Case 1:16-cv-00429-BLW Document 1 Filed 09/22/16 Page 1 of 44

Greg J. Fuller Daniel S. Brown FULLER LAW OFFICES Attorneys at Law 161 Main Avenue West P. O. Box L Twin Falls, ID 83303 Telephone: (208) 734-1602 Facsimile : (208) 734-1606 ISB #1442 ISB #7538 fullerlaw@cableone.net

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO

* * * * *

JOHN and JANE DOES 1-104,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

vs.

)

)

LAWRENCE WASDEN, Attorney General )

of the State of Idaho; KEVIN KEMPF, )

Director of the Idaho Department of

)

Correction; TERRY KIRKHAM, Chief )

Department of Correction Probation and )

Parole Division, SEXUAL OFFENDER )

MANAGEMENT BOARD and its

)

members, JON BURNHAM, MICHAEL )

JOHNSTON, Ph.d., MOIRA LYNCH, )

JEFFREY BETTS, ERWIN

)

SONNENBERG, JEAN FISHER, PAULA )

GARAY, SHERIFF MATTHEW THOMAS,)

KIMBERLY SIMMONS, WILLIAM

)

CRAWFORD and CHRISTINA IVERSON, )

in their official capacities; COLONEL )

RALPH POWELL, Director, IDAHO

)

STATE POLICE, STEVEN BARTLETT, )

ADA COUNTY SHERIFF; LORIN

)

NIELSEN, BANNOCK COUNTY

)

Case No. ______________
COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF

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SHERIFF; BRENT T. BUNN, BEAR LAKE)

COUNTY SHERIFF; CRAIG T.

)

ROWLAND, BINGHAM COUNTY

)

SHERIFF; PAUL J. WILDE,

)

BONNEVILLE COUNTY SHERIFF;

)

KIERAN DONAHUE, CANYON COUNTY)

SHERIFF; MICHAEL HADERLIE,

)

CARIBOU COUNTY SHERIFF; JAY )

HEWARD, CASSIA COUNTY SHERIFF; )

RICK LAYHER, ELMORE COUNTY )

SHERIFF; DAVID FRYAR, FRANKLIN )

COUNTY SHERIFF; CHARLES

)

ROLLAND, GEM COUNTY SHERIFF; )

SHAUN GOUGH, GOODING COUNTY )

SHERIFF; STEVE ANDERSON,

)

JEFFERSON COUNTY SHERIFF; DOUG )

McFALL, JEROME COUNTY SHERIFF; )

LYNN D. BOWERMAN, LEMHI COUNTY)

SHERIFF; KEVIN ELLIS, LINCOLN )

COUNTY SHERIFF; ERIC SNARR,

)

MINIDOKA COUNTY SHERIFF; JOE )

RODRIGUEZ, NEZ PERCE COUNTY )

SHERIFF; TONY LIFORD, TETON

)

COUNTY SHERIFF; TOM CARTER, )

TWIN FALLS COUNTY SHERIFF, and; )

PATTI BOLEN, VALLEY COUNTY

)

SHERIFF,

)

)

Defendants.

)

* * * * *

COME NOW The Plaintiffs, John and Jane Does 1-104, by and through the

undersigned attorneys, Fuller Law Offices, and file this Complaint for Injunctive and

Declaratory Relief. This is an action under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 to address the

unconstitutionality of Idaho’s Sexual Offender Registration Notification and Community

Right-to-Know Act (hereinafter referred to as Sex Offender Registry) as last amended by the

Idaho State Legislature July 1, 2016. Plaintiffs challenge the Sex Offender Registry and

accompanying statutes/laws to be in violation of the U.S. and Idaho Constitutions and ask

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to permanently enjoin the Defendants from enforcing said laws. NATURE OF THE ACTION
As alleged with greater particularity below, Plaintiffs allege that specific provisions of the Sex Offender Registry and accompanying statutes/laws are unconstitutionally vague in violation of the due process protections of the U.S. and Idaho Constitutions and amount to retroactive punishment, in violation of the ex post facto clause of the U.S. Constitution and the retroactivity clause of the Idaho Constitution. Plaintiffs also allege that the Sex Offender Registry and accompanying statutes/laws further violate the Due Process, Substantive Due Process, Equal Protection, Double Jeopardy, Contracts, and Takings clauses of the U.S. and Idaho Constitutions. Plaintiffs also allege that the Sex Offender Registry and accompanying statutes/laws violate their rights to acquire, possess and protect property; their rights to seek and obtain safety and happiness; their rights to travel, life and liberty; and their rights to freedom of association and religion protected by the First Amendment and Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution, as well as Article 1, Sections 4 and 13 of the Idaho Constitution. Additionally, Plaintiffs allege that the Sex Offender Registry and accompanying statutes/laws constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Article 1, Section 6 of the Idaho Constitution. Finally, Plaintiffs allege that the Sex Offender Registry and accompanying statutes/laws violate the Separation of Powers doctrine of the Idaho Constitution. Plaintiffs are challenging the Sex Offender Registry and laws both facially and as applied to them.
I. JURISDICTION 1. This Court has original subject matter jurisdiction over the federal Constitutional violations alleged in this Complaint pursuant to the provisions of 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 and COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF - 3

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28 U.S.C. Sections 1221 and 1343. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1367(a), this Court has supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs state law claims. This Court has jurisdiction to issue injunctive and declaratory relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 2201 and 42 U.S.C. Section 1983.
2. Venue is proper in the District of Idaho pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1391. All parties work and reside in Idaho, and all actions pertinent to this complaint occurred in the State of Idaho.
II. PARTIES 3. Plaintiff, John Doe 1, a resident of Twin Falls County, State of Idaho, was convicted of a sexual offense in Elmore County, State of Idaho in 1984. His offense was not considered aggravated until July 1, 2009, twenty-five (25) years after the conviction date. John Doe 1 is now required to register for life as an aggravated offender on the Idaho Sex Offender Registry. 4. Plaintiff, John Doe 2, a resident of Ada County, State of Idaho, was convicted of two counts of a sexual offense in Ada County, State of Idaho in 1989. His offense was not considered aggravated until July 1, 2009, twenty (20) years after the date of conviction. John Doe 2 is now required to register for life as an aggravated offender on the Idaho Sex Offender Registry. John Doe 2 petitioned to be released from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry in 2007, but was denied. 5. Plaintiff, John Doe 3, a resident of Twin Falls County, State of Idaho, was convicted of a sexual offense in Twin Falls County, State of Idaho in 1999. His offense was not considered aggravated until July 1, 2009, ten (10) years after the conviction date. John Doe 3 is now required to register for life as an aggravated offender on the Idaho Sex COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF - 4

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Offender Registry. 6. Plaintiff, John Doe 4, a resident of Bonneville County, State of Idaho, was
convicted of a sexual offense in Cassia County, State of Idaho in 1988. His offense was not considered aggravated until July 1, 2009, twenty-one (21) years after the date of conviction. John Doe 4 is now required to register for life as an aggravated offender on the Idaho Sex Offender Registry.
7. Plaintiff, John Doe 5, a resident of Williamson County, State of Texas, was convicted of a sexual offense in Jerome County, State of Idaho in 1988. His offense was not considered aggravated until July 1, 2009, twenty-one (21) years after the date of conviction. John Doe 5 is now required to register for life as an aggravated offender on the Idaho Sex Offender Registry.
8. Plaintiff, John Doe 6, a resident of Cassia County, State of Idaho, was convicted of a sexual offense in Cassia County, State of Idaho in 1991. His offense was not considered aggravated until July 1, 2009, eighteen (18) years after the date of conviction. John Doe 6 is now required to register for life as an aggravated offender on the Idaho Sex Offender Registry.
9. Plaintiff, John Doe 7, a resident of Twin Falls County, State of Idaho, was convicted of a sexual offense in Bannock County, State of Idaho in 1992. His offense was not considered aggravated until July 1, 2009, seventeen (17) years after the date of conviction. John Doe 7 is now required to register for life as an aggravated offender on the Idaho Sex Offender Registry.
10. Plaintiff, John Doe 8, a resident of Jerome County, State of Idaho, was convicted of a sexual offense in Twin Falls County, State of Idaho and a sexual offense in Jerome COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF - 5

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County, State of Idaho in 1994. John Doe 8 petitioned to be removed from the registry in 2011, but was denied. His offense was not considered aggravated until July 1, 2009, fifteen (15) years after the date of conviction. John Doe 8 is now required to register for life as an aggravated offender on the Idaho Sex Offender Registry.
11. Plaintiff, John Doe 9, a resident of Canyon County, State of Idaho, was convicted of a sexual offense in Ada County, State of Idaho in 1992. His offense was not considered aggravated until July 1, 2009, seventeen (17) years after the conviction date. John Doe 9 is now required to register for life as an aggravated offender on the Idaho Sex Offender Registry.
12. Plaintiff, John Doe 10, a resident of Twin Falls County, State of Idaho, was convicted of a sexual offense in Jerome County, State of Idaho in 1992. He petitioned to be released from the sex offender registry in 2004 and was denied. His offense was not considered aggravated until July 1, 2001, nine (9) years after the date of conviction. John Doe 10 is now required to register for life as an aggravated offender on the Idaho Sex Offender Registry.
13. Plaintiff, John Doe 11, a resident of Bingham County, State of Idaho, was convicted of a sexual offense in Cassia County, State of Idaho in 1993. His offense was not considered aggravated until July 1, 2001, eight (8) years after the conviction date. John Doe 11 is now required to register for life as an aggravated offender on the Idaho Sex Offender Registry.
14. Plaintiff, John Doe 12, a resident of Ada County, State of Idaho, was convicted of a sexual offense in Nez Perce County, State of Idaho in 1995. His offense was not considered aggravated until July 1, 2009, fourteen (14) years after the conviction date. John COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF - 6

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Doe 12 is now required to register for life as an aggravated offender on the Idaho Sex Offender Registry.
15. Plaintiff, John Doe 13, a resident of Ada County, State of Idaho, was convicted of a sexual offense in Canyon County, State of Idaho in 1990. His offense was not considered aggravated until July 1, 2001, eleven (11) years after the conviction date. John Doe 13 is now required to register for life as an aggravated offender on the Idaho Sex Offender Registry.
16. Plaintiff, John Doe 14, a resident of Franklin County, State of Idaho, was convicted of a sexual offense in Franklin County, State of Idaho in 1993. His offense was not considered aggravated until July 1, 2009, sixteen (16) years after the date of conviction. John Doe 14 is now required to register for life as an aggravated offender on the Idaho Sex Offender Registry.
17. Plaintiff, John Doe 15, a resident of Minidoka County, State of Idaho, was convicted of a sexual offense in Cassia County, State of Idaho in 1996. He was released from incarceration in June, 2000 and began registering as a violent sexual predator on the Idaho Sex Offender Registry. John Doe 15 should have had standing to be released from the Sex Offender Registry in June, 2010 based on Smith v. State.
18. Plaintiff, John Doe 16, a resident of Bannock County, State of Idaho, was convicted of a sexual offense in Bannock County, State of Idaho in 2002. His offense was not considered aggravated until July 1, 2009, seven (7) years after the date of conviction. John Doe 16 is now required to register for life as an aggravated offender on the Idaho Sex Offender Registry.
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19. Plaintiff, John Doe 17, a resident of Twin Falls County, State of Idaho, was convicted of a sexual offense in Twin Falls County, State of Idaho in 2002. His offense was not considered aggravated until July 1, 2009, seven (7) years after the conviction date. John Doe 17 is now required to register for life as an aggravated offender on the Idaho Sex Offender Registry.
20. Plaintiff, John Doe 18, a resident of Lincoln County, State of Idaho, was convicted of a sexual offense in Lincoln County, State of Idaho in 1989. His offense was not considered aggravated until July 1, 2001, twelve (12) years after the conviction date. John Doe 18 is now required to register for life as an aggravated offender on the Idaho Sex Offender Registry.
21. Plaintiff, John Doe 19, a resident of Twin Falls County, State of Idaho, was convicted of a sexual offense in Twin Falls County, State of Idaho in 2002. His offense was not considered aggravated until July 1, 2009, seven (7) years after the date of conviction. John Doe 19 is now required to register for life as an aggravated offender on the Idaho Sex Offender Registry.
22. Plaintiff, John Doe 20, a resident of Teton County, State of Idaho, was convicted of a sexual offense in Teton County, State of Idaho in 2001. John Doe 20’s offense was not considered aggravated until July 1, 2009, eight (8) years after the conviction date. John Doe 20 is now required to register for life as an aggravated offender on the Idaho Sex Offender Registry.
23. Plaintiff, John Doe 21, a resident of Twin Falls County, State of Idaho, was convicted of a sexual offense in Twin Falls County, State of Idaho in 2001. His offense was not considered aggravated until July 1, 2009, eight (8) years after the date of conviction. COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF - 8

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John Doe 21 is now required to register for life as an aggravated offender on the Idaho Sex Offender Registry.
24. Plaintiff, John Doe 22, a resident of Bonneville County, State of Idaho, was convicted of a sexual offense in Bonneville County, State of Idaho in 1991. His offense was not considered aggravated until July 1, 2001, ten (10) years after the date of conviction. John Doe 22 is now required to register for life as an aggravated offender on the Idaho Sex Offender Registry.
25. Plaintiff, John Doe 23, a resident of Valley County, State of Idaho, was convicted of a sexual offense in Canyon County, State of Idaho in 2000. His offense was not considered aggravated until July 1, 2009, nine (9) years after the date of conviction. John Doe 23 is now required to register for life as an aggravated offender on the Idaho Sex Offender Registry.
26. Plaintiff, John Doe 24, a resident of Lincoln County, State of Idaho, was convicted of a sexual offense in Lincoln County, State of Idaho in 2002. His offense was not considered aggravated until July 1, 2009, seven (7) years after the date of conviction. John Doe 24 is now required to register for life as an aggravated offender on the Idaho Sex Offender Registry.
27. Plaintiff, John Doe 25, a resident of Butte County, State of Idaho, was convicted of a sexual offense in Twin Falls County, State of Idaho in 1990. His offense was not considered aggravated until July 1, 2009, nineteen (19) years after the date of conviction. John Doe 25 is now required to register for life as an aggravated offender on the Idaho Sex Offender Registry.
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28. Plaintiff, John Doe 26, a resident of Ada County, State of Idaho, was convicted of a sexual offense in Bonneville County in 1988. His offense was not considered aggravated until July 1, 2009, twenty-one (21) years after the conviction date. John Doe 26 is now required to register for life as an aggravated offender on the Idaho Sex Offender Registry.
29. Plaintiff, John Doe 27, a resident of Minidoka County, State of Idaho, was convicted of a sexual offense in Ada County, State of Idaho in 1992. His offense was not considered aggravated until July 1, 2009, seventeen (17) years after the date of conviction. John Doe 27 is now required to register for life as an aggravated offender on the Idaho Sex Offender Registry.
30. Plaintiff, John Doe 28, a resident of Ada County, State of Idaho, was convicted of a sexual offense in Gem County, State of Idaho in 1991. His offense was not considered aggravated until July 1, 2009, eighteen (18) years after the date of conviction. John Doe 28 is now required to register for life as an aggravated offender on the Idaho Sex Offender Registry.
31. Plaintiff, John Doe 29, a resident of Twin Falls County, State of Idaho, was convicted of a sexual offense in Jerome County, State of Idaho in 1994. His offense was not considered aggravated until July 1, 2009, fifteen (15) years after the date of conviction. John Doe 29 is now required to register for life as an aggravated offender on the Idaho Sex Offender Registry.
32. Plaintiff, John Doe 30, a resident of Jerome County, State of Idaho, was convicted of a sexual offense in Jerome County, State of Idaho in 1991. His offense was not considered aggravated until July 1, 2001, ten (10) years after the date of conviction. John COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF - 10

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Doe 30 is now required to register for life as an aggravated offender on the Idaho Sex Offender Registry.
33. Plaintiff, John Doe 31, a resident of Franklin County, State of Idaho, was convicted of a sexual offense in Franklin County, State of Idaho in 1997. His offense was not considered aggravated until July 1, 2009, twelve (12) years after the date of conviction. John Doe 31 is now required to register for life as an aggravated offender on the Idaho Sex Offender Registry.
34. Plaintiff, John Doe 32, a resident of Ada County, State of Idaho, was convicted of a sexual offense in Ada County, State of Idaho in 2005. His offense was not considered aggravated until July 1, 2009, four (4) years after the date of conviction. John Doe 32 is now required to register for life as an aggravated offender on the Idaho Sex Offender Registry.
35. Plaintiff, John Doe 33, a resident of Cassia County, State of Idaho, was convicted of a sexual offense in Cassia County, State of Idaho in 2003. His offense was not considered aggravated until July 1, 2009, six (6) years after the date of conviction. John Doe 33 is now required to register for life on the Idaho Sex Offender Registry.
36. Plaintiff, John Doe 34, a resident of Franklin County, State of Idaho, was convicted of a sexual offense in Franklin County, State of Idaho in 2003. His offense was not considered aggravated until July 1, 2009, six (6) years after the date of conviction. John Doe 34 is now required to register for life as an aggravated offender on the Idaho Sex Offender Registry.
37. Plaintiff Jane Doe 35, a resident of Ada County, State of Idaho, was convicted of a sexual offense in Ada County, State of Idaho in 1996. Her offense was not considered aggravated until July 1, 2009, thirteen (13) years after the date of conviction. Jane Doe 35 COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF - 11

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is now required to register for life as an aggravated offender on the Idaho Sex Offender Registry.
38. Plaintiff Jane Doe 36, a resident of Minidoka County, State of Idaho, was convicted of a sexual offense in Cassia County, State of Idaho in 2004. Her offense was not considered aggravated until July 1, 2009, five (5) years after the date of conviction. Jane Doe36 is now required to register for life as an aggravated offender on the Idaho Sex Offender Registry.
39. Plaintiff, John Doe 37, a resident of Twin Falls County, State of Idaho, was convicted of a sexual offense in Twin Falls County, State of Idaho in 2007. His offense was not considered aggravated until July 1, 2009, two (2) years after the conviction date. John Doe 37 is now required to register for life as an aggravated offender on the Idaho Sex Offender Registry.
40. Plaintiff, John Doe 38, a resident of Twin Falls County, State of Idaho, was convicted of two counts of a sexual offense in Twin Falls County, State of Idaho in 2006. His offense was not considered aggravated until July 1, 2009, three (3) years after the date of conviction. John Doe 38 is now required to register for life as an aggravated offender on the Idaho Sex Offender Registry.
41. Plaintiff, John Doe 39, a resident of Ada County, State of Idaho, was convicted of two counts of a sexual offense in 2013. He is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and is not classified as a violent sexual predator, therefore, John Doe 39 is eligible to petition the Court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry.
42. Plaintiff, John Doe 40, a resident of Ada County, State of Idaho, was convicted of a sexual offense in Ada County, State of Idaho in 2006. He is not a recidivist, did not COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF - 12

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commit an aggravated offense, and is not classified as a violent sexual predator, therefore, John Doe 40 is eligible to petition the Court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry.
43. Plaintiff, John Doe 41, a resident of Franklin County, State of Idaho, was convicted of a sexual offense in Franklin County, State of Idaho in 1996. His is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and is not classified as a violent sexual predator, therefore, John Doe 41 will be eligible to petition to the Court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry in 2018.
44. Plaintiff, John Doe 42, a resident of Ada County, State of Idaho, was convicted of a sexual offense in Elmore County, State of Idaho in 2004. He is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and is not classified as a violent sexual predator, therefore, John Doe 42 will be eligible to petition to the Court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry in 2021.
45. Plaintiff, John Doe 43, a resident of Ada County, State of Idaho, was convicted of six (6) counts of a sexual offense in Valley County, State of Idaho in 2004. He is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and is not classified as a violent sexual predator, therefore, John Doe 43 is eligible to petition to the Court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry.
46. Plaintiff, John Doe 44, a resident of Twin Falls County, State of Idaho, was convicted of two (2) sexual crimes in Twin Falls County, State of Idaho in 1992. He is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and is not classified as a violent sexual predator, therefore, John Doe 44 is eligible to petition to the Court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry. However, John Doe 44 did attempt to be removed from the COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF - 13

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registry in 2006 and was denied. 47. Plaintiff, John Doe 45, a resident of Ada County, State of Idaho, was convicted
of a sexual offense in Ada County, State of Idaho in 1999. He is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and is not classified as a violent sexual predator, therefore, John Doe 45 is eligible to petition to the Court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry.
48. Plaintiff, John Doe 46, a resident of Boise County, State of Idaho, was convicted of a sexual offense in Ada County, State of Idaho in 1989. He is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and is not classified as a violent sexual predator, therefore, John Doe 46 is eligible to petition to the Court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry.
49. Plaintiff, John Doe 47, a resident of Gooding County, State of Idaho, was convicted of a sexual offense in Bannock County, State of Idaho in 1993. He is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and is not classified as a violent sexual predator, therefore, John Doe 47 is eligible to petition to the Court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry.
50. Plaintiff, John Doe 48, a resident of Ada County, State of Idaho, was convicted of a sexual offense in Ada County, State of Idaho in 1999. He is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and is not classified as a violent sexual predator, therefore, John Doe 48 is eligible to petition to the Court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry.
51. Plaintiff, John Doe 49, a resident of Caribou County, State of Idaho, was convicted of a sexual offense in Caribou County, State of Idaho, in 1989. His offense was COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF - 14

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not considered aggravated until July 1, 2009, twenty (20) years after the conviction date. John Doe 103 is now required to register for life as an aggravated offender on the Idaho Sex Offender Registry.
52. Plaintiff, John Doe 50, a resident of Twin Falls County, State of Idaho, was convicted of a sexual offense in Ada County, State of Idaho in 1991. He is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and is not classified as a violent sexual predator, therefore, John Doe 50 is eligible to petition to the Court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry.
53. Plaintiff, John Doe 51, a resident of Bingham County, State of Idaho, was convicted of a sexual offense in Twin Falls County, State of Idaho in 2002. He is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and is not classified as a violent sexual predator, therefore, John Doe 51 is eligible to petition to the Court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry.
54. Plaintiff, John Doe 52, a resident of Ada County, State of Idaho, was convicted of a sexual offense in Canyon County, State of Idaho in 2002. He is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and is not classified as a violent sexual predator, therefore, John Doe 52 is eligible to petition to the Court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry.
55. Plaintiff, John Doe 53, a resident of Elmore County, State of Idaho, was convicted of a sexual offense in Elmore County, State of Idaho in 1992. He is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and is not classified as a violent sexual predator, therefore, John Doe 53 is eligible to petition to the Court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry. COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF - 15

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56. Plaintiff, John Doe 54, a resident of Bonneville County, State of Idaho, was convicted of a sexual offense in Jefferson County, State of Idaho in 2003. John Doe 54's offense was considered aggravated at the commission of the offense. John Doe 54 is now required to register for life as an aggravated offender on the Idaho Sex Offender Registry. John Doe 54 does not have standing under the present statutes to petition to be released from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry for the reasons that his duty to register as a sex offender is based solely on the fact that his conviction is a predicate offense, rather than a factual determination of probable future conduct, i.e., that John Doe 54 might pose a high risk of reoffending or engaging in predatory sexual conduct.
57. Plaintiff, John Doe 55, a resident of Twin Falls County, State of Idaho, was convicted of a sexual offense in Twin Falls County, State of Idaho in 2001. John Doe 55's offense was considered aggravated at the commission of the offense. John Doe 55 is now required to register for life as an aggravated offender on the Idaho Sex Offender Registry. John Doe 55 does not have standing under the present statutes to petition to be released from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry for the reasons that his duty to register as a sex offender is based solely on the fact that his conviction is a predicate offense, rather than a factual determination of probable future conduct, i.e., that John Doe 55 might pose a high risk of reoffending or engaging in predatory sexual conduct.
58. Plaintiff, John Doe 56, a resident of Twin Falls, State of Idaho, was convicted of a sexual offense in Twin Falls County, State of Idaho in 2004. John Doe 56's offense was considered aggravated at the commission of the offense. John Doe 56 is now required to register for life as an aggravated offender on the Idaho Sex Offender Registry. John Doe 55 does not have standing under the present statutes to petition to be released from the Idaho COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF - 16

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Sex Offender Registry for the reasons that his duty to register as a sex offender is based solely on the fact that his conviction is a predicate offense, rather than a factual determination of probable future conduct, i.e., that John Doe 56 might pose a high risk of reoffending or engaging in predatory sexual conduct.
59. Plaintiff, John Doe 57, a resident of Ada County, State of Idaho, was convicted of a sexual offense in Tulare County, State of California in 1993. In 1996, John Doe 57 was informed that he must begin registering as a sex offender in the State of California. John Doe 57 moved to Idaho in 2009 and began registering on the Idaho Sex Offender Registry. His offense was not considered aggravated until July 1, 2009, sixteen (16) years after the date of conviction. John Doe 57 is now required to register for life as an aggravated offender on the Idaho Sex Offender Registry.
60. Plaintiff, John Doe 58, a resident of Ada County, State of Idaho, was convicted of a sexual offense in Mountain Home Air Force Base, State of Idaho in 1990. His offense was not considered aggravated until July 1, 2009, nineteen (19) years after the date of conviction. John Doe 58 is now required to register for life as an aggravated offender on the Idaho Sex Offender Registry.
61. Plaintiff, John Doe 59, a resident of Twin Falls County, State of Idaho, was convicted of a sexual offense in Benton County, State of Washington in 1993. He began registering as a sex offender in the State of Washington and continued to register in the State of Idaho when he moved in 2001. He is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and is not classified as a violent sexual predator, therefore, John Doe 59 is eligible to petition to the Court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry.
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62. Plaintiff, John Doe 60, a resident of Twin Falls County, State of Idaho, was convicted of a sexual offense in Maricopa County, State of Arizona in 1992. He moved to the State of Idaho the same year and was informed in 1993 that he must begin registering on the Idaho Sex Offender Registry. His offense was not considered aggravated until July 1, 2009, seventeen (17) years after the date of conviction. John Doe 60 is now required to register for life as an aggravated offender on the Idaho Sex Offender Registry.
63. Plaintiff, John Doe 61, a resident of Twin Falls County, State of Idaho, was convicted of a sexual offense in Shasta County, State of California in 1983. In March 1991, John Doe 61 was placed on parole and moved to the State of Idaho. He was advised in 1996 that he must begin registering as a sex offender in the State of Idaho. His offense was not considered aggravated until July 1, 2001, eighteen (18) years after the date of conviction. John Doe 61 is now required to register for life as an aggravated offender on the Idaho Sex Offender Registry.
64. Plaintiff, John Doe 62, a resident of Bannock County, State of Idaho, was convicted of a sexual offense in Grand County, Colorado in 1988. He moved to Idaho in 1992 and was informed that he must register as a sex offender in 1994. His offense was not considered aggravated until July 1, 2009, twenty-one (21) years after the date of conviction. John Doe 62 is now required to register for life as an aggravated offender on the Idaho Sex Offender Registry.
65. Plaintiff, John Doe 63, a resident of Butte County, State of Idaho, was convicted of a sexual offense in Maricopa County, State of Arizona in 1987. After being released from custody, John Doe 63 moved to the State of Nevada where he began registering as a sex offender. In 2008, John Doe 63 moved to Idaho and began registering on the Idaho Sex COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF - 18

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Offender Registry. His offense was not considered aggravated until July 1, 2009, twenty-two (22) years after the date of conviction. John Doe 63 is now required to register for life as an aggravated offender on the Idaho Sex Offender Registry.
66. Plaintiff, John Doe 64, a resident of Ada County, State of Idaho, was convicted of a sexual offense in Southern Canadian County, State of Oklahoma in 1988. He began registering as a sex offender in the State of Oklahoma in 1988. John Doe 64 moved to the State of Idaho in 2000 and began registering on the Idaho Sex Offender Registry. His offense was not considered aggravated until July 1, 2009, twenty-one (21) years after the conviction date. John Doe 64 is now required to register for life as an aggravated offender on the Idaho Sex Offender Registry.
67. Plaintiff, John Doe 65, a resident of Ada County, State of Idaho, was convicted of a sexual offense in US Military Court, Fort Leavenworth, US in 1991. He began registering on the Idaho Sex Offender Registry in 1995. His offense was not considered aggravated until July 1, 2009, eighteen (18) years after the conviction date. John Doe 65 is now required to register for life as an aggravated offender on the Idaho Sex Offender Registry.
68. Plaintiff, John Doe 66, a resident of Bingham County, State of Idaho, was convicted of a sexual offense in San Joaquin County, State of California in 1987. John Doe 66 moved to Idaho in 1998 and was advised that he must register as a sex offender in the State of Idaho in 1991, which he did. His offense was not considered aggravated until July 1, 2001, fourteen (14) years after the date of conviction. John Doe 66 is now required to register for life as an aggravated offender on the Idaho Sex Offender Registry.
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69. Plaintiff, John Doe 67, a resident of Twin Falls County, State of Idaho, was convicted of a sexual offense in Flathead County, State of Montana in 1988. In 1993, John Doe 67 moved to the State of Idaho. After returning to the State of Montana to complete probation, John Doe 67 returned to the State of Idaho in 1999 and began registering on the Idaho Sex Offender Registry. John Doe 67 is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and is not classified as a violent sexual predator, therefore, John Doe 67 is eligible to petition to the Court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry.
70. Plaintiff, John Doe 68, a resident of Franklin County, State of Idaho, was convicted of four (4) counts of a sexual offense in Logan County, State of Utah in 2004. In 2004 he began registering in the State of Utah. John Doe 68 moved to the State of Idaho in 2006 and began registering in the State of Idaho. His offense was not considered aggravated until July 1, 2009, five (5) years after the date of conviction. John Doe 66 is now required to register for life as an aggravated offender on the Idaho Sex Offender Registry.
71. Plaintiff, John Doe 69, a resident of Bannock County, State of Idaho, was convicted of a sexual offense in US Marshal Court, Portland, State of Oregon in 1999. He moved to Idaho in 1999 and was advised that he must begin registering as a sex offender in 2000. He is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and is not classified as a violent sexual predator, therefore, John Doe 69 is eligible to petition to the Court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry.
72. Plaintiff, John Doe 70, a resident of Ada County, State of Idaho, was convicted of a sexual offense in Ada County, State of Idaho in 2005. He is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and is not classified as a violent sexual predator, therefore, John Doe 70 is eligible to petition the Court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF - 20

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Registry. 73. Plaintiff, John Doe 71, a resident of Ada County, State of Idaho, was convicted
of a sexual offense in Calaveras County, State of California in 2004. John Doe 71's offense was considered aggravated at the commission of the offense. He began registering as a sex offender in the State of California in 2007. John Doe 71 moved to the State of Idaho in September, 2014 and has been registering since that date. John Doe 71 is now required to register for life as an aggravated offender on the Idaho Sex Offender Registry. John Doe 71 does not have standing under the present statutes to petition to be released from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry for the reasons that his duty to register as a sex offender is based solely on the fact that his conviction is a predicate offense, rather than a factual determination of probable future conduct, i.e., that John Doe 71 might pose a high risk of reoffending or engaging in predatory sexual conduct.
74. Plaintiff, John Doe 72, a resident of Bannock County, State of Idaho, was convicted of a sexual offense in Malheur County, State of Oregon in 1994. He was advised in 1996 that he must begin registering as a sex offender in the State of Oregon. John Doe 72 moved to the State of Idaho in 1998 and began registering on the Idaho Sex Offender Registry. He is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and is not classified as a violent sexual predator, therefore, John Doe 72 is eligible to petition to the Court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry.
75. Plaintiff, John Doe 73, a resident of Ada County, State of Idaho, was convicted of a sexual offense in Benton County, State of Washington in 2000. John Joe 73 is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and is not classified as a violent sexual predator, therefore, John Doe 73 is eligible to petition to the Court to be removed form the COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF - 21

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Idaho Sex Offender Registry. 76. Plaintiff, John Doe 74, a resident of Ada County, State of Idaho, was convicted
as a juvenile of a sexual offense in Ada County, State of Idaho in 1995. His offense was not considered aggravated until July 1, 2009, fourteen (14) years after the date of conviction. John Doe 74 is now required to register for life as an aggravated offender on the Idaho Sex Offender Registry.
77. Plaintiff, John Doe 75, a resident of Bonneville County, State of Idaho, was convicted as a juvenile of two (2) counts of sexual offense in Rawlins County, State of Wyoming in 2000. In 2001, John Doe 75 began registering as a sex offender in the State of Wyoming. He moved to the State of Idaho in 2004 and began registering on the Idaho Sex Offender Registry as a Violent Sexual Offender. In 2005, he was no longer considered a Violence Sexual Offender. His offense was not considered aggravated until July 1, 2009, nine (9) years after the date of conviction. John Doe 75 is now required to register for life as an aggravated offender on the Idaho Sex Offender Registry.
78. Plaintiff, John Doe 76, a resident of Ada County, State of Idaho, was convicted of a sexual offense through the United States Marine Corps, in San Diego County, State of California in 1999 and was not required to register as a sex offender in the State of California. He moved to the State of Idaho in June 2000 and began registering as a sex offender. He is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and is not classified as a violent sexual predator, therefore, John Doe 76 is eligible to petition to the Court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry.
79. Plaintiff, John Doe 77, a resident of Twin Falls County, State of Idaho, was convicted of a sexual offense in Duchesne County, State of Utah in 2002. He began COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF - 22

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registering as a sex offender in the State of Utah in 2002. John Doe 77 moved to the State of Idaho in 2008 and began registering on the Idaho Sex Offender Registry. He is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and is not classified as a violent sexual predator, therefore, John Doe 77 should be eligible to petition to the Court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry but for the ex post facto application of the 2011 amendment. However, in 2013, John Doe 77 filed a petition to be released from registration requirements and was denied.
80. Plaintiff, John Doe 78, a resident of Jerome County, State of Idaho, was convicted of a sexual offense in Jerome County, State of Idaho in 1991. He moved to Washington and registered as a sex offender in the State of Washington from 1995 to 2011 before returning to Idaho. John Doe 78’s offense was not considered aggravated until July, 1 2009, nineteen (19) years after the conviction date. John Doe 78 is now required to register for life as an aggravated offender on the Idaho Sex Offender Registry.
81. Plaintiff, John Doe 79, a resident of Gooding County, State of Idaho, was convicted of three (3) counts of a sexual offense in Gooding County, State of Idaho in 2004. His offense was not included in Idaho Code Section 18-8304 until July 1, 2005, a year after the date of conviction.
82. Plaintiff, John Doe 80, a resident of Lemhi County, State of Idaho, was convicted of a sexual offense in Lemhi County, State of Idaho in 1989. He was released from the Idaho State Board of Corrections in October 1993. In November 2013, twenty (20) years after being released from custody, John Doe 80 was informed that he must begin registering in the State of Idaho as a sex offender. John Doe 80 is now required to register for life as an aggravated offender on the Idaho Sex Offender Registry. COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF - 23

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83. Plaintiff, John Doe 81, a resident of Twin Falls County, State of Idaho, was convicted of a sexual offense in Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, United States in 1999. He was not required to register as a sex offender in the State of Arizona, where he was residing. In 2001, John Doe 81 moved to the State of Idaho and, in 2004, he was advised that he must begin registering on the Idaho Sex Offender Registry. In 2013, the Court ruled that his offense was substantially similar to Lewd Conduct with a Minor Child Under 16 Years of Age. However, he should have standing to petition because his offense was not considered aggravated until 2009, ten (10) years after his date of conviction.
84. Plaintiff, John Doe 82, a resident of Ada County, State of Idaho, was convicted of a sexual offense in Sitka County, State of Alaska in 1986. He began registering as a sex offender in the State of Alaska in 1995. John Doe 82 moved to the State of Florida in 2000 and began registering in the State of Florida. In 2008, he was informed that he no longer had to register as a sex offender in the State of Florida. John Doe 82 moved to the State of Idaho in 2013 and should not have had to register in the State of Idaho.
85. Plaintiff, John Doe 83, a resident of Bonneville County, State of Idaho, was convicted of a sexual offense in Hillsdale County, State of Michigan in 1995. Later that year, he legally married the alleged victim and began registering as a sex offender in the State of Michigan. While in Michigan, Joe Doe 83 obtained a divorce. In 2001, John Doe 83 moved to the State of Idaho and registered on the Idaho Sex Offender Registry. His conviction has not been determined to be substantially similar to an Idaho aggravated offense, therefore, he should have been eligible to petition to be released from the registry in 2011.
86. Plaintiff, John Doe 84, a resident of Ada County, State of Idaho, was convicted of sexual offenses in 1980 and 1985 in Multnomah County, State of Oregon as well as two COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF - 24

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(2) offenses in 1990 in Marion County, State of Oregon. John Doe 84 began registering as a sex offender in the State of Oregon in 1999. In 2005, he moved to the State of Idaho. John Doe 84's Due Process rights were violated as his conviction was never determined to be substantially similar to those in Idaho. John Doe 84 is now required to register for life as an aggravated offender on the Idaho Sex Offender Registry.
87. Plaintiff, John Doe 85, a resident of Gooding County, State of Idaho, was convicted of a sexual offense in Cape Girardeau County, State of Missouri in 1985. In December, 1985, John Doe 85 moved to Idaho. John Doe 85 had completed parole in 1986, seven (7) years prior to the existence of the Sex Offender Registry. It was not until 2009, twenty-four (24) years after the conviction date, that he was informed that he was required to register as a sex offender.
88. Plaintiff, John Doe 86, a resident of Lincoln County, State of Idaho, was convicted of a sexual offense in Los Angeles County, State of California in 1986. He began registering as a sex offender in the State of California in 1993. He then registered on the Idaho Sex Offender Registry when he moved to Idaho in 1995. Between December 2009 and March 2010, John Doe 86 petitioned to be removed from the registry and was successful, however, on June 14, 2010, John Doe 86 received a letter from the Idaho State Police revoking the earlier granted expungement. John Doe 86’s offense was not considered aggravated until July 1, 2009, twenty-three (23) years after the conviction date. John Doe 86 is now required to register for life as an aggravated offender on the Idaho Sex Offender Registry.
89. Plaintiff, John Doe 87, a resident of Bonneville County, State of Idaho, was convicted of a sexual offense in Bonneville County, State of Idaho in 1999. His offense was COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF - 25

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not considered aggravated until July 1, 2001, two years after the date of conviction. John Doe 87 is now required to register for life as an aggravated offender on the Idaho Sex Offender Registry.
90. Plaintiff, John Doe 88, a resident of Bonneville County, State of Idaho, was convicted of a sexual offense in Bonneville County, State of Idaho in 1989. His offense was not considered aggravated until July 1, 2001, twelve years after the conviction date. John Doe 88 is now required to register for life as an aggravated offender on the Idaho Sex Offender Registry.
91. Plaintiff, John Doe 89, a resident of Jefferson County, State of Idaho, was convicted of a sexual offense in Jefferson County, State of Idaho in 2011. He is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and is not classified as a violent sexual predator, therefore, John Doe 89 should be eligible to petition the Court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry in August 2022.
92. Plaintiff, John Doe 90, a resident of Franklin County, State of Idaho, was convicted of a sexual offense in Cache County, State of Utah in 1997 while he was a resident of the State of Idaho. He is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and is not classified as a violent sexual predator, therefore, John Doe 90 is eligible to petition the Court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry.
93. Plaintiff, John Doe 91, a resident of Twin Falls, State of Idaho, was convicted of a sexual offense in Bonneville County, State of Idaho in 2013. John Doe 91's offense was considered aggravated at the commission of the offense. John Doe 91 is now required to register for life as an aggravated offender on the Idaho Sex Offender Registry. John Doe 91 does not have standing under the present statutes to petition to be released from the Idaho COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF - 26

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Sex Offender Registry for the reasons that his duty to register as a sex offender is based solely on the fact that conviction of a predicate offense, rather than a factual determination of probable future conduct, i.e., that John Doe 91 poses a high risk of reoffending or engaging in predatory sexual conduct.
94. Plaintiff, John Doe 92, a resident of Bonneville County, State of Idaho, was convicted of a sexual offense in Bonneville County, State of Idaho in 2000. His offense was not considered aggravated until July 1, 2001, a year after the conviction date. John Doe 92 is now required to register for life as an aggravated offender on the Idaho Sex Offender Registry.
95. Plaintiff, John Doe 93, a resident of Lemhi County, State of Idaho, was convicted of a sexual offense in Germany in 2010 while he was a member of the military. In February 2011, John Doe 93 was moved to Fort Lewis, State of Washington, and was advised that he must begin registering on the Sex Offender Registry. After being released from incarceration in March 2012, John Doe returned to the State of Idaho and has continued to register. He is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and is not classified as a violent sexual predator, therefore, John Doe 93 should be eligible in 2021 to petition to the Court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry.
96. Plaintiff, John Doe 94, a resident of Bannock County, State of Idaho, was convicted of a sexual offense in Bear Lake County, State of Idaho in 1993. His offense was not considered aggravated until July 1, 2001, eight years after the date of conviction. John Doe 94 is now required to register for life as an aggravated offender on the Idaho Sex Offender Registry.
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97. Plaintiff, John Doe 95, a resident of Twin Falls County, State of Idaho, was convicted of a misdemeanor sexual offense in San Joaquin County, State of California in 2003. His offense did not require registration in the State of California. He moved to Idaho in 2004 and was not required to register until 2009 when Idaho authorities reclassified his offense as a felony rather than the original misdemeanor. John Doe 95 should not have to register as a sex offender in the State of Idaho because his due process rights were violated because there was not a determination of substantial conformance.
98. Plaintiff, John Doe 96, a resident of Dunn County, State of North Dakota, was convicted of a sexual offense in Lincoln County, State of Idaho in 1992. In 1995, John Doe 96 underwent a castration procedure in order to block his sexual urges. He is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and is not classified as a violent sexual predator, therefore, John Doe 96 is eligible to petition the Court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry.
99. Plaintiff, John Doe 97, a resident of Ada County, State of Idaho, was convicted of a sexual offense in Bingham County, State of Idaho in 1997. His offense was not considered aggravated until July 1, 2001, a year after the conviction date. John Doe 97 is now required to register for life as an aggravated offender on the Idaho Sex Offender Registry.
100. Plaintiff, John Doe 98, a resident of Jerome County, State of Idaho, was convicted of a sexual offense in Jerome County, State of Idaho in 1989. He is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and is not classified as a violent sexual predator, therefore, John Doe 98 is eligible to petition the Court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry. COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF - 28

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101. Plaintiff, John Doe 99, a resident of Ada County, State of Idaho, was convicted of a sexual offense in Canyon County, State of Idaho in 2005. His offense was not considered aggravated until July 1, 2001, a year after the conviction date. John Doe 99 is now required to register for life as an aggravated offender on the Idaho Sex Offender Registry.
102. Plaintiff, John Doe 100, a resident of Bannock County, State of Idaho, was convicted of a misdemeanor sexual offense in Cascade County, State of Montana, in 1996. His offense did not require registration in the State of Montana. He moved to Idaho in 2005 and was not required to register until 2007 when Idaho authorities reclassified his offense as a felony rather than the original misdemeanor. John Doe 100 should not have to register as a sex offender in the State of Idaho because his due process rights were violated because there was not a determination of substantial conformance.
103. Plaintiff, John Doe 101, a resident of Bingham County, State of Idaho, was convicted of a sexual offense in Minidoka County, State of Idaho in 1998. His offense was not considered aggravated until July 1, 2001, three (3) years after the conviction date. John Doe 101 is now required to register for life as an aggravated offender on the Idaho Sex Offender Registry.
104. Plaintiff, John Doe 102, a resident of Ada County, State of Idaho, was convicted of a sexual offense in Ada County, State of Idaho in 1988. He is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and is not classified as a violent sexual predator, therefore, John Doe 102 is eligible to petition the Court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry.
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105. Plaintiff, John Doe 103 a resident of Caribou County, State of Idaho, was convicted of sexual abuse of a minor under the age of 16, to-wit: 12 years, a felony, in Caribou County, State of Idaho in 1989. His offense was not considered aggravated until July 1, 2009, twenty (20) years after the conviction date. John Doe 103 is now required to register for life as an aggravated offender on the Idaho Sex Offender Registry.
106. Plaintiff, John Doe 104, a resident of Jerome County, State of Idaho, was convicted of Rape and Sexual Abuse of a Child Under 16 years, both felonies, in Twin Falls County, State of Idaho, in 2002. His offense was not considered aggravated until July 1, 2009, seven (7) years after the date of conviction. John Doe 104 is now required to register for life as an aggravated offender on the Idaho Sex Offender Registry.
107. “Does” herein refers to John and Jane Does 1-104. 108. Defendant, Lawrence Wasden, is the Attorney General for the State of Idaho. Defendant Wasden is sued in his official capacity. 109. Defendant, Kevin Kempf, is Director of the Idaho Department of Correction. The Idaho Department of Correction is vested with the authority to enforce the Sex Offender Registry and accompanying statutes/laws. Defendant Kempf is sued in his official capacity. 110. Defendant, Terry Kirkham, is the Chief of the Parole and Probation Division of the Idaho Department of Correction. The Parole and Probation division is vested with authority to enforce the Sex Offender Registry and accompanying statutes/laws. Defendant Atencio is sued in his official capacity. 111. Defendant, Sexual Offender Management Board, is vested with authority to develop, advance and oversee statewide sexual offender management policies and practices. Defendants Jon Burnham, Michael Johnston, Ph.D., Moira Lynch, Erwin Sonnenberg, COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF - 30

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Jeffrey Betts, Jean Fisher, Paula Garay, Sheriff Matthew Thomas, Kimberly Simmons, William Crawford and Christina Iverson are sued in their official capacities as Members of the Sexual Offender Management Board.
112. Defendant, Colonel Ralph Powell, is the Director of the IDAHO STATE POLICE. The Idaho State Police is vested with authority to enforce the Sex Offender Registry and accompanying statutes/laws. Defendant Powell is sued in his official capacity.
113. Defendant Stephen Bartlett is Sheriff of the Ada County Sheriff’s Office; Defendant Lorin Nielsen is Sheriff of the Bannock County Sheriff’s Office; Sheriff Brent T. Bunn is the Sheriff of Bear Lake County Sheriff’s Office; Defendant Craig T. Rowland is the Sheriff of the Bingham County Sheriff’s Office; Defendant Paul J. Wilde is the Sheriff of the Bonneville County Sheriff’s Office; Defendant Kieran Donahue is the Sheriff of the Canyon County Sheriff’s Office; Defendant Michael Haderlie is the Sheriff of Caribou County Sheriff’s Office; Defendant Jay Heward is the Sheriff of Cassia County Sheriff’s Office; Defendant Rick Layher is the Sheriff of the Elmore County Sheriff’s Office; Defendant David Fryar is the Sheriff of the Franklin County Sheriff’s Office; Defendant Charles Rolland is the Sheriff of the Gem County Sheriff’s Office; Defendant Shaun Gough is the Sheriff of the Gooding County Sheriff’s Office; Defendant Steve Anderson is the Sheriff of the Jefferson County Sheriff’s Office; Defendant Doug McFall is the Sheriff of the Jerome County Sheriff’s Office; Defendant Lynn D. Bowerman is the Sheriff of the Lemhi County Sheriff’s Office; Defendant Kevin Ellis is the Sheriff of the Lincoln County Sheriff’s Office; Defendant Eric Snarr is the Sheriff of the Minidoka County Sheriff’s Office; Defendant Joe Rodriguez is the Sheriff of the Nez Perce County Sheriff’s Office; Defendant Tony Liford is the Sheriff of the Teton County Sheriff’s Office; Defendant Tom Carter is the Sheriff of the Twin Falls County Sheriff’s Office; and, Defendant Patti Bolen is the Sheriff of the COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF - 31

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Valley County Sheriff’s Office. Each individual Sheriff’s Office is vested with authority to enforce the Sex Offender Registry and accompanying statutes/laws, including but not limited to the community notification provisions therein. Defendants Sheriffs are sued in their official capacity as the executive/enforcement agency of the Sex Offender Registry for the State of Idaho, on behalf of the respective Plaintiffs that reside in each of those counties.
III. STANDING 114. All Doe Plaintiffs are directly affected by the Sex Offender Registry and accompanying statutes/laws and their unconstitutional enforcement. The Sex Offender Registry and accompanying statutes/laws and their enforcement have directly caused violations of Doe Plaintiffs’ rights under the U.S. and Idaho Constitutions. Thus, the requirements for Article III standing have been met. IV. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS: HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF SEX
OFFENDER REGISTRY 1993
115. Sex offender registration in Idaho began on July 1, 1993. It established a statutory duty for persons convicted of certain felony sex crimes to register with their local sheriff. In 1998, the Legislature repealed the original act and enacted the "Sexual Offenders Registration Notification and Community Right-to-Know Act" to strengthen program administration and to expand public access to central registry information.
1998 116. The 1998 statute applied to any person who, on or after July 1, 1993, was convicted of a crime listed in Idaho Code Section 18-8304(1)(a), was incarcerated or on probation or parole on or after July 1, 1993 for crimes listed, or entered the State on or after July 1, 1993 and who has been convicted of any crime that is substantially equivalent to the COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF - 32

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listed offenses. This statute did not apply to any such person while they were incarcerated and a conviction in this chapter meant that the person had pled guilty or had been found guilty, notwithstanding the form of the judgment or withheld judgment. The 1998 statute indicated that any person, other than one designated as a violent sexual predator, may, after a period of ten (10) years from the date the person was released from incarceration or placed on parole, supervised release or probation, whichever was greater, petition the District Court for a show cause hearing to determine whether the person shall be exempted from the duty to register as a sexual offender. At that time, “violent sexual predator” meant a person who had been convicted of an offense listed in section 18-8312, Idaho Code, and who had been determined to pose a risk of committing an offense or engaging in predatory sexual conduct. The offender was required to provide clear and convincing evidence that he/she was not at risk to commit a crime identified in section 18-8304, provide an affidavit indicating that the petitioner did not have a criminal charge pending nor was he/she knowingly under criminal investigation for any crime identified in 18-8304, provide proof of service of petition to the prosecuting attorney, and provide a certified copy of the judgment of conviction.
117. The 1998 statutes set forth that offenders were required to obtain psychosexual evaluations upon conviction as well as upon release from incarceration and offenders were required to pay for such evaluations, unless indigent (I.C. Section 18-8318, 1998)
118. The 1998 statutes set out that offenders who failed to comply with registration requirements could be convicted of a felony and could be punished by imprisonment for a period not to exceed five (5) years and a fine not to exceed five thousand dollars ($5,000). If the offender was on probation or otherwise on supervised release during the violation of this chapter, the probation or supervised release could be revoked and the original sentence reinstated. If an offender willfully provided false information to the registry, he/she could COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF - 33

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be found guilty of a felony and punished by imprisonment for a period not to exceed five (5) years and a fine not to exceed five thousand dollars ($5,000).
2001 119. In 2001, amendments were made to Idaho Code Section 18-8303, 18-8304, 188310, and 18-8323. Specifically, those amendments included, among other things, the removal of petitioning rights of offenders who had been convicted of an “aggravated offense.” The definition of an “aggravated offense” included 18-1508 (lewd conduct, when the victim is less than twelve (12) years of age); 18-4003(d) (murder committed in the perpetration of rape); 18-6101 (rape, but excluding section 18-3101(1) where the victim is at least twelve (12) years of age or the defendant is eighteen (18) years of age or younger); 18-6108 (male rape); and 18-6608 (forcible sexual penetration by use of a foreign object. Code Section 18-8323 added that the department may make the sex offender registry available to the public via the internet.
2002 120. In 2002, amendments were made to Idaho Code Section 18-8303, 18-8312, and 18-8314. Specifically, Idaho Code Section 18-8314 was the new reference as to whether an offender was considered a violent sexual predator and, in the same section, Idaho Code Section 18-6101(1) (when the offender is eighteen (18) years of age or younger) was excluded from said list.
2004 121. In 2004, amendments were made to Idaho Code Sections 18-8303, 18-8304, 188306, 18-8307, 18-8314, 18-8315, 18-8317, 18-8327, and 18-8328. Specifically, those amendments included, among other things, the addition of Idaho Code 18-6609 (video voyeurism) being included in the list of crimes that require registration. Idaho Code Section COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF - 34

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18-8314(3) was added which stated that the classification board was to review offenders who were convicted out of state in order to determine if they are violent sexual predators. Code Section 18-8317 was amended so that only those sex offenders who were deemed appropriate for review by the classification board were subject to a psychosexual evaluation prior to release from incarceration. Idaho Code Section 18-8327 was added to the statute which stated that it was “a felony... for an offender to accept employment in any day care center, group day care facility or family day care home,... or to be upon or to remain on the premises of a day care center, group day care facility or family day care home while children are present, other than to drop off or pick up the offender's child or children.” In addition, Code Section 18-8307(7) stated that all offenders would receive written notifications of duty to register which would include a warning of this Idaho Code Section. Idaho Code Section 188328 was also added which stated that offenders could petition to be excluded from the provisions in 18-8327 and 18-8314. To do so, offenders would have to show clear and convincing evidence that the offender does not pose a threat and it has been at least ten (10) years since the person’s last conviction.
2005 122. In 2005, amendments were made to Idaho Code Sections 18-8304, 18-8307, and 18-8324. Specifically, those amendments included, among other things, the addition of Idaho Code Section 18-6110 (sexual contact with a prisoner) as a crime that requires registration. Additionally, Idaho Code 18-8304(1)( c ) was added which states that this chapter applies to any person who was convicted of any crime, an attempt, a solicitation, or a conspiracy to commit a crime in another state, territory, commonwealth, or other jurisdiction of the United States that is substantially equivalent to the offenses listed in 188304(1)(a) and was required to register as a sex offender in any other state or jurisdiction COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF - 35

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when he established permanent or temporary residency in Idaho. 2006
123. In 2006, amendments were made to Idaho Code Sections 18-8304, 18-8307, 188308, 18-8311, 18-8314, 18-8324, and 18-8329. Specifically, those amendments included, among other things, the addition of 18-8304(4) which stated that if a defendant was nineteen or twenty years of age at the commission of the offence and no more than three (3) years older than the victim and was convicted of rape under section 18-6101(1), the Court may order that the defendant is exempt from the provisions in this chapter. Code Section 18-8308 was amended to include address verification every thirty (30) days for violent sexual predators and every four (4) months for all other offenders. Code Section 18-8308(1)(a)(iii) was added to allow the sheriff to verify the address of violent sexual predators once every six (6) months or at any other time if the offender fails to comply with other provisions. Idaho Code Section 18-8311 was amended to include failure to verify address as a felony crime punishable by imprisonment for a period not to exceed ten (10) years and a fine not to exceed five thousand dollars ($5,000). Additionally, punishment for providing misleading or false information as well as evasion of service was increased from incarceration not to exceed a period of five (5) years, to incarceration not to exceed a period of ten (10) years. Code Section 18-8314 gave power to the members of the classification board to review offenders who had violated their duty to register. Idaho Code Section 18-8324 was amended so that the sheriff not only was required to disseminate the name, address, and photograph of violent sexual predators through the newspaper, but also through local radio and television media. Code Section 18-8329 was added this year and stated that it is a misdemeanor for a person who is required to register to be on school grounds where there are children under the age of eighteen (18) years, knowingly loiter on a public way within five hundred (500) feet COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF - 36

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of a school building or school grounds in this state when children under the age of eighteen (18) years are present, be in any conveyance owned, leased or contracted by a school to transport students to or from school or a school-related activity when children under the age of eighteen (18) years are present in the conveyance, reside within five hundred (500) feet of the property on which a school is located, provided however, that this shall not apply if such person's residence was established prior to July 1, 2006. However, this does not apply to offenders who are a student at the school, are attending academic conference or other scheduled school events with school officials as a parent or legal guardian of a child who is enrolled in the school and is participating in the conference or event, resides at a state licensed or certified facility for incarceration, health or convalescent care, are dropping off or picking up a child or children and the person is the child or children's parent or legal guardian, or are temporarily on school grounds, during school hours, for the purpose of making a mail, food or other delivery.
2008 124. In 2008, amendments were made to Idaho Code Sections 18-8329 and 18-8331. Specifically, those amendments included, among other things, the provision that allowed registered offenders to be on school grounds for extracurricular activities, to vote, and to drop off mail at an official post office located on school grounds. Idaho Code Section 188331 was added which stated that a person who is required to register as a sex offender may not reside with more than one other person who is required to register as a sex offender. A person can petition this section, but must convince a judge of the District Court that these provisions would deprive the petitioner of a constitutionally guaranteed right and that such right is more compelling than the interest of the state and local government in protecting neighboring citizens from risk of physical or psychological harm. Additionally, any city or COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF - 37

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county may establish standards for the establishment and operation of residential houses for registered sex offenders which exceed the allowed number of registered sex offenders. And any person who is violating this code section may be found guilty of a misdemeanor.
2009 125. In 2009, amendments were made to Idaho Code Sections 18-8303, 18-8304, 188308, and 18-8310. Those amendments included, among other things, the expansion of the definition of an “aggravated offense.” Specifically, 18-1508 (lewd conduct, when the victim is less than twelve (12) years of age) was changed to 18-1508 (lewd conduct). Other sections were added to the list of aggravated offenders including 18-1506A (ritualized abuse of a child), 18-4502 (first-degree kidnaping committed for the purpose of rape, committing an infamous crime against nature, committing any lewd and lascivious act upon a child under the age of sixteen (16) years or for purposes of sexual gratification or arousal), 18-4503 (second degree kidnaping where the victim is an unrelated minor child and the kidnaping is committed for the purpose of rape, committing an infamous crime against nature, committing any lewd and lascivious act upon any child under the age of sixteen (16) years or for the purposes of sexual gratification or arousal), 18-8602(1) (sex trafficking), and any other offense set forth in section 18-8304, Idaho Code, if at the time of the commission of the offense the victim was below the age of thirteen (13) years. Additionally, Idaho Code Section 18-8304 was expanded so that this chapter applied to persons who were convicted of 18-919 (sexual exploitation by a medical care provider), 18-1505B (sexual abuse and exploitation of a vulnerable adult), 18-5609 (inducing persons under eighteen (18) years of age into prostitution), or 18-8602(1) (sex trafficking). Idaho Code Section 18-8308 provided that all violent sexual predators will be monitored with electronic monitoring technology for the duration of the individual's probation or parole period. Any person who, without COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF - 38

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authority, intentionally alters, tampers with, damages or destroys any electronic monitoring equipment required to be worn or used by a violent sexual predator could be found guilty of a felony.
2010 126. In 2010, amendments were made to Idaho Code Sections 18-8303, 18-8304, 188308, and 18-8314. Specifically, those amendments included, among other things, 18-8303 where a section of the definition of an “aggravated offense” was amended from 18-6108 (male rape) to 18-8108 (male rape, but excluding section 18-6108(1) where the victim is at least twelve (12) years of age or the defendant is eighteen(18) years of age). This change was also made in Code Sections 18-8304 and 18-8314.
2011 127. In 2011, amendments were made to Idaho Code Sections 18-8302, 18-8303, 188304, 18-8305, 18-8306, 18-8307, 18-8308, 18-8309, 18-8310, 18-8311, 18-8312, 18-8314, 18-8315, 18-8316, 18-8318, 18-8323, 18-8324, and 18-8329. Additionally, 18-8317, 188319, 18-8320, 18-8321, and 18-8322 were repealed. Specifically, 18-8302 was amended to state that the legislature finds that sexual offenders present a danger, rather than that they present a significant risk of reoffense. Code Section 18-8303 was amended so that an offense that is substantially similar to any of the foregoing offenses under the laws of another jurisdiction or military court or the court of another country is considered an “aggravated offense.” Additionally, the same code section altered the definition of “violent sexual predator” to mean a person who was designated as a violent sexual predator by the sex offender classification board where such designation has not been removed by judicial action or otherwise.
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128. Idaho Code Section 18-8304 provided that this chapter shall now apply to people who are convicted of 18-5605 (detention for prostitution), 18-5611 (inducing person under eighteen (18) years of age to patronize a prostitute), 18-6609 (video voyeurism where the victim is a minor or upon a second or subsequent conviction), or 18-7804 (if the racketeering act involves kidnaping of a minor).
129. Idaho Code Section 18-8305 stated that the registry must be in digital form or include links or identification numbers that provide access to the information in other databases in which it is included in digital form. The registry includes, but is not limited to, the following information: name and all aliases, a complete physical description of the person including any identifying marks, such as scars or tattoos, the offender's date of birth, the offender's social security number, the criminal history of the offender, the name under which the offender was convicted of each offense, the status of parole, probation or supervised release, registration status, the existence of any outstanding arrest warrants for the offender, the criminal offense for which the sexual offender is registered, the name and location of each hospital, jail or penal institution to which the offender was committed for each offense covered under this chapter, the address or physical description of each residence at which the offender resides, the name and address of any place where the offender is a student or will be a student, the license plate number and a description of any vehicle owned or regularly operated by the sexual offender regardless of to whom the vehicle is registered, any e-mail or instant messaging address used by the offender, the offender's telephone numbers, the name and address of any place where the offender is employed or will be employed and the name and address of any place where the offender works as a volunteer or otherwise works, a description of normal travel routes or the general areas in which the offender works, information regarding any professional license maintained by the offender COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF - 40

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that authorizes the offender to engage in an occupation or carry out a trade or business, information about the offender's passport, and if the offender is an alien, information about documents establishing the offender's immigration status including document type and number information for such documents and a digitized copy of the documents, a set of fingerprints and palm prints of the offender, a current photograph of the offender, and a photocopy of a valid driver's license or identification card issued to the offender.
130. Idaho Code Section 18-8306 stated that the offender shall register within two (2) working days of the judgment of conviction if the offender was not sentenced to incarceration and was only placed on probation. The same stated that if the offender was incarcerated, they must register prior to release.
131. Idaho Code Section 18-8307 stated that registration documents will request the information set out in Idaho Code Section 18-8305. It also amended the registration for violent sexual predators from annually to quarterly. Idaho Code Section 18-8307(7) was added and states that an offender shall keep the registration current for the full registration period. The full registration period is for life; however, offenders may petition for release from the full registration period as set forth in section 18–8310, Idaho Code.
132. Idaho Code Section 18-8309 was repealed and replaced with a new version. This required offenders to report any changes to their address, name, or employment status within two (2) working days of said change. It also required offenders to notify the department of any lodging that will last longer than a period of seven (7) days and will notify the jurisdiction of the location the offender will be lodging. Offenders are now required to give notice of any vehicle changes, as well as additional requirements.
133. Idaho Code Section 18-8310 was amended to state that registration under this act is for life, however, any offender, other than a recidivist, an offender who has been COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF - 41

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convicted of an aggravated offense, or an offender designated as a violent sexual predator, may, after a period of ten (10) years from the date the offender was released from incarceration or placed on parole, supervised release or probation, whichever is greater, petition the district court for a show cause hearing to determine whether the offender shall be exempted from the duty to register as a sexual offender. In the petition, the offender shall provide clear and convincing evidence that the petitioner has completed any periods of supervised release, probation or parole without revocation, provide an affidavit indicating that the petitioner does not have a criminal charge pending or is knowingly under investigation for any crime identified in 18-8304, provide clear and convincing evidence that the petitioner has successfully completed a sexual offender treatment program, and provide an affidavit demonstrating that the petitioner has no felony convictions and has committed no sex offenses during the period of which the petitioner has been registered. Idaho Code Section 18-8310(2) gives the prosecuting attorney and central registry the opportunity to submit evidence, affidavits, or other documents rebutting the assertions contained within the offender’s petition.
134. Idaho Code Section 18-8311(3) was removed so the possible felony conviction for evasion of service was no longer an option.
135. Idaho Code Section 18-8312 changed the name of the Sex Offender Classification Board to the Sex Offender Management Board. The Board was increased from four (4) to nine (9) members and those members are now eligible for reappointment to the Board without limitations. The amendments removed the section stating that the board was to assess the risk of reoffense of any offender convicted and incarcerated for commission of a crime that may classify them as a violent sexual predator, recidivist, or an aggravated offender. It is now stated that the board shall be charged with the advancement and oversight COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF - 42

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of sexual offender management policies and practices statewide. 136. Idaho Code Section 18-8314 amendments removed all duties that involved
evaluating and classifying offenders. Instead, they are in charge of creating standards and procedures that evaluators have to follow as well as administering certifications to evaluators.
137. Idaho Code Section 18-8315 was amended so that the management board has no exceptions to the open meeting law and there is no written record of the vote which classifies the offender.
138. Idaho Code Section 18-8316 was amended to state that offenders may submit to an evaluation rather than they shall submit to an evaluation.
139. Idaho Code Section 18-8323 was amended to state that the department or sheriff shall provide public access to sex offender registry information via the internet. This information is now limited to the offender’s name, date of birth, address of each residence, address of any place the offender may be a student, physical description, offense the offender is registering for, photograph, temporary lodging information. In addition, this code section states that the identity of the victim, offender’s social security number, any arrests of the offender that did not result in conviction, any internet identifier used by the offender, any passports and immigration documents, and any information identifying any person related to, living with, working for, employing, or otherwise associated with the offender will not be released to the public.
140. Idaho Code Section 18-8324 was amended so that the department shall, within three (3) days, disseminate any registration information, including any changes in registry information, to: the attorney general of the United States, each school and public housing agency in each area the offender resides, each jurisdiction where the sexual offender resides, COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF - 43

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criminal justice agencies through the public safety and security information system, social service entities, volunteer organizations, and any organization, company, or individual who requests notification of changes in registry information.
141. Idaho Code Section 18-8329 was amended so that subsections (1)(a) and (1)(b) now applies to an offender who is attending an academic conference or other scheduled extracurricular school event, an offender who is dropping off or picking up a child or children and the person is the child or children’s parent or legal guardian, an offender who is temporarily on school grounds, during school hours, for the purpose of making a mail, food, or other delivery unless they have contacted the school district office annually and has obtained written permission from the district. These also apply to an offender who has written permission from a school principal, vice-principal to be on the school grounds.
142. In 2012, amendments were made to Idaho Code Section 18-8304 where subsection 18-8304(4) was removed which previously stated that when a defendant is convicted of rape under section 18-6101(2) at the time of the offense and the defendant is nineteen or twenty years of age and not more than three years older than the victim of the rape, the court may order that the defendant is exempt from the duty to register. Additionally, 18-8310A was added which stated that any person who was convicted under 18-6101(1) as it existed before July 1, 2010, where such person would not have been convicted under section 18-6101(1) or (2), may petition the district court for a determination to be exempt.
143. In 2013, amendments were made to Idaho Code Section 18-8304 and 18-8307. Those amendments included, among other things, the addition of 18-5610 (utilizing a person under eighteen years of age for prostitution) as an offense that requires registration. Idaho Code Section 18-8307 doubled the registration fee to a total of $80.00 per year. COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF - 44

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V. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS: CLASSIFICATION AND RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF SORA 2001, 2009, 2011
144. SORA 2001, 2009, 2011 classifies registrants based upon whether their offense was an “aggravated offense,” and determines the length of time that a person must register and the frequency of reporting. 145. SORA 2001, 2009, 2011 classifications are based solely on the offense of conviction.
146. SORA 2001, 2009, 2011classifications are not based on, and do not correspond to, a registrant’s actual risk of re-offending or the danger any registrant poses to the public.
147. Prior to SORA 2011, most Idaho registrants were required to register for 10 years. The amendment of SORA 2011 required that registrants that were required to register for 10 years were extended to life. There was no individualized determination about the risk or whether lifetime registration was warranted.
148. Although the plaintiffs have clinically been determined to be low risk, under SORA 2001, 2009, 2011 they were retroactively classified as “aggravated offenders” and must register and comply with SORA 2011 until they die.
149. Even upon the clearest proof that the plaintiffs are not dangerous, there is no mechanism in the statute that would allow the plaintiffs to have their registration obligations eliminated or reduced.
150. SORA 2001, 2009, 2011 are not limited to individuals who committed sex offenses, but some cases require registration and reporting by individuals convicted of other offenses that do not have a sexual component, at least as far as out-of-state registrants are concerned.

