and Ex Parte Young, the TBPP Defendants are not immune from these claims. Indeed, the Defendants’ argument is not an Eleventh Amendment argument at all. Rather, the TBPP Defendants are claiming that they are not the proper defendants on this claim. Whether that is in fact true is an issue that can be dealt with at the summary judgment or trial stage, but it does not entitle the Defendants to immunity from suit.
In sum, the Court recommends that the TBPP Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss be granted as to Meza’s RLUIPA claims, and be denied as to all other claims. B. Collier’s Third Motion to Dismiss
In his motion to dismiss, Collier first argues that the Court need not reach Meza’s constitutional claims because Meza is a “prisoner” for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e), which precludes all his claims. There are a number of steps to this argument. First, Collier states that Meza is on mandatory supervision. Second, Collier contends, because Meza is on mandatory supervision parole,5 he is a prisoner for purposes of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 42 U.S.C.
5Mandatory supervision is “the release of an eligible inmate . . . so that the inmate may serve the remainder of the inmate’s sentence not on parole but under the supervision of the pardons and paroles division.” TEX. GOV'T CODE § 508.001(5) (Vernon 2004). The parole panel must release an inmate on mandatory supervision when his calendar time plus accrued good-conduct time equals the maximum term to which he was sentenced. Id. § 508.147(a). Release on parole, on the other hand, is discretionary with the panel. Id. §§ 508.001(6); 508.141. Importantly, once released, an inmate on mandatory supervision is considered to be on parole. Id. § 508.147(b).
12

§ 1997e(e). This, Collier argues, means that Meza cannot seek compensatory damages because he has alleged no physical injury, a prerequisite under the statute for alleging any federal constitutional violation. Collier also notes that punitive damages are also not recoverable under the PLRA.
The PLRA defines “prisoner” as “any person incarcerated or detained in any facility who is accused of, convicted of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms and conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(h). The Fifth Circuit has held that the following test is to be used in determining whether a litigant is a “prisoner” for purposes of the PLRA: (1) whether the person is “incarcerated or detained in any facility” and (2) if so, whether it is as a result of his criminal conviction. Jackson v. Johnson, 475 F.3d 261, 265 (5th Cir. 2007). In Jackson, the litigant, who was “a mandatory supervisee of the Pardons and Paroles Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, who reside[d] at a privately operated halfway house,” was held to be a prisoner under the PLRA6 Id. at 267. Here, Meza is a “mandatory supervisee” and is in a halfway house (the TCCC Del Valle Facility7). Given these important indistinguishable facts, the Court must find that Meza is a “prisoner” for purposes of the PLRA.
According to Collier this seals Meza’s fate because § 1997e(e) states that “No federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined to a jail, prison, or other correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury.”
6It is worth noting that the Fifth Circuit’s definition of “prisoner” is contrary to other circuits’ cases. See Jackson, 475 F.3d at 266 (distinguishing contrary holdings from the Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits).
7Travis County Correctional Complex is run by the Travis County Sheriff’s Office. According to Collier, this facility houses parolees and mandatory supervisees in lieu of a halfway house in Travis County that will take people who have been convicted of serious offenses.
13

42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) (emphasis added). Therefore, the argument goes, Meza is a prisoner who has not alleged any physical injury, so his claim(s) must fail because he has no damages. In Geiger v. Jowers, 404 F.3d 371, 375 (5th Cir. 2005), the court stated that:
Section 1997e(e) applies to all federal civil actions in which a prisoner alleges a constitutional violation, making compensatory damages for mental or emotional injuries non-recoverable, absent physical injury. Thus . . . failure to allege physical injury falls squarely under § 1997e(e)’s bar, precluding his recovery of compensatory damages for emotional or mental injuries allegedly suffered as a result of the purported First Amendment violation. However, it seems that Collier has not closely read Meza’s Complaint. Meza is not asking for compensatory damages based on mental or emotional injury, but instead for lost wages. See Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint at 10. Therefore, Collier’s argument misconceives the issue. Meza is also asking for punitive damages. Collier again attempts to trade on the above argument in this context; however, it fails here too: numerous courts of appeals have held that the 1997e(e) bar does not apply to constitutional claims for nominal and punitive damages. See Munn v. Toney, 433 F.3d 1087, 1089 (8th Cir. 2006); Hubbard v. Taylor, 399 F.3d 150, 167 (3rd Cir. 2005); Calhoun v. DeTella, 319 F.3d 936, 940 (7th Cir. 2003); Searles v. Van Bebber, 251 F.3d 869, 879-81 (10th Cir. 2001) (nominal and punitive damages for First Amendment violation not barred); Allah v. Al-Hafeez, 226 F.3d 247, 252 (3rd Cir. 2000) (same); Canell v. Lightner, 143 F.3d 1210, 1213 (9th Cir. 1998) (any form of relief for First Amendment violations available, if not for mental or emotional injury); Thompson v. Carter, 284 F.3d 411, 418 (2nd Cir. 2002) (nominal and punitive damages available for deprivation-of-property claim); Oliver v. Keller, 289 F.3d 623, 630 (9th Cir. 2002) (compensatory, nominal or punitive damages available if premised on alleged unconstitutional conditions of pretrial confinement, and not emotional or mental distress suffered); Doe v. Delie, 257
14

F.3d 309, 314 n.3 & 323 (3rd Cir. 2001) (nominal and punitive damages available for violation of inmates' newly recognized right to medical privacy); but cf. Harris v. Garner, 190 F.3d 1279, 1282, 1287-88 & n. 9 (§ 1997e(e) precludes compensatory and punitive damages for alleged violations of Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments, but expressing no view on nominal damages), vacated & reh’g en banc granted, 197 F.3d 1059 (11th Cir.1999), reinstated in pertinent part, 216 F.3d 970 (11th Cir.2000); Davis, 158 F.3d at 1348-49 (compensatory and punitive damages for violations of constitutional right to privacy barred, but expressing no view on nominal damages).
Collier also argues that Meza has not alleged facts to show that Collier’s conduct rises to the requisite level necessary to secure punitive damages. To warrant punitive damages, Meza must allege facts showing that Collier’s conduct was egregious or reprehensible. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 419 (2003); BMW of North Amer. Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575 (1996). Taking Meza’s allegations as true (as the Court must on a motion to dismiss), the question becomes whether Collier acted sufficiently egregiously so as to permit punitive damages when he prevented Meza from: (1) obtaining a job by sending armed guards with him to interviews and insisting that an armed guard would have to be with him at work; (2) receiving an education; (3) getting computer training (Meza has been incarcerated since 1982); and (4) getting a driver’s license. Meza alleges that these requirements are not imposed on any other supervisee, and are the result of Collier taking a “special interest” in his case.
Applying the liberal standard of Rule 12, the Court concludes that these allegations are sufficient to support a claim for punitive damages. In State Farm, the Court said, “We have instructed courts to determine the reprehensibility of a defendant by considering whether the harm caused was physical as opposed to economic; the tortious conduct evinced an indifference to or a
15

reckless disregard of the health or safety of others; the target of the conduct had financial vulnerability; the conduct involved repeated actions or was an isolated incident; and the harm was the result of intentional malice, trickery, or deceit, or mere accident.” State Farm, 538 U.S. at 419. While it is difficult to compare and contrast fundamental rights protected in the Constitution, it is probably fair to say that, save for life, liberty is the most protected, cherished right preserved by our founding document. Arbitrary restrictions on liberty, imposed based upon a person taking a “special interest” in a supervisee’s case, may rise to a level sufficient to permit the recovery of punitive damages. Whether that in fact has happened in this case is something for a later day; at this stage of the proceedings the Court must accept Meza’s pleadings as true, and those pleadings are sufficient to state a claim for punitive damages.
Collier’s final argument is that Meza’s RLUIPA claim should be dismissed because the statute does not contemplate recovery of damages against individuals and Meza is seeking compensatory and punitive damages against Collier. Although it is not clear from the complaint that Meza is asking for compensatory and punitive damages against Collier for RLUIPA violations, Collier is, in any event, correct that RLUIPA governs the conduct of the government, not individuals. See Gooden v. Crain, 405 F. Supp.2d 714, 723 (E.D. Tex. 2005) (statute only provides for relief “against a government”).8 Therefore, if Meza is asserting a RLUIPA claim against Collier, it is recommended that it be dismissed.
8However, it is unclear whether the statute prohibits damages in toto, as Collier intimates. See id.; see also Smith v. Haley, 401 F. Supp.2d 1240, 1245-47 (M.D. Ala. 2005) (noting that it is unclear whether damages are unavailable in addition to injunctive relief).
16

In sum, then, Collier’s argument that all of Meza’s claims should be dismissed because he is a prisoner is rejected, but it is recommended that Meza’s RLUIPA claim, if one in fact was pled against Collier, be dismissed against Collier in his individual capacity.9
RECOMMENDATION The Court RECOMMENDS that the Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss (Clerk’s Docket Nos. 130 & 150) be GRANTED IN PART, and DENIED IN PART. The Court recommends that the Motions to Dismiss be GRANTED as to Meza’s RLUIPA claims (and any claims for damages thereunder). The Court recommends that these Motions to Dismiss be DENIED as to all other claims. The Magistrate Court further RECOMMENDS that Defendant Collier’s Third Motion to Dismiss (Clerk’s Docket No. 162) be GRANTED IN PART, and DENIED IN PART. The Court recommends that the Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED as to Meza’s RLUIPA claims (and any claims for damages thereunder). The Court recommends that the Motion to Dismiss be DENIED as to all other claims, namely the equal protection claims and due process claims based on alleged differential treatment.
9Inexplicably, Collier contends in his Third Motion to Dismiss that he did not raise a qualified immunity argument in his motion for summary judgment, and he was therefore raising that argument for resolution. Clerk’s Doc. No. 162 at 1-2. That is clearly incorrect, however, as a qualified immunity argument is quite plainly raised in the summary judgment motion under the heading “Defendant Collier is Entitled to Qualified Immunity.” See Defendant Collier’s Motion for Summary Judgment with Brief in Support Clerk’s Doc. No. 110 at 9. The Court will therefore address the qualified immunity argument when it addresses the summary judgment motion.
17

V. WARNINGS The parties may file objections to this Report and Recommendation. A party filing objections must specifically identify those findings or recommendations to which objections are being made. The District Court need not consider frivolous, conclusive, or general objections. See Battle v. United States Parole Comm’n, 834 F.2d 419, 421 (5th Cir. 1987). A party’s failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations contained in this Report within ten (10) days after the party is served with a copy of the Report shall bar that party from de novo review by the District Court of the proposed findings and recommendations in the Report and, except upon grounds of plain error, shall bar the party from appellate review of unobjected-to proposed factual findings and legal conclusions accepted by the District Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150-53, 106 S. Ct. 466, 472-74 (1985); Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1428-29 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc). To the extent that a party has not been served by the Clerk with this Report & Recommendation electronically pursuant to the CM/ECF procedures of this District, the Clerk is directed to mail such party a copy of this Report and Recommendation to the parties by certified mail, return receipt requested. SIGNED this 5th day of June, 2007.
_____________________________________ ANDREW W. AUSTIN UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
18

 </s> Case 1:05-cv-01008-LY Document 211 Filed 06/13/07 Page 1 of 8

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
AUSTIN DIVISION

FILED
·ZOBl JUH r 3 PH 12: 19

RAULMEZA,

§

PLAINTIFF,

§

§

V.

§

§

BRAD LIVINGSTON,

§

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE TEXAS §

DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, §

IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY;

§

BRIAN COLLIER, DIRECTOR OF THE §

TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL §

JUSTICE PAROLE DIVISION, IN HIS §

OFFICIAL AND INDIVIDUAL

§

CAPACITIES; AND RISSIE L. OWENS, §

JOSE ALISEDA, CHARLES AYCOCK, §

CONRITH DAVIS, JACKIE

§

DENOYELLES, LINDA GARCIA, AND §

JUANITA M. GONZALES, IN THEIR §

OFFICIAL CAPACITIES AS MEMBERS §

OF THE TEXAS BOARD OF PARDONS §

AND PAROLES,

§

DEFENDANTS. §

CAUSE NO. A-OS-CA-1 008-LY

ORDER

Before the Court are PlaintiffMeza's Motion to Compel Defendants Collier and Livingston

to Respond to His First Discovery Requests filed February 16, 2007 (Clerk's Document 84),

Livingston and Collier's response filed March 7,2007 (Clerk's Document 102), Meza's reply filed

March 15, 2007 (Clerk's Document 115), and Livingston and Collier' s Sur-Reply to Plaintiff s Reply

to Response to Motion to Compel Discovery filed May 2,2007 (Clerk's Document 160); and Meza' s

Motion to Compel Defendant Livingston to Respond to His Second Discovery Requests filed March

14,2007 (Clerk's Document 107), Livingston's Response to Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Second

Case 1:05-cv-01008-LY Document 211 Filed 06/13/07 Page 2 of 8
Discovery Requests filed May 2,2007 (Clerk's Document 159), and Plaintiff's Reply to Defendant Livingston's Response to Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Defendant Livingston to Respond to Plaintiff's Second Discovery Requests filed May 9, 2007 (Clerk's Document 170). Also before the Court is the parties' Joint Status Report on Discovery Issues filed May 25,2007 (Clerk's Document 202). On May 17, 2007, the Court conducted a hearing on Meza' s motions at which all parties were represented by counsel and at which counsel for Meza and Defendants Livingston and Collier presented oral argument. Having considered Meza's motion and other filings submitted by the parties, the oral argument of counsel, the applicable law, and the entire case file, the Court renders the following order.
Meza first asks this Court to compel Defendant Collier in his individual capacity to respond to interrogatories and to produce specific documents. In addition to seeking information from Collier in his individual capacity, Meza seeks information from Defendants Livingston and Collier in their official capacities. By the parties' Joint Status Report, Meza agrees to withdraw a number of his discovery requests. This Court will consider whether to grant Meza's motions to compel as to the remaining requests. Qualified Immunity
Defendant Collier opposes Meza's motion to compel Collier, in his individual capacity, to respond to discovery on the grounds that he is immune from Meza's discovery requests under the doctrine of qualified immunity. Defendant Collier first made this claim in his Motion for Protective Order filed in this Court on July 28, 2006. Collier's motion for protective order was referred to United States Magistrate Judge Andrew Austin for resolution. On August 30, 2006, Judge Austin denied Collier's first motion for protective order because Judge Austin had rendered a Report and
2

Case 1:05-cv-01008-LY Document 211 Filed 06/13/07 Page 3 of 8
Recommendation on Collier's Motion to Dismiss (Clerk's Document 26), recommending that Collier's motion be denied as to Plaintiff's claims for prospective injunctive relief and that such claims against Collier remain pending for trial. Judge Austin advised Collier that, if this Court rejected the Report and Recommendation regarding Meza's claims for prospective injunctive relief, Collier could then renew his request for a protective order. Despite this Court's acceptance ofJudge Austin's Report and Recommendation, Collier renewed his request for a protective order. This Court denied Collier's second motion for a protective order on February 6, 2007, noting that is requested relief that was identical to the relief requested in Collier's first motion for a protective order.
Despite this Court's prior rulings and the Court's statement in open court that Collier may no longer claim qualified immunity as a defense to discovery in this action, Collier maintains in his response to Meza's motion to compel that Collier should not be subject to discovery requests because he is entitled to qualified immunity. Having considered Collier's renewed arguments, the Court will overrule Collier's objections to discovery on the grounds of qualified immunity. Number of Interrogatories
Collier, in his official capacity and his individual capacity, and Livingston object that Meza is seeking more than the permitted number ofinterrogatories when the subparts ofeach interrogatory are counted. Parties are limited to serving no more than 25 written interrogatories on another party, "including all discrete subparts." Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(a). In this Court, other than five specifically designated multipart questions that may be considered one question each, "subparts count as separate questions." W.D. Tex. Local R. CV-33. Although Meza contends that his subparts relate to a "common theme," Rule 33 and Local Rule CV-33's limit applies even if a number of the
3

Case 1:05-cv-01008-LY Document 211 Filed 06/13/07 Page 4 of 8
interrogatories are related, other than the subparts specifically designated by this Court's local rules. This Court will deny Meza's motion to compel Livingston and Collier to answer more than 25 interrogatory subparts.
In light of the interrogatories to Collier in his individual capacity that Meza agrees to withdraw, the Court finds that the remaining interrogatories will not exceed 25, including subparts. The Court will overrule Collier's objections regarding numerosity of interrogatories as to the remaining Interrogatories 1 and 7 in Meza's First Set of Discovery Requests to Collier in his individual capacity. Similarly, in light of the interrogatories to Collier and Livingston in their official capacities that Meza agrees to withdraw, the Court will overrule Livingston and Collier's objections regarding numerosity of interrogatories as to the remaining Interrogatories 1 and 8 in Meza's First Set of Discovery Requests to Defendants in their official capacities and to Interrogatories 1 and 2 of the Second Set of Discovery Requests to Livingston.
Objections to Requests as Overly Broad and Irrelevant Livingston and Collier object to several of Meza's discovery requests on the grounds that the requests are "overly broad, unduly burdensome, and harassing and not reasonably limited in scope and time ... irrelevant and not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence." Livingston and Collier's objection relates to Interrogatories 3 and 7 and Request for Production 1 of Meza's First Set of Discovery Requests to Collier in his individual capacity; Interrogatories 1 and 8 and Request for Production 1 of Meza's First Set of Discovery Requests to Defendants in their official capacities; and to Interrogatories 1 and 2 and Request for Production 1 ofMeza's Second Set of Discovery Requests to Livingston. The Court again notes that Meza has agreed to withdraw many ofhis requests for discovery.
4

Case 1:05-cv-01008-LY Document 211 Filed 06/13/07 Page 5 of 8
The Court has reviewed the remaining objected-to requests and concludes that these requests are relevant to the claims asserted by Meza or to the defenses asserted by Livingston or Collier. The Court does not find these requests to fall outside the scope of appropriate discovery. Noting that Livingston and Collier do not dispute Meza's contention that only twelve parolees are housed at the Travis County Correctional Complex ("TCCC") each month, the Court concludes that the requests regarding all parolees at TCCC since September 1, 2002, will not unduly burden Livingston and Collier. The requests "appear[] reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence." Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
The Court acknowledges that Interrogatories 1 and 2 in Meza's Second Set of Discovery Requests to Livingston in his official capacity request information that is quite broad in scope. However, these interrogatories, regarding all releasees from TDC] custody since September 1,2002, who were previously convicted for murder or sexual assault, are not "overly broad." The interrogatories are limited in scope by the years for which data is requested and by the types of offenses for which the releasees were convicted. The interrogatories request basic, statistical information on each releasee, of the type that may be readily available to Livingston and is likely relevant to Meza's equal-protection claims that he is treated differently from other TDC] parolees based on Defendants' improper motives. The Court further notes that Livingston did not timely respond to Meza's motion to compel answers to these specific interrogatories, allowing the Court to grant Meza's motion to compel responses to these interrogatories as unopposed. See W.D. Tex. Local R. CV-7(d) (requiring party opposed to motion to respond within eleven days of service of motion and allowing district court to grant motion as unopposed if no timely response is filed). Livingston and Collier's objections on the grounds that Meza's requests for discovery are "overly
5

Case 1:05-cv-01008-LY Document 211 Filed 06/13/07 Page 6 of 8
broad, unduly burdensome, and harassing and not reasonably limited in scope and time ... irrelevant and not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence" will therefore be overruled. Privileges Claimed by Livingston and Collier
Livingston and Collier oppose several of Meza' s discovery requests on the basis that they request information that is confidential and privileged under a Texas statute protecting parole files from discovery. See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 508.313(a) (West 2004). Livingston and Collier's objection relates to Interrogatories 1 and 3 and Requests for Production 1, 2, and 5 of the First Set of Discovery Requests to Collier in his individual capacity; Interrogatory 1 and Requests for Production 1 and 2 of the First Set of Discovery Requests to Defendants in their official capacities; and to Interrogatories 1and 2 and Request for Production 1ofthe Second Set ofDiscovery Requests to Livingston.
Livingston and Collier further object to parts of Interrogatory 3 to Meza's First Set of Discovery Requests to Collier in his individual capacity and to Interrogatories 1 and 2 to Meza's Second Set ofDiscovery Requests to Livingston on the grounds that Meza' s interrogatories request information that is confidential and privileged under a Texas statute protecting criminal-history records. See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 411.083 (West 2004).
The Court has received Livingston and Collier's privilege logs claiming that the parole-file privilege protects the majority of the documents requested by Meza in his motions to compel. The Courtwill set a hearing on the issue ofwhether the aforementioned privileges protect the information sought by Meza in his discovery requests. The parties shall present evidence and argument as to the interests protected by the statutory privileges, and the relevance and necessity of the requested
6

Case 1:05-cv-01008-LY Document 211 Filed 06/13/07 Page 7 of 8
documents to Meza's claims. The Court will expect a proffer of evidence from Livingston and Collier as to how the files over which Livingston and Collier claim the parole-file privilege are maintained, where such parole files are located, who is the custodian of such files, and any other evidence that will assist the Court in determining the extent to which the parole-file privilege will be applied in this action.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Meza's Motion to Compel Defendants Collier and Livingston to Respond to His First Discovery Requests (Clerk's Document 84) is GRANTED IN PART as to Interrogatory 7 of Meza' s First Set of Discovery Requests to Collier in his individual capacity and Interrogatory 8ofMeza's First Set ofDiscovery Requests to Defendants in their official capacities. Livingston and Collier shall serve counsel for Meza with responses no later than 5:00 p.m., June 22, 2007.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Meza's Motion to Compel Defendant Livingston to Respond to His Second Discovery Requests (Clerk's Document 107) is GRANTED IN PART as to Request for Production 1 ofMeza's Second Set of Discovery Requests to Livingston. Livingston and Collier shall deliver documents responsive to Request for Production 1 to counsel for Meza no later than 5:00 p.m., June 22, 2007, to the extent that such documents are in the possession or under the control of Livingston or Collier.
IT IS FINALLY ORDERED that a hearing on the Texas statutory privileges asserted by Livingston and Collier as grounds for objections to Meza's discovery requests is set for 2:00 p.m., Tuesday, June 26, 2007, Courtroom No.1, United States Courthouse, 200 West 8th Street, Austin, Texas 78701. The final pretrial conference in this cause will also be held in Courtroom No.1 at 2:00
7

Case 1:05-cv-01008-LY Document 211 Filed 06/13/07 Page 8 of 8

p.m., Tuesday, June 26, 2007.

/Jilt SIGNED this

day of June, 2007.

8

 </s> Case 1:05-cv-01008-LY Document 218 Filed 06/15/07 Page 1 of 3

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
AUSTIN DIVISION

RAUL MEZA, Plaintiff,
v.
BRAD LIVINGSTON, et al., Defendants.

§

§

§

§

Civil Action No. 1:05-CV-1008-LY

§

Jury

§

§

STIPULATION OF PARTIAL DISMISSAL

TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF THE DISTRICT COURT:

Plaintiff Raul Meza, through his attorney of record, files this Stipulation of Partial Dismissal

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41.

1. Rule 41(a)(1) provides that a plaintiff may voluntarily dismiss his action, without order of

the Court, by filing a stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties who have appeared in the

action. FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a)(1)(ii).

2. Plaintiff is voluntarily dism issing all clai ms against Def endant Bryan Collier in his

individual capacity only. Plaintiff is retaininghis claims against Defendant Bryan Collier in

his official capacity and his claims against all other defendants.

3. In accordance with Rule 41, this dismissal will be without prejudice.

Respectfully submitted,

1405

/s/ Scott Medlock JAMES C. HARRINGTON State Bar No. 09048500 SCOTT MEDLOCK State Bar No. 24044783
TEXAS CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT Montopolis Drive

Case 1:05-cv-01008-LY Document 218 Filed 06/15/07 Page 2 of 3
Austin, Texas 78741
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF RAUL MEZA
GREG ABBOTT Attorney General of Texas
KENT SULLIVAN First Assistant Attorney General
DAVID S. MORALES Deputy Attorney General for Civil Litigation
DAVID A. TALBOT, JR. Assistant Attorney General Chief, Law Enforcement Defense Division
/s/ Celamaine Cunniff CELAMAINE CUNNIFF Assistant Attorney General State Bar No. 05231500
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS LIVINGSTON AND COLLIER
/s/ M. Carol Gardner M. CAROL GARDNER Assistant Attorney General State Bar No. 09329490
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS OWENS, ALISEDA, DENOYELLES, DAVIS, AYCOCK, GARCIA AND GONZALES
P.O. Box 12548, Capitol Station Austin, Texas 78711 (512) 463-2080 (512) 495-9139 (FAX)
NOTICE OF ELECTRONIC FILING

Case 1:05-cv-01008-LY Document 218 Filed 06/15/07 Page 3 of 3
I, Scott Medlock, Attorney for Plaintiff, do hereby certify that I have electronically
submitted for filing, a true and correct copy of the above Stipulation of Partial Dismissal in
accordance with the Electronic CaseFiles System of the Western District of Texas, on this the 15th
day of June, 2007.
/s/ Scott Medlock Scott Medlock Attorney for Plaintiff
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Scott Medlock, Attorney for Plaintiff, do hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
above and foregoing Stipulation of Partial Dismissal has been served fax, on this the 15th day of
June, 2007, to:
Celamaine Cunniff Assistant Attorney General P.O. Box 12548, Capitol Station Austin, Texas 78711 (512) 495-9139 Attorneys for Defendants
Carol Gardner Assistant Attorney General P.O. Box 12548, Capitol Station Austin, Texas 78711 (512) 495-9139 Attorney for Co-Defendants

 </s> Case 1:05-cv-01008-LY Document 238 Filed 06/25/07 Page 1 of 3

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FIl E0

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXlIl JUN 25 PH 3: 51

RAULMEZA,

AUSTIN DIVISION §

us CLERK

llx H

;,

T CO

T

WESTERN 01 T~I T F 1. XAS

PLAINTIFF,

§

BY _--lrl--"'~~--

§

V.

§

§

INDIVIDUAL PAROLE OFFICERS, IN §

THEIR INDIVIDUAL AND OFFICIAL §

CAPACITIES, BRAD LIVINGSTON,

§

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE TEXAS §

DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE § CAUSE NO. A-05-CA-I008-LY

IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY, AND

§

BRIAN COLLIER, DIRECTOR OF THE §

TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL §

JUSTICE PAROLE DIVISION, IN HIS §

OFFICIAL AND INDIVIDUAL

§

CAPACITIES,

§

DEFENDANTS. §

ORDER ON REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Before the Court are Defendant Collier's Third Motion to Dismiss filed May 3,2007 (Clerk's

Document 162) and PlaintiffMeza's response (Clerk's Document 167); Defendant Owens's Motion

to Dismiss filed AprilS, 2007 (Clerk's Document 130) and Meza's response filed April 12, 2007

(Clerk's Document 132); and Defendants Aliseda, Davis, Denoyelles, Aycock, Garcia, and

Gonzales's ("Texas Board ofPardons and Paroles Defendants"') Motion to Dismiss filed April 23,

2007 (Clerk's Document 150) and Meza's response filed April 23, 2007 (Clerk's Document 151).

The District Court referred the motions to the Magistrate Judge for report and recommendation

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l), Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72, and Rule 1 of Appendix C

of the Local Rules of the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas. After

considering the parties' pleadings and other filings, the relevant case law, and the case file, the

Magistrate Court signed a Report and Recommendation on June 5, 2007 (Clerk's Document 207),

Case 1:05-cv-01008-LY Document 238 Filed 06/25/07 Page 2 of 3
recommending that this Court grant Owens's and Aliseda, Davis, Denoyelles, Aycock, Garcia, and Gonzales's ("Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles Defendants"') motions to dismiss as to Meza's claims under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act ("RLUIPA" claims), and that the motions be denied in all other respects. The Magistrate Judge further recommended that Collier's motion to dismiss be granted as to Meza's RLUIPAclaims and denied in all other respects.
A party may serve and file specific, written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations ofthe Magistrate Judge within ten (10) days after being served with a copy ofthe Report and Recommendation, and thereby secure a de novo review by the district court. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). A party's failure to timely file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions, and recommendations in a Report and Recommendation bars that party, except upon grounds of plain error, from attacking on appeal the unobjected-to proposed factual findings and legal conclusions accepted by the District Court. See Douglass v. United Services Auto Ass 'n, 79 FJd 1415 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
The parties in this case were properly notified of the consequences of a failure to file objections, which were due June 20, 2007. Meza did not file objections to the findings of fact and conclusions of law in the report and recommendation; rather, Meza states that he is unopposed to the dismissal of his RLUIPA's claims in light of the Magistrate Judge's recommendation. Collier has also failed to timely file objections to the Report and Recommendation. Having reviewed the Report and Recommendation along with the record in this case and finding no plain error, the Court accepts the Report and Recommendation for the reasons stated therein as to dismissal of Meza' s RLUIPA claims and denial in part of Collier's motion to dismiss.
Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles Defendants timely filed objections to the Magistrate's
2

Case 1:05-cv-01008-LY Document 238 Filed 06/25/07 Page 3 of 3
Judge's Report and Recommendations (Clerk's Documents 212). After a de novo review of the record as to the issues raised by the Texas Board ofPardons and Paroles Defendants, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a), and having considered the objections and the applicable law, this Court is of the opinion that the Report and Recommendation should be approved and accepted for the reasons stated therein as to denial in part of Owens's and Aliseda, Davis, Denoyelles, Aycock, Garcia, and Gonzales's motions to dismiss.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Owens, Aliseda, Davis, Denoyelles, Aycock, Garcia, and Gonzales's Objections to the Report and Recommendation of the United Magistrate Judge are OVERRULED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the United States Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation (Clerk's Document 207) is hereby APPROVED AND ACCEPTED.
IT IS ORDERED that Collier's Third Motion to Dismiss (Clerk's Document 162) is GRANTED IN PART as to Meza's RLUIPA claims. In all other respects, the motion is denied.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Owens's Motion to Dismiss (Clerk's Document 130) is GRANTED IN PART as to Meza's RLUIP A claims. In all other respects, the motion is denied.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants Aliseda, Davis, Denoyelles, Aycock, Garcia, and Gonzales's Motion to Dismiss (Clerk's Document 150) is GRANTED IN PART as to Meza's RLUIPA claims. In all other respects, the motion is denied.
SIGNED this.o=iIt day of June, 2007.
3

 </s> Case 1:05-cv-01008-LY Document 258 Filed 07/10/07 Page 1 of 1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FIl EO

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS AUSTIN DIVISION

tft*7· JUl IO·
LUU

P·H

2-
•

5 5

RAULMEZA,

§

PLAINT1FF,

§

§

V.

§

§

BRAD LIVINGSTON,

§

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE TEXAS §

DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, §

IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY;

§

BRIAN COLLIER, DIRECTOR OF THE §

TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL §

JUSTICE PAROLE DIVISION, IN HIS §

OFFICIAL AND INDIVIDUAL

§

CAPACITIES; AND RISSIE L. OWENS, §

JOSE ALISEDA, CHARLES AYCOCK, §

CONRITH DAVIS, JACKIE

§

DENOYELLES, LINDA GARCIA, AND §

JUANITA M. GONZALES, IN THEIR §

OFFICIAL CAPACITIES AS MEMBERS §

OF THE TEXAS BOARD OF PARDONS §

AND PAROLES,

§

DEFENDANTS. §

BY _ _ _ ~~ __
CAUSE NO. A-05-CA-1008-LY

ORDER

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the bench trial in this action scheduled for the month of

July 2007 is CANCELED. All Defendants having filed notices of interlocutory appeal, this Court lacks jurisdiction to

rule on any pending motion.

/&lIIt SIGNED this

day of July, 2007.

 </s> Case 1:05-cv-01008-LY Document 286 Filed 08/18/08 Page 1 of 7

United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit
F I LED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS July 23, 2008

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk

No. 07-50756

L1 FILED D.C. Docket No. 1: 05-CV-1008

RAUL MEZA

Plaintiff - Appellee

AUG 1 8 2008
CLERK (J
BwYeSTeRN'OS'I-~O.'J/SI;TIR7I'J/C/fJ FCTOUXRATS

v.
BRAD LIVINGSTON, Executive director of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, in his official capacity; STUART JENKINS, director of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice Parole Division, in his official capacity
Defendants - Appellants

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, Austin.
Before HIGGINBOTHAM, DAVIS, and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges.
JUDGMENT This cause was considered on the record on appeal and the briefs on file.
It is ordered and adjudged that the judgment of the District Court is affirmed.

ISSUED AS MANDATE: '~UG 1 4 ,~"

A True Copy Attest
Clerk, U.S. Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit
By:~R!mant;"
DeputY,P1fi
New Orleans, Louisiana

Case 1:05-cv-01008-LY Document 286 Filed 08/18/08 Page 2 of 7

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FO R THE FIFTH CIR CUlT

United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit
F I LED

July 23, 2008

No. 07-50756

Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk

RAULMEZA

Plaintiff - Appellee v.

BRAD LIVINGSTON, Executive director of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, in his official capacity; STUART JENKINS, director of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice Parole Division, in his official capacity

Defendants - Appellants

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, DAVIS, and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges. PATRICK E. HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judge:
Raul Meza, an inmate on supervised release at the Texas County Correctional Complex, filed Fourteenth Amendment claims against state officials! and the Sheriff of Travis County on December 5, 2005. Eleventh Amendment immunity was asserted in several motions, including a motion to dismiss on May 22, 2006, and a motion to dismiss and alternative motion for Rule 7(a) reply filed by Collier, Jenkins' predecessor, on June 27, 2006. The
1 The original complaint named the former director of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice Parole Division, Brian Collier.

Case 1:05-cv-01008-LY Document 286 Filed 08/18/08 Page 3 of 7
No. 07-50756 , district court referred these motions to a magistrate judge for recommendation
or resolution on June 30, 2006. The magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation on August 28, 2006, stating, "Plaintiffs claims for injunctive relief ... should not be dismissed, as they are cognizable under Ex Parte Young." On December 6, 2006, the district court accepted the recommendations, granting Defendants' first motion to dismiss with respect to Meza's monetary claims against Livingston and Collier in their official capacity and denying Defendants' motion with respect to prospective injunctive relief. For Collier's motion to dismiss and motion for a Rule 7(a) reply, the court denied the motion to dismiss but granted Collier's motion for a Rule 7(a) reply,2 ordering Meza to reply and describe Collier's personal involvement in the alleged unconstitutional acts. Meza replied.
On June 30, 2006, Meza filed an amended complaint. Livingston and Collier filed a second motion to dismiss on February 7, 2007, again raising Eleventh Amendment immunity claims. Livingston and Collier then submitted a joint motion for summary judgment on March 14, 2007. The court found that the summary judgment arguments were "duplicative of those contained" in the pending second motions to dismiss and concluded, "The Court will therefore dismiss Livingston and Collier's motions to dismiss and will consider Livingston and Collier's arguments as submitted in their pending motions for summary judgment." In this same order, the court referred the motions for summary judgment to the magistrate judge on May 1, 2007.
Defendants filed two motions to stay the pretrial conference hearing and trial setting with the district court and an emergency motion to stay with this court, which we denied. On June 26, 2007, the district court held the final pretrial hearing and stated,
2 This was of course in the context of qualified immunity.
2

Case 1:05-cv-01008-LY Document 286 Filed 08/18/08 Page 4 of 7
No. 07-50756
These [immunity] motions, I believe, were filed on March the 14th and referred to [the] Magistrate Judge ... who has them under advisement at this time, and, therefore, I will have them under advisement. ...
I want the record to be very clear that I have never refused to rule on any of the immunity motions that are before me .... Those motions remain pending in front of me and you are not faced with a refusal to rule.
When the district court held its final pretrial hearing, the magistrate had not yet issued a report on the Eleventh Amendment claims raised in Defendants' motion for summary judgment.3 The Eleventh Amendment question with respect to summary judgment remained "under advisement."
On appeal, Defendants argue that by "failing" to rule on the issue, the district court has effectively refused to rule on immunity and that the refusal is an immediately appealable order under the collateral order doctrine.4 Meza argues that the appeal is an improper interlocutory appeal and that we do not have jurisdiction to review it, as the court has not denied their immunity claims on summary judgment, nor has it refused to rule. He urges that Defendants could have appealed the district court's December 6, 2006, denial oftheir motion to dismiss - including the court's denial of their immunity claims - as a collateral order but failed to do so. Meza similarly maintains that Defendants' summary judgment motion is essentially a motion to reconsider the district court's denial of plaintiffs' motion to dismiss and that an order denying a motion to reconsider is not appealable. Furthermore, Meza maintains, the district court
3 The magistrate's last report was issued on June 5, 2007. This report addressed other Defendants' claims, including Eleventh Amendment claims of Defendants Owens, Aliseda, Aycock, Davis, DeNoyelles, Garcia, and Gonzales, but not Livingston and Jenkins' claims of Eleventh Amendment immunity raised in their motion for summary judgment.
4 See Helton v. Clements, 787 F.2d 1016, 1017 (5th Cir. 1986) (per curiam).
3

Case 1:05-cv-01008-LY Document 286 Filed 08/18/08 Page 5 of 7
No. 07-50756
. has not refused to rule on the issue but was simply awaiting the magistrate's report on the summary judgment motion when Defendants appealed. We are persuaded that we lack jurisdiction to hear this appeal. Instead of appealing the district court's December 6,2006, denial of Defendants' motion to dismiss, which included Eleventh Amendment immunity claims,5 Defendants appeal the district court's failure to address their Eleventh Amendment claims in a motion for summary judgment that was being considered by the magistrate judge when Defendants appealed. This is an unreviewable interlocutory appeal. "The denial of a summary judgment is generally not a final, appealable order.,,6 A district court's failure to rule on a summary judgment motion while awaiting a magistrate judge's report and recommendation on that motion is similarly unreviewable. Here, although the initial briefing on the summary judgment motion was completed as of May 11, 2007, the magistrate ordered additional briefing, and Defendants appealed before the district court could receive the magistrate's report. "'[U]nderthe collateral order doctrine, a small class ofinterlocutory orders that (1) conclusively determine ["the defendant's claim of right not to stand trial"f, (2) important issues, which are separate from the merits of the action, and (3) which would be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment, are deemed 'final' for purposes of appeal."'s In at least one case, we have held that a district court's refusal to rule on a motion to dismiss containing
5 We are not persuaded by Meza's arguments that Defendants' failure to appeal the denial of their motion to dismiss resulted in a waiver of their immunity claims or that their motion for summary judgment was by necessity a motion to reconsider. We simply note that the court ruled on the Eleventh Amendment immunity issue in denying Defendants' motion to dismiss with respect to Meza's claims for prospective injunctive relief.
6 Reyes v. City of Richmond, Tex., 287 F.3d 346, 350 (5th Cir. 2002).
7 Helton, 787 F.2d at 1017 (quoting Mitchell V. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 527 (1985».
8 Reyes, 287 F.3d at 350 (quoting Cantu V. Rocha, 77 F.3d 795, 802 (5th Cir.1996».
4

Case 1:05-cv-01008-LY Document 286 Filed 08/18/08 Page 6 of 7
No. 07-50756 , claims of absolute and qualified immunity constituted a final order under the collateral order doctrine.9 We are not persuaded that this case falls under
Helton's narrow holding. Unlike in Helton, the district court ruled on defendants' motion to dismiss, denying their Eleventh Amendment immunity claims with the exception of immunity from Meza's claims involving monetary damages, a ruling that Defendants do not appeal here. Although the district court has not yet ruled on Defendants' motion for summary judgment, it has not refused to rule on that motion, stating that it has it "under advisement." In Helton, in contrast, the district court made it clear that it would not rule on further immunity claims until trial, stating,
[A]ll parties and attorneys are here notified that any further motions in this case will not be ruled upon by the court prior to trial but will be carried along with the trial of the case on the merits. This ruling applies to any pending motions ....10
Nor has the district court "failed" to rule on the motion. It referred the motion to the magistrate judge for a report and recommendations, and Defendants appealed before the court received the report, thus temporarily depriving that court of jurisdiction to grant or deny the motion.
Defendants urge that "[a]lthough this Court has not issued any further published opinions [after Helton] recognizing other instances where the refusal or failure to rule resulted in an immediately appealable order under the collateral order doctrine," other circuits have. In those cases, the district court either refused to rule, failed to explain its reasons for delaying a ruling on qualified immunity until trial, or dismissed an immunity claim implicitly or in
9 Helton, 787 F.2d at 1017. 10 Id.
5

. '

Case 1:05-cv-01008-LY Document 286 Filed 08/18/08 Page 7 of 7

No. 07-50756

. an oral ruling. 11 We are not convinced that we should "extend" Helton to the facts of this case, as none of these circumstances apply here. AFFIRMED.

11 See, e.g., Parton v. Ashcroft, 16 F.3d 226,227 (8th Cir. 1994) ("On the morning of trial the magistrate judge refused to rule on the motion for summary judgment on the ground of qualified immunity."); Workman v. Jordan, 958 F.2d 332, 334 (10th Cir. 1992) ("The district court, without explanation, postponed disposition ofthe qualified immunity issue until trial."); Id. at 336 n.5 ("Although the oral ruling may have lacked procedural formality for purposes of appeal, we allow the appeal from this ruling because there is no question as to its finality ...."); Craft v. Wipf, 810 F.2d 170, 172 (8th Cir. 1987) ("In its memorandum opinion, the District Court held only that it would not abstain from hearing the case. It is conceivable that it considered abstention to be the logical first step in deciding the various issues raised in defendants' motion for summary judgment, and that it intended to decide other issues, such as immunity, later. This seems somewhat unlikely, however, given the court's reference to the plaintiffs' day in court and its direction for discovery to be completed in sixty days.").
6

 </s> Case 1:05-cv-01008-LY Document 305 Filed 10/22/08 Page 1 of 3

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
AUSTIN DIVISION

FflED III OCT 22 AM 8: 23

RAULMEZA,

§

§

PLAINTIFF,

§

§

V.

§

§

BRAD LIVINGSTON, EXECUTIVE

§

DIRECTOR OF THE TEXAS

§

DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL

§

JUSTICE, IN HIS OFFICIAL

§

CAPACITY; BRIAN COLLIER,

§

DIRECTOR OF THE TEXAS

§

DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL

§

JUSTICE PAROLE DIVISION, IN HIS §

OFFICIAL CAPACITY; AND RISSIE L. §

OWENS, JOSE ALISEDA, CHARLES §

AYCOCK, CONRITH DAVIS, JACKIE §

DENOYELLES, LINDA GARCIA, AND §

JUANITA M. GONZALES, IN THEIR §

OFFICIAL CAPACITIES AS MEMBERS §

OF THE TEXAS BOARD OF PARDONS §

AND PAROLES,

§

§

DEFENDANTS.

§

§

CAUSE NO. A-05-CA-1008-LY

ORDER Before the Court is the above-entitled and nwnbered cause. Pending in this cause are Defendant Livingston and Collier's Motion for Summary Judgment with Brief in Support filed March 14,2007 (Clerk's Document 109), Defendant Collier's Motion for Summary Judgment with Brief in Support filed March 14,2007 (Clerk's Document 110), and Plaintiff Meza's Motion for Partial Swnmary Judgment filed March 14,2007 (Clerk's Document 112), which this Court referred to United States Magistrate Judge Andrew Austin for report and recommendation on May 1,2007

Case 1:05-cv-01008-LY Document 305 Filed 10/22/08 Page 2 of 3
(Clerk's Document 157). See 28 U.S.c. § 636(b); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72; Loc. R. W.D. Tex. App. C, l(d). It is ORDERED that the referral of such motions to Magistrate Judge Austin is hereby WITHDRAWN.
Collier's above-referenced motion for summary judgment pertains to Meza's claims against him in his individual capacity. On June 15,2007, Plaintiff Raul Meza and Defendants stipulated to the dismissal of Meza's claims against Defendant Brian Collier in his individual capacity (Clerk's Document 218). The Court therefore DISMISSES Collier's Motion for Summary Judgment with Brief in Support (Clerk's Document 110).
Also pending before the Court are Defendants' Opposed Joint Motion to Stay Pretrial Hearing and Trial Setting with Brief in Support filed June 5, 2007 (Clerk's Document 206), Defendants' Opposed Joint Motion to Stay Compliance with Local Rule CV-16(e) with Brief in Support filed June 15, 2007 (Clerk's Document 213), Defendants' Opposed Second Motion to Stay Pretrial Hearing and Trial Setting with Brief in Support filed June 19,2007 (Clerk's Document 225), and Defendants Owens, Aliseda, Davis, Denoyelles, Aycock, Garcia, and Gonzales' Motion to Cancel the Trial Setting and Motion to Issue New Scheduling Order filed June 25, 2007 (Clerk's Document 240). Such motions pertain to the Court's final-pretrial-conference setting on June 26, 2007, and related requirements, and are therefore moot. The motions are hereby DISMISSED.
Also pending before the Court is Plaintiff s Daubert Challenge to Defendants' Expert Designation filed June 21, 2007 (Clerk's Document 233). By his motion, Meza asks the Court to exclude the testimony of Vivian Heine or her designee. Livingston and Collier would have been required to file a response to such motion on or before July 2, 2007, but filed their notice of interlocutory appeal on June 22, 2007, before the response time had run. See Loc. R. W.D. Tex. CV-
2

..

