IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

F IL E 0
JAN 1 3 2006
CLERMKI.CUHA.SE.LDWIST. RDIOCT'IICNO~RT

CHARLES KING and ANDRE BROWN, Plaintiffs,
v.
ROGER E. WALKER, Director of Illinois Department of Corrections, JESSE MONTGOMERY, Deputy Director of Parole, Operations,
Defendants.

)

)

) ) No.

06e

0204

)

)

~ JUDGE GETTLEMAN

~ GE=~.N~GE

)

. TDRbWN

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF Now come the 1'Iaintift:~, CHARLES KING and ANDRE BROWN, through their attorneys, THOMAS PETERS and KEVIN PETERS, and states as follows:
COUNT I
PARTIES. JURISDICTION AND VENUE 1. Plaintiff King is a citizen of the United States and an Illinois parolee who currently is in custody at the Logan Correctional Center. 2. Plaintiff Brown i~ a citizen of the United States and an Illinois parolee who currently is in custody at the Big Muddy Correctional Center. 3. Defendant Walker is the Director of the Illinois Department of Corrections. In thai capacity, he sets the policies and practices relating to parolees and he is sued in his

individual and his official capacity. 4. Defendant Montgomery is the Deputy Director of Parole for the Illinois
Department of Corrections. In that capacity, he implements the policies of Defendant Walker and trains other IDOC employees in accordance with those policies and practices, and Montgomery is sued in his individual and his official capacities.
5. All of the acts and omissions alleged in this complaint were made under color of state law.
6. This action is brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983 for violations of Plaintiffs' constitutional rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
7. All of the Defendants maintain offices and do business in or near Chicago, Illinois, and the site for all of the preliminary parole revocation hearings is Chicago, Illinois.
8. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.c. §1331, 1334 and 2201.
FACTUALBACKGRQUND 9. Charles King (No. B68682) was paroled from the Logan Correctional Center.
to. Following his release on parole, Plaintifl'King was assigned a parole agent in Cook County, Illinois.
II. In mid-December 2005, Plaintiff King was arrested in Chicago for an alleged violation ofparole (Case No. 05401398201).
12. Plaintiff King denies that he committed a parole violation at any time prior to
2

his arrest in Decembcr, 2005. 13. Within a few hours of his arrest, Plaintiff King was taken to the Cook County
.T ail. 14. Plaintiff King was transferred to thc Stateville Corrcctional Center within 10
days of his arrest. 15. Case number 05-401398201 was dismisscd on the motion ofthe Cook County
State's Attorncy's Office on Dccember 28,2005. 16. Plaintiff King had not waived his right to a preliminary parole revocation
hearing, at or near the sitc of the alleged violation, when he was transferred to the Statcville Correctional Center, Jolict, JIIinois.
17. It is, and was, at all relevant times, thc policy and practice of Defcndants, Walker and Montgomery, to rcturn alleged parole violators to the institution from which they were paroled.
18. As a direct result of that policy of Defendants Walker and Montgomcry, l'iaintifJ King was transferred from the Statevillc Correctional Center to the Logan Correctional Ccnter.
19. The Logan Correctional Center is located in Lincoln, J\\inois. 20. Lincoln is approximately 165 miles from Chicago. 21. PlaintifJKing did not waive his constitutional right to a prompt preliminary parole revocation hearing at any time prior to his transfer from the Stateville Corrcctional
3

Center to the Logan Correctional Center. 22. Plaintiff King has been in custody for more than 30 days, and he still has not
had a preliminary parole revocation hearing. 23. Plaintiff King has a well-established constitutional right to a prompt
preliminary parole revocation hearing. 24. Plaintiff King has a weIl-established constitutional right to a preliminary
parole revocation hearing near the site of the alleged parole violation. 25. Plaintiff King has a well-established constitutional right to retain counsel, to
call witnesses, and to confront and cross examine witnesses at his preliminary parole revocation hearing.
26. Defendants' policies and practices as applied to Plaintiff King violated Plaintiff King's constitutional rights as identified in paragraphs 22-25 above.
27. Defendants' policy of shipping alleged parole violators out of the Cook County Jail to the Stateville Correctional Center and then to the institution from which the parole was granted, creates a system which guarantees that no Cook County parolee will receive a prompt preliminary parole revocation hearing at or near the site of the alleged parole violation.
28. Defendants' policy of shipping alleged parole violators out of the Cook County Jail to the Stateville Correctional Center and then to the institution from which the parole was granted creates a system which guarantees that Cook County parolees will not
4

have counsel or favorable witnesses present when a preliminary parole revocation hearing finally is held.
29. Absent exigent circumstances, a preliminary parole revocation hearing should be held within ten (10) days of a parolee's arrest and the hearing should be held at or near the site ofthe alleged violation, but in no case in excess of60 miles from the site of the alleged violation.
30. Defendant's policy of shipping alleged parole violators out of the Cook County Jail to 10liet Correctional Center and then to the institution from which the parolee was granted is in direct contradiction to the agreed settlement in Willard v. Snyder, 01 C 1884 (see attached Exhibits A and B).
WHEREFORE, 1'IaintiffKing prays the Court will a) issue a preliminary injunction harring Defendants from continuing their policy of transferring parolees from the Cook County Jail before the parolee has had, or waivcd, a preliminary parole revocation hearing; b) pennanently enjoining Defendants fhlln continuing their police as allcged herein; c) award costs and attorney's fees.
CQUNTII 1-30. PlaintilTBrown re-alleges paragraphs 1-30 of Count I as paragraphs 1-30 of Count II. 31. Plaintiff Brown (No. S00309) was paroled from the Big Muddy Correctional Center.
5

32. On or about January 4,2006, Plaintiff Brown was arrested for a parole violation.
33. Plaintiff Brown denies tbat he violated any condition of his parolc on the day of his arrest or on any othcr day.
34. Plaintiff Brown was not served with noticc of the parole violation charges, has not waivcd his right to a prompt preliminary parole revocation hearing, and has not had a parole revocation hearing.
35. Plaintiff Brown has been in custody for more tban 10 business days, and he still has not had a preliminary parole violation hearing.
36. Plaintiff Brown re-alleges paragraphs 23-30 as paragraph 37-45 of Count II. WHEREFOR..E, Plaintiff Brown prays the Court will a) issuc a preliminary injunction barring Defendants from continuing their policy of transferring parolees from the Cook County Jail before tbe parolee has had, or waived, a preliminary parole revocation hearing; b) permanently enjoining Defendants from continuing their policy as alleged herein; c) award costs and attorney's fees.
COUNT III CLASS ACTION 1-30. Plaintiffs re-allege paragraphs 1-30 of Coun1I as paragraphs 1-30 of Coun1
Ill. 31. Defendants' policies and practices have been in effect for more tban a year.
6

32. The number of Cook County parolees who have been adversely affeeted by Defendants' policies exeeeds llve hundred.
33. Plaintiffs King and Brown represent a class of Cook County parolees who have been or will be arrested for parole violations in Cook County, Illinois.
34. The class, as so defined, is too numerous to make joinder of all class members practicable.
35. Defendants have established a unified policy that affects all Cook County parolees charged with violations in the same way.
36. PlaintiiTs' claims are typical of the claims of all class members. 37. Common issues of law and fact predominate over any minor differences in treatment. 38. Plaintiffs' counscl can fairly and adequately represent the elass. 39. The eonstitutional rights of all class members are being violated by Defendants' systematic polices and practices as described herein. WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs King and Brown pray the Court will a) issue a preliminary injunetion barring Defendants from eontinuing their policy of transferring parolees from the Cook County Jail before the parolee has had, or waived, a preliminary
7

parole revocation hearing; b) pennanently enjoining Defendants from continuing their police as alleged herein; c) award costs and attorney's fees.
Respectfully Submitted, K c' IN PETERS, ONE OF THE ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFFS 407 S. Dearborn, Suite 1675 Chicago, IL 60605 312-697 -0022
8

EXHIBIT
ft

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

" r~'n
:.;H' , " '1001

MICHAEL WILLARD, et aI.,

)

)

Plaintiffs, )

)

-v

)

)

DONALD SNYDER, Director of

)