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VI. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS: IMPACT OF SORA 2001, 2009 AND 2011 ON THE PLAINTIFFS
151. SORA 2001, 2009, 2011 imposes obligations, disabilities, and restraints that are so extensive that they cannot be set out in full here, but by way of summary, are as follows:
By way of summary, SORA 2001, 2009, 2011 subjects the plaintiffs to continuous reporting, surveillance, and supervision. In addition, SORA 2001, 2009, 2011 severely limits their ability to direct the upbringing of their children, find housing and employment, get an education, travel, engage in free speech activities (including use of the Internet), be free from harassment and stigma, and understand what is required of them under the statute.
152. Finally, registration under SORA 2001, 2009, 2011 triggers a vast array of additional obligations, disabilities, and restraints under other federal, state, and local laws, as well as private policies barring or limiting registrants from access to goods or services available to the public.
A. Reporting, Surveillance, and Supervision 153. The plaintiffs must report in person regularly and must provide: • all names and nicknames, Social Security number, and date of birth; • residential address, including any address where the individual expects to spend more than seven days, as well as the dates of any such temporary stays; • employer names and addresses, including information on any person who agrees to hire a registrant for a temporary job, as well as the routes of travel for non-stationary

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employment; • schools attending or schools to which accepted; • telephone numbers registered to the individual or routinely used; • e-mail and instant message addresses, log-in names or other identifiers assigned to
the individual or routinely used, if, in fact, the registrant is granted internet usage; • all other designations used in Internet communications or postings; • license plate and registration information for any vehicle owned or regularly
operated by the individual, and the location where that vehicle is kept; • driver’s license or personal ID card; • passport and immigration documents; • occupational license information; and • a complete physical description. 154. SORA 2001, 2009, 2011 also requires the plaintiffs to provide a photograph,
fingerprints, and palm prints. If a plaintiff’s appearance changes, he or she must update the photograph.
155. In addition to reporting in person at regular intervals, the plaintiffs must report in person within two working days whenever certain information changes. The immediate, in-person reporting requirement is triggered whenever the plaintiffs:
• change their residence; • begin, change, or discontinue employment; • enroll or dis-enroll as a student;

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• change their name; • intend to travel for more than seven days; • establish an e-mail address, instant message address, or other Internet designation; and • buy or begin using a vehicle, or cease owning or using a vehicle. 156. There are no good-cause exceptions to the reporting requirements or to the “immediate” notification requirements. Regardless of illness, injury, transportation problems, or other emergencies, the plaintiffs must report in person within two days or face criminal charges. 157. SORA 2001, 2009, 2011’s reporting, surveillance, and supervision requirements are similar to, but more restrictive and onerous than, the reporting, surveillance, and supervision that the plaintiffs experienced while serving their sentences on probation or parole. 158. Under SORA 2001, 2009, 2011, the plaintiffs must report significantly more information than what they were required to report while they were serving their sentences on probation or parole. 159. SORA 2001, 2009, 2011’s requirement that minor changes be reported in person within two business days is a level of reporting that far exceeds what the plaintiffs experienced while they were serving their sentences on probation or parole. 160. As a result of SORA 2001, 2009, 2011’s immediate reporting requirements, coupled with the reporting requirements, the plaintiffs must – for the rest of their lives –

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report in person to law enforcement with a frequency that is similar to, and often greater than, their reporting obligations when they were on probation or parole.
161. For the plaintiffs, the lifetime surveillance imposed by these reporting requirements is not only intrusive, but burdensome. The time required to register or update information varies depending on where and when the plaintiffs report. Each registration can take up to an hour-and-a-half, not including travel time.
B. Family and Parenting 162. SORA 2001, 2009, 2011 has severely impaired the plaintiffs’ family relationships and parenting, in large part because the statute bars the plaintiffs from “residing” or “loitering” within 500 feet of school property. “To loiter” means “to remain for a period of time and under circumstances that a reasonable person would determine is for the primary purpose of observing or contacting minors.” This provision contains no exception for the plaintiff-parents, who are observing or contacting their own children. 163. For example, permission has to be obtained for parents to attend their children’s school and extra-curricular events, whereupon many have to be accompanied by an approved supervisor. C. Housing 164. SORA 2001, 2009, 2011 also severely limits the plaintiffs’ access to housing. 165. SORA 2001, 2009, 2011 bars the plaintiffs from “residing” within 500 feet of school property, making a substantial amount of housing unavailable as a matter of law. The plaintiffs are also prohibited from living with family members if those family members live

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within 500 feet of school property. 166. Because sex offender registry address information is public, many landlords
outside geographic exclusion zones refuse to rent to registrants, since their properties can then be easily identified on the registry.
167. In some cases, Plaintiffs have been denied subsidized housing for reasons that under Federal Law, individuals subject to lifetime sex offender registrations are barred from subsidized housing.
D. Employment 168. SORA 2001, 2009, 2011 bars the plaintiffs from working within 500 feet of school property, making a substantial number of jobs unavailable to the plaintiffs as a matter of law. 169. Moreover the possible public posting of employment by employers who hire the plaintiffs can create a significant disincentive for employers to hire the plaintiffs, and regularly lose employment opportunities because of their status of registered sex offenders. 170. It is a virtual impossibility for registrants to obtain employment dealing with the public. E. Education 171. SORA 2001, 2009, 2011 has also made it more difficult for the plaintiffs to get an education. 172. Many plaintiffs have been denied opportunities for education, such as medical assistant, nursing, teaching, and several GED programs, as many of those programs

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automatically reject registered sex offenders. F. Travel 173. The plaintiffs’ status as registrants has severely restricted their ability to travel. 174. The plaintiffs must provide advance notice when they intend to travel
anywhere for more than seven days. They must tell the police where they are going, where they will stay, how long they will be there, and when they will return.
175. The plaintiffs must provide advance notice if they travel outside the U.S. for more than seven days.
176. If the plaintiffs travel, they must comply with any applicable sex offender registration laws in other jurisdictions and must register there if they intend to stay over a prescribed period of time. Because sex offender laws are exceedingly complex and vary from state to state, it is extremely difficult to obtain accurate information about either affirmative reporting obligations (such as registering one’s presence in a state) or prohibitions on ordinary behavior (such as visiting a library or park) in other jurisdictions.
G. Speech & Internet 177. SORA 2001, 2009, 2011 severely restricts the plaintiffs’ ability to speak freely on the Internet. The plaintiffs not only must provide law enforcement with all electronic mail addresses, instant message addresses, log-in names, or other identifiers that are assigned to or routinely used by them, but must also immediately report whenever they establish any electronic mail address, instant message address, or other designation used in Internet communications or postings.

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178. The plaintiffs are concerned about using the Internet because SORA 2001, 2009, 2011 is unclear about whether, for example, they must report immediately and in person if they set up an on-line account to pay their taxes, register with Netflix, purchase or review products on Amazon, or use a college on-line bulletin board.
H. False Information and Public Stigmatization 179. The public registry website labels registrants which stigmatizes them, and publicly and falsely identifies them as among the most dangerous sex offenders on the registry. 180. The public registry website posts extensive personal information about each registrant, including residential address, date of birth, physical description (weight, height, etc.), and a photograph. 181. Because they are stigmatized as sex offenders on the public registry website, the plaintiffs and their families are subjected to harassment, social ostracism, and even threats of violence. I. Vagueness, Strict Liability, and Impossibility of Compliance 182. The plaintiffs have been further harmed because the restrictions and obligations of SORA 2001, 2009, 2011 are so vague that the plaintiffs are unable to know whether or not they are in violation of the law, or are so extensive and pervasive that the plaintiffs are literally unable to comply with the law. Moreover, different law enforcement agencies in different places apply the requirements of SORA 2011 differently. 183. SORA 2001, 2009, 2011’s requirements for reporting personal information are

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so vague that the plaintiffs do not understand what information must be reported, or what changes in information subject them to the in-person immediate reporting requirement, which some jurisdictions impose. That because some of the restrictions and obligations are so vague and confusing, plaintiffs are concerned that they will inadvertently violate requirements because they did not understand what they are.
184. Finally, SORA 2001, 2009, 2011 imposes criminal liability despite the impossibility of compliance. SORA 2001, 2009, 2011 imposes liability regardless of whether illness, injury, or practical difficulties make compliance impossible.
185. SORA 2001, 2009, 2011 imposes penalties of up to 10 years imprisonment for violations of the Act.
J. Consequences Beyond SORA 2001, 2009, 2011 186. Because the plaintiffs are required to register as sex offenders under SORA 2001, 2009, 2011, they are also subject to a vast and complex array of laws and ordinances imposed on registered sex offenders by the federal government, other states or tribal governments, and local municipalities. 187. Because registration in one state generally triggers registration in another state, the fact that the plaintiffs are subject to SORA 2001, 2009, 2011 means they are also subject to the sex offender laws of other jurisdictions if they travel or move. 188. In addition, because the plaintiffs are required to register as sex offenders under SORA 2001, 2009, 2011, they are subject to policies by private entities that refuse to provide goods or services to registered sex offenders. But for the fact that the plaintiffs are

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labeled by the state as registered sex offenders, the goods and services provided by those private entities would generally be available to them. VII. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS: SORA 2001, 2009, 2011 IS NOT RATIONALLY
RELATED TO THE GOAL OF PUBLIC SAFETY 189. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as set forth fully herein. 190. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, this claim is brought by all Plaintiffs against all State Defendants. 191. The avowed purpose of Idaho’s sex offender registry is to “assist efforts of local law enforcement agencies to protect communities by requiring sexual offenders to register with local law enforcement agencies and to make certain information about sexual offenders available to the public...” I.C. Section 18-8302. 192. The idea that SORA 2001, 2009, 2011 will promote public safety is based on the assumption that sex offender registration will reduce recidivism by convicted offenders and thereby reduce the risk to the public. 193. That assumption is false. 194. In fact, the research shows that public registries are likely to increase, rather than decrease, recidivism, and are therefore counterproductive to their avowed purpose of public protection. 195. As outlined in more detail in the declaration of James J. Prescott (Exh. A) largescale empirical research on the impact of sex offender registries has found that public sex

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offender registries have likely increased, and almost certainly not reduced, the frequency of sex offenders. (By contrast, the research has also found that private law enforcement registries have reduced recidivism against family members, neighbors, etc., though not against strangers).
196. Specifically, this research shows that the more people a state subjects to public sex offender registration, the higher the relative frequency of sex offenses in that state. Public registries (based on the offense of conviction) correlate with an increase in frequency of sex offenses against all types of victims (family members, neighbors, acquaintances, and strangers). Prescott Decl., at 3-4 (Exh. A).
197. Although it may seem counter-intuitive that public registration increases rather than decreases recidivism, these results reflect the fact that sex offender registration and the attendant consequences exacerbate risk factors for recidivism, such as lack of employment and housing, and prevent healthy reintegration into the community. Prescott Decl., at 7-8 (Exh. A).
198. These results are mirrored by other evidence-based research on the impact of sex offender registration. Most studies reveal no significant reduction in sex crime rates that can be attributed to sex offender laws and policies. Rather, there is a significant body of empirical work that overwhelmingly shows that, at best, public registration makes no difference to recidivism rates, and that it may well be counter-productive. See Levenson Decl., at 3 (Exh. B); Prescott Decl., at 12 (Exh. A).
199. The two studies that detected reductions in sex crime recidivism after the

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passage of registration laws were both in states that have risk-based, rather than offensebased, classification, and that limit public notification to those offenders who have been individually determined to pose the greatest threat to community safety. See Levenson Decl., at 3 (Exh. B).
200. Moreover, there is no research to support the hypothesis that registrants who live closer to child-oriented settings are more likely to reoffend. Rather, the research shows that where registrants live is not a significant contributing factor to recidivism. See Levinson Decl., at 4 (Exh. B).
201. Residency restrictions reduce housing options for registrants, leading to housing instability. Housing instability is consistently correlated with higher criminal recidivism, and may help account for the increases in recidivism triggered by registration. See Prescott Decl., at 7-8 (Exh. A); Levenson Decl., at 5-6 (Exh. B). Thus, residency restrictions are likely to increase rather than decrease sexual offending.
202. Similarly, requirements that interfere with employment, social support, and engagement in pro-social activities undermine the avowed public safety goals of sex offender registration laws. Social policies that ostracize and disrupt the stability of sex offenders are counterproductive to increasing public safety. See Levenson Decl., at 7, 10 (Exh. B).
203. Failure to comply with registration requirements does not predict sexual recidivism. Levenson Decl., at 11-12 (Exh. B).
204. There is no empirical evidence to support the notion that more frequent registration check-ins lower recidivism, nor is there evidence that reporting additional

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information (e.g., email addresses, employment information) reduces recidivism. Levenson Decl., at 10 (Exh. B).
205. In sum, SORA 2001, 2009, 2011 is not rationally related to the public safety goal it purports to serve. VIII. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS: THE REQUIREMENTS OF SORA 2001, 2009,
2011 BEAR NO REASONABLE RELATIONSHIP TO THE RISK THAT INDIVIDUAL REGISTRANTS POSE TO THE COMMUNITY
206. SORA 2001, 2009, 2011 is also premised on the assumption that all individuals convicted of sex offenses pose a great risk in public safety, which justifies continuous and lengthy supervision and restrictions.
207. In fact, while some individuals convicted of sex offenses will reoffend, the vast majority of new sex offenses are committed not by registered offenders, but by individuals without prior sex offenses. For example, a study in New York found that 95% of all arrests for sexual offenses were for individuals who did not have a prior sexual offense conviction and who were not on a sex offender registry. See Levenson Decl., at 8 (Exh. B).
208. Among those with prior sex offenses, recidivism rates vary with the presence of certain risk factors. See Levenson Decl., at 8 (Exh. B). While some individuals convicted of sex offenses pose a significant risk to public safety, most do not.
209. Most sex offenders do not re-offend sexually. First-time sexual offenders are significantly less likely to re-offend than those with multiple sexual convictions, and offenders over the age of 50 are less likely to re-offend than younger offenders. Moreover,

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recidivism rates differ significantly depending on the nature of the offense (e.g., rape, incest, child victim, etc.).
210. Research indicates that the risk for sexual re-offending is reduced by half when a person has spent 5-10 years offense-free in the community. The risk continues to decline the more time the person spends offense-free in the community. Risk for sexual recidivism also declines with age. See Levenson Decl., at 10 (Exh. B).
211. SORA 2001, 2009. 2011 is not based on risk. The tier to which an individual is assigned, whether the individual is listed on the public registry, and how long an individual must register, are all based solely on the offense of conviction, not on the individual’s level of risk.
212. Because recidivism risk declines significantly with advancing age and with time spent offense-free in the community, requiring registration for 25 years to life is both inefficient and unnecessary. See Levenson Decl. (Exh. B) at 10.
213. In addition, SORA 2001, 2009, 2011, by focusing on the danger posed by strangers (who can be identified through the registry), misidentifies the source of risk. In 93% of cases of child sexual abuse, the offender was a family member or acquaintance, not a stranger listed on the registry.
214. Public sex offender registration and residency restrictions, which focus on “stranger danger,” give parents a false sense of security by implying that knowing where sex offenders live or banishing them from the community in fact reduces the risk of sex offenses being committed, when such measures do not have this effect. See Levenson Decl., at 9

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(Exh. B). 215. In sum, the requirements of SORA 2001, 2009, 2011 bear no rational
relationship to the risks that individual registrants pose to the community. IX. THE ACTIONS OF THE LEGISLATURE IN AMENDING THE SEX OFFENDER REGISTRY IN 2009 REPRESENT A VIOLATION OF ALL REGISTRANTS’ RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS 216. In February 2009, the Idaho Supreme Court in Smith vs. State of Idaho, 146
Idaho 822, ruled that “Idaho’s statutory scheme for VSP designation minimizes, at every turn, the possibility that an offender has the required notice and opportunity to be heard.” The Court further stated that “due process requires that the State bears the burden of proving, in some meaningful time, that the Defendant deserves the classification assigned.”
217. At the time of the Smith decision, a sex offender had a right to a due process hearing to determine whether he or she should be put in a class requiring VSPs to update their information every ninety (90) days and to remain on the Registry for life. In other words, classification as a VSP was based upon a factual determination of probable future conduct, i.e., that the offender posed a high risk of committing another offense or engage in predatory sexual conduct.
The Supreme Court in its determination that the defendant had been denied his rights to due process stated:
“The legislature created the Board to ‘assess the risk of reoffense of any offender convicted and incarcerated for commission of a crime as set forth in section 18-8314, Idaho Code, to determine whether the offender should be designated a violent sexual predator.’ I.C. § 18-8312(1). The legislature

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imposed the duty upon the Board to establish objective guidelines to be used in the determination of whether an offender should be designated a VSP.
The board shall establish guidelines to determine whether an offender who meets the criteria of this section is a violent sexual predator presenting a high risk of reoffense. The guidelines shall be established with the assistance of sexual offender treatment and law enforcement professionals who have, by education, experience or training, expertise in the assessment and treatment of sexual offenders.
(a) Factors to be used in establishment of the guidelines must be supported in the sexual offender assessment field as criteria reasonably related to the risk of reoffense and be objective criteria that can be gathered in a consistent and reliable manner.
(b) The guidelines shall include, but are not limited to, the following general categories for risk assessment: seriousness of the offense, offense history, whether the offense was predatory, characteristics of the offender, characteristics of the victim, relationship of the offender to the victim, the number of victims and the number of violations of each victim.”
I.C. § 18-8314(5). Further, the legislature authorized the Board to promulgate rules to carry out the provisions of the Act. I.C. § 18-8314(8).
The Court further stated:
“This Court has previously stated that judicial review is turned into a superfluous exercise of rubberstamping when the decision of a state board sitting in a disciplinary or quasi-judicial position relies on the “expertise,” “experience,” and “collective knowledge” of its members on an “ad hoc basis” rather than declaring and applying clearly articulated standards to the cases before it. H & V Eng'g, Inc. v. Idaho State Bd. of Prof. Eng'rs & Land Surveyors, 113 Idaho 646, 650, 747 P.2d 55, 59 (1988); Tuma v. Bd. of Nursing, 100 Idaho 74, 81, 593 P.2d 711, 718 (1979). In Tuma, we rejected the Board of Nursing's argument that it need not further define “unprofessional conduct” when disciplining a registered nurse. 100 Idaho at 79, 593 P.2d at 716. The Board of Nursing unsuccessfully argued that providing a definition was unnecessary since that board was composed of experts who were fit and capable in their own right to determine the standards of their profession from their personnel knowledge and experience. Id. at 81,

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593 P.2d at 718. In H & V, we similarly rejected the Board of Engineers' reliance on the knowledge and expertise of its members in rendering a disciplinary decision on what constituted professional “misconduct” in the absence of a clearly defined standards. 113 Idaho at 650, 747 P.2d at 59. Both of these cases noted the due process ramifications implicit in a board's failure to avail itself of the opportunity to expand upon the legislative grounds under which its determinations are based. H & V, 113 Idaho at 651, 747 P.2d at 60; Tuma, 100 Idaho at 79, 593 P.2d at 716. This is because reliance on “the phantom of unknown standards” robs the opportunity for notice. H & V, 113 Idaho at 651, 747 P.2d at 60. We find the instant case to be analogous to Tuma and H & V and conclude that, in the absence of objective 12 and clearly defined guidelines and standards upon which Smith's VSP designation may be evaluated, his due process rights could not be protected by the process of judicial review.”
218. The legislature’s response to the decision in Smith vs. State of Idaho, within
approximately four (4) months, was to simply amend SORA by changing the name of the
Sexual Offender Classification Board to the Sexual Offender Management Board, and
requiring all sexual offenders, whether violent or not, to be classified as aggravated
offenders, and to be treated exactly as VSPs, i.e., to remain on the Registry for life.
219. The original Board was required to establish guidelines to determine whether
an offender was a violent sexual predator depending on a high risk to reoffend. The
Guidelines were to be established with the assistance of sexual offender treatment and law
enforcement professionals who had, by education, experience or training, expertise in the
assessment and treatment of sexual offenders.
220. By eliminating the Sexual Offender Classification Board and replacing it with
the Sexual Offender Management Board, with no further classification powers, the
legislature very cleverly side-stepped the Supreme Court’s requirements espoused under
Smith vs. State of Idaho, and effectively removed any provisions regarding classification by

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putting all sex offenders in the same boat, i.e., to be treated as violent sex offenders for life. 221. Essentially, prior to the 2009 amendment to SORA, designation as a VSP
resulted in consequences beyond requiring the designee to register as a sex offender. NonVSP Sex offenders needed only to update their information and photographs on the registry annually, while VSPs had to do it every ninety (90) days. And, non-VSP offenders could petition the court for relief from duty to register after a period of ten (10) years, while a VSP had to remain on the registry for life. Thus, for an offender at that time, only designation as a VSP resulted in the indelible scarlet letters.
222. What the legislature did in response to Smith vs. State of Idaho, and as a result of the 2009 amendment to SORA, was to simply create a situation where the scarlet letters became indelible to all sex offenders, rather than provide the due process required by the Supreme Court.
X. FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION Violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (Due Process) 223. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as set forth fully herein. 224. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, this claim is brought by all Plaintiffs against all State Defendants.

225. SORA 2001, 2009, 2011 is vague and ambiguous and fails to sufficiently define

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who is subject to the laws, what their effects are, and what the penalties for failure to comply with them are, in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
226. SORA 2001, 2009, 2011 also violates the Due Process Clause because it reassesses offenders and subjects them to new restrictions and requirements, regardless of any actual risk to society and without the possibility of any hearing and without any requirement by the State of Idaho to provide offenders with any notice of their classification or any new prohibitions or requirements.
227. Further, SORA 2001, 2009, 2011 violates the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution because it fails to further any legitimate governmental purpose.
228. Each of the Plaintiffs has been, or imminently will be, injured by these constitutional violations, and the Plaintiffs are entitled to declaratory and injunctive relief.
XI. SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION Violations of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (Free Exercise of Religion) 229. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as set forth fully herein. 230. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, this claim is brought by all Plaintiffs against all State Defendants. 231. Because churches and other places of worship fall within the places certain sex offenders may not “knowingly be” within 500 feet of under SORA 2001, 2009, 2011,

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regardless of the actual known risk offenders, SORA 2001, 2009, 2011 improperly interferes with offenders’ right to practice religion without undue governmental interference.
232. The Plaintiffs have been, or imminently will be, injured by these constitutional violations, and Plaintiffs are entitled to declaratory and injunctive relief.
XII. THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION Violations of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (Substantive Due Process) 233. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as set forth fully herein. 234. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, this claim is brought by all Plaintiffs against all State Defendants. 235. SORA 2001, 2009, 2011, impacts the Does’ ability to travel throughout Idaho, attend church or other religious services, go to Court or attorney offices, parent their children, and live with their families, SORA 2001, 2009, 2011 impinges on their fundamental rights to free association, travel, and to raise their children without undue governmental interference. 236. Each of the Plaintiffs has been, or imminently will be, injured by these constitutional violations, and the Plaintiffs are entitled to declaratory and injunctive relief.
XIII. FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION Violations of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (Equal Protection)

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237. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as set forth fully herein.
238. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, this claim is brought by all Plaintiffs against all State Defendants.
239. These laws are irrational, and designed only to burden an unpopular group. SORA 2001, 2009, 2011 thus violate the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution.
240. Each of the Plaintiffs has been, or imminently will be, injured by these constitutional violations, and the Plaintiffs are entitled to declaratory and injunctive relief.
XIV. FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION Violations of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (Cruel and Unusual Punishment) 241. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as set forth fully herein. 242. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, this claim is brought by all Plaintiffs against all State Defendants. 243. SORA 2001, 2009, 2011 impose extensive punishments, both on persons previously convicted of sexual offenses and prospectively, that are excessive in relation to the crimes offenders are convicted of. For example, anyone convicted of any crime with any “sexual element” or any crime that is considered an “aggravated” offense, no matter when they were convicted, is considered a sex offender under SORA 2001, 2009, 2011 and is subject to community notification and registration requirements.

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244. Community notification can subject offenders to violence at the hands of vigilantes. Human Rights Watch, in a comprehensive 2007 study of sex offender laws (laws that were far less extreme than SORA 2001, 2009, 2011) and their effects and utility, found that public safety was not furthered by expanding notification and restriction provisions, but offenders were subjected to vigilantism:
Information provided by state online sex offender registries, as well as information provided during community notification by law enforcement, is not just used by private citizens to determine what streets their children can walk on, or whom to avoid. Neighbors as well as strangers harass, intimidate and physically assault people who have committed sex crimes. At least four registered sex offenders have been killed. P. 89, “No Easy Answers: Sex Offender Laws in the United States,” Human Rights Watch, available at http://222.hrw.org/reports/2007/us0907/usO907web.pdf. Each of the Plaintiffs has been, or imminently will be, injured by Eighth Amendment violations, and the Plaintiffs are entitled to declaratory and injunctive relief.
XV. SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION Violation of Article 1, §9 of the United States Constitution under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(Ex Post Facto) 245. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as set forth fully herein. 246. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, this claim is brought by all Plaintiffs against all State Defendants. 247. The effect and intent of SORA 2001, 2009, 2011 are punitive and impose new punishments, including but not limited to the affirmative disability of having to register in

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person every twelve (12) months, banishment from their families and communities, on offenders convicted before their enactment.
248. Each of the Plaintiffs has been, or imminently will be, injured by these constitutional violations, and the Plaintiffs are entitled to declaratory and injunctive relief.
XVI. SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION Violations of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (Double Jeopardy) 249. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as set forth fully herein. 250. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, this claim is brought by all Plaintiffs against all State Defendants. 251. SORA 2001, 2009, 2011 impose new punishments on persons previously convicted, and impose registration duties, community notification, and movement and residence restrictions based on the crime originally committed, rather than any actual risk of recidivism, in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the U.S. Constitution. 252. Each of the above-described Plaintiffs has been, or imminently will be, injured by these constitutional violations, and the Plaintiffs are entitled to declaratory and injunctive relief.

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XVII. EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION Violation of Article 1, §10 to the United States Constitution under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(Contracts Clause) 253. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as set forth fully herein. 254. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, this claim is brought by John Doe 57, John Doe 59, John Does 60 thru John Doe 69, John Does 71 thru John Doe 73, John Doe 75, John Doe 76, John Doe 77, John Does 81 thru John Doe 86, John Doe 90, John Doe 93, John Doe 95 and John Doe 100 against all State Defendants. 255. SORA 2001, 2009, 2011 operates as a substantial impairment to the preexisting contractual relationship between the state and Plaintiffs Guilty Plea Agreements by imposing new terms not negotiated which drastically increase, and, or require lifetime supervision, registration and community notification. 256. Each of the above-described Plaintiffs has been, or imminently will be, injured by these constitutional violations, and the Plaintiffs are entitled to declaratory and injunctive relief.
XVIII. NINTH CAUSE OF ACTION Violation of Article 1, §16 to the Idaho Constitution (State Contract Clause)
257. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as set forth fully herein.
258. This claim is brought by all Plaintiffs against all State Defendants.

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259. For the same reasons that the SORA 2001, 2009, 2011 violate the contracts clause of the United States Constitution, that also violate the contracts clause of the Idaho State Constitution.
XIX. TENTH CAUSE OF ACTION Violation of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (Takings Clause) 260. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as set forth fully herein. 261. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C., Section 1983, this claim is brought by all Plaintiffs against all State Defendants. 262. SORA 2001, 2009, 2011, by placing residential and movement restrictions on Plaintiffs, unconstitutionally restricts Plaintiffs’ property rights to the point that constitutes a regulatory taking requiring just compensation. 263. Each of the Plaintiffs has been, or imminently will be, injured by these constitutional violations, and the Plaintiffs are entitled to declaratory and injunctive relief.
XX. ELEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION Violation of Article II, Section I of the Idaho Constitution (Separation of Powers)
264. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as set forth fully herein.
265. This claim is brought by all Plaintiffs against all State Defendants. 266. SORA 2001, 2009, 2011 violates the States Separation of Powers doctrine as

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it limits the judicial power of sentence finality as the law vacates existing court judgments regarding sex offenders’ classifications, and community notification and reverse final court judgments setting the length of time that sex offenders must register.
267. Each of the Plaintiffs has been, or imminently will be, injured by these constitutional violations, and the Plaintiffs are entitled to declaratory and injunctive relief.
XXI. PRAYER FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs request this Honorable Court for the following: 1. A declaration that SORA 2001, 2009, 2011 violate, both facially and as applied by the Defendants, the due process clause of the United States Constitution (U.S. CONST., Amend. XIV); 2. A declaration that SORA 2001, 2009, 2011 violate, both facially and as applied by the Defendants, the due process clause of the Idaho Constitution (ID CONST., Article I, § 13 ); 3. A declaration that SORA 2001, 2009, 2011 violate, both facially and as applied by the Defendants, the First Amendment to the United States Constitution (U.S. CONST., Amend. I); 4. A declaration that SORA 2001, 2009, 2011 violate, both facially and as applied by the Defendants, the right to practice religion without governmental interference protected by the Idaho Constitution (ID CONST., Article I, § 4 ); 5. A declaration that SORA 2001, 2009, 2011 violate, both facially and as applied by the Defendants, the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution (U.S.

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CONST., Amend. IV); 6. A declaration that SORA 2001, 2009, 2011 violate, both facially and as applied
by the Defendants, the right to equal protection guaranteed by the Idaho Constitution (ID CONST., Article I, § 1 );
7. A declaration that SORA 2001, 2009, 2011 violate, both facially and as applied by the Defendants, the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment contained in the United States Constitution (U.S. CONST., Amend. VIII).
8. A declaration that SORA 2001, 2009, 2011 violate, both facially and as applied by the Defendants, the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment contained in the Idaho Constitution (ID. CONST., Article I, § 6 );
9. A declaration that SORA 2001, 2009, 2011 violate, both facially and as applied by the Defendants, the ex post facto clause of the United States Constitution (U.S. CONST., Art. 1, §9, cl. 10);
10. A declaration that SORA 2001, 2009, 2011 violate, both facially and as applied by the Defendants, the ex post facto clause of the Idaho Constitution (ID CONST., Article I, § 16);
11. A declaration that SORA 2001, 2009, 2011 violate, both facially and as applied by the Defendants, the double jeopardy clause of the United States Constitution (U.S. CONST., Am. V, AM. XIV);
12. A declaration that SORA 2001, 2009, 2011 violate, both facially and as applied by the Defendants, the double jeopardy clause of the Idaho Constitution (ID CONST., Article

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I, §13); 13. A declaration that SORA 2001, 2009, 2011 violate, both facially and as applied
by the Defendants, the contracts clause of the United States Constitution (U.S. CONST., Art. 1, § 10);
14. A declaration that SORA 2001, 2009, 2011 violate, both facially and as applied by the Defendants, the contracts clause of the Idaho Constitution (ID CONST., Article I, §16);
15. A declaration that SORA 2001, 2009, 2011 violate, both facially and as applied by the Defendants, the takings clause of the United States Constitution (U.S. CONST., Amend. V);
16. A declaration that SORA 2001, 2009, 2011 violate, both facially and as applied by the Defendants, the takings clause of the Idaho Constitution (ID CONST., Article I, § 14);
17. A declaration that SORA 2001, 2009, 2011 violate, both facially and as applied by the Defendants, the separation of powers doctrine of the Idaho Constitution (ID CONST., Article I, § 3);
18. A permanent injunction prohibiting each Defendant from enforcing SORA 2001, 2009, 2011;
19. Reasonable costs and attorney’s fees, and - - - - -

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20. Any further relief the Court deems appropriate. DATED This 22nd day of September, 2016.
FULLER LAW OFFICES
By /s/ Greg J. Fuller GREG J. FULLER 161 Main Avenue West P.O. Box L Twin Falls, ID 83303 fullerlaw@cableone.net (208) 734-1602

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Greg J. Fuller Daniel S. Brown FULLER LAW OFFICES Attorneys at Law 161 Main Avenue West P. O. Box L Twin Falls, ID 83303 Telephone: (208) 734-1602 Facsimile : (208) 734-1606 ISB #1442 ISB #7538 fullerlaw@cableone.net

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO

* * * * *

JOHN and JANE DOES 1-134,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

vs.

)

)

LAWRENCE WASDEN, Attorney

)

General of the State of Idaho; KEVIN

)

KEMPF Director of the Idaho

)

Department of Correction; TERRY

)

KIRKHAM, Chief Department of

)

Correction Probation and Parole

)

Division, SEXUAL OFFENDER

)

MANAGEMENT BOARD and its

)

members, JON BURNHAM, MICHAEL )

JOHNSTON, Ph.d., MOIRA LYNCH, )

JEFFREY BETTS, ERWIN

)

SONNENBERG, JEAN FISHER,

)

PAULA GARAY, SHERIFF

)

MATTHEW THOMAS, KIMBERLY

)

SIMMONS, WILLIAM CRAWFORD )

and CHRISTINA IVERSON, in their

)

official capacities; COLONEL RALPH )

POWELL, Director, IDAHO STATE )

POLICE, STEVEN BARTLETT, ADA )

Case No.: 1:16-CV-429
AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF

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COUNTY SHERIFF; LORIN

)

NIELSEN, BANNOCK COUNTY

)

SHERIFF; BRENT T. BUNN, BEAR

)

LAKE COUNTY SHERIFF; CRAIG

)

T. ROWLAND, BINGHAM COUNTY )

SHERIFF; JIM KACQMAREK, BOISE )

COUNTY SHERIFFL PAUL J. WILDE, )

BONNEVILLE COUNTY SHERIFF;

)

KIERAN DONAHUE, CANYON

)

COUNTY SHERIFF; MICHAEL

)

HADERLIE, CARIBOU COUNTY

)

SHERIFF; JAY HEWARD, CASSIA

)

COUNTY SHERIFF; CHRIS GOETZ, )

CLEARWATER COUNTY SHERIFF; )

RICK LAYHER, ELMORE COUNTY )

SHERIFF; DAVID FRYAR, FRANKLIN )

COUNTY SHERIFF; CHARLES

)

ROLLAND, GEM COUNTY SHERIFF; )

SHAUN GOUGH, GOODING COUNTY )

SHERIFF; STEVE ANDERSON,

)

JEFFERSON COUNTY SHERIFF;

)

DOUG McFALL, JEROME COUNTY )

SHERIFF; BEN WOLFINGER,

)

KOOTENAI COUNTY SHERIFF;

)

RICHARD SKILES, LATAH COUNTY )

SHERIFF; LYNN D. BOWERMAN,

)

LEMHI COUNTY SHERIFF; KEVIN )

ELLIS, LINCOLN COUNTY

)

SHERIFF; ERIC SNARR, MINIDOKA )

COUNTY SHERIFF; JOE

)

RODRIGUEZ, NEZ PERCE COUNTY )

SHERIFF; TONY LIFORD, TETON

)

COUNTY SHERIFF; TOM CARTER, )

TWIN FALLS COUNTY SHERIFF,

)

and; PATTI BOLEN, VALLEY

)

COUNTY SHERIFF,

)

)

Defendants.

)

* * * * *

COME NOW The Plaintiffs, John and Jane Does 1-134, by and through the

undersigned attorneys, Fuller Law Offices, and file this Complaint for Injunctive and

Declaratory Relief. This is an action under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 to address the

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unconstitutionality of Idaho’s Sexual Offender Registration Notification and Community Right-to-Know Act (hereinafter referred to as "Sex Offender Registry" or as "Idaho SORNA") as last amended by the Idaho State Legislature July 1, 2016. Plaintiffs challenge the Sex Offender Registry and accompanying statutes/laws to be in violation of the U.S. and Idaho Constitutions and ask to permanently enjoin the Defendants from enforcing said laws.
NATURE OF THE ACTION As alleged with greater particularity below, Plaintiffs allege that specific provisions of the Sex Offender Registry and accompanying statutes/laws are unconstitutionally vague in violation of the due process protections of the U.S. and Idaho Constitutions and amount to retroactive punishment, in violation of the ex post facto clause of the U.S. Constitution and the retroactivity clause of the Idaho Constitution. Plaintiffs also allege that the Sex Offender Registry and accompanying statutes/laws further violate the Due Process, Substantive Due Process, Equal Protection, Double Jeopardy, Contracts, and Takings clauses of the U.S. and Idaho Constitutions. Plaintiffs also allege that the Sex Offender Registry and accompanying statutes/laws violate their rights to acquire, possess and protect property; their rights to seek and obtain safety and happiness; their rights to travel, life and liberty; and their rights to freedom of association and religion protected by the First Amendment and Due Process Clauses of the U.S. Constitution, as well as Article 1, Sections 4 and 13 of the Idaho Constitution and are further unconstitutionally applied to plaintiffs under the residual grant of police powers to the states by Article 1, Section 10 of the U.S. Constitution and of the specific grant of Police Power rights set forth in Article 11, Section 8 of the Idaho Constitution . AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF - 3

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Additionally, Plaintiffs allege that the Sex Offender Registry and accompanying statutes/laws constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Article 1, Section 6 of the Idaho Constitution. Finally, Plaintiffs allege that the Sex Offender Registry and accompanying statutes/laws violate the Separation of Powers doctrine of the Idaho Constitution. Plaintiffs are challenging the Sex Offender Registry and laws both facially and as applied to them.
I. JURISDICTION 1. This Court has original subject matter jurisdiction over the federal Constitutional violations alleged in this Complaint pursuant to the provisions of 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 and 28 U.S.C. Sections 1221 and 1343. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1367(a), this Court has supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs state law claims. This Court has jurisdiction to issue injunctive and declaratory relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 2201 and 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. 2. Venue is proper in the District of Idaho pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1391. All parties work and reside in Idaho, and all actions pertinent to this complaint occurred in the State of Idaho.
I. PARTIES 3. Plaintiff, John Doe 1, is a resident of Twin Falls County, state of Idaho. On November 15, 1984, John Doe 1 was convicted in Elmore County, state of Idaho, of the crime of Infamous Crime Against Nature, to-wit: the age of eleven (11) years. John Doe 1 was granted a withheld judgment and probation and was placed on supervised probation for a period of ten (10) years. At that time, the Idaho Sex Offender Registry requirements had not been enacted and John Doe 1 was not then required to register as a
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sex offender. In 1993, John Doe 1 was informed by his probation officer that he was now required to register as a sex offender. Under the then existing language of the Idaho sex offender registration requirements, John Doe 1 would later be eligible for release from the requirement to register as a sex offender. The ex post facto amendments to Idaho SORNA effective from and after July 1, 2009, expanded the definition of “aggravated offense” to include, “any other offense set forth in Section 18-8304, Idaho Code, if at the time of the commission of the offense the victim was below the age of thirteen (13) years.” John Doe 1 is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and has not been classified as a violent sexual predator. Therefore, John Doe 1 should be eligible to petition the sentencing court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry. John Doe 1 was, and still is, foreclosed from ever being removed from the Idaho sex offender registry by reason of the July 1, 2009, amendment above stated.
4. Plaintiff, John Doe 2, is a resident of Ada County, State of Idaho. On January 3, 1990, John Doe 2 was convicted of two (2) counts of the crime of Sexual Abuse of a Child Under the Age of Sixteen (16) Years, to-wit: the ages of twelve (12) years and eleven (11) years, respectively, both felonies. On July 20, 1990, John Doe 2 was placed on probation for seven (7) years. At that time, the Idaho Sex Offender Registry requirements had not been enacted and John Doe 2 was not then required to register as a sex offender. John Doe 2 was advised by his probation officer in 1993 that he must thereafter register as a sex offender. Under the then existing language of the Idaho sex offender registration requirements, John Doe 2 would later be eligible for release from the requirement to register as a sex offender. The ex post facto amendments to Idaho SORNA effective from and after July 1, 2009, expanded the definition of
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“aggravated offense” to include, “any other offense set forth in Section 18-8304, Idaho Code, if at the time of the commission of the offense the victim was below the age of thirteen (13) years.” John Doe 2 is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and has not been classified as a violent sexual predator. Therefore, John Doe 2 should be eligible to petition the sentencing court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry. John Doe 2 was, and still is, foreclosed from ever being removed from the Idaho sex offender registry by reason of the July 1, 2009, amendment above stated.
5. Plaintiff, John Doe 3, is a resident of Twin Falls County, State of Idaho. On July 19, 1999, John Doe 3 was convicted of the crime of Sexual Abuse of a Child Under the Age of sixteen (16) years, Incest, to wit: the age of eleven (11) years, a felony, in Twin Falls County, state of Idaho. Under the then existing language of the Idaho sex offender registration requirements, John Doe 3 would later be eligible for release from the requirement to register as a sex offender. The ex post facto amendments to Idaho SORNA effective from and after July 1, 2009, expanded the definition of “aggravated offense” to include, “any other offense set forth in Section 18-8304, Idaho Code, if at the time of the commission of the offense the victim was below the age of thirteen (13) years.” John Doe 3 is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and has not been classified as a violent sexual predator. Therefore, John Doe 3 should be eligible to petition the sentencing court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry. John Doe 3 was, and still is, foreclosed from ever being removed from the Idaho sex offender registry by reason of the July 1, 2009, amendment above stated.
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6. Plaintiff, John Doe 4, is a resident of Bonneville County, State of Idaho. On June 15, 1988, John Doe 4 was convicted in Cassia County, State of Idaho, of the crime of Lewd and Lascivious Conduct with a Minor, to-wit: the age of fourteen (14) years, a felony. John Doe 4 was placed on probation for a period of five (5) years, completed sex offender treatment, and was released from probation on April 17, 1995. At the time of his conviction, the Idaho Sex Offender Registry requirements had not been enacted and John Doe 4 was not then required to register as a sex offender. In July, 1998, John Doe 4 was informed by his probation officer that he was now required to register as a sex offender. Under the then existing language of the Idaho sex offender registration requirements, John Doe 4 would later be eligible for release from the requirement to register as a sex offender. The ex post facto amendments to Idaho SORNA effective from and after July 1, 2009, expanded the definition of “aggravated offense” to exclude any age demarcation to the crime of lewd and lascivious conduct, leaving the crime of “Lewd and Lascivious Conduct” with no reference to the age of the victim as an “aggravated offense.” John Doe 4 is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and has not been classified as a violent sexual predator. Therefore, John Doe 4 should be eligible to petition the sentencing court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry. John Doe 4 was, and still is, foreclosed from ever being removed from the Idaho sex offender registry by reason of the July 1, 2009, amendment above stated.
7. Plaintiff, John Doe 5, is a resident of Williamson County, State of Texas. On August 30, 1988, John Doe 5 was convicted in Jerome County, State of Idaho, of the crime of Sexual Abuse of a Child Under Sixteen (16) Years of Age, to-wit: the age of seven (7) years, a felony. John Doe 5 was sentenced to a period of incarceration and, in
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1994, was placed on parole for a period of two (2) years, and began registering as a sex offender in Idaho. At the time of his conviction, the Idaho Sex Offender Registry requirements had not been enacted and John Doe 5 was not then required to register as a sex offender. Under the then existing language of the Idaho sex offender registration requirements, John Doe 5 would later be eligible for release from the requirement to register as a sex offender. The ex post facto amendments to Idaho SORNA effective from and after July 1, 2009, expanded the definition of “aggravated offense” to include, “any other offense set forth in Section 18-8304, Idaho Code, if at the time of the commission of the offense the victim was below the age of thirteen (13) years.” John Doe 5 is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and has not been classified as a violent sexual predator. Therefore, John Doe 5 should be eligible to petition the sentencing court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry. John Doe 5 was, and still is, foreclosed from ever being removed from the Idaho sex offender registry by reason of the July 1, 2009, amendment above stated.
8. Plaintiff, John Doe 6, is a resident of Cassia County, State of Idaho. On November 15, 1991, John Doe 6 was convicted in Cassia County, State of Idaho, of the crime of Lewd Conduct with a Minor Child Under Sixteen (16) Years of Age, to-wit: the age of fourteen (14) years, a felony. John Doe 6 was thereafter placed on probation. In January of 1995, John Doe 6 was found to have violated his probation and the original five (5) year probationary term was reinstated. John Doe 6 was released from probation on October 19, 1996. John Doe 6 was at the time required to register as a sex offender. Under the then existing language of the Idaho sex offender registration requirements, John Doe 6 would later be eligible for release from the requirement to register as a sex
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offender. The ex post facto amendments to Idaho SORNA effective from and after July 1, 2009, expanded the definition of “aggravated offense” to exclude any age demarcation to the crime of lewd and lascivious conduct, leaving the crime of “Lewd and Lascivious Conduct” with no reference to the age of the victim as an “aggravated offense.” John Doe 6 is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and has not been classified as a violent sexual predator. Therefore, John Doe 6 should be eligible to petition the sentencing court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry. John Doe 6 was, and still is, foreclosed from ever being removed from the Idaho sex offender registry by reason of the July 1, 2009, amendment above stated.
9. Plaintiff, John Doe 7, is a resident of Twin Falls County, State of Idaho. On December 11, 1992, John Doe 7 was convicted in Bannock County, State of Idaho, of the crime of Sexual Abuse of a Child Under Sixteen (16) Years of Age, to-wit: the age of ten (10) years, a felony. John Doe 7 was placed on probation for a period of ten (10) years. John Doe 7 completed a sex offender treatment program and was released from probation on August 24, 1998. In 1999, John Doe 7 was advised by his probation officer that he must begin registering as a sex offender in Idaho. Under the then existing language of the Idaho sex offender registration requirements, John Doe 7 would later be eligible for release from the requirement to register as a sex offender. The ex post facto amendments to Idaho SORNA effective from and after July 1, 2009, expanded the definition of “aggravated offense” to include, “any other offense set forth in Section 188304, Idaho Code, if at the time of the commission of the offense the victim was below the age of thirteen (13) years.” John Doe 7 is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and has not been classified as a violent sexual predator. Therefore,
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John Doe 7 should be eligible to petition the sentencing court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry. John Doe 7 was, and still is, foreclosed from ever being removed from the Idaho sex offender registry by reason of the July 1, 2009, amendment above stated.
10. Plaintiff, John Doe 8, is a resident of Jerome County, State of Idaho. On August 1, 1994, John Doe 8 was convicted in Twin Falls County, State of Idaho, of the crime of Rape, a felony. On that same date, John Doe 8 was convicted in Jerome County, State of Idaho, of the crime of Lewd Conduct with a Minor Child Under Sixteen (16) Years of Age, to-wit: the age of fifteen (15) years, a felony. John Doe 8 was thereafter placed on probation in February of 1995, for a period of two (2) years, and began registering in Idaho as a sex offender. John Doe 8 was released from probation on March 24, 1997. Under the then existing language of the Idaho sex offender registration requirements, John Doe 6 would later be eligible for release from the requirement to register as a sex offender. The ex post facto amendments to Idaho SORNA effective from and after July 1, 2001, created the “aggravated offense” exception to eligibility for release from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry. Furthermore, the ex post facto amendments to Idaho SORNA effective from and after July 1, 2009, expanded the definition of “aggravated offense” to exclude any age demarcation to the crime of lewd and lascivious conduct, leaving the crime of “Lewd and Lascivious Conduct” with no reference to the age of the victim as an “aggravated offense.” John Doe 8 is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and has not been classified as a violent sexual predator. Therefore, John Doe 8 should be eligible to petition the sentencing court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry. In November of 2011, John Doe 8 petitioned the
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sentencing court to be released from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry, which petition was denied by the court. John Doe 8 was, and still is, foreclosed from ever being removed from the Idaho sex offender registry by reason of the July 1, 2001 and July 1, 2009, amendments above stated.
11. Plaintiff, John Doe 9, is a resident of Ada County, State of Idaho. On April 14, 1992, John Doe 9 was convicted in Ada County, State of Idaho, of the crime of Lewd Conduct with a Minor Child Under Sixteen (16) Years of Age, to-wit: the age of fourteen (14) years, a felony. John Doe 9 was thereafter placed on probation for a period of five (5) years. At the time of his conviction, the Idaho Sex Offender Registry requirements had not been enacted and John Doe 9 was not then required to register as a sex offender. In 1993, John Doe 9 was informed by his probation officer that he was now required to register as a sex offender. Under the then existing language of the Idaho sex offender registration requirements, John Doe 9 would later be eligible for release from the requirement to register as a sex offender. The ex post facto amendments to Idaho SORNA effective from and after July 1, 2009, expanded the definition of “aggravated offense” to exclude any age demarcation to the crime of lewd and lascivious conduct, leaving the crime of “Lewd and Lascivious Conduct” with no reference to the age of the victim as an “aggravated offense.” John Doe 9 is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and has not been classified as a violent sexual predator. Therefore, John Doe 9 should be eligible to petition the sentencing court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry. John Doe 9 was, and still is, foreclosed from ever being removed from the Idaho sex offender registry by reason of the July 1, 2009, amendment above stated.
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12. Plaintiff, John Doe 10, is a resident of Twin Falls County, State of Idaho. On April 24, 1992, John Doe 10 was convicted in Jerome County, State of Idaho, of the crime of Rape, to-wit: the age of sixteen (16) years, a felony, and was thereafter placed on probation for a period of two (2) years. At the time of his conviction, the Idaho Sex Offender Registry requirements had not been enacted and John Doe 10 was not then required to register as a sex offender. In 1993, John Doe 10 was informed by his probation officer that he was now required to register as a sex offender. John Doe 10 completed a sex offender treatment program and was released from probation on May 5, 1994. Under the then existing language of the Idaho sex offender registration requirements, John Doe 10 would later be eligible for release from the requirement to register as a sex offender. The ex post facto amendments to Idaho SORNA effective from and after July 1, 2001, created the “aggravated offense” exception to eligibility for release from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry. John Doe 10 is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and has not been classified as a violent sexual predator. Therefore, John Doe 10 should be eligible to petition the sentencing court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry. In 2002, John Doe 10 petitioned the sentencing court to be released from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry, which petition was denied by the court. John Doe 10 was, and still is, foreclosed from ever being removed from the Idaho sex offender registry by reason of the July 1, 2001, amendment above stated.
13. Plaintiff, John Doe 11, is a resident of Bingham County, State of Idaho. On July 9, 1993, John Doe 11 was convicted in Cassia County, State of Idaho, of the crime of Lewd Conduct with a Minor Under the Age of Sixteen (16) Years, to-wit: the age of three (3) years, a felony. John Doe 11 was placed on probation for a period of five
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(5) years and was required to register as a sex offender in Idaho. Under the then existing language of the Idaho sex offender registration requirements, John Doe 11 would later be eligible for release from the requirement to register as a sex offender. The ex post facto amendments to Idaho SORNA effective from and after July 1, 2001, created the “aggravated offense” exception to eligibility for release from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry. This exception included, inter alia, the offense of “lewd conduct when the victim is less than twelve (12) years of age.” John Doe 11 is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and has not been classified as a violent sexual predator. Therefore, John Doe 11 should be eligible to petition the sentencing court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry. John Doe 11 was, and still is, foreclosed from ever being removed from the Idaho sex offender registry by reason of the July 1, 2001, amendment above stated.
14. Plaintiff, John Doe 12, is a resident of Ada County, State of Idaho. On February 14, 1995, John Doe 12 was convicted in Nez Perce County, State of Idaho, of the crime of Sexual Abuse of a Child Under the Age of Sixteen (16) Years, to wit: the age of twelve (12) years, a felony. John Doe 12 was sentenced to a term of incarceration of fifteen (15) years. John Doe 12 was released from custody in September of 2003, was placed on parole, and began registering as a sex offender in Idaho. John Doe 12 completed sex offender treatment and was released from parole in February of 2010. Under the language of the Idaho sex offender registration requirements as they existed at the time of his conviction and release from custody, John Doe 12 would later be eligible for release from the requirement to register as a sex offender. The ex post facto amendments to Idaho SORNA effective from and after July 1, 2009, expanded the
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definition of “aggravated offense” to include, “any other offense set forth in Section 188304, Idaho Code, if at the time of the commission of the offense the victim was below the age of thirteen (13) years.” John Doe 12 is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and has not been classified as a violent sexual predator. Therefore, John Doe 12 should be eligible to petition the sentencing court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry. John Doe 12 was, and still is, foreclosed from ever being removed from the Idaho sex offender registry by reason of the July 1, 2009, amendment above stated.
15. Plaintiff, John Doe 13, is a resident of Ada County, State of Idaho. In February of, 1990, John Doe 13 was convicted in Canyon County, State of Idaho, of the crime of Lewd Conduct with a Minor Child Under the Age of Sixteen (16) Years, to wit: the age of ten (10) years, a felony. John Doe 13 was released from custody or released from probation on April 29, 1996. At the time of his conviction, the Idaho Sex Offender Registry requirements had not been enacted and John Doe 13 was not then required to register as a sex offender. Under the language of the Idaho sex offender registration requirements as they existed prior to July 1, 2001, John Doe 13 would later be eligible for release from the requirement to register as a sex offender. The ex post facto amendments to Idaho SORNA effective from and after July 1, 2001, created the “aggravated offense” exception to eligibility for release from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry. This exception included, inter alia, the offense of “lewd conduct when the victim is less than twelve (12) years of age.” John Doe 13 is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and has not been classified as a violent sexual predator. Therefore, John Doe 13 should be eligible to petition the sentencing court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender
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Registry. John Doe 13 was, and still is, foreclosed from ever being removed from the Idaho sex offender registry by reason of the July 1, 2001, amendment above stated.
16. Plaintiff, John Doe 14, is a resident of Franklin County, State of Idaho. In June of, 1994, John Doe 14 was convicted in Franklin County, State of Idaho, of the crime of Lewd Conduct with a Minor Child Under the Age of Sixteen (16) Years, to wit: the age of nine (9) years, a felony. John Doe 14 was released from custody or released from probation in December of 1999. At the time of his conviction, the Idaho Sex Offender Registry requirements had been enacted and John Doe 14 was then required to register as a sex offender. Under the language of the Idaho sex offender registration requirements as they existed prior to July 1, 2001, John Doe 13 would later be eligible for release from the requirement to register as a sex offender. The ex post facto amendments to Idaho SORNA effective from and after July 1, 2001, created the “aggravated offense” exception to eligibility for release from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry. This exception included, inter alia, the offense of “lewd conduct when the victim is less than twelve (12) years of age.” John Doe 14 is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and has not been classified as a violent sexual predator. Therefore, John Doe 14 should be eligible to petition the sentencing court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry. John Doe 14 was, and still is, foreclosed from ever being removed from the Idaho sex offender registry by reason of the July 1, 2001, amendment above stated.
17. Plaintiff, John Doe 15, is a resident of Minidoka County, State of Idaho. In June of 1996, John Doe 15 was convicted in Cassia County, State of Idaho, of the crime of Lewd Conduct with a Minor Child Under the Age of Sixteen (16) Years, to wit: the age of thirteen (13) years, a felony. John Doe 15 was released from custody in June
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of 2000, and not placed on probation. At the time of his conviction, the Idaho Sex Offender Registry requirements had been enacted and John Doe 15 was then required to register as a sex offender. Under the language of the Idaho sex offender registration requirements as they existed prior to July 1, 2009, John Doe 15 would later be eligible for release from the requirement to register as a sex offender. The ex post facto amendments to Idaho SORNA effective from and after July 1, 2009, expanded the definition of “aggravated offense” to exclude any age demarcation to the crime of lewd and lascivious conduct, leaving the crime of “Lewd and Lascivious Conduct” with no reference to the age of the victim as an “aggravated offense.” John Doe 15 is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and has not been classified as a violent sexual predator. Therefore, John Doe 15 should be eligible to petition the sentencing court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry. John Doe 15 was, and still is, foreclosed from ever being removed from the Idaho sex offender registry by reason of the July 1, 2009, amendment above stated.
18. Plaintiff, John Doe 16, is a resident of Bannock County, State of Idaho. In January of 2002, John Doe 16 was convicted in Bannock County, State of Idaho, of the crime of Sexual Abuse of a Child Under the Age of Sixteen (16) Years, to wit: the age of eleven (11) years, a felony. John Doe 16 was released from custody or released from probation on December 1, 2009. Under the language of the Idaho sex offender registration requirements as they existed at the time of his conviction and release from custody, John Doe 16 would later be eligible for release from the requirement to register as a sex offender. The ex post facto amendments to Idaho SORNA effective from and after July 1, 2009, expanded the definition of “aggravated offense” to include, “any other
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offense set forth in Section 18-8304, Idaho Code, if at the time of the commission of the offense the victim was below the age of thirteen (13) years.” John Doe 16 is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and has not been classified as a violent sexual predator. Therefore, John Doe 16 should be eligible to petition the sentencing court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry. John Doe 16 was, and still is, foreclosed from ever being removed from the Idaho sex offender registry by reason of the July 1, 2009, amendment above stated.
19. Plaintiff, John Doe 17, is a resident of Twin Falls County, State of Idaho. In March of 2002, John Doe 17 was convicted in Twin Falls County, State of Idaho, of the crime of Sexual Abuse of a Child Under the Age of Sixteen (16) Years, to wit: the age of eight (8) years, a felony. John Doe 17 was released from custody or released from probation on November 8, 2012. Under the language of the Idaho sex offender registration requirements as they existed at the time of his conviction and release from custody, John Doe 17 would later be eligible for release from the requirement to register as a sex offender. The ex post facto amendments to Idaho SORNA effective from and after July 1, 2009, expanded the definition of “aggravated offense” to include, “any other offense set forth in Section 18-8304, Idaho Code, if at the time of the commission of the offense the victim was below the age of thirteen (13) years.” John Doe 17 is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and has not been classified as a violent sexual predator. Therefore, John Doe 17 should be eligible to petition the sentencing court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry. John Doe 17 was, and still is, foreclosed from ever being removed from the Idaho sex offender registry by reason of the July 1, 2009, amendment above stated.
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20. Plaintiff, John Doe 18, is a resident of Lincoln County, State of Idaho. In November of 1989, John Doe 18 was convicted in Lincoln County, State of Idaho, of the crime of Lewd Conduct with a Minor Child Under the Age of Sixteen (16) Years, to wit: the age of eleven (11) years, a felony. John Doe 18 was released from custody or released from probation on August 28, 1995. At the time of his conviction, the Idaho Sex Offender Registry requirements had not been enacted and John Doe 18 was not then required to register as a sex offender. Under the language of the Idaho sex offender registration requirements as they existed prior to July 1, 2001, John Doe 18 would later be eligible for release from the requirement to register as a sex offender. The ex post facto amendments to Idaho SORNA effective from and after July 1, 2001, created the “aggravated offense” exception to eligibility for release from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry. This exception included, inter alia, the offense of “lewd conduct when the victim is less than twelve (12) years of age.” John Doe 18 is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and has not been classified as a violent sexual predator. Therefore, John Doe 18 should be eligible to petition the sentencing court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry. John Doe 18 was, and still is, foreclosed from ever being removed from the Idaho sex offender registry by reason of the July 1, 2001, amendment above stated.
21. Plaintiff, John Doe 19, is a resident of Twin Falls County, State of Idaho. In September of 2002, John Doe 19 was convicted in Twin Falls County, State of Idaho, of the crime of Lewd Conduct with a Minor Child Under the Age of Sixteen (16) Years, to wit: the age of fifteen (15) years, a felony. John Doe 19 was released from custody or released from probation on April 30, 2010. At the time of his conviction, the Idaho Sex
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Offender Registry requirements had been enacted and John Doe 15 was then required to register as a sex offender. Under the language of the Idaho sex offender registration requirements as they existed prior to July 1, 2009, John Doe 19 would later be eligible for release from the requirement to register as a sex offender. The ex post facto amendments to Idaho SORNA effective from and after July 1, 2009, expanded the definition of “aggravated offense” to exclude any age demarcation to the crime of lewd and lascivious conduct, leaving the crime of “Lewd and Lascivious Conduct” with no reference to the age of the victim as an “aggravated offense.” John Doe 19 is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and has not been classified as a violent sexual predator. Therefore, John Doe 19 should be eligible to petition the sentencing court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry. John Doe 19 was, and still is, foreclosed from ever being removed from the Idaho sex offender registry by reason of the July 1, 2009, amendment above stated.
22. Plaintiff, John Doe 20, is a resident of Teton County, State of Idaho. In March of 2001, John Doe 20 was convicted in Teton County, State of Idaho, of the crime of Sexual Abuse of a Child Under the Age of Sixteen (16) Years, to wit: the age of twelve (12) years, a felony. John Doe 20 was released from custody or released from probation in November of 2007. At the time of his conviction, the Idaho Sex Offender Registry requirements had been enacted and John Doe 20 was then required to register as a sex offender. Under the language of the Idaho sex offender registration requirements as they existed at the time of his conviction and release from custody, John Doe 20 would later be eligible for release from the requirement to register as a sex offender. The ex post facto amendments to Idaho SORNA effective from and after July 1, 2009, expanded
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the definition of “aggravated offense” to include, “any other offense set forth in Section 18-8304, Idaho Code, if at the time of the commission of the offense the victim was below the age of thirteen (13) years.” John Doe 20 is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and has not been classified as a violent sexual predator. Therefore, John Doe 20 should be eligible to petition the sentencing court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry. John Doe 20 was, and still is, foreclosed from ever being removed from the Idaho sex offender registry by reason of the July 1, 2009, amendment above stated.
23. Plaintiff, John Doe 21, is a resident of Twin Falls County, State of Idaho. In May of 2001, John Doe 21 was convicted in Twin Falls County, State of Idaho, of the crime of Lewd Conduct with a Minor Under the Age of Sixteen (16) Years, to-wit: the age of fourteen (14) years, a felony. John Doe 21 was released from custody or released from probation on July 11, 2005. At the time of his conviction, the Idaho Sex Offender Registry requirements had been enacted and John Doe 21 was then required to register as a sex offender. Under the then existing language of the Idaho sex offender registration requirements, John Doe 21 would later be eligible for release from the requirement to register as a sex offender. The ex post facto amendments to Idaho SORNA effective from and after July 1, 2009, expanded the definition of “aggravated offense” to exclude any age demarcation to the crime of lewd and lascivious conduct, leaving the crime of “Lewd and Lascivious Conduct” with no reference to the age of the victim as an “aggravated offense.” John Doe 21 is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and has not been classified as a violent sexual predator. Therefore, John Doe 21 should be eligible to petition the sentencing court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender
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Registry. John Doe 21 was, and still is, foreclosed from ever being removed from the Idaho sex offender registry by reason of the July 1, 2009, amendment above stated.
24. Plaintiff, John Doe 22, is a resident of Bonneville County, State of Idaho. In December of 1991, John Doe 22 was convicted in Bonneville County, State of Idaho, of the crime of Lewd Conduct with a Minor Child Under the Age of Sixteen (16) Years, to wit: the age of five (5) years, a felony. John Doe 22 was released from parole on custody or released from probation on November 20, 2001. At the time of his conviction, the Idaho Sex Offender Registry requirements had not been enacted and John Doe 22 was not then required to register as a sex offender. Under the language of the Idaho sex offender registration requirements as they existed prior to July 1, 2001, John Doe 22 would later be eligible for release from the requirement to register as a sex offender. The ex post facto amendments to Idaho SORNA effective from and after July 1, 2001, created the “aggravated offense” exception to eligibility for release from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry. This exception included, inter alia, the offense of “lewd conduct when the victim is less than twelve (12) years of age.” John Doe 22 is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and has not been classified as a violent sexual predator. Therefore, John Doe 22 should be eligible to petition the sentencing court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry. John Doe 22 was, and still is, foreclosed from ever being removed from the Idaho sex offender registry by reason of the July 1, 2001, amendment above stated.
25. Plaintiff, John Doe 23, is a resident of Valley County, State of Idaho. In April of 1999, John Doe 23 was convicted in Canyon County, State of Idaho, of the crime of Sexual Abuse of a Child Under the Age of Sixteen (16) Years, to wit: the age of nine
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(9) or ten (10) years, a felony. John Doe 23 was released from custody or released from supervised probation on April 24, 2009, for the remainder of his sentence and was later released from probation in 2011. At the time of his conviction, the Idaho Sex Offender Registry requirements had been enacted and John Doe 23 was then required to register as a sex offender. Under the language of the Idaho sex offender registration requirements as they existed at the time of his conviction and release from custody, John Doe 23 would later be eligible for release from the requirement to register as a sex offender. The ex post facto amendments to Idaho SORNA effective from and after July 1, 2009, expanded the definition of “aggravated offense” to include, “any other offense set forth in Section 18-8304, Idaho Code, if at the time of the commission of the offense the victim was below the age of thirteen (13) years.” John Doe 23 is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and has not been classified as a violent sexual predator. Therefore, John Doe 23 should be eligible to petition the sentencing court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry. John Doe 23 was, and still is, foreclosed from ever being removed from the Idaho sex offender registry by reason of the July 1, 2009, amendment above stated.
26. Plaintiff, John Doe 24, is a resident of Lincoln County, State of Idaho. In December of 2002, John Doe 24 was convicted in Lincoln County, State of Idaho, of the crime of Lewd Conduct with a Minor Under the Age of Sixteen (16) Years, to-wit: the age of fifteen (15) years, a felony. John Doe 24 was released from custody or released from probation on January 16, 2009. At the time of his conviction, the Idaho Sex Offender Registry requirements had been enacted and John Doe 24 was then required to register as a sex offender. Under the then existing language of the Idaho sex offender
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registration requirements, John Doe 24 would later be eligible for release from the requirement to register as a sex offender. The ex post facto amendments to Idaho SORNA effective from and after July 1, 2009, expanded the definition of “aggravated offense” to exclude any age demarcation to the crime of lewd and lascivious conduct, leaving the crime of “Lewd and Lascivious Conduct” with no reference to the age of the victim as an “aggravated offense.” John Doe 24 is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and has not been classified as a violent sexual predator. Therefore, John Doe 24 should be eligible to petition the sentencing court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry. John Doe 24 was, and still is, foreclosed from ever being removed from the Idaho sex offender registry by reason of the July 1, 2009, amendment above stated.
27. Plaintiff, John Doe 25, is a resident of Butte County, State of Idaho. In April of 1990, John Doe 25 was convicted in Twin Falls County, State of Idaho, of the crime of Lewd Conduct with a Minor Under the Age of Sixteen (16) Years, to-wit: the age of twelve (12) years, a felony. John Doe 25 was released from parole in May of 2000. At the time of his conviction, the Idaho Sex Offender Registry requirements had not been enacted and John Doe 25 was not then required to register as a sex offender. Under the then existing language of the Idaho sex offender registration requirements at the time of his release from custody/probation, John Doe 25 would later be eligible for release from the requirement to register as a sex offender. The ex post facto amendments to Idaho SORNA effective from and after July 1, 2009, expanded the definition of “aggravated offense” to exclude any age demarcation to the crime of lewd and lascivious conduct, leaving the crime of “Lewd and Lascivious Conduct” with no reference to the
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age of the victim as an “aggravated offense.” John Doe 25 is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and has not been classified as a violent sexual predator. Therefore, John Doe 25 should be eligible to petition the sentencing court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry. John Doe 25 was, and still is, foreclosed from ever being removed from the Idaho sex offender registry by reason of the July 1, 2009, amendment above stated.
28. Plaintiff, John Doe 26, is a resident of Ada County, State of Idaho. In January of 1988, John Doe 26 was convicted in Bonneville County, State of Idaho, of the crime of Sexual Abuse of a Child Under the Age of Sixteen (16) Years, to wit: the age of four (4) years, a felony. John Doe 26 was released from custody or released from probation in 2000. At the time of his conviction, the Idaho Sex Offender Registry requirements had not been enacted and John Doe 26 was not then required to register as a sex offender. Under the language of the Idaho sex offender registration requirements as they existed at the time of his release from custody/probation, John Doe 26 would later be eligible for release from the requirement to register as a sex offender. The ex post facto amendments to Idaho SORNA effective from and after July 1, 2009, expanded the definition of “aggravated offense” to include, “any other offense set forth in Section 188304, Idaho Code, if at the time of the commission of the offense the victim was below the age of thirteen (13) years.” John Doe 26 is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and has not been classified as a violent sexual predator. Therefore, John Doe 26 should be eligible to petition the sentencing court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry. John Doe 26 was, and still is, foreclosed from ever being removed from the Idaho sex offender registry by reason of the July 1, 2009, amendment
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above stated. 29. Plaintiff, John Doe 27, is a resident of Minidoka County, State of Idaho.
In April of 1992, John Doe 27 was convicted in Ada County, State of Idaho, of the crime of Sexual Abuse of a Child Under the Age of Sixteen (16) Years, to wit: the age of six (6) or seven (7) years, a felony. John Doe 27 was released from custody or released from probation on April 14, 2002. At the time of his conviction, the Idaho Sex Offender Registry requirements had not been enacted and John Doe 27 was not then required to register as a sex offender. Under the language of the Idaho sex offender registration requirements as they existed at the time of his release from custody/probation, John Doe 27 would later be eligible for release from the requirement to register as a sex offender. The ex post facto amendments to Idaho SORNA effective from and after July 1, 2009, expanded the definition of “aggravated offense” to include, “any other offense set forth in Section 18-8304, Idaho Code, if at the time of the commission of the offense the victim was below the age of thirteen (13) years.” John Doe 27 is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and has not been classified as a violent sexual predator. Therefore, John Doe 27 should be eligible to petition the sentencing court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry. John Doe 27 was, and still is, foreclosed from ever being removed from the Idaho sex offender registry by reason of the July 1, 2009, amendment above stated.
30. Plaintiff, John Doe 28, is a resident of Ada County, State of Idaho. In April of 1991, John Doe 28 was convicted in Gem County, State of Idaho, of the crime of Lewd Conduct with a Minor Under the Age of Sixteen (16) Years, to-wit: the age of twelve (12) or thirteen (13) years, a felony. John Doe 28 was discharged from parole on
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March 11, 2006. At the time of his conviction, the Idaho Sex Offender Registry requirements had not been enacted and John Doe 28 was not then required to register as a sex offender. Under the then existing language of the Idaho sex offender registration requirements at the time of his release from custody/probation, John Doe 28 would later be eligible for release from the requirement to register as a sex offender. The ex post facto amendments to Idaho SORNA effective from and after July 1, 2009, expanded the definition of “aggravated offense” to exclude any age demarcation to the crime of lewd and lascivious conduct, leaving the crime of “Lewd and Lascivious Conduct” with no reference to the age of the victim as an “aggravated offense.” John Doe 28 is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and has not been classified as a violent sexual predator. Therefore, John Doe 28 should be eligible to petition the sentencing court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry. John Doe 28 was, and still is, foreclosed from ever being removed from the Idaho sex offender registry by reason of the July 1, 2009, amendment above stated.
31. Plaintiff, John Doe 29, is a resident of Twin Falls County, State of Idaho. In March of 1994, John Doe 29 was convicted in Jerome County, State of Idaho, of the crime of Sexual Abuse of a Child Under the Age of Sixteen (16) Years, to wit: the age of seven (7) years, a felony. John Doe 29 was released from custody on March 20, 2003. At the time of his conviction, the Idaho Sex Offender Registry requirements had been enacted and John Doe 29 was then required to register as a sex offender. Under the language of the Idaho sex offender registration requirements as they existed at the time of his release from custody/probation, John Doe 29 would later be eligible for release from the requirement to register as a sex offender. The ex post facto amendments to Idaho
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SORNA effective from and after July 1, 2009, expanded the definition of “aggravated offense” to include, “any other offense set forth in Section 18-8304, Idaho Code, if at the time of the commission of the offense the victim was below the age of thirteen (13) years.” John Doe 29 is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and has not been classified as a violent sexual predator. Therefore, John Doe 29 should be eligible to petition the sentencing court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry. John Doe 29 was, and still is, foreclosed from ever being removed from the Idaho sex offender registry by reason of the July 1, 2009, amendment above stated.
32. Plaintiff, John Doe 30, is a resident of Jerome County, State of Idaho. In May of 1990, John Doe 30 was convicted in Jerome County, State of Idaho, of the crime of Lewd Conduct with a Minor Under the Age of Sixteen (16) Years, to-wit: the age of nine (9) years, a felony. John Doe 30 was released from probation on May 10, 1996. At the time of his conviction, the Idaho Sex Offender Registry requirements had not been enacted and John Doe 28 was not then required to register as a sex offender. Under the then existing language of the Idaho sex offender registration requirements at the time of his release from custody/probation, John Doe 30 would later be eligible for release from the requirement to register as a sex offender. The ex post facto amendments to Idaho SORNA effective from and after July 1, 2001, created the “aggravated offense” exception to eligibility for release from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry. This exception included, inter alia, the offense of “lewd conduct when the victim is less than twelve (12) years of age.” John Doe 30 is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and has not been classified as a violent sexual predator. Therefore, John Doe 30 should be eligible to petition the sentencing court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry. John
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Doe 30 was, and still is, foreclosed from ever being removed from the Idaho sex offender registry by reason of the July 1, 2001, amendment above stated.
33. Plaintiff, John Doe 31, is a resident of Franklin County, State of Idaho. On November 14, 1997, John Doe 31 was convicted in Franklin County, State of Idaho, of the crime of Sexual Abuse of a Child Under the Age of Sixteen (16) Years, to wit: the age of seven (7) years, a felony. John Doe 31 was (released from custody or released from probation in December of 2002. At the time of his conviction, the Idaho Sex Offender Registry requirements had been enacted and John Doe 31 was then required to register as a sex offender. Under the language of the Idaho sex offender registration requirements as they existed at the time of his release from custody/probation, John Doe 31 would later be eligible for release from the requirement to register as a sex offender. The ex post facto amendments to Idaho SORNA effective from and after July 1, 2009, expanded the definition of “aggravated offense” to include, “any other offense set forth in Section 18-8304, Idaho Code, if at the time of the commission of the offense the victim was below the age of thirteen (13) years.” John Doe 31 is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and has not been classified as a violent sexual predator. Therefore, John Doe 31 should be eligible to petition the sentencing court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry. John Doe 31 was, and still is, foreclosed from ever being removed from the Idaho sex offender registry by reason of the July 1, 2009, amendment above stated.
34. Plaintiff, John Doe 32, is a resident of Ada County, State of Idaho. In June of 2005, John Doe 32 was convicted in Ada County, State of Idaho, of the crime of Sexual Abuse of a Child Under the Age of Sixteen (16) Years, to wit: the age of six (6)
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years, a felony. John Doe 32 was released from probation on February 7, 2012. At the time of his conviction, the Idaho Sex Offender Registry requirements had been enacted and John Doe 32 was then required to register as a sex offender. Under the language of the Idaho sex offender registration requirements as they existed at the time of his release from custody/probation, John Doe 32 would later be eligible for release from the requirement to register as a sex offender. The ex post facto amendments to Idaho SORNA effective from and after July 1, 2009, expanded the definition of “aggravated offense” to include, “any other offense set forth in Section 18-8304, Idaho Code, if at the time of the commission of the offense the victim was below the age of thirteen (13) years.” John Doe 32 is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and has not been classified as a violent sexual predator. Therefore, John Doe 32 should be eligible to petition the sentencing court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry. John Doe 32 was, and still is, foreclosed from ever being removed from the Idaho sex offender registry by reason of the July 1, 2009, amendment above stated.
35. Plaintiff, John Doe 33, is a resident of Cassia County, State of Idaho. In November of 2003, John Doe 33 was convicted in Cassia County, State of Idaho, of the crime of Sexual Abuse of a Child Under the Age of Sixteen (16) Years, to wit: the age of twelve (12) years, a felony. John Doe 33 was released from probation in January of 2010. At the time of his conviction, the Idaho Sex Offender Registry requirements had been enacted and John Doe 33 was then required to register as a sex offender. Under the language of the Idaho sex offender registration requirements as they existed at the time of his release from custody/probation, John Doe 33 would later be eligible for release from the requirement to register as a sex offender. The ex post facto amendments to Idaho
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SORNA effective from and after July 1, 2009, expanded the definition of “aggravated offense” to include, “any other offense set forth in Section 18-8304, Idaho Code, if at the time of the commission of the offense the victim was below the age of thirteen (13) years.” John Doe 33 is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and has not been classified as a violent sexual predator. Therefore, John Doe 33 should be eligible to petition the sentencing court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry. John Doe 33 was, and still is, foreclosed from ever being removed from the Idaho sex offender registry by reason of the July 1, 2009, amendment above stated.
36. Plaintiff, John Doe 34, is a resident of Franklin County, State of Idaho. In May of 2003, John Doe 34 was convicted in Franklin County, State of Idaho, of the crime of Sexual Abuse of a Child Under the Age of Sixteen (16) Years, to wit: the age of five (5) years, a felony. John Doe 34 was (released from custody or released from probation on April 23, 2013. At the time of his conviction, the Idaho Sex Offender Registry requirements had been enacted and John Doe 34 was then required to register as a sex offender. Under the language of the Idaho sex offender registration requirements as they existed at the time of his release from custody/probation, John Doe 34 would later be eligible for release from the requirement to register as a sex offender. The ex post facto amendments to Idaho SORNA effective from and after July 1, 2009, expanded the definition of “aggravated offense” to include, “any other offense set forth in Section 188304, Idaho Code, if at the time of the commission of the offense the victim was below the age of thirteen (13) years.” John Doe 34 is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and has not been classified as a violent sexual predator. Therefore, John Doe 34 should be eligible to petition the sentencing court to be removed from the
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Idaho Sex Offender Registry. John Doe 34 was, and still is, foreclosed from ever being removed from the Idaho sex offender registry by reason of the July 1, 2009, amendment above stated.
37. Plaintiff, Jane Doe 35, is a resident of Ada County, State of Idaho. In January of 1996, John Doe 35 was convicted in Ada County, State of Idaho, of the crime of Lewd Conduct with a Minor Child Under the Age of Sixteen (16) Years, to wit: the age of fourteen (14) years, a felony. Jane Doe 35 was released from probation in January of 2011. At the time of her conviction, the Idaho Sex Offender Registry requirements had been enacted and Jane Doe 35 was then required to register as a sex offender. Under the language of the Idaho sex offender registration requirements as they existed prior to July 1, 2009, Jane Doe 35 would later be eligible for release from the requirement to register as a sex offender. The ex post facto amendments to Idaho SORNA effective from and after July 1, 2009, expanded the definition of “aggravated offense” to exclude any age demarcation to the crime of lewd and lascivious conduct, leaving the crime of “Lewd and Lascivious Conduct” with no reference to the age of the victim as an “aggravated offense.” Jane Doe 35 is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and has not been classified as a violent sexual predator. Therefore, Jane Doe 35 should be eligible to petition the sentencing court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry. Jane Doe 35 was, and still is, foreclosed from ever being removed from the Idaho sex offender registry by reason of the July 1, 2009, amendment above stated.
38. Plaintiff, Jane Doe 36, is a resident of Minidoka County, State of Idaho. In August of 2004, John Doe 36 was convicted in Cassia County, State of Idaho, of the crime of Lewd Conduct with a Minor Child Under the Age of Sixteen (16) Years, to wit:
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the age of fourteen (14) years, a felony. Jane Doe 36 was released from parole on August 16, 2012. At the time of her conviction, the Idaho Sex Offender Registry requirements had been enacted and Jane Doe 35 was then required to register as a sex offender. Under the language of the Idaho sex offender registration requirements as they existed prior to July 1, 2009, Jane Doe 36 would later be eligible for release from the requirement to register as a sex offender. The ex post facto amendments to Idaho SORNA effective from and after July 1, 2009, expanded the definition of “aggravated offense” to exclude any age demarcation to the crime of lewd and lascivious conduct, leaving the crime of “Lewd and Lascivious Conduct” with no reference to the age of the victim as an “aggravated offense.” Jane Doe 36 is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and has not been classified as a violent sexual predator. Therefore, Jane Doe 36 should be eligible to petition the sentencing court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry. Jane Doe 36 was, and still is, foreclosed from ever being removed from the Idaho sex offender registry by reason of the July 1, 2009, amendment above stated.
39. Plaintiff, John Doe 37, is a resident of Twin Falls County, State of Idaho. In April of 2007, John Doe 37 was convicted in Twin Falls County, State of Idaho, of two (2) counts of the crime of Lewd Conduct with a Minor Child Under the Age of Sixteen (16) Years, to wit: the age of fifteen (15) years, a felony. John Doe 37 was released from probation on December 2, 2010. At the time of his conviction, the Idaho Sex Offender Registry requirements had been enacted and John Doe 37 was then required to register as a sex offender. Under the language of the Idaho sex offender registration requirements as they existed prior to July 1, 2009, John Doe 37 would later be eligible for release from the requirement to register as a sex offender. The ex post facto amendments to Idaho SORNA
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effective from and after July 1, 2009, expanded the definition of “aggravated offense” to exclude any age demarcation to the crime of lewd and lascivious conduct, leaving the crime of “Lewd and Lascivious Conduct” with no reference to the age of the victim as an “aggravated offense.” John Doe 37 is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and has not been classified as a violent sexual predator. Therefore, John Doe 37 should be eligible to petition the sentencing court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry. John Doe 37 was, and still is, foreclosed from ever being removed from the Idaho sex offender registry by reason of the July 1, 2009, amendment above stated.
40. Plaintiff, John Doe 38, is a resident of Twin Falls County, State of Idaho. In May of 2006, John Doe 38 was convicted in Twin Falls County, State of Idaho, of two (2) counts of the crime of Lewd Conduct with a Minor Child Under the Age of Sixteen (16) Years, to wit: the age of twelve (12) years, a felony. John Doe 38 was released from probation in December of 2010. At the time of his conviction, the Idaho Sex Offender Registry requirements had been enacted and John Doe 38 was then required to register as a sex offender. Under the language of the Idaho sex offender registration requirements as they existed prior to July 1, 2009, John Doe 38 would later be eligible for release from the requirement to register as a sex offender. The ex post facto amendments to Idaho SORNA effective from and after July 1, 2009, expanded the definition of “aggravated offense” to exclude any age demarcation to the crime of lewd and lascivious conduct, leaving the crime of “Lewd and Lascivious Conduct” with no reference to the age of the victim as an “aggravated offense.” John Doe 38 is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and has not been classified as a violent sexual predator. Therefore, John Doe 38
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should be eligible to petition the sentencing court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry. John Doe 38 was, and still is, foreclosed from ever being removed from the Idaho sex offender registry by reason of the July 1, 2009, amendment above stated.
41. Plaintiff, John Doe 39, is a resident of Ada County, State of Idaho. In February of 2013, John Doe 39 was convicted in Ada County, State of Idaho, of two (2) counts of the crime of Sexual Exploitation of a Child, a felony. John Doe 39 was sentenced to a period of custody of ten (10) years, consisting of a determinate term of three (3) years, followed by an indeterminate term of seven (7) years, with the sentencing court retaining its jurisdiction for a period of three hundred sixty-five (365) days. John Doe 39 was thereafter placed on probation in July of 2013, for a period of twenty (20) years, and began registering in Idaho as a sex offender. John Doe 39 is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and has not been classified as a violent sexual predator. Therefore, John Doe 39 should be eligible to petition the sentencing court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry.
42. Plaintiff, John Doe 40, is a resident of Ada County, State of Idaho. In February of 2006, John Doe 40 was convicted in Ada County, State of Idaho, of the crime of Sexual Contact With A Prisoner, to-wit: an Adult, a felony. John Doe 40 was sentenced to a period of custody of ninety (90) days. John Doe 40 was thereafter placed on probation on March 13, 2006 for a period of five (5) years, and began registering in Idaho as a sex offender in March of 2006. John Doe 40 is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and has not been classified as a violent sexual predator. Therefore, John Doe 40 should be eligible to petition the sentencing court to be removed
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from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry.
43. Plaintiff, John Doe 41, is a resident of Franklin County, State of Idaho. In December of 1996, John Doe 41 was convicted in Franklin County, State of Idaho, of the crime of Sexual Abuse of a Child Under the Age of Sixteen (16) Years, to-wit: the age of fifteen (15) years, a felony. John Doe 41 was sentenced to a period of incarceration and, after serving a period in custody of eleven (11) years, was released from custody on December 12, 2008. At that time, the Idaho Sex Offender Registry requirements had been enacted and John Doe 41was then required to register as a sex offender. Under the then existing language of the Idaho sex offender registration requirements, John Doe 41 would later be eligible for release from the requirement to register as a sex offender. John Doe 41 is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and has not been classified as a violent sexual predator. Therefore, John Doe 41 should be eligible to petition the sentencing court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry. The version of this biography I was provided made an allegation that this plaintiff was foreclosed from release from registration requirements due to the fact that under the 2009 amendments to the registration act, it became an “aggravated offense.”
44. Plaintiff, John Doe 42, is a resident of Ada County, State of Idaho. In September of 2004, John Doe 42 was convicted in Elmore County, State of Idaho, of the crime of Sexual Abuse of a Child Under the Age of Sixteen (16) Years, to-wit: the age of thirteen (13) years, a felony. John Doe 42 was sentenced to a period of incarceration and was released from custody in September of 2011, was placed on parole for a period of seven (7) years thereafter, and began registering as a sex offender. Under the then existing language of the Idaho sex offender registration requirements, John Doe 42 would AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF - 35

