Case: 1:15-cv-11632 Document #: 133 Filed: 03/30/19 Page 1 of 10 PageID #:948

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

Keith Rogers, James Hill, and Wanda Hollins,
Plaintiffs,
-vs-
Sheriff of Cook County and Cook County, Illinois
Defendants

) ) ) ) ) (Judge Chang) ) ) 15-cv-11632 ) ) ) )

SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT

Plaintiff, by counsel, alleges as follows

1. This is a civil action arising under Section 202 of the Americans

with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12132, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation

Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a), and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The jurisdiction of this Court

is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 12133, 29 U.S.C. § 794a(a)(2), 28 U.S.C.

§ 1343.

PARTIES
2. Plaintiffs Keith Rogers, James Hill, and Wanda Hollins are

residents of the Northern District of Illinois. At all times relevant, each

plaintiff was participating in a program that included “opioid agonist

therapy,” also known as “medication-assisted treatment,” that involved

treatment with methadone or buprenorphine.

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3. Each plaintiff is a “qualified individual with a disability” under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1213134 either because the plaintiff has a current or past history of an opioid use disorder that substantially limits a major life activity, or because the plaintiff is regarded as having a disabling impairment because of participation in an “opioid agonist therapy” program.
4. Defendant Thomas Dart is the Sheriff of Cook County. Plaintiff sues Dart in his official capacity.
5. At all times relevant, the Sheriff has received federal funds for use at the Jail.
6. Defendant Cook County is responsible, in collaboration with defendant Sheriff, for providing medical services to detainees at the Cook County Jail.
7. At all times relevant, Cook County has received federal funds for use at the Jail.
8. Defendant Cook County is also joined in this action pursuant to Carver v. Sheriff of LaSalle County, 324 F. 3d 947 (7th Cir. 2003).
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FORCED TAPERING OF DETAINEES RECEIVING “OPIOID AGONIST THERAPY”
9. As explained below with greater specificity, plaintiffs bring this action individually and for a proposed class to challenge the refusal of defendants to permit detainees at the Jail to continue participation in “opioid agonist therapy.”
10. “Opioid agonist therapy” is a safe and widely accepted strategy for treating opioid use disorders. Individuals who participate in “opioid agonist therapy” receive FDA-approved medication, often in combination with behavioral health and other social services, to treat opioid dependence. There is broad agreement in the medical and scientific communities that “opioid agonist therapy” successfully reduces illegal opioid use and enables participants to lead more productive, and healthier lives.
11. Despite the broad support for “opioid agonist therapy” among medical and substance use experts, individuals participating in “opioid agonist therapy” are often subjected to public stigma. This stigma arises, in part, from common misunderstandings about “opioid agonist therapy”. For instance, it is sometimes believed that taking methadone or buprenorphine (or buprenorphine combination products, like Suboxone) simply “replaces one addiction with another.” In fact, when methadone and buprenorphine are used as prescribed, they do not produce a “high,” and instead block the
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euphoric effects of illegal opiates. Another frequent misperception is that individuals should use “opioid agonist therapy” only as a tool to transition from opioid dependence to opioid abstinence. This misperception is contrary the evidence showing that “opioid agonist therapy” is the most effective treatment for opioid addiction.
12. At all times relevant, defendants have relied on these common misunderstandings in applying a “tapering policy” for detainees who enter the Jail while participating in “opioid agonist therapy.” Defendants’ tapering policy requires the Jail to reduce the dosage of “opioid agonist therapy” for each non-pregnant detainee who enters the Jail. Tapering means that the Jail will reduce the amount of medication provided for a detainee’s “opioid agonist therapy” each day until the dosage is zero.
13. Defendants’ tapering policy causes gratuitous physical pain and psychological discomfort and leaves the detainee less likely to restart treatment after leaving custody.
14. Defendants have sought to justify their tapering policy on the assertion that the mission of Cermak Health Services does not include “opioid agonist therapy.” This assertion is not based on any data but is an irrational belief.
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15. Contrary to defendants’ irrational belief, the standard of care is that detainees who enter a jail while enrolled in “opioid agonist therapy” and who will be confined for relatively short periods of incarceration should be continued on that treatment to facilitate reentry and return to treatment in the community.
16. About 35% of the arrestees who enter the Jail while enrolled in “opioid agonist therapy” will leave the Jail in 21 days or less. Defendants do no have a reasonable basis to prevent this group of detainees from continuing “opioid agonist therapy.”
APPLICATION OF THE CHALLENGED POLICY TO THE NAMED PLAINTIFFS
17. Plaintiff Rogers was arrested on January 19, 2014 and entered the Cook County Jail on January 20, 2014. He was released February 16, 2014.
18. While being processed into the Jail, plaintiff Rogers informed intake personnel that he enrolled in an “opioid agonist therapy” program in which he received daily treatment of methadone, buprenorphine, or naltrexone.
19. Jail personnel did not provide plaintiff Rogers with opioid agonist therapy until January 26, 2014.
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20. Plaintiff Rogers underwent extremely painful withdrawal until he began to receive his prescribed methadone; thereafter, Rogers experienced gratuitous pain because of the tapering policy described above.
21. Plaintiff Hill entered the Cook County Jail on December 23, 2013. He was released on December 31, 2013.
22. While being processed into the Jail, plaintiff Hill informed intake personnel that he was enrolled in an “opioid agonist therapy” program in which he received daily treatment of methadone, buprenorphine, or naltrexone.
23. Jail personnel did not provide plaintiff Hill with opioid agonist therapy until December 25, 2013.
24. Plaintiff Hill underwent extremely painful withdrawal until he began to receive his prescribed methadone; thereafter, Hill experienced gratuitous pain because of the tapering policy described above.
25. Plaintiff Hollins entered the Cook County Jail on September 12, 2013. She was released on October 5, 2013.
26. While being processed into the Jail, plaintiff Hollins informed intake personnel that she was enrolled in an “opioid agonist therapy” program in which she received daily treatment of methadone, buprenorphine, or naltrexone.
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27. Jail personnel did not provide plaintiff Hollins with opioid agonist therapy until September 20, 2013.
28. Plaintiff Hollins underwent extremely painful withdrawal until she began to receive his prescribed methadone; thereafter, Hollins experienced gratuitous pain because of the tapering policy described above.
INDIVIDUAL CLAIMS OF DELAY IN CONTINUING OPIOID AGONIST THERAPY
29. At all times relevant, there was a widespread practice or custom at the Jail of inordinate delay in continuing opioid agonist therapy to detainees. This claim is at issue for a class in Parish v. Sheriff, N.D.Ill., No. 07-cv-4369. Each plaintiff opts out of the Parish class by prosecuting this action.
30. Methadone has a “half-life” of about one day. This means that a person regularly taking methadone will begin withdrawal symptoms after one day without the drug; three days without methadone will be an extremely painful period of “cold turkey” withdrawal.
31. Defendants have known since the decisions of the Seventh Circuit in Foelker v. Outagamie County, 394 F.3d 510 (7th Cir. 2005) and Davis v. Carter, 452 F.3d 686 (7th Cir. 2006) that a widespread practice or custom of inordinate delay in continuing opioid agonist therapy to detainees at the Jail causes gratuitous pain and is unconstitutional
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32. Data provided in this case shows that 94 of 185 incoming detainees waited more than two day before continuing opioid agonist therapy.
33. At all times relevant, defendants have turned a blind eye to the injuries caused by their widespread practice or custom of inordinate delay in continuing opioid agonist therapy to detainees at the Jail.
34. Each named plaintiff suffered severe and gratuitous pain as a result of defendants’ widespread practice of delay in continuing opioid against therapy.
35. The application of defendants’ widespread practice of delay in continuing opioid agonist therapy violates the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act, and the United State Constitution.
CLASS CLAIM OF UNREASONABLE TAPERING POLICY
36. Defendants apply their tapering policy, discussed above, to all non-pregnant detainees who enter the Jail while participating in opioid agonist therapy.
37. Each plaintiff experienced painful withdrawal symptom, including anxiety, chills, muscle pain (myalgia) and weakness, tremor, lethargy and drowsiness, restlessness and irritability, nausea and vomiting and diarrhea.
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38. These symptoms are shared by numerous other detainees who entered the Jail while participating in opioid agonist therapy and who are subjected to defendants’ tapering policy.
39. Defendants have known at all times relevant that their tapering policy causes gratuitous harm and interferes with safe and effective treatment.
40. The data available to plaintiffs show that 197 persons participated in opioid agonist therapy at the Jail in the 103-day period between September 20, 2013 and January 1, 2014. At least 144 of these 197 persons were released from the Jail and returned home during the tapering period.
41. The application of defendants’ tapering policy violates the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act, and the United State Constitution.
42. Plaintiffs seek to prosecute this case for the following class: All persons who entered the Cook County Jail on and after December 23, 2013 who were lawfully taking an opioid antagonist, as defined in 42 C.F.R. 8.12(h)(2), who were not then on parole or held on a warrant from another jurisdiction, and who were not pregnant.
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43. Plaintiffs will show in a separate motion for class certification that the proposed class meets each of the requirements of Rule 23(a) and that class certification is appropriate under Rule 23(b)(3).
44. Plaintiffs hereby demands trial by jury. Wherefore plaintiffs requests the Court order that the case may proceed as a class action and that the Court award appropriate compensatory damages against defendants.
/s/ Kenneth N. Flaxman Kenneth N. Flaxman ARDC No. 830399 Joel A. Flaxman 200 S Michigan Ave, Ste 201 Chicago, IL 60604 (312) 427-3200 attorneys for plaintiff
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 </s> Case: 1:15-cv-11632 Document #: 74 Filed: 11/21/16 Page 1 of 33 PageID #:710

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

Keith Rogers, Plaintiff,
-vsSheriff of Cook County and Cook County, Illinois,
Defendants

) ) ) ) (Judge Chang) ) ) 15-cv-11632 ) ) ) )

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO CERTIFY CASE AS A CLASS ACTION
Pursuant to Rule 23(c), plaintiff, by counsel, moves the Court to

order that this case may proceed as a class action for:

All persons who entered the Cook County Jail on and after December 23, 2013 who were lawfully taking an opioid antagonist, as defined in 42 C.F.R. 8.12(h)(2), who were not then on parole or held on a warrant from another jurisdiction, and who were not pregnant.
I. Facts
Plaintiff Keith Rogers has taken methadone for several years to

manage severe chronic pain. Plaintiff entered the Cook County Jail on

January 20, 2014 on a motor vehicle offense; plaintiff pleaded guilty on

January 24, 2014 in exchange for a sentence that resulted in release on

February 16, 2014. The Jail did not provide plaintiff with methadone until

January 26, 2014, and then followed its methadone tapering policy to

Case: 1:15-cv-11632 Document #: 74 Filed: 11/21/16 Page 2 of 33 PageID #:711
reduce (or “taper”) his dosage by 7 mg per day.1 Thus, plaintiff received his regular dosage of 200 mg on January 26, 193 mg on January 27, 186 mg on January 28, and so on. Plaintiff’s dosage had been reduced to 53 mg when he left the Jail on February 16, 2014.
Tapering methadone results in painful withdrawal symptoms, including “anxiety, chills, muscle pain (myalgia) and weakness, tremor, lethargy and drowsiness, restlessness and irritability, nausea and vomiting and diarrhoea.” Amato, Davoli, Minozzi, Ferroni, Ali, and Ferri, Methadone at Tapered Doses for the Management of Opioid Withdrawal, COCHRANE DATABASE OF SYSTEMATIC REVIEWS, Issue 2, Art No. CD003409 at 2 (2013). Plaintiff suffered many of these symptoms until he resumed his regular methadone dosage when he left the Jail when the withdrawal symptoms began to gradually subside.
Plaintiff raises two claims in this lawsuit. The first is about the delay in receiving methadone. This claim is at issue for a class in Parish v.
1 The Jail’s Opioid Treatment Program, Policy #G-01.1, requires tapering for all non-pregnant detainees. Plaintiff attaches Policy #G-01.1 as Exhibit 1. The policy requires “a linear taper to zero, with daily doses decreasing at an integer rate proportional to initial dose, starting at the verified prior dosage and decreasing not more than 7 mg each day.” (Exhibit 1 at 4.)
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Sheriff, N.D.Ill., No. 07-cv-4369.2 The second claim focuses on the tapering policy, which is not part of Parish. See id., ECF No. 315 at 6, n.2.
The overwhelming majority of persons subjected to the tapering policy are, like plaintiff, released from custody before completing the regimen. This is not surprising because research sponsored by the Sheriff in 2011 showed that half of all detainees are at the Jail for 12 or fewer days. Cook County Sheriff’s Reentry Council Research Bulletin, March 2011 at 4, attached as Exhibit 2. Even if completed, tapering leaves those released from the jail at risk of relapse “because of the physical and emotional stress of attempting to discontinue medication.” Center for Substance Abuse Treatment, Medication-Assisted Treatment for Opioid Addiction in Opioid Treatment Programs 117 (2005).
Plaintiff contends that, by continuing the forced tapering policy, defendants are knowingly disregarding a substantial risk of harm to the victims of the policy. This deliberate indifference violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 836-38 (1994); see Rice ex rel. Rice v. Corr. Med. Servs., 675 F.3d 650, 664 (7th Cir. 2012) (noting that “the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment's due process
2 Plaintiff has effectively opted out of Parish by filing this case.
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clause are at least as broad as those that the Eighth Amendment affords to convicted prisoners”).
Plaintiff shows below that this case satisfies the requirements of Rules 23(a) and 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and should be allowed to proceed as a class action for:
All persons who entered the Cook County Jail on and after December 23, 2013 who were lawfully taking an opioid antagonist, as defined in 42 C.F.R. 8.12(h)(2), who were not then on parole or held on a warrant from another jurisdiction, and who were not pregnant.
II. Plaintiff’s “Right to Have a Class Certified”
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits a litigant to “bring his [or her] claim as a class if he [or she] wishes.” Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 400 (2010). Upon showing that the case satisfies the requirements of Rule 23, “the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure give the proposed class representative the right to have a class certified.” United States Parole Commission v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 403 (1980).
In Shady Grove, the Supreme Court rejected a textual argument for treating the decision to certify a class as within the district court’s discretion. Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 399-400. The Court noted that Rule 23(b) starts with the instruction that “[a] class action may be maintained” if Rule 23(a) is satisfied. Id. But the Court rejected the contention that this
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language makes class certification a discretionary decision of the district court. Instead, the Court made plain that the permissive may refers to the plaintiff, rather than to the district court: “The discretion suggested by Rule 23’s ‘may’ is discretion residing in the plaintiff.” Id.
Plaintiff has exercised his discretion to request that the case proceed as a class action. Plaintiff shows below that this case satisfies each requirement of Rule 23(a) as well as Rule 23(b)(3) and should therefore proceed as a class action.
III. Rule 23(a)
A. Ascertainability Rule 23, as applied by the Seventh Circuit, requires “that a class must be defined clearly and that membership be defined by objective criteria rather than by, for example, a class member’s state of mind.” Mullins v. Direct Digital, LLC, 795 F.3d 654, 657 (7th Cir. 2015). Each member of the proposed class is readily ascertainable from records maintained by the defendants. Defendants, as required by 42 CFR 8.12(g), maintain careful records about the persons who receive methadone at the Jail. This information is easily produced by defendants, as appears in a report known as a “Dosing History” produced by defendants in this case. Plaintiff attaches a redacted
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page from the “Dosing History” as Exhibit 3. The proposed class is therefore ascertainable.
IV. Numerosity
Rule 23(a)(1) requires that the proposed class must be “so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable.” The named plaintiffs are not required “to specify the exact number of persons in the class,” Marcial v. Coronet Ins. Co., 880 F.2d 954, 957 (7th Cir. 1989), but must provide “a reasonable estimate” of the size of the proposed class. Ibe v. Jones, 836 F.3d 516, 528 (5th Cir. 2016). As explained below, plaintiff estimates the size of the class to be more than 1,000 persons.
Defendants have produced the “Dosing History” for the 197 persons who received methadone at the Jail in the 103-day period between September 20, 2013 and January 1, 2014. Defendants have also produced a spreadsheet containing information for 184 of those 197 persons.3 Of the 197 persons, 38 are identified in the spreadsheet as having been “Shipped Ill. Dept. Corrections.”4 The defendants’ data identifies another 14 persons as having left the jail for “Deliver to Appropriate Authority,” which, for
3 Plaintiff’s request for information on the missing 13 detainees is the subject of a pending motion to compel. ECF No. 64. 4 The 38 persons who left the Jail for the IDOC had been at the Jail between 2 and 32 days. Plaintiff adopts a worst-case scenario in assuming that these short stays at the Jail mean that each person was on parole.
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estimating class size, plaintiff assumes means that the detainee was the subject of a warrant from another jurisdiction. Excluding these 53 from the 197 persons who received methadone leaves 144 persons in the class for the 103-day period, or about 510 people per year.5
Plaintiff’s “reasonable estimate” of the class size exceeds the showing the Court of Appeals approved in Arreola v. Godinez, 546 F.3d 788 (7th Cir. 1988). There, the named plaintiff identified 14 potential class members and presented evidence suggesting that the class would “exceed 350 class members.” Id. at 798. The Seventh Circuit held that the plaintiff’s evidence “established numerosity, or at a minimum that he has shown enough to warrant further discovery on the issue.” Id.
The proposed class in this case meets the numerosity requirement of Rule 23(a)(1) because at more than 1,000 people, it is “reasonable to believe it large enough to make joinder impracticable and thus justify a class action suit.” Arnold Chapman & Paldo Sign & Display Co. v. Wagener Equities Inc., 747 F.3d 489, 492 (7th Cir. 2014).
5 Even assuming that there are no class members among the 13 detainees for whom defendants have refused to produce data, the total would be 131 persons over 103 days, or about 464 people per year.
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B. Commonality To satisfy the commonality requirement of Rule 23(a)(2), the “prospective class must articulate at least one common question that will actually advance all of the class members’ claims.” Phillips v. Sheriff of Cook Cty., 828 F.3d 541, 550 (7th Cir. 2016). As the Court stated in WalMart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011), “the key to commonality is whether a classwide proceeding can ‘generate common answers apt to drive the resolution of the litigation.’” Id. at 350. The common question in this case is the constitutionality of defendants’ tapering policy, as applied to those who are not on parole or held on a warrant from another jurisdiction, and who were not pregnant. There is no factual variation in this claim, Arreola v. Godinez, 546 F.3d 788, 798 (7th Cir. 2008), and resolution of this common question “will actually advance all of the class members’ claims.” Phillips, supra. Put differently, the commonality requirement is met in this case because proceeding as a class will generate “common answers apt to drive the resolution of the litigation.” Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350 (2011) (emphasis in original and internal quotation omitted). As in Suchanek v. Sturm Foods, Inc., 764 F.3d 750 (7th Cir. 2014), “the plaintiffs’ claims and those of the class they would like to represent all derive from a single course of conduct” by defendant, in this case, defendant’s tapering
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policy. Id. at 756. That is, plaintiff challenges “conduct common to members of the class.” Id. (emphasis in original). Because plaintiff is challenging a one-size-fits-all policy, defendants will not be able to rely on any defenses specific to individual class members. This case therefore satisfies the commonality requirement of Rule 23(a)(2).
C. Typicality Typicality in Rule 23(a)(3) “is closely related to the preceding question of commonality.” Rosario v. Livaditis, 963 F.2d 1013, 1018 (7th Cir. 1992). A “plaintiff's claim is typical if it arises from the same event or practice or course of conduct that gives rise to the claims of other class members and his or her claims are based on the same legal theory.” De La Fuente v. Stokeley–Van Camp, Inc., 713 F.2d 225, 232 (7th Cir. 1983). Although “[t]he typicality requirement may be satisfied even if there are factual distinctions between the claims of the named plaintiffs and those of other class members,” the requirement “primarily directs the district court to focus on whether the named representatives' claims have the same essential characteristics as the claims of the class at large.” Id. Plaintiff’s challenge to the tapering policy arises “from the same event or practice or course of conduct that gives rise to the claims of other class members and [his] claims are based on the same legal theory.”
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Oshana v. Coca-Cola Co., 472 F.3d506, 514 (7th Cir. 2006). The case therefore satisfies the typicality requirement of Rule 23(a)(3).
D. Adequacy Plaintiff is represented by competent counsel and he will “fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class,” as required by Rule 23(a)(4). First, defendants do not asserted any unique defense against the named plaintiff. Randall v. Rolls–Royce Corp., 637 F.3d 818, 824 (7th Cir. 2011); Lipton v. Chattem, Inc., 289 F.R.D. 456, 459 (N.D. Ill. 2013). Second, plaintiff is represented by counsel skilled and experienced in these matters. Plaintiffs’ principal attorney (Kenneth N. Flaxman), was admitted to practice in 1972; his work in class action litigation includes United States Parole Commission v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388 (1980) (class action challenging federal parole guidelines); Doe v. Calumet City, 128 F.R.D. 93 (N.D.Ill. 1989) (class action challenging strip search practice of Calumet City police department); Calvin v. Sheriff of Will County, 405 F.Supp.2d 933 (N.D.Ill. 2005) (class action challenging strip search practice at Will
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County Jail).6 Plaintiffs’ principal attorney has also argued more than 150
federal appeals, including five cases in the United States Supreme Court.7
Plaintiffs’ second attorney (Joel A. Flaxman), is also competent to
represent the class; he was admitted to practice in 2007, served three
years in judicial clerkships,8 followed by four years as a trial attorney in
the United States Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, before
entering private practice.9
E. Rule 23(b)(3) This Court recently analyzed the predominance and superiority
requirements of Rule 23(b)(3) in Wright v. Nationstar Mortage LLC, No.
6 With co-counsel, plaintiffs’ principal attorney has litigated (or is litigating) several class actions against the Sheriff of Cook County, including Jackson v. Sheriff of Cook County, 2006 WL 3718041(06-CV-493, N.D.Ill., Dec. 14, 2006); Parish v. Sheriff of Cook Cty., No. 07 4369, 2008 WL 4812875 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 24, 2008); Phipps v. Sheriff of Cook County, 249 F.R.D. 298 (N.D.Ill. 2008); Lacy v. Dart, No. 14 C 6259, 2015 WL 1995576 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 30, 2015); and Bell v. Dart, No. 14 C 8059, 2016 WL 337144 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 26, 2016). 7 In addition to Geraghty, Flaxman argued Browder v. Director, Department of Corrections, 434 U.S. 257 (1978); Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1 (1996); Ricci v. Arlington Heights, cert dismissed as improvidently granted, 523 U.S. 613 (1998), and Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384 (2007). 8 Counsel was a staff law clerk for the Seventh Circuit from 2007 to 2009 and then a law clerk for the Honorable Rebecca Pallmeyer from 2009 to 2010. 9 With co-counsel, plaintiffs’ second attorney has served as class counsel in several recent cases, including Bell v. Dart, No. 14 C 8059, 2016 WL 337144 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 26, 2016); Beley v. City of Chicago, No. 12 C 9714, 2015 WL 8153377, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 7, 2015); and Lacy v. Dart, No. 14 C 6259, 2015 WL 1995576 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 30, 2015).
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14 C 10457, 2016 WL 4505169 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 29, 2016). The Court noted that it must “compare the role of common issues of law and fact with the role of individual issues, including whether the Court must examine individual transactions in adjudicating the claim.” Id. at *6. The common issue in this case is the constitutionality of the tapering policy; this policy impacts each member of the class and “can be resolved for all members of a class in a single adjudication.” Messner v. Northshore Univ. HealthSystem, 669 F.3d 802, 811 (7th Cir. 2012) (internal citation omitted). As another judge in this district recently explained, “[w]hen a proposed class challenges a uniform policy, as here, the validity of that policy tends to be the predominant issue in the litigation.” Beley v. City of Chicago, No. 12 C 9714, 2015 WL 8153377, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 7, 2015) (citing Streeter v. Sheriff of Cook County, 256 F.R.D. 609, 614 (N.D. Ill. 2009); Herkert v. MRC Receivables Corp., 254 F.R.D. 344, 352 (N.D. Ill. 2008)).
In addition to satisfying the predominance prong of Rule 23(b)(3), a class action is superior to other methods for adjudicating the claims of the members of the proposed class. As in Starr v. Chicago Cut Steakhouse, LLC, 75 F. Supp. 3d 859 (N.D. Ill. 2014), “the existence of a central common legal and factual issue makes class treatment particularly effective.” Id. at 875.
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V. Conclusion10
For the reasons above stated, the Court should order that this case be maintained as a class action under Rule 23(b)(3) for
All persons who entered the Cook County Jail on and after December 23, 2013 who were lawfully taking an opioid antagonist, as defined in 42 C.F.R. 8.12(h)(2), who were not then on parole or held on a warrant from another jurisdiction, and who were not pregnant.
Respectfully submitted, /s/ Kenneth N. Flaxman
Kenneth N. Flaxman ARDC No. 08830399 Joel A. Flaxman 200 S Michigan Ave, Ste 201 Chicago, IL 60604 (312) 427-3200 Attorneys for Plaintiff
10 Plaintiff’s counsel has not conferred with opposing counsel about whether there is an objection to this motion; defendants’ position on this motion is obvious from their responses to plaintiff’’s pending motions to compel.
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Exhibit 1

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PURPOSE
The purpose of this policy is to provide access to opioid treatment: (1) for detoxification of inmates who were enrolled in an opioid treatment program (OTP) immediately before arrest; and (2) for maintenance of pregnant women who are opioid dependent
AFFECTED AREAS
This policy affects all areas and employees of Cermak Health Services.
POUCY
Cermak Health Services, as an operating unit of the Cook County Health and Hospitals System, will sponsor a certified, accredited, and licensed opioid treatment program (OTP). The purposes of this program are (1) detoxification of newly admitted inmates who were enrolled in an OTP immediately before arrest; and (2) maintenance of pregnant women who are opioid-dependent for the duration of their pregnancies, with detoxification to follow delivery.
Cermak will comply with federal and state laws and regulations in its opioid treatment program, including 42 CFR 8.11-12 and 77 ILAC 2060. The certifying, accrediting, and licensing bodies will be, respectively: the Center for Substance Abuse Treatment (CSAT) of the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA) of the US Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS); the National Commission on Correctional Health Care (NCCHC); and the Division of Alcohol and Substance Abuse (DASA) of the Illinois Department of Human Services (IDHS).
DEFINITIONS (from 42 CFR 8.2)
Certification- the process by which SAMHSA determines that an opioid treatment program is qualified to provide opioid treatment under the federal opioid treatment standards.
Accreditation - the process of review and acceptance by an accreditation body that has been approved by SAMHSA to accredit opioid treatment programs using opioid agonist treatment medications.
Program sponsor- the person named in the application for certification described in Sec. 8.11(b) as responsible for the operation of the opioid treatment program and who assumes responsibility for all its employees, including any practitioners, agents, or other persons providing medical, rehabilitative, or counseling services at the program or any of its medication units. The program sponsor need not be a licensed physician but shall employ a licensed physician for the position of medical director.
Program medical director- a physician, licensed to practice medicine in the jurisdiction in which the opioid treatment program is located, who assumes responsibility for administering all medical services performed by the program, either by performing them directly or by delegating specific responsibility to authorized program physicians and healthcare professionals functioning under the medical director's direct supervision.

