Case 1:18-cv-02054 Doc #: 1 Filed 03/07/18 Page 1 of 3 Page ID #: 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

________________________________________________

X

THE NEW YORK TIMES COMPANY

:

and CHARLIE SAVAGE,

:

Plaintiffs,

:

- against -

:

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

:

Defendant.

:

: ________________________________________________X

COMPLAINT

Plaintiffs THE NEW YORK TIMES COMPANY and CHARLIE SAVAGE, by their undersigned attorney, allege for their Complaint:
1. This is an action under the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), 5 U.S.C. § 552, to obtain an order for the production of agency records from Defendant Department of Justice (“DOJ”) in response to a FOIA request properly made by Plaintiffs.
PARTIES 2. Plaintiff The New York Times Company publishes The New York Times newspaper and www.nytimes.com. The New York Times Company is headquartered in this judicial district at 620 Eighth Avenue, New York, New York, 10018. 3. Plaintiff Charlie Savage is a reporter for The New York Times and an employee of The New York Times Company. 4. Defendant DOJ is an agency of the federal government that has possession and control of the records that Plaintiffs seek.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 5. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B).
1

Case 1:18-cv-02054 Doc #: 1 Filed 03/07/18 Page 2 of 3 Page ID #: 2
6. Venue is premised on the place of business of Plaintiffs and is proper in this district under 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B).
7. Defendant DOJ has failed to meet the statutory deadline set by FOIA. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(A). Plaintiffs are therefore deemed to have exhausted all administrative remedies, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(C).
FACTS 8. On February 2, 2018, Plaintiffs submitted a FOIA request to DOJ (FOIA/PA #18-094) seeking “access to, including declassification review of as necessary, documents submitted by DOJ to the FISC, and orders or other documents issued by the FISC, in connection with the FISA order targeting Carter Page issued in October 2016, as well as its extensions, the existence of which and certain details of which were declassified by President Trump in connection to the HPSCI memo.” 9. On February 21, 2018, DOJ acknowledged receipt of the request. 10. DOJ has failed to respond to Plaintiffs’ FOIA request within the statutory time frame required under FOIA.
COUNT 11. Plaintiffs repeat, reallege, and reincorporate the allegations in the foregoing paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 12. Defendant DOJ is subject to FOIA and must therefore release in response to a FOIA request any disclosable records in its possession at the time of the request and provide a lawful reason for withholding any materials as to which it is claiming an exemption. 13. DOJ has failed to meet the statutory deadline set by FOIA. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(A). Accordingly, Plaintiffs are deemed to have exhausted their administrative remedies under FOIA. 14. DOJ has no lawful basis for declining to release the records requested by Plaintiffs under FOIA.
2

Case 1:18-cv-02054 Doc #: 1 Filed 03/07/18 Page 3 of 3 Page ID #: 3
15. Accordingly, Plaintiffs are entitled to an order compelling DOJ to produce records responsive to their FOIA request.
REQUEST FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court:
16. Declare that the documents sought by their FOIA request, as described in the foregoing paragraphs, are public under 5 U.S.C. § 552 and must be disclosed;
17. Order DOJ to provide the requested documents to Plaintiffs within 20 business days of the Court’s order;
18. Award Plaintiffs the costs of this proceeding, including reasonable attorneys’ fees, as expressly permitted by FOIA; and
19. Grant Plaintiffs such other and further relief as this Court deems just and proper.

Dated: New York, NY March 7, 2018

_____________/s/_________________ David E. McCraw, Esq. Legal Department The New York Times Company 620 8th Avenue New York, NY 10018 phone: (212) 556-4031 fax: (212) 556-1009 e-mail: mccrad@nytimes.com Counsel for Plaintiffs

3

The New York Times Company et al v. Department Of Justice, Docket No. 1:18-cv-02054 (S.D.N.Y. Mar 07, 2018), Court Docket
General Information

Court
Federal Nature of Suit Docket Number Status

United States District Court for the Southern District of New York; United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
Freedom of Information Act[895]
1:18-cv-02054
CLOSED

© 2018 The Bureau of National Affairs, Inc. All Rights Reserved. Terms of Service // PAGE 4

 </s> Case 1:18-cv-02054-AT Document 12 Filed 04/13/18 Page 1 of 5

GEOFFREY S. BERMAN United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York By: ANDREW E. KRAUSE Assistant United States Attorney 86 Chambers Street, Third Floor New York, New York 10007 Telephone: (212) 637-2769 Facsimile: (212) 637-2786 E-mail: andrew.krause@usdoj.gov

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

------------------------------------------------------------ x

THE NEW YORK TIMES COMPANY and CHARLIE SAVAGE,

: : :

Plaintiffs,

: :

-against-

: :

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

: :

Defendant.

: :

------------------------------------------------------------ x

18 Civ. 2054 (AT) ANSWER

Defendant United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”), by its attorney, Geoffrey S.

Berman, United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, answers the complaint of

plaintiffs The New York Times Company and Charlie Savage (“Plaintiffs”), dated March 7,

2018, as follows:

1. Paragraph 1 consists of Plaintiffs’ characterization of this lawsuit, to which no

response is required. To the extent a response is required, DOJ denies the allegations contained

in paragraph 1 of the complaint, except admits that Plaintiffs seek relief pursuant to the Freedom

of Information Act (“FOIA”), 5 U.S.C. § 552.

2. DOJ denies knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of

the allegations contained in paragraph 2 of the complaint.

Case 1:18-cv-02054-AT Document 12 Filed 04/13/18 Page 2 of 5
3. DOJ denies knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 3 of the complaint.
4. DOJ denies the allegations contained in paragraph 4 of the complaint, except admits that DOJ is an “agency” of the federal government within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. § 552(f).
5. The allegations contained in paragraph 5 of the complaint consist of Plaintiffs’ legal opinions and conclusions regarding jurisdiction, to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, DOJ denies the allegations contained in paragraph 5 of the complaint.
6. The allegations contained in paragraph 6 of the complaint consist of Plaintiffs’ legal opinions and conclusions regarding venue, to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, DOJ denies knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 6 of the complaint.
7. The allegations contained in paragraph 7 of the complaint consist of Plaintiffs’ legal opinions and conclusions, to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, DOJ denies the allegations contained in paragraph 7 of the complaint.
8. DOJ admits that Plaintiffs submitted a FOIA request to DOJ on February 2, 2018, and admits that the quoted language is an accurate quotation of a portion of the February 2, 2018 FOIA request. DOJ respectfully refers the Court to the FOIA request for a complete description of its contents.
9. DOJ admits the allegations contained in paragraph 9 of the complaint.
2

Case 1:18-cv-02054-AT Document 12 Filed 04/13/18 Page 3 of 5
10. The allegations contained in paragraph 10 of the complaint consist of Plaintiffs’ legal opinions and conclusions, to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, DOJ denies the allegations contained in paragraph 10 of the complaint.
11. DOJ repeats and incorporates by reference each and every response set forth herein to the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 10 of the complaint.
12. The allegations contained in paragraph 12 of the complaint consist of Plaintiffs’ legal opinions and conclusions, to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, DOJ denies the allegations contained in paragraph 12 of the complaint, except admits that DOJ is subject to FOIA.
13. The allegations contained in paragraph 13 of the complaint consist of Plaintiffs’ legal opinions and conclusions, to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, DOJ denies the allegations contained in paragraph 13 of the complaint.
14. The allegations contained in paragraph 14 of the complaint consist of Plaintiffs’ legal opinions and conclusions, to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, DOJ denies the allegations contained in paragraph 14 of the complaint.
15. The allegations contained in paragraph 15 of the complaint consist of Plaintiffs’ legal opinions and conclusions, to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, DOJ denies the allegations contained in paragraph 15 of the complaint.
16. Paragraphs 16 through 19 of the complaint consist of Plaintiffs’ request for relief, to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, DOJ denies that Plaintiffs are entitled to the requested relief, or to any relief whatsoever.
17. DOJ denies each and every allegation in the complaint that has not heretofore been specifically admitted, answered, or otherwise responded to.
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Case 1:18-cv-02054-AT Document 12 Filed 04/13/18 Page 4 of 5
DEFENSES FIRST DEFENSE The Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ requests for relief that exceed the relief authorized by statute under FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552. SECOND DEFENSE The requested records are exempt, in full or in part, from disclosure. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b). THIRD DEFENSE DOJ has exercised due diligence in processing the FOIA Request and exceptional circumstances exist that necessitate additional time for DOJ to complete its processing of the FOIA Request. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(C). FOURTH DEFENSE DOJ reserves the right to amend this answer to assert any other matter that constitutes an avoidance or affirmative defense under Rule 8(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
4

Case 1:18-cv-02054-AT Document 12 Filed 04/13/18 Page 5 of 5

WHEREFORE, DOJ respectfully requests that the Court: (1) dismiss the complaint with

prejudice; (2) enter judgment in favor of DOJ; and (3) grant such further relief as the Court

deems just and proper.

Dated: New York, New York April 13, 2018

Respectfully submitted,

GEOFFREY S. BERMAN United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York

By: /s/ Andrew E. Krause ANDREW E. KRAUSE Assistant United States Attorney 86 Chambers Street, Third Floor New York, New York 10007 Telephone: (212) 637-2769 Facsimile: (212) 637-2786 E-mail: andrew.krause@usdoj.gov

5

 </s> Case 1:18-cv-02054-AT Document 16 Filed 08/09/18 Page 1 of 3

Case 1:18-cv-02054-AT Document 16 Filed 08/09/18 Page 2 of 3

Case 1:18-cv-02054-AT Document 16 Filed 08/09/18 Page 3 of 3
SO ORDERED. Dated: August 9, 2018
New York, New York

The New York Times Company et al v. Department Of Justice, Docket No. 1:18-cv-02054 (S.D.N.Y. Mar 07, 2018), Court Docket
General Information

Court
Federal Nature of Suit Docket Number Status

United States District Court for the Southern District of New York; United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
Freedom of Information Act[895]
1:18-cv-02054
CLOSED

© 2018 The Bureau of National Affairs, Inc. All Rights Reserved. Terms of Service // PAGE 4

 </s> All information is considered unclassified except where otherwise shown.

TOPSECRET/~OFORN

U.S. FOREH."m

INTELUGENCE

uNITED STATES

SURVElUitiCE COURT

Classify
Rea~on: Denve~

By: J23J98T32
(C) . .
From. FBI NSICG,

FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE dated 10-2016

SURVEI7Lil!GLO ANC ~~fTB~-
· CLEm\ Of cOUHT

Declasstfy On: -

WASHINGTON, D.C.

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1

00 IN RE CARTER W. PAGE, A U.S.

Docket Number:

·PERSON.

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1

(U) VERIFIED APPLICATION

~) The United States of America hereby applies to this Court for authority to

cond

as described herein, pursuant

to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended, Title 50, United

States Code (U.S.C.),

(FISA or the Act).

b1-1 b3_1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

1. (U) Identity of Federal Officer Makin& Application This application is

Bureau of Investigation (FBI) whose official duties atFBI Headquarters include supervision of the FBI's investigation of the above-captioned target based upon information officially furnished to

b1-1 b3-1 b6-1 b7A-1 b7C-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

Classified by: Derived from: Declassify on:

TOPSECRET/I.NOFO~~
-

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1
OI Tracking No. 143045
17-cv-597(FBI) - 1

TOP Sl!:CRBT//NOFOR..~

2. (S) Identity of the Target The target of this application is Carter W.
b1-1

Page, a U.S.
.

person,

and an agent of a foreign power,

described in detail below.

The

h3-1 b7A-1

.
status of the target was determined in or about October 2016 from information

b?E-1,2,3,6

provided by the U.S. Department of State.

3. ~) Statement of Facts The United States relies upon the following facts

and circumstances in support of this application. a. (~ The target of this application is an agent of a foreign power.

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

~) The following describes the foreign power and sets forth in detail a

de.scription of the target and the target's activities for or on behalf of this foreign

power.

(U) ~) The Government of the Russian Federation is a foreign power as defined by 50 U.S.C. § 1801(a)(l).
(U) 00 The Government of the Russian Federation (Russia) is an internationally
recognized foreign government and, as of the execution of this application, is listed in the Diplomatic List, published by the United States Department of State, and in Permanent Missions to the United Nations, published by the United Nations, and its establishments in the United States are components thereof.
TOP SBCR:BT//NOFORN
-217-cv-597(FBI)- 2

TOPS~CRBT/~O~ORN
:{6) Clandestine Intelligence Activities Of The Russian Federation
(K)
b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1,2
\

(99
b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E- 1,2

TOPS~CRBV~O~O~~
-3-

17-cv-597(FBI)- 3

TOP SEC&BT!/:NOPORN

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E- 1,2

(U) (s.) Carter W. engage in
clandestine intelligence activities (other than intelligence gathering activities) for

b3-1
b?A- 1 b7E- 1,2

or on behalf of such foreign power, which activities involve or are about to

involve a violation of the criminal statutes of the United States, or knowingly

conspires with other persons to engage in such activities and, therefore, is an

agent of a foreign power as defined by 50 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(2)(E).

~ This application targets Carter Page. The FBI believes Page has been

the subject of targeted recruitment by the Russian

undermine and influence the outcome of the 2016 U.S. Presidential election in violation of U.S. criminal law. Page is a former foreign policy advisor to a Candidate for U.S. President (Candidate #1).

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

-4-
17-cv-597(FBI)- 4

TOP SBCRET/INOFOR.'I\J

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E~ 1,2

I. (U) (CS//m.) RIS Efforts to Influence U.S. Presidential Elections. ~) During a recent interview with an identified news organization, the
Director of National Intelligence (DNI) stated, "Russia has tried to influence U.S. elections since the 1960s during the Cold War" and "there's a tradition in Russia of interfering with elections, their own and others." The DNI commented that this influence included providing money to particular candidates or providing disinformation. The DNI added that "it shouldn't come as a big shock to people, ... I think it's more dramatic maybe because they have the cyber tools that they can
bring to bear in the same effort.

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2

TOP SECRETI/NOFOR.l\l -5-

17-cv-597(FBI) - 5

TOPS~CR~T!fNOFORN

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E- 1,2

(~In or about July 2016, WikiLeaks released a trove of e-mails from the

Democratic National Committee (DNC).1

-

There has been speculation in U.S. media that the Russian Government was

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1
b7E- 1, 2, 3

behind the hack. Russia has publicly denied any involvement in the hack. Russian

President Vladimir Putin said in or about September 2016 that Russia was not

responsible for the hack, but said that the release of the DNC documents was a net

positive: "The important thing is the content that was given to the public." Despite

Russia's

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-l, 2, 3

aimnanrnaefaatotifleroyrmronsimaiaa1sllts~ iamtohinnneed,vdaiopincalucvobooiArlrnuigagccnabactwnsotoiiarouozdrftna,iJtDnsoiugopfNlnyyltCaoia2nr0nigogn1fed,ff6oiada,cnrsaiWmasdtaloisacsck.teoiiiaLtorstrneeuoadopkftnlsciioebirtnnersals.erwoyaAre.secbedcWsdoiottirerhkd,oioiLWntuhegsieaaktkroniwsLdoisessppaeokeefcsnreieiasss-lotmirauziacremictsleeusidlnittoit-fhfeicial

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1,2

TOP SECR~T!/NOPORN
-6-

17-cv-597(FBI) - 6

TOPS~CRBTUNOPORN

In addition, according to an October 7, 2016 Joint Statement from the Department ofHomeland Security and the

b1-1 b3- 1
b7A-1 b7E- 1,2,3

Office of the Director ofNational Intelligence on Election Security (Election Security Joint

Statement), the USIC is confident that the Russian Government directed the recent

compromises of e-mails from U.S. persons and institutions, including from U.S.

political organizations. The Election Security Joint Statement states that the recent

disclosures of e-mails on; among others, sites like WikiLeaks are consistent with the

methods and motivations of Russian-directed efforts. According to the Election

Security Joint Statement, these thefts and disclosures are intended to interfere with

the U.S. election process; activity that is not new to Moscow- the Russians have

used similar tactics and techniques across Europe and Eurasia, for example, to

influence public opinion there. The Election Security Joint Statement states that,

based on the scope and sensitivity of these efforts, only Russia's senior-most officials

could have authorized these activities.

{S.HNI) Based on the Russian Government's historical efforts to influence

U.S. elections,

and

the information discussed herein regarding Russia's coordination with Carter Page

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2

TOP SECRET//NOFORN -7-

17-cv-597(FBI)- 7

TOPSBCRBT/!NOFORN

undermine and improperly and illegally influence the 2016 U.S. Presidential election.
(U)~)

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2

As stated in the legislative history of FISA:

b7A-1 b7E-1, 2

cioh(omchnoNiiapftonasbifarpoutzcirtayicoatemrltsiusinusoiasnendestntmlis.hciiolotnneleyhtfnuogfnepNdosdttau,orfeahacmobistepftnrlioaweoiiotpctnriilnlimeegioaof'tlinsiannilgpcdvst,pnaiaianeostolnpthcirwidagooueoocinerwyonrtri,reif,tea.toocyfohlrntarsSsbrelloyt(usyeehfrecentoveeahhncgorefraegrnafraeucieagcgmaaticgetitntstivieieivsnisipnnnaiitlggotinesye,tsswahtsapbihdcecneyroaeitirapinfnib)ntcvegi,ieuognioadrtaundcniyiirerneidstovsosigeactefirwurhdnlimoieienudhnssfdaieiUfosnocllidausvnhuerf.epiirseaodtnrtSteGrouuocyeduriarpoinocilSevadnsfhgstgeetao)waorema,tuncfnenhaotmrspddioncvuetaedroidbnatilttteii,occsthe

H.R. Rep. No. 95-1283, pt. 1, at 41 (1978).

II.

(U)~ The
Presidential

Russian Government's Election.

Attempts

to

Influence

the

2016

U.S.

~) In or about March 2016, George Papadopoulos2 and Carter Page (the target of this application) were publicly identified by Candidate #1 as part of his/her foreign policy team.

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7D-1 b7E- I, 2

TOP S"BCRBT//NOFORN.

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-l, 2

-817-cv-597(FBI)- 8

TOP S'ECRET!/NOPOR...T!IJ
the FBI believes that the Russian Government's efforts are being coordinated with Page and perhaps other individuals associated with Candidate
bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7D-1 b7E- l, 2

(U) ~

TOPSECRBT//NOPORN
-9-

b7A-1 b7E-l, 2
17-cv-597(FBI)- 9

TOP SECRETI/NOFO~l\ol

As discussed below, Page has established relationships with Russian Government officials, including Russian intelligence offi

b3-l b7A-l
b7D-l
b7E- l, 2

-
nr.(U)Cl) Carter Page.
(U) A. (S} Page's Connections to Russia and the RIS. ~) Page, a U.S. citizen, is. the founder and managing partner of Global
Energy Capital LLC (GEC), an investment management and advisory firm that focuses on the energy sector primarily in emerging markets.

b7A-l b7E-l, 2.

TOPSECREV/NOFORN
,-10-

17-cv-597(FBI)- 10

TOP SECRET//NO~OJL"I\1

b7A-1 b7E-1, 2
b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-l, 2

(U)(Mm)

- f r o m approximately 2004 ~ 2007, Page lived in R u s s i During this time, Page began

b7A-1 b7E-1, 2

business dealings with Gazprom

bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E- 1, 2

TOPSBCRB~ijNOiORN
-11-

17-cv-597(FBI) - 11

TOP SECRET//NOFOR.""+
(~ According to information provided by Page during~

b7A-1 b7E-1,2

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2
b1-1 b3-1 . b7A-1 b7E- 1,2,3

TOPSECR&VANOPO~~
-12-

17-cv-597(FBI)- 12

TOP SECRET//NOEOR.N ~) According to information provided by Page during with the FBI,

interview

b6-2 b7A-l b7C-2 b7E-l, 2

bl-1 b3-l b6-2 b7A-l b7C-2 b7E-l, 2, 6

(U) ~In or about January 2015, Podobnyy, along with Evgeny Buryakov and Igor Sporyshev, were charged by a sealed complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York for violations of 18 U .S.C. §§ 371 and 951 (conspiring to act, and acting as, an unregistered agent of a foreign government). According to the complaint, Buryakov worked in the United States as an agent of the SVR. Specifically, Buryakov operated under non-official cover, posing as an employee in the Manhattan office of a Ru~sian bank. Buryakov worked with two other SVR agents, Podobnyy and Sporyshev, to gather intelligence on behalf of

TOP SECRET.t.LNOEORN -13-

17-cv-597(FBI)- 13

TOP SBCRBT!/NOPOR."'*
Russia:6 The complaint states that the intelligence gathering efforts of Podobnyy and Sporyshev included, among other things, attempting to recruit New York City residents as intelligence sources for Russia.
(~)
bl-1 b3-l b6-2 b7A-l b7C-2 b7E-l, 2

piAwBnr(tueiUttsrroh)oeyrenann.Ukeo6oynt~ viGat'sreerdanerseSrtreteaasdlBtt..e,usIPIrnnayosadookoarronbaavnbbayogwoyueuanttasMtMnaodraafrySreRcsp2uhto0es12rsdy60ia,si1n,h6Bwe,ouvBrirtynuaharoboykoulaooutkvntpoJgwrvaoeanprvsulileisdavedriennygdtg2eui0pninl1crt5ityeoh.dtreoAtnUotcono3tthi0incteseemptdtiioomrSnittnetahhgtoeesftsoinaancdt

TOP SECRET//NOPOR.~
-14-

17-cv-597(FBI)- 14

TOPSECREn1fNOFORN

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2

(U) B. (~Page's Coordination with Russian Government Officials on 2016 . U.S. Presidential Election Influence Activities. ~ According to open source information, in July 2016, Page traveled to

Russia and delivered the commencement address at the New Economic School.7 In

b 1-1
b3-1

addition to giving this address, the FBI has learned that Page met with at least two b7A-1
b7D-1
Russian officials during this trip. First, according to information provided by an FBI b7E- 1, 2

confidential·human source (Source #1),8
-(U)_7~

reported that Page had a

b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 4

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1
b7E- 1,2,5

· firm,

{~ Source #1, was approached by a

who now owns n identified U.S.

a foreign business/financial intelligence person, who indicated to Source #1 that

a

TOPSECREn1fNOFORN
. -15-

17-cv-597(FBI)- 15

TOP SiCIWT/INOJ!OR:N

csth#rUhpo1eae.eugvStclomae.du-rcboaldbaoatieltinsnoeveugdnsadsugCttelhic-adoastawntntttahdobtnfihieisdddrehiimarnsiietndcgeshrdee#ebanatd1udrthi'icssfethihintCie.rireeedaesTssndUsehtdao.rteSiherdRc.iledaahputeiteidsienonsret#nsitina1oofsti'hni(sCeftidhicwpaeae)nUda.mdis.dUSiTplde..iahSknapie.ettgeeiplinfrydei#s.eelro1donsn'sootUinkntfi.eiiSetenvos.dgeptcrUofeooar.RnSrdsd.uovinuspnisfsceioaetrarndsr.meodSTsnaSoehthauoieorirurccnFrehecBdteh#IS1a#o1tausrtcoe

hhi(nUierfr)eoedrimnS,~ aoStuioS orucnreo .ce#Au 1#f1ar tenprdc rSotooe vuitdrhc#ee1edFt#taB1hsIerk.eeicndefiohviresmdsauitnbiof-osnormtuoractthei(oesni)dfterooncmtioflitlehedcetUstuh.Sbe.-sreoquurcisei(tsew),hdoeshcardibed

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bwineitltoiheCvteha~ senSdFoiBduIa,rctweeh##eN11r''sesobttrwiyeepsiStothoorsutitRrnacungesdh#si1ienargp,erbiSonaovstueiorddcbeeoed#ncr1erS'esloidaruiebbralcleeseo.i#nn1ff'osorprmrceaovtniiodonuucstotrinethpgeotrFhtBeinIr,getshheieasrFtcoBhrIy

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TOPS~CRtiTh~OFO~~
-16-

17-cv-597(FBI)- 16

TOP SECR-ET//NOFORN

secret meeting with Igor Sechin, who is the President of Rosneft [a Russian energy

company] and a close associate to Russian President Putin.10

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b3-1

reported that, during the meeting, Page and Sechin discussed future bilateral energy

b7 A-1 b7D-1

cooperation and the prospects for an associated move to lift Ukraine-related Western b7E- l, 2

sanctions against Russia.

b7A-1 b7D-1 b7E-1, 2
b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7D-1 b7E_:1,2
o(iPcDT2uUdfo0(rthfeeUeStn0ienpecs4Dt)tiriuiUaindOultflSuo1enyisT0eDneytPa)~ idstalOnra2lataitdnoT0mnsyI n0edhaseto8noanoCMu,tnln ViodnShctifi.lcatenefaieiciiosTdcrosdhnmiiathriamesssnelaaaraianbowUnronfocrofPaSnettufstDihoushtotuteutOhAenhlinResteTnRpcouMtrD-ueahifsamslneaasR2snkiptne0iuaoaweuan1nsnuygtt4soyGneiiF,cudacmCoeotlneehdvdmhenmeeeeinbtpferriUetfefnafoonBi.tmonStertiaotfoe.deaskanSDnlnSetrstttofdeeona,trcpfoodfaasfhoaemthngfirrasnoiadtttsR2mriaeafn0cobRdsues0usirunstSl8nrtiosRtehrezusmecofeeuintnhfar,seUttintsiioanhldsik2nPatepwera0enaronTnae1iwstGnsdrs2iiefeihtio,fidina.ooevoaesgrdneSnunhm.r"edarthaneycsPsefmrhrutl"iohyetnsimenhntwtho. eawsn

TOPSBCREVP.NOFO~~
-17-

17-cv-597(FBI)- 17

TOPSECRETHNOFORN ~ -according to Source #1,

vyekin [who is assessed to be Igor Nikolayevich DivyekinJI

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7D-1 b7E- 1, 2

had met secretly with Page and that their agenda for the meeting included Divyekin raising a dossier or "kompromat"12 that the Kremlin possessed on Candidate #2 and the possibility of it being released to Candidate #l's campaign.13

(U) 12 (S) politician or blackmail.