Illinois Department of Corrections,

)

Et aI.,

)

)

Defendants. )

01 C 1884
Honorable Matthew Kennelly Judge Presiding
F I LED
SEP 1 3 2001

STIPULATED DISMISSAL

MICHAEL W. DOBBINS CLERK. U.S. DISTRICT COURT

Now come the plaintiffs, Michael Willard, William Frierson, Gary Moore, and Douglas Nash, through their attorneys, Thomas Peters, Kevin Peters, and Elyse Yoelin, and defendants, by and through their attorney, James E. Ryan, Attorney General for the State of Illinois, and hereby stipulate to the dismissal of this cause. The parties agree as follows:
1. This lawsuit is dismissed with prejudice and without leave to reinstate, in view of the acknowledgment by the parties that: 8. the Department has directed its responsible administrators and staff that, absent exigent circumstances, preliminary hearings for parolees/releasees who have been arrested solely for technical parole/release violations in Cook County, Illinois, must be held at a location reasonably near the place of the alleged parole/release violation or arrest, which shall include any designated facility within sixty miles of Cook County or the nearest Department Reception and Classification Center. b. the Department has directed its responsible administrators to amend the notice of charges to provide notice to alleged violators that they may retain an attorney to represent them at

1

the preliminary hearing in accordance with 20 III. Adm. Code 1610.140 (c) and that they may make in advance of the hearing a written request to present witnesses who can provide relevant information, or for adverse witnesses, consistent with the hearing officer's determination of good cause. c. the Department has directed its responsible administrators and staff that where the parolee/releasee requests in advance of the hearing to present witnesses or to confront and cross examine adverse witnesses, the testimony of those witnesses may be provided, as the hearing officer directs, either in person or through a telephonic link up between the witness and the site of the preliminary hearing on the date scheduled for the hearing. However, with regard to witnesses, in person or telephonic testimony shall not be required where the proffered evidence upon which the requested testimony would be based bears substantial guarantees of trustworthiness or where the testimony of a witness is excluded for good cause. d. the Department has directed its responsible administrators and staff to hold preliminary hearings for parolees/releasees who have been arrested solely for technical parole/release violations in Cook County, Illinois, within ten business days of their imprisonment pursuant to the execution of a parole violation warrant alleging a technical parole/release violation, absent exigent circumstances. The Department has directed its responsible administrators and staff that a preliminary parole revocation hearing need not be held within ten business days if (1) the parolee/releasee waives the preliminary parole revocation hearing; (2) the parolee/releasee requests or agrees to a continuance of the preliminary parole revocation hearing; (3) the parolee/releasee is unavailable due to physical or mental health reasons or other reasons as determined by the
2

Department; or (4) the hearing officer continues the preliminary

revocation hearing for up to fourteen business days from the

date the hearing was originally scheduled in order to obtain

evidence or to ensure the attendance of witnesses, or for other

good cause Shown.

e. the Department has directed its responsible administrators and

staff that where the alleged parole violation is supported solely

by an unverified written statement of a parole agent, the hearing

officer must also review a sworn verification, affidavit, or

declaration from the parole agent, an appropriately executed

copy of the violation report or oral testimony of the parole agent.

2. This stipulated dismissal shall not constitute an admission of liability

and shall not serve as a precedent or be admissible in any proceeding.

~~
Thomas Peters

Counsel for PI~ZiffS

(0 Date:

1) b I

Edward Seward
Assistant Attorney General
Counsel for Defendants
9-,--~_1 Date: __ <7---'/cO__ _ _ __ '

3

250

Loyola Univetsity Law Journal

[Vol. 24

ApPENDIX A
FAHEEM CONSENT DECREE
Plaintiffs filed this action on March 27, 1984, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, alleging, among other things, that policies and practices of the Defendants denied Illinois parolees and mandatory supervised releasees (hereinafter parolees) individualized consideration for bail, in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution.
This Court has jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' claims under 28 U.S.C. Sec[s), 1331 and 1343.
The Court on December 4, 1984, certified a plaintiff class consisting of all parolees of the Adult Division of the Illinois Department of Corrections who are or will be arrested on new criminal charges and imprisoned pursuant to a parole violation warrant issued and executed by the Defendants.
On October 25, 1985, this Court entered a preliminary injunction order that required Defendants to provide individualized bail consideration for arrested parolees by a judicial officer. That preliminary injunction order was reversed and remanded by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals on February 25, 1988.
In order to effect an amicable settlement of this action, the parties having agreed. and this Court having found that the interests of the class will be adequately protected:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants, Lane and Klincar, and their successors in office, shall cause procedures to be adopted, within sixty days of the entry of this Consent Decree, which shall reflect the following provisions.
1. Parolees shall he infonned, when they receive a notice of charges alleging a parole violation, that they may request the withdrawal of the parole violation warrant pending a final parole revocation hearing, in the event probable cause is found at the preliminary parole revocation hearing.
2. If the hearing officer at a preliminary parole revocation hearing determines that there is probable cause to believe that the parolee has committed acts that constitute a violation of the terms of his parole or mandatory supervised release, the parolee may request that the hearing officer recommend to the Prisoner Review Board the withdrawal of the parole violation warrant pending a final parole revocation hearing.
3. The parolee shall be afforded an opportunity at the preliminary parole revocation hearing to provide reasons why withdrawal

1993]

Parole Revocation in Illinois

251

of the parole violation warrant pending the final parole revocation
hearing is appropriate.
4. The hearing office [sic] shall transmit a recommendation concerning the withdrawal of the parole violation warrant to the Prisoner Review Board. Within ten business days of the preliminary parole revocation hearing, the Chairman of the Prisoner Review Board, or one member thereof, shall revic;w th~ hearing officer's recommendation and render a final decision, whether the parole violation warrant should be withdrawn.

5. In determining whether the parole violation warrant should be withdrawn pending a final revocation hearing, the hearing officer and the Chairman of the Prisoner Review Board, or a member thereof, shall consider, among other factors, whether the parolee appears to present a risk of danger to any person or the community, whether it appears likely that the parolee may fIee, or such other reasonable factors as the Prisoner Review Board deems appropriate.
6. The Department of Corrections, upon receipt of an order of the Prisoner Review Board to withdraw the parole violation warfant, shall promptly take all action necessary to withdraw the warrant.

7. If the parole violation warrant is withdrawn pending the final parole revocation hearing, the parolee shall remain subject to the conditions of his parole or mandatory supervised release. In addition, the Board may impose additional conditions of parole, or mandatory supervised release, pursuant to ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 38, Sections 110-10 and 1003-3-7. Nothing in this Agreementshall prevent the Department or Board from issuing or reissuing a parole violation warrant based upon new information or acts constituting a violation of parole conditions.

8. The terms of this decree are applicable to Adult Division

parolees charged with the commission of a new criminal offense

and detained in a jailor other penal institution in Illinois pursuant

to a parole violation warrant issued and executed by the

Defendants.

'

9. On October 25, 1985, this Court entered a summary judgment order with respect to parolees of the Adult Division who are or will be arrested on new criminal charges and imprisoned in Cook County pursuant to a parole violation warrant issued and executed by defendants. This summary judgment order required defendants, inter alia, to provide timely fInal parole revocation hearings at which the parolee would have the opportunity to call

252

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 24

195

witnesses and to cross examine adverse witnesses, who have testi-

fied or presented evidence against the parolee absent good cause. It

is, therefore, agreed with respect to the class defined in paragraph

9, that:

A. At the preliminary parole revocation hearing parolees shall

u.

have the opportunity to call witnesses in accordance with Morris-

an

sey v. Brewer, 92 S.Ct. 2593 (1972),

ca'

B. At the preliminary parole, revocation hearing parolees shall

have the opportunity to confront!\Ild.cross examine adverse wit-

u.

nesses who have testified or presented evidence against the parolee,

unless the hearing officer specifically finds good cause for not al-

"(

lowing confrontation. C. Parolees shall be provided with a final parole revocation
hearing by at least one member of the Prisoner Review Board within 120 days of the parolee's request for a final hearing.
10. The parties shall attempt to resolve informally any

re re d
In
Sl;

problems concerning compliance with the terms of this decree

d,

before bringing alleged violations. to the attention of the Court.