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Detoxification -- the dispensing of an opioid agonist treatment medication in decreasing doses to an individual to alleviate adverse physical or psychological effects incident to withdrawal from the sustained use of an opioid drug and as a method of bringing the individual to a drug-free state. Short-term
detoxification treatment means detoxification treatment for a period not in excess of 30 days. [However,
taper from very high initial methadone dosage may exceed this time period.]
Maintenance - the dispensing of an opioid agonist treatment medication at stable dosage levels for a period in excess of 21 days in the treatment of an individual for opioid addiction.
PROCEDURE
A. Program administration
1. Cermak's chief medical officer (CMO) will designate a program medical director for the OTP.
2. The program sponsor will designate a program administrator for the OTP 3. The program administrator will:
a. Ensure compliance with all state and federal regulations (see above); b. Ensure accessible and timely services for all program participants; c. Prepare monthly statistical reports as required by applicable state and federal regulations and
submit to the medical director; d. Convene a multidisciplinary OTP Committee with representatives from the departments of
Medicine, Mental Health, Pharmacy, and Laboratory: e. Facilitate meetings
1. Schedule meetings at least quarterly; ii. Prepare agenda and minutes; f. Maintain archive of statistical reports and meeting minutes. 4. The program medical director will be an authorized methadone prescriber and will: a. Update this policy and any related policies for the program as needed, within the larger framework of the institutional policies of Cermak Health Services; b. Provide clinical oversight; c. Request waivers from CSAT when required for individual patients; e. Lead quality improvement efforts for the program; f. Delegate specific responsibilities to authorized program physicians and/or healthcare professionals functioning under his or her direct supervision, including a designated OTP coordinator. g. Develop a set of protocols for linear taper from a variety of starting doses of up to 120 mg/d, with daily doses decreasing at an integer rate proportional to initial dose, decreasing not more than 7 mg each day over a period of 10 to 21 days. Example: From an initial dose 40 mg. reduce dose by 2 mg every day, reaching zero on Day 21. h. Submit the protocols for approval by the OTP Committee.
B. Initial enrollment At the time of intake to the jail: 1. The intake screener will
a. Ask whether the inmate reports participation in an opioid treatment program and, if so, will provide appropriate forms to complete (see below);
b. Ask whether the inmate regularly uses heroin or opioid medications obtained on the street; c. Refer the patient to an intake clinician if either of the above questions is answered 'yes.'

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2. The inmate, if wishing to continue ongoing opioid treatment while incarcerated, will: a. Fill out the upper portion of Cermak Form 853.14, "Methadone Referral," including his or her name and aliases, other identifying information, and name of previous program and counselor; b. Sign the consent for release of information on the referral form; c. Sign acknowledgment on Cermak Form 863.47, "List of Inmate Rights for the Opioid Treatment Program."
3. The intake clinician will interview and examine the patient. If a diagnosis of opioid dependence or addiction is made (see Appendix), and the patient affirms participation in an opioid treatment program at the time of incarceration, then proceed as follows: a. Enter the diagnosis of opioid dependence or addiction on the problem list in the clinical information system (Gerner) using ICD-9 code 304.x; b. Complete the health assessment form (see Cermak Policy E-04); c. Determine whether the patient is experiencing opioid withdrawal symptoms (see Cermak Policy G-06) and whether the patient is pregnant; d. For pregnant patients: i. If dependent on opioids and not previously enrolled in an OTP, refer to emergency room at John Stroger Hospital (via Cermak ER); ii. If dependent on opioids, previously enrolled in an OTP, and manifesting withdrawal, refer to emergency room at John Stroger Hospital (via Cermak ER); iii If dependent on opioids, previously enrolled in an OTP, and not manifesting withdrawal, proceed as below. e. For all others: prescribe non-opioid medications for relief of withdrawal symptoms, as needed; f. If the patient has been participating in an opioid treatment program and wishes to continue, explain the process for enrollment and send an OTP Folder with the signed paperwork to the emergency room;
4. A designated Cermak staff member will, each morning, pick up any new OTP folders from the emergency room and, for each: a. Call the methadone program named by the inmate; if unable to make contact on a weekend or a holiday, document each attempt and continue calling daily until contact is made; b. Upon contacting the program, ascertain enrollment status; - If enrollment is denied by the program, document accordingly on the Methadone Referral Form and forward the form to the divisional health care team at the dispensary so that the clinician can notify the patient of the rejection. In that case, divisional staff will call the patient to dispensary for evaluation and management of withdrawal. - Or, if enrollment is confirmed, then continue as follows. c. Ask the methadone program to verify the amount and date of the last dose and to send documentation by fax; d, Forward the received fax to the Pharmacy;
5. Pharmacy staff will, upon receiving verification of program participation: a. Enter the approved patient into the Substance Abuse and Methadone Management System (SAMMS), which transmits patient information to the State of Illinois DASA database; b. Complete the lower portion of Cermak Form 853.14, "Methadone Referral;" c. Deliver the OTP Folder to the emergency roorn;

CCSAO Rogers v" Dart 15 C 11632 00201

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d. Contact the Security Office or the Shift Commander of the patient's housing division to arrange escort to the pharmacy; document date, time, phone extension, and name of person contacted on the referral form;
e. Re-contact the shift commander on each shift until the inmate is escorted to the Pharmacy for the first dose, or until the patient is released from custody, whichever comes first; annotate the referral card for each reminder call;
f. Order, by protocol, a urine drug screen on the inmate; g. Verify that the inmate has already consented for treatment (otherwise obtain consent); h. If the patient is pregnant
i. Verify that laboratory testing has confirmed the pregnancy ii. Fax a detoxification exception form to the Illinois State Methadone Authority (312-814-2419). i. Provide a copy of the verification fax, together with a copy of the pre-approved set of protocols for tapering, to the clinician on duty in the emergency room. 6. The clinician on duty in the emergency room will a. Interview and examine the patient and verify the diagnosis of opioid dependence or addiction (see Appendix); b. Complete a "History and Physical" forrn, entering a diagnosis of opioid dependence or addiction; c. In the electronic health record (Cerner): i. Confirm that opioid dependence or addiction has been entered on the problem list (ICD-9
code 304.x); ii. Enter an order to alert CCDOC for participation in the Opioid Treatment Program. d. Initiate Cerrnak Form 847.21, "Substance Abuse Treatment Plan," including an explicit diagnosis of opioid dependence; e. If the patient also is dependent on either alcohol or sedatives, consider maintaining dose until after the period of withdrawal frorn alcohol or sedatives - confer with a physician authorized to prescribe methadone as needed. g. Sign the prescription to start methadone treatment and specify the initial dose; h For pregnant patients, prescribe a constant daily dose at the verified prior dosage; For other patients, prescribe a linear taper to zero, with daily doses decreasing at an integer rate
proportional to initial dose, starting at the verified prior dosage and decreasing not more than 7 mg each day.
- For prior maintenance doses up to 120 mgld, taper over 10 to 21 days, using the preapproved protocol developed by the program medical director.
- For prior maintenance doses above 120 mgld, confer with program medical director and consider a taper longer than 21 days
i. Obtain countersignature from a physician authorized to prescribe methadone; j. For any patient starting with a methadone dose of 100 mg or more:
i. Perform a baseline EKG and check the QT interval before the first dose; ii. If the QT interval is significantly prolonged, hold methadone and confer with program medical
director; k. For any patient starting with a methadone dose of 180 mg or more:
i. Hold methadone and confer with program medical director; ii. Alter conferring, arrange to observe the patient after the first dose in the emergency room,
the infirmary, or intermediate medical housing; I. Send the patient and the OTP folder to the laboratory to obtain a urine sample for drug screening.

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Page 5of8
7. The laboratory will:
a. Perform a urine drug screen and send the report to the OTP program;
b. Send the patient and the OTP folder to the pharmacy for administration of the first dose of methadone.
8. The inmate will: a. Provide a urine sample; b. Sign for the initial dose.
9. The pharmacist will: a. Prepare the initial dose of methadone oral solution, diluted in water or juice; b. Observe the patient swallow the dose; c. Annotate an appointment card for the inmate to bring each day while on the program. d. Notify the Patient Scheduling office to enroll the patient in the OTP Clinic.
10. The Patient Scheduling office will: a. Schedule the initial visit in the OTP Clinic and notify CCDOC of the appointment; b. Enter a health alert, "Opioid Treatment Program," in the information system.
C. Daily dosing. On each successive day until completion of the program: 1. The inmate will present his appointment card to the officer on the living unit. 2. A CCDOC officer will escort the participating inmate from the living unit to the Pharmacy, typically
between 7:00 and 9:00am except for inmates with court dates, who will be brought in the afternoon 3. Pharmacy staff will, if the inmate has not arrived by 6:00 pm, contact the shift commander and
document the date, time, phone extension, and name of the shift commander on the daily methadone worksheet; 4. The inmate will present his appointment card to the pharmacist and sign for the day's dose 5. The pharmacist will:
a. Check whether the inmate is due to complete a random drug screen, once between Day 8 and
Day 14 and then again between Day 15 and Day 21 (and monthly thereafter, for those on longterm or maintenance methadone).; if due, ensure that the urine sample is obtained before the dose is given; b. Prepare the day's dose of methadone oral solution diluted in water or juice; c. If the inmate has been put into segregation, bring the dose to the patient's cell. d. Observe the patient swallow the dose; e. Annotate the appointment card.
D. Clinical follow-up 1. Tile OTP coordinator will schedule each patient for at least one appointment with a program clinician
during opioid taper and another upon completion of the taper. 2. A program clinician will, at the OTP clinic visit:
a. Confirm in the electronic health record (Cerner) that opioid dependence has been entered on the problem list (ICD-9 code 304.x);
b. Obtain additional details of history and check physical examination or lab results as indicated; c. Assess for symptoms and signs of active opioid withdrawal and treat as needed; consider slowing
rate of taper if symptoms are severe. d. Offer HIV and hepatitis screening, as well as hepatitis B immunization;

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e. Refer as needed to mental health and/or medical services; f. Provide additional patient education; g. If the patient opts to withdraw from the OTP, notify the divisional clinician to follow up. h. Formulate a plan with the inmate for follow-up care in the community in the event that the inmate
is released, whether during the taper or after completion; 3. The program medical director will:
a. Advise program clinicians regarding clinical and administrative matters as needed; b. Request a waiver from CSAT for these special cases:
i. Detoxification more than twice in any 12-month period, or ii. Maintenance rather than detoxification, for a reason other than pregnancy
E. Diversion control 1. The pharmacy director will:
a. Stock and use only methadone oral solution for the OTP program; b. Store unopened methadone stock bottles in a DEA-approved safe, numbered consecutively, and
accounted for daily; c. Limit access to the methadone safe to authorized pharmacists. 2. Authorized pharmacists will: a. Have only one stock bottle open at any time; withdraw a new bottle from the safe when needed; b. Refill the dispensing bottle to a maximum of 1000 ml of methadone oral solution; c. Keep both the opened daily bottle and the dispensing bottle in a locked cabinet when not in use; d. Inventory methadone stock at these times:
i. End-of-shift- An exiting pharmacist and an incoming pharmacist each take and reconcile the inventory. Both enter their inventories on a DASA form, "Daily Methadone Accountability."
ii. Weekly - take and record a separate inventory on the form Narcotic Use Record for Methadone.
iii. In case of spillage or wastage - immediately inventory the methadone to determine amount lost and record on the daily methadone work sheet. A witness must verify and sign. Prepare and submit an incident report to the pharmacy supervisor before the end of the shift.
3. Pharmacy administration will review all records for accountability through its quality assurance program.
4. The Director of Pharmacy will submit all quality assurance reports and notification of all discrepancies to the OTP program administrator.
SELF-MONITORING OF COMPLIANCE INDICATORS
1. The director of pharmacy will transmit an electronic data file listing all patients receiving methadone and their dosing to DASA for oversight by the state.
2. The program medical director will: a. Review all statistical and quality improvement reports and forward to Cermak's director of quality improvement, chief medical officer, and chief operating officer; b. In the event of an adverse health incident possibly related to the program, assign a physician to review the case and to submit a written report within 30 days; c. In the event of death of a program participant, either during or within 7 days after detoxification: i. Immediately notify both DASA and CSA T; ii. Conduct a mortality review in accordance with Cermak Policy A-1 0.

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CROSS REFERENCES
APPENDIX·· Diagnosis of opioid dependence and addiction Behavior supportive of a diagnosis of opioid dependence includes: • Significant levels of tolerance resulting in experiencing withdrawal symptoms on abrupt
discontinuation of opioid substances: • Signs and symptoms that reflect compulsive, prolonged self-administration of opioid substances that
are used for no legitimate medical purpose or, if a general medical condition is present that requires opioid treatment, use of opioid doses that are greatly in excess of the amount needed for pain relief: • Such regular patterns of compulsive drug use that daily activities are typically planned around obtaining and administering opioids: • Purchase of opioids on the illegal market or obtaining opioids by faking or exaggerating general medical problems or by receiving simultaneous prescriptions from several physicians: • Engaging in drug-related crimes, such as, fraudulently writing prescriptions for opioids or diverting opioids prescribed for other patients or from pharmacy supplies. (DSM-IV-TR} Behavior indicative of opioid addiction includes: • Continuing use of the opiate despite known adverse consequences to self, family, or society: • Obtaining illicit opiates: • Using prescribed opiates inappropriately: • Previous attempt(s) at tapering using methadone or other drugs. The patient may not have physiologic dependence at present since this may be continuation of methadone use for a long time in the community without illicit use of opioid substances in the recent past.

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TREATMENT PROGRAM
POLICY UPDATE SCHEDULE To be reviewed no later than 1 year after posting date.

POLICY LEAD

Avery Hart, MD Chief Medical Officer

REVIEWER(S)
APPROVAL PARTY(IES)
REVIEW HISTORY Written: August 01, 2010 Revised: June 20,2012

Cindy Kienlen, RN Mary Ann Wrobel, PharmD Quality Improvement Committee
!)
_j(J;\ 1 tI ~V/'I.A.-~- YN
Michael Puis· , DO
Ch~~~;~~?
Avery Hart, MD t}
Chief Medical Officer

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Exhibit 2

Case: 1:15-cv-11632 Document #: 74 Filed: 11/21/16 Page 24 of 33 PageID #:733

Cook County Sheriff’s Reentry Council Research Bulletin

INSIDE THIS ISSUE
Characteristics of Inmates in the

MARCH 2011

 Characteristics of Cook County Jail

Jail Admissions (page 2)
 Time Served Among Jail Exits (page 4)
 Comparison of Male & Female Jail Inmates (page 5)
 Recidivism (page 6)

Introduction & Brief History of the Cook County Department of Corrections
The Cook County Department of Corrections (i.e., the Cook County Jail) is operated by the Cook County Sheriff’s Office, led by Sheriff Thomas Dart. In county fiscal year 2010, the Cook County Department of Corrections operating budget was $245 million, with roughly 83 percent of the budget going towards the salaries of more than 3,500 staff who work within the jail. The purpose of this research brief is to provide criminal justice practitioners and policy makers, as well as the general public, with a better understanding of the size and characteristics of the population detained and served by the Cook County Department of Corrections.
In addition to the Cook County Department of Corrections, there are also a number of other departments within the Sheriff’s Office that provide alternatives to incarceration in the jail, and are adjacent to the jail, including the Department of Community Supervision and Intervention (DCSI), which operates a Day Reporting Center, an electronic monitoring program, and a pre-release center that provides substance abuse treatment to inmates detained in Division 14 of the jail. In addition, the Sheriff’s Department of Women’s Justice Services (DWJS) serves female detainees and those released from the jail, and the Cook County Boot Camp is a sentencing alternative to traditional prison for adult males who meet the eligibility age and conviction offense criteria. Both DWJS and the Boot Camp are adjacent to the Cook County Jail.
Situated on 96 acres, the Cook County Jail is one of the largest single site county jails in

the United States based on both its daily population as well as its rated capacity. Based on 2009 data collected by the U.S. Department of Justice’s Bureau of Justice Statistics, the Cook County Jail housed a total of 9,737 inmates on June 30, 2009, second behind the 11,360 inmates detained in the largest single site facility in the country, the Harris County Jail in Houston, TX, and more than the 8,745 inmates housed in the Maricopa County Jail in Phoenix, AZ. Although the jail systems in New York and Los Angeles have many more inmates—13,130 and 19,869 on June 30, 2009, respectively—the jail systems in these two jurisdictions are in multiple sites through their respective jurisdictions. The Cook County Jail has been accredited by the American Correctional Association since 1988, annually passes inspections by the Illinois Department of Corrections’ Jail and Detention Standards Unit, and is monitored by the John Howard Association in Chicago as well.
Although crowding at the Cook County Jail resulted in a federal consent decree in 1974, the problem of crowding at the jail site has existed since the Chicago House of Corrections opened in 1871. When the House of Corrections opened, approximately 419 inmates each day were housed at the facility, and by the 1920’s, the average daily population had tripled to 1,200, more than double the intended capacity. This severe crowding led to the construction of the County Jail in 1928. The County Jail and the Chicago House of Correction were run as separate facilities until 1969, when the Cook County Department of Corrections was created within the Sheriff’s Office and combined these two facilities. However, even with the new addition, and additional

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housing units added to the facility during the rest of the decade, the jail still experienced crowding, culminating in the issuance of a federal consent decree in 1974. As a result, the Cook County Sheriff developed a number of programs designed to alleviate this crowding, including an electronic monitoring program that began in 1989 and a Day Reporting Center, which opened in 1993. In addition, since December 2008, the Circuit Court has operated a Pre-Trial Services Unit within the Cook County Adult Probation Department to conduct brief assessments of felony defendants at bond hearings to provide judges with more information for decisions regarding pre-trial release.
Since 1996, there have been between 9,000 and 10,000 inmates on any given day housed within the Cook County Jail, with an average daily population of just over 9,000 in 2010 (Figure 1). The rated capacity of the Cook County Jail was 10,607 as of 2009, making it the third largest county jail in the nation (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2010) in terms of capacity. Combining the average daily population and the rated capacity, over the past few years the jail has operated at 92% to 98% of its rated capacity.
Admissions to the Cook County Jail
In 2010, the Cook County Jail recorded a total of 78,534 admissions (Figure 2), 68,657 (87.4%) of which were male detainees and 9,877 (12.6%) were female detainees (Table 3). This total number of admissions during 2010 was 7,533 fewer than the total admissions in 2009, and more than 13,000 fewer than in 2008. Out of these total admissions in 2010, many were accounted for by individuals who

had been admitted multiple times during the year. Specifically, during 2010, there were 56,465 unique individual males and 8,712 unique individual females admitted to the jail. Thus, while the majority of individuals, 83% of males and almost 89% of females, entered the jail only once during 2010, 13% of males and 9% of females entered the jail twice, and 4% and 2% respectively, entered three or more times during 2010 (Table 3). Or, looked at another way, there were more than 9,500 individual males, and nearly 1,000 females, admitted to the jail multiple times during 2010.

The number of admissions per day to

In 2010, an average of 215 inmates were

the Cook County Jail in

admitted to the Cook

2010 averaged 215, with an average of 188

County Jail every day.

men and 27 women

admitted each day, and this level of admissions did

not vary much across the 365 days of the year. For

example, only 45 days during the year were there

fewer than 150 male admissions, and there were only

6 days where there were more than 240 male

admissions. For women, there were 49 days with

fewer than 20 admissions and 16 days with over 40.

Further, admissions were spread out fairly evenly over

the 12 months of the year, with December accounting

for a slightly lower average daily number of admis-

sions (an average of 169 total admissions, or 148

male and 21 female admissions per day) and August

having a slightly higher number of daily admissions

(an average of 232 total admissions per day, or 202

male and 30 female admissions per day).

