Bobby M. v. Chiles

JI-FL-002-011
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA TALLAHASSEE DIVISION

BOBBY M, et al. , Plaintiffs,
v. LAWTON CHILES, et al.,
Defendants.

CASE NO. 4:83cv7003-MP

ORDER

This matter is before the Court on two motions filed by-

Defendants: (i) an Unopposed Motion to Terminate Portions of the

Consent Decree Relating to Eckerd Youth Development Center ("EYDC")

(doc. 547) ("the unopposed motion") ; and (ii) a Motion to Terminate

Consent Decree and Notice of Automatic Stay ("the contested

motion") (doc. 548), to which Plaintiffs filed a reply memorandum

(doc. 549) . A hearing was held on October 23, 1996 at which the

motions were discussed. For the reasons explained below, the

motions are GRANTED.

In the unopposed motion, the Defendants indicate that all are

in accord that it is now time to terminate all portions of the

original consent decree which has governed EYDC for over thirteen

years, except those portions which relate to so-called

"environmental matters". Based on this agreement of the parties,

and on the expert reports which are part of the reccS^-4'n^ tlfts
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ENTERED ON DOCKET.

.BY.

[Rules 58 & 79(a) FRCP or 32(bl(D & 55 FRCRPJ

Copies mailed to:.

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matter, the Court finds that the Defendants have now achieved
substantial compliance with the vast majority of the decretal
objectives at EYDC. It is therefore appropriate, preliminarily, to
terminate the consent decree as to all. portions of the consent
decree save those pertaining to environmental matters1. The
unopposed motion (doc. 547) is GRANTED.
Thus, the only issue which remains before this Court is
whether the Court should continue to hold this thirteen-year-old
consent decree over the heads of the Defendants as a means of
compelling the officials in charge to address the fire safety risks
identified by the court-appointed expert, or whether the Court
should finally put the decree to rest.
As the Court pointed out in its Order dated October 30, 1995,
at the time that this case came before the Court, vicious penal
practices -- such as hog-tying juvenile detainees -- were employed
at the facilities. All parties agree that the days of hog-tying
have passed, and that conditions of confinement have improved
dramatically as a result of this litigation and as a result of the
1 In their response (doc. 549) to Defendants' motion to terminate the decree entirely, Plaintiffs acknowledge that many of the "environmental matters" requiring action by Defendants -problems involving inadequate drainage of ground water, inadequate ventilation, exposed electrical wires, leaking roofs, inadequate lighting, improper garbage disposal, unsanitary toilets, etc. -have been remedied by EYDC officials. According to Plaintiffs, the unitary environmental matter at EYDC which persists, and which arises to the level of constitutional concern, involves fire safety risks at the facility.
In the words of Plaintiffs' counsel, any other environmental matters cited in the court-appointed expert's report which have yet to be remedied "are relatively minor and appear not to rise to constitutional violations." Plaintiffs' Reply to Defendants' Motion to Terminate Consent Decree (doc. 549) at 2, n.l.

efforts of state officials to achieve compliance with the obligations imposed under the decree. Thirteen years later, the only shortcoming that Plaintiffs' counsel can now characterize as a constitutional infirmity is non-compliance with specified fire safety recommendations.
In the contested motion, counsel for Defendants argues that the newly-promulgated Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 18 U.S.C.A. § 3626 (the "PLRA"), requires this Court to bring the life of this consent decree to an abrupt halt. Based on the plain language of that statute, the Court agrees.
The PLRA states: In any civil action with respect to prison conditions, a defendant . . . shall be entitled to immediate termination of any prospective relief if the relief was . . . granted in the absence of a finding by the court that the relief is narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and is the least intrusive means to correct the violation of the Federal right.
18 U.S.C.A. § 3626 (b) (2) . This provision is applicable to the case sub judice. At the time that this Court adopted the consent decree which has governed this case for over a decade, the PLRA was not yet in existence. For that reason, this Court obviously could not divine that it would be required to comply with the statute's requirement that it enter specific written findings before ordering prospective relief. Nonetheless, under the language of the PLRA, the Court's lack of notice is more or less irrelevant; because the above-described findings were not made, the defendants are entitled to immediate termination of the consent decree if § 3626(b) (3) , the statutory limitation to this "immediate termination" clause, is
3

inapplicable.
According to the PLRA, immediate termination of a consent decree would not be appropriate -- even where a court had failed to make specific findings as enumerated in § 3626(b)(2) -- if the court, faced with a motion to terminate the consent decree,
makes written findings based on the record that prospective relief remains necessary to correct a current or ongoing violation of the Federal right, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and that the prospective relief is narrowly drawn and the least intrusive means to correct the violation.
18 U.S.C.A. § 3626(b)(3). Thus, the statute operates to give a court such as this one a second opportunity to enter findings that would maintain the decretal status quo. Stated differently, a court which -- for whatever reason -- neglected to comply with the requirements of § 3626 (b) (2) at the time that it adopted a consent decree has not condemned that decree to automatic termination at the whim of any party who brings that neglect to the court's attention. For, under the PLRA, a court is empowered to enter after-the-fact findings which would allow the decree to carry on.
In their response and at oral argument, Plaintiffs do not take issue with Defendants' assessment that the Court did not make the findings required by § 3626 (b) (2) in 1987 when the consent decree was adopted. Instead, Plaintiffs ask the Court to find -- now -that the lingering fire safety issues justify continuance of the consent decree. This the Court cannot do.
- In order to resuscitate the consent decree and allow it to live on, the Court would have to make the following findings: (i)

that the unaddressed fire safety concerns amount to an ongoing violation of the EYDC detainees' federal constitutional rights; (ii) that continuation of this consent decree is necessary in order to correct the ongoing violation; (iii) that the consent decree extends no further than is necessary to correct that violation; and (iv) that the consent decree is narrowly-drawn and is the leastintrusive means of ensuring that the violation will be corrected. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3626 (b) (3) . Assuming, arguendo, that the extant fire safety concerns at EYDC, standing alone, could constitute a violation of the juvenile detainees' constitutional rights2, the Court must address the. crucial question: Is continuation of the consent decree a necessary means of ensuring that officials at EYDC take action to remedy the shortcomings in the area of fire safety at that facility? The Court finds that the answer to this questions is simple: No.
The record is clear that EYDC officials have already dealt with and remedied a number of the problems which were identified in the court-appointed monitor's March 1995 report. Moreover, to the extent that some of the identified problems areas remain, they have been noted and incorporated into the renovation and construction plans for EYDC, and they will be eradicated upon the completion of construction early in the Spring of next year. Thus, prolonging the life of this consent decree is unnecessary.
The defendants have gone to the expense of putting plans in
2 The Court notes, having read the cases submitted by the Plaintiffs in support of this argument, that this conclusion is highly suspect.

motion which soon will produce full compliance with the monitor's

fire safety recommendations. All that is left is for the

construction crews to perform the labor which is specified in those

plans.

At oral argument, counsel for Plaintiffs asked,

rhetorically, "What will be the motivation to complete renovations

that [EYDC officials] have had trouble completing since January of

1995 if they [don't] have the injunction?" In answer to her own

question, counsel indicated, "I think that the injunction is

necessary in order to wait until these fire safety risks are

remediated." The Court does not agree.

At this point in time, EYDC officials do not need the specter

of a tired consent decree and continued federal court supervision

casting a shadow over their facility as motivation to see their

construction project through to completion. The Court finds no

reason to reach the rather cynical conclusion that EYDC officials

will scrap the plans they have adopted, and abandon their

construction project altogether, solely because this Court is no

longer directing its vision in the direction of their facility and

maintaining jurisdiction over their activities. To the contrary,

the Court finds that the progress made over the last decade at the

facilities which were governed by this consent decree bespeaks of

the good faith and diligence of the defendants, and provides strong

reason for the Court to assume that the construction will be

completed on schedule.

- In passing the PLRA, Congress sought to minimize the federal

judiciary's tendency to supplant state prison officials' control

over state-run penal institutions for unreasonable amounts of time. To be sure, even under the PLRA, this Court maintains its solemn duty to safeguard the constitutional rights of inmates in the custody of the state. The statute simply announces the truism that a federal judge should oversee the day-to-day activities of a state-run penal institution such" as EYDC only so long as is absolutely necessary to protect inmates' federal constitutional rights. The Court is now convinced that further supervision of defendants and EYDC is unnecessary. For that reason, the consent decree must be put to rest.
It is hereby ORDERED AND ADJUDGED: (1) Defendants' Unopposed Motion to Terminate Portions of the Consent Decree Relating to Eckerd Youth Development Center (doc. 547) is GRANTED. (2) Defendants' Motion to Terminate Consent Decree and Notice of Automatic Stay (doc. 548) is GRANTED. (3) The Clerk is directed to CLOSE this case.
DONE AND ORDERED this U7 day of / L&£>~64<<C/Lt<'l^-, 1996.
M A U R I\CQEE^A/U PAUL, CHIEF DISTRICT JUDGE

 </s> 907 F.Supp. 368 (1995)
BOBBY M, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
Lawton CHILES, et al., Defendants.
No. TCA 83-7003-MMP.
United States District Court, N.D. Florida, Tallahassee Division.
October 29, 1995.
Alexa Freeman, National Prison Project, Washington, DC, Pro Hac Vice, Michael J. Dale, Nova University Law Center, Ft. Lauderdale, FL, Pro Hac Vice, Carole Shauffer, Youth Law Center, San Francisco, CA, Pro Hac Vice, Laurene Heybach, Legal Assistant Foundation, Chicago, IL, Pro Hac Vice, Alice K. Nelson, Albert J. Hadeed, Jodi Siegel, Southern Legal Counsel, Gainesville, FL, for Bobby M, Charles W, Susan S, David Mack.
Joseph M. Freeman, Elarbee, Thompson & Trapnell, Atlanta, GA, Pro Hac Vice, Michael J. Dale, Nova University Law Center, Ft. Lauderdale, FL, Pro Hac Vice, Carole Shauffer, Youth Law Center, San Francisco, CA, Pro Hac Vice, Laurene Heybach, Legal Assistant Foundation, Chicago, IL, Pro Hac Vice, Alice K. Nelson, Albert J. Hadeed, Jodi Siegel, Southern Legal Counsel, Gainesville, FL, for Salvadore S.
Charles S. Ruberg, Florida Board of Education, Office of the General Counsel, Tallahassee, FL, Charles Alan 369 Finkel, State of Florida Department of HRS, Tallahassee, FL, Paul DeMuro, Monitor, Paul DeMuro, *369 P.A.,
Montclair, NJ, E. Jason Vail, Kimberly J. Tucker, Attorney General's Office, Department of HRS, Tallahassee, FL, Janet E. Ferris, Florida Department of Juvenile Justice, Office of General Counsel, Tallahassee, FL, for Lawton Chiles.
Charles S. Ruberg, Florida Board of Education, Office of the General Counsel, Tallahassee, FL, Charles Alan Finkel, State of Florida Department of HRS, Tallahassee, FL, for Betty Castor, William Schossler, Wesley Brazell.
Howard M. Talenfeld, Colodny, Gass & Talenfeld, Ft. Lauderdale, FL, Pro Hac Vice, Charles S. Ruberg, Florida Board of Education, Office of the General Counsel, Tallahassee, FL, Charles Alan Finkel, State of Florida Department of HRS, Tallahassee, FL, for James Towey, Roy McKay.
ORDER TERMINATING CONSENT DECREE AS TO THE DOZIER FACILITY
PAUL, Chief Judge.
This cause is before the Court on Defendants' Motion to Terminate the Consent Decree as to Dozier Training School and for Dismissal with Prejudice (doc. 535). Plaintiffs' filed a response thereto (doc. 537). For the reasons stated below, the motion is GRANTED.
BACKGROUND:
This case has been lingering before this Court for more than a decade. It began in 1983 when a class action was filed alleging scores of unconstitutional practices0907including severe overcrowding and vicious punitive practices such as hogtying in 0907 Florida's juvenile training school facilities. Twelve years later, all parties agree that conditions have improved immensely in the training schools. In fact, everyone agrees that the Arthur G. Dozier Training School ("Dozier"), the subject of the present motion, is in full and complete compliance with those standards which are prescribed by the Constitution of the United States and all relevant federal law.

The original complaint in this matter was settled in 1987 when the parties voluntarily entered into a binding consent decree. Since that year, it has been the duty of this Court to monitor and oversee the physical conditions and penological practices of the State of Florida at Dozier and the Eckerd Youth Development Center ("Eckerd"). With this order, the Court takes its first major step towards divesting itself of its supervisory role over the State of Florida's juvenile justice system.
In the course of this consent decree litigation, the parties provided that the decretal requirements would remain in force until that time when the facilities attained "substantial compliance" with the decree and its various provisions. Plaintiffs are in accord with the state's position that substantial compliance has in fact been attained at Dozier.[1] Accordingly, the time is finally here for this Court to withdraw its supervision and control over Dozier.
ANALYSIS:
The exit criteria stipulation ("ECS") adopted by the parties to this litigation provides for termination of the consent decree and dismissal with prejudice upon a finding by this Court that substantial compliance has been reached. Because the parties have all represented to the Court that substantial compliance has been achieved at Dozier, the Court asserts that it is empowered to terminate the consent decree as to Dozier, thereby dismissing Dozier 370 from the explicit strictures and obligations laid out therein.[2] With this *370 order, the Court exercises its power to terminate the decree.
In this federal circuit, questions concerning a district court's authority to terminate a consent decree are governed by United States v. City of Miami, 2 F.3d 1497 (11th Cir.1993). Under City of Miami, this Court must first determine what was the basic purpose of the consent decree at issue. Id. at 1505. Here, there were two. As this Court has stated in a previous order,[3] the purposes of this consent decree were: (1) to redress asserted violations of 29 U.S.C. § 794, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process and Equal Protection clauses; and (2) to establish a system of programs and services that would be designed to meet the needs of each juvenile enrollee so as to facilitate a successful reintegration into his community upon release.
Once the basic purpose of the consent decree has been determined, a court considering a motion to terminate must next focus its inquiry on whether that purpose has been achieved. Id. at 1508. City of Miami lists a number of factors that a court should consider in making this determination. See id. In the present case, however, a stepby-step analysis of those factors is unnecessary.[4] Here, the Plaintiffs forthrightly acknowledge that "Dozier is in substantial compliance with all constitutional, federal law, and decretal requirements" (doc. 537 at 1). The first asserted purpose of the decree was compliance with two specific federal laws and two aspects of the federal Constitution. Plaintiffs concede that no present violations exist. The second asserted purpose of the decree was the establishment of rehabilitative service programs. Plaintiffs concede that the state has substantially complied with these provisions at Dozier. Therefore, the only rational finding for this Court to make under the circumstances is that the two basic purposes of the decree have been achieved. Under the authority outlined in City of Miami, therefore, the Court orders that the consent decree shall be terminated as it applies to Dozier.
At the hearing on this motion and in their memorandum of law, Plaintiffs have raised two arguments which need to be addressed. First, they suggest that there is a crucial distinction between (1) what they referred to at the hearing as "terminating jurisdiction" over Dozier[5], and (2) what they referred to at the hearing as "dissolving the injunction".[6] Plaintiffs insist that the distinction they raise is substantive and not merely semantic. Although semantical sparring is part of the underlying disagreement between the parties,[7] the Court acknowledges that a 371 substantive *371 dispute is raised in the course of this war of words.
The discomfort felt by Plaintiffs arises not from the way Defendants chose to word their motion but rather from the ultimate request contained within Defendants' requested relief: dismissal of the case with prejudice as it pertains to Dozier. In asking the Court to dismiss Dozier from the case with prejudice, Defendants argue that improvements in the facility merit complete removal of Dozier from the consent decree's application. And although they did not enunciate this position clearly, the Court understands the essence of Plaintiffs' contention to

be an argument that dismissal with prejudice would be improper. Insofar as this is their position, Plaintiffs are incorrect.

Plaintiffs' position is that monitoring of Dozier by this Court's designated officials should cease, that payments of additional attorney fees to Plaintiffs' counsel for Dozier-related activity should cease, etc. They urge, however, that these activities should only be put on hold0907i.e., that they should only be stopped unless and until some future violation occurs. In other words, Plaintiffs feel that the decree should remain as it currently exists 0907that Defendants should have a continued obligation to comply with the decree at Dozier 0907even though this Court's active supervision of Dozier's compliance with the decretal provisions would come to an end. The Court declines to follow this suggested approach; such a decision would, in effect, leave a consent decree hovering over Dozier and its administrators even though there is universal agreement that its underlying purpose has been achieved. [8] The Court will not impose such a result on the State of Florida and its agents.

The Supreme Court has recently approved partial termination of a consent decree where a party is shown to have complied with some, but not all, aspects of the decree. In Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 489-93, 112 S.Ct. 1430, 1445-46, 118 L.Ed.2d 108 (1992), the Supreme Court held that when a governmental defendant is "in compliance in some but not all areas [of the consent decree], the court in appropriate cases may return control to [the defendant] in those areas where compliance has been achieved, limiting further judicial supervision to operations that are not yet in full compliance with the court decree." The Court explained the logic and importance of granting district courts this discretion to terminate consent decrees in part when their purposes have been partially achieved. It said:

This discretion derives both from the constitutional authority which justified the intervention in the

first instance and its ultimate objectives in formulating the decree. The authority of the court is

invoked at the outset to remedy particular constitutional violations. In construing the remedial

authority of the district courts, we have been guided by the principles that "judicial powers may be

372

exercised only on the basis of a *372 constitutional violation," and that "the nature of the violation

determines the scope of the remedy." [Cite omitted]. A remedy is justifiable only insofar as it

advances the ultimate objective of alleviating the initial constitutional violation.

We have said that the court's end purpose must be to remedy the violation and in addition to restore state and local authorities to control of a ... system that is operating in compliance with the Constitution. [Cite omitted]. Partial relinquishment of judicial control, where justified by the facts of the case, can be an important and significant step in fulfilling the district court's duty to return the operations and control ... to local authorities.

Id., 503 U.S. at 489, 112 S.Ct. at 1445 (emphasis added).

Freeman v. Pitts sets out a three-part test for determination of whether partial termination of a consent decree is appropriate. The Supreme Court instructed that partial termination of a consent decree would be appropriate where a court finds that: (1) there has been full and satisfactory compliance with the decree in those areas where the court's supervision will be withdrawn; (2) continued retention of judicial supervision is not necessary to facilitate achievement of compliance with the decree in the areas that will remain subject to the decretal terms; and (3) good faith has been shown to the whole of the decree. Id., 503 U.S. at 491, 112 S.Ct. at 1446. Under this test, the Court finds that it would be appropriate, here, to terminate the consent decree as to Dozier.[9]

As has been indicated many times in this order, full compliance with the Constitution and federal law, and substantial compliance with the decree, has been achieved at Dozier. The Court also agrees with the Defendants' position that Dozier is independent from Eckerd in all pertinent respects and therefore it is not necessary to continue to subject Dozier to the decree in order to insure compliance therewith at Eckerd. Lastly, the Court finds that Defendants have displayed good faith in their efforts to carry out the whole of the decree; even though Eckerd has not yet reached substantial compliance, the record indicates that progress has been 0907and continues to be0907made at that facility. Consistent with the holding in Freeman, therefore, the Court finds that partial termination of this consent decree is now warranted.

CONCLUSION:
373 The Court refuses to continue to subject Dozier and its administrators to federal court *373 scrutiny and supervision on grounds that substantial compliance has yet to be attained at Eckerd. There are no unconstitutional practices presently occurring at Dozier. Substantial compliance with the decree has been achieved. There is no reasonable basis on which to believe that future violations of federal law will likely occur. Accordingly, this Court feels compelled to return Dozier to the care and control of the State of Florida and Defendants.
The Supreme Court has given this Court a clear mandate to return control to local authorities upon a showing that the decree's purposes have been reached and no constitutional violations persist. That time has come.
It is hereby
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED
(1) Defendants' Motion to Terminate Consent Decree as to Dozier Training School and for Dismissal with Prejudice (doc. 535) is GRANTED. The consent decree is terminated insofar as it applies to Dozier.
(2) The consent decree remains in effect as it applies to the Eckerd Youth Development Center.
(3) The Clerk is directed to provide the court-appointed monitors with a copy of this order, and inform them that they are relieved of all responsibilities involved with the monitoring of Dozier.
(4) A number of related motions (docs. 482, 485, 505) are hereby declared MOOT.
DONE AND ORDERED.
[1] No one has suggested that substantial compliance has been achieved at Eckerd. For that reason, Defendants have not moved to terminate the decree as to that facility. Until such compliance is evident, the consent decree and the obligations it imposes on that institution will live on. In the wake of this order, therefore, Eckerd will remain subject to the consent decree notwithstanding the liberation of Dozier therefrom.
When substantial compliance is attained at Eckerd, Defendants are invited to submit a separate motion seeking termination of the decree in full. The Court hopes that this order will provide the officials responsible for Eckerd with adequate incentive to follow Dozier's lead and work diligently towards the substantial compliance goal.
[2] Though this aside is nothing more than a statement of the utterly obvious, the Court emphasizes that this order must not be interpreted as saying that officials at Dozier or 0907 any other facility 0907 are permitted to re-adopt the unconstitutional practices that gave rise to this prolonged legal battle. The effect of this order is simply to loose Dozier from the terms of the consent decree. Nothing in this order, however, shields the State of Florida or its training school administrators from a continued obligation to conduct themselves in such a way as to ensure that no resident is subjected to unconstitutional treatment.
[3] Order, January 19, 1995 (doc. 506) (Paul, C.J.).
[4] Notwithstanding the fact that this Court views this footnote as unnecessary to its decision, in the interest of clarity and abundant caution, the Court will enumerate certain additional findings of fact. First, the Court finds that reports of the court-appointed monitors reveal that eight years of diligent effort at Dozier have resulted in substantial advances towards the goal of constitutionality. The goal of constitutionality has been met. In addition, the monitors' reports lead the Court to find that those in charge of Dozier have acted in good faith throughout the tenure of the consent decree. This good faith progress should be commended. Moreover, the Court finds that the monitors' reports indicate that these efforts have eliminated the vestiges of past discrimination.

The Court, in essence, finds that there is no future need for it to supervise those charged with administration of Dozier. The Court is satisfied that the record, the Plaintiffs' own representations, and the monitors' reports all lead it to the conclusion that there is no likelihood of future constitutional violations at Dozier.
[5] Plaintiffs explained that "terminating jurisdiction" is equivalent to "withdrawing supervision" over Dozier, or "closing the case" as to the Dozier portion of the consent decree.
[6] Plaintiffs explained that "dissolving the injunction" is equivalent to ordering that there is no more obligation for the defendants to comply with the decretal standards.
[7] The Court notes that Defendants have requested that the Court "terminate the consent decree" as it pertains to Dozier (doc. 535 at 1), and Plaintiffs claim that this would be inappropriate. They, however, urge that the Court "terminate [its] jurisdiction" over Dozier (doc. 537 at 1), without terminating the consent decree. Under the facts before the Court in this case, this is a distinction without a difference. See note 9, infra.
[8] Plaintiffs seem to worry about the future potential for violations of the consent decree once Dozier is dismissed therefrom. This concern is unsupported and thus irrelevant to the present proceedings.
The mere potential for a future violation of constitutional rights at Dozier does not give this Court authority to continue invocation of its injunctive powers. Here, Defendants have eradicated all unconstitutional practices and conditions at Dozier. A lawsuit was filed; a consent decree was entered; its terms were met in full at Dozier; the case should therefore be closed as to that facility. No one placed in Dozier at the present time is suffering injury as a result of unconstitutional practices and conditions. In the absence of a cognizable injury in fact based on federal law, Plaintiffs have no standing to maintain a lawsuit against these Defendants in this Court. See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101, 103 S.Ct. 1660, 1664, 75 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983). In addition, in that the potential "claim" is one for a violation of constitutional rights that may or 0907 may not 0907occur in the future, such a concern is not yet ripe for adjudication. Because the suggested injury is speculative and may never occur, this Court must refrain from entertaining the claim on ripeness grounds. See Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148, 87 S.Ct. 1507, 1515, 18 L.Ed.2d 681 (1967), overruled on other grounds, 430 U.S. 99, 97 S.Ct. 980, 51 L.Ed.2d 192 (1977).
If any constitutional violations do surface, those who are injured thereby will obviously have standing to file a new lawsuit at that time.
[9] In Freeman, the Supreme Court utilized terminology indicating that the district court was "withdrawing supervision over" certain aspects of the decree, as opposed to "terminating the decree as to" certain institutions. This choice of terminology was dictated by the particular facts before the Supreme Court in that case. The Court believes that this distinction does nothing to render the holding of Freeman any less applicable to the situation before it on this motion, or to cast doubt on the Court's decision to dismiss Defendants with prejudice from this litigation.
At issue in Freeman was a two-decades old school desegregation consent decree. The decree there ordered one school board to take affirmative steps to rectify problems in six discreet areas of its operations. The Supreme Court upheld the district judge's decision to "withdraw supervision over" four of those six areas because of its finding that compliance with constitutional standards had been achieved in those areas. As a result of the district judge's order, the school board remained subject to the decree, but the court refrained from further monitoring of four of the six areas that had given rise to the decree. Thus, the phrase "withdraw supervision over" is appropriately used to achieve partial termination of a consent decree where there is a single institution named as a defendant in the lawsuit, and it has complied with a portion of its decretal obligations.
In the case before this Court, the consent decree orders two separate institutions to rectify problems in a number of areas of their operations. The Court has been convinced that one of these two institutions (Dozier) has done all that it has been told to do, and is thus in complete compliance with the decree and the law. Thus, the Court uses the phrase "terminate the decree as to Dozier"; it does so to achieve partial termination of the consent decree where one of the two institutions named as defendants in the lawsuit has complied with the sum of its decretal obligations.

While the terminology is different, the net effect is the same: the consent decree lives on as to portions of the decree's original scope, but full control is returned to local authorities as to the areas of the decree where constitutional compliance has been attained. Freeman, therefore, provides authority for "termination of the consent decree as to" Dozier, even though it did not use this precise terminology. Freeman's underlying rationale and policy compel this small extension of its literal holding.
Save trees - read court opinions online on Google Scholar.

 </s> Bobby M. v. Chiles
United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida, Tallahassee Division February 9, 1994, Decided
Case No. TCA 83-7003-MMP

Reporter: 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2589; 7 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. D 723 BOBBY M., et al., Plaintiffs, v. LAWTON CHILES, et al., including isolation, hog-tying, shackling, and physical abuse,

Defendants.

lack of appropriate education, lack of due process in

disciplinary matters, mail censorship, restricted access to and Disposition: [*1] GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. communications with family, deprivation of access to courts

Judges: Paul

and attorneys, and lack of aftercare.

Opinion by: MAURICE M. PAUL

The parties negotiated a consent decree which was approved by the court on July 2, 1987 (doc. 273). The relevant

Opinion

provisions of the consent decree are as follows. Section V mandates population reduction at the training schools; it provides that the resident population at each of the training

ORDER
This cause is before the Court upon Defendants' motion to vacate consent decree (doc. 409). For the reasons stated below, Defendants' motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

schools would be gradually reduced to no more than 100 youths by July 1, 1990. Section VI provides that HRS would develop a continuum [*3] of care and services which would allow juvenile offenders to progress developmentally and to receive appropriate services and support throughout their time in care. Section VII provides for development of an

BACKGROUND

assessment, classification and placement process to identify the priority needs of each youth for rehabilitation and

This case started as a civil rights class action brought on behalf of all past, present and future children confined to a training school operated by the Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (hereinafter "HRS") as part of the juvenile justice system of the State of Florida. These training schools house certain children who have been adjudicated as delinquents by the Florida Circuit Courts. The HRS Secretary, who is appointed by and reports to the Governor, prepares and submits all budget requests to the Governor for his review and approval. Once approved, the budget requests are then

treatment and place the juvenile in the most appropriate setting according to his needs. Section VIII provides that youths who are confined to the training schools would be limited to those who exhibit serious and/or chronic delinquent behavior. Section IX provides that compliance by the parties with the provisions of the consent decree would be reviewed and reported to the Court by a monitor at a regular interval. As provided in the consent decrees, the Court retained jurisdiction over the cause, and the parties have been fling quarterly reports.

submitted to the Florida Legislature for funding. The budget, as finally determined by the legislature, fixes the level of staff and programmatic resources available at the training schools as well as capital outlays for physical plant improvements.

Since the parties have been filing reports, plaintiffs have complained that defendants are not abiding by the guidelines set forth in the consent decree. The monitor has noted several areas of non-compliance. The parties cooperated to end their

The complaint alleged that conditions of confinement at the training schools violated [*2] various constitutional and statutory rights of those youths placed there by the courts. Conditions which were cited included overcrowding, placement of juvenile offenders who committed non-violent crimes with those who had committed violent crimes, intermingling of mentally disturbed juvenile offenders with

disagreements, and on April 20, 1992, the Court approved a stipulated settlement [*4] (doc. 357). The stipulated settlement order adopted the continuum plan developed by HRS as part of the consent decree. The continuum plan aims at a systemwide reform and provides for establishment of new programs and services to address the problems of the juvenile justice system as a whole.

the other offenders, unsanitary and dangerous physical DISCUSSION conditions, inadequate provisions, lack of security, lack of

adequate staff, lack of medical and psychological care, A consent decree is a negotiated settlement of a lawsuit. As

abusive punishment

such, it embodies an agreement of the parties and is in

1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2589, *4

Page 2 of 3

some respects contractual in nature. Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk (Fla. 2d DCA 1989). However, as much as it is a contract

County Jail, 116 L. Ed. 2d 867, 112 S. Ct. 748, 757 (1992). between the defendants and the plaintiffs, the 1987 consent

However, the agreement is enforceable as a judicial decree. decree is also a decree of this Court and the power of a federal

Id. Since it is a judicial decree, a consent decree is subject to court to order state [*7] officials to comply with a decree

the rules generally applicable to judgments and decrees of a enforcing federal law is well-established, Edelman v. Jordan,

court. Id. The well-established rule in this area is that a court 415 U.S. 651, 94 S. Ct. 1347, 1357-58, 39 L. Ed. 2d 662

of equity has power to vacate or otherwise modify the (1974), even though it will have an ancillary effect on the

prospective effect of its decrees in accordance with traditional state treasury. Id. Had the plaintiffs established constitutional

principles of equity jurisprudence. Safe Flight Instrument deprivations in the litigation, the defendants would have no

Corp. v. United Control, 576 F.2d 1340, 1343 (9th Cir. 1978). valid objection that the equitable remedies fashioned by this

In the arena of institutional reform litigation, this means that court also required the appropriation and expenditure of state

injunctive [*5] reliefs granted by the court do not operate funds. Having entered into the consent decree rather than

inviolate in perpetuity; the court is not "doomed to some bringing the dispute to trial, the defendants cannot now evade

Sisyphean fate, bound forever to enforce and interpret a portions of the decree premised on such constitutional

preexisting decree without occasionally pausing to question deprivations on the ground that they did not have the authority

whether changing circumstances have rendered the decree to enter into the agreement. To hold otherwise would impugn

unnecessary, outmoded, or even harmful to the public the authority of this Court and allow the defendants to avoid

interest." United States v. City of Miami, 2 F.3d 1497, 1506 bargained-for obligations while still retaining whatever the

(11th Cir. 1993) (citation omitted).

benefits or concessions they obtained during the negotiations.

Defendants move to vacate sections VI, VII, and part of VIII of the consent decree of July of 1987 and the stipulated settlement entered by the Court in April of 1992, on two grounds. First, the defendants contend that their predecessors who agreed to the consent decree in 1987 lacked the constitutional and statutory authority to do so. Second, the defendants argue that the aforementioned sections of the 1987 consent decree and the 1992 stipulated settlement impose obligations upon the defendants that went beyond the general scope of the case as set out in the third amended complaint.
I. Lack of Authority
The defendants argue that a consent decree is essentially a contract that is to be construed pursuant to state law and therefore, [*6] under the Florida constitution, the 1987 consent decree is invalid because their predecessors lacked the constitutional authority to enter into it. Defendants contend that the obligation imposed by the 1987 consent decree and the stipulated settlement, to establish and fund certain programs, is invalid because it requires appropriation of state funds and the power to obligate or appropriate these funds belongs exclusively to the Florida legislature. In short, they argue that their predecessors entered into the consent decree without the requisite authority and therefore those provisions of the 1987 consent decree should be vacated.
Though plausible, the defendants' argument ultimately fails because it does not account for the duality of a consent decree. It is true that, under Florida law, a governing body is not estopped from asserting the invalidity of a contract which it had no power to execute. P.C.B. Partnership v. City of Largo, 549 So. 2d 738, 741

More to the point, Washington v. Penwell, 700 F.2d 570 (9th Cir. 1983), cited by the defendants, does not stand for the proposition that a consent decree [*8] is unenforceable when it conflicts with a state constitution. In Penwell, indigent Oregon prison inmates sued prison officials for allegedly denying the prisoners their constitutional right of access to the court. The defendants entered into a consent decree that, inter alia, contained a provision for the funding of legal services for the prisoners. Later, the defendants moved to vacate the funding provision of the decree on the ground that they did not have the power to bind the state of Oregon to such financial undertaking. Id. at 573. The Oregon constitution, much like the Florida constitution, vests the power to appropriate state funds in the state legislature. Id. The district court applied a contractual analysis and vacated the funding provision of the consent decree. Id. While the appellate court affirmed the district court's decision, it did so on the basis of the Eleventh Amendment. Id. at 574-75. As to the issue applicable to this lawsuit, the appellate court reasoned that when defendants entered into the consent decree, they agreed to do more than what was constitutionally required. Id. Since [*9] the authority of a federal court to adopt a consent decree comes only from the law the decree is intended to enforce, the court concluded that the consent decree was enforceable only to the extent constitutionally required. Id. Thus, the court in Penwell recognized the principle that a consent decree is enforceable notwithstanding conflicts with state constitution, if the decree is required to alleviate violations of federal law. Id. at 574.
To the extent that the court decree addresses a constitutional wrong, it is of no consequence that the

1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2589, *9

Page 3 of 3

decree may conflict with the funding provision of a particular that this Court may not have ordered defendants to establish a

state constitution. Therefore, this Court does not find systemwide program of continuum of services after a trial on

persuasive the defendants' argument that the 1987 consent the merits, they argue that the decision in Local No. 93 v. City

decree should be vacated on the ground that it does not of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 106 S. Ct. 3063, 92 L. Ed. 2d 405

comport with the state constitution. 1

(1986), allows the parties to agree to a broader relief.

[*10] II. Scope of the 1987 Consent Decree

However, the opinion in Local No. 93 makes it clear that, although the parties may agree to a broader relief in a consent

Although a federal court has the power to restructure the operation of local and state governmental entities, such power is not plenary, Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 97 S. Ct. 2766, 2775, 53 L. Ed. 2d 851 (1977), but is constrained by the nature and scope of the alleged constitutional violation. Id. Therefore, any injunctive relief must be crafted so as to address the nature of the constitutional violation itself, Id. and be no broader than is necessary to correct the particular violation which prompted the judicial intervention. Spain v. Procunier, 600 F.2d 189, 194 (1979). To be enforceable, therefore, the consent decree must 1) "spring from and serve to resolve a dispute within the court's subject matter jurisdiction," 2) "come within the general scope of the case made by the pleadings," and 3)

decree, the consent decree will not be enforced if it is "otherwise shown to be unlawful." Id. at 3077. The relief demanded by the plaintiffs would bind the State of Florida to reform the whole juvenile Justice system, not just correct conditions at the training schools. Because the defendants lacked the authority to enter into such a consent decree under the Florida constitution, the consent decree would be unenforceable between the parties as a contract. The only [*13] way such a consent decree could be enforceable is if this Court had the power to fashion such a remedy after a trial on the merits. However, this Court could not have ordered the defendants to reform the whole juvenile justice system based on a complaint which only alleged violations of conditions existing at the training schools.

"further the objectives of the law upon which the complaint On the other hand, if the scope of the consent decree is

was based." Local No. 93 v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, limited to the training schools, it would be enforceable even if

106 S. Ct. 3063, 3077, 92 L. Ed. 2d 405 (1986). [*11]

the decree is infirm under the Florida constitution. This Court

In the instant case, what prompted judicial intervention was the unconstitutional conditions of confinement at the state's training schools. Accordingly, the remedy due is the one that will rectify those unconstitutional conditions of confinement.

had jurisdiction to hear an action to redress the deprivation of constitutional rights. A consent decree that addresses the deprivations found to exist at the training schools would then come within the general scope of the case as made by the pleadings and would also further the objectives of the

Constitution. Such a consent would be enforceable and would The plaintiffs argue that the consent decree comes within the be enforced by this court. general scope of the pleadings because the two main reasons

which caused the horrific conditions of confinement at the training schools were inappropriate placements and overcrowding, caused by the systematic failure of the juvenile justice system. They aver that those problems cannot be fixed in a vacuum, but must be connected to a systemwide reform. However, a system-wide remedy can be justified only for a

The authority to structure the juvenile justice system of the State of Florida is reposed in the Legislative and Executive branches of the government and, as long as the system operates in a constitutionally permissible fashion, this court should not interfere with that process.

systemwide wrong. Brinkman, 97 S. Ct. at 2775. The constitutional violations alleged in the third amended complaint were not systemwide violations. Arguably, they may have been "caused" by some failure within the juvenile justice system. Just as the allegations of constitutional

Accordingly, it [*14] is ordered that the 1987 consent decree and the 1992 stipulated settlement will be enforced only to the extent necessary to rectify constitutional problems existing at the training schools.

violations were confined to conditions existing at the training A status conference will be held by this court on March 4,

schools, so too the relief granted by the consent decree must 1994, at 10:00 a.m. in Tallahassee, Florida. Prior to that status

be confined.

conference, each party shall submit a memorandum outlining

its position as to the future course of conduct between the

[*12] The plaintiffs argue in the alternative that the consent parties and whether this court may now relinquish jurisdiction

decree is still valid because parties to a consent

of the matter. The parties will not reargue the merits of this

decree could agree to broader relief than the court could have order, orally or in writing. awarded after a trial. Although the plaintiffs tacitly concede

1 The defendants also argue that they lacked statutory authority to agree to the 1992 stipulated agreement because certain provisions of Sec. 45.062, Fla. Stat. were not followed. This argument is unpersuasive for the same reasons.

 </s> 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

2

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

3
4 BOBBY M., CHARLES W. , SUSAN S., and SALVADORE S., minors, by and through
5 their next friend, DAVID MACK, on behalf of themselves and all others
6 similarly situated,

Bobby M. v. Chiles JI-FL-002-001

7

Plaintiffs,

8

v.

9 ROBERT GRAHAM, individually and in his official capacity as Governor of the
10 State of Florida;
DAVID H. PINGREE, individually and in his 11 official capacity as Secretary of the
Department of Health and Rehabilitative 12 Services for the State of Florida;
RALPH TURLINGTON, individually and in his 13 official capacity as Commissioner of the
Department of Education for the State of 14 Florida;
LENOX WILLIAMS, individually and in his 15 official capacity as Superintendent of
the Arthur G. Dozier School for Boys; 16 WILLIAM SCHOSSLER, individually and in
his official capacity as Superintendent 17 of the Alyce D. McPherson School; and
WESLEY BRAZELL, individually and in his 18 official capacity as Superintendent of
the Florida School for Boys. 19
Defendants. 20

COMPLAINT

21

INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT

22

1. This is a civil rights class action brought on behalf of

23 all children who have been, are now, or will be confined, in the

24 three traininq schools in the State of Florida: Arthur G. Dozier

25 School for Boys in Marianna ("Dozier"); Alyce D. McPherson School 26 in Ocala ("McPherson"), a co-educational institution; and Florida

1 School for Boys at Okeechobee ("Okeechobee") (plaintiffs).

2 Defendants confine approximately 1,000 children in these

3 institutions.

4

2. Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief from

cruel and abusive conditions of confinement imposed by defendants

that violate rights guaranteed to them by the First, Fourth, Sixth,

Eiqhth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States

Constitution, by federal statutes, and by the Florida Constitution

and statutes. These conditions seriously endanger plaintiffs'

physical and psychological health and safety, deprive them of any

'•'• access to or opportunity for treatment or education, and restrict

their access to and communication with their families, the

community, and the courts. In particular, defendants subject

plaintiffs to overcrowding, unsanitary and dangerous physical

conditions, lack of security, lack of adequate staff, lack of

medical care, abusive punishment including isolation, hogtying,

shackling, and physical abuse, lack of education and programming,
18 lack of due process in disciplinary matters, mail censorship, and
19 20 deprivation of access to courts.

21

JURISDICTION

3. This Court has jurisdiction of this action under 28
23 U.S.C. §1343(3) since this is an action to redress the deprivation,
24

under color of state law, of rights secured by the Constitution of 25 the United States; the Civil Rights Acts, 42 U.S.C. §1983; and

§504 of the Rehabilitation Act, ^ U.S.C.§794 et. seq.

1

4. This Court also has jurisdiction of this action under 2tt

2 U.S.C. §1343(4) since this is an action to secure declaratory,

3 injunctive and other equitable relief under acts of Congress

4 providinq for the protection of civil rights, specifically the

5 Civil Riqhts Acts, 42 U.S.C. §1983; and §504 of the Rehabilitation

6 Act, 29 U.S.C. §794.

7

5. This Court also has jurisdiction of this action under 2c

8 U.S.C. §§2201 and 2202, and Federal Rules of Civil Procedures 57

9 and 65 since this is an action seeking a judgment declaring the

10 rights of plaintiffs and for injunctive and other equitable relief

11 based upon that declaratory judgment under §1983.

12

6. This Court also has jurisdiction of this action under 2d

13 U.S.C. §1331(a) since this is an action in which the matter in

14 controversy arises under the Constitution and laws of the United

15 States.

16

7. This Court has pendent jurisdiction over all claiinr,

17 under Florida law because they arise out of the same nucleus of

18 operative fact as the federal claims. 19

20

PLAINTIFFS

21

8. Plaintiff BOBBY M. is a minor child and a citizen of the

22 United States. He is currently confined at Dozier. Prior to his

23 incarceration, he attended special education classes. He sues

24 through his next friend, DAVID MACK.

25 9. Plaintiff CHARLES W. is a minor child and a citizen of
26 the United States. He is currently confined at McPherson. E'rior

1 to his confinement, he attended special education classes. lie sues

2 through his next friend, DAVID MACK.

3

10. Plaintiff SUSAN S. is a minor child and a citizen of the

4 United States. She is confined at McPherson School where she has

5 been confined since approximately March 29, 1981. She sues throujh

6 her next friend, DAVID MACK.

7

11. Plaintiff SALVADORE S. is a minor child and a resident

8 of the State of Florida. He is confined at Okeechobee. He is

9 Spanish-speaking. He sues through his next friend, DAVID MACK.

10

12. All named plaintiffs have been subjected to the

11 policies, practices, acts and omissions described in this

12 complaint.

13

14

15

DEFENDANTS

16

13. Defendant ROBERT GRAHAM is Governor of the State of

17 Florida. He is the chief executive officer of the State, and,

18 pursuant to Article IV, §1 of the Florida Constitution of 1968, is 19 responsible for the development and implementation of the policies:, 20 practices and procedures described in this complaint, which are the

21 official policies, practices and procedures of the State of

\ Florida.
14. Defendant DAVID H. PINGREE is the Secretary of the 24 Dep/rtment of Health and Rehabilitative Services ("HRS") for the 25 State of Florida. In this capacity, he is responsible, 2_njter ali_a, 26 under Florida Statutes 20.05, 20.19, 402.22, 959.011, 959.021,

1 959.10, 959.12, and 959.25 for developing and implementing programs

2 for the care, education and treatment of persons committed to the

3 custody of the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services,

4 including the operation of training schools.