Case 1:05-cv-01008-LY Document 305 Filed 10/22/08 Page 3 of 3

7(d) (requiring party opposed to motion to respond within eleven days of service of motion).

However, the motion has been pending on this Court's docket since the Fifth Circuit's mandate on

the interlocutory appeal was filed on August 18,2008 (Clerk's Document 286). To date, Defendants

have not filed a response to Meza's motion to exclude Vivian Heine's testimony, and the Court may

therefore grant the motion as unopposed. See id (allowing district court to grant motion as

unopposed if no timely response is filed). Plaintiffs Daubert Challenge to Defendants' Expert

Designation (Clerk's Document 233) is therefore GRANTED as unopposed.

Z/f! SIGNED this

day of October, 2008.

3

 </s> Case 1:05-cv-01008-LY Document 311 Filed 10/30/08 Page 1 of 10

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FILE

WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS tlllOCI 30 AM 10: 13

RAULMEZA

AUSTIN DIVISION §

..~'.:;~",:',";';/1;\,~0"fcoTu(X~>.;l¥:"i&
~ ' • • • 1.-,

§

1 I:'i __, - ~7iT&r'{

.

Plaintiff

§

CIVIL ACTION NO.

v.

§

A-05-CA-lO08-LY

§

BRIAN COLLIER, director ofthe Texas §

Department of Criminal Justice Parole §

Division, in his official capacity,

§

BRAD LIVINGSTON, executive director §

ofthe Texas Department of Criminal

§

Justice, in his official capacity,

§

and RISSIE L. OWENS, JOSE ALISEDA, §

CHARLES AYCOCK, CONRITH DAVIS, §

JACKIE DeNOYELLES, LINDA GARCIA,§

and JUANITA M. GONZALES, in their §

official capacities as members of the Texas §

Board of Pardons and Paroles

§

§

Defendants.

§

FOURTH AMENDED COMPLAINT

Plaintiff Raul Meza respectfully files this complaint and will show:

STATEMENT OF FACTS

l. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Defendants have, without due process of law,

imposed conditions upon Plaintiff Meza's incarceration that are qualitatively different from the

punishment typically imposed on other similarly situated parolees, in violation of the Fourteenth

Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.

2. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Mr. Meza claims that Defendants violated his

Fourteenth Amendment due process rights by imposing additional informal, unauthorized

conditions on his confinement without due process of law.

3. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Mr. Meza claims that policy and custom of the Travis

County Correctional Complex's (TCCC) Del Valle facility, described herein, resulted in

violations ofhis Fourteenth Amendment due process rights.

Case 1:05-cv-01008-LY Document 311 Filed 10/30/08 Page 2 of 10
4. Mr. Meza seeks declaratory relief, injunctive relief, attorneys' fees and costs as a result of Defendants' violations.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 5. Jwisdiction is conferred on this Court by 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343. 6. Further, Defendants' actions and the events giving rise to the claims occurred in Del Valle, Texas. Accordingly, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391, venue is proper for this Court.
PARTIES 7. Plaintiff is confined at the TCCC facility in Del Valle. 8. Defendant Brad Livingston is the executive director of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice ("TDCJ"). 9. Defendant Brian Collier is the director ofthe TDCJ Parole Division. 10. In all the actions described herein, Defendant Collier and Defendant Livingston ("TDCJ Defendants") each were acting under color of law and pursuant to legal authority. Defendant Collier and Livingston are sued only in their official capacities for injunctive and declaratory relief. 11. At all relevant times, Rissie 1. Owens, Jose Aliseda, Charles Aycock, Conrith Davis, Jackie DeNoyelles, Linda Garcia, and Juanita M. Gonzales (hereinafter collectively "the Board") were members of the Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles, and, as such, were responsible for upholding the laws of the United States and Texas. At all relevant times, the Board acted under color of law. The Board is sued in their official capacities for injunctive and declaratory relief. 12. Rissie 1. Owens can be served at the Austin offices of the Board of Pardons and Paroles, 209 W. 14th Street, Suite 500, Austin, IX 78701.
2

Case 1:05-cv-01008-LY Document 311 Filed 10/30/08 Page 3 of 10
13. Jose Aliseda can be served at the San Antonio offices of the Board of Pardons and Paroles, 2902 N.E. Loop 410, Suite 206, San Antonio, IX 78218.
14. Charles Aycock can be served at the Amarillo offices of the Board of Pardons and Paroles, 5809 S. Western, Suite 237, Amarillo, IX 79110.
15. Conrith Davis can be served at the Huntsville offices of the Board of Pardons and Paroles, 1300 11th Street, Suite 520, Huntsville, TX 77342-0599.
16. Jackie DeNoyelles can be served at the Palestine offices of the Board of Pardons and Paroles, 207 E. Reagan, Palestine, TX 75801.
17. Linda Garcia can be served at the Angleton offices of the Board of Pardons and Paroles, 1212 N. Velasco, Suite 201, Angleton, IX 77515.
18. Juanita Gonzales can be served at the Gatesville offices of the Board of Pardons and Paroles, 3408 S. State Highway 36, Gatesville, TX 76528.
STATEMENT OF FACTS 19. On or about March 8, 1982, Plaintiff pled guilty to murder and was sentenced to thirty (30) years imprisonment in Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ) facilities. 20. On or about September 8, 1989, Plaintiff was sentenced to four (4) additional years imprisonment, to be served consecutively to the thirty (30) year term, for possession of a deadly weapon in a penal institution. 21. TDCJ released Plaintiff to the custody of the Sheriff of Travis County on or about September 25,2002, on "mandatory supervision." Plaintiffs release on mandatory supervision was required by statute because his calendar time served plus "good time" credits accumulated totaled the maximum length of his sentence. See Tex. Crim. Pro. Art. 42.1S(S)(c) (1987). 22. Mandatory supervision is ''the release of a prisoner from imprisonment, but not on parole, and not from the legal custody of the state, for rehabilitation outside prison walls under
3

Case 1:05-cv-01008-LY Document 311 Filed 10/30/08 Page 4 of 10
such conditions and provisions for disciplinary supervision as the board may determine." Tex. Crim. Pro. Art. 42.18(2)(b) (1987). The purpose ofmandatory supervision is "to aid all prisoners to readjust to society upon completion of their period of incarceration." Tex. Crim. Pro. Art. 42.18(1) (1987).
23. Parolees on mandatory supervision at TCCC are allowed to search for ajob in the community and to leave the facility to work when they have secured employment. The parolees then return to the facility at night. Eventually, mandatory supervision releasees are allowed to live in the community when they can formulate a "residence plan" that conforms to their conditions of mandatory supervision. If Mr. Meza were able to obtain employment, he would then have the resources necessary to develop a "residence plan" to live outside the jail, like other mandatory supervision releasees.
24. Defendants have not allowed Plaintiff the same opportunities as other parolees. They have placed him on "lock down" status since his arrival at TCCC in 2002, and have confmed him in the jail most ofthe time. Other parolees are not on perpetual "lock down" status and may leave the jail with considerably greater freedom. Other parolees are allowed to formulate a weekly schedule of activities outside of the jail, such as doctors' appointments, job interviews, visits to the Department of Public Safety to obtain driver's licenses, etc. Mr. Meza is routinely denied these same opportunities.
25. Mr. Meza has made numerous good faith attempts to secure employment, but Defendants have thwarted him. Since about June of 2004, Defendants have allowed Plaintiff only five hours per week of time at Project RIO (Reintegration of Offenders), the parolee employment search program. They allow other parolees virtually unlimited time at Project RIO. Prior to June 2004, Defendants did not allow Mr. Meza any access to these resources, even though his conditions of parole explicitly require him to "actively seek employment."
4

Case 1:05-cv-01008-LY Document 311 Filed 10/30/08 Page 5 of 10
26. Before Mr. Meza can interview for a job, employment opportunities must be screened by Defendants to ensure potential employment locations meet the conditions of his mandatory supervision. Defendants habitually delay in screening the potential employers that Plaintiff has located, causing the identified positions to be filled before Mr. Meza has the opportunity to interview for them. Other parolees do not experience these chronic delays in their job searches.
27. On the rare occasion when Mr. Meza is able to secure a job interview, several armed guards accompany him to the interview. On or about November 3, 2004, Mr. Meza had a job interview with Southern Education, and armed guards escorted him there. Unsurprisingly, Plaintiff was unable to secure employment under these conditions. Armed guards do not accompany other mandatory supervision releasees to job interviews.
28. Defendants have also told Mr. Meza that, should he find a job, an armed parole officer will have to go to the job site with him every day. The Board has made this requirement a condition of Mr. Meza's mandatory supervision. Potential employers have told Mr. Meza they cannot hire him for this reason. Other parolees do not face this additional obstacle.
29. On August 21,2006, Mr. Meza had ajob interview for a construction position with Missions of Hope Ministries. Missions of Hope Ministries offered Mr. Meza the position the next day. TDCJ, Collier and the Board, however, intentionally delayed approving this employment opportunity until the position was no longer available.
30. Before Mr. Meza can accept any job opportunity, the offer of employment must be screened by TDCJ's investigators, and then approved by the Board. No other parolee is required to have his job opportunities approved by the Board. No condition of Mr. Meza's release states that job opportunities will have to be approved by the Board.
31. Because Defendants' actions have prevented him from securing ajob, Mr. Meza's 5

Case 1:05-cv-01008-LY Document 311 Filed 10/30/08 Page 6 of 10
liberty is considerably more restricted than other parolees on mandatory supervision at ICCC. Defendants allow other parolees to leave the facility and work in the community.
32. Mr. Meza has been denied educational opportunities that are offered to other parolees at ICCC, even though his conditions of parole require him to "attend educational and vocational training classes." Mr. Meza has not been allowed to attend computer orientation classes, job search classes and resume writing classes offered to other parolees at ICCC. Mr. Meza has only been allowed to attend three one-day seminars offered at Project RIO, and even then has been pulled out of the classes in the middle of the seminars because he is only allowed two and a half hours twice a week at Project RIO.
33. Denying Mr. Meza these educational opportunities also has negatively impacted his job search and thus unduly restrained his liberty. For example, in order to take full advantage of the limited amount of time he has access to Project RIO, Mr. Meza needs effective computer skills. Due to his long incarceration and Defendants' refusal to allow him the same educational opportunities they offer other parolees, Plaintiff has been unable to develop these necessary skills along with other parolees.
34. Mr. Meza has not been allowed to obtain a driver's license, a privilege allowed to other parolees at ICCC. Indeed, Mr. Meza's conditions of parole imply he should be allowed to obtain a driver's license, as the conditions explicitly require him to "obey driving restrictions," "obtain and keep in [his] possession a Iexas Department of Public Safety (DPS) Personal Identification Card or Driver's License," and "leave all keys to any motor vehicle that [he has] use of with facility staff" of any half-way house he may be allowed to reside at. Without a driver's license, certain employment opportunities are unavailable to Mr. Meza (such as auto repair positions). Mr. Meza has been denied employment by auto repair facilities because he does not have a driver's license.
6

Case 1:05-cv-01008-LY Document 311 Filed 10/30/08 Page 7 of 10
35. Defendants have not afforded Mr. Meza any due process of law to justify his disparate treatment at TCCC. No conditions of Plaintiffs mandatory supervision justify this disparate treatment.
36. The conditions imposed on Mr. Meza's mandatory supervision by the Board are irrational, arbitrary and capricious. For example, Mr. Meza is required to wear an electronic global positioning tracking monitor at all times. The monitor informs Defendants of Mr. Meza's location at all times. Mr. Meza is also not allowed to leave TCCC without being accompanied by a parole officer, despite the electronic monitor. These conditions are intentionally redundant and thus arbitrary and capricious. These conditions were imposed without due process of law, and have an intentionally discriminatory purpose. Only two other parolees in the state have conditions as onerous as those imposed on Mr. Meza. The cumulative effect of these conditions creates a substantial restraint on Mr. Meza's liberty, and is a significant, atypical hardship.
37. The Parole Division, at Collier's direction, intentionally refuses to provide Mr. Meza with a parole officer to accompany him so that he may leave the jaiL This creates a de facto qualitative restriction on Mr. Meza's liberty, which has been imposed without due process oflaw.
38. On February 23, 2005, Mr. Meza received a notice informing him the Board was reimposing sex offender conditions on his parole, and that he had one month to respond. Mr. Meza promptly filed a response. This notice was never served on his attorneys, who TDCJ and the Board knew represented him, in violation of Rule 4.02(a) of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct. (Three members of the Board, Aliseda, Aycock and Garcia, are attorneys licensed in the State of Texas who are required to comply with the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct.)
39. TDCJ and the Board ignored Mr. Meza's response, and imposed sex offender 7

Case 1:05-cv-01008-LY Document 311 Filed 10/30/08 Page 8 of 10
conditions on his parole without affording him due process, in violation of the holding of Coleman v. Dretke, 395 FJd 216 (5th Cir. 2004). Mr. Meza's attorneys contacted TDCJ regarding this abuse of due process, and were ignored. The sex offender conditions remain imposed on Mr. Meza's parole.
CAUSE OF ACTION - DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION 40. The TDCJ Defendants and the Board impose qualitatively different conditions of confinement upon Mr. Meza than other similarly situated parolees. The informal imposition of these additional conditions upon Mr. Meza alone violates his due process rights. 41. The TDCJ Defendants enforce additional informal restrictions on Mr. Meza's liberty that have not been justified by due process and are not provided for in any of his conditions of parole. They habitually and intentionally treat Mr. Meza differently from other similarly situated parolees on mandatory supervision so as to deny Mr. Meza the opportunities afforded to others. 42. The Board has imposed sex offender conditions on Mr. Meza's parole without providing him due process, in violation of law and his Fourteenth Amendment rights. 43. The Board has imposed irrational, arbitrary and capricious conditions on Mr. Meza's mandatory supervision without affording him due process of law. These conditions are qualitatively different than the conditions imposed on other parolees released after completion of their sentences for similar convictions.
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT 44. Mr. Meza seeks declaratory judgment to vindicate his rights under Section 1983 with respect to Defendants' violations of his due process rights. 45. Mr. Meza is entitled to declaratory judgment concerning Defendants' violations of his due process rights.
8

Case 1:05-cv-01008-LY Document 311 Filed 10/30/08 Page 9 of 10

INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

46. Mr. Meza seeks injunctive relief, permanently enjoining Defendants from:

a. Continuing to subject Mr. Meza to qualitatively different conditions of confinement without due process of law; and,

b. Imposing sex offender conditions upon his parole without due process of law.

47. Inasmuch as Defendants have acted in the events described herein, they will

continue to act accordingly. Without injunctive relief, Defendants will continue their outrageous

conduct, thereby unduly limiting Mr. Meza's liberty without due process.

ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS

48. Mr. Meza is entitled to reasonable attorneys' fees, litigation costs, and court costs,

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

THEREFORE, Mr. Meza respectfully prays that this Court grant the following relief:

A. Issue declaratory relief that Defendants' conduct constituted illegal deprivation of Plaintiff's due process rights;

B. Grant reasonable attorneys' fees, litigation expenses, and court costs; and

C. Grant all other and additional relief to which Mr. Meza may be entitled, at law or in equity.

DATED: lmro· j, 200g.,"t oJAte.:r~

Respectfully Submitted,

James C. Harrington State Bar No. 09048500 Scott Medlock State Bar No. 24044783
9

Case 1:05-cv-01008-LY Document 311 Filed 10/30/08 Page 10 of 10 TEXAS CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT 1405 Montopolis Dr. Austin, IX 78741 (512) 474~5073 [phone] (512) 474~0726 [fax] ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE A true copy this document was sent to Assistant Attorney General of Texas, Celamaine Cunniff, P.O. Box 12548, Capitol Station, Austin, TX, 78711, via fax, 512~495~9139, and Assistant Attorney General Carol M. Gardner, P.O. Box 12548, Austin, TX 78711, via fax, (512) 4959139, on Jtme 0,2007
OC~~) ZA!¥6 SMe<ilock
10

 </s> Case 1:05-cv-01008-LY Document 355 Filed 03/24/09 Page 1 of 4

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

200911AR 24

PH~: 28

AUSTIN DIVISION

RAULMEZA,

§

§

PLAINTIFF,

§

§

V.

§

§

BRAD LIVINGSTON, EXECUTIVE

§

DIRECTOR OF THE TEXAS

§

DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL

§

JUSTICE, IN HIS OFFICIAL

§

CAPACITY; STUART JENKINS, 1

§

DIRECTOR OF THE TEXAS

§

DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL

§

JUSTICE PAROLE DIVISION, IN HIS §

OFFICIAL CAPACITY; AND RISSIE L. §

OWENS, JOSE ALISEDA, CHARLES §

AYCOCK, CONRITH DAVIS, JACKIE §

DENOYELLES, BARBARA

§

LORRAINE,2 AND JUANITAM.

§

GONZALES, IN THEIR OFFICIAL

§

CAPACITIES AS MEMBERS OF THE §

TEXAS BOARD OF PARDONS AND §

PAROLES,

§

§

DEFENDANTS.

§

§

B
CAUSE NO. A-05-CA-I008-LY

FINAL JUDGMENT Before the Court is the above-entitled and numbered cause. Today the Court rendered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in this cause, granting Plaintiff Raul Meza his requested

1 Meza originally sued Bryan Collier, the former Director of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice Parole Division. The Court granted Defendants Brad Livingston and Collier's motion to substitute Jenkins for Collier on November 10,2008 (Clerk's Document 334).
2 Meza originally sued Linda Garcia, in her official capacity as a member of the Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles. The Court granted the Board members' motion to substitute Lorraine for Garcia on November 10, 2008 (Clerk's Document 334).

Case 1:05-cv-01008-LY Document 355 Filed 03/24/09 Page 2 of 4
declaratory and injunctive reliefto the extent that Defendants Brad Livingston, as Executive Director of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Stuart Jenkins, as Director of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice Parole Division (collectively, "the Department"); and Defendants Rissie L. Owens, Jose Aliseda, Charles Aycock, Conrith Davis, Jackie DeNoyelles, Barbara Lorraine, and Juanita M. Gonzales, as members of the Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles (collectively, "the Board"), acting as the State of Texas, (the "State") must afford Meza due process as required by Coleman v. Dretke, 395 FJd 216 (5th Cir. 2004). The Court dismissed Meza's remaining claims without prejudice.
In his Original Complaint, Meza sued Livingston, in his official capacity; Brian Collier, in his official and individual capacities; Travis County; Greg Hamilton, as Sheriff of Travis County; and parole officers in their official and individual capacities. In addition to his constitutional claims, Meza also brought a claim against Hamilton under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 ("RLUIPA"). See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc, et seq. (2003).
On November 17,2006, the Court granted the relevant parties' voluntary motion to dismiss the claims between Meza, Travis County, and Hamilton (Clerk's Document 49). The Court dismissed the claims for monetary damages against Livingston and Collier in their official capacities on December 6,2006 (Clerk's Document 52).
In his Third Amended Complaint (Clerk's Document 96), Meza added the Board members as Defendants, alleged RLUIPAclaims against the Department and Board Defendants, and dropped his claims against the individual parole officers. Meza stipulated to dismissal without prejudice of his individual-capacity claims against Collier on June 15,2007 (Clerk's Document 218). The Court
2

Case 1:05-cv-01008-LY Document 355 Filed 03/24/09 Page 3 of 4
dismissed Meza's RLUIPA claims against the Department and Board Defendants on June 25,2007 (Clerk's Document 238).
Seeing that no matters remain pending in this cause, the Court renders the following final judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58.
IT IS ORDERED that all claims asserted between Meza, Travis County, and Hamilton are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Meza' s claims for monetary damages against Livingston and Collier in their official capacities are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Meza' s claims against Collier in his individual capacity are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED Meza's RLUIPA claims against the Department and Board are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
THE COURT FURTHER DECLARES that the State failed to afford Meza "a hearing meeting the requirements of due process" when it imposed sex-offender conditions on his parole.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the State shall provide Meza with an appropriate hearing regarding imposition of sex-offender conditions on his parole consistent with the Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law rendered this day.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Meza's equal-protection and due-process claims regarding his other formal and informal conditions of parole are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
3

Case 1:05-cv-01008-LY Document 355 Filed 03/24/09 Page 4 of 4 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Meza is awarded costs for the prosecution ofthis cause. Meza's request for attorney's fees is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to refiling in accordance with the Local Rule CV-7(i) of the Local Rules of the Western District of Texas. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all relief not expressly granted is DENIED. IT IS FINALLY ORDERED that this cause is CLOSED.
SIGNED this ~ day of March, 2009.
4

 </s> .. ,

Case 1:05-cv-01008-LY Document 374 Filed 05/19/09 Page 1 of 2

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 2009 MAY I 9 PH 12: 48
AUSTIN DIVISION

RAULMEZA,

§

§

PLAINTIFF,

§

§

V.

§

§

BRAD LIVINGSTON, EXECUTIVE

§

DIRECTOR OF THE TEXAS

§

DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL

§

JUSTICE, IN HIS OFFICIAL

§

CAPACITY; STUART JENKINS,

§

DIRECTOR OF THE TEXAS

§

DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL

§

JUSTICE PAROLE DIVISION, IN HIS §

OFFICIAL CAPACITY; AND RISSIE 1. §

OWENS, JOSE ALISEDA, CHARLES §

AYCOCK, CONRITH DAVIS, JACKIE §

DENOYELLES, BARBARA LORRAINE, §

AND JUANITA M. GONZALES, IN

§

THEIR OFFICIAL CAPACITIES AS

§

MEMBERS OF THE TEXAS BOARD OF §

PARDONS AND PAROLES,

§

§

DEFENDANTS.

§

§

BY
CAUSE NO. A-05-CA-I008-LY

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR STAY OF JUDGMENT PENDING APPEAL Before the Court are Defendants' Opposed Motion for Stay of Judgment Pending Appeal
filed April 23, 2009 (Clerk's Document 364) and Plaintiffs Response to Defendants' Motion for Stay Pending Appeal filed April 24, 2009 (Clerk's Document 365). By their motion, all Defendants request that this Court stay its March 24,2009 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Final Judgment (Clerk's Documents 353 & 355) pending Defendants' appeal to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.

" (

Case 1:05-cv-01008-LY Document 374 Filed 05/19/09 Page 2 of 2

A party may seek a stay of a district court order or judgment must in the district court. Fed.

R. App. P. 8(a)(1). In determining whether to stay a judgment or order pending appeal, a district

court considers "(1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing that he is likely to succeed

on the merits; (2) whether the applicant will be irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) whether issuance

ofthe stay will substantially injure the other parties interested in the proceeding; and (4) where the

public interest lies." Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776 (1987). The movant need only have

presented "a substantial case on the merits when a serious legal question is involved and show that

the balance ofthe equities weighs heavily in favor of granting the stay." Ruiz v. Estelle, 650 F.2d

555, 565 (5th Cir. 1981). However, if the balance of equities-consideration of the other three

factors-does not weigh heavily in favor of granting the stay, then the movant must show a more

substantial likelihood of success on the merits to obtain a stay pending appeal. Id. at 565-66.

Having reviewed the motion, response, its order and judgment, and the applicable law, the

Court will deny Defendants' motion. The Court does not find that the balance of equities weighs

heavily in favor of granting Defendants a stay of this Court's order and judgment, nor have

Defendants shown a substantial likelihood of success on the merits.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendants' Opposed Motion for Stay of Judgment

Pending Appeal (Clerk's Document 364) is DENIED.

M - SIGNED this

day of May, 2009.

2

 </s> Case 1:05-cv-01008-LY Document 425 Filed 02/22/11 Page 1 of 3

United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS F I LED
January 27,2011

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

Lyle W. Cayce Clerk

No. 10-50061 Summary Calendar

FILED

D.C. Docket No. 1:05-CV-1008

RAULMEZA,

Plaintiff· Appellee v.

JOSE ALISEDA; CHARLES AYCOCK; CONRITH DAVIS; JACKIE DENOYELLES; LINDA GARCIA; JUANITA GONZALES; RISSI L. OWENS,

Defendants - Appellants

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, Austin

Before DAVIS, WIENER, and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges.

JUDGMENT

This cause was considered on the record on appeal and the briefs on file.

It is ordered and adjudged that the judgment of the District Court is affirmed.

ISSUED AS MANDATE: 1 8 FEB 2011

A True Copy Attest
Clerk, U.S. Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit
h By: (/-'Deputy 1 8 FEB 2011 New Orleans, Louisiana

... ..

Case 1:05-cv-01008-LY Document 425 Filed 02/22/11 Page 2 of 3

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I LED
January 27, 2011

No. 10-50061 Summary Calendar

Lyle W. Cayce Clerk

RAULMEZA
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
JOSE ALISEDA, CHARLES AYCOCK, CONRITH DAVIS, JACKIE DENOYELLES, LINDA GARCIA, JUANITA GONZALES, RISSI L. OWENS
Defendants-Appellants.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, Austin Division (1:05-CV-1008)
Before DAVIS, WIENER and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges.. PER CURIAM:*
In this appeal, the members of the Texas Board of Pardons and Parole challenge the district court's award ofattorneys fees. We are intimately familiar with the trial record in this case and the strenuous defense mounted by the defendants at every turn. The record fully supports the fee arrived at by the district court. We also find no merit to defendants' specific objections.
• Pursuant to 5TH GIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH GIR. R. 47.5.4.

... •

Case 1:05-cv-01008-LY Document 425 Filed 02/22/11 Page 3 of 3

No. 10-50061

The time plaintiff spent litigating against the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, another Texas agency, was caused in substantial part by the defendants' refusal to promptly divulge which entity was the responsible party. Also, the party ultimately liable is the State of Texas, which can allocate the award among state agencies as it sees fit.
We also conclude that all of defendants' claims were closely related to Meza's core claim that he had been tagged by the defendants as a sex offender and required to participate in sex offender therapy without due process.
In sum, we have carefully considered all of appellants' arguments and for the above reasons and those assigned by the district court in its thorough order of December 9, 2009, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in arriving at its award of fees and costs.
AFFIRMED. All pending motions are DENIED.

2

 </s> Meza v. Livingston, Not Reported in F.3d (2010)

2010 WL 6511727 Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
Raul MEZA, Plaintiff–Appellee–Cross–Appellant v.
Director Brad LIVINGSTON, Executive director of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, in his official capacity; David Gutierrez; Charles Aycock; Conrith Davis; Jackie Denoyelles; Thomas Leeper;
Juanita Gonzalez; Rissie L. Owens; Stuart Jenkins;
Defendants–Appellants–Cross–Appellees.
No. 09–50367. | Filed May 20, 2010. | Oct. 19, 2010.
Attorneys and Law Firms
Scott Charles Medlock, James C. Harrington, Esq., Texas Civil Rights Project, Austin, TX, Geoffrey Neil Courtney, Clemens & Spencer, San Antonio, TX, William Terrell Habern, Esq., Habern, O’Neil & Pawgan, L.L.P., Huntsville, TX, for Plaintiff–Appellee–Cross–Appellant.
Thomas Matthew Lipovski, Celamaine Cunniff, Assistant Attorney General Office of the Attorney General, Austin, TX, for Defendants–Appellants–Cross–Appellees.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas.
Before DAVIS, WIENER, and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges.
Opinion
W. EUGENE DAVIS, Circuit Judge:
*1 Texas parolee Raul Meza, who has never been convicted of a sex offense, sued the defendants, all employees of the Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles (“the Board”) and the Texas Department of Criminal Justice—Parole Division (“the Department”), for violations of his right to due process after the defendants attached sex offender conditions to his mandatory supervision. This court has made clear that sex offender conditions may only be imposed on individuals not convicted of a sex offense after the individual has received due process. Coleman v. Dretke, 395 F.3d 216 (5th Cir.2004) (Coleman I ), reh’g and en banc denied, 409 F.3d 665 (5th Cir.2005) (Coleman II ). Meza alleges

that before sex offender conditions were attached to his mandatory supervision, inadequate process was provided. Thus, this case requires us to determine whether the process utilized by the defendants in this case is constitutionally sufficient.
We agree with the district court that the current procedures do not pass constitutional muster. However, we do not agree that Meza is owed all of the process afforded by the district court.

I.

In 1982, Meza pleaded guilty to the murder of a nine-year-old girl and was sentenced to thirty years imprisonment.1 While in prison, Meza was sentenced to an additional four years in prison for possession of a deadly weapon in a penal institution.

1

Meza was convicted of aggravated robbery in 1977 and

was released on parole in 1981. He was out on parole

when he committed the murder in 1982.

In 1993, Meza was released from custody and placed under mandatory supervision.2 In 1994, Meza violated the conditions of his supervision by returning home fifteen minutes after the state-imposed curfew. The State revoked Meza’s mandatory supervision and re-incarcerated him until 2002.

2

At the time Meza was convicted, Texas penal law

provided that a prisoner must be released on mandatory

supervision when the length of his calendar time in

prison plus goodconduct time earned equaled the total

length of his sentence. See 1977 Tex. Gen. Laws 925

(currently embodied in TEX. GOV’T CODE § 508.001,

et seq.). The Board had no discretion in whether Meza

was released on mandatory supervision.

In 2002, Meza was re-released from prison under mandatory supervision. TEX. GOV’T CODE § 508.0441(a)(2) provides that “Board members and parole commissioners shall determine: ... conditions of parole or mandatory supervision, including special conditions....” Using this authority to impose “special conditions,” the Board placed more restrictive conditions on Meza than it imposed in 1993, including Super Intensive Supervision Program condition,3 Special Condition O.06,4 Special Condition O.99,5 Special Condition M, and Special Condition X. Special Condition X required, among other
1

Meza v. Livingston, Not Reported in F.3d (2010)

things, that Meza participate in sex offender therapy.6 Special Condition M required that Meza register as a sex offender. Meza was required to register as a sex offender in 2002 when he was released on mandatory supervision. The condition that he register as a sex offender was lifted in April 2005. Today, Meza is no longer required to register as a sex offender.

3

The Super Intensive Supervision Program condition

requires Meza to live in a community residential

facility for 180 days, comply with the facility rules,

attend educational and vocational training classes, not

go within 500 feet of places where children commonly

gather (“child-safety zones”), and wear an

electronic-monitoring device at all times.

4

The Special Condition O.06 requires, among other

things, that Meza not enter childsafety zones.

5

The Special Condition O.99 prohibits Meza from

leaving the Travis County Correctional Complex

(“TCCC”) without a supervising parole officer.

6

Under Special Condition X, the Board may require that

the parolee: (1) must participate in the Sex Offender

Therapy Program; (2) cannot participate in programs

that include as participants individuals 17 years of age

or younger; (3) may have no unsupervised contact with

any person 17 years of age or younger; (4) cannot

reside with any person 17 years of age or younger

unless approved in writing by a supervising parole

officer; (5) cannot leave the county of residence

without written permission of a supervising parole

officer; (6) may not date, marry, or engage in a platonic

relationship with any person who has children 17 years

of age or younger unless approved in writing by a

supervising parole officer; (7) must be electronically

monitored; (8) may not enroll in, attend, be employed

by, or volunteer for an institution of higher learning

without Board approval; (9) may not own, maintain, or

operate computer equipment without written

permission of a supervising parole officer; (10) may not

own, maintain, or operate photographic equipment

without written permission of a supervising parole

officer; (11) must notify any prospective employer in

writing regarding criminal history if directed to by a

supervising parole officer; (12) be evaluated to

determine need for sex offender counseling; (13) may

not be employed by or attend any sexually-oriented

business; (14) may not intentionally or knowingly

communicate with the victim or guardian of the victim

of the instant offense; (15) may not participate in any

volunteer activities without prior written approval of a

supervising parole officer; (16) may not view, possess,

or purchase any literature or videos that depict sexually-explicit images, or communicate through any telecommunication device for sexually-explicit purposes; (17) submit to a search of the person, motor vehicle, residence, and property by a supervising parole officer; (18) submit to polygraph examinations; and (19) abide by an established curfew. All of these conditions were imposed on Meza.

These sex offender conditions were imposed on Meza by the Board because Meza allegedly sexually assaulted the nine-year-old girl he murdered in 1982. It is unclear from the record how the Board obtained evidence that Meza sexually assaulted his victim in 1982, but it is undisputed that Meza was never convicted of a sexual offense.

*2 Because of the sex offender and other conditions attached to Meza’s mandatory supervision, Meza has been unable to leave TCCC since his release from prison in 2002, despite the fact that the conditions of his mandatory supervision only required that he remain at TCCC for 180 days. In order for Meza to leave TCCC, he must arrange for a residence, which, in turn, requires him to secure employment. Thus far, Meza has been unable to secure employment. Part of the reason Meza alleges that he has been unable to secure employment is because of the conditions imposed on him by the Board. To leave TCCC, Meza must be escorted by a parole officer. The Department controls the availability of parole officers. Between 2002 and 2005, Meza was only allowed to leave TCCC twice: once for a job interview and once to visit a hospital emergency room. Meza must also obtain approval for any job prospects from his parole officer. Meza has thus far been denied all job prospects by his parole officer. He was denied one job prospect because of its proximity to a child-safety zone.7 He was denied another job prospect because he would have to cross a child-safety zone to reach the job site. He was denied another job prospect because it required that Meza have a driver’s license and the Parole Division Director for Meza’s region would not allow Meza to obtain a driver’s license at the time of the application. Meza was not allowed to apply for one job because the Department would not allow Meza to undergo a urinalysis, as was required in the application process.8

7

The job was a clerical position on the tenth floor of a

downtown office building. The child-safety zone was

located across the street.

8

The reason Meza was not allowed to undergo a

urinalysis was that Mesa would have to travel through a

child-safety zone in order to reach the location where

2

Meza v. Livingston, Not Reported in F.3d (2010)

he was to take the urinalysis. Meza’s attorney filed a complaint with the Department about not allowing Meza to undergo a urinalysis, but the Department never responded to the complaint. The Parole Division Director for Meza’s region testified at trial that he did not think the complaint needed a response.

In 2004, this court released its opinion in Coleman v. Dretke, 395 F.3d 216 (5th Cir.2004) (Coleman I ), reh’g and en banc denied, 409 F.3d 665 (5th Cir.2005) (Coleman II ). Coleman I held that if a defendant is not convicted of a sex offense, the defendant’s parole may only be conditioned on sex offender registration and therapy if the defendant is “afforded a hearing meeting the requirements of due process” in which it is determined that the defendant “constitute[s] a threat to society by reason of his lack of sexual control.” Id. at 225. At the time Coleman I was decided, Meza was required to register as a sex offender and attend sex offender therapy.

In light of Coleman I, the Texas Board developed a

procedure for providing due process to individuals who were not convicted of a sex offense but could have sex offender conditions attached to their parole or mandatory supervision under Texas law. Counsel for the Board

developed the following process. First, the Board provides written notice to the parolee that his parole or

mandatory supervision may be conditioned on sex offender registration and treatment.9 The parolee has thirty days to respond with any written statements or documents to contest imposition of this condition. Upon

the parolee’s response (or lack thereof), the Department puts together a packet on the parolee. The packet includes the parolee’s complete parole file, psychological evaluations, polygraph tests, and social, education, employment, and medical histories, etc. Neither the parolee nor any attorney he retains is allowed to see the packet. The Department sends the packet to a panel of the Board. A representative from the Department offers a short presentation (ten to thirty minutes) of the packet and the parolee’s background to the Board. Neither the parolee nor his attorney is allowed to attend the panel’s hearing or present facts or arguments on behalf of the

parolee to the panel. After hearing the Department’s presentation and reviewing the packet, the Board votes on whether the parolee’s parole or mandatory supervision should be conditioned on sex offender registration or therapy. The parolee is then notified of whether sex offender registration or therapy is required. The panel does not produce any written findings or inform the parolee of the facts on which the Board based its decision. The parolee may not appeal the Board’s decision.

9

At oral argument, the defendants stated that the initial

recommendation that sex offender conditions should be imposed on an individual’s parole or mandatory supervision is made by the parole officer. There is no requirement that there be evidence of past or present sexual deviancy in order for the parole officer to make this initial recommendation.
*3 In February 2005, Meza received notice that his mandatory supervision might be conditioned on sex offender registration and therapy. Meza was given thirty days to submit a statement or documentation to contest the imposition of sex offender conditions. He did not submit any statement or documentation. After reviewing Meza’s packet as prepared by the Department, the Board panel conditioned his mandatory supervision conditioned on sex offender registration and therapy. The Board subsequently notified Meza of its decision.
In 2005, Meza brought this § 1983 action for injunction against members of the Department and a number of individual parole officers in their official capacities (collectively, “the defendants”). The suit sought to enjoin the defendants from imposing sex offender conditions without due process and from continuing to subject him to qualitatively different conditions of confinement without due process. Meza also alleged violations of his Fourteenth Amendment equal protection rights. Finally, Meza sought attorney’s fees and costs.
The district court found that Coleman I required that a parolee such as Meza who was not convicted of a sex crime receive procedural due process before any sex offender condition could be imposed. The district court found that the procedural protections given to Meza by the Board were constitutionally insufficient and delineated the minimum due process Meza was entitled to receive as follows:
(1) written notice in advance of the hearing; (2) disclosure of the evidence on which the State is relying; (3) a hearing, scheduled sufficiently after the notice to permit Meza to prepare, at which he will have the opportunity to be heard in person, represented by counsel, and to present documentary evidence in his support; (4) an opportunity at the hearing to call witnesses and confront and cross examine State witnesses, “except upon a finding, not arbitrarily made, of good cause for not permitting each as to a particular witness”; (5) an independent decision maker; and (6) a written statement by the fact-finder as to the evidence relied upon and the reasons for the decision.
Meza v. Livingston, 623 F.Supp.2d 782, 796 (W.D.Tex.2009) (citation omitted). Because the Board
3

Meza v. Livingston, Not Reported in F.3d (2010)
failed to provide Meza with that level of process, the district court ordered the Board to provide Meza with an appropriate hearing consistent with its guidelines before imposing sex offender conditions on his parole. The district court dismissed without prejudice Meza’s remaining claims, awarded Meza costs for the prosecution of his case, and dismissed the defendants’ motion for summary judgment.
The defendants timely appealed the district court’s order. Meza also timely filed a cross-appeal.
We review the constitutional issues presented in these appeals de novo, United States v. Locke, 482 F.3d 764, 766–67 (5th Cir.2007) (citations omitted), and the grant of an injunction for abuse of discretion, Lake Charles Diesel, Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 328 F.3d 192, 195 (5th Cir.2003) (footnote omitted).
II.
*4 Procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution is implicated where an individual is deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 3. The Supreme Court has adopted a two-step analysis to examine whether an individual’s procedural due process rights have been violated. The first question “asks whether there exists a liberty or property interest which has been interfered with by the State; the second examines whether the procedures attendant upon that deprivation were constitutionally sufficient.” Kentucky Dept. of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989) (citations omitted).
A.
The district court held that an individual has a liberty interest such that due process is implicated when there is “any State sex-offender condition imposed on a parolee who has not been convicted of a sex crime.” Meza, 623 F.Supp.2d at 792. The defendants do not dispute that Meza has a liberty interest in being free from sex offender registration and therapy, but they maintain that Meza does not have a liberty interest in being free from the other conditions that the Board may attach to his mandatory supervision under Special Condition X. Additionally, the defendants argue that sex offender registration is not at issue in this case because Meza was only required to

register as a sex offender from 2002 to 2005; he is no longer required to register as a sex offender.
Meza counters that the Board misreads the district court’s opinion as finding a liberty interest in all sex offender conditions that may be imposed under Special Condition X. Instead, Meza argues that the only sex offender conditions in which he has a liberty interest are those which require that he (1) participate in a sex offender treatment program, (2) be evaluated for sex offender counseling, (3) submit to polygraph examinations, and (4) be labeled as a sex offender. Meza also disagrees with the defendants’ position that sex offender registration is not at issue. According to Meza’s attorney at oral arguments, “the parole office considers Meza to be a sex offender.... The Department tells Mr. Meza’s potential employers that he is a sex offender.” Thus, Meza asserts that while he currently is not required to put his name on the sex offender registry, the Department continues to operate as if his name were on the sex offender registry.
As an initial matter, we agree with Meza that sex offender registration is a condition at issue in this case. We reach this conclusion for two reasons. First, it is impossible for the defendants to un-ring the bell that was rung when Meza was required to register as a sex offender. The stigma that attached to Meza when he was required to register remains, regardless of whether his name is currently on a sex offender registry. See Coleman II, 409 F.3d at 668 (“The stigma aspect of the case is thus not mooted by the state’s decision to remove Coleman from its sex offender registry.”). The stigmatizing effects of registering as a sex offender still follow Meza and are reinforced by the Department when it continues to tell Meza’s potential employers that he is a sex offender.
*5 Second, sex offender registration is of concern in this case because “a defendant’s voluntary cessation of a challenged practice does not deprive a federal court of its power to determine the legality of the practice,” even in cases in which injunctive relief is sought. City of Mesquite v. Aladdin’s Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283, 289 (1982); accord Northeastern Fla. Chapter of Assoc. Gen Contractors of Am. v. City of Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 661–62 (1993); Cooper v. McBeath, 11 F.3d 547, 550–51 (5th Cir.1994); Resident Council of Allen Parkway Village v. United States Dep’t of Housing & Urban Dev., 980 F.2d 1043, 1048 (5th Cir.1993). It is clear that the alleged wrongful behavior of the Board—requiring Meza to register as a sex offender without due process of law—could recur to Meza if his mandatory supervision is revoked again. Moreover, at trial, an Administrator for the Board testified that as many as 6,900 current inmates are subject to have sex offender conditions, including sex
4

Meza v. Livingston, Not Reported in F.3d (2010)
offender registration, imposed upon them in the future, despite the fact that they have not been convicted of a sex crime. Thus, the Board may continue to use the same procedures for these 6,900 inmates that Meza complains of in this case. If the Board removes the registration requirement before the court can review the adequacy of the process, the Board’s practice will remain in effect and evade court review.
Having determined that sex offender registration and therapy are at issue in this case, we find it is unnecessary to examine whether Meza has a liberty interest in any of the other sex offender conditions. Meza alleges he has a liberty interest in being required to (1) participate in a sex offender treatment program, (2) be evaluated for sex offender counseling, (3) submit to polygraph examinations, and (4) be labeled as a sex offender. Based on the Department’s Policy and Operating Procedure entitled “Sex Offender Treatment and Polygraph Examination Guidelines” that was submitted into evidence, as well as the Coleman I court’s description of sex offender therapy, see 395 F.3d at 224, being evaluated for sex offender counseling and submitting to polygraph examinations may be considered part of sex offender treatment. Thus, the conditions complained of by Meza fall into two categories: sex offender registration and sex offender counseling. As these are the only sex offender conditions that Meza asserts he may have a liberty interest in, we find it unnecessary to determine what, if any, liberty interest Meza may have in the other conditions attached to his mandatory supervision.
This court’s ruling in Coleman I guides our decision of whether Meza has a liberty interest in sex offender registration and therapy. In Coleman I, the defendant was convicted of burglary in 1986. He was released on parole in 1991. While on parole, the defendant was indicted for aggravated sexual assault of a child and indecency with a child by contact. The defendant pleaded guilty to and was convicted of misdemeanor assault. He was never convicted of any sex offense. Thereafter, the defendant’s parole was revoked and he was reincarcerated.
*6 In January 2001, the Coleman I defendant was released on mandatory supervision. In February 2001, the parole panel imposed two requirements on the defendant’s parole: first, he had to register as a sex offender, and second, he had to attend sex offender therapy. The defendant was not given advance notice of the hearing in which the parole panel imposed these requirements. The defendant registered as a sex offender, but did not attend sex offender therapy. Because the defendant violated the terms of his parole, his parole was revoked in July 2001.