Figure 1: A verage Daily Population of the Cook County Jail

Figure 2: A nnual Admissions to the Cook County Jail

12,000 10,000 8,000 6,000 4,000 2,000
0

110,000 100,000
90,000 80,000 70,000 60,000 50,000 40,000 30,000 20,000 10,000
0

1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

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PAGE 3

The typical inmate admitted to, and discharged from, the Cook County Jail is a single, African American male from Chicago averaging 32 years-old at admission. Among those admitted to the Cook County Jail in 2010, the majority (66%) were African-American, followed by Hispanics (19%) and whites (13%). Among those admitted to the Cook County Jail in 2010, the majority (85%) were single/not married, whereas only 15% were married. In terms of the crime associated with admissions to the jail during 2010, the single largest category of admissions to the jail were accounted for by violent crimes (30%), followed closely by drug-law violations (28%), property offenses(18%), traffic/driving under the influence of alcohol (16%), and other types of offenses (6%). Only 2% of admissions to the jail were for sex crimes, which include prostitution offenses.
When Jail admissions were examined across racial characteristics and the crime associated with the admission to the jail, there were some differences noted. Specifically, African-Americans and Hispanics were more likely than whites to be admitted to the jail for a violent offense (30.5% and 31.2% versus 26.5%, respectively), whereas whites admitted to the jail were more likely than African-American and Hispanic to be detained for a property crime (21.2% versus 17.9% and 15.3%, respectively). Nearly 30% of Hispanics

admitted to the jail were detained for traffic-related offenses, which included driving under the influence (DUI) and driving on a suspended license. On the other hand, nearly one-third (32%) of all AfricanAmericans admitted to the jail were charged with drug-law violations, compared to 22.7% of whites and 18.9% of the Hispanics admitted to the jail.
Discharges/Exits from the Cook County Jail
A total of 77,942 discharges/exits from the Cook County Jail occurred in 2010, and as with admissions, there were many individuals who exited the jail multiple times during 2010. Specifically, the 77,942 exits were accounted for by 65,960 unique individuals. Detainees are discharged from the jail for one of four general reasons: 1) they post the necessary cash bond ordered by a judge to obtain their release prior to trial (accounting for 30.7% of discharges), 2) they stay in the jail until their criminal case results in their conviction and sentencing to prison, probation or supervision (accounting for 30.1% of discharges), 3) they stay in the jail until their criminal case results in charges being dropped or they are found not guilty (16.4% of discharges), or 4) they are sentenced to the jail as a result of their conviction, and are released once the jail sentence has been served (14.3% of discharges).

Table 1 Comparison of 2010 Discharges from the Cook County Jail, by Detainee Characteristics

Posted Bond

Average Age

31.4 years

Gender

Male

84.8%

Female

15.2%

Total

100.0%

Race

African-American

58.5%

Hispanic

24.6%

White

16.9%

Total

100.0%

Marital Status

Single

82.9%

Married

17.1%

Total

100%

Offense Type

Drug

25.9%

Property

14.6%

Violent

33.9%

Sex

1.2%

Traffic

18.0%

Other

6.4%

Total

100%

Plaintiff's Exhibit 2

Detained Until Convicted and Sentenced to Probation or
Supervision 30.3 years
82.7% 17.3% 100%
73.1% 15.0% 11.9% 100%
89.3% 10.7% 100%
28.7% 22.7% 31.1%
2.0% 10.3%
5.0% 100%

Detained Until Convicted and Sentenced to
Prison
32.7 years
93.0% 7.0% 100%
74.8% 15.0% 10.2% 100%
87.1% 12.9% 100%
29.1% 22.0% 31.3%
4.0% 9.3% 4.3% 100%

Charges

Total

Dropped or

Dismissed

35.8 years
87.4% 12.6% 100%
80.5% 10.6%
8.9% 100%
85.8% 14.2% 100%
45.3% 13.7% 33.0%
1.4% 2.7% 3.8% 100%

32.6 years
87.3% 12.7% 100%
66.7% 19.5% 13.7% 100%
84.7% 15.3% 100%
27.9% 17.8% 30.2%
2.0% 16.1%
6.0% 100%
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Overall, the characteristics of those released from the jail in 2010 were similar to the characteristics of those admitted to the jail, but did vary depending on the reason behind their discharge from the jail (Table 1). As seen in Table 1, 15.2% of those discharged from the jail because they posted bond were female, compared to only 7% of those who remained in jail until they were convicted and sentenced to prison. Further, a smaller proportion of those discharged from the jail because they posted bond were AfricanAmerican (58.5%) than those who remained in jail until they were convicted and sentenced to probation/ supervision (73.1% were African-American) or who were detained until convicted and sentenced to prison (74.8% were African-American).
Time Served Among Jail Exits
The length of time inmates spend in the Cook County Jail varies widely, and is influenced primarily by the mechanism by which they are released from the jail, such as posting bond, being detained until their criminal case is disposed of, or if they are sentenced to the jail as a result of a conviction. Thus, when attempting to summarize the length of time served among those released from the jail, numerous methods of analysis are needed to fully understand and describe the duration of their incarceration. For example, among all of those released from the Cook County Jail in 2010, 18,197 (or 23.3% of all releasees) spent 2 days or less in the jail (Table 2), while 2,128 (less than 3% of all releasees) spent more than one year in the jail.
Time served is also important to examine and understand, since the average daily population of correctional facilities is driven by changes in admissions, exits and lengths of stay. Over the past few years, the number of admissions to, and exits from, the Cook County Jail have fallen, but the average daily

population has not decreased as much. For example,

between 2007 and 2010, admissions to the jail fell by

19%, while the jail’s average daily population fell by

only 8%. This difference can be attributed to the fact

that, on average, the length of stay at the Cook County

Jail has increased slightly over the past few years.

Overall, between 2007 and 2010, the average length

of time spent in the Cook County Jail among those

released increased from an average (mean) of 47.9

days in 2007 to an average of 49.8 days. Similarly,

the median time spent in the jail increased from 11 to

12 days, meaning that in 2010, 50% of the dis-

charged inmates spent 12 days or less in the jail,

while 50% spent more than 12 days in jail. While an

increase in the average time served of 1.9 days per

detainee does not seem like a dramatic change, when

this small change is multiplied by the 77,942 inmates

discharged in 2010,
that additional 1.9 Between 2007 & 2010, the

days translates to a

average number of days

total of 148,089 jail inmates spent in the Cook

days (1.9 X 77,942), or County Jail increased, and

an addition of 405 inmates to the jail’s

translated into 405 more

average daily popula- inmates in the average daily

tion (148,089 addi-

population.

tional days of incar-

ceration/365 days in a year=405).

As would be expected, the length of time spent in the Cook County Jail varies depending on the means by which detainees were discharged (Table 2). Those who are released because they posted the necessary cash bond generally stay in the jail for a much shorter period of time than do those who remain until they are convicted and sentenced to prison. However, for the most part, increases in the average number of days in jail were seen across all types of discharges from the jail, and each has different implications and possible explanations. For example, among those

Table 2 Time Served (Days) in the Cook County Jail Among 2010 Discharges/Exits

Average (Mean)

Total Posted Bond
Sentenced to Prison Sentenced to
Probation/Supervision Time Served
Sentence Expired Charges Dropped
Not Convicted

49.8 days 11 days
139 days
49 days
60 days 31 days 25 days 248 days

Median
12 days 2 days
56 days
26 days
10 days 13 days 17 days 192 days

Percent 2 days or Less 23.3% 57.1% 4.5%
7.5%
10.9% 14.3%
3.4% 0.6%

COOK COUNTY SHERIFF’S REENTRY
C OPUlaNinCtiIfLf'sREExShEibAitR2C H B U L L E T I N

Page 4

Case: 1:15-cv-11632 Document #: 74 Filed: 11/21/16 Page 28 of 33 PageID #:737

released from the jail because they posted bond (which accounts for about one-third of discharges from the jail each year), the average time served increased from 8.6 days in 2007 to 11.6 days in 2010. This increase could be due to it taking a longer for family members to come up with the necessary cash to post a defendant's bond, higher bond amounts, or both. Again, an average increase of 3 days when multiplied by the 23,845 released because they posted bond translates into an increase in the average daily population of 196 inmates specifically because of this longer time to post cash bond.
Similarly, among those released from the jail because they were convicted and sentenced to the Illinois Department of Corrections, the time in the jail increased from an average of 105 days in 2007 to an average of 139 days in 2010. Overall, the average time those released from the jail because they were sentenced (combining those sentenced to prison or other sanctions, such as probation) increased from 61.8 days in 2007 to 78 days in 2010. This could be due to longer court processing times because of more complex cases, more people staying in jail before they are convicted and sentenced to prison because they could not post bond, or both. Even among those inmates who are released from the jail because the charges against them were dropped-which accounted for 12,446 of the 77,942 exits in 2010, the average time spent in the jail increased from 22.6 days in 2007 to 25 days in 2010.
Thus, despite the fact that admissions into the jail have fallen, due to fewer arrests--particularly for druglaw violations--because inmates appear to be spending more time in the jail, the average daily population has not fallen as much. This increase in time served for those who eventually post bond could be due to the economy and difficulty for family and friends to come up with the necessary bond for pre-trial release, whereas longer time in the jail for those who remain incarcerated until sentenced could indicate more court delays, more serious cases, fewer people able to post bond, or a combination of all three forces. Again, while slight changes in the length of time in the jail may not appear to be significant, when multiplied by the tens of thousands of inmates this impacts, it results in substantially more bed-days in jail for inmates--enough to reduce the impact of fewer admissions on the overall population.
A Comparison of Male & Female Admissions to the Cook County Jail
In recognition of the different needs of females processed through the Cook County Jail, in 1999 the Cook

PAGE 5
Table 3 Comparison of Male & Female Jail Admissions & Exits
Males Females Total

Total Admissions

68,656 9,878 78,534

Percent Admissions per Individual During 2010

87.4% 12.6%

100%

1 Admission 2 Admissions 3 or More Admissions
Total Average Daily Admissions
Race African American Caucasian Hispanic/Other Total
Average Age Age Distribution
17-20 years old 21-25 years old 26-30 years old 31-35 years old 36-40 years old 41-49 years old 50 years old or older
Total Education Level
Not a High-School Graduate/No GED High-School Graduate or
GED Total Marital Status Single Married Total Most Serious Charge Violent Crimes Drug-Law Violations Property Crimes Traffic Offenses Sex Offenses (Including prostitution) Other Total

83% 13%
4% 100%
118
66.6% 12.9% 20.5% 100%
32
14.8% 20.1% 17.1% 12.6% 10.4% 15.7%
9.3% 100.0%
47%
53% 100%
84.0% 16.0% 100.0%
31.1% 28.3% 17.0% 16.6%
1.4% 5.6% 100%

89% 9% 2%
100% 27
68.0% 19.9% 12.1% 100%
33
10.5% 19.2% 16.3% 12.2% 12.6% 20.9%
8.3% 100%
41%
59% 100%
89.9% 10.1% 100%
23.2% 26.8% 24.1% 12.2%
6.1% 7.6% 100%

83.8% 12.8%
3.4% 100%
215
66.8% 13.8% 19.4% 100% 32.51
14.3% 20.0% 17.0% 12.5% 10.7% 16.4%
9.2% 100%
46.5%
53.5% 100%
84.7% 15.3% 100%
30.1% 28.1% 17.9% 16.1%
2.0% 5.8% 100%

Plaintiff's Exhibit 2

Page 5

Case: 1:15-cv-11632 Document #: 74 Filed: 11/21/16 Page 29 of 33 PageID #:738
PAGE 6

County Sheriff’s Office created the Department of Women’s Justice Services (DWJS), which provides enhanced services to women in the jail as well as those released from the jail but still under the custody of the Sheriff’s Office. During 2010, the 9,878 females admitted to the Cook County Jail accounted for 12.6% of all admissions to the jail—a proportion of admissions that has been consistent over the past few years (Table 3). Other than differences in the sheer volume of male versus female admissions into the jail, male and female admissions to the jail were only slightly different in terms of their age, race and education level (Table 3). For example, the average age of females admitted in 2010 was 33 years old, compared to an average of 32 years old for males admitted to the jail. The youngest inmates (male and female) admitted to the jail was 17 (the minimum age of an adult in Illinois’ justice system), while the oldest female admitted in 2010 was 74 years old, and the oldest male admitted was 87. Some slight differences were evident when the race of male and female detainees was compared, with roughly two-thirds of both males and female accounted for by AfricanAmericans, but a smaller proportion of females accounted for by Hispanics (12.1%) than male detainees (20.6%), and a larger proportion of females were accounted for by whites (19.7%) than among males (12.9%). Some slight differences were also noted in terms of educational achievement, with more than 40% of females, and nearly 50% of males admitted to the jail not having completed high-school at the time of admission.
More substantive differences were noted between female and male admissions into the jail when the most serious criminal charges were compared, with males being more likely than females to be admitted for violent crimes (31.1% versus 23.3%, respectively) and traffic offenses (16.6% versus 12.2%, respectively). Roughly similar proportions of male and female jail admissions were for drug-law violations (28.1% and 26.8%, respectively). On the other hand, women were more likely than men to be admitted to the jail for property crimes (23.7% versus 17.0%, respectively) and sex offenses, which include prostitution, at 6.3% versus 1.4%, respectively.
These differences in the types of crimes male and female detainees were charged with is likely behind the differences seen in the means by which they were released from the jail. When the reasons for discharge from the jail, and time spent in the jail, were compared between male and female detainees, females were more likely than males to be released

as a result of posting bond (36.6% of female discharges, compared to 29.9% of male discharges), and also were able to post bond more quickly. Among females released from the jail as a result of posting bond, they did so in an average of 9 days, compared to an average of 12 days for males discharged as a result of posting bond. Females were also more likely than males to be released from the jail as a result of being convicted and sentenced to probation or supervision, although they took longer before being discharged than did males. Specifically, 33.8% of females discharged from the jail were discharged because they were convicted and sentenced to probation or supervision, and on average they spent 55 days in the jail before being discharged. By comparison, 21.2% of males were discharged because they were convicted and sentenced to probation or supervision, and on average they spent 48 days in the jail before being discharged. On the other hand, a larger proportion of male detainees at the jail were discharged as a result of being convicted and sentenced to prison (38.9%) than females (22.6%), although the average lengths of stay for those discharged as a result of a prison sentence were very similar between males and females (139 vs. 131 days, respectively).
Recidivism
One of the most frequently used measures to gauge the outcome of sentences imposed on convicted offenders is the “recidivism rate,” although how the rate is measured varies. In some instances, recidivism is measured by determining what proportion of a correctional population gets rearrested for a new crime, other times it is gauged by the proportion of a correctional population reconvicted of a new felony, and in other instances, particularly with institutional corrections, it is the rate at which persons are returned to that correctional facility. Using data collected by and available to the Cook County Jail, recidivism analyses were performed using the definition of being returned to the Cook County Jail within three years of release from the jail. Further, the recidivism analyses that follow are only for those detainees released from the jail because they were convicted and sentenced, and does not include those who were released on bond, found not guilty or who had the charges against them dropped. Since tracking recidivism requires time to elapse between exit from the jail and any subsequent readmissions to the jail, those detainees released from the Cook County Jail in 2007 because they were convicted and sentenced to either prison, probation or

COOK COUNTY SHERIFF’S REENTRY
C O U NPClaIiLntiRffE'sS EE xAhRibCitH2 B U L L E T I N

Page 6

Case: 1:15-cv-11632 Document #: 74 Filed: 11/21/16 Page 30 of 33 PageID #:739

Table 4 3-Year Recidivism Rates of 2007 Jail Exits

Not Returned

Total By Age 15-25 26-35 36-50 Over 50 By Gender Male Female By Race White African-American Hispanic/Other By Neighborhood Austin, Garfield, Lawndale Other By Education Less than High School High School Diploma/GED By Marital Status Single Married By Type of Crime Drug Property Violent Sex

46.8%
39.7% 50.5% 48.3% 59.1%
46.1% 51.5%
56.6% 40.8% 63.2%
37.5% 48.2%
43.1%
50.1%
44.6% 56.3%
41.6% 40.6% 47.4% 35.2%

Returned Total Number
53.2% 42,637

60.3% 49.5% 51.7% 40.9%

13,856 11,941 14,051
2,787

53.9% 37,082 48.5% 5,555

43.4% 59.2% 36.8%

5,966 29,363
7,308

62.5% 5,423 51.8% 37,214

56.9% 20,306 49.9% 22,058

55.4% 34,698 43.7% 7,710

58.4% 59.4% 52.6% 64.8%

12,498 8,097 8,264 642

supervision, or they served their sentence at the jail and were released, was the cohort that was tracked to determine if they were readmitted to the jail within three years of their release (i.e., returned between their release in 2007 and 2010).

Of the 42,635 sentenced individuals released from the Cook County Jail in 2007, 53.2% were returned to the jail within three years (Table 4). As is the case in most recidivism analyses, the younger the detainee was when they were released, the higher their rate of return to the jail within the three year follow-up period. For example, among those who were between

PAGE 7
the ages of 17 and 25 when released, 60.3% were back in the jail on new charges within three years, compared to just over 40% among those who were over the age of 50 at release. Similarly, males were slightly more likely than females to be returned to the jail (53.9% versus 48.5%, respectively), and African-Americans were more likely to be returned to the jail than either whites or Hispanics. Also consistent with previous recidivism research, those released from the jail who had a high-school diploma/GED, and those that were married, had lower recidivism rates than those without a high-school diploma/GED and those who were single. When the recidivism rate of those released from the jail following their conviction and sentencing was examined by the crime for which they were initially being held in the jail, the rates were not substantively different.

Finally, when the recidivism rates were

More than one-half of those

examined based on the released from the Cook

community where the

County Jail in 2007 as a

inmate resided, differences were seen. Specifically, among those released jail

result of a conviction and sentence were back in the
jail within 3 years

detainees who were from

the Austin, Garfield Park and Lawndale

neighborhoods, 62.5% were returned to the jail

within the 3 year follow-up period, compared to

51.8% among detainees from other community

areas in Chicago and the suburbs. It is because

of this higher recidivism rate among detainees

from these specific Chicago communities that the

Cook County Sheriff’s Office began implementing

a number of initiatives, with the support of

federal grant funds and the cooperation of the

Cook County Adult Probation Department, to in-

crease access to a variety of educational,

vocational, treatment and other rehabilitative

services among detainees returning to those

specific Chicago communities. Through federal

funds obtained through the Illinois Criminal

Justice Information Authority, as well as directly

from the U.S. Department of Justice under the

Second Chance Act, the Sheriff’s Office has

begun a pilot program that will serve a combined

400 inmates going through rehabilitative pro-

grams at the jail, ensuring that in addition to the

treatment and services received while under the

custody of the Sheriff, selected individuals also

receive post-discharge referrals and access to

needed programs and services when they return

to the community.

Plaintiff's Exhibit 2

Page 7

Case: 1:15-cv-11632 Document #: 74 Filed: 11/21/16 Page 31 of 33 PageID #:740

The Cook County Sheriff’s Reentry Council
Rebecca Janowitz Cook County Sheriff’s Office Director of Reentry Policy 3026 South California Avenue Chicago, Illinois 60608 Phone: 773-869-3544 Fax: 773-869-7676 E-mail: rjanowitz.reentry@gmail.com

In order to support research, evaluation and planning efforts for the Cook County Sheriff’s Office, the Sheriff’s Office entered into a cooperative agreement with Loyola University Chicago to support the development of an enhanced research capacity. Under the agreement, Dr. David Olson, Professor and Chair of the Criminal Justice Department at Loyola and Graduate Research Assistant Jana Krepel, have worked to develop datasets and protocols to support research and evaluation efforts, performed research and analyses to support program and policy development and evaluations, and establish stronger ties between the academic community interested in conducting applied research and the Cook County Sheriff’s Office. Daniel Brown, Assistant Executive Director of the Cook County Department of Corrections, and Andrew Krok, also with the Sheriff’s Office, have provided extensive support in obtaining data needed to perform these activities and analyses.

Conclusions
The preceding information was intended to provide practitioners, policy makers, and taxpayers in Cook County with a detailed description of the volume and characteristics of those admitted to and discharged from the Cook County Jail during 2010. The information presented in this Research Bulletin illustrates a number of the challenges that face the Cook County Jail. First, the jail must effectively, efficiently, and safely admit and house an extremely large volume of inmates. On average, 215 inmates are admitted each day, with a similar number of detainees released from the jail every day, and an average daily population of more than 9,000 inmates. In addition to the sheer volume, those admitted to the jail are charged with crimes that range from drug possession offenses to first degree murder, and may be incarcerated within the jail for hours, a few days, or more than a year, depending on what they are charged with, their bond amount, and how their criminal case is resolved. Among those who are able to post bond, most are released within a couple of days, whereas those who cannot post bond and remain in jail until convicted and sentenced to prison stay in the jail for months or years. As a result, the ability to effectively assess detainees for their risks and rehabilitative needs is challenging, and planning for the discharge of inmates can be difficult.

It is also important to note that many of those detained in the jail prior to the disposition of their case end up being convicted and sentenced to something other than prison or jail, most often probation or supervision (or the charges against them are dropped or dismissed). Thus, the majority of those admitted to the Cook County Jail are ultimately released back to the communities they came from, and usually within days or months. Also illustrative of the challenges facing the Cook County Jail, and indeed the entire criminal justice system in Cook County, is the fact that most of those released from the jail following their conviction and sentencing—either to prison, probation, supervision, or jail—end up coming back to the jail within a few years. Indeed, even in just one year—2010—more than 10,500 individuals were admitted to the jail multiple times .
In an effort to break this cycle of recidivism, and increase coordination between the Cook County Jail, the Cook County Adult Probation Department, the City of Chicago and community-based treatment and service providers, the Cook County Sheriff’s Office has successfully applied for and obtained federal grant funds to support the enhancement of existing programs and services, as well as increase the capacity, coordination, and access to post-incarceration aftercare treatment services, educational programs and employment opportunities.

Plaintiff's Exhibit 2

Page 8

Case: 1:15-cv-11632 Document #: 74 Filed: 11/21/16 Page 32 of 33 PageID #:741
Exhibit 3

DOC

Case: 1:15-cv-11632 Document #: 74 Filed: 11/21/16 Page 33 of 33 PageID #:742

Dosing History
Criteria: Date - 9/20/2013 to 1/1/2014 Sort: Default

Cermak Health Services of Cook County
2800 S. California Ave Chicago, Illinois 60608 Run by: jsupasanguan @ 8/5/2016 4:40:26
PM

CHARLES R
10/8/2013 2:49:37 PM 10/9/2013 9:16:45 AM 10/10/2013 8:19:05 AM 10/11/2013 8:47:35 AM 10/12/2013 8:43:01 AM 10/13/2013 8:45:51 AM 10/14/2013 8:11:11 AM 10/15/2013 8:39:47 AM 10/16/2013 1:10:26 PM 10/17/2013 9:03:03 AM 10/18/2013 8:36:32 AM 10/19/2013 9:16:49 AM 10/20/2013 8:16:16 AM 10/21/2013 8:27:51 AM 10/22/2013 9:29:28 AM 10/23/2013 6:38:04 PM

2
9/20/2013 9/21/2013 9/22/2013 9/23/2013 9/24/2013 9/25/2013 9/26/2013 9/27/2013 9/28/2013 9/29/2013 9/30/2013 10/1/2013 10/2/2013 10/3/2013 10/4/2013 10/5/2013 10/6/2013 10/7/2013 10/8/2013 Methadone Liquid 10/9/2013 Methadone Liquid 10/10/2013 Methadone Liquid 10/11/2013 Methadone Liquid 10/12/2013 Methadone Liquid 10/13/2013 Methadone Liquid 10/14/2013 Methadone Liquid 10/15/2013 Methadone Liquid 10/16/2013 Methadone Liquid 10/17/2013 Methadone Liquid 10/18/2013 Methadone Liquid 10/19/2013 Methadone Liquid 10/20/2013 Methadone Liquid 10/21/2013 Methadone Liquid 10/22/2013 Methadone Liquid 10/23/2013 Methadone Liquid 10/24/2013 10/25/2013 10/26/2013 10/27/2013 10/28/2013 10/29/2013 10/30/2013 10/31/2013 11/1/2013 11/2/2013 11/3/2013 11/4/2013 11/5/2013

120 kchan 115 wchin 110 kchan 105 oajala 100 oajala
95 oajala 90 vpatel 85 kchan 80 kchan 75 oajala 70 oajala 65 wchin 60 wchin 55 oajala 50 oajala 45 jsupasanguan

Not enrolled in Methadone program Not enrolled in Methadone program Not enrolled in Methadone program Not enrolled in Methadone program Not enrolled in Methadone program Not enrolled in Methadone program Not enrolled in Methadone program Not enrolled in Methadone program Not enrolled in Methadone program Not enrolled in Methadone program Not enrolled in Methadone program Not enrolled in Methadone program Not enrolled in Methadone program Not enrolled in Methadone program Not enrolled in Methadone program Not enrolled in Methadone program Not enrolled in Methadone program Not enrolled in Methadone program Window Window Window Window Window Window Window Window Window Window Window Window Window Window Window Window Missed Dose Not enrolled in Methadone program Not enrolled in Methadone program Not enrolled in Methadone program Not enrolled in Methadone program Not enrolled in Methadone program Not enrolled in Methadone program Not enrolled in Methadone program Not enrolled in Methadone program Not enrolled in Methadone program Not enrolled in Methadone program Not enrolled in Methadone program Not enrolled in Methadone program

Plaintiff's Exhibit 3

Page 16 of 608

Rogers v. CC 16

 </s> Case: 1:15-cv-11632 Document #: 1 Filed: 12/23/15 Page 1 of 3 PageID #:1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

Keith Rogers, Plaintiff,
-vsSheriff of Cook County and Cook County, Illinois
Defendants

) ) ) ) (jury demand) ) ) 15-cv-____ ) ) ) )

COMPLAINT
Plaintiff, by counsel, alleges as follows

1. This is a civil action arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The

jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1343.