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later be eligible for release from the requirement to register as a sex offender. John Doe 42 is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and has not been classified as a violent sexual predator. Therefore, John Doe 42 should be eligible to petition the sentencing court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry.
45. Plaintiff, John Doe 43, is a resident of Ada County, State of Idaho. In April of 2004, John Doe 43 was convicted in Valley County, State of Idaho, of six (6) counts of the crime of Possession of Sexually Exploitative Material For Other Than Commercial Purposes, each a felony. John Doe 43 was sentenced to a period of probation of eight (8) years thereafter, and began registering as a sex offender. Under the then existing language of the Idaho sex offender registration requirements, John Doe 43 would later be eligible for release from the requirement to register as a sex offender. John Doe 43 is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and has not been classified as a violent sexual predator. Therefore, John Doe 43 should be eligible to petition the sentencing court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry.
46. Plaintiff, John Doe 44 is a resident of Twin Falls County, State of Idaho. In March of 1992, John Doe 44 was convicted in Twin Falls County, State of Idaho, of one (1) count of Crime Against Nature and one (1) count of Rape, to-wit: the victim was an adult, both felonies. John Doe 44 was placed on probation for two (2) years. At the time of his conviction, the Idaho Sex Offender Registry requirements had not been enacted and John Doe 44 was not then required to register as a sex offender. John Doe 44 was advised by his probation officer in 1993 that he must thereafter register as a sex offender. Under the then existing language of the Idaho sex offender registration requirements, John Doe 44 would later be eligible for release from the requirement to register as a sex AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF - 36

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offender. The ex post facto amendments to Idaho SORNA effective from and after July 1, 2001, created the “aggravated offense” exception to eligibility for release from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry. John Doe 44 is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and has not been classified as a violent sexual predator. Therefore, John Doe 44 should be eligible to petition the sentencing court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry. John Doe 44 petitioned the sentencing court for release from sex offender registration requirements in 2006, and the petition was denied. John Doe 44 was, and still is, foreclosed from ever being removed from the Idaho sex offender registry by reason of the July 1, 2001, amendment above Stated. Need to know the victim ages if available.
47. Plaintiff, John Doe 45, is a resident of Ada County, State of Idaho. In October of 1999, John Doe 45 was convicted in Ada County, State of Idaho, of the crime of Possession of Sexually Exploitative Material For Other Than Commercial Purposes, a felony. John Doe 45 was sentenced, received a withheld judgment, was placed on probation for a period of five (5) years, and began registering as a sex offender. Under the then existing language of the Idaho sex offender registration requirements, John Doe 45 would later be eligible for release from the requirement to register as a sex offender. John Doe 45 is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and has not been classified as a violent sexual predator. Therefore, John Doe 45 should be eligible to petition the sentencing court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry.
48. Plaintiff, John Doe 46, is a resident of Boise County, State of Idaho. In April of 1989, John Doe 46 was convicted of the crime of Sexual Abuse of a Child Under the Age of sixteen (16) years, Incest, to wit: the age of fourteen (14) years, a felony, in AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF - 37

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Ada County, State of Idaho. John Doe 46 completed a sex offender treatment program and was placed on probation for a period of five (5) years. At the time of his conviction, the Idaho Sex Offender Registry requirements had not been enacted and John Doe 46 was not then required to register as a sex offender. In 1993, John Doe 46 was advised by his probation officer that he must register as a sex offender. Under the then existing language of the Idaho sex offender registration requirements, John Doe 46 would later be eligible for release from the requirement to register as a sex offender. John Doe 46 is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and has not been classified as a violent sexual predator. Therefore, John Doe 46 should be eligible to petition the sentencing court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry.
49. Plaintiff, John Doe 47 is a resident of Gooding County, State of Idaho. In June of 1993, John Doe 47 was convicted in Bannock County, State of Idaho, of Rape (victim was fourteen (14) years of age at the time of the commission of the offense), a felony. John Doe 47 was placed on probation and released from probation on November 27, 1996. At the time of his conviction, the Idaho Sex Offender Registry requirements had not been enacted and John Doe 47 was not then required to register as a sex offender. John Doe 47 was advised by his probation officer in September of 1993 that he must thereafter register as a sex offender. Under the then existing language of the Idaho sex offender registration requirements, John Doe 47 would later be eligible for release from the requirement to register as a sex offender. The ex post facto amendments to Idaho SORNA effective from and after July 1, 2001, created the “aggravated offense” exception to eligibility for release from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry. John Doe 47 is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and has not been classified as a violent
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sexual predator. Therefore, John Doe 47 should be eligible to petition the sentencing court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry. John Doe 47 was, and still is, foreclosed from ever being removed from the Idaho sex offender registry by reason of the July 1, 2001, amendment above stated.
50. Plaintiff, John Doe 48, is a resident of Ada County, State of Idaho. In November of 1999, John Doe 48 was convicted in Ada County, State of Idaho, of the crime of Sexual Battery of a Minor Sixteen (16) or Seventeen (17) Years of Age, a felony. John Doe 48 was placed on probation for a period of ten (10) years, and was required to register as a sex offender. Under the then existing language of the Idaho sex offender registration requirements, John Doe 48 would later be eligible for release from the requirement to register as a sex offender. Plaintiff, John Doe 48 was released from probation in November of 2009. John Doe 48 is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and has not been classified as a violent sexual predator. Therefore, John Doe 48 should be eligible to petition the sentencing court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry.
51. Plaintiff, Jane Doe 49, is a resident of Ada County, state of Idaho. On July 27, 2003, Jane Doe 49 was convicted in Payette County, state of Kentucky, of the crime of Use of a Minor in Sexual Performance, to-wit: victim sixteen (16) years of age at the time of commission of the offense, a felony. Jane Doe 49 was sentenced to a term of incarceration of twenty-three (23) months in the custody of a Kentucky state prison facility, and was released from custody in 2005. During that time, Jane Doe 49 successfully completed a sex offender treatment program. Commencing November 30, 2003, Jane Doe 49 was required to register as a sex offender in the state of Kentucky. AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF - 39

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Subsequent to her release from custody in 2005, Jane Doe 49 moved to the state of Idaho, where she has continued to register as a sex offender. The ex post facto amendments to Idaho SORNA effective from and after July 1, 2005, expanded the offenses for which sex offender registration was required to include all substantially similar offenses for which convictions have been entered in another jurisdiction. In the event the Kentucky conviction is determined to be a substantially similar offense to Idaho criminal statutes requiring sex offender registration, the Idaho sex offender registration requirements should apply to Jane Doe 49. Jane Doe 49 is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and has not been classified as a violent sexual predator. Therefore, Jane Doe 49 should either not have been required to register as a sex offender in Idaho, or in the alternative, should be eligible to petition the sentencing court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry.
52. Plaintiff, John Doe 50 is a resident of Twin Falls County, State of Idaho. In April of 1991, John Doe 50 was convicted in Ada County, State of Idaho, of the crime of Sexual Abuse of a Child Under the Age of Sixteen (16) years, to wit: the age of thirteen (13) years, a felony. John Doe 50 was sentenced to and served seven (7) years in the custody of the Idaho Department of Correction and was released on March 28, 1998. At the time of his conviction, the Idaho Sex Offender Registry requirements had not been enacted and John Doe 50 was not then required to register as a sex offender. In 1998, John Doe 50 began registering as a sex offender. Under the then existing language of the Idaho sex offender registration requirements, John Doe 50 would later be eligible for release from the requirement to register as a sex offender. John Doe 50 is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and has not been classified as a violent sexual
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predator. Therefore, John Doe 50 should be eligible to petition the sentencing court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry.
53. Plaintiff, John Doe 51 is a resident of Bingham County, State of Idaho. In 2002, John Doe 51 was convicted in Twin Falls County, State of Idaho, of Rape (victim was sixteen (16) years of age at the time of the commission of the offense), a felony. John Doe 51 was placed on probation for a period of five (5) years. At the time of his conviction, the Idaho Sex Offender Registry requirements had been enacted and John Doe 51 began registering as a sex offender in September of 2002. John Doe’s offense was considered “aggravated” at the time of commission of the offense. John Doe 51 is now required to register for life as an aggravated offender on the Idaho Sex Offender Registry. John Doe 51 does not have standing under the present sex offender registration statutes to petition to be released from sex offender registration requirements for the reason that his duty to register as a sex offender is based solely on the fact that his conviction is a predicate offense, rather than pursuant to a factual determination having been made of probable future conduct, (i.e., that John Doe 51 poses a potentially high risk of reoffending or engaging in predatory sexual conduct). John Doe 51 is not a recidivist and has not been classified as a violent sexual predator. Therefore, John Doe 51 should be eligible to petition the sentencing court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry.
54. Plaintiff, John Doe 52, is a resident of Ada County, State of Idaho. On September 20, 2002, John Doe 52 was convicted in Canyon County, State of Idaho, of the crime of Sexual Battery of a Minor Under the Age of Sixteen (16) Years, to-wit: the age of fourteen (14) years, a felony. John Doe 52 was sentenced to a withheld judgment, was AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF - 41

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placed on probation for a period of seven (7) years in March of 2003, and began registering as a sex offender. Under the then existing language of the Idaho sex offender registration requirements, John Doe 52 would later be eligible for release from the requirement to register as a sex offender. John Doe 52 is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and has not been classified as a violent sexual predator. Therefore, John Doe 52 should be eligible to petition the sentencing court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry.
55. Plaintiff, John Doe 53, is a resident of Elmore County, State of Idaho. On March 19, 1992, John Doe 53 was convicted in Elmore County, State of Idaho, of Battery W/Intent To Commit A Rape, to-wit: the age of 15 years, a felony. John Doe 53's sentence was suspended and he was placed on probation for four (4) years. He was advised at that time that he must register as a sex offender. He completed a sex offender treatment. John Doe 53 was released from probation in late 1993. John Doe 53 is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and has not been classified as a violent sexual predator. Therefore, John Doe 53 should be eligible to petition the sentencing court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry.
56. Plaintiff, John Doe 54, is a resident of Bonneville County, State of Idaho. In 2003, John Doe 54 was convicted in Jefferson County, State of Idaho, of a felony sexual offense. At the time of his conviction, the Idaho Sex Offender Registry requirements had been enacted and John Doe 54 began registering as a sex offender in 2003. John Doe 54’s offense was considered “aggravated” at the time of commission of the offense. John Doe 54 is now required to register for life as an aggravated offender on the Idaho Sex Offender Registry. John Doe 54 does not have standing under the present AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF - 42

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sex offender registration statutes to petition to be released from sex offender registration requirements for the reason that his duty to register as a sex offender is based solely on the fact that his conviction is a predicate offense, rather than pursuant to a factual determination having been made of probable future conduct, (i.e., that John Doe 54 poses a potentially high risk of reoffending or engaging in predatory sexual conduct). John Doe 54 is not a recidivist and has not been classified as a violent sexual predator. Therefore, John Doe 54 should be eligible to petition the sentencing court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry.
57. Plaintiff, John Doe 55, is a resident of Twin Falls County, State of Idaho. In 2001, John Doe 55 was convicted in Twin Falls County, State of Idaho, of a felony sexual offense. At the time of his conviction, the Idaho Sex Offender Registry requirements had been enacted and John Doe 55 began registering as a sex offender in 2001. John Doe 55’s offense was considered “aggravated” at the time of commission of the offense. John Doe 55 is now required to register for life as an aggravated offender on the Idaho Sex Offender Registry. John Doe 55 does not have standing under the present sex offender registration statutes to petition to be released from sex offender registration requirements for the reason that his duty to register as a sex offender is based solely on the fact that his conviction is a predicate offense, rather than pursuant to a factual determination having been made of probable future conduct, (i.e., that John Doe 55 poses a potentially high risk of reoffending or engaging in predatory sexual conduct). John Doe 55 is not a recidivist and has not been classified as a violent sexual predator. Therefore, John Doe 55 should be eligible to petition the sentencing court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry.
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58. Plaintiff, John Doe 56, is a resident of Twin Falls County, State of Idaho. In 2004, John Doe 56 was convicted in Twin Falls County, State of Idaho, of Lewd Conduct W/Minor Child Under the age of 16 years, to-wit: eleven (11) years of age, a felony. At the time of his conviction, the Idaho Sex Offender Registry requirements had been enacted and John Doe 56 began registering as a sex offender in 2004. John Doe 56’s offense was considered “aggravated” at the time of commission of the offense. John Doe 56 is now required to register for life as an aggravated offender on the Idaho Sex Offender Registry. John Doe 56 does not have standing under the present sex offender registration statutes to petition to be released from sex offender registration requirements for the reason that his duty to register as a sex offender is based solely on the fact that his conviction is a predicate offense, rather than pursuant to a factual determination having been made of probable future conduct, (i.e., that John Doe 56 poses a potentially high risk of reoffending or engaging in predatory sexual conduct). John Doe 56 is not a recidivist and has not been classified as a violent sexual predator. Therefore, John Doe 56 should be eligible to petition the sentencing court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry.
59. Plaintiff, John Doe 57, is a resident of Ada County, State of Idaho. In 1993, John Doe 57 was convicted in Tulare County, State of California, of a non-aggravated felony sexual offense. In 1996, John Doe 57 was advised by his probation officer of the requirement that he register as a sex offender in the State of California. John Doe 57 thereafter moved to the State of Idaho in 2009 and began registering there as a sex offender. Under the language of the Idaho sex offender registration requirements as they existed at the time of his release from custody/probation, John Doe 31 would later be
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eligible for release from the requirement to register as a sex offender. The ex post facto amendments to Idaho SORNA effective from and after July 1, 2009, expanded the definition of “aggravated offense” to include the substantially equivalent offense for which John Doe 57 was convicted in the State of California. John Doe 57 is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and has not been classified as a violent sexual predator. Therefore, John Doe 57 should be eligible to petition the sentencing court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry. John Doe 57 was, and still is, foreclosed from ever being removed from the Idaho sex offender registry by reason of the July 1, 2009, amendment above stated.
60. Plaintiff, John Doe 58, is a resident of Ada County, State of Idaho. In 1990, John Doe 58 was convicted at Mountain Home Air Force Base, State of Idaho, of a nonaggravated felony sexual offense. After 1993, John Doe 58 was advised by his probation officer of the requirement that he register as a sex offender in the State of Idaho. Idaho sex offender registry requirements had not yet been enacted at the time of the conviction of John Doe 58. Under the language of the Idaho sex offender registration requirements as they existed at the time of his release from custody/probation, John Doe 58 would later be eligible for release from the requirement to register as a sex offender. The ex post facto amendments to Idaho SORNA effective from and after July 1, 2009, expanded the definition of “aggravated offense” to include the substantially equivalent offense for which John Doe 58 was convicted at the Mountain Home military base. John Doe 58 is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and has not been classified as a violent sexual predator. Therefore, John Doe 58 should be eligible to petition the sentencing court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry. John Doe 58 was,
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and still is, foreclosed from ever being removed from the Idaho sex offender registry by reason of the July 1, 2009, amendment above stated.
61. Plaintiff, John Doe 59, is a resident of Twin Falls County, State of Idaho. On January 29, 1993, John Doe 59 was convicted in Benton County, State of Washington, of a non-aggravated felony sexual offense (Rape of a Child 2nd Degree, towit: thirteen (13) years of age). John Doe 59 began registering as a sex offender in the State of Washington and continued to do so in the State of Idaho after moving here in 2001. Under the language of the Idaho sex offender registration requirements as they existed at the time of his release from custody/probation, John Doe 59 would later be eligible for release from the requirement to register as a sex offender. John Doe 59 is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and has not been classified as a violent sexual predator. Therefore, John Doe 59 should be eligible to petition the sentencing court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry.
62. Plaintiff, John Doe 60, is a resident of Twin Falls County, State of Idaho. On January 31, 1992, John Doe 60 was convicted in Maricopa County, State of Arizona, of a non-aggravated felony sexual offense (Attempted Child Molestation in the 3rd degree, to-wit: ten (10) years of age). John Doe 60 thereafter moved to the State of Idaho in 1992 and was advised by his probation officer in 1993 of the requirement that he register as a sex offender in the State of Idaho. Idaho sex offender registry requirements had not yet been enacted at the time of the conviction of John Doe 60. Under the language of the Idaho sex offender registration requirements as they existed at the time of his release from custody/probation, John Doe 60 would later be eligible for release from the requirement to register as a sex offender. The ex post facto amendments to Idaho SORNA effective AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF - 46

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from and after July 1, 2009, expanded the definition of “aggravated offense” to include the substantially equivalent offense for which John Doe 60 was convicted in the State of Arizona. John Doe 60 is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and has not been classified as a violent sexual predator. Therefore, John Doe 60 should be eligible to petition the sentencing court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry. John Doe 60 was, and still is, foreclosed from ever being removed from the Idaho sex offender registry by reason of the July 1, 2009, amendment above stated.
63. Plaintiff, John Doe 61, is a resident of Twin Falls County, State of Idaho. In June of 1983, John Doe 61 was convicted in Shasta County, State of California, of two (2) counts of Lewd and Lascivious Acts with a Child Under Fourteen (14) Years of Age, to-wit: ten (10) or eleven (11) years. In March of 1991, John Doe 61 was placed on parole and he moved to the State of Idaho. At the request of his parole officer, in 1996, John Doe 61 began registering as a sex offender in Idaho. Under the language of the Idaho sex offender registration requirements as they existed at the time of his release from custody/probation, John Doe 61 would later be eligible for release from the requirement to register as a sex offender. The ex post facto amendments to Idaho SORNA effective from and after July 1, 2009, expanded the definition of “aggravated offense” to include the substantially equivalent offense for which John Doe 61 was convicted in the State of California. John Doe 61 is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and has not been classified as a violent sexual predator. Therefore, John Doe 61 should be eligible to petition the sentencing court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry. John Doe 61 was, and still is, foreclosed from ever being removed from the Idaho sex offender registry by reason of the July 1, 2009, amendment above stated.
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64. Plaintiff, John Doe 62, is a resident of Bannock County, State of Idaho. In January of 1988, John Doe 62 was convicted in Grand County, State of Colorado, of Sexual Assault of a Minor, to-wit: nine (9) years of age, a felony. John Doe 62 was placed on probation for a period of for (4) years. In 1992, John Doe 62 moved to the State of Idaho while still on probation. John Doe 62 was released from probation on January 5, 1994, and was informed by his probation officer of the requirement that he register as a sex offender in Idaho. Under the language of the Idaho sex offender registration requirements as they existed at the time of his release from custody/probation, John Doe 62 would later be eligible for release from the requirement to register as a sex offender. The ex post facto amendments to Idaho SORNA effective from and after July 1, 2009, expanded the definition of “aggravated offense” to include the substantially equivalent offense for which John Doe 62 was convicted in the State of Colorado. John Doe 62 is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and has not been classified as a violent sexual predator. Therefore, John Doe 62 should be eligible to petition the sentencing court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry. John Doe 62 was, and still is, foreclosed from ever being removed from the Idaho sex offender registry by reason of the July 1, 2009, amendment above stated.
65. Plaintiff, John Doe 63, is a resident of Butte County, State of Idaho. On July 28, 1987, John Doe 63 was convicted in Maricopa County, State of Arizona, of Attempted Molestation of a Child, to-wit: ten (10) years of age, a felony. John Doe 63 was placed on probation and moved to the State of Nevada on December 26, 1997, and commenced registering as a sex offender in that State. In 2008, John Doe 63 moved to the State of Idaho and began registering with the Idaho Sex Offender Registry. Under the
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language of the Idaho sex offender registration requirements as they existed at the time of his release from custody/probation, John Doe 63 would later be eligible for release from the requirement to register as a sex offender. The ex post facto amendments to Idaho SORNA effective from and after July 1, 2009, expanded the definition of “aggravated offense” to include the substantially equivalent offense for which John Doe 63 was convicted in the State of Arizona. John Doe 63 is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and has not been classified as a violent sexual predator. Therefore, John Doe 63 should be eligible to petition the sentencing court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry. John Doe 63 was, and still is, foreclosed from ever being removed from the Idaho sex offender registry by reason of the July 1, 2009, amendment above stated.
66. Plaintiff, John Doe 64, is a resident of Ada County, State of Idaho. On February 25, 1988, John Doe 64 was convicted in Canadian County, State of Oklahoma, of Lewd Acts to a Child, to-wit: fourteen (14) years of age, a felony. John Doe 64 was placed on probation and began registering as a sex offender in the State of Oklahoma in 1988. John Doe 64 moved to the State of Idaho in 2000 and began registering with the Idaho Sex Offender Registry. Under the language of the Idaho sex offender registration requirements as they existed at the time of his release from custody/probation, John Doe 64 would later be eligible for release from the requirement to register as a sex offender. The ex post facto amendments to Idaho SORNA effective from and after July 1, 2009, expanded the definition of “aggravated offense” to include the substantially equivalent offense for which John Doe 64 was convicted in the State of Oklahoma. John Doe 64 is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and has not been classified as a
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violent sexual predator. Therefore, John Doe 64 should be eligible to petition the sentencing court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry. John Doe 64 was, and still is, foreclosed from ever being removed from the Idaho sex offender registry by reason of the July 1, 2009, amendment above stated.
67. Plaintiff, John Doe 65, is a resident of Ada County, State of Idaho. On March 27, 1992, John Doe 65 was convicted by Military Court Martial, Fort Ord, California, of the crime of Indecent Acts with a Child Under Sixteen (16) Years of Age, to-wit: twelve (12) years of age, a felony. In 1995, John Doe 65 moved to the State of Idaho and began registering as a sex offender. Under the language of the Idaho sex offender registration requirements as they existed at the time of his release from custody/probation, John Doe 65 would later be eligible for release from the requirement to register as a sex offender. The ex post facto amendments to Idaho SORNA effective from and after July 1, 2009, expanded the definition of “aggravated offense” to include the substantially equivalent offense for which John Doe 65 was convicted in military court in the State of California. John Doe 65 is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and has not been classified as a violent sexual predator. Therefore, John Doe 65 should be eligible to petition the sentencing court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry. John Doe 65 was, and still is, foreclosed from ever being removed from the Idaho sex offender registry by reason of the July 1, 2009, amendment above stated.
68. Plaintiff, John Doe 66, is a resident of Bingham County, State of Idaho. On July 20, 1987, John Doe 66 was convicted in San Joaquin County, State of California, of Sexual Penetration With A Foreign Object with Force, involving a victim of the age of AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF - 50

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eight (8) months to one (1) year, a felony. John Doe 66 moved to Idaho in 1998 and was advised at the time by his probation/parole officer that he was required to register in Idaho as a sex offender. Under the language of the Idaho sex offender registration requirements as they existed at the time of his release from custody/probation, John Doe 66 would later be eligible for release from the requirement to register as a sex offender. The ex post facto amendments to Idaho SORNA effective from and after July 1, 2001, created the category of offenses excluded from the petitioner’s ability to obtain release from sex offender registry requirements and labeled those offenses “aggravated offenses.” The statutory definition of “aggravated offense” included the substantially equivalent offense for which John Doe 66 was convicted in the State of California. John Doe 66 is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and has not been classified as a violent sexual predator. Therefore, John Doe 66 should be eligible to petition the sentencing court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry. John Doe 66 was, and still is, foreclosed from ever being removed from the Idaho sex offender registry by reason of the July 1, 2001, amendment above stated.
69. Plaintiff, John Doe 67, is a resident of Twin Falls County, State of Idaho. On August 5, 1988, John Doe 67 was convicted in Flathead County, State of Montana, of the crime of Sexual Assault, to-wit: five (5) or six (6) years of age, a felony. In 1999, John Doe 67 moved to the State of Idaho and began registering as a sex offender. Under the language of the Idaho sex offender registration requirements as they existed at the time of his release from custody/probation, John Doe 67 would later be eligible for release from the requirement to register as a sex offender. John Doe 67 is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and has not been classified as a violent sexual
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predator. Therefore, John Doe 67 should be eligible to petition the sentencing court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry.
70. Plaintiff, John Doe 68, is a resident of Franklin County, State of Idaho. In 2004, John Doe 68 was convicted in Logan County, State of Utah, of four (4) counts of the crime of Sexual Abuse of a Child, to-wit: the age of seven (7) years, a felony. In 2006, John Doe 68 moved to the State of Idaho and began registering with the Idaho Sex Offender Registry. Under the then existing language of the Idaho sex offender registration requirements, John Doe 68 would later be eligible for release from the requirement to register as a sex offender. The ex post facto amendments to Idaho SORNA effective from and after July 1, 2009, expanded the definition of “aggravated offense” to include the substantially equivalent offense for which John Doe 68 was convicted in the State of Utah. John Doe 68 is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and has not been classified as a violent sexual predator. Therefore, John Doe 65 should be eligible to petition the sentencing court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry. John Doe 68 was, and still is, foreclosed from ever being removed from the Idaho sex offender registry by reason of the July 1, 2009, amendment above stated.
71. Plaintiff, John Doe 69, is a resident of Bannock County, State of Idaho. On July 9, 1999, John Doe 69 was convicted by U.S. Marshall Court, Portland, State of Oregon, of the crime of Sex Exploitation of a Child, a felony. In 1999, John Doe 69 moved to the State of Idaho and began registering as a sex offender. Under the language of the Idaho sex offender registration requirements as they existed at the time of his release from custody/probation, John Doe 69 would later be eligible for release from the AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF - 52

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requirement to register as a sex offender. John Doe 69 is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and has not been classified as a violent sexual predator. Therefore, John Doe 69 should be eligible to petition the sentencing court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry.
72. Plaintiff, John Doe 70, is a resident of Ada County, State of Idaho. On September 21, 2005, John Doe 70 was convicted in Ada County, State of Idaho, of the crime of Sexual Exploitation of a Child, a felony. He was sentenced to the United States Bureau of Prisons for a period of sixty (60) months. John doe 70 was released in March, 2010, placed on probation for a period of three (3) years, and began registering in the State of Idaho as a sex offender. Under the then existing language of the Idaho sex offender registration requirements, John Doe 70 would later be eligible for release from the requirement to register as a sex offender. John Doe 70 is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and has not been classified as a violent sexual predator. Therefore, John Doe 70 should be eligible to petition the sentencing court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry.
73. Plaintiff, John Doe 71, is a resident of Ada County, State of Idaho. On August 10, 2004, John Doe 71 was convicted in Calaveras County, State of California, of the crime of Lewd or Lascivious Conduct, to-wit: ten (10) years of age, an aggravated offense. In 2007, John Doe 71 began registering as a sex offender in the State of California. In September of 2014, John Doe 71 moved to the State of Idaho and began registering with the Idaho Sex Offender Registry. John Doe 71’s offense was considered “aggravated” at the time of commission of the offense. John Doe 71 is now required to register for life as an aggravated offender on the Idaho Sex Offender Registry. John Doe AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF - 53

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71 does not have standing under the present sex offender registration statutes to petition to be released from sex offender registration requirements for the reason that his duty to register as a sex offender is based solely on the fact that his conviction is a predicate offense, rather than pursuant to a factual determination having been made of probable future conduct, (i.e., that John Doe 71 poses a potentially high risk of reoffending or engaging in predatory sexual conduct). John Doe 71 is not a recidivist and has not been classified as a violent sexual predator. Therefore, John Doe 71 should be eligible to petition the sentencing court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry.
74. Plaintiff, John Doe 72, is a resident of Bannock County, State of Idaho. On October 24, 1994, John Doe 72 was convicted in Malheur County, State of Oregon, of the crime of Rape in the Third Degree, to-wit: thirteen (13) years of age. He was placed on probation for a period of thirty-six (36) months. John Doe 72 violated his probation and in February, 1996, was sentenced to serve six (6) months in a correctional institution in the State of Oregon. John Doe 72 was released in July, 1996, after serving the full six (6) months and was placed on probation. In 1996, John Doe 72 began registering as a sex offender in the State of Oregon. In 1998, John Doe 72 moved to the State of Idaho and began registering with the Idaho Sex Offender Registry. John Doe 72 is not a recidivist, has not committed an aggravated offense and has not been classified as a violent sexual predator. Therefore, John Doe 72 should be eligible to petition the sentencing court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry.
75. Plaintiff, John Doe 73, is a resident of Ada County, State of Idaho. On January 25, 2000, John Doe 73 was convicted in Benton County, State of Washington, of the crime of Communication with a Minor for Immoral Purposes, to-wit: thirteen (13) AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF - 54

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years of age, a misdemeanor. In 2009, John Doe 73 began registering as a sex offender in the State of Washington. In 2010, John Doe 73 moved to the State of Idaho and began registering with the Idaho Sex Offender Registry. John Doe 73 is not a recidivist, has not committed an aggravated offense and has not been classified as a violent sexual predator. Therefore, John Doe 73 should be eligible to petition the sentencing court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry.
76. Plaintiff, John Doe 74, is a resident of Ada County, State of Idaho. On June 26, 1995, John Doe 74 was convicted, as a juvenile, in Ada County, State of Idaho, of the crime of Lewd Conduct with a Minor Under the Age of Sixteen (16) Years, to-wit: the age of twelve (12) years, a felony. John Doe 74 began registering as a juvenile sex offender at that time. Under the then existing language of the Idaho sex offender registration requirements at the time of his release from custody/probation, John Doe 74 would later be eligible for release from the requirement to register as a sex offender. The ex post facto amendments to Idaho SORNA effective from and after July 1, 2009, expanded the definition of “aggravated offense” to exclude any age demarcation to the crime of lewd and lascivious conduct, leaving the crime of “Lewd and Lascivious Conduct” with no reference to the age of the victim as an “aggravated offense.” John Doe 74 is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and has not been classified as a violent sexual predator. Therefore, John Doe 74 should be eligible to petition the sentencing court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry. John Doe 74 was, and still is, foreclosed from ever being removed from the Idaho sex offender registry by reason of the July 1, 2009, amendment above stated.
77. Plaintiff, John Doe 75, is a resident of Bonneville County, State of Idaho. AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF - 55

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On June 14, 2000, John Doe 75 was convicted, as a juvenile, in Sweetwater County, State of Wyoming, of two (2) counts of the crime of Sexual Assault in the Second Degree, towit: seven (7) years of age, a felony. In 2001, John Doe 75 began registering as a juvenile sex offender in the State of Wyoming. In 2004, John Doe 75 moved to the State of Idaho and began registering under the Idaho Sex Offender Registry as a Violent Sexual Offender; however, that designation was removed from his registration status in 2005. Under the then existing language of the Idaho sex offender registration requirements at the time of his release from custody/probation, John Doe 75 would later be eligible for release from the requirement to register as a sex offender. The ex post facto amendments to Idaho SORNA effective from and after July 1, 2009, expanded the definition of “aggravated offense” to include all registration offenses where the victim was less than thirteen (13) years of age. John Doe 75 is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and has not been classified as a violent sexual predator. Therefore, John Doe 75 should be eligible to petition the sentencing court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry. John Doe 75 was, and still is, foreclosed from ever being removed from the Idaho sex offender registry by reason of the July 1, 2009, amendment above stated.
78. Plaintiff, John Doe 76, is a resident of Ada County, state of Idaho. On February 2, 1999, John Doe 76 was convicted in Military Court proceedings in San Diego County, state of California, of the crime of Sodomy, to-wit: victim fifteen (15) years of age, a felony. In June of 2000, John Doe 76 moved to the state of Idaho and he began registering under the Idaho Sex Offender Registry. Under the then existing language of the Idaho sex offender registration requirements at the time of his release from
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custody/probation, John Doe 76 would later be eligible for release from the requirement to register as a sex offender. John Doe 76 is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and has not been classified as a violent sexual predator. Therefore, John Doe 76 should be eligible to petition the sentencing court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry.
79. Plaintiff, John Doe 77, is a resident of Twin Falls County, state of Idaho. On July 12, 2002, John Doe 77 was convicted in Duchesne County, state of Utah, of the crime of Unlawful Sexual Conduct with a 16 or 17 Year Old, to-wit: victim 16 years of age, a felony. In 2002, John Doe 77 began registering as a sex offender in the state of Utah. In 2008, John Doe 77 moved to the state of Idaho and began registering under the Idaho Sex Offender Registry. Under the then existing language of the Idaho sex offender registration requirements at the time of his release from custody/probation, John Doe 77 would later be eligible for release from the requirement to register as a sex offender. The ex post facto amendments to Idaho SORNA effective from and after July 1, 2011, expanded the definition of “aggravated offense” to include as “aggravated offenses” substantially similar offenses from another jurisdiction. John Doe 77 is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and has not been classified as a violent sexual predator. Therefore, John Doe 77 should be eligible to petition the sentencing court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry. John Doe 77 was, and still is, foreclosed from ever being removed from the Idaho sex offender registry by reason of the July 1, 2011, amendment above stated.
80. Plaintiff, John Doe 78, is a resident of Jerome County, state of Idaho. On May 14, 1991, John Doe 78 was convicted in Jerome County, state of Idaho, of the crime AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF - 57

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of Sexual Abuse of a Child Under the Age of Sixteen (16) Years, to wit: the age of nine (9) years, a felony. John Doe 78 moved to the state of Washington in 1995, where he remained until 2011, at which time he moved back to the state of Idaho. John Doe 78 registered as a sex offender during the time he resided in the state of Washington. John Doe 78 has registered as a sex offender in Idaho since his return. Under the terms of Idaho SORNA registration requirements as they existed at the time of his release from custody/probation, John Doe 78 would later be eligible for release from the requirement to register as a sex offender. The ex post facto amendments to Idaho SORNA effective from and after July 1, 2009, expanded the definition of “aggravated offense” to include, “any other offense set forth in Section 18-8304, Idaho Code, if at the time of the commission of the offense the victim was below the age of thirteen (13) years.” John Doe 78 is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and has not been classified as a violent sexual predator. Therefore, John Doe 78 should be eligible to petition the sentencing court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry. John Doe 78 was, and still is, foreclosed from ever being removed from the Idaho sex offender registry by reason of the July 1, 2009, amendment above
81. Plaintiff, John Doe 79, is a resident of Gooding County, state of Idaho. On May 14, 2004, John Doe 79 was convicted in Gooding County, state of Idaho, three (3) counts of the crime of Sexual Contact with a Prisoner, a felony. John Doe 79 was released from custody in 2009, and began registering as a sex offender in May of 2009. At the time of the conviction of John Doe 79, this offense was not a registration offense under Idaho SORNA, that amendment to Idaho SORNA becoming effective July 1, 2005. John Doe 79 is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and has not been
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classified as a violent sexual predator. Therefore, John Doe 79 should be eligible to petition the sentencing court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry.
82. Plaintiff, John Doe 80, is a resident of Lemhi County, state of Idaho. On June 8, 1989, John Doe 80 was convicted in Lemhi County, state of Idaho, of the crime of Lewd Conduct with a Minor Child Under Sixteen (16) Years of Age, to-wit: the age of fourteen (14) years, a felony. On June 8, 1989, John Doe 80 was granted probation for a period of five (5) years. On February 19, 1992, his probation was revoked due to a probation violation and John Doe 80 was sentenced to the custody of the Idaho State Board of Corrections for a fixed period of one (1) year followed by an indeterminate period not to exceed four (4) years. John Doe 80 received a reduced sentence which consisted of a fixed period of one (1) year followed by an indeterminate period not to exceed one (1) year. John Doe 80 was released from custody in October of 1993. John Doe 80 was then required to begin registering as a sex offender commencing November of 2013. At the time of his conviction, the Idaho Sex Offender Registry requirements had not been enacted and John Doe 80 was not then required to register as a sex offender. Under the then existing language of the Idaho sex offender registration requirements, John Doe 80 would later be eligible for release from the requirement to register as a sex offender. The ex post facto amendments to Idaho SORNA effective from and after July 1, 2009, expanded the definition of “aggravated offense” to exclude any age demarcation to the crime of lewd and lascivious conduct, leaving the crime of “Lewd and Lascivious Conduct” with no reference to the age of the victim as an “aggravated offense.” John Doe 80 is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and has not been classified as a violent sexual predator. Therefore, John Doe 80 should be eligible to
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petition the sentencing court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry. John Doe 80 was, and still is, foreclosed from ever being removed from the Idaho sex offender registry by reason of the July 1, 2009, amendment above stated.
83. Plaintiff, John Doe 81, is a resident of Twin Falls County, state of Idaho. On November 3, 1999, John Doe 81 was convicted in a Military Court at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, state of Arizona, of the crime of Indecent Acts with a Child Under the Age of Sixteen (16) Years, to-wit: victim fifteen (15) years of age, a misdemeanor. John Doe 81 was sentenced to thirty (30) days in military custody by reason of the conviction. John Doe 81 was not required to register as a sex offender in the state of Arizona as a result of the conviction. In 2001, John Doe 81 moved to the state of Idaho and was required to register under the Idaho Sex Offender Registry commencing in 2004. Under the then existing language of the Idaho sex offender registration requirements at the time of his release from custody/probation, John Doe 81 would later be eligible for release from the requirement to register as a sex offender. The ex post facto amendments to Idaho SORNA effective from and after July 1, 2009, expanded the definition of “aggravated offense” to exclude any age demarcation to the crime of lewd and lascivious conduct, leaving the crime of “Lewd and Lascivious Conduct” with no reference to the age of the victim as an “aggravated offense.” The ex post facto amendments to Idaho SORNA effective from and after July 1, 2011, expanded the definition of “aggravated offense” to same or similar offenses committed in other jurisdictions. In 2013, in response to a petition filed by John Doe 81, the Court found that the Arizona offense was the same or similar to Idaho’s Lewd Conduct statute and denied the petition. John Doe 81 is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and has not been classified as
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a violent sexual predator. Therefore, John Doe 81 should be eligible to petition the sentencing court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry. John Doe 81 was, and still is, foreclosed from ever being removed from the Idaho sex offender registry by reason of the July 1, 2009 and July 1 2011 amendments above stated.
84. Plaintiff, John Doe 82, is a resident of Ada County, state of Idaho. On May 12, 1986, John Doe 82 was convicted in Sitka County, state of Alaska, of the crime of Sexual Abuse of a Minor in the 2nd Degree, to-wit: Sixteen (16) or Seventeen (17) Years, a felony. John Doe 82 began registering as a sex offender in the state of Alaska in 1995. John Doe 82 moved to the state of Florida in 2000 and began registering as a sex offender in that state. In 2008, John Doe 82 was advised by his probation/parole officer he was no longer required to register as a sex offender in the state of Florida. John Doe 82 is not a recidivist, has not committed an aggravated offense and has not been classified as a violent sexual predator. Therefore, John Doe 82 should be eligible to petition the sentencing court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry.
85. Plaintiff, John Doe 83, is a resident of Bonneville County, state of Idaho. On July 10, 1995, John Doe 83 was convicted in Hillsdale County, state of Michigan, of the crime of Criminal Sexual Conduct in the 3rd Degree, to-wit: victim’s age fourteen (14) years. In 1995, John Doe 83 began registering as a sex offender in the state of Michigan. In 2001, John Doe 83 moved to the state of Idaho and began registering with the Idaho Sex Offender Registry. John Doe 83 is not a recidivist, has not committed an aggravated offense and has not been classified as a violent sexual predator. Therefore, John Doe 83 should be eligible to petition the sentencing court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry. AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF - 61

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86. Plaintiff, John Doe 84, is a resident of Ada County, state of Idaho. On January 23, 1980 and in a second proceeding on February 27, 1985, John Doe 84 was convicted in Multnomah County, state of Oregon, of the crime of Attempted Sexual Abuse 1st Degree, and, in 1990, John Doe 84 was convicted of two (2) other offenses in Marion County, state of Oregon. John Doe 84 began registering as a sex offender in the state of Oregon in 1999. In 2005, John Doe 84 moved to the state of Idaho. Under the then existing language of the Idaho sex offender registration requirements at the time of his release from custody/probation, John Doe 74 would later be eligible for release from the requirement to register as a sex offender. The ex post facto amendments to Idaho SORNA effective from and after July 1, 2011, expanded the definition of “aggravated offense” to include same or similar offenses committed by the petitioner in other jurisdictions. No court in Idaho has addressed whether John Doe 84’s convictions in the state of Oregon are the same or similar to offenses defined as “aggravated offenses” in Idaho for sex offender registration purposes. Notwithstanding, John Doe 84’s probation officer has advised him the Idaho Department of Correction has taken the position his convictions are the equivalent of aggravated offenses and he will be required to register as a sex offender the remainder of his life. John Doe 84 is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and has not been classified as a violent sexual predator. Therefore, John Doe 84 should be eligible to petition the sentencing court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry.
87. Plaintiff, John Doe 85, is a resident of Gooding County, state of Idaho. On July 1, 1985, John Doe 85 was convicted in Cape Girardeau County, state of Missouri, of the crime of Sexual Abuse in the 1st Degree, to-wit: victim twelve (12) years of age, a
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felony. In December of 1985, John Doe 85 moved to the state of Idaho where John Doe 85 completed probation/parole and was released in 1986. The sex offender registry requirements had not been enacted at the time John Doe 85 was released from probation/parole requirements. The ex post facto amendments to Idaho SORNA effective
from and after July 1, 2009, expanded the definition of “aggravated offense” to include all registration offenses where the victim was less than thirteen (13) years of age. Based on that amendment, John Doe 85 was required to start registering as a sex offender in Idaho. John Doe
85 is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and has not been classified as a violent sexual predator. Therefore, John Doe 85 should be eligible to petition the sentencing court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry.
88. Plaintiff, John Doe 86, is a resident of Lincoln County, state of Idaho. On June 27, 1986, John Doe 86 was convicted in Los Angeles County, state of California, of the crime of Lewd or Lascivious Conduct with a Child Under Fourteen (14) Years of Age, to-wit: at or below the age of five (5) years, a felony. In 1993, John Doe 86 began registering as a sex offender in the state of California. In 1995, John Doe 86 moved to the state of Idaho and registered as a sex offender. In 2010, John Doe 86 petitioned the Court in Idaho for removal from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry. That application was granted; however, citing the July 1, 2009 amendment to Idaho SORNA, the Court reconsidered its ruling and placed John Doe 86 back on the Idaho Sex Offender Registry. The ex post facto amendments to Idaho SORNA effective from and after July 1, 2009, expanded the definition of “aggravated offense” to include all registration offenses where the victim was less than thirteen (13) years of age. John Doe 86 is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and has not been classified as a violent sexual predator.
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Therefore, John Doe 86 should be eligible to petition the sentencing court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry.
89. Plaintiff, John Doe 87, is a resident of Bonneville County, state of Idaho. On March 9, 1999, John Doe 87 was convicted in Bonneville County, state of Idaho, of the crime of Rape, to-wit: victim fourteen (14) years of age, a felony. John Doe 87 was thereafter placed on probation. Under the then existing language of the Idaho sex offender registration requirements, John Doe 87 would later be eligible for release from the requirement to register as a sex offender. The ex post facto amendments to Idaho SORNA effective from and after July 1, 2001, created the “aggravated offense” exception to eligibility for release from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry, which included the crime of “Rape”. John Doe 87 is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and has not been classified as a violent sexual predator. Therefore, John Doe 87 should be eligible to petition the sentencing court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry. John Doe 87 was, and still is, foreclosed from ever being removed from the Idaho sex offender registry by reason of the July 1, 2001, amendments above stated.
90. Plaintiff, John Doe 88, is a resident of Bonneville County, state of Idaho. On October 4, 1989, John Doe 88 was convicted in Bonneville County, state of Idaho, of the crime of Lewd Conduct with a Child Under the Age of Sixteen (16) Years, to-wit: victim four (4) years of age. Idaho had not yet enacted a sex offender registry at the time of this conviction. The ex post facto amendments to Idaho SORNA effective from and after July 1, 2001, created the “aggravated offense” exception to eligibility for release from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry, which included the crime above-referenced. John Doe 88 is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and has not been AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF - 64