Isolated or inadvertent failures to comply with the terms of the

decree shall not be deemed to be a violation of this Order.

11. This agreement shall not be construed as an admission of

liability by the Defendants or their sUCGessors, liability having been

expressly denied.

12. This agreement is contingent upon judicial approval of a

proposed consent decree tendered by the parties in Butler v. Lane,

#87 C 4542 (N.D. IL). 13. The named Plaintiffs, for themselves, their heirs, executors,
administrators and assigns, hereby release and forever discharge

t
t

the Defendants, the State of Illinois, Illinois Department of Cor-

rections' Illinois Prisoner Review Board, their agents, employees

~

and members in their individual and official capacities, their execu-

\

tors, administrators, successors and. assigns, from any and all

f

claims and demands, actions and causes·of actions resulting Q( aris-

ing from the subject matter and allegations at issue in this case.

[Vol. 24
who have testiIt good cause. It .ed in paragraph
Ig parolees shaH Ice with Morris-
.lg parolees shall ine adverse witrinst the parolee,
:ause for not al-
revocation Board
any this decree the Court.
of the

1993]

Parole Revocation ill Illinois

253

ApPENDIX B

PINZON CONSENT DECREE

Plaintiffs filed this action on May 19, 1987, pursuant to 42 U.S.c. § 1983, alleging that policies and practices of the defendants denied them timely and meaningful preliminary parole revocation hearings in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
This Court has jurisdiction over plaintiffs' claims under 28 U.S.c. §§ 1331 and 1343.
On November 20, 1987 this Court certified a plaintiff class (the "Class") consisting of all parolees and mandatory supervised releasees of the Adult Division of the Illinois Department of Corrections who have been or will be arrested on a new criminal charge in Cook County, I\linois and who are or will be imprisoned in Cook County Jail pending a final parole revocation hearing pursuant to a parole violation warrant issued and executed by the defendants.
On December 23, 1987 this Court entered a preliminary injunction order which required defendants, inter alia, to provide preliminary parole revocation hearings to members of the Class within ten calendar days of imprisonment pursuant to a parole violation warrant. By this consent decree ("Decree") that preliminary injunction is vacated upon the adoption of the procedures described below.
In order to effect an amicable settlement of this action, the parties having agreed and this Court having found that the interests of the Class will be adequately protected:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants Lane and Klincar and their successors in office shall cause procedures to be adopted within sixty days of the entry of this Decree, which shall reflect the following provisions:
I. Within ten business days of the imprisonment of a parolee/ releasee pursuant to the execution of a parole violation warrant, hearing officers designated by the Prisoner Review Board pursuant to III. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, ~1003-3-9(c) shall conduct a preliminary parole revocation hearing for that parolee/releasee, except as provided in Paragraph 2.
2. A preliminary parole revocation hearing need not be held within ten business days if:
a. the parolee/releasee waives the preliminary parole revocation hearing; or

254

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 24

b. the parolee/releasee requests a continuance of the preliminary parole revocation hearing; or
c. a Court has found probable cause on the criminal charge that prompted the parole revocation charge at a preliminary examination conducted pursuant to Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, ~ 109-1 et seq.; or
d. the parole revocation charge is based upon a new criminal conviction; or
e. the parolee/releasee is unavailable due to physical or mental health reasons; or
f. the hearing officer continues the preliminary parole revocation hearing for up to fourteen days from the date the preliminary parole revocation hearing was originally scheduled in order to obtain evidence or to ensure the attendance of witnesses, or for other good cause shown.
The hearing officers shall enter on the written record the reason(s) for not holding the preliminary parole revocation hearing within ten business days of the imprisonment of a parolee/releasee pursuan t to a parole violation warrant.
3. Prior to the date of the preliminary parole revocation hearing, the parolee/releasee shall be informed that he/she shall be provided with a preliminary parole revocation hearing within 10 business days of imprisonment pursuant to a parole violation warrant, subject to the conditions outlined in Paragraph 2.
4. The terms of this Decree are applicable to Adult Division parolees/releasees charged with the commission of a new criminal offense and detained in a jailor other penal institution in Cook County pursuant to a parole violation warrant issued and executed by the defendants.
5. The parties shall attempt to resolve informally any problems concerning compliance with the terms of this Decree before bringing alleged violations to the attention of this Court. Isolated or inadvertent failures to comply with the terms of the Decree shall not be deemed to be a violation of its requirements.
6. This Decree is conditioned on the jndicial approval of a proposed consent decree in Kareem Faheem-Ef y. Klincar, No. 84 C 2561.
7. This Decree i~ conditioned on the entry of an order by this Conrt dismissing with prejndice this action against all defendants.
8. This Decree shall not be constrned as an admission of liability by the defendants or their successors, liability having been expressly denied.

L.....

Case 1:04-cv-06623 Document 5 Filed 11/19/2004 Page 12 of 14

I. 24

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1993}

Parole Revocation in Illinois

255

9. The named plaintiffs, for themselves, their heirs, executors,

administrators and assigns, hereby release and forever discharge

the defendants, the Illinois Department of Corrections, the Illinois

Prisoner Review Board. and the State of Illinois and their agents,

employees and members in their individual and official capacities,

their executors, administrators, successorS and assigns, from any

and all claims and demands, actions and causes of actions resulting

or arising from the subject matter and allegations at issue in this

case.

-

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• ~

256

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 24

ApPENDIX C

DOWNIE CONSENT DECIU!E

This cause coming on to be heard by agreement of the Parties,

after due notice, and the Court being duly advised as to the

circumstances,

'

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

1. In all final pamle revocation hearings, the Prisoner Re-

view Board, and each of its members, shall conduct the final revo-

cation hearings in such a manner that confrontation and cross-

examination of adverse witnesses is allowed as described below.

2. Standard of Proof. The standard of proving charges of a

violation at a final parole/MSR revocation hearing is a preponder-
ance 0/ the evidence. If the evidence supporting the charged viola-

tion as a whole shows that it is more probable than not that the

parolee has violated, as charged, then the Board shall so find. In

those cases in which the evidence as a whole does not show that it

is more probable than not that the parolee has violated, as charged,

the Board shall find no violation.

3. Burden of Proof The charge of a violation, by itself, does

not establish evidence of a violation. If the charge is not admitted

by the alleged violator, thcn the charge must be supported by some

presentation of evidence sufficient to meet the burden of proof. Ex-

. ccpt in those cases where a document bears, on its face, constitu-

tionally adequate indicia of reliability or where an additional

extrinsic factor enhances the reliability of the documentary evi-

dence, the failure to call witnesses constitutes an absence of suffi-

cient proof. In such a case, thc Board shall find that the parolee

did not violate as charged.

4. Confrontation. The alleged violator has a right to con-

front and cross-examine persons who have provided adverse infor-

mation, whether in a document or by· means of live testimony,

upon which a charge of violation is based.

a. If the documentation itself contains a sufficient indica-

tor of reliability, examples of which are listed below, the alleged

violator need not be granted the right to confront, in person, the

preparer of the documentation or any witness whose statements

formed the substance of the documentation and the Board may

then find a violation as charged. However, the Board may, in its

discretion, allow confrontation even where a document contains a

sufficient indicator of reliability.

b. If the documentary evidence dces 110t contain a suffi-

1993]

cient inc

rolee vi

granted.

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describe

cases cil

ruary 1

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the rec(

describ,

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.,
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-,

Case 1:04-cv-06623 Document 5 Filed 11/19/2004

1993]

Parole Revocation in Illinois

257

cient indicator of reliability, the Board may not find that the pa-

rolee violated as charged unless the right of confrontation is

granted.

\

c. The Board may deny confrontation for "good cause" as
described in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), and those

I

cases cited in Judge Moran's Memorandum IUId Order dated February 11, 1991. Any finding of "good cause" must be placed on the record and must be consistent with the indicators of reliability

!

described in paragraph 5 below.

'

5, Indicators of Reliability. Anyone of the following factors

1
i

may be accepted by the Board as lUI indication that documentary evidence alone may be relied upon to prove. the charged violation.

