IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

I1-05-2945

Plaintiff,

CIVIL ACTION NO.

EGS ELECTRICAL GROUP, L.L.C. and EMERSON ELECTRIC COMPANY
Defendants.

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

ORIGINAL COMPLAINT
1. This is an action under the Equal Pay Act of 1963, as amended, 29 U.S.C. §206 et seq. and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §2000e, etseq, and Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §1981 etseq, to restrain the unlawful payment of wages to employees of one sex at rates less than the rates paid to employees of the opposite sex and to correct unlawful employment practices on the basis of sex, and to provide appropriate relief to Karen Barfield and April Harrison who were adversely affected by such unlawful practices. As alleged herein, Defendants, EGS Electrical Group, L.L.C. ("EGS") and Emerson Electric Company ("Emerson") unlawfully pay its female inside sales staff at wage rates which are less than the rates paid to its male employees performing substantially equal work, and otherwise discriminates against those females because of their sex in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Equal Pay Act. Further, Defendants unlawfully transferred and demoted Ms. Harrison in retaliation for her opposing the unlawful wage disparity and because she filed a charge of discrimination.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE 2. Jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. {}{}451, 1331, 1337, 1343 and 1345. This action is authorized and instituted pursuant to Sections 16(c) and 17 of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (the "FLSA"), as amended 29 U.S.C. {}{}216 (c) and 217, to enforce the requirements of the Equal Pay Act of 1963, codified as Section 6(d) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §206(d), et seq. ("Equal Pay Act") and pursuant to Section 706 (f)(1) and (3) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Acts of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. {}2000e, et seq. ("Title VII") and Section 102 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. {}1981A. 3. Venue is proper in this Court because the unlawful employment practices alleged below were and are now being committed within the jurisdiction of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Houston Division.
PARTIES Plaintiff, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("Commission"or "EEOC") is an agency of the United States of America charged with the administration, interpretation and enforcement of the Equal Pay Act and Title VII, and is expressly authorized to bring this action by Sections 16 (c) and 17 of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. {}§216 (c) and 217, as amended by Section 2 of the Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1978, 92 Stat. 3781, and Public Law 98-532 (1984), 98 Stat. 2705 and by Section 706 (0(1) and (3) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. {}2000e-5 (f)(1) and (3). 5. Defendant EGS has continuously been and is now doing business in the State of Texas and the City of Houston and has continuously had more than 15 employees. EGS has its principal place of business at 13639 Aldine Westfield Road,

Houston, Texas 77039. Defendant EGS is a Delaware Limited Liability Corporation that has failed to appoint or maintain a registered agent in Texas. EGS may be served with process by serving the Office of the Texas Secretary of State, 1019 Brazos Street, Austin, Texas 78701.
6. At all relevant times, Defendant EGS has acted directly or indirectly as an employer in relation to employees and continuously been an employer within the meaning of Section 3(d) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §203(d).
7. At all relevant times, Defendant EGS has continuously employed employees engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce within the meaning of Sections 3(b), (i) and (j) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§203(b), (i) and (j) or has continuously been an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce within the meaning of Sections 3(r) and (s) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§203(r) and (s).
8. At all relevant times, Defendant EGS has continuously been an employer engaged in an industry affecting commerce within the meaning of Sections 701(b), (g) and (h) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(b), (g) and (h).
9. Defendant Emerson has continuously been and is now doing business in the State of Texas and the City of Houston. Defendant Emerson is a Missouri Corporation and may be served with process by serving is registered agent, CT Corp. System, 350 N. St. Paul Street, Dallas, Texas 75201.
10. At all relevant times, Defendant Emerson has acted directly or indirectly as an employer in relation to employees and continuously been an employer within the meaning of Section 3(d) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §203(d).
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11. At all relevant times, Defendant Emerson has continuously employed employees engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce within the meaning of Sections 3(b), (i) and (j) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§203(b), (i) and (j) or has continuously been an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce within the meaning of Sections 3(r) and (s) of the FLSA, 29 UoS.C. §§203(r) and
(s).
12. At all relevant times, Defendant Emerson has continuously been an employer engaged in an industry affecting commerce within the meaning of Sections 701 (b), (g) and (h) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(b), (g) and (h).
13. Defendant Emerson has continuously been and is now doing business in the State of Texas and the City of Houston as the operational partner and as a joint venture owner of Defendant EGS. As such, in its representative capacity, it may be served with process by serving is registered agent, CT Corp. System, 350 N. St. Paul Street, Dallas, Texas 75201.
14. At all relevant times, Defendant Emerson, as a joint venture owner, has acted directly or indirectly as an employer in relation to employees and continuously been an employer within the meaning of Section 3(d) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §203(d).
15. At all relevant times, Defendant Emerson, as a joint venture owner, has continuously employed employees engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce within the meaning of Sections 3(b), (i) and (j) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§203(b), (i) and (j) or has continuously been an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce within the meaning of Sections 3(r) and (s) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§203(r) and (s).
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16. At all relevant times, Defendant Emerson, as a joint venture owner, has continuously been an employer engaged in an industry affecting commerce within the meaning of Sections 701(b), (g) and (h) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(b), (g) and (h).
STATEMENT OF CLAIMS 17. More than thirty days prior to the institution of this lawsuit, Karen Barfield and April Harrison each filed a charge of discrimination with the Commission alleging violations of the Equal Pay Act and Title VII by Defendants, their employer. All conditions precedent to the institution of this lawsuit have been fulfilled. 18. Since at least 1999, Defendants have engaged in unlawful employment practices at their offices located at 13639 Aldine Westfield Road, Houston, Texas, in violation of Sections 6(d)(1) and 15(a)(2)of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§206(d)(1) and 215 (a)(2), and Section 703(a)(1) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §2000e-

Ms. Barfield was hired by Curlee Manufacturing, a predecessor company, in

1995 as an order entry clerk. She steadily progressed through the ranks and was promoted to Sales Service/Quotations-grade 25 in 1997 with a starting salary of $23, 520.

This was an inside sales position. In 1999, she was promoted within the position to grade

28 earning $31,200. The following year she received a pay increase to$32,136 and again

in 2002 to $33,048. In September 2004, Ms. Barfield’s earned another pay increase to Sales Services/Quotations-grade 30. Her salary increased to $35,570. Two months later,

her salary increased to $44,000.

20.

Ms. Harrison was hired byAppleton Electric, a predecessor company,

as a customer service representative in 1997. She was subsequently promoted, in late

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1999, to Product Manager Trainee- grade 28 with a starting salary of $25,501. This was the beginning of her work in inside sales positions. In September 2000 she was promoted to Product Support Specialist I-grade 28 earning $28,630 and, two years later, she was promoted to Product Support Specialist II-grade 28, resulting in a pay increase to $33,750. In September 2004, after complaining of gender based was disparities, she was promoted within her position to grade 30 with a pay increase to $36,330.
21. In June 1999, a male was hired by Curlee Manufacturing into the position of Sales Service/Quotations. Although his title was identical to that held by Ms. Barfield, and his duties substantially similar to both women, he was hired as a grade 30 with a starting salary of $37,000. A year later, his salary was increased to $38,124. In 2001, his salary and grade were increased to $42,000, grade 32. In 2003, this male saleman’s pay was again increased to $43,176. In April 2004, he was given another salary increase to $50,000.
22. Both Charging Parties and the male comparator had the same direct supervisor. All performed inside sales duties. Although Charging Parties performed substantially equal work as the male employee, they were paid significantly less than the male comparator. Thus, since at least 1999, Defendants have willfully violated Sections 6(d)(1) and 15(a)(2) of the Equal Pay Act and Section 703(a)(1) of Title VII by paying wages to its female inside sales staff at rates less than the rate paid to a male inside sales staff in the same establishment for substantially equal work on jobs the performance of which required equal skill, effort, and responsibility and which were performed under similar working conditions.
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23. As a result of the acts complained of above, Defendants unlawfully withheld and are continuing to withhold the payment of wages due to Ms. Barfield and Ms. Harrison.
24. The effect of the practices complained of herein has been to deprive Ms. Barfield and Ms. Harrison of equal employment opportunities and otherwise adversely affected their status as an employees because of their sex.
25. The conduct described in the paragraphs above was willful, intentional and was committed with malice or with willful disregard for the federally protected civil rights of Ms. Barfield and Ms. Harrison.
26. Beginning in 2003, Ms. Harrison began to complain about the wage disparity between herself and the male comparator. And, by April 2004, she spoke about the disparity with the General Manager and requested that her salary be raised to the salary the male was earning. After receiving no results from him, she spoke with the Vice President of Sales-Gulf States and complained about the wage disparity. He informed her that he was not going to take any steps to have her salary increased and that nothing she could do would result in her pay being increased. After again complaining to the General Manager about the differences in pay, she filed a charge of discrimination with the Commission. Days later, in retaliation for having filed a discrimination charge, she arrived at work to discover maintenance workers packing the contents of her desk and learned, for the first time, that she was being relocated to another building. The move has made it more difficult for her to complete her sales job duties and has effectively reduced her to a customer service role.
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27. The conduct described in the paragraph above was willful, intentional and was committed with malice or with willful disregard for the federally protected civil rights of Ms. Harrison.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE, the Commission respectfully requests that this Court: 28. Grant a permanent injunction enjoining Defendants EGS and Emerson, their officers, successors, assigns and all persons in active concert or participation with them, from engaging in an employment practice which discriminates on the basis of sex and from discriminating within any of its establishment between employees on the basis of sex, by paying wages to employees at rates less than the rates at which it pays wages to employees of the opposite sex in the same establishment for equal work on jobs, the performance of which require equal skill, effort and responsibility, and which are performed under similar working conditions; 29. Order Defendants EGS and Emerson to institute and carry out policies, practices and procedures which provide equal employment opportunities for its female employees and which eradicate the effects of its unlawful employment practices; 30. Order Defendants EGS and Emerson to make Ms. Barfield and Ms. Harrison whole by providing appropriate back pay, with prejudgment interest in amounts to be determined at trial, and other affirmative relief necessary to eradicate the effects of its unlawful employment practices; 31. Order Defendants EGS and Emerson to make Ms. Barfield and Ms. Harrison whole by providing appropriate compensatory damages to her in amounts t~) be proved at trial resulting from the unlawful practices described above;
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32. Order Defendants EGS and Emerson to pay punitive damages to Ms. Barfield and Ms. Harrison for their willful, malicious and/or reckless conduct described above in amounts to be proved at trial;
33. Grant a judgment requiring Defendants EGS and Emerson to pay appropriate back wages in an amount to be proved at trial, and an equal sum as liquidated damages or prejudgment interest in lieu thereof, to employees whose wages are being unlawfully withheld as a result of the acts complained of above, including but not limited to, Ms. Barfield and Ms. Harrison.
34. Award pre-judgment and post-judgment interest on all amounts recovered as allowed by law;
35. Order all affirmative relief necessary to eradicate the effects of their unlawful employment practices;
36. Award the Commission its costs in this action; and 37. Grant such other and further relief as the Court deems necessary and proper in the public interest.
JURY TRIAL DEMAND 38. The Commission requests a jury trial on all questions of fact raised by its complaint.
Respectfully submitted, EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION ERIC S. DREIBAND General Counsel
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OF COUNSEL
Sacher) ional Attorney Houston District Office ~ 919 Smith, 7t" Floor Houston, Texas 77002 (713) 209-3398 Fax: (713) 209-3402

JAMES L. LEE Deputy General Counsel
GWENDOLYN YOUNG REAMS Associate General Counsel
1801 L. Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20507
By: ~tot~rYn el~_ iBn .°~ a rgCh e~I TBN: 02717500 SDN: 10145 Houston District Office 1919 Smith Street, 7t" Floor Houston, Texas 77002 (713) 209-3399 Fax: (713) 209-3402
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF

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The JS 44 cwil cover sheet and the information contained herein neither replace nor supplement the filing and serwce of pleadings or olher I~p~ as requiredkb~fh~,~ept as pro~. b~,,~hl f~eof ~ This form, approved by the Judicial Conference of the United States m September 19"/4, )s required for the use of the Clerk of Court for the puq)ose of initiating the civil docket sheet. (SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON Tile REVERSE
OF" TIlE FORM.)