Kompromat is a Russian political figure, which is

term for typically

compromising material used to create negative

about a publicity

or

b1-1
b3-1 b7A-1 b7D-1 b7E- 1, 2

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1
b7E-1, 2

TOP SECRETIINOFORN -18-

17-cv-597(FBI) -18

TOP ~iCRiTl/NOFOR..~

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7D-1 b7E-1,2

TOP~ECRiTUNOFOR..~
-19-

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7D-1 b7E-1,2 b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1
b7D-1 b7E-1, 2
b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7D-1 b7E-1, 2
b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7D-1 b7E-1, 2
17-cv-597(FBI)- 19

TOP SECRET//NOFORN

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7D-1 b7E- 1,2

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7D-1 b7E- 1,2

TOP SECirnT//NOFORN
-20-

b7A-1
h7F-1.?
17-cv-597(FBI)- 20

- -i

TOP S'8CR'8TJ/NOPORN

- a July 2016 article in an identified news organization reported that

b7A-l b7E-l, 2

Candidate #1's campaign worked behind the scenes to make sure Political Party #1's

platform would not call for giving weapons to Ukraine to fight Russian and rebel

· forces, contradicting the view of almost all Political Party #l's foreign policy leaders

in Washington. The article stated that Candidate #1's campaign sought "to make

sure that [Political Party #1] would ~ot pledge to give Ukraine the weapons it has

been asking for from the United States." Further, an August 2016 article published

by an identified news organization characterized Candidate #1 as sounding like a

supporter of Ukraine's territorial integrity in September [2015], adopted a "milder"

tone regarding Russia's annexation of Crimea. The August 2016 article further

reported that Candidate #1 said Candidate #1 might recognize Crimea as Russian

territory and lift punitive U.S. sanctions against Russia. The article opined that

while the reason for Candidate #1's shift was not clear, Candidate #1's more

conciliatory words, which contradict Political Party #1's official platform, follow

Candidate #l's recent association with several people sympathetic to Russian influence in Ukraine, including foreign policy advisor Carter Page.

bl-1 b3-l b7A-l b7E-1,2

TOP SECRETJ/NOFO~l\J -21-

17-cv-597(FBI)- 21

(~

TOP SEC~T/lNOFORN

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7D-1 b7E-1, 2
b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7D-1 b7E- 1,2

IV.(U) (~) Page's Denial of Cooperation with the Russian Government. (U) (Iii~) On or about September 23, 2016, an identified news organization
published an article (September 23rd News Article), which was written by the news organization's Chief Investigative Correspondent, alleging that U.S. intelligence officials are investigating Page with respect to suspected efforts by the Russian Government to influence the U.S. Presidential election.· According to the September 23rd News Article, U.S. officials received intelligence reports that when Page was in Moscow in July 2016 to deliver the above-noted commencement address at the New Economic School, he met with two senior Russian officials. The September 23rd News Article stated that a "well-placed Western intelligence source" told the news organization that Page met with Igor Sechin, a longtime Putin associate and former

TOP S"ECRETI/NO~ORN -22-

17-cv-597(FBI)- 22

TOPSBCRETJfNOFORN

Russian deputy minister who is now the executive chairman of Rosneft. At their

alleged meeting, Sechin raised the issue of the lifting of sanctions with Page.

According to the September 23rd News Article, the Western intellig~nce source also

reported that U.S. intelligence agencies received reports that Page met with another

top Putin aide -Igor Divyekffi., a former Russian security official who now serves as

deputy chief for internal policy and is believed by U.S. officials to have

responsibility for intelligence collected by Russian agencies about the U.S. election. 18

(U) ~ According to the September 23rd News Article, certain members of

Congress were "taken aback" after being briefed on the alleged meetings and

viewed the meetings as a possible back channel to the Russians that could undercut

I
U.S.

foreign

policy.

The September 23rd News Article-also stated that, following

the

briefing, the Senate Minority Leader wrote to the FBI Director, and citing the reports

coaaosfsssnhoodiccsuiiarac1ett8teser~eelia)inskreCetAahlhrysectpdhofiriritsosnhctvteuopisbdlsCaueecsaddeinnt.adhebSiissdoosaviuanteresf,cso#eSor1ocm#'iu1saartttctieoiee,olsdan#t1ntothodwRettauhhFsseeBshlIFiiaaBrt.wheIdaSaftiobsrhsuyieenrs/acsstehhbes#uea1tsthihpnairertoestvsdhiaedtshebseduobsctihuinaesteiernstehsteosisusslts information to the business associate and the FBI.

bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1,2

The FBI does not believe that Source #1 directly
provided this information to the press. ,

TOPSBCRB~'fNOFORN
-23-

17-cv-597(FBI) - 23

TOPSB~TUNOFO~~

of meetings between an advisor to Candidate #1 [the advisor was unnamed in the

letter, but the article indicated that the advisor is Page] and "high ranking

sanctioned individuals" [in context, likely a reference to Sechin] in Moscow over the · summer as evidence of "significant and disturbing ties" between Candidate #1's

campaign ·and the Kremlin that needed to be investigated by the FBI.

(U) ~ Based on statements in the September 23rd News Article, as well as

in other recent articles published by identified news organizations, Candidate #1's campaign repeatedly has made public statements in an attempt to create the

appearance of distance between Page and Candidate #l's campaign. For example, the September 23rd News Article noted that Page's precise role in Candidate #1's

campaign is unclear. According to the article, a spokesperson for Candidate #1's

campaign called Page an "informal foreign advisor" who "does not speak for

[Candidate #1]
.

or the campaign."

In addition,

another spokes' person for Candidate

#l's campaign said that Page "has no role" and added "[w]e are not aware of any of

his activities, past or present." However, the article stated that the campaign

spokesperson did not respond when asked why Candidate #1 had previously

described Page as an advisor. In addition, on or about September 25, 2016, an

identified news organization published an article that was based primarily on an

interview with Candidate #l's current campaign manager (the September 25th News

TOP SECRET/INOFOR...~
-24-

17-cv-597(FBI)- 24

TOPS~CR~TNNOPO~~

Article). During the interview, the campaign manager stated, "[Page is] not part of

the campaign I'm running." The campaign manager added that Page is not part of

Candidate #1's national security or foreign policy briefings since he/she became

campaign manager. In response to a question from the interviewer regarding

reports that Page has been meeting with Russian officials to essentially attempt to

conduct diplomatic negotiations with the Russian Government, the campaign .

manager responded, "If [Page is] doing that, he's certainly not doing it with the

permission or knowledge of the campaign ...."

b7A-1 b7E-l, 2

(U) (~On or about September 25, 2016, Page sent a letter to the FBI Director. In this letter, Page made reference to the accusations in the September 23rd News Article and denied them. Page stated thatthe source of the accusations is nothing more than completely false media reports and that he did not meet this year with any sanctioned official in Russia. Page also stated that he would '5e willing to

TOP S~C~Tl/NOFORN
-25-

17-cv-597(FBI) - 25

TOP SECRETI/NOFO~l\l
discuss any "final" questions the FBI may have.19 ~ Additionally, on or about September 26; 2016, an identified news
organization published an article that was based on an interview with Page (September 26th News Article). In the September 26th News Article, Page stated that all of the accusations are complete "garbage" and that he did not meet with Sechin or Divyekin. Page also stated that he would be taking a leave of absence from his work with Candidate #l's campaign because the accusations area "distraction.

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7D-1 b7E-1,2

19(~

TOP SECRETI/NOFORN -26-

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2
17-cv-597(FBI)- 26

~PSBCRBTifNOPORN
v. (SUNK)
(~

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7D-1 b7E-1, 2
b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7D-1 b7E- 1,2,6

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7D-1 b7E- 1, 2, 5, 6

TOP SBCRBT//NOPORN -27-

17-cv-597(FBI)- 27

(~)

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7D-1 b7E- 1,2
b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7D-1 b?E-1,2

TOP SECRBT!/NOFO~'I\J -28-

17-cv-597(FBI)- 28

VI. (SJ
(~ (~

TOPSBCRBT/ANOPORN

(~ (~

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7D-1 b7E-1, 2, 4, 6
b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7D-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

b3-1 b7A-1 b7E- 2, 4

TOP SBCRBT/ANOFOR.~
-29-

17-cv-597(FBI)- 29

(J)
(~

TOPS~CRE~~~OPO~~

(s:) (~)

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7D-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E- 1,2,3,6

TOP S~C~T/,~OPORN
-30-

17-cv-597(FBI)- 30

(Si)
(~)

TOPSBCRB~'f.NOPO~~

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E- 1, 2, 3, 6

(Mm.)

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E- 1,2,3,6

TOP SECRiT/f.NOPORN
-31-

b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2
17-cv-597(FBI)- 31

TOP SI;CR~T//NOFORN

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E- 1,2,3,6

VII. (U) Conclusion.

(U) ~ As discussed above, the FBI believes that Page has been collaborating

and conspiring with the Russian

Based on the

b7A-1 b7E-1, 2

foregoing facts and circumstances~ the FBI submits that there is probable cause to

believe that Page

engage in

clandestine intelligence activities (other than intelligence gathering activities) for or

on behalf of such foreign power, or knowingly conspires with other persons to

engage in such activities and, therefore, is an agent of a foreign power as defined by

50 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(2)(E).

(U) ~

the FBI submits that there is probable cause to believe that

b7A-1 b7E-l, 2

such activities involve or are about to involve violations of the criminal statutes of

TOPS~CRET/ANOFORN
-32-

17-cv-597(FBI)- 32

• (U)
II
00

TOP S~CRBTl/NO'FORN

·.i
b7A-l b7E-l, 2
b7A-l b7E-l, 2
bl-1 b3-l b6-2 b7A-l b7C-2 b7E-l, 2, 3, 6

TOPS~CRBT#NOFORN
-33-

17-cv-597(FBI)- 33

I
(.S)
(S)

TOPS~CRET/!NOPO~~

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b?E-1, 2, 3, 6

(~-

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-l, 2, 3, 6

(S)
b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b?E-1, 2, 3, 6
(J)

TOP S~CRET/INOFORN -34-

17-cv-597(FBI) - 34 j

TOPS~CRETNNOPORN
(i)
-
(S)
-

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

TOPS~CRE~'~PORN
-35-

17-cv-597(FBI)- 35

TOP S'ECD:T//NOPOR.'t
-
(~)
I

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

4. ~) Proposed Minimization Procedures As to all inform~tion acquired through the authorities requested herein, the FBI will folio~

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-l, 2, 3, 6

TOPSECREhlf.NOFORN
-36-

17-cv-597(FBI)- 36

TOPSECRBTIINOPO~~
I I
(U)

bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-2, 3
b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-2, 3
b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E- 1, 2, 3, 6

TOP SECRETJ/NOPORN
-37-

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
17-cv-597(FBI)- 37

TOPSECRETNNOPO~~

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
~)

(i)

b1-l

b3-1

b7A-1

(!)

b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

TOP SECRBT!INOPORN
-38-

17-cv-597(FBI)- 38

TOP S"SCR'8T//NOPORN

5. (i) Nature of the Information Sousht Through the authorities

bl-1 b3-l

requested herein, the United States is seeking foreign intelligence information with

b7A-l b7E-l, 2, 3, 6

respect to the activities of the target described above and detailed further in the

certification set forth below. As indicated by the facts set forth herein, the FBI is

seeking foreign intelligence information that relates and is necessary to the ability of

the United States to protect against clandestine intelligence activities by an intelligence service or network of this foreign power or by agents of this foreign power, and information with respect to a foreign power or foreign territory that relates and is necessary to the national defense, security, and the conduct of the foreign affairs of the United States. These same authorities may also incidentally

acquire other foreign intelligence information, as defined by the Act.

{1&)

bl-1 b3-l b7A-l b7E-l, 2, 3, 6

TOP Sl!.CRI!.Tl/NO:POR."J -39-

17-cv-597(FBI)- 39

TOP·S"BC:R£TJI:NOPORN (S)

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-l b7E-l, 2, 3, 6
b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E- 1,2,3,6

- (S)

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

TOP SBCRBT//NOFORN
-40-

17-cv-597(FBI) - 40

·- .. ~
'

TOP Si:CR-BT/INOPOR-N

6. (S) Certification The certification of the Assistant to the President for

National Security Affairs or an Executive branch official duly designated by the President as a certifying official in Executive Order N
amended, is set forth below.

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E- 1, 2, 3, 6

{!)

b1-1

b3-1

b6-2

b7A-1

(S)

b7C-2

b7E-1, 2, 7

(U) The PUI'J'ose of the Authorities Requested (~ The FBI's foreign intelligence goals for this investigation are set forth in the certification of the Executive Branch official contained herein. However, the authorities requested in this application may produce information and material which might, when evaluated by prosecutive authorities, constitute evidence of a violation of United States law, and this investigation may result in an eventual

TOPSBCRBTI/NOPORN
-41-

17-cv-597(FBI) - 41

TOP S~CRETNNO~ORN

criminal prosecution of the target. Nevertheless, as discussed in the certification, at

least a significant purpose of this request for

-

is to collect foreign intelligence information as part of the FBI's investigation

of this target.

I <K>

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

•

b1-1 b3-1

b7A-1

b7E-l, 2, 3, 6

TOP S~CR~T//NO~ORN -42-

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TOP SECRiT//NO:FORN

9. ~) Duration of the Authorities Requested (See also,

1-1

The authorities requested should not automatically terminate when foreign

b3-1 b7A-1

b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

intelligence information has first been obtained. Additional information of the same

type will be obtained on a continuous basis throughout the entire period requested.

The activities which the United States must identify and monitor are incremental

and continuous, and communications relating to such activities·are often disguised

to appear innocuous. The type of foreign intelligence information being sought and

the fact that the activities of this target are ongoing preclude the conclusion that, at a

given time, all such information has been obtained and collection can be ended.

Accordingly, the United States requests the authorities specified herein for a period

of ninety (90) days.

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E- 1,2

TOP SECRET//NOFORN
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17-cv-597(FBI)- 43

TOP S~CRETJ/NOFORN (~

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2
b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2

b1-1 b3-1
b7A~1
b7E-2, 6

TOP SECRETJ/NOFORN -44-

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. ·i
TOPS£CRET/ANOPORN

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b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 · b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

TOPSECRSN/NOPORN
-45-

17-cv-597(FBI)- 45

TOPSECRETI~OPO~~
-

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-l, 2, 3, 6

13. ~)

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

TOP SECRET!/NOPORN
-46-

17-cv-597(FBI)- 46

TOP SECRET//NOFOIL~

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-l b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
(UX3) Specific Authorities Requested Based upon the foregoing information,
the United States requests that this Court authorize the FBI to conduct the activities
described immediately below for the period requested herein.

-II

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

TOP SECRETI/NOFO~l\JJ -47-.

17-cv-597(FBI) - 47

TOP SBCRBT//NOFO:R~l!.J

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-l, 2, 3, 6

TOPSECRETIINOPO~l!.J
-48-

17-cv-597(FBI) - 48

TOP SE~T!/NOFORN
I I (X)
(li)

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

TOP SBCRETJ/NOFORN -49-

17-cv-597(FBI)- 49

TOPSBCRET!~OF,O~~
(~)

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

b1-1

b3-1

(~)

b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

b1-1 b3-l b7A-l b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

I I

TOPSBCRET/hNOFORN
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17-cv-597(FBI)- 50

TOP SECR8TI/NOPORN
I
I
-
I I

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b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

b1-1

b3-1

I

b7A-1

b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

I

I

TOP SECR-ETHNOPORN -51-

17-cv-597(FBI)- 51

TOP S~C&BT//NOPORN
I

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---- The remainder of this page is intentionally left blank. ----

TOPS~CRET/f.NO~ORN
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17-cv-597(FBI)- 52

TOPSBCREN!NOFORN (U) (~ The FBI has reviewed this verified application for· accuracy in accordance with its April 5, 2001 procedures, which include sending a copy of the draft to the appropriate field office(s). A copy of those procedures was previously provided to the Court.
--- The remainder of this page is intentionally left blank. ---

TOP SBCRBT#NOFOR.""l -53-

17-cv-597(FBI)- 53

TOP SECIG:TI/NO~O~l\J

(U) VERIFICATION
00 I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing information
regarding Carter W. Page is true and correct. Executed pursuant to Title 28, United
States Code,§ 1746 on !IJ

hl-1 b3-l b7A-l

Supervisory Special Agent Federal Bureau of Investigation

b6-l
b7A-l b7C-l

3llll'l '~ I, leeAnn Flynn Hall, Cl rk, ~ISC, certify that this document is a true and correct copy of the original.

TOP SECRET/INOPORN

-54-

17-cv-597(FBI)- 54

-i

TOPSECRBTHNOFO~~

(U) CERTIFICATION

00 L the undersigned, having been designated as one of the officials

authorized to make the certifications required by the Foreign Intelligence

Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended, do hereby certify with regard to t h e -

requested in this verified application targeting

b1-1 b3-1

b7A-1
Carter W. Page, an agent of the Government of Russia, a foreign power, as follows: b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

(A) (U) The information sought through the authorities requested herein is

foreign intelligence information.
(B) (U) At least a significant purpose of the authorities requested herein is to obtain foreign intelligence information and, notwithstanding the related criminal .matters described in this application, the primary purpose of the authorities requested herein is not to obtain information for the prosecution of crimes other than those referred to in the Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1801(a)-(e), or related to such foreign

intelligence crimes.

(C) (U) The foreign intelligence information sought by the authorities

b1-1 b3-1

requested herein cannot be reasonably obtained by normal investigative techniques.

b7A-1 b7E-1,

2,

3, 6

(D) (S) The type of foreign intelligence information being sought through the authorities requested herein is that described in 50 U.S.C. § 1801(e)(l)(C), i.e.,

TOP SECRETJ/NOFO.RN
-55-

17-cv-597(FBI)- 55

TOPSECRET/INOPO~~

information that relates and is necessary to the ability of the United States to protect against clandestine intelligence activities by an intelligence service or network of this foreign power or by agents of this foreign power, and 50 U.S.C. § 1801(e)(2)(A)-(B), i.e., information with respect to a foreign power or foreign territory that relates and is necessary to the national defense or security, and the conduct of the foreign affairs .of the United States. These same authorities may also incidentally acquire foreign intelligence information as defined by other subsections of 50 U.S.C. § 1801(e).

(E) ($.) The basis for my certification that the information sought is the type

bl-1
b3 _1

of

foreign

intelligence

information

specified

herein

and

that

such

information

cannot

b7A-l b7E-l,

2,

3,

6

be obtained by normal investigative techniques is as follows.

TOP SBC~/NOF9R.~ -5617-cv-597(FBI)- 56

TOP SBCRET//NOPORN

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2

-II(S.)
II<K> I I (S)

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TOP S~C&ET/lNOFOR.l\l -57-

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 8
17-cv-597(FBI)- 57

TOP S~CRET//NOPORN
bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-l, 2, 8

(U) (~

b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-l, 2

TOP S~CRET//NOPORN -58-

17-cv-597(FBI) - 58

TOPSBCREhlfNOPORN
(S)

b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2
b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-l, 2, 3

TOPSECRET!INOPO~~
-59- .

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3
17-cv-597(FBI)- 59

TOP Sli:CRETN:NOFORN
(~

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3
b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3

~)

b1-1

b3-1 b7A-1

b7E-1, 2, 3

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-60-

17-cv-597(FBI)- 60

!
TOP SBC.gT/INOFOR.~
(5)

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3
b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3

b1-1

b3-1

(S)

· b7A-1

b7E-1, 2, 3

TOP SBCRET//NOFORN -61-

17-cv-597(FBI)- 61

TOP Sl!.~T!/:NOFOR.~

h1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-l, 2, 3

(S)

b1-1

b3-1

b7A-1

b7E-l, 2, 3

(U)

(~ Based upon the foregoing information, it is the Governm.eJlt's belief that

the authorities requested herein targeting Page are critical investigative means for

obtaining the foreign intelligence irtformation identified herein.

----The remainder of this page is intentionally left blank.-----

TOP SECRET!/NO:FOR.~ -62-

17-cv-597(FBI)- 62

TOPS~CR~T/ANOPORN
(~ Accordingly, I execute this certification regarding Carter W. Page in accordance with the requirements of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended.

irector Federal Bureau of Investigation
Andrew G. McCabe Deputy Director Federal Bureau of Investigation
John 0. Brennan Director of the Central Intelligence Agency
James R. Oapper, Jr. Director of National Intelligence

John F. Kerry Secretary of State
Antony J. Blinken
Deputy Secretary of State ·
Ash Carter Secretary of Defense
Susan E. Rice Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Stephanie O'Sullivan Principal Deputy Director of National.Intelligence
I~

~ -"?.l(l\11
1, LeeAnn Flynn Hall, C erk, F\SC, CEtrtify that this document \s · @. true and corr~ct copy ot the orlg1nal. ·

TOP SECRET#NOPORN -63-

bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1
17-cv-597(FBI)- 63

TOP S~CRET,l/NOFO~'I\I
(U) APPROVAL (U) (S.) I find that this application regarding Carter W. Page satisfies the criteria and requirements for such applications set forth in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended, and hereby approve its filing with this Court.
(S)
b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b?E-1, 2, 6

TOP S'ECR'ETI/NOFORN -64-

17-cv-597(FBI)- 64

.·. i
I '.

TOPSECREUY.NOFORN

(S) Accordingly, I approve the filing of this application regarding Carter W. Page with the Court,

bl-1 b3-l b7A-l b7E-l

Loretta E. Lynch Attorney General of the United States

Sally Quilli

es

Deputy Attorney General of

Assistant Attorney General for National Security

bl-1 b3-l b7A-l

. ' * 'jl.nl~'1 1, L,eeAnn Flynn Hall,·Cl rk, ~ISc, C$l'ttfy that th\S document IS • true •nd correct copy · ·of the original.

'fOP SECRE'ff/NOFORN
-65-

17-cv-597(FBI)- 65

TOP SECRET!/NOPORN

(U)

~) WHEREFORE, the United States submits that this application

regarding Carter W. Page satisfies the criteria and requirements of the Foreign

Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended, and therefore requests that

this Court authorize the activities described herein, and enter the proposed

orders and warrants which accompany this application.

Respectfully submitted,

U.S. Department of Justice

b6-3 h7A-I b7C-3

~~\~Ill dt~rk'. I'

LeeAnn certify

tFhlaytntnhiHs adlol,cumentFI.SISC,

a true and correct copy

of the original.

TOP 8'8C:&BTNNOPORN -66-

17-cv-597(FBI)- 66

Flltcl

All Information is considered unclassified except where otherwise shown

SBCRBT

lntetUUanaitneodtlStauttr1wFllolatwnlO•IC't ourt
OCT 112018

UNITED STATES

LeeAnn Flynn Hall, Clerk of Court

Classify Reason: Derived

By: J23]98T32 ·
(C)
From: FBI NSICG,

FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE dated 10-2016

SURVEILLANCE
.