J

These factors are representative examples only and should not be construed as an exhaustive list.

a. The nature of the documentation proves, in itself, a cer-

tain geographical or biographical element of the violation or docu-

mentation prepared by the parole officer establishing a non-

criminal violation of the conditions of parole. Example: (1) An

out-of-state arrest report establishes parolee's whereabouts when

absconsion is in issue; (2) Parolee is charged with failure to report

monthly as ordered, and parole officer specifies the missed month

or presents as evidence business records showing missed office

visits. .

b. The documentation is a transcript of testimony under

oath in another setting, where the parolee had the opportunity to

,

cross-e)[amine the witness whose testimony or report is at issue in

I

the revocation proceeding.

i
I

c. The dOCUmentation is a copy of a signed order or finding of a court of law or other competent tribunal which establishes

I

the parolee's guilt of the criminal violation, which is the basis of the parole violation.

d. The documentation is a lab report or forensic evidence

prepared by a competentscientific source, where the only issue is

i

the subject-matter of the scientific report. 6. The Board may rely upon documentary evidence that

I

contains none of the described indicators of reliability, even absent

I

confrontation, if the documentary evidence is presented in con-

i

junction with some additional extrinsic factor that adequately en-

I

hances the reliability of the documentary evidence.

. I,.

7. Whether an additional extrinsic factor is sufficient to enhance the reliability of the documentary evidence must be deter-

mined by the Board on [a] case-by-case basis.

258

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 24

8. A police or parole agent report which summarizes the statements or observations of a citizen (non-police) witness may bear sufficient reliability upon which to find a violation of parole, absent confrontation, if, and only if, some additional extrinsic factor is presented which adequately enhances the reliability of the police or parole agent report. Such a report, standing alone, unenhanced by any additional extrinsic factors, does not bear sufficient indicia of reliahility to revoke parole absent confrontation.
9. An eye-witness police report (one that indicates that the officcr who prepared the report claims to have seen the alleged violation) may bear sufficient reJiability upon which to find a violation of parole, abscnt confrontation, if, and only if, some additional extrinsic factor is presented which adequately enhances the reliability of the police or parole agent report. Such a report, standing alone, unenhanced by any additional extrinsic factors, does not bear sufficient indicia of reliability to revoke parole absent confrontation.
10. If a Board member determines that confrontation will not be allowed, that Board member must include on the record the specific reasons for not allowing confrontation.
II. This Order shall be applied consistent with the rules and regulations of the Board as found in Ill.Rev.Stat. Ch. 38, par. 10033-1 et seq. and Title 20, Ch. IV, Section 1610.140 of the Illinois Administrative Code and is intended to supersede or modify those rules only to the extent that they relate to the issue of confrontation at a final revocation hearing.
12. Defendants hereby agree to pay to plaintiff[sj reasonable costs and attorneys' fees from monies properly appropriated by the State of Illinois and set aside for such purpose by the Department of Central Management Services.
13. Plaintiffs release and discharge the Board, its members and the State of Illinois from any and all claims for damages resulting from those actions which formed the subject matter of this action. Nothing in this order shall be construed as an admission of liability_

 </s> IN TH~ UNITED STATE DISTRICT COURT FOR TH~ NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

CHARLES KING, ANDRE BROWN, )

CHIOKE HILL, THOMAS GILI3ERT, )

NELSON MUNIZ, ANTHONY SMITH, )

and ANDRE McGREGG,

)

)

Plaintiff~,

)

)

w.

)

)

ROGER E. WALKER, and

)

JESSE MONTGOMERY,

)

)

Dofondants.

)

No. 06 C 204 The Honorable Robert W. Gettleman

ORD~R

TIllS MATTER, coming before the Court for entry orthe Agreed Consent Decree, the Court

having jurisdiction and b"ing fully advised in the premises, it is herehy ordered that:

I. Thc Agreed Consent Decree is herehy preliminarily approved;

2. Notice of the settlement of a class action shall be distributed as described in the

Agreed Consent Decree;

3. The fairness hearing is set for January 19, 2007 at 2:30 p.m.; and

4.

or Pending the results the fairness hearing, the consent decree shall be finally

approved on January 19,2007.

~~ - - - - Entered this

day of November, 2006

~I~-

.....

-_._-----

Th Honorahle ROBERT W. GETTLEMAN

 </s> IN THE UNiTED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

CHARLES KING, ANDRE BROWN, )

CHIOKE HILL, THOMAS GILBERT,

)

NELSON MUNIZ, ANTHONY SMITH, )

and ANDRE MeGREGG,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

vS.

)

)

ROGER E. WALKER and

)

JESSE MONTGOMERY,

)

)

Defendants.

)

No. 06 C 204 The Honorable Robeli W. Ge((leman

FINAL CONSENT DECREE

I. PlaintitTs Charles King, Andre Brown, Chioke Hill, Thomas Gilbert,

Nelson Muniz, Anthony Smith, and Andre MeGregg, on their own behalf, and Charles

King, Chioke Hill, Nelson Muniz, and Andre MeGregg on behalf of a class of others

similarly situated, and Defendants Roger E. Walker, Jr., in his official capacity as

Director of the Illinois Department of Conections, ami Jesse Montgomery, in his official

capacity as D!!pllty Dirtlc(or I(lr Parole, hereby enter into this Final Consent Decree to

resolve Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint alleging violations of their FOUlieenth

Amendment Due Process rights as provided for by Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,

92 S.C!. 2593, 33 L.Ed. ld 484 (i 972).

J. BACKGROUND
2. Plaintiffs are indiviliLlals who arc on parole and who were taken into or were held III custody lor an alleged parole violation, pursuant to a parole violation WUlTant issued hy the Illinois Depat1ment of COIT<;lctions. See 730 ILCS 5/3-14-2(c). They were taken into custody in Cook County. They were then transferred into the custody of lhe Illinois Department 0 f Corrections without having waived their preliminary parole revocation hearing and without receiving any such hearing within ten business days, as required by the consent decree entered in Pinzon v. Lane, 675 F.Supp. 429 (N.D. Ill. 1987).
3. Defendanls are the Direclor and the Deputy Director for Parole of· the llIinois Department of Corrections, which is the agency responsihle lor retaining custody of all persons placed on parole or mandatory supervised rdease or released pursuant to 730 lLCS 5/3-3-10, and supervising such persons during their parole or release period in accord with the conditions set by lhe Prisoner Review Board of the Stale oflllinois.
4. The Plaintiffs initiated this action on January 13, 2006, and Illed an amended complaint on February 13, 2006, alleging, inter alia, that Defendants had denied or lailed to provide preliminary parole revocation hearings for the Plaintiffs and those similarly situated, pursuant to Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed. 2d 484 (1972). Plaintiffs filed a motion for class certification with their initial complaint and a motion lor preliminary injunction on January 24, 2006.
5. By Order dated May 8, 2006, this Court certified this case to proceed as a class action pursuant to Federal Rldes of Civil Procedure 23(a) and 23(h)(2) on behalf of "Cook County Parolees who have been or will he arrested for parole violations in Cook
2

County, Illinois and who will be: a) taken into custody at Cook County Jail; b) transferred from Cook County Jail within 10 days wilhout a preliminary parole revocation hearing; c) transferred from the Cook County Jail to the Illinois Department of Corrections; and d) held without a preliminary parole revocation healing for more than 10 days." The Court deemed only four of the class representatives proposed by the Plainti ffs as acceptable under the requirements of Rule 23: Charlcs King, Chioke Hill, Nelson Muniz, and Andre MeGrcgg.
6. On May 8,2006, the COllli also gran led Plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. The Court found that parolees have a constitutional right to a prompt, preliminary parole revocation hearing and that parolees have a limited cOllslillllionalright to conti'ont and cross examine persons who have provided testimony or evidence which could he used to revoke parole. The Court then concluded that Defendants were violating these constitutional rights with respect to the certified parolee class.
7. Defendants deny the allegations of the Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint and further deny any violations of statutes or regulations. Defendanls make 110 admission of liability, and nothing herein shall be deemed an admission of falllt of any kind by Defendants.
8. The parties have stated their desire to resolve this muller amicably and wilhoul going 10 lriaL
9. The parties agree that this Court has jurisdiction over the sllbject matter of this case pursuanl to 28 U.S.c. §§ 1331 and 1343.
10. As indicated by their signature, the parties agree 10 lhe entry of this Final Consent Decree.
3