I(a) PLAINTIFFS EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

DEFENDANTS EGS ELECTRICAL GROUP. L.L.C. and EMERSON ELECTRIC COMPANY

(b) COUNTY OF RESIDENCE OF FIRST LISTED PLAINTIFF
(EXCEPT IN U.S. PLAINTIFF CASES)
(C) ATTORNEYS (FIRM NAME, ADDRESS, AND TELEPHONE NUMBER) Kathy Boutchee, Trial Attorney EEOC-Houston District Office 1919 Smith Street, 7th Floor Houston, Texas 77002 (713) 209-3399

COUNTY OF RESIDENCE OF FIRST LISTED DEFENDANT

NOTE: .N LAND (IN U.S. PLAINTIFF CASES TRACT OF LAND INVOLVED

OCNLYO) NDEMNATICOouNr

CASES.

~o~s OF ~uO~)

FI LE~

AUG 2 2 2005

I!. BASIS OF JURISDICTION

Ix] I U.S. Government Plaintiff
[1 2 U.S. Government Defendant

[] 3 Federal Question (U.S. Government Not a Party)
[] 4 Diversity (Indicate Citizenship of Parties in Item III)

I!1. CITIZENSHIP OF PRINCIPAL PARTIES

(For Diversity Cases Only) Fo~ PLAI]~ IEF AND ONE BOX FOR DEFENDAhFr)

PTF DEF

PTF DEF

Citizen of This State [ ] I [ ] I Incorporated or Principal Place [ ] 4 [ ] 4

of Business in This State

Citizen of Another State [ ] 2 [ ] 2 Incorporated and Principal Place [ ] ~ [ ] 5 of Business in Another State

Citizen or Subject of a []3 []3 Foreign Nation

[ ] 6 [ ] 6

Foreign Country

I V. CA U S E O F ACTI O N (c~ n ¯ v s, cxv~L STATU’rE UNDER ~IICII YOU ARE FILING AND WR[~ A BRIEF STATEIvIL~ OF CAUSE, DO NOT CITE JURISD1C’IIONAL STA rLrFES UNLESS DIVERSrtY )
EGS Electrical Group, k L.C. and Emerson Electric Company engaged in unlawful employment prachces by subjecting Ms. Barfield amd Ms. Harrison to the unlawful payment of wages
to employees of one sex at rates less than the rates pa~d to employees of the opposite sex and to correct unlawful employment practices on the basis of sex in violaUon of Title VII and the Equal Pay Act. As alleged herein, Defendants, EGS Electrical Group, LL.C and Emerson Electric Company unlawfully paid its female inside sales staff at wage rates which are less than the rates pa~d to its male employees performing substantially equal work, and othenwise discriminates against those females because of their sex in violation of Title VII of the Ciwl Rtghts Act of 1964 and the Equal Pay Act. Further, Defendants unlawfully transferred and demoted Ms. Harrison m retaliation for her opposing the unlawful wage dispanty and because she filed a charge of discrimination.

V. NATURE OF SUIT (PLACE AN x IN ONE BOX ONLY)

CONTRACT

TORTS

[] 110 Insurance
[] 12o M
[] 130 MIlle[Act [] 140 NeSoUalIIc In~trament

PERSONAL INJURY
[] 3"1S A,tplan¢ [] 320 ~s~ult. L,bcl ~ Shn~
[] 340 ~ [] 330 F~I Empl~’
[] 345 Manne ~u¢l I,tahdtw

PERSONAL INJURY I Inju~-Prnduot
[] 36sP ....
PERSONAL PROPERTY [] 370 0~<~ Frond

[] 160 S,~kh,ddm’ [] 190
REAL PROPERTY
[] ~20 ~°"~’ [] 210 Land Condemnation ....
[] 230 Rent Lea,© & F.j=tmem [] 240 Tort~ ,o Land

CIVIL
[x] 442 [] 443 [] 444

PRISONER PETITIONS
[] slo ~ .... v.=~ s~=
[] ~0
[] 540 Mandamul ,i ~
[1 ss0 o~o

FORFEITURE/PENALTY [] 610 Agriculture [] 620 Other Food & Drug ] 625 Din8 Relatnd S~l#~tr~ of [] 630 L,~o,
[] ~40"
[] 690
LABOR
1 730 Labo~nvl~m~ [] 740 Redly ~ Act [] 790 ~

BANKRUPTCY
[] 422 Appeal 28 USC 158 [] 423 wahan~wal 2s use 157
PROPERTY RIGHTS
[] s2o
[1 sJo"
[] 840 Tmdenuirk
SOCIAL SECURITY
[] 861 HIA(DOsa) [] 862 81aok L~S 4923) [] 863 DIWC/DIWW
[] ~64 ss,~’r.lo xvl [] 865 Rsl
FEDERAL TAX SUITS

1~ D87ef0en’ld’aanxt)e~ (U S, Plamtaff~ t Jr1 871 IRS-Third Party 26 US(:: 7609

OTHER STATUTES [] 400 [] 410 Ant,ram [] 430 Ban~.s and Ba~,n8 [] 450 c~cc [1 460 ~
[] 894 E~ [] A~

Vl. ORIGIN
[X] I Original Proceeding

(PLACE AN x IN ONE BOX ONLY)

[] 2 Removed from [] 3 Remanded from

State Court

Appellate Court

Transferred from

[] 4 Reinstated or

[] 5 another district

Reopened

(specif~)

VII. REQUESTED IN

CHECK IF THIS IS A CLASS ACTION

COMPLAINT:

[] UNDER F.R.C P. 23

DEMANDS

VIII. RELATED CASE(S) IF ANY (,,~i ....

JUDGE

Appeal to District

[] 6 Mult,d,stric,

[] 7 Judge from

Litigation

Ma[~istrnte Jud[~ment

Check YES only if demanded in complaint:

DOCKET NUMBER

 </s> IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT ,,er, ~’r~ FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS l~[,1~ 2, 3 2005
HOUSTON DIVISION
Miohael N, Milbgo Clerk of Court

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY

COMMISSION

Plaintiff,

CIVIL ACTION NO. H-05-2945

EGS ELECTRICAL GROUP, L.L.C. and EMERSON ELECTRIC COMPANY
Defendants.

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

FIRST AMENDED ORIGINAL COMPLAINT
1. This is an action under the Equal Pay Act of 1963, as amended, 29 U.S.C. §206 etseq, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §2000e, et seq. and Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §1981 et seq. to restrain the unlawful payment of wages to employees of one sex at rates less than the rates paid to employees of the opposite sex and to correct unlawful employment practices on the basis of sex, and to provide appropriate relief to Karen Barfield and April Harrison who were adversely affected by such unlawful practices. As alleged herein, Defendants, EGS Electrical Group, L.L.C. ("EGS") and Emerson Electric Company ("Emerson") unlawfully pay its female inside sales staff at wage rates which are less than the rates paid to its male employees performing substantially equal work, and otherwise discriminates against those females because of their sex in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Equal Pay Act. Further, Defendants unlawfully transferred and demoted Ms. Harrison in retaliation for her opposing the unlawful wage disparity and because she filed a charge of discrimination.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE 2. Jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§451, 1331, 1337, 1343 and 1345. This action is authorized and instituted pursuant to Sections 16(c) and 17 of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (the "FLSA"), as amended 29 U.S.C. §§216 (c) and 217, to enforce the requirements of the Equal Pay Act of 1963, codified as Section 6(d) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §206(d), et seq. ("Equal Pay Act") and pursuant to Section 706 (f)(1) and (3) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Acts of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §2000e, et seq. ("Title VII") and Section 102 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. §1981A. 3. Venue is proper in this Court because the unlawful employment practices alleged below were and are now being committed within the jurisdiction of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Houston Division.
PARTIES 4. Plaintiff, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("Commission"or "EEOC") is an agency of the United States of America charged with the administration, interpretation and enforcement of the Equal Pay Act and Title VII, and is expressly authorized to bring this action by Sections 16 (c) and 17 of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§216 (c) and 217, as amended by Section 2 of the Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1978, 92 Stat. 3781, and Public Law 98-532 (1984), 98 Stat. 2705 and by Section 706 (f)(1) and (3) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §2000e-5 (f)(1) and (3). 5. Defendant EGS has continuously been and is now doing business in the State of Texas and the City of Houston and has continuously had more than 15 employees. EGS has its principal place of business at 13639 Aldine Westfield Road,
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Houston, Texas 77039. Defendant EGS is a Delaware Limited Liability Corporation that has failed to appoint or maintain a registered agent in Texas. EGS may be served with process by serving the Office of the Texas Secretary of State, 1019 Brazos Street, Austin, Texas 78701.
6. At all relevant times, Defendant EGS has acted directly or indirectly as an employer in relation to employees and continuously been an employer within the meaning of Section 3(d) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §203(d).
7. At all relevant times, Defendant EGS has continuously employed employees engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce within the meaning of Sections 3(b), (i) and (j) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§203(b), (i) and (j) or has continuously been an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce within the meaning of Sections 3(r) and (s) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§203(r) and (s).
8. At all relevant times, Defendant EGS has continuously been an employer engaged in an industry affecting commerce within the meaning of Sections 701(b), (g) and (h) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(b), (g) and (h).
9. Defendant Emerson has continuously been and is now doing business in the State of Texas and the City of Houston. Defendant Emerson is a Missouri Corporation and may be served with process by serving is registered agent, CT Corp. System, 350 N. St. Paul Street, Dallas, Texas 75201.
10. At all relevant times, Defendant Emerson has acted directly or indirectly as an employer in relation to employees and continuously been an employer within the meaning of Section 3(d) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §203(d).
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11. At all relevant times, Defendant Emerson has continuously employed employees engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce within the meaning of Sections 3(b), (i) and (j) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§203(b), (i) and (j) or has continuously been an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce within the meaning of Sections 3(r) and (s) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§203(r) and
(s).
12. At all relevant times, Defendant Emerson has continuously been an employer engaged in an industry affecting commerce within the meaning of Sections 701(b), (g) and (h) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 8§ 2000e(b), (g) and (h).
13. Defendant Emerson has continuously been and is now doing business in the State of Texas and the City of Houston as the operational partner and as a joint venture owner of Defendant EGS. As such, in its representative capacity, it may be served with process by serving is registered agent, CT Corp. System, 350 N. St. Paul Street, Dallas, Texas 75201.
14. Atall relevant times, Defendant Emerson, as a joint venture owner, has acted directly or indirectly as an employer in relation to employees and continuously been an employer within the meaning of Section 3(d) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §203(d).
15. At all relevant times, Defendant Emerson, as a joint venture owner, has continuously employed employees engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce within the meaning of Sections 3(b), (i) and (j) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§203(b), (i) and (j) or has continuously been an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce within the meaning of Sections 3(r) and (s) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§203(r) and (s).
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16. At all relevant times, Defendant Emerson, as a joint venture owner, has

continu(~usly been an employer engaged in an industry affecting commerce within the

meaning of Sections 701(b), (g) and (h) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(b), (g) and (h).

STATEMENT OF CLAIMS

17. More than thirty days prior to the institution of this lawsuit, Karen Barfield and

April Harrison each filed a charge of discrimination with the Commission alleging violations

of the Equal Pay Act and Title VII by Defendants, their employer. All conditions precedent

to the institution of this lawsuit have been fulfilled.

18. Since at least 1999, Defendants have engaged in unlawful employment

practices at their offices located at 13639 Aldine Westfield Road, Houston, Texas, in

violation of Sections 6(d)(1) and 15(a)(2)of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§206(d)(1) and 215 (a)(2), and Section 703(a)(1) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §2000e-

2.

19. Ms. Barfield was hired by Curlee Manufacturing, a predecessor company, in

1995 as an order entry clerk. She steadily progressed through the rahks and was

promoted to Sales Service/Quotations-grade 25 in 1997 with a starting salary of $23, 520.

This was an inside sales position. In 1999, she was promoted within the position to grade

28 earning $31,200. The following year she received a pay increase to$32,136 and again

in 2002 to $33,048. In September 2004, Ms. Barfield’s earned another pay increase to

Sales Services/Quotations-grade 30. Her salary increased to $35,570. Two months later,

her salary increased to $44,000.

20.