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classified as a violent sexual predator. Therefore, John Doe 88 should be eligible to petition the sentencing court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry. John Doe 88 was, and still is, foreclosed from ever being removed from the Idaho sex offender registry by reason of the July 1, 2001, amendments above stated. Plaintiff, John Doe 88, is a resident of Jefferson County, state of Idaho. On December 19, 2011, John Doe 88 was convicted in Jefferson County, state of Idaho, of the crime of Sexual Exploitation of a Child, a felony. John Doe 89 began registering with the Idaho Sex Offender Registry in August of 2012. John Doe 88 is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and has not been classified as a violent sexual predator. Therefore, John Doe 89 should be eligible to petition the sentencing court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry.
91. Plaintiff, John Doe 89, is a resident of Jefferson County, state of Idaho. On December 19, 2011, John Doe 89 was convicted in Jefferson County, state of Idaho, of the crime of Sexual Exploitation of a Child, a felony. He was sentenced to the Idaho State Board of Corrections for a minimum period of two (2) years followed by an indeterminate period of eight (8) years. However, this sentence was suspended and, after successfully completing the Rider program, John Doe 89 was placed on probation for a period of ten (10) years. John Doe 89 began registering with the Idaho Sex Offender Registry in August of 2012. This particular crime, sexual exploitation of a child, was listed as a register-able offense since 1998, but has never been listed as an aggravated offense unless the child was less than thirteen (13) years of age according to the most recent laws. There is no evidence whatsoever in the record that is available to the sex offender registry to determine that any victim was under the age of thirteen (13) years.
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Based on the above-cited facts, John Doe 89 would have standing to petition to be released from the registration requirements in August 2022, ten (10) years after beginning registration John Doe 89 is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and has not been classified as a violent sexual predator. Therefore, John Doe 89 should be eligible to petition the sentencing court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry.
92. Plaintiff, John Doe 90, is a resident of Franklin County, state of Idaho. On August 20, 1997, John Doe 90 was convicted in Cache County, state of Utah, of the crime of Attempted Sexual Abuse of a Minor, to-wit: victim thirteen (13) years of age. John Doe 90 was a resident of the state of Idaho at the time of entry of the conviction. John Doe 90 began registering as a sex offender in the state of Utah. Upon his release by the state of Utah, John Doe 90 returned to the state of Idaho and was placed on probation for a period of five (5) years. John Doe 90 is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and has not been classified as a violent sexual predator. Therefore, John Doe 90 should be eligible to petition the sentencing court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry.
93. Plaintiff, John Doe 91, is a resident of Bonneville County, State of Idaho. On November 12, 2012, John Doe 91 was convicted of Rape in Bonneville County, State of Idaho, to-wit the age of 17 years, a felony. He was sentenced to the Idaho State Penitentiary for a determinate period of one (1) year, six (6) months followed by an indeterminate period of five (5) years, six (6) months. However, John Doe 91 was granted a withheld judgment and, after a rule 35, was sentenced to the custody of the Bonneville County Jail for a determinate period of ten (10) days, followed by an AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF - 66

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indeterminate period of 180 days. In addition, John Doe 91 was required to do 100 hours of community service. On January 10, 2013, John Doe 91 was placed on probation for a period of eight (8) years and began registering as a sex offender in the State of Idaho. John Doe 91 is currently attending a sex offender treatment program with New Beginnings. John Doe 91 does not have standing under the present statutes to petition to be released from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry nor would he have for the rest of his life. He would be subject to the amendment to the registration in 2009 and 2011 wherein his crime was considered aggravated and requires a lifetime registration which violates his constitutional rights for the reasons that his duty to register as a sex offender is based solely on the fact of conviction of a predicate offense, rather than a factual determination of probable future conduct. In other words, that John Doe 91 poses a high risk of reoffending or engaging in predatory sexual conduct. John Doe 91 expects to be released from probation in 2021. For the above reasons, John Doe 91 should have standing to petition to be released from the registry in January 2023.
94. Plaintiff, John Doe 92, is a resident of Bonneville County, state of Idaho. On May 8, 2000, John Doe 92 was convicted in Bonneville County, state of Idaho, of the crime of Lewd Conduct with a Child Under the Age of Sixteen (16) Years, to-wit: victim nine (9) years of age. The ex post facto amendments to Idaho SORNA effective from and after July 1, 2001, created the “aggravated offense” exception to eligibility for release from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry, which included the crime above-referenced where the victim was less than twelve (12) years of age. John Doe 92 is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and has not been classified as a violent sexual predator. Therefore, John Doe 92 should be eligible to petition the sentencing court to be removed
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from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry. John Doe 92 was, and still is, foreclosed from ever being removed from the Idaho sex offender registry by reason of the July 1, 2001, amendments above stated.
95. Plaintiff, John Doe 93, is a resident of Lemhi County, state of Idaho. On March 24, 2010, John Doe 93 was convicted in a German court, of the crime of Attempted Rape, to-wit: victim was nineteen (19) years of age at the time of the commission of the offense, a felony. At the time of conviction, John Doe 93 was a member of the United States military and was stationed in Germany. John Doe 93 was sentenced to incarceration for three (3) months in a German jail, followed by seven and one-half (7 ½) months of incarceration in a military jail. John Doe 93 returned to a military base in the state of Washington in February of 2011, and was required to register as a sex offender in the state of Washington. In March of 2012, John Doe 93 moved to the state of Idaho and has continued to register as a sex offender in the state of Idaho. John Doe 93 is not a recidivist, has not committed an aggravated offense and has not been classified as a violent sexual predator. Therefore, John Doe 93 should be eligible to petition the court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry.
96. Plaintiff, John Doe 94, is a resident of Bannock County, state of Idaho. On June 24, 1993, John Doe 94 was convicted in Bear Lake County, state of Idaho, of the crime of Lewd Conduct with a Child Under the Age of Sixteen (16) Years, to-wit: victim five (5) years of age; and of the crime of Sexual Abuse of a Child Under the Age of Sixteen (16) Years, to-wit: victim five (5) years of age at the time of commission of the offense, both felonies. The state of Idaho had not yet adopted sex offender registration requirements at the time of the conviction of John Doe 94. The ex post facto AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF - 68

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amendments to Idaho SORNA effective from and after July 1, 2001, created the “aggravated offense” exception to eligibility for release from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry, which included the crime of Lewd and Lascivious Conduct where the victim was less than twelve (12) years of age. The ex post facto amendments to Idaho SORNA effective from and after July 1, 2009, expanded the definition of “aggravated offense” to include all registration offenses where the victim was less than thirteen (13) years of age. John Doe 94 is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and has not been classified as a violent sexual predator. Therefore, John Doe 94 should be eligible to petition the sentencing court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry. John Doe 94 was, and still is, foreclosed from ever being removed from the Idaho sex offender registry by reason of the July 1, 2001 and July 1, 2009, amendments above stated.
97. Plaintiff, John Doe 95, is a resident of Twin Falls County, state of Idaho. On January 9, 2003, John Doe 95 was convicted in San Joaquin County, state of California, of the crime of Attempted Statutory Rape, to-wit: victim age fifteen (15) years at the time of commission of the offense, a misdemeanor. John Doe 95 was not required to register as a sex offender in the state of California as a result of the conviction. John Doe 95 moved to Idaho in 2004 and was required to register under the Idaho Sex Offender Registry commencing in 2009, when Idaho authorities reclassified the conviction as a felony for registration purposes. John Doe 95 should not be required to register as a sex offender in the state of Idaho by reason of the violation of his due process rights in reclassifying his conviction from a misdemeanor to a felony for registration purposes. John Doe 95 is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and has not been classified as a violent sexual predator. Therefore, John Doe 95 should be
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eligible to petition the court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry.
98. Plaintiff, John Doe 96, is a resident of Dunn County, state of North Dakota. In December of 1992, John Doe 96 was convicted in Lincoln County, state of Idaho, of the crime of Sexual Abuse of a Minor to-wit: victim thirteen (13) years of age at time of commission of crime, a felony. In 1995, John Doe 96 underwent a castration procedure in order to curb his sexual urges. At the time of the conviction entered against John Doe 96, Idaho had not yet adopted sex offender registration procedures. In September of 1996, John Doe 96 was advised by state of Idaho authorities that he would be required to register as a sex offender thereafter. John Doe 96 is not a recidivist, has not committed an aggravated offense and has not been classified as a violent sexual predator. Therefore, John Doe 96 should be eligible to petition the sentencing court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry.
99. Plaintiff, John Doe 97, is a resident of Ada County, state of Idaho. On March 24, 1997, John Doe 97 was convicted in Bingham County, state of Idaho, of the crime of Lewd Conduct with a Child Under the Age of Sixteen (16) Years, to-wit: victim ten (10) years of age, a felony. The ex post facto amendments to Idaho SORNA effective from and after July 1, 2001, created the “aggravated offense” exception to eligibility for release from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry, which included the crime of Lewd and Lascivious Conduct where the victim was less than twelve (12) years of age. John Doe 97 is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and has not been classified as a violent sexual predator. Therefore, John Doe 97 should be eligible to petition the sentencing court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry. John Doe 97 was, and still is, foreclosed from ever being removed from the Idaho sex offender registry by AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF - 70

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reason of the July 1, 2001, amendment above stated. 100. Plaintiff, John Doe 98, is a resident of Jerome County, state of Idaho. On
December 6, 1989, John Doe 98 was convicted in Jerome County, state of Idaho, of the crime of two (2) counts of Statutory Rape, to-wit: the age of 12 – 18 years, a felony. In 1994, John Doe 98 was released and placed on probation for a period of six (6) years, and began registering as a sex offender in the state of Idaho at that time. John Doe 98 is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and has not been classified as a violent sexual predator. Therefore, John Doe 98 should be eligible to petition the sentencing court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry.
101. Plaintiff, John Doe 99, is a resident of Ada County, state of Idaho. On January 3, 2005, John Doe 99 was convicted in Canyon County, state of Idaho, of the crime of Enticement of Minor Child Online, a felony. John Doe 99 was incarcerated for a period of six (6) years as a result of this conviction commencing on March 7, 2006, and ending on February 17, 2012, with a requirement that John Doe 99 register in the state of Idaho as a sex offender. John Doe 99 is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and has not been classified as a violent sexual predator. Therefore, John Doe 99 should be eligible to petition the sentencing court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry.
102. Plaintiff, John Doe 100, is a resident of Bannock County, state of Idaho. On April 1, 1996, John Doe 100 was convicted in Cascade County, state of Montana, of the crime of Sexual assault, to-wit: victim age ten (10) years at the time of commission of the offense, a misdemeanor. John Doe 100 was not required to register as a sex offender
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in the state of Montana as a result of the conviction. John Doe 100 moved to Idaho in 2005 and was required to register under the Idaho Sex Offender Registry commencing in 2007, when Idaho authorities reclassified the conviction as a felony for registration purposes. John Doe 100 should not be required to register as a sex offender in the state of Idaho by reason of the violation of his due process rights in reclassifying his conviction from a misdemeanor to a felony for registration purposes. John Doe 100 is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and has not been classified as a violent sexual predator. Therefore, John Doe 100 should be eligible to petition the court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry.
103. Plaintiff, John Doe 101, is a resident of Bingham County, state of Idaho. In March of 1998, John Doe 101 was convicted in Minidoka County, state of Idaho, of the crime of Rape, to-wit: victim thirteen (13) years of age at the time of the commission of the offense, a felony. The ex post facto amendments to Idaho SORNA effective from and after July 1, 2001, created the “aggravated offense” exception to eligibility for release from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry, which included the crime above-referenced. John Doe 101 is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and has not been classified as a violent sexual predator. Therefore, John Doe 101 should be eligible to petition the sentencing court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry. John Doe 101 was, and still is, foreclosed from ever being removed from the Idaho sex offender registry by reason of the July 1, 2001, amendments above stated.
104. Plaintiff, John Doe 102, is a resident of Ada County, state of Idaho. On October 31, 1988, John Doe 102 was convicted in Ada County, state of Idaho, of the crime of Lewd Conduct with a Child Under the Age of Sixteen (16) Years, to-wit: victim AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF - 72

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eleven (11) years of age at the time of the commission of the offense, a felony. John Doe 102 was released from probation between November of 1998 and January of 1999, and has been registering as a sex offender in the state of Idaho since that time. The ex post facto amendments to Idaho SORNA effective from and after July 1, 2001, created the “aggravated offense” exception to eligibility for release from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry, which included the crime above-referenced where the victim was less than twelve (12) years of age. John Doe 102 is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and has not been classified as a violent sexual predator. Therefore, John Doe 102 should be eligible to petition the sentencing court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry. John Doe 102 was, and still is, foreclosed from ever being removed from the Idaho sex offender registry by reason of the July 1, 2001, amendments above stated.
105. Plaintiff, John Doe 103, is a resident of Caribou County, state of Idaho. On October 20, 1989, John Doe 103 convicted in Caribou County, state of Idaho, of the crime of Sexual Abuse of a Minor Child Under the Age of Sixteen (16) Years, to-wit: victim was twelve (12) years of age at the time of the commission of the offense, a felony. John Doe 103 has continued to register as a sex offender in the state of Idaho since July of 1999. The ex post facto amendments to Idaho SORNA effective from and after July 1, 2009, expanded the definition of “aggravated offense” to include all registration offenses where the victim was less than thirteen (13) years of age, including the offense abovereferenced. John Doe 103 is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and has not been classified as a violent sexual predator. Therefore, John Doe 103 should be eligible to petition the sentencing court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender
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Registry. John Doe 103 was, and still is, foreclosed from ever being removed from the Idaho sex offender registry by reason of the July 1, 2009, amendment above stated.
106. Plaintiff, John Doe 104, is a resident of Jerome County, state of Idaho. In 2002, John Doe 104 was convicted in Twin Falls County, state of Idaho, of the crimes of Rape, a felony, and of Sexual Abuse of a Minor Child Under the Age of Sixteen (16) Years, to-wit: victim was fifteen (15) years of age at the time of the commission of the offense, a felony. John Doe 104 has continued to register as a sex offender in the state of Idaho since 2002. The ex post facto amendments to Idaho SORNA effective from and after July 1, 2009, expanded the definition of “aggravated offense” to include all registration offenses where the victim was less than thirteen (13) years of age, including the offenses above-referenced. John Doe 104 is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and has not been classified as a violent sexual predator. Therefore, John Doe 104 should be eligible to petition the sentencing court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry. John Doe 104 was, and still is, foreclosed from ever being removed from the Idaho sex offender registry by reason of the July 1, 2009, amendment above stated.
107. Plaintiff, John Doe 105, is a resident of Canyon County, state of Idaho. In 1992, John Doe 105 was convicted in Ada County, state of Idaho, of the crime of Sexual Abuse of a Minor Child Under the Age of Sixteen (16) Years, to-wit: victim was fourteen (14) years of age at the time of the commission of the offense, a felony. John Doe 105 was sentenced to the custody of the Idaho State Board of Corrections, Boise, Idaho, for a minimum fixed period of one (1) year followed by an indeterminate period of four (4) years. John Doe 105 was placed on probation for five (5) years, but violated his AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF - 74

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probation and on April 6, 1995, he was convicted of one count of Driving While Intoxicated, and sentenced to imprisonment with Idaho Department of Correction for a term of five (5) years, to run concurrent with the Sexual Abuse conviction. John Doe 105 began registering in June, 1998, while on parole, and completed a sex offender. Idaho had not yet enacted the sex offender registry requirements at the time of the commission of this offense. John Doe 105 is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and has not been classified as a violent sexual predator. Therefore, John Doe 105 should be eligible to petition the court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry.
108. Plaintiff, John Doe 106, is a resident of Latah County, state of Idaho. In 1990, John Doe 106 was convicted in King County, state of Washington, of the crimes of Rape of a Child, First Degree, and of Child Molestation, First Degree, to-wit: victim was three (3) years of age at the time of the commission of the offense, both felonies. He was sentenced to forty-eight (48) months at the King County Jail. John Doe 106 was released in September, 1994, and was then placed on probation for a period of one (1) year. In 1995, John Doe 106 completed a sex offender treatment program with Marsh and Associates. In 1994, John Doe 106 was advised that he must begin registering as a sex offender in the State of Washington. John Doe 106 was released from probation in October, 1995. John Doe 106 moved to Idaho in 2007 and began registering in the State of Idaho. At the time of the conviction entered against John Doe 106, Idaho had not yet adopted sex offender registration procedures. In 1994, John Doe 106 was advised by state of Washington authorities that he would be required to register as a sex offender thereafter. John Doe 106 moved to the state of Idaho in 2007 and began registering as a sex offender thereafter. The ex post facto amendments to Idaho SORNA effective from
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and after July 1, 2011, expanded the definition of “aggravated offense” to include all substantially similar offenses for which convictions have been entered in another jurisdiction. John Doe 106 is not a recidivist, has not committed an aggravated offense and has not been classified as a violent sexual predator. Therefore, John Doe 96 should be eligible to petition the sentencing court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry. John Doe 106 was, and still is, foreclosed from ever being removed from the Idaho sex offender registry by reason of the July 1, 2011, amendment above stated.
109. Plaintiff, John Doe 107, is a resident of Canyon County, state of Idaho. In 1997, John Doe 107 was convicted in Ada County, state of Idaho, of three (3) counts of the crime of Second Degree Kidnapping of an Unrelated Minor, to-wit: victim fifteen (15) years of age, all felonies. He was sentenced to a period of eleven (11) years, five (5) months, and five (5) days, at the Idaho Maximum State Institution. John Doe 107 began registering when his parole began in July, 2008. The ex post facto amendments to Idaho SORNA effective from and after July 1, 2009, expanded the “aggravated offense” exception to eligibility for release from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry, which included the crime above-referenced. John Doe 107 is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and has not been classified as a violent sexual predator. Therefore, John Doe 107 should be eligible to petition the sentencing court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry. John Doe 107 was, and still is, foreclosed from ever being removed from the Idaho sex offender registry by reason of the July 1, 2009, amendment above stated.
110. Plaintiff, John Doe 108, is a resident of Bannock County, state of Idaho. In 2005, John Doe 108 was convicted in Calaveras County, state of California, of the AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF - 76

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crime of Unlawful Sexual Intercourse With A Minor, to-wit: the Ages of Fourteen (14) Years, Fifteen (15) Years, and Sixteen (16) Years, all felonies. John Doe 108 began registering as a sex offender in the state of California in 2005. The California court subsequently reduced the conviction of John Doe 108 to a misdemeanor. In 2007, John Doe 108 moved to the state of Idaho and began registering as a sex offender, despite his conviction having been reduced to a misdemeanor, as above-stated. The ex post facto amendments to Idaho SORNA effective from and after July 1, 2001, created the “aggravated offense” exception to eligibility for release from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry. Furthermore, the ex post facto amendments to Idaho SORNA effective from and after July 1, 2009, expanded the definition of “aggravated offense” to exclude any age demarcation to the crime of lewd and lascivious conduct, leaving the crime of “Lewd and Lascivious Conduct” with no reference to the age of the victim as an “aggravated offense” Finally, the ex post facto amendments to Idaho SORNA effective from and after July 1, 2011, expanded the definition of “aggravated offense” to include all substantially similar offenses for which convictions have been entered in another jurisdiction. In the event the California conviction is determined to be a substantially similar offense to the Idaho crime of Lewd Conduct, the Idaho “aggravated offense” criteria would apply. Finally, John Doe 108 is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and has not been classified as a violent sexual predator. Therefore, John Doe 108 should be eligible to petition the sentencing court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry. In the event it is determined this is an “aggravated offense” under Idaho law, John Doe 108 was, and still is, foreclosed from ever being removed from the Idaho sex offender registry by reason of the July 1, 2001, 2009 and 2011 amendments above stated.
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111. Plaintiff, John Doe 109, is a resident of Boise County, state of Idaho. In 2002, John Doe 109 was convicted in the federal district court for the District of Connecticut of the crime of Possession of Child Pornography, a felony. He served thirteen (13) months at the Tucson Federal Prison, State of Arizona. John Doe 109 moved to the state of Idaho in 2002 and has been registering as a sex offender in the state of Idaho since 2010. Subsequent ex post facto amendments to Idaho SORNA made possession of child pornography a registration offense. Furthermore, the ex post facto amendments to Idaho SORNA effective from and after July 1, 2005, required those persons convicted in another jurisdiction of an offense substantially similar to an Idaho registration offense to register as a sex offender in the state of Idaho. John Doe 109 is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and has not been classified as a violent sexual predator. Therefore, John Doe 109 should be eligible to petition the sentencing court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry.
112. Plaintiff, John Doe 110, is a resident of Bannock County, state of Idaho. Prior to 2003, John Doe 110 was convicted in Queen’s Village, state of New York, of the crime of Sodomy, to-wit: the age of seven (7) to eight (8) years, a felony. John Doe 110 was sentenced to twenty-eight (28) months in the Oneida Correctional Facility in Rome, New York, where he attended a Sexual Offender Treatment Program. He was released from prison in 1995, and placed on three (3) years probation. John Doe 110 began registering as a sex offender on February 8, 1994. At the time of Sentencing, John Doe 110 was told that he could petition the Court to get off the Registry, which he later attempted but was denied. John Doe 110 moved to the state of Idaho in 2003 and has been registering as a sex offender since that time. The ex post facto amendments to Idaho
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SORNA effective from and after July 1, 2005, required those persons convicted in another jurisdiction of an offense substantially similar to an Idaho registration offense to register as a sex offender in the state of Idaho. John Doe 110 is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and has not been classified as a violent sexual predator. Therefore, John Doe 110 should be eligible to petition the sentencing court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry.
113. Plaintiff, John Doe 111, is a resident of Bannock County, state of Idaho. In 1997, John Doe 111 was convicted in Caribou County, state of Idaho, of two (2) counts of the crime of Battery with the Intent to Commit Lewd Conduct and the crime of Battery with the Intent to Commit Rape with a Minor Child, to-wit: the ages of Fourteen (14) Years and Sixteen (16) Years, each a felony. John Doe 111 was sentenced to a period of incarceration of two (2) years and was thereafter placed on parole for a period of four (4) years. John Doe 111 began registering as a sex offender in the state of Idaho in 2001. John Doe 111 is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and has not been classified as a violent sexual predator. Therefore, John Doe 111 should be eligible to petition the sentencing court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry.
114. Plaintiff, John Doe 112, is a resident of Canyon County, state of Idaho. In 1996, John Doe 112 was convicted in Ada County, state of Idaho, and in 1997, in Valley County, state of Idaho, of the crime(s) of Lewd Conduct With a Minor, to-wit: victim thirteen (13) years of age at the time of commission of the offense, a felony. He was sentenced to two (2) years fixed, twelve (12) years indeterminate, of which he served seven (7), and then placed on parole for a period of seven (7) years. He
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began registering on May 13, 2003. The ex post facto amendments to Idaho SORNA effective from and after July 1, 2001, created the “aggravated offense” exception to eligibility for release from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry. Under this designation, the crime of Lewd Conduct With a Minor where the victim was under twelve (12) years of age at the time of commission of the offense was classified as an “aggravated offense.” Furthermore, the ex post facto amendments to Idaho SORNA effective from and after July 1, 2009, expanded the definition of “aggravated offense” to exclude any age demarcation to the crime of lewd and lascivious conduct, leaving the crime of “Lewd and Lascivious Conduct” with no reference to the age of the victim as an “aggravated offense.” While on probation, John Doe 112 attended a sex offender treatment program with S.A.N.E., and successfully completed same. Finally, John Doe 112 is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and has not been classified as a violent sexual predator. Therefore, John Doe 112 should be eligible to petition the sentencing court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry. John Doe 112 was, and still is, foreclosed from ever being removed from the Idaho sex offender registry by reason of the July 1, 2001, and 2009 amendments, above-stated.
115. Plaintiff, John Doe 113, is a resident of Ada County, state of Idaho. In 1998, John Doe 113 was convicted in Riverside County, state of California, of the crime of Unlawful Sexual Intercourse With Person Under 16, to-wit: a felony. John Doe 113 is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and has not been classified as a violent sexual predator. Therefore, John Doe 113 should be eligible to petition the sentencing court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry.
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116. Plaintiff, John Doe 114, is a resident of Bannock County, state of Idaho. In 1989, John Doe 114 was convicted Bannock County, state of Idaho, of the crime of Sexual Abuse of a Child Under the Age of Sixteen (16) Years, to-wit: victim thirteen (13) years of age at the time of the commission of the offense, a felony. He was sentenced to the custody of the Idaho State Board of Corrections, Boise, State of Idaho, for a minimum fixed period of four (4) years followed by an indeterminate period of eleven (11) years, to be served concurrently. However the Court retained jurisdiction for 120 days and John Doe 114 was placed in Cottonwood for the Sexual Offender Program. At this time, the Sex Offender Registry was not in place and John Doe 114 was not required to register. John Doe 114 was contacted in 1993 and informed that he must register as a sex offender. John Doe 114 is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and has not been classified as a violent sexual predator. Therefore, John Doe 114 should be eligible to petition the sentencing court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry.
117. Plaintiff, John Doe 115, is a resident of Clearwater County, state of Idaho. In 1995, John Doe 115 was convicted in Valley County, state of Idaho, of the crime of Assault with Intent to Commit a Serious Felony, to-wit: victim fifteen (15) years of age at the time of the commission of the offense, a felony. John Doe 115 was sentenced to a five (5) year unified sentence consisting of one (1) year determinate, followed by four (4) years indeterminate. John Doe 115 has been registering as a sex offender in the state of Idaho since 2006. John Doe 115 completed a sex offender treatment program while at Cottonwood, entitled SOAG, graduating in 2008. John Doe 115 is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and has not been classified as a violent sexual predator. Therefore, John Doe 115 should be eligible to petition the sentencing court to
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be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry.
118. Plaintiff, John Doe 116, is a resident of Nez Perce County, state of Idaho. In March of 2004, John Doe 116 was convicted in Nez Perce County, state of Idaho, of the crime of Sexual Abuse of a Child Under the Age of Sixteen (16) Years, to-wit: the age of fifteen (15) years at the time of the commission of the offense, a felony. John Doe 116 was placed on probation in 2004 for a period of ten (10) years after successfully completing the retained jurisdiction program. John Doe 116 began registering in the state of Idaho as a sex offender in December of 2004, and has continued to do so. He completed a sex offender treatment program with Dave Neistrom, Valley Treatment Specialties, Clarkston, WA, in 2009, and was released from felony probation in December of 2013. John Doe 116 is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and has not been classified as a violent sexual predator. Therefore, John Doe 116 should be eligible to petition the sentencing court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry.
119. Plaintiff, John Doe 117, is a resident of Canyon County, state of Idaho. In 2002, John Doe 117 was convicted in Canyon County, state of Idaho, of the crime of Lewd Conduct With a Minor, to-wit: victim fifteen (15) years of age at the time of commission of the offense, a felony. The ex post facto amendments to Idaho SORNA effective from and after July 1, 2001, created the “aggravated offense” exception to eligibility for release from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry. Under this designation, the crime of Lewd Conduct With a Minor where the victim was under twelve (12) years of age at the time of commission of the offense was classified as an “aggravated offense.” Furthermore, the ex post facto amendments to Idaho SORNA effective from and after AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF - 82

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July 1, 2009, expanded the definition of “aggravated offense” to exclude any age demarcation to the crime of lewd and lascivious conduct, leaving the crime of “Lewd and Lascivious Conduct” with no reference to the age of the victim as an “aggravated offense.” Finally, John Doe 117 is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and has not been classified as a violent sexual predator. Therefore, John Doe 117 should be eligible to petition the sentencing court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry. John Doe 117 was, and still is, foreclosed from ever being removed from the Idaho sex offender registry by reason of the July 1, 2001, and 2009 amendments, abovestated.
120. Plaintiff, John Doe 118, is a resident of Canyon County, state of Idaho. In 1991, John Doe 118 was convicted in Canyon County, state of Idaho, of the crime of Lewd Conduct With a Child Under the Age of Sixteen (16) Years, to-wit: victim fourteen (14) years of age at the time of commission of the offense, a felony. John Doe 118 was incarcerated for a period of four (4) months at the County Jail, was released on probation, and began registering at that time. The ex post facto amendments to Idaho SORNA effective from and after July 1, 2001, created the “aggravated offense” exception to eligibility for release from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry. Under this designation, the crime of Lewd Conduct With a Minor where the victim was under twelve (12) years of age at the time of commission of the offense was classified as an “aggravated offense.” Furthermore, the ex post facto amendments to Idaho SORNA effective from and after July 1, 2009, expanded the definition of “aggravated offense” to exclude any age demarcation to the crime of lewd and lascivious conduct, leaving the crime of “Lewd and Lascivious Conduct” with no reference to the age of the victim as an “aggravated AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF - 83

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offense.” Finally, John Doe 118 is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and has not been classified as a violent sexual predator. Therefore, John Doe 118 should be eligible to petition the sentencing court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry. John Doe 118 was, and still is, foreclosed from ever being removed from the Idaho sex offender registry by reason of the July 1, 2001, and 2009 amendments, abovestated.
121. Plaintiff, John Doe 119, is a resident of Canyon County, state of Idaho. On November 1, 2004, John Doe 119 was convicted in Canyon County, state of Idaho, of the crime of Sexual Abuse of a Child Under the Age of Sixteen (16) Years, to-wit: the age of fourteen (14) years at the time of the commission of the offense, a felony. He was sentenced to the Idaho State Board of Corrections for a determinate period of five (5) years followed by an indeterminate period of five (5) years. However, this sentence was suspended and John Doe 119 was placed on supervised probation for a period of six (6) years. John Doe 119 began registering in November 2004 and has continued to do so. John Doe 119 completed a sex offender treatment program with SANE Counseling in Boise in 2009. John Doe 119 is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and has not been classified as a violent sexual predator. Therefore, John Doe 119 should be eligible to petition the sentencing court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry.
122. Plaintiff, John Doe 120, is a resident of Ada County, state of Idaho. In 2001, John Doe 120 was convicted in Ada County, state of Idaho, of the crime of Battery With the Intent to Commit Rape, to-wit: an adult Correctional Officer, a felony. He was sentenced to a determinate period of six (6) years at the Idaho State Board of Correctional AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF - 84

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Institute, Orofino, Idaho. John Doe 120 was placed on probation for a period of ten (10) years. He began registering in Idaho in 2004. John Doe 120 completed a sex offender treatment program while incarcerated in Orofino, Idaho. John Doe 120 is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and has not been classified as a violent sexual predator. Therefore, John Doe 120 should be eligible to petition the sentencing court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry.
123. Plaintiff, John Doe 121, is a resident of Nez Perce County, state of Idaho. In 1989, John Doe 121 was convicted in San Diego County, state of California, of the crime of Lewd Acts With a Child Under the Age of Fourteen (14) Years, to-wit: victim eight (8) years of age at the time of commission of the offense, a felony. John Doe 121 was on active duty in the military at the time of the commission of the offense. In December of 1989, John Doe 121, was required to commence registering as a sex offender in the state of California. After completion of his sentence, John Doe 121 moved to the state of Idaho and began registering as a sex offender. The state of Idaho had not yet enacted sex offender registration requirements at the time of the conviction of John Doe 121. The ex post facto amendments to Idaho SORNA effective from and after July 1, 2001, created the “aggravated offense” exception to eligibility for release from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry. Furthermore, the ex post facto amendments to Idaho SORNA effective from and after July 1, 2009, expanded the definition of “aggravated offense” to exclude any age demarcation to the crime of lewd and lascivious conduct, leaving the crime of “Lewd and Lascivious Conduct” with no reference to the age of the victim as an “aggravated offense” Finally, the ex post facto amendments to Idaho SORNA effective from and after July 1, 2011, expanded the definition of “aggravated
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offense” to include all substantially similar offenses for which convictions have been entered in another jurisdiction. In the event the California conviction is determined to be a substantially similar offense to the Idaho crime of Lewd Conduct, the Idaho “aggravated offense” criteria would apply. Finally, John Doe 121 is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and has not been classified as a violent sexual predator. Therefore, John Doe 121 should be eligible to petition the sentencing court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry. In the event it is determined this is an “aggravated offense” under Idaho law, John Doe 121 was, and still is, foreclosed from ever being removed from the Idaho sex offender registry by reason of the July 1, 2001, 2009 and 2011 amendments above stated.
124. Plaintiff, John Doe 122, is a resident of Nez Perce County, state of Idaho. In 1998, John Doe 122 was convicted in Nez Perce County, state of Idaho, of the crime of Lewd Conduct With a Child Under the Age of Sixteen (16) Years, to-wit: victim fifteen (15) years of age at the time of commission of the offense, a felony. The ex post facto amendments to Idaho SORNA effective from and after July 1, 2001, created the “aggravated offense” exception to eligibility for release from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry. Under this designation, the crime of Lewd Conduct With a Minor where the victim was under twelve (12) years of age at the time of commission of the offense was classified as an “aggravated offense.” Furthermore, the ex post facto amendments to Idaho SORNA effective from and after July 1, 2009, expanded the definition of “aggravated offense” to exclude any age demarcation to the crime of lewd and lascivious conduct, leaving the crime of “Lewd and Lascivious Conduct” with no reference to the age of the victim as an “aggravated offense.” John Doe 122 petitioned the court to be
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released from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry requirements in 2011; however, that petition was denied. John Doe 122 is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and has not been classified as a violent sexual predator. Therefore, John Doe 122 should be eligible to petition the sentencing court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry. John Doe 122 was, and still is, foreclosed from ever being removed from the Idaho sex offender registry by reason of the July 1, 2001, and 2009 amendments, above-stated.
125. Plaintiff, John Doe 123, is a resident of Nez Perce County, state of Idaho. In 1997, John Doe 123 was convicted in Nez Perce County, state of Idaho, of the crime of Lewd Conduct With a Child Under the Age of Sixteen (16) Years, to-wit: victim fifteen (15) years of age at the time of commission of the offense, a felony. John Doe 123 was placed on probation for a period of seven (7) years beginning August 29, 1997, as well as registering as sex offender in the state of Idaho at that same time. The ex post facto amendments to Idaho SORNA effective from and after July 1, 2001, created the “aggravated offense” exception to eligibility for release from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry. Under this designation, the crime of Lewd Conduct With a Minor where the victim was under twelve (12) years of age at the time of commission of the offense was classified as an “aggravated offense.” Furthermore, the ex post facto amendments to Idaho SORNA effective from and after July 1, 2009, expanded the definition of “aggravated offense” to exclude any age demarcation to the crime of lewd and lascivious conduct, leaving the crime of “Lewd and Lascivious Conduct” with no reference to the age of the victim as an “aggravated offense.” While on probation, John Doe 123 completed a sex offender treatment program through Steve Lindsey of Valley Treatment
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Specialists. John Doe 123 is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and has not been classified as a violent sexual predator. Therefore, John Doe 123 should be eligible to petition the sentencing court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry. John Doe 123 was, and still is, foreclosed from ever being removed from the Idaho sex offender registry by reason of the July 1, 2001, and 2009 amendments, abovestated.
126. Plaintiff, John Doe 124, is a resident of Nez Perce County, state of Idaho. In 2007, John Doe 124 was convicted in Nez Perce County, state of Idaho, of two (2) counts of the crime of Sexual Abuse of a Child Under the Age of Sixteen (16) Years, towit: the age of thirteen (13) years at the time of the commission of the offense, each a felony. He was sentenced to the custody of the Idaho State Penitentiary for a determinate period of five (5) years, followed by an indeterminate period of fifteen (15) years. John Doe 124 was released from incarceration in October, 2007, was placed on probation for a period of twenty (20) years, and began registering as a sex offender in the State of Idaho. John Doe 124 was granted an early termination from probation on July 1, 2016. John Doe 124 is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and has not been classified as a violent sexual predator. Therefore, John Doe 116 should be eligible to petition the sentencing court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry.
127. Plaintiff, John Doe 125, is a resident of Nez Perce County, state of Idaho. On July 31, 2007, John Doe 125 was convicted in Bannock County, state of Idaho, of two (2) counts of the crime of Lewd Conduct With a Child Under the Age of Sixteen (16)
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Years, to-wit: victim fourteen (14) years of age at the time of commission of the offense, each a felony. He was sentenced to the custody of the Idaho State Board of Corrections, Boise, Idaho, to a determinate term of three (3) years, together with an additional but indeterminate term not to exceed five (5) years, for a total of eight (8) years, including both fixed and indeterminate, on each Count, to run concurrently. The court retained jurisdiction for a period of six (6) months and John Doe 125 spent three (3) days in county jail. Upon completion of the three (3) days, John Doe 125 was placed on probation for a period of ten (10) years. John Doe 125 began registering as a sex offender in March of 2001. John Doe 125 did attend sexual offender treatment with Dr. Rodger Groves and completed said treatment in 2001. In September of 2011, a motion was filed on behalf of John Doe 125 to be released from the sexual registration requirements, however, the motion was denied The ex post facto amendments to Idaho SORNA effective from and after July 1, 2001, created the “aggravated offense” exception to eligibility for release from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry. Under this designation, the crime of Lewd Conduct With a Minor where the victim was under twelve (12) years of age at the time of commission of the offense was classified as an “aggravated offense.” Furthermore, the ex post facto amendments to Idaho SORNA effective from and after July 1, 2009, expanded the definition of “aggravated offense” to exclude any age demarcation to the crime of lewd and lascivious conduct, leaving the crime of “Lewd and Lascivious Conduct” with no reference to the age of the victim as an “aggravated offense.” John Doe 125 is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and has not been classified as a violent sexual predator. Therefore, John Doe 125 should be eligible to petition the sentencing court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender
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Registry. John Doe 125 was, and still is, foreclosed from ever being removed from the Idaho sex offender registry by reason of the July 1, 2001, and 2009 amendments, abovestated.
128. Plaintiff, John Doe 126, is a resident of Clearwater County, state of Idaho. On November 27, 2001, John Doe 126 was convicted in Pontiac County, state of Michigan, of the crime of Child Sexually Abusive Activity, and on March 1, 2002, he was convicted of Criminal Sexual Conduct 1st Degree Person of the Age of Thirteen (13) to Fifteen (15) Years, each a felony. After completion of his sentence, John Doe 126 was placed on probation for a period of two (2) years, and began registering as a sex offender in October of 2001. John Doe 126 was released from probation in 2004, moved to the state of Idaho and began registering as a sex offender. The ex post facto amendments to Idaho SORNA effective from and after July 1, 2005, expanded the offenses for which sex offender registration was required to include all substantially similar offenses for which convictions have been entered in another jurisdiction. In the event the Michigan convictions are determined to be substantially similar offenses to Idaho criminal statutes requiring sex offender registration, the Idaho sex offender registration requirements should apply to John Doe 126. John Doe 126 is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and has not been classified as a violent sexual predator. Therefore, John Doe 126 should either not have been required to register as a sex offender in Idaho, or in the alternative, should be eligible to petition the sentencing court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry.
129. Plaintiff, John Doe 127, is a resident of Twin Falls County, state of Idaho. On November 4, 1997, John Doe 127 was convicted in Twin Falls County, state of Idaho, AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF - 90

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of the crime of Sexual Abuse of a Child Under the Age of Sixteen (16) Years, to-wit: the age of fourteen (14) years at the time of the commission of the offense, a felony. He was sentenced to the custody of the Idaho State Board of Corrections, Boise, Idaho, for a mandatory minimum period of one (1) year, followed by an indeterminate period of four (4) years. However the Court retained jurisdiction for 180 days and John Doe 127 was placed at Cottonwood for the Sexual Offender Program. In May of 1998, John Doe 127 was placed on probation for a period of four (4) years. John Doe 127 completed a sex offender treatment program while incarcerated at Cottonwood, and in July of 2002, John Doe 127 was released from probation. John Doe 127 is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and has not been classified as a violent sexual predator. Therefore, John Doe 127 should be eligible to petition the sentencing court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry.
130. Plaintiff, John Doe 128, is a resident of Kootenai County, state of Idaho. In 1993, John Doe 128 was convicted in Kootenai County, state of Idaho, of the crime of Lewd Conduct With a Child Under the Age of Sixteen (16) Years, to-wit: victim thirteen (13) years of age at the time of commission of the offense, a felony. The ex post facto amendments to Idaho SORNA effective from and after July 1, 2001, created the “aggravated offense” exception to eligibility for release from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry. Under this designation, the crime of Lewd Conduct With a Minor where the victim was under twelve (12) years of age at the time of commission of the offense was classified as an “aggravated offense.” Furthermore, the ex post facto amendments to Idaho SORNA effective from and after July 1, 2009, expanded the definition of
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“aggravated offense” to exclude any age demarcation to the crime of lewd and lascivious conduct, leaving the crime of “Lewd and Lascivious Conduct” with no reference to the age of the victim as an “aggravated offense.” John Doe 128 is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and has not been classified as a violent sexual predator. Therefore, John Doe 128 should be eligible to petition the sentencing court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry. John Doe 128 was, and still is, foreclosed from ever being removed from the Idaho sex offender registry by reason of the July 1, 2001, and 2009 amendments, above-stated.
131. Plaintiff, John Doe 129, is a resident of Kootenai County, state of Idaho. In 1988, John Doe 129 was convicted in Kootenai County, state of Idaho, of the crime of Lewd Conduct With a Child Under the Age of Sixteen (16) Years, to-wit: victim eleven (11) years of age at the time of commission of the offense, a felony. The ex post facto amendments to Idaho SORNA effective from and after July 1, 2001, created the “aggravated offense” exception to eligibility for release from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry. Under this designation, the crime of Lewd Conduct With a Minor where the victim was under twelve (12) years of age at the time of commission of the offense was classified as an “aggravated offense.” John Doe 129 is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and has not been classified as a violent sexual predator. Therefore, John Doe 129 should be eligible to petition the sentencing court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry. John Doe 129 was, and still is, foreclosed from ever being removed from the Idaho sex offender registry by reason of the July 1, 2001 amendment, above-stated.
132. Plaintiff, John Doe 130, is a resident of Kootenai County, state of Idaho. AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF - 92

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On January 30, 2004, John Doe 130 was convicted in Kootenai County, state of Idaho, of the crime of Sexual Battery of a Minor of the Age of Sixteen (16) or Seventeen (17) Years, to-wit: the age of sixteen (16) years at the time of the commission of the offense, a felony. John Doe 130 was sentenced to a thirteen (13) year unified sentence consisting of a three (3) year determinate term, followed by a ten (10) year indeterminate term; however, the sentence was suspended and John Doe 130 was placed on probation commencing July 26, 2004, for a period of six (6) years. During his probationary term, John Doe 130 successfully completed sex offender treatment. John Doe 130 was released from probation in April of 2010. Thereafter, on November 13, 2014, John Doe 130 filed a petition seeking release from his obligation to register as a sex offender; however, the petition was denied by the court. John Doe 130 is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and has not been classified as a violent sexual predator. Therefore, John Doe 130 should be eligible to petition the sentencing court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry.
133. Plaintiff, John Doe 131, is a resident of Kootenai County, state of Idaho. On June 7, 1995, John Doe 131 was convicted in Kootenai County, state of Idaho, of the crime of Sexual Abuse of a Child Under the Age of Sixteen (16) Years, to wit: the age of eleven (11) years, a felony. John Doe 131 was sentenced to a unified sentence of ten (10) years, consisting of a determinate term of three (3) years followed by an indeterminate term of seven (7) years; however, the court retained its jurisdiction for a period of one hundred twenty (120) days and John Doe 131 entered and completed the sex offender treatment program. John Doe 131 was released from custody in November of 1995, was placed on probation, and began registering as a sex offender in Idaho. John Doe 131 was
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released from probation in 1998. Under the language of the Idaho sex offender registration requirements as they existed at the time of his conviction and release from custody/probation, John Doe 131 would later be eligible for release from the requirement to register as a sex offender. The ex post facto amendments to Idaho SORNA effective from and after July 1, 2009, expanded the definition of “aggravated offense” to include, “any other offense set forth in Section 18-8304, Idaho Code, if at the time of the commission of the offense the victim was below the age of thirteen (13) years”. John Doe 131, petitioned the court to be released from sex offender registration requirements in 2011; however, that petition was denied. John Doe 131 is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and has not been classified as a violent sexual predator. Therefore, John Doe 131 should be eligible to petition the sentencing court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry. John Doe 131 was, and still is, foreclosed from ever being removed from the Idaho sex offender registry by reason of the July 1, 2009, amendment above stated.
134. Plaintiff, John Doe 132, is a resident of Bannock County, state of Idaho. On May 11, 1988, John Doe 132 was convicted in Santa Barbara County, state of California, of the crime of Lewd and Lascivious Act w/Child Under Fourteen (14) Years, to-wit: victim eight (8) years of age at the time of commission of the offense, a felony. John Doe 132 was sentenced to a term of incarceration of six (6) years in the custody of a California state prison facility, but was released from custody in February of 1991. John Doe 132 was released from parole in March of 1992. John Doe 132 was not required to register as a sex offender in the state of California. John Doe 132 moved to the state of Idaho in 2000, and was informed of his obligation to register as a sex offender at that
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time. In 2011, John Doe 132 petitioned the Idaho court to be released from sex offender registration requirements; however, that petition was denied. The ex post facto amendments to Idaho SORNA effective from and after July 1, 2001, created the “aggravated offense” exception to eligibility for release from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry. Under this designation, the crime of Lewd Conduct With a Minor where the victim was under twelve (12) years of age at the time of commission of the offense was classified as an “aggravated offense”. Finally, the ex post facto amendments to Idaho SORNA effective July 1, 2011, provided that an offense for which a conviction was entered in another jurisdiction which is substantially similar to any Idaho offense considered to be an “aggravated offense”, will also be considered an “aggravated offense” in Idaho for purposes of sex offender registration requirements. John Doe 132 is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and has not been classified as a violent sexual predator. Therefore, John Doe 132 should be eligible to petition the sentencing court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry. John Doe 132 was, and still is, foreclosed from ever being removed from the Idaho sex offender registry by reason of the July 1, 2001 and 2011 amendments, above-stated.
135. Plaintiff, John Doe 133, is a resident of Bonneville County, State of Idaho. On June 21, 2004, John Doe 133 was convicted in Bingham County, State of Idaho, of Sexual Abuse of a Child Under Age 16, to-wit: 15 years of age, a felony. He was sentenced to a withheld judgment and placed on probation for ten (10) years. Upon expiration of his probationary term, he petitioned the Court to set aside his plea of guilty or conviction, and to dismiss the case. This application was denied by the sentencing court due to a change in the language of Section 19-2604, Idaho Code, occurring after the
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date of conviction. John Doe 133 began registering in June of 2004 and has continued to do so. John Doe 133 completed a sex offender treatment program while on probation. Sexual Abuse of a Child Under 16 years of age, is an offense which has required registration as a sex offender since 1998, but has never been included as an aggravated offense except in those cases where the child victim was under the age of thirteen (13) years at the time of the commission of the offense. Based on the above-cited facts, John Doe 133 would have had standing to petition to be released from the registration requirements in June 2014. Pursuant to the 2011 Idaho SORNA requirements: “registration under this act is for life; however, any offender, other than a recidivist, an offender who has been convicted of an aggravated offense, or an offender designated as a violent sexual predator, may, after a period of ten (10) years from the date the offender was released from incarceration or placed on parole, supervised release or probation, whichever is greater, petition the district court for a show cause hearing to determine whether the offender shall be exempted from the duty to register as a sexual offender.” John Doe 133 petitioned the Court to be released from registration requirements in February of 2014; however, the Court denied his petition. John Doe 133 is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and is not classified as a violent sexual predator and is not classified as a violent sexual predator and is entitled to be released from sex offender registration requirements.
136. Plaintiff, John Doe 134, is a resident of Canyon County, state of Idaho. On February 24, 1998, John Doe 134 was convicted in Washoe County, state of Nevada, of the crime of Statutory Sexual Seduction and Open or Gross Lewdness, to-wit: both victims were age 15 years at the time of the commission of the offense. John Doe 134 AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF - 96

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was sentenced to five (5) years probation on July 10, 1998, whereupon he obtained a transfer of his probation to the state of Idaho, attended a sex offender treatment program, and began registering on the Idaho Sexual Offender Registry. Under the then existing language of the Idaho Sex Offender Registration requirements, John Doe 134 would later be eligible for release from the requirement to register as a sex offender. The ex post facto amendments to Idaho SORNA effective from and after July 1, 2005, expanded the offenses for which convictions have been entered in another jurisdiction. The Nevada conviction in this case has never been determined to be a substantially similar offense to Idaho criminal statutes requiring sex offender registration. Therefore, John Doe 134 should either not have been required to register as a sex offender in Idaho, or in the alternative, should be eligible to petition the sentencing court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry. Additionally, in the event the Nevada crime for which conviction was entered is determined to be substantially similar to the Idaho offense of lewd and lascivious conduct, the ex post facto amendments to Idaho SORNA effective from and after July 1, 2009, expanded the definition of “aggravated offense” to exclude any age demarcation to the crime of lewd and lascivious conduct, leaving the crime of “Lewd and Lascivious Conduct” with no reference to the age of the victim as an “aggravated offense.” John Doe 134 is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and is not a violent sexual predator. Therefore, John Doe 134 should be eligible to petition the sentencing court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry. John Doe 134 was, and still is, foreclosed from ever being removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry by reason of the July 1, 2009 amendment above stated.
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137. “Does” herein refers to John and Jane Does 1-134.
138. Defendant, Lawrence Wasden, is the Attorney General for the State of Idaho. Defendant Wasden is sued in his official capacity.
139. Defendant, Kevin Kempf, is Director of the Idaho Department of Correction. The Idaho Department of Correction is vested with the authority to enforce the Sex Offender Registry and accompanying statutes/laws. Defendant Kempf is sued in his official capacity.
140. Defendant, Terry Kirkham, is the Chief of the Parole and Probation Division of the Idaho Department of Correction. The Parole and Probation division is vested with authority to enforce the Sex Offender Registry and accompanying statutes/laws. Defendant Kirkham is sued in his official capacity.
141. Defendant, Sexual Offender Management Board, is vested with authority to develop, advance and oversee statewide sexual offender management policies and practices. Defendants Jon Burnham, Michael Johnston, Ph.d., Moira Lynch, Erwin Sonnenberg, Jeffrey Betts, Jean Fisher, Paula Garay, Sheriff Chad Huff, Kimberly Simmons, William Caldwell and Christina Iverson are sued in their official capacities as Members of the Sexual Offender Management Board.
142. Defendant, Colonel Ralph Powell, is the Director of the IDAHO STATE POLICE. The Idaho State Police is vested with authority to enforce the Sex Offender Registry and accompanying statutes/laws. Defendant Powell is sued in his official capacity.
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143. Defendant Stephen Bartlett is Sheriff of the Ada County Sheriff’s Office; Defendant Lorin Nielsen is Sheriff of the Bannock County Sheriff’s Office; Sheriff Brent T. Bunn is the Sheriff of Bear Lake County Sheriff’s Office; Defendant Craig T. Rowland is the Sheriff of the Bingham County Sheriff’s Office; Defendant Jim Kacqmarek is the Sheriff of the Boise County Sheriff’s Office; Defendant Paul J. Wilde is the Sheriff of the Bonneville County Sheriff’s Office; Defendant Kieran Donahue is the Sheriff of the Canyon County Sheriff’s Office; Defendant Michael Haderlie is the Sheriff of Caribou County Sheriff’s Office; Defendant Jay Heward is the Sheriff of Cassia County Sheriff’s Office; Defendant Chris Goetz is the Sheriff of Clearwater County; Defendant Rick Layher is the Sheriff of the Elmore County Sheriff’s Office; Defendant David Fryar is the Sheriff of the Franklin County Sheriff’s Office; Defendant Charles Rolland is the Sheriff of the Gem County Sheriff’s Office; Defendant Shaun Gough is the Sheriff of the Gooding County Sheriff’s Office; Defendant Steve Anderson is the Sheriff of the Jefferson County Sheriff’s Office; Defendant Doug McFall is the Sheriff of the Jerome County Sheriff’s Office; Defendant Ben Wolfinger is the Sheriff of the Kootenai County Sheriff’s Office; Defendant Richard Skiles is the Sheriff of the Latah County Sheriff’s Office; Defendant Lynn D. Bowerman is the Sheriff of the Lemhi County Sheriff’s Office; Defendant Kevin Ellis is the Sheriff of the Lincoln County Sheriff’s Office; Defendant Eric Snarr is the Sheriff of the Minidoka County Sheriff’s Office; Defendant Joe Rodriguez is the Sheriff of the Nez Perce County Sheriff’s Office; Defendant Tony Liford is the Sheriff of the Teton County Sheriff’s Office; Defendant Tom Carter is the Sheriff of the Twin Falls County Sheriff’s Office; and, Defendant Patti Bolen is the Sheriff of the Valley County Sheriff’s Office. Each individual Sheriff’s Office is vested
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with authority to enforce the Sex Offender Registry and accompanying statutes/laws, including but not limited to the community notification provisions therein. Defendants Sheriffs are sued in their official capacity as the executive/enforcement agency of the Sex Offender Registry for the State of Idaho, on behalf of the respective Plaintiffs that reside in each of those counties.
III. STANDING 144. All Doe Plaintiffs are directly affected by the Sex Offender Registry and accompanying statutes/laws and their unconstitutional enforcement. The Sex Offender Registry and accompanying statutes/laws and their enforcement have directly caused violations of Doe Plaintiffs’ rights under the U.S. and Idaho Constitutions. Thus, the requirements for Article III standing have been met. IV. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS: HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF SEX
OFFENDER REGISTRY 1993
145. Sex offender registration in Idaho began on July 1, 1993. It established a statutory duty for persons convicted of certain felony sex crimes to register with their local sheriff.
146. In 1998, the Legislature repealed the original Sex Offender Registration Act and enacted the "Sexual Offenders Registration Notification and Community Right-to-Know Act" with the intended purpose of strengthening program administration and to expand public access to central registry information. The 1998 statute applied to any person who, on or after July 1, 1993, was convicted of a crime listed in Idaho Code Section 18-8304(1)(a), was
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incarcerated or on probation or parole on or after July 1, 1993 for crimes listed therein, or entered the State on or after July 1, 1993, and who had been convicted of any crime that was substantially equivalent to the listed offenses in Idaho Code Section 18-8304(1)(a). This statute did not apply to any such person while they were incarcerated; however, a conviction in this chapter did apply to all such persons who had pled guilty, or had been found guilty, notwithstanding the form of the judgment or withheld judgment. The 1998 statute indicated that any person, other than one designated as a violent sexual predator, could, after a period of ten (10) years from the date the person was released from incarceration or placed on parole, supervised release or probation, whichever was greater, petition the District Court for a show cause hearing to determine whether the person shall be exempted from the duty to register as a sexual offender. At that time, “violent sexual predator” meant a person who had been convicted of an offense listed in Idaho Code Section 18-8312, and who had been determined to pose a risk of committing a future offense or engaging in predatory sexual conduct. The offender was required to provide clear and convincing evidence that he/she was not at risk to commit a crime identified in Idaho Code Section 18-8304, provide an affidavit indicating that the petitioner did not have a criminal charge pending nor was he/she knowingly under criminal investigation for any crime identified in Idaho Section Code 188304, provide proof of service of the petition to the prosecuting attorney, and provide a certified copy of the judgment of conviction.
147. The 1998 statutes set forth that offenders were required to obtain a psychosexual evaluation upon conviction, as well as upon release from incarceration, and offenders were required to pay for such evaluations, unless indigent (Idaho Code Section 188318, 1998) AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF - 101

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148. The 1998 statutes further set out that offenders who failed to comply with registration requirements could be convicted of a felony and could be punished by imprisonment for a period not to exceed five (5) years and a fine not to exceed five thousand dollars ($5,000). If the offender was on probation or otherwise on supervised release during the violation of this chapter, the probation or supervised release could be revoked and the original sentence reinstated. Also, if an offender willfully provided false information to the registry, he/she could be found guilty of a felony and punished by imprisonment for a period not to exceed five (5) years and a fine not to exceed five thousand dollars ($5,000).
2001 149. In 2001, amendments were made to Idaho Code Sections 18-8303, 18-8304, 18-8310, and 18-8323. Specifically, those amendments included among other things, the removal of the right of offenders who had been convicted of an “aggravated offense” to petition for release from registration requirements. The definition of an “aggravated offense” included Idaho Code Sections 18-1508 (lewd conduct, when the victim is less than twelve (12) years of age); 18-4003(d) (murder committed in the perpetration of rape); 186101 (rape, but excluding section 18-3101(1) where the victim is at least twelve (12) years of age or the defendant is eighteen (18) years of age or younger); 18-6108 (male rape); and 18-6608 (forcible sexual penetration by use of a foreign object. Idaho Code Section 18-8323 added that the Idaho State Police be empowered to make the sex offender registry available to the public via the internet.
2002 150. In 2002, amendments were made to Idaho Code Sections 18-8303, 18-8312, and 18-8314. Specifically, Idaho Code Section 18-8314 was amended to exclude offenders AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF - 102

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eighteen (18) years of age or younger, under subsection (1) of Idaho Code Section 18-6101, from the designation “violent sexual predator presenting a high risk of reoffense”.
2004 151. In 2004, amendments were made to Idaho Code Sections 18-8303, 18-8304, 188306, 18-8307, 18-8314, 18-8315, 18-8317, 18-8327, and 18-8328. Specifically, those amendments included, among other things, the addition of Idaho Code Section 18-6609 (video voyeurism) as an included offense in the roster of crimes requiring registration. Subsection (3) was added to Idaho Code Section 18-8314 providing that the sex offender classification board was to review offenders who were convicted out of state in order to determine if they were violent sexual predators. Idaho Code Section 18-8317 was amended limiting only those sex offenders deemed appropriate for review by the sex offender management board to be subject to a psychosexual evaluation prior to release from incarceration. Idaho Code Section 18-8327 was added to Idaho SORNA. It created a new felony crime, setting forth that it was “a felony... for an offender to accept employment in any day care center, group day care facility or family day care home,... or to be upon or to remain on the premises of a day care center, group day care facility or family day care home while children are present, other than to drop off or pick up the offender's child or children.” In addition, subsection (7) was added to Idaho Code Section 18-8307, requiring that all offenders subject to the duty of registration would receive written notifications of their duty to register, including a warning as to the consequences of an offender’s failure to comply. Idaho Code Section 18-8328 was added which stated that offenders could petition to be excluded from the prohibited employment provisions of Idaho Code Sections 18-8327 and 18-8414. To do so, offenders were required to show clear and convincing evidence that the AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF - 103

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offender does not pose a threat and it has been at least ten (10) years since the person’s last conviction.
2005 152. In 2005, amendments were made to Idaho Code Sections 18-8304, 18-8307, and 18-8324. Specifically, those amendments included, among other things, the addition of Idaho Code Section 18-6110 (sexual contact with a prisoner) as a crime that required registration. Also, Idaho Code 18-8304(1)(c) was added which stated that this chapter applies to any person who was convicted of any crime, an attempt, a solicitation, or a conspiracy to commit a crime in another state, territory, commonwealth, or other jurisdiction of the United States that was substantially equivalent to the offenses listed in Idaho Code Section 18-8304(1)(a) and was required to register as a sex offender in any other state or jurisdiction when he established permanent or temporary residency in Idaho, per Idaho Code Section 18-8304(1)(c).
2006 153. In 2006, amendments were made to Idaho Code Sections 18-8304, 18-8307, 18-8308, 18-8311, 18-8314, 18-8324, and 18-8329. Specifically, those amendments included, among other things, the addition of subsection(4) to Idaho Code Section 18-8304 which stated that if a defendant was nineteen (19) or twenty (20) years of age at the commission of the offense and no more than three (3) years older than the victim and was convicted of rape under Idaho Code Section 18-6101(1), the Court may order that the defendant is exempt from the provisions in this chapter. Idaho Code Section 18-8308 was amended to include address verification every thirty (30) days for violent sexual predators
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and every four (4) months for all other offenders. Idaho Code Section 18-8308(1)(a)(iii) was added to allow the sheriff to verify the address of violent sexual predators once every six (6) months, or at any other time, if the offender failed to comply with other provisions. Idaho Code Section 18-8311 was amended to include failure to verify address as a felony crime punishable by imprisonment for a period not to exceed ten (10) years and a fine not to exceed five thousand dollars ($5,000). Additionally, punishment for providing misleading or false information as well as evasion of service was increased from incarceration not to exceed a period of five (5) years, to incarceration not to exceed a period of ten (10) years. Idaho Code Section 18-8314 gave power to the members of the Sex Offender Classification Board to review offenders who had violated their duty to register. Idaho Code Section 18-8324 was amended so that the sheriff not only was required to disseminate the name, address, and photograph of violent sexual predators through the newspaper, but also through local radio and television media. Idaho Code Section 18-8329 was added this year and stated that it is a misdemeanor for a person who is required to register to be on school grounds where there are children under the age of eighteen (18) years, knowingly loiter on a public way within five hundred (500) feet of a school building or school grounds in this state when children under the age of eighteen (18) years are present, be in any conveyance owned, leased or contracted by a school to transport students to or from school or a school-related activity when children under the age of eighteen (18) years are present in the conveyance, reside within five hundred (500) feet of the property on which a school is located, provided however, that this shall not apply if such person's residence was established prior to July 1, 2006. However, these amendments did not apply to offenders who were a student at the school, were attending academic conference or other scheduled school events with school AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF - 105

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officials as a parent or legal guardian of a child who was enrolled in the school and was participating in the conference or event, resided at a state licensed or certified facility for incarceration, health or convalescent care, were dropping off or picking up a child or children and the person was the child or children's parent or legal guardian, or was temporarily on school grounds, during school hours, for the purpose of making a mail, food or other delivery.
2008 154. In 2008, amendments were made to Idaho Code Sections 18-8329 and 18-8331. Specifically, those amendments included, among other things, the provision that allowed registered sex offenders to be on school grounds for extracurricular activities, to vote, and to drop off mail at an official post office located on school grounds. Idaho Code Section 18-8331 was added which stated that a person who was required to register as a sex offender could not reside with more than one (1) other person who was required to register as a sex offender. Pursuant to Idaho Code Section 18-8331(3)(A), authority was given to a judge of the district court, upon petition from a person required to register as a sex offender, and after hearing, to allow the petitioner to reside in a residential dwelling with more than one (1) other person who is also required to register as a sex offender if the judge determined the provisions of the statute would deprive the petitioner of a constitutionally guaranteed right and that such right was more compelling than the interest of the state and local government in protecting neighboring citizens from risk of physical or psychological harm. Any person found to be in violation of this code section could be found guilty of a misdemeanor.
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2009 155. In 2009, amendments were made to Idaho Code Sections 18-8303, 18-8304, 18-8308, and 18-8310. Those amendments included, among other things, the expansion of the definition of an “aggravated offense.” Specifically, Idaho Code Section 18-1508 (lewd conduct, when the victim is less than twelve (12) years of age) was changed to Idaho Code Section 18-1508 (lewd conduct). Other sections were added to the list of aggravated offenders including Idaho Code Sections 18-1506A (ritualized abuse of a child), 18-4502 (first-degree kidnaping committed for the purpose of rape, committing an infamous crime against nature, committing any lewd and lascivious act upon a child under the age of sixteen (16) years or for purposes of sexual gratification or arousal), 184503 (second degree kidnaping where the victim is an unrelated minor child and the kidnaping is committed for the purpose of rape, committing an infamous crime against nature, committing any lewd and lascivious act upon any child under the age of sixteen (16) years or for the purposes of sexual gratification or arousal), 18-8602(1) (sex trafficking), and any other offense set forth in Idaho Code Section 18-8304, if at the time of the commission of the offense the victim was below the age of thirteen (13) years. Additionally, Idaho Code Section 18-8304 was expanded so that this chapter applied to persons who were convicted of Idaho Code Sections 18-919 (sexual exploitation by a medical care provider), 18-1505B (sexual abuse and exploitation of a vulnerable adult), 18-5609 (inducing persons under eighteen (18) years of age into prostitution), or 188602(1) (sex trafficking). Idaho Code Section 18-8308 provided that all violent sexual predators will be monitored with electronic monitoring technology for the duration of the individual's probation or parole period. Any person who, without authority, intentionally AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF - 107

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alters, tampers with, damages or destroys any electronic monitoring equipment required be worn or used by a violent sexual predator could be found guilty of a felony.
2010 156. In 2010, amendments were made to Idaho Code Sections 18-8303, 18-8304, 18-8308, and 18-8314. Specifically, those amendments included, among other things, Idaho Code Sections 18-8303 where a section of the definition of an “aggravated offense” was amended from 18-6108 (male rape) to 18-8108 (male rape, but excluding section 186108(1) where the victim is at least twelve (12) years of age or the defendant is eighteen(18) years of age). This change was also made in Idaho Code Sections 18-8304 and 18-8314.
2011 157. In 2011, amendments were made to Idaho Code Sections 18-8302, 188303, 18-8304, 18-8305, 18-8306, 18-8307, 18-8308, 18-8309, 18-8310, 18-8311, 188312, 18-8314, 18-8315, 18-8316, 18-8318, 18-8323, 18-8324, and 18-8329. Additionally, 18-8317, 18-8319, 18-8320, 18-8321, and 18-8322 were repealed. Specifically, 18-8302 was amended to state that the legislature finds that sexual offenders present a danger, rather than that they present a significant risk of reoffense. Idaho Code Section 18-8303 was amended so that an offense that is substantially similar to any of the foregoing offenses under the laws of another jurisdiction or military court or the court of another country is considered an “aggravated offense.” Additionally, the same code section altered the definition of “violent sexual predator” to mean a person who was designated as a violent sexual predator by the sex offender classification board where such designation has not been removed by judicial action or otherwise.
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158. Idaho Code Section 18-8304 provided that this chapter shall now apply to people who are convicted of Idaho Code Sections 18-5605 (detention for prostitution), 18-5611 (inducing person under eighteen (18) years of age to patronize a prostitute), 186609 (video voyeurism where the victim is a minor or upon a second or subsequent conviction), or 18-7804 (if the racketeering act involves kidnaping of a minor).
159. Idaho Code Section 18-8305 stated that the registry must be in digital form or include links or identification numbers that provide access to the information in other databases in which it is included in digital form. It required to include, but not be limited to, the following information: name and all aliases, a complete physical description of the person including any identifying marks, such as scars or tattoos, the offender's date of birth, the offender's social security number, the criminal history of the offender, the name under which the offender was convicted of each offense, the status of parole, probation or supervised release, registration status, the existence of any outstanding arrest warrants for the offender, the criminal offense for which the sexual offender is registered, the name and location of each hospital, jail or penal institution to which the offender was committed for each offense covered under this chapter, the address or physical description of each residence at which the offender resides, the name and address of any place where the offender is a student or will be a student, the license plate number and a description of any vehicle owned or regularly operated by the sexual offender regardless of to whom the vehicle is registered, any e-mail or instant messaging address used by the offender, the offender's telephone numbers, the name and address of any place where the offender is employed or will be employed and the name and address of any place where the offender works as a volunteer or otherwise works, a description of normal travel routes or the AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF - 109

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general areas in which the offender works, information regarding any professional license maintained by the offender that authorizes the offender to engage in an occupation or carry out a trade or business, information about the offender's passport, and if the offender is an alien, information about documents establishing the offender's immigration status including document type and number information for such documents and a digitized copy of the documents, a set of fingerprints and palm prints of the offender, a current photograph of the offender, and a photocopy of a valid driver's license or identification card issued to the offender.
160. Idaho Code Section 18-8306 stated that the offender shall register within two (2) working days of entry of judgment of conviction if the offender was not sentenced to incarceration and was only placed on probation. The same stated that if the offender was incarcerated, he/she must register prior to release.
161. Idaho Code Section 18-8307 stated that registration documents were to request the information set out in Idaho Code Section 18-8305. It also amended the required frequency of registration for violent sexual predators from annually to quarterly. Idaho Code Section 18-8307(7) was added and stated that an offender shall keep the registration current for the full registration period. The full registration period was for life; however, offenders could petition for release from the full registration period as set forth in Idaho Code Section 18–8310.
162. Idaho Code Section 18-8309 was repealed and replaced with a new version. This required offenders to report any changes to their address, name, or employment status within two (2) working days of said change. It also required offenders AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF - 110

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to notify the department of any lodging that would last longer than a period of seven (7) days and were to notify the jurisdiction of the location the offender would be lodging. Offenders were required to give notice of any vehicle changes, as well as additional requirements.
163. Idaho Code Section 18-8310 was amended to state that registration under this act is for life, however, any offender, other than a recidivist, an offender who has been convicted of an aggravated offense, or an offender designated as a violent sexual predator, could, after a period of ten (10) years from the date the offender was released from incarceration or placed on parole, supervised release or probation, whichever is greater, petition the district court for a show cause hearing to determine whether the offender should be exempted from the duty to register as a sexual offender. In the petition, the offender was required to provide clear and convincing evidence that the petitioner had completed any periods of supervised release, probation or parole without revocation, provide an affidavit indicating that the petitioner did not have a criminal charge pending or was knowingly under investigation for any crime identified in Idaho Code Section 18-8304, provide clear and convincing evidence that the petitioner had successfully completed a sexual offender treatment program, and provided an affidavit demonstrating that the petitioner had no felony convictions and had committed no sex offenses during the period of which the petitioner had been registered. Idaho Code Section 18-8310(2) gave the prosecuting attorney and central registry the opportunity to submit evidence, affidavits, or other documents rebutting the assertions contained within the offender’s petition.
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164. Idaho Code Section 18-8311(3) was removed so the possible felony conviction for evasion of service was no longer an option.
165. Idaho Code Section 18-8312 changed the name of the Sex Offender Classification Board to the Sex Offender Management Board. The Board was increased from four (4) to nine (9) members and those members were now eligible for reappointment to the Board without limitations. The amendments removed the section stating that the board was to assess the risk of reoffense of any offender convicted and incarcerated for commission of a crime that may classify them as a violent sexual predator, recidivist, or an aggravated offender. It was further stated that the board was charged with the advancement and oversight of sexual offender management policies and practices statewide.
166. Amendments to Idaho Code Section 18-8314 removed all duties from the Sex Offender Management Board involving the evaluation and resulting classification of sex offenders, limiting the duties of the Board to the creation of standards and procedures which sex offender evaluators must follow, and administering certification of sex offender evaluators
167. Idaho Code Section 18-8315 was amended to provide that the Sex Offender Management Board was subject to Idaho Open Meeting laws and further providing that no written record be kept of any sex offender classification vote taken by the Board.
168. Idaho Code Section 18-8316 was amended to state that offenders “may” submit to an evaluation rather than they “shall” submit to an evaluation.
169. Idaho Code Section 18-8323 was amended to state that the department or AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF - 112

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sheriff shall provide public access to sex offender registry information via the internet. This information was now limited to the offender’s name, date of birth, address of each residence, address of any place the offender may be a student, physical description, offense the offender was registering for, photograph, temporary lodging information. In addition, this code section stated that the identity of the victim, offender’s social security number, any arrests of the offender that did not result in conviction, any internet identifier used by the offender, any passports and immigration documents, and any information identifying any person related to, living with, working for, employing, or otherwise associated with the offender would not be released to the public.
170. Idaho Code Section 18-8324 was amended to provide that the department be required to, within three (3) days, disseminate any registration information, including any changes in registry information, to: the attorney general of the United States, each school and public housing agency in each area the offender resided, each jurisdiction where the sexual offender resided, criminal justice agencies through the public safety and security information system, social service entities, volunteer organizations, and any organization, company, or individual who requests notification of changes in registry information.
171. Idaho Code Section 18-8329 was amended so that subsections (1)(a) and (1)(b) now applied to an offender who was attending an academic conference or other scheduled extracurricular school event, an offender who was dropping off or picking up a child or children and the person was the child or children’s parent or legal guardian, an offender who was temporarily on school grounds, during school hours, for the purpose of making a mail, food, or other delivery unless they had contacted the school district office
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annually and had obtained written permission from the district. These also applied to an offender who had written permission from a school principal, vice-principal to be on the school grounds.
2012 172. In 2012, amendments were made to Idaho Code Section 18-8304 removing subsection(4) which previously stated that when a defendant was convicted of rape under Idaho Code Section 18-6101(2), and at the time of the offense the defendant was nineteen (19) or twenty (20) years of age and not more than three (3) years older than the victim of the rape, the court could order that the defendant be exempt from the duty to register. Additionally, Idaho Code Section 18-8310A was added which stated that any person who was convicted under Idaho Code Section 18-6101(1) as it existed before July 1, 2010, where such person would not have been convicted under Idaho Code Section 18-6101(1) or (2), could petition the district court for a determination of exemption.
2013 173. In 2013, amendments were made to Idaho Code Sections 18-8304 and 188307. Those amendments included, among other things, the addition of Idaho Code Section 18-5610 (utilizing a person under eighteen (18) years of age for prostitution) as an offense that required registration. Idaho Code Section 18-8307 doubled the registration fee to a total of eighty dollars ($80.00) per year. V. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS: CLASSIFICATION AND RETROACTIVE
APPLICATION OF SORNA 2001, 2009, 2011 174. Idaho SORNA 2001, 2009, 2011 classifies registrants based upon whether their offense was an “aggravated offense,” and determines the length of time that a person
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must register and the frequency of reporting. Idaho SORNA 2001, 2009, 2011 classifications are based solely on the offense of conviction.
175. Idaho SORNA 2001, 2009, 2011 classifications are not based on, and do not correspond to, a registrant’s actual risk of re-offending or the danger any registrant poses to the public.
176. Prior to Idaho SORNA 2011, most Idaho registrants were required to register for ten (10) years. The amendment of Idaho SORNA 2011 required that registrants that were previously required to register for ten (10) years, were extended to life. There was no individualized determination about the risk or whether lifetime registration was warranted.
177. Although the plaintiffs have clinically been determined to be low risk, under Idaho SORNA 2001, 2009, 2011 they were retroactively classified as “aggravated offenders” and required to register and comply with Idaho SORNA 2011 until they die.
178. Even upon the clearest proof that the plaintiffs are not dangerous, there is no mechanism under Idaho SORNA that would allow the plaintiffs to have their registration obligations eliminated or reduced.
179. Idaho SORNA 2001, 2009, 2011 are not limited to individuals who committed sex offenses, but in some cases required registration and reporting by individuals convicted of other offenses that do not have a sexual component, at least as far as out-of-state registrants are concerned.
VI. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS: IMPACT OF Idaho SORNA 2001, 2009 AND 2011 ON THE PLAINTIFFS
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180. Idaho SORNA 2001, 2009, 2011 imposes obligations, disabilities, and

restraints that are so extensive that they cannot be set out in full here, but by way of

summary, are as follows:

Plaintiffs are subject to continuous reporting, surveillance, and supervision. In

addition, Idaho SORNA 2001, 2009, 2011 severely limits their ability to direct the

upbringing of their children, find housing and employment, get an education, travel, engage

in free speech activities (including use of the Internet), be free from harassment and stigma,

and understand what is required of them under the statute.

