Case 2:07-cv-00380-GW-FFM Document 90 Filed 03/08/09 Page 1 of 25 Page ID #:552

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Michael Nozzi, et al.

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)

Plaintiff(s),

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V.

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Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles, )

et al.

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Defendant(s).

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____________________________))

No. CV 07-380-GW(FFMx)
RULING ON CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Case 2:07-cv-00380-GW-FFM Document 90 Filed 03/08/09 Page 2 of 25 Page ID #:553
Nozzi v. Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles, Case No. CV 07-0380 Ruling on Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiffs in this action are two recipients of federal benefits under the "Section 8 Housing Voucher Program" (henceforth "S8HVP") pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(o), and a non-profit advocacy organization. Defendants are the Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles (henceforth "HACLA") and Rudolf Montiel, the Executive Director of HACLA. In their First Amended Class Action Complaint (henceforth "FAC"), Plaintiffs alleged five causes of action: (1) "Denial of Due Process of Law (42 U.S.C. § 1983)" for failing to provide adequate notice to S8HVP recipients pursuant to 24 C.F.R. § 982.505(c)(3)(ii) before implementing a reduction of housing benefits; (2) "Violation of Rights created by 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(Private Right of Action Available under 42 U.S.C. § 1983)"; (3) "Violation of Cal. Gov't. Code§ 815.6"; (4) "Violation of Art. I, § 7 of California Constitution"; and (5) "Negligence" pursuant to California Government Code§ 815.2, Civil Code§ 1714 and Evidence Code§ 669. On November 26, 2007, this Court entered an order (henceforth "11/26/07 Order") dismissing Plaintiffs' Second and Fifth Causes of Action.
Plaintiffs and Defendants have filed cross-motions for summary judgment as to Plaintiffs' First Cause of Action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Third Cause of Action under California Government Code§ 815.6, and the Fourth Cause of Action under Article I, Section 7, ofthe California Constitution. For the following reasons, summary judgment is GRANTED on each of those causes of action in favor of Defendants and against Plaintiffs.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Statutory and Regulatory Scheme In its 11/26/07 Order, this Court described the relevant statutory and regulatory scheme in detail. That discussion is incorporated herein and a copy of the Order is attached hereto. To briefly reiterate, the Section 8 housing program was created to help low income families obtain housing by subsidizing private landlords who would rent to low-income tenants. See Cisneros v. Alpine Ridge Group, 508 U.S. 10, 12 (1993). One ofthe Section 8 programs is the S8HVP. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(o); 24 C.F.R. § 982.1(a)(l). The S8HVP is usually administered by a state or local governmental entity called a "public housing agency" or '"PHA" within a designated geographic area. See 24 C.F.R. § 982.1(a)(1). The United States Department ofHousing and Urban Development ("HUD") provides housing assistance funds to the PHAs and also supplies money for the PHAs' administration of the programs. Jd. HUD publishes the fair market rents (henceforth "FMR") for designated geographic areas in the United States. 24 C.F.R. §§ 888.111 and 982.503(a). A PHA must adopt a payment schedule that establishes "voucher payment standard amounts" (henceforth "VPSA") for each FMR area within its jurisdiction. See 24 C.F.R. § 982.503(a). The PHA may establish the payment standard amount for a unit size at any level between 90 percent and 110 percent of the
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published FMR for that unit size without HUD approval. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(o)(l)(B); see also 24 C.F.R. § 982.503(b)(l). It may also establish a separate payment standard amount within the basic range for a designated part of an FMR area. 24 C.F.R. § 982.503(b)(l)(ii). HUD approval is not required for HACLA to reduce the VPSA within the prescribed basic range. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(o)(l)(B); see also 24 C.F.R. § 982.503(b)(l).
As conceded by the Plaintiffs in their FAC, "PHAs have discretion to raise or lower the VPS[A] within a statutorily prescribed range." See FAC at~ 26. If a PHA decreases the amounts on the payment standard schedule, "the lower payment standard amount generally must be used to calculate the monthly housing assistance payment for the family beginning at the effective date of the family's second regular reexamination following the effective date of the decrease in the payment standard amount." 24 C.F.R. § 982.505(c)(3). Under the regulations promulgated by HUD, the PHA is required to advise the S8HVP participants that the application of the lower payment standard will be so deferred. See C.F.R. § 982.505(c)(3)(ii). 24 C.F.R. § 982.5 requires that such notice be in writing.
B. HACLA's Reduction of the VPSA As eventually memorialized in a "Memorandum of Understanding" entered into between HUD and HACLA in April2004, HUD required HACLA to address the latter's "significant projected deficits" in its S8HVP program and to bring its spending on Housing Assistance Payments ("HAP") into line with the HUD budget at the time. See Plaintiffs' Separate Statement of Genuine Issues of Material Facts in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment ("PSSGI") at~ 10. HACLA elected to use its discretionary authority to take certain actions to reduce HAP expenditures, including lowering the VSPA within the prescribed basic range allowed by the statute and the HUD regulation. Id. at~ 11. On March 26, 2004, HACLA's Board of Commissioners ("Board") voted to reduce the VPSA from 110% to 100% ofthe FMR. Id. at~ 12. On August 25, 2004, a public hearing, with public comments, was held on HACLA's "Year 2005 Agency Plan" where the Board emphasized that the 2004 VPSA reduction would not take effect until the Spring of2005. Id. at~ 14. Prior to the August hearing, copies ofHACLA's draft of its 2005 Agency Plan, which included information relating to the VPSA reduction, were made available at all HACLA offices. Id. at~ 15. In addition, HACLA conducted approximately twenty outreach meetings at public housing sites and seven regional Section 8 meetings which included a slideshow presentation detailing the effects of the 2004 VPSA reduction. Id. at ~ 16. The written notice of the 2004 VPSA reduction ("reduction notice") was sent to each Housing Choice Voucher Program participant on or about the date of the participants' annual reexamination, a "full" year before the 2004 VPSA reduction was to go into effect. Id. at~ 17. The reduction notice stated that:
Effective April 2, 2004, the Housing Authority lowered the payment standards used to determine your portion of the rent. We will not apply these lower payment standards until your next regular reexamination. If you move, however, these new lower payment standards will apply to your next unit. PSSGI ~ 18; Fields Decl., Ex. I. The reduction notice also contained a chart detailing the new payment standard by unit size. Id. at~ 19; Fields Decl., Ex I. Plaintiffs received the reduction
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notice. Id. at ,-r 21.
III. DISCUSSION
A. First Cause Of Action In its 11/26/07 Order, this Court wrote:
Plaintiffs' SCA [Second Cause of Action] is based on the following syllogism: 1) the S8VHP benefits are "a federally secured right"; 2) HUD regulations flesh out how HACLA's monthly payments are to be calculated; 3) by failing to provide the required notice, HACLA's reduction in S8HVP benefits is unlawful and 4) "HACLA, therefore, violated 42 U.S.C. § 143 7f(o)(2) by failing to make the required payments under the 'applicable payment standard'" which constitutes a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See FAC at ,-r,-r 68-69. Docket No. 63, 7:2-6. The Court found that this argument failed for a number of reasons. First, inadequate notice is not itself cognizable as a §1983 claim. Second, where (as here) the issue does not concern the procedural fairness of individual eligibility determinations and notice is not required by the governing statute but only in a concomitant regulation, Defendants' alleged failure to give notice as required by 24 C.F.R. § 982.505(c)(3) could not give rise to a§ 1983 claim, because a regulation cannot create a right where Congress did not. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 291 (2001). Finally, even if the regulation here somehow could create a private right of action, HACLA has not violated the notice provision as set out in the regulation. Docket No. 63, 9:25-28. In its previous Order, the Court also wrote that, although the statute did not impose any obligation with respect to notice, a failure of notice might still give rise to a due process complaint that could, in turn, give rise to a §1983 claim. This, in essence, is the substance of the First Cause of Action. Rather than alleging the violation of a specific statutory right to receive notice that is enforceable under § 1983, it alleges that Plaintiffs were deprived of a protected property interest without due process. The "minimum" elements of a claim for procedural due process are "(I) a liberty or property interest protected by the Constitution; (2) a deprivation of the interest by the government; and (3) lack of process." Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1129 (9th Cir. 1996). Because the undisputed evidence establishes that Plaintiffs have not demonstrated the deprivation of a protected interest or a failure of due process, summary judgment as to the First Cause of Action is GRANTED in favor of Defendants.
1. Is There a Protectable Property Interest in Notice Alone? As an initial matter, the Court rejects Defendants' contention that the cases- Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329 (1997), and Gozanga University v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 285 (2002)apply to Plaintiffs First Cause of Action. The First Cause of Action does not, as the Second Cause of Action purported to do, assert the violation of a right secured by federal statutes. Nor, obviously, is § 1983 limited in its application to the vindication of such rights. As noted above,
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the relevant threshold inquiry is whether Plaintiffs can establish a property interest that is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Defendants argue that, because HACLA had statutory discretion to reduce the VPSA, "the law is clear that there is no property interest for Plaintiffs to assert." To say categorically that Plaintiffs could not have had any property interest in the benefit they were receiving is, at best, an oversimplification. It is clear, in the abstract at least, that Plaintiffs can have "a constitutionally protected 'property' interest in Section 8 benefits by virtue of [their] membership in a class of individuals whom the Section 8 program was intended to benefit." Ressler v. Pierce, 692 F.2d 1212, 1215 (9th Cir. 1982); see also Walters v. Nat'l A..ss'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 320 n.8 (1985) ("this Court has held that a person receiving ... benefits [under a federal statutory program] has a 'property' interest in their continued receipt."). Nevertheless, the argument could be made (and perhaps this is the argument that HACLA is trying to make) that the only protectible claim of entitlement they could have is in the minimum allowable VPSA that the housing authority could permissibly establish without HUD approval- i.e., 90% of the published FMR. Because the Defendants have not sought to lower the VSPA amount below the prescribed basic range and because the Plaintiffs have conceded that the Defendants did not act improperly in deciding to reduce the VPSA amounts from 110% to 100% of the published FMR, the claimed property interest that has been allegedly violated herein is not as to the benefits themselves.
A statute, rule or regulation may create an entitlement to a government benefit. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972) ("Property interests, of course, are not created by the Constitution. Rather, they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law - rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those benefits."); see also Allen v. Beverly Hills, 911 F.2d 367, 370 (9th Cir. 1990) (looking to "California state law or City rules and regulations" to decide whether plaintiff had a property interest in continued employment). In Allen, the appellate court wrote:
Whether an expectation of entitlement is sufficient to create a property interest "will depend largely upon the extent to which the statute contains mandatory language that restricts the discretion of the [decisionmaker]." Jacobson v. Hannifin, 627 F.2d 177, 180 (9th Cir. 1980) (Jacobson). If "the decision to confer a benefit is unconstrained by 'particularized standards or criteria,' no entitlement exists." Fidelity Financial Corp. v. Federal Home Loan Bank, 792 F.2d 1432, 1436 (9th Cir. 1986) (Fidelity), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1064,93 L. Ed. 2d 998, 107 S. Ct. 949 (1987), quoting Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 249, 75 L. Ed. 2d 813, 103 S. Ct. 1741 (1983); see also Loehr v. Ventura County Community College District, 743 F.2d 1310, 1315 (9th Cir. 1984); Association of Orange County Deputy Sheriffs v. Gates, 716 F.2d 733, 734 (9th Cir. 1983) (Orange County Deputy Sheriffs), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 937, 104 S. Ct. 1909, 80 L. Ed. 2d 458 (1984); City of Santa Clara v. Andrus, 572 F.2d 660, 676 (9th Cir.) ("[AJ statute will create an
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entitlement to a governmental benefit either if the statute sets out conditions under which the benefit must be granted or if the statute sets out the only conditions under which the benefit may be denied.") (quotation omitted, emphasis in original), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 859, 99 S. Ct. 176, 58 L. Ed. 2d 167 (1978). 911 F.2d at 370. Here, the relevant statute places no restriction on the PHA's discretion to raise or lower the VPSA within the prescribed basic range. Thus, arguably, HACLA's lowering the VPSA from 110% to 100% ofthe FMR did not effect a cognizable "property interest." However, because 24 C.P.R. § 982.505(c)(3) provides for a three-step procedure that must be followed when a decrease in payment amounts occurs during a HAP contract term, there might be some argument for the view that there could be a property interest in the "current" VPSA. But see Atkins v. Parker, 472 U.S. 115, 129-30 (1985). On the other hand, the regulation does not so much set out the conditions under which the benefit may be lowered as the procedure that must be followed after the benefit is lowered. Even assuming that the regulation is sufficient to create a property interest as described, that property interest would be contingent upon Plaintiffs not having received the regulatory notice. Plaintiffs' papers never adequately explain why the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and not the regulation itself, should be determinative of the nature and sufficiency of the notice required. Plaintiffs' characterization of the potential interest at stake is often confusing. For example, Plaintiffs write: "Section 8 tenants have a property interest in this regulation (including in receiving timely notice of a change in the VPS[A] standard that effectively reduces their benefit and increases their rent) either on its O\VTI or in combination with their section 8 tenancy and/or California law allowing them to enforce federal regulations enacted for their benefit." Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment ("DMSJ Opp.") 1:25-2:5. It is safe to say that no one can have a property interest in a regulation or a property interest "in receiving timely notice," because there can only be a property interest in property. 1 The regulatory notice requirement is arguably the only "restriction" (if that is the appropriate word) on HACLA's ability to reduce the VPSA within HUD limits. If the notice procedures set forth in 24 C.F.R. § 982.505(c)(3) were followed, it would obviate any property interest Plaintiffs might have claimed in continuing to receive the benefit they were receiving prior to the reduction. It does not aid our analysis in any way to think of this fact - as Plaintiffs would have us do- as creating a property interest in receiving notice. Nor is it useful to collapse the analysis of whether there is a protected interest into the analysis of whether there was due process. They are two separate inquiries. Plaintiffs' efforts to characterize their interest in receiving adequate notice as a property interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment are understandable, because it is easy to see that the consequences of a sudden reduction in benefits
1 At page 2 of their opposition, Plaintiffs write, "As we shall discuss, Defendants fail to recognize that the right to notice of a change in benefits is part of the property interest here, and so the fact that HACLA could change the benefit does not eviscerate the property interest in the benefit." However, Plaintiffs never fulfill their promise by articulating exactly how a person can have a "property interest" in receiving notice of a change in benefits which is separate and legally cognizable from the underlying benefit/property itself.
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to a Section 8 participant could be potentially devastating. However, Plaintiffs simply have not presented a coherent theory for stating such a § 1983 claim in the present context.
2. The First Cause of Action Is Untenable in Light of the Holding in Atkins. Plaintiffs' due process cause of action based upon purported insufficiency of notice is contrary to the holding ofthe Supreme Court in Atkins v. Parker, 472 U.S. 115 (1985). In Atkins, Congress had amended the Food Stamp Act to reduce the earned-income "disregard" used in computing eligibility from 20 percent to 18 percent. Thereafter, the Massachusetts Department of Public Welfare mailed a notice to all food-stamp recipients with earned income in the state notifying them that: 1) the reduction might result in a lowering or termination of their benefits; 2) they had a right to request a hearing; and 3) their benefits would be reinstated if a hearing was requested within ten days of the notice. A class action was brought claiming that the notice was inadequate. The lower courts agreed and found that the initial and subsequent notices violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The statute itself did not mandate any notice at all but merely provided that a household "which timely requests ... a fair hearing after receiving individual notice of agency action reducing or terminating its benefits" would continue to receive the same level of benefits until the hearing is completed. Id. at 12324. In reversing the lower courts' rulings, the Court initially observed that:
Food-stamp benefits, like the welfare benefits at issue in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), "are a matter of statutory entitlement for persons qualified to receive them." !d., at 262 (footnote omitted). Such entitlements are appropriately treated as a form of "property" protected by the Due Process Clause; accordingly, the procedures that are employed in determining whether an individual may continue to participate in the statutory program must comply with the commands of the Constitution. Id. at 128. The Court went on to hold that:
This case, however, does not concern the procedural fairness of individual eligibility determinations. Rather, it involves a legislatively mandated substantive change in the scope of the entire program. Such a change must, of course, comply with the substantive limitations on the power of Congress, but there is no suggestion in this case that the amendment at issue violated any
such constraint. * * * * The procedural component of the
Due Process Clause does not "impose a constitutional limitation on the power of Congress to make substantive changes in the law of entitlement to public benefits." Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78, 81 (1971).
The congressional decision to lower the earned-income deduction from 20 percent to 18 percent gave many food-stamp households a less valuable entitlement in 1982 than they had received in 1981. But the 1981 entitlement did not include any
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right to have the program continue indefinitely at the same level, or

to phrase it another way, did not include any right to the

maintenance of the same level of property entitlement. Before the

statutory change became effective, the existing property

entitlement did not qualify the legislature's power to substitute a

different, less valuable entitlement at a later date. As we have

frequently noted: "[A] welfare recipient is not deprived of due

process when the legislature adjusts benefit levels.... [T]he

legislative determination provides all the process that is due."

The participants in the food-stamp program had no greater

right to advance notice of the legislative change - in this case, the

decision to change the earned-income disregard level - than did any

other voters.

*

*

*

*

The claim that petitioners had a constitutional right to better

notice of the consequences of the statutory amendment is without

merit. All citizens are presumptively charged with knowledge of

the law, see, e.g., North Laramie Land Co. v. Hoffman, 268 U.S.

276, 283 (1925). Arguably that presumption may be overcome in

cases in which the statute does not allow a sufficient "grace

period" to provide the persons affected by a change in the law with

an adequate opportunity to become familiar with their obligations

under it. See Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516, 532 (1982). In

this case, however, not only was there a grace period of over 90

days before the amendment became effective, but in addition,

every person affected by the change was given individual notice of

the substance of the amendment.

As a matter of constitutional law there can be no doubt

concerning the sufficiency of the notice describing the effect of the

amendment in general terms. Surely Congress can presume that

such a notice relative to a matter as important as a change in a

household's food-stamp allotment would prompt an appropriate

inquiry if it is not fully understood. The entire structure of our

democratic government rests on the premise that the individual

citizen is capable of informing himself about the particular policies

that affect his destiny. To contend that this notice was

constitutionally insufficient is to reject that premise.

Id. 128-31 (footnotes omitted).

This case is similar to Atkins in that: 1) it does not concern individual eligibility

determinations as to welfare benefits; 2) it involves a substantive change in a rate that is utilized

to calculate the amount of benefits for persons within a federal program administered by the

states; 3) that change results in the participating households' receiving a "less valuable

entitlement" than prior to the change; 4) there is no challenge that the change itself is beyond the

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authority of the enacting government body nor to the manner in which it was promulgated; 5) there is no challenge to the change itself but simply as to notice given; and 6) the operative federal statutes do not require any specific notice to be given to pruticipants prior to the change becoming effective. In light of Atkins, Plaintiffs' fundamental claim in their First Cause of Action in the FAC that they have a "constitutional right to better notice ofthe consequence ofthe . . . amendment [here, the change in the VPSA within the prescribed basic range] is without merit." Id. at 130.
3. The HACLA Complied with the Requirements 24 C.F.R. § 982.505(c)(3)(ii). Once again, Plaintiffs frame the issue of Defendants' compliance with the regulatory notice requirement confusingly:
In its order on the Motion to Dismiss, this Court suggested that HACLA had complied (in a literal sense) with the HUD regulation. However, since that motion did not challenge Plaintiffs due process claims, the issue was not before the Court ofwhether literal compliance with a regulation is lawful compliance if applicable due process standards were not met in implementing the regulation. Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment ("PMSJ") 14:16-20. Plaintiffs have never established why the Court would look beyond the regulations to decide the procedural minimum for compliance when the "case ... does not concern the procedural fairness of individual eligibility determinations."2 Atkins, 472 U.S. at 129. Either the regulatory requirements were satisfied or they were not - and the Court, in its previous Order, found that they were. It could not have made this finding if the notice Defendants sent did not communicate the information that the HUD regulation requires that it convey. Plaintiffs argue that "where a regulation establishes a right to notice, and the notice did not comport with due process, the regulation was not lawfully implemented." But, here Plaintiffs confuse their own First and Second Causes of Action. The Court has already determined that the regulation did not create a "right to notice." Moreover, inadequate notice by itself does not give rise to a § 1983 claim. While a failure of notice might, for the reasons described above, effect a property interest such that due process concerns would be implicated, there is- again- no reason to look beyond the regulatory language for the notice requirements. The assertion that "the
2 Although Plaintiffs cite Geneva Towers Tenants Organization v. Federated Mortgage Investors, 504 F.2d 483,489 n.13 (9th Cir. 1974) for the proposition that "once a substantive right has been created, it is the Due Process Clause which provides the procedural minimums, and not a statute or regulation," they have not established the existence of such a substantive right. The cited text in Geneva Towers refers to the plurality opinion in Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974), in which a majority of the justices rejected Justice Rehnquist's "bitter with the sweet" approach to property interests conferred by statute. This majority view has prevailed. See, u,_, Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 432 (1982) ("While the legislature may elect not to confer a property interest ... it may not constitutionally authorize the deprivation of such an interest, once conferred, without appropriate procedural safeguards."). The corollary of this view is not, however, that anytime there is a statutory or regulatory procedure, it automatically invokes the full range of due process protection.
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notice did not comport with due process" here is essentially meaningless.

Even assuming that a failure of regulatory notice could here give rise to a § 1983 claim,

Plaintiffs have not proffered any evidence which raises a dispute as to a material fact which

would demonstrate any failure on Defendants' part to provide the notice required under the

applicable regulation. It is not disputed by the Plaintiffs that:

The reduction notice that was sent to each participant stated

that, "Effective April 2, 2004, the Housing Authority lowered the

payment standards used to determine your portion of the rent. We

will not apply these lower payment standards until your next regular

reexamination. If you move, however, these new lower payment

standards will apply to your next unit." [See PSSGI at, 18.]

*

*

*

*

The reduction notice also contained a chart that detailed the

new payment standard amount by bedroom size. [See PSSGI at,

19.]

*

*

*

*

The reduction notice also included a form titled HAPP RE-

38 ("RE-38") which showed the amount of rent each participant

would be required to pay the landlord/owner and the amount that

HACLA would pay the landlord/owner on the participant's behalf

for that year. [See PSSGI at, 22.]

*

*

*

*

Approximately four weeks prior to the 2004 VPS reduction

going into effect, each participant received a second RE-38 which

detailed the actual amount of rent each participant would be

required to pay for that year. [See PSSGI at, 24.]

The declaration of Plaintiffs' expert (Dr. Finegan), which is employed in an attempt to

create a material issue of fact, is premised upon the incorrect assumption that the requirement of

24 C.F.R. § 982.505(c)(3)(ii) is to give tenants notice of an increase in rent rather than informing

them that "the application of the lower payment standard will be deferred until the second regular

reexamination ...." Compare Finegan Decl. Page 2, lines 20-23 and page 4, line 4-6 with 24

C.F.R. § 982.505(c)(3)(ii). There is no basis for reading Finegan's requirements or

misunderstandings into the regulation. Similarly, Plaintiffs' argument that the notice flyer was

defective because it "did not explain the reasons or legal justification for the action" finds no

support in the regulation. Moreover, the Finegan Declaration assumes that Section 8 participants

are not familiar with the term "Voucher Payment Standard" and the payment standard chart,

whereas Defendants have submitted unrebutted evidence to the contrary. See Agbor Decl. ,, 4-

8; Baldwin Decl., 12. Finally, to paraphrase Atkins, 472 U.S. at 131:

As a matter of constitutional law there can be no doubt

concerning the sufficiency of the notice describing the effect of the

amendment in general tetms. Surely [the HACLA] can presume

that such a notice relative to a matter as important as [the effective

date of] a change in a household's [VPSA] allotment would

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prompt an appropriate inquiry if it is not fully understood. The entire structure of our democratic government rests on the premise that the individual citizen is capable of informing himself about the particular policies that affect his destiny. To contend that this notice was constitutionally insufficient is to reject that premise. In light of the above discussion, the Court need not consider Defendants' argument that a "lesser" due process standard exists for "across-the-board" reductions in benefits. See DMSJ § IV(3)(a). Similarly, Defendants' evidence regarding additional "outreach" efforts to Section 8 recipients is immaterial to resolving this claim. Finally, because there is no fact in dispute whether Plaintiffs have a cognizable §1983 claim, the Court need not reach Defendants' challenge - in the context of their opposition to Plaintiffs' summary judgment motion - to Plaintiffs' ability to act as class representatives. 3
B. Third Cause Of Action Plaintiffs' Third Cause of Action, for violation of Cal. Govt. Code§ 815.6, is also premised upon a purported failure of due process. Section 815.6 provides:
Where a public entity is under a mandatory duty imposed by an enactment that is designed to protect against the risk of a particular kind of injury, the public entity is liable for an injury of that kind proximately caused by its failure to discharge the duty unless the public entity establishes that it exercised reasonable diligence to discharge the duty. Plaintiff relies upon the Due Process Clause to create the "mandatory duty" that Defendants allegedly breached. Plaintiffs also appear to contend that § 815.6 could have independently created a protected property interest in the HUD regulation. Again, however, this contention is never cashed out. Accepting Plaintiff's argument that§ 815.6 creates a statutory right to enforce federal and state regulations, there is still no basis for concluding that Defendants' literal compliance with the regulation was an abrogation of their duty. Plaintiffs' argument that§ 815.6 itself implicates a somehow more robust due process standard is a non-sequitor. Citing Wolffv. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974), they write that because due process standards apply to insure state created rights are not arbitrarily abrogated, HUD "had to comply with due process" in providing notice under the HUD regulations. This is simply another iteration of the argument which the Court has already rejected in its earlier ruling on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss.
3 With regard to this latter contention, Defendants are correct that the admissions ofNozzi and Palaez that they do not recall reading the notification flyer until right around the time the VPSA went up do indeed indicate that they could not have suffered the harm allegedly suffered by the rest of the class i.e., confusion by the notice a year before. Plaintiffs' argument from Nelson v. City ofN.Y., 352 U.S. 103 (1956), where the court found that notice was sufficient to satisfY due process even though plaintiffs never read the notice, suffers from a logical fallacy. Plaintiffs have not shown why common law causation principles should not apply here.
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C. Fourth Cause Of Action Plaintiffs' Fourth Cause of Action alleges a violation of the California Constitution, Art. 1 § 7. Defendants argue correctly that this cause of action fails because it is well settled under California law that only those governmental decisions that are adjudicative in nature, and not
legislative or quasi-legislative, are subject to procedural due process principles. See u,.
McKinney v. Board of Trustees, 31 Cal.3d 79, 98-99 (1982). Plaintiffs respond that the cases cited by Defendants for this proposition involve challenges to the decision itself or challenges to the decision making process, whereas "Plaintiffs are challenging the notice from the perspective of tenants being able to plan for their rent increase, which was the purpose for the regulation's one-year notice requirement." Opp. 14:27-15:1. The provision of the California Constitution which provides that no person shall be deprived of property without due process of law, "has been held to be identical in scope and purpose with the due process clause of the federal Constitution." Russell v. Carleson, 36 Cal.App.3d 334, 342 (1973). Plaintiffs do not contend that their claim under the California Constitution would still be viable even if their federal due process claim were not. Accordingly, summary judgment is granted as to this claim.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above and in the 11126/07 Order, summary judgment is granted in favor of the Defendants and against the Plaintiffs as to the First, Third and Fourth Causes of Action in the FAC.
V. RULINGS ON EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS
A. Plaintiffs' Objections; Motion to Strike Declarations in Support of Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment
1. Declaration of Megumi Takarabe a) Request to strike entire declaration is denied. b) Objections to paragraph 3 sustained on the basis of Federal Rules of Evidence 408 as to the second sentence only. Otherwise, objections overruled. c) Objections to paragraph 4 sustained as to the word "always" in the first sentence. Otherwise, objections overruled. The Court treats paragraph 4 as a description ofHACLA's position on the subject delineated therein and not as a statement of applicable law. d) Objections to paragraph 5 sustained on the basis of relevance.
2. Declaration of Kenneth Baldwin a) Objections to paragraph 11 sustained in part because vast portions of it consist of arguments and/or characterization/interpretation of regulations which are improper in a declaration. b) Objections to paragraphs 12 and 13 sustained in part because vast portions of those paragraphs consist of arguments and/or characterization or
-11-

Case 2:07-cv-00380-GW-FFM Document 90 Filed 03/08/09 Page 13 of 25 Page ID #:564
interpretation of regulations which are improper in a declaration.
3. Declaration of Agbor I. Agbor a) Request to strike entire declaration denied. b) Objections to paragraphs 4 - 8 denied.
B. Plaintiffs' Objections to the Declaration of Shirley Fields
Plaintiffs' objections to the Declaration of Shirley Fields is unclear in that most of it appears to be in the form of substantive arguments rather than proper evidentiary objections. Moreover, it seems that the Plaintiffs are only objecting to the contents of paragraph 20 in the declaration. Plaintiffs' objections are denied except that: 1) as to the last three sentences in paragraph 20, it is unclear as to what documents are being referenced therein and whether those documents are included in the Defendants' Appendix of Exhibits; and 2) copies ofthose documents should have been provided and would "speak for themselves."
C. Defendants' Objections and Motion to Strike the Declarations Filed in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment
1. Declaration of Edward Finegan While the Court agrees that Dr. Finegan's declaration contains a multitude of incorrect assumptions, unsupported factual assertions, and misstatements as to applicable law, it will not strike the entire declaration. Had Defendants specified particular portions of the declaration to strike, this Court would have been more receptive to that approach.
2. Declarations of Michael Nozzi and Nidia Pelaez The Defendants' request to strike the entire declarations of Michael Nozzi and Nidia Pelaez is denied. The Defendants' request to strike the specified language on page 2 of the respective declarations is granted.
3 Dated: This tl day of March, 2009.
GEORGE H. WU United States District Court Judge
-12-

Case 2:07-cv-00380-GW-FFM Document 90 Filed 03/08/09 Page 14 of 25 Page ID #:565

1

2

3

4

5

6
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 8

9

10

MICHAEL NOZZI, et al., 11

) No. CV 07-380-GW (FFMx) )

Plaintiffs,

) RULING ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO

12

) DISMISS THE SECOND AND FIFTH

v. 13

) CAUSES OF ACTION IN THE FIRST ) AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

HOUSING AUTHORITY OF THE CITY OF )

14 LOS ANGELES, et al.,

)

)
15 ______________D_e_fe_n_da_n_ts_. _______))

16

I. INTRODUCTION 17

Plaintiffs in this action are two recipients offederal benefits under the "Section 8 Housing Voucher 18

Program" (henceforth "S8HVP") pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 143 7f(o) and a non-profit advocacy organization. 19

Defendants are the Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles (henceforth "HACLA") and Rudolf 20

Montiel, the Executive Director of HACLA. 21

In their First Amended Class Action Complaint (henceforth "FAC"), Plaintiffs allege that:
22

2. In or around July of2005, the Housing Authority ofthe City

23

of Los Angeles ("HACLA"), which administers the Section 8 Program

locally, began implementing a large-scale rollback of housing benefits

24

provided to Section 8 recipients in its jurisdiction. [ * * * *].

25

3. Before doing so, however, HACLA was required by

applicable federal regulations, independently enforceable as well through

26

state law, to provide adequate notice at least one year prior to the cut in the

level of services. [ * * * *].

27

4. HACLA did not make any meaningful attempt to comply

28

with this notice requirement. Rather than separately providing a formal

administrative notice informing Section 8 recipients that they would be

Case 2:07-cv-00380-GW-FFM Document 90 Filed 03/08/09 Page 15 of 25 Page ID #:566

responsible for a specific increase in rent, HACLA inserted into a large stack

1

ofmaterials sent to each recipient a nondescript and technically worded flyer

that failed to convey any useful information relating to the change in

2

benefits.

3 See FAC at rs 2, 3 and 4. Plaintiffs raise five causes of action: 1) "Denial ofDue Process ofLaw (42 4 U.S.C. § 1983)" for failing to provide notice to S8HVP recipients pursuantto 24 C.F.R. § 982.505(c)(3)(ii) 5 before implementing the rollback of housing benefits which are a protected property interest under 42 6 U.S.C. § 1437f(o); 2) "ViolationofRights Created by 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(Private Right ofAction Available 7 under 42 U.S.C. § 1983)"; 3) "Violation of Cal. Gov't. Code § 815.6"; 4) "Violation of Art. I, § 7 of 8 California Constitution"; and 5) "Negligence" pursuant to California Government Code§ 815.2, Civil Code 9 § 1714 and Evidence Code § 669. 1 Defendants now move to dismiss the second and fifth causes of action.

10 II. BACKGROUND

11

A. The S8HVP

12

As noted in Cisneros v. Alpine Ridge Group, 508 U.S. 10, 12 (1993):

13

In 1974, Congress amended the United States Housing Act of 1937

(Housing Act) to create what is known as the Section 8 housing program.

14

Through the Section 8 program, Congress hoped to "ai[d] low-income

families in obtaining a decent place to live," 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(a)(1988 ed.,

15

Supp. III), by subsidizing private landlords who would rent to low-income

tenants. Under the program, tenants make rental payments based on their

16

income and ability to pay; the Department of Housing and Urban

Development (HUD) then makes "assistance payments" to the private

17

landlords in an amount calculated to make up the difference between the

tenant's contribution and a "contract rent" agreed upon by the landlord and

18

HUD.

19

One ofthe Section 8 programs is the S8HVP. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(o); 24 C.F.R. § 982.l(a)(l).

20 The S8HVP is usually administered by a state or local governmental entity called a "public housing agency"

21 or "PHA" within a designated geographic area. See 24 C.F.R. § 982.1(a)(l). HUD provides housing

22 assistance funds to the PHAs and also supplies monies for the PHAs' administration of the programs. Id.

23

24

Plaintiffs' original Complaint contained two additional causes of action for "Violation of Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1" (which

this Court dismissed without leave to amend) and "Taxpayers' ... Suit for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief under Cal. Code of
25 Civil Procedure§ 526a" (which Plaintiffs voluntarily withdrew). Also, this Court granted Defendants' initial Motion to Dismiss

as to the second cause ofaction, but with leave to amend, because it found that count to be unclear as to the basis ofthe claim since

26 it appeared to be entirely duplicative of the first cause of action. Further, at the hearing on the Motion to Dismiss, the Court also

heard Defendants' Motion to Strike Causes of Action Pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure § 425.16. In their papers

27 and at the oral argument, Plaintiffs conceded that their lawsuit did not challenge the decision to lower the S8HVP benefits but

rather the Defendants' failure to give adequate notice to recipients prior to the effectuating the change. See~, Reporter's

28 Transcript of April30, 2007 hearing at page 12.

2

Case 2:07-cv-00380-GW-FFM Document 90 Filed 03/08/09 Page 16 of 25 Page ID #:567

1

HUD publishes the fair market rents (henceforth "FMR")2 for designated geographic areas in the

2 United States. See 24 C.P.R.§§ 888.111 and 982.503(a). A public housing agency must adopt a payment

3 schedule that establishes "voucher payment standard amounts" (henceforth sometimes "VPSA") for each

4 PMR area within its jurisdiction. See 24 C.P.R.§ 982.503(a). As to each PMR area, the PHA must set the

5 VPSA for each "unit size" where unit size is measured by the number of bedrooms (i.e., zero-bedroom or

6 studio, one-bedroom and so on). Id. The public housing agency is initially limited as to its choice of the

7 voucher payment standard amount. As stated in 24 C.P.R. § 982.503(b)(l):

8

(i) The PHA may establish the payment standard amount for a unit size at any level between 90 percent and 110 percent of the published PMR

9

for that unit size. HUD approval is not required to establish a payment standard amount in that range ("basic range").

10

(ii) The PHA may establish a separate payment standard amount within the basic range for a designated part of an PMR area.

11 See also 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(o)(l)(B).

12

The voucher payment standard amount is used to calculate the monthly housing assistance payment

13 fora family. See 24 C.P.R.§ 982.505(a). Where the PHAhas established a VPSA within the "basic range"

14 and where the rent for a family (including utilities except for telephone) for their particular unit falls within

15 that range, the amount of monthly assistance payment for that family will normally be:

16

... the amount by which the rent (including the amount allowed for tenant-

17

paid utilities) exceeds the greatest of the following amounts, rounded to the nearest dollar:

18

(i) 30 percent of the monthly adjusted income ofthe family. (ii) 10 percent ofthe monthly income ofthe family.

19 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(o)(2)(A);3 see also 24 C.P.R. § 982.505(a).

20

Persons seeking S8HVP assistance must apply to the PHA and supply income and other information

21 to establish their eligibility to participate in the program. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(o)(4); 24 C.P.R. §
22 982.201(a) and (b). Once in the program, the PHA must conduct, at a minimum, a yearly review of the

23 family income and other information of the S8HVP participants. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(o)(5); 24 C.P.R.

24 § 982.516(a).

25

26

"Fair market rent means the rent, including the cost of utilities (except telephone), as established by HUD ... for units

of varying sizes (by number of bedrooms), that must be paid in the market area to rent privately owned, existing, decent, safe and

27 sanitary rental housing of modest (non-luxury) nature with suitable amenities." 24 C.F.R. § 888.1ll(b).

28

"Adjusted income" is defined in 42 U.S.C. § 1437a(b)(5).

3

Case 2:07-cv-00380-GW-FFM Document 90 Filed 03/08/09 Page 17 of 25 Page ID #:568

1

As conceded by the Plaintiffs in their FAC, "PHAs have discretion to raise or lower the VPS[A]

2 within a statutorily prescribed range." See FAC at~ 26. Under regulations promulgated by HUD, ifa PHA

3 decreases the amounts on the payment standard schedule, "the lower payment standard amount generally

4 must be used to calculate the monthly housing assistance payment for the family beginning at the effective

5 date of the family's second regular reexamination following the effective date of the decrease in the

6 payment standard amount." 24 C.F.R. § 982.505(c)(3). There is a three step process.

7

Decrease in the payment standard amount during the HAP [housing assistance payments] contract term. If the amount on the payment standard

8

schedule is decreased during the term of the HAP contract, the lower payment standard amount generally must be used to calculate the monthly

9

housing assistance payment for the family beginning at the effective date of the family's second regular reexamination following the effective date ofthe

10

decrease in the payment standard amount. The PHA must determine the payment standard for the family as follows.

11

(i) Step I: At the first regular reexamination following the decrease in the

12

payment standard amount, the PHA shall determine the payment standard for the family[...] (using the decreased payment standard amount).

13

(ii) Step 2 (first reexamination payment standard amount): The PHA shall

14

compare the payment standard amount from step 1 to the payment standard amount last used to calculate the monthly housing assistance payment for the

15

family. The payment standard amount used by the PHA to calculate the monthly housing assistance payment at the first regular reexamination

16

following the decrease in the payment standard amount is the higher ofthese two payment standard amounts. The PHA shall advise the family that the

17

application ofthe lower payment standard amount will be deferred until the second regular reexamination following the effective date ofthe decrease in

18

the payment standard amount.

19

(iii) Step 3 (second reexamination payment standard amount): At the second regular reexamination following the decrease in the payment standard

20

amount, the lower payment standard amount shall be used to calculate the monthly housing assistance payment for the family unless the PHA has

21

subsequently increased the payment standard amount ....

22 24 C.F.R. § 982.505(c)(3)(i) thru (iii) [emphasis added].

23

As stated in 24 C.F.R. § 982.5: "Where part 982 requires any notice to be given by the PHA, the

24 family or the owner, the notice must be in writing."

25

B. Operative Allegations

26

In regards to the HACLA's purported failure to provide notice to the Plaintiff class, the operative

27 allegations are contained in paragraphs 28 through 31 of the FAC which state:

28

28. On April2, 2004, HACLA made a decision to reduce the pre-

4

Case 2:07-cv-00380-GW-FFM Document 90 Filed 03/08/09 Page 18 of 25 Page ID #:569

1

existing VPS[A]. The impact on Section 8 participants was significant. For

example, the VPS[A] for a 0-bedroom ("bachelor") apartment plummeted

2

from $795 to $674, a reduction of$121 per month.

3

29. To implement this change in policy, the HACLA stuck a onepage flyer in the materials mailed to each recipient on the date of their

4

annual re-examination. Unlike other explanatory notices contained in these

packets, the flyer did not require the recipient to acknowledge receipt by

5

signing and returning the form. The flyer was not on letterhead, did not contain a phone number for inquiries, and did not give a legal basis for the

6

decision. More importantly, the flyer did not advise recipients that their outof-pocket rent payment would actually be going up, much less specify the

7

amount of the increase. Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and on that basis allege, that these flyers were sent out, buried among other

8

reexamination materials, from approximately July 2004 through July 2005.

9

30. The language ofthe flyer did not meaningfully communicate to the recipient that there would actually be a reduction in the portion of his

10

or her rent that HACLA would pay, and a corresponding increase in the portion of his or her rent that the recipient would be required to pay.

11

31. The VPS [A] decrease went into effect with re-examinations

12

that took place from July 2005 to July 2006.

13 See FAC at ~'s 28 through 31.

14

Plaintiffs' first cause of action is a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim of a denial of due process against

15 Defendant HACLA. They contend that they have "a property interest in the provisions of [24] C.P.R. §

16 982.505(c)(3)(ii) under both state and federal law ...." See FAC at~ 58. In paragraph 59 ofthe FAC,

17 Plaintiffs assert that:

18

By failing to provide PlaintiffClass clear or meaningful notice ofthe actions HACLA intended to take and its consequences at the time required by 24

19

C.P.R. 982.505(c)(3)(ii), most particularly by failing to meaningfully or effectively advise the Plaintiff Class that their out of pocket share of future

20

rents would be increased [ ... ] and by failing to indicate from whom the notice emanated, the legal basis for the action, a phone number for inquiries,

21

or how to protest or appeal the action, Defendant HACLA deprived the Plaintiff Class of due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth

22

Amendment, thereby entitling the Class to bring the suit and recover damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

23 Plaintiffs seek "injunctive and declaratory relief, an accounting, restitution and/or damages." Id. at~ 61.

24

Plaintiffs' second cause of action seeks to establish a claim based upon a purported violation of

25 rights created by 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(o) which allegedly can be litigated through a "private right of action

26 available under 42 U.S.C. § 1983." See FAC at page 17. As stated in paragraphs 68 and 69 of the FAC:

27

68. In sum, 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(o)(2) and the other sections cited

28

above required HACLA to make monthly payments for the benefit of

5

Case 2:07-cv-00380-GW-FFM Document 90 Filed 03/08/09 Page 19 of 25 Page ID #:570

1

recipients according to the "applicable payment standard." That is a federally secured right. The regulations flush [sic] out how HACLA's

2

monthly payments are to be calculated by specifying how the applicable

payment standard is to be determined. By failing to provide the required

3

notice, the new payment standard implemented by HACLA was unlawful. HACLA, therefore, violated 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(o)(2) by failing to make the

4

required payments under the "applicable payment standard."

5

69. Defendants, as described in this complaint, deprived Plaintiffs and the Plaintiff Class of their federal rights, specifically their

6

voucher payment standard rights created by42 U.S.C. § 1437f(o), including § 1437(o)(2) and§ 1437f(o)(1), under the color of state law, and thereby

7

violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

8 II. DISCUSSION

9

A. Applicable Law

10

Defendants herein seek to dismiss the second and fifth causes of action pursuant to Federal Rules

11 of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). As stated in Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dept., 901 F.2d 696,699 (9th Cir.

12 1990).

13

A complaint should not be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) "unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his

14

claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). Dismissal can be based on lack of cognizable legal theory or

15

the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory. Robertson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 533-34 (9th Cir.

16

1984). On a motion to dismiss, the court accepts the facts alleged in the complaint as true. Shah, 797 F.2d at 745.

17

B. Plaintiffs' Second Cause of Action

18

Before considering the viability of the Plaintiffs' Second Cause of Action (henceforth "SCA"), it

19 should initially be noted that Defendants have not moved to dismiss the First Cause of Action (henceforth

20 "FCA") which asserts that HACLA violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by denying Plaintiffs due process in failing

21 to give them sufficient notice as required by 24 C.F.R. § 982.505(c)(3)(ii) before reducing S8HVP benefits.

22 Likewise, Plaintiffs have conceded that PHAs (such as HACLA) have the discretion to lower the voucher

23 program standard amount (which is used to calculate the S8HVP benefits) within certain limitations.

24 Plaintiffs have not (and apparently do not) contend that HACLA acted substantively or procedurally in an

25 unlawful manner in deciding to reduce the S8HVP benefits, except as to the notice issue. In light of the

26 above, Plaintiffs' SCA either: 1) is simply the same claim as the FCA but stated in slightly different words,

27 or 2) fails to state a cognizable legal theory other than a due process claim based on lack of notice and fails

28

6

Case 2:07-cv-00380-GW-FFM Document 90 Filed 03/08/09 Page 20 of 25 Page ID #:571

1 to allege sufficient facts that would establish a cognizable legal theory under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

2

Plaintiffs' SCA is based on the following syllogism: 1) the S8VHP benefits are "a federally secured

3 right"; 2) HUD regulations flesh out how HACLA's monthly payments are to be calculated; 3) by failing

4 to provide the required notice, HACLA's reduction in S8HVP benefits is unlawful and 4) "HACLA,

5 therefore, violated 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(o)(2) by failing to make the required payments under the 'applicable

6 payment standard"' which constitutes a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See FAC at r s 68-69. Plaintiffs'

7 SCA fails to state a claim for the reasons stated below.

8

As held in Wright v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment & Housing Authority, 479 U.S. 418, 423

9 (1987), 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is available to enforce violations of federal statutes by agents of a state with two

10 exceptions: where Congress has foreclosed such enforcement and where the statute did not create

11 enforceable rights within the meaning of § 1983. The Court stated, as to the first exception, that "we

12 conclude that nothing in the Housing Act ... evidences that Congress intended to preclude ... [a]§ 1983

13 claim against [a PHA]." Id. at 429. In regards to the second exception, the Supreme Court has retreated

14 from its position in Wright that spending legislation automatically gives rise to enforceable rights under

15 § 1983. As delineated in Gonzaga Universitv v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 281 (2002): "Our more recent

16 decisions, however, have rejected attempts to infer rights from Spending Clause statutes." The Court went

17 on to state: 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

We now reject the notion that our cases permit anything short of an unambiguously conferred right to support a cause of action brought under § 1983. Section 1983 provides a remedy only for the deprivation of"rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws" of the United States. Accordingly, it is rights, not the broader or vaguer "benefits" or "interests," that may be enforced under the authority ofthat section. This being so, we further reject the notion that our implied right of action cases are separate and distinct from our§ 1983 cases. To the contrary, our implied right of action cases should guide the determination of whether a statute confers rights enforceable under § 1983.
We have recognized that whether a statutory violation may be enforced through § 1983 '·is a different inquiry than that involved in determining whether a private right of action can be implied from a particular statute." Wilder, supra, 496 U.S. 498 at 508, n.9. But the inquiries overlap in one meaningful respect - in either case we must first determine whether Congress intended to create a federal right. Thus, we have held that "[t]he question whether Congress ... intended to create a private right of action [is] definitively answered in the negative" where "a statute by its terms grants no private rights to any identifiable class." Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 576 (1979). For a statute

7

Case 2:07-cv-00380-GW-FFM Document 90 Filed 03/08/09 Page 21 of 25 Page ID #:572

1

to create such private rights, its text must be "phrased in terms ofthe persons benefited." Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 692, n. 13

2

(1979). * * * * But even where a statute is phrased in such explicit rights-
creating terms, a plaintiff suing under an implied right of action still must

3

show that the statute manifests an intent "to create not just a private right but also a private remedy." Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275,286 (2001)

4

(emphases omitted).

5 Id. at 283-84. See also Hill v. Richardson, 7 F.3d 656, 658 (7th Cir. 1993) ("Wright was closely divided,

6 and Suter [v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347 (1992)] shows that the Court is unwilling to press Wright for the most

7 it can be worth.").

8

In this case, Plaintiffs are not claiming that the HACLA's decision to reduce voucher payment

9 standard amounts was unlawful, improper or beyond its authority. Thus, while S8HVPs may be a federally

10 secured right, HACLA's reduction of the VPSA has not violated that right. Rather, Plaintiffs' actual

11 complaint is as to a purported failure by HACLA to give adequate notice before effectuating the reduction.

12 While such failure ofnotice may give rise to a due process complaint that could in tum give rise to a§ 1983

13 claim (which is, in essence, the substance ofPlaintiffs' FCA),4 inadequate notice by itself is not otherwise

14 cognizable as a § 1983 deprivation of rights claim.

15

First, the applicable federal statute does not require any notice to be given before a PHA reduces

16 the VPSA so long as the reduction is not less than 90 percent of the FMR published by HUD for the

17 designated geographic area within the PHA's jurisdiction. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(o). Therefore, even if

18 HACLA's notice in this case was inadequate, such conduct would not violate a federal statute so as to give

19 rise to a§ 1983 claim under the previously established (but now questioned) holding in Wright that § 1983

20 is available to enforce violations of federal statutes by agents of a State.

21

Second, Plaintiffs cite to HUD's regulation at 24 C.F.R. § 982.505(c)(3) for the existence of such

22 notice requirement and then argue that the failure to comply with that regulation gives rise to the § 1983

23 claim. That contention must fail in light of the decision in Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001).

24 In Alexander, the Supreme Court rejected the argument that, where a regulation contains some "rights-

25 creating language," the regulation can provide a basis for private enforcement under § 1983 that goes

26 beyond what the statute itself requires. Id. at 291 and 293 fnt. 8. As stated by the Court:

27
For purposes of deciding this motion, this Court need not and does not reach a decision as to whether a failure to give
28 adequate notice would constitute a due process violation which can be litigated as a§ 1983 claim in this case.

8

Case 2:07-cv-00380-GW-FFM Document 90 Filed 03/08/09 Page 22 of 25 Page ID #:573

1

Language in a regulation may invoke a private right of action that Congress

through statutory text created, but it may not create a right that Congress has

2

not. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S., at 577 n. 18 ("[T]he

language of the statute and not the rules must control"). Thus, when a

3

statute has provided a general authorization for private enforcement of

regulations, it may perhaps be correct that the intent displayed in each

4

regulation can determine whether or not it is privately enforceable. But it is

most certainly incorrect to say that language in a regulation can conjure up

5

a private cause ofaction that has not been authorized by Congress. Agencies

may play the sorcerer's apprentice but not the sorcerer himself.

6 ld. at 291. See also Save Our Valley v. Sound Transit, 335 F.3d 932, 936-940 (9th Cir. 2003).

7 Plaintiffs' reliance on the Wright decision and Johnson v. Housing Authority of Jefferson Parish,

8 442 F.3d 356 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 127 S.Ct. 136 (2006), is unavailing. In both of those cases, the

9 disputes revolved around the allocation of utilities expenses; in Wright it was a claim of over-billing for

10 utilities by the defendant City Housing Authority (see 479 U.S. at 419), and in Johnson it was the failure

11 of the defendant PHA to use current rates in calculating the utility allowance (see 442 F.3d at 359). As

12 explained in Johnson:

13 ... the statutory language of the voucher program unmistakably provides -

14

in the text of the act itself- for an "amount [to be] allowed for tenant paid

utilities." [42 U.S.C. § 1437f(o)(2)(A), (B).] Contrary to the Housing

15

Authority's assertion, the HUD regulations are not necessary to establish

Plaintiff-Appellants' right to the utility allowance, and certainly no more so

16

than they were in Wright, where such an allowance was not even mentioned

in the text of the statute itself. Congress's intent to benefit Plaintiffs-

17

Appellants here cannot be gainsaid.

18 ld. at 364 (footnote omitted). In both Wright and Johnson, the claims were based on the statutory right to

19 receive the correct amount ofrent assistance payments as delineated in the Housing Act as amended. Here,

20 unlike the Wright and Johnson cases, Plaintiffs are not challenging the PHA's calculation as to the amount

21 of the assistance as set forth in the statute. Rather, they are raising an issue of adequacy of notice which

22 is not required in the applicable statute but only in the regulation. Thus, the Wright and Johnson decisions

23 are inapplicable, while the holdings in Alexander and Save Our Valley are controlling.

24

Moreover, even assuming arguendo that a violation of a notice provision in a regulation (that is not

25 required by the underlying statute) can serve theoretically as a basis for a § 1983 action, Plaintiffs would

26 still not have stated a cognizable claim for two reasons. First, HACLA has not violated the notice provision

27 as set out in the regulation. Second, if the notice provision requires more than what HACLA provided, it

28 is too vague and amorphous to confer an enforceable right.

9

Case 2:07-cv-00380-GW-FFM Document 90 Filed 03/08/09 Page 23 of 25 Page ID #:574

1

Plaintiffs claim that the notice provided by HACLA was inadequate because it: 1) did not require

2 the recipient to acknowledge receipt by signing and returning the form; 2) was not on HACLA letterhead;

3 3) did not contain a phone number for inquiries; 4) did not state a legal basis for the decision; and 5) did

4 not advise the recipient ofhow much their out of pocket rent payments would increase. See FAC ~'s 29

5 and 59. However, the only regulation cited by Plaintiffs does not state that any ofthose items are required.

6 24 C.F.R. § 982.505(c)(3)(ii) merely provides that, after a PHA has calculated the appropriate payment

7 standard amount at the first yearly reexamination following the decrease in the VPSA, "the PHA shall

8 advise the family that the application of the lower payment standard amount will be deferred until the

9 second regular reexamination following the effective date ofthe decrease in the payment standard amount."

10 It makes no reference to having the recipient acknowledge receipt, letterhead, phone numbers, explanation

11 of the legal basis for its decision, etc.

12

Plaintiffs have not alleged that HACLA failed in fact to give the only advisal that is required by the

13 language of24 C.F.R. § 982.505(c)(3)(ii). Moreover, 24 C.F.R. § 982.5, which sets out the only condition

14 for notice, merely states that "[w]here Part 982 requires any notice to be given by the PHA ... , the notice

15 must be in writing." Here, Plaintiffs in paragraph 4 of the FAC indicate that HACLA did give written

16 notice.

17

It is further noted that where specific information is required to be given to a S8HVP participant,

18 the HUD regulation will set forth these requirements. See,~' 24 C.F.R. §§ 982.301(b) and 982.554(a).

19 Likewise, where a participant can challenge the PHA decision, the PHA must give that participant notice

20 of the availability of an informal hearing. However, a PHA's decision setting the VPSA within the basic

21 range is not subject to informal hearings. 24 C.F.R. § 982.555.

22

Finally, in order for a court to conclude that a statute creates a right enforceable under § 1983, it

23 must find: 1) the statute was intended to benefit the plaintiffs; 2) the statute imposes a binding obligation

24 on the government unit rather than merely expressing a congressional preference for a certain kind of

25 conduct, and 3) the interest asserted by the plaintiff is not so vague and amorphous that it is beyond the

26 competence of the judiciary to enforce. See Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n., 496 U.S. 498, 509 (1990);

27 Legal Services ofN. Calif. v. Arnett, 114 F.3d 135, 138 (9th Cir. 1997). Here, as noted above, the statute

28 does not impose any obligation (let alone a binding one) in regards to notice. Even if one were to utilize

10

Case 2:07-cv-00380-GW-FFM Document 90 Filed 03/08/09 Page 24 of 25 Page ID #:575

1 the referenced regulation as an appropriate surrogate for a statute, 24 C.P.R. § 982.505(c)(3)(ii) does not

2 set out any binding obligation insofar as the procedural requirements which Plaintiffs seek to impose(~,

3 acknowledgment ofreceipt ofnotice, explanation oflegal basis, telephone numbers, etc.). Moreover, aside

4 from the due process claim which is the subject of the FCA, the interest asserted by Plaintiffs in the SCA

5 is so vague and amorphous that it fails to confer on S8HVP participants an enforceable "right" within the

6 meaning of§ 1983.

7

For all ofthe above reasons, the SCA is dismissed with prejudice.

8

C. Plaintiffs' Fifth Cause of Action

9

Plaintiffs' fifth cause of action is for negligence based on California Government Code § 815 .2,

10 Evidence Code§ 669, and Civil Code§ 1714. None of those provisions provides a basis for Plaintiffs'

11 negligence claim.

12

As stated in Eastburn v. Regional Fire Protection Agency, 31 Ca1.4th 1175, 1179 (2003):

13

... the California Tort Claims Act provides that "[a] public entity is not

liable for an injury," "[e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute." (Gov.

14

Code,§ 815, subd. (a).) As that language indicates, the intent ofthe Tort

Claims Act is to confine potential governmental liability, not expand it.

15

(Zelig v. County of Los Angeles (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1112, 1127.

16 Civil Code§ 1714(a) states that "Everyone is responsible ... for an injury occasioned to another by his or

17 her want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his or her property or person ...." Eastburn held

18 that the ordinary negligence liability provision in Civil Code§ 1714 is inapplicable to public entities. As

19 stated in Eastburn, 31 Cal.4th at 1183:

20

In other words, direct tort liability of public entities must be based on a

specific statute declaring them to be liable, or at least creating some specific

21

duty of care, and not on the general tort provisions of Civil Code section

1714. Otherwise, the general rule of immunity for public entities would be

22

largely eroded by the routine application of general tort principles.

23

Government Code§ 815.2(a) provides that: "A public entity is liable for injury proximately caused

24 by an act or omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment if the act or

25 omission would, apart from this section, have given rise to a cause of action against that employee or his 26 personal representative [emphasis added]." § 815.2(a) does not provide a basis for a ~ommon law claim

27 for negligence against a public entity for its own negligent conduct. As stated in Zelig v. County of Los

28 Angeles, 27 Cal.4th 1112, 1127 (2002) (emphasis omitted):

11

Case 2:07-cv-00380-GW-FFM Document 90 Filed 03/08/09 Page 25 of 25 Page ID #:576

1

The Tort Claims Act draws a clear distinction between the liability of a

public entity based on its own conduct, and the liability arising from the

2

conduct of a public employee. Although the Act provides that a public

employee generally is liable for an injury caused by his or her act or

3

omission "to the same extent as a private person" (Gov. Code.,§ 820, subd.

(a)) and that, when the act or omission of the public employee occurs in the

4

scope of employment the public entity will be vicariously liable for the

injury (Gov. Code § 815.2), the Act contains no provision similarly

5

providing that a public entity generally is liable for its own conduct or

omission to the same extent as a private person or entity. Rather, the Act

6

provides that a public entity is not liable for an injury"[e]xcept as otherwise

provided by statute ...." (Gov. Code,§ 815.)

7 Evidence Code § 669(a) provides that a "failure of a person to exercise ordinary case is presumed

8 if: (1) He violated a statute, ordinance, or regulation of a public entity ...." However, as noted in

9 California Service Station etc. Assn. v. American Home Assurance Co., 62 Cal.App.4th 1166, 1177-78

10 (1998), a claim of ordinary negligence must be viable before the presumption of negligence in Evidence

11 Code§ 669(a) can be employed. The mere fact that a person has violated a statute or regulation does not,

12 by itself, establish that the result will be the tort of negligence. Id. at 1178-79. Plaintiffs have offered

13 nothing to suggest that a purported failure to provide adequate notice under 24 C.P.R.§ 982.505(c)(3)(ii)

14 should be treated as negligence. Moreover, as discussed above, Plaintiffs' allegations in the FAC do not

15 set forth a basis for finding that HACLA has violated the notice requirement of§ 982.505(c)(3)(ii). That

16 regulation does not delineate any duty or standard of care as to how the advisal is to be given. To the extent

17 that the HUD regulations in 24 C.F.R. Part 982 can be said to set forth a duty of care regarding notice, as

18 discussed above, HACLA has complied with it.

19 IV. CONCLUSION

20 For the reasons stated above and at the hearings on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, the second and

21 fifth causes of action in the FAC are hereby dismissed with prejudice.

22

23 DATED: November ~~ , 2007.
24
25
26

&~:z~ ~ ttL--. GEORGEH. WU United States District Judge

27

28

12

 </s> Case 2:07-cv-00380-GW-FFM Document 94 Filed 03/25/09 Page 1 of 2 Page ID #:584

BEST BEST & KRIEGER LLP ATTORNEYS AT LAW
300 SOUTH GRAND AVENUE, 25TH FLOOR LOS ANGELES, CA 90071

1 BRANT H. DVEIRIN, Bar No. 130621 Brant. Dveirin@bbklaw.com
2 CHRISTOPHER M. PISANO, Bar No. 192831 Christopher.Pisano@bbklaw.com
3 BEST BEST & KRIEGER LLP 300 South Grand Avenue, 25th Floor
4 Los Angeles, California 90071 Telephone: (213) 617-8100
5 Telecopier: (213) 617-7480

MADE JS-6

6 Attorneys for Defendants HOUSING AUTHORITY OF THE CITY OF
7 LOS ANGELES and RUDOLF MONTIEL

8

9

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

10

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

11

12

MICHAEL NOZZI, an individual; NIDIA PALAEZ, an individual; LOS

13

ANGELES COALITION TO END HUNGER AND HOMELESSNESS,

a non-profit organization, on behalf of

14 themselves and similarly situated

15 persons,

16

Plaintiffs,

v. 17

18

HOUSING AUTHORITY OF THE CITY OF LOS ANGELES; CITY OF

19

LOS ANGELES; RUDOLPH MONTIEL, in his official capacity;

and DOES 1 through 100, inclusive,

20

21

Defendants.

Case No. CV 07-00380 GW (FFMx) Judge: Hon. George H. Wu
JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANTS THE HOUSING AUTHORITY OF THE CITY OF LOS ANGELES AND RUDOLF MONTIEL

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

[PROPOSED] JUDGMENT

Case 2:07-cv-00380-GW-FFM Document 94 Filed 03/25/09 Page 2 of 2 Page ID #:585

BEST BEST & KRIEGER LLP ATTORNEYS AT LAW
300 SOUTH GRAND AVENUE, 25TH FLOOR LOS ANGELES, CA 90071

1 JUDGMENT
2

3 The Court, pursuant to its Ruling on Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment,
4 filed on March 8, 2009, granted the Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendants
5 Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles (“HACLA”) and Rudolf Montiel, in
6 its entirety, on the First, Third and Fourth Counts in the First Amended Class
7 Action Complaint. The Court, pursuant to its Ruling on Defendants’ Motion to
8 Dismiss the Second and Firth Causes of Action in the First Amended Class Action
9 Complaint, filed on November 26, 2007, earlier dismissed with prejudice the
10 Second and Fifth Counts.
11 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that Judgment
12 in the above-captioned case be, and hereby is, entered in favor of Defendants
13 HACLA and Rudolf Montiel, on the one hand, and against Plaintiffs Michael
14 Nozzi, Nidia Palaez, Los Angeles Coalition to End Hunger and Homelessness, on
15 behalf of themselves and similarly situated persons (“Plaintiffs”), on the other hand.
16 Plaintiffs shall take nothing on their First Amended Complaint.
17

18 Dated:

19 March 25, 2009 ________________
20 21

Hon. George H. Wu UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 1 -

[PROPOSED] JUDGMENT

 </s> Case 2:07-cv-00380-PA-FFM Document 42 Filed 04/30/07 Page 1 of 1 Page ID #:38
PRlORITY SEND

UNITED STATES DISTRJCT COURT CENTRAL DISTRJCT OF CALIFORNIA

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**AMENDED** CV07-380-GW(FFMx)

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Michael Nozzi eta! v. Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles eta!

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Javier Gonzalez Deputy Clerk

Wil Wilcox Court Reporter I Recorder

Tape No.

Attorneys Present for Plaintiffs:

Attorneys Present for Defendants:

Barrett S. Litt
Paul J. Estaur

Brant H. Dveirin Todd T. Leung

PROCEEDINGS: HEARING RE: SCHEDULING CONFERENCE; and MOTIONS TO DISMISS

Matter is called. For the reasons stated on the record, the Court rules on motions as follows:

Defendant City of Los Angeles' Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim is GRANTED with leave to amend.

Defendants' Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles and Rudolf Montiel's Motion to Dismiss as to the Second, Third and Fifth through Seventh Counts in Plaintiffs' Complaint is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Count 2 is GRANTED with leave to amend; Count 5 is GRANTED without leave to amend; Count 3 is DENIED; Count 6 is sustained with leave to amend; and Count 7 is withdrawn and dismissed.

Defendants' Housing Authority ofthe City of Los Angeles and Rudolf Montiel's Motion to Strike the State Causes of Action in Plaintiffs' Complaint against Defendants Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles and Rudolf Montiel pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure Section 424.16 is DENIED.

Plaintiff shall have up to and including, May 21, 2007 to amend the complaint.

The Scheduling Conference is CONTINUED to June 14,2007 at 8:30a.m. Counsel are reminded of

their obligations to disclose information, confer on a discovery plan, and report to the Court, as required

by FRCP 26 and the Local Rules of this Court. · I counsel are ordered to be present.

, ,

. . "''!ir:\-: {)\~ C\'~

CV-90 (06/04)

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CIVIL MINUTES- GENERAL

Page I of 1

 </s> Case 2:07-cv-00380-PA-FFM Document 63 Filed 11/26/07 Page 1 of 12 Page ID #:46

1

filED

2

ClERK U.S. DISTRICT COURT

...,pnon., :E./

Send

3

Enter

Closed

4

CENTRAL OISTRIWIOF CAlifORNIA

JS-5/JS-6 ~­

BY

-.li-r DEPUTY

!S-2/JS-3 - - -

5

Scan O n l y - - -

6
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
7
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
8

9

10

MICHAEL NOZZI, eta!.,
11
Plaintiffs,
12
~
13

) No. CV 07-380-GW (FFMx)
) ) RULING ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO ) DISMISS THE SECOND AND FIFTH
) CAUSES OF ACTION IN THE FIRST
) AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

HOUSING AUTHORITY OF THE CITY OF )

14 LOS ANGELES, et a!.,

)

)

15

_

_

_

_

_

_ _ _ _ Defendants.