Ms. Harrison was hired by Appleton Electric, a predecessor company,

as a customer service representative in 1997. She was subsequently promoted, in late

-5-

1999, to Product Manager Trainee- grade 28 with a starting salary of $25,501. This was the beginning of her work in inside sales positions. In September 2000 she was promoted to Product Support Specialist I-grade 28 earning $28,630 and, two years later, she was promoted to Product Support Specialist II-grade 28, resulting in a pay increase to $33,750. In September 2004, after complaining of gender based was disparities, she was promoted within her position to grade 30 with a pay increase to $36,330. Two months later, her salary increased to $44,000.
21. In June 1999, a male was hired by Curlee Manufacturing into the position of Sales Service/Quotations. Although his title was identical to that held by Ms. Barfield, and his duties substantially similar to both women, he was hired as a grade 30 with a starting salary of $37,000. A year later, his salary was increased to $38,124. In 2001, his salary and grade were increased to $42,000, grade 32. In 2003, this male saleman’s pay was again increased to $43,176. In April 2004, he was given another salary increase to $50,000.
22. Both Charging Parties and the male comparator had the same direct supervisor. All performed inside sales duties. Although Charging Parties performed substantially equal work as the male employee, they were paid significantly less than the male comparator. Thus, since at least 1999, Defendants have willfully violated Sections 6(d)(1) and 15(a)(2) of the Equal Pay Act and Section 703(a)(1) of Title VII by paying wages to its female inside sales staff at rates less than the rate paid to a male inside sales staff in the same establishment for substantially equal work on jobs the performance of which required equal skill, effort, and responsibility and which were performed under similar working conditions.
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23. As a result of the acts complained of above, Defendants unlawfully withheld and are continuing to withhold the payment of wages due to Ms. Barfield and Ms. Harrison.
24. The effect of the practices complained of herein has been to deprive Ms. Barfield and Ms. Harrison of equal employment opportunities and otherwise adversely affected their status as an employees because of their sex.
25. The conduct described in the paragraphs above was willful, intentional and was committed with malice or with willful disregard for the federally protected civil rights of Ms. Barfield and Ms. Harrison.
26. Beginning in 2003, Ms. Harrison began to complain about the wage disparity between herself and the male comparator. And, by April 2004, she spoke about the disparity with the General Manager and requested that her salary be raised to the salary the male was earning. After receiving no results from him, she spoke with the Vice President of Sales-Gulf States and complained about the wage disparity. He informed her that he was not going to take any steps to have her salary increased and that nothing she could do would result in her pay being increased. After again complaining to the General Manager about the differences in pay, she filed a charge of discrimination with the Commission. Days later, in retaliation for having filed a discrimination charge, she arrived at work to discover maintenance workers packing the contents of her desk and learned, for the first time, that she was being relocated to another building. The move has made it more difficult for her to complete her sales job duties and has effectively reduced her to a customer service role.
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27. The conduct described in the paragraph above was willful, intentional and was con~mitted with malice or with willful disregard for the federally protected civil rights of Ms. Harrison.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE, the Commission respectfully requests that this Court: 28. Grant a permanent injunction enjoining Defendants EGS and Emerson, their officers, successors, assigns and all persons in active concert or participation with them, from engaging in an employment practice which discriminates on the basis of sex and from discriminating within any of its establishment between employees on the basis of sex, by paying wages to employees at rates less than the rates at which it pays wages to employees of the opposite sex in the same establishment for equal work on jobs, the performance of which require equal skill, effort and responsibility, and which are performed under similar working conditions; 29. Order Defendants EGS and Emerson to institute and carry out policies, practices and procedures which provide equal employment opportunities for its female employees and which eradicate the effects of its unlawful employment practices; 30. Order Defendants EGS and Emerson to make Ms. Barfield and Ms. Harrison whole by providing appropriate back pay, with prejudgment interest in amounts to be determined at trial, and other affirmative relief necessary to eradicate the effects of its unlawful employment practices; 31. Order Defendants EGS and Emerson to make Ms. Barfield and Ms. Harrison whole by providing appropriate compensatory damages to her in amounts to be proved at trial resulting from the unlawful practices described above;
-8-

32. Order Defendants EGS and Emerson to pay punitive damages to Ms. Barfield and Ms." Harrison for their willful, malicious and/or reckless conduct described above in amounts to be proved at trial;
33. Grant a judgment requiring Defendants EGS and Emerson to pay appropriate back wages in an amount to be proved at trial, and an equal sum as liquidated damages or prejudgment interest in lieu thereof, to employees whose wages are being unlawfully withheld as a result of the acts complained of above, including but not limited to, Ms. Barfield and Ms. Harrison.
34. Award pre-judgment and post-judgment interest on all amounts recovered as allowed by law;
35. Order all affirmative relief necessary to eradicate the effects of their unlawful employment practices;
36. Award the Commission its costs in this action; and 37. Grant such other and further relief as the Court deems necessary and proper in the public interest.
JURY TRIAL DEMAND 38. The Commission requests a jury trial on all questions of fact raised by its complaint.
Respectfully submitted, EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION ERIC S. DREIBAND General Counsel
-9-

OFCOUNSEL
/ Jim Sa.£.,her //Regional Attorney ,. ,’ Houston District Office
1919 Smith, 7th Floor Houston, Texas 77002 (713) 209-3398 Fax: (713) 209-3402

JAMES L. LEE Deputy General Counsel
GWENDOLYN YOUNG REAMS Associate General Counsel
1801 L. Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20507
By: .l~a~y ~ Bo-ut(;hee ~’
Attorney in Charge TBN: 02717500 SDN: 10145 Houston District Office 1919 Smith Street, 7th Floor Houston, Texas 77002 (713) 209-3399 Fax: (713) 209-3402
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF

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 </s> Case 4:05-cv-02945 Document 18 Filed 01/05/2006 Page 1 of 11

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY §

COMMISSION,

§

§

Plaintiff,

§

§

v.

§

§

EGS ELECTRICAL GROUP, L.L.C. and §

EMERSON ELECTRICAL COMPANY §

§

Defendants.

§

____________________________________§

CIVIL ACTION NO. H-05-2945 JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

SECOND AMENDED ORIGINAL COMPLAINT

1. This is an action under the Equal Pay Act of 1963, as amended, 29 U.S.C. §206 et

seq. and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §2000e, et seq. and

Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §1981 et seq. to restrain the

unlawful payment of wages to employees of one sex at rates less than the rates paid to employees

of the opposite sex and to correct unlawful employment practices on the basis of sex, and to

provide appropriate relief to Karen Barfield and April Harrison who were adversely affected by

such unlawful practices. As alleged herein, Defendants, EGS Electrical Group, L.L.C. (“EGS”)

and Emerson Electric Company (“Emerson”) unlawfully pay its female inside sales staff at wage

rates which are less than the rates paid to its male employees performing substantially equal

work, and otherwise discriminates against those females because of their sex in violation of Title

VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Equal Pay Act. Further, Defendants unlawfully

transferred and demoted Ms. Harrison in retaliation for her opposing the unlawful wage disparity

and because she filed a charge of discrimination.

Case 4:05-cv-02945 Document 18 Filed 01/05/2006 Page 2 of 11
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 2. Jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§451, 1331, 1337, 1343 and 1345. This action is authorized and instituted pursuant to Sections 16(c) and 17 of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (the “FLSA”), as amended 29 U.S.C. §§216 (c) and 217, to enforce the requirements of the Equal Pay Act of 1963, codified as Section 6(d) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §206(d), et seq. (“Equal Pay Act”) and pursuant to Section 706 (f)(1) and (3) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Acts of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §2000e, et seq. (“Title VII”) and Section 102 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. §1981A. 3. Venue is proper in this Court because the unlawful employment practices alleged below were and are now being committed within the jurisdiction of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Houston Division.
PARTIES 4. Plaintiff, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“Commission”or “EEOC”) is an agency of the United States of America charged with the administration, interpretation and enforcement of the Equal Pay Act and Title VII, and is expressly authorized to bring this action by Sections 16 (c) and 17 of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§216 (c) and 217, as amended by Section 2 of the Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1978, 92 Stat. 3781, and Public Law 98-532 (1984), 98 Stat. 2705 and by Section 706 (f)(1) and (3) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §2000e-5 (f)(1) and (3). 5. Defendant EGS has continuously been and is now doing business in the State of Texas and the City of Houston and has continuously had more than 15 employees. EGS has its principal place of business at 13639 Aldine Westfield Road, Houston, Texas 77039. Defendant
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Case 4:05-cv-02945 Document 18 Filed 01/05/2006 Page 3 of 11
EGS is a Delaware Limited Liability Corporation that has failed to appoint or maintain a registered agent in Texas. EGS may be served with process by serving the Office of the Texas Secretary of State, 1019 Brazos Street, Austin, Texas 78701.
6. At all relevant times, Defendant EGS has acted directly or indirectly as an employer in relation to employees and continuously been an employer within the meaning of Section 3(d) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §203(d).
7. At all relevant times, Defendant EGS has continuously employed employees engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce within the meaning of Sections 3(b), (i) and (j) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§203(b), (i) and (j) or has continuously been an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce within the meaning of Sections 3(r) and (s) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§203(r) and (s).
8. At all relevant times, Defendant EGS has continuously been an employer engaged in an industry affecting commerce within the meaning of Sections 701(b), (g) and (h) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(b), (g) and (h).
9. Defendant Emerson has continuously been and is now doing business in the State of Texas and the City of Houston. Defendant Emerson is a Missouri Corporation and may be served with process by serving is registered agent, CT Corp. System, 350 N. St. Paul Street, Dallas, Texas 75201.
10. At all relevant times, Defendant Emerson has acted directly or indirectly as an employer in relation to employees and continuously been an employer within the meaning of Section 3(d) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §203(d).
11. At all relevant times, Defendant Emerson has continuously employed employees
-3-

Case 4:05-cv-02945 Document 18 Filed 01/05/2006 Page 4 of 11
engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce within the meaning of Sections 3(b), (i) and (j) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§203(b), (i) and (j) or has continuously been an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce within the meaning of Sections 3(r) and (s) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§203(r) and (s).
12. At all relevant times, Defendant Emerson has continuously been an employer engaged in an industry affecting commerce within the meaning of Sections 701(b), (g) and (h) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(b), (g) and (h).
13. Defendant Emerson has continuously been and is now doing business in the State of Texas and the City of Houston as the operational partner and as a joint venture owner of Defendant EGS. As such, in its representative capacity, it may be served with process by serving is registered agent, CT Corp. System, 350 N. St. Paul Street, Dallas, Texas 75201.
14. At all relevant times, Defendant Emerson, as a joint venture owner, has acted directly or indirectly as an employer in relation to employees and continuously been an employer within the meaning of Section 3(d) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §203(d).
15. At all relevant times, Defendant Emerson, as a joint venture owner, has continuously employed employees engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce within the meaning of Sections 3(b), (i) and (j) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§203(b), (i) and (j) or has continuously been an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce within the meaning of Sections 3(r) and (s) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§203(r) and (s).
16. At all relevant times, Defendant Emerson, as a joint venture owner, has continuously been an employer engaged in an industry affecting commerce within the meaning
-4-

Case 4:05-cv-02945 Document 18 Filed 01/05/2006 Page 5 of 11
of Sections 701(b), (g) and (h) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(b), (g) and (h). STATEMENT OF CLAIMS
17. More than thirty days prior to the institution of this lawsuit, Karen Barfield and April Harrison each filed a charge of discrimination with the Commission alleging violations of the Equal Pay Act and Title VII by Defendants, their employer. All conditions precedent to the institution of this lawsuit have been fulfilled.
18. Since at least 1999, Defendants have engaged in unlawful employment practices at their offices located at 13639 Aldine Westfield Road, Houston, Texas, in violation of Sections 6(d)(1) and 15(a)(2)of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§206(d)(1), 215 (a)(2), and 215 (a)(3), and Sections 703(a)(1) and 704(a) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2.
19. Ms. Barfield was hired by Curlee Manufacturing, a predecessor company, in 1995 as an order entry clerk. She steadily progressed through the ranks and was promoted to Sales Service/Quotations-grade 25 in 1997 with a starting salary of $23, 520. This was an inside sales position. In 1999, she was promoted within the position to grade 28 earning $31,200. The following year she received a pay increase to$32,136 and again in 2002 to $33,048. In September 2004, Ms. Barfield’s earned another pay increase to Sales Services/Quotations-grade 30. Her salary increased to $35,570. Two months later, her salary increased to $44,000.
20. Ms. Harrison was hired by Appleton Electric, a predecessor company, as a customer service representative in 1997. She was subsequently promoted, in late 1999, to Product Manager Trainee- grade 28 with a starting salary of $25,501. This was the beginning of her work in inside sales positions. In September 2000 she was promoted to Product Support Specialist I-grade 28 earning $28,630 and, two years later, she was promoted to Product Support
-5-