COURT

b1-1 b3-1

Declassify On: -

WASHINGTON, D. C.

b7A-1

IN RE CARTER W. PAGE, A U.S. PERSON

Docket Number:

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1

PRIMARY ORDER AND WARRANT

1. An application having been made by the United States of America

pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1918, as amended, 50

u.s.c. §§

or

the

Act),

for

'
an

order

and

warrant

(hereinafter "order") for

and full

consideration having been given to the matters set forth therein, the Court finds

b1-1

as follows:

b 3-1
b7A-1

2. The application has been made by a Federal officer and approved by the b?E-1, 2• 3• 6

Attorney General; 3. On the basis of the facts submitted in the verified application, there is
probable cause to believe that:

Derived from: Declassify on:

SBCRBT

-Application to the USFISC
in Docket Number captioned above

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1

17-cv-597(FBI)- 67

SECRET
(A) The Government of the Russian Federation (Russia) is a foreign power and Carter W. Page is an agent of Russia, as defined by

b7A-1 b7E-l, 2

4. The minimization procedures proposed in the application have been adopted by the Attorney General and meet the definition of minimization procedures

h1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 h7E-l, 2, 3, 6

5. The application contains all statements and certifications required byll

the certification is not clearly erroneous on the basis

of the statements made

h1-1 b3-1

any other information furnished under

b7A-l b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

WHEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, pursuant to the authority conferred on this Court by the Act, that the application of the United States is GRANTED, and it is

FURTHER ORDERED, as follows:

SECRET
-2-

17-cv-597(FBI)- 68

·.. I
SECRET the target as follows;
-

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
b1-l b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

SECRET -3-

17-cv-597(FBI) - 69

S~CRJ!:T

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-l, 2, 3, 6

SBCHT -4-

bl-1 b3-l b6-2 b7A-l b7C-2 b7E-l, 2, 3, 6
17-cv-597(FBI)- 70

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

I I

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

SECRET -5-

17-cv-597(FBI)- 71

SBC~T

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

I I I

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

SBCRBT
-6-

17-cv-597(FBI}- 72

S~CRET
I I
I

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

I

b1-1

I

b3-1 b7A-1

b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
I

I

SBCRBT
-7-

17-cv-597(FBI)- 73

S8CR8T

b1-1 b3-1 b?A-1 b?E-1, 2, 3, 6
b1-1 b3-1 b?A-1 b?E-1, 2, 3, 6

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b?E-1, 2, 3, 6

SECRET -8-

17-cv-597(FBI) .- 74

b1-1 b3-l b7A-1 b7E-l, 2, 3, 6

-

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-l, 2, 3, 6

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

SECRET -9-

17-cv-597(FBI)- 75

SBCRBT

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b?E-1, 2, 3, 6

-

6. The authorities approved are for the period indicated below unless otherwise ordered by this Court.
As to all information acquired through the authorities approved herein, the FBI shall follow

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b?E-1, 2, 3, 6

I

b1-1

b3-1

b7A-t-

b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

I

SBCM;T
-10-

17-cv-597(FBI)- 76

SECRET

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-l,-2, 3, 6

SBCRBT
-11-

17-cv-597(FBI)- 77

S~CRBT
-

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-l, 2, 3, 6
b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

b1-1 b3-1 -
b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

SBCRBT -12-

17-cv-597(FBI)- 78

S'BCR'BT

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
b1-l b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2,3, 6

S'BCRBT
-13-

17-cv-597(FBI)- 79

SECRET

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-l, 2, 3, 6
b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E.:1, 2, 3, 6

SECRET -14-

17-cv-597(FBI)- 80

SECRET

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

-

h1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

SECRET -15-

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
17-cv-597(FBI) - 81

SBCRBT

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

----- The remainder of this page is intentionally left blank. -----

SBCRBT
-16-

17-cv-597(FBI) - 82

on the Signed

S~CR~T

Carter W. Page expires at-Eastern Time

day of January, 2017.

bl-1 b3-l b7A-l

10 . . . 2016~

Date

Time

Eastern Time

dge, United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court

l, Lee.An' n Fly~ nn Hal1l, d1telrl~l.t1ASC, CEirtify that ttlls document is a true •nd correct copy ot the original.

S~CRBT
-17-

17-cv-597(FBI)- 83

All information is considered unclassified except where otherwise shown.

TOP SECRET/fNOFORN/FISA

Classify By: J23J98T32 Reason: (C) Derived From: FBI NSICG, dated 01-2017

UNITED STATES

Declassify On: -

FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE. COJ.J.R,.

.,_,, '

~-u l •

b1-1 CL...,, C.,
WASHINGTON, D.C. b3-1

., ' . '
._,~,.;,;

'
i

'

~

. b7A-1

(S) IN RE CARTER W. PAGE, A U.S.

Docket Number:

PERSON.

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1

(U) VERIFIED APPLICATION

(S) The United States of America hereby applies to this Court for authority to

conduct

described herein, pursuant

to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended, Title 50, United

States Code (U.S.C.), §§

or the Act).

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

1. (U) Identity of Federal Officer Making Application This application is

made by

a Supervisory Special Agent (SSA) of the Federal Bureau

of Investigation (FBI) whose official duties at FBI Headquarters include supervision

of the FBI's investigation of the above-captioned target based upon information

b 1-1 b3-1 b6-1 b7A-1 b7C-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

officially furnished to

TOP SECRET//NOFORNIFISA

Classified by:

Derived from: Declassify on:

-

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1
OI Tracking No. 144610 17-cv-597(FBI)-84

TOP SBCRET//NOFORNIFISA

2. (~ Identity of tJ:te Target The target of this application is Carter W.

Page, a U.S. person, and an agent of a foreign power, described in detail below. The

status of the target was determined in or about December 2016 from information

provided by the U.S. Department of State.

h1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

3. (5:) Statement of Facts The United States relies upon the following facts

and circumstances in support of this application.
a. (S.) The target of this application is an agent of a foreign power. (X) The following describes the foreign power and sets forth in detail a

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

description of the target and the target's activities for or on behalf of this foreign

power.

(U) 00 This verified application reports on developments in the FBI's
investigation of the above captioned target since the most recent application described herein, Unless stated otherwise herein, information presented in previous applications has been summarized or removed not because it was factually inaccurate but in order to create a more concise document.

(U) (X) The Government of the Russian Federation is a foreign power as defined by 50 U.S.C. § 1801(a)(1).
TOP SBCRBTNNOFORN/FISA -217 -cv-597(FBI)-85

TOP SECRET//NOFORN/FISA
(U) (~ The Government of the Russian Federation (Russia) is an internationally recognized foreign government and, as of the execution of this application, is listed in the Diplomatic List, published by the United States Department of State, and in Permanent Missions to the United Nations, published by the United Nations, and its establishments in the United States are components thereof. (U) (&) Clandestine Intelligence Activities Of The Russian Federation

bl-1
b3-l b7A-l b7E-l, 2

TOP SECRBTI/NOFORN/FISA
-3-

17-cv-597(FBI)-86

TOP SF:CRBTI/NOPORN/FISA (S:)

h1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-l, 2
b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2

(U) (!) Carter W. Page
engage in clandestine intelligence activities (other than intelligence gathering activities) for or on behalf of such foreign power, which activities involve or are about to involve a violation of the criminal statutes of the United States, or knowingly conspires with other persons to engage in such activities and, therefore, is an agent of a foreign power as defined by 50 U.S.C. § 180l(b)(2)(E).

b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2

TOP SECRETHNOPORN/FISA -4-

17-cv-597(FBI)-87

TOP SBCRBT//NOFORN/FISA

I. (U) Overview.

~This application seeks renewed authority to conduc~

b1-1

of Carter Page.

The FBI believes Page has been the

b3-1 b6-2

b7A-1

subject of targeted recruitment by the Russian

b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
Page is

a former foreign policy advisor to a Candidate for U.S. President (Candidate #1).1 As discussed in greater detail below, the FBI believes that the Russian Government engaged in efforts to undermine and influence the outcome of the 2016 U.S.

Presidential election.

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1,2

-Aarreeclfmctehuraoreiaunnc1cgyt(ehhJso)eCftsoOatahnCnmedaoibendraadacastikbedigona#rut1toethiuN#sen1noidnavoiinewtnidmfatolmbhraeemeprmPpa8rtlb,ieioce2san0ridst1,ie6uoon,fnntClC-feeaiasllneesnddcdotii,itddnhianaetttrheoewi#rs#id1s1meew'srasactttotsaaetmemreld(epasc,aeitnetiehgtddaenoiPontcerrkteaihegsmetiidnnhweauinlsimlttlo.breicral

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1

TOP SBCRBT/!NOPORNIFISA
-5-

17-cv-597(FBI)-88

TOP SECR~T.~'NO~ORN/FISA

II.

~) The FBI Believes that Influence Operations Against

the the

Russian Government United States.

Engages

in

(U) A. ~ RIS Efforts to Influence U.S. Presidential Elections.

(~During an interview with an identified news organization, the

Director of National Intelligence (DNI) stated, "Russia has tried to influence U.S.

elections since the 1960s during the Cold War" and "there's a tradition in Russia of

interfering with elections, their own and others." The DNI commented that this

influence included providing money to particular candidates or providing

disinformation. The DNI added that "it shouldn't come as a big shock to people, ...

I think it's more dramatic maybe because they have the cyber tools that they can

bring to bear in the same effort.

b1-1 b3-1
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b1-1
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TOP 8ECRBTh'NHFORN/FISA -6-

17 -cv-597(FBI)-89

TOP ~iCRiT//NO:PORN/FISA

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2
~) In or about July 2016, WikiLeaks released a trove of e-mails from the
Democratic National Committee (DNC).

-

There has been speculation in the U.S. media that the Russian Government

was behind the hack. Russia has publicly denied any involvement in the hack.

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1,2,3

Russian President Vladimir Putin said in or about September 2016 that Russia was

not responsible for the hack, but said that the release of the DNC documents was a

net positive: "The important thing is the content that was given to the public."

Despite Russia's

b-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3

2 (~According to information on its website, WikiLeaks is a multinational media organization and associated library. WikiLeaks specializes in the analysis and publication of large datasets of censored or otherwise restricted official materials involving war, spying, and corruption. According to open source information, in or about July 2016, WikiLeaks released thousands of e-mails it says
are from the accounts ofDNC officials.

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2

TOP SECRET//NOPORN/FISA
-7-

17-cv-597(FBI)-90

TOP SBCRBT//NOPORN/FISA

In addition, according to an October 7, 2016 Joint Statement from the Department of Homeland Security and the Office of the Director ofNational Intelligence on Election

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b?E-1, 2, 3

Security (Election Security Joint Statement), the USIC is confident that the Russian

Government directed the recent compromises of e-mails from U.S. persons and

institutions, including from U.S. political organizations. The Election Security Joint

Statement states that the recent disclosures of e-mails on, among others, sites like

WikiLeaks are consistent with the methods and motivations of Russian-directed

efforts. According to the Election Security Joint Statement, these thefts and

disclosures were intended to interfere with the U.S. election process; activity that is

not new to Moscow - the Russians have used similar tactics and techniques across

Europe and Eurasia, for example, to influence public opinion there. The Election

Security Joint Statement stated that, based on the scope and sensitivity of these

efforts, only Russia's senior-most officials could have authorized these activities.

More recently, on December 29, 2016, the White House issued a statement that the

U.S. President had ordered a number of actions in response to the Russian

Government's aggressive harassment of U.S. officials and cyber operations aimed at

the U.S. election. According to this December 29th statement, the current U.S.

Presidential Administration publicized its assessment in October [2016] that Russia

TOP SBCRBTJ/NOPORN/FISA -8-

17-cv-597(FBI)-91

TOP SBCRBT/INOFORNIFISA took actions intended to interfere with the U.S. election process and that these activities could only have been directed by the highest levels of the Russian Government [in context, this is likely a reference to the Election Security Joint Statement].
~Based on the Russian Government's historical efforts to influence U.S. and foreign elections, ~d the information discussed herein regarding Russia's coordination with Carter

bl-1 b3-l b7A-l b7E-l, 2

to attempt to undermine and improperly and illegally influence the 2016 U.S. Presidential election.

As stated in the legislative history of FISA:

b7A-l b7E-l, 2

TOP SBCRBT//NOFOR"N/FISA -9-

17-cv-597 (FB1)-92

TOP SECRETI/NO:FORNIFISA

iho(mohcoNniapfoabnsfaorpurtticaytciamroltsisiuouisasnendnetltmhsiciiolotnnyelethfunfognedpNodsttauor,feahamcobitsfeptnriloaeooiwitprtcniilnielmgeiooa'ftilnsignanpilcdvns,tipaainaeotsolnphtcirwaiogdoueoocniwryeonrtfi,rieft,eaot.oychforlnrtsasSebrlolty(uesyefhreenocveteanhhrgceofeagrranfraeiuceaggcmtaaicgeittntstviieieisvinsinpnnatiiglgiontese,sytwsathspabihdcecenyroeaitriainfpib)nntvc,gieiegoniuoadrtaudninciyirenrsiedtsvosogietceaifrwuhrdlnioimieeuhnnsdsfaeidUfiocsonlldiusanhuvre.fepiirsaetondrtSeGrtoocuuydeuirpoarnciioSlavednhgsftgseeta)owaoreamt,ncuenfnhamtosrpddioncvuetaedroidbnatiltttei,iocscthe citizens.

H.R. Rep. No. 95-1283, pt. 1, at 41 (1978).

(U)

B.

~The Russian Government's the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election.

Coordinated

Efforts

to

Influence

~ In or about March 2016, George Papadopoulos3 and Carter Page (the

target of this application) were publicly identified by Candidate #1 as part of his/her

foreign policy team. the FBI believes that the Russian Government's efforts to influence the

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7D-1
b?E-1, 2

2016 U.S. Presidential election were being coordinated with Page and perhaps other

individuals associated with Candidate #1's

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TOP SECRETI/NOFORN/FISA -10-

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17-cv-597(FBI)-93

TOP SECRET//NOPORNIFISA

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(~ As discussed below, Page has established relationships with Russian Government officials, including Russian intelligence officers, -

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TOP SECRBTI/NOPORNIFISA -11-

17 -cv-597(FBI)-94

TOP S'£CRBT/lNOFORN/FISA

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b?E-1, 2, 3

(U)
III. (50 Carter Page.
(U)A. (&) Page's Connections to Russia and the RIS. ~ Page, a U.S. citizen, is the founder and managing partner of Global
Energy Capital LLC (GEC), an investment management and advisory firm that focuses on the energy sector primarily in emerging markets.

b7A-1 b?E-1, 2

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b7A-1
b?E-1, 2

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b?E-1, 2

TOP SBCRBT//NOFORN/FISA -12-

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TOP Sl1.CRI1.TI/NOFORNIFISA
(U) (~

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2

- f r o m approximately 2004 - 2007, Page lived in Russia

b7A-1

During this time, Page began b7E-l, 2

business dealings with

~ According to information provided by Page during~

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b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2

TOP SECRET//NOFORN/FISA

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3

-1317 -cv-597(FBI)-96

TOP Sli:CRJ!:T//NOFORN/FISA

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-l, 2

~) According to information provided by Page during -interview with the FBI,

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. b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-l, 2, 6
b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-l, 2, 3

TOP SECRBT//NOPORN/FISA -14-

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TOP 6BCRET//NOFORNIFISA

bl-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-l, 2, 6

(U) ~) In or about January 2015, Podobnyy, along with Evgeny Buryakov and Igor Sporyshev, were charged by a sealed complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York for violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 and 951 (conspiring to act, and acting as,~ unregistered agent of a foreign government). According to the complaint, Buryakov worked in the United States as an agent of the SVR. Specifically, ·Buryakov operated under non-official .cover, posing as an employee in the Manhattan office of a Russian bank. Buryakov worked with two
other SVR agents, Podobnyy and Sporyshev, to gather intelligence on behalf of Russia.7 The complaint states that the intelligence gathering efforts of Podobnyy and Sporyshev included, among other things, attempting to recruit New York Oty
(BwUiAnu)etttrrhoyeerannkU7oeoy( tnvaiG'tsrere~ adenrserSteretasadBltt..,euPsrIIynonaadsookoarrobnaavnbbaywoogyaueusnatt ntMMaodrarafSeryRcsp2htuoe0sr2d1sy06iis1a,nh6Bweo, uvBritrnauhyboroayokulauootktnvpoJgrwvaoenvarpusilldiaesvirdeneyndgg2tuei0pinn1rlcti5tyoeh. rdetAontUtoocnttoh3iicn0eteesmtpdtioimoSrintetnhatgohetefstsoianancdt prison.

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17 -cv-597(FBI)-98

TOP SECRETHNOFORN/FISA residents as intelligence sources for Russia.
(~

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2

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TOP S~CR"ETI/NOPORN/FISA
(U) B. ~) Page's Coordination with Russian Government Officials on 2016
U.S. Presidential Election Influence Activities.
(~) According to open source information, in July 2016, Page traveled to

Russia and delivered the commencement address at the New Economic School,B In

addition to giving this address, the FBI learned that Page met with at least two

Russian officials during this trip. First, according to information provided by an FBI

confidential human source (Source #1),9

reported that Page had a

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7D-1 b7E-1, 2

-(U)s~

b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 4

b1-1

in or about October 2016, the FBI suspended its relationship with Source #1 due to Source #l's unauthorized disclosure of information to the press. Notwithstanding the suspension of its relationship with Source #1, the FBI assesses Source #1 to be reliable as previous reporting from Source #1 has been corroborated and used in criminal proceedings. Moreover, the FBI notes that the incident that led to the FBI suspending its relationship with Source #1 occurred after Source #1 provided the reporting that is described herein.

b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 5

(U) ~) Source #1, who now owns a foreign business/financial intelligence firm, was approached by an identified U.S. person, who indicated to Source #1 that a U.S.-based law firm had hired the identified U.S. person to conduct research regarding Candidate #1's ties to Russia (the identified U.S. person and Source #1 have a long-standing business relationship). The identified U.S. person hired Source #1 to conduct this research. The identified U.S. person never advised Source #1 as to the motivation behind the research into Candidate #1's ties to Russia. The FBI speculates that the identified U.S. person was likely looking for information that could be used to discredit Candidate #1's campaign.

TOP SBCRBTIINOFORNIFISA -17-

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TOP SBCRBT/lNOFORNIFISA

(U) ~ Source #1 tasked his sub-source(s) to collect the requisite

information. After Source #1 received information from the sub-source(s) described

herein, Source #1 provided the information to the identified U.S.

who had

hired Source #1 and to the FBI.

b3-1 b7A-1 b7D-1 b7E-l, 2

(~ Notwithstanding Source #1 's reason for conducting the research

into Candidate #1's ties to Russia, based on Source #1's previous reporting history

with the FBI, whereby Source #1 provided reliable information to the FBI, the FBI

believes Source #1's

herein to be credible.

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7D-1 b7E-1, 2

-

--~~-

- - - ~-

-----~----

-- -

TOP SECRET//NOFORN/FISA -18-

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7D-1 b7E-1, 2
b7A-1 b7D-1 b7E-1, 2
b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7D-1 b7E-1, 2
17-cv-597(FBI)-1 01

TOP S~CRBT//:NO:FORN/FISA

. secret meeting with Igor Sechin, who is the President of Rosneft [a Russian energy that, during the meeting, Page and Sechin discussed future bilateral energy

h1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7D-1 b7E-1, 2

cooperation and the prospects for an associated move to lift Ukraine-related Western

sanctions against Russia.

~-according to Source

b1-1
b3-1 b7A-1 b7D-1 b7E-1, 2

(U) 11 (~ In or about April2014, the U.S. Department of the Treasury b7E-1, 2 (USDOT) announced sanctions that would be taken against Russian Government officials and entities as a result of Russian efforts to destabilize Ukraine. Sechin was identified as an official of the Russian Government, and further identified as the President and Chairman of the Management Board for Rosneft, a position he continues to hold. The USDOT announcement also stated Sechin was formerly the Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation from 2008 until 2012, and from 2004 until2008, Sechin was the Deputy Chief of Staff for Russian President Putin. The USDOT sanctions announcement identified Sechin as someone who has "shown utter loyalty to Vladimir Putin- a key component to his current standing."
b1-1 b3-1
b7A-1 b7D-1
b7E-1, 2

TOP S~CR~TI/NOPOR.11tJ./FISA -19-

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TOP S~CRETJ/NOFORN/FISA

I Divyekin [who is assessed to be Igor Nikolayevich Divyekin],

had met secretly with Page and that their agenda for the meeting included Divyekin raising a dossier or "kompromat"13 that the Kremlin possessed on Candidate #2 and the possibility of it

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7D-1 b7E-l, 2

being released to Candidate #l's campaign.14

(U) 13 (3) Kompromat is a Russian term for compromising material about a politician or political figure, which is typically used to create negative publicity or blackmail.
b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7D-1 b7E-l, 2

TOP SECRBT//NOFORN/FISA -20-

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TOP SECRET//NOFORNIFISA

bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7D-1 b7E-1, 2

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7D-1 b7E-1, 2
b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7D-1 b7E-1, 2
b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7D-1 b7E-1, 2

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TOP SECRET/INO'PORN/FISA

bl-1 b3-l b7A-l b7D-l b7E-l, 2

b7A-l b7E-l, 2
- - J u l y 2016 article in an identified news organization reported that Candidate #l's campaign worked behind the scenes to make sure Political Party #l's platform would not call for giving weapons to Ukraine to fight Russian and rebel forces, contradicting the view of almost all Political Party #l's foreign policy leaders in Washington. The article stated that Candidate #l's campaign sought "to make

TOP 8ECRET/lNOFORN/FISA -22-

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TOP SBCRBT!lNOPORN/FISA

sure that [Political Party #1] would not pledge to give Ukraine the weapons it has been asking for from the United States." Further, an August 2016 article published by an identified news organization, which characterized Candidate #1 as sounding like a supporter of Ukraine's territorial integrity in September [2015], noted that Candidate #1 had recently adopted a "milder" tone regarding Russia's annexation of Crimea. The August 2016 article further reported that Candidate #1 said Candidate #1 might recognize Crimea as Russian territory and lift punitive U.S. sanctions against Russia. The article opined that while the reason for Candidate #1' s shift was not clear, Candidate #1's more conciliatory words, which contradict Political Party #1's official platform, follow Candidate #1's recent association with several people sympathetic to Russian influence in Ukraine, including foreign policy advisor Carter

Page.

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2

(~

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7D-1 b7E-1, 2

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TOP SECRBT//NOPORN/FISA
IV. (U) ~ Page1 S Denial of Cooperation with the Russian Government to
Influence the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election. (U) ~ On or about September 23, 2016, an identified news organization

bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7D-1 b7E-l, 2

published an article (September 23rd News Article), which was written by the news

organization's Chief Investigative Correspondent, alleging that U.S. intelligence

officials are investigating Page with respect to suspected efforts by the Russian

Government to influence the U.S. Presidential election; According to the September

23rd News Article, U.S. officials received intelligence reports that when Page was in

Moscow in July 2016 to deliver the above-noted commencement address at the New

Economic School, he met with two senior Russian officials. The September 23rd

News Article stated that a "well-placed Western intelligence source" told the news

organization that Page met with Igor Sechin, a longtime Putin associate and former

Russian deputy minister who is now the executive chairman of Rosneft. At their

alleged meeting, Sechin raised the issue of the lifting of sanctions with Page.

According to the September 23rd News Article, the Western intelligence source also

reported that U.S. intelligence agencies received reports that Page met with another

top Putin aide - Igor Divyekin, a former Russian security official who now serves as

deputy chief for internal policy and is believed by U.S. officials to have

TOP SBCRBT/INOFORN/FISA -24-

17-cv-597(FBI)-1 07

TOP SBCRBTl/NOFORNIFISA
responsibility for intelligence collected by Russian agencies about the U.S. election.19 (U) ~ According to the September 23rd News Article, certain members of Congress were "taken aback" after being briefed on the alleged meetings between Page and Russian officials and viewed the meetings as a possible back channel to the Russians that could undercut U.S. foreign policy. The September 23rd News Article

coaaosfsssnhoodiccsuiiraca1et9tteser(ee~lia)isnkrecetAahhlrysectdhpofiirirtsonshctvteuopisbdlCsaueecasddeinnt.adhebiSissdoosaviuanteresf,cso#Seor1ocm#'uis1aarttcttieoiee,olsd#ant1notthdowRettauhhFsseeBshFIiliaaBrt.wehIdaSaftobsihrsuymeersa/csstebhehus#ae1sttihhpnairertosetvsdhpiaerdtsohebsvedouicbsdtiihueanesdteeirsntetsheosisusslts information to the business associate and the FBI.

bl-1 b3-l b7A-l
b7E-l, 2

The FBI does not believe that Source #1 directly provided this information to the identified news organization that published the September 23rd News Article.
(FncteaUmorhBoelger)eiawnIlgascitdiasattanieinuebncosrnicl( tfn,tzetitora.tio,ahenrtnamIilegls~ oeneaapaonntnrttsrf.oeediei·oCstroAdebpnrItadelootnnatthlnhhaddtioesheaboimrevrdteoueaoeamvtgUpbodtneheioo.,iSgSisrtu#tt.hhothh2twiCeutme,nlrbaooSFgFceteunBoeeBndglupItiId#Orrsecfehclclcrro'seiasutotksniossm#,cnetbs1siowleeneuytntndhrhuoscitiee2plhnectd0seorfeFh1nlntrtBau6oshsedn,Ie,tieeaahnnStisdoFtocnosetBeowievusdtIspresteatschtsevhnrheteaSeeaiaik#lgor2tdta1,au0toethaht1riinnienocf6eotlt/edniyesnUFfeshr#Biwt.hp1eeSthIihe'id.apswthnePthnrawdaDteresdtehepihwinestfrloehrietesFrdulFactSyBesitrB,onotnnIrIaugrtewainorodaticadensfleosdttfh#hw1eisith because of this disclosure.

TOP 6ECRBT//NOFOR.l\ffi7ISA -25-

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TOP SJ;CRBT//NO~ORN/FISA

also stated that, following the briefing, the Senate Minority Leader wrote to the FBI Director, and citing the reports of meetings between an advisor to Candidate #1 [the advisor was unnamed in the letter, but the article indicated that the advisor is Page] and "high ranking sanctioned individuals" [in context, likely a reference to Sechin] in Moscow over the summer as evidence of "significant and disturbing ties" between Candidate #1's campaign and the Kremlin that needed to be investigated by the FBI.