181. Finally, registration under Idaho SORNA 2001, 2009, 2011 triggers a vast

array of additional obligations, disabilities, and restraints under other federal, state, and local

laws, as well as private policies barring or limiting registrants from access to goods or

services available to the public.

A. Reporting, Surveillance, and Supervision

The plaintiffs must report in person regularly and must provide:

•

all names and nicknames, Social Security number, and date of birth;

•

residential address, including any address where the individual expects

to spend more than seven days, as well as the dates of any such temporary stays;

•

employer names and addresses, including information on any person

who agrees to hire a registrant for a temporary job, as well as the routes of travel for

non-stationary employment;

•

schools attending or schools to which accepted;

•

telephone numbers registered to the individual or routinely used;

•

e-mail and instant message addresses, log-in names or other identifiers

assigned to the individual or routinely used, if, in fact, the registrant is granted

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internet usage;

•

all other designations used in Internet communications or postings;

•

license plate and registration information for any vehicle owned or

regularly operated by the individual, and the location where that vehicle is kept;

•

driver’s license or personal ID card;

•

passport and immigration documents;

•

occupational license information; and

•

a complete physical description.

182. Idaho SORNA 2001, 2009, 2011 also requires the plaintiffs to provide a

photograph, fingerprints, and palm prints. If a plaintiff’s appearance changes, he or she must

update the photograph.

•

In addition to reporting in person at regular intervals, the plaintiffs must

report in person within two (2) working days whenever certain information

changes. The immediate, in-person reporting requirement was triggered

whenever the plaintiffs:

• change their residence;

• begin, change, or discontinue employment;

• enroll or dis-enroll as a student;

• change their name

• Intend to travel for more than seven days;

• establish an e-mail address, instant message address, or other Internet designation; and

• buy or begin using a vehicle, or cease owning or using a vehicle.

183. There are no good-cause exceptions to the reporting requirements or to the

“immediate” notification requirements. Regardless of illness, injury, transportation problems,

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or other emergencies, the plaintiffs must report in person within two (2) days or face criminal
charges.
• Idaho SORNA 2001, 2009, 2011’s reporting, surveillance, and supervision requirements are similar to, but more restrictive and onerous than, the reporting, surveillance, and supervision that the plaintiffs experienced while serving their sentences on probation or parole.
• Under Idaho SORNA 2001, 2009, 2011, the plaintiffs must report significantly more information than what they were required to report while they were serving their sentences on probation or parole.
• Idaho SORNA 2001, 2009, 2011’s requirement that minor changes be reported in person within two (2) business days is a level of reporting that far exceeds what the plaintiffs experienced while they were serving their sentences on probation or parole.
• As a result of Idaho SORNA 2001, 2009, 2011’s immediate reporting requirements, coupled with the reporting requirements themselves, the plaintiffs must – for the rest of their lives – report in person to law enforcement with a frequency that is similar to, and often greater than, their reporting obligations when they were on probation or parole.
• For the plaintiffs, the lifetime surveillance imposed by these reporting requirements is not only intrusive, but burdensome. The time required to register or update information varies depending on where and when the plaintiffs report. Each registration can take up to an hour-and-a-half, not including travel time.
B. Family and Parenting
184. Idaho SORNA 2001, 2009, 2011 has severely impaired the plaintiffs’ family
relationships and ability to parent, in large part because the statute bars the plaintiffs from
“residing” or “loitering” within five hundred (500) feet of school property. “To loiter”
means “to remain for a period of time and under circumstances that a reasonable person
would determine is for the primary purpose of observing or contacting minors.” This
provision contains no exception for the plaintiff-parents, who are observing or contacting
their own children.
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• For example, permission has to be obtained for parents to attend their children’s school and extra-curricular events, whereupon many have to be accompanied by an approved supervisor.
C. Housing
185. Idaho SORNA 2001, 2009, 2011 also severely limits the plaintiffs’ access to
housing.
• Idaho SORNA 2001, 2009, 2011 bars the plaintiffs from “residing” within five hundred (500) feet of school property, making a substantial amount of housing unavailable as a matter of law. The plaintiffs are also prohibited from living with family members if those family members live within 500 feet of school property.
• Because sex offender registry address information is public, many landlords outside geographic exclusion zones refuse to rent to registrants, since their properties can then be easily identified on the registry.
• In some cases, Plaintiffs have been denied subsidized housing for reasons that under Federal Law, individuals subject to lifetime sex offender registrations are barred from subsidized housing.
D. Employment
186. Idaho SORNA 2001, 2009, 2011 bars the plaintiffs from working within five
hundred (500) feet of school property, making a substantial number of jobs unavailable to
the plaintiffs as a matter of law.
• Moreover the possible public posting of employment by employers who hire the plaintiffs can create a significant disincentive for employers to hire the plaintiffs, and regularly lose employment opportunities because of their status of registered sex offenders.
• It is a virtual impossibility for registrants to obtain employment dealing with the public.
E. Education
187. Idaho SORNA 2001, 2009, 2011 has also made it more difficult for the
plaintiffs to get an education.
• Many plaintiffs have been denied opportunities for education, such as medical
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assistant, nursing, teaching, and several GED programs, as many of those programs automatically reject registered sex offenders.
F. Travel
188. The plaintiffs’ status as registrants has severely restricted their ability to
travel, both interstate and intrastate.
• The plaintiffs must provide advance notice when they intend to travel anywhere for more than seven (7) days. They must tell the police where they are going, where they will stay, how long they will be there, and when they will return.
• The plaintiffs must provide advance notice if they travel outside the U.S. for more than seven (7) days.
• If the plaintiffs travel, they must comply with any applicable sex offender registration laws in other jurisdictions and must register there if they intend to stay over a prescribed period of time. Because sex offender laws are exceedingly complex and vary from state to state, it is extremely difficult to obtain accurate information about either affirmative reporting obligations (such as registering one’s presence in a state) or prohibitions on ordinary behavior (such as visiting a library or park) in other jurisdictions.
G. Speech & Internet
189. Idaho SORNA 2001, 2009, 2011 severely restricts the plaintiffs’ ability to
speak freely on the Internet. The plaintiffs not only must provide law enforcement with all
electronic mail addresses, instant message addresses, log-in names, or other identifiers that
are assigned to or routinely used by them, but must also immediately report whenever they
establish any electronic mail address, instant message address, or other designation used in
Internet communications or postings.
• The plaintiffs are concerned about using the Internet because Idaho SORNA 2001,2009, 2011 is unclear about whether, for example, they must report immediately and in person if they set up an on-line account to pay their taxes, register with Netflix, purchase or review products on Amazon, or use a college online bulletin board.
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H. False Information and Public Stigmatization 190. The public registry website labels registrants which stigmatizes them, and publicly and falsely identifies them as among the most dangerous sex offenders on the registry. 191. The public registry website posts extensive personal information about each registrant, including residential address, date of birth, physical description (weight, height, etc.), and a photograph. 192. Because they are stigmatized as sex offenders on the public registry website, the plaintiffs and their families are subjected to harassment, social ostracism, and even threats of violence. I. Vagueness, Strict Liability, and Impossibility of Compliance 193. The plaintiffs have been further harmed because the restrictions and obligations of Idaho SORNA 2001, 2009, 2011’s requirements for reporting personal information are so vague that the plaintiffs do not understand what information must be reported, or what changes in information subject them to the in-person immediate reporting requirement, which some jurisdictions impose. That because some of the restrictions and obligations are so vague and confusing, plaintiffs are concerned that they will inadvertently violate requirements because they did not understand what they are. For example, Idaho Code Section 18-8305 requires registrants to provide the name and address of any place where the offender is a student or will be a student unless the offender is only participating in courses remotely through the mail or the internet. It further provides in subsection (h) that registrants are to provide the license plate number and a description of any vehicle owned or regularly operated. Subsection (k) provides the registrant must provide the name and
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address of any place where the offender is employed or will be employed. Finally, Idaho Code Section 18-8329 prohibits sex offender registrants from knowingly “loitering” on a public way or residing within five hundred (500) feet from the property line of school grounds. That these terms for which sex offender registrants are held strictly liable, are defined nowhere within Idaho SORNA.
194. Idaho SORNA 2001, 2009, 2011’s requirements for reporting personal information are so vague that the plaintiffs do not understand what information must be reported, or what changes in information subject them to the in-person immediate reporting requirement, which some jurisdictions impose. That because some of the restrictions and obligations are so vague and confusing, plaintiffs are concerned that they will inadvertently violate requirements because they did not understand what they are.
195. Finally, Idaho SORNA 2001, 2009, 2011 imposes criminal liability despite the impossibility of compliance. Idaho SORNA 2001, 2009, 2011 imposes liability regardless of whether illness, injury, or practical difficulties make compliance impossible.
196. Idaho SORNA 2001, 2009, 2011 imposes penalties of up to ten (10) years imprisonment for violations of the Act.
J. Consequences Beyond Idaho SORNA 2001, 2009, 2011 197. Because the plaintiffs are required to register as sex offenders under Idaho SORNA 2001, 2009, 2011, they are also subject to a vast and complex array of laws and ordinances imposed on registered sex offenders by the federal government, other states or tribal governments, and local municipalities. 198. Because registration in one state generally triggers registration in another state, the fact that the plaintiffs are subject to Idaho SORNA 2001, 2009, 2011 means they
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are also subject to the sex offender laws of other jurisdictions if they travel or move. 199. In addition, because the plaintiffs are required to register as sex offenders
under Idaho SORNA 2001, 2009, 2011, they are subject to policies by private entities that refuse to provide goods or services to registered sex offenders. But for the fact that the plaintiffs are labeled by the state as registered sex offenders, the goods and services provided by those private entities would generally be available to them.
VII. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS: Idaho SORNA 2001, 2009, 2011 IS NOT RATIONALLY RELATED TO THE GOAL OF PUBLIC SAFETY
200. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as set forth fully herein.
201. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, this claim is brought by all Plaintiffs against all State Defendants.
202. The avowed purpose of Idaho’s sex offender registry is to “assist efforts of local law enforcement agencies to protect communities by requiring sexual offenders to register with local law enforcement agencies and to make certain information about sexual offenders available to the public...” I.C. Section 18-8302.
203. The idea that Idaho SORNA 2001, 2009, 2011 will promote public safety is based on the assumption that sex offender registration will reduce recidivism by convicted offenders and thereby reduce the risk to the public.
204. That assumption is false.
205. In fact, the research shows that public registries are likely to increase, rather than decrease, recidivism, and are therefore counterproductive to their avowed purpose of
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public protection. 206. As outlined in more detail in the declaration of James J. Prescott, (Exh. A,
incorporated by this reference as if fully set forth herein) large scale empirical research on the impact of sex offender registries has found that public sex offender registries have likely increased, and almost certainly not reduced, the frequency of sex offenders. (By contrast, the research has also found that private law enforcement registries have reduced recidivism against family members, neighbors, etc., though not against strangers).
207. Specifically, this research shows that the more people a state subjects to public sex offender registration, the higher the relative frequency of sex offenses in that state. Public registries (based on the offense of conviction) correlate with an increase in frequency of sex offenses against all types of victims (family members, neighbors, acquaintances, and strangers). Prescott Decl., at 3-4 (Exh. A).
208. Although it may seem counter-intuitive that public registration increases rather than decreases recidivism, these results reflect the fact that sex offender registration and the attendant consequences exacerbate risk factors for recidivism, such as lack of employment and housing, and prevent healthy reintegration into the community. Prescott Decl., at 7-8 (Exh. A).
209. These results are mirrored by other evidence-based research on the impact of sex offender registration. Most studies reveal no significant reduction in sex crime rates that can be attributed to sex offender laws and policies. Rather, there is a significant body of empirical work that overwhelmingly shows that, at best, public registration makes no difference to recidivism rates, and that it may well be counter-productive. See Levenson Decl., at 3 (Exh. B, incorporated by this reference as if fully set forth herein); Prescott Decl., AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF - 124

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at 12 (Exh. A). 210. The two studies that detected reductions in sex crime recidivism after the
passage of registration laws were both in states that have risk-based, rather than offense based, classification, and that limit public notification to those offenders who have been individually determined to pose the greatest threat to community safety. See Levenson Decl., at 3 (Exh. B).
211. Moreover, there is no research to support the hypothesis that registrants who live closer to child-oriented settings are more likely to reoffend. Rather, the research shows that where registrants live is not a significant contributing factor to recidivism. See Levinson Decl., at 4 (Exh. B).
212. Residency restrictions reduce housing options for registrants, leading to housing instability. Housing instability is consistently correlated with higher criminal recidivism, and may help account for the increases in recidivism triggered by registration. See Prescott Decl., at 7-8 (Exh. A); Levenson Decl., at 5-6 (Exh. B). Thus, residency restrictions are likely to increase rather than decrease sexual offending.
213. Similarly, requirements that interfere with employment, social support, and engagement in pro-social activities undermine the avowed public safety goals of sex offender registration laws. Social policies that ostracize and disrupt the stability of sex offenders are counterproductive to increasing public safety. See Levenson Decl., at 7, 10 (Exh. B).
214. Failure to comply with registration requirements does not predict sexual recidivism. Levenson Decl., at 11-12 (Exh. B).
215. There is no empirical evidence to support the notion that more frequent registration check-ins lower recidivism, nor is there evidence that reporting additional AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF - 125

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information (e.g., email addresses, employment information) reduces recidivism. Levenson Decl., at 10 (Exh. B).
216. In sum, Idaho SORNA 2001, 2009, 2011 is not rationally related to the public safety goal it purports to serve.
VIII. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS: THE REQUIREMENTS OF Idaho SORNA 2001, 2009, 2011 BEAR NO REASONABLE RELATIONSHIP TO THE RISK
THAT INDIVIDUAL REGISTRANTS POSE TO THE COMMUNITY
217. Idaho SORNA 2001, 2009, 2011 is also premised on the assumption that all individuals convicted of sex offenses pose a great risk in public safety, which justifies continuous and lengthy supervision and restrictions.
218. In fact, while some individuals convicted of sex offenses will reoffend, the vast majority of new sex offenses are committed not by registered offenders, but by individuals without prior sex offenses. For example, a study in New York found that 95% of all arrests for sexual offenses were for individuals who did not have a prior sexual offense conviction and who were not on a sex offender registry. See Levenson Decl., at 8 (Exh. B). Among those with prior sex offenses, recidivism rates vary with the presence of certain risk factors. See Levenson Decl., at 8 (Exh. B). While some individuals convicted of sex offenses pose a significant risk to public safety, most do not.
219. Most sex offenders do not re-offend sexually. First-time sexual offenders are significantly less likely to re-offend than those with multiple sexual convictions, and offenders over the age of fifty (50) years are less likely to re-offend than younger offenders. Moreover, recidivism rates differ significantly depending on the nature of the offense (e.g.,
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rape, incest, child victim, etc.). 220. Research indicates that the risk for sexual re-offending is reduced by half
when a person has spent 5-10 years offense-free in the community. The risk continues to decline the more time the person spends offense-free in the community. Risk for sexual recidivism also declines with age. See Levenson Decl., at 10 (Exh. B).
221. Idaho SORNA 2001, 2009. 2011 is not based on risk. The tier to which an individual is assigned, whether the individual is listed on the public registry, and how long an individual must register, are all based solely on the offense of conviction, not on the individual’s level of risk.
222. Because recidivism risk declines significantly with advancing age and with time spent offense-free in the community, requiring registration for twenty-five (25) years to life is both inefficient and unnecessary. See Levenson Decl. (Exh. B) at 10.
223. In addition, Idaho SORNA 2001, 2009, 2011, by focusing on the danger posed by strangers (who can be identified through the registry), misidentifies the source of risk. In 93% of cases of child sexual abuse, the offender was a family member or acquaintance, not a stranger listed on the registry.
224. Public sex offender registration and residency restrictions, which focus on“stranger danger,” give parents a false sense of security by implying that knowing where sex offenders live or banishing them from the community in fact reduces the risk of sex offenses being committed, when such measures do not have this effect. See Levenson Decl., at 9 (Exh. B).
225. In sum, the requirements of Idaho SORNA 2001, 2009, 2011 bear no rational relationship to the risks that individual registrants pose to the community. AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF - 127

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IX. THE ACTIONS OF THE LEGISLATURE IN AMENDING THE SEX OFFENDER REGISTRY IN 2009 REPRESENT A VIOLATION OF ALL
REGISTRANTS’ RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS 226. In February 2009, the Idaho Supreme Court in Smith vs. State of Idaho, 146 Idaho 822, ruled that “Idaho’s statutory scheme for VSP designation minimizes, at every turn, the possibility that an offender has the required notice and opportunity to be heard.” The Court further stated “due process requires that the State bears the burden of proving, in some meaningful time, that the Defendant deserves the classification assigned.” 227. At the time of the Smith decision, a sex offender had a right to a due process hearing to determine whether he or she should be put in a class requiring VSPs to update their information every ninety (90) days and to remain on the Registry for life. In other words, classification as a VSP was based upon a factual determination of probable future conduct (i.e., that the offender posed a high risk of committing another offense or engage in predatory sexual conduct). The Supreme Court in its determination that the defendant had been denied his rights to due process stated: “The legislature created the Board to ‘assess the risk of reoffense of any offender convicted and incarcerated for commission of a crime as set forth in section 18-8314, Idaho Code, to determine whether the offender should be designated a violent sexual predator.’ I.C. § 18-8312(1). The legislature imposed the duty upon the Board to establish objective guidelines to be used in the determination of whether an offender should be designated a VSP. The board shall establish guidelines to determine whether an offender who meets the criteria of this section is a violent sexual predator presenting a high risk of reoffense. The guidelines shall be established with the assistance of sexual offender treatment and law enforcement professionals who have, by education, experience or training, expertise in the assessment and treatment of sexual offenders.
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(a) Factors to be used in establishment of the guidelines must be supported in the sexual offender assessment field as criteria reasonably related to the risk of reoffense and be objective criteria that can be gathered in a consistent and reliable manner.
(b) The guidelines shall include, but are not limited to, the following general categories for risk assessment: seriousness of the offense, offense history, whether the offense was predatory, characteristics of the offender, characteristics of the victim, relationship of the offender to the victim, the number of victims and the number of violations of each victim.”
I.C. § 18-8314(5). Further, the legislature authorized the Board to
promulgate rules to carry out the provisions of the Act. I.C. § 18-8314(8).
The Court further stated:
“This Court has previously stated that judicial review is turned into a superfluous exercise of rubberstamping when the decision of a state board sitting in a disciplinary or quasi-judicial position relies on the “expertise,” “experience,” and “collective knowledge” of its members on an “ad hoc basis” rather than declaring and applying clearly articulated standards to the cases before it. H & V Eng'g, Inc. v. Idaho State Bd. of Prof. Eng'rs & Land Surveyors, 113 Idaho 646, 650, 747 P.2d 55, 59 (1988); Tuma v. Bd. of Nursing, 100 Idaho 74, 81, 593 P.2d 711, 718 (1979). In Tuma, we rejected the Board of Nursing's argument that it need not further define “unprofessional conduct” when disciplining a registered nurse. 100 Idaho at 79, 593 P.2d at 716. The Board of Nursing unsuccessfully argued that providing a definition was unnecessary since that board was composed of experts who were fit and capable in their own right to determine the standards of their profession from their personnel knowledge and experience. Id. at 81, 593 P.2d at 718. In H & V, we similarly rejected the Board of Engineers' reliance on the knowledge and expertise of its members in rendering a disciplinary decision on what constituted professional “misconduct” in the absence of a clearly defined standards. 113 Idaho at 650, 747 P.2d at 59. Both of these cases noted the due process ramifications implicit in a board's failure to avail itself of the opportunity to expand upon the legislative grounds under which its determinations are based. H & V, 113 Idaho at 651, 747 P.2d at 60; Tuma, 100 Idaho at 79, 593 P.2d at 716. This is because reliance on “the phantom of unknown standards” robs the opportunity for notice. H & V, 113 Idaho at 651, 747 P.2d at 60. We find the instant case to be analogous to Tuma and H & V and conclude that, in the absence of objective 12 and clearly defined guidelines and standards upon which Smith's VSP designation may
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be evaluated, his due process rights could not be protected by the process of judicial review.” 228. The legislature’s response to the decision in Smith vs. State of Idaho, within approximately four (4) months, was to simply amend Idaho SORNA by changing the name of the Sexual Offender Classification Board to the Sexual Offender Management Board, and requiring all sexual offenders, whether violent or not, to be classified as aggravated offenders, and to be treated exactly as VSPs (i.e., to remain on the Registry for life). 229. The original Board was required to establish guidelines to determine whether an offender was a violent sexual predator depending on a high risk to reoffend. The Guidelines were to be established with the assistance of sexual offender treatment and law enforcement professionals who had, by education, experience or training, expertise in the assessment and treatment of sexual offenders. 230. By eliminating the Sexual Offender Classification Board and replacing it with the Sexual Offender Management Board, with no further classification powers, the legislature very cleverly side-stepped the Supreme Court’s requirements espoused under Smith vs. State of Idaho, and effectively removed any provisions regarding classification by putting all sex offenders in the same boat (i.e., to be treated as violent sex offenders for life). 231. Essentially, prior to the 2009 amendment to Idaho SORNA, designation as a VSP resulted in consequences beyond requiring the designee to register as a sex offender. NonVSP sex offenders needed only to update their information and photographs on the registry annually, while VSPs were required to do so every ninety (90) days. And, non-VSP offenders could petition the court for relief from the duty to register after a period of ten (10) years, while a VSP had to remain on the registry for life. Thus, for an offender at that time,
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only the designation as a VSP resulted in the indelible scarlet letters. 232. What the legislature did in response to Smith vs. State of Idaho, and as a result
of the 2009 amendment to Idaho SORNA, was to simply create a situation where the scarlet letters became indelible to all sex offenders, rather than provide the due process required by the Supreme Court.
X. FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION Violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (Due Process) 233. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as set forth fully herein. 234. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, this claim is brought by all Plaintiffs against all State Defendants. 235. Idaho SORNA 2001, 2009, 2011 is vague and ambiguous and fails to sufficiently define who is subject to the laws, what their effects are, and what the penalties for failure to comply with them are, in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
236. Idaho SORNA 2001, 2009, 2011 also violates the Due Process Clause because it reassesses offenders and subjects them to new restrictions and requirements, regardless of any actual risk to society and without the possibility of any hearing and without any requirement by the State of Idaho to provide offenders with any notice of their classification or any new prohibitions or requirements.
237. Further, Idaho SORNA 2001, 2009, 2011 violates the Due Process Clause
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of the U.S. Constitution because it fails to further any legitimate governmental purpose. 238. Each of the Plaintiffs has been, or imminently will be, injured by these
constitutional violations, and the Plaintiffs are entitled to declaratory and injunctive relief. XI. SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
Violations of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Free Exercise of Religion)
239. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as set forth fully herein.
240. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, this claim is brought by all Plaintiffs against all State Defendants.
241. Because churches and other places of worship fall within the places certain sex offenders may not “knowingly be” within five hundred (500) feet of under Idaho SORNA 2001, 2009, 2011, regardless of the actual known risk posed by these offenders, Idaho SORNA 2001, 2009, 2011 improperly interferes with plaintiffs’ right to practice religion without undue governmental interference.
242. The Plaintiffs have been, or imminently will be, injured by these constitutional violations, and Plaintiffs are entitled to declaratory and injunctive relief.
XII. THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION Violations of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (Substantive Due Process) 243. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as set forth fully herein. 244. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, this claim is brought by all Plaintiffs
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against all State Defendants. 245. Idaho SORNA 2001, 2009, 2011, impacts the plaintiffs’ ability to travel
throughout Idaho, attend church or other religious services, go to Court or attorney offices, parent their children, and live with their families. Idaho SORNA 2001, 2009, 2011 impinges on their fundamental rights to free association, travel, and to raise their children without undue governmental interference.
246. Each of the Plaintiffs has been, or imminently will be, injured by these constitutional violations, and the Plaintiffs are entitled to declaratory and injunctive relief.
XIII. FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION Violations of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (Equal Protection) 247. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference each and every allegation contained in thepreceding paragraphs as set forth fully herein. 248. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, this claim is brought by all Plaintiffs against all State Defendants. 249. The Idaho legislature has enacted separate sex offender registration requirements, one (1) for adult sex offenders (Idaho Code Sections 18-8301, et seq., "Sexual Offender Registration Notification and Community Right-To-Know-Act") and one (1) for juvenile sex offenders (Idaho Code Sections 18-8401, et seq., "Juvenile Sex Offender Registration Notification and Community Right-To-Know-Act"). 250. The Juvenile Sex Offender Registration Act imposes sex offender registration requirements for all juvenile offenders, who were between the ages of fourteen (14) years and eighteen (18) years at the time of the commission of the offense, and who were AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF - 133

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adjudicated to be guilty of those criminal offenses set forth in Idaho Code Section 18-8304. 251. The adult sex offender registration act imposes sex offender registration
requirements for all offenders, who were the age of eighteen (18) years or over, at the time of the commission of the offense, and who were found to be guilty of those criminal offenses set forth in Idaho Code Section 18-8304.
252. That by the inclusionary provisions of each sex offender registration act, the Idaho legislature has created two (2) separate but similarly situated groups, one (1) between fourteen (14) and eighteen (18) years of age, and one (1) eighteen (18) years of age and older, members of each group having committed and been found guilty of one (1) or more of a group of included criminal offenses.
253. That the Idaho legislature further created important distinctions in the registration requirements, and consequences for failure to register, ascribed to each group. Those differences are as follows:
a. Juvenile sex offenders are not subject to the same tiered designations as adult sex offenders ( i.e., "rescidivist", those convicted of an "aggravated offense", and "violent sexual predator").
b. Juvenile sex offenders, even in those circumstances where they would otherwise qualify as an adult "violent sexual predator", are limited to registration as a sex offender annually, as opposed to the more onerous requirement of every ninety (90) days, are not faced with more burdensome and frequent verification of address, and are not subject to the requirement that they wear an electronic monitoring device at all times, faced by adult offenders in that same class.
c. In the event of a failure to register, juvenile offenders are subject to a general AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF - 134

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misdemeanor criminal charge, whereas adult sex offenders are subject to being charged criminally at a felony level for the identical conduct.
d. Upon reaching the age of twenty-one (21) years, all juvenile sex offenders are entitled to be removed from the juvenile sex offender registry, unless the prosecuting attorney files a petition with the court asking that the juvenile offender be transferred to the adult registry and, after hearing, that the court determines the juvenile poses and ongoing threat to the safety of others. The level of the burden of proof on the State in making such a showing is not prescribed by the statute. By contrast, adult sex offenders who have been designated as a "recidivist", a "violent sexual predator", or those who were convicted of an "aggravated offense" are required to register for life. Only those adult sex offenders whose conviction(s) do not fall within one (1) of those designations may petition for removal from the sex offender registry. The petition may be filed on or after a period of ten (10) years from the date the adult offender was released from incarceration or placed on parole, supervised release or probation, whichever is greater, at which time the court is required to schedule a show cause hearing to determine whether the offender is to be exempted from the duty to register as a sexual offender. The burden of proof required to be shown by the petitioner is clear and convincing evidence.
254. That there is no rational legislative purpose or basis for the disparate treatment of registration requirements and penalties for non-compliance between these two (2) similarly situated groups.
255. Furthermore, there is no rational legislative purpose or basis for the disparate post-conviction treatment of those offenders having been convicted of crimes under Idaho Code Section 8304, and other serious felony level crimes where evidence indicates sexual AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF - 135

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offenders are no more likely to re-offend, nor any more likely to pose a threat to the safety of others.
256. That Idaho SORNA 2001, 2009, 2011 is designed only to burden an unpopular group and thus violates the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution.
257. Each of the Plaintiffs has been, or imminently will be, injured by these constitutional violations, and the Plaintiffs are entitled to declaratory and injunctive relief.
XIV. FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION Violations of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Cruel and Unusual Punishment) 258. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as set forth fully herein. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, this claim is brought by all Plaintiffs against all State Defendants. 259. Idaho SORNA 2001, 2009, 2011 imposes extensive punishments, both on persons previously convicted of sexual offenses and prospectively, that are excessive in relation to the crimes for which offenders are convicted January 20, 2017. For example, anyone convicted of a crime with any “sexual element” or any crime that is considered an “aggravated” offense, no matter when they were convicted, is considered a sex offender under Idaho SORNA 2001, 2009, 2011 and is subject to community notification and registration requirements. 260. Community notification can subject offenders to violence at the hands of vigilantes. Human Rights Watch, in a comprehensive 2007 study of sex offender laws (laws that were far less extreme than Idaho SORNA 2001, 2009, 2011) and their effects and utility, AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF - 136

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found that public safety was not furthered by expanding notification and restriction provisions, but offenders were subjected to vigilantism:
Information provided by state online sex offender registries, as well as information provided during community notification by law enforcement, is not just used by private citizens to determine what streets their children can walk on, or whom to avoid. Neighbors as well as strangers harass, intimidate and physically assault people who have committed sex crimes. At least four registered sex offenders have been killed. P. 89, “No Easy Answers: Sex Offender Laws in the United States,” Human Rights Watch, available at http://222.hrw.org/reports/2007/us0907/usO907web.pdf, which is incorporated by this reference as if set forth fully herein. Each of the Plaintiffs has been, or imminently will be, injured by these Eighth Amendment violations, and the Plaintiffs are entitled to declaratory and injunctive relief.
XV. SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION Violation of Article 1, §9 of the United States Constitution under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(Ex Post Facto) 261. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as set forth fully herein. 262. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, this claim is brought by all Plaintiffs against all State Defendants. 263. The effect and intent of Idaho SORNA 2001, 2009, 2011 are punitive and impose new punishments, including but not limited to the affirmative disability of having to register in person every twelve (12) months, banishment from their families and communities, on offenders convicted before their enactment. 264. Each of the Plaintiffs has been, or imminently will be, injured by these
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constitutional violations, and the Plaintiffs are entitled to declaratory and injunctive relief. XVI. SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION
VIOLATIONS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION UNDER 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (DOUBLE JEOPARDY)
265. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as set forth fully herein.
266. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, this claim is brought by all Plaintiffs against all State Defendants.
267. Idaho SORNA 2001, 2009, 2011 impose new punishments on persons previously convicted, and impose registration duties, community notification, and movement and residence restrictions based on the crime originally committed, rather than any actual risk of recidivism, in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the U.S. Constitution.
268. Each of the above-described Plaintiffs has been, or imminently will be, injured by these constitutional violations, and the Plaintiffs are entitled to declaratory and injunctive relief.
XVII. EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION Violation of Article 1, §10 to the United States Constitution under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 (Contracts Clause) 269. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as set forth fully herein.
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270. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, this claim is brought by all Plaintiffs against all State Defendants.
271. Idaho SORNA 2001, 2009, 2011 operates as a substantial impairment to the preexisting contractual relationship between the state and Plaintiffs Guilty Plea Agreements by imposing new terms not negotiated which drastically increase, and, or require lifetime supervision, registration and community notification.
272. Each of the above-described Plaintiffs has been, or imminently will be, injured by these constitutional violations, and the Plaintiffs are entitled to declaratory and injunctive relief.
XVIII. NINTH CAUSE OF ACTION VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 1, §16 TO THE IDAHO CONSTITUTION (STATE CONTRACTS CLAUSE)
273. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as set forth fully herein.
274. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, this claim is brought by all Plaintiffs against all State Defendants.
275. For the same reasons that the Idaho SORNA 2001, 2009, 2011 violate the contracts clause of the United States Constitution, that also violate the contracts clause of the Idaho State Constitution.
276. Each of the above-described Plaintiffs has been, or imminently will be, injured by these constitutional violations, and the Plaintiffs are entitled to declaratory and injunctive AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF - 139

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relief.
XIX. TENTH CAUSE OF ACTION Violation of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Takings Clause) 277. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as set forth fully herein. 278. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C., Section 1983, this claim is brought by all Plaintiffs against all State Defendants. 279. Idaho SORNA 2001, 2009, 2011, by placing residential and movement restrictions on Plaintiffs, unconstitutionally restricts Plaintiffs’ property rights to the point that constitutes a regulatory taking requiring just compensation. 280. Each of the Plaintiffs has been, or imminently will be, injured by these constitutional violations, and the Plaintiffs are entitled to declaratory and injunctive relief.
XX. ELEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION Violation of Article II, Section I of the Idaho Constitution
(Separation of Powers) 281. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as set forth fully herein. 282. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, this claim is brought by all Plaintiffs against all State Defendants.
283. Idaho SORNA 2001, 2009, 2011 violates the States Separation of Powers doctrine as it limits the judicial power of sentence finality as the law vacates existing court
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judgments regarding sex offenders’ classifications, and community notification and reverses final court judgments setting the length of time that sex offenders must register.
284. Each of the Plaintiffs has been, or imminently will be, injured by these constitutional violations, and the Plaintiffs are entitled to declaratory and injunctive relief.
XXI. TWELFTH CAUSE OF ACTION VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 11, SECTION 8 OF THE IDAHO
CONSTITUTION (POLICE POWERS) 285. Plaintiffs, John Does 4, 7, 18, 53, 62, 80, 85, 100, 105, and 132 incorporate by reference each and every allegation contained in the preceding paragraphs as set forth fully herein. 286. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, this claim is brought by Plaintiffs, John Does 4, 7, 18, 53, 62, 80, 85, 100, 105, and 132 against all State Defendants. 287. These named Plaintiffs had been unconditionally released from custody, probation/parole and any sex offender registration requirements prior to the enactment of Idaho SORNA 2001, 2009, 2011. These named plaintiffs were, therefore, not in any special relationship with the government of the state of Idaho at the time of the enactment of SORNA 2001, 2009, 2011. That by reason thereof, the provisions of Idaho SORNA have been unconstitutionally extended to this class of Plaintiffs in violation of the residual police powers granted to the states pursuant to Article 1, Section 10 of the U.S. Constitution and the Police Powers clause of Article 11, Section 8 of the Constitution of the state of Idaho. 288. Each of the Plaintiffs has been, or imminently will be, injured by these constitutional violations, and the Plaintiffs are entitled to declaratory and injunctive relief.
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XXII. ATTORNEY’S FEES That pursuant to 42 U.S.C.A. §§1983 and 1988, and further pursuant to Rule 54 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (F.R.C.P.), plaintiffs, and each of them as the prevailing party(ies) herein, are entitled to an award of costs of suit, including attorney fees determined in the Court’s discretion to be reasonable in the premises, incurred by plaintiffs in their prosecution of this action, against defendants, jointly and severally
XXIII. PRAYER FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs request this Honorable Court for the following: 1. A declaration that Idaho SORNA 2001, 2009, 2011 violate, both facially and as applied by the Defendants, the due process clause of the United States Constitution (U.S. CONST., Amend. XIV); 2. A declaration that Idaho SORNA 2001, 2009, 2011 violate, both facially and as applied by the Defendants, the due process clause of the Idaho Constitution (ID CONST., Article I, § 13 ); 3. A declaration that Idaho SORNA 2001, 2009, 2011 violate, both facially and as applied by the Defendants, the First Amendment to the United States Constitution (U.S. CONST., Amend. I); 4. A declaration that Idaho SORNA 2001, 2009, 2011 violate, both facially and as applied by the Defendants, the right to practice religion without governmental interference protected by the Idaho Constitution (ID CONST., Article I, § 4 ); 5. A declaration that Idaho SORNA 2001, 2009, 2011 violate, both facially and as applied by the Defendants, the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution (U.S. CONST., Amend. IV);
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6. A declaration that Idaho SORNA 2001, 2009, 2011 violate, both facially and as applied by the Defendants, the right to equal protection guaranteed by the Idaho Constitution (ID CONST., Article I, § 1 );
7. A declaration that Idaho SORNA 2001, 2009, 2011 violate, both facially and as applied by the Defendants, the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment contained in the United States Constitution (U.S. CONST., Amend. VIII).
8. A declaration that Idaho SORNA 2001, 2009, 2011 violate, both facially and as applied by the Defendants, the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment contained in the Idaho Constitution (ID. CONST., Article I, § 6 );
9. A declaration that Idaho SORNA 2001, 2009, 2011 violate, both facially and as applied by the Defendants, the ex post facto clause of the United States Constitution (U.S. CONST., Art. 1, §9, cl. 10);
10. A declaration that Idaho SORNA 2001, 2009, 2011 violate, both facially and as applied by the Defendants, the ex post facto clause of the Idaho Constitution (ID CONST., Article I, § 16);
11. A declaration that Idaho SORNA 2001, 2009, 2011 violate, both facially and as applied by the Defendants, the double jeopardy clause of the United States Constitution (U.S. CONST., Am. V, AM. XIV);
12. A declaration that Idaho SORNA 2001, 2009, 2011 violate, both facially and as applied by the Defendants, the double jeopardy clause of the Idaho Constitution (ID CONST., Article I, §13);
13. A declaration that Idaho SORNA 2001, 2009, 2011 violate, both facially and as applied by the Defendants, the contracts clause of the United States Constitution (U.S. AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF - 143

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CONST., Art. 1, § 10); 14. A declaration that Idaho SORNA 2001, 2009, 2011 violate, both facially and
as applied by the Defendants, the contracts clause of the Idaho Constitution (ID CONST., Article I, §16);
15. A declaration that Idaho SORNA 2001, 2009, 2011 violate, both facially and as applied by the Defendants, the takings clause of the United States Constitution (U.S. CONST., Amend. V);
16. A declaration that Idaho SORNA 2001, 2009, 2011 violate, both facially and as applied by the Defendants, the takings clause of the Idaho Constitution (ID CONST., Article I, § 14);
17. A declaration that Idaho SORNA 2001, 2009, 2011 violate, both facially and as applied by the Defendants, the separation of powers doctrine of the Idaho Constitution (ID CONST., Article I, § 3);
18. A declaration that Idaho SORNA 2001, 2009, 2011 violate, both facially and as applied by the Defendants, the residual and specific grants of police powers to the State of Idaho contained in Article 1, Section 10 of the U.S. Constitution and Article 11, Section 8 of the Constitution of the state of Idaho;
19. A permanent injunction prohibiting each Defendant from enforcing Idaho SORNA 2001, 2009, 2011;
20. Reasonable costs and attorney’s fees, and - - - - AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF - 144

Case 1:16-cv-00429-DCN Document 4 Filed 04/26/17 Page 145 of 145 21. Any further relief the Court deems appropriate. DATED This 26th day of April, 2017. FULLER LAW OFFICES By /s/ Greg J. Fuller GREG J. FULLER 161 Main Avenue West P.O. Box L Twin Falls, ID 83303 fullerlaw@cableone.net (208) 734-1602
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO

JOHN and JANE DOES 1-134, Plaintiffs, v.

Case No. 1:16-cv-00429-DCN
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER

LAWRENCE WASDEN, Attorney General of the State of Idaho, et al.,

Defendants.

I. INTRODUCTION Pending before the Court is Defendants’1 Motion to Dismiss. Dkt. 15. Once the parties briefed the Motion, the Court held oral argument and took the matter under advisement. After fully considering the arguments presented by the parties, for the reasons set forth below, the Court finds good cause to GRANT the Motion and dismiss the Complaint. However, the Court will grant Plaintiffs leave to amend their complaint to cure deficiencies outlined in this decision. Simply put, Plaintiffs must identify actual harms suffered by one or more “Does” and present sufficient facts upon which the Court can make a reasoned decision.