Case 4:05-cv-02945 Document 18 Filed 01/05/2006 Page 6 of 11
Specialist II-grade 28, resulting in a pay increase to $33,750. In September 2004, after complaining of gender based was disparities, she was promoted within her position to grade 30 with a pay increase to $36,330. Two months later, her salary increased to $44,000.
21. In June 1999, a male was hired by Curlee Manufacturing into the position of Sales Service/Quotations. Although his title was identical to that held by Ms. Barfield, and his duties substantially similar to both women, he was hired as a grade 30 with a starting salary of $37,000. A year later, his salary was increased to $38,124. In 2001, his salary and grade were increased to $42,000, grade 32. In 2003, this male saleman’s pay was again increased to $43,176. In April 2004, he was given another salary increase to $50,000.
22. Both Charging Parties and the male comparator had the same direct supervisor. All performed inside sales duties. Although Charging Parties performed substantially equal work as the male employee, they were paid significantly less than the male comparator. Thus, since at least 1999, Defendants have willfully violated Sections 6(d)(1) and 15(a)(2) of the Equal Pay Act and Section 703(a)(1) of Title VII by paying wages to its female inside sales staff at rates less than the rate paid to a male inside sales staff in the same establishment for substantially equal work on jobs the performance of which required equal skill, effort, and responsibility and which were performed under similar working conditions.
23. As a result of the acts complained of above, Defendants unlawfully withheld and are continuing to withhold the payment of wages due to Ms. Barfield and Ms. Harrison.
24. The effect of the practices complained of herein has been to deprive Ms. Barfield and Ms. Harrison of equal employment opportunities and otherwise adversely affected their status as an employees because of their sex.
-6-

Case 4:05-cv-02945 Document 18 Filed 01/05/2006 Page 7 of 11
25. The conduct described in the paragraphs above was willful, intentional and was committed with malice or with willful disregard for the federally protected civil rights of Ms. Barfield and Ms. Harrison.
26. Beginning in 2003, Ms. Harrison began to complain about the wage disparity between herself and the male comparator. And, by April 2004, she spoke about the disparity with the General Manager and requested that her salary be raised to the salary the male was earning. After receiving no results from him, she spoke with the Vice President of Sales-Gulf States and complained about the wage disparity. He informed her that he was not going to take any steps to have her salary increased and that nothing she could do would result in her pay being increased. After again complaining to the General Manager about the differences in pay, she filed a charge of discrimination with the Commission. Days later, in retaliation for having filed a discrimination charge, she arrived at work to discover maintenance workers packing the contents of her desk and learned, for the first time, that she was being relocated to another building. The move has made it more difficult for her to complete her sales job duties and has effectively reduced her to a customer service role.
27. The conduct described in the paragraph above was willful, intentional and was committed with malice or with willful disregard for the federally protected civil rights of Ms. Harrison.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE, the Commission respectfully requests that this Court: 28. Grant a permanent injunction enjoining Defendants EGS and Emerson, their officers, successors, assigns and all persons in active concert or participation with them, from
-7-

Case 4:05-cv-02945 Document 18 Filed 01/05/2006 Page 8 of 11
engaging in an employment practice which discriminates on the basis of sex and from discriminating within any of its establishment between employees on the basis of sex, by paying wages to employees at rates less than the rates at which it pays wages to employees of the opposite sex in the same establishment for equal work on jobs, the performance of which require equal skill, effort and responsibility, and which are performed under similar working conditions;
29. Order Defendants EGS and Emerson to institute and carry out policies, practices and procedures which provide equal employment opportunities for its female employees and which eradicate the effects of its unlawful employment practices;
30. Order Defendants EGS and Emerson to make Ms. Barfield and Ms. Harrison whole by providing appropriate back pay, with prejudgment interest in amounts to be determined at trial, and other affirmative relief necessary to eradicate the effects of its unlawful employment practices;
31. Order Defendants EGS and Emerson to make Ms. Barfield and Ms. Harrison whole by providing appropriate compensatory damages to her in amounts to be proved at trial resulting from the unlawful practices described above;
32. Order Defendants EGS and Emerson to pay punitive damages to Ms. Barfield and Ms. Harrison for their willful, malicious and/or reckless conduct described above in amounts to be proved at trial;
33. Grant a judgment requiring Defendants EGS and Emerson to pay appropriate back wages in an amount to be proved at trial, and an equal sum as liquidated damages or prejudgment interest in lieu thereof, to employees whose wages are being unlawfully withheld as a result of the acts complained of above, including but not limited to, Ms. Barfield and Ms.
-8-

Case 4:05-cv-02945 Document 18 Filed 01/05/2006 Page 9 of 11
Harrison. 34. Award pre-judgment and post-judgment interest on all amounts recovered as
allowed by law; 35. Order all affirmative relief necessary to eradicate the effects of their unlawful
employment practices; 36. Award the Commission its costs in this action; and 37. Grant such other and further relief as the Court deems necessary and proper in the
public interest. JURY TRIAL DEMAND
38. The Commission requests a jury trial on all questions of fact raised by its complaint.
Respectfully submitted, EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION ERIC S. DREIBAND General Counsel JAMES L. LEE Deputy General Counsel GWENDOLYN YOUNG REAMS Associate General Counsel 1801 L. Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20507
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Case 4:05-cv-02945 Document 18 Filed 01/05/2006 Page 10 of 11 By: /s/ Aimee L. McFerren Aimee L. McFerren Attorney-in-Charge KY Bar No.: 89912 S.D. of Tex. Bar No.: 36953 Houston District Office 1919 Smith Street, 7th Floor Houston, Texas 77002-8049 (713) 209-3390 Fax: (713) 209-3402 ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF
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Case 4:05-cv-02945 Document 18 Filed 01/05/2006 Page 11 of 11

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that the foregoing Second Amended Original Complaint was filed electronically through the Court's CM/ECF System on January 5, 2006, and a copy served via Certified Mail/RRR on Defendants’ representative as follows:

Susan L. Bickley ABRAMS SCOTT & BICKLEY, L.L.P. 700 Louisiana, Suite 4000 Houston, Texas 77002-2727

/s/ Aimee L. McFerren Aimee L. McFerren

-11-

 </s> IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

HOUSTON DIVISION

§

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT

§

OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

§

§

PLAINTIFF,

§ CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:05-cv-2945

§

v.

§

§

EGS ELECTRICAL GROUP, L.L.C. and § JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

§

DEFENDANT.

§

CONSENT DECREE

Plaintiff, the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

("Commission") and Defendant, EGS Electrical Group, L.L.C. ("Defendant" or "EGS")

agree to entry of this Consent Decree. Wherever the term "Defendant" is used in this

Consent Decree it shall be limited to the Houston, Texas facility unless otherwise noted.

I. Background and History of Proceedings

A. Charging Parties Karen Barfield ("Barfield") and April Harrison

("Harrison"), (collectively called "Charging Parties") filed charges of discrimination with

the Commission (Charge Nos. 330-2005-00030 and 330-2005-00408) alleging

Defendant violated the Equal Pay Act of 1963 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of

1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §2000e et seq. ("Title VII"). Ms. Harrison subsequently

amended her charge to allege that Defendant unlawfully transferred and demoted her in

retaliation for opposing unlawful wage disparity and because she filed a charge of

discrimination.

B. On August 22, 2005, after investigating the Charges and finding

discrimination, the Commission commenced this action alleging that Defendant's

conduct constituted wage discrimination on the basis of sex in violation of Section 206

of the Equal Pay Act and Section 703(a) of Title VII and retaliation against Ms. Harrison

in violation of Section 215 of the Equal Pay Act and Section 704 of Title VII.

C. Defendant denied the allegations of wage discrimination on the basis of

sex and retaliation. Defendant additionally asserted its actions were in compliance with

the Equal Pay Act and Title VII and made in good faith.

D. The parties wish to avoid the risks, uncertainties and expenses of

continued litigation. Accordingly, the parties have agreed to settle this lawsuit.

Defendant's consent to the entry of this Decree and the terms set forth in it shall not

constitute or be construed as an admission of any Equal Pay Act or Title VII violation.

The parties agree that this Consent Decree is being entered into for the sole purpose of

compromising disputed claims without the necessity for protracted litigation.

E. The Commission and Defendant stipulate to the jurisdiction of the Court

and the satisfaction of all administrative prerequisites. The parties further waive

hearing, appeal, and entry of findings of fact and conclusions of law on all issues and as

to all parties.

IT IS ORDERED:

1.

This Consent Decree is entered in full and complete settlement of any and

all claims arising out of or asserted in Civil Action No. H-05-2945 and the above-

referenced Charges on behalf of Karen Barfield and April Harrison. This Consent

Decree remains in effect for eighteen (18) months from the date of entry

("Consent Period") and is solely applicable to Defendant's Houston, Texas

location. The Charging Parties will separately sign a release and waiver of all

2

claims and non-disclosure agreement based upon the same consideration set

forth in the consent decree.

II. Injunctive Relief

2.

During the Consent Period, Defendant's Houston based management

employees agree they will not engage in any employment practices which

discriminate against any individual with respect to compensation in employment

because of such individual's sex in violation of the Equal Pay Act or Title VII and

will not retaliate against any individual who has opposed a gender based wage

discrimination practice made an unlawful employment practice under the Equal

Pay Act or Title VII or who has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated

in any manner in an investigation, proceeding or hearing under the Equal Pay Act

or Title VII related to gender based wage discrimination.

3.

During the Consent Period, on an annual basis, Defendant will provide, as

to its Houston location, using either an attorney or an independent experienced

training person or group, a live and interactive program on the illegality of

employment discrimination regarding wage decisions based on sex. Such

training shall include a discussion of the law relating to the Equal Pay Act and

Title VII as said statutes relate to gender based wage discrimination and

retaliation for reporting the same to all human resources professionals and

management level and above employees. The minimum duration of each

training shall be one (1) hour. The first such training shall be completed by

November 1, 2007 or within six (6) months from the date the Consent Decree is

entered, whichever is later. Defendant shall submit to the EEOC, each year at

3

least thirty days in advance of the program, for the EEOC's approval, the name

of the program provider and an outline indicating the information to be addressed

during the program and copies of all agendas and materials to be distributed at

the training seminar. The person administering the training shall have at least

five years of experience in labor and employment law. The presenter must be

approved by the EEOC through its counsel. The EEOC's approval will not be

unreasonably withheld and will be assumed if Defendant does not receive

EEOC's written objections no later than fifteen (15) days prior to the date of the

scheduled training. Written acknowledgment of receipt of the training shall be

obtained by Defendant from all individuals attending the training and retained

among the employment records of Defendant and also copies of sign in sheets

shall be forwarded to the EEOC within one month of the delivery of the training.

4.

During the Consent Period, Defendant agrees that when placing job

advertisements for the positions for inside sales/customer service at its Houston

location, it shall state that it is an equal employment opportunity employer.

Pictorial ads, if any, should feature a female.

III. Relief for Charging Parties

5.

Defendant agrees to pay the total sum of FORTY-FIVE THOUSAND AND

NO/100 DOLLARS ($45,000.00), less legally required tax deductions, in full and

final settlement of the Commission's lawsuit to provide monetary relief to Karen

Barfield. Said sum shall be paid within twenty (20) days from the date of entry of

the Decree. Defendant shall mail or deliver the settlement check to Ms. Barfield

at the address provided by the Commission to Defendant or deliver said check in

4

person. Within seven (7) days, a copy of the check disbursed to Barfield shall

be mailed to the Commission's undersigned counsel of record.

6.

Defendant agrees to pay the total sum of FORTY-FIVE THOUSAND AND

NO/100 DOLLARS ($45,000.00), less legally required tax deductions, in full and

final settlement of the Commission's lawsuit to provide monetary relief to April

Harrison. Said sum shall be paid within twenty (20) days from the date of entry

of the Decree or deliver said check in person. Defendant shall mail or deliver the

settlement check to Ms. Harrison at the address provided by the Commission to

Defendant. Within seven (7) days, a copy of the check disbursed to Ms. Harrison

shall be mailed to the Commission's undersigned counsel of record.

7.

The sum payable to the Charging Parties may be subject to federal

income tax. Defendant agrees to issue appropriate Internal Revenue Service

Forms to Charging Parties for all sums paid pursuant to this Consent Decree not

later than January 31,2008.

8.

Defendant agrees that within ten (10) days after entry of this Decree, it will

remove from Charging Parties' personnel files any documents referencing their

charges of discrimination, the Commission's lawsuit or this Consent Decree

entered in resolution of the lawsuit to the extent any such documents are in the

personnel files. These documents shall not be part of their personnel files but

shall be kept segregated in separate, confidential folders.