(U)

~) Based on statements in the September 23rd News Article, as well as

in other articles published by identified news organizations, Candidate #1's

campaign repeatedly made public statements in an attempt to distance Candidate

#1's campaign from Page. For example, the September 23rd News Article noted that

Page's precise role in Candidate #1's campaign is unclear. According to the article, a

spokesperson for Candidate #1's campaign called Page an "informal foreign

advisor" who "does not speak for [Candidate #1] or the campaign." In addition,

another spokesperson for Candidate #1's campaign said that Page "has no role" and

added "[w]e are not aware of any of his activities, past or present." However, the

article stated that the campaign spokesperson did not respond when asked why

Candidate #1 had previously described Page as an advisor. In addition, on or about

September 25, 2016, an identified news organization published an article that was

TOP SBCRET//NO~ORN/FISA -26-

17-cv-597(FBI)-1 09

TOP SBCRBT//NOFORN/FISA based primarily on an interview with Candidate #l's then campaign manager. During the interview, the campaign manager stated, "[Page is] not part of the campaign I'm running." The campaign manager added that Page has not been part of Candidate #1's national security or foreign policy briefings since he/she became campaign manager. In response to a question from the interviewer regarding reports that Page was meeting with Russian officials to essentially attempt to conduct diplomatic negotiations with the Russian Government, the campaign manager responded, "If [Page is] doing that, he's certainly not doing it with the permission or knowledge of the campaign ...."

b7A-1 b7E-l, 2

· (U)

~) On or about September 25, 2016, Page sent a letter to the FBI Director.

In this letter, Page made reference to the accusations in the September 23rd News

Article and denied them. Page stated that the source of the accusations was nothing

more than completely false media reports and that he did not meet with any

sanctioned official in Russia. Page also stated that he would be willing to discuss

TOP SBCRBT//NOFORNIFISA -27-

17-cv-597(FBI)-11 0

TOP SBCRBT//NO'FORN/FISA
any "final" questions the FBI may have.20 ~ Additionally, on or about September 26, 2016, an identified news
organization published an article that was based on an interview with Page (September 26th News Article). In the September 26th News Article, Page stated that all of the accusations were complete "garbage" and that he did not meet with Sechin or Divyekin. Page also stated that he was taking a leave of absence from his work with Candidate #l's campaign because the accusations were a "distraction."
b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7D-1 b7E-1,2

20(~)

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17-cv-597(FBI)-111

TOP SBCRBT/INOFORNIFISA
v. (~
(~

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7D-1 b7E-1, 2
b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7D-1 b7E-1, 2, 6

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7D-1 b7E-1, 2, 5, 6

TOP SBCRBT//NOFORNIFISA -29-

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TOP SI':CRI':T;l/NOFORN/FISA
(~

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7D-1 b7E-1, 2
b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7D-1 b7E-1, 2

-

•

(U)

(U) ~~~~~~~

b7A-1 b7E -1, 2, 3

TOP SBCRBT/lNO:fORN/FISA -30-

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TOP SECRETIINOFORN/FISA

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3

(~

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E- 1, 2, 3, 6

TOP SECRETHNOFORN/FISA -31-

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TOP S"EC~TilNOPOR"N/FISA

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7D-1 b7E- 1, 2, 3, 6

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E- 1,2,3,6

TOP SECRET//"NOPORN/FISA -32-

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17-cv-597(FBI)-115

TOP SECRET//NOFORN/FISA

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E- 1,2,3,6

·(~
(~

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E- 1, 2, 3, 6

TOP SECRET//NOFOR.li.J/FISA -33-

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TOP S~CR~T//NOFOR."'WFISA

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E- 1, 2, 3, 6

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E- 1,2,3,6

TOP SECRET//NOFORN/FISA -34-

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TOP SiCRiTI/NOFORN/FISA
·(~

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E- 1, 2, 3, 6
b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7D-1 b7E-1,2
b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7D-1 b7E-1,2

TOP SBCRBT/lNOF'ORN/FISA
-35-

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TOP S"ECRBT/INOFORN/FISA
·~)

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7D-1 b7E- 1,2
b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E- 1,2,3,6

TOP SECRBTI/NOPORN/FISA -36-

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TOP S'BCUT//NOFORN/FISA

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

·~)

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

TOP S'BCUT//NOFORNIFISA -37-

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TOP SECRET/lNOFORN/FISA

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TOP SECRET!/NOFORN/FISA -38-

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VII. (i)
(~)

TOP SBCRETIINOFORNIFISA

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7D-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 4, 6

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b6C-2 b7D-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

b3-1 b7A-1 b7E- 2, 4

TOP SECRBT/INOPORN/FISA -39-

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TOP ~Ii:CRETJ/NOPORN/FISA
(~
(~
(S)

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7D-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

TOP SBCRBT//NOPO~Tt.YFISA -40-

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TOP S~CRl!:TI/NOPORN/FISA (S)

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b?E-1, 2, 3, 6
b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b?E-1, 2, 3, 6

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-l, 2, 3, 6

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b?E-1, 2

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(!)
(~

TOF S~CR~T//NOI'ORN/FISA

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E- 1,2,3,6

TOP SJ!:CRETJ/NOI'ORN/FISA
-42-

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TOP SBCRBT!/:NOPORN/FISA

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(~

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

VIII. (U) Conclusion.
(U) (~ As discussed above, the FBI believes that Page has been collaborating b7A-1
b7E-1, 2
and conspiring with the Russian

TOP SBCRBT!INOPORN/FISA -43-

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TOP SBCRBT//NOFORN/FISA

Based on the

foregoing facts and circumstances, the FBI submits that there is probable cause to believe that Page
yengage in

b7A-l . b7E-l, 2

clandestine intelligence activities (other than intelligence gathering activities) for or

on behalf of such foreign power, or knowingly conspires with other persons to

engage in such activities and, therefore, is an agent of a foreign power as defined by

50 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(2)(E).

(U) (~

FBI submits that there is probable cause to believe that such activities involve or are about to involve violations of the criminal statutes of the United Sta

b7A-l b7E-l, 2

(U) (~

b7A-l b7E-l, 2

TOP SBCRBT//NOFORN/FISA -44-

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I
(~

TOP SECRETI/NOFORNIFISA

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

I
(i)
(~

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

TOP SECRETHNOFORNIFISA -45-

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(X)-

TOP S~CR~TIJ:NOFORN/FISA

(X)

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bl-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

bl-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-l, 2, 3, 6

(~

TOP SBCRBTJ/:NOFORNIFISA -46-

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TOP S~CR~T/INOFORNIFISA
~)
(Ji) (X)

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b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-l, 2, 3, 6

-

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TOP S~CR~Tt/NOPORN/FISA (S)

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-
(S)
bl-1 b3-l b7A-l b7E-l, 2, 3, 6
-

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TOP S~CR~T/lNOPORNIFISA
I

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4. (S) Proposed Minimization Procedures As to all information acquired through the authorities requested herein, the FBI will f o l l o w -

-

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I

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I

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TOP SJ);CRJn;lJNO:PORN/FISA (.S.)

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b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
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TOP S:ECRBT//NOFORNIFISA -50-

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TOP SJ!;CRBT/INOFORNIFISA (S)
(~
(S)

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

(U) 5. (i.) Nature of the Information Sought Through the authorities requested herein, the United States is seeking foreign intelligence information with respect to the activities of the target described above and detailed further in the

