Case 1:00-cv-02116-FAM Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/14/2000 Page 1 of 60

UNITED STATES DISTRICT

31 FOSTER CHILDREN on behalf

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

of themselves and all other Children in Florida Foster Care

CASE NO.:

-; I
--. ! . t

Plaintiffs,
v.

COMPCLAIINVT ..F.~wR\~~~f~~~TORY

JEB BUSH, as Governor of the State of Florida, KATHLEEN KEARNEY,

AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF CLASS ACTION

as Secretary of the Florida

Department of Children and Families,

-- and District Administrators

, CHUCK BATES~ ~

JOijN AWAD,

ESTER T, IBBS,/

LEE JOHNSON, LYNN RICHARD, DON DIXON,

ROBERT MORI~ FRAN GlBBONS, PAUL' BROWN,

/

PHYLLIS SC, OTT, CHARLES AUSLANDER,
CHRISTINE DAVENPORT, PATRICK HOWARD,

SUE GRAY and BUDDY CLINE,

Defendants.
________________________________ !

Plaintiffs, 31 Foster Children, on behalf of themselves and all other Children in Florida Foster Care, sue Defendants Jeb Bush, as Governor of the State of Florida, Kathleen Kearney, as Secretary of the Florida Department of Children and Families [DCAF], and District Administrators Chuck Bates, John Awad, Ester Tibbs, Lee Johnson, Lynn Richard, Don Dixon, Robert Morin, Fran Gibbons, Paul Brown, Phyllis Scott, Charles Auslander, Christine Davenport, Patrick Howard, Sue Gray and Buddy Cline, and allege:

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I. INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT 1. This is an action for declaratory and injunctive relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Americans with Disabilities Act including 42 U.S.C. §12133. 2. This suit addresses the failure of the Defendants to follow the law relating to the children in Florida foster care, and the harm caused by the resulting abuse and neglect of the children by the Defendants.
II. JURISDICTION 3. Because this is an action in which the matter in controversy arises under the constitution and the laws of the United States, this Court has jurisdiction over this controversy pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§1331 and 1343. 4. This action arises under 42 U.S.C. §1983 and the Americans with Disabilities Act to redress the Defendants' deprivation under color of state law of the rights, privileges and immunities secured to Florida's foster children by the Constitution and laws of the United States and Florida. The federal rights sought to be redressed are guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 5. This Court also has jurisdiction pursuant to 28
u.s.c. § 2201 and 2202, as Plaintiffs also seek a judgment
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declaring Plaintiffs' rights and injunctive and other equitable relief.
III. PLAINTIFFS 6. Approximately 14,000 children are presently in foster care in Florida; the children's lengths of stay and excess lengths of stay are set forth on the attached schedule [Exhibit A]. 7. The named plaintiffs are acting on behalf of themselves and of the children abused, neglected, and financially exploited by Florida's foster care system, including the 14,000 foster children currently in the Defendants' custody. 8. Plaintiff Ashleigh Abbott is in foster care in Broward County DCAF/District 10. Now 5 years old, she has been illegally held in "emergency shelteru since March 1998, more than 2 years, without having been adjudicated dependent as to her custodial parent, who has denied any abuse or neglect of her. Although she has significantly deteriorated in DCAF's custody and is now functioning at only 50% of her capacity, the defendants continue to use her as a pawn in battling with her custodial parent and have stated they will keep her in foster care, in an unsuitable detrimental institutional setting condemned by her dependency court
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guardian ad litem, until her parent "gives up, gives out or gives in". She brings this action through her next friend Brenda B. Shapiro.
9. Plaintiffs Two Forgotten Children are two Dade County DCAF/District 11 sisters held by the State of Florida in foster care since 1986, when they were 4 and 2 years of
age. They have never been placed for adoption. In fact,
despite adoption being recommended several times, they are still not even available for adoption because the Defendants', contrary to law, have made no efforts to terminate the parental rights of their non-present father.
During their 14 years in Florida's foster care system, the girls have been subjected to rapes, beatings and neglect. The older girl was given syphilis when she was nine years old. They have been wrongly separated from each other. Their minds have been damaged by years of psychotropic medications administered with the State's approval for the convenience of their caretakers. They have been locked up for years needlessly in restricted, locked facilities and held there as virtual captives, to the financial gain of the facilities and DCAF.
The older girl, now 18, has a permanent mental disability severe enough that in approximately 1994 DCAF
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applied for and obtained federal disability benefits for her, then intercepted the resulting federal funds as representative payee; thereafter DCAF then wrongly denied her access to the independent living program because of State-caused disabilities and the fact she had no savings due to DCAF's taking her federal SSI funds. Although of mixed Hispanic descent, the girls were labeled and treated as Black children, and discriminated against in their multiple placements and DCAF's denial of timely access to real permanency. The girls are acting through their guardian ad litem Brenda B. Shapiro.
10. Foster Child #93-15027 is an 11-year-old Dade County child who has languished in foster care for years. Separated from her siblings for no reason, she finally had parental rights terminated, and was then placed for adoption with a licensed foster family, the father of which already had a criminal record for sexually abusing children. The child lived nearly 12 months in that house, subjected to unspeakable abuse before criminal charges were instituted against the foster father. A suitable adoptive parent has now been found, but the Defendants are capriciously and arbitrarily refusing to let the child have a real family. The child is separated from her siblings, is devastated and is suffering greatly.
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She brings this action through her guardian ad litem Kristi Kassebaum.
11. Plaintiff 14-year old Ashley Rhodes-Courter spent nine years in Florida's foster system, being moved 14 different times. She was periodically separated from her brother, Plaintiff J.J. No proper diligent search was timely done for a suitable relative placement, although it was discovered years after the fact that an appropriate aunt was willing to care for Plaintiff Ashley. Conversely, one of Ashley's placements was with an unsuitable relative who had previously had his own children taken from him.
DCAF District 6/Hillsborough County DCAF kept Ashley for nearly a year at an over-crowded foster home where the foster children were subjected to beatings and horrible sadistic abuse, including hot sauce applied to the tongue, faces dunked in the toilet bowl and kept there until the child gasped for breath, and to beatings and ridicule. Plaintiff J.J. spent even longer at the same overcrowded abusive house. When the child abuse "Hotline" was called, DCAF ignored the abuses, exonerated the foster parents and kept the home open, allowing the foster parents to keep custody of children who had been removed from their own families for neglect or for much less serious abuse than that being inflected in the
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foster homes. Ashley brings this action through her adoptive
parents and next friends Gay and Philip Courter; J.J. brings
this action through his next friend Mary Miller. 12. Plaintiffs Two Sisters from Manatee County have been
involved with Florida's foster care system since 1986, when they were 4 and 2. Their father's parental rights were terminated in 1987; their mother was having trouble maki11g ends meet as a recently divorced single parent with few job skills. Instead of providing services, DCAF convinced her to instead surrender the girls so they could be adopted and have a better life.
The adoptive parents handpicked by DCAF were abusive beyond imagination. The girls were subjected to innumerable beatings and other bizarre torture, including being tied to the bed by wrists and ankles, being made to sleep on concrete surrounded by a brick cage at night, and punished if the two girls spoke to each other or any one else. DCAF's Hotline received several calls reporting the abuse, including calls in 1990, 1993, 1994 and 1997 before finally taking the girls back into foster care in March 1997 after a total of 10 years of what DCAF itself called egregious abuse. Since then, DCAF chose not to even attempt to seek a permanent family for the girls, moving them from one unsuitable placement to another.
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In 1999, a guardian ad litem located the girls' natural mother who asked to adopt the girls. Although DCAF had no other options [and was not even looking for an adoptive placement for the girls], DCAF initially objected to either of the girls even having contact. When the girls asked to be adopted by their mom and step-dad, DCAF fought strenuously against the adoption for months but provided not even a single written reason to support its objection.
The official DCAF permanency goal for the younger girl continued for more than three years to be the oxymoronic "long term foster care", clearly contrary to law. Also contrary to law, there was no case plan in effect for the younger girl for several months, even though DCAF was obligated to provide proper case management services and received federal and state funds for case management services it was not providing. In December 1999, DCAF said a case plan would be done after the December judicial review; it was not submitted until June 1, 2000, a clear violation of state and federal law.
For several months DCAF also failed to provide the children and their counsel with copies of court papers, further violating the girls' due process rights. It is not known at this time what has happened to the room and board funds the federal government is paying DCAF to keep the
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younger child in long term foster care - the natural mom and step-dad are taking no money. The girls bring this action through their next friend Donald Hadsock.
13. Natalie and Nathan are two young Monroe County children taken by the defendants into foster custody and held there more than six months [200 days] without any adjudication of dependency ever being entered. During their stay as foster children, the caretakers provided by defendants neglected the children and failed to provide proper care. The defendants held the children in foster placements with persons unknown to them although perfectly suitable relatives were available and willing to care for the children during any time out of home care was necessary. This is another case where the defendants and their department used the children as leverage to try to make parents admit to abuse or neglect which did not happen, ignoring the illegality of such conduct and the unfair violation of the children's rights resulting from such tyrannical conduct. The children bring this action through their parents Carrie and Nick Nowatney.
14. Plaintiff Omar D. is an Orange County/District 7 youngster who was taken from his mother years ago, due to alleged neglect, and placed with an unsuitable adoptive parent who routinely neglected the child and his siblings. A flight
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attendant, the adoptive mother frequently left the children alone with no adult supervision. When home, she often abused the child and his siblings. DCAF failed to properly investigate multiple Hotline calls about the abuse before finally removing the child and his siblings from the home.
In the next foster home, the child was again subjected to multiple incidents of abuse and neglect. When DCAF finally decided to do a proper investigation, they found that the foster father had a criminal background involving child abuse and had had that background before being licensed as a foster parent. DCAF also found DCAF District 10 licensed the foster father anyway and neglected to advise DCAF District 7 of the foster father's criminal child abuse background when the family had relocated from Broward County to Orlando. DCAF District 7 had placed the already abused and traumatized child in the foster home without any background check or risk assessment of it. The child brings this action through his next friend Betty J.
15. Plaintiff P.D.B. is a 16-year-old Palm Beach County foster child under DCAF supervision from 10 days of age until age 10, then in foster care since age 10. Since age 10, he was moved more than 18 times, and has been denied a good
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permanent family. He brings this action through his guardian ad litem Kathleen Fayette.
16. Plaintiff R.C. is a 13-year-old Palm Beach County child kept by DCAF in a temporary shelter for more than 12 months. She brings this action through her mother.
17. Plaintiffs T.C. and C.C. are Palm Beach County DCAF/District 9 children placed by DCAF in a abusive foster home in Belle Glade, where they were beaten and kept in a closet; additionally plaintiff C. C. was sexually abused. DCAF "investigated" its foster parents, covered up the wrongdoing and kept the foster home open. The children bring this
action through their mother V.J.
18. Plaintiff foster child M.I. is two years old. He was neglected in a foster home in Palm Beach County, and had to be taken to the hospital before receiving treatment or care. He brings this action through his mother B.C.
19. District 9 Plaintiff S.M. is a 16-year-old who has spent virtually her entire life in foster care. The child and her brother had been placed in one foster home for two years, and had bonded to the good, loving foster parents. When the natural parents' rights were terminated and the children became available for adoption, DCAF illegally denied the foster parents' request to adopt the children. DCAF then
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separated the child from her brother, and both children continued to be held in foster care limbo. DCAF ignored recommendations of the child's guardian ad litem and instead required her to be adopted by an unfit, inappropriate mother whom DCAF no longer licenses as a foster parent. The child has continued to be placed in an ever increasing number of placements and was held unlawfully for 12 months [rather than 72 hours] at the crisis unit of a residential treatment center before being officially placed in a residential treatment center in June 1999, where she remains to this day, generating still more fees for the facility. She brings this action through her guardian ad litem.
20. Plaintiff C.W. is a 12-year-old child who has been held in a temporary shelter in District 9 since May 1999, even though the Defendants know the placement is inappropriate for her and for the other children there. She brings this action through her mother.
21. Plaintiff T.M. is a 14-year-old foster child wrongly separated from her siblings. District 9 DCAF has placed her in several different unsuitable placement including places where she has been neglected and places where she was not wanted. In one foster home she was one of 8 children DCAF placed in the house, violating the S-child maximum. Her
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attempts to be properly placed were ignored, and DCAF took her to a home where the foster mother had already told DCAF the child was not wanted, and left her there after dark, only to be told to leave by the foster mother, even though the neighborhood was not a safe one. She brings this action through her mother L.M.
22. Plaintiffs L.S. and L.S. are two fostPr children in the Defendants' custody in Palm Beach County. Born in 1991 and 1993 respectively, the girls have been in foster care since March 1995. DCAF did not perform a proper diligent search to locate suitable caretakers and incorrectly told an uncle that relatives are not allowed to adopt. DCAF placed the girls in an inappropriate place. DCAF ignored complaints about the placement and kept the children there for years even though it was known to be a more appropriate placement for teenage girls rather than young children. The girls were traumatized by DCAF's inappropriate handling of their case, and by the several years delay in being moved to a good permanent family. They bring this action through their guardian ad litem Barbara Wilt.
23. Plaintiff H.S. is a 16-year-old Palm Beach County foster child. In 1996, when he was 12 years old, his mother passed away and his father turned him in to DCAF, claiming he
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was not the child's biological father. DCAF has neither located any natural father nor any good permanent substitute father. He has been moved from place to place, missed more than one month of school, having spent many days in DCAF's office rather than in school. He has inadequate clothing, and has been completely neglected by Defendants. Contrary to law, DCAF has not provided him with a guardian ad litem. Ire brings this action through his personal attorneys, Michelle Hankey, Barbara Burch, John Walsh and James Walsh.
24. Plaintiff foster child L.G. was taken into Palm Beach County foster care as a young infant. The child was neglected and failed to thrive in an inappropriate foster house. By age 13 months, the child was still not on solid food and was kept in her crib the majority of her time. The pediatrician could not effectively treat the child because the DCAF workers who took the child to the doctor's office provided no information about the child. Although an adoptive home was located, DCAF has not yet provided the child with permanency. She brings this action through her guardian ad litem Al Mann.
25. Plaintiff T.G. is a 9 year old District 9 foster child. She has been in four different foster houses in the past three years. She has seen her four siblings only once
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during the past year. In her current DCAF selected placement, the children sleep in a room attached to a converted garage. There is no air conditioning in the children's room, although the foster parent sleeps in the main house which does have air conditioning. The child is not being fed properly. In a prior placement, she was subjected to physical abuse by the foster mother, including having her arm twisted behind her back and her nose twisted. She brings this action through her guardian ad litem Al Mann.
26. Plaintiff J.G. is a 14 year old Ocala boy who spent several years in Hillsborough foster care. He and his sister Plaintiff H.B. were taken into foster care when DCAF claimed they were being neglected because their parents' house was messy. Their parents would not capitulate to DCAF's charges and were ultimately exonerated. Meanwhile, the children were held for years in abusive, neglected foster houses.
Plaintiff J.G. was sexually abused; both Plaintiffs were subjected to bizarre punishments. DCAF either ignored Hotline calls reporting the abuse or conducted an investigation designed to exonerate the foster parents and keep the overcrowded abusive house open. Because the house was kept open, even more children suffered even more abuse, all
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because of the Defendants' tolerance of foster system abuse. These Plaintiffs bring this action through their parents.
27. Plaintiff Lauren C. will be two years old in July 2000. While in foster care, she was placed in an abusive, neglected foster placement in Flagler County where she was subjected to repeated abuses. The traumatic brain injuries inflicted upon this child by DCAF's designated foster parents have left her partly paralyzed and with impaired vision and speech. She brings this action through her attorney ad litem Rhoda Goodson.
28. Plaintiff DCAF/District 1 Walton County sisters Jennifer and Beronica are two foster children now 17 and 15 years of age held in foster care for more than 3 years and harmed and abused in at least three placements. When they reported the abuse, they were not listened to. When they ran from the still abusive foster homes, pick up orders were issued because DCAF had put these children in a situation where they had to choose between being abused or violating a court order that required them to stay where DCAF put them. They bring this action through their next friend Brenda B. Shapiro.
29. Plaintiffs R.B. and R.B. are 13 year old District 9 Twins. They have been stuck in foster care since 1997.
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Suitable relative caretakers in other states were never contacted. One of the children has a cleft palate and other medical needs which the Defendants have neglected to do anything about. They bring this action through their attorney/guardian ad litem John Walsh.
IV. DEFENDANTS 30. Defendant Jeb Bush is the Governor of the State u£ Florida, the head of the Executive Branch of government and the person responsible proper operation of the foster system and for the hiring and continued employment of Kathleen Kearney, Secretary of the State of Florida Children and Families Services [''DCAF"], Defendant Bush is sued in his official capacity. By law, Defendant Bush is responsible for supervising Defendant Kearney. He is also responsible for the proper administration of DCAF, proposing a proper budget for DCAF to the legislature and assuring that DCAF operates in conformity with the law and State plans submitted to the federal government allowing state qualification for funding under Title IV of the Social Security Act, under the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment and Adoption Reform Act, and the Adoption and Safe Families Act.
Defendant Bush is also responsible under State law for seeing that DCAF complies with the mandatory provisions of
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Chapter 39, Florida Statutes and Chapter 65c of the Florida Administrative Code relating to dependency cases, foster care and termination of parental rights, and is responsible for ensuring that DCAF protects the federally protected civil rights of the foster children in state care. Additionally, since his inauguration in January 1999, Defendant Bush has personally directed the operation of Florida's foster Cdre system and dictated the actions to be taken by the other defendants in the operation of Florida's foster care system in a manner contrary to law and proper, competent professional standards.
31. Defendant Kathleen Kearney is Secretary of the Department of Children and Families of Florida. She is sued in her official capacity. Under Florida law, Defendant Kearney is responsible for supervising, directing, organizing, planning, administering and executing the functions of DCAF and for seeing that DCAF performance is in compliance with federal law to qualify for appropriate funding under Title IV, and for operating the foster care system in such a way as to protect the lives, safety, health and rights of the children held by Florida in foster care. In this role, she serves at the pleasure of and subject to the direction of Defendant Bush.
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32. Defendants Bates, Awad, Tibbs, Johnson, Richard, Dixon, Morin, Gibbons, Brown, Scott, Auslander, Davenport, Howard, Gray and Cline are the District Administrators of DCAF's districts 1 through 15, respectively. They are sued in their official capacities and under color of state law. They serve at the pleasure and direction of Defendants Kearney and Bush; each servPs as the local official in charge in each of the 15 DCAF districts to see that the children in Florida foster care are free from harm and properly cared for while in state foster custody. They also have the legal duty to see that the foster care system is operated in accordance with federal and Florida law. They are each also obligated to see that proper professional standards and judgment are exercised in determining and providing for the protection, familial and permanency needs of the children in the temporary custody known as foster care, and to see that the system is not operated recklessly or with deliberate indifference to the needs, safety, lives and rights of Florida's foster children.
33. At all times and in all respects relevant to the claims herein, Defendants Bush, Kearney and District Administrators were acting in their official capacities and under color of state law.
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V. CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS 34. Plaintiffs bring this action on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated pursuant to Rule 23(a) and 23 (b) (2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The class consists of all children currently in the custody of the Florida foster care system. 35. Every child in foster care is directly impacted by the Defendants' deficient operation of Florida's foster care system. Florida's foster care system has been described as the worst for children in America by the National Coalition for Child Protection Reform. As operated, the Florida foster care system is the single biggest abuser, neglecter and exploiter of children in Florida. Children who have the misfortune of being taken into Florida's foster care system routinely have their rights trampled upon and are likely to be harmed by the experience. 36. This action qualifies as a class action pursuant to Rule 23(b) in that:
a. There are presently approximately 14,000 children currently in Florida foster care, including more than 6,300 Black children. Many of these children have been in foster care longer than the legally established limit. Many of these children are being held in emergency
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shelter status for longer than 30 days without having being adjudicated dependant. The named plaintiffs are representative of all foster children who have been abused, neglected or financially exploited in foster care and all children currently in foster care, regardless of whether they have been adjudicated dependent.
b. The Plaintiff class of children in Florida foster care is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. Even joinder of the more than 6,300 Black children is impracticable. Further, throughout the state, there are hundreds of cases where parental rights should have been terminated but termination proceedings have not been timely begun by DCAF. Additionally, thousands of children have been improperly assigned a permanency goal of long term foster care, which damages the children by denying them good permanent families and allowing the children to be further financially exploited by the Defendants and their providers, and increases the risk of further abuse and neglect.
c. With each passing day, the number of children who have been too long in foster care increases.
d. Each of the class members is in the physical custody and legal custody of DCAF and is and has been
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adversely affected by the overcrowding in foster care and by DCAF's failure to comply with the foster care time limits, and its obligation to provide proper services to those it keeps in care.
e. The questions of law and fact involved in this case are common to the class and the claims of the plaintiffs are typical of the claims of the other class members.
f. The representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interest of the class. They bring this action through their well-qualified representatives, including guardians ad litem, parents and next friends. They are represented by geographically diverse, competent counsel including board certified civil trial lawyers with experience in class action litigation as well as child advocacy.
g. The Defendants have acted and refused to act on grounds generally applicable to all members of the class, making appropriate final injunctive relief and corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole.
h. The questions of law or fact common to members of the class will predominate over any other questions
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affecting only individual members. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. There are questions of law and fact common to the class which include:
1. All members of the class are in Defendants' legal and physical custody;
2. All members of the class are currently being denied or are at risk of being denied their constitutional right to safety, receipt of care consistent with competent professional judgment and the protections afforded to them under Florida law and the Florida Administrative Code as a result of Defendants' placement of them in overcrowded, unsupervised foster homes, shelters, and other residential facilities with other unscreened, foster children;
3. Defendants have subjected all members of the class to imminent and substantial risk of harm due to the neglectful, abusive, violent, and/or dangerous conditions in Florida's foster care system;
4. Defendants have failed to monitor the care of
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all members of the class and to ensure by proper caseworker visitation that their placements are safe;
5. Defendants have subjected all class members to the substantial risk of truancy and its associated harms;
6. Defendants have subjected all members of the class to the risk of being allowed to remain on the street after they have left their placements and their location is known to Defendants thereby exposing them to the dangers of homelessness and a lack of supervision;
7. Defendants have acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making injunctive relief with respect to the class as a whole an appropriate remedy; and
8. Defendants have treated and continue to treat children of color differently, with resulting harm. i. To the extent Defendants are the legal custodian of these children, they have an inescapable inherent conflict of interest and are not in a position to bring this action against the Defendants or the Department itself on behalf of these children.
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j. All members of the class seek to vindicate [through 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and, to the extent pertinent, the Americans with Disabilities Act] rights, privileges and immunities that are secured to them by Title IV of the Social Security Act, the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment and Adoption Reform Act, and the related Florida foster care program, the Americans with Disabilities Act, The Adoptions and Safe Families Act and the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
VI. STATEMENT OF FACTS 37. Under federal law, Florida's foster care system must provide services to effectuate the child's return to the natural parents in not more than 12 months, if such reunification can be done safely and consistent with the child's best interests. If reunification cannot be accomplished, the foster care system is obligated to petition for termination of parental rights and, simultaneously, concurrently locate and approve a qualified adoptive family.
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38. As of January 13, 2000, dependent children stay in Florida foster care for an average of 34.1 months nearly three times the legal limit established in federal and state law.
39. Children in Florida foster care generate funds for the Florida foster care system and for outside contract providers to whom the Defendants, inappropriately, give total control and deference over a child's length of stay with a particular provider.
40. The Defendants are not operating Florida's foster care system properly, for the appropriate purpose of providing children with the requisite good permanent homes as quickly as possible. The Defendants routinely hold children in emergency shelter care longer than the maximum of 2 months allowed by law and excessively overuses an oxymoronic "permanency" goal of long term foster custody, which keeps the children in the system rather than finding adoptive families. This overuse of long term foster custody maximizes federal revenue for DCAF and its allies, job security for DCAF workers and rewards contract providers with payments for the foster children who contrary to law - are not moved toward real permanency and who suffer harm while being held as virtual hostages by the Defendants.
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41. Defendants operate the foster care system with a much greater tolerance for child abuse committed by their own foster parents, group home parents and institutional personnel who benefit financially from the children's stay in foster care than they show toward children neglected or abused outside the system by their own parents.
42. The Defendants know Florida's foster care syslem operationally discriminates against Black children in several ways. The Defendants know Florida's foster care system treats Black children differently in taking them into foster care, moving them to permanency and keeping them in the system. There is a disproportionate number of Black children taken into foster custody, a disproportionately longer time before Black children become available for adoption, and longer lengths of stay in foster care for Black children. The Defendants know and have known for years that Florida's foster care system treats children believed to be Black differently than other children.
43. The Defendants know that the longer children are in foster care, the more likely they are to be abused by their DCAF-approved custodians or others in the DCAF-selected placements.
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44. The Defendants know the longer a child is in foster care, the more placements and schools the child will be moved to, and the more harm the child is likely to suffer.
45. The Defendants also routinely violate the due process rights of foster children not providing them a guardian ad litem or attorney and by engaging in ex parte proceedings with the dependency court, by not serving court papers on the child or the child's attorneys, by excluding the child [and the child's attorney, if there is one] from permanency staffings, by not moving the children to permanency timely, and by subjecting foster children to abuse, neglect, bizarre punishments, over-crowded, dangerous placements, separation from their siblings, excessive placement and school changes, and an unacceptable high risk of harm arising from the Defendants' unlawful manner of operating the Florida foster care system.
46. The Defendants have acknowledged the Adoptions and Safe Families Act requirement that children are not to remain in foster care longer than 12 months, yet have admitted that the vast majority [72.3%] of children in Florida's foster care system have been there longer than 12 months and have indicated they are not complying and will not comply with the 12 month legal limit. Exhibit A sets forth the percentage of
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foster children who have already been in care longer than 12 months. Nearly 80% of the more than 6,000 Black children in foster care have been held by the Defendants for more than the legally permissible limit of 12 months; 68% of the more than 6,000 White children stuck in foster care limbo have been there longer than the 12 months limit.
47. As a result of being kept longer in the system Lhan they should be, the children overflow the Defendants' foster facilities, causing further overcrowding and greater risk of harm and increasing the likelihood of the abuse, neglect and financial exploitation of these children.
48. As the result of their illegally excessive foster care confinement with its associated harm and devastating lack of permanence, the plaintiff children have been harmed physically and mentally, are not developing properly and are being subjected to other cruel yet foreseeable abuses inflicted upon them by others in the foster care system.
49. The problems of foster care programs in Dade County are neither new nor surprising. In 1978 a Grand Jury in Dade County looked into the unacceptable dysfunction of the District 11 foster care system. [Final Report of the Grand Jury, "1978 Report", p. 29].
29

Case 1:00-cv-02116-FAM Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/14/2000 Page 30 of 60
50. The 1978 Grand Jury found that 36% of the children studied had been in foster care for more than five years. The Grand Jury noted DCAF's contention that large numbers of foster children were unadoptable but found that the large number of children denied permanency was more likely due to the fact that DCAF's perception functioned as a self-
non-aggressive efforts to return foster children to their natural parents or place them in adoptive homes.
51. As a 1989 Grand Jury Report reflected 11 years later, the situation in 1989 [11 years ago] showed no noteworthy improvement from the 1978 situation.
52. The 1978 Grand Jury was troubled by the apparent drift of many foster children from home to home, particularly those in long term placement, and the State was - in 1978! directed to increase its efforts to promote stability and placement. It did not.
53. The 1989 Grand Jury again deplored the fact that the lack of stability and delay in termination of parental rights continued. The 1989 Grand Jury also noted the continuing lack of good residential and group foster homes in the community, finding the same problems as the 1978 Grand Jury.
30

Case 1:00-cv-02116-FAM Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/14/2000 Page 31 of 60
54. In January 1995, a grand jury in Palm Beach County released its report, finding that
Children alleged to be abused, neglected or abandoned in Palm Beach County are at significant risk for further abuse if they are taken into the custody of the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. January 13, 1995 Grand Jury Report, p. 1. The Grand Jury also re-recommended areas of changes first urged in the December 14, 1993 report of the Fifteenth Circuit Grand Jury, and asked for a statewide Grand Jury, which has still not been convened by Defendants. Indeed, the only known statewide quality assurance review was conducted in 1994, finalized in 1995; Defendants have provided no quality control assessment since. 55. The State of Florida has consistently disregarded its obligations toward the innocent abused and neglected victims who languish, almost invisibly, in DCAF placements. The invisibility is due, at least in part, to DCAF's subversion and misuse of the confidentiality protecting certain court records to protect itself from scrutiny. 56. In the late 1980's, DCAF received an additional nearly $2 billion annually, raising the budget by nearly 50% from $4.1 billion to nearly $6 billion. In the early 1990's the legislature provided more than another $100 million in additional funding for the specific purpose of addressing the deficiencies in the foster care system acknowledged in January
31

Case 1:00-cv-02116-FAM Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/14/2000 Page 32 of 60
1992. Although the then-Secretary claimed that the funds improved the system by reducing the foster care population by 10% since 1991, increasing the number of case workers 56% and increasing the number of children successfully placed for adoption, as of January 1995, there remained at least 5,782 children in DCAF's care too long, some 50% of the children in ''.i.nventory" as of that time.
Today, although even more additional funds have been budgeted, 9,366 children [more than 70% of all children in care as of January 2000] have been held there too long, benefiting only DCAF and its providers. Of greater concern is the increase in length of stay numbers despite the larger numbers of children just coming into the system, which influx has brought the average lower than it would otherwise have been.
57. The problems faced by children in foster care are both epidemic and long-standing. The Defendants have failed to discharge their legal responsibilities to these children.
58. Defendants for years have attempted to excuse or justify the failure to comply with the maximum time limits by claiming to not be able to find adequate adoptive homes and foster homes. For thousand of children Defendants do not even look for families. This lack of real permanency has resulted,
32

Case 1:00-cv-02116-FAM Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/14/2000 Page 33 of 60
inter alia, in foster children being deprived of their rights to the opportunity to seek a healthy parent substitute through the adoption process and to finally enjoy a healthy permanent home. Further, if the system had functioned properly since this administration took office in January 1998, the 9,673 present long-termers would no longer be DCAF children, but
families. 59. Continued overcrowding and inadequately supervised
foster homes expose foster children to the very real risk of sexual and other abuse and neglect while they remain wards of DCAF.
60. The deficient foster care conditions and the excessive time spent in foster care are known to the Defendants but have not been addressed properly by the Defendants. In fact, DCAF has deliberately used a providerfocused system, concentrating on the department, its workers and its outside providers, and ignoring state and federal law as to its obligations to the children. DCAF and the Defendants have also intentionally misused the long term foster care permanency goal and have ignored the right of children to permanent families outside of State custody, keeping the children in the system and exploiting the
33

Case 1:00-cv-02116-FAM Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/14/2000 Page 34 of 60
children's presence to provide revenue maximization for the department and its providers.
61. The Defendants know that Florida's foster care system discriminates against Black children, but have taken no action to remedy the shameful situation.
62. The Defendants know that the confidentiality provisions in state and federal law are intended to protect the child and family, yet warp and twist the confidentiality provision to protect DCAF and its providers, and to cover up DCAF's chronic disregard of the abuse of foster children in DCAF-approved placements, as well as DCAF's flagrant chronic violation of the length of stay laws and the rights of children and their attorneys to their own records.
63. The Defendants know that their revenue maximization increases if a child is abused and broken by the foster care system to the point the child is eligible for federal disability benefits, because the Defendants know DCAF intercepts such federal funds and uses them for itself.
64. The Defendants know that Florida's independent living system violates the rights of disabled children because DCAF's interception of a disabled child's funds precludes disabled foster children from meeting the savings criteria
34

Case 1:00-cv-02116-FAM Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/14/2000 Page 35 of 60
capriciously, irrationally and unfairly insisted upon by DCAF as a precondition to being considered for independent living.
65. The Defendants know that the longer they subject a foster child to the inhumane conditions that comprise Florida's foster care system, the more likely the child is to become a truant child, then a delinquent child. Notwithstanding this knowledge, the Defendar1t~ cunlinue to exploit Florida's foster children, exposing them to unspeakable horrors with no real families to provide needed moral or emotional support.
66. To the extent the Defendants have wrongly delayed in providing services and/or giving the children good permanent homes because of any disability or unlawful racial discrimination, the failure constitutes illegal and impermissible discrimination violative of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and
42 u.s.c. § 12132.
67. Defendants' failure to comply with the mandatory termination requirements of the controlling plan constitutes gross neglect and deliberate indifference to their obligations to the children whose custody has been entrusted to them.
68. The Defendants have knowingly: a) Allowed children in foster care to be placed in
overcrowded, inadequate or otherwise unsuitable foster
35

Case 1:00-cv-02116-FAM Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/14/2000 Page 36 of 60
homes; b) Failed to properly monitor and supervise the
foster children entrusted to them; c) Intentionally chosen to keep foster children in
State custody for longer than legally allowable; d) Created excessive caseloads for the foster
c a s e w o r k e r s by i g n o r i n g l e g a l +- ..: --- , ..: ........ ...: +- - ..... - +-l.-.. .... 1 .............. -+- \... ,.., ~ L.Llllt:: .L.Llll.LLL> Ull Lllt:: .Lt::l1'::jL11 U.L
foster care permissible; e) Failed to take the action necessary to provide
foster children with the adoptive, permanent, stable, healthy environment to which they are constitutionally and legally entitled no later than twelve months after being adjudicated dependent.
f) Improperly utilized excessive medications including, but not limited to Ritalin, Thorazine, Benadryl, Paxil and Lithium, and placed children in more restrictive placements than necessary rather than securing appropriate permanent homes and families, further violating the children's rights and subjecting the children to increasingly severe psychological damage.
g) Knowingly violated the provisions currently in Chapter 65C of the Florida Administrative Code mandating the actions for Defendants to take to provide properly for
36

Case 1:00-cv-02116-FAM Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/14/2000 Page 37 of 60
these children. h) Failed to operate Florida's foster care system in
a manner consistent with the competent professional judgment.
69. The Defendants' acts are such improper deprivations of proper shelter and environment as to constitute child abuse and neglect. Such grossly uegligent treatment of the foster children in question constitutes child abuse and neglect and violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment and the childrens' basic due process rights to be free from governmental harm under the Federal and State Constitutions.
70. By their culpable negligence and their failure to comply with Florida law, the Florida Administrative Code and their failure to operate the system consistent with competent professional judgment, the Defendants have caused Plaintiff class members to be denied their due process rights and to be deprived of necessary safe shelter and have permitted the infliction of physical, mental and psychological injuries to be inflicted on members of the Plaintiff class, contrary to the provisions of section 827.04, Florida Statutes and the children's federal and State rights.
71. As a direct and proximate result of the Defendants
37

Case 1:00-cv-02116-FAM Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/14/2000 Page 38 of 60
conduct, Plaintiffs have been deprived by State action, under color of State law, and without any due process of their right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment and of their rights to the benefits guaranteed to them under Federal and Florida law and the Fourteenth Amendment.
72. Defendants' failure to provide children in their custody with reasonably safe placements, care that is consistent with competent professional judgment, and the protections afforded to them by Florida Statutes and the Florida Administrative Code have caused these children to suffer harm which is often more severe than that which caused them to be removed from the custody of their parents and or custodians and which will leave them with long-lasting physical and emotional wounds more serious than any injuries caused by their families.
VII. FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF: SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS Plaintiffs reallege the allegations of paragraph 1
through 72, and further allege: 73. Defendants have denied Plaintiffs' right to
substantive due process by, inter alia: a. Detaining non-adjudicated children for
excessive lengths of time in emergency shelter status
38

Case 1:00-cv-02116-FAM Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/14/2000 Page 39 of 60
in an attempt to convince non-abusive, non-neglectful parents to falsely stipulate to a dependency adjudication.
b. Providing a foster care environment not consistent with competent professional judgment;
c. Failing to comply with the State plan for permanency following 12 months of foster care;
d. Unreasonably restraining Plaintiffs liberty by keeping them isolated from their siblings and a permanent environment;
e. Causing their emotional conditions to worsen by ignoring the maximum 12 months time limit on the amount of time a child can be kept in foster care, thereby further overcrowding facilities and overloading the case workers assigned;
f. Denying the children the permanence of safe natural or adoptive families in violation of the children's right to be properly and safely parented;
g. Subjecting the children to excessive medication and placements other than the least restrictive placement, constituting inappropriate invasive control tactics violative of the children's rights;
h. By holding non-dependent children in emergency
39

) ) Case 1:00-cv-02116-FAM Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/14/2000 Page 40 of 60
shelters for more than 30 days, causing harm and deterioration.
i. By ignoring the clear intent of Congress and Florida's legislature that no child spend more than 12 months in foster care and by not aggressively and diligently pursuing proper reunification efforts with those parents with whom the children could be bctfely reunified, and not promptly pursuing good adoptive placements, the Defendants' gross neglect has predictably resulted in these children failing to thrive and has subjected them to unacceptable and improper psychological pressure and, in far too many instances, physical abuse.
j. The Defendants have wrongly interfered with the children's guaranteed access to education and fail to provide for the proper education of the children retained in foster care, acting in gross disregard of the children's rights under federal and state law to a proper.
k. Retaining Plaintiffs in foster care under the circumstances existing constitutes cruel and unusual punishment contrary to the provision of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
40

Case 1:00-cv-02116-FAM Do)cument 1 Entered on FLSD Docket)06/14/2000 Page 41 of 60
1. By ignoring the 12 month time limit imposed by federal and Florida law, the Defendants have essentially imprisoned the Plaintiffs and kept them from having the liberty necessary to enjoy a normal childhood, with a permanent, stable healthy environment.
m. By illegally discriminating on the basis of ethnic and racial background.
n. By operating the foster care system for the financial benefit of DCAF and its providers while abusing and neglecting the children, contributing to their dependency and, in some cases, to their delinquency. 74. Defendants' policies, practices, acts and omissions in operating Florida's foster care program constitute a failure to provide Plaintiffs with reasonably safe placements and protection from harm while in state custody in violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. 75. Defendants' policies, practices, acts and omissions in operating Florida's foster care program constitute failure to provide Plaintiffs with care that is consistent with competent professional.judgment in violation of the due
41

Case 1:00-cv-02116-FAM Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/14/2000 Page 42 of 60
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
WHEREFORE Plaintiffs seek the relief set forth herein.
VIII. SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF: PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS Plaintiffs reallege the allegations of paragraphs 1
through 72 and further allege: 76. Defendants' policies, practices, acts and
omissions in operating Florida's shelter and foster care programs, in contravention of the Florida statutory and regulatory scheme which mandates that officials follow guidelines and take affirmative actions to ensure the welfare and well-being of children in foster care, deprives Plaintiffs of their liberty interest in personal safety in violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
WHEREFORE Plaintiffs seek the relief requested herein.
VIIII. THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF: EQUAL PROTECTION Plaintiffs reallege paragraphs numbered 1 through 72 and further allege:
42

) Case 1:00-cv-02116-FAM D)ocument 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/14/2000 Page 43 of 60
77. As clearly reflected in Exhibit A, the Defendants treat Black children differently than other children in every aspect of Florida's foster care system.
78. As a result of the Defendants' actions in not properly operating the foster care system, the Defendants are illegally treating children of color as second class citizens and denying these children the protection of the laws to which they are entitled.
WHEREFORE Plaintiffs seek the relief requested herein.
REMEDY AT LAW INADEQUATE 79. Each day that the Defendants delay their compliance with the controlling law, foster children are damaged. There is no plain, adequate or complete remedy at law. Plaintiffs will continue to be irreparably injured by the Defendants' policies, practices, acts and omissions until and unless this Court grants the injunctive relief requested. 80. With each day that Defendants delay their compliance with the law, continue their unlawful custody of members of the Plaintiff class, and continue confining Plaintiffs in inadequate, temporary, unstable foster homes, Plaintiffs are being harmed and losing valuable rights for which there is no adequate remedy at law for damages and can only request this
43

) Case 1:00-cv-02116-FAM Do)cument 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/14/2000 Page 44 of 60
Court to immediately order the Defendants to stop their unlawful activity and to immediately begin complying with the provisions of federal and Florida laws.
RELIEF REQUESTED Plaintiffs request that the Court order that this action be maintained as a class action pursuant to Rule 23, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiffs request the Court to declare unlawful the Defendants' policies and practices of ignoring federal and Florida laws and the Florida foster care plan with the result of denying Plaintiffs and the Plaintiff class the benefits to which they are entitled under the plan. Plaintiffs further request the Court to provide temporary injunctive relief and a permanent injunction requiring the Defendants to operate the foster care system in accordance with the laws in effect, and the procedural and substantive due process and equal protection rights of the children. The injunction should:
A. As to any child in emergency shelter status longer than 30 days for whom no adjudication of dependency has yet been entered, require the Defendants to immediately return the child to the parent or other suitable relative caretaker with no
44

) Case 1:00-cv-02116-FAM Do)cument 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/14/2000 Page 45 of 60
further delay. B. Immediately order the Defendants to promptly
initiate termination proceedings or otherwise provide children with permanency in all cases more than 12 months old without reunification having been already safely completed.
C. Require the Defendants to immediately cease the excessive medication of children being held by them in foster care and to reevaluate the appropriateness of forcing children to take mind-orbehavior-altering drugs rather than providing them with the permanent, nurturing families the children are entitled to.
D. Whenever possible, require the Defendants to stop changing the children's house placements from one school's boundary area to another when the child has adjusted to the school and is learning.
E. Require the Defendants to provide a minimum of two hours per month direct contact between nonabusive siblings, in addition to allowing liberal sibling telephone and letter writing access to each when the Defendants do not place the children in the same placement.
45

) ) Case 1:00-cv-02116-FAM Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/14/2000 Page 46 of 60
F. Require the Defendants to immediately comply with the S-child per house maximum to end the overcrowding and unacceptable increased risk of harm;
G. Prohibit the Defendants from paying for case management relating to any foster child in care for more than 30 days for whom there is no case plan in effect;
H. Prohibit the Defendants from removing children from abusive or neglectful relative homes unless the Defendants have taken proper action to ensure that the Defendants'-selected placement will be safer for the child than the home the child is being removed from;
I. Require the Defendants to immediately remove all foster children from any foster placement where the custodian or other occupant has a criminal child abuse conviction;
J. Within 30 days, prohibit the Defendants' utilization of long term foster care or long term custody as a legitimate permanency goal;
K. Immediately eliminate racial and ethnic discrimination;
L. Immediately prohibit further ADA violations
46

) ) Case 1:00-cv-02116-FAM Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/14/2000 Page 47 of 60
and further denial of access to independent living programs for children with physical or other disabilities;
M. Appoint a permanent child advocate or ombudsman to oversee Defendants' compliance;
N. Appoint foster care review boards with the authority to provide oversight and require the Defendants to provide children with permanency when children have not been moved to permanency within the time limits of the Adoptions and Safe Families Act, Florida law and competent professional judgment.
0. Require the Defendants to eliminate the conflict of interest inherent in DCAF investigating allegations of abuse and neglect by facilities and placements it licenses directly or indirectly;
P. Prohibit the Defendants from seizing children and keeping them in conditions causing deterioration, holding them hostage for the purpose of compelling parents to admit child abuse or neglect when there is none;
Q. Prohibit the Defendants from retaliating against parents or children in any circumstance, including those when parents refuse to admit DCAF's
47

) Case 1:00-cv-02116-FAM Do)cument 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/14/2000 Page 48 of 60
untrue charges of abuse or neglect or requests are made for copies of records;
R. Prohibit the Defendants from placing a child in a DCAF-licensed or contracted facility unless and until a proper diligent search for suitable relative caretaker has been completed and it has been properly determined there are no suitable relative caretakers;
S. Require the Defendants to promptly utilize family group conferencing, dependency mediation and concurrency planning when children are taken from their families in order to maximize chances for reunification and simultaneously minimize the time needed to find the child a good permanent adoptive family if reunification does not occur within 12 months; and
T. Prohibit the Defendants from withholding records from children and their attorneys or guardians ad litem. Plaintiffs also request the entry of an order assessing their costs and reasonable attorney's fees against the Defendants pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1988 and such further relief as the Court deems appropriate.
48

Case 1:00-cv-02116-FAM Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/14/2000 Page 49 of 60
DATED this l ~11- day of June, 2000.
GIEVERS, P.A. COUNSEL for Plaintiffs 524 E. College Avenue Suite 2 Tallahassee, FL 32301 T - 850/222-1961 F - 850/~7

Fla. Bar No.: 262005

Co-Counsel for Plaintiffs

Theodore Babbitt, Esquire~ Fla. Bar No.:091146 Babbitt, Johnson and Osborne, Suite 200 1801 Australian Avenue South West Palm Beach, FL 33409 Mailing address: P.O. Box 024426 West Palm Beach, FL 33402
T - 561/684-2500
F - 561/684-6308

P.A.

Robert M. Montgomery, Esquire/ Fla. Bar No.: 056153 Montgomery & Larmoyeux 1016 Clearwater Place West Palm Beach, FL 33401
T - 561/832-2880
F - 561/832-0887

Michael R. Barnes, Esquire ~
Fla. Bar No.: (pending admission pro haec vice) Law Offices of Michael R. Barnes P.O. Box 1777 Key West, FL 33041 T - 305/296-5297 F - 305/296-6254

Barbara C. Burch, Esquire~
Fla. Bar No.: 0978670 423 Fern Street, Suite 300 West Palm Beach, FL 33401 T - 561/655-8944 F - 561/655-5269

William M. Chanfrau, Esquire Fla. Bar No.: 0155064 (pending admission pro haec vice) Chanfrau, Chanfrau & Bouch P.O. Box 265880 Daytona Beach, FL 32126
T - 800/969-7313 T - 904/258-7313

Jerold Feuer, Esquire Fla. Bar No. : (pending admission pro haec vice) 402 N.E. 36th Street Miami, FL 33137
T - 305/573-2282
F - 305/573-2285

49

Case 1:00-cv-02116-FAM Do)cument 1 Entered on FLSD Docket )06/14/2000 Page 50 of 60

Robert A. Glenn, Esquire Fla. Bar No.: 159844 / (pending admission pro haec vice) Glenn, Rasmussen, et al P. 0. Box 3333 Tampa, FL 33601 T - 813/229-3333 F - 813/229-5946
Wayne Hogan, Esquire Fla. Bar No.: 142460 (pending admission pro haec vice) Brown, Terrell, Hogan et al. 233 E. Bay Street, Fl. 8 Jacksonville, FL 32202 T - 904/632-2424 F - 904/353-4418
Jorge A. Lorenzo, Esquire Fla. Bar No.: 849596 (pending admission pro haec vice) 1001 N. Macdill Ave., Suite A Tampa, FL 33607 T - 813/998-9529 F - 813/998-9329

Bernard P. Perlmutter, Esquire.

Fla. Bar No.: 455260

/

Univ. of Miami School of Law

5915 Ponce de Leon Blvd #28

Coral Gables, FL 33146

T - 305/284-3123

F - 305/284-4384

Michelle Hankey, Esquire Fla. Bar No.: 0827835 (pending admission pro haec vice) 423 Fern Street, Suite 200 West Palm Beach, FL 33401 T - 561/655-8944 F - 561/655-5269

Robert G. Kerrigan; Esquire

Fla. Bar No.: 134044

~

(pending admission pro haec vice)

Kerrigan, Estes, et al.

400 E. Government Street

Pensacola, FL 32501

T - 850/444-4444

F - 850/444-4493

John B. Ostrow, Esquire Fla. Bar No.: 124324 Law Offices of John B. Ostrow,
p .A.
Miami Center Bldg, Suite 1380 201 S. Biscayne Blvd. Miami, FL 33131 T - 305/358-1496 F - 305/371-7999

Carolyn Salisbury, Esquire Fla. Bar No.: 0074772 (pending admission pro haec vice) Univ. of Miami School of Law 5915 Ponce de Leon Blvd #28 Coral Gables, FL 33146 T - 305/284-4321 F - 305/284-4384

50

) ) Case 1:00-cv-02116-FAM Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/14/2000 Page 51 of 60

Gregory A. Samms, Esquire~ Fla. Bar No.: 438863 9th Floor, New Times Towers 2800 Biscayne Blvd. Miami, Fl 33137 T - 305/573-2444 F - 305/576-9113

Neil C. Spector, Esquire ~, Fla. Bar No.:280471 (pending admission pro haec vice) 1505 N. Florida Avenue P.O. Box 800 Tampa, FL 33601 T - 813/229-0900 F - 813/229-3323

Susan L. Stockham, Esquire Fla. Bar No.: 342521 (pending admission pro haec vice) 2700 S. Tamiami Tr., Suite 17 Sarasota, FL 34239 T - 941/957-0094 F - 941/957-0084

James Walsh, Esquire Fla. Bar No.: 0796352 (pending admission pro haec vice) 423 Fern Street, Suite 200 West Palm Beach, FL 33401 T - 561/655-8944 ext. 243 F - 561/655-5269

John Walsh, Esquire Fla. Bar No.: 0796360 (pending admission pro haec vice) 423 Fern Street, Suite 200 West Palm Beach, FL 33401 T - 561/655-8944 ext. 242 F - 561/655-5269

Dianne Weaver, Esquire Fla. Bar No.: 139778 Krupnick, Campbell, et al. 700 SE 3~ Avenue
Suite 100 Ft. Lauderdale, Fl 33316 T - 954/763-8181 F - 954/763-8292

51

Case 1:00-cv-02116-FAM Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/14/2000 Page 52 of 60

Length of Stay (months) for Foster Care • Substitute Care Cases Clients Currently ACTIVE In Care as of 1·13-2000

CliENTS WITH A CURRENT GOAL OF PERM CUSTODY OF FOSTER PARENT ADOPT10N LONG TERM FOSTER CARE TEMPORARY PLCMNT & RETURN HOME INDEP LVNG-STIU FOSTER CARE PLCMT INDEP LVNG-SU8SIDIZED LMNG ct. ENTS BY CURRENT LEGAL STATUS INVAUD LEGAL STATUS VOLUNTARY PLACEMENT TEMPORARY CUSTODY OF DCF PERMANENT COMMITMENT CUSTODY OF OTHER STATE Ct. ENTS BY RACE BLACK WHITE OTHER CliENTS BY AGE AGE GROUP 0. 5 YRS AGE GROUP 6-12 YRS AGE GROUP 13-15 YRS AGE GROUP 16-18 YRS AGE GROUP 19+ YRS CliENTS W/ GOAL OF ADOPTlON BY RACE BLACK WHITE OTHER CLIENTS W/ GOAL OF ADOPTION BY AGE AGE GROUP 0. 5 YRS AGE GROUP 6-12 YRS AGE GROUP 13-15 YRS AGE GROUP 16-18 YRS AGE GROUP 19+ YRS PERM COMMIT CLIENTS BY RACE BLACK WHITE OTHER PERM COMMIT CLIENTS BY AGE AGE GROUP 0. 5 YRS AGE GROUP 6-12 YRS AGE GROUP 13-15 YRS AGE GROUP 16-18 YRS AGE GROUP 19+ YRS PERM COMMT & ADPT CUENTS BY RAt:E BLACK WHITE OTHER PERM COMMT & ADPT CLIENTS BY AGE AGE GROUP 0. 5 YRS AGE GROUP 6-12 YRS AGE GROUP 13-15 YRS AGE GROUP 16-18 YRS AGE GROUP 19+ YRS
"'- CLIENTS
!AU CLIENTS EXCEPT IN CUSTODY OF iFosTER PARENT & SUBSIDIZED IMNG

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93.3 90.0

6(] •-.-51.3 88.0 .' .85.3

7~ 70.8 100.0 97.3

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15.2 37.9 52.1

43.1 88.6 100.0

38.9 88.6 100.0

a: ·~ 211 •.';':':14.8

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78.4 ·95.8 95.8

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·.:59 ..···. 0

39.9 0.0

87.8 0.0

87.8 0.0

74 0

24.1 31.9 37.1 88.8

93.3 92.9 100.0 100.0

63.3 91.4 75.0 100.0

~
s
8

24.5 .. 35.3 38.9
0.0

.U.4 .. 76.7

116:9 .115.7
•.:o.o

·-·-.'7885..82
. ''v.o

-43 27.0 82.9 78.0
.81 52.0 94.7 94.7
14 73.1 100.0 100.0
0 88.8 100.0 100.0

41 75 25
7

0.0

0.0

0.0

~

-'0.0

0.0

0.0

0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0

61.3 100.0 100.0

12 83.4 100.0 '96.2

26 83.0 97.5 94.9

79

47.8 0.0

96.2 96.2

0.0

0.0

~

42.7 0.0

87.0 0.0

64.8 0.0

~

82.7 0.0

98.9 0.0

97.8 0.0

~

29.2 100.0 100.0

45.8

95.0 95.0

63.9 100.0 100.0

73.9 100.0 100.0

~
:

26.0 38.3 54.5 70.5

81.8 89.3 94.1
100.0

83.6 . 89.3
94.1
100.0

11 32.3 92.9 89.3

-~

62.3 98.0 82.0 100.0

98.0 97.5

'11 93.7 100.0 97.7

28 49
~

0.0

0.0

0.0

0 104.9 100.0 100.0

5 109.1 100.0 100.0

8

42.3 100.0 100.0

42.0 100.0 112.9

14 68.8 96.2 96.2

53

41.8 0.0

94.7 94.7

0.0

0.0

1: 37.0 88.2 .· 82.8

0

0.0

0.0 "0.0

~

50.1 0.0

97.3 0.0

97.3 0.0

37 0

29.2 100.0 100.0

5 27.9 110.0 70.0

10 33.1 91.3 91.3

23

39.4

94.4 94.4

18 40.0 "88.5 88.5

-~ 63.6 97.6 97.6

42

55.7 100.0 100.0

2 48.8 100.0 100.0

81.7 100.0 100.0

21

69.5 0.0

100.0 100.0

0.0

0.0

~

0.0 0.0

0.0 0.0

0.0 0.0

.(] 88.8 100.0 100.0

0

0.0

0.0

0.0

4 0

26.7

66.7 62.7 426 29.7 67.8 60.7 438 36.7 74.7 67.9 633

26.3

66.2 62.1

420 26.9 86.2 56.7

414 35.6 74.4 67.5

625

Data sourat: Clent Information System (CIS) ad hoc Nna.
• ALOS K Avwage Length of Stay in months calalr.tlld from the lnlllal PllclMnenl in
Subs1l1ule Carll Date 1D lha As at Date In lha raport lllle.
A~ will anN of less tlan 30.,. CCIIIidenld llallllcaly Ullllable.
% 12+ • Pan:ent of clentllln C8nl whose CUII'al1llength at Slay 1112 rnonth5 or men. % 15+ • Pan:ent of clients in C8nl whose cumtnllanglh at stay 1115 months or men.
N ~ Number of clients in care ti:1r whom lha average and percents are calculate<l.
lnckldea clentll wllh a &ervlce lllalull at ll'liiCIMI· Runaway.
Clents are unduplicat8d for each district and slalawida.
Totals for each dislricl wl not IUilliD lha slatewidaiDtal.

Nota: Community Baaed Carll data ara basad on units.
4 CBC Includes 048007, 048497, 048498, and 048499.
8 CBC Includes 085Y01, 085Y02, 085Y03, and 085Y04.

NOTE: THIS DOES NOT REPRESENT TOTAL LENGTH OF CARE, BUT ONLY THE nME SPENT IN CARE TO DATE FOR ACTIVE CLIENTS. AVERAGES CAN BE GREATLY SKEWED BY A FEW OUTLYING (LONG TERM) CASES.

""'--' by F11mly Solely Data~ on 1-21-2000

1'91

Case 1:00-cv-02116-FAM Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/14/2000 Page 53 of 60

Length of Stay (months) for Foster Care • Substitute Care Cases Clients Currently ACTIVE in Care as of 1-13-2000

CliENTS WITH A CURRENT GOAL OF PERM CUSTODY OF FOSTER PARENT ADOPTION LONG TERM FOSTER CARE TEMPORARY PLCMNT & RETURN HOME INDEP LVNG-STIU FOSTER CARE PLCMT INDEP LVNG-SUBSIDIZED LMNG CliENTS BY CURRENT LEGAL STATUS INVALID LEGAL STATUS VOLUNTARY PLACEMENT
!TEMPORARY CUSTODY OF DCF PERMANENT COMMITMENT CUSTODY OF OTHER STATE ICUENTS BY RACE BLACK WHITE OTHER ICUENTS BY AGE AGE GROUP 0. 5 YR5 AGE GROUP &-12 YRS AGE GROUP 13-15 YRS !AGE GROUP 1&-18 YRS AGE GROUP 19< YRS ~WI GOAL OF ADOPTION BY RACE BLACK WHITE OTHER CLIENTS W/ GOAL OF ADOPTION BY AGE AGE GROUP 0. 5 YRS AGE GROUP &-12 YRS ~GROUP13-15YRS AGE GROUP 1&-18 YRS AGE GROUP 19< YRS ~COMMIT CLIENTS BY RACE BLACK WHITE OTHER PERM COMMIT CLIENTS BY AGE AGE GROUP 0. 5 YRS
!AGE GROUP &-12 YRS AGE GROUP 13-15 YRS AGE GROUP 16-18 YRS AGE GROUP 19< YRS I!>E_RM COMMT & AOPT CLIENTS BY RACE BLACK WHITE OTHER PERM COMMT & ADPT CUENTS BY N3E AGE GROUP (). 5 YR5 AGE GROUP &-12 YRS AGE GROUP 13-15 YRS AGE GROUP 1&-18 YRS AGE GROUP 19< YRS AU. CLIENTS All CLIENTS EXCEPT IN CUSTODY OF FOSTER PARENT & SUBSIOIZEO LMNG

DISTRICT

4

4CBC

5

ALOS• 'llo 12+ % 15+

N ALos· "12+ "15+

N - ALOS• 'llo 12+ % 15+

N

-100;0 ,_,_.,~.3
-""'- ~45.7 -_- 97.7

77.8 100.0 ,'' 20.8 '"59.4

41.3 1).0

''

:1-0o0..o0

•100.0 95.5
100.0 48.6 100.0 ' 0.0

71.9 100.0 100.0 87.9 100.0 100.0 65.7 100.0 100.0 32.8 83.6 78.0 64.2 93.3 93.3 62.1 100.0 100.0

----~
_121
:,,-,,420

_-· ··o0.o.0_

0.0
- e.o

0.0 _'0.0

; . •

'28.8 74.7

''/,rU _iiU

----·~ 98.8

38.8 TZ.i '59.1

35..3 '77.8 . 68.6
'29.8 712 11:t4
9.1 33.3 '' 16.7

,' --.'~
'~t!G4 84
--Z! 341 --- e

19.2 -85.0 '52.2 '274 ~.8 _;TT.A .70.0 310

'48.0 84.0 81.3

75

.57.9 M.2 _ ,82.8 81.8 100.0 100.0

~

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

37.1 85.8 81.0

92.7 100.0 100.0

83.0 100.0 100.0

43.3 88.6 84.6

38.8 64.4 78.9

5.8

0.0

0.0

20.3 60.0 40.0 31.4 85.3 78.5 39.0 81.3 76.8 47.9 95.0 93.3 63.1 100.0 100.0

·0.0 ' 27
'''S.isS.3ll ' _-_•_ &.a4
:m _-·181
80.0 ···-· 2Q

210 ' . 31.2 71;8 '414.3 213

90 -~_'\3o.8 1 '21.1

:'87.4 ·-5l:o

---<. ·«s1a2:.o8

55:

~ " ....

' 53.7 .. 48:1 .•.;69.1 .·112.3
'84.2 ... 81.2
· u~ 83.0 1oo:o tO!l.o

49.7 . 99.2 96.0 12~ 88.1 100.0 100.0

40.9 9S.8 94.8

9E 87.4 100.0 100.0

> 13 . . ·-32.4 _:18.1
8 . ':SS.9 ,' ' 91.9

5&
180

17.4 100.0 . 100.0

1

0.0

0.0

tlO

0 19.1 88.7

_3

--' .2c9a..5a
i!J.O ·108.9 ' . 0.0

•'117.3
'117.5
100.0 100.0
0.0

.83.3
95.8 100.0 100.0 ·- 0.0

77.9 98.0 98.0 70.1 100.0 100.0
0.0 0.0 CLO

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

88.9 100.0 100.0

88.9 100.0 100.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

:

100.7 84.6

100.0 100.0

100.0 100.0

_Q

0.0

0.0

0.0

:=----··: 00 . =215.8 ..:-tlll.8 '' ·83.5

91

. ;A.t:-4 84.8

11 '42.8 . :91.2

o.o 10 •67.2 ,,!7511 '.1&:0

a

.O.o •O:O

'4 -- tl

11 47.9 83.9 93.9

49

11 5U .. 88.2 ·113.8 130

0 25.0 100.0 '100.0

_2

''· 38.9 ·-e-1.9
85.3 110.3
87.0

91.7 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

.91.7
too.o
100.0 100.0 100.tl

·'· 12
~
1~
~

74.1 100.0 100.0

3E

.62.7 100.0 ' 100.0

24

0.0

0.0

0.0

0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

98.1 100.0 100.0

91.7 100.0 100.0

49.9 100.0 100.0

992 100.0 100.0

87.4 100.0 100.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

~ ,:~~

85.0 9EL2

82.5 94.7

;·4(]
57

10 ';·:.83.7 . 98.1 fl8.1

52

11 ':19.0 100.0 100.0

28

1 87.1 100.0 100.0

4

·93.3 -90.4

:

100.0

2

41.4 67.2 78.5 119.4
0.0 32.4
322

100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
0.0 74.2

100.0 100.0 100."0
-ioo.o
0.0 85.7

74.0 . -~.4

·~

0.0 0.0

0.0 0.0

0.0 0.0

t~ 98.1 100.0 100.0
90.8 100.0 100.0

0

0.0

0.0

0.0

722 41.8 87.0 82.7

716 41.4 86.8 82.4

88.8 84.2
'll8.1 :,94.2
.·95.7 ••it>e.r
. '!btt.Ci ·10CU) .
0.0 0.0 301 -30.9 68.5 83.1 780
296 30.4 68.0 62.5 789

Data source: Clenllnfonndon Sysl8m (CIS) ad hoc lllfll, • ALOS =A-.ge Lenglh of Stay i1 months calculated from the lnlllal PlaC1111181111n
SutlsftJte Cant Date to the As d oatil the report tflle.
A~s wilh an N of Ins than 30 8111 considered lla1isllcaly unslable.
= % 12+ P - t r:A cllenls In an whose current length r:A lllay Ia 12 months or morw.
% 15+ • Pen:ent of CleniB In an whose current length r:A lilly Is 15 months or mora.
N • Number r:A dients in an for whom the average and percents 11n1 calculalild.
lncludel c11ent11 wilh a IIINice 1111atus ollnaciNe - Rui"8WIIy. Clents are unduplicalad for each district and stalllwide. TotaiS for aach disllk:! Ml not sum ID the lllal8wide IOial.