9.

Defendant agrees that within fifteen (15) days from the date of entry of the

Consent Decree, Karen Barfield's and April Harrison's salaries will be increased

to $52,700.00, the same salary as the male comparator, with a deduction of no

5

more than $4,000.00 as a result of the difference in Harrison's pension benefits.

Defendant agrees that they will not reduce the salary of the male comparator

during the Consent Period based upon his participation in this suit; however,

nothing stated herein shall prevent Defendant from reducing the salary of the

male comparator for legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons.

10. Defendant's Houston management shall notify Harrison of any open inside

sales/customer service position(s) during the consent period before such

position(s) is posted. It is understood and agreed that the salary and benefits

paid for such position(s) will be based on business issues, including, but not

limited to, level of open position(s), skills and abilities and the legal or operational

entity that has the opening.

11. Further, Defendant agrees to investigate the possibility of changing Harrison's

reporting relationship based upon business needs and employee relations

considerations.

12.

Defendant will not discharge Charging Parties as a result of their filing

charges of discrimination or participating in the Commission's lawsuit against

Defendant. If, during the Consent Period, Defendant involuntarily terminates

either of the Charging Parties for any reason, Defendant shall submit a written

report of any such discharge to the Commission's undersigned counsel within ten

(10) days of the discharge. The report shall include the basis for the discharge,

explanation of the underlying basis for the discharge, and the names, titles and

telephone numbers of all persons participating in the decision resulting in the

6

discharge. The EEOC, at its option and upon five (5) days notice to Defendant's

counsel, may discuss the discharge with any person participating in such

decision in person or by telephone. Defendant's counsel will be allowed to be

present during any such discussion.

IV. Postings

13.

Defendant agrees that within ten (10) days after entry of this Decree, it

will conspicuously post the attached notice (Exhibit "A") in an area accessible to

all employees at its Houston, Texas facility for the duration of the Decree.

V. Reporting

14.

During the Consent Period, Defendant will provide to the EEOC, on an

annual basis, a copy of all written complaints of gender based wage

discrimination, gender based wage disparity or retaliation related to gender

based wage complaints made by any employee at the Houston location and shall

describe its investigation of the complaint, the results of the complaint and

describe any pay changes made or disciplinary action imposed as a result of its

investigation. The documents provided to the EEOC shall also identify the name

and title of the persons involved in the complaint and investigation.

15.

Once during the Consent Period, Defendant agrees to provide the

Commission with a report containing the name, gender, and salary of all persons

in inside sales positions at the EGS Houston facility and said report shall be

submitted on or before November 1, 2008.

7

VI. Effect of the Decree

16.

This Consent Decree shall be binding on Defendant and all of Defendant's

successors-in-interest, and Defendant will notify all such successors-in-interest of

the existence and terms of this Consent Decree.

17.

During the Consent Period, the Court shall retain jurisdiction to assure

compliance with this Decree and to permit entry of such further orders or

modifications as may be appropriate. The Commission is specifically authorized

to seek Court-ordered enforcement of this Decree in the event of a breach of any

of the provisions herein.

18.

The Commission agrees that, in the event the Commission believes

Defendant is in violation of any provision of this Consent Decree, the

Commission shall notify Defendant, through their undersigned counsel, of such

violation and afford Defendant the opportunity to remedy as may be appropriate

any such alleged violation within 30 days of such notice, before instituting any

legal action to enforce such provision(s).

19.

Nothing in this Consent Decree shall be construed to preclude the

Commission from filing a separate action under Equal Pay Act, Title VII or any

other statute which the Commission enforces in the future for any alleged

violations by Defendant not resolved by this Decree.

20.

Each party to this action shall bear their own costs and attorney's fees.

21.

Each signatory certifies that she is authorized to execute this document on

behalf of the party whom she represents.

8

Signed this Texas.

:l'-l-t.b. day of _ _ _--'fn...c.......L..-'-,"'.,...v_ _ _ _ , 2007 at Houston,
7

AGREED AND CONSENTED TO:
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
By: /s/ Kathy D. Boutchee by permission ALM
Kathy D. Boutchee TBN: 02717500 SON: 10145 Aimee L. McFerren Kentucky Bar No.: 89912 SON: 36953 Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission
1919 Smith Street, ih Floor
Houston, Texas 77002 (713) 209-3399 Fax: (713) 209-3402

ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT EGS ELECTRICAL GROUP L.L.C.
By: /s/ Susan L. Bickley by permission ALM
Susan L. Bickley TBN:02298150 SON: 6869 Abrams Scott & Bickley, L.L.P. 700 Louisiana Street, Suite 4000 Houston, Texas 77002 (713) 228-6601 Fax: (713) 228-6605

9

 </s> E.E.O.C. v. EGS Elec. Group, L.L.C., Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2007)

2007 WL 1258798 Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
United States District Court, S.D. Texas,
Houston Division.
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Plaintiff, v.
EGS ELECTRICAL GROUP, L.L.C., Defendant.
Civil Action No. H-05-2945. | April 30, 2007.
Attorneys and Law Firms
Aimee Lynn McFerren, Kathy D. Boutchee, EEOC, Houston, TX, for Plaintiff.
Susan L. Bickley, Abrams Scott & Bickley, L.L.P., Houston, TX, for Defendant.
Opinion
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
STEPHEN WM. SMITH, United States Magistrate Judge.
*1 Defendant EGS Electrical Group L.L.C. (EGS) has filed a motion for reconsideration (Dkt.63) of this court’s memorandum and order (Dkt.62) denying EGS’s motion for summary judgment on the EEOC’s retaliation claim on behalf of April Harrison. Having considered the parties’ submissions, all matters of record, and applicable law, the court concludes that EGS’s motion should be denied.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not expressly

provide for a “motion for reconsideration.” See Hamilton Plaintiffs v. Williams Plaintiffs, 147 F.3d 367, 371 n. 10 (5th Cir.1998). Instead, a motion for reconsideration can be treated as a Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment under Rule 59(e) or a Motion for Relief from Judgment under Rule 60(b). Id. EGS has filed its motion pursuant to Rule 59(e).
“A Rule 59(e) motion is a motion that calls into question the correctness of a judgment.” Templet v. Hydrochem, Inc., 367 F.3d 473, 478 (5th Cir.2004) (quoting In re TranstexasGas Corp., 303 F.3d 571, 581 (5th Cir.2002)). Rule 59(e) is properly invoked “to correct manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence.” In re TranstexasGas Corp., 303 F.3d at 581. A motion for reconsideration is “not the proper vehicle for rehashing evidence, legal theories, or arguments that could have been offered or raised before the entry of judgment.” Templet, 367 F.3d at 479.
EGS’s motion challenges the court’s finding that there is a jury issue whether changes to Harrison’s job constituted “materially adverse” employment actions under the Burlington standard. EGS cites unpublished Fifth Circuit decisions and other district court opinions issued post-Burlington, but essentially the motion presents no argument or legal authority that could not have been raised in connection with its summary judgment motion. Moreover, the legal authorities cited by EGS do not indicate that the March 21, 2007 memorandum and order contains any error of law or fact, manifest or not. Therefore, it is
ORDERED that EGS’s motion for reconsideration (Dkt.63) is denied. It is further
ORDERED that EEOC’s motion to strike (Dkt.64) is denied.
	
  

1

 </s> E.E.O.C. v. EGS Elec. Group, L.L.C., Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2007)

2007 WL 869529 Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
United States District Court, S.D. Texas,
Houston Division.
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Plaintiff, v.
EGS ELECTRICAL GROUP, L.L.C., Defendant.
Civil Action No. H-05-2945. | March 21, 2007.
Attorneys and Law Firms
Aimee Lynn McFerren, Kathy D. Boutchee, Houston, TX, for Plaintiff.
Susan L. Bickley, Abrams Scott & Bickley, L.L.P., Houston, TX, for Defendant.
Opinion

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
STEPHEN WM. SMITH, United States Magistrate Judge.
*1 This employment discrimination case is before the court on defendant EGS Electrical Group L.L.C.’s (EGS’s) motion for summary judgment. Having considered the parties’ submissions, all matters of record, and applicable law, the court concludes that EGS’s motion should be denied.

I. Background The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has brought this Equal Pay Act and Title VII case on behalf of two female EGS employees, April Harrison1 and Karen Barfield. Harrison and Barfield complain that they have been, and continue to be, paid less than a male coworker, Glenn Anthony (Tony) Johnson, who performs the same job. Harrison also asserts that EGS transferred her to a less desirable job in retaliation for filing a complaint with the EEOC.2

1

April Harrison recently married Tony Johnson and

changed her name to April Johnson. The court will

refer to her as Harrison, the name under which she filed

her charge.

2

Barfield filed her charge of discrimination with the

EEOC on October 4, 2004. Harrison followed on

October 25, 2004. On January 10, 2005, Harrison

amended her EEOC charge to add a retaliation claim.

EGS manufactures and sells electrical products such as switch racks, explosion proof enclosures and controls, instrumentation boxes, and control centers. EGS manufactures and sells these products under the brand names Appleton, OZ/Gedney, Curlee, and Nelson. The EGS Houston facility is known as Enclosures and Controls (E & C).
EGS hired Barfield as an order entry clerk in 1993. In 1997, she began working in the E & C inside sales group at a salary of $23,520. EGS hired Harrison in 1997. She was promoted to a position in E & C inside sales in 1999, at a salary of $22,175. EGS hired Johnson for an E & C inside sales position in 1999, at a starting salary of $37,000. Beginning in 1999 and until late October 2004, Harrison, Barfield, and Johnson worked together in E & C inside sales in what is known as Building A, or the North Building, of EGS’s Houston facility. The inside sales job requires comprehensive product knowledge in order to customize products and options to meet customer specifications. At times, the completion of a sales quote requires working with engineers to create drawings of the application. Also at times, the job requires creation of drill and tap charts illustrating the position of holes to be drilled on an enclosure. The job requires regular communication and coordination with the engineering, purchasing and planning, and manufacturing departments as well as the outside sales group. Beginning in 2003, each member of the inside sales group was assigned a sales territory. When a customer called in, the person responsible for the customer’s territory would handle the call. Computer records indicate that Harrison, Barfield, and Johnson were responsible for approximately equal sales revenue. Barfield and Johnson continue to work in inside sales.
In late October 2004, Harrison was transferred from the inside sales group in Building A to a position in Building C, or the South Building. Her job still involves inside sales for Appleton-brand products, but she is no longer responsible for her sales territory and no longer provides quotes for customized applications. Her job primarily consists of handling customer service inquiries regarding standard catalog products.
*2 The grade and salary history3 for Harrison, Barfield, and Johnson is illustrated in the following chart:

3

Each position at EGS is designated by grade. Each

grade has a corresponding minimum, competitive, and

1

E.E.O.C. v. EGS Elec. Group, L.L.C., Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2007)

maximum salary range.

Date Barfield

Harrison Johnson

grade/salary grade/salary grade/salary

April 1999

28/$22,175

June 28/$31,200 1999

30/$37,000

Dec.1 999

28/$25,501

April 2000

28/$28,630

July 28/$32,136 2000

Jan.20 01

30/$38,000

Oct.2 001

32/$42,000

Oct.2 002

28/$33,750

Dec.2 28/$33,048 002

April 2003

32/$43,000

Dec.2 28/$33,876 28/$34,599 003

April 2004

32/$50,000

Sept.2 30/$35,570 30/$36,330 004

Nov.2 30/$44,000 30/$44,000 004

May 2005

32/$51,000

July 30/$45,320 2005

Oct.2 005

30/$45,320

2006 30/$46,680 30/$46,226 32/$53,000

It is undisputed that Barfield and Harrison are, and have always been, paid significantly less than Johnson.4 EGS

also does not contest, for summary judgment purposes, that Barfield and Harrison performed essentially the same job as Johnson.5 However, EGS asserts that the pay disparity is based on factors other than gender.

4

EGS motion, at 10.

5

Id. at n. 2.