_

_

_ ) )

16

I. INTRODUCTION 17
Plaintiffs in this action are two recipients of federal benefits under the "Section 8 Housing Voucher
18
Program" (henceforth "S8HVP") pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(o) and a non-profit advocacy organization. 19

Defendants are the Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles (henceforth "HACLA") and Rudolf
20

Montiel, the Executive Director ofHACLA.
21

In their First Amended Class Action Complaint (henceforth "FAC"), Plaintiffs allege that:
22

2. In or around July of2005, the Housing Authority ofthe City

23

of Los Angeles ("HACLA"), which administers the Section 8 Program

locally, began implementing a large-scale rollback of housing benefits

24

provided to Section 8 recipients in its jurisdiction. [ * * * *].

25

3. Before doing so, however, HACLA was required by

applicable federal regulations, independently enforceable as well through

26

state law, to provide adequate notice at least one year prior to the cut in the

level of services. [ * * * *].

27

4. HACLA did not make any meaningful attempt to comply

28

with this notice requirement. Rather than separately providing a formal

administrative notice informing Section 8 recipients that they would be

Case 2:07-cv-00380-PA-FFM Document 63 Filed 11/26/07 Page 2 of 12 Page ID #:47

responsible for a specific increase in rent, HACLA inserted into a large stack

1

ofmaterials sent to each recipient a nondescript and technically worded flyer

that failed to convey any useful information relating to the change in

2

benefits.

3 See FAC at rs 2, 3 and 4. Plaintiffs raise five causes of action: I) "Denial of Due Process of Law (42

4 U.S.C. § 1983)" for failing to provide notice to S8HVP recipients pursuant to 24 C.F.R. § 982.505(c)(3)(ii)

5 before implementing the rollback of housing benefits which are a protected property interest under 42

6 U.S.C. § 1437f(o); 2) "ViolationofRights Created by42 U.S.C. § 1437f(Private Right ofAction Available

7 under 42 U.S.C. § 1983)"; 3) "Violation of Cal. Gov't. Code§ 815.6"; 4) "Violation of Art. I,§ 7 of

8 California Constitution"; and 5) "Negligence" pursuant to California Government Code § 815 .2, Civil Code

9 § I 714 and Evidence Code § 669. 1 Defendants now move to dismiss the second and fifth causes of action.

10 II. BACKGROUND

11

A. The S8HVP

12

As noted in Cisneros v. Alpine Ridge Group. 508 U.S. 10, 12 (1993):

13

In 1974, Congress amended the United States Housing Act of 1937

(Housing Act) to create what is known as the Section 8 housing program.

14

Through the Section 8 program, Congress hoped to "ai[d] low-income

families in obtaining a decent place to live," 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(a) (1988 ed.,

15

Supp. III), by subsidizing private landlords who would rent to low-income

tenants. Under the program, tenants make rental payments based on their

16

income and ability to pay; the Department of Housing and Urban

Development (HUD) then makes "assistance payments" to the private

17

landlords in an amount calculated to make up the difference between the

tenant's contribution and a "contract rent" agreed upon by the landlord and

18

HUD.

19

One ofthe Section 8 programs is the S8HVP. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(o); 24 C.F.R. § 982.1(a)(l).

20 The S8HVP is usually administered by a state or local governmental entity called a "public housing agency"

21 or "PHA" within a designated geographic area. See 24 C.F.R. § 982.l(a)(l). HUD provides housing 22 assistance funds to the PHAs and also supplies monies for the PHAs' administration of the programs. Id.

23

24

Plaintiffs' original Complaint contained two additional causes ofaction for "Violation ofCal. Civ. Code§ 52.1" (which

25

this Court dismissed without leave to amend) and "Taxpayers' ... Suit for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief under Cal. Code of Civil Procedure§ 526a" (which Plaintiffs voluntarily withdrew). Also, this Court granted Defendants' initial Motion to Dismiss

26

as to the second cause ofaction, but with leave to amend, because it found that count to be unclear as to the basis ofthe claim since it appeared to be entirely duplicative ofthe first cause ofaction. Further, at the hearing on the Motion to Dismiss, the Court also

heard Defendants' Motion to Strike Causes of Action Pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure § 425.16. In their papers
27 and at the oral argument, Plaintiffs conceded that their lawsuit did not challenge the decision to lower the S8HVP benefits but

rather the Defendants' failure to give adequate notice to recipients prior to the effectuating the change. See~. Reporter's
28 Transcript of April 30, 2007 hearing at page 12.

2

Case 2:07-cv-00380-PA-FFM Document 63 Filed 11/26/07 Page 3 of 12 Page ID #:48

1

HUD publishes the fair market rents (henceforth "FMR"? for designated geographic areas in the

2 United States. See 24 C.F.R. §§ 888.111 and 982.503(a). A public housing agency must adopt a payment

3 schedule that establishes "voucher payment standard amounts" (henceforth sometimes "VPSA") for each

4 FMR area within its jurisdiction. See 24 C.F.R. § 982.503(a). As to each FMR area, the PHA must set the

5 VPSA for each "unit size" where unit size is measured by the number of bedrooms (i.e., zero-bedroom or

6 studio, one-bedroom and so on). Id. The public housing agency is initially limited as to its choice of the

7 voucher payment standard amount. As stated in 24 C.F.R. § 982.503(b)(l):

8

(i) The PHA may establish the payment standard amount for a unit size at any level between 90 percent and II 0 percent of the published FMR

9

for that unit size. HUD approval is not required to establish a payment standard amount in that range ("basic range").

10

(ii) The PHA may establish a separate payment standard amount within the basic range for a designated part of an FMR area.

11 See also 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(o)(l)(B).

12

The voucher payment standard amount is used to calculate the monthly housing assistance payment

13 for a family. See 24 C.F.R. § 982.505(a). Where the PHA has established a VPSA within the "basic range"

14 and where the rent for a family (including utilities except for telephone) for their particular unit falls within

15 that range, the amount of monthly assistance payment for that family will normally be:

16

... the amount by which the rent (including the amount allowed for tenant-

17

paid utilities) exceeds the greatest of the following amounts, rounded to the nearest dollar:

18

(i) 30 percent of the monthly adjusted income of the family. (ii) 10 percent ofthe monthly income of the family.

19 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(o)(2)(A);3 see also 24 C.F.R. § 982.505(a).

20

Persons seeking S8HVP assistance must apply to the PHA and supply income and other information

21 to establish their eligibility to participate in the program. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(o)(4); 24 C.F.R. §

22 982.201(a) and (b). Once in the program, the PHA must conduct, at a minimum, a yearly review of the

23 family income and other information of the S8HVP participants. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(o)(5); 24 C.F.R.

24 § 982.516(a).

25

26

2 "Fair market rent means the rent, including the cost of utilities (except telephone}, as established by HUD ... for units

of varying sizes (by number ofbedrooms), that must be paid in the market area to rent privately owned, existing, decent, safe and
27 sanitary rental housing of modest (non-luxury) nature with suitable amenities." 24 C.F.R. § 888.Jll(b).

28

"Adjusted income" is defined in 42 U.S. C. § 1437a(b)(5).

3

Case 2:07-cv-00380-PA-FFM Document 63 Filed 11/26/07 Page 4 of 12 Page ID #:49

1

As conceded by the Plaintiffs in their PAC, "PHAs have discretion to raise or lower the VPS[A]

2 within a statutorily prescribed range." SeePAC at '1[26. Under regulations promulgated by HUD, ifa PHA

3 decreases the amounts on the payment standard schedule, "the lower payment standard amount generally

4 must be used to calculate the monthly housing assistance payment for the family beginning at the effective

5 date of the family's second regular reexamination following the effective date of the decrease in the

6 payment standard amount." 24 C.P.R. § 982.505(c)(3). There is a three step process.

7

Decrease in the payment standard amount during the HAP [housing assistance payments] contract term. Ifthe amount on the payment standard

8

schedule is decreased during the term of the HAP contract, the lower payment standard amount generally must be used to calculate the monthly

9

housing assistance payment for the family beginning at the effective date of the family's second regular reexamination following the effective date ofthe

10

decrease in the payment standard amount. The PHA must determine the payment standard for the family as follows.

11

(i) Step I: At the first regular reexamination following the decrease in the

12

payment standard amount, the PHA shall determine the payment standard for the family[...] (using the decreased payment standard amount).

13

(ii) Step 2 (first reexamination payment standard amount): The PHA shall

14

compare the payment standard amount from step I to the payment standard amount last used to calculate the monthly housing assistance payment for the

15

family. The payment standard amount used by the PHA to calculate the monthly housing assistance payment at the first regular reexamination

16

following the decrease in the payment standard amount is the higher ofthese two payment standard amounts. The PHA shall advise the family that the

17

application of the lower payment standard amount will be deferred until the second regular reexamination following the effective date ofthe decrease in

18

the payment standard amount.

19

(iii) Step 3 (second reexamination payment standard amount): At the second regular reexamination following the decrease in the payment standard

20

amount, the lower payment standard amount shall be used to calculate the monthly housing assistance payment for the family unless the PHA has

21

subsequently increased the payment standard amount ....

22 24 C.P.R. § 982.505(c)(3)(i) thru (iii) [emphasis added].

23

As stated in 24 C.P.R.§ 982.5: "Where part 982 requires any notice to be given by the PHA, the

24 family or the owner, the notice must be in writing."

25

B. Operative Allegations

26

In regards to the HACLA's purported failure to provide notice to the Plaintiff class, the operative

27 allegations are contained in paragraphs 28 through 31 of the PAC which state:

28

28. On April2, 2004, HACLA made a decision to reduce the pre-

4

Case 2:07-cv-00380-PA-FFM Document 63 Filed 11/26/07 Page 5 of 12 Page ID #:50

1

existing VPS. The impact on Section 8 participants was significant. For

example, the VPS for a 0-bedroom ("bachelor") apartment plummeted from

2

$795 to $674, a reduction of$121 per month.

3

29. To implement this change in policy, the HACLA stuck a onepage flyer in the materials mailed to each recipient on the date of their

4

annual re-examination. Unlike other explanatory notices contained in these

packets, the flyer did not require the recipient to acknowledge receipt by

5

signing and returning the form. The flyer was not on letterhead, did not contain a phone number for inquiries, and did not give a legal basis for the

6

decision. More importantly, the flyer did not advise recipients that their outof-pocket rent payment would actually be going up, much less specifY the

7

amount of the increase. Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and on that

basis allege, that these flyers were sent out, buried among other

8

reexamination materials, from approximately July 2004 through July 2005.

9

30. The language ofthe flyer did not meaningfully communicate to the recipient that there would actually be a reduction in the portion ofhis

10

or her rent that HACLA would pay, and a corresponding increase in the portion of his or her rent that the recipient would be required to pay.

11

31. The VPS decrease went into effect with re-examinations that

12

took place from July 2005 to July 2006.

13 See FAC at rs 28 through 31.

14

Plaintiffs' first cause of action is a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim of a denial of due process against

15 Defendant HACLA. They contend that they have "a property interest in the provisions of [24] C.F.R. §

16 982.505(c)(3)(ii) under both state and federal law ...." See FAC at~ 58. In paragraph 59 of the FAC,

17 Plaintiffs assert that:

18

By failing to provide PlaintiffClass clear or meaningful notice ofthe actions HACLA intended to take and its consequences at the time required by 24

19

C.F.R. 982.505(c)(3)(ii), most particularly by failing to meaningfully or effectively advise the Plaintiff Class that their out of pocket share of future

20

rents would be increased [ ... ] and by failing to indicate from whom the notice emanated, the legal basis for the action, a phone number for inquiries,

21

or how to protest or appeal the action, Defendant HACLA deprived the Plaintiff Class of due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth

22

Amendment, thereby entitling the Class to bring the suit and recover damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

23 Plaintiffs seek "injunctive and declaratory relief, an accounting, restitution and/or damages." Id. at~ 61.

24 Plaintiffs' second cause of action seeks to establish a claim based upon a purported violation of

25 rights created by 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(o) which allegedly can be litigated through a "private right of action

26 available under 42 U.S.C. § 1983." See FAC at page 17. As stated in paragraphs 68 and 69 of the FAC:

27

68. In sum, 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(o)(2) and the other sections cited

28

above required HACLA to make monthly payments for the benefit of

5

Case 2:07-cv-00380-PA-FFM Document 63 Filed 11/26/07 Page 6 of 12 Page ID #:51

1

recipients according to the "applicable payment standard." That is a federally secured right. The regulations flush [sic] out how HACLA's

2

monthly payments are to be calculated by specifYing how the applicable payment standard is to be determined. By failing to provide the required

3

notice, the new payment standard implemented by HACLA was unlawful. HACLA, therefore, violated 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(o)(2) by failing to make the

4

required payments under the "applicable payment standard."

5

69. Defendants, as described in this complaint, deprived Plaintiffs and the Plaintiff Class of their federal rights, specifically their

6

voucher payment standard rights created by 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(o), including § 1437(o)(2) and§ 1437f(o)(l), under the color of state law, and thereby

7

violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

8 II. DISCUSSION

9

A. Applicable Law

10

Defendants herein seek to dismiss the second and fifth causes of action pursuant to Federal Rules

11 of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). As stated in Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir.

12 1990).

13

A complaint should not be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) "unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his

14

claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). Dismissal can be based on lack of cognizable legal theory or

15

the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory. Robertson v. Dean Witter Reynolds. Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 533-34 (9th Cir.

16

1984). On a motion to dismiss, the court accepts the facts alleged in the complaint as true. Shah, 797 F.2d at 745.

17

B. Plaintiffs' Second Cause of Action

18

Before considering the viability of the Plaintiffs' Second Cause of Action (henceforth "SCA"), it

19 should initially be noted that Defendants have not moved to dismiss the First Cause ofAction (henceforth

20 "FCA") which asserts that HACLA violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by denying Plaintiffs due process in failing 21 to give them sufficient notice as required by 24 C.F.R. § 982.505(c)(3)(ii) before reducing S8HVP benefits.
22 Likewise, Plaintiffs have conceded that PHAs (such as HACLA) have the discretion to lower the voucher

23 program standard amount (which is used to calculate the S8HVP benefits) within certain limitations.

24 Plaintiffs have not (and apparently do not) contend that HACLA acted substantively or procedurally in an

25 unlawful manner in deciding to reduce the S8HVP benefits, except as to the notice issue. In light of the 26 above, Plaintiffs' SCA either : 1) is simply the same claim as the FCA but stated in slightly different words, 27 or 2) fails to state a cognizable legal theory other than a due process claim based on lack of notice and fails 28

6

Case 2:07-cv-00380-PA-FFM Document 63 Filed 11/26/07 Page 7 of 12 Page ID #:52

1 to allege sufficient facts that would establish a cognizable legal theory under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

2

Plaintiffs' SCA is based on the following syllogism: I) the S8VHP benefits are "a federally secured

3 right"; 2) HUD regulations flesh out how HACLA's monthly payments are to be calculated; 3) by failing

4 to provide the required notice, HACLA's reduction in S8HVP benefits is unlawful and 4) "HACLA,

5 therefore, violated 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(o)(2) by failing to make the required payments under the 'applicable

6 payment standard'" which constitutes a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See FAC at ~'s 68-69. Plaintiffs'

7 SCA fails to state a claim for the reasons stated below.

8

As held in Wright v. Roanoke Redevelopment & Housing Authoritv, 479 U.S. 418,423 (1987), 42

9 U.S.C. § 1983 is available to enforce violations of federal statutes by agents of a state with two exceptions:

10 where Congress has foreclosed such enforcement and where the statute did not create enforceable rights

11 within the meaning of§ 1983. The Court stated, as to the first exception, that "we conclude that nothing

12 in the Housing Act ... evidences that Congress intended to preclude ... [a] § 1983 claim against [a PHA]."

13 Id. at 429. In regards to the second exception, the Supreme Court has retreated from its position in Wright

14 that spending legislation automatically gives rise to enforceable rights under§ 1983. As delineated in

15 Gonzaga Universitv v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 281 (2002): "Our more recent decisions, however, have rejected

16 attempts to infer rights from Spending Clause statutes." The Court went on to state:

17

We now reject the notion that our cases permit anything short of an unambiguously conferred right to support a cause of action brought under

18

§ 1983. Section 1983 provides a remedy only for the deprivation of"rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws" of the

19

United States. Accordingly, it is rights, not the broader or vaguer "benefits" or "interests," that may be enforced under the authority ofthat section. This

20

being so, we further reject the notion that our implied right of action cases are separate and distinct from our§ 1983 cases. To the contrary, our implied

21

right of action cases should guide the determination of whether a statute confers rights enforceable under§ 1983.

22

We have recognized that whether a statutory violation may be

23

enforced through § 1983 "is a different inquiry than that involved in determining whether a private right of action can be implied from a

24

particular statute." Wilder. supra, 496 U.S. 498 at 508, n. 9. But the inquiries overlap in one meaningful respect -- in either case we must first

25

determine whether Congress intended to create a federal right. Thus, we have held that "the question whether Congress . . . intended to create a

26

private right of action [is] definitively answered in the negative" where "a statute by its terms grants no private rights to any identifiable class."

27

Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 576 (1979). For a statute to create such private rights, its text must be "phrased in terms ofthe persons

28

benefitted." Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 692, n. 13

7

Case 2:07-cv-00380-PA-FFM Document 63 Filed 11/26/07 Page 8 of 12 Page ID #:53

1

(1979). * * * * But even where a statute is phrased in such explicit rights-
creating terms, a plaintiff suing under an implied right of action still must

2

show that the statute manifests an intent "to create not just a private right but also a private remedy." Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275,286 (2001)

3

(emphases added).

4 See also Hill v. Richardson, 7 F.3d 656,658 (7th Cir. 1993) ("Wright was closely divided, and Suter [v.

5 Artist M, 503 U.S. 347 (1992)] shows that the Court is unwilling to press Wright for the most it can be

6 worth.").

7

In this case, Plaintiffs are not claiming that the HACLA's decision to reduce voucher payment

8 standard amounts was unlawful, improper or beyond its authority. Thus, while S8HVPs may be a federally

9 secured right, HACLA's reduction of the VPSA has not violated that right. Rather, Plaintiffs' actual

10 complaint is as to a purported failure by HACLA to give adequate notice before effectuating the reduction.

11 While such failure ofnotice may give rise to a due process complaint that could in turn give rise to a§ 1983 12 claim (which is, in essence, the substance of Plaintiffs' FCA),4 inadequate notice by itself is not otherwise

13 cognizable as a § 1983 deprivation of rights claim.

14

First, the applicable federal statute does not require any notice to be given before a PHA reduces

15 the VPSA so long as the reduction is not Jess than 90 percent of the FMR published by HUD for the

16 designated geographic area within the PHA'sjurisdiction. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(o). Therefore, even if

17 HACLA's notice in this case was inadequate, such conduct would not violate a federal statute so as to give

18 rise to a§ 1983 claim under the previously established (but now questioned) holding in Wright that§ 1983

19 is available to enforce violations of federal statutes by agents of a State.

20

Second, Plaintiffs cite to HUD's regulation at 24 C.P.R. § 982.505(c)(3) for the existence of such

21 notice requirement and then argue that the failure to comply with that regulation gives rise to the § 1983

22 claim. That contention must fail in light of the decision in Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001).

23 In Alexander, the Supreme Court rejected the argument that, where a regulation contains some "rights-

24 creating language," the regulation can provide a basis for private enforcement under § 1983 that goes

25 beyond what the statute itself requires. Id. at 291 and 293 fnt. 8. As stated by the Court:

26

Language in a regulation may invoke a private right ofaction that Congress

27
For purposes of deciding this motion, this Court need not and does not reach a decision as to whether a failure to give
28 adequate notice would constitute a due process violation which can be litigated as a § 1983 claim in this case.

8

Case 2:07-cv-00380-PA-FFM Document 63 Filed 11/26/07 Page 9 of 12 Page ID #:54

1

through statutory text created, but it may not create a right that Congress has not. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S., at 577 n. 18 ("[T]he

2

language of the statute and not the rules must control"). Thus, when a statute has provided a general authorization for private enforcement of

3

regulations, it may perhaps be correct that the intent displayed in each regulation can determine whether or not it is privately enforceable. But it is

4

most certainly incorrect to say that language in a regulation can conjure up a private cause ofaction that has not been authorized by Congress. Agencies

5

may play the sorcerer's apprentice but not the sorcerer himself.

6 Id. at 291. See also Save Our Valley v. Sound Transit, 335 F.3d at 932, 936-940 (9th Cir. 2003).

7

Plaintiffs' reliance on the Wright decision and Johnson v. Housing Authoritv of Jefferson Parish,

8 442 F.3d 356 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 127 S.Ct. 136 (2006), is unavailing. In both of those cases, the

9 disputes revolved around the allocation of utilities expenses; in Wright it was a claim of over-billing for

10 utilities by the defendant City Housing Authority (see 479 U.S. at 419), and in Johnson it was the failure

11 of the defendant PHA to use current rates in calculating the utility allowance (see 442 F.3d at 359). As

12 explained in Johnson:

13

... the statutory language of the voucher program unmistakably provides-in the text of the act itself-- for an "amount [to be] allowed for tenant paid

14

utilities." [42 U.S.C. § 1437f(o)(2)(A), (B).] Contrary to the Housing Authority's assertion, the HUD regulations are not necessary to establish

15

Plaintiff-Appellants' right to the utility allowance, and certainly no more so than they were in Wright, where such an allowance was not even mentioned

16

in the text of the statute itself. Congress's intent to benefit PlaintiffsAppellants here cannot be gainsaid.

17 Id. at 364 (footnote omitted). In both Wright and Johnson, the claims were based on the statutory right to

18 receive the correct amount ofrent assistance payments as delineated in the Housing Act as amended. Here,

19 unlike the Wright and Johnson cases, Plaintiffs are not challenging the PHA's calculation as to the amount

20 of the assistance as set forth in the statute. Rather, they are raising an issue of adequacy of notice which 21 is not required in the applicable statute but only in the regulation. Thus, the Wright and Johnson decisions
22 are inapplicable, while the holdings in Alexander and Save Our Valley are controlling.

23

Moreover, even assuming arguendo that a violation of a notice provision in a regulation (that is not

24 required by the underlying statute) can serve theoretically as a basis for a § 1983 action, Plaintiffs would 25 still not have stated a cognizable claim for two reasons. First, HACLA has not violated the notice provision

26 as set out in the regulation. Second, if the notice provision requires more than what HACLA provided, it 27 is too vague and amorphous to confer an enforceable right. 28

9

Case 2:07-cv-00380-PA-FFM Document 63 Filed 11/26/07 Page 10 of 12 Page ID #:55

1

Plaintiffs claim that the notice provided by HACLA was inadequate because it: 1) did not require

2 the recipient to acknowledge receipt by signing and returning the form; 2) was not on HACLA letterhead;

3 3) did not contain a phone number for inquiries; 4) did not state a legal basis for the decision; and 5) did

4 not advise the recipient of how much their out of pocket rent payments would increase. See FAC rs 29

5 and 59. However, the only regulation cited by Plaintiffs does not state that any ofthose items are required.

6 24 C.F.R. § 982.505(c)(3)(ii) merely provides that, after a PHA has calculated the appropriate payment

7 standard amount at the first yearly reexamination following the decrease in the VPSA, "the PHA shall

8 advise the family that the application of the lower payment standard amount will be deferred until the

9 second regular reexamination following the effective date ofthe decrease in the payment standard amount."

10 It makes no reference to having the recipient acknowledge receipt, letterhead, phone numbers, explanation

11 of the legal basis for its decision, etc.

12

Plaintiffs have not alleged that HACLA failed in fact to give the only advisal that is required by the

13 language of24 C.F.R. § 982.505(c)(3)(ii). Moreover, 24 C.F.R. § 982.5 which sets out the only condition

14 for notice merely states that "Where Part 982 requires any notice to be given by the PHA ... , the notice

15 must be in writing." Here, Plaintiffs in paragraph 4 of the FAC indicate that HACLA did give written

16 notice.

17

It is further noted that where specific information is required to be given to a S8HVP participant,

18 the HUD regulation will set forth these requirements. See,~. 24 C.F.R. §§ 982.301(b) and 982.554(a).

19 Likewise, where a participant can challenge the PHA decision, the PHA must give that participant notice

20 of the availability of an informal hearing. However, a PHA's decision setting the VPSA within the basic

21 range is not subject to informal hearings. 24 C.F.R. § 982.555.

22

Finally, in order for a court to conclude that a statute creates a right enforceable under§ 1983, it

23 must find: I) the statute was intended to benefit the plaintiffs; 2) the statute imposes a binding obligation

24 on the government unit rather than merely expressing a congressional preference for a certain kind of

25 conduct, and 3) the interest asserted by the plaintiff is not so vague and amorphous that it is beyond the

26 competence of the judiciary to enforce. See Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Asin., 496 U.S. 498,509 (1990);

27 Legal Services ofNorthem Calif. v. Arnett, 114 F.3d 135, 138 (9th Cir. 1997). Here, as noted above, the

28 statute does not impose any obligation (let alone a binding one) in regards to notice. Even if one were to

10

Case 2:07-cv-00380-PA-FFM Document 63 Filed 11/26/07 Page 11 of 12 Page ID #:56

1 utilize the referenced regulation as an appropriate surrogate for a statute, 24 C.F.R. § 982.505(c)(3)(ii) does

2 not set out any binding obligation insofar as the procedural requirements which Plaintiffs seek to impose

3 (~,acknowledgment ofreceipt ofnotice, explanation oflegal basis, telephone numbers, etc.). Moreover,

4 aside from the due process claim which is the subject of the FCA, the interest asserted by Plaintiffs in the

5 SCA is so vague and amorphous that it fails to confer on SSHVP participants an enforceable "right" within

6 the meaning of§ 1983.

7

For all of the above reasons, the SCA is dismissed with prejudice.

8

C. Plaintiffs' Fifth Cause of Action

9

Plaintiffs' fifth cause of action is for negligence based on California Government Code § 815.2,

10 Evidence Code§ 669, and Civil C?de § 1714. None of those provisions provides a basis for Plaintiffs'

11 negligence claim.

12

As stated in Eastburn v. Regional Fire Protection Agency, 31 Cal.4th 1175, 1179 (2003):

13

... the California Tom Claims Act provides that "[a] public entity is not liable for an injury," "[e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute." (Gov.

14

Code,§ 815; subd. (a).) As that language indicates, the intent of the Tort Claims Act is to confine potential governmental liability, not expand it.

15

(Zelig v. Countv of Los Angeles (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1112, 1127.

16 Civil Code § 1714(a) states that "Every one is responsible ... for an injury occasioned by his want of

17 ordinary care of skill in the management of his property or person ...." Eastburn held that the ordinary

18 negligence liability provision in Civil Code § 1714 is inapplicable to public entities. As stated in Eastburn,

19 31 Ca1.4th at 1183:

20

In other words, direct tort liability of public entities must be based on a specific statute declaring them to be liable, or at least creating some specific

21

duty of care, and not on the general tort provisions of Civil Code section 1714. Otherwise, the general rule of immunity for public entities would be

22

largely eroded by the routine application of general tort principles.

23

Government Code § 815.2(a) provides that: "A public entity is liable for injury proximately caused

24 by an act or omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment if the act or

25 omission would, apart from this section, have given rise to a cause of action against that employee or his

26 personal representative [emphases added]." § 815.2(a) does not provide a basis for a common law claim
27 for negligence against a public entity for its own negligent conduct. As stated in Zelig v. Countv of Los

28 Angeles, 27 Ca1.4th 1112, 1127 (2002):

11

Case 2:07-cv-00380-PA-FFM Document 63 Filed 11/26/07 Page 12 of 12 Page ID #:57

1

The Tort Claims Act draws a clear distinction between the liability of a public entity based on its own conduct, and the liability arising from the

2

conduct of a public employee. Although the Act provides that a public employee generally is liable for an injury caused by his or her act or

3

omission "to the same extent as a private person" (Gov. Code.,§ 820, subd. (a)) and that, when the act or omission of the public employee occurs in the

4

scope of employment the public entity will be vicariously liable for the injury (Gov. Code § 815.2), the Act contains no provision similarly

5

providing that a public entity generally is liable for its own conduct or omission to the same extent as a private person or entity. Rather, the Act

6

provides that a public entity is not liable for an injury"[e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute ...." (Gov. Code,§ 815.)

7

Evidence Code§ 669(a) provides that a "failure of a person to exercise ordinary case is presumed

8 if: (1) he violated a statute, ordinance, or regulation of a public entity ...." However, as noted in

9 California Service Station etc. Assn. v. American Home Assurance Co., 62 Cal.App.4th 1166, 1177-78

10 (1998), a claim of ordinary negligence must be viable before the presumption of negligence in Evidence

11 Code§ 669(a) can be employed. The mere fact that a person has violated a statute or regulation does not,

12 by itself, establish that the result will be the tort of negligence. Id. at 1178-79. Plaintiffs have offered

13 nothing to suggest that a purported failure to provide adequate notice under 24 C.F.R. § 982.505(c)(3)(ii)

14 should be treated as negligence. Moreover, as discussed above, Plaintiffs' allegations in the FAC do not

15 set forth a basis for finding that HACLA has violated the notice requirement of§ 982.505(c)(3)(ii). That

16 regulation does not delineate any duty or standard ofcare as to how the advisal is to be given. To the extent

17 that the HUD regulations in 24 C.F.R. Part 982 can be said to forth a duty of care regarding notice, as

18 discussed above, HACLA has complied with it.

19 IV. CONCLUSION

20

For the reasons stated above and at the hearings on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, the second and

21 fifth causes of action in the FAC are hereby dismissed with prejudice.

22

23 DATED: November J.{ 2007
24
25 26 27

~~d:&-
United States District Judge

28

12

 </s> Case 2:07-cv-00380-PA-FFM Document 132 Filed 05/23/11 Page 1 of 7 Page ID #:871

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

FILED
MAY23 2011
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

MICHAEL NOZZI, individually and as class representatives; et al.,
Plaintiffs- Appellants,
v.
HOUSING AUTHORITY OF THE CITY OF LOS ANGELES and RUDOLPH MONTIEL, in his official capacity,
Defendants- Appellees.

No. 09-55588

D.C. No. 2:07-cv-00380-GW-FFM
U.S. District Court for Central California, Los Angeles

MANDAT

RECEIVED CLERK, U.S. DISTRICT COURT

MAY 2 3 2011
T ~V't~~n"U'{FDOERPNUITYA

The judgment of this Court, entered March 21, 2011, takes effect this date.
This constitutes the formal mandate of this Court issued pursuant to Rule
41(a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.
FOR THE COURT: Molly C. Dwyer Clerk of Court
Lee-Ann Collins Deputy Clerk

Case 2:07-cv-00380-PA-FFM Document 132 Filed 05/23/11 Page 2 of 7 Page ID #:872
FILED

NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MAR 21 2011
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

MICHAEL NOZZI, individually and as class representative; et al.,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
v.
HOUSING AUTHORITY OF THE CITY OF LOS ANGELES and RUDOLPH MONTIEL, in his official capacity,
Defendants - Appellees.

No. 09-55588 D.C. No. 2:07-cv-00380-GW-FFM
MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California
George H. Wu, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted December 8, 2010 Pasadena, California
Before: TROTT and WARDLAW, Circuit Judges, and MOSMAN, District Judge.**

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
** The Honorable Michael W. Mosman, United States District Judge for the District of Oregon, sitting by designation.

Case 2:07-cv-00380-PA-FFM Document 132 Filed 05/23/11 Page 3 of 7 Page ID #:873
Plaintiffs Michael Nozzi and Nidia Pelaez, putative class representatives of recipients of federal housing assistance payments under the Section 8 Housing Voucher Program, 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(o), and the Los Angeles Coalition to End Hunger and Homelessness (collectively "plaintiffs") appeal the district court's dismissal of two claims and grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles ("HACLA"), which administers the Section 8 Program, and its Executive Director, Rudolph Montiel, on other claims arising from defendants' failure to provide adequate notice of its planned reduction of the voucher payment standard ("VPS"), which is used to calculate plaintiffs' monthly housing assistance payments. Because the district court incorrectly applied well-established law to conclude that plaintiffs asserted no property interest to which due process attached, and because genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether the notice HACLA provided satisfied the requirements of due process, we affirm in part and reverse in part.
1. Perhaps misconstruing plaintiffs' § 1983 due process claim, the district court improperly concluded that plaintiffs' property interest in Section 8 benefits did not require adequate notice that their benefits were subject to the planned reduction. Although the district court based this conclusion on its determination that plaintiffs could not claim a property interest in the § 982.505 notice
2

Case 2:07-cv-00380-PA-FFM Document 132 Filed 05/23/11 Page 4 of 7 Page ID #:874
requirement, plaintiffs' claim does not depend on finding a "right to notice." Rather, plaintiffs claim that they are statutorily entitled to benefits under Section 8, and that the statute in tandem with the regulatory requirements "restrict[ing] the discretion" of HACLA, Griffeth v. Detrich, 603 F.2d 118, 121 (9th Cir. 1979), creates a property interest in Section 8 benefits to which constitutional due process attaches. See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 599-603 (1972) (citing Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972)) (a legitimate claim of entitlement derived from a statute, rule, regulation, or de facto protocol gives rise to a federally protected property interest). Moreover, because it is beyond dispute that "property interests ... extend well beyond actual ownership," Roth, 408 U.S. at 571-72, the district court erred in concluding that plaintiffs "can only [have] a property interest in property." See, e.g., Ressler v. Pierce, 692 F.2d 1212, 1215 (9th Cir. 1982) (finding that applicants have a federally protected property interest in receiving benefits); Griffeth, 603 F.2d at 121 (same).
The controlling authority establishes that Section 8 participants have a property interest in housing benefits by virtue of their "membership in a class of individuals whom the Section 8 program was designed to benefit." Ressler, 692 F.2d at 1215. Because the Section 8 regulations "closely circumscribe" HACLA's discretion - by prohibiting HACLA from immediately implementing a reduced
3

Case 2:07-cv-00380-PA-FFM Document 132 Filed 05/23/11 Page 5 of 7 Page ID #:875
VPS, and requiring HACLA to inform participants that a reduced VPS will be implemented- plaintiffs' property interest is protected against avoiding an abrupt and unexpected change in benefits. ld.; see also Geneva Towers Tenants Org. v. Romney, 504 F.2d 483, 490 (9th Cir. 1974) (finding that plaintiffs' protected property interest in low-income housing included an expectation "that rents will be kept as low as economically feasible" where an entity's discretion to increase rent was limited and plaintiffs clearly fell within the category of intended beneficiaries of the federal assistance program).
What process is due to protect plaintiffs' well-settled property interest in their Section 8 benefits is controlled by the factors set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,335 (1976). Upon remand, the district court shall apply the Mathews factors to the circumstances presented here. See, e.g., Ressler, 692 F.2d at 1216-22 (evaluating the sufficiency ofprocedural safeguards); Geneva Towers, 504 F.2d at 491-93 (same). We note that the district court's conclusion that there is "no reason to look beyond the regulatory language" to determine if HACLA's notice was sufficient is at odds with Mathews. Technical compliance with regulatory procedures does not automatically satisfy due process requirements. See Cleveland Bd. ofEduc. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532,541 (1985) ("'Property' cannot be defined by the procedures provided for its deprivation.").
4

Case 2:07-cv-00380-PA-FFM Document 132 Filed 05/23/11 Page 6 of 7 Page ID #:876
Moreover, given that the district court recognized that "the consequences of a sudden reduction in benefits to a Section 8 participant could be potentially devastating," there exists a genuine issue of material fact as to whether HACLA's notice sufficiently protected plaintiffs' property interest. 1
2. For similar reasons, the district court improperly granted summary judgment on plaintiffs' state due process claim. California courts have held that the due process provision of the California Constitution, Cal. Const. art I, § 7, is "identical in scope and purpose" to the Due Process Clause of the federal Constitution. Gray v. Whitmore, 17 Cal. App. 3d 1, 20 (1971) (citing Gray v. Hall, 203 Cal. 306, 318 (1928)).
3. The district court incorrectly concluded that the notice provided by defendants satisfied the mandatory duty in§ 982.505 to provide one-year notice before implementing the reduced VPS. California Government Code§ 815.6 permits private individuals to sue public entities where: (1) an enactment imposes a mandatory duty; (2) it is intended to protect the individual from the type of injury suffered; and (3) the breach of the mandatory duty was the proximate cause of the
1 The district court's reliance on Atkins v. Parker, 472 U.S. 115 (1985), is misplaced. There, the plaintiffs had no property interest in advance notice of congressional action under the Food Stamp Act, and thus minimal, after-the-fact notice of a legislative change satisfied due process. !d. at 125-26, 129-30.
5

Case 2:07-cv-00380-PA-FFM Document 132 Filed 05/23/11 Page 7 of 7 Page ID #:877
injury suffered. Cal. Gov't Code§ 815.6. At a minimum, the notice must be sufficiently effective to protect housing benefits recipients from an abrupt and unexpected reduction of benefits. It is a question of fact whether the "literal compliance" that occurred here was sufficient to meet§ 815.6's requirements.
4. The district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' state law negligence claim was erroneous because, while public entities cannot be held liable for their own negligence, they may be held vicariously liable for the negligent acts of their individual employees. See Cal. Gov't Code§ 815.2; Eastburn v. Reg 'l Fire Prot. Agency, 31 Cal. 4th 1175, 1179 (2003).
5. The district court did not err in dismissing plaintiffs'§ 1983 claim to enforce the notice requirement in the regulation. Under Save Our Valley v. Sound Transit, 335 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2003), agency regulations cannot create a federal right enforceable under § 1983.
AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED for proceedings consistent with this disposition. Each party shall bear its own costs.
6

 </s> Case 2:07-cv-00380-PA-FFM Document 218 Filed 11/30/15 Page 1 of 48 Page ID #:1919

FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MICHAEL NOZZI, an individual; NIDIA PELAEZ, an individual; LOS ANGELES COALITION TO END HUNGER AND HOMELESSNESS, a non-profit organization, on behalf of themselves and similarly situated persons,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
HOUSING AUTHORITY OF THE CITY OF LOS ANGELES; RUDOLPH MONTIEL, in his official capacity,
Defendants-Appellees.

No. 13-56223
D.C. No. 2:07-cv-00380-
GW-FFM
OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California
George H. Wu, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted July 10, 2015—Pasadena, California
Filed November 30, 2015

Case 2:07-cv-00380-PA-FFM Document 218 Filed 11/30/15 Page 2 of 48 Page ID #:1920

2

NOZZI V. HACLA

Before: Stephen Reinhardt and Richard R. Clifton, Circuit Judges and Miranda M. Du,* District Judge.

Opinion by Judge Reinhardt

SUMMARY**

Civil Rights
The panel reversed the district court’s summary judgment in favor of defendants, directed that summary judgment be entered in favor of plaintiffs, and remanded for further proceedings in a putative class action in which plaintiffs alleged that defendants, the local administrators of the Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher Program, reduced the amount of Section 8 beneficiaries’ subsidies without providing adequate notice, in violation of federal and state law.
The panel first noted that this Court had previously held that plaintiffs have a property interest in Section 8 benefits to which the procedural protections of the Due Process Clause apply. Nozzi v. Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles, 425 F. App’x 539 (9th Cir. 2011). The panel held that the Housing Authority failed to provide meaningful information to Section 8 beneficiaries about a change to the program’s

* The Honorable Miranda M. Du, District Judge for the U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada, sitting by designation.
** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

Case 2:07-cv-00380-PA-FFM Document 218 Filed 11/30/15 Page 3 of 48 Page ID #:1921

NOZZI V. HACLA

3

subsidy payment standard and the effect of that change upon the beneficiaries and their property interests. The panel held that this failure violated both the requirements of the Voucher Program regulations and the requirements of procedural due process. It also resulted in a violation of two state statutes, California Government Code §§ 815.6 & 815.2, which require public entities to take reasonable efforts to comply with the mandatory duties established by federal regulations. The panel reversed and remanded with instructions for the district court to enter summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs on the merits of the federal and state law claims.

The panel ordered that on remand, the case be reassigned to a different district judge—a judge other than the two identified by the current district judge who himself had declined to hear the case further. The panel stated that further factual development may be needed to determine the size and validity of plaintiffs’ class and to determine the appropriate remedy.

COUNSEL
Barrett S. Litt (argued), Kaye, McLane, Bednarski & Litt, LLP, Pasadena, California; Patrick Dunlevy, Lisa R. Jaskol, Stephanie Carroll, Public Counsel, Los Angeles, California, for Plaintiffs-Appellees.
Roy G. Weatherup (argued) and Brant H. Dveirin, Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith LLP, Los Angeles, California, for Defendants-Appellees.

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OPINION

REINHARDT, Circuit Judge:

The Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher Program provides rental assistance to the most vulnerable members of our society. For many, especially those in areas with a high cost of living, the continuous receipt of these benefits is the only means through which Section 8 beneficiaries and their families can obtain safe, affordable housing. For those on a fixed income or those living paycheck to paycheck, any unexpected decrease in the subsidy can result in homelessness. For this reason, the program contains procedural protections designed to ensure that beneficiaries have at least a full year to plan for certain changes that may decrease the beneficiary’s subsidy and increase the rent that they will have to pay.

Plaintiffs are the putative class representatives of a group of tenants who receive rent subsidies through the Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher Program. They assert that the Defendants, the local administrators of the Voucher Program, reduced the amount of Section 8 beneficiaries’ subsidies without providing adequate notice, in violation of federal and state law. We agree. Accordingly, we reverse the grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants, direct that summary judgment be entered in favor of the plaintiffs, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

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I. STATUTORY AND REGULATORY BACKGROUND

A. Overview of the Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher Program

In 1974, Congress created the Section 8 housing program in order to “aid[] low-income families in obtaining a decent place to live” and “promot[e] economically mixed housing.” Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. 93-383 § 201(a), 88 Stat. 633, 622–66 (1974) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1437f). For over four decades, the program has provided rental assistance to low-income, elderly, and disabled families. See generally Park Village Apartment Tenants Ass’n v. Mortimer Howard Trust, 636 F.3d 1150, 1152 (9th Cir. 2011).

The majority of federal housing assistance takes place through the Housing Choice Voucher Program, which subsidizes the cost of renting privately-owned housing units. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(o). The Voucher Program is funded and regulated by the federal Department of Housing and Urban Development, and it is administered at the local level through “public housing agencies.” 24 C.F.R. § 982.1(a).

The public housing agencies determine whether individuals are eligible to participate in the program. 24 C.F.R. § 982.201. When an individual is approved, the public housing agency gives that person a voucher which entitles him to search for qualifying privately-owned housing. 24 C.F.R. § 982.302. When a voucher-possessing individual finds a qualifying unit, the unit owner and public housing agency will negotiate and enter into a housing assistance payment contract, which inter alia specifies the maximum monthly rent that the unit owner may charge. 42 U.S.C.

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§ 1437f(c). After that contract has been formed, the public
housing agency will make subsidy payments to the unit owner on behalf of the tenant.1

An extensive set of statutory provisions and regulations governs the calculation of the subsidy that must be paid on behalf of each tenant. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(o); 24 C.F.R. § 982.501 et seq. To begin with, the Department of Housing and Urban Development must set the fair market rent for established geographic areas across the United States. 24 C.F.R. § 982.503(a)(1). The public housing agency must use this fair market rent to create a local voucher “payment standard” for each of the areas in its jurisdiction. 24 C.F.R. § 982.503(b)(1)(I). A payment standard is the maximum subsidy payment that the housing agency will provide for each type of apartment in the area. Id. It must generally be set between 90 percent and 110 percent of the fair market rent for the area. 24 C.F.R. § 982.503(b)(1)(i).2

All tenants are responsible for contributing 30% of their monthly adjusted income or 10% of their gross monthly

1 As the “beneficiaries” at issue in this opinion are those Section 8 recipients who have already secured and are currently leasing apartments that are paid for, in part, by Section 8 subsidies, the terms “beneficiary” and “tenant” are used interchangeably throughout the opinion.
2 The public housing agency must request approval to establish a payment standard outside of this range. 24 C.F.R. § 982.503(b)(2). The Department of Housing and Urban Development may approve such a variance if the public housing agency meets one of the prescribed exceptions. See 24 C.F.R. § 982.503(c)–(d).

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income, whichever is greater. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(c)(2)(A).3 Tenants whose rental units cost more than the payment standard have a higher expected contribution. Such tenants must also pay any amount by which their rent exceeds the established payment standard. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(o)(2)(B).4 In either case, the subsidy covers the balance of the rent.

B. Procedures for Decreasing the Payment Standard

Practically, the formula for calculating a tenant’s expected rent contribution means that a decision by the public housing agency to increase the payment standard will generally yield larger subsidies. By contrast, a decrease in the payment standard will generally decrease subsidies and may increase the rental contribution of a substantial number of tenants.5

3 This calculation must account for any welfare assistance tenants receive that is specifically designated for housing costs. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(o)(2)(A)(iii).
4 An example helps to illustrate this formula. Abel and Beth both must contribute 30% of their monthly adjusted income, for a total of $100 each. The payment standard for one-bedroom apartments in their area is $400. Abel rents a $400 apartment. He must pay $100 towards his rent and will receive the remaining $300 as a rent subsidy. Beth rents a $500 apartment. She must pay the $100 from her monthly adjusted income, but must also pay the amount by which her $500 apartment exceeds the $400 payment standard–another $100, for a total of $200.
5 In the hypothetical above, if the public housing agency lowered the payment standard for a one-bedroom apartment in the area from $400 to $300, Abel, who is renting a $400 apartment, would now need to pay an additional $100 for a total of $200. Beth, who is renting a $500 apartment, would need to pay an additional $200, for a total of $300. A decrease in the payment standard would not cause an increase in rent when: (1) the total rent for the unit is less than the lower payment

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To avoid any hardship caused by this change, the Department of Housing and Urban Development’s regulations are designed to ensure that beneficiaries have a one-year period of stable benefits in which to plan for changes to the payment standard that may adversely affect their subsidy amount and rent contribution. Each year, the public housing agency conducts annual examinations of each beneficiary, usually on the anniversary of the beneficiary’s entry into the Section 8 program, to verify his continued eligibility for benefits and to calculate his expected rent contribution for the current year. 24 C.F.R. § 982.516. Alterations to a tenant’s benefits may occur due to circumstantial changes, such as adjustments to the tenant’s income, family composition, or cost to rent his apartment, but the regulations limit the discretion of public housing agencies to lower subsidies based on adjustments to the payment standards. If the public housing agency decides to lower the payment standards, it must provide information about the change to all beneficiaries at their annual reexaminations following the decision, and must further advise these beneficiaries that the change will not go into effect until their following reexamination one year later. See 24 C.F.R. § 982.505(c)(3).

This requirement provides some measure of financial stability for vulnerable Section 8 beneficiaries as it protects against sudden decreases in subsidy at the whims of the public housing agency. Absent any changes to a beneficiary’s circumstances, he can be assured that his subsidy will renew with, at a minimum, the same terms as the

standard, (2) the tenant’s adjusted income has also decreased, or (3) the public housing agency later raised the payment standard before the decrease went into effect.

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prior year unless he had previously been warned that the public housing agency has taken an action that could adversely affect his subsidy. The regulations cast this warning in terms of the public housing agency’s duty to provide information to the beneficiary that the payment standard has been decreased, to be effective at least a year afterward. Thus, under that mandatory procedure, the beneficiary necessarily has an expectation in an unaffected one-year term of benefits following the warning in which to plan for the change’s potential adverse impact.

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Implementation of the 2004 Payment Standard Decrease

The Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles (“Housing Authority”) administers the Voucher Program for that city.6 In 2004, the Department of Housing and Urban Development required the Housing Authority to limit spending in order to balance the Department’s 2004 budget. To meet the budget constraints, the Housing Authority’s Board of Commissioners reduced the payment standard from 110% of the 50th percentile of rents in Los Angeles County to 100% of the 40th percentile of rents. At the time, the Board estimated that “approximately 45% of its approximately 45,000 Section 8 tenants would be adversely affected by the April 2004 decrease, and would have to pay an average of $104 more in rent each month if they chose to remain in their current units. Of this number, nearly 5,000

6 The plaintiffs in this case also sued the Executive Director of the Housing Authority for the City of Los Angeles. Throughout the opinion, both defendants will be referred to as the “Housing Authority.”

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were elderly families, and nearly 4,500 were non-elderly, disabled families.”7

That year, the Housing Authority instructed its staff to attach a copy of a flyer to each Section 8 beneficiaries’ “notice of review determination” or “RE-38,” which is a form sent annually to all Section 8 beneficiaries at the time of their annual reexamination that confirms their renewed eligibility for benefits and sets forth their rent contribution and subsidy amount for the current year. The flyer, which was printed in both English and Spanish, stated:

HOUSING AUTHORITY OF THE CITY OF LOS ANGELES

NOTICE

Effective April 2, 2004 the Housing Authority lowered the payment standards used to determine your portion of the rent. We will not apply these lower payment standards until your next regular reexamination. If you move, however, these new lower payment standards will apply to your next unit.

That message was followed by (1) a heading stating “PAYMENT STANDARDS AND TENANT-BASED SHELTER PLUS CARE PAYMENT STANDARDS EFFECTIVE APRIL 2, 2004”; (2) a table listing the new payment standards; and (3) a statement that “Regardless of its

7 The Board also provided, for the first time, that every tenant must pay a minimum expected contribution of $50. That change is not at issue in this case.

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location, the unit’s rent can never be higher than the comparable rents determined by the housing authority.”8 For simplicity, this will hereinafter be referred to as the “flyer.” The attached RE-38 form showed the tenant’s subsidy and rent contribution for the current year, a number that was unaffected by the decreased payment standards.

Approximately one year later and only thirty days before the changes to the payment standard were scheduled to be implemented and to adversely affect the tenants’ subsidies and rent contributions, the Housing Authority sent out another notice of review determination. This particular notice, which will hereinafter be referred to as the “four-week notice,” set forth the tenants’ subsidies and rents for the upcoming year using the new, lowered payment standard. This was the first time that tenants were actually notified that the change would affect them personally or that there would be an increase to their rent contributions.

B. The Impacted Beneficiaries Sue

In 2007, Plaintiffs Michael Nozzi and Nidia Palaez, together with the Los Angeles Coalition to End Hunger and Homelessness, filed an amended class action complaint on behalf of affected Section 8 beneficiaries against the Housing Authority and its Executive Director.9 They claimed that, as

8 See Appendix A.
9 Plaintiff Los Angeles Coalition to End Hunger and Homelessness is a non-profit devoted to fighting the causes and effects of homelessness. It advocates for more affordable housing on behalf of low-income individuals in Los Angeles. Its membership includes people who receive Section 8 benefits and who have been negatively affected by the 2004 decrease in the payment standard.

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relevant here, the Defendants’ failure to provide comprehensible information to Section 8 beneficiaries about the payment standard change and its effect one year in advance of the change’s implementation: (1) violated the due process clauses of the United States and California Constitutions, (2) violated California Government Code § 815.6, which governs liability for public entities that breach mandatory duties, and (3) constituted negligence pursuant to California Government Code § 815.2.

Plaintiff Michael Nozzi, a Section 8 beneficiary since December 2003, is totally and permanently disabled under Social Security’s standards. As a result of the 2004 change, his expected rent contribution increased 48%—from $231 to $342 per month. Plaintiff Nidia Palaez, a beneficiary since February 2004, is a single mother with a young daughter. She experienced a 177% increase in her portion of the rent as a result of the 2004 change. She alleges that this increase has adversely affected her family’s quality of life, that she has had difficulty affording suitable school clothes for her daughter, and that she has had to divert money from her food budget to cover her increased rent costs.

Both Nozzi and Palaez allege that they did not understand that their Section 8 benefits would decrease and that their own rent obligations would increase until they received notices approximately one year after the flyer, four weeks before the change in the payment standard adversely affected their rent contribution. Neither recalls receiving the original flyer, and neither could comprehend it when it was later shown to them.

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C. The District Court Disposes of Plaintiff’s Claims

On November 26, 2007, the district court for the Central District of California dismissed the plaintiff’s negligence claim. The court held that the plaintiffs failed to establish an essential element for such claims against a public entity: that a statute imposed a mandatory duty on the entity.10

In early 2009, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment on the remaining issues. With respect to the due process claims, the Housing Authority argued that the plaintiffs did not have a property interest protected by the due process clauses of the United States or California Constitutions.

Furthermore, the Housing Authority asserted that, even if the plaintiffs had a protected property interest, they received sufficient process because the Housing Authority had sent the flyer and “made significant efforts to increase participants’ awareness of the 2004 VPS reduction through public hearings and community outreach.” The Housing Authority supported its position with (1) declarations from Housing Authority employees summarily stating that all Section 8 beneficiaries receive instructional training upon entry into the Section 8 program, and (2) minutes of a public meeting and a PowerPoint presentation used at the meeting discussing changes to the Housing Authority’s operation, during which a brief discussion occurred regarding the payment standard decrease.

10 The district court also dismissed other claims that are not relevant to this appeal.

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In response, the plaintiffs argued that they had a legitimate expectation in continued and stable Section 8 benefits. They challenged the relevance of the Defendants’ purported training sessions and public meetings to the question whether the Housing Authority provided sufficient notice to the affected beneficiaries. Furthermore, the plaintiffs asserted, the only relevant question was whether the flyer was reasonably comprehensible to the average recipient, a question unaffected by the Housing Authority’s other actions.

The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Housing Authority on the due process claims and the remaining state statutory claim, an alleged violation of § 815.6. According to the district court, the plaintiffs could not have a protectable property interest in their Section 8 benefits because the Housing Authority had complete discretion to reduce the payment standard. The only restriction, the district court wrote, was 24 C.F.R. § 982.505(c)(3), which required the agency to provide notice, but did not create a property interest protectable by the due process clauses.

With regard to the California Government Code § 815.6 claim, the district court held that such a claim required the plaintiffs to show that the Housing Authority had breached a “mandatory duty” imposed by statute. The court reasoned that even if 24 C.F.R. § 982.505(c)(3) or the due process clauses created such a duty, there was no basis on which to conclude that the Housing Authority had breached its obligations under that regulation.

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D. Nozzi I

On appeal, a different panel of this Court reversed. Nozzi v. Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles (“Nozzi I”) (mem.), 425 F. App’x 539 (9th Cir. 2011). With regard to the plaintiffs’ due process claims, we held that the district court “improperly concluded that plaintiffs’ property interest in Section 8 benefits did not require adequate notice that their benefits were subject to the planned reduction.” 425 F. App’x at 541. To begin with, the plaintiffs had a “wellsettled property interest” in Section 8 benefits because “the statute, in tandem with regulatory requirements ‘restrict[ing] the discretion’” of the Housing Authority, “protected against an abrupt and unexpected change in benefits.” Id.11 We remanded for the district court to apply the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test to determine if the Housing Authority’s notice was sufficient.12 Id.

11 In so holding, the prior panel held that the grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants was inappropriate because there was a material issue of fact as to whether the steps taken by the Housing Authority protected against a sudden change in benefits. The majority did not find it necessary, for purposes of reversing the district court’s grant of summary judgment, to address the merits of the plaintiffs’ contentions that they had a right to a stable one-year term of benefits and that any steps by the Housing Authority taken less than one year before the change would be insufficient to protect this interest.
12 As described in greater detail below, Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) requires courts, when determining what process is due to protect an interest covered by the due process clause, to examine (1) the private interest that will be affected by an official action; (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value of additional or substitute safeguards; and (3) the government’s interest, which includes the administrative burdens of additional or substitute procedures. Id. at 335.

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As for the California Government Code § 815.6 claim, we noted that the statute permits private individuals to sue public entities when three elements have been met: (1) there is an enactment imposing a mandatory duty, (2) that enactment is intended to protect the individual from the type of injury suffered, and (3) the breach of the mandatory duty was the proximate cause of the injury suffered. Id. We held that the “district court incorrectly concluded that the notice provided by defendants satisfied the mandatory duty in § 982.505 to provide one-year notice before implementing the reduced [payment standard].” Id. The notice required by the regulation must be, “[a]t a minimum,” “sufficiently effective to protect housing benefits recipients from an abrupt and unexpected reduction in benefits.” Id. Accordingly, this Court remanded the § 815.6 claim for further consideration.13

Finally, we held that the district court’s dismissal of the plaintiffs’ state law negligence claim was “erroneous” because public entities “may be held vicariously liable for the negligent acts of their individual employees” under California Government Code § 815.2. Id. This claim was also remanded for further consideration.

E. Remand and the Current Appeal

On remand from Nozzi I, pursuant to a jointly agreed upon phased discovery plan, the plaintiffs sought discovery of the identities of Section 8 tenants who had been sent the flyer and whose benefits were ultimately affected by the decreased payment standard. They also sought discovery

13 Again, for the purposes of reversing summary judgment in favor of the defendants, the prior panel did not find it necessary to address whether plaintiffs’ had a right to a stable one-year term of benefits.

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pertaining to any training sessions and public outreach efforts by the Housing Authority that concerned the payment standard. Before the completion of discovery, the Housing Authority filed a renewed motion for summary judgment. The plaintiffs objected that ruling on summary judgment should be deferred under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d), which allows the court to defer considering a motion for summary judgment when the nonmovant shows that it cannot yet present facts essential to its opposition. The Housing Authority disagreed, arguing that no further discovery was necessary.

The district court ignored the plaintiffs’ request for more discovery and issued a tentative ruling granting summary judgment to the Housing Authority which it later reduced to a final judgment. In that order, the district court determined that, applying the Mathews test, plaintiffs received constitutionally adequate process. Specifically, the district court reasoned, the flyer, training sessions, public outreach meetings, and four-week notice provided more than enough notice to Section 8 beneficiaries.

With regard to the California Government Code § 815.6 claim, the district court rejected the plaintiffs’ claim that the notice provided was not adequate, and held that the totality of the Housing Authority’s efforts protected plaintiffs from an “abrupt” and “unexpected” reduction in their Section 8 benefits. Finally, the court held that the Housing Authority could not be vicariously liable for the conduct of its employees, because its employees did not breach any mandatory duty owed to the plaintiffs. This appeal followed.

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III. STANDING AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

As an initial matter, the Housing Authority claims that the plaintiffs lack standing to bring this action. It is incorrect. To establish standing, plaintiffs must establish that they have: (1) an injury in fact, (2) that is “fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant” and (3) that is “likely to be redressed by a favorable decision.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992) (quotation marks omitted). Here, the plaintiffs alleged that the Housing Authority decreased the amount of their Section 8 benefits and therefore increased the amount they had to pay in rent without adhering to the protections required by due process and by Voucher Program regulations. As the Supreme Court has held, “[w]hen the suit is one challenging the legality of government action or inaction” and “the plaintiff is himself an object of the action . . . there is ordinarily little question that the action or inaction has caused him injury[.]” Id. at 561–62. Plaintiffs request compensatory damages, as well as declaratory and injunctive relief, for uncompensated injuries that were ongoing when they filed their complaint. As a result, they met all three standing requirements.

We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the Housing Authority for each claim de novo and must determine whether, “viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, there are any genuine issues of material fact and whether the district court correctly applied the substantive law.” Leisik v. Brightwood Corp., 278 F.3d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 2002).14 If we determine that

14 Plaintiffs also contend that the district court abused its discretion in denying their motion to postpone consideration of the Defendants’ motion for summary judgment until the completion of discovery. Because we

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there are no genuine issues of material fact remaining, that the Housing Authority does not prevail, and that it has had a “full and fair opportunity” to present its case, we may consider whether plaintiffs are entitled to summary judgment. Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1176 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc). Here, we also consider, at the plaintiffs’ request, whether to reassign this case to a different district judge, which we may do only when a party can show “personal biases or unusual circumstances,” such as when the district judge can be reasonably expected to have substantial difficulty setting aside his previous impressions of the case or when reassignment is desirable in order to preserve the appearance of justice. Krechman v. Cnty. of Riverside, 723 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2013).

IV. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS

A. The Contours of the Plaintiffs’ Property Right

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment imposes procedural constraints on governmental decisions that deprive individuals of liberty or property interests. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 332 (1976).15 Thus, the first question

hold that granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants was improper for other reasons, and because there is no cause for further discovery on the summary judgment issues following remand, we need not address this contention.
15 The language of Article I § 7 of the California Constitution is “virtually identical” to the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution, with the caveat that California courts place a higher significance on the dignitary interest inherent in providing proper procedure. Today’s Fresh Start, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cnty. Office of Education, 303 P.3d 1140, 1150 (Cal. 2013). Recognizing this difference,

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in any case in which a violation of procedural due process is alleged is whether the plaintiffs have a protected property or liberty interest and, if so, the extent or scope of that interest. Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569–70 (1972). The property interests that due process protects extend beyond tangible property and include anything to which a plaintiff has a “legitimate claim of entitlement.” Id. at 576–77. A legitimate claim of entitlement is created “and [its] dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law—rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those benefits.” Id. at 577. Further, as we have previously held, plaintiffs have a protected property right in public benefits when, as here, a statute authorizes those benefits and the “implementing regulations” “greatly restrict the discretion” of the people who administer those benefits. See Griffeth v. Detrich, 603 F.2d 118, 121 (9th Cir. 1979).

Thus, as we held in Nozzi I, the plaintiffs here have a property interest in Section 8 benefits to which the procedural protections of the due process clause apply. 425 F. App’x at 541 (“Section 8 participants have a property interest in housing benefits[.]”); Ressler v. Pierce, 692 F.2d 1212, 1215–16 (9th Cir. 1982) (“In addition, [the plaintiff] has a constitutionally protected ‘property’ interest in Section 8 benefits by virtue of her membership in a class of individuals whom the Section 8 program was intended to benefit.”); see also Roth, 408 U.S. at 576 (“[A] person receiving . . . benefits

we nevertheless address the plaintiffs’ federal and state due process claims together, as it is unnecessary to take the additional factor into account in this case.

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under statutory and administrative standards defining eligibility for them has an interest in continued receipt of those benefits that is safeguarded by procedural due process.”); Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261, 1278 (7th Cir. 1981) (“Courts have held in a variety of circumstances that certified tenants in Section 8 programs have protectable property interests under the due process clause.”).

The “dimensions” of the property interest here “are defined by existing rules . . . or understandings that secure certain benefits”—in this case, the Voucher Program statute and regulations. See Roth, 408 U.S. at 577. These regulations limit the Housing Authority’s discretion to alter tenants’ subsidies through changes to the payment standard unless tenants have been advised of the change and notified that the reduced standard will not be implemented for at least a full year afterwards. See 24 C.F.R. § 982.505(c)(3); see also Nozzi I, 425 F. App’x at 541–42 (“[T]he Section 8 regulations ‘closely circumscribe’ [the Housing Authority’s] discretion—by prohibiting [it] from immediately implementing a reduced [payment standard] and requiring [it] to inform participants that a reduced [standard] will be implemented[.]”). This mandatory one-year postponement is designed to serve as an “equitable . . . safeguard[] against reductions in subsidy.” Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher Program; Expansion of Payment Standard Protection, 65 Fed. Reg. 42508-01, 42508 (July 10, 2000).

Thus, plaintiffs’ property right extends beyond Section 8 benefits generally. The protected property right is in housing benefits that continue in existence for a period of at least one year after the beneficiary is advised that his benefits may be decreased by a change to the payment standard. The tenant can budget for annual leases, plan for any drastic changes,

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and take steps to avoid his family’s eviction, secure in the knowledge that his benefits will not be adversely affected during the extended period his property rights remain in effect.

The district court and the Housing Authority heavily rely on Rosas v. McMahon, 945 F.2d 1469 (9th Cir. 1991) to support the argument that the plaintiffs do not have a protected property interest, but that case is inapplicable. In Rosas, the local agency provided notice of a change to welfare benefits 10 days before its implementation, as required by a regulation. Id. at 1472. The plaintiffs insisted that they were entitled to an earlier notice about which the statutes and regulations said nothing. Id. at 1474. This court rejected the plaintiffs’ claim and held that welfare recipients had no right to notice of the “passage of statutes” which reduced their benefits or to a “grace period” before benefits were reduced. Id. at 1473–74.

Rosas, however, relied on the fact that there was no “preexisting regulation intended to forestall the implementation of a congressionally mandated program change until [program participants] were provided with notice of that change.” Id. at 1475. Where, as here, a pre-existing regulation does forestall the implementation of a reduction in benefits for a one year period, it is the plaintiffs’ property interest in that term of benefits that procedural due process protects.16 Accordingly, the question in this case is not

16 Similarly, as the prior panel noted, the district court and the Housing Authority’s reliance on Atkins v. Parker, 472 U.S. 115 (1985) is misplaced. In that case, Congress changed the eligibility standards required for benefits under the Food Stamp Act. There, the Court held that “Congress has plenary power to define the scope and duration of the

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whether the plaintiffs have an interest protected by due process—it is clear that they do—but rather “[w]hat process is due to protect plaintiffs’ well-settled property interest.” Nozzi, 425 F. App’x at 542.