5

15. Defendant RALPH TURLINGTON is the Commissioner of the

6 Department of Education of the State of Florida. Pursuant to

7 Florida Statutes 22.05, 22.15, 230.23(4)(m) and (n), 402.22 and

959.25, he is responsible for providing education and related

services to children confined in training schools in Florida.

10

16. Defendant LENOX WILLIAMS is the Superintendent of Dozi-r-r

H School and is re:-3pons i hi o for the policies, practices, acts an A

omissions described in this complaint to the extent that they are

implemented or occur at Dozier.

14

17. Defendant WILLIAM SCHOSSLER is the Superintendent of

McPherson School and is responsible for the policies, practices,

acts and omissions described in this complaint to the extent that

they are implemented or occur at McPherson.

18

18. Defendant WESLEY. BRAZELL is the Superintendent of

Okeechobee School and is responsible for the policies, practices, 9fl'
acts and omissions described in this complaint to the extent that

they are implemented or occur at Okeechobee.

99

/z

19. Defendants1 policy manuals purport to prohibit certain

practices described in this complaint. Nevertheless, defendants or

and their agents and employees, with defendants' knowledge and 95
consent, routinely engage in such practices, so that such practices 26
constitute the actual policies and practices, customs and usages of

\ defendants.

2

20. All defendants are sued individually and in their

3 official capacities. At all relevant times, defendants have acted

4 under color of state law to deprive plaintiffs of their rights,

5 privileges and immunities under the Constitution and laws of the

6 United States.

7

CLASS ACTION

8

21. Named plaintiffs bring this action on behalf of

9 themselves and all others similarly situated pursuant to Rule 23(a)

10 and (b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The class

11 consists of all juveniles who are currently, who have been, or who

12 will be confined in the three Florida training schools, Dozier,

13 McPherson, and Okeechoboe.

14

22. The members of the class are so numerous that joinder oi

15 all members is impracticable. At the present time, the Florida

16 State training schools confine approximately 1,000 children.

17

23. Named plaintiffs and their counsel will fairly,

18 vigorously and adequately protect the interests of the class. Tho

19 claims of the named plaintiffs are typical of the claims of the

20 plaintiff class. At least one of the named plaintiffs has been

21 subjected to and suffered from each of the conditions, policies,

22 practices, acts and omissions complained of in this action.

23 Plaintiffs' counsel have substantial experience in this type o£

24 litigation and have represented children in similar cases in

25 several states. 26 //

1

24. All plaintiffs are subject to the conditions and

2 policies and practices of defendants described in this complaint

3 during their confinement at the training schools, so that there are

4 questions of law and fact common to members of the plaintiff class.

5 The Questions of law and fact common to all members of the

6 plaintiff class include whether the conditions, practices, acts and

omissions complained of occur at defendants' institutions, and

whether these conditions violate rights guaranteed to plaintiffs by

the United States Constitution, federal law and Florida law.

25. By their policies and practices, defendants have acted,

and continue to act on grounds and in a manner generally applicable

12 to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive and

13 corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a 14 whole. 15

16

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

I. Background and Placement

26. Defendants GRAHAM and PINGREE operate three training
10
17 schools in the State of Florida: Dozier in Harianna, Florida; *u McPherson in Ocala, Florida; and Florida School for Boys at

Okeechobee, Florida. At Dozier and Okeechobee, defendants confine

22 only boys; at McPherson they confine both boys and girls. Dozier

and Okeechobee house boys from designated geographical catchment
24 areas; McPherson houses girls and younger, smaller boys from all
over the state. 26 f/

1

27. At these training schools, defendants confine boys and

2 girls who have been adjudicated delinquent in Florida juvenile

3 courts. Florida juvenile procedure does not afford children all of

4 the due process protections to which adults are entitled in
5 criminal court.

6

28. In opposition to stated HRS policy, defendants confine

7 children as young as 10 years old, children who have committed only

8 minor offenses, and children who have had no previous involvement 9 with the juvenile court system in these institutions merely because 10 appropriate placements are not available.

11 11. Living Conditions

12

29. Living units at the training schools are called

13 "cottages." Cottages contain one or more sleeping areas; lockers;

14 one or more bathroom areas containing toilets, sinks and showers; 15 and large, open recreation areas. At McPherson, cottages also

16 contain a kitchen and dining area. Most cottages use open

17 dormitories as sleeping areas.

18

30. The cottages are extremely overcrowded. At McPherson,

19 rooms built to house 4 children now house 8, cottages built for 16

20 children house 30. At Okeechobee, dormitories originally designed

21 for 17 children house 40. In Dozier, school dormitories originally

22 built for 20 children house 40. At times children sleep on

23 mattresses on the floor because defendants do not provide enough

24 beds.

25

26

1

31. Because of the tension, lack of space and lack of

2 supervision caused by overcrowding, physical and sexual assaults

3 are common.

4

32. Because of overcrowding, defendants do not provide

5 children with adequate space, equipment or supervision for

6 recreation or leisure time activities.

7

33. Defendants deprive plaintiffs of all personal privacy in

8 their living areas. Children are not allowed to personalize their

9 living areas. The few personal belongings they are allowed to kner

10 must be stored in small lockers or boxes. At Dozier and

11 Okeechobee, defendants fail to provide doors or curtains on s

12 and toilet areas, leaving those areas completely exposed to open

13 view.

14

34. Defendants maintain unhealthy and unsanitary conditions

15 at all three institutions. Defendants do not adequately clean or

16 maintain the buildings. Defendants maintain buildings which are

17 structurally unsound and which present serious danger in the event

18 of fire. Defendants force children to live in buildings that are 19 improperly heated, cooled, ventilated, or lighted. These building.: 20 do not have screens and are often insect-infested. 21 III. Food and Clothing

22

35. Defendants do not adequately feed and clothe plaintiffs.

23

36. Defendants do not provide children with clean, untorn,

24 appropriately-sized clothing.

25

37. Defendants do not adequately feed children.

26 Defendants do not provide meals which are adequate in quantity or

1 quality to meet the nutritional needs of growing children or

2 adolescents. Defendants prepare food under conditions that are

3 unhealthful and unsanitary. At Okeechobee and Dozier, defendants

4 do not provide children with anything to eat for the almost

5 fourteen hours between supper (at approximately 5:00 p.m.) and

6 breakfast (at approximately 7:00 a . m . ) .

7 IV. Security

8

38. Defendants further jeopardize plaintiffs' health and

9 safety by failing to provide adequate security in the

10 institutions.

11

39. Defendants completely fail to supervise and train st-atf

12 As a result, children are victims of staff assaults. Defendants

13 have taken little or no action to curtail staff brutality. When

14 notified of abuses, defendants have failed to take action againct

15 staff members involved.

16

40. Defendants have failed to design or implement a

17 classification system for residents at the schools. Defendcinta do

18 not separate children who have committed serious or violent

19 offenses from children who have committed only property crimes, aiu.i

20 do not separate children with emotional disturbances from the rest

21 of the population.

22

41. Defendants also fail to adequately supervise children a

23 the training schools.

24

4 2 . Defendants' staff members encourage larger children to

25 assault or restrain smaller children as a means of disciplining an \ 26 controlling them. As a result, residents frequently assault oth-3t

10

1 residents.

2

43. Defendants fail to provide adequate staff coverage in

3 any of the training schools. Defendants do not provide enough

4 staff to adequately supervise or treat children confined in the

5 training schools. As a result, defendants deny plaintiffs personal

6 security and safety in the institutions.

7

44. Defendants employ staff members who are inadequately

8 trained to perform childcare responsibilities. Defendants do not

9 provide staff with the psychological, sociological or medical

10 information necessary to care for and treat children in the

11 traininq schools.

12

45. Defendants agqravate the atmosphere of fear and violence

13 that prevails at these schools by using tracking dogs to hunt down

14 children who attempt to escape from either Okeechobee or Dozier. 15 Dog handlers terrorize and abuse children.

16 V. Medical Care

17

46. Defendants provide medical care at all three

18 institutions which is grossly inadequate to maintain physical or

19 mental health. Defendants' failure to provide adequate medical

20 care amounts to deliberate indifference to the health and safety

21 requirements of children at these institutions.

22

47. Defendants fail to provide medical staffs at the

23 institutions that are adequate to meet children's needs.

24 Defendants fail to employ adequate numbers of physicians,

25 psychiatrists, psychiatric aides, nurses, nurses1 aides or

26 dentists.

11

1

4b. Defendants fail to provide adequate supplies in the

2 medical areas of all three schools. Defendants fail to provide

3 supplies necessary to maintain a healthy and sanitary environment, 4 or equipment necessary to provide adequate medical, dental or 5 psychiatric treatment.

6

49. Defendants have failed to design and implement an

7 adequate procedure for preventing, treating and containing

8 contagious diseases, including venereal diseases. Defendants fail

9 to remove children with contagious diseases from the general

10 populat ion.

11

"50. Defendants maintain infirmaries at the training schools

12 in an unsanitary, unhygienic, and medically unsafe manner.

13 Defendants maintain infirmaries that are insect-infested, and are

14 often uncomfortably hot or cold. Defendants have required children

15 to sleep on mattresses without sheets. Defendants fail to provide

16 plaintiffs with pajamas or appropriate hospital attire in medical

17 areas. Defendants do not permit children to bathe every day v/h i 1 e

18 they are in the infirmary. .

19 VI. Psychological Counseling

20

51. Defendants fail to provide plaintiffs with adequate

21 psychological care and treatment.

22 52. Defendants fail to adequately assess children's

23 psychological condition at or before the time of their admission to

24 the training schools. As a result, defendants confine children

25 with serious psycholoqical illnesses, children who are mentally

26 retarded,and children who are otherwise handicapped or

12

1 developmentally disabled in training schools where they cannot

2 adequately be treated.

3

53. Defendants fail to design and implement an adequate

4 treatment plan for each child at the training schools. As a

5 result, defendants fail to provide children with appropriate

6 rehabilitation or treatment.

7

54. Defendants do not employ or make available a sufficient

8 number of qualified psychologists or social workers to counsel ar.1

9 treat children.

10

55. Defendants delegate the responsibility for providing

11 plaintiffs with direct psychological treatment to persons who art?

12 inadequately trained and supervised. As a result, children do ru •

13 receive psychological treatment. 14 VII. Isolation and Shackling

15

56. Defendants operate "adjustment units" at all three

16 training schools. They use these adjustment units for purposes of

17 discipline and control.

18

57. At McPherson and. Okeechobee, these units consist of

19 several individual isolation cells. At Dozier, the adjustment

20 unit contains 10 isolation cells and 3 open dormitory areas.

21 Defendants use isolation at Dozier to further punish children who

22 are confined in the adjustment unit.

23

58. The isolation cells are similar in all three

24 institutions. Kach cell contains a concrete platform, a sink, and

25 an open toilet. Defendants put mattresses, pillows, and blankots

26 in the cells at night, but at Dozier and Okeechobee often remove

13

1 them as punishment.

2

59. Each isolation cell is separated from the corridor by a

3 heavy locked metal door. This door has a small view window

4 approximately 4-1/2 feet from the ground and a T-shaped slot

5 approximately 2-1/2 feet from the ground. Children can communicatt-

6 with the outside only through the T-shaped slot. This slot can

7 only be closed or opened from the outside. Staff frequently close

8 these slots, depriving children of any contact with the outside

9 while they are in isolation.

10

60. The physical conditions in the isolation cells endanger

11 children's health and safety. Cells are unventilated, poorly

12 lighted and unsanitary. Children must eat their meals next to

13 open, uncleaned toilet fixtures. Because they are locked,

14 isolation cells pose a serious danger in case of fire, and

15 defendants have completely failed to develop procedures for

16 evacuating plaintiffs from these cells in case of fire.

17

61. Defendants confine depressed, agitated and emotionally

18 disturbed children in isolation cells. Defendants make no effort

19 to protect children against self-inflicted injuries. Isolation

20 cells contain many sharp objects such as screens and vents and

21 breakable porcelain toilet fixtures. All these objects can be ana

22 are used by children to injure themselves. Defendants fail to

23 adequately monitor children in isolation to ensure that they do not

24 injure themselves.

25

62. Defendants subject children to long periods of isolation

26 in bare concrete walled cells. They do not provide children with

14

1 access to television, radio or reading materials. Communication

2 with other children or staff is minimal. Children held under these

3 conditions suffer severe sensory deprivation.

4

63. Defendants often confine children in isolation for 24

5 hours a day. At Dozier and Okeechobee, defendants fail to provide

6 any programming for children in isolation. At McPherson,

7 defendants permit some children in isolation to leave their cells

8 only to obtain their school assignments and for an hour a day of

9 exercise. Defendants also fail to provide any programming for

10 children in the open dormitory areas of the adjustment unit at

11 Dozier School. Children in this unit can go outside or into a

12 common area, but receive no recreational or educational materials

13 for the duration of their stay in the adjustment unit.

14

64. Defendants' regulations permit children to be confined

15 in security units for up to 21 days. In fact, children often

16 remain in isolation units for longer periods of time.

17

65. Defendants confine children to adjustment units for

18 minor incidents, including disrespect for staff members,

19 altercations with other children, and refusal to promptly obey

20 orders. Defendants confine children to adjustment units for

21 behaviors caused by mental or emotional illnesses and other

22 handicaps, instead of providing plaintiffs with treatment for thos«-

23 illnesses and handicaps.

24 66. Defendants use shackles in the adjustment units as a

25 means of discipline and of controlling children's behavior.
26

15

1

67. Defendants use several methods of shackling. At Dczier

2 and Okeechobee, defendants use a particularly harmful method called

3 "hogtying." Defendants hogtie children by forcing them to lie on

4 their stomachs, handcuffing their wrists behind their backs,

5 shackling their legs together and connecting the handcuffs to the

6 leg shackles.

7

68. At all three schools, defendants handcuff children,

8 chain their hands to their waists, and use leg shackles.

9 Defendants frequently use metal handcuffs and metal leg restraints 10 to restrict children's movement.

11

69. Defendants' employees have, on many occasions, lji.vitk.-ri .:

12 kicked children while they were shackled or hogtied.

13

70. Defendants leave children locked in isolation cellc

14 lying on concrete beds, sometimes without sheets or mattresses,

15 hogtied or shackled, for extended periods of time.

16

71. Plaintiffs have suffered and continue to suffer serious

17 physical and emotional damage as a result of extended i s c l a t ^ n ,

18 shackling, hogtying, and beatings.

19 VIII. Education and Programming

20

72. Defendants fail to provide plaintiffs with an adequate

21 education comparable to that available to plaintiffs in the

22 community.

23

73. Defendants fail to provide special education and relate.!

24 services to children who were receiving such services prior to

25 their incarceration. Defendants fail to adequately assess children 26 to determine whether they have special needs and how such s

16

1 needs can be met. Defendants fail to develop appropriate

2 individualized education programs for children who need special

3 education. Defendants fail to provide appropriate related

4 services, including speech therapy, physical therapy and

5 psychological services, to handicapped children who need such

6 services to benefit from their education.

7

74. Defendants fail to provide bilingual education or

8 services to children who are not fluent in English.

9

75. Defendants fail to provide adequate vocational

10 education. The vocational education they do provide is inadequate

11 to prepare children to obtain employment upon release.

12

76. Defendants fail to provide children with other forms oLr

13 programming. They require children to spend prolonged

14 periods of time without any programmed activity or recreational or

15 therapeutic programming.

16

77. Defendants fail to provide rehabilitative treatment to

17 plaint iffs.

18 IX. Due Process

19

78. Defendants deprive plaintiffs of constitutionally

20 guaranteed due process in classification, disciplinary procedures,

21 and transfer.

22

79. Defendants discipline plaintiffs arbitrarily and

23 capriciously for minor misbehaviors and for behaviors that are

24 symptoms of emotional or mental handicaps.

25

80. Defendants authorize staff members, regardless of

26 training or qualifications, to order children into confinement in

17

the adjustment unit. Children must remain in the adjustment unit a

minimum of 24 hours before they have the opportunity for a hearinj.

81. Defendants transfer children from one institution to

another without affording them the opportunity for a hearing.

These inter-institutional transfers are disciplinary in nature.

Inter-institutional transfers punish children by further removing

7 them from their families and home communities and by subjecting

8 them to harsher, more restrictive conditions.

9

82. To the extent that defendants have developed a grievance

10 procedure, they fail to inform children about the existence of this

procedure or to explain to them how the procedure can be used.

12 X. Communication

13

83. Defendants interfere with non-English speaking

14 plaintiffs' ability to communicate by prohibiting them from

15 speaking any language other than English.

16

84. Defendants, by their mail, telephone and visitation

17 policies, deprive plaintiffs of their right to communicate and

18 associate with their families and friends outside of the training

19 schools by interfering with and restricting mail and telephone

20 communications. This communication is necessary to children's

21 treatment and rehabilitation and to assist their reintegration into

22 the community.

23

85. Defendants open all mail other than attorney-client mail

24 that comes to children in the institutions. Defendants open this

25 mail outside of the presence of the child to whom the mail is

26 addressed. Defendants also prohibit children from sending sealed

18

1 letters to persons outside the institution. These practices permit

2 staff members to read children's mail.

3

86. Defendants improperly restrict children from

4 communicating by telephone with their parents, relatives or

5 friends. These restrictions work a particularly severe hardship on

6 children whose parents live at great distances from the schools ar.ii

7 are unable to visit them.

8

87. Defendants severely restrict children's opportunities

9 for visitation with family and friends. Defendants unreasonably

10 limit the number of visitors a child may have and the hours during

11 which visits may occur.

12

88. Defendants transfer children from detention centers or

13 community-based programs to training schools, and from one training

14 school to another, without adequately informing children's parents

15 or relatives. As a result, some parents do not know where their

16 children are for several months after such a transfer.

17 x i . Access to Courts

18

89. Defendants deprive plaintiffs of adequate access to the

19 courts. Defendants fail to inform children that they may make

20 telephone calls to or receive telephone calls from counsel.

21

90. Defendants fail to provide children with either legal

22 materials or access to counsel who can assist them with their legal

23 problems. Defendants also fail to provide children with any

24 instruction or assistance in protecting their rights through the

25 legal system. 26 //

19

1

LEGAL CLAIMS

t

2

9 1 . For plaintiffs' claims enumerated below, they repeat and

3 reallege paragraphs 1 through 90 as if fully set forward herein

4 each and every statement of claim, and further allege:

5

First Claim: Due Process

6

9 2 . Defendants, by subjecting plaintiffs to the conditions

7 of confinement, individually and in their totality, described in

8 paragraphs 26 through 90 above, deprive plaintiffs of their right

9 to due process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to tho

10 United States Constitution.

11

Second Claim: Cruol and Unusual Punishment

12

93. Defendants, by subjecting plaintiffs to the conditions

13 of confinement, individually and in their totality, described in

14 paragraphs 26 through 90 above, deprive plaintiffs of their right

15 to be free from cruel and unusual punishment guaranteed by the

16 Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States

17 Constitution.

18

< Third Claim: Freedom of Speech and Association

19

9 4 . Defendants, by subjecting plaintiffs to the conditions

20 described in paragraphs 26 through 90 above, and in particular by

21 restricting their communication with persons outside of the

22 training schools, deprive plaintiffs of their right to freedom of

23 speech and association guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth

24 Amendments to the United States Constitution. 25 //

26 //

20

1

Fourth Claim; Access to Courts

2

95. Defendants, by failing to provide plaintiffs with access

3 to the courts violate rights guaranteed to plaintiffs by the First

4 and Sixth Amendments and by the due process clause of the

5 Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

6

Fifth Claim; Right to Treatment

7

96. Defendants, by failing to provide plaintiffs with

8 adequate treatment, deprive plaintiffs of the right to treatment

9 guaranteed by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United

10 States Constitution.

11

Sixth Claim: Least Restrictive Alternatives

12

9 7 . Defendants, by failing to place plaintiffs in the least

13 restrictive setting necessary, and by failing to provide suitable

14 treatment and rehabilitation violate plaintiffs' right to placement.

15 in the least restrictive alternative that will effectuate the

16 purpose of their confinement, guaranteed by the due process clause

17 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, anJ

18 violate their rights to association, assembly, speech, belief and

19 travel guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the

20 United States Constitution.

21

Seventh Claim; Discrimination on the Basis of Handicap

22

98. Defendants, by failing to test plaintiffs to determine

23 if they are handicapped, by failing to provide handicapped

24 plaintiffs with appropriate services, and by discriminating against

25 or punishing plaintiffs solely by reason of their handicap, violate

26 rights guaranteed to plaintiffs by §504 of the Rehabilitation Act,

21

1 29 U.S.C. §794 and regulations promulgated thereunder.

2

Eighth Claim; Right to Education

3

99. Defendants, by failing to identify and evaluate

4 plaintiffs who are handicapped and in need of special education and

5 by failing to provide them with special education and related

6 services, violate rights guaranteed to plaintiffs §504 of the

7 Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. §794 and regulations promulgated

8 thereunder.

9

Ninth Claim: Florida Constitutional Claims

10

100. Defendants, by subjecting plaintiffs to the

11 and practices described in paragraphs 26 through 90 above, deprive

12 plaintiffs of rights guaranteed by sections 2, 4, 5, 9, 12, is, r/

13. and 21 of Article I of the Florida Constitution.

14

Tenth Claim; State Statutory Claims

15

101. Defendants, by subjecting plaintiffs to conditions and

16 practices described in paragraphs 26 through 90 above, deprive 17 plaintiffs of the right to treatment, education, rehabilitation anil 18 placement in the least restrictive alternative guaranteed by 19 Chapters 39, 230, 394, 409 and 959 of the Florida statutes and 20 regulations promulgated thereunder. 21

22

NO ADEQUATE REMEDY AT LAW

23

102. As a proximate result of defendants' policies,

24 practices, procedures, acts and omissions, plaintiffs have

25 suffered, do suffer and will continue to suffer immediate and

26 irreparable injury, including physical, psychological and emotional

22

1 injury. Their intellectual abilities, their emotional health and

2 well-being and their ability to function adequately in the

3 community have seriously deteriorated and will continue to

4 deteriorate during the course of their confinement at institutions

5 operated by defendants. Plaintiffs have no plain, adequate or

6 complete remedy at law to redress the wrongs described in this

7 complaint. Plaintiffs will continue to be irreparably injured by

8 the policies, practices, procedures, acts and omissions of

9 defendants unless this Court grants the injunctive relief that

10 plaintiffs seek.

11

12

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

13

WHEREFORE, plaintiffs pray that this Court:

14

1. Permit plaintiffs to pursue this action jln forma

15 pauperis.

16

2. Certify this action and permit it to proceed as a

17 class action.

18

3. Issue a declaratory judgment declaring that defendants'

19 practices in subjecting plaintiffs to the conditions of conf inement.

20 described in this Complaint violate rights guaranteed to plaintiffs

21 under the First, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment of the

22 United States Constitution; the Education for All Handicapped

23 Children Act, 20 U.S.C. §1401 et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act, 29

24 U.S.C. §794 e^ seq.; sections 2, 4, 5, 9, 12, 15, 17 and 21 cf

25 Article I of the Florida Constitution; and chapters 39, 230, 304,

26 409 and 959 of the Florida statutes.

23

1

4. Preliminarily and permanently enjoin defendants, their

2 agents, employees, successors in office and assigns from engaging

3 in the unconstitutional and unlawful practices, acts and omissions

4 described herein, including, but not limited to:

5

(a) Confining plaintiffs in facilities that are

6 overcrowded unhealthful, unsanitary and life-endangering;

7

(b) Failing to adequately protect the physical health of

8 plaintiffs;

9

(c) Failing to insure plaintiffs against attacks by

10 staff members or by other children confined in the institution;

11

(d) Failing to provide adequately trained staff in

12 adequate numbers to insure plaintiffs' safety and provide them with

13 t reatment;

14

(e) Failing to provide plaintiffs with adequate medical,

15 dentnl and psychiatric care;

16

(f) Confining plaintiffs in security units, and, in

17 particular, in isolation units, or otherwise subjecting plaintiffs

18 to sensory deprivation;

19

(g) Shackling plaintiffs;

20

(h) Hogtying plaintiffs;

21

(i) Failing to provide plaintiffs with adequate

22 education, including special education and related services;

23

(j) Failing to provide plaintiffs with adequate

24 programming;

25

(k) Failing to provide plaintiffs with adequate

26 t reatment;

24

(1) Failing to adequately screen plaintiffs to insure

2 that plaintiffs with serious emotional or psychological

3 disabilities are not confined in training schools;

4

(m) Failing to provide plaintiffs with due process

5 protections prior to imposing discipline, including but not limited

to, discipline that results in transfers from one institution to

another;

(n) Prohibiting plaintiffs from speaking languages other

9 than English;

10

(o) Opening plaintiffs' mail outside of the presence of

11 the addressee;

12

(p) Failing to permit plaintiffs to send uncensored,

13 unread and unopened mail to friends and relatives;

14

(q) Failing to provide plaintiffs with reasonable

15 opportunities to telephone and visit parents, friends and

16 relatives;

17

(r) Failing to provide plaintiffs with adequate access

18 to courts; and

19

(s) Failing to confine plaintiffs in the least

20 restrictive alternative consistent with their need for

21 rehabilitation and treatment.

22

5. Direct defendants to develop and submit to this Court a

23 plan, that will insure that plaintiffs are not subject to

24 conditions of confinement that deprive them of rights guaranteed t>>

25 them by the federal Constitution, federal statutes, and by the

26 Florida Constitution or Florida statutes, and that will insure that

25

 </s> Bobby M. v. Chiles

•••••• • • •••••• •••!• • • ! • • n a i
JI-FL-002-003

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

2

3 BOBBY M., et al.,

)

Plaintiffs,

)

N o . TCA 8 3 - 7 0 0 3

)

6

ROBERT GRAHAM, e t a l . ,

)

)

Defendants .

)

MOTION TO ADD NAMED P L A I N T I F F S AND AMEND COMPLAINT

P l a i n t i f f s , by and through t h e i r counsel u n d e r s i g n e d , move

t h i s Court for an order pursuant t o Rules 15(a) and 2 1 of the

Federal Rules of C i v i l Procedure g r a n t i n g l e a v e to amend

p l a i n t i f f s ' complaint to add p a r t y p l a i n t i f f s . P l a i n t i f f s move

t h i s Court t o amend the c o m p l a i n t , p r e v i o u s l y amended once upor.

order of the Court, in order to amplify the complai:.t to include

minors who have been confined in t h e Okeechobee f a c i l i t y s i n c e ;

f i l i n g of t h e o r i g i n a l complaint.

The complaint has a l s o been amended pursuant to Rule 15(•

of t h e Federal Rules of C i v i l Procedure to s u b s t i t u t e c e r t a i n

19

p u b l i c o f f i c e r s as p a r t i e s who a r e t h e s u c c e s s o r s of p r e v i o u s l y

90u

named d e f e n d a n t s .

p l a i n t i f f s a r e moving for l e a v e to amend the complaint 22

23 24

25 26

despite the fact that it appears that an order from the Court may

not arguably be necessary. The previous amendment to the

3

complaint in this case was made at the request of the Court. Rul

15 provides that a party may amend this complaint once as a matte:

of course at any time before a responsive pleading is served. I:

this case, no responsive pleading has yet been served and u.:--

amendment was not occasioned by the desires or actions of the

plaintiffs. g
Nonetheless, this motion to amend is being made in the
alternative upon the grounds and for the reasons that amending

complaint to include a new plaintiff imposes no burdens on either
12 plaintiffs or defendants. Substantive claims made by the new
13 plaintiffs are similar to those set forth by the named plaintiffs
14 in their original complaint. The claims arise from the same
factual legal situations as set forth by the original named

plaintiffs and involve the same questions of law.

17

Dated: June 2, 1986

18
Respectfully submitted, 19

20 /' *
Michael Dale Laurene M. Heybach Nova University Law Center 3100 S.W. 9th Avenue Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33315 (305) 467-0301

24

Carole B. Shauffer

Youth Law Center

1663 Mission Street, Fifth

9fi

San Francisco, CA 94103

'415) 543-3307

1

Albert J . Hadeed

Southern Legal Counsel, Inc.

2

115-A N.E. 7th Avenue

Gainesville, FL 32601

3

(904) 377-82:

4

Mary E. McClymont

National Prison Project of the

5

American Civil Liberties Union

1616 P Street, N.W., Suite 340

6

Washington, D.C. 200 3 5

(202) 331-0500 7

Counsel for Plaintiffs 8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

13

19

20

21

22

23

24

25 26

 </s> c

Bobby M. v. Chiles

JI-FL-002-004
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

BOBBY M., et al. Plaintiffs,
v. ROBERT GRAHAM, et al.
Defendants.

)

)

)

No. TCA 83-7003

)

)

ORDER Based on the stipulation between the plaintiffs >and HRS defendants, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 1. No children shall be confined or placed in
the Alyce D. McPherson School/ Ocala, for any purpose after December 31, 1984. 2. No child placed or confined at the McPherson School shall be transferred to any other training school for the purpose of closing the McPherson School. For all children transferred from the McPherson School to any other training school the HRS defendants shall provide to plaintiffs1 counsel a written report which includes the reasons for any transfer.

3. After December 31, 1984, no female children shall be confined or placed in any training school.
4. After December 31, 1984, no male children aged 13 and under shall be placed or confined in any training school.
5. After December 31, 1984, no male children who are status offenders shall be placed or confined in any training school. A status offender for purposes of this decree includes children who are committed to the custody of the HRS defendants on the basis of: (a) a dependency order; (b) a violation of a court order the underlying offense for which is a status offense; (c) the non-felonious running away from a non-secure placement; and (d) such other categories as the parties may agree to from time to time.
6. In the event any child is placed in or confined to a training school in violation of paragraphs 2-5, the HRS defendants shall provide immediate notice to counsel for the plaintiffs and promptly furnish a copy of the entire HRS file on the child.
7. To effectuate administratively the requirements of this order, the HRS defendants shall:
-2-

a. Inform all appropriate HRS personnel that as of July 1, 1984 training schools shall not be a recommended placement to the state court in any form for children identified in paragraphs 3-5 above;
b. Inform the HRS Office of Central Admissions and Interstate Compact (OPAC) that all requests for transfer or placement in the training schools shall be disapproved;
c. Provide OPAC and appropriate HRS personnel an explication of the inappropriateness of training school placement for these children, including information developed by the superintendents of the training schools;
d. Inform OPAC and appropriate HRS personnel that information concerning the inappropriateness of such placements shall be provided to the state courts, if necessary.
e. Provide training school and district personnel with access to legal counsel when necessary to explain to the state courts the inappropriateness of training school placement and the existence of this order.
f. Provide notice to counsel for the plaintiffs of all waivers requested of OPAC for training school placement.
-3-

r
8. Counsel for the plaintiffs may enforce the terms of this order on motion.
ORDERED this {<>/?/ day oriwSp?1985, in
Florida. UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
-4-

 </s> Bobby M. v. Chiles

JI-FL-002-005 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

2 ;

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

3 I
i
4 BOBBY M., CHARLES W., SUSAN S., SALVADORE S., RAYMOND C , RICHARD 0.,
5 THOMAS P., minors, by and through their next friends, DAVID MACK, and
6 JOSEPH F. SMITH, JR., ESQ., On behalf of themselves and all others
' similarly situated,

8

Plaintiffs,

NO.

9

V.

10 ROBERT GRAHAM, in his official capacity as Governor of the State of Florida; PETER PAGE, in his official capacity as Secretary of the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services for-the State of Florida;
13 RALPH TURLINGTON, in his official capacity as Commissioner of the Department of
14 Education for the State of Florida; WAYNE SMITH, in his official capacity as Superintendent of the Arthur G. Dozier
. School for Boys; and SAMUEL STREIT, in ' his official capacity as Superintendent
of the Florida School for Boys,

SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT

18 !

Defendants. /

19 '

INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT

20

1

1. This is a civil rights class action brought on beh

911 I all children who have been, are now, or will be confined in t;

99
' three training schools in the state of Florida: Arthur G. Do:

23 |

24

25

26

1 School for Boys in Marianna ("Dozier"); Alyce D. McPherson School

2 in Ocala ("McPherson"), a co-educational institution; and Florida

3 School for Boys at Okeechobee ("Okeechobee") (plaintiffs).

4 Defendants confine approximately 1,000 children in these

5 institutions.

6

2. Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief frcm

7 cruel and abusive conditions of confinement imposed by defendants

that violate rights guaranteed to them by the First, Fourth, Sixth,

Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States

Constitution, by federal statutes, and by the Florida Constituzion

11 and statutes. These conditions seriously endanger plaintiffs'

12 physical and psychological health and safety, deprive them of any

13 access to, or opportunity for, treatment or education, and restrict

their access to and communication with their families, the

community, and the courts. In particular, defendants subject

plaintiffs to overcrowding, unsanitary and dangerous physical

conditions, lack of security, lack of adequate staff, lack of

medical care, abusive punishment including isolation, hogtying,

shackling, and physical abuse, lack of education and programming,

lack of due process in disciplinary matters, mail censorship, and

deprivation of access to courts. 22

23

JURISDICTION

3. This Court has jurisdiction of this action under 23
95 U.S.C. §1343(3) since this is an action to redress the deprivaLic:
26 under color or state lav/, or rights secured by the Constitution c 2

1 the United States; the Civil Rights Acts, 42 U.S.C. §1983; and

2 §504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 20 U.S.C. §§794 et_ seg.

3

4. This Court also has jurisdiction of this action under 2C

4 U.S.C. §1343(4) since this is an action to secure declaratory,

5 injunctive and other equitable relief under acts of Congress

6 providing for the protection of civil rights, specifically the

7 Civil Rights Acts, 42 U.S.C. §1983; §504 of the Rehabilitation Ac:,

8 29 U.S.C. §794; and the Education for All Handicapped Children Act,

9 20 U.S.C. §§1401 et seq.

10

5. This Court also has jurisdiction of this action under 2?

U.S.C. §§2201 and 2202, and Federal Rules of Civil Procedures "

12 and 65 since this is an action seeking a judgment declaring the

13 .rights of plaintiffs and for injunctive and other equitable relief

based upon that declaratory judgment under §1983.

6. This Court also has jurisdiction of this action under 2

U.S.C. §1331(a) since this is an action in which the matter in

controversy arises under the Constitution and laws of the United I3 States.

1°

7. This Court has pendent jurisdiction over all claims

20 under Florida law because they arise out of the same nucleus of

operative fact as the federal claims. 22 !

23

PLAINTIFFS

0 A

8. Plaintiff BOBBY M. is a minor child and a citizen

United States. He is currently confined at Dozier. Prior to his

incarceration, he attended special education classes. He sues

3

incarceration, he attended special education classes. He sues

2 through his' next friend, DAVID MACK.

3

9. Plaintiff CHARLES W. is a minor child and a citizen of

the United States. He is currently confined at McPherson. Prior

to his confinement, he attended special education classes. He sue.

0 through his next friend, DAVID MACK.

10. Plaintiff SUSAN S. is a minor child and a citizen of z:\
Q
° United States. She is confined at McPherson School where she has
Q
been confined since approximately March 29, 1981. She sues thrcug:

her next friend, DAVID MACK.

11. Plaintiff SALVADORE S. is a minor child and a resident
1 9 x* of the State of Florida. He is confined at Okeechobee. He is 1 1

Spanish-speaking. He sues through his next friend, DAVID MACK.

12. Plaintiff PAYMOND C. is a minor child and a citizen of

the United States. He is currently confined at Okeechobee. Prior

to his confinement , he attended special education classes. He

sues through his next friend, JOSEPH F. SMITH, JR., ESQ.

IS

13. Plaintiff RICHARD 0. is a minor child and a citizen of

19

the United States. He is currently confined at Okeechobee. He

20

sues through his next friend, JOSEPH F. SMITH, JR., ESQ.

21

14. Plaintiff THOMAS P. is a minor child and a citizen or

22

the United States. He is currently confined at Okeechobee. He

23

sues through his next friend, JOSEPH F. SMITH, JR., ESQ.

24

15. All named plaintiffs have been subjected to the

25

policies, practices, acts and omissions described in this

26

, .

complaint.

4

DEFENDANTS
16. Defendant ROBERT GRAHAM is Governor of the State of
Florida. He is the chief executive officer of the State, and,
pursuant to Article Four, §1 of the Florida Constitution of 1963,
is responsible for the development and implementation of the
° policies, practices and procedures described in this complain-,
which are the official policies, practices and procedures of
8 State of Florida.
17. Defendant PETER PAGE is the Secretary of the Depart:
of Health and Rehabilitative Services ("HRS") for the State ^f
Florida. In this capacity, he is responsible, inter al^a, unc-
12 Florida Statutes 20.05, 20.19, 402.22, 959.011, 959.021, 9 5 9.1C,
959.12, and 959.25 for developing and implementing programs for
care, education and treatment of persons committed to the cus_c:".y
of the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, inciudin
the operation of training schools.
18. Defendant RALPH TURLINGTON is the Commissioner of -..-.-:18
Department of Education of the State of Florida. Pursuant t :. Florida Statutes 22.05, 22.15, 230.23(4)(m) and (n), 402.22 a' 20 959.25, he is responsible for providing education and related 21 services to children confined in training schools in Florida. 22
19. Defendant WAYNE SMITH is the Superintendent of Cosi or 23
School and is responsible for the policies, practices, acts a:v:. 24
omissions described m this Complaint to the extent that they ;:e 25
implemented or occur at Dozier. 26
20. Defendant SAMUEL STREIT is the Superintendent of 5

1 Okeechobee School and is responsible for the policies, practices,

2 acts and omissions described in this Complaint to the extent tha

3 they are implemented or occur at Okeechobee.

4

21. Defendants' policy manuals purport to prohibit certain

5 practices described in this Complaint. Nevertheless, defendants o;

6 and their agents and employees, with defendants' knowledge and

7 consent, routinely engage in such practices, so that such prac

8 constitute the actual policies and practices, customs and usages o

9. defendants.

22. All defendants are sued individually and in their

official capacities. At all relevant times, defendants have acted

under color of state law to deprive plaintiffs of their rights,

privileges and immunities under the Constitution and laws of the

14 United States.

15

CLASS ACTION

23. Named plaintiffs bring this action on behalf o

themselves and all others similarly situated pursuant to Rule 2

1 o I
90

and (b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The class consists of all juveniles who are currently, who have been, or

will be confined in the three Florida. training schools, Dozier,

McPherson, and Okeechobee.

24. The members of the class are so numerous that joinder o

23

•

all members is impracticable. At the present time, the Florida

9 A

State training schools confine approximately 1,000 children.

25. Named plaintiffs and their counsel will fairly,

vigorously and adequately protect the interests of the class. 6

1 claims of the named plaintiffs are typical of the claims of the

2 plaintiff class. At least one of the named plaintiffs has been

3 subjected to and suffered from each of the conditions, policies,

p r a c t i c e s , acts and omissions complained of in this action.

Plaintiffs' counsel have substantial experience in this type of

litigation and have represented children in similar cases in

several states .

26. All plaintiffs are subject to the conditions and

policies and practices of defendants described in this Complaint

during their confinement at the training schools, so that there • questions of law and fact common to members of the plaintiff ci_r;

The questions of law and fact common to all members of the

plaintiff class include whether the conditions, practices, acts •

omissions complained of occur at defendants' institutions, and

whether these conditions violate rights guaranteed to plaintiffs

the United States Constitution, federal law and Florida law.

27. By their policies and practices, defendants have

1° and continue to act on grounds and in a manner generally apoli:;

19
90
zu
21
1 22

to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive and corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as whole.

23

GENERAL FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

24 Background and Piacement

28. Defendants GRAHAM and PAGE operate three training

16 schools in the State of Florida: Dozier in Marianna, Florida;

7

At Dozier and Okeechobee, defendants confine only boys; at

McPherson they confine both boys and girls. Dozier and Okeechc

house boys from designated geographical catchment areas; McPhehouses boys from its designated catchment area, and younger, smaller boys and girls from all over the state. The Department

Education and Health and Human Resources, and all three• traini: schools, receive federal funds.

29. At these training schools, defendants confine boys ^ girls who have been adjudicated delinquent in Florida juvenile-

courts. Florida juvenile procedure does not afford children s"

the due process protections afforded to adults in criminal cou: 30. . In opposition to stated HRS policy, defendants conf:
iO -children as young as 10 years old, children who have committee

minor offenses -, and children who have had no previous involve"; | with the juvenile court system in these institutions merely be.

appropriate placements are not available.

17 COUNT ONE - Defendants GRAHAM, PAGE, SMITH and STREIT

18

Living Conditions, Food and Clothing

19 3.1. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege paragraphs 1 through
20

if fully set forward herein, and further allege:

21

32. Living units at the training schools are called

22

"cottages." Cottages contain one or more sleeping areas; lock

23

one or more bathroom areas containing toilets, sinks and -showe

24

and a large, open recreation area. At McPherson, cottages als

25

contain a kitchen and dining area. Most cottages use open

26

.

,

dormitories as sleeping areas.

33. The cottages are extremely overcrowded. At McPherson,

rooms built to house 4 children now house 8, cottages built for 15

children house 30. At Okeechobee, dormitories originally designed

for 17 children house 40. In Dozier, school dormitories originall;

built for 20 children also house 40. At times children sleep on

mattresses on the floor because defendants GO not provide enough

: 7 beds.

o
34. Because of" the tension, lack of space and lack of
o
supervision caused by overcrowding, physical and sexual assaults 10
are common. 35. Because of overcrowding, defendants do not provide
12 children with adequate space, equipment or supervision for
13 recreation or leisure time activities.
14 36. Defendants deprive plaintiffs of all personal privacy :.
their living areas. Children are not allowed to personalize their 16
living areas. The few personal belongings they are allowed tc kee must be stored in small lockers or boxes. At Dozier and 18 Okeechobee, defendants fail to provide doors or curtains on shcv/ir
19 I

and toilet areas, leaving those areas completely exposed to ocer.

20

v lew.

21

37. Defendants maintain unhealthy and unsanitary conditions

22

at all three institutions. Defendants do not adequately clean or

23

maintain the buildings. Defendants maintain buildings which are

24

•

structurally unsound and which present serious danger in tne even:

of fire. Defendants force children to live in buildings that -r'.-

26

improperly heated, cooled, ventilated, or lighted. These builcir...

9

do not have screens and are often insect-infested.

38. Defendants do not adequately feed and clothe plaintiff

39. Defendants do not provide children with clean, untorn, appropriately-sized clothing.

4 0 . D e f e n d a n t s do not provide m e a l s which are adequate in

quantity or quality to meet the nutritional needs of crowing

children or adolescents. Defendants prepare food under condiiion.

that are unhealthful and unsanitary. At Okeechobee and Do~.ier,

defendants do not provide children with anything to eat for the

a l m o s t fourteen hours between supper (at approximately 5:00 p.--.}

and breakfast (at approximately 7:00 a . m . ) .