The defendant challenged his parole revocation in a habeas petition, alleging a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Relying primarily on Vitek v. Jones, 445 U .S. 480 (1980), we held that “prisoners who have not been convicted of a sex offense have a liberty interest created by the Due Process Clause in freedom from sex offender classification and conditions.” Coleman I, 395 F.3d at 222. The court found a liberty interest existed because sex offender registration and therapy were highly stigmatizing and invasive conditions that were “qualitatively different” from other conditions regularly attached to parole. Id. at 223. Because the State admitted it provided the defendant with no procedural protections, this court found that the defendant’s due process rights were violated. We noted, however, that the State was “not precluded from further efforts to add these same conditions to [the defendant’s] parole upon proper notice....” Id. at 225.
Based on Coleman I, it is clear that Meza had a liberty interest in being free from being required to register as a sex offender and participate in sex offender therapy. Other circuits have reached this same conclusion. E.g., Gwinn v. Awmiller, 354 F.3d 1211, 1217 (10th Cir.2004); Kirby v. Siegleman, 195 F.3d 1285, 1291–92 (11th Cir.1999); Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818, 829–30 (9th Cir.1997).10
10 The Eighth Circuit found that under a particular Minnesota statute no due process is required to impose sex offender conditions on an individual’s probation, despite the fact that the individual has not been convicted of a sex offense. See Gunderson v. Hvass, 339 F.3d 639, 644–45 (8th Cir.2003). Minnesota statute § 243.166 provides that a “person shall register [as a sex offender] if ... the person was charged with ... and convicted of [criminal sexual conduct under section 609.342] or another offense arising out of the same set of circumstances.” In Gunderson, the alleged sex offender was originally charged with sexual assault, but negotiated a plea agreement for third degree assault. The Eighth Circuit found that because the third degree assault conviction arose from the same set of circumstances as the alleged sexual assault, the alleged sex offender met the statutory criteria for being required to register as a sex offender. We see no indication the Eighth Circuit would reach this result in Meza’s case because Texas does not have a statute similar to the Minnesota statute. Even if Texas did have a similar statute, Meza was not charged with or convicted of a sex offense so the State could not prove that he was charged with a non-sex offense that arose out of the same set of circumstances as a sex offense.
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Meza v. Livingston, Not Reported in F.3d (2010)
B.
Given that Meza has a liberty interest in being free from sex offender registration and therapy, we now examine whether the procedures provided by the defendants to Meza were constitutionally sufficient. Thompson, 490 U.S. at 460 (citations omitted).
When an individual is convicted of a sex offense, no further process is due before imposing sex offender conditions. See Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 7–8 (2003); Jennings v. Owens, 602 F.3d 652, 2010 WL 1267163 (5th Cir.2010). The individual “convicted of a sex crime in a prior adversarial setting, whether as the result of a bench trial, jury trial, or plea agreement, has received the minimum protections required by due process.” Neal, 131 F.3d at 831. Meza, however, was not convicted of a sex offense, and he neither stipulated nor judicially admitted that he sexually assaulted his murder victim in 1982.11 Thus, under our cases, he is owed procedural due process before sex offender conditions may attach. See Coleman I, 395 F.3d at 221. 11 According to the joint agreed stipulated facts, Meza
only admitted that he sexually assaulted his victim as part of his sex offender treatment. According to Meza’s attorney at oral argument, Meza was required to make this admission as part of his treatment. Meza’s attorney stated, “If Mr. Meza did not make that admission during the sex offender treatment, his parole would have been revoked and he would have been returned to prison for refusing to take part in the treatment process.” The State did not dispute this statement.
*7 Thus far, the previously described procedure provided by the Board is the only process Meza has received. To determine whether this process meets constitutional muster, we rely on the balancing test in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). The Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test offers three distinct factors for a court to weigh in considering whether the procedural due process provided is adequate:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedure used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the

additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.
Id. at 335 (citation omitted).
The first factor is the private interest affected. “Courts are in agreement that imposing a sex offender registration requirement and treatment affects a substantial right, because it compels a serious deprivation of liberty and creates stigmatizing consequences .” United States v. Jimenez, 275 F. App’x 433, 442 (5th Cir.2008) (citing Coleman II, 409 F.3d at 668; Neal, 131 F.3d at 829) (unpublished). “We can hardly conceive of a state’s action bearing more ‘stigmatizing consequences’ than the labeling of a prison inmate as a sex offender.” Neal, 131 F.3d at 829 (9th Cir.1997). Based on cases from this court and other circuits, we are convinced that Meza has a significant interest in being free from sex offender registration.
The defendants seek to minimize any interest Meza has in being free from sex offender therapy. In Coleman II, this court equated the consequences of being required to attend sex offender therapy with the consequences of being required to register as a sex offender. “[B]y requiring [a parolee] to attend sex offender therapy, the state label[s] him a sex offender—a label which strongly implies that [the parolee] has been convicted of a sex offense and which can undoubtedly cause ‘adverse social consequences .’ “ Coleman II, 409 F.3d at 668 (quoting Vitek, 445 U.S. at 492). The consequences of attending sex offender therapy, combined with the highly invasive nature of the therapy,12 leave us no doubt that Meza also had a significant interest in being free from sex offender therapy. 12 Meza has undergone sex offender therapy similar to the
therapy prescribed for the parolee in Coleman I. The Coleman I court described sex offender therapy as follows:
“[S]ex offender treatment is different than traditional psychotherapy in that treatment is mandated, confrontational, structured, victim centered, focused on behaviors, and confidentiality is not maintained.” Treatment can include “interventions with psychopharmacological agents,” polygraph exams to determine sexual history, and use of penile plethysmographs to “modify deviant sexual arousal and enhance appropriate sexual arousal.” Id. at 224 (quoting the Council for Sex Offender Treatment’s website); accord Jennings, 602 F.3d at –––– n. 8, 2010 WL 1267163, at *4.
The second factor is the risk of erroneous deprivation.
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Meza v. Livingston, Not Reported in F.3d (2010)
Under the current Texas system there is a high risk that the Board will make erroneous findings because the parolee is kept in the dark about the evidence being considered by the Board in reaching its decision. Critically, the parolee has no opportunity to correct errors in the packet provided to the Board. Damning information may incorrectly be placed in the wrong parolee’s packet. Facts may be erroneously or unfairly slanted against the parolee. Under the current procedure, the parolee has no opportunity to correct false information or provide an explanation for any adverse information. Neither the parolee nor his attorney may even see the completed evidentiary packet on which the Board bases its decision of whether to require the parolee to register as a sex offender and attend sex offender therapy. At trial, it was estimated that there are currently 6,900 prisoners who will potentially need to receive Coleman notice upon their release. In compiling 6,900 parolee packets, human error will inevitably occur and parolees may be falsely accused of sexually-deviant behavior. By simply granting the parolee the right to review his packet, such human errors could be avoided. For this reason, the current Texas system creates a high risk of erroneous deprivation.
*8 The third factor that we must weigh in the balancing test is the Government’s interest. Undoubtedly the State has a significant interest in rehabilitating sex offenders prior to their reentry into society, as well as monitoring sex offenders while on parole. See McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 32–33 (2002). Also, the State certainly has an interest in keeping the costs of providing notice to individuals like Meza as low as constitutionally permissible. The Board Administrator who predicted at trial that 6,900 offenders currently incarcerated may at some point require notice pursuant to Coleman I also estimated that to provide these offenders with the process afforded in parole revocation hearings could cost $750,000. Therefore, requiring more procedural protections would cause the State to incur significant additional costs.
Taking the Mathews v. Eldridge factors into consideration, we conclude that the current procedure provided to parolees who have never been convicted of a sex offense and who face possible sex offender registration and therapy is constitutionally insufficient. While the State has a significant interest in avoiding additional costs, Meza’s liberty interest in being free from the stigma of registering as a sex offender and avoiding highly invasive sex offender therapy is palpable. When balancing these significant interests with the likelihood of erroneous decision-making, we are convinced that the current procedure is unconstitutional. The grave risk of error that envelops the procedures used by the Board is

most troubling. By not allowing the parolee to review the evidence presented against him, he is unable to correct any misinformation placed in his packet that the Board reviews. By not allowing the parolee to appear before the Board, the Board must act without mitigating or clarifying evidence from the parolee. By not allowing the parolee to confront opposing witnesses, the parolee is unable to refute damning statements made against his interest and the Board is unable to evaluate the credibility of the parolee against that of opposing witnesses.
In sum, after weighing the factors of Mathews v. Eldridge, we find that the current Texas procedure for providing parolees with their Coleman notice does not meet the constitutional requirements for procedural due process.
III.
Having determined that the process afforded to Meza is constitutionally insufficient, we must now determine what process is required.
“[D]ue process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.” Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972). “ ‘[P]rocess’ is not a term with a clear definition and the nature of the procedure required to comply with the due process clause depends on many factors concerning the individual deprivation.” RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 17.7 (4th ed.2008). The Supreme Court has afforded a broad spectrum of process depending on the deprivation at issue. To determine the amount of process due in this case, we first examine similar Supreme Court cases involving the deprivation of rights of prisoners and parolees.
*9 A. In 1972, the Supreme Court issued the landmark decision Morrissey v. Brewer, in which the Court determined that parolees had a liberty interest in avoiding parole revocation. Having found that a liberty interest was present, the Court then decided the minimum process owed to a parolee before parole may be revoked. The Court held that a parolee was owed, at a minimum:
(a) written notice of the claimed violations of parole; (b) disclosure to the parolee of evidence against him; (c) opportunity to be heard in person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence; (d) the right
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Meza v. Livingston, Not Reported in F.3d (2010)
to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the hearing officer specifically finds good cause for not allowing confrontation); (e) a “neutral and detached” hearing body such as a traditional parole board, members of which need not be judicial officers or lawyers; and (f) a written statement by the factfinders as to the evidence relied on and reasons for revoking parole.
Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 489. The Court specifically did “not reach or decide the question of whether the parolee is entitled to the assistance of retained counsel or to appointed counsel if he is indigent.” Id.13
13 The following year, in Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973), the Court found that the right to counsel in parole revocation hearings must be made on a case-by-case basis. The Gagnon Court stated: [T]he decision as to the need for counsel must be made on a case-by-case basis in the exercise of a sound discretion by the state authority charged with responsibility for administering the probation and parole system. Although the presence and participation of counsel will probably be both undesirable and constitutionally unnecessary in most revocation hearings, there will remain certain cases in which fundamental fairness—the touchstone of due process—will require that the State provide at its expense counsel for indigent probationers or parolees. Id. at 790.
Two years after Morrissey, in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974), the Court examined the procedural due process protections owed to an inmate in prison disciplinary proceedings that could result in the loss of the inmate’s good-time credits. The Court held that the inmate was owed: (1) written notice of the claimed violation that enables the inmate to marshal the facts and prepare a defense; (2) an opportunity “to call witnesses and present documentary evidence in his defense when permitting him to do so will not be unduly hazardous to institutional safety or correctional goals”; and (3) a “written statement by the factfinders as to the evidence relied on and reasons for the disciplinary action.” Id. at 563–66. The Court also recognized that the committee that conducted the prisoner disciplinary proceedings was sufficiently impartial, implying that such impartiality was a requirement of due process. Id. at 570–71. Finally, the Wolff Court found that an inmate was not entitled to confront and cross-examine witnesses and did not “have a right to either retained or appointed counsel.” Id. at

567–70.
Thus, the Wolff Court found that inmates facing a possible loss of good-time credits were owed less process than parolees facing a possible revocation of parole; specifically, inmates were not entitled to confront and cross-examine witnesses, while parolees in Morrissey were entitled to this procedural protection. Also, Wolff afforded inmates no absolute right to present testimony or other evidence that would compromise safety and correctional goals. In finding that parolees and inmates were not owed the same process, the Wolff Court noted that “one cannot automatically apply procedural rules designed for free citizens in an open society, or for parolees or probationers under only limited restraints, to the very different situation presented by a disciplinary proceeding in a state prison.” Id. at 560. Justice White, writing for the majority, distinguished the revocation of parole—the deprivation at issue in Morrissey—from the loss of good-time credits—the deprivation at issue in Wolff—by stating:
*10 Revocation of parole may deprive the parolee of only conditional liberty, but it nevertheless “inflicts a ‘grievous loss’ on the parolee and often on others.” Simply put, revocation proceedings determine whether the parolee will be free or in prison, a matter of obvious great moment to him. For the prison inmate, the deprivation of good time is not the same immediate disaster that the revocation of parole is for the parolee. The deprivation, very likely, does not then and there work any change in the conditions of his liberty.... The deprivation of good time is unquestionably a matter of considerable importance. The State reserves it as a sanction for serious misconduct, and we should not unrealistically discount its significance. But it is qualitatively and quantitatively different from the revocation of parole or probation.
In striking the balance that the Due Process Clause demands, however, we think the major consideration militating against adopting the full range of procedures suggested by Morrissey for alleged parole violators is the very different stake the State has in the structure and content of the prison disciplinary hearing. That the revocation of parole be justified and based on an accurate assessment of the facts is a critical matter to the State as well as the parolee; but the procedures by which it is determined whether the conditions of parole have been breached do not themselves threaten other important state interests, parole officers, the police, or witnesses—at least no more so than in the case of the ordinary criminal trial. Prison disciplinary proceedings, on the other hand, take place in a closed, tightly controlled environment peopled by those who have
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Meza v. Livingston, Not Reported in F.3d (2010)

chosen to violate the criminal law and who have been lawfully incarcerated for doing so. Some are first offenders, but many are recidivists who have repeatedly employed illegal and often very violent means to attain their ends. They may have little regard for the safety of others or their property or for the rules designed to provide an orderly and reasonably safe prison life. Although there are very many varieties of prisons with different degrees of security, we must realize that in many of them the inmates are closely supervised and their activities controlled around the clock. Guards and inmates co-exist in direct and intimate contact. Tension between them is unremitting. Frustration, resentment, and despair are commonplace. Relationships among the inmates are varied and complex and perhaps subject to the unwritten code that exhorts inmates not to inform on a fellow prisoner.
Id. at 560–62 (citations omitted). In discussing why inmates in particular were not owed the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses, but parolees were extended that protection, the Court said:

Confrontation

and

cross-examination present greater

hazards to institutional interests. If

confrontation

and

cross-examination of those

furnishing evidence against the

inmate were to be allowed as a

matter of course, as in criminal

trials, there would be considerable

potential for havoc inside the

prison walls. Proceedings would

inevitably be longer and tend to

unmanageability. These procedures

are essential in criminal trials

where the accused, if found guilty,

may be subjected to the most

serious deprivations, Pointer v.

Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965), or

where a person may lose his job in

society, Greene v. McElroy, 360

U.S. 474, 496–497 (1959).

*11 Id. at 567.

Five years after Wolff, the Court was again called upon to determine the amount of procedural due process owed to inmates. In Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1 (1979), the Court answered the question of how much due process was owed to inmates when they become eligible for parole and the Board must make the purely discretionary call of granting or denying

parole. The Court stated that “[p]rocedures designed to elicit specific facts, such as those required in Morrissey ... and Wolff, are not necessarily appropriate to a ... parole determination.” Id. at 14. The Court found that Nebraska’s scheme of providing the inmate with an informal process in which the Board of Pardons and Paroles was able to interview the inmate met constitutional scrutiny:
At the Board’s initial interview hearing, the inmate is permitted to appear before the Board and present letters and statements on his own behalf. He is thereby provided with an effective opportunity first, to insure that the records before the Board are in fact the records relating to his case; and second, to present any special considerations demonstrating why he is an appropriate candidate for parole. Since the decision is one that must be made largely on the basis of the inmate’s files, this procedure adequately safeguards against serious risks of error and thus satisfies due process.
Id. at 15. The Court found that the Parole Board was not required to provide a formal hearing or “to specify the particular ‘evidence’ in the inmate’s file or at his interview on which it rest[ed] the discretionary determination” on, because such would “provide at best a negligible decrease in the risk of error.” Id. at 14–16.
The Court again assessed the amount of process due to another class of inmates the following year in Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980). In Vitek, a Nebraska statute allowed for an inmate to be involuntarily transferred to a mental hospital after a physician found that the inmate suffered from a mental disease or defect and could not be given proper treatment in the prison. Id. at 483. Before being transferred under the Nebraska statute, prisoners were provided with no process to contest the transfer. The prisoner in Vitek challenged the constitutionality of the statute, arguing that he had a liberty interest implicating the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in not being transferred to a mental hospital.
The Vitek Court agreed that the prisoner had a liberty interest, stating that “the stigmatizing consequences of a transfer to a mental hospital for involuntary psychiatric treatment, coupled with the subjection of the prisoner to mandatory behavior modification as a treatment for
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Meza v. Livingston, Not Reported in F.3d (2010)
mental illness, constitute the kind of deprivations of liberty that requires procedural protections.” Id. at 494. Upon reaching that conclusion, the Court found that the prisoner was owed the following process before he could be transferred to a mental hospital: (1) written notice that a transfer to a mental hospital was being considered; (2) a hearing, sufficiently after the notice, at which disclosure to the prisoner was made of the evidence being relied upon and at which an opportunity to be heard in person and to present documentary evidence was given; (3) an opportunity at the hearing to present testimony of witnesses by the defense and to confront and cross-examine witnesses called, unless good cause was shown for why such confrontation and cross-examination should not be permitted; (4) an independent decision maker; (5) a written statement by the fact finder as to the evidence relied on and the reasons for action; (6) the availability of qualified and independent assistance, which may be an attorney, but need not be; and (7) effective and timely notice of all the foregoing rights. Id. at 494–95 (majority opinion), 499–500 (Powell, J., concurring). Thus, except for the right to counsel, the Vitek Court granted the inmate facing involuntary transfer to and confinement in a mental hospital the full panoply of due process rights available to a defendant facing a criminal trial. This exceeded the process allowed the inmate seeking discretionary parole in Greenholtz, the inmate facing the loss of good-time credits in Wolff, and even the parolee facing possible parole revocation in Morrissey.
*12 Four of the Justices were persuaded that the inmate in Vitek had a right to counsel. Writing for the plurality, Justice White stated:
The District Court did go beyond the requirements imposed by prior cases by holding that counsel must be made available to inmates facing transfer hearings if they are financially unable to furnish their own. We have not required the automatic appointment of counsel for indigent prisoners facing other deprivations of liberty, but we have recognized that prisoners who are illiterate and uneducated have a greater need for assistance in exercising their rights. A prisoner thought to be suffering from a mental disease or defect requiring involuntary treatment probably has an even greater need for legal assistance, for such a prisoner is

more likely to be unable to understand or exercise his rights. In these circumstances, it is appropriate that counsel be provided to indigent prisoners whom the State seeks to treat as mentally ill.
445 U.S. at 496–97 (citations omitted). The majority, however, did not hold that an inmate facing involuntary mental institution had a right to counsel. Instead, the majority found that due process was satisfied by providing the inmate the assistance of a “qualified and independent adviser who is not a lawyer.” Id. at 499 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell, in his concurrence, wrote:
I do not believe, however, that an inmate must always be supplied with a licensed attorney.... “Due Process has never been thought to require that the neutral and detached trier of fact be law trained or a judicial or administrative officer.” Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 607 (1979). In that case, we held that due process is satisfied when a staff physician determines whether a child may be voluntarily committed to a state mental institution by his parents. That holding was based upon recognition that the issues of civil commitment “are essentially medical in nature,” and that “ ‘neither judges nor administrative hearing officers are better qualified than psychiatrists to render psychiatric judgments.’ “ Id., at 607, 609, quoting In re Roger S., 19 Cal.3d 921, 942, 569 P.2d 1286, 1299 (1977) (Clark, J., dissenting).
In my view, the principle that due process does not always require a law-trained decisionmaker supports the ancillary conclusion that due process may be satisfied by the provision of a qualified and independent adviser who is not a lawyer.
Id. (citations omitted). The Vitek Court ultimately adopted Justice Powell’s position and only afforded the inmate the assistance of a qualified and independent advisor. Id. at 497 (majority opinion).
Reading these four principal procedural due process cases clarifies the spectrum of due process rights that the Court has developed. On one end of the spectrum is the consideration of discretionary parole in Greenholtz in which the Court afforded minimal due process consisting essentially of an interview of the inmate who has an opportunity to verify that the Board has his correct file before it. In Wolff, when faced with the deprivation of good-time credits, the Court granted the inmate slightly more procedural protections, including notice of the
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Meza v. Livingston, Not Reported in F.3d (2010)
violation and a limited right to present evidence at a hearing if safety and correctional goals of the institution are not compromised. The Court found that even more process was owed in Morrissey when the deprivation at issue concerned parole revocation. And finally, in Vitek, except for the right to counsel, the Court determined that the full panoply of due process was required before involuntarily transferring a prisoner to a mental institution.
*13 The Court has crafted this spectrum based on the specific factors surrounding the deprivation at issue. When deprivation of the liberty interest leads to stigmatizing and physically-invasive consequences, the Court grants greater procedural protections, as it did in Vitek. See Wolff, 418 U.S. at 565–66. However, where the rights of inmates are implicated, when providing additional process creates security risks or provides a negligible decrease to the risk of error, the Court is less willing to afford additional process. See id. at 562 (discussing security risks); Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 14 (discussing risk of error). If the deprivation of liberty will cause certain, immediate adverse consequences to the parolee or prisoner, the Court provides more due process than when the deprivation of liberty is uncertain and may occur at a later date. See Wolff, 418 U.S. at 560–61. Because fewer security concerns are at issue and the liberty deprivations are more immediate and certain, the Court generally finds that parolees are owed more process than inmates. See id. at 560; Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 489.
B.
With this range of possible due process protections in mind, we must now determine where on the spectrum Meza falls.
In evaluating this spectrum, we begin by concluding that the lowest level of due process provided by the above discussed cases, the Greenholtz standard, to be inapplicable in this case because of the distinction between the liberty deprivations at issue. In Greenholtz, the Court considered the process due for resolving an inmate’s claim to parole—a purely discretionary call by the Board. Meza, on the other hand, is entitled under Texas law to be released under mandatory supervision in 2002. If Meza failed to register as a sex offender between 2002 and 2005, or does not participate in sex offender therapy currently, he will immediately lose the mandatory supervision that Texas law requires he receive.
Furthermore, the nature of the rights at issue makes the

instant case distinguishable from Greenholtz. Registering as a sex offender and participating in sex offender therapy is highly stigmatizing and invasive. Being denied discretionary parole is neither stigmatizing nor invasive. Therefore, because of the differing nature of the rights, we find that the Greenholtz standard is inapplicable in this case.
Having found the Greenholtz standard inapplicable, we next examine the liberty deprivation at issue in Wolff. While there are numerous differences between the loss of good-time credits and the imposition of sex offender conditions, there are also similarities. In Wolff, prisoners were entitled to receive good-time credits, see Wolff, 418 U.S. at 545 n. 6, just as Meza was entitled to be released on mandatory supervision. Thus, revoking a prisoner’s good-time credits and imposing sex offender conditions on parole both have the effect of inhibiting a liberty interest to which the inmate or parolee is entitled.
*14 If Meza were an inmate instead of a parolee, the Wolff standard would likely apply. Two circuits have so held. See Gwinn, 354 F.3d at 1219; Neal, 131 F.3d at 831. Meza can claim at least the same process of an inmate, but as a parolee, he should generally be entitled to more favorable treatment than inmates. See Wolff, 418 U.S. at 560–62. Applying Wolff, we find that Meza is owed, at a minimum: (1) written notice that sex offender conditions may be imposed as a condition of his mandatory supervision, (2) disclosure of the evidence being presented against Meza to enable him to marshal the facts asserted against him and prepare a defense, (3) a hearing at which Meza is permitted to be heard in person, present documentary evidence, and call witnesses, (4) an impartial decision maker, and (5) a written statement by the factfinder as to the evidence relied on and the reasons it attached sex offender conditions to his mandatory supervision.14
14 We note that the Board already provides parolees with written notice that sex offender conditions may be imposed as a condition of parole. Similarly, the decision to impose sex offender conditions is currently made by the Board, an impartial decision maker. The other requirements listed here, however, are not currently part of the Board’s procedures.
We are persuaded that Meza is owed at least these protections because under the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test, these additional procedural protections help create a constitutionally-permissible system. Disclosing to Meza the evidence to be used against him greatly decreases the possibility that the Board will rely on incorrect information inadvertently placed in Meza’s
11

Meza v. Livingston, Not Reported in F.3d (2010)
packet. Allowing Meza to be heard in person decreases the possibility that the Board will misinterpret any information provided in the packet. Further, it provides the Board with the opportunity to evaluate Meza’s credibility in resolving any factual disputes and allows an exchange between the Board and Meza such that the Board can consider mitigating information and evaluate Meza as a person. Providing a written statement as to the evidence relied upon by the Board promotes fairness in the process; “the provision for a written record helps to insure that administrators, faced with possible scrutiny by state officials and the public, and perhaps even the courts, where fundamental constitutional rights may have been abridged, will act fairly.” Wolff, 418 U.S. at 565.
It is true that these additional due process requirements will increase costs to the State, but these increased costs are outweighed by the serious deprivation to a parolee unjustly required to register as a sex offender or participate in sex offender therapy. Moreover, we do not find the additional costs imposed on the State to be overly burdensome given that these are the same protections the State is constitutionally required to provide to inmates facing the possible loss of good-time credits. The loss of good-time credits, as Justice White articulated, is a significant loss, but it is less significant than requiring a parolee to register as a sex offender or attend sex offender therapy. “We can hardly conceive of a state’s action bearing more ‘stigmatizing consequences’ than the labeling of a prison inmate as a sex offender.” Coleman I, 395 F.3d at 223 n. 27 (citing Neal, 131 F.3d at 829). Because Meza’s interest in being free from sex offender conditions is greater than an inmate’s interest in good-time credits, Meza is owed, at a minimum, the same process due to inmates under Wolff.
*15 In addition to the procedural protections discussed above, the district court also granted two additional due process rights that were not granted to inmates in Wolff: (1) the right to confront and cross-examine the State’s witnesses unless good cause is shown and (2) the right to counsel. We examine each of these due process rights to determine whether they should be afforded to Meza.
In Morrissey, when faced with the issue of parole revocation, the Court granted the parolee the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses, unless good cause was shown for why the parolee should not be allowed this procedural protection. 408 U.S. at 489. The Wolff Court, however, denied inmates this right, primarily because of the security threat the inmates posed inside the prison walls. “If confrontation and cross-examination of those furnishing evidence against the inmate were to be allowed as a matter of course, as in criminal trials, there would be

considerable potential for havoc inside the prison walls.” Wolff, 418 U.S. at 567. The safety concerns of Wolff are not present with parolees because parolees cannot wreak the same havoc within prison walls that inmates m ay cause. Thus, the Wolff rationale for not allowing confrontation and cross-examination are inapplicable in the instant case and Meza should be granted the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses unless the State can show good cause in a particular case why this right should not be granted.
The district court also found that Meza was entitled to counsel. While the right to counsel is a fundamental right for individuals facing criminal charges, U.S. Const. amend. VI, the Court has declined to find it part of the panoply of due process protections that must be automatically afforded parolees or inmates. See Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 790 (finding that the need for counsel at parole revocation hearings must be made on a “case-by-case basis”). In Vitek, when examining the due process protections that should be afforded to inmates facing involuntary confinement in a mental institution, the four members of the Court who wanted to provide all inmates facing transfer to a mental hospital a right to counsel reasoned that “[a] prisoner thought to be suffering from a mental disease or defect requiring involuntary treatment probably has an even greater need for legal assistance, for such a prisoner is more likely to be unable to understand or exercise his rights.” Vitek, 445 U.S. at 496–97 (citations omitted).
In this case, the concerns of the plurality of the Vitek Court are not present. No claim is made that Meza is suffering from a mental disease that may cause him to be unable to understand or exercise his rights. Instead, he is faced with the question of whether he can control his sexual desires such that he is not a threat to society. Thus, the reasons the Vitek plurality would have granted a right to counsel are not present. Given the substantial cost to the State to provide counsel to parolees facing registration and sex therapy and the Supreme Court precedent discussed above, we conclude that the State is not required to provide counsel to Meza.
*16 In sum, we find that on the spectrum of due process rights afforded by the Court in analogous cases, requiring a parolee who has not been convicted of a sex offense to register as a sex offender or participate in sex offender therapy requires more process than was provided to the inmate in Wolff, but less process than was provided in Vitek. In other words, we find Meza is due: (1) written notice that sex offender conditions may be imposed as a condition of his mandatory supervision; (2) disclosure of the evidence being presented against Meza to enable him
12

Meza v. Livingston, Not Reported in F.3d (2010)
to marshal the facts asserted against him and prepare a defense; (3) a hearing at which Meza is permitted to be heard in person, present documentary evidence, and call witnesses; (4) the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses, unless good cause is shown why this right should not be granted; (5) an impartial decision maker (which we assume the Board will be); and (6) a written statement by the factfinder as to the evidence relied on and the reasons it attached sex offender conditions to his mandatory supervision.
IV.
In addition to the aforementioned procedural due process claims, the defendants and Meza raise additional separate arguments on appeal.
A. The defendants argue that two individuals—Brad Livingston, the Executive Director of the Department, and Stuart Jenkins, the Director of the Department’s Parole Division—enjoy immunity under the Eleventh Amendment and may not be sued. This argument is based on the assertion that Livingston and Jenkins work for the Department and the Department does not have the authority to provide Meza with the type of hearing he requests. That authority, the defendants allege, rests solely with the Board.
The State’s argument is without merit. The Department plays an integral role in determining a prisoner’s mandatory supervision conditions. The Department prepares the file reviewed by the Board. The Department orally presents the packet to the Board. The Department controls the implementation of many of the conditions, such as controlling when a parole officer escort is available. Though the Board is the entity that makes the final decision regarding a parolee’s conditions of parole or mandatory supervision, the Department plays a key role in helping the Board reach that determination, and thus should also be accountable for any constitutional violations that may exist.
Under Ex Parte Young, a state official may be sued in his official capacity for injunctive relief without violating the Eleventh Amendment. 209 U.S. 123, 159–60 (1908). In this case, because the Department plays an integral role in determining and executing a prisoner’s mandatory supervision conditions, Meza may seek injunctive relief against Livingston and Jenkins; they do not enjoy Eleventh Amendment immunity.

B.
Meza argues that he has an equal protection claim against the defendants under the class-of-one theory. He also asserts that he has a liberty interest in three non-sex offender conditions—(1) requiring him to reside at TCCC pursuant to the Super Intensive Supervision Program (“SISP”), (2) requiring him to have a parole escort to leave TCCC pursuant to Special Condition O.99, and (3) prohibiting him from entering “child safety zones” pursuant to SISP—as well as a liberty interest in the imposition of all of these conditions together.
*17 The district court did not consider Meza’s equal protection claim or non-sex offender due process claims. Instead, the court stated: “Because the Court has concluded that Coleman’s ‘appropriate hearing’ mandate requires more robust procedural protections than the State’s current Coleman review, the Court does not today reach these remaining claims and will dismiss them without prejudice .” Meza, 623 F.Supp.2d at 797.
Although Meza’s equal protection and due process claims for the non-sex offender conditions are not patently frivolous, they have not been developed by the district court and “[p]rudence dictates that we allow the lower court[ ] to consider [these] question[s] in the first instance.” Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 622–23 (1993); accord United States v. 92,203.00 in United States Currency, 537 F.3d 504, 510 (5th Cir.2008). Thus, we vacate the district court’s dismissal without prejudice on these claims and remand those issues to the district court to decide in the first instance.
CONCLUSION
For the forgoing reasons, we find that Meza has a liberty interest in being free from sex offender registration and therapy, and this interest is significant. When Meza’s interest is balanced against the State’s significant interest in not incurring additional costs, and the high risk of error that may occur based on the State’s current due process protections, we find that the State’s procedures do not satisfy constitutional due process. Instead, the State must afford Meza the following procedure: (1) written notice that sex offender conditions may be imposed as a condition of his mandatory supervision; (2) disclosure of the evidence being presented against Meza to enable him to marshal the facts asserted against him and prepare a defense; (3) a hearing at which Meza is permitted to be heard in person, present documentary evidence, and call witnesses; (4) the right to confront and cross-examine
13

Meza v. Livingston, Not Reported in F.3d (2010)
witnesses, unless good cause is shown; (5) an impartial decision maker; and (6) a written statement by the factfinder as to the evidence relied on and the reasons it attached sex offender conditions to his mandatory supervision. Additionally, we find that defendants Livingston and Jenkins do not enjoy qualified immunity under the Eleventh Amendment.
As such, we AFFIRM the district court’s conclusion as to the process the State must furnish Meza in all respects except that we do not agree that the State is required to provide Meza with counsel. Further, we VACATE the district court’s order dismissing without prejudice Meza’s equal protection and due process claims relating to the non-sex offender conditions attached to his mandatory supervision and REMAND those issues to the district court to decide in the first instance. We remand the case for entry of an order consistent with this opinion and further proceedings as required.
AFFIRMED, in part,
VACATED, in part,
and
REMANDED.
WIENER, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
*18 I concur in the entirety of the panel majority’s Opinion with one exception: I must dissent from its failure to specify that qualified and independent

assistance—which may be an attorney, but need not be, as spelled out in Vitek for mentally impaired inmates—must be afforded to a non-sex offender parolee like Meza. The class comprising parolees who have never been convicted of sex offenses should be entitled to no less process than is afforded to the class comprising inmates who will remain in custody and merely face transfer from a prison to a mental institution. The disparity in the level of the liberty interest of parolees vis a vis that of inmates is significantly greater than the disparity in the relatively small, secondary liberty interest of inmates who, like the one in Vitek, merely face being transferred from prison to a mental institution. In comparison, the need for qualified and independent non-lawyer assistance by a mentally competent parolee might well equal or even exceed the need for such assistance by many an inmate with mental issues. Indeed, the case can be made for the proposition that a substantial majority of mentally competent former inmates who are on parole are nevertheless so limited intellectually and so under-educated that their need of such assistance is at least as great as that of many mentally disturbed inmates. When considered in light of the Supreme Court’s recognition that the label of sex-offender is the most stigmatizing of all those encountered in any of these cases, the panel majority’s failure to afford non-attorney assistance to parolees like Meza cannot be justified, particularly given that such assistance can be provided by the State with relatively little difficulty and at relatively modest cost. Because I conclude that failure to require such assistance for non-sex offender parolees like Meza violates their Due Process rights, I respectfully dissent from the otherwise proper holding of the panel majority.

14

 </s> Case 1:05-cv-01008-LY Document 450 Filed 08/24/11 Page 1 of 4

t IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT F! E
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXA~II AUG 24 PH 4: 40
AUSTIN DIVISION

RAULMEZA,

§

s

PLAINTIFF, §

§

V.

§

§ CAUSE NO. A-05-CA-I008-LY

BRAD LIVINGSTON, EXECUTIVE

§

DIRECTOR OF THE TEXAS

§

DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL

§

JUSTICE, IN HIS OFFICIAL

§

CAPACITY; STUART JENKINS,

§

DIRECTOR OF THE TEXAS

§

DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL

§

JUSTICE PAROLE DIVISION, IN HIS §

OFFICIAL CAPACITY; AND RISSIE L. §

OWENS, JOSE ALISEDA, CHARLES §

AYCOCK, CONRITH DAVIS, JACKIE §

DENOYELLES, BARBARA LORRAINE, §

AND JUANITA GONZALES, IN THEIR §

OFFICIAL CAPACITIES AS MEMBERS §

OF THE TEXAS BOARD OF PARDONS §

AND PAROLE,

§

DEFENDANTS. §

ORDER Before the Court in the above styled and numbered cause is Plaintiff s Second Motion for

Enforcement of Judgment filed June 13,2011 (Clerk's Document No. 444); Defendants Owens, Aliseda, Aycock, Davis, Denoyelles, Garcia and Gonzales' Response to Plaintiffs Second Motion for Enforcement ofJudgment filed June 29, 2011 (Clerk's Document No. 448); and PlaintiffsReply to Defendants' Response to Second Motion for Enforcement ofJudgment filed July 6, 2011 (Clerk's Document No. 449). Having reviewed the motion, response, reply, as well as all evidence and the file in this case, the Court determines that Plaintiffs motion should be denied.
On March 24,2009, this Court ordered the Texas Board ofPardons and Paroles (the "Board") to provide Plaintiff Raul Meza a hearing with the following due process protections: (1) written

Case 1:05-cv-01008-LY Document 450 Filed 08/24/11 Page 2 of 4
notice in advance ofthe hearing; (2) disclosure of the evidence on which the State is relying; (3) a hearing, scheduled sufficiently after the notice to permit Meza to prepare, at which he will have the opportunity to be heard in person, represented by counsel, and to present documentary evidence in his support; (4) an opportunity at the hearing to call witnesses and confront and cross examine state witnesses, 'except upon a finding, not arbitrarily made, of good cause for not permitting each as to a particular witness'; (5) an independent decision maker; and, at issue here, (6) a written statement by the fact-finder as to the evidence relied upon and the reasons for the decision. Specifically, the Court found the record in this case was utterly devoid of findings regarding Meza and rejected the Board's argument that the continued imposition of sex-offender conditions constituted a sufficient finding that Meza possessed the offensive characteristic of lack of sexual control for the basis for such finding. On May 20, 2010, the Fifth Circuit affirmed these findings and conclusions, only disagreeing with this Court's finding that the State is required to provide counsel to Meza.
After the Fifth Circuit's ruling, a hearing was conducted by the Board on June 4, 2010. On June 25, 2010, the panel voted unanimously in a one-page notice to continue Meza's sex-offender conditions. The findings were a single sentence: "Raul Meza constitutes a threat to society by reason of his lack of sexual control." On August 20,2010,
On November 19,2010, Meza filed a motion for enforcement of judgment and contempt against Defendants, requesting, in part, that the Court enforce its judgment that the Board provide the required written statement by the fact-finder as to the evidence relied upon and the reasons for the decision. On March 29,2011, the Court held a hearing on Meza's motion. After reviewing the motion, the evidence, all briefing submitted by the parties, and the arguments of counsel at the hearing, the Court found that the Board decision of June 25, 2010, did not comply with this Court's
2

Case 1:05-cv-01008-LY Document 450 Filed 08/24/11 Page 3 of 4
Order of March 24, 2009, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The Court found the Board's decision was not a written statement by the fact-finder as to the evidence relied upon and the reasons for the decision in that it contained neither reasons for the decision nor evidence relied upon. On March 30, 2011, the Court ordered the Board to prepare a new written statement that set out with specificity the evidence presented to the Board that was persuasive to the Board in its decision and the specific reasons for its decision to continue Meza's sex-offender conditions. On April 28, 2011, the Board issued an additional written statement. Unlike the prior written statement, which was a one-page notice with a one-sentence summary ofthe Board's findings, the Apri128, 2011 statement details the proceedings of the June 4, 2010 hearing, identifies the witnesses who testified and evidence considered in the Board's decision, lists specific findings of fact made by the Board, and identifies specific evidence the Board relied upon to make its findings.
By his current motion, Meza again argues that the written statement is insufficient. Specifically, Meza contends he was not provided with a therapist's notes prior to her testimony at his hearing and was not notified that she would testify, that some statements by Meza presented at the hearing as evidence were compelled in violation ofMeza' s Fifth Amendment rights, and that the Board's conclusion was not supported by sufficient evidence. Meza asks the Court to appoint a third party to review the record ofthe hearing, make the required findings, and author the required written statement at the Board's expense. Meza also requests attorney's fees and costs associated with the preparation of his motion.
The Court, after reviewing the motion, response, reply, as well as all evidence and the file in this case, finds that the Board has sufficiently complied with this Court's Order of March 30,
3

Case 1:05-cv-01008-LY Document 450 Filed 08/24/11 Page 4 of 4

2011. Likewise, the Court finds that the Board has sufficiently complied with this Court's Order of

March 24, 2009.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiffs Second Motion for Enforcement of

Judgment filed June 13,2011 (Clerk's Document No. 444) is DENIED.

kltl, SIGNED this

of August, 2011.

4

 </s> Case 1:05-cv-01008-LY Document 500 Filed 07/29/14 Page 1 of 10

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS AUSTIN DIVISION

RAUL MEZA

§

Plaintiff

§

v.

§

§

BRAD LIVINGSTON, Executive

§

Director of the Texas Department of

§

Criminal Justice, in his official capacity; §

and STUART JENKINS, director of the §

Texas Department of Criminal Justice §

Parole Division, in his official capacity; §

§

Defendants.

§

Cause No. 1:05-cv-01008-LY

SIXTH AMENDED COMPLAINT

Plaintiff Raul Meza respectfully files this amended complaint and will show:

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

1. Raul Meza is a mandatory supervision parolee.

2. The Texas Department of Criminal Justice Parole Division (“the Department”) treats

Mr. Meza significantly differently than other mandatory supervision parolees who are similarly

situated – people with similar convictions, backgrounds, and parole conditions.

3. The Department’s special attention dramatically interferes with Mr. Meza’s

opportunity to readjust to society. For years, the Department has exercised its discretionary

authority to isolate him from his family, deny him employment, and otherwise punished him.

4. The Department has no reason to treat Mr. Meza differently than other similarly-

situated parolees, and yet it does. This special attention violates his 14th Amendment right to

equal protection.

5. The Department will continue this course as long as Mr. Meza is on mandatory

supervision if there is no judicial intervention to stop it. Therefore, Mr. Meza seeks declaratory

relief, injunctive relief, attorneys’ fees and costs.