IT IS HEREBY ADJUDGED, ORDERED AND DECREED that; II. DEI<'INlTIONS A. For purposes o1'this Final Consent Decree, unless otherwise specified:
I. "Parole Violator" shall he defined as a person who is on parole ami who is taken into or being held in custody for an alleged parole violution in Cook County, pursuant to a parole violation warrant iS$LLed hy the Illinois Department of Corrections under 730 ILCS 5/3-14-2(c).
2. "Notice of Class Action Settlement" shall be the document providing notice to the potential members of the class and shall contain the terms of the agreement reached by the parties, with a copy of the Notice of Rights (see section 3. below) attached. The Notice of Class Action Settlement shall be attached hereto and incorporated herein as Exhihit A.
3. "Notice of Rights" shall be the amended Notice of Parole Violation f0l11l that shall include the language attached hereto as Exhibit B, which describes the Parole Violator's right to a preliminary parole revocation hearing pursuant to Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 92 S.C!. 2593, 33 L.Ed. 2d 484 (1972).
4. "King Investigation" shall he delincd as an investigation conducted by an employee or agent of the ll1inois Department of" Corrections into the facts and circulllstances surrounding the Parole Violator's alleged parole violation. The investigation shall
4

include, at a muumum, a revIew of the police report and any supporting documentation and an interview of the arresting officer(s). 5. "Hearing Officer" shall be defined as an employee of the Illinois Prisoner Review Board who is assigned to conduct the preliminary parole revocation hearing for each Parole Violator. 6. "Technical Violator" shall bo detlned as a parolee who is picked up for a violation or the terms or bis mandatOlY supervised release agreement, hut who is not charged with a new criminal ofronse. Examples or technical violations include, but are not limited to; failing to contact parole orficer, failure to reside in an approved location, or testing positive for illegal dmgs on a random drug test.
III. TERMS 1. Defendants shall take the following measures, intended to provide each
Parole Violator with an opportunity to have a preliminary parole revocation hearing which protects their due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment or the United States Constitution, as defined by Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 LEd. 2d 484 (1972).
2. The Defendants shall publish the Notice of Class Action Settlement (Exhibit A) in each 100C facility housing adults. The Notice shall explain to each prospective class member the settlement reached by the parties, generally, and shall refer the prospective class members to Plaintiffs' counsel for further explanation. With the
5

pemlission or the Cook County Department of Corrections, the Notice of Class Action
Settlement shall be posted on each gallery within the Cook County Jail. The Notice of Class Action Setllement shall be delivered to each parolee presently on parole or on Mandatory Supervised Release by his or her parole agent at a face to face meeting within sixty days of entry of the Proposed Consent Decree by the court.
3. The Defendants shall publish the Notice of Rights (Exhibit 8) in each !DOC facility housing adults upon entry of tho Proposed Consent Decree. With the permission of the Cook County Department of COITections, the Notice of Rights shall also he posted on each gallery within the Cook County Jail. Within 60 days of entry of this Proposed Consent Decree, Defendants shall implement use of tile Notice of Rights foml, agreed to by the parties, allached hereto as Exhibit "8" and incorporated herein by reference, at Cook County Jail as well as within ilie Northelll Reception and Classification Center, located at Stateville COITectional Center in Joliet, llIinois. The Notice of Rights foml shall be distlibuted to all Parole Violators within a reasonable lime f(lllowing their apprehension, to provide them with the ability to either waive their preliminary parole revocation heaTing or to have it held within 10 business days. It shall further he distrihU(ed to all inmates being released on parole or mandatory supervised release with the other documents including their mandatory supervised release agreement. Each inmate receiving the Notice of Rights form shall sign a receipt for the lorm prior to release.
4. Defendants shall enter into disClissions with the Cook County Sheriff and appropriate state agencies, and allelllpt to enter into a written agreement providing for
6

one of the two following scenarios to occur for each Parole Violator who is reincarcerated in Cook County or at the Northern Reception ,md Classification Center:
a, The transfer of any Parole Violator shall be completed so that the Parole Violator is sent to, and custody is accepted by, the l1linois Department of Corrections at the Northem Reception and Classification Center at Stateville Correctional Center within five calendar days of service of a parole violation warrant. This schedule shall provide that the Parole Violator receives adequate notice of his right to a preliminary parole revocation, which shall he hold by the Illinois Prisoner Review Board within 10 business days of imprisonment pursuant to the execution of a parole violation warrant.
b. Should a transfer within five calendar days of arrest prove impossible for any ParoltJ Violator, whether due to impending court dates in Cook County, or for issues of safety and security or severe administrative hardship on behalf of either Cook County or the Illinois Depmtment of Con-ections, the Cook County Sheriff
shall defer transrer of any Parole Violator back to moe. In such
cases, a preliminary parole revocation hearing shall be held in an appropriate Cook County facility, unless another suitable facility in Cook County is available, within 10 business days of imprisomncnt pursuant to the execution of a parole violation warrant. Thc availability and suitability of any facility shall be
7

determined by mutual agreement of th~ Cook County Sheri ff and

the I11inois Dcpaltment orCorreetions.

c.

Regardless of which option is invoked. either a., or b., descTib~d

above, the Parole Violator shall be entitled to a preliminary parole

revocation hearing in the manner described below in Section 5,

within 20 business d<lys of the service of' a parole violation

wanant. This provision, allowing for 20 business days following

service of the parole violation. shall be in effect Il)r the first 60

days following the entry of this Final Consent Decree. After 60

days from the entry of this Final Consent decree, the Parole

Violator shall be entitled to a preliminary parole revocation

hearing within 10 business days following the execution of a

parole violation warrant.

5. Defendants, in conjunction with the lllinois Prisoner Review Board ami

other appropriate state agencies, shall provide that Parole Violators receive a preliminary

parole revocation hearing which protects their due process rights under the Fourteenth

Amendment orthc United States Constitution, as defined by Morrissey, as follows:

a. The Illinois Prisoner Review Board shall assign a Hearing OfIicer

to conduct the preliminary pal'ole revocation hearings pursuant to its statutory obligation und~r 730 ILCS 5/3-3-9. The lllinois

DepOIrlment of Corrections, its agents or employees, shall not serve

as the designee of the JPRB lor purposes of deciding the issue or

8

probable cause at a preliminary parole revocation hearing for a Parole Violator; b, Any Parole Violator who does not waive the preliminary parole revocation hearing shall be provided writtcn instructions in conjunction with the notice of charges (Sec Exhibit B), describing the process by which witnesses may appear and give teslimony before the Illinois Prisoner Review Board hearing officer. Tf lbe hearing is being held in Joliet, at the Northern Reception and Classification Center, pursuant to section 4(a) of this proposed consent decree, lhe witness testimony may be taken by video conferencing; c, If a Parole Violator does not waive his preliminary parole revocation hearing, the 11Iinoi8 Departmcnt of Corrections shall
assign an moe cmployec to conduct a King Investigation;
d, The King Investigation shall include, at a minimum, a review of the police report and any ~uppOliing documentation, and an intervicw with the arresting officer(s);
e, The 100C employee assigned to complete the King Investigation shall testify, under oath and in person, at the preliminary parole [(<vocation hearing held by the Hearing Officer within 10 business days of imprisonment pursuant to the execution of a parole violation warrant, unless the hearing is continued at the request of the Parole Violator, or by agreement. The hearing shall also be
9

continued if" the Parole Violator is otherwise unavailable for a

reason not within the control of the IDOC, such as the Parole

Violator being conl1ned for medical care or being held elsewhere

ior another COUlt appearance, The testimony, given On the record

at the preliminary parole revocation hearing, shall include a

description of" the King Investigation. In the event that the King

investigation is not completed at the time the preliminary parole

revocation hearing is held, there shall be a finding of no probable

cause, unless the Parole Violator requests a continuance or the

Parole Violator otherwise unavailable for a reason not within the

control or the 100C, such as the Parole Violator being confined

for medical care or being held elsewhere for another court

appeanmce;

1'.