2. Plaintiff Keith Rogers is a resident of the Northern District of

Illinois.

3. Defendant Thomas Dart is the Sheriff of Cook County.

Plaintiff sues Dart in his official capacity.

4. Defendant Cook County is responsible, in collaboration with

defendant Sheriff, for providing medical services to detainees at the Cook

County Jail. Defendant Cook County is also joined in this action pursuant

to Carver v. Sheriff of LaSalle County, 324 F. 3d 947 (7th Cir. 2003).

Case: 1:15-cv-11632 Document #: 1 Filed: 12/23/15 Page 2 of 3 PageID #:2
5. Plaintiff was arrested on January 19, 2014 and entered the Cook County Jail on January 20, 2014.
6. While being processed into the Jail, plaintiff informed intake personnel that he was taking a variety of prescription medications for serious medical needs, including being enrolled in a methadone maintenance program.
7. Jail personnel did not provide plaintiff with methadone until January 26, 2014.
8. Plaintiff underwent extremely painful withdrawal until he began to receive his prescribed methadone.
9. At all times relevant, there was a widespread practice or custom at the Jail of inordinate delay in providing methadone treatment to detainees.
10. The data available to plaintiff shows that between March 9, 2009 and March 19, 2011, 73 detainees who entered the Cook County Jail did not receive methadone until their fourth day at the jail.
11. Methadone has a “half-life” of about one day. This means that a person regularly taking methadone will begin withdrawal symptoms after one day without the drug; three days without methadone will be an extremely painful period of “cold turkey” withdrawal.
-2-

Case: 1:15-cv-11632 Document #: 1 Filed: 12/23/15 Page 3 of 3 PageID #:3
12. Defendants have known since the decision of the Seventh Circuit in Davis v. Carter, 452 F.3d 686 (7th Cir. 2006) that a widespread practice or custom of inordinate delay in providing methadone treatment to detainees at the Jail is unconstitutional.
13. At all times relevant, defendants have turned a blind eye to the injuries caused by their widespread practice or custom of inordinate delay in providing methadone treatment to detainees at the Jail.
14. As a result of having been deprived of methadone, plaintiff suffered painful withdrawal symptoms and great physical pain and was deprived of rights secured by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States.
15. Plaintiff hereby demands trial by jury. Wherefore plaintiff requests that appropriate compensatory damages be awarded against defendants.
/s/ Kenneth N. Flaxman Kenneth N. Flaxman ARDC No. 830399 Joel A. Flaxman 200 S Michigan Ave, Ste 201 Chicago, IL 60604 (312) 427-3200 attorneys for plaintiff
-3-

 </s> Case: 1:15-cv-11632 Document #: 90 Filed: 09/29/17 Page 1 of 5 PageID #:777

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

KEITH ROGERS, Plaintiff, v.
SHERIFF OF COOK COUNTY and COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS,
Defendants.

)

)

)

No. 15 C 11632

)

)

)

Judge Edmond E. Chang

)

)

)

)

ORDER

This Order addresses the pending motions.

County’s motion [59] for protective order as to OTP Committee documents. The County moves to withhold the contents of certain parts of documents generated by the Opioid Treatment Program (OTP)1 Committee. In support, the County relies on the privilege created by the Illinois Medical Studies Act. In pertinent part, the Act creates a privilege for all information used by health care facilities for “internal quality control”:

All information, interviews, reports, statements, memoranda, recommendations, … or other data of … health care delivery entities or facilities … or committees of licensed or accredited hospitals or their medical staffs … used in the course of internal quality control or of medical study for the purpose of reducing morbidity or mortality, or for improving patient care … shall be privileged, strictly confidential and shall be used only for … the evaluation and improvement of quality care … .

735 ILCS 5/8-2101. The defense acknowledges that, because Plaintiff Keith Rogers brings a federal-law claim (namely, for deliberate indifference to medical needs

1 The minutes of the Committee use the acronym “OPT” to refer to the Committee, but most other documents use “OTP,” including the agendas that accompany the minutes.
The OPT headers on the minutes appear to be typographical error.

Case: 1:15-cv-11632 Document #: 90 Filed: 09/29/17 Page 2 of 5 PageID #:777
under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause), state-law privileges like the one created by the Act are not necessarily applicable. Cty.’s Mot., R. 55 at 5 (citing Fed. R. Evid. 501). The County argues, however, that Federal Rule of Evidence 501—which instructs federal courts to apply “reason and experience”— should be invoked to allow the privilege’s application in this case.
Rogers resists the privilege’s application, first by arguing that the information used by the OTP Committee, and the recommendations generated by it, would not be covered by the Act at all, even if this were a state-law case. This is a close question: on the one hand, the County argues that the Committee clearly is reviewing the results of the Opioid Treatment Program and making recommendations. That characterization is borne out by the unredacted version of the documents sought to be withheld (the Court has reviewed those unredacted documents, which were filed at the Court’s direction as R. 60 on the docket). As the already-disclosed table-header of the minutes reveal, the Committee engages in a discussion (“Discussion Details”), assigns tasks in reaction to that discussion (“Action/Responsibility”), and then proposes a follow-up to that assignment (“Follow-Up”). E.g., Bates 626, 629, 632. Also, many of the withheld documents relate to “Unusual Occurrences” concerning patients in the Opioid Treatment Program. E.g., Bates 647, 663. The Country reasonably argues that the information and recommendations are “used in the course of internal quality control or of medical study … for improving patient care.” 735 ILCS 5/8-2101.
On the other hand, Rogers points out that the OTP Committee actually approves the opioid taper protocols, which are the primary issue in this case. The Opioid Treatment Program is governed by Cermak Health Services Policy G-06.1 (2012), which Rogers attached to his response (the defense did not dispute, in its reply, that this is the governing Policy). R. 56, Exh. 1. The Program is administered with the following structure: Cermak’s chief medical officer designates a “program medical director.” Policy § A(1). The program medical director is a licensed physician who is responsible for either delivering or overseeing the Program’s medical services. Policy, Definitions at 1.2 Under the Policy, the program medical director also will “[u]pdate this policy and any related policies for the program as needed, within the larger framework of the institutional policies of Cermak Health Services.” Policy § A(4)(a).
2 This is actually the definition drawn from regulations governing federal accreditation of opioid treatment programs (which dispense controlled substances). 42 C.F.R. § 8.2 (defining “medical director”).
2

Case: 1:15-cv-11632 Document #: 90 Filed: 09/29/17 Page 3 of 5 PageID #:777
Going beyond the direct delivery of medical services, there is a “program administrator” who has various duties, including “[c]onven[ing] a multidisciplinary OTP Committee with representatives from the departments of Medicine, Mental Health, Pharmacy, and Laboratory.” Policy § A(3)(d). This is the Committee at issue. The Policy makes only one other reference to the Committee: the program medical director must develop “a set of protocols for linear taper” and must “[s]ubmit the protocols for approval by the OTP Committee.” Policy § A(4)(g), (h) (emphasis added).
That approval is the problem with the County’s argument: the Committee is not so much conducting a peer review or, in the words of the Act, an “internal quality control” so much as it is actually setting the taper protocols. Again, this is a close call because the Policy also dictates that it is the medical director who has responsibility for updating the Policy itself. Policy § A(4)(a). But the Policy then specifically says that the medical director must submit the protocols to the OTP Committee for approval. Policy § A(4)(g), (h). This is unlike the primary case cited by the County, where a truly separate Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Committee reviewed the treatment provided to a particular detainee who passed away while in custody. Warren v. Dart, 2013 WL 5835771, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 30, 2013) (Kim, M.J.). In light of the Policy here, the County has not met its burden to show that the privilege applies, as a factual matter.
Even if what the Committee was doing factually met the definition of “internal quality control” under the Act, the Court is skeptical that reason and experience would justify the privilege’s application to a deliberate indifference case like this one. Rogers is pursuing a Monell claim, and one way to establish Monell liability is to show that policymakers knew of a substantial risk that a serious medical need would not be met. In the run-mill medical malpractice claim, the overall policies of a health care facility are not directly at issue, but in a Monell claim, that is the heart of the case. In the run-mill medical malpractice claim, knowledge is not an element of the claim for negligence, but in a Monell claim, unless the risk of a constitutional violation is obvious (this distinguishes what “deliberate indifference” means in individual-defendant cases versus municipal liability), actual knowledge of the risk is an important way to establish liability. Contrary to the County’s argument, R. 55 at 7, this is not the sort of evidence that Rogers can obtain simply from examining the medical records of the detainees.
3

Case: 1:15-cv-11632 Document #: 90 Filed: 09/29/17 Page 4 of 5 PageID #:777
One more point is worth making: the County, as the invoker of the privilege, bears the burden of establishing it, yet did not supply a survey of other states that might have adopted a similar privilege. See Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1996) (psychotherapist privilege recognized in all 50 States). That might have strengthened the case for its applicability, even in Monell cases. In any event, because of the factual deficiency in the County’s argument, the privilege does not apply.
Accordingly, the motion [55] for protective order as to the Committee documents is denied. The County must disclose the unredacted versions of the documents by October 10, 2017. The County may do so, however, under the Confidential Information designation in its proposed discovery confidentiality order. As noted earlier, this was a very close question, and Illinois state courts might disagree with whether the Act covers this situation. Discovery is not generally conducted in public, so the County ought to be able to preserve the argument for any state-court cases, and allowing public dissemination during federal-court discovery would thwart that legitimate argument. If and when the use of this information becomes the basis for judicial decision-making, then the Court will consider again whether the information should be made public (and in what form). The County shall email a copy of the proposed confidentiality order to the Proposed Order email account.
Rogers’s motion [64] to compel data and the County’s motion [76] to quash 30(b)(6) notice. Rogers’s motion to compel data is granted in part and denied in part. First, the last known address and phone number of the 197 methadone-recipient detainees at issue is information that is relevant to the Monell claim, because Rogers is entitled to try contacting these detainees to discovery what treatment they received and how effective it was. Surely Rogers will place a selflimit on the number of detainees he will try to contact, but in the first instance it should be up to him to decide whom to contact. The defense argues that the request is too burdensome, but the supplemental reply says that it would take about one month to compile, R. 73 at 2. And that is a reasonable burden: if the County pulls the information for just 10 detainees per day, the task will be done in 20 business days. The Count shall disclose this information by October 31, 2017.
Second, the request for prior-stay information is denied. Rogers does not articulate a relevancy theory to this information. Right now, the discovery period as to the detainees themselves (the Court broadened the period as to policy generation) is September 20, 2013 through January 20, 2014. If and when the facts justify an
4

Case: 1:15-cv-11632 Document #: 90 Filed: 09/29/17 Page 5 of 5 PageID #:777

expanded time period for discovery, then the information for all the methadonerecipient detainees will be relevant (not just the ones who also were treated in the four-month period). This request is denied.
Third, the request to identify the correct booking numbers for the 13 mismatched detainees is granted. Rogers explains, without rebuttal, that the format of the booking numbers provides the entry date into the Jail. The entry date is relevant to how quickly the detainees receive their first dose of methadone. That information too shall be provided by October 31, 2017. In light of these decisions, the County’s motion [76] to quash the related 30(b)(6) is granted.
Rogers’s motion [74] to certify class. This motion is terminated without prejudice as premature. Fact discovery has not yet concluded, nor has expert discovery, which might very well be relevant to arguing that a tapering policy generally affects persons in the same way, or to resisting that conclusion. The motion itself makes assertions about tapering policies as increasing the chances of relapse; although that might very well be true, discovery on that issue has not concluded. There also was no class allegation in the amended complaint, R. 24, so the defense was not put on notice of the potential for class treatment by the formal pleading. At the next status hearing, the Court will discuss the discovery plan with the parties. The status hearing is set for October 11, 2017, at 10 a.m.

ENTERED:

DATE: September 29, 2017

s/Edmond E. Chang Honorable Edmond E. Chang United States District Judge

5

 </s> Case: 1:15-cv-11632 Document #: 91 Filed: 10/06/17 Page 1 of 12 PageID #:782

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

KEITH ROGERS, Plaintiff,
vs. SHERIFF OF COOK COUNTY and COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS,
Defendants.

)

)

)

15-cv-11632

)

)

Honorable Judge

)

Edmond E. Chang

)

)

)

)

CONFIDENTIALITY ORDER A party to this action has moved that the Court enter a confidentiality order. The Court has determined that the terms set forth herein are appropriate to protect the respective interests of the parties, the public, and the Court. Accordingly, it is ORDERED: 1. Scope. All materials produced or adduced in the course of discovery, including, initial disclosures, responses to discovery requests, deposition testimony and exhibits, and information derived directly therefrom (hereinafter collectively "documents"), shall be subject to this Order concerning Confidential Information as defined below. This Order is subject to the Local Rules of this District and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on matters of procedure and calculation of time periods. 2. Confidential Information. As used in this Order, “Confidential Information” means information designated as "CONFIDENTIAL - SUBJECT TO PROTECTIVE ORDER" by the producing party that falls within one or more of the following categories: (a) information protected from disclosure by statute; (b) research, technical, commercial or financial information that the party has maintained as

Case: 1:15-cv-11632 Document #: 91 Filed: 10/06/17 Page 2 of 12 PageID #:782
confidential, including but not limited to the agendas, minutes and statistics of Cermak Health Services’ Opioid Treatment Program Committee; (e) Information or documents that are available to the public may not be designated as Confidential Information.
3. Designation (a) A party may designate a document as Confidential Information for
protection under this Order by placing or affixing the words “CONFIDENTIAL SUBJECT TO PROTECTIVE ORDER” on the document and on all copies in a manner that will not interfere with the legibility of the document. As used in this Order, “copies” includes electronic images, duplicates, extracts, summaries or descriptions that contain the Confidential Information. The marking “CONFIDENTIAL - SUBJECT TO PROTECTIVE ORDER” shall be applied prior to or at the time of the documents are produced or disclosed. Applying the marking “CONFIDENTIAL - SUBJECT TO PROTECTIVE ORDER” to a document does not mean that the document has any status or protection by statute or otherwise except to the extent and for the purposes of this Order. Any copies that are made of any documents marked “CONFIDENTIAL SUBJECT TO PROTECTIVE ORDER” shall also be so marked, except that indices, electronic databases or lists of documents that do not contain substantial portions or images of the text of marked documents and do not otherwise disclose the substance of the Confidential Information are not required to be marked.
2

Case: 1:15-cv-11632 Document #: 91 Filed: 10/06/17 Page 3 of 12 PageID #:782
(b) The designation of a document as Confidential Information is a certification by an attorney or a party appearing pro se that the document contains Confidential Information as defined in this order. 1
4. Depositions Deposition testimony is protected by this Order only if designated as “CONFIDENTIAL – SUBJECT TO PROTECTIVE ORDER” on the record at the time the testimony is taken. Such designation shall be specific as to the portions that contain Confidential Information. Deposition testimony so designated shall be treated as Confidential Information protected by this Order until fourteen days after delivery of the transcript by the court reporter to any party or the witness. Within fourteen days after delivery of the transcript, a designating party may serve a Notice of Designation to all parties of record identifying the specific portions of the transcript that are designated Confidential Information, and thereafter those portions identified in the Notice of Designation shall be protected under the terms of this Order. The failure to serve a timely Notice of Designation waives any designation of deposition testimony as Confidential Information that was made on the record of the deposition, unless otherwise ordered by the Court. 5. Protection of Confidential Material.
1 An attorney who reviews the documents and designates them as CONFIDENTIAL - SUBJECT TO PROTECTIVE ORDER must be admitted to the Bar of at least one state but need not be admitted to practice in the Northern District of Illinois unless the lawyer is appearing generally in the case on behalf of a party. By designating documents confidential pursuant to this Order, counsel submits to the jurisdiction and sanctions of this Court on the subject matter of the designation.
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Case: 1:15-cv-11632 Document #: 91 Filed: 10/06/17 Page 4 of 12 PageID #:782
(a) General Protections. Confidential Information shall not be used or
disclosed by the parties, counsel for the parties or any other persons identified in
subparagraph (b) for any purpose whatsoever other than in this litigation, including any
appeal thereof.
(b) Limited Third-Party Disclosures. The parties and counsel for the
parties shall not disclose or permit the disclosure of any Confidential Information to any
third person or entity except as set forth in subparagraphs (1)-(9). Subject to these
requirements, the following categories of persons may be allowed to review Confidential
Information:
(1) Counsel. Counsel for the parties and employees of counsel who have responsibility for the action;
(2) The Court and its personnel;
(3) Court Reporters and Recorders. Court reporters and recorders engaged for depositions;
(4) Consultants and Experts. Consultants, investigators, or experts employed by the parties or counsel for the parties to assist in the preparation and trial of this action but only after such persons have completed the certification contained in Attachment A, Acknowledgment of Understanding and Agreement to Be Bound;
(5) Witnesses at depositions. During their depositions, witnesses in this action to whom disclosure is reasonably necessary. Witnesses shall not retain a copy of documents containing Confidential Information. Pages of transcribed deposition testimony or exhibits to depositions that are designated as Confidential Information pursuant to the process set out in this Order must be separately bound by the court reporter and may not be disclosed to anyone except as permitted under this Order.
(6) Authors or recipients. The authors or original recipients of the document (not including a person who received the document in the course of litigation); and 4

Case: 1:15-cv-11632 Document #: 91 Filed: 10/06/17 Page 5 of 12 PageID #:782
(7) Others by Consent. Other persons only by written consent of the producing party or upon order of the Court and on such conditions as may be agreed or ordered.
(c) Control of Documents. Counsel for the parties shall make reasonable efforts to prevent unauthorized or inadvertent disclosure of Confidential Information. Counsel shall maintain the originals of the forms signed by persons acknowledging their obligations under this Order for a period of three years after the termination of the case.
6. Inadvertent Failure to Designate. An inadvertent failure to designate a document as Confidential Information does not, standing alone, waive the right to so designate the document; provided, however, that a failure to serve a timely Notice of Designation of deposition testimony as required by this Order, even if inadvertent, waives any protection for deposition testimony. If a party designates a document as Confidential Information after it was initially produced, the receiving party, on notification of the designation, must make a reasonable effort to assure that the document is treated in accordance with the provisions of this Order. No party shall be found to have violated this Order for failing to maintain the confidentiality of material during a time when that material has not been designated Confidential Information, even where the failure to so designate was inadvertent and where the material is subsequently designated Confidential Information.
7. Filing of Confidential Information. This Order does not, by itself, authorize the filing of any document under seal. Any party wishing to file a document designated as Confidential Information in connection with a motion, brief or other submission to the Court must comply with Local Rule 26.2.
5

Case: 1:15-cv-11632 Document #: 91 Filed: 10/06/17 Page 6 of 12 PageID #:782
8. No Greater Protection of Specific Documents. Except on privilege grounds not addressed by this Order, no party may withhold information from discovery on the ground that it requires protection greater than that afforded by this Order unless the party moves for an order providing such special protection.
9. Challenges by a Party to Designation as Confidential Information. The designation of any material or document as Confidential Information is subject to challenge by any party. The following procedure shall apply to any such challenge.
(a) Meet and Confer. A party challenging the designation of Confidential Information must do so in good faith and must begin the process by conferring directly with counsel for the designating party. In conferring, the challenging party must explain the basis for its belief that the confidentiality designation was not proper and must give the designating party an opportunity to review the designated material, to reconsider the designation, and, if no change in designation is offered, to explain the basis for the designation. The designating party must respond to the challenge within five (5) business days.
(b) Judicial Intervention. A party that elects to challenge a confidentiality designation may file and serve a motion that identifies the challenged material and sets forth in detail the basis for the challenge. Each such motion must be accompanied by a competent declaration that affirms that the movant has complied with the meet and confer requirements of this procedure. The burden of persuasion in any such challenge proceeding shall be on the designating party. Until the Court rules on the challenge, all parties shall continue to treat the materials as Confidential Information under the terms of this Order.
6

Case: 1:15-cv-11632 Document #: 91 Filed: 10/06/17 Page 7 of 12 PageID #:782
10. Action by the Court. Applications to the Court for an order relating to materials or documents designated Confidential Information shall be by motion. Nothing in this Order or any action or agreement of a party under this Order limits the Court’s power to make orders concerning the disclosure of documents produced in discovery or at trial.
11. Use of Confidential Documents or Information at Trial. Nothing in this Order shall be construed to affect the use of any document, material, or information at any trial or hearing. A party that intends to present or that anticipates that another party may present Confidential information at a hearing or trial shall bring that issue to the Court’s and parties’ attention by motion or in a pretrial memorandum without disclosing the Confidential Information. The Court may thereafter make such orders as are necessary to govern the use of such documents or information at trial.
12. Confidential Information Subpoenaed or Ordered Produced in Other Litigation.
(a) If a receiving party is served with a subpoena or an order issued in other litigation that would compel disclosure of any material or document designated in this action as Confidential Information, the receiving party must so notify the designating party, in writing, immediately and in no event more than three court days after receiving the subpoena or order. Such notification must include a copy of the subpoena or court order.
(b) The receiving party also must immediately inform in writing the party who caused the subpoena or order to issue in the other litigation that some or all of the material covered by the subpoena or order is the subject of this Order. In addition,
7

Case: 1:15-cv-11632 Document #: 91 Filed: 10/06/17 Page 8 of 12 PageID #:782
the receiving party must deliver a copy of this Order promptly to the party in the other action that caused the subpoena to issue.
(c) The purpose of imposing these duties is to alert the interested persons to the existence of this Order and to afford the designating party in this case an opportunity to try to protect its Confidential Information in the court from which the subpoena or order issued. The designating party shall bear the burden and the expense of seeking protection in that court of its Confidential Information, and nothing in these provisions should be construed as authorizing or encouraging a receiving party in this action to disobey a lawful directive from another court. The obligations set forth in this paragraph remain in effect while the party has in its possession, custody or control Confidential Information by the other party to this case.
13. Challenges by Members of the Public to Sealing Orders. A party or interested member of the public has a right to challenge the sealing of particular documents that have been filed under seal, and the party asserting confidentiality will have the burden of demonstrating the propriety of filing under seal.
14. Obligations on Conclusion of Litigation. (a) Order Continues in Force. Unless otherwise agreed or ordered,
this Order shall remain in force after dismissal or entry of final judgment not subject to further appeal.
(b) Obligations at Conclusion of Litigation. Within sixty-three days after dismissal or entry of final judgment not subject to further appeal, all Confidential Information and documents marked “CONFIDENTIAL - SUBJECT TO PROTECTIVE ORDER” under this Order, including copies as defined in ¶ 3(a), shall be
8

Case: 1:15-cv-11632 Document #: 91 Filed: 10/06/17 Page 9 of 12 PageID #:782
returned to the producing party unless: (1) the document has been offered into evidence or filed without restriction as to disclosure; (2) the parties agree to destruction to the extent practicable in lieu of return;2 or (3) as to documents bearing the notations, summations, or other mental impressions of the receiving party, that party elects to destroy the documents and certifies to the producing party that it has done so.
(c) Retention of Work Product and one set of Filed Documents. Notwithstanding the above requirements to return or destroy documents, counsel may retain (1) attorney work product, including an index that refers or relates to designated Confidential Information so long as that work product does not duplicate verbatim substantial portions of Confidential Information, and (2) one complete set of all documents filed with the Court including those filed under seal. Any retained Confidential Information shall continue to be protected under this Order. An attorney may use his or her work product in subsequent litigation, provided that its use does not disclose or use Confidential Information.
(d) Deletion of Documents filed under Seal from Electronic Case Filing (ECF) System. Filings under seal shall be deleted from the ECF system only upon order of the Court.
2 The parties agree that the receiving party shall destroy documents containing Confidential Information and certify the fact of destruction, and that the receiving party shall not be required to locate, isolate and return e-mails (including attachments to emails) that may include Confidential Information, or Confidential Information contained in deposition transcripts or drafts or final expert reports.
9

Case: 1:15-cv-11632 Document #: 91 Filed: 10/06/17 Page 10 of 12 PageID #:782

15. Order Subject to Modification. This Order shall be subject to modification by the Court on its own initiative or on motion of a party or any other person with standing concerning the subject matter.
16. No Prior Judicial Determination. This Order is entered based on the representations and agreements of the parties and for the purpose of facilitating discovery. Nothing herein shall be construed or presented as a judicial determination that any document or material designated Confidential Information by counsel or the parties is entitled to protection under Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or otherwise until such time as the Court may rule on a specific document or issue.
17. Persons Bound. This Order shall take effect when entered and shall be binding upon all counsel of record and their law firms, the parties, and persons made subject to this Order by its terms.
So Ordered. ENTERED:

DATE: October 6, 2017

s/Edmond E. Chang Honorable Edmond E. Chang United States District Judge

10

Case: 1:15-cv-11632 Document #: 91 Filed: 10/06/17 Page 11 of 12 PageID #:782

ATTACHMENT A

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

KEITH ROGERS, Plaintiff,
vs. SHERIFF OF COOK COUNTY and COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS,
Defendants.