II. Legal Standards
A. Summary Judgment Summary judgment is appropriate if no genuine issues of material fact exist, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). The party moving for summary judgment has the initial burden to prove there are no genuine issues of material fact for trial. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Goel, 274 F.3d 984, 991 (5th Cir.2001). Dispute about a material fact is “genuine” if the evidence could lead a reasonable jury to find for the nonmoving party. In re Segerstrom, 247 F.3d 218, 223 (5th Cir.2001). “An issue is material if its resolution could affect the outcome of the action.” Terrebonne Parish Sch. Bd. v. Columbia Gulf Transmission Co., 290 F.3d 303, 310 (5th Cir.2002).
If the movant meets this burden, “the nonmovant must go beyond the pleadings and designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Littlefield v. Forney Indep. Sch. Dist ., 268 F.3d 275, 282 (5th Cir.2001) (quoting Tubacex, Inc. v. M/V Risan, 45 F.3d 951, 954 (5th Cir.1995)). If the evidence presented to rebut the summary judgment is not significantly probative, summary judgment should be granted. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). In determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, the court views the evidence and draws inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. at 255.
B. Equal Pay Act In order to prevail on a claim brought under the Equal Pay Act (EPA), the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that:
(1) the employer is subject to the EPA;
(2) the employee performed work in a position requiring equal skill, effort, and responsibility under similar working conditions as an employee of the opposite sex; and
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E.E.O.C. v. EGS Elec. Group, L.L.C., Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2007)

*3 (3) the employee was paid less than the employee of the opposite sex providing the basis of comparison.
See 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1); Chance v. Rice University, 984 F.2d 151, 153 (5th Cir.1993). “Unlike the showing required under Title VII’s disparate treatment theory, proof of discriminatory intent is not required to establish a prima facie case under the Equal Pay Act.” Id. at 1153.
Under the EPA, the employer bears the burden of proof on an affirmative defense that the difference in wages is justified by one of four exceptions contained in the EPA. See Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 196, 94 S.Ct. 2223, 41 L.Ed.2d 1 (1974); Peters, 818 F.2d at 1153. The exception that EGS claims applies here is that the wage differential is “based on any other factor other than sex.” 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1)(iv).6

6

The other three exceptions are for disparate payments

“made pursuant to (i) a seniority system; (ii) a merit

system; [and] (iii) a system which measures earnings

by quantity or quality of production.” 29 U.S.C. §

206(d)(1).

Assessing the probative value of the parties’ competing evidence in EPA cases often requires credibility determinations and detailed factual development, which render these issues inappropriate for disposition through summary judgment. See Brobst v. Columbs Serv. Int’l, 761 F.2d 148, 156 (3d Cir.1985) (“given the fact intensive nature of the inquiry, summary judgment will often be inappropriate”).

C. Title VII A claim of salary discrimination under Title VII closely resembles, but is not identical to, an EPA claim. See Uviedo v. Steves Sash & Door Co., 738 F.2d 1425, 1431 (5th Cir.1984) (“To establish a prima facie case of discrimination respecting compensation a plaintiff must prove (1) that she is a member of a protected class, and (2) that she is paid less than a nonmember for work requiring substantially the same responsibility.”). Title VII incorporates the same defenses available under the EPA. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h). However, in contrast to the EPA, ultimately it is the plaintiff’s burden under Title VII to prove that unequal treatment is the result of intentional discrimination. Celestine v. Petroles de Venezuella SA, 266 F.3d 343, 355 (5th Cir.2001).
In addition to the discriminatory pay claim, the EEOC asserts a Title VII retaliation claim on behalf of Harrison. The Supreme Court recently established standards for a Title VII retaliation claim in Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Rwy. Co. v. White, --- U.S. ----, 126 S.Ct. 2405, 165

L.Ed.2d 345 (2006). In order to establish a claim of retaliation, a plaintiff must show (1) she engaged in protected activity; (2) she was subjected to an action that a reasonable employee would find materially adverse; and (3) a causal link exists between the protected activity and the adverse action. Id.
A materially adverse action for purposes of retaliation need not be an ultimate employment decision as required for proof of a claim under Title VII’s substantive provision. Burlington Northern Ry., 126 S.Ct. at 2414. An action is materially adverse for purposes of Title VII’s retaliation provision if it “well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.” Id. at 2415 (internal citation omitted). Whether or not an action will meet this standard will often depend on the particular circumstances. Id. Moreover, a plaintiff need not show that the protected activity was the sole motivating factor for the adverse action, but only that it was a motivating factor. Medina v. Ramsey Steel Co., 238 F.3d 674, 684 (5th Cir.2001).
III. Analysis
A. Wage Disparity Claims *4 The EEOC has presented uncontradicted evidence that Barfield and Harrison were paid less than Johnson for essentially the same job. EGS argues that it paid Johnson more based on (1) his education and experience; (2) his negotiated starting salary; and (3) EGS’s decision to match two outside job offers. Under the EPA, EGS must do more than merely articulate gender-neutral factors, it must “prove that the pay differential was based on a factor other than sex.” Simpson v. Merchants & Planters Bank, 441 F.3d 572, 579 (8th Cir.2006).
There is a factual dispute as to whether Johnson’s education and experience, starting salary, or outside offers justify a pay disparity in this case. The EEOC has presented some evidence that EGS did not actually rely on Johnson’s education and training in deciding his salary. The 1999 memorandum recommending Johnson’s employment notes his general technical ability and solid work history, but does not refer to his education or industry training as reasons for hiring him.7 Jeff Philippe, the operations manager at EGS who was responsible for Johnson’s performance evaluations and recommended him for raises, knew very little about Johnson’s education and nothing of his industry-related training.8 Johnson testified that he has zero college credits, and his transcript from Kilgore College indicates that he failed every course he took in the Spring of 1988.9 Barfield graduated from high school, and Harrison earned a GED.10 Thus, the three employees have essentially equivalent educational backgrounds.
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E.E.O.C. v. EGS Elec. Group, L.L.C., Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2007)

7

EGS 410, Exhibit O to plaintiff’s response.

8

Philippe Dep. at 49-50.

9

Johnson Dep., Exhibit F to plaintiff’s response, at

43-44; Transcript, Exhibit Q to plaintiff’s response.

to equalize the pay of its employees who were performing the same job at comparable levels of efficiency.15 There is also some evidence to suggest that Johnson’s starting salary was not the product of any real negotiation.16

15

EGS 1305-26, Exhibit O to plaintiff’s response

(showing that in 2004, Barfield was responsible for

$4,717,723.65 worth of business, Harrison

$4,514,805.25, and Johnson $3,778,240.72). Philippe

testified that he considered Barfield the most successful

employee of the three. Philippe Dep., at 52-54.

10

Barfield Aff., Exhibit A to plaintiff’s response, ¶ 6;

Harrison Aff., Exhibit B to plaintiff’s response, ¶ 2.

Furthermore, education and training that are not necessary to perform the job at issue do not justify a wage difference. 29 C.F.R. § 800.125; Simpson, 441 F.3d at 578-79. Philippe, who supervised the three inside sales employees on a daily basis beginning in 2003, testified that Johnson does not utilize his prior education and training in the performance of the inside sales job.11 In addition, Johnson testified that none of the industry training he possesses gives him an advantage because it was necessary to “learn [the job] as you go.” Johnson relied heavily on Barfield and Harrison for on the job training.12 In fact, at the time Johnson was hired, Barfield had been successfully performing the E & C inside sales job for approximately two years, while Johnson’s prior experience was not with a manufacturer and did not involve enclosures and controls for use in hazardous locations.13 A September 12, 2002 salary change form for April Harrison states that she is currently earning less that other employees in the same position with less experience, an apparent reference to Johnson.14

11

Philippe Dep., Exhibit H to plaintiff’s response, at

33-35, 50.

12

Johnson Dep., at 101, 122, 243.

13

Johnson Dep., at 62-63.

16

Johnson Dep., at 133, 138, 276-77 (stating that he

wrote a desired salary range on his application, but he

had no conversations with anyone at EGS about what

salary he would accept).

*5 Finally, EGS contends that the pay disparity is a result of two outside job offers Johnson used as leverage to secure raises. However, when Barfield and Harrison asked whether they could get raises if they had matching outside job offers, they were told EGS does not “play that game,” or “operate that way.”17 Yet, EGS did play that game with Johnson,18 and in fact relies on those offers to justify Johnson’s higher salary. At the time he sought approval for Johnson’s 2004 raise based on an outside job offer, Philippe pulled the files to compare Barfield and Harrison’s compensation rates. He realized then that the raise created a problem because they were doing the same job as Johnson for less pay. Philippe told Jerry McQuade, Vice President of Human Resources for EGS, that the disparity needed to be fixed.19 The fact that Johnson’s salary reflects his market value only highlights the fact that EGS paid Barfield and Harrison well below market levels. This evidence creates a fact issue as to whether Johnson’s outside job offers are factors other than sex that in fact justify the pay differential. The court concludes that EGS has not met its burden to prove its EPA defenses as a matter of law, and the EEOC has met its burden to show a material fact dispute as to whether the pay disparity was the result of discrimination. Therefore, EGS’s motion for summary on the EPA and Title VII salary disparity claims must be denied.

17

Barfield Aff., ¶ 45; Harrison Aff., ¶ 37.

14

EGS 326, Exhibit O to plaintiff’s response (emphasis

added).

EGS also relies on Johnson’s negotiated starting salary in defense of his consistently higher salary. Even if this explains the salary disparity in 1999, it is not an explanation for EGS’s failure over the next several years

18

There is some evidence that EGS also did it for another

male employee, Cris Janin. Harrison ¶ 37; Harrison

Dep., at 183-85.

19

Philippe Dep. at 90-95; EGS 568, Exhibit O to

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E.E.O.C. v. EGS Elec. Group, L.L.C., Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2007)

plaintiff’s response.

B. Title VII Retaliation As to Harrison’s retaliation claim, EGS argues that (1) her transfer is not materially adverse; and (2) the transfer decision was made before Harrison filed her EEOC charge, eliminating any causal link between her protected activity and the transfer. Again, fact questions on these issues preclude summary judgment.
Immediately after filing her charge, Harrison was moved to a position in another building, with non-EGS employees. The majority of her inside sales duties were eliminated, and she was relieved of responsibility for her sales territory. Her physical location makes it difficult for her to handle the ATX sales duties she is assigned. The products she sells are standard catalog products and do not require engineering.20 EGS managers characterize her new position as primarily a customer service position.21 Significantly, there is evidence that other E & C employees perceived Harrison’s move as punishment for her filing an EEOC charge.22 The court concludes there is sufficient evidence to create a fact question as to whether a reasonable employee would consider what happened to Harrison to be materially adverse.

20

Harrison Aff., ¶¶ 42-46, 56.

21

Dreher Dep., Exhibit G to plaintiff’s response, at 61-66,

184-85; Morris Dep., Exhibit J to plaintiff’s response,

at 23-25.

22

Vann Dep., at 174 (“It looked ... to everybody in the

company, that it was a way to punish her, because all

this happened after she filed the suit. Once they found

out about it, ... April was being treated like a third-class

citizen.”).

Fact questions also exist as to when Harrison first engaged in a protected activity, and when management decided to transfer Harrison to another position. It is clear that Harrison engaged in protected activity when she filed her EEOC charge on October 25, 2004. It is also clear that Harrison complained about her salary prior to filing her charge. However, EGS contends that prior to filing her EEOC charge, Harrison never complained that her salary was the product of gender discrimination. An employee who does not identify gender, or other illegal basis under Title VII, as the basis for her treatment does not engage in a protected activity. Harris-Childs v. Medco Health

Solutions, Inc., 169 Fed. Appx. 913, 916 (5th Cir.2006).
*6 On August 18, 2004, Philippe sent an e-mail to McQuade stating “[t]he ladies remind me at least every other day that they are doing the same work for substantial differences in pay.”23 Shortly thereafter, Philippe sent a September 9, 2004 e-mail to Peterson stating that it was “wrong” that the company was paying the women less than a male co-worker, and that Philippe had notified McQuade of the problem in July.24 Thus, there is some evidence to contradict EGS’s position that Harrison did not make it clear that her dissatisfaction with her salary was related to an allegation of gender bias before she filed her EEOC charge. There is some evidence she had made it clear to Philippe as early as July, 2004.

23

EEOC 334, Exhibit O to plaintiff’s response.

24

EGS 329, Exhibit O to plaintiff’s response.