12

4 1 . By subjecting plaintiffs to o v e r c r o w d i n g , inadequate fc'

and clothing, and unhealthful and unsanitary living conditions, I4 defendants GRAHAM, PAGE, SMITH and STREIT deprive plaintiffs of

their right to due process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth

A m e n d m e n t to the United States C o n s t i t u t i o n , of their right t.: b-e

free from cruel and unusual punishment as guaranteed by the Eight:

and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States C o n s t i t u t i o n , •: :

19 I 90 91 99 93 24

• their right to treatment guaranteed by the Eighth and Fourt-:••:• r. 1 r. Amendments to the United States Constitution, and of their
placement in the least restrictive alternative that will ef. the purpose of their confinement guaranteed by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

25

COUNT TWO - Defendants GRAHAM, PAGE, SMITH and STRSIT

26 Living Conditions, Food and Clothing - Pendent State Claims

10

1

42. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege paragraphs 29 through 29

2 as if fully set forward herein, and further allege:

3

43. By subjecting plaintiffs to overcrowding, inadequa

food and clothing, and unhealthful and unsanitary living

conditions, defendants GRAHAM, PAGE, SMITH and STREIT deprive

plaintiffs of basic rights, the right to due process, and the righ-

to be free from excessive punishment, guaranteed by Article Cne ,

§§2, 9 and 17 of the Florida Constitution, and of rights cuaran-e-.--:

by Fla. Stat. Chapters 39 and 959.

COUNT THREE - Defendants GRAHAM, PAGE, SMITH and STRSIT

Lack of Security

44. plaintiffs repeat and reallege paragraphs 1 through 4"!

as if fully set forward herein, and further allege: 45. Defendants further jeopardize plaintiffs' health ar.-i

safety by failing to provide adequate security in the

1° institutions.

46. Defendants completely fail to supervise and train si?.ff

1° As a result, children are victims of staff assaults. Defendants 1 9
have taken little or no action to curtail staff brutality.

notified of abuses, defendants have failed to take action against

staff members involved.
99
47. Defendants have failed to design or implement a classification system for residents at the schools. Defendants d 24 not separate children who have committed serious or violent 25 offenses from children who have committed only property crimes,
9/;
do not separate children, with emotional disturbances from the r-=;; 1 1

of the population.
48. Defendants also fail to adequately supervise children
the training schools.
49. Defendants' staff members encourage larger children t<
assault or restrain smaller children as a means of disciplining <
controlling them. As a result, residents frequently assault --.:';
other.
50. Defendants fail to provide adequate staff coverage in
any of the training schools. Defendants do not provide enoucn
staff to adequately supervise or treat children confined in t'r.~
training schools. As a result, defendants deny plaintiffs cerso;
*•*• security and safety in the institutions.
51. Defendants employ staff members who are inadequately
trained to perform childcare responsibilities. Defendants
provide staff with the psychological, sociological or medical
information necessary to care for and treat children in the
training schools. 13
52. Defendants aggravate the atmosphere of fear and v i d e 19
that prevails at these schools by using tracking dogs to hunt 6o 20
children who attempt to escape from either Okeechobee or Dozier. 21
Dog handlers terrorize and abuse children. 22
53. By their actions in failing to provide plaintiffs v.-it 23
adequate security, safety, and supervision, defendants GRAHAM, 24
PAGE, SMITH AND STREIT deprive plaintiffs of their right to cue 25
process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Uni 26
States Constitution, of their right to be free from cruel and 12

1 unusual punishment guaranteed by the Eighth and Fourteenth

2 Amendments to the United States Constitution, of their right to

3 treatment guaranteed by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to t:

4 United States Constitution, and of their right to confinement in

5 the least restrictive alternative that will effectuate the purpos-

of their confinement guaranteed by the due process clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

8 COUNT FOUR - Defendants GRAHAM, PAGE, SMITH AND STREIT

9 Lack of Security - Pendent State Claims

10

54. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege paragraphs 42 through 5'

11 as if fully set forward herein, and further allege:

12

55. By their actions in failing to provide plaintiffs v;ith

•adequate security, safety, and supervision, defendants GRAHAM,

PAGE, SMITH and STREIT deprive plaintiffs of basic rights, the

right to due process, and the right to be free from excessive

punishment guaranteed by Article One, §52, 9 and 17 of the Florid:

Constitution, and of rights guaranteed by Fla. Stat. Chapters ?? 18 and 959. 19 COUNT FIVE - Defendants GRAHAM, PAGE, SMITH and STREIT

Medical Care

21

56. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege paragraphs 1 through 52

•^ as if fully set forward herein, and further allege:

57. The medical care defendants provide at all three
24 institutions is grossly inadequate to maintain physical or rr.er.tal
or
health. Defendants1 failure to provide adequate medical care 16
amounts to deliberate indifference to the health and safety
13

1 requirements of children at these institutions.

2

58. Defendants fail to provide medical staffs at the

3 institutions that are adequate to meet children's needs.

4 Defendants fail to employ adequate numbers of physicians,

5 psychiatrists, psychiatric aides, nurses, nurses' aides or

6 dentists.

7

59. Defendants fail to provide adequate supplies in the

8 medical areas of all -three schools. Defendants fail to provide

9 supplies necessary to maintain a healthy and sanitary environment,

10 or equipment necessary to provide adequate medical, dental or

11 psychiatric treatment.

12

60. Defendants have failed to design and implement an

13 adequate procedure for preventing, treating and containing

contagious diseases, including venereal • diseases. Defendants fail

15 to remove children with contagious diseases from the general

population.

61. Defendants maintain infirmaries at the training schcols

in an unsanitary, unhygienic, and medically unsafe manner.

Defendants maintain infirmaries that are insect-infested. They a:

20 often uncomfortably hot or cold. Defendants have required childr?

to sleep on mattresses without sheets. Defendants fail to provic^

plaintiffs with pajamas or appropriate hospital attire in medical

^ areas. Defendants do not permit children to shower or bathe ever'

day while they are in the infirmary.

62. By failing to provide plaintiffs with adequate medic?'.

and psychiatric care and treatmeennt, defendants GRAHAM, PAGE, S.V.

14

1 AND STREIT deprive plaintiffs of their right to due process of la-

2 guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States

3 Constitution, of their right to be free from cruel and unusual

4. punishment guaranteed by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to

the United States Constitution, of their right to treatment

guaranteed by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the unitei

States Constitution, and of their right to placement in the le^s-

restrictive alternative that will effectuate the purposes of thei:

confinement, guaranteed by the due process clause of the Fourteent

Amendment.

COUNT SIX - Defendants GRAHAM, PAGE, SMITH and STREIT

Medical Care to Handicapped Students

63. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege paragraphs 54 thro:.:-"::: •:'[

as if fully set forward herein, and further allege:

^

64. By failing to provide adequate medical and psych i.?. ir ic

1° care and treatment to handicapped plaintiffs, defendants GRAr'."-.::,
17 PAGE, SMITH and STREIT discriminate against plaintiffs and ::,:;-. :.Vr.
18 iO them solely by reason of their handicap, violating rights
jo |
g u a r a n t e e d t o them by §504 of t h e R e h a b i l i t a t i o n A c t , - 2 9 20
U.S.C. §794 and r e g u l a t i o n s promulgated t h e r e u n d e r .
2 1 COUNT SEVEN - D e f e n d a n t s GRAHAM, PAGE, SMITH and STREIT

23 M e d i c a l Care - P e n d e n t S t a t e Claims 65. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege paragraphs 54 through. 5
24 as if fully set forward herein, and further allege:
25 66. By failing to provide plaintiffs with adequate medi ;: 1
and psychiatric care and treatment, defendants GRAHAM, PAGE,

15

1 SMITH and STREIT deprive plaintiffs of basic rights, the right to 2 due process, and the right to be free from excessive punishment

3 guaranteed to them by Article One, §§2, 9 and 17 of the Florida

Constitution, and of rights guaranteed by Fla. Stat. Chapters 39

5 and 959, and §§402.22 and 230.23.

6 COUNT EIGHT - Defendants GRAHAM, PAGE, SMITH and STREIT

7 Psychological Counseling

67. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege paragraphs 1 through 6-'

9 as if fully set forward herein, and further allege:

10

68. Defendants fail to provide plaintiffs with adequate

11 psychological care and treatment.

12

69. Defendants fail to adequately assess children's

psychological condition at or before the time of their admission

the training schools. As a result, defendants confine children

with serious psychological illnesses, children who are mentally

retarded,and children who are otherwise handicapped or

developmentally disabled in training schools where they cannc:

adequately be treated.

70. Defendants fail to design and implement an adequate

20 treatment plan for each child at the training schools. As a

result, defendants fail to provide children with appropriate

22 rehabilitation or treatment.

71. Defendants do not employ or m_ke available'a suffici.3.-.-

number of qualified psychologists or social workers to counsel a.-. 9*5

"

treat children.

72. Defendants delegate the responsibility for providing

16

1 plaintiffs with direct psychological treatment to persons who are
2 inadequately trained and supervised. As a result, children do no
3 receive psychological treatment.
73. By failing to provide plaintiffs with adequate
5 psychological assessment, care and treatment, defendants GRAHAM, 6 PAGE, SMITH and STREIT deprive plaintiffs of their right to due
' process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Un
States Constitution, of their right to be free from cruel and
unusual punishment guaranteed by the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution, of their right to
treatment guaranteed by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to
United States Constitution, and of their right to placement in
least restrictive alternative that will effectuate the purposes
their confinement, guaranteed by the due process clause of th
Fourteenth Amendment.
16 COUNT NINE - Defendants GRAHAM, PAGE, SMITH and STREIT
Psychological Counseling - Handicapped Children
TO
74. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege paragraphs 65 through 19
as if fully set forward herein, and further allege: 20
75. By failing to provide adequate psychological assessrr.er.
care and treatment to handicapped plaintiffs, defendants GRAHAM,
PAGE, SMITH and STREIT discriminate against plaintiffs and punish 23
them solely by reason of their handicap, violating rights 24
guaranteed to them by §504 of the R e h a b i l i t a t i o n Act, 29 95
U.S.C. §794 and regulations promulgated thereunder. 26
COUNT TEN - D e f e n d a n t s GRAHAM, PAGE and STREIT
17

1 Psychological Counseling - Pendent State Claims

2

76. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege paragraphs 65 through

3 as if fully set forward herein, and further allege:

4

77. By failing to provide plaintiffs with adequate

5 psychological assessment, care and treatment, defendants GRAHAM,

6 PAGE, SMITH and STREIT deprive plaintiffs of basic rights, the

7 right to due process, and the right to be free from excessive

8 punishment guaranteed to them by Article One, §§2, 9 and 17 of z':~.

9 Florida Constitution, and of rights guaranteed to them by 10 Fla. Stat. Chapters 39 and 959, and §§402.22 and 230.23

11 COUNT ELEVEN - Defendants GRAHAM, PAGE, SMITH and STREIT

12 Isolation

13

78. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege paragraph 1 through 75 .

though fully set forward herein, and further allege:

79. Defendants operate "adjustment units" at all three

training schools. They use these adjustment units for purposes o

discipline and control.

80. At McPherson and Okeechobee, these units consist of

several individual isolation cells. At Dozier, the adjustment

unit contains 10 isolation cells and 3 open dormitory areas.

Defendants use isolation at Dozier to further punish children who

are confined in the adjustment unit.

81. The isolation cells are similar in all three
1A
institutions. Each cell contains a concrete platform, a sink, ?.r.v
an open toilet. Defendants put mattresses, pillows, and blankets 2<6
I in the c e l l s at night, but, at Dozier and Okeechobee often remove-
18

them as punishment.

82. Each isolation cell is separated from the corridor by

heavy locked metal door. This door has a small view window

approximately 4-1/2 feet from the ground and a T-shaped -slot

approximately 2-1/2 feet from the ground. Children can communio

with the outside only through the T-shaped slot. This slot car-,

only be closed or opened from the outside. Staff frequently clo.

these slots, depriving children of any contact with the outside

while they are in isolation.

\

83. The physical conditions in the isolation cells endar.g-

children's health and safety. Cells are unventilated , poorly

lighted and unsanitary. Children must eat their meals next zo 10 open, uncleaned toilet fixtures. Because they are locked,

isolation cells pose a serious danger in case of fire, and

defendants have completely failed to develop procedures for

evacuating plaintiffs from these cells in case of fire.

84. Defendants confine depressed, agitated and emotionally

d i s t u r b e d c h i l d r e n in i s o l a t i o n c e l l s . Defendants make no efft

io
20
91
99 ' I
23 I
I
25
26

to protect children against self-inflicted injuries. Isolation. cells contain many sharp objects such as screens and vents and breakable porcelain toilet fixtures. All these objects can be, are, used by children to injure themselves. Defendants fail t
adequately monitor children in isolation to ensure that they c: injure themselves.
85. Defendants subject children to long periods of isolat in bare concrete wailed cells. They do not provide children wi-;
19

access to television, radio or reading materials. Communicati

2 v/ith other children or staff is minimal. Children held under th;

3 conditions suffer severe sensory deprivation.

i6. Defendants often confine children in isolation for 24

5 hours a day. At Dozier and Okeechobee, defendants fail to provi-

6 any programming for children in isolation. At McPherson,

7 defendants permit some children in isolation to leave thei"

8 for a brief period to obtain their school assignments and for

9 hour a day of exercise. Defendants also fail to provide any

10 programming for children in the open dormitory areas of the

11 adjustment unit at Dozier School. Children in this unit car.

12 outside or into a common area, but receive no recreational

13 educational materials for the duration of their stay in the

adjustment unit.

87. Defendants' regulations permit children to be cor. fir-.

in security units for up to 21 days. In fact, children ofter.

remain in isolation units for longer periods of time-

ly

88. Defendants confine children to adjustment units

19 minor incidents, including disrespect for staff members,
90

zu altercations with other children, and refusal to promptly obey

21 orders. Defendants confine children to adjustment units for

behaviors caused by mental or emotional illnesses and other
oq I handicaps, instead of providing plaintiffs with treatment for illnesses and handicaps.
25 8 9 . By s u b j e c t i n g p l a i n t i f f s t o t h e p r a c t i c e s o f i s o l a t i c
2 6 d e s c r i b e d a b o v e , d e f e n d a n t s GRAHAM, PAGE, SMITH a n d STREIT c e c r i -

20

plaintiffs of their right to due process of law guaranteed by t:
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, of theii
right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment guaranteed b-
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution, of their right to treatment guaranteed by the Eig:
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, ar.:
' their right to placement in the least restrictive alternative z
n
0 will effectuate the purposes of their confinement guaranteed by
° due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Unite
Constitution.
1 1 COUNT TWELVE - Defendants GRAHAM, PAGE, SMITH and STREIT
Isolation - Handicapped P l a i n t i f f s
90. P l a i n t i f f s r e p e a t and r e a l l e g e paragraphs 75 through 14
as if fully set forward herein, and further allege:
91. By confining handicapped plaintiffs to isolation as
16 described above, defendants GRAHAM, PAGE, SMITH and STREIT discriminate against them and punish them solely by reason of
18 their handicap, thus violating rights guaranteed to them by §EC
TO
the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. §794 and regulations promulga 20
thereunder. 21 COUNT THIRTEEN - Defendants GRAHAM, PAGE, SMITH and STREIT 7? I
Isolation - Pendent State Claims
no
92. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege paragraphs 7 6 through 24
as if fully set forward herein, and further allege: 25
93. By subjecting plaintiffs to the practices of isolati 26
j described above, defendants GRAHAM, PAGE, SMITH and STREIT dec: 21

plaintiffs of basic rights, of the right to due process, and of t:

2 right to be free from excessive punishment guaranteed to them by

3 Article One, §§ 2, 9 and 17 of the Florida Constitution, and of 4 rights guaranteed by Fla. Stat . Chapters 39 and 959.

5 COUNT FOURTEEN - Defendants GRAHAM, PAGE, TURLINGTON, SMITH and

STREIT

Shackling

94. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege paragraphs 1 through 9"!

as though fully set forward herein, and further allege:

95. Defendants use shackles in the adjustment units as a

means of discipline and of controlling children's behavior.

12

96. Defendants use several methods of shackling. Ac Dozie:

and Okeechobee, defendants use a particularly harmful method call^

"hogtying." Defendants hogtie children by forcing them to lie or.

15 their stomachs, handcuffing their wrists behind their backs,

shackling their legs together and connecting the handcuffs to the

leg shackles.

1°

97. At all three schools, defendants handcuff children,

1 9 I
90
zv
21

chain their hands to their waists, and use leg shackles.
Defendants frequently use metal handcuffs and metal leg restrain;:; to restrict children's movement. Use of these metal restraints h:

22 been shown to cause serious injury to developing children.

98. At Dozier School, educational staff also use shackles
24 i
restrain plaintiffs in the educational area.
or
99. Defendants' employees at all three schools have, on 26 '
occasions, beaten or kicked children while they were shackled 22

1 hog tied .

2

100. Defendants leave children locked in isolation cells

3 lying on concrete beds, sometimes without sheets or mattresses,

hogtied or shackled, for extended periods of time.

101. Plaintiffs have suffered and continue to suffer serious

physical and emotional damage as a result of extended isolation,

shackling, hog tying, and beatings.

102. By subjecting plaintiffs to the practices of shacklir.;

described above, defendants GRAHAM, PAGE, TURLINGTON, SMITH and

STREIT deprive plaintiffs of their right to due process

11 guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States

12 Constitution, of their right to be free from cruel and unusual

punishment guaranteed by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments t;

the United States Constitution, of their right to treatment

guaranteed by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United

States Constitution, and of their right to placement in the least

*•' restrictive alternative that will effectuate the purposes cf thei
"I o
0 confinement guaranteed by the due process clause of the Fourteen::. 19

Amendment to the United States Constitution.

COUNT FIFTEEN - Defendants GRAHAM, PAGE, TURLINGTON, SMITH an

21

STREIT

99 I
Shackling Handicapped Plaintiffs 103. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege paragraphs 92 through

24 I

as if fully set forward herein, and further allege:

25

104. Ey shackling handicapped plaintiffs as described above,

defendants GRAHAM, PAGE, TURLINGTON, SMITH AND STREIT d iscr im ir. •-, - ,

23

against them and punish them solely by reason of their handicap,

thus violating rights guaranteed to them by §504 of the

Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. §794 and regulations promulgated

thereunder .

5 COUNT SIXTEEN - Defendants GRAHAM, PAGE, TURLINGTON, SMITH and

6

STREIT

Shackling - Pendent State Claims

105. P l a i n t i f f s r e p e a t and r e a l l e g e paragraphs 92 through

as if f u l l y s e t forward h e r e i n , and further a l l e g e :

10 6 - By s u b j e c t i n g p l a i n t i f f s to the p r a c t i c e of shackling

d e s c r i b e d above, defendants GRAHAM, PAGE, TURLINGTON, SMITH and

12 STREIT d e p r i v e p l a i n t i f f s of b a s i c r i g h t s , the r i g h t to due i O p r o c e s s , and the r i g h t to be free from e x c e s s i v e punishmen1

guaranteed to them by A r t i c l e One, §§2,-9 and 17 of the Florid.

C o n s t i t u t i o n , and of r i g h t s guaranteed by F l a . S t a t . Chapters

16 and 959.

17 COUNT SEVENTEEN - Defendants GRAHAM, PAGE, TURLINGTON, SMITH ~r.z

1 ft
10 I

STREIT

19

Education and Programming

20

107. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege paragraphs 1 through 1

21

as though fully set forward herein, and further allege:

99

108. Defendants fail to provide plaintiffs with an

23

education comparable to that available to plaintiffs in the

community.

25

109. Defendants fail to provide bilingual education

26

services to children who are not fluent in English.

24

110. Defendants fail to provide adequate vocational

education. The vocational education they do provide is inadequa'

to prepare children to obtain employment upon release.

111. Defendants fail to provide children with other forms <.

programming. They require children to spend prolonged periods o

time without any programmed activity or recreational or therapeu-

' programming

°

112. .Defendants fail to provide rehabilitative treatment t

" plaintiffs.

113. The Florida Departments of Education and Health and

Human Services', and each of the training schools, receive fe.i

funds under, inter al ia, Public Lav; 94-142, the Education for 13 Handicapped Children Act, 20 U.S.C. §§1401 et seq. 14'

114. Defendants fail to provide special education and

services to handicapped children who were receiving such s

prior to their incarceration. Defendants fail to adequately

assess children to determine whether they have special need;:
18 how such special needs can be met. Defendants fail to develop
19 I appropriate individualized education programs for children wh
on special education. Defendants fail to provide appropriate rel>--;
21 services, including speech therapy, physical therapy and
11 psychological services, to handicapped children who need such
23 services to benefit from their education.
24 115. By failing to provide plaintiffs with adequate
25 educational services described above, defendants GRAHAM, PAGE,
26 TURLINGTON, SMITH and STREIT d e p r i v e p l a i n t i f f s o f t h e i r r i g h t 25

equal protection and due process of law guaranteed by the

2 Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, of their

3 right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment guaranteed by

the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States

Constitution, of their right to treatment guaranteed by the Eighth

and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and c

their right to placement in the least restrictive alternative thai

will effectuate the purposes of their confinement guaranteed by th-

9 due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United Stale 10 Constitution.

11 COUNT EIGHTEEN - Defendants GRAHAM, PAGE, TURLINGTON, SMITH

12

and STREIT

^

Education and Procramminq - Discrimination Against Handicapped

14

Students

•^

116. P l a i n t i f f s repeat and reallege paragraphs 105 through

113 as if fully set forward herein, and further allege:

117. By failing to provide otherwise qualified handicapped
18 plaintiffs with adequate educational services as described above,
19 defendants GRAHAM, PAGE, TURLINGTON, SMITH and STREIT discriminate
20 against them by reason of their handicap, thus violating rights
21
g u a r a n t e e d to them by §504 of the R e h a b i l i t a t i o n Act, 29 22
U.S.C. §794 and regulations promulgated thereunder. 23 COUNT NINETEEN - Defendants GRAHAM, PAGE, TURLINGTON, ' SMITH ar.-i
24 STREIT
25 Educational Programming - Failure to Provide Special Education
26 118. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege paragraphs 105 throuc.-; 26

1 115 as if fully set forward herein, and further allege:

2

119. Since defendants completely deprive all plaintiffs o

3 special education and related services on a classwide basis,

4 exhaustion of administrative remedies by plaintiffs would be

5 futile.

6

120. By failing to provide handicapped plaintiffs with

evaluation and special education and related services as descri'.

8 above, defendants GRAHAM, PAGE, TURLINGTON, SMITH and STREIT

9 deprive them of rights guaranteed to them by the Education for

1° Handicapped Children Act, Public Law 94-142, 20 U.S.C. §§1401

11 et seq., and regulations promulgated thereunder.

12 COUNT TWENTY - Defendants GRAHAM, PAGE, TURLINGTON, SMITH and

13

STREIT

Education and Programming - Pendent S t a t e Claims

121. P l a i n t i f f s repeat and r e a l l e g e paragraphs 105 throuc

6

118 as if f u l l y set forward herein,, and further a l l e g e :

'

122. Bv f a i l i n g to provide p l a i n t i f f s with adequate

18 educational services as described above, and .by failing to prov

1 9

handicapped p l a i n t i f f s with adequate educational services,

2 0 defendants GRAHAM, PAGE, TURLINGTON, SMITH and STREIT deprive

p l a i n t i f f s of basic r i g h t s , the right to due process, and the r

to be free from excessive punishment guaranteed by^ Article Cne ,

§§2, 9 and 17 of the Florida Constitution, and by

24

F l a . S t a t . Chapters 39, 959, and §§402.22 and 230.23.

25

COUNT TV7ENTY-QNS - D e f e n d a n t s GRAHAM, PAGE, SMITH a n d STREIT

Due Process

27

123. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege paragraphs 1 through 12C

as though fully set forward herein, and further allege:

124. Defendants deprive plaintiffs of constitutionally

guaranteed due process in classification, disciplinary procedures;

and transfer .

125. Defendants discipline plaintiffs arbitrarily and

capriciously for minor misbehaviors and for behaviors that are

symptoms of emotional or mental handicaps.

126. Defendants authorize staff members, regardless of

training or qualifications, to order children into confinement in .

the adjustment unit. Children must remain in the adjustment ur.it

minimum of 24 hours before they have the opportunity for a hearing

10

127. Defendants transfer children from one institution to

14

another without affording them the opportunity for a hearing.

These inter-institutional transfers are disciplinary in nature.

Inter-institutional transfers punish children by further removing

them from their families and home communities and by subjecting

18

them to harsher, more restrictive conditions.

19 128. To the extent that defendants have developed a grievance
20

procedure, they fail to inform children about the existence of thi;

21 '

I procedure or to explain to them how the procedure can be used.

9? i as described above, defendants GRAHAM, PAGS, SMITH and STREIT

24

129. By disciplining, classifying and transferring plainti

deprive plaintiffs of their right to due process of law guarantee.

25

by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

26 COUNT TWENTY-TWO - D e f e n d a n t s GRAHAM, PAGE, SMITH a n d STREIT

28

Due Process - Pendent S t a t e Claims

130. P l a i n t i f f s repeat and r e a l l e g e paragraphs 121 through

127 as if f u l l y set forward h e r e i n , and further a l l e g e :

131. By d i s c i p l i n i n g , c l a s s i f y i n g and t r a n s f e r r i n g p l a i n t i f .

in the manner described above, defendants GRAHAM, PAGE, SMITH anc

° STREIT deprive p l a i n t i f f s of t h e i r r i g h t to due process of law

' guaranteed by A r t i c l e One, §9 of the Florida C o n s t i t u t i o n , an; 8 rights guaranteed b y F l a . Stat. §959.10.

9 COUNT TWENTY-THREE - Defendants GRAHAM, PAGE, SMITH and STREIT

Freedom of Speech and A s s o c i a t i o n

11

132. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege paragraphs 1 through

kJ- as though fully set forward herein, and further allege: 13
133. Defendants interfere with non-English speaking
p l a i n t i f f s ' a b i l i t y to communicate by prohibiting them from

speaking any language other than English.

134. Defendants, by their mail, telephone and v i s i t a t i o n

p o l i c i e s , deprive p l a i n t i f f s of their right to communicate and
18 associate with their families and friends outside of the train!"-
19 schools by interfering with and restricting mail and telephone
20 communications. This communication is necessary to children's
21 treatment and rehabilitation and to assist their reintegration int
22 the community.
23 135. Defendants open a l l mail other than attorney-client mai
24 that comes to children in the institutions. Defendants open this
25 mail outside of the presence of the child to whom the mail is
26 addressed. Defendants also prohibit children from sending seal-::: 29

l e t t e r s to persons outside the i n s t i t u t i o n . These practices permit

staff members to read children's mail.

136. Defendants improperly r e s t r i c t children from

communicating by telephone with their parents, relatives or

friends. These r e s t r i c t i o n s work a particularly severe hardship o::

children whose parents live at great distances from the schools zr..~

'

are unable to v i s i t them.

°

137. .Defendants severely r e s t r i c t children's opportunities

for v i s i t a t i o n with family and friends. Defendants unreasonably

limit the number of v i s i t o r s a child may have'and the hours ourir.c

which v i s i t s may occur.

*2

138. Defendants transfer children from detention centers or

community-based programs to training schools, and from one tr.-.ir.ir.-
14' school to another, without adequately informing children's c;:e:::3
^ or r e l a t i v e s . As a r e s u l t , some parents do not know where th-

children are for several months after such a transfer.

139. By r e s t r i c t i n g p l a i n t i f f s ' communication"with

18

o u t s i d e the t r a i n i n g schools in the manner described above,

19

d e f e n d a n t s GRAHAM, PAGE, SMITH and STREIT d e p r i v e p l a i n t i f f s

20

their right to freedom of speech and association guaranteed c

21

First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.

22

COUNT TWENTY-FOUR - D e f e n d a n t s GRAHAM, PAGE, SMITH and STREIT

23 Freedom of Speech and Association - Pendent State Claims
24 140. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege paragraphs 130 through
25 137 as if fully set forward herein, and further allege:
26 141. By restricting plaintiffs' communication with perso::.; 30

outside the training schools in the manner described above,

defendants GRAHAM, PAGE, SMITH and STREIT deprive plaintiffs of

basic rights, the right to freedom of speech, the right to due

process, and the right to freedom from unreasonable interception o

private communications guaranteed by Article One, §§ 2, 4, 9 and 1:

of the Florida Constitution, and of rights guaranteed by

7 Fla. Stat. Chapters 39 and 959.

8 COUNT TWENTY-FIVE - Defendants GRAHAM, PAGE, SMITH and STREIT

.9 Access to Courts

142. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege paragraphs 1 through 13?

as though fully set forward herein, and further allege:

143. Defendants deprive plaintiffs of adequate access to civ-

13 courts. Defendants fail to inform children that they may make

1

telephone calls to or receive telephone calls from counsel.

144. Defendants fail to provide children with either legal

materials or access to counsel who can assist them with thei:

problems. Defendants also fail to provide children with any

I Q
instruction or assistance in protecting their rights through t'-:.~

19 legal system.
90 145. By f a i l i n g to provide p l a i n t i f f s with access to the

21

courts as described above, defendants GRAHAM, PAGE, SMITH and

99
STREIT deprive plaintiffs of their right to counsel and access ^

the courts guaranteed by the First and Sixth Amendments and by the

24 due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United Szazi
25 Constitution.
26 COUNT TWENTY-SIX - D e f e n d a n t s GRAHAM, PAGE, SMITH a n d STREIT 31

Access to Courts - Pendent State Claims

146. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege paragraphs 140 through

143 as if fully set forward herein, and further allege:

147. By failing to provide plaintiffs with access to courts

as described above, defendants GRAHAM, PAGE, SMITH and STREIT

violate basic rights, the right to freedom of speech and of the

press, the right to due process, and the right to access to the

courts guaranteed by Article One, §§2, 4, 9 and 21 of the -Florida

Constitution, and rights guaranteed by Fla. Stat. Chapters 39 and

10 959.
11

NO ADEQUATE REMEDY AT LAW

148. As a proximate result of defendants' policies,

practices, procedures, acts and omissions, plaintiffs have

suffered, do suffer and will continue to suffer immediate and

irreparable injury, including physical, psychological and emotion-:

injury. Their intellectual a b i l i t i e s , their emotional health and

well-being and their ability to function adequately in the

18
19
20 I
91
I 99
I 23
24
25
26

community have seriously deteriorated and will continue to deteriorate during the course of their confinement at institution.; operated by defendants. Plaintiffs have no plain, adequate or complete remedy at law to redress the wrongs described in this complaint. Plaintiffs will continue to be irreparably injured by the policies, practices, procedures, acts and omissions of
defendants unless this Court grants the injunctive relief tha plaintiffs seek.
32

1

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

2

WHEREFORE, p l a i n t i f f s p r a y t h a t t h i s C o u r t :

3

1. Permit p l a i n t i f f s to pursue t h i s action in forma

pauper is

5

2. Certify t h i s action and permit i t to proceed as a

6 class action.

7

3. Issue a d e c l a r a t o r y judgment declaring thai: defendants '

8 p r a c t i c e s in subjecting p l a i n t i f f s to the c o n d i t i o n s of confine.:^:

9 described in t h i s Complaint v i o l a t e r i g h t s guaranteed to p l a i n t i f ;

10 under the F i r s t , S i x t h , Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment of the

11 United S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n ; the Education for All Handicapped

12 Children Act, 20 U.S.C. §§1401 e t s e q . ; the R e h a b i l i t a t i o n HCZ , 2:

13 • U.S.C. §§794 e_t seq. ; §§2, 4, 5, 9, 12, 15, 17 and 21 of A r t i c l e :

14 of the Florida C o n s t i t u t i o n ; and Chapters 39, 230, 394, 409 and S:

15 of the Florida S t a t u t e s .

16

4. P r e l i m i n a r i l y and permanently enjoin defendants, t h e i r

17

a g e n t s , employees, successors in o f f i c e and assigns from engaci-g

18

in the u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l and unlawful p r a c t i c e s , a c t s and omission.;

19

described herein, including, but not limited t o :

20
(a) Confining p l a i n t i f f s in f a c i l i t i e s that are

21

overcrov/ded u n h e a l t h f u l , u n s a n i t a r y and l i f e - e n d a n g e r i n g ;

22
(b) F a i l i n g to adequately p r o t e c t the physical h e a l t h c
23
plaintiffs;
24
(c) F a i l i n g to insure p l a i n t i f f s against a t t a c k s by

25

s t a f f members or by other c h i l d r e n confined in the i n s t i t u t i o n ;

26

(d) Failing to provide adequately t r a i n e d staff in

33

adequate numbers to insure plaintiffs' safety and provide them wit:

treatment;

(e) Failing to provide plaintiffs with adequate medical

dental and psychiatric care;

(f) Confining plaintiffs in security units, and, in

particular, in isolation units, or otherwise subjecting plaintiffs

' to sensory deprivation;

8

(g) Shackling plaintiffs;

9

(h) Hogtying plaintiffs;

(i) Failing to provide plaintiffs with adequate

education, including special education and related services;

(j) Failing to provide plaintiffs with adequate 13 iJ programming;

(k) Failing to provide plaintiffs with adequate

treatment;

(1) Failing to adequately screen plaintiffs to insure

that plaintiffs with serious emotional or psychological

10
19 20
22
23 I
24 25

disabilities are not confined in training schools; (m) Failing to provide p l a i n t i f f s with due process
protections prior to imposing d i s c i p l i n e , including but not lir.i-e to, d i s c i p l i n e that r e s u l t s in transfers from one i n s t i t u t i o n to another;
(n) Prohibiting plaintiffs from speaking languages othe than English;

(o) Opening plaintiffs' mail outside of the presence

the addressee;

34

1

(p) Failing to permit plaintiffs to send uncensored ,

2 unread and unopened mail to friends and relatives;

3

(q) Failing to provide plaintiffs with reasonable

opportunities to telephone and visit parents, friends and

relatives;

(r) Failing to provide plaintiffs with adequate acce

to courts; and

(s) Failing to confine plaintiffs in the least

restrictive alternative consistent with their need for

rehabilitation and treatment.

•5. Direct defendants to develop and submit to this Court

plan, that will insure that plaintiffs are not subject to

conditions of confinement that deprive them of rights guarar.-eec

them by the federal Constitution, federal statutes, and by the

Florida Constitution or Florida statutes, and that will insure 16 no juvenile is placed in a training school in Florida unles

training school is a least restrictive alternative consistent. :•;:

his or her individual needs.

19

6. Retain jurisdiction over this matter until • implemen :;•

20

of t h i s Court's decree has been completed.

911

7 . Award t o p l a i n t i f f s r e a s o n a b l e a t t o r n e y s ' fees and C J :

22

o f t h i s a c t i o n , pursuant t o 42 U.S.C. §1988 and 29 U.S.C.

23

§794a(2)(6).

24

35

25

26

1

8. Award such other and further relief as this Court ma-

2 deem necessary.

3 DATED: June 2, 1986

4

Respectfully submitted,

Michael Rale

9

Laurene M. Heybach

Nova University Law Center

10

3100 S.W. 9th Avenue

F t . L a u d e r d a l e , FL 33315

11

(305) 467-0301

12

C a r o l e B. Shauffer

Youth Law Center

13

1663 Mission Street, Fifth Floor

San Francisco, CA 94103

14

(415) 543-3307

15

A l b e r t J . Hadeed

Southern Legal Counsel, Inc.

16

115-A N.E. 7th Avenue

G a i n e s v i l l e , FL 32601

17

(904) 377-8288

18

Mary E. McClymont

National Prison Project of the

American Civil L i b e r t i e s Unio:

1616 P S t r e e t , N.W., S u i t e 340

20

Washington, D.C. 20036

(202) 331-0500

22

23

24

36

25 26

1

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

2

3

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the

4

foregoing SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT has been furnished by United

States Mail to JOHN MILLER, Esquire, Attorney for the Department

of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 1323 Winevood Boulevar::,

Building One, Suite 406, Tallahassee, Florida 3230 1; JUDITH A.

BRECHMER, Esquire, and GENE T. SELLERS, Esquire, State o f Florid,

Board of Education, Knott Building, Tallahassee, Florida 3230 1;

10

JIM SMITH, Esquire, SHIRLEY A. WALKER, Esquire, Department of

Legal Affairs, Suite 1501 - The Capitol, Tallahassee, Florida

12

32301, this 3ub day of \J'JUZ

13

, 1986.

14

,e

MICHAELS. DALE

16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
25 26

 </s> UNITED STATES DISTRICtJCQURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA^
TALLAHASSEE DIVISION

BOBBY M., et al. Plaintiffs,
v. BOB MARTINEZ, et al
Defendants.

Bobby M. v. Chiles

"™" ™ • • « " am ^

HV V H

•• ••

••

JI-FL-002-007

Civ. Case No. TCA 83-7003 MMP

CONSENT DECREE TABLE OF CONTENTS I. Representations of the Parties II. Submission of Consent Decree to the Court III. Settlement Class IV. Notice to the Class V. Population Reduction VI. Program Goals VII. Assessment, Classification and Placement VIII. Training School Placement IX. Technical Assistance and Assessment X. Miscellaneous Provisions APP. A Notice APP. B Standards for Institutional Operations

•

-

•'•»

i
, li
'*:..

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TALLAHASSEE DIVISION

BOBBY M., et al. Plaintiffs,
v. BOB MARTINEZ, et al
Defendants.