b1-1
~~~- 1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

certification set forth below. As indicated by the facts set forth herein, the FBI is

seeking foreign intelligence information that relates and is necessary to the ability of

the United States to protect against clandestine intelligence activities by an

intelligence service or network of this foreign power or by agents of this foreign

power, and information with respect to a foreign power or foreign territory that

relates and is necessary to the national defense, security, and the conduct of the

TOP S:SCRETI/NOFORN/FISA

-5117-cv-597(FBI)-134

TOP S~CR~TI/NOFORN/FISA
foreign affairs of the United States. These same authorities may also incidentally acquire other foreign intelligence information, as defined by the Act.
~) b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

(~

b1-1

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b7A-1

b7E-l, 2, 3, 6

TOP 8~C~TI/NOFORN/FISA -52-

17-cv-597(FBI)-135

TOP S~CR~TJ/NO:FORWFISA

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-l, 2, 3, 6

- (S) I (i.) Certification The certification of the Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs or an Executive branch official duly designated by the President as a certifying official in Executive Order N u m b e -

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

amended, is set forth below.

(i)

b1-1

b3-1

b6-2

b7A-1

(~

b7C-2

b7E-1, 2, 7

TOP SEC~TI/NOPORNIFISA -53-

17-cv-597(FBI)-136

TOP SBCRBT//NO~ORN/FISA

(U) The Purpose of the Authorities Requested (S) The FBI's foreign intelligence goals for this investigation are set forth in

the certification of the Executive Branch official contained herein. However, the

authorities requested in this application may produce information and material

which might, when evaluated by prosecutive authorities, constitute evidence of a

violation of United States law, and this investigation may result in an eventual

criminal prosecution of the target. Nevertheless, as discussed in the certification, at

least a significant purpose of this request for
b1-1

b3-1
is to collect foreign intelligence information as part of the FBI's investigation b?A- 1

-
of this target.
I (~

b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
b1-1

b3-1

b7A-1

b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

TOP SECRBTNNOFORNIFISA
-54-

17-cv-597(FBI)-137

TOP S~CR~Tt/NOFORN/FISA
II <~>

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-l, 2, 3, 6
b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

9. (3) Duration of the Authorities Requested (See also,

b1-1

The authorities requested should not automatically terminate when foreign

b3-1 b7A-1

intelligence information has first been obtained. Additional information of the same b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

type will be obtained on a continuous basis throughout the entire period requested.

The activities which the United States must identify and monitor are mcremental

and continuous, and communications relating to such activi_ties are often disguised

to appear innocuous. The type of foreign intelligence information being sought and

the fact that the activities of this target are ongoing preclude the conclusion that, at a

given time, all such information has been obtained and collection can be ended.

Accordingly, the United States requests the authorities specified herein for a period

of ninety (90) days.

TOP SECRETl/NOFORN/FISA -55-

17-cv-597(FBI)-138

TOP Sli:CRET/-/NOPORN/FISA

bl-1 b3-l b7A-l b7E-l, 2

bl-1 b3-l b7A-l b7E-l, 2

bl-1

(~

b3-l

b7A-l

b7E-l, 2

-5617-cv-597(FBI)-139

TOP SCB RB:nJ='~OFORN/FISA

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2
h1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-2, 6

. (~

TOP SB-C-·R~u:'Tm''''NOFORN!FISA
-57-

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E- 1,2,3,6
17-cv-597(FBI)-140

TOP SECRET/lNOfORN/FISA
(S) b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-l, 2, 3, 6
-

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

TOP SECRET/INOPORN/FISA -58-

17-cv-597(FBI)-141

TOP SBCIU;T//NOFORN/FISA (X)

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

TOP SBCIU;T,L/NOFORN/FISA -59-

17-cv-597(FBI)-142

TOP SiCRBTf.INOPORN/FISA

(U)(S) Specific Authorities Requested Based upon the foregoing information, the United States requests that this Court authorize the FBI to conduct the activities described immediately below for the period requested herein.

(~
• I

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

-

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1

b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

TOP SBCRBT//NOPORN/FISA -60-

17-cv-597(FBI)-143

TOP SI!:CRI!:T//NO'FORN/FISA

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

TOP S~CR~T/lNO'FORN/FISA -61-

17-cv-597(FBI)-144

TOP S~CRET/-/NOFORN/FISA

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

TOP SECRETNNOFORN/FISA -62-

17-cv-597(FBI)-145

TOP SECRET/INOFORN/FISA

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

b1-1

b3-1

(K)

b7A-1

b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

TOP SECRET//NOFORN/FISA
-63-

17-cv-597(FBI)-146

TOP SECRET//NOFORN/FISA
~)

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

(~ b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

b1-1

I

b3-1 b7A-1

b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
I

I

TOP SECRET/INOFORN/FISA -64-

17-cv-597(FBI)-147

TOP SECRETI.f:NOFORNIFISA
I
-
I I
I I I
I

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-l, 2, 3, 6

TOP SECRETNNOFORN/FISA -65-

17-cv-597(FBI)-148

TOP SBCRET//NO"fORN/FISA

bl-1 b3-l b7A-l b7E-l, 2, 3, 6

(U) (~ The FBI has reviewed this verified application for accuracy in accordance

with its AprilS, 2001 procedures, which include sending a copy of the draft to the

appropriate field office(s). A copy of those procedures was previously provided to

the Court.

----- The remainder of this page is intentionally left blank. -----

TOP SECRET//NOPORNIFISA -66-

17 -cv-597(FBI)-149

TOP SBCRETlJNOFOR.~IFISA

(U) VERIFICATION

(S). I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing information

regarding Carter W. Page is true and correct. Executed pursuant to Title 28, United
States Code,§ 1746 on ~OJ :2.o !1

bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1

~upervtsory ~peCial Agent Federal Bureau of Investigation

b6-1 b7A-1 b7C-1

. I,

leeAnn

-~Y\
Flynn Hall,

Cle3rk1,nF1fsJc1,

certify that this document is ·

a true and correct copy
of the original.

TOP SECRE'f/INOFORNIFISA

-67-

17-cv-597(FBI)-150

TOP SECRET//NOFORNIFISA

(U) CERTIFICATION
~) I, the undersigned, having been designated as one of the officials
authorized to make the certifications required by the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended, do hereby certify with regard to t h e -
in this verified application targeting
Carter W. Page, an agent of the Government of Russia, a foreign power, as follows: b1-1
b3..:1
(A) (U) The information sought through the authorities requested herein is b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
foreign intelligence information.

(B) (U) At least a significant purpose of the authorities requested herein is to obtain foreign intelligence information and, notwithstanding the related criminal matters described in this application, the primary purpose of the authorities requested herein is not to obtain information for the prosecution of crimes other than those referred to in the Act, 50 U.S. C.§ 1801(a)-(e), or related to such foreign intelligence crimes.

(C) (U) The foreign intelligence information sought by the authorities

b1-1

b3-1
requested herein cannot be reasonably obtained by normal investigative techniques. b7A- 1

b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

(U) (D) (i) The type of foreign intelligence information being sought through the

authorities requested herein is that described in 50 U.S.C. § 180l(e)(l)(C), i.e.,

TOP SECRET/INOFORN/FISA -68-

17-cv-597(FBI)-151

TOP 6BCRBTh'NOFORNIFISA

information that relates and is necessary to the ability of the United States to protect against clandestine intelligence activities by an intelligence service or network of this foreign power or by agents of this foreign power, and 50 U.S.C.§ 1801(e)(2)(A)-(B), i.e., information with respect to a foreign power or foreign territory that relates and is necessary to the national defense or security, and the conduct of the foreign affairs of the United States. These same authorities may also incidentally acquire foreign intelligence information as defined by other subsections of 50 U.S.C. § 1801(e).

(E) (S) The basis for my certification that the information sought is the type b1-1
b3-1

of foreign intelligence information specified herein and that such information cannot

b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

be obtained by normal investigative techniques is as follows.

(~)

b1-1

b3-1

b7A-1

b7E-1, 2

•

•
-

TOP 6ECRET//NOFORN/FISA -69-

17 -cv-597(FBI)-152

II (S)
·(~)

TOP SBCRBT//NOFORN/FISA

II<~

.(X)

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2
b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2

(~)

b1-1

b3-1

b7A-1

b7E-1, 2, 8

TOP SBCRBT//NOFORN/FISA -70-

17-cv-597(FBI)-153

TOP S~C&ET.4NOPORN/FISA

bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-l, 2, 8

(U) (15)

b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2

TOP SECRET/INOFORN/FISA
-71-

17-cv-597(FBI)-154

TOP SBCRET//NOFORN/FISA (X)

b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-l, 2
b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3

b1-1

b3-1

~)

b7A-1

b7E-l, 2, 3

TOP SECRBT!!NOFORN/FISA -72-

17-cv-597(FBI)-155

TOP SBC~TNNOPORN/FISA (K)

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3
b1-l b3-1 b7A-l b7E-l, 2, 3

($) bl-1
b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1,2,3

TOP 6ECRBT/INOPORN/FISA
-73-

17-cv-597(FBI)-156

TOP SBCIU;T//NO:FO:&'-t/FISA
(~

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-l, 2, 3
b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3

(~

b1-1

b3-1

b7A-1

b7E-1, 2, 3

TOP SECIU;T//NO":FORN/FISA -74-

17-cv-597(FBI)-157

TOP SBCRBT/tNOFORN/FISA

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3

(3.)

b1-1

b3-1

b7A-1

b7E-1, 2, 3

(U) (~) Based upon the foregoing information, it is the Government's belief that the authorities requested herein targeting Page are critical investigative means for obtaining the foreign intelligence information identified herein.

----- The remainder of this page is intentionally left blank. -----

TOP SBCRBTt/NOFORN/FISA -75-

17-cv-597(FBI)-158

TOP SECRETl/NOFOR.~IFISA
~) Accordingly, I execute this certification regarding Carter W. Page in accordance with the requirements of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended.

irector Federal Bureau of Investigation

John F. Kerry Secretary of State

Andrew G. McCabe Deputy Director Federal Bureau of Investigation

Antony J. Blinken Deputy Secretary of State

John 0. Brennan Director of the Central Intelligence Agency

Ash Carter Secretary of Defense

James R. Oapper, Jr. Director of National Intelligence

Susan E. Rice Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Stephanie O'Sullivan Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence
!1-0~~'~-
Date

I I,

leeA·nn"~.ly"nn>H-~a;:1,,rC/1eJ, FfSC,TOP
certify that this document is

SECRETIINOFORN/FISA

a true and correct copy

-76-

of the original.

bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1
17-cv-597(FBI)-159

TOP SI!.CRI!.TJ./NOFOR.~ISA

(U) APPROVAL (U) ($:) I find that this application regarding Carter W. Page satisfies the criteria and requirements for such applications set forth in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended, and hereby approve its filing with this Court.
(S)

bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-l, 2, 6

TOP SBCRBT/INOFORN/FISA -77-

17-cv-597(FBI)-160

TOP SECRETfiNOFORN/FISA (1) Accordingly, I approve the filing of this application regarding Carter
W. Page with the Court,L.I-~L-----------------1
Loretta E. Lynch Attorney General of the United

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1

'ted States
_U[]rr_ Assistant Attorney General for National Security
Date

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1

, ~ ·~lolll
I, LeeAnn Flynn Hall, Clei1<, ¢1SC,
certify that this. doc~u'nent is a true and ·correct~PY
. of the origin~•

TOP SECRET/INOFORNIFISA .,;78-

17-cv-597(FBI)-161

TOP SECRBT/INOFORNIFISA
(U) (Sj WHEREFORE, the United States submits that this application regarding Carter W. Page satisfies the criteria and requirements of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended, and therefore requests that this Court ~thorize the activities described herein, and enter the proposed orders and warrants which accompany this application.
..._____ _I Respectfullysubmitted, Attorney U.S. Department of Justice

b6-3 b7A-l b7C-3

-3(,l'll '~ 1, LeeAnn Rynn Hall, Ct~. ASC. certify that this document Is

a

true and oi the

correct copy original.

TOP SECRET//NOFORNIFISA -79-

17-cv-597(FBI)-162

Classify By: J23J98T32 Reason: (C)

Derived From: Declassify On:

FBI -

NSICG,

dated

oll-2017

SECRET

IntellUigneitnecde1S\Fu1U~frilv1fMe1 illl'aanf tcieg nCourt

All information is considered unclassified except where

UNITED STATES

JAN 112017

b1-l

otherwise shown.

FOREIGN

INTELUGENCE

SURVEILLANCE

LeeAnn
COURT

Flynn

Hall,

Clerk

of

Court

b3-l b7A-l
.

WASHINGTON, D. C.

IN RE CARTER W. PAGE, A U.S. PERSON

Docket Number:

b1-1 b3-l b7A-l

PRIMARY ORDER AND WARRANT

1. An application having been made by the United States of America

pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended, 50

u.s.c.

or the Act), for an order and warrant

(hereinafter "order'') for

and full

consideration having been given to the matters set forth therein, the Court finds

as follows:

2. The application has been made by a Federal officer and approved by the Attorney General;

bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-l, 2, 3, 6

3. On the basis of the facts submitted in the verified application, there is probable cause to believe that:

Derived from: Declassify on:

SECRET
-Application to the USFISC
in Docket Number captioned above

b1-1
b3-1 b7A-l

17-cv-597(FBI)-163

SI!:CRBT (A) The Government of the Russian Federation (Russia) is a foreign power and Carter W. Page is an agent of Russia, as defined by

b7A-1 b7E-l, 2

4. The minimization procedures proposed in the applicatio'n have been adopted by the Attorney General and meet the definition of minimization procedures

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

.5. The application contains all statements and certifications required by.

the certification is not clearly erroneous on the basis of the statements made any other information furnished

b 1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

WHEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, pursuant to the authority conferred on this Court by the Act, that the application of the United States is GRANTED, and it is

FURTHER ORDERED, as follows:

SECRBT -2-

17-cv-597(FBI)-164

i~CR.~T
the target as follows;
-

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

i~CR~T
-3-

17-cv-597(FBI)-165

SECUT

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

SECRET
-4-

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
17-cv-597(FBI)-166

SECRET

bl-1 b3-l b6-2 b7A-l b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
b1-1 b3-l b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-l, 2, 3, 6

SECRET -5-

17 -cv-597(FBI)-167

SECRET

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1
b7E-1, i, 3, 6
b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

SECRET -6-

17-cv-597(FBI)-168

SECRET
I

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-l, 2, 3, 6

SECRET
-7-

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
17-cv-597(FBI)-169

SBCRBT
I I I
I
I I

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2,3, 6
b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

Sl:CRBT -8-

17-cv-597(FBI)-170

SBCRET
I I I
I

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-l, 2, 3, 6

SBCRBT
-9-

17 -cv-597(FBI)-171

S'ECRBT

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-l, 2, 3, 6

-

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-l, 2, 3, 6

S'ECR'ET -10-

17-cv-597(FBI)-172

-

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b?E-1, 2, 3, 6
b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-l, 2, 3, 6
b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b?E-1, 2, 3, 6
17-cv-597(FBI)-173

SECRET
I
•

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

SECRET
-12-

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
17-cv-597(FBI)-174

Sll:CRJi:T
-

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-l, 2, 3, 6
b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-l, 2, 3, 6

SECR:Il:T -13-

17-cv-597(FBI)-175

SECRET

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

SECRET -14-

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
17-cv-597(FBI)-176

SECRET

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-l, 2, 3, 6
b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

SECRET
-15-

17-cv-597(FBI)-177

SECRET

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

SECRET -16-

17-cv-597(FBI)-178

SECRET
-

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

SECRET -17-

17-cv-597(FBI)-179

SECRET

bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-l, 2, 3, 6

--- The remainder ofthis page is intentionally left blank. ----

SECRET -18-

17-cv-597(FBI)-180

S~CRBT

This authorization regarding Carter W. Page expires - E a s t e r n Time day of April, 2017.

bl-1 b3-l b7A-l

Signed

01111-20171111111

Date

Time

Judge, United States oreign Intelligence Surveillance Court

SBCRBT
-19-

b6-3 b7A-l b7C-3
17-cv-597(FBI)-181

All information is considered

unclassified except where

TOP SECRET//NOFORN/FISA

otherwise shown.
·, ·.

Classify By: J23J98T32

UNITED STATES

Reason: (C)

Derived From: FBI NSICG, dated FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
4-12017

Declassify On: -

/

WASHINGTON, D.C.

...

·, ' ·~

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1

Of)) IN RE CARTER W. PAGE, A U.S.

Docket Number:

PERSON.

b1-1 - b3-1
b7A-1

(U) VERIFIED APPLICATION

(~) The United States of America hereby applies to this Court for authority to

cond

as described herein, pursuant

b1-1

to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended, Title 50, United b3-1
b7A-1

States Code (U.S.C.),

or the Act).

b7E-l, 2, 3, 6

1. (U) Identity of Federal Officer Making Application This application is

made

a Supervisory Special Agent (SSA) of the Federal Bureau

b1-1
b3_1

b6-1
of Investigation (FBI) whose official duties at FBI Headquarters include supervision b7A-1

of the FBI's investigation of the above-captioned target based upon information

b7C-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

officially furnished

TOP SEC~Th'NOFORN/FISA

Classified by:

Derived from: Declassify on:

-

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1
01 Tracking No. 146281 17-cv-597(FBI)-182

TOP SBCRET/-/NO'FORN/FISA

2. Qi_) Identity of the Target The target of this application is Carter W.

Page, a U.S. person, and an agent of a foreign power, described in detail below. The

status of the target was determined in or about December 2016 from information

provided by the U.S. Department of State.

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

3. (X) Statement of Facts The United States relies upon the following facts

and circumstances in support of this application. a. gl) The target of this application is an agent of a foreign power. (S) The following describes the foreign power and sets forth in detail a

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

description of the target and the target's activities for or on behalf of this foreign

power.

(U) <R) This verified application reports on developments in the FBI's
investigation of the above captioned target since the most recent application described herein. Unless stated otherwise herein, information presented in previous applications has been summarized or removed not because it was factually inaccurate but in order to create a more concise document.
(U) (30. The Government of the Russian Federation is a foreign power as
defined by 50 U.S.C. § 1801(a)(l). TOP SBCRET//NOFORN/FISA -2-
17-cv-597(FBI)-183

TOP S-eCRET//NOFORN/FISA
(U) (~ The Government of the Russian Federation (Russia) is an internationally recognized foreign government and, as of the execution of this application, is listed in the Diplomatic List, published by the United States Department of State, and in Permanent Missions to the United Nations, published by the United Nations, and its establishments in the United States are components thereof.
(U) (~ Clandestine Intelligence Activities Of The Russian Federation
(~)
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b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2

(U) QS) Carter W. Page

knowingly engage in clandestine intelligence activities (other than intelligence gathering activities) for or on behalf of such foreign power, which activities involve or are about to involve a violation of the criminal statutes of the United States, or knowingly conspires with other persons to engage in such activities and, therefore, is an agent of a foreign power as defined by 50 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(2)(E).

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I. (U) Overview.

(~ This application seeks renewed authority to c o n d u c -

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of Carter Page. The FBI believes that Page has been

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the subject of targeted recruitment by the Russian Government

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Page is a former foreign policy advisor to a Candidate for U.S. President (Candidate #1).1 As discussed in greater detail below, the FBI believes that the Russian Government engaged in efforts to undermine and influence the outcome of the 2016

U.S. Presidential election.

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Aarreeclfcmtehuraoreiaunnc1cgy(tehShso)eCftosOatahnCnmedaoibednraadacastikbedigona#rut1oetiuN#sn1nodavoinewndmfotmbhareepmerpmPa8lrtib,ieco2esa0nritds1i,oe6uonn,nfstClC,efaiiasnlnsnedoddoiritdiddhnaaeetttrrehewti#o#si1s1mmew'saasacittsnataetmteeraldeip(nsc,aettiteehghddeneoPohtcerrikesaigstemoiitdnrnwieacunliamltll. bers

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TOP SECRETl/NOFORN/FISA

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b3-l
b7A-l b7E-l, 2
-

II.

(U)~ T Influence

he FBI Believes that Operations Against

the the

Russian Gover United States.

nmen

t

Engages

i

n

(U) A. X5t1NF) RIS Efforts to Influence U.S. Presidential Elections.

~) During a September 2016 interview with an identified news

organization, the then Director of National Intelligence (DNI) stated, "Russia has

tried to influence U.S. elections since the 1960s during the Cold War" and "there's a tradition in Russia of interfering with elections, their own and others." The then

DNI commented that this influence included providing money to particular

candidates or providing disinformation. The then DNI added that "it shouldn't

. come as a big shock to people, ... I think it's more dramatic maybe because they

have the cyber tools that they can bring to bear in the same effort."

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-6-

17-cv-597(FBI)-187

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~ In or about July 2016, WikiLeaks released a trove of e-mails from the

Democratic National Committee (DNC). - T h e r e has been speculation in the U.S. media that the Russian Government

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3

was behind the hack. Russia has publicly denied any involvement in the hack.

Russian President Vladimir Putin said in or about September 2016 that Russia was

· not responsible for the hack, but said that the release of the DNC documents was a

net positive: "The important thing is the content that was given to the public."

Despite Russia's

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2 ~) According to information on its website, WikiLeaks is a multinational media organization and associated library. WikiLeaks specializes in the analysis and publication of large datasets of censored or otherwise restricted official materials involving war, spying, and corruption. According to open source information, in or about July 2016, WikiLeaks released thousands of e-mails it says are from the accounts of DNC officials.

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In addition, according to an October 7, 2016 Joint Statement from the Department of

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Homeland Security and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence on Election

Security (Election Security Joint Statement), the USIC is confident that the Russian

Government directed the recent compromises of e-mails from U.S. persons and

institutions, including from U.S. political organizations. The Election Security Joint

Statement states that the recent disclosures of e-mails on, among others, sites like

WikiLeaks are consistent with the methods and motivations of Russian-directed

efforts. According to the Election Security Joint Statement, these thefts and

disclosures were intended to interfere with the U.S. election process; activity that is

not new to Moscow - the Russians have used similar tactics and techniques across

Europe and Eurasia, for example, to influence public opinion there. The Election

Security Joint Statement stated that, based on the scope and sensitivity of these

efforts, only Russia's senior-most officials could have authorized these activities.

More recently, on December 29, 2016, the White House issued a statement that the

U.S. President had ordered a number of actions in response to the Russian

Government's aggressive harassment of U.S. officials and cyber operations aimed at

the U.S. election. According to this December 29th statement, the U.S. Presidential

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TOP SBCRBTNNO:FORN/FISA

Administration publicized its assessment in October [2016] that Russia took actions intended to interfere with the U.S. election process and that these activities could only have been directed by the highest levels of the Russian Government [in context, this is likely a reference to the Election Security Joint Statement].
(~ Based on the Russian Government's historical efforts to influence

U.S. and foreign elections,

-

and the information discussed herein regarding Russia's coordination

with Carter

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to attempt to undermine and improperly and illegally influence the 2016 U.S. Presidential election.

(U)

(

As stated in the legislative history of FISA:

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Not only do foreign powers engage in spying in the United States to obtain information, they also engage in activities which are intended to harm the Nation's security by affecting the course of our Government, the course of public opinion, or the activities of individuals. Such activities may include political action (recruiting, bribery or influencing of public officials to act in favor of the foreign power), disguised propaganda (including the planting of false or misleading articles or stories), and harassment, intimidation, or even assassination of individuals who oppose the foreign power. Such activity can undermine our democratic institutions as well as directly threaten the peace and safety of our citizens.

H.R. Rep. No. 95-1283, pt. 1, at 41 (1978).

(U) B.~) The Russian Government's Coordinated Efforts to Influence the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election.

~ In or about March 2016, George Papadopoulos3 and Carter Page (the

target of this application) were publicly identified by Candidate #1 as part of his/her

foreign policy team. - ' t h e FBI believes that the Russian Government's efforts to influence the

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7D-1 b7E-1, 2

2016 U.S. Presidential election were being coordinated with Page and perhaps other

individuals associated with Candidate #1's campaign.

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TOP SECRET//NOFORN/FISA -10-

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17-cv-597(FBI)-191

TOP S"ECR"ETI/NOPORN/FISA

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(~ As discussed below, Page has established relationships with

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-11-

17-cv-597(FBI)-192

TOP ~ECRET//NO~ORN/FISA Russian Government officials, including Russian intelligence officers,-

b7A-l b7D-l b7E-l, 2

bl-1 b3-l b7A-l b7E-l, 2, 3

III. (U)(~ Carter Page.
(U)
A. (X) Page's Connections to Russia and the RIS.

(~ Page, a U.S. citizen, is the founder and managing partner of Global

Energy Capital LLC (GEC), an investment management and advisory firm that

focuses on the energy sector primarily in emerging markets.

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-1217-cv-597(FBI)-193
X

TOP S"ECRBTN:NOFORN/FISA
(U) (~)

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- f r o m approximately 2004 - 2007, Page lived in Russia this time, Page began

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TOP 8ECRBT#NOFORN/FISA
~) According to information provided by Page d u r i n g interview with the

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17 -cv-597(FBI)-195

TOP SECRET/lNOPO~~/FISA

~) According to information provided by Page during ~nterview with the

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(U) ~) In or about January 2015, Podobnyy, along with Evgeny Buryakov and Igor Sporyshev, were charged by a sealed complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York for violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 and 951 (conspiring to act, and acting as, an unregistered agent of a foreign government). According to the complaint, Buryakov worked in the United States as an agent of the SVR. Specifically, Buryakov operated under non-official cover, posing as an employee in the Manhattan office of a Russian bank. Buryakov worked with two other SVR agents, Podobnyy and Sporyshev, to gather intelligence on behalf of

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TOP SECRETI/NOFORN/FISA

Russia.8 The complaint states that the intelligence gathering efforts of Podobnyy

and Sporyshev included, among other things, attempting to recruit New York City

residents as intelligence sources for Russia.

(~)

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(U) 8 ~) Buryakov was arrested in or about January 2015. At the time of Buryakov's arrest, Podobnyy and Sporyshev no longer lived in the United States and were not arrested. In or about March 2016, Buryakov pleq guilty to conspiring to act in the United States as an agent of Russia without providing prior notice to the Attorney General. In or about May 2016, Buryakov was sentenced to 30 months in prison. According to information provided by the Federal Bureau of Prisons, Buryakov was released on March 31,2017.

TOP SECRBT,4'NOFORN!FISA -16-

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b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2

(U)
B. ~

Page's

Coordination

with

Russian

Government

Officials

on

2016

U.S. Presidential Election Influence Activities.

~ According to open source information, in July 2016, Page traveled to

Russia and delivered the commencement address at the New Economic School.9 In

b1-1

addition to giving this address, the FBI learned that Page met with at least two

b3-1

b7A-1

Russian officials during this trip. First, according to information provided by an FBI b7D- 1 b7E-1, 2

confidential human source (Source #1),

reported that Page had a

-(U) 9~)

b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 4

b1-1

the FBI. As (TS) b3-1

discussed below in footnote 20, in or about October 2016, the FBI suspended its relationship with Source #1 due to Source #1's unauthorized disclosure of

b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 5

information to the press. Subsequently, the FBI closed Source #1 as an FBI source.

Nevertheless, the FBI assesses Source #1 to be reliable as previous reporting from

Source #1 has been corroborated and used in criminal proceedings. Moreover, the

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FBI notes that the incident that led the FBI to terminate its relationship with Source #1 occurred after Source #1 provided the reporting that is described herein. (U) ~ Source #1, who now owns a foreign business/financial intelligence firm, was approached by an identified U.S. person, who indicated to Source #1 that a U.S.-based law firm had hired the identified U.S. person to conduct research regarding Candidate #1's ties to Russia (the identified U.S. person and Source #1 have a long-standing business relationship). The identified U.S. person hired Source #1 to conduct this research. The identified U.S. person never advised Source #1 as to the motivation behind the research into Candidate #l's ties to Russia. The FBI speculates that the identified U.S. person was likely looking for information that could be used to discredit Candidate #l's campaign.

(U) ~) Source #1 tasked his sub-source(s) to collect the requisite information. After Source #1 received information from the sub-source(s) described herein, Source #1 provided the information to the identified U.S. person who had hired Source #1 and to the FBI.

b3-1 b7A-1 b7D-1 b7E-1, 2

(~ Notwithstanding Source #1's reason for conducting the research

into Candidate #1's ties to Russia, based on Source #l's previous reporting history

with the FBI, whereby Source #1 provided reliable information to the FBI, the FBI

believes Source #1's

herein to be credible.

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TOP SBCRETJ/NOFORN/FISA -18-

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TOP SECRBTl/NOPORN/FISA secret meeting with Igor Sechin, who is the President of Rosneft [a Russian energy

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7D-1 b7E-1, 2.

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b7A-1 b7D-1 b7E-1, 2
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((oiPcD2TUUudfor0feth)eSen0itnepcseD4ttiiiurUaiOdnuftll1eSuiysonT2en~ eDyta)PdistanlOaralatid2ntoTsmny0neda0hesotn8nooaCuMt,nlionVhdtSIcific.naletenfeaiiiscioTocrddshminarhitaismessnelaaarabaionnwUornofcrofSaPentutfistDhsoutohtuetAuOhntehlinRestTpenRcoutrM-Duehaifslmsanas2aeRsintnp0keaiuwoa1auennsnugy4ttsoGynei,iFucadmctoCeolnheedvdmhenemeeenibtfpreUrietfenfafoon.BimSttonertiao.tofdeeaskaDnnSnlSetrstottdefnoea,trpcfodfoaasfahoemgnthrfirasnaodtittRmsi2raeanf0bocdRuses0siunrtluSs8ntriRtoshezeruosmcefeeunitfhnrsa,UettistniiaonhidklsanePpwret2naeaonr0TanieG1stwnrsisdi2efetiohif,iiad.noevooasegdrenSunnhm.rre"dathanycsePsemfhrtrul"ihoeyntseinmhntwtho. aewsn