The next issue, then, is whether EGS decided to change Harrison’s job before she engaged in any protected activity.25 EGS contends that the decision to transfer Harrison was made early in 2004 as part of its “Gulf Coast Initiative” to focus on marketing Appleton products to Gulf Coast refinery customers. But Philippe, who took part in meetings during which the Gulf Coast Initiative was discussed, testified that it was not part of the business plan in 2004 to transfer Harrison. In fact, paperwork had just been submitted on October 1, 2004 to move Harrison to the E & C payroll along with Barfield and Johnson.26 An October 21, 2004 e-mail from John Peterson to Jerry McQuade reflects that a change was in the works for Harrison at that time, but it does not indicate when that plan was first conceived.27 There is also some question as to whether that October 21 e-mail reflects the actual move that was implemented on October 27, 2004. While the e-mail indicates that Harrison will be responsible for Appleton quotations while another employee is out on maternity leave, it does not indicate that the move would be permanent. The e-mail also indicates that Harrison will “assist Ray Malek (RDC Mgr) as the order entry and systems guru on the LogPro conversion,” an assignment it appears she was never given.28

25

There is some confusion about when Harrison learned

her job duties would change. Harrison’s October 25,

2004 EEOC charge states that she discovered on

October 22, 2004 that she was being “demoted” to a

customer service position. Exhibit P to plaintiff’s

response. Harrison’s affidavit says she learned about

her permanent transfer for the first time on October 27,

2004, when she arrived at work to find a maintenance

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E.E.O.C. v. EGS Elec. Group, L.L.C., Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2007)

worker packing the contents of her desk. Harrison Aff., ¶ 39. There is no evidence she was aware before October 27, 2004 that the physical location of her work space would change.

26

Philippe Dep., at 124-129; EGS 568, Exhibit O to

plaintiff’s response. Apparently, EGS had neglected to

move Harrison to the E & C payroll after she was

promoted into inside sales in 1999. Harrison was

moved back to the Appleton income statement in

February 2005 and her title was changed from Product

Support Specialist II to ATX & Appleton Inside

Sales/Quotations Correspondent. EGS 340, Exhibit O

to plaintiff’s response.

27

EEOC 1011, Exhibit O to plaintiff’s response.

28

Id.; Harrison Aff., ¶¶ 53-54.

The conflicting evidence about when Harrison first engaged in protected activity and when EGS decided to transfer her prevent entry of summary judgment in EGS’s favor on the Title VII retaliation claim.

IV. Conclusion For the reasons discussed above, EGS’s motion for summary judgment (Dkt.49) is denied. The trial of this case is set for June 25, 2007. The parties’ joint pretrial order is due on June 8, 2007.
	
  

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U.S. District Court SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS (Houston) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 4:05-cv-02945

CLOSED

Equal Emplyment Opportunity Commission v. EGS Electrical Group LLC et al Assigned to: Magistrate Judge Stephen Smith Cause: 28:1331 Fed. Question: Employment Discrimination

Date Filed: 08/22/2005 Date Terminated: 05/24/2007 Jury Demand: Both Nature of Suit: 442 Civil Rights: Jobs Jurisdiction: U.S. Government Plaintiff

Plaintiff
Equal Emplyment Opportunity Commission

represented by Aimee Lynn McFerren EEOC 1919 Smith St 7th Floor Houston, TX 77002 713-209-3390 Fax: 713-209-3402 Email: aimee.mcferren@eeoc.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kathy D Boutchee EEOC 1919 Smith St 7th Floor Houston, TX 77002 713-209-3399 Fax: 713-209-3402 fax Email: kathy.boutchee@eeoc.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V. Defendant EGS Electrical Group LLC

represented by Susan L. Bickley Abrams Scott & Bickley, L.L.P. 700 Louisiana Ste 4000 Houston, Tx 77002-2727 713-228-6601 Fax: 713-228-6605 Email: sbickley@asbtexas.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

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Defendant
Emerson Electrical Company TERMINATED: 08/16/2006

represented by Susan L. Bickley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 08/22/2005 08/22/2005
08/22/2005
08/23/2005 08/23/2005
09/13/2005 09/27/2005 09/28/2005 09/28/2005 10/18/2005
10/19/2005

#

Docket Text

1 COMPLAINT against EGS Electrical Group LLC, Emerson Electric Company (Filing fee $ 250) filed by Equal Emplyment Opportunity Commission.(hlerma, ) Additional attachment(s) added on 8/23/2005 (espencer, ). (Entered: 08/22/2005)
2 ORDER for Initial Pretrial and Scheduling Conference and Order to Disclose Interested Persons. Initial Conference set for 12/2/2005 at 01:00 PM in Courtroom 9F before Judge Nancy F. Atlas. ( Signed by Judge Nancy F. Atlas ) Parties notified. (hlerma, ) (Entered: 08/22/2005)
Summons Issued as to EGS Electrical Group LLC, Emerson Electric Company, EGS Electrical Group, LLD c/o Office of Texas Secretary of State, Emerson Electric Co. Joint Venture Owner of EGS Electrical Group LLC, filed.(hlerma, ) (Entered: 08/22/2005)
Fee waived re: 1 Complaint , filed. (agould, ) (Entered: 08/23/2005)
3 First AMENDED Original Complaint against EGS Electrical Group LLC, Emerson Electric Company filed by Equal Emplyment Opportunity Commission. Related document: 1 Complaint filed by Equal Emplyment Opportunity Commission.(cpeebles) (Entered: 08/24/2005)
4 CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PARTIES by Equal Emplyment Opportunity Commission, filed.(Boutchee, Kathy) (Entered: 09/13/2005)
7 FIRST AMENDED ANSWER to Amended Complaint with Jury Demand by EGS Electrical Group LLC, Emerson Electric Company, filed.(jmarchand, ) (Entered: 09/29/2005)
5 CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PARTIES by EGS Electrical Group LLC, Emerson Electric Company, filed.(psmith, ) (Entered: 09/29/2005)
6 ANSWER to Complaint with Jury Trial Demanded by EGS Electrical Group LLC, Emerson Electric Company, filed.(mkallie, ) (Entered: 09/29/2005)
8 Unopposed MOTION to Substitute Attorney Aimee L. McFerren in place of Kathy D. Boutchee by Equal Emplyment Opportunity Commission, filed. Motion Docket Date 11/7/2005. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(McFerren, Aimee) (Entered: 10/18/2005)
9 ORDER granting 8 Motion to Substitute Attorney Attorney Kathy D Boutchee terminated .( Signed by Judge Nancy F. Atlas ) Parties notified.(sashabranner, ) (Entered: 10/19/2005)

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10/19/2005 10/26/2005 11/04/2005 11/28/2005 12/02/2005 12/02/2005
12/09/2005 12/09/2005 01/05/2006
02/28/2006 02/28/2006 02/28/2006 05/31/2006

10 SUMMONS Returned Executed. EGS Electrical Group LLC served on 9/15/2005, answer due 10/5/2005, filed.(espencer, ) (Entered: 10/21/2005)
11 JOINT DISCOVERY/CASE MANAGEMENT PLAN by Equal Emplyment Opportunity Commission, filed. (Attachments: # 1 Defense counsel's signature)(McFerren, Aimee) (Entered: 10/26/2005)
12 SUMMONS Returned Executed. EGS Electrical Group LLC served on 9/15/2005, answer due 10/5/2005, filed.(mkallie, ) (Entered: 11/10/2005)
13 SECOND AMENDED ANSWER to 3 Amended Complaint/Counterclaim/Crossclaim etc. with Jury Demand by all defendants, filed. (jmarchand, ) (Entered: 11/30/2005)
14 MINUTE ENTRY ORDER: Pretrial conference held. Appearances: Stephanie Orr. Susan Louise Bickley, Aimee Lynn McFerren. ERO: Handley..Docket control order.( Signed by Judge Nancy F. Atlas ) Parties notified.(sashabranner, ) (Entered: 12/05/2005)
17 DOCKET CONTROL ORDER: ETT: 3-4.5 days. Jury Trial Amended Pleadings due by 2/28/2006; Joinder of Parties due by 2/28/2006; Pltf Expert Report due by 4/30/2006; Deft/Counter-Deft Expert Report due by 5/31/2006; Rebuttal Opinions from existing experts due by 6/14/2006; Discovery due by 7/31/2006; Dispositive Motion Filing due by 8/25/2006; All other pretrial motions due by 8/25/2006; Mediation due by 10/9/2006; Joint Pretrial Order due by 11/12/2006; Docket Call set for 11/17/2006 at 04:00 PM in Courtroom 9F before Judge Nancy F. Atlas.( Signed by Judge Nancy F. Atlas ) Parties notified.(csonnier, ) (Entered: 12/12/2005)
15 PROPOSED AGREED PROTECTIVE ORDER re: 3 Amended Complaint/Counterclaim/Crossclaim etc., 1 Complaint, filed.(mkadlubowski, ) (Entered: 12/09/2005)
16 AGREED PROTECTIVE ORDER GRANTING 15 Proposed Order.( Signed by Judge Nancy F. Atlas ) Parties notified.(csonnier, ) (Entered: 12/12/2005)
18 Second AMENDED Complaint against all defendants filed by Equal Emplyment Opportunity Commission. Related document: 3 Amended Complaint/Counterclaim/Crossclaim etc. filed by Equal Emplyment Opportunity Commission,, 1 Complaint filed by Equal Emplyment Opportunity Commission,.(McFerren, Aimee) (Entered: 01/05/2006)
19 NOTICE to Take Deposition of Glenn A. Johnson by all defendants, filed. (Bickley, Susan) (Entered: 02/28/2006)
20 NOTICE to Take Deposition of Karen Barfield by all defendants, filed. (Bickley, Susan) (Entered: 02/28/2006)
21 NOTICE to Take Deposition of April Harrison by all defendants, filed. (Bickley, Susan) (Entered: 02/28/2006)
22 DESIGNATION OF EXPERT WITNESS LIST by all defendants, filed. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Bickley, Susan) (Entered: 05/31/2006)

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06/19/2006 06/19/2006 06/19/2006 06/22/2006 06/26/2006 06/27/2006 06/27/2006 06/27/2006 07/06/2006 07/10/2006 07/19/2006 07/31/2006
08/15/2006

23 OBJECTIONS to Notice of Oral Deposition of Dane Dreher with Subpoena Duces Tecum, filed by all defendants. (Bickley, Susan) (Entered: 06/19/2006)
24 OBJECTIONS to Amended Notice of Oral Deposition of Jerry McQuade with Subpoena Duces Tecum, filed by all defendants. (Bickley, Susan) (Entered: 06/19/2006)
25 OBJECTIONS to Notice of Oral Deposition of John Peterson with Subpoena Duces Tecum, filed by all defendants. (Bickley, Susan) (Entered: 06/19/2006)
27 ORDER OF RECUSAL. Judge Nancy F. Atlas recused. Case reassigned to Judge Lynn N. Hughes and Lynn N. Hughes for all further proceedings.( Signed by Judge Nancy F. Atlas ) Parties notified.(swhite) (Entered: 06/26/2006)
26 Unopposed MOTION to Modify Scheduling Order by Equal Emplyment Opportunity Commission, filed. Motion Docket Date 7/17/2006. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(McFerren, Aimee) (Entered: 06/26/2006)
28 Order: Pretrial Conference set for 6/30/2006 at 02:00 PM in Room 11122 before Judge Lynn N. Hughes. (Signed by Judge Lynn N. Hughes) Parties notified. (dkelly, ) (Entered: 06/27/2006)
29 EMAIL from Susan Bickley re: request to move pretrial conference because of vacation, filed. (dkelly, ) (Entered: 06/27/2006)
30 Order Resetting Conference. Pretrial Conference reset for 7/31/2006 at 11:00 AM in Room 11122 before Judge Lynn N. Hughes. (Signed by Judge Lynn N. Hughes) Parties notified. (dkelly, ) (Entered: 06/27/2006)
31 NOTICE of attorney substitution by Equal Emplyment Opportunity Commission. Attorney Boutchee, Kathy D. added, filed. (Boutchee, Kathy) (Entered: 07/06/2006)
32 OBJECTIONS to Amended Notice of Oral Deposition of John Peterson, filed by all defendants. (Bickley, Susan) (Entered: 07/10/2006)
33 ORDER denying 26 Motion to Modify the scheduling order. The parties will discuss deadlines with the court at the conference of 7/31/2006.( Signed by Judge Lynn N. Hughes ) Parties notified.(dkelly, ) (Entered: 07/19/2006)
34 CONFERENCE MEMORANDUM: Appearances: Susan L. Bickley, Kathy D Boutchee, Aimee Lynn McFerren, Stephanie Orr. Ct Reporter: J. Sanchez. By 8/01/2006, EGS must give the EEOC (a) a chart of the chain of authority from Barfield, Harrison, and Johnson up to John Peterson; and (b) the names of the inside salesmen from January 1, 2001, to present with their territories, product lines, sex, tenure, pay data, and promotions. Order to be entered. Pretrial Conference set for 8/15/2006 at 03:00 PM in Room 11122 before Judge Lynn N. Hughes.( Signed by Judge Lynn N. Hughes ) Parties notified.(dkelly, ) (Entered: 08/01/2006)
35 CONFERENCE MEMORANDUM: Appearances: Susan L. Bickley, Kathy D Boutchee, Aimee Lynn McFerren, Stephanie Orr. Ct Reporter: S. Carlisle. Order to be entered. Pretrial Conference set for 9/5/2006 at 04:00 PM in Room 11122 before Judge Lynn N. Hughes.( Signed by Judge Lynn N. Hughes ) Parties notified.(dkelly, ) (Entered: 08/16/2006)