)

)

)

15-cv-11632

)

)

Honorable Judge

)

Edmond E. Chang

)

)

)

)

ACKNOWLEDGMENT AND AGREEMENT TO BE BOUND

The undersigned hereby acknowledges that he/she has read the Confidentiality

Order dated _______ in the above-captioned action and attached hereto, understands the

terms thereof, and agrees to be bound by its terms. The undersigned submits to the

jurisdiction of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois in

matters relating to the Confidentiality Order and understands that the terms of the

Confidentiality Order obligate him/her to use materials designated as Confidential

Information in accordance with the Order solely for the purposes of the above-captioned

action, and not to disclose any such Confidential Information to any other person, firm or

concern.

The undersigned acknowledges that violation of the Confidentiality Order may

result in penalties for contempt of court.

Name:

_________________________________________

Job Title:

_________________________________________ 11

Case: 1:15-cv-11632 Document #: 91 Filed: 10/06/17 Page 12 of 12 PageID #:782

Employer:
Business Address:

_________________________________________
_________________________________________ _________________________________________ _________________________________________

Date:

_________

____________________________________ Signature

12

 </s> Case: 1:15-cv-11632 Document #: 132 Filed: 03/29/19 Page 1 of 4 PageID #:944

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

KEITH ROGERS, Plaintiff, v.
SHERIFF OF COOK COUNTY AND COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS
Defendants.

)

)

)

No. 15 C 11632

)

)

)

Judge Edmond E. Chang

)

)

)

)

ORDER

This Order addresses two pending motions filed by Keith Rogers.

Leave to File Second Amended Complaint. First, Rogers moves to file a second amended complaint to add two individuals as named plaintiffs, as well as additional claims under the American with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act. R. 110, Mtn. Amend ¶¶ 1-9. The Defendants object under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(b), because Rogers has not shown “good cause” for the amendment. R. 113, Opp. Mtn. Amend at 3.1 But Rogers correctly points out that the Court vacated the Rule 16(b) deadline in this case, R. 114, Pl.’s Reply at 1 (citing R. 40, 6/15/16 Minute Entry), and did not reset it after deciding a partial dismissal motion and discovery disputes arose. So Rogers is not required to show “good cause” for the proposed amendment. Instead, the proposal is subject only to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 15(a)(2), which instructs courts to give leave to amend “when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). The Seventh Circuit has elaborated that amendments should be allowed “unless there is good reason—futility, undue delay, undue prejudice, or bad faith—for denying leave to amend.” Life Plans, Inc. v. Sec. Life of Denver Ins. Co., 800 F.3d 343, 358 (7th Cir. 2015).

1R. 113 was filed by defendant Cook County. Opp. to Mtn. Amend at 1. The Sheriff of Cook County filed a motion to join in Cook County’s opposition shortly thereafter, which the
Court granted. R. 119, Mtn. to Join; R. 124, 4/18/18 Minute Entry.

Case: 1:15-cv-11632 Document #: 132 Filed: 03/29/19 Page 2 of 4 PageID #:944
There is no reason to deny leave to amend here. The first proposed amendment is the addition of two named plaintiffs—James Hill and Wanda Hollins. Mtn. Amend, Exh. 1, Proposed Second Amend. Compl. ¶ 2. The Defendants argue that this amendment is unduly prejudicial at this stage of the litigation when, for example, they have already disclosed an expert report. Opp. Mtn. Amend. at 4. But Rogers convincingly argues that this amendment was triggered by the Defendants’ Rule 26(a)(2)(C) expert summaries, in which they disclosed a witness who will challenge Rogers as a class representative.2 Mtn. Amend ¶ 6. Nor had fact discovery completely closed in this case; because it was obvious that the defense would at least offer its own employees as experts under Rule 702, the Court intentionally set Rule 26(a)(2)(C) summaries within the fact-discovery period. See R. 93, 10/11/17 Minute Entry (setting close of fact discovery as 2/8/18 and deadline for Rule 26(a)(2)(C) summaries as 12/11/17). As a result, the proposed amendment will not cause an undue delay, nor are the Defendants significantly prejudiced by adding the two additional plaintiffs. So the motion for leave to amend is granted as to the new plaintiffs. See Phillips v. Ford Motor Co., 435 F.3d 785, 787 (7th Cir. 2006) (“Substitution of unnamed class members for named plaintiffs who fall out of the case because of settlement or other reasons is a common and normally an unexceptionable (‘routine’) feature of class action litigation both in the federal courts and in the Illinois courts.”).
It is also granted as to Rogers’s proposed additional claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act, although this certainly presents a closer call. See Mtn. Amend ¶ 9. The statutory claims introduce another legal theory into the case, but the Defendants did not meaningfully contest the addition of these claims in their Opposition. Even if they had, there is a good chance that the Court would have granted the amendment over the objection, because any additional discovery that is required should be modest, given the factual overlap between these claims and Rogers’s constitutional claims. So there is no reason to deny Rogers leave to add these claims. The motion for leave to file an amended complaint is granted in its entirety.
2Neither party provides a satisfactory explanation of the challenge that the Defendants’ expert plans to make against Rogers, other than to quote his opinion that Rogers’s experience was “atypical of detainees admitted to [Opioid Treatment Program].” Mtn. Amend at 2. Nonetheless, the Court accepts as true Rogers’s claim that he was not aware of this defense until the Defendants’ Rule 26(a)(2)(C) disclosures, as the Defendants do not contest this in their briefing.
2

Case: 1:15-cv-11632 Document #: 132 Filed: 03/29/19 Page 3 of 4 PageID #:944
Rogers shall file the Second Amended Complaint as a separate docket entry, and the Defendants shall answer by April 26, 2019.
Time Limit on Detainee Data. Rogers’s second motion seeks to expand the time period for discoverable detainee data from January 20, 2014 to April 30, 2018. R. 115, Mtn. Vacate Temporal Limitation ¶ 3; R. 123, Pl.’s Reply at 9. The Defendants counter that Rogers’s motion does not comply with the previous order and that he should not now be permitted to “redefine the litigation.” R. 121, Defs.’ Resp at 1, 3. It is true that Rogers did not really follow the prior instructions: in June 2016, the Court denied the Defendants’ motion to dismiss and explained that Rogers could “seek data concerning other detainees on Count 2 [the delay in providing the first methadone dosage], but must start with the time period of 9/20/2013 through 1/20/2014.” R. 41, 6/27/16 Minute Entry. Because the data on which Rogers relied (which was from several years ago) showed that many detainees did get the first methadone dose before Day Four, the Court balanced the relevance, burden, and need of the discovery by limiting the time period of the detainee data. The Court also explained that, “if discovery for this time period shows a reason to keep going, then the time period can be expanded.” Id.
Although Rogers did not label his Counts in the Amended Complaint, see R. 24, Amend. Compl, the Court adopted the numbering used by the Defendants in their motion to dismiss, which defined Count Two as Rogers’s claim that “Defendants had a widespread practice or custom at CCJ of inordinate delay in providing methadone treatment to detainees.” R. 25, Mtn. Dismiss at 2. As explained above, Rogers was supposed to start with detainee data from 9/20/2013 through 1/20/2014. And if he wanted to expand the relevant time-period, he was supposed to present the Court with discovery that bolstered Count Two. Rogers instead argues that the time-period should be expanded to “permit [him] to identify all members of the putative class” and to help him “rebut any claim that [the] defendants do not actually apply the written policy [requiring tapering].” Mtn. Vacate Temporal Limitation ¶ 3; Pl.’s Reply at 5. Neither of those purposes is directly tied to Count Two or the original purpose of the discovery.
Having said that, at this point it is clear that the burden on the Defendants of producing the detainee data that Rogers wants (as very distinct from the underlying medical records, which Rogers does not want) is minimal. Rogers just wants an expanded version of the already-produced Excel spreadsheet that “identifies, through the jail identification number, the date the detainee entered the Jail, as well as the dates that the detainee received methadone.” Pl.’s Reply at 4. This request is not
3

Case: 1:15-cv-11632 Document #: 132 Filed: 03/29/19 Page 4 of 4 PageID #:944

overly burdensome, especially if the Defendants maintain this record in the ordinary course of business, as Rogers asserts. Id. Also, Rogers is permitted to obtain information about the detainees’ length of stay, because that information is relevant to both his delay and tapering claims. See id. at 5.3
The parties shall confer about the discovery and discuss a timeline for production. A status hearing is set for April 19, 2019, at 10:15 a.m. to get an update and set the schedule for the remainder of the case.
ENTERED:

DATE: March 29, 2019

s/Edmond E. Chang Honorable Edmond E. Chang United States District Judge

3The Defendants assert that additional discovery is unnecessary in light of the medical records already produced in the case: “If Plaintiff cannot make out a claim with 50,000 pages of medical records from the [Opioid Treatment Program], then perhaps a claim cannot properly be made.” Defs.’ Resp. at 3. This argument is unpersuasive because it is not at all clear Rogers even requested these records, see Pl.’s Reply at 7, and he has stated that he does not want any additional medical records moving forward, id. at 8.
4

 </s> MARTIN,PROTO
United States District Court Northern District of Illinois - CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 6.3.3 (Chicago)
CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:15-cv-11632

Rogers v. Cook County et al Assigned to: Honorable Edmond E. Chang Cause: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

Date Filed: 12/23/2015 Jury Demand: Both Nature of Suit: 555 Civil Rights (Prison Condition) Jurisdiction: Federal Question

Plaintiff Keith Rogers

represented by Kenneth N Flaxman Kenneth N. Flaxman, P.C. 200 South Michigan Avenue Suite 201 Chicago, IL 60604-6107 (312) 427-3200 Email: knf@kenlaw.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Joel A. Flaxman Kenneth N. Flaxman P.C. 200 S Michigan Ave Ste 201 Chicago, IL 60604 (312) 427-3200 Email: jaf@kenlaw.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Wanda Hollins

represented by Kenneth N Flaxman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff James Hill

represented by Kenneth N Flaxman (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V.

Defendant Sheriff of Cook County

represented by David Lee Bonner Cook County Assessor 118 North Clark Street, 3rd Floor Chicago, IL 60602 (312) 603-5331 Email: DBonner@cookcountyassessor.com TERMINATED: 06/19/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY
Gerald Michael Dombrowski Sanchez & Daniels 333 West Wacker Drive Suite 500 Chicago, IL 60606 (312) 641-1555 Email: gdombrowski@sanchezdh.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John Power Cook County State's Attorney's Office Richard J. Daley Center, Fifth Floor Chicago, IL 60602 312-603-4370 Email: John.Power@cookcountyil.gov TERMINATED: 06/19/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY
Anthony E. Zecchin Hale Law LLC 53 West Jackson Blvd. Suite 330 Chicago, IL 60604 (312) 870-6933 Email: azecchin@ahalelaw.com TERMINATED: 06/19/2019
Jessica Megan Scheller Office of the Cook County States Attorney 500 Richard J. Daley Center

Defendant Cook County Illinois

Chicago, IL 60602 312-603-6934 Email: jessica.scheller@cookcountyil.gov TERMINATED: 09/26/2018
Meghan Domenica White Sanchez Daniels & Hoffman 333 West Wacker Drive Suite 500 Chicago, IL 60606 (312) 641-1555 Email: mwhite@sanchezdh.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael Jude Sorich Cavanagh Law Group 161 N. Clark Street Chicago, IL 60601 (312) 425-1900 Email: mjs@CavanaghLawGroup.com TERMINATED: 04/25/2016
represented by David Lee Bonner (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/19/2019 LEAD ATTORNEY
James Chandler Cook County State's Attorney's Office 50 West Washington Street, 5th Floor Chicago, IL 60602 312 603-5471 Email: james.chandler@cookcountyil.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Thomas E. Cargie Cook County State's Attorney's Office (69W) 69 W. Washington

Date Filed

# Docket Text

Suite 3110 Chicago, IL 60602 (312) 603 1426 Email: thomas.cargie@cookcountyil.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Anthony E. Zecchin (See above for address) TERMINATED: 06/19/2019
Jessica Megan Scheller (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/26/2018
Lyle Kevin Henretty Cook County State's Attorney 2760 50 West Washington 20th Floor Chicago, IL 60602 312-603-1424 Email: lyle.henretty@cookcountyil.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael Jude Sorich (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/25/2016
Patrick Daniel Morris Cook County State's Attorney's Office 50 W. Washington Street Suite 2760 Chicago, IL 60602 312.603-1426 Email: patrick.morris@cookcountyil.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

12/23/2015 12/23/2015 12/23/2015 12/28/2015 12/28/2015 12/28/2015 01/08/2016 01/08/2016 01/08/2016
01/08/2016 01/08/2016 01/08/2016 01/11/2016

1 COMPLAINT filed by Keith Rogers; Jury Demand. Filing fee $ 400, receipt number 0752-11433006.(Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 12/23/2015)
2 CIVIL Cover Sheet (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 12/23/2015)
3 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiff Keith Rogers by Kenneth N Flaxman (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 12/23/2015)
CASE ASSIGNED to the Honorable Edmond E. Chang. Designated as Magistrate Judge the Honorable Daniel Martin. (daj, ) (Entered: 12/28/2015)
4 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiff Keith Rogers by Joel A. Flaxman (Flaxman, Joel) (Entered: 12/28/2015)
SUMMONS Issued as to Defendants Sheriff of Cook County, Cook County Illinois (jp, ) (Entered: 12/28/2015)
5 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendants Sheriff of Cook County, Cook County Illinois by David Lee Bonner (Bonner, David) (Entered: 01/08/2016)
6 MOTION by Defendants Sheriff of Cook County, Cook County Illinois for extension of time to file answer (Bonner, David) (Entered: 01/08/2016)
7 NOTICE of Motion by David Lee Bonner for presentment of motion for extension of time to file answer 6 before Honorable Edmond E. Chang on 1/19/2016 at 08:30 AM. (Bonner, David) (Entered: 01/08/2016)
8 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendants Sheriff of Cook County, Cook County Illinois by Michael Jude Sorich (Sorich, Michael) (Entered: 01/08/2016)
9 MOTION by Defendants Sheriff of Cook County, Cook County Illinois for extension of time to file answer (Bonner, David) (Entered: 01/08/2016)
10 NOTICE by Sheriff of Cook County, Cook County Illinois (Bonner, David) (Entered: 01/08/2016)
11 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Edmond E. Chang: Status hearing set for 03/14/2016 at 9:30 a.m. The parties must file a joint initial status report with the content described in the attached status report requirements at least 3 business days before the initial status hearing. Plaintiff must still file the report even if not all Defendants

01/15/2016
03/04/2016 03/04/2016 03/09/2016 03/14/2016

have been served or have responded to requests to craft a joint report. Additionally, the parties must read Judge Chang's Case Management Procedures on the Court's website; those Procedures are considered standing orders in this case. Judge Chang's Case Management Procedures were revised in December 2014.Emailed notice (Attachments: # 1 Status Report Requirements) (slb, ) (Entered: 01/11/2016)
12 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Edmond E. Chang: The defense extension motion [6, 9] to answer or respond to the complaint is granted to 03/04/2016. In view of the length of the extension, the Court does expect that there would likely not be a need for another extension. Emailed notice (slb, ) (Entered: 01/15/2016)
13 ANSWER to Complaint with Jury Demand by Sheriff of Cook County, Cook County Illinois(Bonner, David) (Entered: 03/04/2016)
14 NOTICE by Sheriff of Cook County, Cook County Illinois re answer to complaint 13 (Bonner, David) (Entered: 03/04/2016)
15 STATUS Report (Joint Initial Status Report) by Keith Rogers (Flaxman, Joel) (Entered: 03/09/2016)
18 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Edmond E. Chang: Status hearing held. Rule 26(a)(1) disclosures due 04/08/2016. The firstround of written discovery requests must be issued no later than 04/13/2016. Fact discovery, including treating physicians (Rule 26(a)(2)(C) disclosures for any treaters are due no later than 60 days before the close of fact of discovery), shall close by 08/16/2016. Rule 16(b) motions to add parties or amend pleadings are due by 06/13/2016. Any Rule 26(a)(2) expert disclosures (whether retained or not) are due 30 days after the close of fact discovery, and the 30-day deadline is adjusted automatically if the close of fact discovery is adjusted. No summary judgment motions may be filed before the close of discovery without leave of Court. The parties shall work promptly on a HIPAA order and discovery confidentiality order. As discussed in Court, Plaintiff's counsel tried to explain the length of the proposed discovery schedule by saying that, in addition to the methadone-delay claim, that there is also a claim for forced tapering for every detainee. But no such claim is in the complaint. Plaintiff must act very promptly if he wishes to seek leave to amend the complaint to assert that type of claim. With regard to settlement negotiations, Plaintiff shall send a settlement demand to Defendants by 03/16/2016, explaining in

03/15/2016 03/15/2016 03/16/2016 03/16/2016 03/16/2016 03/16/2016 03/18/2016

detail the basis for liability, itemizing damages, and making a good-faith demand that takes into account the risks of litigation, the time and expense of litigation. Defendants shall respond to Plaintiff's proposal by 03/31/2016, explaining in detail the basis for Defendant's offer and taking into account the same risks and costs of litigation. Defendants shall submit a copy of the proposal and response to chambers through the Proposed Order e-mail account. The parties may jointly call the courtroom deputy for a settlement referral to the magistrate judge or to schedule a settlement conference with the Court before the next status hearing. Status hearing set for 05/25/2016 at 9:00 a.m. Emailed notice (slb, ) (Entered: 03/15/2016)
16 MOTION by Plaintiff Keith Rogers for protective order (Agreed Motion for Entry of Agreed Qualified HIPAA Protective Order) (Flaxman, Joel) (Entered: 03/15/2016)
17 (Agreed Motion) NOTICE of Motion by Joel A. Flaxman for presentment of motion for protective order 16 before Honorable Edmond E. Chang on 3/21/2016 at 08:30 AM. (Flaxman, Joel) (Entered: 03/15/2016)
19 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Edmond E. Chang:Plaintiff's agreed motion for protective order 16 is granted. Emailed notice (slb, ) (Entered: 03/16/2016)
20 AGREED Qualified HIPAA Protective Order Signed by the Honorable Edmond E. Chang on 3/16/2016:Emailed notice(slb, ) (Entered: 03/16/2016)
21 MOTION by Plaintiff Keith Rogers to amend/correct complaint 1 (Unopposed Motion to File Amended Complaint) (Flaxman, Joel) (Entered: 03/16/2016)
22 NOTICE of Motion by Joel A. Flaxman for presentment of motion to amend/correct, motion for relief 21 before Honorable Edmond E. Chang on 3/21/2016 at 08:30 AM. (Flaxman, Joel) (Entered: 03/16/2016)
23 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Edmond E. Chang: Plaintiff's unopposed motion to file amended complaint 21] is granted. Plaintiff shall file the amended complaint on the docket as a separate entry. Defendants' answer due by 04/15/2016. Any supplemental Rule 26(a)(1) disclosures due by 04/22/2016 (still make the initial set of disclosures on the original complaint by 04/08/2016). Emailed notice (Chang, Edmond) (Entered: 03/18/2016)

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04/22/2016 04/22/2016

24 AMENDED complaint by Keith Rogers against All Defendants (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 03/18/2016)
25 MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM as to Count II (Bonner, David) (Entered: 04/01/2016)
26 NOTICE of Motion by David Lee Bonner for presentment of Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim 25 before Honorable Edmond E. Chang on 4/11/2016 at 08:30 AM. (Bonner, David) (Entered: 04/01/2016)
27 MEMORANDUM by Keith Rogers in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim 25 (Flaxman, Joel) (Entered: 04/05/2016)
28 MOTION by Plaintiff Keith Rogers for protective order (Flaxman, Joel) (Entered: 04/05/2016)
29 NOTICE of Motion by Joel A. Flaxman for presentment of motion for protective order 28 before Honorable Edmond E. Chang on 4/11/2016 at 08:30 AM. (Flaxman, Joel) (Entered: 04/05/2016)
30 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Edmond E. Chang: Both motions hearings [25, 28] of 04/11/2016 are reset to 04/18/2016 at 10:30 a.m. Emailed notice (slb, ) (Entered: 04/08/2016)
31 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Edmond E. Chang: Motion hearing held on Defendants' partial motion to dismiss 25 and Plaintiff's motion for protective order 28 . The Court discussed various issues and concerns with the parties. On the dismissal motion, Defendants shall file a reply by 04/25/2016. Plaintiff may file a sur-reply by 05/09/2016. The motion for protective order 28 is entered and continued. In light of the pending motion to dismiss, the answer deadline to the complaint is suspended, but the parties must proceed with discovery on the forced tapering claim (it was not targeted by the dismissal motion). Status hearing set for 05/19/2016 at 10:30 a.m.Emailed notice (slb, ) (Entered: 04/18/2016)
32 REPLY by Sheriff of Cook County, Cook County Illinois to MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM as to Count II 25 (Bonner, David) (Entered: 04/22/2016)
33 NOTICE by Sheriff of Cook County, Cook County Illinois re reply to response to motion 32 (Bonner, David) (Entered: 04/22/2016)

04/25/2016 05/09/2016 05/18/2016
06/07/2016
06/13/2016 06/13/2016 06/15/2016 06/27/2016