Civ. Case No. TCA 83-7003 MMP

CONSENT DECREE This consent decree is entered into by the below listed parties to this litigation to resolve all claims asserted by the plaintiffs in their complaint as amended, except those related to the Department of Education. The parties to this consent decree are: 1. Plaintiff children Bobby M., Charles W., Susan S. and Salvadore S., by and through their next friend David Mack, individually and as representatives of all children confined at the training schools;

-2-

2. Plaintiff children Raymond C , Richard 0. and Thomas P., by and through their next friend Joseph F. Smith, Jr., Esq., individually and as representatives of all children confined at the training schools (while these plaintiffs have not formally served the defendants, the defendants consent to their being included in this consent decree); and
3. The Defendants, acting in their official capacities, the Honorable Bob Martinez, Governor of Florida; Gregory Coler, the Secretary of the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services; Superintendent Roy McKay; and Superintendent Samuel M. Streit who also serves as the Director of the Department's Children, Youth and Families Programs.
I. Representations of the Parties
WHEREAS the original complaint was filed on January 2, 1983, on behalf of the plaintiffs and all others similarly situated, and as amended, asserted violations of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. §794), the Federal Civil Rights Act (42 U.S.C. §1983), and the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution of the United States at the McPherson Training School in Ocala, now closed by court order, the Arthur G. Dozier School for Boys in Marianna ("Dozier") and the Florida School for Boys at Okeechobee, subsequently renamed the Eckerd Youth Development Center ("Okeechobee");
WHEREAS the defendants filed an answer denying the allegations of the complaint as amended;
-3-

WHEREAS the Court has certified a class of all past, present and future children confined to a training school in Florida;
WHEREAS the parties acknowledge that since late 1984, substantial progress in addressing deficiencies in the training schools, as alleged in the original complaint and as amended, have been made at the Florida training schools;
WHEREAS the undersigned counsel are authorized by their clients to enter into this binding decree and to take all steps reguired of them by this decree;
WHEREAS the plaintiffs consider it desirable and in their best interests and in the best interest of the class members to settle their claims by entering into this decree;
WHEREAS the defendants consider it desirable and in their best interests to settle the claims brought against them and their predecessors in office by entering into this decree;
WHEREAS the parties have determined that the undertakings called for in this decree are reasonable and in the best interests of youth and Florida's juvenile justice system;
WHEREAS the parties agree that the relief set out herein is consistent with applicable law and principles governing treatment, care and custody for this population of youth;
WHEREAS the parties represent to the Court that this decree is fair, reasonable, and adequate to protect the class in accordance with the standards of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e);
WHEREAS by entering into this decree the defendants do not admit they violated any laws; and

WHEREAS the Court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§1331 and 1343(a)(3)&(4);
NOW THEREFORE, the parties by and through their counsel hereby further agree as follows:
II. Submission of Consent Decree to the Court
A. Promptly upon execution of this decree, counsel for the parties shall jointly submit this decree to the Court for its approval and recommend that the Court approve the decree. The decree is an irrevocable agreement to finally resolve this action, and the parties through counsel shall take all steps that may be required or requested by the Court and to use their best efforts to consummate this settlement.
B. Upon final approval by the Court, this decree shall be effective immediately. None of the parties may appeal such approval.
Ill. Settlement Class
This decree shall apply to all youth who are presently or who in the future will be confined to a training school in Florida.
IV. Notice to the Class
A. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ,23(e), the defendants shall within 14 days after preliminary approval of the decree by the Court post the notice attached hereto as Appendix A
— 5 —

at the training schools in conspicuous places which the youth frequent. Members of the class shall have until June 17, 1987, to submit to the Court any objections they may have. The Clerk shall forward copies of any objections or inquiries to the General Counsel for the Department for all defendants and to plaintiffs' lead counsel on behalf of all plaintiffs.
V. Population Reduction
A. The resident population secured within the perimeter fence shall be no more than 195 youngsters at Dozier and 180 youngsters at Okeechobee by July 1, 1988, and continuing thereafter at no more than that cap until June 30, 1989.
B. Beginning July 1, 1989 and continuing until June 30, 1990, the cap at each training school shall not exceed a resident population of 145 youngsters secured within the perimeter fence.
C. Beginning July 1, 1990 and thereafter, no training school shall exceed a resident population of 100 youngsters secured within the perimeter fence.
D. Beginning with the effective date of this decree and continuing thereafter, each training school shall have no more than 30 total youngsters placed in non-secure transition programs which are outside of the perimeter fence. For purposes of this decree, a non-secure transition program shall mean a residence or cottage where a transitional program is operated under the authority of a training school.
-6-

To the extent that the number of youth in non-secure transition programs exceeds the aforementioned limits there shall be a corresponding decrease in the allowable number of juveniles confined within the perimeter fence, e.g., a training school in the final target year could have 60 juveniles in non-secure transition programs but no more than 70 juveniles confined within the perimeter fence.
E. To the extent that the number of residents in the transitional program exceeds 15 at Dozier during the period from July 1, 1988 until June 30, 1989, there shall be a corresponding decrease in the number of residents permitted in the institution proper.
F. No transition program located outside of the perimeter fence shall exceed 15 youngsters per residential unit, and only children lawfully admitted to the training schools shall be placed in such transition programs.
G. The defendants agree to make every reasonable effort and to act in good faith to prevent any significant increase in the current population or significant reduction in current services from the date of the entry of this decree to the first designated target date.
VI. Program Goals
The Department agrees to establish a system of programs and services which will provide to each juvenile a range of services designed to meet his individual needs. The parties acknowledge
-7-
-— T '

that the primary goal of the system contemplated by this section will be to ensure for each juvenile a successful reintegration into his family and home community.
To accomplish this goal, the Department shall develop a continuum of care and services which will allow juveniles to progress developmentally and to receive appropriate services and support throughout their time in care. The Department also commits to reexamine existing programs and to develop alternative programs which will together maximize the use of State resources to meet the needs of individual youth and the public safety interests of the citizens of Florida.
VII. Assessment, Classification and Placement
The Department agrees to develop an assessment, classification and placement process no later than June 30, 1988, that meets the following goals:
1. An individualized, multidisciplinary assessment process that identifies the priority needs of each individual client for rehabilitation and treatment.
2. A classification system that assigns a relative risk factor to each juvenile based upon an objective evaluation of risk to the child and the community.
3. An admissions process that ensures for each juvenile the most appropriate setting that will meet the juvenile'-s programmatic needs and provide the minimum program security which ensures public safety.
-8-

The Department agrees to establish, consistent with this section, a centralized placement authority in Children, Youth and Families Programs to ensure that the placement of each juvenile will be consistent with the goals set forth above.
VIII. Training School Placement
The appropriate population for Florida's training schools should consist of individuals who exhibit serious and/or chronic delinquent behavior. Alternative programming should be provided to all other youth.
As soon as is practicable, but in no event after June 30, 1988, no juvenile shall be placed in a training school if such juvenile's committing act falls solely within any of the following categories:
1. Any juvenile who has committed technical violations (curfew, attendance, restitution, etc.) of furlough, community control or any commitment program (non-law, rule of program) violation;
2. Any juvenile adjudicated for a misdemeanor while not in a commitment status;
3. Any juvenile adjudicated for a misdemeanor while on nonresidential commitment status;
4. Any juvenile adjudicated for a misdemeanor while in residential commitment status which does not include "violence to a person or property;
-9-

5. Any juvenile transferred for a violent misdemeanor while in residential commitment;
6. Any juvenile adjudicated for a third degree felony unless committed to HRS on at least two previous occasions for third degree or higher felonies;
7. Any juvenile who, pursuant to the plan described in Section VII, has been determined to be classified as inappropriate for placement in a training school.
Juveniles within the above exclusionary criteria may be admitted to training schools only in extraordinary circumstances where the HRS Director of Children, Youth and Families Programs determines such placement is warranted.
In the event of a request for' placement in a training school of a child within the exclusionary criteria, and if the director determines preliminarily that the child should be admitted, he shall promptly advise plaintiffs1 lead counsel and Mr. Paul DeMuro (see SIX, 1(2), and shall furnish to them the complete HRS record on the child. Within a reasonable time, but in no event more than 72 hours, the plaintiffs' lead counsel and Mr. DeMuro shall provide input to the director concerning the proposed admission. The determination for placement shall rest with the director. A written justification by the director for the decision to place and written comments by Mr. DeMuro shall be filed with the Court. In the event of an irreconcilable difference on placement, plaintiffs may petition the Court to overturn the director's decision to admit.
-10-

IX. Technical Assistance and Assessment
1. Plaintiffs and Defendants agree that compliance by the parties with the provisions of this decree shall be reviewed and reported upon at regular intervals.
2. Plaintiffs and Defendants have selected Paul DeMuro to serve as technical assistance and assessment coordinator. Mr. DeMuro will be responsible for administering and coordinating the assessment process contemplated by this decree. Upon request of the Department, Mr. DeMuro also will provide and coordinate technical assistance as contemplated by this section. The responsibilities and duties conferred upon Mr. DeMuro and the technical consultants shall not in any way interfere with the Department's day-to-day responsibility for establishing and administering its programs.
3. To assist Mr. DeMuro with his duties and responsibilities pursuant to this decree, he will have at his disposal the services of the following individuals: Thomas Mullen (institutional conditions and programming); Dr. Michael Milan (psychology and programs); Dr. Michael Cohen (health services) and Ward Duel (environmental).
4. It is the intent of this decree that technical assistance and substantive expertise be accessible to the Department in providing the most meaningful and cost-effective system of juvenile services and programs. To this end, the parties agree that Mr. DeMuro and the technical consultants retained pursuant to this decree will assist the Department in designing the programmatic and systemic goals set out herein.
-11-

5. To ensure compliance with the decree, Mr. DeMuro will, with the assistance of the technical consultants, assess and report upon compliance with each of the specific agreements herein. Such reports shall be filed with the Court and provided to all parties.
6. In their official capacities, Mr. DeMuro and the technical consultants, or their successors in that eventuality, will be provided open, uninhibited access to the facilities, including unannounced visits, documents, student files, medical files, staff and children in order to accurately assess compliance and prepare reports of such assessments. All inspections and visits under this section shall be conducted so as not to disrupt ongoing institutional operations.
7. Subsequent to the entry of this decree, and before June 30, 1988, Mr. DeMuro will file with the Court and the parties four technical assistance assessment reports, at quarterly intervals.
8. Mr. DeMuro will certify on or before June 30, 1988, upon the filing of the last quarterly report whether the Department is in reasonable compliance. If the Department is deemed to be in reasonable compliance, Mr. DeMuro will prepare only two reports at semi-annual intervals through June 30, 1989. Should the Department not be deemed to be in reasonable compliance, Mr. DeMuro will continue quarterly reporting until the Department is so deemed.
-12-

9. After the filing of the semi-annual reports and upon a further certification of the Department's reasonable compliance by Mr. DeMuro, Mr. DeMuro will prepare annual reports. These reports shall continue until one year following a certification of full compliance to assure that the Department is able to maintain compliance. After the final annual report and notice of full compliance by Mr. DeMuro, his responsibilities and authority and that of all other technical consultants shall cease, and the parties may petition the Court for a confirmation of full compliance.
10. All reports referenced above shall be filed with the Court and provided to the parties. Either party wishing to file objections, additions or corrections to such reports may do so, after consultation with the opposing party, within 30 days after the filing of each report. The parties agree that any such submissions will become a part of the record in this case. If no resolution is reached among the parties, the matter may be submitted for disposition by the Court.
11. In the course of providing technical assistance and assessment pursuant to this decree, Mr. DeMuro may retain the services of other consultants in technically complex areas if such need should arise, e.g., an expert on alcohol and substance abuse. If defendants object to the retention of such consultants, they shall notify Mr. DeMuro and lead counsel for the plaintiffs of such objections. Plaintiffs' lead counsel, Mr. DeMuro and the director shall meet within 10 days to discuss such objections and attempt
-13-

to reach a resolution acceptable to all parties. If no amicable resolution can be reached, the objection will be submitted to the Court within 5 days for resolution.
12. The defendants shall bear the costs of the technical assistance and assessment contemplated herein. In the event of any irreconcilable disagreement on costs, the matter may be submitted to the Court for resolution. In the implementation of this decree, and in particular with reference to the above assessment process, the parties shall employ their best efforts to resolve informally any non-compliance or other disagreements. To facilitate this process the single point of accountability for the defendants shall be the HRS Director for Children, Youth and Families Programs. For the plaintiffs, lead counsel shall serve as the coordination point for all of plaintiffs' counsel activities. The director and lead counsel shall meet periodically to discuss any issues that may be presented by either side or by Mr. DeMuro and the technical consultants. At a minimum, the director and lead counsel shall consult or meet after the issuance of each report by Mr. DeMuro.
13. Attached hereto as Appendix B are the standards for institutional operation which shall serve as the benchmarks for Mr. DeMuro and the technical consultants.
X. Miscellaneous Provisions
A. Implementation of Prior Orders The decree incorporates by reference and fully implements
-14-

the prior orders in this case governing the following matters:

1. provision of access to counsel (order on stipulated

motion dated

, 1987) ;

2. prohibition against hogtying and shackling to fixed

objects, and regulating the use of mechanical restraints

(orders dated February 1, 1983 and July 14, 1983);

3. closure of McPherson Training School (order dated

August 6, 1985);

4. removal of females from training schools (order dated

August 6, 1985);

5. removal of all children 13 years of age and under from

training schools (order dated August 6, 1985);

6. removal of all status offenders from training schools

(order dated August 6, 1985).

B. Attorney-Client Access

The lead counsel for the plaintiff class or his attorney

designee shall have the right to visit the training schools and

transitional programs, meet with his clients, and review his

clients' records at reasonable times and with reasonable advance

notice to the institutions. The attorney shall use his best

efforts to avoid interfering with the ongoing activities and

programs at the facilities.

C. Prohibition Against Use of Isolation

The use of punitive segregation, isolation or separation in

the so-called lockup, security units, or adjustment units at the

training schools has been terminated. No such units or structures

-15-

shall be employed at the training schools in the future. D. Education Claims Claims concerning education will be resolved by a separate
consent decree between the plaintiffs and defendant Commissioner of Education and which will be filed subsequently to the filing of this decree.

Albert J. Hadeed Southern Legal Counsel 115-A N.E. 7th Avenue Gainesville, FL 32601 (904) 377-8288
Michael J. Dale Laurene M. Heybach Nova University Center for the Study of Law 3100 SW 9th Avenue Fort Lauderdale, FL 33315 (305) 522-2300
Claudia Wright Alexa P. Freeman ACLU National Prison Project 1616 P Street, N.W. Suite 340 Washington, D.C. 20036 (202) 331-0500
Carole B. Shauffer Youth Law Center 1663 Mission Street Fifth Floor San Francisco, CA 94103 (415) 543-3379

John S. Miller, Jr. General Counsel Department of HRS 1323 Winewood Blvd. Building 1, Room 407 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700 (904) 488-2381
By: Attorneys for HRS Defendants
Eric J. Taylor Department of Legal Affairs Suite 1501 The Capitol Tallahassee, FL 32301 (904) 488-1573

By: Attorneys /for Plaintiffs

By: Attorneys for HR6 Defendants

-16-

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TALLAHASSEE DIVISION

BOBBY M., et al. Plaintiffs,
BOB MARTINEZ, et al Defendants.

Civ. Case No. TCA 83-7003 MMP

INFORMATION ABOUT PROPOSED FEDERAL COURT ORDERS THAT AFFECT THE LEGAL RIGHTS
OF STUDENTS AT THE TRAINING SCHOOLS
If you are in a training school in Florida, you need to know about two proposed United States court orders that will affect your legal rights while you are in a training school.
These proposed court orders come from a United States judqe in Tallahassee. The United States judge is not the same as your juvenile judge. Your juvenile judge handled your offenses under Florida law. The United States judge is deciding how the training schools should follow United States law.
The court orders the United States judge is considering are only suggested orders. The United States court may or. may not approve them.

PILED IN OPEN CJui\T Tiili
CL2R&; U. S. DISTRICT COURT, NOKIK._

The court orders will affect all youth in training schools now and in the future.
These are what the proposed orders do: 1. The number of youth at the trainina schools will be smaller. Right now, there are about 260 to 275 younqsters at each training school. Within 3 years, each training school will only be allowed to have 100 youth within the fence. Up to 30 other youth also will be allowed to live outside of the fence of each school in a non-secure cottage or residence to help the youngsters get a job or to adjust to return to their home community. 2. HRS will develop more programs and services to help youth with their individual problems and needs. 3. HRS will develop a new classification system for deciding which HRS program best fits a youngster's needs. 4. Only boys who have committed serious or repeated crimes will be sent to a training school. 5. Educational programs will be improved. 6. Over the next few years, several people who know a lot about training schools and juvenile programs will visit the schools to see if the court orders are being followed. 7. There are other court orders already signed by the United States judge in this case in 1983, 1985 and-1987. These orders will be followed, including having lawyers to help-boys at the training schools. 8. Lock-up, security units or adjustment units will not be used again, but the schools may use disciplinary cottages.
-2-

You have a right to read a copy of these proposed United States court orders. If you want to see written copies, you can get them by asking the superintendent, your cottaoe parent supervisor or your social worker. To make sure you qet a copy, you should write your request down and aive it to the person from whom you request the copy.
If you have any questions about how the United States court orders will affect your legal rights, you may call Al Hadeed or Jodi Siegel at (904) 377-8288. They are lawyers who have been involved in this lawsuit who represent the youngsters at the training schools. If you want to write to them, their address is 115 N.E. 7th Avenue, Gainesville, FL 32601.
You may. also call or write John Miller, the HRS lawyer in Tallahassee. His address and phone are: Department of HRS, 1323 Winewood Blvd., Building 1, Room 407, Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700, telephone (904) 488-2381.
You have the right to call or write these lawyers or any othe; lawyer you choose about the proposed United States court orders.
If you have a problem with the proposed United States court orders, you may object to them in writing by sending your written comments to Marvin S. Waits, Clerk of the Court, U.S. Courthouse, Northern District, 110 East Park Avenue, Tallahassee, FL 32301. Your letters must be received by June 17, 1987.
The United States judge will read or listen to all of the objections and decide whether to make the proposed orders final. The judge will make this decision at a court hearing on July 2,
-3-

1987, beginning at 11:00 a.m., at the United States Courthouse in Tallahassee .
Done and ordered this () ^/y day of May, 1987, in Tallahassee, Florida.
U .y. District Court Judqe

CERTIFIED A TRUE COPY

MARVIN S. WAITS, CLERK

-4-

By.

( A

0 Deputy Clerk

APPENDIX B
The following standards are to be applied as they affect operations of the training schools and the youth held there. Whenever any standard in its text makes reference to having a particular policy or procedure, the assessment shall include not only the existence of the policy or procedure but also its substance and adherence to the policy or procedure.
For certain standards, especially those relating to Living Conditions and Sanitation, the parties acknowledge that strict, immediate and full compliance could entail significant outlays. It is not the intent of the parties that the following benchmarks result in significant outlay, but only cost effective means to achieve a healthful, safe and habilitative environment for youth confined to the training schools.
I. Programming
Implementation and maintenance of appropriate programs for all youth pursuant to the standards of the American Correctional Association, Standards for Juvenile Training Schools, 2d Edition 1983; standards 2-9334; 2-9340; 2-9341; 2-9342; 2-9357; 2-9358; 2-9359; 2-9360; 2-9361; 2-9362; 2-9363; 2-9364; 2-9365; 2-9366; 2-9367; 2-9368; 2-9369; 2-9371; 2-9372; 2-9373; 2-2374; 2-9375; 2-9376; 2-9377; 2-9378; 2-9379; 2-9380.
Adequate and appropriate classification procedures within each training school, considering the likelihood the juvenile may abscond, the degree to which the juvenile needs protection either
App. B.I

from self-injurious behavior or harm from others, and the juvenile's program needs.
Adequate and appropriate privacy screening in the bathroom areas of the cottages which also takes into account internal security.
II. Living Conditions and Sanitation
A. In general, the standards outlined in the chapter on Environmental Health in the American Public Health Association Standards for Health Services in Correctional Institutions (the latest edition was published in 1986) apply to the training schools unless otherwise specified, and shall include the following modifications: Standard A.I. to exclude the requirement of a registered engineer or architect; Standard B.8. modified to conform with the energy conservation measures of the Florida General Services Administration with respect to installation of self-closing water faucets; and E.4.D. modified for dormitory space to 50 square feet of floor space per juvenile. In addition, all relevant ACA Standards for Juvenile Training Schools will apply.
B. Standards of the American Society of Heating, Refrigerating and Air Conditioning Engineers (ASHRAE) apply to ventilation.
C. All electrical, plumbing and mechanical work 'done in the future, except for minor repairs to existing buildings, must meet Florida state codes and regulations normally applied to similar facilities privately owned.
App. B.2

D. Lighting in areas where visual tasks and grooming take place must be at least 20 foot candles.
E. Florida standards for food service establishments apply to all areas where food is prepared and served, including the kitchen, food service, food storage (both- refrigerated and dry), commissary, living units where meals are served and bakery. In addition, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration standards in the 1976 Food Service Sanitation Manual apply.
F. Screens must be maintained on all operating windows and doors to the extent practicable; window panes must be continually maintained in all areas; structural defects which allow rodents to enter the buildings must be cured; and effective vermin and pest control programs must be implemented.
G. Comprehensive written preventive maintenance manuals must be prepared for the two schools and utilized which include an inventory of all equipment and systems along with a schedule for regular inspection and maintenance of the equipment and systems which includes the maintenance requirements of the manufacturer's specifications. The manual must specifically state the employees responsible for executing the plan and specific measures to be taken in maintaining each machine or system. Those persons will be adequately trained for their duties. As part of the preventive maintenance program to be developed, a preventive maintenance staffing study must be conducted at the two facilities. Trades people in the key trades (plumbing, electrical, refrigeration and heating, etc.) must be available either on staff or by contract.
App. B.3

H. A checklist must be developed for the inspection and maintenance of each machine or system and the person responsible for inspection and maintenance must certify that the facts stated on the checklist are true.
I. An adequate inventory of parts regularly needed must be maintained to prevent unnecessary delays in major repairs.
J. Emergency response teams must be established that are trained to respond to emergencies and are available on a 24 hour, 7 day a week basis.
K. The National Fire Protection Association's Life Safety Code governs all aspects of fire safety. Where dorms are locked, LSC requirements for detention and correctional facilities apply.
L. For laundry, Guidelines for Hand Washing and Hospital Environmental Control, 1985 edition, published by the Center for Disease Control.
M. Applicable rules from the Florida Administrative Code on environmental health, Chapters 10D-7 and 33-8.
III. Medical, Dental, Psychological and Substance Abuse Treatment Services
Further, development and maintenance of a comprehensive, humane approach to the provision of medical, dental and mental health care services for youngsters, which are essential to a juvenile's rehabilitation and safety:
A. American Correctional Association, Standards for Juvenile Training Schools, 2nd edition 1983, as supplemented January 1986:
App. B.4

1. Standards 2-9229 through 2-9235, 2-9236 (substance abuse specialists must be included), 2-9237 through 2-9244, 2-9246 through 2-9249, 2-9252 through 2-9263, 2-9264 (the problem oriented medical record structure is to be used), 2-9265 through 2-9269, 2-9271, 2-9272. A records specialist will be consulted to devise the most useful medical, dental, mental health recording system.
2. 2-9254. This standard is revised to provide training of all staff in suicide recognition and prevention techniques. B. American Public Health Association, Standards for Health Services in Correctional Institutions, 2nd Edition 1986:
1. Primary Health Care Services sections A (and Appendix I ) , C, D, E, F, G, H, I, J (including the recent, updated loose-leaf version of Drug Facts and Comparisons as required by HRS regulation 95-3), K, L, M (and Appendix II except for the protocol provisions for testing of AIDS. Due to the rapid development of information and research in this volatile area, the technical consultants may be called upon to provide advice on how AIDS should be handled).
2. Primary Health Care Services, section N. In addition, children who have suffered sexual assault shall be examined immediately by the physician on call and/or a physician at the appropriate hospital or sexual assault treatment center. Testing and treatment
App. B.5

shall be undertaken for sexually transmitted diseases and referral must be made for appropriate psychological support, counseling or treatment. Follow-up on any disease transmission shall be conducted at a 2-3 month interval. The medical record shall reflect the nature of the incident and mental health care follow-up. A supportive staff member shall be assigned to stay with this juvenile for a reasonable period on a one-on-one basis to avoid subsequent harassment, monitor the juvenile's response and insure adequate services.
3. Health Care Services for Special Populations; Dental Health Care Services; Other Special Services, sections A and B; Evaluation of Health Services (Quality Assurance); Health Records; and Staffing and Organization of Health Services, except that paragraph numbered 2 shall not apply. Health records of juveniles transmitted outside of the training school for any purpose shall be purged so as not to contain any information regarding the nature of the juvenile's offense. This is intended to assure that post-discharge health care services performed by other providers are not influenced by release of information concerning committing offenses which are sealed and made confidential by Florida law.
4. Pharmacy Services.
App. B.6

5. Each training school must make available a range of health services beyond those which can be provided on an ambulatory basis. The plan for such services shall be in writing and include levels of care available both inside and outside the facility. Each school shall also designate an appropriately staffed and equipped area in which limited observation and health care management may be provided for those cases not requiring hospital or infirmary services. All care provided in secondary care facilities, both inside and outside the schools, shall be regularly evaluated as part of the health services quality assurance program. Written records of such evaluation shall be maintained. C. Administration of Juvenile Justice (National Advisory Committee for Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention 1980)
1. Standards 4.2121 a.-f. & last sentence, 4.2122 except that subsection b is revised to permit an individual with a Masters Degree in the behavioral sciences to assume this position, 4.213, 4.214 - in addition, there shall be referrals to appropriate specialists for additional evaluations as necessary.
2. The IPP (or the training school's equivalent) envisioned in 2.214 must be truly "individualized", must clearly identify the youth's strengths and -• weaknesses as well as those of his family and
App. B.7

significant other adults in his life. The IPP must specify the problems he experiences. There must be a clear statement of the goals, and long term and short term objectives for resolution of the identified problems. The IPP shall provide that the program and services provided to the youth are designed to achieve those objectives and shall be linked to successful reentry and reintegration into the youth's home community. Time lines for achievement shall be provided. A formal progress review will be, at a minimum, conducted at 30 days, 90 days and every 90 days thereafter.
3. 4.215, add "Counseling and treatment must be given to those children suffering from alcoholism or other drug addiction or who are the children of a parent so affected." Certain youth will require participation in a program whose principle treatment focus is the disease concept of drug addiction and alcoholism. To accommodate successful reintegration into the youth's home community, there should be linkage with Alcoholics Anonymous, Al-Anon or Alateen.
4. Each juvenile is to receive individual counseling on a bi-weekly basis for a period of at least 1/2 hour with a person who possesses at least a Masters Degree in Social Work (M.S.W.), Psychology, or a- related mental health discipline, or an individual who has demonstrated sufficient skills comparable to those held
App. B.8

by a competent counseling professional. If professional staff conclude that any juvenile requires less frequency, the basis shall be clearly and fully documented in the juvenile's record.
5. 4.2151 and 4.2152. The semi-autonomous living unit will be the focus of the rehabilitation program for these children. The cottage caseworkers or social workers or their equivalent shall fully inform themselves of the status and progress of juveniles assigned to their caseloads. One means of accomplishing this objective is through attendance at group therapy sessions (or their equivalent) and through in person contact with the youth. 4.2151 is modified to require group counseling (or their equivalent) 2-3 times weekly, the quality and quantity of which is overseen and assured by a person who possesses at least a Masters Degree in Social Work, Psychology or a related mental health discipline. Staff will initiate additional counseling and contact as necessary.
6. 4.217, 4.2174. A student is to be informed within 24 hours of entry to the facility that he may consult with either a psychologist or psychiatrist. Such consultation is to be afforded immediately if necessary but no later than 24 hours from the time of request. Many children will not require special mental health services and for those children, the rehabilitative services described in subparagraph 5 will suffice.
App. B.9,

Special treatment, however, must be afforded to sex offenders and those suffering from the aftermath of incest, sexual or physical abuse. D. The standards listed above may be superseded and modified where consistent with better programmatic, medical, dental and/or mental health practices. Such standards are not meant to limit the ability of the training schools to provide other and better services. The parties specifically recognize that in certain areas - alcoholism, drug addiction, AIDS, children of alcoholics (COA) syndrome, etc. - research data and treatment modalities are constantly changing and it is the intention of the parties that these changes be reflected to improve institutional practices.
IV. Staff Training
American Correctional Association Standards for Juvenile Training Schools, numbers 2-9085 to 2-9099, 2nd edition 1983, as supplemented by January 1986 edition.
V. Juvenile Rights and Discipline
American Correctional Association Standards for Juvenile Training Schools, numbers 2-9273 to 2-9333, except that standards 2-9300, 2-9301, 2-9302 and 2-9312 shall not apply and that the training schools shall utilize the disciplinary cottages or other programs for major rule violations. Standard 2-9316 is modified
App. B.10

so that referral is not mandatory but shall be based on the reha-

bilitative mission of the training school.

Albert J. Hadeed Southern Legal Counsel 115-A N.E. 7th Avenue Gainesville, FL 32601 (904) 377-8288
Michael J. Dale Laurene M. Heybach Nova University Center for the Study of Law 3100 SW 9th Avenue Fort Lauderdale, FL 33315 (305) 522-2300
Claudia Wright Alexa P. Freeman ACLU National Prison Project 1616 P Street, N.W. Suite 340 Washington, D.C. 20036 (202) 331-0500

John S. Miller, Jr. General Counsel Department of HRS 1323 Winewood Blvd. Building 1, Room 407 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700 (904) 488-2381
Eric J. Taylor Department of Legal Affairs Suite 1501 The Capitol Tallahassee, FL 32301 (904) 488-1573

Carole B. Shauffer Youth Law Center 1663 Mission Street Fifth Floor San Francisco, CA 94103 (415) 543-3379

By: Attorneys for Plaintiffs

By:
Attorneys for HR Defendants Martinez, Coler, McKay and Streit

App. B.ll

 </s> UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TALLAHASSEE DIVISION

BOBBY M., et al. Plaintiffs,
BOB MARTINEZ, et al Defendants.

Civ. Case No. TCA 83-7003 MMP

INFORMATION ABOUT PROPOSED FEDERAL COURT ORDERS THAT AFFECT THE LEGAL RIGHTS
OF STUDENTS AT THE TRAINING SCHOOLS
If you are in a training school in Florida, you need to know about two proposed United States court orders that will affect your legal rights while you are in a training school.
These proposed court orders come from a United States judqe in Tallahassee. The United States judge is not the same as your juvenile judge. Your juvenile judge handled your offenses under Florida law. The United States judge is deciding how the training schools should follow United States law.
The court orders the United States judge is considering are only suggested orders. The United States court may or. may not approve them.

PILED IN OPEN CJui\T Tiili
CL2R&; U. S. DISTRICT COURT, NOKIK._

The court orders will affect all youth in training schools now and in the future.
These are what the proposed orders do: 1. The number of youth at the trainina schools will be smaller. Right now, there are about 260 to 275 younqsters at each training school. Within 3 years, each training school will only be allowed to have 100 youth within the fence. Up to 30 other youth also will be allowed to live outside of the fence of each school in a non-secure cottage or residence to help the youngsters get a job or to adjust to return to their home community. 2. HRS will develop more programs and services to help youth with their individual problems and needs. 3. HRS will develop a new classification system for deciding which HRS program best fits a youngster's needs. 4. Only boys who have committed serious or repeated crimes will be sent to a training school. 5. Educational programs will be improved. 6. Over the next few years, several people who know a lot about training schools and juvenile programs will visit the schools to see if the court orders are being followed. 7. There are other court orders already signed by the United States judge in this case in 1983, 1985 and-1987. These orders will be followed, including having lawyers to help-boys at the training schools. 8. Lock-up, security units or adjustment units will not be used again, but the schools may use disciplinary cottages.
-2-

You have a right to read a copy of these proposed United States court orders. If you want to see written copies, you can get them by asking the superintendent, your cottaoe parent supervisor or your social worker. To make sure you qet a copy, you should write your request down and aive it to the person from whom you request the copy.
If you have any questions about how the United States court orders will affect your legal rights, you may call Al Hadeed or Jodi Siegel at (904) 377-8288. They are lawyers who have been involved in this lawsuit who represent the youngsters at the training schools. If you want to write to them, their address is 115 N.E. 7th Avenue, Gainesville, FL 32601.
You may. also call or write John Miller, the HRS lawyer in Tallahassee. His address and phone are: Department of HRS, 1323 Winewood Blvd., Building 1, Room 407, Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700, telephone (904) 488-2381.
You have the right to call or write these lawyers or any othe; lawyer you choose about the proposed United States court orders.
If you have a problem with the proposed United States court orders, you may object to them in writing by sending your written comments to Marvin S. Waits, Clerk of the Court, U.S. Courthouse, Northern District, 110 East Park Avenue, Tallahassee, FL 32301. Your letters must be received by June 17, 1987.
The United States judge will read or listen to all of the objections and decide whether to make the proposed orders final. The judge will make this decision at a court hearing on July 2,
-3-

1987, beginning at 11:00 a.m., at the United States Courthouse in Tallahassee .
Done and ordered this () ^/y day of May, 1987, in Tallahassee, Florida.
U .y. District Court Judqe

CERTIFIED A TRUE COPY

MARVIN S. WAITS, CLERK

-4-

By.

( A

0 Deputy Clerk

APPENDIX B
The following standards are to be applied as they affect operations of the training schools and the youth held there. Whenever any standard in its text makes reference to having a particular policy or procedure, the assessment shall include not only the existence of the policy or procedure but also its substance and adherence to the policy or procedure.
For certain standards, especially those relating to Living Conditions and Sanitation, the parties acknowledge that strict, immediate and full compliance could entail significant outlays. It is not the intent of the parties that the following benchmarks result in significant outlay, but only cost effective means to achieve a healthful, safe and habilitative environment for youth confined to the training schools.
I. Programming
Implementation and maintenance of appropriate programs for all youth pursuant to the standards of the American Correctional Association, Standards for Juvenile Training Schools, 2d Edition 1983; standards 2-9334; 2-9340; 2-9341; 2-9342; 2-9357; 2-9358; 2-9359; 2-9360; 2-9361; 2-9362; 2-9363; 2-9364; 2-9365; 2-9366; 2-9367; 2-9368; 2-9369; 2-9371; 2-9372; 2-9373; 2-2374; 2-9375; 2-9376; 2-9377; 2-9378; 2-9379; 2-9380.
Adequate and appropriate classification procedures within each training school, considering the likelihood the juvenile may abscond, the degree to which the juvenile needs protection either
App. B.I

from self-injurious behavior or harm from others, and the juvenile's program needs.
Adequate and appropriate privacy screening in the bathroom areas of the cottages which also takes into account internal security.
II. Living Conditions and Sanitation
A. In general, the standards outlined in the chapter on Environmental Health in the American Public Health Association Standards for Health Services in Correctional Institutions (the latest edition was published in 1986) apply to the training schools unless otherwise specified, and shall include the following modifications: Standard A.I. to exclude the requirement of a registered engineer or architect; Standard B.8. modified to conform with the energy conservation measures of the Florida General Services Administration with respect to installation of self-closing water faucets; and E.4.D. modified for dormitory space to 50 square feet of floor space per juvenile. In addition, all relevant ACA Standards for Juvenile Training Schools will apply.
B. Standards of the American Society of Heating, Refrigerating and Air Conditioning Engineers (ASHRAE) apply to ventilation.
C. All electrical, plumbing and mechanical work 'done in the future, except for minor repairs to existing buildings, must meet Florida state codes and regulations normally applied to similar facilities privately owned.
App. B.2

D. Lighting in areas where visual tasks and grooming take place must be at least 20 foot candles.
E. Florida standards for food service establishments apply to all areas where food is prepared and served, including the kitchen, food service, food storage (both- refrigerated and dry), commissary, living units where meals are served and bakery. In addition, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration standards in the 1976 Food Service Sanitation Manual apply.
F. Screens must be maintained on all operating windows and doors to the extent practicable; window panes must be continually maintained in all areas; structural defects which allow rodents to enter the buildings must be cured; and effective vermin and pest control programs must be implemented.
G. Comprehensive written preventive maintenance manuals must be prepared for the two schools and utilized which include an inventory of all equipment and systems along with a schedule for regular inspection and maintenance of the equipment and systems which includes the maintenance requirements of the manufacturer's specifications. The manual must specifically state the employees responsible for executing the plan and specific measures to be taken in maintaining each machine or system. Those persons will be adequately trained for their duties. As part of the preventive maintenance program to be developed, a preventive maintenance staffing study must be conducted at the two facilities. Trades people in the key trades (plumbing, electrical, refrigeration and heating, etc.) must be available either on staff or by contract.
App. B.3

H. A checklist must be developed for the inspection and maintenance of each machine or system and the person responsible for inspection and maintenance must certify that the facts stated on the checklist are true.
I. An adequate inventory of parts regularly needed must be maintained to prevent unnecessary delays in major repairs.
J. Emergency response teams must be established that are trained to respond to emergencies and are available on a 24 hour, 7 day a week basis.
K. The National Fire Protection Association's Life Safety Code governs all aspects of fire safety. Where dorms are locked, LSC requirements for detention and correctional facilities apply.
L. For laundry, Guidelines for Hand Washing and Hospital Environmental Control, 1985 edition, published by the Center for Disease Control.
M. Applicable rules from the Florida Administrative Code on environmental health, Chapters 10D-7 and 33-8.
III. Medical, Dental, Psychological and Substance Abuse Treatment Services
Further, development and maintenance of a comprehensive, humane approach to the provision of medical, dental and mental health care services for youngsters, which are essential to a juvenile's rehabilitation and safety:
A. American Correctional Association, Standards for Juvenile Training Schools, 2nd edition 1983, as supplemented January 1986:
App. B.4

1. Standards 2-9229 through 2-9235, 2-9236 (substance abuse specialists must be included), 2-9237 through 2-9244, 2-9246 through 2-9249, 2-9252 through 2-9263, 2-9264 (the problem oriented medical record structure is to be used), 2-9265 through 2-9269, 2-9271, 2-9272. A records specialist will be consulted to devise the most useful medical, dental, mental health recording system.
2. 2-9254. This standard is revised to provide training of all staff in suicide recognition and prevention techniques. B. American Public Health Association, Standards for Health Services in Correctional Institutions, 2nd Edition 1986:
1. Primary Health Care Services sections A (and Appendix I ) , C, D, E, F, G, H, I, J (including the recent, updated loose-leaf version of Drug Facts and Comparisons as required by HRS regulation 95-3), K, L, M (and Appendix II except for the protocol provisions for testing of AIDS. Due to the rapid development of information and research in this volatile area, the technical consultants may be called upon to provide advice on how AIDS should be handled).
2. Primary Health Care Services, section N. In addition, children who have suffered sexual assault shall be examined immediately by the physician on call and/or a physician at the appropriate hospital or sexual assault treatment center. Testing and treatment
App. B.5

shall be undertaken for sexually transmitted diseases and referral must be made for appropriate psychological support, counseling or treatment. Follow-up on any disease transmission shall be conducted at a 2-3 month interval. The medical record shall reflect the nature of the incident and mental health care follow-up. A supportive staff member shall be assigned to stay with this juvenile for a reasonable period on a one-on-one basis to avoid subsequent harassment, monitor the juvenile's response and insure adequate services.
3. Health Care Services for Special Populations; Dental Health Care Services; Other Special Services, sections A and B; Evaluation of Health Services (Quality Assurance); Health Records; and Staffing and Organization of Health Services, except that paragraph numbered 2 shall not apply. Health records of juveniles transmitted outside of the training school for any purpose shall be purged so as not to contain any information regarding the nature of the juvenile's offense. This is intended to assure that post-discharge health care services performed by other providers are not influenced by release of information concerning committing offenses which are sealed and made confidential by Florida law.
4. Pharmacy Services.
App. B.6

5. Each training school must make available a range of health services beyond those which can be provided on an ambulatory basis. The plan for such services shall be in writing and include levels of care available both inside and outside the facility. Each school shall also designate an appropriately staffed and equipped area in which limited observation and health care management may be provided for those cases not requiring hospital or infirmary services. All care provided in secondary care facilities, both inside and outside the schools, shall be regularly evaluated as part of the health services quality assurance program. Written records of such evaluation shall be maintained. C. Administration of Juvenile Justice (National Advisory Committee for Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention 1980)
1. Standards 4.2121 a.-f. & last sentence, 4.2122 except that subsection b is revised to permit an individual with a Masters Degree in the behavioral sciences to assume this position, 4.213, 4.214 - in addition, there shall be referrals to appropriate specialists for additional evaluations as necessary.
2. The IPP (or the training school's equivalent) envisioned in 2.214 must be truly "individualized", must clearly identify the youth's strengths and -• weaknesses as well as those of his family and
App. B.7

significant other adults in his life. The IPP must specify the problems he experiences. There must be a clear statement of the goals, and long term and short term objectives for resolution of the identified problems. The IPP shall provide that the program and services provided to the youth are designed to achieve those objectives and shall be linked to successful reentry and reintegration into the youth's home community. Time lines for achievement shall be provided. A formal progress review will be, at a minimum, conducted at 30 days, 90 days and every 90 days thereafter.
3. 4.215, add "Counseling and treatment must be given to those children suffering from alcoholism or other drug addiction or who are the children of a parent so affected." Certain youth will require participation in a program whose principle treatment focus is the disease concept of drug addiction and alcoholism. To accommodate successful reintegration into the youth's home community, there should be linkage with Alcoholics Anonymous, Al-Anon or Alateen.
4. Each juvenile is to receive individual counseling on a bi-weekly basis for a period of at least 1/2 hour with a person who possesses at least a Masters Degree in Social Work (M.S.W.), Psychology, or a- related mental health discipline, or an individual who has demonstrated sufficient skills comparable to those held
App. B.8

by a competent counseling professional. If professional staff conclude that any juvenile requires less frequency, the basis shall be clearly and fully documented in the juvenile's record.
5. 4.2151 and 4.2152. The semi-autonomous living unit will be the focus of the rehabilitation program for these children. The cottage caseworkers or social workers or their equivalent shall fully inform themselves of the status and progress of juveniles assigned to their caseloads. One means of accomplishing this objective is through attendance at group therapy sessions (or their equivalent) and through in person contact with the youth. 4.2151 is modified to require group counseling (or their equivalent) 2-3 times weekly, the quality and quantity of which is overseen and assured by a person who possesses at least a Masters Degree in Social Work, Psychology or a related mental health discipline. Staff will initiate additional counseling and contact as necessary.
6. 4.217, 4.2174. A student is to be informed within 24 hours of entry to the facility that he may consult with either a psychologist or psychiatrist. Such consultation is to be afforded immediately if necessary but no later than 24 hours from the time of request. Many children will not require special mental health services and for those children, the rehabilitative services described in subparagraph 5 will suffice.
App. B.9,

Special treatment, however, must be afforded to sex offenders and those suffering from the aftermath of incest, sexual or physical abuse. D. The standards listed above may be superseded and modified where consistent with better programmatic, medical, dental and/or mental health practices. Such standards are not meant to limit the ability of the training schools to provide other and better services. The parties specifically recognize that in certain areas - alcoholism, drug addiction, AIDS, children of alcoholics (COA) syndrome, etc. - research data and treatment modalities are constantly changing and it is the intention of the parties that these changes be reflected to improve institutional practices.
IV. Staff Training
American Correctional Association Standards for Juvenile Training Schools, numbers 2-9085 to 2-9099, 2nd edition 1983, as supplemented by January 1986 edition.
V. Juvenile Rights and Discipline
American Correctional Association Standards for Juvenile Training Schools, numbers 2-9273 to 2-9333, except that standards 2-9300, 2-9301, 2-9302 and 2-9312 shall not apply and that the training schools shall utilize the disciplinary cottages or other programs for major rule violations. Standard 2-9316 is modified
App. B.10

so that referral is not mandatory but shall be based on the reha-

bilitative mission of the training school.

Albert J. Hadeed Southern Legal Counsel 115-A N.E. 7th Avenue Gainesville, FL 32601 (904) 377-8288
Michael J. Dale Laurene M. Heybach Nova University Center for the Study of Law 3100 SW 9th Avenue Fort Lauderdale, FL 33315 (305) 522-2300
Claudia Wright Alexa P. Freeman ACLU National Prison Project 1616 P Street, N.W. Suite 340 Washington, D.C. 20036 (202) 331-0500

John S. Miller, Jr. General Counsel Department of HRS 1323 Winewood Blvd. Building 1, Room 407 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700 (904) 488-2381
Eric J. Taylor Department of Legal Affairs Suite 1501 The Capitol Tallahassee, FL 32301 (904) 488-1573

Carole B. Shauffer Youth Law Center 1663 Mission Street Fifth Floor San Francisco, CA 94103 (415) 543-3379

By: Attorneys for Plaintiffs

By:
Attorneys for HR Defendants Martinez, Coler, McKay and Streit

App. B.ll

 </s> Bobby M. v. Chiles

••••••

•• •• • • •• •• •• • •

JI-FL-002-009

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TALLAHASSEE DIVISION

B0B3Y M., et al.,

)

)

Plaintiffs, )

)

vs.

)

)

BOB MARTINEZ, et al. ,

)

)

Defendants. )

Civ. Case No. TCA 83-7003 MMP

JOINT MOTION TO ADOPT STIPULATION AMENDING POPULATION REDUCTION SCHEDULE OF CONSENT DECREE
The plaintiffs and HRS defendants move the Court to adopt the attached Stipulation Amending Population Reduction Schedule of Consent Decree. As grounds therefor, the parties state that the stipulation sets forth a sufficient basis to amend the population reduction schedule of the consent decree.
WHEREFORE the above parties requesc the CourK. enter an order adopting the attached Stipulation amending die consent decree that resolved claims against Governor Bob Martinez, Secretary of the Department of Health and Rehab:Litative

Services Gregory Coler, the Department's Director of Children, Youth and Families Programs Jay Kassack, Dozier Superintendent Roy McKay, and EYDC Superintendent Gerry Luse.

L DATED:

Respectfully submitted,

/7

DATED:

u
JI SIEGEL ALBERT J. HADEED ALICE K. NELSON Southern Legal Counsel 115 NE Seventh Avenue Gainesville, FL 32601 (904) 336-2144

JOfiIN MILLER General Counsel Department of HRS 1323 Winewood Blvd. Building.1, Room 407 Tallahassee, FL 32399 (904) 488-2381

MICHAEL DALE Nova University Law Center 310 0 SW Ninth Avenue Ft. Laud-ardale, FL 33315 (305) 760-5737

ATTORNEYS FOR HRS DEFENDANTS

CAROLE SHAUFFER
Youth Law Center 1663 Mission Street, Fifth Floor San Francisco, CA 94103 (415) 543-3379

CLAUDIA WRIGHT National Prison Project 1616 P Street, NW Suite 340 Washington, DC 20036 (2C2) 331-0500

LAURLNE HEYBACH
Legal Assistance Foundation of Chicago 343 South Dearborn, Room 815 Chicago, IL 60604 (312) 341-1070

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed to Paul DeMuro, Court Monitor, 82 Essex Avenue, Montclair, New Jersey 07042, and Eric J. Taylor, Department of Legal Affairs, Tax Section, Tallahassee, FL 32399-1050, this ("L- day of-A^irfT 1990.

 </s> UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

BOBBY M., et al. Plaintiffs,
v. ROBERT GRAHAM, et al
Defendants.

) No. TCA 83-7003

STIPULATION AND ORDER

The plaintiffs and HRS defendants agree to further

systematic reduction of the population at the remaining

training schools (the Dozier School and the Eckerd Youth

Development Center). The HRS defendants shall take all

action within their existing authority and resources to

reduce the population of the training schools to the lowest

number possible. In order to determine the lowest number

possible and to implement a mutually acceptable and

appropriate plan to reach that number, the parties agree to

the following process:

1. The HRS defendants shall employ Paul DeMuro and

Dr. Brad Fisher to develop a comprehensive assessment of

existing community programs for commitment of delinquent

youth.

Community programs include all residential and

Bobby M. v. Chiles

OFFiCE OF CULW n 5. Dir.TJ-'C'J?!.-

•• i m ••• • ••••• VH. v H
JI-FL-002-012

HH8-.it I

/Si/

FILb

non-residential programs operated by HRS or licensed by HRS through purchase of services, other than the training schools.
2. The consultants shall develop a preliminary plan for systematically reducing the population at the training schools to the lowest number possible using existing community programs, with or without program modifications, and other existing HRS resources to the extent practicable. These modifications may include, but are not limited to, changes in: criteria for admissions; procedures and reasons for transfer; program rules of behavior; program goals; performance evaluations; lengths of stay; and reallocation of resources. The consultants' plan shall include appropriate alternative placements for youth who are now or may in the future be committed to the training schools.
3. In preparing their assessment and preliminary plan, the consultants shall have access to all information and sources of information concerning community programs including documents, data, on site visitation, and briefings by pertinent HRS staff. The consultants shall cooperate with the HRS defendants in identifying and obtaining requested information and data.
4. Initially, the HRS defendants shall provide the consultants the following information concerning community programs on a schedule agreed to among the consultants, the
-2-

plaintiffs and the HRS defendants: a. identity of program b. location c. characteristics of youth committed and excluded from the program d. description of the program e. admissions and transfer criteria and information on selected transfer dispositions f. average length of stay g. budget h. Whether contracted for or directly operated by HRS i. number of beds or slots j. utilization rates or percentage of capacity used.
5. The consultants' assessment and preliminary plan shall be completed and furnished to counsel for the plaintiffs and the HRS defendants no later than Oct. 25, 1985.
6. Counsel for the plaintiffs and the HRS defendants shall meet on or about November 5, 1985, for the purpose of reviewing and finalizing the preliminary plan. The final plan shall include negotiated time frames and priorities for implementation of those recommendations of the consultants that are feasible and reasonably calculated to achieve the •
-3-

systematic reduction of the population at the training schools to the lowest number possible. The final plan shall be the subject of a further stipulation.