B. The Process Due

Once a substantive right has been created, “it is the Due Process Clause which provides the procedural minimums, and not a statute or regulation.” Geneva Towers, 504 F.2d at 491 n.13; Nozzi, 425 F. App’x at 542 (“Technical compliance with regulatory procedures does not automatically satisfy due process requirements.”). For this reason, in analyzing the plaintiffs’ due process claim, we do not address whether the Housing Authority complied with the requirements of 24 C.F.R. § 982.505(c)(3), but whether the Housing Authority complied with the requirements of the due process clause. We conclude that it failed to do so, and indeed, that the flyer was totally inadequate for that purpose.

Procedural safeguards come in many forms, including, inter alia, “timely and adequate notice,” pre-termination hearings, the opportunity to present written and oral arguments, and the ability to confront adverse witnesses. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267 (1970). Which protections are due in a given case requires a careful analysis of the importance of the rights and the other interests at stake.

entitlement to food-stamp benefits” and thus welfare recipients were not deprived of due process by Congress’s adjustment. Id. at 129. The Housing Authority, however, does not have plenary power to implement a change in the payment standard. Rather its authority is limited to changing the amount of assistance one year or more after it has informed beneficiaries of the change.

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Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334–35 (1976); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950). Accordingly, in Mathews v. Eldridge, the Supreme Court set forth a three-part inquiry to determine whether the procedures provided to protect a liberty or property interest are constitutionally sufficient. 424 U.S. at 334–35. First, courts must look at the nature of the interest that will be affected by the official action, and in particular, to the “degree of potential deprivation that may be created.” Id. at 341. Second, courts must consider the “fairness and reliability” of the existing procedures and the “probable value, if any, of additional procedural safeguards.” Id. at 343. Finally, courts must assess the public interest, which “includes the administrative burden and other societal costs that would be associated with” additional or substitute procedures. Id. at 347.17 Here, plaintiffs request notice of any intended changes to their housing subsidies provided at least one year in advance of the change.

17 As the district court noted, the Supreme Court applies a streamlined test when the only question to be decided is whether the government has provided sufficient notice and there is no request for further procedural safeguards. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950). Under Mullane, courts must determine whether the notice given was “reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.” Id. at 314. If we were to review this case ab initio, we might simply apply Mullane to the facts of this case, as might well be appropriate. See Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 167–68 (2002). Because the prior panel instructed the district court to apply Mathews, we also conduct our due process analysis in terms of the Mathews test. We note, however, that the choice of test is not dispositive here. For reasons that we explain below, the notice afforded to the plaintiffs in this case was insufficient under either test.

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1. The Private Interest at Stake

First, the private interest at stake in this case and the “degree of potential deprivation,” Mathews, 424 U.S. at 341, is substantial. The 2004 decrease in payment standards affected Section 8 beneficiaries’ rent by an average of $104 per month, a deprivation that could be “very serious to a poor person.” Geneva Towers, 504 F.2d at 492; see also Escalera v. New York City Hous. Auth., 425 F.2d 853, 864 (2d Cir. 1970) (“[E]ven small charges can have great impact on the budgets of public housing tenants, who are by hypothesis below a certain economic level.”). For plaintiffs Nozzi and Palaez, the payment standard yielded 48% and 177% increases in their respective rent obligations. This reduction in a tenant’s subsidies and accompanying increase in the cost of housing “could force tenants to forego other perhaps necessary purchases and could even force some tenants to seek other less expensive housing.” Geneva Towers, 504 F.2d at 491.

Furthermore, for many Section 8 beneficiaries, subsidies from the Voucher Program for a stable and renewable oneyear term are the difference between safe, decent housing and being homeless. A tenant’s inability to pay for an unexpected increase in his portion of the rent and utilities could result in eviction, which ultimately would require the public housing agency to terminate benefits, U.S. Dep’t of Housing & Urban Dev., Housing Choice Voucher Program Guidebook, at 15-1, 5, and render it impossible for the tenant to pay for a new unit. This deprivation is especially dire considering the vulnerability of Section 8 recipients, a large portion of whom are elderly or disabled, and many of whom, like Plaintiff Pelaez, have young children.

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2. The Risk of Erroneous Deprivation

Turning to the second Mathews inquiry, we must examine whether the procedures provided to the plaintiffs risked erroneous deprivation of their right to stable and renewable Section 8 benefits, as well as the value of any additional safeguards. Plaintiffs here simply request fair notice: simple and unadorned, reasonably comprehensible notice provided at least one year in advance of the change. Thus, to determine the fairness and reliability of the safeguards provided by the Housing Association and the probative value of this requested safeguard we look—as the district court did—to Mullane and its progeny for guidance.

“[W]hen notice is a person’s due, process which is a mere gesture is not due process.” Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314. To be constitutionally adequate, notice must be “reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties . . . with due regard for the practicalities and particularities of the case[.]” Id. at 314. The means employed must be “reasonably certain” to “actually inform” the party, id., and in choosing the means, one must take account of the “capacities and circumstances” of the parties to whom the notice is addressed, Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 268–69; Memphis Light, Gas & Water Division v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 14 n.15 (1978).

The flyer was, without doubt, entirely insufficient to meet this standard. In no respect does it reasonably inform its intended recipients of the changes to the payment standard, the meaning of those changes, or, most important, their effect upon the recipient. Because of this, Section 8 beneficiaries were not meaningfully advised regarding the payment standard and were, accordingly, deprived of their right to a

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one-year term of stable benefits in which to plan for the impending potential hardship.

To begin with, the flyer, which essentially mirrored the language of 24 C.F.R. § 982.505(c)(3), is incomprehensible to anyone without a relatively sophisticated understanding of the Voucher Program’s payment calculations. It uses the term “payment standards” six times without ever defining or explaining the term’s meaning. A short and simple explanation, such as “this means that the Housing Authority has reduced the maximum amount it will contribute towards recipients’ rent,” would have provided at least a small measure of clarity. The absence of such a minimal statement is particularly troublesome because, to the ordinary Section 8 beneficiary, the flyer might well suggest that the beneficiary’s expected rent contribution would decrease. See ER 117 (“Effective April 2, 2004 the Housing Authority lowered the payment standards used to determine your portion of the rent.”). Moreover, the flyer which stated that the change to the payment standards was “[e]ffective April 2, 2004” was attached to an RE-38 that showed the tenant’s expected rent contribution for the current year. This could be confusing to many tenants as that number was unaffected by the change and could give the impression that the change to the payment standard would not affect the tenant’s subsidy amount at all—indeed that his subsidy would be higher than the lower payment standard should allow.

Further, the flyer in no way explained the potential effect of the change: that it could potentially increase the tenant’s expected rent contribution and decrease his subsidy. Indeed, as the Housing Authority estimated at the time, this change would affect roughly 45% of Section 8 beneficiaries and require them to pay an average of $104 more in rent each

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month. None of this information, however, was included in the flyer. Finally, the flyer was devoid of any name, address, or other information that Section 8 beneficiaries could contact for assistance understanding the flyer’s contents. The totality of these deficiencies makes it is impossible to say that the flyer was reasonably calculated to give notice to the average recipient, or possibly even to the average reasonable jurist.18

The Housing Authority relies upon three actions that it asserts correct this failure inherent on the face of the flyer. None does so, singly or collectively. As discussed, absent circumstantial changes such as an increase in income or change in family composition, the plaintiffs had a legitimate expectation in a one-year term of stable Section 8 benefits. The first of the Housing Authority’s actions that it cites is the four-week notice, which was sent only thirty days before the increase in the tenants’ rent contribution was scheduled to be implemented. This notice could not possibly provide notice a full year in advance of the scheduled change.19

18 Similarly unavailing is the Housing Authority’s reliance on a letter purportedly sent to all beneficiaries on April 19, 2005. The Housing Authority did not assert that this letter is in the record, nor is there any evidence of it being so. It is only mentioned in passing in a discussion in the deposition of one of the Housing Authority’s employees. That employee declared only that it was “similar to” the flyer. For the reasons already discussed, any letter that was simply “similar to” the flyer would be inadequate to provide the necessary notice for the same reasons as the flyer itself. Furthermore, the letter, like the four-week notice discussed in the next paragraph, was sent too late to have been of any use to many beneficiaries.
19 The Housing Authority relies on Willis v. United States, 787 F.2d 1089 (7th Cir. 1986) for the proposition that this Court should consider subsequent steps like the four-week notice. That case is of no relevance. There, a plaintiff claimed that procedures attending the forfeiture of his

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The two other actions consisted of general advice offered prior to the receipt of the flyer: the holding of “public outreach meetings” and the conducting of “training sessions.” Both fell woefully short of advising the Section 8 recipients of the meaning or effect of the change in the payment standards.

First, the public outreach meetings cannot serve to render the Housing Authority’s deficient notice consistent with due process. In 2004, the Housing Authority held several meetings about significant changes to the agency’s operations that were open to the public. A number of topics were discussed at these meetings, including the challenges faced by the Housing Authority in implementing the Section 8 program, the use of criminal background and credit checks of Section 8 beneficiaries, the portability of Section 8 benefits across apartments, and the Housing Authority’s efforts to stabilize rent in the area. As the Housing Authority noted, “part of the discussion” at these meetings, among the other topics listed, were changes to the payment standard and the impact on Section 8 beneficiaries.

These general meetings, however, are no substitute for notice provided directly to the individual tenants. As Mullane

automobile did not comport with the requirements of due process because he only received a form letter containing nothing more than “legal ‘jargon.’” Id. at 1093. The Seventh Circuit held that, while there was “no question that the language in the letter Willis received would not be adequate notice in itself,” that letter in combination with a second letter enclosed within the same envelope adequately informed Willis of the forfeiture proceedings. Id. Unlike Willis, however, the Housing Authority’s four-week notice was not contemporaneous with the flyer, and therefore could not possibly help Section 8 beneficiaries comprehend the legal jargon in the flyer at the time it was to be read.

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established, “[w]here the names and post addresses of those affected . . . are at hand, the reasons disappear for resort to means less likely than the mails to apprise” affected persons. 339 U.S. at 315 (emphasis added). The Housing Authority certainly knew the names and addresses of the Section 8 tenants for whom it was supplying housing benefits, and indeed sent the flyers directly to the tenants, but it failed to provide an understandable notice directly to them at the time it would be relevant to the loss or diminution of their benefits.20 All things considered, therefore, the public outreach meetings were not “reasonably certain to inform those affected” of the change to the payment standard, or the effect of such change. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 315 (emphasis added). Indeed, even construed most favorably to the Housing Authority, the outreach meetings when considered along with all the other factors in this case fail to raise a genuine issue of fact as to whether the steps taken by the Housing Authority provided constitutionally adequate notice of the potential change to the plaintiffs’ property rights.

Second, the training sessions held by the Housing Authority, even when considered along with all the other factors relied on by the Authority, also cannot have rendered the flyer “reasonably certain to inform” the average Section 8 beneficiary of the potential reduction in benefits to occur one year later. Federal regulations require that the Housing Authority give certain information to beneficiaries when they

20 The Housing Authority manages the benefits of approximately 45,000 Section 8 beneficiaries, around 45% of whom were estimated to have been adversely affected by the changes to the payment standards. The Housing Authority’s agent did not recall how these beneficiaries were informed of the time and place of these meetings, nor could she recall whether more than 50 people attended the meeting that she attended.

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are first selected to participate in the Voucher Program. 24 C.F.R. § 982.301. According to declarations from Housing Authority employees, the Authority fulfills this requirement by requiring all new beneficiaries to attend a one hour “Session,” during which Housing Authority staff explains to the new beneficiaries how a tenant’s rent contribution is calculated, which includes an explanation of the term “payment standard.” The Housing Authority argues that this explanation served to give sufficient meaning to the contents of the otherwise incomprehensible flyer.

For many affected beneficiaries, however, this information was provided years before the flyer was sent. For others, it may have been only a period of up to twelve months. As Mullane makes clear, the fact that the Housing Authority provided tenants with this information “months and perhaps years in advance” of the change to the payment standard does not justify “dispensing with a serious effort to inform [the beneficiaries] personally” of the change to their benefits at a time the information would be directly meaningful. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 318.21 Thus, regardless of

21 Mullane dealt with the question of what notice was sufficient to apprise beneficiaries of a judicial settlement of accounts in a common trust fund. In that case, when the common trust fund was created, the trust company mailed a notice to every person who might be entitled to a share of the fund’s income. That notice included copies of state statutes that explained that a judicial settlement of accounts would periodically occur after the fund’s establishment, and that participants would be notified of the settlement through publications in their local newspaper. The Supreme Court held that this procedure failed to comply with the requirements of due process and that the trustee was required to undertake a “serious effort to inform [those affected] personally of the accounting.” Most relevant to this case, the Supreme Court held that the trustee could not dispense with this effort merely because it had previously provided information to those affected. Instead, the Court held, those affected must

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whether the term “payment standard” was explained to tenants years or months before the flyer was sent, the Housing Authority was required to send a timely notice that provided meaningful information about the change to the payment standard and the change’s potential adverse effect on the tenant’s benefits.

Furthermore, the payment standard was far from a primary subject of the Housing Authority’s one-hour introductory Session to the Section 8 program. At that Session, information must be provided to new beneficiaries regarding: where they may lease a unit, which landlords may be willing to lease a unit to them, how long they have to find a unit, how they may request an extension, the advantage of choosing to live in an area that does not have a high concentration of low-income families, how to complete the forms required to request approval of a rental unit, 24 C.F.R. § 982.301, how people with disabilities can request a reasonable accommodation, the amount of utilities that a tenant would be allowed to use, and what steps tenants can take to avoid housing discrimination. In that same one hour period, the Housing Authority also attempted to explain how the Voucher Program worked generally, including the formula used to calculate a tenant’s portion of the rent and the complicated and convoluted role that the payment standards play in that calculation.

In light of the overwhelming amount of information and the complex and variegated subject matter involved, any data as to the meaning and effect of payment standards would likely not be retained for a number of years or even a number

be informed, at the time of the impending settlement, “that steps were being taken affecting their interests.” Id. at 318 (emphasis added).

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of months by the average Section 8 beneficiary. It certainly could not make the flyer, which was confusing, inadequate, and indeed unintelligible on its face, “reasonably certain” to inform Section 8 beneficiaries of a potential reduction in their subsidies to take place one year after receipt of the flyer. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 318.22 Thus, even when considered along with all the other factors relied on by the Housing Authority, no genuine issue of fact exists with respect to whether the beneficiaries’ attendance at a Session renders the otherwise wholly inadequate flyer compliant with due process.

In sum, there can be no genuine dispute of fact as to whether the Housing Authority provided constitutionally adequate notice of the change to the payment standard, or more important, the meaning and effect of the change on the plaintiffs’ Section 8 benefits. The Housing Authority simply failed to do so. The simplest means of ensuring adequate notice was the means requested by the plaintiffs: a simple and clear letter, written in plain English (or Spanish), mailed directly to the plaintiffs one year in advance of the date of the change’s implementation—a letter that contained an understandable explanation of the change and the effect of that change on Section 8 benefits; in other words, a flyer that met the requirements of due process.

22 Although we assume for the purposes of the above analysis that all beneficiaries actually attended one of these required Sessions, we note that some evidence suggests that not all beneficiaries actually did so. Plaintiff Pelaez states, for example, that she did not remember attending a training session, and has no recollection of “ever having the concept of Voucher Payment Standards explained to [her.]”

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A proper notice would have made plaintiffs aware of the seriousness of the Housing Authority’s actions. It might have stated, for example, that the Housing Authority estimated that “approximately 45% of [the] approximately 45,000 Section 8 tenants [would] be adversely affected by the April 2004 [payment standard] decrease, and [would] have to pay an average of $104 more in rent each month if they chose to remain in their current units.” It might also have provided beneficiaries with a number to call in case they had questions about the upcoming change or needed help finding a more affordable apartment in light of the change. Instead, the Housing Authority’s flyer failed even to achieve the minimum that due process requires: an explanation of the change to the payment standard and its likely effect upon tenants—an explanation that could reasonably be understood by the average Section 8 beneficiary. The failure to do so deprived the plaintiffs of the necessary one-year period of stable benefits in which to seek to avoid any impending hardship, and thus, of due process of law.

3. The Burden of Providing the Requested Procedure

Turning to the third Mathews inquiry, affording the procedure requested by the plaintiffs would place no burden on the Housing Authority. The plaintiffs do not ask for a hearing, an individual meeting, or even an explanation of the precise amount by which their portion of the rent would increase. They ask only for an elementary explanation of what a change to the payment standard means and what effect it has on tenants’ rights. The Housing Authority’s argument that it could not have sent a more precise notice because it could not have prospectively calculated whether the plaintiffs’ rent would increase at the time it sent the flyer

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stems from a fundamental misunderstanding of the plaintiffs’ challenge. The plaintiffs recognize that there are situations in which a tenant’s subsidies would not decrease despite the change to the payment standard.23 The plaintiffs merely seek a uniform notice that adequately explains the effect of the change in payment standard in a manner sufficient to reasonably ensure that plaintiffs knew that they might well have to plan for and adjust to a potential decrease in their subsidy and an accompanying increase in the rent they must pay commencing one year from the time they received the flyer.

Surely this information could be readily incorporated into the standard form without placing any burden on the government’s fiscal and administrative resources. There is no reason to conclude, after all, that “printing six paragraphs of information is any more burdensome than printing four paragraphs of information.” Henry v. Gross, 803 F.2d 757, 768 (2d Cir. 1986). Indeed, the Housing Authority printed a more thorough explanation in letters that it sent to people other than those directly affected by the change. Around the same time that the Housing Authority sent the flyer to the existing tenants, it sent a letter to Voucher Program beneficiaries who had not yet found a unit to rent. That letter explained that the payment standard “is the most the Housing Authority can pay for a unit. If the rent for your unit is higher, you must pay the difference in rent.” An even clearer explanation was sent to the Mayor, to members of the Los Angeles City Council, and to the members of the United States Congress from California just before the change in the

23 A change in the payment standard would not affect, for example, a tenant whose entire unit cost less to rent than the new, decreased payment standard.

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payment standard was implemented. Those letters explained that the change to the payment standard “means many tenants will soon begin paying more rent or, if they choose, move to a less expensive unit,” and that the “average increase is estimated at $100/month.”24 Notably missing from the list of people who received an adequate explanation are the people who needed it most—the same people that due process requires receive adequate notice—those Section 8 beneficiaries whose rent might actually be increased by the change.

Accordingly, all of the Mathews v. Eldridge factors weigh in favor of the notice that the plaintiffs seek. The Housing Authority’s flyer, with its total absence of any effort to explain the payment standard and its relation to tenants’ obligations, was inadequate on its face, and the Housing Authority has not shown that any additional steps were reasonably calculated to actually inform the plaintiffs of the necessary information.25 Moreover, it is beyond dispute that the Housing Authority could, at no extra cost or expense,

24 The letters sent to high-ranking officials, unlike the flyer that was sent to the plaintiffs, also provided a list of people who could help the Section 8 beneficiaries with a housing search.
25 We reject the Housing Authority’s arguments that (1) there was a minimal risk that plaintiffs would have been erroneously deprived of their property interest because it legally decreased the payment standard and that (2) any error connected with the notice was harmless because the “benefit change would have admittedly been the same.” Again, these arguments stem from a misunderstanding of the nature of plaintiffs’ protected property interest. While the Housing Authority could lawfully change the payment standard, the plaintiffs have a legitimate expectation in a one-year term of benefits to plan for and adjust to upcoming changes. The Housing Authority’s failure to provide adequate notice deprived them of that right.

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have provided the notice that would have afforded the tenants the due process they requested.

The state due process claims are subject to the same analysis, except that under state law there is an additional factor to consider: the “dignitary interest in informing individuals of the nature, grounds, and consequences of the action.” Today’s Fresh Start, 303 P.3d at 1150. This factor strongly favors the plaintiffs. The district court, therefore, erred in granting summary judgment to the defendants on both due process claims.

C. Remedy

Ordinarily, where there has not been a cross-motion for summary judgment, we would reverse and remand to the district court for further factual development. We conclude, however, that even when viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the Housing Authority, there is no genuine dispute of material fact for a fact-finder to decide. In this case, therefore, the appropriate remedy is to grant summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs nostra sponte.

“We have long recognized that, where the party moving for summary judgment has had a full and fair opportunity to prove its case, but has not succeeded in doing so, a court [of appeal] may enter summary judgment sua sponte for the nonmoving party.” Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1176 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc); see also Gospel Missions of Am. v. City of L.A., 328 F.3d 548, 553 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Even when there has been no cross-motion for summary judgment, a district court may enter summary judgment sua sponte against a moving party if the losing party has had a ‘full and fair opportunity to ventilate the issues involved in the matter.’”

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(quoting Cool Fuel, Inc. v. Connett, 685 F.2d 309, 312 (9th Cir. 1982)). So long as the moving party has “be[en] given reasonable notice that the sufficiency of his or her claim will be in issue,” Buckingham v. United States, 998 F.2d 735, 742 (9th Cir. 1993), and has therefore had “adequate time to develop the facts on which the litigant [would] depend to oppose summary judgment,” Portsmouth Square v. Shareholders Protective Comm., 770 F.2d 866, 869 (9th Cir. 1985), sua sponte summary judgment is appropriate. Doing so preserves judicial resources by preventing courts from having to preside over “unnecessary trials” where no genuine issues of fact are in dispute, which is consistent with the overall “objective of [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56] of expediting the disposition of cases.” 10A Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary K. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2720, at 345 (3d ed. 1998).

The Housing Authority has been afforded ample opportunity to develop the facts on which it would oppose summary judgment. To begin with, “[a]s the movant[] for summary judgment in this case, [the Housing Authority] w[as] on notice of the need to come forward with all [its] evidence in support of this motion, and [it] had every incentive to do so.” Albino, 747 F.3d at 1177. Moreover, the Housing Authority has had two rounds of litigation in which to develop the facts necessary to oppose summary judgment. The issues here are identical to those litigated before the district court in Nozzi I. At that time, the plaintiffs made a cross-motion for summary judgment, and the Housing Authority had a full and complete opportunity to develop facts to oppose it. On remand, the Housing Authority had the opportunity to develop additional facts, but it declined to do so. Instead, it strategically chose to move for a pre-trial disposition before the close of discovery and effectively cut

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short any additional factual development. In short, the Housing Authority had more than enough notice that the sufficiency of its defense was at issue.

Despite having this opportunity, the Housing Authority has not produced evidence suggesting that there is an issue of material fact that is appropriate for resolution by a fact-finder. As explained in greater detail above, it is beyond dispute that the flyer was constitutionally inadequate. On its face, it was clearly inadequate and failed to provide notice in a form that Section 8 recipients could comprehend. The Housing Authority’s subsequent steps cannot solve the flyer’s deficiency as a matter of law, as those steps occurred too late to protect the plaintiffs’ legitimate expectation in an unaffected one-year period of benefits in which to plan for any adverse effects of the change.

Additionally, the Housing Authority’s reliance on the training sessions and the public outreach meetings fails to raise a genuine issue of material fact appropriate for resolution by a jury. The meetings it held could not, as a matter of law, have been sufficient to afford the plaintiffs the notice that due process requires. The training sessions when beneficiaries first entered the program provided relatively minimal information on the meaning of “payment standard,” and this information was provided months or years before the flyer was sent. Thus, the training sessions cannot have served to ensure that the confusing and inadequate flyer was “reasonably certain” to “actually inform” the average beneficiary that he had one year in which to plan for a potential reduction to his benefits. Because there are no genuine issues of material fact as to whether the Housing Authority complied with the requirements of due process, we remand with instructions to the district court to grant

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summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs on the merits of their federal and state due process claims.

V. THE OTHER STATE LAW CLAIMS

Next, we turn to the plaintiffs’ allegations that the Housing Authority violated various provisions of the California Government Code. California has abolished common law tort liability for public entities. Miklosy v. Regents of California, 188 P.3d 629 (Cal. 2008). Thus, under California law, “‘[a] public entity is not liable for an injury,’ ‘[e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute.’” Eastburn v. Regional Fire Prot. Auth., 80 P.3d 656, 657–58 (Cal. 2003) (quoting Cal. Gov. Code § 815(a)). Plaintiffs claim that the Housing Authority is liable under two statutes: (1) California Government Code § 815.6 which governs liability for public entities that breach their mandatory duties, and (2) California Government Code § 815.2 which governs vicarious liability for public employees’ negligence.

A. California Government Code § 815.6

Under California Government Code § 815.6, a public entity will be liable to a plaintiff for injury “when (1) a mandatory duty is imposed [on the public entity] by enactment, (2) the duty was designed to protect against the kind of injury allegedly suffered, and (3) breach of the duty proximately caused injury,” unless the public entity can “establish that it exercised reasonable diligence” in discharging this mandatory duty. State Dept. of State Hospitals v. Superior Court, 349 P.3d 1013, 1018 (Cal. 2015); see also Chaudhry v. City of Los Angeles, 751 F.3d 1096, 1106–07 (9th Cir. 2014). The “mandatory duty” breached by the public entity must be created by a

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“constitutional provision, statute, charter provision, ordinance or regulation,” Cal. Gov’t Code § 810.6, including federal regulations, id. § 811.6 (defining “regulation’ as including federal regulations).26 Further, it must be “obligatory, rather than merely discretionary or permissive, in its directions to the public entity,” and must “require rather than merely authorize or permit, that a particular action be taken[.]” State Dept. Of State Hospitals, 349 P.3d at 1018–19 (emphasis in original).

We hold that, even taking the facts in the light most favorable to the Housing Authority, there can be no dispute that it is liable under the statute. To begin with, as we have determined above, the Voucher Program regulations create a mandatory duty to advise plaintiffs of the change in the payment standard, the meaning of that change, and its effect upon them. 24 C.F.R. § 982.505(c).27 The Housing Authority argues that Section 982.505(c) creates only a duty to send a one-year notice, with no obligations as to the form of that notice. This is incorrect. At a minimum, the information given to the tenants about the change in payment standards and the one-year period that tenants have to prepare

26 See also Hines v. United States, 60 F.3d 1442, 1448–49 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that under California law, federal regulation created a mandatory duty), abrogated on other grounds by United States v. Olson, 546 U.S. 43 (2005); Bowman v. Wyatt, 111 Cal. Rptr. 3d 787, 808 n.10 (Ct. App. 2010) (noting that jury was instructed that mandatory duty under § 815.6 could be supplied by federal regulation).
27 Notwithstanding the Housing Authority’s assertion to the contrary, the fact that there is no federal cause of action to enforce directly 24 C.F.R. § 982.505(c)(3) does not defeat plaintiffs’ § 815.6 claim. See Haggis v. City of Los Angeles, 993 P.2d 983, 988 (Cal. 2000) (“It is section 815.6, not the predicate enactment, that creates the private right of action.” (emphasis in original)).

Case 2:07-cv-00380-PA-FFM Document 218 Filed 11/30/15 Page 42 of 48 Page ID #:1960

42

NOZZI V. HACLA

for its implementation must be reasonably comprehensible by the intended recipients. A mandatory obligation to provide notice includes the obligation to provide an intelligible notice that can be understood by its average intended recipients and must convey the information required by the regulation.

Next, it is apparent that the regulation was “designed to protect against the kind of injury” the plaintiffs suffered. Haggis, 993 P.2d at 987–88. The regulation was created as an equitable “safeguard” for tenants “against reductions in subsidy,” that would give Section 8 beneficiaries one year in which to plan for adjustments to the payment standard that could adversely affect their subsidy. Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher Program; Expansion of Payment Standard Protection, 65 Fed. Reg. at 42508. Here, because plaintiffs were not given meaningful information about the change in the payment standard and its meaning and effect, the plaintiffs were deprived of the very one-year stable planning period that the regulation was designed to protect.

Finally, the Housing Authority breached this mandatory duty and this breach was the proximate cause of injury to the plaintiffs. As described earlier, the flyer was totally incomprehensible to anyone without a relatively sophisticated understanding of the machinations of Section 8 subsidy payments. It did not provide the average recipient with any meaningful information about the change or its potential adverse impact. As with the due process claims, the Housing Authority argues that no injury could have occurred because it had total discretion to decrease the payment standard. Once again, the Authority misunderstands the nature of the plaintiffs’ challenge. The question here is not whether the payment standard could be decreased, but whether the manner in which the Housing Authority implemented the

Case 2:07-cv-00380-PA-FFM Document 218 Filed 11/30/15 Page 43 of 48 Page ID #:1961

NOZZI V. HACLA

43

decrease breached its mandatory duty to provide advance notice to plaintiffs of the intended action. The answer is that it did, and that plaintiffs, who experienced an unexpected and dramatic increase in their rental obligations, suffered from that breach.

What remains then, is the question whether the Housing Authority “exercised reasonable diligence to discharge the duty.” Cal. Gov’t Code § 815.6. As described in greater detail above, there are extreme deficiencies in the flyer provided to the plaintiffs. The Housing Authority has had two opportunities to come forward with evidence in support of its motion for summary judgment and a further opportunity to rebut the cross-motion for summary judgment brought by the plaintiffs in Nozzi I. Despite this, it has fallen far short of producing evidence sufficient to raise a genuine issue of fact as to whether it made reasonable efforts to provide meaningful information to the plaintiffs about the payment standard change and its adverse effect upon them.

The Housing Authority initially took the position that it was “impossible” to draft a different, more comprehensible notice, but that position is plainly contradicted by the undisputed evidence. The Housing Authority was clearly capable of explaining the meaning and effect of the payment standard. It provided a comprehensible notice to Voucher Program beneficiaries who had not yet found a unit to rent. Indeed, it provided an even more thorough explanation of the meaning and effect of the change to the Mayor, members of the Los Angeles City Council, and California congressmen.

The Housing Authority produced evidence, in the form of a declaration by the individual who wrote the flyer, purportedly showing that he exercised reasonable efforts.

Case 2:07-cv-00380-PA-FFM Document 218 Filed 11/30/15 Page 44 of 48 Page ID #:1962

44

NOZZI V. HACLA

Even construing this declaration in the light most favorable to the defendants, however, it is insufficient to raise a genuine issue of fact as to whether the Housing Authority exercised reasonable efforts to comply with the regulation. The declaration states that the employee drafts all of his notices in language that can be understood by a person with an eighth grade education. This is a conclusion that is belied by the evidence. The flyer unquestionably does not explain the meaning and effect of the change in the payment standard in any terms at all, let alone in terms that can be understood by a person with an eighth grade education. The employee admittedly simply took the flyer’s language directly from the regulation, and the Housing Authority did not offer any evidence that he took any steps to ensure that the language would provide any meaningful information about the change that would advise the average recipient of its meaning or effect. Nor did the Housing Authority offer any evidence suggesting that the employee considered alternatives to merely parroting the regulation, such as, inter alia, defining payment standard—as did the letters sent to house-hunting Section 8 beneficiaries and to the public officials.

Thus, as with the due process claims, the Housing Authority had ample opportunity to develop facts to support its defense against the state law claims, but failed to do so. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the district court and remand with instructions to grant summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs on the merits of this statutory claim.

B. California Government Code § 815.2

Under California Government Code § 815.2, a public entity is “vicariously liable for its employees’ [non-immune] negligent acts or omissions within the scope of

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NOZZI V. HACLA

45

employment[.]” Eastburn v. Regional Fire Protection Authority, 80 P.3d 656, 658 (Cal. 2003). The Housing Authority asserts, and the plaintiffs do not dispute, that plaintiffs theory of negligence is “essentially interchangeable” with its § 815.6 claim discussed in Section V.A above. Indeed, the elements of a vicarious liability claim against a public entity in California are “virtually identical” to the elements of a § 815.6 claim. Alejo v. City of Alhambra, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 768, 771 & n.3 (Ct. App. 1999); see also San Mateo Union High School District v. Cnty. of San Mateo, 152 Cal. Rptr. 3d 530, 542–544 (Ct. App. 2013). The above discussion of the plaintiffs’ § 815.6 claim, therefore, applies equally to their vicarious liability claim and they are entitled to summary judgment on the merits of this claim as well.

VI. REASSIGNMENT

Plaintiffs have requested that we use our supervisory power to reassign this case to a different district judge on remand. We reassign a case to a different district judge in “unusual circumstances.” Krechman v. County of Riverside, 723 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2013). To determine whether such reassignment is appropriate we look to three factors: (1) whether the original judge could “reasonably be expected upon remand to have substantial difficulty in putting out of his or her mind previously-expressed views or findings determined to be erroneous or based on evidence that must be rejected,” (2) whether reassignment is advisable to preserve the appearance of justice, and (3) whether reassignment would “entail waste and duplication out of proportion to any gain in preserving the appearance of fairness.” Id. at 1111–12.

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46

NOZZI V. HACLA

On remand from Nozzi I, the district judge made a number of statements indicating his strong disagreement with this Court’s holding in Nozzi I. Then, before ruling in favor of the Housing Authority for the second time, the judge stated, “When you do argue this in the Ninth Circuit, don’t make just that argument, because if you do . . . we’ll be back here again, and I’ll be tearing out my hair and saying I don’t understand why this happened the way it did. In fact, let me just indicate that if this case gets reversed, I want it to be like Judge Wright or Judge Real. I want it to go to some other district court judge, because I have spent a lot of time on this case. . . . I pretty much have done all I can.”

The district judge’s statements constitute a “rare and extraordinary circumstance[]” justifying reassignment. Krechman, 723 F.3d at 1112. The judge repeatedly made clear that he would have substantial difficulty setting aside his previous views of the case. Under these circumstances, remand is not only “advisable,” Krechman, 723 F.3d at 1111, but essential in order to preserve the appearance of justice. Accordingly, we need not consider the third factor. Krechman, 723 F.3d at 1102 (“The first two factors are equally important and a finding of either is sufficient to support reassignment on remand.”). Regardless whether duplication of effort would be involved, we have no choice but to send the case to a judge whose designation would appear to be consistent with the interests of justice.28 Lastly, we hold that this case must be reassigned to a district judge

28 Although it does not affect our decision, we note that reassignment will not entail more than minimal duplication as there is little, if any, overlap between issues to be resolved on remand and the issues previously considered by the district court.

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47

other than one of the two judges named by Judge Wu in order to “preserve the appearance of justice.” Id.

VII. CONCLUSION

In sum, the district court erred by granting summary judgment to the Housing Authority. There is no genuine dispute of fact as to whether the Housing Authority failed to provide meaningful information to Section 8 beneficiaries about the change to the payment standard and the effect of that change upon the beneficiaries and their property interests. That failure violated both the requirements of the Voucher Program regulations and the requirements of procedural due process. It also resulted in a violation of two state statutes which require public entities to take reasonable efforts to comply with the mandatory duties established by federal regulations. Accordingly, we reverse and remand with instructions for the district court to enter summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs on the merits of the federal and state law claims at issue on this appeal. In order to preserve the appearance of justice, we order the case reassigned to a different district judge—a judge other than the two identified by the current district judge who himself has declined to hear the case further. On remand, further factual development may be needed to determine the size and validity of plaintiffs’ class and to determine the appropriate remedy.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

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APPENDIX A

 </s> Case 2:07-cv-00380-PA-FFM Document 332 Filed 02/15/18 Page 1 of 4 Page ID #:5972

JS-6 1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

10

11 MICHAEL NOZZI, individually, and NIDIA PELAEZ, individually, and on
12 behalf of all others similarly situated,

CV 07-380 PA (FFMx) JUDGMENT

13

Plaintiffs,

14

v.

15 HOUSING AUTHORITY OF THE CITY OF LOS ANGELES and RUDOLPH
16 MONTIEL,

17

Defendants.

18

19

Pursuant to the settlement agreement (“Settlement Agreement”), filed on June 19,

20 2017, between plaintiffs Michael Nozzi and Nidia Pelaez (collectively “Plaintiffs”) and

21 defendants Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles (“HACLA”) and Rudolph Montiel

22 (collectively “Defendants”), and the Court’s February 15, 2018, Minute Order granting the

23 Motion for Final Approval of Class Action Settlement and granting, in part, the Motion for

24 Attorneys’ Fees and Costs,

25

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that:

26

1. All terms herein shall have the same meaning as the terms defined in the

27 Settlement Agreement, unless otherwise specifically provided herein.

28

Case 2:07-cv-00380-PA-FFM Document 332 Filed 02/15/18 Page 2 of 4 Page ID #:5973

1

2. The Injunctive Relief Class consists of all Section 8 beneficiaries whose

2 benefits are administered by HACLA and who in the past received, or in the future may

3 receive, notices of a VPS decrease.

4

3. The Damages Class consists of all HACLA Section 8 tenants, between June 1,

5 2005, and September 30, 2006, whose rental contribution for a period not to exceed eleven 6 months was greater than it would have been but for HACLA’s 2004 decrease in the VPS.1/

7

4. Defendants will issue a check by overnight mail payable to the JND Legal

8 Administration within thirty (30) business days of the date of entry of this Order on the

9 docket.

10

a. the total amount for valid claims made by Damages Class Members and

11

approved by the Class Administrator;

12

b. $3,000 in incentive/individualized payments to Named Plaintiffs Nidia

13

Pelaez and Michael Nozzi;

14

c. Defendants shall pay all current outstanding bills from JND Legal

15

Administration. To the extent that the payments due to JND cannot yet

16

be finally determined because there is more work to be done,

17

Defendants shall pay those amounts within 30 days of being billed by

18

JND.

19

5. Defendants will issue a check by overnight mail payable to the Kaye, McLane,

20 Bednarski & Litt Client Trust Account within thirty (30) business days of the entry of this

21 Judgment the amount of $2,957,382.80 as full and final settlement of all past, present and

22 future attorneys’ fees and all past, present and future ordinary and extraordinary costs.

23 . . .

24 . . .

25

26 1/

Only the Damages Class Members identified in the Damages Class Member List as

27 having calculable damages are considered Damages Class Members under this Judgment

and the Order, and only they will be bound by its monetary damages provisions if they do 28
not opt out. Injunctive Relief Class Members may not opt out of the injunctive relief portion

of this Order or the Judgment.

-2-

Case 2:07-cv-00380-PA-FFM Document 332 Filed 02/15/18 Page 3 of 4 Page ID #:5974

1

6. The Court orders the following injunctive relief for a three-year period:

2

a. In any future notices to Section 8 tenants, related to the reduction of the

3

VPS, HACLA shall simply and plainly communicate the information

4

provided in non-technical, language that would be reasonably

5

understandable to Section 8 tenants, at a language level commensurate

6

with the average educational level of Section 8 tenants. The notice shall

7

reasonably explain the known, likely or potential impact on the tenant

8

of the action that is the subject of the notice.

9

b. Any notice within the next three years regarding reduction of the VPS

10

shall be provided to Class Counsel before it is sent, and shall be subject

11

to the approval of Class Counsel before it is communicated to Section 8

12

tenants, which approval shall not be unreasonably withheld.

13

c. When communicating any new notices to tenants (other than a notice of

14

reduction of VPS to which ¶ 72(a) of the Settlement Agreement

15

applies), HACLA will use language reasonably understandable to

16

Section 8 tenants. For purposes of this Agreement, the Parties agree

17

that existing notices that have been historically sent regularly to tenants

18

without challenge, such as the RE 38 notice, notices sent to tenants

19

when HACLA approves a rent increase requested by the landlord, and

20

notices when there is a bedroom downsizing, meet this standard.

21

7. Except as otherwise provided in this Judgment, each party shall bear its own

22 costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees.

23

8. The Court reserves and maintains jurisdiction over the claims administration

24 and distribution of the funds. Disagreements between the Parties on any disputes or

25 unresolved aspects of this Judgment as it relates to monetary relief shall be subject to

26 mediation before the mediator who has mediated this case to date, Magistrate Judge

27 Woehrle, if she is available, or before the Magistrate Judge otherwise assigned to the case if

28

-3-

Case 2:07-cv-00380-PA-FFM Document 332 Filed 02/15/18 Page 4 of 4 Page ID #:5975

1 she is not. If mediation is not successful, the matter shall be brought to this Court for resolution.

2

9. The Court hereby dismisses the lawsuit on the merits, with prejudice, and

3 without further costs, with such dismissal subject only to compliance by the Parties with the

4 terms and conditions of the Settlement Agreement and this Judgment.

5

6 DATED: February 15, 2018 7 8

___________________________________ Percy Anderson
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

-4-

 </s> Case 2:07-cv-00380-PA-FFM Document 331 Filed 02/15/18 Page 1 of 12 Page ID #:5960

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL Case No. CV 07-380 PA (FFMx)

Date February 15, 2018

Title

Michael Nozzi, et al. v. Housing Authority for the City of Los Angeles, et al.

Present: The Honorable PERCY ANDERSON, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Kamilla Sali-Suleyman Deputy Clerk

Not Reported Court Reporter

N/A Tape No.

Attorneys Present for Plaintiffs:

Attorneys Present for Defendants:

None

None

Proceedings:

MOTIONS FOR FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT AND ATTORNEYS’ FEES

Before the Court are a Motion for Final Approval of Class Action Settlement (Docket No. 322) and a Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs (Docket No. 307) filed by plaintiffs Michael Nozzi (“Nozzi”) and Nidia Pelaez (“Pelaez”) (collectively “Plaintiffs” or “Named Plaintiffs”). Defendants Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles (“HACLA”) and Rudolph Montiel in his official capacity1/ (collectively “Defendants”) do not oppose either motion. A Fairness Hearing was held on January 29, 2018.
I. FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The Section 8 housing program provides rental assistance to low-income, elderly, and disabled families. See Nozzi v. HACLA, 806 F.3d 1178, 1184 (9th Cir. 2015) (“Nozzi II”). The majority of this assistance is provided through the Housing Choice Voucher Program, which is funded and regulated by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”) and administered locally by public housing agencies such as HACLA. Id. Under this program, the renter identifies qualifying housing, the public housing agency negotiates the rent with the landlord, the public housing agency pays a rent subsidy to the landlord on behalf of the tenant, and the renter pays the balance of the rent. Id. Within parameters established by HUD, the public housing agency sets a voucher payment standard (VPS) representing the maximum subsidy that it will pay for each type of housing in a particular area. Id. at 1185. Raising the VPS will generally yield larger subsidies, while lowering the VPS will generally yield smaller subsidies. Id. Each renter’s eligibility for Section 8 benefits is examined on a yearly basis. Id. “If the public housing agency decides to lower the [VPS], it must provide information about the change to all beneficiaries at their annual reexaminations following the decision, and must further advise these beneficiaries that the change will not go into effect until their following reexamination one year later.” Id.

1/ The City of Los Angeles was originally named as a defendant, but was dismissed on May 23, 2007. (Docket No. 48.)

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Case 2:07-cv-00380-PA-FFM Document 331 Filed 02/15/18 Page 2 of 12 Page ID #:5961

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL Case No. CV 07-380 PA (FFMx)

Date February 15, 2018

Title

Michael Nozzi, et al. v. Housing Authority for the City of Los Angeles, et al.

HACLA reduced its VPS in 2004. Under the new standard, an estimated 45% of tenants were required to pay an average of $104 more in rent each month. Id. at 1186. HACLA notified renters of this change in a flyer sent with annual reexamination documents. Id. The flyer provided general information about the new VPS, but did not specify how the changes would affect each renter. Id. An individualized notice was not provided until a second notice sent approximately four weeks before the new subsidy would take effect for each renter. Id.

Plaintiffs, along with the now-defunct Los Angeles Coalition to End Hunger & Homelessness, initiated this action in January 2007. Id. In April 2007, the district court granted in part and denied in part a motion to dismiss. (Docket No. 42.) Plaintiffs filed a First Amended Complaint alleging violations of (1) due process of law under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, (2) rights created by 42 U.S.C. § 1437f, (3) Cal. Gov. Code § 815.6, (4) Art. I, § 7 of the California Constitution, and (5) negligence. (Docket No. 49.) The Court dismissed the second and fifth claims (Docket No. 63) and later granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the remaining claims (Docket No. 90). The Ninth Circuit reversed the dismissal of the fifth claim and the grant of summary judgment on the first, third, and fourth claims. Nozzi v. HACLA, No. 09–55588, 2011 WL 1167188 (9th Cir. 2011) (“Nozzi I”). On remand, the district court granted HACLA’s renewed motion for summary judgment. (Docket Nos. 190, 192.) The Ninth Circuit again reversed, holding that the flyer sent by HACLA did not provide sufficient notice of the VPS change. The court found that this “failure violated both the requirements of the Voucher Program regulations and the requirements of procedural due process,” as well as state law. Nozzi II, 806 F.3d at 1204. The matter was remanded “with instructions for the district court to enter summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs on the merits of the federal and state law claims at issue on this appeal.” Id.

Following remand, this Court certified two classes: (1) the Rule 23(b)(2) “Injunctive Relief Class” and (2) the Rule 23(b)(3) “Damages Class.” (Docket No. 245.) The Injunctive Relief Class consists of all Section 8 beneficiaries whose benefits are administered by HACLA and who in the past received, or in the future may receive, notices of a VPS decrease. (Id.) The Damages Class consists of all HACLA Section 8 tenants, between June 1, 2005, and September 30, 2006, whose rental contribution for a period not to exceed eleven months was greater than it would have been but for HACLA’s 2004 decrease in the VPS. (Id.) All Damages Class Members are also members of the Injunctive Relief Class. (Docket No. 297, Ex. A (“Settlement Agreement”) ¶ 7.) The Damages Class consists of 11,870 tenants on the Damages Class Member List, and their principal damages amount to $10,308,774. (See id. ¶¶ 9, 10; Docket No. 297, Ex. D ¶ 3.)

In February 2017, the parties filed cross-motions for partial summary judgment as to remedies. (Docket Nos. 250, 256.) Before the Court ruled on those motions, the parties filed a Stipulation for Settlement. (Docket No. 286.) On June 19, 2017, Plaintiffs filed an unopposed Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement. (Docket No. 296.) On July 29, 2017, the Court preliminarily approved the Settlement Agreement, as well as the appointment of JND Legal Administration (“JND”) as Class Administrator, and Barrett S. Litt, Anne Richardson, and Stephanie Carroll as Class Counsel. (Docket No. 305 (“Prelim. Approval Order”).)

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Case 2:07-cv-00380-PA-FFM Document 331 Filed 02/15/18 Page 3 of 12 Page ID #:5962

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL Case No. CV 07-380 PA (FFMx)

Date February 15, 2018

Title

Michael Nozzi, et al. v. Housing Authority for the City of Los Angeles, et al.

Plaintiffs now move for final approval of the Settlement Agreement. In addition, Plaintiffs seek approval of attorneys’ fees, litigation costs, settlement administration costs, and incentive awards.

II. THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

The Settlement Agreement was reached after ten years of litigation, two appeals, and two days of mediation before a retired federal judge. (See Settlement Agreement pp. 2–3.) The parties ultimately agreed that HACLA’s insurers would pay a total of between $9 million and $9.4 million toward the “Class Fund” to settle all monetary claims of the Damages Class Members. (Id. at ¶ 6.) Under the Settlement Agreement, and as further explained in the motion for preliminary approval, the following expenses would be deducted from the Class Fund: attorneys’ fees of less than 30% of the Class Fund; litigation costs of approximately $220,000; expenses of approximately between $48,000 and $68,000 incurred by the Class Administrator, and publication expenses of approximately $10,000 to $12,000; Pelaez’s incentive award of $5,000; and Nozzi’s incentive award of $1,000. (Id. at ¶¶ 4, 22, 49, 52; Mot. for Prelim. Approval at 9; Docket No. 297, Ex. E (“JND Proposal”).) The residual amount of approximately $6 million (the “Residual Class Fund”) would be available for Damages Class Member claims. (See Settlement Agreement ¶ 35.) The final Damages Class Member List was to be prepared by Plaintiffs’ expert Kriegler based on information supplied by HACLA and HUD. (Id. at ¶¶ 9, 12.)

The Settlement Agreement required the Damages Class Members to file claims to qualify for and receive damages. (Id. at ¶ 35.) Pursuant to the Settlement Agreement, a Damages Class Member would be compensated up to the amount of additional rent that he or she paid as a result of the reduced HACLA subsidy, depending on the number of claimants. (Id. at ¶ 19.) If more claims were made than could be fully compensated by the Residual Class Fund, claimants would receive proportional reductions in their reimbursements. (Id. at ¶ 32.) If more than $2 million, but less than the Residual Class Fund, was claimed, the remainder would revert to Defendants’ insurers. (Id. at ¶ 33.) If less than $2 million in claims were made, the difference between $2 million and the claims made would be donated to a cy pres organization. (Id.) In addition, if Damages Class Members made claims, but do not cash their checks, the parties agreed that the Class Administrator would make efforts to reach them and assist them to do so; the funds from checks not cashed within one year of issuance would go to agreed upon cy pres organizations. (Id.)

The Settlement Agreement further provided that HACLA would treat any payment to Damages Class Members who are current recipients of Section 8 in accordance with HUD regulation 24 C.F.R. § 5.609(c)(3), i.e., as a settlement for personal injury. (Id. at ¶ 34.) Furthermore, HACLA would designate a person whom Damages Class Members could contact with questions about the impact of receipt of settlement funds on their Section 8 benefits. (Id.)

The parties also agreed upon a three-year injunction. Pursuant to the injunction provisions, HACLA, when issuing notices related to reduction of the VPS, must “simply and plainly communicate the information provided in non-technical, [sic] language that would be reasonably understandable to Section 8 tenants, at a language level commensurate with the average educational level of Section 8

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Case 2:07-cv-00380-PA-FFM Document 331 Filed 02/15/18 Page 4 of 12 Page ID #:5963

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL Case No. CV 07-380 PA (FFMx)

Date February 15, 2018

Title

Michael Nozzi, et al. v. Housing Authority for the City of Los Angeles, et al.

tenants. The notice shall reasonably explain the known, likely or potential impact on the tenant of the action that is the subject of the notice.” (Id. at ¶ 71(a).) Furthermore, any such notice involving reduction of the VPS “shall be provided to Class [C]ounsel before it is sent [to Section 8 tenants], and shall be subject to approval of Class Counsel before it is communicated to Section 8 tenants, which approval shall not be unreasonably withheld.” (Id. at ¶ 71(b).) Finally, HACLA is required to “use language reasonably understandable to Section 8 tenants” when communicating any new notices to tenants, other than a notice of reduction of the VPS, which are addressed by ¶ 71(a) of the Settlement Agreement. (Id. at ¶ 71(c).)
In return for the injunction and damages, Class Members agree to release Defendants from “all claims . . . involving violations of law or constitutional rights, including, without limitation, their due process rights under federal and California Constitutions and law, their rights under California Civil Code § 815.6 and for negligence, any other rights under any other federal, state or local law, regulation, duty, or obligation, or any other legal theory, action or cause of action, which are based upon or could be based upon or arise from the facts alleged in the lawsuit (hereafter ‘Covered Claims’).” (Id. at ¶ 42.) Class Members, including the Named Plaintiffs, “waive all rights to any and all claims relating to damages or reimbursement of any kind for the Covered Claims.” (Id. at ¶ 43.) They further “waive any and all rights to pursue, initiate, prosecute, or commence any action or proceeding before any court, administrative agency or other tribunal, or to file any complaint regarding acts or omissions by the Released Persons with respect to the Covered Claims during the Class Period that fit within the definition of the Damages Class; and further, as it relates to this waiver or Release, expressly waive the provisions of California Civil Code § 1542.” (Id. at ¶ 44). Those who suffered damages but were omitted from the Damages Class Member List would not be bound by the Settlement Agreement as to claims for damages, and would be permitted to bring such claims against Defendants. (Id. at ¶ 10 n.1.) Finally, Damages Class Members could opt out or object if they were not satisfied with the settlement amount or other aspects of the Settlement Agreement. (Id. at ¶¶ 66–70.)

III. FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT
A. Fairness of the Class Settlement
Rule 23(e) requires a district court to determine whether a proposed class action settlement is “fundamentally fair, adequate, and reasonable.” Staton v. Boeing Co., 327 F.3d 938, 959 (9th Cir. 2003). To make this determination, courts consider a number of factors, including: (1) the strength of the plaintiff’s case; (2) the risk, expense, complexity, and likely duration of further litigation; (3) the risk of maintaining class action status throughout the trial; (4) the amount offered in settlement; (5) the extent of discovery completed, and the stage of the proceedings; (6) the experience and views of counsel; (7) the presence of a governmental participant; and (8) the reaction of the class members to the proposed settlement. See id. Also, the settlement may not be the product of collusion among the negotiating parties. In re Mego Fin. Corp. Sec. Litig., 213 F.3d 454, 458 (9th Cir. 2000). The Ninth Circuit has declared that a strong judicial policy favors settlement of class actions. Class Plaintiffs v.

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Case 2:07-cv-00380-PA-FFM Document 331 Filed 02/15/18 Page 5 of 12 Page ID #:5964

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL Case No. CV 07-380 PA (FFMx)

Date February 15, 2018

Title

Michael Nozzi, et al. v. Housing Authority for the City of Los Angeles, et al.

City of Seattle, 955 F.2d 1268, 1276 (9th Cir. 1992). For the following reasons, the Court finds that the Settlement Agreement is fundamentally fair, adequate, and reasonable.
1. The Strength of Plaintiffs’ Case and the Risk, Expense, Complexity, and Likely Duration of Further Litigation
“When evaluating the strength of a case, the Court should evaluate objectively the strengths and weaknesses inherent in the litigation and the impact of those considerations on the parties’ decisions to reach these agreements.” De Santos v. Jaco Oil Co., No. 1:14-cv-0738-JLT, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93410, at *16 (E.D. Cal. July 17, 2015). Here, prior to settlement, the parties had already litigated for more than 10 years, and endured two appeals, which ultimately resolved the issue of liability. However, whether, and to what extent, damages were available remained unresolved and cross-motions for summary judgment on that issue remained pending at the time of settlement. There remained a likelihood that the Court’s ruling on those motions would have been appealed. (See Final Approval Mot. 7, 9.) In addition, failure to settle at this point would have further delayed relief for Class Members who, by definition, are (or at least were during the class period) low-income. These factors favor granting final approval of the Settlement Agreement.
2. The Amount Offered in the Settlement Agreement
The Class Fund amount is $9,339,256.47.2/ The Motions for Final Approval and Attorneys’ Fees seek (1) an attorneys’ fee award of $2,801,776.94; (2) reimbursement of litigation expenses of $169,699.88; (3) incentive payments to Pelaez and Nozzi of $5,000 and $1,000, respectively; and (4) costs for settlement administration, totaling $60,000. Thus, the Residual Class Fund of approximately $6.3 million was available for claims by Damages Class Members. The Residual Class Fund was sufficient for up to approximately 58% of claims of Damages Class Members to be compensated in full. In fact, approximately 19.38% of Damages Class Members filed claims that have been approved, and thus each of those claimants will be paid in full for the decrease in rent subsidy, without interest. Claimed damages total approximately $2,160,078.45.3/ (Keough Decl. ¶ 22.)

2/ The Settlement Agreement provided for a Class Fund that was between $9 million and $9.4 million, dependent upon defense fees. (Settlement Agreement ¶ 6.) The parties have concluded, after subtracting total defense fees, that $9,339,256.47 is the total available Class Fund. (Final Approval Mot. 2; Litt Decl. ISO Final Approval Mot. ¶ 5.)

3/ While the Motion for Final Approval states that the value of all valid claims was $2,218,075.26 as of December 6, 2017, the initial declaration of the Class Administrator attests that the damages for all valid claims amounted to $2,160,078.45 as of December 20, 2017. (Compare Final Approval Mot. 3, with Litt Decl. ISO Final Approval Mot., Ex. 7 (“Keough Decl.”) ¶ 22.) However, the Class Administrator has updated the number of valid claims from 2,269 in her initial declaration to 2,300 in a
(continued...)

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Case 2:07-cv-00380-PA-FFM Document 331 Filed 02/15/18 Page 6 of 12 Page ID #:5965

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL Case No. CV 07-380 PA (FFMx)

Date February 15, 2018

Title

Michael Nozzi, et al. v. Housing Authority for the City of Los Angeles, et al.

Given the increased expense and risk that would accompany continued litigation and the presence of the opt-out provision, the Court finds that the total settlement amount is reasonable and favors approval of the Settlement Agreement.
3. The Extent of Discovery Completed and the Stage of the Proceedings
Litigation in this action has been extensive and discovery was complete at the time of settlement. Furthermore, Plaintiffs hired an expert who performed extensive analysis of records held by HACLA and HUD to determine damages. The parties also engaged in two days of formal mediation before a third-party neutral. This extensive case history weighs in favor of approval of the Settlement Agreement.
4. The Experience and Views of Counsel
The Court finds that Class Counsel has sufficient experience with class action litigation to appropriately assess the legal and factual issues in this matter and determine whether the Settlement Agreement serves the interests of the Class Members. Thus, Class Counsel’s belief that the Settlement Agreement is both fair and adequate weighs in favor of approval.
5. Collusion Between the Parties
To determine whether there has been any collusion between the parties, a court must evaluate whether “fees and relief provisions clearly suggest the possibility that class interests gave way to self interests,” thereby raising the possibility that the settlement is the result of misconduct by the negotiators or improper incentives for certain class members. Staton, 327 F.3d at 961. Here, it appears that the Settlement Agreement was the product of informed, arm’s-length negotiations between the parties. The reasonableness of the amount offered in settlement, the extensive litigation history, and the involvement of a third-party neutral further suggest an absence of collusion. Furthermore, the fees and incentive awards sought do not suggest collusion, particularly as any such award was conditioned upon approval of the Court. (See Settlement Agreement ¶¶ 49, 52); see also Rodriguez v. W. Publ’g Corp., 563 F.3d 948, 968 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding conflicts of interest where incentive agreements existed between named plaintiffs and counsel). The Court finds that the Settlement Agreement is the product of noncollusive negotiations.

3/(...continued) supplemental declaration, but has not updated the dollar value of approved claims. (Compare Keough Decl. ¶ 22, with Docket No. 330-1 (“Keough Suppl. Decl.”) ¶ 12.a.) While this change in number of valid claims renders it likely that the $2,160,078.45 figure is low, for purposes of this Order, the Court assumes it is a reasonable approximation of the value of the valid and approved claims.

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Case 2:07-cv-00380-PA-FFM Document 331 Filed 02/15/18 Page 7 of 12 Page ID #:5966

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL Case No. CV 07-380 PA (FFMx)

Date February 15, 2018

Title

Michael Nozzi, et al. v. Housing Authority for the City of Los Angeles, et al.

6. Presence of Governmental Participant
Pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1715, Defendants notified the Attorney General of the United States and the CAFA Coordinators of the California Office of the Attorney General of the Settlement Agreement. (See Docket No. 303.) “Although CAFA does not create an affirmative duty for either state or federal officials to take any action in response to a class action settlement, CAFA presumes that, once put on notice, state or federal officials will raise any concerns that they may have during the normal course of the class action settlement procedures.” Garner v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., Case No. CV 08-1365 CW (EMC), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49477, at *14 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 22, 2010). No government official has objected to the terms of the Settlement Agreement. Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of final approval. See Noll v. eBay, Inc., 309 F.R.D. 593, 608 (N.D. Cal. 2015); Holman v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., Case No. 11-cv-0180 CW (DMR), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 173698, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 12, 2014).
7. Reaction of Class Members to Settlement
Where a settlement agreement enjoys overwhelming support from the class, this lends weight to a finding that the settlement agreement is fair, adequate, and reasonable. Nat’l Rural Telecomms. Coop. v. DIRECTV, Inc., 221 F.R.D. 523, 529 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (“It is established that the absence of a large number of objections to a proposed class action settlement raises a strong presumption that the terms of a proposed class settlement action are favorable to the class members.”); see also Boyd v. Bechtel Corp., 485 F. Supp. 610, 624 (N.D. Cal. 1979) (finding that objections from only 16 percent of the class was persuasive that the settlement was adequate). Class Members were provided notice of the Settlement Agreement pursuant to this Court’s order granting the motion for preliminary approval. (See infra Part III.B.)
According to the Class Administrator, there were 2,300 valid and approved claims out of 11,870 Damages Class Members, amounting to 19.38% participation of the Damages Class. (See Keough Suppl. Decl. ¶ 12.a.) Thirty-one additional Class Members filed claims that lacked signatures or were otherwise deficient, and were not timely cured.4/ (Id. at ¶ 12.c.) Twenty-seven claim forms were submitted by eligible Class Members but postmarked after the filing deadline of December 6, 2017.5/

4/ Additionally, 556 claim forms were submitted by individuals who did not appear on the Damages Class List and 65 claim forms were duplicates of earlier-submitted claims forms. (Id. at ¶¶ 12.d, 12.e.) These claims were denied. (Id. at ¶¶ 12.d, 12.e.)

5/ At the final fairness hearing, counsel indicated that the parties were still deciding whether to accept these claims despite their untimeliness. Unless otherwise agreed upon by the Parties, claim forms not received or postmarked by December 6, 2017, shall not be paid, although those claimants shall nonetheless be bound by this Order and the Judgment.

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Case 2:07-cv-00380-PA-FFM Document 331 Filed 02/15/18 Page 8 of 12 Page ID #:5967

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL Case No. CV 07-380 PA (FFMx)

Date February 15, 2018

Title

Michael Nozzi, et al. v. Housing Authority for the City of Los Angeles, et al.

(Id. at ¶ 12.b.) No Class Member objected to the Settlement Agreement6/ and 8 Class Members opted out. (Keough Decl. ¶¶ 15, 18.) The Administrator attempted to mail notices to all Class Members, and after skip-tracing, ultimately 11,056 such notices were mailed and not returned as undeliverable. (Id. at ¶ 7.)

The settlement website created by JND tracked 13,285 unique users who registered 24,595 page views and 1,103 case document views. (Id. at ¶ 8.) The toll-free number established by JND received more than 1,775 calls (id. at ¶ 11), and JND associates spoke with 737 such callers (Keough Suppl. Decl. ¶ 8). The overall positive reaction of Class Members and lack of objections is strong evidence that the Settlement Agreement is fundamentally fair and reasonable.

B. Adequacy of Notice to the Settlement Class

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e), this Court must “direct notice in a reasonable manner to all class members who would be bound by the proposal.” Such notice must be “‘reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.’” Klee v. Nissan N. Am., Inc., No. CV 12-08238 AWT (PJWx), 2015 WL 4538426, at *5 (C.D. Cal. July 7, 2015). The notice given in this case was reasonably calculated to reach the Damages Class. The notices described the essential terms of the Settlement Agreement, defined the classes, set forth the procedure for Damages Class Members to make claims, opt out, or file objections to the Settlement Agreement, and provided information on the date, time, and location of the Final Fairness Hearing. (Docket No. 297, Ex. C; Keough Decl. ¶ 5.) They further provided a toll-free number for Class Members to call and a website containing essential case documents. (Keough Decl. ¶¶ 8, 10.) In addition, notices were posted at HACLA offices where Section 8 tenants may have occasion to visit. (See Docket No. 325, Mendoza Decl. ¶¶ 2–3.) Finally, a notice was published in the L.A. Times for three consecutive weeks on August 18, 2017, August 25, 2017, and September 1, 2017, and a 30-day internet advertising campaign was launched on Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter to inform Class Members about the settlement. (Keough Decl. ¶ 12.) The Court therefore concludes that the notice procedures satisfied the requirements of Due Process and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e).

IV. ATTORNEYS’ FEES, LITIGATION EXPENSES, INCENTIVE AWARDS, AND ADMINISTRATION EXPENSES

A. Attorneys’ Fees

The Court is obligated to conduct a careful review of the reasonableness of requested attorneys’ fees and costs. See In re Wash. Pub. Power Supply Sys. Sec. Litig., 19 F.3d 1291, 1302 (9th Cir. 1994)

6/ One objection was received, but that Class Member later withdrew his objection, which involved

matters distinct from the instant action or the Settlement Agreement. (See Docket Nos. 318, 319, 320; see also Litt Decl. ISO Final Approval Mot., Ex. 2.)

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Case 2:07-cv-00380-PA-FFM Document 331 Filed 02/15/18 Page 9 of 12 Page ID #:5968

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL Case No. CV 07-380 PA (FFMx)

Date February 15, 2018

Title

Michael Nozzi, et al. v. Housing Authority for the City of Los Angeles, et al.

(“Because in common fund cases the relationship between plaintiffs and their attorneys turns adversarial at the fee-setting stage, courts have stressed that when awarding attorneys’ fees from a common fund, the district court must assume the role of fiduciary for the class plaintiffs.”). Plaintiffs seek $2,801,776.94 in attorneys’ fees. (Final Approval Mot. 19.) This constitutes 30% of the Class Fund created by the Settlement Agreement. In common fund cases, “where the settlement or award creates a large fund for distribution to the class, the district court has discretion to use either a percentage or lodestar method.” Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1029 (9th Cir. 1998). “The percentage method means that the court simply awards the attorneys a percentage of the fund sufficient to provide class counsel with a reasonable fee.” Id. The Ninth Circuit has established 25% of the common fund “as a benchmark award for attorney fees.” Id.
Class Counsel cites numerous cases in district courts and other circuits that have found up to 33% to be a reasonable fee in class action settlement. (See Attorneys’ Fees Mot. 13–14 & n.2.) Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit has concluded that “[t]he 25% benchmark rate, although a starting point for analysis, may be inappropriate in some cases. Selection of the benchmark or any other rate must be supported by findings that take into account all of the circumstances of the case.” Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp., 290 F.3d 1043, 1048 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding 28% of common fund as attorneys’ fees). Class Counsel argues that in light of the risk involved; complexity of issues; Class Counsel’s experience, skill, and effort expended; and results obtained, 30% of the Class Fund is a reasonable fee in this case. (Attorneys’ Fees Mot. 3–9.)
“The lodestar method can ‘confirm that a percentage of recovery amount does not award counsel an exorbitant hourly rate . . . .’” In re Bluetooth Headset Prods. Liab. Litig., 654 F.3d 935, 945 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting In re GMC Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 820 (3d Cir. 1995)). Here, according to Class Counsel’s professed rates and hours worked, the lodestar calculation would be approximately $3.3 million. (See Final Approval Mot. 17.) The Class was represented by two firms: Kaye, McLane, Bednarski, and Litt and Public Counsel. Between the two firms, ten attorneys have spent 3,735.7 hours working on this case since its inception more than a decade ago. (Litt Decl. ISO Final Approval Mot. ¶ 10; Richardson Decl. ISO Final Approval Mot. ¶ 8.)7/ Each of these attorneys has a rate of between $540 and $1150 per hour. (Litt Decl. ISO Final Approval Mot. ¶ 10; Richardson Decl. ISO Final Approval Mot. ¶ 8.) A litigation coordinator and three paralegals have rates of between $150 and $335 and have committed a total of 685.9 hours to this case, while three law clerks, billing at $200 per hour, spent 96.8 hours on this case. (Litt Decl. ISO Final Approval Mot. ¶ 10; Richardson Decl. ISO Final Approval Mot. ¶ 8.)