Nola: Community Basad Cant dala 8111 based on unils.
4 CBC includes 048007. 048497, 048498, and 048499.
8 esc Includes 085Y01, 085Y02. 085Y03. and 085YD4.

NOTE: THIS DOES NOT REPRESENT TOTAL LENGTH OF CARE, BUT ONLY THE TIME SPENT IN CARE TO DATE FOR ACTIVE CLIENTS. AVERAGES CAN BE GREATLY SKEWED BY A FEW OUTlYING (LONG TERM) CASES.

"'-.a by Fomiy s.fety Data~ on 1-21·2000

t.!U0007

Case 1:00-cv-02116-FAM Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/14/2000 Page 54 of 60

Length of Stay (months) for Foster Care - Substitute Care Cases Clients Currently ACTIVE in Care as of 1-13-2000

ICl ENTS WITH A CURRENT GOAL OF PERM CUSTOOY OF FOSTI:R PAREI'IT AOOPTION LONG TERM FOSTER CARE TEMPORARY PLCMI'IT 6 RETVRN HOME INDEP LVNG-STILL FOSTER CARE PLCMT INDEP LVNG-SU8SIDIZED LMNG !CliENTS BY CURRENT LEGAL STATUS INVAUD LEGAL STATUS ~OLUNTARY PLACEMEI'IT jreMPORARY CUSTODY OF OCF PERMANEI'IT COMMITMEI'IT CUSTODY OF OTHER STATE ICL ENTS BY RACE BLACK WHITE OTHER ICUEKTS BY AGE AGE GROUP (). 5 YRS AGE GROUP 6-12 YRS AGE GROUP 13-15 YRS
jAGE GROUP 16-111 YRS
AGE GROUP 19+ YRS CLIENTS W/ GOAL OF AOOPT10N BY RACE BLACK WHITE OTHER ~UENTS W/ GOAL OF ADOPT10I'I BY AGE !AGE GROUP (). 5 YRS AGE GROUP 6-12 YRS AGE GROUP 13-15 YRS AGE GROUP 16-18 YRS AGE GROUP 19+ YRS PERM COMMIT Q.IEmS BY RACE BLACK WHITE 011-iER PERM COMMIT CLIENTS BY AGE AGE GROUP (). 5 YRS AGE GROUP 6-12YRS AGE GROUP 13-15 YRS AGE GROUP 16-1& YRS AGE GROUP 19+ YRS PERM COMMT & ADPT CLIENTS BY RACE BLACK WHITE OlHER PERM COMMT & ADPT CLIENTS BY A.GC AGE GROUP (). 5 YRS AGE GROUP 6-12 YRS AGE GROUP 13-15 YRS AGE GROUP 16-18 YRS AGE GROUP 19+ YRS AL~ CLIEI'ITS ALL CLIENTS EXCEPT IN CUSTOOY OF FOSTER PAREI'IT & SUBSIOIZEO LMNG

DISTRICT

•

ALOS• "'12+ "'15+

7 ~ ALos· %12+ %15+

I N ALos· "'12+ "'15+

N

76.8 100.0 100.0 42.9 91.5 86.9 63.5 97.1 95.2

. 441 "~7~ :rao;o 10(l.O
82E -~33.B -"~.3 ;71:2 208 85.9 93:8 .•. ·.112.3

-~
~71

93.3 100.0 34.8 83.8 71.8 95.5

95.5 78.7 93.2

22 122
.....

14.3 41.4 35.4 53.2 94.6 90.5 64.8 100.0 94.1

720 :.20;1 ·~ >o.o 1,303

7~ •58;5 ;&o;o. .8CU)
17 .. 55.2 ·1oo.o 100.0

•-1~

11.8 75.8 83.1

37.7 86.9 100.0

28.8 77.8 100.0

212
s
5

0.0 14.8 '¥12 64.3

0.0 40.0 84.8 97.8

0.0 40.0 58.5 94.9

.-f:~ -~'~·=~ . u:s 4S
1C

. JtO

. o:o

: .oO.O . 31 .z.o , .;~

1,257 . ·-24:0

1;7!8

372 ·.. 532

'·t&

0.0 7.6 20.9 58.5

0.0 0.0 51.1 95.0

0.0 0.0 42.8 92.4

14 1
278 119

13.8 80.0 20.0

! 18.3 , 38.4 38.4

11 11.8 25.0

0.0

4

38.5 732 70.1 31.7 89.5 632 25.9 100.0 100.0

807 86;

29.9 .. 702 23.4 83.8 14.9 29:7

>.~ 82.0
57JI 21.!1

45.1 252 27.9

70.8 58.7 100.0

84.6 51.8 100.0

13C 2a.
1

17.7 55.4 48.3

513 18.9 · .. •572 <48.7 -63E

14.9 50.3 40.7

145

37.4 74.8 71.3 43.3 78.1 74.4 50.2 85.3 80.8 85.8 100.0 100.0

81e 27.3 297 '' .302 24! .· '39.4
22 88.8

.86.4
.'19.4
1:~

·.·. 59.9
85;1 74.3
1oo:o

7&(
. 32~
•• ;'23(
.. 1

302 39.8 59.0 124.2

82.5 88.7 87.8 100.0

572 81.7 111.6 100.0

:152 8

45.9 90.4 86.0

32'1 31:1. ·852 .. 79.~ ..271 51.0 97.5 97.5

39.8 92.7 85.7 34.8 100.0 100.0

~

31.5 85.1.' :79.4 .. 262 26.9 78.8 89.5

15.3 S9.1 2U '•' 23

0.0

0.0

0.0

:
_!!

26.3 84.5 78.7 21S 22.3 75.5 67.3 208 26.3 88.9 75.6

4~

492 94.8 922 58.0 96.1 92.1

~

40.9 37.8

-~88.9
a.u

' li2.9 ' ··81.0

·i~

38.3 42.9

80.3 80.0

80.3 80.0

81 1!

67.0 100.0 95.7

0.0

0.0

0.0

2~ 41.1

( '

0.0

':117.9 "0.0

87.9 . 0.0

~

82.4 100.0 100.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

1
c

70.9 97.4 96.9 57.2 98.3 92.7

195 80.4 eu 91.3
177 -49.8 :112.1 882

7~~

73.0 50.0

95.9 94.3

95.9 90.0

49 70

0.0

0.0

0.0

(

8.8 20.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0

31.9 87.9 762 85.7 117.9

95.1 98.1 98.8 100.0 100.0

69.0 962 96.5 97.8 100.0

82 ' 26.7
::156 !50.0 .. -8·a3.u5
2 -84.8

642 '89.1
86.0
··m.2
100.0

s71u.1
·86:0
811:1. tm-o

.: 2S ·le
A

27.4 53.8 63.0 942 1'8.A

90.9 96.0 91.7 100.0 100.0

77.3 96.0 91.7 100.0 1110.0

~
24 20
3

59.5 97.6 96.8 124 .W2 95.5 .90.9 -44 46.3 96.7 96.7

30

52.3 97.9 90.9

0.0

0.0

0.0

·. u 1~ '···'42;8 ... 81.1 20.0

88.9
·o:il

~

29.9 0.0

89.7 0.0

82.1 0.0

39 0

32.1 95.0 88.8 63.0 98.4 96.0

8C 26.7 84.4 71.9
12~ ... .51.5 92;3 92.3

:

27.4 42.4

90.9 94.9

77.3 94.9

22 3!

67.3 84.0
0.0

100.0 100.0
0.0

95.8 92.9
0.0

~ 482 '' 93.3 . 40.4 .87.5

93.3 87.5

c

0.0

0.0

0.0

:1!
.

37.4 0.0 0.0

87.5 0.0 0.0

87.5 0.0 0.0

8 0 0

34.9 71.4 88.6 1693 26.1 85.11 5!1,.4 1954 31.4 62.6 55.8

414

_,

33.4 70.2 85.4 1 628 25.9 85.4 58.2 1.!142 272 59.9 53.0

387

Data source: Clenllnformallon Syslam (CIS) ad hoc runs.
• ALOS • A-.ge L~ of Stay in rnonthll Clllculllled from the Initial Plllc:emenlln Substitute Carll Date to the As ~ Data In the lllport ....
Awrages wll'l anN of lea tllan 30 1n CDI1Iiclenld lllllillicaly unslable.
% 12+ = Pen:ent ~ clents In car. whole c:unent length ~ lilly II 12 months or mont. % 15+ =Pen:ent ~ clents In care WhoM CUIIIIIllllnglh ~lilly il15 month& or mora. N • Number of c1ents In care for whom the .-age and pen:ents .,. calalla1ad.
lnc:Mies clents with a -w:& slalus ~ lnadMI· Runaway.
Clents are unduplicatad for •ch dislllcl and IIBIIIwide. To1a1s for each l1i!lrlct wl not sum to 1111 llalewlde 1111111.

Nola: Community Based Carll data are basad on unla. 4 CBC Includes 048007. 048497, 048498, and 048499. 6 CBC induciae 085Y01, 085Y02, 085Y03, and 085Y04.

NOTE: THIS DOES NOT REPRESENT TOTAI. lENGTH OF CARE, BlJT ONLY THE nME SPENT IN CARE TO DATE FOR ACTlVE CLIENTS. AVERAGES CAN BE GREATLY SKEWED BY A FEW OUTLV1NG (LONG TERM) CASES.

"'-od by Famty Safety O• s~ on 1·21·2000

Page3
oJUOU08

Case 1:00-cv-02116-FAM Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/14/2000 Page 55 of 60

Length of Stay (months) for Foster Care - Substitute Care Cases Clients Cu1T8ntly ACTIVE in Care as of 1-13-2000

lei.lENTS WITH A CURRENT GOAL Of PERM CUSTODY OF FOSTER PARENT
ADOPTION LONG TERM FOSTER CARE TEMPORARY PLCMNT & RETURN HOME INDEP LVNG-STILL FOSTER CARE PLCMT INDEP LVNG-SUBSIDIZED LMNG
ICuENTS BY CURRENT LEGAL STATUS INVAUD LEGAL STATUS VOLUNTARY PLACEMENT
!TEMPORARY CUSTODY OF DCF PERMANENT COMMITMENT CUSTOOY OF OTHER STATE
ICUENTS BY RACE BLACK ~ITE IOTHER CLIENTs BY AGE AGE GROUP (). 5 YRS
AGE GROUP 6-12 YRS AGE GROUP 13-15 YRS ~E GROUP 16-18 YRS AGE GROUP 19+ YRS
I::UENTs W/ GOAL OF ADOPT10N BY RACE
BLACK ~ITE OTHER CJENTs W/ GOAL OF ADOPTION BY AGE AGE GROUP (). 5 YRS ~GE GROUP 6-12 YRS AGE GROUP 13-15 YRS ~GE GROUP 16-18 YRS AGE GROUP 19+ YRS PERM COMMIT CLIENTS BY RACE
BLACK
WHITE OTHER PERM COMMIT CLIENTS BY AGE f'GE GROUP 0. 5 YRS AGEGROUP S.12YRS !AGE GROUP 13-15 YRS AGE GROUP 16-18 YRS AGE GROUP 19+ YRS ~RM COMMT & AOPT CUENTS BY RACE
BLACK
WHITE OTHER
IPERM COMMT & AOPT CLIENTS BY AGE
f'GEAGE GROUP (). 5 YRS GROUP 6-12 YRS !AGE GROUP 13-15 YRS AGE GROUP 16-18 YRS AGE_G_ROUP 19+ YRS
ALL CLIENTS ~ CLIENTS EXCEPT t4 CUSTODY OF iFosTJ:R PARENT & SUBSIOIZED LMNG

DISTRICT
·ecsc
"AlOS* "12+ "15+

I N ALOS* "12+ 'J(, 15+

::t ·:~611.9 ··e~oo~o •<101Ul

.. ._.·::~
·.;~·'.MA

.··.

·W".Ii -.~8

-,aaioi::Bs

: '77.8 ,,:;;'39.3

-~ 88.3 ~00.0 ·!loo.o

72.0 100.0 '100.0

: -~~
. 1 . -:·13 ·.... 2

54.2 100.0 100.0 43.8 94.8 92.9 70.7 89.9 88.2 27.4 88.9 58.4 88.4 100.0 90.9 65.4 88.2 88.2

:·.:=~· 0.0

0.0

'. . !)~0 .. :.·,·ao

".;18.8 ;:c''52:8

·.

:~:~

0.0

0.0

0.0 . ..a
.......,.c·:Q
('·133
0.0 ·::~

0.0 220.8
31.7 85.2 58.6

0.0 100.0 72.0 97.4 88.9

o.o
100.0 84.0
95.5 _88.9

..... · 35.8 . ./:22.1

. 75.7 85.7 •.. ml /t2.8 · :.se.1 • .:.,0'1

46.8 33.8

85.5 71.1

79.5 84.2

. 19.7 ·'100.0 100:0 .. 1 14.7 40.0 40.0

:11..6
...•:2344:...5.
49.8 '113.2

·.43:1 '..29.3

:>:1&5
. \'i-'A

.-.~ ::.•w.2

9U .':85.2
'100.0. lOo.O

58 ·····.51 '·•·c'.39
:~

21.7 71.1 58.4 39.7 17.0 72:.5 52.2 83.8 81.0 54.1 86.1 82.2 87.2 100.0 100.0

·-·ALOS*

;
c. ''·,.o.o
11; --_<;38.8

119 IS1.1

341 11

.-::~

1 <tie A

tO
"12+ "15+

.;o.o
83.1 95.0 ,·S5.7
90.8 94..7

...Q.O
89.9 94.0 . 4;.0 ]10.8 94.7

e 0.0 .•..,o.o

(~~ 1

.. ;:so.o

4341

:•>!ro.e

156

'.•:18.2

e

.
....

«7.4

..

100.0

352 . .->41.3 ,:79.7 2441 : .· ''32:5 ''72;1

1C 12.7 33.3

.· '!-0.0..00
.:tu
•. :tll.2 .. 91.3
75.1
89.3
33.3

173 ...• :17:<1 "8!.5 204 -'~'38.3 80:4
105 ·" .45.2 82.i 101 ~;$1.7 118.2
25 -72.8 .. tilo;O

"B.9
78.8 ·78.7
84.5
100.0

c
306 501 716 " 44
1e
.-1~
·~
1,211 .-33!1
~
. 987 S96 3
. 363 57C 328
.304 '21

35.7 67:.5 67:.5

16

>;34.1 :.100.0 :.JOO.O

15

19.7 '100.0 ·100.0

1

·29.4

'38.3

'..

34.8 '0;0

0.0

1.0..0...0. 85.7
0.0 . Q.O

100.0 ·94:4
·:a5.7
. 'Oll
:o~o

7
''UI
·... ~
)!

43.3 95.8 93.0 44.4 112.5 92.5 30.3 100.0 100.0

32.6 90.9 84.8

48.5 95.0 95.0

44.4 100.0 100.0

56.4 100.0 100.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

71 .:311.9 . 83..4 ,'iiU ... .1911

40 . ·-~'l3.0 . 83:.5 ' 112:.6 1 ', ~- '18.5 ·:;so~o ··!0.0

.1011 .·.·~

: .26.9 •••> :;39:.5

88.8 ·:'82.5 ·98.9 .: 93.8

11~ 181

15 ·. ·<48.8
~ "::~n.s '"··•'17.4

'100.0 111).0
'100.0

.100.0 c.90.0 100.0

~ 1

.. 158..4 "B.1
0.0

100.0 100.0
0.0

100.0 100.0
0.0

·23 88.3 982 96.4

~

58.1 95.5 93.2 30.3 100.0 100.0

,111 . 85.4 '98.5

44. .-52.4 ·.,IIU

~ '10.2

0.0

118:.5 98:.5
·-~o

,203
131

28.3 40.7 72.5 63.2 135.6

100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

.100.0 '100.0 '100.0
100.0 100.0

8 34.7 100.0 93.3 1~ 60.3 94.9 114.11 .1C 75.5 100.0 97.3 11 84.8 98.0 96.0
1 132.1 100.0 100.0

: •' 32.6 'S5.2 37 ;./;74.8 25 '89.7

·93.8
993
joo.o
98.0

·. 93.8
911.3
10cl.O -98.0

,: :

5 73.2 100.0 ·100.0

3

41.9 100.0 100.0

11

39.6 100.0 100.0 •11

0.0

0.0

0.0

il

27.0 100.0

43.8 100.0

• 54.8 •100.0

~
.,,

·o.o . ;; o.o

0.0

0.0

27.5 fS8.0

'•
25~5 fS8.5

-.100.0 100.0
1:o·oo..oo
0.0 40.1
' 58.2

;.,~
:~.~ . ·· .. ;~
178
17C

45.6 98.6 93.1 44.1 95.8 95.8 30.3 100.0 100.0

34.9 100.0 92.3

50.5 93.5 113.5

42.2 100.0 100.0

81.2 100.0 100.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

41.1 78.9 72.7

40.3 78.8 72.2

:;w.o ~ 48.1 .. 97.1

1

·.
..

·:aB.4
"102

·o.o

.97.1 w~o
0.0

:

32.0 •83.4 93.4
-<t5.2 ·:-9u .118:9

~
0

..§r.t
,;:_i~:~

1110.0
:-.···'833 ·}(l.O

:: ..100.0
··83.3 .·.o;o

608 .~aa.o
..,. ........,..
589 37.6

-7U . ·......;.~
711.6

72.8
... .. · -~~
·72.6

104 :1ST
1
81
9,1..
-~
1586
1.567

Data 1011nl8: Ciani lnfonnallon System (CIS) ad hoc runs. * ALOS =A-.ge Lengll or Slay In rnonlhs calculatild from . . lnllal ~In
Subslllule Cant Date to . . As d Date In . . report ....
A-.ges wlh anN dless than 30- ODflllidered IIBiillicaly ullllable.
% 12+ = Percant or c1ents in care whose ammt lenglh of slay ia 12 monlls or mare.
% 15+ "Pen:entafclents In care wi'IOse current length rl*'fll15 monhDfmare.
N • Number d clanls in cant i:lr whom . . ewrage and pen::ents - calculatad. lnciJdes c::lienls Mill a -*-llfalus d lnaciMt ·RuMMy.
Cients ant unduplicated fer each dl&lrlcland llattwkle.
TOials for each dlslrtd wll not sum to the lla1llwlde tolaL

Note: Communly BaHd Cant da1a ara based on unb. 4 CBC Includes 048007. 048497, 048498, and 048499. 8 CBC includes 085Y01, 085Y02. 08SY03. and 085Y04.

NOTE: THIS DOES NOT REPRESENT TOTAL LENGTH OF CARE, BUT ONLY THE nME SPENT IN CARE TO DATE FOR ACTIVE CLIENTS. AVERAGES CAN BE GREATl.Y SKEWeD BY A FEW OUTLYING (LONG TERM) CASES.

~by Fomly Solely Data s._,n en 1·21·2000

uUOUQ~}

Case 1:00-cv-02116-FAM Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/14/2000 Page 56 of 60

Length of Stay (months) for Foster Care • Substitute Care Cases Clients Currently ACTIVE In Care as of 1-13-2000

DISTRICT

11A

·us

12

~WITH A CURRENT GOAL OF PERM CUSTODY OF FOSTER PARENT ~ LONG "TERM FOSTER CARE TEMPORARY PLCMNT & RETURN HOME INDEP lVNG-SllLL FOSTER CARE PLCMT INOEP LVNG-SUBSIDIZED lMNG ~BY CURRENT LEGAL STAl\JS INVALID lEGAl STAniS VOLUNTARY PLACEMENT TEMPORARY CUSTODY OF DCF PERMANENT COMMITMENT CUSTODY OF OTHER STATE

ALOS" "'12+ "'15+

N ALOS" "'12+ "'15+

N ALOS" "'12+ "'15+

N

.,

51.2 55.3 77.0 29.9 87.9

100.0 94.5 94.0 80.1 89.1

100.0 90.5 92.8 89.1 89.1

<I 598

,;.-:'O;o
·;;,;'22;0

·-,co;o· OJI .... 0
.r.u -13.7 ' '1SI

. .:::u 58!5 '111.$ .80;0 .· 80JI : $

583 8<1

·-:a:a --~~-~7
·:o;o •.•. :"C);o

~- 12
:D.O. .•.. _;';~;:-~

83.6 100.0 100.0 24.9 86.7 59.8 86.7 93.0 88.4 17.0 47.5 40.1 83.2 83.6 83.8

1
~
202
11

97.1 100.0 100.0

3 115.3 100.0 fOO.O..

94.9 100.0 100.0

1

0.0 83.8 47.9 75.5 58.8

0.0 85.7 87.4 98.7 86.4

0.0 85.7 81.3 95.4 86.4

4S
7
1.227 548 22

:.0;0
.:Q.o
'12.0
:s:e . ·O:o

4~ ...'.-;0:o;.0o

o;o ·,·:.o;o

.· 3

45.5 . «<.B

,,!H;;'7 '-':'f1::7

o:o ·o.o

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

18.9 47.8 40.8

59.0 98.8 91.4

57.2 100.0 100.0

1 0 249
~

iCuENTs BY RACE

BLACK WHITE OTHER

58.2 51.0

91.5 87.0

·.::su 86.3 1,258 0. ;l4JI 33:.3 . .'.<33.3

-'3

82.2 58!5 -::21.4 ''»:a:i

.:~f~

41.2 71.3 87.8 21.9 52.3 44.1

87 222

1!U {1{10 60.0

10

0:0 • 0.0 "0.0

20.8 83.3 83.3

6

CLIENTS BY AGE. AGE GROUP G- 5 YRS AGE GROUP 6-12 YRS AGE GROUP 13-15 YRS AGE GROUP 16-18 YRS AGE GROUP 19+ YRS Cl. ENTS W/ GOAL OF AOOPT10N BY RACE

28.2 80.5 71.0 385 11.7 .. 29.4 23.5 . 17 15.0 43.5 34.8

92

49.9 86.5 82.8

848 0 20.3 IOJI ·. .,;o . . 1C 19.8 52.4 46.7

105

83.8 91.7 89.4 76.9 96.6 93.1 88.3 100.0 100.0

349 31.3 -88.7 . -..'7 ·. ···:··'.3 38.3 73.3 68.3

377 -.5 . ,~85.7 ·-a5.7
114 .o.o Q_;o . 0.0

··~

44.2 119.1

73.8 100.0

86.0 100.0

~
Ji

BLACK WHITE OTHER

57.7 94.5 91.2 50.6 95.3 89.5 18.9 80.0 80.0

422 171
~

14;0 .23.5 0
o:ii .···

33.3
· ~81.3
'.OJI

.... &331.;33
.·. ·o.o

··

. 3
1E
·'ci

30.1 55.0 55.0 22.0 70.8 58.8 24.0 100.0 100.0

~ 3

Q.JENTs W/ GOAL OF AOOPT10N BY AGE. ~E GROUP G- 5 YRS ~ GROUP 6-12 YRS lo.GE GROUP 13-15 YRS AGE GROUP 16-18 YRS AGE GROUP 19+ YRS f'EBfo!_cor.atiT CLIENTS BY RACE
BLACK ~ITE OTHER

-·.1":0'

30.0 62.4 71.1 108.8
0.0

87.0 97.4 98.9 100.0
0.0

79.9 94.4 96.8 100.0
0.0

78.6 97.0 98.5

67.9 97.3 93.8

10.0

0.0

0.0

r?::7 : 184 '20.3 ·'11&.7

305 8'

. ·-'20.3
31.3

··:::~

. "· Jl
·,..7

:·~
~

~

· · · ·~ 0.0 : OJI ... AUI
0.0 ·o.o ·'t);O

3911 18.8 '$).1) SIJI

4

146 2

:85.3 100.0 tOOJI
0.0 .o.o 0.0

'·.~

21.2 85.0 45.0

27.2 71.4 71.4

28.4 86.7 86.7

25.9 33.3 33.3

0.0

0.0

0.0

83.i 95.0 95.0 46.9 97.2 88.9 27.8 100.0 100.0

: : 0
:
..2

PERM COMMTT CUEHTS BY AGE

AGE GROUP G- 5 YRS
AGE GROUP 6-12YRS ~E GROUP 13-15 YRS AGE GROUP 16-18 YRS
AGE GROUP 19+ YRS

32.9 88.1 85.1 87.7 97.6 98.7 87.3 99.0 97.9

.... 101 24.8 75.0 ·.75.0
20i 32.1 too:O . 100.0

'~

98 •. 88.5 .soo.o 100.0 '

35.1 100.0 85.7 31.0 100.0 100.0 61.7 92.9 92.9

1~
14

110.9 100.0 98.9

89 '108.7 ' 100.0 100.0 . ..c 80.0 93.8 81.3

16

107.8 100.0 100.0

51 iiJI .o.o 0.0

t 128.8 100.0 100.0

<I

PERM COMMT & ADPT CLIENTS BY RACE

BLACK
~ITE
OTHER i!"eR_M COMMT & ADPT CliENTS BY AGE

85.0 95.4 95.4

58.0 98.8 91.5

10.0

0.0

0.0

239 18.8
~ '·' 'T1.7 ·0.0

·4iQJI
>10oJI ·0.0

50;0 •100;0
OJI

-·~.. -~

28.4 83.3 83.3 30.1 95.0 90.0 27.6 100.0 100.0

~
2

AGE GROUP G- 5 YRS !AGE GROUP 6-12 YRS AGE GROUP 13-15 YRS AGE GROUP 16-18 YRS !AGE GROUP 19+ YRS

31.9 88.8 83.5

91 .. 24.8 75.0 75.0

4 35.1 100.0 85.7

7

87.6 98.3 97.7

177. 32.1 1.(10;0 -100..0

·~ 25.7 100.0 100.0

14

80.5 121.9
0.0

98.1 100.0
0.0

98.3 100.0
0.0

~ -:all .100.0 oioo.o ec-:o;o -~-0 •'';0;0
J! ·o.o '0.0 ~

.1 29.4 80.0 80.0
c 37.9 50.0 50.0

_J:

0.0

0.0

0.0

5
-~

AlL CLIENTS

55.7 89.9 84.9 1 851 28.3 58.8 54.1

3

27

58.1 51.4 :tl5

!ALLa.JENTS EXCEPT fol CUSTODY OF

il'osTER PARENT & SUBSIDIZED lMNG · .. ... 54.9 89.7 84.5 1810 23.9 55.6 52.8

~ 26.9 57.8 51.1

313

Data 81Ma!: Clenllnfonnatlon SyMall (CIS) Mllxlc runs. • ALOS ,. AW18!18 Leng1h of Stay In months cak:IJiatad from the lnllal Plaalmenlln
Substllu1a Canl Dala ID the !>£ t:l Data In the l8port tile.
A-.ges wllh an N of leulhan 30 11111 COIIIIderwd lldlllicaly unslable. % 12+ • P-.1 of c:ienls In an wt-. amant llnQih of .-y i112 monlll or 111018.
'llo 15+ =Parc:anl of c1ents in care wt-. c:unnt length of ay 1115 months or mont. N a Number of cllenls In care b' whom fill everage and perc8nls are ClllcuiiRad.
lrdldes clenls wilh a !I8IYice lllllul of lnaciMI - RuiWWII)'.
Clents are unduplcatad for aactt dlllric:t and llllnllwlde.
TOials b' each~_. nol sum ID lhe llllnllwlde IolBI.

Nola: Cornlnunly Based Canl dam Bl8 baMd on unlls. 4 CBC includes 048007, 046497, 046498, and 048499. 8 CBC Includes 085Y01, 085Y02. 085Y03, and 085Y04.

NOTE: THIS DOES NOT REPRESENT TOTAL LENGTM OF CARE, BUT ONLY THE TIME SPENT IN CARE TO DATE FOR ACTIVE CLIENTS. AVERAGES CAN BE GREATLY SKEWED BY A FEW OUTLYING (LONG TERM) CASES.

P - - ' by Fomily Saf8ly Data Suppcwt en 1-21-2000

vUOOlO

Case 1:00-cv-02116-FAM Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/14/2000 Page 57 of 60
C.
Length of Stay (months) for Foster Care - Substitute Care Cases Clients Currently ACTIVE In Care as of 1·13-2000
Dlltl sourat: Clenl Wamdon ~(CIS).., hoC• ALOS • A-.ge lengtl of Slay In monlha Clllculatllld from lie ....... Pllcanert In
c . Subsllut8 Cll8 Calli to . . Aa of In lle!Wport ...
A-.gas will an N of llllallan 30 . . COI1IIdenld lfalllflcaly Ullltlble. " 12+ • P81'C8111 of clenls In car. whoM curenllenglh of Slay 1112rnontlll ar - · " 15+ • P81'C8111 d c1ents In car. whoM Cll'lilnllllngth d Slay il 15 montw or 11'11118. N "'Number d c111nts in cant for whom 11e ...,_.and 1181-* . . c:alclllald.
lnciJdes clenll will a ~~~Me~ llldua of IMcllve • Rur-.y. Clltnls . . undupk:aled far -=tl cMicl and . . . . . . TOials far each diWtct wl not tum to twllldllwide tolal Hole: Communly Based Cll8 data.,. baled on unils.
.. esc includes 048007, 048497, 048498, and 048499.
8 CBC includea 085Y01, 085Y02, 085Y03, and 085Y04. NOTE: THIS DOES NOT REPRESENT TOTAL LENG1M OF CARE, BUT ONLY THE TIME SPENT IN CARE TO DATE FOR ACTIVE CLIENTS. AVERAGES CAN BE GREAT\.Y SKEWED BY A FEW 0\ITl.YlNG (LONG TERM) CASES.
UU0011

Case 1:00-cv-02116-FAM Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/14/2000 Page 58 of 60

,·
Length of Stay (months) for Foster Care - Substitute Care Cases Clients Currently ACTIVE in Care as of 1·13-2000

CUEr.rt'S WITH A CURRENT GOAL"OF

PERM CUSTODY OF FOSTER PARENT

ADOPTION

LONG TERM FOSTER CARE

jreMPORARY PLCMNT & REllJRN HOME

INOEP LVNG-STIU FOSTER CARE PLCMT

INDEP LVNG-SUBSIDIZED LMNG ~NTS BYClJRREI'ITl£GALSTA.TUS

INVALID LEGAL STATUS

VOLUNTARY PLACEMENT

!TEMPORARY CUSTOOY OF DCF

PERMANENT COMMITMENT

CUSTODY OF OTHER STATE

a.JENTS BY RACE

BLACK

WHITE

O'TliER

CLIENTS BY AGE

AGE GROUP II- 5 YRS

AGEGROUP &-12YRS

AGE GROUP 13-15 YRS

AGE GROUP 1&-18 YRS

AGE GROUP 19+ YRS

QJENTS W/ GOAL OF AOOP110N BY RACE

BLACK

WHITE

OTHER ~ENTSW/~OF

BY AGE.

AGE GROUP II- 5 YRS

AGE GROUP 8-12 YRS

AGE GROUP 13-15 YRS

AGE GROUP 111-18 YRS

AGE GROUP 19+ YRS

'PERM COMMIT CLIENTS BY RACE

BLACK

WHITE

OTHER

PERM COMMIT CLIENTS BY AGE

AGE GROUP II- 5 YRS

AGE GROUP &-12 YRS

AGE GROUP 13-15 YRS

AGE GROUP 111-18 YRS

AGE GROUP 19+ YRS

IPERM COMMT & AOPT CLIENTS BY RACE

BLACK

WHITE

OTHER

PERM COMMT & AOPT CLIENTS SY AGE

AGE GROUP II- 5 YRS

AGE GROUP &-12 YRS

AGE GROUP 13-15 YRS

AGE GROUP 111-18 YRS

AGE GROUP 19+ YRS

ALLCUEr.rt'S

~CLIENTSEXCEPTIIICUSTODYOF . , -~~..!.';FOSTER PAAEI'IT & S1J8SIOIZEO lMNG · '·

ALos·
74.9 41.5 66.4 19.8 57.9 75.2
0.0 47.1
'D~
85.3 43.9
41.4 292 15.i
17.7 33.5 42.7 53.9 68.5
48.4 38.4 18.0
28.2 48.4 54.5 71.5 17.4
72.5 57.2 15.4
30.9 59.8 75.8 91.7 108.4
57.7 45.8 15.4
30.9 56.1 65.5 88.2
0.0 34.9
34.1

Total 'J!o 12+ 'J!o 15+

1182 97.3 90.6 86.4 94.4 92.8 662 -46.8 86.4 86.5 97.3 96.8

0.0

0.0

68.7 86.7

fS7.0 80.2

118.7 94.8

77.4 71.9

7B2 n.3
fS7.8 81.8 39.6 34.3

57.5 48.5 73.2 ff1.7 78.0 73.4 87.8 84.0 99.8 99.8

91.9 86.4 89.9 85.2 56.1 48.3

85.0 93.4 93.4 113.9 100.0

77.9 90.7 90.8 93.1 100.0

97.3 96.3 96.5 93.8 48.2 38.5

91.1 97.1 98.5 98.6 100.0

86.2 96.2 97.2 96.8 100.0

96.4 95.7 95.8 92.0 48.2 38.5

91.4 86.4

97:3 98.5

97.9 98.7

95.7 94.2

0.0

0.0

72.3 66.4

71.8 65.8

_N
110 3,430 2,199 7,182
310 149
251 54
2!:10,475
8,343 8,903
134
3,8113 4,745 2,384 2,109
279
1,7118 1,591
41
1,170 1,701
427 131
1
1,337 1,104
1
: = 9
788
~
42~
~: ~
13.38<1
13121

Data IIDIRII: Clenl Wannation $y8elm (CIS) lid hoc runs.
• ALOS • A-.ge Lengfl or Slay In rnonlhs ClllaJinld from._ fnillal Placament in
Subdlula Care Data., . . As d Oalrlln . . n!pOit ....
A.-ages \loth anN dllla lhan 30- CXltllidenld Slatlslk:aly unstable.
% 12•" P - t d c1en11 in cant whose curent length d lilly II 12 rnonlhl 01' mont.
'J!o 15+ • Pelt8nl d c:lllnls In an whose amtnt llnglh at lilly 1115 manila or mora.
N z Number d dlanls In an i:lr whom lhe average and penllt/lll- Clllculaald.
Includes l:llnls wllh • ....a lbllus d lnacllw- Runaway.
Clenls - unduplclted 101' each dlslrict and llatewide. Telals tor each dlslrlcl wil not IIUIIIIo llellalswlde IOial.

Note: Cam1unily Based Canl data 11r11 ba-s on unb.

NOTE: THIS DOES NOT REPRESENT TOTAL LENGTH OF CARE, BI.IT ONLY THE nME SPENT IN CARE TO DATE FOR ACTlVE CLENTS. AVERAGES CAN BE GREATI.Y SKEWED BY A FEW OUTLYING (LONG TERM) CASES.

"'-«1 by Fomly s.r.ty Data &4JPQO'!on 1·21-2000

vU0012

Case 1:00-cv-02116-FAM Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/14/2000 Page 59 of 60

Page9

~-
MAP OF FLORIDA

9
10
t.oq"" 'b .. ~,
HRS Statewide Review of Children

5C-2a3s-e2010:0004-c:0v9-P0M2116-FFARMOM Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/14/2000 Page 6P0.2of 60

JS «
(Rev. 12196)

211 0J CIVIL COVEFI SHEEif» ~

The JS-44 Civil cover shlw! and the Information oomalned hen!in neither I'QPiact nor supplement the filing and $ervic:e of pleadings or other papers • ~

f Jlliif"Dd by law, except 11J \:1 of the CleO< of

u provided by local rules of court. This form, approved Court for the purpose o1 inillarll'lg ",e civil docket sheet.

b(SyE1EtteINJSuTdRicUiaCl CTIoOnNfeSreOnNceToHfEtheREU'VnEi ~I~ l1~ f h~ iifS 'f\,jt

fer ltle use

I. (a) PLAINTIFFS

DEFENDANTS

31 Foster Children on behalf of themselves and all foster children in Florida

Jeb Bush, as Governor Kathleen Kearney, as Secretary 15 District Administrators

(b) COUNTY OF RiSIOEr«:e OP' l'liiST LJmD PLAINTII:J: BrOWa r d
(EXCEPT IN U.S. Pl.AINTlFF CASES)

~OOAESS. (¢) ATTORNEYS (FiRM NAME.

ANO TEL!Pt10NI! NUM!EII)

GIEVERS, P.A.

524 E. College Avenue, #2

TE J oour.IT'f

Of'

"~SICENCE

oF FIRST 11STEO W~NOAHT

Leon

(IN u.s. PLAINTIFF c~TRA

. .. 0 D'

1QFl:r+EAN NOT!::

IN ~AND CONDEMNAOON CAS!S,
TRACT OPLAND NVOLViO.

LJt!n4:"~~ . U"DULL

l

v.'

1

A'TTORNEYS Ol= I(N()WN)

k

Not nown

______ Tallahassee, -....::Fc..::L=--...:3~2~3=0-=1'---=--~=-~=--.....-----------· ------:---~--­

(d) CIRCLI!¢QUNTY WHERE ACTION ARO~¢!f>~

MAR'!lN, ST. tlJCU;;, INDIAN RIVER, Ol<&fCHOII!! MIGHLAHDS

II. ISASIS OF JURISDICTION

1
\PI.AOE A"' x· IN ONE iiOX ONLY)

Ill. CITIZENSHIP OF PRINCIPAt.:"PARTIE.S'~IiAN"K"I>ION&IIOICRlll~

(For Diveraitf Caees Only)

/lHO ONe eo11 ~ OEFENDNIT)

C ' U.S. Government
Plaintift'

.I!! Federal Ouestiorl
(U.S. Goveml'nef'lt Not a p.ty)

Citizen ot This State

PTf DEF

Pll' DEl'

o 1 c 1 rnoorporllted or Pl1nclpal Place c .c c •

of Buslnese In This Stale

c 2 u.s. Governi'I'KII'It
Defendant

c~DIYet'8itV
(lndlcale CitiZen:~t~ip of Par1ie in Item Ill)

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IV. ORIGIN

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V. NATURE OF SUIT (PLACE AN "X" IN ONE BOX ONLY)

A CONTRACT

A TOR'TS

VI. CAUSE OF ACTION {CITE TME u.s ¢ML STArvn: UNO.-A w..JCH v~ ARE FH,JNG ~o WRITIO IIRIIiF &TATEMENT OF CAUSE
§ 00 NOT CITi JI.IRISOICTIONAL STAT1.1TES UN~I;S$ OI~P'1:51TY)
42 U.S.C. 1983 This is an action on behalf of Florida's foster children for the declaratory and· injunctive relief necessary to protect them from ~~~~:~~~·~~~~-~~rm arising from violations of their due process rights.

VII. REQUeSTED IN

COMPLAIN'r.

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DEMAND $ N /A

CHECK Y~S only if dernand&d in ct;~mplei!1t JURY D!MAND: 0 YES }K NO

VIII. RELATeD CAS.E(S) (See inm,ctions): IF ANY
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 </s> Case 1:00-cv-02116-FAM Document 42 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/30/2000 Page 1 of 116

UNITED STATES DISTRICT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

CASE NO.: 00-2116-CIV-HUCK

NI''~EBV~

FOSTER CHILDREN BONNIE L., by and through her next friend Donald Hadsock;

~G 292000

REGGIE B. and REBECCA B., by and through their next friend Danielle Roussel;

CLARENCE MADDOX ~ltlAI\, ~aQ_C£~D£Lll!f~

LAURIE S. and LILLIE S., by and through

their next friend Danielle Roussel;

LESLIE F., by and through her next friend

Brenda Shapiro; SANDRA M., by and through

her next friend Danielle Roussel; TANYA M.,

by and through her next friend Danielle

Roussel; CANDICE D. and JAY D., by and

through their next friend Lori A. Haythorn;

MATTHEW I., by and through his next friend

Danielle Roussel; HUGH S., by and through

His next friend Danielle Roussel; LEANNE G.

and TAMMY G., by and through their next

friend Danielle Roussel; ELAINE R., by and

through her next friend Kristi Kassebaum;

PAUL B., by and through his next friend

Danielle Roussel; RACHEL C., by and through

her next friend Danielle Roussel; CATHY W.,

by and through her next friend Danielle

Roussel; LARISSA C., by her next friend,

Rhoda Goodson; JOHN J., by and through

his next friend Mary Miller; MELINDA and

KARINA, by and through their guardian ad

AMENDED COMPLAINT

litem Brenda Shapiro, on behalf of

FOR DECLARATORY AND

themselves and all other similarly

INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

situated children,

CLASS ACTION

Plaintiffs,
v.

JEB BUSH, as Governor of the State of Florida; KATHLEEN KEARNEY, as Secretary of the Florida Department of Children and Families; CHUCK BATES, JOHN AWAD, ESTER TIBBS, LEE JOHNSON, LYNN RICHARD, DON DIXON, ROBERT MORIN, FRAN GIBBONS, PAUL BROWN, CHARLES AUSLANDER, CHRISTINE DAVENPORT, PATRICK HOWARD, SUE GRAY and VERN MARTIN, each as a District Administrator of the Florida Department of Children and Families,

Defendants.
-----------------------------------------I

Case 1:00-cv-02116-FAM Document 42 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/30/2000 Page 2 of 116
A. INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT 1. Plaintiffs, Foster Children, on behalf of themselves and all other children in Florida foster care, sue Defendants Jeb Bush, as Governor of the State of Florida; Kathleen Kearney, as Secretary of the Florida Department of Children and Families [DCAF]; and Chuck Bates, John Awad, Ester Tibbs, Lee Johnson, Lynn Richard, Don Dixon, Robert Morin, Fran Gibbons, Paul Brown, Charles Auslander, Christine Davenport, Patrick Howard, Sue Gray and Vern Martin, each as a DCAF District Administrator. [In this paragraph and hereafter, the terms ~foster childn and "foster care" are used to include children in Defendants' custody based on either an allegation or an adjudication that the child is abused, neglected, abandoned, surrendered or voluntarily placed with Defendants, and specifically includes foster care, shelter care, independent living and pre-adoptive and adoptive placements]. Plaintiffs allege: 2. This is an action for declaratory and injunctive relief, brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for redress from Defendants' acts and omissions in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution; the First and Ninth Amendments to the United States Constitution; provisions of the Adoption and Safe Families Act; the Early, Periodic Screening, Diagnosis and Treatment ("EPSDT") provisions of the Medicaid Title of the
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Case 1:00-cv-02116-FAM Document 42 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/30/2000 Page 3 of 116
federal Social Security Act; and Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.
3. This suit challenges Defendants' pattern and practice of failing to fulfill the federal constitutional and statutory obligations they owe to the children in Florida foster care as well as the children's need for a safe, stable and appropriate placement. This suit also challenges Defendants' deliberate indifference to the existence of such pattern and practice; to the children's need for safe, stable and appropriate placements; to the children's health and well being; and to the harm Defendants thereby cause these exceptionally vulnerable children. Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and all other similarly situated children, seek injunctive and declaratory relief from such unconstitutional and otherwise illegal practices.
B. JURISDICTION 4. Because this is an action in which the matter in controversy arises under the Constitution and the laws of the United States, this Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343(3).
C. PLAINTIFFS 1. Bonnie
5. Plaintiff Bonnie L. has been involved with Florida's foster care system since 1986, when she was two years of age. Her father's parental rights were terminated in 1987; her
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Case 1:00-cv-02116-FAM Document 42 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/30/2000 Page 4 of 116
mother was having trouble making ends meet as a recently divorced single parent with few job skills. Instead of providing services to the child's mother, DCAF convinced the mother to surrender the Plaintiff and her older sister J.L. so they could be adopted and have a ~better life." [Plaintiffs' sister J.L. has reached her majority and has left Defendants' custody] .
6. Bonnie's adoptive parents, who also cared for her sister and whom DCAF handpicked to care for these children, were abusive beyond imagination. The girls were subjected to innumerable beatings and other torture, including being tied to the bed by their wrists and ankles, being made to sleep on concrete surrounded by a brick cage at night, and punished if the two girls spoke to each other or anyone else. DCAF's ~Hotline" received several calls reporting the abuses, including calls in 1990, 1993, 1994 and 1997, before Defendants finally took the girls back into foster care in March 1997 after a total of ten years of what DCAF itself called egregious abuse. Since then, DCAF chose not even to attempt to seek a permanent family for the girls, moving them from one unsuitable placement to another.
7. In 1999, a guardian ad litem located the girls' natural mother who asked to adopt her biological daughters, Bonnie and her sister. Although DCAF had no other options (and was not even looking for an adoptive placement for the girls),
4

Case 1:00-cv-02116-FAM Document 42 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/30/2000 Page 5 of 116
DCAF initially objected to either of the girls even having contact with their biological mother.
8. For more than three years, Defendants effectively had given up on achieving permanency for these girls and expected them to remain in foster care until they reached their majority. Recently, Defendants finally acquiesced to the biological mother's adoption of Bonnie, but the adoption is not final. Until it is final, this child remains in foster care.
9. Plaintiff Bonnie L. has suffered and continues to suffer irreparable harm as a result of Defendants' failure to protect her from harm and to provide her expeditiously with a permanent, legally stable family. Both the adoption and the child's placement with her biological mother could easily disrupt, which would require Defendants to select another placement for Bonnie. Defendants' continuing custody of and control over Bonnie, together with their pattern and practice of operating the Florida foster care system in an unconstitutional and otherwise illegal manner, create a real and substantial threat that this child will be subjected to further harm in addition to that which Defendants have already inflicted on her. Plaintiff Bonnie L. brings this action through her next friend Donald Hadsock.
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Case 1:00-cv-02116-FAM Document 42 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/30/2000 Page 6 of 116

2. Rebecca and Reggie B.

10. Plaintiffs Reggie B. and Rebecca B. are 13-year-old

twins who reside in District 9. They entered Defendants'

custody and were placed in a shelter on May 4, 1997 and were

adjudicated dependent on June 1, 1998. Suitable relative

caretakers in other states were not contacted until very

recently.

11. Reggie and Rebecca were separated for a while in

foster care. For one month, Reggie was sent to a group home to

develop "social skills." His therapist, teachers, former

foster mother and DCAF caseworker all agree that something

major happened at the group home that caused the child to

deteriorate drastically. He was returned to his previous

overcrowded foster home but continued to deteriorate

emotionally, eventually killing a puppy. After he was asked to

leave this foster home, he spent weeks moving from one shelter

to another, from one foster home to another, usually a

different place each night. He left one home and hitchhiked

back to the DCAF offices after dark. He has developed such

significant emotional problems while in care that he is now in

a therapeutic group home.

'

12. Defendants have only recently approached an aunt of

Reggie and Rebecca, who lives out of state, to be a placement

resource for them. Although, on information and belief, she

helped rear the children while their mother was alive and

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Case 1:00-cv-02116-FAM Document 42 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/30/2000 Page 7 of 116
before they entered Defendants' custody, no prior request was made for her to care for these children. A horne study of this aunt is now under way pursuant to the interstate compact for child placement, but only for Rebecca. If Defendants had previously identified this relative and placed Reggie and Rebecca with her, Reggie would have been spared the devastating harm he suffered in the group horne. This, in turn, would have eliminated even the possibility that he would suffer the debilitating number of replacements he has endured or that he would be subjected to the night-to-night circuit. It would also have expedited the placement of Rebecca - and made it possible for Reggie to be placed - with a permanent family.
13. Following his experience in Defendants' custody, Reggie now has such severe emotional problems that the aunt is unable to care for him. The twins are currently separated and are likely to remain so. This separation would not have been necessary had the children been provided adequate and safe care from the outset of their placement with Defendants.
14. Reggie also has a cleft palate and other medical needs which Defendants have failed to address. The Children's Medical Services reports several missed appointments, which have caused him to "fall through the cracks" at the cllnic.
15. Reggie and Rebecca continue to be in Defendants' custody. Thus, Defendants continue to control where the twins
7

Case 1:00-cv-02116-FAM Document 42 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/30/2000 Page 8 of 116
are placed or if they are to be moved. The planned relative placement for Rebecca could easily disrupt prior to or possibly even after the child is moved, and Reggie's current placement in a therapeutic setting could end at any time. Either circumstance would require Defendants to place the children in a new foster home or facility.
16. Reggie and Rebecca have suffered and continue to suffer serious and irreparable harm as a result of Defendants' failure to protect them from harm, to ensure that Reggie has the medical care he needs, to provide a stable living environment that is adequate to both children's needs, and to achieve permanency expeditiously for these children, which could have been accomplished by Defendants' earlier identification of the aunt as a placement resource. As a result of Defendants' pattern and practice of operating the Florida foster care system in an unconstitutional and otherwise illegal manner, Reggie and Rebecca will continue to be at substantial and imminent risk of being subjected to the types of harm Defendants have already inflicted on them as long as they remain in Defendants' custody. They bring this action through their next friend Danielle Roussel.
3. Laurie and Lillie S. 17. Plaintiffs Laurie S. and Lillie S. are two Black foster children who are sisters and are in the Defendants' custody in Palm Beach County. Born in 1991 and 1993
8

Case 1:00-cv-02116-FAM Document 42 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/30/2000 Page 9 of 116

respectively, the girls entered Defendants' custody on

December 19, 1994 and remain in foster care today.

18. Laurie and Lillie have several siblings in foster

care with whom they were not placed, and they were not

provided with sibling visitation. It was not necessary for

Defendants to separate Laurie and Lillie from their siblings,

or to deny them sibling visitation, in order to protect the

health, safety or welfare of any of the children, and a

professional competent to make such a judgment has never

determined that placement together or regular and frequent

visitation would be detrimental to any of them. Instead, these

siblings were separated from each other because Defendants

failed to recruit a sufficient number of foster homes for

large siblings groups, and failed to arrange for visits

between the separately placed children. This racially neutral

method of administration has a disparate impact on Black siblings in foster care, making sibling separation more likely

'

for Black foster children than for White foster children; has

had the effect of discriminating against Laurie and Lillie and

other Black foster children on the basis of their race or

color; and has had the effect of defeating or substantially

impairing the accomplishment of the objectives of Defendants'

provision of foster care to Laurie, Lillie, and other Black

children in Defendants' custody.

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Case 1:00-cv-02116-FAM Document 42 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/30/2000 Page 10 of 116
19. The parental rights of the children's mother were terminated in March of 1997. The father's rights were not terminated until May 1999.
20. DCAF did not perform a proper, diligent search to locate suitable caretakers for Laurie and Lillie. Instead, DCAF placed the girls in an inappropriate foster home that has been the subject of numerous investigations and is known for housing teenage girls who engage in casual and frequent sexual conduct. DCAF ignored complaints about the placement and kept Laurie and Lillie there for years.
21. The foster mother initially wished to adopt Laurie and Lillie, and, despite the problems with the foster home, the children bonded to her and called her "grandma". However, Lillie began acting out sexually at school when she was six years old. When the DCAF adoption worker requested that the foster mother work on issues involving her home and parenting, the foster mother requested and obtained the immediate removal of the children.
22. The sudden move from the home where they had lived for the previous five years was traumatic for Laurie and Lillie. Their mental and emotional health began to deteriorate severely, and Lillie, at only seven years of age, expressed the wish to die. She was involuntarily committed to a mental health crisis unit.
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Case 1:00-cv-02116-FAM Document 42 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/30/2000 Page 11 of 116
23. DCAF has now located an uncle of Laurie and Lillie, who lives out of state and wishes to adopt the girls. This same uncle informed Defendants he was willing to adopt the girls when they were initially removed in 1994, but was told by DCAF that relatives could not adopt. Placement with this uncle in 1994 would have significantly increased Laurie's and Lillie's opportunity for permanency and concomitantly decreased the chance they would have been exposed either to a damaging environment such as that provided by their preadoptive horne or the trauma of being uprooted.
24. Defendants' failure to achieve a permanent family for Laurie and Lillie more expeditiously resulted from Defendants' practice of treating Black and White foster children differently based on their race or color and is also due to Defendants' practice of making even less effort to provide services and develop and obtain appropriate foster and adoptive placements for Black foster children than for White children in Defendants' custody.
25. Defendants' failure to develop and maintain a sufficient number of appropriate and safe foster homes and to timely identify relatives who are able and willing to care for children in foster care decreases the children's chance to have a permanent, loving horne. These racially neutral practices have a disparate impact on Black foster children, have had the effect of discriminating against Laurie, Lillie
11

Case 1:00-cv-02116-FAM Document 42 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/30/2000 Page 12 of 116
and other Black foster children on the basis of their race or color, and have had the effect of defeating or substantially impairing the accomplishment of the objectives of Defendants' provision of foster care for these children.
26. Laurie and Lillie have been and continue to be irreparably and seriously traumatized and harmed by Defendants' inappropriate handling of their case, their failure to protect these children from harm, and the several years' delay in being moved to a good permanent family. As a result of Defendants' pattern and practice of operating the Florida foster care system in an unconstitutional, racially discriminatory and otherwise illegal manner, Laurie and Lillie will continue to be at substantial and imminent risk of being subjected to the types of harm Defendants have already inflicted on them as long as they remain in Defendants' custody. Laurie S. and Lillie S. bring this action through their next friend Danielle Roussel.
4. Leslie F. 27. Plaintiff Leslie F. is in Defendants' custody as a foster child. She is currently 17 years of age. Leslie is Black and of Haitian descent. She was freed for adoption when she was nine years old, but has never been adopted or otherwise provided with a permanent home. Leslie's former foster mother adopted Leslie's biological brother, but refused
12

Case 1:00-cv-02116-FAM Document 42 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/30/2000 Page 13 of 116
to adopt Leslie. She then cut off all contact between Leslie and her biological brother.
28. Leslie has endured over 30 different foster care placements, and possibly as many as 50 placements. The child was told by her DCAF foster care caseworker that DCAF could not find a stable placement for her because no one wants her.
29. The grossly inappropriate number of placements to which Defendants subjected Leslie and their failure to provide her with the services she needed to achieve permanency, including but not limited to placing her in an adoptive home that would accept her and providing supportive services to her and her adoptive family, resulted from Defendants' practice of treating Black and White foster children differently based on their race or color. The remarkable instability of Leslie's placements and the failure to achieve permanency for her are also due to Defendants' practice of making even less effort to provide services and develop and obtain appropriate foster and adoptive placements for Black foster children than for White children in Defendants' custody. The system's discrimination against Black children is long-standing; the Defendants are aware of a 1978 Dade County grand jury report condemning the discrimination and demanding an end to it.
30. Defendants' failure to develop and maintain a sufficient number of appropriate foster and adoptive placements increases the likelihood children will be placed
13

Case 1:00-cv-02116-FAM Document 42 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/30/2000 Page 14 of 116
with foster parents incapable of caring for them, which, in turn, leads to disruption and multiple placements. The lack of placements also decreases the chance children will achieve permanency expeditiously. These racially neutral methods of administration have a disparate impact on Black children, have had the effect of discriminating against Leslie and other Black foster children on the basis of their race or color, and have had the effect of defeating or substantially impairing the accomplishment of the objectives of Defendants' provision of foster care to Leslie and other similarly situated children.
31. From late 1998 through early 1999, Leslie was in a shelter, even though there was nothing temporary about Defendants' custody of her and she was entitled to a stable placement where she would not suffer further damage or injury.
32. Eventually in 1999, DCAF finally found a foster home for Leslie, but when the DCAF foster care supervisor visited the home after Leslie complained about the conditions there, the supervisor reported the home for investigation because there was insufficient food for the children placed in the foster home, as well as other exhibited problems. These concerns were raised with a DCAF licensing supervisor who is responsible for determining whether foster homes will be licensed and retain their license to care for children in Defendants' custody. This DCAF supervisor was asked to talk to
14

Case 1:00-cv-02116-FAM Document 42 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/30/2000 Page 15 of 116
other children in the home to verify the conditions there, but she refused to do so, stating she talks to the foster parents, not to the children. This DCAF supervisor also refused to call the child abuse ~Hotlinen to report the concerns about the children not being fed in the foster home which, if true, would constitute neglect. Her response was that she is an advocate for foster parents and does not call the Hotline to report them.
33. Since leaving the neglectful foster home in 1999, Leslie has endured several additional moves to other foster care placements. She and other foster children were removed from her most recent foster home in connection with allegations they were in grave danger in the home, and Leslie was placed in a shelter, a totally inappropriate placement for her. She was then placed in yet another temporary placement, from which she ran, but she intends to return to Defendants' physical custody, and remain in their legal custody.
34. As a result of her many moves, Leslie's education has been seriously disrupted. Although DCAF has not made reasonable efforts to find placements that would allow Leslie to continue to attend the same school, she herself has made Herculean efforts to maintain continuity in her education, often having to travel unacceptably long distances to remain in the same school after Defendants transferred to her a new foster care placement.
15

Case 1:00-cv-02116-FAM Document 42 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/30/2000 Page 16 of 116
35. Leslie has sought an opportunity to participate in the subsidized Independent Living foster care program, a benefit provided by the State. There is no application process for this program, and Defendants do not provide children who are excluded from it with notice of the decision or an opportunity to have DCAF's decision reviewed, and their decisions concerning which children will participate in the program are arbitrary and capricious. Thus far, Leslie has not been included in the subsidized Independent Living program.
36. Leslie will turn 18 years of age in October 2000. She has mental health problems and will not be prepared to leave Defendants' custody when she reaches her majority. Individuals in foster care are permitted to remain in care past their 18th birthday if they meet specified criteria, but Defendants do not provide youngsters in their custody who reach their 18th birthday with notice that they have this option or provide such individuals who are discharged from care with an opportunity to have the discharge decision reviewed before or after discharge. Defendants' decisions concerning which individuals will be permitted to remain in care after reaching 18 years of age are arbitrary and capricious. If Leslie is discharged from Defendants' custody when she reaches 18 years of age, she will be exposed to immediate and grave danger because she is not prepared to care for herself.
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Case 1:00-cv-02116-FAM Document 42 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/30/2000 Page 17 of 116
37. Until the Florida Dependency Court took the unusual step of appointing an attorney for Leslie, [something which does not occur for most children in dependency proceedings], Defendants had consistently deprived her of an opportunity to attend and participate in judicial and administrative reviews that addressed her legal, custodial and permanency status. Defendants have failed to notify Leslie of the judicial and administrative reviews, although they routinely provide notice to other parties concerning these types of proceedings, the court had not determined her attendance at judicial review hearings was not in her best interests, and Defendants had not determined she had insufficient maturity to attend administrative reviews of her case. Defendants have also failed to provide the services, such as transportation, that Leslie needed in order to be able to attend and participate in these proceedings, and she had no other source from which to obtain these services. Additionally, Defendants have arbitrarily and capriciously prevented Leslie from participating in DCAF's process for developing a case plan for her, although it would have been appropriate for her to participate in this process. Leslie's case plan addresses, among other things, the appropriateness of retaining her in Defendants' custody, her current placement, the services provided to her, her participation in an Independent Living
17

Case 1:00-cv-02116-FAM Document 42 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/30/2000 Page 18 of 116
Program, and other issues that are critical to her well being and development.
38. Leslie has suffered and continues to suffer irreparable and very serious injury as a result of Defendant's failure to protect her from harm, to provide her with a stable foster care placement, to provide her with permanency, to prevent her separation from her brother, to provide her with an opportunity to participate in all court hearings administrative reviews and the development of case plans that affect her, and to desist from their racially discriminatory practices. As a result of Defendants' pattern and practice of operating the Florida foster care system in an unconstitutional, racially discriminatory and otherwise illegal manner, Leslie will continue to be at substantial and imminent risk of being subjected to the types of harm Defendants have already inflicted on her as long as she remains in Defendants' custody. Leslie is also at imminent and very real risk of being denied participation in the subsidized Independent Living Program and discharged from Defendants' custody, without notice or an opportunity for a hearing to contest either decision. Leslie F. brings this action through her next friend Brenda Shapiro.
5. Sandra M. 39. District 9 Plaintiff Sandra M. is a 16-year-old who was sexually abused and neglected while living at home and,
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Case 1:00-cv-02116-FAM Document 42 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/30/2000 Page 19 of 116
after six reports of suspected maltreatment, was removed from her mother and placed in foster care in 1989. Sandra and her brother were placed in one foster home for two years, where they bonded to their good, loving foster parents. When the natural parents' rights were terminated and the children became available for adoption, Defendants, for no legitimate reason, denied the children's foster parents' request to adopt the children.
40. DCAF instead separated Sandra from her brother, and both children continued to be held in foster care limbo. Sandra was placed in several different foster homes over the next two years, while she was separated from her brother. She was eventually placed with a foster parent (foster parent "A") who offered Sandra stability.
41. Against the advice of Sandra's guardian ad litem, Defendants then moved Sandra from A's foster home to an adoptive home with her brother and an older sister. By this time, Sandra and her siblings were displaying such disturbed behavior that this adoptive placement lasted only six months, and Sandra was moved back to foster parent A, being separated from her siblings for the last time. At this time Sandra was eight years old and foster parent A decided to adopt her. There were obvious problems with this mother's parenting skills, which were well known to DCAF, and Sandra did not appear to be happy during her foster placement in the home,
19

Case 1:00-cv-02116-FAM Document 42 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/30/2000 Page 20 of 116
which boded ill for a successful adoption. DCAF pursued this adoption, which was finalized, but subsequently failed.
42. The adoptive mother could not handle Sandra, who continued to exhibit disturbed behavior. The adoptive mother placed her at the Nelle Smith Group Home, and on July 2, 1997, Defendants retook custody of Sandra. In the same month, the Nelle Smith Group Home closed, and Defendants placed Sandra at the White Foundation shelter, where she was attacked and beaten by two female residents on July 15, 1997. Due to Defendants' failure to care for her and to provide her with a safe placement, Sandra returned to her adoptive mother. But her adoptive mother was still unable to maintain Sandra due to the child's behavior, and she placed her back in foster care as of October 8, 1997.
43. After Sandra returned to foster care in Fall 1997, Defendants placed her in several foster homes until 1998, when she was placed at the South County Mental Health Center's Group Home, where she did well. But that facility, like the Nelle Smith Group Home, closed, and, because Defendants said they had nowhere else to place her, they placed Sandra at the crisis unit at South County Mental Health Center in April 1998. She remained there for one year, rather than the short (normally 72-hour) period for which placement there is designed. Finally, in May 1999, she was placed at the Adolescent Residential Learning Center at the 45th Street
20

Case 1:00-cv-02116-FAM Document 42 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/30/2000 Page 21 of 116
Mental Health Center, a residential psychiatric setting. She was then "stepped down" to daniel memorial therapeutic group home in December 1999, where she remains.
44. Defendants have never moved to terminate the parental rights of Sandra's adoptive parent; Sandra remains in Defendants' custody as a foster child; and Defendants' intention is for her to remain in foster care until she reaches her majority. Effectively, Defendants have abandoned any attempt to find a permanent home for Sandra.
45. Sandra has been and continues to be seriously and irreparably harmed by Defendants' failure to provide her with a safe and stable foster care placement or an appropriate and stable permanent family. As a result of Defendants' pattern and practice of operating the Florida foster care system in an unconstitutional and otherwise illegal manner, Sandra will continue to be at substantial and imminent risk of being subjected to the types of harm Defendants have already inflicted on her as long as she remains in Defendants' custody. She brings this action through her guardian ad litem Danielle Roussel.
6. Tanya M. 46. Plaintiff Tanya M. is a 14-year-old foster child who was first placed in foster care on August 31, 1998. District 9 DCAF has placed her in several different unsuitable placements including foster homes where she has been neglected
21

Case 1:00-cv-02116-FAM Document 42 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/30/2000 Page 22 of 116
and subjected to cruel and dangerous treatment. In one home, she was not adequately fed and lost a significant amount of weight within one month. Tanya was thin to start with, and this weight loss was unnecessary and harmful. Her complaints to her DCAF worker about this foster home were ignored. In her next foster home, she was one of eight children. All eight children slept in one bedroom and shared one dresser.
47. Tanya's need to be placed in an appropriate foster home was ignored, and DCAF left her at another overcrowded home where she had previously been placed, even though the foster mother had already warned DCAF the child was not acceptable for placement there. Despite this warning, the DCAF worker left Tanya at this foster home after the DCAF office had closed. The foster mother made it clear she did not want Tanya there, and as a result, Tanya left the foster home, although she had no place to go. Later that night, a Pahokee Police Department officer who was concerned that it was unsafe for her to be walking alone in the area after dark picked up Tanya. At the time, she was carrying all of her possessions in bags and a backpack.
48. Subsequently, an appropriate home was located and Tanya began to thrive in her new environment; she began to do well in school, also. She was subsequently returned to her biological parents on October 18, 1999, after more than 12 months in the foster care system.
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Case 1:00-cv-02116-FAM Document 42 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/30/2000 Page 23 of 116
49. The reunification with her parents failed. After less than two months, on December 5, 1999, Tanya was assaulted by her father and sustained a broken arm. Tanya was placed in a DCAF shelter and then returned to foster care on May 1, 2000.
50. Both times Tanya was removed from her biological family's horne (in 1998 and 2000), her three younger siblings were removed simultaneously. Tanya, however, has never been placed with her siblings, although placement together would not be contrary to the health, safety or welfare of any of the children. No professional qualified by the training, credentials and experience needed to make a sibling-separation decision has ever found that a joint placement would be detrimental to any of the children.
51. Tanya was placed in an overcrowded girls' group shelter. DCAF has stated that it wants to place Tanya at a wilderness camp, which is primarily used as a moderate risk delinquency commitment program, even though Tanya is not a delinquent and has not committed any violations of the law. Tanya remains in Defendants' legal custody as a foster child. As a result of Defendants' failure to provide minimally adequate care and supervision of Tanya, she has run away from the shelter, and her whereabouts are not known, subjecting her to grave danger.
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52. Tanya has suffered and continues to suffer irreparable and very serious injury as a result of Defendants' failure to protect her from harm and provide her with a secure, safe and appropriate placement. As a result of Defendants' pattern and practice of operating the Florida foster care system in an unconstitutional and otherwise illegal manner, Tanya will continue to be at substantial and imminent risk of being subjected to the types of harm Defendants have already inflicted on her as long as she remains in Defendants' custody. She brings this action through Danielle Roussel.
7. Jay and Candice D. 53. Plaintiffs Jay D. and Candice D. are brother and sister, born on August 28, 1992 and May 6, 1991, respectively. They were placed in foster care on February 15, 1996, and have lived continuously in foster care since that date. They remain in Defendants' custody. Parental rights were terminated with respect to these children on June 17, 1998. 54. Jay and Candice have resided in a stable home-like environment at the Real Life Children's Ranch since April 30, 1997. Candice has lived with the same group-home parents for her entire placement at the Real Life Ranch, and Jay has lived with his same group-home parents since September 1998. The children are bonded to their house parents, attend community schools, and are part of their group-home families; both
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families want to adopt the D. children who currently resides with them and have placed adoption bids for the children.
55. For some time Jay's and Candice's older brother was also placed at the Real Life Ranch. The younger children had been separated from him earlier because of his aggressive behavior, and he was subsequently discharged from the Real Life Ranch on July 22, 1999, because of allegations of inappropriate sexual behavior toward his siblings. The elder brother was subsequently rejected by a prospective foster horne based on the perceived danger he posed to the family's biological son, and he was eventually placed in a facility with his own alarmed room. This placement also failed because of his aggression toward the younger children also in the facility.
56. Jay and Candice, who had exhibited problematic behaviors while their elder sibling was at the Real Life Ranch, have achieved far more stable and acceptable behavior patterns since his removal and they are doing remarkably well in their placement. The children's therapist, as well as the staff at the Real Life Ranch, have indicated their belief that Jay's and Candice's behavior has stabilized because their elder brother was removed from their living environment, which resulted in the children developing an increased sense of security.
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57. Between April 1997 and February 2000, Jay and Candice had only three visits from a DCAF caseworker. The decision to deny them caseworker oversight and protection was not subject to a meaningful professional, administrative or judicial review.
58. Despite Defendants' almost complete lack of meaningful contact with Jay and Candice for almost three years, on March 20, 2000, Defendants announced their intention to remove Jay and Candice from the Real Life Ranch almost immediately, place them in an interim foster placement and then replace them in yet another foster home to which their elder brother would also be moved. This plan is currently on hold, but since Defendants announced their intention to remove Jay and Candice from the Real Life Ranch, they have excluded the personnel of the Real Life Ranch from any case planning, staffings or meetings concerning Jay and Candice. Defendants cannot make competent professional judgments about how these children are functioning, what their needs are, and what plans are appropriate for them in the absence of information from the responsible adults who care for and observe Jay and Candice on a daily basis.
59. As long as Jay and Candice remain in foster care, they are at substantial and very real risk that Defendants will return to their long-standing policy and practice of
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denying these children the protection of monthly caseworker visits, to which they are entitled.
60. Jay and Candice are at imminent risk of further serious and irreparable injury because Defendants fail to exercise competent professional judgment in making decisions concerning these children's care and safety and intentionally exclude critically important and readily available information from that decision-making process. Plaintiffs Jay D. and Candice D. appear by their next friend Lori A. Haythorn.
8. Matthew I. 61. Plaintiff foster child Matthew I. is two years old. He entered foster care in October 1999. Matthew was neglected in a grossly overcrowded foster home in Palm Beach County that housed a total of seven children, including a child with Down's Syndrome, whose special needs placed a further drain on the foster parents. Defendants were fully aware of the number of children in this horne when they placed and retained Matthew and the other foster children there. 62. On October 15, 1999, a worker from an agency that contracts with Defendants observed Matthew to be very sick, to have difficulty breathing, and to have a bite mark on his arm. The foster mother reported that another two-year-old in the foster horne had bitten Matthew. 63. On November 6, 1999, a worker from the same contract-agency observed Matthew to be very dirty, with dirty
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ears, dirty hair, scaly skin on his scalp, a bruise on his

chin, a dirty diaper with red sores and scabs on his buttocks

and inner thighs, and long, dirty finger and toe nails.