1 In this case there are 33 named defendants including various state officials, members of the Sexual Offender Management Board, and 25 of Idaho’s 44 county sheriffs. Individually and collectively the Court will refer to this group as simply “Defendants.”
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II. BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs, Does 1-134, filed this lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of
Idaho’s Sexual Offender Registration Notification and Community Right-to-Know Act (“SORA”);2 namely, the 2001, 2009, and 2011 amendments.
Plaintiffs are all individuals required to register under SORA. Specifically, it
appears that all Does 1-134 are required to register for life under the Act because of their
classification as recidivist, or because their underlying crimes have been classed as
“aggravated offenses.”
In their Complaint, Plaintiffs do not list particular causes of action as to specific
individuals, but merely state that all plaintiffs suffer from a wide variety of constitutional
depravations SORA has created, from which they request relief. Plaintiffs’ causes of
action are:
1. Due process violations under the Fourteenth Amendment because of SORA’s vagueness, because it subjects sexual offenders “to new restrictions and requirements, regardless of any actual risk to society and without the possibility of any hearing and without any requirement by the State of Idaho to provide offenders with any notice of their classification or any new prohibitions or requirements,” and because it “fails to further any legitimate governmental purpose.” Dkt. 4 ¶¶ 236, 237.
2. Free exercise of religion violations under the First Amendment, “[b]ecause churches and other places of worship fall within the places certain sex offenders may not ‘knowingly be’ within five hundred (500) feet of under
2 The parties utilize SORA, SORNA, “the Act”, “the registry”, and other similar iterations throughout the briefing to reference Title 18, Chapter 83 of the Idaho Code—Idaho’s Sexual Offender Registration Notification and Community Right-to-Know Act. The Court will use “SORA” or “the Act” in reference to this Act.
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[SORA], regardless of the actual known risk posed by these offenders[.]” Id. ¶ 241.
3. Substantive due process violations under the Fourteenth Amendment, because SORA “impinges on their fundamental rights to free association, [to] travel, and to raise their children without undue governmental interference.” Id. ¶ 245.
4. Equal protection violations under the Fourteenth Amendment, because “the Idaho legislature has created two (2) separate but similarly situated groups, one (1) between fourteen (14) and eighteen (18) years of age [subject to the Juvenile Sex Offender Registration Notification and Community Right-toKnow Act (JSORA), Idaho Code §§ 18-8401 to -8414], and one (1) eighteen (18) years of age and older, members of each group having committed and been found guilty of one (1) or more of a group of included criminal offenses.” Id. ¶ 252.
5. Cruel and unusual punishment violations under, the Eighth Amendment, because “anyone convicted of a crime with any ‘sexual element’ or any crime that is considered an ‘aggravated’ offense, no matter when they were convicted, is considered a sex offender under [SORA] and is subject to community notification and registration requirements.” Id. ¶ 259.
6. Ex Post Facto Clause violations under Article I, Section 9, Clause 3, because “[t]he effect and intent of [SORA] are punitive and impose new punishments, including but not limited to the affirmative disability of having to register in person every twelve (12) months, banishment from their families and communities, on offenders convicted before their enactment.” Id. ¶ 263.
7. Double Jeopardy Clause violations under the Fifth Amendment, because SORA “impose[s] new punishments on persons previously convicted, and impose registration duties, community notification, and movement and residence restrictions based on the crime originally committed, rather than any actual risk of recidivism.” Id. ¶ 267.
8. Contracts Clause violations under Article I, Section 10, Clause 1 of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 16 of the Idaho Constitution,3 because SORA “operates as a substantial impairment to the
3 Plaintiffs list their contracts claims as two separate causes of action (Dkt. 4)—one under federal law and one under state law—for simplicity, the Court will combine them here.
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preexisting contractual relationship between the state and Plaintiffs Guilty Plea Agreements by imposing new terms not negotiated which drastically increase, and, or require lifetime supervision, registration and community notification.” Id. ¶ 271.
9. Takings Clause violations under the Fifth Amendment, because SORA places “residential and movement restrictions on Plaintiffs, [and] unconstitutionally restricts Plaintiffs’ property rights to the point that constitutes a regulatory taking requiring just compensation.” Id. ¶ 279.
10. Separation-of-powers violations under Article XI, Section 1 of the Idaho Constitution, because SORA “limits the judicial power of sentence finality as the law vacates existing court judgments regarding sex offenders’ classifications, and community notification and reverses final court judgments setting the length of time that sex offenders must register.” Id. ¶ 283.
11. Police power violations under Article XI, Section 8 of the Idaho Constitution, because John Does 4, 7, 18, 53, 62, 80, 85, 100, 105 and 132 “had been unconditionally released from custody, probation/parole and any sex offender registration requirements prior to the enactment of Idaho SORNA 2001, 2009, 2011” and “were, therefore, not in any special relationship with the government of the State of Idaho at the time of the enactment of SORNA 2001, 2009, 2011.” Id. ¶ 287.
Defendants filed the instant Motion to Dismiss seeking outright dismissal of some
of Plaintiffs’ claims on legal and statutory grounds. As to the remaining claims,
Defendants ask the Court to require Plaintiffs to amend their Complaint to list more “as-
applied” challenges so that Defendants know which individual plaintiffs actually suffered
from which of the alleged constitutional violations.
III. LEGAL STANDARD
A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim challenges the legal sufficiency of
the claims stated in the complaint. Conservation Force v. Salazar, 646 F.3d 1240, 1242
(9th Cir. 2011). “A complaint generally must satisfy the notice pleading requirements of
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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) to avoid dismissal under a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.” Id. (citing Porter v. Jones, 319 F.3d 483, 494 (9th Cir. 2003)). “Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only ‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests,’” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)).
To sufficiently state a claim for relief and survive a 12(b)(6) motion, the pleading “does not need detailed factual allegations;” however, the “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Mere “labels and conclusions” or a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. Rather, there must be “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. In other words, the complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
In light of Twombly and Iqbal, the Ninth Circuit summarized the governing standard as follows: “In sum, for a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss, the nonconclusory factual content, and reasonable inferences from that content, must be plausibly suggestive of a claim entitling the plaintiff to relief.” Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009).
In deciding whether to grant a motion to dismiss, the court must accept as true all well-pleaded factual allegations in the pleading under attack. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 663. A
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court is not, however, “required to accept as true allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001).
When ruling on a motion to dismiss, the court must normally convert a Rule 12(b)(6) motion into one for summary judgment under Rule 56 if the court considers evidence outside of the pleadings. United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 907 (9th Cir. 2003). A court may consider certain materials, such as documents attached to the complaint, documents incorporated by reference in the complaint, or matters of judicial notice, without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. Id. at 908.
In cases decided after Iqbal and Twombly, the Ninth Circuit has continued to adhere to the rule that a dismissal of a complaint without leave to amend is inappropriate unless it is beyond doubt that the complaint could not be saved by an amendment. See Harris v. Amgen, Inc., 573 F.3d 728, 737 (9th Cir. 2009).
IV. ANALYSIS The Court will first address two topics of concern in this case: the distinction between facial and as-applied challenges and the legal doctrine of standing. Next, the Court will analyze the merits of each of Plaintiffs’ claims under a facial theory and an asapplied theory. Finally, the Court will outline the claims it is dismissing, as well as the claims the Court will grant Plaintiffs leave to amend.
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A. FACIAL AND AS-APPLIED CHALLENGES When a petitioner seeks to challenge a statute as unconstitutional there are two types of challenges: “facial challenges” and “as-applied” challenges. Facial challenges seek to have a statute declared unconstitutional “on its face.” This standard presents an extremely high bar because a plaintiff must show that the statute is unconstitutional in all possible applications and situations. See Diaz v. Paterson, 547 F.3d 88, 101 (2d Cir. 2008) (finding “a facial challenge to a legislative Act is . . . the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid.”). In United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987), the United States Supreme Court concluded that facial challenges are extremely difficult to prove and ought to be rare. Id. The justices, however, were deeply divided on what types of constitutional claims would warrant a facial challenge, when a facial challenge becomes ripe, and the level of scrutiny that should be applied to the challenged statute. Id.; See also, Michael C. Dorf, Facial Challenges to State and Federal Statutes, 46 STAN. L. REV. 235, 236 (1994); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., As-Applied and Facial Challenges and Third-Party Standing, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1321, 1322 (2000). While courts and commentators have developed various opinions on how to approach facial challenges—including what degree of deference is given to Salerno—it is clear that in order to succeed on a facial challenge, a plaintiff must show that the law is unconstitutional in not just some, but in all situations:
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Under United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987), a plaintiff can only succeed in a facial challenge by “establish[ing] that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid,” i.e., that the law is unconstitutional in all of its applications. . . . While some Members of the Court have criticized the Salerno formulation, all agree that a facial challenge must fail where the statute has a “‘plainly legitimate sweep.’” Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 449 (2008) (citation omitted) (finding that “[i]n determining whether a law is facially invalid, we must be careful not to go beyond the statute’s facial requirements and speculate about ‘hypothetical’ or ‘imaginary’ cases.”). As-applied challenges, on the other hand, do not look at the text, or face, of the statute, but rather argue that even if a law is valid on its face, it may nonetheless—as the name suggests—be unconstitutionally applied. The question in an as-applied challenge is whether the statute is unconstitutional when applied in a particular case. See Tsirelman v. Daines, 19 F. Supp. 3d 438, 447–48 (E.D.N.Y. 2014), aff’d, 794 F.3d 310 (2d Cir. 2015). Specific facts are critical. As-applied challenges, however, are somewhat of a catch 22. One commentator explains why: Sometimes it is said of a statute which is not void ‘on its face’ that it nevertheless is invalid as applied. This is a malapropism, however, for a provision which is only invalid as applied in the facts of a particular case is possibly capable of valid application in another fact situation. In reality, it is only the implementing action which purports to apply the legislation and not the provision itself which is invalid in such cases.
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1 Sutherland, Statutory Construction (Sands, 4th ed. 1985) § 2.06, pp. 31–32 (footnote omitted).4 This very dichotomy is what puzzles the Court at the outset of this case.
Here, Plaintiffs cannot establish a facial challenge to SORA generally because the law has a “plainly legitimate sweep” and is applicable to thousands of Idahoans who are required to register for a time, but then in due course are no longer required to register. In other words, there are numerous circumstances under which the Act is valid and constitutional. Plaintiffs in this case make up the limited group of offenders who have underlying “aggravated offenses,” or who have been designated recidivists by statute, and thus must register for life. It is only as to these individuals that Plaintiffs’ challenges could apply.5 Plaintiffs, unfortunately, have not pleaded any specific as-applied challenges.6 Therefore, amendment is necessary for the Court to make an appropriate determination as to those claims.
4 Furthermore, as many scholars note, the distinction, if any, between a facial and an as-applied challenge is difficult to explain because there is a disconnect between what the Supreme Court has outlined and what happens in actual practice. See e.g., Gillian E. Metzger, Facial Challenges and Federalism, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 882 (2005). 5 Plaintiffs never address whether their claims are facial or as-applied challenges in their Complaint, nor do they even address this argument in their briefing. While some claims appear to be facial challenges, and some are evidently as-applied challenges, there are no persuasive legal arguments to substantiate the facial challenges and there are no specific facts to support the as-applied challenges. 6 The sole cause of action which lists specific Does is Claim 12 (number 11 in the Court’s list above), which relates to a number of Does who had been discharged from probation—and any registration requirement—but were then “brought back” and required to register. Plaintiffs couch this “bringing back” as an abuse of the police power claim under the Idaho Constitution.
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B. STANDING Fundamentally intertwined with this discussion regarding as-applied challenges is the legal topic of standing. This too is of great concern to the Court. Article III, Section 2 of the United States Constitution “confines the judicial power of federal courts to deciding actual ‘Cases’ or ‘Controversies.’” Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693, 704 (2013). The United States Supreme Court has long held that [t]he irreducible constitutional minimum of standing contains three elements. First, the plaintiff must have suffered an injury in fact—an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical. Second, there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of—the injury has to be fairly . . . trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and not . . . th[e] result [of] the independent action of some third party not before the court. Third, it must be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61(1992) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Here, Plaintiffs have failed to meet the first requirement of standing. As currently pleaded, Plaintiffs have not suffered any injury in fact. With the exception of Plaintiffs’ twelfth cause of action, Plaintiffs have not tied any particular Doe to any particular alleged harm. This is not appropriate. One cannot simply name a large group of Plaintiffs, allege a dozen causes of actions, and expect the Court to figure out which plaintiffs have suffered which harms.7
7 At oral argument, Plaintiffs’ counsel asserted that the Court can be “aware” of the claims Plaintiffs are asserting because one only need look at a plaintiff and see his conviction to know
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Plaintiffs allege that all of them have suffered from certain aspects of SORA generally—such as the reporting requirements, or the negative aspects of public registration—however, these generalizations only give Plaintiffs standing for facial challenges, if even that. As currently pleaded, Plaintiffs’ do not have standing for any asapplied challenges.8
The broad allegations of Plaintiffs’ Complaint fail as a matter of law—most have already been litigated and denied in prior cases—and without any as-applied challenges, the Court can only speculate as to what harms have actually occurred in this case. This is one of the main reasons the Court will dismiss with leave to amend. Plaintiffs have set this case up as a quasi-class action by listing 134 plaintiffs. While possibly done for emphasis, the Court instead needs accuracy.
that a constitutional violation had occurred. Counsel asserted that certain claims “speak for [themselves],” that the “factors have been met,” and that there was no need to “go into depth” or give details concerning any particular claim. To the contrary, this is what Plaintiffs need to do. It is not the Court’s job to parse through the Complaint to determine the relationship of any Doe to any claim. As the Ninth Circuit has observed, this type of approach is not appropriate.
When reading [plaintiff’s] brief, one wonders if [plaintiff], in its own version of the “spaghetti approach,” has heaved the entire contents of a pot against the wall in hopes that something would stick. We decline, however, to sort through the noodles in search of [plaintiff’s] claim.
As the Seventh Circuit observed in its now familiar maxim, “[j]udges are not like pigs, hunting for truffles buried in briefs.” Indep. Towers of Washington v. Washington, 350 F.3d 925, 929 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal citations omitted). 8 Because the Court will dismiss all facial challenges, Plaintiffs must therefore establish standing as to each as-applied challenge that they seek to raise.
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As outlined below, the Court will dismiss all of Plaintiffs’ facial challenges to SORA. Plaintiffs cannot meet their burden of proving that SORA is unconstitutional in all its applications—or that any of the identified provisions or requirements are unconstitutional in all circumstances. Additionally, the Court will dismiss some claims without leave to amend because they fail to state a valid as-applied challenge, or no asapplied challenge is legally cognizable.
Finally, the Court will dismiss the remaining claims in order for Plaintiffs to amend their Complaint and state valid as-applied challenges tying specific Plaintiffs to specific causes of action. After amendment, the Court will be able to concretely determine standing and assess whether the amended complaint can survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.
The Court next turns to the merits of Plaintiffs’ Complaint. C. PLAINTIFFS’ CLAIMS There is no shortage of United States Supreme Court cases, Ninth Circuit Cases, Federal District Cases, and (for the purposes of this case) Idaho State cases that discuss the constitutionally of sex offender registration acts. Although there have been minor deviations for certain fact specific circumstances, the vast majority of these opinions have upheld the various acts as constitutional. Plaintiffs and Defendants have taken different approaches on how they elected to group the claims in this case. To avoid confusion, the Court will simply address each
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claim one by one and discuss its validity as a facial challenge and then as an as-applied
challenge.
The outcome of Claim 6 is determinative as to several of the other “punishment”
based claims; therefore, the Court will address it first. The Court will then take up the
remaining claims in numerical order.
CLAIM 6 – EX POST FACTO
Ex Post Facto Clause violations under Article I, Section 9, Clause 3, because “[t]he effect and intent of [SORA] are punitive and impose new punishments, including but not limited to the affirmative disability of having to register in person every twelve (12) months, banishment from their families and communities, on offenders convicted before their enactment.” Dkt. 4, ¶ 263.
1. Facial Challenge
In this cause of action, Plaintiffs’ state that SORA violates the Ex Post Facto Clause
of the United States Constitution (Article I, Section 9, Clause 3) because the law is
retroactive and punishment based. The United States Supreme Court in Smith v. Doe,
rejected this exact ex post facto challenge to the Alaska Sex Offender Registration Act and
courts have relied on its analysis in virtually all subsequent cases that have dealt with sex
offender registration act challenges.
The framework for our inquiry . . . is well established. We must “ascertain whether the legislature meant the statute to establish ‘civil’ proceedings.” If the intention of the legislature was to impose punishment, that ends the inquiry. If, however, the intention was to enact a regulatory scheme that is civil and nonpunitive, we must further examine whether the statutory scheme is “ ‘so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate [the State’s] intention’ to deem it ‘civil.’ ”
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538 U.S. 84, 92 (2003) (internal citations omitted). Ultimately in Smith, the Court found that creating a law that alerts the public to the risk of sex offenders in their community is legitimate and nonpunitive in nature. Neither the purpose, nor the effect, was unconstitutional. See generally id.
Like Plaintiffs in this case, the Plaintiff in Smith argued that the state cannot group people together to make blanket determinations. Id. at 102-03. The Supreme Court disagreed. In response to the argument that specific classes of individuals, such as those convicted of certain offenses, were targeted by Alaska’s SORA and subjected to unfair treatment, the Supreme Court reasoned that “the Ex Post Facto Clause does not preclude a State from making reasonable categorical judgments that conviction of specified crimes should entail particular regulatory consequences.” Id. at 103–04. The Court also reiterated that “the State’s determination to legislate with respect to convicted sex offenders as a class, rather than require individual determination of their dangerousness, does not make the statute a punishment under the Ex Post Facto Clause.” Id.
Following Smith v. Doe, numerous Circuits have taken up related issues regarding the constitutionality of sex offender registration acts and various tangential arguments put forth by various plaintiffs in an effort to distinguish Smith and have their particular state’s act deemed unconstitutional as an ex post facto violation. Effectively, all of these arguments have failed. Two of particular note—because plaintiffs raise the same arguments here—are Litmon v. Harris and U.S. v. Elk Shoulder.
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In Litmon v. Harris, the Ninth Circuit rejected an ex post facto challenge to a California statute which required lifetime in-person reporting by sexually violent predators. 768 F.3d 1237, 1243 (9th Cir. 2014). The Litmon Court explained “[t]here is no reason to believe that the addition of such a requirement would have changed the outcome [of Smith]. In fact, we held in ACLU of Nevada v. Masto, that an in-person, 90– day, lifetime registration requirement for the highest level sex offenders does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause.” Id. at 1243.
In U.S. v. Elk Shoulder, the Ninth Circuit rejected an ex post facto argument challenging SORNA (the federal version of a sex offender registration act). 738 F.3d 948, 954 (9th Cir. 2013). In that case, the petitioner sought to distinguish Smith arguing that he faced difficulty finding and maintaining housing and employment because his name and address, along with all other offenders’, were listed on the internet. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the requirement was nonpunitive because its intent was not to humiliate, but rather to inform the public for its own safety. Id. at 954.
Plaintiffs in this case have put forth identical arguments concerning lifetime reporting and internet publicity, but have not presented any facts or evidence indicating why the Court should treat this case any different from Litmon or Elk Shoulder. Under binding Ninth Circuit precedents, the Court can only come to one conclusion. These arguments are unavailing.
Idaho Courts have also rejected so called “shunning” arguments, State v. Gragg, 137 P.3 461 (Idaho Ct. App. 2005), as well as arguments concerning adverse employment
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impacts, id., the lifetime requirement for aggravated offenses, Groves v. State, 328 P.3d 532 (Idaho Ct. App. 2014), and numerous other challenges. Each has failed. The Idaho Supreme Court has uniformly found that SORA is regulatory in nature and the requirements therein valid. See e.g., Ray v. State, 982 P.2d 931 (Idaho1999); State v. Johnson, 266 P.3d 1146 (Idaho 2011); Knox v. State, 404 P.3d 1280 (Idaho 2017); Bottum v. Idaho State Police, Bureau of Criminal Identification Cent. Sex Offender Registry, 296 P.3d 388 (Idaho 2013).
Smith, its Ninth Circuit progeny, and relevant Idaho State cases have laid to rest all of Plaintiffs’ Ex Post Facto Clause arguments. Each Court that has addressed the issue has found the challenged requirements to be nonpunitive, regulatory in nature, and has upheld them as constitutional.
Plaintiffs rely on Does #1-5 v. Snyder, a 2017 Sixth Circuit case, to illustrate that, as set forth in Smith v. Doe, even if a court concludes the intent of a law is civil, if its effects are punitive, it can still violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. 834 F.3d 696, 701 (6th Cir. 2016). The specific provision challenged in Snyder prohibited all registrants from “living, working, or loitering within 1,000 feet of a school.” Id. at 698. Relying on experts who provided real property maps of parts of Michigan, the Court noted that particularly in densely populated areas, the 1,000 foot restriction cut out entire portions of town and essentially banished registrants. Id. at 703.
While instructive, the Court notes three things. First, the Sixth Circuit admitted that it was splitting a fine hair because it first found that intent of the challenged SORA
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was not punitive, id. at 701, but that the effects of the specific provision nonetheless imposed a form of punishment and were unconstitutional, id. at 705-06. Second, the restrictions at issue in Snyder were larger than their Idaho counterparts9 and, consequently, distinguishable. Third, the Ninth Circuit has yet to find any provision (that this Court is aware of) in any challenged SORA as punitive or an Ex Post Facto Clause violation. The Court does not make a contrary finding today. Absent applicable precedential case law, the Snyder case is simply informative.
In short, while all of these problems and challenges offenders face as a result of having to register may be real, and to some degree infringe upon certain rights, those concerns do not trump the community safety considerations that form the basis of the civil, regulatory requirements outlined in SORA. Plaintiffs have failed to explain how this case differs from any of the previous challenges. Facially, this argument fails.
2. As-Applied Challenge Because, as stated in Smith, “only the clearest proof will suffice to override legislative intent and transform what has been denominated a civil remedy into a criminal penalty,” 538 U.S. at 92, the Court is doubtful that any challenge, even as-applied, could overcome the high burden required to state a valid Ex Post Facto cause of action.
9 For example, the Idaho statute mandates a smaller restricted zone (500 feet, rather than 1,000) and provides for more exceptions than are available in Michigan. See Idaho Code § 18-8329.
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However, because Plaintiffs have failed to lay out any specifics, the Court will grant leave to amend so Plaintiffs can identify explicitly how, as to any particular Doe, SORA is an Ex Post Facto Clause violation in his or her circumstance.10
CLAIM 1 – DUE PROCESS (Vagueness) Due process violations under the Fourteenth Amendment, because of SORA’s vagueness, and because it subjects sexual offenders “to new restrictions and requirements, regardless of any actual risk to society and without the possibility of any hearing and without any requirement by the State of Idaho to provide offenders with any notice of their classification or any new prohibitions or requirements” and because it “fails to further any legitimate governmental purpose.” Dkt. 4 ¶¶ 236, 237. 1. Facial Challenge The Court notes that certain allegations raised in this claim would fall under the analysis outlined in the previous section. For example, the Court has already addressed arguments regarding “new restrictions,” and requirements based upon “classification,” which Plaintiffs repeat here. Both fail as a matter of law.
10 Some of Plaintiffs’ examples of “punishment” would still be barred (even if raised individually) as the Ninth Circuit has already directly addressed them. For example, Plaintiffs complain about having to register in person every twelve months. The Ninth Circuit has already held that a 90-day registration requirement does not implicate any fundamental rights, and did not violate the Ex Post Facto or Double Jeopardy clauses. Litman v. Harris. It is somewhat disingenuous, and a waste of the Court’s time, for Plaintiffs to assert claims which Ninth Circuit case law clearly bars. Plaintiffs need to identify specific Does and specific harms (not already ruled upon) and present those for the Court’s consideration. Like in Snyder, Plaintiffs need to be identifiable and specific.
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Two other SORA provisions that Plaintiffs challenge on vagueness grounds are the reporting requirements in Idaho Code section 18-8305 and the term “loiter” in section 18-8329(1)(b). Dkt. 4, ¶ 193-95.
a. Reporting requirements First, Idaho Code section 18-8305(1)(g) requires the registrant to provide “[t]he name and address of any place where the offender is a student or will be a student unless the offender is only participating in courses remotely through the mail or the internet.” Section 18-8305(1)(k) requires the registrant to provide: [t]he name and address of any place where the offender is employed or will be employed and the name and address of any place where the offender works as a volunteer or otherwise works without remuneration or if the offender does not have a fixed place of employment, a description of normal travel routes or the general areas in which the offender works. Plaintiffs contend that the requirements are so vague they cannot understand what is actually required. A statute is impermissibly vague if it “fails to provide a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited, or is so standardless that it authorizes or encourages seriously discriminatory enforcement.” United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008). The United States Supreme Court has found that when a statute “interferes with the right of free speech or of association, a more stringent vagueness test should apply.” Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 499 (1982). “But ‘perfect clarity and precise guidance have never been required even of regulations that restrict expressive activity.’” Williams, 553 U.S. at 304
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(quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 794 (1989); see also, Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 18-19 (2010).
In the case of SORA, these reporting obligations are in fact quite specific on their face, and thus do not implicate Due Process vagueness concerns. While these requirements demand a lot of information from offenders, they are not discriminatory, nor do they restrict any activity simply as a result of their function.
b. Loiter Next, Plaintiffs’ argue that because SORA does not define “loiter”—but nonetheless holds Plaintiffs strictly liable under this section—it is impermissible. A statute is not vague if it “gives a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated activity is forbidden.” United States v. Spencer, 839 F.2d 1341, 1344 (9th Cir. 1988). Additionally, when addressing terms in a statute, absent indications of a contrary purpose, a Court must give terms their ordinary meaning. Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Ada Cty., 849 P.2d 83, 88 (Idaho 1993). Here, it is clear that an offender cannot: Knowingly loiter on a public way within five hundred (500) feet from the property line of school grounds in this state, including properties posted with a notice that they are used by a school, when children under the age of eighteen (18) years are present and are involved in a school activity or when children are present within thirty (30) minutes before or after a scheduled school activity. Idaho Code § 18-8329(1)(b). Although only a single word is challenged, the Court must look to see if the prohibited behavior is well defined. “In an as-applied challenge, a
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statute is void for vagueness (and thus unconstitutional under due process) if the statute “(1) does not define the conduct it prohibits with sufficient definiteness and (2) does not establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement.” United States v. Wyatt, 408 F.3d 1257, 1260 (9th Cir. 2005) (emphasis added).
SORA’s loitering prohibition complies with both requirements. As outlined above, the statute sufficiently defines the prohibited behavior, albeit not the exact word. The word, “loiter” is given its ordinary meaning. The statute also outlines exceptions, as well as punishments for violating the rule. See Idaho Code § 18-8329(2)(a)-(f).
Plaintiffs have not met their burden of showing any vagueness on the face of SORA—with regard to the reporting requirements and the term “loiter.”
c. Other challenges Additionally, insofar as Plaintiffs allege that SORA, and/or any specific restriction, “fails to further any legitimate governmental purpose,” as will be addressed in more detail regarding Claim 3, “to withstand Fourteenth Amendment scrutiny, a statute is required to bear only a rational relationship to a legitimate state interest, unless it makes a suspect classification or implicates a fundamental right.” Nat’l Ass’n for Advancement of Psychoanalysis v. California Bd. of Psychology, 228 F.3d 1043, 1049 (9th Cir. 2000). As the Court explained in regards to Claim 6, SORA and its provisions serve a legitimate state interest: protection of society. As will be explained in detail in upcoming sections, sex offenders are not a suspect class and SORA does not implicate any fundamental rights. This claim is facially barred.
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On a related note, in Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint (Dkt. 4), in between the factual allegation subheading and the causes of action section there is a section entitled: “IX. The Actions Of The Legislature In Amending The Sex Offender Registry In 2009 Represent A Violation Of All Registrants’ Rights To Due Process.” Although not officially listed as a claim, the assertions in these paragraphs are not, strictly speaking, covered in Plaintiffs’ Due Process claims (Claim 1 and Claim 3). Insofar as this is a general Procedure Due Process challenge, the Court notes that the analysis of the other claims is sufficiently analogous to illustrate why this claim cannot withstand scrutiny.
Under Procedural Due Process standards, Plaintiffs’ claim would fail,11 but more on point, the United States Supreme Court in Connecticut Department of Public Safety v. Doe, and the Ninth Circuit in Doe v. Tandeske, have already ruled upon this very issue. In both cases, the courts found that classification based registration requirements were valid, that registrants were not entitled to an opportunity to be heard on an individual basis, and that this type of regulatory structure did not violate Procedural Due Process rights. See generally, Connecticut Department of Public Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1 (2003); Doe v. Tandeske, 361 F.3d 594 (9th Cir. 2004).
11 See Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. 216, 220 (2011) and Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). These cases outline a two-step process for Due Process challenges: whether there exists a liberty or property interest of which a person has been deprived, and if so, whether the procedures followed by the State were constitutionally sufficient. Under this analysis, as outlined in other sections in this decision, Plaintiffs’ claim would be unsuccessful.
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The State has met their burden to avoid a facial or as-applied Procedural Due Process challenge. The enactment of SORA was constitutionally sufficient. “When a state alters a state-conferred property right through the legislative process, ‘the legislative determination provides all the process that is due.’” Rea v. Matteucci, 121 F.3d 483, 485 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 433, (1982) (emphasis added). Furthermore, a legitimate interest is present and the State applied SORA in a non-discriminatory fashion. The State can also enforce specific requirements based upon certain group classifications without making any individualized assessments.
2. As-Applied Challenge Plaintiffs have not identified any specific Does who were injured as a result of the reporting requirement or the alleged vagueness of the term “loiter.” Therefore, dismissal with leave to amend is appropriate as to those specific challenges. Under settled precedent, however, even an as-applied challenge to Procedural Due Process (as a whole) would fail. Therefore, the Court will not grant leave to amend this “claim.”12
12 At the conclusion of this decision, the Court will outline which claims it is dismissing outright and which claims it will grant Plaintiffs leave to amend. Even then, because Plaintiffs’ causes of action are so broad, a “claim” such as Due Process may appear multiple times. The Court expects Plaintiffs to use reasoned judgment and understand that even if the Court does not list every claim that has some elements of that particular cause of action, this does not mean that Plaintiffs can amend it. Case-in-point: Procedural Due Process. Plaintiffs have sprinkled this broad constitutional topic throughout two or three of their claims (and as noted, not in a claim at all). The Court here has determined that no Procedural Due Process claim may proceed— facially or
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CLAIM 2 – FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION Free exercise of religion violations under the First Amendment, “[b]ecause churches and other places of worship fall within the places certain sex offenders may not ‘knowingly be’ within five hundred (500) feet of under [SORA], regardless of the actual known risk posed by these offenders[.]” Dkt. 4, ¶ 241. 1. Facial Challenge This claim is tenuous at best. Broadly speaking, it operates under the assumption that a church or place of worship could be located within 500 feet of a school, park, or place children frequent (i.e. a place where a registered offended cannot be), and, as a result, the offender would have to choose between violating SORA and being able to exercise his or her First Amendment right to freedom of religion. Facially, SORA is valid; the regulation to stay 500 feet from certain locations is regulatory and numerous churches and places of worship in Idaho do not fall within this restricted zone (i.e. there is a set of facts that exists under which the Act is valid). This appears to be one of the “hypothetical or imaginary cases” the Court should not endeavor to speculate on. 2. As-Applied Challenge As-applied, Plaintiffs have not identified a single example of this happening (a person’s religious building being located in a restricted zone and therefore unavailable to
as-applied—therefore, regardless of where it appears, the Court will not allow any amendment on that topic.
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them); however, even if a specific example was present, the Court would have to look outside SORA for a determination on this claim.
In 2000, Idaho enacted the Free Exercise of Religion Protected Act (“FERPA”), largely mirroring the 1993 federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”). Idaho Code § 73-401 et sec. FERPA protects the free exercise of religion in Idaho and mandates that the government cannot substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion. Idaho Code § 73-402(1)-(2).
Under FERPA, any state law that is “enacted or adopted on or after the effective date of this chapter [is] subject to this chapter unless the law explicitly excludes application by reference to this chapter.” Id. at § 73-403(2). SORA was enacted (at least the 2001, 2009, and 2011 amendments at issue here) after FERPA, and SORA does not enumerate FERPA as an exclusion. Plaintiffs are essentially claiming that the provisions of SORA run contrary to FERPA.
FERPA outlines that the government may only burden a person’s free exercise of religion if the burden is essential to furthering a compelling government interest and the burden is the least restrictive means of furthering that interest. Idaho Code § 73402(3)(a)-(b).
The Court has already determined the SORA’s provisions serve a compelling government interest: the protection of society. Second, this 500 foot restriction appears to be the least restrictive means to accomplish that goal.
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Lastly, when challenges to enacted laws arise, the Court must give deference to the government and presume that they acted in accordance with all relevant statutes (FERPA) and constitutional provisions (the First Amendment). See e.g., Angov v. Lynch, 788 F.3d 893, 905 (9th Cir. 2015).
The Court will allow Plaintiffs to amend this claim. Plaintiffs must provide specific facts for an as-applied challenge, but must also address FERPA, specifically what, if anything, rebuts the presumption that the State enacted SORA in accordance with FERPA’s requirements and thus SORA cannot violate the Free Exercise Clause as a matter of state law.
CLAIM 3 – DUE PROCESS (Free association/ travel) Substantive due process violations under the Fourteenth Amendment, because SORA “impinges on their fundamental rights to free association, [to] travel, and to raise their children without undue governmental interference.” Dkt. 4, ¶ 245. 1. Facial Challenge Continuing the discussion from Claim 1, Plaintiffs must identify which fundamental rights SORA has burdened in order to bring a valid Fourteenth Amendment claim. Because strict scrutiny analysis applies to statutes that infringe upon a fundamental right, Courts have outlined which rights are truly fundamental: “the right to marry, to have children, to direct the education and upbringing of one’s children, to marital privacy, to use contraception, to bodily integrity, to abortion, and to refuse unwanted lifesaving medical treatment.” United States v. Juvenile Male, 670 F.3d 999, 1012 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 727 (1997)).
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In this case, Plaintiffs’ contend that: Idaho SORNA 2001, 2009, 2011, impacts the plaintiffs’ ability to travel throughout Idaho, attend church or other religious services, go to Court or attorney offices, parent their children, and live with their families. Idaho SORNA 2001, 2009, 2011 impinges on their fundamental rights to free association, travel, and to raise their children without undue governmental interference. Dkt. 4, ¶ 245. In Doe v. Tandeske, the Ninth Circuit found that individuals convicted of serious sex offenses did not have a fundamental right to be free from sex offender registration requirements or regulations, and that such requirements serve “a legitimate nonpunitive purpose of public safety, which is advanced by alerting the public to the risk of sex offenders in their community.” 361 F.3d 594, 597 (9th Cir. 2004). Here, Plaintiffs cannot mount a successful facial challenge as they have not alleged, nor could they, that all registrants have suffered all of the purported harms. Furthermore, under United States v. Juvenile Male and Doe v. Tandeske, none of the “rights” Plaintiffs’ allege are fundamental rights demanding strict scrutiny analysis. Plaintiffs simply state that SORA “impacts” them in negative ways. As has already been discussed, while the outcome of certain regulations may negatively affect a person socially, economically, or even legally, the Court must weigh any competing interests. Time and time again, Courts have found that the protection of society outweighs any inconvenience or diminution in rights suffered by registrants. Common arguments in this area are that the registration requirements are embarrassing, invasive, and burdensome. These challenges, however, have been unavailing as none are based on recognized fundamental rights. Facially, this challenge fails.
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2. As-Applied Challenge Plaintiffs’ broad assertions have a questionable connection at best to protected fundamental rights,13 but without details related to specific Does, Plaintiffs cannot establish a valid claim. The Court will dismiss with leave to amend. CLAIM 4 – EQUAL PROTECTION (Disparity in treatment) Equal protection violations under the Fourteenth Amendment, because “the Idaho legislature has created two (2) separate but similarly situated groups, one (1) between fourteen (14) and eighteen (18) years of age [subject to the Juvenile Sex Offender Registration Notification and Community Right-toKnow Act (JSORA), Idaho Code §§ 18-8401 to -8414], and one (1) eighteen (18) years of age and older, members of each group having committed and been found guilty of one (1) or more of a group of included criminal offenses.” Dkt. 4, ¶ 252. 1. Facial Challenge The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires the application of strict scrutiny to any law if the aggrieved party is a member of a protected or suspect class, or otherwise suffers the unequal burdening of a fundamental right. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 439–40 (1985). Here, Plaintiffs are not members of a suspect or protected class, and as was just addressed, no fundamental rights are at issue. Plaintiffs claim that in Idaho there exists a disparity in treatment between juvenile sex offenders and adult sex offenders. This argument fails, however, because 1) sex
13 The only claims of Plaintiffs that touch upon fundamental rights are the assertions regarding parenting their children and raising their children without undue governmental interference.
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offenders are not a suspect class, 2) age is not a suspect class, and 3) these two groups are not similarly situated. Equal Protection analysis simply does not apply.
The Ninth Circuit has previously rejected the argument that sex offenders are a suspect or protected class. United States v. LeMay, 260 F.3d 1018, 1030–31 (9th Cir.2001). Further, the United States Supreme Court has determined that “age is not a suspect classification under the Equal Protection Clause.” Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 470 (1991) (citing City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 441) (“We have declined, however, to extend heightened review to differential treatment based on age.”). Finally, the Supreme Court held in Roper v. Simmons that juveniles and adults are not similarly situated, particularly in the context of sexual offenses, and can therefore be treated differently. 543 U.S. 551, 569-70 (2005).
Because Plaintiffs in this case have failed to establish membership in a recognized protected class, and because a statute, like SORA, can treat juveniles and adults differently,14 the Court must dismiss Plaintiffs’ facial Equal Protection claim.
2. As-Applied Challenge The above analysis applies to as-applied challenges as well. Because Plaintiffs are not a protected class, and because there is a valid reason for treating age groups
14 The Court notes that in reality minors are subject to JSORA (the Juvenile version of SORA) because the Court sentences them under a different code section than adults who are subsequently subject to SORA. This too is an indication that adults and juveniles are not similarly situated under Idaho statutes and can be treated differently.
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differently, even an individual as-applied challenge on this basis is legally barred. The Court will not grant leave to amend Claim 4.
CLAIM 5 – CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT Cruel and unusual punishment violations under the Eighth Amendment, because “anyone convicted of a crime with any ‘sexual element’ or any crime that is considered an ‘aggravated’ offense, no matter when they were convicted, is considered a sex offender under [SORA] and is subject to community notification and registration requirements.” Dkt. 4, ¶ 259. 1. Facial Challenge Here again, the Court incorporates the Ex Post Facto Clause analysis. The regulations do not constitute punishment nor are the specific requirements alleged here— community notification and lifetime registration for aggravated offenses—criminal. They are statutory creations which other petitioners have tried to challenge in other courts and been unsuccessful. There is no reason to treat this challenge any differently. Numerous courts have held that SORA statutes “do[] not meet the high standard of cruel and unusual punishment.” United States v. Juvenile Male, 670 F.3d 999, 1010 (9th Cir. 2012). As has been discussed, registration requirements are not punitive, let alone do they constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Moreover, the Ninth Circuit has held that “the broad categories of offenses differentiated in the Act and the corresponding length of the reporting requirement, are
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reasonably related to the danger of recidivism,15 and this is consistent with the regulatory objective.” Tandeske, 361 F.3d at 597 (citing Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. at 87 (internal quotation marks omitted).
2. As-Applied Challenge Plaintiffs have a tough road to plow to mount a successful as-applied challenge on their punishment based claims (Claims 5, 6, 7, 10, 11). The Court has cited cases that foreclose comparable challenges as those brought by Plaintiffs. Some of those cases dealt with facial challenges, some with as-applied challenges, and some with both. By allowing amendment for these as-applied punishment challenges, the Court is not prescreening or opining that any will be availing; the Court is allowing amendment primarily because Plaintiffs pleaded no as-applied challenges so the Court does not know if any exist in Idaho.16
15 Plaintiffs have a continuing challenge throughout their briefing concerning the idea that recidivism is an appropriate metric for evaluating and classifying offenders. Plaintiffs provide extensive research and commentary supporting the proposition that assumptions about recidivism are incorrect, that statistical analysis in this area is flawed, and that regulations based upon such a premise miss the mark. The Court finds this data interesting, but under the facial challenge analysis, only looks at whether a set of circumstances exists in which the law is constitutional. Even assuming that a better method is out there for classifying people, this would not change the fact that the regulatory scheme as currently written is nonetheless still constitutional. 16 Specifically, in regards to Plaintiffs’ cruel and unusual punishment claim, the Court recognizes that the Idaho Court of Appeals recently addressed this exact constitutional challenge in State v. Kinney, No. 44752, 2018 WL 1598914 (Idaho Ct. App. Apr. 3, 2018). That case most likely forecloses the challenge here. As noted, however, because Plaintiffs have not plead any specific facts and the Court is granting leave to amend this claim, the Court will discuss the implications of State v. Kinney once Plaintiffs have amended their Complaint.
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Additionally, even if the Court grants leave to amend particular claims, Plaintiffs are not required to do so. If Plaintiffs brought a challenge primarily on a facial basis, they can simply let that claim go; Plaintiffs do not need to conjure up an as-applied claim where none exists.
Similar to Claim 6, the Court will grant leave to amend on this claim so that Plaintiffs can identify any particular Does and specifically how SORA has resulted in cruel and unusual punishment in his or her circumstance.
CLAIM 7 – DOUBLE JEOPARDY Double Jeopardy Clause violations under the Fifth Amendment, because SORA “impose[s] new punishments on persons previously convicted, and impose registration duties, community notification, and movement and residence restrictions based on the crime originally committed, rather than any actual risk of recidivism.” Dkt. 4, ¶ 267. 1. Facial Challenge The Court reincorporates the Ex Post Facto Clause analysis here as well. Specifically, the Ninth Circuit has held that “the inquiry into whether a law constitutes retroactive punishment in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause is identical to that with respect to the Ex Post Facto Clause.” Litmon, 768 F.3d at 1242. Plaintiffs have not meet their burden to mount a successful facial challenge based upon the Ex Post Facto Clause therefore their Double Jeopardy facial challenge fails as well.
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2. As-Applied Challenge Similar to Claims 5 and 6, the Court will grant leave to amend in order for Plaintiffs to identify a specific Doe whose Fifth Amendment rights were violated by Idaho SORA. If none exists, Plaintiffs need not revise this claim. CLAIM 8 – CONTRACTS CLAIMS Contracts Clause violations under Article I, Section 10, Clause 1 of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 16 of the Idaho Constitution, because SORA “operates as a substantial impairment to the preexisting contractual relationship between the State and Plaintiffs Guilty Plea Agreements by imposing new terms not negotiated which drastically increase, and, or require lifetime supervision, registration and community notification.” Dkt. 4, ¶ 271. 1. Facial Challenge The Court incorporates the prior sections addressing the Ex Post Facto Clause and Due Process challenges in relation to the “retroactive punishment” aspect of this claim, and the forthcoming discussion in Claim 10 regarding “new terms.” The Court simply adds that a petitioner has tried to assert a similar type of contract argument before and failed. See Maciel v. Cate, 731 F.3d 928 (9th Cir. 2013). Plaintiffs have not presented anything that would distinguish this case from what the Ninth Circuit has already decided, which is binding on this Court. Additionally, as a general rule, requiring compliance with changes in a law made retroactive to an individual does not violate the terms of a defendant’s plea agreement. See Doe v. Harris, 302 P.3d 598, 605 (Cal. 2013). Similarly, the fact that a plea
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agreement does not specifically reference something (usually unforeseeable) does not negate its efficacy. Id.
In summary, even if SORA’s requirements are “new terms” or new requirements not contemplated for in a Defendant’s plea agreement (contract), the State can apply SORA retroactively without “breaking” or altering the individual’s agreement. Additionally, these alleged contracts violations would not apply to an offender whose conviction was not the product of a plea deal. Facially, the Court must dismiss this challenge.
2. As-Applied Challenge The Court will dismiss this claim with leave to amend so Plaintiffs can identify a specific Doe who has suffered the alleged contractual harm. CLAIM 9 – TAKINGS Takings Clause violations under the Fifth Amendment, because SORA places “residential and movement restrictions on Plaintiffs, [and] unconstitutionally restricts Plaintiffs’ property rights to the point that constitutes a regulatory taking requiring just compensation.” Dkt. 4, ¶ 279. 1. Facial Challenge At this point, the Court can only surmise how SORA, or any of its requirements, would constitute a taking that would require government compensation. There is no facial challenge Plaintiffs could make as the residential restrictions cannot negatively affect all offenders in the way suggested, once again indicating that the law is not unconstitutional in all situations. The Court will dismiss this facial challenge.
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2. As-Applied Challenge The only as-applied theory Plaintiffs could raise (which Defendants point out) is that someone may have somehow “lost” the value of their home because of certain SORA restrictions—an inverse condemnation theory. The Court cannot contemplate a scenario in which a person would lose the entire value of their home—especially considering the numerous exceptions in the statute—but assuming arguendo that an as-applied situation like this does exist, Supreme Court precedence most likely forecloses the claim. Under Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172 (1985), in order to obtain just compensation for a taking, the claim must be ripe. In order for a takings claim to be ripe, a plaintiff must demonstrate that “the government entity charged with implementing the regulations has reached a final decision regarding the application of the regulations to the property at issue. . . . Second, the plaintiff must have sought, and been denied, compensation through the procedures the State has provided for doing so.” Colony Cove Properties, LLC v. City of Carson, 640 F.3d 948, 958 (9th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted). Here, Plaintiffs have not alleged that anyone has met these two requirements sufficient to establish a ripe takings claim. The Court will not grant Plaintiffs leave to amend this claim. In the unlikely event that some Doe is in this position: has had a final determination by the State, has exhausted his administrative remedies, and has a ripe takings claim, the Court would reconsider this part of its decision.
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CLAIM 10 – STATE SEPARATION OF POWERS Separation-of-powers violations under Article XI, Section 1 of the Idaho Constitution, because SORA “limits the judicial power of sentence finality as the law vacates existing court judgments regarding sex offenders’ classifications, and community notification and reverses final court judgments setting the length of time that sex offenders must register.” Dkt. 4, ¶ 283. 1. Facial Challenge The Court reincorporates the same discussion here that it has reiterated with all other punishment-based causes of action. The assertion that final sentences imposed before the enactment of SORA act as a bar to future civil requirements, such as registration, is baseless. Courts have held that “the registration requirement [is] a nonpunitive regulatory measure . . . not part of [defendants] sentence and thus need not be included in the court’s judgment.” Maciel, 731 F.3d at 935. SORA did not change Plaintiffs’ sentences, nor have any “final court orders,” as Plaintiff calls them, been reversed. SORA imposes a duty to register on individuals. The duties and requirements of SORA are separate from Plaintiffs’ convictions, and as the Court has noted, are regulatory penalties, i.e. civil, not criminal. The Court will dismiss this facial challenge. 2. As-Applied Challenge Plaintiffs have not raised any as-applied challenge, so the Court will grant Plaintiffs leave to amend to provide further details if such a claim exists. CLAIM 11 – STATE POLICE POWERS Police power violations under Article XI, Section 8 of the Idaho Constitution, because John Does 4, 7, 18, 53, 62, 80, 85, 100, 105 and 132 “had been unconditionally released from custody, probation/parole and any sex
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offender registration requirements prior to the enactment of Idaho SORNA 2001, 2009, 2011” and “were, therefore, not in any special relationship with the government of the State of Idaho at the time of the enactment of SORNA 2001, 2009, 2011.” Dkt. 4, ¶ 287. 1. Facial Challenge This final punishment-based challenge fails facially for the same reasons the Ex Post Facto Clause challenge failed. SORA’s requirements are not punitive or retaliatory. The claim here seems to be that once SORA was enacted, certain individuals, all of whom had previously been required to register—but were no longer under any reporting requirements—were “brought back” and required to re-register. Because the State had previously released them, Plaintiffs contend the State did not have any legal authority to require them to re-register. This argument is a stretch. To imply that a state cannot police its citizens generally is a fallacy. But to say—in essence—that a state cannot enact and then enforce its own statutes or laws is wholly inaccurate. Even though the State of Idaho had previously released these individuals from probation or other reporting requirements, as has been noted numerous times, the Supreme Court has already determined that a state can apply SORAs retroactively. In summary, even though Idaho “brought back” these Plaintiffs after releasing them, this requirement to re-register does not constitute a violation of the statute or any other constitutional provision. Additionally, Plaintiffs seem to be quoting an inapplicable statute. Article XI of the Idaho Constitution applies to private and public corporations. Section 8 does have to do with the police power, but only as applied to corporations. It states “the police powers of the state shall never be abridged or so construed as to permit corporations to conduct
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their business in such manner as to infringe the equal rights of individuals, or the general well-being of the state.” Id. (emphasis added).
Even construing this claim broadly, taking into account the Court’s analysis on all other claims that outline the State’s valid and constitutional reasons for enacting SORA, there has been no violation of the police power. The Court will dismiss this facial challenge.
2. As-Applied Challenge The same analysis would apply to an as-applied challenge. Reference to a corporate section of the Idaho Constitution is insufficient to support a facial or as-applied challenge based upon a police power argument. The Court will not allow amendment on this claim.
V. CONCLUSION Upon review, the Court has no choice but to dismiss each claim when viewed as a facial challenge. In every situation, Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that “no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid.” The Act itself is valid and each challenged provision or requirement is valid and applicable in numerous circumstances. The Court cannot find as a matter of law that Idaho SORA, in whole or in part, is facially unconstitutional. The Court must next analyze whether SORA is unconstitutional as to any particular person. This requires specific facts. Plaintiffs must plead as-applied challenges so that the Court can properly establish standing and evaluate the alleged harms of
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 38

Case 1:16-cv-00429-DCN Document 32 Filed 05/17/18 Page 39 of 40
specific plaintiffs. For legal and statutory reasons, however, even some as-applied challenges would not withstand scrutiny and the Court will dismiss those claims outright without leave to amend.
Plaintiffs must amend the surviving claims to comply with the Court’s analysis. In summary, the Court will allow Plaintiffs to amend Claim 1 (Due Process – Reporting and Vagueness)17; Claim 2 (Free Exercise); Claim 3 (Due Process – Free Association and Travel); Claim 5 (Cruel and Unusual Punishment); Claim 6 (Ex Post Facto); Claim 7 (Double Jeopardy); Claim 8 (Contracts)18; and Claim 10 (Separation of Powers) to state an appropriate as-applied challenge with a specific plaintiff/s and specific facts.19 If none exists, amendment is not necessary.
17 The Court will only allow amendment regarding reporting or vagueness or other specific provisions within SORA. The Court will not allow amendment for a general Procedural Due Process claim as even an as-applied challenge in this area would fail. 18 As noted, the Court combined the U.S. Constitution and Idaho Constitution contract based claims. Plaintiffs can elect whether to plead this as one or two claims. 19 Finally, the Court notes that technically speaking, some claims in this lawsuit do include arguments that would apply to all Does. For example, all Does are required to report in person and all Does have been criminally prosecuted in State Court. These 134 Does do not represent the entire population required to report, however, so the facial challenges still fail. But by saying Plaintiffs need to raise as-applied challenges, the Court is not implying Plaintiffs must take the time to list each Doe and how the regulation affects him or her. Plaintiffs simply need to find someone who fits the required fact pattern, outline in detail how SORA is unconstitutional to them, and submit that claim for review. Only in this way will Plaintiffs be able to mount an appropriate as-applied challenge.
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The Court will not allow Plaintiffs to amend Claim 4 (Equal Protection); Claim 9 (Takings)20; and Claim 11 (State Police Powers) because even an as-applied challenge would fail.
VI. ORDER 1. Defendants Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 15) is GRANTED. 2. Plaintiffs are GRANTED LEAVE to file a second amended complaint to cure
deficiencies identified in this decision. Plaintiffs have 60 days to file their second amended complaint.
DATED: May 17, 2018 _________________________ David C. Nye U.S. District Court Judge
20 Except if, as this decision outlines, a Doe has exhausted all administrative state remedies and has a ripe claim. MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 40

 </s> Case 1:16-cv-00429-DCN Document 36 Filed 08/30/18 Page 1 of 45

Greg J. Fuller Daniel S. Brown FULLER LAW OFFICES Attorneys at Law 161 Main Avenue West P. O. Box L Twin Falls, ID 83303 Telephone: (208) 734-1602 Facsimile : (208) 734-1606 ISB #1442 ISB #7538 fullerlaw@cableone.net

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO

* * * * *

JOHN and JANE DOES 1-134,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

vs.

)

)

LAWRENCE WASDEN, Attorney

)

General of the State of Idaho; KEVIN

)

KEMPF Director of the Idaho

)

Department of Correction; TERRY

)

KIRKHAM, Chief Department of

)

Correction Probation and Parole

)

Division, SEXUAL OFFENDER

)

MANAGEMENT BOARD and its

)

members, JON BURNHAM, MICHAEL )

JOHNSTON, Ph.d., MOIRA LYNCH, )

JEFFREY BETTS, ERWIN

)

SONNENBERG, JEAN FISHER,

)

PAULA GARAY, SHERIFF

)

MATTHEW THOMAS, KIMBERLY

)

SIMMONS, WILLIAM CRAWFORD )

and CHRISTINA IVERSON, in their

)

Case No.: 1:16-CV-429
AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF (PART II)

AMENDED COMPLAINT PART II - 1

Case 1:16-cv-00429-DCN Document 36 Filed 08/30/18 Page 2 of 45

official capacities; COLONEL RALPH )

POWELL, Director, IDAHO STATE )

POLICE, STEVEN BARTLETT, ADA )

COUNTY SHERIFF; LORIN

)

NIELSEN, BANNOCK COUNTY

)

SHERIFF; BRENT T. BUNN, BEAR

)

LAKE COUNTY SHERIFF; CRAIG

)

T. ROWLAND, BINGHAM COUNTY )

SHERIFF; JIM KACQMAREK, BOISE )

COUNTY SHERIFF PAUL J. WILDE, )

BONNEVILLE COUNTY SHERIFF;

)

KIERAN DONAHUE, CANYON

)

COUNTY SHERIFF; MICHAEL

)

HADERLIE, CARIBOU COUNTY

)

SHERIFF; JAY HEWARD, CASSIA

)

COUNTY SHERIFF; CHRIS GOETZ, )

CLEARWATER COUNTY SHERIFF; )

RICK LAYHER, ELMORE COUNTY )

SHERIFF; DAVID FRYAR, FRANKLIN )

COUNTY SHERIFF; CHARLES

)

ROLLAND, GEM COUNTY SHERIFF; )

SHAUN GOUGH, GOODING COUNTY )

SHERIFF; STEVE ANDERSON,

)

JEFFERSON COUNTY SHERIFF;

)

DOUG McFALL, JEROME COUNTY )

SHERIFF; BEN WOLFINGER,

)

KOOTENAI COUNTY SHERIFF;

)

RICHARD SKILES, LATAH COUNTY )

SHERIFF; LYNN D. BOWERMAN,

)

LEMHI COUNTY SHERIFF; KEVIN )

ELLIS, LINCOLN COUNTY

)

SHERIFF; ERIC SNARR, MINIDOKA )

COUNTY SHERIFF; JOE

)

RODRIGUEZ, NEZ PERCE COUNTY )

SHERIFF; TONY LIFORD, TETON

)

COUNTY SHERIFF; TOM CARTER, )

TWIN FALLS COUNTY SHERIFF,

)

and; PATTI BOLEN, VALLEY

)

COUNTY SHERIFF,

)

)

Defendants.

)

* * * * *

AMENDED COMPLAINT PART II - 2

Case 1:16-cv-00429-DCN Document 36 Filed 08/30/18 Page 3 of 45
COME NOW the Plaintiffs, by and through their attorneys of record, Fuller Law Offices, and hereby amends the Amended Complaint pursuant to this Honorable Court’s Memorandum Decision and Order dated May 17, 2018. The Plaintiffs hereby reincorporate and reallege all allegations contained in the Amended Complaint as if fully set forth in this Amended Complaint Part II. Pursuant the Memorandum Decision and Order, the Plaintiffs respectfully allege the following in support of their as-applied analysis:
1. SORA only applies to those convicted of a sexual offense “[o]n or after July 1, 1993" or those who “[p]leads guilty to or has been found guilty of a crime covered in this chapter prior to July 1, 1993, and the person, as a result of the offense, is incarcerated in a county jail facility or a penal facility or is under probation or parole supervision, on or after July 1, 1993.” (Idaho Code Section 18-8304(a), (d)).
2. Plaintiffs jointly allege that the fact that the Idaho Legislature has not included all of those convicted of the same sexual offenses in the registration scheme, is powerful evidence of an intent to punish those who are recently convicted of a sexual offense, on or after January 1, 1993, or those who are incarcerated or under probation or parole on or after January 1, 1993 for a sexual offense.
3. Plaintiffs jointly allege that anyone who was convicted of a sexual offense prior to January 1, 1993, and had concluded any incarceration, probation or parole prior to January 1, 1993 would not be required to register, regardless of the severity of the sexual offense. Because Idaho classifies sexual offenders solely by the nature of the conviction, as opposed to the nature of the offense, there can be no justification for
AMENDED COMPLAINT PART II - 3

Case 1:16-cv-00429-DCN Document 36 Filed 08/30/18 Page 4 of 45
excluding those of the same conviction, except for punitive reasons. 4. Plaintiffs jointly allege that Idaho’s practice of applying potential criminal
penalties for violations of SORA, is additional evidence of punitive intent. If SORA is civil in nature, violations of same should trigger civil penalties as opposed to criminal penalties.
5. Plaintiffs jointly allege that the findings of the Idaho Legislature as set forth in Idaho Code Section 18-8302 are not supported by factual evidence.
6. Plaintiff John Doe 82, was convicted on May 12, 1986, in Sitka County, state of Alaska, of the crime of Sexual Abuse of a Minor in the 2nd Degree, to-wit: Sixteen (16) or Seventeen (17) Years, a felony. The sentence imposed consisted of a two (2) year determinate term, followed by a six (6) year indeterminate term, for a total unified sentence of eight (8) years. Plaintiff, John Doe 82, was released from custody in 1988 after serving the two (2) year determinate portion of his sentence.
At the time of imposition of sentence, the laws of the State of Alaska did not provide for sex offender registration.
In 1995, Plaintiff, John Doe 82, was released from parole unconditionally with no further duties or obligations to the state of Alaska as a result of the above-mentioned conviction. Thereafter, Plaintiff, John Doe 82, was notified by the state of Alaska that due to a change in state law, he would be brought back into the criminal justice system for the purpose of newly enacted sex offender registration requirements. That this was done without prior notice to John Doe 82 without the opportunity to be heard in opposition to the newly enacted registration requirements.
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Case 1:16-cv-00429-DCN Document 36 Filed 08/30/18 Page 5 of 45
In the year 2000, Plaintiff, John Doe 82, moved to the state of Florida and began
registering as a sex offender pursuant to that state’s registration requirements. That by
letter dated November 19, 2008, John Doe 82 was advised by the Florida Department of
Law Enforcement that he was being permanently released from the requirement that he
register as a sex offender from that point forward. Between the time of receiving the
letter and 2013, Defendant, John Doe 82, continued to reside in the State of Florida
without any registration requirements. During this time period, said Plaintiff’s owner
operated business flourished as a direct result of his removal from Florida’s sex offender
registry.
Plaintiff, John Doe 82, additionally alleges as follows:
That in 2013, Plaintiff, John Doe 82, moved with his family to the State of Idaho. Shortly after his arrival, he applied for an Idaho’s driver’s license and was informed by the State of Idaho law enforcement authorities that he would, once again, be required to register as a sex offender in that state, for life. Furthermore, due to the fact Idaho was now requiring him to register, he was notified by Idaho authorities that in the event of his return to the state of Florida, he would once again have to register as a sex offender in that state, despite his earlier unconditional release from reporting requirements there.
To the best of John Doe 82's recollection, early on he only had to report once annually to verify his personal information, i.e., address, phone number, vehicle license, etc. As time has passed, the requirements have continued to increase to where now he has to reply via mail three (3) times annually, appear in person once annually, as well as having the police come to his door unannounced at least once annually to verify his address. He has had travel restrictions placed on him that he asserts are anything but reasonable as well as having absolutely no housing or employment opportunities.
John Doe 82 feels as though he has been relentlessly persecuted for thirty-three (33) years for his offense. He never willingly shares his last name with those whom he is just meeting (at church for example) for fear they will do a background search and discover that he is on the sex offender registry. He has experienced it over and over - once he is found to be on the sex offender registry,
AMENDED COMPLAINT PART II - 5

Case 1:16-cv-00429-DCN Document 36 Filed 08/30/18 Page 6 of 45
he is shunned and alienated. Even the persons that go to church want nothing to do with him once they realize he is on the sex offender registry. John Doe 82 asserts that no one takes the time to find out how he came to be on the registry, they just assume the worst.
John Doe 82 has lost many acquaintances (they never had the opportunity to become friends!) over the years due to this. In this day and age, everyone seems to check-up on everyone else and most often it is via the internet.
In addition, there is another factor that discourages traveling. John Doe 82 was released from having to register by the State of Florida. However, if he travels to Florida from Boise, the Boise sex offender registry office contacts the State of Florida and he has to register with Florida while he is there.
As with all sex offenders, John Doe 82 has been routinely denied living in an apartment, home, or condo, simply because the owner/landlord already has considered “what would the neighbors, my family, my friends or my colleagues think if they knew I somehow associated with a sex offender or perhaps even helped them in some small way, such as letting them rent some run-down property from me?” Plaintiff John Doe 82 asserts that if you are on the sex offender registry and you apply to rent a home or apartment, you almost will 100% certainly be turned down.
It is John Doe 82's personal experience that it is virtually impossible to find housing or employment opportunities as a registered sex offender. The first thing any landlord or property management company does is run a background check. If you are found to be on the sex offender registry you are automatically disqualified as being a viable candidate for anything you were trying to rent from them. If you are a sex offender but are not on the registry due to the dates of your sentence being pre-1995 or so, then it is no problem to rent as his experience suggests that they only look for your name on the Sex Offender Registry.
Plaintiff John Doe 82 has considered taking his own life because at times he has felt it would be easier on everyone else, i.e., his loved ones, friends, and those that know who he truly is and so forth.
Virtually all employers perform a background check and if you are found to be on the registry, you are ruled out as a viable candidate for any position for which you have applied. Plaintiff John Doe 82 went to over thirty (30) job interviews with the State of Alaska before he was hired. And, even then, it was only due to the fact that they needed someone right away and he was hired on a “trial” basis. Even after “proving” himself to be reliable, honest and professional, getting promoted was more of a pipe dream than a possibility. More than once he was
AMENDED COMPLAINT PART II - 6

Case 1:16-cv-00429-DCN Document 36 Filed 08/30/18 Page 7 of 45
told that due to his being on the Sex Offender Registry, he would not be accepted as a candidate for the position for which he was applying.
Plaintiff John Doe 82 has his own business and when he was released from the sex offender registry, his business soared and he was almost living the good life. Upon moving to Boise and being required to again be on the sex offender registry, his business has suffered and he is in debt more than ever in his life. He knows a number of people have decided not to use his service simply due to him being on the sex offender registry.
In about the mid-1990s, Plaintiff, John Doe 82, had worked in the same department and the same division within that department for several years. His role was to prepare, submit and monitor the annual multi-million dollar budget account for all personnel services for the entire division and he also filled in for any one of three managers in the department when they were on vacation or away for any other reason. Basically, he was monitoring the spending of several hundred million dollars. The Senior Manager understood his abilities and encouraged him to apply for one of the manager positions that was coming open due to a manager retiring. Unfortunately, another department (which had final say on all State hiring) felt that due to John Doe 82 being on the sex offender registry, he would not be considered for that position. Part of it was him being on the registry, but a portion of their reasoning was that the restrictions placed on him such as the travel restrictions, reporting requirements and so forth “may” make it too difficult for him to perform his job well.
7. John Doe 62, was convicted in January, 1988 in Grand County, Colorado, for
Sexual Assault of a Minor, to wit: the age of 9 years, a felony. He was sentenced to a
period of probation of four (4) years and was ordered that he was not to have any contact
with children unless he received prior approval from the probation department. Any time
spent with children he was required to be on a supervised basis only. In 1992, Plaintiff,
John Doe 62, moved to Idaho while still on probation. Plaintiff, John Doe 62, completed
his probation without any violations, not even a traffic violation. On January 5, 1994,
said Plaintiff was released from probation by the Grand County, without any conditions
whatsoever.
AMENDED COMPLAINT PART II - 7

Case 1:16-cv-00429-DCN Document 36 Filed 08/30/18 Page 8 of 45
Plaintiff, John Doe 62, additionally alleges as follows:
That John Doe 62's probation officer in Idaho informed him to either quit school and go back to Colorado, or be placed on the sex offender registry. John Doe 62 felt he had too much invested in is education to leave, so he was placed on the registry. As a term and condition of probation, John Doe 62 was to remain clean and sober, which he did. In fact, he conducted his own NA meetings for a period of three (3) years.
His life changed forever from that moment on to here, twenty-eight (28) years later. Being labeled a sex offender was used against him during his divorce in 1998. He fought for his rights as a father to have partial custody and it came to a point where he was continually in and out of court to fight for his rights as a parent. John Doe 62 was ostracized and persecuted by his family over this matter. In fact, he has not had contact with his family in a long, long time. Just recently, his sister found him, through his wife on Facebook, and informed him that his mother has Stage 4 COPD and that she fell and broke her hip. His mother is in South Dakota. John Doe 62 is 53 years old and would love to see his mother – if only things were different. Plaintiff, John Doe 62, cannot be alone with his grandchildren and has to be “supervised” for fear that he may be prosecuted over it. He adores his grandchildren and they him. He dreads the day that he has to tell them about their “Papa’s” past and that they may see his photograph on the internet.
Plaintiff, John Doe 62, purchased a home in 2010. The next year, someone stated that he lived too close to the elementary school down the street. The U.S. Marshalls came to his home and informed him that they were going to measure the distance of his home to the school. Plaintiff, John Doe 62's residence was outside the 500 feet. However, in the excitement of purchasing his first home, he had forgotten that part of the minimum requirement law. The implications of what would, or what could, have happened if the measurement was within the 500 feet is too hard for Plaintiff, John Doe 62, to contemplate, as his home is his sanctuary.
Since the date Plaintiff, John Doe 62, was required to register as a sex offender, he has worked jobs where he could work alone. He did not tell anyone of his status for fear of being judged and persecuted. Being on the sex offender registry has precluded him from making lasting friendships. He is, and always will be, antisocial.
Plaintiff, John Doe 62, asserts that he has been unfairly and unlawfully treated by the SORA Board by all of the law changes from 2001-2011. By receiving letters in the mail informing him of the new law changes implemented after the fact,
AMENDED COMPLAINT PART II - 8