ALBERT J. HADEED Southern Legal Counsel, Inc. 115-A N.E. 7th Avenue Gainesville, FL 32601 (904)377-8288
CAROLE SHAUFFER Youth Law Center 1663 Mission Street 5th Floor San Francisco, CA 94103 (415)543-3379
CLAUDIA WRIGHT ACLU National Prison Project 1616 P Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20036 (202)331-0500

JAY ADAMS Deputy General Counsel Department of Health and
Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Blvd. Tallahassee, FL 32301 (904)488-2381

Dated:

By: (hfms AttornneyW's for HRS Defendants

J Dated:

7.

—4—

Based on the joint motion of the plaintiffs and the HRS defendants, the foregoing Stipulation is hereby approved as an order of the Court.
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers in " /CM»r<<*0f^<1^^ -, Florida, this ^3'^ day of August 1985.
ITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
-5-

 </s> IN THE \ITED STATES DISTRICT COLT " FOR THI NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLOR-^A DIVISION

OBBY M, et al S. iOB MARTINET, et al

Case No. TCA 83-7003/MMP REFERRAL AND ORDER

deferred to Judge Paul

on 7/17/90

?ype of M o t i o n / P l e a d i n g

JOINT MOTION TO ADOPT STIPULATION AMENDING

POPULATION REDUCTION SCHEDULE OF CONSENT DECREE

^iled by

PLTF & DEFDT

on

7/16/90 Doc. No.

i a

Responses :

on

Doc. No.

on

Doc. No.

) Stipulated/Consented/Joint Pleading

MARVIN S. WAITS, Clerk

Bv: Deputy (Tlerx

ORDER OF COURT

the foregoing it is ORDERED this

day of

The R e l i e f Requested Is
) by t h i s o r d e r . ) by separate order.

Uf FiCt Uf CLhRK U.S. DISTRICT CT. 'iculf; uiST.,FLA, "''•1AHASSEE. FLA.
I990JUL23 CM 9 : 5 2
FILED

uUNuWyEsD STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
ENTERED ON DOCKET _ [Ruies 55 i 7C;?; FRC? c : 32:'J!;1) S. £0 FRCRP1

IN THE BBY M., et al

JITED STATES DISTRICT COUr FOR TH NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORx^A
DIVISION
Case No

)B MARTINEZ

REFERRAL AND ORDER

ferred to Judge Paul pe of Motion/Pleading

on

7/17/90

MOTION FOREXT. OF TIME (till 8/2/90) to

ILE OBJECTIONS, ADDITIONS OR CORRECTIONS TO THIRD QUARTERLY REPORT

led by

de"-fd t .

on

7/17/90

Doc.No.

170

sponses :

on

Doc. No.

on

Doc.No.

) Stipulated/Consented/Joint Pleading

MARVIN S. WAITS, Clerk

By: Deputy"Clerk

ORDER OF COURT :he foregoing it is ORDERED this
The Relief Requested Is ( \ ) by this order. ( ) by separate order.

LA.
1990 JUL 23 fiff 3: 52
FILE-©-

STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
ENTERED OM DOCKET \ ~ [Ruias 53 & 7D-» FRCP cr 2 i :

Bobby M. v. Chiles

"

V

HH

HH

^™»B™ • • • •

JI-FL-002-013

 </s> 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

2

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

3 BOBBY M., CHARLES W., SUSAN S., and SALVADORE S., minors, by and through
4 their next friend, DAVID MACK, on behalf of themselves and all others
5 similarly situated,

6

Plainti ffs,

7

v.

8 ROBERT GRAHAM, in his official capacity as Governor of the State of Florida;
9 DAVID H. PINGREE, in his official capacity as Secretary of the Department of Health
10 and Rehabilitative Services for the State of Florida;
11 RALPH TURLINGTON, in his official capacity as Commissioner of the Department of
12 Education fcr the State of Florida; LENOX WILLIAMS, in his official capacity
13' -as Superintendent of the Arthur G. Dozier
14 i School for Boys; WILLIAM SCHOSSLER, in his official capacity as Superintendent of the Alyce 15 D. McPherson School; and
WESLEY BRAZELL, in his official capacity 16 as Superintendent of the Florida School
for Boys, 17
Defendants. 18

NO. TCA-83-7003 AMENDED COMPLAINT

19

INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT

2 0 ii

1. This is a civil rights class action brought on behalf of

f

all children who have been, are now, or will be confined in the

21

22

23

24

25

26

Bobby M. v. Chiles

• • • •• ••• • * mw m m
JI-FL-002-014

1 three training schools in the State of Florida: Arthur G. Dozier 2 School for Boys in Marianna ("Dozier"); Alyce D. McPherson School 3 in Ocala ("McPherson"), a co-educational institution; and Florida 4 School for Boys at Okeechobee ("Okeechobee") (plaintiffs). 5 Defendants confine approximately 1,000 children in these
institutions. 2. Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief from
cruel and abusive conditions of confinement imposed by defendants that violate rights guaranteed to them by the First, Fourth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 11 Constitution, by federal statutes, and by the Florida Constitution 12 and statutes. These conditions seriously endanger plaintiffs' physical and psychological health and safety, deprive them of any access to, or opportunity for, treatment or education, and restrict their access to and communication with their families, the community, and the courts. In particular, defendants subject plaintiffs to overcrowding, unsanitary and dangerous physical conditions, lack of security, lack of adequate staff, lack of medical care, abusive punishment including isolation, hogtying, shackling, and physical abuse, lack of education and programming, lack of due process in disciplinary matters, mail censorship, and 22 deprivation of access to courts. 23

24

JURISDICTION

3. This Court has jurisdiction of this action under 28

U.S.C. §1343(3) since this is an action to redress the deprivation,

1 under color of state law, of rights secured by the Constitution of

2 the United States; the Civil Rights Acts, 42 U.S.C. §1983; and

3 §504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 20 U.S.C. §§794 e_t seq.

4

4. This Court also has jurisdiction of this action under 28

5 U.S.C. §1343(4) since this is an action to secure declaratory,

injunctive and other equitable relief under acts of Congress

providing for the protection of civil rights, specifically the 8 Civil Rights Acts, 42 U.S.C. §1983; §504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 9 29 U.S.C. §794; and the Education for All Handicapped Children Act, 20 20 U.S.C. §§1401 et_ seq.

11

5. This Court also has jurisdiction of this action under 28

12 U.S.C. §§2201 and 2202, and Federal Rules of Civil Procedures 57

and 65 since this is an action seeking a judgment declaring the I4 rights of plaintiffs and for injunctive and other equitable relief

based upon that declaratory judgment under §1983.

6. This Court also has jurisdiction of this action under 28

U.S.C. §1331(a) since this is an action in which the matter in

controversy arises under the Constitution and laws of the United 19 States.

7. This Court has pendent jurisdiction over all claims

under Florida law because they arise out of the same nucleus of operative fact as the federal claims. 23

24

PLAINTIFFS

2*>

8. Plaintiff BOBBY M. is a minor child and a citizen of the

26 United States. He is currently confined at Dozier. Prior to his

1 incarceration, he attended special education classes. He sues

2 through his next friend, DAVID MACK.

3

9. Plaintiff CHARLES W. is a minor child and a citizen of

4 the United States. He is currently confined at McPherson. Prior

5 to his confinement, he attended special education classes. He sues

6 through his next friend, DAVID MACK.

7

10. Plaintiff SUSAN S. is a minor child and a citizen of the

8 United States. She is confined at McPherson School where she has

9 been confined since approximately March 29, 1981. She sues through

10 her next friend, DAVID MACK.

11

11. Plaintiff SALVADORE S. is a minor child and a resident

12 of the State of Florida. He is confined at Okeechobee. He is

13 Spanish-speaking. He sues through his next friend, DAVID MACK.

14

12. All named plaintiffs have been subjected to the

15 policies, practices, acts and omissions described in this

16 complaint. 17

18

DEFENDANTS

19

13. Defendant ROBERT GRAHAM is Governor of the State of

20 Florida. He is the chief executive officer of the State, and,

21 pursuant to Article Four, §1 of the Florida Constitution of 1968, 22 is responsible for the development and implementation of the

23 policies, practices and procedures described in this complaint,

24 which are the official policies, practices and procedures of the

25 State of Florida.

26

14. Defendant DAVID H. PINGREE is the Secretary of the

1 Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services ("HRS") for the

2 State of Florida. In this capacity, he is responsible, inter alia,

3 under Florida Statutes 20.05, 20.19, 402.22, 959.011, 959.021,

4 959.10, 959.12, and 959.25 for developing and implementing programs

5 for the care, education and treatment of persons committed to the

6 custody of the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services,

7 including the operation of training schools.

8

15. Defendant RALPH TURLINGTON is the Commissioner of the

Department of Education of the State of Florida. Pursuant to 10 Florida Statutes 22.05, 22.15, 230.23(4)(m) and (n), 402.22 and

959.25, he is responsible for providing education and related

12 services to children confined in training schools in Florida.

13

16. Defendant LENOX WILLIAMS is the Superintendent of Dozier

School and is responsible for the policies, practices, acts and

omissions described in this Complaint to the extent that they are

implemented or occur at Dozier.

17

17. Defendant WILLIAM SCHOSSLER is the Superintendent of

McPherson School and is responsible for the policies, practices,

acts and omissions described in this Complaint to the extent that

20 they are implemented or occur at McPherson.

18. Defendant WESLEY BRAZELL is the Superintendent of

22 Okeechobee School and is responsible for the policies, practices,

23 acts and omissions described in this Complaint to the extent that

they are implemented or occur at Okeechobee.

19. Defendants' policy manuals purport to prohibit certain 26 practices described in this Complaint. Nevertheless, defendants or

1 and their agents and employees, with defendants' knowledge and

2 consent, routinely engage in such practices, so that such practices

3 constitute the actual policies and practices, customs and usages of

4 defendants.

5

20. All defendants are sued individually and in their

6 official capacities. At all relevant times, defendants have acted

7 under color of state law to deprive plaintiffs of their rights,

privileges and immunities under the Constitution and laws of the

9 United States.

10

CLASS ACTION

11

21. Named plaintiffs bring this action on behalf of

12 themselves and all others similarly situated pursuant to Rule 23(a)

13 and (b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The class

consists of all juveniles who are currently, who have been, or who

15 will be confined in the three Florida training schools, Dozier,

McPherson, and Okeechobee.

22. The members of the class are so numerous that joinder of

all members is impracticable. At the present time, the Florida

State training schools confine approximately 1,000 children.

20

23. Named plaintiffs and their counsel will fairly,

21 vigorously and adequately protect the interests of the class. The

22 claims of the named plaintiffs are typical of the claims of the

23 plaintiff class. At least one of the named plaintiffs has been

subjected to and suffered from each of the conditions, policies,

practices, acts and omissions complained of in this action.

Plaintiffs' counsel have substantial experience in this type of

1 litigation and have represented children in similar cases in

2 several states.

3

24. All plaintiffs are subject to the conditions and

4 policies and practices of defendants described in this Complaint

5 during their confinement at the training schools, so that there are

questions of law and fact common to members of the plaintiff class.

The questions of law and fact common to all members of the

plaintiff class include whether the conditions, practices, acts and

omissions complained of occur at defendants' institutions, and

whether these conditions violate rights guaranteed to plaintiffs by

the United States Constitution, federal law and Florida law.

12

25. By their policies and practices, defendants have acted,

and continue to act on grounds and in a manner generally applicable

I4 to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive and

corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a

whole. 17

GENERAL FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS Background and Placement
26. Defendants GRAHAM and PINGREE operate three training schools in the State of Florida: Dozier in Marianna, Florida; McPherson in Ocala, Florida; and Okeechobee at Okeechobee, Florida. At Dozier and Okeechobee, defendants confine only boys; at McPherson they confine both boys and girls. Dozier and Okeechobee
or
*J house boys from designated geographical catchment areas; McPherson houses boys from its designated catchment area, and younger,

1 smaller boys and girls from all over the state. The Departments of

2 Education and Health and Human Resources, and all three training

3 schools, receive federal funds.

4

27. At these training schools, defendants confine boys and

5 girls who have been adjudicated delinquent in Florida juvenile

6 courts. Florida juvenile procedure does not afford children all of

7 the due process protections afforded to adults in criminal court.

8

28. In opposition to stated HRS policy, defendants confine

9 children as young as 10 years old, children who have committed only

10 minor offenses, and children who have had no previous involvement

with the juvenile court system in these institutions merely because

12 appropriate placements are not available.

13 COUNT ONE - Defendants GRAHAM, PINGREE, WILLIAMS, SCHOSSLER, BRAZELL

14 Living Conditions, Food and Clothing

15

29. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege paragraphs 1 through 28 as

if fully set forward herein, and further allege:

30. Living units at the training schools are called

"cottages." Cottages contain one or more sleeping areas; lockers;

one or more bathroom areas containing toilets, sinks and showers;

20 and a large, open recreation area. At McPherson, cottages also

21 contain a kitchen and dining area. Most cottages use open

22 dormitories as sleeping areas.

23

31. The cottages are extremely overcrowded. At McPherson,

rooms built to house 4 children now house 8, cottages built for 16

children house 30. At Okeechobee, dormitories originally designed

for 17 children house 40. In Dozier, school dormitories originally

1 built for 20 children also house 40. At times children sleep on

2 mattresses on the floor because defendants do not provide enough

3 beds.

32. Because of the tension, lack of space and lack of

supervision caused by overcrowding, physical and sexual assaults

are common.

33. Because of overcrowding, defendants do not provide

children with adequate space, equipment or supervision for

recreation or leisure time activities.

34. Defendants deprive plaintiffs of all personal privacy in

their living areas. Children are not allowed to personalize their

living areas. The few personal belongings they are allowed to keep

must be stored in small lockers or boxes. At Dozier and

I4 Okeechobee, defendants fail to provide doors or curtains on shower

" and toilet areas, leaving those areas completely exposed to open

16 view.

17

35. Defendants maintain unhealthy and unsanitary conditions

18 at all three institutions. Defendants do not adequately clean or
19 maintain the buildings. Defendants maintain buildings which are
20 structurally unsound and which present serious danger in the event
91 of fire. Defendants force children to live in buildings that are
99
improperly heated, cooled, ventilated, or lighted. These buildings 23
do not have screens and are often insect-infested.
0 A
36. Defendants do not adequately feed and clothe plaintiffs. 25
37. Defendants do not provide children with clean, untorn,
26
appropriately-sized clothing.

1

38. Defendants do not provide meals which are adequate in

2 quantity or quality to meet the nutritional needs of growing

3. children or adolescents. Defendants prepare food under conditions

4 that are unhealthful and unsanitary. At Okeechobee and Dozier,

5 defendants do not provide children with anything to eat for the

6 almost fourteen hours between supper (at approximately 5:00 p.m.)

7 and breakfast (at approximately 7:00 a.m.).

8

39. By subjecting plaintiffs to overcrowding, inadequate food

9 and clothing, and unhealthful and unsanitary living conditions,

10 defendants GRAHAM, PINGREE, WILLIAMS, SCHOSSLER and BRAZELL deprive

11 plaintiffs of their right to due process of law guaranteed by the

12 Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, of their

13 right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment as guaranteed by

14 the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States

15 Constitution, of their right to treatment guaranteed by the Eighth

16 and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and of

17 their right to placement in the least restrictive alternative that

18 will effectuate the purpose of their confinement guaranteed by the

19 due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States

20 Constitution.

21 COUNT TWO - Defendants GRAHAM, PINGREE, WILLIAMS, SCHOSSLER and

22

BRAZELL

23 Living Conditions, Food and Clothing - Pendent State Claims

24

40. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege paragraphs 29 through 39

25 as if fully set forward herein, and further allege:

26

41. By subjecting plaintiffs to overcrowding, inadequate

10
TI II

1 food and clothing, and unhealthful and unsanitary living

2 conditions, defendants GRAHAM, PINGREE, WILLIAMS, SCHOSSLER, and

3 BRAZELL deprive plaintiffs of basic rights, the right to due

4 process, and the right to be free from excessive punishment,

5 guaranteed by Article One, §§2, 9 and 17 of the Florida

6 Constitution, and of rights guaranteed by Fla. Stat. Chapters 39

7 and 959.

8 COUNT THREE - Defendants GRAHAM, PINGREE, WILLIAMS, SCHOSSLER and

9

BRAZELL

10 Lack of Security

11

42. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege paragraphs 1 through 41

12 as if fully set forward herein, and further allege:

13

43. Defendants further jeopardize plaintiffs' health and

safety by failing to provide adequate security in the

15 institutions.

44. Defendants completely fail to supervise and train staff.

As a result, children are victims of staff assaults. Defendants

have taken little or no action to curtail staff brutality. When

notified of abuses, defendants have failed to take action against

20 staff members involved.

21

45. Defendants have failed to design or implement a

22 classification system for residents at the schools. Defendants do

23 not separate children who have committed serious or violent

24 offenses from children who have committed only property crimes, and

25 do not separate children with emotional disturbances from the rest

of the population.

11

1

46. Defendants also fail to adequately supervise children at

2 the training schools.

3

47. Defendants' staff members encourage larger children to

4 assault or restrain smaller children as-a means of disciplining and

5 controlling them. As a result, residents frequently assault each

6 other.

7

48. Defendants fail to provide adequate staff coverage in

8 any of the training schools. Defendants do not provide enough

9 staff to adequately supervise or treat children confined in the

10 training schools. As a result, defendants deny plaintiffs personal

11 security and safety in the institutions.

12

49. Defendants employ staff members who are inadequately

13 trained to perform childcare responsibilities. Defendants do not 14 provide staff with the psychological, sociological or medical

15 information necessary to care for and treat children in the

16 training schools.

17

50. Defendants aggravate the atmosphere of fear and violence

18 that prevails at these schools by using tracking dogs to hunt down

19 children who attempt to escape from either Okeechobee or Dozier.

20 Dog handlers terrorize and abuse children.

21

51. By their actions in failing to provide plaintiffs with

22 adequate security, safety, and supervision, defendants GRAHAM,

23 PINGREE, WILLIAMS, SCHOSSLER and BRAZELL deprive plaintiffs of

24 their right to due process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth 25 Amendment to the United States Constitution, of their right to be 26 free from cruel and unusual punishment guaranteed by the Eighth and

12

1 Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, of their

2 right to treatment guaranteed by the Eighth and Fourteenth

3 Amendments to the United States Constitution, and of their right to

4 confinement in the least restrictive alternative that will

5 effectuate the purposes of their confinement guaranteed by the due

6 process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States

7 Constitution.

8 COUNT FOUR - Defendants GRAHAM, PINGREE, WILLIAMS, SCHOSSLER and

9

BRAZELL

10 Lack of Security - Pendent State Claims

11

52. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege paragraphs 42 through 51

12 as if fully set forward herein, and further allege:

13

53. By their actions in failing to provide plaintiffs with

14 adequate security, safety, and supervision, defendants GRAHAM,

15 PINGREE, WILLIAMS, SCHOSSLER and BRAZELL deprive plaintiffs of

16 basic rights, the right to due process, and the right to be free

17 from excessive punishment guaranteed by Article One, §§2, 9 and 17

18 of the Florida Constitution, and of rights guaranteed by

19 Fla. Stat. Chapters 39 and 959.

20 COUNT FIVE - Defendants GRAHAM, PINGREE, WILLIAMS, SCHOSSLER and

21

BRAZELL

22 Medical Care

23

54. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege paragraphs 1 through 53

24 as if fully set forward herein, and further allege:

25 55. The medical care defendants provide at all three

26 institutions is grossly inadequate to maintain physical or mental

13

1 health. Defendants' failure to provide adequate medical care

2 amounts to deliberate indifference to the health and safety

3 requirements of children at these institutions.

4

56. Defendants fail to provide medical staffs at the

5 institutions that are adequate to meet children's needs.

6 Defendants fail to employ adequate numbers of physicians,

7 psychiatrists, psychiatric aides, nurses, nurses' aides or

8 dentists.

9

57. Defendants fail to provide adequate supplies in the

10 medical areas of all three schools. Defendants fail to provide

11 supplies necessary to maintain a healthy and sanitary environment,

12 or equipment necessary to provide adequate medical, dental or

13 psychiatric treatment.

58. Defendants have failed to design and implement an

adequate procedure for preventing, treating and containing

contagious diseases, including venereal diseases. Defendants fail

to remove children with contagious diseases from the general

population.

59. Defendants maintain infirmaries at the training schools

20 in an unsanitary, unhygienic, and medically unsafe manner.

21 Defendants maintain infirmaries that are insect-infested. They are

22 often uncomfortably hot or cold. Defendants have required children

23 to sleep on mattresses without sheets. Defendants fail to provide

plaintiffs with pajamas or appropriate hospital attire in medical

25 areas. Defendants do not permit children to shower or bathe every

day while they are in the infirmary.

14

1

60. By failing to provide plaintiffs with adequate medical

2 and psychiatric care and treatment, defendants GRAHAM, PINGREE,

3 WILLIAMS, SCHOSSLER and BRAZELL deprive plaintiffs of their right 4 to due process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the

United States Constitution, of their right to be free from cruel

and unusual punishment guaranteed by the Eighth and Fourteenth

Amendments to the United States Constitution, of their right to

treatment guaranteed by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the 7 United States Constitution, and of their right to placement in the

" least restrictive alternative that will effectuate the purposes of

their confinement, guaranteed by the due process clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment.

13 COUNT SIX - Defendants GRAHAM, PINGREE, WILLIAMS, SCHOSSLER and

14

BRAZELL

Medical Care to Handicapped Students

61. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege paragraphs 54 through 60

as if fully set forward herein, and further allege:

62. By failing to provide adequate medical and psychiatric

care and treatment to handicapped plaintiffs, defendants GRAHAM, 20 PINGREE, WILLIAMS, SCHOSSLER and BRAZELL discriminate against 21 plaintiffs and punish them solely by reason of their handicap, 22 violating rights guaranteed to them by §504 of the Rehabilitation

Act, 29 U.S.C. §794 and regulations promulgated thereunder.

24 COUNT SEVEN - Defendants GRAHAM, PINGREE, WILLIAMS, SCHOSSLER and

25

BRAZELL

26 Medical Care - Pendent State Claims

15

1

63. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege paragraphs 54 through 62

2 as if fully set forward herein, and further allege:

3

64. By failing to provide plaintiffs with adequate medical

4 and psychiatric care and treatment, defendants GRAHAM, PINGREE,

5 WILLIAMS, SCHOSSLER and BRAZELL deprive plaintiffs of basic rights, 6 the right to due process, and the right to be free from excessive

7 punishment guaranteed to them by Article One, §§2, 9 and 17 of the

Florida Constitution, and of rights guaranteed by Fla. 9 Stat. Chapters 39 and 959, and §§402.22 and 230.23.

1° COUNT EIGHT - Defendants GRAHAM, PINGREE, WILLIAMS, SCHOSSLER and

BRAZELL

12 Psychological Counseling

65. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege paragraphs 1 through 64

as if fully set forward herein, and further allege:

66. Defendants fail to provide plaintiffs with adequate

psychological care and treatment.

67. Defendants fail to adequately assess children's

psychological condition at or before the time of their admission to

the training schools. As a result, defendants confine children
20 with serious psychological illnesses, children who are mentally
21 retarded,and children who are otherwise handicapped or

22 developmentally disabled in training schools where they cannot
no

° adequately be treated.

24

68. Defendants fail to design and implement an adequate

treatment plan for each child at the training schools. As a

26

result, defendants fail to provide children with appropriate

16

1 rehabilitation or treatment.

2

69. Defendants do not employ or make available a sufficient

3 number of qualified psychologists or social workers to counsel and

4 treat children.

5

70. Defendants delegate the responsibility for providing

6 plaintiffs with direct psychological treatment to persons who are

7 inadequately trained and supervised. As a result, children do not

receive psychological treatment.

9

71. By failing to provide plaintiffs with adequate

10 psychological assessment, care and treatment, defendants GRAHAM,

11 PINGREE, WILLIAMS, SCHOSSLER and BRAZELL deprive plaintiffs of

12 their right to due process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth

Amendment to the United States Constitution, of their right to be

free from cruel and unusual punishment guaranteed by the Eighth and

Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, of their

right to treatment guaranteed by the Eighth and Fourteenth

*•' Amendments to the United States Constitution, and of their right to
I Q
° placement in the least restrictive alternative that will effectuate
1 g
17 the purposes of their confinement, guaranteed by the due process 20

clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

21 COUNT NINE - Defendants GRAHAM, PINGREE, WILLIAMS, SCHOSSLER and

22

BRAZELL

Psychological Counseling - Handicapped Children

94
72. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege paragraphs 65 through 71
25
as if fully set forward herein, and further allege: 73. By failing to provide adequate psychological assessment,

17

Til

1 care and treatment to handicapped plaintiffs, defendants GRAHAM,

2 PINGREE, WILLIAMS, SCHOSSLER and BRAZELL discriminate against

3 plaintiffs and punish them solely by reason of their handicap,

4 violating rights guaranteed to them by §504 of the Rehabilitation

5 Act, 29 U.S.C. §794 and regulations promulgated thereunder.

6 COUNT TEN - Defendants GRAHAM, PINGREE, WILLIAMS, SCHOSSLER and

7

BRAZELL

8 Psychological Counseling - Pendent State Claims

9

74. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege paragraphs 65 through 73

10 as if fully set forward herein, and further allege:

11

75. By failing to provide plaintiffs with adequate

12 psychological assessment, care and treatment, defendants GRAHAM,

13 'PINGREE, WILLIAMS, SCHOSSLER and BRAZELL deprive plaintiffs of

basic rights, the right to due process, and the right to be free

from excessive punishment guaranteed to them by Article O n e , § § 2 , 9

and 17 of the Florida Constitution, and of rights guaranteed to

17 them by Fla. Stat. Chapters 39 and 959, and §§402.22 and 230.23

18 COUNT ELEVEN - Defendants GRAHAM, PINGREE, WILLIAMS, SCHOSSLER and

19

BRAZELL

20 Isolation

21

76. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege paragraph 1 through 75 as

22 though fully set forward herein, and further allege:

23

77. Defendants operate "adjustment units" at all three

training schools. They use these adjustment units for purposes of

discipline and control.

78. At McPherson and Okeechobee, these units consist of

18

1 several individual isolation cells. At Dozier, the adjustment

2 unit contains 10 isolation cells and 3 open dormitory areas.

3 Defendants use isolation at Dozier to further punish children who

4 are confined in the adjustment unit.

5

79. The isolation cells are similar in all three

6 institutions. Each cell contains a concrete platform, a sink, and

7 an open toilet. Defendants put mattresses, pillows, and blankets

8 in the cells at night, but, at Dozier and Okeechobee often remove

9 them as punishment.

10

80. Each isolation cell is separated from the corridor by a

11 heavy locked metal door. This door has a small view window

12 approximately 4-1/2 feet from the ground and a T-shaped slot

13 approximately 2-1/2 feet from the ground. Children can communicate

14 with the outside only through the T-shaped slot. This slot can

15 only be closed or opened from the outside. Staff frequently close

16 these slots, depriving children of any contact with the outside

17 while they are in isolation.

•

18

81. The physical conditions in the isolation cells endanger

19 children's health and safety. Cells are unventilated, poorly

20 lighted and unsanitary. Children must eat their meals next to

21 open, uncleaned toilet fixtures. Because they are locked,

22 isolation cells pose a serious danger in case of fire, and

23 defendants have completely failed to develop procedures for 24 evacuating plaintiffs from these cells in case of fire.

25

82. Defendants confine depressed, agitated and emotionally

26 disturbed children in isolation cells. Defendants make no effort

19

1 to protect children against self-inflicted injuries. Isolation

2 cells contain many sharp objects such as screens and vents and

3 breakable porcelain toilet fixtures. All these objects can be, and

4 are, used by children to injure themselves. Defendants fail to

5 adequately monitor children in isolation to ensure that they do not

6 injure themselves..

7

83. Defendants subject children to long periods of isolation

in bare concrete walled cells. They do not provide children with

access to television, radio or reading materials. Communication

with other children or staff is minimal. Children held under these

11 conditions suffer severe sensory deprivation.

12

84. Defendants often confine children in isolation for 24

13 hours a day. At Dozier and Okeechobee, defendants fail to provide

any programming for children in isolation. At McPherson,

defendants permit some children in isolation to leave their cells

for a brief period to obtain their school assignments and for an

hour a day of exercise. Defendants also fail to provide any

programming for children in the open dormitory areas of the

adjustment unit at Dozier School. Children in this unit can go

outside or into a common area, but receive no recreational or

educational materials for the duration of their stay in the

adjustment unit. 85. Defendants1 regulations permit children to be confined

in security units for up to 21 days. In fact, children often

remain in isolation units for longer periods of time.

86. Defendants confine children to adjustment units for

20

1 minor incidents, including disrespect for staff members,

2 altercations with other children, and refusal to promptly obey

3 orders. Defendants confine children to adjustment units for

4 behaviors caused by mental or emotional illnesses and other

5 handicaps, instead of providing plaintiffs with treatment for these

6 illnesses and handicaps.

7

87. By subjecting plaintiffs to the practices of isolation

8 described above, defendants GRAHAM, PINGREE, WILLIAMS, SCHOSSLER

9 and BRAZELL deprive plaintiffs of their right to due process of law

10 guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States

11 Constitution, of their right to be free from cruel and unusual

12 punishment guaranteed by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to

13 the United States Constitution, of their right to treatment

guaranteed by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United

15 States Constitution, and of their right to placement in the least

restrictive alternative that will effectuate the purposes of their

confinement guaranteed by the due process clause of the Fourteenth

18 Amendment to the United States Constitution.

19 COUNT TWELVE - Defendnts GRAHAM, PINGREE, WILLIAMS, SCHOSSLER and

20

BRAZELL

21 Isolation - Handicapped Plaintiffs

22

88. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege paragraphs 76 through 87

23 as if fully set forward herein, and further allege:

89. By confining handicapped plaintiffs to isolation as 25 described above, defendants GRAHAM, PINGREE, WILLIAMS, SCHOSSLER,

and BRAZELL discriminate against them and punish them solely by

21

1 reason of their handicap, thus violating rights guaranteed to them

2 by §504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. §794 and regulations

3 promulgated thereunder.

COUNT THIRTEEN - Defendants GRAHAM, PINGREE, WILLIAMS, SCHOSSLER

and BRAZELL

Isolation - Pendent State Claims

90. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege paragraphs 76 through 89

as if fully set forward herein, and further allege:

91. By subjecting plaintiffs to the practices of isolation 10 described above, defendants GRAHAM, PINGREE, WILLIAMS, SCHOSSLER

and BRAZELL deprive plaintiffs of basic rights, of the right to due

process, and of the right to be free from excessive punishment 13 guaranteed to them by Article One, §§ 2, 9 and 17 of the Florida 14 Constitution, and of rights guaranteed by Fla. Stat. Chapters 39

15 and 959.

16 COUNT FOURTEEN - Defendants GRAHAM, PINGREE, TURLINGTON, WILLIAMS,

17

SCHOSSLER and BRAZELL

18 Shackling

19

92. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege paragraphs 1 through 91

20 as though fully set forward herein, and further allege:

93. Defendants use shackles in the adjustment units as a

22 means of discipline and of controlling children's behavior.

23

94. Defendants use several methods of shackling. At Dozier

24 and Okeechobee, defendants use a particularly harmful method called 25 "hogtying." Defendants hogtie children by forcing them to lie on 26 their stomachs, handcuffing their wrists behind their backs,

22

1 shackling their legs together and connecting the handcuffs to the

2 leg shackles.

3

95. At all three schools, defendants handcuff children,

4 chain their hands to their waists, and use leg shackles.

5 Defendants frequently use metal handcuffs and metal leg restraints

6 to restrict children's movement. Use of these metal restraints has

7 been shown to cause serious injury to developing children.

8

96. At Dozier School, educational staff also use shackles to

9 restrain plaintiffs in the educational area.

97. Defendants' employees at all three schools have, on many

occasions, beaten or kicked children while they were shackled or

12 hogtied.

13

98. Defendants leave children locked in isolation cells

lying on concrete beds, sometimes without sheets or mattresses,

hogtied or shackled, for extended periods of time.

99. Plaintiffs have suffered and continue to suffer serious

physical and emotional damage as a result of extended isolation,

1° shackling, hogtying, and beatings.

100. By subjecting plaintiffs to the practices of shackling 20 described above, defendants GRAHAM, PINGREE, TURLINGTON, WILLIAMS,

SCHOSSLER, and BRAZELL deprive plaintiffs of their right to due 22 process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United 23 States Constitution, of their right to be free from cruel and

24 unusual punishment guaranteed by the Eighth and Fourteenth 25 Amendments to the United States Constitution, of their right to .

treatment guaranteed by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the

23

1 United States Constitution, and of their right to placement in the

2 least restrictive alternative that will effectuate the purposes of

3 their confinement guaranteed by thedueprocess clause of the

4 Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

5 COUNT FIFTEEN - Defendants GRAHAM, PINGREE, TURLINGTON, WILLIAMS,

SCHOSSLER and BRAZELL

Shackling Handicapped Plaintiffs

101. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege paragraphs 92 through 100

as if fully set forward herein, and further allege:

102. By shackling handicapped plaintiffs as described above,

defendants GRAHAM, PINGREE, TURLINGTON, WILLIAMS, SCHOSSLER,and

12 BRAZELL discriminate against them and punish them solely by reason

13 of their handicap, thus violating rights guaranteed to them by §504 14 of theRehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. §794 and regulations

promulgated thereunder.

COUNT SIXTEEN - Defendants GRAHAM, PINGREE, TURLINGTON, WILLIAMS,

17

SCHOSSLER and BRAZELL

18 Shackling - Pendent State Claims

103. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege paragraphs 92 through 102
90
u I as if fully set forward herein, andfurther allege: 104. By subjecting plaintiffs to the practice of shackling
22 described above, defendants GRAHAM, PINGREE, TURLINGTON, WILLIAMS,

23 SCHOSSLER and BRAZELL deprive plaintiffs of basic rights, the right

to due process, andthe right to be free from excessive punishment

* guaranteed to them by Article One, §§2, 9 and 17 of the Florida

Constitution, and of rights guaranteed by Fla. Stat. Chapters 39

24

1 and 959.

2 COUNT SEVENTEEN - Defendants GRAHAM, PINGREE, TURLINGTON, WILLIAMS,

3

SCHOSSLER and BRAZELL

4 Education and Programming

5

105. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege paragraphs 1 through 104

as though fully set forward herein, and further allege:

106. Defendants fail to provide plaintiffs with an adequate

education comparable to that available to plaintiffs in the

community.

107. Defendants fail to provide bilingual education or

services to children who are not fluent in English.

108. Defendants fail to provide adequate vocational

education. The vocational education they do provide is inadequate

to prepare children to obtain employment upon release.

"

109. Defendants fail to provide children with other forms of

programming. They require children to spend prolonged periods of 17 time without any programmed activity or recreational or therapeutic 10 programming
19
110. Defendants fail to provide rehabilitative treatment to 20 plaintiffs.

111. The Florida Departments of Education and Health and
99
Human Services, and each of the training schools, receive federal
03
funds under, inter alia, Public Law 94-142, the Education for All Handicapped Children Act, 20 U.S.C. §§1401 e_t seq. 25
112. Defendants fail to provide special education and related 26
services to handicapped children who were receiving such services

25

1 prior to their incarceration. Defendants fail to adequately

2 assess children to determine whether they have special needs and

3 how such special needs can be met. Defendants fail to develop

4 appropriate individualized education programs for children who need

special education. Defendants fail to provide appropriate related

services, including speech therapy, physical therapy and

psychological services, to handicapped children who need such

services to benefit from their education.

113. By failing to provide plaintiffs with adequate

educational services described above, defendants GRAHAM, PINGREE, 11 TURLINGTON, WILLIAMS, SCHOSSLER, and BRAZELL deprive plaintiffs of

12 their right to equal protection and due process of law guaranteed

13 by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, of

their right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment guaranteed

by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States

Constitution, of their right to treatment guaranteed by the Eighth

and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and of

their right to placement in the least restrictive alternative that

will effectuate the purposes of their confinement guaranteed by the

due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States

Constitution.

22 COUNT EIGHTEEN - Defendants GRAHAM, PINGREE, TURLINGTON, WILLIAMS,

23

SCHOSSLER and BRAZELL

* Education and Programming - Discrimination Against Handicapped 25

26

1 113 as if fully set forward herein, and further allege:

2

115. By failing to provide otherwise qualified handicapped

3 plaintiffs with adequate educational services as described above,

4 defendants GRAHAM, PINGREE, TURLINGTON, WILLIAMS, SCHOSSLER and

5 BRAZELL discriminate against them by reason of their handicap, thus

violating rights guaranteed to them by §504 of the Rehabilitation

7 Act, 29 U.S.C. §794 and regulations promulgated thereunder.

8 COUNT NINETEEN - Defendants GRAHAM, PINGREE, TURLINGTON, WILLIAMS,

9

SCHOSSLER and BRAZELL

Educational Programming - Failure to Provide Special Education

11

116. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege paragraphs 105 through

12 115 as if fully set forward herein, and further allege:

117. Since defendants completely deprive all plaintiffs of I4 special education and related services on a classwide basis,

l-> exhaustion of administrative remedies by plaintiffs would be

futile.

17

118. By failing to provide handicapped plaintiffs with

i ft

10 evaluation and special education and related services as described

19 above, defendants GRAHAM, PINGREE, TURLINGTON, WILLIAMS, SCHOSSLER,

21 BtRheAZEELdLucaantdionTURfLoIrNGATlOlN HdaenpdriciavpepetdhemChiofldrreinghtAsctg,uaPruabnltiecedLatwo9t4h-e1m42b,y

22 20 U.S.C. §§1401 et seq., and regulations promulgated thereunder.

23 COUNT TWENTY - Defendants GRAHAM, PINGREE, TURLINGTON, WILLIAMS,

24

SCHOSSLER and BRAZELL

25
Education and Programming - Pendent State Claims
119. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege paragraphs 105 through

27

1 118 as if fully set forward herein, and further allege:

2

120. By failing to provide plaintiffs with adequate

3 educational services as described above, and by failing to provide 4 handicapped plaintiffs with adequate educational services,

5 defendants GRAHAM, PINGREE, TURLINGTON, WILLIAMS, SCHOSSLER and

BRAZELL deprive plaintiffs of basic rights, the right to due

process, and the right to be free from excessive punishment

8 guaranteed by Article One, §§2, 9 and 17 of the Florida

9 Constitution, and by Fla. Stat. Chapters 39, 959, and §§402.22 and

10 230.23.

11 COUNT TWENTY-ONE - Defendants GRAHAM, PINGREE, WILLIAMS, SCHOSSLER

12

AND BRAZELL

Due Process

^

121. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege paragraphs 1 through 120

as though fully set forward herein, and further allege:

122. Defendants deprive plaintiffs of constitutionally

guaranteed due process in classification, disciplinary procedures,

18

and transfer.
•jo
123. Defendants discipline plaintiffs arbitrarily and

20

capriciously for minor misbehaviors and for behaviors that are

91

symptoms of emotional or mental handicaps

99

z

124. Defendants authorize staff members, regardless of

no
training or qualifications, to order children into confinement in

the adjustment unit. Children must remain in the adjustment unit a

25 minimum of 24 hours before they have the opportunity for a hearing.

125. Defendants transfer children from one institution to

28

another without affording them the opportunity for a hearing.

2 These inter-institutional transfers are disciplinary in nature.

3 Inter-institutional transfers punish children by further removing 4 them from their families and home communities and by subjecting

5 them to harsher, more restrictive conditions.

126. To the extent that defendants have developed a grievance

procedure, they fail to inform children about the existence of this

procedure or to explain to them how the procedure can be used.

°

127. By disciplining, classifying and transferring plaintiffs

10 as described above, defendants GRAHAM, PINGREE, WILLIAMS, SCHOSSLER

and BRAZELL deprive plaintiffs of their right to due process of law

guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States

Constitution.

14 COUNT TWENTY-TWO - Defendants GRAHAM, PINGREE, WILLIAMS, SCHOSSLER

15

and BRAZELL

Due Process - Pendent State Claims

128. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege paragraphs 121 through

127 as if fully set forward herein, and further allege:

129. By disciplining, classifying and transferring plaintiffs

in the manner described above, defendants GRAHAM, PINGREE,

WILLIAMS, SCHOSSLER and BRAZELL deprive plaintiffs of their right

22 to due process of law guaranteed by Article One, §9 of the Florida

23 Constitution, and of rights guaranteed by Fla. Stat. §959.10.

24 //
25 // 26

29

1 COUNT TWENTY-THREE - Defendants GRAHAM, PINGREE, WILLIAMS,

2

SCHOSSLER and BRAZELL

3 Freedom of Speech and Association

4

130. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege paragraphs 1 through 129

5 as though fully set forward herein, and further allege:

6

131. Defendants interfere with non-English speaking

7 plaintiffs' ability to communicate by prohibiting them from

8 speaking any language other than English.

9

132. Defendants, by their mail, telephone and visitation

10 policies, deprive plaintiffs of their right to communicate and

11 associate with their families and friends outside of the training

12 schools by interfering with and restricting mail and telephone

13 communications. This communication is necessary to children's

14 treatment and rehabilitation and to assist their reintegration into

15 the community.

16

133. Defendants open all mail other than attorney-client mail

1^ that comes to children in the institutions. Defendants open this

18 mail outside of the presence of the child to whom the mail is

1' addressed. Defendants also prohibit children from sending sealed

^ letters to persons outside the institution. These practices permit

21 staff members to read children's mail.

22

134. Defendants improperly restrict children from

23 communicating by telephone with their parents, relatives or

2* friends. These restrictions work a particularly severe hardship on ^5 children whose parents live at great distances from the schools and

are unable to visit them.

30

1

135. Defendants severely restrict children's opportunities

2 for visitation with family and friends. Defendants unreasonably

3 limit the number of visitors a child may have and the hours during

4 which visits may occur.

5

136. Defendants transfer children from detention centers or

6 community-based programs to training schools, and from one training

7 school to another, without adequately informing children's parents

8 or relatives. As a result, some parents do not know where their

9 children are for several months after such a transfer.

10

137. By restricting plaintiffs' communication with persons

11 outside the training schools in the manner described above,

12 defendants GRAHAM, PINGREE, WILLIAMS, SCHOSSLER, and BRAZELL

13 deprive plaintiffs of their right to freedom of speech and

14 association guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments to

15 the United States Constitution.