Matthew was again very sick and wheezing. The foster home was

observed as emitting a strong, offensive odor; the sink was

overflowing with dirty dishes; old food was on the floor; and

weeks' worth of dirt was encrusted on the floor. The contract-

agency worker took Matthew to a hospital emergency room. He

had a fever of 104 degrees and was diagnosed with bacterial

pneumonia; he was treated and released. The foster home was

reported to Defendants' child abuse ''Hotline".

64. On November 19, 1999, a DCAF worker observed

Matthew to be very sick, dirty and with a black eye. The

foster mother reported that Matthew and another child fell off

the couch while fighting. The DCAF worker did not report the

condition of the foster horne or of Matthew to the "Hotline".

I

Despite repeated observations that this was an unfit foster

home, Defendants did not remove Matthew from this home until

January 17, 2000. Matthew's new foster mother observed him to

be very sick and to have difficulty breathing when she

received him. A nebulizer machine was provided to the new

foster horne for Matthew's use, but the new foster mother did

not know, and was not instructed, how to use it. After five

days in this new foster home, Matthew was observed as looking

better than he ever had. Instead of being left there, he was

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returned to the previous foster home on January 24, 2000. On at least three subsequent occasions, Matthew was observed as extremely dirty, and he was consistently sick at his day care center. Matthew was finally removed from this inadequate and, for him, dangerous home on February 9, 2000.
65. Matthew has suffered and continues to suffer serious and irreparable harm as a result of Defendants' failure to ensure he has the medical care and living environment that meet his needs and do not subject him to harm. As a result of Defendants' pattern and practice of operating the Florida foster care system in an unconstitutional and otherwise illegal manner, Matthew will continue to be at substantial and imminent risk of being subjected to the types of harm Defendants have already inflicted on him as long as he remains in Defendants' custody. Matthew I. brings this action through Danielle Roussel.
9. Hugh S. 66. Plaintiff Hugh S. is a 16-year-old Palm Beach County foster child. In 1996, when he was twelve years old, his mother died and his father turned him in to DCAF, claiming he was not the child's biological father. The parental rights of the father were never terminated, and DCAF has neither located Hugh's natural father nor made an attempt to locate a good, permanent substitute family for this child.
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67. Hugh has been moved from place to place because of a lack of placements for teenagers, and he has missed a significant amount of school, having spent many days in DCAF's office rather than in school. He has spent weeks not knowing where he would be spending the night from one night to the next. He would wait in the DCAF office during the day and then be taken to a place in the evening where he could only spend one night. Night-to-night placements are not uncommon for children in Defendants' custody; the DCAF pattern and practice of not timely moving children to permanency contribute to overcrowding in foster placements and a lack of sufficient, safe, suitable foster placements.
68. Hugh has had inadequate clothing, and often had no jacket; his foster home did not have the funds to purchase a jacket for him. This situation prompted complaints to DCAF from his school that he would come to school with inadequate and dirty clothes.
69. During the summer of 2000, Hugh resided with his father (who originally placed him into foster care), but remained in Defendants' custody as a foster child. His father then returned Hugh to Defendants' physical custody, and he was again on the night-to-night circuit. During July 2000, he resided at a runaway shelter, although he is not a runaway, and had only one change of clothing. The shelter insisted Hugh attend summer school because all of the youngsters at the
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shelter did so, although he had inadequate clothing and had not previously been in summer school. Even if Hugh eventually returns to his father, this arrangement could easily disrupt, as it has in the past, and Hugh could remain in or return to foster care.
70. Hugh has been and continues to be seriously and irreparably harmed by Defendants' failure to provide him with a stable, appropriate placement, to achieve permanency for him, and to provide for his basic needs. As a result of Defendants' pattern and practice of operating the Florida foster care system in an unconstitutional and otherwise illegal manner, Hugh will continue to be at substantial and imminent risk of being subjected to the types of harm Defendants have already inflicted on him as long as he remains in Defendants' custody. He brings this action through his next friend Danielle Roussel.
10. Leanne and Tammy G. 71. Plaintiff foster child Leanne G. is a two-and-onehalf-year-old Black girl who was taken into Defendants' custody and placed in a shelter at birth and entered formal foster care (after dependency adjudication) as a young infant on March 11, 1999. Leanne was then placed in a neglectful and inadequate foster home, where she failed to thrive. By age 13 months, Leanne was still not on solid food and was kept in her crib or playpen the majority of the time.
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72. Leanne's foster mother refused to take the child to

the pediatrician between March 17, 1999 and September 10,

1999. When the DCAF worker finally took Leanne to the

pediatrician, the pediatrician could not effectively treat the

child because the DCAF worker provided no information about

the child and the foster mother refused to attend

appointments. The pediatrician, who threatened not to treat

Leanne any further unless he was provided with necessary

information, also noted that the "baby's muscles [were] very

tight ... but does [sic] not bear weight" and that the "baby

[was] not receiving therapies."

73. Leanne has five siblings in foster care, including

Plaintiff Tammy G. Leanne did not see her siblings for one

year. There is no legitimate reason for Leanne's and Tammy's

separation from their siblings or the denial of sibling

visitation. The decision to separate these children and deny

I

them visitation with each other was not reviewed by a

professional qualified by training, experience and credentials

to determine whether separating the children was necessary to

protect their health, safety and welfare.

74. Defendants have separated these children only

because they do not have a sufficient number of foster homes

that will care for large family groups. The effects of

separating siblings in their placements are compounded by the

Defendants' unjustified failure to arrange for visitations

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between siblings at least once monthly, as required by law. Defendants' racially neutral failure to recruit a sufficient number of foster families suitable for sibling groups and their failure to provide at least monthly visitations between siblings has a disparate impact on Black siblings in foster care, making sibling separation more likely for Black foster children than for White foster children; has had the effect of discriminating against Tammy, Leanne and other Black foster children on the basis of their race or color, and has had the effect of defeating or substantially impairing the accomplishment of the objectives of defendants' provision of foster care to Tammy, Leanne and other Black children in Defendants' custody.
75. Although Leanne has been placed in a pre-adoptive home, DCAF has effectively put the adoption on hold and the prospective adoption and the placement could easily disrupt at any time. Defendants do not have an alternative strategy for achieving permanency for Leanne.
76. Defendants' failure to achieve permanency for Leanne has resulted from Defendants' practice of making even less effort to provide services and develop and obtain appropriate adoptive placements for Black foster children than for White children in Defendants' custody.
77. Defendants' failure to develop and maintain a sufficient number of adoptive homes decrease the likelihood
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children will achieve permanency expeditiously. This racially

neutral method of administration has a disparate impact on

Black children, has had the effect of discriminating against

Leanne and other Black foster children who are appropriate for

adoption on the basis of their race or color, and has had the

effect of defeating or substantially impairing the

accomplishment for Leanne and similarly situated Black foster

children of the objectives of Defendants' foster care and

adoption program.

78. Leanne has been and continues to be irreparably and

seriously injured by Defendants' failure to protect her from

harm, to meet her basic needs, to achieve permanency for her,

and to place her with her siblings or, if that would be

harmful to one of the children, as determined by professional

competent to make such a determination, to provide her with

regular and frequent sibling visitation. (Such a professional

l

might, but would not necessarily, find that a delay in

achieving permanency for one of the children would pose an

unacceptable risk of harm to the child, justifying

separation). As a result of Defendants' pattern and practice

of operating the Florida foster care system in an

unconstitutional, racially discriminatory and otherwise

illegal manner, Leanne will continue to be at substantial and

imminent risk of being subjected to the types of harm

Defendants have already inflicted on her as long as she

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remains in Defendants' custody. She brings this action through her next friend Danielle Roussel.
79. Plaintiff Tammy G. is a nine-year-old Black foster child from District 9 who was placed in foster care on October 21, 1997, at the same time as four of her siblings. She has seen her siblings only once during the past year. Her younger sister, Plaintiff Leanne, came into care in 1999, and the six siblings are in six different homes.
80. Tammy has been in four separate homes in the past three years. In one home, the foster parent punished Tammy by forcing her to stand with one leg in the air, for considerable periods of time. In another placement, the foster mother abusively punished her by twisting her arm behind her back and by twisting her nose. The abuse was not adequately investigated by DCAF, consistent with its pattern and practice of greater toleration of child abuse committed by DCAF agents and contract providers than that allegedly committed by parents.
81. In her current DCAF-selected placement, Tammy sleeps with three other children in a room attached to a converted garage. This room has central air conditioning, but the air conditioning is not used. Tammy is not being fed properly in this foster home.
82. Defendants' failure to provide Tammy with the services she needed to achieve permanency, including but not
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limited to taking the reasonable, necessary steps to seek and secure an appropriate adoptive home for her, resulted from Defendants' practice of treating Black and White foster children differently based on their race or color. Defendants' failure to achieve permanency for Tammy is also due to Defendants' practice of making even less effort to provide services and develop and obtain appropriate adoptive placements for Black foster children than for White children in Defendants' custody.
83. Defendants' failure to develop and maintain a sufficient number of adoptive homes decrease the likelihood children will achieve permanency expeditiously. This racially neutral practice has a disparate impact on Black children, has had the effect of discriminating against Tammy and other Black foster children appropriate for adoption on the basis of their race or color; and has had the effect of defeating or substantially impairing the accomplishment of the objectives of Defendants' foster care and adoption program for Tammy and other similarly situated Black foster children.
84. Tammy has been and continues to be irreparably and very seriously injured as a result of Defendants' failure to protect her from harm and to provide her with both a stable placement and permanency, as well as by Defendants' separation of Tammy from her siblings and denial of regular and frequent visitation. As a result of Defendants' pattern and practice of
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operating the Florida foster care system in an unconstitutional, racially discriminatory and otherwise illegal manner, Tammy will continue to be at substantial and imminent risk of being subjected to the types of harm Defendants have already inflicted on her as long as she remains in Defendants' custody. She brings this action through her next friend Danielle Roussel.
11. Elaine R. 85. Plaintiff Elaine R. is an eleven-year-old Dade County child who was taken into Defendants' custody in 1993 and has languished in foster care since then. Separated for no reason from her siblings, who are also in foster care, she finally had parental rights terminated in or before August 1997 and was then placed for adoption with a licensed foster family. At the time of this placement, the father of this foster family already had a criminal record for sexually abusing children. Elaine lived nearly twelve months in that pre-adoptive home, subjected to multiple sexual assaults and abuse before she was removed from this foster home and criminal charges were instituted against the foster father. 86. A suitable adoptive parent has now been found for Elaine, but Defendants are delaying this adoption, thereby denying Elaine the opportunity to have a real, permanent family. Defendants have no alternative strategy by which Elaine will achieve permanency.
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87. Elaine has suffered and continues to suffer serious and irreparable injury as a result of Defendants' failure to protect her from harm, to protect her interest in living and maintaining contact with her siblings, and to provide her with a permanent, legally stable family. As a result of Defendants' pattern and practice of operating the Florida foster care system in an unconstitutional and otherwise illegal manner, Elaine will continue to be at substantial and imminent risk of being subjected to the types of harm Defendants have already inflicted on her as long as she remains in Defendants' custody. She brings this action through her guardian ad litem Kristi Kassebaum.
12. Paul B. 88. Plaintiff Paul B. is a 16-year-old Black foster child from Palm Beach County. While living with his biological family, he was placed under DCAF supervision in April 1983 at the age of two weeks and remained under DCAF supervision until he entered foster care in September of 1993, at the age of ten years. Paul has had at least 33 placements, including a period at a DCAF shelter (although he had already been adjudicated dependent), where he was placed due to a claimed lack of foster homes. This shelter facility was used to house juvenile delinquents, some of whom were violent offenders. 89. Paul's multiple moves, as well as his having to attend school at such shelter facilities, have caused him to
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fall behind in his education. The Palm Beach County Board of Education has no record that Paul attended school during an entire academic year Paul spent in a DCAF facility.
90. Paul has, moreover, been denied a good permanent family. Paul's parents' rights were terminated, but he was never placed for adoption.
91. The outrageous number of times Defendants moved Paul and their failure to provide him with the services he needed to achieve permanency, including but not limited to the placement of Paul in an adoptive home, resulted from Defendants' practice of treating Black and White foster children differently based on their race or color. The shocking instability of Paul's placements and the failure to achieve permanency for him are also due to Defendants' practice of making even less effort to provide services to and develop and obtain appropriate foster and permanent placements for Black foster children than for White children in Defendants' custody.
92. Defendants' failure to develop and maintain a sufficient number of appropriate foster and adoptive placements increases the likelihood children will be placed with foster parents incapable of caring for them, which, in turn, leads to disrupted and multiple placements. The lack of placements also decreases the chance children will achieve permanency expeditiously. This racially neutral method of
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administration (the failure to maintain a sufficient number of foster placements) has had a disparate impact on Black foster children, has had the effect of discriminating against Paul and other Black foster children on the basis of their race or color, and has had the effect of defeating or substantially impairing the accomplishment of the objectives of Defendants' placement of Paul and other similarly situated Black children, out of their own home and into foster care.
93. Paul has and continues to suffer serious and irreparable harm as a result of Defendants' failure to provide him with a safe, stable and secure placement, to ensure he received an adequate education, and to provide him with a permanent, legally stable family. Paul's injuries also resulted from Defendants' racial discrimination. Paul is currently in Defendants' legal custody. As a result of Defendants' pattern and practice of operating the Florida foster care system in an unconstitutional, racially discriminatory and otherwise illegal manner, Paul will continue to be at substantial and imminent risk of being subjected to the types of harm Defendants have already inflicted on him as long as he remains in Defendants' custody. He brings this action through his next friend Danielle Roussel.
13. Rachel c.
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94. Plaintiff Rachel C. is a 13-year-old Palm Beach County child kept by DCAF in a temporary shelter for more than 12 months, from approximately October 5, 1998 through approximately April 3, 2000. At this shelter, Rachel was housed with girls with significant mental health and delinquency histories, rendering this facility entirely inappropriate for her. While Rachel resided there, she was charged as a delinquent. Rachel left Defendants' care in April 2000 to reside with an uncle, but returned to Defendants' custody on June 13, 2000. Rachel remains in Defendants' custody as a foster child, and is in a shelter.
95. Rachel has suffered and continues to suffer irreparable and very serious harm as a result of Defendants' failure to provide her with a safe, stable and secure placement. As a result of Defendants' pattern and practice of operating the Florida foster care system in an unconstitutional and otherwise illegal manner, Rachel will continue to be at substantial and imminent risk of being subjected to the types of harm Defendants have already inflicted on her as long as she remains in Defendants' custody. Rachel C. brings this action through her next friend Danielle Roussel.
14. Cathy W. 96. Plaintiff Cathy W. is a twelve-year-old child who was held in a temporary shelter in District 9 beginning in May
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1999, even though the Defendants knew the placement exposed her to significant danger and provided her with inadequate supervision. Cathy was involved in several sexual incidents at the shelter, which were clearly and obviously foreseeable, given the past behavior of the youngsters involved, the inappropriateness and danger created by having these children in the same facility, and the absence of minimally competent supervision of these children. Cathy remains in Defendants' custody as a foster child.
97. While in this chaotic and inadequately supervised environment, Cathy was charged as a delinquent. She remains in Defendants' custody as a foster child and has since been placed in a residential treatment facility. As a result of these incidents and Defendants' failure to provide Cathy with a safe, stable placement, Cathy has been seriously and irreparably harmed and her health has been placed at grave risk. As a result of Defendants' pattern and practice of operating the Florida foster care system in an unconstitutional and otherwise illegal manner, Cathy will continue to be at substantial and imminent risk of being subjected to the types of harm Defendants have already inflicted on her as long as she remains in Defendants' custody. Cathy W. brings this action through Danielle Roussel.
15. Larissa c.
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98. Plaintiff Larissa C. was two years old in July 2000. While in foster care, she was placed in an abusive and neglectful foster placement in Flagler County where she was subjected to repeated abuse. Defendants failed both to screen this foster home adequately before placing Larissa there and to supervise the foster home while she lived there. The traumatic brain injuries inflicted upon this child by the foster parents DCAF selected and then failed to supervise have left her partially paralyzed with impaired vision and speech. Larissa remains in Defendants' custody as a foster child.
99. Larissa has been and continues to be irreparably and very seriously injured as a result of Defendants' failure to protect her from harm. As a result of Defendants' pattern and practice of operating the Florida foster care system in an unconstitutional and otherwise illegal manner, Larissa will continue to be at substantial and imminent risk of being subjected to the types of harm Defendants have already inflicted on her as long as she remains in Defendants' custody. She brings this action through her attorney ad litem and next friend Rhoda Goodson.
16. John J. 100. Plaintiff John J. (twelve years of age) entered Defendants' custody as a foster child in approximately 1989 and is still in foster care. John has been in multiple different foster placements. Until recently, Defendants failed
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to search for a suitable relative placement, although it was

discovered years after he entered Defendants' custody that an

appropriate aunt was willing to care for John.

101. During his stay in foster custody, DCAF District

6/Hi1lsborough County DCAF kept John for more than 12 months

at an over-crowded foster home where he was subjected to

beatings and horrible, sadistic abuse, including hot sauce

applied to his tongue, his face dunked in the toilet bowl and

kept there until he gasped for breath, and ridicule, all

prohibited by the Defendants' rules. Although DCAF's rules

prohibit more than five children in a house, this house was

licensed for seven children during the pertinent time.

Following DCAF's express rejection, in 1993, of a request to

increase the licensed number to ten children, there were in

fact ten or more children there during the material times.

When the child abuse "Hotline" was called, DCAF ignored the

abuses, exonerated the foster parents and kept the home open.

'

102. John has suffered and continues to suffer serious

and irreparable injury as a result of Defendants' failure to

protect him from harm and Defendants' delay in providing him

with an opportunity for a permanent, legally stable family. As

a result of Defendants' pattern and practice of operating the

Florida foster care system in an unconstitutional and

otherwise illegal manner, John will continue to be at

substantial and imminent risk of being subjected to the types

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of harm Defendants have already inflicted on him as long as he remains in Defendants' custody. John J. brings this action through his next friend Mary Miller.
18. Melinda and Karina 103. Plaintiff Karina (17 years of age) is one of two Dade County DCAF/District 11 sisters held by the State of Florida in foster care since 1986; they were four and two years of age when they entered Defendants' custody. Now 18, Melinda should still be in foster care, participating in the subsized independent living program. DCAF conferred with her without her guardian ad litem or her attorneys present and coerced and misled her to allegedly sign a form purportedly ending foster care efforts for her. Defendants have not provided Melinda's guardian ad litem or court-appointed counsel with a copy of the alleged form; Plaintiffs believe any such form to be invalid, under the circumstances existing, and efforts for Melinda to re-access services to which she may be entitled are ongoing. Plaintiff Karina remains in foster care. Neither was ever placed for adoption, and Defendants never pursued an alternative form of permanency for either child. In fact, despite adoption being recommended several times by some DCAF caseworkers and DCAF retained therapists, these girls were never even available for adoption because Defendants, contrary to law, made absolutely no efforts to terminate the parental rights of their absent father and give
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them an opportunity for permanency, even though DCAF knew the lack of a permanent family was seriously harming the girls.
104. During their 14 years in Florida's foster care system, Melinda and Karina have been subjected to rapes, beatings and neglect. Melinda contracted syphilis when she was nine years old. The girls have been wrongly separated from each other. Their minds have been damaged by years of psychotropic medications administered for non-therapeutic reasons with Defendants' approval for the convenience of their caretakers. They have been confined for years needlessly in restricted, locked facilities and held there as virtual captives. Melinda and Karina now have permanent mental disabilities.
105. Although of mixed Hispanic descent, Melinda and Karina were labeled and treated as African-American children. The number of placements to which Defendants subjected Melinda and Karina and Defendants' failure to provide them with the services they needed to achieve permanency, including but not limited to the prosecution of a proceeding to terminate parental rights of their father and placement of these girls in an adoptive home, resulted from Defendants' practice of treating Black and White foster children differently based on their race or color. Melinda's and Karina's lack of a stable placement and a permanent family are also due to Defendants' practice of making even less effort to provide services and
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develop and obtain appropriate foster and adoptive placements for Black foster children than for White children in Defendants' custody.
106. Defendants' failure to develop and maintain a sufficient number of appropriate foster and adoptive placements increases the likelihood children will be placed with foster parents incapable of caring for them which in turn leads to disrupted and multiple placements. The lack of placements also decreases the chance children will achieve permanency expeditiously. These racially neutral practices have a disparate impact on children of color and have had the effect of discriminating against Melinda and Karina and other similarly situated foster children on the basis of their color or their race or perceived race, and have had the effect of defeating or substantially impairing the accomplishment of the objectives of Defendants' provision of foster care for Melinda and Karina and other children of color.
107. Karina, the younger sister, remains in Defendants' custody as a foster child and does not have a permanent family, and is currently absent from her placement without permission. Defendants have done little or nothing to recover Karina, although, while absent from her placement, she has been seriously injured and continues to be at grave and imminent risk of further harm.
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108. Melinda is now 18 years of age, and she is either still in Defendants' legal custody or was misled or coerced by Defendants into leaving their custody. Melinda meets the eligibility criteria for remaining in foster care beyond her 18th birthday, but Defendants have effectively denied her this option without the opportunity for a hearing to determine her eligibility and entitlement to remain in foster care.
109. Until the Florida Dependency Court took the unusual step of appointing an attorney for Melinda, [something which does not occur for most children in dependency proceedings], Defendants had consistently deprived her of an opportunity to attend and participate in judicial and administrative reviews that addressed her legal, custodial and permanency status. Defendants have failed to notify Melinda of the judicial and administrative reviews, although they routinely provide notice to the other parties concerning these types of proceedings, the court had not determined her attendance at judicial review hearings was not in her best interests, and Defendants had not determined she had insufficient maturity to attend administrative reviews of her case. Defendants have also failed to provide the services, such as transportation, that Melinda needed in order to be able to attend and participate in these proceedings, and she had no other source from which to obtain these services. Additionally, Defendants arbitrarily and capriciously prevented Melinda from participating in
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DCAF's process for developing a case plan for her, although it would have been appropriate for her to participate in this process. Melinda's case plan addresses, among other things, the appropriateness of retaining her in Defendants' custody, her current placement, the services provided to her, her participation in an Independent Living Program, and other issues that are critical to her well being and development.
110. Melinda and Karina have suffered and continue to suffer irreparable and very serious injury as a result of Defendants' failure to protect them from harm, to provide them with the opportunity to have a permanent, legally stable family, and to provide them with appropriate care. Melinda has further been seriously and irreparably harmed by being deprived of continuing foster care services through Defendants' arbitrary and capricious actions and be being denied an opportunity to participate in all court hearings, administrative reviews and the development of case plans that affect her. As a result of Defendants' pattern and practice of operating the Florida foster care system in an unconstitutional, racially discriminatory and otherwise illegal manner, Melinda and Karina will continue to be at substantial and imminent risk of being subjected to the types of harm Defendants have already inflicted on them as long as they remain in Defendants' custody. The girls are acting through their guardian ad litem Brenda B. Shapiro.
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D. DEFENDANTS 111. Defendant Jeb Bush is the Governor of the State of Florida, the head of the Executive Branch of government and the person responsible for the proper operation of the foster care and adoption systems and for the hiring and continued employment of Kathleen Kearney, Secretary of DCAF. Defendant Bush is sued in his official capacity. By law, Defendant Bush is responsible for supervising Defendant Kearney. He is also responsible for the proper administration of DCAF, proposing a proper budget for DCAF to the legislature and assuring that DCAF operates in conformity with the federal law and State plans submitted to the federal government, which allow Florida to qualify for funding under Title IV and Title XIX of the Social Security Act, including the Adoption and Safe Families Act and the EPSDT provisions of the Medicaid Title of the federal Social Security Act. 112. Defendant Bush is responsible for ensuring that DCAF is operated in accordance with federal law and protects the federally ensured civil rights of the children in Florida foster care, to ensure that the system is not operated recklessly or with deliberate indifference to the needs, safety, lives and rights of Florida's foster children. Additionally, since his inauguration in January 1999, Defendant Bush has directed the operation of Florida's foster care system and dictated the actions to be taken by the other
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Defendants in the operation of Florida's foster care system in a manner that is contrary to law and proper, competent professional standards.
113. Defendant Kathleen Kearney is Secretary of the Department of Children and Families of the State of Florida. She is sued in her official capacity. Under Florida law, Defendant Kearney is responsible for supervising, directing, organizing, planning, administering and executing the functions of DCAF, for ensuring that DCAF performance is in compliance with federal law, for operating the foster care system in such a way as to protect the lives, safety, health and rights of the children in Florida foster care and for ensuring it is operated in such a manner that competent professional judgment is exercised in caring for the children. Additionally, she is responsible for ensuring that DCAF agents and employees exercise proper professional judgment consistent with professional standards in caring for the children subject to their jurisdiction and in their care. Defendant Kearney is also responsible to ensure that the system is not operated recklessly or with deliberate indifference to the needs, safety, lives and rights of Florida's foster children. In this role, she serves at the pleasure of and subject to the direction of Defendant Bush.
114. Defendants Bates, Awad, Tibbs, Johnson, Richard, Dixon, Morin, Gibbons, Brown, Auslander, Davenport, Howard,
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Gray and Martin are the District Administrators of DCAF's Districts One through Nine and Eleven through Fifteen, respectively [collectively referred to as "District Administrators"]. They are sued in their official capacity. Each District Administrator serves at the pleasure and direction of Defendants Kearney and Bush; each serves as the local official in charge in their respective DCAF districts, to ensure that the children in Defendants' custody are free from harm and receive proper care while in state foster care. They also have the legal duty to ensure that the foster care system is operated in accordance with federal law and protects the civil rights of the children in Florida foster care. Each District Administrator is further obligated to ensure that proper professional standards and judgment are exercised in determining and providing for the protection, familial and permanency needs of the children in foster care, and to ensure that the system is not operated recklessly or with deliberate indifference to the needs, safety, lives and rights of Florida's foster children.
115. Defendants are aware of the rampant deficiencies in the operation of the Florida foster care/adoption system and have failed to take the steps needed to cause it to operate in a manner that does not violate the federally protected rights of the children in Defendants' care, but instead is operated in conformity with accepted professional standards.
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116. At all times and in all respects relevant to the claims herein, Defendants Bush, Kearney and the District Administrators were acting in their official capacities and under color of state law.
E. CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS 1. The System-Wide Class
117. Plaintiffs bring this action on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated pursuant to Rule 23{a) and 23{b) {2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The class consists of all children who are currently or who will be in the custody of Defendants as an alleged or adjudicated dependent child.
118. Every child in foster care is directly and adversely affected by the Defendants' deficient operation of Florida's foster care system and specifically by Defendants' acts and decisions that impair the children's federally protected rights as a result of Defendants' failure to comply with accepted professional standards and to exercise competent professional judgment. Children who have the misfortune of being taken into Florida's foster care system routinely have their rights deliberately disregarded by Defendants and are likely to be harmed by the experience.
119. Plaintiffs are members of the class they seek to represent; each Plaintiff and each putative class member is currently in Defendants' custody, with the possible exception
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of Melinda who, if she is not in Defendants' custody, was improperly coerced or misled by Defendants into leaving foster care.
120. The class is so numerous that joinder of all class members is impracticable. There are presently approximately 15,000 children in Florida foster care, including foster home care, emergency shelter care and residential group care, and Defendants expect this population to increase to over 18,000 by June 2001. ~Expenditures by Issue and Appropriation Category, Detail of Expenditures, Exhibit D-3A" September 10, 1999, at 145-46; hereinafter ~Budget Document.")
121. There are questions of law or fact that are common to Plaintiffs and the members of the class they seek to represent, and the claims of the Plaintiffs are typical of the claims of the other class members. Each Plaintiff and each putative class member is in need of safe and adequate foster care, must rely on Defendants for the provision of all care, treatment and services they need, and is harmed by the Defendants' systemic failures to fulfill their legal obligations in the provision of such care, treatment and services.
122. The common questions of fact shared by Plaintiffs and the members of the class they seek to represent include:
a. Whether Defendants fail to provide children in their custody with safe, stable and secure foster care
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placements, as required by law and accepted professional standards;
b. Whether Defendants fail to provide foster children with legally required services, consistent with accepted professional standards, that are necessary to prevent the children from deteriorating while in Defendants' custody, including appropriate medical and educational services; and
c. Whether Defendants fail expeditiously to take reasonable steps to seek and secure for the children in their custody a permanent, legally stable family, as required by federal law and accepted professional standards. 123. Questions of law common to Plaintiffs and their putative class members include:
a. Whether Defendants' actions and inactions violate rights secured to Plaintiffs and the members of the class they seek to represent by the First, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution; and
b. Whether Defendants' actions and inactions violate rights secured to Plaintiffs and the members of the class they seek to represent by the Adoption Assistance and Safe Families Act and the EPSDT provisions of the Social Security Act.
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124. The legal claims alleged by the Plaintiffs are typical and representative of those of the members of the putative class. The injuries Plaintiffs have and continue to suffer are typical of the injuries the proposed class members have suffered and continue to suffer. Declaratory and equitable relief addressed to the putative class members' claims and injuries will address equally the claims and injuries of the individual named Plaintiffs.
125. The representative Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. They bring this action through their well-qualified representatives, including guardians ad litem and next friends. They are represented by geographically diverse, competent counsel including boardcertified civil trial and appellate lawyers and attorneys with experience in class action litigation and child advocacy.
126. The Defendants have acted and refused to act on grounds generally applicable to all members of the class, making appropriate final injunctive relief and corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole.
127. Although they are the legal custodians of the Plaintiffs and all members of the putative class, Defendants have an inescapable and inherent conflict of interest with these children and cannot bring this action against themselves on behalf of these children.
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2. The Subclass of Black Foster Children 128. Plaintiffs Paul B., Leslie F., Laurie S. and Lillie S., Tammy G., Leanne G., Melinda and Karina bring this action on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated pursuant to Rule 23(a) and 23(b) (2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The subclass consists of all children who are Black or are perceived by Defendants as being Black and are or will be in the custody of Defendants as an alleged or dependent child. All putative subclass members are also members of the system-wide class of foster children that all Plaintiffs seek to represent, and the allegations concerning the class as a whole are incorporated here by reference. 129. Every Black child in foster care is directly and adversely affected by the Defendants' racially discriminatory operation of Florida's foster care system. 130. Plaintiffs Paul B., Leslie F., Laurie S. and Lillie S., Tammy G., Leanne G., Melinda and Karina are members of the subclass they seek to represent; each such Plaintiff and each putative class member is in Defendants' custody, with the possible exception of Melinda, who, if she is not in Defendants' custody, was coerced or misled by Defendants into leaving foster care. 131. The subclass is so numerous that joinder of all subclass members is impracticable. There are presently at least 6,000 Black children in Florida foster care, including
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foster horne care, residential group care and emergency shelter care, and this number is increasing.
132. There are questions of law or fact that are common to Plaintiffs Paul B., Leslie F., Laurie S. and Lillie S., Tammy G., Leanne G., Melinda and Karina, and the members of the subclass they seek to represent, and the claims of these Plaintiffs are typical of the claims of the other subclass members.
133. The common questions of fact shared by Plaintiffs Paul B., Leslie F., Laurie S. and Lillie S., Tammy G., Leanne G., Melinda and Karina and the members of the subclass they seek to represent include:
a. Whether Defendants treat Black foster children differently from White children in Defendants' custody because of their race or color, in the provision of foster care or adoption services to them, such as providing safe, secure, stable foster care placements; prosecuting termination of parental rights proceedings; and placing children in adoptive or other permanent homes; and
b. Whether Defendants utilize racially neutral criteria or methods of administering foster care and adoption services that have a disparate impact on Black foster children or have the effect of defeating or substantially impairing the accomplishment of the
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objectives of such foster care and adoption services for Black foster children. 134. Questions of law common to Plaintiffs and their putative subclass members include:
a. Whether Defendants' treatment of Black foster children with respect to the provision of foster care or adoption services constitutes illegal discrimination on the basis of race or color in violation of Tile VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d, et seq. and the regulations promulgated under the Act; and
b. Whether the racially neutral criteria or methods of administering foster care and adoption services used by Defendants have the effect of illegally discriminating against Black foster children on the basis of race or color in violation of Tile VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d, et seq. and the regulations promulgated under the Act. 135. The legal claims asserted by Plaintiffs Paul B., Leslie F., Laurie S. and Lillie S., Tammy G., Leanne G., Melinda and Karina are typical and representative of those of the members of the putative subclass. The injuries these Plaintiffs have and continue to suffer are typical of the injuries the proposed subclass members have suffered and continue to suffer. Declaratory and equitable relief addressed to the putative subclass members' claims and injuries will
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address equally the claims and injuries of Plaintiffs Paul B., Leslie F., Laurie S. and Lillie S., Tammy G., Leanne G., Melinda and Karina.
136. Plaintiffs Paul B., Leslie F., Laurie S. and Lillie S., Tammy G., Leanne G., Melinda and Karina will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the subclass. They bring this action through their well-qualified representatives, including guardians ad litem and next friends. They are represented by geographically diverse, competent counsel including board-certified civil trial and appellate lawyers and attorneys with experience in class action litigation, child advocacy and claims of discrimination on the basis of race or color.
137. The Defendants have acted and refused to act on grounds generally applicable to all members of the subclass, making appropriate final injunctive relief and corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the subclass as a whole.
F. STATEMENT OF FACTS 138. Plaintiffs incorporate paragraphs 1 through 135 into the Statement of Facts.
1. Violations of Foster Children's Substantive Due Process Rights
139. Because plaintiffs and the putative class members are in government custody and wholly dependent on the government for protection of all aspects of their health and
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well-being, Defendants are obligated under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution: to meet these children's basic needs for food, clothing, shelter, and medical, educational and other services, either by providing the needed service or ensuring the service is provided; to provide safe care and a placement that protects Plaintiffs and the putative class members from unnecessary harm, injury or deterioration and neither contravenes accepted professional standards of social work practice nor undermines, impairs or adversely affects their well-being, health, development or education; to provide or ensure the provision of the services these children need to prevent harm, injury or deterioration from occurring; to provide or ensure the provision of the services, help and protection Plaintiffs and the putative class members need to ameliorate any harm, injury or deterioration caused or exacerbated by the actions or inactions of Defendants; to provide care to Plaintiffs and their putative class members that, in terms of their nature, conditions and duration, are consistent with the purposes for which Defendants assumed custody of these children. In each category, the required services and care must be sufficient to provide a safe environment in which Plaintiffs and the putative class members do not deteriorate.
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140. Defendants have engaged in a pattern and practice of failing to fulfill these obligations to Plaintiffs and the putative class members in a variety of ways, as described below. In all such manifestations, Defendants have acted to the detriment of Plaintiffs and the putative class members as a consequence of Defendants' failure to exercise competent professional judgment in the decisions they make and the actions they take and fail to take concerning these children.
141. The problems faced by children in Defendants' custody are both epidemic and long-standing. The Defendants have failed to discharge their legal responsibilities to Plaintiffs and the putative class members. Indeed, continued overcrowding and inadequately supervised foster homes and other out-of-home care facilities, resulting from Defendants' pattern and practice of not timely and properly moving children to permanency, expose children in Defendants' custody to the imminent risk of sexual and other abuse, neglect and other dangers while they remain in Defendants' care.
142. Defendants routinely fail to screen, oversee, monitor and visit the foster and pre-adoptive homes and foster and shelter facilities in which they place Plaintiffs and members of the putative class. Defendants, in fact, operate the foster care system with a much greater tolerance for child abuse committed by their own foster parents, group home parents and institutional personnel than by children's
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biological families. Defendants have, as part of a pattern and practice, knowingly placed and retained Plaintiffs Tanya M., Hugh S., Sandra M., Laurie S. and Lillie S., Elaine R., Paul B., Matthew I., Rachel, Reggie B., John J., Leanne G., Tammy G., Cathy W., Melinda and Karina, Sandra M., Leslie F., Larissa, and other members of Plaintiffs' putative class, in foster care placements that were dangerous, abusive, neglectful, overcrowded, or wholly inappropriate to and incapable of meeting the children's individual needs.
143. Defendants have a pattern and practice of ignoring or inappropriately responding to complaints and other information identifying individual foster, shelter and preadoptive placements as dangerous, abusive, neglectful, overcrowded or inappropriate for specific children in Defendants' custody, including complaints concerning the placements of Plaintiffs Tanya M., Laurie S. and Lillie S., Matthew I., Tammy G., John J., and Leslie F., and other members of the putative class.
144. Defendants' pattern and practice of placing children in their custody into dangerous and overcrowded foster care settings and failing to respond adequately to complaints about such placements violate accepted professional standards, do not represent the exercise of competent professional judgment, are inconsistent with the purpose for which the children were taken into Defendants' custody, have caused and continue to
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cause Plaintiffs and their putative class members serious injury, and are known to Defendants, who through their deliberate indifference have failed to remedy them.
145. In January 1995, a Grand Jury in Palm Beach County released a report, finding that: ~children alleged to be abused, neglected or abandoned in Palm Beach County are at significant risk for further abuse if they are taken into the custody of the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services." (January 13, 1995 Grand Jury Report, p. 1.) [The Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services is DCAF's predecessor agency] .
146. A major contributing factor to the placement and retention of Plaintiffs and the putative class members in dangerous, abusive, neglectful, overcrowded and inappropriate placements is the large workload of Defendants' caseworkers, their high level of turnover, and the lack of adequate and meaningful supervision, training and management of the caseworkers, all of which lead to inadequate supervision and oversight of children in Defendants' custody.
147. In a budget document Defendants prepared for FY20000l, they project that they need an additional 833 DCAF out-ofhome counselors to meet the professionally accepted workload standard for this type of caseworker. DCAF out-of-home counselors supervise and provide services to children and their families while the children are in foster care or
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relative placements and during the first six months following

a child's reunification with the biological family.

Defendants, however, have requested funding for only 104 out-

of-home counselors (12.5% of the need as calculated by

Defendants). Similarly, they are seeking only half the needed

increase in both non-supervisory support personnel, whose

functions are essential to the efficient use of the out-of-

horne counselors, and family support workers, who are intended

to free the out-of-home counselors to concentrate on their

primary mission of working with the child, parents and foster

parents to achieve permanency for the child. (Budget Document,

at 152-156.)

148. As a result of excessive workloads, Defendants' out-

of-home counselors do not visit Plaintiffs and the putative

class members in their placements with sufficient frequency or

in a manner that is adequate to ensure such children's safety.

Such failure contravenes accepted professional standards, does

'

not represent the exercise of competent professional judgment,

has harmed and continues to harm Plaintiffs Jay D. and Candice

D. and other putative class members. Defendants permit this

practice of failing to visit and supervise children in out-of-

home placement to continue as a result of their deliberate

indifference to the children's need for safety.

149. Also significantly contributing to the placements

and retention of Plaintiffs and their putative class members

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in dangerous, abusive, overcrowded, neglectful or inappropriate placements is Defendants' failure to develop, and the resulting lack of a sufficient number and array of placements, to facilitate Defendants' selection of a safe and appropriate placement for each child in their custody. Defendants are fully aware of the lack of an adequate number and array of appropriate placement and have acted with deliberate indifference to the plaintiffs' and class members' need for safe and appropriate placements.
150. Defendants have knowingly engaged in a pattern and practice of placing some foster children, including Plaintiffs Leslie F., Sandra M., Rachel C., Paul B., Hugh S. and Tammy G., on a long-term basis in a temporary shelter or in a group placement because of the unavailability of a foster home that will accept the child. These placements are inappropriate, contravene competent professional judgment, and have harmed and continue to harm these Plaintiffs and other class members.
151. While Defendants have failed to develop an array of foster care settings in sufficient numbers to ensure a safe and secure placement for each foster child, this deficiency is particularly glaring with respect to certain types of placements. Among these are foster homes for large sibling groups and teenagers. DCAF has recognized the need to focus its recruitment efforts on these types of placements [Defendants'
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web site, www.state.fl.us/cfweb/fs/fostercare/issues.html], but has failed to take adequate and reasonable steps to address this acknowledged need.
152. As a result of the lack of foster homes for large sibling groups, Defendants unnecessarily separated Plaintiffs
Tanya M., Reggie B. and Rebecca B., Laurie S. and Lillie S.,
Tammy G and Leanne G., Leslie F., Elaine R., and Melinda and Karina and other class members from their siblings. As a result of a lack of foster homes and other placements for teens, Plaintiff HughS. Paul B., Rachel C., Sandra M., Tanya M., Leslie F., Melinda and Karina and other class members have been placed in dangerous and wholly inappropriate placements. Defendants' failure to recruit, develop and maintain a sufficient number of foster homes for large sibling groups, teenagers, and other groups of foster children who have a foreseeable need for earmarked foster homes violates accepted professional standards, has harmed and continues to harm Plaintiffs Tanya M., Reggie B. and Rebecca B., Laurie S. and Lillie S., Tammy G., Leanne G., Leslie F., Elaine R., Melinda and Karina and Hugh S. and other class and members.
153. Defendants know Plaintiffs and their putative class members have been and continue to be placed and retained in dangerous, abusive, overcrowded, neglectful or inappropriate placements but have failed to address or remedy that practice or the underlying actions and inactions that cause or significantly contribute to it.
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154. In Defendants' budget document, they state:
There has been a significant increase in the need for out of home care placement options for children who have been identified as victims of child abuse or neglect. Over the next two years the department is expecting continued increases in the number of children requiring out of home care placements. There has not been a parallel increase in the number of available foster homes or specialized group homes for children who need to be placed out of their homes. This has resulted in over-crowded conditions in current foster homes and other related facilities. This has caused some districts to pay for children and staff to be housed in motels. The overcrowding of foster homes places children at serious risk of being harmed by other children; places unrealistic expectations for care and supervision on foster parents; and ultimately leads to their rapid turnover.
Foster homes are also overcrowded because the population
needing placement continues to rise, in part, because
Defendants fail to achieve adoption or other type of discharge
expeditiously for the children already in foster care.
155. Even if Defendants are able to develop the needed
out-of-home placements, they will not have an adequate number
of out-of-horne counselors and supervisors to supervise and
serve the children in these placements. Defendants will,
therefore, continue to fail to fulfill their obligation to
protect Plaintiffs and the members of the putative class.
Given the out-of-home counselors' workload, it will simply be
impossible to supervise these children's placements
adequately.
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156. Children require stability and se~urity to grow and develop. It is contrary to sound professional judgment to move a child from foster care placement to foster care placement except in extraordinary circumstances when the movement is needed to protect the child from harm or to provide a specialized placement that is designed to meet the child's specific needs. Multiple moves, including night-to-night placements, and sleeping in motels instead of houses are needlessly, inescapably traumatic to a child, undermining the child's stability and security, and causing the child to suffer an injury.
157. Defendants have a pattern and practice of moving children in their custody repeatedly in contravention of competent professional judgment and have knowingly permitted this practice to continue as a result of their deliberate indifference to the children's need for a safe, stable and appropriate placement. In some cases, these moves have been caused by Defendants' initial failure to exercise professional judgment that resulted in the child's placement in a dangerous, abusive, neglectful, overcrowded or inappropriate foster home or facility, from which the child then had to be removed. This pattern and practice of subjecting children in Defendants' custody to multiple, unwarranted placements has injured Plaintiffs Tanya M., HughS., Sandra M., Laurie S. and Lillie S., Reggie B. Tammy G., Paul B., Leslie F., Jay D. and
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Candice D., Melinda and Karina, and Bonnie L., and other members of the putative class.
158. A factor that contributes to Defendants' repeated replacement of foster children into new settings is Defendants' lack of an efficient and competent mechanism or procedure for locating vacant foster care beds, identifying the characteristics of the children for whom the foster homes and facilities with vacancies would be appropriate, matching the children in need of a placement with appropriate vacancies, and expeditiously placing each child in an appropriate placement. Defendants are fully aware of the lack of such a process, but have not remedied this deficiency as a result of their deliberate indifference to the children's need for a safe, stable and appropriate placement. The absence of a mechanism for identifying settings that are appropriate for each child in need of a placement contravenes professional standards and precludes Defendants from exercising competent professional judgment in selecting placements for children in their custody. Plaintiffs Paul B., Tanya M., Cathy W., Sandra M., Rachel C. Laurie S. and Lillie S., Hughs., Reggie B. and Leslie F. and other putative class members have been or will be placed in inappropriate placements, requiring subsequent replacement, and have been or will be harmed as a result.
159. Defendants often move children to a new placement because the foster parent has demanded the child's removal,
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frequently because of the child's allegedly disruptive

behavior. Children who have undergone abuse or neglect that is

sufficiently serious to require their removal from their

biological families have suffered such great trauma that

disruptive behavior can be expected from them. Indeed,

Defendants recognized this in their Budget Document:

Many children placed in foster care display serious, chronic and disruptive behaviors as a result of the trauma and loss they have experienced. Foster parents need techniques and tools to help them manage these extremely difficult behaviors. Foster parents frequently request that children be removed from their homes because of the children's disruptive behaviors.

(Budget Document, at 156) .

160. Defendants violate accepted professional standards

by failing to prepare foster parents to deal with the

predictable behavior of the children placed in their homes,

although Defendants have foreseen both this type of behavior

and how it undermines the stability of placements, and by

I

failing to support the foster parents with services and other

types of help to make it possible for the child to be

maintained in the foster home. Defendants have thus acted with

deliberate indifference to the children's need for safe,

stable and appropriate placements. This deficiency has harmed

and continues to harm Plaintiffs Sandra M., Tanya M., Reggie

B., and Leslie F., and other members of the putative class.

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161. Defendants also have a pattern and practice of failing to identify relatives who are competent and willing to provide safe and appropriate care for children in Defendants' custody. If Defendants assessed and utilized these capable family members as placement resources, instead of ignoring or actively discouraging relatives (which is currently the case), Defendants would: partially relieve the overcrowding in existing out-of-home placements; avoid placing children in dangerous, abusive, neglectful or inappropriate placements; provide the children placed with relatives with the most appropriate care available; and facilitate the placement of siblings together and foster children's visitation with their separated siblings. It would also increase the likelihood that the children would expeditiously achieve permanent placements and be provided with permanent families.
162. Defendants have injured Plaintiffs Laurie S. and Lillie S., Reggie B. and Rebecca B., John J., Bonnie L., and other members of the putative class by ignoring or actively discouraging possible relative placements and, instead, placing these children into dangerous, abusive, neglectful or overcrowded stranger-placements that were not appropriate and could not meet these children's individual needs. This practice violates accepted professional standards and does not reflect the exercise of competent professional judgment. Defendants, moreover, know of both the insufficiency of the
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number and array of out-of-home placements available to care for the children in their custody and the policy and practice of failing to use relatives or discouraging them from being foster or adoptive resources. Defendants have acted with deliberate indifference to Plaintiffs' and the putative class members' need for appropriate and safe placements.
163. Defendants have a pattern and practice of excluding from the decision-making process concerning individual foster children, the foster children themselves and some responsible adults who are deeply involved with the children and possess critically important information about them. This practice violates accepted professional standards, is outside the scope of professional judgment and defies logic. It has injured Plaintiffs Jay D. and Candice D., Melinda, and Bonnie L. and other putative class members by depriving them of even the possibility that Defendants will engage in fully informed and competent decision-making concerning matters that are critical to the children's well-being and development. Defendants know of this pattern and practice and its detrimental effect on the life-altering decisions made concerning children in their custody, but have been deliberately indifferent to its existence and effect on children and have failed to stop it from occurring.
164. Defendants routinely fail to provide children in their custody with needed medical care for acute, chronic and
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congenital conditions or with treatment prescribed by a physician. This pattern and practice, which is known to Defendants, contravenes accepted professional standards and reflects both a failure to exercise professional judgment and deliberate indifference to the medical needs of Plaintiffs and the putative class members. Defendants have thereby injured and continue to injure Plaintiffs Matthew I., Reggie B. and Leanne G. and other members of the putative class.
165. Defendants have a pattern and practice of allowing children in their custody and care to be subjected to the administration of psychotropic medications for the purpose of making it more convenient and easier to care for these children in an out-of-home setting, rather than for the improvement of the child's mental or emotional health. The administration of such mind-altering drugs for a nontherapeutic purpose unreasonably and unnecessarily restrains these children's liberty and contravenes accepted professional practice. Defendants have undertaken this practice without the exercise of professional judgment and with deliberate indifference to the health and well being of the affected children. Plaintiffs Melinda and Karina and other members of the putative class have been subjected to this practice, which is known to Defendants and these children, have suffered serious injuries as a result.
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166. Defendants systematically deprive children in their custody of access to an education. As a consequence of moving children from one placement to another, children's education is interrupted and impaired. Defendants do not monitor the educational performance of children in their custody to determine whether the child's educational performance is deteriorating or the child requires assistance in meeting educational goals. Defendants also routinely fail to provide educational assistance when a child in their custody needs it. Defendants do not ensure that children in foster care who have special educational needs have those educational needs met. The denial and interruption of the education of Plaintiffs HughS., Paul B., Leslie F., Melinda, Karina and other members of the putative class have resulted from Defendants' failure to exercise competent professional judgment. Defendants are aware of these systemic failings, but have acted with deliberate indifference to the children's educational needs, thereby seriously injuring these children.
167. Defendants have a pattern and practice of failing to provide children in their custody with adequate clothing or a timely paid clothing allowance, and as a result children in Defendants' custody are deprived of adequate and seasonappropriate clothing. Defendants' Budget Document states: ~Despite annual inflation, the clothing allowance has not been changed in six years. The current clothing allowance is
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critically insufficient." Defendants' pattern and practice of failing to provide Plaintiff Hugh S. and other members of the putative class with adequate clothing injures these children, deprives them of a basic need, violates accepted professional standards. Defendants fail to provide foster children with adequate clothing because they do not exercise professional judgment in determining how to meet foster children's basic needs and they are deliberately indifferent to those needs.
168. Defendants have a pattern and practice of attempting to reunify foster children with their biological families when doing so remains obviously dangerous to the child. Defendants' obligation to prevent children in their custody from being harmed encompasses the decision whether it is safe to return a child to the biological family, as well as the decision to place a child in a particular foster, shelter or pre-adoptive placement.
169. Based on Defendants' own data, during the period covering the fourth quarter of FY98-99 through the second quarter of FY99-00, only 23.9% of the children in a licensed home or group care facility who exited foster care did not reenter foster care within twelve months. Thus, 76.1% of these children did re-enter government custody within twelve months, indicating their biological families pose an immediate danger to their safety, health or well being. Defendants' performance (23.9%) fell far short of Florida's own standard that over 95%
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of the children should not reenter foster care within twelve

months, as well as the State's interim goal that 70% of the

children should not reenter care. Every DCAF district was

identified as "Attention Needed" on this performance

indicator. (Florida Department of Children and Families,

"April 2000 Situation Report," Table FSP-026).

170. Defendants' decision that these putative class

members should be discharged from foster care created a known

and imminent danger to them, was contrary to competent

professional judgment, was undertaken with deliberate

indifference to the children's safety, and caused these

children serious injury. Moreover, every Plaintiff, with the

possible exception of Melinda, and every putative class member

currently in Defendants' custody are at immediate risk that

Defendants will decide they should be discharged home without

an adequate assessment of the safety of the parental home. 171. Children are placed into Defendants' custody in

'

order to provide them with temporary care that is safe and

appropriate because their biological families are unable or

unwilling to do so. Except in extremely rare situations,

retaining children in government custody for long periods of

their childhood is not reasonably related to the reason the

children were taken into government custody and is contrary to

competent professional judgment.

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172. Defendants have a pattern and practice of retaining children in foster care for longer periods than is necessary or appropriate. Plaintiffs Laurie S. and Lillie S., Sandra M., Hughs. Reggie B. and Rebecca B., Melinda and Karina, Bonnie L., Jay D. and Candice D., Leslie F. and other members of the putative class have been held in foster care for an unnecessarily long period of time, have thereby been deprived of an opportunity for a permanent family, and have been seriously and permanently injured. Defendants have retained these children in foster care for excessive amounts of time because they have failed to exercise professional judgment in identifying and implementing the reasonable steps needed to discharge these children to an appropriate permanent living arrangement with their biological family, through adoption or otherwise.
173. Not only does an extended stay in "temporary" foster care harm a child by depriving him or her of the stability and support of a permanent family, but, as Defendants know, the longer children are in foster care: the less likely they are to be adopted; the more likely they are to be abused by their DCAF-approved custodians or others in the DCAF-selected placements; the more likely they are to be moved into new placements and consequently into new schools, disrupting both their development and education; and the more likely they are to become truant, delinquent, or both. Each of these
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consequences has caused or will cause additional injury to Plaintiffs Hugh S., Paul B., Rachel C., Cathy W., Melinda, Karina and other putative class members. Additionally Defendants' practice of keeping children in foster care for unreasonably long and harmful periods of time causes the foster care population to increase, resulting in even further overcrowding and greater risk of harm.
174. According to Defendants' own data, dependent children in licensed homes and group homes as of May 2000 remained in Florida foster care for an average of 33.8 months. In Miami-Dade County, the average length of stay was 55 months. For Florida's foster children, the average length of stay exceeds the 12 month standard recognized by the state, and the longer 18-month federal standard. As of May 2000, only 28.7% of the dependent children in licensed foster homes and group care left Defendants' custody within the twelve month time frame adopted by the State of Florida. In Miami-Dade County, only 11.4% of the foster children exited care within twelve months. Conversely, Defendants have recognized that having 72% of the children exit care within twelve months is the federal target and 80% constitutes "good" performance. The abysmal result of the Defendants' pattern and practice of needlessly keeping foster children in custody for longer than the pertinent federal and state time limits is evident from the Defendants labeling all the districts as ~Attention
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Needed" on this indicator. (Florida Department of Children and Families, "April 2000 Situation Report," Tables FSP-003, FSP-027) .
175. When a child is first removed from the biological family, accepted professional judgment requires in most cases that Defendants provide necessary services to the biological family to attempt to facilitate reunification, assuming the parents are alive and their whereabouts are known. In most cases, this requires the assessment of the biological family's needs and provision of services designed to ameliorate the problems that necessitated the child's placement. Unless Defendants make some attempt to facilitate reunification, their efforts to move the child to permanency through adoption may be precluded or significantly delayed, even when adoption appears to be the only avenue to permanency open to the child. Defendants have a pattern and practice of failing to provide the services needed by the biological families of children in out-of-home care, delaying reunification even where it is appropriate.
176. If reunification with the child's biological family cannot be safely accomplished within a reasonable amount of time, accepted professional standards require the government foster care agency to secure an alternative permanent family for the child, either with a relative or through adoption. When adoption is the appropriate approach to achieving
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permanency, Defendants must petition for termination of

parental rights and, concurrently locate and approve a

qualified and appropriate adoptive family. Failing to take

these steps when adoption is appropriate does not represent

competent professional judgment, deprives the child of a real

family and causes a permanent and serious injury to the child.

177. Defendants' most recent available data show that for

FY1998-99, only 68.2% of the children eligible for adoption

were actually adopted, although the State's own standard was

90%. [Defendants asserted that "about 88% is an upper limit on

this measure in Floridau]. As poor as Defendants' performance

is on this measure, it deceptively does not take into account

the thousands of children who should be available for adoption

but for whom Defendants have as yet failed to take the steps

needed first to change their permanency goal and then to free

them for adoption. Defendants further stated that the

I

~denominator for this measure includes many children who have

not yet been placed and some who will never be placed.u

(Florida Department of Children and Families, 'Summary Report

of FY1998-1999 Performance Based on Exhibit D-2A,u (August 31,

1999), at 10. (Emphasis supplied).