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08/15/2006 08/15/2006
09/05/2006 09/08/2006 09/08/2006 09/08/2006 09/12/2006 09/28/2006 09/28/2006
09/29/2006 10/17/2006 01/22/2007 01/23/2007

36 INTERLOCUTORY JUDGMENT: On the oral motion of EGS, Emerson Electric Company is dismissed with prejudice.( Signed by Judge Lynn N. Hughes ) Parties notified.(dkelly, ) (Entered: 08/16/2006)
37 ORDER: By 8/16/06, EGS must give the EEOC a hierarchy diagram that explains its relation to Emerson Electric. By 8/18/06, the EEOC must give EGS Philippe's statement. By 9/1/06, the parties must depose Morris and Vann.( Signed by Judge Lynn N. Hughes ) Parties notified.(dkelly, ) (Entered: 08/16/2006)
39 CONFERENCE MEMORANDUM: Appearances: Susan L. Bickley, Kathy D Boutchee, Aimee Lynn McFerren, Stephanie Orr. Ct Reporter: A. Manley. Order to be entered.( Signed by Judge Lynn N. Hughes ) Parties notified.(dkelly, ) (Entered: 09/08/2006)
38 CONSENT to Jurisdiction by US Magistrate Judge by all parties, filed.(Bickley, Susan) (Entered: 09/08/2006)
40 ORDER following conference. ( Signed by Judge Lynn N. Hughes ) Parties notified.(dkelly, ) (Entered: 09/08/2006)
41 ORDER TRANSFERRING CASE. Case reassigned to Judge Stephen Smith for all further proceedings. Judge Lynn N. Hughes no longer assigned to the case.( Signed by Judge Lynn N. Hughes ) Parties notified.(dkelly, ) (Entered: 09/11/2006)
42 NOTICE of Hearing. Parties notified Status Conference set for 9/28/2006 at 02:00 PM in Courtroom 702 before Magistrate Judge Stephen Wm Smith, filed. (jmarchand) (Entered: 09/12/2006)
43 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Stephen Wm Smith. STATUS CONFERENCE held on 9/28/2006. Scheduling order issued. Appearances:Stafanie Orr. Susan L. Bickley, Kathy D Boutchee, Aimee Lynn McFerren.(ERO:Yes), filed.(jmarchand) (Entered: 09/29/2006)
44 SCHEDULING ORDER: ETT: 5 days. Jury trial. Dispositive Motion Filing due by 1/22/2007. Non-Dispositive Motion Filing due by 1/22/2007. Jury Trial set for 3/26/2007 at 09:30 AM in Courtroom 702 before Magistrate Judge Stephen Wm Smith.( Signed by Judge Stephen Wm Smith ) Parties notified.(jmarchand) (Entered: 09/29/2006)
45 Docket Control ORDER: Dispositive Motion Filing due by 1/22/2007 Non-Dispositive Motion Filing due by 1/22/2007 Mediation due by 1/31/2007 Joint Pretrial Order due by 3/12/07.( Signed by Judge Stephen Smith ) Parties notified.(smurdock, ) Modified on 9/29/2006 (smurdock, ). (Entered: 09/29/2006)
46 Return of Service Executed as to Jeff Phillippe on 9/29/2006 re: Subpoena, filed.(ejuarez, ) Modified on 10/23/2006 (ltien, ). (Entered: 10/19/2006)
47 First MOTION for Extension of Time to File Dispositive Motions by EGS Electrical Group LLC, filed. Motion Docket Date 2/12/2007. (Attachments: # 1)(Bickley, Susan) (Entered: 01/22/2007)
48 CERTIFICATE of Conference re: 47 First MOTION for Extension of Time to File Dispositive Motions by EGS Electrical Group LLC, filed.(Bickley, Susan)

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01/26/2007
02/02/2007 02/14/2007 02/16/2007 02/21/2007 02/21/2007 02/21/2007
02/21/2007 02/21/2007

(Entered: 01/23/2007)
49 MOTION for Summary Judgment by EGS Electrical Group LLC, filed. Motion Docket Date 2/15/2007. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Exhibit B# 3 Exhibit C# 4 Exhibit D# 5 Exhibit E (Part 1 of 3)# 6 Exhibit E (Part 2 of 3)# 7 Exhibit E (Part 3 of 3)# 8 Exhibit F# 9 Exhibit G (Part 1 of 3)# 10 Exhibit G (Part 2 of 3)# 11 Exhibit G (Part 3 of 3)# 12 Exhibit H# 13 Exhibit I# 14 Exhibit J# 15 Exhibit K# 16 Proposed Order)(Bickley, Susan) Modified on 1/30/2007 (ledwards, ). (Entered: 01/26/2007)
50 ORDER granting 47 Motion for Extension of Time. Dispositive motions to be filed by 1/26/2007.( Signed by Judge Stephen Wm Smith ) Parties notified.(jmarchand) (Entered: 02/02/2007)
51 Unopposed MOTION for Extension of Time Respond to Motion for Summary Judgment by Equal Emplyment Opportunity Commission, filed. Motion Docket Date 3/6/2007. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Boutchee, Kathy) (Entered: 02/14/2007)
52 ORDER granting 51 Motion for Extension of Time. Plaintiff to have through 2/20/2007 to file response to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.( Signed by Judge Stephen Wm Smith ) Parties notified.(jmarchand) Additional attachment(s) added on 3/14/2007 (rwestmoreland, ). (Entered: 02/16/2007)
53 First RESPONSE to 49 MOTION for Summary Judgment, filed by Equal Emplyment Opportunity Commission. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(McFerren, Aimee) Additional attachment(s) added on 3/26/2007 (ltien, ). Additional attachment(s) added on 3/26/2007 (ltien, ). Additional attachment(s) added on 3/26/2007 (ltien, ). (Entered: 02/21/2007)
54 Corrected RESPONSE to 49 MOTION for Summary Judgment, filed by Equal Emplyment Opportunity Commission. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order # 2 Exhibit # 3 Exhibit # 4 Exhibit # 5 Exhibit # 6 Exhibit # 7 Exhibit # 8 Exhibit # 9 Exhibit # 10 Exhibit # 11 Exhibit # 12 Exhibit # 13 Exhibit # 14 Exhibit # 15 Exhibit # 16 Exhibit # 17 Exhibit # 18 Exhibit)(McFerren, Aimee) (Entered: 02/21/2007)
55 Additional Exhibits to 54 Memorandum in Response to 49 MOTION for Summary Judgment, filed by Equal Emplyment Opportunity Commission. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit # 2 Exhibit # 3 Exhibit # 4 Exhibit # 5 Exhibit # 6 Exhibit # 7 Exhibit # 8 Exhibit # 9 Exhibit # 10 Exhibit # 11 Exhibit # 12 Exhibit # 13 Exhibit # 14 Exhibit # 15 Exhibit # 16 Exhibit # 17 Exhibit # 18 Exhibit # 19 Exhibit # 20 Exhibit # 21 Exhibit)(McFerren, Aimee) Modified on 2/26/2007 - linked to #54 (ltien, ). (Entered: 02/21/2007)
56 MOTION for Extension of Time File Response to Motion for Summary Judgment by Equal Emplyment Opportunity Commission, filed. Motion Docket Date 3/13/2007. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Boutchee, Kathy) (Entered: 02/21/2007)
57 CERTIFICATE of Conference re: 56 MOTION for Extension of Time File Response to Motion for Summary Judgment by Equal Emplyment Opportunity Commission, filed.(Boutchee, Kathy) (Entered: 02/21/2007)

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03/21/2007 04/04/2007 04/24/2007
04/30/2007 05/17/2007 05/23/2007 05/24/2007

58 ORDER granting 56 Motion for Extension of Time.( Signed by Judge Stephen Wm Smith ) Parties notified.(jmarchand) (Entered: 02/22/2007)
59 Unopposed MOTION for Continuance Docket Control Order Deadlines by Equal Emplyment Opportunity Commission, filed. Motion Docket Date 3/20/2007. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Boutchee, Kathy) (Entered: 02/28/2007)
60 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Stephen Wm Smith. TELEPHONE CONFERENCE held on 3/9/2007. New scheduling order issued. Appearances: Susan L. Bickley, Kathy D Boutchee, Aimee Lynn McFerren.(ERO:B. Goolsby), filed.(jmarchand) (Entered: 03/09/2007)
61 ORDER granting 59 Unopposed MOTION for Continuance Docket Control Order Deadlines Joint Pretrial Order due by 6/8/2007. Jury Trial set for 6/25/2007 at 09:30 AM in Courtroom 702 before Magistrate Judge Stephen Wm Smith.( Signed by Judge Stephen Wm Smith ) Parties notified.(jmarchand) (Entered: 03/09/2007)
62 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER denying 49 MOTION for Summary Judgment. Trial settings remain in effect.( Signed by Judge Stephen Wm Smith ) Parties notified. (jmarchand) (Entered: 03/21/2007)
63 MOTION for Reconsideration of 49 MOTION for Summary Judgment by EGS Electrical Group LLC, filed.Motion Docket Date 4/24/2007. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibit A# 2 Proposed Order Order Granting Motion for Reconsideration)(Bickley, Susan) (Entered: 04/04/2007)
64 MEMORANDUM in Opposition to Defendant's 63 MOTION for Reconsideration and MOTION to Strike Exhibit A to Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration, filed by Equal Emplyment Opportunity Commission. Motion Docket Date 5/14/2007. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(McFerren, Aimee) Motion to Strike added on 4/27/2007 (ltien, ). (Entered: 04/24/2007)
65 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER denying 64 MOTION to Strike, 63 MOTION for Reconsideration of 49 MOTION for Summary Judgment. ( Signed by Judge Stephen Wm Smith ) Parties notified. (jmarchand) (Entered: 04/30/2007)
66 Alternative Dispute Resolution Memorandum; case settled, filed.(sbyrum, ) (Entered: 05/21/2007)
67 Agreed MOTION for Entry of Order re: Consent Decree by Equal Emplyment Opportunity Commission, filed. Motion Docket Date 6/12/2007. (Attachments: # 1 Consent Decree# 2 Exhibit Ex. A to Consent Decree)(McFerren, Aimee) (Entered: 05/23/2007)
68 ORDER granting 67 Agreed MOTION for Entry of Order re: Consent Decree. Case terminated on 5/24/2007. ( Signed by Judge Stephen Wm Smith ) Parties notified. (jmarchand) (Entered: 05/24/2007)

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[CONTENT] August 2005 | Houston | EEOC | EGS Electrical Group | LLC | Emerson Electrical Company | District Court | the Southern District | Texas ||| EEOC | the Equal Pay Act | Title VII ||| Two ||| January 2007 | March 2007 ||| May 2007 ||| 45,000.00 | two ||| Title VII | Houston | EEOC | annually ||| 18 months ||| 2008 [SUMMARY] In August 2005 the Houston office of the EEOC brought this suit against EGS Electrical Group, LLC and Emerson Electrical Company in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas. In its complaint, the EEOC alleged that the defendant violated the Equal Pay Act and Title VII by engaging in sex-based wage discrimination. Two female charging parties were allegedly paid less than a male counterpart, and one party was allegedly retaliated against for filing a charge of discrimination.

In January 2007 the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, which was denied in March 2007. The case was resolved by the entry of a consent decree in May 2007. The decree awarded $45,000.00 to each of the two female complainants, and their salaries were increased to match that of a male comparator. The defendant was required to provide Title VII and Equal Pay Act training to its employees, post a notice of rights at its Houston facility, and report to the EEOC annually with all complaints of sex-based wage discrimination. The settlement term was 18 months. The docket sheet does not show any further enforcement; the case was presumably closed in 2008.