16 COUNT TWENTY-FOUR - Defendants GRAHAM, PINGREE, WILLIAMS, SCHOSSLER

17

and BRAZELL

18 Freedom of Speech and Association - Pendent State Claims

19

138. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege paragraphs 130 through

20 137 as if fully set forward herein, and further allege:

21

139. By restricting plaintiffs' communication with persons

22 outside the training schools in the manner described above,

23 defendants GRAHAM, PINGREE, WILLIAMS, SCHOSSLER and BRAZELL deprive 24 plaintiffs of basic rights, the right to freedom of speech, the 25 right to due process, and the right to freedom from unreasonable 26 interception of private communications guaranteed by Article One,

31

TT

II!

1 §§2, 4, 9 and 12 of the Florida Constitution, and of rights

2 guaranteed by Fla. Stat. Chapters 39 and 959.

3 COUNT TWENTY-FIVE - Defendants GRAHAM, PINGREE, WILLIAMS, SCHOSSLER

4

and BRA2ELL

5 Access to Courts

6

140. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege paragraphs 1 through 139

7 as though fully set forward herein, and further allege:

8

141. Defendants deprive plaintiffs of adequate access to the

9 courts. Defendants fail to inform children that they may make

10 telephone calls to or receive telephone calls from counsel.

11

142. Defendants fail to provide children with either legal

12 materials or access to counsel who can assist them with their legal

13 problems. Defendants also fail to provide children with any

14 instruction or assistance in protecting their rights through the

15 legal system.

16

143. By failing to provide plaintiffs with access to the

17 courts as described above, defendants GRAHAM, PINGREE, WILLIAMS,

18 SCHOSSLER, and BRAZELL, deprive plaintiffs of their right to

19 counsel and access to the courts guaranteed by the First and Sixth

20 Amendments and by the due process clause of the Fourteenth

21 Amendment to the United States Constitution.

22 COUNT TWENTY-SIX - Defendants GRAHAM, PINGREE, WILLIAMS, SCHOSSLER

23

and BRAZELL

24 Access to Courts - Pendent State Claims

25

144. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege paragraphs 140 through

26 143 as if fully set forward herein, and further allege:

32
IT II

1

145. By failing to provide plaintiffs with access to courts

2 as described above, defendants GRAHAM, PINGREE, WILLIAMS, SCHOSSLER

3 and BRAZELL violate basic rights, the right to freedom of speech 4 and of the press, the right to due process, and the right to access

to the courts guaranteed by Article One, §§2, 4, 9 and 21 of the

Florida Constitution, and rights guaranteed by Fla. Stat. Chapters 7 39 and 959. 8

9

NO ADEQUATE REMEDY AT LAW

146. As a proximate result of defendants' policies,

practices, procedures, acts and omissions, plaintiffs have

suffered, do suffer and will continue to suffer immediate and 10 irreparable injury, including physical, psychological and emotional

injury. Their intellectual abilities, their emotional health and

" well-being and their ability to function adequately in the

community have seriously deteriorated and will continue to

deteriorate during the course of their confinement at institutions
18
operated by defendants. Plaintiffs have no plain, adequate or 19
complete remedy at law to redress the wrongs described in this 20
complaint. Plaintiffs will continue to be irreparably injured by 21
I the policies, practices, procedures, acts and omissions of 22
defendants unless this Court grants the injunctive relief that 23
plaintiffs seek

24

//

25

//

26

//

33

1

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

2

WHEREFORE, plaintiffs pray that this Court:

3

1. Permit plaintiffs to pursue this action Jji forma

4 pauperis.

5

2. Certify this action and permit it to proceed as a

6 class action.

7

3. Issue a declaratory judgment declaring that defendants'

8 practices in subjecting plaintiffs to the conditions of confinement

described in this Complaint violate rights guaranteed to plaintiffs

10 under the First, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment of the

United States Constitution; the Education for All Handicapped

12 Children Act, 20 U.S.C. §§1401 et sjeg.;'the Rehabilitation Act, 29

13 U.S.C. §§794 et seq.; §§2, 4, 5, 9, 12, 15, 17 and 21 of Article I 14 of the Florida Constitution; and Chapters 39, 230, 394, 409 and 959 15 of the Florida Statutes.

4. Preliminarily and permanently enjoin defendants, their

agents, employees, successors in office and assigns from engaging

in the unconstitutional and unlawful practices, acts and omissions

described herein, including, but not limited to:

(a) Confining plaintiffs in facilities that are

overcrowded unhealthful, unsanitary and life-endangering;

22

(b) Failing to adequately protect the physical health of

plaintiffs;

24

(c) Failing to insure plaintiffs against attacks by

25 staff members or by other children confined in the institution;

26

(d) Failing to provide adequately trained staff in

34

1 adequate numbers to insure plaintiffs' safety and provide them with

2 treatment;

3

(e) Failing to provide plaintiffs with adequate medical,

4 dental and psychiatric care;

5

(f) Confining plaintiffs in security units, and, in

particular, in isolation units, or otherwise subjecting plaintiffs

to sensory deprivation;

(g) Shackling plaintiffs;

(h) Hogtying plaintiffs;

(i) Failing to provide plaintiffs with adequate

education, including special education and related services;

(j) Failing to provide plaintiffs with adequate

programming;

I4

(k) Failing to provide plaintiffs with adequate

treatment;

(1) Failing to adequately screen plaintiffs to insure

1' that plaintiffs with serious emotional or psychological

disabilities are not confined in training schools;

(m) Failing to provide plaintiffs with due process
90

protections prior to imposing discipline, including but not limited

21 to, discipline that results in transfers from one institution to

another;

23

(n) Prohibiting plaintiffs from speaking languages other

than English;

25

(o) Opening plaintiffs' mail outside of the presence of

26 the addressee;

35

(p) Failing to permit plaintiffs to send uncensored,

2 unread and unopened mail to friends and relatives;

3

(q) Failing to provide plaintiffs with reasonable

4 opportunities to telephone and visit parents, friends and

5 relatives;

6

(r) Failing to provide plaintiffs with adequate access

to courts; and

(s) Failing to confine plaintiffs in the least

restrictive alternative consistent with their need for

rehabilitation and treatment.

5. Direct defendants to develop and submit to this Court a

plan, that will insure that plaintiffs are not subject to

conditions of confinement that deprive them of rights guaranteed to

them by the federal Constitution, federal statutes, and by the

Florida Constitution or Florida statutes, and that will insure that

no juvenile is placed in a training school in Florida unless that

training school is a least restrictive alternative consistent with

i0s his or her individual needs.

19

17

6. Retain jurisdiction over this matter until implementation

of this Court's decree has been completed.

7. Award to plaintiffs reasonable attorneys' fees and costs

22 of this action, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1988 and 29 U.S.C.

23 §794a(2)(6).

24

//

25

//

26

//

36

1

8. Award such other and further relief as this Court may

2 deem necessary.

3 DATED: July 22, 1983.

4

Respectfully submitted,

5

6

0ULtrC-

CAROLE B.

7

MARK I. SC

JAMES BELL

8

ELIZABETH JAMESON

YOUTH LAW CENTER

9

1663 Mission Street, 5th Floor

San Francisco, CA 94103

10

(415) 543-3379

11

ALBERT J. HADEED

SOUTHERN LEGAL COUNSEL, INC.

12

Suite A, 115 NE 7th Avenue

Gainesville, Florida 32601

13

(904) 377-8288

14

CLAUDIA WRIGHT

15

SHAWN MOORE

NATIONAL PRISON PROJECT OF THE

16

AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION

FOUNDATION

17

1346 Connecticut Avenue, NW

Suite 1031

18

Washington, D.C. 20036

19

(202) 331-0500

Attorneys for Plaintiffs 20

21

22

23

24

25

26

37

1

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

2

3

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the

4 foregoing AMENDED COMPLAINT has been furnished by United States

5 Mail to ALICIA S. JACOBS, Esquire, and JUDITH CURTIN, Esquire,

6 Attorneys for the Department of Health and Rehabilitative

7 Services, 1323 Winewood Boulevard, Building One, Suite 406,

8 Tallahassee, Florida 32301; JUDITH A. BRECHNER, Esquire and

9 HERBERT D. SIKES, Esquire, State of Florida Board of Education,

10 Knott Building, Tallahassee, Florida 32301; JIM SMITH, Esquire,

11 SHIRLEY A. WALKER, Esquire and CHARLES H. MARTIN, Esquire,

12 Department of Legal Affairs, Suite 1501 - The Capitol,

13 Tallahassee, Florida 32301, this 22nd day of July, 1983.

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

TW

 </s> CM/ECF - U.S. District Court:flnd - Docket Report

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CLERK_2
U.S. District Court Northern District of Florida - District Version 2.5 (Tallahassee)
CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 4:83-cv-07003-MP

M, et al v. CHILES, et al Assigned to: Judge MAURICE M PAUL Demand: $0 Cause: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act
Plaintiff
BOBBY M

Date Filed: 01/05/1983 Jury Demand: None Nature of Suit: 440 Civil Rights: Other Jurisdiction: Federal Question
represented by ALBERT JOHN HADEED COUNTY ATTORNEY FLAGLER COUNTY 1200 E MOODY BLVD STE 11 BUNNELL, FL 32110 352/437-7483 Fax: 437-8292 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
ALEXA FREEMAN NATIONAL PRISON PROJECT 1875 CONNECTICUT AVENUE NW SUITE 410 WASHINGTON, DC 20004-5725 TERMINATED: 09/01/1994 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
ALICE K NELSON SOUTHERN LEGAL COUNSEL INC - GAINESVILLE FL 1229 NW 12TH AVE GAINESVILLE, FL 32601-4113 352/271-8890 Fax: 271-8347 Email: alice.nelson@southernlegal.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
CAROLE SHAUFFER YOUTH LAW CENTER - SAN FRANCISCO CA 114 SANSOME ST STE 950 SAN FRANCISCO, CA 94104

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Plaintiff CHARLES W

415/543-3379 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
JODI LYNN SIEGEL SOUTHERN LEGAL COUNSEL INC - GAINESVILLE FL 1229 NW 12TH AVE GAINESVILLE, FL 32601-4113 352/271-8890 Fax: 352/271-8347 Email: jodi.siegel@southernlegal.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
LAURENE HEYBACH LEGAL ASSISTANT FOUNDATION 343 S DEARBORN RM 815 CHICAGO, IL 60604 312/341-1070 Fax: 341-1041 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
MICHAEL J DALE NOVA UNIVERSITY LAW CENTER 3100 SW 9TH AVE FORT LAUDERDALE, FL 33315 954/452-6100 Fax: 452-6227 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by ALBERT JOHN HADEED (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
ALEXA FREEMAN (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/01/1994 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
ALICE K NELSON (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

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Plaintiff SUSAN S

CAROLE SHAUFFER (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
JODI LYNN SIEGEL (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
LAURENE HEYBACH (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
MICHAEL J DALE (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by ALBERT JOHN HADEED (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
ALEXA FREEMAN (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/01/1994 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
ALICE K NELSON (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
CAROLE SHAUFFER (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
JODI LYNN SIEGEL (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
LAURENE HEYBACH (See above for address)

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Plaintiff SALVADORE S

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
MICHAEL J DALE (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by ALBERT JOHN HADEED (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
ALICE K NELSON (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
CAROLE SHAUFFER (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
JODI LYNN SIEGEL (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
JOSEPH M FREEMAN ELARBEE THOMPSON & TRAPNELL 229 PEACHTREE ST NE STE 800 INTERNATIONAL TOWER ATLANTA, GA 30303-1614 404/659-6700 Fax: 222-9718 TERMINATED: 03/28/1994 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
LAURENE HEYBACH (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
MICHAEL J DALE (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

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Plaintiff DAVID MACK
V. Defendant LAWTON CHILES

represented by ALBERT JOHN HADEED (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
ALEXA FREEMAN (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/01/1994 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
ALICE K NELSON (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
CAROLE SHAUFFER (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
JODI LYNN SIEGEL (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
LAURENE HEYBACH (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
MICHAEL J DALE (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by CHARLES ALAN FINKEL ATTORNEY GENERAL STATE OF FL - TALLAHASSEE FL STATE OF FLORIDA PL 01 THE CAPITOL TALLAHASSEE, FL 32399-1050 850/414-3300 Fax: 488-4872 LEAD ATTORNEY

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ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
CHARLES SIMON RUBERG FLORIDA BOARD OF EDUCATION - TALLAHASSEE FL STATE OF FLORIDA THE CAPITOL STE 1701 TALLAHASSEE, FL 32301-0400 850/488-7707 Fax: 921-5776 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
CHESTERFIELD SMITH, JR ATTORNEY GENERAL STATE OF FL - TALLAHASSEE FL STATE OF FLORIDA PL 01 THE CAPITOL TALLAHASSEE, FL 32399-1050 850/414-3300 Fax: 488-4872 TERMINATED: 08/31/1998 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
JANET EVE FERRIS DEPT OF JUVENILE JUSTICE STATE OF FLORIDA 2737 CENTERVIEW DR TALLAHASSEE, FL 32399-3100 850/921-4129 Fax: 921-4159 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
PAUL DEMURO PAUL DEMURO PA 82 ESSEX AVENUE MONTICLAIR, NJ 07042 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
WILLIAM EUGENE GANDY, JR ATTORNEY GENERAL - PL-01 TALLAHASSEE FL STATE OF FLORIDA 400 S MONROE ST PL-01 THE CAPITOL TALLAHASSEE, FL 32399-1050

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Defendant BETTY CASTOR Commissioner of Department of Education
Defendant WILLIAM SCHOSSLER

850-414-3300 Fax: 850-488-4872 Email: Eugene_Gandy@oag.state.fl.us TERMINATED: 02/26/1997 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
KIMBERLY JEANENE TUCKER ATTORNEY GENERAL STATE OF FL - TALLAHASSEE FL STATE OF FLORIDA PL 01 THE CAPITOL TALLAHASSEE, FL 32399-1050 850/414-3300 Fax: 488-4872 TERMINATED: 12/08/1994 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by CHARLES ALAN FINKEL (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
CHARLES SIMON RUBERG (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
E JASON VAIL ATTORNEY GENERAL STATE OF FL - TALLAHASSEE FL STATE OF FLORIDA PL 01 THE CAPITOL TALLAHASSEE, FL 32399-1050 850/414-3300 Fax: 488-4872 Email: jay_vail@oag.state.fl.us TERMINATED: 08/31/1998 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
WILLIAM EUGENE GANDY, JR (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by CHARLES ALAN FINKEL (See above for address)

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Defendant WESLEY BRAZELL
Defendant JAMES TOWEY Secretary of Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
CHARLES SIMON RUBERG (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
E JASON VAIL (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/31/1998 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
WILLIAM EUGENE GANDY, JR (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by CHARLES ALAN FINKEL (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
CHARLES SIMON RUBERG (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
E JASON VAIL (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/31/1998 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
WILLIAM EUGENE GANDY, JR (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by E JASON VAIL (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/31/1998 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
HOWARD M TALENFELD COLODNY FASS & TALENFELD -

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Defendant
ROY MCKAY Superintendant of Arthur G. Dozier School for Boys

FORT LAUDERDALE FL 2000 W COMMERCIAL BLVD STE 232 FORT LAUDERDALE, FL 33309 954/492-4010 Fax: 492-1144 TERMINATED: 01/01/1994 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
WILLIAM EUGENE GANDY, JR (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by CHARLES ALAN FINKEL (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
CHARLES SIMON RUBERG (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
E JASON VAIL (See above for address) TERMINATED: 08/31/1998 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
WILLIAM EUGENE GANDY, JR (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 07/02/1987
01/05/1993 12/27/1993

#

Docket Text

Case closed. Upon review of case with Judge Paul it was determined that the case should be closed for statistical purposes as of the entry of the consent decree on 7/2/87 (doc. 273 on manual docket). Subsequent activity is then considered post judgment. (tdg,Pensacola) (Entered: 08/11/1995)

440 Minute entry: Oral Argument . [ Court Reporter: Judy Ellan] (former employee) (Entered: 01/06/1994)

document 1-431 on hard copy of docket sheet (former employee) (Entered: 12/29/1993)

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12/27/1993 12/27/1993 12/29/1993 01/04/1994
01/04/1994 01/04/1994 01/05/1994
01/05/1994
01/05/1994 01/05/1994
01/10/1994

432 NOTICE of Appearance by Jason Vail (former employee) (Entered: 12/29/1993)
433 NOTICE of prior responsibilities on January 5, 1994 by Paul DeMuro (former employee) (Entered: 12/29/1993)
File Returned to Court. (former employee) (Entered: 12/29/1993)
434 RESPONSE by defendant LAWTON CHILES, defendant BETTY CASTOR, defendant WILLIAM SCHOSSLER, defendant WESLEY BRAZELL, defendant JAMES TOWEY, defendant ROY MCKAY re: motion to vacate portions of 1987 decree and subsequent orders . Response referred . (former employee) (Entered: 01/04/1994)
435 AFFIDAVIT of Lou Merritt (former employee) (Entered: 01/04/1994)
438 ORDER granting [432-1] appear/appearance notice ( signed by Judge Maurice M. Paul ) (Copies mailed as noted on document: ) (former employee) (Entered: 01/06/1994)
436 CORRECTED RESPONSE TO PLAINITFFS' REPLY TO MOTION TO VACATE THE CONSENT DECREE by defendant LAWTON CHILES, defendant BETTY CASTOR, defendant WILLIAM SCHOSSLER, defendant WESLEY BRAZELL, defendant JAMES TOWEY, defendant ROY MCKAY re: . Response referred to Judge Maurice M. Paul . (former employee) (Entered: 01/05/1994)
437 MOTION TO FILE A RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S REPLY TO MOTION TO VACATE THE CONSENT DECREE by defendant LAWTON CHILES, defendant BETTY CASTOR, defendant WILLIAM SCHOSSLER, defendant WESLEY BRAZELL, defendant JAMES TOWEY, defendant ROY MCKAY . (former employee) (Entered: 01/05/1994)
439 ORDER oral hearing held on January 5, 1994. Parties are to resolve as many of their differences as possible by January 20 attorney conference scheduled for 1:00 pm. ( signed by Judge Maurice M. Paul ) (Copies mailed as noted on document: ) (former employee) (Entered: 01/06/1994)
441 MOTION by defendant LAWTON CHILES, defendant BETTY CASTOR, defendant WILLIAM SCHOSSLER, defendant WESLEY BRAZELL, defendant JAMES TOWEY, defendant ROY MCKAY to withdraw response to monitor's quarterly report . (former employee) (Entered: 01/06/1994)
442 NOTICE of LOCAL RULE 6(B), CERTIFICATION ON DEFTS MOTION TO FILE A RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS REPLY TO MOTION TO VACATE THE CONSENT DECREE OF JULY 1987 AND THE STIPULATED SETTLEMENT ON MONITORS NONCOMPLIANCE FINDING RELATED TO CONTINUM OF CARE AND SERVICES AND APPROVING CONTINUUM PLAN AND EXIT CRITERIA OF APRIL 1992. by defendant ROY MCKAY, defendant WESLEY BRAZELL, defendant WILLIAM SCHOSSLER,

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01/18/1994 01/19/1994 01/19/1994 01/25/1994 01/25/1994 01/28/1994 02/03/1994
02/07/1994 02/10/1994
02/10/1994 02/28/1994
03/02/1994
03/04/1994

defendant BETTY CASTOR, defendant JAMES TOWEY, defendant LAWTON CHILES (former employee) (Entered: 01/11/1994)
443 AFFIDAVIT of Richard L. Rachin (former employee) (Entered: 01/19/1994)
444 TRANSCRIPT filed RE: January 5, 1994 hearing (former employee) (Entered: 01/19/1994)
445 LETTER TO JUDGE PAUL IS CONSIDERED AS NOTICE of MONITORING REPORT (former employee) (Entered: 01/21/1994)
446 NOTICE TO CHANGE ADDRESS of Kimberly Tucker (former employee) (Entered: 01/27/1994)
447 NOTICE TO CHANGE ADDRESS Jason Vail (former employee) (Entered: 01/27/1994)
File Returned to Court. (former employee) (Entered: 01/28/1994)
448 NOTICE of SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITY by defendant ROY MCKAY, defendant WESLEY BRAZELL, defendant WILLIAM SCHOSSLER, defendant BETTY CASTOR, defendant JAMES TOWEY, defendant LAWTON CHILES (former employee) (Entered: 02/07/1994)
449 letter from Michael D. Cohen to Judge Paul (former employee) (Entered: 02/09/1994)
450 ORDER -1987 consent decree and the 1992 stipulated settlement will be enforced only to the extent necessary to rectify constitutional problems existing at the training schools, status conference set for March 4, 1994 at 10:00 am. ( signed by Judge Maurice M. Paul ) (Copies mailed as noted on document: ) (former employee) (Entered: 02/10/1994)
450 ORDER, set Status Conference for 10:00 3/4/94 ( signed by Judge Maurice M. Paul ) (Copies mailed as noted on document: ) (former employee) (Entered: 02/10/1994)
451 RESPONSE by defendant ROY MCKAY, defendant WESLEY BRAZELL, defendant WILLIAM SCHOSSLER, defendant BETTY CASTOR, defendant JAMES TOWEY, defendant LAWTON CHILES re: [450-1] order set Status Conference for 10:00 3/4/94 . Response referred to Judge Maurice M. Paul . (als,Tallahassee) (Entered: 03/01/1994)
452 RESPONSE by plaintiff DAVID MACK, plaintiff SALVADORE S, plaintiff SUSAN S, plaintiff CHARLES W, plaintiff BOBBY M re: [4501] order set Status Conference for 10:00 3/4/94 . (former employee) (Entered: 03/02/1994)
453 Minute entry: Status Conference - 2 weeks to submit formulation, either agreed or separate, on exit from Decree. Court to schedule evidentiary hearing IF necessary. . [ Court Reporter: Christine Bordenave]

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03/04/1994
03/07/1994 03/15/1994 03/17/1994
03/18/1994
03/22/1994 03/25/1994 03/28/1994 04/07/1994 04/20/1994 04/22/1994 04/22/1994

(als,Tallahassee) (Entered: 03/04/1994)
454 ORDER.....Status conference held on 3/4/94. Parties to confer w/each other to develop plan to dissolve consent decree...such plant shall be submitted to Court no later than 3/18/94... ( signed by Judge Maurice M. Paul ) (Copies mailed as noted on document: ) (als,Tallahassee) (Entered: 03/07/1994)
Deadline updated; to Return File to Court by 3/21/94 to MMP per order dtd. 3/4/94 (als,Tallahassee) (Entered: 03/07/1994)
455 NOTICE of change of addres of Southern Legal Counsel, counsel for plantiffs. Ref Andrea (als,Tallahassee) (Entered: 03/18/1994)
456 MOTION by defendant ROY MCKAY, defendant WESLEY BRAZELL, defendant WILLIAM SCHOSSLER, defendant BETTY CASTOR, defendant JAMES TOWEY, defendant LAWTON CHILES, plaintiff DAVID MACK, plaintiff SALVADORE S, plaintiff SUSAN S, plaintiff CHARLES W, plaintiff BOBBY M to Extend Time - for filing joint closure plant - until 6/1/94 . (als,Tallahassee) (Entered: 03/21/1994)
457 RESPONSE by defendant ROY MCKAY, defendant WESLEY BRAZELL, defendant WILLIAM SCHOSSLER, defendant BETTY CASTOR, defendant JAMES TOWEY, defendant LAWTON CHILES re: [454-1] order . Response referred to Judge Maurice M. Paul . (als,Tallahassee) (Entered: 03/22/1994)
458 RESPONSE by plaintiff DAVID MACK, plaintiff SALVADORE S, plaintiff SUSAN S, plaintiff CHARLES W, plaintiff BOBBY M re: Deft's case closure plan . Response referred to Judge Maurice M. Paul . (former employee) (Entered: 03/24/1994)
459 ORDER granting [456-1] motion to Extend Time - time is extended until June 1, 1994. ( signed by Judge Maurice M. Paul ) (Copies mailed as noted on document: ) (former employee) (Entered: 03/28/1994)
460 letter from Joseph Freeman's office to terminate him as attorney in this case (former employee) (Entered: 03/28/1994)
461 letter from Lou Merritt (mbs,Tallahassee) (Entered: 04/12/1994)
462 NOTICE of filing trainign school waiver by defendant ROY MCKAY, defendant WESLEY BRAZELL, defendant WILLIAM SCHOSSLER, defendant BETTY CASTOR, defendant JAMES TOWEY, defendant LAWTON CHILES (former employee) (Entered: 04/22/1994)
Status Conference re-set at 11:30 6/29/94 (Copies mailed as indicated on document.) previously set for 6/24/94 in G'ville. (als,Tallahassee) (Entered: 04/26/1994)
463 NOTICE of Hearing:, re setting Status Conference for 11:30 6/29/94 (Copies mailed as noted on document: ) (als,Tallahassee) (Entered: 04/26/1994)

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05/03/1994 05/12/1994 05/26/1994 06/01/1994 06/01/1994 06/07/1994 06/13/1994 06/29/1994 06/30/1994 06/30/1994
07/01/1994 07/06/1994 07/08/1994

464 REQUEST for Admissions by defendant ROY MCKAY, defendant WESLEY BRAZELL, defendant WILLIAM SCHOSSLER, defendant BETTY CASTOR, defendant JAMES TOWEY, defendant LAWTON CHILES (former employee) (Entered: 05/09/1994)
465 QUARTERLY STATUS REPORT.....for period 11/1/93 through 1/31/94 (als,Tallahassee) (Entered: 05/17/1994)
466 NOTICE of CASE CLOSURE PLAN by defendant ROY MCKAY, defendant WESLEY BRAZELL, defendant WILLIAM SCHOSSLER, defendant BETTY CASTOR, defendant JAMES TOWEY, defendant LAWTON CHILES (former employee) (Entered: 05/26/1994)
467 NOTICE - Case Closure plan plaintiff DAVID MACK, plaintiff SALVADORE S, plaintiff SUSAN S, plaintiff CHARLES W, plaintiff BOBBY M (former employee) (Entered: 06/02/1994)
468 NOTICE of filing monitors report by plaintiff DAVID MACK, plaintiff SALVADORE S, plaintiff SUSAN S, plaintiff CHARLES W, plaintiff BOBBY M (in separate folder) (former employee) (Entered: 06/02/1994)
469 RESPONSE by plaintiff DAVID MACK, plaintiff SALVADORE S, plaintiff SUSAN S, plaintiff CHARLES W, plaintiff BOBBY M re: [4641] admission requested by defendantsssss . Response referred to Judge Maurice M. Paul . (bss,Tallahassee) (Entered: 06/07/1994)
470 letter from Carole B. Shauffer, attorney for plaintiffs (former employee) (Entered: 06/13/1994)
471 Minute entry: status conference, order to follow . [ Court Reporter: none] (former employee) (Entered: 06/29/1994)
472 letter from Michael D. Cohen to Kimberly Tucker, General Counsel HRA requesting payment of delinquent attorney services. (former employee) (Entered: 07/01/1994)
474 NOTICE of waiver of training school waiver by defendant ROY MCKAY, defendant WESLEY BRAZELL, defendant WILLIAM SCHOSSLER, defendant BETTY CASTOR, defendant JAMES TOWEY, defendant LAWTON CHILES (former employee) (Entered: 07/06/1994)
473 ORDER deft. shall file a motion to compel admissions by July 11, 1994, and pla. shall respond by August 1, 1994. ( signed by Judge Maurice M. Paul ) (Copies mailed as noted on document: ) (former employee) (Entered: 07/05/1994)
475 MOTION by defendant ROY MCKAY, defendant WESLEY BRAZELL, defendant WILLIAM SCHOSSLER, defendant BETTY CASTOR, defendant JAMES TOWEY, defendant LAWTON CHILES to Compel . (former employee) (Entered: 07/08/1994)
Deadline updated; Response to Motion reset to 7/18/94 for [475-1] motion to Compel (former employee) (Entered: 07/08/1994)

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07/29/1994 08/01/1994 08/08/1994 08/09/1994 08/10/1994 08/17/1994 08/17/1994 08/26/1994
10/04/1994 10/04/1994
10/04/1994 10/11/1994

File Returned to Court with motion to compel. (former employee) (Entered: 07/29/1994)
476 RESPONSE by plaintiffs DAVID MACK, SALVADORE S, SUSAN S, CHARLES W, plaintiff BOBBY M to [475-1] motion to Compel by defendants. (bkp,Gainesville) (Entered: 08/01/1994)
477 REPLY by defendants ROY MCKAY, WESLEY BRAZELL, WILLIAM SCHOSSLER, BETTY CASTOR, JAMES TOWEY and LAWTON CHILES to response to [475-1] motion to Compel by defendants (former employee) (Entered: 08/09/1994)
CASE NO LONGER REFERRED TO Magistrate Judge William C. Sherrill Jr. (former employee) (Entered: 08/09/1994)
478 NOTICE of SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITY by plaintiff DAVID MACK, plaintiff SALVADORE S, plaintiff SUSAN S, plaintiff CHARLES W, plaintiff BOBBY M (former employee) (Entered: 08/10/1994)
479 MOTION by plaintiffs DAVID MACK, SALVADORE S, SUSAN S, CHARLES W, BOBBY M to Strike exhibit attached [477-1] to motion reply by defendants; regarding motion to compel . (bkp,Gainesville) (Entered: 08/17/1994)
Deadline updated; Response to Motion reset to 8/30/94 for [479-1] motion to Strike exhibit attached [477-1] to motion reply by defendants; regarding motion to compel (bkp,Gainesville) (Entered: 08/17/1994)
480 RESPONSE by defendants ROY MCKAY, WESLEY BRAZELL, WILLIAM SCHOSSLER, BETTY CASTOR, JAMES TOWEY, LAWTON CHILES to [479-1] motion to Strike exhibit attached [477-1] to motion reply defendants; regarding motion to compel by BOBBY M, CHARLES W, SUSAN S, SALVADORE S, DAVID MACK. (bkp,Gainesville) (Entered: 08/26/1994)
481 MOTION by defendants ROY MCKAY, WESLEY BRAZELL, WILLIAM SCHOSSLER, BETTY CASTOR, JAMES TOWEY, LAWTON CHILES to modify consent decree and stipulation concerning population caps . (bkp,Gainesville) (Entered: 10/04/1994)
482 MOTION by defendants ROY MCKAY, WESLEY BRAZELL, WILLIAM SCHOSSLER, BETTY CASTOR, JAMES TOWEY, LAWTON CHILES to expedite consideration of defendants' motion to modify consent decree and stipulation concerning population caps and RQUEST for oral argument . (bkp,Gainesville) (Entered: 10/04/1994)
483 Exhibits to motion to modify consent decree and stipulation concerning population caps. (bkp,Gainesville) (Entered: 10/04/1994)
484 NOTICE of by defendant ROY MCKAY, defendant WESLEY BRAZELL, defendant WILLIAM SCHOSSLER, defendant BETTY CASTOR, defendant JAMES TOWEY, defendant LAWTON CHILES of Supplemental Authority in support of motion to modity consent decree

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10/17/1994 10/19/1994 10/31/1994
11/09/1994 11/15/1994 11/17/1994 11/21/1994 11/21/1994 11/30/1994 11/30/1994 11/30/1994

and stip. of March, 1993. (former employee) (Entered: 10/12/1994)
485 MOTION by plaintiffs DAVID MACK, SALVADORE S, SUSAN S, CHARLES W, BOBBY M to Extend Time to file a reply to defendants' motion to modify consent decree and stipulation concerning population caps and plaintiffs' reply to defendants' motion to expedite consideration . (bkp,Gainesville) (Entered: 10/19/1994)
Motion submission: [485-1] motion to Extend Time to file a reply to defendants' motion to modify consent decree and stipulation concerning population caps and plaintiffs' reply to defendants' motion to expedite consideration submitted to Judge Maurice M. Paul (bkp,Gainesville) (Entered: 10/19/1994)
486 RESPONSE by defendants ROY MCKAY, WESLEY BRAZELL, WILLIAM SCHOSSLER, BETTY CASTOR, JAMES TOWEY, LAWTON CHILES to [485-1] motion to Extend Time to file a reply to defendants' motion to modify consent decree and stipulation concerning population caps and plaintiffs' reply to defendants' motion to expedite consideration by BOBBY M, CHARLES W, SUSAN S, SALVADORE S, DAVID MACK . (bkp,Gainesville) (Entered: 11/01/1994)
487 MOTION by plaintiffs DAVID MACK, SALVADORE S, SUSAN S, CHARLES W, BOBBY M for Leave to File reply to response to motion for enlargement of time. (bkp,Gainesville) (Entered: 11/10/1994)
488 MOTION by counsel Albert J. Hadeed for the plaintiffs DAVID MACK, SALVADORE S, SUSAN S, CHARLES W, BOBBY M to Withdraw . (bkp,Gainesville) (Entered: 11/16/1994)
Motion submission: [488-1] motion to Withdraw submitted to Judge Maurice M. Paul (bkp,Gainesville) (Entered: 11/17/1994)
489 ORDER granting [487-1] motion for Leave to File reply to response to motion for enlargement of time. ( signed by Judge Maurice M. Paul ) (Copies mailed as noted on document: ) (knr,Gainesville) (Entered: 11/22/1994)
490 ORDER granting [488-1] motion by Albert J. Hadeed to Withdraw as cocounsel ( signed by Judge Maurice M. Paul ) (Copies mailed as noted on document: ) (knr,Gainesville) (Entered: 11/22/1994)
491 NOTICE by defendants ROY MCKAY, WESLEY BRAZELL, WILLIAM SCHOSSLER, BETTY CASTOR, JAMES TOWEY, LAWTON CHILES to the court on status of discovery. (bkp,Gainesville) (Entered: 11/30/1994)
491 MOTION by defendants ROY MCKAY, WESLEY BRAZELL, WILLIAM SCHOSSLER, BETTY CASTOR, JAMES TOWEY, LAWTON CHILES to Extend Time to respond to dft. motion for modification , and for authorization for tour by monitors. (bkp,Gainesville) (Entered: 11/30/1994)
492 Mail returned (time for forwarding has expired) to Howard M. Talenfeld,

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11/30/1994 12/05/1994 12/08/1994
12/13/1994 12/13/1994 12/19/1994 12/20/1994 12/22/1994 12/27/1994 12/29/1994 12/29/1994 01/10/1995

Esquire. (knr,Gainesville) (Entered: 12/05/1994)
493 Mail returned (time expired for forwarding) to Howard M. Talenfeld, Esquire (knr,Gainesville) (Entered: 12/05/1994)
494 MOTION by defendant LAWTON CHILES to Substitute Attorney Janet Ferris in place and stead of Kimberly J. Tucker. and request for copies of all papers and pleadings filed in case. (bkp,Gainesville) (Entered: 12/06/1994)
495 ORDER granting [494-1] motion to Substitute Attorney Janet Ferris in place and stead of Kimberly J. Tucker. and request for copies of all papers and pleadings filed in case. terminated attorney Kimberly J. Tucker for LAWTON CHILES Added ( signed by Judge Maurice M. Paul ) (Copies mailed as noted on document: ) (bkp,Gainesville) (Entered: 12/09/1994)
496 NOTICE of Hearing: Oral argument on renewed motion for enlargement of time, motion for autorization for tour by monitors and status of discovery. (Copies mailed as noted on document: ) (tdg,Pensacola) (Entered: 12/13/1994)
497 RESPONSE by defendant LAWTON CHILES to [491-2] motion for authorization for tour by monitors. by defendantsssss . (bkp,Gainesville) (Entered: 12/14/1994)
498 ORDER, doc 495, returned undeliverable to Howard Telenfeld. (bkp,Gainesville) (Entered: 12/19/1994)
499 Letter, dtd 12/16/94, by Alice K. Nelson confirming notification to all parties of change of hearing 12/22/94 to 1:00pm and oral approval of the court. (bkp,Gainesville) (Entered: 12/20/1994)
500 Minute entry: oral argument on renewed motion for enlargement of time and motion for authorization for tour by monitors and status of discovery. Written order to follow. [ Court Reporter: Christine Bordenave] (tdg,Pensacola) (Entered: 12/22/1994)
501 Notice returned undeliverable as to attorney H. Talenfeld (bkp,Gainesville) (Entered: 12/28/1994)
502 AMENDMENT TO THE MOTION by defendants ROY MCKAY, WESLEY BRAZELL, WILLIAM SCHOSSLER, BETTY CASTOR, JAMES TOWEY,LAWTON CHILES to modify training scholl population caps. (bkp,Gainesville) (Entered: 12/29/1994)
Deadline updated; Response to Motion reset to 1/18/95 for [502-1] motion to modify training scholl population caps. (bkp,Gainesville) (Entered: 12/29/1994)
503 UNOPPOSED MOTION by plaintiffs DAVID MACK, SALVADORE S, SUSAN S, CHARLES W, BOBBY M to Extend Time to file a reply to dft. amendment to motion to modify training school population caps . (bkp,Gainesville) (Entered: 01/10/1995)

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01/11/1995 01/13/1995 01/13/1995 01/13/1995
01/18/1995 01/19/1995 01/25/1995 01/27/1995 01/27/1995 02/01/1995 02/06/1995

Motion submission: [503-1] motion to Extend Time to file a reply to dft. amendment to motion to modify training school population caps submitted to Judge Maurice M. Paul (bkp,Gainesville) (Entered: 01/11/1995)
504 ORDER granting [503-1] motion to Extend Time to file a reply to dft. amendment to motion to modify training school population caps ( signed by Judge Maurice M. Paul ) (Copies mailed as noted on document: ) (bkp,Gainesville) (Entered: 01/13/1995)
Deadline updated; Response to Motion reset to 1/31/95 for [482-1] motion to expedite consideration of defendants' motion to modify consent decree and stipulation concerning population caps and RQUEST for oral argument (bkp,Gainesville) (Entered: 01/13/1995)
505 Second MOTION by defendant ROY MCKAY, defendant WESLEY BRAZELL, defendant WILLIAM SCHOSSLER, defendant BETTY CASTOR, defendant JAMES TOWEY, defendant LAWTON CHILES to Expedite consideration of defendants motion to modify the consent decree and stipulation on miscellaneous matters . (vjr,Tallahassee) (Entered: 01/18/1995)
Deadline updated; Response to Motion reset to 1/31/95 for [505-1] motion to Expedite consideration of defendants motion to modify the consent decree and stipulation on miscellaneous matters (vjr,Tallahassee) (Entered: 01/18/1995)
506 ORDER granting [475-1] motion to Compel, granting [491-2] motion for authorization for tour by monitors. ( signed by Judge Maurice M. Paul ) (Copies mailed as noted on document: ) (bkp,Gainesville) (Entered: 01/19/1995)
507 Order, dtd 1/13/95, returned undeliverable as to attorney Howard Talenfeld (bkp,Gainesville) (Entered: 01/26/1995)
508 RESPONSE by plaintiffs DAVID MACK, SALVADORE S, SUSAN S, CHARLES W, BOBBY M to [505-1] motion to Expedite consideration of defendants motion to modify the consent decree and stipulation on miscellaneous matters by defendants. (bkp,Gainesville) (Entered: 01/27/1995)
Motion submission: [505-1] motion to Expedite consideration of defendants motion to modify the consent decree and stipulation on miscellaneous matters submitted to Judge Maurice M. Paul (bkp,Gainesville) (Entered: 01/27/1995)
509 MEMORANDUM by plaintiffs DAVID MACK, SALVADORE S, SUSAN S, CHARLES W, BOBBY M in opposition to [502-1] motion to modify training scholl population caps. by defendants. (bkp,Gainesville) (Entered: 02/02/1995)
516 Letter, dtd 2/1/95, by Roy C. McKay regarding visit of Dozier School and Eckerd Youth Development Center. (bkp,Gainesville) (Entered:

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02/08/1995 02/10/1995 02/10/1995 02/13/1995 02/17/1995 02/17/1995 02/24/1995
02/24/1995
02/24/1995
02/24/1995 02/27/1995

02/27/1995)
510 MOTION by defendants ROY MCKAY, WESLEY BRAZELL, WILLIAM SCHOSSLER, BETTY CASTOR, JAMES TOWEY, LAWTON CHILES for Protective Order . (bkp,Gainesville) (Entered: 02/09/1995)
Motion submission: [510-1] motion for Protective Order submitted to Judge Maurice M. Paul (bkp,Gainesville) (Entered: 02/10/1995)
511 AMENDED MOTION by defendants ROY MCKAY, WESLEY BRAZELL, WILLIAM SCHOSSLER, BETTY CASTOR, JAMES TOWEY, LAWTON CHILES for Protective Order . (bkp,Gainesville) (Entered: 02/10/1995)
512 NOTICE by plaintiffs DAVID MACK, SALVADORE S, SUSAN S, CHARLES W, BOBBY M of supplemental authority for pla. opposition memo to dft. amendment to motion to modify population caps. (bkp,Gainesville) (Entered: 02/14/1995)
Motion hearing re: [502-1] motion to modify training scholl population caps. by defendantsssss set at 9:30 3/3/95 (Copies mailed as indicated on document.) (tdg,Pensacola) (Entered: 02/20/1995)
513 NOTICE of hearing on motion to modify consent decree set for March 3, at 9:30 am in Tallahassee. (tdg,Pensacola) (Entered: 02/20/1995)
514 MOTION by defendants ROY MCKAY, WESLEY BRAZELL, WILLIAM SCHOSSLER, BETTY CASTOR, JAMES TOWEY, LAWTON CHILES to for a continuance of oral arguments regarding motion to modify consent decree, scheduled for 3/3/95. . (bkp,Gainesville) (Entered: 02/24/1995)
515 MOTION by plaintiffs DAVID MACK, SALVADORE S, SUSAN S, CHARLES W, BOBBY M for continuance (rescheduling) of oral argument hearing , to Extend Time to respond to dft. motion to modify , and notice regarding status of discovery . (bkp,Gainesville) (Entered: 02/24/1995)
Motion submission: [515-1] motion for continuance (rescheduling) of oral argument hearing submitted, [515-2] motion to Extend Time to respond to dft. motion to modify submitted, [515-3] motion notice regarding status of discovery submitted to Judge Maurice M. Paul (bkp,Gainesville) (Entered: 02/24/1995)
517 Letter, dtd 2/13/95, by J. Thomas Mullen regarding visit at Eckerd. (bkp,Gainesville) (Entered: 02/27/1995)
518 ORDER granting [515-1] motion for continuance (rescheduling) oral arguments [514-1] motion to for a continuance of oral arguments regarding motion to modify consent decree, scheduled for 3/3/95. ( signed by Judge Maurice M. Paul ) (Copies mailed as noted on document: ) (bkp,Gainesville) (Entered: 02/27/1995)

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02/28/1995 02/28/1995 03/01/1995
03/02/1995 03/02/1995
03/10/1995 03/10/1995 03/10/1995 03/13/1995 03/13/1995 03/21/1995 03/27/1995