178. Defendants have a pattern and practice of too

quickly giving up on finding adoptive families for children

who cannot be returned to their biological families or placed

permanently with a relative. Plaintiffs Bonnie L. and Sandra

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M. and other members of the putative class have been and continue to be seriously harmed by this practice, which is well known to Defendants.
179. For years, Defendants have attempted to excuse or justify their failure to comply with accepted professional standards concerning the inappropriateness of keeping children in government custody for extended periods of time by claiming not to be able to find adequate adoptive homes, or sufficient foster homes for that matter. For thousands of children, Defendants do not even look for families. Defendants, moreover, wait such an unacceptably long time to begin to consider and work toward adoption that the children have been seriously damaged by their foster care experience, making it increasingly difficult to find adoptive homes willing and able to care for them.
This pattern and practice has been identified and condemned by many over the years, including the 1978 Dade County Grand Jury, yet still shamefully continues without interruption. Defendants' perception that it is impossible to recruit a sufficient number of adoptive homes has resulted in foster children being deprived of their right to Defendants' professionally competent efforts to seek and obtain a permanent, legally secure family for them. Further, if the system had functioned properly since Defendant Bush's Administration took office in January 1999, the thousands of
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children who have remained in foster care too long would no longer be in Defendants' custody, but would be children living with loving, stable, permanent families. Instead, a significant number of children in Defendants' custody today [the majority] were already in custody in January 1999; most appear no closer to permanency than they were in January 1999.
180. In order to achieve permanency for foster children more expeditiously, Defendants have identified their need for additional DCAF lawyers and legal support staff. Defendants expect this additional legal staff to increase the initiation and prosecution of termination of parental rights proceedings and generally to speed children's transit through the foster care system. The end product of achieving these goals would be to improve the children's lives and decrease the foster care population, thus relieving some of the overcrowding in placements. To accomplish these purposes, Defendants found they need to add 497 attorneys, 248 paralegals, and 124 secretaries. Defendants, however, only asked for funding for 25% of the unmet needs: 60 attorneys, 28 paralegals and 16 secretaries. [Budget Document, at 148]. Similarly, in connection with the request for additional out-of-home counselors, Defendants stated, ~the fact that there is a severe shortage of staff limits the Defendants' ability to be totally successful" in ~find[ing] alternatives to placing children in out of home care and to reducing the length of
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time children remain in care." [Id., at 152]. Yet, Defendants asked for only 12.5% (104 of 833) of the unmet need for these critically important workers. [Id].
181. Defendants clearly know children are languishing in Defendants' custody rather than being moved toward having permanent, legally stable families of their own, despite established professional standards that such childhood-long government custody is harmful to children and must be prevented except in the rarest of cases. They have, however, failed to take meaningful steps to ameliorate this longstanding pattern and practice that violates the rights of Plaintiffs and the putative class members. Defendants have acted with deliberate indifference to the need of each child for a safe, legally stable permanent home.
182. A young person between the ages of 18 and 21 years may, in some cases, be allowed to remain in Defendants' custody. Defendants' decisions concerning which individuals will be permitted to remain in foster care past their 18th birthday are arbitrary, capricious and fundamentally unfair. Defendants, in fact, simply decide that some youngsters will be able to extend their stay in foster care while others will not.
183. Defendants' decision not to permit an individual to remain in foster care after reaching 17 years of age can and, for many young people does, create an immediate, known and
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unnecessary danger to the individual because of the young person's inability to live independently without the protection and support of the government custodian. Many of these youngsters, including Plaintiffs Leslie F. and Melinda, have been in foster care for much of their childhood because Defendants never arranged a permanent family placement for them, and consequently, they have no family or other adults on whom they can rely for financial and other support once they leave foster care. Also like Plaintiffs Leslie F. and Melinda, many of these young people have educational and other deficiencies and problems that were caused or exacerbated by Defendants' actions and omissions, which have rendered these youngsters unable to live independently upon reaching their majority.
184. Defendants have a pattern and practice of making arbitrary and capricious decisions concerning which foster children will be allowed to remain in Defendants' custody after their 18th birthday. These decisions have deprived or imminently threaten to deprive Plaintiffs Leslie F. and Melinda and other putative class members of an important government benefit and to place them in unnecessary, immediate and foreseeable danger created by Defendants' decision to discharge them from care, causing them serious and irreparable injury.
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185. Defendants operate a subsidized Independent Living Program that pays directly to a child 16 years of age or older the foster care maintenance payment usually paid to a foster care provider (foster parent or agency) to allow the youngster to live in an unlicensed setting independent of daily supervision of a responsible adult but under the on-going supervision of a DCAF caseworker or other adult approved by DCAF. These benefits can continue past the youngster's 18th birthday. Defendants' decisions concerning which individuals will be permitted to participate in the subsidized Independent Living Program are made without full information from the child as well as persons with knowledge of the child and are arbitrary, capricious and fundamentally unfair. Again, Defendants simply decide that some youngsters will receive this substantial government benefit and others will not.
186. Neither Plaintiff Melinda nor Plaintiff Leslie F. was selected to participate in Defendants' subsidized Independent Living Program. For these young people, as well as many other putative class members, exclusion from this program deprives them of the opportunity to prepare adequately to live independently once they are discharged from foster care. The denial of the associated Independent Living cash benefit further precludes them from sustaining themselves financially and exposes them to brutal and overwhelming need for the monetary support.
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187. Defendants have a pattern and practice of making arbitrary and capricious decisions concerning which foster children will be allowed to participate in the subsidized Independent Living Program and receive the cash payment associated with it. Defendants' decision to exclude Plaintiffs Leslie F. and Melinda and other members of the putative class from the subsidized Independent Living Program has arbitrarily and capriciously deprived them of an important government benefit, causing them serious and irreparable injury.
188. Defendants have consistently disregarded their obligations toward the innocent abused and neglected victims who languish, almost invisibly, in DCAF foster placements. The invisibility is due, at least in part, to Defendants' subversion and misuse of the confidentiality that protects certain records; they misuse the confidentiality to shield themselves and the deficient operation of Florida's foster care system - not the affected children or families - from scrutiny.
189. The 1995 Palm Beach County Grand Jury Report re-recommended areas of change first urged in the December 14, 1993 report of the Fifteenth Circuit Grand Jury, and asked for a statewide Grand Jury. Defendant Bush and his predecessors in office have still not petitioned the Florida Supreme Court to impanel such a statewide Grand Jury. Indeed, the only known statewide quality assurance review was conducted in 1994 and
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finalized in 1995; Defendants have intentionally provided no quality control assessment since. It is impossible for Defendants to operate the Florida foster care and adoption programs appropriately and with adequate protection for children in the absence of meaningful programmatic compliance and performance evaluations.
190. Defendants' deliberate indifference to the rights and serious needs of the children in their custody and their pattern and practice of failing to exercise competent professional judgment in the operation of the Florida foster care system have directly and proximately caused Plaintiffs and the putative class members to be deprived of safe placements that meet their basic needs, as well as permanent, legally stable families. All of these violations of the rights of Plaintiffs and the putative class members have resulted in serious physical, mental and psychological injuries to these already damaged and vulnerable children and the irretrievable loss of the opportunity to develop in accordance with their inherent abilities.
2. Violations of Plaintiffs' Procedural Due Process Rights
191. When state law creates an entitlement to a benefit, Defendants cannot deny the benefit to an individual without providing that person with notice and a fair and adequate procedure for challenging the denial or, in some limited
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circumstances, without requiring a professional qualified by appropriate training, credentials and experience to determine, through the exercise of independent professional judgment, whether a course of action is appropriate for the individual.
192. The State of Florida has created entitlements on behalf of Plaintiffs and the putative class members that Defendants cannot deny to such children without adequate procedural protections or in an arbitrary and capricious manner. Defendants have failed to provide any procedures for a meaningful administrative hearing or professional review of the deprivation of these benefits. Among these entitlements are:
a. Caseworker supervision of children in foster care: at least monthly, the DCAF out-of-home counselor will visit the foster child and foster parents in the foster home, Florida Administrative Code, § 65C13.010(5) (g);
b. Caseworker supervision of children in shelter care: while a child in Defendants' custody is in shelter care, the DCAF protective investigator or service counselor will make at least two contacts with the child per week, at least one of which must be face-to-face with the child and shelter parent or provider; and during the visitation, the DCAF worker must evaluate the condition of the shelter home or facility, whether the licensed
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capacity of the shelter has been exceeded, the treatment received by the child and other children in the shelter, and other factors that affect the child, Florida Administrative Code, § 65C-12.008(3);
c. Medical care: when there are indications a foster child has sustained a physical injury or is suffering from an illness, a licensed health care professional shall be immediately called or the child shall be taken to the nearest available hospital for emergency care, Fla. Stat. § 984.19(5).
d. Remaining in foster care after reaching majority: an individual may remain in Defendants' custody following the person's 18th birthday (subject to limitations on the duration of the in-care period) if: the individual is enrolled in high school, a program leading to a high school equivalency diploma, or a full-time career education program, or is enrolled full-time or accepted for admittance in a postsecondary vocational-technical education program, a community college program leading toward a vocational or an associate degree, or a university or college; the person was committed to the legal custody of DCAF for placement in foster care as a dependent child; and all other resources have been thoroughly explored and it can be clearly established
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that there are no alternative resources for placement, Fla. Stat. § 409.145(3}; and
e. Participation in the subsidized Independent Living Program: a cash benefit and opportunity to live independently under the supervision of a DCAF caseworker or other responsible adult approved by DCAF; Fla. Stat. § 409.165(4} (b). 193. Defendants, moreover, have not established, nor have they provided to Plaintiffs and the putative class members, a procedure by which they can apply to Defendants either to remain in foster care beyond their 18th birthday or to participate in the subsidized Independent Living Program. In the alternative, if a procedure exists either to apply for or to challenge the denial of either of these benefits, Defendants do not give Plaintiffs and the putative class members notice of such procedures or as in the case of Melinda and some putative class members, coerce and mislead the child into signing documents relinquishing these benefits, expressly ignoring and precluding input from the children's courtappointed attorneys or guardians ad litem. 194. Defendants' failure to establish a process for an administrative hearing or professional review of decisions to deny Plaintiffs and the putative class members the benefits to which they are entitled, or to have an application procedure or give notice of such procedure for benefits for which
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eligibility criteria exist, constitutes a pattern, practice and policy of depriving Plaintiffs and the putative class members due process of law. Plaintiffs Jay D., Candice D., Matthew I., Reggie B. Leanne G., Leslie F. and Melinda and other putative class members have been and continue to be seriously and irreparably injured as a result of this pattern and practice.
195. Defendants' failure to provide Plaintiffs and the class members with the process that is due when they deny the above-described entitlements to such children constitutes deliberate indifference to the legal rights of these children.
196. The Florida Dependency Court conducts periodic reviews of the legal, custodial and permanency status of each child in Defendants' custody as an abused or neglected child. These review hearings continue at least until a child who is free for adoption has been placed for adoption. The child is a party to the proceeding and has a right to be present at any hearing unless the Dependency Court specifically finds the child's mental or physical condition or age would render a court appearance contrary to the child's best interest. Section 39.01(52), Florida Statutes; Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure, Rules 8.210, 8.255, 8.415. The Department routinely gives notice to the parties, other than children, of such judicial reviews. Some periodic reviews for some children over 13 years of age are administrative, rather than judicial. They
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also address the custodial and permanency status of the child. Children with sufficient maturity are entitled to participate in the administrative review. Florida Administrative Code, § 65C-13.019. Defendants are also required to include children, ~when appropriaten, in DCAF's development of a case plan for the child. Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure, Rule 8.400. The case plan is the basic operating document for each child in Defendants' custody, describing the on-going appropriateness of government custody and the child's current placement, the services to be provided by DCAF to the child and the child's biological and foster parents need, the child's permanency goal, and other critical planning information. Planning is to include Independent Living and the extension of foster care services beyond the age of 18.
197. To a significant degree, the judicial and administrative periodic reviews and case plans determine what a foster child's present and future life will be like and whether the child will achieve permanency. These proceedings and plans are of the utmost importance to the child's long and short-term well being, and the child has the greatest stake of any party in their outcome. No other party or participant in these proceedings or in developing the case plan, other than the child's attorney or guardian ad litem, if one is appointed, has an interest that never conflicts with that of the child.
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198. As the child's custodian, Defendants have complete control over whether a child will be able to attend a judicial review hearing, administrative review conference or a case planning conference. A child can attend such a hearing or conference only if informed of it. Children in Defendants' custody are dependent on DCAF to provide transportation to a judicial hearing or an administrative case-planning conference.
199. Statistically, less than 50% of children in the foster care system have a guardian ad litem. At this time, there is no state program of attorneys for these children. So few children are represented by legal counsel that this is statistically irrelevant. Unless an attorney or guardian ad litem has been appointed for a child, Defendants have a pattern and practice of failing to notify children of judicial review hearings and administrative review and case planning conferences and of failing to provide transportation and other services the children need to be able to attend and participate in such hearings and conferences.
200. Defendants also do not have standards for determining when a child would be an appropriate participant in a case planning conference or has sufficient maturity to participate in an administrative review conference. In fact, Defendants rarely, if ever, provide children in their custody with an opportunity to participate in such conferences, and
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Defendants' decision-making on this matter, or lack of it, is arbitrary and capricious. As in Melinda's case, even when an attorney or guardian is appointed, Defendants have a pattern and practice of ignoring said appointees and denying them input, further interfering with and denying foster children their due process rights.
201. Defendants' pattern and practice of denying foster children an opportunity to attend and participate in judicial review hearings and administrative review and case planning conferences deprives them of due process of law and constitutes deliberate indifference to the children's legal rights. Plaintiffs Leslie F. and Melinda and other members of the putative class have been and continue to be seriously and irreparably harmed as a result of this pattern and practice.
3. Violations of Plaintiffs' First, Ninth And Fourteenth Amendment Rights 202. Children have substantial associational and familial interests in continuing to reside with their siblings when they are taken into, and while they remain in, government custody, absent a compelling reason for their separation. Additionally, except when the separation of siblings is necessary to protect the health, safety or welfare of one of the children, it contravenes competent professional judgment to separate siblings who are in government custody. Only a professional qualified by training, credentials and
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experience, who exercises independent professional judgment, is capable of making the required determination that placing siblings together would be contrary to the health, safety or welfare of one of the children. The separation of siblings without such a professional's determination, and periodic reappraisal, deprives the children of rights secured to them by the First, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
203. In the event a professional determines placing siblings together in an out-of-home placement would be contrary to the health, safety or welfare of one of the children, such children have an associational and familial interest in frequent and regular visitation with each other. It would, moreover, be contrary to competent professional judgment to fail to provide such regular and frequent sibling visitation, absent a finding by a professional, qualified by training, credentials and experience and exercising independent professional judgment, that such visitation would be contrary to the health, safety or welfare of one of the children. The denial of regular and frequent sibling visitation in the absence of such a professional's determination, and periodic reappraisal of the decision, deprives the children of rights secured to them by the First, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
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204. Defendants have a pattern and practice of separating siblings who are in their custody and depriving them of regular and frequent visitation with each other, although placement together or visitation would not be contrary to the health, safety or welfare of any of the children and despite the absence of a qualified professional's independent determination that the joint placement or visitation would be detrimental to any of the children. Plaintiffs Tanya M.,
Tammy G., Laurie S. and Lillie S., Leanne G., John J., Melinda
and Karina, Elaine R., Leslie F., and other putative class members have been unnecessarily separated from their siblings who are also in Defendants' custody, have been deprived of regular and frequent visitation with their siblings, and have suffered a serious injury as a result. Defendants know of this practice and are deliberately indifferent to its effect on these children.
4. Violation of Plaintiffs' Rights Under the Adoption and Safe Families Act
205. The Adoption and Safe Families Act ("ASFA"), which amended Title IV-E of the Social Security Act, enacted as the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. §§ 670 et seq., imposed new obligations on Defendants, which they owe to Plaintiffs and the members of the putative class as children in government-supported foster care.
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206. Under ASFA, Defendants are required to initiate a proceeding to terminate the parental rights to any child who has been in their custody for 15 of the most recent 22 months unless, at the option of the State, the child is in the care of a relative or unless (a) Defendants have documented in the case plan a compelling reason for determining that filing such a petition would not be in the best interests of the child or (b) Defendants have not provided to the child's family such services as Defendants deem necessary for the safe return of the child to the child's home, if such provision is required under the Act. 42 U.S. C. § 675(5) (E).
207. Defendants routinely fail to initiate termination of parental rights proceedings on behalf of children in foster care for 15 of the most recent 22 months, although none of the exceptions are applicable. Defendants also routinely, knowingly and intentionally fail to provide or choose not to provide the services they have determined to be necessary for the safe return of children in their care, thereby depriving those children of the right to permanency conferred by ASFA. These acts are part of Defendants' pattern and practice of deliberate indifference to the serious needs and rights of the children in their custody. Plaintiffs Laurie S. and Lillie S., Sandra M., Hugh S., Reggie B. and Rebecca B., Melinda and Karina, Bonnie L., and members of the putative class have been injured by these practices of Defendants.
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208. ASFA also requires Defendants to have, review, update and provide to each foster parent or foster care provider a health and education record for each child placed in such home or facility. 42 U.S.C. § 675(5) (D). Defendants routinely fail to obtain the required education and health information, review and update it, or provide a record containing the specified information to each foster home or facility in which a child in Defendants' custody is placed. On information and belief, Defendants failed to fulfill these obligations with respect to Plaintiffs Matthew I., Reggie B., Leanne G., Melinda, Karina, other Plaintiffs, and other members of the putative class, and as a result, such children have been injured and have not received needed attention to their health and educational needs.
5. Violations of Plaintiffs' Rights Under the Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnosis and
Treatment (EPSDT) Provisions of the Medicaid Title 209. Under the EPSDT provisions of the Medicaid Title of the federal Social Security Act, Defendants are required to ensure that all Florida Medicaid-eligible children up to the age of twenty-one years, including Plaintiffs and the members of the putative class, receive comprehensive physical, developmental and mental health care. Among the services Defendants are required to ensure Plaintiffs and the putative class members receive are:
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a. Periodic comprehensive health screens, at the age-appropriate intervals deemed proper by a board of medical professionals, including general physical examinations, eye examinations, dental examinations, hearing examinations, lead blood tests, and vaccinations or boosters, all performed by competent medical professionals; and
b. Any and all follow-up physical health services or treatment deemed necessary to treat or address any condition diagnosed at any periodic screening, performed in a timely manner, regardless of whether any such treatment or service is otherwise covered by the Florida Medicaid plan. 210. Defendants routinely fail to ensure that Plaintiffs and the putative class members are given general physical examinations, eye examinations, dental examinations, hearing examinations, lead blood tests, and vaccinations or boosters, at the specified times and that these children receive timely and needed follow-up physical health services and treatment. Defendants are fully aware of their EPSDT obligations and the pattern and practice of failing to meet these requirements. As a result of Defendants' failure to fulfill their EPSDT obligations, Plaintiffs Matthew I., Reggie B. and Leanne G. and other members of the putative class have been injured.
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6. Violations of the Rights of Plaintiffs Paul B., Leslie F., Laurie S. and Lillie S., Tammy G., Leanne G., Melinda and Karina and the Putative Subclass Under Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act 211. The State of Florida, DCAF and Defendants are recipients of federal financial assistance through the United States Department of Health and Human Services ["DHHS"] for the Florida foster care and adoption program and the child welfare services program.
212. Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act prohibits any
state program or activity that receives federal financial assistance from excluding from participation, denying benefits to or subjecting to discrimination, any person on the basis of race, color or national origin. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d et ~.; 45 C.F.R. § 80.3.
213. DHHS has promulgated regulations, pursuant to Title
VI, that prohibit any state programs or activities that
receive federal financial assistance that are subject to the regulations from utilizing criteria or methods of administration which have the effect of subjecting individuals to discrimination because of their race, color, or national origin, or have the effect of defeating or substantially impairing accomplishment of the objectives of the program with respect to individuals of a particular race, color, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1; 45 C.F.R. § 80.3. These
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regulations apply to the operation of the Florida foster care and adoption program under Defendants' direction and control.
214. Defendants have a pattern and practice of treating Black foster children differently and less advantageously than White foster children, because of their race or color, with respect to access to, receipt of and the quality and value of services and benefits. Such difference in treatment constitutes illegal discrimination on the basis of race or color under Title VI and affects, among other aspects of Defendants' foster care and adoption programs, the number of times foster children are moved from one placement to another, the timing and tenacity with which Defendants pursue permanent families for foster children, and the identification of and placement of the child with an appropriate permanent family. Plaintiffs Paul B., Leslie F., Laurie S. and Lillie S., Tammy G., Leanne G., Melinda and Karina and the members of the putative subclass have suffered and continue to suffer serious and irreparable harm as a result of Defendants' actions that are discriminatory on the basis of race or color.
215. Defendants have a pattern and practice of utilizing racially neutral criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of subjecting Black foster children to discrimination because of their race or color or have the effect of defeating or substantially impairing accomplishment of the objectives of the foster care and adoption program for
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Black foster children because of their race or color. Defendants' inadequate operation of the Florida foster care and adoption system injures all children in Defendants' custody, but has an even more deleterious effect on Black foster children than on White foster children. When such racially neutral criteria or methods of administration have an illegal disparate impact by race or color, they constitute discrimination on the basis of race or color proscribed by Title VI.
216. Among the racially neutral criteria and methods of administration Defendants employ that discriminate against Black foster children on the basis of their race or color are the efforts Defendants make to recruit foster and adoptive families, the efforts Defendants make to move foster children expeditiously to permanency, the types, quantity and quality of services and benefits provided to the biological parents or relatives of children in Defendants' custody for the purpose of moving the children to permanency, the process of selecting a foster family or facility that is appropriate for an individual child, and the recruitment and training of DCAF staff who work with foster children.
217. These racially neutral criteria and methods of administration have the effect of subjecting Black foster children to discrimination because of their race or color and have the effect of defeating or substantially impairing
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accomplishment of the objectives of the foster care and adoption program for them. Plaintiffs Paul B., Leslie F., Laurie S. and Lillie S., Tammy G., Leanne G., Melinda and Karina and the members of the putative subclass have suffered and continue to suffer serious and irreparable harm as a result of Defendants' practices that have a disparate impact on and disadvantage Black foster children.
G. PLAINTIFFS HAVE NO ADEQUATE REMEDY AT LAW 218. Paragraphs 1 through 137 and 139 through 217 are incorporated herein by reference. 219. Plaintiffs and the putative class members have and continue to suffer irreparable harm by Defendants' abovedescribed acts and omissions and do not have an adequate remedy at law, thereby making appropriate declaratory and injunctive relief.
H. CAUSES OF ACTION 220. Paragraphs 1 through 137 and 139 through 217 are incorporated into each Cause of Action (First through Sixth) set forth below.
1. First Cause of Action - Substantive Due Process 221. The foregoing actions and inactions of Defendants are inconsistent with the exercise of competent professional judgment; deprive Plaintiffs and the putative class members of basic needs while in government custody; create conditions of care, treatment and duration of custody that are inconsistent
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with the purpose for which Defendants took Plaintiffs and the putative class members into custody; comprise arbitrary and capricious decision-making; and amount to a pattern, practice and custom of deliberate indifference to the serious and constitutionally protected rights and needs of Plaintiffs and the putative class members. As a result, Plaintiffs and the members of the putative class have been deprived of the substantive due process rights conferred on them by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. These rights include, but are not limited to: the right to have their basic need for food, clothing, safe care, shelter, medical care and education met; the right to protection from unnecessary harm, injury or deterioration; the right not to be harmed while in state custody; the right not to be unnecessarily deprived of their liberty by retention in state custody; the right not to have their liberty unnecessarily restrained by the use of chemical agents for non-therapeutic purposes; the right to treatment and care that, in terms of its nature, conditions and duration are consistent with the purposes for which they were taken into government custody, including safety, protection from abuse, neglect and abandonment; the right not to be retained in state custody longer than necessary to accomplish the purposes to be served by state custody; the right to receive care, treatment and services consistent with the exercise of competent
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professional judgment; the right to be protected from statecreated dangers, including placement in dangerous, abusive, overcrowded or neglectful out-of-horne placements or returned to a dangerous condition in the horne of the child's biological family; and the right to eligibility determinations that are not arbitrary or capricious.
2. Second Cause of Action - Procedural Due Process 222. The foregoing actions and inactions of Defendants deprive Plaintiffs and the putative class members of statecreated entitlements without providing an adequate and fair procedure, including: a professional review of any failure to provide required caseworker-child contact and visits or to obtain immediate medical consultation when a foster child exhibits an indication of injury or illness; an opportunity to submit an application to remain in foster care after reaching 18 years of age or to participate in the subsidized Independent Living Program; an opportunity for an administrative hearing to challenge an adverse decision on any such application; and notice of any process by which such an adverse decision on an application can be reviewed. Defendants further deprive Plaintiffs and the putative class members of their right to be present and provide meaningful input at judicial review hearings and administrative review and case planning conferences. Such lack of fair and adequate process with respect to the above-listed benefits, hearings
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and conferences deprives such children of due process of law

in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States

Constitution and amounts to a pattern, practice and policy of

deliberate indifference to the serious and constitutionally

protected needs and rights of Plaintiffs and the putative

class members.

3. Third Cause of Action - First, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments

223. The foregoing actions and inactions of Defendants

that unnecessarily separate siblings in Defendants' custody

and unnecessarily deprive such separated siblings of frequent

and regular visitation are inconsistent with the exercise of

competent professional judgment in violation of the Fourteenth

Amendment to the United States Constitution; deprive such

children of associational and familial rights in violation of

the First, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United

States Constitution; deprive such children of constitutionally

protected liberty interests without adequate or due process in

'

violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States

Constitution; and amount to a pattern, practice and custom of

deliberate indifference to the serious and constitutionally

protected needs of Plaintiffs and the putative class members.

4. Fourth Cause of Action Adoption and Safe Families Act

224. As a result of the foregoing actions and inactions

of Defendants, Plaintiffs and the members of the putative

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class are being deprived of rights conferred on them by the

federal Adoption and Safe Families Act. These rights include,

but are not limited to: the right to have Defendants initiate

a proceeding to terminate parental rights when the child has

been in Defendants' custody for 15 of the most recent 22

months, unless the child resides with a relative or Defendants

have documented a compelling reason not to terminate parental

rights; the right to have Defendants offer the child's

biological family the services Defendants deem necessary for

the safe return of the child to the child's home in order to

trigger the child's right to have Defendants initiate a

termination of parental rights proceeding; and the right to

have Defendants obtain required education and health

information, review it, update it, and provide the education

and health record to each foster home or facility in which a

child is placed. Defendants' failure to fulfill their

obligations under ASFA amounts to a pattern, practice and custom of deliberate indifference to the serious needs and

'

federally protected rights of Plaintiffs and the putative

class members.

5. Fifth Cause of Action Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnosis and Treatment

225. As a result of the foregoing actions and inactions

of Defendants, Plaintiffs and the members of the putative

class are being denied the rights conferred on them by the

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Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnosis and Treatment (EPSDT) provision of the Medicaid Title of the federal Social Security Act. These rights include but are not limited to these children's right to receive periodic general physical health examinations administered by competent medical professionals at appropriate intervals determined by a panel of independent health care experts; their right to receive periodic hearing and eye examinations, dental examinations and lead blood tests, administered by competent medical professionals at ageappropriate intervals; their right to receive all necessary childhood vaccinations and boosters at appropriate times; and their right to receive any and all treatments deemed necessary by a qualified medical professional conducting any of the above-mentioned periodic health examinations. Defendants' failure to fulfill their EPSDT obligations amounts to a pattern, practice and custom of deliberate indifference to the serious needs and federally protected rights of Plaintiffs and the putative class members.
6. Sixth Cause of Action - Title VI 226. As a result of the foregoing actions and inactions
of the defendants, Plaintiffs Paul B., Leslie F., Laurie s.
and Lillie S., Tammy G., Leanne G., Melinda and Karina, and the members of the putative subclass are being denied the rights conferred on them by Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and regulations promulgated by the United States
•
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Case 1:00-cv-02116-FAM Document 42 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/30/2000 Page 110 of 116
Department of Health and Human Services pursuant to Title VI. These rights include but are not limited to the right not to be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving federal financial assistance; and the right not to have any state program or activity which receives federal financial assistance utilize criteria or methods of administration which have the effect of subjecting any person to discrimination on the ground of their race, color, or national origin, or which have the effect of defeating or substantially impairing the accomplishment of the objectives of the programs with respect to individuals of a particular race, color, or national origin. Defendants' failure to fulfill their Title IV obligations amounts to a pattern, practice and custom of deliberate indifference to the serious needs and federally protected rights of Plaintiffs and the putative class members.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and the members of the class and subclass they seek to represent, request that this Court:
A. Assume and retain jurisdiction over this matter; B. Determine that this matter may proceed as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and (b) (2);
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C. Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 57 and 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202, declare unconstitutional and unlawful: Defendants' failure to provide for Plaintiffs' and the putative class members' basic needs, safety, freedom from harm, freedom from unreasonable restraints on their liberty, care and treatment that is consistent with accepted professional judgment and the purpose for which the children were taken into government custody, freedom from being placed into unnecessary statecreated danger, and freedom from arbitrary and capricious actions and decisions that deprive them of benefits to which they are entitled; Defendants' deprivation of state-created entitlements without an adequate and fair procedure; Defendants' unnecessary separation of siblings in government custody and denial of reasonable and frequent visitation of such siblings without proper procedure; Defendants' failure to comply with the Adoption and Safe Families Act and the Early, Periodic Screening, Diagnosis and Treatment provisions of the Medicaid Title of the Social Security Act; and Defendants' discrimination on the basis of race or color in the operation of the foster care, adoption and child welfare services program for which Florida receives federal financial assistance;
D. Permanently enjoin Defendants from subjecting Plaintiffs and the members of the class they seek to represent to practices that violate their federal constitutional and
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statutory rights, including those identified in paragraph "C" of this Prayer for Relief;
E. Order appropriate remedial relief to ensure Defendants' future compliance with the Constitution and laws of the United States and their provision of legally mandated services, protection and procedures to Plaintiffs and the members of the class they seek to represent;
F. Appoint an expert panel with full access to Defendants, their agents, records, clients and personnel, to develop and oversee the implementation of a plan for reform, which will ensure that Defendants protect the federal constitutional and statutory rights of Plaintiffs and the members of the class they seek to represent;
G. Appoint a permanent ombudsman or children's advocate to present the interests of Plaintiffs and their putative class members to Defendants and DCAF, to whom all children in Florida foster care will have open and confidential access and with whom Defendants or their designees with authority to make decisions on Defendants' behalf will meet regularly and frequently to attempt to resolve issues that affect individual or groups of similarly situated foster children.
H. Award plaintiffs their reasonable attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1920 and 1988; and
I. Grant such other further equitable and other relief as the Court deems just, necessary and proper to protect
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John B. Ostrow, Esquire Fla. Bar No.: 124324 Law Offices of John B. Ostrow, P.A. Miami Center Bldg, Suite 1380 201 S. Biscayne Blvd. Miami, FL 33131 T - 305/358-1496 F - 305/371-7999
Carolyn Salisbury, Esquire Fla. Bar No.: 074772 (pending admission pro hac vice) Univ. of Miami School of Law 5915 Ponce de Leon Blvd #28 Coral Gables, FL 33146 T - 305/284-4321 F - 305/284-4384
Deborah Schroth, Esquire Fla. Bar No.: 290629 (pending admission pro hac vice) Florida Legal Services 126 W. Adams Street Suite 502 Jacksonville, FL 32202-3849 T - 904/355-5200 F - 904/355-5223
Susan L. Stockham, Esquire Fla. Bar No.: 342521 (pending admission pro hac vice) 2700 S. Tamiami Tr., Suite 17 Sarasota, FL 34239 T - 941/957-0094 F - 941/957-0084
John Walsh, Esquire Fla. Bar No.: 0796360 (pending admission pro hac vice) 423 Fern Street, Suite 200 West Palm Beach, FL 33401 T - 561/655-8944 ext. 242 F - 561/655-5269

Bernard P. Perlmutter, Esquire Fla. Bar No.: 455260 Univ. of Miami School of Law 5915 Ponce de Leon Blvd #28 Coral Gables, FL 33146 T - 305/284-3123 F - 305/284-4384
Gregory A. Samms, Esquire Fla. Bar No.: 438863 9th Floor, New Times Towers 2800 Biscayne Blvd. Miami, Fl 33137 T - 305/573-2444 F - 305/576-9113
Neil C. Spector, Esquire Fla. Bar No.:280471 (pending admission pro hac vice) 1505 N. Florida Avenue P.O. Box 800 Tampa, FL 33601 T - 813/229-0900 F - 813/229-3323
James Walsh, Esquire Fla. Bar No.: 0796352 (pending admission pro hac vice) 423 Fern Street, Suite 200 West Palm Beach, FL 33401 T - 561/655-8944 ext. 243 F - 561/655-5269
Roy Wasson, Esquire Fla. Bar No.: 332070 1320 South Dixie Highway Suite 450 Gables One Tower Miami, Florida 33146 T - 305/666-5053 F - 305/666-2636

115

Case 1:00-cv-02116-FAM Document 42 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/30/2000 Page 114 of 116

Dianne Weaver, Esquire Fla. Bar No.: 139778 Krupnick, Campbell, et al. 700 SE 3rd Avenue Suite 100 Ft. Lauderdale, Fl 33316 T - 954/763-8181 F - 954/763-8292
Of Counsel
Christina A. Zawisza, Esquire Fla. Bar No. 241725 John M. Ratliff Fla. Bar No. 402599 3305 College Ave Ft. Lauderdale, Fla. 33314 T - 954/262-6027 F - 954/262-3832

Claudia Wright, Esquire Fla. Bar No.: 251569 (pending admission pro hac vice) Gator Teamchild University of Florida Levin College of Law Post Office Box 117626 Gainesville, FL 32611-7626 T - 352/392-0412 F - 352/392-0414

Certificate of Service I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the
·}~fL
foregoing was mailed on this .-z.Q -- day of August, 2000 to Maxine S. Ryan, Esquire, Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General, Civil Litigation Division, 110 S.E. 6th Street, lOth Floor, Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301-5000 and Cecilia Bradley, Esquire, Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General, The Capitol - PL01, Tallahassee, Florida

Fla. Bar No.: 262005

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Case 1:00-cv-02116-FAM Document 42 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/30/2000 Page 115 of 116

Jerold Feuer, Esquire Fla. Bar No. : (pending admission pro hac vice) 402 N.E. 36th Street Miami, FL 33137 T - 305/573-2282 F - 305/573-2285
Daniel Freyberg, Esquire 335 S. Plumosa Street Suite D Merritt Island, FL 32952 T - 407/459-2994 F - 407/459-9790
Leslie Goller, Esquire Fla. Bar No.: 393932 Brown, Terrell, Hogan et al. 233 E. Bay Street, Fl. 8 Jacksonville, FL 32202 T - 904/632-2424 F - 904/353-4418.
Wayne Hogan, Esquire Fla. Bar No.: 142460 Brown, Terrell, Hogan et al. 233 E. Bay Street, Fl. 8 Jacksonville, FL 32202 T - 904/632-2424 F - 904/353-4418
Jorge A. Lorenzo, Esquire Fla. Bar No.: 849596 (pending admission pro hac vice) 1001 N. Macdil1 Ave., Suite A Tampa, FL 33607 T - 813/998-9529 F - 813/998-9329

Rose E. Firestein, Esquire (pending admission pro hac vice) Children's Rights, Inc. 404 Park Avenue South, 11th Floor New York, NY 10016 T - 212/683-2210 F - 212/683-4015
Robert A. Glenn, Esquire Fla. Bar No.: 159844 (pending admission pro hac vice) Glenn, Rasmussen, et al P. 0. Box 3333 Tampa, FL 33601 T - 813/229-3333 F - 813/229-5946
Michelle Hankey, Esquire Fla. Bar No.: 0827835 (pending admission pro hac vice) 423 Fern Street, Suite 200 West Palm Beach, FL 33401 T - 561/655-8944 F - 561/655-5269
Robert G. Kerrigan, Esquire Fla. Bar No.: 134044 (pending admission pro hac vice) Kerrigan, Estes, et al. 400 E. Government Street Pensacola, FL 32501 T - 850/444-4444 F - 850/444-4493
Marcia R. Lowry, Esquire (pending admission pro hac vice) Children's Rights, Inc. 404 Park Avenue South, 11th Floor New York, NY 10016 T - 212/683-2210 F - 212/683-4015

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Plaintiffs and the members of the class they seek to represent from further harm by Defendants.

Dated: Tallahassee, Florida

August

, 2000

GIEVERS, P.A. COUNSEL for Plaintiffs 524 E. College Avenue Suite 2 Tallahassee, FL 32301 T - 850/222-1961 F - 850/222-2153

KAREN GIEVERS Fla. Bar No.: 262005

Co-Counsel for Plaintiffs

Theodore Babbitt, Esquire Fla. Bar No.:091146 Babbitt, Johnson and Osborne, Suite 200 1801 Australian Avenue South West Palm Beach, FL 33409 Mailing address: P.O. Box 024426 West Palm Beach, FL 33402 T - 561/684-2500 F - 561/684-6308

P.A.

Robert M. Montgomery, Esquire Fla. Bar No.: 056153 Montgomery & Larmoyeux 1016 Clearwater Place West Palm Beach, FL 33401 T - 561/832-2880 F - 561/832-0887

Barbara C. Burch, Esquire Fla. Bar No.: 0978670 (pending admission pro hac vice) 423 Fern Street, Suite 300 West Palm Beach, FL 33401 T - 561/655-8944 F - 561/655-5269

William M. Chanfrau, Esquire Fla. Bar No.: 0155064 (pending admission pro hac vice) Chanfrau, Chanfrau & Bouch P.O. Box 265880 Daytona Beach, FL 32126 T - 904/258-7313 F - 904/238-1464

113

 </s> Case 1:00-cv-02116-FAM Document 212 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/23/2001 Page 1 of 36
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA CASE NO. 00-2116-CIV-MORENO/DUBE
FOSTER CHILDREN BONNIE L., by and through her next friend Donald Hadsock, et. al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
JEB BUSH, as Governor ofthe State of Florida, et. a!.,
Defendants.
----------------------------~/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION THIS CAUSE is before this Court on the Motion to Dismiss filed by the Defendants (D. E. #93) and the Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendant Governor Jeb Bush (D.E. #94) pursuant to an Order of Reference entered by the Honorable Federico A. Moreno, United States District Judge. This Court has reviewed the motions, the file in this cause and has heard argument of counsel.
I. DISCUSSION A. The Allegations of the Amended Complaint The complex 116 page, 226 paragraph Amended Complaint filed in this cause seeks declaratory and injunction relief pursuant to 42 U .S.C. §1983 based on various alleged violations of the rights of the Plaintiffs who are children in the Defendants' custody. According to the Amended Complaint, the suit challenges the Defendants' "pattern and practice·· of not meeting the constitutional and statutory obligations owed to the children and the "deliberate indifference" by the Defendants to the existence of this pattern and practice. (~3).

Case 1:00-cv-02116-FAM Document 212 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/23/2001 Page 2 of 36
The Amended Complaint asserts causes of action for Substantive Due Process (Count I): Procedural Due Process (Count 2); Violations of the First, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments (Count 3); Violation ofthe Adoption and Safe Families Act (Count 4); Violation of the Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnosis and Treatment provisions of42 U.S.C. §1396 (Count 5) and Violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Count 6). The Amended Complaint seeks a declaration that the acts of the Defendants are unconstitutional and unlawful; the imposition of a permanent injunction: the appointment of an expert panel to develop and oversee a plan for reform: the appointment of a permanent ombudsman and the award of fees and costs.
(l) The Plaintiffs The Amended Complaint sets out extensive allegations concerning each of the Plaintiffs. as is set forth below. Plaintiff Bonnie L. has been in the foster care system since 1986, and has been subject to abuse. including beatings and other torture by her adoptive parents. The Department of Children and Families received several calls reporting the abuse in 1990. 1993, 1994 and 1997. Bonnie \Vas then taken back into foster care, with no further attempts to seek a permanent family. (~5-6). The Department recently agreed to Bonnie's adoption by her biological mother. but this was not final at the time of the filing of the Amended Complaint. (~8). According to the Amended Complaint. Bonnie has suffered and continues to suffer irreparable harm. (~9). Plaintiffs Rebecca and Reggie B. are described in the Amended Complaint as 13 year old tw·ins residing in District 9. These children were placed in a shelter in 1997. and \Vere adjudicated dependent on June 1, 1998. Reggie was sent to a group home. but suffered drastic deterioration and was then returned to "his previous overcrowded foster home'" where further deterioration occurred.
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Reggie was asked to leave the home, and spent weeks moving from one shelter and foster home to another. He is presently in a therapeutic group home. (~1 0-11 ). The Amended Complaint adds that a relative was available to be a placement resource for the children, but that no prior request was made for her to care for the children. The Plaintiffs allege that if this resource \Vere utilized earlier by the Defendants, Reggie would not have suffered the several emotional problems he presently faces. Reggie also suffers from a cleft palate and other medical needs, which the Plaintiffs allege the "Defendants have failed to address.'' According to the Amended Complaint. Reggie missed several medical appointments, "which have caused him to ··fall through the cracks'" at the clinic.'"
(~12-14).
Plaintiffs Laurie and Lillian S, two sisters born in 1991 and 1993. entered the Defendant" s custody in 1994, and are presently in foster care.(~ 17). The girls also have several siblings in foster care in different homes, and they are not provided with visitation. According to the Amended Complaint, the siblings were separated "because Defendants failed to recruit a sufficient number of foster homes for large siblings groups, and failed to arrange for visits between the separately placed children." (~18). The Plaintiffs also allege that this method of administration. \Vhile racially neutral. has a disparate impact on Black siblings in foster care such as Laurie and Lillian. and makes sibling separation more likely for Black foster children. (~ 18).
The Amended Complaint also alleges that the Defendants placed the girls in an inappropriate foster home which has been the subject of numerous investigations. According to the PlaintitTs. the Department ignored the complaints about placement and kept the girls there for years. However. after the Department adoption worker requested that the foster mother work on issues involving her home and parenting, the foster mother requested the immediate removal of the children. (',i 21 ). The
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children were then suddenly and traumatically moved from the home and the girls mental and emotional health began to deteriorate. Ultimately, Lillie, at age 7, was involuntarily committed to a mental health crisis unit. (~ 22).
The Amended Complaint asserts that the Department has located an uncle who wishes to adopt the girls, and in fact, he had informed the Department of this fact in 1994, but was told that relatives could not adopt. According to the Plaintiffs, the failure by the Department to achieve a permanent family more quickly was a result of the practice of treating Black and White foster children differently and in their making less efforts to provide services and develop proper placements for Black children than for White children.(~ 23. 24).
Plaintiff Leslie F. is a 17 year old foster child \vho is Black and of Haitian descent. Leslie has been freed for adoption since she was 9 years old, but has never been adopted or provided w·ith a permanent home. Her former foster mother adopted Leslie's biological brother. but refused to adopt Leslie and then cut off all contact between Leslie and her brother. Leslie has had over 30. and possibly as many as 50, different foster care placements and according to the Amended Complaint. was told by her caseworker that a stable placement could not be found because no one \vanted her. (~ 27. 28). According to the Plaintiffs, the large number of placements and the failure to tind a permanent home for Leslie was a result of the practices of the Defendants in treating children differently based on their race. (~29, 30).
The Department found a foster home for Leslie in 1999. but a visit by a supervisor revealed insufficient food and other problems. The concerns \vere raised with a Department licensing supervisor (the person responsible for determining whether foster homes \viii be licensed and whether they retain their licenses), and the licensing supervisor was asked to speak with the children
4

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in the home to verify the conditions. This supervisor refused to do so and also refused to call the child abuse hotline to report the concerns about children not being fed. The supervisor indicated that she talks to the foster parents, not the children and that she is an advocate for the foster parents and does not call the hotline to report them. (~ 32).
The Amended Complaint also alleges that the Defendants make arbitrary and capricious decisions as to who will remain in care after reaching 18 years of age; that the Defendants have prevented Leslie from participating in proceedings relating to her case plan, and that she is at risk of being denied participation in an Independent Living Program. (~ 36-38).
PlaintiffSandra M. is a 16 year old who was placed in foster care in 1989. Sandra and her brother were placed in a foster home together for two years, and after their natural parent's rights w·ere terminated, the foster parents requested to adopt the children. However, according to the Amended Complaint, this request was denied by the Defendants "for no legitimate reason." (,]39). The siblings were then separated, with both being held in foster care. After being placed in several different homes, Sandra was eventually placed with a stable foster parent.
The Defendants then moved Sandra from this home to an adoptive home with her brother and an older sister. This placement lasted only 6 months due to disturbed behavior by the siblings, and Sandra was then returned to the foster home. The foster parent decided to adopt Sandra. then age 8, but problems developed, and Sandra was ultimately returned to the custody ofthe Defendants. After being placed in a shelter where she was attacked and beaten, Sandra was returned for a time with the adoptive mother, and then placed back in foster care. (~ 41, 42).
Sandra was placed in several foster homes and then in a group home. which subsequently closed. The Defendants then placed Sandra at a crisis unit at a Mental Health Center. where she
5

Case 1:00-cv-02116-FAM Document 212 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/23/2001 Page 6 of 36
remained for one year. Ultimately. she was placed in a residential psychiatric setting. and then in a therapeutic group home. According to the Plaintiffs. the Defendants have never moved to terminate the parental rights of the adoptive parent and the Defendants have the intention for Sandra to remain in foster care until she reaches majority, thus. efTectively abandoning any attempt to tind her a permanent home. (~43, 44).
Tanya M. is a 14 year old first placed in foster care in August. 1998. She was placed in several foster homes where she was subject to neglect and dangerous treatment including inadequate feeding which resulted in a harmful weight loss. In another home she was one of 8 children \vho slept in one bedroom and shared one dresser. (~ 46). The Amended Complaint also sets out allegations concerning Tanya's placement at another overcrowded home. in which the foster mother had advised the Department that Tanya was not acceptable for placement. Despite this warning, Tanya was left at the home after the Department's office had closed. and ultimately, Tanya left and was found by a police officer walking alone at night carrying her possessions in bags and a backpack. (~ 47).
Tanya was sent to another home and was doing well. She was then returned to her biological parents, but the reunification failed, and less than two months after returning, she was assaulted by her father and suffered a broken arm. Tanya was then placed in an overcrowded group shelter. \Vith plans by the Department to place Tanya at a wilderness camp used primarily as a moderate risk delinquency commitment program. even though she is not delinquent and has not committed any violations of law. According to the Amended Complaint, Tanya has run away from the shelter and her whereabouts are not known. (~ 48, 49, 51). The Plaintiffs also allege that she has never been placed with her three younger siblings who were also removed from the biological parent's home.
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and that no proper decision has been made that a joint placement would be detrimental to any of the children. (~ 50).
Jay and Candice D. are brother and sister who were born in 1992 and 1991, respectively. They have been in foster care since February. 1996, with parental rights to these children terminated in June, 1998. The children have resided in a stable environment since ApriL 1997. and both have bonded to their group home parents. Both children had behavioral problems during the time that their older brother was placed at the group home, but were doing well since his removal. According to the Amended Complaint, the children's therapist as well as the staff at the group home indicated their beliefthat the children's behavior stabilized because the removal ofthe older brother gave them an increased sense of security.(~ 53-56).
The children had only three visits from a Department caseworker between April. 1997 and February. 2000. However, on March 20, 2000, the Defendants announced that they intended to remove the children from the group home, place them in an interim placement and then put them in another foster home with the older brother. According to the Plaintiffs. this plan is presently on hold. but the Department has excluded the personnel of the group home from any planning or meetings concerning the children. (~ 57, 58). 1
Plaintiff Matthew I., is two years old, and according to the Amended Complaint was ·'neglected in a grossly overcrowded foster home."(~ 61 ). In October, 1999. Matthev.' was observed by a worker from an agency that contracts with the Defendants to be very sick. having difticulty breathing and with a bite mark on his arm. The next month. another worker from the agency found
1 On March 30, 200 I, the Defendants filed a Notice of Filing Final Judgment of Adoption for Jay D. and Candice D., which indicated that the children had been adopted and were no longer in the physical or legal custody of the Department. (D.E. #205).
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Matthew to be very dirty, with a bruise on his chin, a dirty diaper and long. dirty. finger nails and toe nails. He was also sick and wheezing. The worker took Matthew to a hospital emergency room where he was found to have a 104 degree fever and was diagnosed with bacterial pneumonia. The foster home was noted as emitting a strong odor, with old food on the floor. and a sink overflowing with dirty dishes.(~ 61-63).
Approximately 2 weeks later, a Department worker found Matthew to be very sick. dirty and with a black eye. The foster mother reported that Matthew and another child had fallen off a couch while fighting. The worker did not report the condition of either the home or Matthev,: to the hotline. (~ 64).
Matthew was removed from the home in January. 2000. The new foster mother found him to be very sick and to have difficulty breathing. The child was provided with a nebulizer. but the ne\V foster mother did not know how to use it. and she was not provided with any instructions. Although Matthew did well at this home, he was returned to the prior home after only one \Veek. Later examinations of that home found that Matthew was extremely dirty and that he was consistently sick at his day care center. He was removed from the home after approximately 2 weeks. The Amended Complaint alleges that Matthew has suffered and continues to suffer harm as a result of the Defendants' failure to provide the medical care and living environment required to meet his needs. (~ 64-65).
Plaintiff HughS. is 16 years old, and has been in the custody of the Department since 1996. Hugh was turned into the Department by his father. who claimed that he was not the child's biological father. According to the Plaintiffs, the parental rights of the father were never terminated, and the Department has not located Hugh's natural father or attempted to locate a permanent
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substitute family. In fact. Hugh has been subject to multiple placements. including many \Vhich han' lasted only one night and he has often had inadequate and dirty clothing. (~67-68).
Leanne G., is a two and one-half year old Black girl placed in a shelter at birth. Leanne was placed in an inadequate foster home, and by 13 months old. she was still not on solid food and was kept in a crib or playpen.(,) 71 ). According to the Amended Complaint the child's foster mother refused to take the child to a doctor between March and September. 1999. and when a Department worker took the child, the worker was unable to provide any information to assist in the treatment. The foster mother refused to attend the appointment.(~ 72). The Plaintiffs also contend that Leanne has not seen her five siblings in foster care for one year. According to the Plaintiffs. the pattern of practice by the Department has resulted in a disparate impact on Black siblings and decreases the likelihood of permanent placement. (~ 73-78).
Leanne's sister, PlaintiffTammy G., is a nine year old Black foster child, who only saw her siblings only once during the year prior to the filing of the Amended Complaint. (~1 79). Tammy resided in four separate homes in three years, and in one home she \vas subject to being forced to stand with one leg in the air for considerable periods of time. In another home. Tammy \\as punished by having the foster mother twist her am1 behind her back and twist her nose. According to the Amended Complaint, this abuse was not adequately investigated by the Department which \Vas consistent with its practice of being more tolerant of child abuse committed by Department agents and providers than that allegedly committed by parents. (~ 80). Presently, Tammy sleeps \Vith three other children in a room attached to a converted garage. and is not being properly fed. ((T 81 ). The Amended Complaint also asserts that Tammy has not achieved a permanent home due to the Defendant's failure to take the necessary steps including developing a sufficient number of
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adoptive homes, which is based in part on the practice of treating Black and White foster children differently. (~ 82, 83).
Elaine R. is an II year old who has been in foster care since I993. Her parental rights were terminated in 1997, and Elaine was placed for adoption \vith a licensed foster family. The father of this foster family had a criminal record for sexually abusing children at the time of the placement. and Elaine was subjected to multiple sexual assaults and abuse for the nearly 12 months she resided in the home. Elaine was ultimately removed. and criminal charges were instituted against the foster father. (~85). According to the Plaintiffs, a suitable adoptive parent has been found. but the Defendants are delaying the adoption, thus denying the opportunity for a permanent family. (~86). The Amended Complaint also alleges that Elaine has been separated for no reason from her siblings who are also in foster care. (~85, 87).
Plaintiff Paul B. is a 16 year old Black child who was placed under Department supervision in 1983 and remained there until entering foster care in 1993 at the age of 10. Paul has had at least 33 placements, including time spent in a shelter facility which was used to house juvenile delinquents and violent offenders.(~ 88). The repeated placements have caused Paul to fall behind in his education: denied him a good permanent family. and leaves him at substantial and imminent risk of being subjected to the continued harms. (~!90).
Rachel C.. is 13 years old, and was improperly kept in a temporary shelter for over a year where she was housed with girls with significant mental health and delinquency histories. She left the care of the Department for 2 months, but returned to their custody as a foster child and was placed in a shelter. (~ 94).
Plaintiff Cathy W. is 12 years old, and was held in a temporary shelter from May 1999. e\'en
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though the Defendants knew that this placement had inadequate supervision and exposed her to danger. In fact, Cathy was involved in several sexual incidents at the shelter. Cathy \vas subsequently placed in a residential treatment facility. (~ 96. 97).
Larrisa C. was 2 years old in July, 2000, and while in foster care she was placed in a home where she was subjected to repeated abuse including traumatic brain injuries \Vhich left her partially paralyzed with impaired vision and speech. According to the Amended Complaint the Defendants failed to screen the home adequately and to supervise the home once she \vas placed. (4.' 98).
John L age 12, entered the Defendant's custody in 1989 and has been in multiple foster placements. At one point, John was kept for over a year in an over-crowded foster home where he \Vas subjected to beatings and sadistic abuse. The home had as many as I 0 children present. although the Defendant's rules prohibited more than five children. The Amended Complaint also asserts that the Defendants failed to search for a suitable relative placement. although it was discovered years after his entry into custody that an aunt \Vas willing to care for him. (,]I 00. I 0 I).
The final Plaintiffs listed in the Amended Complaint are Melinda and Karina, sisters age I7 and 18 who have been held in foster care since 1986. According to the Amended Complaint the Defendants misled Melinda into signing a form ending foster care efforts, rather than participating in the subsidized independent living program.(~ 103). The Defendants also deprived Melinda ofthc opportunity to attend judicial and administrative revie\vs addressing her status and have failed to provide necessary transportation to attend any proceedings. (~ 109). Karina remains in foster care. Neither child was ever placed for adoption and no alternative form of permanency for either was ever pursued. In fact, no effort was made to terminate the parental rights of the absent father. (~ I 03).
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The Plaintiffs allege that both girls have been subjected to rape, beatings and neglect in foster care and that Melinda contracted syphilis when she was nine years old. Both have been damaged by improperly administered psychotropic medications and suffer from permanent mental disabilities. (~ 104). The Amended Complaint also asserts that the harm suffered by the children in not having permanent residences derived in part from the Defendants· practice of treating Black and \'-/bite foster children differently based on race and on the disparate impact on Black children from other practices. (~ 105. 106).
(2) The Defendants The Amended Complaint also addresses the role of the various named Defendants. (~ 111116). Governor Jeb Bush is identified as "the person responsible for the proper operation of the foster care and adoption systems and for the hiring and continued employment of Kathleen Kearney. Secretary ofDCAF.'' (~Ill). According to the Plaintiffs. Bush has responsibility to ensure that the Department operates in accord with federal law; that it protects the civil rights of children. and that the system does not operate "recklessly or with deliberate indifference to the needs. safety. lives and rights of Florida's foster children."(~ 1I 2). The Amended Complaint alleges that the Defendants knew of the deficiencies in the foster care/adoption system and have failed to take the necessary steps to operate it without violating the federally protected rights of the children. (~ I I5).
(3) The Causes of Action Allegations relating to each ofthe six causes of action are set out in the Amended Complaint. both as part of a section entitled "Statement of Facts'· (~ 139-217) and in the ··causes of Action·· section(~ 221-226). The specific allegations asserted in the Amended Complaint as related to each
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cause of action are as follows: (a) Substantive Due Process
The Plaintiffs allege that the actions and inactions ofthe Defendants deprived them of their basic needs while in government custody and create conditions which are inconsistent with the purpose for which the Plaintiffs were taken into custody. These acts also constitute arbitrary and capricious decision-making and ·'amount to a pattern, practice and custom ofdeliberate indifference to the serious and constitutionally protected rights and needs of Plaintiffs and the putative class members.'' (~ 221 ).
According to the Amended Complaint, the Plaintiffs have been deprived of the substantiYe due process rights conferred on them by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution including the failure to meet the basic needs tor food, clothing. safe care. shelter. medical care and education: the right to protection from unnecessary harm or injury: the depri\'ation of liberty: the right to not be retained in state custody longer than necessary to accomplish the goals ofcustody, and the right to eligibility determinations that are not arbitrary or capricious. (•; 221 ). The Amended Complaint asserts that these violations have resulted in serious physical. mental and psychological injuries to the children and the loss of their opportunity to develop in line with their inherent abilities.(~ 190). Specifically, the Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants' pattern and practice result in various failures in providing the necessary care to the children including the following:
(a) failing to screen, oversee and visit foster and pre-adoptive homes and facilities resulting in children being placed in dangerous, abusive, overcrowded and otherwise inappropriate facilities (~ 142):
(b) ignoring or inappropriately responding to complaints or other information identifying
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individual homes as abusive or inappropriate(~ 143. 144): (c) failing to remedy various problems associated with the caseworkers employed by the
Defendants including their large caseload, high level of turnover. lack of adequate supervision. training and management and the failure to visit children in their placements with sufficient frequency to ensure the childrens' safety (~ 146, 148):
(d) the failure to develop, and the lack of, a sufficient number and array of placements to aiiO\v for the selection of a safe and proper placement for each child (~ 149):
(e) the improper placement of children in temporary shelters or group homes on a long term basis due to the lack of foster homes to accept the children (~ 150):
(f) failure to provide foster homes for large sibling groups and teens which have resulted in the unnecessary separation of siblings and the placement ofchildren in dangerous and inappropriate placements (~ 152);
(g) the pattern and practice of moving children repeatedly from one place of custody to another which has resulted in needless trauma to the children and undermined the child's stability and security. In some cases, the need for multiple moves has been caused by the Defendant's failure to exercise professional judgment which resulted in the placement of a child in a dangerous. abusive or inappropriate home in the first instance(~ 156-157).
(h) the lack of an efficient and competent mechanism or procedure to locate vacant foster care beds and to properly match the children with an appropriate placement which results in the need for the repeated placement of children into new settings(~ 158).
(i) failing to prepare foster parents to deal with the predictable disruptive behavior of children placed in their homes and failing to support the foster parents \vith services and other
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assistance to allow the child to be maintained in the foster home (~ 160);
mfailing to identify relatives who are competent and willing to provide proper care for
children in the Defendants' custody and ignoring or actively discouraging possible relative placements (~ 161, 162):
(k) improperly excluding foster children and responsible adults from the decision making process concerning individual children thus depriving the children of the possibility that the decisions made which are critical to their well-being \Vill be fully informed and competent (t1 163 ):
(I) failing to provide needed medical care for acute, chronic and congenital conditions or with physician prescribed treatment (~ 164);
(m) wrongfully subjecting children to the administration of psychotropic medications to make it more convenient and easier to care for children in an out of home setting rather than to improve the mental or emotional health of the children (~ 165):
(n) systematically depriving children of access to an education because of the continual moving of the children without monitoring their educational performance and in failing to provide needed educational assistance (~ 166):
(o) failing to provide children with adequate and season appropriate clothing or a timely paid clothing allowance (~ 167):
(p) improperly attempting to reunify foster children with their biological families \Vhen doing so remains obviously dangerous to the safety, health or well being ofthe child(~ 168, 169):
(q) wrongfully retaining children in foster care for longer than is either necessary or appropriate, thus depriving them of an opportunity for a permanent family and making it less likely they will be adopted and more likely that they will be subject to repeated moves and abuse. This also
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results in an increase in the foster care population causing further overcro\vding and greater risk of harm.(~ 172, 173).
(r) failing to provide the services needed by the biological families of children in out-ofhome care. thus delaying reunification even if it is appropriate (~ 175):
(s) failing to look for adequate adoptive homes and/or wrongfully quickly giving up on tinding adoptive families for children who cannot be returned to their biological families or placed with a relative (~ 178, 179);
(t) making arbitrary, capricious and fundamentally unfair decisions concerning which individuals will be permitted to remain in foster care following their eighteenth birthday and \Vhich individuals will be permitted to participate in the subsidized Independent Living Program (~]182187).
(b) Procedural Due Process In this cause of action, the Plaintiffs contend that the Defendants' actions and inactions deprive them of state-created entitlements without the provision of an adequate and fair procedure including professional review of the failure to provide required visitation or medical consultation: failing to provide the opportunity to submit applications to remain in foster care atler reaching 1g years of age or to participate in a subsidized Independent Living Program: failing to allow for the opportunity for an administrative hearing to challenge an adverse decision and notice of process. and the denial of the right to be present and provide meaningful input at judicial review and administrative review proceedings. (~192-200, 222). According to the Plaintiffs. the lack of adequate process in connection with the listed benefits deprives the Plaintiffs of due process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and constitutes '"a pattern. practice and policy of deliberate
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indifference to the serious and constitutionally protected needs and rights of Plaintiffs and the putative class members.''(~ 222).
(c) Violation of First, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments According to the Plaintiffs, the actions and inactions by the Defendants separate siblings in the Defendant's custody and deprive the children of frequent and regular visitation. This separation is done without the necessary determination by a professional that keeping the siblings together or allowing visitation would be contrary to the health, safety or welfare of one of the children and has resulted in serious injury to the children.(~ 202-204). The Plaintiffs allege that these actions violate the Fourteenth Amendment, and also deprive the children of their associational and familial rights in violation of the First, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Amended Complaint also asserts that the children were deprived ofconstitutionally protected liberty interests without adequate or due process which violated the Fourteenth Amendment and that the Defendants' conduct amounted to a ·•pattern, practice and custom of deliberate indifference" to the constitutionally protected needs of the Plaintiffs and the putative class members. (~ 223 ).
(d) Adoption and Safe Families Act The Plaintiffs also allege that the Defendants have deprived them of rights afforded by the Adoption and Safe Families Act including the right to have a proceeding initiated to terminate parental rights after 15 months of custody ofthe most recent 22 months: the right to have Defendants offer the biological family of the child the services necessary for the safe return of the child in on.kr to trigger the right to have a termination of parental rights proceeding initiated and the right of the Defendants to obtain required education and health information. (~206-208. 224 ).
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(e) Early and Periodic Screenine. Diagnosis and Treatment According to the Amended Complaint, the Defendants actions and inactions denied the
Plaintiffs their rights under the Early and Periodic Screening. Diagnosis and Treatment provision or
the Social Security Act to receive periodic general physical health, dentaL hearing and eye examinations; to receive all necessary and appropriate childhood vaccinations and boosters. and to receive all follow up services and treatment deemed necessary to treat or address any condition. (1. 209-210. 225).
(f) Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 The Amended Complaint alleges that eight of the Plaintiffs (Paul B.. Leslie F.. Laurie S., Lillie S., Tammy G., Leanne G., Melinda and Karina) and members of the sought subclass were denied their rights under Title VI to be free from discrimination in the administration and provision ofbenefits of a federal program due to race, color or national origin.(~ 226). According to the Amended Complaint, the "'Defendants have a pattern and practice of treating Black foster children differently and Jess advantageously than White foster children. because of their race or color, with respect to access to. receipt of and the quality and value of services and benefits:·(~ 214). This treatment impacts the number of times foster children are moved from one placement to another; the timing and effort with which Defendants pursue permanent families for the children and the identification and placement of the child \Vith an appropriate permanent family. (~ 214). Additionally, the Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants employ racially neutral criteria and methods of administration that discriminate against Black foster children including the efforts to recruit foster and adoptive families, the efforts to move children quickly to permanency, the process of selecting an appropriate foster family or facility and the recruitment and training of staff.(~ 216 ).
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B. The Applicable Standard For purposes of a motion to dismiss. the complaint must be construed in a light most favorable to the non-moving party and the court must take the allegations contained in the complaint as true. See, Harris v. Procter & Gamble Cellulose Co .. 73 F.3d 321 (11th Cir. \996 ). A complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the pleader can prove no set of facts in support of the claim which \Votdd entitle him to relief. See, Con\ev v. Gibson. 355 U.S. 4 L 45-46. 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 ( 1957L Harris. 73 F.3d at 324. The analysis of a 12(b)(6) motion is limited primarily to the face of the complaint and any attachments thereto. Franklin v. Minnesota Mutual Life Insurance Companv, 97 F.Supp.2d 1324. 1326 (S.D. Fla. 2000). Dismissal of a complaint is appropriate on the basis of a dispositive issue of law if no construction of the factual allegations will support the cause of action. See. Marshall Countv Board of Education v. Marshall County Gas District 992 F.2d 117L 1174 (11'h Cir. 1993).
C. The Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (D.E. #93) The Defendants raise several multiple bases for the dismissal of each count of the Amended Complaint, as will be addressed below.
(l) Compliance with the Pleading Requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
The Defendants contend that the Amended Complaint constitutes a ··shotgun·· pleading based on the numerous allegations contained in each claim which are irrelevant to the causes ofaction. The Plaintiffs respond that the Amended Complaint ties the specitic factual allegations concerning the individual children to the claims asserted.
The allegations ofthe Amended Complaint, as set out above, assert specific acts taken by the Defendants which impacted on the care or custody of specific children and tie these actions to
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specific asserted violations. While there may have been alternative methods of setting out the claims in a more efficient manner, this Court cannot find that the Amended Complaint is so deficient so as to require further amendment prior to allowing this cause to proceed. Accordingly, it is the recommendation of this Court that the Motion to Dismiss on this basis be DENIED.
(2) Eleventh Amendment Immunity The Defendants assert that Eleventh Amendment immunity applies in this cause since the state dependency courts are able to address the issues raised in this case, thus making the immunity exceptions contained in Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 44L 52 L.Ed.714 (1908) inapplicable. The Plaintiffs argue that there is no Eleventh Amendment bar since the relief sought here is prospective and the alleged illegal practices are continuous and ongoing. An exception to the Eleventh Amendment bar exists ifthe Plaintiff is seeking prospective relief against a state officer for ongoing violations of federal law. See, Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. at 159-160: Sandoval v. Hagan, 197 F.3d. 484, 492 (11th Cir. 1999): Occean v. Kearnev. 123 F.Supp.2d 618, 621 (S.D. Fla. 2000). In the present case, the Amended Complaint seeks a declaration that certain acts by the Defendants are unconstitutional and unlawful and asks the Court to enjoin such practices and take remedial action to ensure that the Defendants comply \vith all such laws in the future. As such, the Ex Parte Young exception applies and there is no basis for dismissal. Accordingly, the Motion to Dismiss based on the Eleventh Amendment should be DENIED.
(3) Rooker-Feldman, Abstention and Comin· The Defendants contend that the claims in this case are barred by the application of the Rooker-Feldman, abstention and comity doctrines which require that the federal courts defer to state
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court proceedings. The Plaintiffs counter that Rooker-Feldman is inapplicable since the case does not seek review of a determination by a Florida dependency court or any relief that pertains to a particular child. Additionally, the claims challenge the Defendant's generally applicable practices rather than a court determination in a particular case. and thus. could not be asserted as part of a dependency court proceeding.
The Plaintiffs also contend that there is no basis for abstention since there is no possibility that the relief sought in this case would interfere with any aspect of a state court proceeding or in the decision making process of a state courtjudge concerning any individual child. Additionally. the Plaintiffs argue that there is no opportunity to raise the federal claims in the dependency court proceedings.
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine, as set forth in Rooker v. Fidelitv Trust Companv. ~63 U.S. 413, 44 S.Ct. 149. 68 L.Ed.2d 362 (1923) and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman. 460 U.S. 462, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983) precludes lower federal courts ti·om conducting appellate review of decisions by the state courts. The doctrine applies to claims actually raised in the state court as well as claims not raised but which are ''inextricably intertwined" with the judgment ofthe state court. Powell v. PowelL 80 F.3d 464.466-467 (11th Cir. 1996). quoting. Feldman, 460 U.S. at482, n.16, 103 S.Ct. at 1315. n.l6.
The federal case and the state court judgment will be seen as intert\vined "if the federal claim succeeds only to the extent that the state court wrongly decided the issues before it." Siegel \'. LePore. 234 F.3d 1163. 1172 (11th Cir. 2000), quoting. Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc .. 481 U.S. L 25. 107 S.Ct. 1519, 1533, 95 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987)(Marshall. L concurring). Thus. a claim is inextricably intertwined if approving the claim requires a determination that the decision reached by
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the state court was erroneous. Dow Jones & Company, Inc. v. Kave, 90 F.Supp.2d 1347. 1353 (S.D. Fla. 2000).
Under the abstention doctrine, federal courts should not interfere with ongoing state court proceedings unless the Plaintiff show·s bad faith, harassment, or some other unusual situation. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 55,91 S.Ct. 746,27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971 ). The doctrine should only be invoked in rare circumstances since federal courts have the obligation to exercise the jurisdiction which is conferred by Congress. See, Kaye, 90 F.Supp.2d at 1353. Additionally. the doctrine should only be applied if the plaintiffs in the federal action had the opportunity to present the federal claims in the state proceedings. See, Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415. 425. 99 S.Ct. 2371. 2378. GO L.Ed.2d 994 (1979).
In the present case, the relief sought by the PlaintitTs and the allegations of the Amended Complaint as set out above, do not involve an on-going action dealing with a specific child. but rather, seek action to be taken for system-wide problems. There is nothing in the Amended Complaint which seeks to interfere with the power or discretion of the state courts. Additionally. the relief sought in this case is directed to the presence of department wide violations. including federal constitutional violations, which could not be dealt with as part of a dependency proceeding for an individual child. Thus. the shO\ving required for applying either the Rooker-Feldman doctrine or abstention/comity are not present. See, LaShawn A. v. Kellv. 990 F.2d 1319. 1322-132] (D.C. Cir. 1993). Accordingly, the Motion to Dismiss on this basis should be DENIED.
(4) Early and Periodic Screenin&::. Diagnosis and Treatment Count V of the Amended Complaint seeks relief based on alleged violations of the Early and Periodic Screening. Diagnosis and Treatment (EPSDT) provisions found in 42 U.S.C. ~ 1396d
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(r). These provisions must be included in a state plan for medical assistance. 42 U.S.C. ~I J%a (a)(l O)(A): §1396d(a).
Section 1396d(r) provides for various items and services to be provided to Medicaid recipients, such as screening services, which includes a comprehensive health and developmental history. a comprehensive unclothed physical exam, appropriate immunizations. laboratory tests and health education. 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(r)(l ). Additionally. the provision requires vision services. dental services, and hearing services. §1396d(r)(2), (3), (4). The focus of the present Motion to Dismiss is on §1396d(r)(5), which provides as follows:
(5) Such other necessary health care, diagnostic services. treatment. and other measures described in subsection (a) of this section to correct or ameliorate defects and physical and mental illnesses and conditions discovered by the screening services. whether or not such services are covered under the State plan. The first argument raised by the Defendants is that the Plaintiffs lack standing to sue under the EPSDT since the Amended Complaint fails to allege (I) that they are receiving Medicaid services: (2) that they are eligible for these services and (3) that specific medical treatment or services are medically necessary and recommended as a result ofEPSDT screening. The Plaintiffs respond that the Amended Complaint clearly sets out all of the elements necessary to assert this claim. The Amended Complaint alleges that the Defendants are required to ensure ..that all Florida Medicaid -eligible children up to the age oftwenty-one years. including Plaintiffs and the members of the putative class, receive comprehensive physicaL developmental and mental health care."(~ 209). Additionally. the Plaintiffs state that the Defendants fail to ensure that the required examinations and follow up services are provided, and that as a result. injuries and irreparable harm
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have occurred. (~ 210, 219, 225). According to the Amended Complaint. the failures by the Defendants ''amounts to a pattern, practice and custom ofdeliberate indifference to the serious needs and federally protected rights of Plaintiffs and the putative class members.'' (~; 225 ).
The Amended Complaint also alleges that one child has suflered from a cleft palate and other medical needs which have not been addressed by the Defendants: that needed instruction was not provided for a nebulizer needed by another child, and that a third child was not properly treated based on the failure to take the child for medical care and the lack of information needed for treatment after the child was taken.(~ 14, 64, 72).
The allegations contained in the Amended Complaint. which must be taken as true on a Motion to Dismiss, contain all of the elements for the claim asserted as missing by the Defendants. Accordingly, the Motion to Dismiss Count Von this basis should be DENIED.
As a second ground for dismissal, the Defendants contend that there is no private right of action for the claim based on the denial of services required under 42 U.S.C. ~ 1396d (r)(5). According to the Defendants. this provision, as set forth above, is non-specific and fails to set any standards to measure the state's compliance. Thus, the administration of this provision is left to the discretion of the state.
The PlaintitTs respond to this argument by asserting that the Amended Complaint alleges the routine failure by the Defendants to comply with any of the five categories found in ~ 1396d(r). Additionally. even as to the challenged provision found in subsection (5). the Plaintiffs contend that the provision simply requires the state to cover all medically necessary treatment 1or eligible children and that it is neither vague or amorphous.
In order to pursue a claim for liability in a section 1983 action. the Plaintiff must assert the
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Case 1:00-cv-02116-FAM Document 212 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/23/2001 Page 25 of 36
violation of a federal right, not only a violation offederallmv. Doe v. Chiles. 136 F.3d 709. 713 (II th Cir. 1998). quoting, Blessing v. Freestone. 520 U.S. 329. II7 S.Ct. 1353. 1359. 137 L.Ed.2d 569 ( 1997). The factors to be applied to determine if a federal right is present were also discussed in Blessing, as follows:
First, Congress must have intended that the provision in question benefit the plaintiff. Second, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the right assertedly protected by the statute is no so ··vague and amorphous" that its enforcement would strain judicial competence. Third, the statute must unambiguously impose a binding obligation on the States. In other words, the provision giving rise to the asserted right must be couched in mandatory rather than precatory terms. Id. (citations omitted). If these three factors are shown, a rebuttable presumption arises that the statutory right is enforceable under section 1983. However, dismissal \Vould still be proper if a remedy under~ 1983 was specifically foreclosed by Congress either in the statute itself or by creating a comprehensi\·e enforcement procedure incompatible with enforcement by individuals under~ 1983. The burden of making such a showing is with the Defendant. Doe. 136 F.3d at 718-719. quoting. Blessing. 117 S.Ct. at 1360, 1362. In the present case. this Court finds that ~ l396d( r)( 5) satisfies the three-part test set out above. The Amended Complaint clearly alleges that the statute is intended for the benefit of the Plaintiffs in this cause and the requirement of the states to provide such services is clearly mandatory. See, Pittman v. Secretary of Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. 998 F.2d 887, 891-892 (11th Cir. 1993). Finally, the provision at issue is not so ··vague and amorphous" to not allow enforcement since it clearly defines what services are to be provided. See. Miller v. Whitbum, 10 F.3d. 1315 (7th Cir. 1993): Frew· v. Gilbert, I09 F.Supp.2d 579 (E. D. Tex.
25