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that, during the meeting, Page and Sechin discussed future bilateral energy cooperation and the prospects for an associated move to lift Ukraine-related Western sanctions against Russia

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(~)-according to Source #1

[who is assessed to be Igor Nikolayevich DivyekinJ,I

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had met secretly with Page and that their agenda for the meeting included Divyekin raising a dossier or "kompromat"14 that the Kremlin possessed on Candidate #2 and the possibility of it

(U) 14 (K.) politician or blackmail.

Kompromat is a Russian political figure, which is

term for typically

compromising material used to create negative

about a publicity

or

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; I

' I

TOP SECRET/fNOFORNIFISA being released to Candidate #l 's ca.mpaign.1s

(XTSX)

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TOP SBCM:T,t.'NOPORN/FISA

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- a July 2016 article in an identified news organization reported that Candidate #l's campaign worked behind the scenes to make sure Political Party #l's platform would not call for giving weapons to Ukraine to fight Russian and rebel forces, contradicting the view of almost all Political Party #l's foreign policy leaders

TOP SBCRET//NOPORN/FISA -23-

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TOP SBCRBTNNOI'ORN/FISA
in Washington. The article stated that Candidate #1's campaign sought "to make sure that [Political Party #1] would not pledge to give Ukraine the weapons it has been asking for from the United States." Further, an August 2016 article published by an identified news organization, which characterized Candidate #1 as sounding like a supporter of Ukraine's territorial integrity in September [2015], noted that Candidate #1 had recently adopted a "milder" tone regarding Russia's annexation of Crimea. The August 2016 article further reported that Candidate #1 said Candidate #1 might recognize Crimea as Russian territory and lift punitive U.S. sanctions against Russia. The article opined that while the reason for Candidate #1's shift was not clear, Candidate #1's more conciliatory words, which contradict Political Party #1's official platform, follow Candidate #1's recent association with several people sympathetic to Russian influence in Ukraine, including foreign policy advisor Carter Page.

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IV.

(U)~ Page's Denial of Cooperation with the Influence the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election.

Russian

Government

to

(U) ~ On or about September 23, 2016, an identified news organization

published an article (September 23rd News Article), which was written by the news

organization's Chief Investigative Correspondent, alleging that U.S. intelligence

officials are investigating Page with respect to suspected efforts by the Russian

Government to influence the U.S. Presidential election. According to the September

23rd News Article, U.S. officials received intelligence reports that when Page was in

Moscow in July ~016 to deliver the above-noted commencement address at the New

Economic School, he met with two senior Russian officials. The September 23rd

News Article stated that a ·"well-placed Western intelligence source" told the news

organization that Page met with Igor Sechin, a longtime Putin associate and former

Russian deputy minister who is now the executive chairman of Rosneft. At their

alleged meeting, Sechin raised the issue of the lifting of sanctions with Page.

According to the September 23rd News Article, the Western intelligence source also

reported that U.S. intelligence agencies received reports that Page met with another

top Putin aide - Igor Divyekin, a former Russian security official who now serves as

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TOP SECRET//NOFORN/FISA

deputy chief for internal policy and is believed by U.S. officials to have responsibility for intelligence collected by Russian agencies about the U.S. election.20
(U) (~R) According to the September 23rd News Article, certain members of Congress were "taken aback" after being briefed on the alleged meetings between Page and Russian officials and viewed the meetings as a possible back channel to the Russians that could undercut U.S. foreign policy. The September 23rd News Article

iaaocnssfofsshonooridccsmuiiaarcate2tt0etesir(eoileina~nskretecthAaolhyerscttfphohdierritiosshnbtcvetupuoisdblsiaCsuencedsaeedins.tnhsdaeSibiassdoossiausvnaotresefcc,soei#oSar#clmto'1eisuaaarttttoceinie,eoldsdna#ttnt1thohodweeRttFahFhuBsBeesIshIl.FiaiatBrwh.eIadSaftisohbrsumeyer/scsatsehhebesa#u1ttshhipnairretoestvdshieatdhsbeesduobsctuihinaseetientsrhseetisossuslts

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Sper opvt eimd ebde rth2i3s ridnfNoermwastAiorntictolet.hTehiedeFnBtIifdioedesnneowtsboelrigeavneizt haatitoSnotuhractep#u1bdliisrehcetdlythe romaetcnFe(hrglUoelBaegiain)wtscaaIitdtbnneasiuiloirsecnez,ctntnf( ,airtt.tooietahniarnlsIeo~ emgnlnnaapeoanor.srt) tefetidtiAeosedCorpbdrlntatoteIahaonhtnlndebhidotsemooahriuevdevrtegoetpaeamohnUdto,bieitS.triosghShtt#houihe.e2wnumttC,FFgrlobSecoaBBudeneotnIIeliutgp#dschrfOrcelocrale'uroiscnesstkstmtsicn#osein,o1neolbewtynduwehtncoheriehtenslic2etdrcFfol0tnrlhoBo1teusashI6is,aeenne,ttSsndaohsiFtoctnoeoSseBeuvswpodraIstecuehnettsSearhhvetciokiaa#ede2gu1ttreo0a,r#thni1ncth1anei6telfeoid/yatfUs#nseeFihw1ep.rBatSe'hdiestnI.thwanhrnhPaetdeaecarttpeDswehthdoniseifevsrltirreeldtFeFuyiaceBBnss,rtnotIgIonartuaowrnieirastndcodealefdsot.htfwhiseith

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also stated that, following the briefing, the Senate Minority Leader wrote to the FBI Director, and citing the reports of meetings between an advisor to Candidate #1 [the advisor was unnamed in the letter, but the article indicated that the advisor is Page} and "high ranking sanctioned individuals" [in context, likely a reference to Sechin} in Moscow over the summer as evidence of "significant and disturbing ties" between Candidate #l's campaign and the Kremlin that needed to be investigated by the FBI.
(U) (~ Based on statements in the September 23rd News Article, as well as in other articles published by identified news organizations, Candidate #l's campaign repeatedly made public statements in an attempt to distance Candidate #l's campaign from Page. For example, the September 23rd News Article noted that Page's precise role in Candidate #l's campaign is unclear. According to the article, a spokesperson for Candidate #l's campaign called Page an "informal foreign advisor" who "does not speak for [Candidate #1} or the campaign." In addition, another spokesperson for Candidate #l's campaign said that Page "has no role" and added "[w}e are not aware of any of his activities, past or present." However, the article stated that the campaign spokesperson did not respond when asked why Candidate #1 had previously described Page as an advisor. In addition, on or about September 25,2016, an identified news organization published an article that was

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based primarily on an interview with Candidate #l's then campaign manager. During the interview, the campaign manager stated, "[Page is] not part of the campaign I'm running." The campaign manager added that Page has not been part of Candidate #l's national security or foreign policy briefings since he/she became campaign manager. In response to a question from the interviewer regarding reports that Page was meeting with Russian officials to essentially attempt to conduct diplomatic negotiations with the Russian Government, the campaign manager responded, "If [Page is] doing that, he's certainly not doing it with the permission or knowledge of the campaign ...."

b7A-1 b7E-l, 2

(U) ~) On or about September 25,2016, Page sent a letter to the FBI Director. In this letter, Page made reference to the accusations in the September 23rd News Article and denied them. Page stated that the source of the accusations was nothing more than completely false media reports and that he did not meet with any sanctioned official in Russia. Page also stated that he would be willing to discuss

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any "final" questions the FBI may have.2t (~ Additionally, on or about September 26, 2016, an identified news
organization published an article that was based on an interview with Page (September 26th News Article). In the September 26th News Article, Page stated that all of the accusations were complete "garbage" and that he did not meet with Sechin or Divyekin. Page also stated that he was taking a leave of absence from his work with Candidate #l's campaign because the accusations were a "distraction."
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17-cv-597(FBI)-21 0

TOP SBCRBT//NOPORN/FISA
v. (~
(~

b1-1 b3-l b7A-1 b7D-l b7E-1, 2
b1-l b3-l b7A-l b7D-1 b7E-l, 2, 6

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7D-1 b7E-1, 2, 5, 6 •

TOP SECRET//NOFORN/FISA -30-

17-cv-597(FBI)-211

TOP SBCRBT//NOFORNIFISA
-

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7D-1 b7E-1, 2
b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7D-1 b7E-1, 2

-
I I (U)
~-
-31-

b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3
17-cv-597(FBI)-212

TOP S~CR~TNNO:f'O~l\t/FISA

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1,2,3 :

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

TOP S~CR~TJ/NOFORNIFISA -32-

17-cv-597(FBI)-213

TOP SBCRBTNNOFORN/FISA • {3)

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7D-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

(~

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

TOP SECRBT//NOFORNIFISA
-33-

17-cv-597(FBI)-214

TOP 811CRET/lNO~ORN/FISA

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-l, 2, 3, 6

TOP SBCRBTh'NOPORN/FISA -34-

17-cv-597(FBI)-215

~)

TOP SBCRBT//NOPORNIFISA

·~)

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3
b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

TOP SECRET//NOFOR.~ISA -35-

1?-cv-597(FBI)-216

TOP SECRET,~'NO:PORN/FISA

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-l, 2, 3, 6

~)

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-l, 2, 3, 6

TOP 5ECRET,L/NO:PORNIFISA -36-

17-cv-597(FBI)-217

TOP S"BC~TN~O:PORN/FISA

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2

(~

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2

TOP SECRETNNOPORNIFISA -37-

17-cv-597(FBI)-218

TOP SBCRBTJ/NQ;pQRN/FISA

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2

-

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7D-1 b7E-1, 2
b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2
b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2

TOP SBCRETJ/NOFORN/FISA -38-

17-cv-597(FBI)-219

TOP SECRETI/NOFORN/FISA

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7D-1 b7E-1, 2

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7D-1 b7E-1, 2

·~)

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2
7E-1, 2, 3, 6

TOP SECRET//NOFORNIFISA -39-

17-cv-597(FBI)-220

TOP SBCRBT//NOFORN/FISA

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-l b7C-2 b7E-l, 2, 3, 6

bl-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-l b7C-2 b7E-l, 2, 3, 6

TOP SECRET,4'NO:PORN/FISA
-40-

17-cv-597(FBI)-221

TOP SECRET/.fNHFORN/FISA

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

TOP SECRET/lNOPOR.l\YFISA -41-

17-cv-597(FBI)-222

TOP SBCREri/NO~ORN/FISA

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b?E-1,2,3,6 ·•

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

~)

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

TOP SBCRl1T/-/NO~ORN/FISA -42-

17-cv-597(FBI)-223

I 1
TOP S£CR£Th'NOFORN/FISA
·~

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

TOP SBCRBTNNOFORN/FISA -43-

b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-2
17-cv-597(FBI)-224

TOP SBCRBT//NOFORN/FISA

bl-1 b3-l b6-2 b7A-l b?C-2· b7E-l, 2, 3, 6

(U) G. (i//NF) Page's Letter to the U.S. Department of Justice. (~In or around February 2017, Page sent a letter to the U.S.
Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, Voting Section, urging the review of what Page claimed was "severe election fraud in the form of disinformation, suppression of dissent, hate crimes and other extensive abuses led by members of [Candidate #2's] campaign and their political allies last year." In his letter, Page claims that he has not directly supported a political campaign since September 2016, but continues to be subjected to personal attacks by former members of Candidate #2's campaign based on fictitious information. Page wrote that his academic lecture and related meetings with scholars and business people in Moscow had no connection to the U.S. election. Page attributes the assertions in the September 23rd News Article that Page met with two senior Russian officials

TOP SBCRBTJ./NOPORN/FISA -44-

17-cv-597(FBI)-225

TOP SBCRET//NOPORN/FISA
(i.e., Sechin and Diveykin) while he was in Moscow in July 2016 to give the commencement address at the New Economic School, which Page claims is "false evidence," to Candidate #2's campaign. Page further claims that the information relied on by Candidate #2's campaign, certain members of the U.S. Congress, and the media are lies that were completely fabricated by Candidate #2's paid consultants and private investigators.

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2

II<~

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2

TOP SBCRBT//NOPORN/FISA -45-

17-cv-597(FBI)-226

TOP 8BCRBT//NOPORN/FISA

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2

(Um)

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2

(~

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2

TOP 8ECRBT/INOFOR.."J/FISA -46-

17-cv-597(FBI)-227

TOP SECRETI/NOFORN/FISA

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-l, 2

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2

(Mm)

TOP SECRET//NOFORN/FISA
-47-

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2
17-cv-597(FBI)-228

TOP SECM;T/lNOl'ORN/FISA

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2

(SJINB)

TOP SECRBTHNO'FORN/FISA -48-

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7D-1 b7E-1, 2
17-cv-597(FBI)-229

TOP S~CR~T//NOFORNIFISA

i i
b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-l, 2

(~)

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

TOP SECR~TI/NHFORN/FISA
-49-

17-cv-597(FBI)-230

VII. (~ ($}

TOP S~CR~T//NOPORN/FISA

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7D-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 4, 6

(S)
b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-l, 2, 3, 6

b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-2, 4

TOP SECRETNNOPORN-IFISA -50-

17-cv-597(FBI)-231

TOP SECRETh'NOPORNIFISA (S:)

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b?E-1, 2, 3, 6
b1-1 b6-2 b3-1 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7D-1 b?E-1, 2, 3, 6

(S) b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b?E-1, 2, 3, 6

-

TOP SECRET//NOPORNIFISA -51-

17-cv-597(FBI)-232

TOP SECRETf./NO:PORN/FISA (.S)

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

(~

b1-1

b3-1

b6-2

b7A-1

b7C-2

b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

TOP SECRETh'NOFORN-/FISA -52-

17-cv-597(FBI)-233

TOP SBCRBTJ/:NOPORN/FISA
(~

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6 !

(~ (~

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2

TOP SBCRBTNNOPORNIFISA -53-

17-cv-597(FBI)-234

TOP SBCRBT//NOPO:R..""t/FISA
(~
(~

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

TOP SBCRBTNNOFORN/FISA -54-

17-cv-597(FBI)-235

TOP SECRET//NOFORNIFISA
~)

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

VIII. (U) Conclusion. (U) (~ As discussed above, the FBI believes that Page has been collaborating
and conspiring with the Russian b7A-1
Based on the b7E-1, 2
foregoing facts and circumstances, the FBI submits that there is probable cause to believe that Page
yengage in clandestine intelligence activities (other than intelligence gathering activities) for or

TOP SECRET/-/NOFORN/FISA -55-

17-cv-597(FBI)-236

TOP S~CR~T/I:NOFORN'FISA

b7A-l b7E-l, 2

(U) (~/U')

the FBI submits that there is probable cause to believe that such activities involve or are about to involve violations of the criminal statutes of

b7A-l b7E-l, 2

(U) (S)

b7A-l b7E-l, 2

I
(~

bl-1 b3-l b6-2 b7A-l b7C-2 b7E-l, 2, 3, 6

TOP S~CRBTNNO:PORN/FISA -56-

17 -cv-597(FBI)-237

TOP SBCRBT//NO~ORN/FISA
I

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

(~

b1-1

b3-1

b6-2

b7A-1

b7C-2

b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

(~(50

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

TOP SBCRBTNNO~ORNIFISA -57-

17-cv-597(FBI)-238

TOP SBCRBT/INOPORN/FISA
(~)

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

b1-1

b3-1

b6-2

b7A-1

b7C-2

(5)

b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

TOP SBCRBT//NOFORNIFISA -58-

17-cv-597(FBI)-239

TOP SBCRBTh'NOPORN/FISA (~)
(~
-
(S)

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

TOP SBCRBT//NOPORN/FISA -59-

17-cv-597(FBI)-240

TOP SBCRBTI/NO~ORN/FISA
-
(X)
-
(XI)
I

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b?E-1,2,3,6 i

TOP SBCRBT/INO~ORN!FISA -60-

17-cv-597(FBI)-241

TOP SECRET#N"OFORNIFISA 4. (!) Proposed Minimization Procedures As to all information acquired through the authorities requested herein, the FBI will follo~
b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6!
I

b1-1

I

b3-1

b7A-1

b7E-2, 3

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

TOP SECRET//NOFORNIFISA -61-

17-cv-597(FBI)-242

-
(5:)

TOP SBCRETI/NOFORN/FISA

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6 I

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

(i)

b1-1

b3-1

b7A-1

b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

TOP SECRET!/NOJlORNIFISA
-62-

17-cv-597(FBI)-243

i I
TOP SECRET//NOFORN!FISA (S)
(K)

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

5. (i) Nature of the Information Sought Through the authorities

b1-1

b3-1

b7A-1
requested herein, the United States is seeking foreign intelligence information with b7E-1,2,3,6

respect to the activities of the target described above and detailed further in the

certification set forth below. As indicated by the facts set forth herein, the FBI is

seeking foreign intelligence information that relates and is necessary to the ability of

the United States to protect against clandestine intelligence activities by an

intelligence service or network of this foreign power or by agents of this foreign

power, and information with respect to a foreign power or foreign territory that

relates and is necessary to the national defense, security, and the conduct of the

TOP SECRET//NOFORN/FISA

-6317-cv-597(FBI)-244

TOP S~CR~T/lNOPORN/FISA

foreign affairs of the United States. These same authorities may also incidentally acquire other foreign intelligence information, as defined by the Act.

(~)

b1-1

b3-1

b7A-1

b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
(S) b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

TOP S~CR~T//NOPORN/FISA -64-

17-cv-597(FBI)-245

TOP SBCRET//NOFORNIFISA

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

6.

(~ Certification The certification of the Assistant to the President for

National Security Affairs or an Executive branch official duly designated by the

President as a certifying official in Executive Order

amended, is set forth below.

b 1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-l, 2, 7

TOP SBCRBT//NOFORN/FISA -65-

17-cv-597(FBI)-246

TOP SBCRBTilNO:PORN/FISA

(U) The Purpose of the Authorities Requested

(5:) The FBI's foreign intelligence goals for this investigation are set forth in

the certification of the Executive Branch official contained herein. However, the

authorities requested in this application may produce information and material

which might, when evaluated by prosecutive authorities, constitute evidence of a

violation of United States law, and this investigation may result in an eventual

criminal prosecution of the target. Nevertheless, as discussed in the certification, at

least a significant purpose of this request

b1-1 b3-1

- i s to collect foreign intelligence information as part of the FBI's investigation

b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

of this target.

I (X)

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

TOP SBCRETNNOFORN/FISA -66-

17-cv-597(FBI)-247

TOP SECRETh'NOFORNIFISA
II (X)

bl-1 b3-l b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
bl-1 b3-1 b7A-l b7E-l, 2, 3, 6

9. (S) Duration of the Authorities Requested (See also, The authorities requested should not automatically terminate when foreign

bl-1 b3-l b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

intelligence information has first been obtained. Additional information of the same

type will be obtained on a continuous basis throughout the entire period requested.

The activities which the United States must identify and monitor are incremental

and continuous, and communications relating to such activities are often disguised

to appear innocuous. The type of foreign intelligence information being sought and

the fact that the activities of this target are ongoing preclude the conclusion that, at a

given time, all such information has been obtained and collection can be ended.

Accordingly, the United States requests the authorities specified herein for a period

of ninety (90) days.

TOP SECRET//NOFORN/FISA -67-

17-cv-597(FBI)-248

• (X)

TOP SBCRBT//NO:PORN/FISA

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2

TOP SBCRBTIINOPORN/FISA -68-

17-cv-597(FBI)-249

TOP SBCRBTI/NOFORN/FISA
II (~

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2
b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-2, 6
b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-2, 6

I I (X)

TOP SEE-R-B~n''NOFORN/FISA -69-

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
17-cv-597(FBI)-250

TOP 8ECRB1WNOFORN/FISA

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
-

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

TOP SECRET//NO:PORN/FISA -70-

17-cv-597(FBI)-251

TOP SBCRBT//:NO:FORN/FISA
Ill (~

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

TOP SBCRBTHNO~ORN/FISA -71-

17-cv-597(FBI)-252

TOP SBCRBTI/NOFORN/FISA

(S) Specific Authorities Requested Based upon the foregoing information, the United States requests that this Court authorize the FBI to conduct the activities described immediately below for the period requested herein.

(~
• (S)

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

•

b1-1

b3-1

b6-2

b7A-1

b7C-2

b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

TOP SBCRBT//NOFORN/FISA -72-

17 -cv-597(FBI)-253

Ill (X)

TOP SBCRBTl/NOl'ORN/FISA

II <~

bl-1
b3~1
b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
bl-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

Ill (X)

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

TOP SBCRBTI/NOl'ORN/FISA -73-

17-cv-597(FBI)-254

TOP SECRETh'NOFORN/FISA • (X)
• (SJ

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-l, 2, 3, 6
b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-l, 2, 3, 6
b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

TOP SECRET//NOFORN/FISA -74-

17-cv-597(FBI)-255

Ill<~

TOP SBCRETNNOFORNIFISA

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-l, 2, 3, 6

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

b1-1

(S)

b3-1

b7A-1

b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

TOP SBCRET//NOFORN/FISA -75-

17-cv-597(FBI)-256

TOP SBCRBT//NOFORN/FISA
~)
(~

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

I

b1-1 b3-1

b7A-1

I

b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

I

TOP SECRETNNOFORN/FISA
-76-

17-cv-597(FBI)-257

TOP SBGR:BTII"NOPOJL~/FISA
I
-
I I

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
I I I
b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
I

TOP SBC:R:BTIuI NOPORNIFISA -77-

17-cv-597(FBI)-258

TOP SECRETNNOFORN/FISA

bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-l, 2, 3, 6

(U) (S:) The FBI has reviewed this verified application for accuracy in accordance

with its AprilS, 2001 procedures, which include sending a copy of the draft to the

appropriate field office(s). A copy of those procedures was previously provided to

the Court.

----- The remainder of this page is intentionally left blank. -----

TOP SECRET//NOFORNIFISA -78-

17 -cv-597(FBI)-259

TOP SBCRBT/INOPORN/FISA

(U) VERIFICATION
00 I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing information

regarding Carter W. Page is true and correct. Executed pursuant to Title 28, United
States Code,§ 1746 on ~V'"t I 11111--'2-o=-=-.:.1'1_.__ __

bl-1 b3-l b7A-l

Special Agent Federal Bureau of Investigation

b6-l b7A-l b7C-l .

TOP SBCRBT//NOPORN!FISA
-79-

17-cv-597(FBI)-260

TOP SECRET//NOFORN/FISA

(U) CERTIFICATION
(50 I, the undersigned, having been designated as one of the officials

authorized to make the certifications required by the Foreign Intelligence

Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended, do hereby certify with regard to t h e -

requested in this verified application targeting Carter W. Page, an agent of the Government of Russia, a foreign power, as follows:

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

(A) (U) The information sought through the authorities requested herein is foreign intelligence information.

(B) (U) At least a significant purpose of the authorities requested herein is to obtain foreign intelligence information and, notwithstanding the related criminal matters described in this application, the primary purpose of the authorities requested herein is not to obtain information for the prosecution of crimes other than those referred to in the Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1801(a)-(e), or related to such foreign intelligence crimes.

(C) (U) The foreign intelligence information sought by the authorities

b1-1

b3-1

requested herein cannot be reasonably obtained by normal investigative techniques. b?A- 1
b7E-l, 2, 3, 6

(D) (X) The type of foreign intelligence information being sought through the

authorities requested herein is that described in 50 U.S.C. § 1801(e)(l)(C), i.e.,

TOP SBCRBT//NOFORN/FISA -80-

17-cv-597(FBI)-261

TOP SECRBTN:NOFORNIFISA

information that relates and is necessary to the ability of the United States to protect

against clandestine intelligence activities by an intelligence service or network of this

foreign power or by agents of this foreign power, and 50 U.S.C. § 1801(e)(2)(A)-(B),

i.e., information with respect to a foreign power or foreign territory that relates and

is necessary to the national defense or security, and the conduct of the foreign affairs

of the United States. These same authorities may also incidentally acquire foreign

intelligence information as defined by other subsections of 50 U.S.C. § 1801(e).

bl-1

b3-l

(E) Qfl) The basis for my certification that the information sought is the type b7A-1
b7E-l, 2, 3, 6

of foreign intelligence information specified herein and that such information cannot

be obtained by normal investigative techniques is as follows.

(S)

b1-1

b3-1

b7A-1

b7E-1, 2

TOP SECRET//NOFORN/FISA
-8117-cv-597(FBI)-262

TOP SBCRBT//NOFORNIFISA

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2
• b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-l, 2

TOP SBCRBT//NOFORN/FISA -82-

17-cv-597(FBI)-263

TOP SECRETNNOFORN/FISA
(~

bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-l, 2, 8

(U) (~

b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-l, 2

TOP SECRET//"NOFOR"N/FISA -83-

17-cv-597(FBI)-264

TOP 8BCRBT,4NOPORN/FISA
(~)

i,_
b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-l, 2
b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-l, 2
bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3

TOP 8BCRBT//NOPOIL1\l/FISA -84-

17-cv-597(FBI)-265

TOP S~CR~T!/NOFORN/FISA

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3

~)
b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3

TOP S~CR~1i'/NO~ORNIFISA -85-

17-cv-597(FBI)-266

TOP SJ;;CRBTNNOPORN/FISA
(j)

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3

(S)

b1-1

b3-1

b7A-1

b7E-1, 2, 3

(S)

b1-1

b3-1

b7A-1

b7E-1, 2, 3

TOP SECRETIINOPORN/FISA

-8617-cv-597(FBI)-267

TOP SBCRBTHNOFORN/FISA

bl~l
b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-l, 2, 3

(X)

bl-1

b3-1

b7A-1

b7E-l, 2, 3

(U) (~ Based upon the foregoing information, it is the Government's belief that the authorities requested herein targeting Page are critical investigative means for obtaining the foreign intelligence information identified herein.

TOP 5BCRBT//NOFORN/FISA -87-

17-cv-597(FBI)-268

TOP SJ;CRBT/,!NOPORN/FISA ~) Accordingly, I execute this certification regarding Carter W. Page in accordance with the requirements of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended.

Federal Bureau of Investigation
Andrew G. McCabe Deputy Director Federal Bureau of Investigation
Michael R. Pompeo Director of the Cenh·al Intelligence Agency
Daniel R. Coats Director of National Intelligence

Rex Tillerson Secretary of State
Deputy Secretary of State
James N. Mattis Secretary of Defense
HR. McMaster Assistant to the.President for National Security Affairs

Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence
TOP SIKRBT//NOFORN/FISA -88-

bl-1 b3-l
b7A~l
17-cv-597(FBI)-269

TOP SECRETJ/NOFORN!FISA

(U) APPROVAL (U) ~) I find that this application regarding Carter W. Page satisfies the criteria and requirements for such applications set forth in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended, and hereby approve its filing with this Court.
(~

bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 6

TOP SECRET!/-NOFO~N/FISA -89-

17-cv-597(FBI)-270

TOP S'BCRBT,L/:NOI'ORNIFISA (.S) Accordingly, I approve the filing of this application regarding Carter W. Page with the Court,

bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1

Dana J. Boente27
Acting Attorney General of the United States
I?

27 (U) Pursuant to Executive Order 13787 (March 31, 2017), Dana J. Boente
is serving as the Acting Attorney General with respect to this matter by virtue of the Attorney General's recusal.

TOP S'BCRBT//NOPORNIFISA
..
-90-

17-cv-597(FBI)-271

TOP SBCRBT//NOPORN/FISA

(U) 00 WHEREFORE, the United States submits that this application
regarding Carter W. Page satisfies the criteria and requirements of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended, and therefore requests that this Court authorize the activities described herein, and enter the proposed orders and warrants which accompany this application.

Respectfully submitted, U.S. Department of Justice

b6-3 b7A-l b7C-3

TOP SBCRBTMN'OPORN/FISA -91-

I
I
;
17-cv-597(FBI)-272

All information is considered unclassified except where otherwise shown.

Classify By: J23J98T32

SJ!;CRJ;T

Reason: (C)

Derived From: FBI NSICG, dated

UNITED STATES

0-2017 D:ra'ssify On: -

FOREIGN

INTELLIGENCE

SURVEILLANCE

leeAnn Flyrm COURT

H
all, Clerk
b1-1

of

Court

WASHINGTON, D. C.

b3-1 b7A-1

IN RE CARTER W. PAGE, A U.S. PERSON

Docket Number:

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1

PRIMARY ORDER AND WARRANT

1. An application having been made by the United States of America

pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended, 50

U.S.C.

or the Act), for an order and warrant

(hereinafter "order") for

and full

consideration having been given to the matters set forth therein, the Court finds

as follows: 2. The application has been made by a Federal officer and approved by the

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b?E-1, 2, 3, 6

Attorney General;

3. On the basis of the facts submitted in the verified application, there is probable cause to believe that:

Derived from: Declassify on:

8BCRET

-Application to the USFISC
in Docket Number captioned above

bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1

17-cv-597(FBI)-273

I '
SBCRBT
(A) The Government of the Russian Federation (Russia) is a foreign power and Carter W: Page is an agent of Russia, as defined by

b7A-1 b7E-1, 2

4. The minimization procedures proposed in the application have been adopted by the Attorney General and meet the definition of minimization procedures

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

5. The application contains all statements and certifications req1;1ired b .

of the statements made

the certification is not clearly erroneous on the basis

b 1-1
b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

any other information furnished

WHEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, pursuant to the authority conferred on this Court by the Act, that the application of the United States is GRANTED, and it is

FURTHER ORDERED, as follows:

SBCRET
-2-

17-cv-597(FBI)-274

SBC~T
1. The United States is authorized to the target as follows;
-

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

SECRET
-3-

17-cv-597(FBI)-275

S~CRBT
II

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

S~CR~T
-4-

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
17-cv-597(FBI)-276

S~CR~T
•

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

S~CRET
-5-

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
17-cv-597(FBI)-277

SECRET

bl-1 b3-l b6-2 b7A-l b7C-2 b7E-l, 2, 3, 6
bl-1 b3-l b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-l, 2, 3, 6
b1-1 b3-l b7A-l b7E-l, 2, 3, 6

SECRET
-6-

17-cv-597(FBI)-278

S~CR~T
I

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

SECRET
-7-

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
17-cv-597(FBI)-279

S~CRBT
-· I I I
I
I
I

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-l, 2, 3, 6
b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1
b7E-1, 2, 3, 6 ;
b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

SECRET -8-

17-cv-597(FBI)-280

S~CR~T
I I
I
I

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-l, 2, 3, 6
b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-l, 2, 3, 6

SBCRBT -9-

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SBCRBT

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E~ 1, 2, 3, 6
b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

b1-1

b3-1

-

b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

SBCREf
-10-

17-cv-597(FBI)-282

S~CR~T

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

6. The authorities approved are for the period indicated below unless otherwise ordered by this Court.

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

As to all information acquired through the authorities approved herein, the FBI shall follow

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

SBCRET -11-

17-cv-597(FBI)-283

S~CRBT
•
•

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

SECRET -12-

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17-cv-597(FBI)-284