The Parole Violator shall have the right to cross exanunc the

lDOC employee regarding the King Investigation during the

preliminary parole revocation hearing;

g. Parole Violators may also present written evidence to the Hearing

Officer pursuant to 20 111. Admin. Code 16IO.I40(b)(l);

h, Parole Violators shall have the right to retain counsel at both the

prc1iminruy and the final parole revocation hearings, purSUrult to

20111. Admin, Code I 620(c); and

I.

Pursuant to 730 ILCS 5/3-3-9(~), a record of the hearing shall be

made,

10

6. Defendants shall provide Parole Violators with a copy of the written detemlinalion Ii-om the Hearing Offieer within 24 hours of receiving the wrillen findings from the Hearing Officer. The Defendants shall notify the Illinois Prisoner Review Board that the findings should be prepared within 48 hours of the conclusion of the hearing and must include a statement of whether probable cause of a parole violation was found, and if it was, that the Parole Violator shall be held over for a IInal revocation hearing by the Prisoner Review Board. The Defendants shall notify the Illinois Prisoner Review Board that tho IIndings shall include a written statement of the basis for the Hearing Onker's detemlinatioll. A copy of the written (\e!enllination shall he provided to the Parole Violator and any counscl retained pursuant to Section S(h) of this consent decree, to the
Parole Violator's parent institution within moc for inclusion in the Parole Violator's
imnate master file, to the Chainnan of the Illinois Prisoner Review Board, and (0 the llIinois Department ofColTections Deputy Director for Parole.
7. Once a finding of probable cause has been made and the written determination has heen served on the Parole Violator, he or she may he transferred to any appropriate facility within the Illinois Department of Corrections, unless otherwise ordered by the lPRB.
8. Tf the Hearing Officer makes a finding of no probable cause at the preliminary parole revocation hearing, and the preliminary parole revocation hearing is held at the Northern Reception and Classi IIcation Center at Stateville Correctional Center, pursuant to Section 4(a) above, the parolee shall, for those parolees who are (he sl~bjecl of pending criminal charges, be (umed over to (he custody of" the Cook County
Sheriff in Cook County as prOJllptly as possible hy moc. Alleged teclmical violators
II

shall he released under appropriate tenm or Mandatory Supervised Release ( "MSR") as
deternlined by the TIIinois Prisoner Review Board. The return to Cook County Sheriff in Cook County or release subject to appropriate temlS or MSR shall be accomplished as promp!ly as is administratively possible.
9. The Court shall appoint, by agreement of the parties, the John Howard Association as the monitor of this Final Consent Decree for a period of one year after its entry. The Monitor shall be paid for its services, according to the following schedule of rates: a) Malcolm C. Young, Executive Director, one hundred fifty dollars ($150.00) per hour, Charles A. Fasano, Director, Prisons and Jails Program, one hundred twenty five dollars ($125.00) per hour, and other staff, if necessary, one hundred dollars ($100.00) per hour to be paid by the Illinois Department of Conections. The John Howard Association shall provide an accounting (If all time (md work provided while monitoring to the Illinois Department of Corrections for its review, prior to payment of any fees. The Defendants shall provide the Monitor with reasonable access to the preliminary parole revocation hearings that are held at the Northern Reception and Classification Conter at Statevilk C(llT~ctional Center, pursuant to Section 4(a), above. Defendan(s
shall work with the Illinois Prisoner Review Board and the Cook County Sheri rr to
provide thal the Monitor is granted reasonable access to the preliminary parole revocation hearings held pursuant to Section 4(h), above. The Defendants shall also provide the Monitor reasonable access to the Parole Violators' parole files for inspection of'docwnen(s. All infomlation reviewed, considered or collected by the Monitor shall be kept in confidence. Such information may be disclosed only to the Court, the Parties and Counsel tor the Parties. If the Monitor determines that the Defendants are not in
12

compliance with the terms or the proposed consent decree, the monitor shall provide written notice of the deficiencies to the Counsel tor the Plaintiffs und the Defendants, and
the Defendants shall have 21 days to submit a plan or correction. The Monitor may
discuss any matter concerning the proposed consent decree with the COUlt. Until the Defendants have had an opportunity to correct any alleged deficiencies, Plaintiffs shall not involve the Court. If there are, durillg the life of the proposed consent decree, any disagreements between the parties, both sides shall endeavor to address them in good faith to come to resolution without thrther involvement of the court. The Monitor's responsibililies relative (0 this Final Consent Decree shall terminate one (I) year after the date of entry.
10. The Co,~rt shall retain jurisdiction (0 enforce the tenns of this Final Consent Decree. The Consent Decree shall he the Jlnal judgment in the case and upon its entry, the case shall be dismissed with prejudice, subject to the court's retained jurisdiction to en torce the terms of the agreement.
I I. The Illinois Department of Corrections shall pay to Plaintiffs counsel reasonable attomeys' fees, <lccording to information provided to Derendant, by Plaintiff~' counsel, indicating that he has spent one hundred ninety two and one hull' (192.5) hours of work on the case to date. The fees ~hall be calculated at the rate or one hundred thirty Ii ve dollars per hour. Such fees shall be paid hy 100C within a reasonable time of the entry of this proposed consent decree, and entry of an order fixing the specific dollar amount of the rees. As Plaintiffs' counsel will be required to spend time and erfort moving forward, the parties agree thatlhose final fees in excess of the 192.5 hours paid upon entry of the proposed consent decree shall be paid at (he tel1l1ination of monitoring.
13

Plaintiffs' counsel shall submit his fees to the Defendants, and the DeCcndants shall be entitled to bring a motion before the court reasonably objecting to any excessive fees. IC there is no objection, !DOC shall pay the additional fees within a reasonable time pursuant to an order I1xing the specific doll~r amo,mt of the additional fees.
14

So ordered this ';J,G'~day=ofrJan~uary,, 2(007a. &2~ THE HONORABLE ROBE~T W. GETILEMAN UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Agreed to by the parties as indicated by their signatures below.
Tom Peters The law Office of Thomas Peters 407 S. Dearborn Street Chicago, Illinois 60605 Morne or e Plaintiffs
E. Walker, Jr., Director is Department of Correctl S
Jesse Montgomery, Deputy Director for Parole, Illinois Department of Corrections
15

 </s> H Case: 1:06-cv-00204 Document #: 114 Filed: 01/23/08 Page 1 of 28 PageID #:945

fff.J

John Howard Association of Illinois
I£. 300 West Adams Street, Suite 423 Chicago, IL 60606
Tel. 312-782-1901 fax. 3i2-782-1902 www.john-howard.orj::
RE£E!v[D

King v. Walker et al. No. 06 C 204

lUOC[ Raorll 2 3 zoos UNJTEo STAocT.JEsTDWis.r,u"'ETTl£AfAN
'IIICT COURT

United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois
Eastern Division
The Honorable Robert W. Gettleman

January 18, 2008
COURT MONITOR'S REPORT
John Howard Association 300 West Adams Street, Suite 423
Chicago, IL 60606
312-782-1901

Working for Corre<.tlons Reform since 190 I John Howard Association Is a. member of the United Way of Metropolitan Chicago

Case: 1:06-cv-00204 Document #: 114 Filed: 01/23/08 Page 2 of 28 PageID #:946 2
This report reflects monitoring activities rdating to an assessment of compliance with the Consent Decree in this case since November 1, 2007. As described in our previous reports of November 20, 2007 and August 16,2007, these activities have included observations of preliminary parole revocation hearings and analysis of data, including King hearing schedules, individual hearing reports, and other documents introduced during hearings and generated by staff of the Illinois Prisoner Review Board (PRB ), the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC), various law enforcement agencies, and other data; and meetings with PRR, TDOC, and Cook County Department of Corrections (CCDOC) administrators and staff, and counsel for the parties and for the Sheriff of Cook County). During this period, most of the monitoring activities have been conducted by Charles A. Fasano, Director of the Prisons and Jails Program of lhe John Howard Association (JHA). The Association's Executive Director, Malcolm C. Young, also participated in activities pertaining to this case.
The scope ofthis report covers the major provisions of the Consent Decree during a period of two months, from November 1, 2007 through December 31,2007. Collectively, the three monitoring reports cover a period of nearly one year, dating from the approval ofthe Consent Decree on January 26,2007. This report also includes recommendations for improwments that could enhance the quality and consistency of the hearing proc~ss and related activities and help to ensure that the substantial compliance achieved to date persists beyond the term.ination of monitoring in this case.