34 WITHDRAWING Michael J. Sorich as counsel for Defendants Sheriff of Cook County, Cook County Illinois and substituting Anthony E. Zecchin as counsel of record (Zecchin, Anthony) (Entered: 04/25/2016)
35 SUR-REPLY by Plaintiff Keith Rogers to Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim 25 (Plaintiff's Sur-Reply in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss) (Flaxman, Joel) (Entered: 05/09/2016)
36 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Edmond E. Chang: Defendants' partial motion to dismiss 25 and Plaintiff's related motion for HIPAA protective order 28 are under advisement. The parties must continue to make progress on discovery for the forced tapering claim. Status hearing of 05/19/2016 (as well as the previously set status hearing of 05/25/2016) is reset to 06/08/2016 at 10:15 a.m.Emailed notice (slb, ) (Entered: 05/18/2016)
37 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Edmond E. Chang: The Court has under advisement Defendants' partial motion to dismiss 25 (and the related motion for HIPAA protective order 28 filed by Plaintiff). The parties should continue to take discovery for the tapering claim. Status hearing of 06/08/2016 is reset to 06/28/2016 at 10:15 AM.Emailed notice (slb, ) (Entered: 06/07/2016)
38 MOTION by Plaintiff Keith Rogers to vacate Deadlines for Rule 16(b) Motions and Rule 26(a)(2)(C) Disclosures (Flaxman, Joel) (Entered: 06/13/2016)
39 NOTICE of Motion by Joel A. Flaxman for presentment of motion to vacate 38 before Honorable Edmond E. Chang on 6/16/2016 at 08:30 AM. (Flaxman, Joel) (Entered: 06/13/2016)
40 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Edmond E. Chang: Plaintiff's motion to vacate Rule 16(b) and Rule 26(a)(2)(C) disclosures 38 is granted, in view of the pending partial dismissal motion and the discovery back/forth cited in the motion. The Court will reset the schedule at the next status hearing. Emailed notice (slb, ) (Entered: 06/15/2016)
41 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Edmond E. Chang: After reviewing the briefs on Defendants' motion to dismiss Count 2 25 , the Court denies the motion, though it is a close call. Despite the parties' arguments to the contrary, there is no bright-line rule either way when it comes to adequately alleging Monell claims. The substantive elements of the underlying constitutional right and the

06/27/2016 06/28/2016

particular circumstances of each factual setting will vary too much from case to case for there to be a bright line. Here, proving the methadone-delay claim will require Plaintiff to prove deliberate indifference to that medical need, meaning, that policy makers disregarded a serious risk that there would be a delay in administering methadone till the fourth day of detention (Day Four is the benchmark that Plaintiff focuses on). The 2009-2011 data relied on by Plaintiff show 73 detainees did not get methadone until the fourth day -- but many more detainees (1,368 of them) *did* receive methadone sometime during Days Zero through Tree. And Plaintiff was not detained until 01/20/2014, so the data's usefulness is questionable. But this type of scrutiny of the facts is not for the dismissal-motion stage. So the motion is denied, and Defendants must answer the Amended Complaint by 07/11/2016. Moreover, discovery will proceed to reflect the substantive standard and the need to balance efficiency and proportionality. Specifically, Plaintiff may seek data concerning other detainees on Count 2, but must start with the time period of 09/20/2013 through 01/20/2014. This four-month time period, at least to start, makes sense because Monell requires that the municipality's policy or custom be the moving force to the violation. If discovery does not unearth some evidence of the unlawful policy or custom for the four-month period before Plaintiff's detention, then the discovery will stop. On the other hand, if discovery for this time period shows a reason to keep going, then the time period can be expanded. The motion for HIPAA protective order 28 is granted, in light of the anticipated discovery. The HIPAA order will be entered on the docket separately. At the next status hearing, the Court will set the remainder of the discovery schedule.Emailed notice (Chang, Edmond) (Entered: 06/27/2016)
42 SECOND Quailified HIPAA Protective Order Signed by the Honorable Edmond E. Chang on 6/27/2016:Emailed notice(slb, ) (Entered: 06/27/2016)
43 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Edmond E. Chang: Status hearing held. Fact discovery, including treating physicians (Rule 26(a)(2)(C) disclosures for any treaters are due no later than 45 days before the close of fact discovery), shall close by 12/05/2016. Any Rule 26(a)(2) expert disclosures (whether retained or not) are due 30 days after the close of fact discovery, and the 30-day deadline is adjusted automatically if the close of fact discovery is adjusted. No summary judgment motions may be filed before the close of discovery without leave of Court. Plaintiff's counsel mentioned the possibility of class-action treatment, but right now the case is alleged as an individual action. Plaintiff may seek leave

07/06/2016 07/11/2016 07/11/2016 07/11/2016 08/08/2016 08/08/2016 08/09/2016
08/11/2016
08/15/2016

to amend the complaint, but the parties must bear this in mind for discovery so that the parties are able to brief a motion for class certification after the close of discovery (if the complaint is amended to allege a class). Status hearing set for 08/31/2016 at 9:30 AM.Emailed notice (slb, ) (Entered: 06/28/2016)
44 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendant Cook County Illinois by Thomas E. Cargie (Cargie, Thomas) (Entered: 07/06/2016)
45 ANSWER to amended complaint and Affirmative Defenses by Cook County Illinois(Cargie, Thomas) (Entered: 07/11/2016)
46 ANSWER to amended complaint by Sheriff of Cook County(Bonner, David) (Entered: 07/11/2016)
47 NOTICE by Sheriff of Cook County re answer to amended complaint 46 (Bonner, David) (Entered: 07/11/2016)
48 MOTION by Plaintiff Keith Rogers to compel (Flaxman, Joel) (Entered: 08/08/2016)
49 NOTICE of Motion by Joel A. Flaxman for presentment of motion to compel 48 before Honorable Edmond E. Chang on 8/11/2016 at 08:30 AM. (Flaxman, Joel) (Entered: 08/08/2016)
50 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Edmond E. Chang: On the Court's own initiative, the motion hearing on Plaintiff's motion to compel 48 is reset to 1:30 p.m. on the same date, 08/11/2016.Emailed notice (slb, ) (Entered: 08/09/2016)
51 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Edmond E. Chang: Motion hearing held on Plaintiff's motion compel 48 . The County disclosed data in response to Document Request 1. With regard to the remaining issues, by 08/16/2016, the parties shall confer on the motion. After the initial conferral, the parties shall have a followup conferral on 08/22/2016. The motion is entered and continued to 08/23/2016 at 1:30 p.m., at which time the Court will address any remaining disputes.Emailed notice (slb, ) (Entered: 08/11/2016)
52 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS held on 3-14-16 before the Honorable Edmond E. Chang.
Court Reporter Contact Information: Krista Flynn Burgeson, Krista_Burgeson@ilnd.uscourts.gov, 312-435-5567.
IMPORTANT: The transcript may be viewed at the court's public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber

08/23/2016 09/13/2016

before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through the Court Reporter/Transcriber or PACER. For further information on the redaction process, see the Court's web site at www.ilnd.uscourts.gov under Quick Links select Policy Regarding the Availability of Transcripts of Court Proceedings.
Redaction Request due 9/5/2016. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 9/15/2016. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 11/14/2016. (Burgeson, Krista) (Entered: 08/15/2016)
53 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Edmond E. Chang: Motion hearing held on Plaintiff's motion to compel 48 . As a formal matter, the motion is terminated as no longer necessary in view of the conferrals and agreed disclosures, and because pre-motion conferrals were not really sufficient to justify a compulsion order. As discussed during the hearing, Defendants shall respond to Plaintiff's Interrogatories 4, 5, and 14 by 08/26/2016. By 09/17/2016, Defendants shall produce documents responsive to the pending production requests, covering the time period 01/01/2011 to 01/20/2014. Pending the entry of a protective order as to certain designated documents, the documents shall be disclosed under attorney's-eyes only protection (but also allowing Plaintiff's experts to review them) to avoid delay. Defendants' motion for protective order, invoking the Medical Studies Act or other privilege, statute, or regulation, due 09/17/2016. Plaintiff's response, if any, due 09/24/2016. Defense reply due 10/03/2016. The status hearing of 08/31/2016 is reset to 10/11/2016 at 9:30 a.m. Emailed notice (slb, ) (Entered: 08/25/2016)
54 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS held on August 23, 2016, before the Honorable Edmond E. Chang. Court Reporter Contact Information: Nancy L. Bistany, CSR, RPR, FCRR nancy_bistany@ilnd.uscourts.gov - 312.435.7626.
IMPORTANT: The transcript may be viewed at the court's public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through the Court Reporter/Transcriber or PACER. For further information on the redaction process, see the Court's web site at www.ilnd.uscourts.gov under Quick Links select Policy Regarding the Availability of Transcripts of Court Proceedings.

09/19/2016 09/26/2016 10/03/2016 10/07/2016
10/11/2016 10/11/2016 10/11/2016 10/14/2016 10/27/2016 10/31/2016

Redaction Request due 10/4/2016. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 10/14/2016. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 12/12/2016. (Bistany, Nancy) (Entered: 09/13/2016)
55 MOTION by Defendant Cook County Illinois for protective order and support for claim of privilege pursuant to Illinois Medical Studies Act. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2)(Cargie, Thomas) (Entered: 09/19/2016)
56 MEMORANDUM by Keith Rogers in Opposition to motion for protective order 55 (Flaxman, Joel) (Entered: 09/26/2016)
57 REPLY by Defendant Cook County Illinois to motion for protective order 55 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1)(Cargie, Thomas) Modified on 10/3/2016 (kp, ). (Docket Text modified by Clerks Office). (Entered: 10/03/2016)
58 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Edmond E. Chang: With regard to the motion for protective order 55 , Defendant Cook County shall file on the electronic docket, under seal and ex parte, a copy of both the redacted and unredacted Opioid Treatment Program documents referred to in the briefing. (If Defendant files the documents under seal electronically, it will automatically be ex parte because no party/attorney will be able to access it.) The filing shall be made by 10/12/2016. The status hearing of 10/11/2016 is reset to 10/26/2016 at 9:15 AM.Emailed notice (slb, ) (Entered: 10/07/2016)
59 SEALED DOCUMENT by Defendant Cook County Illinois (Cargie, Thomas) (Entered: 10/11/2016)
60 SEALED DOCUMENT by Defendant Cook County Illinois (Cargie, Thomas) (Entered: 10/11/2016)
61 SEALED DOCUMENT by Defendant Cook County Illinois Amended filing (Cargie, Thomas) (Entered: 10/11/2016)
62 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Edmond E. Chang: Due to the Court's trial schedule, the status hearing of 10/26/2016 is reset to 11/03/2016 at 9 a.m. Emailed notice (slb, ) (Entered: 10/14/2016)
63 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendant Sheriff of Cook County by John Power (Power, John) (Entered: 10/27/2016)
64 MOTION by Plaintiff Keith Rogers to compel (Flaxman, Joel) (Entered: 10/31/2016)

10/31/2016 11/01/2016
11/09/2016 11/09/2016 11/09/2016 11/14/2016 11/14/2016 11/15/2016
11/18/2016 11/21/2016

65 NOTICE of Motion by Joel A. Flaxman for presentment of motion to compel 64 before Honorable Edmond E. Chang on 11/3/2016 at 08:30 AM. (Flaxman, Joel) (Entered: 10/31/2016)
66 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Edmond E. Chang: On Plaintiff's motion to compel 64 certain detainee information, the defense shall respond by 11/09/2016. Plaintiff may reply by 11/14/2016. The status and motion hearing are reset to 11/16/2016 at 10:45 AM.Emailed notice (slb, ) (Entered: 11/01/2016)
67 MOTION by Plaintiff Keith Rogers to vacate and Reset Discovery Cutoff Date in Light of Pending Discovery Motions (Flaxman, Joel) (Entered: 11/09/2016)
68 NOTICE of Motion by Joel A. Flaxman for presentment of motion to vacate 67 before Honorable Edmond E. Chang on 11/15/2016 at 08:30 AM. (Flaxman, Joel) (Entered: 11/09/2016)
69 RESPONSE by Sheriff of Cook Countyin Opposition to MOTION by Plaintiff Keith Rogers to compel 64 (Attachments: # 1 Notice of Filing)(Power, John) (Entered: 11/09/2016)
70 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Edmond E. Chang: Plaintiff's discovery extension motion 67 is entered and continued to 11/16/2016, at 10:45 a.m., to coincide with the status hearing. Emailed notice (slb, ) (Entered: 11/14/2016)
71 REPLY by Keith Rogers to response in opposition to motion 69 (Flaxman, Joel) (Entered: 11/14/2016)
72 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Edmond E. Chang: The Court has under advisement the defense motion for protective order 55 and Plaintiff's motion to compel 64 . The status and motion hearings of 11/16/2016 are reset to 12/02/2016 at 10:45 a.m. The extension motion on fact discovery 67 is granted; even if the protective order is granted and the motion to compel denied, still the parties would need to consider whether additional discovery is needed. A new deadline will be set at the next hearing. Emailed notice (slb, ) (Entered: 11/15/2016)
73 RESPONSE by Defendant Sheriff of Cook County to response in opposition to motion 69 Supplemental Response (Attachments: # 1 Notice of Filing)(Power, John) (Entered: 11/18/2016)
74 MOTION by Plaintiff Keith Rogers to certify class (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 11/21/2016)

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12/01/2016 12/06/2016 12/12/2016 12/18/2016

75 NOTICE of Motion by Kenneth N Flaxman for presentment of motion to certify class 74 before Honorable Edmond E. Chang on 11/30/2016 at 08:30 AM. (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 11/21/2016)
76 MOTION by Defendant Sheriff of Cook County for protective order , MOTION by Defendant Sheriff of Cook County to quash (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibit 1)(Power, John) (Entered: 11/22/2016)
77 NOTICE of Motion by John Power for presentment of motion for protective order, motion to quash 76 before Honorable Edmond E. Chang on 11/30/2016 at 08:30 AM. (Power, John) (Entered: 11/22/2016)
78 AMENDED NOTICE of Motion by Kenneth N Flaxman for presentment of motion to certify class 74 before Honorable Edmond E. Chang on 12/2/2016 at 10:45 AM. (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 11/27/2016)
79 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Edmond E. Chang: Plaintiff's motion to certify class 74 is reset to coincide with the status hearing of 12/02/2016 at 10:45 a.m., when the Court will discuss whether the motion is ready to be briefed. Defendant Sherriff's motion for protective order 76 is also reset to the status hearing date and time; in the meantime, the discovery requests that are the subject of the motion are suspended.Emailed notice (slb, ) (Entered: 11/29/2016)
80 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Edmond E. Chang: To allow more time for the Court to review the filings, the status and motion hearings of 12/02/2016 are reset to 12/13/2016 at 10 a.m. Emailed notice (slb, ) (Entered: 12/01/2016)
81 RESPONSE by Keith Rogersin Opposition to MOTION by Defendant Sheriff of Cook County for protective order MOTION by Defendant Sheriff of Cook County to quash 76 (Flaxman, Joel) (Entered: 12/06/2016)
82 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Edmond E. Chang: The Court has the pending motions under advisement and resets the status hearing of 12/13/2016 to 12/19/2016 at 2:30 p.m. Emailed notice (slb, ) (Entered: 12/12/2016)
83 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Edmond E. Chang: The status hearing and pending motions 55 74 76 are reset from

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10/06/2017 10/10/2017

12/19/2016 to 01/06/2017 at 09:30 AM.Emailed notice (Chang, Edmond) (Entered: 12/18/2016)
84 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Edmond E. Chang: In light of an appellate-argument scheduling conflict on Plaintiff's counsel's calendar, the hearing of 01/06/2017 is reset to 01/11/2017 at 11 a.m. Emailed notice (slb, ) (Entered: 01/04/2017)
85 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Edmond E. Chang: The Court will post an order dealing with the pending discovery motions in due course, and will reset the status hearing at that time. The status hearing of 01/11/2017 is vacated.Emailed notice (Chang, Edmond) (Entered: 01/10/2017)
86 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendant Cook County Illinois by James J. Chandler (Chandler, James) (Entered: 08/07/2017)
87 MOTION by Plaintiff Keith Rogers to expedite ruling (Flaxman, Joel) (Entered: 09/22/2017)
88 NOTICE of Motion by Joel A. Flaxman for presentment of motion to expedite 87 before Honorable Edmond E. Chang on 9/28/2017 at 08:30 AM. (Flaxman, Joel) (Entered: 09/22/2017)
89 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Edmond E. Chang: The Court plans to issue a decision on the discovery motions in the next week, so the motion to expedite 87 is denied. Emailed notice (slb, ) (Entered: 09/27/2017)
90 ORDER signed by the Honorable Edmond E. Chang on 9/29/2017: For the reasons stated in the Order, Defendants' motion for protective order as to OTP Committee 55 is denied in large part and granted in part; Plaintiff's motion to compel data 64 is granted in part and denied in part; Defendants' motion 76 to quash 30(b)(6) notice is granted in light of the decision on the motion to compel data; and Plaintiff's motion 74 to certify class is terminated without prejudice as premature. At the next status hearing, the Court will discuss the discovery plan, including class-certification discovery, with the parties. The status hearing is set for 10/11/2017, at 10 a.m. Emailed notice(Chang, Edmond) (Entered: 09/29/2017)
91 PROTECTIVE Order signed by the Honorable Edmond E. Chang on 10/6/2017: This is the confidentiality order governing discovery materials.Emailed notice(Chang, Edmond) (Entered: 10/06/2017)
92 CERTIFICATE of Service of Defendant, Cook County's Production of Un-Redacted Documents Pursuant to Judge Emdond

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Chang's Order dated September 29, 2017 by James J. Chandler on behalf of Cook County Illinois (Chandler, James) (Entered: 10/10/2017)
93 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Edmond E. Chang: Status hearing held. The Court discussed a reasonable deadline to close fact discovery on the merits of Plaintiff's individual claim and the propriety of class certification. Plaintiff reported that he will not need a retained expert for class certification; the defense was not yet sure. To the extent that the defense will use County employees as Rule 26(a)(2)(C) experts, the summaries are due by 12/11/2017. Fact discovery on individual merits and the propriety of class certification shall close by 02/08/2018, and if no retained experts are disclosed that will be the close of all discovery (the parties should have a firmer idea on retained experts by the next status hearing). Status hearing is set for 12/12/2017 at 10:15 a.m. Mailed notice (ags, ) (Entered: 10/11/2017)
94 WITHDRAWING James J. Chandler as counsel for Defendant Sheriff of Cook County and substituting Jessica Megan Scheller as counsel of record (Scheller, Jessica) (Entered: 11/07/2017)
95 WITHDRAWING David Lee Bonner, Jessica Megan Scheller, John Power and Anthony E. Zecchin as counsel for Defendant Sheriff of Cook County and substituting Gerald Michael Dombrowski as counsel of record (Dombrowski, Gerald) (Entered: 11/30/2017)
96 WITHDRAWING James J. Chandler as counsel for Defendant Cook County Illinois and substituting Jessica Megan Scheller as counsel of record (Scheller, Jessica) (Entered: 12/07/2017)
97 MOTION by Defendant Cook County Illinois for extension of time to complete discovery Unopposed (Scheller, Jessica) (Entered: 12/07/2017)
98 Unopposed NOTICE of Motion by Jessica Megan Scheller for presentment of motion for extension of time to complete discovery 97 before Honorable Edmond E. Chang on 12/12/2017 at 08:30 AM. (Scheller, Jessica) (Entered: 12/07/2017)
99 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Edmond E. Chang: The agreed extension motion 97 on the deadline for the County employees Rule 26(a)(2)(C) summaries is granted to 01/05/2018. The status hearing of 12/12/2017 is reset to 01/08/2018 at 9:15 a.m.Emailed notice (slb, ) (Entered: 12/11/2017)

12/11/2017 01/08/2018
02/07/2018 02/07/2018 02/08/2018 02/08/2018
02/21/2018

100 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendant Sheriff of Cook County by Meghan Domenica White (White, Meghan) (Entered: 12/11/2017)
101 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Edmond E. Chang: Status hearing held. Counsel for both sides reported on the status of discovery. Defendants made a physician Rule 26(a)(2)(C) summary disclosure by the 01/05/2018 deadline. Defendants shall disclose supporting documents by 01/22/2018. By 01/15/2018, Plaintiff shall serve Defendant with a request for production of documents as to the Rule 26 summary; Plaintiff will be seeking data as to the length of stay at the Jail before transfer to IDOC. By 01/29/2018, the parties shall confer on the document request. If a dispute remains after the conferral, then Plaintiff shall file a motion to compel by 02/07/2018, noticed for the next status hearing date and time, and if the motion provides plausible grounds for relief, then the Court will set a response deadline at that hearing. Status hearing set for 02/13/2018 at 11:30 a.m., at which time the deadline for the physician's deposition will be set (if it has not occurred yet). Emailed notice (slb, ) (Entered: 01/08/2018)
102 MOTION by Defendant Cook County Illinois for extension of time to complete discovery Unopposed (Scheller, Jessica) (Entered: 02/07/2018)
103 MOTION by Plaintiff Keith Rogers to compel , MOTION by Plaintiff Keith Rogers for extension of time to complete discovery (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 02/07/2018)
104 NOTICE of Motion by Kenneth N Flaxman for presentment of motion to compel, motion for extension of time to complete discovery 103 before Honorable Edmond E. Chang on 2/13/2018 at 11:30 AM. (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 02/08/2018)
105 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Edmond E. Chang: Defendant's unopposed extension motion 102 to produce documents is granted to 02/14/2018. Plaintiff's motion 103 to compel and extend fact discovery is continued until after the production and review of it. The status hearing of 02/13/2018 is reset to 02/26/2018 at 9:30 a.m. By 02/21/2018, Plaintiff shall file a supplement to the motion to compel, either to withdraw it, narrow it, or to explain why all the issues remain pending. Emailed notice (slb, ) (Entered: 02/08/2018)
106 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendant Cook County Illinois by Lyle Kevin Henretty (Henretty, Lyle) (Entered: 02/21/2018)

02/21/2018 02/21/2018 02/23/2018
03/16/2018 03/16/2018 03/19/2018 03/28/2018 04/03/2018 04/03/2018

107 MOTION by Defendant Sheriff of Cook County for extension of time to complete discovery (Henretty, Lyle) (Entered: 02/21/2018)
108 NOTICE of Motion by Lyle Kevin Henretty for presentment of motion for extension of time to complete discovery 107 before Honorable Edmond E. Chang on 3/1/2018 at 08:30 AM. (Henretty, Lyle) (Entered: 02/21/2018)
109 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Edmond E. Chang: Defendants' unopposed extension motion 107 on deadlines is granted as follows: first, the County shall produce the follow-up documents on the Rule 26(a)(2)(C) by 03/23/2018. If there is a remaining dispute, then Plaintiff shall file its motion to compel by 03/30/2018, noticed for the next status hearing date and time. Plaintiff's original motion 103 to compel is terminated without prejudice to filing the new motion (if one is filed at all). The status hearing of 02/26/2018 is reset to 04/09/2018 at 10:00 a.m. The Court notes that, by this time, this discovery (and the follow-up directly related to it) should be the **only** topics of fact discovery remaining to be completed. The fact discovery deadline on the limited topics is set for 05/07/2018, but that deadline might be accelerated or delayed depending on the additional conferrals and production. Emailed notice (slb, ) (Entered: 02/23/2018)
110 MOTION by Plaintiff Keith Rogers to amend/correct complaint 1 (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 03/16/2018)
111 NOTICE of Motion by Kenneth N Flaxman for presentment of motion to amend/correct 110 before Honorable Edmond E. Chang on 3/21/2018 at 08:30 AM. (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 03/16/2018)
112 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Edmond E. Chang: On Plaintiff's motion 110 to file a second amended complaint, Defendants shall respond by 03/28/2018. Plaintiff shall reply by 04/03/2018. Emailed notice (slb, ) (Entered: 03/19/2018)
113 RESPONSE by Defendant Cook County Illinois to notice of motion 111 and in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Amend (ECF No. 110). (Scheller, Jessica) (Entered: 03/28/2018)
114 REPLY by Plaintiff Keith Rogers to Response 113 (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 04/03/2018)
115 MOTION by Plaintiff Keith Rogers to vacate temporal limitation set in ECF No. 41 (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 04/03/2018)