Case 1:00-cv-02116-FAM Document 212 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/23/2001 Page 26 of 36
2000). Accordingly, the Motion to Dismiss on this basis should be DENIED. The final basis for dismissal of Count V is the Eleventh Amendment. According to the
Defendants, the present case is actually one against Florida as a state, and the intricate remedial scheme of the Medicaid Act and its underlying basis via the Spending Clause. render the Ex Parte Young exception inapplicable. The Plaintiffs reject the contention that the claim is barred and point to the fact that only prospective relief is requested and on the nature of the remedial scheme of the Medicaid Act.
As noted earlier. an exception to the Eleventh Amendment immunity bar exists if the Plaintiff is seeking prospective relief against a state officer for ongoing violations of federal law. See,ExParteYoung,209U.S.at 159-160: Sandovalv.Hagan.197F.3d 484.492(llthCir.1999): Occean v. Kearney, 123 F.Supp.2d 618, 621 (S.D. Fla. 2000). In the present case. the Amended Complaint seeks a declaration that certain acts by the Defendants are unconstitutional and unlawful and asks the Court to enjoin such practices and take remedial action to ensure that the Defendants comply with all such laws in the future. Thus, the Ex Parte Young exception applies and there is no basis for dismissal. See also, Doe v. Chiles, 136 F.3d 709. 719-720 (lith Cir. 1998): Hunter v. Chiles, 944 F.Supp. 914,917-918 (S.D. Fla. 1996) (rejecting claim that Eleventh Amendment bars suit to enforce provisions ofthe Medicaid Act).
Based on the foregoing, it is recommended that the Motion to Dismiss as directed to Count V be DENIED.
(5) Adoption and Safe Families Act The Defendants contend that Count 4. which seeks relief based on the Adoption and Safe Families Act (ASFA), should be dismissed as to all Plaintiffs since there is no private right of action.
26

Case 1:00-cv-02116-FAM Document 212 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/23/2001 Page 27 of 36
or in the alternative, dismissed at least as to some Plaintiffs based on lack of standing. According to the Defendants, the only requirement under the Act is that the state provide periodic judicial or administrative review of a foster child's status. Thus. the obligations sought to be asserted by the Plaintiffs are not ''unambiguously imposed" by the statutory provisions. and therefore. no right of private enforcement exists. The Defendants also note that the ASF A provided for phased in enforcement: that a private right of action is clearly authorized for racial discrimination. which shO\vs the Congressional intent to not provide it for length of stay clause and that the provision allows for discretion by the executive and judicial branches of the state. Additionally. the Defendants argue that since the right to any services under the statute relate solely to the return of the child to the original home, relief is not available to those children '''hose parents have had their parental rights terminated or to any Plaintiffv,·ho has reached the age of I8.
In response, the Plaintiffs state that the applicable test for the enforcement ofa right pursuant to Section 1983 has been met since the statutory provision and the accompanying regulations sho,,· an unambiguous obligation on the state to comply with the requirement that the termination of parental rights be initiated in a timely manner and that medical and education records be provided. The Plaintiffs also contend that the presence of an express right of private action tor racial discrimination is not dispositive of a finding that there must be no right here since the provisions were separate acts, legislated at different times to solve different problems. According to the Plaintiffs. the right to private enforcement is shown by the lack of either an express prohibition or the creation of a comprehensive enforcement scheme by Congress at the time the 15/22 provision was enacted.
The Plaintiffs further assert that the requirement to provide all services necessary for the
27

Case 1:00-cv-02116-FAM Document 212 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/23/2001 Page 28 of 36
return to the home is not a separate claim. but rather. additional relief needed to achieve the 15
month parental termination requirement. The Plaintiffs do not contest the lack of standing fl)r the
individuals mentioned in the Motion to Dismiss. but argue that it is irrelevant since no challenge has
been made to the standing of Plaintiffs Reggie. Rebecca. Hugh and Karina to assert the claim on
their own behalf and on behalf of the proposed class.
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §67l(a)(16), a state plan must contain a ·'case review system." A case
review system is defined by 42 U.S.C. §675(5). as a procedure which assures that various services
are provided to foster children. including the following. for which relief is sought in the Amended
Complaint:
(D) a child's health and education record (as described in paragraph (1 )(A) is reviewed and updated, and supplied to the foster parent or foster care provider with whom the child is placed, at the time of each placement of the child in foster care;
(E) in the case of a child who has been in foster care under the responsibility of the State for I5 of the most recent 22 months.... the State shall file a petition to terminate the parental rights ofthe child's parents (or. if such a petition has been filed by another party. seek to be joined as a party to the petition) and concurrently. to identify. recruit, process and approve a qualified family for adoption. unless-
(i) at the option ofthe State, the child is being cared for by a relative:
(ii) a State agency has documented in the case plan (which shall be available for court review) a compelling reason for determining that filing such a petition would not be in the best interests of the child: or
(iii) the State has not provided to the family of the child. consistent with the time period in the State case plan. such services as the State deems necessary tor the safe return of the child to the child's home, ifreasonable et1orts of the type described in section 67l(a)(l5)(B)(ii) ofthis title are required to be made with respect to the child:
The applicable criteria for determining whether a private right of action exists was set out in
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Case 1:00-cv-02116-FAM Document 212 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/23/2001 Page 29 of 36
the previous section dealing with a cause of action under the EPSDT. In applying the factors set out in Doe v. Chiles, this Court finds that 42 U.S.C. §675(5)(C) and 42 U.S.C. §671(a)( 16) satist~- the three-part test set out above. The Amended Complaint clearly alleges that the provisions are intended for the benefit of the Plaintiffs in this cause and the requirement of the states to provide such services is clearly mandatory. Finally, the provisions at issue are not so "'vague and amorphous" to not allow enforcement. See, Occean v. Kearnev, 123 F.Supp.2d 618. 624-625 (S.D. Fla. 2000). Accordingly, the Motion to Dismiss on this basis should be DENIED.
However. this Court agrees with the Defendants that dismissal is proper as to Plaintiffs Bonnie L., Laurie and Lillie S. since the rights of their parents have already been terminated. and as to Melinda since she has reached the age of 18. Accordingly, it is recommended that the Motion to Dismiss as to Count 4 be DENIED in part and GRANTED in part.
(6) Violation of Title Vl The Defendants contend that Count 6 ofthe Amended Complaint, which seeks relief based on violations of Title VI, should be dismissed based on a lack of standing by the named Plaintiffs. According to the Defendants, the Plaintiffs have failed to allege that they have been personally harmed by many of the alleged bad acts in the Amended Complaint. Additionally. the Defendants argue that any claims against Plaintiff Melinda should be dismissed as barred by· the Eleventh Amendment, and that all the claims are subject to dismissal under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. In response. the Plaintiffs contend that the Amended Complaint adequately sets out claims for both intentional discrimination and for racially discriminatory disparate treatment. Additionally. the Plaintiffs note that the relief sought by Melinda relates to her claim of eligibility for future. prospective relief. and that Rooker-Feldman is inapplicable.
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Case 1:00-cv-02116-FAM Document 212 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/23/2001 Page 30 of 36
The allegations ofthe Amended Complaint, which must be taken as true at this point in the proceedings. are sufficient to state the racial discrimination claims asserted by the Plaintiffs. The allegations also show that the relief requested is only prospective, and thus. there is no Eleventh Amendment bar. Furthermore, as discussed earlier, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not constitute a bar to the relief sought since it does not interfere nor it is ""inextricably intet1\vined·· \vith a pending state court case. Accordingly, it is the recommendation of this Court that the Motion to Dismiss Count 6 be DENIED.
(7) Violation of First, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments The Defendants contend that Count 3 of the Amended Complaint should be dismissed since there is no basis for a constitutional claim to have siblings either remain with each other in foster care or to ensure that visitation \Vith siblings in other homes is provided. In response, the Plaintiffs argue that the Defendants" practice and action of placing siblings 111 separate facilities directly infringes on the children "s constitutionally protected interest in continuing their relationship with each other. The Plaintiffs also contend that this protection extends to visitation between siblings. There is no dispute between the parties in this case that ""there is a zone of privacy protecting matters of personal family life insulated from government interference"" and that "this right arises variously under the first, ninth and fourteenth amendments. depending on the court looking at the matter."' (Motion to Dismiss at 32-33 ). The issue before this Court is whether the allegations of the Amended Complaint state a claim for a violation of this right. The Amended Complaint alleges that children are separated and denied visitation without a professional determination that allowing contact would be contrary to the child's interests or
30

Case 1:00-cv-02116-FAM Document 212 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/23/2001 Page 31 of 36
health. Additionally, the Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants acted with ''deliberate indit1erencc·· to the constitutionally protected needs of the children. (~202-204. 223 ).
The allegations ofthe Amended Complaint, read in the light most favorable to the Plaintiffs. state a claim for violation of the constitutional rights ofthe Plaintiffs by interfering with the right nl' association with their family members. without regard to the impact on the children. These allegations are sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss. See. Marisol A. v. Giuliani. 929 F.Supp. 662, 676-677 (S.D. N.Y. 1996): Aristotle P. v. Johnson, 721 F.Supp. 1002 (N.D. !11. 1989). Accordingly, it is the recommendation ofthis Court that the Motion to Dismiss as directed to Count 3 be DENIED.
(8) Substantive and Procedural Due Process Violations The Defendants assert that dismissal is proper for Count 1 (Substantive Due Process) and Count 2 (Procedural Due Process) since the Amended Complaint contains insutlicient facts to sho\\. that the harms that occurred to the children were the result of deliberate indifference by the Defendants. The Plaintiffs respond that the professional judgment standard is in fact applicable rather than deliberate indifference. but that in any event either standard is met by the allegations of the Amended Complaint. As set out above, the provisions of the Amended Complaint relating to Substantive and Procedural Due Process contain great detail concerning the alleged wrongs committed by the Defendants and clearly alleges that the acts were done in an arbitrary and capricious manner \\ith deliberate indifference. The arguments raised by the Defendants for the dismissal of Counts I and 2 are refuted by the language of the Amended Complaint itself. and there is no basis for dismissal. Accordingly, it is the recommendation of this Court that the Motion to Dismiss Counts I and 2 be
31

Case 1:00-cv-02116-FAM Document 212 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/23/2001 Page 32 of 36
DENIED. (9) Claim Preclusion Based on Other Actions
In the Motion to Dismiss the Defendants contend that a number of the children named as Plaintiffs were part ofa prior suit, Children A-F, Case No. 90-2416-CIV-KEHOE. which was settled in 1995. According to the Defendants, the settlement agreement entered in that case precludes suit for any allegations occurring prior to March, 1995. The Plaintiffs refute this contention. and argue that as to the Plaintiffs who were also members of the A-F class. there would be no claim preclusion for actions or inactions ofthe Defendants which occurred after July 15, 1995. the date the A-F case was dismissed with prejudice or for claims asserted in this litigation (the First Amendment. Ninth Amendment and Title VI claims) but not asserted in A-F.
While the issue of overlapping claims may impact on the availability and scope of the class action determination. which will be addressed by a separate Report and Recommendation to be issued by this Court. for purposes of a motion to dismiss. this Court finds that the Amended Complaint adequately sets out injuries for each claim asserted that \Vould not be foreclosed by the earlier settlement either because it arose after the settlement or since it is on-going. Furthermore. there is no basis for dismissal due to the pending action in M.E. v. Chiles. 90-1 008-CIV -MOORE. Accordingly. it is the recommendation of this Court that the Motion to Dismiss based on claim preclusion be DENIED.
D. The Motion to Dismiss by Governor Bush (D.E. #94) The Motion to Dismiss filed by Governor Bush adopts the arguments made in the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and also contends that the dismissal is proper since the Governor may not be held liable for any purported violation in the Amended Complaint.
32

Case 1:00-cv-02116-FAM Document 212 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/23/2001 Page 33 of 36
The Plaintiff is not required to show personal action by defendants individually in order to obtain injunctive relief against state officers in their official capacity. Rather. the only requirement is that the official be responsible for the challenged action. Luckev v. Harris. 860 F.2d 1012. I 015 (11th Cir. 1988). In explaining this standard, the Eleventh Circuit cited to Ex parte YoutH!. 209 U.S. 123.28 S.Ct. 441,52 L.Ed. 714 (1908), and stated:
As the Young court held. it is sufficient that the state officer sued must, "by virtue of his office, ha[ve] some connection'' with the unconstitutional act or conduct complained of. [W]hether [this connection) arises out ofgeneral law, or is specially created by the act itself, is not material so long as it exists:· Luckey, 860 F.2d at 1015-1016, quoting, Young, 209 U.S. at 157.28 S.Ct. at 453. As set out above. the Amended Complaint alleges that the "Defendants.. committed \'arious acts or failed to carry out required duties resulting in harm to the Plaintiffs. According to the Plaintiffs, the Governor is included in the term "Defendants.'' Additionally. the Amended Complaint contains specific allegations concerning the role and responsibility of the Governor. (tl 111-116 ). These allegations, which must be taken as true for the purposes of a motion to dismiss. are sufficient to allow for the case to proceed at this stage as against the Governor. Accordingly. it is the recommendation ofthis Court that the Motion to Dismiss filed by Governor Jeb Bush (D.E. #94) be DENIED.
II. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION Based on the foregoing, the recommendation of this Court is as follows: (l) The Motion to Dismiss tiled by the Defendants (D.E. #93) should be DENIED as to Counts I, 2, 3, Sand 6 and DENIED in part and GRANTED in part as to Count 4, as set out above.
33

Case 1:00-cv-02116-FAM Document 212 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/23/2001 Page 34 of 36
(2) The Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendant Governor Jeb Bush (D.E. #94) should be DENIED.
Pursuant to Local Magistrate Rule 4(b). the parties have I0 days from service of this Report and Recommendation to serve and file written objections. if any. \vith the Honorable Federico A. Moreno. United States District Judge. Failure to timely file objections shall bar the parties from attacking on appeal the factual findings contained herein. Loconte v. Dugger. 84 7 F .2d 745 ( 11 111 Cir.1988): R.T.C. v. Hallmark Builders. Inc., 996 F.2d 1144. 1149 (11 111 Cir. 1993).
DONE AND ORDERED this <!to"!!. day of April. 2001.
Q~~~ ROBERT L. DUBE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
cc: Honorable Federico A. Moreno Attached Service List
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Case 1:00-cv-02116-FAM Document 212 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/23/2001 Page 35 of 36

SERVICE LIST
Foster Children Bonnie L. v. Jeb Bush Case No. 00-2116--CIV-MORENO

Douglas M. Halsey, Esq. White & Case First Union Financial Center 200 South Biscayne Boulevard Miami. FL 33132
Karen Gievers, Esq. 524 East College Avenue, Suite 2 Tallahassee, FL 32301
Theodore Babbitt, Esq. 1881 Australian Avenue South Suite 200 P.O. Drawer 024426 West Palm Beach. FL 33402-4426
Cecilia Bradley, Esq. Assistant Attorney General The Capitol- PL01 Tallahassee, FL 32399-l 050
Maxine S. Ryan, Esq. Office of the Attorney General 110 Southeast 6th Street Tenth Floor Fart Lauderdale, FL 33 301-5000
John B. Ostrow, Esq. 201 S. Biscayne Blvd. Suite 13 80 Miami, FL 33131
Barbara C. Burch, Esq. 423 Fern Street Suite 300 West Palm Beach. FL 33401

Kevin S. Cannon, Esq. P.O. Box 912 Orlando, FL 32802
William M. Chanfrau. Esq. P.O. Box 265880 Daytona Beach, FL 32126
Jerold Feuer, Esq. 402 N.E. 36th Street Miami, FL 33137
Rose Firestein, Esq. Marcia Lowry, Esq. Children's Rights Inc. 404 Park Avenue South 11th Floor New York, N.Y. 10016
Robert Glenn. Esq. P.O. Box 3333 Tampa, FL 3360 I
Leslie Goller, Esq. Wayne Hogan, Esq. Brown, Terrell, Hogan 233 E. Bay Street Fl. 8 Jacksonville, FL 32202
Robert Kerrigan, Esq. Kerrigan Estes 400 E. Government Street Pensacola, FL 32501
Robert Montgomery. Esq. Montgomery & Larmoyeux 1016 Clearwater Place West Palm Beach, FL 33401

Case 1:00-cv-02116-FAM Document 212 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/23/2001 Page 36 of 36

Bernard P. Perlmutter. Esq. Carolyn Salisbury, Esq. University ofMiami School of Law 5915 Ponce de Leon Blvd. #28 Coral Gables. FL 33146
Gregory A. Samms, Esq. Ocean Optique Tower 2 N.E. 40th Street Suite 201 Miami. FL 33137
Deborah Schroth, Esq. Florida Legal Services 126 W. Adams Street Suite 502 Jacksonville, FL 32202
Neil C. Spector, Esq. 1505 N. Florida Ave. P.O. Box 800 Tampa, FL 33601
Susan Stockman, Esq. 2700 South Tamiami Trial Suite 17 Sarasota, FL 34239
Greg Tynan, Esq. P.O. Box 912 Orlando, FL 32802
Robert A. Vostrejs, Jr., Esq. 202 N .E. 2nd Street P.O. Box 2530 Ocala. FL 34478
James Walsh, Esq. 423 Fern Street Suite 200 West Palm Beach. FL 33401

Roy Wasson. Esq. 1320 South Dixie Highway Gables One Tower. Suite 450 Miami. FL 33146
Dianne Weaver, Esq. Krupnick Campbell 700 S.E. 3rd Avenue Suite 100 Fort Lauderdale, FL 33316
Claudia Wright Esq. Gator Teamchild University of Florida Levin College of Law P.O. Box 117626 Gainesville, FL 32611
Jay C. Hmvell, Esq. 2029 Third Street, North Jacksonville Beach. FL 32250
Cynthia A. McNeely, Esq. With Arms Open Wide Foundation 525 College Avenue Tallahassee, FL 32301
Christina A. Zawisa, Esq. John M. RatlitT, Esq. 3305 College Avenue Fort Lauderdale, Fl 33314

 </s> Case 1:00-cv-02116-FAM Document 220 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/11/2001 Page 1 of 11

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
CASE NO. 00-2116-CIV -MORENO/DUB!~:

FOSTER CHILDREN BONNIE L., by and through her next friend Donald Hadsock, et. al.,
Plaintiffs,

V.
JEB BUSH. as Governor of the State of Florida, et. al.,
______D_e_fe_n_d_an_t_s._________________./

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

THIS CAUSE is before this Court on the Motion for Certification of a Class and a Subclass

filed by the Plaintiffs (D.E. #50) pursuant to an Order of Reference entered by the Honorable

Federico A. Moreno, United States District Judge. This Court has reviewed the motion. the file in

this cause and has heard argument of counsel.

I. DISCUSSION

The present motion seeks to have this Court certify a Plaintiff class consisting of all children

who are currently or who will be in the custody of the Defendants as an alleged or adjudicated

dependent child. Additionally, the Plaintiffs seek the certification of a sub-class consisting of all

children \Vho are Black or are perceived by Defendants as being Black who are currently or \vho will

be in the custody of Defendants as an alleged or adjudicated dependent child.

0

Case 1:00-cv-02116-FAM Document 220 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/11/2001 Page 2 of 11
A. The Allegations of the Amended Complaint The Amended Complaint in this case seeks declaratory and injunctive relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983 based on various alleged violations of the rights of the Plaintiffs \vho are children in the Defendants' custody. The Amended Complaint asserts causes of action for Substantive Due Process (Count 1): Procedural Due Process (Count 2): Violations of the First. Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments (Count 3); Violation of the Adoption and Safe Families Act (Count 4): Violation of the Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnosis and Treatment provisions of Medicaid (Count 5)and Violation of Title VI ofthe Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Count 6). The allegations of the Amended Complaint are set out m detail in the Report and Recommendation entered by this Court on the Motions to Dismiss and are incorporated herein. Additionally, the Amended Complaint contains "Class Action Allegations·· (~117-137). which are set forth below.
(1) The System-Wide Class The Amended Complaint alleges that every child in the Florida foster care system is directly affected by the failure ofthe Defendants to comply with accepted professional standards and exercise competent judgment. These children routinely have their federally protected rights deliberately disregarded and are likely to be harmed. (~ 118). According to the Amended Complaint the Plaintiffs are members ofthe class they seek to represent. and each Plaintiff and each putative class member (with one possible exception) is currently in the Defendants' custody. Additionally. the class is so numerous (between 15,000 to 18,000) as to make joinder of all class members impracticable, and there are questions of law or fact common to the Plaintiffs and the members of the class they seek to represent. (~ 119-121 ).
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Case 1:00-cv-02116-FAM Document 220 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/11/2001 Page 3 of 11

Specifically. the Amended Complaint indicates that common questions of fact include whether Defendants fail to provide safe. stable and secure foster care as required by law: whether the Defendants fail to provide legally required services including medical and educational services. and whether the Defendants fail to promptly take steps to secure a permanent. legally stable family for the children. (~ 122). The issues of lavv· common to the Plaintiffs include whether the Defendants' actions and inactions violate rights secured by the First. Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and whether the Defendants violate the Adoption Assistance and Safe Families Act and the EPSDT provisions of the Social Security Act.(~ 123 ).
The Amended Complaint also alleges that the claims ofthe Plaintiffs are typical of the claims ofother class members. Specifically. each Plaintiffand class member is in need of adequate and safe foster care, relies on the Defendants for the provision of all care. treatment and services and are banned by the failure ofthe Defendants to meet their obligations. Additionally. the relief addressed to the putative class members' claims will also address the claims and injuries ofthe individually

named Plaintiffs. (~ 121. 124). According to the Plaintiffs, they will fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class
and since the Defendants have acted and refused to act on grounds generally applicable to all class members. final injunctive and declaratory relief is appropriate with respect to the class as a whole.

(~ 125-126).

(2) Subclass of Black Foster Children

In addition to the main claim. Plaintiffs Paul B.. Leslie F.. Laurie S. and Lillie S.. Tammy G .. Leanne G .. Melinda and Karina seek to certify a subclass "'of all children who are Black or are perceived by Defendants as being Black and are or will be in the custody of Defendants as an alleged

3

Case 1:00-cv-02116-FAM Document 220 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/11/2001 Page 4 of 11
or dependent child." (~ 128). The allegations relating to the subclass incorporate the allegations related to the system wide class and also set out facts specific to the claims. The subclass is described as too numerous for joinder (over 6,000 children) and the Plaintiffs allege that there are common questions of Jaw and fact. (~131-132).
The common factual questions include whether Black foster children are treated differently because of their race or color and whether the Defendants use racially neutral criteria or methods in administering foster care and adoption services which have a disparate impact on Black children or defeat or impair the objectives of foster care and adoption services for Black foster children. (~1 133 ). Common questions of law cited by the Plaintiffs include \Vhether the treatment of Black foster children constitutes illegal discrimination in violation of Title VI and whether the racially neutral criteria or methods used by the Defendants illegally discriminate against Black foster children in violation of Title VI. (~ 134).
The Amended Complaint alleges that the legal claims and injuries suffered by the Plaintitf<> are typical and representative of the putative subclass and the relief addressed to the subclass members claims and injuries will also address the claims and injuries of the Plaintiffs. (.-; 13 5 ). Additionally, the Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately represent the interests ofthe subclass and since the Defendants have acted and refused to act on grounds generally applicable to all subclass members. final injunctive and declaratory relief is appropriate \vith respect to the subclass as a \vhole. (~ 136-13 7).
B. The Applicable Standard In order to allow for class certification, the moving party must show that the requirements of Rule 23(a). Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and one of the alternative requirements of Rule
4

Case 1:00-cv-02116-FAM Document 220 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/11/2001 Page 5 of 11
23(b) have been met. Jackson v. Motel 6 Multipurpose, Inc., 130 F.3d 999, I005 (11th Cir. 1997).
Rule 23(a) provides as follows:
(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalfofall only if (I) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties \Viii fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. Under Rule 23(b)(2), the following additional requirement must be met to maintain a class action:
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive reliefor corresponding declaratory reliefwith respect to the class as a whole:
The four prerequisites to class certification under Rule 23(a) are commonly referred to as "numerosity, commonality, typicality and adequacy of representation." Prado -Steiman v. Bush. 21 I F.3d 1266, 1278 (11th Cir. 2000). The requirements of commonality and typicality both focus on the issue of whether there is a sufficient connection between the legal claims brought by the named class representatives and those of the individual class members. Id. In order to satisfy the commonality requirement the class action must involve issues that are susceptible to class \vide proof. Murray v. Auslander, 244 F.3d 807, 811 (lith Cir. 2001 ). The party seeking class certification can meet the requirement of typicality by show·ing '"a strong similarity of legal theories... despite substantial factual differences." Prada-Steiman, 221 F.3d at 1279.n. 14. quotinu.
Appleyard v. Wallace, 754 F.2d 955, 958 (11th Cir. 1985). Prior to the certification of a class, "the district court must determine that at least one named
class representative has Article III standing to raise each class subclaim." Prada-Steiman, 221 F.3d
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Case 1:00-cv-02116-FAM Document 220 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/11/2001 Page 6 of 11
at 1279. In making this determination, "each claim must be analyzed separately·. and a claim cannot be asserted on behalf of a class unless at least one named plaintiff has suffered the injury that giws rise to that claim." ld. at 1280, quoting, Griffin v. Dugger, 823 F.2d 1476. 1483 (11th Cir. 1987). Furthem1ore, in making the certification determination, the court should insure that it does not certifY a class which overlaps with certified classes in other related pending litigation. ld. at 1282.
C. The Motion for Certification The arguments raised by the Defendants in opposition to the motion for class certification focus on standing and the typicality and commonality elements addressed above. Spe<..:itically. the Defendants contend that the class certification sought in this case should be denied since many· of the claims are barred by prior and pending litigation and that the named Plaintiffs lack standing to bring many of the claims asserted. The Defendants rely on the presence of three earlier filed suits to support their argument that the class certification sought by the Plaintiffs should be denied. The three cases. M.E. \'.Chiles. 901008-CIV-MOORE: A-F v. Chiles, 90-2416-CIV-KEHOE and Ward v. Kearnev. 98-7137-CIVMORENO. all dealt with complaints brought by children in the custody of the Department. and each sought specific remedies based on alleged wrongs. In their supplemental filing (D.E. #163 at p. 3), the Plaintiffs concede that the main class and sub-class should be certified absent the members of the Ward class (children in District I 0). thus. the impact of this case does not have to be addressed. The A-F case resulted in a settlement and a final order of dismissal by Judge Kehoe in .July. 1995. The Defendants contend that the claims of any child in state custody prior to the dismissal arc barred by the prior case, and note that the allegations of the Amended Complaint do not clearly shO\\
6

Case 1:00-cv-02116-FAM Document 220 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/11/2001 Page 7 of 11
that the claims now brought by these children arose prior to the dismissal. The Plaintiffs counter that the settlement of A-F specifically contemplated bringing future actions for new claims such as the relief sought in the Amended Complaint. which focus on injuries which the children are experiencing now or under the threat of experiencing in the future.
A review of the record before this Court shows that the settlement reached in A-F would bar any claim which arose prior to July. 1995. but would not preclude the certification of a class including members who were in custody prior to that date. but whose claims arose after that date. The allegations of the Amended Complaint assert on-going violations. and to the extent such violations occurred after July, 1995, they should be properly included in this action.
The Plaintiffs in M.E., have certified a class consisting of"all children who are now or in the future will be in the legal or physical custody of the State of Florida, including children who are dependent or delinquent. whom the State kno\vs or should know have a need for mental health services or developmental services." While there are some similarities between the relief sought in M.E. and that sought in the present case. the relief sought here is clearly beyond the scope of mental health services. Thus. there should be no blanket preclusion of class certification based on M.E. However. it does appear that there may be individual cases where the relief sought \Vould be available in the M.E. action. Therefore, any claims for mental health and developmental services should be addressed in M.E. rather than in the present case.
The Defendants also assert that many of the class members and many of the claims should be excluded due to lack of standing. This argument is based on the Defendants' underlying contention that the claims should be looked at district by district rather than statewide. 1-lo\vever. the Amended Complaint in this case clearly alleges that the problems sought to be remedied are
7

Case 1:00-cv-02116-FAM Document 220 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/11/2001 Page 8 of 11
system-wide and are the result of policies and procedures administered on a statewide level by state officials. These allegations are sufficient to allow for a state wide class, thus vitiating the standing argument.
The Defendants also raise an argument relating to the need for individualized factual proof for each of the claims. However, this Court finds that the factual distinctions do not preclude a finding that the requirements for class certification has been met. In the present case. the injuries are claimed to have been brought about by practices which impact all of the children and the requested relief is applicable to the named Plaintiffs and the putative class members. This allows for a finding that the requirements of commonality and typicality have been met.
Accordingly, based on the foregoing, it is the recommendation of this Court that the following class be certified in this cause:
All children who are currently or \Vill be in the custody of the Florida Department of Children and Families as an alleged or adjudicated dependent child, excludine the following: (a) children who reside in Broward/District 10; (b) children who were in the custody of the Department prior to July 24, 1995. but only for claims \Vhich arose prior to that date and (c) any claims for the failure to provide mental health and/or developmental services. Additionally, this Court finds that the Plaintiffs have shown the necessary elements for the certification of a subclass. The arguments raised by the Defendants directed tO\vard the likelihood of success of the claim are not determinative of whether the class should be certified. See, Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156,94 S.Ct. 2140,40 L.Ed.2d 732 (1974); Walco Investments v. Thenen, 168 F.R.D. 315, 329 (S.D. Fla. 1996). Accordingly, this Court recommends that the following subclass be certified in this cause: All children who are Black or identified by the Defendants as Black. who are currently, or will be in the custody of the Florida Department
8

Case 1:00-cv-02116-FAM Document 220 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/11/2001 Page 9 of 11

of Children and Families as an alleged or adjudicated dependent child. excludin~ the following: (a) children who reside in Broward/District I 0; (b) children who were in the custody of the Department prior to July 24. I995, but only for claims \Vhich arose prior to that date and (c) any claims for the failure to provide mental
health and/or developmental services.

II. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing, it is the recommendation of this Court that the Motion for

Certification of a Class and a Subclass (D.E. #50) be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part as

set out above. Pursuant to Local Magistrate Rule 4(b), the parties have I0 days from service of this Report
and Recommendation to serve and file written objections. if any. \Vith the Honorable Federico A. Moreno. United States District Judge. Failure to timely file objections shall bar the parties from attacking on appeal the factual findings contained herein. Loconte v. Dugger. 847 F.2d 745 ( 11 111 Cir.l988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 958 (1988); R.T.C. v. Hallmark Builders, Inc .. 996 F.2d 1144. 1149

(II th Cir. 1993). DONE AND ORDERED this

(\~ day of May. 2001.

Q,);\~\S).~.L ROBERT L. DUBE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

cc: Honorable Federico A. Moreno Attached Service List

9

Case 1:00-cv-02116-FAM Document 220 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/11/2001 Page 10 of 11

SERVICE LIST
Foster Children Bonnie L. v. Jeb Bush Case No. 00-2116--CIV-MORENO

Douglas M. Halsey, Esq. White & Case First Union Financial Center 200 South Biscayne Boulevard Miami, FL 33132
Karen Gievers, Esq. 524 East College Avenue, Suite 2 Tallahassee, FL 32301
Theodore Babbitt, Esq. 1881 Australian Avenue South Suite 200 P.O. Drawer 024426 West Palm Beach, FL 33402-4426
Cecilia Bradley, Esq. Assistant Attorney General The Capitol- PL01 Tallahassee. FL 32399-1050
Maxine S. Ryan, Esq. Office of the Attorney General 110 Southeast 6th Street Tenth Floor Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301-5000
John B. Ostrow. Esq. 201 S. Biscayne Blvd. Suite 1380 Miami. FL 33131
Barbara C. Burch, Esq. 423 Fern Street Suite 300 West Palm Beach, FL 33401

Kevin S. Cannon, Esq. P.O. Box 912 Orlando, FL 32802
William M. Chanfrau, Esq. P.O. Box 265880 Daytona Beach, FL 32126
Jerold Feuer, Esq. 402 N.E. 36th Street Miami, FL 3313 7
Rose Firestein, Esq. Marcia Lowry, Esq. Children's Rights Inc. 404 Park Avenue South II th Floor New York. N.Y. 10016
Robert Glenn, Esq. P.O. Box 3333 Tampa. FL 33601
Leslie Goller, Esq. Wayne Hogan, Esq. Brovm. TerrelL Hogan 233 E. Bay Street Fl. 8 Jacksonville. FL 32202
Robert Kerrigan, Esq. Kerrigan Estes 400 E. Government Street Pensacola. FL 3250 I
Robert Montgomery. Esq. Montgomery & Larmoyeux 1016 Clearwater Place West Palm Beach, FL 33401

Case 1:00-cv-02116-FAM Document 220 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/11/2001 Page 11 of 11

Bernard P. Perlmutter, Esq. Carolyn Salisbury, Esq. University of Miami School of Law 5915 Ponce de Leon Blvd. #28 Coral Gables, FL 33146
Gregory A. Samms, Esq. Ocean Optique Tower 2 N.E. 40th Street Suite 201 Miami, FL 33137
Deborah Schroth, Esq. Florida Legal Services 126 W. Adams Street Suite 502 Jacksonville, FL 32202
Neil C. Spector, Esq. 1505 N. Florida Ave. P.O. Box 800 Tampa, FL 33601
Susan Stockman, Esq. 2700 South Tamiami Trial Suite 17 Sarasota, FL 34239
Greg Tynan, Esq. P.O. Box 912 Orlando. FL 32802
Robert A. Vostrejs, Jr., Esq. 202 N.E. 2nd Street P.O. Box 2530 Ocala, FL 34478
James Walsh, Esq. 423 Fern Street Suite 200 West Palm Beach. FL 33401

Roy Wasson, Esq. 1320 South Dixie Highway Gables One Tov.:er. Suite 450 Miami. FL 33146
Dianne Weaver, Esq. Krupnick Campbell 700 S.E. 3rd Avenue Suite I00 Fort Lauderdale, FL 33316
Claudia Wright. Esq. Gator Teamchild University of Florida Levin College of Law P.O. Box 117626 Gainesville, FL 32611
Jay C. Howell, Esq. 2029 Third Street, North Jacksonville Beach. FL 32250
Cynthia A. McNeely. Esq. With Arms Open Wide Foundation 525 College Avenue Tallahassee. FL 32301
Christina A. Zawisa. Esq. John M. Ratliff, Esq. 3305 College Avenue Fort Lauderdale. FL 33314

 </s> Case 1:00-cv-02116-FAM Document 259 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/11/2001 Page 1 of 4

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA Miami Division

Case Number: 00-2116-CIV-MORENO

FOSTER CHILDREN BONNIE L., by and through her next friend Donald Hadsock, et. a/.,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
JEB BUSH, as Governor of the State of Florida, et. a/.,

~ FILED by

u.C.

JUN 0 8 200t
CLARENCE MADDOX CLERK U.S. DIST. CT.
S.D. OF FLA.

Defendants.
---------------------------------I
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS' EMERGENCY MOTION FOR TEMPORARY INJUNCTION PENDING APPEAL

On May 29, 2001, Plaintiffs filed an Emergency Motion for Temporary Injunction Pending

Appeal pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P 62(c). Rule 62(c) provides that the court in its discretion may grant

an injunction during an appeal of an order denying an injunction. Having failed to persuade this

Court that it should grant an injunction on the merits and prevent Defendants from terminating

Plaintiff's benefits, Plaintiff now seeks to have this Court temporarily enjoin Defendants from

terminating her benefits while her appeal is before the Eleventh Circuit.

As grounds, Plaintiff directs the attention of the Court to Subparagraph IV.B. of an

attachment to Defendants' April 11, 2001 Response Regarding the Status of Agreement for

Continued Services. That subparagraph states:

The recipient by executing this agreement does not waive or agree to waive any state or federal constitutional rights that she may have. At the same time, the recipient understands and agrees that the Department is authorized to terminate the agreement if the recipient fails to comply with any of the terms of the agreement, notwithstanding a contention that the noncompliance is an exercise ofa constitutional

Case 1:00-cv-02116-FAM Document 259 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/11/2001 Page 2 of 4
right. Proposed Agreement for Continued Services at ~ IV.B. Plaintiff argues that the Court's understanding of Defendants' position is contradicted by the language ofthat subparagraph.
In its April30, 2001 Order, the Court acknowledged in its holding that Defendants' proposed written service agreement is ambiguous about whether signing the agreement would result in the relinquishment of constitutional rights and nothing in Plaintiff's submission alters this understanding. Plaintiffs submission makes Plaintiffs lack of standing and ripeness evident as the Court was not and has not been presented with a complete and final agreement with which to rule on the underlying constitutional issues raised by Plaintiff.
Subparagraph IV.B. does not constitute a waiver of constitutional rights at the moment the individual signs the agreement as Plaintiff contends. Instead, it allows for the possibility that the Department will be able to terminate the benefits for the failure to comply with any of the terms of the agreement. Plaintiff must show that she is in immediate danger of sustaining a direct injury as a result of the conduct of Defendants, and not just a conjectural or hypothetical injury. City ofLos Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101-2, 103 S.Ct 1660, 1665 (1983).
After receiving Defendants' response filed on June 6, 200 I to Plaintiff's motion for temporary injunction pending appeal, it now appears that the motion is moot in any event as Defendants have agreed to continue services to Plaintiff Leslie F. for 45 days or until the Eleventh
-2-

Case 1:00-cv-02116-FAM Document 259 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/11/2001 Page 3 of 4
Circuit rules. Accordingly, Plaintiffs motion is DENIED as moot.
1_ v DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami, Florida, this day of June, 2001.

Copies provided to:
Karen Gievers, Esq.
GIEVERS, P.A.
524 East College Avenue, Suite 2 Tallahassee, FL 32301
Theodore Babbitt, Esq.
BABBITI,JOHNSON & OSBORNE
1801 Australian Avenue South Suite 200 P.O. Drawer 024426 West Palm Beach, FL 33402-4426
Barbara C. Burch, Esq. Bill Fraser, Esq. Michelle Hankey, Esq. 423 Fern St., Ste. 300 West Palm Beach, FL 33401
Kevin S. Cannon, Esq. P.O. Box 912 Orlando, FL 32802
William M. Chanfrau, Esq.
CHANFRAU, CHANFRAU & BOUCH
P.O. Box 265880 Daytona Beach, FL 32126
Jerold Feuer, Esq. 402 N.E. 36th St. Miami, FL 33137

FEDERIC .

0

UNITE TATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Rose Firestein, Esq. Marcia Lowry, Esq.
CIDLDREN'S RIGHTS, INC.
404 Park Avenue South, 11th Floor New York, NY 10016
Robert Glenn, Esq.
GLENN, RASMUSSEN
P.O. Box 3333 Tampa, FL 33601
Leslie Goller, Esq. Wayne Hogan, Esq.
BROWN, TERRELL, HOGAN
233 E. Bay St., Fl. 8 Jacksonville, FL 32202
Robert Kerrigan, Esq.
KERRIGAN ESTES
400 E. Government St. Pensacola, FL 32501
Robert Montgomery, Esq.
MONTGOMERY & LARMOYEUX
10 16 Clearwater Place West Palm Beach, FL 33401
John B. Ostrow, Esq.
LAW OFFICES OF JOHN B. OSTROW, P.A.
-3-

Case 1:00-cv-02116-FAM Document 259 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/11/2001 Page 4 of 4

Miami Center Bldg., Ste. 1380 201 S. Biscayne Blvd. Miami, FL 33131
Bernard P. Perlmutter, Esq. Carolyn Salisbury, Esq.
UNIV. OF MIAMI LAW SCHOOL
5915 Ponce de Leon Blvd. # 28 Coral Gables, FL 33146
Gregory A. Samms, Esq. Ocean Optique Tower 2 NE 40th St., Ste. 201 Miami, FL 33137
Deborah Schroth, Esq.
FLORIDA LEGAL SERVICES
126 W. Adams St., Ste. 502 Jacksonville, FL 32202
Neil C. Spector, Esq. 1505 N. Florida Ave. P.O. Box 800 Tampa, FL 33601
Susan Stockham, Esq. 2700 S. Tamiami Tr., Ste. 17 Sarasota, FL 34239
Greg Tynan, Esq. P.O. Box 912 Orlando, FL 32802
Robert A. Vostrejs, Jr., Esq. 202 NE 2nd St. P.O. Box 2530 Ocala, FL 34478
James Walsh, Esq. John Walsh, Esq. 423 Fern Street, Ste. 200 West Palm Beach, FL 33401

Roy Wasson, Esq. 1320 S. Dixie Highway Ste. 450, Gables One Tower Miami, FL 33146
Dianne Weaver, Esq.
KRUPNICK CAMPBELL
700 SE 3rd Ave., Ste. 100 Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33316
Claudia Wright, Esq.
GATOR TEAMCillLD UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA, LEVIN COLLEGE OF LAW
P.O. Box 117626 Ganiesville, FL 32611
Jay C. Howell, Esq. 2029 3rd St. North Jacksonville Beach, FL 32250
Cynthia A McNeely, Esq.
WITH ARMS OPEN WIDE FOUNDATION
525 E. College Ave. Tallahassee, FL 32301
Of Counsel Christina A Zawisa, Esq. John M. Ratliff, Esq. 3305 College Ave. Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33314
Cecilia Bradley, Esq. Assistant Attorney General
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
The Capitol -PLO 1 Tallahassee, FL 32399-1050
Maxine S. Ryan, Esq.
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
110 Southeast 6th Street Tenth Floor Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301-5000
-4-

 </s> Case 1:00-cv-02116-FAM Document 475 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/15/2002 Page 1 of 9
', _·, ._, ~~! ..~

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
CASE NO.: 00-2116-CIV-MORENO/Dube

FOSTER CHILDREN, et al,
Plaintiffs, v.

',-/
PLAINTIFFS' NOTICE OF FILING SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

JEB BUSH, et al,

Defendants.
______________________ /

Plaintiffs hereby give notice of the filing of a

settlement agreement reached between the named Defendants

in the case at bar and the Plaintiffs named in the

agreement. The agreement settles the claims remaining

pending before this Court which were to be repleaded in an

amended complaint due no later than February 15. [The

settlement agreement does not resolve the constitutional

claims in Counts I, II and III or the ASFA claims in Count

IV of the August 2000 amended complaint to the extent the

claims were filed by foster children still in the

Defendants' custody and still under the age of eighteen;

those claims are pending before the appellate court].

The effect of the settlement agreement is to make it

··-- unnecessary for an amended complaint to be filed on the
behalf of the individual youngsters whose claims were not ~
L(7 ~
.JOHN B. OSTROW. P.A .. 201 S. BISCAYNE BOULEVARD · SUITE 1380 · MIAMI. FLORIDA 33131

Case 1:00-cv-02116-FAM Document 475 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/15/2002 Page 2 of 9 subject to the abstention and Eleventh Amendment immunity rulings of this Court. Respectfully submitted, GIEVERS, P.A. Counsel for Plaintiffs
~f!f ·~r-
Fla. Bar No.: 262005 524 East College Avenue Suite 2 Tallahassee, FL 32301 T - 850/222-1961 F - 850/222-2153
.JOHN B. OSTROW. P.A.. 201 S. BISCAYNE BOULEVARD · SUITE 1380 · MIAMI. FLORIDA 33131

Case 1:00-cv-02116-FAM Document 475 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/15/2002 Page 3 of 9

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing was mailed on this ~~day of February, 2002 to

Plaintiffs' counsel and counsel on the attached service

list.

~--------~~

Fla. Bar No. 262005

Co-Lead Counsel for Plaintiffs

Theodore Babbitt, Esquire Fla. Bar No. :091146 Babbitt, Johnson and Osborne, P.A. Suite 100 1450 Centerpark Blvd West Palm Beach, FL 33401 Mailing address: P.O. Box 4426 West Palm Beach, FL 33402-4426 T - 561/684-2500 F - 561/684-6308

John B. Ostrow, Esquire Fla. Bar No.: 124324 Law Offices of John B. Ostrow, P.A. Miami Center Bldg Suite 1380 201 S. Biscayne Blvd. Miami, FL 33131 T - 305/358-1496 F - 305/371-7999

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS

Cecilia Bradley, Esquire Asst. Atty. General Fla. Bar No.: 363790 Jason Vail, Esquire Asst. Atty. General Chesterfield Smith, Esquire Asst. Atty. General Office of the Attorney General The Capitol - PLOl Tallahassee, FL 32399-1050 T - 850/414-3300 F - 850/414-9650

Lynn Sharon, Esquire Asst. Atty. General Paul Hancock, Esquire Asst. Atty. General Stephanie S. Curd, Esquire Asst. Atty. General Office of the Attorney General Civil Litigation Division 110 S.E. 6th Street - lOth Floor Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33301-5000 T - 954/712-4600 F - 954/712-4700

Case 1:00-cv-02116-FAM Document 475 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/15/2002 Page 4 of 9

OmnCEOFTHEATTORNEYGENERAL

ROBERT A. BUTIERWORTH Attomey G~rlll Stale ofFlorida

DEPARTMENT OF LEGAL AFFAIRS THE CAPITOL
TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32399-1050

Please reply to:
Office oftbe Altomcy Gcncral SuitePL-01 The Capitol
Tallabassee, Florida 32399-1050
(8S0)414-3JOO;FAJ{:(8S0)48~812

February 7, 2002

Ms. Karen Gievers 524 East College Ave., Suite 2 Tallahassee, FL 32301

re: Foster Children v. Bush

Dear Ms. Gievers:

I have enclosed two signed copies ofthe settlement agreement. Please return a signed copy to me for our records.

I understand that the plaintiffs have no objection to the attached draft policy statement condemning racial discrimination in the delivery offoster care services.

Sm~.:;:r~. /

// i·l /. /
( .1 f/Lv•

c' II

'

Jason (Vail

Assistant Attorney General

cc: Josefina Tamayo Simone Marstiller

AN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION/EQUAL OPPORTUNITY EMPLOYER

Case 1:00-cv-02116-FAM Document 475 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/15/2002 Page 5 of 9

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA Miami division

FOSTER CIDLDREN BONNIE L., et al.,

Plaintiffs

v.

Case Number: 00-2116-CIV MORENO

JED BUSH, et al.,

Defendants I
----------------------~
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

The parties enter into this settlement agreement after arms-length negotiation. I. The claims raised in the amended complaint by plaintiffs Sandra M., Bonnie L., Paul B., and Hugh S. are moot and will be dismissed with prejudice, consistent with paragraphs 6-8. 2. The claims raised in the amended complaint by plaintiffs Jay and Candice D., Matthew I., and Cathy W. are moot and will be dismissed with prejudice, consistent with paragraphs 6-8. 3. To settle the claims raised in the amended complaint by Leslie F. Melinda, and Karina, the defendants will include in any agreement for continued foster care services or subsidized independent living services offered to them the following provisions, assuming the plaintiffs qualify for services: • By executing this agreement, the recipient does not waive any state or
federal constitutional rights that he/she may have. At the same time, the recipient agrees that the Department is authorized to terminate the

Case 1:00-cv-02116-FAM Document 475 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/15/2002 Page 6 of 9
agreement if the recipient fails to comply with any of the tenns of the agreement despite the recipient's contention that noncompliance arises from an exercise ofa constitutional right if such noncompliance constitutes a danger to self or others. • (insert the name) is entitled to the confidentiality of his/her medical records. By signing this agreement, (insert the name of the former foster child) authorizes his/her secondary/post-secondary educational program to provide the Department, upon request, access to information and/or to provide a copy of any and all records (other than medical, mental health and therapy records) concerning (insert the name). By this agreement, (insert the name) authorizes the Department to obtain medical, mental health and therapy records when the Department has reason to believe that the recipient may present a risk of harm to self or others. The Department will protect (insert the name)'s privacy rights as required by law. The claims raised in the amended complaint by Leslie F., Melinda and Karina will be dismissed with prejudice, consistent with paragraphs 6-8. 4. The EPSDT claims raised in the amended complaint by Reggie B. are moot and will be dismissed with prejudice, consistent with paragraphs 6-8. 5. To settle the claims raised in the amended complaint by Laurie S., Lillie S. and Tammy G. for intentional racial discrimination under Title VI, the secretary of the Department of Children and Families will issue a policy statement reemphasizing that it is the department's policy not to discriminate on the basis of race in decisions to provide foster care and adoption services to Florida children in the department's care and custody. The defendants will continue to explore placement options for Tammy G., as provided by law. This claim will be dismissed with prejudice, consistent with paragraphs 6-8.
2

Case 1:00-cv-02116-FAM Document 475 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/15/2002 Page 7 of 9

6. Plaintiffs Sandra M., Bonnie L., Paul B., Hugh S., Jay and Candice D.,

Matthew 1., Cathy W., Leslie F., Melinda, and Karina release the defendants from

all claims for injunctive or declaratory relief that were or could have been raised in

the amended complaint filed in this action in August 2000. Reggie B. releases the

defendants from his EPSDT claim for injunctive and declaratory relief. Laurie S.,

Lillie S., and Tammy G. release the defendants from their Title VI claim for

injunctive and declaratory relief. By releasing their respective EPSDT and Title VI

claims for injunctive and declaratory relief, Reggie B., Laurie S., Lillie S., and

Tammy G. are not releasing their right to continue to pursue their a1ready ongoing

constitutional and ASFA claims raised in Counts I through IV of the amended

complaint.

7 This settlement agreement does not settle or compromise any claims

for damages.

8. As to Sandra M., Bonnie L., Paul B., Hugh S., Jay and Candice D.,

Matthew I., Cathy W., Leslie F., Melinda and Karina, this settlement agreement

also does not settle or compromise and any claims for injunctive or declaratory

relief that may arise after the date of this settlement agreement.

9. No statement in this agreement shall constitute an admission by the

defendants.

10. This agreement applies only to the defendants in this suit and to the

plaintiffs specifically name herein.
;;;} --- . --Z-~'~A-'~2
Karen A. Gtevers Gievers P.A. 524 E. College Ave Ste 2 Tallahassee, FL 32301-2529 Counsel for Plaintiff

Assi t Attorney General PL-0 1 The Capitol Tallahassee, FL 32399 Counsel for Defendants

3

Case 1:00-cv-02116-FAM Document 475 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/15/2002 Page 8 of 9 Date

Case 1:00-cv-02116-FAM Document 475 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/15/2002 Page 9 of 9
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES
Secretary's Policy on Race in Foster Care
It is the express policy ofthe Deparbnent ofChildren and Families that children in foster care shall not be treated differently because oftheir race. Decisions about the delivery of services, the setting ofpermanency goals, and placement shall not be based on a child's race or the color ofhis or her skin.
The deparbnent is committed to achieving positive outcomes for all children in its custody, regardless oftheir race.
Each department supervisor, employee and contract provider must ensure that this policy is enforced at every level for every child.
Violation of this policy is grounds for discipline, including dismissal.