Case: 1:06-cv-00204 Document #: 114 Filed: 01/23/08 Page 3 of 28 PageID #:947 3
HEARINGS AT CCDOC AND IDOC
During thtl two months covered in this report, a number of PRB staff have conducted King hearings. This cadre has included Jeanetla Cardine, who had previously conducted the great majority ofthese hearings. The recent broadening of this responsibility to a larger cadre of staff has allowed Ms. Cardine to spend more time on her other duties, including arranging for program placements for parolees, itself an important activity for King class members who may qualify for reinstatement on parole if suitable placements are achieved.
The schedule of King hearings has remained as described in our previous reports. King hearings have occurred once weekly at CCDOC since June 20061 and twice weekly at NRC since January 2007. The hearings at CCDOC occur every Wednesday beginning at 9:00a.m. and normally extend over a period of 2 - 4 hours. Hearings at NRC occur every Monday and Thursday, and these hearings also begin at 9:00a.m. The NRC hearing schedule docket continues to contain more hearings on Thursdays than on Mondays, which is largely attributable to the schedule of inmate shipments from CCDOC to !DOC, which occur three days each week. During the month of Decemher 2007, the regular seasonal phenomenon of decreased admissions to CCDOC has contributed to a decrease in the number of King hearings at both locations.
Based on data analyzed by the Monitor, the majority of King hearings since entry of the Consent Decree in this case continue to be held at IDOC's Northern Reception Center following
1 Some of the parole revocation hearings held at CCDOC before December 31, 2006 were Morrissey hearings.

Case: 1:06-cv-00204 Document #: 114 Filed: 01/23/08 Page 4 of 28 PageID #:948 4
the transfer of inmates from CCDOC. During the period November I, 2007- December 31, 2007, a total of 181 hearings were conducted with inmates at CCDOC. As described below, 59 of these hearings resulted in continuances based on requests from inmates. A total of 122 hearings resulting in dispositions (probable cause or no probable cause) occurred at CCDOC during this period. During this same period, a total of 362 hearings were conducted with inmates at NRC. 70 continuances were granted, and dispositions were reached in the remaining 292 cases.
These data indicate that 29.5% of dispositions were reached while inmates were at CCDOC, in comparison to 70.5% of dispositions that were reached after inmates had arrived at NRC. This distribution of hearings between the two locations is virtually unchanged from that described in the report of November 20, 2007 and consistent with the distribution described in the August 16,2007 report: at that time, 30.9% of hearings with dispositions were occurring at CCDOC, in comparison to 69.1% of hearings with dispositions th..1.t were reached at NRC.
The number of dispositions achieved at these preliminary hearings on a monthly basis has also remained relatively constant over time. Based on the data presented in the August 16, 2007 report, an average of247 dispositions were reached in King hearings monthly, including an average of 45 dispositions monthly at CCDOC and 202 dispositions monthly at NRC. Between August 1, 2007 and October 31,2007, an average of241 dispositions were reached in these hearings monthly, with an average of 71 dispositions monthly al CCDOC and 170 dispositions at NRC. Between November 1, 2007 and December 31,2007, a monthly average of207

Case: 1:06-cv-00204 Document #: 114 Filed: 01/23/08 Page 5 of 28 PageID #:949 5
dispositions were reached, with an average of 61 dispositions monthly at CCDOC and 146 dispositions at NRC,
A more accurate comparison of the relative frequency of hearings at the two locations can be gained by analyt.ing data for calendar year 2007. Since January I 0, 2007, a total of 705 hearings resulting in dispositions occurred at CCDOC. In comparison to the 2,217 dispositions reached during hearings at NRC, hearings at CCDOC represent 24.1% of King hearings with dispositions, as contrasted to 75.9% of King hearings that achieved dispositions during hearings at NRC during 2007. The distribution of hearings remains virtually unchanged fmm that described in our report of November 20, 2007. The main reason for this chronic disproportionate breakdown appear to be that most newly arrested inmates at CCDOC have not experienced preliminary hearings by the time they are afforded thdr first King hearing, with many requesting continuances from the King Hearing Officer. In conjunction with CCDOC's practice of rapidly shipping parolees to NRC2, these facts result in the presence of hundreds of parolees at that site, where they receive a finding of pmbablc cause or no probable cause at a King hearing.
Inmates at both CCDOC and NRC have continued to request continuances with considerable frequency, a phenomenon that we first described in the August 16, 2007 report. During the two month period covered in the current report, 59 continuances were requested 2 Based on Cook County's interpretation of Judge George M. Marovich's October 30, 2003 ordo:r in Duran?

Case: 1:06-cv-00204 Document #: 114 Filed: 01/23/08 Page 6 of 28 PageID #:950 6
during a total of 181 King hearings conducted at CCDOC, representing approximately 33% of all hearings at that location. This is significantly lower than the continuance rate of 43% described in the November 20, 2007 report but higher than the continuance rate of 26% for hearings at CCDOC described in the August 16, 2007 report. For King hearings at NRC during the preceding two months, 70 continuances out a total of 362 hearings were granted, representing a total of 19.3%, noticeably lower than the 25.9% continuance rate described in the November 22, 2007 rate and slightly lower than the 21.7% continuance rate described in the August 16, 2007 report. Our observations support the conclusion that the great majority of continuances are still requested in order to await the outcome of preliminary hearings or other proceedings in the Circuit Court of Cook County. Many inmates believe that pending criminal charges may be dropped during their next court appearance, which they believe would enhance their chances of receiving a finding of no probable cause at the King hearing.
While all of the hearings at NRC and the vast majority of hearings at CCDOC involve male inmates, a few female inmates at CCDOC are included in the plaintiff class in this litigation and received King hearings in accordance with the provisions of the Consent Decree. Between November 1, 2007 and December 31, 2007, a total of eight (8) females received preliminary parole revocation hearings while incarcerated at CCDOC, in contrast with 16 females who received these hearings between August 1, 2007 and October 31, 2007. During the past two months, dispositions were reached in 7 of these cases, all of which were findings of probable cause, and the remaining case involved an inmate who was transferred to Dwight Correctional Center before a disposition was achieved.

Case: 1:06-cv-00204 Document #: 114 Filed: 01/23/08 Page 7 of 28 PageID #:951 7
As noted in our previous reports, a special segment of the plaintiff class in this litigation involves young inmates who were still under juvenile parole supervision despite the fact that they had passed their seventeenth birthdays and been subsequently arrested and charged as adults. Insofar as the hearings for these individuals are represented in the statistics for hearings conducted at CCDOC, the handling of their hearings is indistinguishable from those provided to their older colleagues. At the same time, however, these individuals have become a progressively more serious problem for the Illinois Department of Juvenile Justice3, which retains the responsibility for housing these individuals. The special problems associated with many of the~e individuals are restated below.
TIMELINESS OF HEARINGS
Our ongoing assessment of the timeliness of King hearings remains ba~ed largely on analysis of data contained in daily hearing schedules and records, which provide summary information on hearing decisions and some of the dates pertinent to the time provisions ofthc Consent Decree.4 As noted in both of our previous reports, schedules for hearings at CCDOC still do not include dates parole warrants were served5, although individual hearing records do contain these data. The absence of these data continues to make it difllcult to empirically evaluate th.e timeliness of hearings and to ensure that parole warrants were served in all cases. We have, however, reviewed records pertaining to all hearings between November 1, 2007 and
'o'Cw'TTfAoafhhrerlrrelneeaddcnIfealtotlirtsiorasnmanoyinsnsiods(cutuhpDunnerrgeteriecpellirunamJrtrtuhrltiyemlanynnauetrnI.y1a,et7nd2hod0wefd0apoJhr6ruoiec)nvvohgeainannsotviduarleeesimfnebmJ-teauraoesitcnnntooisiccltbueoosumtrnwsaivnintanuigscetfotosrfeesrrodyprddomaraarestetyessrapsld>ryo,eu"enltlr'ashtvssiteebi,pdniJealguci(ntfivtdyofoeirienftnodhpidlraeeiirnhvnoDoiutlduhiemvusewiaibsnClaiesgororurnjnoaunsnofvdetfdeen/ntnarthyoijDelusteievcIsbcleeelarn)itednwitejlohu.eeiadseptinaDcisras"otenJelrloedavtrsiatcuumsespedeeodnerfvtlbpiionsuaqfitrouodnelo.entnso, \ contain a colwnn for jail admission date.