SBCRET
-

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

SECRET -13-

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SECRET

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

SECRET -14-

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
17-cv-597(FBI)-286

SBCRBT

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

-

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

SBCRBT
-15-

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SECRET

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

SECRET
-16-

17-cv-597(FBI)-288

-

S~CR~T

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-l, 2, 3, 6
b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

S~CR~T
-17-

17-cv-597(FBI)-289

S~CR~T

bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-l, 2, 3, 6

----- The remainder of this page is intentionally left blank. -----

S~CRET
-18-

17 -cv-597(FBI)-290

on the Signed

S~CR~T

Carter W. Page expires a t - Eastern Time

day of June, 2017.
- ....~£]~~~~ ..

bl-1 b3-l b7A-l

~ ~W(AY '/~1
Judge, United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court

.,
true cw1cl ·:.:::)(:·:_:Jj_ -.~(:{}>' ::·d· u--,(:; o(~J~n:=:!

SBCRBT -19-

b6-3 b7A-l b7C-3
17-cv-597(FBI)-291

TOP SECRET//NOFORN/FISA

il

UNITED STATES

All information is considered unclassified

except where otherwise shown.

FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT

Classify By: J23J98T32

b 1-1

~=~~~~:F~~~: FBI NSICG,

WASHINGTON, D.C.

b3_1 b7A-1

06.2017
(S) IN RE CARTER W. PAGE, A U.S.

Docket Number:

PERSON.

. -· -~ ~· \ J
-

' ' ! :" -~ ''· •
i\
b1-1 b3-l b7A-1

(U) VERIFIED APPLICATION

(16) The United States of America hereby applies to this Court for authority to

described herein, pursuant b1-1 b3-1

to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended, Title 50, United

b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

States Code (U.S.C.),

or the Act).

1. (U) Identity of Federal Officer Making Application This application is
of Investigation (FBI) whose official duties at FBI Headquarters include supervision of the FBI's investigation of the above-captioned target based upon information

b1-1 b3-1 b6-1 b7A-1 b7C-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

officially furnished to

TOP SECRETHNOFORN/FISA

Classified by:

Derived from: Declassify on: .

-

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1
OI Tracking No. 147743
17-cv-597(FBI)-292

TOP 8BCRBTi/NO.FORN/FISA

2. (S) Identity of the Target The target of this application is Carter W.

Page, a U.S. person, and an agent of a foreign power, described in detail below. The b1-1

status of the target was determined in or about June 2017 from information provided

b3-1 b7A-1

by the U.S. Department of State.

b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

3. (K) Statement of Facts The United States relies upon the following facts b1-1

and circumstances in support of this application. a. (S) The target of this application is an agent of a foreign power.

b3-1
b7A-1
b7E-l, 2, 3, 6

(~ The following describes the foreign power and sets forth in detail a

description of the target and the target's activities for or on behalf of this foreign

power.

(U) (~ This verified application reports on developments in the FBI's investigation of the above captioned target since the most recent application described herein. Unless stated otherwise herein, information presented in previous applications has been summarized or removed not because it was factually inaccurate but in order to create a more concise document.
(U) ~) The Government of the Russian Federation is a foreign power as defined by 50 U.S.C. § 1801(a)(l).
TOP SECRET//NOFORN/FISA
-217-cv-597(FBI)-293

TOP SECRETJ/NOFORN/FISA
(U) (!) The Government of the Russian Federation (Russia) is an internationally recognized foreign government and, as of the execution of this application, is listed in the Diplomatic List, published by the United States Department of State, and in Permanent Missions to the United Nations, published by the United Nations, and its establishments in the United States are components thereof. ~) Clandestine Intelligence Activities Of The Russian Federation
(X)
bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-l, 2

TOP 8BCRBTNNOFOR.~/FISA
-3-

17-cv-597(FBI)-294

TOP SBCRET/INOFORN/FISA (X)

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2
b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-l, 2

(U) ~) Carter W. Page
engage in b3- 1
b7A-1
clandestine intelligence activities (other than intelligence gathering activities) for b7E-1, 2
or on behalf of such foreign power, which activities involve or are about to
involve a violation of the criminal statutes of the United States, or knowingly
conspires with other persons to engage in such activities and, therefore, is an
agent of a foreign power as defined by 50 U.S.C. § 180l(b)(2)(E).

TOP SBCRET//NHFORN/FISA
-4-

17-cv-597(FBI)-295

TOP SBCRBT//NOI'ORN/FISA

I. (U) Overview.

(S/~) This application seeks renewed authority to c o n d u c t -

b1-1

Carter Page.

The FBI believes that Page has been

b3-1 b6-2

the subject of targeted recruitment by the Russian

b7A-1 b7C-2

b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

~I/JJ4Kj Page is a former foreign policy advisor to a Candidate for U.S. President (Candidate #1).1 As discussed in greater detail below, the FBI believes that the Russian Government engaged in efforts to undermine and influence the outcome
of the 2016 U.S. Presidential election.

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 biE-1, 2

1 ~) On or about November 8, 2016, Candidate #1 was elected President. AareclfctehurroeaunccgyehsoCftotahnCedabindadactikedga#rt1oeiu#sn1ndaoinwndftomhrememPa..rt.b.ie..o.e.s..nr.i..ds.,.,Jeuo..n.fn..t,lC,efiiaslnnsedodoritiddhnaeettrrhewtio#sis1mme'saasctittnaaetmteradpi(sn,aetiethghdeneoothcerikaisgetmoitnrnwiaculiamlll bers

bl-1 b3-l b7A-1

TOP SBCRBT//NOI'ORN/FISA -5-

17-cv-597(FBI)-296

TOP SECRET//NOFORN/FISA

-

II.

(U)

(~/~ The FBI Believes that Influence Operations Against

the the

Russian Government United States.

Engages

in

(U) A. (~/NR:) RIS Efforts to Influence U.S. Presidential Elections.

(~/Wf) During a September 2016 interview with an identified news

organization, the then Director of National Intelligence (DNI) stated, "Russia has

tried to influence U.S. elections since the 1960s during the Cold War" and "there's a

tradition in Russia of interfering with elections, their own and others." The then

DNI commented that this influence included providing money to particular

candidates or providing disinformation. The then DNI added that "it shouldn't

come as a big shock to people, ... I think it's more dramatic maybe because they

have the cyber tools that they can bring to bear in the same effort."

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2
b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b?E-1, 2

TOP SECRETNNOFORN/FISA -6-

17-cv-597(FBI)-297

TOP SECRET/lNOFORN/FISA

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2

(~~) In or about July 2016, WikiLeaks released a trove of e-mails from the

Democratic National Committee (DNC).2 - T h e r e has been speculation in the U.S. media that the Russian Government

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3

was behind the hack. Russia has publicly denied any involvement in the hack.

Russian President Vladimir Putin said in or about September 2016 that Russia was

not responsible for the hack, but said that the release of the DNC documents was a

net positive: "The important thing is the content that was given to the public." Despite Russia's

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3

2 (Ji/INK) According to information on its website, WikiLeaks is a multinational media organization and associated library. WikiLeaks specializes in the analysis and publication of large datasets of censored or otherwise restricted official materials involving war, spying, and corruption. According to open source information, in or about July 2016, WikiLeaks released thousands of e-mails it are from the accounts of DNC officials.

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2

TOP SECRET//NOFORN/FISA
-7-

17-cv-597(FBI)-298

TOP ~li:CRET//NOFORN/FISA

In addition, according to an October 7, 2016 Joint Statement from the Department of

bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-l, 2, 3

Homeland Security and the Office of the Director ofNational Intelligence on Election

Security (Election Security Joint Statement), the USIC is confident that the Russian

Government directed the recent compromises of e-mails from U.S. persons and

_institutions, including from U.S. political organizations. The Election Security Joint

Statement states that the recent disclosures of e-mails on, among others, sites like

WikiLeaks are consistent with the methods and motivations of Russian-directed

efforts. According to the Election Security Joint Statement, these thefts and

disclosures were intended to interfere with the U.S. election process; activity that is

not new to Moscow - the Russians have used similar tactics and techniques across

Europe and Eurasia, for example, to influence public opinion there. The Election

Security Joint Statement stated that, based on the scope and sensitivity of these

efforts, only Russia's senior-most officials could have authorized these activities.

More recently, on December 29, 2016, the White House issued a statement that the

U.S. President had ordered a number of actions in response to the Russian

Government's aggressive harassment of U.S. officials and cyber operations aimed at

the U.S. election. According to this December 29th statement, the U.S. Presidential

TOP SECRET,L/NOFORN/FISA -8-

17 -cv-597(FBI)-299

TOP 8~CRBT//NO:FORN/FISA

Administration publicized its assessment in October [2016] that Russia took actions

intended to interfere with the U.S. election process and that these activities could

only have been directed by the highest levels of the Russian Government [in context,

this is likely a reference to the Election Security Joint Statement].

(9'//K]JJ) Based on the Russian Government's historical efforts to influence

U.S. and foreign elections, - a n d the information discussed herein regarding Russia's coordination with Carter

bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-l, 2

to attempt to undermine and improperly and illegally influence the 2016 U.S. Presidential election.

(U) (~INK)

b7A-1 b7E-l, 2

As stated in the legislative history of FISA:

TOP 8BCRBT//NO:FOR.l\1/FISA -9-

17-cv-597(FBI)-300

TOP SBCRET/INOFORN/FISA

Not only do foreign powers engage in spying in the United States to obtain information, they also engage in activities which are intended to harm the Nation's security by affecting the course of our Government, the course of public opinion, or the activities of individuals. Such activities may include political action (recruiting, bribery or influencing of public officials to act in favor of the foreign power), disguised propaganda (including the planting of false or misleading articles or stories), and harassment, intimidation, or even assassination of individuals who oppose the foreign power. Such activity can undermine our democratic institutions as well as directly threaten the peace and safety of our citizens.
H.R. Rep. No. 95-1283, pt. 1, at 41 (1978).

(U) B. ('K;/NB.) The Russian Government's Coordinated Efforts to Influence the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election.
(X/~) In or about March 2016, George Papadopoulos3 and Carter Page (the

target of this application) were publicly identified by Candidate #1 as part of his/her foreign policy team.
the FBI believes that the Russian Government's efforts to influence the

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7D-1 b7E-1, 2

2016 U.S. Presidential election were being coordinated with Page and perhaps other

individuals associated with Candidate #1's campaign.

•

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7D-1 b7E-1, 2

TOP SECRETh'NOFORN/FISA -10-

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2
17-cv-597(FBI)-301

TOP SECRETh'NOFORN/FISA

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7D-1 b7E-1, 2

(51~- As discussed below, Page has established relationships with

b3-1 b7E-1, 2

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7D-1 b7E-1, 2

TOP SECRETl/NOFORN/FISA -11-

17-cv-597(FBI)-302

TOP SECRETJ/NO"PORN/FISA Russian Government officials, including Russian intelligence officers,-

b7A-l b7D-l b7E-l, 2

bl-1 b3-l b7A-l b7E-l, 2, 3

III. (U)(.S) Carter Page. (U) A. (!.) Page's Connections to Russia and the RIS.
(~ Page, a US. citizen, is the founder and managing partner of Global
Energy Capital LLC (GEC), an investment management and advisory firm that focuses on the energy sector primarily in emerging markets.

b7A-l b7E-l, 2

TOP SECRET//NO"PORN/FISA -12-

17 -cv-597(FBI)-303

TOP SECRETh'NOFORN/FISA

b7A-1 b7E-1, 2
b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2

(U)(~/1®)

- f r o m approximately 2004 - 2007, Page lived in Russia

b7A-1 b7E-1, 2

this time, Page began

business dealings with

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2

TOP SECRET//NOFORN/FISA -13-

17 -cv-597(FBI)-304

TOP ~BCRBTt/NOPORN/FISA (~/001{) According to information provided by Page during . interview with the FB

b7A-1 b7E-1, 2

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2
b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3

TOP SECRETh'NOPOR.l\J/FISA -14-

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TOP SBCRBTNNOFORN/FISA (~/Xm) According to information provided by Page during ~interview with the FBI,

b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-l, 2

bl-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 6

(U) ®fIbm) In or about January 2015, Podobnyy, along with Evgeny Buryakov and Igor Sporyshev, were charged by a sealed complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York for violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 and 951 (conspiring to act, and acting as, an unregistered agent of a foreign government). According to the complaint, Buryakov worked in the United States as an agent of the SVR. Specifically, Buryakov operated under non-official cover, posing as an employee in the Manhattan office of a Russian bank. Buryakov worked with two other SVR agents, Podobnyy and Sporyshev, to gather intelligence on behalf of

TOP SBCRET/INOFORN/FISA -15-

17 -cv-597(FBI)-306

TOP SECRBT//NOPORN/FISA
Russia.8 The complaint states that the intelligence gathering efforts of Podobnyy
and Sporyshev included, among other things, attempting to recruit New York City
residents as intelligence sources for Russia.
bl-1 b3-l b6-2 b7A-l b7C-2 b7E-l, 2

(U) 8 ($'/:NX) Buryakov was arrested in or about January 2015. At the time of Buryakov's arrest, Podobnyy and Sporyshev no longer lived in the United States and . were not arrested. In or about March 2016, Buryakov pled guilty to conspiring to act in the United States as an agent of Russia without providing prior notice to the Attorney General. In or about May 2016, Buryakov was sentenced to 30 months in prison. According to information provided by the Federal Bureau of Prisons, Buryakov was released on March 31,2017.

TOP SECRET//NOPORN/FISA -16-

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TOP S~CR~TNN"O'FORN/FISA

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2

(U) B. (~/NIX) Page's Coordination with Russian Government Officials on 2016 U.S. Presidential Election Influence Activities.
(:lllOOK) According to open source information, in July 2016, Page traveled to

Russia and delivered the commencement address at the New Economic School.9 In

addition to giving this address, the FBI learned that Page met with at least two

Russian officials during this trip. First, according to information provided by an FBI

confidential human source (Source #1),10

that Page had a

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7D-1 b7E-1, 2

-(U)9 (S//)TJf)

b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 4

Source #1 has been

by the FBI. As

b1-1

discussed below in footnote 22, in or about October 2016, the FBI suspended its b3-1

relationship with Source #1 due to Source #l's unauthorized disclosure of

b7A-1

information to the press. Subsequently, the FBI closed Source #1 as an FBI source. b7E-1, 2, 5

Nevertheless, the FBI assesses Source #1 to be reliable as previous reporting from

Source #1 has been corroborated and used in criminal proceedings. Moreover, the

TOP SECRET//N"O'FORN"/FISA -17-

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TOP SBCRBT/INOFORN/FISA

FBI notes that the incident that led the FBI to terminate its relationship with Source #1 occurred after Source #1 provided the reporting that is described herein.

(U) (~/NK) Source #1, who now owns a foreign business/financial intelligence firm, was approached by an identified U.S. person, who indicated to Source #1 that a U.S.-based law firm had hired the identified U.S. person to conduct research regarding Candidate #1's ties to Russia (the identified U.S. person and Source #1 have a long-standing business relationship). The identified U.S. person hired Source #1 to conduct this research. The identified U.S. person never advised Source #1 as to the motivation behind the research into Candidate #1's ties to Russia. The FBI speculates that the identified U.S. person was likely looking for information that could be used to discredit Candidate #1's campaign.

(U)(~~ Source #1 tasked his sub-source(s) to collect the requisite

information. After Source #1 received information from the sub-source(s) described

herein, Source #1 provided the information to the identified U.S.

who had

hired Source #1 and to the FBI.

b3-1 b7A-1 b7D-1 b7E-1, 2

C05//NK) Notwithstanding Source #1's reason for conducting the research

into Candidate #1's ties to Russia, based on Source #1's previous reporting history

with the FBI, whereby Source #1 provided reliable information to the FBI, the FBI

believes Source #1's

herein to be credible.

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7D-1 b7E-1, 2

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7D-1 b7E-1, 2

TOP SBCRBT!/NOFORN/FISA -18-

17-cv-597(FBI)-309

TOP SECRET/lNOFORN/FISA secret meeting with Igor Sechin, who is the President of Rosneft [a Russian energy company] and a close associate to Russian President Putin.12

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7D-1 b7E-1, 2

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7D-1 b7E-1, 2
b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7D-1 b7E-1, 2

b7A-1 b7D-1 b7E-1, 2

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7D-1 b7E-1, 2
12 {:S//NX) In or about April2014, the U.S. Department of the Treasury
(USDOT) announced sanctions that would be taken against Russian Government officials and entities as a result of Russian efforts to destabilize Ukraine. Sechin was identified as an official of the Russian Government, and further identified as the President and Chairman of the Management Board for Rosneft, a position he continues to hold. The USDOT announcement also stated Sechin was formerly the Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation from 2008 until2012, and from 2004 until 2008, Sechin was the Deputy Chief of Staff for Russian President Putin. The USDOT sanctions announcement identified Sechin as someone who has "shown utter loyalty to Vladimir Putin- a key component to his current standing."

TOP SECRETNNOFORN/FISA -19-

17-cv-597(FBI)-310

TOP 8ECRET~lfNOFORN/FISA

that, during the meeting, Page and Sechin discussed future bilateral energy

b1-1

cooperation and the prospects for an associated move to lift Ukraine-related Western b3-1
b7A-1

sanctions against Russia.

b7D-1 b7E-1, 2

(.S//NJO

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-l, 2
b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-l, 2

TOP SECRETNNOFORN/FISA -20-

17 -cv:-597(FBI)-311

TOP SECR.ETt/NOI'OllN/FISA

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2

~~-according to Source Divyekin [who is assessed to be Igor Nikolayevich DivyekinJ,I

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7D-1 b7E-1, 2

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2
b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7D-1 b7E-1, 2

TOP SECR ETt/NOI'OR.N/FISA -21-

17-cv-597(FBI)-312

TOP SBCRETJ/NOFORN/FISA

had met secretly with Page and that their agenda for the meeting included Divyekin raising a dossier or "kompromat"15 that the Kremlin possessed on Candidate #2 and the possibility of it being released to Candidate #1's campaign.16

h1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7D-1 b7E-1, 2

(U) 15 (X) Kompromat is a Russian term for compromising material about a politician or political figure, which is typically used to create negative publicity or blackmail.

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7D-1 b7E-1, 2
b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7D-1 b7E-1, 2

TOP SECRET//NOFORN/FISA -22-

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TOP SECRET//NOFORN/FISA

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7D-1 b7E-1, 2

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7D-1 b7E-1, 2
b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7D-1 b7E-1, 2
b1-1 b3-1 b6-4 b7A-1 b7C-4 b7E-1, 2

b6-4 b7A-1 b7C-4 b7E-1, 2

TOP SBCRBT//NOFORN/FISA
-23-

17-cv-597(FBI)-314

TOP 8BCRBT//NOFORN/FISA

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7D-1 b7E-1, 2

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7D-1 b7E-1, 2

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7D-1 b7E-1, 2

TOP 8ECRETNNOFORN/FISA -24-

17-cv-597(FBI)-315

TOP SECR~TI/NOFORNIFISA

bl-1 b3-l b7A-l b7D-l b7E-l, 2

b7A-l b7E-l, 2
- a July 2016 article in an identified news organization reported that Candidate #1/s campaign worked behind the scenes to make sure Political Party #1/s platform would not call for giving weapons to Ukraine to fight Russian and rebel forces, contradicting the view of almost all Political Party #rs foreign policy leaders in Washington. The article stated that Candidate #11 S campaign sought "to make sure that [Political Party #1] would not pledge to give Ukraine the weapons it has been asking for from the United StateS.11 Further, an August 2016 article published by an identified news organization, which characterized Candidate #1 as sounding like a supporter of Ukraine/s territorial integrity in September [2015], noted that Candidate #1 had recently adopted a "milder// tone regarding Russia1S annexation of
. Crimea. The August 2016 article further reported that Candidate #1 said Candidate
#1 might recognize Crimea as Russian territory and lift punitive U.S. sanctions against Russia. The article opined that while the reason for Candidate #rs shift was not clear, Candidate #1's more conciliatory words, which contradict Political Party #1/s official platform, follow Candidate #1's recent association with several people

TOP SECRETNNOFORNIFISA -25-

17-cv-597(FBI)-316

TOP 8BCRET//NOFORN/FISA

sympathetic to Russian influence in Ukraine, including foreign policy advisor Carter Page.

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2

(~/MK)

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7D-1 b7E-1, 2

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7D-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7D-1 b7E-1, 2, 5

TOP 8BCRET//NOFORN/FISA
-26-

17-cv-597(FBI)-317

TOP SJ;CRJ;TJ./:NOFORN/FISA

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7D-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7D-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

TOP SECRET/fNOFOR:N/FISA -27-

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TOP SI!:CRET,~'NO"FORN/FISA

bl-1 b3-l b6-2 b7A-l b7C-2 b7D-l b7E-l, 2, 3, 6

IV. (U)~//m) Page's Denial of Cooperation with the Russian Government to
Influence the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election. (U) (~00) On or about September 23, 2016, an identified news organization published an article (September 23rd News Article), which was written by the news organization's Chief Investigative Correspondent, alleging that U.S. intelligence officials are investigating Page with respect to suspected efforts by the Russian Government to influence the U.S. Presidential election. According to the September 23rd News Article, U.S. officials received intelligence reports that when Page was in Moscow in July 2016 to deliver the above-noted commencement address at the New Economic School, he met with two senior Russian officials. The September 23rd News Article stated that a "well-placed Western intelligence source" told the news organization that Page met with Igor Sechin, a longtime Putin associate and former

TOP SBCRET/!NOFOR..'"-l/FISA -28-

17-cv-597(FBI)-319

TOP SBCRETJ/:NOFORN/FISA Russian deputy minister who is now the executive chairman of Rosneft. At their alleged meeting, Sechin raised the issue of the lifting of sanctions with Page. According to the September 23rd News Article, the Western intelligence source also reported that U.S. intelligence agencies received reports that Page met with another top Putin aide - Igor Divyekin, a former Russian security official who now serves as deputy chief for internal policy and is believed by U.S. officials to have responsibility for intelligence collected by Russian agencies about the U.S. election.22

22 (~ As discussed above, Source #1 was hired by a business associate to

conduct research into Candidate #1's ties to Russia. Source #1 provided the results

of his research to the business associate, and the FBI assesses that the business

associate likely provided this information to the law firm that hired the business

associate in the first place. Source #1 told the FBI that he/she

this

information to the business associate and the FBI.

bl-1 b3-l b7A-l b7E-l, 2

The FBI does not believe that Source #1 directly provided this information to the identified news organization that published the September 23rd News Article.

(U) (fi/~ In or about late October 2016, however, after the FBI Director sent a letter to the U.S. Congress, which stated that the FBI had learned of new information that might be pertinent to an investigation that the FBI was conducting of Candidate #2, Source #1 told the FBI that he/she was frustrated with this action and believed it would likely influence the 2016 U.S. Presidential election. In response to Source #1's concerns, Source #1 independently, and against the prior admonishment from the FBI to speak only with the FBI on this matter, released the reporting discussed

TOP SECRBT/INOFORN/FISA -29-

17-cv-597(FBI)-320

TOP 8BCRBT/INOFORN/FISA (U) (W/~ According to the September 23rd News Article, certain members of Congress were "taken aback" after being briefed on the alleged meetings between Page and Russian officials and viewed the meetings as a possible back channel to the Russians that could undercut U.S. foreign policy. The September 23~d News Article also stated that, following the briefing, the Senate Minority Leader wrote to the FBI Director, and citing the reports of meetings between an advisor to Candidate #1 [the advisor was unnamed in the letter, but the article indicated that the advisor is Page] and "high ranking sanctioned individuals" [in context, likely a reference to Sechin] in Moscow over the summer as evidence of "significant and disturbing ties" between Candidate #1's campaign and the Kremlin that needed to be investigated by the FBI. (U) (S//NK) Based on statements in the September 23rd News Article, as well as in other articles published by identified news organizations, Candidate #l's campaign repeatedly made public statements in an attempt to distance Candidate #1's campaign from Page. For example, the September 23rd News Article noted that Page's precise role in Candidate #1's campaign is unclear. According to the article, a spokesperson for Candidate #1's campaign called Page an "informal foreign
herein to an identified news organization. Although the FBI continues to assess Source #1's reporting is reliable, as noted above, the FBI closed Source #1 as an active source.

TOP 8BCRBT/INOFORN/FISA -30-

17-cv-597(FBI)-321

TOP SECRET//NOFORN/FISA advisor" who "does not speak for [Candidate #1] or the campaign." In addition, another spokesperson for Candidate #1's campaign said that Page "has no role" and added "[w]e are not aware of any of his activities, past or present." However, the article stated that the campaign spokesperson did not respond when asked why Candidate #1 had previously described Page as an advisor. In addition, on or about September 25, 2016, an identified news organization published an article that was based primarily on an interview with Candidate #1's then campaign manager. During the interview, the campaign manager stated, "[Page is] not part of the campaign I'm running." The campaign manager added that Page has not been part of Candidate #1's national security or foreign policy briefings since he/she became campaign manager. In response to a question from the interviewer regarding reports that Page was meeting with Russian officials to essentially attempt to conduct diplomatic negotiations with the Russian Government, the campaign manager responded, "If [Page is] doing that, he's certainly not doing it with the permission or knowledge of the campaign ...."
b7A-l b7E-l, 2

(U) (jjfBF) On or about September 25, 2016, Page sent a letter to the FBI Director.

TOP SECRETNNOFORN/FISA -31-

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TOP ~ECRE'h41NOFORN/FISA
In this letter, Page made reference to the accusations in the September 23rd News Article and denied them. Page stated that the source of the accusations was nothing more than completely false media reports and that he did not meet with any sanctioned official in Russia. Page also stated that he would be willing to discuss any "final" questions the FBI may have.23
(U)(~/lXTX) Additionally, o:h or about September 26, 2016, an identified news organization published an article that was based on an interview with Page (September 26th News Article). In the September 26th News Article, Page stated that all of the accusations were complete "garbage" and that he did not meet with Sechin or Divyekin. Page also stated that he was taking a leave of absence from his work with Candidate #l's campaign because the accusations were a "distraction."
b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7D-1 b7E-1, 2

TOP SBCRBT,LJNOFORN/FISA -32-

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17-cv-597(FBI)-323

TOP SI!:CRBTJ/NOPORN/FISA
v. ~//xm)
(~/Dm)

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7D-1 b7E-1, 2
b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7D-1 b7E-1, 2, 6

TOP SBCRBT//NOPORN/FISA -33-

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TOP SBCRBT,l/NO"PORN/FISA
(~/~)

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7D-1 b7E-1, 2
b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7D-1 b7E-1, 2

b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3

TOP SECRET//NO"PORN/FISA -34-

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3
17-cv-597(FBI)-325

TOP SECRET//NOFORN/FISA
-

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3
b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

TOP SECRET//NOFORN/FISA -35-

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TOP SBCRBT,lfNOFORN/FISA

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

(S/~

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

TOP SECRET/INOFORN/FISA -36-

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TOP SECRBT//NOFORN/FISA

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

TOP SBCRBT//NOFORN/FISA -37-

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
17-cv-597(FBI)-328

TOP SECRET//NOfORN/FISA

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b?E-1,2,3,6;

TOP SECRET,l/NOFORN/FISA -38-

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(~/NX)

TOP S~CR~T//NOFORN/FISA

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2

TOP SBCRBT//NOFOR.l\t/FISA -39-

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17-cv-597(FBI)-330

TOP SBCRBT//NOPORN/FISA

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

TOP SBCRBT//NOPORN/FISA -40-

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TOP SECRET/lNOFORN/FISA

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

TOP SECRETHNOFORN/FISA -41-

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TOP SBCRBT/INOFORN/FISA

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

TOP SBCRBT//NOFORN/FISA -42-

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TOP SBCRBT//NO:PORN/FISA

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2
b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2

TOP SBCRBT//NO:PORN/FISA -43-

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TOP SBCRET//NOFORN/FISA

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7D-1 b7E-1, 2

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7D-1 b7E-1, 2

TOP SECRETh'NOFORN/FISA
-44-

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TOP SECRBVlNOFORN/FISA

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7D-1 b7E-1, 2
b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

TOP SECRET//NOFOR:N/FISA -45-

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TOP SECRET//NOFORN/FISA

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

(~/~

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

TOP SECRET//NOFORN/FISA -46-

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TOP S~CR~Tf/NO~ORN/FISA

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

TOP SBCRBT//NO~O~~/FISA -47-

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TOP SECRET//NO"FORN/FISA

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1,2,3,6 '
b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

TOP SECRET/-/NO"FORN'/FISA -48-

b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-2
17-cv-597(FBI)-339

TOP SBCRBT//NOFORN/FISA

bl-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-l, 2, 3, 6

(U) G. (i/J;Nf) Page's Letter to the U.S. Department of Justice. ~//'NE) In or around February 2017, Page sent a letter to the U.S. Department
of Justice, Civil Rights Division, Voting Section, urging the review of what Page claimed was "severe election fraud in the form of disinformation, suppression of dissent, hate crimes and other extensive abuses led by members of [Candidate #2' s] campaign and their political allies last year." In his letter, Page claims that he has

TOP SBCRBT/INOFORN/FISA -49-

17-cv-597(FBI)-340

TOP S~CR6T//NOFORN/FISA