Case 1:05-cv-01008-LY Document 500 Filed 07/29/14 Page 2 of 10
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 6. Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court by 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343. 7. Further, Defendants’ actions and the events giving rise to the claims occurred in Travis County, Texas, and TDCJ maintains headquarters in Austin. TEX. GOV’T CODE 492.014 (b). Accordingly, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391, venue is proper for this Court.
PARTIES 8. Plaintiff, Raul Meza, and resides in Travis County on mandatory supervision parole. 9. Defendant Brad Livingston is the executive director of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (“TDCJ”). 10. Defendant Stuart Jenkins is the director of the TDCJ Parole Division. 11. In all the actions described herein, Defendant Jenkins and Livingston are acting under color of law and pursuant to legal authority. They are sued only in their official capacities for injunctive and declaratory relief.1
STATEMENT OF FACTS A. Mr. Meza is on mandatory supervision for a possessing a weapon in prison in 1989. 12. Mr. Meza was sentenced to thirty years in state prison on March 8, 1982. That sentence ended in 2012. 13. On September 8, 1989, he was also sentenced to four additional years imprisonment, to be served consecutively with his original term, for possession of a deadly weapon in a penal institution. That is the conviction for which he is currently on mandatory supervision. 14. The purpose of mandatory supervision is rehabilitation. TEX. CRIM. PRO. ART. 42.18(2)(b) (1987). It was meant “to aid all prisoners to readjust to society upon completion of their period of incarceration.” TEX. CRIM. PRO. ART. 42.18(1) (1987).
1 Because Defendants Livingston and Jenkins are sued in their official capacities, this complaint will refer to them simply as “the Division.”
2

Case 1:05-cv-01008-LY Document 500 Filed 07/29/14 Page 3 of 10
15. Mr. Meza was downgraded from “super intensive” supervision to “moderate security” supervision in 2010, and his therapist reports Mr. Meza has made remarkable progress in his treatment. In September 2013, his therapist recommended he be allowed to graduate and leave treatment, noting Mr. Meza:
 Completed 318 sessions, with components on empathy, thinking errors and social skills;
 Has shown significant emotional improvement;  “He continues to be a significant leader in group, freely and opening discussing his
offense, taking full responsibility for his behavior”  “He identifies errors in others’ thinking accurately”  “His performance has been consistent, he has passed his Polygraphs, and is doing
well in [treatment]”  “The reduction in his Supervision level is to be in everyone’s favor.” B. The Department singles-out Mr. Meza for especially onerous treatment for no reason. 16. A state violates the Fourteenth Amendment when it intentionally treats a person differently from others who are similarly situated without a rational justification. Newman Marchive Partnership, Inc. v. Hightower, 349 Fed.Appx. 963, 965 (5th Cir. 2009). It doesn’t matter if the treatment itself – when viewed in isolation – is reasonable. The choice to treat a person differently than his peers must also be rational. Id. (citing City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 440-42 (1985)) (emphasis added). 17. There are many mandatory supervision parolees similarly situated to Mr. Meza. Neither of his convictions are unique, nor were the circumstances of the crimes. There are other people are mandatory supervision today with the same convictions and background as Mr. Meza. There are other parolees with the same conditions of parole. 18. Yet, the Department treats Mr. Meza significantly differently than parolees with whom
3

Case 1:05-cv-01008-LY Document 500 Filed 07/29/14 Page 4 of 10
he is similarly situated. 19. “Mr. Meza is specifically limiting his challenge to the actions TDCJ is taking within
the scope of its discretion to administer the terms of his parole. His claims do not challenge the terms and conditions the Parole Board itself imposed.”
20. Mr. Meza is confined to his home unless the Department allows him to leave. It uses that authority arbitrarily, and has isolated him from family, church, and employment for years.
21. The Department’s exercise of its discretionary authority severely inhibits Mr. Meza’s ability to maintain ties with his family, attend church, and to be employed – all of which are permitted and encouraged by the terms of his parole.
Separated from Family 22. The Department arbitrarily isolates Mr. Meza from his family. Mr. Meza’s stepfather recently died. The Department refused to let Mr. Meza visit his stepfather while he was on his death bed; so he did not arrive until five hours after his step father had passed away. Other, similarly situated parolees would have been allowed to visit a parent in their final hours. 23. The Department would not allow Mr. Meza to attend his stepfather’s funeral until after his counsel intervened to plead his case. 24. Mr. Meza fears this will happen again with his mother. The Division has the lawful authority to allow Mr. Meza to visit his mother, but it refuses to exercise it. Other similarly situated parolees would be allowed to visit their aging, infirm mother – at least to some extent. Mr. Meza is denied that opportunity because of his history with the Division.
Denied Church 25. The Department refuses to allow Mr. Meza to visit church, unlike other similarly situated parolees.
4

Case 1:05-cv-01008-LY Document 500 Filed 07/29/14 Page 5 of 10
26. Recently, Mr. Meza requested permission to visit a church in south Austin. In the past, he has been allowed to visit it a handful of times, on an ad hoc basis. Today, however, the Division has flatly denied him permission to go again, without justification. His parole officer simply told him “[the request] went up the chain of command” and was denied.
27. In early 2013, the Department allowed Mr. Meza to attend Sunday services at a Baptist Church in north Austin. But after Mr. Meza had attended three services, the Department inexplicably decided he would no longer be permitted to go.
28. One other parolee, in particular, who is registered sex offender, was attending the same church at the same time as Mr. Meza, and on information and belief, the Department allowed him to continue attending even after it stopped Mr. Meza. There was no reason to treat them differently.
Home 29. A few months ago, Mr. Meza was preparing to move to a new home. It was transitional housing for parolees, and other parolees with whom he is similarly situated live there. The owner approved Mr. Meza as a tenant. 30. Mr. Meza proposed the plan to his parole officer and the officer’s supervisor. They told him the plan was approved, but they needed to “line up a few details” before he could move. 31. But the Division’s assistant regional director called Mr. Meza at the last minute before he moved, and told him he was actually denying the request. He told Mr. Meza that he had decided to deny it because he considered Mr. Meza an “ongoing threat.” He would not give any further explanation. 32. Mr. Meza’s only alternative was to move into substandard housing in a rundown neighborhood. On information and belief, the Division reversed its decision to approve Mr. Meza’s placement at the first home because it was located in a more affluent neighborhood, and
5

Case 1:05-cv-01008-LY Document 500 Filed 07/29/14 Page 6 of 10
the Division did not want him to live there. There was no penological justification for the decision.
Denied Employment 33. Every travel request Mr. Meza makes to the Department has to be passed up through four levels in its chain-of-command, including:
 His parole officer, Ray Rodriguez;  His parole offer’s supervisor, Kim Solis;  The acting head of the Parole Division’s Austin offices; and  Jayme Martinez, Assistant Regional Director. 34. Other parolees’ travel requests are handled by their immediate parole officer, including parolees similarly-situated to Mr. Meza. But those parolees’ travel requests are not reviewed director level, even though there is no reason to treat them differently than Mr. Meza. 35. For over three years, Department routinely refused to approve Mr. Meza’s requests to travel to job interviews. Often a week or more would pass before he got any response. Even if the request was ultimately approved, so much time had passed that often the job was no longer be available. The delay was caused by passing all of his requests through hands at so many levels in the Division’s chain of command, which does not happen to other mandatory supervision parolees. There is no reason to treat Mr. Meza differently. 36. Mr. Meza must submit all travel plans to the Department for approval two weeks in advance and cannot deviate from them. Other mandatory supervision parolees with the same parole conditions have flexibility to change their travel plans by calling their parole officers, which permits them to take care of daily affairs and build lives in the free world – which is the goal of mandatory supervision. The Department does not permit Mr. Meza that flexibility. For instance, Mr. Meza was once approved to visit a business in the morning for a job interview, but
6

Case 1:05-cv-01008-LY Document 500 Filed 07/29/14 Page 7 of 10
the staff person who was scheduled to interview him was unexpectedly absent. Another staff person asked him to the return in the afternoon, but the Department would not let him return. Needless to say, he was not hired. The Department does not treat similarly situated parolees this way, and has no reason to treat Mr. Meza differently.
37. Mr. Meza was recently hired at an auto body shop, in February 2014, for the first time after three years of mandatory supervision – a length of time unique among similarly-situated parolees. The Department caused his long-term unemployment. It only stopped because of pressure from this litigation. If he were to lose his current job while this litigation was not ongoing, the Department would resume its behavior. The Departments treats other mandatory supervision parolees differently, and does not actively interfere with their efforts to have employment.
CAUSE OF ACTION –EQUAL PROTECTION 38. The Department intentionally treats Mr. Meza differently than similarly situated mandatory supervision parolees, for no reason rationally related to any legitimate government interest. 39. The terms and conditions of Mr. Meza’s parole are onerous but not unique. On information and belief, the Parole Board has imposed the same set of conditions on other parolees. Yet TDCJ treats Mr. Meza differently than other parolees who bear the same terms and conditions of parole, for no legitimate or logical reason. 40. Objectives “such as a bare desire to harm a politically unpopular group are not legitimate state interests.” City of Cleburne, Tex., 473 U.S. at 446-47 (citing U. S. Dept. of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534-35 (1973)). Nor may the State, even when it cites a legitimate state interest, “rely on a classification whose relationship to [the] asserted goal is so attenuated as to render the distinction arbitrary or irrational.” Id.
7

Case 1:05-cv-01008-LY Document 500 Filed 07/29/14 Page 8 of 10
41. The Department treats Mr. Meza as a “class of one,” in violation of his right to equal protection under the law. Newman Marchive Partnership, 349 Fed.Appx. at 965.
42. To put it simply, TDCJ treats Mr. Meza differently from other parolees because of who he is (Raul Meza) rather than what he is (the total sum of his parts). It is purposefully treating him differently than similarly situated parolees with the same terms and conditions of parole, without a legitimate justification.
43. If the relevant penological factors surrounding Mr. Meza (e.g. terms and conditions of parole, background, conviction, success during parole) were written on a notecard without his name and shuffled with a dozen more note cards describing other anonymous parolees similarly situated to Mr. Meza in each penologically-relevant respect, and if TDCJ then used those note cards to determine how they would administer those individuals’ parole, Mr. Meza would not be treated differently than the other parolees in the stack.
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT 44. Mr. Meza seeks a declaratory judgment that Defendants are violating his right to equal protection under the law. 28 U.S.C. § 2201. 45. Mr. Meza seeks a declaration stating:
a. Defendants intentionally treat Mr. Meza differently than other people who are similarly situated;
b. Defendants have no rational basis for the difference in treatment; c. Defendant is making choices with “discriminatory purpose.”
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 46. Inasmuch as Defendants have acted in the events described herein, they will continue to act accordingly. Without injunctive relief, Defendants will continue to violate Mr. Meza’s right to equal protection.
8

Case 1:05-cv-01008-LY Document 500 Filed 07/29/14 Page 9 of 10
47. Therefore, Mr. Meza asks this Court to issue an injunction ordering Defendants treat
Mr. Meza in the same manner it treats all similarly situated parolees. 42 U.S.C § 1983.
ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS
48. Mr. Meza is entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees, litigation costs, and court costs,
under to 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
THEREFORE, Mr. Meza respectfully prays that this Court grant the following relief:
A. Issue declaratory relief that Defendants’ conduct constituted illegal deprivation of Plaintiff’s right to equal protection;
B. Enjoin Defendants from violating Plaintiff’s rights to equal protection;
C. Grant reasonable attorneys’ fees, litigation expenses, and court costs; and
D. Grant all other and additional relief to which Mr. Meza may be entitled, at law or in equity.
DATED: July 28, 2014
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Brian McGiverin Brian McGiverin Texas Bar No. 24067760 brian@texascivilrightsproject.org Wayne Krause Yang State Bar No. 24032644 James C. Harrington Texas Bar No. 09048500
TEXAS CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT 1405 Montopolis Dr Austin, Texas 78741 Tel. (512) 474-5073 Fax (512) 474-0726
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF
9

Case 1:05-cv-01008-LY Document 500 Filed 07/29/14 Page 10 of 10 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been served on all counsel of record who have appeared in this matter through the Electronic Case Files System of the Western District of Texas.
/s/ Brian McGiverin Brian McGiverin
10

 </s> Case 1:05-cv-01008-LY Document 459 Filed 09/20/13 Page 1 of 3

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
AUSTIN DIVISION

RAUL MEZA, Plaintiff,
v. BRAD LIVINGSTON, et al,
Defendants.

§

§

§

§

Civil Action No. 1:05-CV-1008-LY

§

§

§

§

AGREED STIPULATION OF DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE The following parties appearing herein have reached a settlement disposing of all claims brought by Plaintiff Raul Meza against Defendants Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles (BPP) Board Members and Parole Commissioners Rissie L. Owens, Romulu Chavez, Barbara Lorraine, Juanita M. Gonzalez, David Gutierrez, James LaFavers, Michelle Skyrme, Cynthia Taussr, Tony Garcia, Billy Humphrey, James Hensarling, James Paul Kiel, Jr., Elvis Hightower, Pamela D. Freeman, Marsha S. Moberly, and Charles Shipman (“Board Defendants”). Therefore, pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a)(1)(ii), it is hereby stipulated by Plaintiff and Defendants that the above entitled action be dismissed against the Board and its’ employees with prejudice.
Respectfully submitted, GREG ABBOTT Attorney General of Texas DANIEL T. HODGE First Assistant Attorney General DAVID C. MATTAX Deputy Attorney General for Defense Litigation

Case 1:05-cv-01008-LY Document 459 Filed 09/20/13 Page 2 of 3
KAREN D. MATLOCK Assistant Attorney General Chief, Law Enforcement Defense Division /s/ Bruce R. Garcia BRUCE R. GARCIA Assistant Attorney General Attorney In Charge State Bar No. 07631060 P. O. Box 12548, Capitol Station Austin, Texas 78711 (512) 463-2080 / Fax No. (512)495-9139 Attorneys for Defendants Scott Medlock Texas Civil Rights Project 1405 Montopolis Drive Austin, TX. 78741 Counsel for Plaintiff Raul Meza Notice of Electronic Filing I, Bruce R. Garcia, Assistant Attorney General of Texas, certify that I have electronically submitted for filing a copy of this Agreed Stipulation of Dismissal with Prejudice in accordance with the Electronic Case Files System of the Western District of Texas, on this the 20th day of September, 2013. /s/ Bruce R. Garcia BRUCE R. GARCIA Assistant Attorney General
-2-

Case 1:05-cv-01008-LY Document 459 Filed 09/20/13 Page 3 of 3 Certificate of Service
I, Bruce R. Garcia, Assistant Attorney General of Texas, do hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing Agreed Stipulation of Dismissal with Prejudice has been served by first class mail on this the 20th day of September, 2013 to: Scott Medlock Texas Civil Rights Project 1405 Montopolis Drive Austin, Texas 78741
/s/ Bruce R. Garcia BRUCE R. GARCIA Assistant Attorney General
-3-

 </s> Case 1:05-cv-01008-LY Document 435 Filed 03/30/11 Page 1 of 4

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FIl ED

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

AUSTIN DIVISION

201 f HAR 30 PH I: 16

RAULMEZA,

§

PLAINTIFF, §

§

V.

§

§ CAUSE NO. A-05-CA-1008-L Y

BRAD LIVINGSTON, EXECUTIVE

§

DIRECTOR OF THE TEXAS

§

DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL

§

JUSTICE, IN HIS OFFICIAL

§

CAPACITY; STUART JENKlNS,

§

DIRECTOR OF THE TEXAS

§

DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL

§

JUSTICE PAROLE DIVISION, IN HIS §

OFFICIAL CAPACITY; AND RISSIE L. §

OWENS, JOSE ALISEDA, CHARLES §

AYCOCK, CONRITH DAVIS, JACKIE §

DENOYELLES, BARBARA LORRAINE, §

AND JUANITA GONZALES, IN THEIR §

OFFICIAL CAPACITIES AS MEMBERS §

OF THE TEXAS BOARD OF PARDONS §

AND PAROLE,

§

DEFENDANTS. §

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER Before the Court in the above styled and nwnbered cause is Plaintiffs Motion for Enforcement of Judgment and Contempt Against Defendants Owen, Aliseda, Aycock, Davis, Denoyelles, Lorraine, and Gonzales (Clerk's Document No. 413); Owens, Aliseda, Aycock, Davis, Denoyelles, Garcia and Gonzales' Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Enforcement of Judgment and Contempt filed December 13, 2010 (Clerk's Docwnent No. 416); and Plaintiffs Reply to His Motion for Enforcement ofJudgment and Contempt Against Defendants Owens, Aliseda, Aycock, Davis, Denoyelles,Lorraine, and Gonzalez filed January 21, 2011 (Clerk's Document No. 423). On March 29,2011, the Court held a hearing on Plaintiffs motion. All parties appeared by and were represented by counsel. Having reviewed the motion, response, reply, as well as all evidence and

Case 1:05-cv-01008-LY Document 435 Filed 03/30/11 Page 2 of 4
briefing submitted by the parties, and the arguments of counsel at the hearing, the Court determines that Plaintiffsmotion should be granted in part as to Plaintiffsrequest for enforcement ofjudgment. Insofar as Plaintiff moves for contempt against the Board Defendants, the motion remains pending before the Court.
On March 24,2009, this Court ordered the Board to provide Plaintiff Raul Meza a hearing with the following due process protections: (l) written notice in advance of the hearing; (2) disclosure of the evidence on which the State is relying; (3) a hearing, scheduled sufficiently after the notice to permit Meza to prepare, at which he will have the opportunity to be heard in person, represented by counsel, and to present documentary evidence in his support; (4) an opportunity at the hearing to call witnesses and confront and cross examine state witnesses, 'except upon a finding, not arbitrarily made, of good cause for not permitting each as to a particular witness'; (5) an independent decision maker; and, at issue here, (6) a written statement by the fact-finder as to the evidence relied upon and the reasons for the decision. Specifically, the Court found the record in this case was utterly devoid of findings regarding Meza and rejected the Board's argument that the continued imposition ofsex-offender conditions constituted asufficient finding that Meza possessed the offensive characteristic oflack ofsexual control for the basis for such finding. On May 20, 2010, the Fifth Circuit affirmed these findings and conclusions, only disagreeing with this Court's finding that the State is required to provide counsel to Meza.
By his motion, Meza contends that after the Fifth Circuit's ruling, a hearing was conducted by the Board on June 4, 2010. On June 25, 2010, the panel voted unanimously in a one-page notice to continue Meza's sex-offender conditions. The findings were a single sentence: "Raul Meza constitutes a threat to society by reason of his lack of sexual control." On August 20, 2010, Meza
2

Case 1:05-cv-01008-LY Document 435 Filed 03/30/11 Page 3 of 4
filed a motion for reconsideration with the Board and requested the Board provide the required written statement by the fact-finder as to the evidence relied upon and the reasons for the decision. To date, argues Meza, the Board has still not provided this required written statement. Meza asks the Court to appoint athird party to review the record ofthe hearing, make the required findings, and author the required written statement at the Board's expense. Meza also requests that the Court find the Board in contempt, levy a fine against each ofthe Board Defendants, and award Meza attorney's fees and costs associated with the preparation of this motion.
The Board responds that they have provided the required written statement. The Board refers the Court to the same one-page document as Meza which finds that Meza "constitutes a threat to society by reason of his lack of sexual control" and lists witnesses who testified and documents admitted at the hearing as evidence relied upon. The Board contends that neither the Government Code nor the Code of Criminal Procedure requires findings of fact and that a list of evidence presented is sufficient and that requiring specific findings "would have the potential to unnecessarily overburden the Board process by extending such a requirement to all parole-related decisions."
Having reviewed the motion, response, reply, as well as all evidence and briefing submitted by the parties, and the arguments of counsel at the hearing, the Court finds that the Board decision of June 25, 2010 does not comply with this Court's Order of March 24,2009, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The Board's decision is not a "written statement by the fact-finder as to the evidence relied upon and the reasons for the decision" in that it contains neither reasons for the decision nor evidence relied upon. To be in compliance, the written statement must contain with specificity the evidence presented to the Board that was persuasive to the Board in its decision and the specific reasons for the decision.
3

Case 1:05-cv-01008-LY Document 435 Filed 03/30/11 Page 4 of 4
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiffs Motion for Enforcement of Judgment and Contempt Against Defendants Owen, Aliseda, Aycock, Davis, Denoyelles, Lorraine, and Gonzales (Clerk's Document No. 413) is GRANTED insofar as the Board is ORDERED to prepare a new written statement on or before April 29, 2011 that sets out with specificity the evidence relied upon and the reasons for its decision to continue Meza's sex-offender conditions. In all other respects, Plaintiff s Motion for Enforcement of Judgment and Contempt Against Defendants Owen, Aliseda, Aycock, Davis, Denoyelles, Lorraine, and Gonzales (Clerk's Document No. 4l3) remains pending before the Court.
SIGNED this ...:1"ft< of March, 2011.
LEEY KEL UNIT STATES D STRICT JUDGE
4

 </s> Case: 1:05-cv-1008 As of: 11/10/2017 11:10 AM CST 1 of 39
U.S. District Court [LIVE] Western District of Texas (Austin) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:05−cv−01008−LY

CLOSED

Meza v. Livingston Assigned to: Judge Lee Yeakel Demand: $0 Related Case: 1:12−cv−00360−LY Case in other court: 5th USCA (Member Case), 07−50808
USCA−5th, 09−50367 USCA−5th, 09−50367 USCA−5TH, 10−50061 5th USCA, 07−50756 TXWD − Austin, 1:03cv136HH Cause: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights Plaintiff

Date Filed: 12/05/2005 Date Terminated: 01/21/2015 Jury Demand: None Nature of Suit: 550 Prisoner: Civil Rights Jurisdiction: Federal Question

Raul Meza

represented by Brian Rolland McGiverin Dietz, Lawrence & McGiverin 2221 Hancock Drive Austin, TX 78756 (512) 387−0718 Fax: (512) 597−0805 Email: bmcgiver@gmail.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James C. Harrington 1405 Montopolis Drive Austin, TX 78741 (512) 771−1759 Email: jch@utexas.edu LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Scott Medlock Edwards Law 1101 East 11th Street Austin, TX 78702 512−623−7727 Fax: 512−623−7729 Email: scott@edwards−law.com TERMINATED: 10/30/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Wayne Krause Yang Texas Civil Rights Project 1405 Montopolis Drive Austin, TX 78741 (512) 474−5073 Fax: (512) 474−0726 Email: wayne@texascivilrightsproject.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V. Defendant

Case: 1:05-cv-1008 As of: 11/10/2017 11:10 AM CST 2 of 39

Travis County TERMINATED: 11/17/2006

represented by Elaine A. Casas Travis County Attorney's Office P.O. Box 1748 Austin, TX 78767−1748 (512) 854−9197 Fax: 512/854−4808 Email: elaine.casas@co.travis.tx.us TERMINATED: 11/17/2006 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jennifer Kraber Travis County Attorney's Office P.O. Box 1748 Austin, TX 78767 (512)854−9531 Fax: 512/854−4808 Email: jennifer.kraber@co.travis.tx.us TERMINATED: 11/17/2006 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Individual Parole Officers in their individual and offical capacities TERMINATED: 07/29/2014

Defendant
Sheriff Greg Hamilton in his official capacity TERMINATED: 11/17/2006

represented by Elaine A. Casas (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/17/2006 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jennifer Kraber (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/29/2014 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Director Brad Livingston executive director of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, in his official capacity

represented by Anthony G. Brocato , Jr. Assistant Attorney General Transportation Division − 020 P.O. Box 12548 Austin, TX 78711−2548 (512) 463−2004 Fax: (512) 472−3855 Email: anthony.brocato@texasattorneygeneral.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Celamaine Cunniff Office of the Attorney General State of Texas Law Enforcement Defense Division P.O. Box 12548 Austin, TX 78711−2548 (512) 463−2080 Fax: 512/370−9389 Email: Cela_Cunniff@txed.uscourts.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:05-cv-1008 As of: 11/10/2017 11:10 AM CST 3 of 39

Defendant Brian Collier dirctor of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice Parole Division, in his official capacities TERMINATED: 11/10/2008
Defendant Jose Aliseda TERMINATED: 07/29/2014

Calysta L. Lantiegne Assistant Attorney General Law Enforcement Defense Division P.O. Box 12548, Capitol Station 300 W. 15th Street, 7th Floor Austin, TX 78701 (512) 463−2080 Fax: (512) 936−2109 Email: calysta.lantiegne@texasattorneygeneral.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Demetri Anastasiadis Office of the Attorney General State of Texas P.O. Box 12548 Capitol Station Austin, TX 78711 (512) 463−2080 Fax: 512−370−9374 Email: demetri.anastasiadis@oag.texas.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Anthony G. Brocato , Jr. (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/10/2008 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Celamaine Cunniff (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/10/2008 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Demetri Anastasiadis (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/10/2008 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Bruce R. Garcia Office of the Attorney General for the State of Texas 300 West 15th Street, 7th Floor Austin, TX 78701 (512) 463−2080 Fax: 512/370−9397 Email: Bruce.Garcia@oag.texas.gov TERMINATED: 07/29/2014 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Celamaine Cunniff (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/29/2014 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
M. Carol Gardner Assistant Attorney General State of Texas P.O. Box 12548 Capitol Station Austin, TX 78711

Case: 1:05-cv-1008 As of: 11/10/2017 11:10 AM CST 4 of 39

(512) 463−2100 Fax: 512/495−9139 TERMINATED: 07/29/2014 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Charles Aycock TERMINATED: 07/29/2014

represented by Bruce R. Garcia (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/29/2014 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Celamaine Cunniff (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/29/2014 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

M. Carol Gardner (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/29/2014 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Conrith Davis TERMINATED: 07/29/2014

represented by Bruce R. Garcia (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/29/2014 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Celamaine Cunniff (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/29/2014 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

M. Carol Gardner (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/29/2014 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Jackie DeNoyelles TERMINATED: 07/29/2014

represented by Bruce R. Garcia (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/29/2014 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Celamaine Cunniff (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/29/2014 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

M. Carol Gardner (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/29/2014 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Linda Garcia TERMINATED: 07/29/2014

represented by Bruce R. Garcia (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/29/2014 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Celamaine Cunniff (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/29/2014

Case: 1:05-cv-1008 As of: 11/10/2017 11:10 AM CST 5 of 39

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

M. Carol Gardner (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/29/2014 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Juanita Gonzales TERMINATED: 07/29/2014

represented by Bruce R. Garcia (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/29/2014 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Celamaine Cunniff (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/29/2014 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

M. Carol Gardner (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/29/2014 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Rissi L. Owens TERMINATED: 07/29/2014

represented by M. Carol Gardner (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/29/2014 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Bruce R. Garcia (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/29/2014 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Celamaine Cunniff (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/29/2014 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Stuart Jenkins

represented by Anthony G. Brocato , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Celamaine Cunniff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Demetri Anastasiadis (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Calysta L. Lantiegne (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant

represented by

Case: 1:05-cv-1008 As of: 11/10/2017 11:10 AM CST 6 of 39

Texas Dept of Criminal Justice TERMINATED: 07/29/2014

Celamaine Cunniff (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/29/2014 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Movant Texas Attorney General's Office

represented by Celamaine Cunniff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Movant Mike Lozito

represented by Demetri Anastasiadis (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Counter Plaintiff Stuart Jenkins

represented by Anthony G. Brocato , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Celamaine Cunniff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Demetri Anastasiadis (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Calysta L. Lantiegne (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Counter Plaintiff
Director Brad Livingston executive director of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, in his official capacity

represented by Anthony G. Brocato , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Celamaine Cunniff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Calysta L. Lantiegne (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Demetri Anastasiadis (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V. Counter Defendant Raul Meza

represented by

Case: 1:05-cv-1008 As of: 11/10/2017 11:10 AM CST 7 of 39

Brian Rolland McGiverin (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James C. Harrington (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Scott Medlock (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/30/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Wayne Krause Yang (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Counter Plaintiff Stuart Jenkins

represented by Anthony G. Brocato , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Celamaine Cunniff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Demetri Anastasiadis (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Calysta L. Lantiegne (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Counter Plaintiff
Director Brad Livingston executive director of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, in his official capacity

represented by Anthony G. Brocato , Jr. (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Celamaine Cunniff (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Calysta L. Lantiegne (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Demetri Anastasiadis (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V. Counter Defendant

Case: 1:05-cv-1008 As of: 11/10/2017 11:10 AM CST 8 of 39

Raul Meza

represented by Brian Rolland McGiverin (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James C. Harrington (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Scott Medlock (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/30/2013 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Wayne Krause Yang (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 12/05/2005 12/05/2005 12/05/2005 12/06/2005 12/19/2005 12/22/2005
12/28/2005 01/24/2006 01/24/2006 02/07/2006
02/10/2006 04/05/2006 04/11/2006 04/11/2006 04/19/2006

# Docket Text
Case assigned to Judge Lee Yeakel (tdk) (Entered: 12/06/2005)
1 Complaint filed. Filing Fee: $ 250.00 Receipt # 383491 ) (tdk) (Additional attachment(s) added on 4/24/2013: # 1 JS 44) (klw). (Entered: 12/06/2005)
2 Motion by Raul Meza for Scott Medlock to appear pro hac vice (tdk) (Entered: 12/06/2005)
Court file prepared and forwarded to Judge Yeakel (tdk) (Entered: 12/06/2005)
3 Motion by Raul Meza for Scott Medlock to appear pro hac vice (td) (Entered: 12/20/2005)
4 Order granting motion for Scott Medlock to appear pro hac vice [3−1], granting motion for Scott Medlock to appear hac vice [2−1] signed by Judge Lee Yeakel (td) (Entered: 12/22/2005)
Mail addressed to Scott Medlock : order [4−1] : returned by post office marked undeliverable as addressed (dm) (Entered: 01/03/2006)
Returned mail fwd to Atty Medlock (td) (Entered: 01/24/2006)
Summons issued for Brad Livingston, Brian Collier (td) (Entered: 01/24/2006)
MOTION REFERRED: referred 73 Second MOTION to Dismiss Defendant Collier's Second Motion to Dismiss, 75 MOTION to Dismiss Defendants Livingston and Collier's Second Motion to Dismiss to Judge Austin. (See Order filed 12/6/06 re−referring issues from dkt. #14 motion to dismiss, which was terminated by this Order, and Judge Austin's Order, dkt. #69, filed 1/29/07, that defendants' file supplemental motions to dismiss.) (mc2, ) (Entered: 03/15/2007)
5 Answer by Travis County, Greg Hamilton; jury demand (td) (Entered: 02/10/2006)
6 Motion by Raul Meza for default judgment against Brad Livingston, Brian Collier , and for hearing on damages (td) (Entered: 04/07/2006)
7 Response by TX Atty General's Of motion for default judgment against Brad Livingston, Brian Collier [6−1] (td) (Entered: 04/13/2006)
8 Motion by TX Atty General's Of to quash purported service (td) (Entered: 04/13/2006)
9 Order denying motion to quash purported service [8−1], denying motion for default judgment against Brad Livingston, Brian Collier [6−1], denying motion for hearing on damages [6−2] signed by Judge Lee Yeakel (td) (Entered: 04/19/2006)

Case: 1:05-cv-1008 As of: 11/10/2017 11:10 AM CST 9 of 39

04/24/2006 05/02/2006 05/16/2006 05/22/2006 06/02/2006 06/20/2006
06/27/2006 06/27/2006 06/30/2006
06/30/2006 06/30/2006
07/03/2006 07/10/2006 07/24/2006 07/28/2006 08/08/2006 08/24/2006
08/28/2006
08/29/2006 08/30/2006 08/31/2006 09/11/2006

457 Summons issued for Brad Livingston, Brian Collier (td) (klw). (Entered: 04/24/2006)
10 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Raul Meza. Brian Collier served on 5/2/2006, answer due 5/22/2006. (td, ) (Entered: 05/04/2006)
11 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Raul Meza. Brad Livingston served on 5/8/2006, answer due 5/29/2006. (td, ) (Entered: 05/17/2006)
12 MOTION to Dismiss by Brad Livingston, Brian Collier. (td, ) (Entered: 05/23/2006)
13 RESPONSE to Motion re 12 MOTION to Dismiss , filed by Raul Meza. (td, ) (Entered: 06/06/2006)
14 SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION to Dismiss and Reply to Plaintiff's Response by Brad Livingston, Brian Collier. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit # 2 Exhibit)(td, ) (Entered: 06/21/2006)
15 MOTION to Amend Complaint by Raul Meza. (td, ) (Entered: 06/28/2006)
16 MOTION to Dismiss, and MOTION for Rule 7(a) Reply by Brian Collier. (td, ) (Entered: 06/28/2006)
17 ORDER REFERRING MOTION: 14 MOTION to Dismiss filed by Brian Collier,, Brad Livingston,, 16 MOTION to Dismiss MOTION for Rule 7(a) Reply filed by Brian Collier,, 12 MOTION to Dismiss filed by Brian Collier,, Brad Livingston, referred to Judge Andrew W. Austin. Signed by Judge Lee Yeakel. (jk, ) (Entered: 07/03/2006)
18 ORDER granting 15 Motion to Amend Complaint Signed by Judge Lee Yeakel. (mc2, ) (Entered: 07/03/2006)
24 AMENDED COMPLAINT against Travis County, Individual Parole Officers, Greg Hamilton, Brad Livingston, Brian Collier amending 1 Complaint., filed by Raul Meza.(td, ) (Entered: 08/16/2006)
19 RESPONSE to Motion re 14 MOTION to Dismiss , filed by Raul Meza. (td, ) (Entered: 07/05/2006)
20 RESPONSE to Motion re 16 MOTION to Dismiss MOTION for Rule 7(a) Reply , filed by Raul Meza. (td, ) (Entered: 07/11/2006)
21 REPLY to Response to Motion re 14 SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION to Dismiss , filed by Brad Livingston, Brian Collier. (td, ) (Entered: 07/25/2006)
22 MOTION for Protective Order by Brad Livingston, Brian Collier. (td, ) (Entered: 07/31/2006)
23 RESPONSE to Motion re 22 MOTION for Protective Order , filed by Raul Meza. (td, ) (Entered: 08/08/2006)
25 ORDER REFERRING MOTION: 22 MOTION for Protective Order filed by Brian Collier,, Brad Livingston, referred to Judge Austin. Signed by Judge Lee Yeakel. (td, ) (Entered: 08/25/2006)
26 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS re 14 MOTION to Dismiss filed by Brian Collier,, Brad Livingston,, 16 MOTION to Dismiss MOTION for Rule 7(a) Reply filed by Brian Collier,, 12 MOTION to Dismiss filed by Brian Collier,, Brad Livingston, . Signed by Judge Andrew W. Austin. (td, ) (Entered: 08/29/2006)
27 ANSWER to Amended Complaint with Jury Demand by Travis County, Greg Hamilton.(td, ) (Entered: 08/30/2006)
28 ORDER denying 22 Motion for Protective Order Signed by Judge Andrew W. Austin. (td, ) (Entered: 08/31/2006)
Motions No Longer Referred: 22 MOTION for Protective Order (td, ) (Entered: 08/31/2006)
29 OBJECTION to 26 Report and Recommendations by Brad Livingston, Brian Collier.. (Cunniff, Celamaine) (Entered: 09/11/2006)

Case: 1:05-cv-1008 As of: 11/10/2017 11:10 AM CST 10 of 39

09/13/2006 09/13/2006 09/20/2006
09/20/2006
09/25/2006 09/25/2006 10/02/2006 10/02/2006
10/23/2006 10/23/2006 10/27/2006
10/30/2006
10/30/2006 10/31/2006 11/01/2006 11/01/2006 11/02/2006
11/02/2006 11/15/2006 11/17/2006 11/17/2006

30 NOTICE Defendants Livingston and Collier's Notice of Initial Disclosure by Brad Livingston, Brian Collier (Cunniff, Celamaine) (Entered: 09/13/2006)
31 NOTICE of Vacation by Raul Meza (Medlock, Scott) (Entered: 09/13/2006)
32 Opposed MOTION for Protective Order Defendant Collier's Second Opposed Motion for Protective Order by Brian Collier. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order GRANTING Motion# 2 Proposed Order DENYING Motion)(Cunniff, Celamaine) (Entered: 09/20/2006)
33 ATTACHMENT Attachment A to Defendant Collier's Second Opposed Motion for Protective Order to 32 Opposed MOTION for Protective Order Defendant Collier's Second Opposed Motion for Protective Order by Brian Collier. (Cunniff, Celamaine) (Entered: 09/20/2006)
34 Unopposed MOTION Prevent Bias at Deposition by Raul Meza. (Medlock, Scott) (Entered: 09/25/2006)
35 ORDER granting 34 Motion to Prevent Bias Signed by Judge Lee Yeakel. (td, ) (Entered: 09/26/2006)
36 MOTION for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint by Raul Meza. (Medlock, Scott) (Entered: 10/02/2006)
37 RESPONSE to Motion re 32 Opposed MOTION for Protective Order Defendant Collier's Second Opposed Motion for Protective Order, filed by Raul Meza. (Medlock, Scott) (Entered: 10/02/2006)
38 MOTION to Compel Mediation by Raul Meza. (Medlock, Scott) (Entered: 10/23/2006)
39 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction by Raul Meza. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Conditions of Mandatory Supervision)(Medlock, Scott) (Entered: 10/23/2006)
40 Order for Scheduling Recommendations/Proposed Scheduling Order. Parties are to submit a Proposed Agreed Scheduling Order... on or before Thursday, 11/9/2006. Signed by Judge Lee Yeakel. (td, ) (Entered: 10/27/2006)
41 RESPONSE to Motion re 39 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction Defendants Livingston and Collier's Response to Plaintiff's Motion for Temporary Injunction, filed by Brad Livingston, Brian Collier. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Exhibit B# 3 Exhibit C# 4 Exhibit D# 5 Proposed Order)(Cunniff, Celamaine) (Entered: 10/30/2006)
42 Agreed MOTION to Dismiss by Raul Meza, Travis County, Greg Hamilton. (td, ) (Entered: 10/31/2006)
43 REPLY to Response to Motion re 39 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction, filed by Raul Meza. (Medlock, Scott) (Entered: 10/31/2006)
44 Scheduling Recommendations by Raul Meza. (Medlock, Scott) (Entered: 11/01/2006)
45 ADR Report Filed − CONSENT to Alternate Dispute Resolution (ADR) by Raul Meza(Medlock, Scott) (Entered: 11/01/2006)
46 Response in Opposition to Motion re 38 MOTION to Compel Mediation, filed by Brad Livingston, Brian Collier. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Cunniff, Celamaine) (Entered: 11/02/2006)
47 ADR Report Filed − NON−CONSENT to Alternate Dispute Resolution (ADR) by Brad Livingston, Brian Collier(Cunniff, Celamaine) (Entered: 11/02/2006)
48 REPLY to Response to Motion re 38 MOTION to Compel Mediation, filed by Raul Meza. (Medlock, Scott) (Entered: 11/15/2006)
49 ORDER granting 42 Motion to Dismiss Signed by Judge Lee Yeakel. (td, ) (Entered: 11/20/2006)
50 ORDERED that this matter is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE... as to Travis County and Sheriff Greg Hamilton.... Signed by Judge Lee Yeakel. (td, ) (Entered:

Case: 1:05-cv-1008 As of: 11/10/2017 11:10 AM CST 11 of 39

12/05/2006 12/06/2006 12/15/2006 12/20/2006 12/21/2006 12/22/2006 12/22/2006 12/27/2006 12/29/2006 01/03/2007
01/03/2007 01/10/2007 01/19/2007
01/22/2007 01/23/2007 01/24/2007 01/25/2007 01/26/2007
01/26/2007

11/20/2006)
51 ORDER Initial Pretrial Conference set for 1/3/2007 09:30 AM before Honorable Lee Yeakel.. Signed by Judge Lee Yeakel. (dm, ) (Entered: 12/06/2006)
52 ORDER granting in part and denying in part 12 Motion to Dismiss, denying 14 Motion to Dismiss, denying 16 Motion to Dismiss, granting 16 Motion for Rule 7(a) Reply Signed by Judge Lee Yeakel. (dm, ) (Entered: 12/06/2006)
53 MOTION to Quash or for Protective Order by Brad Livingston, Brian Collier. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Proposed Order)(Cunniff, Celamaine) (Entered: 12/15/2006)
54 NOTICE Defendants Livingston and Collier's Notice of First Supplemental Disclosure by Brad Livingston, Brian Collier (Cunniff, Celamaine) (Entered: 12/20/2006)
55 RESPONSE to Motion re 16 MOTION to Dismiss MOTION for Rule 7(a) Reply, filed by Raul Meza. (Medlock, Scott) (Entered: 12/21/2006)
56 RESPONSE to Motion re 53 MOTION to Quash or for Protective Order and Plaintiff's Motion to Compel, filed by Raul Meza. (Medlock, Scott) (Entered: 12/22/2006)
MOTION to Compel (contained in response, see doc #56) by Raul Meza. (td, ) (Entered: 12/27/2006)
57 ORDER, Set Motion Hearing for 53 MOTION to Quash or for Protective Order, MOTION to Compel Motion Hearing set for 2/20/2007 02:00 PM before Honorable Lee Yeakel.. Signed by Judge Lee Yeakel. (td, ) (Entered: 12/27/2006)
58 ORDER granting 36 Motion for Leave to File Signed by Judge Lee Yeakel. (td, ) (Entered: 12/29/2006)
59 SCHEDULING ORDER: Final Pretrial Conference set for 6/28/2007 09:00 AM and Jury Trial in the month of July 2007 before Honorable Lee Yeakel. Discovery due by 4/1/2007. Motions due by 2/8/2007.. Signed by Judge Lee Yeakel. (dm, ) (Entered: 01/03/2007)
60 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Lee Yeakel : Initial Pretrial Conference held on 1/3/2007 (Minute entry documents are not available electronically.). (Court Reporter Kathy Carroll.) (dm, ) (Entered: 01/04/2007)
61 ORDER Withdrawing 39 Motion for Preliminary Injunction Signed by Judge Lee Yeakel. (td, ) (Entered: 01/10/2007)
62 Joint MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 57 Order, Set Motion Hearings Joint Motion for Extension of Time to File Brief in Response to Court's Order by Raul Meza, Brad Livingston, Brian Collier. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Cunniff, Celamaine) (Entered: 01/19/2007)
63 Miscellaneous Objection Defendant Collier's Objections to the Notice of Intention to Take Oral Deposition by Subpoena Duces Tecum of Bryan Collier by Brian Collier. (Cunniff, Celamaine) (Entered: 01/22/2007)
64 ORDER granting 62 Motion for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply Signed by Judge Lee Yeakel. (td, ) (Entered: 01/23/2007)
65 NOTICE of Second Supplemental Disclosure by Brad Livingston, Brian Collier (Cunniff, Celamaine) (Entered: 01/24/2007)
66 RESPONSE to 63 Miscellaneous Objection by Raul Meza. (Medlock, Scott) (Entered: 01/25/2007)
67 SUPPLEMENT to 53 MOTION to Quash or for Protective Order Defendants Livingston and Collier's Supplement to Motion to Quash or For Protective Order by Brad Livingston, Brian Collier. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Exhibit B)(Cunniff, Celamaine) (Entered: 01/26/2007)
68 ***BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF *** supplement re 56 Response to Motion by Raul Meza. (Medlock, Scott) Modified on 1/29/2007 (ja, ). (Entered: 01/26/2007)

Case: 1:05-cv-1008 As of: 11/10/2017 11:10 AM CST 12 of 39

01/29/2007 02/06/2007 02/06/2007 02/06/2007
02/06/2007 02/07/2007
02/07/2007 02/07/2007 02/07/2007 02/07/2007 02/08/2007 02/14/2007
02/14/2007 02/15/2007 02/15/2007 02/16/2007 02/19/2007 02/19/2007 02/20/2007

69 ORDER... the Court ORDERS that Defendants file a supplemental motion to dismiss fully addressing these issues no later than February 20, 2007.... Signed by Judge Andrew W. Austin. (td, ) (Entered: 01/30/2007)
70 ORDER denying 32 Motion for Protective Order Signed by Judge Lee Yeakel. (td, ) (Entered: 02/06/2007)
71 Unopposed MOTION to Extend Scheduling Order Deadlines by Raul Meza. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Medlock, Scott) (Entered: 02/06/2007)
72 Unopposed MOTION for Leave to Exceed Page Limitation Defendant Collier's Unopposed Motion for Leave to File a Motion to Dismiss in Excess of the Court's Page Limits by Brian Collier. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Cunniff, Celamaine) (Entered: 02/06/2007)
73 Second MOTION to Dismiss Defendant Collier's Second Motion to Dismiss by Brian Collier. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Proposed Order)(Cunniff, Celamaine) (Entered: 02/06/2007)
74 Unopposed MOTION for Leave to Exceed Page Limitation Defendants Livingston and Collier's Unopposed Motion for Leave to File a Motion in Excess of The Court's Page Limits by Brad Livingston, Brian Collier. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Cunniff, Celamaine) (Entered: 02/07/2007)
75 MOTION to Dismiss Defendants Livingston and Collier's Second Motion to Dismiss by Brad Livingston, Brian Collier. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Cunniff, Celamaine) (Entered: 02/07/2007)
76 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Lee Yeakel : Telephone Conference held on 2/7/2007 (Minute entry documents are not available electronically.). (Court Reporter Kathy Carroll.) (td, ) (Entered: 02/08/2007)
77 ORDER granting 72 Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages Signed by Judge Lee Yeakel. (td, ) (Entered: 02/08/2007)
78 ORDER granting 71 Motion to Extend Scheduling Order Deadlines Motions due by 3/14/2007... Signed by Judge Lee Yeakel. (td, ) (Entered: 02/08/2007)
79 Response in Opposition to Motion re 53 MOTION to Quash or for Protective Order, filed by Raul Meza. (Medlock, Scott) (Entered: 02/08/2007)
80 SUPPLEMENT to 53 MOTION to Quash or for Protective Order Defendants Livingston and Collier's Second Supplement to Motion to Quash or For Protective Order by Brad Livingston, Brian Collier. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Exhibit B)(Brocato, Anthony) (Entered: 02/14/2007)
81 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Joint Status Report by Brad Livingston, Brian Collier. (td, ) (Entered: 02/14/2007)
82 ORDER granting 81 Motion for Extension of Time to File Signed by Judge Lee Yeakel. (td, ) (Entered: 02/15/2007)
83 ORDER granting 74 Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages Signed by Judge Lee Yeakel. (td, ) (Entered: 02/15/2007)
84 MOTION to Compel by Raul Meza. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit)(td, ) (Entered: 02/16/2007)
85 Response in Opposition to Motion re 73 Second MOTION to Dismiss Defendant Collier's Second Motion to Dismiss, filed by Raul Meza. (Medlock, Scott) (Entered: 02/19/2007)
86 Response in Opposition to Motion re 75 MOTION to Dismiss Defendants Livingston and Collier's Second Motion to Dismiss, filed by Raul Meza. (Medlock, Scott) (Entered: 02/19/2007)
87 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Lee Yeakel : Motion Hearing held on 2/20/2007 re 53 MOTION to Quash or for Protective Order filed by Brian Collier,, Brad Livingston,, MOTION to Compel 56 filed by Raul Meza, (Minute entry documents are not available electronically.). (Court Reporter Kathy Carroll.) (td, )