7/ The Court notes disparity between the hours and rates for Public Counsel provided by Mr. Litt in

his Declaration in support of the Motion for Final Approval, and those provided by Ms. Richardson in her Declaration. (Compare Litt Decl. ISO Final Approval Mot. ¶ 10, with Richardson Decl. ISO Final

Approval Mot. ¶ 8.) At the Final Fairness Hearing, Class Counsel acknowledged that Ms. Richardson’s

Declaration should be relied upon for such hours and rates where contradictions between the declarations exist.

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Case 2:07-cv-00380-PA-FFM Document 331 Filed 02/15/18 Page 10 of 12 Page ID #:5969

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL Case No. CV 07-380 PA (FFMx)

Date February 15, 2018

Title

Michael Nozzi, et al. v. Housing Authority for the City of Los Angeles, et al.

Considering the results achieved, the time expended, the risks faced in this litigation, the skill required, the quality of work, the contingent nature of the fee, the financial burden carried by Class Counsel, and awards made in similar cases, as well as the lack of Class Member objection to this fee award, the Court finds that the requested attorneys’ fee award is reasonable. The Court therefore grants Plaintiffs’ request for $2,801,776.94 in attorneys’ fees to be awarded from the Class Fund.

B. Litigation Costs

Plaintiffs request $169,699.88 in litigation costs. “Reasonable costs and expenses incurred by an attorney who creates or preserves a common fund are reimbursed proportionately by those class members who benefit by the settlement.” In re Media Vision Tech. Sec. Litig., 913 F. Supp. 1362, 1366 (N.D. Cal. 1996). However, expenses that should be considered part of an attorney’s overhead, and therefore included within an award of attorneys’ fees, should not be characterized as a litigation expense and recovered as a cost item. Id. (“An award of out-of-pocket expenses should be limited to those expenses customarily billed to a fee-paying client.”) These costs are itemized in detail in the supporting declarations. (See Litt Decl. ISO Final Approval Mot. Ex. 6; Litt Decl. ISO Attorneys’ Fees Mot., Ex. D.) The most expensive items include expert fees of $118,430.50, mediation costs of $18,000, and online research costs of $17,094.02. The Settlement Agreement further identifies the types of costs for which Defendants agreed to reimburse Class Counsel, and the Preliminary Approval Order noted that litigation costs of up to $220,000 could be awarded. (See Settlement Agreement ¶¶ 5, 52; Prelim. Approval Order at 3.) No Class Member objected. The Court concludes that with the exception of the online research costs of $17,094.02 which the Court determines is part of an attorney’s overhead, the requested litigation costs are reasonable. Accordingly, the Court awards $152,605.86 in litigation costs.

C. Named Plaintiffs’ Incentive Awards

Plaintiffs also seek incentive awards of $5,000 for Pelaez in addition to her damages award, and of $1,000 for Nozzi inclusive of his damages. (Final Approval Mot. 13.) Courts may consider the following criteria to determine whether to make an incentive award: (1) the risk to the class representative in commencing suit, both financial and otherwise; (2) the notoriety and personal difficulties encountered by the class representative; (3) the amount of time and effort spent by the class representative; (4) the duration of the litigation; and (5) the personal benefit enjoyed by the class representative as a result of the litigation. Van Vraken v. Atl. Richfield Co., 901 F. Supp. 294, 299 (N.D. Cal. 1995); see also Rodriguez, 563 F.3d at 959 (agreeing with district court that incentive award should be tied to work performed, risks undertaken, and time spent on litigation). Courts also consider “the number of named plaintiffs receiving incentive payments, the proportion of the payments relative to the settlement amount, and the size of each payment.” Staton, 327 F.3d at 975; see, e.g., In re Online DVD-Rental Antitrust Litig., 779 F.3d 934, 943 (9th Cir. 2015) (holding that incentive award to class representative was permissible where “[t]he amount sought and awarded was relatively small, well within the usual norms of ‘modest compensation’ paid to class representatives for services performed in the class action”); Friedman v. Guthy-Renker, LLC, No. 2:14-cv-06009-ODW(AGRx), 2016 WL 6407362, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 28, 2016) (balancing the above considerations and concluding that “while

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Case 2:07-cv-00380-PA-FFM Document 331 Filed 02/15/18 Page 11 of 12 Page ID #:5970

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL Case No. CV 07-380 PA (FFMx)

Date February 15, 2018

Title

Michael Nozzi, et al. v. Housing Authority for the City of Los Angeles, et al.

[two of the named plaintiffs’] awards come close to the threshold of disapproval, the Court finds that their participation in this lawsuit—including responding to substantial discovery and sitting for a deposition—justifies the award.” (citation omitted)); Cox v. Clarus Mktg. Grp., LLC, 291 F.R.D. 473, 483 (S.D. Cal. 2013).

In its order preliminarily approving of the Settlement Agreement, the Court explicitly warned that final approval of an incentive award would require a more significant showing. (See Prelim. Approval Order at 6.) Despite this warning, Plaintiffs have provided little additional factual basis to support the requested incentive awards. Plaintiffs assert that Nozzi initiated this action and without him there may have been no case. (Final Approval Mot. 13.) Meanwhile, Pelaez served as Class Representative and was available for a deposition if necessary, participated in interviews with Class Counsel, and provided declarations. (Id.; Litt Decl. ISO Final Approval Mot. ¶ 2.)

Such assertions do not support the awards sought by Plaintiffs. However, the Court finds an award of $2,500 to Pelaez, in addition to her damages award, and $500 to Nozzi, inclusive of his damages, to be reasonable in light of their participation, and thus, grants awards to Named Plaintiffs in those amounts.

D. Settlement Administration Award

Finally, Plaintiffs seek approval of settlement administration costs. The Class Administrator has billed $24,000 and anticipates billing another $24,000 for administration fees. (Keough Suppl. Decl. ¶ 13.) Furthermore, the Class Administrator seeks $12,000 in costs for publication – $6,000 for costs associated with publication in the L.A. Times, and $6,000 for the internet campaign. (Id. at ¶ 11.) Plaintiffs previously filed JND’s bid, in which JND estimated a total cost of $48,000 in the event of a 25% claims rate, and noted it could reach $68,000 if more claims were filed. (See Settlement Agreement, Ex. E.) Here, including claims that have been rejected, the Class Administrator has processed 2,979 claims, representing a 25.1% claims rate. (Keough Suppl. Decl. ¶ 12.) In its bid, JND identified the services it expected to provide depending on the number of claimants. Since then, the CEO of JND has provided declarations in which she attests to the services JND has provided, and will provide in this case. (Keough Decl.; Keough Suppl. Decl.) In addition, the parties previously sought, and the Court considered, publication costs of between $10,000 and $12,000, in preliminarily approving the Settlement Agreement. (See Mot. for Prelim. Approval at 9; Prelim. Approval Order at 3.) No class member has objected to such awards of administration or publication costs. Based on the evidence provided and the lack of objections, the Court finds that up to $60,000 total to be reasonable administration and publication costs in this case, and authorizes payment of such costs to JND from the Class Fund.

Furthermore, as requested in the Proposed Order, the Class Administrator will prepare a list of all rejected claims, with the reasons for rejection, and maintain the list in its case file. The Class Administrator shall preserve all written communications from Class Members in response to the Class for at least three years. All written communications received by the Class Administrator from Class

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Case 2:07-cv-00380-PA-FFM Document 331 Filed 02/15/18 Page 12 of 12 Page ID #:5971

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL Case No. CV 07-380 PA (FFMx)

Date February 15, 2018

Title

Michael Nozzi, et al. v. Housing Authority for the City of Los Angeles, et al.

Members relating to the Settlement Agreement shall be available at all reasonable times for inspection and copying by Counsel for the Parties. At the conclusion of the Class Distribution, the Class Administrator shall submit a report to the Court summarizing the payments made to the Class.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that the Settlement Agreement is fundamentally fair, adequate, and reasonable. The Court therefore grants Plaintiffs’ Motion for Final Approval of Settlement. Injunctive Relief Class Members and Damages Class Members release those claims against Defendants as set forth in the Settlement Agreement, except as to monetary damages for those Damages Class Members who timely opted out. The Court reaffirms its approval of Barrett S. Litt, Anne Richardson, and Stephanie Carroll as Class Counsel and JND as Class Administrator.
The Court also grants in part Plaintiffs’ Motion for Award of Attorneys’ Fees and awards $2,801,776.94 in fees and $152,605.86 in costs to Class Counsel to be paid by Defendants. Additionally, the Court grants $2,500 to Pelaez as an incentive award and $500 to Nozzi as an incentive award. Furthermore, JND’s costs of up to $60,000 are approved. Each of these awards and costs are to be paid from the Class Fund.
The Court orders Defendants to provide the Class Fund to the Class Administrator for disbursement in accordance with the terms of the Settlement Agreement. The Court further orders the Class Administrator to pay all members of the Damages Class who have filed valid claims in accordance with the terms of the Settlement Agreement. The Court will enter a Judgment consistent with this Order and the Settlement Agreement. The effective date of settlement is 30 days after the date the Judgment is entered on the Docket. (Settlement Agreement ¶ 13.)
IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Case 2:07-cv-00380-PA-FFM Document 1 Filed 01/16/07 Page 1 of 58 Page ID #:3665

1 BA RRETT S.LITT,SBN 45527 PAUL J.ESTUA R,SBN 167764
2 E-M ai1:pestuar@ littlaw.com
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1. Foroverthirtyyears,thefederal<çsection 8Program ''hasprovided

3 housingbenefitsacrossthecountrytoahighly vulnerablepopulation comprisedof

4 impoverished,elderly,andoften disabledresidents,m any ofwhom w ouldsw ell 5 theranksofthehomelessbutforthiscriticalgovernm entassistance.Housing 6 benefitsareprovidedin theform ofaCdvoucher''orhousing subsidy,which

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11 recipientsin itsjurisdiction.Thereductionwassignificant,averaging$121per
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14 federalregulations,independentlyenforceableaswelltluough statelaw ,toprovide 15 adequatenoticeatleastoneyearpriorto,thecutin thelevelofservices.This 16 specificand m andatoryone-yearnoticerequirem entw ascreated so thatrecîpients

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18 housing,orm akeotheranungem entsto accom m odatethissignificantchangein

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4. HACLA didnotm akeanym eaningfulattempttocom plywith this

21 noticerequirem ent. Ratherthan separately providing a form aladnlinistrative

22 noticeinform ing Section 8 recipientsthatthey w ould beresponsible fora specific

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23 increasein rent,HA CLA insertedintoalargestack ofm aterialssentto each

24 recipîentanondescriptandtechnically wordedflyerthatfailedtoconvey any

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I l

l
Case 2:07-cv-00380-PA-FFM Document 1 Filed 01/16/07 Page 3 of 58 Page ID #:3667

1 specify any procedure forappeal;itdid notrequirea signature acknow ledging

2 receipt;and,m ostim portantly,itdidnotinform recipientsthattheirrentpaym ents

3 wouldbegoingup.

4

5. HACLA 'Sabsolutefailuretocomplywith theSection 8notice

5 requirem entsrendersthesubsequentim plem entation ofthesubsidy reduction

6 unlawful.ltconstim tesauniform dueprocessviolation ofa1laffected recipients'

7 propertyinterestinthisfederalprogram .A saresult,over23,000 Section 8

8 recipientslivinginLosAngeles(includingnearly5,000elderlyfamiliesand4,500 9 disabledfannilies)literallyandfigurativelyhadtherugpulledoutfrom underthem.
10 Theyhavebeen andw illcontinuetobeunlawfullydeprivedoffederalhousing

ll benestsestimatedatover$25rnillion.

12

6. Theactionsofa11defendantshaveresultedin thedenialofPlaintiffs'

13 and theclassm em bers'constitutional,statutory,and connnnon law rights.

14 Furtherm ore,theactsof DefendantsHA CLA andtheCity ofLosAngeles

15 dem onstratean affirm ativepolicy,and/orcustom ,and/orpracticeofcondoningthe

16 conductsetoutherein.

17

7

I

. Thisactionseeksclass-widerelieftoenjoinD efendants'continuing

18 vîolations,andtoproviderestitm sontotheclassofaffected Section 8recipients

l9 whosufferedan unlaw fulincreasein theirrent,ltisideally suited forRule23

I

20 classtreatm entbecauseD efendants'failuretoprovideconstitutionally adequate

21 noticeisadirectresultofapolicy andpracticethatwasapplieduniformlyto all

I

22 affected classm em bers.

23 ll. JURISDICTIO N AND V ENUE
I

24

8. ThisisacivilactionoverwhichthisCourthasoriginaljurisdiction

25 under28U.S.C.j1331inthatitseeksredressunder42U.S.C.j1983(ttsection

26

1983'')forthedeprivation ,

tm

der color of state law

,ofrights,privileges,and

I

27 im munitiessecuredby federalstatutesandtheUnited StatesConstitution.This

28

3

I

CLA SS A CTION COM PLA IN T

i i

I

1
Case 2:07-cv-00380-PA-FFM Document 1 Filed 01/16/07 Page 4 of 58 Page ID #:3668

1 courthasjurisdictiontohearpendentstateclaimsunderthedoctineof 2 supplem entaljurisdictionsetforthat28U.S.C.j1367.Plaintiffs'action for 3 declaratoryandinjunctivereliefisauthorizedby20U.S.C.jj220l,2202,and
4 1343andbyFed.R.Civ.P.57and 65.Plaintiffs'state1aw claim saresorelatedto

5 theirfederal1aw claim sthatthey form partofthesam ecaseorcontroversy.

6 Accordingly,supplementaljurisdictionoverthoseclaimsisappropriateunder28

7 U.S.C.j1367.

8

9. VenueinthisCourtisproperunder20U.S.C.j1391(b)because

9 variousDefendantsresideinthisjudicialdistrict.Theeventsorom issionsgiving

10 risetotheclaimsoccurredprimarilyinthisjudicialdistrict.

l1 111. PA R TIE S

12

10. PlaintiffM içhaçlNpzgi($W OZZl'')isadisabledmalewhois,and

13 wasata11tim esm aterialherein,aresidentoftheCounty ofLosAngeles,Stateof

14 California.NO ZZIhasbeen receivingSection 8benefitssince2003.

15

11. PlaintiffNidiaPelaez(CTELAEZ'')isafemalewhois,andwasatal1

16 tim esm aterialherein,aresidentoftheCounty ofLosAngeles,StateofCalifornia.
I
17 PELAEZ hasbeen receiving Section 8benetitssinceFebruary2004.

18

12. PlaintiffLosAngelesCoalitionto EndHungerandHom elessness

19 (<<LACEHH'')isanon-profitmembershiporganizationwhosemissionistoworkto 1

20 endhungerand hom elessnessin LosM gelesthroughpubliceducation,technical

21 assistance,publicpolicy apalysij,adyoç>cy,organizing,andcom m unityaction.

I

,

22 LACEHH wasfounded in 1985,andhasover500m embers,includingindividuals

23 whoreceiveSection 8 assistance.LACEHH isheadquarteredin LosAngeles.lt

I

24 createdtheSaveSection 8Coalition,agroup ofoverl30organizationsthat

25 advocatesforthepreservation andexpansion oftheSection 8Housing Choice
I
26 V oucherProgram locally,andatthenationallevel.LACEHH haslongbeen

27 conam itted topreserving govem m entassistancethathelpspoorand low-incom e

I

28

4

C LA SS A CTION COM PLA FN T
I

Case 2:07-cv-00380-PA-FFM Document 1 Filed 01/16/07 Page 5 of 58 Page ID #:3669

l îndivîdualsto keep aroofovertheirheads,and to decreasethenum berwho suffer 2 hom elessnessin LosA ngeles.

3

13. DefendanttheCityofLosAngeles((çC1TY'')isapolitical

4 subdivision duly organizedandexistingunderthelaw softheStateofCalifornia .

5

D efendantC ITY

issuedboth in itsownright ,

andon thebasisofrespondeat

6 superiorunderCaliforniaGovernm entCodej815.2.

7

14

. Plaintiffsareinform edandbelieve,andthereupon allege,that

8
DefendanttheHousingAuthorityoftheCityofLosAngeles(CtHACLA'')isan
9
agency oftheCITY,andisapublicentityunderCalifornialaw .Califom ialaw 10

authorizescitiesto createhousing authoritiesto dealw ith theproblem ofsafeand 1 1

12 sanitary dwellingaccom m odationsforpersonsoflow incom e.H ealth & Safety

13 Codejj34201(a),34240.State1aw providesthatalocalhousîngauthorityshall

14 nottransactanybusinessorexerciseitspow ers,unlessacountyorcîty

15 governm entdeclarestheneed forsuchahousing authority,and thatany action by

l6 theauthority isconclusively deem ed to havebeen established and authorized by a

17 resolution ofthe county orcity. Heath& SafetyCode5534240,34244.Assuch,
18 theCITY hasdelegateditsnllem akingauthority overtheissueofaffordable

19

housing to H A CLA .

The M

ayorofthe CITY

appointsthe individualstoserveas

20
connm issionersofHACLA.Hea1th& SafetyCode534270.TheCommission,
2 1 serving atthepleasureofthe M ayorofthe CITY ,hasthe authority to determ ine
22 policy forH A CLA ,and to appointorapprove H A CLA 'Stop officials.Chapter6 of
23
theLosAngelesA dm inistrativeCodeincludesseveralordinancesthrough which 24

25 theCITY enacted cooperation agreem entsw ith H ACLA .L.A .,Ca1.,

26 AdministrativeCode,ch.6,art.2,j8.106(Aug.8,1949).TheCityAttorneyfor
gy theCITY actsasin-housecounselforHA CLA .

28

5

CLA SS A CTION COM PLAm T

Case 2:07-cv-00380-PA-FFM Document 1 Filed 01/16/07 Page 6 of 58 Page ID #:3670

l

15. A ta11relevanttim es,D efendantsHACLA and CITY operatedasan

2

agentand/oralterego

of the

otherand ,

in

doing

the

acts

alleged

herein,w

ere

acting

3

w ithin the courseand scope ofsaid agency .

Becauseoftheagency and/or

4 corporaterelationship betw een them , DefendantsH ACLA and Cityhadknowledge
5 orconstructivenotîce ofthe actsoftheother.D ueto thecontrolthatthe CITY
6 exercises,orhasthepowerto exercise,overHA CLA ,itisresponsîblefor
7 H A CLA 'Sactions.
8 16. Even ifitisnotan agency oftheCITY ,H ACLA isaseparately suable
9
10 publicentity,andissuedboth in itsown right,and on thebasisofrespondeat

l1 superiorunderCalifom iaGovem mentCodej815.2.

12

17. HACLA isaPublicH ousingAuthorityestablishedunder42U .S.C.

13 j1437f.Assuch,itisrequiredtoestablishandadnzinisterlocalpoliciesthat

14 complywithfederalregulationsandrequirements.24C.F.R.jj982.52/),

15 982.j4(a)-(c).

16

18 DefendantRudolphM onteil(6dMONTElL''),suedinhisofficial

17

capacity

exceptasothenvise

stated

herein
,

is the

Executive

D

irectorofH

A

CLA

.

lt

l8 isD efendantM ON TEIL,sduty tooverseetj)eoperatiou O6HACLA,and to

19 executepoliciesandproceduresimplem entingfederallaw sregardingtheSection 8
20 Program .
2 1
19. Plaintiffisignorantofthetruenam esandcapacitiesofD efendants 22

23 sued herein asD O ES 1throtàgh 100,inclusîve,and therefore suesthese D efendants

24 by such fictîtiousnam es.D OES lthrough20 areagenciesorentitiesresponsible

25 fortheunlaw fulpractîcesandpolicesallegedherein.DOES 21through 100 are

26 presentorform erem ployeesofHA CLA ortheCITY responsiblefortheunlaw ful

27 practicesandpoliciesallegedherein.Plaîntîffswîllseeltleavetoam endthis

28

y

CLA SS A CTION COM PLA INT

l l

Case 2:07-cv-00380-PA-FFM Document 1 Filed 01/16/07 Page 7 of 58 Page ID #:3671

1 complainttoallegetheirtruenam esandcapacitieswhenascertained.

i

20 .

Plaintiffsareinformedandbelieve,and on thatbasisallege,thateach

3

defendant ,

including

the

D

oe D

efendants,aided

and

abetted

the w

rongful acts of

4

the others
.

Totheextentany such Defendantdidnotpersonally violatethe

5 constitutionalorstatutoryrightsofthePlaintiffsandtheClass,each condoned,

6 encouraged,approved,ratifiedorotherwiseparticipatedin such actions.
7 21. CITY andHA CLA aresuedboth directly andvicariously on thebasis
8
ofrespondeatsuperiorliabilityunderstatelaw ,asthey areresponsibleforthe 9

l0 actionsofa11theiragentsandemployeesperform edin thecourseand scopeof

11 theirem ploym entand/oragency.A1loftheactionsallegedherein by agentsand

12 employeesofHA CLA ortheCITY w ereso perform ed.Thus,CITY andHACLA

13 areliablefortheactionsofa11theiremployeesand agents,nam ed orunnam ed,

14 whoperform ed actsatissueinthislaw suit,a11ofwhom w ereactingin thecourse

16 and scopeoftheirem ploym entand/oragency.ln addition,theactionsalleged

16 hereinw ereundertaken by HACLA andtheCITY pursuantto custom andpolicy

17

ofthose

entities
,

m

aking them

independently

liable tm

derfederallaw

.

18 IV . FA C TU A L A LL EG A TIO N S

19

A

. B ackground ofSection 8 Program

20

21

. TheHousing andConzmunityDevelopm entActof1974 authorized

2 1 andestablished theSection 8Program to beadm inisteredby thelocalPublic

22
HousingAuthorities(dTHA 's'').TheSection 8Program,fundedbytheU.S.
23

24 DepartmentofHousingandUrbanDevelopment(ççHUD''),provideshousing

25 assistance(aportionofrentandutilities)toextrem ely1ow andverylow-income

26 farnîlîes,senîorcîtizens,anddisabledorhandicappedpersons.1tsobjectiveisto
27 provideaffordable,decentandsafehousingforeligiblefam ilies,whileincreasinga

28

7

CLA SS A CTION COM PLA INT

Case 2:07-cv-00380-PA-FFM Document 1 Filed 01/16/07 Page 8 of 58 Page ID #:3672

1 farnily'sresidentialm obility and choice.

2

22 .

ln 1975,H ACLA im plem ented theSection 8Program providingrent

3 subsidiesintheform ofhousingassistancepayments(HAPs)toprivatelandlords

4

on

behalfofeligib1e

fanlilies

in

LosA

ngeles
.

HACLA ,astatecharteredpublic

5 housing agency since l938,now adm inistersthesecond largestSection 8 Program

6 in the country.
7 23. lnM ay 1999,HUD created anew Section 8Program called the
8
S<l-lousing ChoiceVoucherProgram .''ThelocalPHA adm inisterstheHousing 9

l0 ChoiceVoucherProgram undercontractwith HUD,andhas,am ong others,the

ll responsibilityofdeterminingtheVoucherPaymentStandard(1CVPS'')-the
12 m aximum m onthly subsidy aH ousingAuthority canprovidetoafarnily.See24

13 C.F.R.j982.505(a).TheVPSisthesubsidygenerallyneededtoallow aSection8
14 recipienttorentam oderately-priced dwellingunitinthelocalhousingmarketand

15 isused to calculatethe am ountofhousing assistancea fam ily w illreceive.

16

24 HACLA 'Slatestw ebsiteindicatesthatitadrninistersover36,000

17

section

8

H

ousing

choice

v

ouchertenanciesin

the

City

ofLosA

ngeles
.

These

18 tenanciesarecomprised of59% farniliesw ith children,27% elderlyindividuals,

1 9 and 14% non-elderly disabledpersons.Sourcesofincom e forthesefam ilîes
20
includewages(22% ),SupplementalSecuritylncome($tSS1'')(20%),CaIW ORKS
2 1
22 (19% ),SocialSecurityDisabilitylncom e(&tSSD1'')andSocialSecurityRetirement

23 lncome(ûdSSA'')(13% ),GeneralRelief(4% ),and23% comingfrom otherand

24 com binedsources.

zj

B. Fram ew ork for D ecreasing the VPS

26

25. UnderH UD regulations,HousingAuthoritiesconductannual

27 reexanlinationstoverifyincom eandrecertify fanailycom position.24 C.F.R.

28

8

CLASS ACTION COM PLAINT

I
Case 2:07-cv-00380-PA-FFM Document 1 Filed 01/16/07 Page 9 of 58 Page ID #:3673

1 982.516(a).W iththatinformation,theHousingAuthoritycalculatesthetenant's

2

share

ofrent ,

w

hich

is subtracted

from

thegrossrentto determ inethepaym entdue

3

from

theH ousingAuthority .

Them aximum

HousingAuthoritypaym entisthe

4 V PS foran apartm entofthatsize.

5

26

. PHA Shavediscretion toraiseorlowertheV PS within astatutorily-

6 prescribed range.
7
27. Beforelow eringtheVPS,however,Housing Authoritiesm ustcomply 8
with avery specifctim elinerelatingtonotice.A PHA m ustprovidepropernotice 9

l0 toarecipientw hosebenefitsarebeingreduced atthefirstannualreexam ination

11 followingthechangeinservices.24C.F.R.982.505(c)(3)(ii).Theactual
12 reduction inbenefitscannotoccurunti-lo-neyearafterthisnotice,upon the l3 completion ofthesecondreexam ination aftertheeffectivedateofthedecisionto

14 decreasethelevelofservices.f#.

15

C . H A C LA 'SF ailureto ProvideN otice

16

28

O

n A

pril 2 ,

2004,H A

CLA

m

ade

a decision

to

reduce the pre-existing

17

v ps

Theimpacton section 8pm

icipantsw assignificant .

Forexam ple,thev PS

IF

dçb

foraO-bedroom ( achelor'')apartmentplummetedfrom $795toonly$674,a

19 reduction of$121perm onth.
20 29. To im plem entthischangeinpolicy,HA CLA stuck aone-pageflyerin
2 l

them aterialsm ailed to each recipienton the date oftheir annualreexam ination. 22

23 U nlike otherexplanatory noticescontained in thesepackets,the flyerdid not

24 requiretherecipienttoacknowledgereceiptby signingandreturnîngtheform .

zj Theflyerwasnoton letterhead,didnotcontain aphonenum berforinquiries,and

26 didnotgivealegalbasisforthedecision.M oreimportantly,the flyerdidnot

27 adviserecipientsthattheirout-of-pocketrentpaym entwouldactuallybegoingup

28

9

CLA SS A CTION COM PLA INT

l
Case 2:07-cv-00380-PA-FFM Document 1 Filed 01/16/07 Page 10 of 58 Page ID #:3674

1 (muchlessspecifytheam ountoftheincrease).Plaintiffsareinformedand

2

believe ,

and

on

thatbasisallege,thatthesetlyersw

eresentout(buriedam

ong

3 otherreexarninationm aterials)from approximatelyJuly2004tk oughJuly2005.

4

30
.

Thelanguageoftheflyerdidnotm eaningfully com m unicatetothe

5 recipientthattherewouldactuallybeareduction in theportion ofhisorherrent

6 thatHA CLA w ouldpay,andacorresponding increasein theportion ofhisorher
7 rentthattherecipîentwouldberequired topay.
8
31. The V PS decreasew entinto effectw ith reexam inationsthattook 9

l0 placefrom July2005throughJuly 2006.A ccording toHA CLA estim ates,

l1 approxim ately 45% ofHACLA 'Sapproxim ately 45,000 Section 8participants

12 w ereadversely affectedby theApril2004V PS decrease.

13

D . T heR epresentativePlaintiffs

14

32. M ichaelNOZZIisa53-year-o1dm an who isconsidered totallyand

15 perm anently disabledby SocialSecuritystandardsdueto HIV/AIDS. Helivesîn a

16 rentalunitw ithin theCity ofLosAngeles .

1-/

33 N OZZIhasreceivedaSection 8housingbenefitsinceDecember1

,

18 2003
. PriortotheV PS decreaseatissue,hisrentobligation w as$23l.00per

1 9
month(withHACLA payingthedifferencethroughtheVPS).
20 34. EffectiveJune 1,2006,N O ZZI'SSection 8 rentobligation w as
2 1

22 increasedto$342.00permonth(a48% increase).NOZZIreceivednothingfrom

23 H A C LA inform ing him ofthissigniticantincrease untilon oraround April18,

24 2006,justafew weekspriortotheeffectivedateofincrease,andfarfrom theone

:5 yearormorerequiredby24C.F.R.982.505(c)(3)(ii).Thiswasthefirsttimethat

26 heunderstood thathisSection 8benefitswouldbedecreased.

27

35. Soon thereafter,NOZZIappealedtheincreasethrough hiscounseland

28

10

CLASSA CTION COM PLAINT

Case 2:07-cv-00380-PA-FFM Document 1 Filed 01/16/07 Page 11 of 58 Page ID #:3675

requested ahearing,butnone w asprovided.

2

36 .

NideaPELAEZ isasingleparentraising ayoungdaughter.H er

3 Prim ary sourcesofincom earethe$239shereceivesfrom CaIW ORKS and the

4 Socia1Security Survivor'sB enefitsshereceiveson behalfofherdaughter.
5 PELA EZ residesinN orth Hollywood andhasreceived aSection 8housingbenetit
6 through HACLA sinceFebruary 1,2004.
7 37. EffectiveFebruary 1,2006,PELA EZ'SSection 8rentobligation was
8
9 increasedto$252.00permonth(a177% increase).PELAEZ receivednothing

10 from HACLA inform ing herofthissignificantincreaseuntilon oraround

1l December28,2005,justfiveweekspriortotheeffectivedateofincrease,andfar

12 from theoneyearormorerequîredby24C.F.R.982.505(c)(3)(ii). Thîswasthe
13 firsttim ethatsheunderstoodthatherSection 8benefitsw ouldbedecreased.

14

38. PELAEZ alsorequested ahearingtlzroughcounsel.Although the

l5 hearingw asconductednearly ayearago,no decision hasbeen renderedby

16 H A CLA .

17

39 The 177% increasein them onthlyrentthatPELAEZ hashadtopay

1 8 sinceFebrtzary 1,2006,hasreduced thequalityoflifeforherandheryoung

19 d aughter.PELAEZ hashaddifficultyaffording suitableschoolclothesforher

20 daughter.Shehashadtoreducetheam ountofm oney thatshespendseach m onth
2 1

on food in orderto pay the increased rent. 22

23

40. TheLosAngelesCoalitionto EndHungerandHom elessnessisa

24 nonprofitcop oratîon devotedtofightîngthecausesandeffectsofhom elessnessîn

cj LosAngeles.LACEHH advocatesOn behalfoflow-incom eindividuals to ensure

26 m oreaffordablehousing forLosAngelesresidents.LACEHH includesm em bers

27 w ho receive Section 8 assistance.

28

1 1

C LA SS A CTION COM PLAIN T

Case 2:07-cv-00380-PA-FFM Document 1 Filed 01/16/07 Page 12 of 58 Page ID #:3676

1 41. From 2005totltepresent,membersofLACEHHIZaVebeensubjected

2

to theunlaw ful2004 V PS decrease .

LA CEHH

hasworked on behalfofthese

3

affected

m

em

bers to

rescind

this adm

inistrative

decision ,

has devoted

considerable

4 effortsto advocatîng w ith H A CLA thatthey m aintain Sectîon 8 benefitsatlevels

5 priortothe2004decrease.,andhasm etregularlyw ith HA CLA staffforthis

6

Pu1POSe, 7

8

E. ComplianceW ith Cal.Governm entCodej910,etseq.

42. PlaintiffN O ZZIfiled an adm inistrativeclaim againstthe CITY , 9 10 individually andonbehalfofaclassofsim ilarly situatedpersons,on June30,

11 2006,acopyofwhichisattachedasExhibitçW '',TheCITY rejectedhisclaim on
12 July 17,2006,acopy ofwhich isattached asExhibitSIB''

13

43. PlaintiffPELA EZ filed anadrninistrativeclaim againsttheCITY,

14 individually and on behalfofaclassofsim ilarly situated persons,onJune30,

15 2006, acopyofwhichisattachedasExhibitd(C''.TheCITY rejectedherclaim on

16

July

l 7 ,

2006,a

copy

of w

hich

îs attached

asExhibitCCD

''

17

44

B y w ritten

agreem

ent
,

plaintiffs,counseland

H

A

CLA

agreed

that

18 plaintiffs'adm inistrativec1aim sagainstHA CLA wouldbetolled asofJune 1,

1 9 2006.Theagreem entisattached asExhibit'IE''Theagreem entw asentered into
20 sothatthepartîescouldengagein preliminarysettlem entdîscussîonsfreefrom the
2 1 pressureoftheexpiration ofany statutesoflim itation.W hen settlem entdiscussion
22
23 w ith HACLA didnotprove fruitful,Plaintiffsthen filedadm inistrativeclaim swith

24 H ACLA .N OZZIfiled hisclassclaim onN ovemberl5,2006,acopyofwhich is

25 attachedasExhibit''F'',PELAEZ filedherclassclaim on N ovem ber15,2006,

26 andan am ended claim on December8,2006,to correctatypographicalerroron

27 theoriginalclaim.(A copyofthesecondPELAEZ claim isattachedasExhibit

28

12

CLA SS A CTION COM PLA JNT

I 1

Case 2:07-cv-00380-PA-FFM Document 1 Filed 01/16/07 Page 13 of 58 Page ID #:3677

$ûG''.Bothclaim swererejectedon December29,2006.Copiesoftherejection
2 lettersare attached asExhibit(çH ''.

3

F Plaintiffs'Prelitigation Settlem entE fforts

@

4

45. On M ay 24,2006,Plaintiffs'counselsubm ittedaprelitigation

5 settlem entlettertoboth theCITY and HA CLA asking thatthey:
6
(a) inzmediatelyceaseanddesistfrom enforcingadecreased
7 paym entstandardfora1lSection 8recipientswhoseeffectiverentincreaseshave
8 taken,orw illtake,effectduringtheJuly '05to June'06period;
9
(b) providerestitutionofa1lîncreasedSection8paymentsmadeby
1 0 recipientsin thepasttwelvem onthsasaresultofHA CLA 'Sim properactîon,and
1 1 going into the fum re;
l 2
(c) agreeinwritingtoincreasetheVPS(paymentstandard)tothe
13
earlier(pre-2004)levelseffectiveimmediately(i.e.,notphasedinthrough
l 4
reexaminationsoccurringthroughJuly?07);and
1 5
(d) payPlaintiffs'attorney'sfeesincurredtodate.
l 6 46. TheCityindîcatednointerestin resolvingPlaintiffs'claim spriorto
l 7 thefiling oftheinstantlaw suit,anddeclined to enterintoatolling agreem entto
1 8
allow tim eto discussandnegotiatetheissues.Accordingly,asdescribed l 9

20 previously,PlaintiffstiledGovt.Codej910claim sagainsttheCity.Asmentioned

21 in paragraph 43 above,Plaintiffsand H A CLA entered into prelitigation settlem ent

22 discussions,butthose discussionsproved unsuccessful.Plaintiffsthen tiled G ovt.

23 Codej910claimsagainstHACLA.

24 V. CLA SS A CTION A LLEGA TIO N S

25

47. plaintiffsbringthisaction on theirown behalf,on behalfoftheclass

26 ofa11otherpersonssinzilarlysim ated pursuanttoRule23oftheFederalRulesof
7
27 civilprocedure .

28

13

CLA SS A CTION C OM PLA INT

1

l
Case 2:07-cv-00380-PA-FFM Document 1 Filed 01/16/07 Page 14 of 58 Page ID #:3678

1

48. The Classisdefined asa11personsw ho experienced a decreasein

2 theirSection 8H ousing ChoiceV oucherbenefitsasaresultofthedefendants'

3 decisîontodecreasetheVPS in April2004 .

4

49

. ThemembersoftheClassaresonumerousthatjoinderofall

5 m embersisimpracticable.Plaintiffsareinformedandbelieve,and thereon allege,

6 thattherearem orethan 20,000 tenantswhoareaffectedbyD efendants'wrongful

7 conduct.Althoughtheexactnumberofclassm em bersisnotknown atthistim e,
8

thenum berandidentity ofclassm em berscanbeeasilydeterm ined from 9

l0 HA CLA 'Selectronicrecords.

l 1

Thereisawell-definedcom m unityofinterestam ong them em bersofthe

12 proposedClassinthattherearecomm on questionsoflaw andfact.Thecomrnon

13 questionsinclude,interalial

14

a. W hetherH ACLA providedadequatenoticeto Section 8

15 recipientspriortoim plem entingthe2004VPS benefitdecrease;

1 6

b. W hetherH ACLA 'Spup ortednoticecomplîedw ith statutory

l7 and regulatory requirem ents;

1 8

c. W hetherH ACLA 'Spurportednoticecompliedw ith

19 constîtutionaldueprocessrequirem ents;

20

d. W hetherH A CLA 'Sfailure toprovide adequatenotice

21 invalidatesthe subsequentV PS benefitdecrease;

22

e. W hetherH A CLA 'Sactionsconstitm e violationsunder42

23 U.S.C.j1983ofaprotectedpropertyinterest',

24

f. W hetherHACLA 'SactionsconstituteviolationsofCalifornia

25 law,includingGovt.Codej815.6.

26

50. Thesequestionsoffactandlaw predom inate overquestionsthataffect

27 only indîvidualClassm embers.Proofofacom m on setoffactswillestablîsh the

28
I l

14
CLA SS A CTION COM PLA INT

1
Case 2:07-cv-00380-PA-FFM Document 1 Filed 01/16/07 Page 15 of 58 Page ID #:3679

1 rightofeach Classm embertorecover,and thereisan ascertainableclassof

2 custom ersentitled to relief.

3

51. Plaintiffs'claim sare typicalofthose ofthe Class.

4

52. Plaintiffscanandw illfairly andadequatelyrepresentandprotectthe

5 interestsoftheproposedClass.Plaintiffshaveno interestthatconflictsw ith,oris

6 antagonisticto,theinterestsoftheproposed Class.Plaintiffshaveemployed

7 attorneyswho areexperiencedand competentin consum erandcivilrights

8 litigation and classactions,andareableto adequately and vigorously pursuethis

9 classaction on behalfofa11classm embers.

l 0

53. A classactionissuperiorto otheravailablem ethodsforthefairand

l1 efficientadjudicationoftheclaim sassertedherein giventhat:

12

a. Com m on questionsof1aw andfactpredom inateoverany

13 individualquestionsthatm ayarise.Therew ouldbeenorm ouseconom iestothe

14 courtandthepartiesin litigatingthecom m on issueson aclass-widebasis.

15 Plaintiffs'proofofliabilitywillbebased on the factualandlegalnatureof

16 HACLA 'Spurportednotice-whichw asdisthbutedîn thesam eway to allthe

17 m em bersofthe class.

I

l 8

b. Prosecution ofseparateactionsby individualm em bersofthe

19 classwouldcreateariskthatinconsistentorvaryingadjudicationswithrespectto

j

20 individualm embersoftheclasswouldestablish incompatiblestandardsofconduct

21 forthe partiesopposing theclass.

I

22

c. The sizeofeach proposed C lassm em ber'sindîvidualclaim sfor

23 dam agesand/orrestitutionistoo sm alltom akeindividuallitigation an

24

econoznically viablealternative .

Given theam ountsandthecomplexityofthe

I

25 issues,few proposedClassm em bersw ouldhavetheinterestorabilitytoprosecute

26 separateactionsindividually.

I

27

e. D espitetherelatively sm allsizeofindividualclaîm s,their

28

jj

I

CLA SS A CTION COM PLA IN T

I

Case 2:07-cv-00380-PA-FFM Document 1 Filed 01/16/07 Page 16 of 58 Page ID #:3680

1 aggregatevolum e coupled w ith the econom iesofscale inherentin litigating sinzilar

2 claim son acom m on basiswillenablethiscasetobelitigated asaclassaction on a

3 cost-effectivebasis.N otm usualdiffcultiesarelikelyto beencountered in the

4 m anagem entofthisclassin thatquestionsoflaw orfacttobelitigated atthe

5 liabilitystagearecommontotheclass,asareinjunctive,declaratory,and
6 restitutionary reliefissues.

7

54. Plaintiffsareinform ed andbelieveandthereon allegethatthe

8 defendantshaveactedon groundsgenerally applicabletotheclass,therebym aking

9 appropriatefinalinjunctivereliefordeclaratolyreliefwithrespecttotheclassasa

10 w hole.

l l

CO UNT O NE

12

D EN IA L O F D U E PR O C ESS O F L A W

13

(42U.S.C.j1983)

14

(By Plaintiffand PlaintiffC-la- ssAuainstCITY and H A CLA)

l 5

55. Plaintiffsrestate,reallegeandincop orateby referencea1lprevious

16 and subsequently statedparagraphs,asîffully setforthherein.

17

56. ThedueprocessclauseoftheFourteenth Am endm entprohibits

18 govem mentofficials,and thoseactingin concertw ith them ,actingundercolorof

l9 law,from deprivingpersonsoftheirpropertywithoutdueprocessoflaw .

20

57. Defendantsw ereobligated toprovidenoticetotheClassoftheVPS

2l decreaseatthefirstannualreexarnination follow ing the change in services. 24

22 C.F.R.982.505(c)(3)(ii).Theactualreductioninbenefitscannotoccuruntilone
23 yearafterthisnotice,upon the com plçtion ofthesecond reexam ination afterthe

24 effectivedateofthedecision to decreasethelevelofservices.1d.By theten'nsof

25 thisregulation,thePlaintiffClasshadapropert-yinterestin theVPS andthe

26 processby which itcouldbechanged.

27

58. UnderCalifomialaw,Govt.Codej815.6,24C.F.R.982.505(c)(3)(ii)

28

16

CLA SS ACTION COM PLAINT

l l

Case 2:07-cv-00380-PA-FFM Document 1 Filed 01/16/07 Page 17 of 58 Page ID #:3681

1 constitm esan enactm entdesigned to protectthePlaintiffClassfrom thetypeof

2 injurysufferedbyPlaintiffsherein.UnderthatCaliforniastatute,wherethe
3 govem m ententityinvolvedhasviolatedtheterm softheenactm ent,hasfailedto 4 usereasonablediligenceindischargingitsdutyundertheenactm ent,andhas

5 therebyinjuredthePlaintiffs,theinjuredpartymaysue.Accordingly,thePlaintiff
6 Classhadan independentpropertyinterestin theregulation asincop orated into

7 Govt.Code5815.6pursuanttoCalifornialaw.

8

59. Furtherm ore,Plaintiffshadaprotectedproperty interestin their

9 VoucherPaymentStandardpursuanttotheprovisionsof42U.S.C.j1437f(o).

10

6O. Thus,Plaintiffshadapropertyinterestin theprovisionsofC.F.R.

1l 982.505(c)(3)(ii)underbothstateandfederallaw,andb0thindependently(i.e.,the 12 regulation,thestatestatm eandthefederalstatm eeachstandingalone)and l3 collectively(i.e.,thethreeconsideredtogetherinlightofeach).Thedeprivationof
14 thatinterestby defendantsispermissibleonlyin accordancew ith therequirem ents

15 ofdueprocessof1aw undertheFpurteenth A m endm ent.

l 6

6l. By failing to providePlaintiffClassclear orm eaningfulnotice ofthe

17 actionsHA CLA intendedto takeanditsconsequencesatthetim erequired by 24

18 C

I

.F.R.982.505(c)(3)(ii),mostparticularlybyfailingtom eaningftlllyoreffectively

19 advisethePlaintiffClassthattheiroutofpocketshareoff'uturerentswouldbe

20 increased,asism orefullyexplainedin!4,supra;andbyfailingtoindicatefrom

21 w hom thenotice em anated,thelegalbasisforthe action,a phonenum berfor

l

22 inquiries,orhow toprotestorappealthe action,defendantH A CLA deprived the 23 PlaintiffClassofdue processoflaw in violation oftheFourteenth A m endm ent, 24 thereby entitling theClasstobringjuitandrecoverdam agespttrsuantto 42U .S.C. I

25 j1983.

26

62. Thewrongfulconductcomplaîned ofherein w astheproductofa

27 policy andpracticeoftheDefendants,w asnottheproductofaccîdentor

I

28

17

CLA SS A CTION COM PLA IN T

I l

I

Case 2:07-cv-00380-PA-FFM Document 1 Filed 01/16/07 Page 18 of 58 Page ID #:3682

1 inadvertence,and w asnotrandom . ln so acting,D efendantsw ere deliberately

2 indifferenttotherightsofPlaintiffsand theClass,andactedin willfulandreckless

3 disregard oftherightsofPlaintiffsandtheClass.

4

63. A sadirectand proxim ate cause ofthe aforem entioned actsof

5 defendants,PlaintiffsandPlaintiffClasssuffered lossesin thatthey incurred

6 increasedrentalpaym entsf'rom theirown pocketsthatDefendantswerenotlegally

7 entitledtoimpose.PlaintiffsandthePlaintiffClassseekinjunctiveanddeclaratory
8 relief,an accounting,restitution and/ordam ages.Saidrestitution ordam agesare

9 incidentaltotheinjunctivereliefsoughtherein.

10

COIX T TW O

11

VIOLATION OFRIGHTSCREATED BY 42U.S.C.j1437f

1 2

(PrivateRightofActionAvailableUnder42U.S.C.j1983)

13

(By PlaintiffandPlaintiffClassAaainstCITY and H A CLA)

14

64. Plaintiffsrestate,reallegeand incorporatebyreferencea11previous

15 and subsequently statedparagraphs,asiffully setforthherein.

16

65. Pursuanttotheprovisionsof42U.S.C.j1437f(o),titleddçvoucher

l7 Program '',w hen theSecretary oftheD epartm entofHousingandUrban

18 Developm ent(ççHUD'')providesassistancetotenants,asisthecaseforthe
19 PlaintiffClass,s/heshalldo sousingapaym entstandardto deterlninethem onthly

20 assistance to qualified tenants.Thestat-ute establishesa system and criteria for

2l determ ining the am ountofthem onthly assistancepaym ent,including w herethe

22 rentexceedsthepaym entstandard.The system established underthe statute

23 includesan annualreview offarnily incom e.

24

66. Thus,42U.S.C.jl437f(o)providestherightofqualifiedtenantstoa

25 paymentstandardundertheVoucherProgram.24C.F.R.982.505(c)(3)(ii),which
26 am ongotherthingsaddresseswhen andhow thetenantscoveredby theprogzam

27 aretohavetheirpaym entstandard changed,constitutesoneaspectofHUD 'S

28

18

CLA SS A CTION COM PLA IN T

Case 2:07-cv-00380-PA-FFM Document 1 Filed 01/16/07 Page 19 of 58 Page ID #:3683

1 intem retation ofthe scope ofthe rightestablished by the statute.A ssuch,the

2 dtgljanguagein(thejregulation ...invokelsqaprivaterightofactionthatCongress
3 through statutorytextcreated.''Alexanderv.Sandoval,532U .S.275,291,121S.

4 Ct.1511,1522(2001).

5

67. Defendants,asdescribed in thiscomplaint,deprivedthePlaintiffsand

6 PlaintiffClassoftheirfederalrights,speciticallytheirvoucherpaym entstandard

7 rightscreatedby42U.S.C.j1437f(o),undercolorofstatelaw,andthereby

8 violated42U.S.C.j1983.

9

68. Thewrongfulconductcomplainedofherein wastheproductofa

10 policy andpracticeofthedefendants,w asnottheproductofaccidentor

11 inadvertence,andwasnotrandom .In soacting,defendantsweredeliberately

12 indifferenttotherightsofPlaintiffsandtheClass,and acted in willfulandreckless

l3 disregard oftherightsofPlaintiffsand theClass.

14

69. A sadirectandproxim atecauseoftheaforem entionedactsof

15 defendants,Plaintiffsand PlaintiffClasssufferedlossesin thattheyincurred

l6 increasedrentalpaym entsfrom theirown pocketsthatDefendantsw ezenotlegally

17 entitledtoimpose.PlaintiffsandthePlaintiffClassseekinjunctiveanddeclaratory
18 relief,an accounting,restitution and/ordam ages.Saidrestitution ordam agesare

19 incidentaltotheinjunctivereliefsoughtherein.

20

C O UNT THR EE

21

VIOLATION OF CAL.GOV'T CODE j815.6

22

(Bv Plaintiffand PlaintiffClassAcainstAIlD efendants)

23

70. Plaintiffsrestate,reallegeand incop orateby referencea1lprevious

24 and subsequently statedparagraphs,asiffully setfol'thherein.

25

71. Calfornia CivilCodej815.6providesforliabilityagainstapublic

26 entity w hen:

27

(a) Theentityviolatesanenactment;

28

19

CLA SS A CTION COM PLAIN T

Case 2:07-cv-00380-PA-FFM Document 1 Filed 01/16/07 Page 20 of 58 Page ID #:3684

1

(b) Theplaintiffsareintheclassofpersonsprotectedbythe

2

enactm ent;

3

(c) Theenactmentisdesignedtoprotectthekindofinjury

4

com plained ofby theplaintiffs;

5

(d) Theviolationproximatelycausedtheinjury;and

6

(e) Thepublicentitydidnotexercisereasonablediligencein

7

dischargingitsduty establishedby theenactm ent.

8

72. An enactm entincludesafederalorstateconstitutionalprovision,

9

statute ,

charterprovision,ordinanceorproperly

adopted

regulation.

10

73. TheFourteenthAm endm entoftheUnitedStatesConstitution',24

11 C.F.R.j982.505(c)(3)-(4),'Article1,j7oftheCalforniaConstitutionk42U.S.C.

12 51437f)andCalforniaCivilCode552.1area11enactmentswithinthemeaningof

13 Cal. CivilCode5815.6.PlaintiffsandthePlaintiffClassareintheclassofpersons

14 protected by these enactm ents.

15

74. The aforem entioned enactm ents,applying to Plaintiffs,separately and

16 together, constitm em andatorydutiesw ithinthem eaning ofCal.CivilCode

17 5815.6andweredesignedtopreventthekindofinjuriesallegedherein.

l 8

75. Defendants,asdescribed in thiscom plaint,didnotexercise

19 reasonablediligenceipdischgrgipgthek dutyestablishedbytheenactments

20 enum erated above to refrain from violating the constitm ionaland statm oly rights

21 ofPlaintiffsand the Class.

22

76. A sadirectandproxim atecauseoftheaforem entioned actsof

23

D

efendants ,

Plaintiffs and

PlaintiffClass

suffered

losses in

thatthey

incurred

24 increased rentalpaym entsfrom theirown pocketsthatD efendantsw erenotlegally

25 entitled toimpose. PlaintiffsandthePlaintiffClassseekinjunctiveanddeclaratoly

26

relief ,

an

accotm ting,restitm

ion,and/ordam

ages. Saidrestitution

or dam

ages are

27 incidentaltotheinjunctiverelîefsoughtherein.

28

20

CLASSACTION COM PLAINT

Case 2:07-cv-00380-PA-FFM Document 1 Filed 01/16/07 Page 21 of 58 Page ID #:3685

1

CO UNT FO UR

2

VIOLATION OF ART.1,j7OF CALIFORM A CONSTITUTION

3

C alifornia D ueProcess Clause

4

(Bv Plaintiffand PlaintiffClassA uainstAlIDefendants)

5

77. Plaintiffsrestate,reallegeand incorporateby reference al1previous

6 and subsequently statedparagraphs,asiffully setforth herein.

7

78. Article1j7oftheCaliforniaConstitution(sçtheCaliforniaDue

8 ProcessClause'')prohibitsgovem mentalDefendants,and thoseactinginconcert

9 w ith them ,acting undercoloroflaw ,from depriving personsoftheirproperty

10 w ithoutdueprocessoflaw .Asstatedpreviously,Plaintiffsand theClasshavea

11 propertyinterestin24C.F.R.982.505(c)(3)(ii),theI'IUD regulationrequiring
l2 noticepriorto aVPS decrease,asw ellasin thatregulation asincorporatedinto

13 Govt.Codej815.6,andin42U.S.C.j1437:bothseparatelyandincombination.
14 Also,asstatedpreviously,D efendantsdeprived thePlaintiffClassofthatproperty 15 rightw ithoutdueprocessoflaw.

16

79. Thew rongfulconductcom plained ofherein w astheproductofa

17 policy and practice oftheD efendants,w asnottheproductofaccidentor

18 inadvertence,and w asnotrandom . ln so acting,D efendantsw ere deliberately

19 indifferentto therightsofPlaintiffsandtheClass,andactedin willfulandreckless

20 disregard oftherightsofPlaintiffsand the Class.

21

80. Article1,j26oftheCalfornia Constitutionprovidesthatthe

22 provisionsoftheCalforniaConstitutionaremandatory.Failuretoprovidethe

23 rightsandbenefitsrequiredunderthestatm oryschem e,and violation ofPlaintiffs'

24 rightsunderArticle1,j7,constituteafailuretodischargemandatoryduties.

25

8l. Asadirectandproxim atecauseoftheaforem entioned actsof

26 Defendants,PlaintiffsandPlaintiffClasssufferedlossesin thatthey incurred

27 increasedrentalpaym entsfrom theirownpocketsthatD efendantswerenotlegally

28

21

CLASS A CTION COM PLA FNT

Case 2:07-cv-00380-PA-FFM Document 1 Filed 01/16/07 Page 22 of 58 Page ID #:3686

1 entitledtoimpose.PlaintiffsandthePlaintiffClassseekinjunctiveanddeclaratory
2 relief,an accounting,restitution and/ordam ages.Saidrestitution ordam agesare

3 incidentaltotheinjunctivereliefsoughtherein.

4

C O U N T FIV E

5

VIOLATION OF CAL.ClV.CODE j52.1

6

(ByPlaintiffand PlaintiffClassAaainstAllDefendants)

7

82. Plaintiffsrestate,reallegeandincop oratebyreferenceal1previous

8 and subsequently stated paragraphs,asiffully setforth herein.

9

83. CalforniaCivilCodej52.1prohibitstheinterference,orattempted

10 interference,through threats,intinzidation,orcoercion,ofan individual'sexercise

l1 orenjoymentofrightssecuredbytheConstitutionorlawsoftheUnitedStates,or

12 ofrightssectlredby theConstitution orlaw softheStateofCalifornia

13

84. Defendants'deprivation ofPlaintiffs'andthe Class'rightsguaranteed

14 undertheFourteenthA m endm entoftheUnitedStates Constitution,24 C.F.R.

15 j982.505(c)(3)-(4),42U .S.C.j1437f,CivilCodej815.6,andArticle1,jj7and26

16 oftheCalforniaConstitutionisactionableunderCalforniaCivilCodej52.1.

17

85. Thewrongfulconductcomplainedofherein w astheproductofa

18 policyandpracticeoftheDefendants,wasnottheproductofaccidentor

19 inadvertence,and w asnotrandom . ln so acting,D efendantsw ere deliberately

20 indifferentto therightsofPlaintiffsand the Class,and acted in w illfuland reckless

21 disregard oftherightsofPlaintiffsand theClass.

22

86. D efendantschangedtheVoucherPaym entStandard applicableto

23 PlaintiffsandthePlaintiffClassinyiolation oftheaforem entionedfederaland

24 state law sand constitm ionalprovisions,and required Plaintiffsand thePlaintiff

25 Classtopayan increased out-of-pocketshareofrents,orlosetheirhousing.ln so

26 acting,D efendantsinterferedbythreat,intirnidation,orcoercîon with theexercise

27 orenjoym entofPlaintiffs'andPlaintiffClass'rightssecuredbytheConstitm ion

28

22

CLASSACTION COM PLAINT

Case 2:07-cv-00380-PA-FFM Document 1 Filed 01/16/07 Page 23 of 58 Page ID #:3687

1 orlaw softheU nited Statesand/orthe State ofCalifom ia.

2

87. lfaperson orpersons,whetherornotacting undercoloroflaw,

3 interferesby threats,orattemptstointerferebythreats,intim idation,orcoercion, 4 oroftherightssecuredbytheConstitm ion orlawsofthisstate,oroftheUnited

5 States,theinjuredpartyhasaclaim underCivilCodej52.1

6

88. A sadirectand proxim ate cause ofthe aforem entioned actsof

7 defendants,PiaintiffsandPlaintiffClasssuffered lossesin thattheyincurred 8 increasedrentalpaym entsfrom theirownpockets.Thesew ereincreasedpaym ents 9 thatD efendantswerenotlegally entitledto impose.PlaintiffsandthePlaintiff

10 Classseekinjunctiveanddeclaratoryrelief,anaccounting,restitm ionand/or

11 damages,includingdamagesunderCalforniaCivilCodej52.Saidrestitutionor

12 damagesareincidentaltotheinjtmctivereliefsoughtherein.

13

C O U N T SlX

14

N EG LIGENCE

15

(Bv Plaintiffand PlaintiffClassAcainstAllDefendants)

16

89. Plaintiffsreallegeandincorporatebyreferencea11previousand

17 subsequently statedparagraphs,asifsetforth fullyherein.

18

90. UnderCalforniaGovernmentCodej815.2,theDefendantsareliable

19 forthenegligentactsofeach and every one ofitsem ployeesacting w ithin the

20 scope ofhisorherem ploym ent,w hetherornotnam ed in thiscom plaint.This

21 liability includesliability forthose acting pursuanttopolicy orhigherlevel 22 instruction even though the individualsw ho so acted arenotnam ed in the 23 com plaint.

24

91. Defendants,ata11m aterialtim esherein,had aduty toPlaintiffsand a11

25 classm embersassetforth in thestatm es,regulations,enactm entsandcom m on law

26 ofCaliforniaandtheUnited States,assetforth herein.

27

92. CalforniaEvidenceCodej669establishesdtnegligencepcrse''where

28

23

CLA SS ACTION COM PLAINT

Case 2:07-cv-00380-PA-FFM Document 1 Filed 01/16/07 Page 24 of 58 Page ID #:3688

1 thereisaviolation ofa statm e,ordinance,orregulation ofapublic entity;the

2 violationproximatelycausedinjurytoaperson;theinjuryresultedfrom an
3 occurrenceofanaturewhich thestatutewasdesigned toprevent;andtheperson

4 sufferingtheinjurywasoneoftheclassofpersonsforwhoseprotectionthestatute

5 wasadopted.UnderEvidenceCodej669,defendantswerenegligentpcrse.

6

93. ln com m itting theactsand om issionsdescribedm orefullyherein,

7 Defendantslm ew,orreasonably shouldhavelm own,thattheirconductwould

8 resultininjurytoPlaintiffs,andtothosesimilarlysituated.

9

94. A sadirectandproxim atecauseoftheaforem entioned actsof

10 D efendants,Plaintiffsand PlaintiffClasssufferedlossesin thatthey incurred

11 increasedrentalpaym entsfrom theirownpocketsthatD efendantswerenotlegally

12 entitledtoimpose.PlaintiffsandthePlaintiffClassseekinjunctiveanddeclaratory
13 relief,an accounting,restitm ion and/ordam ages.Saidrestitm ion ordam agesare

14 incidentaltotheinjunctivereliefsoughtherein.

15

C O U N T SEV E N

16 TA X PA Y ER S'A N D CL A SS M EM BER S'SU IT FO R D E C LA M T O RY

17

A ND IN JUN C TIV E R ELIEF UN DE R C A L.C O D E O F C IV IL

PROCEDURE j526a
1 8

1 9

(Bv Plaintiffand PlaintiffClassAcainstA llD efendants)

20

95. Plaintiffsreallegeand incorporateby reference a11previousand

21 subsequently stated paragraphs,asifsetforth fully herein.

22

96. Plaintiffshave been assessed for,and are liable to pay taxesin and to

23 theCity ofLosA ngeles. Plaintiffsand the Classhave suffered and,unlessthis

24 CourtrestrainsD efendants,willcontinueto sufferirreparableharm .

25

97. Plaintiffsareinform ed andbelieve,andon thatbasisallege,thatthe

26 conductofDefendants,and each ofthem ,hasbeen and,unlessrestrained,will

27 continuetobedeleterioustotheconstitutionaland statutoryrightsofPlaintiffsand

28

24

CLA SS A CTION COM PLA IN T

Case 2:07-cv-00380-PA-FFM Document 1 Filed 01/16/07 Page 25 of 58 Page ID #:3689

1 the generalpublic. Plaintiffsthereby seek to enforceim portantrightsaffecting the

2 publicinterestwithinthemeaningofCalforniaCodeofcivilProcedurej1021.5.

3

98. Plaintiffshavenoadequaterem edy atlaw .

4

99. UnlesstheDefendants,andeachofthem ,areenjoinedfrom

5 continuingtheircourseofconduct,Plaintiffsw illsufferongoing andirreparable

6 injurytotheirrights.PlaintiffsseekinjunctivereliefpursuanttoCalforniaCode

7 ofcivilProcedurej526andthesubstantivestandardsretlectedintheclaimsstated

8 above,forwhichinjunctiveanddeclaratoryreliefareappropriateremedies.

9

100. D efendantshave expended public m onies,and threaten and w ill

10 continueto spend suchm oniestoim plem entand engagein theillegalconduct

l1 describedherein.

12

l01. PursuanttoCalforniaCodeofcivilProcedurejj526and526(a),and

13 tothe statutesand com m on 1aw enum erated above,the Plaintiffsand Plaintiff

14 Class,bothastaxpayersandasinjuredpartiesentitledtorelief,seekdeclaratory l5 andinjunctiverelief,restitm ionandanaccountingtopreventcontinuedharm and
l6 toprotectthem selvesandthepublicfrom thedefendants'unlaw fulpoliciesand

17 practices.Saidrestitutionisincidentaltotheinjunctivereliefsoughtherein.

18

PR AY ER FO R R ELIEF

19

102. W herefore,Plaintiffsand the Classseek the follow ing relief:

20

a. D am agesagainsteach D efendant,as to each causeofaction in

2 l

w hich thatdefendantisnam ed;

22

b. Restim tion,includinginterest,on ftm dsim properly collected',

23

c. A declaration thatthepoliciesandpracticesoftheCITY and

24

HA CLA com plained ofhereinviolatefederaland state

25

C onstitutions;

26

d. A preliluinaryandpermanentinjunctionrestrainingDefendants

27

in thefuturefrom engagingin theunlaw fulconductstated

28

25

CLA SS A CTIO N COM PLA m T

Case 2:07-cv-00380-PA-FFM Document 1 Filed 01/16/07 Page 26 of 58 Page ID #:3690

1

herein and from failing to provide restitution;

2

e. Attom eys'feesunderCalfornia CodeofcivilProcedure

3

jl021.5,42U.S.C.j1988,CivilCodej52.1(h)andwhatever

4

otherstam teor1aw m ay beapplicable;and

5

f. Suchotherreliefasisjustandproper.

6

DEM AND FO R JURY TR IAL

7

8

Plaintiffs,onbehalfofthem selvesindividually and on behalfoftheclass,

9 demandajurytrial.