04/03/2018 04/06/2018 04/08/2018
04/10/2018
04/10/2018 04/13/2018 04/16/2018 04/17/2018 04/18/2018

116 NOTICE of Motion by Kenneth N Flaxman for presentment of motion to vacate 115 before Honorable Edmond E. Chang on 4/9/2018 at 08:30 AM. (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 04/03/2018)
117 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Edmond E. Chang: Plaintiff's motion 115 to expand time period is reset to 10 a.m. on the same date, 04/09/2018, to coincide with the previously set status hearing. Emailed notice (slb, ) (Entered: 04/06/2018)
118 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Edmond E. Chang: On Plaintiff's motion 115 to expand time period, the defense shall respond by 04/13/2018. Plaintiff may reply by 04/17/2018. The status and motion hearings of 04/09/2018 are reset for 04/19/2018 at 02:15 PM.Emailed notice (Chang, Edmond) (Entered: 04/08/2018)
119 MOTION by Defendants Sheriff of Cook County, Cook County Illinois to join Co-Defendant Cook Countys Response in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(White, Meghan) (Entered: 04/10/2018)
120 NOTICE of Motion by Meghan Domenica White for presentment of motion to join 119 before Honorable Edmond E. Chang on 4/19/2018 at 02:15 PM. (White, Meghan) (Entered: 04/10/2018)
121 RESPONSE by Cook County Illinoisin Opposition to MOTION by Plaintiff Keith Rogers to vacate temporal limitation set in ECF No. 41 115 (Scheller, Jessica) (Entered: 04/13/2018)
122 STATUS Report regarding joining Cook County's Response (ECF No. 121) by Sheriff of Cook County (White, Meghan) (Entered: 04/16/2018)
123 REPLY by Plaintiff Keith Rogers to response in opposition to motion 121 (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 04/17/2018)
124 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Edmond E. Chang: The Sheriff's motion 119 to join the County's response on the opposition to the filing of a second amended complaint is granted. Plaintiff's motion to amend 110 and to expand discovery time period 115 are taken under advisement. The motion and status hearings of 04/19/2018 are reset to 05/08/2018 at 11:00 a.m., and the fact discovery deadline will be adjusted as necessary. Emailed notice (slb, ) (Entered: 04/18/2018)

05/07/2018 125
06/07/2018 126 07/11/2018 127 09/21/2018 128 09/21/2018 129 09/26/2018 130 01/10/2019 131 03/29/2019 132
03/30/2019 133

MINUTE entry before the Honorable Edmond E. Chang: The Court has Plaintiff's motion to amend 110 and to expand discovery time period 115 under advisement. The motion and status hearings of 05/08/2018 are reset to 06/11/2018 at 9:15 a.m. The fact discovery deadline will be adjusted as necessary after the decision on the motions. Emailed notice (slb, ) (Entered: 05/07/2018)
MINUTE entry before the Honorable Edmond E. Chang:The motion to amend 110 the complaint and to expand discovery time period 115 remain under advisement. The motion and status hearings of 06/11/2018 are reset to 07/11/2018 at 10:45 AM.Emailed notice (slb, ) (Entered: 06/07/2018)
MINUTE entry before the Honorable Edmond E. Chang:The pending motions 110 115 remain under advisement. A decision will be posted to the docket when ready. The status hearing of 07/11/2018 is vacated and will be reset when the decision is posted.Emailed notice (eec) (Entered: 07/11/2018)
MOTION by Attorney Jessica Megan Scheller to withdraw as attorney for Sheriff of Cook County, Cook County Illinois. No party information provided (Scheller, Jessica) (Entered: 09/21/2018)
NOTICE of Motion by Jessica Megan Scheller for presentment of motion to withdraw as attorney 128 before Honorable Edmond E. Chang on 9/27/2018 at 08:30 AM. (Scheller, Jessica) (Entered: 09/21/2018)
MINUTE entry before the Honorable Edmond E. Chang: Defendants' motion to withdraw the appearance of Jessica Megan 128 is granted. Emailed notice (slb, ) (Entered: 09/26/2018)
ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendant Cook County Illinois by Patrick Daniel Morris (Morris, Patrick) (Entered: 01/10/2019)
ORDER signed by the Honorable Edmond E. Chang on 3/29/2019: For the reasons stated in the Order, the motion to amend complaint 110 is granted. Plaintiff shall file the second amended complaint on the docket separately. Defendants' answer is due by 04/26/2019. Plaintiff's motion to vacate time limit on detainee data is 115 is granted. A status hearing is set for 04/19/2019 at 10:15 AM. Emailed notice(eec) (Entered: 03/29/2019)
Second AMENDED complaint by Keith Rogers, Wanda Hollins, James Hill against All Defendants (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 03/30/2019)

04/17/2019 04/19/2019 04/25/2019 04/26/2019
05/03/2019 06/17/2019 06/17/2019 06/17/2019 06/17/2019 06/19/2019

134 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Edmond E. Chang: At defense's request and without objection, the status hearing of 04/19/2019 is reset to 04/26/2019 at 10:15 a.m. Emailed notice (slb, ) (Entered: 04/17/2019)
135 ANSWER to amended complaint Second Amended by Sheriff of Cook County(White, Meghan) (Entered: 04/19/2019)
136 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Edmond E. Chang: On the Court's own initiative, the status hearing at 10:15 a.m. is reset to 10 a.m on the same date, 04/26/2019.Emailed notice (slb, ) (Entered: 04/25/2019)
137 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Edmond E. Chang: Status hearing held. Defense counsel reported that the expanded version of the already-produced Excel spreadsheet with detainee data through 03/31/2019 is being prepared. Plaintiffs' counsel reported that the medical records of the newly added Plaintiffs had previously been produced. Fact discovery on individual merits and the propriety of class certification shall close by 09/24/2019. Status hearing set for 06/26/2019 at 9:00 a.m.Emailed notice (slb, ) (Entered: 04/26/2019)
138 ANSWER to amended complaint Second Amended Complaint by Cook County Illinois(Henretty, Lyle) (Entered: 05/03/2019)
139 MOTION by Plaintiff Keith Rogers to compel [production of ESI] (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 06/17/2019)
140 NOTICE of Motion by Kenneth N Flaxman for presentment of motion to compel 139 before Honorable Edmond E. Chang on 6/20/2019 at 08:30 AM. (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 06/17/2019)
141 MOTION by Attorney John Power, Anthony Zecchin, David Bonner to withdraw as attorney for Sheriff of Cook County, Cook County Illinois. No party information provided (Power, John) (Entered: 06/17/2019)
142 NOTICE of Motion by John Power for presentment of motion to withdraw as attorney 141 before Honorable Edmond E. Chang on 6/24/2019 at 08:30 AM. (Power, John) (Entered: 06/17/2019)
143 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Edmond E. Chang: Motion by Attorneys John Power, Anthony Zecchin, and David Bonner to withdraw as attorneys for Sheriff of Cook County, Cook County Illinois 141 is granted. Emailed notice (slb, ) (Entered: 06/19/2019)

06/19/2019 06/25/2019 06/25/2019 06/25/2019 06/26/2019
07/19/2019 07/21/2019
09/10/2019 10/10/2019

144 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Edmond E. Chang: On Plaintiff's motion 139 to compel, the defense response is due by 06/25/2019 before 12 p.m. The motion hearing is reset to coincide with the previously set status hearing on 06/26/2019 at 9 a.m. Emailed notice (slb, ) (Entered: 06/19/2019)
145 MEMORANDUM by Sheriff of Cook County in Opposition to motion to compel 139 (White, Meghan) (Entered: 06/25/2019)
146 NOTICE by Sheriff of Cook County re memorandum in opposition to motion 145 of Filing (White, Meghan) (Entered: 06/25/2019)
147 REPLY by Keith Rogers to memorandum in opposition to motion 145 (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 06/25/2019)
148 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Edmond E. Chang: Status and motion hearing held on Plaintiff's motion to compel 139 . As discussed during the hearing, by 07/10/2019, the parties shall confer again on the feasibility of extracting the unique ID, birth year, type of charge, bond amount, entry date, release date, and type of release for detainees from 01/20/2014 to 03/31/2019. If disputes remain after the conferral, then the defense shall file a supplemental response by 07/15/2019. Status and hearing on the motion to compel 139 is continued to 07/22/2019 at 10:00 a.m.Emailed notice (slb, ) (Entered: 06/27/2019)
149 STATUS Report by Keith Rogers (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 07/19/2019)
150 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Edmond E. Chang: In view of the status report filed by Plaintiff, R. 149, the motion to compel 139 is terminated after the disclosures made by the defense. The status hearing of 07/22/2019 is reset to 10/10/2019 at 10:00 a.m., at which time fact discovery shall be complete and the parties shall be prepared to discuss the next step of the litigation. (Chang, Edmond) (Entered: 07/21/2019)
151 CERTIFICATE of Service of Third Request to Admit by Kenneth N Flaxman on behalf of James Hill, Wanda Hollins, Keith Rogers (Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 09/10/2019)
152 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Edmond E. Chang:Status hearing held. The parties reported that fact discovery is nearly completed, with a few lingering issues that will not hold-up the next phase of the case. Plaintiff's counsel reported that he is prepared to file a motion for class certification. Plaintiffs' motion for class certification due 10/31/2019. Defendants' joint response to

10/31/2019 153

the class-certification motion due 12/09/2019. Plaintiffs' reply due 01/10/2020. By 11/08/2019, the parties shall confer on whether Defendants need to retain an expert in order to respond to the motion for class certification; if so, the defense shall file a prompt motion. Status hearing set for 01/10/2020 at 10 a.m.Emailed notice (slb, ) (Entered: 10/10/2019) MOTION by Plaintiffs James Hill, Wanda Hollins, Keith Rogers to certify class Responses due by 12/9/2019 (Attachments: # 1
Exhibit Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit Ex 1 Rogers
Methadone Form, # 3 Exhibit Ex 2 Rogers Methadone
Prescription, # 4 Exhibit Ex 3 Rogers Dosing History, # 5
Exhibit Ex 4 Rogers Deposition Excerpts, # 6 Exhibit
Ex 5 Rogers Grievance, # 7 Exhibit Ex 6 Hill Methadone
Form, # 8 Exhibit Ex 7 Hill Methadone Prescription, # 9
Exhibit Ex 8 Hill Dosing History, # 10 Exhibit Ex 9 Hill
Deposition Excerpts, # 11 Exhibit Ex 10 Hollins Methadone
Form, # 12 Exhibit Ex 11 Hollins Methadone Prescription,
# 13 Exhibit Ex 12 Hollins Dosing History, # 14 Exhibit
Ex 13 Hollins Deposition Excerpts, # 15 Exhibit Ex 14 Dr.
Hart Deposition Excerpts, # 16 Exhibit Ex 15 Methadone
Policy 2010, # 17 Exhibit Ex 16 Methadone Policy 2012, # 18
Exhibit Ex 17 Amato Article, # 19 Exhibit Ex 18
National Academies MAT Book, # 20 Exhibit Ex 19 Detailees
Fully Tapered, # 21 Exhibit Ex 20 Excerpts of Dr. Richardson
Deposition, # 22 Exhibit Ex 21 Ethical and Human Rights Imperatives)(Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 10/31/2019)

12/06/2019 12/06/2019 12/13/2019 01/06/2020
01/06/2020 01/06/2020 01/10/2020
01/10/2020 01/10/2020

154 MOTION by Defendant Cook County Illinois for extension of time to file response/reply to Plaintiff's Motion to Certify Class (Henretty, Lyle) (Entered: 12/06/2019)
155 NOTICE of Motion by Lyle Kevin Henretty for presentment of motion for extension of time to file response/reply 154 before Honorable Edmond E. Chang on 12/16/2019 at 08:30 AM. (Henretty, Lyle) (Entered: 12/06/2019)
156 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Edmond E. Chang: Cook County's unopposed extension motion 154 to respond to the classcertification motion is granted to 01/06/2020. Plaintiffs' reply is due by 01/27/2020. The status hearing of 01/10/2020 is reset to 02/28/2020 at 8:30 a.m. Mailed notice (cn). (Entered: 12/13/2019)
157 RESPONSE by Cook County Illinoisin Opposition to MOTION by Plaintiffs James Hill, Wanda Hollins, Keith Rogers to certify
class 153 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit C, # 3 Exhibit D, # 4 Exhibit E, # 5 Exhibit F)(Henretty, Lyle) (Entered: 01/06/2020)
158 MOTION by Defendant Sheriff of Cook County to join CoDefendant Cook County's Response in Opposition of Plaintiff's Renewed Motion to Certify Case as a Class Action (White, Meghan) (Entered: 01/06/2020)
159 NOTICE of Motion by Meghan Domenica White for presentment of motion to join 158 before Honorable Edmond E. Chang on 1/13/2020 at 08:30 AM. (White, Meghan) (Entered: 01/06/2020)
160 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Edmond E. Chang: Defendant Dart's motion to join co-defendant's response 158 is denied without prejudice. The relief might be justified but there is no statement of conferral as required by Judge Chang's Case Management Procedures. Mailed notice (mw, ) (Entered: 01/10/2020)
161 MOTION by Defendant Sheriff of Cook County to join CoDefendant Cook County's Response in Opposition of Plaintiff's Renewed Motion to Certify Case as a Class Action (White, Meghan) (Entered: 01/10/2020)
162 NOTICE of Motion by Meghan Domenica White for presentment of motion to join 161 before Honorable Edmond E. Chang on 1/16/2020 at 08:30 AM. (White, Meghan) (Entered: 01/10/2020)

01/15/2020 01/27/2020 01/27/2020 01/27/2020 01/29/2020 01/31/2020 02/27/2020 03/16/2020
03/30/2020

163 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Edmond E. Chang: Dart's unopposed motion to join co-defendant's opposition to the certification motion 161 is granted. Mailed notice (mw, ) (Entered: 01/15/2020)
164 MOTION by Defendant Cook County Illinois to supplement Record, Unopposed (Henretty, Lyle) (Entered: 01/27/2020)
165 NOTICE of Motion by Lyle Kevin Henretty for presentment of motion to supplement 164 before Honorable Edmond E. Chang on 1/30/2020 at 08:30 AM. (Henretty, Lyle) (Entered: 01/27/2020)
166 REPLY by James Hill, Wanda Hollins, Keith Rogers to response in opposition to motion, 157 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 22 Date of Production of New Polocy, # 2 Exhibit 23 Complete New Policy)(Flaxman, Kenneth) (Entered: 01/27/2020)
167 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Edmond E. Chang: The unopposed motion to supplement the record 164 is granted. The defense shall promptly file the excerpts of the deposition of Stamatina Z. Richardson as a separate docket entry. Mailed notice (mw, ) (Entered: 01/29/2020)
168 Exhibit B to Defendant Cook County's Response to Motion to Certify Class by Cook County Illinois (Henretty, Lyle) (Entered: 01/31/2020)
169 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Edmond E. Chang: In light of
the fully briefed class-certification motion 153 , the status hearing of 02/28/2020 is reset to 06/02/2020 at 9:30 a.m. Mailed notice (mw, ) (Entered: 02/27/2020)
170 ORDER Amended General Order 20-0012 IN RE: CORONAVIRUS COVID-19 PUBLIC EMERGENCY Signed by the Chief Judge Rebecca R. Pallmeyer on March 16, 2020. All open cases are impacted by this Amended General Order. See attached Order for guidance.Signed by the Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer on 3/16/2020: Mailed notice. (docket1, ) (Entered: 03/18/2020)
171 ORDER Seconded Amended General Order 20-0012 IN RE: CORONAVIRUS COVID-19 PUBLIC EMERGENCY Signed by the Chief Judge Rebecca R. Pallmeyer on March 30, 2020. All open cases are impacted by this Second Amended General Order. Amended General Order 20-0012, entered on March 17, 2020, and

04/24/2020 05/07/2020 05/26/2020 06/24/2020 07/10/2020

General Order 20-0014, entered on March 20, 2020, are vacated and superseded by this Second Amended General. See attached Order for guidance.Signed by the Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer on 3/30/2020: Mailed notice. (docket8, ) (Entered: 03/31/2020)
172 ORDER Third Amended General Order 20-0012 IN RE: CORONAVIRUS COVID-19 PUBLIC EMERGENCY Signed by the Chief Judge Rebecca R. Pallmeyer on April 24, 2020. All open cases are impacted by this Third Amended General Order. Parties are must carefully review all obligations under this Order, including the requirement listed in paragraph number 5 to file a joint written status report in most civil cases. See attached Order. Signed by the Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer on 4/24/2020: Mailed notice. (docket1, ) (Entered: 04/27/2020)
173 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Edmond E. Chang: In light of
the fully briefed class-certification motion 153 , the status hearing of 06/02/2020 is reset to 06/26/2020 at 8:30 a.m., but to track the case only (no appearance is required, the case will not be called). Mailed notice (mw, ) (Entered: 05/07/2020)
174 ORDER ORDER Fourth Amended General Order 20-0012 IN RE: CORONAVIRUS COVID-19 PUBLIC EMERGENCY Signed by the Chief Judge Rebecca R. Pallmeyer on May 26, 2020. This Order does not extend or modify any deadlines set in civil cases. For non-emergency motions, no motion may be noticed for presentment on a date earlier than July 15, 2020. See attached Order. Signed by the Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer on 5/26/2020: Mailed notice. (docket1, ) (Entered: 05/26/2020)
175 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Edmond E. Chang: The
Court has the class-certification motion 153 under advisement. Status hearing of 06/26/2020 is reset to 09/18/2020 at 8:30 a.m., but to track the case only (no appearance is required, the case will not be called). Mailed notice (ma,) (Entered: 06/24/2020)
176 ORDER Fifth Amended General Order 20-0012 IN RE: CORONAVIRUS COVID-19 PUBLIC EMERGENCY Signed by the Chief Judge Rebecca R. Pallmeyer on July 10, 2020. This Order does not extend or modify any deadlines set in civil cases. No motions may be noticed for in-person presentment; the presiding judge will notify parties of the need, if any, for a hearing by electronic means or in-court proceeding. See attached Order.

09/17/2020 177
11/29/2020 178

Signed by the Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer on 7/10/2020: Mailed notice. (Clerk3, Docket) (Entered: 07/10/2020)
MINUTE entry before the Honorable Edmond E. Chang: The
class-certification motion 153 remains under advisement. Status hearing of 09/18/2020 is reset to 12/11/2020 at 8:30 a.m., but to track the case only (no appearance is required, the case will not be called). Emailed notice (mw, ) (Entered: 09/17/2020)
MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order signed by the Honorable Edmond E. Chang. For the reasons stated in the Opinion, the
Plaintiffs' motion 153 for class certification is granted as to the Fourteenth and Eighth Amendment claims and denied as to the Americans with Disabilities Act and Rehabilitation Act claims. On the constitutional claims, the class definition is modified from the proposed classes as discussed in the Opinion. The parties shall confer on the class notice and class-notice plan; shall confer on the litigation plan going forward, moving on to the merits of the liability questions; and shall initiate settlement negotiations. The tracking status hearing of 12/11/2020, is reset to 01/15/2021, at 8:30 a.m., but to track the case only (no appearance is required, the case will not be called). Instead, the parties shall file a joint status report by 01/07/2021, proposing the next steps of the litigation. Emailed notice (mw, ) (Main Document 178 replaced on 11/30/2020, First page was missing) (mw, ). (Entered: 11/30/2020)

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 </s> Case: 1:15-cv-11632 Document #: 178 Filed: 11/29/20 Page 1 of 19 PageID #:1765

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

KEITH ROGERS, et al.,
Plaintiff,
v. SHERIFF OF COOK COUNTY and COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS,
Defendants.

)

)

)

No. 1:15-CV-11632

)

)

)

Judge Edmond E. Chang

)

)

)

)

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Keith Rogers, James Hill, and Wanda Hollins each had been on a methadone-

maintenance program to treat their heroin addiction before being detained in the

Cook County Jail. Under the Jail’s mandatory methadone-taper policy, the metha-

done dosage was reduced until zeroed out. Now, they have filed a lawsuit challenging

that policy and moved for class certification on behalf of former Jail detainees who

were subject to the policy. For the reasons that follow, the certification is granted in

part, but the proposed class definition is modified. See In re Motorola Sec. Litig., 644

F.3d 511, 518 (7th Cir. 2011) (discussing a district court’s authority to modify the

class definition).

I. Background

The Plaintiffs challenge the methadone-taper policy that was in place at the

Cook County Jail until at least July 2017 (and perhaps even through October 2019).

Under the policy, the Jail imposed a linear taper on all non-pregnant detainees taking

methadone, eventually tapering down to a complete stop of methadone altogether. R.