519 RESPONSE by plaintiff DAVID MACK, plaintiff SALVADORE S, plaintiff SUSAN S, plaintiff CHARLES W, plaintiff BOBBY M to [5111] motion for Protective Order by defendants, [510-1] motion for Protective Order by defendants. (bkp,Gainesville) (Entered: 03/01/1995)
520 NOTICE by plaintiffs DAVID MACK, SALVADORE S, SUSAN S, CHARLES W, BOBBY M to take deposition of Susan Bisbee on 1/12/95; Richard Kline on 1/11/95; Rex Uberman on 1/13/95 at various at Tallahassee. (bkp,Gainesville) (Entered: 03/01/1995)
521 NOTICE by defendants ROY MCKAY, WESLEY BRAZELL, WILLIAM SCHOSSLER, BETTY CASTOR, JAMES TOWEY, LAWTON CHILES to the Court indicating attorney Jason Vail is able to attend the 3/3/95 motion hearing. (bkp,Gainesville) (Entered: 03/01/1995)
Motion submission: [511-1] motion for Protective Order submitted to Judge Maurice M. Paul, only R&R and response, file previously referred. (bkp,Gainesville) (Entered: 03/02/1995)
522 NOTICE of Hearing:, Motion Hearing set for 10:00 3/20/95 for [482-1] motion to expedite consideration of defendants' motion to modify consent decree and stipulation concerning population caps and RQUEST for oral argument, set for 10:00 3/20/95 for [481-1] motion to modify consent decree and stipulation concerning population caps (Copies mailed as noted on document: ) (former employee) (Entered: 03/06/1995)
523 MOTION by plaintiffs DAVID MACK, SALVADORE S, SUSAN S, CHARLES W, BOBBY M for clarification - regarding argument on the Crime Bill aspects , and to Continue hearing set for 3/20/95 . (former employee) (Entered: 03/10/1995)
Motion submission: [523-1] motion for clarification - regarding argument on the Crime Bill aspects submitted, [523-2] motion to Continue hearing set for 3/20/95 submitted to Judge Maurice M. Paul (former employee) (Entered: 03/10/1995)
524 ORDER granting [523-1] motion for clarification - regarding argument on the Crime Bill aspects, granting [523-2] motion to Continue hearing set for 3/20/95 ( signed by Judge Maurice M. Paul ) (Copies mailed as noted on document: ) (bkp,Gainesville) (Entered: 03/10/1995)
525 ORDER [511-1] motion for Protective Order, Set for oral argument hearing for 3/21/95 at 10:30am. ( signed by Judge Maurice M. Paul ) (Copies mailed as noted on ) (bkp,Gainesville) (Entered: 03/13/1995)
526 Notice modifying oral argument until 3/20/95 returned undeliverable as to Howard M. Talenfeld. (bkp,Gainesville) (Entered: 03/14/1995)
527 Minute entry: Oral argument on [511-1] motion for Protective Order. Motion under advisement. Written order to follow. [ Court Reporter: Ellan] (tdg,Pensacola) (Entered: 03/21/1995)
528 NOTICE by Monitor Michael D. Cohen, M.D. of filing monitor's report

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03/30/1995 03/31/1995 04/04/1995
04/19/1995 04/28/1995 05/08/1995
05/31/1995
06/01/1995 06/16/1995 06/16/1995
06/16/1995 06/16/1995 09/06/1995

by (name). (bkp,Gainesville) (Entered: 03/28/1995)
529 Monitoring Report (2 binders) by Ward Duel for Eckerd Yourth Development Center, Okeechobee and Arthur G. Dozier Training School, Marianna, FL. (bkp,Gainesville) (Entered: 03/30/1995)
530 Report to Chief Judge Paul by J. Thomas Mullen, Court Apponted Monitor (former employee) (Entered: 04/03/1995)
531 ORDER granting [511-1] motion for Protective Order. Pla. may depose Messrs. McKay and Luse if and when the Dept. develops such a plan ( signed by Judge Maurice M. Paul ) (Copies mailed as noted on document: ) (former employee) (Entered: 04/04/1995)
532 TRANSCRIPT filed RE: Motion for protective order for dates of 3/21/95 (bkp,Gainesville) (Entered: 04/21/1995)
533 NOTICE of filing Monitor's report by Michael A. Milan. (bkp,Gainesville) (Entered: 04/28/1995)
534 TRANSCRIPT filed RE: Oral argument on renewed motion for enlargement of time and motion for authorization for tour by monitors and status of discovery for dates of 12/22/94 (bkp,Gainesville) (Entered: 05/10/1995)
535 MOTION with Memorandum in Support by defendant ROY MCKAY, defendant WESLEY BRAZELL, defendant WILLIAM SCHOSSLER, defendant BETTY CASTOR, defendant JAMES TOWEY, defendant LAWTON CHILES to Terminate consent decree as to Dozier TRaining School, and for Dismissal with Prejudice . (former employee) (Entered: 06/01/1995)
Deadline updated; Response to Motion reset to 6/19/95 for [535-1] motion to Terminate consent decree (former employee) (Entered: 06/01/1995)
536 NOTICE of Vacation by Plaintiff's counsel (former employee) (Entered: 06/16/1995)
537 RESPONSE by plaintiff DAVID MACK, plaintiff SALVADORE S, plaintiff SUSAN S, plaintiff CHARLES W, plaintiff BOBBY M to [5351] motion to Terminate consent decree by defendants . (former employee) (Entered: 06/16/1995)
Motion submission: [535-1] motion to Terminate consent decree submitted to Judge Maurice M. Paul (former employee) (Entered: 06/16/1995)
File Returned to Court. (former employee) (Entered: 06/16/1995)
538 Notice of supplemental authority by defendant ROY MCKAY, defendant WESLEY BRAZELL, defendant WILLIAM SCHOSSLER, defendant BETTY CASTOR, defendant JAMES TOWEY, defendant LAWTON CHILES in support of [535-1] motion to Terminate consent decree by

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09/29/1995 10/16/1995 10/18/1995 10/30/1995
12/11/1995 03/29/1996
05/24/1996 06/07/1996 06/11/1996 06/11/1996 09/06/1996

defendantsssss . (knr,Gainesville) (Entered: 09/06/1995)
539 NOTICE of Hearing:, Motion Hearing set for 1:00 10/20/95 for [535-1] motion to Terminate consent decree (Copies mailed as noted on document: ) (tdg,Pensacola) (Entered: 09/29/1995)
540 NOTICE of Hearing:, Motion Hearing reset for 1:00 10/18/95 for [535-1] motion to Terminate consent decree (Copies mailed as noted on document: ) (tdg,Pensacola) (Entered: 10/16/1995)
541 Minute entry: oral argument on dft's motion to terminate consent decree. Dft moves to terminate the Dozier training school portion of the consent decree. Written order to follow. terminated deadlines . [ Court Reporter: Judy Ellan] (tdg,Pensacola) (Entered: 10/18/1995)
542 ORDER granting [535-1] motion to Terminate consent decree as to Dozier Tranining School and for Dismissal with prejudice; the consent decree remains in effect as it applies to the Eckerd Youth Development Center, mooting [482-1] motion to expedite consideration of defendants' motion to modify consent decree and stipulation concerning population caps and RQUEST for oral argument, mooting [485-1] motion to Extend Time to file a reply to defendants' motion to modify consent decree and stipulation concerning population caps and plaintiffs' reply to defendants' motion to expedite consideration, mooting [505-1] motion to Expedite consideration of defendants motion to modify the consent decree and stipulation on miscellaneous matters ( signed by Judge Maurice M. Paul ) (Copies mailed as noted on document: ) (knr,Gainesville) (Entered: 10/30/1995)
543 letter to MMP from Jason Vail, Assistant Attorney General (knr,Gainesville) (Entered: 12/11/1995)
544 ORDER denying [481-1] motion to modify consent decree and stipulation concerning population caps, denying [502-1] motion to modify training scholl population caps. ( signed by Judge Maurice M. Paul ) (Copies mailed as noted on document: ) (bkp,Gainesville) (Entered: 03/29/1996)
545 NOTICE of filing monitor's report by Michael A. Milan (knr,Gainesville) (Entered: 05/28/1996)
546 LETTER, dtd 6/7/96, by Robert B. Rutherford, Jr. re: monitoring report. (bkp,Gainesville) (Entered: 06/07/1996)
547 MOTION by defendants to terminate portions of the consent decree relating to ECKERD Youth Development Center (bkp,Gainesville) (Entered: 06/11/1996)
Deadline updated; to Return File to Court, re: doc 547, by 6/26/96 (bkp,Gainesville) (Entered: 06/11/1996)
548 MOTION by defendants ROY MCKAY, WESLEY BRAZELL, WILLIAM SCHOSSLER, BETTY CASTOR, JAMES TOWEY, LAWTON CHILES to terminate consent decree , notice of automatic

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09/06/1996 10/03/1996 10/04/1996 10/16/1996 10/22/1996 10/22/1996
10/22/1996 10/23/1996 11/01/1996 11/06/1996 11/06/1996
11/12/1996 11/20/1996

Stay . (knr,Gainesville) (Entered: 09/13/1996)
Deadline updated; Response to Motion reset to 9/24/96 for [548-1] motion to terminate consent decree (knr,Gainesville) (Entered: 09/13/1996)
Motion submission: [548-1] motion to terminate consent decree submitted, [548-2] and notice of automatic Stay submitted to Judge Maurice M. Paul (knr,Gainesville) (Entered: 10/03/1996)
549 RESPONSE by plaintiffs DAVID MACK, SALVADORE S, SUSAN S, CHARLES W, BOBBY M to [548-1] motion to terminate consent decree by defendants. (knr,Gainesville) (Entered: 10/11/1996)
553 NOTICE of Hearing:, Setting deadline motion to terminate consent for set for 10/23/96 , (Copies mailed as noted on document: ) (bkp,Gainesville) (Entered: 10/23/1996)
550 NOTICE of Appearance by W. Eugene Gandy, Jr. (not admitted to pratice - do not add to system until Court grants motion to appear) (former employee) (Entered: 10/22/1996)
551 MOTION by defendant ROY MCKAY, defendant WESLEY BRAZELL, defendant WILLIAM SCHOSSLER, defendant BETTY CASTOR, defendant JAMES TOWEY, defendant LAWTON CHILES, plaintiff DAVID MACK for W. Eugene Gandy, Jr. to Appear Pro Hac Vice . (former employee) (Entered: 10/22/1996)
552 NOTICE OF AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN REDHEAD, EUGENIO NICOLOSO, AND GERRY LUSE (former employee) (Entered: 10/22/1996)
554 Minute entry: Oral arguments on motion to terminate consent decree. [ Court Reporter: Mark Stuart] (bkp,Gainesville) (Entered: 10/23/1996)
555 MOTION by defendant ROY MCKAY for William Eugene Gandy, JR to Appear Pro Hac Vice . (bkp,Gainesville) (Entered: 11/07/1996)
556 ORDER granting [551-1] motion for W. Eugene Gandy, Jr. to Appear Pro Hac Vice, nunc pro tunc October 23, 1996. ( signed by Judge Maurice M. Paul ) (Copies mailed as noted on document: ) (former employee) (Entered: 11/12/1996)
557 ORDER granting [548-1] motion to terminate consent decree, granting [547-1] motion to terminate portions of the consent decree relating to ECKERD Youth Development Center ( signed by Judge Maurice M. Paul ) (Copies mailed as noted on document: ) (former employee) (Entered: 11/12/1996)
558 NOTICE of intention to file motion for post judgment attorneys' fees and expenses by plaintiffs DAVID MACK, SALVADORE S, SUSAN S, CHARLES W, BOBBY M (knr,Gainesville) (Entered: 11/14/1996)
559 MOTION by plaintiffs DAVID MACK, SALVADORE S, SUSAN S,

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11/27/1996 12/05/1996
12/06/1996 12/10/1996
12/11/1996 12/12/1996 12/13/1996
12/13/1996 12/13/1996 12/16/1996

CHARLES W, BOBBY M clarification of application of Local Rule 54.1 , or in the alternative to Extend Time to file for litigation expenses and attorneys' fees . (knr,Gainesville) (Entered: 11/26/1996)
Motion submission with file (vol. 14) : [559-1] motion clarification of application of Local Rule 54.1 and [559-2] motion to Extend Time to file for litigation expenses and attorneys' fees submitted to Judge Maurice M. Paul (knr,Gainesville) (Entered: 11/27/1996)
560 MOTION by defendants ROY MCKAY, WESLEY BRAZELL, WILLIAM SCHOSSLER, BETTY CASTOR, JAMES TOWEY, LAWTON CHILES to Extend Time to Answer [559-1] motion clarification of application of Local Rule 54.1 by BOBBY M, CHARLES W, SUSAN S, SALVADORE S, DAVID MACK . (knr,Gainesville) (Entered: 12/12/1996)
561 UNOPPOSED MOTION by plaintiffs DAVID MACK, SALVADORE S, SUSAN S, CHARLES W, BOBBY M to Extend Time to file motion for post-judgment fees and expenses (knr,Gainesville) (Entered: 12/12/1996)
562 RESPONSE by defendant ROY MCKAYs, WESLEY BRAZELL, WILLIAM SCHOSSLER, BETTY CASTOR, JAMES TOWEY, LAWTON CHILES to [559-1] motion clarification of application of Local Rule 54.1 by BOBBY M, CHARLES W, SUSAN S, SALVADORE S, DAVID MACK . (knr,Gainesville) (Entered: 12/13/1996)
Motion submission without file: [560-1] motion to Extend Time to Answer [559-1] motion clarification of application of Local Rule 54.1 by BOBBY M, CHARLES W, SUSAN S, SALVADORE S, DAVID MACK submitted to Judge Maurice M. Paul (knr,Gainesville) (Entered: 12/12/1996)
Motion submission without file: [561-1] motion to Extend Time to file motion for post-judgment fees and expenses submitted to Judge Maurice M. Paul (knr,Gainesville) (Entered: 12/12/1996)
563 ORDER granting [560-1] motion to Extend Time to Answer [559-1] motion clarification of application of Local Rule 54.1 by BOBBY M, CHARLES W, SUSAN S, SALVADORE S, DAVID MACK, Response to Motion reset to 12/5/96 for [559-1] motion clarification of application of Local Rule 54.1 ( signed by Judge Maurice M. Paul ) (Copies mailed as noted on document: ) (knr,Gainesville) (Entered: 12/17/1996)
564 ORDER granting [561-1] motion to Extend Time to file motion for postjudgment fees and expenses ( signed by Judge Maurice M. Paul ) (Copies mailed as noted on document: ) (knr,Gainesville) (Entered: 12/17/1996)
Deadline updated; set Motion Filing deadline to 1/2/97 (knr,Gainesville) (Entered: 12/17/1996)
565 mail returned undeliverable for Ferris (knr,Gainesville) (Entered:

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12/18/1996 01/17/1997 01/21/1997 01/21/1997 01/24/1997 02/05/1997
02/06/1997 02/10/1997 02/10/1997
02/18/1997

12/23/1996)
566 ORDER granting [559-2] motion to Extend Time to file for litigation expenses and attorneys' fees ( signed by Judge Maurice M. Paul ) (Copies mailed as noted on document: ) (knr,Gainesville) (Entered: 12/23/1996)
567 ORDER denying [559-1] motion clarification of application of Local Rule 54.1, denying [559-2] motion to Extend Time to file for litigation expenses and attorneys' fees ( signed by Judge Maurice M. Paul ) (Copies mailed as noted on document: ) (knr,Gainesville) (Entered: 01/23/1997)
568 MOTION by plaintiffs DAVID MACK, SALVADORE S, SUSAN S, CHARLES W, BOBBY M for post-judgment Attorney Fees and related expenses (knr,Gainesville) (Entered: 01/24/1997)
569 MOTION by plaintiffs DAVID MACK, SALVADORE S, SUSAN S, CHARLES W, BOBBY M to waive requirements of Local Rule 54.1 (knr,Gainesville) (Entered: 01/24/1997)
Deadline updated; Response to Motion set to 2/10/97 for [569-1] motion to waive requirements of Local Rule 54.1 and [568-1] motion for postjudgment Attorney Fees and related expenses (knr,Gainesville) (Entered: 01/24/1997)
570 UNOPPOSED MOTION by defendants ROY MCKAY, WESLEY BRAZELL, WILLIAM SCHOSSLER, BETTY CASTOR, JAMES TOWEY, LAWTON CHILES to Extend Time to respond to [569-1] motions to waive requirements of Local Rule 54.1 and [568-1] for postjudgment Attorney Fees and related expenses by BOBBY M, CHARLES W, SUSAN S, SALVADORE S, DAVID MACK (knr,Gainesville) (Entered: 02/06/1997)
Motion submission with file: [570-1] motion to Extend Time to respond to [569-1] motions to waive requirements of Local Rule 54.1 and [568-1] for post-judgment Attorney Fees and related expenses by BOBBY M, CHARLES W, SUSAN S, SALVADORE S, DAVID MACK submitted to Judge Maurice M. Paul (knr,Gainesville) (Entered: 02/06/1997)
571 mail returned for Ferris (knr,Gainesville) (Entered: 02/10/1997)
572 ORDER granting [570-1] motion to Extend Time to respond to [569-1] motions to waive requirements of Local Rule 54.1 and [568-1] for postjudgment Attorney Fees and related expenses by BOBBY M, CHARLES W, SUSAN S, SALVADORE S, DAVID MACK, Response to Motions reset to 2/18/97 for [569-1] and [568-1] ( signed by Judge Maurice M. Paul ) (Copies mailed as noted on document: ) (knr,Gainesville) (Entered: 02/10/1997)
573 MOTION by defendants ROY MCKAY, WESLEY BRAZELL, WILLIAM SCHOSSLER, BETTY CASTOR, JAMES TOWEY, LAWTON CHILES to Extend Time to file responses to [569-1] motion to waive requirements of Local Rule 54.1 and [568-1] motion for postjudgment Attorney Fees and related expenses by BOBBY M, CHARLES

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02/20/1997 02/21/1997 02/21/1997
02/25/1997
02/26/1997 02/27/1997 02/28/1997 03/03/1997 03/07/1997

W, SUSAN S, SALVADORE S, DAVID MACK (knr,Gainesville) (Entered: 02/19/1997)
574 ATTORNEY TIME RECORD by DAVID MACK, SALVADORE S, SUSAN S, CHARLES W, BOBBY M (knr,Gainesville) (Entered: 02/20/1997)
Deadline updated; Response to Motion reset to 2/24/97 for [569-1] motion to waive requirements of Local Rule 54.1, and for [568-1] motion for post-judgment Attorney Fees and related expenses (knr,Gainesville) (Entered: 02/21/1997)
575 ORDER by Judge Maurice M. Paul granting [573-1] motion to Extend Time to file responses to [569-1] motion to waive requirements of Local Rule 54.1 and [568-1] motion for post-judgment Attorney Fees and related expenses by BOBBY M, CHARLES W, SUSAN S, SALVADORE S, DAVID MACK, Response to Motions reset to 2/25/97 for [569-1] motion to waive requirements of Local Rule 54.1 and [568-1] motion for post-judgment Attorney Fees and related expenses (Copies mailed as noted on document) (knr,Gainesville) (Entered: 02/21/1997)
576 MEMORANDUM by defendants ROY MCKAY, WESLEY BRAZELL, WILLIAM SCHOSSLER, BETTY CASTOR, JAMES TOWEY, LAWTON CHILES in opposition to [568-1] motion for post-judgment Attorney fees and related expenses by BOBBY M, CHARLES W, SUSAN S, SALVADORE S, DAVID MACK. (knr,Gainesville) (Entered: 02/25/1997)
Motion submission with file: [569-1] motion to waive requirements of Local Rule 54.1 submitted, [568-1] motion for post-judgment Attorney Fees and related expenses submitted to Judge Maurice M. Paul (knr,Gainesville) (Entered: 02/26/1997)
577 ORDER by Judge Maurice M. Paul denying [569-1] motion to waive requirements of Local Rule 54.1 (Copies mailed as noted on document) (knr,Gainesville) (Entered: 02/28/1997)
578 MEMORANDUM by defendants ROY MCKAY, WESLEY BRAZELL, WILLIAM SCHOSSLER, BETTY CASTOR, JAMES TOWEY, LAWTON CHILES in opposition to [569-1] motion to waive requirements of Local Rule 54.1 by BOBBY M, CHARLES W, SUSAN S, SALVADORE S, MACK (knr,Gainesville) (Entered: 03/03/1997)
579 UNOPPOSED MOTION by plaintiffs DAVID MACK, SALVADORE S, SUSAN S, CHARLES W, BOBBY M to file reply in opposition to plaintiffs' motion for award of post-judgment attorneys fees and expenses (knr,Gainesville) (Entered: 03/04/1997)
Motion submission without file: [579-1] motion to file reply in opposition to plaintiffs' motion for award of post-judgment attorneys fees and expenses submitted to Judge Maurice M. Paul (knr,Gainesville) (Entered: 03/07/1997)

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03/07/1997
03/10/1997
03/10/1997 03/13/1997 03/14/1997 03/19/1997
03/19/1997 03/19/1997 03/19/1997 03/20/1997 03/21/1997
04/02/1997 04/11/1997

580 ORDER by Judge Maurice M. Paul, Motion Hearing set for 10:30 3/14/97 in GAINESVILLE for [568-1] motion for post-judgment Attorney Fees and related expenses (Copies mailed as noted on document) (knr,Gainesville) (Entered: 03/07/1997)
581 ORDER by Judge Maurice M. Paul granting [579-1] motion to file reply in opposition to plaintiffs' motion for award of post-judgment attorneys fees and expenses (Copies mailed as noted on document) (knr,Gainesville) (Entered: 03/10/1997)
582 RESPONSE by plaintiffs DAVID MACK, SALVADORE S, SUSAN S, CHARLES W, BOBBY M re: [576-1] opposition memorandum by defendants. (knr,Gainesville) (Entered: 03/10/1997)
584 ATTORNEY TIME RECORD by DAVID MACK, SALVADORE S, SUSAN S, CHARLES W, BOBBY M (knr,Gainesville) (Entered: 03/18/1997)
583 Minute entry: Motion on entitlement of attorney's fees and expenses written order to follow [ Court Reporter: Mark Stuart] (bkp,Gainesville) (Entered: 03/14/1997)
585 ORDER by Judge Maurice M. Paul [568-1] motion for post-judgment Attorney Fees and related expenses under advisement, Setting deadline for parties to file additional affidavit testimony regarding the matters which were discussed at the hearing to 3/24/97 , to Return File to Court by 3/27/97 (Copies mailed as noted on document) (knr,Gainesville) (Entered: 03/19/1997)
586 NOTICE by plaintiffs DAVID MACK, SALVADORE S, SUSAN, CHARLES W, BOBBY M of filing declarations of Jodi Siegel and Alice K. Nelson (bkp,Gainesville) (Entered: 03/20/1997)
587 Declaration of Alice K. Nelson (bkp,Gainesville) (Entered: 03/20/1997)
588 Declaration of Jodi Siegel (bkp,Gainesville) (Entered: 03/20/1997)
589 NOTICE by plaintiffs DAVID MACK, SALVADORE S, SUSAN S, CHARLES W, BOBBY M of filing Fane scheduling order (bkp,Gainesville) (Entered: 03/21/1997)
590 NOTICE of filing documents in support of their position by defendants ROY MCKAY, WESLEY BRAZELL, WILLIAM SCHOSSLER, BETTY CASTOR, JAMES TOWEY, LAWTON CHILES (knr,Gainesville) (Entered: 03/24/1997)
FILE RETURNED TO - Judge Maurice M. Paul Re: pursuant to court order 585 (knr,Gainesville) (Entered: 04/02/1997)
591 ORDER by Judge Maurice M. Paul granting in part [568-1] motion for post-judgment Attorney Fees and related expenses, Setting deadline for plaintiffs' counsel to file affidavits in support of attorneys' fees and litigation expenses request for 4/25/97. , Setting deadline for defendants' to file a responsive pleading for 5/9/97. , to Return File to Court by

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04/15/1997 04/18/1997 04/21/1997 04/22/1997 04/24/1997 05/01/1997
05/08/1997
05/13/1997 05/13/1997 05/15/1997 05/19/1997

5/13/97 . (Copies mailed as noted on document) (knr,Gainesville) (Entered: 04/14/1997)
592 ATTORNEY TIME RECORD by DAVID MACK, SALVADORE S, SUSAN S, CHARLES W, BOBBY M (knr,Gainesville) (Entered: 04/16/1997)
593 MOTION by plaintiffs DAVID MACK, SALVADORE S, SUSAN S, CHARLES W, BOBBY M for Reconsideration of [591-1] order granting in part and denying in part motion for attorney fees (knr,Gainesville) (Entered: 04/21/1997)
Deadline updated; Response to Motion set to 5/6/97 for [593-1] motion for Reconsideration of [591-1] order granting in part and denying in part motion for attorney fees (knr,Gainesville) (Entered: 04/21/1997)
594 Declaration of Michael J. Dale by plaintiffs DAVID MACK, SALVADORE S, SUSAN S, CHARLES W, BOBBY M in support of [568-1] motion for post-judgment Attorney and related expenses (knr,Gainesville) (Entered: 04/24/1997)
595 NOTICE of filing documents by plaintiffs DAVID MACK, SALVADORE S, SUSAN S, CHARLES W, BOBBY M in support of [568-1] motion for post-judgment Attorney and related expenses (knr,Gainesville) (Entered: 04/24/1997)
596 RESPONSE by defendants ROY MCKAY, WESLEY BRAZELL, WILLIAM SCHOSSLER, BETTY CASTOR, JAMES TOWEY, and LAWTON CHILES in opposition to [593-1] motion for Reconsideration of [591-1] order granting in part and denying in part motion for attorney fees by BOBBY M, CHARLES W, SUSAN S, SALVADORE S, DAVID MACK (knr,Gainesville) (Entered: 05/08/1997)
597 UNOPPOSED MOTION by defendants ROY MCKAY, WESLEY BRAZELL, WILLIAM SCHOSSLER, BETTY CASTOR, JAMES TOWEY, LAWTON CHILES to Extend Time to file responses and objections to plaintiffs' fees and determination (knr,Gainesville) Modified on 05/13/1997 (Entered: 05/13/1997)
Motion submission with file: [597-1] motion to Extend Time to file responses and objections to plaintiffs' fees and determination submitted to Judge Maurice M. Paul (knr,Gainesville) (Entered: 05/15/1997)
598 ATTORNEY TIME RECORD by ROY MCKAY, WESLEY BRAZELL, WILLIAM SCHOSSLER, BETTY CASTOR, JAMES TOWEY, LAWTON CHILES (knr,Gainesville) (Entered: 05/19/1997)
Deadline updated; to Return File to Court by 5/19/97 (knr,Gainesville) (Entered: 05/15/1997)
599 ORDER by Judge Maurice M. Paul granting [597-1] motion to Extend Time to file responses and objections to plaintiffs' fees and determination (Copies mailed as noted on document) (knr,Gainesville) (Entered: 05/20/1997)

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05/19/1997 06/03/1997 06/04/1997 06/05/1997 06/05/1997 06/09/1997 06/10/1997 06/12/1997
06/13/1997 06/20/1997 06/25/1997

599 ORDER by Judge Maurice M. Paul, Response to Motion reset to 5/29/97 for [593-1] motion for Reconsideration of [591-1] order granting in part and denying in part motion for attorney fees , to Return File to Court by 5/29/97 . (Copies mailed as noted on document) (knr,Gainesville) (Entered: 05/20/1997)
600 MOTION by defendants ROY MCKAY, WESLEY BRAZELL, WILLIAM SCHOSSLER, BETTY CASTOR, JAMES TOWEY, LAWTON CHILES to Extend Time to file Local Rule 54.1 response and objections to Pla. Attorney's fees documentation (bkp,Gainesville) (Entered: 06/03/1997)
FILE RETURNED TO - Judge Maurice M. Paul Re: Agreed motion for an enlargement of time to file responses (doc. 600) (former employee) (Entered: 06/04/1997)
Motion submission: (court has file on prior referral) [593-1] motion for Reconsideration of [591-1] order granting in part and denying in part motion for attorney fees submitted to Judge Maurice M. Paul (smb,Gainesville) (Entered: 06/05/1997)
601 MOTION by defendants ROY MCKAY, WESLEY BRAZELL, WILLIAM SCHOSSLER, BETTY CASTOR, JAMES TOWEY, LAWTON CHILES to Extend Time to file responses and objections to attorneys fees documentation (knr,Gainesville) (Entered: 06/10/1997)
602 ORDER by Judge Maurice M. Paul granting [600-1] motion to Extend Time to file Local Rule 54.1 response and objections to Pla. Attorney's fees documentation (Copies mailed as noted on document) (knr,Gainesville) (Entered: 06/10/1997)
Motion submission with file: [601-1] motion to Extend Time to file responses and objections to attorneys fees documentation submitted to Judge Maurice M. Paul (knr,Gainesville) (Entered: 06/10/1997)
603 ORDER by Judge Maurice M. Paul granting [601-1] motion to Extend Time to file responses and objections to attorneys fees documentation, Response to Motion reset to 6/18/97 for [593-1] motion for Reconsideration of [591-1] order granting in part and denying in part motion for attorney fees (Copies mailed as noted on document) (knr,Gainesville) (Entered: 06/13/1997)
604 ATTORNEY TIME RECORD by DAVID MACK, SALVADORE S, SUSAN S, CHARLES W, BOBBY M (knr,Gainesville) (Entered: 06/16/1997)
605 MOTION by defendants ROY MCKAY, WESLEY BRAZELL, WILLIAM SCHOSSLER, BETTY CASTOR, JAMES TOWEY, LAWTON CHILES to Extend Time to file responses re: attorney fees (knr,Gainesville) (Entered: 06/25/1997)
Motion submission with file: [605-1] motion to Extend Time to file responses re: attorney fees submitted to Judge Maurice M. Paul

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06/27/1997 06/30/1997 06/30/1997
06/30/1997 07/01/1997 07/07/1997
07/15/1997 07/15/1997 07/16/1997 07/21/1997
07/21/1997
07/28/1997

(knr,Gainesville) (Entered: 06/25/1997)
606 MOTION by defendants to Extend Time to respond to motion for attorney fees (knr,Gainesville) (Entered: 07/01/1997)
607 ORDER by Judge Maurice M. Paul granting [605-1] motion to Extend Time to file responses re: attorney fees (Copies mailed as noted on document) (knr,Gainesville) (Entered: 07/02/1997)
608 RESPONSE by defendants to [593-1] motion for Reconsideration of [591-1] order granting in part and denying in part for attorney fees by BOBBY M, CHARLES W, SUSAN S, S, DAVID MACK . (knr,Gainesville) (Entered: 07/02/1997)
609 MOTION by defendants for oral argument on motion for attorneys fees and costs . (knr,Gainesville) (Entered: 07/02/1997)
610 MOTION by plaintiffs to Compel defendants to file a counteroffer to request for attorneys's fees , to Extend Time to file acceptance or rejection of the counter offer (knr,Gainesville) (Entered: 07/02/1997)
611 NOTICE of service of responses and objections to plaintiff by defendants ROY MCKAY, WESLEY BRAZELL, WILLIAM SCHOSSLER, BETTY CASTOR, JAMES TOWEY, LAWTON CHILES (knr,Gainesville) (Entered: 07/08/1997)
612 NOTICE of vacation 7/18 thru 8/8 by plaintiffs attorney (knr,Gainesville) (Entered: 07/15/1997)
613 ATTORNEY TIME RECORD by DAVID MACK, SALVADORE S, SUSAN S, CHARLES W, BOBBY M (knr,Gainesville) (Entered: 07/15/1997)
614 RESPONSE by defendants to [610-1] motion to Compel defendants to file a counteroffer to request for attorneys's fees by Plaintiffs (former employee) (Entered: 07/17/1997)
615 ORDER by Judge Maurice M. Paul granting [609-1] motion for oral argument on motion for attorneys fees and costs, Motion Hearing set for 9:00 8/18/97 for [593-1] motion for Reconsideration of [591-1] order granting in part and denying in part motion for attorney fees (Copies mailed as noted on document) (knr,Gainesville) (Entered: 07/22/1997)
616 NOTICE of correction to filing of May 1997 time records (it should have read May instead of April) by plaintiffs DAVID MACK, SALVADORE S, SUSAN S, CHARLES W, BOBBY M (knr,Gainesville) (Entered: 07/23/1997)
617 ORDER by Judge Maurice M. Paul denying [610-1] motion to Compel defendants to file a counteroffer to request for attorneys's fees and denying [610-2] motion to Extend Time to file acceptance or rejection of the counter offer (Copies mailed as noted on document) (knr,Gainesville) (Entered: 07/29/1997)

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08/04/1997
08/12/1997
08/15/1997 09/05/1997 09/09/1997 09/15/1997 09/16/1997 09/17/1997 09/19/1997 09/22/1997 09/23/1997

618 MOTION by plaintiffs DAVID MACK, SALVADORE S, SUSAN S, CHARLES W, BOBBY M for Reconsideration of [615-1] order Motion Hearing set 9:00 8/18/97 and for [593-1] motion for Reconsideration of [591-1] order granting in part and denying in part motion for attorney fees , or in the alternative motion for clarification of the order (knr,Gainesville) (Entered: 08/06/1997)
619 ORDER by Judge Maurice M. Paul granting in part [618-1] motion for Reconsideration of [615-1] order Motion Hearing set 9:00 8/18/97 and for [593-1] motion for Reconsideration of [591-1] order motion for attorney fees, [618-2] motion motion for clarification of the order. Hearing set for August 18, 1997 is hereby cancelled. (Copies mailed as noted on document) (bkp,Gainesville) (Entered: 08/12/1997)
620 ATTORNEY TIME RECORD by DAVID MACK, SALVADORE S, SUSAN S, CHARLES W, BOBBY M (knr,Gainesville) (Entered: 08/25/1997)
621 REPLY by plaintiffs DAVID MACK, SALVADORE S, SUSAN S, CHARLES W, BOBBY M to response to [568-1] motion for postjudgment Attorney Fees and related expenses by BOBBY M, CHARLES W, SUSAN S, SALVADORE S, DAVID MACK . (knr,Gainesville) (Entered: 09/10/1997)
622 REPLY by plaintiffs DAVID MACK, SALVADORE S, SUSAN S, CHARLES W, BOBBY M to response to [568-1] motion for postjudgment Attorney Fees and related expenses by BOBBY M, CHARLES W, SUSAN S, SALVADORE S, DAVID MACK . (knr,Gainesville) (Entered: 09/14/1997)
623 ATTORNEY TIME RECORD by DAVID MACK, SALVADORE S, SUSAN S, CHARLES W, BOBBY M (knr,Gainesville) (Entered: 09/18/1997)
624 ATTORNEY TIME RECORD by DAVID MACK, SALVADORE S, SUSAN S, CHARLES W, BOBBY M (knr,Gainesville) (Entered: 09/18/1997)
625 MOTION by plaintiffs DAVID MACK, SALVADORE S, SUSAN S, CHARLES W, BOBBY M to file attorney time records out of time (knr,Gainesville) (Entered: 09/18/1997)
Motion submitted without file to Judge Maurice M. Paul Re: [625-1] motion to file attorney time records out of time by BOBBY M, CHARLES W, SUSAN S, SALVADORE S, DAVID MACK (knr,Gainesville) (Entered: 09/19/1997)
626 ORDER by Judge Maurice M. Paul granting [625-1] motion to file attorney time records out of time (Copies mailed as noted on document) (knr,Gainesville) (Entered: 09/22/1997)
627 ORDER by Judge Maurice M. Paul granting in part, denying in part [593-1] motion for Reconsideration of [591-1] order granting in part and

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10/09/1997 10/15/1997 11/14/1997 05/19/1998 05/19/1998 07/29/1998 08/13/1998 08/24/1998 09/02/1998
09/10/1998

denying in part motion for attorney fees; granting nunc pro tunc to 6/25/97[606-1] motion to Extend Time to respond to motion for attorney fees, to Amend [591-1] order to allow plaintiffs to seek attorneys' fees and related expenses for work done in the time period from 10/28/87 to 3/95. Order 591 and this order do not address the timeliness of plaintiffs's fee summaries under Rule 54.1 for work performed in the month of February 1997 and thereafter. Plaintiffs may not seek fees for work performed in January 1997, because their fee summary for that period under Rule 54.1 was not filed in a timely manner. (Copies mailed as noted on document) (knr,Gainesville) (Entered: 09/25/1997)
628 ATTORNEY TIME RECORD by DAVID MACK, SALVADORE S, SUSAN S, CHARLES W, BOBBY M (knr,Gainesville) (Entered: 10/09/1997)
629 ATTORNEY TIME RECORD by DAVID MACK, SALVADORE S, SUSAN S, CHARLES W, BOBBY M (knr,Gainesville) (Entered: 10/17/1997)
630 ATTORNEY TIME RECORD by BOBBY M (csg,Gainesville) (Entered: 11/18/1997)
631 MOTION by plaintiffs DAVID MACK, SALVADORE S, SUSAN S, CHARLES W, and BOBBY M for Attorney Fees (tss,Gainesville) (Entered: 05/21/1998)
Deadline updated response to Motion reset to 6/8/98 for [631-1] motion for Attorney Fees and to return file to Court 6/11/98 (tss,Gainesville) (Entered: 05/21/1998)
Motion submitted with file to Judge Maurice M. Paul Re: [631-1] motion for Attorney Fees by BOBBY M, CHARLES W, SUSAN S, SALVADORE S, DAVID MACK (tss,Gainesville) (Entered: 07/29/1998)
632 NOTICE of Hearing:, Motion Hearing set for 9:00 9/2/98 for [631-1] motion for Attorney Fees (Copies mailed as noted on document: ) (bkp,Gainesville) (Entered: 08/13/1998)
633 NOTICE by defendants ROY MCKAY, WESLEY BRAZELL, WILLIAM SCHOSSLER, BETTY CASTOR, JAMES TOWEY, LAWTON CHILES of appearance and substitution of counsel and notice of change of address (bkp,Gainesville) (Entered: 08/31/1998)
634 Motion hearing re: [631-1] motion for Attorney Fees by BOBBY M, CHARLES W, SUSAN S, SALVADORE S, DAVID MACK held [ Court Reporter: Mark Stuart ] Defendant instructed to file list of withdrawn objection regarding Plaintiff's cost written order to follow (bkp,Gainesville) Modified on 09/02/1998 (Entered: 09/02/1998)
635 MOTION by defendants ROY MCKAY, WESLEY BRAZELL, WILLIAM SCHOSSLER, BETTY CASTOR, JAMES TOWEY, LAWTON CHILES to Extend Time of Two Days to File Defendants'

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09/11/1998
09/14/1998 09/15/1998 09/17/1998
10/15/1998 10/26/1998 10/29/1998 10/29/1998 10/30/1998 11/05/1998 12/14/1998 03/18/1999 03/22/1999

Notice of Withdrawal of Certain Objections to Plaintiffs' Fees and Costs Claim (atm,Gainesville) (Entered: 09/11/1998)
Motion submitted without file to Judge Maurice M. Paul Re: [635-1] motion to Extend Time of Two Days to File Defendants' Notice of Withdrawal of Certain Objections to Plaintiffs' Fees and Costs Claim by defendantsssss (atm,Gainesville) (Entered: 09/14/1998)
636 ATTORNEY TIME RECORD for attorney MICHAEL J. DALE by Plaintiffs, DAVID MACK, SALVADORE S, SUSAN S, CHARLES W, and BOBBY M (tss,Gainesville) (Entered: 09/17/1998)
637 ATTORNEY TIME RECORD for attorney JODI SIEGEL by Plaintiffs DAVID MACK, SALVADORE S, SUSAN S, CHARLES W, and BOBBY M (tss,Gainesville) (Entered: 09/17/1998)
638 ORDER granting [635-1] motion to Extend Time of Two Days to File Defendants' Notice of Withdrawal of Certain Objections to Plaintiffs' Fees and Costs Claim ( signed by Judge Maurice M. Paul ) (Copies mailed as noted on document) (tss,Gainesville) (Entered: 09/17/1998)
639 ATTORNEY TIME RECORD by DAVID MACK, SALVADORE S, SUSAN S, CHARLES W, BOBBY M (atm,Gainesville) (Entered: 10/16/1998)
640 MOTION by plaintiff DAVID MACK for Leave to File Attorney Time Records for Michael Dale (atm,Gainesville) Modified on 10/29/1998 (Entered: 10/29/1998)
Motion submitted without file to Judge Maurice M. Paul Re: [640-1] motion for Leave to File Attorney Time Records for Michael Dale by DAVID MACK (atm,Gainesville) (Entered: 10/29/1998)
641 ORDER by Judge Maurice M. Paul granting [640-1] motion for Leave to File Attorney Time Records for Michael Dale Copies sent as noted on document. (atm,Gainesville) (Entered: 10/30/1998)
642 ATTORNEY TIME RECORD by DAVID MACK, SALVADORE S, SUSAN S, CHARLES W, BOBBY M (atm,Gainesville) (Entered: 10/30/1998)
643 ATTORNEY TIME RECORD by DAVID MACK, SALVADORE S, SUSAN S, CHARLES W, BOBBY M (tss,Gainesville) (Entered: 11/06/1998)
644 ATTORNEY TIME RECORD by DAVID MACK, SALVADORE S, SUSAN S, CHARLES W, BOBBY M (tss,Gainesville) (Entered: 12/14/1998)
645 REQUEST by plaintiffs DAVID MACK, SALVADORE S, SUSAN S, CHARLES W, and BOBBY M for Ruling on Pending Motion for Attorneys' Fees (tss,Gainesville) (Entered: 03/22/1999)
Copy of Request for Ruling (doc 645) on Motion for Attorneys' Fees

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03/31/1999
03/31/1999 04/01/1999
04/12/1999 04/15/1999 04/15/1999 04/15/1999 04/16/1999 04/20/1999

forwarded to Chambers (tss,Gainesville) (Entered: 03/22/1999)
646 MEMORANDUM (Notice of Supplemental Authority) by defendants ROY MCKAY, WESLEY BRAZELL, WILLIAM SCHOSSLER, BETTY CASTOR, JAMES TOWEY, LAWTON CHILES in opposition to [631-1] motion for Attorney Fees by BOBBY M, CHARLES W, SUSAN S, SALVADORE S, and DAVID MACK (tss,Gainesville) (Entered: 04/01/1999)
647 ORDER by Judge Maurice M. Paul granting in part, denying in part [631-1] motion for Attorney Fees. Attorneys' fees in the amount of $182,912.19, plus costs in the amount of $10,724.90, are awarded to the plaintiff and assessed against the defendants. Copies sent as noted on document. (tss,Gainesville) (Entered: 04/01/1999)
648 JUDGMENT for plaintiffs DAVID MACK, SALVADORE S, SUSAN S, CHARLES W, and BOBBY M and against defendants ROY MCKAY, WESLEY BRAZELL, WILLIAM SCHOSSLER, BETTY CASTOR, JAMES TOWEY, and LAWTON CHILES Attorneys' fees in the amount of $182,912.19, plus costs in the amount of $10,724.90, are awarded to the plaintiffs and assessed against the defendants. Copies sent as noted on document. (tss,Gainesville) (Entered: 04/01/1999)
649 ATTORNEY TIME RECORD by DAVID MACK, SALVADORE S, SUSAN S, CHARLES W, BOBBY M (tss,Gainesville) (Entered: 04/13/1999)
650 ATTORNEY TIME RECORD by DAVID MACK, SALVADORE S, SUSAN S, CHARLES W, BOBBY M (tss,Gainesville) (Entered: 04/16/1999)
651 MOTION by plaintiffs DAVID MACK, SALVADORE S, SUSAN S, CHARLES W, BOBBY M to Extend Time to File Documentation of Fees to a date 14 days after ruling has been made of Motion for Reconsideration (doc 652) (tss,Gainesville) (Entered: 04/16/1999)
652 MOTION by plaintiffs DAVID MACK, SALVADORE S, SUSAN S, CHARLES W, and BOBBY M for Reconsideration of [647-1] order and [648-1] judgment Deadline for filing response to motion is: 5/3/99 and deadline to return file to court is: 5/6/99 (tss,Gainesville) (Entered: 04/16/1999)
Motion submitted with file (18 & 19) to Judge Maurice M. Paul Re: [651-1] motion to Extend Time to File Documentation of Fees to a date 14 days after ruling has been made of Motion for Reconsideration (doc 652) by BOBBY M, CHARLES W, SUSAN S, SALVADORE S, DAVID MACK (tss,Gainesville) (Entered: 04/16/1999)
653 NOTICE by plaintiffs DAVID MACK, SALVADORE S, SUSAN S, CHARLES W, and BOBBY M of Filing Corrected Motion for Reconsideration of Order dated 4/1/99 (tss,Gainesville) (Entered: 04/21/1999)