Case: 1:05-cv-1008 As of: 11/10/2017 11:10 AM CST 13 of 39

02/20/2007 02/21/2007 02/21/2007
02/22/2007 02/23/2007 02/23/2007 02/23/2007 02/27/2007 02/27/2007
03/02/2007
03/02/2007 03/05/2007 03/07/2007 03/07/2007
03/07/2007
03/08/2007 03/08/2007

(Entered: 02/21/2007)
88 Court's Exhibit List (td, ) (Entered: 02/21/2007)
89 Opposed MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 84 MOTION to Compel by Brad Livingston, Brian Collier. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Cunniff, Celamaine) (Entered: 02/21/2007)
90 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 86 Response in Opposition to Motion, 85 Response in Opposition to Motion by Brad Livingston, Brian Collier. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Cunniff, Celamaine) (Entered: 02/21/2007)
91 Miscellaneous Objection Defendant Collier's Objections to the Notices of Intention to Take Oral Deposition by Subpoena Duces Tecum on February 28, 2007, and March 8, 2007, of Bryan Collier by Brian Collier. (Cunniff, Celamaine) (Entered: 02/22/2007)
92 ORDER granting 90 Motion for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply Signed by Judge Lee Yeakel. (td, ) (Entered: 02/23/2007)
93 STATUS REPORT by Raul Meza. (Medlock, Scott) (Entered: 02/23/2007)
94 Opposed MOTION to Amend Complaint by Raul Meza. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Third Amended Complaint# 2 Proposed Order)(Medlock, Scott) (Entered: 02/23/2007)
95 BRIEF regarding 53 MOTION to Quash or for Protective Order by Brad Livingston, Brian Collier. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit)(Cunniff, Celamaine) (Entered: 02/27/2007)
96 AMENDED COMPLAINT against Jose Aliseda, Charles Aycock, Conrith Davis, Jackie DeNoyelles, Linda Garcia, Juanita Gonzales, Rissi L. Owens, Brad Livingston, Brian Collier amending 24 Amended Complaint., filed by Raul Meza.(td, ) (Entered: 02/28/2007)
97 RESPONSE to Motion re 89 Opposed MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 84 MOTION to Compel Plaintiffs Response to Defendants Motion for Extension of Time to File Response to Plaintiffs Motion To Compel, filed by Raul Meza. (Medlock, Scott) (Entered: 03/02/2007)
98 BRIEF regarding 95 Brief by Raul Meza Letter Brief in Opposition to Motion to Quash. (Medlock, Scott) (Entered: 03/02/2007)
99 Miscellaneous Objection Defendant Collier's Objection to the Notices of Intention to Take Oral Deposition by Subpoena Duces Tecum on March 22, 2007, of Bryan Collier by Brian Collier. (Cunniff, Celamaine) (Entered: 03/05/2007)
100 MOTION In Forma Pauperis by Raul Meza. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1# 2 # 3 # 4)(Medlock, Scott) (Entered: 03/07/2007)
101 Unopposed MOTION for Leave to Exceed Page Limitation for Defendants Livingston and Collier's Response to Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Discovery by Brad Livingston, Brian Collier. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Cunniff, Celamaine) (Entered: 03/07/2007)
102 RESPONSE to Motion re 84 MOTION to Compel Defendants Livingston and Collier's Response to Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Discovery, filed by Brad Livingston, Brian Collier. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Exhibit B# 3 Exhibit C# 4 Exhibit D# 5 Exhibit E# 6 Exhibit F# 7 Exhibit G# 8 Exhibit H# 9 Exhibit I# 10 Exhibit J)(Cunniff, Celamaine) (Entered: 03/07/2007)
103 RESPONSE Defendant Collier's Reply to Plaintiff's Response to Second Motion to Dismiss to 85 Response in Opposition to Motion by Brian Collier. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Cunniff, Celamaine) (Entered: 03/08/2007)
104 RESPONSE Defendants Livingston and Collier's Reply to Plaintiff's Response to Second Motion to Dismiss to 86 Response in Opposition to Motion by Brad Livingston, Brian Collier. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Cunniff, Celamaine) (Entered: 03/08/2007)

Case: 1:05-cv-1008 As of: 11/10/2017 11:10 AM CST 14 of 39

03/09/2007 03/12/2007 03/14/2007 03/14/2007
03/14/2007
03/14/2007
03/14/2007 03/14/2007 03/15/2007 03/15/2007
03/15/2007
03/16/2007 03/19/2007 03/19/2007 03/22/2007 03/23/2007 03/23/2007

105 ORDER granting 101 Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages Signed by Judge Lee Yeakel. (td, ) (Entered: 03/09/2007)
106 ORDER granting 89 Motion for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply Signed by Judge Lee Yeakel. (jk, ) (Entered: 03/12/2007)
107 MOTION to Compel Defendant Livingston to Respond to his Second Discovery Requests by Raul Meza. (Attachments: # 1 exhibit 1# 2 # 3)(Medlock, Scott) (Entered: 03/14/2007)
108 Unopposed MOTION for Leave to Exceed Page Limitation to File Defendants Livingston and Collier's Motion for Summary Judgment with Brief in Support by Brad Livingston, Brian Collier. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Cunniff, Celamaine) (Entered: 03/14/2007)
109 MOTION for Summary Judgment Defendants Livingston and Collier's Motion for Summary Judgment with Brief in Support by Brad Livingston, Brian Collier. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Exhibit B# 3 Exhibit C# 4 Exhibit D# 5 Exhibit E# 6 Exhibit F# 7 Exhibit G# 8 Exhibit H# 9 Exhibit I# 10 Exhibit J# 11 Exhibit K# 12 Exhibit L# 13 Exhibit M# 14 Proposed Order)(Cunniff, Celamaine) (Entered: 03/14/2007)
110 MOTION for Summary Judgment Defendant Collier's Motion for Summary Judgment with Brief in Support by Brian Collier. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Cunniff, Celamaine) Modified on 3/15/2007 to correct filer per AG's office (ja, ). (Entered: 03/14/2007)
111 MOTION for Leave to Exceed Page Limitation on Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment by Raul Meza. (ja, ) Modified on 3/15/2007 to correct filing date. (ja, ). (Entered: 03/15/2007)
112 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment by Raul Meza. (ja, ) (Entered: 03/15/2007)
113 SUPPLEMENT to 112 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment Plaintiff's Amended Certificate of Service for Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment by Raul Meza. (Medlock, Scott) (Entered: 03/15/2007)
114 RESPONSE to Motion re 84 MOTION to Compel Plaintiff's Reply to Defendants Response to Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Defendants Collier and Livingston to Respond to his first Discovery Requests, filed by Raul Meza. (Medlock, Scott) (Entered: 03/15/2007)
115 ***AMENDED***REPLY to Response to Motion re 84 MOTION to Compel Plaintiff's Reply to Defendants Response to Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Defendants Collier and Livingston to Respond to his First Discovery Requests, filed by Raul Meza. (Medlock, Scott) Modified on 3/15/2007 to add 'amended' (ja, ). (Entered: 03/15/2007)
116 Summons Issued as to Rissi L. Owens. (ja, ) (Entered: 03/16/2007)
117 ORDER granting 108 Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages Signed by Judge Lee Yeakel. (ja, ) (Entered: 03/19/2007)
118 Miscellaneous Objection Defendant Collier's Objections to the Notices of Intention to Take Oral Deposition by Subpoena Duces Tecum on March 23, 2007 by Brian Collier. (Cunniff, Celamaine) (Entered: 03/19/2007)
119 NOTICE of Rule 29 Agreement by Raul Meza (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit)(Medlock, Scott) (Entered: 03/22/2007)
120 RESPONSE to Motion re 109 MOTION for Summary Judgment Defendants Livingston and Collier's Motion for Summary Judgment with Brief in Support, filed by Raul Meza. (Attachments: # 1)(Medlock, Scott) (Entered: 03/23/2007)
121 RESPONSE to Motion re 110 MOTION for Summary Judgment Defendant Collier's Motion for Summary Judgment with Brief in Support, filed by Raul Meza. (Attachments: # 1)(Medlock, Scott) (Entered: 03/23/2007)

Case: 1:05-cv-1008 As of: 11/10/2017 11:10 AM CST 15 of 39

03/23/2007 03/23/2007 03/23/2007 03/26/2007 03/26/2007 03/26/2007 03/30/2007
04/04/2007 04/05/2007 04/12/2007
04/12/2007 04/12/2007 04/17/2007 04/17/2007 04/17/2007 04/17/2007 04/17/2007 04/17/2007 04/17/2007 04/17/2007 04/18/2007
04/18/2007 04/18/2007

122 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Raul Meza. Rissi L. Owens served on 3/16/2007, answer due 4/5/2007. (td, ) (Entered: 03/26/2007)
123 NOTICE of Attorney Appearance by Demetri Anastasiadis on behalf of Mike Lozito (ja, ) (Entered: 03/26/2007)
124 Ojection to Notice of Intention to take oral deposition by subpoena duces tecum by Mike Lozito.(ja, ) (Entered: 03/26/2007)
125 ORDER granting 94 Motion to Amend Complaint Signed by Judge Lee Yeakel. (td, ) (Entered: 03/27/2007)
126 ORDER granting 100 Motion to proceed in forma pauperis Signed by Judge Lee Yeakel. (td, ) (Entered: 03/27/2007)
127 ORDER on Motion for Service of Defendants. Signed by Judge Lee Yeakel. (td, ) (Entered: 03/27/2007)
128 Summons Issued as to Jose Aliseda, Charles Aycock, Conrith Davis, Jackie DeNoyelles, Linda Garcia, Juanita Gonzales, Rissi L. Owens. (td, ) (Entered: 04/02/2007)
129 ORDER granting 111 Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages Signed by Judge Lee Yeakel. (td, ) (Entered: 04/04/2007)
130 MOTION to Dismiss by Rissi L. Owens. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Gardner, M.) (Entered: 04/05/2007)
131 ORDER granting in part and denying in part 53 Motion to Quash, granting in part and denying in part 56 Motion to Compel Signed by Judge Lee Yeakel. (td, ) (Entered: 04/12/2007)
132 RESPONSE to Motion re 130 MOTION to Dismiss, filed by Raul Meza. (Attachments: # 1)(Medlock, Scott) (Entered: 04/12/2007)
133 USM 285 w/attached order fwd to USMS for service (td, ) (Entered: 04/13/2007)
134 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Raul Meza. Jackie DeNoyelles served on 4/9/2007, answer due 4/30/2007. (td, ) (Entered: 04/18/2007)
135 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Raul Meza. Juanita Gonzales served on 4/9/2007, answer due 4/30/2007. (td, ) (Entered: 04/18/2007)
136 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Raul Meza. Linda Garcia served on 4/5/2007, answer due 4/25/2007. (td, ) (Entered: 04/18/2007)
137 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Raul Meza. Rissi L. Owens served on 4/10/2007, answer due 4/30/2007. (td, ) (Entered: 04/18/2007)
138 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Raul Meza. Charles Aycock served on 4/9/2007, answer due 4/30/2007. (td, ) (Entered: 04/18/2007)
139 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Raul Meza. Conrith Davis served on 4/11/2007, answer due 5/1/2007. (td, ) (Entered: 04/18/2007)
140 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Raul Meza. Jose Aliseda served on 4/9/2007, answer due 4/30/2007. (td, ) (Entered: 04/18/2007)
141 Request for U.S. Marshals Service Expenses in Pauper Case ($93.52) (td, ) (Entered: 04/18/2007)
142 NOTICE Defendants Livingston and Collier's Notice of Third Supplemental Disclosure by Brad Livingston, Brian Collier (Cunniff, Celamaine) (Entered: 04/18/2007)
143 Witness List by Brad Livingston, Brian Collier. (Cunniff, Celamaine) (Entered: 04/18/2007)
144 Exhibit List Defendants Livingston and Collier's Exhibit List by Brad Livingston, Brian Collier.. (Cunniff, Celamaine) (Entered: 04/18/2007)

Case: 1:05-cv-1008 As of: 11/10/2017 11:10 AM CST 16 of 39

04/18/2007 04/18/2007 04/20/2007 04/23/2007 04/23/2007 04/23/2007 04/25/2007 04/25/2007 04/26/2007
04/26/2007
05/01/2007
05/01/2007 05/01/2007
05/01/2007
05/02/2007 05/02/2007

145 DESIGNATION OF EXPERT WITNESS by Brad Livingston, Brian Collier Defendants Livingston and Collier's Designation of Expert Witnesses. (Cunniff, Celamaine) (Entered: 04/18/2007)
146 WITNESS/EXHIBIT/EXPERT LIST by Raul Meza. (Medlock, Scott) (Entered: 04/18/2007)
147 MOTION to Exclude Testimony of Defendant's Experts by Raul Meza. (Attachments: # 1 # 2 # 3 # 4)(Medlock, Scott) (Entered: 04/20/2007)
149 DESIGNATION OF EXPERT WITNESS by Brad Livingston, Brian Collier Defendants Livingston and Collier's Amended Designation of Expert Witnesses. (Cunniff, Celamaine) (Entered: 04/23/2007)
150 MOTION to Dismiss by Jose Aliseda, Charles Aycock, Conrith Davis, Jackie DeNoyelles, Linda Garcia, Juanita Gonzales. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order Proposed Order)(Gardner, M.) (Entered: 04/23/2007)
151 RESPONSE to Motion re 150 MOTION to Dismiss, filed by Raul Meza. (Attachments: # 1)(Medlock, Scott) (Entered: 04/23/2007)
154 Return of service unexecuted as to Orion Treatment Center (td, ) (Entered: 04/27/2007)
155 Letter/Correspondence from Attorney Cunniff by Jose Aliseda, Charles Aycock, Conrith Davis, Jackie DeNoyelles, Linda Garcia, Juanita Gonzales, Rissi L. Owens, Brad Livingston, Brian Collier. (td, ) (Entered: 04/27/2007)
152 MOTION for Leave to Exceed Page Limitation to File Defendants Livingston and Collier's Response and Objections to Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment by Brad Livingston, Brian Collier. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Cunniff, Celamaine) (Entered: 04/26/2007)
153 RESPONSE to Motion re 112 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment Defendants Livingston and Collier's Response and Objection to Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, filed by Brad Livingston, Brian Collier. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A (Part 1 of 2)# 2 Exhibit A (Part 2 of 2)# 3 Exhibit B# 4 Exhibit C# 5 Exhibit D# 6 Exhibit E# 7 Exhibit F# 8 Exhibit G# 9 Exhibit H# 10 Exhibit I# 11 Exhibit J# 12 Exhibit K# 13 Proposed Order)(Cunniff, Celamaine) (Entered: 04/26/2007)
156 ORDER Setting Hearing on 38 MOTION to Compel Mediation, 84 MOTION to Compel, 107 MOTION to Compel Defendant Livingston to Respond to his Second Discovery Requests: Motion Hearing set for 5/24/2007 10:30 AM in Courtroom before Honorable Lee Yeakel.. Signed by Judge Lee Yeakel. (ja, ) (Entered: 05/02/2007)
157 ORDER dismissing 73 Motion to Dismiss, dismissing 75 Motion to Dismiss Signed by Judge Lee Yeakel. (ja, ) Additional attachment(s) added on 5/2/2007 (ja, ). Modified on 5/2/2007 to enter correct ORDER (ja, ). (Entered: 05/02/2007)
ORDER REFERRING MOTION: 110 MOTION for Summary Judgment ; 109 MOTION for Summary Judgment; 130 MOTION to Dismiss ; 112 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment, referred to Judge Andrew Austin. Signed by Judge Lee Yeakel. (ja, ) (Entered: 05/02/2007)
158 ORDER REFERRING MOTION: 150 MOTION to Dismiss filed by Linda Garcia,, Juanita Gonzales,, Jose Aliseda,, Charles Aycock,, Jackie DeNoyelles,, Conrith Davis, referred to Judge Andrew Austin. Signed by Judge Lee Yeakel. (ja, ) (Entered: 05/02/2007)
Notice of Correction: re 157 Order on Motion to Dismiss. CORRECT ORDER SUBSTITUTED.. (originally had incorrect order) (ja, ) (Entered: 05/02/2007)
159 RESPONSE to Motion re 107 MOTION to Compel Defendant Livingston to Respond to his Second Discovery Requests **Defendant Livingston's Response to Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Second Discovery Requests**, filed by Brad Livingston. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Exhibit B# 3 Exhibit C# 4 Exhibit D# 5 Proposed Order)(Cunniff, Celamaine) (Entered: 05/02/2007)

Case: 1:05-cv-1008 As of: 11/10/2017 11:10 AM CST 17 of 39

05/02/2007
05/02/2007 05/03/2007 05/04/2007 05/04/2007 05/04/2007 05/07/2007
05/07/2007 05/08/2007 05/09/2007 05/09/2007
05/09/2007 05/10/2007 05/10/2007 05/11/2007 05/11/2007
05/14/2007 05/14/2007

160 RESPONSE Defendants Livingston and Collier's Sur−reply to Plaintiff's Reply to Response to Motion to Compel Discovery to 115 Reply to Response to Motion, by Brad Livingston, Brian Collier. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Proposed Order)(Cunniff, Celamaine) (Entered: 05/02/2007)
161 ORDER Cancelling Hearing set on May 24, 2007.... Signed by Judge Lee Yeakel. (ja, ) (Entered: 05/02/2007)
162 Third MOTION to Dismiss Defendant Collier's Third Motion to Dismiss by Brian Collier. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Proposed Order)(Cunniff, Celamaine) (Entered: 05/03/2007)
163 RESPONSE Defendant Collier's Reply to Plaintiff's Response to Collier's Motion for Summary Judgment to 121 Response to Motion by Brian Collier. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Cunniff, Celamaine) (Entered: 05/04/2007)
REPLY to Response to Motion re 110 MOTION for Summary Judgment Defendant Collier's Motion for Summary Judgment with Brief in Support , filed by Brian Collier. (contained in doc 163 ) (td, ) (Entered: 05/04/2007)
164 ORDER granting in part and denying in part 147 Motion to exclude Signed by Judge Lee Yeakel. (td, ) (Entered: 05/04/2007)
165 RESPONSE to Motion re 152 MOTION for Leave to Exceed Page Limitation to File Defendants Livingston and Collier's Response and Objections to Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, filed by Raul Meza. (Attachments: # 1)(Medlock, Scott) (Entered: 05/07/2007)
166 REPLY to Response to Motion re 112 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment, filed by Raul Meza. (Medlock, Scott) (Entered: 05/07/2007)
167 RESPONSE to Motion re 162 Third MOTION to Dismiss Defendant Collier's Third Motion to Dismiss, filed by Raul Meza. (Attachments: # 1)(Medlock, Scott) (Entered: 05/08/2007)
168 ANSWER to Third Amended Complaint with Jury Demand by Brad Livingston, Brian Collier.(td, ) (Entered: 05/09/2007)
169 Unopposed MOTION to supplement re 110 MOTION for Summary Judgment Defendant Collier's Motion for Summary Judgment with Brief in Support by Brian Collier. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Exhibit B# 3 Exhibit C# 4 Exhibit D# 5 Exhibit E# 6 Proposed Order)(Cunniff, Celamaine) (Entered: 05/09/2007)
170 REPLY to Response to Motion re 107 MOTION to Compel Defendant Livingston to Respond to his Second Discovery Requests, filed by Raul Meza. (Medlock, Scott) (Entered: 05/09/2007)
171 NOTICE of Initial Disclosure by Jose Aliseda, Charles Aycock, Conrith Davis, Jackie DeNoyelles, Linda Garcia, Juanita Gonzales, Rissi L. Owens (Gardner, M.) (Entered: 05/10/2007)
172 ORDER granting 169 Motion to supplement Signed by Judge Andrew W. Austin. (mc2, ) (Entered: 05/10/2007)
173 Opposed MOTION for Leave to Exceed Page Limitation by Brad Livingston, Brian Collier. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Cunniff, Celamaine) (Entered: 05/11/2007)
174 REPLY to Response to Motion re 109 MOTION for Summary Judgment Defendants Livingston and Collier's Motion for Summary Judgment with Brief in Support, filed by Brad Livingston, Brian Collier. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Cunniff, Celamaine) (Entered: 05/11/2007)
175 ORDER REFERRING MOTION: 162 Third MOTION to Dismiss Defendant Collier's Third Motion to Dismiss filed by Brian Collier, referred to Judge Austin. Signed by Judge Lee Yeakel. (td, ) (Entered: 05/14/2007)
176 NOTICE Defendants Livingston and Collier's Notice of Fourth Supplemental Disclosure by Brad Livingston, Brian Collier (Cunniff, Celamaine) (Entered: 05/14/2007)

Case: 1:05-cv-1008 As of: 11/10/2017 11:10 AM CST 18 of 39

05/14/2007 05/15/2007 05/15/2007 05/15/2007 05/16/2007
05/16/2007 05/16/2007 05/17/2007 05/17/2007
05/17/2007 05/17/2007 05/17/2007 05/17/2007 05/17/2007
05/17/2007

177 ORDER, Set Motion Hearing for 38 MOTION to Compel Mediation, 84 MOTION to Compel, 107 MOTION to Compel Defendant Livingston to Respond to his Second Discovery Requests Motion Hearing reset for 5/17/2007 10:00 AM before Honorable Lee Yeakel.. Signed by Judge Lee Yeakel. (td, ) (Entered: 05/15/2007)
178 NOTICE Defendants Livingston and Collier's Notice of Fifth Supplemental Disclosure by Brad Livingston, Brian Collier (Cunniff, Celamaine) (Entered: 05/15/2007)
179 NOTICE Defendants' Privilege Log from Disclosure and all Supplemental Disclosures by Brad Livingston, Brian Collier re 84 MOTION to Compel, 107 MOTION to Compel Defendant Livingston to Respond to his Second Discovery Requests, 170 Reply to Response to Motion (Cunniff, Celamaine) (Entered: 05/15/2007)
180 NOTICE Defendants Livingston and Collier's Privilege Log / Citizen Correspondence Letters by Brad Livingston, Brian Collier re 84 MOTION to Compel, 107 MOTION to Compel Defendant Livingston to Respond to his Second Discovery Requests, 170 Reply to Response to Motion (Cunniff, Celamaine) (Entered: 05/15/2007)
181 NOTICE Defendants Livingston and Collier's Supplemental Privilege Log of Citizen Correspondence by Brad Livingston, Brian Collier re 84 MOTION to Compel, 107 MOTION to Compel Defendant Livingston to Respond to his Second Discovery Requests, 170 Reply to Response to Motion (Cunniff, Celamaine) (Entered: 05/16/2007)
182 NOTICE Defendants Livingston and Collier's Notice of Fifth Supplemental Disclosure by Brad Livingston, Brian Collier (Cunniff, Celamaine) (Entered: 05/16/2007)
183 NOTICE of Defendants" Privilege Log for Fifth Supplemental Disclosure by Brad Livingston (Cunniff, Celamaine) (Entered: 05/16/2007)
184 NOTICE Defendants' Privilege Log (Sixth Supplemental Disclosure) by Brad Livingston, Brian Collier re 84 MOTION to Compel, 107 MOTION to Compel Defendant Livingston to Respond to his Second Discovery Requests, 170 Reply to Response to Motion (Cunniff, Celamaine) (Entered: 05/17/2007)
185 NOTICE Defendants Livingston and Collier's Second Supplemental Privilege Log of Citizen Correspondence by Brad Livingston, Brian Collier re 84 MOTION to Compel, 107 MOTION to Compel Defendant Livingston to Respond to his Second Discovery Requests, 170 Reply to Response to Motion (Cunniff, Celamaine) (Entered: 05/17/2007)
186 NOTICE Defendants Livingston and Collier's Notice of Sixth Supplemental Disclosure by Brad Livingston, Brian Collier (Cunniff, Celamaine) (Entered: 05/17/2007)
187 NOTICE Defendants Amended Privilege Log by Brad Livingston, Brian Collier re 84 MOTION to Compel, 107 MOTION to Compel Defendant Livingston to Respond to his Second Discovery Requests, 170 Reply to Response to Motion (Cunniff, Celamaine) (Entered: 05/17/2007)
188 ***DOCUMENT DEFICIENT*** NOTICE Amended Bates−Stamp Document List for Defendants Livingston and Collier's Fifth Supplemental Disclosure by Brad Livingston, Brian Collier (Cunniff, Celamaine) Modified on 5/17/2007 (td, ). (Entered: 05/17/2007)
189 DEFICIENCY NOTICE to Celamaine Cunniff: re 188 Notice (Other) (td, ) (Entered: 05/17/2007)
190 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Lee Yeakel : Motion Hearing held on 5/17/2007 re 84 MOTION to Compel filed by Raul Meza,, 107 MOTION to Compel Defendant Livingston to Respond to his Second Discovery Requests filed by Raul Meza,, 38 MOTION to Compel Mediation filed by Raul Meza, (Minute entry documents are not available electronically.). (Court Reporter Kathy Carroll.) (td, ) (Entered: 05/17/2007)
191 ORDER denying 38 Motion to Compel; Livingston and Collier status report due by 5/21/07; Meza, Livingston, and Collier status report due by 5/25/07. Signed by Judge Lee Yeakel. (mc2, ) (Entered: 05/18/2007)

Case: 1:05-cv-1008 As of: 11/10/2017 11:10 AM CST 19 of 39

05/18/2007 05/18/2007 05/21/2007 05/21/2007 05/22/2007 05/23/2007 05/24/2007 05/24/2007 05/24/2007
05/25/2007 05/25/2007 05/30/2007
05/30/2007 06/04/2007 06/05/2007
06/05/2007
06/06/2007

192 NOTICE Amended Notice of Fifth Supplemental Disclosure by Brad Livingston, Brian Collier re 188 Notice (Other) (Attachments: # 1 Transmittal Letter# 2 Amended Bates Stamp List)(Cunniff, Celamaine) (Entered: 05/18/2007)
193 Opposed MOTION for Reconsideration re 164 Order on Motion to exclude by Brad Livingston, Brian Collier. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Cunniff, Celamaine) (Entered: 05/18/2007)
194 STATUS REPORT by Brad Livingston, Brian Collier. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit)(Cunniff, Celamaine) (Entered: 05/21/2007)
195 NOTICE Defendants Livingston and Collier's Notice Seventh Supplemental Disclosure by Brad Livingston, Brian Collier (Cunniff, Celamaine) (Entered: 05/21/2007)
196 Order regarding briefs.... Signed by Judge Andrew W. Austin. (td, ) (Entered: 05/22/2007)
197 ORDER Final Pretrial Conference reset for 6/26/2007 02:00 PM before Honorable Lee Yeakel.. Signed by Judge Lee Yeakel. (td, ) (Entered: 05/23/2007)
198 RESPONSE Defendants Livingston and Collier's Response to Order of May 21, 2007 to 196 Order by Brad Livingston, Brian Collier. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit N# 2 Exhibit O# 3 Exhibit P)(Cunniff, Celamaine) (Entered: 05/24/2007)
199 RESPONSE Defendants Livingston and Collier's Second Status Report to 191 Order on Motion to Compel by Brad Livingston, Brian Collier. (Attachments: # 1 Attachment)(Cunniff, Celamaine) (Entered: 05/24/2007)
200 MOTION to Seal "Attachment A" to Defendants Livingston and Collier's Second Status Report re 199 Response, 191 Order on Motion to Compel by Brad Livingston, Brian Collier. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Cunniff, Celamaine) (Entered: 05/24/2007)
201 RESPONSE to Motion re 193 Opposed MOTION for Reconsideration re 164 Order on Motion to exclude, filed by Raul Meza. (Attachments: # 1)(Medlock, Scott) (Entered: 05/25/2007)
202 RESPONSE Joint Status Report on Discovery Issues to 191 Order on Motion to Compel by Raul Meza, Brad Livingston, Brian Collier. (Cunniff, Celamaine) (Entered: 05/25/2007)
203 RESPONSE to Court Order of May 21, 2007 to 196 Order by Jose Aliseda, Charles Aycock, Conrith Davis, Jackie DeNoyelles, Linda Garcia, Juanita Gonzales, Rissi L. Owens. (Attachments: # 1 Appendix Appendix to Defs Response to Court Order)(Gardner, M.) (Entered: 05/30/2007)
204 NOTICE Defendants Livingston and Collier's Notice of Eighth Supplemental Disclosure by Brad Livingston, Brian Collier (Cunniff, Celamaine) (Entered: 05/30/2007)
205 ORDER denying 193 Motion for Reconsideration...Order to provide written reports...by June 8, 2007... Signed by Judge Lee Yeakel. (jg3, ) (Entered: 06/04/2007)
206 MOTION to Stay Defendants' Opposed Joint Motion to Stay Pretrial Hearing and Trial Setting with Brief in Support by Jose Aliseda, Charles Aycock, Conrith Davis, Jackie DeNoyelles, Linda Garcia, Juanita Gonzales, Rissi L. Owens, Brad Livingston, Brian Collier. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Cunniff, Celamaine) (Entered: 06/05/2007)
207 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS re 150 MOTION to Dismiss filed by Charles Aycock, Linda Garcia, Conrith Davis, Jose Aliseda, Juanita Gonzales, Jackie DeNoyelles, 130 MOTION to Dismiss filed by Rissi L. Owens, 162 Third MOTION to Dismiss Defendant Collier's Third Motion to Dismiss filed by Brian Collier. Signed by Judge Andrew W. Austin. (td, ) (Entered: 06/06/2007)
208 RESPONSE to Courts Order of May 21st., 2007 to 196 Order by Raul Meza. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1# 2 Exhibit 2# 3 Exhibit 3# 4 Exhibit 4# 5 Exibit 5# 6 Exhibit 6# 7 Exhibit 7)(Medlock, Scott) (Entered: 06/06/2007)

Case: 1:05-cv-1008 As of: 11/10/2017 11:10 AM CST 20 of 39

06/08/2007 06/13/2007
06/13/2007 06/13/2007 06/14/2007 06/15/2007
06/15/2007 06/15/2007 06/15/2007 06/15/2007 06/15/2007 06/18/2007
06/18/2007 06/18/2007 06/18/2007 06/18/2007

209 DESIGNATION OF EXPERT WITNESS by Brad Livingston, Brian Collier Defendants Livingston and Collier's Second Amended Designation of Expert Witnesses. (Attachments: # 1 Attachment A# 2 Attachment B# 3 Attachment C)(Cunniff, Celamaine) (Entered: 06/08/2007)
210 RESPONSE to Motion, filed by Raul Meza, re 206 MOTION to Stay Defendants' Opposed Joint Motion to Stay Pretrial Hearing and Trial Setting with Brief in Support filed by Defendant Charles Aycock, Defendant Jose Aliseda, Defendant Juanita Gonzales, Defendant Rissi L. Owens, Defendant Brad Livingston, Defendant Linda Garcia, Defendant Conrith Davis, Defendant Brian Collier, Defendant Jackie DeNoyelles (Attachments: # 1)(Medlock, Scott) (Entered: 06/13/2007)
211 ORDER granting in part and denying in part 84 Motion to Compel; granting in part and denying in part 107 Motion to Compel Signed by Judge Lee Yeakel. (td, ) (Entered: 06/13/2007)
Set/Reset Hearings: Miscellaneous Hearing set for 6/26/2007 02:00 PM before Honorable Lee Yeakel. (td, ) (Entered: 06/13/2007)
212 OBJECTION to 207 Report and Recommendations of the United States Magistrate Judge by Jose Aliseda, Charles Aycock, Conrith Davis, Jackie DeNoyelles, Linda Garcia, Juanita Gonzales, Rissi L. Owens.. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order proposed order)(Gardner, M.) (Entered: 06/14/2007)
213 Opposed MOTION to Stay Defendants' Opposed Joint Motion to Stay Compliance with Local Rule CV−16(e) with Brief in Support by Jose Aliseda, Charles Aycock, Conrith Davis, Jackie DeNoyelles, Linda Garcia, Juanita Gonzales, Rissi L. Owens, Brad Livingston, Brian Collier. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Cunniff, Celamaine) (Entered: 06/15/2007)
214 Proposed Pretrial Order by Raul Meza. (Attachments: # 1 Stipulated Facts# 2 Exhibit List# 3 Witness List# 4)(Medlock, Scott) (Entered: 06/15/2007)
215 MOTION to Withdraw Jury Demand by Raul Meza. (Attachments: # 1)(Medlock, Scott) (Entered: 06/15/2007)
216 MOTION to Amend Complaint by Raul Meza. (Attachments: # 1)(Medlock, Scott) (Entered: 06/15/2007)
217 ATTACHMENT to 216 MOTION to Amend Complaint by Raul Meza. (Medlock, Scott) (Entered: 06/15/2007)
218 STIPULATION of Dismissal by Raul Meza. (Medlock, Scott) (Entered: 06/15/2007)
219 RESPONSE Defendants Livingston and Collier's Response in Opposition in Part and in Agreement in Part to Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File His Fourth Amended Complaint to 216 MOTION to Amend Complaint by Brad Livingston, Brian Collier. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Exhibit B# 3 Proposed Order)(Cunniff, Celamaine) (Entered: 06/18/2007)
220 Agreed MOTION for Leave to File Pretrial Materials Filed Under Local Rule CV−16 Out of Time by Jose Aliseda, Charles Aycock, Conrith Davis, Jackie DeNoyelles, Linda Garcia, Juanita Gonzales, Rissi L. Owens. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order Proposed Order)(Gardner, M.) (Entered: 06/18/2007)
221 MOTION re 216 MOTION to Amend Complaint by Jose Aliseda, Charles Aycock, Conrith Davis, Jackie DeNoyelles, Linda Garcia, Juanita Gonzales, Rissi L. Owens. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order Proposed order)(Gardner, M.) (Entered: 06/18/2007)
222 Proposed Pretrial Order by Jose Aliseda, Charles Aycock, Conrith Davis, Jackie DeNoyelles, Linda Garcia, Juanita Gonzales, Rissi L. Owens. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Ex. A# 2 Exhibit Ex. B# 3 Exhibit Ex. C# 4 Exhibit Ex. D)(Gardner, M.) (Entered: 06/18/2007)
223 ADVISORY TO THE COURT by Raul Meza. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Medlock, Scott) (Entered: 06/18/2007)

Case: 1:05-cv-1008 As of: 11/10/2017 11:10 AM CST 21 of 39

06/18/2007
06/19/2007 06/19/2007
06/19/2007 06/20/2007 06/21/2007 06/21/2007
06/21/2007 06/21/2007 06/21/2007 06/21/2007 06/21/2007 06/22/2007 06/22/2007 06/22/2007 06/22/2007 06/25/2007
06/25/2007 06/25/2007

Response in Opposition to Motion (contained in doc 221 ), filed by Jose Aliseda, Charles Aycock, Conrith Davis, Jackie DeNoyelles, Linda Garcia, Juanita Gonzales, Rissi L. Owens, re 216 MOTION to Amend Complaint filed by Plaintiff Raul Meza (td, ) (Entered: 06/20/2007)
224 RESPONSE to Stay Rule 16 (e) by Raul Meza. (Attachments: # 1 Order)(Medlock, Scott) (Entered: 06/19/2007)
225 MOTION to Stay Defendants Livingston and Collier's Opposed Second Motion to Stay Pretrial Hearing and Trial Setting with Brief in Support by Brad Livingston, Brian Collier. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Cunniff, Celamaine) (Entered: 06/19/2007)
226 NOTICE of Vacation by Raul Meza (Medlock, Scott) (Entered: 06/19/2007)
Notice of Correction to M. Gardner: re 221 MOTION re 216 MOTION to Amend Complaint. (filing user selected wrong event) (td, ) (Entered: 06/20/2007)
227 NOTICE of Vacation by Jose Aliseda, Charles Aycock, Jackie DeNoyelles, Linda Garcia, Juanita Gonzales, Rissi L. Owens (Gardner, M.) (Entered: 06/21/2007)
228 REPLY to Response to Motion, filed by Raul Meza, re 221 MOTION re 216 MOTION to Amend Complaint filed by Defendant Charles Aycock, Defendant Linda Garcia, Defendant Conrith Davis, Defendant Jose Aliseda, Defendant Juanita Gonzales, Defendant Jackie DeNoyelles, Defendant Rissi L. Owens (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Medlock, Scott) (Entered: 06/21/2007)
229 ORDER granting 215 Motion to Withdraw Jury Demand Signed by Judge Lee Yeakel. (dm, ) (Entered: 06/21/2007)
230 ORDER granting 220 Motion for Leave to File Signed by Judge Lee Yeakel. (dm, ) (Entered: 06/21/2007)
231 ORDER regarding Stipulation of Partial Dismissal.. Signed by Judge Lee Yeakel. (dm, ) (Entered: 06/21/2007)
232 RESPONSE to 212 Objection to Report and Recommendations, by Raul Meza. (Medlock, Scott) (Entered: 06/21/2007)
233 MOTION to Exclude Expert Testimony by Raul Meza. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1# 2 Exhibit 2# 3 Exhibit 3)(Medlock, Scott) (Entered: 06/21/2007)
234 DEFICIENCY NOTICE to Scott Medlock: re 233 MOTION to Exclude Expert Testimony (td, ) (Entered: 06/22/2007)
235 ATTACHMENT to 233 MOTION to Exclude Expert Testimony by Raul Meza. (Medlock, Scott) (Entered: 06/22/2007)
236 NOTICE OF INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL (No appeal fee pd) by Brad Livingston, Brian Collier. (jk, ) (Entered: 06/22/2007)
237 Transmission of Notice of Appeal and Docket Sheet to US Court of Appeals re 236 Notice of Appeal − Interlocutory (jk, ) (Entered: 06/22/2007)
238 ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS for 162 Motion to Dismiss filed by Brian Collier, 150 Motion to Dismiss filed by Charles Aycock, Linda Garcia, Conrith Davis, Jose Aliseda, Juanita Gonzales, Jackie DeNoyelles, 130 Motion to Dismiss filed by Rissi L. Owens. Signed by Judge Lee Yeakel. (td, ) (Entered: 06/25/2007)
239 ORDER of USCA (certified copy) regarding Appellants' Emergency Motion to Stay All Proceedings ; re 236 Notice of Appeal − Interlocutory USCA−DENIES appellants' request for a stay. (mh, ) (Entered: 06/25/2007)
240 MOTION (Defendants Owens, Aliseda, Davis, DeNoyelles, Aycock, Garcia and Gonzales' Motion to Cancel the Trial Setting and Motion to Issue A New Scheduling Order) by Jose Aliseda, Charles Aycock, Conrith Davis, Jackie DeNoyelles, Linda Garcia, Juanita Gonzales, Rissi L. Owens. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order Order)(Gardner, M.) (Entered: 06/25/2007)

Case: 1:05-cv-1008 As of: 11/10/2017 11:10 AM CST 22 of 39

06/25/2007 06/25/2007 06/25/2007 06/26/2007 06/26/2007 06/26/2007
06/26/2007 06/26/2007 06/28/2007 06/28/2007 06/29/2007 07/02/2007 07/02/2007
07/05/2007 07/06/2007 07/09/2007
07/09/2007
07/09/2007

241 NOTICE OF INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL by Jose Aliseda, Charles Aycock, Conrith Davis, Jackie DeNoyelles, Linda Garcia, Juanita Gonzales, Rissi L. Owens. (appeal fees not included)(mh, ) (Entered: 06/25/2007)
242 NOTICE of Filing Objections to Notice of Intention to Take Oral Deposition and Portions of the Subpoena Duces Tecum of Mike Lozito by Mike Lozito (Anastasiadis, Demetri) (Entered: 06/25/2007)
USCA Appeal Fees received $ 455 receipt number 406769 re 236 Notice of Appeal − Interlocutory filed by Brian Collier, Brad Livingston (jk, ) (Entered: 06/26/2007)
243 Transmission of Notice of Appeal and Docket Sheet to US Court of Appeals re 241 Notice of Appeal − Interlocutory (jk, ) (Entered: 06/26/2007)
244 NOTICE of Attorney Appearance by Demetri Anastasiadis on behalf of Brad Livingston, Brian Collier (Noticeof Appearance of Co−Counsel) (Anastasiadis, Demetri) (Entered: 06/26/2007)
245 AMENDED NOTICE OF INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL re 241 Notice of Interlocutory Appeal, by Jose Aliseda, Charles Aycock, Conrith Davis, Jackie DeNoyelles, Linda Garcia, Juanita Gonzales, Rissie L. Owens. Filing fee $ 455, receipt number 406785. (jk, ) (Entered: 06/26/2007)
246 Transmission of Notice of Appeal and Docket Sheet to US Court of Appeals re 245 Amended Notice of Appeal − Interlocutory (jk, ) (Entered: 06/26/2007)
247 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Lee Yeakel : Miscellaneous Hearing held on 6/26/2007 (Minute entry documents are not available electronically.). (Court Reporter Rachel Kocher.)(td, ) (Entered: 06/27/2007)
248 TRANSCRIPT REQUEST by Brad Livingston, Brian Collier for dates of 6/26/2007. Proceedings Transcribed: Pretrial Conference. Court Reporter: Raquel Kocher. (jk, ) (Entered: 06/29/2007)
249 TRANSCRIPT REQUEST by Brad Livingston, Brian Collier for dates of 5/17/2007. Proceedings Transcribed: Motion Heariong. Court Reporter: Kathy Carroll. (jk, ) (Entered: 06/29/2007)
250 ORDER of USCA (certified copy) DENYING appellants' Emergency Motion to stay all proceedings ; re 236 Notice of Appeal − Interlocutory (jk, ) (Entered: 07/02/2007)
251 ORDERED that on or before July 9, 2007, the parties shall file a joint written report that outlines any joint proposal or other agreement reached by any parties to this action.... Signed by Judge Lee Yeakel. (td, ) (Entered: 07/02/2007)
252 ADVISORY TO THE COURT by Jose Aliseda, Charles Aycock, Conrith Davis, Jackie DeNoyelles, Linda Garcia, Juanita Gonzales, Rissi L. Owens, Brad Livingston, Brian Collier Appellants' Joint Designation of Appellate Record. (Cunniff, Celamaine) (Entered: 07/02/2007)
253 NOTICE of Designation of Appellate Record by Raul Meza (Medlock, Scott) (Entered: 07/05/2007)
254 TRANSCRIPT filed for dates of 5/17/2007 re 236 Notice of Appeal − Interlocutory. Proceedings Transcribed: Oral Argument. Court Reporter: Kathy Carroll. NOTE: Transcript document is not available online. (jk, ) (klw). (Entered: 07/06/2007)
255 NOTICE of Attorney Appearance by Bruce R. Garcia on behalf of Jose Aliseda, Charles Aycock, Conrith Davis, Jackie DeNoyelles, Linda Garcia, Juanita Gonzales, Rissi L. Owens (Notice of Appearance of Co−Counsel) (Garcia, Bruce) (Entered: 07/09/2007)
256 Joint ADVISORY TO THE COURT by Raul Meza, ***Rissie Owens, Jose Aliseda, Charles Aycock, Conrith Davis, Jackie DeNoyelles, Linda Garcia, Juanita Gonzales, Bryan Collier, Brad Livingston***. (Medlock, Scott) Modified on 7/10/2007 to add joint document filers (jk, ). (Entered: 07/09/2007)
257 USCA Appeal Info Sheet received. USCA Case Number 07−50808 for 245 Notice of Appeal − Interlocutory filed by Charles Aycock, Linda Garcia, Conrith Davis, Jose Aliseda, Juanita Gonzales, Jackie DeNoyelles, Rissi L. Owens. (jk, ) (Entered:

Case: 1:05-cv-1008 As of: 11/10/2017 11:10 AM CST 23 of 39

07/10/2007 07/16/2007 07/27/2007 07/30/2007
07/30/2007 07/31/2007 08/09/2007 08/10/2007
08/20/2007 09/07/2007 09/07/2007 09/11/2007 10/26/2007 11/19/2007
01/04/2008 02/05/2008 04/17/2008

07/10/2007)
258 ORDERED that the bench trial in this action scheduled for the month of July 2007 is CANCELED.. Signed by Judge Lee Yeakel. (dm, ) (Entered: 07/11/2007)
259 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings held on June 26, 2007. Proceedings Transcribed: Final Pretrial Hearing. Court Reporter: Raquel Kocher. NOTE: Transcript document is not available online. (td, ) (klw). (Entered: 07/16/2007)
260 NOTICE Counsel Advisory to the Court by Brad Livingston, Brian Collier (Cunniff, Celamaine) (Entered: 07/27/2007)
261 Certified copy of USCA JUDGMENT/MANDATE DISMISSING APPEAL FOR WANT OF PROSECUTION re 241 Notice of Appeal − Interlocutory filed by Charles Aycock, Linda Garcia, Conrith Davis, Jose Aliseda, Juanita Gonzales, Jackie DeNoyelles, Rissi L. Owens (mh, ) (Entered: 07/31/2007)
262 Letter of transmittal from USCA received for 241 Notice of Appeal − Interlocutory filed by Charles Aycock, Linda Garcia, Conrith Davis, Jose Aliseda, Juanita Gonzales, Jackie DeNoyelles, Rissi L. Owens. (mh, ) (Entered: 08/01/2007)
NOTICE of Certified Record on Appeal notified USCA via email re 241 Notice of Appeal − Interlocutory, 245 Notice of Appeal − Interlocutory (mh, ) (Entered: 07/31/2007)
USCA Appeal Fees received $ 455 receipt number 407414 re 241 Notice of Appeal − Interlocutory filed by Charles Aycock, Linda Garcia, Conrith Davis, Jose Aliseda, Juanita Gonzales, Jackie DeNoyelles, Rissi L. Owens (mh, ) (Entered: 08/16/2007)
263 NOTICE of Attorney Appearance by Bruce R. Garcia on behalf of Jose Aliseda, Charles Aycock, Conrith Davis, Jackie DeNoyelles, Linda Garcia, Juanita Gonzales, Rissi L. Owens (Notice of Designation of New Attorney−In−Charge) (Garcia, Bruce) (Entered: 08/10/2007)
264 CORRECTED Letter/Correspondence from USCA − in re: mandate (mh, ) (Entered: 08/21/2007)
265 Letter requesting Certified Record on Appeal by attorney Celamaine Cunniff. (jk, ) (Entered: 09/10/2007)
266 Certified and Transmitted Record on Appeal to attorney Celamaine Cunniff. re 236 Notice of Appeal − Interlocutory, 241 Notice of Appeal − Interlocutory, 245 Notice of Appeal − Interlocutory, (jk, ) (Entered: 09/10/2007)
267 Acknowledgement Receipt for Record on Appeal by Celamaine Cunniff. re 266 Appeal Record Transmitted (mh, ) (Entered: 09/12/2007)
268 Transmitted Record on Appeal re 241 Notice of Appeal − Interlocutory, 245 Notice of Appeal − Interlocutory, 236 Notice of Appeal − Interlocutory forwarded to Scott Medlock @ Texas Civil Rights Project. (mh, ) (Entered: 10/26/2007)
269 USCA DECISION ON INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL Dismissing pursuant to Appellants' unopposed motion; re 245 Notice of Appeal − Interlocutory filed by Charles Aycock, Linda Garcia, Conrith Davis, Jose Aliseda, Juanita Gonzales, Jackie DeNoyelles, Rissi L. Owens. Terminating Appeal: 245 Notice of Appeal − Interlocutory. (jk, ) (Entered: 11/21/2007)
270 Scheduling Recommendations/Proposed Scheduling Order by Raul Meza. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Medlock, Scott) (Entered: 01/04/2008)
271 ORDERED that Plaintiff and non−appealing Defendants file a Joint Status Report on or before 4/27/2008. Signed by Judge Lee Yeakel. (td, ) (Entered: 02/05/2008)
272 ***DEFICIENT PLDG (discovery)*** Miscellaneous Objection (Defendant Rissi Owens Objections to the Notice of Intention to Take Oral Deposition with Subpoena Duces Tecum of Troy Fox) by Rissi L. Owens. (Garcia, Bruce) Modified on 4/18/2008 to amend text (td). (Entered: 04/17/2008)

Case: 1:05-cv-1008 As of: 11/10/2017 11:10 AM CST 24 of 39

04/18/2008 04/24/2008 06/16/2008
06/19/2008 06/19/2008 07/17/2008
08/04/2008
08/04/2008 08/07/2008 08/08/2008 08/11/2008
08/14/2008 08/15/2008 08/18/2008 08/18/2008

273 DEFICIENCY NOTICE to Bruce R. Garcia: re 272 Miscellaneous Objection (td) (Entered: 04/18/2008)
274 STATUS REPORT by Raul Meza, Jose Aliseda, Charles Aycock, Jackie DeNoyelles, Linda Garcia, Juanita Gonzales, Rissi L. Owens. (Medlock, Scott) (Entered: 04/24/2008)
275 * MOTION for Extension of Time to File (Defendants Rissie Owens, Jose Aliseda, Charles Aycock, Conrith Davis, Jackie DeNoyelles, Linda Garcia and Juanita Gonzales Motion for an Extension of Time to File a Dispositive Motion) by Jose Aliseda, Charles Aycock, Conrith Davis, Jackie DeNoyelles, Linda Garcia, Juanita Gonzales, Rissi L. Owens. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order Order)(Garcia, Bruce) (Entered: 06/16/2008)
276 ORDER GRANTING 275 Motion for Extension of Time to File Signed by Judge Lee Yeakel. (td) (Entered: 06/20/2008)
Set/Reset Deadlines: Motions due by 7/21/2008. (td) (Entered: 06/20/2008)
277 MOTION for Summary Judgment by Raul Meza. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit 4, # 5 Exhibit 5, # 6 Exhibit 6, # 7 Exhibit 7, # 8 Exhibit 8, # 9 Exhibit 9, # 10 Exhibit 10, # 11 Exhibit 11, # 12 Exhibit 12, # 13 Exhibit 13, # 14 Exhibit 14, # 15 Exhibit 15, # 16 Exhibit 16, # 17 Exhibit 17, # 18 Exhibit 18, # 19 Exhibit 19, # 20 Proposed Order)(Medlock, Scott) (Entered: 07/17/2008)
278 *Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to File UNOPPOSED MOTION TO FILE THEIR DISPOSITIVE MOTION OUT OF TIME by Jose Aliseda, Charles Aycock, Conrith Davis, Jackie DeNoyelles, Linda Garcia, Juanita Gonzales, Rissi L. Owens. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order Order)(Garcia, Bruce) (Entered: 08/04/2008)
279 MOTION for Summary Judgment by Jose Aliseda, Charles Aycock, Conrith Davis, Jackie DeNoyelles, Linda Garcia, Juanita Gonzales, Rissi L. Owens. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Proposed Order Order)(Garcia, Bruce) (Entered: 08/04/2008)
280 Proposed Pretrial Order (to the Unopposed Motion for Extension of Time to File Their Dispositive Motion Out of Time) by Jose Aliseda, Charles Aycock, Conrith Davis, Jackie DeNoyelles, Linda Garcia, Juanita Gonzales, Rissi L. Owens. (Garcia, Bruce) (Entered: 08/07/2008)
281 NOTICE of Vacation by Raul Meza (Medlock, Scott) (Entered: 08/08/2008)
282 SUPPLEMENT to 279 MOTION for Summary Judgment (Defendants Unopposed Motion to Supplement Owens, Aliseda, Aycock, Davis, Denoyelles, Garcia and Gonzales Motion for Summary Judgment) by Jose Aliseda, Charles Aycock, Conrith Davis, Jackie DeNoyelles, Linda Garcia, Juanita Gonzales, Rissi L. Owens. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Proposed Order Order)(Garcia, Bruce) (Entered: 08/11/2008)
283 ORDER re 282 Supplement, filed by Charles Aycock, Linda Garcia, Conrith Davis, Jose Aliseda, Juanita Gonzales, Jackie DeNoyelles, Rissi L. Owens. Signed by Judge Lee Yeakel. (td) (Entered: 08/14/2008)
284 Proposed Pretrial Order (to the Unopposed Motion for Extension of Time to File Their Dispositive Motion Out of Time) by Jose Aliseda, Charles Aycock, Conrith Davis, Jackie DeNoyelles, Linda Garcia, Juanita Gonzales, Rissi L. Owens. (Garcia, Bruce) (Entered: 08/15/2008)
285 ORDER GRANTING 278 Motion for Extension of Time to File UNOPPOSED MOTION TO FILE THEIR DISPOSITIVE MOTION OUT OF TIME. Signed by Judge Lee Yeakel. (jk, ) (Entered: 08/19/2008)
286 Certified copy of USCA JUDGMENT/MANDATE Affirming 236 AFFIRMING THE JUDGMENT OF THE DISTRICT COURT−Notice of Appeal − Interlocutory filed by Brian Collier, Brad Livingston. (mh, ) (Entered: 08/20/2008)

Case: 1:05-cv-1008 As of: 11/10/2017 11:10 AM CST 25 of 39

08/18/2008 08/20/2008 08/20/2008
08/25/2008 08/29/2008
09/04/2008 10/03/2008 10/21/2008 10/21/2008 10/21/2008 10/21/2008 10/21/2008
10/21/2008 10/21/2008 10/21/2008
10/21/2008 10/22/2008

287 Letter of transmittal from USCA received in re 286 regarding 245 Notice of Appeal − Interlocutory filed by Charles Aycock, Linda Garcia, Conrith Davis, Jose Aliseda, Juanita Gonzales, Jackie DeNoyelles, Rissi L. Owens. (mh, ) (Entered: 08/20/2008)
288 ORDER, ( Status Conference set for 10/3/2008 11:00 AM before Judge Lee Yeakel.). Signed by Judge Lee Yeakel. (jk, ) (Entered: 08/20/2008)
289 RESPONSE to Motion, filed by Raul Meza, re 279 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Defendant Charles Aycock, Defendant Linda Garcia, Defendant Conrith Davis, Defendant Jose Aliseda, Defendant Juanita Gonzales, Defendant Jackie DeNoyelles, Defendant Rissi L. Owens (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit 4, # 5 Exhibit 5, # 6 Exhibit 6, # 7 Exhibit 7, # 8 Proposed Order)(Medlock, Scott) (Entered: 08/20/2008)
290 Appeal Record Returned/Disposed by USCA: 236 Interlocutory Notice of Appeal (mh, ) (Entered: 08/26/2008)
291 RESPONSE to Motion, filed by Jose Aliseda, Charles Aycock, Conrith Davis, Jackie DeNoyelles, Linda Garcia, Juanita Gonzales, Rissi L. Owens, re 277 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Plaintiff Raul Meza (Defendants Owens, Aliseda, Aycock, Davis, Denoyelles, Garcia and Gonzales Response to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment) (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Proposed Order Order)(Garcia, Bruce) (Entered: 08/29/2008)
292 REPLY to Response to Motion, filed by Raul Meza, re 277 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Plaintiff Raul Meza (Medlock, Scott) (Entered: 09/04/2008)
293 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Lee Yeakel: Status Conference held on 10/3/2008 (Minute entry documents are not available electronically.). (Court Reporter Kathy Carroll.)(td) (Entered: 10/06/2008)
294 Pretrial Disclosures 16e by Raul Meza. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C)(Medlock, Scott) (Entered: 10/21/2008)
295 ORDER GRANTING 152 Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages Signed by Judge Lee Yeakel. (td) (Entered: 10/21/2008)
296 ORDER GRANTING 173 Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages Signed by Judge Lee Yeakel. (td) (Entered: 10/21/2008)
297 ORDER GRANTING 200 Motion to Seal "Attachment A" to Defendants Livingston and Collier's Second Status Report Signed by Judge Lee Yeakel. (td) (Entered: 10/21/2008)
298 Proposed Findings of Fact by Jose Aliseda, Charles Aycock, Conrith Davis, Jackie DeNoyelles, Linda Garcia, Juanita Gonzales, Rissi L. Owens (Defendants Rissie Owens, Jose Aliseda, Charles Aycock, Conrith Davis, Jackie Denoyelles, Linda Garcia and Juanita Gonzales Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law). (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order Order)(Garcia, Bruce) (Entered: 10/21/2008)
299 ORDER GRANTING 216 Motion to Amend Complaint Signed by Judge Lee Yeakel. (td) (Entered: 10/21/2008)
300 Witness List by Jose Aliseda, Charles Aycock, Conrith Davis, Jackie DeNoyelles, Linda Garcia, Juanita Gonzales, Rissi L. Owens. (Garcia, Bruce) (Entered: 10/21/2008)
301 Proposed Pretrial Order Defendants Livingston and Jenkins' Pretrial Materials Filed Under Local Rule CV−16(e) by Brad Livingston, Brian Collier. (Attachments: # 1 Attachment A − Proposed Stipulated Facts, # 2 Attachment B − Amended Exhibit List, # 3 Attachment C − Amended Witness List, # 4 Attachment D − Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law)(Cunniff, Celamaine) (Entered: 10/21/2008)
302 Exhibit List by Jose Aliseda, Charles Aycock, Conrith Davis, Jackie DeNoyelles, Linda Garcia, Juanita Gonzales, Rissi L. Owens.. (Garcia, Bruce) (Entered: 10/21/2008)
303 *Unopposed MOTION to Prvent Bias by Raul Meza. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Medlock, Scott) (Entered: 10/22/2008)

Case: 1:05-cv-1008 As of: 11/10/2017 11:10 AM CST 26 of 39

10/22/2008 10/22/2008
10/22/2008 10/22/2008 10/28/2008 10/29/2008 10/29/2008 10/29/2008 10/30/2008 10/30/2008 10/30/2008 10/30/2008 10/30/2008
10/31/2008 10/31/2008 10/31/2008 10/31/2008 10/31/2008 10/31/2008

304 * MOTION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS TO PRODUCE TEXAS INMATE RAUL MEZA FOR TRIAL by Raul Meza. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Medlock, Scott) (Entered: 10/22/2008)
305 ORDER DISMISSING 110 Motion for Summary Judgment; DISMISSING 206 Motion to Stay; DISMISSING 213 Motion to Stay; DISMISSING 225 Motion to Stay; GRANTING 233 Motion to exclude; DISMISSING 240 Motion to Issue a New Scheduling Order. Signed by Judge Lee Yeakel. (td) (Entered: 10/22/2008)
306 ORDER GRANTING 303 Motion to Prevent Bias Signed by Judge Lee Yeakel. (td) (Entered: 10/23/2008)
307 Writ of Habeas Corpus for Raul Meza. Signed by Judge Lee Yeakel. (td) (Entered: 10/23/2008)
308 STIPULATION Agreed Stipulated Facts by Raul Meza. (Medlock, Scott) (Entered: 10/28/2008)
309 NOTICE Defendants Livingston and Jenkins' Notice of Sixth Amended Supplemental Disclosure by Brad Livingston, Brian Collier (Cunniff, Celamaine) (Entered: 10/29/2008)
310 ORDER, Final Pretrial Conference set for 10/31/2008 09:00 AM before Judge Lee Yeakel. Signed by Judge Lee Yeakel. (td) (Entered: 10/29/2008)
312 ANSWER to 311 Fourth Amended Complaint by Jose Aliseda, Charles Aycock, Conrith Davis, Jackie DeNoyelles, Linda Garcia, Juanita Gonzales, Rissi L. Owens.(td) (Entered: 10/30/2008)
311 FOURTH AMENDED COMPLAINT against all defendants amending 96 Amended Complaint., filed by Raul Meza.(td) (Entered: 10/30/2008)
313 NOTICE Defendants Livingston and Jenkins' Notice of Fourth Amended Supplemental Disclosure by Brad Livingston, Brian Collier (Cunniff, Celamaine) (Entered: 10/30/2008)
314 NOTICE Notice of Ninth Supplemental Disclosure by Brad Livingston, Brian Collier (Cunniff, Celamaine) (Entered: 10/30/2008)
315 Exhibit List Defendants Livingston and Jenkins' Second Amended Exhibit List by Brad Livingston, Brian Collier.. (Cunniff, Celamaine) (Entered: 10/30/2008)
316 ***Deficient Pleading (incomplete filing)***Opposed MOTION to Substitute Party Defendants Livingston and Collier's Opposed Motion (Notice) of Substitution of Parties by Brad Livingston, Brian Collier. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Cunniff, Celamaine) Modified on 10/31/2008 to amend text (td). (Entered: 10/30/2008)
317 DEFICIENCY NOTICE Celamaine Cunniff: re 316 *Opposed MOTION to Substitute Party Defendants Livingston and Collier's Opposed Motion (Notice) of Substitution of Parties (td) (Entered: 10/31/2008)
318 *CORRECTED MOTION to Substitute Party Defendants Livingston and Collier's Opposed Motion (Notice) of Substitution of Parties by Brad Livingston, Brian Collier. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Cunniff, Celamaine) (Entered: 10/31/2008)
319 NOTICE Defendants' Second Amended Privilege Log for Sixth Supplemental Disclosure by Brad Livingston, Brian Collier (Cunniff, Celamaine) (Entered: 10/31/2008)
320 NOTICE Defendants Livingston and Jenkins' Amended Privilege Log for Fourth Supplemental Disclosure (Disclosures and Supplemental Disclosures) by Brad Livingston, Brian Collier (Cunniff, Celamaine) (Entered: 10/31/2008)
321 ANSWER to 311 Fourth Amended Complaint by Brad Livingston, Brian Collier.(td) (Entered: 10/31/2008)
322 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Lee Yeakel: Pretrial Conference held on 10/31/2008 (Minute entry documents are not available electronically.). (Court Reporter Kathy Carroll.)(td, ) (Entered: 10/31/2008)

Case: 1:05-cv-1008 As of: 11/10/2017 11:10 AM CST 27 of 39

10/31/2008 10/31/2008 11/03/2008 11/03/2008 11/03/2008 11/04/2008 11/06/2008 11/06/2008 11/07/2008
11/07/2008 11/10/2008
11/10/2008 11/10/2008
11/12/2008 11/12/2008 11/16/2008

323 * Sealed Motion filed (td) (Entered: 10/31/2008)
324 Sealed Document filed (td) (Entered: 10/31/2008)
325 ORDER GRANTING 323 Sealed Motion Signed by Judge Lee Yeakel. (td) (Entered: 11/03/2008)
326 NOTICE of Tenth Supplemental Disclosure by Brad Livingston, Brian Collier (Cunniff, Celamaine) (Entered: 11/03/2008)
327 Exhibit List Defendants Livingston and Jenkins' Third Amended Exhibit LIst by Brad Livingston, Brian Collier.. (Cunniff, Celamaine) (Entered: 11/03/2008)
328 WITNESS/EXHIBIT LIST by Raul Meza. (Medlock, Scott) (Entered: 11/04/2008)
329 NOTICE of Eleventh Supplemental Disclosure by Brad Livingston, Brian Collier (Cunniff, Celamaine) (Entered: 11/06/2008)
330 Exhibit List Defendants Livingston and Jenkins' Fourth Amended Exhibit List by Brad Livingston, Brian Collier.. (Cunniff, Celamaine) (Entered: 11/06/2008)
331 *Unopposed MOTION to Substitute Party (Defendants Owens, Aliseda, Aycock, Davis, Denoyelles Garcia and Gonzalezs Unopposed Motion (Notice) of Substitution of Parties) by Jose Aliseda, Charles Aycock, Conrith Davis, Jackie DeNoyelles, Linda Garcia, Juanita Gonzales, Rissi L. Owens. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order Order)(Garcia, Bruce) (Entered: 11/07/2008)
332 Exhibit List Parties' Agreed Admissible Exhibits by Raul Meza, Jose Aliseda, Charles Aycock, Conrith Davis, Jackie DeNoyelles, Linda Garcia, Juanita Gonzales, Rissi L. Owens, Brad Livingston, Brian Collier.. (Cunniff, Celamaine) (Entered: 11/07/2008)
333 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Lee Yeakel: Motion Hearing held on 11/10/2008 re 112 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment filed by Raul Meza, 279 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Charles Aycock, Linda Garcia, Conrith Davis, Jose Aliseda, Juanita Gonzales, Jackie DeNoyelles, Rissi L. Owens, 277 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Raul Meza, 109 MOTION for Summary Judgment Defendants Livingston and Collier's Motion for Summary Judgment with Brief in Support filed by Brian Collier, Brad Livingston (Minute entry documents are not available electronically.). (Court Reporter Kathy Carroll.)(td, ) (Entered: 11/10/2008)
334 ORDER GRANTING 318 331 Motion to Substitute Party. (added Stuart Jenkins rep by Demetri Anastasiadis, Celamaine Cunniff, Anthony G. Brocato, Jr) Signed by Judge Lee Yeakel. (td) (Entered: 11/12/2008)
336 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Lee Yeakel: Bench Trial begun on 11/10/2008 (Minute entry documents are not available electronically.) Bench Trial continued to 11/12/2008 09:00 AM before Judge Lee Yeakel. (Court Reporter Kathy Carroll.)(td) (Entered: 11/12/2008)
335 NOTICE Defendants Livingston and Jenkins' Notice of Twelfth Supplemental Disclosure by Stuart Jenkins, Brad Livingston (Cunniff, Celamaine) (Entered: 11/12/2008)
337 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Lee Yeakel: Bench Trial held on 11/12/2008. (Minute entry documents are not available electronically.). (Court Reporter Kathy Carroll.)(dm, ) (Entered: 11/12/2008)
338 Transcript filed of Proceedings held on November 12, 2008, Proceedings Transcribed: Plaintiff's Response to Rule 52(c) Motion. Court Reporter/Transcriber: Kathy Carroll, Telephone number: 512.916.5143. Parties are notified of their duty to review the transcript to ensure compliance with the FRCP 5.2(a)/FRCrP 49.1(a). A copy may be purchased from the court reporter or viewed at the clerk's office public terminal. If redaction is necessary, a Notice of Redaction Request must be filed within 21 days. If no such Notice is filed, the transcript will be made available via PACER without redaction after 90 calendar days. The clerk will mail a copy of this notice to parties not electronically noticed Redaction Request due 12/8/2008. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 12/17/2008. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 2/17/2009. (Carroll, Kathy) (Entered: 11/16/2008)

Case: 1:05-cv-1008 As of: 11/10/2017 11:10 AM CST 28 of 39

11/16/2008
11/17/2008 11/21/2008
11/24/2008 11/26/2008 12/03/2008 12/05/2008 12/05/2008 12/09/2008 12/09/2008 12/09/2008 12/09/2008 12/23/2008 12/23/2008 03/24/2009 03/24/2009

339 Transcript filed of Proceedings held on November 10, 2008, Proceedings Transcribed: Bench Trial Testimony of Robert Butler. Court Reporter/Transcriber: Kathy Carroll, Telephone number: 512.916.5143. Parties are notified of their duty to review the transcript to ensure compliance with the FRCP 5.2(a)/FRCrP 49.1(a). A copy may be purchased from the court reporter or viewed at the clerk's office public terminal. If redaction is necessary, a Notice of Redaction Request must be filed within 21 days. If no such Notice is filed, the transcript will be made available via PACER without redaction after 90 calendar days. The clerk will mail a copy of this notice to parties not electronically noticed Redaction Request due 12/8/2008. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 12/17/2008. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 2/17/2009. (Carroll, Kathy) (Entered: 11/16/2008)
340 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Lee Yeakel: Bench Trial held on 11/17/2008 (Minute entry documents are not available electronically.) Bench Trial continued to 11/24/2008 01:30 PM before Judge Lee Yeakel. (Court Reporter Kathy Carroll.)(td) (Entered: 11/18/2008)
341 Transcript filed of Proceedings held on November 12, 2008, Proceedings Transcribed: Defendants' Rule 52(c) Motion. Court Reporter/Transcriber: Kathy Carroll, Telephone number: 512.916.5143. Parties are notified of their duty to review the transcript to ensure compliance with the FRCP 5.2(a)/FRCrP 49.1(a). A copy may be purchased from the court reporter or viewed at the clerk's office public terminal. If redaction is necessary, a Notice of Redaction Request must be filed within 21 days. If no such Notice is filed, the transcript will be made available via PACER without redaction after 90 calendar days. The clerk will mail a copy of this notice to parties not electronically noticed Redaction Request due 12/12/2008. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 12/22/2008. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 2/19/2009. (Carroll, Kathy) (Entered: 11/21/2008)
342 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Lee Yeakel: Bench Trial held on 11/24/2008 (Minute entry documents are not available electronically.). (Court Reporter Kathy Carroll.)(td) (Entered: 11/25/2008)
343 ORDER, (Closing Argument set for 12/9/2008 09:00 AM before Judge Lee Yeakel.). Signed by Judge Lee Yeakel. (dm, ) (Entered: 11/26/2008)
344 ADVISORY TO THE COURT by Raul Meza. (Medlock, Scott) (Entered: 12/03/2008)
345 BRIEF by Stuart Jenkins, Brad Livingston Defendants Livingston and Jenkins' Bench Brief on Parole Conditions. (Cunniff, Celamaine) (Entered: 12/05/2008)
346 TRIAL BRIEF Plaintiff's Post Trial Brief by Raul Meza. (Medlock, Scott) (Entered: 12/05/2008)
347 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Lee Yeakel: Bench Trial held on 12/9/2008 (Minute entry documents are not available electronically., Bench Trial completed on 12/9/2008 (Minute entry documents are not available electronically.). (Court Reporter Kathy Carroll.)(td) (Entered: 12/09/2008)
348 Witness List re: Bench Trial as to Raul Meza, Individual Parole Officers, Jose Aliseda, Charles Aycock, Conrith Davis, Jackie DeNoyelles, Linda Garcia, Juanita Gonzales, Rissi L. Owens, Stuart Jenkins, Brad Livingston. (td) (Entered: 12/09/2008)
349 Exhibit List re: Bench Trial as to Raul Meza. (td) (Entered: 12/09/2008)
350 Exhibit List re: Bench Trial as to Stuart Jenkins, Brad Livingston.(td) (Entered: 12/09/2008)
351 Opposed MOTION to supplement the Record by Raul Meza. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit, # 2 Proposed Order)(Medlock, Scott) (Entered: 12/23/2008)
352 ADVISORY TO THE COURT by Raul Meza. (Medlock, Scott) (Entered: 12/23/2008)
353 FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW. Signed by Judge Lee Yeakel. (td) (Entered: 03/25/2009)
354 NOTICE of Filing Declaration of Lisa Scavella by Raul Meza (td) (Entered: 03/25/2009)

Case: 1:05-cv-1008 As of: 11/10/2017 11:10 AM CST 29 of 39

03/24/2009 04/07/2009
04/07/2009 04/07/2009 04/13/2009 04/13/2009 04/16/2009
04/20/2009 04/22/2009
04/23/2009 04/24/2009
04/24/2009
04/29/2009 05/01/2009

355 FINAL JUDGMENT. Signed by Judge Lee Yeakel. (td) (Entered: 03/25/2009)
356 Miscellaneous Objection to 353 Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law (Defendants Rissie Owens, Jose Aliseda, Charles Aycock, Conrith Davis, Jackie Denoyelles, Linda Garcia and Juanita Gonzales Objections to the Courts Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law) by Jose Aliseda, Charles Aycock, Conrith Davis, Jackie DeNoyelles, Linda Garcia, Juanita Gonzales, Rissi L. Owens. (Garcia, Bruce) (Entered: 04/07/2009)
357 Miscellaneous Objection to 353 Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law Defendants Livingston and Jenkins' Objections to the Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law by Stuart Jenkins, Brad Livingston. (Cunniff, Celamaine) (Entered: 04/07/2009)
358 MOTION for Attorney Fees by Raul Meza. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order, # 2 Appendix, # 3 Exhibit, # 4 Exhibit, # 5 Exhibit, # 6 Exhibit, # 7 Exhibit, # 8 Exhibit)(Medlock, Scott) (Entered: 04/07/2009)
359 RESPONSE to 356 Miscellaneous Objection, by Raul Meza. (Medlock, Scott) (Entered: 04/13/2009)
360 RESPONSE to 357 Miscellaneous Objection by Raul Meza. (Medlock, Scott) (Entered: 04/13/2009)
361 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 358 MOTION for Attorney Fees Joint Defendants' Unopposed Motion for Extension of Time to File Response to Plaintiff's Motion for Attorneys' Fees, Etc. by Jose Aliseda, Charles Aycock, Conrith Davis, Jackie DeNoyelles, Juanita Gonzales, Rissi L. Owens, Stuart Jenkins, Brad Livingston. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Cunniff, Celamaine) (Entered: 04/16/2009)
362 ORDER GRANTING 361 Motion for Extension of Time to File Response... due on or before May 20, 2009. Signed by Judge Lee Yeakel. (td) (Entered: 04/20/2009)
363 NOTICE OF APPEAL by Individual Parole Officers, Jose Aliseda, Charles Aycock, Conrith Davis, Jackie DeNoyelles, Linda Garcia, Juanita Gonzales, Rissi L. Owens, Stuart Jenkins, Brad Livingston. Filing fee $ 455, receipt number 100002022. Per 5th Circuit rules, the appellant has 10 days, from the filing of the Notice of Appeal, to order the transcript. To order a transcript, the appellant should fill out Form DKT−13 (Transcript Order) and follow the instructions set out on the form. This form is available in the Clerk's Office or by clicking the hyperlink above. (mh, ) (Entered: 04/23/2009)
364 Opposed MOTION to Stay of Judgment Pending Appeal by Jose Aliseda, Charles Aycock, Conrith Davis, Jackie DeNoyelles, Juanita Gonzales, Rissi L. Owens, Stuart Jenkins, Brad Livingston. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Cunniff, Celamaine) (Entered: 04/23/2009)
365 RESPONSE to Motion, filed by Raul Meza, re 364 Opposed MOTION to Stay of Judgment Pending Appeal filed by Defendant Charles Aycock, Defendant Jose Aliseda, Defendant Juanita Gonzales, Defendant Rissi L. Owens, Defendant Brad Livingston, Defendant Conrith Davis, Defendant Jackie DeNoyelles, Defendant Stuart Jenkins (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Medlock, Scott) (Entered: 04/24/2009)
366 NOTICE OF CROSS−APPEAL by Raul Meza. Per 5th Circuit rules, the appellant has 10 days, from the filing of the Notice of Appeal, to order the transcript. To order a transcript, the appellant should fill out Form DKT−13 (Transcript Order) and follow the instructions set out on the form. This form is available in the Clerk's Office or by clicking the hyperlink above. (APPEAL FEES NOT INCLUDED) (mh, ) (Entered: 04/27/2009)
367 TRANSCRIPT REQUEST by Stuart Jenkins, Brad Livingston for dates of 11/10/09, 11/12/08, 11/24/08, 12/9/09. Proceedings Transcribed: Bench Trial. Court Reporter: Kathy Carroll. (mh, ) (Entered: 04/30/2009)
368 Unopposed MOTION to proceed In Forma Pauperis on appeal by Raul Meza. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order, # 2 Appendix)(Medlock, Scott) (Entered: 05/01/2009)

Case: 1:05-cv-1008 As of: 11/10/2017 11:10 AM CST 30 of 39

05/08/2009 05/08/2009 05/14/2009 05/14/2009 05/18/2009
05/19/2009 05/19/2009 05/22/2009 06/01/2009
06/01/2009
06/01/2009

369 NOTICE (Advisory to the Court) by Jose Aliseda, Charles Aycock, Conrith Davis, Jackie DeNoyelles, Linda Garcia, Juanita Gonzales, Rissi L. Owens (Garcia, Bruce) (Entered: 05/08/2009)
370 ORDER GRANTING 368 Motion to proceed In Forma Pauperis on Appeal Signed by Judge Lee Yeakel. (mh, ) (Entered: 05/08/2009)
371 USCA Appeal Info Sheet received. USCA Case Number 09−50367 for 363 Notice of Appeal,, filed by Charles Aycock, Jose Aliseda, Juanita Gonzales, Rissi L. Owens, Individual Parole Officers, Brad Livingston, Linda Garcia, Conrith Davis, Jackie DeNoyelles, Stuart Jenkins. 363 Notice of Appeal. (mh, ) (Entered: 05/15/2009)
372 USCA Appeal Info Sheet received. USCA Case Number 09−50367 for 366 Notice of Appeal, filed by Raul Meza. (mh, ) (Entered: 05/15/2009)
373 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 358 MOTION for Attorney Fees (Joint Defendants Second Unopposed Motion for Extension of Time to File Response in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Attorneys Fees) by Jose Aliseda, Charles Aycock, Conrith Davis, Jackie DeNoyelles, Juanita Gonzales, Rissi L. Owens, Stuart Jenkins, Brad Livingston. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order Order)(Cunniff, Celamaine) (Entered: 05/18/2009)
374 ORDER DENYING 364 Motion to Stay Signed by Judge Lee Yeakel. (mh, ) (Entered: 05/20/2009)
375 ORDER GRANTING 373 Motion for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply (response due on or before 6/22/09) Signed by Judge Lee Yeakel. (mh, ) (Entered: 05/20/2009)
376 ORDER OVERRULING 356 Objections, filed by Charles Aycock, Linda Garcia, Conrith Davis, Jose Aliseda, Juanita Gonzales, Jackie DeNoyelles, Rissi L. Owens, 357 Objections filed by Brad Livingston, Stuart Jenkins. Signed by Judge Lee Yeakel. (td) (Entered: 05/22/2009)
377 Transcript filed of Proceedings held on November 10, 2008, Proceedings Transcribed: Motions Hearing. Court Reporter/Transcriber: Kathy Carroll, Telephone number: 512.916.5143. Parties are notified of their duty to review the transcript to ensure compliance with the FRCP 5.2(a)/FRCrP 49.1(a). A copy may be purchased from the court reporter or viewed at the clerk's office public terminal. If redaction is necessary, a Notice of Redaction Request must be filed within 21 days. If no such Notice is filed, the transcript will be made available via PACER without redaction after 90 calendar days. The clerk will mail a copy of this notice to parties not electronically noticed Redaction Request due 6/22/2009. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 7/2/2009. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 8/31/2009. Appeal Record due by 6/16/2009. (Carroll, Kathy) (Entered: 06/01/2009)
378 Transcript filed of Proceedings held on November 10, 2008, Proceedings Transcribed: Bench Trial, Volume 1 of 5. Court Reporter/Transcriber: Kathy Carroll, Telephone number: 512.916.5143. Parties are notified of their duty to review the transcript to ensure compliance with the FRCP 5.2(a)/FRCrP 49.1(a). A copy may be purchased from the court reporter or viewed at the clerk's office public terminal. If redaction is necessary, a Notice of Redaction Request must be filed within 21 days. If no such Notice is filed, the transcript will be made available via PACER without redaction after 90 calendar days. The clerk will mail a copy of this notice to parties not electronically noticed Redaction Request due 6/22/2009. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 7/2/2009. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 8/31/2009. Appeal Record due by 6/16/2009. (Carroll, Kathy) (Entered: 06/01/2009)
379 Transcript filed of Proceedings held on November 12, 2008, Proceedings Transcribed: Bench Trial, Volume 2 of 5. Court Reporter/Transcriber: Kathy Carroll, Telephone number: 512.916.5143. Parties are notified of their duty to review the transcript to ensure compliance with the FRCP 5.2(a)/FRCrP 49.1(a). A copy may be purchased from the court reporter or viewed at the clerk's office public terminal. If redaction is necessary, a Notice of Redaction Request must be filed within 21 days. If no such Notice is filed, the transcript will be made available via PACER without redaction after 90 calendar days. The clerk will mail a copy of this notice to parties not electronically noticed Redaction Request due 6/22/2009. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 7/2/2009. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 8/31/2009. Appeal Record

Case: 1:05-cv-1008 As of: 11/10/2017 11:10 AM CST 31 of 39

06/01/2009
06/01/2009
06/01/2009
06/17/2009 06/22/2009 06/23/2009 06/23/2009 06/24/2009 06/24/2009 06/24/2009

due by 6/16/2009. (Carroll, Kathy) (Entered: 06/01/2009)
380 Transcript filed of Proceedings held on November 17, 2008, Proceedings Transcribed: Bench Trial, Volume 3 of 5. Court Reporter/Transcriber: Kathy Carroll, Telephone number: 512.916.5143. Parties are notified of their duty to review the transcript to ensure compliance with the FRCP 5.2(a)/FRCrP 49.1(a). A copy may be purchased from the court reporter or viewed at the clerk's office public terminal. If redaction is necessary, a Notice of Redaction Request must be filed within 21 days. If no such Notice is filed, the transcript will be made available via PACER without redaction after 90 calendar days. The clerk will mail a copy of this notice to parties not electronically noticed Redaction Request due 6/22/2009. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 7/2/2009. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 8/31/2009. Appeal Record due by 6/16/2009. (Carroll, Kathy) (Entered: 06/01/2009)
381 Transcript filed of Proceedings held on November 24, 2008, Proceedings Transcribed: Bench Trial, Volume 4 of 5. Court Reporter/Transcriber: Kathy Carroll, Telephone number: 512.916.5143. Parties are notified of their duty to review the transcript to ensure compliance with the FRCP 5.2(a)/FRCrP 49.1(a). A copy may be purchased from the court reporter or viewed at the clerk's office public terminal. If redaction is necessary, a Notice of Redaction Request must be filed within 21 days. If no such Notice is filed, the transcript will be made available via PACER without redaction after 90 calendar days. The clerk will mail a copy of this notice to parties not electronically noticed Redaction Request due 6/22/2009. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 7/2/2009. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 8/31/2009. Appeal Record due by 6/16/2009. (Carroll, Kathy) (Entered: 06/01/2009)
382 Transcript filed of Proceedings held on December 9, 2008, Proceedings Transcribed: Bench Trial, Volume 5 of 5. Court Reporter/Transcriber: Kathy Carroll, Telephone number: 512.916.5143. Parties are notified of their duty to review the transcript to ensure compliance with the FRCP 5.2(a)/FRCrP 49.1(a). A copy may be purchased from the court reporter or viewed at the clerk's office public terminal. If redaction is necessary, a Notice of Redaction Request must be filed within 21 days. If no such Notice is filed, the transcript will be made available via PACER without redaction after 90 calendar days. The clerk will mail a copy of this notice to parties not electronically noticed Redaction Request due 6/22/2009. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 7/2/2009. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 8/31/2009. Appeal Record due by 6/16/2009. (Carroll, Kathy) (Entered: 06/01/2009)
383 NOTICE Defendants−Appellants' Designation of Appellate Record by Jose Aliseda, Charles Aycock, Conrith Davis, Jackie DeNoyelles, Linda Garcia, Juanita Gonzales, Rissi L. Owens, Stuart Jenkins, Brad Livingston (Cunniff, Celamaine) (Entered: 06/17/2009)
384 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 358 MOTION for Attorney Fees (Joint Defendants Third Unopposed Motion for Extension of Time to File Response in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Attorneys Fees) by Jose Aliseda, Charles Aycock, Conrith Davis, Jackie DeNoyelles, Juanita Gonzales, Rissi L. Owens, Stuart Jenkins, Brad Livingston. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order Order)(Cunniff, Celamaine) (Entered: 06/22/2009)
385 NOTICE OF VACATION by Raul Meza (Medlock, Scott) (Entered: 06/23/2009)
386 NOTICE APPELEE/CROSS APPEALLANTS DESIGNATION OF APPELLATE RECORD by Raul Meza (Medlock, Scott) (Entered: 06/23/2009)
NOTICE OF CERTIFIED RECORD ON APPEAL SENT TO USCA VIA EMAIL in re 363 Notice of Appeal,, 366 Notice of Appeal, (mh, ) (Entered: 06/24/2009)
387 RESPONSE to Motion, filed by Jose Aliseda, Charles Aycock, Conrith Davis, Jackie DeNoyelles, Linda Garcia, Juanita Gonzales, Rissi L. Owens, re 358 MOTION for Attorney Fees filed by Plaintiff Raul Meza (Defendants Response to Plaintiffs Motion for Attorneys Fees with Brief in Support) (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit Exhibit B)(Garcia, Bruce) (Entered: 06/24/2009)
388 RESPONSE to Motion, filed by Stuart Jenkins, Brad Livingston, re 358 MOTION for Attorney Fees filed by Plaintiff Raul Meza (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Proposed Order)(Cunniff, Celamaine) (Entered:

Case: 1:05-cv-1008 As of: 11/10/2017 11:10 AM CST 32 of 39

06/24/2009 06/26/2009
06/26/2009 06/30/2009 07/02/2009
07/06/2009 07/21/2009 07/23/2009 07/29/2009 07/29/2009 09/15/2009 09/21/2009 10/09/2009
12/09/2009 01/08/2010
01/28/2010 02/12/2010

06/24/2009)
389 REQUEST for certified record on appeal made by Celamaine Cunniff, AAG (mh, ) (Entered: 06/25/2009)
390 Certified and Transmitted Record on Appeal to Celamaine Cunniff w/the Attorney General re 363 Notice of Appeal 366 Notice of Appeal consisting of 14 vols of the electronic record, 11 vols of transcripts and 3 vols of exhibits. (klw, ) (Entered: 06/26/2009)
391 Acknowledgement Receipt for Record on Appeal by Celamaine Cunniff. re 390 Appeal Record Transmitted (klw, ) (Entered: 06/29/2009)
392 ORDER GRANTING 384 Motion for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply Signed by Judge Lee Yeakel. (mh, ) (Entered: 06/30/2009)
393 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply TO DEFENDANTS RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS FEES, LITIGATION EXPENSES, AND COSTS by Raul Meza. (Attachments: # 1 Order)(Medlock, Scott) (Entered: 07/02/2009)
394 ORDER GRANTING 393 Motion for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply due 08/03/2009 Signed by Judge Lee Yeakel. (mh, ) (Entered: 07/07/2009)
395 Acknowledgement Receipt for Record on Appeal by Scott Medlock. Appeal Record Transmitted (mh, ) (Entered: 07/21/2009)
396 Transmitted Record on Appeal forwarded to attorney Scott Medlock by attorney Celamaine Cunniff. re 363 Notice of Appeal, 366 Notice of Appeal. (jk, ) (Entered: 07/24/2009)
397 REPLY to Response to Motion, filed by Raul Meza, re 358 MOTION for Attorney Fees filed by Plaintiff Raul Meza (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Exhibit, # 3 Exhibit, # 4 Exhibit, # 5 Exhibit, # 6 Exhibit)(Medlock, Scott) (Entered: 07/29/2009)
398 REPLY to Response to Motion, filed by Raul Meza, re 358 MOTION for Attorney Fees filed by Plaintiff Raul Meza (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Exhibit, # 3 Exhibit, # 4 Exhibit, # 5 Exhibit)(Medlock, Scott) (Entered: 07/29/2009)
399 NOTICE of Vacation by Raul Meza (Medlock, Scott) (Entered: 09/15/2009)
400 ORDER of USCA (certified copy) regarding Motion for stay of judgment pending appeal DENIED; re 363 Notice of Appeal,, 366 Notice of Appeal, (mh, ) (Entered: 09/23/2009)
401 Letter from USCA received for 363 Notice of Appeal,, filed by Charles Aycock, Jose Aliseda, Juanita Gonzales, Rissi L. Owens, Individual Parole Officers, Brad Livingston, Linda Garcia, Conrith Davis, Jackie DeNoyelles, Stuart Jenkins, 366 Notice of Appeal, filed by Raul Meza. in re: substitution of parties and amend caption. (mh, ) (Entered: 10/09/2009)
402 ORDER GRANTING 358 Motion for Attorney Fees Signed by Judge Lee Yeakel. (mh, ) (Entered: 12/10/2009)
403 NOTICE OF APPEAL by Jose Aliseda, Charles Aycock, Conrith Davis, Jackie DeNoyelles, Linda Garcia, Juanita Gonzales, Rissi L. Owens. Filing fee $ 455, receipt number 100004952. Per 5th Circuit rules, the appellant has 10 days, from the filing of the Notice of Appeal, to order the transcript. To order a transcript, the appellant should fill out Form DKT−13 (Transcript Order) and follow the instructions set out on the form. This form is available in the Clerk's Office or by clicking the hyperlink above. (mh, ) (Entered: 01/11/2010)
404 USCA Appeal Info Sheet received. USCA Case Number 10−50061 for 403 Notice of Appeal,, filed by Charles Aycock, Linda Garcia, Conrith Davis, Jose Aliseda, Juanita Gonzales, Jackie DeNoyelles, Rissi L. Owens. (mh, ) (Entered: 01/29/2010)
405 MOTION to Compel Injunctive Relief by Raul Meza. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Medlock, Scott) (Entered: 02/12/2010)