 </s> Case: 1:00-cv-2116 As of: 09/23/2015 04:58 PM EDT 1 of 39
U.S. District Court Southern District of Florida (Miami) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:00−cv−02116−FAM

CLOSED

31 Foster Children v. Bush, et al Assigned to: Judge Federico A. Moreno Demand: $0 Case in other court: USDC SD FL, 98−07137−CV−FAM Cause: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act
Plaintiff

Date Filed: 06/13/2000 Date Terminated: 03/08/2002 Jury Demand: None Nature of Suit: 440 Civil Rights: Other Jurisdiction: Federal Question

31 Foster Children on behalf of themselves and all other Children in Florida Foster Care

represented by Barbara Burch Briggs Legal Aid Society of Palm Beach County 423 Fern Street Suite 200 West Palm Beach, FL 33401 561−655−8944 Fax: 655−5269 Email: bbriggs@legalaidpbc.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Bernard P. Perlmutter University of Miami School of Law Children &Youth Law Clinic PO Box 248087 Coral Gables, FL 33124−8087 305−284−3123 Fax: 284−4384 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Carolyn Salisbury University of Miami School of Law 5915 Ponce De Leon Boulevard Suite 28 Coral Gables, FL 33146 305−284−4321 Fax: 284−4384 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Cynthia A. McNeely With Arms Open Wide Foundation 525 E College Avenue Tallahassee, FL 32301 850−222−3882 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Deborah Schroth Legal Aid Society 126 W Adams Street Jacksonville, FL 32202 904−355−5200 Fax: 355−5223 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Dianne Jay Weaver Krupnick Campbell Malone Roselli et al Courthouse Law Plaza

Case: 1:00-cv-2116 As of: 09/23/2015 04:58 PM EDT 2 of 39
700 SE 3rd Avenue Suite 100 Fort Lauderdale, FL 33316−1186 954−763−8181 TERMINATED: 08/29/2001 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Greg A. Tynan PO Box 912 Orlando, FL 32802 407−839−1040 Fax: 839−2002 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Gregory Antonio Samms Gregory A. Samms 225 Alcazar Avenue Coral Gables, FL 33134 786−953−5802 Fax: 786−513−3191 Email: sammslaw@gmail.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
James Walsh Legal Aid Society of Palm Beach County 423 Fern Street Suite 200 West Palm Beach, FL 33401 561−655−8944X243 Fax: 655−5269 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jerold Feuer 402 NE 36th Street Miami, FL 33137 305−573−2282 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John Bruce Ostrow Polenberg, Cooper, Saunders &Riesberg, PL 777 Brickell Avenue Suite 1210 Miami, FL 33131 305−371−9617 Fax: 305−371−9628 Email: jbostrow@bellsouth.net LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John Walsh Legal Aid Society of Palm Beach County 423 Fern Street Suite 200 West Palm Beach, FL 33401 561−655−8944X242 Fax: 655−5269 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:00-cv-2116 As of: 09/23/2015 04:58 PM EDT 3 of 39
Jorge A. Lorenzo 1001 N Macdill Avenue Tampa, FL 33607 813−998−9529 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Karen A. Gievers 524 E College Avenue Suite 2 Tallahassee, FL 32301 850−222−1961 Fax: 222−2153 Email: kgievers@karengievers.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kevin S. Cannon PO Box 912 Orlando, FL 32802 407−839−1040 Fax: 839−2002 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Leslie Goller Brown Terrell Hogan Ellis McClamma &Yegelwel 233 East Bay Street Suite 804 Blackstone Bldg Jacksonville, FL 32202 904−632−2424 Fax: 353−4418 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Marcia Lowry Children's Right's Inc 404 Park Avenue South 11th Floor New York, NY 10016 212−683−2210 Fax: 683−4015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael Richard Barnes Michael R. Barnes 801 Whitehead Street Key West, FL 33040 305−296−5297 Fax: 296−5254 Email: mrbarnes@barneslaw.net LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michelle Hankey Legal Aid Society of Palm Beach County 423 Fern Street Suite 200 West Palm Beach, FL 33401 561−655−8944 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:00-cv-2116 As of: 09/23/2015 04:58 PM EDT 4 of 39
Neil C. Spector Kass Shuler Solomon Spector et al PO Box 800 Tampa, FL 33601 813−229−0900 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Robert Baltzell Glenn , Jr. Bradley Arant Boult Cummings LLP 100 S Ashley Drive Suite 1300 PO Box 3333 Tampa, FL 33601−3333 813−229−3333 Email: rglenn@babc.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Robert G. Kerrigan Kerrigan Estess Rankin &McLeod 400 E Government Street PO Box 12009 Pensacola, FL 32589 850−444−4444 Fax: 444−4494 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Robert M. Montgomery , Jr. Robert M Montgomery Jr &Associates PL 1016 Clearwater Place West Palm Beach, FL 33401 561−832−2880 Fax: 832−0887 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Robert A. Vostrejs , Jr. 202 NE 2nd Street PO Box 2530 Ocala, FL 34478−2530 352−622−3252 Fax: 622−8310 TERMINATED: 11/02/2001 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Rose E. Firestein Children's Right's Inc 404 Park Avenue South 11th Floor New York, NY 10016 212−683−2210 Fax: 683−4015 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Susan L. Stockham 2700 S Tamiami Trail Sarasota, FL 34239 941−957−0094 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Theodore Babbitt

Case: 1:00-cv-2116 As of: 09/23/2015 04:58 PM EDT 5 of 39
Babbitt Johnson &Osborne 1641 Worthington Road Suite 100 PO Box 4426 West Palm Beach, FL 33402−4426 561−684−2500 Fax: 561−684−6308 Email: tedbabbitt@babbitt−johnson.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Wayne Hogan Brown Terrell Hogan Ellis McClamma &Yegelwel 233 East Bay Street Suite 804 Blackstone Bldg Jacksonville, FL 32202 904−632−2424 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
William M. Chanfrau Chanfrau Chanfrau &Bouch PO Box 265880 Daytona Beach, FL 32126 904−258−7313 Fax: 238−1464 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V.
Defendant
Governor Jeb Bush as Governor of the State of Florida

represented by Cecilia Bradley Attorney General Office Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol PL−01 Tallahassee, FL 32399−1050 850−414−3300 Fax: 488−4872 Email: cecilia.bradley@myfloridalegal.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jason Vail Attorney General Office Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol PL−01 Tallahassee, FL 32399−1050 850−414−3300 Fax: 488−4872 Email: jay.vail@myfloridalegal.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Maxine K. Streeter Conrad &Scherer 633 S Federal Highway 8th Floor PO Box 14723 Fort Lauderdale, FL 33302−4723 954−462−5500 Fax: 463−9244 TERMINATED: 06/22/2001 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:00-cv-2116 As of: 09/23/2015 04:58 PM EDT 6 of 39

Defendant Kathleen Kearney as Secretary of the Florida Department of Children and Families,
Defendant Chuck Bates District Administrators
Defendant Robert Williams District Administrators

Stephanie Lynne Staples Curd Attorney General Office Department of Legal Affairs 110 SE 6th Street 9th &10th Floor Republic Tower Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301 954−712−4600 Fax: 712−4700 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Cecilia Bradley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jason Vail (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Maxine K. Streeter (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/22/2001 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Cecilia Bradley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jason Vail (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Maxine K. Streeter (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/22/2001 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Cecilia Bradley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jason Vail (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Maxine K. Streeter (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/22/2001 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:00-cv-2116 As of: 09/23/2015 04:58 PM EDT 7 of 39

Defendant Ester Tibbs District Administrators
Defendant Betty Carley District Administrators
Defendant Lynn Richard District Administrators
Defendant Lynn Richard District Administrators

represented by Cecilia Bradley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jason Vail (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Maxine K. Streeter (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/22/2001 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Cecilia Bradley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jason Vail (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Maxine K. Streeter (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/22/2001 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Cecilia Bradley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jason Vail (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Maxine K. Streeter (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/22/2001 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Cecilia Bradley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Maxine K. Streeter (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/22/2001 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:00-cv-2116 As of: 09/23/2015 04:58 PM EDT 8 of 39

Defendant Robert Morin District Administrators
Defendant Mike Murphy District Administrators
Defendant David May District Administrators
Defendant Phyllis Scott District Administrators

Jason Vail (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Cecilia Bradley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jason Vail (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Maxine K. Streeter (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/22/2001 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Cecilia Bradley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jason Vail (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Maxine K. Streeter (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/22/2001 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Cecilia Bradley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jason Vail (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Maxine K. Streeter (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/22/2001 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Cecilia Bradley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:00-cv-2116 As of: 09/23/2015 04:58 PM EDT 9 of 39

Jason Vail (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Maxine K. Streeter (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/22/2001 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Charles Auslander District Administrators

represented by Cecilia Bradley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jason Vail (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Maxine K. Streeter (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/22/2001 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Father Richard L. Barry District Administrators

represented by Cecilia Bradley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jason Vail (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Maxine K. Streeter (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/22/2001 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Patrick Howard District Administrators

represented by Cecilia Bradley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jason Vail (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Maxine K. Streeter (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/22/2001 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant

Case: 1:00-cv-2116 As of: 09/23/2015 04:58 PM EDT 10 of 39

Sue Gray District Administrators

represented by Cecilia Bradley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jason Vail (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Maxine K. Streeter (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/22/2001 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Buddy Cline District Administrators TERMINATED: 07/14/2000

represented by Jason Vail (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Maxine K. Streeter (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/22/2001 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant
Vern Melvin Districit Administrator also known as Vern Martin

represented by Cecilia Bradley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Jason Vail (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Maxine K. Streeter (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/22/2001 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 06/13/2000
06/13/2000 06/26/2000 06/26/2000 06/26/2000

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF CLASS ACTION FILED; A−7 JJO: FILING FEE $150.00 RECEIPT # 712615 (at, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/14/2000)
Magistrate identification: Magistrate Judge John J. O'Sullivan (at, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/14/2000)
2 SUMMONS(ES) issued for Jeb Bush (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/26/2000)
3 SUMMONS(ES) issued for Kathleen Kearney (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/26/2000)
4 SUMMONS(ES) issued for Chuck Bates (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/26/2000)

Case: 1:00-cv-2116 As of: 09/23/2015 04:58 PM EDT 11 of 39

06/26/2000 06/26/2000 06/26/2000 06/26/2000 06/26/2000 06/26/2000 06/26/2000 06/26/2000 06/26/2000 06/26/2000 06/26/2000 06/26/2000 06/26/2000 06/26/2000 07/10/2000 07/10/2000 07/10/2000 07/10/2000 07/10/2000 07/10/2000 07/10/2000 07/10/2000 07/12/2000 07/14/2000

5 SUMMONS(ES) issued for John Awad (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/26/2000)
6 SUMMONS(ES) issued for Ester Tibbs (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/26/2000)
7 SUMMONS(ES) issued for Lee Johnson (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/26/2000)
8 SUMMONS(ES) issued for Lynn Richard (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/26/2000)
9 SUMMONS(ES) issued for Don Dixon (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/26/2000)
10 SUMMONS(ES) issued for Robert Morin (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/26/2000)
11 SUMMONS(ES) issued for Fran Gibbons (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/26/2000)
12 SUMMONS(ES) issued for Paul Brown (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/26/2000)
13 SUMMONS(ES) issued for Phyllis Scott (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/26/2000)
14 SUMMONS(ES) issued for Charles Auslander (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/26/2000)
15 SUMMONS(ES) issued for Patrick Howard (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/26/2000)
16 SUMMONS(ES) issued for Sue Gray (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/26/2000)
17 SUMMONS(ES) issued for Buddy Cline (cj, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/27/2000)
18 SUMMONS(ES) issued for Christine Davenport (cj, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/27/2000)
19 RETURN OF SERVICE executed for John Awad on 6/29/00 Answer due on 7/19/00 for John Awad (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 07/11/2000)
20 RETURN OF SERVICE executed for Jeb Bush on 6/29/00 Answer due on 7/19/00 for Jeb Bush (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 07/11/2000)
21 RETURN OF SERVICE executed for Kathleen Kearney on 6/29/00 Answer due on 7/19/00 for Kathleen Kearney (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 07/11/2000)
22 RETURN OF SERVICE executed for Lee Johnson on 6/30/00 Answer due on 7/20/00 for Lee Johnson (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 07/11/2000)
23 RETURN OF SERVICE executed for Phyllis Scott on 6/26/00 Answer due on 7/16/00 for Phyllis Scott (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 07/11/2000)
24 RETURN OF SERVICE executed for Robert Morin on 6/30/00 Answer due on 7/20/00 for Robert Morin (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 07/11/2000)
25 RETURN OF SERVICE executed for Ester Tibbs on 6/28/00 Answer due on 7/18/00 for Ester Tibbs (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 07/11/2000)
26 Return of service unexecuted as to Buddy Cline (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 07/11/2000)
27 RETURN OF SERVICE executed for Charles Auslander on 6/30/00 Answer due on 7/20/00 for Charles Auslander (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 07/13/2000)
28 NOTICE of substitution of party by 31 Foster Children (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 07/14/2000)

Case: 1:00-cv-2116 As of: 09/23/2015 04:58 PM EDT 12 of 39

07/18/2000 07/18/2000 07/18/2000 07/18/2000 07/18/2000 07/20/2000 07/20/2000 07/21/2000
07/25/2000 07/25/2000 08/07/2000 08/07/2000 08/07/2000 08/21/2000
08/28/2000 08/29/2000
09/01/2000

29 RETURN OF SERVICE executed for Chuck Bates on 6/30/00 Answer due on 7/20/00 for Chuck Bates (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 07/20/2000)
30 RETURN OF SERVICE executed for Lynn Richard on 7/5/00 Answer due on 7/25/00 for Lynn Richard (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 07/20/2000)
31 RETURN OF SERVICE executed for Don Dixon on 7/3/00 Answer due on 7/23/00 for Don Dixon (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 07/20/2000)
32 RETURN OF SERVICE executed for Sue Gray on 6/30/00 Answer due on 7/20/00 for Sue Gray (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 07/20/2000)
33 RETURN OF SERVICE executed for Fran Gibbons on 6/30/00 Answer due on 7/20/00 for Fran Gibbons (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 07/20/2000)
34 MOTION by All Defendants to extend time to respond to the complaint (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 07/20/2000)
35 RETURN OF SERVICE executed for Paul Brown on 7/6/00 Answer due on 7/26/00 for Paul Brown (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 07/20/2000)
36 ORDER granting [34−1] motion to extend time to respond to the complaint reset answer due for 9/18/00 for All Defendants, for Vern Martin, for Buddy Cline, for Sue Gray, for Patrick Howard, for Christine Davenport, for Charles Auslander, for Phyllis Scott, for Paul Brown, for Fran Gibbons, for Robert Morin, for Don Dixon, for Lynn Richard, for Lee Johnson, for Ester Tibbs, for John Awad, for Chuck Bates, for Kathleen Kearney, for Jeb Bush ( Signed by Judge James Lawrence King on 7/20/00) CCAP [EOD Date: 7/24/00] (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 07/24/2000)
37 RETURN OF SERVICE executed for Patrick Howard on 7/5/00 Answer due on 7/25/00 for Patrick Howard (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 07/25/2000)
38 RETURN OF SERVICE executed for Christine Davenport on 7/11/00 Answer due on 7/31/00 for Christine Davenport (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 07/25/2000)
39 ORDER transferring case to the calendar of Judge Paul C. Huck ( Signed by Judge James Lawrence King on 7/31/00) CCAP [EOD Date: 8/7/00] (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 08/07/2000)
CASE reassigned to Judge Paul C. Huck (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 08/08/2000)
Magistrate identification: Magistrate Judge Stephen T. Brown (mg, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 09/12/2000)
40 NOTICE of attorney appearance for Jeb Bush, Kathleen Kearney, Chuck Bates, John Awad, Ester Tibbs, Lee Johnson, Lynn Richard, Don Dixon, Robert Morin, Fran Gibbons, Paul Brown, Phyllis Scott, Charles Auslander, Christine Davenport, Patrick Howard, Sue Gray, Buddy Cline, Vern Martin by Maxine Streeter Ryan (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 08/23/2000)
41 ORDER setting status conference set status conference for 12:30 9/8/00 before Judge Paul C. Huck ( Signed by Judge Paul C. Huck on 8/28/00) CCAP [EOD Date: 8/29/00] (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 08/29/2000)
42 AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF by 31 Foster Children , (Answer due 9/8/00 for Jeb Bush, for Kathleen Kearney, for Chuck Bates, for John Awad, for Ester Tibbs, for Lee Johnson, for Lynn Richard, for Don Dixon, for Robert Morin, for Fran Gibbons, for Paul Brown, for Charles Auslander, for Sue Gray, for Christine Davenport, for Patrick Howard, for Vern Martin ) amending [1−1] complaint (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 08/30/2000)
43 MOTION with memorandum in support by 31 Foster Children to expand page limitation for memorandum in support of motion for class certification (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 09/05/2000)

Case: 1:00-cv-2116 As of: 09/23/2015 04:58 PM EDT 13 of 39

09/01/2000 09/07/2000 09/08/2000
09/08/2000 09/08/2000 09/08/2000 09/11/2000 09/11/2000 09/11/2000 09/11/2000 09/18/2000 09/20/2000
09/20/2000 09/20/2000 09/20/2000
09/20/2000
09/20/2000 09/21/2000

44 STATUS REPORT by 31 Foster Children (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 09/05/2000)
45 SUMMONS issued for Vern Martin (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 09/08/2000)
46 ORDER granting [43−1] motion to expand page limitation for memorandum in support of motion for class certification, not to exceed 30 pages ( Signed by Judge Paul C. Huck on 9/8/00) CCAP [EOD Date: 9/11/00] (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 09/11/2000)
47 MOTION with memorandum in support by 31 Foster Children to waive or modify the requirements governing the admission of plaintiffs' co−counsel pro hac vice (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 09/11/2000)
48 CERTIFICATE of compliance: by 31 Foster Children with rule Rule 4(B) of the special rules governing the admission and practice of attorneys (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 09/11/2000)
49 CERTIFICATE of compliance with Rule 4(B) of the special rules governing the admission and practive of attorney by 31 Foster Children (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 09/11/2000)
50 MOTION by 31 Foster Children for certification of class and a subclass (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 09/12/2000)
51 MEMORANDUM by 31 Foster Children in support of [50−1] motion for certification of class and a subclass (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 09/12/2000)
52 MOTION by 31 Foster Children for oral argument in connection with [50−1] motion for certification of class and a subclass (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 09/12/2000)
53 AFFIRMATION of Rose E. Firestein by 31 Foster Children Re: [50−1] motion for certification of class and a subclass (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 09/12/2000)
54 MOTION by All Defendants to extend time to respond to Amended Complain (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 09/21/2000)
55 ORDER RE STATUS CONFERENCE and denying [47−1] motion to waive or modify the requirements governing the admission of plaintiffs' co−counsel pro hac vice ( Signed by Judge Moreno on 9/19/00) CCAP [EOD Date: 9/21/00] (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 09/21/2000)
56 ORDER transferring case to Judge Moreno ( Signed by Judge Paul C. Huck on 9/12/00 and by Judge Moreno on 9/15/00) CCAP [EOD Date: 9/22/00] (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 09/22/2000)
CASE transferred to Judge Federico A. Moreno (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 09/22/2000)
57 ORDER granting [54−1] motion to extend time to respond to Amended Complain reset answer due for 10/18/00 for Vern Martin, for Buddy Cline, for Sue Gray, for Patrick Howard, for Christine Davenport, for Charles Auslander, for Phyllis Scott, for Paul Brown, for Fran Gibbons, for Robert Morin, for Don Dixon, for Lynn Richard, for Lee Johnson, for Ester Tibbs, for John Awad, for Chuck Bates, for Kathleen Kearney, for Jeb Bush ( Signed by Judge Paul C. Huck on 9/19/00) CCAP [EOD Date: 9/22/00] (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 09/22/2000)
58 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' UNOPPOSED MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME (not filed) reset Ward Status report due on 9/25/00 ( Signed by Judge Paul C. Huck on 9/20/00) CCAP [EOD Date: 9/22/00] (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 09/22/2000)
59 MOTION by All Defendants to extend time to file Ward Status Report (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 09/22/2000)
60 RETURN OF SERVICE executed for Vern Martin on 9/8/00 Answer due on 9/28/00 for Vern Martin (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 09/22/2000)

Case: 1:00-cv-2116 As of: 09/23/2015 04:58 PM EDT 14 of 39

09/21/2000 09/25/2000 09/27/2000
09/27/2000 09/27/2000 09/28/2000 10/02/2000 10/03/2000 10/03/2000 10/05/2000
10/06/2000 10/06/2000
10/06/2000 10/10/2000 10/12/2000 10/16/2000 10/16/2000 10/18/2000 10/19/2000 10/19/2000

61 REPORT AND MOTION by 31 Foster Children for Order setting trial in Mid−July, 2001 (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 09/22/2000)
62 MOTION by All Defendants to stay discovery , and to extend time for filing scheduling order (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 09/26/2000)
63 ORDER deferring ruling on [62−1] motion to stay discovery under advisement, denying [62−2] motion to extend time for filing scheduling order. Response to Plaintiff's Request for Production of Documents due 11/13/00. ( Signed by Judge Federico A. Moreno on 9/26/00) CCAP [EOD Date: 9/28/00] (nt, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 09/28/2000)
64 Scheduling Report of Scheduling Meeting by 31 Foster Children (nt, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 09/28/2000)
65 OBJECTION AND RESPONSE by 31 Foster Children to [62−1] motion to stay discovery, [62−2] motion to extend time for filing scheduling order (nt, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 09/28/2000)
66 STATUS REPORT by All Defendants (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 09/29/2000)
67 MOTION by All Defendants to extend time to 10/30/00 to respond to motion for certification of class and subclass (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 10/03/2000)
68 MOTION by 31 Foster Children for Marcia Lowry and Rose Firestone to appear pro hac vice (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 10/04/2000)
Filing Fee Paid; FILING FEE $ 150.00 RECEIPT # 829376 + 829377 (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 10/04/2000)
69 SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE by 31 Foster Children to: [65−1] OBJECTION AND RESPONSE by 31 Foster Children to [62−1] motion to stay discovery, [62−2] motion to extend time for filing scheduling order (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 10/06/2000)
70 NOTICE of filing certificates of standing and membership fees by 31 Foster Children (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 10/06/2000)
72 ORDER SETTING STATUS CONFERENCE Status conference set for 10:00 10/17/00 before Judge Federico A. Moreno ( Signed by Judge Federico A. Moreno on 10/5/00) CCAP [EOD Date: 10/11/00] CCAP (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 10/11/2000)
73 ORDER granting [68−1] motion for Marcia Lowry and Rose Firestone to appear pro hac vice ( Signed by Judge Federico A. Moreno on 10/5/00) CCAP [EOD Date: 10/11/00] (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 10/11/2000)
71 Scheduling Report of Scheduling Meeting by All Defendants (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 10/11/2000)
74 NOTICE by 31 Foster Children to take deposition of Florida Dept. of Children and Families on 11/15/00 11:00 (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 10/13/2000)
75 MOTION by 31 Foster Children for Leslie Goller, Michelle Hankey, Wayne Hogan, Deborah Schroth, James Walsh John Walsh and Claudia Wright to appear pro hac vice (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 10/18/2000)
Filing Fee Paid; FILING FEE $ 75.00 x 7 RECEIPT # 829554 + 829955 (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 10/18/2000)
76 MOTION with memorandum in support by All Defendants to require counsel to produce documentation establishing their authority to represent the children , and to stay case (lk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 10/20/2000)
80 ORDER referring case to mediation. 15 days to appoint mediator ( Signed by Judge Federico A. Moreno on 10/18/00) CCAP [EOD Date: 10/23/00] (lk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 10/23/2000)
81 ORDER setting Jury trial for 7/16/01 before Judge Federico A. Moreno , setting calendar call for 2:00 7/10/01 before Judge Federico A. Moreno , setting pretrial

Case: 1:00-cv-2116 As of: 09/23/2015 04:58 PM EDT 15 of 39

10/19/2000 10/19/2000
10/20/2000 10/20/2000 10/20/2000 10/20/2000 10/20/2000 10/20/2000 10/20/2000
10/20/2000 10/23/2000 10/25/2000 10/25/2000 10/26/2000 10/26/2000 10/27/2000

stipulation due for 7/3/01 ( Signed by Judge Federico A. Moreno on 10/18/00) CCAP [EOD Date: 10/23/00] (lk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 10/23/2000)
82 SCHEDULING ORDER setting Deadline for filing of all motions by 5/11/01 Discovery cutoff 3/16/01 ; ( Signed by Judge Federico A. Moreno on 10/18/00) CCAP [EOD Date: 10/23/00] CCAP (lk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 10/23/2000)
83 OMNIBUS ORDER denying [61−1] motion for Order setting trial in Mid−July, 2001 granting [52−1] motion for oral argument in connection with [50−1] motion for certification of class and a subclass granting [67−1] motion to extend time to 10/30/00 to respond to motion for certification of class and subclass, denying [62−1] motion to stay discovery Response to motion reset to 10/30/00 for [50−1] motion for certification of class and a subclass ( Signed by Judge Federico A. Moreno on 10/18/00) CCAP [EOD Date: 10/23/00] (lk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 10/23/2000)
77 NOTICE of filing affidavit of next friend, Danielle Roussel, by 31 Foster Children (nt, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 10/20/2000)
77 AFFIDAVIT of Danielle Roussel by 31 Foster Children Re: [76−1] motion to require counsel to produce documentation establishing their authority to represent the children (nt, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 10/20/2000)
78 UNOPPOSED MOTION by All Defendants to extend time to respond to amended complaint (nt, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 10/20/2000)
79 UNOPPOSED MOTION by All Defendants for leave to file legal memorandum in excess of 20 page limit (not attached) (nt, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 10/20/2000)
84 NOTICE of filing supplemental affidavits and transcripts by All Defendants (lk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 10/23/2000)
85 RESPONSE by 31 Foster Children to [76−1] motion to require counsel to produce documentation establishing their authority to represent the children (nt, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 10/23/2000)
86 ORDER granting [78−1] motion to extend time to respond to amended complaint reset answer due for 10/23/00 for Vern Martin, for Buddy Cline, for Sue Gray, for Patrick Howard, for Christine Davenport, for Charles Auslander, for Phyllis Scott, for Paul Brown, for Fran Gibbons, for Robert Morin, for Don Dixon, for Lynn Richard, for Lee Johnson, for Ester Tibbs, for John Awad, for Chuck Bates, for Kathleen Kearney, for Jeb Bush ( Signed by Judge Federico A. Moreno on 10/20/00) CCAP [EOD Date: 10/23/00] (nt, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 10/23/2000)
87 ORDER granting [79−1] motion for leave to file legal memorandum in excess of 20 page limit ( Signed by Judge Federico A. Moreno on 10/20/00) CCAP [EOD Date: 10/23/00] (nt, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 10/23/2000)
88 NOTICE of filing attached original affidavit of Linda Spector, Esq. by All Defendants (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 10/24/2000)
89 MOTION by All Defendants to extend time respond to plaintiffs' motion for class certification (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 10/26/2000)
90 AMENDED MOTION by All Defendants for leave to file memoramdum in excess of 20 page limit referring to [79−1] motion for leave to file legal memorandum in excess of 20 page limit (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 10/26/2000)
91 ORDER granting [90−1] motion for leave to file memoramdum in excess of 20 page limit ( Signed by Judge Federico A. Moreno on 10/25/00) CCAP [EOD Date: 10/27/00] (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 10/27/2000)
92 ORDER granting [89−1] motion to extend time to 11/6/00 to respond to plaintiffs' motion for class certification ( Signed by Judge Federico A. Moreno on 10/25/00) CCAP [EOD Date: 10/27/00] (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 10/27/2000)
93 MOTION with memorandum in support by All Defendants to dismiss the amended class action complaint for failure to state a cause of action (lk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 10/30/2000)

Case: 1:00-cv-2116 As of: 09/23/2015 04:58 PM EDT 16 of 39

10/27/2000 10/27/2000 10/27/2000 10/30/2000 10/30/2000 10/30/2000 10/31/2000 11/06/2000 11/06/2000 11/06/2000 11/07/2000
11/08/2000 11/08/2000 11/08/2000
11/09/2000 11/16/2000 11/16/2000 11/16/2000 11/16/2000

94 MOTION with memorandum in support by Jeb Bush to dismiss amended complaint (lk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 10/30/2000)
95 NOTICE of filing original affidavit of next friend, Danielle Roussel in support of plaintiffs' response to the motion to require counsel by 31 Foster Children (lk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 10/30/2000)
96 AFFIDAVIT of Danielle Roussel by 31 Foster Children Re: [85−1] motion response (lk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 10/30/2000)
97 NOTICE by 31 Foster Children to take videotaped deposition of Florida DCAF on 11/27/00 at 10:00 (dg, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 10/31/2000)
99 SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE by 31 Foster Children to: DEFENDANTS MOTION REGARDING PROOF (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 11/01/2000)
100 REPLY by All Defendants to response to [76−1] motion to require counsel to produce documentation establishing their authority to represent the children (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 11/01/2000)
98 CLERK'S RECEIPT for: Pro Hac Vice Admissions paid by 31 Foster Children . AMOUNT: $ 150.00 RECEIPT # 831025 (vp, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 11/01/2000)
101 MOTION by 31 Foster Children for Appointment of case record review Expert (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 11/07/2000)
102 RESPONSE by All Defendants in opposition to [50−1] motion for certification of class and a subclass (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 11/07/2000)
103 MOTION by 31 Foster Children for leave to file /expand page limits of response to motion to dismiss (proposed pleading not attached) (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 11/07/2000)
104 ORDER for appointment of Douglas Halsey, Esq. as guardian ad litem for 31 Foster Children denying [76−1] motion to require counsel to produce documentation establishing their authority to represent the children ( Signed by Judge Federico A. Moreno on 11/7/00) CCAP [EOD Date: 11/9/00] (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 11/09/2000)
105 ORDER granting [103−1] motion for leave to file /expand page limits of response to motion to dismiss ( Signed by Judge Federico A. Moreno on 11/7/00) CCAP [EOD Date: 11/9/00] (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 11/09/2000)
106 ORDER granting [76−2] motion to stay case ( Signed by Judge Federico A. Moreno on 11/7/00) CCAP [EOD Date: 11/9/00] (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 11/09/2000)
107 ORDER granting [75−1] motion for Leslie Goller, Michelle Hankey, Wayne Hogan, Deborah Schroth, James Walsh John Walsh and Claudia Wright to appear pro hac vice ( Signed by Judge Federico A. Moreno on 11/8/00) CCAP [EOD Date: 11/9/00] (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 11/09/2000)
108 MOTION by All Defendants for leave to file /accept legal memorandum in excess of page limit (See DE 102 response) (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 11/13/2000)
109 RESPONSE by All Defendants to [101−1] motion for Appointment of case record review Expert (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 11/17/2000)
110 MOTION by 31 Foster Children for Hearing on [93−1] motion to dismiss the amended class action complaint for failure to state a cause of action (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 11/17/2000)
111 MEMORANDUM by 31 Foster Children in opposition to [94−1] motion to dismiss amended complaint (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 11/17/2000)
112 MEMORANDUM by 31 Foster Children in opposition to [93−1] motion to dismiss the amended class action complaint for failure to state a cause of action (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 11/17/2000)

Case: 1:00-cv-2116 As of: 09/23/2015 04:58 PM EDT 17 of 39

11/16/2000 11/17/2000 11/20/2000 11/21/2000 11/21/2000
11/21/2000 11/21/2000
11/22/2000 11/22/2000
11/24/2000 11/24/2000 11/27/2000 11/29/2000 12/01/2000 12/04/2000
12/04/2000 12/04/2000 12/11/2000

113 ORDER granting [108−1] motion for leave to file /accept legal memorandum in excess of page limit ( Signed by Judge Federico A. Moreno on 11/15/00) CCAP [EOD Date: 11/17/00] (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 11/17/2000)
114 NOTICE of selection of Mitchell Franks as Mediator by 31 Foster Children (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 11/20/2000)
115 Position on the impact of Ward Class Action Settlement agreement by All Defendants (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 11/21/2000)
116 ORDER denying [101−1] motion for Appointment of case record review Expert ( Signed by Judge Federico A. Moreno on 11/20/00) CCAP [EOD Date: 11/22/00] (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 11/22/2000)
117 ORDER denying [110−1] motion for Hearing on [93−1] motion to dismiss the amended class action complaint for failure to state a cause of action ( Signed by Judge Federico A. Moreno on 11/20/00) CCAP [EOD Date: 11/22/00] (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 11/22/2000)
118 MOTION by 31 Foster Children for leave to file /extension of page limit for reply memorandum concerning moion for class certification (proposed pleading not attached) (sk, Deputy Clerk) Modified on 11/22/2000 (Entered: 11/22/2000)
119 ORDER OF REFERENCE Referring Motion(s) [94−1] motion to dismiss amended complaint referred to Magistrate Judge Robert L. Dube, [93−1] motion to dismiss the amended class action complaint for failure to state a cause of action referred to Magistrate Judge Robert L. Dube, [50−1] motion for certification of class and a subclass referred to Magistrate Judge Robert L. Dube ( signed by Judge Federico A. Moreno on 11/20/00) [EOD Date: 11/22/00] (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 11/22/2000)
120 Report as to impact of settlement in Ward by 31 Foster Children (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 11/27/2000)
123 ORDER granting [118−1] motion for leave to file /extension of page limit for reply memorandum concerning moion for class certification ( Signed by Judge Federico A. Moreno on 11/21/00) CCAP [EOD Date: 11/27/00] (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 11/27/2000)
121 REPLY by 31 Foster Children to response to [50−1] motion for certification of class and a subclass (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 11/27/2000)
122 MOTION by All Defendants to extend time to 11/29/00 to reply to motion to dismiss (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 11/27/2000)
124 REPLY by 31 Foster Children to response to [101−1] motion for Appointment of case record review Expert (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 11/28/2000)
125 REPLY by Jeb Bush to response to [122−1] motion to extend time to 11/29/00 to reply to motion to dismiss (gp, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 11/30/2000)
128 Transcript filed re: status conference held 10/17/00 before Judge Federico A. Moreno Pages: 1−82 (sn, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 12/04/2000)
126 RENEWED REQUEST by 31 Foster Children for oral argument on [94−1] motion to dismiss amended complaint, [93−1] motion to dismiss the amended class action complaint for failure to state a cause of action (Former Deputy Clerk) Modified on 12/04/2000 (Entered: 12/04/2000)
127 Request by All Defendants for oral argument on [93−1] motion to dismiss the amended class action complaint for failure to state a cause of action (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 12/04/2000)
129 ORDER granting [122−1] motion to extend time to 11/29/00 to reply to motion to dismiss ( Signed by Judge Federico A. Moreno on 12/1/00) CCAP [EOD Date: 12/5/00] (gp, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 12/05/2000)
130 NOTICE of filing copy of previous request for oral argument and order granting hearing on motion for class certification by 31 Foster Children (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 12/12/2000)

Case: 1:00-cv-2116 As of: 09/23/2015 04:58 PM EDT 18 of 39

12/11/2000 12/11/2000 12/11/2000 12/11/2000 12/11/2000
12/11/2000 12/11/2000 12/11/2000 12/11/2000 12/12/2000 12/12/2000 12/14/2000 12/15/2000 12/18/2000
12/20/2000
01/04/2001 01/04/2001 01/05/2001 01/08/2001

131 NOTICE of motion hearing (no date supplied) on motion for class certification by 31 Foster Children (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 12/12/2000)
132 NOTICE by 31 Foster Children to take videotaped deposition of DCAF 12/27/00 at 10:00 (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 12/12/2000)
133 NOTICE by 31 Foster Children to take videotaped deposition of designate "DCAF" 12/21/00 at 10:00 (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 12/12/2000)
134 NOTICE of rescheduling depositions in accordance with order staying discovery until 12/20/00 by 31 Foster Children (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 12/12/2000)
135 ORDER OF REFERENCE Referring Motion(s) [127−1] motion for oral argument on [93−1] motion to dismiss the amended class action complaint for failure to state a cause of action referred to Magistrate Judge Robert L. Dube, [126−1] motion for oral argument on [94−1] motion to dismiss amended complaint, [93−1] motion to dismiss the amended class action complaint for failure to state a cause of action referred to Magistrate Judge Robert L. Dube ( signed by Judge Federico A. Moreno on 12/08/00) [EOD Date: 12/12/00] (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 12/12/2000)
136 NOTICE of submission of pertinent filing fees on behalf of plaintiff's co−counsel by 31 Foster Children (dg, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 12/13/2000)
Filing Fee Paid; FILING FEE $ 75.00 RECEIPT # 833297 (dg, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 12/13/2000)
137 MOTION by 31 Foster Children to extend discovery cutoff (dg, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 12/13/2000)
139 NOTICE by 31 Foster Children to take videotaped deposition of FL Dept. of Children &Families on 1/4/01 at 10:00 (dg, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 12/13/2000)
138 NOTICE by 31 Foster Children to take videotaped deposition of Rep. of FL Dept. of Children &Families on 1/3/01 at 10:00 (dg, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 12/13/2000)
140 NOTICE of motion hearing by 31 Foster Children (dg, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 12/13/2000)
141 NOTICE of Unavailability by All Defendants for dates of: 1/2/01−1/3/01, 2/14/01−2/21/01, 4/12/01−4/16/01 (lk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 12/15/2000)
142 PRELIMINARY Report of Guardian Ad Litem: by 31 Foster Children (lk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 12/18/2000)
143 ORDER OF REFERENCE Referring Motion(s) [127−1] motion for oral argument on [93−1] motion to dismiss the amended class action complaint for failure to state a cause of action referred to Magistrate Judge Robert L. Dube ( signed by Judge Federico A. Moreno on 12/15/00) [EOD Date: 12/20/00](Former Deputy Clerk) Modified on 12/28/2000 (Entered: 12/20/2000)
144 ORDER granting [137−1] motion to extend discovery cutoff resetting discovery deadline for 6/4/01 , reset Jury trial for 7/16/01 before Judge Federico A. Moreno , reset calendar call for 2:00 7/10/01 before Judge Federico A. Moreno ( Signed by Judge Federico A. Moreno on 12/18/00) CCAP [EOD Date: 12/22/00] (tb, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 12/22/2000)
145 PERRY AFFIDAVIT by All Defendants Re: [102−1] RESPONSE by All Defendants in opposition to [50−1] motion for certification of class and a subclass (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 01/05/2001)
146 NOTICE of PERRY AFFIDAVIT by All Defendants Re: [102−1] RESPONSE by All Defendants in opposition to [50−1] motion for certification of class and a subclass by All Defendants (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 01/05/2001)
147 Guardian ad litum Fee and cost Statement by Douglas M. Halsey (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 01/08/2001)
148 ORDER setting motion hearing on [94−1] motion to dismiss amended complaint by Jeb Bush for 10:00 1/25/01, setting motion hearing on [93−1] motion to dismiss

Case: 1:00-cv-2116 As of: 09/23/2015 04:58 PM EDT 19 of 39

01/10/2001 01/22/2001 01/22/2001 01/23/2001 01/24/2001 01/24/2001
01/25/2001 01/25/2001
01/29/2001 01/30/2001 02/01/2001 02/01/2001 02/01/2001 02/01/2001 02/01/2001 02/02/2001

the amended class action complaint for failure to state a cause of action by All Defendants for 10:00 1/25/01, setting motion hearing on [50−1] motion for certification of class and a subclass by 31 Foster Children for 10:00 1/25/01, granting [127−1] motion for oral argument on [93−1] motion to dismiss the amended class action complaint for failure to state a cause of action, granting [126−1] motion for oral argument on [94−1] motion to dismiss amended complaint, [93−1] motion to dismiss the amended class action complaint for failure to state a cause of action ( Signed by Magistrate Judge Robert L. Dube on 1/5/01) CCAP [EOD Date: 1/9/01] (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 01/09/2001)
149 ORDER granting [147−1] Guardian ad litum Fee and cost Statement by Douglas M. Halsey ( Signed by Judge Federico A. Moreno on 1/9/01) CCAP [EOD Date: 1/12/01] (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 01/12/2001)
150 HALSEY AFFIDAVIT by 31 Foster Children Re: [50−1] motion for certification of class and a subclass (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 01/23/2001)
151 NOTICE of HALSEY AFFIDAVIT by 31 Foster Children Re: [50−1] motion for certification of class and a subclass by 31 Foster Children (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 01/23/2001)
152 NOTICE of filing order approving settlement agreement in children A − F v. Chiles by 31 Foster Children (sk, Deputy Clerk) Modified on 02/13/2001 (Entered: 01/24/2001)
153 MOTION by 31 Foster Children to Magistrate Judge for leave to use projection equipment during oral argument on motion for class certification (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 01/25/2001)
154 ORDER granting [153−1] motion to Magistrate Judge for leave to use projection equipment during oral argument on motion for class certification ( Signed by Magistrate Judge Robert L. Dube on 1/24/01) CCAP [EOD Date: 1/25/01] (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 01/25/2001)
155 Minutes of oral argument/class action held before Magistrate Judge Robert L. Dube on 1/25/01; Court Reporter Name or Tape #: 01H−3−800/01H−4−1−5−1 (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 01/26/2001)
Motion hearing re: [50−1] motion for certification of class and a subclass Motion hearing held, [93−1] motion to dismiss the amended class action complaint for failure to state a cause of action Motion hearing held (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 01/26/2001)
156 NOTICE to court by 31 Foster Children (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 01/29/2001)
157 Transcript filed re: Hearing held 01/24/01 before Judge Magistrate Robert L. Dube Pages: 1−139 by All Defendants (ga, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 02/01/2001)
158 NOTICE of filing transcript of 1/24/01 proceedings before Magistrate Judge Dube by All Defendants (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 02/02/2001)
159 Notice of filing REPLY by All Defendants to response to [93−1] motion to dismiss the amended class action complaint for failure to state a cause of action (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 02/02/2001)
160 Notice of filing copy of Jeb Bush's REPLY by All Defendants to response to [94−1] motion to dismiss amended complaint (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 02/02/2001)
161 SUPPLEMENTAL SUBMISSION by All Defendants to: [93−1] motion to dismiss the amended class action complaint for failure to state a cause of action, [94−1] motion to dismiss amended complaint (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 02/02/2001)
162 Transcript filed re: Hearing Proceedings held 1/24/01 before Judge Robert L. Dube Pages: 1−139 (gp, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 02/05/2001)
163 (MOTION) MEMORANDUM by 31 Foster Children in support of [50−1] motion for certification of class and a subclass (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 02/05/2001)

Case: 1:00-cv-2116 As of: 09/23/2015 04:58 PM EDT 20 of 39

02/02/2001
02/05/2001 02/05/2001 02/07/2001 02/09/2001 02/12/2001 02/12/2001 02/13/2001
02/15/2001 02/26/2001 03/02/2001 03/05/2001 03/06/2001 03/07/2001 03/08/2001 03/08/2001 03/08/2001 03/08/2001 03/08/2001 03/09/2001

164 REPLY by 31 Foster Children to arguments to defendants' [93−1] motion to dismiss the amended class action complaint for failure to state a cause of action, [94−1] motion to dismiss amended complaint (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 02/05/2001)
165 NOTICE by 31 Foster Children to take deposition of Linda Radigan 10:00 2/20/01 (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 02/06/2001)
166 MOTION by All Defendants to extend time to respond to second request for production (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 02/06/2001)
167 ORDER denying [166−1] motion to extend time to respond to second request for production ( Signed by Judge Federico A. Moreno on 2/6/01) CCAP [EOD Date: 2/8/01] (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 02/08/2001)
168 NOTICE OF FILING SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITY AND DOCUMENTS by 31 Foster Children re: [50−1] motion for certification of class and a subclass (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 02/12/2001)
169 NOTICE by 31 Foster Children to take deposition of Susan Chase 10:00 2/9/01 (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 02/12/2001)
170 RESPONSE by 31 Foster Children in opposition to [166−1] motion to extend time to respond to second request for production (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 02/12/2001)
171 NOTICE OF FILING GRAND JURY REPORT AS SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITY by Jeb Bush, Kathleen Kearney re: [50−1] motion for certification of class and a subclass (sk, Deputy Clerk) Modified on 02/13/2001 (Entered: 02/13/2001)
172 GUARDIAN AD LITEM FEE AND COST Statement for December 2000 by Douglas M. Halsey re: [104−1] relief for appointment of Douglas Halsey, Esq. as guardian ad litem for 31 Foster Children (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 02/16/2001)
173 NOTICE of attorney appearance for 31 Foster Children by Kevin S. Cannon (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 02/27/2001)
174 ORDER granting [173−1] appear/appearance notice/motion to appear pro hac vice ( Signed by Judge Federico A. Moreno on 3/2/01) CCAP [EOD Date: 3/5/01] (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 03/05/2001)
175 ORDER granting fees , and Costs to guardian ad litem ( Signed by Judge Federico A. Moreno on 3/2/01) CCAP [EOD Date: 3/6/01] (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 03/06/2001)
176 MOTION by 31 Foster Children to extend time to 3/26/01 to respond to discovery (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 03/07/2001)
177 ORDER granting [176−1] motion to extend time to 3/26/01 to respond to discovery ( Signed by Judge Federico A. Moreno on 3/6/01) CCAP [EOD Date: 3/8/01] (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 03/08/2001)
178 MOTION by 31 Foster Children for William Chanfrau, Cynthia McNeely and Robert Vostrejs to appear pro hac vice (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 03/09/2001)
Filing Fee Paid; FILING FEE $ 75.00 RECEIPT # 838032 (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 03/09/2001)
Filing Fee Paid; FILING FEE $ 150.00 RECEIPT # 838034 + 838033 (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 03/09/2001)
179 NOTICE of submission of filing fees on behalf of co−counsel by 31 Foster Children (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 03/09/2001)
180 NOTICE of filing certificates of good standing by 31 Foster Children (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 03/09/2001)
181 NOTICE OF FILING SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITY by 31 Foster Children re: [50−1] motion for certification of class and a subclass (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered:

Case: 1:00-cv-2116 As of: 09/23/2015 04:58 PM EDT 21 of 39

03/09/2001 03/09/2001 03/12/2001
03/13/2001 03/13/2001 03/14/2001 03/15/2001 03/15/2001 03/19/2001 03/20/2001 03/23/2001 03/23/2001 03/23/2001 03/23/2001 03/26/2001
03/27/2001

03/12/2001)
182 NOTICE OF FILING SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITY by 31 Foster Children re: [50−1] motion for certification of class and a subclass (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 03/12/2001)
183 NOTICE OF FILING SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITY by 31 Foster Children re: [50−1] motion for certification of class and a subclass (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 03/12/2001)
184 NOTICE OF FILING SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITY by 31 Foster Children re: [94−1] motion to dismiss amended complaint, [93−1] motion to dismiss the amended class action complaint for failure to state a cause of action (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 03/13/2001)
185 ORDER RELEASING GUARDIAN FROM FURTHER DUTIES, releasing Douglas Halsey, Esq. as Guardian ad litem. (Signed by Judge Federico A. Moreno on 3/12/01) CCAP [EOD Date: 3/14/01] (sn, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 03/14/2001)
186 ORDER staying all discovery until 4/25/01 (Signed by Judge Federico A. Moreno on 3/12/01) CCAP [EOD Date: 3/14/01] (sn, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 03/14/2001)
187 ORDER granting [178−1] motion for William Chanfrau, Cynthia McNeely and Robert Vostrejs to appear pro hac vice (Signed by Judge Federico A. Moreno on 3/13/01) CCAP [EOD Date: 3/15/01] (sn, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 03/15/2001)
188 RESPONSE by All Defendants to [181−1] notice of filing additional authority (sn, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 03/16/2001)
189 MOTION by All Defendants to strike [182−1] notice/article for consideration in conjunction with the motion for class certification (sn, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 03/16/2001)
190 NOTICE OF FILING SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITY by All Defendants re: [93−1] motion to dismiss the amended class action complaint for failure to state a cause of action (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 03/20/2001)
191 NOTICE OF FILING SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITY by All Defendants re: opposition to [50−1] motion for certification of class and a subclass (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 03/21/2001)
192 EMERGENCY MOTION by 31 Foster Children for temporary restraining order (with Notice) , and for preliminary injunction (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 03/26/2001)
193 APPENDIX to: [192−1] motion for temporary restraining order, [192−2] motion for preliminary injunction by 31 Foster Children (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 03/26/2001)
194 SEALED DOCUMENT placed in vault (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 03/26/2001)
195 SEALED DOCUMENT placed in vault (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 03/26/2001)
196 ORDER setting briefing schedule: Response to motion reset to 3/27/01 for [192−1] motion for temporary restraining order, reset to 3/27/01 for [192−2] motion for preliminary injunction , Status/Motion hearing before Judge Federico A. Moreno set for 9:30 3/29/01 for [192−1] motion for temporary restraining order, set for <date not set> for [192−2] motion for preliminary injunction ( Signed by Judge Federico A. Moreno on 3/26/01) CCAP [EOD Date: 3/27/01] (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 03/27/2001)
197 MOTION with memorandum in support by 31 Foster Children to strike [190−1] NOTICE OF FILING SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITY by All Defendants re: [93−1] motion to dismiss the amended class action complaint for failure to state a cause of action (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 03/28/2001)

Case: 1:00-cv-2116 As of: 09/23/2015 04:58 PM EDT 22 of 39

03/27/2001
03/27/2001 03/28/2001 03/28/2001 03/29/2001 03/30/2001 03/30/2001 03/30/2001 04/02/2001 04/02/2001
04/05/2001
04/05/2001
04/11/2001 04/11/2001 04/16/2001 04/20/2001
04/24/2001

197 RESPONSE by 31 Foster Children in opposition to [190−1] NOTICE OF FILING SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITY by All Defendants re: [93−1] motion to dismiss the amended class action complaint for failure to state a cause of action (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 03/28/2001)
198 RESPONSE by All Defendants to [192−1] motion for temporary restraining order, [192−2] motion for preliminary injunction (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 03/28/2001)
199 REPLY by 31 Foster Children to response to [192−1] motion for temporary restraining order, [192−2] motion for preliminary injunction (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 03/29/2001)
200 NOTICE of Change of Address of attorney by 31 Foster Children (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 03/29/2001)
201 NOTICE OF FILING SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITY by 31 Foster Children re: [50−1] motion for certification of class and a subclass (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 03/30/2001)
203 NOTICE of correcting misstatements in defendants 3/20/01 by 31 Foster Children (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 04/02/2001)
204 NOTICE of independent filing additionaly supplemental ASFA review documents and RESPONSE by 31 Foster Children to [189−1] motion to strike [182−1] "Legthening Shadow" report (sn, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 04/03/2001)
205 NOTICE of filing Final Judgments of Adoptions for Jay D. and Candice D. by All Defendants (sn, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 04/03/2001)
202 Transcript filed re: proceedings held 3/29/01 before Judge Federico A. Moreno Pages: 1−98 (sn, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 04/02/2001)
206 ORDER Response to motion reset to 4/11/01 for [192−2] motion for preliminary injunction denying [192−1] motion for temporary restraining order, denying [192−2] motion for preliminary injunction ( Signed by Judge Federico A. Moreno on 3/29/01) CCAP [EOD Date: 4/3/01] (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 04/03/2001)
207 ORDER granting [197−1] motion to strike [190−1] NOTICE OF FILING SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITY by All Defendants re: [93−1] motion to dismiss the amended class action complaint for failure to state a cause of action ( Signed by Judge Federico A. Moreno on 4/4/01) CCAP [EOD Date: 4/6/01] (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 04/06/2001)
208 ORDER granting [189−1] motion to strike [182−1] notice/article for consideration in conjunction with the motion for class certification ( Signed by Judge Federico A. Moreno on 4/4/01) CCAP [EOD Date: 4/6/01] (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 04/06/2001)
209 STATUS REPORT regarding extended foster service agreement by 31 Foster Children (sn, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 04/11/2001)
210 RESPONSE regarding the status of Agreement for Continued Services, per [206−1] order, by All Defendants to (sn, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 04/12/2001)
211 Notice of filing by 31 Foster Children In Re: proposed agreement rejected by defendants (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 04/17/2001)
212 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS of Magistrate Judge Robert L. Dube recommending that [94−1] motion to dismiss amended complaint GRANTED AND DENIED, [93−1] motion to dismiss the amended class action complaint for failure to state a cause of action be DENIED. Motion no longer referred. Signed on: 4/20/01 Objections to R and R due by 4/30/01 CCAP (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 04/23/2001)
213 MOTION by All Defendants to extend time of the deadline to stay all discovery (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 04/25/2001)

Case: 1:00-cv-2116 As of: 09/23/2015 04:58 PM EDT 23 of 39

04/27/2001 04/30/2001 04/30/2001 05/01/2001
05/03/2001
05/07/2001 05/10/2001 05/10/2001 05/14/2001 05/14/2001 05/14/2001 05/18/2001 05/21/2001

214 OBJECTIONS/RESPONSE by 31 Foster Children to [213−1] motion to extend time of the deadline to stay all discovery (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 04/30/2001)
215 ORDER denying [192−2] motion for preliminary injunction ( Signed by Judge Federico A. Moreno on 4/30/01) CCAP [EOD Date: 5/1/01] (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 05/01/2001)
216 ORDER denying [213−1] motion to extend time of the deadline to stay all discovery ( Signed by Judge Federico A. Moreno on 4/30/01) CCAP [EOD Date: 5/1/01] (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 05/01/2001)
217 MOTION by All Defendants for clarification of [212−1] REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS of Magistrate Judge Robert L. Dube recommending that [94−1] motion to dismiss amended complaint GRANTED AND DENIED, [93−1] motion to dismiss the amended class action complaint for failure to state a cause of action be DENIED. , or to extend time to 5/7/01 to object to report and recommendations (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 05/02/2001)
218 ORDER granting [217−1] motion for clarification of [212−1] REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS of Magistrate Judge Robert L. Dube recommending that [94−1] motion to dismiss amended complaint GRANTED AND DENIED, [93−1] motion to dismiss the amended class action complaint for failure to state a cause of action be DENIED. granting [217−2] motion to extend time to 5/7/01 to object to report and recommendations Objections reset to 5/7/01 for [212−1] report and recommendations ( Signed by Judge Federico A. Moreno on 5/2/01) CCAP [EOD Date: 5/4/01] (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 05/04/2001)
219 NOTICE OF FILING SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITY by 31 Foster Children re: Alexander v. Sandoval (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 05/08/2001)
220 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS of Magistrate Judge Robert L. Dube recommending that [50−1] motion for certification of class and a subclass be granted in part and denied in part . Motion no longer referred. Signed on: 5/9/01 Objections to R and R due by 5/21/01 CCAP (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 05/11/2001)
221 MOTION by All Defendants for leave to file memorandum/objections to report and recommendations on motions to dismiss (proposed pleading in Docketing Section Team 3) (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 05/11/2001)
222 MOTION by All Defendants for Hearing on objections to [212−1] REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS of Magistrate Judge Robert L. Dube recommending that [94−1] motion to dismiss amended complaint GRANTED AND DENIED, [93−1] motion to dismiss the amended class action complaint for failure to state a cause of action be DENIED. (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 05/15/2001)
223 ORDER granting [221−1] motion for leave to file memorandum/objections to report and recommendations on motions to dismiss ( Signed by Judge Federico A. Moreno on 5/11/01) CCAP [EOD Date: 5/15/01] (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 05/15/2001)
224 OBJECTION by All Defendants to [212−1] REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS of Magistrate Judge Robert L. Dube recommending that [94−1] motion to dismiss amended complaint GRANTED AND DENIED, [93−1] motion to dismiss the amended class action complaint for failure to state a cause of action be DENIED. (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 05/15/2001)
225 UNOPPOSED MOTION by 31 Foster Children for enlargement of number of pages to respond to defendants's objectins regarding motions to dimiss (proposed response not attached) (sn, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 05/21/2001)
226 FINAL FEE AND COST Statement of Guardian ad Litum by Douglas M. Halsey re: [104−2] ORDER for appointment of Douglas Halsey, Esq. as guardian ad litem for 31 Foster Children denying [76−1] motion to require counsel to produce documentation establishing their authority to represent the children ( Signed by Judge Federico A. Moreno on 11/7/00) (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 05/22/2001)

Case: 1:00-cv-2116 As of: 09/23/2015 04:58 PM EDT 24 of 39

05/21/2001
05/21/2001 05/22/2001
05/23/2001 05/23/2001 05/23/2001 05/23/2001 05/24/2001 05/24/2001 05/24/2001
05/25/2001
05/25/2001
05/25/2001 05/25/2001 05/29/2001

228 NOTICE OF INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL by 31 Foster Children [Bonnie L., Leslie F., Candice D. and Jay D., Reggie B., Rebecca B., Laurie S., Lillie S., Sandra M., Tanya M., Matthew I., Hugh S., Leanne G., Tammy G., Paul B., Rachel C. and Cathy W., Elaine R., Larissa C., John J., Karina] of [215−1] order . EOD Date: 5/1/01; Filing Fee: $ 105.00; Receipt #: 842247; Copies to USCA and Counsel of Record. (gp, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 05/23/2001)
Certified copies of Notice of Appeal, Docket, and Order under appeal to USCA: [228−1] appeal by 31 Foster Children as to 31 Foster Children (gp, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 05/23/2001)
227 ORDER granting fees , and to Tax Costs to guardian ad litum re FINAL FEE AND COST Statement of Guardian ad Litum by Douglas M. Halsey re: [104−2] ORDER for appointment of Douglas Halsey, Esq. as guardian ad litem for 31 Foster Children ( Signed by Judge Federico A. Moreno on 5/21/01) CCAP [EOD Date: 5/23/01] (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 05/23/2001)
229 MOTION by 31 Foster Children to continue pretrial deadlines and postpone trial (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 05/24/2001)
230 NOTICE by 31 Foster Children to take deposition of Carol Hutchinson 10:00 5/30/01 (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 05/24/2001)
231 NOTICE by 31 Foster Children to take deposition of Patricia Hicks 10:00 6/1/01 (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 05/24/2001)
232 NOTICE by 31 Foster Children to take deposition of Linda Radigan 10:00 5/31/01 (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 05/24/2001)
233 OBJECTION by All Defendants to [220−1] report and recommendations on the motion for certification of a class and subclass (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 05/25/2001)
234 MOTION by All Defendants for Hearing on [233−1] OBJECTION by All Defendants to [220−1] report and recommendations on the motion for certification of a class and subclass (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 05/25/2001)
235 MOTION by All Defendants for leave to file memorandum in excess of page limit re OBJECTION by All Defendants to [220−1] report and recommendations on the motion for certification of a class and subclass (see DE 233 OBJECTION by All Defendants to [220−1] report and recommendations on the motion for certification of a class and subclass) (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 05/25/2001)
236 MOTION with memorandum in support by 31 Foster Children to strike [224−1] affidavits and reference to matters outside the amended complaint re OBJECTION by All Defendants to [212−1] REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS of Magistrate Judge Robert L. Dube recommending that [94−1] motion to dismiss amended complaint GRANTED AND DENIED, [93−1] motion to dismiss the amended class action complaint for failure to state a cause of action (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 05/29/2001)
237 RESPONSE by 31 Foster Children to Objections to [212−1] REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS of Magistrate Judge Robert L. Dube recommending that [94−1] motion to dismiss amended complaint GRANTED AND DENIED, [93−1] motion to dismiss the amended class action complaint for failure to state a cause of action (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 05/29/2001)
238 MOTION by 31 Foster Children to compel discovery wrongly withheld from documents produced in response to first request for production (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 05/29/2001)
239 RESPONSE by 31 Foster Children in opposition to 5/25/01 objections to deposition for Radigan and related motion for protective order (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 05/29/2001)
240 EMERGENCY MOTION by 31 Foster Children for temporary injunction pending appeal (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 05/30/2001)

Case: 1:00-cv-2116 As of: 09/23/2015 04:58 PM EDT 25 of 39

05/29/2001 05/29/2001 05/29/2001 05/29/2001
05/29/2001
05/29/2001
05/30/2001 05/30/2001 05/30/2001 05/30/2001 05/30/2001 06/01/2001 06/01/2001
06/01/2001 06/04/2001 06/05/2001 06/06/2001

241 OBJECTIONS/RESPONSE by All Defendants in opposition to deposition duces tecum for Linda Radigan (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 05/30/2001)
241 MOTION by All Defendants for protective order re deposition duces tecum for Linda Radigan (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 05/30/2001)
242 RENEWED MOTION by 31 Foster Children for preliminary injunction (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 05/30/2001)
243 ORDER setting motion hearing on objections to report and recommendations re on [94−1] motion to dismiss amended complaint by Jeb Bush for 9:00 8/28/01, setting motion hearing on [93−1] motion to dismiss the amended class action complaint for failure to state a cause of action by All Defendants for 9:00 8/21/01 granting [234−1] motion for Hearing on [233−1] OBJECTION by All Defendants to [220−1] report and recommendations on the motion for certification of a class and subclass ( Signed by Judge Federico A. Moreno on 5/29/01) CCAP [EOD Date: 5/30/01] (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 05/30/2001)
244 ORDER granting [229−1] motion to continue pretrial deadlines and postpone trial revising pretrial scheduling order deadlines: Jury Trial 3/25/02 Calendar Call set for 2:00 3/19/02 ( Signed by Judge Federico A. Moreno on 5/25/01) CCAP [EOD Date: 5/30/01] (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 05/30/2001)
245 ORDER granting [235−1] motion for leave to file memorandum in excess of page limit re OBJECTION by All Defendants to [220−1] report and recommendations on the motion for certification of a class and subclass ( Signed by Judge Federico A. Moreno on 5/25/01) CCAP [EOD Date: 5/30/01] (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 05/30/2001)
246 NOTICE of scrivener's error by 31 Foster Children (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 05/31/2001)
247 NOTICE of substitution by 31 Foster Children (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 05/31/2001)
248 NOTICE by 31 Foster Children to take deposition of District 1, others, 9:30 6/11/01 (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 05/31/2001)
249 MOTION by 31 Foster Children to compel discovery re second request for production (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 05/31/2001)
250 MEMORANDUM by 31 Foster Children in support of [249−1] motion to compel discovery re second request for production (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 05/31/2001)
251 NOTICE of defendants' reneging on agreement to continue foster caser services to Lesilie F. by 31 Foster Children (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/04/2001)
251 SUPPLEMENT by 31 Foster Children to: [242−1] motion for preliminary injunction, [240−1] motion for temporary injunction pending appeal; and suggestion of resumption of emergency situation (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/04/2001)
252 TRANSCRIPT INFORMATION FORM by 31 Foster Children re: [228−1] appeal by 31 Foster Children received. (Forwarded to Court Reporter Coordinater) (gp, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/04/2001)
253 NOTICE by 31 Foster Children to take deposition of Anita Bock 12:00 6/7/01 (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/05/2001)
254 NOTICE by 31 Foster Children to take deposition of Richard Funderburk, Dept. of Children and Families 6/27/01 at 3:00 (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/06/2001)
255 ORDER OF REFERENCE Referring Motion(s) [249−1] motion to compel discovery re second request for production and [238−1] motion to compel discovery wrongly withheld from documents produced in response to first request for production referred to Magistrate Judge Robert L. Dube (signed by Judge Federico A. Moreno on 6/6/01) [EOD Date: 6/7/01] (sn, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/07/2001)

Case: 1:00-cv-2116 As of: 09/23/2015 04:58 PM EDT 26 of 39

06/06/2001 06/07/2001 06/07/2001 06/08/2001 06/08/2001 06/08/2001
06/11/2001
06/13/2001 06/15/2001 06/18/2001 06/18/2001 06/19/2001 06/19/2001 06/19/2001
06/20/2001 06/22/2001