10

,

11 DA TED :January 12,2007 Respectfully subrnitted,

12

LITT,ESTU A R ,H A RR ISO N & K ITSON ,LLP

13

PU YLIC CO UN SEL

14

A SIA N PA CIFIC A M ER IC AN LEG A L

CEN TER

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17

PaulJ.Est'uar

D anielG nm feld

1 8

H erpan D .Vera

JotllsRafti

19

JulleA .Su

A ttorneysforPlaintiffs

20

2 l

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

26

CLASSACTION COM PLAINT

Case 2:07-cv-00380-PA-FFM Document 1 Filed 01/16/07 Page 27 of 58 Page ID #:3691
EX H IB IT A

Case 2:07-cv-00380-PA-FFM Document 1 Filed 01/16/07 Page 28 of 58 Page ID #:3692
L itt,E stuar,H arrison, lller& lfitson,LLP
BARRETTS.LlTT*PAUL1.ESTUAR* GENIEHARRISON *BRYAND.M ILLER @ROBERTM.IQTSON
oFcouNsn : LEONAIID WEtNGLASS HADSBLL&STORM22
Jtm e30,2006
O fficeofthe City Clerk
R200NorthSpjngStreet
oom 395,CltyHall LosAllgeles,Califonnia90012
Re; Claim ant,M ICHAEL NOZZIvs.CityofL0sAngeles
TO W HOM IT M AY CONCERN :
Thisletterconstitutesaclaim fordnmagespursuanttoCalifonniaGovenlmeniCode5910et J'cç.)forinjtldessustainedbyclaimmltandtheciassofclaimantsadsingoutofviolationsofstatutory,
comm onlaw,andconstitutionalrights.
1. SUM M ARY 0F CLAIM :
M ichaelNozzi,G dtheciassofsirniiarlysimatedpersons(hereinaftertfclaimants'' collectively),bringsthisclaim fordepl-ivationofconstitutional,statutory,andcornrnon1aw rightsby tileCityofLosAngelesC$City'')andvaziousunlmownpersonsemployedbytlzeCitybyvirtueofacts,
policiesandpracticesoftheCity.Irlthetwoyearsprecedingthefilingofthisclaim ,Claim antsallege thefollow ing:
'
a) hn2004,theCityandtheHousingAuthori'tyoftheCityofLosAngeles('CHACLX ')
decidedtoreducethem axim um m onthlysubsidyprovidedtoafmnily,effectivelyincreasingtherent
pol-tiontobepaidbySection8recipientsfDrtheirhousing.Under24C.F.R.j982.505(c)(ii),however,
eachaffectedfnmilywasrequiredtohavebeenadvised,atthefirstnnnualreexarnination followingthe changein policy,thatthebenefitreduction w ouidnottakeplaceuntilaftertherecipient'ssecond
almualreexamination(f.c.,thefollowingyeazaflerthenotice)..TheCitytltterlyfailedtocomplywith
tlaisnotification prerequisite.
b) Ratherthanprovidingrecipientswithclearnotificationthattheirrentobligationwould beincreasedthefollowingyear,HACEA mailedaone-pageflyerinApril2004containingthecryptic
andtechllicalstatem enttlnattheH ousingAutholityçtloweredthepaym entstandrdsusedtodeterm ine .
yourpol4ionoftherent.''Tllisflyerhadnoindiciaofanofficialnotics:itwasnotpdntedonCity or HACLA letterhead;itdidnotspecifythelega)basisfortheaction;itdidnotgiveaphonenumberfor inquiries;itdidnotrequireany aclm owledgem entorsignaturebytherecipient;and itdidnotspecify anyprocedku'eforappealingtheadministrativedecision.M oreimpolantly,theflyerdidnotadvise recipientstlnattheirrentobligationwouldacm allybegoingup,byhow much,orwhen.Simplyput, theflyerdoesnotconnportwitlnm inim alstandardsofdueprocess.uîee,e.g.,Goldbergv.Kelly,?97
U.S.254(1970).
I055W ILSHIREBOULEVARD,SUITE l880 LOSANGELES,CALIFORNIA 90Ol7 PHONE:(2I3)386-31I4 FAX:(2l3)380-4585

Case 2:07-cv-00380-PA-FFM Document 1 Filed 01/16/07 Page 29 of 58 Page ID #:3693
N ozziTortClaina June3O,2006 Page 2

Becauseofthefailureto com plyw ith thenotificationl'equirem entfortherentincreaseseither alreadyorto beim plem ented from July 'O5 to Jtm e '06,al1rentincreasesim posed on Section 8 recipientstodateasaresultofthisadm inistrativeaction arelegallyinvalid,and willbefhroughthe contintlingim pactlastinguntilJune:07.

Onbehalfofthem selvesandaclassofaffectedSection 8recipientsthattheywillseekto represent)otn'clientsask thattheCity;

a) innmediatelyceaseanddesistfrom enforcingadecreasedpapnentstandardfora11

Section 8recipientswhoseeffectiverentincreaseshavetaken,orwilltake,effectdttring

theJuly '05to June '06 periàd;

.

b) providerestitutionofa11increasedSection8paynwntsmadebyrecipientsintkepast twelvem onthsasaresultoftheCity'sim properaction,andgoingintoihefuture;

c) agreeinwritingtoincreasetheVPS(paymentstaladard)totheearlier@re-20O4)levels effectiveimmediately(i.e.,notphasedintkoughreexaminationsoccuningthroughJuly '07);arld
PayClaimants'attom ey'sfeesincun-edtodats. .

1I. ADDRESSTO W HICJINOTICESSHOULD BE SENT:
A11correspondencerelatedtothism attershouldbeaddressedtoPaulJ.E stuar,Litt Estuar
Harrison,Miller&Iutson,LLP,1055WilshireBoulevard,Suite1880,LosAngeles,Califomia90b17.
Thetelephonen'lmberofLEHMK is(213)386-3114.
111. HO W DAM AGES OR INJURTES OCCURRED:
W ithinthelasttwoyears,Claimantanda12otherssimilarlysituatedweresubjectedtoa
decreasedpaymentstandardwithoutreceivinganytypeofwrittennoticewlAich w ouldcomportwith 24
C.F.R,j982.505(c)(ii)ordueprocessstandards.AsaresultClaimantarldal1otherssimilarlysituated
receivedillegalrentincreases,withlittleornochoicebuttopaytheincreaseorEnd alternatehousing. Thisispm icularlydifficultforthoseSection 8recipientswhoarethem ostvulnerable,e.g.,elderlyor disabled,
1V. W HEN DAM A GES OR INJURTES OC CURRED:
Theincidentgivingrisetotlzisciaim occuln'edwithinthelast'twoyears,andcontlued thtrsafterfora11Claim antssim ilarlysituated.Specifically,onApril18,2006,M r,Nozzireceiveda noticethateffectiveJune1,2006,llisV'PS woulddecreasetherebyresultingin an increasedrentof $111perm onth,
ACT OR OM M ISSION CAUSING INJUM ES:
Thisclaim arisesfrozntheactionsoftheCity andtheemployees,representativesandagents
thereof.TheCityisliabietoclaimantsb0thbecauseofitsownconduct(andtheconductofits empioyees/agents),andbecauseofitsconductinparticipating,approving,ratifying,consulting:and/or controllingtheconductofHACLA.Altennatively,theCityisliabletoclaimm tsasajointpaltcipant
58813 Client:1459

Case 2:07-cv-00380-PA-FFM Document 1 Filed 01/16/07 Page 30 of 58 Page ID #:3694 N ozziTortClaim June 30,2006 Page 3
oractorwithHA CLA,thoughitshottldbem adeciearthatthisclaim isonly againsttheCityandnot againstH A CLA .
Theunconstitutionalandtmlawfulconductgivesrisetolegalclaim swhichinclude,butarenot lim itedto,violationsofstateand federallaw,stateandfederalconstitutionaland civilzightsviolations, incltldingbutnotlim itedtofederalcausesofactionincltlding butnotlim ited tovioiationofDtle
Process;CalifonniaGov'tCode5815,6;CaliforniaCivil5552,52.1,'invidiousdiscl-imination;noninvidiousdisclim ination;inténtionaltorts;non-intentionaltortsjnegiigence;intentionalinllictionof
emotionaldistress?'negligentilo ictionofem otionaldistress;m lsrepresentation;vicariousiiability; non-vicariousliabllity;conspiracy,andotherlegaltheorfeswhichm ayapply, VI. N AM RSO F PERSONS CAUSING INJURIES;
Atthistim t,Claim antdoesnotlcrloF theidentityofthespecificindividualswhoare
responsiblefortheadoptionarldformulationofthepoliciesandpracticesobjectedtoherein.
W 1. DAM AGES OR INJURTES: Asadirectandproxim ateresultofthewrongftllactsallegedabove,M r,Nozzihassufferedaud
cone uestosufferfrom injuriesanddamages,thefullextentarenotcompletelylmownatthistime.
Claimantallegesthathisdnm agesexceed$25,000,andthattllisisnotalinnited civilcase. Should you haveany questionsasto any oftheforegoing,pleasedo nothesitateto contactm e. V erytrulyyours,
#aulJ,Bstuar
68813 Client;l459

Case 2:07-cv-00380-PA-FFM Document 1 Filed 01/16/07 Page 31 of 58 Page ID #:3695
EX H IB IT B

Case 2:07-cv-00380-PA-FFM Document 1 Filed 01/16/07 Page 32 of 58 Page ID #:3696
B4k0SA4?
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O FFICE D F TH E C ITY A TTO RN EY Rocn nb J.DELGADILLO
C ITY AU ORNEY
July 17,2006

PaulJ.Estuaz,Esquire Litt Estuar,Hnnison,M iller& Kitson,LLP 1055W ilshireBlvd.,Suite1880 LosAngeleq,CA 90017

RE:0. Clnl'rnNo. Y oarClient

C07-00k9
M ichaelNozzi

DearM z.Estuar:

The claim which you submitted to the City ofLosM geles on J'tm e30,2006 isbeing acceptedirlpart.Theclnim withthelossdatecom mencing9om Jtme30,2005hasbeen accepted
astimelyanda11otherlossdates,priortothisdatearerejectedw1t11noactionbehgtnkenonit.

Governm entCodeSection911.2sttesthatàlossmustbefledwilhsn oneyearoftheaccrnnl ofthecauseofaction.Todeterminewhetheryouhaveanyfuz-therrem edy orifflleberprocedr es areopentoyou,youm aywishtoconsultwithanattorneyofyourchoice.Ifyouwishtospeakwith anattozney,you shoulddosoimm ediately.

n isletterrepresentsafozmalnoticetpyouthatsaidclnirnhasbeendenied.In view ofthis
action, wearere'quizydby1éW togiVélybti-thèèfollowingwnrning:

kkkW

G ***

' .

''Suhjectto'certain.excéptions,youhaveonlysix(6)m onths
from thedafethishèticeW aspèrsonally delf#eked ordeppsited .
in:hem ailtofileacèurtaction allegingstatèç/psésbfactitm.

Thetim ewithinwhichfedetalééusesofaction.mustbeRledis

'

governedbyfeder/ statutes-'''

'

''You m ay seektheadviceofahattorney ofyourchoicein

connedionwiththismatter.Ifyou desiretocohsultan attorney,

#oushoùlddosoihlediatélyt'''

! . . .. . ... ,

.. ..'

' ' . .. .:

AN EQLJAL EMPLOYM ENT O PPO RTUNITY - AFFIRM ATIVE ACTION EM PLO YER
2OONORTHMAINSTREET.LOsANGELES,CA90012-4131*213.9V8.81OO.21:6.978.831OTDD C)

Case 2:07-cv-00380-PA-FFM Document 1 Filed 01/16/07 Page 33 of 58 Page ID #:3697
PaulJ.Eàttzar,Esquire Litt Esttzaz,Hnnison,M iller& lcitson,LLP July 17,2006 Page 2 :
V erytruly yours,
W. *.
THOM ASW ON G ChiefInvestigator
TW CM
Telephone;(213)978-7071
' .
P.S.TheHousingAuthority oftheCityofLosM gelesisaseparatepublicentityandnotpartof
theCityofLosAngeles.(Seeenclosm eforaddress.)

Case 2:07-cv-00380-PA-FFM Document 1 Filed 01/16/07 Page 34 of 58 Page ID #:3698

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Case 2:07-cv-00380-PA-FFM Document 1 Filed 01/16/07 Page 35 of 58 Page ID #:3699
EX H IB IT C

Case 2:07-cv-00380-PA-FFM Document 1 Filed 01/16/07 Page 36 of 58 Page ID #:3700
L itt,E stuar,H arrison,lYr'lller& K itson,LL P
BARRETTS.LIrr*PAULJ.ESTUAR *GENIEHARRISON *BRYAN 9.M ILLER *ROBERTM ,IQTSON
ohv* &#.VJz..'LKONAILDWEINGLM S HADSELL&STORMEII
Jtm e30,2006
OfficeoftheCity Clerk
R200 North Spjng Street
oom 395,CltyHall LosAngeles,Califol-nia 90012
Re: Ciaim ant,ND 1/.PELAEZ vs.CityofLosArlgeles
TO N IOM IT M AY CON CERN :
Thisietterconstitutesaclaim fordnrnagespursuanttoCalifoY aGovernmentCode5910et seq.,fcrinjm-iessustainedbyclaimp tandtheclassofclaimantsarisingoutofviolationsofstatutory,
common law,andconstitutionalrights.
1. SUM M ARY O F CLATM :
NidiaPelaez,andtheclassofsimilarlysituatedpersons(hereinafterç<clairnants''collectively),
bringsthisclaim fordeprivation ofconsétational,statutory,andcomm on1aw zightsbytheCityofLos
Angeles(tçCity'')andvariousllnlmownpersonsemployedbytheCitybyvirtueofacts,policiesand
practicesoftlw City.Claim antsallegethat,inthetwoyearsprecedingtheflingoftllisclaim ,the follow ing:
a) lrl2004,theCityandtheHousingAuthorityoftieCityofLosAngeles('N ACLA'')
decide#toreducethem axim tu'n m onthly subsidyprovidedtoafam ily,effectively increasingtherent
portiontobepaidbySection8recipientsfortheizhousing.Under24C.F.R.j982.505(c)(ii),
however,each affectedfam ilywasrequiredtohavebeen advised,atthefirstalanualreexnm ination following the changein policy,thatthebenefitreduction w ould nottakeplaceuntilaftertherecipient's
secondarmualreexamination(f.c.,'thefollowingyearaflerthenotice).TheCityuttetlyfailedto
com plyw ith thisnotification prerequisite.
b) Rathertllanprovidingrecipientswithcleaznotificationthattheirrentobiigationwould
beincreasedthefollowingyear,HA CLA m ailedaone-pageflyerinApril2004 containingthecryptic andtechnicalstatementthattheHousingAuthorityS%loweredthepaym entstandardsusedtodetermine yourportionoftherent.''Thisflyerhadnoindiciaofan officialnotice:itwasnotprintedon Cityor HACLA letterhead;itdidnotspecifythelegalbasisfortheaction;itdidnotgiveaphonenumberfor inguiiies;itdidnotrequireanyaclcnowledgementorsignatkuebytherecipient;and itdidnotspecify anyprocedureforappealingtheadmiaistrativedecision,M oreim portantly,thefiyerdidnotadviss recipientsthattheirrentobligationw ouldactuallybegoingup,byhow m uch orwhen.Simplyput,the fiyerdoesnotcom pol'tw ithm irlim a)standardsofdueprocess.uîee,e.g.,Golclberg 'p.Kelly,397U .S.
254 (1970),
1055WILSI'IIR.EBOULEVARD,SUITEl880 LOSANGELES,CALIFORNIA 900l7 PHONE;(2I3)386-3lI4 FAX:(2l3)380-4585

Case 2:07-cv-00380-PA-FFM Document 1 Filed 01/16/07 Page 37 of 58 Page ID #:3701
Pelaez TortClaim June 3O,2006 Page 2
Becauseofthefailuretocomplywith thenotificationrequirem entfortherentincreaseseither alreadyQrtobeimpiem entedfrom July '05toJnne'06,a11rentincreasesim posedon Section 8 recipientstodateasaresultofthisadministrativeactionazelegallyinvzid,a'tad willbethroughthe continuing im pactlasting untilJune :07.
Onbehalfofthem selvesandaclassofaffectedSection 8recipientsthkttheyw illseekto ropresent,ourclientsask thattheCity:
a) inamediatelyceaseanddesistfrom enforcingadecreasedpaym entstandardfora1l
Sectiop 8recipientswhoseeffectiverentincreaseshavetaken,orwilltake,effectduring theJtTly '05to Jtm e 'O6 pe'riod;
providerestitutionofa11increasedSection8paym entsm adeby recipientsinthepast twelvem onthsasaresultoftheCity'simproperaction)andgoingintotheR ture;
c) ap-eeinwritingtoincreasethe'VPS(paymentstandard)totheearlier(pro-2O04)levels effectiveimmediately(i.e.,notphasedinthroughreexsnainationsoccurringthroughJtlly '07);and
d) payClaim ants'atton4ey'sfeesincttrredtodate.
I1. ADDRESS TO M QH CH N OTICES SH OU LD BE SENT:
HnnisonA,1M1clyllrerres&polundtesnoncecLreLlaPt,ed10t5o5thWisimlshalpreerBsohuoluelvdarbde,aSdudirtees1se8d80to,LPoasuAlJn.gBeslteusa,rCaLaliitfto,rEmqtau9a0iL17.'
ThetelephonentlmberofLEHM K is(213)386-3114.
111. H OW DAM A GES OR INJURIES OCCURRED :
W ithinthelasttwoyears,claimantanda11otherssimilarlysituatedwerestlbjectedtoa
decreasedpaym entstandardwithoutreceiving anytm eofwrittennoticewhich w ouidcomportwith24
C.F.R.j982.505(c)(ii)ordueprocessstaudards.Asaresultclaimantanda1lotherssimilitrlysittlated
received illegalrentincreases,with littieorno choicebutto pay theincrease orfind alternatehousing, ThisisparticularlydiffcultforthoseSection 8recipientswhoarethem ostvulnerable,e.g.,elderly, disabled,single-parentfam ilies.
IV. W HEN DAM AGES OR INJURTES OCCTFRRED :
Theincidentgivingrisetothisclaim occuln-edwithinthelasttwoyears,and continued thereafterfora11claim antssimilarlysituated.Specifically,onDecem ber28,2005,M s.Pelaezreceived anoticetlaateffectiveFebnlary 1,2006,herVPSw oulddeczeasetherebyresultinginan increasedrent of$161perm onth.
ACT OR OM M ISSION CAUSING INJURTES:
Tilisciaim arisesfrozzltheactionsoftheCity andtheemployess,representativesand agents
thereof.TheCityisliabletoclaim antsbothbecaussofitsownconduct(andtheconductofits employees/agsnts),andbeoaustofitsconductinpm icipating,approving,ratifying,consulting:and/or controllingtheconductofHACLA.Altennatively,theCityisliabletoclaimantsasajointpaz-tlcipant
Doc68.814Clitnt:1459

Case 2:07-cv-00380-PA-FFM Document 1 Filed 01/16/07 Page 38 of 58 Page ID #:3702 PelaezTortC laim June3O,2006 Page 3
oractorwithHACLA ,thoughitshouldbsmadeclearthatthisclaim isonly againsttheCity andnot againstH A CLA .
Theunconstitutionalandunlawfulconductgivesrisetolegalclaim swhichinclude,butarenot iim itedto,violationsofstate andfederallaw,stateandfederalconstitutioni nndcivilrightsviolations, includingbutnotlhnitedtofederalcatlsesofactionincludingbutnotiimitedto violation ofDue
Process;CaiifonliaGov'tCode5815.6,.CaliforniaCivilûj52,52.1,.invidiousdiscrimination;non-
invidiotlsdiscrim ination;iùtentionaltorts;non-intentionaltortsr.negligence;intentionalinfliction of em otionaldistress',negligentinflictionofem otionaldistress;m lsrepresentation;vicariousliability; non-vicariousliabllity;conspiracy,andotherlegaltheorieswhich m ayapply. V1. NAM ES OF PER SONS CAUSING INJUW ES:
Attllistime,Ciaim antdoesnotlœ ow theidentityofthespecificindividtlalswhoare
responsiblefortheadoptionandformulationofthepoliciesandpracticesobjectedtoherein.
V1L DAM AGES OR INTUIUES: A sadirectandproxim ateresultofthewrongfulactsallegedabove,M s.Peiaezhassuffbred
arldcontinuestosufferfrom injuriesanddnmages,theftzllextentarenotcompletelyl<nownatthis
tim e.Claim antallegesthatherdlm agesexceed$25,000,arldthattllisisnota.lim itedcivilcase.
Shouldyouhaveany questionsastoanyoftheforegoing,pleasedonothesitateto contactm e. , Very tulyyours,
PaulJ.Estuar
Doc688!4Clicllt:I459

Case 2:07-cv-00380-PA-FFM Document 1 Filed 01/16/07 Page 39 of 58 Page ID #:3703
EX H IB IT
D

Case 2:07-cv-00380-PA-FFM

Document 1 Filed 01/16/07

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Page 40 of 58

Page ID #:3704

O FFIC E O F TH E C ITY A TTD RN EY
R OCKARD J.D ELGADILLO C ITY AU ORNEY

July 17,2006

PaulJ.Estuar,Esquire Litt Estuaz,Hanison,M iller& Kitson,LLP 1055W ilshreBlvd.,Suite1880 LosAngeles,CA 90017

RF,:OtlrClaim N o. Y ouzClient

C07-0050 '
. .NidiaPelaez

DearM r.Estuar:

The claim which you subm itted totheCity ofLosAngeleson June 3O,2006 isbeing acceptedinpmt Theclnim w1t.11thelossdatecom m encing9om Jtme30,2005hasbeen accepted
astinaelyanda11otherlossdates,priortothisdatearerejectedwithnoactionbeingtakenonit.
Governm entCodeSection911.2statesthatalossmustbefledwithinoneyearofthea'ccm al ofthecauseofaction.Todeterminewhetheryou hakeany fhrtherremedy oriffurtherprocedures areopentoyou,youm aywishtoconsultw1:1anattom eyofyourchoice.Ifyou wishtospeakwith anattorney,you should dosoim m ediately.

'Ihisletterrepresentsaform alnoticetoyouthatsaidclninnhasbeen denied.Inview ofthis action,wearerequiredby1aw togiveyouthefollowingwnrning:

W**W

G WWW

''Subjecttocertainexceptions,#ouhaveonlysix(6)m onthl
ifromthedatetiispoticewaspersonjlydeliveredordeposited
nthem ailtoflleacourtactioh allegm gstatecausesofaction.'
Thetim :sWthinwhiçh féderalcausesofaction m ustbefiled.is goV.erned.by féderalstatutes.'r

''Y ou m ay seek theadviceofah attorney ofyour choicein connectionw ith thism atter.Ifyou desiretoconsultan attorney, you should do soim m ediately.''

AN EQUAL EM PLOYM ENT OPPORTUN ITY - AFFIRMATIVE ACTIO N EM PLOYER

2OO NO RTH MAIN STREET .LOS ANGLLES,CA 900 12-4131 *2 :3.978.8 100 *2 13.978.53 1O TDD

.=*'zn.u.mw.sK .

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Case 2:07-cv-00380-PA-FFM Document 1 Filed 01/16/07 Page 41 of 58 Page ID #:3705
PaulJ.Bsm ar,Bsquire Litt,Estuar,Hanison,V ller& Kiyson,LLP July 17,2006 Page2
Very% lyyours,
THOA4AS ON G ' CM efkavesûgator TW CM
Telephone:(213)978-7071
P.S.TheHousingAuthority oftheCity ofLosAngelesisaseparatepublicentityandnotpartof
theCityofLosM geles.(Seeenclosuteforaddress.)

Case 2:07-cv-00380-PA-FFM Document 1 Filed 01/16/07 Page 42 of 58 Page ID #:3706

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Case 2:07-cv-00380-PA-FFM Document 1 Filed 01/16/07 Page 43 of 58 Page ID #:3707
EX H IB IT E

Case 2:07-cv-00380-PA-FFM Document 1 Filed 01/16/07 Page 44 of 58 Page ID #:3708

STAO STILL A G R EEG N T

rnajsAgreennentisenteredintobstweenthtHoaoingAuthority fort:e
CityofLoBAngeles(:$HA,CLA''),whoseiôgalcounaeqistheCityAttorney's Of5.ceoft'iw City ofbosAngeles,and Section 3recipients(includin.g but notJ.i= :ktad to M ichaelNotiz.iandNidiaPelaez),an'dtheclassofsimilarly
affecttdSection8Tenant:theypuporttcrepresent(thedee itionofwhioh ipelaboratediu theletteraentto.EACLX on M ay 24,2006)9whoaelegal
cpunsel i.: the firnns ôf Public Counsel, Asiam Pacific American Legal
Cpnter, and Litt Estuar et a1. (hereafter collectively teferzed to as 'Tlaintiffs''),ThepmposecfthisAgreemtnticttmaintaintllestatusqucin
a11respects,jncludingin tliz nmring ofamy statateofiinqitaions,in ordarto allow tho'padiestonegotiatcingoodfaitl to detennineifthi:m atterm ay be
resolved,withoutthenecessity ofacti'yr litigation.Accordingly,the parties
agrce:

A dkpute 'har arigen over tht reduction in palcfntnt standazds and the acconpacyingriseiu therentalsharepaidby Section î rscjpients for their houm'ng, The Plaintiffs positiom îs m ore fully presentôd im tht lotter sent to HACLA by Plaintiffs' Counselom M ay 24,2906,wh.ich isaftached as'Bxhibit1 and wlnosecontentsazeincorporatedbythisrefertnce.

2. The parties are negodating i!l good faith to determ int if the disputtcan beresolvedwithoutactivelitigation.

$ .
3. Plaintiffswzllreftain from filing any lawyuitseeldng z'elitffor

them attersadiiressedittExbibit1.

'

4. D efendO ts agree thatthe gtatute of'limîtations,og amy other

rdcvao.t lim itationy perjod,for

t'tae

fling ,

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zûy

law suit oz

administrativeorotl'lsrciaim,inczudingacy j9)Ocqaim ,ofany

sortregarding tht maters adckrssed io sxhibit1 (hereafter

''LAW SUTT OR CLAI.M '')istolledvffective.lunt1,2,006.This

appliesnoto't4l.y to theiniividualPiaintiffsbutto the class of

sim ilarly affectod Section 8 Tenants, a: fuzther definod jn

Exlzibit1,tbr,ypup orttorepresent.

This Agrtem e'nts1>1.1ttnuinats 30 daysafttznotic: by either partythatitwichestoterminatst'heAgrsem ent,

Case 2:07-cv-00380-PA-FFM Document 1 Filed 01/16/07 Page 45 of 58 Page ID #:3709

6. .2n themrontPlaictiffsfle any LAW SUJT aâerfhe termili tîon cfthisA greem et ,fheLA W SUIT OR CLAIM 'willbedzem ed ffled on June 1,2006,no m >tterwàatdateitisactuily filed. Buti.ftb.e LAW SUIT OR CLM M k filed m ore Qzan 30 days
aftertlie'lYrrnination Dato,a:dsfmedirlqr.5,above,then the
statute ofâim itations wi11begin:to run again begilm ing om the 31ctda.y.

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Case 2:07-cv-00380-PA-FFM Document 1 Filed 01/16/07 Page 46 of 58 Page ID #:3710
EX H IB IT F

Case 2:07-cv-00380-PA-FFM Document 1 Filed 01/16/07 Page 47 of 58 Page ID #:3711

L ittsE stuar,H arrison,17.,xa'ller & K itson,LLP

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BARAETTS.LITT @PAULJ.ESTUAR @OaNIEHARRISON *BRYANB.M ILL7R*M BERTM.KITSON

*FCOUNSELt LEONARDWEINGLASS HADSELL&STOZMER

N ovem ber15,2006

M r,RudolfM ontiel
H ousinqAuthorityoftheCityofLosAngeles 2600W llsllireBlyd.,3rdFloor
Los Angeles,Callfonxia90057
Re: Claimant,W CHAELNOZZIvs,HousingAuthorityofte CityofLosM getes
TO W H OM ITM AY CONCBRN :
n isleterconstitatesaclaim fordnm agesptlrsuardtoCalifonaiaGovernmentCode9910et SBq.,forinjuliessustm:inedàycllimantatldtheclassofclaimantsarisingoutofviolationsofstattory,
com m on law,arldconstitutionalrights.
Bywrittens'tandstillagreement,cotmselfofclaimantsandZACLA ap-eedthatclnimants'
claim s,includingthetim ebywllich anytortoradnnilzistrativeclaim sm ustbeO ed,aretolledasof June1,2006.Anysubsequentlyfledclaim sshallbedeem ediiledonthatdate.Theapzem entreads,in
relevantpart,''(tlhestatuteoflimitations,oraùyotherrelevrtlimnitationsperiod,fortlleflingofany
lawsuitoradministrativeorotherclnim,includinganyj910cim'rn,Qfatajsortregardingthematters
addressedin(tilistortc1%im)...istolledeffectiveJune1,2006,Thisappllesnotonlytotb.eindividual
Plaintifs,buttotheclassofsimilarlyaffectedSection 8Tenants.''
TheApeem entalsoreads,asitrelatestothedeem edfled dateofany clm'm orlawsuit,flrlthe eventPlaintiffsfleanyLAW SUIT aftertheterm inationofthisAv eem ent,theLAW SUIT OR CLAW w illbedeem edfledonJtm e1,2006,nom atterwhatdateitisactuallyfiled.ButiftheLAW SUIT OR
CLAN isfiledm oret11= 30daysaftertheTerminationDate,asdefmedinX5,above,thenthestamte
oflim itationswillbegintornnagainbegizm ingon the31Stday.''
A copyoftheAgreem entisattachedheretoasExhibit1.TheoriginalsignedbyHACLA BxecutiveD irectorRudyM ontielandHA CLA oounselCraigTakenakaispto ourlcnow ledgepinthe possession ofM r.Takenaka,whoismlattom eyintheLosAngelesCityAttom ey'sOffce.
1. SUIHM M W OF CLATM :
M ichaelNozzi,andtheclassofsimilarlysituatedpersons(hereinafterltclrll'mants'' collectively),bringsthisclaim fordeprivaéonofconstitutional,stamtory,arldcom rnonlaw rightsby theHousingAuthorityoftheCityofLosAmgeles(%SHACLA'')andvariousnnlcnownpersonsemployed
byT-IACLA byvirtueofacts,policiesandpracticesofHA CLA .J.nthetwoyearsprecedl gthefiling of thisclaim ,Claim antsallegethefollowing:
1055W II.SHIlkEBOULEVARD,SUITE 188O LOSANOELES,CALIFORNIA 90017 PHONB:(213)386-3114 FAX:(213)380-4585

Case 2:07-cv-00380-PA-FFM Document 1 Filed 01/16/07 Page 48 of 58 Page ID #:3712 NozziTortClaim reHACLA N ovem ber15,2006 Page2
a) I'n2004,theCityofLosAngolesandHACLA decidedtoreduoethemaxinmm monthly
subsidyprovidedtoafnm ily,effectivolyirzcreasingtherentportion tobepaidby Section 8zecipients
fortheirhousing.Under24C.F.R.j982.505(c)(ii),however,eachaffectedfa=ilywasrequiredto
havebeen advised,atthefirstnnoualreexnminationfollowicgtl'lechangeinpolicy,ofthechangein policyandthattllebeneftreduction wouldnottakeplaceuntilaflertherecipient'ssecondannualre-
exnmination(f.c.,thefoliowingyearafterthenotice).HACT,Autterlyfailedtocomplywiththis
notification prerequisit..
b) Ratherthanprovidingrecipientswithclearnotificationthattlleirrentobligationwould
beincreasedthefollowingyear,H ACLA m aGedaone-pageGyerinApril2004 contm'oingthecryptic andteclm icalstatem entthattheHousingAuthority'Gloweredthepam entstaadardsused todetermine youzportionoftherent.''Thisflyerhadnoindiciaofatlofscialnotice:itwasnotprinted on Citypr H ACLA letterhead;itdidnotspecifythelegalbasisfortheaction;itdidnotgiveaphonen'lrnberfor inqlliries;itdidnotreqplireahyacH owledgem entorsignaturebytllerecipient;anditdidnotspecify anyprocedureforappealingtheadm inistrativedecision,M oreimportantly,thefyerdidnotadvise recipientsthati eirrentobligationwould actuilybegoingup,byhow m uch,prwhen.Simplyput, theflyerdidnotcomportw ithm inim alstandnrdsofdueprocess.See,e.g.,Goldberg v.K elly,397U.S.
254 (1970),
Bccauseofthefailureto complywiththenotificationrequirem entfortherentincreaseseither alreadyortobeimplm entedfrom Jttly '05toJune306,allreptincreasesimposedon Section8 recipientstodateasaresultofthisadmh istrativeaction,arelegallyinvalid,andwillbetbzoughthe continuingimpactlaqtingu tilJun.e,07.
Onbehalfofthem selvesandaclass9faffectedSection 8recipientsthattheywillseekto rm zesent,ourclientsask thatHA CLA :
a) irnrbediatelyceaseanddesist9om enforcingadeoreasedpaymentstandardforall
Section 8recipientswhoseeffectikerentincreaseshavetaken,orwilltake,effectdnn'ng tlw July'O5toJtme'06period;
b) providerestitutionofa11increasedSection 8paym entsm adebyrecipientsinthepast
twelvem onthsasaresultofHACLA'Sim properaction,andgoingintothefttture;
c) agreeinwdtingtoincreasethe'VPS(paymentstandard)totheearlier@re-2004)levels effectiveimmediately(i.e.,notphasedinthroughre-exnminationsoccurzingthrough July707),.arld
d) payClaimants'attomeys'feesincun'edtodate.
6881:5M.2 Ciient:1459

Case 2:07-cv-00380-PA-FFM Document 1 Filed 01/16/07 Page 49 of 58 Page ID #:3713 NozziTortClaim reHACLA N ovember15,2006 Page3
I1. ADDRESSTO W H ICH NOTICES SH O ULD BE SENT:
A11correspondeùcerelatedtothism attershouldbeaddressedtoPaulJ.Estuar,Litt,Bstur,
Hnvison,M iller& Kitson,LLP(''LBWMTC''),1055W ilshireBoulevard,Suite1880,LosAngeles, Califonlia90017,Thetelephonen'lmberofLEHM K is(213)386-3114.
111. H OW DAM AGES OR IND W ES OCCURRED :
W ithinthelasttwoyears,Claimantarlda1lotherssimiladysituatedweresubjectedtoa
decreasedpaym entstandardwithoutreccivinganytm eofm ittennoticewllich w ould'comportwith24
C.F.R.j982.5O5(c)(ii)ordueprocessstandards.Asaresult,Claimautanda11otherssimilarlysftaated
received illegalrentincreases,withli/leornochoicebuttopaytheincrease orfm dalternatehousing. D isisparticularlydifdcultforthoseSection 8recipientswhoaretilem ostvttlnerable;e.g.,theelderly ord sabled.
1V. F HEN DAMAGESORINJURIESOCCUG D:
Theincidentgiviugrisetothisolm'm occurredwithinthelasttwoyears,andcontinued thereaherfora11Clninnantssim ilarlysituated.Speciscally,onApril18,2006.M r.Nozzireceiveda noticethateffectiveJtm e1,2006,hisVPSw ould decreasethezebyresulting i'n anincreasedrentof $111perm onth.
V . A CT OR OM M TSSION CAU SING IN R FRTES:
Tlaisclaim arises9om theactionsofHACLA andtheemployees,representativesandagents thereof.HA CLA isliabletoClaim antsbecaussofitsownionductpandtheconductofits
employees/agents.Altematively,HACLA ishabletoCiaimantsasajointparticipantoractorw1t1)the
City.
Theïmconstitationalandtmlaw fulconductgivesrisetolegalclaim swhichinclude,butm-enot lim itedto,violationsofstateaudfederallaw,stateandfederalconstitutionalnnd civilrightsviolations including,butnotlimitedto,federalcausesofactionincluding,butnotlimitedto,violation ofDue
Process;CalifbrniaGov'tCodej815.6',CaliforniaCiviljj52,52.1.,invidiousdiscrimination;non-
ùw idiousdisorim ination;intentionz torts;non-intentiona)torts;nogligence;kltentionalinflictionof em otionaldistress;negligentinfiidion ofem otionaldistress;m isrepresentation;vicariousJiabiiity; non-vicariousliability;conspizacy,andotherlegaltheorieswhic.hm ayapply.
AttachedasExhibit2isaletterfrom BarrettS.Litt writtgnonbehalfoftheClaimantnmmed herein,anda11similarly situatedfndividuals,totheattom eysforHACLA,Crzg TakenalcaandN eil Blumenthal,whichdescribesinp'eaterdetailthesalientfactsandprim arylegaltheoriesadvancedby Claim ants.Itscontentsazeincop ozatedbythisreference.
68813v,2 Clicnt:1459

Case 2:07-cv-00380-PA-FFM Document 1 Filed 01/16/07 Page 50 of 58 Page ID #:3714
N ozziTortClaim reHA CLA Novem ber15,2006 Page4

VI. NAM ES 01 PERSONS CAU SING INJURIES:

Attbistime,Claim antdoesnot% ow theidentityofthem ecifich dividualswhoare
responsiblefortheadoptionandformulationofthepoliciesandpracticesobjectedtohereic.Howevez,
thosel dividualsinsoactingwereactinginthecourseandscopeoftheirem ploym entw ith,and agency onbehalfofHACLA,andHA CLA endorsed,approved,authodzed,superdsedand/orrate ed thosepoliciesandpractices.

5+ . D AM AGES OR INJUU S:

A sadlectaudproxim atertsultoftllewrongfulactsallegedabove,M r.N ozzi,arzdtheclassof

simiiadysituatedSection8recipientswhoserental.sharewasiucreasedduetotlleactionsöbjectedto int'hisletter,hassufferedandcohtinuestosufferâom injuriesanddnmages,thyf'IZIIextentofwhich
arenotcompletelylm ownattitistim e,Claim antallegesthathisdam agesexceed $25,000,arzdthattkis

jsnotalim itedcivilcase.

'

Shoaldyouhaveany questionsasto anyoftheforegoing,pleasedonothesitatetocontactm e.

Ve

tlr

PaalJ.Estuar

68813v.2 Ciielkt:1459

Case 2:07-cv-00380-PA-FFM Document 1 Filed 01/16/07 Page 51 of 58 Page ID #:3715
EX H IB IT G

Case 2:07-cv-00380-PA-FFM Document 1 Filed 01/16/07 Page 52 of 58 Page ID #:3716
L itt,E stuar,H arrison,'swiller & K itson,LLP
DAU NTT*.LIrr@ PAULZ.E:TL;AR #OENJBHARRJSON @BRYANB.M LLBR *ROBERTM.JQTSON
OFc/&lrzz. LEONARDWElhlGlM s HADSELL&S'rORMER
D ecem ber8 2006
Avxxoko
* .RudolfM ontiel H ousingAuthonty oftheCityofLosM geles 2600W ilshireBlvd.,3rdFloor LosM gelessCalifom ia90057
Rc: Claimant,ND 1A.PELAEZ vs.H ousingAuthozityoftheCityofLosAmgeles
TO W HOM ITM AY CON CEM :
n isletterconstitutesaclaim fordnmagespursuanttoCaliforztiaGovem m entCode5910et seq.,forinjuziessuste edbyclaim antandtheclassofclaimantsarisingoutofviolationsofstatutory,
com gnon law ,acd constitutionalrights.
Bywrittonstarldstillar eem ent,counselforclaimantsandHACLA agreedthatclnim ants' iiaims,includingthethuebyw/ ch any tortoradm iaistraévedaim smustbeEled,aretolledasof J= e1,2006,,'andanysubsequentlyfledclaiH .shallbedeemedfledontllatdate.Theap eem ent
reads,inrelevantpmt ''ltlhestatuteoflimitations,orahyoierrelevantlimitationsperiodafozthe ftlingofanylawsttitoradministrativeoroierclm'm,includingany5910claim,ofanysortregarding themattersaddzessedinlthistortclm'ml...istolledesectiveJ= e1,2006.Thisappliesnotonlytotb.e
individualPlaintiffsbuttotheclassofsinlilar,ly affectedSection 8Tenants.'''
Tjw Aprem entalsoreads,asitrelatestothedeem edfileddateofan.y claim orlaw suit,1% the eventPlaintiffs5learlyLAW SU T afterthetermination oftitisAp eem ent,theLA W SUIT OR CLAIM willbedeemedfiledon Jtme1,2006,nom atterwhatdateitisactuallysled.ButiftheLAW SUIT OR
CLAN isftledmorcthan30daysaftertheTerminationDate,asdeG edin!J5,above,thenthestatate
oflim itationswillb6gintonlm againbeginningonthe31Stday.''
A copyofttleAp eem entisattachedheretoasExbibit1.TheoriginalsigrzedbyHA CLA ExecutiveDirectorRudyM ontielandHACLA ooum elCrigTakenakais,to oarlm owlsdge,inthe possession of* .Takenaka,whoisan attorneyi!l'tlleLosM gelesCityAttom ey'sOfsce.
SUM M ARY OF CLM M :
NidiaPelaez,andtheclassofsimilarlysituatedpersons(hereinahertIclaim ants''collectiveiy),
bringsthisclaim fordeprivation ofoonstitutional,statatory,andcom nnon1aw rightsbytheH ousing
AuthorityofthtCityofLosAngelesICCHA CLA''IandvariouslmkmownpersonsemployedbyHA CLA
byvirtueofacts,polidesandpracticesofHA CLA.Jn tiletlvoyearsprecedingtb.eftlingofthisciaim , Claim antsallegethefollowing:
1055WILSHIIG BOULEVARD,SUITE l88O LOSANGELBS)CALIFORNIA 90017 PHONE.:(213)386-3114 FAX:(2l3)380-4585

Case 2:07-cv-00380-PA-FFM Document 1 Filed 01/16/07 Page 53 of 58 Page ID #:3717
Pelaez TortClaim D ecem ber8,2006 Page2
a) In2004,theCityofLosAngelesandHACLA dzcidedtoreducethem aximxlnnmontllly
subsidyprovidedtoafsm ily,effeotivelyincreasingthezentportiontobepaidby Section 8reoipients
forthez'rhousing.Under24C.F.R.j982.505(c)(ii),however,eachaffectedfnm ilywasrequizedto
havebeenadvised,atthesrstazmualreexnm inationfollowingthechangein policy,ofthechangein policyandthattllebenefitreduction wouldnottakeplaceuntilaftertherecipient'ssecond Rmnual
reexaminatiorz(2'.c.,tllefollowingyearaftertlw notice).HACLA utterlyfailedtocompiyw1t11this
nctification prerequisite
b) Ratherthanprovidingrecipientswithclearnotifcationthattheirrentobligationwouid
beincreasedtilefollowingyear,HA CLA m ailedaone-pageiyerinApdl2004 contail ngthecryptic andtecbnicalstatem entthattheHousirzgAuthozityçfloweredthepam cntstarzdardsusedtodetenmine youzportionoftherent.''Thisflyerhadnoindiciaofa:zoffcialnotice:itwasnotpzintedon Cityof
HACLA letterheaé;itdidnotspecifythelegalbasisfortheaction;itdidnotgiveaphonen:lmberfor
intuiries;itdidnotrequizeanyaclm owledgementorsignaturebytherecipient;anditdidnotspecify
anyprocedureforappeaiingtheadrninistativedecision.M oreimportantly,theflyerdidnotadvise recipientsthattheirrentobligationwouldactuallybegoingup,byhow much orwhmz.Simplyput,the flyerdidnotcom portwithm inim alstandardsofdueprocess.See,4.:.,Goldberg v.Kelly,397U .S.
254 (1970).
Becauseofthefailureto complywiththenotz cationrequirem entfortllerentincreaseseither alreadyortobeim plem entedâom July '05toJune'06,allrentincreasesim posedonSection 8 recipientstodateasaresttltofthisadministativeaction arelegallyinvalid,andw illbethroughthe
continuingimpactlasiingutdlJtme'07.
Onbehalfofl em selvesandachssofaffectedSection 8recipientsthattheywillseek lo zepresent,ottrclientsask thatHA CLA :
a) immediatolyoeaseanddesistfrom enforcingadecreasedpaym entstandardfora11
Section 8recipientswhoseeffectiverentincrtaseshavetalcen,orw illtake,effectduzing theJuly '05toJtm e'06period;
b) pzoviderestitutionofa11increasodSection8paymentsmadebyrecipientsintltepast twelvem onthsasaresultofHA CLA 'Simproperaction,andgoingintotim future;
ameeinwritingtoincreasetheVPS(paymentstandazd)totheeadier@re-2OO4)levels effectiveimm ectiately(i.e.,notphasedintbroug,hreexsminationsoccurringtilrougbJuly '07);arzd
d) payClaimants'attom efsfeesiucun'edtodate.
1I. ADDRESS TO W HTCH N OTICES SH OULD BE SENT:
A1icorrespondencerelatedtothism attershouldbeaddressedtoPaulJ.Estuar,Litt,Estuar ,
Halcison,M ilier& Kitson,LLP ($YE1'1M K.''),1055W ilshreBoulevard,Suite1880,LocAngeles, Califcmia90017.ThetelsphonenumberofLEFIMK is(213)386-3114.
Doc6:814Cyiçnt:!459

Case 2:07-cv-00380-PA-FFM Document 1 Filed 01/16/07 Page 54 of 58 Page ID #:3718 PelaezTortClaim D ecem ber8,2006 Page3
TII. 11O W DAM AGES OR IND RIES OCCUDNED ;
w itbimtilelasttwoyears,clnim antanda11olerssimiladysituatedweresubjectedtoa
decreasedpaym entstandm'dw ithoutreceivinganytypeofwrittennoticùwhich wouldcom portwith24
C.F.R.j982.505(c)(ii)ordueprocessstandards.Asaresultclaimarltanda11otlxrssimiladysitaated
receivedillegalrentincreases,wii littleornocitoicebuttopaytheincreaseor6nd alternatehousing. ThisispadicuirlydifficultforthoseSection8recipientswhoarethem ostvulnerable,e.g.,elderly, disabled,single-parentfsm ilies.
IV. W H EN DAM AGES OR IN JUW ES OCCTFRQED :
Theincidentgivingrisetotllisclaim occurredwitbinthelast'twoyeazs,arld continued thereo erfora11clzim antssim ilarlysituated.Specifcally,onDecember28,2005,M s.Pelaezreceived ancticeiateffectiveFebruary 1,2006,herVPSwoulddtcreasethtrebyresulth gin anincreasedrent of$161p>rmonth.
V. ACT OR OM M SSION CA VSING INJURIES;
Tllisclnim arisesfrom theactiom ofHACLA andtheemployees,representativesacdagents tkereof HA CLA isliableto chim antsbecauseofitsown conductandtheconductofits
employees/agents.Alternatively,HACLA isliabletocbilmantsasajointparticipantoractorwiththe
City.
''Theunconstituùonala't'ldtmhwfulconductgivesrisetolegalolaimswhichincludè,butarenot
limited1 ,violationsofstateandfederallaw,stateandfederalconstitutionalan.dcivilrightsviolations, includingbutnotliraited.to federalcausesofactionincludingbutnotlirnitedto violation ofDue
Process;CalifonliaGov'tCodej815.6,.CaliforniaCiviljj52,52.1,.ùwidiousdiscrirntation;non-
invidiousdiscrim ination;intentionaltorts;non-intentionaltorts;negligence;irltentionalinfliction of em otionaldistess;negligentinfliction ofem otional(listess;nlisrepresentation;vicariousliability; non-vicariousliability;conp iracy,andotherlegaltheorieswhichm ayapply.
AttachedasBxiibit2isalettorfrom BarrettS.Littwrittenonbehalfoftheclaimantnamed
hsrein,anda11sim ilm-ly situatedindividuals,totheattom eysfozHACLA,Craig TakenakaandNeil Blum enthal,which descdbesin p eaterdetailtllesalientfactsandpzim arylegaltheodesadvancedby Claimallts.1tsconttntsareincop oratedbythisreference.
Vl. NAM ES OF PERSON S CAU SING INJURIES:
Attlnistim e,Claim antdoesnot% ow theidentityofthespeciscindividuaâswhoare
responsiblefortheadoptionandformulationofthepoliciesandpractioesobjectedtoherein.However,
thoseindividualsinsoactingwerôactinginthecouzseandscopeoftheiremploym entwitk,and agencyonbebalfofHACLA,andHACLA endorsed,approved,authol-ized,superd sedand/orratified thosepoliciesandpractices.
Doc68814Client:1459

Case 2:07-cv-00380-PA-FFM Document 1 Filed 01/16/07 Page 55 of 58 Page ID #:3719 Peiaez To14 Claim D ecem ber8,2006 Page'4 W I. D AM AGES OR INJTJRIES:
Asadirectandproximateresultofthewrongfulactsallegedabove,M s.Pelaez,andtheclassof
simiiarlysittlatedSection 8recipientswhoserentalsharewasincreasedduetotheactionsobjectedto inthisletter,hassufferedandcontinuestosuffer9om injuriesanddnmages,ttlefullextentofwhich
arenotcom pletely known atthistim e.Claim antallegesthatherdnm agesexceed$25,000,andthat thisisnotalim ited cjvilcase.
Shouldyou haveanyquestionsastoanyoftheforegoing,pleasedonothesitatetocontactm e. o Verytruly#ours, PaulJ.E st'uar
Doc(48,?.14Client:1459

Case 2:07-cv-00380-PA-FFM Document 1 Filed 01/16/07 Page 56 of 58 Page ID #:3720
EX H IB IT H

Case 2:07-cv-00380-PA-FFM Document 1 Filed 01/16/07 Page 57 of 58 Page ID #:3721

Housing Division 9th Floor-CHE

*1vo5,w AA' .+ .. +
()r <.t;;.i)k)
lk: '!Vp',3
%Vomp dG
O FFICE O F TH E C ITY A TTD R N EY
ROCKARD J .D ELGADILLO CITY ATTORNEY

213.978-7958 213-978-7957

Decem ber29,2006

BarrettLitt,Esq. Litt,Estuar,Harrison,M iller& Kitson,LLP 1055W iîshireBoulevard,Sutte 1880 LosAngeles,Califoknia 90017

Re: Claim Dated Novem bgrï5,2006

DearM r.Lltt:

The Novem ber15,2006 claim againstthe Housing Authorftyforthe CityofLos

Angeies whichyoufilèd hasbeenreferred to this Office.

. . .

'
û ..c.'.

.
.'@

.
.. . '

Afterreviewingoe circumstancesofthis.ciaim.aniilaeakpliqasleIaw,wehave

: . . .' . '

com eto the conclusion thatthis claim should be denied.

This ietterrepresentsa formalnotice to yputhatyourclaim has been denled. In view ofthisaction,we are required byIaw to give you the followirigw arning.

W ARNING

''Subjecttocedainexceptions,youhaveonlysîx(6)months
from the date thisnotice waspersonallydelivered ordeposited in.the m qiltofile a'state coud action on thisclaim .
See Governm entCode Section 945.6.

''You m ay seekthe advice ofan adorney ofyourçhoice in

connectionw iththis m atter.lfyou desiretoconsultan attorney,

youshould do so im m ediately.''

'

Sincerely,

25780

CRAIG- . NAF%
MaG gingAssistantCityAttorney

k.--.* .=. Axa.';&zvïr

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Case 2:07-cv-00380-PA-FFM
Housing Divlsion 9th Floor-CHE

Document 1 Filed 01/16/07

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Page 58 of 58

Page ID #:3722
213-978-7952 213-978-7957

O FFIC E O F TH E C ITY A TTO RN EY
R OCKARD J.D ELGAD ILLO C ITY ATTORNEY

Decem ber29,2006

PaulEstuar,Esq! Litt',E'stuar,Harri>on,,Miller& Kitson,LLP 1055 W ilshire Boulevàrd,Suite 1880 LosA ngeles,California 90017

Re: Am ended Claim Dated Decem ber8,2006

DearMr.Estuar:

The Decem ber8,2006 am ended claim againstthe Housing A uthorityforthe City

ofLosAngeieswhich youfiled hasbeen referred to this Oiice.

:
ev

.
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.,J

.. ' . . ,

,

.

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.. .

.

Afterreviewingthecircumstancesoftlisgçlaj!ppndthp appliçable Iaw ,we have

.

com e to the conclusionthatthisdaim should be denied.

..

z.L '

This Ietterrepresentsa form alnotice tpyourthàtyourclaim has been denied. In

view ofthis action,we are required by Iaw togive youthe following w arning.

W ARNING

''Subjecttocertainexceptions,youhaveonlysix(6)months
fyom the date this notide was personally delivered ordeposited
in the m ailto file a state courtaction on this claim .
See G overnmentCode Sectlon 945.6.

''You m ay seekthe advice ofan attorney ofyourchoice in

connectionwiththism atter.Ifyoudesire to consultanattorney,

you should do so im mediately.''

'

Sincerely,,.

.

>

H

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wz '
'

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CRAIG'M .'ILAK NAKA

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MaW gingAssistantCityAttorney

25781

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 </s> '
Case 2:07-cv-00380-PA-FFM Document 49 Filed 05/23/07 Page 1 of 42 Page ID #:3799

1 BA RRETT S.LITT,SBN 45527 PAU L J.ESTUA R,SBN 167764

2 E-M ail:pestuar@ littlaw.com
LITT,ESTU AR,H ARRISON & K ITSON ,
3 LLP
1055w ilshireBoulevaM ,Suite 1880
4 LosAngeles California* 017
Telephone:(è13)386-3114
5 Facsimile:(213)380-4585

caqxttzkjtmcrop M ï22W

6 DANIELGRUNFELD SBN 128494 , HERNAN D .V ERA,SBN 175149
LOU IS R AFTI,SBN 243813

C2;illRAt91 1ûFCAtljjjj
STEW A RT KW O H ,SBN 61805

8 E-M ai1:hvera@publiccounsel.org PUBLIC COUN SEL
9 610 South Ardm oreAvenue LosAngelesycalifornia 90005

JULIEA.SU,SBN 174279 E-M ai1:jsu@ apalc.org
A SIAN PA CIFIC AM ERICAN LEGAL CEN TER OF SOU THERN CA LIFO RN IA

10 Telephone:(213)385-2977
Facsimile:(213)385-9089

1145W ilshireBoulevard 2ndFloor
LosAngelesycalifornia40017

1 1

Telephone:(213)977-7500

12 DAtorneysfprPlaintiffs

Facsimile:(213)977-7595

.
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Attom eysforPlaintiffs

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UNITED STATESDISTRICT COURT

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CENTM L DISTRICT OF CALIFORM A

ù' H L NOZZI,anindividual; 17 NIDIA FELAEZ,anindividual',LOS 1g ANGELESCOALITION TO END

CaseNo.:CV07-00380-GW (FFM x) rH
on.GeorgeH.W uj

H UN GER A N D H O M ELESSN ESS,a

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non-profitorganization ,

on

behalfof

them selvesand sim ilarly situated

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persons,

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FIR ST A M EN D ED CL A SS A C TIO N C O M PLA IN T
D EM A N D FO R JU R Y TR IA L

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'

'.:' !

!t
)
.

H O U SIN G A U TH O R ITY OF T E, .. .

s ,j

.24

CITY OF LOS AN GELES ;R U

OiF l'.'t).'!..;-,..-,..k''.k-sk 'lj
.

tt

25 M ON TIEL

!

DOES1thr,oinhisofficialcapacij',atp.rd'. ..t.'...'.k,)çy:.;

26

ugh 100,inclusive, j,;t7; ... .r.wzz=.=-.=-

.;--

27

D efendants.

28

1

FIRST AM ENDED CLA SS ACTION COM PLAINT

Case 2:07-cv-00380-PA-FFM Document 49 Filed 05/23/07 Page 2 of 42 Page ID #:3800

1 1. IN TR O D U CT IO N

2

1. Foroverthirty years,the federalttsection 8 Program ''hasprovided

3 housing benefitsacrossthe country to ahighly vulnerablepopulation com prised of

4 im poverished,elderly,and often disabled residents,m any ofw hom w ould sw ell

5 theranksofthehom elessbutforthiscliticalgovem m entassistance.H ousing 6 benefitsareprovidedintheform ofattvoucher''orhousing subsidywhich

7 supplem entsthe am ountpaid by the recipientforrentand utilities.

8

2. ln oraroundJulyof2005,theHousingAuthority oftheCityofLos

9 Angeles(ECHACLA''),whichadministerstheSection 8Program locally,began
10 im plem enting alarge-scalerollbackofhousingbenefitsprovidedto Section 8

1l recipientsinitsjurisdiction.Thereductionwassignificant,averaging$121per

12 m onth,orover10% ofatypicalrecipient'shousehold incom e.

13

3. Before doing so,how ever,H A CLA w asrequired by applicable

14 federalregulations,independently enforceableasw ellthrough statelaw ,to provide

15 adequatenoticeatleastoneyearpriortothecutin thelevelofservices.This

16 specitic and m andatory one-yearnoticerequirem entw ascreated so thatrecipients

17 facingabenefitdecreasewouldhavesufticienttim eto eitherlook foralternative

18 housing,orm ake otherarrangem entsto accom m odate thissignificantchangein

19 assistance.

20

4. HACLA didnotm akeany m eaningfulattem pttocom plywith this

21 noticerequirem ent. Ratherthan separately providing a form aladm inistrative

22 notice inform ing Section 8 recipientsthatthey w ould be responsible fora specitic

23 increase in rent,H A CLA inserted into alarge stack ofm aterialssentto each

24 recipientanondescriptand technically w orded flyerthatfailed to convey any 25 usefulinform ationrelating tothechangeinbenefits. Thistlyerhad absolutelyno

26 indiciaofpropernotice:itw asnotprintedon letterhead;itdidnotspecifythe

27 legalbasisfortheaction;itdidnotprovideaphonenum berforinquiries;itdidnot

28

z

FIR ST A M EN DED CLA SS A CTION COM PLAINT

Case 2:07-cv-00380-PA-FFM Document 49 Filed 05/23/07 Page 3 of 42 Page ID #:3801

l specify anyprocedureforappeal;itdidnotrequireasignatureacknowledging

2 receipt;and,m ostim portantly,itdid notinform recipientsthattheirrentpaym ents

3 wouldbegoingup.

4

5. H A CLA 'Sabsolute failure to com ply w ith the Section 8notice

5 requirem entsrendersthesubsequentim plem entation ofthesubsidy reduction 6 unlawful.Itconstitutesauniform dueprocessviolationofa1laffectedrecipients' 7 property interestin thisfederalprogram . A saresult,over23,000 Section 8

8 recipientslivinginLosAngeles(includingnearly5,000elderlyfamiliesand4,500

9 disabledfamilies)literallyandfigurativelyhadtherugpulledoutfrom underthem .
10 They have been and w illcontinue to be unlaw fully deprived offederalhousing

l1 benefitsestim ated atover$25rnillion.

12

6. Theactionsofa1ldefendantshaveresulted in thedenialofPlaintiffs'

13 andtheclassm embers'constitutional,statutory,and comm on 1aw rights.

14 Furthermore,theactsofDefendantsdem onstratean affirm ativepolicy,and/or 15 custom ,and/orpracticeofcondoningtheconductsetoutherein.

16

7. Thisactionseeksclass-widerelieftoenjoinDefendants'continuing

17 violations,and toproviderestitm ion to the classofaffected Section 8 recipients

18 who suffered an unlaw fulincreasein theirrent.ltisideally suited forRule23

19 classtreatm entbecauseDefendants'failuretoprovideconstim tionally adequate 20 noticeisadirectresultofapolicy andpracticethatwasapplieduniform ly toa11 21 affected classm em bers. 22 II. JU R ISD IC TIO N A N D V E N U E

23

8. ThisisacivilactionoverwhichthisCourthasoriginaljurisdiction

24 under28U.S.C.j1331inthatitseeksredressunder42U.S.C.j1983(Edsection

25 1983'1)forthedeprivation,tmdercolorofstatelaw,ofrights,privileges,and

26 im m unitiessecuredby federalstatutesand theUnitedStatesConstitm ion.This

27 courthasjurisdictiontohearpendentstateclaimsunderthedoctrineof

28

3

FG ST AM ENDED CLASSACTION COM PLAFNT

Case 2:07-cv-00380-PA-FFM Document 49 Filed 05/23/07 Page 4 of 42 Page ID #:3802

l supplementaljurisdictionsetforthat28U.S.C.j1367.Plaintiffs'action for 2 declaratoryandinjunctivereliefisauthorizedby20U.S.C.jj220l,2202,and
3 1343,andby Fed.R.Civ.P.57and65.Plaintiffs'state1aw claim saresorelated 4 to theirfederal1aw claim sthatthey form partofthe sam e case orcontroversy.

5 Accordingly,supplementaljurisdictionoverthoseclaimsisappropriateunder28

6 U.S.C.j1367.

7

9. VenueinthisCourtisproperunder20U.S.C.j1391(b)because

8 variousDefendantsresideinthisjudicialdistrict.Theeventsoromissionsgiving

9 risetotheclaimsoccurredprimarilyinthisjudicialdistrict.

10 111. PA R TIE S

1 1

l0. PlaintiffM ichaelNozzi($ENOZZ1'')isadisabledm alewhois,and

12 wasata11tim esm aterialherein,aresidentoftheCounty ofLosAngeles,Stateof

13 California.N OZZIhasbeen receiving Section 8benefitssince2003.

14

1l. PlaintiffNidiaPelaez(ETELAEZ'')isafemalewhois,andwasatal1

15 tim esm aterialherein,a residentofthe County ofLosA ngeles,StateofCalifom ia.

16 PELAEZ hasbeenreceiving Section 8benefitssinceFebruary2004.

17

l2. PlaintiffLosAngelesCoalition to End HungerandHom elessness

18 (CELACEHH'')isanon-profitmembershiporganizationwhosemissionistoworkto
19 endhungerand hom elessnessin LosAngelesthrough publiceducation,technical 20 assistance,publicpolicy analysis,advocacy,organizing,and com m unity action. 21 LACEHH w asfoundedin 1985,andhasover500m embers,includingindividuals 22 whoreceiveSection 8assistance.LACEHH isheadquartered in LosAngeles.lt 23 createdtheSaveSection 8Coalition,agroup ofoverl30organizationsthat

24 advocatesforthepreservation andexpansion oftheSection 8HousingChoice 25 V oucherProgram locally,and atthenationallevel.LA CEH H haslong been

26 com m itted topreserving govem m entassistancethathelpspoorandlow -incom e

27 individualskeep aroofovertheirheads,anddecreasesthenum berwho suffer

28

4

FIR ST AM EN D ED CLA SS A CTION COM PLA INT

Case 2:07-cv-00380-PA-FFM Document 49 Filed 05/23/07 Page 5 of 42 Page ID #:3803

l hom elessnessin LosA ngeles.

2

3

l3 .

Plaintiffsare inform ed and believe,and thereupon allege,that

4 DefendanttheHousingAuthorityoftheCityofLosAngeles(E&HACLA'')isan

5

agency

of the

City

ofLosA

ngeles
,

and

is a public

entity

underCalifom

ia

law

.

6C alifornia1aw authorizescitiesto createhousing authoritiesto dealwith the

7 problem ofsafeand sanitarydw elling accom m odationsforpersonsof1ow incom e.

8
9 Hea1th& SafetyCodejj34201(a),34240.State1aw providesthatalocalhousing

authority shallnottransactany businessorexercise itspow ers,unlessa county or 10 11 city governm entdeclarestheneed forsuch a housing authority,and thatany action

12 bytheauthority isconclusively deem edtohavebeen establishedand authorizedby

13 aresolutionofthecountyorcity.Heath& SafetyCodejj34240,34244.Assuch,
14 theCityofLosAngeleshasdelegateditsrulem akingauthority overtheissueof

15 affordablehousingtoHA CLA .

16

14. HACLA isaPublicHousingAuthority establishedunder42U .S.C.

17 j1437f.Assuch,itisrequiredtoestablishandadministerlocalpoliciesthat

18

com

p1yw

ith

federalregulations

and

requirem

ents .

24

C.F.R.jj982.52($

,

19 982
.54(a)-(c).

20

:

,,

15. DefendantRudolfM onteil(<M ONTEIL ),sue(jjjau sojucial

2 1 capacity exceptasotherwisestatedherein,istheExecutiveDirectorofHACLA .It

22
isD efendantM ON TEIL 'Sduty to overseethe operation ofH A CLA ,and to 23

24 executepoliciesandproceduresim plem entingfederallawsregarding theSection 8

25 Program .

26

16. Plaintiffisignorantofthetruenam esandcapacitiesofDefendants

27 suedherein asD OES 1through 100inclusive,andthereforesuestheseDefendants

28

5

FIRST AM ENDED CLASSACTION COM PLAW T

Case 2:07-cv-00380-PA-FFM Document 49 Filed 05/23/07 Page 6 of 42 Page ID #:3804

l by such fictitiousnam es. D O ES 1tlzrough 20 are agenciesorentitiesresponsible

2

fortheunlaw fulpracticesand policesallegedherein .

D OE S 21through

100 are

3 Presentorform eremployeesofHA CLA ortheCITY responsiblefortheunlawful

4 practicesand policiesalleged herein. Plaintiffsw illseek leavetoam endthis
5 complaintto allegetheirtruenam esandcapacitieswhen ascertained.
6 17. Plaintiffsareinform ed andbelieve,and on thatbasisallege,thateach
7 Defendant,including theD oeDefendants,aidedand abetted thewrongfulactsof
8 the others. To the extentany such D efendantdid notpersonally violate the
9
10 constim tionalorstatm ory rightsofthe Plaintiffsand theClass,each condoned,

l1 encouraged,approved,ratified orotherwiseparticipatedin suchactions.

12

18. H A CLA issued both directly and vicariously on thebasisof

13 respondeatsuperiorliability understatelaw ,asitisresponsiblefortheactionsof

14 al1itsagentsandem ployeesperform edin thecourseandscopeoftheir

15 employm entand/oragency.Alloftheactionsallegedhereinby agentsand

16

employeesofHA CLA

w

ere so

perform

ed .

Thus,H

A

C

LA

isliable forthe actions

1V

ofa11theirem

ployeesand

agents
,

nam

ed

or unnam

ed,w

ho

perform

ed

acts

atissue

18 in thislaw suit,a11ofw hom w ere acting in thecourse and scope oftheir

1 9 em ploym entand/oragency.In addition,theactionsalleged herein w ereundertaken

20 by H A CLA pursuantto custom and policy ofthose entitîes,m aking them
2 1 independently liableunderfederallaw .
22

23 lV . FA C TU A L A LLE G A TIO N S

24

A. Background ofSection 8 Program

25

21. TheH ousing and Com m unity Developm entActof1974 authorized

26 and established theSection 8Program tobeadm inisteredby thelocalPublic

27 HousingAuthorities(&(PHA's'').TheSection8Program,fundedbytheU.S.

28

6

FG ST AM ENDED CLASSACTION COM PLAW T

Case 2:07-cv-00380-PA-FFM Document 49 Filed 05/23/07 Page 7 of 42 Page ID #:3805

l DepartmentofHousingandUrbanDevelopment(ç$HUD''),provideshousing

2

assistance ,

a portion

ofrentandutilities,to extrem

ely 1ow

and very low -incom

e

3

fam

ilies
,

seniorcitizens,anddisabledorhandicappedpersons.ltsobjectiveisto

4

provide

affordable
,

decentand

safe housing

for eligible

fam

ilies,whileincreasing

a

5f , am ily sresidentialm obility and choice.