1

Case: 1:15-cv-11632 Document #: 178 Filed: 11/29/20 Page 2 of 19 PageID #:1766
153, Pls.’ Mot. to Certify Class, at 2–4. Methadone is a medication commonly used to treat opioid use disorder. See Exh. 18 to R. 153, National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, Medications for Opioid Use Disorder Save Lives, at 20. In a linear taper, the dosage is decreased at regular intervals by a predetermined amount (for example, by 7 milligrams per day). Exh. 15 to R. 153, Cermak Health Services Policy G-06.1, ¶ 5(h).
The question at the heart of this case is whether opioid use disorder is best treated by a stable maintenance dose of methadone (or other similar medications), or by tapering medication over time with the goal of taking the patient off medication entirely. Both approaches are advocated under various circumstances by experts in addiction treatment. See Exh. 17 to R. 153, Amato, et al., Methadone at Tapered Doses for the Management of Opioid Withdrawal, 2013 Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews (2013). The Plaintiffs challenge the Jail’s “linear taper to zero” policy as a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment (for pretrial detainees) and the Eighth Amendment (for post-sentencing prisoners), as well as a violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act. R. 153 at 2. Detainees with opioid use disorder, they contend, suffer from a chronic medical condition that requires ongoing medication as the treatment. Id. The Plaintiffs assert that, during the taper period, patients suffer from painful and difficult symptoms, including “anxiety, chills, muscle pain (myalgia) and weakness, tremor, lethargy and drowsiness, restlessness and irritability, nausea and vomiting and diarrhea.” Exh. 17 to R. 153, at 2. Plaintiff Rogers, for example, alleges that he experienced severe pain, day-long bouts of
2

Case: 1:15-cv-11632 Document #: 178 Filed: 11/29/20 Page 3 of 19 PageID #:1767
diarrhea, sweats, and nausea while tapering. R. 153 at 5 (citing Exh. 4, Rogers Dep., at 29, 30, 36–37). Plaintiff Hill alleges that he had nausea, vomiting, diarrhea, and trouble sleeping while tapering. R. 153 at 5–6 (citing Exh. 9, Hill Dep., at 15–16, 23). And Plaintiff Hollins alleges that she had nausea, stomach cramps, and body aches, and also felt cold while tapering. R. 153 at 6 (citing Exh. 13, Hollins. Dep., at 44, 45).
Beyond the immediate suffering caused by tapering, the Plaintiffs also allege that the Jail’s taper-to-zero policy is harmful in the long run. R. 153 at 4. They cite medical studies suggesting that tapering causes high rates of relapse, and that medication maintenance is the standard of care for opioid use disorder, especially for patients whose brain chemistry may have been permanently altered by prolonged opioid use. Id. at 2. Therefore, the Plaintiffs argue, the Jail’s policy causes not only the shortterm harms of withdrawal, but serious longer-term risks including relapse and fatal overdose. Id.
The Jail applied this policy to all non-pregnant detainees who had been in a lawful methadone or opioid antagonist program before entering the Jail. Exh. 15 to R. 153. (Pregnant detainees were allowed to maintain a consistent methadone dosage. Id.) The linear-taper-to-zero policy was in place at the time Hill entered the Jail on December 23, 2013, which is the proposed start date for the class. R. 153 at 5, 15. The proper end date for any potential class is a matter of dispute. Cook County says that “there was a significant change in policy in July 2017,” when it abandoned the universal linear-taper policy in favor of an individualized approach to each detainee’s treatment. R. 157, Def.’s Resp. at 1. Cook County supports this contention with the
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declaration and deposition testimony of Dr. Stamatia Richardson, the medical director of the Jail’s opioid treatment program. See Exh. A to R. 157, Decl. of Stamatia Richardson; Exh. B to R. 157, Dep. of Stamatia Richardson. But Dr. Richardson expressly testified that the Jail did not keep any records of this change in practice. Richardson Dep. at 43. In contrast, the Plaintiffs argue that the class should extend to October 7, 2019, when the Jail formally adopted a new written policy for opioid treatment. R. 167, Pls.’ Reply, at 3. Under the Jail’s current policy, detainees lawfully taking an opioid antagonist when they enter the Jail may take the same medication dosage while in custody. Exh. 23 to R. 167, Cermak Policy G-07.1.
Other than the linear-taper policy’s end date, the basic facts are not in dispute. Both sides agree that the Jail applied a linear-taper-to-zero policy to all non-pregnant detainees who had been lawfully taking an opioid antagonist before their detention. (Cook County, though, argues that each patient’s taper plan was individualized to some extent; the plan was based on the detainee’s prior dosage and other considerations, such as individual health issues and whether the particular detainee was likely, after leaving the Jail, to be incarcerated or instead to return to the community. See, e.g., R. 157 at 3.) In their class-certification briefing, the Plaintiffs and the Jail dispute the medical propriety of that policy—a merits question—and, of course, whether the Plaintiffs’ challenges are suitable for class certification, or best brought as individual suits.
II. Legal Standard Courts usually should decide the question of class certification before turning to the merits of a given action. See Wiesmueller v. Kosobucki, 513 F.3d 784, 787 (7th
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Cir. 2008). To be entitled to class certification, a plaintiff must satisfy each requirement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)—numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation—as well as one of the subsections of Rule 23(b). Messner v. Northshore Univ. Health Sys., 669 F.3d 802, 811 (7th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). “Failure to meet any of the Rule’s requirements precludes class certification.” Harper v. Sheriff of Cook Cnty., 581 F.3d 511, 513 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting Arreola v. Godinez, 546 F.3d 788, 794 (7th Cir. 2008)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
“A class may be certified only if ‘the trial court is satisfied, after a rigorous analysis, that the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) have been satisfied.’” Creative Montessori Learning Ctrs. v. Ashford Gear LLC, 662 F.3d 913, 916 (7th Cir. 2011) (emphasis in original) (quoting Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350–351 (2011)). The named plaintiff bears the burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that all of Rule 23’s requirements are satisfied. See Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1432 (2013); Messner, 669 F.3d at 811. The Court “must make whatever factual and legal inquiries are necessary to ensure that requirements for class certification are satisfied before deciding whether a class should be certified, even if those considerations overlap the merits of the case.” Am. Honda Motor Co. v. Allen, 600 F.3d 813, 815 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing Szabo v. Bridgeport Machs., Inc., 249 F.3d 672, 676 (7th Cir. 2001)); see also Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2551 (recognizing that class-certification analysis “[f]requently … will entail some overlap with the merits of the plaintiff’s underlying claim”). In the end, the Court has “broad discretion to determine whether certification of a class-action lawsuit is appropriate.” Ervin v. OS Restaurant
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Servs., Inc., 632 F.3d 971, 976 (7th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Because plaintiffs have sought to certify this class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3), the Court will first analyze the prerequisites of Rule 23(a), and then make findings as to whether, as Rule 23(b)(3) requires, “the questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.”
III. Analysis A. Rule 23(a) Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) contains four “prerequisites” to class certification: (1) “the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable”; (2) “there are questions of law or fact common to the class”; (3) “the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class”; and (4) “the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1)–(4). For Rule 23(b)(3) proposed classes, “courts have long recognized an implicit requirement under Rule 23 that a class must be defined clearly and that membership be defined by objective criteria rather than by, for example, a class member’s state of mind.” Mullins v. Direct Digital, LLC, 795 F.3d 654, 657 (7th Cir. 2015). Though the term “ascertainability” is sometimes used to describe this implicit requirement, the Seventh Circuit has declined to impose the heightened “ascertainability” standard
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that some other circuits have required. Id. at 658. Essentially, “there is a ‘definiteness’ requirement implied in Rule 23(a).” Alliance to End Repression v. Rochford, 565 F.2d 975, 977 (7th Cir. 1977) (citations omitted); see also Simer v. Rios, 661 F.2d 655, 669 (7th Cir. 1981) (“It is axiomatic that for a class action to be certified a ‘class’ must exist.” (citations omitted)). Beyond being required to evaluate the Rule 23(a) prerequisites, the definiteness requirement serves two more purposes. First, it alerts the parties and the Court to the burdens that identification of the class might entail, which is relevant to whether the proposed class action is manageable. Simer, 661 F.2d at 670. Second, ascertaining a definite class ensures that the parties actually harmed by the defendants’ conduct will be the recipients of any relief eventually awarded. Id.
The Plaintiffs have proposed the following class definition, see R. 153 at 9, though now with an end date (that is, October 7, 2019):
All persons who (a) entered the Cook County Jail on and after December 23, 2013 or (b) opted out of, or are otherwise excluded from, participation in Parish v. Sheriff, 07-cv-4369, and were, at the time of entry into the Jail, lawfully taking an opioid antagonist, as defined in 42 C.F.R. 8.12(h)(2), who were not then on parole or held on a warrant from another jurisdiction, and who were not pregnant.
1. Numerosity On the Rule 32(a) prerequisites, Cook County does not contest the numerosity of the proposed class. Indeed, the Plaintiffs have shown that at least 1,090 detainees were subject to the Jail’s methadone-taper policy during the relevant time period, even if the end-date is July 2017 (when Cook County says the Jail discontinued the mandatory taper policy); only around 137 detainees of the 1,090 are from the disputed
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time period. R. 153 at 10–11 (citing Exh. 19, List of Fully Tapered Detainees, Sept. 2013–Mar. 2019). This group is “large enough to make joinder impracticable and thus justify a class action suit.” Arnold Chapman & Paldo Sign & Display Co. v. Wagener Equities Inc., 747 F.3d 489, 492 (7th Cir. 2014). So numerosity is readily satisfied.
2. Commonality On commonality, Rule 23(a)(2) requires that “there are questions of law or fact common to the class.” To establish commonality, generally speaking the class representative must demonstrate that members of the class “have suffered the same injury.” Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2551. Put another ways, commonality requires that all of the class members’ claims “depend upon a common contention” that is “of such a nature that it is capable of classwide resolution—which means that determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke.” Id. In Dukes, the Supreme Court concluded that what is most relevant to class certification “is not the raising of common ‘questions’—even in droves—but, rather the capacity of a classwide proceeding to generate common answers apt to drive the resolution of the litigation. Dissimilarities within the proposed class are what have the potential to impede the generation of common answers.” Id. (cleaned up).1 The Plaintiffs here argue that liability turns on one set of dispositive legal questions, with no factual variation among them: whether the Jail’s tapering policy
1This opinion uses (cleaned up) to indicate that internal quotation marks, alterations, and citations have been omitted from quotations. See Jack Metzler, Cleaning Up Quotations, 18 Journal of Appellate Practice and Process 143 (2017).
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violates the Eighth Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the Rehabilitation Act. R. 153 at 11–12. Cook County argues that this is not enough—that, even if the legal questions are common, the answers they generate would not be, in large part because the class members’ injuries are different. R. 157 at 8. Cook County makes the important point that the linear-taper policy did not impose the same taper on all patients (rather, tapers were individually calculated), and that patients’ symptoms during the taper period would have varied. R. 157 at 8, 9.
Although the County’s concerns have some force, they are not enough to outweigh the other considerations that justify a finding of commonality. Indeed, the concerns are not all that unusual: a similar problem often arises in products-liability cases, where each end user might have suffered a somewhat different injury. Yet those cases are often certified as class actions; individual variability in injury is taken into account at the damages, rather than the liability, phase of a case. See, e.g., In re IKO Roofing Shingle Products Liability Litigation, 757 F.3d 599, 601–03 (7th Cir. 2014). The same goes for the concern that each taper was individually calculated. Yes, the particular milligram-decrease reduction might have differed from detainee to detainee. But the fact that every class-member detainee was subject to tapering— and whether across-the-board tapering was lawful—presents a liability question that can be answered with a common liability decision. Dukes requires a common injury and a common answer only in the sense that class members’ injuries are all allegedly caused by the same conduct of the defendant and can be answered with the same
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liability decision; the injuries need not be exactly the same, so long as the Court can answer the liability question in one common stroke. Id. at 602. That is the case here: the plaintiffs have argued that imposing a uniform linear-taper-to-zero policy is unlawful. Although patients’ withdrawal symptoms may vary, they are all caused by common conduct—the same linear-taper-to-zero policy, applied without exception to non-pregnant detainees.
Having said that, the governing legal standards will require, for the constitutional claims, that the class be split in two; and for the statutory claims, the applicable legal standard undermines the propriety of certification for the statute-based claims. In other words, the Plaintiffs’ proposal sweeps too broadly in lumping together the varying legal questions that arise under the Fourteenth Amendment, Eighth Amendment, Americans with Disabilities Act, and the Rehabilitation Act.
First, the Court’s revised class definition separates pretrial detainees from post-sentencing prisoners. Pretrial detainees’ rights are governed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535–36 (1979). On the merits, pretrial detainees “can prevail by providing only objective evidence that the challenged governmental action [here, the linear-taper-to-zero policy] is not rationally related to a legitimate governmental objective or that it is excessive in relation to that purpose.” Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 398 (2015). It is true that, before Kingsley, the Seventh Circuit generally applied the Eighth Amendment deliberate-indifference standard to the medical-care claims of pretrial detainees. But in the wake of Kingsley, the Seventh Circuit has since explicitly changed course on
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the claims of pretrial detainees. See Miranda v. County of Lake, 900 F.3d 335, 352 (7th Cir. 2018). Thus, “medical-care claims brought by pretrial detainees under the Fourteenth Amendment are subject only to the objective unreasonableness inquiry identified in Kingsley.” Id. Liability still requires that the defendant acted “purposefully, knowingly, or perhaps even recklessly,” but that action is then measured against objective reasonableness. Id. at 353–54.
In contrast, post-sentencing prisoners’ claims are governed by the Eighth Amendment, see Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994), which requires that prisoners show “deliberate indifference,” that is, “a showing that the defendant had a ‘sufficiently culpable state of mind’ and asks whether the official actually believed there was a significant risk of harm.” Miranda, 900 F.3d at 350. So, at a minimum, the Fourteenth and Eighth Amendment claims differ in the required state of mind in devising the taper-to-zero policy. Therefore, Class 1 shall comprise pretrial detainees and Class 2 shall comprise post-sentencing prisoners.
Moving on to the statutory claims, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and Rehabilitation Act claims are not suitable for class-action treatment at all. To prove those claims (which are generally governed by the same legal standard), plaintiffs would need to show (1) that they were qualified persons (2) with a disability and (3) that the Jail “denied [them] access to a program or activity because of” the disability. Jaros v. Illinois Dept. of Corrections, 684 F.3d 667, 672 (7th Cir. 2012). “Refusing to make reasonable accommodations is tantamount to denying access.” Id. Even assuming for argument’s sake that all class members would be qualified persons with
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a disability (their opioid use disorder), the commonality of the class founders on the reasonable-accommodation requirement. The question of what medication regimen constituted a reasonable accommodation—and thus, whether an accommodation was denied—varies by patient.
In response, the Plaintiffs do not really develop the statutory claims beyond bare assertions. Even fashioning an argument for the Plaintiffs does not help. Their best foot forward would to argue that the linear-taper policy is per se unreasonable under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act, because the detainees did not receive an individualized interactive process to arrive at an accommodation. But that position does not survive Rule 23(a)(2)’s commonality requirement. Although the ADA contemplates an interactive process to determine reasonable accommodations, that process “is not an end in itself.” Rehling v. City of Chicago, 207 F.3d 1009, 1015 (7th Cir. 2000). The Plaintiffs still must show that that failure of the process resulted in the failure to provide a reasonable accommodation. There would not necessarily be a common answer on liability; the class’s claims would not rise or fall together, and instead would require an individualized factual inquiry even on liability. See id. Plaintiffs Rogers, Hill, and Hollins remain free to pursue their ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims on an individual basis, but not as representatives of a certified class.
3. Typicality & Adequacy Next, Cook County argues that the proposed class cannot satisfy the typicality requirement, Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3), nor the adequacy requirement, Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4). But the defense largely restates its arguments against commonality. First,
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Cook County argues that because the Jail’s linear-taper-to-zero policy was changed in July 2017, the Plaintiffs, who were detained before that time, are too different from detainees who were held in custody after July 2017. R. 157 at 12–13. But this is a matter of setting the class closing date appropriately, rather than rejecting certification altogether. Both sides agree that Cook County Jail instituted a new written policy on October 7, 2019. See Exh. 22 to R. 167, Email from Cook County Attaching New Policy. As discussed earlier, Cook County says that it stopped the across-the-board taper policy in July 2017, despite the absence of a written change in policy. The Plaintiffs dispute this, not least of which based on the absence of records to demonstrate that the change happened before the issuance of the October 2019 written policy. As the litigation proceeds, the parties will have the opportunity to fully litigate this enddate question. At the appropriate time, the Court will decide whether the end-date should stay as-is (October 7, 2019) or instead must be modified and truncated. It might very well be that an evidentiary hearing will be needed—neither side has asked for that yet—because the end date might turn on credibility decisions as to witnesses. Indeed, if one side (or both) believes that sufficient discovery has been taken on this issue and wishes the Court to convene an evidentiary hearing, then the party may file a motion at any time.
Second, Cook County restates its argument that because each patient was given an individualized taper-to-zero regimen and might have experienced different (or no) withdrawal symptoms, no one of the Plaintiffs can be said to be typical or representative of the proposed class. R. 157 at 12. Again, for the reasons already
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discussed, this is a damages question, rather than a liability question (at least as to the Fourteenth and Eighth Amendment claims). So if the case moves on to the damages phase, then the parties and the Court will discuss how best to manage that phase of the litigation.
Third, Cook County argues that “many of the putative class members have suffered no injury,” whether because the taper on which they were placed was medically appropriate, or because they did not experience withdrawal symptoms or relapse. R. 157 at 12. Similarly, Cook County argues that because the named Plaintiffs themselves have not relapsed into opioid use, they cannot challenge the linear-taper policy on the grounds that it increases risk for relapse. Indeed, the defense argues that the Plaintiffs’ failure to relapse is a fatal causation problem that prevents the Plaintiffs from even being able to claim that the policy subjected them to this risk. But these arguments confuse success on the merits with suitability for class-action adjudication. “[A] class will often include persons who have not been injured by the defendant’s conduct; indeed this is almost inevitable, given that a class can be certified yet fail to prove its case on the merits.” Lacy v. Cook County, Illinois, 897 F.3d 847, 864 (7th Cir. 2018) (citation and quotation omitted). As explained earlier, the Plaintiffs have raised common liability questions on the constitutional claims. They may or may not succeed in proving on the merits that the linear-taper-to-zero policy
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was inappropriate for any, let alone all, of the class members. But those are questions for the merits stage.2
In conclusion, the Court finds that plaintiffs’ Fourteenth and Eighth Amendment claims, if broken out by subclasses of pre- and post-trial detainees, satisfy Rule 23(a)’s four prerequisites for class certification.
B. Rule 23(b)(3) Even if a proposed class satisfies Rule 23(a), it still must also satisfy the requirements of one of the three subtypes of class actions under Rule 23(b). Here, the Plaintiffs seek to certify the class under Rule 23(b)(3). R. 153 at 8. That rule permits the certification of a class if “the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.” It also identifies four “matters pertinent to these findings”: (A) “the class members’ interests in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions”; (B) “the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already begun by or against class members”; (C) “the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of claims in the particular forum”; and (D) “the likely difficulties in managing a class action.” Although similar to commonality, “the predominance criterion is far more demanding.” Messner, 669 F.3d at 814 (quoting Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521
2Cook County also raised arguments against typicality and adequacy elements on the ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims. Because the Court has already held that those statutory claims fail for lack of commonality, there is no need to address those arguments.
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U.S. 591, 623–24 (1997)). Under Rule 23(b)(3), the plaintiff must show that “questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members.” The Court thus must compare the role of common issues of law and fact with the role of individual issues, including whether the Court must examine individual transactions in deciding the claim. See Messner, 669 F.3d at 815; see also Lady Di’s, Inc. v. Enhanced Servs. Billing, Inc., 654 F.3d 728, 738 (7th Cir. 2011).
Here, on the Fourteenth and Eighth Amendment claims that survived the Rule 23(a) prerequisites, the Court finds that common questions predominate over individual issues, and that the class mechanism is the superior means of adjudication. First, the Plaintiffs challenge the across-the-board taper policy. As discussed earlier, the Fourteenth and Eighth Amendment factual and legal inquiries revolve entirely around the conduct and state of mind of Cook County Jail officials in devising the policy across-the-board—questions that are necessarily common to all class members. Factual variations among class members, such as withdrawal symptoms they may have experienced, will arise only as to damages and not as to liability. It is true that, in some cases, the damages questions are so difficult to manage that they overwhelm the commonality in the liability question. For example, it would be one thing if the record evidence showed that tapering caused vastly different reactions that medical experts would not be able to predict or that class members would not be able to readily describe. But the variability in damages is not likely to be so extreme amongst the
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class members that it would be better to have hundreds of separate cases instead of a single class action.
Second and relatedly, the class device is vastly more efficient than adjudicating the same question repeatedly across the 1,000 or so separate lawsuits that could, in theory, be brought by the class members as individual lawsuits. At the liability stage, managing the class action will be relatively straightforward, relying primarily on evidence arising from the records governing the policy, testimony of certain Jail officials, and expert evidence. R. 153 at 15. The parties likely will present cross-motions for summary judgment on liability, and either one side will win outright on liability via summary judgment or a jury will decide the class-liability issue. If liability is found, then a damages-setting mechanism can be developed with input from the parties. For example, medical records might describe the withdrawal symptoms, or under-oath surveys can be taken from the class. Also, different categories of symptoms might result in damages amounts that are fixed according to a certain schedule, including the number of days that the class member suffered the symptom. The bottom line is that getting the common liability answer across the class in one fell swoop is much more important than the separate damages questions.
IV. Conclusion The Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification is granted as to the Fourteenth and Eighth Amendment claims and denied as to the Americans with Disabilities Act and
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Rehabilitation Act claims. On the constitutional claims, the class definition is modified as follows:
Class 1 (Pre-trial Detainees) comprises all pre-trial detainees who (1) entered the Cook County Jail between December 23, 2013 and October 7, 2019, inclusive and3 (2) opted out of, or are otherwise excluded from, participation in Parish v. Sheriff, 07-cv-4369; and were, at the time of entry into the Jail, lawfully taking an opioid antagonist, as defined in 42 C.F.R. 8.12(h)(2), who were not then on parole or held on a warrant from another jurisdiction, who were not pregnant, and who received more than one dose of methadone while detained; Class 2 (Post-sentence Prisoners) comprises all post-sentencing prisoners who (1) entered the Cook County Jail between December 23, 2013 and October 7, 2019, inclusive and (2) opted out of, or are otherwise excluded from, participation in Parish v. Sheriff, 07-cv-4369; and were, at the time of entry into the Jail, lawfully taking an opioid antagonist, as defined in 42 C.F.R. 8.12(h)(2), who were not then on parole or held on a warrant from another jurisdiction, who were not pregnant, and who received more than one dose of methadone while detained. The parties shall confer on the class notice and class-notice plan; shall confer on the litigation plan going forward, moving on to the merits of the liability questions; and shall initiate settlement negotiations. The tracking status hearing of December 11, 2020, is reset to January 15, 2021, at 8:30 a.m., but to track the case only (no
3Unless the Court is missing something, the conjunction here should be “and” rather than what the Plaintiffs propose, which is “or.” If the resolution of Parish does not include the challenge to the tapering policy, then the parties may seek a change to the class definitions here.
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appearance is required, the case will not be called). Instead, the parties shall file a joint status report by January 7, 2021, proposing the next steps of the litigation.
ENTERED:

DATE: November 29, 2020

s/Edmond E. Chang Honorable Edmond E. Chang United States District Judge

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[CONTENT] December 23, 2015 | Cook County | the U.S. District Court | the Northern District | Illinois ||| two ||| the Sheriff of Cook County | Cook County | Section 202 | Americans | 42 | Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act | 29 | U.S.C. | § | 42 | 1983 ||| the Cook County Jail's | Eighth |||  ||| Edmond E. Chang ||| between late 2013 to early 2014 |||  |||  ||| One | January 20, 2014 | January 26, 2014 ||| second | December 23, 2013 | December 25, 2013 ||| third | September 12, 2013 | September 20, 2013 ||| Chang | June 27, 2016 ||| Chang ||| November 29, 2020 | Americans | Rehabilitation Act ||| 2020 WL 7027556 ||| Cook County Jail | ADA | Rehabilitation Act ||| two | the Cook County Jail | between December 23, 2013 | October 7, 2019 ||| the Cook County Jail |||  [SUMMARY] On December 23, 2015, the plaintiff, a prisoner in the Cook County jail, filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The plaintiff later amended the complaint twice, adding two plaintiffs and to seeking class-action certification. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, sued both the Sheriff of Cook County in his official capacity and Cook County itself for damages under Section 202 of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12132; Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a); and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiffs alleged that the Cook County Jail's policy of forced tapering of inmates participating in opioid antagonist therapy caused them great physical pain and thereby deprived them of their Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The plaintiffs sought class-action certification and compensatory damages for their pain and suffering. The case was assigned to Judge Edmond E. Chang.

The named plaintiffs all entered the Cook County Jail between late 2013 to early 2014. During that time, the plaintiffs informed intake personnel of their enrollment in opioid antagonist therapy. Each experienced extremely painful withdrawal symptoms after administration of their prescribed medical treatment was delayed. One entered the jail on January 20, 2014, and did not receive treatment until January 26, 2014. The second entered the jail on December 23, 2013, and did not receive treatment until December 25, 2013. The third entered the jail on September 12, 2013, and did not receive treatment until September 20, 2013.

The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the claims, but Judge Chang denied the motion on June 27, 2016. Judge Chang noted that the plaintiffs may face difficulty in proving their claim, but declined to evaluate the facts at that stage of the litigation.

On November 29, 2020, the court granted class certification for the plaintiffs’ Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment claims and denied class certification for the plaintiffs’ Americans with Disabilities Act and Rehabilitation Act claims. 2020 WL 7027556. The court held that the plaintiffs’ Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment claims raised “questions that are necessarily common to all class members,” such as Cook County Jail officials’ state of mind when developing the tapering policy, whereas the plaintiffs’ ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims required individualized determinations. The court divided the class it into two classes: “Pre-trial Detainees” consisted of all pre-trial detainees who entered the Cook County Jail between December 23, 2013 and October 7, 2019 and who were lawfully taking an opioid antagonist when they entered. ; “Post-sentence Prisoners” consisted of all post-sentencing prisoners who were lawfully taking an opioid antagonist when they entered the Cook County Jail between the same time period.

This case is ongoing. 