Case 1:16-cv-00429-DCN Document 36 Filed 08/30/18 Page 9 of 45
indicating that he must do this, or do that, for fear of being arrested and prosecuted, heavily fined and/or possibly jailed. He feels like he has been tried and re-convicted, multiple times, on the original charge after having completed his sentence/probation. He feels his rights have been violated, that he is worthless in trying to make anything of himself. He is unable to date due to fear that any woman in whom he was interested would abandon the relationship upon discovering his sex offender status. This, in fact, happened and has affected his self-esteem, leaving him afraid of trying again, only to be hurt. In 2002, he met a woman who gave him a chance and has been by his side for over fifteen (15) years. She has a daughter who, at that time lived with him and her mother. If John Doe 62 came home from work and she was there, he immediately went outside and sat in his truck until her mother got home from work.
Plaintiff, John Doe 62, attempted to obtain release from registry requirements in Idaho in 2011. The Court ordered him to obtain a Psychosexual Evaluation, which he did. However, the Court indicated that he did not read the evaluation stating that Plaintiff, John Doe 62, would have to register for life because the law changed to include the word “aggravated” to all convictions regardless of felony type. Type I felonies being the worst to Type IV felonies being least of offenses of which he was.
Plaintiff, John Doe 62, is a 53 year old man and a model citizen. It has been 28 years since his offense and he has been on the sex offender registry for 24 years. He is not a recidivist and would like the opportunity of being removed from the registry and not having to register for the rest of his life so that he can live free.
8. Plaintiff, John Doe 106, pled guilty pursuant to an Alford Plea to the crimes
of Rape of a Child and Child Molestation, for which conviction was entered on December
31, 1990, in King County, Washington. The sentence imposed consisted of forty-eight
(48) months in the King County Jail, after which he was released in September, 1994.
Said Plaintiff was then placed on probation for a period of one (1) year. That same year,
said Plaintiff was advised he was required to register as a sex offender in the State of
Washington, and he was released from probation in October, 1995.
In 2000, said Plaintiff moved to Idaho, where he began registering as a sex
offender. At this point in time, Idaho SORA’s requirements provided that this Plaintiff
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Case 1:16-cv-00429-DCN Document 36 Filed 08/30/18 Page 10 of 45
register for a period of ten (10) years from the date of release from his probation, i.e.,
October, 2005. That subsequent to the amendment to Idaho SORA which became
effective July 1, 2009, said Plaintiff was notified he would thereafter be required to
register for life as a sex offender. That this substantial and material change in the
registration reporting requirements, as to this Plaintiff, were made with no prior notice to
him, no opportunity to be heard in opposition, and with no regard for the subjective
circumstances of this Plaintiff. By reason thereof, Plaintiff, John Doe 106's, due process
rights were violated all to his detriment.
Plaintiff, John Doe 106, additionally alleges as follows:
In 2007, John Doe 106 and his wife were cast in leading roles at the Moscow Community Theater (MCT) along with their oldest son. Afterwards, due to concerns by other people whom had seen Plaintiff, John Doe 106, on the SORA postings, the theater group banded together to prohibit him and his family from participation in future shows. This restricted not only himself, but his entire family from participation with MCT for quite some time.
In October 2009, Plaintiff, John Doe 106, was pulling into his driveway and was stopped by a state patrol officer. The officer stated that Plaintiff was speeding, although he did not receive a ticket. The officer’s first question after running Plaintiff John Doe 106's drivers license, was whehter he was allowed to have his three (3) children in the vehicle. The officer detained him while verifying his legal status to have his children on an unsupervised basis. This detention occurred when Plaintiff, John Doe 106's, conviction was nearly 20 years old.
In August 2010, John Doe 106 went on vacation with his family. They traveled for 2 weeks to Yellowstone for camping. During the trip, he received a phone call from the Latah County Sheriff wanting to know why he did not re-register. He stated he had not been notified. They threatened to have him arrested and put into jail for not doing so, notwithstanding his explanation he had not been home to receive his mailed notice. Plaintiff rushed home to get the notification so that he could get fingerprinted and, yet again, obtain another fresh photo.
In February 2011, John Doe 106 received a primary role in a play in Pullman, WA. (R-Top Theater). He completed 3 weeks of practice then lost the role due to
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his inclusion on the sex offender registry posted on the internet.
In July 2011, Plaintiff, John Doe 106, lost a $1.3 million dollar contract for his construction company because when the company pulled his name up they discovered that he was listed on the internet as a registered sex offender.
In March of 2015, Plaintiff, John Doe 106, purchased a building in Moscow, Idaho, for a future home of his construction building and brewery. He was told that due to his past, he could not open such a business.
In September 2015, Plaintiff, John Doe 106, attempted to get a liquor license. He was told by Idaho Alcohol Beverage Control he could not due to the fact that he was on the sex offender registration list.
In January of 2016, Plaintiff, John Doe 106, opened up Rants & Raves Brewery. Due to his inclusion in the sex offender registry posted on the internet, he was harassed on social media and lost many customers to his brewery. In January of 2016, the business did $78,000.00 in sales. Once his status of a sex offender appeared on social media, revenues decreased. In February of 2016, the business generated $34,000.00 in sales, with a steady decline from there. It has taken nearly 3 years to slowly get business sales up to $40,000.00 monthly.
From 2016 to present, Plaintiff, John Doe 106, cannot get a beer distributor. The company has won countless awards for the quality of their beer, however, no distributor will touch their company because he is associated with it, based on the Internet’s publication about him being on the sex offender registry. Plaintiff has been slandered, harassed, and shunned from the community because he is on that list. As a direct result, Plaintiff has lost approximately $500,000 in business revenue.
In June, 2017, a customer of Plaintiff, John Doe 106, for approximately 14 years, implemented a background check system. Plaintiff, John Doe 106, lost a contract that provided over $3.5 million a year of revenue due to the fact that his ICO score was less because he was on the sex offender registry. Plaintiff was informed by the customer that if he was removed from sex offender registry, he could get his contract back.
In September, 2017, one of Plaintiff, John Doe 106's sales staff members received a letter from Craig Stein Distribution. It stated "We very much enjoyed the beer, it is very marketable, but until the management of Rants & Raves Brewery is changed we cannot distribute for Rants & Raves". Plaintiff, John Doe 106, believes this is based directly upon him being on the sex offender registry.
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In October of 2017, Plaintiff, John Doe 106, lost beer tap handles at two establishments. Managers of both establishments indicated to Plaintiff that due to the fact that he was on the sex offender registry, they switched.
In January of 2018, John Doe 106 received a call from his distributer for the Spokane Market. They indicated that they heard he was on the sex offender registry and due to that fact, they would no longer distribute his beer. Due to this, Plaintiff’s business suffered lost revenue of approximately $8-10,000.00 per month.
In January, 2018, Plaintiff, John Doe 106, opened a new location brewery in Riggins, Idaho. The neighbor whom owns a bar, has handed out flyers and posted notices on the exterior wall of their building of the sex offender registry list with John Doe 106's picture on it. The neighbor has actively participated in steering business away from Plaintiff’s business and is slandering Plaintiff’s business by utilizing that list.
John Doe 106 has received death threats, has been harassed, his family and employees have been harassed, and his brewer employee was punched as someone mistook him for John Doe 106. To be punished for a crime that happened over 30 years ago with absolutely no indication that this is a behavior that would repeat itself. He has been injured, discriminated against, embarrassed, punished many times over. To have moved from a state that did not consider him a threat, that did not post him on the internet, and move to a state where he has added to the economy, created jobs, showed he was a valuable community member and for the punishment to not end but only get worse, Plaintiff. John Doe 106, would assert that the SORA is punitive and that has been injured greatly therefrom.
John Doe 106 purchased a building to open a business in Riggins, Idaho. In April, 2018, he purchased the RV Park behind the building. The neighbor called the Sheriff when John Doe 106 parked his own RV , in his RV park, to stay for a weekend of work. He was notified by the Sheriff that the Prosecutor of Idaho County had determined that he would be allowed to stay in his own RV park for one night and that it would not be considered a residence. However, if he stayed two days or longer it would be considered a residence and he could be charged with a crime.
9. Plaintiff, John Doe 117, is a resident of Canyon County, state of Idaho. In
2002, John Doe 117 was convicted in Canyon County, state of Idaho, of the crime of
Lewd Conduct With a Minor, to-wit: victim fifteen (15) years of age at the time of
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Case 1:16-cv-00429-DCN Document 36 Filed 08/30/18 Page 13 of 45
commission of the offense, a felony. The ex post facto amendments to Idaho SORA effective from and after July 1, 2001, created the “aggravated offense” exception to his eligibility for release from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry. Under this amendment, the crime of Lewd Conduct With a Minor where the victim was under twelve (12) years of age at the time of commission of the offense was classified as an “aggravated offense.” Furthermore, the ex post facto amendments to Idaho SORA effective from and after July 1, 2009, expanded the definition of “aggravated offense” to exclude any age demarcation to the crime of lewd and lascivious conduct, leaving the crime of “Lewd and Lascivious Conduct”, with no reference to the age of the victim, an “aggravated offense.” Finally, John Doe 117 is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and has not been classified as a violent sexual predator. Therefore, John Doe 117 should be eligible to petition the sentencing court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry. John Doe 117 was, and still is, foreclosed from ever being removed from the Idaho sex offender registry by reason of the July 1, 2001, and 2009 amendments, above-stated.
Plaintiff, John Doe 117, additionally alleges as follows: In the summer of 2004, John Doe 117 transitioned from one probation officer to another. In conversations with his prior probation officer, he was allowed to attend social functions and go to a movie while chaperoned. This complied with the sex offender registry and had been approved by his treatment counselor. The latter probation officer, revoked that privilege without provocation or explanation. John Doe 117 had been an exemplary probationer and was completely compliant with all requirements. This move was unwarranted. By this time, Plaintiff had been on probation for nearly two (2) years and was doing well. This unprovoked revocation of a previously approved family activity further alienated Plaintiff from his family and friends, causing harm to those relationships. However, as probation is meant to be a form of punishment, Plaintiff accepted revocation of this privilege believing if he complied to his very best ability, he would be
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released and the punishment would cease.
Again in 2004 and similar to the example set forth above, John Doe 117 attempted to get permission to attend a gym where minors wouldn’t be present, and he would be with a designated chaperone. In his previous experiences with a prior probation officer, John Doe 117's significant other was serving (and had been duly trained) as his chaperone. This was approved by his treatment counselor and was allowed by the Sex Offender Registry requirements. A later probation officer denied John Doe 117's approved chaperone, merely because he said he had a more “hard-lined” approach. This excluded Plaintiff from family, social, and religious activities, including the gym. The damage caused in this instance was more measurable. John Doe 117 felt his probation officer was exacting additional punishment and was attempting to simulate a prison environment by isolating him in his home, akin to “house arrest”. John Doe 117 was not allowed to attend important family events, social functions, and religious activities.
Between approximately 2003 and 2005, John Doe 117 was struggling to get settled in a place to live. He worked to find places that met all the requirements of the sex offender registry and probation requirements. Early on, when he gave the proposed location to his probation officer (the location met the requirements of the sex offender registry), the probation officer visited the location and went to all the neighbors and let them know of his status asking them if they were ok John Doe 117 lived there. Of course, they weren’t. This cycle happened several times before Plaintiff was forced to live in an extremely rundown studio apartment across the street from the courthouse. John Doe 117 affectionately called it “The Crack Shack” as it was clear many drug deals went down in the complex…or only convicted drug dealers could live there. While he made it work, this living arrangement was humiliating and debilitating. He felt defeated...a lower form of life and that this is what he deserved. It was humiliating to have his probation officer announce to his potential neighbors his status as a sex offener. In the fall of 2004, Plaintiff attempted to move in with his significant other (who had been trained as an approved chaperone). His home met all the criteria of the sex offender registry, and had been approved by his sex offender treatment counselor, however, his application was denied by his probation officer. Again, his performance on probation remained exemplary, his costs paid on time, and his treatment going well. However, he was told that he “could not set foot on the property.” This almost destroyed the relationship with his significant other. It was frustrating and hurtful. Eventually however, he was allowed to move in with him, as he transitioned to another probation officer who said, without incident, it was ok. However, it was after much stress and trauma both to himself, his significant other, and their families.
Initially after his release from jail, John Doe #117 had attempted to get permission
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to attend church. He was told by his treatment counselor that he needed to complete further steps to be allowed to attend. He worked on those steps and was later approved to attend by his sex offender treatment counselor. However, he was not approved by his probation officer and the probation officer denied his request to attend church on the grounds of my status as a sex offender. The probation officer stated he believed that Idaho code did not permit John Doe 117 on the premises due to children being present. Plaintiff understood his reasoning and didn’t question it any further. But, John Doe 117 grew up in the church and his faith was very important to him. This was traumatic and took him time to adapt to. When Plaintiff moved in with his significant other (and beyond), they decided not to attend church in order to avoid the possibility of noncompliance with the Idaho Code requirements regarding being on or near school grounds (often churches are home to schools as well and have children present in Sunday School).
Shortly after his sentencing (approximately fall/winter of 2002), Plaintiff was working as an Office Manager for a local newspaper. His workplace was approved by his probation officer and he complied with the requirements of the sex offender registry. The business was run from Plaintiff’s supervisor’s residence (he worked in the separate office portion of the home). When his supervisor started dating a woman with a child (in the residence portion of the home), John Doe 117 was told by his probation officer to terminate his employment immediately. John Doe 117 complied, but was left without work which jeopardized his work release privileges. His probation officer didn’t attempt to apply any work arounds (he could have worked in another location). He required that John Doe 117 terminate without notice to his employer. He struggled to find work afterwards and was almost discharged out of the work release program. The jail allowed him to activate his business license and he worked for himself to stay in the program.
Since his conviction and in express connection to his status as a sex offender on the registry, his right to religious freedom has been directly hindered by the limitations placed by the registry. Idaho code §18-8329 outlines specific requirements for schools, daycares and other specific limitations when children are present. Many churches are also co-located with schools, daycares, or child care centers. While the elementary, middle, and high schools are not in session during typical days of worship, daycare/child care facilities and Sunday School activities are usually in session during all church activities. Early on, John Doe 117's probation officer interpreted this as reason to prohibit him from attending church services. He believed the language, “when the person has reason to believe children under the age of eighteen (18) years are present and are involved in a school activity” to include school sessions held on non-governmental locations such as church grounds and the language “school activity” to include school held during atypical scheduling (i.e. Saturday or Sunday). Plaintiff John Doe 117 has
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held to that interpretation and currently doesn’t attend church services. John Doe 117 grew up very connected to the church. In his teens, church was his life and he has nearly spent his entire life (prior to his conviction) deeply involved in worship and ministry. Life on the registry has removed him from that. There are few options for church worship under these constraints. John Doe 117 believes he has paid his debt to society (and lives in deep, persistent remorse) and has satisfied his sentence, but this ongoing hindrance feels to him like sustained punishment.
John Doe 117 enjoyed traveling a great deal and prior to his conviction had taken several extended vacations and/or camping trips. He had been asked on several occasions to travel within the United States on trips to various locations with friends/family. While his close family/friends are aware of his registration requirements, many of his friends who want him to travel with them don’t know of his status. The travel restriction is exceptionally harsh. If lodging away from his primary address (no matter the reason or location) for 7 days or more, he is required to notify the Sheriff’s office. This often entails a day off from work to do so (as the lines at DMV are long) and then he is told by the local Sheriff’s office to notify the Sheriff’s office at the location he is visiting. This requirement is unpleasant, uncomfortable, and embarrassing. John Doe 117 either has to make up a reason as to why he needs to disappear at his destinations for some time (to notify the destination Sheriff) or has to tell his less than close friends that he is on the registry and needs to check in.
In 2006, John Doe 117 traveled to Palm Springs, CA to visit friends and was going to be gone for a period of 10 days. He took time off from work to notify the county sheriff’s office and was told that he needed to check in to every county he would spend a night in. Fortunately, he planned on staying at one hotel the entire time. He went to notify the sheriff’s office in California and they brushed him off and said he didn’t need to let them know. He had to take time from his trip, interrupt his time with friends in Palm Springs to visit the sheriff’s office, only to be told, that he didn’t need to let them know. It was unpleasant and embarrassing. This lack of freedom to travel directly affects his freedom to associate. He is unable to visit with friends in other states due to the restrictions placed on him by the sex offender registry.
In addition, John Doe 117 has turned down work travel due to the travel restrictions. There have been several occasions where his employer has offered to pay for him to attend a conference or seminar in another state which he has had to turn down due to the travel restrictions. It has negatively affected his job performance. As required by the sex offender registry, his employer’s HR department is aware of his status, but nearly all of his coworkers don’t appear to know. This makes doing his job uncomfortable when he has to turn down training
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opportunities due to the restrictions established by the sex offender registry. Plaintiff makes up excuses to defend them as best he can. People are aware of his desire to travel and are often flummoxed when he turns them down.
In the Fall of 2008, as part of his business, Plaintiff provided offsite accounting services (he would get client records and, in turn, would provide accounting reports, file returns, and provide general accounting services). He had been doing the books for one client (a partnership) for several years and had been doing their taxes. Prior to this time, this customer and his partner were very happy with John Doe 117's work. When they discovered John Doe 117's status as a sex offender by chance, they terminated his work and refused to pay him. He had gone to their house to pick up documents when they told him they had found out he was on the sex offender registry. In a verbal tirade, they fired him. When John Doe 117 attempted to explain, one of the partners attempted to hit him. John Doe 117's partner was with him and witnessed the altercation. A shouting match between the client and his partner ensued with the exchange of swear words. They immediately left. Later, as Plaintiff was attempting to collect what he was owed for his services already rendered, the aggressive partner who had tried to hit him wrote several harassing letters to Plaintiff, harassing and threatening him. John Doe 117 later attempted to collect the monies through legal action, but decided to stop due to the threatening letters and phone messages he received.
In the Summer of 2011, John Doe 117 applied for a job as an accountant for a local ag parts and repair corporation. The interview went well, and he had been acquainted and casual friends with the owners of the business for several years. They didn’t know of his status prior to the interview. As required by the sex offender registry, he notified them of his status during the interview. It severed those friendships which he had had for over a decade and he did not get the job. To add insult, he was told by the hiring manager prior to the interview the job was as good as his. He had the necessary experience, qualifications, and fit. He had known the hiring manager for quite some time and she has remained good friends after. The owner, however, couldn’t see past John Doe 117's status as a sex offender and he wasn’t hired. Those relationships remain lost to this day.
In the Summer of 2015, John Doe 117 applied for a job with the Idaho Department of Finance. Plaintiff was forced to withdraw his application upon learning he was ineligible for employment due to his status as a sex offender.
In the Fall of 2016, Plaintiff applied for a job with the Idaho Department of Labor and was forced to withdraw when a friend working there said he would be disqualified due to his status as a sex offender.
In June 2018, Plaintiff applied for a job with the Idaho Department of Insurance
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and withdrew due to learning from the first interview that his status on the SOR would likely disqualify him.
In June 2018, John Doe 117 applied with PERSI and continually worries that when they learned of his status it would disqualify him.
Plaintiff, John Doe 117's current job offers no promotion capability. He is looking for other work in hopes of finding a better paying job to increase his behind-schedule retirement planning. He lives in constant fear while he is looking for work, the biggest discomfort is hoping they don’t look to the internet when considering hiring him. Googling his name will bring up the arrest records, or at least a glimpse that they exist, which in turn drives potential employers to the sex offender registry. Regardless of a background check, the fact Plaintiff is on the sex offender registry often disqualifies him as a potential employee. The background check reveals the crime but because so much time has passed, John Doe 117 believes the prospective employer can make allowances. But his current status on the sex offender registry is active and ongoing. Plaintiff’s status on the sex offender registry makes finding work nearly impossible and the notification requirement nearly sinks every job opportunity.
In approximately the Fall of 2017, a coworker approached Plaintiff John Doe 117 with a favor. It was a work-related favor and one that was a bit controversial. It wasn’t illegal or unethical but stepped out of the bounds of his comfort. He politely declined. She promptly went on to say that she thought he would be a bit more willing to bend the rules given his “situation.” He knew she knew and it was apparent she had learned from the internet (she had made comments in the past as to how she likes to google people’s names just to see what’s out there). He is in compliance with the sex offender registry notification requirement. Human Resources knows of his status. However, he has made no additional efforts beyond that and have worked hard to keep his status out of workplace conversations. Her comment shocked him. She attempted again to ask for the favor having seen the look of horror on his face. He ignored the request and worked to shake off the humiliation with humor. He laughed as if he didn’t hear her comment. Working with her was tense for the next several months, with aggressive behaviors by her and an overall condescending attitude exhibiting by her toward him. Her use of his status on the sex offender registry shocked him, humiliated him, damaged his working status, and hurt his relationship with her for quite some time.
Each year, John Doe 117 fears Idaho Legislators will “knee jerk” react to a crime they’ve heard about in the news and propose legislation to further limit where he can go, who he can associate with, or announcements he must make to neighbors, colleagues, friends, and even total strangers, further punishing him based, not on
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his actions, but the actions of some random person in Idaho who committed a crime similar to his. He has worked long and with fastidious dedication to learn, grow, rehabilitate, and remain unfailingly compliant to become a valued and contributing member of Idaho’s society. Yet, each year, there is a chance he’ll be sentenced again by the ever-changing law surrounding the sex offender registry. When stricter legislation surrounding the sex offender registry is introduced, there is very little resistance to that law. Most lawmakers do not want to be seen as soft on this issue.
10. Plaintiff, John Doe 128, is a resident of Kootenai County, state of Idaho. In
1993, John Doe 128 was convicted in that county of the crime of Lewd Conduct With a Child Under the Age of Sixteen (16) Years, to-wit: victim thirteen (13) years of age at the time of commission of the offense, a felony. On the 23rd day of February, 2011, The Kootenai County District Court dismissed the charges in this matter by setting aside the plea of guilty and dismissing the case pursuant to Idaho Code Section 19-2604. The ex post facto amendments to Idaho SORA effective from and after July 1, 2001, created the “aggravated offense” exception to eligibility for release from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry. Under this designation, the crime of Lewd Conduct With a Minor where the victim was under twelve (12) years of age at the time of commission of the offense was classified as an “aggravated offense.” Furthermore, the ex post facto amendments to Idaho SORA effective from and after July 1, 2009, expanded the definition of “aggravated offense” to exclude any age demarcation to the crime of lewd and lascivious conduct, leaving that crime, with no reference to the age of the victim, as an “aggravated offense.” John Doe 128 is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and has not been classified as a violent sexual predator. Therefore, John Doe 128 should be eligible to petition the sentencing court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender
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Registry. John Doe 128 was, and still is, foreclosed from ever being removed from the
Idaho sex offender registry by reason of the July 1, 2001, and 2009 amendments, above-
stated.
Plaintiff, John Doe 128, additionally alleges as follows:
In order to avoid breaking the rules of SORA, since the date of SORA implementation, Plaintiff, John Doe 128, has avoided attending church services during school hours and have been unable to participate in church functions due to the proximity of a school near the church. This has restricted his religious freedom since 1993.
From 1993 to present, he has been restricted from attending education, religious and social events of his children, nieces, nephews and friends causing harm to all of these relationships. He has been restricted from family vacations, boat cruises with his partner, camping trips and other travels due to sex offender registry requirements that vary throughout the United States. He also has been unable to travel abroad due to the registration requirements. All of these restrictions have caused unrest in his relationships.
From 2010 to the present, he has been unable to reside with his partner in her home in Coeur d Alene due to its proximity to a daycare and school which would not be allowed by the sex offender registry. Due to this situation, selling the home is the only realistic option available at this point as he cannot live there with his partner as a couple.
In 2011, John Doe 128 lost a job at Knife River due to a company housing policy relative to sex offenders. That loss of employment has caused him to lose over $750,000.00 in medical and dental benefits they offered, along with raises and promotions over the course of the last 7.5 years.
In 2011, he was hired by Stock Building Supply and worked for approximately three (3) weeks until being fired due to a background check which showed his name on the sex offender registry. He was informed when he interviewed for the company that they allowed hiring of felons, but when the background report came back showing that he was a registered sex offender, he was fired from that job even though he had initially disclosed that fact at the interview. Over the past 7.5 years, John Doe 128 lost approximately $500,000.00 in benefits, raises and promotions.
The stigma of being a registered sex offender, having his photograph in the
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newspaper, and having his name appear in a newspaper article because he filed to be removed from the sex offender registry, has caused Plaintiff, John Doe 128, relationship problems with friends and family since 1993. He has also had to take time off of work in order to go to the Sheriff’s office to renew his registration and pay fees to do so each time, which not only caused a financial burden on him, but also a burden to his employer and co-workers for time away from work. 11. Plaintiff, John Doe 126, is a resident of Clearwater County, state of Idaho. On November 27, 2001, John Doe 126 was convicted in Pontiac County, state of Michigan, of the crime of Child Sexually Abusive Activity, and on March 1, 2002, he was convicted of Criminal Sexual Conduct 1st Degree Person of the Age of Thirteen (13) to Fifteen (15) Years, each a felony. No Judgment of Conviction was entered. On January 28, 2004, Plaintiff’s status of the Youthful Trainee was terminated under the Holmes Youthful Trainee Act (MCL 762.14) and the case was dismissed. The record of arrest and discharge or dismissal in this case was retained as a nonpublic record according to the law. After completion of his sentence, John Doe 126 was placed on probation for a period of two (2) years, and began registering as a sex offender in October of 2001. John Doe 126 was released from probation in 2004, moved to the state of Idaho and began registering as a sex offender. The ex post facto amendments to Idaho SORA effective from and after July 1, 2005, expanded the offenses for which sex offender registration was required to include all substantially similar offenses for which convictions have been entered in another jurisdiction. In the event the Michigan conviction is determined to be a substantially similar offense to Idaho criminal statutes requiring sex offender registration, the Idaho sex offender registration requirements should apply to John Doe 126. John Doe 126 is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and has not
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been classified as a violent sexual predator. Therefore, John Doe 126 should either not
have been required to register as a sex offender in Idaho, or in the alternative, should be
eligible to petition the sentencing court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender
Registry.
Plaintiff, John Doe 126, additionally alleges as follows:
In the years of 2013 through 2017, John Doe 126 was tracked by pastors who are part of the denomination know as the Christian and Missionary Alliance, between the Orofino, ID church and the Lewiston, ID church. One pastor called another pastor, to let each other know of his whereabouts. The Orofino pastor let the Lewiston pastor know that he is on the Sex Offender Registry, and that John Doe 126 may be attending the Lewiston church so they would be able to track his location. John Doe 126 felt moderately violated, knowing that he has to be watched by other individuals or teams of individuals just so he can go to church and practice his religion.
Prior to getting married in 2014, John Doe 126 would use dating websites to seek out someone for dating or a relationship. Through those, dating a person who is on the registry is tracked by either facial recognition or via email, because both of those items are required on dating websites. Therefore, any time John Doe 126 would attempt to join a dating website, he would be denied within 24 hours, because that information was open to the public. It was tracked through the networks, and his face and email would be tagged by those websites.
In late 2006, John Doe 126 was coming back from a visit in Canada. On his way back into the United States, the gates were placed on lock down, he was handcuffed, and taken into a holding cell. He was later released. John Doe 126 was told by U.S. Customs that when traveling and using a passport, a person who is on the sex offender registry is red flagged, meaning “dangerous”, so Customs goes into lock down mode until everything is straightened out. He was told the next time he is coming back into the United States, he is to tell the Customs agent that he is on the registry.
In 2007, John Doe 126 was banned from attempting to travel to Ontario, Canada. He was detained, placed into a holding cell, and told that if he ever attempted to access any part of Canada again, he would be imprisoned for up to 1 year. John Doe 126 was forced to either sign the documentation they gave him, certifying that he agreed to this, or he would face up to 1 year in prison, as well. He signed the paperwork, but was refused a copy of it. This was all because he was on the
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sex offender registry.
In 2005, John Doe 126 applied to live in an apartment complex in Livonia, MI. He was denied on the application, because they did an authorized background check. He asked them, what particularly were they looking for, and they mentioned anyone on the sex offender registry was not allowed to live in their complex.
In 2008, John Doe 126 applied to live in another apartment complex. He was initially granted access to live in one of their apartments. They later advised him that his application had been denied due to an unauthorized background check revealing his status as a sex offender.
In 2010, John Doe 126 was hired at a restaurant to work as a line cook. Fully knowing that he was on the registry, they still hired him. He was later relieved from his job because either a customer or employee found out he was on the registry.
In 2013, John Doe 126 applied for a job and was denied the position because it was too close to a school.
In October of 2015, John Doe 126 applied for a job with the Sodexo Company in Moscow, Idaho. He was denied the job, which he was over qualified for in the first place, because he was on the sex offender registry.
In September of 2017, John Doe 126 was denied a job at a Senior Citizen’s Home in Lewiston, Idaho, and also at the Veteran’s Home in Lewiston, Idaho. Sex offenders are not allowed to work in those types of facilities, just because they are on the registry. It has nothing to do with the fact of a criminal conviction, but because they are on the registry, it is unlawful for a person to work there.
In December of 2017, John Doe 126 was denied a job at the Red Lion in Lewiston, Idaho, because he was on the sex offender registry. Yet, 2 years later prior, he had been offered a job at the same location, and they knew he was on the registry then as well.
In 2002, John Doe 126 was convicted of a crime in Oakland County, MI. The plea agreement provided for disposition under the Holmes Youthful Training Act, which provides that upon completion of sentence, the defendant’s conviction is hidden from their record. Plaintiff was given this opportunity, and he completed his sentence without any issues. His record was supposed to be hidden and sealed, but because he is on the sex offender registry, it appears on the registry websites in violation of the terms of the plea agreement.
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In September of 2014, John Doe 126 and his wife were taken to court over child custody issues. He was forced to testify about his 2002 conviction that was sealed. If he did not reveal the information in the sealed case, he could be found in contempt of court. This was all because the father of the child, the ex-husband, found out that John Doe 126 was on the registry, and threatened to take away her child because he could not find information regarding the 2002 conviction.
In June 2017, an officer from the Orofino Police Department in Idaho took it upon himself to get information illegally, that was sealed from the 2002 conviction, because John Doe 126 is on the Sex Offender Registry.
In July of 2017, John Doe 126 was discriminated against by his local mechanic, someone whom he had come to know very well, because the mechanic had found out that John Doe 126 was on the sex offender registry.
In August of 2017, John Doe 126 closed down a business he had started to build and established in Orofino. He closed it down because, in a public police report, the officer stated that John Doe 126 worked too close to a day care facility. This affected the business and he was forced to close his doors.
In August 2017, John Doe 126's family home and property was vandalized because he was on the registry, and the Orofino Police Department refused to do anything about the situation.
In November 2017, John Doe 126 was convicted of Failing to Register because he did not notify the local Sheriff’s Office that he had changed jobs.
In May of 2018, John Doe 126 was offered a position in New Meadows, Idaho, which is 2.5 hours away from where he lived. He took the position. In the same month, or possibly in June, his employer let him know that two separate times, two separate couples traveled down to the location where he currently works, attempted to harass his employer with the attempt to get Plaintiff fired. They obtained this information by using the Idaho Sex Offender Registry website.
There have been countless times in the past 17 years that John Doe 126 has been on the registry, where he had to pass up very good jobs and places to live, because of being on the registry.
12. Plaintiff, John Doe 116, is a resident of Nez Perce County, state of Idaho. In
March of 2004, John Doe 116 was convicted in Nez Perce County, state of Idaho, of the
crime of Sexual Abuse of a Child Under the Age of Sixteen (16) Years, to-wit: the age of
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fifteen (15) years at the time of the commission of the offense, a felony. The Order
Suspending Sentence and Order of Probation stated that Defendant shall not associate
with any person under the age of 18 years without another competent adult present who
has been previously approved by his supervising officer. John Doe 116 was placed on
probation in 2004 for a period of ten (10) years after successfully completing the retained
jurisdiction program. John Doe 116 began registering in the state of Idaho as a sex
offender in December of 2004, and has continued to do so. He completed a sex offender
treatment program with Dave Neistrom, Valley Treatment Specialties, Clarkston, WA, in
2009, and was released from felony probation in December of 2013. John Doe 116 is not
a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and has not been classified as a violent
sexual predator. Therefore, John Doe 116 should be eligible to petition the sentencing
court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry.
Plaintiff, John Doe 116, additionally alleges as follows:
John Doe 116 has attended two different churches since his conviction. The first was 8 years ago and the second 3 years ago. Both churches welcomed him with open arms. He was honest with the pastors about his crime. For the first several weeks, people were very friendly and welcoming. After a few weeks though, people started to not be so friendly. After talking to a member of each church, they said word had gotten around that he was a registered sex offender and people felt uncomfortable around him and did not feel he should be around their children.
John Doe 116 has seven (7) grandchildren from the ages of 2 to 12. They are very active in dance, school functions, and sports. When they have events at the school, Boys and Girls Club, or recitals, he is excluded due to the registered sex offender laws. This puts a lot of strain on him, his daughters, and his grandchildren, trying to explain why Papa can’t watch their events. When they come to his home, they want to go to the park or school playground, where he is not allowed to go. His daughter has a step-son who resides with her and her husband part time. For the last eight (8) years, the stepson’s biological mother has not allowed John Doe 116 to be around him at all, due to him being a registered sex offender. He has not
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been allowed to go to his daughter’s home to visit or for holidays if the stepson is present. Much of John Doe 116's family lives in Eugene, Oregon, where he was born and raised. For many years, Probation and Parole would not allow him to travel to Oregon to see his family. When he has done so, he must register there as a sex offender the day he arrives. This has severely affected his family life.
John Doe 116 is not allowed to reside within a certain distance from a school, park, or daycare. Fortunately, he lived in a home before convicted that he was allowed to stay in once released on probation. However, he as been harassed due to his conviction in his own neighborhood. Probation and Parole went to each home on his street and told them of his conviction and that he was a registered sex offender. They provided a photo of him to each home. The gas station at the end of the street was also provided this information as a warning. He has a newer neighbor next door, who has looked on the internet and found that he is a sex offender. The neighbor yells profanities at him from across the fence and has had a computer camera in her window, pointing right at his deck. John Doe 116 has notified police and she was forced to removed the camera. He is not invited to neighborhood activities and gatherings, even though he is friends with most of them, because of his sex offender status. He received a letter in the mail a month ago, for a neighborhood watch program, indicating that he could go online to see neighborhood problems and complaints. His girlfriend tried to register him and herself into the program, but was declined due to the fact that she resided in the home of a registered sex offender. He is obviously posted as a threat on the neighborhood watch program.
John Doe 116 has been denied many decent, good paying jobs due to the criminal background check. He has told each interviewer of his crime, and they said it didn’t matter at first, but once they received the background check, it had big bold letters across the top that said “CAUTION-REGISTERED SEX OFFENDER”.
Examples include:
Lewiston RV 2011/2012: John Doe 116 was very qualified for the position of troubleshooting and repairing RV’s. The owner was excited and impressed with his resume. After the background check, he was informed they were unable to hire him.
Home Depot 2015/2016: John Doe 116 applied for a position managing the lumber department. He met with the manager of the store, who was impressed with his resume and wanted to hire him on the spot. John Doe 116 told the store manager about his crime, and the store manager acted like he did not care, and said he would highly recommend him to the corporate office. He passed the UA and they just needed the background
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check done. A few weeks later, he was informed that corporate would not allow him to work at the store due to his sex offender registration status.
North 40 Sporting Goods 2015/2016: It was the same thing with Home Depot for John Doe 116. They were excited to hire him until the background check came back, at which time he was told they could not hire him due to his sex offender registration status.
Howell C&C 2013/2014: John Doe 116 interviewed for his dream job. This job had excellent pay and provided health insurance, retirement, and a great chance for advancement in the company. He was hired after the interview, pending a background check. He received a letter shortly thereafter with a copy of his background check saying they could not hire him. At the top of the first page in red bold letters was “CAUTIONREGISTERED SEX OFFENDER!”.
After John Doe 116's original conviction and 10 years of probation, he had no issues with what he was required to do, in fact, he felt he deserved it. But during those 10 years, the laws were amended 8 or 9 times. His crime was increased to a “violent crime” even though it was not “violent”. He has been punished for 16 years and now will be punished for the rest of his life, even though he has never re-offended in a sexual nature. He is 57 years old. The only jobs he can obtain pay $10-$12 per hour, with no health insurance or benefits. He can hardly maintain his home and pay his bills. He sees no end in sight. He has another 10 years where he can obtain a career job and have benefits and be able to lead a normal life, but this will never happen as long as the laws remain the same.
13. Plaintiff, John Doe 134, is a resident of Canyon County, state of Idaho. On
February 24, 1998, John Doe 134 was convicted in Washoe County, state of Nevada, of
the crime of Statutory Sexual Seduction and Open or Gross Lewdness, to-wit: both
victims were age 15 years at the time of the commission of the offense. John Doe 134
was sentenced to five (5) years probation on July 10, 1998, whereupon he obtained a
transfer of his probation to the state of Idaho, attended a sex offender treatment program,
and began registering on the Idaho Sexual Offender Registry. Under the then existing
language of the Idaho Sex Offender Registration requirements, John Doe 134 would later
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be eligible for release from the requirement to register as a sex offender. The ex post facto amendments to Idaho SORA effective from and after July 1, 2005, expanded the offenses for which convictions have been entered in another jurisdiction. The Nevada conviction in this case has never been determined to be a substantially similar offense to Idaho criminal statutes requiring sex offender registration. Therefore, John Doe 134 should either not have been required to register as a sex offender in Idaho, or in the alternative, should be eligible to petition the sentencing court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry. Additionally, in the event the Nevada crime for which conviction was entered is determined to be substantially similar to the Idaho offense of lewd and lascivious conduct, the ex post facto amendments to Idaho SORA effective from and after July 1, 2009, expanded the definition of “aggravated offense” to exclude any age demarcation to the crime of lewd and lascivious conduct, leaving the crime of “Lewd and Lascivious Conduct” with no reference to the age of the victim as an “aggravated offense.” John Doe 134 is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and is not a violent sexual predator. Therefore, John Doe 134 should be eligible to petition the sentencing court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry. John Doe 134 was, and still is, foreclosed from ever being removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry by reason of the July 1, 2009 amendment above stated.
Plaintiff, John Doe 134, additionally alleges as follows: On July 7, 1998, as part of John Doe 134's probationary release, he was rated a low-risk offender in his pre-sentencing reports. On July 10, 1998, he was granted probation under interstate compact to move back to the state of Idaho. His location was approved to live in Idaho with his parents by the Nevada authorities. On July 14, 1998, Nevada reclassified him as a “violent” offender. However, on
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July 24, 1998, he receive a copy of Nevada’s registry form, on which he scored 38 out of a possible 168, which qualified him as a low risk offender. On August 25, 1998, he was subjected to a second assessment, in which he scored 37 out of a possible 168. The Assessor refused to accept this classification, crossed out his scores, and wrote that he is a higher-level threat in an attempt to move him into a “violent” category with more restrictions and requirements. This moved him from law enforcement notification only to law enforcement notification, only, to law enforcement notification plus public notification, in addition to other burdens.
On August 14, 1998, John Doe 134's attorney sent notice that the State of Nevada Community Notification Sex Offender Assessors Office added another law he did not plead to in order to raise his level of offense as outlined above. This was an attempt to classify his crime as a sexual assault, which it was not. This was the first of many attempts to reclassify him as a violent predator and increase his registration requirements.
On February 12, 1999, he was informed by his attorney that felony charges can be sealed. However, on November 8, 1999, he was informed by his attorney that the felony charge he pled guilty to could no longer be sealed. This was not what Plaintiff agreed to when entering into his plea agreement.
On July 1, 2002, in addition to notifying registration officials where he lived, where he worked, and all other requirements, the State of Idaho on this date required notification of whether he had enrolled in higher learning or worked in education – which, in effect, prohibited him from going back to school. In addition, his employment at the time involved chemical analysis and food testing, and this created multiple embarrassing employment situations and difficulty in his ability to accept training assignments on behalf of his employer. This held him down in his job and prohibited promotions, and ultimately led to him having to leave the company. Specifically, he had applied for four different supervisory positions, but was unable to meet all of the corporate requirements due to the registry requirements, and ultimately had to leave the company.
On the same date as above, he was required to notify the State of Idaho whenever his employment situation changed. So, the rules in effect cost him his employment, and he then had to report that loss of employment.
John Doe 134 was mailed a notice on July 1, 2006, stating that he could not be found on or near schools or school grounds, or daycare facilities. He was further informed via letter that whereas he had ten (10) days to register in the past, he now had seven (7) days within which to register. He was also notified that if he were to change address or move to a different county, he now had only two (2) days to register. In addition, any name change now had to be reported within two
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(2) days. Any move to another state, and he would be forced to notify the State of Idaho within two (2) days. He was also notified that he (and every other offender, of any level) would have to verify their address every four (4) months with the State of Idaho registry. Previously, that requirement was limited to violent offenders.
On October 1, 2006, he was mailed the “Halloween Notification,” under which he was required to be at home by 6 p.m., with the light off, and to not answer the door for trick-or-treaters. On October 1, 2007, he was mailed the same “Halloween Notification.” He has never been mailed this notice since.
On June 28, 2009, John Doe 134 was notified that in order to ever be released from the registration, he was required to notify both the county prosecuting attorney and the central sex offender registry.
On July 1, 2010, he was notified that he had to register his mailing address with the state registry system.
On July 1, 2011, he was informed that all names and addresses he uses, or had ever used, had to be recorded with the state registry system. Also, all license plate numbers and descriptions of all vehicles he owned and used, including boats and airplanes, for personal and business use, were required to be registered with the state registry system.
Any and all telephone numbers, email or IM addresses used, all names and addresses of where John Doe 134 was employed; any professional licenses that he maintained; and any passports had to be provided to the state registry system. Notification of any temporary lodging, i.e., anything over seven (7) days, was required be provided to the state registry system. Palm prints, instead of fingerprints, would be taken and provided, as well as a copy of driver’s license, would thereafter have to be provided at the time of each registration.
On July 1, 2013, he received notice that the registration fee was now $80 annually. It used to be $10.
On July 1, 2016, he received notification that instead of seven (7) days to register, he now had to register in five (5) days. It started at 10 days.
On July 1, 2017, he was notified that he is now required to provide a DNA sample to the state registry system.
All of the above requirements have added an almost immeasurable burden to his life. Instead of going on with his life, working at his business, and, enjoying the
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company of his family in the area, he is often left to suffer with these burdensome regulations alone. This system robs him of his family life and support system, as it is onerous, capricious and arbitrary.
He has five nieces and nephews. They attend religious private schools, and, due to the onerous requirements above, he is unable to attend any of their school functions, including Christmas and Easter plays or performances, athletic events, or even graduations.
Any passports he has and all numbers must be provided to the state registry system.
On February 8, 2016, International Megan’s Law, stating anyone required to register as a sex offender in any jurisdiction is required to inform their jurisdiction of any travel within twenty-one (21) days, including itinerary, destination, dates, places of departure, arrival, return, carrier and flight numbers for the entire trip, destination country, address, contact information, and purpose of travel. This includes copy of passport, and consultation with country of destination.
Plaintiff has missed over five (5) family reunions, each July of the last several years, due to these onerous requirements. He has missed multiple funerals of family members in neighboring states because of the near impossibility of obtaining travel permission. In addition, those who ask for permission are given further unwanted scrutiny, inviting even more trouble with the registration administrators.
When he has traveled in the past, the State of Idaho’s onerous and burdensome regulations have forced him to humiliate himself by going to the county he was visiting, to obtain their verification of his travel. Often they wouldn’t know what he was talking about or needed, which led to further embarrassment due to his explanation. This has had a chilling effect on his employment and vacation abilities, as well as his right to move about the country freely – a right which, in short, doesn’t exist.
This registry makes it almost impossible to date members of the opposite sex. An offender is marked for life, and even if Plaintiff did find someone to spend the rest of his life with, this system makes it impossible to marry that person, or to even consider having children of your own.
In or about September of 1998, John Doe 134 applied with an investment firm in Boise, Idaho, for which he was highly qualified. The interview went extremely well, and they were progressing to their making of an offer. As he was required to inform them of his status on the registry, they immediately withdrew their
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consideration of his employment.
Immediately after John Doe 134 was charged with the two offenses outlined above, and before he accepted the plea agreement, State Farm Insurance contacted him, terminating not only his insurance, but that of all of his family members.
On April 1, 2018, three employees at my business googled his name, found him in the registry, and quit on the same day due to his status under this system. This has created even more hardship in his life as he continues to comply with these requirements, work hard, pay his taxes and seek to be a good citizen. It is almost as if the system would prefer him to fail.
For approximately ten (10) of the twenty (20) years he has registered, the State of Idaho would shout out Plaintiff’s name, then shout out the words “Sex Offender” in a room of over 100 people at the DMV, and then shout out “has registered.” This equates to nothing more than public humiliation.
Plaintiff has been threatened in public. He cannot go to a public place such as a store without the fear of someone accosting and trying to engage him in either a verbal or physical altercation. This has happened before, so he lives in constant fear of it happening again. People have recognized his photo from the internet database, and made a show of supposedly protecting their kids and getting in his face and invading his personal space.
14. Plaintiff, John Doe 122, is a resident of Nez Perce County, state of Idaho. In
1998, John Doe 122 was convicted in Nez Perce County, state of Idaho, of the crime of
Lewd Conduct With a Child Under the Age of Sixteen (16) Years, to-wit: victim fifteen
(15) years of age at the time of commission of the offense, a felony. The ex post facto
amendments to Idaho SORA effective from and after July 1, 2001, created the
“aggravated offense” exception to eligibility for release from the Idaho Sex Offender
Registry. Under this designation, the crime of Lewd Conduct With a Minor where the
victim was under twelve (12) years of age at the time of commission of the offense was
classified as an “aggravated offense.” Furthermore, the ex post facto amendments to
Idaho SORA effective from and after July 1, 2009, expanded the definition of
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“aggravated offense” to exclude any age demarcation to the crime of lewd and lascivious
conduct, leaving the crime of “Lewd and Lascivious Conduct” with no reference to the
age of the victim as an “aggravated offense.” John Doe 122 petitioned the court to be
released from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry requirements in 2011; however, that
petition was denied. John Doe 122 is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated
offense, and has not been classified as a violent sexual predator. Therefore, John Doe
122 should be eligible to petition the sentencing court to be removed from the Idaho Sex
Offender Registry. John Doe 122 was, and still is, foreclosed from ever being removed
from the Idaho sex offender registry by reason of the July 1, 2001, and 2009 amendments,
above-stated.
Plaintiff, John Doe 122, additionally alleges as follows:
After John Doe 122’s divorce, it made it hard to be with his children because they were under the age of 18. He missed baseball games and graduation and being with them at birthday events. There are many things that people take for granted with their children that he will never be able to get back with his children because of the sex offender registry. It is inhumane that the government punishes his children for what he did, through the sex offender registry requirements.
In 2000, John Doe 122's wife was harassed by an employee at her work. This employee put fliers on everyone’s car in the parking lot, saying what he had done. This employee also sent a letter to his house telling his wife that she did not deserve to have children and that she would “rot in Hell”. His wife divorced him shortly after that. His oldest daughter and her husband let John Doe 122 move in with them for awhile, but later told him that he had to move because the neighbor thought her husband was the offender. He had asked other family members and gotten the same response. After awhile, he was able to buy a house and still lives there today. The registry just doesn’t harm him, but it also harms his children. They suffer the same as he does. He lives with anxiety, depression, hopelessness, shame, embarrassment, and the fear of living alone for the rest of his life.
In 2012, a woman that lives near John Doe 122, told his daughter that she was going to the sheriff, and school board to complain that he lived too close to a
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school, wanting him to be forced to move. Nothing ever came of it, but the damage was done. Incidents like those have caused him to rarely leave his house. It is the only safe place he has left.
15. Plaintiff, John Doe 111, is a resident of Bannock County, state of Idaho. In
1997, John Doe 111 was convicted in Caribou County, state of Idaho, of two (2) counts of
the crime of Battery with the Intent to Commit Lewd Conduct and the crime of Battery
with the Intent to Commit Rape with a Minor Child, to-wit: the ages of Fourteen (14)
Years and Sixteen (16) Years, each a felony. John Doe 111 was sentenced to a period of
incarceration of two (2) years and was thereafter placed on parole for a period of four (4)
years. John Doe 111 began registering as a sex offender in the state of Idaho in 2001.
John Doe 111 is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and has not been
classified as a violent sexual predator. Therefore, John Doe 111 should be eligible to
petition the sentencing court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry.
Plaintiff, John Doe 111, additionally alleges as follows:
After completing the six month “rider” program, John Doe 111 was told that he must register as a sex offender. He told his probation officer that he had a pleaagreement that said he would not have to register. His probation officer told him to register that day or go to jail. After registering, he was kicked out of his apartment, and once the word got around, he was fired from his employment. After the loss of his apartment and job, he was sent back to prison for probation violations that included no place to live and no employment.
After registering, Plaintiff John Doe 111 was told that he was not allowed to go to any church or gatherings where teen-girls might be present. It was not until he was release from probation that he was allowed to be in a public church meeting.
It is a constant struggle being on the Sex Offender Registry, and has caused John Doe 111 a lifetime of loss. He has struggled to find and sustain full time employment. He has had a very difficult time finding housing due to the fact few places will rent to someone on the Sex Offender Registry. Due to his being on the registry, he lost custody and visitation rights with his children. The judge, based
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solely on the fact that he was a registered sex offender, took his family away. John Doe 111 has had to stay with family and friends since he was told to register. Every apartment he has lived in was leased by someone other than him because they all required a background check. Being a registered sex offender makes it nearly impossible to find housing. He has been let go from jobs that provide housing because he is not allowed to live there. John Doe 111 is limited in his employment opportunities. He has applied and interviewed with countless companies in and outside of Idaho, and been denied due to the Registry. When he has gotten lucky enough to get a job, he is constantly pushed aside and never given an opportunity to advance within the company because he is on the Sex Offender Registry. When moving to a new town or neighborhood, within a short period of time, those living nearby start making threats and trying to push John Doe 111 out of the area. 16. Plaintiff, John Doe 34, is a resident of Franklin County, State of Idaho. In May of 2003, John Doe 34 was convicted in Franklin County, State of Idaho, of the crime of Sexual Abuse of a Child Under the Age of Sixteen (16) Years, to wit: the age of five (5) years, a felony. John Doe 34 was released from probation on April 23, 2013. At the time of his conviction, the Idaho Sex Offender Registry requirements had been enacted and John Doe 34 was then required to register as a sex offender. Under the language of the Idaho sex offender registration requirements as they existed at the time of his release from custody/probation, John Doe 34 would later be eligible for release from the requirement to register as a sex offender. The ex post facto amendments to Idaho SORA effective from and after July 1, 2009, expanded the definition of “aggravated offense” to include, “any other offense set forth in Section 18-8304, Idaho Code, if at the time of the commission of the offense the victim was below the age of thirteen (13) years.” John Doe 34 is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and has not been
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classified as a violent sexual predator. Therefore, John Doe 34 should be eligible to
petition the sentencing court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry. John
Doe 34 was, and still is, foreclosed from ever being removed from the Idaho sex offender
registry by reason of the July 1, 2009, amendment above stated.
Plaintiff, John Doe 34, additionally alleges as follows:
From the time of John Doe 34's arrest, he was told he could not live in the same house as his children, even though the crime happened 15 years prior to his arrest. There hadn’t been any issues, subsequent to commission of the crime, with his other kids or the victim. It was an extreme financial burden to his family, as his source of income was a home based business.
John Doe 34 had an opportunity to buy a house and property while he was on parole, but his parole officer would not allow him to do so, because there was a public beach on a lake that was approximately 1 mile away from the home.
As of yet, John Doe 34 has not been denied employment only because he runs his own Auto Body and Salvage business. He is harassed because he has had a lot of inventory and was told he has to register each vehicle, including the ones that don’t run. The requirements seem to change each time he goes in to register. The most recent registration took 2 trips to the Sheriff’s Office and over 5 hours between the 2 times. He was also told by one of the deputies that he couldn’t have this type of business because they wouldn’t know what he was driving.
While on parole and living away from his family, John Doe 34's mailbox was constantly opened and his mail was thrown all over the street. This was not happening to anyone else living on his street, only to him.
John Doe 34 was told by his lawyer that 10 years after completion of his parole and if there were no other offenses, he would be released from having to register. That has not been the case as he is still having to register, and the annual cost to register keeps increasing.
17. Plaintiff, John Doe 132, is a resident of Bannock County, state of Idaho. On
May 11, 1988, John Doe 132 was convicted in Santa Barbara County, state of California,
of the crime of Lewd and Lascivious Act w/Child Under Fourteen (14) Years, to-wit:
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victim eight (8) years of age at the time of commission of the offense, a felony. John Doe 132 was sentenced to a term of incarceration of six (6) years in the custody of a California state prison facility, but was released from custody in February of 1991. John Doe 132 was released from parole in March of 1992. John Doe 132 was not required to register as a sex offender in the state of California. John Doe 132 moved to the state of Idaho in 2000, and was informed of his obligation to register as a sex offender at that time. In 2011, John Doe 132 petitioned the Idaho court to be released from sex offender registration requirements; however, that petition was denied. The ex post facto amendments to Idaho SORA effective from and after July 1, 2001, created the “aggravated offense” exception to eligibility for release from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry. Under this designation, the crime of Lewd Conduct With a Minor where the victim was under twelve (12) years of age at the time of commission of the offense was classified as an “aggravated offense”. Finally, the ex post facto amendments to Idaho SORA effective July 1, 2011, provided that an offense for which a conviction was entered in another jurisdiction which is substantially similar to any Idaho offense considered to be an “aggravated offense”, will also be considered an “aggravated offense” in Idaho for purposes of sex offender registration requirements. John Doe 132 is not a recidivist, did not commit an aggravated offense, and has not been classified as a violent sexual predator. Therefore, John Doe 132 should be eligible to petition the sentencing court to be removed from the Idaho Sex Offender Registry. John Doe 132 was, and still is, foreclosed from ever being removed from the Idaho sex offender registry by reason of the July 1, 2001 and 2011 amendments, above-stated.
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Plaintiff, John Doe 132, additionally alleges as follows:
John Doe 132 became part of the Melchizedic Priesthood in 1997, and even then he was not limited in various callings when offered a position in any ward. After he registered as a sex offender, it became a matter of public knowledge. Positions for him to participate within the church became very restrictive after that. Members would go to the bishop and express concern that he was given positions that may involve children. He was allowed to take positions such as being in charge of maintenance and securing the church at night. While in his current ward, he was released from his position as a Sunday school teacher due to complaints that as a registered sex offender, he should not be teaching Sunday school even though they were all adults.
When he moved to where he is currently living, the bishop for the ward John Doe 132 was supposed to attend refused to even meet with him or give him his phone number.
The greatest harm resulting from having to register as a sex offender has been to John Doe 132's children. Parents of most of his children’s friends would not allow their children to come to their home and interact with his children. During church, his children were subjected to name calling and bullying, saying their dad was a pervert or sex offender. Even during school, his children would sometime come from school in tears and would refuse to discuss what happened during school.
In this small community, it is difficult, if not impossible to locate suitable workers for John Doe 132's business. After an employee got hired, they would approach me after a short while saying they were quitting due to him being on the sex offender registry. Plaintiff was unable to locate and hire apprentices, laborers, or journeymen to work for him. Due to surgeries and constantly being in pain, it became extremely difficult for Plaintiff to continue working as a plumbing contractor. As of late, his knee and prior surgeries have placed him in a disabled status and without proper help in his business as a plumbing and construction contractor, he is out of business.
Approximately 2013, John Doe 132 and his family were offered section 8 housing after being on the waiting list for a couple of years. They were contacted by section 8 housing personnel stating they were next in line for housing. Plaintiff and his family were having a very difficult time financially. They were interviewed and were given the housing package with all the requirements and rules for section 8 housing. They were further instructed to go ahead with their search for suitable housing in the range of their qualifications. After locating several potential residences, they went back to the housing office to complete the final paperwork. John Doe 132 and his family were then told that they could not
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receive section 8 approval due to him being on the sex offender registry. The housing clerk, who was sympathetic to his family’s hurt, said that no other felons would be denied section 8 housing and it was unfair. Even murderers, burglars, and other felons would be eligible for section 8 despite their crime.
Finally after his last knee surgery, it was determined that John Doe 132 needed to be admitted to a long term care facility for rehabilitation. There were two facilities where he qualified for insurance coverage. However, due to his status as a sex offender, he was refused admission to both facilities. This occurred in April and May of 2018. Even the hospital administrator intervening on his behalf could not get either facility to admit John Doe 132. Plaintiff’s medical treatment required him to receive antibiotics through a pik line that went from his arm to a chamber over his heart. While at home recovering from his surgery, he fell causing a huge gash in his arm. His son rushed him to the hospital where they stopped the bleeding and stitched the gaping wound.
EX POST FACTO
18. Plaintiffs reallege and reincorporated paragraphs 6-17 as if fully set forth
herein and allege that for the purposes of this Amended Complaint Part II, this Honorable
Court in its Memorandum Decision and Order has utilized the Ex Post Facto legal
analysis as a barrier to reaching a particular analysis of Cruel and Unusual Punishment,
Double Jeopardy, Contracts, and Separation of Powers. As such, the Plaintiffs focus
primarily upon said analysis, however, the Plaintiffs jointly allege violations of their
constitutional rights as to Cruel and Unusual Punishment, Double Jeopardy, Contracts,
and Separation of Powers.
Plaintiffs allege that [t]he touchstone of the Supreme Court's inquiry into whether
a sentencing law violates the Ex Post Facto Clause is whether a given change in law
presents a sufficient risk of increasing the measure of punishment attached to the covered
crimes; the question when a change in law creates such a risk is a matter of degree, and
the test cannot be reduced to a single formula. U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 1, § 9, cl. 3. Peugh v.
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U.S., 133 S. Ct. 2072 (2013). See also, United States v. Elk Shoulder, 738 F.3d 948 (9th Cir. 2013).
CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT 19. Plaintiffs reallege and reincorporated paragraphs 6-17 as if fully set forth herein and allege that in determining whether a statute is otherwise cruel and unusual, the U.S. Supreme Court relies on the proportionality test which requires a weighing of the punishment inflicted upon the offender against the protection and safety the community enjoys as a result of the punishment. A 3-part objective test has been adopted to determine proportionality. 1. The nature of the offense; 2. The sentence imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions; and, 3. The sentence imposed upon other criminals in the same jurisdiction. See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983). According to the proportionality test, the effects of community notification on offenders must be proportional to the benefit the notification provides to society. The most recent studies conducted have failed to empirically show any additional benefit to the public through community notification. See, Peter Finn, Sex Offender Community Notification, National Institute of Justice: Research in Action (Feb. 1997); and, Abril R. Bedarf, Comment, Examining Sex Offender Community Notification Laws, 83, Cal.L.Rev. 885m 893 (1995).
DOUBLE JEOPARDY 20. Plaintiffs reallege and reincorporated paragraphs 6-17 as if fully set forth herein and allege that evaluation of a double jeopardy challenge depends on an initial determination of whether enforcement of the statute constitutes punishment. The Double
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Jeopardy Clause prohibits the government from punishing an individual twice for the same crime. In cases where sex offender registration and notification laws are challenged on all three grounds – ex post facto, cruel and unusual punishment, and double jeopardy – courts often decide the issue under the Ex Post Facto Clause rather than evaluate the law under the Double Jeopardy Clause. The primary inquiry, then, is whether the challenged provision has a punitive effect. Keeping Children Out Of Double Jeopardy: An Assessment Of Punishment And Megan’s Law In Doe v. Poritz. 81 Minn.L.Rev. 501.
CONTRACTS CLAUSE 21. Plaintiffs that pled guilty pursuant a plea agreement, received a Withheld Judgment, and/or had their charge reduced and/or dismissed, allege that the Contract Clause of the U.S. Constitution prohibits states from enacting any law that will impair "the Obligation of Contracts." This prohibition, in general, prevents the states from passing any legislation that would alleviate the commitments of one party to a contract or make enforcement of the contract unreasonably difficult. Plaintiffs reallege and reincorporated paragraphs 6-17 as if fully set forth herein in support of this claim.
SEPARATION OF POWERS 22. Plaintiffs that pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement, received a Withheld Judgment, and/or had their charge reduced and/or dismissed, allege that the Idaho Legislature has usurped the authority of Idaho Courts to enter into and enforce plea agreements, to grant withheld judgments, and/or reduce and/or dismiss charges. Plaintiffs reallege and reincorporated paragraphs 6-17 as if fully set forth herein in support of this claim.
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DUE PROCESS AND SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS 23. Plaintiffs reallege and reincorporated paragraphs 6-17 as if fully set forth herein and allege that their Due Process and Substantive Due Process rights have been violated. In particular, Plaintiffs assert that their “right to travel” has been violated as they have not been treated as a welcome visitor rather than an unfriendly alien when temporarily present in the second State, and, for those travelers who elect to become permanent residents, the right to be treated like other citizens of that State. Plaintiffs allege that SORA penalizes migration or creates fixed, permanent distinctions among citizens. Plaintiffs allege that any classification which serves to penalize the exercise of that right, unless shown to be necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest, is unconstitutional.
RELIGION 24. Plaintiffs reallege and reincorporated paragraphs 6-17 as if fully set forth herein and allege that Idaho has substantially burdened their exercise of religion without demonstrating that application of the burden to the person is both (a) essential to further a compelling governmental interest; and is (b) the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.
ATTORNEY’S FEES 25. That pursuant to 42 U.S.C.A. §§1983 and 1988, and further pursuant to Rule 54 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (F.R.C.P.), plaintiffs, and each of them as the prevailing party(ies) herein, are entitled to an award of costs of suit, including attorney fees determined in the Court’s discretion to be reasonable in the premises, incurred by
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plaintiffs in their prosecution of this action, against defendants, jointly and severally PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs request this Honorable Court for the following: 1. A declaration that Idaho SORA 2001, 2009, 2011 violate, both facially and as applied by the Defendants, the due process clause of the United States Constitution (U.S. CONST., Amend. XIV); 2. A declaration that Idaho SORA 2001, 2009, 2011 violate, both facially and as applied by the Defendants, the due process clause of the Idaho Constitution (ID CONST., Article I, § 13 ); 3. A declaration that Idaho SORA 2001, 2009, 2011 violate, both facially and as applied by the Defendants, the First Amendment to the United States Constitution (U.S. CONST., Amend. I); 4. A declaration that Idaho SORA 2001, 2009, 2011 violate, both facially and as applied by the Defendants, the right to practice religion without governmental interference protected by the Idaho Constitution (ID CONST., Article I, § 4 ); 5. A declaration that Idaho SORA 2001, 2009, 2011 violate, both facially and as applied by the Defendants, the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution (U.S. CONST., Amend. IV); 6. A declaration that Idaho SORA 2001, 2009, 2011 violate, both facially and as applied by the Defendants, the right to equal protection guaranteed by the Idaho Constitution (ID CONST., Article I, § 1 ); 7. A declaration that Idaho SORA 2001, 2009, 2011 violate, both facially and as applied by the Defendants, the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment contained AMENDED COMPLAINT PART II - 43

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in the United States Constitution (U.S. CONST., Amend. VIII). 8. A declaration that Idaho SORA 2001, 2009, 2011 violate, both facially and
as applied by the Defendants, the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment contained in the Idaho Constitution (ID. CONST., Article I, § 6 );
9. A declaration that Idaho SORA 2001, 2009, 2011 violate, both facially and as applied by the Defendants, the ex post facto clause of the United States Constitution (U.S. CONST., Art. 1, §9, cl. 10);
10. A declaration that Idaho SORA 2001, 2009, 2011 violate, both facially and as applied by the Defendants, the ex post facto clause of the Idaho Constitution (ID CONST., Article I, § 16);
11. A declaration that Idaho SORA 2001, 2009, 2011 violate, both facially and as applied by the Defendants, the double jeopardy clause of the United States Constitution (U.S. CONST., Am. V, AM. XIV);
12. A declaration that Idaho SORA 2001, 2009, 2011 violate, both facially and as applied by the Defendants, the double jeopardy clause of the Idaho Constitution (ID CONST., Article I, §13);
13. A declaration that Idaho SORA 2001, 2009, 2011 violate, both facially and as applied by the Defendants, the contracts clause of the United States Constitution (U.S. CONST., Art. 1, § 10);
14. A declaration that Idaho SORA 2001, 2009, 2011 violate, both facially and as applied by the Defendants, the contracts clause of the Idaho Constitution (ID CONST., Article I, §16);
15. A declaration that Idaho SORA 2001, 2009, 2011 violate, both facially and AMENDED COMPLAINT PART II - 44

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as applied by the Defendants, the takings clause of the United States Constitution (U.S. CONST., Amend. V);
16. A declaration that Idaho SORA 2001, 2009, 2011 violate, both facially and as applied by the Defendants, the takings clause of the Idaho Constitution (ID CONST., Article I, § 14);
17. A declaration that Idaho SORA 2001, 2009, 2011 violate, both facially and as applied by the Defendants, the separation of powers doctrine of the Idaho Constitution (ID CONST., Article I, § 3);
18. A declaration that Idaho SORNA 2001, 2009, 2011 violate, both facially and as applied by the Defendants, the residual and specific grants of police powers to the State of Idaho contained in Article 1, Section 10 of the U.S. Constitution;
19. A permanent injunction prohibiting each Defendant from enforcing Idaho SORA 2001, 2009, 2011;
20. Reasonable costs and attorney’s fees, and 21. Any further relief the Court deems appropriate. DATED This 30th day of August, 2018.
FULLER LAW OFFICES
By /s/ Greg J. Fuller GREG J. FULLER 161 Main Avenue West P.O. Box L Twin Falls, ID 83303 fullerlaw@cableone.net (208) 734-1602
AMENDED COMPLAINT PART II - 45

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO

JOHN AND JANE DOES 1-134, Plaintiffs,
v.
LAWRENCE WASDEN, Attorney General of the State of Idaho, et al.,
Defendants.

Case No. 1:16-cv-00429-DCN
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER

I. INTRODUCTION This represents Plaintiffs, Does 1-134 (hereinafter “Plaintiffs” or “Does”), second attempt to challenge the constitutionality of Idaho’s Sexual Offender Registration Notification Act (“SORA” or the “Act”). The Court dismissed Plaintiffs’ complaint in May, 2018. Dkt. 32. While the Court granted Plaintiffs leave to amend some of their asapplied challenges to SORA, it dismissed all facial challenges without leave to amend. The Court also held Plaintiffs could not amend certain causes of action because even asapplied challenges to such claims would fail. The Court allowed Plaintiffs to amend the rest of their constitutional claims to state appropriate as-applied challenges with specific plaintiffs and specific facts. In their new complaint, Plaintiffs add facts with respect to twelve defendants, but fail to tie such facts to specific constitutional violations, and also fail to allege essential details which would allow the Court to evaluate whether any of the as-applied challenges are plausible. In their briefing, Plaintiffs do not cite a single Idaho, District Court within