Case: 1:05-cv-1008 As of: 11/10/2017 11:10 AM CST 33 of 39

02/18/2010 03/10/2010 03/25/2010 04/05/2010 10/29/2010
10/29/2010 11/17/2010 11/19/2010
11/29/2010
11/30/2010 12/13/2010
12/20/2010 12/21/2010 12/30/2010 01/12/2011 01/12/2011 01/13/2011

406 NOTICE of Withdrawal by Raul Meza re 405 MOTION to Compel Injunctive Relief (Medlock, Scott) (Entered: 02/18/2010)
407 NOTICE of Vacation by Raul Meza (Medlock, Scott) (Entered: 03/10/2010)
408 Certified and transmitted Supplemental Record on Appeal to US Court of Appeals re 403 Notice of Appeal. (jk, ) (Entered: 03/25/2010)
409 Acknowledgement Receipt for Record on Appeal by USCA−5TH. re 408 Supplemental ROA Sent to USCA (mh, ) (Entered: 04/06/2010)
410 Certified copy of USCA JUDGMENT/MANDATE AFFIRMING IN PART, VACATED IN PART, AND REMANDED TO THE DISTRICT COURT FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH THE USCA OPINION... 366 Notice of Appeal, filed by Raul Meza, 363 Notice of Appeal,filed by Charles Aycock, Jose Aliseda, Juanita Gonzales, Rissi L. Owens, Individual Parole Officers, Brad Livingston, Linda Garcia, Conrith Davis, Jackie DeNoyelles, Stuart Jenkins. (THIS OPINION IS IN REFERENCE TO APPEAL CASE NO: 09−50367) (mh, ) (Entered: 11/01/2010)
411 Appeal Record Returned/Disposed by USCA: Terminated appeal: 410 USCA Judgment/Mandate, ONE BOX WAS RETURNED WITH TWO LARGE−THREE RING BINDERS (mh, ) (Entered: 11/01/2010)
412 Certified and Transmitted Record on Appeal to US Court of Appeals re 403 Notice of Appeal,,(in re: USCA# 10−50061) (mh, ) (Entered: 11/18/2010)
413 MOTION to Enforce Judgment, MOTION for Contempt AGAINST DEFENDANTS OWENS, ALISEDA, AYCOCK, DAVIS, DENOYELLES, LORRAINE, AND GONZALES by Raul Meza. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Proposed Order)(Medlock, Scott) (Entered: 11/19/2010)
414 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 413 MOTION to Enforce Judgment MOTION for Contempt AGAINST DEFENDANTS OWENS, ALISEDA, AYCOCK, DAVIS, DENOYELLES, LORRAINE, AND GONZALES by Jose Aliseda, Charles Aycock, Conrith Davis, Jackie DeNoyelles, Linda Garcia, Juanita Gonzales, Rissi L. Owens. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order Order)(Garcia, Bruce) (Entered: 11/29/2010)
415 ORDER GRANTING 414 Motion for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply (DUE 12/13/10) Signed by Judge Lee Yeakel. (mh, ) (Entered: 12/02/2010)
416 Response in Opposition to Motion, filed by Jose Aliseda, Charles Aycock, Conrith Davis, Jackie DeNoyelles, Linda Garcia, Juanita Gonzales, Rissi L. Owens, re 413 MOTION to Enforce Judgment MOTION for Contempt AGAINST DEFENDANTS OWENS, ALISEDA, AYCOCK, DAVIS, DENOYELLES, LORRAINE, AND GONZALES filed by Plaintiff Raul Meza (Garcia, Bruce) (Entered: 12/13/2010)
417 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 416 Response in Opposition to Motion, by Raul Meza. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Medlock, Scott) (Entered: 12/20/2010)
418 Supplemental Record on Appeal transmitted to US Court of Appeals re 403 Notice of Appeal,, (mh, ) (Entered: 12/22/2010)
419 Acknowledgement Receipt for Record on Appeal by 5th USCA. re 418 Supplemental ROA Sent to USCA. (jk, ) (Entered: 12/30/2010)
420 Second MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 416 Response in Opposition to Motion, Unopposed, by Raul Meza. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Medlock, Scott) (Entered: 01/12/2011)
421 ORDER GRANTING 417 Motion for Extension of Time to File Response to Motion to Enforce Judgment 413 Motion for Contempt Signed by Judge Lee Yeakel. (mh) Modified on 1/13/2011 to correct event (m) (Entered: 01/13/2011)
Notice of Correction: re 421 Order on Motion to Enforce Judgment, Order on Motion for Contempt − addressed motion #417. Motion #413 remains pending.. (mh, ) (Entered: 01/13/2011)

Case: 1:05-cv-1008 As of: 11/10/2017 11:10 AM CST 34 of 39

01/13/2011 01/21/2011 02/14/2011 02/22/2011 02/22/2011 03/07/2011
03/08/2011 03/08/2011 03/11/2011 03/15/2011
03/16/2011 03/28/2011
03/29/2011
03/29/2011 03/30/2011

422 ORDER GRANTING 420 Second Motion for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply Signed by Judge Lee Yeakel. (mh, ) (Entered: 01/13/2011)
423 REPLY to Response to Motion, filed by Raul Meza, re 413 MOTION to Enforce Judgment MOTION for Contempt AGAINST DEFENDANTS OWENS, ALISEDA, AYCOCK, DAVIS, DENOYELLES, LORRAINE, AND GONZALES filed by Plaintiff Raul Meza (Medlock, Scott) (Entered: 01/21/2011)
424 ORDER of USCA (certified copy) GRANTING appellee's motion for award of attorney fees..., and motion for costs... ; re 403 Notice of Appeal,, (mh, ) (Entered: 02/14/2011)
425 Certified copy of USCA JUDGMENT/MANDATE Affirming the judgment of the District Court 403 Notice of Appeal,, filed by Charles Aycock, Linda Garcia, Conrith Davis, Jose Aliseda, Juanita Gonzales, Jackie DeNoyelles, Rissi L. Owens. (mh, ) (Entered: 02/23/2011)
426 Appeal Record Returned/Disposed by USCA: (mh, ) (Entered: 02/23/2011)
427 ORDER, Set Motion Hearing for 413 MOTION to Enforce Judgment MOTION for Contempt AGAINST DEFENDANTS OWENS, ALISEDA, AYCOCK, DAVIS, DENOYELLES, LORRAINE, AND GONZALES (Motion Hearing set for 3/22/2011 at 09:00 AM before Judge Lee Yeakel.). Signed by Judge Lee Yeakel. (td) (Entered: 03/07/2011)
428 NOTICE OF VACATION by Raul Meza (Medlock, Scott) (Entered: 03/08/2011)
429 Unopposed MOTION to Continue the March 22, 2011 Hearing Setting by Jose Aliseda, Charles Aycock, Conrith Davis, Jackie DeNoyelles, Linda Garcia, Juanita Gonzales, Rissi L. Owens. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order Order)(Garcia, Bruce) (Entered: 03/08/2011)
430 ADVISORY TO THE COURT by Jose Aliseda, Charles Aycock, Conrith Davis, Jackie DeNoyelles, Linda Garcia, Juanita Gonzales, Rissi L. Owens (Advisory Regarding Unopposed Motion to Continue the March 22, 2011 Hearing Setting). (Garcia, Bruce) (Entered: 03/11/2011)
431 ORDER Resetting Hearing on 413 MOTION to Enforce Judgment MOTION for Contempt AGAINST DEFENDANTS OWENS, ALISEDA, AYCOCK, DAVIS, DENOYELLES, LORRAINE, AND GONZALES : Motion Hearing reset for 3/29/2011 09:00 AM before Judge Lee Yeakel. Signed by Judge Lee Yeakel. (dm, ) (Entered: 03/15/2011)
432 ORDER DISMISSING 429 Motion to Continue. Signed by Judge Lee Yeakel. (dm, ) (Entered: 03/16/2011)
433 ORDER, Set Motion Hearing for 413 MOTION to Enforce Judgment MOTION for Contempt AGAINST DEFENDANTS OWENS, ALISEDA, AYCOCK, DAVIS, DENOYELLES, LORRAINE, AND GONZALES ( Motion Hearing reset for 3/29/2011 at 09:30 AM before Judge Lee Yeakel.). Signed by Judge Lee Yeakel. (td) (Entered: 03/28/2011)
434 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Lee Yeakel: Motion Hearing held on 3/29/2011 re 413 MOTION to Enforce Judgment MOTION for Contempt AGAINST DEFENDANTS OWENS, ALISEDA, AYCOCK, DAVIS, DENOYELLES, LORRAINE, AND GONZALES filed by Raul Meza (Minute entry documents are not available electronically.). (Court Reporter Arlinda Rodriguez.)(td) (Entered: 03/29/2011)
Motions Taken Under Advisement: 413 MOTION to Enforce Judgment MOTION for Contempt AGAINST DEFENDANTS OWENS, ALISEDA, AYCOCK, DAVIS, DENOYELLES, LORRAINE, AND GONZALES (td) (Entered: 03/29/2011)
435 MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER, Motions terminated: granting 413 MOTION to Enforce Judgment, and MOTION for Contempt AGAINST DEFENDANTS OWENS, ALISEDA, AYCOCK, DAVIS, DENOYELLES, LORRAINE, AND GONZALES filed by Raul Meza remains pending.. Signed by Judge Lee Yeakel. (mc2, ) (Entered: 03/31/2011)

Case: 1:05-cv-1008 As of: 11/10/2017 11:10 AM CST 35 of 39

04/01/2011
04/25/2011 04/27/2011 04/29/2011 04/29/2011 05/13/2011 05/18/2011 05/26/2011 06/13/2011 06/13/2011
06/14/2011 06/24/2011
06/27/2011 06/29/2011
07/06/2011 08/24/2011 10/25/2011 11/15/2011 01/12/2012

436 Transcript filed of Proceedings held on March 29, 2011, Proceedings Transcribed: Plaintiff's Motion for Enforcement of Judgment and Contempt against Defendants. Court Reporter/Transcriber: Arlinda Rodriguez, Telephone number: 512−916−5143. Parties are notified of their duty to review the transcript to ensure compliance with the FRCP 5.2(a)/FRCrP 49.1(a). A copy may be purchased from the court reporter or viewed at the clerk's office public terminal. If redaction is necessary, a Notice of Redaction Request must be filed within 21 days. If no such Notice is filed, the transcript will be made available via PACER without redaction after 90 calendar days. The clerk will mail a copy of this notice to parties not electronically noticed Redaction Request due 4/22/2011. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 5/2/2011. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 6/30/2011. (Rodriguez, Arlinda) (Entered: 04/01/2011)
437 Exhibit Letter instructing parties to pick up their exhibits. (mh, ) (Entered: 04/25/2011)
440 Affidavits of Interested Parties (td) (Entered: 05/09/2011)
438 ADVISORY TO THE COURT by Raul Meza. (Medlock, Scott) (Entered: 04/29/2011)
439 EXHIBIT RECEIPT by Raul Meza. (mh, ) (Entered: 05/02/2011)
ALL UNCLAIMED EXHIBITS WERE DESTROYED. (mh, ) (Entered: 05/13/2011)
441 ADVISORY TO THE COURT by Stuart Jenkins, Brad Livingston. (Cunniff, Celamaine) (Entered: 05/18/2011)
442 ORDER DISMISSING WITHOUT PREJUDICE 413 Motion for Enforcement of Judgment and Contempt. Signed by Judge Lee Yeakel. (td) (Entered: 05/26/2011)
443 Unopposed MOTION to File Documents Under Seal by Raul Meza. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Medlock, Scott) (Entered: 06/13/2011)
444 SECOND MOTION for Enforcement of Judgment by Raul Meza. (Attachments: #(1) Exhibit 1 (FILED UNDER SEAL − NOT AVAILABLE ELECTRONICALLY), #(2) Exhibit 2, #(3) Exhibit 3 (FILED UNDER SEAL − NOT AVAILABLE ELECTRONICALLY), # 4 Exhibit 4)(td) (Entered: 06/14/2011)
445 ORDER GRANTING 443 Motion to File Documents Under Seal. Signed by Judge Lee Yeakel. (td) (Entered: 06/15/2011)
446 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply to Plaintiff's Second Motion for Enforcement of Judgment 444 by Jose Aliseda, Charles Aycock, Conrith Davis, Jackie DeNoyelles, Linda Garcia, Juanita Gonzales, Rissi L. Owens. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Garcia, Bruce) Modified on 6/24/2011 to create link (td). (Entered: 06/24/2011)
447 ORDER GRANTING 446 Motion for Extension of Time to File Response to Second Motion for Enforcement of Judgment... due on or before June 29, 2011. Signed by Judge Lee Yeakel. (td) (Entered: 06/27/2011)
448 Response in Opposition to Motion, filed by Jose Aliseda, Charles Aycock, Conrith Davis, Jackie DeNoyelles, Linda Garcia, Juanita Gonzales, Rissi L. Owens, re 444 MOTION for Enforcement of Judgment filed by Plaintiff Raul Meza (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibit A, # 2 Proposed Order)(Garcia, Bruce) (Entered: 06/29/2011)
449 REPLY to Response to Motion, filed by Raul Meza, re 444 MOTION for Enforcement of Judgment filed by Plaintiff Raul Meza (Medlock, Scott) (Entered: 07/06/2011)
450 ORDER DENYING 444 Second Motion for Enforcement of Judgment. Signed by Judge Lee Yeakel. (td) (Entered: 08/25/2011)
451 ORDER, (Status Conference set 11/15/2011 at 09:00 AM before Judge Lee Yeakel.). Signed by Judge Lee Yeakel. (td) (Entered: 10/25/2011)
452 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Lee Yeakel: Status Conference held on 11/15/2011 (Minute entry documents are not available electronically.). (Court Reporter Arlinda Rodriguez.)(td) (Entered: 11/15/2011)
453 ADVISORY TO THE COURT by Stuart Jenkins, Brad Livingston. (Cunniff, Celamaine) (Entered: 01/12/2012)

Case: 1:05-cv-1008 As of: 11/10/2017 11:10 AM CST 36 of 39

03/29/2012 11/27/2012 03/13/2013 09/20/2013 09/20/2013 09/24/2013 09/24/2013 10/10/2013 10/30/2013 12/03/2013 12/12/2013 12/12/2013
12/18/2013
12/18/2013 01/03/2014
01/03/2014
01/03/2014 01/06/2014

454 ADVISORY TO THE COURT by Raul Meza. (Medlock, Scott) (Entered: 03/29/2012)
455 NOTICE Vacation Advisory to the Court by Texas Dept of Criminal Justice (Cunniff, Celamaine) (Entered: 11/27/2012)
456 NOTICE of Vacation by Raul Meza (Medlock, Scott) (Entered: 03/13/2013)
458 Unopposed MOTION to Substitute Party by Jose Aliseda, Charles Aycock, Conrith Davis, Jackie DeNoyelles, Linda Garcia, Juanita Gonzales, Rissi L. Owens. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Garcia, Bruce) (Entered: 09/20/2013)
459 STIPULATION of Dismissal Agreed Stipulation of Dismiss with Prejudice by Jose Aliseda, Charles Aycock, Conrith Davis, Jackie DeNoyelles, Linda Garcia, Juanita Gonzales, Rissi L. Owens. (Garcia, Bruce) (Entered: 09/20/2013)
460 ORDER GRANTING 458 Motion to Substitute Party. Signed by Judge Lee Yeakel. (dm) (Entered: 09/24/2013)
461 ORDERED that the style in the case remaining before this court be modified as noted in the style utilized in this order. Signed by Judge Lee Yeakel. (dm) (Entered: 09/24/2013)
462 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney by Raul Meza. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Medlock, Scott) (Entered: 10/10/2013)
463 ORDER GRANTING 462 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. Signed by Judge Lee Yeakel. (td) (Entered: 10/30/2013)
464 NOTICE of Attorney Appearance by Brian Rolland McGiverin on behalf of Raul Meza (McGiverin, Brian) (Entered: 12/03/2013)
465 MOTION to Dismiss Defendants Livingston and Jenkins' Motion to Dismiss for Mootness by Stuart Jenkins, Brad Livingston. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Proposed Order)(Cunniff, Celamaine) (Entered: 12/12/2013)
466 Opposed MOTION to Quash Defendants Livingston and Jenkins' Opposed Motion to Quash Depositions/Subpoena Duces Tecum or Motion for Protection by Stuart Jenkins, Brad Livingston. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Proposed Order)(Cunniff, Celamaine) (Entered: 12/12/2013)
467 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 465 MOTION to Dismiss Defendants Livingston and Jenkins' Motion to Dismiss for Mootness, 466 Opposed MOTION to Quash Defendants Livingston and Jenkins' Opposed Motion to Quash Depositions/Subpoena Duces Tecum or Motion for Protection by Raul Meza. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(McGiverin, Brian) (Entered: 12/18/2013)
468 ORDER GRANTING 467 Motion for Extension of Time; Response to Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Quash Deposition due by 1/3/2014. Signed by Judge Lee Yeakel. (kkc) (Entered: 12/18/2013)
469 RESPONSE to Motion, filed by Raul Meza, re 466 Opposed MOTION to Quash Defendants Livingston and Jenkins' Opposed Motion to Quash Depositions/Subpoena Duces Tecum or Motion for Protection filed by Defendant Brad Livingston, Defendant Stuart Jenkins (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(McGiverin, Brian) (Entered: 01/03/2014)
470 RESPONSE to Motion, filed by Raul Meza, re 465 MOTION to Dismiss Defendants Livingston and Jenkins' Motion to Dismiss for Mootness filed by Defendant Brad Livingston, Defendant Stuart Jenkins (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Proposed Order)(McGiverin, Brian) (Additional attachment(s) added on 1/8/2014: # 3 Sealed Exhibit) (td). (Entered: 01/03/2014)
471 Motion for leave to File Sealed Document (Attachments: # 1 Sealed Document, # 2 Proposed Order) (McGiverin, Brian) (Entered: 01/03/2014)
472 DEFICIENCY NOTICE to Brian Rolland McGiverin: re 471 Motion for leave to File Sealed Document. (td) (Entered: 01/06/2014)

Case: 1:05-cv-1008 As of: 11/10/2017 11:10 AM CST 37 of 39

01/06/2014 01/07/2014 01/08/2014 01/15/2014 02/06/2014 02/20/2014 02/20/2014 02/25/2014
03/13/2014 03/31/2014 03/31/2014 04/14/2014 04/15/2014
04/29/2014 04/29/2014

473 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE by Raul Meza 471 Motion for leave to File Sealed Document (McGiverin, Brian) (Entered: 01/06/2014)
474 ORDER GRANTING 471 Motion for Leave to File Sealed Document. Signed by Judge Lee Yeakel. (td) (Entered: 01/07/2014)
475 REPLY to Response to Motion, filed by Stuart Jenkins, Brad Livingston, re 465 MOTION to Dismiss Defendants Livingston and Jenkins' Motion to Dismiss for Mootness filed by Defendant Brad Livingston, Defendant Stuart Jenkins (Attachments: # 1 Attachment, # 2 Proposed Order)(Cunniff, Celamaine) (Entered: 01/08/2014)
476 ORDER DISMISSING 466 Motion to Quash. FURTHER ORDERED that this action is STAYED pending order of the court on Defendants Livingston and Jenkins' Motion to Dismiss for Mootness (Clerk's Doc. No. 465 ). Signed by Judge Lee Yeakel. (td) (Entered: 01/15/2014)
477 ORDER, (Status Conference set for 2/20/2014 at 2:00 PM before Judge Lee Yeakel). Signed by Judge Lee Yeakel. (td) (Entered: 02/06/2014)
478 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Lee Yeakel: Status Conference held on 2/20/2014 (Minute entry documents are not available electronically.). (Court Reporter Arlinda Rodriguez.)(td) (Entered: 02/20/2014)
479 NOTICE of Attorney Appearance by Calysta L. Lantiegne on behalf of Stuart Jenkins, Brad Livingston. Attorney Calysta L. Lantiegne added to party Stuart Jenkins(pty:dft), Attorney Calysta L. Lantiegne added to party Brad Livingston(pty:dft) (Lantiegne, Calysta) (Entered: 02/20/2014)
480 ORDERED that Plaintiff Raul Meza' s Motion to Amend the Complaint (Clerk's Doc. No. 470 ) is GRANTED. FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff Raul Meza shall file and serve an amended complaint on or before March 13, 2014, and Defendants Livingston and Jenkins may file and serve a response on or before April 8, 2014. FURTHER ORDER that Defendants Livingston and Jenkins' Motion to Dismiss for Mootness (Clerk's Doc. No. 465 ) is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Signed by Judge Lee Yeakel. (td) (Entered: 02/26/2014)
481 AMENDED COMPLAINT (Fifth) against Raul Meza amending, filed by Raul Meza.(McGiverin, Brian) (Entered: 03/13/2014)
482 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to File Answer re 481 Amended Complaint by Stuart Jenkins, Brad Livingston. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Cunniff, Celamaine) (Entered: 03/31/2014)
483 ORDER GRANTING 482 Motion for Extension of Time to Answer; Stuart Jenkins answer due 4/15/2014; Brad Livingston answer due 4/15/2014. Signed by Judge Lee Yeakel. (td) (Entered: 04/01/2014)
484 Defendants Livingston and Jenkins' Answer to Plaintiff's Fifth Amended Complaint ANSWER to 481 Amended Complaint , COUNTERCLAIM against All Plaintiffs by Stuart Jenkins, Brad Livingston. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Cunniff, Celamaine) (Entered: 04/14/2014)
485 Second MOTION to Dismiss by Stuart Jenkins, Brad Livingston. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A: Affidavit of Jennifer Robinson, # 2 Exhibit B: TDCJ Parole Division Notice of Special Conditions, # 3 Exhibit C: Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles Board Policy #BPP−POL.145.263, # 4 Exhibit D: TDCJ Parole Division Policy and Operating Procedure #PD/POP−3.5.1 "Electronic Monitoring Program", # 5 Exhibit E: TDCJ Parole Division Policy and Operating Procedure #PD/POP−3.6.2 "Sex Offender Program Supervision Guidelines", # 6 Proposed Order)(Cunniff, Celamaine) (Entered: 04/15/2014)
486 Response in Opposition to Motion, filed by Raul Meza, re 485 Second MOTION to Dismiss filed by Defendant Brad Livingston, Defendant Stuart Jenkins (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(McGiverin, Brian) (Entered: 04/29/2014)
487 MOTION to Amend Complaint by Raul Meza. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Proposed Order)(McGiverin, Brian) (Entered: 04/29/2014)

Case: 1:05-cv-1008 As of: 11/10/2017 11:10 AM CST 38 of 39

04/29/2014 05/06/2014 05/06/2014 05/06/2014
05/06/2014 05/12/2014
05/20/2014 05/20/2014 07/02/2014 07/05/2014 07/28/2014 07/29/2014 07/29/2014 08/14/2014 08/15/2014 09/11/2014 09/15/2014 09/26/2014
10/01/2014 10/08/2014

488 MOTION to Continue by Raul Meza. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Proposed Order)(McGiverin, Brian) (Entered: 04/29/2014)
489 RESPONSE to Motion, filed by Stuart Jenkins, Brad Livingston, re 487 MOTION to Amend Complaint filed by Plaintiff Raul Meza (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Cunniff, Celamaine) (Entered: 05/06/2014)
490 RESPONSE to Motion, filed by Stuart Jenkins, Brad Livingston, re 488 MOTION to Continue filed by Plaintiff Raul Meza (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Cunniff, Celamaine) (Entered: 05/06/2014)
491 REPLY to Response to Motion, filed by Stuart Jenkins, Brad Livingston, re 485 Second MOTION to Dismiss filed by Defendant Brad Livingston, Defendant Stuart Jenkins (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Cunniff, Celamaine) (Entered: 05/06/2014)
492 ADVISORY TO THE COURT by Stuart Jenkins, Brad Livingston. (Cunniff, Celamaine) (Entered: 05/06/2014)
493 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply to Defendants' Responses to Motion for Leave to Amend 489 and Motion for Continuance 490 by Raul Meza. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(McGiverin, Brian) Modified on 5/12/2014 to create link (td). (Entered: 05/12/2014)
494 REPLY to Response to Motion, filed by Raul Meza, re 487 MOTION to Amend Complaint filed by Plaintiff Raul Meza (McGiverin, Brian) (Entered: 05/20/2014)
495 REPLY to Response to Motion, filed by Raul Meza, re 488 MOTION to Continue filed by Plaintiff Raul Meza (McGiverin, Brian) (Entered: 05/20/2014)
496 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Lee Yeakel: Conference Call in Chambers held on 7/2/2014 (Minute entry documents are not available electronically.). (Court Reporter Arlinda Rodriguez.)(td) (Entered: 07/03/2014)
497 NOTICE Joint Advisory by Raul Meza (McGiverin, Brian) (Entered: 07/05/2014)
498 Unopposed MOTION to Amend Complaint by Raul Meza. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Proposed Order)(McGiverin, Brian) (Entered: 07/28/2014)
499 ORDER GRANTING 498 Motion to Amend Complaint. Signed by Judge Lee Yeakel. (td) (Entered: 07/29/2014)
500 SIXTH AMENDED COMPLAINT against Stuart Jenkins, Brad Livingston amending 481 Amended Complaint, filed by Raul Meza.(td) (Entered: 07/29/2014)
501 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 500 Amended Complaint by Stuart Jenkins, Brad Livingston. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Cunniff, Celamaine) (Entered: 08/14/2014)
502 ORDER GRANTING 501 Motion for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply to to the Sixth Amended Complaint. Signed by Judge Lee Yeakel. (td) (Entered: 08/15/2014)
503 Defendants Livingston and Jenkins' Answer to Plaintiff's Sixth Amended Complaint ANSWER to 500 Amended Complaint , COUNTERCLAIM against Raul Meza by Stuart Jenkins, Brad Livingston.(Cunniff, Celamaine) (Entered: 09/11/2014)
504 Order for Scheduling Recommendations/Proposed Scheduling Order − due by 9/29/2014. Signed by Judge Lee Yeakel. (td) (Entered: 09/15/2014)
505 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time to File Defendants Livingston and Stuart's Unopposed Motion for Extension of Time for the Parties to Submit a Joint Proposed Scheduling Order by Stuart Jenkins, Brad Livingston. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Cunniff, Celamaine) (Entered: 09/26/2014)
506 ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART 505 Motion for Extension of Time to File. Signed by Judge Lee Yeakel. (dm) (Entered: 10/01/2014)
507 ORDER DISMISSING 485 Motion to Dismiss; GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART 487 Motion to Amend Complaint; DISMISSING 488 Motion to

Case: 1:05-cv-1008 As of: 11/10/2017 11:10 AM CST 39 of 39

10/21/2014 10/27/2014
12/10/2014 01/20/2015 01/21/2015

Continue; DISMISSING 493 Motion for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply. Signed by Judge Lee Yeakel. (td) (Entered: 10/08/2014)
508 Proposed Scheduling Order by Raul Meza. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Agreed Scheduling Order)(McGiverin, Brian) (Entered: 10/21/2014)
509 SCHEDULING ORDER: Final Pretrial Conference set for 7/30/2015 at 11:00 AM before Judge Lee Yeakel, ADR Report Deadline due by 3/13/2015, Discovery due by 3/20/2015, Motions due by 3/27/2015. Signed by Judge Lee Yeakel. (td) (Entered: 10/28/2014)
510 NOTICE of Filing Defendants Livingston and Jenkins' Privilege Log to Plaintiff's Third Request for Production by Stuart Jenkins, Brad Livingston (Cunniff, Celamaine) (Entered: 12/10/2014)
511 NOTICE of Voluntary Dismissal by Raul Meza (McGiverin, Brian) (Entered: 01/20/2015)
512 FINAL JUDGMENT. Signed by Judge Lee Yeakel. (dm) (Entered: 01/21/2015)

 </s> Meza v. Livingston, 607 F.3d 392 (2010)

607 F.3d 392 United States Court of Appeals,
Fifth Circuit.
Raul MEZA, Plaintiff–Appellee–Cross–Appellant, v.
Director Brad LIVINGSTON, Executive director of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, in his official capacity; David Gutierrez; Charles Aycock; Conrith Davis; Jackie Denoyelles; Thomas Leeper; Juanita Gonzalez; Rissie L. Owens; Stuart Jenkins,
Defendants–Appellants–Cross–Appellees.
No. 09–50367. | May 20, 2010.
Synopsis Background: Parolee, who had never been convicted of sex offense, brought action against Texas Department of Criminal Justice and officials, alleging that defendants denied him due process when they imposed and enforced sex-offender conditions as part of mandatory supervision following term of incarceration. The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, Lee Yeakel, J., 623 F.Supp.2d 782, found that procedural protections given to parolee were constitutionally insufficient and ordered that parolee be provided with appropriate hearing. Cross-appeals were taken.
Holdings: The Court of Appeals, W. Eugene Davis, Circuit Judge, held that:
[1] procedure provided by Texas Department of Criminal Justice to parolees who had never been convicted of sex offense and faced possible sex offender registration and therapy violated due process;
[2] parolee subject to imposition and enforcement of sex-offender conditions as part of mandatory supervision was owed hearing meeting due process requirements;
[3] state was not required to provide counsel to parolee facing registration as sex offender and sex therapy as part of mandatory supervision; and
[4] Texas Department of Criminal Justice officials were not entitled to immunity under Eleventh Amendment from parolee’s claim for injunctive relief.

Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded.
Wiener, Circuit Judge, filed opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.
Attorneys and Law Firms
*395 Scott Charles Medlock (argued), James C. Harrington, Texas Civ. Rights Project, Austin, TX, for Meza.
Thomas Matthew Lipovski (argued), Austin, TX, for all Defendants.
Celamine Cunniff, Asst. Atty. Gen., Law Enforcement Defense Div., Austin, TX, for Livingston and Jenkins.
Bruce Russell Garcia, Asst. Atty. Gen., Law Enforcement Defense Div., Austin, TX, for Gutierrez, Aycock, Davis, Denoyelles, Leeper, Gonzalez and Owens.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas.
Before DAVIS, WIENER, and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges.
Opinion
W. EUGENE DAVIS, Circuit Judge:
Texas parolee Raul Meza, who has never been convicted of a sex offense, sued the defendants, all employees of the Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles (“the Board”) and the Texas Department of Criminal Justice—Parole Division (“the Department”), for violations of his right to due process after the defendants attached sex offender conditions to his mandatory supervision. This court has made clear that sex offender conditions may only be imposed on individuals not convicted of a sex offense after the individual has received due process. Coleman v. Dretke, 395 F.3d 216 (5th Cir.2004) (Coleman I), reh’g and en banc denied, 409 F.3d 665 (5th Cir.2005) (Coleman II). Meza alleges that before sex offender conditions were attached to his mandatory supervision, inadequate process was provided. Thus, this case requires us to determine whether the process utilized by the defendants in this case is constitutionally sufficient.
We agree with the district court that the current procedures do not pass constitutional muster. However, we do not agree that Meza is owed all of the process afforded by the district court.
1

Meza v. Livingston, 607 F.3d 392 (2010)

I.

In 1982, Meza pleaded guilty to the murder of a nine-year-old girl and was sentenced to thirty years imprisonment.1 While in prison, Meza was sentenced to an additional four years in prison for possession of a deadly weapon in a penal institution.

1

Meza was convicted of aggravated robbery in 1977 and

was released on parole in 1981. He was out on parole

when he committed the murder in 1982.

In 1993, Meza was released from custody and placed under mandatory supervision.2 In 1994, Meza violated the conditions of his supervision by returning home fifteen minutes after the state-imposed curfew. The State revoked Meza’s mandatory supervision and re-incarcerated him until 2002.

2

At the time Meza was convicted, Texas penal law

provided that a prisoner must be released on mandatory

supervision when the length of his calendar time in

prison plus good-conduct time earned equaled the total

length of his sentence. See 1977 Tex. Gen. Laws 925

(currently embodied in TEX. GOV’T CODE § 508.001,

et seq.). The Board had no discretion in whether Meza

was released on mandatory supervision.

In 2002, Meza was re-released from prison under

mandatory supervision. TEX. GOV’T CODE § 508.0441(a)(2) provides that “Board members and parole commissioners shall determine: ... conditions of parole or mandatory supervision, including special conditions ....”

Using this authority *396 to impose “special conditions,” the Board placed more restrictive conditions on Meza

than it imposed in 1993, including Super Intensive Supervision Program condition,3 Special Condition O.06,4 Special Condition O.99,5 Special Condition M, and Special Condition X. Special Condition X required,

among other things, that Meza participate in sex offender therapy.6 Special Condition M required that Meza register

as a sex offender. Meza was required to register as a sex offender in 2002 when he was released on mandatory supervision. The condition that he register as a sex offender was lifted in April 2005. Today, Meza is no

longer required to register as a sex offender.

3

The Super Intensive Supervision Program condition

requires Meza to live in a community residential

facility for 180 days, comply with the facility rules,

attend educational and vocational training classes, not

go within 500 feet of places where children commonly gather (“child-safety zones”), and wear an electronic-monitoring device at all times.

4

The Special Condition O.06 requires, among other

things, that Meza not enter child-safety zones.

5

The Special Condition O.99 prohibits Meza from

leaving the Travis County Correctional Complex

(“TCCC”) without a supervising parole officer.

6

Under Special Condition X, the Board may require that

the parolee: (1) must participate in the Sex Offender

Therapy Program; (2) cannot participate in programs

that include as participants individuals 17 years of age

or younger; (3) may have no unsupervised contact with

any person 17 years of age or younger; (4) cannot

reside with any person 17 years of age or younger

unless approved in writing by a supervising parole

officer; (5) cannot leave the county of residence

without written permission of a supervising parole

officer; (6) may not date, marry, or engage in a platonic

relationship with any person who has children 17 years

of age or younger unless approved in writing by a

supervising parole officer; (7) must be electronically

monitored; (8) may not enroll in, attend, be employed

by, or volunteer for an institution of higher learning

without Board approval; (9) may not own, maintain, or

operate computer equipment without written

permission of a supervising parole officer; (10) may not

own, maintain, or operate photographic equipment

without written permission of a supervising parole

officer; (11) must notify any prospective employer in

writing regarding criminal history if directed to by a

supervising parole officer; (12) be evaluated to

determine need for sex offender counseling; (13) may

not be employed by or attend any sexually-oriented

business; (14) may not intentionally or knowingly

communicate with the victim or guardian of the victim

of the instant offense; (15) may not participate in any

volunteer activities without prior written approval of a

supervising parole officer; (16) may not view, possess,

or purchase any literature or videos that depict

sexually-explicit images, or communicate through any

telecommunication device for sexually-explicit

purposes; (17) submit to a search of the person, motor

vehicle, residence, and property by a supervising parole

officer; (18) submit to polygraph examinations; and

(19) abide by an established curfew. All of these

conditions were imposed on Meza.

These sex offender conditions were imposed on Meza by 2

Meza v. Livingston, 607 F.3d 392 (2010)

the Board because Meza allegedly sexually assaulted the nine-year-old girl he murdered in 1982. It is unclear from the record how the Board obtained evidence that Meza sexually assaulted his victim in 1982, but it is undisputed that Meza was never convicted of a sexual offense.

Because of the sex offender and other conditions attached to Meza’s mandatory supervision, Meza has been unable

to leave TCCC since his release from prison in 2002, despite the fact that the conditions of his mandatory

supervision only required that he remain at TCCC for 180 days. In order for Meza to leave TCCC, he must arrange for a residence, which, in turn, requires him to secure employment. Thus far, Meza has been unable to secure

*397 employment. Part of the reason Meza alleges that he has been unable to secure employment is because of the conditions imposed on him by the Board. To leave TCCC, Meza must be escorted by a parole officer. The Department controls the availability of parole officers. Between 2002 and 2005, Meza was only allowed to leave

TCCC twice: once for a job interview and once to visit a hospital emergency room. Meza must also obtain

approval for any job prospects from his parole officer. Meza has thus far been denied all job prospects by his parole officer. He was denied one job prospect because of its proximity to a child-safety zone.7 He was denied

another job prospect because he would have to cross a child-safety zone to reach the job site. He was denied another job prospect because it required that Meza have a driver’s license and the Parole Division Director for Meza’s region would not allow Meza to obtain a driver’s license at the time of the application. Meza was not

allowed to apply for one job because the Department would not allow Meza to undergo a urinalysis, as was required in the application process.8

7

The job was a clerical position on the tenth floor of a

downtown office building. The child-safety zone was

located across the street.

8

The reason Meza was not allowed to undergo a

urinalysis was that Meza would have to travel through a

child-safety zone in order to reach the location where

he was to take the urinalysis. Meza’s attorney filed a

complaint with the Department about not allowing

Meza to undergo a urinalysis, but the Department never

responded to the complaint. The Parole Division

Director for Meza’s region testified at trial that he did

not think the complaint needed a response.

In 2004, this court released its opinion in Coleman v. Dretke, 395 F.3d 216 (5th Cir.2004) (Coleman I), reh’g and en banc denied, 409 F.3d 665 (5th Cir.2005)

(Coleman II). Coleman I held that if a defendant is not convicted of a sex offense, the defendant’s parole may only be conditioned on sex offender registration and therapy if the defendant is “afforded a hearing meeting the requirements of due process” in which it is determined that the defendant “constitute[s] a threat to society by reason of his lack of sexual control.” Id. at 225. At the time Coleman I was decided, Meza was required to register as a sex offender and attend sex offender therapy.

In light of Coleman I, the Texas Board developed a procedure for providing due process to individuals who were not convicted of a sex offense but could have sex offender conditions attached to their parole or mandatory supervision under Texas law. Counsel for the Board developed the following process. First, the Board provides written notice to the parolee that his parole or mandatory supervision may be conditioned on sex offender registration and treatment.9 The parolee has thirty days to respond with any written statements or documents to contest imposition of this condition. Upon the parolee’s response (or lack thereof), the Department puts together a packet on the parolee. The packet includes the parolee’s complete parole file, psychological evaluations, polygraph tests, and social, education, employment, and medical histories, etc. Neither the parolee nor any attorney he retains is allowed to see the packet. The Department sends the packet to a panel of the Board. A representative from the Department offers a short presentation (ten to *398 thirty minutes) of the packet and the parolee’s background to the Board. Neither the parolee nor his attorney is allowed to attend the panel’s hearing or present facts or arguments on behalf of the parolee to the panel. After hearing the Department’s presentation and reviewing the packet, the Board votes on whether the parolee’s parole or mandatory supervision should be conditioned on sex offender registration or therapy. The parolee is then notified of whether sex offender registration or therapy is required. The panel does not produce any written findings or inform the parolee of the facts on which the Board based its decision. The parolee may not appeal the Board’s decision.

9

At oral argument, the defendants stated that the initial

recommendation that sex offender conditions should be

imposed on an individual’s parole or mandatory

supervision is made by the parole officer. There is no

requirement that there be evidence of past or present

sexual deviancy in order for the parole officer to make

this initial recommendation.

In February 2005, Meza received notice that his mandatory supervision might be conditioned on sex offender registration and therapy. Meza was given thirty
3

Meza v. Livingston, 607 F.3d 392 (2010)
days to submit a statement or documentation to contest the imposition of sex offender conditions. He did not submit any statement or documentation. After reviewing Meza’s packet as prepared by the Department, the Board panel conditioned his mandatory supervision conditioned on sex offender registration and therapy. The Board subsequently notified Meza of its decision.
In 2005, Meza brought this § 1983 action for injunction against members of the Department and a number of individual parole officers in their official capacities (collectively, “the defendants”). The suit sought to enjoin the defendants from imposing sex offender conditions without due process and from continuing to subject him to qualitatively different conditions of confinement without due process. Meza also alleged violations of his Fourteenth Amendment equal protection rights. Finally, Meza sought attorney’s fees and costs.
The district court found that Coleman I required that a parolee such as Meza who was not convicted of a sex crime receive procedural due process before any sex offender condition could be imposed. The district court found that the procedural protections given to Meza by the Board were constitutionally insufficient and delineated the minimum due process Meza was entitled to receive as follows:
(1) written notice in advance of the hearing; (2) disclosure of the evidence on which the State is relying; (3) a hearing, scheduled sufficiently after the notice to permit Meza to prepare, at which he will have the opportunity to be heard in person, represented by counsel, and to present documentary evidence in his support; (4) an opportunity at the hearing to call witnesses and confront and cross examine State witnesses, “except upon a finding, not arbitrarily made, of good cause for not permitting each as to a particular witness”; (5) an independent decision maker; and (6) a written statement by the fact-finder as to the evidence relied upon and the reasons for the decision.
Meza v. Livingston, 623 F.Supp.2d 782, 796 (W.D.Tex.2009) (citation omitted). Because the Board failed to provide Meza with that level of process, the district court ordered the Board to provide Meza with an appropriate hearing consistent with its guidelines before imposing sex offender conditions on his parole. The district court dismissed without prejudice Meza’s remaining claims, awarded Meza costs for the prosecution of his case, and dismissed the defendants’ motion for summary judgment.
The defendants timely appealed the district court’s order. Meza also timely filed a cross-appeal.