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04/20/1999
04/23/1999 04/26/1999
05/07/1999 05/07/1999 05/10/1999 05/11/1999 05/11/1999 05/12/1999 05/17/1999 05/17/1999 05/25/1999

654 CORRECTED MOTION by plaintiffs DAVID MACK, SALVADORE S, SUSAN S, CHARLES W, BOBBY M for Reconsideration of [647-1] order, [648-1] judgment order Deadline for filing response to motion is: 5/10/99 and deadline to return file to court is: 5/13/99 (tss,Gainesville) (Entered: 04/21/1999)
656 NOTICE of Appearance and Request to Correct File Service List to Include W. EUGENE GANDY (rec 4/26/99) (tss,Gainesville) (Entered: 04/26/1999)
655 ORDER by Judge Maurice M. Paul granting [651-1] motion to Extend Time to File Documentation of Fees to a date 14 days after ruling has been made of Motion for Reconsideration (doc 652), denying [652-1] motion for Reconsideration of [647-1] order and [648-1] judgment Setting deadline for plaintiffs to file documentation in support of fees by: 5/10/99 Copies sent as noted on document. (tss,Gainesville) (Entered: 04/26/1999)
657 ATTORNEY TIME RECORD by DAVID MACK, SALVADORE S, SUSAN S, CHARLES W, BOBBY M (attorney MICHAEL J. DALE) (tss,Gainesville) (Entered: 05/07/1999)
658 AFFIDAVIT of MICHAEL J. DALE by plaintiffs DAVID MACK, SALVADORE S, SUSAN S, CHARLES W, BOBBY M Re: [654-1] motion for Reconsideration of [647-1] order, [648-1] judgment order (tss,Gainesville) (Entered: 05/07/1999)
659 NOTICE by plaintiffs DAVID MACK, SALVADORE S, SUSAN S, CHARLES W, BOBBY M of Filing Documentation of Attorney's Fees (tss,Gainesville) (Entered: 05/11/1999)
Motion submitted with file to Judge Maurice M. Paul Re: [654-1] amended motion for Reconsideration of [647-1] order, judgment order by BOBBY M, CHARLES W, SUSAN S, SALVADORE S, DAVID MACK (tss,Gainesville) (Entered: 05/11/1999)
File Returned to Court: to Judge Maurice M. Paul Re: [659-1] notice of Filing Documentation of Attorney's Fees by BOBBY M, CHARLES W, SUSAN S, SALVADORE S, DAVID MACK (tss,Gainesville) (Entered: 05/11/1999)
660 ORDER by Judge Maurice M. Paul denying [654-1] corrected motion for Reconsideration of [647-1] order and [648-1] judgment order. Copies sent as noted on document. (tss,Gainesville) (Entered: 05/12/1999)
661 ATTORNEY TIME RECORD by DAVID MACK, SALVADORE S, SUSAN S, CHARLES W, BOBBY M (tss,Gainesville) (Entered: 05/17/1999)
662 ATTORNEY TIME RECORD by DAVID MACK, SALVADORE S, SUSAN S, CHARLES W, BOBBY M (tss,Gainesville) (Entered: 05/17/1999)
663 NOTICE OF APPEAL by plaintiff of [648-1] judgment order FILING

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05/25/1999 05/25/1999 05/26/1999 05/28/1999 06/01/1999 06/04/1999 06/07/1999 06/08/1999 06/08/1999 06/14/1999

FEE $ 105.00 RECEIPT # 100-98252 (deb,Gainesville) (Entered: 05/26/1999)
664 COPY OF [660-1] order mailed to LAURENE HEYBACH, one of the attorneys for plaintiff BOBBY M, returned as undeliverable because no forwarding order on file (tss,Gainesville) (Entered: 05/26/1999)
665 UNOPPOSED MOTION by defendants ROY MCKAY, WESLEY BRAZELL, WILLIAM SCHOSSLER, BETTY CASTOR, JAMES TOWEY, LAWTON CHILES for Leave to File Response to Fees-forFees Documentation on or before 5/28/99 (tss,Gainesville) (Entered: 05/26/1999)
Motion submitted with file (vol 19) to Judge Maurice M. Paul Re: [6651] motion for Leave to File Response to Fees-for-Fees Documentation on or before 5/28/99 by defendants (tss,Gainesville) (Entered: 05/26/1999)
666 ORDER by Judge Maurice M. Paul granting [665-1] motion for Leave to File Response to Fees-for-Fees Documentation on or before 5/28/99 Copies sent as noted on document. (tss,Gainesville) (Entered: 06/01/1999)
667 MOTION by Defendants ROY MCKAY, WESLEY BRAZELL, WILLIAM SCHOSSLER, BETTY CASTOR, JAMES TOWEY, LAWTON CHILES to Extend Time an additional one week to June 4, 1999 to file response to Plaintiff's Fees-for-Fees Documentation (tss,Gainesville) (Entered: 06/04/1999)
Motion submitted with file (vol 19) to Judge Maurice M. Paul Re: [6671] motion to Extend Time an additional one week to June 4, 1999 to file response to Plaintiff's Fees-for-Fees Documentation by defendants (tss,Gainesville) (Entered: 06/04/1999)
668 SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION by defendants ROY MCKAY, WESLEY BRAZELL, WILLIAM SCHOSSLER, BETTY CASTOR, JAMES TOWEY, LAWTON CHILES to Extend Time to and through 6/11/99 to file response to fees-for-fees documentation (tss,Gainesville) (Entered: 06/08/1999)
Motion submitted without file to Judge Maurice M. Paul Re: [668-1] motion to Extend Time to and through 6/11/99 to file response to feesfor-fees documentation by defendants (tss,Gainesville) (Entered: 06/08/1999)
669 NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL by defendants ROY MCKAY, WESLEY BRAZELL, WILLIAM SCHOSSLER, BETTY CASTOR, JAMES TOWEY, and LAWTON CHILES FILING FEE $ 105.00 RECEIPT # 400-402192 (deb,Gainesville) (Entered: 06/10/1999)
670 Notice of Appeal, Cross Appeal and certified copy of docket to USCA: [663-1] appeal by BOBBY M, CHARLES W, SUSAN S, SALVADORE DAVID MACK and [669-1] cross appeal by defendants Copies sent as noted on document. (deb,Gainesville) (Entered: 06/14/1999)

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06/14/1999
06/15/1999 06/15/1999 06/15/1999 06/15/1999 06/17/1999 06/18/1999 06/18/1999 06/21/1999 06/23/1999 06/23/1999

671 ORDER by Judge Maurice M. Paul granting [667-1] motion to Extend Time an additional one week to June 4, 1999 to file response to Plaintiff's Fees-for-Fees Documentation, and granting [668-1] motion to Extend Time to and through 6/11/99 to file response to fees-for-fees documentation resetting response to fees-for-fees deadline for 6/7/99 nunc pro tunc Copies sent as noted on document. (tss,Gainesville) (Entered: 06/15/1999)
672 MOTION by defendants ROY MCKAY, WESLEY BRAZELL, WILLIAM SCHOSSLER, BETTY CASTOR, JAMES TOWEY, and LAWTON CHILES to Extend Time to file response to Fees-for-Fees Documentation to 6/16/99 (tss,Gainesville) (Entered: 06/15/1999)
Motion submitted with file (vol 2) to Judge Maurice M. Paul Re: [672-1] motion to Extend Time to file response to Fees-for-Fees Documentation to 6/16/99 by defendants (tss,Gainesville) (Entered: 06/15/1999)
673 MEMORANDUM by plaintiffs DAVID MACK, SALVADORE S, SUSAN S, CHARLES W, and BOBBY M in support of [659-1] notice of Filing Documentation of Attorney's Fees (tss,Gainesville) (Entered: 06/15/1999)
674 ATTORNEY TIME RECORD by DAVID MACK, SALVADORE S, SUSAN S, CHARLES W, BOBBY M (tss,Gainesville) (Entered: 06/16/1999)
675 ORDER by Judge Maurice M. Paul granting [672-1] motion to Extend Time to file response to Fees-for-Fees Documentation to 6/16/99 Setting deadline for response to fees-for-fees documentation by: 6/16/99 Copies sent as noted on document. (tss,Gainesville) (Entered: 06/17/1999)
676 MOTION by defendants ROY MCKAY, WESLEY BRAZELL, WILLIAM SCHOSSLER, BETTY CASTOR, JAMES TOWEY, and LAWTON CHILES to Extend Time to 6/21/99 to file response to feesfor-fees documentation (tss,Gainesville) (Entered: 06/18/1999)
Motion submitted with file (vol 19) to Judge Maurice M. Paul Re: [6761] motion to Extend Time to 6/21/99 to file response to fees-for-fees documentation by defendants (tss,Gainesville) (Entered: 06/18/1999)
677 NOTICE by W. Eugene Gandy Jr, attorney for defendants ROY MCKAY, WESLEY BRAZELL, WILLIAM SCHOSSLER, BETTY CASTOR, JAMES TOWEY, LAWTON CHILES, of Unavailability from 6/26/99 to 7/14/99 (tss,Gainesville) (Entered: 06/22/1999)
Copy of Notice (doc 677) of Unavailability forwarded to Chambers (tss,Gainesville) (Entered: 06/23/1999)
678 ORDER by Judge Maurice M. Paul granting [676-1] motion to Extend Time to 6/21/99 to file response to fees-for-fees documentation. Granted nunc pro tunc to 6/18/99. Setting deadline to file response to fees-for-fees documentation by: 6/21/99 Copies sent as noted on document. (tss,Gainesville) (Entered: 06/23/1999)

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06/23/1999 06/24/1999 06/24/1999
06/25/1999 06/30/1999
07/01/1999 07/01/1999 07/07/1999
07/08/1999 07/09/1999 07/09/1999 07/09/1999

679 MOTION by defendants ROY MCKAY, WESLEY BRAZELL, WILLIAM SCHOSSLER, BETTY CASTOR, JAMES TOWEY, LAWTON CHILES to Extend Time to File Response to Fees-for-Fees Documentation to 6/24/99 (tss,Gainesville) (Entered: 06/23/1999)
Motion submitted with file (vol 19) to Judge Maurice M. Paul Re: [6791] motion to Extend Time to File Response to Fees-for-Fees Documentation to 6/24/99 by defendants (tss,Gainesville) (Entered: 06/24/1999)
680 ORDER by Judge Maurice M. Paul granting [679-1] motion to Extend Time to File Response to Fees-for-Fees Documentation to 6/24/99 Setting deadline for to file response to fees for fees documentation by: 6/24/99 Copies sent as noted on document. (tss,Gainesville) (Entered: 06/24/1999)
681 NOTICE by USCA to counsel of appellate procedure re: USCA# 9911712-H (deb,Gainesville) (Entered: 06/25/1999)
682 MOTION by ROY MCKAY, WESLEY BRAZELL, WILLIAM SCHOSSLER, BETTY CASTOR, JAMES TOWEY, LAWTON CHILES to Extend Time to File Response to Fees-for-Fees Documentation through and including 7/16/99 (tss,Gainesville) (Entered: 06/30/1999)
Motion submitted with file to Judge Maurice M. Paul Re: [682-1] motion to Extend Time to File Response to Fees-for-Fees Documentation through and including 7/16/99 by defendants (tss,Gainesville) (Entered: 07/01/1999)
683 Transcript requested [663-1] appeal by BOBBY M, CHARLES W, SUSAN S, SALVADORE S, DAVID MACK (pre-trial proceedings 9/2/98, 3/14/97, court reporter Mark Stuart) (deb,Gainesville) (Entered: 07/02/1999)
684 ORDER by Judge Maurice M. Paul granting [682-1] motion to Extend Time to File Response to Fees-for-Fees Documentation through and including 7/16/99 Setting deadline for - defendants to file a response to fees-for-fees documentation by: 7/16/99 Copies sent as noted on document. (deb,Gainesville) (Entered: 07/08/1999)
685 Transcript requested [663-1] appeal by BOBBY M, CHARLES W, SUSAN S, SALVADORE S, DAVID MACK (3/14/97, 9/2/98) (deb,Gainesville) (Entered: 07/09/1999)
686 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT by court reporter Mark Stuart of [685-1] transcript request, projected filing date 8/9/99. (deb,Gainesville) (Entered: 07/09/1999)
687 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT by court reporter Mark Stuart of receipt of [683-1] transcript request, projected filing date 30 days after payment received. (deb,Gainesville) (Entered: 07/09/1999)
Deadline updated Transcript deadline set for 8/9/99 for [663-1] appeal

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07/09/1999 07/12/1999 07/19/1999
07/20/1999 07/20/1999
07/22/1999 07/23/1999 07/30/1999 07/30/1999
08/02/1999 08/04/1999 08/05/1999

3/14/97, 9/2/98, (deb,Gainesville) (Entered: 07/09/1999)
688 ATTORNEY TIME RECORD by DAVID MACK, SALVADORE S, SUSAN S, CHARLES W, BOBBY M (tss,Gainesville) (Entered: 07/09/1999)
689 ATTORNEY TIME RECORD by DAVID MACK, SALVADORE S, SUSAN S, CHARLES W, BOBBY M (tss,Gainesville) (Entered: 07/13/1999)
690 MOTION by ROY MCKAY, WESLEY BRAZELL, WILLIAM SCHOSSLER, BETTY CASTOR, JAMES TOWEY, LAWTON CHILES to Extend Time to File Response to Fees-for-Fees Documentation through and including 7/20/99 (tss,Gainesville) (Entered: 07/19/1999)
Motion submitted with file to Judge Maurice M. Paul Re: [690-1] motion to Extend Time to File Response to Fees-for-Fees Documentation through and including 7/20/99 by defendants (tss,Gainesville) (Entered: 07/20/1999)
691 ORDER by Judge Maurice M. Paul granting [690-1] motion to Extend Time to File Response to Fees-for-Fees Documentation through and including 7/20/99 Setting deadline to file response to Fees-for-Fees Documentation by: 7/20/99 Copies sent as noted on document. (tss,Gainesville) (Entered: 07/20/1999)
692 Objection to Fees-for-Fees Documentation by Defendants (tss,Gainesville) (Entered: 07/23/1999)
File Returned to Court: to Judge Maurice M. Paul Re: [692-1] objection to fees-for-fees documentation (tss,Gainesville) (Entered: 07/23/1999)
694 TRANSCRIPT re: [631-1] motion for Attorney Fees by BOBBY M, CHARLES W, SUSAN S, SALVADORE S, DAVID MACK Date(s): 9/2/98 Court Reporter: Mark Stuart Number of Pages: 69 (deb,Gainesville) (Entered: 08/02/1999)
695 TRANSCRIPT re: [568-1] motion for post-judgment Attorney Fees and related expenses by BOBBY M, CHARLES W, SUSAN S, SALVADORE S, DAVID MACK Date(s): 3/14/97 Court Reporter: Mark Stuart Number of Pages: 35 (deb,Gainesville) (Entered: 08/02/1999)
693 MOTION by plaintiffs DAVID MACK, SALVADORE S, SUSAN S, CHARLES W, BOBBY M to Extend Time to 8/30/99 to File Acceptance or Rejection of Defendants' Offer on Plaintiff's Request for Fees-for-Fees (tss,Gainesville) (Entered: 08/02/1999)
696 ATTORNEY TIME RECORD by DAVID MACK, SALVADORE S, SUSAN S, CHARLES W, BOBBY M (tss,Gainesville) (Entered: 08/04/1999)
697 NOTICE by court reporter Mark Stuart of filing requested transcripts on

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08/05/1999 08/06/1999
08/09/1999
08/13/1999 08/30/1999 08/30/1999 09/01/1999 09/02/1999
09/02/1999 09/02/1999 09/03/1999

7/30/99 USCA# 99-11712-H (deb,Gainesville) (Entered: 08/05/1999)
698 NOTICE by court reporter Mark Stuart of filing requested transcripts on 7/30/99 USCA# 99-112712-H (deb,Gainesville) (Entered: 08/05/1999)
Motion submitted without file to Judge Maurice M. Paul Re: [693-1] motion to Extend Time to 8/30/99 to File Acceptance or Rejection of Defendants' Offer on Plaintiff's Request for Fees-for-Fees by BOBBY M, CHARLES W, SUSAN S, SALVADORE S, DAVID MACK (deb,Gainesville) (Entered: 08/06/1999)
699 ORDER by Judge Maurice M. Paul granting [693-1] motion to Extend Time to 8/30/99 to File Acceptance or Rejection of Defendants' Offer on Plaintiff's Request for Fees-for-Fees Setting deadline for for Plaintiffs to file acceptance or rejections by: 8/30/99 Copies sent as noted on document. (deb,Gainesville) (Entered: 08/10/1999)
700 ATTORNEY TIME RECORD by DAVID MACK, SALVADORE S, SUSAN S, CHARLES W, BOBBY M (tss,Gainesville) (Entered: 08/13/1999)
701 NOTICE by plaintiffs DAVID MACK, SALVADORE S, SUSAN S, CHARLES W, BOBBY M of Rejection of Counter-Offer for "Fees-forFees" by Attorney Michael Dale (tss,Gainesville) Modified on 08/31/1999 (Entered: 08/31/1999)
702 MOTION by plaintiffs DAVID MACK, SALVADORE S, SUSAN S, CHARLES W, and BOBBY M to Extend Time to 9/1/99 for Southern Legal Counsel to Accept or Reject Defendant's Counter-Offer on Feesfor-Fees (tss,Gainesville) (Entered: 08/31/1999)
703 NOTICE by attorneys JODI SIEGEL and ALICE NELSON for plaintiffs DAVID MACK, SALVADORE S, SUSAN S, CHARLES W, and BOBBY M of Rejection of Defendants' Counter-Offer on Plaintiffs' Request for Fees-for-Fees (tss,Gainesville) (Entered: 09/02/1999)
Motion submitted with file to Judge Maurice M. Paul Re: [702-1] motion to Extend Time to 9/1/99 for Southern Legal Counsel to Accept or Reject Defendant's Counter-Offer on Fees-for-Fees by BOBBY M, CHARLES W, SUSAN S, SALVADORE S, DAVID MACK (tss,Gainesville) (Entered: 09/02/1999)
File Returned to Court: to Judge Maurice M. Paul Re: [701-1] notice of Rejection of Counter-Offer for "Fees-for-Fees" by Attorney Michael Dale by BOBBY M, CHARLES W, SUSAN S, SALVADORE S, DAVID MACK (tss,Gainesville) (Entered: 09/02/1999)
704 ATTORNEY TIME RECORD by DAVID MACK, SALVADORE S, SUSAN S, CHARLES W, BOBBY M (for attorney Michael Dale) (tss,Gainesville) (Entered: 09/02/1999)
705 ORDER by Judge Maurice M. Paul granting nunc pro tunc to 8/30/99 [702-1] motion to Extend Time to 9/1/99 for Southern Legal Counsel to Accept or Reject Defendant's Counter-Offer on Fees-for-Fees Copies sent

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09/09/1999
09/14/1999 10/08/1999 10/12/1999 10/14/1999 11/02/1999 11/08/1999 11/08/1999 11/09/1999 11/12/1999 11/23/1999 11/23/1999 01/06/2000 01/10/2000

as noted on document. (tss,Gainesville) (Entered: 09/07/1999)
File Returned to Court: to Judge Maurice M. Paul Re: [703-1] notice of Rejection of Defendants' Counter-Offer on Plaintiffs' Request for Feesfor-Fees by BOBBY M, CHARLES W, SUSAN S, SALVADORE S, DAVID MACK (tss,Gainesville) (Entered: 09/09/1999)
706 ATTORNEY TIME RECORD by DAVID MACK, SALVADORE S, SUSAN S, CHARLES W, BOBBY M (by Jodi Siegel) (tss,Gainesville) (Entered: 09/16/1999)
707 ATTORNEY TIME RECORD by DAVID MACK, SALVADORE S, SUSAN S, CHARLES W, BOBBY M by Michael Dale (tss,Gainesville) (Entered: 10/08/1999)
708 NOTICE by defendants ROY MCKAY, WESLEY BRAZELL, WILLIAM SCHOSSLER, BETTY CASTOR, JAMES TOWEY, and LAWTON CHILES of Settlement (tss,Gainesville) (Entered: 10/12/1999)
File Returned to Court: to Judge Maurice M. Paul Re: [708-1] notice of Settlement by defendants (tss,Gainesville) (Entered: 10/14/1999)
709 LETTER from Eugene Gandy Jr, Esq to Judge Paul regarding settlement (placed in court file pursuant to instructions from chambers) (tss,Gainesville) (Entered: 11/02/1999)
710 NOTICE by defendants of Filing Joint Motion to Dismiss (tss,Gainesville) (Entered: 11/08/1999)
711 JOINT MOTION by defendants and plaintiffs to Dismiss All Pending Claims for Attorneys' Fees (tss,Gainesville) (Entered: 11/08/1999)
Motion submitted with file (vol 19) to Judge Maurice M. Paul Re: [7111] joint motion to Dismiss All Pending Claims for Attorneys' Fees by plaintiffs and defendants (tss,Gainesville) (Entered: 11/09/1999)
712 ORDER by Judge Maurice M. Paul granting [711-1] joint motion to Dismiss All Pending Claims for Attorneys' Fees Copies sent as noted on document. (tss,Gainesville) (Entered: 11/12/1999)
713 COPY OF [712-1] order mailed to LAURENE HEYBACH for plaintiff BOBBY M returned as undeliverable because no forwarding order on file (atm,Gainesville) (Entered: 11/23/1999)
Copy of Order (document 712) re-sent to: Laurene Heyback at Legal Assistant Foundation; 111 W Jackson; Chicago IL 60604 (atm,Gainesville) (Entered: 11/23/1999)
714 ORDER by USCA Remanding this appeal for approval of the parties settlement agreement [USCA is retaining jurisdiction of this appeal] (USCA# 99-11712-HH) (deb,Gainesville) (Entered: 01/06/2000)
File Returned to Court: to Judge Maurice M. Paul Re: [714-2] order remanding appeal pending settlement approval. Jurisdiction is being retained by the Eleventh Circuit USCA# 99-11712-HH (deb,Gainesville)

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01/10/2000 02/02/2000 03/01/2000 03/20/2000
03/29/2000 04/10/2000
05/03/2000 05/10/2000 05/22/2000 09/27/2000

(Entered: 01/10/2000)
Deadline updated Setting deadline for clerk to check status of appeal remand (Settlement agreement approval) by: 1/24/00 (deb,Gainesville) (Entered: 01/10/2000)
Deadline updated Setting deadline for for clerk to check appeal remand status (Settlement agreement approval) by: 2/24/00 (deb,Gainesville) (Entered: 02/02/2000)
Deadline updated Setting deadline for clerk to check status of appeal remand by: 3/22/00 - Parties filed motion to reconsider with USCA (deb,Gainesville) Modified on 03/07/2000 (Entered: 03/01/2000)
715 MANDATE OF USCA Re: [663-1] appeal by BOBBY M, CHARLES W, SUSAN S, SALVADORE S, DAVID MACK [appellees' motion for reconsideration is granted, the parties motion to dismiss the appeal is granted, the parties motion for remand to this district court is denied as moot] USCA# 99-11712-HH (deb,Gainesville) (Entered: 03/20/2000)
File Returned to Court: to Judge Maurice M. Paul Re: [715-1] Mandate USCA (deb,Gainesville) (Entered: 03/29/2000)
716 MOTION by defendants ROY MCKAY, WESLEY BRAZELL, WILLIAM SCHOSSLER, BETTY CASTOR, JAMES TOWEY, LAWTON CHILES to Dismiss the remaining claims Deadline for filing response to motion is: 4/28/00 and deadline to return file to court is: 5/3/00 (atm,Gainesville) (Entered: 04/11/2000)
Motion submitted with file to Judge Maurice M. Paul Re: [716-1] motion to Dismiss the remaining claims by defendants (atm,Gainesville) (Entered: 05/03/2000)
717 ORDER by Judge Maurice M. Paul granting [716-1] motion to Dismiss the remaining claims - Copies sent as noted on document. (atm,Gainesville) (Entered: 05/11/2000)
718 COPY OF [717-1] order mailed to LAURENE HEYBACH for plaintiff BOBBY M returned as undeliverable because forwarding order expired (atm,Gainesville) (Entered: 05/23/2000)
ARCHIVED RECORD: Accession #: 021 00 0557 Agency Box #: 1-4 of 80 FRC Location #: H0032871 BAN Disposal Date: 2020/07 (tss,Gainesville) (Entered: 09/27/2000)

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 </s> 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 2

3

BOBBY M. , et al. ,

4

Plaintiffs,

, ) No. TCA 83-7003

6

ROBERT GRAHAM, et al.,

j

Defendants.

)

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO ADD NAMED PLAINTIFFS AND AMEND COMPLAINT 9

ARGUMENT 10

RULE 21 OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

11

GIVES THIS COURT AUTHORITY TO ADD NAMED PLAINTFFS

TO THIS LAWSUIT. 12

13 [

Rule 21 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states,

14 pertinent part, that:

Parties may be dropped or added by order of the

court on motion of any party or of its own

6

initiative at any stage of the action and on

such terms as are just.

18

°

Courts have held that, as long as notice and an oppor tur. i .;

19 to be heard are given, parties may be added in the judge's

20 discretion. Gentry v. Smith, 487 F.2d 571 (5th Cir. 1973), Aero

21 C o r p . v. D e p a r t m e n t of the N a v y , 493 F. Supp. 558 (D.C.D.C. 19S1 22

23

24

25

26

1

For example, in Soler v. G. & U., Inc., 86 F.R.D. 524

p

(S.D.N.Y. 1980), the original plaintiffs were migrant farmworkers

for the 1978 migratory season who contested defendants' unfair

wage and payment practices. Plaintiffs moved to add as parties 5
migrant workers for the 1979 migratory season who had similar claims. The court allowed the addition, stating:
Rule 21 simply provides that parties may be added by court order "on such terms as are just." A district coar has considerable discretion in determining whether additior.a parties should be included in a pending action. Gentry v. Smith, 487 F.2d 571, 579-80 (5th Cir. 1973); Fairhouse Dev. Ct. v. Burke, supra, 55 F.R.D. at 419.

Having ruled that the plaintiffs may amend their

complaint to add 1979 claims, the court concludes that othe.

workers seeking to assert the exact same claim should be

permitted to join the action. It appears that all these

_

claims involve the same or related factual and legal

questions. Joinder of additional parties at this stage of

..

the litigation would not create an unfair disadvantage for

the defendants and may preserve judicial resources.

Therefore, the complaint may be amended to include addition?.

parties pursuing claims under the act rising from the 1 9"79

16

season.

17

ld_. a t 528.

18

P l a i n t i f f s in t h i s case move to add RAYMOND C , RICHARD C ,

19

and THOMAS P., minor children presently confined at Okeechobee. i

20

plaintiffs. They challenge the same conditions at issue in the

21

original Complaint, i.e., education and counseling, overcrowd ir.-,

22 •

use and conditions of isolation, and lack of adequate medical

23

psychiatric care. Thus, defendants have notice of plaintiffs'

24

claims, and the addition of RAYMOND C , RICHARD 0., AMD THOMAS

25
as named plaintiffs at this stage of the lawsuit is not 26 prej.ud,lc.i.al..

1

2. THIS PLEADING CAN BE AMENDED PURSUANT TO RULE 15(a)

OF THE FEDE.RAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.

2

3

Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides,

4

in pertinent part that:

5
6 || 7 j

A party may amend his pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when justice so requires.
In the leading case of Fonan v. Davis, 371 U.S. 1978 (1952),

the Supreme Court articulated the general principle that, in the

absence of bad faith or misconduct by the moving party, or undue

prejudice to the opposing party, leave to amend should be "freely

11 12 13 14
17 j 18 I
i 19 i 20 I 21 i

given:" If the underlying facts or circumstances relied upon by
the plaintiff may be a proper subject of relief, he ough- -; be afforded an opportunity to test his claims on the merits. In the absence of any apparent or declared reason -- such as undue delay, bad faith, or dilatory motive on the part of t'r. movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing par^y by virtue of allowance of the amendments, etc. — the leave should as the rules require be "freely given."
I_d. at 182. See 3B J. Moore, W. Taggart & J. Wicker, Moore' s
Federal Practice *\ 15.08 (2d ed. 1974); United States v. Hcuchr.-,
364 U.S. 310, 316-17 (1960); Simons v. United States, 497 F.lc;
1046, 1049-50 (9th Cir. 1974); Howey v. United States, 431 F.lc
1187, 1190 (9th Cir. 1973). Similarly, the Ninth Circuit Courc c:

Appeals has held that, "Rule 15' s policy of favoring amendmer.-s t:

pleadings should be applied with 'extreme liberality.1" Cn ite;":

24

States v. W e b b , 655 F.2d 9 7 7 , 979 (9th Cir. 1981) (quoting

25

Rosenberg Brothers & C o . v. A r n o l d , 28 3 F.2d 40 6 (9th

26

Cir. 1960)).

1

As discussed in section 1 of this brief, adding additional

2 plaintiffs will not cause delay or undue prejudice. Plaintiffs
o

° only use Rule 15(a) to amend the "factual allegations" section of

their complaint to include specific information concerning the 5 plaintiffs. In Joseph v. House, 353 F. Supp. 367 (S.D. Va. 1973)

a case involving a challenge to a municipal ordinance brought cy

several massage parlors, the court allowed the amendment of

additional named plaintiffs, stating that:
q
Rule 21, Fed. R. Civ. P., provides that parties to an actior. may be added by order of the court at any stage of the proceedings ... the main purpose of the amended complaint is to add new plaintiffs. While the original plaintiffs are -^ to be permitted to blandly defeat the requirement that the court must order such additions by proceeding under Rule 1 (cite omitted), the court concludes it appropriate to exercise the discretion vested in it by Rules 15 and 2 permit the filing of the amended complaint. The addition of parties is not made at a late stage of the proceedings.

15

Id. at 371.

1 R
Similarly, in McLellan v. Mississippi Power and Lighi
17 Company, 526 F.2d 870 (5th Cir. 1976), a civil rights action

1 fi

against certain local and international unions, the court allowed

19

the addition of defendants, saying:

20

Professor Wright makes the very practical point that

2

first part of Rule 15(a) contemplates that the court shou!

not have to be concerned with passing on amendments at an

early stage when there is little likelihood of prejudice to

other parties. Finally, the cases that require Rule 21

mechanics but apply Rule 15(a) standards, and those in which

the court goes through the form of giving precedence to Rule

2 1 but then acts on its own initiative to permit the

amendment, give indirect support to our views.

25

Id. at 873.

Plaintiffs in this case are using Rule 21 to add plainti

and Rule 15(a) to include factual allegations regarding the added

plaintiffs, and thus are clearly supported by both rules and case

3 law.
4

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, plaintiffs urge this Court to

order that (1) plaintiffs' motion to add named plaintiffs be

granted, and (2) leave be given to amend plaintiffs' original

Complaint to include the allegations specific to the added

g parties.

10

DATED: June 2, 1986

11

12 Respectfully submitted,
13

14

Michael "Bale

Laurene M. Heybach

Nova University Law Center

16

3100 S.W. 9th Avenue

Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33315

17

(305) 467-0301

18

Carole B. Shauffer

Youth Law Center

1663 Mission Street, Fifth FIco:

San Francisco, CA 94103

20

(415) 543-3307

21

Albert J. Kadeed

Southern Legal Counsel, Inc.

115-A N.E. 7th Avenue .'

Gainesville, FL 32601

23

(904) 377-8288

24

"

Mary E. McClymont

National Prison Project of the

American Civil Liberties Union

1616 P Street, N.W., Suite 340

26

Washington, D.C. 20036

(202) 331-0500

Counsel for Plaintiffs

 </s> UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TALLAHASSEE DIVISION

BOBBY M., et al.,

)

)

Plaintiffs, )

)

vs.

)

)

BOB MARTINEZ, et al.,

)

)

Defendants. )

Civ. Case No. TCA 8 3-7003 MMP

STIPULATION AMENDING POPULATION REDUCTION SCHEDULE
OF CONSENT DECREE
WHEREAS the consent decree in this action requires that beginning July 1, 1989, and continuing until Jur.e 30, 1990, the cap at each training school shall not exceed a resident population of 145 youngsters secured within the perimeter fence (§V, SB);
WHEREAS the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services ("Department") has complied with this provi.sion of the decree;
WHEREAS the consent decree further requires that beginning July 1, 1990, and thereafter, no training school shall exceed a resident population of 100 youngsters secured within the perimeter fence (§V,

WHEREAS the Department's renovations of the cottages at Dozier School for Boys ("Dozier") are substantially completed and accommodate the anticipated July 1, 1990 population cap of 100 youngsters;
WHEREAS Dozier currently exceeds the July 1, 1990, cap, thus requiring youngsters to double bunk until the cap is reached, which raises fire and safety code concerns;
WHEREAS Eckerd Youth Development Center ("EYDC") has the bed capacity to accommodate the current cap of 145 youths inside the fence;
WHEREAS both training schools have a waiting list for admission;
WHEREAS the Department asserts it has decreased, but not eliminated, the waiting lists at the training -choois and the nurrber of adjudicated youngsters waiting for placements;
WHEREAS the court monitor has found that there is an insufficient number of programs available to accommodate adjudicated youngsters waiting for placements;
WHEREAS the Department represents it has made certain efforts, including expanding home detention, Special Intensive Group and re-entry; establishing the Juvenile J;..stioo Continuum Task Force; monitoring overpopulation in all coiumicment and detention programs; monitoring average lengths of stay in all commitment programs; and meeting with judges to discuss reasonable solutions to training school waicing lists and
2

overcrowding in detention centers, including large numbers of adjudicated youths waiting for placement;
WHEREAS the Children, Youth and Families Program Office of the Department requested the Governor to seek legislative funding to initiate new programs to expand the continuum;
WHEREAS the Department has proposed extending the July 1, 1990, cap until March 1, 1991, in accordance with the attached schedule, with Dozier phasing down more quickly than EYDC to accommodate the fire and safety concerns at Dozier;
WHEREAS the court monitor believes that the proposed extension of the population cap is reasonable (see compliance monitoring report, dated Feb. 5, 1990, at p.4);
WHEREAS the plaintiffs believe there is no other solution than the proposed extension to avert further ex ; :erbatIon of the current concerns involved with training school waiting lists, adjudicated youths waiting for placements ar.d the lack of available placements throughout the continuum;
NOW THEREFORE, the parties by and through their counsel hereby further agree as follows:
Section V, paragraph C, of the Consent Decree concerning claims against Governor Bob Martinez, Secretary of the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services Gregory Coler, the Department's Director of Children, Youth ar.c< Families Progra s Jay Kassack, Dozier Superintendent Roy McKay, and EYDC

Superintendent Gerry Luse is hereby amended according to the

attached schedule.

The schedule requires the resident population cap of 100

youths inside the perimeter fence at Dozier to begin December 1,

1990, and remain at that cap thereafter. Beginning March 1,

1991, and thereafter, EYDC shall not exceed a resident

population of 100 youngsters secured within the perimeter fence.

The decree's provisions regarding the population of non-secure

transition programs outside the perimeter fence are not amended

by this stipulation.

DATED:
JOB I SIEGEL J AKiSRT J. HADEED ALICE K. NELSON Southern Legal Counsel 115 NE Seventh Avenue Gainesville, FL 32601 (904) 336-2144

DATED-:
CJZ
JOHIPMILLER General Counsel Departme:.': of HP.S 1323 Winjwood' Blvd. Building 1, F.oo'ii 407 Tallahassee, FL 32399 (904) 48£-236._

MICHAEL DALE Nova University Law Center 31C0 SW Ninth Avenue Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33315 (305) 760-5737
CAROLE 3HAUFFER Youth Law Center 1663 Mission Street, Fifth Floor San Francisco, CA 94103 (415) 543-3379

ATTORNEYS FOF; KRS DEFENDANTS

CLAUDIA WRIGHT National Prison Project 1616 P Street, NW Suite 340
Washington, DC 20036 (202) 331-0500

LAURENE HEYBACH Legal Assistance Foundation of Chicago 343 South Dearborn, Room 815 Chicago, IL 60604 (312) 341-1070
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFFS

HRS RESPONSE TO ORDER ON STATUS CONFERENCE DATED DECEMBER 19, 1989.

Response to Number 6.

In reviewing the alternatives to resolve the double bunking issues at Dozier, our recommendation is as follows for youth inside the fence. The population in transitional cottages (30) would remain the same.

Reduce Dozier population by five (5) beds each month beginning February 1 to reach a cap of 115 by July 1 with no double bunking. This would utilize the following cottages at the following caps on July 1st;

Kennedy

13

Bethune

15

Robinson

15

Reality

15

Dozier

15

Lincoln

15

Roosevelt

22

Reception &

Orientation

_5

Total

115

This would meet fire and safety code and reduce the number of youth in over capacity cottages monthly, on July 1 there would be no double bunking. At a cap of 115 we would meet fire safety and environmental issues. This plan would not require additional funding for staff or renovation. All youth would be located on the South Campus which is the recommendation of the court monitor. The net loss of beds at •Dozier would be thirty beds. This plan has been discussed with Roy McKay, Superintendent of Dozier and has been conceptually agreed upon.

While this reduction is talcing place at Dozier, we would request from Paul DeMuro, that EYDC remain at 145 until July 1st at which*time they'would reduce to 140. Further reductions would continue until March 1st of 1991 when we would reach the court ordered training school population cap of 100 inside the fence at each institution. This plan would include a change in the regional assignment of youth to allow the same number of youth that are being reduced at Dozier to be served at EYDC. The regional assignment change would involve Districts 5, 6 or 7.

1990

Dozier

EYDC

TOTAL

January February March April May June July August September October November December

145 140 135 130 125 120 115 108* 108 108 108 100

145 (145)

290

145 (140 + 5)

285

145 (135 + 10)

280

145 (130 + 15)

275

145 (125 + 20)

270

145 (120 + 25)

265

140 (115 + 25)

255

135 (115 + 20)

243

130 (115 + 15)

238

125 (115 + 10)

233

120 (115 + 5)

228

115 (115)

215

1991

January

100

110

210

February

100

105

205

March

100

100

200

This plan has been discussed with Gerry Luse, Superintendent of EYDC. He assures me that he would be able to stay at the cap of 145 until July provided there are no further cuts in his funding. The renovation schedule at EYDC is such that there would not be fire and safety issues. The planned dates for the completion of cottage renovations would be consistent with the reductions in population. The department would have the opportunity to develop any new programs which may be 'initiated through 90-91 legislative funding.

With the completion of Jackson Cottage (Capacity 15), Roosevelt Cottage would become ISP for a net loss of 7 beds.


[CONTENT] January 2, 1983 | U.S. | District Court Northern District | Florida | 42 | the Rehabilitation Act | 29 | 794 | Florida ||| the McPherson Training School | Ocala | the Arthur G. Dozier School for Boys in | Marianna | the Florida School for Boys | Okeechobee | the Eckerd Youth Development Center ||| the ACLU National Prison Project | the Southern Legal Counsel |||  ||| several years | Florida | a Consent Decree ||| the District Court | Maurice M. Paul | July 7, 1987 ||| Decree | the District Court | 1 | 1987 ||| 2 | February 1, 1983 | July 14, 1983 | 3 | McPherson Training School | August 6, 1985 | 4 | August 6, 1985 | 5 | 13 years of age | August 6, 1985 | 6 | August 6, 1985 ||| Decree ||| years ||| October 29, 1995 | the District Court | Maurice M. Paul | the Dozier Training School ||| Decree | the Eckerd Youth Development Center ||| Bobby M. v. Chiles | 907 | 368 | N.D.Fla | 1995 ||| November 6, 1996 | ECKERD Youth Development Center |||  ||| April 1, 1999 | the District Court | 182,912.19 | 10,724.90 |||  |||  ||| May 10, 2000 | the District Court | Maurice M. Paul |||  [SUMMARY] On January 2, 1983, juveniles filed a class action lawsuit in U.S. District Court Northern District of Florida pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. §794), challenging their conditions of confinement at the juvenile facilities in the State of Florida. Those facilities included the McPherson Training School in Ocala, the Arthur G. Dozier School for Boys in Marianna and the Florida School for Boys at Okeechobee, subsequently renamed the Eckerd Youth Development Center. 

Plaintiffs were represented by attorneys for the ACLU National Prison Project, the Youth Law Center and the Southern Legal Counsel. Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief.  

Following several years of litigation and improvements to the Florida juvenile justice system, the parties entered into a Consent Decree to resolve all claims.  The Consent Decree, which was approved by the District Court (Judge Maurice M. Paul) on July 7, 1987, set forth agreed reforms to be implemented in the following areas: assessment, evaluation and placement of juveniles; education; attorney client access; and prohibition of isolation.  The Decree also incorporated previous orders that had been entered by the District Court, as follows:

1. provision of access to counsel (order on stipulated motion in 1987);

2. prohibition against hogtying and shackling to fixed objects, and regulating the use of mechanical restraints (orders dated February 1, 1983 and July 14, 1983);

3. closure of McPherson Training School (order dated August 6, 1985);

4. removal of females from training schools (order dated August 6, 1985);

5. removal of all children 13 years of age and under from training schools (order dated August 6, 1985); and

6. removal of all status offenders from training schools (order dated August 6, 1985).

Following entry of the Decree, the case was then administratively closed.  Monitoring of the implementation process continued for years.

On October 29, 1995, the District Court (Judge Maurice M. Paul) terminated the Consent Decree as to the Dozier Training School.  The Decree remained in effect as to the Eckerd Youth Development Center.   Bobby M. v. Chiles, 907 F.Supp. 368 (N.D.Fla. 1995).  On November 6, 1996, portions of the consent decree relating to ECKERD Youth Development Center were also terminated.

Thereafter, the parties litigated the issue of liability for post-judgment attorney fees and related expenses.  On April 1, 1999, the District Court entered judgment in favor of plaintiffs for attorneys' fees in the amount of $182,912.19, plus costs in the amount of $10,724.90.  Defendants appealed.  While the case was on appeal, the parties settled the issue of fees and costs.

On May 10, 2000, the District Court (Judge Maurice M. Paul) granted defendants' motion to dismiss the remaining claims and the case was closed.  We have no further information on the case.