256 RESPONSE by All Defendants to [240−1] motion for temporary injunction pending appeal, [242−1] motion for preliminary injunction (sn, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/07/2001)
257 NOTICE of anticipated trial length by 31 Foster Children (tb, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/08/2001)
NOTICE of Receipt of (NOA) Transmittal Letter from USCA on 5/31/01 Re: [228−1] appeal by 31 Foster Children USCA NUMBER: 01−12965−G (vl, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/13/2001)
258 ORDER denying [242−1] motion for preliminary injunction (Signed by Judge Federico A. Moreno on 6/2/01) CCAP [EOD Date: 6/11/01] (sn, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/11/2001)
259 ORDER denying as moot [240−1] motion for temporary injunction pending appeal (Signed by Judge Federico A. Moreno on 6/7/01) CCAP [EOD Date: 6/11/01] (sn, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/11/2001)
260 ORDER OF REFERENCE Referring Motion(s) re: objections to deposition duces tecum for Linda Radigan and [241−1] motion for protective order re deposition duces tecum for Linda referred to Magistrate Judge Robert L. Dube (signed by Judge Federico A. Moreno on 6/7/01) [EOD Date: 6/11/01] (sn, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/11/2001)
261 RESPONSE by 31 Foster Children to Objections to REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS of Magistrate Judge Robert L. Dube recommending that [50−1] motion for certification of class and a subclass be granted in part and denied in part . Motion no longer referred. Signed on: 5/9/01 (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/12/2001)
262 MOTION by All Defendants to compel better answer(s)/respond(ses) to expert interrogatories/request(s) for production (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/14/2001)
263 SUPPLEMENTAL SUBMISSION/RESPONSE by 31 Foster Children in opposition to [241−1] motion for protective order re deposition duces tecum for Linda Radigan (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/18/2001)
264 MOTION by All Defendants to extend time to 6/18/01 to respond to motions to compel (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/19/2001)
265 ORDER OF REFERENCE Referring Motion(s) [262−1] motion to compel better answer(s)/respond(ses) to expert interrogatories/request(s) for production referred to Magistrate Judge Robert L. Dube ( signed by Judge Federico A. Moreno on 6/15/01) [EOD Date: 6/19/01] (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/19/2001)
266 RESPONSE by All Defendants to [249−1] motion to compel discovery re second request for production (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/20/2001)
267 RESPONSE by All Defendants to [238−1] motion to compel discovery wrongly withheld from documents produced in response to first request for production (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/20/2001)
268 ORDER granting [264−1] motion to extend time to 6/18/01 to respond to motions to compel Response to motion reset to 6/18/01 for [249−1] motion to compel discovery re second request for production, reset to 6/18/01 for [238−1] motion to compel discovery wrongly withheld from documents produced in response to first request for production (Signed by Judge Federico A. Moreno on 6/18/01) CCAP [EOD Date: 6/20/01] (sn, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/20/2001)
269 ORDER granting [225−1] motion for enlargement of number of pages to respond to defendants's objectins regarding motions to dimiss (proposed response not attached) ( Signed by Judge Federico A. Moreno on 6/19/01) CCAP [EOD Date: 6/21/01] (lk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/21/2001)
270 REPLY by All Defendants in support of [241−1] objections to deposition duces tecum of Linda Radigan and [241−1] motion for protective order (sn, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/25/2001)

Case: 1:00-cv-2116 As of: 09/23/2015 04:58 PM EDT 27 of 39

06/22/2001 06/26/2001
06/27/2001
06/27/2001 06/28/2001 06/28/2001
06/28/2001 06/28/2001 06/28/2001 06/29/2001 06/29/2001
06/29/2001
06/29/2001 06/29/2001 06/29/2001 06/29/2001 06/29/2001 06/29/2001

271 NOTICE of substitution of counsel by All Defendants (sn, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/25/2001)
272 MOTION by Jeb Bush to strike [263−1] SUPPLEMENTAL SUBMISSION/RESPONSE by 31 Foster Children in opposition to [241−1] motion for protective order re deposition duces tecum for Linda Radigan (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/27/2001)
273 NOTICE OF INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL by 31 Foster Children of [259−1] order. EOD Date: 6/11/01; [258−1] order. EOD Date: 6/11/01; Filing Fee: $ 105.00; Receipt #: 844659; Copies to USCA and Counsel of Record. (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/28/2001)
297 DESIGNATION by 31 Foster Children of record on appeal (vl, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 07/02/2001)
Certified copies of Notice of Appeal, Docket, and Order under appeal to USCA: [273−1] appeal by 31 Foster Children as to 31 Foster Children (vl, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/28/2001)
274 RESPONSE by 31 Foster Children to [272−1] motion to strike [263−1] SUPPLEMENTAL SUBMISSION/RESPONSE by 31 Foster Children in opposition to [241−1] motion for protective order re deposition duces tecum for Linda Radigan (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/29/2001)
275 MOTION by 31 Foster Children to extend time to 7/5/01 to respond to motion(s) to compel relating to expert interrogatories and production (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/29/2001)
276 MOTION by 31 Foster Children to extend time to 7/5/01 to reply to response to motion to compel re first request for production (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/29/2001)
277 REPLY by 31 Foster Children to response to [249−1] motion to compel discovery re second request for production (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/29/2001)
278 Notice and MOTION by All Defendants to stay motion to compel (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 07/02/2001)
279 NOTICE OF FILING SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITY by 31 Foster Children re: [224−1] OBJECTION by All Defendants to [212−1] REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS of Magistrate Judge Robert L. Dube recommending that [94−1] motion to dismiss amended complaint GRANTED AND DENIED, [93−1] motion to dismiss the amended class action complaint (sk, Deputy Clerk) Modified on 07/02/2001 (Entered: 07/02/2001)
280 ORDER denying [272−1] motion to strike [263−1] SUPPLEMENTAL SUBMISSION/RESPONSE by 31 Foster Children in opposition to [241−1] motion for protective order re deposition duces tecum for Linda Radigan ( Signed by Judge Federico A. Moreno on 6/29/01) [EOD Date: 7/2/01] (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 07/02/2001)
281 NOTICE by 31 Foster Children to take deposition of Chuck Bates 9:30 7/27/01 (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 07/02/2001)
282 NOTICE by 31 Foster Children to take deposition of John Awad 1:00 7/26/01 (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 07/02/2001)
283 NOTICE by 31 Foster Children to take deposition of Lynn Richard 9:30 7/16/01 (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 07/02/2001)
284 NOTICE by 31 Foster Children to take deposition of Florida Dept. of Children 7/5/01 at 9:30 (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 07/02/2001)
285 NOTICE by 31 Foster Children to take deposition of DCAF District 14, 9:30 7/5/01 (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 07/02/2001)
286 NOTICE by 31 Foster Children to take deposition of DCAF, District 13; 9:30 6/14/01 (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 07/02/2001)

Case: 1:00-cv-2116 As of: 09/23/2015 04:58 PM EDT 28 of 39

06/29/2001 06/29/2001 06/29/2001 06/29/2001 06/29/2001 06/29/2001 06/29/2001 06/29/2001 06/29/2001 06/29/2001 06/29/2001 06/29/2001 06/29/2001 06/29/2001 06/29/2001 06/29/2001 06/29/2001 06/29/2001 06/29/2001 06/29/2001 06/29/2001 06/29/2001 07/02/2001

287 NOTICE by 31 Foster Children to take deposition of DCAF, District 1; 9:30 6/11/01 (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 07/02/2001)
288 NOTICE by 31 Foster Children to take deposition of DCAF, District 2; 6/12/01 9:30 (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 07/02/2001)
289 NOTICE by 31 Foster Children to take deposition of DCAF, District 3; 6/16/01 9:30 (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 07/02/2001)
290 NOTICE by 31 Foster Children to take deposition of DCAF, District 4; 6/15/01 9:30 (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 07/02/2001)
291 NOTICE by 31 Foster Children to take deposition of DCAF, District 5 and 6; 6/28−29/01 9:30 (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 07/02/2001)
292 NOTICE by 31 Foster Children to take deposition of DCAF, District 7; 6/21/01 9:30 (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 07/02/2001)
293 NOTICE by 31 Foster Children to take deposition of DCAF, District 8; 7/2/01 9:30 (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 07/02/2001)
294 NOTICE by 31 Foster Children to take deposition of DCAF, District 9; 9:30 6/19−20/01 (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 07/02/2001)
295 NOTICE by 31 Foster Children to take deposition of DCAF, District 11; 10:30 6/26/01 (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 07/02/2001)
296 NOTICE by 31 Foster Children to take deposition of DCAF, District 12; 7/6/01 9:30 (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 07/02/2001)
298 NOTICE by 31 Foster Children to take deposition of Don Dixon 9:30 7/17/01 (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 07/03/2001)
299 NOTICE by 31 Foster Children to take deposition of Richard Betty 9:30 7/23/01 (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 07/03/2001)
300 NOTICE by 31 Foster Children to take deposition of Robert Morin 7/19/01 9:30 (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 07/03/2001)
301 NOTICE by 31 Foster Children to take deposition of Sue Gray 9:30 7/18/01 (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 07/03/2001)
302 NOTICE by 31 Foster Children to take deposition of Vern Melvin 7/13/01 at 9:30 (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 07/03/2001)
303 NOTICE by 31 Foster Children to take deposition of David May 9:30 7/12/01 (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 07/03/2001)
304 NOTICE by 31 Foster Children to take deposition of Cahrles Auslander 9:30 7/11/01 (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 07/03/2001)
305 NOTICE by 31 Foster Children to take deposition of Lee Johnson 9:30 7/10/01 (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 07/03/2001)
306 NOTICE by 31 Foster Children to take deposition of Robert Williams 7/26/01 9:30 (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 07/03/2001)
307 NOTICE by 31 Foster Children to take deposition of Ester Tibbs 9:30 7/25/01 (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 07/03/2001)
308 NOTICE by 31 Foster Children to take deposition of Betty Carley 9:30 7/24/01 (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 07/03/2001)
309 NOTICE by 31 Foster Children to take deposition of Mike Murphy 9:30 7/9/01 (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 07/03/2001)
311 ORDER granting [276−1] motion to extend time to 7/5/01 to reply to response to motion to compel re first request for production, granting [275−1] motion to extend time to 7/5/01 to respond to motion(s) to compel relating to expert interrogatories and production ( Signed by Magistrate Judge Robert L. Dube on 7/2/01) [EOD Date: 7/3/01] (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 07/03/2001)

Case: 1:00-cv-2116 As of: 09/23/2015 04:58 PM EDT 29 of 39

07/03/2001 07/03/2001
07/03/2001
07/03/2001 07/05/2001 07/06/2001 07/06/2001 07/06/2001 07/06/2001 07/06/2001 07/09/2001 07/12/2001 07/16/2001
07/16/2001 07/16/2001 07/16/2001 07/16/2001 07/16/2001 07/16/2001

NOTICE of Receipt of Transmittal Letter from USCA as to 31 Foster Children Re: [273−1] appeal by 31 Foster Children USCA NUMBER: 01−13665−GG (vl, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 07/03/2001)
310 Certificate of readiness as to 31 Foster Children transmitted to USCA Re: [273−1] appeal by 31 Foster Children, [228−1] appeal by 31 Foster Children USCA NUMBER: 01−12965−GG &01−13665−GG (vl, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 07/03/2001)
Transmitted record on appeal as to 31 Foster Children to U.S. Court of Appeals consisting of (2) volumes of pleadings, (3) transcripts and (2) accordian folders containing DE's: [273−1] appeal by 31 Foster Children, [228−1] appeal by 31 Foster Children USCA #'s 01−12965−GG &01−13665−GG (vl, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 07/03/2001)
312 DESIGNATION by 31 Foster Children of record on appeal (vl, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 07/05/2001)
313 MOTION by 31 Foster Children to extend time to 7/12/01 to respond to motion(s) to compel expert production (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 07/06/2001)
314 NOTICE by 31 Foster Children to take deposition of Imram Ali, others 9:30 7/19/01 (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 07/09/2001)
315 NOTICE by 31 Foster Children to take deposition of Mike Murphy, 1:00 7/26/01 (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 07/09/2001)
316 NOTICE by 31 Foster Children to take deposition of Ed Howell, others, 10:00 7/16/01 (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 07/09/2001)
317 REPLY by 31 Foster Children to response to [238−1] motion to compel discovery wrongly withheld from documents produced in response to first request for production (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 07/09/2001)
318 ORDER granting [313−1] motion to extend time to 7/12/01 to respond to motion(s) to compel expert production ( Signed by Judge Federico A. Moreno on 7/5/01) [EOD Date: 7/10/01] (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 07/10/2001)
NOTICE of Receipt of (NOA) Transmittal Letter from USCA, On 7/2/01; Re: [273−1] appeal by 31 Foster Children USCA NUMBER: 01−13665−G (gp, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 07/13/2001)
319 RESPONSE by 31 Foster Children to [262−1] motion to compel better answer(s)/respond(ses) to expert interrogatories/request(s) for production (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 07/13/2001)
320 NOTICE OF FILING SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITY by All Defendants re: [233−1] objections to the reports and recommendations on the defense motion to dismiss and its opposition to class certification (sn, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 07/17/2001)
321 NOTICE by 31 Foster Children to take deposition of Dr. Phil Colasio 7/30/01 at 1:00 (sn, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 07/17/2001)
322 NOTICE by 31 Foster Children to take deposition of Sandra Owen 8/2/01 at 1:00 (sn, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 07/17/2001)
323 NOTICE by 31 Foster Children to take deposition of Dr. George Rahaim 8/3/01 at 9:30 (sn, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 07/17/2001)
324 NOTICE by 31 Foster Children to take deposition of Ron Newberry 8/1/01 at 3:00 (sn, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 07/17/2001)
325 NOTICE by 31 Foster Children to take deposition of Bill Tetreault 8/1/01 at 1:00 (sn, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 07/17/2001)
326 NOTICE by 31 Foster Children to take deposition of David May 8/3/01 at 1:00 (sn, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 07/17/2001)

Case: 1:00-cv-2116 As of: 09/23/2015 04:58 PM EDT 30 of 39

07/16/2001 07/16/2001 07/16/2001 07/16/2001 07/16/2001 07/16/2001 07/16/2001 07/16/2001 07/16/2001
07/31/2001 07/31/2001 07/31/2001
08/06/2001 08/06/2001 08/06/2001 08/07/2001 08/09/2001
08/09/2001
08/13/2001 08/13/2001 08/13/2001 08/13/2001

327 NOTICE by 31 Foster Children to take deposition of Becky Walker 8/6/01 at 11:30 (sn, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 07/17/2001)
328 NOTICE by 31 Foster Children to take deposition of Andrea Kinsale 8/1/01 at 9:30 (sn, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 07/17/2001)
329 NOTICE by 31 Foster Children to take deposition of Dorrie Tippett 8/6/01 at 9:30 (sn, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 07/17/2001)
330 NOTICE by 31 Foster Children to take deposition of Ebony Harris 7/31/01 at 11:00 (sn, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 07/17/2001)
331 NOTICE by 31 Foster Children to take deposition of Scott Frasier 7/31/01 at 9:30 (sn, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 07/17/2001)
332 NOTICE by 31 Foster Children to take deposition of Roselee Echeverria 7/30/01 at 9:30 (sn, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 07/17/2001)
333 NOTICE by 31 Foster Children to take deposition of Joan Dwyer 7/30/01 at 3:00 (sn, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 07/17/2001)
334 NOTICE by 31 Foster Children to take deposition of Holly Plank 8/2/01 at 3:00 (sn, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 07/17/2001)
ACKNOWLEDGMENT of receipt by U.S.C.A. of: CERTIFICATE OF READINESS, On 7/6/01; U.S.C.A. # 01−12965−G &01−13665−GG (gp, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 07/18/2001)
335 MOTION by All Defendants to dismiss selected claims for lack of standing (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 08/01/2001)
336 MOTION by All Defendants to dismiss claims of ten named plaintiffs for mootness (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 08/01/2001)
337 MOTION by All Defendants for Hearing on [335−1] motion to dismiss selected claims for lack of standing, [336−1] motion to dismiss claims of ten named plaintiffs for mootness (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 08/01/2001)
338 NOTICE by 31 Foster Children to take deposition of David May 10:30 8/7/01 (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 08/07/2001)
339 NOTICE by 31 Foster Children to take deposition of Scott Frasier, others, 1:00 7/31/01 (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 08/07/2001)
340 NOTICE by 31 Foster Children to take deposition of Dr. Phil Colasio 5:00 8/6/01 (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 08/07/2001)
341 MOTION by 31 Foster Children to compel compliance with fourth request for production (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 08/07/2001)
342 MOTION with memorandum in support by 31 Foster Children to strike improper duplicative 7/26/01 [336−1] motion to dismiss claims of ten named plaintiffs for mootness, [335−1] motion to dismiss selected claims for lack of standing (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 08/10/2001)
343 NOTICE OF FILING SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITY by 31 Foster Children re: [336−1] motion to dismiss claims of ten named plaintiffs for mootness, [335−1] motion to dismiss selected claims for lack of standing (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 08/10/2001)
344 NOTICE by 31 Foster Children to take deposition of Dr. Ted Wasserman 2:00 8/6/01 (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 08/14/2001)
345 NOTICE by 31 Foster Children to take deposition of Joan Dwyer, others 8/13/01 at 10:00 (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 08/14/2001)
346 NOTICE by 31 Foster Children to take deposition of Joan Dwyer, others 8/13/01 at 10:00 (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 08/14/2001)
347 MOTION by 31 Foster Children to extend time to 8/14/01 to respond to motion(s) to dismiss (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 08/14/2001)

Case: 1:00-cv-2116 As of: 09/23/2015 04:58 PM EDT 31 of 39

08/13/2001 08/13/2001
08/13/2001 08/13/2001 08/13/2001 08/13/2001 08/13/2001 08/13/2001 08/13/2001 08/13/2001 08/14/2001 08/14/2001 08/14/2001
08/14/2001
08/14/2001
08/16/2001
08/16/2001
08/17/2001

348 UNNOPPOSED MOTION by 31 Foster Children to allocate oral argument responsibilities among three attorneys (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 08/14/2001)
349 NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL by 31 Foster Children of motion for sanctions within MOTION with memorandum in support by 31 Foster Children to strike improper duplicative 7/26/01 [336−1] motion to dismiss claims of ten named plaintiffs for mootness, [335−1] motion to dismiss selected claims for lack of standing (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 08/14/2001)
350 NOTICE by 31 Foster Children to take deposition of Patricia Hicks, others 10:00 8/29/01 (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 08/14/2001)
351 NOTICE by 31 Foster Children to take deposition of Imram Ali, 1:00 8/28/01 (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 08/14/2001)
352 NOTICE by 31 Foster Children to take deposition of Kristen Emden 10:00 8/22/01 (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 08/14/2001)
353 NOTICE by 31 Foster Children to take deposition of John Perry, others 8/16/01 at 10:00 (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 08/14/2001)
354 NOTICE by 31 Foster Children to take deposition of Skeeter Surdguine, others 8/20/01 at 10:00 (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 08/14/2001)
355 Unopposed MOTION by 31 Foster Children to seal the July 26 defense Motions to dismiss and their attachments (gp, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 08/15/2001)
356 Unopposed MOTION by 31 Foster Children to Direct Clerk to include Sealed Documents in Record on Appeal (gp, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 08/15/2001)
357 MOTION by 31 Foster Children to Correct Omission from Record on Appeal (gp, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 08/15/2001)
358 RESPONSE by 31 Foster Children to [336−1] motion to dismiss claims of ten named plaintiffs for mootness (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 08/15/2001)
359 RESPONSE by 31 Foster Children to [335−1] motion to dismiss selected claims for lack of standing (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 08/15/2001)
360 RESPONSE by All Defendants to [342−1] motion to strike improper duplicative 7/26/01 [336−1] motion to dismiss claims of ten named plaintiffs for mootness, [335−1] motion to dismiss selected claims for lack of standing (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 08/15/2001)
361 ORDER OF REFERENCE Referring Motion(s) [341−1] motion to compel compliance with fourth request for production referred to Magistrate Judge Robert L. Dube ( signed by Judge Federico A. Moreno on 8/13/01) [EOD Date: 8/15/01] (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 08/15/2001)
362 ORDER denying [342−1] motion to strike improper duplicative 7/26/01 [336−1] motion to dismiss claims of ten named plaintiffs for mootness, [335−1] motion to dismiss selected claims for lack of standing ( Signed by Judge Federico A. Moreno on 8/13/01) [EOD Date: 8/15/01] (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 08/15/2001)
365 ORDER granting [357−1] motion to Correct Omission from Record on Appeal, granting [356−1] motion to Direct Clerk to include Sealed Documents in Record on Appeal ( Signed by Judge Federico A. Moreno on 8/15/01) [EOD Date: 8/21/01] (gp, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 08/21/2001)
366 ORDER CANCELLING HEARING, DENYING as Moot [348−1] motion to allocate oral argument responsibilities among three attorneys, denying [337−1] motion for Hearing on [335−1] motion to dismiss selected claims for lack of standing, [336−1] motion to dismiss claims of ten named plaintiffs for mootness ( Signed by Judge Federico A. Moreno on 8/15/01) [EOD Date: 8/21/01] (gp, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 08/21/2001)
363 REQUEST for Production of Documents by 31 Foster Children (sn, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 08/20/2001)

Case: 1:00-cv-2116 As of: 09/23/2015 04:58 PM EDT 32 of 39

08/17/2001 08/21/2001 08/22/2001
08/24/2001 08/24/2001
08/24/2001 08/27/2001 08/29/2001
08/30/2001 08/30/2001 08/30/2001 08/30/2001 09/07/2001
09/07/2001 09/11/2001 09/11/2001 09/14/2001
09/14/2001 09/14/2001 09/14/2001 09/14/2001

364 MOTION by All Defendants to extend time to respond to plaintiffs' motion to compel (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 08/20/2001)
367 REPLY by All Defendants to response to [335−1] motion to dismiss selected claims for lack of standing (sn, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 08/22/2001)
368 ORDER granting [364−1] motion for enlargement of time to respond to plaintiffs' motion to compel Response to motion reset to 8/28/01 for [341−1] motion to compel compliance with fourth request for production (Signed by Magistrate Judge Robert L. Dube on 8/22/01) [EOD Date: 8/23/01] (sn, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 08/23/2001)
369 RESPONSE by All Defendants to [341−1] motion to compel compliance with fourth request for production (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 08/27/2001)
370 NOTICE of RESPONSE by All Defendants to [341−1] motion to compel compliance with fourth request for production by All Defendants (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 08/27/2001)
372 REPLY by All Defendants to response to [336−1] motion to dismiss claims of ten named plaintiffs for mootness (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 08/28/2001)
371 MOTION by 31 Foster Children for Dianne Weaver to withdraw as attorney (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 08/28/2001)
373 ORDER granting [371−1] motion for Dianne Weaver to withdraw as attorney (Terminated: attorney Dianne Jay Weaver for 31 Foster Children ( Signed by Judge Federico A. Moreno on 8/29/01) [EOD Date: 8/30/01] (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 08/30/2001)
374 NOTICE by 31 Foster Children to take deposition of Joan Dwyer, 2:00 9/5/01 (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 08/31/2001)
375 NOTICE by 31 Foster Children to take deposition of Sandra OWen, 9:30 9/5/01 (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 08/31/2001)
376 NOTICE by 31 Foster Children to take deposition of Dr. Ted Wasserman 9/6/01 at 11:00 (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 08/31/2001)
377 NOTICE by 31 Foster Children to take deposition of Lucy Farley, others 9/10/01 at 9:30 (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 08/31/2001)
378 MOTION by 31 Foster Children for immediate telephonic conference for order to compel attendance at 9/10/01 depositions , and for sanctions (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 09/10/2001)
379 MOTION by All Defendants for protective order , and to enforce stipulation limiting discovery (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 09/10/2001)
380 NOTICE by 31 Foster Children to take deposition of Dr. Ted Wasserman 9/17/01 at 1:30 (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 09/13/2001)
381 NOTICE by 31 Foster Children to take deposition of Sandra Owen 1:30 9/17/01 (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 09/17/2001)
385 MOTION by 31 Foster Children to extend time to 9/20/01 to respond to motion to compel responses to fourth request for production (sk, Deputy Clerk) Modified on 09/17/2001 (Entered: 09/14/2001)
382 NOTICE by 31 Foster Children to take deposition of Mike Watkins, others 10:00 9/17/01 (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 09/14/2001)
383 NOTICE by 31 Foster Children to take deposition of John Perry, Patricia Hicks 9/27/01 at 9:30 (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 09/14/2001)
384 NOTICE by 31 Foster Children to take deposition of Sylvia Williams, others, 9:30 9/24/01 (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 09/14/2001)
386 NOTICE by 31 Foster Children to take deposition of Sandra Owen 1:30 9/17/01 (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 09/17/2001)

Case: 1:00-cv-2116 As of: 09/23/2015 04:58 PM EDT 33 of 39

09/18/2001
09/18/2001
09/19/2001
09/20/2001 09/21/2001 09/21/2001 09/21/2001 09/24/2001
09/24/2001 09/25/2001 09/25/2001 09/25/2001 09/25/2001 09/26/2001
09/26/2001
10/03/2001 10/03/2001 10/03/2001 10/03/2001

387 1st Supplemental Certificate of readiness as to 31 Foster Children transmitted to USCA Re: [273−1] appeal by 31 Foster Children, [228−1] appeal by 31 Foster Children USCA NUMBER: 01−12965−GG &01−13665−GG (vl, Deputy Clerk) Modified on 09/18/2001 (Entered: 09/18/2001)
Transmitted 1st Supplemental record on appeal as to 31 Foster Children to U.S. Court of Appeals: (Miami Office) Consisting of (2) Volumes of Pleadings of which one is sealed [273−1] appeal by 31 Foster Children, [228−1] appeal by 31 Foster Children (vl, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 09/18/2001)
388 ORDER granting [385−1] motion to extend time to 9/20/01 to respond to motion to compel responses to fourth request for production ( Signed by Judge Federico A. Moreno on 9/19/01) [EOD Date: 9/20/01] (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 09/20/2001)
389 REPLY by 31 Foster Children to response to [341−1] motion to compel compliance with fourth request for production (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 09/21/2001)
390 NOTICE by 31 Foster Children to take deposition of Chelly Schembers, others 9/27/01 at 9:30 (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 09/24/2001)
391 MEMORANDUM by 31 Foster Children in opposition to [379−1] motion for protective order, [379−2] motion to enforce stipulation limiting discovery (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 09/24/2001)
392 MOTION by All Defendants for protective order re deposition of Wells , and for Hearing on [392−1] motion (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 09/24/2001)
393 ORDER Response to motion reset to 12:00 9/25/01 for [392−1] motion for protective order re deposition of Wells, reset to 12:00 9/25/01 for [392−2] motion for Hearing on [392−1] motion ( Signed by Judge Federico A. Moreno on 9/21/01) [EOD Date: 9/24/01] (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 09/24/2001)
394 NOTICE by 31 Foster Children to take deposition of Tony Ojeda 10/10/01 at 9:30 (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 09/24/2001)
395 RESPONSE by 31 Foster Children to [392−1] emergency motion for protective order re deposition of Wells (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 09/25/2001)
396 NOTICE by 31 Foster Children to take deposition of Christopher Card, others 10/1/01 at 9:30 (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 09/25/2001)
397 NOTICE by 31 Foster Children to take deposition of Mike Carroll 9:30 10/2/01 (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 09/25/2001)
398 NOTICE by 31 Foster Children to take deposition of Dr. Sally Smith 9:30 10/3/01 (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 09/25/2001)
399 MOTION by 31 Foster Children for leave to file SUPPLEMENT to REPLY by All Defendants to response to [336−1] motion to dismiss claims of ten named plaintiffs for mootness (proposed pleading not attached) (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 09/26/2001)
400 ORDER granting [392−1] motion for protective order re deposition of Wells, terminating [392−2] motion for Hearing on [392−1] motion (Signed by Judge Federico A. Moreno on 9/26/01) [EOD Date: 9/27/01] (sn, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 09/27/2001)
401 NOTICE by 31 Foster Children to take deposition of Betty Williams 10/24/01 9:00 (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 10/04/2001)
402 NOTICE by 31 Foster Children to take deposition of Melinda Clarke Thompson, others 10/3/01 at 9:30 (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 10/04/2001)
403 NOTICE by 31 Foster Children to take deposition of Coleman Zuber, others 10/15/01 at 9:30 (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 10/04/2001)
404 RESPONSE by All Defendants in opposition to [399−1] motion for leave to file SUPPLEMENT to REPLY by All Defendants to response to [336−1] motion to

Case: 1:00-cv-2116 As of: 09/23/2015 04:58 PM EDT 34 of 39

10/04/2001
10/09/2001 10/10/2001 10/12/2001 10/15/2001 10/17/2001 10/18/2001 10/18/2001 10/18/2001 10/18/2001 10/18/2001 10/18/2001 10/18/2001 10/22/2001 10/24/2001 10/25/2001

dismiss claims of ten named plaintiffs for mootness (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 10/04/2001)
405 OMNIBUS ORDER granting [399−1] motion for leave to file SUPPLEMENT to REPLY by All Defendants to response to [336−1] motion to dismiss claims of ten named plaintiffs for mootness, denying [379−1] motion for protective order, denying [379−2] motion to enforce stipulation limiting discovery, denying [378−1] motion for immediate telephonic conference for order to compel attendance at 9/10/01 depositions, granting [355−1] motion to seal the July 26 defense Motions to dismiss and their attachments, granting [347−1] motion to extend time to 8/14/01 to respond to motion(s) to dismiss, denying [278−1] motion to stay motion to compel, denying [222−1] motion for Hearing on objections to [212−1] REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS of Magistrate Judge Robert L. Dube recommending that [94−1] motion to dismiss amended complaint GRANTED AND DENIED, [93−1] motion to dismiss the amended class action complaint for failure to state a cause of action be DENIED. ( Signed by Judge Federico A. Moreno on 10/3/01) [EOD Date: 10/5/01] (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 10/05/2001)
406 NOTICE by 31 Foster Children to take deposition of Laura Giambono 10/9/01 at 2:30 (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 10/10/2001)
ACKNOWLEDGMENT of receipt by U.S.C.A. of: 1st Supplement on 9/24/01; U.S.C.A. # 01−12965−G &01−13665−GG (gp, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 10/15/2001)
407 MOTION by All Defendants for reconsideration of [405−1] order denying [379−1] motion for protective order, denying [379−2] motion to enforce stipulation limiting discovery (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 10/15/2001)
408 MOTION by All Defendants to dismiss action (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 10/15/2001)
409 NOTICE by 31 Foster Children to take deposition of Amy Baker, others 10/29/01 at 9:30 (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 10/18/2001)
410 NOTICE by 31 Foster Children to take vodeotaped deposition of Jerry Miller on 11/5/01 at 9:30 a.m.; Chuck Bates on 11/5/01 at 1:30 p.m. (sn, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 10/19/2001)
411 ORDER OF REFERENCE of cause to Magistrate Judge Peter Palermo for purposes of settlment ( signed by Judge Federico A. Moreno on 10/18/01) [EOD Date: 10/19/01] (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 10/19/2001)
412 NOTICE by 31 Foster Children to take deposition of Alan Williams, Ester Tibbs 11/6/01 at 9:30 (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 10/19/2001)
413 NOTICE by 31 Foster Children to take deposition of Lee Johnson, others 11/5/01 9:30 (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 10/19/2001)
414 NOTICE by 31 Foster Children to take deposition of Joe Johnson, others 11/13/01 at 9:30 (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 10/19/2001)
415 NOTICE by 31 Foster Children to take deposition of Mike Murphy 9:30 11/14/01 (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 10/19/2001)
416 NOTICE by 31 Foster Children to take deposition of Barbara Brannon, others 11/20/01 at 9:30 (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 10/19/2001)
417 MEMORANDUM by 31 Foster Children, Jeb Bush in opposition to [407−1] motion for reconsideration of [405−1] order denying [379−1] motion for protective order, denying [379−2] motion to enforce stipulation limiting discovery (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 10/23/2001)
418 NOTICE of Change of Address of attorney by 31 Foster Children (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 10/25/2001)
419 ORDER scheduling settlement conference for 9:30 12/19/01 before Magistrate Peter R. Palermo ( Signed by Magistrate Peter R. Palermo on 10/22/01) [EOD

Case: 1:00-cv-2116 As of: 09/23/2015 04:58 PM EDT 35 of 39

10/29/2001 10/31/2001 11/02/2001 11/06/2001 11/09/2001 11/09/2001 11/13/2001 11/13/2001 11/20/2001 11/20/2001 11/23/2001 11/26/2001 11/30/2001 11/30/2001 12/03/2001 12/04/2001
12/07/2001 12/07/2001

Date: 10/26/01] (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 10/26/2001)
420 RESPONSE by 31 Foster Children to [408−1] motion to dismiss action (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 10/30/2001)
421 MOTION by 31 Foster Children for Robert Vostrejs to withdraw as attorney (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 11/01/2001)
422 ORDER granting [421−1] motion for Robert Vostrejs to withdraw as attorney ( Signed by Judge Federico A. Moreno on 11/1/01) [EOD Date: 11/5/01] (tb, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 11/05/2001)
423 MOTION by 31 Foster Children for modification/ clarification re [244−1] order revising pretrial scheduling order deadlines (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 11/07/2001)
424 Notice of defendant's non−compliance: by 31 Foster Children with [186−2] ORDER staying all discovery until 4/25/01 (Signed by Judge Federico A. Moreno on 3/12/01) (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 11/13/2001)
424 MOTION by 31 Foster Children to compel discovery and other relief (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 01/15/2002)
425 REPLY by All Defendants to response to [408−1] motion to dismiss action (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 11/14/2001)
426 MOTION by All Defendants for leave to file REPLY by All Defendants to response to [408−1] motion to dismiss action out of time (see DE 425 reply) (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 11/14/2001)
427 RESPONSE by All Defendants to [423−1] motion for modification/ clarification re [244−1] order revising pretrial scheduling order deadlines (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 11/21/2001)
427 MOTION by All Defendants to continue /reset discovery and trial dates (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 12/03/2001)
428 MOTION by All Defendants for relief from abusive discovery , to compel discovery from plaintiffs , for expedited Hearing (sn, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 11/26/2001)
429 REPLY by 31 Foster Children to response to [423−1] motion for modification/ clarification re [244−1] order revising pretrial scheduling order deadlines (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 11/29/2001)
430 REPLY by 31 Foster Children to response to [423−1] motion for modification/ clarification re [244−1] order revising pretrial scheduling order deadlines (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 12/03/2001)
430 RESPONSE by 31 Foster Children to [427−1] motion to continue /reset discovery and trial dates (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 12/03/2001)
431 RESPONSE by All Defendants in opposition to motion to compel (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 12/04/2001)
432 ORDER granting in part, denying in part [408−1] motion to dismiss action, granting in part, denying in part [336−1] motion to dismiss claims of ten named plaintiffs for mootness, granting in part, denying in part [335−1] motion to dismiss selected claims for lack of standing, granting in part, denying in part [94−1] motion to dismiss amended complaint, granting in part, denying in part [93−1] motion to dismiss the amended class action complaint for failure to state a cause of action ( Signed by Judge Federico A. Moreno on 12/3/01) [EOD Date: 12/5/01] (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 12/05/2001)
433 MOTION by 31 Foster Children to compel production of updated records (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 12/10/2001)
434 MOTION by 31 Foster Children to extend time to respond to motion(s) re discovery (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 12/10/2001)

Case: 1:00-cv-2116 As of: 09/23/2015 04:58 PM EDT 36 of 39

12/10/2001 12/11/2001 12/11/2001 12/11/2001
12/11/2001
12/13/2001 12/13/2001 12/14/2001 12/14/2001 12/18/2001 12/18/2001 12/20/2001 12/26/2001

435 MOTION by 31 Foster Children to extend time to respond to motion(s) re discovery and to reply to motion to compel (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 12/11/2001)
436 SUPPLEMENT by 31 Foster Children to: [434−1] motion to extend time to respond to motion(s) re discovery (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 12/12/2001)
437 ORDER granting [435−1] motion to extend time to respond to motion(s) re discovery and to reply to motion to compel, mooting [434−1] motion to extend time to respond to motion(s) re discovery ( Signed by Judge Federico A. Moreno on 12/10/01) [EOD Date: 12/13/01] (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 12/13/2001)
438 OMNIBUS ORDER denying [428−1] motion for relief from abusive discovery, denying [428−2] motion to compel discovery from plaintiffs, mooting [428−3] motion for expedited Hearing, granting [426−1] motion for leave to file REPLY by All Defendants to response to [408−1] motion to dismiss action out of time, denying [378−2] motion for sanctions, granting [341−1] motion to compel compliance with fourth request for production, granting [262−1] motion to compel better answer(s)/respond(ses) to expert interrogatories/request(s) for production, denying [249−1] motion to compel discovery re second request for production, mooting [241−1] motion for protective order re deposition duces tecum for Linda Radigan, denying [238−1] motion to compel discovery wrongly withheld from documents produced in response to first request for production, mooting [236−1] motion to strike [224−1] affidavits and reference to matters outside the amended complaint re OBJECTION by All Defendants to [212−1] REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS of Magistrate Judge Robert L. Dube recommending that [94−1] motion to dismiss amended complaint GRANTED AND DENIED, [93−1] motion to dismiss the amended class action complaint for failure to state a cause of action denying [407−1] motion for reconsideration of [405−1] order denying [379−1] motion for protective order, denying [379−2] motion to enforce stipulation limiting discovery ( Signed by Judge Federico A. Moreno on 12/10/01) [EOD Date: 12/13/01] (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 12/13/2001)
439 ORDER granting [423−1] motion for modification/ clarification re [244−1] order revising pretrial scheduling order deadlines, granting [427−1] motion to continue /reset discovery and trial dates continuing, revising pretrial scheduling order deadlines: Jury Trial 12/2/02 Calendar Call set for 2:00 11/26/02 ( Signed by Judge Federico A. Moreno on 12/10/01) [EOD Date: 12/13/01] (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 12/13/2001)
440 MOTION by 31 Foster Children for Greg Tynan to withdraw as attorney (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 12/14/2001)
441 MOTION by All Defendants to allow participation in mediation by telephone (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 12/14/2001)
442 ORDER denying [441−1] motion to allow participation in mediation by telephone ( Signed by Judge Federico A. Moreno on 12/13/01) [EOD Date: 12/17/01] (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 12/17/2001)
443 MOTION by 31 Foster Children to extend time to file second amended complaint (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 12/17/2001)
444 ORDER granting [440−1] motion for Greg Tynan to withdraw as attorney ( Signed by Judge Federico A. Moreno on 12/18/01) [EOD Date: 12/19/01] (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 12/19/2001)
445 ORDER granting [443−1] motion to extend time to file second amended complaint ( Signed by Judge Federico A. Moreno on 12/18/01) [EOD Date: 12/19/01] (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 12/19/2001)
446 MOTION by All Defendants to vacate [438−1] order (sn, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 12/21/2001)
447 REPLY by 31 Foster Children to response in opposition to [424−1] Notice of defendant's non−compliance with order, [433−1] motion to compel production of updated records (discovery and other relief) (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 12/27/2001)

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12/27/2001 12/27/2001
12/31/2001
12/31/2001
12/31/2001 12/31/2001 12/31/2001 12/31/2001 01/03/2002 01/08/2002 01/09/2002
01/10/2002 01/11/2002 01/11/2002 01/14/2002 01/14/2002
01/15/2002

448 MOTION by 31 Foster Children for certification of questions for interlocutory appeal , and to Correct partial dismissal of plaintiff's claims with prejudice (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 12/28/2001)
449 MEMORANDUM by 31 Foster Children in support of [448−1] motion for certification of questions for interlocutory appeal, [448−2] motion to Correct partial dismissal of plaintiff's claims with prejudice (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 12/28/2001)
450 MOTION by 31 Foster Children for certification of questions for interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 USC 1292 , and to Correct partial dismissal of plaintiff's claims with prejudice (proposed pleading not attached) (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 01/02/2002)
451 MEMORANDUM by 31 Foster Children in support of [450−1] motion for certification of questions for interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 USC 1292, [450−2] motion to Correct partial dismissal of plaintiff's claims with prejudice (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 01/02/2002)
452 REPLY by 31 Foster Children to response in opposition to [424−1] notice of non−compliance with order, and [433−1] motion to compel production of updated records (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 01/02/2002)
453 MOTION by 31 Foster Children for final judgment on dismissed claims pursuant to Rule 54b re 12/5/01 order (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 01/02/2002)
456 SEALED DOCUMENT with attached exhibits placed in vault (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 01/10/2002)
454 NOTICE OF INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL by 31 Foster Children of [432−1] order . EOD Date: 12/05/01; Filing Fee: $ 105.00; Receipt #: 855049; Copies to USCA and Counsel of Record. (vl, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 01/03/2002)
Certified copies of Notice of Appeal, Docket, and Order under appeal to USCA: [454−1] appeal by 31 Foster Children as to 31 Foster Children (vl, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 01/03/2002)
455 RESPONSE by 31 Foster Children to [446−1] motion to vacate 12/10/01 [438−1] OMNIBUS ORDER denying [428−1] motion for relief from abusive discovery (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 01/09/2002)
458 ORDER denying [446−1] motion to vacate [438−1] order; granting 12/31/01 plaintiffs motion to file FosterChildrens Records under seal in support of its motion for summary judgment ( Signed by Judge Federico A. Moreno on 2/8/02) [EOD Date: 1/11/02] (Former Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 01/11/2002)
457 MOTION by 31 Foster Children to extend time to 1/18/02 to file second amended complaint (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 01/11/2002)
459 DANIELLE CLARK AFFIDAVIT by 31 Foster Children Re: [453−1] motion for final judgment on dismissed claims pursuant to Rule 54b re 12/5/01 order (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 01/14/2002)
460 NOTICE of DANIELLE CLARK AFFIDAVIT by 31 Foster Children Re: [453−1] motion for final judgment on dismissed claims pursuant to Rule 54b re 12/5/01 order by 31 Foster Children (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 01/14/2002)
461 ORDER granting [457−1] motion to extend time to 1/25/02 to file second amended complaint ( Signed by Judge Federico A. Moreno on 1/11/02) [EOD Date: 1/15/02] (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 01/15/2002)
462 ORDER denying [424−1] motion to compel discovery and other relief, granting [433−1] motion to compel production of updated records ( Signed by Judge Federico A. Moreno on 1/14/02) [EOD Date: 1/15/02] (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 01/15/2002)
463 MOTION by 31 Foster Children to extend time to 1/18/02 to respond to motion(s) for certification of questions for interlocutory appeal and to correct partial dismissal of claims with prejudice (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 01/16/2002)

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01/16/2002 01/17/2002 01/18/2002 01/22/2002 01/22/2002 01/23/2002 01/25/2002 01/28/2002 01/28/2002 01/30/2002
02/01/2002 02/05/2002 02/14/2002 02/25/2002

464 MOTION by All Defendants to strike [459−1] affidavit and documents in support of plaintiff's motion for final summary judgment (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 01/17/2002)
465 Transcript Information Form re: as to 31 Foster Children [454−1] appeal by 31 Foster Children . No transcript requested. (nc, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 01/18/2002)
NOTICE of Receipt of Notice of Appeal Transmittal Letter from USCA on 01/10/02 as to 31 Foster Children Re: [454−1] appeal by 31 Foster Children USCA NUMBER: 02−10180−GG (vl, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 01/18/2002)
466 NOTICE OF FILING SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITY by 31 Foster Children re: Joseph v. Ingram (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 01/23/2002)
468 DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE to PLAINTIFFS' [453−1] motion for final judgment on dismissed claims pursuant to Rule 54b re order (nc, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 01/25/2002)
467 STATUS REPORT and notice of filing by 31 Foster Children (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 01/24/2002)
469 MOTION by 31 Foster Children to extend time /allow additional time for filing the second amended complaint (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 01/28/2002)
470 MOTION by All Defendants for reconsideration of [462−1] ORDER denying [424−1] motion to compel discovery and other relief, granting [433−1] motion to compel production of updated records ( Signed by Judge Federico A. Moreno on 1/14/02) , and to stay discovery (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 01/29/2002)
471 REPLY by 31 Foster Children to response to [453−1] motion for final judgment on dismissed claims pursuant to Rule 54b re 12/5/01 order (nc, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 01/30/2002)
472 OMNIBUS ORDER granting in part, denying in part [470−1] motion for reconsideration of [462−1] ORDER denying [424−1] motion to compel discovery and other relief, granting [433−1] motion to compel production of updated records ( Signed by Judge Federico A. Moreno on 1/14/02), granting in part, denying in part [470−2] motion to stay discovery, granting [469−1] motion to extend time /allow additional time for filing the second amended complaint, granting [464−1] motion to strike [459−1] affidavit and documents in support of plaintiff's motion for final summary judgment, granting [463−1] motion to extend time to 1/18/02 to respond to motion(s) for certification of questions for interlocutory appeal and to correct partial dismissal of claims with prejudice, denying [453−1] motion for final judgment on dismissed claims pursuant to Rule 54b re 12/5/01 order, mooting [450−1] motion for certification of questions for interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 USC 1292, mooting [450−2] motion to Correct partial dismissal of plaintiff's claims with prejudice, denying [448−1] motion for certification of questions for interlocutory appeal, denying [448−2] motion to Correct partial dismissal of plaintiff's claims with prejudice ( Signed by Judge Federico A. Moreno on 1/29/02) [EOD Date: 1/31/02] (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 01/31/2002)
473 RESPONSE by 31 Foster Children to [464−1] motion to strike [459−1] affidavit and documents in support of plaintiff's motion for final summary judgment (ra, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 02/04/2002)
474 ORDER of dismissal from USCA (certified copy) dismissing [228−1] appeal pursuant to the parties reaching settlement on the issue, copy of amendment to the written service agreement attached. USCA #: 01−12965−GG USCA Order Date: 01/30/02 (vl, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 02/05/2002)
475 Notice of filing Settlement agreement by 31 Foster Children (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 02/15/2002)
476 AMENDED NOTICE OF INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL by 31 Foster Children of [432−1] order . EOD Date: 12/05/01; Filing Fee: $ 105.00; Receipt #: 857913; Copies to USCA and Counsel of Record. (hh, Deputy Clerk) Modified on 03/08/2002 (Entered: 02/26/2002)

Case: 1:00-cv-2116 As of: 09/23/2015 04:58 PM EDT 39 of 39

02/26/2002 03/07/2002 03/08/2002 03/08/2002
03/08/2002 03/19/2002
03/21/2002 04/05/2002 04/05/2002
04/08/2002
04/22/2002 06/27/2003
06/30/2003

Certified copies of Notice of Appeal, Docket, and Order under appeal to USCA: [476−1] appeal by 31 Foster Children (hh, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 02/26/2002)
477 MOTION by All Defendants for final judgment (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 03/08/2002)
NOTICE of Receipt of Notice of Appeal Transmittal Letter from USCA on 2/28/02 Re: [476−1] appeal by 31 Foster Children USCA NUMBER: 02−10180−GG (vl, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 03/08/2002)
478 ORDER dismissing case granting [477−1] motion for final judgment, mooting [50−1] motion for certification of class and a subclass ( Signed by Judge Federico A. Moreno on 3/07/02) [EOD Date: 3/11/02] (sk, Deputy Clerk) Modified on 03/11/2002 (Entered: 03/11/2002)
CASE CLOSED. Case and Motions no longer referred to Magistrate. (sk, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 03/11/2002)
Record on appeal returned from U.S. Court of Appeals: (Miami/Records) consisting of (2) Volumes of Pleadings, (2) Volumes of Transcripts and (2) Accordian Folders [228−1] appeal by 31 Foster Children USCA #: 01−12965−GG (vl, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 03/20/2002)
479 DESIGNATION by 31 Foster Children of record on appeal (nc, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 03/21/2002)
480 Certificate of readiness as to 31 Foster Children transmitted to USCA Re: [476−1] appeal by 31 Foster Children, [454−1] appeal by 31 Foster Children USCA NUMBER: 02−10180−GG (vl, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 04/05/2002)
Transmitted record on appeal as to 31 Foster Children to U.S. Court of Appeals: (Atlanta Office−Eleanor M. Dixon) consisting of (5) Volumes of Pleadings, (4) Volumes of Transcripts and (3) Accordian Folders containing DE's 42,55,111,112,115,161,164,188,193,237,453 re: [476−1] appeal by 31 Foster Children, [454−1] appeal by 31 Foster Children (vl, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 04/05/2002)
Record on appeal returned from U.S. Court of Appeals: (Miami/Records) consisting of (1) Volume of Pleadings and (1) PSI of Supplement [228−1] appeal by 31 Foster Children USCA #: 01−12965−GG (vl, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 04/08/2002)
ACKNOWLEDGMENT of receipt by U.S.C.A. of: Certificate of Readiness on 04/10/02; U.S.C.A. # 02−10180−GG (vl, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 04/23/2002)
481 MANDATE OF USCA (certified copy)affirming in part, vacating in part, remanding in part the judgment/order of the district court with court's opinion [476−1] appeal, [454−1] appeal Mandate Issued Date: 06/23/03; USCA Appeal #: 02−10180−GG; Copy to Judge. (vl, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/27/2003)
Record on appeal as to 31 Foster Children returned from U.S. Court of Appeals: (Miami/Records) consisting of (9) Volumes of Pleadings and (3) Accordian folders [476−1] appeal by 31 Foster Children, [454−1] appeal by 31 Foster Children USCA #: 02−10180−GG (vl, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 07/01/2003)

 </s> 31 Foster Children v. Bush, 329 F.3d 1255 (2003)

329 F.3d 1255 United States Court of Appeals,
Eleventh Circuit.
31 FOSTER CHILDREN, on behalf of themselves and all other Children in Florida Foster Care, Plaintiffs–Appellants, v. Jeb BUSH, as Governor of the State of Florida, Kathleen Kearney, as Secretary of the Florida Department of Children and Families, Chuck Bates, District Administrator, Robert Williams, District Administrator, Ester Tibbs, District Administrator, et al., Defendants–Appellees.
No. 02–10180. | May 8, 2003.
Foster children in physical custody of State of Florida brought civil rights action challenging various aspects of Florida’s foster care system, including their alleged substantive due process right to safe care and placement, as well as right to pursue sibling associations. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, No. 00–02116–CV–FA M, Federico A. Moreno, J., 180 F.Supp.2d 1321,granted defendants’ motion to dismiss portions of complaint on Younger abstention and Eleventh Amendment immunity grounds, and plaintiffs appealed. The Court of Appeals, Carnes, Circuit Judge, held that: (1) foster care children in physical custody of State of Florida, who had allegedly been denied their substantive due process right to safe care and placement, as well as right to pursue sibling associations, based on alleged systematic deficiencies in foster care program, had standing to pursue their civil rights claims for prospective injunctive relief; (2) language contained in definitional section of the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act, requiring that foster care child’s health and education record be reviewed and updated, or providing for institution of parental rights termination proceedings, did not confer rights that foster children could enforce in § 1983 action; and (3) children failed to satisfy their burden of showing the inadequacy of remedies available to them in their ongoing dependency proceedings, so that district court did not abuse its discretion when it decided, on Younger abstention grounds, to refrain from hearing due process and other claims.
Affirmed in part, vacated in part and remanded.
Attorneys and Law Firms

*1260 Marcia Robinson Lowry, Children’s Rights, Inc., New York City, Karen A. Gievers, Tallahassee, FL, Robert M. Montgomery, Jr., Montgomery & Larmoyeux, West Palm Beach, FL, Roy D. Wasson, Miami, FL, Christina A. Zawisza, Children First Project, Fort Lauderdale, FL, William H. Fraser, Legal Aid Society of Palm Beach County, Inc., West Palm Beach, FL, Deborah A. Schroth, Florida Legal Services, Inc., Jacksonville, FL, Bernard P. Perlmutter, University of Miami School of Law, Children & Youth Law Clinic, Miami FL, for Plaintiffs–Appellants.
Jason Vail, Tallahassee, FL, for Defendants–Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida.
Before ANDERSON and CARNES, Circuit Judges, and HAND*, District Judge.
Opinion
CARNES, Circuit Judge:
This case involves a proposed class action brought on behalf of all children in Florida’s foster care system against the Governor of Florida, the Secretary of Florida’s Department of Children and Families (“the Department”), and the administrators of fourteen of the Department’s fifteen districts, all of whom collectively administer Florida’s foster care system. The individual plaintiffs’ amended complaint alleges widespread deficiencies in the state’s foster care system, in violation of the United States Constitution and federal statutory *1261 law. The plaintiffs appeal the district court’s order insofar as it grants the defendants’ motions to dismiss parts of the amended complaint on grounds of Younger v. Harris abstention and Eleventh Amendment immunity.
In Part I of this opinion, we set out the allegations contained in the multi-count complaint and the procedural history of the case. In Part II, we address the justiciability concerns raised by the defendants and conclude that although the claims of two of the plaintiffs are moot, the other plaintiffs have standing to pursue their claims. In Part III, we review the plaintiffs’ federal statutory claims and affirm the district court’s order dismissing those claims, because the statutes at issue do not give rise to enforceable rights. In Part IV, we discuss the Younger abstention doctrine and conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in abstaining from deciding the plaintiffs’ claims. Part V contains our conclusions and instructions for the district court on remand.
1

31 Foster Children v. Bush, 329 F.3d 1255 (2003)
I. THE COMPLAINT AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In June of 2000, the plaintiffs filed suit on behalf of themselves and a statewide class of children in custody of the defendants. The amended complaint contains six counts, alleging that the defendants’ practices deny and threaten the plaintiffs’1 claimed rights to: (1) safe care that meets their basic needs, prompt placements with permanent families, and services extended after their eighteenth birthdays, as guaranteed by substantive due process (Count I); (2) procedural due process in determining the services they will receive (Count II); (3) family association with siblings as guaranteed by the First, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments (Count III); (4) prompt placement with permanent families and to have their medical and educational backgrounds provided to their care givers, as guaranteed by 42 U.S.C. §§ 675(5)(D) and (E), which are provisions of the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, Pub.L. No. 96–272, 94 Stat. 500, 516 (June 17, 1980) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 620–628 and §§ 670–679a) (“the Adoption Act”) (Count IV); (5) health screening and followup under schedules established pursuant to the Medicaid Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a)(43)(B), 1396(a)(43)(C), and 1396d(r) (Count V); and (6) in the case of the black plaintiff foster children, freedom from racial discrimination in the provision of care and services, as guaranteed by Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act (Count VI).
The plaintiffs brought their lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief relating to the operation of Florida’s foster care system. Specifically, they requested that the court:
(1) declare unconstitutional and unlawful the following alleged practices: (a) the failure to provide for the plaintiffs’ basic needs, safety, freedom from harm, freedom from unreasonable restraints on their liberty, care and treatment, freedom from being placed into unnecessary state-created danger, and freedom from arbitrary and capricious actions and decisions that deprive them of benefits to which they are entitled; (b) deprivation of state-created entitlements without an adequate and fair procedure; (c) unnecessary separation of siblings and denial of visitation among them; (d) failure to comply with the Adoption Act and the Medicaid Act; and (e) discrimination on the basis of race;
*1262 (2) enjoin the Department and the defendants from

violating the plaintiffs’ constitutional rights, including those described in (1) above;
(3) order appropriate remedial relief to ensure compliance with the Constitution and laws of the United States;
(4) appoint an expert panel to develop and oversee the implementation of a plan for reform;
(5) appoint a permanent ombudsman or children’s advocate to present the plaintiffs’ interests to the defendants, and require the defendants to meet regularly and frequently with that ombudsman; and
(6) grant other equitable relief as the court sees fit.
After amending the complaint, the plaintiffs moved to certify the statewide class of all children who are or would be in foster care in Florida, along with a subclass of black children.2 Upon motion of the defendants, the court appointed a guardian ad litem, who concluded after investigation that “a class action lawsuit is an appropriate mechanism to secure a remedy for all the children in State custody ... [and] that the prosecution of this lawsuit to a final resolution ... will be in the best interests of the Plaintiff children and the class they represent.”
The district court dismissed all of the plaintiffs’ claims on the pleadings. It ruled that Count IV, which involves the Adoption Act claims, is barred by the Eleventh Amendment and dismissed those claims with prejudice. The court also dismissed with prejudice the constitutional claims—Counts I, II, and III—as to all plaintiffs who are not in extended foster care (which exists only for persons age 18 or older); it did so based upon the abstention doctrine of Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971). The court dismissed with prejudice the portion of Count VI that alleges disparate impact discrimination under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Concluding that the amended complaint was not a “short and plain statement” of claims, the court dismissed all the other claims (including the Title VI claims for intentional discrimination) in the amended complaint without prejudice, granting the plaintiffs leave to replead those claims that had not been dismissed on some other basis.
Thereafter, eleven of the twenty-two named plaintiffs who had filed the amended complaint settled all of their claims, executed a release, and are no longer part of the lawsuit. Some of the eleven plaintiffs who remain in the lawsuit also settled some of their claims. More specifically, all the intentional racial discrimination claims and all the Medicaid Act claims have been settled
2

31 Foster Children v. Bush, 329 F.3d 1255 (2003)
and dismissed.3 The settlement left no unadjudicated claims pending in the district court.
The plaintiffs who appealed to this Court are the remaining eleven named plaintiffs still in foster care in Florida for persons under the age of eighteen.4 The issues they raise in this appeal concern only Counts I through IV, which involve some of the claims that were dismissed with prejudice.5
*1263 II. JUSTICIABILITY
Initially, we are faced with some threshold questions about whether the plaintiffs’ claims present a justiciable case or controversy. Specifically, we must decide whether the claims of two of the plaintiffs are moot and whether the other plaintiffs have standing to challenge the practices at issue.
A. MOOTNESS
[1] [2] The exercise of jurisdiction by the federal courts “depends upon the existence of a case or controversy.” North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 246, 92 S.Ct. 402, 404, 30 L.Ed.2d 413 (1971) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “[A] case is moot when the issues presented are no longer ‘live’ or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.” Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 496, 89 S.Ct. 1944, 1951, 23 L.Ed.2d 491 (1969). “Put another way, [a] case is moot when it no longer presents a live controversy with respect to which the court can give meaningful relief.” Fla. Ass’n of Rehab. Facilities, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 225 F.3d 1208, 1217 (11th Cir.2000) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). We consider questions of mootness under a plenary standard of review. United States v. Fla. Azalea Specialists, 19 F.3d 620, 621 (11th Cir.1994).
[3] The defendants contend that Larissa C.’s and Leanne G.’s claims are moot, and we agree. Because Larissa C. and Leanne G. have been adopted, they are no longer in the defendants’ legal or physical custody and therefore cannot be further harmed by the defendants’ alleged illegal practices. Because the plaintiffs’ amended complaint seeks only prospective injunctive relief against the defendants to prevent future harm, no live controversy exists between them and these two plaintiffs. Larissa C. and Leanne G. have no legally cognizable interest in the

outcome of this lawsuit. All of their claims are moot.
B. STANDING
[4] The three prerequisites for standing are that: (1) the plaintiff have suffered an “injury in fact”—an invasion of a judicially cognizable interest, which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) there be a causal connection between that injury and the conduct complained of—the injury must be fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant, and not the result of the independent action of some third party not before the court; and (3) it be likely, not merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 162, 117 S.Ct. 1154, 1161, 137 L.Ed.2d 281 (1997). These three elements “constitute[ ] the core of Article III’s case-or-controversy requirement.” Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 103–04, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 1017, 140 L.Ed.2d 210 (1998).
[5] [6] The plaintiffs bear the burden of establishing each of the three standing elements. Bennett, 520 U.S. at 167–68, 117 S.Ct. at 1163–64. How much evidence is necessary to satisfy that burden depends on the stage of litigation at which the standing challenge is made. Id. At the pleading stage, “general factual allegations of injury resulting from the defendant’s conduct may suffice, for on a motion to dismiss we presume that general allegations embrace those specific facts that are necessary to support the claim.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 2137, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992) (citations and internal marks omitted).
*1264 Because Larissa C.’s and Leanne G.’s claims are moot, we have nine remaining plaintiffs who appealed to this Court and for whom the standing question matters: Reggie B., Rebecca B., Laurie S., Lillie S., Tanya M., Tammy G., Elaine R., Rachel C., and John J. Taking the allegations of the complaint as true for present purposes, as we must, Pompey v. Broward County, 95 F.3d 1543, 1548 n. 6 (11th Cir.1996), we will proceed count-bycount as to all the injury claimed by the plaintiffs who have appealed to this Court.
In Count I, the plaintiffs claim that the defendants have violated their substantive due process rights by engaging in a pattern and practice of failing to meet their obligations in the following ways: failing to satisfy the plaintiffs’ basic needs for food, clothing, and shelter, as well as for medical, educational and other services; failing to provide safe care and placements that protect the
3

31 Foster Children v. Bush, 329 F.3d 1255 (2003)
plaintiffs from harm and services that prevent or ameliorate harm; and failing to provide the plaintiffs with care consistent with the purposes for which the defendants assumed custody of them.
As additional claimed violations of their substantive due process rights in Count I, eight of the nine remaining plaintiffs—Tanya M., Laurie S., Lillie S., Elaine R., Rachel C., Reggie B., John J., and Tammy G.—assert that the defendants knowingly placed and retained them in foster care placements that were dangerous, abusive, neglectful, overcrowded, or wholly inappropriate for meeting the children’s needs. The plaintiffs further claim that the defendants ignore or inappropriately respond to complaints or other information identifying certain placements as dangerous, abusive, neglectful, overcrowded, or wholly inappropriate for meeting the children’s needs, and have done so in the placements of Tanya M., Laurie S., Lillie S., Tammy G., and John J. Further, the defendants are alleged to have engaged in a pattern and practice of placing some children, including Rachel C. and Tammy G., in temporary shelters or group homes on a long-term basis because of the unavailability of foster homes to accommodate them. They are alleged to have retained children, including Laurie S., Lillie S., Reggie B., and Rebecca B., in foster care longer than necessary and to have subjected children to multiple, unwarranted placements. The position of the plaintiffs is that the defendants have a pattern and practice of engaging in the conduct alleged in Count I, which has caused and continues to cause the plaintiffs injury.
In Count II, the plaintiffs assert violations of procedural due process. They allege that the defendants have failed to establish a process for an administrative hearing or professional review of decisions that deny the plaintiffs benefits to which they are entitled, including caseworker supervision of children in foster care and shelter care, medical care, foster care after reaching the age of majority, and participation in a subsidized Independent Living Program. Specifically, it is alleged that Reggie B. has been and continues to be injured by this pattern and practice, because he has been denied treatment necessary to repair a cleft palate and for other medical needs.
In Count III, eight of the remaining plaintiffs—Tanya M., Tammy G., Laurie S., Lillie S., John J., Elaine R., Reggie B., and Rebecca B.—claim that the defendants have violated their First, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights by unnecessarily separating them from their siblings and depriving them of regular and frequent visitation with their separated siblings. They allege that the defendants have a pattern and practice of doing so, and that it has harmed them.