We review the constitutional issues presented in these appeals de novo, United States v. Locke, 482 F.3d 764, 766–67 (5th Cir.2007) (citations omitted), and the grant *399 of an injunction for abuse of discretion, Lake Charles Diesel, Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 328 F.3d 192, 195 (5th Cir.2003) (footnote omitted).
II.
Procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution is implicated where an individual is deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 3. The Supreme Court has adopted a two-step analysis to examine whether an individual’s procedural due process rights have been violated. The first question “asks whether there exists a liberty or property interest which has been interfered with by the State; the second examines whether the procedures attendant upon that deprivation were constitutionally sufficient.” Kentucky Dept. of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460, 109 S.Ct. 1904, 104 L.Ed.2d 506 (1989) (citations omitted).
A.
The district court held that an individual has a liberty interest such that due process is implicated when there is “any State sex-offender condition imposed on a parolee who has not been convicted of a sex crime.” Meza, 623 F.Supp.2d at 792. The defendants do not dispute that Meza has a liberty interest in being free from sex offender registration and therapy, but they maintain that Meza does not have a liberty interest in being free from the other conditions that the Board may attach to his mandatory supervision under Special Condition X. Additionally, the defendants argue that sex offender registration is not at issue in this case because Meza was only required to register as a sex offender from 2002 to 2005; he is no longer required to register as a sex offender.
Meza counters that the Board misreads the district court’s opinion as finding a liberty interest in all sex offender conditions that may be imposed under Special Condition X. Instead, Meza argues that the only sex offender conditions in which he has a liberty interest are those which require that he (1) participate in a sex offender treatment program, (2) be evaluated for sex offender counseling, (3) submit to polygraph examinations, and (4)
4

Meza v. Livingston, 607 F.3d 392 (2010)
be labeled as a sex offender. Meza also disagrees with the defendants’ position that sex offender registration is not at issue. According to Meza’s attorney at oral arguments, “the parole office considers Meza to be a sex offender .... The Department tells Mr. Meza’s potential employers that he is a sex offender.” Thus, Meza asserts that while he currently is not required to put his name on the sex offender registry, the Department continues to operate as if his name were on the sex offender registry.
As an initial matter, we agree with Meza that sex offender registration is a condition at issue in this case. We reach this conclusion for two reasons. First, it is impossible for the defendants to un-ring the bell that was rung when Meza was required to register as a sex offender. The stigma that attached to Meza when he was required to register remains, regardless of whether his name is currently on a sex offender registry. See Coleman II, 409 F.3d at 668 (“The stigma aspect of the case is thus not mooted by the state’s decision to remove Coleman from its sex offender registry.”). The stigmatizing effects of registering as a sex offender still follow Meza and are reinforced by the Department when it continues to tell Meza’s potential employers that he is a sex offender.
[1] Second, sex offender registration is of concern in this case because “a defendant’s *400 voluntary cessation of a challenged practice does not deprive a federal court of its power to determine the legality of the practice,” even in cases in which injunctive relief is sought. City of Mesquite v. Aladdin’s Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283, 289, 102 S.Ct. 1070, 71 L.Ed.2d 152 (1982); accord Northeastern Fla. Chapter of Assoc. Gen Contractors of Am. v. City of Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 661–62, 113 S.Ct. 2297, 124 L.Ed.2d 586 (1993); Cooper v. McBeath, 11 F.3d 547, 550–51 (5th Cir.1994); Resident Council of Allen Parkway Village v. United States Dep’t of Housing & Urban Dev., 980 F.2d 1043, 1048 (5th Cir.1993). It is clear that the alleged wrongful behavior of the Board—requiring Meza to register as a sex offender without due process of law—could recur to Meza if his mandatory supervision is revoked again. Moreover, at trial, an Administrator for the Board testified that as many as 6,900 current inmates are subject to have sex offender conditions, including sex offender registration, imposed upon them in the future, despite the fact that they have not been convicted of a sex crime. Thus, the Board may continue to use the same procedures for these 6,900 inmates that Meza complains of in this case. If the Board removes the registration requirement before the court can review the adequacy of the process, the Board’s practice will remain in effect and evade court review.
Having determined that sex offender registration and

therapy are at issue in this case, we find it is unnecessary to examine whether Meza has a liberty interest in any of the other sex offender conditions. Meza alleges he has a liberty interest in being required to (1) participate in a sex offender treatment program, (2) be evaluated for sex offender counseling, (3) submit to polygraph examinations, and (4) be labeled as a sex offender. Based on the Department’s Policy and Operating Procedure entitled “Sex Offender Treatment and Polygraph Examination Guidelines” that was submitted into evidence, as well as the Coleman I court’s description of sex offender therapy, see 395 F.3d at 224, being evaluated for sex offender counseling and submitting to polygraph examinations may be considered part of sex offender treatment. Thus, the conditions complained of by Meza fall into two categories: sex offender registration and sex offender counseling. As these are the only sex offender conditions that Meza asserts he may have a liberty interest in, we find it unnecessary to determine what, if any, liberty interest Meza may have in the other conditions attached to his mandatory supervision.
This court’s ruling in Coleman I guides our decision of whether Meza has a liberty interest in sex offender registration and therapy. In Coleman I, the defendant was convicted of burglary in 1986. He was released on parole in 1991. While on parole, the defendant was indicted for aggravated sexual assault of a child and indecency with a child by contact. The defendant pleaded guilty to and was convicted of misdemeanor assault. He was never convicted of any sex offense. Thereafter, the defendant’s parole was revoked and he was reincarcerated.
In January 2001, the Coleman I defendant was released on mandatory supervision. In February 2001, the parole panel imposed two requirements on the defendant’s parole: first, he had to register as a sex offender, and second, he had to attend sex offender therapy. The defendant was not given advance notice of the hearing in which the parole panel imposed these requirements. The defendant registered as a sex offender, but did not attend sex offender therapy. Because the defendant violated the terms of his parole, his parole was revoked in July 2001.
*401 The defendant challenged his parole revocation in a habeas petition, alleging a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Relying primarily on Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 100 S.Ct. 1254, 63 L.Ed.2d 552 (1980), we held that “prisoners who have not been convicted of a sex offense have a liberty interest created by the Due Process Clause in freedom from sex offender classification and conditions.” Coleman I, 395 F.3d at 222. The court found a liberty interest existed because sex offender registration and therapy were highly
5

Meza v. Livingston, 607 F.3d 392 (2010)
stigmatizing and invasive conditions that were “qualitatively different” from other conditions regularly attached to parole. Id. at 223. Because the State admitted it provided the defendant with no procedural protections, this court found that the defendant’s due process rights were violated. We noted, however, that the State was “not precluded from further efforts to add these same conditions to [the defendant’s] parole upon proper notice ....” Id. at 225.
[2] Based on Coleman I, it is clear that Meza had a liberty interest in being free from being required to register as a sex offender and participate in sex offender therapy. Other circuits have reached this same conclusion. E.g., Gwinn v. Awmiller, 354 F.3d 1211, 1217 (10th Cir.2004); Kirby v. Siegelman, 195 F.3d 1285, 1291–92 (11th Cir.1999); Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818, 829–30 (9th Cir.1997).10 10 The Eighth Circuit found that under a particular
Minnesota statute no due process is required to impose sex offender conditions on an individual’s probation, despite the fact that the individual has not been convicted of a sex offense. See Gunderson v. Hvass, 339 F.3d 639, 644–45 (8th Cir.2003). Minnesota statute § 243.166 provides that a “person shall register [as a sex offender] if ... the person was charged with ... and convicted of [criminal sexual conduct under section 609.342] or another offense arising out of the same set of circumstances.” In Gunderson, the alleged sex offender was originally charged with sexual assault, but negotiated a plea agreement for third degree assault. The Eighth Circuit found that because the third degree assault conviction arose from the same set of circumstances as the alleged sexual assault, the alleged sex offender met the statutory criteria for being required to register as a sex offender.
We see no indication the Eighth Circuit would reach this result in Meza’s case because Texas does not have a statute similar to the Minnesota statute. Even if Texas did have a similar statute, Meza was not charged with or convicted of a sex offense so the State could not prove that he was charged with a non-sex offense that arose out of the same set of circumstances as a sex offense.
B.
Given that Meza has a liberty interest in being free from sex offender registration and therapy, we now examine whether the procedures provided by the defendants to Meza were constitutionally sufficient. Thompson, 490 U.S. at 460, 109 S.Ct. 1904 (citations omitted).

[3] [4] [5] When an individual is convicted of a sex offense, no further process is due before imposing sex offender conditions. See Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 7–8, 123 S.Ct. 1160, 155 L.Ed.2d 98 (2003); Jennings v. Owens, 602 F.3d 652 (5th Cir.2010). The individual “convicted of a sex crime in a prior adversarial setting, whether as the result of a bench trial, jury trial, or plea agreement, has received the minimum protections required by due process.” Neal, 131 F.3d at 831. Meza, however, was not convicted of a sex offense, and he neither stipulated nor judicially admitted that he sexually assaulted his murder victim in 1982.11 Thus, under *402 our cases, he is owed procedural due process before sex offender conditions may attach. See Coleman I, 395 F.3d at 221.
11 According to the joint agreed stipulated facts, Meza only admitted that he sexually assaulted his victim as part of his sex offender treatment. According to Meza’s attorney at oral argument, Meza was required to make this admission as part of his treatment. Meza’s attorney stated, “If Mr. Meza did not make that admission during the sex offender treatment, his parole would have been revoked and he would have been returned to prison for refusing to take part in the treatment process.” The State did not dispute this statement.
[6] Thus far, the previously described procedure provided by the Board is the only process Meza has received. To determine whether this process meets constitutional muster, we rely on the balancing test in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976). The Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test offers three distinct factors for a court to weigh in considering whether the procedural due process provided is adequate:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedure used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.
Id. at 335, 96 S.Ct. 893 (citation omitted).
[7] The first factor is the private interest affected. “Courts are in agreement that imposing a sex offender registration requirement and treatment affects a substantial right,
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Meza v. Livingston, 607 F.3d 392 (2010)
because it compels a serious deprivation of liberty and creates stigmatizing consequences.” United States v. Jimenez, 275 Fed.Appx. 433, 442 (5th Cir.2008) (citing Coleman II, 409 F.3d at 668; Neal, 131 F.3d at 829) (unpublished). “We can hardly conceive of a state’s action bearing more ‘stigmatizing consequences’ than the labeling of a prison inmate as a sex offender.” Neal, 131 F.3d at 829 (9th Cir.1997). Based on cases from this court and other circuits, we are convinced that Meza has a significant interest in being free from sex offender registration.
The defendants seek to minimize any interest Meza has in being free from sex offender therapy. In Coleman II, this court equated the consequences of being required to attend sex offender therapy with the consequences of being required to register as a sex offender. “[B]y requiring [a parolee] to attend sex offender therapy, the state label[s] him a sex offender—a label which strongly implies that [the parolee] has been convicted of a sex offense and which can undoubtedly cause ‘adverse social consequences.’ ” Coleman II, 409 F.3d at 668 (quoting Vitek, 445 U.S. at 492, 100 S.Ct. 1254). The consequences of attending sex offender therapy, combined with the highly invasive nature of the therapy,12 leave us no doubt that Meza also had a significant interest in being free from sex offender therapy.
12 Meza has undergone sex offender therapy similar to the therapy prescribed for the parolee in Coleman I. The Coleman I court described sex offender therapy as follows: “[S]ex offender treatment is different than traditional psychotherapy in that treatment is mandated, confrontational, structured, victim centered, focused on behaviors, and confidentiality is not maintained.” Treatment can include “interventions with psychopharmacological agents,” polygraph exams to determine sexual history, and use of penile plethysmographs to “modify deviant sexual arousal and enhance appropriate sexual arousal.” Id. at 224 (quoting the Council for Sex Offender Treatment’s website); accord Jennings, 602 F.3d at 658 n. 8,.
The second factor is the risk of erroneous deprivation. Under the current Texas system there is a high risk that the Board *403 will make erroneous findings because the parolee is kept in the dark about the evidence being considered by the Board in reaching its decision. Critically, the parolee has no opportunity to correct errors in the packet provided to the Board. Damning information may incorrectly be placed in the wrong parolee’s packet. Facts may be erroneously or unfairly slanted against the

parolee. Under the current procedure, the parolee has no opportunity to correct false information or provide an explanation for any adverse information. Neither the parolee nor his attorney may even see the completed evidentiary packet on which the Board bases its decision of whether to require the parolee to register as a sex offender and attend sex offender therapy. At trial, it was estimated that there are currently 6,900 prisoners who will potentially need to receive Coleman notice upon their release. In compiling 6,900 parolee packets, human error will inevitably occur and parolees may be falsely accused of sexually-deviant behavior. By simply granting the parolee the right to review his packet, such human errors could be avoided. For this reason, the current Texas system creates a high risk of erroneous deprivation.
The third factor that we must weigh in the balancing test is the Government’s interest. Undoubtedly the State has a significant interest in rehabilitating sex offenders prior to their reentry into society, as well as monitoring sex offenders while on parole. See McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 32–33, 122 S.Ct. 2017, 153 L.Ed.2d 47 (2002). Also, the State certainly has an interest in keeping the costs of providing notice to individuals like Meza as low as constitutionally permissible. The Board Administrator who predicted at trial that 6,900 offenders currently incarcerated may at some point require notice pursuant to Coleman I also estimated that to provide these offenders with the process afforded in parole revocation hearings could cost $750,000. Therefore, requiring more procedural protections would cause the State to incur significant additional costs.
Taking the Mathews v. Eldridge factors into consideration, we conclude that the current procedure provided to parolees who have never been convicted of a sex offense and who face possible sex offender registration and therapy is constitutionally insufficient. While the State has a significant interest in avoiding additional costs, Meza’s liberty interest in being free from the stigma of registering as a sex offender and avoiding highly invasive sex offender therapy is palpable. When balancing these significant interests with the likelihood of erroneous decision-making, we are convinced that the current procedure is unconstitutional. The grave risk of error that envelops the procedures used by the Board is most troubling. By not allowing the parolee to review the evidence presented against him, he is unable to correct any misinformation placed in his packet that the Board reviews. By not allowing the parolee to appear before the Board, the Board must act without mitigating or clarifying evidence from the parolee. By not allowing the parolee to confront opposing witnesses, the parolee is unable to refute damning statements made against his interest and
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Meza v. Livingston, 607 F.3d 392 (2010)
the Board is unable to evaluate the credibility of the parolee against that of opposing witnesses.
In sum, after weighing the factors of Mathews v. Eldridge, we find that the current Texas procedure for providing parolees with their Coleman notice does not meet the constitutional requirements for procedural due process.
III.
Having determined that the process afforded to Meza is constitutionally insufficient, *404 we must now determine what process is required.
[8] “[D]ue process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.” Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972). “ ‘[P]rocess’ is not a term with a clear definition and the nature of the procedure required to comply with the due process clause depends on many factors concerning the individual deprivation.” RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 17.7 (4th ed.2008). The Supreme Court has afforded a broad spectrum of process depending on the deprivation at issue. To determine the amount of process due in this case, we first examine similar Supreme Court cases involving the deprivation of rights of prisoners and parolees.
A.
In 1972, the Supreme Court issued the landmark decision Morrissey v. Brewer, in which the Court determined that parolees had a liberty interest in avoiding parole revocation. Having found that a liberty interest was present, the Court then decided the minimum process owed to a parolee before parole may be revoked. The Court held that a parolee was owed, at a minimum:
(a) written notice of the claimed violations of parole; (b) disclosure to the parolee of evidence against him; (c) opportunity to be heard in person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence; (d) the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the hearing officer specifically finds

good cause for not allowing confrontation); (e) a “neutral and detached” hearing body such as a traditional parole board, members of which need not be judicial officers or lawyers; and (f) a written statement by the factfinders as to the evidence relied on and reasons for revoking parole.
Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 489, 92 S.Ct. 2593. The Court specifically did “not reach or decide the question of whether the parolee is entitled to the assistance of retained counsel or to appointed counsel if he is indigent.” Id.13
13 The following year, in Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 93 S.Ct. 1756, 36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973), the Court found that the right to counsel in parole revocation hearings must be made on a case-by-case basis. The Gagnon Court stated: [T]he decision as to the need for counsel must be made on a case-by-case basis in the exercise of a sound discretion by the state authority charged with responsibility for administering the probation and parole system. Although the presence and participation of counsel will probably be both undesirable and constitutionally unnecessary in most revocation hearings, there will remain certain cases in which fundamental fairness—the touchstone of due process—will require that the State provide at its expense counsel for indigent probationers or parolees. Id. at 790, 93 S.Ct. 1756.
Two years after Morrissey, in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974), the Court examined the procedural due process protections owed to an inmate in prison disciplinary proceedings that could result in the loss of the inmate’s good-time credits. The Court held that the inmate was owed: (1) written notice of the claimed violation that enables the inmate to marshal the facts and prepare a defense; (2) an opportunity “to call witnesses and present documentary evidence in his defense when permitting him to do so will not be unduly hazardous to institutional safety or correctional goals”; and (3) a “written statement by the factfinders as to the evidence relied on and reasons *405 for the disciplinary action.” Id. at 563–66, 94 S.Ct. 2963. The Court also recognized that the committee that conducted the prisoner disciplinary proceedings was sufficiently impartial, implying that such impartiality was a requirement of due process. Id. at 570–71, 94 S.Ct. 2963. Finally, the Wolff Court found that an inmate was not entitled to confront and cross-examine witnesses and did not “have a right to either retained or appointed counsel.” Id. at 567–70, 94 S.Ct. 2963.
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Meza v. Livingston, 607 F.3d 392 (2010)
Thus, the Wolff Court found that inmates facing a possible loss of good-time credits were owed less process than parolees facing a possible revocation of parole; specifically, inmates were not entitled to confront and cross-examine witnesses, while parolees in Morrissey were entitled to this procedural protection. Also, Wolff afforded inmates no absolute right to present testimony or other evidence that would compromise safety and correctional goals. In finding that parolees and inmates were not owed the same process, the Wolff Court noted that “one cannot automatically apply procedural rules designed for free citizens in an open society, or for parolees or probationers under only limited restraints, to the very different situation presented by a disciplinary proceeding in a state prison.” Id. at 560, 94 S.Ct. 2963. Justice White, writing for the majority, distinguished the revocation of parole—the deprivation at issue in Morrissey—from the loss of good-time credits—the deprivation at issue in Wolff—by stating:
Revocation of parole may deprive the parolee of only conditional liberty, but it nevertheless “inflicts a ‘grievous loss’ on the parolee and often on others.” Simply put, revocation proceedings determine whether the parolee will be free or in prison, a matter of obvious great moment to him. For the prison inmate, the deprivation of good time is not the same immediate disaster that the revocation of parole is for the parolee. The deprivation, very likely, does not then and there work any change in the conditions of his liberty .... The deprivation of good time is unquestionably a matter of considerable importance. The State reserves it as a sanction for serious misconduct, and we should not unrealistically discount its significance. But it is qualitatively and quantitatively different from the revocation of parole or probation.
In striking the balance that the Due Process Clause demands, however, we think the major consideration militating against adopting the full range of procedures suggested by Morrissey for alleged parole violators is the very different stake the State has in the structure and content of the prison disciplinary hearing. That the revocation of parole be justified and based on an accurate assessment of the facts is a critical matter to the State as well as the parolee; but the procedures by which it is determined whether the conditions of parole have been breached do not themselves threaten other important state interests, parole officers, the police, or witnesses—at least no more so than in the case of the ordinary criminal trial. Prison disciplinary proceedings, on the other hand, take place in a closed, tightly controlled environment peopled by those who have chosen to violate the criminal law and who have been

lawfully incarcerated for doing so. Some are first offenders, but many are recidivists who have repeatedly employed illegal and often very violent means to attain their ends. They may have little regard for the safety of others or their property or for the rules designed to provide an orderly and reasonably safe prison life. Although there are very many varieties of prisons with different degrees of security, we must *406 realize that in many of them the inmates are closely supervised and their activities controlled around the clock. Guards and inmates co-exist in direct and intimate contact. Tension between them is unremitting. Frustration, resentment, and despair are commonplace. Relationships among the inmates are varied and complex and perhaps subject to the unwritten code that exhorts inmates not to inform on a fellow prisoner.
Id. at 560–62, 94 S.Ct. 2963 (citations omitted). In discussing why inmates in particular were not owed the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses, but parolees were extended that protection, the Court said:

Confrontation

and

cross-examination present greater

hazards to institutional interests. If

confrontation

and

cross-examination of those

furnishing evidence against the

inmate were to be allowed as a

matter of course, as in criminal

trials, there would be considerable potential for havoc inside the prison walls. Proceedings would inevitably be longer and tend to unmanageability. These procedures are essential in criminal trials where the accused, if found guilty,

may be subjected to the most

serious deprivations, Pointer v.

Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 85 S.Ct. 1065,

13 L.Ed.2d 923 (1965), or where a

person may lose his job in society, Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496–97, 79 S.Ct. 1400, 3 L.Ed.2d 1377 (1959).

Id. at 567, 94 S.Ct. 2963.

Five years after Wolff, the Court was again called upon to determine the amount of procedural due process owed to inmates. In Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 99 S.Ct. 2100, 60 L.Ed.2d 668 (1979), the Court answered the question of how much due process was owed to inmates when they become eligible
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Meza v. Livingston, 607 F.3d 392 (2010)
for parole and the Board must make the purely discretionary call of granting or denying parole. The Court stated that “[p]rocedures designed to elicit specific facts, such as those required in Morrissey ... and Wolff, are not necessarily appropriate to a ... parole determination.” Id. at 14, 99 S.Ct. 2100. The Court found that Nebraska’s scheme of providing the inmate with an informal process in which the Board of Pardons and Paroles was able to interview the inmate met constitutional scrutiny:
At the Board’s initial interview hearing, the inmate is permitted to appear before the Board and present letters and statements on his own behalf. He is thereby provided with an effective opportunity first, to insure that the records before the Board are in fact the records relating to his case; and second, to present any special considerations demonstrating why he is an appropriate candidate for parole. Since the decision is one that must be made largely on the basis of the inmate’s files, this procedure adequately safeguards against serious risks of error and thus satisfies due process.
Id. at 15, 99 S.Ct. 2100. The Court found that the Parole Board was not required to provide a formal hearing or “to specify the particular ‘evidence’ in the inmate’s file or at his interview on which it rest[ed] the discretionary determination” on, because such would “provide at best a negligible decrease in the risk of error.” Id. at 14–16, 99 S.Ct. 2100.
The Court again assessed the amount of process due to another class of inmates the following year in Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 100 S.Ct. 1254, 63 L.Ed.2d 552 (1980). In Vitek, a Nebraska statute allowed for an inmate to be involuntarily transferred to a mental hospital after a physician found that the inmate suffered from a mental disease or defect and could not be given proper treatment in the prison. Id. at 483, 100 S.Ct. 1254. Before being *407 transferred under the Nebraska statute, prisoners were provided with no process to contest the transfer. The prisoner in Vitek challenged the constitutionality of the statute, arguing that he had a liberty interest implicating the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in not being transferred to a mental hospital.
The Vitek Court agreed that the prisoner had a liberty interest, stating that “the stigmatizing consequences of a

transfer to a mental hospital for involuntary psychiatric treatment, coupled with the subjection of the prisoner to mandatory behavior modification as a treatment for mental illness, constitute the kind of deprivations of liberty that requires procedural protections.” Id. at 494, 100 S.Ct. 1254. Upon reaching that conclusion, the Court found that the prisoner was owed the following process before he could be transferred to a mental hospital: (1) written notice that a transfer to a mental hospital was being considered; (2) a hearing, sufficiently after the notice, at which disclosure to the prisoner was made of the evidence being relied upon and at which an opportunity to be heard in person and to present documentary evidence was given; (3) an opportunity at the hearing to present testimony of witnesses by the defense and to confront and cross-examine witnesses called, unless good cause was shown for why such confrontation and cross-examination should not be permitted; (4) an independent decision maker; (5) a written statement by the fact finder as to the evidence relied on and the reasons for action; (6) the availability of qualified and independent assistance, which may be an attorney, but need not be; and (7) effective and timely notice of all the foregoing rights. Id. at 494–95, 100 S.Ct. 1254 (majority opinion), 445 U.S. at 499–500, 100 S.Ct. 1254 (Powell, J., concurring). Thus, except for the right to counsel, the Vitek Court granted the inmate facing involuntary transfer to and confinement in a mental hospital the full panoply of due process rights available to a defendant facing a criminal trial. This exceeded the process allowed the inmate seeking discretionary parole in Greenholtz, the inmate facing the loss of good-time credits in Wolff, and even the parolee facing possible parole revocation in Morrissey.
Four of the Justices were persuaded that the inmate in Vitek had a right to counsel. Writing for the plurality, Justice White stated:
The District Court did go beyond the requirements imposed by prior cases by holding that counsel must be made available to inmates facing transfer hearings if they are financially unable to furnish their own. We have not required the automatic appointment of counsel for indigent prisoners facing other deprivations of liberty, but we have recognized that prisoners who are illiterate and uneducated have a greater need for assistance in exercising their rights. A prisoner thought to be suffering from a
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Meza v. Livingston, 607 F.3d 392 (2010)
mental disease or defect requiring involuntary treatment probably has an even greater need for legal assistance, for such a prisoner is more likely to be unable to understand or exercise his rights. In these circumstances, it is appropriate that counsel be provided to indigent prisoners whom the State seeks to treat as mentally ill.
445 U.S. at 496–97, 100 S.Ct. 1254 (citations omitted). The majority, however, did not hold that an inmate facing involuntary mental institution had a right to counsel. Instead, the majority found that due process was satisfied by providing the inmate the assistance of a “qualified and independent adviser who is not a lawyer.” Id. at 499, 100 S.Ct. 1254 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell, in his concurrence, wrote:
*408 I do not believe, however, that an inmate must always be supplied with a licensed attorney .... “Due Process has never been thought to require that the neutral and detached trier of fact be law trained or a judicial or administrative officer.” Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 607, 99 S.Ct. 2493, 61 L.Ed.2d 101 (1979). In that case, we held that due process is satisfied when a staff physician determines whether a child may be voluntarily committed to a state mental institution by his parents. That holding was based upon recognition that the issues of civil commitment “are essentially medical in nature,” and that “ ‘neither judges nor administrative hearing officers are better qualified than psychiatrists to render psychiatric judgments.’ ” Id., at 607, 609, 99 S.Ct. 2493, quoting In re Roger S., 19 Cal.3d 921, 942, 141 Cal.Rptr. 298, 569 P.2d 1286, 1299 (1977) (Clark, J., dissenting).
In my view, the principle that due process does not always require a law-trained decisionmaker supports the ancillary conclusion that due process may be satisfied by the provision of a qualified and independent adviser who is not a lawyer.
Id. (citations omitted). The Vitek Court ultimately adopted Justice Powell’s position and only afforded the inmate the assistance of a qualified and independent advisor. Id. at 497, 100 S.Ct. 1254 (majority opinion).
Reading these four principal procedural due process cases clarifies the spectrum of due process rights that the Court has developed. On one end of the spectrum is the consideration of discretionary parole in Greenholtz in which the Court afforded minimal due process consisting

essentially of an interview of the inmate who has an opportunity to verify that the Board has his correct file before it. In Wolff, when faced with the deprivation of good-time credits, the Court granted the inmate slightly more procedural protections, including notice of the violation and a limited right to present evidence at a hearing if safety and correctional goals of the institution are not compromised. The Court found that even more process was owed in Morrissey when the deprivation at issue concerned parole revocation. And finally, in Vitek, except for the right to counsel, the Court determined that the full panoply of due process was required before involuntarily transferring a prisoner to a mental institution.
The Court has crafted this spectrum based on the specific factors surrounding the deprivation at issue. When deprivation of the liberty interest leads to stigmatizing and physically-invasive consequences, the Court grants greater procedural protections, as it did in Vitek. See Wolff, 418 U.S. at 565–66, 94 S.Ct. 2963. However, where the rights of inmates are implicated, when providing additional process creates security risks or provides a negligible decrease to the risk of error, the Court is less willing to afford additional process. See id. at 562, 94 S.Ct. 2963 (discussing security risks); Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 14, 99 S.Ct. 2100 (discussing risk of error). If the deprivation of liberty will cause certain, immediate adverse consequences to the parolee or prisoner, the Court provides more due process than when the deprivation of liberty is uncertain and may occur at a later date. See Wolff, 418 U.S. at 560–61, 94 S.Ct. 2963. Because fewer security concerns are at issue and the liberty deprivations are more immediate and certain, the Court generally finds that parolees are owed more process than inmates. See id. at 560, 94 S.Ct. 2963; Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 489, 92 S.Ct. 2593.
*409 B.
With this range of possible due process protections in mind, we must now determine where on the spectrum Meza falls.
In evaluating this spectrum, we begin by concluding that the lowest level of due process provided by the above discussed cases, the Greenholtz standard, to be inapplicable in this case because of the distinction between the liberty deprivations at issue. In Greenholtz, the Court considered the process due for resolving an inmate’s claim to parole—a purely discretionary call by the Board. Meza, on the other hand, is entitled under
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Meza v. Livingston, 607 F.3d 392 (2010)
Texas law to be released under mandatory supervision in 2002. If Meza failed to register as a sex offender between 2002 and 2005, or does not participate in sex offender therapy currently, he will immediately lose the mandatory supervision that Texas law requires he receive.
Furthermore, the nature of the rights at issue makes the instant case distinguishable from Greenholtz. Registering as a sex offender and participating in sex offender therapy is highly stigmatizing and invasive. Being denied discretionary parole is neither stigmatizing nor invasive. Therefore, because of the differing nature of the rights, we find that the Greenholtz standard is inapplicable in this case.
Having found the Greenholtz standard inapplicable, we next examine the liberty deprivation at issue in Wolff. While there are numerous differences between the loss of good-time credits and the imposition of sex offender conditions, there are also similarities. In Wolff, prisoners were entitled to receive good-time credits, see Wolff, 418 U.S. at 545 n. 6, 94 S.Ct. 2963, just as Meza was entitled to be released on mandatory supervision. Thus, revoking a prisoner’s good-time credits and imposing sex offender conditions on parole both have the effect of inhibiting a liberty interest to which the inmate or parolee is entitled.
[9] If Meza were an inmate instead of a parolee, the Wolff standard would likely apply. Two circuits have so held. See Gwinn, 354 F.3d at 1219; Neal, 131 F.3d at 831. Meza can claim at least the same process of an inmate, but as a parolee, he should generally be entitled to more favorable treatment than inmates. See Wolff, 418 U.S. at 560–62, 94 S.Ct. 2963. Applying Wolff, we find that Meza is owed, at a minimum: (1) written notice that sex offender conditions may be imposed as a condition of his mandatory supervision, (2) disclosure of the evidence being presented against Meza to enable him to marshal the facts asserted against him and prepare a defense, (3) a hearing at which Meza is permitted to be heard in person, present documentary evidence, and call witnesses, (4) an impartial decision maker, and (5) a written statement by the factfinder as to the evidence relied on and the reasons it attached sex offender conditions to his mandatory supervision.14
14 We note that the Board already provides parolees with written notice that sex offender conditions may be imposed as a condition of parole. Similarly, the decision to impose sex offender conditions is currently made by the Board, an impartial decision maker. The other requirements listed here, however, are not currently part of the Board’s procedures.

We are persuaded that Meza is owed at least these protections because under the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test, these additional procedural protections help create a constitutionally-permissible system. Disclosing to Meza the evidence to be used against him greatly decreases the possibility that the Board will rely on incorrect information inadvertently placed in Meza’s packet. Allowing Meza to be heard in person decreases the possibility that the Board will misinterpret any information *410 provided in the packet. Further, it provides the Board with the opportunity to evaluate Meza’s credibility in resolving any factual disputes and allows an exchange between the Board and Meza such that the Board can consider mitigating information and evaluate Meza as a person. Providing a written statement as to the evidence relied upon by the Board promotes fairness in the process; “the provision for a written record helps to insure that administrators, faced with possible scrutiny by state officials and the public, and perhaps even the courts, where fundamental constitutional rights may have been abridged, will act fairly.” Wolff, 418 U.S. at 565, 94 S.Ct. 2963.
It is true that these additional due process requirements will increase costs to the State, but these increased costs are outweighed by the serious deprivation to a parolee unjustly required to register as a sex offender or participate in sex offender therapy. Moreover, we do not find the additional costs imposed on the State to be overly burdensome given that these are the same protections the State is constitutionally required to provide to inmates facing the possible loss of good-time credits. The loss of good-time credits, as Justice White articulated, is a significant loss, but it is less significant than requiring a parolee to register as a sex offender or attend sex offender therapy. “We can hardly conceive of a state’s action bearing more ‘stigmatizing consequences’ than the labeling of a prison inmate as a sex offender.” Coleman I, 395 F.3d at 223 n. 27 (citing Neal, 131 F.3d at 829). Because Meza’s interest in being free from sex offender conditions is greater than an inmate’s interest in good-time credits, Meza is owed, at a minimum, the same process due to inmates under Wolff.
In addition to the procedural protections discussed above, the district court also granted two additional due process rights that were not granted to inmates in Wolff: (1) the right to confront and cross-examine the State’s witnesses unless good cause is shown and (2) the right to counsel. We examine each of these due process rights to determine whether they should be afforded to Meza.
[10] In Morrissey, when faced with the issue of parole revocation, the Court granted the parolee the right to
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Meza v. Livingston, 607 F.3d 392 (2010)
confront and cross-examine witnesses, unless good cause was shown for why the parolee should not be allowed this procedural protection. 408 U.S. at 489, 92 S.Ct. 2593. The Wolff Court, however, denied inmates this right, primarily because of the security threat the inmates posed inside the prison walls. “If confrontation and cross-examination of those furnishing evidence against the inmate were to be allowed as a matter of course, as in criminal trials, there would be considerable potential for havoc inside the prison walls.” Wolff, 418 U.S. at 567, 94 S.Ct. 2963. The safety concerns of Wolff are not present with parolees because parolees cannot wreak the same havoc within prison walls that inmates may cause. Thus, the Wolff rationale for not allowing confrontation and cross-examination are inapplicable in the instant case and Meza should be granted the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses unless the State can show good cause in a particular case why this right should not be granted.
The district court also found that Meza was entitled to counsel. While the right to counsel is a fundamental right for individuals facing criminal charges, U.S. CONST. amend. VI, the Court has declined to find it part of the panoply of due process protections that must be automatically afforded parolees or inmates. See Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 790, 93 S.Ct. 1756 (finding that the need for counsel at parole revocation hearings *411 must be made on a “case-by-case basis”). In Vitek, when examining the due process protections that should be afforded to inmates facing involuntary confinement in a mental institution, the four members of the Court who wanted to provide all inmates facing transfer to a mental hospital a right to counsel reasoned that “[a] prisoner thought to be suffering from a mental disease or defect requiring involuntary treatment probably has an even greater need for legal assistance, for such a prisoner is more likely to be unable to understand or exercise his rights.” Vitek, 445 U.S. at 496–97, 100 S.Ct. 1254 (citations omitted).
[11] In this case, the concerns of the plurality of the Vitek Court are not present. No claim is made that Meza is suffering from a mental disease that may cause him to be unable to understand or exercise his rights. Instead, he is faced with the question of whether he can control his sexual desires such that he is not a threat to society. Thus, the reasons the Vitek plurality would have granted a right to counsel are not present. Given the substantial cost to the State to provide counsel to parolees facing registration and sex therapy and the Supreme Court precedent discussed above, we conclude that the State is not required to provide counsel to Meza.
In sum, we find that on the spectrum of due process rights

afforded by the Court in analogous cases, requiring a parolee who has not been convicted of a sex offense to register as a sex offender or participate in sex offender therapy requires more process than was provided to the inmate in Wolff, but less process than was provided in Vitek. In other words, we find Meza is due: (1) written notice that sex offender conditions may be imposed as a condition of his mandatory supervision; (2) disclosure of the evidence being presented against Meza to enable him to marshal the facts asserted against him and prepare a defense; (3) a hearing at which Meza is permitted to be heard in person, present documentary evidence, and call witnesses; (4) the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses, unless good cause is shown why this right should not be granted; (5) an impartial decision maker (which we assume the Board will be); and (6) a written statement by the factfinder as to the evidence relied on and the reasons it attached sex offender conditions to his mandatory supervision.
IV.
In addition to the aforementioned procedural due process claims, the defendants and Meza raise additional separate arguments on appeal.
A.
[12] The defendants argue that two individuals—Brad Livingston, the Executive Director of the Department, and Stuart Jenkins, the Director of the Department’s Parole Division—enjoy immunity under the Eleventh Amendment and may not be sued. This argument is based on the assertion that Livingston and Jenkins work for the Department and the Department does not have the authority to provide Meza with the type of hearing he requests. That authority, the defendants allege, rests solely with the Board.
The State’s argument is without merit. The Department plays an integral role in determining a prisoner’s mandatory supervision conditions. The Department prepares the file reviewed by the Board. The Department orally presents the packet to the Board. The Department controls the implementation of many of the conditions, such as controlling when a parole officer escort is available. Though the Board is *412 the entity that makes the final decision regarding a parolee’s conditions of parole or mandatory supervision, the Department plays a
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Meza v. Livingston, 607 F.3d 392 (2010)
key role in helping the Board reach that determination, and thus should also be accountable for any constitutional violations that may exist.
[13] Under Ex Parte Young, a state official may be sued in his official capacity for injunctive relief without violating the Eleventh Amendment. 209 U.S. 123, 159–60, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908). In this case, because the Department plays an integral role in determining and executing a prisoner’s mandatory supervision conditions, Meza may seek injunctive relief against Livingston and Jenkins; they do not enjoy Eleventh Amendment immunity.
B.
Meza argues that he has an equal protection claim against the defendants under the class-of-one theory. He also asserts that he has a liberty interest in three non-sex offender conditions—(1) requiring him to reside at TCCC pursuant to the Super Intensive Supervision Program (“SISP”), (2) requiring him to have a parole escort to leave TCCC pursuant to Special Condition O.99, and (3) prohibiting him from entering “child safety zones” pursuant to SISP—as well as a liberty interest in the imposition of all of these conditions together.
The district court did not consider Meza’s equal protection claim or non-sex offender due process claims. Instead, the court stated: “Because the Court has concluded that Coleman’s ‘appropriate hearing’ mandate requires more robust procedural protections than the State’s current Coleman review, the Court does not today reach these remaining claims and will dismiss them without prejudice.” Meza, 623 F.Supp.2d at 797.
Although Meza’s equal protection and due process claims for the non-sex offender conditions are not patently frivolous, they have not been developed by the district court and “[p]rudence dictates that we allow the lower court[ ] to consider [these] question[s] in the first instance.” Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 622–23, 113 S.Ct. 2801, 125 L.Ed.2d 488 (1993); accord United States v. $92,203.00 in United States Currency, 537 F.3d 504, 510 (5th Cir.2008). Thus, we vacate the district court’s dismissal without prejudice on these claims and remand those issues to the district court to decide in the first instance.

CONCLUSION
For the forgoing reasons, we find that Meza has a liberty interest in being free from sex offender registration and therapy, and this interest is significant. When Meza’s interest is balanced against the State’s significant interest in not incurring additional costs, and the high risk of error that may occur based on the State’s current due process protections, we find that the State’s procedures do not satisfy constitutional due process. Instead, the State must afford Meza the following procedure: (1) written notice that sex offender conditions may be imposed as a condition of his mandatory supervision; (2) disclosure of the evidence being presented against Meza to enable him to marshal the facts asserted against him and prepare a defense; (3) a hearing at which Meza is permitted to be heard in person, present documentary evidence, and call witnesses; (4) the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses, unless good cause is shown; (5) an impartial decision maker; and (6) a written statement by the factfinder as to the evidence relied on and the reasons it attached sex offender conditions to his mandatory supervision. Additionally, we find that defendants Livingston and Jenkins do not *413 enjoy qualified immunity under the Eleventh Amendment.
As such, we AFFIRM the district court’s conclusion as to the process the State must furnish Meza in all respects except that we do not agree that the State is required to provide Meza with counsel. Further, we VACATE the district court’s order dismissing without prejudice Meza’s equal protection and due process claims relating to the non-sex offender conditions attached to his mandatory supervision and REMAND those issues to the district court to decide in the first instance. We remand the case for entry of an order consistent with this opinion and further proceedings as required.
AFFIRMED, in part, VACATED, in part, and REMANDED.
WIENER, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in the entirety of the panel majority’s Opinion with one exception: I must dissent from its failure to specify that qualified and independent assistance—which may be an attorney, but need not be, as spelled out in Vitek for mentally impaired inmates—must be afforded to a non-sex offender parolee like Meza. The class comprising parolees who have never been convicted of sex offenses should be entitled to no less process than is afforded to the class comprising inmates who will remain in custody and merely face transfer from a prison to a
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Meza v. Livingston, 607 F.3d 392 (2010)
mental institution. The disparity in the level of the liberty interest of parolees vis a vis that of inmates is significantly greater than the disparity in the relatively small, secondary liberty interest of inmates who, like the one in Vitek, merely face being transferred from prison to a mental institution. In comparison, the need for qualified and independent non-lawyer assistance by a mentally competent parolee might well equal or even exceed the need for such assistance by many an inmate with mental issues. Indeed, the case can be made for the proposition that a substantial majority of mentally competent former inmates who are on parole are nevertheless so limited intellectually and so under-educated that their need of such assistance is at least as great as that of many mentally disturbed inmates. When considered in light of

the Supreme Court’s recognition that the label of sex-offender is the most stigmatizing of all those encountered in any of these cases, the panel majority’s failure to afford non-attorney assistance to parolees like Meza cannot be justified, particularly given that such assistance can be provided by the State with relatively little difficulty and at relatively modest cost. Because I conclude that failure to require such assistance for non-sex offender parolees like Meza violates their Due Process rights, I respectfully dissent from the otherwise proper holding of the panel majority.

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[CONTENT] December 5, 2005 | Texas | the U.S. District Court | the Western District | Texas | the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 | 42 | 1983 | the Texas Department of Criminal Justice | the Texas Board of Pardons and Parole |||  |||  |||  |||  ||| June 25 2007 | Lee Yeakel | the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 ||| 42 | 1983 ||| under 42 | 1983 ||| June 23, 2008 | the US Court of Appeals | Fifth Circuit ||| March 24, 2009 | Lee Yeakel |||  ||| May 20, 2010 | The United States Court of Appeals | Fifth Circuit ||| March 30, 2011 | Lee Yeakel | the March 24, | 2009 | the court of appeals ||| August 24, 2011 | Lee Yeakel | second | the March 30, 2011 | March 24 | 2009 ||| 2012 ||| 1989 | 2016 ||| September 20, 2013 | the Texas Department of Pardons and Parole ||| the Texas Department of Pardons and Parole ||| December 12, 2013 | the Texas Department of Criminal Justice ||| The Texas Department of Criminal Justice | the Texas Board of Pardons and Parole ||| March 13, 2014 | fifth ||| July 29, 2014 | sixth |||  ||| Jan. 20, 2015 ||| the next day |||  [SUMMARY] On December 5, 2005, a convicted murderer on parole in Texas filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas, under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Texas Department of Criminal Justice and the Texas Board of Pardons and Parole. The plaintiff is represented by both public and private counsel. The plaintiff asked the court for a declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, and damages. The plaintiff asked the court to permanently enjoin the defendants from: imposing the sex-offender label on him without a hearing that met due process requirements; subjecting the plaintiff to conditions that were different than similar supervisees; and failing to accommodate his religious exercise. The plaintiff also alleged that he has not had the same opportunities as other supervisees to acquire a job, obtain a driver's license, or receive education. 

On June 25 2007, Judge Lee Yeakel dismissed the plaintiff's claim under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000. The plaintiff's claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 were allowed to proceed. The decision allowing the claims to proceed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was appealed. On June 23, 2008, the US Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, affirmed the decision of the district court.

On March 24, 2009, Judge Lee Yeakel ordered that the defendants must afford the plaintiff due process of law, and dismissed, without prejudice, all of his other claims. This judgment was appealed. 

On May 20, 2010, The United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, ruled mostly for the plaintiff, slightly modifying the amount of due process that the plaintiff must be afforded. 

On March 30, 2011, the district court (Judge Lee Yeakel) granted the plaintiff's motion for the enforcement of the March 24, 2009 judgment as confirmed by the court of appeals, and ordered that the determination of whether the plaintiff should be considered a sex offender should conform with the plaintiff's due process rights.  On August 24, 2011, the district court (Judge Lee Yeakel) denied the plaintiff's second motion for enforcement of the judgment, ruling that the defendant's actions after the March 30, 2011 order had sufficiently complied with the March 24, 2009 judgment.

The plaintiff's original sentence for murder ended in 2012. He will remain under mandatory supervision for possessing a weapon in prison in 1989 until 2016.

On September 20, 2013, the court granted a stipulation of dismissal for the Texas Department of Pardons and Parole, and dismissed the claim with prejudice. It appears that the plaintiff settled with the Texas Department of Pardons and Parole.

On December 12, 2013, the Texas Department of Criminal Justice filed a motion to dismiss the complaint as moot since they did not have the ability to grant the relief that the plaintiff was asking for. The Texas Department of Criminal Justice stated that only the Texas Board of Pardons and Parole had this power, and they had been dismissed from the complaint.

On March 13, 2014, the plaintiff filed a fifth amended complaint based on the defendant's motion to dismiss for mootness. On July 29, 2014, the plaintiff filed a sixth amended complaint alleging that the plaintiff was unable to move into suitable housing and denied employment due to the defendant's actions. Not much activity appears on the docket thereafter. On Jan. 20, 2015, the parties filed a stipulation to dismiss the case. The court issued its final judgment the next day, granting the motion.

The case is now closed.