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the Ninth Circuit, Ninth Circuit, or Supreme Court case which would support an asapplied challenge to SORA, and also ignore most of the arguments raised in Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. Finally, at oral argument, Plaintiffs’ attorney did not address any of Plaintiffs’ as-applied challenges. Instead, Counsel exclusively argued an ex post facto challenge to SORA, despite the Court’s previous holding that any facial ex post facto claim fails as a matter of law. The Second Amended Complaint does not plausibly allege any as-applied challenge to SORA and, therefore, must be dismissed.
II. FACTS On September 22, 2016, Plaintiffs filed the instant suit to challenge the constitutionality of the 2001, 2009, and 2011 amendments to SORA. Idaho Code § 188301 et. seq. Among other things, the 2001 amendments to SORA ended the right of offenders who had been convicted of an “aggravated offense” to petition for release from registration requirements. At the time, the definition of “aggravated offense” included various sexual offenses committed against a victim less than twelve years old. The 2001 amendments also empowered the Idaho State Police to make the sex offender registry available to the public via the internet. In 2009, the definition of “aggravated offense” was expanded to include certain offenses against any child under the age of sixteen years old, as well as to cover a number of additional sexual crimes. In 2011, SORA was amended so that, inter alia, any offense under the laws of another jurisdiction that is substantially similar to an “aggravated offense” in Idaho is an “aggravated offense” for purposes of registration requirements. The 2011 amendments also increased the information required to be included for each sex offender in the digital
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registry; required an offender to register within two days of entry of conviction or prior to release from incarceration; required offenders to report any changes to their address, name or employment status within two working days of such change; required offenders to notify the police department of any lodging that would last longer than a period of seven days, and also to notify the jurisdiction of the location where they would be lodging; and required offenders to give notice of any vehicle changes. Finally, the 2011 amendments stated registration under SORA is for life, but allowed any offender other than a recidivist, offender convicted of an aggravated offense, or an offender designated as a violent sexual predator, to petition for release from the registration requirement within ten years of release from prison or parole.
Plaintiffs are all individuals required to register under SORA. Due to the aforementioned amendments to SORA, it appears that all Does are required to register for life under the Act because of their classification as recidivist, or because their underlying crime has been classed as an “aggravated offense.” Plaintiffs amended their initial complaint on April 26, 2017. Dkt. 4 (hereinafter “First Amended Complaint”). In their First Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs did not associate particular causes of action with specific individuals, but instead generally stated that all 134 Does suffered from a wide variety of constitutional deprivations as a result of SORA. Plaintiffs’ claims under the United States Constitution included Procedural and Substantive Due Process violations under the Fourteenth Amendment, Free Exercise of Religion violations under the First Amendment, Equal Protection violations under the Fourteenth Amendment, Cruel and Unusual Punishment violations under the Eighth Amendment, Ex Post Facto Clause
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violations, Double Jeopardy Clause violations under the Fifth Amendment, Contracts Clause violations, and Takings violations under the Fifth Amendment. Plaintiffs also included claims for Contracts Clause, Separation of Powers, and Police Power violations under the Idaho Constitution.
Defendants1 filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint on November 17, 2017. The Court held oral argument on March 6, 2018, and subsequently issued its Memorandum Decision and Order granting Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. Dkt. 32. In its Order, the Court held Plaintiffs could not establish any facial challenges to SORA because there are numerous circumstances under which the Act is valid and constitutional. Dkt. 32, at 8-9 (citing Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 449 (2008) (“a plaintiff can only succeed in a facial challenge by ‘establish[ing] that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid,’ i.e., that the law is unconstitutional in all of its applications.”) (quoting U.S. v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987)). Because it could not find as a matter of law that SORA, either in whole or in part, was facially unconstitutional, the Court dismissed all facial challenges without leave to amend.
The Court could not determine whether Plaintiffs stated any valid as-applied challenges to SORA because Plaintiffs did not plead any as-applied challenges in their First Amended Complaint. The Court dismissed Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint but
1 There are a number of named Defendants in this case, including various state officials, members of the Sexual Offender Management Board, the Idaho State Police, and individual county sheriffs. The Court refers to this group, individually and collectively, as “Defendants.”
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permitted Plaintiffs to amend certain claims to allege facts—tying specific Plaintiffs to specific causes of action—to allow the Court to assess standing and determine whether Plaintiffs could state plausible causes of action. However, the Court dismissed some of Plaintiffs’ claims without leave to amend because even any as-applied challenges would fail.
First, the Court denied leave to amend all but one aspect of Plaintiffs’ Procedural Due Process claim. Specifically, Plaintiffs alleged SORA subjected sexual offenders to “new restrictions and requirements, regardless of any actual risk to society and without the possibility of any hearing[.]” Dkt. 4, at ¶¶ 236, 237. The Court explained the Supreme Court, in Connecticut Dep’t of Public Safety, and the Ninth Circuit, in Doe v. Tandeske, already ruled upon this very issue. See generally, Connecticut Dep’t of Public Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1 (2003); Doe v. Tandeske, 361 F.3d 594 (9th Cir. 2004). In both cases, the Courts held classification-based registration requirements were valid, that registrants were not entitled to an opportunity to be heard on an individual basis, and that this type of regulatory structure does not violate Procedural Due Process rights. Under such precedent, a state can enforce specific registration requirements based upon a group classification without making individualized assessments. The Court accordingly denied Plaintiffs’ leave to amend their general Procedural Due Process claim.
Plaintiffs also alleged SORA’s reporting requirements for students, and use of the term “loiter,” were unconstitutionally vague and discriminatory. The Court reviewed SORA’s student reporting requirements and use of the term loiter, determined neither provision was unconstitutionally vague, but allowed Plaintiffs to amend their Complaint
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only to allege specific reporting provisions or other terms within SORA are unconstitutionally vague as applied to a particular Doe. Dkt. 32, at 39 n. 17.
The Court did not grant Plaintiffs leave to amend their Equal Protection claim because sex offenders are not a protected class, and because there is a valid reason for treating age groups differently,2 so even as-applied Equal Protection challenges are barred. The Court also denied leave to amend any takings challenge under the Fifth Amendment unless a particular Doe could allege compliance with the exhaustion criteria of Williamson Cty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172 (1985). Finally, the Court dismissed Plaintiffs’ state police powers claim without leave to amend because a state can enact and enforce its own statutes and the Supreme Court has held that a state can apply sexual registration laws retroactively, so requiring Does already released from probation to re-register after SORA was amended does not violate Idaho’s police powers.
Following the Court’s dismissal, Plaintiffs filed a new complaint on August 30, 2018. In their new complaint, Plaintiffs provide allegations in support of as-applied claims of twelve Does. Such allegations illustrate the twelve Does have faced significant hardships related to the registration requirements under SORA. These challenges can be generally categorized as difficulties finding employment or disruption of business
2 In their First Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs alleged SORA causes a disparity in treatment between youth and adult sex offenders in Idaho. The Court determined Equal Protection analysis does not apply to this claim because sex offenders are not a suspect class, age is not a suspect class, and the Supreme Court has already determined that juveniles and adults are not similarly situated, particularly in the context of sexual offenses, and can therefore be treated differently. Dkt. 32, at 29 (citing Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569-70 (2005)).
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opportunities, burdens upon travel, problems maintaining familial, social, or personal relationships, trouble finding a place to live, and difficulties attending church. Although the Court sympathizes with the Does and recognizes they have endured substantial obstacles, the challenges the Does allege are the same as those raised by sexual offenders in as-applied constitutional challenges to sexual offender registration laws across the country that have already been considered and rejected by the Ninth Circuit and Supreme Court. Without any allegations to distinguish Plaintiffs’ harms from those foreclosed under binding precedent, the Court must dismiss the Second Amended Complaint.
III. LEGAL STANDARD A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim challenges the legal sufficiency of the claims stated in the complaint. Conservation Force v. Salazar, 646 F.3d 1240, 1242 (9th Cir. 2011). To sufficiently state a claim to relief and survive a 12(b)(6) motion, the pleading “does not need detailed factual allegations,” however, the “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Mere “labels and conclusions” or a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. Rather, there must be “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Id. at 556. The plausibility standard is not akin to a “probability requirement,” but does require more than a sheer possibility that a defendant acted unlawfully. Id.
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In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009), the Supreme Court identified two “working principles” that underlie Twombly. First, although a court must accept as true all factual allegations in a complaint when ruling on a motion to dismiss, the court need not accept legal conclusions as true. Id. “Rule 8 marks a notable and generous departure from the hyper-technical, code-pleading regime of a prior era, but it does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions.” Id. at 67879. Second, only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief will survive a motion to dismiss. Id. at 679. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will . . . be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id.
In light of Twombly and Iqbal, the Ninth Circuit has summarized the governing standard as follows: “In sum, for a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss, the nonconclusory factual content, and reasonable inferences from that content, must be plausibly suggestive of a claim entitling the plaintiff to relief.” Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Apart from factual insufficiency, a complaint is also subject to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) where it lacks a cognizable legal theory, Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990), or where the allegations on their face show that relief is barred for a legal reason. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 215 (2007).
A dismissal without leave to amend is improper unless it is clear that the complaint “could not be saved by any amendment.” Harris v. Amgen, Inc., 573 F.3d 728, 737 (9th Cir. 2009). The Ninth Circuit has held that “in dismissals for failure to state a
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claim, a district court should grant leave to amend even if no request to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.” Cook, Perkiss and Liehe, Inc. v. N. California Collection Serv., Inc., 911 F.2d 242, 247 (9th Cir. 1990).
IV. ANALYSIS A. SURVIVING CLAIMS
Plaintiffs captioned their new complaint, “Amended Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief Part II.” Dkt. 36. Plaintiffs also claim to “reincorporate and reallege all allegations contained in the Amended Complaint as if fully set forth in this Amended Complaint Part II.” Id., at 3. However, “an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint” and renders the latter “without legal effect.” Lacey v. Maricopa Cty., 693 F.3d 896, 927 (9th Cir. 2012). The Court accordingly rejects Plaintiffs’ proposed “Amended Complaint Part II” title and will instead refer to Plaintiffs’ new complaint as the “Second Amended Complaint.”
Plaintiffs suggest they did not “incorporate the prior Complaint with the intent of having this Court re-litigate the legal claims that have already been decided.” Dkt. 43, at 1. Yet, the Second Amended Complaint’s prayer for relief seeks a declaration that the 2001, 2009, and 2011 amendments violate, both facially and as applied to Plaintiffs, each of the twelve causes of action alleged in the First Amended Complaint. Four of these claims, and all facial challenges, have already been dismissed without leave to amend. The Court adopts the analysis outlined in its Memorandum Decision and Order, Dkt. 32,
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and notes it will not repeat or reconsider its rejection of any facial challenges, or as-
applied Procedural Due Process, Equal Protection, takings, or police powers challenges. 3
The Court has already explained that Plaintiffs must establish standing as to each
as-applied challenge they seek to raise. Although the Second Amended Complaint
provides a litany of specific harms suffered by twelve Does, it still fails to tie each Doe to
a particular constitutional violation. The Second Amended Complaint instead generally
asserts all Plaintiffs “jointly allege” violation of their constitutional rights. Dkt. 36, at 39-
42. Even with the detail added for each of the twelve Does, it is clear not all twelve Does
can state an as-applied challenge for each surviving cause of action.4
Like the Amended Complaint, the Second Amended Complaint still requires the
Court to parse through pages upon pages of allegations to attempt to determine the
relationship between any particular Doe and a specific cause of action. As the Court has
already noted, this approach is not appropriate. Dkt. 32, at 10; see also Indep. Towers of
Washington v. Washington, 350 F.3d 925, 929 (9th Cir. 2003). However, to the extent the
Court can infer an individual Doe has standing to allege an as-applied challenge to a
3 Although the Court allowed Plaintiffs leave to amend an as applied Procedural Due Process claim to allege a specific reporting obligation or other provision of SORA is unconstitutionally vague, the Second Amended Complaint does not allege any specific provision of SORA is unconstitutionally vague as applied to a particular Doe, and thus fails to state a Procedural Due Process claim for the limited purpose permitted by the Court. The Court also allowed leave to amend a takings claim only if a particular Doe could allege compliance with the exhaustion requirements of Williamson Cnty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172 (1985). The Second Amended Complaint does not allege any Doe has a ripe takings claim because s/he had a final determination by the State and exhausted administrative remedies, and, consequently, fails to state an as-applied takings claim. 4 For instance, some Does allege compliance with SORA violates aspects of their plea agreements in support of a Contracts Clause violation, while others do not. Of course, some claims in this suit, such as violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause, would apply to all Does. The Second Amended Complaint simply fails to distinguish between individual causes of action and those alleged by all Does.
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specific provision of the Constitution, the Second Amended Complaint still fails to state a plausible claim upon which relief can be granted.
1. EX POST FACTO Defendants in their Motion to Dismiss, and Plaintiffs in their Response to Defendants’ Motion, focus on the Ex Post Facto Clause. The parties also debated the Ex Post Facto clause almost exclusively during oral argument. The Ex Post Facto Clause, Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution, bars the enactment of any law that “imposes a punishment for an act which was not punishable at the time it was committed, or imposes additional punishment to that then prescribed.” Russell v. Gregoire, 124 F.3d 1079, 1083 (9th Cir. 1997) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). In Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003), the Supreme Court set forth the standard for evaluating whether a sex offender registration program violates the Ex Post Facto Clause. First, the Court must determine whether the law was enacted with the intent to impose a punishment or to establish a regulatory scheme that is civil and nonpunitive. If the intent of the law was punitive, the inquiry ends and retroactive enforcement would violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. If, however, the intent was to enact a civil regulatory scheme, the court must “examine whether the statutory scheme is so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate [the legislature’s] intention to deem it civil.” Id. at 92 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). To answer that question, the Supreme Court focused on five factors, including: “whether, in its necessary operation, the regulatory scheme: has been regarded in our history and traditions as a punishment; imposes an affirmative disability or restraint; promotes the traditional aims of punishment; has a
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rational connection to a nonpunitive purpose; or is excessive with respect to this
purpose.” Smith, 538 U.S. at 97 (citing Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144,
168-69 (1963)).
Here, as in Smith, there is no dispute that SORA was enacted with the intent to
establish a civil regulatory scheme. Idaho Code § 18-83025; see also State v. Gragg, 137
P.3d 461, 464 (Idaho Ct. App. 2005); Groves v. State, 328 P.3d 532, 557 (Idaho Ct. App.
2014). The same holds true for the amendments to SORA Plaintiffs challenge, such as the
expansion of the definition of “aggravated offenses” requiring life time registration, the
application of SORA to anyone “who has a foreign conviction that is substantially
equivalent the offenses listed in [Idaho Code § 18-8304(4)],” and the requirement that
certain information regarding registered sex offenders is disseminated to the public via
internet. State v. Kinney, 417 P.3d 989, 994 (Idaho Ct. App. 2018) (“The Idaho Supreme
Court has determined that, even in light of the amendments to Idaho’s SORA, the Act is
not punitive.”).
5 The Idaho legislature expressed the civil intent of SORA in the statutory text itself. Idaho Code section 18-8302 provides:
The legislature finds that sexual offenders present a danger and that efforts of law enforcement agencies to protect their communities, conduct investigations and quickly apprehend offenders who commit sexual offenses are impaired by the lack of current information available about individuals who have been convicted of sexual offenses who live within their jurisdiction. The legislature further finds that providing public access to certain information about convicted sexual offenders assists parents in the protection of their children. Such access further provides a means for organizations that work with youth or other vulnerable populations to prevent sexual offenders from threatening those served by the organizations. Finally, public access assists the community in being observant of convicted sexual offenders in order to prevent them from recommitting sexual crimes. Therefore, this state’s policy is to assist efforts of local law enforcement agencies to protect communities by requiring sexual offenders to register with local law enforcement agencies and to make certain information about sexual offenders available to the public as provided in this chapter. Idaho Code § 18-8302 (2011).
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Although SORA explicitly articulates a nonpunitive purpose and the Idaho courts have held the purpose of the Act is not punitive, Plaintiffs suggest the effects of Idaho’s SORA are nevertheless punitive as applied to the Does. Defendants respond that the effects of SORA cannot be considered punitive under the five Smith factors. First, with respect to whether SORA resembles a historical form of punishment, Smith rejected analogies between sex offender registration requirements and “shaming punishments of the colonial period.” 538 U.S. at 97. “Historical shaming punishments were intended to expose and publicly disgrace individuals, while sex offender registration laws disseminate accurate information about offenders for public safety purposes.” American Civil Liberties Union v. Masto, 670 F.3d 1046, 1057 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Smith, 538 U.S. at 97-99). While internet publicity may humiliate offenders, Smith held such shame is “but a collateral consequence of a valid regulation.” 538 U.S. at 99.
Plaintiffs attempt to distinguish Smith because “readily available information through internet services has exponentially compounded the grossly disproportionate affect that lifetime registration has on convicted sex offenders as compared to the punitive level which the registration imposed upon offenders in 2004” when Smith was decided. Dkt. 43, at 5-6. Despite an exponential increase in information availability through internet use, the Ninth Circuit and Idaho courts have continued to find internet publication requirements are not punitive in the years since Smith was decided. See, e.g., U.S. v. Elk Shoulder, 738 F.3d 948, 954 (9th Cir. 2013) (rejecting Plaintiff’s claim that, in part because of availability of internet, the Smith analysis “no longer hold[s] true in today’s society”); Maciel v. Cate, 731 F.3d 928, 937 (9th Cir. 2013) (publication of
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information about sexual offender on website was not materially different from
registration requirements the Ninth and other circuits have found to be regulatory);
Kinney, 417 P.3d at 996 (the fact that certain information about sexual offenders is now
required to be disseminated to the public does not “tip the scales and change [SORA]
from nonpunitive to punitive”).
Further, Smith contemplated that sexual offender information would be available
on the internet, but determined such dissemination of information differed from historical
punishments:
Any initial resemblance to early punishments is . . . misleading. Punishments such as whipping, pillory, and branding inflicted physical pain and staged a direct confrontation between the offender and the public. Even punishments that lacked the corporal component, such as public shaming, humiliation, and banishment, involved more than the dissemination of information. They either held the person up before his fellow citizens for face-to-face shaming or expelled him from the community. By contrast, the stigma of [Alaska’s sexual offender registration law] results not from public display for ridicule and shaming but from the dissemination of accurate information about a criminal record, most of which is already public. . . . [P]ublicity may cause adverse consequences for the convicted defendant, running from mild personal embarrassment to social ostracism. In contrast to the colonial shaming punishments, however, the State does not make the publicity and the resulting stigma an internal part of the objective of the regulatory scheme.
Smith, 538 U.S. at 98-99 (citations omitted). Despite increased publicity via the internet,
SORA is not akin to historical forms of punishment.
The second Smith factor considers whether a law imposes an affirmative disability
or restraint on Plaintiffs. Smith held Alaska’s sexual registration scheme imposed no
physical restraint, and thus did not resemble the punishment of imprisonment, “which is
the paradigmatic affirmative disability or restraint.” Id. at 100. Although it does not
inflict imprisonment, Plaintiffs imply SORA imposes an affirmative disability because it
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severely limits their ability to obtain employment and housing. Smith addressed such limitations, noting such effects do not constitute an affirmative disability or restraint because landlords and employers can conduct background checks on the criminal records of prospective employees or tenants even without sexual offender registration requirements. Id. Plaintiffs also highlight burdensome in-person registration requirements every three months or upon travel. However, the Ninth Circuit has expressly rejected the contention that such requirements constitute an affirmative disability. Masto, 670 F.3d at 1056.
The third Smith factor requires evaluating whether the law promotes the traditional aims of punishment: deterrence and retribution. The Smith Court recognized registration laws might have a deterrent effect but stated “hold[ing] that the mere presence of a deterrent purpose renders such sanctions ‘criminal’ . . . would severely undermine the Government’s ability to engage in effective regulation.” Smith, 538 U.S. at 102 (quoting Hudson v. U.S., 522 U.S. 93, 105 (1997)). The Smith Court rejected the argument that reporting requirements “measured by the extent of the wrongdoing, not by the extent of the risk posed” demonstrated retributive intent. Id. In so holding, the Court explained, “[t]he Act, it is true, differentiates between individuals convicted of aggravated or multiple offenses and those convicted of a single nonaggravated offense. The broad categories, however, and the corresponding length of the reporting requirement, are reasonably related to the danger of recidivism, and this is consistent with the regulatory objective.” Id. SORA is indistinguishable from Smith on this basis, and the third factor
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does not weigh in favor of finding a punitive effect despite the harms alleged by Plaintiffs.
The Smith Court implied that whether a challenged regulation is rationally connected to a nonpunitive purpose is the most important factor in the effects analysis. Id. The Court held Alaska’s sexual offender registration law was rationally connected to the legitimate, nonpunitive purpose of preventing recidivism. Id. at 103. In this case, Plaintiffs argue the “research and data upon which the [Smith Court] made its decision. . . was prompted by a study. . . conducted by a person substantially unqualified in that field of study and [whose] conclusions have later been debunked by researchers in the field of sex offender recidivism far more qualified than the original author.” Dkt. 43, at 5. Plaintiffs’ seek to undermine the evidence relied upon by the Smith Court with expert declarations attached to their Amended Complaint.6 Counsel for Plaintiffs also expounded upon this argument during the hearing on Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. However, the Ninth Circuit rejected such an approach in Masto.
Plaintiffs in Masto similarly presented an expert declaration critiquing the methodology of the recidivism studies utilized in Smith to argue Smith overstated the risk of sex-offender recidivism. Masto, 670 F.3d at 1057. The Ninth Circuit noted the district court did not make any factual finding regarding the risk of sex offender recidivism.
6 Plaintiffs did not attach such declarations to their Second Amended Complaint. Even if they had, “[a]ffidavits and declarations . . . are not allowed as pleading exhibits unless they form the basis of the complaint.” U.S. v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2003). The declarations mentioned on page 5 of Plaintiffs’ Response to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss do not form the basis for the Second Amended Complaint, and, in fact, are not referenced at all in the Second Amended Complaint. As such, it would be improper for the court to consider Plaintiffs’ expert declarations without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. Id. at 909.
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However, the Ninth Circuit held that even had the district court adopted plaintiffs’ declaration’s conclusions “as its own, a recalibrated assessment of recidivism risk would not refute the legitimate public safety interest in monitoring sex-offender presence in the community.” Id. Similarly, assuming this Court could consider Plaintiffs’ declarations at this stage of the proceedings, such declarations cannot overcome the legitimate nonpunitive purpose of SORA. See, e.g., Idaho Code § 18-8302; State v. Joslin, 175 P.3d 764, 775 (Idaho 2007) (SORA is not punitive but rather “provides an essential regulatory purpose that assists law enforcement and parents in protecting children and communities”).
Further, although Plaintiffs criticize Smith and the research upon which it relied, the Supreme Court has not reconsidered or questioned its holding in Smith. Consequently, the opinion stands as the Supreme Court’s most recent pronouncement on the constitutionality of sexual offender registration requirements. The Smith Court expressly rejected the notion that the harms Plaintiffs allege, such as social ostracization and difficulties finding housing or employment, are so punitive as to negate the civil intent of sexual offender registration statutes.7 Smith, 538 U.S. at 99-102. The Smith Court also explicitly authorized categorical classifications—such as the “aggravated offense” classification provided under SORA—as non-punitive. Id. at 104 (“The State’s determination to legislate with respect to convicted sex offenders as a class, rather than
7 The Ninth Circuit has subsequently applied Smith to determine additional harms Plaintiffs allege in the Second Amended Complaint, such as burdensome in-person registration requirements and restrictions on freedom of movement, do not render SORA retroactive punishment in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause. Litmon v. Harris, 768 F.3d 1237, 1242 (9th Cir. 2014).
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require individual determination of their dangerousness, does not make the statute a punishment under the Ex Post Facto Clause.”). This Court, like any other state or federal court, is bound by the Supreme Court’s interpretation of federal law and would commit reversible error in concluding otherwise.8 James v. City of Boise, Idaho, 136 S.Ct. 685, 686 (2016).
The final Smith factor—whether a law is excessive in scope—is “not an exercise in determining whether the legislature has made the best choice possible to address the problem it seeks to remedy.” Smith, 538 U.S. at 105. Instead, the “question is whether the regulatory means chosen are reasonable in light of the nonpunitive objective.” Id. Plaintiffs argue SORA is overbroad because:
The evolution and development of SORA laws in recent years . . . have converted regulatory and administrative procedures for safeguarding the public from those sexual offenders who have been clinically determined to be true dangers to the public, to statutory schemes that arbitrarily and without any subjective basis pigeonhole virtually all sexual offenders into a classification of a lifetime of probation. Dkt. 43, at 5. This argument is not only foreclosed under Smith, 538 U.S. at 103, but has also been rejected by the Ninth Circuit and Idaho courts post-Smith. See, e.g., Masto, 670 F.3d at 1057 (holding in-person, lifetime registration requirement and expansion of the size of the class subject to regulation did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause); Litmon v. Harris,
8 Idaho courts rely on federal law for purposes of the ex post facto analysis. State v. Johnson, 266 P.3d 1146, 1152 (Idaho Ct. App. 2011) (“In the SORA context, however, there is no apparent reason for us to depart from the federal understanding of the rights at issue.”).
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768 F.3d 1237, 1243 (9th Cir. 2014) (affirming dismissal of ex post facto challenge to a California statute requiring lifetime in-person reporting every 90 days by a particular class of offenders); State v. Johnson, 266 P.3d 1146, 1151 (Idaho 2011) (“The fact that a sexual offender, convicted of a certain class of crime, may be required to register for life is not so punitive that it overrides SORA’s regulatory purpose.”).
After considering the harms the Does allege, and evaluating the five Smith factors, the Court concludes SORA is not so punitive in effect or purpose that it negates the Idaho legislature’s intent to enact a civil regulatory scheme. SORA does not materially differ from the law at issue in Smith in any way that would alter application of that precedent. However, Plaintiffs suggest, over the past several years, “more and more Courts have courageously moved away from the precedential impact of Smith, rethinking the ex post facto punitive affect of lifetime sex offender registration requirements.” Dkt. 43, at 6. In support of this contention, Plaintiffs offer a string cite of sixty cases, but fail to provide any explanation or analysis of a single case. Moreover, as Defendants note, many of the cases cited are irrelevant, have been vacated or reversed on appeal, or pre-date Smith, and therefore carry no weight. Dkt. 44, at 5-8. The Court declines Plaintiffs’ invitation to cull through dozens of cases in an attempt to locate an argument that supports their position.
Although the Court allowed Plaintiffs the opportunity to amend in order to “identify explicitly how, as to any particular Doe, SORA is an Ex Post Facto Clause violation in his or her circumstance,” Plaintiffs do not allege that the current version of SORA constitutes an exception to the federal and state case law which establishes SORA is not punitive. Dkt. 32, at 18. Because “only the clearest proof will suffice to override
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legislative intent and transform what has been denominated a civil remedy into a criminal penalty,” Plaintiffs’ inability to distinguish the harms they have suffered from previous ex post facto challenges considered and rejected by federal and state courts is fatal to their claim. Smith, 538 U.S. at 92.
In sum, the Second Amended Complaint fails to state an Ex Post Facto Clause violation as applied to the individual Does. Plaintiffs’ cruel and unusual punishment and Double Jeopardy Clause arguments necessarily fail as well. Litmon, 768 F.3d at 1242 (“the inquiry into whether a law constitutes retroactive punishment in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause is identical to that with respect to the Ex Post Facto Clause.”); Kinney, 417 P.3d at 996-997 (applying Smith ex post facto analysis to determine SORA’s registration requirements do not constitute cruel and unusual punishment).
2. CONTRACTS CLAIMS The United States Constitution prohibits states from passing “law[s] impairing the Obligation of Contracts.” U.S. Const. art. 1, § 10. To determine whether there has been a violation of the Contracts Clause, courts look to: (1) whether the state law has the effect of impairing a contractual obligation; (2) if so, whether that impairment is permitted under the Constitution.” Masto, 670 F.3d at 1060. Plaintiffs contend that those Does who “pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement, received a Withheld Judgment, and/or had their charge reduced and/or dismissed, allege that the Contract Clause of the U.S. Constitution prohibits states from enacting any law that will impair ‘the Obligation of Contracts.’” Dkt. 36, at ¶ 21. The sole allegations to support Plaintiffs’ contracts claim appear in paragraphs 11, 13, and 15 of the Second
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Amended Complaint. Specifically, John Doe 126 alleges his record was supposed to be sealed under the terms of his plea agreement, but, because he is required to register, his record appears on the registry websites in violation of his plea agreement. Dkt. 36, at ¶ 11. John Doe 134 states he was informed by his attorney “that felony charges can be sealed. [But]. . . he was [later] informed by his attorney that the felony charge he pled guilty to could no longer be sealed. This was not what Plaintiff agreed to when entering his plea agreement.” Id., at ¶ 13. Finally, John Doe 111 alleges “he had a plea agreement that said he would not have to register.” Id., at ¶ 15. However, Does 126, 134, and 111 do not provide the specific terms of their plea agreements, nor offer any further information whatsoever. Absent more than a bare accusation that SORA violates their plea agreements, the Court cannot determine whether SORA has the effect of impairing such contractual obligations.
Even if the Does had included the specific terms of the plea agreements they claim SORA violates, the Ninth Circuit has held impairment with plea agreements caused by sexual offender registration laws is permitted under the Constitution. Masto, 670 F.3d at 1060-61. In so holding, the Masto Court explained, “it is not every modification of a contractual promise that impairs the obligation of contract under federal law” as a “State has the sovereign right to protect the general welfare of the people and we must respect the wide discretion on the part of the legislature in determining what is and what is not necessary.” Id. at 1060. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Further, “‘States must possess broad power to adopt general regulatory measures without being concerned
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that private contracts will be impaired, or even destroyed, as a result.’” Id. at 1061
(quoting U.S. Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 22 (1977)).
In holding Nevada’s sexual offender registration law did not impair the plea
bargain contracts of those who fell within its scope, the Masto Court noted:
As we have already held in our disposition of the Plaintiffs’ ex post facto, double jeopardy, and due process challenges, (1) the law is not punitive in intent, (2) it has no overriding punitive effect, (3) it is not the equivalent of historical punishment, (4) and it does not impose upon a registrant any significant affirmative disability or restraint. Moreover, [it] has a rational connection to a nonpunitive regulatory purpose and is not excessive in scope. Id.
Thus, even if the Ninth Circuit had determined Nevada’s registration law impaired
specific plea agreements, the court “would nevertheless conclude that the impairment is
permitted under the Constitution for the same reasons previously articulated and because
of the importance of this law to the protection of the general welfare of people in Nevada
against sexually motivated crimes.” Id. Under Masto, even if Plaintiffs had provided this
Court with the specific terms of the plea agreements they claim SORA violates, a
Contracts Clause violation would fail as a matter of law under the analysis previously
articulated with respect to Plaintiffs’ ex post facto challenge.9
3. STATE SEPARATION OF POWERS
Plaintiffs’ separation of powers claim is based on the same grounds as their
9 The Masto Court did note that in “individual cases where the state has made an explicit promise to a defendant that the defendant would be exempt from registration as a condition of his guilty plea, that promise—whether memorialized in the terms of the written plea agreement or otherwise proven—is entitled to be enforced against the State.” Id. (citing Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971)). The only Doe to claim his plea agreement exempted him from the registration requirement does not offer the terms of his agreement or any other evidence to support his claim. In the absence of such, the Court has no way to review this allegation.
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impairment of contracts claim—an interference with the plea agreements some Does may have entered into. Dkt. 36, ¶ 22. Article II, Section 1 of the Idaho Constitution prohibits one branch of government from exercising the power ascribed to another branch. The U.S. Constitution lacks a similar provision.
In Idaho, “the separation of powers doctrine is triggered when (1) a ‘textually demonstrable constitutional commitment’ assigns the matter to a particular branch of government; or (2) the matter implicates another branch’s discretionary authority.” Tucker v. State, 394 P.3d 54, 71 (Idaho 2017) (quoting Miles v. Idaho Power Co., 778 P.2d 757, 761-62 (Idaho 1989)). Although Plaintiffs allege the Idaho Legislature has usurped the authority of the Idaho Courts to enter into and enforce plea agreements, to grant withheld judgments, and/or to reduce or dismiss charges, Plaintiffs do not provide specific factual allegations relating to the existence of plea agreements, withheld judgments, or dismissal of charges, and do not explain how the SORA amendments may have affected those documents. Regardless, the Court has already determined SORA is regulatory and nonpunitive as applied to the Does under the five-factor Smith analysis. As such, the legislature has not usurped judicial authority and Plaintiffs separation of powers claim fails as a matter of law.
4. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS In a Substantive Due Process analysis, the Court must first consider whether a statute in question abridges a fundamental right. U.S. v. Juvenile Male, 670 F.3d 999, 1012 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993)). “If it does, the statute will be subject to strict scrutiny and is invalidated unless it is ‘narrowly tailored to
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serve a compelling state interest.’” Id. (quoting Flores). If the statute does not infringe a fundamental right, it “need only bear a ‘reasonable relationship to a legitimate state interest to justify the action.’” Id. (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 722 (1997)).
Rights which are “truly fundamental” include “the right to marry, to have children, to direct the education and upbringing of one’s children, to marital privacy, to use contraception, to bodily integrity, to abortion, and to refuse unwanted lifesaving medical treatment.” Id. at 1012 (citing Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 727). The only Substantive Due Process violation Plaintiffs appear to allege in the Second Amended Complaint is that their “right to travel” has been violated as a result of SORA. Dkt. 36, at ¶ 23. Under the U.S. Constitution, the right to travel protects the right of a citizen of one State “to enter and to leave another State, the right to be treated as a welcome visitor rather than an unfriendly alien when. . . present in the second State, and, for those travelers who elect to become permanent residents, the right to be treated like other citizens of that State.” Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 500 (1999). Because the right to travel is not fundamental, it may be burdened if justified by a compelling state interest. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 342 (1972).
The Court has already determined SORA is justified by a compelling state interest: protecting society. Further, although Plaintiffs claim their right to travel has been limited by registration requirements, none of them allege they have actually been prohibited from travel to another state or prohibited from entering a state because of SORA. In the absence of such allegations, and because SORA’s registration requirements are justified
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by a compelling state interest, Plaintiffs’ Substantive Due Process/freedom of travel claim fails.
5. FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION Plaintiffs allege that “Idaho has substantially burdened their exercise of religion without demonstrating that application of the burden to the person is both (a) essential to further a compelling governmental interest; and is (b) the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling government interest.” Dkt. 36, at ¶ 24. As noted, the Court has already determined SORA’s provisions serve a compelling government interest. Several of the Does identified in the Second Amended Complaint allege they have had to choose between attending church or risking noncompliance with Idaho Code requirements regarding not being present in places where children are present. Id., at ¶¶ 9-11, 17. However, SORA does not prohibit sex offenders from attending church unless the church itself is used as a school and posted pursuant to Idaho Code section 18-8329(1)(a). None of the Does allege that a church they attend is used as a school, has been so posted, and is therefore unavailable to them. As such, the Does do not establish SORA’s requirements are overly restrictive as applied to their individual circumstances. Moreover, as the Court explained in its Memorandum Decision and Order, Idaho enacted the Free Exercise of Religion Protected Act (“FERPA”) in 2000. Idaho Code § 73-401, et. seq. FERPA protects the free exercise of religion in Idaho and mandates that the government cannot substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion. Idaho Code § 73-402(1)-(2). Any state law enacted subsequent to FERPA is subject to FERPA’s requirements unless the law explicitly excludes FERPA by reference. Id. at § 73-403(2).
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Because the 2001, 2009, and 2011 amendments to SORA were enacted after FERPA, and SORA does not enumerate FERPA as an exclusion, Plaintiffs essentially claim that the provisions of SORA run contrary to FERPA.
When permitting Plaintiffs leave to amend their free exercise claim, the Court directed Plaintiffs to address FERPA, and specifically what, if anything, rebuts the presumption that the State enacted SORA in accordance with FERPA’s requirements and thus that SORA cannot violate the Free Exercise Clause as a matter of law. Plaintiffs did not address FERPA in the Second Amended Complaint, in their Response to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, or during oral argument. As such, the Second Amended Complaint fails to state an as-applied claim for violation of Plaintiffs’ First Amendment free exercise of religion rights.
V. CONCLUSION For the reasons set forth herein, the Court dismisses the Second Amended Complaint in its entirety.10
VI. ORDER NOW THEREFORE IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1. Defendants Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. 2. Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.11
10 The Court does not address Defendants’ statute of limitations argument in light of this dismissal.
11 The Court has already given Plaintiffs an opportunity to amend their Complaint to allege any viable as-applied challenges. The Second Amended Complaint fails to state plausible as-applied
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3. The Court will enter a separate judgement in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 58.
DATED: April 5, 2019 _________________________ David C. Nye Chief U.S. District Court Judge
challenges, and Plaintiffs’ inability to distinguish their claims from binding precedent is fatal to any further amendment. The Court accordingly dismisses with prejudice.
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 </s> Case 1:16-cv-429 Document <docnum> Filed <datefiled> Page 1 of 22
APPEAL,LC20,TERMED
U.S. District Court District of Idaho (LIVE Database)Version 6.2.2 (Boise − Southern)
CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:16−cv−00429−DCN

John and Jane Does 1−104 v. Wasden et al Assigned to: Judge David C. Nye Demand: $0 Cause: 28:1343 Violation of Civil Rights Plaintiff John and Jane Does 1−104 TERMINATED: 04/26/2017
Plaintiff John and Jane Does 1−134

Date Filed: 09/22/2016 Date Terminated: 04/09/2019 Jury Demand: None Nature of Suit: 950 Constitutional − State Statute Jurisdiction: Federal Question
represented by Greg J Fuller FULLER LAW OFFICES PO Box L Twin Falls, ID 83303−0055 (208) 734−1602 Fax: (208) 734−1602 Email: fullerlaw@cableone.net LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel S. Brown Fuller Law Offices PO Box L Twin Falls, ID 83303 208−734−1602 Fax: 208−734−1606 Email: brown_law@hotmail.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Daniel S. Brown (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Greg J Fuller (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V.
Defendant
Lawrence Wasden Attorney General of the State of Idaho

represented by Chris Kronberg Office of the Attorney General PO Box 83720 Boise, ID 83720−0010 208−334−4536 Email: chris.kronberg@ag.idaho.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Clay R Smith OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL POB 83720 Boise, ID 83720−0010 (208) 334−4118 Fax: (208) 854−8073

Case 1:16-cv-429 Document <docnum> Filed <datefiled> Page 2 of 22

Email: clay.smith@ag.idaho.gov TERMINATED: 04/18/2018 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Peter L Wucetich Office of the Idaho Attorney General 954 W. Jefferson Boise, ID 83720 208−332−3548 Email: peter.wucetich@ag.idaho.gov TERMINATED: 10/02/2018 LEAD ATTORNEY

Steven Lamar Olsen OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL POB 83720 Boise, ID 83720−0010 (208) 334−2400 Fax: (208) 854−8073 Email: steven.olsen@ag.idaho.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Kevin Kempf Director of the Idaho Department of Correction

represented by Chris Kronberg (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Clay R Smith (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/02/2018 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Peter L Wucetich (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/02/2018 LEAD ATTORNEY

Steven Lamar Olsen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Terry Kirkham Chief Department of Correction Probation and Parole Division

represented by Chris Kronberg (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Clay R Smith (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/02/2018 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Peter L Wucetich (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/02/2018 LEAD ATTORNEY

Case 1:16-cv-429 Document <docnum> Filed <datefiled> Page 3 of 22

Steven Lamar Olsen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Jon Burnham Sexual Offender Management Board

represented by Chris Kronberg (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Clay R Smith (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/02/2018 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Peter L Wucetich (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/02/2018 LEAD ATTORNEY

Steven Lamar Olsen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Michael Johnston Ph.d., Sexual Offender Management Board

represented by Chris Kronberg (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Clay R Smith (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/02/2018 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Peter L Wucetich (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/02/2018 LEAD ATTORNEY

Steven Lamar Olsen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Moira Lynch Sexual Offender Management Board

represented by Chris Kronberg (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Clay R Smith (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/02/2018 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Peter L Wucetich (See above for address)

Case 1:16-cv-429 Document <docnum> Filed <datefiled> Page 4 of 22

TERMINATED: 10/02/2018 LEAD ATTORNEY

Steven Lamar Olsen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Jeffrey Betts Sexual Offender Management Board

represented by Chris Kronberg (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Clay R Smith (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/02/2018 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Peter L Wucetich (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/02/2018 LEAD ATTORNEY

Steven Lamar Olsen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Erwin Sonnenberg Sexual Offender Management Board

represented by Chris Kronberg (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Clay R Smith (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/02/2018 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Peter L Wucetich (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/02/2018 LEAD ATTORNEY

Steven Lamar Olsen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Jean Fisher Sexual Offender Management Board

represented by Chris Kronberg (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Clay R Smith (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/02/2018 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case 1:16-cv-429 Document <docnum> Filed <datefiled> Page 5 of 22

Defendant Paula Garay Sexual Offender Management Board
Defendant Kimberly Simmons Sexual Offender Management Board
Defendant William Crawford Sexual Offender Management Board

Peter L Wucetich (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/02/2018 LEAD ATTORNEY
Steven Lamar Olsen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Chris Kronberg (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Clay R Smith (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/02/2018 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Peter L Wucetich (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/02/2018 LEAD ATTORNEY
Steven Lamar Olsen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Chris Kronberg (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Clay R Smith (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/02/2018 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Peter L Wucetich (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/02/2018 LEAD ATTORNEY
Steven Lamar Olsen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Chris Kronberg (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Clay R Smith (See above for address)

Case 1:16-cv-429 Document <docnum> Filed <datefiled> Page 6 of 22

TERMINATED: 10/02/2018 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Peter L Wucetich (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/02/2018 LEAD ATTORNEY

Steven Lamar Olsen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Christina Iverson Sexual Offender Management Board

represented by Chris Kronberg (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Clay R Smith (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/02/2018 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Peter L Wucetich (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/02/2018 LEAD ATTORNEY

Steven Lamar Olsen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Ralph Powell Colonel, Director Idaho State Police

represented by Chris Kronberg (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Clay R Smith (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/02/2018 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Peter L Wucetich (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/02/2018 LEAD ATTORNEY

Steven Lamar Olsen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Matthew Thomas Sheriff, Sexual Offender Management Board

represented by Chris Kronberg (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case 1:16-cv-429 Document <docnum> Filed <datefiled> Page 7 of 22

Defendant Stephen Bartlett Ada County Sheriff
Defendant Lorin Nielsen Bannock County Sheriff
Defendant

Clay R Smith (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/02/2018 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Peter L Wucetich (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/02/2018 LEAD ATTORNEY
Steven Lamar Olsen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Chris Kronberg (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Clay R Smith (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/02/2018 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Peter L Wucetich (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/02/2018 LEAD ATTORNEY
Steven Lamar Olsen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Chris Kronberg (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Clay R Smith (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/02/2018 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Peter L Wucetich (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/02/2018 LEAD ATTORNEY
Steven Lamar Olsen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by

Case 1:16-cv-429 Document <docnum> Filed <datefiled> Page 8 of 22

Brent T Bunn Bear Lake County Sheriff

Chris Kronberg (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Clay R Smith (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/02/2018 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Peter L Wucetich (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/02/2018 LEAD ATTORNEY

Steven Lamar Olsen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Craig T Rowland Bingham County Sheriff

represented by Chris Kronberg (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Clay R Smith (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/02/2018 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Peter L Wucetich (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/02/2018 LEAD ATTORNEY

Steven Lamar Olsen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Paul J Wilde Bonneville County Sheriff

represented by Chris Kronberg (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Clay R Smith (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/02/2018 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Peter L Wucetich (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/02/2018 LEAD ATTORNEY

Steven Lamar Olsen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case 1:16-cv-429 Document <docnum> Filed <datefiled> Page 9 of 22

Defendant Kiernan Donahue Canyon County Sheriff
Defendant Michael Haderlie Caribou County Sheriff
Defendant Jay Heward Cassia County Sheriff

represented by Chris Kronberg (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Clay R Smith (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/02/2018 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Peter L Wucetich (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/02/2018 LEAD ATTORNEY
Steven Lamar Olsen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Chris Kronberg (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Clay R Smith (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/02/2018 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Peter L Wucetich (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/02/2018 LEAD ATTORNEY
Steven Lamar Olsen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Chris Kronberg (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Clay R Smith (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/02/2018 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Peter L Wucetich (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/02/2018 LEAD ATTORNEY
Steven Lamar Olsen

Case 1:16-cv-429 Document <docnum> Filed <datefiled> Page 10 of 22

(See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Rick Layher Elmore County Sheriff

represented by Chris Kronberg (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Clay R Smith (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/02/2018 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Peter L Wucetich (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/02/2018 LEAD ATTORNEY

Steven Lamar Olsen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
David Fryar Franklin County Sheriff

represented by Chris Kronberg (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Clay R Smith (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/02/2018 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Peter L Wucetich (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/02/2018 LEAD ATTORNEY

Steven Lamar Olsen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Charles Rolland Gem County Sheriff

represented by Chris Kronberg (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Clay R Smith (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/02/2018 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Peter L Wucetich (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/02/2018

Case 1:16-cv-429 Document <docnum> Filed <datefiled> Page 11 of 22

LEAD ATTORNEY

Steven Lamar Olsen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Shawn Gough Gooding County Sheriff

represented by Chris Kronberg (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Clay R Smith (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/02/2018 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Peter L Wucetich (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/02/2018 LEAD ATTORNEY

Steven Lamar Olsen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Steve Anderson Jefferson County Sheriff

represented by Chris Kronberg (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Clay R Smith (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/02/2018 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Peter L Wucetich (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/02/2018 LEAD ATTORNEY

Steven Lamar Olsen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Doug McFall Jerome County Sheriff

represented by Chris Kronberg (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Clay R Smith (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/02/2018 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case 1:16-cv-429 Document <docnum> Filed <datefiled> Page 12 of 22

Peter L Wucetich (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/02/2018 LEAD ATTORNEY

Steven Lamar Olsen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Lynn Bowerman Lemhi County Sheriff

represented by Chris Kronberg (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Clay R Smith (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/02/2018 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Peter L Wucetich (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/02/2018 LEAD ATTORNEY

Steven Lamar Olsen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Kevin Ellis Lincoln County Sheriff

represented by Chris Kronberg (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Clay R Smith (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/02/2018 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Peter L Wucetich (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/02/2018 LEAD ATTORNEY

Steven Lamar Olsen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Eric Snarr Minidoka County Sheriff

represented by Chris Kronberg (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Clay R Smith (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/02/2018

Case 1:16-cv-429 Document <docnum> Filed <datefiled> Page 13 of 22

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Peter L Wucetich (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/02/2018 LEAD ATTORNEY

Steven Lamar Olsen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Joe Rodriguez Nez Perce County Sheriff

represented by Chris Kronberg (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Clay R Smith (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/02/2018 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Peter L Wucetich (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/02/2018 LEAD ATTORNEY

Steven Lamar Olsen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Tom Carter Twin Falls County Sheriff

represented by Chris Kronberg (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Clay R Smith (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/02/2018 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Peter L Wucetich (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/02/2018 LEAD ATTORNEY

Steven Lamar Olsen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Patti Bolen Valley County Sheriff

represented by Chris Kronberg (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case 1:16-cv-429 Document <docnum> Filed <datefiled> Page 14 of 22

Clay R Smith (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/02/2018 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Peter L Wucetich (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/02/2018 LEAD ATTORNEY

Steven Lamar Olsen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Sexual Offender Management Board

represented by Chris Kronberg (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Clay R Smith (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/02/2018 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Peter L Wucetich (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/02/2018 LEAD ATTORNEY

Steven Lamar Olsen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Tony Liford Teton County Sheriff

represented by Chris Kronberg (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Clay R Smith (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/02/2018 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Peter L Wucetich (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/02/2018 LEAD ATTORNEY

Steven Lamar Olsen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Jim Kacqmarek Boise County Sheriff

represented by Chris Kronberg (See above for address)

Case 1:16-cv-429 Document <docnum> Filed <datefiled> Page 15 of 22

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Clay R Smith (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/02/2018 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Peter L Wucetich (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/02/2018 LEAD ATTORNEY

Steven Lamar Olsen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Chris Goetz Clearwater County Sheriff

represented by Chris Kronberg (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Clay R Smith (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/02/2018 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Peter L Wucetich (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/02/2018 LEAD ATTORNEY

Steven Lamar Olsen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Ben Wolfinger Kootenai County Sheriff

represented by Chris Kronberg (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Clay R Smith (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/02/2018 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Peter L Wucetich (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/02/2018 LEAD ATTORNEY

Steven Lamar Olsen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case 1:16-cv-429 Document <docnum> Filed <datefiled> Page 16 of 22

Defendant
Richard Skiles Latah County Sheriff

represented by Chris Kronberg (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Clay R Smith (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/02/2018 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Peter L Wucetich (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/02/2018 LEAD ATTORNEY

Steven Lamar Olsen (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 09/22/2016 12/21/2016 02/16/2017 04/26/2017 04/27/2017 06/03/2017 07/12/2017
08/02/2017 08/02/2017 08/07/2017 09/25/2017

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT For Injunctive and Declaratory Relief against All Defendants ( Filing fee $ 400 receipt number 0976−1495323.), filed by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Complaint Part II, # 2 Cover Sheet)(Fuller, Greg) Modified on 9/23/2016 (cjs).
2 STATUS REPORT by John and Jane Does 1−104. (Fuller, Greg)
3 MOTION to Add Plaintiff by Movant John Doe 109. Responses due by 3/9/2017 (Attachments: # 1 envelope)(st) (Entered: 02/17/2017)
4 AMENDED COMPLAINT For Injunctive and Declaratory Relief against All Defendants, filed by All Plaintiffs. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit Exhibit B)(Fuller, Greg)
5 Summons Issued as to All Defendants. (Print attached Summons for service.) (Attachments: # 1 Summonses, # 2 Summonses, # 3 Summonses, # 4 Summonses, # 5 Summonses, # 6 Summonses, # 7 Summonses) (km)
6 NOTICE by John and Jane Does 1−104 Status Report (Fuller, Greg)
7 DOCKET ENTRY ORDER: On February 16, 2017, a person identified only as Plaintiff 109 asked to be added to the complaint. See Dkt. 3. Thereafter, an amended complaint was filed, adding various plaintiffs to the complaint, including a plaintiff identified as Plaintiff 109. Accordingly, the Court DEEMS AS MOOT the earlier−filed Motion to Add Plaintiff at Dkt. 3 Signed B. Lynn Winmill (mls)
8 DOCKET ENTRY ORDER − IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that this case is reassigned to the Honorable David C. Nye for all further proceedings. Judge B. Lynn Winmill no longer assigned to case. Signed by Judge B. Lynn Winmill. (km)
DOCKET ENTRY NOTICE of Case Number Change. Please use this case number on all future pleadings, 1:16−cv−00429−DCN. (km)
9 AFFIDAVIT of Service for Amended Complaint for Injunctive Relief , filed by John and Jane Does 1−134., SUMMONS Returned Executed by John and Jane Does 1−134. Lawrence Wasden served on 7/7/2017, answer due 7/28/2017. (Fuller, Greg)
10 WAIVER OF SERVICE Returned Executed by Eric Snarr, Joe Rodriguez, Kiernan Donahue, Jeffrey Betts, Charles Rolland, Lorin Nielsen, Kevin Kempf, Lawrence Wasden, Brent T Bunn, Lynn Bowerman, Stephen Bartlett, Sexual Offender Management Board, David Fryar, Shawn Gough, Steve Anderson, Ben Wolfinger, Paul J Wilde, Ralph Powell, Jim Kacqmarek, Rick Layher, Paula Garay, Kevin Ellis, Patti Bolen, Kimberly Simmons, Michael Haderlie, Jay Heward, Christina Iverson,

Case 1:16-cv-429 Document <docnum> Filed <datefiled> Page 17 of 22

10/27/2017 10/27/2017 11/16/2017

Doug McFall, Moira Lynch, Terry Kirkham, Jean Fisher, William Crawford, Matthew Thomas, Erwin Sonnenberg, Chris Goetz, Jon Burnham, Tom Carter, Tony Liford, Craig T Rowland. Eric Snarr waiver sent on 9/5/2017, answer due 11/6/2017; Joe Rodriguez waiver sent on 9/5/2017, answer due 11/6/2017; Kiernan Donahue waiver sent on 9/5/2017, answer due 11/6/2017; Jeffrey Betts waiver sent on 9/5/2017, answer due 11/6/2017; Charles Rolland waiver sent on 9/5/2017, answer due 11/6/2017; Lorin Nielsen waiver sent on 9/5/2017, answer due 11/6/2017; Kevin Kempf waiver sent on 9/5/2017, answer due 11/6/2017; Lawrence Wasden waiver sent on 9/5/2017, answer due 11/6/2017; Brent T Bunn waiver sent on 9/5/2017, answer due 11/6/2017; Lynn Bowerman waiver sent on 9/5/2017, answer due 11/6/2017; Stephen Bartlett waiver sent on 9/5/2017, answer due 11/6/2017; Sexual Offender Management Board waiver sent on 9/5/2017, answer due 11/6/2017; David Fryar waiver sent on 9/5/2017, answer due 11/6/2017; Shawn Gough waiver sent on 9/5/2017, answer due 11/6/2017; Steve Anderson waiver sent on 9/5/2017, answer due 11/6/2017; Ben Wolfinger waiver sent on 9/5/2017, answer due 11/6/2017; Paul J Wilde waiver sent on 9/5/2017, answer due 11/6/2017; Ralph Powell waiver sent on 9/5/2017, answer due 11/6/2017; Jim Kacqmarek waiver sent on 9/5/2017, answer due 11/6/2017; Rick Layher waiver sent on 9/5/2017, answer due 11/6/2017; Paula Garay waiver sent on 9/5/2017, answer due 11/6/2017; Kevin Ellis waiver sent on 9/5/2017, answer due 11/6/2017; Patti Bolen waiver sent on 9/5/2017, answer due 11/6/2017; Kimberly Simmons waiver sent on 9/5/2017, answer due 11/6/2017; Michael Haderlie waiver sent on 9/5/2017, answer due 11/6/2017; Jay Heward waiver sent on 9/5/2017, answer due 11/6/2017; Christina Iverson waiver sent on 9/5/2017, answer due 11/6/2017; Doug McFall waiver sent on 9/5/2017, answer due 11/6/2017; Moira Lynch waiver sent on 9/5/2017, answer due 11/6/2017; Terry Kirkham waiver sent on 9/5/2017, answer due 11/6/2017; Jean Fisher waiver sent on 9/5/2017, answer due 11/6/2017; William Crawford waiver sent on 9/5/2017, answer due 11/6/2017; Matthew Thomas waiver sent on 9/5/2017, answer due 11/6/2017; Erwin Sonnenberg waiver sent on 9/5/2017, answer due 11/6/2017; Chris Goetz waiver sent on 9/5/2017, answer due 11/6/2017; Jon Burnham waiver sent on 9/5/2017, answer due 11/6/2017; Tom Carter waiver sent on 9/5/2017, answer due 11/6/2017; Tony Liford waiver sent on 9/5/2017, answer due 11/6/2017; Craig T Rowland waiver sent on 9/5/2017, answer due 11/6/2017; Michael Johnston waiver sent on 9/5/2017, answer due 11/6/2017. (Olsen, Steven)
11 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to File Answer re 4 Amended Complaint Clay R Smith appearing for Defendants Steve Anderson, Stephen Bartlett, Jeffrey Betts, Patti Bolen, Lynn Bowerman, Brent T Bunn, Jon Burnham, Tom Carter, William Crawford, Kiernan Donahue, Kevin Ellis, Jean Fisher, David Fryar, Paula Garay, Chris Goetz, Shawn Gough, Michael Haderlie, Jay Heward, Christina Iverson, Michael Johnston, Jim Kacqmarek, Kevin Kempf, Terry Kirkham, Rick Layher, Tony Liford, Moira Lynch, Doug McFall, Lorin Nielsen, Ralph Powell, Joe Rodriguez, Charles Rolland, Craig T Rowland, Sexual Offender Management Board, Kimberly Simmons, Eric Snarr, Erwin Sonnenberg, Matthew Thomas, Lawrence Wasden, Paul J Wilde, Ben Wolfinger. Responses due by 11/17/2017 (Smith, Clay)
12 ORDER GRANTING CONSENT MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE ANSWER OR OTHER RESPONSE TO AMENDED COMPLAINT granting 11 Motion for Extension of Time to Answer. Steve Anderson, Stephen Bartlett, Jeffrey Betts, Patti Bolen, Lynn Bowerman, Brent T Bunn, Jon Burnham, Tom Carter, William Crawford, Kiernan Donahue, Kevin Ellis, Jean Fisher, David Fryar, Paula Garay, Chris Goetz, Shawn Gough, Michael Haderlie, Jay Heward, Christina Iverson, Michael Johnston, Jim Kacqmarek, Kevin Kempf, Terry Kirkham, Rick Layher, Tony Liford, Moira Lynch, Doug McFall, Lorin Nielsen, Ralph Powell, Joe Rodriguez, Charles Rolland, Craig T Rowland, Sexual Offender Management Board, Kimberly Simmons, Eric Snarr, Erwin Sonnenberg, Matthew Thomas, Lawrence Wasden, Paul J Wilde, and Ben Wolfinger answer due 11/17/2017. Signed by Judge David C. Nye. (caused to be mailed to non Registered Participants at the addresses listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF) by (st)
13 MOTION for Leave to File Excess Pages Clay R Smith appearing for Defendants Steve Anderson, Stephen Bartlett, Jeffrey Betts, Patti Bolen, Lynn Bowerman, Brent T Bunn, Jon Burnham, Tom Carter, William Crawford, Kiernan Donahue, Kevin Ellis, Jean Fisher, David Fryar, Paula Garay, Chris Goetz, Shawn Gough, Michael Haderlie, Jay Heward, Christina Iverson, Michael Johnston, Jim Kacqmarek, Kevin Kempf, Terry Kirkham, Rick Layher, Tony Liford, Moira Lynch, Doug McFall, Lorin Nielsen,

Case 1:16-cv-429 Document <docnum> Filed <datefiled> Page 18 of 22

11/17/2017 11/17/2017
12/06/2017 12/07/2017 01/05/2018 01/08/2018
01/22/2018 01/22/2018 01/23/2018
01/23/2018 01/29/2018 02/02/2018 02/09/2018

Ralph Powell, Joe Rodriguez, Charles Rolland, Craig T Rowland, Sexual Offender Management Board, Kimberly Simmons, Richard Skiles, Eric Snarr, Erwin Sonnenberg, Matthew Thomas, Lawrence Wasden, Paul J Wilde, Ben Wolfinger. Responses due by 12/7/2017 (Smith, Clay)
14 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE EXCESS PAGES granting 13 Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages. Signed by Judge David C. Nye. (caused to be mailed to non Registered Participants at the addresses listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF) by (st)
15 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim Clay R Smith appearing for Defendants Steve Anderson, Stephen Bartlett, Jeffrey Betts, Patti Bolen, Lynn Bowerman, Brent T Bunn, Jon Burnham, Tom Carter, William Crawford, Kiernan Donahue, Kevin Ellis, Jean Fisher, David Fryar, Paula Garay, Chris Goetz, Shawn Gough, Michael Haderlie, Jay Heward, Christina Iverson, Michael Johnston, Jim Kacqmarek, Kevin Kempf, Terry Kirkham, Rick Layher, Tony Liford, Moira Lynch, Doug McFall, Lorin Nielsen, Ralph Powell, Joe Rodriguez, Charles Rolland, Craig T Rowland, Sexual Offender Management Board, Kimberly Simmons, Richard Skiles, Eric Snarr, Erwin Sonnenberg, Matthew Thomas, Lawrence Wasden, Paul J Wilde, Ben Wolfinger. Responses due by 12/8/2017 (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support)(Smith, Clay)
16 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply Greg J Fuller appearing for Plaintiff John and Jane Does 1−134. Responses due by 12/27/2017 (Fuller, Greg)
17 ORDER granting 16 Motion for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply re 15 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim . Responses due by 1/8/2018. Signed by Judge David C. Nye. (caused to be mailed to non Registered Participants at the addresses listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF) by (st)
18 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply Greg J Fuller appearing for Plaintiff John and Jane Does 1−134. Responses due by 1/26/2018 (Fuller, Greg)
19 ORDER GRANTING SECOND CONSENT MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM granting 18 Motion for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply re 15 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. Responses due by 1/22/2018. Signed by Judge David C. Nye. (caused to be mailed to non Registered Participants at the addresses listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF) by (cjs)
20 RESPONSE to Motion re 15 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim filed by John and Jane Does 1−134. Replies due by 2/5/2018.(Fuller, Greg)
21 MOTION for Leave to File Excess Pages Greg J Fuller appearing for Plaintiff John and Jane Does 1−134. Responses due by 2/12/2018 (Fuller, Greg)
22 ORDER RE: MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE EXCESS PAGES. Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages 21 is DENIED in PART and GRANTED in Part. Plaintiffs' current Response (Dkt. 20) is stricken from the docket. Plaintiffs' shall file their amended response by 2/2/2018. Signed by Judge David C. Nye. (caused to be mailed to non Registered Participants at the addresses listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF) by (st)
Set/Reset Deadlines as to 15 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim . Responses due by 2/2/2018 (Per Order, dkt #22)(st)
23 DOCKET ENTRY NOTICE of Hearing on 15 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim : Hearing set for 2/20/2018 at 02:00 PM in Boise − Courtroom 1 before Judge David C. Nye. (ab)
24 RESPONSE to Motion re 15 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim filed by John and Jane Does 1−134. Replies due by 2/16/2018.(Fuller, Greg)
25 NOTICE of Appearance by Greg J Fuller on behalf of John and Jane Does 1−134 (Fuller, Greg)

Case 1:16-cv-429 Document <docnum> Filed <datefiled> Page 19 of 22

02/12/2018 02/16/2018 03/06/2018 04/04/2018 04/18/2018
04/18/2018 05/17/2018

26 REPLY to Response to Motion re 15 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim filed by Steve Anderson, Stephen Bartlett, Jeffrey Betts, Patti Bolen, Lynn Bowerman, Brent T Bunn, Jon Burnham, Tom Carter, William Crawford, Kiernan Donahue, Kevin Ellis, Jean Fisher, David Fryar, Paula Garay, Chris Goetz, Shawn Gough, Michael Haderlie, Jay Heward, Christina Iverson, Michael Johnston, Jim Kacqmarek, Kevin Kempf, Terry Kirkham, Rick Layher, Tony Liford, Moira Lynch, Doug McFall, Lorin Nielsen, Ralph Powell, Joe Rodriguez, Charles Rolland, Craig T Rowland, Sexual Offender Management Board, Kimberly Simmons, Richard Skiles, Eric Snarr, Erwin Sonnenberg, Matthew Thomas, Lawrence Wasden, Paul J Wilde, Ben Wolfinger.(Smith, Clay)
27 AMENDED DOCKET ENTRY NOTICE of Hearing on 15 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim : Hearing reset for 3/6/2018 at 03:00 PM in Boise − Courtroom 1 before Judge David C. Nye. (ab)
28 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge David C. Nye: Motion Hearing held on 3/6/2018 re 15 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim filed by Defendants. Matter is deemed UNDER ADVISEMENT and the Court will issue a Written Decision. (Court Reporter/ESR Katherine Eismann.) (paf) (Entered: 03/07/2018)
29 NOTICE by Steve Anderson, Stephen Bartlett, Jeffrey Betts, Patti Bolen, Lynn Bowerman, Brent T Bunn, Jon Burnham, Tom Carter, William Crawford, Kiernan Donahue, Kevin Ellis, Jean Fisher, David Fryar, Paula Garay, Chris Goetz, Shawn Gough, Michael Haderlie, Jay Heward, Christina Iverson, Michael Johnston, Jim Kacqmarek, Kevin Kempf, Terry Kirkham, Rick Layher, Tony Liford, Moira Lynch, Doug McFall, Lorin Nielsen, Ralph Powell, Joe Rodriguez, Charles Rolland, Craig T Rowland, Sexual Offender Management Board, Kimberly Simmons, Richard Skiles, Eric Snarr, Erwin Sonnenberg, Matthew Thomas, Lawrence Wasden, Paul J Wilde, Ben Wolfinger of Supplemental Authority (Attachments: # 1 Attachment − State v. Kinney)(Smith, Clay)
30 NOTICE of Substitution − Attorney Steven Lamar Olsen for Steve Anderson,Steven Lamar Olsen for Stephen Bartlett,Steven Lamar Olsen for Jeffrey Betts,Steven Lamar Olsen for Patti Bolen,Steven Lamar Olsen for Lynn Bowerman,Steven Lamar Olsen for Brent T Bunn,Steven Lamar Olsen for Jon Burnham,Steven Lamar Olsen for Tom Carter,Steven Lamar Olsen for William Crawford,Steven Lamar Olsen for Kiernan Donahue,Steven Lamar Olsen for Kevin Ellis,Steven Lamar Olsen for Jean Fisher,Steven Lamar Olsen for David Fryar,Steven Lamar Olsen for Paula Garay,Steven Lamar Olsen for Chris Goetz,Steven Lamar Olsen for Shawn Gough,Steven Lamar Olsen for Michael Haderlie,Steven Lamar Olsen for Jay Heward,Steven Lamar Olsen for Christina Iverson,Steven Lamar Olsen for Michael Johnston,Steven Lamar Olsen for Jim Kacqmarek,Steven Lamar Olsen for Kevin Kempf,Steven Lamar Olsen for Terry Kirkham,Steven Lamar Olsen for Rick Layher,Steven Lamar Olsen for Tony Liford,Steven Lamar Olsen for Moira Lynch,Steven Lamar Olsen for Doug McFall,Steven Lamar Olsen for Lorin Nielsen,Steven Lamar Olsen for Ralph Powell,Steven Lamar Olsen for Joe Rodriguez,Steven Lamar Olsen for Charles Rolland,Steven Lamar Olsen for Craig T Rowland,Steven Lamar Olsen for Sexual Offender Management Board,Steven Lamar Olsen for Kimberly Simmons,Steven Lamar Olsen for Richard Skiles,Steven Lamar Olsen for Eric Snarr,Steven Lamar Olsen for Erwin Sonnenberg,Steven Lamar Olsen for Matthew Thomas,Steven Lamar Olsen for Lawrence Wasden,Steven Lamar Olsen for Paul J Wilde,Steven Lamar Olsen for Ben Wolfinger added. Attorney Clay R Smith terminated. (Olsen, Steven)
31 AMENDED DOCUMENT by Steve Anderson, Stephen Bartlett, Jeffrey Betts, Patti Bolen, Lynn Bowerman, Brent T Bunn, Jon Burnham, Tom Carter, William Crawford, John Doe 109, Kiernan Donahue, Kevin Ellis, Jean Fisher, David Fryar, Paula Garay, Chris Goetz, Shawn Gough, Michael Haderlie, Jay Heward, Christina Iverson, Michael Johnston, Jim Kacqmarek, Kevin Kempf, Terry Kirkham, Rick Layher, Tony Liford, Moira Lynch, Doug McFall, Lorin Nielsen, Ralph Powell, Joe Rodriguez, Charles Rolland, Craig T Rowland, Sexual Offender Management Board, Kimberly Simmons, Richard Skiles, Eric Snarr, Erwin Sonnenberg, Matthew Thomas, Lawrence Wasden, Paul J Wilde, Ben Wolfinger. . (Olsen, Steven)
32 MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER − 1. Defendants Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 15 ) is GRANTED. 2. Plaintiffs are GRANTED LEAVE to file a second

Case 1:16-cv-429 Document <docnum> Filed <datefiled> Page 20 of 22

07/06/2018 07/09/2018 07/09/2018 08/08/2018 08/30/2018 09/13/2018
09/14/2018 09/14/2018 10/02/2018
10/18/2018

amended complaint to cure deficiencies identified in this decision. Plaintiffs have 60 days to file their second amended complaint. Signed by Judge David C. Nye. (caused to be mailed to non Registered Participants at the addresses listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF) by (cjs)
33 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to Amend Complaint Greg J Fuller appearing for Plaintiff John and Jane Does 1−134. Responses due by 7/27/2018 (Fuller, Greg)
34 ORDER GRANTING CONSENT MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs Consent Motion for Extension of Time to File Second Amended Complaint (Dkt. 33 ) is GRANTED. The Plaintiffs will have until August 30, 2018, to file a Second Amended Complaint. Signed by Judge David C. Nye. (caused to be mailed to non Registered Participants at the addresses listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF) by (km)
Set Deadlines/Hearings: Second Amended Complaint due by 8/30/2018. (km)
35 NOTICE of Appearance by Peter L Wucetich on behalf of All Defendants (Wucetich, Peter)
36 AMENDED COMPLAINT PART II against All Defendants, filed by All Plaintiffs.(Fuller, Greg)
37 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to File Answer or Response to Amended Complaint Steven Lamar Olsen appearing for Defendants Steve Anderson, Stephen Bartlett, Jeffrey Betts, Patti Bolen, Lynn Bowerman, Brent T Bunn, Jon Burnham, Tom Carter, William Crawford, Kiernan Donahue, Kevin Ellis, Jean Fisher, David Fryar, Paula Garay, Chris Goetz, Shawn Gough, Michael Haderlie, Jay Heward, Christina Iverson, Michael Johnston, Jim Kacqmarek, Kevin Kempf, Terry Kirkham, Rick Layher, Tony Liford, Moira Lynch, Doug McFall, Lorin Nielsen, Ralph Powell, Joe Rodriguez, Charles Rolland, Craig T Rowland, Sexual Offender Management Board, Kimberly Simmons, Eric Snarr, Erwin Sonnenberg, Matthew Thomas, Lawrence Wasden. Responses due by 10/4/2018 (Olsen, Steven)
38 DOCKET ENTRY ORDER. Pursuant to the unopposed Motion for Extension of Time (Dkt. 37 ), the same is hereby GRANTED. Defendants shall have until October 18, 2018, to file an answer or otherwise respond. Signed by Judge David C. Nye. (caused to be mailed to non Registered Participants at the addresses listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF) by (bb)
NOTICE TO COURT that counsel Peter L. Wucetich wishes to no longer be noticed electronically on this case as of the date of this notice. (Olsen, Steven)
39 NOTICE of Substitution − Attorney Chris Kronberg for Steve Anderson,Chris Kronberg for Stephen Bartlett,Chris Kronberg for Jeffrey Betts,Chris Kronberg for Patti Bolen,Chris Kronberg for Lynn Bowerman,Chris Kronberg for Brent T Bunn,Chris Kronberg for Jon Burnham,Chris Kronberg for Tom Carter,Chris Kronberg for William Crawford,Chris Kronberg for Kiernan Donahue,Chris Kronberg for Kevin Ellis,Chris Kronberg for Jean Fisher,Chris Kronberg for David Fryar,Chris Kronberg for Paula Garay,Chris Kronberg for Chris Goetz,Chris Kronberg for Shawn Gough,Chris Kronberg for Michael Haderlie,Chris Kronberg for Jay Heward,Chris Kronberg for Christina Iverson,Chris Kronberg for Michael Johnston,Chris Kronberg for Jim Kacqmarek,Chris Kronberg for Kevin Kempf,Chris Kronberg for Terry Kirkham,Chris Kronberg for Rick Layher,Chris Kronberg for Tony Liford,Chris Kronberg for Moira Lynch,Chris Kronberg for Doug McFall,Chris Kronberg for Lorin Nielsen,Chris Kronberg for Ralph Powell,Chris Kronberg for Joe Rodriguez,Chris Kronberg for Charles Rolland,Chris Kronberg for Craig T Rowland,Chris Kronberg for Sexual Offender Management Board,Chris Kronberg for Kimberly Simmons,Chris Kronberg for Richard Skiles,Chris Kronberg for Eric Snarr,Chris Kronberg for Erwin Sonnenberg,Chris Kronberg for Matthew Thomas,Chris Kronberg for Lawrence Wasden,Chris Kronberg for Paul J Wilde,Chris Kronberg for Ben Wolfinger added. Attorney Clay R Smith and Peter L Wucetich terminated. (Kronberg, Chris)
40 MOTION to Dismiss Chris Kronberg appearing for Defendants Steve Anderson, Stephen Bartlett, Jeffrey Betts, Patti Bolen, Lynn Bowerman, Brent T Bunn, Jon

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11/06/2018 11/06/2018 12/07/2018 12/21/2018
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Burnham, Tom Carter, William Crawford, Kiernan Donahue, Kevin Ellis, Jean Fisher, David Fryar, Paula Garay, Chris Goetz, Shawn Gough, Michael Haderlie, Jay Heward, Christina Iverson, Michael Johnston, Jim Kacqmarek, Kevin Kempf, Terry Kirkham, Rick Layher, Tony Liford, Moira Lynch, Doug McFall, Lorin Nielsen, Ralph Powell, Joe Rodriguez, Charles Rolland, Craig T Rowland, Sexual Offender Management Board, Kimberly Simmons, Richard Skiles, Eric Snarr, Erwin Sonnenberg, Matthew Thomas, Lawrence Wasden, Paul J Wilde, Ben Wolfinger. Responses due by 11/8/2018 (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support)(Kronberg, Chris)
41 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply Greg J Fuller appearing for Plaintiff John and Jane Does 1−134. Responses due by 11/27/2018 (Fuller, Greg)
42 ORDER granting 41 Motion for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply re 40 MOTION to Dismiss . Responses due by 12/7/2018. Signed by Judge David C. Nye. (caused to be mailed to non Registered Participants at the addresses listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF) by (jp)
43 RESPONSE to Motion re 40 MOTION to Dismiss filed by John and Jane Does 1−134. Replies due by 12/21/2018.(Fuller, Greg)
44 REPLY to Response to Motion re 40 MOTION to Dismiss filed by Steve Anderson, Stephen Bartlett, Jeffrey Betts, Patti Bolen, Lynn Bowerman, Brent T Bunn, Jon Burnham, Tom Carter, William Crawford, Kiernan Donahue, Kevin Ellis, Jean Fisher, David Fryar, Paula Garay, Chris Goetz, Shawn Gough, Michael Haderlie, Jay Heward, Christina Iverson, Michael Johnston, Jim Kacqmarek, Kevin Kempf, Terry Kirkham, Rick Layher, Tony Liford, Moira Lynch, Doug McFall, Lorin Nielsen, Ralph Powell, Joe Rodriguez, Charles Rolland, Craig T Rowland, Sexual Offender Management Board, Kimberly Simmons, Richard Skiles, Eric Snarr, Erwin Sonnenberg, Matthew Thomas, Lawrence Wasden, Paul J Wilde, Ben Wolfinger.Motion Ripe Deadline set for 12/24/2018.(Kronberg, Chris)
45 DOCKET ENTRY NOTICE of Hearing on MOTION to Dismiss (Dkt. 40) − A hearing on this Motion is set for 3/12/2019 at 09:00 AM in Boise − Courtroom 1 before Judge David C. Nye. (ab)
46 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge David C. Nye: Motion Hearing held on 3/12/2019 re 40 Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendants. Matter is deemed UNDER ADVISEMENT and the Court will issue a Written Decision. (Court Reporter/ESR Katherine Eismann.) (paf)
47 MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER. Defendants Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Signed by Judge David C. Nye. (alw)
48 JUDGMENT It is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that judgment be entered in favor of Defendants, and this case closed. Signed by Judge David C. Nye. (caused to be mailed to non Registered Participants at the addresses listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF) by (jp)
49 NOTICE OF APPEAL by John and Jane Does 1−134. Filing fee $ 505, receipt number 0976−1883720. (Notice sent to Court Reporter & 9th Cir) (Fuller, Greg)
50 TRANSCRIPT REQUEST by John and Jane Does 1−134 for proceedings held on 03/06/2018 03/12/2019 before Judge David C. Nye, re 49 Notice of Appeal (Notice sent by e−mail to Court Reporter) Transcript due by 7/5/2019. (Fuller, Greg)
51 Transcript filed for dates of March 6, 2018 before Judge David C. Nye, re 49 Notice of Appeal Court Reporter Katherine Eismann, Email katherine_eismann@id.uscourts.gov. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Redaction Request due 7/15/2019. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 7/25/2019. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 9/23/2019. (ke)
52 Transcript filed for dates of March 12, 2019 before Judge David C. Nye, re 49 Notice of Appeal Court Reporter Katherine Eismann, Email katherine_eismann@id.uscourts.gov. Transcript may be viewed at the court public

Case 1:16-cv-429 Document <docnum> Filed <datefiled> Page 22 of 22

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terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Redaction Request due 7/15/2019. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 7/25/2019. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 9/23/2019. (ke)
53 Notice of Filing of Official Transcript Motion Hearings 3/6/18 and 3/12/19. (ke)


[CONTENT] September 22, 2016 | under 42 | 1983 | 104 | John | Jane | the U.S. District Court | the Southern District | Idaho | the Idaho Department of Corrections | the Idaho State Police Force ||| Idaho | the Due Process | the U.S. Constitution ||| the Sex Offender Registry | Contracts | Takings | U.S. | Idaho Constitutions |||  ||| 1980s | 1990s ||| One | Idaho ||| John Doe 100 | Bannock County | Montana | 1996 ||| Montana ||| Idaho | 2005 | 2007 | 11 years | Idaho ||| the Sex Offender Registry ||| Apr. 26, 2017 | U.S. | Idaho Constitutions ||| Registry ||| David C. Nye | Aug. 2, 2017 ||| Nov. 17, 2017 ||| March 6, 2018 | Nye ||| May 17, 2018 | Nye | second ||| one ||| 2018 | 2275220 ||| August 30, 2018 | second ||| October 18, 2018 ||| March 12, 2019 ||| April 5, 2019 | Nye | second ||| twelve | second |||  ||| Nye ||| 2019 | 1508037 ||| May 5, 2019 | the U.S. Court of Appeals | the Ninth Circuit ||| January 20, 2020 | the Court of Appeals [SUMMARY] On September 22, 2016, this complaint was filed under 42 U.S.C. §1983 on behalf of 104 unnamed sexual offenders, identified as John or Jane Does, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Idaho against the Idaho Attorney General, the Idaho Department of Corrections, and the Idaho State Police Force. The plaintiffs alleged that Idaho’s Sexual Offender Registration Notification and Community Right-to-Know Act was unconstitutionally vague in violation of the Due Process and the Ex Post Facto clauses of the U.S. Constitution. The plaintiffs also alleged that the Sex Offender Registry and accompanying statutes further violated the Substantive Due Process, Equal Protection, Double Jeopardy, Contracts, and Takings clauses of the U.S. and Idaho Constitutions. 

The plaintiffs were from across the country. Most were convicted of sexual offenses in 1980s and 1990s. One of their major complaints was that subsequent amendments to Idaho’s sex-offender registry laws amounted to unconstitutional retroactive punishment. For example, John Doe 100, of Bannock County, was convicted of a misdemeanor sexual offense in Montana in 1996. His offense did not require registration in Montana. He moved to Idaho in 2005 and was not required to register until 2007, 11 years after his conviction, when Idaho authorities reclassified his offense as a felony rather than the original misdemeanor. 

The plaintiffs sought a permanent order to stop the state and its counties from enforcing specific provisions of the Sex Offender Registry and accompanying statutes and laws. An amended complaint was filed on Apr. 26, 2017, which argued that the defendants further violated the plaintiffs' rights to: acquire, possess and protect property; seek and obtain safety and happiness; travel, life and liberty; and freedom of association and religion protected by the U.S. and Idaho Constitutions. The complaint argued that the Registry and accompanying laws were unconstitutional both facially and as-applied. 

The case was assigned to Judge David C. Nye on Aug. 2, 2017.

On Nov. 17, 2017, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. A hearing was held on March 6, 2018 before Judge Nye. On May 17, 2018, Judge Nye granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss and granted the plaintiffs leave to file a second amended complaint to cure deficiencies identified. Specifically, the plaintiffs must identify actual harms suffered by one or more “Does” and present sufficient facts upon which the court can make a reasoned decision. 2018 WL 2275220.

On August 30, 2018, the plaintiffs filed the second amended complaint against the defendants. The defendants filed another motion to dismiss on October 18, 2018. A hearing was held on March 12, 2019. 

On April 5, 2019, Judge Nye granted the motion to dismiss again and dismissed the second amended complaint with prejudice. The court reasoned that the plaintiffs added facts with respect to twelve defendants in the second amended complaint but failed to tie such facts to specific constitutional violations and allege essential details that would allow the court to evaluate whether any of the allegations are plausible. The plaintiffs also ignored most of the arguments raised in the defendants’ motion to dismiss and failed to cite any binding authority to support their arguments. Accordingly, Judge Nye dismissed this case. 2019 WL 1508037.

On May 5, 2019, the plaintiffs appealed this decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. As of January 20, 2020, this case is pending in the Court of Appeals.