*1265 In Count IV, the plaintiffs allege that the defendants have violated rights granted them under the Adoption Act. Specifically, Laurie S., Lillie S., Reggie B., and Rebecca B. claim that the defendants routinely fail to initiate proceedings for termination of parental rights to children in their custody for 15 of the most recent 22 months as required under 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(E), and that they have been harmed by this practice. Reggie B. also alleges specifically that his health and education records were not provided to foster parents or foster care providers immediately upon his placement in a home or facility, as required under 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(D), and the other eight remaining plaintiffs allege generally that the defendants routinely fail to obtain the required information, update it, or provide a record of the information to each foster home or facility.
The defendants contend that none of the plaintiffs has standing to bring claims under Count II (procedural due process) or Count IV (Adoption Act). With regard to Count I (substantive due process), the defendants contend that only four plaintiffs—Laurie S., Lillie S., Reggie B., and Rebecca B.—have standing to claim that they have been in foster care longer than reasonably necessary. They contend that only three plaintiffs—Tammy G., Laurie S., and Lillie S.—have standing to bring a claim under Count III (sibling association) for failure to be placed in a foster home with their siblings. Finally, they contend that only two plaintiffs—Elaine R. and Tammy G.—have standing to raise a claim under Count III for failure to allow visitation with siblings. The defendants’ basis for claiming that most plaintiffs lack standing for these claims is that most of them fail to allege either a palpable injury or the imminent risk of harm.6 Instead, according to the defendants, most of the plaintiffs complain about past harms and seek relief for aspects of the Florida foster care system that have not caused them injury.
[7] [8] In order to satisfy the “injury in fact” requirement of standing, a plaintiff need not wait for an injury to occur. An allegation of future injury satisfies this prong of standing so long as the alleged injury is “imminent” or “real and immediate” and not merely “conjectural” or “hypothetical.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560, 112 S.Ct. at 2136; City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101–02, 103 S.Ct. 1660, 1665, 75 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983). An injury is imminent if it is likely to occur, and likely to do so immediately. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560, 112 S.Ct. at 2136.
[9] [10] When a plaintiff cannot show that an injury is likely to occur immediately, the plaintiff does not have standing to seek prospective relief even if he has suffered a past
4

31 Foster Children v. Bush, 329 F.3d 1255 (2003)
injury. For example, in Lyons, the plaintiff sought to enjoin the use of “chokeholds” by police officers. 461 U.S. at 98, 103 S.Ct. at 1663. The Court stated that the plaintiff’s standing to seek *1266 that relief hinged on “whether he was likely to suffer future injury from the use of the chokeholds by police officers.” Id. at 105, 103 S.Ct. at 1667. The Court held that the plaintiff lacked standing, because the probability of future injury was too speculative, id. at 106–07, 103 S.Ct. at 1667–68, explaining:
In order to establish an actual controversy in this case, [the plaintiff] would have had not only to allege that he would have another encounter with the police but also to make the incredible assertion either (1) that all police officers in Los Angeles always choke any citizen with whom they happen to have an encounter ... or (2) that the City ordered or authorized police officers to act in such manner.
Id. at 105–06, 103 S.Ct. at 1667. As Lyons illustrates, future injury that depends on either the random or unauthorized acts of a third party is too speculative to satisfy standing requirements. However, when the threatened acts that will cause injury are authorized or part of a policy, it is significantly more likely that the injury will occur again. See id. at 106, 103 S.Ct. at 1667 (plaintiff may have had standing if he had alleged “that the City ordered or authorized police officers to [perform illegal chokeholds]”).
This case is more like Church v. City of Huntsville, 30 F.3d 1332 (11th Cir.1994), than Lyons. In Church, the plaintiffs were homeless persons who sought an injunction against the City of Huntsville to prevent the City and its employees from harassing, intimidating, detaining, and arresting them solely because they were homeless, as part of a concerted effort to drive them out of the city. Id. at 1335. We held that the plaintiffs had standing, because they were far more likely than the Lyons plaintiff to have future encounters with the police, were homeless involuntarily, and could not “ ‘avoid future exposure to the challenged course of conduct’ ” in which the City engaged. Id. at 1338 (quoting O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 497, 94 S.Ct. 669, 677, 38 L.Ed.2d 674 (1974)). Importantly, the Church plaintiffs alleged that municipal policy authorized the constitutional deprivations they claimed and that the City had a “custom, practice and policy” of engaging in the

challenged conduct. Id. at 1339.
[11] For the reasons that the Church plaintiffs had standing, the plaintiffs in this case who are in the defendants’ physical custody have standing to pursue their substantive due process claims (Count I). The plaintiffs who are in the defendants’ physical custody and have siblings in the defendants’ custody—Tammy G., Laurie S., Lillie S., John J., Reggie B., and Rebecca B.—have standing to pursue their sibling association claims (Count III). These plaintiffs are in much the same legal position as the Church plaintiffs. They are in the custody of the defendants involuntarily and will be until they are returned to their parents, are adopted, or reach the age of majority. They cannot avoid exposure to the defendants’ challenged conduct. The alleged systemic deficiencies in the Florida foster care system are similar to an injurious policy, and different from the random act at issue in Lyons. The alleged pattern and practice in this case presents a substantial likelihood that the alleged injury will occur. See Church, 30 F.3d at 1339.
[12] Moreover, the plaintiffs’ allegations under Counts I and III support the conclusion that future injury will proceed with a high degree of immediacy. The Supreme Court addressed this aspect of the injury in fact requirement in Lujan, holding that because the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate their injury would “proceed with a high degree of immediacy, so as to reduce the possibility of deciding a case in which no injury would have occurred at all,” they lacked standing to pursue their *1267 claim. 504 U.S. at 559, 564 n. 2, 112 S.Ct. at 2135–36, 2138 n. 2. Thus, under Lujan, one cannot merely allege that an injury will be suffered at “some time” in the future. However, a plaintiff need not demonstrate that the injury will occur within days or even weeks to have standing. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 211–12, 115 S.Ct. 2097, 2105, 132 L.Ed.2d 158 (1995) (plaintiff who was likely to suffer injury within one year period had standing to sue). The court must make a qualitative inquiry into this question. See Wilderness Soc’y v. Alcock, 83 F.3d 386, 390 (11th Cir.1996) (when determining standing, court focuses on qualitative sufficiency of the injury). In this case, for those plaintiffs who are in the physical custody of the defendants, the degree of immediacy is sufficiently high that there is little likelihood the district court will be deciding a case “in which no injury would have occurred at all.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 564 n. 2, 112 S.Ct. at 2138 n. 2.
[13] However, the two plaintiffs who are not in the defendants’ physical custody lack standing to pursue the constitutional claims under Counts I and III. The amended complaint states that Tanya M. has run away, and at oral
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31 Foster Children v. Bush, 329 F.3d 1255 (2003)
argument the plaintiffs’ counsel referred to Elaine R. as one of the “hundreds of missing children.” Plaintiffs who are not in the defendants’ physical custody cannot demonstrate that their constitutional injuries are imminent. They may return to the defendants’ physical custody, but they may not. If they do not return to the defendants’ physical custody, then they will never be harmed by the alleged practices of the defendants. It follows that they cannot demonstrate any injury that would “proceed with a high degree of immediacy.” Id.
[14] Only Reggie B. has standing to pursue the procedural due process claims set out in Count II, because he is the only plaintiff who has demonstrated injury in fact as to that claim. He claims that he has been denied medical care to repair a cleft palate (and other unspecified medical care) and that the defendants have not provided a process for review of that denial. If his cleft palate has not been repaired, he has been denied an alleged entitlement, and he is asking for procedural protections he claims have not been provided. His is a concrete injury that is real and immediate. Id. at 560, 112 S.Ct. at 2136. The other plaintiffs, however, have not alleged that they have been denied any entitlement. Without such an allegation, the other plaintiffs are essentially asserting that they will be denied a benefit in the future, and that when that happens, the defendants will provide them with no process for reviewing the denial. The plaintiffs’ procedural due process claims are different from their substantive due process claims because the procedural injury requires two steps: the defendants must deny the plaintiffs a benefit and then deny them process. Such an injury may never occur. See id. at 564 n. 2, 112 S.Ct. at 2138 n. 2.
[15] As to the Adoption Act claims in Count IV, all of the plaintiffs whose parents’ parental rights have not been terminated within the period set out in the statute have standing to pursue a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(E). Their claimed injury is concrete. In the amended complaint, Laurie S., Lillie S., Reggie B., and Rebecca B. present such claims. Other plaintiffs, the ones who have not been in the defendants’ custody for the statutory period, do not have standing to bring a claim under § 675(5)(E), because they may not be injured at all; they may return to their parents’ custody.
All of the remaining plaintiffs in the defendants’ physical custody have claims under 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(D) for the defendants’ failure to provide updated health *1268 and education records to the plaintiffs’ foster caregivers for the same reasons that they have standing to pursue their substantive due process claims. Because it is alleged that the defendants routinely fail to obtain the required information, update the records, and provide the

information to the foster caregivers, all children who are within the defendants’ physical custody are at risk of immediate harm from that pattern and practice.
In sum, Larissa C.’s and Leanne G.’s claims are moot because they have been adopted. Reggie B., Rebecca B., Laurie S., Lillie S., Tammy G., Rachel C., and John J. have standing to pursue their Count I claims. Reggie B. has standing to pursue his Count II claims. Tammy G., Laurie S., Lillie S., John J., Reggie B., and Rebecca B. have standing to pursue their Count III claims. Laurie S., Lillie S., Reggie B., and Rebecca B. have standing to pursue their Count IV claims for failure to terminate parental rights in the statutory period. Reggie B., Rebecca B., Laurie S., Lillie S., Tammy G., Rachel C., and John J. have standing to pursue their Count IV claims for failure to provide updated health and education records to foster caregivers.
III. THE PLAINTIFFS’ CLAIMS UNDER § 1983 FOR VIOLATIONS OF §§ 675(5)(D) AND (E) OF
THE ADOPTION ACT
[16] Because some of the plaintiffs have standing to pursue their Adoption Act claims, we must now decide whether 42 U.S.C. §§ 675(5)(D) and (E) provide rights enforceable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.7 It provides a federal remedy for violations not only of the Constitution but federal statutes as well. Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 100 S.Ct. 2502, 65 L.Ed.2d 555 (1980). In order to have a viable cause of action under § 1983 based on the violation of a federal statute, however, a plaintiff must establish that the statute allegedly violated gives the plaintiff enforceable rights. Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 283, 122 S.Ct. 2268, 2275, 153 L.Ed.2d 309 (2002) (rejecting the notion that case law permits “anything short of an unambiguously conferred right to support a cause of action brought under § 1983”).
[17] [18] We emphasize, as did the Court in Gonzaga, that in cases brought to enforce legislation enacted pursuant to Congress’ spending power, such as the Adoption Act, Congress must “speak with a clear voice” and manifest an “unambiguous” intent to confer individual rights before federal funding provisions will be read to provide a basis for private enforcement. Id. at 280, 122 S.Ct. at 2273 (citing Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17, 28 & n. 21, 101 S.Ct. 1531, 1540, 1545 & n. 21, 67 L.Ed.2d 694 (1981)). “In legislation enacted pursuant to the spending power, the typical remedy for state noncompliance with federally imposed conditions is not a private cause of action for noncompliance but rather
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action by the Federal Government to terminate funds to the State.” Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 28, 101 S.Ct. at 1545. Only twice since Pennhurst has the Supreme Court held that spending legislation gave rise to rights enforceable via § 1983. See Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498, 110 S.Ct. 2510, 110 L.Ed.2d 455 (1990) (holding that *1269 health care providers could, pursuant to § 1983, enforce the Boren Amendment to the Medicaid Act); Wright v. Roanoke Redevelopment & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 107 S.Ct. 766, 93 L.Ed.2d 781 (1987) (holding that the Brooke Amendment to the Housing Act provided a cause of action under § 1983).
[19] [20] The Supreme Court has set forth three requirements that must be met before a federal statute will be read to confer a right enforceable under § 1983: (1) Congress must have intended that the provisions in question benefit the plaintiff; (2) the plaintiff must demonstrate that the right assertedly protected by the statute is not so vague and amorphous that its enforcement would strain judicial resources; and (3) the provision giving rise to the asserted right must be couched in mandatory, rather than precatory, terms. Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340–41, 117 S.Ct. 1353, 1359, 137 L.Ed.2d 569 (1997). The Supreme Court in Gonzaga clarified the first of the Blessing requirements, making it plain that only unambiguously conferred rights, as distinguished from mere benefits or interests, may be enforced under § 1983. 536 U.S. at 283, 122 S.Ct. at 2275 (rejecting the notion private plaintiffs have enforceable federal rights merely because they are the intended beneficiaries of a statute or fall within its zone of interest).
The Court held in Gonzaga that a private plaintiff could not bring an action under § 1983 to enforce provisions of the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 (FERPA), 20 U.S.C. § 1232g. In FERPA Congress directed the Secretary of Education to deny federal funding to any state with a policy or practice of permitting the unauthorized release of education records or personal information. Congress was explicit about it, saying: “No funds shall be made available ... to any [school] which has a policy or practice of permitting the release of education records ... of students without the written consent of their parents ....” 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(1).
In holding that FERPA does not create a right enforceable under § 1983, the Supreme Court explained that the act lacks “rights-creating” language critical to showing congressional intent to create new rights. Instead, the act speaks only to the Secretary of Education, directing him to withhold funds if the prohibited practice exists. Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 287, 122 S.Ct. at 2277. The Court

contrasted FERPA’s language that “[n]o funds shall be made available,” with the individually focused language of Titles VI and IX, which mandate that “[n]o person ... shall ... be subjected to discrimination,” statutes that do create enforceable rights, see Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 99 S.Ct. 1946, 60 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). The Court concluded in Gonzaga that the focus of FERPA is “two steps removed from the interests of individual students and parents.” 536 U.S. at 287, 122 S.Ct. at 2277. Instead of creating an enforceable duty on the part of the school, the act only imposed a duty on the part of the federal government—the duty to withhold funds.
A second reason the Supreme Court gave in Gonzaga for concluding that FERPA does not create enforceable rights is that its nondisclosure provisions speak only in terms of institutional policy and practice, not about “individual instances of disclosure.” Id. at 288, 122 S.Ct. at 2278. The provisions therefore have an aggregate focus, instead of a concern for “whether the needs of any particular person have been satisfied.” Id. (citation omitted). Also thought significant is the fact that institutions can avoid funding termination under FERPA by substantial compliance with the act’s requirements; compliance in every case is not necessary to avoid loss of funding. Id.
*1270 Finally, the Supreme Court considered in Gonzaga the mechanism that Congress chose to provide for enforcing the provisions of FERPA. The act expressly authorizes the Secretary of Education to “deal with violations” of it and to establish a review board for investigating and adjudicating such violations. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(f). The Secretary’s regulations create an office to act as a review board, and students can file individual written complaints with that office. This review mechanism, the Court concluded, evidences a congressional intent to avoid the multiple interpretations of FERPA that might arise if the act created enforceable individual rights. Gonzaga, 536 at 289–90, 122 S.Ct. at 2278–79.
[21] [22] We take from Gonzaga the lesson that we are to look at the text and structure of a statute in order to determine if it unambiguously provides enforceable rights. If the text and structure “provide no indication that Congress intends to create new individual rights, there is no basis for a private suit.” Id. at 286, 122 S.Ct. at 2277. If they provide some indication that Congress may have intended to create individual rights, and some indication it may not have, that means Congress has not spoken with the requisite “clear voice.” Ambiguity precludes enforceable rights. Id. at 280, 122 S.Ct. at 2273. The first Blessing requirement, which is what Gonzaga addressed, is that Congress must have intended that the provision in
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31 Foster Children v. Bush, 329 F.3d 1255 (2003)
question benefit the plaintiff. Factors to consider in determining if it did include whether the statute: (1) contains “rights-creating” language that is individually focused; (2) addresses the needs of individual persons being satisfied instead of having a systemwide or aggregate focus; and (3) lacks an enforcement mechanism through which an aggrieved individual can obtain review.
[23] Turning to the specific legislation at hand, the Adoption Act comprises Parts B and E of Title IV of the Social Security Act and is a federal funding statute that establishes a program of payments to states for foster care and adoption assistance. 42 U.S.C. §§ 620–628, 670– 679a. Sections 675(5)(D) and (E) are found in Part E. For a state to receive funds under Part E, it must satisfy certain requirements. The state must submit for approval by the Secretary of Health and Human Services a plan for foster care and adoption assistance. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a). If a state follows its approved plan, it receives federal funds. 42 U.S.C. § 670; 42 U.S.C. § 1320a–2a.
If the state does not follow its approved plan, it may lose all or some of the federal funds it otherwise would receive. Section 1320a–2a requires the Secretary to promulgate regulations for use in reviewing state programs in order to determine whether the programs are in substantial conformity with the state plan. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a–2a(a)(3). Under the statute, the regulations must require the Secretary to withhold federal funds if a state has failed to substantially conform to its approved plan, id. § 1320a–2a(b)(3), and the regulations do exactly that, 45 C.F.R. §§ 1355.35(c)(4), 1355.36(b).
The plaintiffs in this case brought suit under § 675, a section that provides definitions for both Parts B and E, including a definition for the term “case review system.” 42 U.S.C. § 675(5). The plaintiffs’ position is that those provisions relating to a case review system give them an enforceable right under the statute. Section 675(5) provides, in relevant part:
The term “case review system” means a procedure for assuring that—
* * *
(D) a child’s health and education record (as described in paragraph (1)(A)) is *1271 reviewed and updated, and supplied to the foster parent or foster care provider with whom the child is placed, at the time of each placement of the child in foster care;

(E) in the case of a child who has been in foster care under the responsibility of the State for 15 of the most recent 22 months, or, if a court of competent jurisdiction has determined a child to be an abandoned infant (as defined under State law) or has made a determination that the parent has committed murder of another child of the parent, committed voluntary manslaughter of another child of the parent, aided or abetted, attempted, conspired, or solicited to commit such a murder or such a voluntary manslaughter, or committed a felony assault that has resulted in serious bodily injury to the child or to another child of the parent, the State shall file a petition to terminate the parental rights of the child’s parents (or, if such a petition has been filed by another party, seek to be joined as a party to the petition)....
42 U.S.C. § 675(5). Because §§ 675(5)(D) and (E) are definitional in nature, they alone cannot and do not supply a basis for conferring rights enforceable under § 1983. See Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 280, 122 S.Ct. at 2273; see also Charlie H. v. Whitman, 83 F.Supp.2d 476, 490 (D.N.J.2000) (§ 675(5), standing alone, does not confer a right enforceable under § 1983); B.H. v. Johnson, 715 F.Supp. 1387, 1401 (N.D.Ill.1989) (“It would be strange for Congress to create enforceable rights in the definitional section of a statute.”).
Other than the definition, the only provision in Part E of Title IV that uses the term “case review system” is 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(16). That section conditions receipt of federal funds on the existence of a state plan that, among other things, provides for “a case review system which meets the requirements described in section 675(5)(B) ... with respect to each such child.” Section 671(a)(16) does not go beyond that and explicitly require a plan to meet the requirements described in §§ 675(5)(D) and (E).
The plaintiffs contend otherwise. They argue that we should not interpret § 671(a)(16) to require compliance only with § 675(5)(B) in order for states to receive federal funds, but we think that is the most logical interpretation. The statute plainly directs that the state must have a plan that provides for a case review system “which meets the requirements described in section 675(5)(B) of this title.” 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(16). It does not say that a plan’s case review system must meet the requirements of §§ 675(5)(D) and (E). Moreover, in other provisions of the Adoption Act, provisions that are codified in Part B of Title IV, Congress has required compliance with all of § 675(5) in order for a state to receive funds.8 The *1272 conclusion we reach is that Congress knew how to require compliance with all aspects of a case review system, as described in § 675(5), when it wanted to do so. It did not
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choose to do so in § 671(a)(16).
Additionally, §§ 675(5)(D) and (E) do not have the kind of focused-on-the-individual, rights-creating language required by Gonzaga. Instead, the language of those provisions gives them an aggregate or system wide focus instead of one that indicates concern with whether the needs of any particular child are met. Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 288, 122 S.Ct. at 2277–78. Although the text of the provisions speaks to “a child’s health and education record” provided at “each placement of the child” and to termination of the parental rights of “the child’s parents,” the case review system as a whole is defined as “a procedure for assuring” that the desired steps are taken. 42 U.S.C. § 675(5). The references to individual children and their placements are made in the context of describing what the procedure is supposed to ensure, and such provisions “cannot make out the requisite congressional intent to confer individual rights enforceable by § 1983.” Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 289, 122 S.Ct. at 2278.
Further, Congress has required the Secretary of Health and Human Services to promulgate regulations for the review of the child welfare and adoption assistance programs set out in Parts B and E in order “to determine whether such programs are in substantial conformity with—State plan requirements under such parts B and E.” 42 U.S.C. § 1320a–2a(a)(1) (emphasis added). The substantial conformity requirement is similar to FERPA’s, which the Court in Gonzaga concluded showed an aggregate instead of an individual focus. 536 U.S. at 288, 122 S.Ct. at 2278; see also Blessing, 520 U.S. at 335, 343, 117 S.Ct. at 1357, 1361 (holding that Title IV–D of the Social Security Act did not support a right enforceable pursuant to § 1983, in part because the statute mandated “substantial compliance” with federal regulations).
[24] As for enforcement of §§ 675(5)(D) and (E), it is true that the statutes do not contain “a remedial scheme sufficiently comprehensive to demonstrate congressional intent to preclude the remedy of suits under § 1983.” Blessing, 520 U.S. at 346, 117 S.Ct. at 1362 (internal marks omitted). In fact, the Adoption Act contains no mechanism by which aggrieved individuals can enforce its provisions. Instead, the Secretary enforces the Adoption Act by requiring the implementation of corrective action or withholding federal funds if the states fail to comply with an approved plan. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a–2a. Federal regulations require that the Secretary audit states to determine whether they are in compliance. 45 C.F.R. §§ 1355.32–33; 1355.36. This enforcement scheme is not like those that have been held by the Supreme Court to preclude suits under § 1983. See Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 289–90, 122 S.Ct. at 2278–79

(creation of centralized review board for individual complaints and enforcement of FERPA precluded private suits); Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1010–12, 104 S.Ct. 3457, 3467–68, 82 L.Ed.2d 746 (1984), superseded in part by 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (review scheme in Education of the *1273 Handicapped Act permitting aggrieved individuals to invoke “carefully tailored” local administrative procedures followed by federal judicial review precluded § 1983 suits because such suits would “render superfluous most of the detailed procedural protections outlined in the statute”); Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Nat’l Sea Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1, 13, 20, 101 S.Ct. 2615, 2623, 2626–27, 69 L.Ed.2d 435 (1981) (“unusually elaborate enforcement provisions” of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, which provided many enforcement options, including noncompliance orders, civil suits, and criminal penalties and authorized private persons to initiate enforcement actions, foreclosed § 1983 suit). Nonetheless, in this case, the lack of an enforcement mechanism by which an aggrieved individual can obtain review is but one of the factors we consider. The others point in the other direction and prevent us from saying that Congress spoke with a clear voice to unambiguously manifest its intent to create enforceable rights.
One other, more specific argument of the plaintiffs needs to be discussed. They contend that § 103(c) of the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 (ASFA), Pub.L. No. 105–89, 111 Stat. 2115, 2119, shows that Congress intended that the right to have parental rights termination proceedings initiated within the statutory period be an enforceable right for children in foster care. Section 103(c) provides:
(1) NEW FOSTER CHILDREN. In the case of a child who enters foster care ... under the responsibility of a State after the date of the enactment of this Act—
(A) if the State comes into compliance with the amendments made by [section 103(a), which amended the Adoption Act] before the child has been in such foster care for 15 of the most recent 22 months, the State shall comply with [42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(E) ] with respect to the child when the child has been in such foster care for 15 of the most recent 22 months; and
(B) if the State comes into such compliance after the child has been in such foster care for 15 of the most recent 22 months, the State shall comply with [42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(E) ] with respect to the child not later than 3 months after the end of the first regular session of the State legislature that begins after such date of enactment.
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(2) CURRENT FOSTER CHILDREN. In the case of children in foster care under the responsibility of the State on the date of the enactment of this Act, the State shall—
* * *
(C) not later than 18 months after the end of such first regular [legislative] session, comply with [42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(E) ] with respect to all of such children. ASFA § 103(c). Section 103(c) does mandate that a state must comply with 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(E) with respect to all children in foster care. However, when examined in light of the structure of both that section of the ASFA and the Adoption Act as a whole, § 103(c) is ambiguous. Section 103(c)(4) provides that the requirements of § 103(c) “shall be treated as State plan requirements imposed by [42 U.S.C. § 671(a) ].” Treating § 103(c) as a plan requirement means that the Secretary is to review compliance with the requirements of § 103(c) only for substantial compliance, not for compliance in every individual case. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a–2a(a)(1) (requiring Secretary to “promulgate regulations for the review of such programs [under Parts B and E of Title IV] to determine whether such programs are in substantial conformity with—State plan requirements under such parts B and E.”) (emphasis added). The *1274 substantial conformity standard applicable to § 103(c) of the ASFA puts that provision on the same footing as 42 U.S.C. §§ 675(5)(D) and (E), and it prevents us from finding that the statute manifests an unambiguous congressional intent to create a right enforceable under § 1983.
Taken as a whole, §§ 675(5)(D) and (E) do not contain rights-creating language; they have an aggregate, not individual, focus. Those provisions do not give plaintiffs an “unambiguously conferred right to support a cause of action brought under § 1983.” Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 283, 122 S.Ct. at 2275. Congress has not spoken with a clear voice manifesting an unambiguous intent for those provisions of the Adoption Act to provide a basis for private enforcement. Id. at 280, 122 S.Ct. at 2273; Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17, 28 & n. 21, 101 S.Ct. at 1540, 1545 & n. 21. Count IV of the complaint, therefore, does not state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
IV. YOUNGER ABSTENTION

[25] Because some of the plaintiffs have standing to pursue the constitutional claims, we turn to the issue arising from the district court’s dismissal of Counts I through III under the abstention doctrine of Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971). We review an abstention decision only for an abuse of discretion. Boyes v. Shell Oil Prods. Co., 199 F.3d 1260, 1265 (11th Cir.2000).
[26] [27] The Supreme Court has said that federal courts have a “virtually unflagging obligation ... to exercise the jurisdiction given them.” Col. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817, 96 S.Ct. 1236, 1246, 47 L.Ed.2d 483 (1976). But “virtually” is not “absolutely,” and in exceptional cases federal courts may and should withhold equitable relief to avoid interference with state proceedings. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 359, 109 S.Ct. 2506, 2513, 105 L.Ed.2d 298 (1989). While nonabstention remains the rule, the Younger exception is an important one. It derives from “the vital consideration of comity between the state and national governments,” Luckey v. Miller, 976 F.2d 673, 676 (11th Cir.1992) (“Luckey V ”),9 which Younger itself characterized as a “sensitivity to the legitimate interests of both State and National Governments,” 401 U.S. at 44, 91 S.Ct. at 750.
[28] [29] [30] Although Younger concerned state criminal proceedings, its principles are “fully applicable to noncriminal judicial proceedings when important state interests are involved.” Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 432, 102 S.Ct. 2515, 2521, 73 L.Ed.2d 116 (1982). “Proceedings necessary for the vindication of important state policies or for the functioning of the state judicial system ... evidence the state’s substantial interest in the litigation.” Id. “Where vital state interests are involved, a federal court should abstain unless state law clearly bars the interposition of the constitutional claims.” Id. (citation and internal marks omitted). As the Middlesex Court framed the issue, “The question ... is threefold: first, do [the proceedings] constitute an ongoing state judicial proceeding; second, do the proceedings implicate important state interests; and third, is there an adequate opportunity in the state proceedings to raise constitutional challenges.” Id. (emphasis omitted); see *1275 also Old Republic Union Ins. Co. v. Tillis Trucking Co., 124 F.3d 1258, 1261 (11th Cir.1997).
[31] The parties agree, and so do we, that the continuing state dependency proceedings involving each of the plaintiffs are ongoing state proceedings for the purposes of Middlesex analysis, see J.B. ex rel. Hart v. Valdez, 186 F.3d 1280, 1291 (10th Cir.1999) (holding that continuing
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jurisdiction of juvenile court and six month periodic review hearings constituted an ongoing state judicial proceeding), although they dispute whether this federal proceeding, if allowed to go forward, would interfere with those state proceedings. The parties also agree, and so do we, that important state interests are involved. The parties disagree about whether the state court dependency proceedings provide the plaintiffs with an opportunity to raise and vindicate the federal constitutional claims, if those claims are valid. We will start by addressing whether the first Middlesex factor is properly read as requiring federal court interference with state proceedings and whether a federal court proceeding in this case would interfere with the dependency proceedings. Then we will address whether the plaintiffs have an adequate state remedy.
A. THE FIRST MIDDLESEX FACTOR
Both the plaintiffs and the defendants have presumed the first Middlesex factor, in addition to requiring an ongoing state proceeding, also requires that the federal relief the plaintiffs seek would interfere with those proceedings, and that if it would not interfere with the state proceedings, then the federal court has no basis for abstaining under Younger. See generally, Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 431, 102 S.Ct. at 2521 (“Younger v. Harris ... and its progeny espouse a strong federal policy against federal-court interference with pending state judicial proceedings absent extraordinary circumstances.”). Decisions from some other circuits support that view. See, e.g., Green v. City of Tucson, 255 F.3d 1086, 1097 (9th Cir.2001) (en banc) (“[T]he three part test we derived from Middlesex is a suitable guide for analysis only when the threshold condition for Younger abstention is present—that is, when the relief sought in federal court would in some manner directly ‘interfere’ with ongoing state judicial proceedings.”); J.B., 186 F.3d at 1291 (stating first Middlesex factor as requiring abstention under Younger “when federal proceedings would ... interfere with an ongoing state judicial proceeding”); FOCUS v. Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas, 75 F.3d 834, 843 (3d Cir.1996) (stating first Middlesex factor as “there must be an ongoing state judicial proceeding to which the federal plaintiff is a party and with which the federal proceeding will interfere”).
[32] We have not yet expressly held that the first Middlesex factor requires that the federal proceeding interfere with the state proceeding, but implicitly we seem to have assumed as much. For example, in Old Republic, the plaintiff filed a declaratory judgment action in federal

court to avoid paying a state court judgment and to have its obligations under certain insurance policies determined by a federal court instead of a state court. 124 F.3d at 1259. In applying the Middlesex factors, we concluded that the first factor was met, not simply because there was an ongoing state proceeding, but because that proceeding would have been effectively enjoined by a declaratory judgment issued by the federal court. Id. at 1261–62; see also For Your Eyes Alone, Inc. v. City of Columbus, 281 F.3d 1209, 1216 n. 13 (11th Cir.2002) (“[T]he Supreme Court has held that Younger abstention is sometimes applicable to restrain federal court interference *1276 with certain noncriminal state proceedings that implicate important state interests.”). Indeed, the Supreme Court in Middlesex held that “[b]ecause respondent ... had an opportunity to raise and have timely decided by a competent state tribunal the federal issues involved ... federal courts should abstain from interfering with the ongoing proceedings.” 457 U.S. at 437, 102 S.Ct. at 2524 (emphasis added) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Therefore, we join our sister circuits in explicitly stating that an essential part of the first Middlesex factor in Younger abstention analysis is whether the federal proceeding will interfere with an ongoing state court proceeding. If there is no interference, then abstention is not required.
[33] [34] In order to decide whether the federal proceeding would interfere with the state proceeding, we look to the relief requested and the effect it would have on the state proceedings. See O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 499– 502, 94 S.Ct. 669, 677–79, 38 L.Ed.2d 674 (1974); Luckey V, 976 F.2d at 679 (Younger and O’Shea require “focus on the likely result of an attempt to enforce an order of the nature sought here”). The relief sought need not directly interfere with an ongoing proceeding or terminate an ongoing proceeding in order for Younger abstention to be required. In O’Shea, the Supreme Court held that abstention was required where an injunction would have “indirectly accomplish[ed] the kind of interference that Younger v. Harris ... and related cases sought to prevent.” Id. at 500, 94 S.Ct. at 678 (emphasis added). The plaintiffs in O’Shea did not seek to enjoin directly any pending prosecutions but apparently did seek a federal court injunction aimed at controlling or preventing the occurrence of specific events that might take place in the course of future state criminal trials. The requested injunction contemplated interruption of the state proceedings in order for the federal court to adjudicate compliance by the defendants with the injunction, through what the Supreme Court called “an ongoing federal audit of state criminal proceedings.” Id. at 500, 94 S.Ct. at 678. The Court found that the injunction “would disrupt the normal course of proceedings in the state courts via resort
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31 Foster Children v. Bush, 329 F.3d 1255 (2003)
to the federal suit for determination of the claim ab initio.” Id. at 501, 94 S.Ct. at 679.
We applied the reasoning of O’Shea in Luckey V, 976 F.2d at 678–79. In that case, the plaintiffs had asserted a class action on behalf of “all individuals who are or will in the future be adversely affected by the unconstitutional practices of the indigent defense system within Georgia.” Id. at 676. They sought injunctive relief to reform the indigent defense system, including orders that the system provide speedy appointment of counsel and ensure that there would be counsel at all probable cause determinations, and would have required monitoring the implementation of the injunction. Id. Adopting in full the explanation in the district court’s abstention order, we concluded that the decree requested by the plaintiffs inevitably would interfere with state criminal proceedings. Id. at 677.
Luckey V did not involve a direct termination of ongoing state proceedings, and the plaintiffs did not directly contest any single criminal conviction or seek to restrain any individual prosecution. Nevertheless, as we observed, the injunctive relief the plaintiffs sought would have had the effect of restraining every indigent prosecution until the systemic improvements they wanted were in place. Id. We focused on the effect of the requested relief on the state proceedings. See id.; see also Joseph A. ex rel. Wolfe v. Ingram, 275 F.3d 1253, 1272 (10th Cir.2002) (“Younger governs whenever the requested relief *1277 would interfere with the state court’s ability to conduct proceedings, regardless of whether the relief targets the conduct of a proceeding directly.”) (citing News–Journal Corp. v. Foxman, 939 F.2d 1499, 1511 (11th Cir.1991) (affirming district court’s decision to abstain under Younger from hearing newspaper’s challenge to state court’s pre-trial order because an injunction would restrict the ability of the state court to impanel an impartial jury)).
[35] Whether the effect of the federal court injunctive relief the plaintiffs seek in this lawsuit will interfere with ongoing state dependency proceedings depends in part upon the nature and extent of those proceedings. The state trial level courts of Florida play a critically important role in dependency hearings from the outset of a child’s case. After the Department files a petition for dependency, the court holds an adjudicatory hearing as soon as practicable. Fla. Stat. § 39.507. If the facts alleged in the dependency petition are proven in the adjudicatory hearing and the child is determined to be dependent, the state court conducts a disposition hearing. Id. §§ 39.507(7); 39.521(1). The Department must prepare a written case plan and a predisposition study and file these items with the court no later than 72 hours before the disposition

hearing. Id. § 39.521(1)(a).
The case plan is a document that “follows the child from the provision of voluntary services through any dependency, foster care, or termination of parental rights proceeding or related activity or process.” Id. § 39.01(11). It must include, among other items, a description of the permanency goal for the child, a description of the type of home or institution in which the child is to be placed, a discussion of the safety and appropriateness of the child’s placement, the services that the child needs and will receive, a description of the visitation rights of the parents, and a description of the efforts to be undertaken to maintain the stability of the child’s education. Id. § 39.601(3)(a)–(i).
The case plan must be approved by the court. Id. §§ 39.601(2), (3); 39.603. It may be amended if all the parties agree and the court approves, or after a hearing it may be amended by the court on its own motion or that of a party, based on competent evidence that demonstrates the need for an amendment. Id. § 39.601(9)(f). If at the hearing on the case plan, which occurs in conjunction with the disposition hearing, the court determines that any of the elements required in the plan are not present, it can order the Department to amend the plan to include what is necessary. Id. § 39.603(2).
The state court has continuing jurisdiction over a dependency case and reviews the child’s status at least every six months. Id. § 39.701(1)(a). Prior to the review hearing, the Department must furnish to the court a written report that includes, among other items, a description of the placement of the child, its appropriateness, the safety of the child, the number of placements, documentation of the efforts of all parties to comply with the case plan, the number of times the child’s educational placement has been changed, and copies of all medical and psychological records that support the terms of the case plan. Id. § 39.701(6)(a). At the review hearing, the court considers the child’s situation, including whether there has been compliance with the case plan, the appropriateness of the child’s current placement, and whether the child is in a setting that is family-like and consistent with the child’s best interests and special needs. Id. § 39.701(7)(d), (g). No later than 12 months after the date that the child is placed in shelter care, the court must conduct a judicial review to plan for the child’s permanent placement. Id. § 39.701(8)(f). If the child is not returned to his parents, the case *1278 plan must document steps the Department is taking to find an adoptive parent or other permanent living arrangement for the child. Id.
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If the Department has not complied with the case plan, the court may find it in contempt. Id. § 39.701(8)(c). The court can also issue protective orders. Id. § 39.701(8)(g). A protective order can require a person or agency to make periodic reports to the court containing such information as the court prescribes. Id. The court can issue a protective order in support of, or as a condition to, any other order it may make. Id.
The Tenth Circuit has addressed two cases similar to this one and held that abstention was required because the plaintiffs’ federal proceeding would interfere with the state court proceedings by “fundamentally changing the dispositions and oversight of the children.” J.B., 186 F.3d at 1291–92; see also Joseph A., 275 F.3d 1253. In J.B., the plaintiffs, mentally or developmentally disabled children in the custody of New Mexico, alleged violations of the Constitution and federal statutes and brought suit against several state officers in their official capacities, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The Tenth Circuit concluded that the relief requested would give the federal district court an oversight role over the entire state program for children with disabilities and would give it control over decisions then in the hands of the New Mexico Children’s Court, such as whether to return a child to his parents or whether to modify a treatment plan. J.B., 186 F.3d at 1292.
In the other similar case decided by the Tenth Circuit, Joseph A., the plaintiffs, who were children in New Mexico’s custody because of abuse or neglect, and the New Mexico Department of Human Services had entered into a federal court consent decree. 275 F.3d at 1259. When the plaintiff children moved the court to hold the Department in contempt for allegedly violating the consent decree, the Department moved for dismissal based on Younger abstention. The Tenth Circuit held that federal court enforcement of certain provisions of the decree would interfere with the ongoing juvenile proceedings in the state court.10 Id. at 1272. It concluded that “federal court oversight of state court operations, even if not framed as direct review of state court judgments, may nevertheless be problematic for Younger purposes,” citing O’Shea and Luckey V. Id. at 1271.
In this case, the plaintiffs are seeking relief that would interfere with the ongoing state dependency proceedings by placing decisions that are now in the hands of the state courts under the direction of the federal district court. The declaratory judgment and injunction that they request would interfere with the state proceedings in numerous ways. The federal and state courts could well differ, issuing conflicting orders about what is best for a particular plaintiff, such as whether a particular placement

is safe or appropriate or whether sufficient efforts are being made to find an adoptive family. The federal court relief might effectively require an amendment to a child’s case plan that the state court would not have approved, and state law gives its courts the responsibility for deciding upon such an amendment. See Fla. Stat. § 39.601(9)(f). Even though any remedial order would run against the Department, state law makes it a duty of state courts to decide whether to approve a case plan, and to monitor the plan to *1279 ensure it is followed. Id. § 39.701(1), (7)-(8). The plaintiffs seek to have the district court appoint a panel and give it authority to implement a systemwide plan to revamp and reform dependency proceedings in Florida, as well as the appointment of a permanent children’s advocate to oversee that plan. To say the least, taking the responsibility for a state’s child dependency proceedings away from state courts and putting it under federal court control constitutes “federal court oversight of state court operations, even if not framed as direct review of state court judgments” that is problematic, calling for Younger abstention. Joseph A., 275 F.3d at 1271. The relief that the plaintiffs seek would interfere extensively with the ongoing state proceedings for each plaintiff.11 The first Middlesex factor is satisfied.
B. THE THIRD MIDDLESEX FACTOR
[36] [37] As for the other Middlesex factor that is disputed, the third one, the plaintiffs have the burden of establishing that the state proceedings do not provide an adequate remedy for their federal claims. Butler v. Ala. Judicial Inquiry Comm’n, 261 F.3d 1154, 1159 (11th Cir.2001). “Minimal respect for the state processes, of course, precludes any presumption that the state courts will not safeguard federal constitutional rights.” Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 431, 102 S.Ct. at 2521. A federal court “should assume that state procedures will afford an adequate remedy, in the absence of unambiguous authority to the contrary.” Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 15, 107 S.Ct. 1519, 1528, 95 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987). Plaintiffs, having failed to raise their federal claims in the ongoing state proceedings involving them, must overcome this initial presumption by demonstrating that the state remedies are inadequate. Butler, 261 F.3d at 1159.
[38] [39] In determining whether the state remedies are adequate, as the district court correctly observed, “[t]he relevant question is not whether the state courts can do all that Plaintiffs wish they could, but whether the available remedies are sufficient to meet Pennzoil ‘s requirement that the remedy be adequate.” The district court found that “the juvenile court can act to protect children within its
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jurisdiction,” citing Dep’t of Children & Family Servs. v. I.C., 742 So.2d 401, 404 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999), and declined to hold that the remedies available are inadequate. We agree with its conclusion.
A Florida state court can remedy in a dependency proceeding the harms that a child in the defendants’ custody and in that court’s jurisdiction might suffer. Although the Department has discretion regarding the identification of a specific placement for a child, State v. Brooke, 573 So.2d 363, 368 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991), the court can order that siblings be placed together in *1280 foster care, one of the very things that some of these plaintiffs seek. See Div. of Family Servs. v. S.R., 328 So.2d 270, 271 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976); F.B. v. State, 319 So.2d 77, 79 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975). The court can order that a child be placed in a therapeutic setting, In the Interest of L.W., 615 So.2d 834, 839 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993), and that a child be treated by a licensed health care professional or receive mental health treatment. Fla. Stat. § 39.407(4). While the state court cannot compel the Department to place children where space is not available, Dep’t of Children & Family Servs. v. M.H., 830 So.2d 849, 850 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002), it can hold the Department in contempt for failing to comply with a child’s case plan and can order the Department to submit proposals for compliance. Fla. Stat. § 39.701(8)(c); L.W., 615 So.2d at 837–38. Even though the court cannot prevent the Department from using unsafe or inappropriate facilities for all children, as to those children within its division, the court can take protective measures. It can determine whether a facility in which a child is located is safe, either by appointing a child’s representative to make an inquiry or itself investigating conditions at the facility. Fla. Stat. § 39.701(8)(g); I.C., 742 So.2d at 405. If the investigation reveals that a child within the jurisdiction of the court (meaning within its division) is in a dangerous facility, the court can take action, including finding the Department in contempt for failing to comply with the child’s case plan. See generally, Fla. Stat. §§ 39.601(3)(e); 39.701(8)(c); I.C., 742 So.2d at 404–06. Case plans always call for an appropriate placement, and an unsafe facility is not an appropriate one. Fla. Stat. § 39.601(3)(e) (“placement is intended to be safe, the least restrictive and most familylike setting available consistent with the best interest and special needs of the child, and in as close proximity as possible to the child’s home”).
Again, the Tenth Circuit’s decisions in similar cases are helpful. In J.B., that Court affirmed the district court’s decision to abstain, because the plaintiffs had failed to show clearly that they could not have raised their claims in their periodic review hearings in the New Mexico Children’s Court. 186 F.3d at 1292. The Court concluded

that New Mexico law “seemingly grants the Children’s Court wide power to determine the needs and claims of children during the periodic review proceeding.” Id. Additionally, because the Children’s Court was a court of general jurisdiction and had full constitutional powers under New Mexico law, the plaintiffs had not provided the “unambiguous authority” that Pennzoil requires to prove that the state courts could not afford an adequate remedy. Id. at 1292–93.
In Joseph A., the Tenth Circuit held that a certified class of plaintiffs had not shown that the New Mexico Children’s Court offered inadequate opportunities to raise federal constitutional and statutory claims. 275 F.3d at 1274. The plaintiffs in that case argued that the systemwide, structural relief they sought was not available in the Children’s Court and cited a New Mexico decision, In re T.B., 121 N.M. 465, 913 P.2d 272 (App.1996), for that proposition. The Tenth Circuit was not convinced the T.B. decision established the Children’s Court was precluded from granting systemic relief. 275 F.3d at 1274 n. 6. Although in T.B. the Children’s Court had dismissed a motion brought under § 1983 to require the Department of Human Services “to submit an action plan for a system for the proper licensure and regulation of therapeutic foster care,” the New Mexico Court of Appeals had addressed the dismissal only in dicta, noting that the guardian ad litem who had filed the motion had failed to identify which federal laws secured the rights the plaintiffs sought to *1281 enforce. Id. The Court held that the plaintiffs had not provided unambiguous authority that the relief they sought was unavailable. Id. at 1274.
In the present case, each of these plaintiffs is represented by counsel. There are no procedural constraints preventing them from presenting the claims in this case to the state courts in their dependency review hearings. They have not provided unambiguous authority establishing that the procedures available in state court dependency proceedings do not provide an adequate opportunity for them to raise their constitutional claims. At dependency review proceedings for each plaintiff in this case, the state court will consider whether the parties have complied with the child’s case plan, the appropriateness of that child’s current facility placement, educational placement, and any special needs the child has. Fla. Stat. §§ 39.701(7)(d), (g). If the Department is not complying with the case plan for the child, the court can hold it in contempt. Id. §§ 39.701(8)(c), (g). If the plaintiff claims that he is in an unsafe and inappropriate placement, as we have already noted, the court can order the Department to comply with the case plan by putting him in a safe and appropriate place. Id. §§ 39.601(3)(e); 39.701(8)(c). If the plaintiff claims that he has been in foster care longer than
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reasonably necessary, the court can require the Department to document the steps that it is taking toward permanent placement. Id. § 39.701(f). If the plaintiff has not been placed with his siblings, the court can order them be placed together or it can require visitation between them. See Div. of Family Servs. v. S.R., 328 So.2d 270, 271 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976).
The availability of these forms of relief and the existence of the state courts’ protective order and contempt powers mean that the plaintiffs have not carried their burden of establishing that the ongoing state court proceedings do not provide an adequate opportunity to raise and vindicate each plaintiff child’s individual claims.12 Therefore, the third and final *1282 Middlesex factor is satisfied. The district court did not abuse its discretion in abstaining under the Younger doctrine.
V. CONCLUSION

Insofar as it relates to Larissa C. and Leanne G., the district court’s judgment is VACATED and the case is REMANDED with instructions to dismiss that part of the amended complaint as moot. Insofar as it relates to Tanya M. and Elaine R., the district court’s judgment is VACATED and the case is REMANDED with instructions to dismiss that part of the amended complaint for lack of standing. The district court’s judgment is also VACATED as to those portions of the complaint for which the each of the seven remaining plaintiffs do not have standing, as discussed in Part II, and the case is REMANDED with instructions to dismiss those portions of the amended complaint for lack of standing. In all other respects, the district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.
All Citations
329 F.3d 1255

Footnotes

*

Honorable William B. Hand, United States District Judge for the Southern District of Alabama, sitting by designation.

1

The plaintiffs who filed the amended complaint are: Bonnie L., Reggie B., Rebecca B., Laurie S., Lillie S., Leslie F., Sandra M.,

Tanya M., Candice D., Jay D., Matthew I., Hugh S., Leanne G., Tammy G., Elaine R., Paul B., Rachel C., Cathy W., Larissa C.,

John J., Melinda, and Karina.

2

The class description was later modified to exclude children who were plaintiffs in a separate class action involving only children

in foster care in Broward County.

3

Because of that settlement, none of the plaintiffs filed an amendment to the complaint repleading those claims, even though the

district court’s dismissal of them had been without prejudice.

4

They are: Reggie B., Rebecca B., Laurie S., Lillie S., Tanya M., Leanne G., Tammy G., Elaine R., Rachel C., Larissa C., and John

J.

5

Although the disparate impact portion of the black children’s Title VI claims in Count VI was also dismissed with prejudice, the

plaintiffs do not contest that ruling.

6

In addition to injury in fact, plaintiffs must also allege that their injuries are “fairly traceable to the challenged action of the

defendant, and not the result of the independent action of some third party not before the court,” and that it is likely the injury will

be redressed if the court rules in their favor. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 167, 117 S.Ct. 1154, 1163, 137 L.Ed.2d 281 (1997).

These aspects of standing are not disputed in this case. According to the amended complaint, the defendants’ failures caused the

plaintiffs’ injuries and their continued failures are likely to cause further injuries. The plaintiffs do allege that their injuries are

related to the challenged conduct of the defendants. Therefore, the alleged injuries suffered by the plaintiffs are fairly traceable to

the conduct of the defendants. In addition, the plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment and prospective injunctive relief that will

prevent the defendants from violating their constitutional and federal statutory rights. The relief the plaintiffs seek would clearly

remedy their claimed injuries.

7

The district court did not decide this question, instead dismissing the plaintiffs’ Adoption Act claims as barred by the Eleventh

Amendment under Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 116 S.Ct. 1114, 134 L.Ed.2d 252 (1996). In view of our

conclusion that the Adoption Act claims are due to be dismissed on other grounds, we need not address the Eleventh Amendment

issue. McClendon v. Ga. Dep’t of Cmty. Health, 261 F.3d 1252, 1258–59 (11th Cir.2002).

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8

Part B creates a joint federal-state program that provides federal funds for child welfare services. In order to be eligible for these

funds, 42 U.S.C. § 622(b)(10)(B)(ii) requires that each state have a plan for child welfare services that “provide[s] assurances that

the State—is operating, to the satisfaction of the Secretary—a case review system (as defined in section 675(5) of this title) for

each child receiving foster care under the supervision of the State.” Another provision, 42 U.S.C. § 626(b)(3), requires that, in

order for states to receive funds for projects for the development of alternate care arrangement for infants who do not need to be in

hospital settings, the state develop “a case review system of the type described in § 675(5) of this title” for each infant.

The plaintiffs have not sued under either 42 U.S.C. § 622(b)(10)(B)(ii) or § 626(b)(3), which are in Part B, and instead have

repeatedly said that their claims arise under Part E. Section 671(a)(16) is the only section in Part E that refers to a “case review

system.” So, we have confined our consideration to it. However, other courts have found that § 622(b)(10)(B)(ii), at least, does

not confer an enforceable right. See Charlie H. v. Whitman, 83 F.Supp.2d 476, 485–89 (D.N.J.2000) (§ 622(b)(10)(B)(ii) is not

so unambiguous as to confer a right enforceable under § 1983); Eric L. v. Bird, 848 F.Supp. 303, 312 (D.N.H.1994) (plaintiffs

have no enforceable right to compel state’s implementation of programs under predecessor to § 622(b)(10)(B)(ii)).

9

The genealogy of the Luckey case is: Luckey v. Harris, 860 F.2d 1012 (11th Cir.1988) (“Luckey I ”); Luckey v. Harris, 896 F.2d

479 (11th Cir.1989) (“Luckey II ”); Harris v. Luckey, 918 F.2d 888 (11th Cir.1990) (“Luckey III ”); Luckey v. Miller, 929 F.2d 618

(11th Cir.1991) (“Luckey IV ”); and Luckey v. Miller, 976 F.2d 673 (11th Cir.1992) (“Luckey V ”).

10 Some of the provisions that the Tenth Circuit cited as “[p]articularly problematic” under Younger included provisions governing assessment and treatment planning conferences for children entering the Department of Human Services’ custody and periodic review of the Department’s plans for those children. Joseph A., 275 F.3d at 1267–68.

11 The plaintiffs argue that the requested relief would not interfere because it is directed solely at the Department of Children and Families and not the state courts. We previously rejected essentially that same argument in Luckey V, and we reject it again here. In that case, the plaintiffs sued the Governor of Georgia and all state court judges who presided over prosecutions of indigent defendants. 976 F.2d 673, 678. The plaintiffs contended that the relief they requested against the Governor of Georgia would not interfere with state court proceedings because the onus to comply would be on the state executive and not the judiciary. Id. We observed that “a case cannot be decided in a vacuum, and the potential enforcement difficulties of any order reforming such an integral aspect of a state criminal justice process as the indigent defense system would be significant.” Id. at 679. This case raises the same concerns that Luckey V did, and the federal court relief the plaintiffs seek would interfere with the ongoing state dependency hearings, even if it were directed against the Department and state officers, instead of state courts and judges.

12 In LaShawn A. ex rel. Moore v. Kelly, 990 F.2d 1319, 1323–24 (D.C.Cir.1993), the Court held that the District of Columbia’s juvenile review proceedings did not provide the plaintiffs an adequate opportunity to raise their constitutional challenges. The plaintiffs in that case brought a class action on behalf of children who were in foster care under the supervision of the District of Columbia Department of Human Services, alleging widespread federal constitutional and statutory violations. The D.C. Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision that Younger abstention was not warranted after noting that the family court had “explicitly rejected the use of review hearings to adjudge claims requesting broad-based injunctive relief based on federal law” in In re Brim, No. 489–80 (D.C.Super.Ct. July 20, 1984). In the Brim case the family court had denied a motion by two children for injunctive relief against the Department for its alleged mishandling of Social Security disability payments it had collected on the children’s behalf and noted that the appropriate forum for such issues is federal court. LaShawn A., 990 F.2d at 1323. The D.C. Circuit therefore rejected Younger abstention because “there was no pending judicial proceeding in the District of Columbia which could have served as an adequate forum for the class of children in this case to present its multifaceted request for broad-based injunctive relief based on the Constitution and on federal and local statutory law.” Id. In contrast to the D.C. Circuit, however, in this circuit’s Younger decisions, we have not determined whether the broad relief the plaintiffs would prefer is available but instead whether the forum itself is adequate for addressing the claims and providing a sufficient remedy to the individual plaintiffs. In the Luckey case, the plaintiffs sought broad-based injunctive relief to reform Georgia’s indigent defense system. Luckey V, 976 F.2d at 676. Although we did not expressly address the third Middlesex factor in our opinion in that case, we did affirm the district court’s decision to abstain under Younger. Id. at 679. The decision turned on the fact that the Luckey plaintiffs could have brought their challenges in their individual criminal trials, even though it is obvious that the broad-sweeping remedy they sought was unavailable there. “Equity need not intervene immediately in plaintiffs’ state trials. Plaintiffs have an adequate remedy at law for any ineffective assistance of counsel they may actually receive. Most important, they can present objections to sixth amendment violations at their state trials and in their state appeals.” Luckey v. Harris, 896 F.2d 479, 482 (11th Cir.1989) (“Luckey II ”) (Edmondson, J., dissenting).

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31 Foster Children v. Bush, 329 F.3d 1255 (2003) 17


[CONTENT] June 13, 2000 | thirty-one | the Florida Department of Children and Families | the U.S. District Court | the Southern District | Florida ||| Children's Rights and by private counsel ||| DCAF | DCAF ||| 42 | 1983 |||  ||| August 30, 2000 | Periodic Screening | Title VI | the Civil Rights Act ||| September 11, 2000 ||| October 27, 2000 ||| Magistrate | Robert L. Dube ||| April 20, 2001 | Magistrate | Dube ||| Magistrate | EPSDT | Magistrate ||| Bonnie L. ||| Bush | 2001 | 1840843 | S.D. Fla. Apr. | 20, 2001 ||| May 10, 2001 | Magistrate | Dube ||| Magistrate ||| Magistrate | Broward/District | DCAF | July 24, 1995 ||| Bonnie L. ||| Bush | 2001 | WL 1400051 | S.D. Fla. | May 10, 2001 |||  ||| March 23, 2001 | Leslie F. ||| Leslie F. | eighteen ||| April 30, 2001 | the Court (District | Federico A. Moreno ||| Court | Leslie F. lacked ||| the United States Court of Appeals | the Eleventh Circuit | District Court ||| Moreno | 45 days | the Eleventh Circuit ||| Bonnie L. ||| Bush | 2001 | 1840845 | S.D. Fla. June | 8, 2001 |||  ||| two | the Eleventh Circuit ||| October 15, 2001 ||| the Eleventh Amendment | Court | Younger | Harris ||| Report and Recommendation | Court ||| December 4, 2001 | the District Court | Moreno ||| Court | the Eleventh Amendment | Seminole Tribe | Florida | 517 | U.S. | 1996 | Alexander v. Sandoval | 532 | U.S. | 275 | 2001 | Harris | James | 127 | 993 | 11th Cir. | 1997 | Sandoval | Harris ||| Court | Younger | First | Fourteenth Amendments ||| Court | Court | Federal Rule of Civil | 8 ||| Court | second ||| Bonnie L. ||| Bush | 180 ||| 2d 1321 | S.D. Fla. 2001 ||| the Eleventh Circuit ||| February 14, 2002 | the United States Court of Appeals | the Eleventh Circuit ||| EPSDT ||| the District Court's | December 4 | the Eleventh Circuit ||| May 8, 2003 | the United States Court of Appeals | the Eleventh Circuit | the District Court's ||| The Eleventh Circuit | Carnes | 1 | 2 | 3 | Younger ||| The Eleventh Circuit |||  ||| 31 | Foster Children | Bush | 329 | 1255 | 2003 ||| 540 | U.S. | 984 [SUMMARY] On June 13, 2000, thirty-one minor children in the legal custody of the Florida Department of Children and Families ("DCAF") filed this putative class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The named plaintiffs were represented by the advocacy organization Children's Rights and by private counsel. Plaintiffs sought certification of a class of all children who are or will be in the legal custody of DCAF as an alleged or adjudicated dependent child; plaintiffs also sought certification of a subclass of all children who are black or perceived by DCAF as black. They asserted claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that systemic deficiencies in the operation of DCAF subjected children in the state's care to harm or an unreasonable risk of harm.

The alleged problems included: overuse of shelters; failing to comply with permanency plans; keeping siblings apart; overcrowding of residential facilities; overworking of caseworkers; denying children safe and permanent homes; overmedicating children; using non-least restrictive placements; failure to provide for foster children's education; operating a foster care system for "financial benefit"; and discriminating on the basis of race and ethnicity, particularly against black children.

On August 30, 2000, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, adding new claims, including challenges brought under the Adoption and Safe Families Act; Early Periodic Screening, Diagnostic and Treatment; and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act.

On September 11, 2000, plaintiffs moved to certify the class. On October 27, 2000, defendants moved to dismiss the amended complaint for failure to state a cause of action. Both motions were referred to Magistrate Judge Robert L. Dube.

On April 20, 2001, Magistrate Judge Dube issued a Report and Recommendation largely denying the defendants' motion to dismiss. The Magistrate denied defendants' motion with respect to all counts, except for the EPSDT claims, for which the Magistrate dismissed certain of the named plaintiffs. Bonnie L. ex rel. Hadsock v. Bush, No. 00-2116-CIV-Moreno Dube, 2001 WL 1840843 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 20, 2001). Defendants subsequently filed objections to the R&R.

On May 10, 2001, Magistrate Judge Dube issued a Report and Recommendation largely granting plaintiffs' motion for class certification. The Magistrate certified plaintiffs' proposed class and subclass, but excluded certain groups because they had been members of prior classes. Specifically, the Magistrate excluded the following from the class and subclass: (a) children who reside in Broward/District 10; (b) children who were in the custody of DCAF prior to July 24, 1995, but only for claims which arose prior to that date; and (c) any claims for the failure to provide mental health and/or developmental services. Bonnie L. ex rel. Hadsock v. Bush, No. 00-2116-CIV, 2001 WL 1400051 (S.D. Fla. May 10, 2001). Defendants filed objections to this R&R.

In the meantime, on March 23, 2001, plaintiff Leslie F. moved for a preliminary injunction, seeking to enjoin defendants from terminating her foster care services. Leslie F. had turned eighteen but was still enrolled in high school.  On April 30, 2001, the Court (District Judge Federico A. Moreno) denied the requested preliminary injunction. The Court held that, inter alia, Leslie F. lacked standing because she had not yet had her benefits terminated (and thus had not suffered an injury in fact), and that her claims were not yet ripe. Plaintiff appealed this decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, while also seeking a temporary injunction from the District Court pending appeal. The Court (Judge Moreno) again denied plaintiff's request, noting that defendants had agreed to continue to provide services for 45 days or until the Eleventh Circuit ruled. Bonnie L. ex rel. Hadsock v. Bush, No. 00-2116-CIV-MORENO, 2001 WL 1840845 (S.D. Fla. June 8, 2001). Plaintiff subsequently appealed this ruling as well. The two appeals were consolidated by the Eleventh Circuit.

On October 15, 2001, the defendants filed a supplemental motion to dismiss. The defendants argued that the action was barred by the Eleventh Amendment, and that the Court must abstain under the Younger v. Harris doctrine. At this time, the defendants' objections to the Magistrate's Report and Recommendation denying defendants' motion to dismiss was still under consideration by the Court.

On December 4, 2001, the District Court (Judge Moreno) granted defendants' motion to dismiss. The Court held that plaintiffs' claims under the ASFA were barred by the Eleventh Amendment and the doctrine of Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996), and that certain of plaintiffs' Title VI claims were barred by Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001) and Harris v. James, 127 F.3d 993 (11th Cir. 1997) (holding that, by reading Sandoval in pari materia with Harris, the disparate impact regulations do not contain a substantive private right under disparate impact regulations). The Court also abstained under Younger from considering plaintiffs' substantive and procedural due process claims, as well as plaintiffs' claims under the First, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments for plaintiffs not in extended foster care. And while the Court did not dismiss all claims with respect to those plaintiffs, the Court dismissed the complaint without prejudice due to plaintiffs' failure to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8. The Court also set a deadline within which plaintiffs could file a second amended complaint. Bonnie L. ex rel. Hadsock v. Bush, 180 F. Supp. 2d 1321 (S.D. Fla. 2001). Plaintiffs appealed this decision to the Eleventh Circuit.

On February 14, 2002, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit dismissed plaintiffs' appeal regarding the preliminary injunction because the parties had reached a partial settlement agreement. Per the terms of the settlement agreement, certain of the named plaintiffs released defendants from all claims, while others released defendants only from their EPSDT and Title VI claims. Those plaintiffs continued to press their constitutional and ASFA claims by appealing the District Court's December 4 dismissal to the Eleventh Circuit.

On May 8, 2003, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part the District Court's order granting defendants' motion to dismiss. The Eleventh Circuit (Judge Carnes) held that (1) certain named plaintiffs' claims had become moot; (2) the district court properly dismissed plaintiffs' statutory claims, as those statutes do not give rise to enforceable rights; and (3) the district court did not abuse its discretion in abstaining under Younger. The Eleventh Circuit only vacated the district court's opinion and remanded with instructions regarding certain named plaintiffs, whose claims were moot or who lacked standing. Thus, this appeal affirmed the district court in all substantive respects and ended the case. 31 Foster Children v. Bush, 329 F.3d 1255 (11th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 984. 