6 22. ln 1975,HACLA im plem entedtheSection 8Program providingrent
7
8 subsidiesintheform ofhousingassistancepayments(HAPs)toprivatelandlords

on behalfofeligiblefam iliesinLosAngeles.HA CLA ,astatecharteredpublic 9 10 housingagency since 1938,now adm inistersthesecond largestSection 8Program

11 in thecountry.

12

23. ln M ay 1999,HUD createdanew Section 8Program calledthe

13 dtl-lousing ChoiceVoucherProgram .''ThelocalPHA adm inisterstheHousing

14 C hoiceV oucherProgram undercontractw ith H U D ,and has,am ong others,the

15 responsibilityofdeterminingtheVoucherPaymentStandard((EVPS'')-the

16

m axim um

m onthly subsidy aH ousing A uthority can provide to a fam ily .

See 24

17 C FR j982.505(4 .TheVPSisthesubsidygenerallyneededtoallow aSection8
18 recipienttorentam oderately-priced dwellingunitin thelocalhousing m arket,and
19 i sused to calculatethe am ountofhousing assistancea fam ily w illreceive.
20 24. H A C LA 'Slatestw ebsiteindicatesthatitadm inistersover36,000
2 1 Section 8 H ousing ChoiceV ouchertenanciesin theC ity ofLosA ngeles.These
22
23 tenanciesare com prised of59% fam iliesw ith children,27% elderly individuals,

24 and 14% non-elderly disabledpersons. Sourcesofincom eforthesefamilies

25 includewages(22%),SupplementalSecurityIncome(d&SS1'')(20% ),CaIW ORKS 26 (1914,SocialSecurityDisabilitylncome(&ûSSD1'')andSocialSecurityRetirement

27 lncome(ttSSA'')(1384),GeneralRelief(4%),and23% coming9om otherand

28

7

FIRST AM ENDED CLASSACTION COM PLAW T

Case 2:07-cv-00380-PA-FFM Document 49 Filed 05/23/07 Page 8 of 42 Page ID #:3806

1 com bined sources.

2

B . Fram ew ork forD ecreasing theV PS

3

25

U nderH U D

regulations ,

H

ousing

A

uthoritiesconductannualre-

4

exam

inations

to

verify

incom

e

and

recertify

fam

ily

com

position
.

24 C .F.R .

5 982

,

.5164a).W iththatinform ation,theHousingAuthoritycalculatesthetenants

6 shareofrent,w hichissubtracted from thegrossrentto determinethepaym entdue

7 from the H ousing A uthority. Them axim um H ousing A uthority paym entisthe
8
V PS foran apartm entofthatsize. 9

l 0

26. PH AShavediscretiontoraiseorlowertheVPS within astatutorily-

11 prescribed range.

12

27. B efore low ering theV PS,how ever,H ousing Authoritiesm ustcom ply

13 w ith a very specitictim elinerelating to notice.A PH A m ustprovidepropernotice

14 to arecipientw hosebenefitsarebeing reduced atthe lirstannualre-exam ination

15 following thechangein services.24C.F.R.982.505(c)(3)(ii).Theactual

16

reduction

in

benefitscannotoccuruntilone

yearafterthisnotice ,

upon

the

17

com

pletion

ofthe

secon

d

re -

exam

ination

afterthe

effective

date

ofthe

decision

to

18 decreasethelevelofservices.1d.

1 9 C . H A C LA 'SFailure to Provide N otice
20 28. OnApril2,2004,HACLA m adeadecision toreducethepre-existing
2 1 V PS. The im pacton Section 8 participantsw assignificant. Forexam ple,theV PS
22
23 foraO-bedroom (<çbachelor'')apartmentplurnm etedfrom $795toonly$674,a

24 reduction of$l21perm onth.

25

29. To im plem entthischange in policy,H A C LA stuck a one-page flyerin

26 them aterialsm ailed to each recipienton thedateoftheirannualre-exam ination.

27 Unlikeotherexplanatorynoticescontainedin thesepackets,theflyerdidnot

28

8

FIRST AM ENDED CLASSACTION COM PLAINT

l

Case 2:07-cv-00380-PA-FFM Document 49 Filed 05/23/07 Page 9 of 42 Page ID #:3807

l require therecipientto acknow ledgereceiptby signing and returning the form .

2

The

flyer w

asnoton

letterhead ,

did

notcontain

a

phone

num

berforinquiries,and

3

did notgive alegalbasisforthedecision .

M

oreim portantly,theflyerdid not

4

advise

recipientsthattheirout -

of-pocketrentpaym

ent w

ould

actually

be

going

up,

5 m uch lessspecify the am ountoftheincrease. Plaintiffsareinform ed and believe,
6 and on thatbasisallege,thatthese flyersw ere sentout,buried am ong otherre-
7 exam ination m aterials,from approxim ately July 2004 through July 2005.
8 30. Thelanguageofthetlyerdidnotm eaningfully conununicateto the
9
10 recipientthattherewould actuallybeareduction intheportion ofhisorherrent

1l thatHACLA w ouldpay,andacorresponding increasein theportion ofhisorher

12 rentthattherecipientw ouldberequiredtopay.

13

31. The V PS decreasew entinto effectw ith re-exam inationsthattook

14 placefrom July 2005 through July2006.According toHA CLA estim ates,

15 approxim ately 45% ofHA CLA 'Sapproxim ately 45,000 Section 8participants

16 w ereadversely affected by theA pril2004 V PS decrease .

17

D Tlle R epresentative Plaintiffs

@

1 8

32
.

M ichaelN OZZIisa53-year-o1dm an who isconsideredtotallyand

1 9 perm anently disabled by SocialSecurity standardsdue to H IV /A ID S. H e livesin a

20 rentalunitw ithin the City ofLosA ngeles.

2 l

33. N O ZZIhasreceived a Section 8 housing benetitsince D ecem ber 1, 22

23 2003.PriortotheVPS decreaseatissue,hisrentobligation w as$231.00per

24 m onth with HACLA payingthedifferencethroughtheVPS.

25

34. EffectiveJune 1,2006,NOZZI'SSection 8rentobligationw as

26 increasedto$342.00perm onth(a48% increase).NOZZIreceivednothingfrom
27 H A CLA inform ing him ofthissignificantincreaseuntilon oraround A prill8,

28

9

FIRST AM ENDED CLASSACTION COM PLAINT

Case 2:07-cv-00380-PA-FFM Document 49 Filed 05/23/07 Page 10 of 42 Page ID #:3808

1 2006,justafew weekspriortotheeffectivedateofincrease,andfarfrom theone

2 yearorm ore required by 24 C .F.R.982.505(c)(3)(ii).Thiswasthefirsttimethat

3 heunderstoodthathisSection 8benefitswouldbedecreased .

4

35. Soon thereafter,N O ZZIappealed the increase through hiscounsel,

5 andrequested ahearing.N ohearingwasprovided.

6 36. N ideaPELAEZ isasingleparentraising ayoungdaughter.Her

7
prim ary sourcesofincom earethe$239shereceivesfrom CaIW ORK S,and the
8
SocialSecurity Survivor'sBenefitsshereceiveson behalfofherdaughter. 9

l0 PELAEZ residesinN orth Hollywood andhasreceived aSection 8housingbenetit

1l through H A CLA sinceFebruary 1,2004.

12

37. EffectiveFebruary 1,2006,PELAEZ'SSection 8rentobligation was

13 increasedto$252.00permonth(a177% increase).PELAEZ receivednothing
14 from H A CLA inform ing herofthissignificantincreaseuntilon oraround

15

D

ecem

ber

28 ,

2005,justfivew

eekspriortotheeffectivedateofincrease,and

far

16 from theone yearorm orerequired by 24 C .F.R.982.505(c)(3)(ii). Thiswasthe

17 firsttim ethatsheunderstoodthatherSection 8benefitswouldbedecreased .

18

38
.

PELAEZ alsorequestedahearing through counsel.A lthough the

19 h earing w asconducted nearly ayearago,no decision hasbeen rendered by

20 HACLA .

2 1

39. The 177% increasein them onthlyrentthatPELAEZ hashadtopay 22

23 since February l,2006,hasreduced the quality oflifeforherand heryoung

24 daughter.PELAEZ hashad difficultyaffording suitableschoolclothesforher

25 daughter.Shehashad toreducetheam ountofm oney thatshespendseach m onth

26 on foodin ordertopay theincreasedrent.

27

40. TheLosM gelesCoalition toEndHungerandH om elessnessisa

28

10

FIRST AM ENDED CLASSACTION COM PLAINT

Case 2:07-cv-00380-PA-FFM Document 49 Filed 05/23/07 Page 11 of 42 Page ID #:3809

l nonprofitcorporation devotedto fightingthecausesandeffectsofhom elessnessin

2 LosA ngeles. LA CEH H advocateson behalfoflow -incom eindividualsto ensure

3

m oreaffordablehousingforLosAngelesresidents .

LA C EH H

includesm em bers

4 h ive Section 8 assistance

w o rece

.

5

41

. From 2005tothepresent,membersofLACEHH havebeensubjected

6 totheunlawful2004V PS decrease.LACEHH hasw orkedon behalfofthese

7
affectedm em bersto rescind thisadministrativedecision,hasdevoted considerable 8

effortsto advocating w ith H A CLA thatthey m aintain Section 8 benefitsatlevels 9

10 priorto the 2004 decrease.,and hasm etregularly w ith H A C LA staffforthis

ll PVP OSC.

12

E. Com plianceW ith Cal.GovernmentCodej910,etseq.

13

42. By written agreem ent,Plaintiffs'counselandHA CLA agreedthat

14 Plaintiffs'administrativeclaim sagainstHA CLA wouldbetolled asofJune 1,

15 2006. 'lnheagreem entisattached asExhibit$$A''.Theagreem entw asentered into 16 so thatthepartiescould engageinprelim inarysettlem entdiscussionsfreefrom the

17

pressure

ofthe

expiration

of any

statutes

of lim

itation
.

W

hen settlem entdiscussion

18 with HA CLA didnotprovefruitful,Plaintiffsthen filedadm inistrativeclaim swith

1 9 H A CLA .N O ZZIGled hisclassclaim on N ovem ber 15,2006,acopy ofw hich is

20 attached asExhibit''B''. PELA EZ tiled herclassclaim on N ovem ber 15,2006,
2 1
and an am ended claim on D ecem ber8,2006,to correctatypographicalen-oron 22

23 theoriginalclaim .(A copyofthesecondPELAEZ claim isattachedasExhibit

24 ç<C''.)Bothclaimswererejectedon December29,2006.Copiesoftherejection

25 lettersareattachedasExhibitt&D'''

26

F. Plaintiffs'Prelitigation Settlem entEfforts

27

43. On M ay24,2006,Plaintiffs'counselsubm ijtedaprelitigation

28

11

FIRST AM ENDED CLASS ACTION COM PLAW T
1

Case 2:07-cv-00380-PA-FFM Document 49 Filed 05/23/07 Page 12 of 42 Page ID #:3810

1 settlem entletterto HA CLA and theCity ofLosAngelesaskingthatthey:

2

(a) immediatelyceaseanddesistfrom enforcingadecreased

3 paym entstandard fora11Section 8recipientswhoseeffectiverentincreaseshave

4

taken ,

or w

illtake,effectduring

the

July

'05

to

June

'06

period;

5

(b) providerestitutionofa11increasedSection8paymentsmadeby

6

recipientsin

the

pasttw

elve m

onthsasaresultofH

A

C

LA

'S im

proper action ,

and

7 going into the future;

8

(c) agreeinwritingtoincreasetheVPS(paymentstandard)tothe

9 earlier(pre-2004)levelseffectiveinzmediately(i.e.,notphasedinthrough

10 reexaminationsoccuningthroughJuly '07);and

1 1

(d) payPlaintiffs'attorney'sfeesincurredtodate.

12

44 .

A sm entioned above,PlaintiffsandHA CLA enteredintoprelitigation

13

settlem

entdiscussions ,

butthosediscussionsprovedunsuccessful.

Plaintiffsthen

14

filed

G

ovt.C

ode

j910

claim

sagainstHACLA .

15 V . CL A SS A C TIO N A L LE G A TIO N S

1 6 45. Plaintiffsbring thisaction ontheirownbehalf,andonbehalfofthe
l 7 classofa1lotherpersonssim ilarly situated,pursuantto Rule23oftheFederal
1 8
RulesofCivilProcedure. 19

20

46. TheClassisdetined asallpersonswhoexperiencedadecreasein

21 theirSection 8 H ousing ChoiceV oucherbenefitsasaresultofthe D efendants'

22 decision to decrease theV PS in A pril2004.

23

47. ThemembersoftheClassaresonumerousthatjoinderofal1

24 m em bersisim practicable.Plaintiffsareinform ed andbelieve,andthereon allege,

25 thattherearem orethan 20,000tenantsw ho areaffectedby Defendants'w rongful

26

conduct .

Although theexactnumberofclassm em bersisnotknown atthistim e,

17 thenum berandidentity ofclassm emberscanbeeasily determinedfrom

28

12

FIRST AM ENDED CLASS ACTION COM PLAINT

I

Case 2:07-cv-00380-PA-FFM Document 49 Filed 05/23/07 Page 13 of 42 Page ID #:3811

I

1 H A CLA 'Selectronicrecords.

2

Thereisa w ell-defined cornm unity ofinterestam ong the m em bersofthe

3 proposed Classin thatthere are com m on questionsoflaw and fact. Thecommon

I

4 questionsinclude,interJ/jt?:

5

a. W hetherH A C LA provided adequatenoticeto Section 8

6 recipientspriortoim plem enting the2004 VPS benefitdecrease;

7

b. W hetherHA CLA 'Spurportednoticecompliedwith statutory

8 andregulatoryrequirements;

I

9

c. W hetherHA CLA 'Spurportednoticecompliedwith

10 constitutionaldueprocessrequirem ents;

l l

d. W hetherHACLA 'Sfailuretoprovideadequatenotice

12 invalidatesthesubsequentVPSbenefitdecrease;

13

e. W hetherH A CLA 'Sactionsconstitm eviolationsunder42

14 U.S.C.j1983ofaprotectedpropertyinterest;

15

f. W hetherH A CLA 'Sactionsconstit-uteviolationsofCalifornia

16 law,includingGovt.Codej815.6.

17

48. Thesequestionsoffactand1aw predom inateoverquestionsthataffect

18 only individualClassm em bers.Proofofacom m on setoffactswillestablish the

19 rightofeach Classm em bertorecover,andthereisan ascertainableclassof

20 custom ersentitled to relief.

21

49. Plaintiffs'claim sare typicalofthose ofthe Class.

22

50. Plaintiffscan andw illfairlyandadequatelyrepresentandprotectthe

23 interestsoftheproposed Class.Plaintiffshavenointerestthatconflictswith,oris

24 antagonisticto,theinterestsoftheproposedClass.Plaintiffshaveem ployed

25 attorneyswhoareexperiencedandcom petentin consum erandcivilrights

26 litigation and classactions,andareabletoadequately and vigorously pursuethis

27 classaction onbehalfofallclassm embers.

28

13

FIRST AM ENDED CLA SS ACTION COM PLAINT

1

Case 2:07-cv-00380-PA-FFM Document 49 Filed 05/23/07 Page 14 of 42 Page ID #:3812
I

1

51. A classaction issuperiorto otheravailablem ethodsforthe fairand

2 efficientadjudicationoftheclaimsassertedhereingiventhat:

3

a. Com m on questionsof1aw and factpredom inateoverany

4 individualquestionsthatmayarise.Therewouldbeenormouseconomiestothe

I

5 courtandthepartiesin litigatingtheconzm on issueson aclass-widebasis.

6 Plaintiffs'proofofliability willbebasedon thefactualand legalnatureof

7 HACLA 'Spup ortednotice,which wasdistributed in thesam eway toa11m em bers

8 ofthe class.

9

b .

Prosecution ofseparate actionsby individualm em bersofthe

I

10 classwouldcreateariskthatinconsistentorvaryingadjudicationswithrespectto

11 individualm em bersoftheclasswould establish incom patiblestandardsofconduct

12 forthepartiesopposing theclass.

l 3

c. Thesizeofeachproposedclassm ember'sindividualclaim sfor

14 dam agesand/orrestitutionistoo sm alltom akeindividuallitigation an

15 economicallyviablealternative.Given theam ounts,andthecomplexityofthe

16 issues,few proposedclassm emberswouldhavetheinterestorability toprosecute

l7 separate actionsindividually.

18

e. D espitetherelatively sm allsizeofindividualclaim s,their

19 aggregatevolum e coupled w ith the econom iesofscaleinherentin litigating sim ilar 20 claim son a com m on basisw illenablethiscaseto be litigated asaclassaction on a

21 cost-effective basis.N o unusualdifficultiesarelikely to be encountered in the 22 m anagem entofthisclassin thatquestionsoflaw orfactto belitigated atthe

23 liabilitystagearecommontotheclass,asareinjunctive,declaratory,and
24 restitm ionary reliefissues.

25

52. Plaintiffsareinform edandbelieve,andthereon allege,that

26 Defendantshaveactedon groundsgenerally applicabletotheclass,thereby

27 makingappropriatefinalinjunctivereliefordeclaratoryreliefwithrespecttothe

28

14

FIRST AM ENDED CLASS ACTION COM PLAINT

Case 2:07-cv-00380-PA-FFM Document 49 Filed 05/23/07 Page 15 of 42 Page ID #:3813

1 classasaw hole.

2

CO UN T ON E

3

D EN IA L O F D U E PR O CE SS O F LA W

4

(42U.S.C.j1983)

5

(Bv Plaintiffand PlaintiffClassAzainstH ACLA)

6

53. Plaintiffsrestate,reallege,andincop oratebyreferenceallprevious

7 andsubsequently statedparagraphsasiffullysetforth herein.

8

54. The dueprocessclause oftheFourteenth A m endm entprohibits

9 governm entofficials,and thoseactingin concertwith them ,actingundercolorof

10 law ,from depriving personsoftheirproperty w ithoutdueprocessoflaw .

1 l

55. D efendantsw ere obligated to providenotice to the Classofthe V PS

12 decreaseatthe lirstannualre-exam ination follow ing the change in services. 24

13 C.F.R.982.505(c)(3)(ii).Theactualreductioninbenetitscannotoccuruntilone
14 yearafterthisnotice,upon thecom pletion ofthesecondre-exam ination afterthe

15 effectivedateofthedecision todecreasethelevelofservices.1d.By theterm sof

16 thisregulation,thePlaintiffClasshad apropertyinterestintheVPS and the

17 processby w hich itcould be changed.

18

56. UnderCalifom ialaw,Govt.Codej815.6,24C.F.R.982.505(c)(3)(ii)

19 constitutesan enactm entdesignedtoprotectthePlaintiffClassfrom thetypeof

20 injurysufferedbyPlaintiffsherein.UnderthatCaliforniastatute,wherethe
21 govem m ententityinvolvedhasviolatedtheterm softheenactm ent,hasfailed to

22 usereasonablediligencein discharging itsdutyundertheenactm ent,andhas

23 therebyinjuredthePlaintiffs,theinjuredpartymaysue.Accordingly,thePlaintiff
24 Classhadan independentpropertyinterestin theregulation asincorporatedinto

25 Govt.Codej815.6pursuanttoCalifornialaw.

26

57. Furtherm ore,Plaintiffshadaprotectedproperty interestin their

27 VoucherPaymentStandardpursuanttotheprovisionsof42U.S.C.jl437f(o).

28

15

FIRST AM ENDED CLASSACTION COM PLAINT

Case 2:07-cv-00380-PA-FFM Document 49 Filed 05/23/07 Page 16 of 42 Page ID #:3814
I

1

58. Thus,Plaintiffshad aproperty interestin theprovisionsofC .F.R .

2 982.505(c)(3)(ii)underbothstateandfederallaw,andbothindependently(i.e.,the 3 regulation,thestatestatute,andthefederalstatuteeachstandingalone)and
4 collectively(i.e.,thethreeconsideredtogetherinlightofeach).Thedeprivationof j
5 thatinterestby D efendantsispcrm issibleonly in accordance w ith therequirem ents 6 ofdueprocessoflaw undertheFourteenthA m endm ent.

7

59. By failingtoprovidePlaintiffClassclearorm eaningfulnoticeofthe

8 actionsHA CLA intendedtotakeanditsconsequencesatthetim erequiredby 24
9 C.F.R.982.505(c)(3)(ii),mostparticularlybyfailingtomeaningfullyoreffectively I

10 advisethePlaintiffClassthattheiroutofpocketshare offuturerentsw ould be

11 increased,asismorefullyexplainedin!4,supra;andbyfailingtoindicatefrom
12 whom thenoticeem anated,thelegalbasîsfortheaction,aphonenumberfor l3 inquiries,orhow toprotestorappealtheaction,D efendantH ACLA deprivedthe 14 PlaintiffClassofdueprocessof1aw in violation oftheFourteenth A m endm ent, 15 thereby entitlingtheClasstobringsuitandrecoverdam agespursuantto42U .S.C.

16 51983.

17

60. Thewrongfulconductcomplainedofherein wastheproductofa

l8 policy andpracticeoftheD efendants,wasnottheproductofaccidentor

19 inadvertence,and wasnotrandom .ln soacting,D efendantsw eredeliberately

20 indifferenttotherightsofPlaintiffsandtheClass,and actedinw illfulandreckless

21 disregard ofthe rightsofPlaintiffsand the Class.

22

61. A sadirectand proxim ate cause ofthe aforem entioned actsof

23 D efendants,PlaintiffsandPlaintiffClasssufferedlossesin thattheyincurred

24 increased rentalpaym entsfrom theirown pocketsthatD efendantsw ere notlegally

25 entitledtoimpose.PlaintiffsandthePlaintiffClassseekinjunctiveanddeclaratory
26 relief,an accounting,restitm ion,and/ordam ages. Saidrestitution ordam agesare

27 incidentaltotheinjunctivereliefsoughtherein.

28

16

FIRST AM ENDED CLA SSA CTION COM PLAINT

Case 2:07-cv-00380-PA-FFM Document 49 Filed 05/23/07 Page 17 of 42 Page ID #:3815

1

COUNT TW O

2

VIOLATION OF RIGHTSCREATED BY 42U.S.C.j1437f

3

(PrivateRightofActionAvailableUnder42U.S.C.j1983)

4

(BvPlaintiffand PlaintiffClassAaainstH A CLA)

5

62. Plaintiffsrestate,reallege,and incorporateby reference al1previous

6 and subsequently statedparagraphsasiffully setforth herein.

7

63. Pursuanttotheprovisionsof42U.S.C.j1437f(o),titledûtvoucher

8 Program '',w hen the Secretary ofthe D epartm entofH ousing and Urban

9 Development(tçHUD'')providesassistancetotenants,asisthecaseforthe
10 PlaintiffClass,s/he shalldo so using apaym entstandard to determ ine them onthly

1l assistanceto qualified tenants.Thestatuteestablishesasystem andcriteriafor

12 determ ining theam ountofthem onthly assistancepaym ent,includingwherethe

13 rentexceedsthepaym entstandard.Thesystem establishedunderthestatute

14 includesan annualreview offam ily incom e.

15

64. Thus,42U.S.C.j1437f(o)providestherightofqualifiedtenantstoa

16 paym entstandardundertheVoucherProgram .Specifically,under42U .S.C.

17 j1437f(o)(2),tenantshaveafederalstatutoryrighttoatimonthlyassistance
l8 paym ent''byHA CLA thatiscalculatedbyreferenceto thedtapplicablepavm ent

19 standard-''Therelevantprovisionof1437f(o)(2)reads:tdls'orafamilyreceiving 20 tenant-basedassistance,iftherentforthefamily(includingtheamountallowedfor

21 tenant-paidutilities)exceedstheapplicablepaym entstandardestablishedunder 22 paragraph (1),themonthlyassistancepaymentforthefamilyshallbeequaltothe
23 am ountby which theapplicablepaym entstandardexceedsthegreatestofam ounts

24 underclauses(i),(ii),and(iii)ofsubparagraph(A).''See,also,42U.S.C

25 j1437f(o)(1)(B)(providingforthettestablishmentofapaymentstandard''under

26 thevoucherprogram;42U.S.C.jl437f(o)(l)(A)(purposeofthepayment

27 standardistottdeterminethem onthlyassistancethatmaybepaidEbythehousing

28

1,7

FIRST A M EN DED CLA SS A CTION COM PLA IN T

Case 2:07-cv-00380-PA-FFM Document 49 Filed 05/23/07 Page 18 of 42 Page ID #:3816

1 authority)foranyfamily....'');42U.S.C.j1437f(o)(5)(A)(tocalculatethe
2 paym entstandard,an çtannualreview ''processofthetenant'sincom e and

3 eligibilityistooccur).

4

65. Federalcourtshavespeciticallyheldthat42U.S.C.j1437f(o)(2)

5 confersupon Section 8recipientsstatutory rightstobenefitsthatcan beinvoked

6 under42U.S.C.j1983.See,Johnsonv.HousingAuthorityofleyersonParrish, 7 442F.3d356(5thCir.2006);see,also,Wrightv.CityofRoanokeRedevelopment

8 & HousingAuthority,479U.S.418(1987).

9

66. 24C.F.R.982.505(c)(3)(ii),whichamongotherthingsaddresseshow

10 to calculateHA CLA 'Sm onthly assistancepaym entsby referencetothe

ll ttapplicablepaym entsstandard''5and when andhow tenantscoveredby the

12 program are to have theirpaym entstandard changed,constitutesone aspectof

l3 HUD 'Sintep retation ofthescopeoftherightestablishedbythestatute.

14 Specifically,theregulationsprovideasfollow s:

15

Section 982.505Vouchertenancy:How to calculatehousing assistance

l 6

Paym ent.

17

(a)Useofpaymentstandard.A paymentstandardisusedtocalculatethe

l 8

m onthly housing assistancepaym entfora fam ily.The ''paym entstandard''is

the m axim um m onthly subsidy paym ent.

l 9

20

(b)Amountofmonthlyhousingassistancepayment.ThePHA shallpaya

m onthly housing assistance paym enton behalfofthe fam ily thatisequalto

21

the low erof:

22

(l)Thepaymentstandardforthefamilyminusthetotaltenant

paym ent;or

23

(2)Thegrossrentminusthetotaltenantpaym ent.

24

(c)Paymentstandardforfamily

.

25

(1)Thepaymentstandardforthefamilyisthelowerof:

26

(i)Thepaymentstandardamountforthefamilyunitsize;or

27

28

18

FIRST AM ENDED CLASSACTION COM PLAINT

Case 2:07-cv-00380-PA-FFM Document 49 Filed 05/23/07 Page 19 of 42 Page ID #:3817

1

(ii)Thepaymentstandardamountforthesizeofthedwelling

2

unitrented by the fam ily.

3

(3)DecreaseinthepaymentstandardamountduringtheHAP contract

4

term .lfthe am ounton thepaym entstandard scheduleisdecreased

duringtheterm oftheHAP contract,thelowerpaym entstandard

5

am ountgenerally m ustbe used to calculate them onthly housing

6

assistancepaym entforthe farnily beginning atthe effectivedate of

the fam ily,ssecond regularreexam ination follow ing the effective date

7

ofthedecreaseinthepaym entstandard am ount.ThePHA m ust

8

determ inethepaym entstandardforthefam ily asfollows.

9

(i)Step l:Atthetirstregularreexaminationfollowingthe

10

decreasein thepaym entstandard am ount,the PH A shall

determ ine thepaym entstandard forthe fam ily in accordance

1 l

withparagraphs(c)(1)and(c)(2)ofthissection(usingthe

12

decreasedpaymentstandardamount).

,

l 3

(ii)Step2(firstreexaminationpaymentstandardamount):The

14

PH A shallcom pare thepaym entstandard am ountfrom step l

to thepaym entstandardam ountlastusedtocalculatethe

15

m onthly housing assistancepaym entforthe fam ily.The

16

paym entstandard am ountused by thePH A to calculatethe

m onthly housing assistancepaym entatthefirstregular

l 7

reexam ination followingthedecreasein thepaym entstandard

l 8

am ountisthehigherofthesetw opaym entstandardam ounts.

ThePHA shalladvisethefam ilythattheapplication ofthe

19

lowerpaym entstandardam ountw illbedefen'eduntilthe

20

second regularreexam ination follow ing the effective date ofthe

decrease in thepaym entstandard am ount.

2 1

22

(iii)Step3(secondreexaminationpaymentstandardam ount):

A tthe second regularreexam ination follow ing the decrease in

23

thepaym entstandard am ount,the low erpaym entstandard

24

am ountshallbeusedto calculatethem onthlyhousing

assistancepaym entforthe fam ily unlessthe PH A has

25

subsequently increasedthepaym entstandard am ount,in which

26

casethepaym entstandard am ountisdeterm ined in accordance

withparagraph(c)(4)ofthissection.
27

28

19

FIRST AM ENDED CLASSACTION COM PLAm T

Case 2:07-cv-00380-PA-FFM Document 49 Filed 05/23/07 Page 20 of 42 Page ID #:3818

1

67. Assuch,thestamtecreatesafederalright.Thetdllqanguageingthe)

2 regulation ...invokelsqaprivaterightofactionthatCongresstllroughstatutory

3 textcreated.''Alexanderv.Sandoval,532U.S.275,291(2001).

4

68. lnsum ,42U.S.C.j1437f(o)(2)andtheothersectionscitedabove

5 require H A CLA to m akem onthly paym entsforthe benefitofrecipientsaccording

6 to thedtapplicablepaym entstandard.''Thatisafederally securedright.The

7 regulationstlush outhow H A C LA 'Sm onthly paym entsareto be calculatedby

8 specifying how the applicablepaym entstandard isto be detenuined. By failing to

9 provide therequired notice,thenew paym entstandard im plem entedby H A CLA

10 wasunlawful.HACLA,therefore,violated42U.S.C.j1437f(o)(2)byfailingto
1l m aketherequiredpaym entsunderthetsapplicablepaym entstandard.''

12

69. D efendants,asdescribedinthiscom plaint,deprived Plaintiffsand the

13 PlaintiffClassoftheirfederalrights,specifically theirvoucherpaym entstandard

14 rightscreatedby42U.S.C.jl437f(o),includingj1437f(o)(2)andj1437f(o)(1),

15 undercolorofstatelaw,andtherebyviolated42U.S.C.j1983.

16

70. Thewrongfulconductcom plainedofhereinw astheproductofa

17 policy andpracticeofDefendants,w asnottheproductofaccidentorinadvertence,

18 and w asnotrandom . ln so acting,D efendantsw eredeliberately indifferentto the

19 rightsofPlaintiffsand theClass,and acted in w illfuland recklessdisregard ofthe

20 rightsofPlaintiffsand theClass.

21

71. A sa directand proxim ate causeofthe aforem entioned actsof

22 D efendants,Plaintiffsand thePlaintiffClasssuffered lossesin thatthey incurred

23 increasedrentalpaym entsfrom theirownpocketsthatDefendantswerenotlegally

24 entitledtoimpose.PlaintiffsandthePlaintiffClassseekinjunctiveanddeclaratory
25 relief,an accounting,restim tion,and/ordam ages.Saidrestitm ion ordam agesare

26 incidentaltotheinjunctivereliefsoughtherein.
27

28

20

FIRST AM ENDED CLASSACTION COM PLAINT

Case 2:07-cv-00380-PA-FFM Document 49 Filed 05/23/07 Page 21 of 42 Page ID #:3819

1

COUN T TH REE

2

VIOLATION OF CAL.GOV'T CODE j815.6

3

(Bv Plaintiffand PlaintiffClassA gainstAIlD efendants)

4

72. Plaintiffsrestate,reallege and incorporateby reference allprevious

5 and subsequently statedparagraphsasiffully setforth herein.

6

73. CalforniaCivilCodej815.6providesforliabilityagainstapublic

7 entity w hen:

8

(a) Theentityviolatesanenactment;

9

(b) Theplaintiffsareintheclassofpersonsprotectedbythe

l 0

enactm ent;

1 l

(c) Theenactmentisdesignedtoprotectthekindofinjury

l 2

com plained ofby theplaintiffs;

l 3

(d) Theviolationproximatelycausedtheinjury;and

14

(e) Thepublicentitydidnotexercisereasonablediligencein

l 5

dischargingitsduty establishedby theenactm ent.

16

74 .

A n enactm entincludesafederalorstate constitutionalprovision,

17

statute ,

charterprovision,ordinance,orproperly

adopted

regulation.

18

75 .

The Fourteenth A m endm entofthe United States Constitution;24

19 C F.R.j982.505(c)(3)-(4);Article1,j7oftheCalforniaConstitution;42U.S.C.

20 j1437f;andCalforniaCivilCodej52.1area1lenactmentswithinthemeaningof

21 Cal. CivilCode5815.6.PlaintiffsandthePlaintiffClassareintheclassofpersons

22 protected by these enactm ents.

23

76 .

Theaforem entionedenactm ents,applyingto Plaintiffsseparately and

24

together ,

constitute m

andatory

duties w

ithin

the

m

eaning

ofCal.CivilCode

25 5815.6,andweredesignedtopreventthekindofinjuriesallegedherein.

26

77 .

D efendants,asdescribed in thiscom plaint,did notexercise

27 reasonable diligence in discharging theirduty established by the enactm ents

28

21

FIRST AM ENDED CLASSACTION COM PLAINT

Case 2:07-cv-00380-PA-FFM Document 49 Filed 05/23/07 Page 22 of 42 Page ID #:3820

l enum erated above to refrain from violating the constitutionaland statutory rights

2 ofPlaintiffsand the Class.

3

78. Asadirectandproxim atecauseoftheaforem entionedactsof

4 D efendants,Plaintiffsand PlaintiffClasssuffered lossesin thatthey incurred

5 increased rentalpaym entsfrom theirow n pocketsthatD efendantsw erenotlegally

6 entitledtoimpose.PlaintiffsandthePlaintiffClassseekinjunctiveanddeclaratory
7 relief,an accounting,restitution,and/ordam ages.Saidrestitutionordam agesare

8 incidentaltotheinjunctivereliefsoughtherein.

9

C O U N T FO U R

10 VIOLATION OF ART.1,j7OF CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION

l 1

C alifornia D ueProcessC lause

12

(BvPlaintiffand PlaintiffClassAuainstA llDefendants)

13

79. Plaintiffsrestate,reallegeandincorporateby referenceallprevious

14 and subsequently statedparagraphsasiffully setforthherein.

15

80. Articlelj7oftheCaliforniaConstitm ion (tttheCaliforniaDue

16 ProcessClause'')prohibitsgovernmentalDefendants,andthoseactinginconcert

l7 withthem ,actingundercoloroflaw ,from deprivingpersonsoftheirproperty

l8 withoutdueprocessoflaw .Asstatedpreviously,Plaintiffsand theClasshavea

19 propertyinterestin 24C.F.R.982.505(c)(3)(ii),theHUD regulationrequiring
20 noticepriorto a V PS decrease,asw ellasin thatregulation asincop orated into

21 Govt.Codej815.6,andin42U.S.C.jj1437f(o)(2)and 1437f(o)(1),both
22 separately and in com bination.A lso,asstated previously,D efendantsdeprived the

23 PlaintiffClassofthatpropertyrightwithoutdueprocessoflaw .

24

8l. Thewrongfulconductcom plainedofherein wastheproductofa

25 policy andpracticeoftheD efendants,wasnottheproductofaccidentor

26 inadvertence,and wasnotrandom .ln soacting,Defendantsw eredeliberately

27 indifferenttotherightsofPlaintiffsandtheClass,andactedinw illfulandreckless

28

22

FIRST AM ENDED CLASSACTION COM PLAW T

Case 2:07-cv-00380-PA-FFM Document 49 Filed 05/23/07 Page 23 of 42 Page ID #:3821

1 disregard oftherightsofPlaintiffsand the Class.

2

82. Article1,j26oftheCalforniaConstitutionprovidesthatthe

3 provisionsoftheCalforniaConstitutionaremandatory.Failuretoprovidethe

4 rightsand benetitsrequired underthe statutory schem e,and violation ofPlaintiffs'

5 rightsunderArticle1,j7,constitm eafailuretodischargemandatoryduties.

6

83. Asadirectandproxim atecauseoftheaforem entionedactsof

7 D efendants,Plaintiffsand PlaintiffClasssuffered lossesin thatthey incurred

8 increased rentalpaym entsfrom theirow n pocketsthatD efendantsw erenotlegally

9 entitledtoimpose.PlaintiffsandthePlaintiffClassseekinjunctiveanddeclaratory
10 relief,an accounting,restitm ion and/ordam ages. Said restitution ordam agesare

1l incidentaltotheinjunctivereliefsoughtherein.

12

C O U N T FIV E

13

N E G LIG EN CE

14

(Bv Plaintiffsand PlaintiffClassAaainstA lIDefendants)

15

84. Plaintiffsreallege and incorporate by referenceallpreviousand

l6 subsequently statedparagraphs,asifsetforth fullyherein.

17

85. UnderCalforniaGovernmentCodej815.2,Defendantsareliablefor

l8 thenegligentactsofeach and every oneofitsem ployeesactingwithinthescopeof

19 hisorheremploym ent,whetherornotnam ed in thiscom plaint.Thisliability

20 includesliability forthose acting pursuantto policy orhigherlevelinstruction even

2l though theindividualsw ho so acted arenotnam ed in the com plaint.

22

86. D efendants,ata11m aterialtim esherein,had aduty to Plaintiffsand a11

23 classm embersassetforth in thestatutes,regulations,enactm ents,and comm on 24 law ofCalifom iaandtheUnited Statesassetforthherein.

25

87. DefendantsareliablefornegligenceunderCaliforniaCivilCode

26 51714becausePlaintiffs'injurieswerecaused,inwholeorinpart,byDefendants'

27 lack ofordinary careorskillin them anagem entoftheiragents,and the delivery of

28

23

FIR ST AM EN DED CLA SS A CTION CO M PLAIN T

Case 2:07-cv-00380-PA-FFM Document 49 Filed 05/23/07 Page 24 of 42 Page ID #:3822

1 theirprogram sand services.

2

88. In com m itting the actsand om issionsdescribed m ore fully herein,

3 D efendantsknew ,orreasonably should have know n,thattheirconductw ould

4 resultininjurytoPlaintiffs,andtothosesimilarlysituated.M oreover,Calfornia 5 EvidenceCode5669establishesS<negligenceperse''wherethereisaviolationofa
6 statute,ordinance,orregulation ofapublicentity;theviolationproxim ately caused

7 injurytoaperson;theinjuryresultedfrom anoccurrenceofanaturewhichthe 8 statutewasdesignedtoprevent',andthepersonsufferingtheinjurywasoneofthe
9 classofpersonsforwhoseprotection thestatutew asadopted.Theconductalleged 10 herem eetsthatstandard.

l l

89. A sa directandproxim atecause ofthe aforem entioned actsof

12 D efendants,PlaintiffsandPlaintiffClasssufferedlossesinthattheyincurred 13 increased rentalpaym entsfrom theirow n pocketsthatD efendantsw erenotlegally

14 entitledtoimpose.PlaintiffsandthePlaintiffClassseekinjunctiveanddeclaratory
15 relief,an accounting,restitution,and/ordam ages.Saidrestit-ution ordam agesare

l6 incidentaltotheinjunctivereliefsoughtherein.

17

PR AY ER FO R R ELIEF

l 8

90. W herefore,Plaintiffsand theClassseek thefollowingrelief:

19

a. C ertification ofa classunderF.R .CiV.P.Rule23*,

20

b. D am agesagainsteach D efendant,asto each causeofaction in

21

w hich thatD efendantisnam ed;

22

c. R estitution,including interest,on fundsim properly collected;

23

d. A declaration thatthepoliciesand practicesofH A CLA

24

com plainedofherein violatefederaland stateConstitutions;

25

e. A preliminaryandperm anentinjunctionrestrainingDefendants

26

in thefum refrom engagingintheunlaw fulconductstated

27

herein and from failing toproviderestitution;

28

24

FIRST AM ENDED CLASSACTION COM PLAINT

Case 2:07-cv-00380-PA-FFM Document 49 Filed 05/23/07 Page 25 of 42 Page ID #:3823

1

f. Attom eys'feesunderCalforniaCodeofcivilProcedure

l

j1021.5,42U .S.C.j1988,andwhateverotherstatuteor1aw

3

m aybeapplicable;and

4

g. Suchotherreliefasisjustandproper.

5

D EM A N D FO R JU R Y TR IA L

6

7

Plaintiffs,on behalfofthem selvesindividually and on behalfofthe class,

8 demandajurytrial.

9 10 D A TED : M ay 18,2007
l 1

Respectfully subm itted,

12

LITT,ESTU A R ,H A R RISON & K ITSON ,LLP

13

PU B LIC CO UN SEL

14

A SIA N PA C IFIC A M ERICA N LEG A L

l 5

16

B y:

arrett . 1tt

l 7

PaulJ.Estuar

D anielGnm feld

18

Herpan D.Vera

JotllsR afti

19

JulleA . Su

A ttorneysforPlaintiffs 20

2 l

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

25

FIRST AM ENDED CLASSACTION COM PLAINT

Case 2:07-cv-00380-PA-FFM Document 49 Filed 05/23/07 Page 26 of 42 Page ID #:3824
EX H IB IT A

Case 2:07-cv-00380-PA-FFM Document 49 Filed 05/23/07 Page 27 of 42 Page ID #:3825

STAN DSTD L AGRIEM BNT

'rkisAp e= sntjaentered infobôtweejltheHoue gAui ority fortl:e
Ui1 ofLosAngeles(mHACLA'AI,whoselôgalcotmselis* CityAtomey's
Ofsc:ofleCi:.Vofbo,AngeleG and Secéon 3recipients.(induda but not11=:'tôdtpMicâaelNoV O dNidiaPelaez),à dtheclas:ofsinilarly a'A ct:dSection 8Tenlpl tbey tcrepresent(1edev tonofwHch i!elabcratdinielctteraenttuVACLX on May24,2000$whogelogal
cox seli: le 5=nv of Public Couusel.Asiam Pacï c A.Tma 'cau Legk
Cmter,and LiftjBst= gl a1. (àer-h:er colledvely referred to %
zT1ain* s''),'I'hepmpyaiofe sAwe> t'ntistbmx='* tiesitusqucin
allrem ects,hcludingm tàbm,nwlng oîr y zàttôoflizniïûons,iu orderto atlow the.pad estnnegoiattiu good111 to detv îneifthi:m att. = y be. rtsolvd .withoutl e necessity ofactiyelitigatioa Aqoordingly,tbepardes
apce:
A diapute ha8arigen ow th: m ducton in pam tntstsn% rds .
> d 51eacoom N yingrix 1 therontalsharepidby Secuc 8 redpient f;r i oir lm qing, TM Plxsnlils'posihom % m œ e
fully pre- ïd im th: lotter sent to H ACLA by'Plaintge ' Coo elom M ay 24,2906,wàich isa> hed aç'BxY bit1 aad wbogeconteatsareinco zd# thkreference.

2% Thepe es c t negniac'g Z gond fith fo doterm int if the

e utecr beresolvtd.wihoutacév:A 'ga:on.

'

3. Kaintie will'efe iom Glingany,lawbedtseeldngzolimffor
fhem attA adl essedh Exbibit1.

é. D efma4rrntm aga e O ttlm :1:,7% oflimltûtionssor amy otker

rôlrvr tlilnitaliv : pe pi for tk: Slm'# of c y law sitoz

' e'

*'

''''''' #'

acllml'plae afivçcra*< cM m ,includiùgany(91OcJaim ,ofany

sortrzgardingthema- saMmssedim Bxlnlkt1 qnoreafïer

RLAW SUITOR CLAJM ''Iistolzedoffective'Imw 1,2006.'lxis

appliesnototly to tbeindvidualPlFiréssbutto tke class ()f

sM larly e ected Socuon 8 Ten= tq a: furtlaer defm od in

Exkibit1,tbmypup orttorzpresent.

5- rfhis Agream entshqlltov inats JO dap afterno:c: by rither partytu titwk% stotermio tetheAm zment.

Case 2:07-cv-00380-PA-FFM Document 49 Filed 05/23/07 Page 28 of 42 Page ID #:3826

6. 1n t:sev tPlah e sfleany LAW SUJT aA rl e te in's:ca

oftï sA p e= < àeLAW SUIT OR CLAIM wJIZbeye.en.lH fled ou J= e 1,2006,cô notterRhatdate itis acel'llly l ecl,

Butifthe LAW SU T OR .CLAN k fled more lbM .39 l y$
a;c tlisTerzm'nsuonDat,a8defmedh !5,above,tk= th,

statuœ ofllmitations&villbo> tortm again beginningon .1e

3y,x% y,

.

*

K

DAN :

-

DA1K : - -

DATED: .

*

l % utïve Nl- ctcr '

J

*

Ctty A

offige .

DAD D:

2

Case 2:07-cv-00380-PA-FFM Document 49 Filed 05/23/07 Page 29 of 42 Page ID #:3827
EX H IB IT B

Case 2:07-cv-00380-PA-FFM Document 49 Filed 05/23/07 Page 30 of 42 Page ID #:3828
Liw Estuar,H arrl'son,Yzdlller & K itsnn,LLP
BARR= S,Lrrr*PADLZM UM *OSNIEHARRIO N *BRYANB.KO T= * M 3V TK KM ON
*FCOW JZONAD WFJNW SS WAnAPTJ.ZW *
Novom be 15,2006

Vr.RudolfMonuel
HoxlingAuiozityoftheCityofLosAngeles 2B0ûW '11AA1,'eBlvd.,3rdFioor LosAngeles,Califom ix90057
Re: C1,1'msnf;MIG AE'LNOZQ vs.HoushgàzlfhorityoftlwCityofLosM getes

TO W H OM ITM AY CON Y :

n islsttorconsututesacqna'nfozda agespwsuanttoCalifomiaGovernm = fCoiej910FJ

s. ,foriaju esswqtalnedàyclml'msnt=dtheclassofclm'mMtsM'm'ngoutofWolationsofgtattory,

commonhw,e rm gfi= 'onalril ts.

'

Bywritt= >f= de'llape= ent,co= elfoyolximlntand1iAt71T,àareed* cle ants'
o1m'= K,iudue gtheO ebywhich = ytortoradgnl'nl'- ivecle sm ub'tbe51e11,a tolledâsof J= e1,2006.Anysubsm uentlyO d clnlm xAhsllbodllemM EledonO tdate.'Iheagr> entreaxda,in
Dlev=tpc ''(t)b.enfntnteoflimitl om ,orl.yotH reix t11% l'tauonypœiodmfort:e611.ngof=y . 1awsuitnrsdminie nliveoroàerclm'm zkc'lue gO yj910clâl'm ;of=yyortrege gthematt=
ae essedin(t% t01clpiml.,.istolledeffe veJ= e1,2006.n l:appliesnotonlytoO individual
PlaintiskbuttoiechssofsimilarlyafectedSecfoa8Tennnl.n

'

.

RYeAgreem=te oTeads,asitrelatestotkede= e SIM * 2 ofaayclsim orlaWspity4% %

eventPlnm'tl'fl SleD yLA W SUD 1*.eri etermimqGonofQlisAp eem ent,theLAW RTIIT OR CIA IM

willbede= i fledonM e1,2006,nom - erwhatdateitisqrttnnllyftled.Butift eLAW SW JOR

CLAN isfledmore11% 30d*ysO ertheTennimxdonDatt,a:defmedin%5,above,tKO o G tate
oflimitationswm beglntonm age begianingonthe31Xday''

A copyof*eAp erm O tisattachedhœ etoasFxhlbit1.'rheorigm'alsia edbyM cr,A BxecutiveDkectorkudyM oO elandHAC!T.A oo= elCrdgTe emskaisoto ourM owledge,h the
possxsionofMr.Teapslca;wboisanattomeyhtheLosA gelesCityAltomey*sOïce.

L SIMKW AQY OF CLADW :
W chaelNoY andt:eolusofsimilrlysftaatedpezsons'l erefnsf.erwçc'1m% lmts'' collecdvely),bringsthi:claim fprdepriva:onofcoA tutionaks'tatutozy,aade.ommon1aw rightby tïeHousingAufhort oftheC# ofLosM geles(<$EAX .A'')andvG ousnmknownpgrsonsc ployed Y HACLA byvirtueofacts,policiesandpracticesofHACLA.h tlletwoyearsprecedingtheilingof
tbisclaim ,Cllsm = tsallegethsfonowing:
1055WILVIIRRBOULBVARD.SUO 18K LDSANOELES,CALIFORNIA 90017 PHONK (213)386-3114 FAX:(213)380-4585
28

Case 2:07-cv-00380-PA-FFM Document 49 Filed 05/23/07 Page 31 of 42 Page ID #:3829
N oY TortCiaim > H AG .A N ovember15,2006 Pag62

a) Jn2004,ieCityofIrsM gtlesandM CILAdeddedtoreduc:iemm emum monthly
Bubédyprovidedtoafm lly,esbcfvolyincreasingl erentporuon tobepe by Secfon 8recipients

fortheirhousinp Under24C'.R.â982.505(c)(ii),however,-=%e ectedfm llywasrequH dto havebe= adviset atthe1- = v re= m m'sûonfollowingthec- geiupolicy,bfiecY ge1

policyaadthati ebeneftreduction wouldnotA eplàcelmtî'laheri erecipient'ssecondpnmlllrem

exxminion(f.e.,iefollowhgyearO eritIoticej.EAX.,Auttœlyfailedtoccmplyw11 tilis

noe cv onpw eqaisite.

'

'

b) Raler:hnnprovie grecipientsw11 cltm'nov caticn1%%ttkeirre obligaûonwould behcresxedthefollowingyec,RACLA mnlledaonopagefyerin& r112004cooim'nlmgtïeolyptic u dtecM cal#sir antthatth5HouéngAuthozt ''loweredtlo pam Y xfnndse nUSH todete= l'ne
ycurpohionoft:e- .''Thisiyerhadnohdici&ofau ol cialnouce:itw asaotpzintedonCz'tyqr HAX .A lefe ead;itdidnotspc 'fyi elegalbasisfort eO om itdidnotgiveaphonenumberfor h quides;itdidnotrN nireahyacknowledgc = toria aturebyi erecipient;a ditdidnotm ecify
anypmcedureforapp'ah'mgt11:Admlnl'sH ovedecîsix MoD e oztmltly,tàe% didnotH vige re ienàthattheirrctobEgafonwouldaclnnllybegoingup,byhow muck prwhen.Simplyput
i eGyc didaotcompox w ii m lnim ll2= 11m71 cfdaeprocess.Sce,e.g.,Golk g v,reJJz,397U.S.
254 (197û).
Becauseof% failuretocomplywih t enov cation ' entforh erentin- neseii œ alreadyertobeM plem c tedfrom July '05toJ= e'06,allrp tinœeu esimposedonSeéGon8 recipi= tstolateasa- lltofthiszdm lmlKtrstiveacfoma legallyinvalid,m dM IIbethroug:tke conlinningimpK tlne-ng=n111Juae'07

Onbe alfcftxem melvesR daolasspfG ectedSeodon 8recipientstu ttheywillseek to rem ant,ourclienl a* thatHAG ,A :

a) iomerlistelyceaseOddv'eâom H orcingadecreasedpam entx'tnndardforG
seltion8recipien: whoseelectivez= tincreassshavetslren,orwilltake,eleotdlm'mg

% July*05toJune'06periodi

'

b) providereotutionofallinoreasedSecfon8paym=ts=xHebyre ientsinZepast
lwelvem ontiksassresultofHACLA'Simpm pc e on,andgoingintol efuture;

c) apeeinwrie gtoin- aaeieVPS(paym=ts'tandard)totheerliez(pre-2O04)'levels

a

&

X ecfveAmmeiately(i.e.,nctpha dintbroughD-exo inatbnsoccnm nglhroagh

July:07)9and

â) payClaim ants'attom eys'feesinmazedlodate.

* :13va C!1- ':14A
29

Case 2:07-cv-00380-PA-FFM Document 49 Filed 05/23/07 Page 32 of 42 Page ID #:3830
NoM TortClaim reHACLA N ovembar15,2006 Page3
IL ADDRESSTOWHH NOTICESSHOULDBESN :
A1Jcorrvpoadeùcerelatedtotb:ismatterO ouldboaddressedtoPa< J.Bstuar,Litt,Bsmr, He sow M 111c &Kilon,L1,Pr%ERMIC''),1055WilA%igeBoulevard,Suite1880,LosW eles, Oellforaia90017,V 5telephonenxlmbc ofTK TW Cis(213)386-3114.

m . H OW DAM AGESOR W R X TRS OCC O RMT::

W ilhinie1+ twoy= ,ClmI'msntandV o1= simllnrlysituatedwc subjectH toa
deorease pam entA drdwii outIeceiving = ytp eofwrittennofcewhic: wouldtom portwii 24

C.P.R.9982.505(c)4:)ordueprocesse mdcds.M aresultClmemmntanllalloiers='=:'lar1ysitnniM receivH iliegi 1.=11n07eases,wiZ littleo'rnochoicebuttopayleln- ueorfmdaltv lteim:xving.
Tâisispar:rnllrlydim cultforthoaeSecfon2rodpiOtswhorettemost3re œabie;e.g.,theelderly

ordisablei

'

W . M N DAM AG S OR W WTG S O CG FRDED:
Thehoid=tgvhgzisetotu c1e ocmvredwite thelastY D>= ,aadcoutinued
tk- eerfozallcln=' M à m'm llvlysitnxed.Specï cally,onApdl18,2006.M n N oe recdveda nouceO te ectiveM e1,2006,hisVPSwouldde- asei ceby-mllm' in = hcreasedrO tof Slllpœ monl.

V . A CT OR OM M TSSION CAU SING IN TTN TES:
Thisclaim arisœ frnm tlleacuonsofHAO A R di eemployees,represM fe 'vesD dag= ts tbereof.HACLA isliabletoClm% anlbecaus:ofitsownioniuctandtâeconductofits
'
rmployees/agent.Altsvnlh'vely,HAG ,Aisliabletotmm'mutsasajointpe cipaatoractorwithie
City.
Thelmconeitutionalaadnmlnw fulconductgiveBrisetolegalclaim swhich h clude,butm'enot Hm ltedto,violat'onsofA'1pleaudfelleralhw,state= dfederalconstitat'onaland civildghtsviolations
inclllrlin'g:butnotll'ml'td to>fedemlcmksesofactionincluding,butnotlimited1o,Wolationofbue .
Pzocess;Call'fomiaGov'tCode9815.6;CxgifomiaCivl'ljj52,52.1;1nv1d10> discrimipnfiow non-
lvidousdiseriminntiow intentionk torts;non-intentinmsltodx;negligence;intendonalimflicûon of M nionald stress;aeglig= tinflict'onofem oQonaldistœ s;miârepres= tadon;vicadousliabiiity; non-vice ousk'abilityiconsp'm ny,nndQtlv logali eozieswhichm ayo ly.
A ttaoàedasExh-bit2isalettr â'om Br etlS.u ttwritten onlmAllfoftheCblm sntmm ed hereà andallm'mllmrlysituatedindviduals!toieattorneysforHACLA,CraigTakennkaandNeil Blum entbal,whichdescribesinp eaterde* tkesalientfactsandprim o legali eoriesadvancedby Claimaats.1+ oonl= tsarzinccp oratedbyY sreference,

58:13V.Z Clfot:1459

30

Case 2:07-cv-00380-PA-FFM Document 49 Filed 05/23/07 Page 33 of 42 Page ID #:3831
N ozziTortC1m' reHACLA Novem ber15,2006 Page 4

W . N AM ES OF PXRSONS CAU SIN G W .1Tm m S:

Atfhistimt,Clm'maatdoesnot% ow ieidenW ofthespecifcindividuxlnwkoare responsiblefortheadopfonOttfo= uletionofiepolicies=dpracdcesobjectedtohereh.However,
ioseindividualsinsoace gWereactingini ecourseandscopeoftheir= plom = twith,and
agencyonb'AnlfofHAX -A,andEACLA O dorsedyappmvë autodzc supœvisedaad/ormtifod
i osepolicies= dpracuces.

VR D AM AX A OR W ITTG S:

A sa* ctandproxlm eeremlltofi ewrongfalactsZlegedabove,* .N ozzi,aM theclassof

n=' 11r1ydlllnte Section8recipi=tswhoserental.e ewashcreasd duetotheactionsöbjededto

intlzislettez,hassuffered=dcoktinuestosafferA m injuriesOdHnmRges,1::M extxtofwhic,h

arenotcompletelyu ownatthsM e,C1=' m,tG egegO thisdmmngesexoeed$25,000,andthatthis

isnotalim itedcivllc>t.

'

z

Shoi dyouhaveanyquestionsastoanyofl eforegoh g,pleasedonothesitatetocomtsntm e,

V

PazfJ.Estur

68:13vo Q ient:1459
31

Case 2:07-cv-00380-PA-FFM Document 49 Filed 05/23/07 Page 34 of 42 Page ID #:3832
EX H IB IT C

Case 2:07-cv-00380-PA-FFM Document 49 Filed 05/23/07 Page 35 of 42 Page ID #:3833
LitçE staar,H arrs'on,M ller& K itsan,LLP
BAR= TS.LIIT @PAULJ.M AR*(I>:< RA*#YQ,N *BRYANB.M'Lrm *M - TM.JX D N
oFc'oce 'prwApnw> elAu HADG AD RMR
D ecembc 8 2006
Akmxnko
0 .RudolfM ontiel
Hollm'n:A,#hrrr'ltyqfieCityofLosArgeles
2600m lAhireBlvd.,3rdFloor LosM geles,C>116om ia90057
Re: Cllyl'=antND 1 .PRTARZ vs.HoushgAmhorityofth:Ci@ ofLosM geles
TO U OM ITM AY CON CO :
n 7'Alotterconsut'lllomaclm'm fordamagespnv mnttoC>h'fozniaOovernmentCode9910s'f seq.,forhjH esm'e inedbycln=' pnt= dtheclass.ofclnlmsml arie goutofviolaGonsofe fnfory, commonkw,andoonsGe onalril ts.
Bywrittm stan/le lapf= O t,co= selforclmw - landIG f7T.A ar eedQI/ claim ants' '
o
*lm= n,lclndlng& e ebywhich O ytortoradminie o veclxim nm ustbeG ed,a tolledasof
J= e1,2006,,** anysubpequ=tlySIe,dclzm':M%q11b:d- ed512 onH tdate.n iar m=t reads,inrelev=tpm ''ltpeenh3teoflimitations,orMyoe releva h'mitatio= pe odaforthe Sl1'mgof=ylawe toradmûni- tiveirotherclxim;iacludhg=y9910clnlmaofRysortregG t:emattersRddressedin(H tortolximj...istolledelece e7= t.ly2006.n imalzpliesnotonlytot:e
individnnlPlaintie buttpheclw ofimllalsyl'A ,reedSecGon8Tennnl.'''
'1YeAgreemO talgor,.%8A,kqitrelatestoiedee'medSIH O eofaxycln'l'gnorlawsuit,$% te eventple e S eanylA W str x- tâelermirnh'on ofthisAgre= = tI eLAW SIJIT OR G .AN wiz bedeem edG edoa7= e1,2006,nom n/erwhatdateitioactuallyftled.ButifO M W SUIT OR CV,AN isRedmore% 30dayssfertheTermlnlheonDate,asdeo edinï5,above,thenthen1m#'#:
oflimitationswillbegin torunage begine gonthe31*dayy''
A copyoftheApeementisnfnnbadhazeloasBxhz-bit1.TheoriA alsir edbyHAfNzA ExecuûveDiredorRudyMontielaadHACLA ooo elCrak Teennlrs1,tooarlmowlHge,inthe posseasionofMz.TG O A whois= attorneyintheLosAngelesCityAttom ey'sOm ce.
1. STTM M ARY OF CL AIM :
NidaPelaez,adt:eclassofsimilnrlydtuatedpœsonsth- ensfter**C)x5m=ts''conecûvely), bringstbisdaim fordmzivadonofconséta:onal,statatory,andcommonlaw rlA tcbyieHousing Authon'tyofthe(211 ofLosAngelx (<'HACIT.A'')=dvariouslenkmownpersonsemployedbyM x ,A
byvm eofact%polidesandpracûcesofHAO .A.lntàetwoyearsprecedingthellsmgofH claimy
clslm sntsagegetkefollowiug:
1955WLSHIREBOULW AO ,SUITE1880 LO:ANOD AS CAU ORNIA 90017 PHOX ;(213)3864114 M X:(213)380.45:5
32

Case 2:07-cv-00380-PA-FFM Document 49 Filed 05/23/07 Page 36 of 42 Page ID #:3834
PelaezTortQ aim D ecember8,2006 Page2

a) In2004,'teCityofLosM geles= dHACLA decidedtoreducetilemxyimum moaœ .y

BubsidyprovidedtoaRm lly,esecdvelyincrmmxingierentpoo ontobepaid bySec:ol 8x 'pients

forieirhoue g,Under24C.RR.9982.505(c)(ii),howevc,eache ectedfm r'lywasrequiadto
havebeenaévised,ati e%mi= ualr- m lnplionfolloe gtlm c%xngeinpolicy,ofi eohsngein

polic'y= dO ti eboneftreducûon wouldnottakeplaceunt11O œ i ericipieat'ssecondam mal

reexxminxson(ts.,iefollowingyeare eri:notioe).HACLA uttclyfailedtocomplye l ths

aov ca;onprœN dsita

'

b) Ratherfbsmprovie grecipienœwithclev notisqaéonfssttheirr=tobligationwould
beincve>xôdtk:fozowingyee ,R ACLA m slledaone-page;yc inApril2004 contxlningthecryptic = dteihnicalemfem'entlAxttheHotl='ngAul ou'tyQowere,dthepam entst= dv dsUSH tcdetm m'e
w w po/ oroftlït= t.n'flu'qûyerhadnoiudiciacf= oK cialnoGce:itwasnolprinte.donCityoi ?
EAO .Alettœheat itdidaotspect,fytàelegalbasisfori eactioniitdidnotgiveaphonentlm. bc for
11:1111d,:9itdidnotreG e=yaclmowledgemantorsia at.:byësrecipict;= ditdidnoteeol'fy
anyprocedureforappanlingthendm lnixtaûve.de,n1'm'(m.M nreimpe a tly,tkeSm didnotade e
rH pien'àthatteirr=tobligatiotwoulda#nlllybegoiagup,bykow muchorwk= .Se lypukthe
ûyerdidnotcomportV t m4%'ms1Mtstndrdsofduepmcess.See,e.g.,(bze grgv.Kelb,397U.S. 254 (1970),

Becauseofthefe uretocom piywiû i enoo cationrequir= entforther= th c- esoit c

alreadyoztobeimplem = tedâom Jaly '05toJ= e:06,V r= tincreasesH posedonSecfon 2

'recipi=tstodateasa- 1tofY ssdmlointrséveacion= iege yKvalit = dwillbete ughie

cone e gimpr tlnW gunZ J= e:07.

'

œ behe ofl= sdves= dacl= ofG ectedSecoon8m* ientsthattheywillseoklo
repms= tourchentsaskO tHAX .A:

a) immedatelycease= ddesistA m enfnrciug&drztr- edpam ente nde forG
SecGon 8recipim tqwhoseefecovtrenthcm aseshav:tc en,orwilllalre,eFed during
t eJuly '05toJ= e'06periodi

b) proyiderestitaûonofall='n-asedSeC;On8pa> entgtnld:byredpi= tsiutikçpat
twelvem on% asaresultofHACILA'Simpropere on,andgoO gintotùefuture;

agreeinwrie' toin- mneieVPS(paymmtst=dnmd)tntheem'jiœ * -2004)loels

esecéve:'mmediately(i.e.,notph'tse.dintkoughrxxsmsnationsocmr ingtbroughM y

'07)9an.d

'

;) payClsgm=ln'attom ey'sfeeshcuzredtoAte.