not directly supported a political campaign since September 2016, but continues to be subjected to personal attacks by former members of Candidate #2's campaign based on fictitious information. Page wrote that his academic lecture and related meetings with scholars and business people in Moscow had no connection to the U.S. election. Page attributes the assertions in the September 23rd News Article that Page met with two senior Russian officials (i.e., Sechin and Diveykin) while he was in Moscow in July 2016 to give the commencement address at the New Economic School, which Page claims is "false evidence," to Candidate #2's campaign. Page further claims that the information relied on by Candidate #2's campaign, certain members of the U.S. Congress, and the media are lies that were completely fabricated by Candidate #2's paid consultants and private investigators.
b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2

TOP SBCRBTI/NOFORN/FISA -50-

17 -cv-597(FBI)-341

TOP SECRETilNO:FORN/FISA

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2

TOP SECRETh'NO:FORN/FISA -51-

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TOP SECRETNNO:PORN/FISA

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2
b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2

(~/N}i)

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2

TOP SBCRET//NO:PORN/FISA -52-

17-cv-597(FBI)-343

TOP S~CRBTJ./NOFORN/FISA

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2
b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2
b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

TOP SBCRBT//NOFORN/FISA -53-

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TOI' S~CRETI/NOPORN/FISA
(Sf~)

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2

TOP S~CRETI/NOFORN/FISA -54-

17-cv-597(FBI)-345

TOP SECRET//NOFORN/FISA

bl-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2
b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7D-1 b7E-1, 2

-

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

TOP SBCRBTJ/NOFORN/FISA -55-

17-cv-597(FBI)-346

TOP SECR"gTh'NOFORN/FISA

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b?E-1, 2, 3, 6

(S//~

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b?E-1, 2, 3, 6

TOP S~CR~T//NOFORN/FISA -56-

17-cv-597(FBI)-347·

(S//NI')

TOPs~CRET'I'Y :.NOPORN/FISA

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2

VII. (S)

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7D-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 4, 6

T O P SB-C-R-E~4'1'NOFORN/FISA
-57-

17-cv-597(FBI)-348

TOP SBCRBT//NOFORN/FISA

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7D-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 4, 6
b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7D-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-2, 4

TOP SBCRETNNOFORN/FISA -58-

17-cv-597(FBI)-349

TOP ~~CR~T//NOFORN/FISA
(~ (S//~

b1-1 b6-2 b3-1 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7D-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

TOP ~~CRBTI/NOPORN/FISA -59-

17-cv-597(FBI)-350

TOP SECRET/INOFORN/FISA

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

TOP SECRET//NOPORN/FISA -60-

17-cv-597(FBI)-351

TOP SECRBT/-/NOFORN/FISA

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

(!.)

b1-1

b3-1

b6-2

b7A-1

b7C-2

b7E-l, 2, 3, 6

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2

TOP SECRET//NOPORN/FISA -61-

17-cv-597(FBI)-352.

TOP S~CIU~T,llNOFORN/FISA
(i)
(-$//~)

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
bl-1 b3-l b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1,2,3,6

bl-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-l, 2, 3, 6

TOP 8~CRBT//NOFORN/FISA -62-

17-cv-597(FBI)-353

TOP SECRET,l/NOPORN/FISA

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

TOP SECRET//NOPORN/FISA -63-

17-cv-597(FBI)-354

TOP SECRETNNOFORN/FISA

h1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

(Si'/Ni)

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

VIII. (U) Conclusion.

(U) (9(~) As discussed above, the FBI believes that Page has been collaborating

and conspiring with the Russian

b7A-1 b7E-1, 2 Based on the

foregoing facts and circumstances, the FBI submits that there is probable cause to

believe that Page

TOP SECRET//NOFORN/FISA -64-

17-cv-597(FBI)-355

TOP S~CRET//NOFORN/FISA

knowingly engage in clandestine intelligence activities (other than intelligence gathering activities) for or

b7A-1 b7E-1, 2

on behalf of such foreign power, or knowingly conspires with other persons to

engage in such activities and, therefore, is an agent of a foreign power as defined by

50 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(2)(E).

(U) OOruF)

the FBI submits that there is probable cause to believe that such activities involve or are about to involve violations of the criminal statutes of the United

b7A-1 b?E-1,.2

-
(U) ~)

b7A-1 b7E-1, 2

I
(i)

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

TOP SECRET//NOFORN/FISA -65-

17-cv-597(FBI)-356

TOP SECRETilNOFORN/FISA

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

b1-1

b3-1

(:1)

b7A-1

b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

~) b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

(~-

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

TOP SBCRBTNNOFORN/FISA -66-

17-cv-597(FBI)-357

TOP S~CR~T/!NOFORNIFISA
(1)

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
(X)
b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

TOP S~CRETl/NOFORNi'FISA
-67-

17-cv-597(FBI)-358

TOP eECRET//NO:PORN/FISA (i)

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

(S)
b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
(~
(~ b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

TOP SECRET//NO:PORN/FISA -68-

17-cv-597(FBI)-359

TOP SJ!CRET//NOFORN/FISA
-
-
(i)

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1,2,3,6:
b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

TOP SBCRET//NOFORN/FISA -69-

1T-cv-597(FBI)-360

TOF SECRET//NOFORN/FISA
-
~)
I

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

4. (i) Proposed Minimization Procedures As to all information acquired

through the authorities requested herein, the FBI will follow -

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

TOF SECRET//NOFORN/FISA
-70-

17-cv-597(FBI)-361

TOP SBCRBT,l/NOPORNIFISA
I

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-2, 3

I
(~
(U)

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-2, 3
b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

TOP SBCRBT//NOPORN/FISA -71-

17-cv-597(FBI)-362

TOP 8ECRET//NOFORN/FISA

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
(~

b1-1

b3-1

b7A-1

(~

b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

TOP 8ECRET//NOFORN/FISA -72-

17-cv-597(FBI)-363

TOP SBCRBT//NOFORN/FISA

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

5. (~ Nature of the Information Sought Through the authorities requested herein, the United States is seeking foreign intelligence information with

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2 3, 6

respect to the activities of the target described above and detailed further in the

certification set forth below. As indicated by the facts set forth herein, the FBI is

seeking foreign intelligence information that relates and is necessary to the ability of

the United States to protect against clandestine intelligence activities by an

intelligence service or network of this foreign power or by agents of this foreign

power, and information with respect to a foreign power or foreign territory that

relates and is necessary to the national defense, security, and the conduct of the

foreign affairs of the United States. These same authorities may also incidentally

acquire other foreign intelligence information, as defined by the Act.

(~
b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

TOP SBCRBT//NOFORN!FISA -73-

17-cv-597(FBI)-364

TOP SECRET//NOPORN/FISA (S)

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

- (S)

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

TOP SECRET//NOPORN/FISA -74-

17-cv-597(FBI)-365

TOP SBCRBTI/NOFORN/FISA

6. (X) Certification The certification of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs or an Executive branch official duly designated by the President as a certifying official in Executive Order

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

amended, is set forth below.

~)

b1-1

b3-1

b6-2

b7A-1

b7C-2

~)

b7E-1, 2, 7

(U) The Purpose of the Authorities Requested (~ The FBI's foreign intelligence goals for this investigation are set forth in the certification of the Executive Branch official contained herein. However, the authorities requested in this application may produce information and material which might, when evaluated by prosecutive authorities, constitute evidence of a

TOP SECRETI/NOFORN/FISA -75-

17-cv-597(FBI)-366

TOP SEC~TI/NOPORN/FISA

violation of United States law, and this investigation may result in an eventual

criminal prosecution of the target. Nevertheless, as discussed in the certification, at

least a significant purpose of this request

-

is to collect foreign intelligence information as part of the FBI's investigation

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

of this target.

I ~)

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

I CX)

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

TOP SECRET//NOPORN/FISA
-76-

17-cv-597(FBI)-367

. TOP SBCIU:TIINOPORN/FISA

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

9. (SQ Duration of the Authorities Requested (See

The authorities requested should not automatically terminate when foreign

b1-1 b3-1

b7A-1 intelligence information has first been obtained. Additional information of the same b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

type will be obtained on a continuous basis throughout the entire period requested.

The activities which the United States must identify and monitor are incremental

and continuous, and communications relating to such activities are often disguised

to appear innocuous. The type of foreign intelligence information being sought and

the fact that the activities of this target are ongoing preclude the conclusion that, at a

given time, all such information has been obtained and collection can be ended.

Accordingly, the United States requests the authorities specified herein for a period

of ninety (90) days.

II~>

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2

TOP SECRETHNOPORN/FISA
-77-

17-cv-597(FBI)-368

TOP SBCRBTh'NOPORN/FISA

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2
(~
b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2

TOP SBCRBT/lNOPORN/FISA -78-

17-cv-597(FBI)-369

TOP S"8CR"8T//NO~ORN/FISA

b1-l b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2
b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-2, 6
b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-2, 6

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

TOP SECRET//NOFORWFISA -79-

17-cv-597(FBI)-370

TOP SI!:CRET//NOFORN/FISA

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

-

b1-1 b3-1

b7A-1

b7E-l, 2, 3, 6

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

TOP SECRETI/NO:FORN/FISA -80-

17-cv-597(FBI)-371

TOP SECRBTh'NOFORN/FISA
(i)
II

bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
bl-1 b3-l b7A-1 b7E-l, 2, 3, 6

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

TOP SBCRBTNNOFORN/FISA -81-

17-cv-597(FBI)-372

TOP SBCRBTh'NOFORN/FISA
(U) t;f)) Specific Authorities Requested Based upon the foregoing information, the United States requests that this Court authorize the FBI to conduct-the activities described immediately below for the period requested herein.

(£)

•

b1-1 b3-1

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b7E-1,2,3,6 ,

b1-l b3-l b7A-l b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

b1-1

•

b3-l b6-2 b7A-l b7C-2

b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

TOP SBCRBT//NOFORN/FISA -82-

17-cv-597(FBI)-373

TOP SBCRBTh'NOFORN/FISA
• (£)

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

• (£)

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

TOP SBCRBTNNOFORN/FISA -83-

17-cv-597(FBI)-374

. (~)

TOP SI!;CRI!;T//NOPORN/FISA

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

• (i)

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

b1-1

b3-1

•

b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2

b7E-l, 2, 3, 6

TOP SECRET/INOFORN/FISA -84-

1?-cv-597(FBI)-375

TOP S~CRET//NO:PORN/FISA
.(X)

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b?E-1, 2, 3, 6
b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

• (SO

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b?E-1, 2, 3, 6

TOP S~CRET//NO:PORNIFISA -85-

17-cv-597(FBI)-376

TOP s-gc&-gT,L/N"0¥0RN/FISA (X) (X)

b1-1 b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

~)
b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

TOP 8ECRETNNOFORN/FISA -86-

17-cv-597(FBI)-377

TOP S~CR~TN:NOPORN/FISA
I I I
I
-
I I

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
(
b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

TOPS- ~C-~-T~'',:NOFOR:N/FISA
-87-

17-cv-597(FBI)-378

TOP SJ!,CRI!:T//NOI'ORW/FISA
I I I

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b?E-1, 2, 3, 6

I

b1-1

b3-1

b7A-1

b?E-1, 2, 3, 6

(U) ($:.) The FBI has reviewed this verified application for accuracy in accordance with its AprilS, 2001 procedures, which include sending a copy of the draft to the appropriate field office(s). A copy of those procedures was previously provided to the Court.

----- The remainder of this page is intentionally left blank. -----

TOP SECRBTh'NOFORN/FISA -88-

17-cv-597(FBI)-379

TOP SECRBT//NOFORN/FISA

(U) VERIFICATION

(S) I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing information

regarding Carter W. Page is true and correct. Executed pursuant to Title 28, United

States Code,§ 1746 on

'""

bl-1 b3-l b7A-l

Federal Bureau of Investigation

b6-l b7A-l b7C-l

TOP SBCRET//NOFORN/FISA -89-

17-cv-597(FBI)-380

TOP SBCRBT//NOFORN/FISA
(U) CERTIFICATION (~ I, the undersigned, having been designated as one of the officials
authorized to make the certifications required by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended, do hereby certify with regard to th~
d in this verified application targeting
bl-1
Carter W. Page, an agent of the Government of Russia, a foreign power, as follows: b3-1 b7A-1
(A) (U) The information sought through the authorities requested herein is b7E-l, 2, 3, 6
foreign intelligence information.
(B) (U) At least a significant purpose of the authorities requested herein is to
obtain foreign intelligence information and, notwithstanding the related criminal
matters described in this application, the primary purpose of the authorities
requested herein is not to obtain information for the prosecution of crimes other
than those referred to in the Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1801(a)-(e), or related to such foreign
intelligence crimes.
(C) (U) The foreign intelligence information sought by the authorities
hl-1
requested herein cannot be reasonably obtained by normal investigative techniques. b3-l b7A-l b7E-l, 2, 3, 6
(D) ~) The type of foreign intelligence information being sought through the
authorities requested herein is that described in 50 U.S.C. § 1801(e)(l)(C), i.e.,

TOP 5ECRBT//NOFORN/FISA -90-

17 -cv-597(FBI)-381

TOP S}i;CRBT#NOPORN/FISA information that relates and is necessary to the ability of the United States to protect against clandestine intelligence activities by an intelligence service or network of this foreign power or by agents of this foreign power, and 50 U.S.C. § 1801(e)(2)(A)-(B), i.e., information with respect to a foreign power or foreign territory that relates and is necessary to the national defense or security, and the conduct of the foreign affairs of the United States. These same authorities may also incidentally acquire foreign intelligence information as defined by other subsections of 50 U.S.C. § 1801(e).
b1-1 (E) (~ The basis for my certification that the information sought is the type b3_1
b7A-1 of foreign intelligence information specified herein and that such information cannot b7E-l, 2, 3, 6 be obtained by normal investigative techniques is as follows.
b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2
TOP 8ECRET//NOPORN/FISA -9117-cv-597(FBI)-382

TOP SI;CR~Th'NOPORN/FISA

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-l, 2

. ~)

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2
b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-l, 2

TOP SBCRBT//NOFORN/FISA -92-

17-cv-597(FBI)-383

TOP 8~CR~T//NOFORN/FISA (:$)

bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-l, 2, 8

(U) (S)

b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-l, 2

TOP 8BCRET//NOFORN/FISA
-93-

17-cv-597(FBI)-384

TOP SBCRBTNNOPORN/FISA (S)

b6-2 b7A-l b7C-2 b7E-l, 2
b6-2 b7A-l b7C-2 b7E-l, 2
bl-1 b3-l b7A-l b7E-l, 2, 3

TOP SBCRBTJ/NOPORN/FISA -94-

17"'CV-597(FBI)-385

TOP SBCRBT/-/NO:PORN/FISA (S)

bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3

(~
b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-l, 2, 3

TOP SECRET//NOfORN/FISA -95-

17-cv-597(FBI)-386

TOP SBCRli:TI/NO~ORN/FISA
(S)

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-l, 2, 3

~)
bl-1 b3-1 b7A-l b7E-1, 2, 3

~)
TOP SBCRBT/INO~ORNIFISA

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-l b7E-1, 2, 3

-9617-cv-597(FBI)-387

TOP S~CR~~OI'ORN/FISA

b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3

(i)

b1-1

b3-1

b7A-1

b7E-1, 2, 3

(U) (:i) Based upon the foregoing information, it is the Government's belief that the authorities requested herein targeting Page are critical investigative means for obtaining the foreign intelligence information identified herein.

TOP SBCRBT//NO:FORN/FISA
-97-

17-cv-597(FBI)-388

TOP SECRETH-NOFORNIFISA (S) Accordingly, I execute this certification regarding Carter W. Page in accordance with Lhe requirement..;; of lhe f()reign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended.

Director Federal Bureau of Investigation
An~
Deputy Director Federal Bureau oi Investigation
Michael Pompeo Director of the Central Intelligence Agency
Daniel R. Coats Director of National Intelligence

Rex Tillerson Secretary of State
John}. Sullivan Deputy Secretary of Stale
James N. Mattis Secretary of Defense
H.R. McMaster Assistant to the President for National Securily Affairs

Principal Deputy Director of National [ntelligence
Da
TOP S6CIUITJ/NOFORNIFISA -98-

bl-1 b3-l b7A-l

17-cv-597(FBI)-389

TOP e"BCR~TI/NOI'ORN/FISA
(U) APPROVAL (U) (X) I find that this application regarding Carter W. Page satisfies the criteria and requirements for such applications set forth in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended, and hereby approve its filing with this Court.
(S)
bl-1 b3-l b7A-l b7E-l, 2, 6

TOP SECRETI/NOI'ORN/FISA -99-

17-cv-597(FBI)-390

TOP SECRET!/NOFORNIFISA
(I) Accordingly, I approve the filing of this application regarding Carter
W. Page with the
bl-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1

TOP SECRiT//NO~ORNIFISA
-100-

17-cv-597(FBI)-391

'Jllt sren~:';'t!i PPQAN/WA
~WHEREFORE, the United States submits that this application regarding Carter W. Page satisfies the criteria and requirements of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended, and therefore requests that this Court aut11orize the activities described herein, and enter the proposed orders and warrants which accompany this application.

Respectfully submitted, U.S. Department of Justice

b6-3 b7A-1 b7C-3

-101-

17-cv-597(FBI)-392

SECRET

All Information is considered

UNITED STATES

JUN 1112017

unclassified except where otherwise shown

leeAnn Flynn Hall C!e k

FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT

' r ot Court

Classify By: J23J98T32 Reason: (C)

b1-1

WASHINGTON, D. C.

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D0 e6r-iv2e0d 1Fr7omDe:c=F~B-nI-:::-;-­ IN

. PAGE, A U.S.

b7A-1
Docket Number: b1-1

PERSON

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PRIMARY ORDER AND WARRANT

1. An application having been made by the United States of America

pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended, 50

u.s.c. §§

or the Act), for an order and warrant

(hereinafter "order")

and full

consideration having been given to the matters set forth therein, the Court finds b1-1

as follows:

b3-1 b7A-l

2. The application has been made by a Federal officer and approved by the b?E- 1, 2, 3, 6

Attorney General;

3. On the basis of the facts submitted in the verified application, there is

probable cause to believe that:

Derived from: Declassify on:

SECRET

-Application to the USFISC
in Docket Number captioned above

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17-cv-597(FBI)-393

S"8CR"ET (A) The Government of the Russian Federation (Russia) is a foreign power and Carter W. Page is an agent of Russia, as defined by

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4. The minimization procedures proposed in the application have been adopted by the Attorney General and meet the definition of minimization procedures

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5. The application contains all statements and certifications required by. and the certification is not clearly erroneous on the basis
of the statements made

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any other information furnished

WHEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, pursuant to the authority conferred on this Court by the Act, that the application of the United States is GRANTED, and it is

FURTHER ORDERED, as follows:

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1. The United States is authorized to cond the target as follows;

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17 -cv-597(FBI)-395

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17 -cv-597(FBI)-396

SECRET

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17-cv-597(FBI)-397

6BCRBT

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17-cv-597(FBI}-398

8BC~T

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b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

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17-cv-597(FBI)-399

S'BCR'BT

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I I I

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SBCRBT
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17 -cv-597 (FBI)-400

S~CR~T
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I I
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b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6
17-cv-597(FBI)-401

SECRET

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b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

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SECRET
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17-cv-597(FBI)-402

S~CR~T
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S~CR~T
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17-cv-597(FBI)-403

S~CR~T

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6. The authorities approved are for the period indicated below unless otherwise ordered by this Court.

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As to all information acquired through the authorities approved herein, the FBI shall follow

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S~CR~T
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17 -cv-597(FBI)-404

SBCRBT
I
I

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b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6

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17-cv-597(FBI)-405

S"ECRBT
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S"ECRHT -14-

17-cv-597(FBI)-406

SBCRBT

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SBCRBT
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17-cv-597(FBI)-408

SECRBT

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SBCRBT -17-

17 -cv-597(FBI)-409

-

SECRBT

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17-cv-597(FBI)-411

on the Signed

SI!:CRI!:T

Carter W. Page expires at-Eastern Time

day of September, 2017.

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06--201._

Date

Time

Eastern Time

Judge, nited States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court

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 </s> U.S. District Court Southern District of New York (Foley Square) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:18−cv−02054−AT

CLOSED,ECF

The New York Times Company et al v. Department Of Justice Assigned to: Judge Analisa Torres Cause: 05:552 Freedom of Information Act
Plaintiff

Date Filed: 03/07/2018 Date Terminated: 08/09/2018 Jury Demand: None Nature of Suit: 895 Freedom of Information Act Jurisdiction: U.S. Government Defendant

The New York Times Company

represented by David Edward McCraw The New York Times Company (10018) 620 Eighth Avenue New York, NY 10018 (212) 556−4031 Fax: (212) 556−1009 Email: mccraw@nytimes.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Charlie Savage

represented by David Edward McCraw (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V. Defendant Department Of Justice

represented by Andrew Edward Krause United States Attorney's Office, SDNY 86 Chambers Street, 3rd Floor New York, NY 10007 (212) 637−2769 Fax: (212) 637−2786 Email: andrew.krause@usdoj.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 03/07/2018
03/07/2018 03/07/2018
03/07/2018
03/08/2018

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT against Department Of Justice. (Filing Fee $ 400.00, Receipt Number 0208−14781435)Document filed by The New York Times Company, Charlie Savage.(McCraw, David) (Entered: 03/07/2018)
2 CIVIL COVER SHEET filed. (McCraw, David) (Entered: 03/07/2018)
3 RULE 7.1 CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT. Identifying Other Affiliate Grupo Financiero Inbursa, S.A.B. de C.V. for The New York Times Company. Document filed by The New York Times Company.(McCraw, David) (Entered: 03/07/2018)
4 REQUEST FOR ISSUANCE OF SUMMONS as to Department of Justice, re: 1 Complaint. Document filed by Charlie Savage, The New York Times Company. (McCraw, David) (Entered: 03/07/2018)
CASE OPENING INITIAL ASSIGNMENT NOTICE: The above−entitled action is assigned to Judge Analisa Torres. Please download and review the Individual Practices of the assigned District Judge, located at http://nysd.uscourts.gov/judges/District. Attorneys are responsible for providing courtesy copies to judges where their Individual Practices require such. Please download and review the ECF Rules and

03/08/2018
03/08/2018 03/08/2018 03/09/2018 03/16/2018 03/19/2018
03/19/2018
04/09/2018 04/10/2018
04/13/2018 05/18/2018 08/03/2018 08/09/2018 08/09/2018

Instructions, located at http://nysd.uscourts.gov/ecf_filing.php. (laq) (Entered: 03/08/2018)
Magistrate Judge Stewart D. Aaron is so designated. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 636(c) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 73(b)(1) parties are notified that they may consent to proceed before a United States Magistrate Judge. Parties who wish to consent may access the necessary form at the following link: http://nysd.uscourts.gov/forms.php. (laq) (Entered: 03/08/2018)
Case Designated ECF. (laq) (Entered: 03/08/2018)
5 INITIAL PRETRIAL CONFERENCE ORDER: Initial Conference set for 4/2/2018 at 10:20 AM in Courtroom 15D, 500 Pearl Street, New York, NY 10007 before Judge Analisa Torres. (As further set forth in this Order.) (Signed by Judge Analisa Torres on 3/8/2018) (cf) (Entered: 03/08/2018)
6 ELECTRONIC SUMMONS ISSUED as to Department Of Justice. (pc) (Entered: 03/09/2018)
7 NOTICE OF APPEARANCE by Andrew Edward Krause on behalf of Department Of Justice. (Krause, Andrew) (Entered: 03/16/2018)
8 LETTER MOTION to Adjourn Conference currently scheduled for April 2, 2018 addressed to Judge Analisa Torres from Andrew E. Krause dated March 19, 2018., LETTER MOTION for Extension of Time to File the parties' joint pre−conference letter and proposed scheduling order addressed to Judge Analisa Torres from Andrew E. Krause dated March 19, 2018. Document filed by Department Of Justice.(Krause, Andrew) (Entered: 03/19/2018)
9 ORDER granting in part and denying in part 8 Letter Motion to Adjourn Conference; granting in part and denying in part 8 Letter Motion for Extension of Time to File. GRANTED in part, DENIED in part. The initial pretrial conference scheduled for April 2, 2018 is ADJOURNED to April 16, 2018, at 11:40 a.m. The parties shall file their joint letter and proposed scheduling order by April 9, 2018. (Initial Conference set for 4/16/2018 at 11:40 AM before Judge Analisa Torres.) (Signed by Judge Analisa Torres on 3/19/2018) (cf) (Entered: 03/19/2018)
10 LETTER addressed to Judge Analisa Torres from David E. McCraw dated 04/09/2018 re: Parties' joint letter proposing schedule. Document filed by Charlie Savage, The New York Times Company.(McCraw, David) (Entered: 04/09/2018)
11 MEMO ENDORSEMENT on re: 10 Letter filed by The New York Times Company, Charlie Savage. ENDORSEMENT: GRANTED. By May 18, 2018, the Government shall file a status letter. By July 20, 2018, the Government shall finish producing all responsive, non−exempt documents on a rolling basis. By August 3, 2018, the parties shall file a joint status letter. The initial conference scheduled for April 16, 2018 is ADJOURNED sine die. (Signed by Judge Analisa Torres on 4/10/2018) (cf) (Entered: 04/10/2018)
12 ANSWER to 1 Complaint. Document filed by Department Of Justice.(Krause, Andrew) (Entered: 04/13/2018)
13 STATUS REPORT. Document filed by Department Of Justice.(Krause, Andrew) (Entered: 05/18/2018)
14 JOINT LETTER addressed to Judge Analisa Torres from Andrew E. Krause dated August 3, 2018 re: status letter, in accordance with April 10, 2018 scheduling order (Dkt. No. 11). Document filed by Department Of Justice.(Krause, Andrew) (Entered: 08/03/2018)
15 PROPOSED STIPULATION AND ORDER. Document filed by Charlie Savage, The New York Times Company. (McCraw, David) (Entered: 08/09/2018)
16 STIPULATION AND ORDER OF SETTLEMENT AND DISMISSAL: In exchange for The Times's agreement to dismiss this action, DOJ agrees to provide to The Times any documents responsive to The Times's FOIA Request that are released in related actions. Further, DOJ agrees to provide to The Times any publicly−released Vaughn Index from these same actions. The parties' agreement fully settles any and all claims

The Times now has or may hereafter acquire against DOJ or the United States of America (the "United States"), or any department, agency, officer, or employee of DOJ and/or the United States, related to or arising out of Plaintiffs' FOIA Request at issue in this action. This action is hereby dismissed with prejudice, with each party to bear its own fees and costs, provided that the Court shall retain jurisdiction over any issues that may arise relating to this Stipulation and Order. (Signed by Judge Analisa Torres on 8/9/2018) (tn) (Entered: 08/09/2018)


[CONTENT] The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act | FISA | the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court |||  |||  ||| up to 90 days ||| the Civil Rights Litigation Clearinghouse | FISA ||| January 29, 2018 | the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI | the Nunes Memo | FISA | Carter Page | the Trump Campaign | September 2016 ||| The Nunes Memo | Donald Trump | February 2, 2018 ||| October 21, 2016 | the Department of Justice | the Federal Bureau of Investigations | FBI | FISC | Carter Page ||| three ||| February 6, 2018 | Adam Goldman | Charlie Savage | the New York Times | Carter Page ||| Misc ||| 18-01 | Clearinghouse ||| March 7, 2018 | Charlie Savage | the New York Times Company | the U.S. District Court | the Southern District | New York ||| the Department of Justice | the Freedom of Information Act | FOIA | FISC | Carter Page ||| July 21, 2018 | FOIA ||| Carter W. Page | Clearinghouse ||| August 9, 2018 ||| Times | DOJ | Times | Times | FOIA Request ||| August 9, 2018 | United States | Analisa Torres |||  [SUMMARY] The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) requires the government to obtain a warrant from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) before it may conduct any domestic electronic surveillance to acquire foreign intelligence information. The warrant applications are made ex parte and must include a sworn statement by a federal officer of the facts and circumstances relied upon to justify the government's belief that the target of surveillance is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power. Once a FISC judge receives a warrant application, the judge can order approval of the surveillance only if the judge finds that there is probable cause to believe that the target of the electronic surveillance is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power. Because the orders only authorize surveillance up to 90 days, the government must file an application for an extension that meets the same requirements as the initial warrant application and obtain a renewal order from the FISC for continued surveillance. For the Civil Rights Litigation Clearinghouse collection of FISA matters, see our <a href="http://www.clearinghouse.net/results.php?searchSpecialCollection=20">special collection</a>.

On January 29, 2018, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) voted to disclose a memorandum (the Nunes Memo) revealing existence of a FISA warrant for the electronic surveillance of Carter Page, who served as a onetime foreign policy advisor to the Trump Campaign until September 2016. The Nunes Memo was declassified by President Donald Trump on February 2, 2018. The Nunes Memo revealed that on October 21, 2016, the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) sought and received a probable cause order from the FISC authorizing electronic surveillance on Carter Page. The Nunes Memo further disclosed that in addition to the initial warrant application, the government had received three renewal orders from the FISC.

On February 6, 2018, reporters Adam Goldman and Charlie Savage, along with the New York Times, filed a motion in the FISC for release of all court records, including opinions and application materials, in reference to the surveillance of Carter Page. See Misc. 18-01, <a href="https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=16844">NS-DC-0126</a> in this Clearinghouse.

On March 7, 2018, reporter Charlie Savage and the New York Times Company also filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. The plaintiffs sued the Department of Justice (DOJ) under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) for the same documents they requested in their FISC motion: the release of all documents regarding the surveillance of Carter Page.

On July 21, 2018, the DOJ produced redacted documents it considered responsive to the FOIA request. See In re Carter W. Page, <a href="https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=17114">NS-DC-0127</a> in this Clearinghouse.

On August 9, 2018, the parties stipulated to settle their claims. In exchange for The Times's agreement to dismiss this action, the DOJ agreed to provide to the Times any additional documents responsive to The Times's FOIA Request that are released in any related actions. On August 9, 2018, United States District Judge Analisa Torres approved the settlement. The case is now closed.