H . ADDM SSTO W Y CH NO TIG S S'H OULD BE SENT:
M 1corzespontl= cerôlatodto*ism nfershouldbeaddm qsedtoPaul1.Be 1m',LittEe mr,
Hll'rn'xonyM1'llc &Kizon,IJ-P($%BN-MK''),1055WllnhlreBoulôvart Suite1880,Lo:M geles, CG fornia90017.'rhetelephonenumberof L'E'FTMTC:is(213)386-3114.
Dcc6:814Clio k1459
33

Case 2:07-cv-00380-PA-FFM Document 49 Filed 05/23/07 Page 37 of 42 Page ID #:3835
PelaezTortClaim Decembc 8,2006 Page 3

m . EOW D AM AGES OR W R N TRS OCTO QED :
wilhx'ntke1- twdyem ,clnr'mm,t= du otsem sl'm,'- lysftuatedweresubjectedtoa
(lx roasedpam = tIinmdnrdw itkotltrecdvinganytr eofqd ttenaofcéwhich wouldcompox wii 24
C.F.R.5982.505(c)(ii)ordueprocessxfqne d:.As:resultoizm=t=da11othersm'ml'lrlysituated
zecdyedillogalr= tinoreu es,wi1 littleDrnochoioebuttopayi eincreaseorfm dalternslehousing. Tb1'Aispar:nnlsdydiK oaltforthoseSeofon 8recipi= t whoarei em ostve erable,e.g.,eldcly, dlpp%led)single-pk ent6m 111'es

rV. W M N D AM AGES OR W N O S OCG TQRED :

n eincid=tgvingrisetotu clm'm occr edwithinthelasl> oy= .audcoae ud
thereale forallcblm rmtssim ilirlys'itaated.Speciâco y,on,Dec= ber22,2005,M s.P:1= a ceived anoûce% efectiveFebruav 1,2006,herVPSw ouldd- neZ œebyresult'mgin aninoTeaaedr= t
of1161p:rmconou

V. AW Ok OM W SSION CAUSW G W R TRIES:

Thisc1e adsesfm i racioncofM cf.A andZ ec ploye ,repreaentafvesr dagx à tkep of HA O A isliableto clm'm = tsbecauseofitsown conduct= dtheconduotofits
= ployees/agent.M t- eevely,M CLAi:liabletoclll% nntsazajohtpe cipmltozrtorw11 the
Q ty.

' .
''D e= consGtuiionllaadu lawfulconduct#vesdsetolegalclx:% qwMchinciuGè,but= not

li4m-tedtw violaoonsofstateaudfederalhw,stateandfe

a,

#

eralconKlltufirmnlm

d'civilrightôviolaions,

indudingbutnothm z'tedtofederalcauseaofacuonh clndm'gbutnotll'm z'tedto violv onofnnm

Procœs;CaliforniaG v'tCode9815.69Califtvm'aG'W15j52,52.19invidiousdiscdml'natiow non-
inxridiouzdiscrr'mm'nlioaiintenNonalte ;non-intentionaltortB;negligenx ;int= éonalinfh'cGon of

emotifmz dskeas;negligentn'n'fh'ct'onofc oûoni din- s;miqrepresentatiow vice ouslivbilityi

non-vicarioush'abilityiconp iracy,andolherlegall eorieswh'chm ayapply.

A> hedasRxhibllzisaletterâom BarrettS.LrX writtenoubahalfofthoolzmm#nxmod hœeiw andallm'oîlarlysituatedinllivitbxsln,toieattom eysforHACW Craig TakenxknR dNdl Bl= M i1Rsl;which descdbesin p'eaterdetaill esG entFxcinR dprim myTegaltîeoriesadvancedby Claim anà.1tscont= ts> incop oratedbythisD ferance.

W .' N AM PA OF PERSONS C AUSm G INA TRR S)
Attàistim e,Cle = tdoesnot% ow Qm id= tityofthespeoisch diviiualswhom'e
responsibiefortizadopfovaadfozmulationoflepoiiciesandpme cesobjectedtoharoin.How> œ,
thoaeindividualsinsoae gwereace ginte coursem dscopeoftheiremploym entwith = d agencyonbebllfof11Acf.A,r dIIAG 'A rndorsed,approved,authorized,su17er5,1sM M d/orrav ed i osepoliciesaudpractices.

Dor:8814Ce t1459
34

Case 2:07-cv-00380-PA-FFM Document 49 Filed 05/23/07 Page 38 of 42 Page ID #:3836
Pelaez TM Claim
Decepbc 8,2006
Pagt4

VK DAM AGES OR IN WTRTRS:

M aA ecte pro=' ater* toftimwron> adsallegedabove,M s.Pejaez,= dtlzecjusof

simlllrlysituatedSecûon8recipienl whoserentalxhArawasiucreasedduttotheacuonsobjectedto

inthis1* er,hasmleeredandcone aestcxqlfferâom injuries=de es.iefullex't=tofwltich

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Case 2:07-cv-00380-PA-FFM Document 49 Filed 05/23/07 Page 39 of 42 Page ID #:3837
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Case 2:07-cv-00380-PA-FFM Document 49 Filed 05/23/07 Page 40 of 42 Page ID #:3838

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O FFICE OF THE C ITY A TTO RNEY
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213.978-D 58 213-978-7::7

Decem ber29,2006

BarrettLt,Esq. . Litt,Estuar,Harrison,Mlller& Kitson,LLP 1955W llshire'Boulsvard,Sufte1880 ' Lo:Angeles,Califpimia 90047

Re: Claim DatedNoyemà#r15,2006

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''Subjecttocertainexceptiops,youhaveonlysîx(6)months
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Case 2:07-cv-00380-PA-FFM Document 49 Filed 05/23/07 Page 41 of 42 Page ID #:3839

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O FFICE OF THE C ITY A TTORNEY
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213-978-7968 213-978-79:7

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PaulEstuar,Esqt . . tjtt,E:stuar,Harrivon,tMiller&Kitson,LLP 1055W llshjre Boulevérd,Suife 1880 '.''
LosAngelos,California 90017

Re: Amended Claim DatedDeuem ber8,2006

DearM r.Estuar:

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Case 2:07-cv-00380-PA-FFM Document 49 Filed 05/23/07 Page 42 of 42 Page ID #:3840

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 </s> Case: 2:07-cv-380 As of: 11/15/2018 11:55 AM PST 1 of 32
(FFMx),CLOSED,DISCOVERY,MANADR,PROTORD,REOPENED
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA (Western Division − Los Angeles)
CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 2:07−cv−00380−PA−FFM

Michael Nozzi et al v. Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles et al Assigned to: Judge Percy Anderson Referred to: Magistrate Judge Frederick F. Mumm Case in other court: 9th CCA, 09−55588
9th CCA, 13−56223 Cause: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act
Plaintiff

Date Filed: 01/16/2007 Date Terminated: 02/15/2018 Jury Demand: Both Nature of Suit: 440 Civil Rights: Other Jurisdiction: Federal Question

Michael Nozzi an individual

represented by Anne K Richardson Public Counsel 610 South Ardmore Avenue Los Angeles, CA 90005 213−385−2977 Fax: 213−385−9089 Email: arichardson@publiccounsel.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barrett S Litt Kaye McLane Bednarski and Litt LLP 975 East Green Street Pasadena, CA 91106 626−844−7660 Fax: 626−844−7670 Email: blitt@kmbllaw.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Louis A Rafti Legal Aid Foundation of Los Angeles 1550 West 8th Street Los Angeles, CA 90017 213−640−3823 Email: lrafti@lafla.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Stephanie Dominique Carroll Public Counsel 610 South Ardmore Avenue Los Angeles, CA 90005 213−385−2977 x 137 Fax: 213−385−9089 Email: scarroll@publiccounsel.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Stewart Chih−Ming Kwoh Asian Pacific American Legal Center 1145 Wilshire Blvd., 2nd Floor Los Angeles, CA 90017 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Daniel Grunfeld Morgan Lewis & Bockius LLP 300 South Grand Avenue

Case: 2:07-cv-380 As of: 11/15/2018 11:55 AM PST 2 of 32

22nd Floor Los Angeles, CA 90071−3132 213−612−2500 Fax: 213−612−2501 Email: dan.grunfeld@morganlewis.com TERMINATED: 07/15/2009

Hernan D Vera Bird Marella Boxer Wolpert Nessim Drooks Lincenberg Rhow PC 1875 Century Park East 23rd Floor Los Angeles, CA 90067−2561 310−201−2100 Fax: 310−201−2110 Email: hvera@birdmarella.com TERMINATED: 02/17/2016 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Julie A Su Asian Pacific American Legal Center 1145 Wilshire Boulevard 2nd Floor Los Angeles, CA 90017 213−977−7500 TERMINATED: 04/06/2011

Patrick Mark Dunlevy 2239 Wanderer Drive San Pedro, CA 90732 310−514−1415 Fax: 310−514−1415 Email: pmarkd@aim.com TERMINATED: 09/11/2015

Paul J Estuar Litt Estuar and Kitson LLP 1055 Wilshire Boulevard Suite 1880 Los Angeles, CA 90017 213−386−3114 Fax: 213−380−4585 TERMINATED: 09/05/2013

Plaintiff
Nidia Pelaez an individual

represented by Anne K Richardson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barrett S Litt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Louis A Rafti (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Stephanie Dominique Carroll (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Stewart Chih−Ming Kwoh (See above for address)

Case: 2:07-cv-380 As of: 11/15/2018 11:55 AM PST 3 of 32

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Daniel Grunfeld (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/15/2009

Hernan D Vera (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/17/2016 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Julie A Su (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/06/2011

Patrick Mark Dunlevy (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2015

Paul J Estuar (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/05/2013

Plaintiff
Los Angeles Coalition to End Hunger and Homelessness a non−profit organization, on behalf of themselves and similarly situated persons

represented by Anne K Richardson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Barrett S Litt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Louis A Rafti (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Stephanie Dominique Carroll (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Stewart Chih−Ming Kwoh (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Daniel Grunfeld (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/15/2009

Hernan D Vera (See above for address) TERMINATED: 02/17/2016 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Julie A Su (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/06/2011

Patrick Mark Dunlevy

Case: 2:07-cv-380 As of: 11/15/2018 11:55 AM PST 4 of 32
(See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/11/2015
Paul J Estuar (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/05/2013

V. Defendant Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles
Defendant City of Los Angeles TERMINATED: 05/23/2007

represented by Brant H Dveirin Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard and Smith LLP 221 North Figueroa Street Suite 1200 Los Angeles, CA 90012 213−580−6317 Fax: 213−250−7900 Email: Brant.dveirin@lewisbrisbois.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Christopher M Pisano Best Best and Krieger 300 S Grand Ave, Ste 2850 Los Angeles, CA 90071 213−617−8100 Email: christopher.pisano@bbklaw.com TERMINATED: 11/25/2013
Yangyang Li Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard and Smith LLP 633 West 5th Street Suite 4000 Los Angeles, CA 90071 213−250−1800 Fax: 213−250−7900 Email: travis.li@lewisbrisbois.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Heather Elayne Jones Los Angeles City Attorney's Office DWP 221 North Figueroa Street, Suite 1000 Los Angeles, CA 90012 213−367−4590 Fax: 213−367−4588 Email: heather.jones@ladwp.com TERMINATED: 03/20/2007 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Todd T Leung Office of the City Attorney City Hall East−Litigation Division 200 North Main St, Room 900 Los Angeles, CA 90012−4131 213−473−6875 Email: todd.leung@lacity.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Brant H Dveirin (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 2:07-cv-380 As of: 11/15/2018 11:55 AM PST 5 of 32

Defendant Rudolph Montiel in his official capacity
Defendant Does 1 through 100 inclusive TERMINATED: 02/01/2007 Defendant Does 1−10 Interested Party Charles Jackson

represented by Brant H Dveirin (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED Christopher M Pisano (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/25/2013 Yangyang Li (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Charles Jackson PO Box 192197 Los Angeles, CA 90019 PRO SE

Date Filed 01/16/2007
01/16/2007 01/16/2007 01/16/2007 01/16/2007 01/16/2007 01/18/2007 02/01/2007
02/05/2007
02/06/2007

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT against Defendants Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles, City of Los Angeles, Rudolph Montiel, Does 1 through 100 inclusive. (Filing fee $ 350 PAID.) Jury Demanded, filed by plaintiffs Nidia Pelaez, Los Angeles Coalition to End Hunger and Homelessness, Michael Nozzi. (jp) (mgu). (Additional attachment(s) added on 4/4/2017: # 1 Civil Cover Sheet, # 2 CV18) (et). (Entered: 01/24/2007)
2 NOTICE of Interested Parties filed by Plaintiffs Nidia Pelaez, Los Angeles Coalition to End Hunger and Homelessness, Michael Nozzi. (jp) (mgu). (Entered: 01/24/2007)
3 NOTICE TO PARTIES OF ADR PILOT PROGRAM filed.(jp) (Entered: 01/24/2007)
FAX number for Attorney Paul J Estuar is 213−380−4585. (jp) (Entered: 01/24/2007)
FAX number for Attorneys Daniel Grunfeld, Louis Rafti, Hernan D Vera is 213−385−9089. (jp) (Entered: 01/24/2007)
FAX number for Attorneys Stewart Kwoh, Julie A Su is 213−977−7595. (jp) (Entered: 01/24/2007)
4 STANDING ORDER by Judge John F. Walter,(bp, ) (Entered: 01/26/2007)
5 MINUTES OF IN CHAMBERS ORDER held before Judge John F. Walter : Pursuant to Local Rule 19−1, no complaint or petition shall be filed that includes more than ten doe or fictitiously named parties. Accordingly, the court hereby dismisses the action as to Doe Defendants 11 through 100, inclusive.Court Reporter: None present. (bp, ) (Entered: 02/05/2007)
6 FIRST STIPULATION Extending Time to Answer the complaint. City of Los Angeles answer due 2/28/2007. filed by defendant City of Los Angeles. (bp, ) (mgu). (Entered: 02/06/2007)
8 FIRST STIPULATION Extending Time to Answer the complaint. Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles answer due 2/28/2007; Rudolph Montiel answer due 2/28/2007. filed by defendant Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles; Rudolph

Case: 2:07-cv-380 As of: 11/15/2018 11:55 AM PST 6 of 32

02/08/2007 02/13/2007 02/26/2007 02/26/2007 02/26/2007 02/26/2007
02/26/2007
02/26/2007
02/26/2007
02/26/2007
02/28/2007 02/28/2007
02/28/2007 02/28/2007

Montiel. (bp, ) (mgu). (Entered: 02/13/2007)
7 NOTICE of order dismissing does filed by plaintiffs' Nidia Pelaez, Michael Nozzi. (bp, ) (mgu). (Entered: 02/13/2007)
9 MINUTES OF IN CHAMBERS ORDER held before Judge John F. Walter : Counsel are hereby notified that a Scheduling Conference has been set for 4/9/2007 08:30 AM before Judge John F. Walter.Court Reporter: None present. (bp, ) (Entered: 02/20/2007)
10 CERTIFICATION of Interested Parties filed by Defendant City of Los Angeles. (bp, ) (mgu). (Entered: 02/27/2007)
11 NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION to Dismiss Complaint for failure to state a claim filed by defendant City of Los Angeles. Motion set for hearing on 3/19/2007 at 01:30 PM before Judge John F. Walter. Lodged proposed order. (bp, ) (mgu). (Entered: 03/01/2007)
12 DECLARATION of Heather E. Davis in support of MOTION to Dismiss Case 11 filed by defendant City of Los Angeles. (bp, ) (mgu). (Entered: 03/01/2007)
13 PROOF OF SERVICE Executed by plaintiffs' Nidia Pelaez, Michael Nozzi, upon Rudolph Montiel served on 1/22/2007, answer due 2/11/2007. The Summons and Complaint were served by personal service, by federal statute, upon Brant H. Dveirin, esq. Due Dilligence declaration not attached. Original Summons not returned. (bp, ) (mgu). (Entered: 03/02/2007)
PROOF OF SERVICE Executed by plaintiffs' Nidia Pelaez, Michael Nozzi, upon Rudolph Montiel served on 1/19/2007, answer due 2/8/2007. The Summons and Complaint were served by personal service, by federal statute, upon Shirlie Hopgood, person authorized to accept. Due Dilligence declaration not attached. Original Summons not returned. (bp, ) (Entered: 03/02/2007)
PROOF OF SERVICE Executed by plaintiffs' Nidia Pelaez, Michael Nozzi, upon Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles served on 1/18/2007, answer due 2/7/2007. The Summons and Complaint were served by personal service, by federal statute, upon Shirlie Hopgood, person authorized to accept. Due Dilligence declaration not attached. Original Summons not returned. (bp, ) (Entered: 03/02/2007)
PROOF OF SERVICE Executed by plaintiffs' Nidia Pelaez, Los Angeles Coalition to End Hunger and Homelessness, Michael Nozzi, upon The Summons and Complaint were served by personal service, by federal statute, upon Maria Vizcarra. Due Dilligence declaration not attached. Original Summons not returned. (bp, ) (Entered: 03/02/2007)
14 PROOF OF SERVICE Executed by plaintiffs' Nidia Pelaez, Los Angeles Coalition to End Hunger and Homelessness, Michael Nozzi, upon City of Los Angeles served on 1/18/2007, answer due 2/7/2007. The Summons and Complaint were served by personal service, by federal statute, upon Judith Ortega, person authorized to accept. Due Dilligence declaration not attached. Original Summons not returned. (bp, ) (Entered: 03/02/2007)
15 CERTIFICATION of Interested Parties filed by Defendants Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles, Rudolph Montiel. (bp, ) (mgu). (Entered: 03/06/2007)
16 NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION to Dismiss as to the second,third and fifth through seventh countsin plaintiffs' complaint filed by defendants' Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles, Rudolph Montiel. Motion set for hearing on 3/26/2007 at 01:30 PM before Judge John F. Walter. Lodged proposed order. (bp, ) (mgu). (Entered: 03/06/2007)
17 DECLARATION of Brant H. Dveirin in support of MOTION to Dismiss Case 16 filed by defendants' Los Angeles Coalition to End Hunger and Homelessness, Rudolph Montiel. (bp, ) (mer). (Entered: 03/06/2007)
18 REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE re MOTION to Dismiss Case 16 filed by defendants' Los Angeles Coalition to End Hunger and Homelessness, Rudolph Montiel. (bp, ) (mgu). (Entered: 03/06/2007)

Case: 2:07-cv-380 As of: 11/15/2018 11:55 AM PST 7 of 32

03/02/2007 03/06/2007 03/07/2007 03/08/2007 03/12/2007 03/12/2007 03/12/2007 03/12/2007 03/12/2007 03/19/2007
03/19/2007 03/19/2007 03/19/2007 03/20/2007
04/02/2007

20 EX PARTE APPLICATION to Continue hearing on motions to dismiss and scheduling hearing filed by plaintiffs' Nidia Pelaez, Los Angeles Coalition to End Hunger and Homelessness, Michael Nozzi. Lodged proposet stip. (bp, ) (mgu). (Entered: 03/07/2007)
19 ORDER, Denying the stipulation of the parties continuing hearing on defendants' motion to dismiss and continuing scheduling conference by Judge John F. Walter,(bp, ) (Entered: 03/06/2007)
24 PROOF OF SERVICE filed by plaintiffs' Michael Nozzi, re In Chambers Order/Directive − no proceeding held, Set Deadlines/Hearings 9 , was served on 3/7/07. (bp, ) (rhe). (Main Document 24 replaced on 4/18/2017) (mgu). (Entered: 03/13/2007)
25 EX PARTE APPLICATION to Continue hearing on motions to dismiss and scheduling conference filed by plaintiffs' Nidia Pelaez, Los Angeles Coalition to End Hunger and Homelessness, Michael Nozzi. Lodged lodged stip. (bp, ) (mgu). (Entered: 03/14/2007)
21 STIPULATION AND ORDER that the hearing on defendants' respective motions to dismiss shall take place on the same date, either April 16, April 30, or a date after April 30 more convenient for the court, at 1:30 p.m. by Judge John F. Walter :(bp, ) (Entered: 03/13/2007)
22 DENIED by Order of the United StatesJudge John F. Walter, Plaintiff's ex parte application to file a late opposition brief.(bp, ) (Entered: 03/13/2007)
23 STIPULATION AND ORDER by Judge John F. Walter : that the Scheduling Conference be continued to 4/23/2007 08:30 AM before Judge John F. Walter.(bp, ) (Entered: 03/13/2007)
289 PLACED IN FILE − NOT USED re plaintiff's opposition to defendants motion to dismiss submitted by plaintiffs' Los Angeles Coalition to End Hunger and Homelessness. (bp, ) (mgu). (Main Document 289 replaced on 4/10/2017) (mer). (Entered: 03/21/2007)
26 NOTICE of errata filed by plaintiffs' Nidia Pelaez, Los Angeles Coalition to End Hunger and Homelessness, Michael Nozzi. (bp, ) (mgu). (Entered: 03/22/2007)
28 NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION to Strike the state causes of action in plaintiffs' complaint against defendants Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles and Rudolph Montiel filed by defendants' Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles, Rudolph Montiel. Motion set for hearing on 4/16/2007 at 01:30 PM before Judge John F. Walter. (bp, ) (mgu). (Entered: 03/30/2007)
29 REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE IN SUPPORT OF MOTION to Strike 28 filed by defendants Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles, Rudolph Montiel. (bp, ) (mgu). (Entered: 03/30/2007)
30 DECLARATION of Debra Amenson in support of MOTION to Strike 28 filed by defendants' Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles, Rudolph Montiel. (bp, ) (mgu). (Entered: 03/30/2007)
31 DECLARATION of Brant H. Dveirin in support of MOTION to Strike 28 filed by defendants' Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles, Rudolph Montiel. (bp, ) (mgu). (Entered: 03/30/2007)
27 NOTICE of Change of Attorney Information: adding Todd T Leung as attorney as counsel of record for City of Los Angeles for the reason indicated in the G−06 Notice. Adding Todd T Leung for City of Los Angeles as attorney as counsel of record for the reason indicated in the G−06 Notice. Attorney Heather E Davis will no longer receive service of documents from the Clerks Office for the reason indicated in the G−06 Notice.Heather E Davis is no longer attorney of record in this case for the reason indicated in the G−06 Notice.Filed by defendant City of Los Angeles (bb, ) (mgu). (Entered: 03/23/2007)
34 OPPOSITION to MOTION to Strike 28 filed by plaintiffs' Nidia Pelaez, Michael Nozzi. (bp, ) (mgu). (Entered: 04/19/2007)

Case: 2:07-cv-380 As of: 11/15/2018 11:55 AM PST 8 of 32

04/02/2007 04/05/2007 04/09/2007 04/10/2007
04/11/2007
04/11/2007 04/11/2007 04/18/2007
04/19/2007
04/19/2007 04/20/2007 04/23/2007 04/23/2007 04/30/2007 04/30/2007

35 OPPOSITION to MOTION to Dismiss Case 16 filed by plaintiffs' Nidia Pelaez, Michael Nozzi. (bp, ) (mgu). (Entered: 04/19/2007)
36 REPLY TO OPPOSITION TO MOTION to Dismiss Case 11 filed by defendant City of Los Angeles. (bp, ) (mgu). (Entered: 04/19/2007)
40 REPLY TO PLAINTIFFS' OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS MOTION to Strike 28 filed by defendants' Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles, Rudolph Montiel. (bp, ) (mgu). (Entered: 04/23/2007)
33 NOTICE OF DISCREPANCY AND ORDER: by Judge John F. Walter, ORDERING reply to opposition to motion to dismiss submitted by Defendants Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles, Rudolph Montiel received on 4/9/07 is not to be filed but instead rejected. Denial based on: no proof of service attached.(lc, ) (Entered: 04/12/2007)
32 MINUTES OF IN CHAMBERS ORDER held before Judge John F. Walter : On the court's own motion, the parties are hereby notified that the following motions currently on calendar for 4/16/07 at 1:30 p.m. are continued to 4/30/07 at 1:30 p.m. MOTION to Strike 28 , MOTION to Dismiss Case 11 , MOTION to Dismiss Case 16 . The scheduling conference on 4/23/07 at 8:30 a.m. is hereby continued to 4/30/07. Court Reporter: None present. (bp, ) (Entered: 04/12/2007)
Set Deadlines/Hearings: Scheduling Conference set for 4/30/2007 01:30 PM before Judge John F. Walter. (bp, ) (Entered: 04/12/2007)
37 PROOF OF SERVICE filed by defendants' Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles, re Reply (Motion related) 36 , was served on 4/11/07. (bp, ) (mgu). (Entered: 04/19/2007)
39 ORDER OF THE CHIEF JUDGE (#07−118) approved by Chief District Judge Alicemarie H. Stotler. Pursuant to the recommended procedure adopted by the Court for the Creation of Calendar of Judge George H. Wu, this case is transfered from Judge John F. Walter to the calendar of Judge George H Wu for all further proceedings. The case number will now reflect the initials of the transferee Judge CV 07−0380 GW (FFMx).(rn, ) (Entered: 04/20/2007)
38 MINUTES OF IN CHAMBERS ORDER held before Judge George H Wu : This action has been reassigned to the Honorable George H. Wu. Scheduling Conference set for 4/30/2007 08:30 AM. Defendants' motions to dismiss and strike state causes of action are set for hearing on 4/30/07 at 8:30 a.m.Court Reporter: None present. (bp, ) (Entered: 04/19/2007)
Set Deadlines as to MOTION to Strike 28 , MOTION to Dismiss Case 11 , MOTION to Dismiss Case 16 . Motion set for hearing on 4/30/2007 at 08:30 AM before Judge John F. Walter. (bp, ) (Entered: 04/19/2007)
43 REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS MOTION to Dismiss Case 16 filed by defendants' Los Angeles Coalition to End Hunger and Homelessness, Rudolph Montiel. (bp, ) (mgu). (Entered: 05/11/2007)
44 JOINT REPORT Rule 26(f) Discovery Plan filed; (bp, ) (mgu). (Entered: 05/17/2007)
45 INITIAL DISCLOSURE filed by Defendant City of Los Angeles (bp, ) (mgu). (Entered: 05/17/2007)
41 MINUTES OF IN CHAMBERS ORDER held before Judge George H Wu : The scheduling conference is CONTINUED to 6/14/2007 08:30 AM before Judge George H Wu.Court Reporter: Wil Wilcox. (bp, ) (Entered: 05/01/2007)
42 MINUTES OF Motion Hearing held before Judge George H Wu : Defendants' Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles and Rudolf Montiel's motion to dismiss as to the second, third and fifth through seventh counts in plaintiffs' complaint is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Count 2 is GRANTED with leave to amend; count 5 is GRANTED without leave to amend; count 3 is DENIED; count 6 is sustained with leave to amend; and count 7 is withdrawn and dismissed. The scheduling conference is CONTINUED to 6/14/07 at 8:30 a.m. Judge George H Wu.Court Reporter: Wil Wilcox. (bp, ) (Entered: 05/02/2007)

Case: 2:07-cv-380 As of: 11/15/2018 11:55 AM PST 9 of 32

05/01/2007 05/11/2007 05/16/2007 05/16/2007 05/21/2007 05/23/2007
05/23/2007 06/08/2007 06/18/2007 06/21/2007 07/12/2007 07/18/2007 07/18/2007 07/19/2007 07/26/2007
09/28/2007

46 NOTICE of Ruling filed by plaintiffs Nidia Pelaez, Los Angeles Coalition to End Hunger and Homelessness, Michael Nozzi. (ca ) (mgu). (Entered: 05/18/2007)
51 STIPULATION to Dismiss with prejudice defendant City of Los Angeles filed by plaintiff Michael Nozzi. Lodged proposed order and 1st A/C. (bp, ) (rhe). (Main Document 51 replaced on 4/18/2017) (mgu). (Entered: 05/31/2007)
50 STIPULATION to Continue scheduling conference filed by plaintiff Michael Nozzi. Lodged proposed order. (bp, ) (mgu). (Entered: 05/29/2007)
52 DECLARATION of Barrett S. Litt re stipulation to continue scheduling conference filed by Plaintiff Michael Nozzi. (bp) (mgu). (Entered: 06/05/2007)
47 ORDER by Judge George H Wu, that the Scheduling Conference in the foregoing matter be continued to 6/21/2007 08:30 AM before Judge George H Wu.(bp, ) (Entered: 05/22/2007)
48 IT IS ORDERED that: All claims stated in the original complaint against the City of Los Angeles are dismissed with prejudice nunc pro tunc, dating backing to the court's original dismissal. Plaintiffs have the right appeal this order at the appropriate time, but plaintiffs have waived any right to contend that they were denied the opportunity to amend the complaint prior to dismissal by Judge George H Wu,, City of Los Angeles terminated.(bp, ) (Entered: 05/23/2007)
49 FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT against defendants' Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles, Rudolph Montiel, Does 1−10 amending Complaint − (Discovery), Complaint − (Discovery) 1 ,filed by plaintiffs' Nidia Pelaez, Los Angeles Coalition to End Hunger and Homelessness, Michael Nozzi (bp, ) (mgu). (Entered: 05/23/2007)
54 NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION to Dismiss Second and Fifth Counts of First Amended Complaint filed by Defendants Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles, Rudolph Montiel.Motion set for hearing on 7/26/2007 at 08:30 AM before Judge George H Wu. Lodged Proposed Order. (jl) (mgu). (Entered: 06/22/2007)
55 JOINT Rule 26(f) REPORT; filed by Plaintiffs; estimated length of trial not specified, (ear) (mgu). (Entered: 07/09/2007)
53 MINUTES OF Scheduling Conference held before Judge George H Wu: Deadline to file motions for summary judgment 10/15/07; Oppositions 11/2/07; Reply to oppositions 11/13/07; Hearing on motions for summary judgment 11/19/07 at 8:30 a.m.Court Reporter: Wil Wilcox.(bp) (Entered: 06/22/2007)
58 OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS HACLA'S AND MOTIEL'S MOTION to Dismiss Second and Fifth Counts of First Amended Complaint 54 filed by Defendant Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles. (bp) (mgu). (Entered: 07/23/2007)
56 Opposition to MOTION to Dismiss Second and Fifth Counts of First Amended Complaint 54 filed by Plaintiffs Nidia Pelaez, Los Angeles Coalition to End Hunger and Homelessness, Michael Nozzi. (jl) (mgu). (Entered: 07/20/2007)
57 NOTICE OF ERRATA filed by Plaintiffs Nidia Pelaez, Los Angeles Coalition to End Hunger and Homelessness, Michael Nozzi. correcting MEMORANDUM in Opposition to Motion 56 (jl) (mgu). (Entered: 07/20/2007)
60 REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO MOTION to Dismiss Second and Fifth Counts of First Amended Complaint 54 filed by Defendants Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles, Rudolph Montiel. (bp) (mgu). (Entered: 07/31/2007)
59 MINUTES OF Motion Hearing held before Judge George H Wu : Defendants' Housing Authority of The City of Los Angeles and Rudolf Montiel's Motoin to Dismiss as the second and fifth counts in plaintiffs' first amended complaint. Defendants' motion to dismiss as to the second and fifth counts in plaintiffs' first amended complaint is TAKEN UNDER SUBMISSION. Court shall issue order.Court Reporter: Wil Wilcox.(bp) (Entered: 07/27/2007)
61 JOINT EX PARTE APPLICATION to Continue Motion for Summary Judgment filing briefing schedule and hearing date filed by defendants Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles, Rudolph Montiel. Lodged proposed order.(jag) (mgu). (Entered: 10/03/2007)

Case: 2:07-cv-380 As of: 11/15/2018 11:55 AM PST 10 of 32

09/28/2007 11/26/2007 11/26/2007 12/10/2007 12/28/2007 02/27/2008
02/28/2008 02/28/2008 02/28/2008 02/28/2008 02/28/2008 02/28/2008 02/28/2008

62 DECLARATION of BRANT H DVEIRIN in support of EX PARTE APPLICATION to Continue Motion for Summary Judgment filing briefing schedule and hearing date 61 filed by Defendants Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles, Rudolph Montiel. (jag) (mgu). (Entered: 10/03/2007)
63 ORDER by Judge George H Wu: Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Second and Fifth Counts of First Amended Complaint 54 are hereby dismissed with prejudice. (rrey) (Entered: 11/27/2007)
64 STIPULATION AND ORDER by Judge George H Wu : that the motion for summary judgment briefing scheduled and hearing date be continued to the following dates: Deadline to file Motions for summary judgment 1/28/2008; Oppositions 2/15/2008; Replies to Oppositions 2/26/2008; Hearing on motions for summary judgment 3/6/2008 at 8:30 AM (pj) (Entered: 11/29/2007)
65 ANSWER to First Amended Complaint, 49 with JURY DEMAND filed by defendants' Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles, Rudolph Montiel.(bp) (mgu). (Main Document 65 replaced on 4/17/2017) (rhe). (Entered: 12/12/2007)
66 STIPULATION AND ORDER by Judge George H Wu : that the current deadlines for parties cross motions for summary judgment be extended for 30 days as follows: Deadline to file motions for summary judgment 2/28/2008; Opposition briefs 3/17/20085; Reply briefs 3/28/2008; Hearing date 4/7/2008 (pj) (Entered: 12/28/2007)
67 NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Summary Judgment as to All Remaining Causes of Action & Memorandum of Points and Authorities filed by Defendants Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles, Rudolph Montiel.Motion set for hearing on 4/7/2008 at 08:30 AM before Judge George H Wu. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order Proposed Judgment# 2 Supplement Proposed Statement of Uncontroverted Facts and Conclusions of Law# 3 Declaration Declaration of Shirley Fields# 4 Declaration Declaration of Brant H. Dveirin# 5 Supplement Notice of Manual Filing of Exhibits)(Dveirin, Brant) (Entered: 02/27/2008)
68 NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Plaintiffs Nidia Pelaez, Los Angeles Coalition to End Hunger and Homelessness, Michael Nozzi.Motion set for hearing on 4/7/2008 at 08:30 AM before Judge George H Wu. (Attachments: # 1 Memo of Points & Authorities in Support of Motion# 2 Proposed Order)(Estuar, Paul) (Entered: 02/28/2008)
69 STATEMENT of UNCONTROVERTED FACTS MOTION for Summary Judgment 68 filed by Plaintiffs Nidia Pelaez, Los Angeles Coalition to End Hunger and Homelessness, Michael Nozzi. (Estuar, Paul) (Entered: 02/28/2008)
70 DECLARATION of Paul J. Estuar In Support Of Plaintiffs' Motion MOTION for Summary Judgment 68 With Exhibits filed by Plaintiffs Nidia Pelaez, Los Angeles Coalition to End Hunger and Homelessness, Michael Nozzi. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit No. 1# 2 Exhibit Nos. 2−13)(Estuar, Paul) (Entered: 02/28/2008)
71 DECLARATION of Edward Finegan In Support of Plaintiffs' Motion MOTION for Summary Judgment 68 With Exhibits filed by Plaintiffs Nidia Pelaez, Los Angeles Coalition to End Hunger and Homelessness, Michael Nozzi. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Exhibit B)(Estuar, Paul) (Entered: 02/28/2008)
72 DECLARATION of Michael Nozzi In Support of Plaintiffs' Motion MOTION for Summary Judgment 68 filed by Plaintiffs Nidia Pelaez, Los Angeles Coalition to End Hunger and Homelessness, Michael Nozzi. (Estuar, Paul) (Entered: 02/28/2008)
73 DECLARATION of Nidia Pelaez In Support of Plaintiffs' Motion MOTION for Summary Judgment 68 filed by Plaintiffs Nidia Pelaez, Los Angeles Coalition to End Hunger and Homelessness, Michael Nozzi. (Estuar, Paul) (Entered: 02/28/2008)
74 APPENDIX OF EXHIBITS IN SUPPORT MOTION for Summary Judgment as to All Remaining Causes of Action & Memorandum of Points and Authorities 67 filed by Defendants Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles, Rudolph Montiel. (pj) (Main Document 74 replaced on 4/6/2017) (mgu). (Additional attachment(s) added on 4/6/2017: # 1 doc 74 − Part 2) (mgu). (Entered: 03/04/2008)

Case: 2:07-cv-380 As of: 11/15/2018 11:55 AM PST 11 of 32

03/10/2008 03/10/2008 03/17/2008 03/17/2008
03/28/2008 03/28/2008 03/28/2008 03/28/2008 04/02/2008
04/07/2008
04/07/2008
02/17/2009

75 OBJECTIONS Objection to Fields Declaration in Support of Defendants' MSJ re: MOTION for Summary Judgment as to All Remaining Causes of Action & Memorandum of Points and Authorities 67 filed by Plaintiffs Nidia Pelaez, Los Angeles Coalition to End Hunger and Homelessness, Michael Nozzi. (Estuar, Paul) (Entered: 03/10/2008)
76 STATEMENT of Genuine Issues of Material Facts in Opposition to Defendants' MSJ MOTION for Summary Judgment as to All Remaining Causes of Action & Memorandum of Points and Authorities 67 filed by Plaintiffs Nidia Pelaez, Los Angeles Coalition to End Hunger and Homelessness, Michael Nozzi. (Estuar, Paul) (Entered: 03/10/2008)
77 MEMORANDUM in Opposition to MOTION for Summary Judgment as to All Remaining Causes of Action & Memorandum of Points and Authorities 67 filed by Plaintiffs Nidia Pelaez, Los Angeles Coalition to End Hunger and Homelessness, Michael Nozzi. (Estuar, Paul) (Entered: 03/17/2008)
78 MEMORANDUM in Opposition to MOTION for Summary Judgment 68 filed by Defendants Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles, Rudolph Montiel. (Attachments: # 1 Supplement Statement of Genuine Issues# 2 Supplement Objections to Declarations/Motion to Strike# 3 Declaration of Agbor I. Agbor# 4 Declaration of Kenneth Baldwin# 5 Declaration of Megumi Takarabe)(Dveirin, Brant) (Entered: 03/17/2008)
79 REPLY filed by Plaintiffs Nidia Pelaez, Los Angeles Coalition to End Hunger and Homelessness, Michael Nozzi REPLY TO DEFENDANTS' STATEMENT OF GENUINE ISSUES (Estuar, Paul) (Entered: 03/28/2008)
80 OBJECTIONS TO DECLARATIONS IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' OPPOSITION TO MSJ filed by Plaintiffs Nidia Pelaez, Los Angeles Coalition to End Hunger and Homelessness, Michael Nozzi. (Estuar, Paul) (Entered: 03/28/2008)
81 REPLY in support of a motion MOTION for Summary Judgment as to All Remaining Causes of Action & Memorandum of Points and Authorities 67 filed by Defendants Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles, Rudolph Montiel. (Dveirin, Brant) (Entered: 03/28/2008)
82 REPLY filed by Plaintiffs Nidia Pelaez, Los Angeles Coalition to End Hunger and Homelessness, Michael Nozzi REPLY TO DEFENDANTS' OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MSJ (Estuar, Paul) (Entered: 03/28/2008)
83 NOTICE TO FILER OF DEFICIENCIES in Electronically Filed Documents. The following deficiency was found Incorrect event selected. Correct event is The correct event to use is: Reply (Motion Related), Objections(Motion Related) under RESPONSES, REPLIES AND OTHER MOTIONS EVENTS, action was or will be taken by Filer taken: RE Reply (non−motion) 82 , Objections − non−motion 80 , Reply (Motion related) 81 , Reply (non−motion) 79 (pj) (Entered: 04/02/2008)
84 RESPONSE BY THE COURT TO NOTICE TO FILER OF DEFICIENCIES IN ELECTRONICALLY FILED DOCUMENTS: by Javier Gonzalez Deputy Clerk for Judge George H Wu. The documents are accepted as filed. Please take notice of the deficiencies. Any further incorrect entries will result in your documents being stricken for failure to use the correct events. RE: Reply (non−motion) 82 , Objections − non−motion 80 , Reply (non−motion) 79 (pj) (Entered: 04/10/2008)
85 MINUTES OF Motion Hearing held before Judge George H Wu :, RE: MOTIONS for Summary Judgment Hearings are held. For the reasons stated on the record, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment(filed 02/27/08), and Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, or in the alternative, Partial SummaryJudgment (filed 02/28/08) are taken under submission. Court to issue order. 68 , 67 Court Reporter: Wil Wilcox. (pj) (Entered: 04/11/2008)
86 EX PARTE APPLICATION for Ruling on Ex Parte Application Re Motions for Summary Judgment filed by Plaintiffs Nidia Pelaez, Los Angeles Coalition to End Hunger and Homelessness, Michael Nozzi. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Estuar, Paul) (Entered: 02/17/2009)

Case: 2:07-cv-380 As of: 11/15/2018 11:55 AM PST 12 of 32

02/17/2009 02/19/2009 03/08/2009 03/09/2009 03/13/2009 03/17/2009 03/19/2009 03/25/2009
04/07/2009 04/09/2009 04/16/2009 04/20/2009 04/20/2009

87 DECLARATION of Paul J. Estuar re EX PARTE APPLICATION for Ruling on Ex Parte Application Re Motions for Summary Judgment 86 filed by Plaintiffs Nidia Pelaez, Los Angeles Coalition to End Hunger and Homelessness, Michael Nozzi. (Estuar, Paul) (Entered: 02/17/2009)
88 OPPOSITION IN RESPONSE re: EX PARTE APPLICATION for Ruling on Ex Parte Application Re Motions for Summary Judgment 86 filed by Defendant Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles. (Dveirin, Brant) (Entered: 02/19/2009)
90 RULING ON CROSS MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT by Judge George H Wu, re Plaintiffs and Defendants Cross− MOTIONS for Summary Judgment. Summary judgment is GRANTED on each of those causes of action in favor of Defendants and against Plaintiffs. 68 , 67] (pj) (Entered: 03/11/2009)
89 MINUTES OF COURT ORDER (IN CHAMBERS) by Judge George H Wu: Pursuant to the Court's Ruling on Cross−Motions for Summary Judgment 67 , 68 , filed on March 8, 2009, the defendant is ordered to submit a (proposed) judgment by no later than March 13, 2009. (lom) (Entered: 03/10/2009)
91 PROPOSED JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANTS HOUSING AUTHORITY OF THE CITY OF LOS ANGELES AND RUDOLF MONTIEL re MOTION for Summary Judgment as to All Remaining Causes of Action & Memorandum of Points and Authorities 67 filed by Defendants Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles, Rudolph Montiel. (Dveirin, Brant) (Entered: 03/13/2009)
92 OBJECTIONS to Motion Related Document, 91 Objection to Proposed Judgment filed by Plaintiffs Nidia Pelaez, Los Angeles Coalition to End Hunger and Homelessness, Michael Nozzi. (Estuar, Paul) (Entered: 03/17/2009)
93 PROPOSED JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANTS re MOTION for Summary Judgment as to All Remaining Causes of Action & Memorandum of Points and Authorities 67 filed by Defendants Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles, Rudolph Montiel. (Dveirin, Brant) (Entered: 03/19/2009)
94 JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANTS THE HOUSING AUTHORITY OF THE CITY OFLOS ANGELES AND RUDOLF MONTIELby Judge George H Wu: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that Judgment in the above−captioned case be, and hereby is, entered in favor of Defendants HACLA and Rudolf Montiel, on the one hand, and against Plaintiffs Michael Nozzi, Nidia Palaez, Los Angeles Coalition to End Hunger and Homelessness, on behalf of themselves and similarly situated persons (Plaintiffs), on the other hand. Plaintiffs shall take nothing on their First Amended Complaint. (MD JS−6, Case Terminated). (ake) (Entered: 03/26/2009)
95 APPLICATION to Tax Costs Nidia Pelaez, Los Angeles Coalition to End Hunger and Homelessness, Michael Nozzi filed by Defendants Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles, Rudolph Montiel. (Attachments: # 1 Supplement Bill of Costs)(Dveirin, Brant) (Entered: 04/07/2009)
96 Amended APPLICATION to the Clerk to Tax Costs against Plaintiffs Nidia Pelaez, Los Angeles Coalition to End Hunger and Homelessness, Michael Nozzi filed by Defendants Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles, Rudolph Montiel. Application set for hearing on 4/23/2009 at 10:00 AM before Judge George H Wu. (Dveirin, Brant) (Entered: 04/09/2009)
97 OPPOSITION to Amended APPLICATION to the Clerk to Tax Costs against Plaintiffs Nidia Pelaez, Los Angeles Coalition to End Hunger and Homelessness, Michael Nozzi 96 filed by Plaintiffs Nidia Pelaez, Los Angeles Coalition to End Hunger and Homelessness, Michael Nozzi. (Estuar, Paul) (Entered: 04/16/2009)
98 NOTICE OF APPEAL to the 9th CCA filed by Plaintiffs Nidia Pelaez, Los Angeles Coalition to End Hunger and Homelessness, Michael Nozzi. Appeal of Order, 90 , Judgment,, 94 . (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit 4)(Estuar, Paul) (Entered: 04/20/2009)
99 Civil Appeals Docketing Statement received from Plaintiffs Nidia Pelaez, Los Angeles Coalition to End Hunger and Homelessness, Michael Nozzi forwarded to 9th CCA. RE: Notice of Appeal to 9th Circuit Court of Appeals, 98 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit

Case: 2:07-cv-380 As of: 11/15/2018 11:55 AM PST 13 of 32

04/20/2009 04/20/2009 04/21/2009 04/23/2009
04/23/2009 04/28/2009
04/28/2009
04/28/2009 05/06/2009 05/11/2009 05/13/2009 05/14/2009 05/21/2009 07/07/2009

Judgment, # 2 Exhibit Order of 11−26−07, # 3 Exhibit Order of 3−8−09, # 4 Exhibit Second Order of 3−8−09)(Estuar, Paul) (Entered: 04/20/2009)
100 REPRESENTATION STATEMENT re Notice of Appeal to 9th Circuit Court of Appeals, 98 . (Estuar, Paul) (Entered: 04/20/2009)
102 APPEAL FEE PAID: re Notice of Appeal to 9th Circuit Court of Appeals, 98 as to Plaintiffs Nidia Pelaez, Los Angeles Coalition to End Hunger and Homelessness, Michael Nozzi, Defendant Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles; Receipt Number: 117883 in the amount of $455. (dmap) (Entered: 04/21/2009)
101 NOTIFICATION by Circuit Court of Appellate Docket Number 09−55588, 9th CCA regarding Notice of Appeal to 9th Circuit Court of Appeals, 98 as to plaintiff Nidia Pelaez, Los Angeles Coalition to End Hunger and Homelessness, Michael Nozzi. (lra) (Entered: 04/21/2009)
103 BILL OF COSTS. Costs Taxed in amount of $ 720.95 in favor of Defendants The Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles and Rudiof Montiel and against Plaintiffs Michael Nozzi, Nidia Palaez and Los Angeles Coalition to End Hunger and Homelessness. RE: APPLICATION to Tax Costs Nidia Pelaez, Los Angeles Coalition to End Hunger and Homelessness, Michael Nozzi 95 , Amended APPLICATION to the Clerk to Tax Costs against Plaintiffs Nidia Pelaez, Los Angeles Coalition to End Hunger and Homelessness, Michael Nozzi 96 (rb) (Entered: 04/23/2009)
104 TRANSCRIPT DESIGNATION AND ORDERING FORM For Dates: 7−26−07; 4−7−08; Court Reporter: Wil Wilcox; Court of Appeals Case Number: 09−55588; Re: 98 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Proof of Service)(Estuar, Paul) (Entered: 04/23/2009)
105 NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION to Tax Costs against Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles, Rudolph Montiel filed by Plaintiffs Nidia Pelaez, Los Angeles Coalition to End Hunger and Homelessness, Michael Nozzi. Motion set for hearing on 5/21/2009 at 08:30 AM before Judge George H Wu. (Estuar, Paul) (Entered: 04/28/2009)
106 DECLARATION of Paul J. Estuar In Support of MOTION to Tax Costs against Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles, Rudolph Montiel 105 Motion to Re−Tax Costs filed by Plaintiffs Nidia Pelaez, Los Angeles Coalition to End Hunger and Homelessness, Michael Nozzi. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2)(Estuar, Paul) (Entered: 04/28/2009)
107 NOTICE OF LODGING filed re MOTION to Tax Costs against Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles, Rudolph Montiel 105 (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Estuar, Paul) (Entered: 04/28/2009)
108 OPPOSITION to MOTION to Tax Costs against Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles, Rudolph Montiel 105 filed by Defendants Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles, Rudolph Montiel. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Christopher Pisano, # 2 Declaration of Lois Ludwin)(Pisano, Christopher) (Entered: 05/06/2009)
109 TRANSCRIPT DESIGNATION AND ORDERING FORM For Dates: 04/30/08; Court Reporter: Wil S. Wilcox; Court of Appeals Case Number: 09−55588; Re: 98 (Dveirin, Brant) (Entered: 05/11/2009)
110 TRANSCRIPT DESIGNATION AND ORDERING FORM For Dates: 4/30/07; Court Reporter: Wil S. Wilcox; Court of Appeals Case Number: 09−55588; Re: 98 (Pisano, Christopher) (Entered: 05/13/2009)
111 TRANSCRIPT DESIGNATION AND ORDERING FORM For Dates: 4/30/2007; Court Reporter: Wil Wilcox; Court of Appeals Case Number: 09−55588; Re: 98 (Estuar, Paul) (Entered: 05/14/2009)
112 MINUTES (IN CHAMBERS) ORDER by Judge George H Wu: Granting in Part and Denying in Part 105 Plaintiffs' Motion to Re−Tax Costs. (mg) (Entered: 05/22/2009)
113 TRANSCRIPT for proceedings held on MONDAY, APRIL 30, 2007; 9:00 AM. Court Reporter/Electronic Court Recorder: Wil S. Wilcox, email: wswilcox@pobox.com, phone number: 213−894−2849. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Electronic Court Recorder before the

Case: 2:07-cv-380 As of: 11/15/2018 11:55 AM PST 14 of 32

07/07/2009 07/23/2009
07/23/2009
07/23/2009 07/23/2009 08/27/2010 08/31/2010 08/31/2010 09/01/2010
10/29/2010 11/09/2010

deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Notice of Intent to Redact due within 7 days of this date. Redaction Request due 7/28/2009. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 8/7/2009. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 10/5/2009. (Wilcox, Wil) (Entered: 07/07/2009)
114 NOTICE OF FILING TRANSCRIPT filed for proceedings MONDAY, APRIL 30, 2007; 9:00 AM (Wilcox, Wil) (Entered: 07/07/2009)
115 TRANSCRIPT for proceedings held on JULY 26, 2007; 10:00 AM. Court Reporter/Electronic Court Recorder: Wil S. Wilcox, email: wswilcox@pobox.com, phone number 213−894−2849. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Electronic Court Recorder before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Notice of Intent to Redact due within 7 days of this date. Redaction Request due 8/13/2009. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 8/23/2009. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 10/21/2009. (Wilcox, Wil) (Entered: 07/23/2009)
116 TRANSCRIPT for proceedings held on MONDAY, APRIL 7, 2008; 9:48 A.M.. Court Reporter/Electronic Court Recorder: Wil S. Wilcox, email: wswilcox@pobox.com, phone number 213−894−2849. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Electronic Court Recorder before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Notice of Intent to Redact due within 7 days of this date. Redaction Request due 8/13/2009. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 8/23/2009. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 10/21/2009. (Wilcox, Wil) (Entered: 07/23/2009)
117 NOTICE OF FILING TRANSCRIPT filed for proceedings JULY 26, 2007; 10:00 AM; and MONDAY, APRIL 7, 2008; 9:48 A.M. (Wilcox, Wil) (Entered: 07/23/2009)
118 CERTIFICATE OF RECORD Transmitted to USCA re Notice of Appeal to 9th Circuit Court of Appeals, 98 filed by Nidia Pelaez, Michael Nozzi, Los Angeles Coalition to End Hunger and Homelessness ; Court of Appeals Case Number: 09−55588 (dmap) (Entered: 07/23/2009)
119 NOTICE of CHANGE IN FIRM NAME filed by plaintiffs Los Angeles Coalition to End Hunger and Homelessness, Michael Nozzi, Nidia Pelaez. (Estuar, Paul) (Entered: 08/27/2010)
122 ORDER from 9th CCA filed re: Notice of Appeal to 9th Circuit Court of Appeals, 98 filed by Nidia Pelaez, Michael Nozzi, Los Angeles Coalition to End Hunger and Homelessness, CCA # 09−55588. Appellants' motion for continuance of oral argument is GRANTED. The case will be assigned to a new panel for the December 2010 calendar. Order received in this district on 3/28/2011. (lr) (Entered: 03/30/2011)
124 ORDER from 9th CCA filed re: Notice of Appeal to 9th Circuit Court of Appeals, 98 filed by Nidia Pelaez, Michael Nozzi, Los Angeles Coalition to End Hunger and Homelessness, CCA # 09−55588. Appellants' motion for continuance of oral argument is GRANTED. The case will be assigned to a new panel for the December 2010 calendar. Order received in this district on 3/25/2011. (lr) (Entered: 03/30/2011)
120 NOTICE TO FILER OF DEFICIENCIES in Electronically Filed Documents RE: Notice (Other) 119 . The following error(s) was found: Incorrect event selected. The correct event is: Change of Address under NOTICES. In response to this notice the court may order (1) an amended or correct document to be filed (2) the document stricken or (3) take other action as the court deems appropriate. You need not take any action in response to this notice unless and until the court directs you to do so. (pj) (Entered: 09/01/2010)
121 RECORD ON APPEAL sent to Circuit Court re: Appeal number, 09−55588 Record consists of 3 volumes, One Brown Folder: B0074. re Notice of Appeal to 9th Circuit Court of Appeals, 98 (lr) (Entered: 10/29/2010)
123 ORDER from 9th CCA filed re: Notice of Appeal to 9th Circuit Court of Appeals, 98 filed by Nidia Pelaez, Michael Nozzi, Los Angeles Coalition to End Hunger and Homelessness, CCA # 09−55588. Appellant's requeSt for judicial notice is GRANTED. Order received in this district on 3/28/2011. (lr) (Entered: 03/30/2011)

Case: 2:07-cv-380 As of: 11/15/2018 11:55 AM PST 15 of 32

03/25/2011
04/01/2011
04/06/2011 04/06/2011 04/19/2011 04/19/2011 05/13/2011 05/23/2011 06/28/2011 06/29/2011 06/30/2011 07/12/2011 07/18/2011 08/01/2011

125 ORDER from 9th CCA filed re: Notice of Appeal to 9th Circuit Court of Appeals 98 filed by Nidia Pelaez, Michael Nozzi and Los Angeles Coalition to End Hunger and Homelessness CCA # 09−55588. The memorandum disposition and concurrence filed on March 21, 2011, are hereby withdrawn. The clerk shall file the attached memorandum disposition and concurrence in their place. The parties shall have fourteen days from entry of the superseding memorandum disposition to file petitions for rehearing or petitions for rehearing en banc in the above−captioned matter. Order received in this district on 3/28/2011. (dmap) (Entered: 03/30/2011)
130 ORDER from 9th CCA filed re: Notice of Appeal to 9th Circuit Court of Appeals, 98 filed by Nidia Pelaez, Michael Nozzi, Los Angeles Coalition to End Hunger and Homelessness, CCA # 09−55588. Appellees request for 7−day extension of time to file Petition For Rehearing and For Rehearing En Banc is granted. Petition For Rehearing and/or Rehearing En Banc is due on or before April 15, 2011. Order received in this district on 5/13/2011. (lr) (Entered: 05/18/2011)
126 MINUTE ORDER IN CHAMBERS by Judge George H Wu: The Court sets a Status Conference for April 21, 2011 at 8:30 a.m. (im) (Entered: 04/06/2011)
127 NOTICE of Change of Attorney Information for attorney Barrett S Litt counsel for Plaintiffs Los Angeles Coalition to End Hunger and Homelessness, Michael Nozzi, Nidia Pelaez.Julie A. Su is no longer attorney of record for the aforementioned party in this case for the reason indicated in the G−06 Notice. Filed by Plaintiffs Barrett S. Litt (Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 04/06/2011)
128 Joint STIPULATION to Continue Status Conference from April 21, 2011 to July 25, 2011 filed by Plaintiff Los Angeles Coalition to End Hunger and Homelessness, Michael Nozzi, Nidia Pelaez. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Estuar, Paul) (Entered: 04/19/2011)
129 ORDER GRANTING STIPULATION TO CONTINUE STATUS CONFERENCE by Judge George H Wu 128 . The status conference currently set for April 21, 2011 at 8:30 A.M. be continued until June 30, 2011 at 8:30 A.M. (im) (Entered: 04/20/2011)
131 ORDER from 9th CCA filed re: Notice of Appeal to 9th Circuit Court of Appeals 98 filed by Nidia Pelaez, Michael Nozzi and Los Angeles Coalition to End Hunger and Homelessness CCA # 09−55588. T The petitions for panel rehearing and for rehearing en banc are denied. Order received in this district on 05/13/2011. (dmap) (Entered: 05/19/2011)
132 MANDATE of 9th CCA filed re: Notice of Appeal to 9th Circuit Court of Appeals, 98 , CCA # 09−55588. The Decision of the District Court is AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED. Each party shall bear its own costs. Mandate received in this district on 5/23/2011. (lr) (Entered: 05/24/2011)
133 STATUS REPORT filed by Plaintiffs Los Angeles Coalition to End Hunger and Homelessness, Michael Nozzi, Nidia Pelaez. (Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 06/28/2011)
134 STATUS REPORT filed by Defendants Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles, Rudolph Montiel. (Dveirin, Brant) (Entered: 06/29/2011)
135 MINUTES OF Status Conference held before Judge George H Wu: A Scheduling Conference is set for July 18, 2011 at 8:30 a.m. Proposed schedules will be filed by July12, 2011. :(Case reopened. MD JS−5.) Court Reporter: Wil Wilcox. (pj) (Entered: 07/01/2011)
136 STATUS REPORT JOINTLY filed by Defendants Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles, Rudolph Montiel, Plaintiffs Los Angeles Coalition to End Hunger and Homelessness, Michael Nozzi, Nidia Pelaez. (Dveirin, Brant) (Entered: 07/12/2011)
137 MINUTES OF Scheduling Conference before Judge George H Wu: Court hears oral argument. Parties will file simultaneous initial positions regarding what needs to be litigated in this action and interpretations of the 9th Circuit decision by 8/1/2011. Simultaneous responses will be filed by 8/15/2011. Hearing is continued to 8/22/2011 at 8:30 AM. Court Reporter: Wil Wilcox. (jp) (Entered: 07/19/2011)
138 STATEMENT Impact on Ruling of 9th Circuit filed by Plaintiffs Los Angeles Coalition to End Hunger and Homelessness, Michael Nozzi, Nidia Pelaez (Estuar,

Case: 2:07-cv-380 As of: 11/15/2018 11:55 AM PST 16 of 32

08/01/2011 08/15/2011 08/15/2011 08/16/2011 08/22/2011 12/01/2011 12/02/2011 12/05/2011
12/29/2011 01/24/2012 01/25/2012 02/23/2012 02/27/2012 04/06/2012 04/10/2012 06/27/2012

Paul) (Entered: 08/01/2011)
139 STATEMENT Re: THE MEANING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS' MEMORANDUM (Dveirin, Brant) (Entered: 08/01/2011)
140 BRIEF filed by Defendants Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles, Rudolph Montiel. in Reply to Plaintiffs' Statement re Impact of 9th Circuit Ruling regarding Statement 138 . (Pisano, Christopher) (Entered: 08/15/2011)
141 REPLY filed by Plaintiffs Los Angeles Coalition to End Hunger and Homelessness, Michael Nozzi, Nidia Pelaez to Statement 139 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1)(Estuar, Paul) (Entered: 08/15/2011)
142 APPEAL RECORD RETURNED from 9th CCA Received: Volume(s): 1 through 3; 1 Brown Folder No 74 RE: Appeal Record Sent to USCA (A−26) 121 (car) (Entered: 08/17/2011)
143 MINUTES OF Scheduling Conference held before Judge George H Wu: Court confers with counsel regarding their interpretations of the 9th Circuit decision.For reasons stated on the record, the Scheduling Conference set for 12/5/2011 at 8:30 AM. Court Reporter: Pat Cuneo. (jp) (Entered: 08/23/2011)
144 STATUS REPORT filed by Plaintiffs Los Angeles Coalition to End Hunger and Homelessness, Michael Nozzi, Nidia Pelaez. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 16, # 2 Exhibit 17)(Estuar, Paul) (Entered: 12/01/2011)
145 STATUS REPORT filed by Defendants Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles, Rudolph Montiel. (Dveirin, Brant) (Entered: 12/02/2011)
146 MINUTES OF Scheduling Conference held before Judge George H Wu, Court hears further oral argument relating to the 9th Circuit decision.Parties are to confer and attempt to resolve issues as indicated on the record Scheduling Conference is continued to 12/29/2011 09:00 AM before Judge George H Wu. Court Reporter: Pat Cuneo. (pj) (Entered: 12/06/2011)
147 MINUTES OF Scheduling Conference held before Judge George H Wu: A Joint Report re issues parties can/cannot settle on are due by noon on 2/2/2012. The Scheduling Conference is CONTINUED to 2/6/2012 at 8:30 AM. Court Reporter: Pat Cuneo. (jp) (Entered: 12/29/2011)
148 STIPULATION to Continue JOINT REPORT DEADLINE AND SCHEDULING CONFERENCE from February 2, 2012 and February 6, 2012 to February 20, 2012 filed by Defendants Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles, Rudolph Montiel. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Dveirin, Brant) (Entered: 01/24/2012)
149 ORDER re Stipulation to Continue 148 by Judge George H Wu. A Joint Report re issues parties can/cannot settle on is continued and is due noon on February 23, 2012. The Scheduling Conference is continued to February 27, 2012 at 8:30 a.m. IT IS SO ORDERED. (kti) (Entered: 01/27/2012)
150 JOINT STATUS REPORT filed by Defendants Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles, Rudolph Montiel, Plaintiffs Los Angeles Coalition to End Hunger and Homelessness, Michael Nozzi, Nidia Pelaez. (Dveirin, Brant) (Entered: 02/23/2012)
151 MINUTES OF Scheduling Conference held before Judge George H Wu. Counsel for Plaintiffs will have until August 27, 2012 to file their Motion for Class Certification. Parties will confer re briefing schedule and file a stipulation and proposed order. Court Reporter: Pat Cuneo. (kti) (Entered: 02/28/2012)
152 STIPULATION for Protective Order filed by DEFENDANTS Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles, Rudolph Montiel. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order Granting Protective Order)(Dveirin, Brant) (Entered: 04/06/2012)
153 PROTECTIVE ORDER re Stipulation concerning confidentiality of documents 52 by Judge George H Wu. (lom) (Entered: 04/10/2012)
154 TRANSCRIPT for proceedings held on 2/27/2012 9:02 a.m. Court Reporter: PAT CUNEO, CSR 1600, website: www.patcuneo.com. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter before the deadline for

Case: 2:07-cv-380 As of: 11/15/2018 11:55 AM PST 17 of 32

06/27/2012 08/08/2012
08/10/2012 11/19/2012
11/19/2012 11/26/2012
12/19/2012 12/21/2012 01/10/2013 01/10/2013 01/24/2013

Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Notice of Intent to Redact due within 7 days of this date. Redaction Request due 7/18/2012. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 7/28/2012. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 9/25/2012. (Cuneo, Patricia) (Entered: 06/27/2012)
155 NOTICE OF FILING TRANSCRIPT filed for proceedings 2/27/2012 9:02 a.m. re Transcript 154 THERE IS NO PDF DOCUMENT ASSOCIATED WITH THIS ENTRY.(Cuneo, Patricia) TEXT ONLY ENTRY (Entered: 06/27/2012)
156 STIPULATION to Continue DEADLINE TO FILE MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION AND FOR A BRIEFING SCHEDULE AND HEARING ON MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION from August 27, 2012 to November 26, 2012 filed by Defendants City of Los Angeles, Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles, Los Angeles Coalition to End Hunger and Homelessness, Rudolph Montiel, Michael Nozzi, Nidia Pelaez. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order Continuing Date of Motion for Class Certification and Briefing Schedule)(Dveirin, Brant) (Entered: 08/08/2012)
157 ORDER CONTINUING DATE OFMOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION AND BRIEFING SCHEDULE ON MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION by Judge George H Wu, re Stipulation to Continue, 156 (pj) (Entered: 08/13/2012)
158 NOTICE OF MOTION AND Renewed MOTION for Summary Judgment as to APPELLATE DECISION filed by Defendants Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles, Rudolph Montiel. Motion set for hearing on 1/17/2013 at 08:30 AM before Judge George H Wu. (Attachments: # 1 Supplement NOTICE OF LODGING COPIES OF PREVIOUSLY FILED DOCUMENTS IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS HOUSING AUTHORITY OF THE CITY OF LOS ANGELES' AND RUDOLF MONTIEL'S NOTICE OF RENEWED MOTION AND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BASED ON APPELLATE DECISION)(Dveirin, Brant) (Entered: 11/19/2012)
159 STIPULATION to Continue CLASS DISCOVERY AND DEADLINE TO FILE MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION from 11/26/2012 to 03/26/2013 filed by DEFENDANTS Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles, Rudolph Montiel. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Pisano, Christopher) (Entered: 11/19/2012)
160 ORDER re Stipulation 159 by Judge George H Wu. The Court hereby Orders as follows: 1. The deadline for Plaintiffs to file and serve their Motion for Class Certification is continued from November 26, 2012 to March 26, 2013. 2. The Opposition the Motion for Class Certification shall be filed and served on or before May 28, 2013, and any Reply shall be filed and served on or before June 25, 2013. The Motion for Class Certification shall be heard before this Court on July 18, 2013, at 8:30 a.m. (kti) (Entered: 11/26/2012)
161 STIPULATION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to Renewed MOTION for Summary Judgment as to APPELLATE DECISION 158 filed by Plaintiffs Michael Nozzi, Nidia Pelaez. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Estuar, Paul) (Entered: 12/19/2012)
162 ORDER RE EXTENSION OF TIME FOR RENEWED MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BRIEFING AND HEARING SCHEDULE 161 by Judge George H Wu that Plaintiffs' Opposition shall be due on or before 1/10/2013; Defendants Reply shall be due on or before 1/24/2013; The hearing on the MOTION 158 is hereby set for 2/11/2013 at 8:30 AM. (jp) (Entered: 12/27/2012)
163 OPPOSITION to Renewed MOTION for Summary Judgment as to APPELLATE DECISION 158 filed by Plaintiffs Los Angeles Coalition to End Hunger and Homelessness, Michael Nozzi, Nidia Pelaez. (Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 01/10/2013)
164 DECLARATION of Paul J. Estuar In Support of Plaintiffs' Opposition Renewed MOTION for Summary Judgment as to APPELLATE DECISION 158 filed by Plaintiffs Los Angeles Coalition to End Hunger and Homelessness, Michael Nozzi, Nidia Pelaez. (Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 01/10/2013)
165 REPLY IN SUPPORT OF Renewed MOTION for Summary Judgment as to APPELLATE DECISION 158 filed by Defendants Housing Authority of the City of

Case: 2:07-cv-380 As of: 11/15/2018 11:55 AM PST 18 of 32

01/31/2013 01/31/2013 02/01/2013 02/04/2013 02/07/2013 02/21/2013 02/22/2013 02/25/2013
03/04/2013
03/25/2013 03/25/2013 03/25/2013 03/25/2013

Los Angeles, Rudolph Montiel. (Dveirin, Brant) (Entered: 01/24/2013)
166 Joint STIPULATION to Reschedule Hearing on Renewed MSJ filed by Plaintiffs Los Angeles Coalition to End Hunger and Homelessness, Michael Nozzi, Nidia Pelaez. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Estuar, Paul) (Entered: 01/31/2013)
167 NOTICE of Change of Attorney Information for attorney Barrett S Litt counsel for Plaintiffs Los Angeles Coalition to End Hunger and Homelessness, Michael Nozzi, Nidia Pelaez. Changing firm name to Kaye, McLane, Bednarski & Litt. Changing e−mail to blitt@kmbllaw.com. Filed by Plaintiffs Michael Nozzi (Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 01/31/2013)
168 Joint STIPULATION to Produce Database filed by Defendants Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles, Rudolph Montiel. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order for Database Production Pursuant to Stipulation)(Dveirin, Brant) (Entered: 02/01/2013)
169 ORDER RE EXTENSION OF TIME For Renewed Motion For Summary Judgment Hearing by Judge George H. Wu, re Stipulation to Reschedule 166 : The stipulation of the parties having come before this Court, and good cause appearing therefor, It is hereby ORDERED that The hearing on the Motion is hereby set for February 25, 2013 at 8:30 A.M. (bm) (Entered: 02/04/2013)
170 ORDER FOR DATABASE PRODUCTION PURSUANT TO STIPULATION by Judge George H. Wu, re Stipulation to Produce 168 . (bm) (Entered: 02/08/2013)
171 MINUTE ORDER (IN CHAMBERS) − QUESTIONS FOR PARTIES by Judge George H. Wu: The Court requests the parties to be prepared to address the attached issues (including appropriate references to the record for support of their positions and/or alternatively through the submission of additional materials). (Attachments: # 1 Questions for Parties) (jag) (Entered: 02/21/2013)
172 re: Renewed MOTION for Summary Judgment as to APPELLATE DECISION 158 (Dveirin, Brant) (Entered: 02/22/2013)
173 MINUTES OF Motion RENEWED MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENTBASED ON APPELLATE DECISION (filed 11/19/12) Hearing held before Judge George H. Wu: Court hears oral arguments. The matter is continued to April 11, 2013 at 8:30 a.m. The following schedule is set: Defendants brief March 4, 2013; Plaintiffs response March 25, 2013; Defendants reply April 2, 2013;Court Reporter: Wil Wilcox. (pj) (Entered: 02/27/2013)
174 SUPPLEMENT to Renewed MOTION for Summary Judgment as to APPELLATE DECISION 158 SUPPLEMENTAL STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS AND LAW IN SUPPORT OF RENEWED MOTION filed by Defendants Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles, Rudolph Montiel. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 to Supplemental Statement of Undisputed Facts, # 2 Exhibit 2 to Supplemental Statement of Undisputed Facts, # 3 Declaration of Brant H. Dveirin In Support of Supplemental Statement of Undisputed Facts, # 4 Request for Judicial Notice In Support of Supplemental Statement of Undisputed Facts)(Dveirin, Brant) (Entered: 03/04/2013)
175 Objections to in opposition re: Renewed MOTION for Summary Judgment as to APPELLATE DECISION 158 filed by Plaintiffs Los Angeles Coalition to End Hunger and Homelessness, Michael Nozzi, Nidia Pelaez. (Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 03/25/2013)
176 Opposition to Oppositionj to re: Renewed MOTION for Summary Judgment as to APPELLATE DECISION 158 filed by Plaintiffs Los Angeles Coalition to End Hunger and Homelessness, Michael Nozzi, Nidia Pelaez. (Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 03/25/2013)
177 DECLARATION of Barrett S. Litt In Opposition to Renewed MOTION for Summary Judgment as to APPELLATE DECISION 158 filed by Plaintiffs Los Angeles Coalition to End Hunger and Homelessness, Michael Nozzi, Nidia Pelaez. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 27, # 2 Exhibit 28, # 3 Exhibit 29, # 4 Exhibit 30)(Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 03/25/2013)
178 DECLARATION of Nidia Pelaez In Opposition to Renewed MOTION for Summary Judgment as to APPELLATE DECISION 158 filed by Plaintiffs Los Angeles Coalition to End Hunger and Homelessness, Michael Nozzi, Nidia Pelaez. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 03/25/2013)

Case: 2:07-cv-380 As of: 11/15/2018 11:55 AM PST 19 of 32

04/02/2013
04/08/2013 04/08/2013
04/22/2013
05/06/2013 05/06/2013 05/09/2013 05/14/2013 05/16/2013 05/16/2013 05/16/2013 06/06/2013
06/10/2013

179 REPLY IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' SEPARATE STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS RESPONDING TO COURT'S QUESTIONS TO THE PARTIES FILED ON FEBRUARY 12, 2013, DOCKET NO. 171−1 filed by Defendants Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles, Rudolph Montiel. (Attachments: # 1 Supplement HACLA'S OBJECTIONS TO EVIDENCE AND MOTION TO STRIKE)(Dveirin, Brant) (Entered: 04/02/2013)
180 OPPOSITION to HACLA's Objections to Evidence filed by Plaintiffs Los Angeles Coalition to End Hunger and Homelessness, Michael Nozzi, Nidia Pelaez. (Estuar, Paul) (Entered: 04/08/2013)
181 TEXT ONLY ENTRY (IN CHAMBERS): by Judge George H. Wu; The Court, on its own motion, CONTINUES Defendants' Renewed MOTION for Summary Judgment as to APPELLATE DECISION 158 previously scheduled for 04/11/2013 to 4/22/2013 at 08:30 AM before Judge George H. Wu. THERE IS NO PDF DOCUMENT ASSOCIATED WITH THIS ENTRY.(jag) TEXT ONLY ENTRY (Entered: 04/08/2013)
182 MINUTES OF DEFENDANTS' RENEWED MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BASED ON APPELLATE DECISION 158 Hearing held before Judge George H. Wu. The Court's Tentative Ruling is circulated and attached hereto. Court hears oral argument. For reasons stated on the record, Defendants' motion is continued to May 23,2013 at 8:30a.m. Simultaneous supplemental briefs will be filed by May 6, 2013. Simultaneous Replies, if any, will be filed by May 16, 2013. (See order for details.) Court Reporter: Anne Kielwasser. (kti) (Entered: 04/23/2013)
183 SUPPLEMENT filed by Plaintiffs Los Angeles Coalition to End Hunger and Homelessness, Michael Nozzi, Nidia Pelaez. (Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 05/06/2013)
184 SUPPLEMENT to Renewed MOTION for Summary Judgment as to APPELLATE DECISION 158 HACLA'S SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF RE STANDING AND MANDATORY DUTY IN SUPPORT OF ITS RENEWED MOTION filed by Defendants Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles, Rudolph Montiel. (Dveirin, Brant) (Entered: 05/06/2013)
185 Joint STIPULATION to Continue Hearing Date for HACLA's Motion for Summary Judgment from May 23, 2013 to June 6, 2013 filed by Defendants Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles, Rudolph Montiel. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order Pursuant to Stipulation to Continue Hearing)(Dveirin, Brant) (Entered: 05/09/2013)
186 ORDER PURSUANT TO STIPULATION TO CONTINUE HEARING by Judge George H. Wu, re Stipulation to Continue, 185 . The continued hearing date for HACLA's motion for summary judgment shall rescheduled from May 23, 2013 to a new date of June 6, 2013 at 8:30 a.m. (bp) (Entered: 05/15/2013)
187 REPLY filed by Plaintiffs Los Angeles Coalition to End Hunger and Homelessness, Michael Nozzi, Nidia Pelaez to Supplement(Motion related), 184 (Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 05/16/2013)
188 DECLARATION of Barrett S. Litt re Reply (non−motion) 187 filed by Plaintiffs Los Angeles Coalition to End Hunger and Homelessness, Michael Nozzi, Nidia Pelaez. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B)(Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 05/16/2013)
189 REPLY IN SUPPORT OF Renewed MOTION for Summary Judgment as to APPELLATE DECISION 158 HACLA'S REPLY SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF RE STANDING AND MANDATORY DUTY filed by Defendants Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles, Rudolph Montiel. (Dveirin, Brant) (Entered: 05/16/2013)
190 MINUTES OF Motion Hearing held before Judge George H. Wu. The Court's Tentative Ruling is circulated and attached hereto. Court hears oral argument. Based on the Tentative Rulings circulated today and on April22, 2013, and for reasons stated on the record, Defendants' renewed motion 158 is GRANTED in its entirety. Defendants will file a proposed judgment forthwith. (See order for details.) Court Reporter: Sheri Kleeger. (kti) (Entered: 06/07/2013)
191 [PROPOSED] JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANTS THE HOUSING AUTHORITY OF THE CITY OF LOS ANGELES AND RUDOLF MONTIEL re Renewed MOTION for Summary Judgment as to APPELLATE DECISION 158 filed

Case: 2:07-cv-380 As of: 11/15/2018 11:55 AM PST 20 of 32

06/12/2013
06/28/2013 07/11/2013 07/12/2013 07/25/2013 07/25/2013 07/29/2013 08/09/2013 09/05/2013 09/11/2013

by Defendants Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles, Rudolph Montiel. (Dveirin, Brant) (Entered: 06/10/2013)
192 JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANTS THE HOUSING AUTHORITY OF THE CITY OF LOS ANGELES AND RUDOLF MONTIEL by Judge George H. Wu, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that, for the all the reasons stated in this Courts order granting Defendants Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment, Judgment in the above−captioned case be, and hereby is, entered in favor of Defendants Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles and Rudolf Montiel, on the one hand, and against Plaintiffs Michael Nozzi, Nidia Palaez, and Los Angeles Coalition to End Hunger and Homelessness, on behalf of themselves and similarly situated persons (Plaintiffs), on the other hand. Plaintiffs shall take nothing on their First Amended Complaint. Defendants are entitled to recover costs. 190 (MD JS−6, Case Terminated). (pj) (Entered: 06/13/2013)
193 NOTICE OF ENTRY OF JUDGMENT filed by Defendants Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles, Rudolph Montiel. (Dveirin, Brant) (Entered: 06/28/2013)
194 NOTICE OF APPEAL to the 9th CCA filed by plainitffs Los Angeles Coalition to End Hunger and Homelessness, Michael Nozzi, Nidia Pelaez. Appeal of Judgment 192 , Order 190 . Filed On: 6/6/2013 and 6/12/2013; Entered On: 6/7/2013 and 6/13/2013; Filing fee $455 paid, receipt number LA074642. (Attachments: # 1 Appeal fee paid in the amount of $455.) (dmap) (Entered: 07/12/2013)
195 NOTIFICATION by Circuit Court of Appellate Docket Number 13−56223, 9th CCA regarding Notice of Appeal to 9th Circuit Court of Appeals 194 as to Plaintiffs Los Angeles Coalition to End Hunger and Homelessness, Michael Nozzi, Nidia Pelaez. (mat) (Entered: 07/12/2013)
196 TRANSCRIPT ORDER as to Plaintiffs Los Angeles Coalition to End Hunger and Homelessness, Michael Nozzi, Nidia Pelaez Court Reporter. Court will contact Julia White at jwhite@kmbllaw.com with any questions regarding this order. Transcript portion requested: Other: Motion Hearing. Transcript preparation will not begin until payment has been satisfied with the court reporter/recorder. (Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 07/25/2013)
197 TRANSCRIPT ORDER as to Plaintiffs Los Angeles Coalition to End Hunger and Homelessness, Michael Nozzi, Nidia Pelaez Court Reporter. Court will contact Julia White at jwhite@kmbllaw.com with any questions regarding this order. Transcript portion requested: Other: 8/22/11; 12/5/11; 12/29/11; 2/27/12. Transcript preparation will not begin until payment has been satisfied with the court reporter/recorder. (Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 07/25/2013)
198 TRANSCRIPT ORDER as to Plaintiffs Los Angeles Coalition to End Hunger and Homelessness, Michael Nozzi, Nidia Pelaez Court Reporter. Court will contact Julia White at jwhite@kmbllaw.com with any questions regarding this order. Transcript portion requested: Other: 4/22/2013 Motion Hearing. Transcript preparation will not begin until payment has been satisfied with the court reporter/recorder. (Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 07/29/2013)
199 TRANSCRIPT ORDER as to Plaintiffs Los Angeles Coalition to End Hunger and Homelessness, Michael Nozzi, Nidia Pelaez Court Reporter. Court will contact Julia White at jwhite@kmbllaw.com with any questions regarding this order. Transcript portion requested: Other: 2/25/13; 7/18/11; 6/30/11. Transcript preparation will not begin until payment has been satisfied with the court reporter/recorder. (Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 08/09/2013)
200 Notice of Appearance or Withdrawal of Counsel: for attorney Barrett S Litt counsel for Plaintiff Michael Nozzi. Paul J. Estuar is no longer attorney of record for the aforementioned party in this case for the reason indicated in the G−123 Notice. Filed by Plaintiff Michael Nozzi. (Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 09/05/2013)
201 TRANSCRIPT for proceedings held on 8/22/2011 at 9:47 a.m. Court Reporter: PAT CUNEO CSR 1600, OFFICIAL REPORTER, website: www.patcuneo.com. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Notice of Intent to Redact due within 7 days of this date.

Case: 2:07-cv-380 As of: 11/15/2018 11:55 AM PST 21 of 32

09/11/2013 09/11/2013 09/11/2013 09/11/2013 11/07/2013 11/07/2013 11/13/2013 11/13/2013

Redaction Request due 10/2/2013. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 10/12/2013. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 12/10/2013. (Cuneo, Patricia) (Entered: 09/11/2013)
202 TRANSCRIPT for proceedings held on 12/5/2011 at 9:33 a.m. Court Reporter: PAT CUNEO CSR 1600, OFFICIAL REPORTER, website: www.patcuneo.com. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Notice of Intent to Redact due within 7 days of this date. Redaction Request due 10/2/2013. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 10/12/2013. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 12/10/2013. (Cuneo, Patricia) (Entered: 09/11/2013)
203 TRANSCRIPT for proceedings held on 12/29/2011 at 8:52 a.m. Court Reporter: PAT CUNEO CSR 1600, OFFICIAL REPORTER, website: www.patcuneo.com. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Notice of Intent to Redact due within 7 days of this date. Redaction Request due 10/2/2013. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 10/12/2013. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 12/10/2013. (Cuneo, Patricia) (Entered: 09/11/2013)
204 TRANSCRIPT for proceedings held on 2/27/2012 at 9:02 a.m. Court Reporter: PAT CUNEO CSR 1600, OFFICIAL REPORTER, website: www.patcuneo.com. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Notice of Intent to Redact due within 7 days of this date. Redaction Request due 10/2/2013. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 10/12/2013. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 12/10/2013. (Cuneo, Patricia) (Entered: 09/11/2013)
205 NOTICE OF FILING TRANSCRIPT filed for proceedings 8/22/2011 at 9:47 a.m.; 12/5/2011 at 9:33 a.m.; 12/29/2011 at 8:52 a.m.; 2/27/2012 at 9:02 a.m. re Transcript 203 , 201 , 202 , 204 THERE IS NO PDF DOCUMENT ASSOCIATED WITH THIS ENTRY. (Cuneo, Patricia) TEXT ONLY ENTRY (Entered: 09/11/2013)
206 TRANSCRIPT for proceedings held on 4/22/13 @ 9:30 a.m.. Court Reporter/Electronic Court Recorder: ANNE KIELWASSER, phone number 213−894−2969. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Electronic Court Recorder before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Notice of Intent to Redact due within 7 days of this date. Redaction Request due 11/28/2013. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 12/8/2013. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 2/5/2014. (Kielwasser, Anne) (Entered: 11/07/2013)
207 NOTICE OF FILING TRANSCRIPT filed for proceedings 4/22/13 @ 9:30 A.M. re Transcript 206 THERE IS NO PDF DOCUMENT ASSOCIATED WITH THIS ENTRY. (Kielwasser, Anne) TEXT ONLY ENTRY (Entered: 11/07/2013)
208 TRANSCRIPT for proceedings held on THURSDAY, JUNE 30, 2011; 9:24 A.M. Court Reporter/Electronic Court Recorder: Wil S. Wilcox, phone number 213−290−2849. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Electronic Court Recorder before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Notice of Intent to Redact due within 7 days of this date. Redaction Request due 12/4/2013. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 12/14/2013. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 2/11/2014. (Wilcox, Wil) (Entered: 11/13/2013)
209 TRANSCRIPT for proceedings held on MONDAY, JULY 18, 2011; 9:00 A.M. Court Reporter/Electronic Court Recorder: Wil S. Wilcox, phone number 213−290−2849. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Electronic Court Recorder before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Notice of Intent to Redact due within 7 days of this date. Redaction Request due 12/4/2013. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 12/14/2013. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 2/11/2014. (Wilcox, Wil) (Entered: 11/13/2013)

Case: 2:07-cv-380 As of: 11/15/2018 11:55 AM PST 22 of 32

11/13/2013
11/13/2013 11/14/2013
11/14/2013 11/25/2013 09/04/2015 09/11/2015 09/11/2015 11/30/2015
01/29/2016 02/09/2016

210 TRANSCRIPT for proceedings held on MONDAY, FEBRUARY 25, 2013; 9:52 A.M. Court Reporter/Electronic Court Recorder: Wil S. Wilcox, phone number 213−290−2849. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Electronic Court Recorder before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Notice of Intent to Redact due within 7 days of this date. Redaction Request due 12/4/2013. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 12/14/2013. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 2/11/2014. (Wilcox, Wil) (Entered: 11/13/2013)
211 NOTICE OF FILING TRANSCRIPT filed for proceedings THURSDAY, JUNE 30, 2011; 9:24 A.M.; MONDAY, JULY 18, 2011; 9:00 A.M.; MONDAY, FEBRUARY 25, 2013; 9:52 A.M. re Transcript 208 , 209 , 210 THERE IS NO PDF DOCUMENT ASSOCIATED WITH THIS ENTRY. (Wilcox, Wil) TEXT ONLY ENTRY (Entered: 11/13/2013)
212 NOTICE of Change of Attorney Business or Contact Information: for attorney Brant H Dveirin counsel for Defendants Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles, Rudolph Montiel. Changing Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith LLP to 221 N. Figueroa Street Suite 1200. Changing email and fax number to brant.dveirin@lewisbrisbois.com fax 213−250−7900. Filed by Defendants Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles, Rudolph Montiel in his corporate capacity. (Dveirin, Brant) (Entered: 11/14/2013)
213 First REQUEST to Substitute attorney Brant H. Dveirin in place of attorney Christopher M. Pisano filed by Defendants Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles, Rudolph Montiel. Request set for hearing on 12/3/2013 at 08:30 AM before Judge George H. Wu. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order Order Request for Substution of Counsel)(Dveirin, Brant) (Entered: 11/14/2013)
214 ORDER by Judge George H. Wu: granting 213 Request to Substitute Attorney Brant H. Dveirin instead of Attorney Christopher M Pisano terminated (pj) (Entered: 11/27/2013)
215 RECORD ON APPEAL sent to Circuit Court re: Appeal number, 13−56223 Record consists of 3 volumes, 0 exhibits., 0 transcripts, 1 bulky document #74. Sent to Judges chambers in Pasadena (dd) Modified on 2/17/2016 (dd). (Entered: 09/04/2015)
216 Notice of Change of Attorney Business or Contact Information filed by Plaintiffs Michael Nozzi, Nidia Pelaez (Carroll, Stephanie) (Entered: 09/11/2015)
217 Notice of Appearance or Withdrawal of Counsel filed by Plaintiffs Michael Nozzi, Nidia Pelaez (Carroll, Stephanie) (Entered: 09/11/2015)
218 OPINION from Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals filed re: Notice of Appeal to 9th Circuit Court of Appeals, 194 filed by Nidia Pelaez, Michael Nozzi, Los Angeles Coalition to End Hunger and Homelessness. CCA # 13−56223. We (9TH CCA) order the case reassigned to a different district judgea judge other than the two identified by the current district judge who himself has declined to hear the case further. On remand, further factual development may be needed to determine the size and validity of plaintiffs' class and to determine the appropriate remedy. REVERSED AND REMANDED.(mat) (Entered: 12/01/2015)
219 ORDER from Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals filed re: Notice of Appeal to 9th Circuit Court of Appeals, 194 filed by Nidia Pelaez, Michael Nozzi, Los Angeles Coalition to End Hunger and Homelessness. CCA # 13−56223. The petitions for rehearing and rehearing en banc are DENIED. No further petitions for rehearing or petitions for rehearing en banc will be entertained. (mat) (Entered: 01/29/2016)
220 MANDATE of Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals filed re: Notice of Appeal 194 CCA # 13−56223. The judgment of the 9th Circuit Court, entered November 30, 2015, takes effect this date.This constitutes the formal mandate of the 9th CCA issued pursuant to Rule 41(a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. [See USCA Memorandum 218 , Accordingly, we reverse and remand with instructions for the district court to enter summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs on the merits of the federal and state law claims at issue on this appeal. In order to preserve the appearance of justice, we order the case reassigned to a different district judgea judge other than the two identified by the current district judge who himself has declined to hear the case further. On remand, further factual development may be needed to determine the size

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and validity of plaintiffs' class and to determine the appropriate remedy. REVERSED AND REMANDED. (mat) (Entered: 02/10/2016)
221 NOTICE OF REASSIGNMENT OF CASE upon Receipt of Mandate filed. This case having been returned on a mandate from the 9th CCA, Reversing and remanding the decision of Judge George H. Wu and requiring judicial action, this case has been reassigned to Judge Percy Anderson for all further proceedings. Case number will now read 2:07−cv−00380 PA(FFMx). (rn) (Entered: 02/10/2016)
222 STANDING ORDER by Judge Percy Anderson. Read this Order carefully. It controls the case and differs in some respects from the Local Rules. (mg) (Entered: 02/12/2016)
223 MINUTE ORDER IN CHAMBERS by Judge Percy Anderson: The Court is in receipt of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals' mandate in the above−entitled action. The panel reversed the district court's summary judgment in favor of defendants, directed that summary judgment be entered in favor of plaintiffs, and remanded for further proceedings to determine the size and validity of plaintiffs' class and the appropriate remedy. The parties are ordered to meet and confer no later than February 23, 2016 to discuss whether there is agreement as to the validity and size of the class and an appropriate remedy. Following their meeting, the parties shall file a joint report no later than March 4, 2016. The Joint Report shall include proposed agreement, if any, about the validity and size of plaintiffs' class and an appropriate remedy. If the parties are unable to agree, the Joint Report shall include a succinct statement of the parties' views and proposals for resolving these issues, including any forms of alternate dispute resolution, and any other issues that the parties wish to bring to the Court's attention. (smo) (Entered: 02/12/2016)
224 Notice of Appearance or Withdrawal of Counsel: for attorney Stephanie Dominique Carroll counsel for Plaintiffs Los Angeles Coalition to End Hunger and Homelessness, Michael Nozzi, Nidia Pelaez. Adding Stephanie Carroll as counsel of record for Plaintiffs for the reason indicated in the G−123 Notice. Filed by Plaintiifs Nozzi, et al.. (Attorney Stephanie Dominique Carroll added to party Los Angeles Coalition to End Hunger and Homelessness(pty:pla), Attorney Stephanie Dominique Carroll added to party Michael Nozzi(pty:pla), Attorney Stephanie Dominique Carroll added to party Nidia Pelaez(pty:pla))(Carroll, Stephanie) (Entered: 02/17/2016)
225 Notice of Appearance or Withdrawal of Counsel: for attorney Stephanie Dominique Carroll counsel for Plaintiffs Los Angeles Coalition to End Hunger and Homelessness, Michael Nozzi, Nidia Pelaez. Hernan D. Vera is no longer counsel of record for the aforementioned party in this case for the reason indicated in the G−123 Notice. Filed by Plaintiff Nozzi, et al.. (Carroll, Stephanie) (Entered: 02/17/2016)
226 Notice of Appearance or Withdrawal of Counsel: for attorney Anne K Richardson counsel for Plaintiffs Los Angeles Coalition to End Hunger and Homelessness, Michael Nozzi, Nidia Pelaez. Adding Annie Richardson as counsel of record for Plaintiffs for the reason indicated in the G−123 Notice. Filed by Plaintiff Nozzi, et al.. (Attorney Anne K Richardson added to party Los Angeles Coalition to End Hunger and Homelessness(pty:pla), Attorney Anne K Richardson added to party Michael Nozzi(pty:pla), Attorney Anne K Richardson added to party Nidia Pelaez(pty:pla))(Richardson, Anne) (Entered: 02/17/2016)
227 JOINT STATUS REPORT of Petition for Writ of Certiorari filed by Defendant Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Dveirin, Brant) (Entered: 03/03/2016)
228 IN CHAMBERS ORDER by Judge Percy Anderson: The Joint Report should be preceded by a thorough and frank in−person discussion among the attorneys for the parties.IT IS SO ORDERED. Please refer to the Court's order for specifics. (cr) (Entered: 03/07/2016)
229 STATUS REPORT Joint Status Report and Stipulation filed by Plaintiff Michael Nozzi. (Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 03/17/2016)
230 MINUTE ORDER (IN CHAMBERS) by Judge Percy Anderson: The Court is in receipt of a Revised Joint Status Report 229 . The last day for hearing a motion for class certification will be 7/18/16. Other dates set by the Court are: Jury Trial set for 1/31/2017 at 09:00 AM. Final Pretrial Conference set for 1/6/2017 at 01:30 PM.

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04/25/2016 05/06/2016

Exhibit and Witness List due by 12/23/2016. Last date to conduct settlement conference is 12/5/2016. Joint Status Report regarding Settlement is 12/23/2016., Discovery cut−off 11/21/2016. (mg) (Entered: 03/21/2016)
231 CIVIL TRIAL ORDER by Judge Percy Anderson, (pj) (Entered: 03/21/2016)
232 SCHEDULING ORDER by Judge Percy Anderson,, (Case reopened. MD JS−5.) (pj) (Entered: 03/21/2016)
233 NOTICE ELECTION OF PRIVATE MEDIATION filed by Plaintiffs Michael Nozzi, Nidia Pelaez. (Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 03/31/2016)
234 NOTICE NOTICE OF MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION filed by Plaintiffs Michael Nozzi, Nidia Pelaez. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 04/04/2016)
235 DECLARATION of Barrett S. Litt re Notice (Other) 234 In Support of Motion for Class Certification filed by Plaintiffs Michael Nozzi, Nidia Pelaez. (Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 04/04/2016)
236 DECLARATION of Anne Richardson re Notice (Other) 234 In Support of Motion for Class Certification filed by Plaintiffs Michael Nozzi, Nidia Pelaez. (Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 04/04/2016)
237 DECLARATION of Dr. Brian Kriegler re Notice (Other) 234 In Support of Motion for Class Certification filed by Plaintiffs Michael Nozzi, Nidia Pelaez. (Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 04/04/2016)
238 Amended NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION to Certify Class filed by Plaintiffs Michael Nozzi, Nidia Pelaez. Motion set for hearing on 5/9/2016 at 01:30 PM before Judge Percy Anderson. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order) (Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 04/04/2016)
239 DECLARATION of Nidia Palaez In Support Of Amended NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION to Certify Class 238 filed by Plaintiffs Michael Nozzi, Nidia Pelaez. (Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 04/05/2016)
240 Opposition re: Amended NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION to Certify Class 238 filed by Defendants Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles, Rudolph Montiel. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Attorney Yang Yang Li added to party Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles(pty:dft), Attorney Yang Yang Li added to party Rudolph Montiel(pty:dft))(Li, Yang) (Entered: 04/18/2016)
241 NOTICE OF ERRATA REGARDING DEFENDANTS' OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION to Certify Class 238 filed by Defendants Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles, Rudolph Montiel. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Li, Yang) Modified on 4/20/2016 (pj). (Entered: 04/18/2016)
242 NOTICE TO FILER OF DEFICIENCIES in Electronically Filed Documents RE: Objection/Opposition (Motion related) 241 . The following error was found: Incorrect event selected. The correct event is: Other Filings / Miscellaneous Filings / Errata. In response to this notice the court may order (1) an amended or correct document to be filed (2) the document stricken or (3) take other action as the court deems appropriate. You need not take any action in response to this notice unless and until the court directs you to do so. (mg) (Entered: 04/19/2016)
243 RESPONSE BY THE COURT TO NOTICE TO FILER OF DEFICIENCIES IN ELECTRONICALLY FILED DOCUMENTS RE: Objection/Opposition (Motion related) 241 by Judge Percy Anderson. The document is accepted as filed. The Docket Clerk is instructed to correct the docket entry to reflect the true name of the document as: NOTICE OF ERRATA REGARDING DEFENDANTS OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS MOTION TO CERTIFY CLASS.. (pj) (Entered: 04/20/2016)
244 REPLY In Support Of Amended NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION to Certify Class 238 filed by Plaintiff Michael Nozzi. (Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 04/25/2016)
245 MINUTES (IN CHAMBERS) by Judge Percy Anderson: Granting 238 MOTION to Certify Class Action. (mg) (Entered: 05/09/2016)

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246 STIPULATION to Reschedule to Modify Schedule Due to US Supreme Court Requesting Briefing and Amicus Brief Filed on Petition for Writ of Certiorari filed by defendant Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Dveirin, Brant) (Entered: 06/29/2016)
247 ORDER by Judge Percy Anderson approving Stipulation to Reschedule, 246 . (Discovery cut−off 4/17/2017. Motions due by 4/24/2017. Motions in Limine to be filed by 6/2/2017. Last date to conduct settlement conference is 5/1/2017. Final Pretrial Conference set for 6/2/2017 at 01:30 PM before Judge Percy Anderson. Jury Trial set for 6/27/2017 at 09:00 AM before Judge Percy Anderson. Motion set for hearing on 6/19/2017 at 01:30 PM before Judge Percy Anderson.) (mrgo) (Entered: 08/05/2016)
248 NOTICE of Decision: United States Supreme Court Denial of Petition for Certiorari filed by Plaintiffs Michael Nozzi, Nidia Pelaez. (Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 10/06/2016)
249 NOTICE TO PARTIES by District Judge Percy Anderson. Effective November 21, 2016, Judge Anderson will be located at the 1st Street Courthouse, COURTROOM 9A on the 9th floor, located at 350 W. 1st Street, Los Angeles, California 90012. All Court appearances shall be made in Courtroom 9A of the 1st Street Courthouse, and all mandatory chambers copies shall be hand delivered to the judge's mail box outside the Clerk's Office on the 4th floor of the 1st Street Courthouse. The location for filing civil documents in paper format exempted from electronic filing and for viewing case files and other records services remains at the United States Courthouse, 312 North Spring Street, Room G−8, Los Angeles, California 90012. The location for filing criminal documents in paper format exempted from electronic filing remains at Edward R. Roybal Federal Building and U.S. Courthouse, 255 East Temple Street, Room 178, Los Angeles, California 90012. THERE IS NO PDF DOCUMENT ASSOCIATED WITH THIS ENTRY. (rrp) TEXT ONLY ENTRY (Entered: 11/15/2016)
250 NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment as to Appropriate Remedy filed by defendants Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles, Rudolph Montiel. Motion set for hearing on 3/27/2017 at 01:30 PM before Judge Percy Anderson. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Separate Statement ISO Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, # 3 Appendix, # 4 Exhibit A, # 5 Exhibit B, # 6 Exhibit C, # 7 Exhibit D, # 8 Exhibit E, # 9 Exhibit F, # 10 Declaration Brant Dveirin, # 11 Declaration Rod Solomon, # 12 Proof of Service, # 13 Proposed Order) (Dveirin, Brant) (Entered: 02/21/2017)
251 NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION to AMEND Answer to Complaint (Discovery) 65 filed by defendants Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles, Rudolph Montiel. Motion set for hearing on 3/27/2017 at 01:30 PM before Judge Percy Anderson. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Declaration, # 5 Proof of Service, # 6 Proposed Order) (Dveirin, Brant) (Entered: 02/21/2017)
252 APPLICATION to file document under seal filed by Plaintiffs Los Angeles Coalition to End Hunger and Homelessness, Michael Nozzi, Nidia Pelaez. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order to File Exhibits Under Seal)(Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 02/27/2017)
253 DECLARATION of Barrett S. Litt In Support Of APPLICATION to file document under seal 252 and Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Plaintiffs Los Angeles Coalition to End Hunger and Homelessness, Michael Nozzi, Nidia Pelaez. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 001, # 2 Exhibit 001 Continued (1A), # 3 Exhibit 002, # 4 Exhibit 003, # 5 Exhibit 004, # 6 Exhibit 005, # 7 Exhibit 006, # 8 Exhibit 007, # 9 Exhibit 008, # 10 Exhibit 009, # 11 Exhibit 010, # 12 Exhibit 011, # 13 Exhibit 012, # 14 Exhibit 013)(Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 02/27/2017)
254 DECLARATION of Stephanie Carroll In Support Of APPLICATION to file document under seal 252 and Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Plaintiffs Los Angeles Coalition to End Hunger and Homelessness, Michael Nozzi, Nidia Pelaez. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 014, # 2 Exhibit 015)(Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 02/27/2017)
255 STATEMENT of Uncontroverted Facts and Conclusions of Law APPLICATION to file document under seal 252 and Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Plaintiffs Los Angeles Coalition to End Hunger and Homelessness, Michael Nozzi, Nidia Pelaez. (Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 02/27/2017)

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256 NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Summary Judgment as to Injunctive Relief, Damages/Restitution filed by Plaintiffs Los Angeles Coalition to End Hunger and Homelessness, Michael Nozzi, Nidia Pelaez. Motion set for hearing on 3/27/2017 at 01:30 PM before Judge Percy Anderson. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order) (Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 02/27/2017)
257 Addendum to Application for Under Seal Filing filed by Plaintiffs Los Angeles Coalition to End Hunger and Homelessness, Michael Nozzi, Nidia Pelaez re: APPLICATION to file document under seal 252 (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order Amended)(Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 02/28/2017)
258 AMENDED ORDER GRANTING PERMISSION TO FILE EXHIBITS UNDER SEAL by Judge Percy Anderson re: 252 APPLICATION to Seal Document. Having considered Plaintiffs' application to file only exhibits 1 and 15 to the expert report of Brian Kriegler under seal, which comprise distinct sub−parts of the collective Ex. 1 to Barrett Litt's declaration in support of Plaintiffs' Motion forPartial Summary Judgment. IT IS ORDERED that plaintiff's application is provisionally granted. (mrgo) (Entered: 03/02/2017)
259 STIPULATION FOLLOWING FIRST MEDIATION SESSION WITH JUDGE (RET.) GARY FEESS REGARDING BRIEFING AND HEARIG ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT re NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment as to Appropriate Remedy 250 filed by Defendant Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Dveirin, Brant) (Entered: 03/02/2017)
260 MINUTE ORDER IN CHAMBERS − COURT ORDER by Judge Percy Anderson re: Motion Related Document, 259 . The Stipulation is denied without prejudice. The current briefing schedules remain intact. The Parties should address all issues raised in the existing Motions for Summary Judgment in their Opposition and Reply briefs. (See Docket Nos. 250, 256.) If, after briefing is completed, the Court determines that it is appropriate to defer ruling on issues 510 in Plaintiffs Notice of Motion, the Court reserves the right to do so. (mrgo) (Entered: 03/03/2017)
261 Opposition Opposition re: NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment as to Appropriate Remedy 250 filed by Plaintiffs Los Angeles Coalition to End Hunger and Homelessness, Michael Nozzi, Nidia Pelaez. (Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 03/06/2017)
262 Objection Objection to Defendants' Evidence re: NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment as to Appropriate Remedy 250 Evidentiary Objections filed by Plaintiffs Los Angeles Coalition to End Hunger and Homelessness, Michael Nozzi, Nidia Pelaez. (Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 03/06/2017)
263 DECLARATION of Stephanie Carroll In Opposition To NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment as to Appropriate Remedy 250 filed by Plaintiffs Los Angeles Coalition to End Hunger and Homelessness, Michael Nozzi, Nidia Pelaez. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 016, # 2 Exhibit 017, # 3 Exhibit 018, # 4 Exhibit 019, # 5 Exhibit 020, # 6 Exhibit 021, # 7 Exhibit 022, # 8 Exhibit 023, # 9 Exhibit 024, # 10 Exhibit 025, # 11 Exhibit 026, # 12 Exhibit 027, # 13 Exhibit 028, # 14 Exhibit 029, # 15 Exhibit 030)(Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 03/06/2017)
264 Opposition Opposition to re: NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION to AMEND Answer to Complaint (Discovery) 65 251 filed by Plaintiffs Los Angeles Coalition to End Hunger and Homelessness, Michael Nozzi, Nidia Pelaez. (Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 03/06/2017)
265 STATEMENT of Genuine Issues of Material Fact NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment as to Appropriate Remedy 250 filed by Plaintiffs Los Angeles Coalition to End Hunger and Homelessness, Michael Nozzi, Nidia Pelaez. (Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 03/06/2017)
266 REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE re NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment as to Appropriate Remedy 250 filed by Plaintiffs Los Angeles Coalition to End Hunger and Homelessness, Michael Nozzi, Nidia Pelaez. (Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 03/06/2017)

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03/06/2017
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03/13/2017 03/13/2017

267 MEMORANDUM in Opposition to NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Summary Judgment as to Injunctive Relief, Damages/Restitution 256 filed by Defendant Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration DECLARATION OF BRANT H. DVEIRIN IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON INJUNCTIVE RELIEF, DAMAGES RESTITUTION, # 2 Declaration DECLARATION OF PATRICIA MENDOZA IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON INJUNCTIVE RELIEF, DAMAGES RESTITUTION, # 3 Exhibit 1, # 4 Exhibit 2, # 5 Declaration DECLARATION OF MICHAEL BUCHANAN IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON INJUNCTIVE RELIEF, DAMAGES RESTITUTION, # 6 Exhibit 1, # 7 Exhibit 2)(Dveirin, Brant) (Entered: 03/06/2017)
268 STATEMENT of OF GENUINE DISPUTES FILED IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Summary Judgment as to Injunctive Relief, Damages/Restitution 256 filed by Defendant Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles. (Dveirin, Brant) (Entered: 03/06/2017)
269 REPLY in Support of NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION to AMEND Answer to Complaint (Discovery) 65 251 filed by Defendant Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Brant H. Dveirin In Support of Reply to Motion for Leave to File Amended Answer)(Dveirin, Brant) (Entered: 03/13/2017)
270 REPLY In Support Of NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Summary Judgment as to Injunctive Relief, Damages/Restitution 256 Reply to Defendants' Opposition filed by Plaintiffs Los Angeles Coalition to End Hunger and Homelessness, Michael Nozzi, Nidia Pelaez. (Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 03/13/2017)
271 DECLARATION of Barrett S. Litt In Support Of NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Summary Judgment as to Injunctive Relief, Damages/Restitution 256 filed by Plaintiffs Los Angeles Coalition to End Hunger and Homelessness, Michael Nozzi, Nidia Pelaez. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 031, # 2 Exhibit 032, # 3 Exhibit 033)(Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 03/13/2017)
272 REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE re NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Summary Judgment as to Injunctive Relief, Damages/Restitution 256 filed by Plaintiffs Los Angeles Coalition to End Hunger and Homelessness, Michael Nozzi, Nidia Pelaez. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 033)(Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 03/13/2017)
273 Objection In Opposition re: NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment as to Appropriate Remedy 250 Defendants' Dkt No. 250 #2 filed by Plaintiffs Los Angeles Coalition to End Hunger and Homelessness, Michael Nozzi, Nidia Pelaez. (Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 03/13/2017)
274 REPLY Reply in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment as to Appropriate Remedy 250 filed by Defendants Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles, Rudolph Montiel. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration OF HELEN YUN IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' REPLY TO OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT, # 2 Exhibit A, # 3 Declaration of Patricia Mendoza in Support of Defendants' Reply to Opposition to Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, # 4 Exhibit A (Part I), # 5 Exhibit A (Part II))(Dveirin, Brant) (Entered: 03/13/2017)
275 STATEMENT of DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' SEPARATE STATEMENT IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment as to Appropriate Remedy 250 filed by Defendants Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles, Rudolph Montiel. (Dveirin, Brant) (Entered: 03/13/2017)
276 RESPONSE IN SUPPORT of NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment as to Appropriate Remedy 250 DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' OBJECTIONS IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT filed by Defendants Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles, Rudolph Montiel. (Dveirin, Brant) (Entered: 03/13/2017)

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277 NOTICE OF ERRATA filed by Plaintiffs Los Angeles Coalition to End Hunger and Homelessness, Michael Nozzi, Nidia Pelaez. correcting Declaration (Motion related),, 253 (Attachments: # 1 Appendix A)(Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 03/14/2017)
278 APPLICATION for Leave to file Exhibits 1 and 3 to Supplemental Report of Brian Kriegler as submitted to the Court in the Notice of Lodging filed by Plaintiffs Los Angeles Coalition to End Hunger and Homelessness, Michael Nozzi, Nidia Pelaez. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Barrett Litt re Under Seal Application, # 2 Proposed Order to file Exs. 1 and 3 Under Seal) (Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 03/17/2017)
280 ORDER GRANTING PERMISSION TO FILE EXHIBITS 1 and 3 UNDER SEAL AND ON CD by Judge Percy Anderson re: 278 APPLICATION for Leave to File. (mrgo) (Entered: 03/20/2017)
279 NOTICE TO FILER OF DEFICIENCIES in Electronically Filed Documents RE: APPLICATION for Leave to file Exhibits 1 and 3 to Supplemental Report of Brian Kriegler as submitted to the Court in the Notice of Lodging 278 . The following error(s) was found: Other error(s) with document(s) are specified below: Please refer to L.R. 79 for the proper e−filing procedure. Or go to our Court's website at www.cacd.uscourts.gov, go to the E−Filing tab, click on Sealed Documents. There should be 2 docket entries made: 1) Application (as main document), Proposed order (as 1st attachment), & Redacted Document (as 2nd attachment); 2) Sealed Declaration in Support (as main document) & Unredacted Document (as 1st attachment). In response to this notice the court may order (1) an amended or correct document to be filed (2) the document stricken or (3) take other action as the court deems appropriate. You need not take any action in response to this notice unless and until the court directs you to do so. (cr) (Entered: 03/20/2017)
281 Objection To In Support Of re: NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Summary Judgment as to Injunctive Relief, Damages/Restitution 256 Objection to Defendants' Reply to Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Plaintiffs Los Angeles Coalition to End Hunger and Homelessness, Michael Nozzi, Nidia Pelaez. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Barrett S. LItt)(Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 03/20/2017)
282 SUPPLEMENT to Report of Brian Kriegler Filed as Exhibit 031 to the Declaration of Barrett S. Litt on March 13, 2017, Dkt 271−1 filed by Plaintiffs Los Angeles Coalition to End Hunger and Homelessness, Michael Nozzi, Nidia Pelaez. (Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 03/20/2017)
283 DECLARATION of Michael Buchanan in Support of NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment as to Appropriate Remedy 250 filed by Defendant Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles. (Dveirin, Brant) (Entered: 03/21/2017)
284 NOTICE of Manual Filing filed by Plaintiffs Los Angeles Coalition to End Hunger and Homelessness, Michael Nozzi, Nidia Pelaez of UNDER SEAL − Exhibits 1 and 3 to Supplemental Report of Brian Kriegler s. (Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 03/21/2017)
285 TEXT ONLY ENTRY ORDER by Judge Percy Anderson: On the Court's own motion, Defendants MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment 250 , MOTION for Leave to File Amended Answer 251 and Plaintiffs MOTION for Summary Judgment 256 currently set for hearing on March 27, 2017 are hereby VACATED. No appearances are necessary THERE IS NO PDF DOCUMENT ASSOCIATED WITH THIS ENTRY. (vv) (Entered: 03/24/2017)
286 First STIPULATION for Settlement filed by Defendant Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Dveirin, Brant) (Entered: 03/24/2017)
287 (IN CHAMBERS) ORDER by Judge Percy Anderson: The Court has been advised that a settlement has been reached in this action. The hearing on Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment on Injunctive Relief, Damages/Restitution (Docket No. 256), Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Docket No. 250), and Defendants' Motion for Leave to File an Amended Answer to Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint (Docket No. 251) currently scheduled for March 27, 2017, is continued to April 17, 2017, at 1:30 p.m. Please refer to the Court's order for specifics. (cr) (Entered: 03/24/2017)

Case: 2:07-cv-380 As of: 11/15/2018 11:55 AM PST 29 of 32

04/05/2017
06/02/2017 06/02/2017
06/09/2017 06/14/2017 06/19/2017 06/19/2017 06/19/2017 06/23/2017 06/23/2017 06/25/2017 06/27/2017
06/27/2017

290 ORDER RE: STIPULATION FOR SETTLEMENT [TAKING ALL PENDING MOTIONS OFF CALENDAR AND VACATING ALL PRETRIAL AND TRIAL DATES] approved by Judge Percy Anderson, re Stipulation for Settlement 286 . A proposed stipulated preliminary approval order with the appropriate accompanying exhibits shall be submitted to the court no later than 6/2/17. (mrgo) (Entered: 04/06/2017)
291 Joint STIPULATION for Extension of Time to File Preliminary Approval Order filed by Plaintiffs Los Angeles Coalition to End Hunger and Homelessness, Michael Nozzi, Nidia Pelaez. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 06/02/2017)
292 ORDER EXTENDING BY ONE WEEK THE DATE TO FILE PRELIMINARY APPROVAL SETTLEMENT DOCUMENTS by Judge Percy Anderson, re Stipulation for Extension of Time to File 291 : The Court, having reviewed the joint stipulation of the parties regarding the need for a one weeks extension for the submission of the preliminary approval order and accompanying exhibits, and Good Cause Appearing Therefore, it is hereby ORDERED that The preliminary approval order, accompanied by all relevant exhibits, shall be filed no later than June 9, 2017. (bm) (Entered: 06/05/2017)
293 SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT filed by Plaintiffs Michael Nozzi, Nidia Pelaez. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit B−Claim Form, # 2 Exhibit C−Class Notice, # 3 Exhibit D−Kriegler Memo, # 4 Exhibit E−Class Administrator's Bid, # 5 Proposed Order Preliminary Approval Order)(Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 06/09/2017)
294 (IN CHAMBERS) COURT ORDER 293 by Judge Percy Anderson: Plaintiffs are ordered to file a noticed Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement on or before June 29, 2017. IT IS SO ORDERED. Please refer to the Court's order for specifics. (cr) (Entered: 06/15/2017)
295 Joint STIPULATION for Relief from to Shorten Time for Hearing filed by Plaintiffs Michael Nozzi, Nidia Pelaez. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 06/19/2017)
296 MEMORANDUM of Points and Authorities in Support filed by Plaintiffs Michael Nozzi, Nidia Pelaez. Motion for Preliminary Approval (Litt, Barrett) Modified on 7/31/2017 (mrgo). (Entered: 06/19/2017)
297 SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT Proposed Settlement Order and Agreement filed by Plaintiff Nidia Pelaez. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E)(Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 06/19/2017)
298 ***STRICKEN SEE DOCUMENT NUMBER 302***NOTICE of Proposed Class Action Settlement Pursuant to 28 USC Section 1715 filed by Defendants Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles. (Dveirin, Brant) Modified on 6/27/2017 (vv). (Entered: 06/23/2017)
299 ***STRICKEN SEE DOCUMENT NUMBER 302***NOTICE of Proposed Class Action Settlement Pursuant to 28 USC Section 1715 filed by Defendants Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles. (Dveirin, Brant) Modified on 6/27/2017 (vv). (Entered: 06/23/2017)
300 ORDER SHORTENING TIME FOR MOTION HEARING by Judge Percy Anderson, re Stipulation for Relief 295 . The hearing on the matter may be held on July 3, 2017 at 1:30 PM. (mrgo) (Entered: 06/26/2017)
301 NOTICE TO FILER OF DEFICIENCIES in Electronically Filed Documents RE: Notice (Other) 298 , Notice (Other) 299 . The following error(s) was found: Title page is missing. In response to this notice the court may order (1) an amended or correct document to be filed (2) the document stricken or (3) take other action as the court deems appropriate. You need not take any action in response to this notice unless and until the court directs you to do so. (mrgo) (Entered: 06/27/2017)
302 RESPONSE BY THE COURT TO NOTICE TO FILER OF DEFICIENCIES IN ELECTRONICALLY FILED DOCUMENTS RE: Notice (Other) 298 , Notice (Other) 299 by Judge Percy Anderson. The document is stricken and counsel is ordered to file an amended or corrected document by 06/28/2017. Title page is missing (L.R. 11−3.8) (vv) (Entered: 06/27/2017)

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06/28/2017 06/28/2017 07/29/2017
08/03/2017 09/18/2017 09/18/2017 09/18/2017 09/18/2017 09/18/2017 09/18/2017 09/19/2017
09/19/2017 10/10/2017

303 NOTICE of Compliance with Class Action Fairness Act filed by Defendants Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B)(Dveirin, Brant) (Entered: 06/28/2017)
304 TEXT ONLY ENTRY ORDER by Judge Percy Anderson: On the Courts own motion, PLAINTIFFS' Unopposed Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action 296 currently scheduled for hearing on July 3, 2017 is hereby VACATED. No appearances are necessary. THERE IS NO PDF DOCUMENT ASSOCIATED WITH THIS ENTRY. (vv) (Entered: 06/28/2017)
305 MINUTES (IN CHAMBERS) − COURT ORDER by Judge Percy Anderson re: 296 MOTION for Settlement. Plaintiffs' Unopposed Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement is granted. The fairness hearing for final approval of the proposed Settlement Agreement is set for January 29, 2018, at 1:30 p.m. JND is approved as Class Administrator. Barrett S. Litt, Anne Richardson, and Stephanie Carroll are appointed Class Counsel. The Notice and Claim Form are approved. A motion for final approval of the Settlement Agreement shall be filed in accordance with Local Rule 6−1. (See document for additional details) (mrgo) (Entered: 07/31/2017)
306 MINUTES (IN CHAMBERS) − COURT ORDER by Judge Percy Anderson. Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Docket No. 250), Defendants' Motion for Leave to Amend Answer (Docket No. 251), and Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket No. 256) are denied without prejudice. (mrgo) (Entered: 08/03/2017)
307 NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Attorney Fees filed by Plaintiffs Michael Nozzi. Motion set for hearing on 1/29/2018 at 01:30 PM before Judge Percy Anderson. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order) (Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 09/18/2017)
308 DECLARATION of Anne Richardson In Support Of NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Attorney Fees 307 filed by Plaintiff Michael Nozzi. (Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 09/18/2017)
309 DECLARATION of Hernan Vera In Support Of NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Attorney Fees 307 filed by Plaintiff Michael Nozzi. (Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 09/18/2017)
310 DECLARATION of Lisa Jaskol In Support Of NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Attorney Fees 307 filed by Plaintiff Michael Nozzi. (Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 09/18/2017)
311 DECLARATION of Barrett S. Litt In Support Of NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Attorney Fees 307 filed by Plaintiff Michael Nozzi. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Barry Litt Resume, # 2 Exhibit Civil Rights Litigation Awards, # 3 Exhibit Non−Reported Cases, # 4 Exhibit Billing/Timekeeping Records, # 5 Exhibit Costs Detail, # 6 Exhibit Resume of Paul Hughes)(Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 09/18/2017)
312 DECLARATION of Carol A Sobel In Support Of NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Attorney Fees 307 filed by Plaintiff Michael Nozzi. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit 1, # 3 Exhibit 2, # 4 Exhibit 3, # 5 Exhibit 4, # 6 Exhibit 5, # 7 Exhibit 6, # 8 Exhibit 7, # 9 Exhibit 8, # 10 Exhibit 9, # 11 Exhibit 10, # 12 Exhibit 11, # 13 Exhibit 12)(Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 09/18/2017)
313 NOTICE TO FILER OF DEFICIENCIES in Electronically Filed Documents RE: Declaration (Motion related) 309 . The following error(s) was/were found: Title page is missing. In response to this notice, the Court may: (1) order an amended or correct document to be filed; (2) order the document stricken; or (3) take other action as the Court deems appropriate. You need not take any action in response to this notice unless and until the Court directs you to do so. (mrgo) (Entered: 09/19/2017)
314 NOTICE OF CLERICAL ERROR: Due to clerical error Re: Deficiency in Electronically Filed Documents (G−112A) − optional html form, 313 . The deficiency was issued in error and doc. no. 309 is accepted as filed. (mrgo) (Entered: 09/19/2017)
315 Pursuant to Local Rule 5−4.3.1, documents filed electronically must be submitted in Portable Document Format ("PDF"), created using word−processing software, and published to PDF from the original word−processing file to permit the electronic

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10/19/2017 10/20/2017
11/13/2017 11/20/2017 11/30/2017 12/20/2017 12/22/2017
12/22/2017 12/22/2017 12/22/2017 12/27/2017

version of the document to be searched. Other than signature pages, PDF IMAGES CREATED BY SCANNING PAPER DOCUMENTS ARE PROHIBITED. Violation of Local Rule 5−4.3.1 may result in the striking of the offending document and the imposition of monetary or other sanctions. THERE IS NO PDF DOCUMENT ASSOCIATED WITH THIS ENTRY. (rrp) TEXT ONLY ENTRY (Entered: 10/10/2017)
316 Joint STIPULATION for Order to permit additional class member outreach filed by Plaintiffs Los Angeles Coalition to End Hunger and Homelessness, Michael Nozzi, Nidia Pelaez. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Outreach Document, # 2 Proposed Order)(Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 10/19/2017)
317 ORDER RE STIPULATION REGARDING ADDITIONAL OUTREACH TO CLASS MEMBERS by Judge Percy Anderson. The Parties have stipulated that:Plaintiffs counsel may produce the communication attached as Exhibit A (the Flyer) in poster and flyer format to be distributed to tenant groups, community groups, churches, legal and social service providers, legislators and policy makers, in the City of Los Angeles area, to increase awareness of the settlement in this case and encourage class members to make a claim. Plaintiffs counsel may incur expenses in the amount of $300 for the printing and production of the Flyer, and such costs up to the $300 amount agreed may be claimed as costs by Plaintiffs attorneys in this action at the time of Final Approval. IT IS SO ORDERED. (yl) (Entered: 10/23/2017)
318 OBJECTION TO CLASS ACTION filed by Interested Party Charles Jackson. (mrgo) (Entered: 11/16/2017)
319 OBJECTION RE SETTLEMENT filed by Interested Party Charles Jackson. (mrgo) (Entered: 11/29/2017)
320 NOTICE filed by Interested Party Charles Jackson, Michael Nozzi. Notice of Withdrawal of Objection by Charles Jackson (Richardson, Anne) (Entered: 11/30/2017)
321 NOTICE of Change of address by Barrett S Litt attorney for Plaintiff Michael Nozzi. Changing attorneys address to 975 East Green Street, Pasadena, CA 91106. Filed by Plaintiff Michael Nozzi. (Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 12/20/2017)
322 NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Order for Final Approval of Class Action Settlement filed by Plaintiffs Michael Nozzi, Nidia Pelaez. Motion set for hearing on 1/29/2018 at 01:30 PM before Judge Percy Anderson. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order) (Litt, Barrett) ** HEARING DATE CORRECTION FROM 1/31/2018 TO 1/29/2018, PURSUANT TO THE RESPONSE BY THE COURT TO NOTICE TO FILER OF DEFICIENCIES IN ELECTRONICALLY FILED DOCUMENTS FILED 1/4/2018 327 ** Modified on 1/5/2018 (gk). (Entered: 12/22/2017)
323 DECLARATION of Barrett S. Litt In Support Of NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Order for Final Approval of Class Action Settlement 322 filed by Plaintiffs Michael Nozzi, Nidia Pelaez. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit 4, # 5 Exhibit 5, # 6 Exhibit 6, # 7 Exhibit 7)(Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 12/22/2017)
324 DECLARATION of Anne Richardson In Support Of NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Order for Final Approval of Class Action Settlement 322 filed by Plaintiffs Michael Nozzi, Nidia Pelaez. (Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 12/22/2017)
325 DECLARATION of Patricia Mendoza In Support Of NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Order for Final Approval of Class Action Settlement 322 filed by Plaintiff Michael Nozzi. (Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 12/22/2017)
326 NOTICE TO FILER OF DEFICIENCIES in Electronically Filed Documents RE: NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Order for Final Approval of Class Action Settlement 322 . The following error(s) was/were found: Hearing information is missing, incorrect, or not timely. Other error(s) with document(s): Hearing was set for 1/31/18, but page 2 notices the motion for 1/29/18. In response to this notice, the Court may: (1) order an amended or correct document to be filed; (2) order the document stricken; or (3) take other action as the Court deems appropriate. You need not take any action in response to this notice unless and until the Court directs you to do so.

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01/04/2018 01/24/2018 01/29/2018 02/02/2018 02/15/2018
02/15/2018

(mrgo) (Entered: 12/27/2017)
327 RESPONSE BY THE COURT TO NOTICE TO FILER OF DEFICIENCIES IN ELECTRONICALLY FILED DOCUMENTS by Clerk RE: Unopposed Motion for Final Approval filed 12/22/2017 322 . The document is accepted as filed. The Motion hearing is set for 1/29/2018 at 01:30 PM. The Clerk shall amend the docket text to reflect the correct hearing date. (gk) (Entered: 01/05/2018)
328 MINUTE ORDER IN CHAMBERS − COURT ORDER by Judge Percy Anderson re: Declaration (Motion related), 323 . The Court observes that Exhibit 4 to the Declaration of Barrett S. Litt in Support of Motion for Order for Final Approval of Class Action Settlement (Docket No. 323, Ex. 4) includes complete home addresses of certain class members, in violation of Local Rule 5.2−1. Accordingly, Exhibit 4 to Mr. Litts declaration (Docket No. 323, Ex. 4) is placed under seal. (mrgo) (Entered: 01/25/2018)
329 MINUTES OF MOTION for Order for Final Approval of Class Action Settlement 322 ; MOTION for Attorneys' fees 307 Hearing held before Judge Percy Anderson. For the reasons stated on the record, the Court grants the motion for final approval and reserves its ruling on motion for attorneys fees and costs. Plaintiff is ordered to file the claims administrator's final cost estimate by Friday, February 2, 2018. Court Reporter: Victoria Valine. (mrgo) (Entered: 01/30/2018)
330 SUPPLEMENT to NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Order for Final Approval of Class Action Settlement 322 , NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Attorney Fees 307 filed by Plaintiff Michael Nozzi. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A−Declaration of Jennifer Keough)(Litt, Barrett) (Entered: 02/02/2018)
331 MINUTES (IN CHAMBERS): MOTIONS FOR FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT AND ATTORNEYS' FEES by Judge Percy Anderson. For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that the Settlement Agreement is fundamentally fair, adequate, and reasonable. The Court therefore grants Plaintiffs' Motion for Final Approval of Settlement. Injunctive Relief Class Members and Damages Class Members release those claims against Defendants as set forth in the Settlement Agreement, except as to monetary damages for those Damages Class Members who timely opted out. The Court reaffirms its approval of Barrett S. Litt, Anne Richardson, and Stephanie Carroll as Class Counsel and JND as Class Administrator. The Court also grants in part Plaintiffs' Motion for Award of Attorneys' Fees and awards $2,801,776.94 in fees and $152,605.86 in costs to Class Counsel to be paid by Defendants. Additionally, the Court grants $2,500 to Pelaez as an incentive award and $500 to Nozzi as an incentive award. Furthermore, JND's costs of up to $60,000 are approved. Each of these awards and costs are to be paid from the Class Fund. (See document for further details) (mrgo) (Entered: 02/15/2018)
332 JUDGMENT by Judge Percy Anderson, Related to: Order on Motion for Attorney Fees, 331 . IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that: 1. All terms herein shall have the same meaning as the terms defined in the Settlement Agreement, unless otherwise specifically provided herein. (See document for details) (MD JS−6, Case Terminated). (mrgo) (Entered: 02/15/2018)


[CONTENT] January 16, 2007 | two | the Section 8 Housing Voucher Program | the U.S. District Court | the Central District | California ||| the Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles | HACLA | 42 | 1983 ||| George H. Wu ||| Authority ||| HACLA | six | Section 8 | approximately 22,000 |||  ||| 2004 ||| April 2005 |||  ||| November 2007 ||| 2007 | 9658205 ||| First Amended Complaint | 1 | under 42 | 1983 | 2 | 42 | the Fair Housing Act | FHA | 3) Cal ||| Code | 815.6 | 4 | Art | 1 | 7 | the California Constitution | 5 ||| second | fifth ||| 2009 | 10678033 ||| Percy Anderson | the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals | fifth | the first, | third | fourth ||| 425 | Fed |||  ||| 539 ||| HACLA ||| The Ninth Circuit | HACLA ||| the Voucher Program ||| 806 | F. 3d | 1178 |||  ||| November 2015 | HACLA | the Ninth Circuit | January 2016 ||| 806 | F. 3d | 1178 ||| HACLA | the Supreme Court | October 2016 ||| 137 | S.Ct ||| 52 ||| two | 1 | 2 ||| Section 8 | HACLA ||| between June 1, 2005 | September 30, 2006 | HACLA | 2004 ||| 11,870 ||| February 2017 |||  ||| February 15, 2018 ||| 2018 | 1659984 ||| approximately $3.5 million | $6 million | three-year | HACLA | Notify Class Counsel | Section 8 |||  ||| 2021 ||| May 26, 2020 [SUMMARY] On January 16, 2007, two recipients of federal benefits under the Section 8 Housing Voucher Program and a non-profit advocacy organization filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California. The plaintiff sued the Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles (HACLA) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The case was assigned to Judge George H. Wu. The plaintiff, represented by private counsel, claimed that the Authority had violated due process by altering housing benefits to voucher recipients without adequate notice. The plaintiff claimed that HACLA violated six due process and federal regulations by failing to provide proper notice of Section 8 rent increases, which would affect approximately 22,000 tenants receiving federal benefits.

The Section 8 Housing Voucher Program was designed to aid low-income families in acquiring housing by subsidizing private landlords who rented to low-income tenants. In 2004, the defendant proposed cutting back on these federal subsidies in order to meet a federally-set budget. The changes were announced publicly, and would not take effect until April 2005. Individual tenants would not be subject to new regulations until their next annual evaluation, unless they moved before that time.

In November 2007, the court granted in part and denied in part a motion to dismiss. 2007 WL 9658205. Plaintiffs then filed a First Amended Complaint alleging violations of (1) due process of law under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, (2) rights created by 42 U.S.C. § 1437f, the Fair Housing Act (FHA), (3) Cal. Gov. Code § 815.6, (4) due process of law under Art. 1, § 7 of the California Constitution, and (5) negligence. The court dismissed the second and fifth claims and later granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the remaining claims. 2009 WL 10678033. 

Plaintiffs appealed and Judge Percy Anderson of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal of the fifth claim and the grant of summary judgment on the first, third, and fourth claims. 425 Fed.Appx. 539. On remand, the district court granted HACLA’s renewed motion for summary judgment. The Ninth Circuit again reversed, holding that the flyer sent by HACLA did not provide sufficient notice of the voucher program change.  Specifically, the court held that this “failure violated both the requirements of the Voucher Program and regulations and the requirements of procedural due process.” 806 F. 3d 1178. The matter was remanded but included instructions to the district court to enter summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs on the matters of federal and state law at issue on appeal. 

In November 2015, HACLA petitioned the Ninth Circuit for rehearing en banc which the court denied in January 2016. 806 F. 3d 1178. HACLA subsequently petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari which was denied in October 2016. 137 S.Ct. 52.  

Following remand, the court certified two classes: (1) an injunctive relief class and (2) a damages class. The Injunctive Relief Class consisted of all Section 8 voucher recipients whose benefits were administered by HACLA and who in the past received, or in the future may receive, notice of decreased benefits. The Damages Class consisted of HACLA Section 8 tenants, between June 1, 2005 and September 30, 2006, whose rental contribution was greater than it would have been if not for HACLA’s 2004 decrease in benefits. The Damages Class consisted of 11,870 tenants. 

In February 2017, the parties filed cross-motions for partial summary judgment as to remedies. Before the court ruled on these motions, the parties filed a stipulation for settlement. On February 15, 2018, the court granted final approval of the settlement agreement. 2018 WL 1659984. The settlement included attorneys’ fees and other fees (approximately $3.5 million total), a $6 million fund for the damages class, a three-year injunction that required HACLA to: <ul> 
<li>Notify all Section 8 tenants in plain language of a known, likely, or potential reduction in benefits</li>
<li>Notify Class Counsel of any reduction in benefits</li>
<li>Communicate with all Section 8 tenants in plain language regarding anything related to the Settlement Agreement</li></ul>

In return for the injunction and monetary award, the plaintiffs agreed to release the defendant from all claims potentially arising out of the facts alleged in the complaint. The district court will retain jurisdiction over the settlement until 2021. 

As of May 26, 2020, there has been no further docket activity. 