Case: 1:06-cv-00204 Document #: 114 Filed: 01/23/08 Page 8 of 28 PageID #:952 8
December 31, 2007, and we feel confident restating our previous conclusion that virtually all initial King hearings conducted at CCDOC are taking place within the I0-day time limit specified in the Consent Decree. Only one case in this two-month period was identified in which more than 10 business days elapsed before a King hearing was conducted, and this case involved a period of 12 business days.
At NRC, the schedules for hearings do contain admission and warrant service dates, but frequent requests for continuances make accurate calculation of timeliness of King hearings somewhat difficult in these cases. This limitation has not, however, precluded an analysis of compliance with the provision n:quiring a King hearing within I0 days of imprisonment.
Data provided by the PRB indicate that a total of approximately 362 King hearings ocCulTed at NRC between November 1, 2007 and December 31,2007. During this period, the average (mean) length of time between incarceration and initial King hearings in the 292 cases in which continuances were not requested was 3.9 business days, and virtually all cases in this category were heard within the I 0-day limit. This compares favorably with an average lenb>th of time between incarceration and initial hearings of 8.6 Jays described in the report of November 20, 2007. Although shorter hearing dockets may have contributed somewhat to the improvement in timeliness, this achievement is nonetheless commendable.
At the other end of the spectrum, cases in which continuances were requested took considerably longer to achieve dispositions than in previous periods. An analysis of a sample of

Case: 1:06-cv-00204 Document #: 114 Filed: 01/23/08 Page 9 of 28 PageID #:953 9
cases involving continuances reveals that these cases took an average of more than 22 days to achieve disposition, despite the fact that most continued cases were nonetheless disposed of within the 1O~day limit. The lengthy average appears to be attributable largely to a few cases which involved extended periods to reach di:.-position. Even in these cases, however, the initial King hearing was usually conducted within the I 0-day limit.
CONDUCT OF HEARINGS
As noted above, a number ofPRB staff have served as the designated King hearing officer for hearings conducted during November and December 2007. The distribution of this responsibility has enabled Jcanetta Cardine to spend more time on her other PRB duties, including arranging program placements for parolees.
As described in our previous reports, two or more IDOC Parole Agents are present at all King hearings in their capacities as King investigators. These agents are routinely sworn in by the Hearing Officer at the beginning of each day's hearings. They provide testimony at each hearing based on information in police reports or communications from other law enforcement agents. At each hearing, the inmate is sworn immediately by the Hearing Officer, who also verifies that s/he has received notice of charges. The Hearing Officer also reads the specific violations alleged and, in appropriate cases, explains these allegations.
Based on hearings observed by the Monitor and a review of hearing reports, King investigators almost invariably obtained and recorded the names and badge numbers of law-

Case: 1:06-cv-00204 Document #: 114 Filed: 01/23/08 Page 10 of 28 PageID #:954 10
enforcement personnel with whom they spoke. In all hearings either observed by or with reports reviewed by the Monitor, the King investigators attempted and usually succeeded in contacting the arresting officer or law-enforcement investigator for confirmation of and/or daboration on information contained in arrest reports. In many cases, the investigators are able to obtain additional information about the alleged offense from police; however, a significant munber of cases remain in which investigators are only able to obtain statements that police "stand by the information" in their reports. Virtually all King hearing reports reviewed by the Monitor have included notations regarding the information obtained hy the King investigators.
King investigators also frequently contacted other IDOC parole agents who had information pertinent to the situation of the inmates. T1wse contacts often reveal other relevant information, such as participation in mandatory activities including substance abuse treatment programs or compliance with electronic detention conditions. Some of this information ha~ constituted grounds for a technical parole violation, separate and distinct from the criminal charges that led to the incarceration of the individual. When such information has been provided, it has been taken into consideration by the King Hearing Officer. Hearing reports also reflect frequent efforts by IDOC parole agents to modify conditions of supervision, including arranging for placement into treatment programs and other facilities and adjusting levels of supervision in accordance with a detailed "sanction matrix", which lists a wide variety of sanctions to be implemented in response to various types of parole violations.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - -·--·--···--- ···-
Case: 1:06-cv-00204 Document #: 114 Filed: 01/23/08 Page 11 of 28 PageID #:955 II
During (as well as prior to) King hearings, the King investigators continue to routinely utilize data contained in computerized databases, including !DOC's AMS system and the Offender Tracking System (OTS); in addition, a GPS tracking system utilized by Parole Agents is also accessible and utilized regularly. CCDOC's Correctional Inmate Management Information System (CIMIS) is also utilized routinely for hearings at the jail. The database maintained by the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Cook County continues to be utilized frequently, when information regarding current and !berner criminal charges is needed.
Based on our observations of hearings and review ofrecords, John Howard Association staff can report that the various King Hearing Officers have continued to consider a full range of pertinent information from King investigators, inmates, and other sources in their handling of cases. We have continued to observe numerous cases in which a finding of no probable cause was entered because time limits had been exceeded and/or criminal charges had been dismissed. We have also observed hearings and reviewed records in which inmates were not served in timely fashion, and in these ca~es the Hearing Officer entered a finding of no probable cause. We have also observed numerous cases in which arresting officers have been unable or unwilling to provide factual information that goes beyond the rote statement that they stand by their (arrest) reports. In some of these cases, the King Hearing Officers have identified substantive deficiencies in arrest or parole violation reports and have entered findings of no probable cause. After months of observing hearings and reviewing hearing reports, JHA staff remain impressed by the exercise of independent judgment which these findings reflect.

Case: 1:06-cv-00204 Document #: 114 Filed: 01/23/08 Page 12 of 28 PageID #:956 12
Since the beginning of November 2007, we have continued to observe cases in which King Hearing Officers took steps to modify conditions of supervision to more appropriately meet the needs of parolees. We have also observed ongoing collaboration between the various Hearing Officers and PRB Chainnan Jorge Montes, who (.,"(mtinues to exercise his authority to modify parole conditions pending approval by tho: fuJI PRB.
Participation by Witnesses and Attorneys
During the period covered in this report, witnesses have continued to appear for King hearings at both CCDOC and NRC, although they remain tew in number. Most of the witnesses who have participated have kstified on behalf of inmates. To date, all witnesses have appeared in person. A videoconferencing site already established has not been utilized to date. 6 In those cases in which witnesses have chosen to come to the facilities, the King Hearing Officer has interviewed them in the lobby of the facility (Division V of CCDOC) or immediately outside the main entrance (at NRC), both of which are outside the presenco: of the inmate (or his representative). The decision to interview witnesses in these locations is attributed to security concerns regarding public access to internal portions of the facilities. While the Monitor has not been made aware of any complaints about the inability of inmates to questions witnesses directly, we remain concerned about this makeshift arrangement and urge both CCDOC and IDOC to make good-faith efforts to devise more suitable accommodations. We restate our
'!DOC has made videoconferencing facilitic• for witnesses and attomeys available at an !DOC facility at 100 North Westem Avenue in Chicago. Videoconferem:ing with the NRC (and other !DOC facilities) is possible when this system is working. In a few of\hese situations, witnesses whose identity has been positively estahlished by !DOC staff at the facility have been permitted to participate telephonically when videoconferencing has been unavailable. At NRC, the videoconferencing equipment is not available in the room used for King hearings but is accessible to the King hearing officer.

Case: 1:06-cv-00204 Document #: 114 Filed: 01/23/08 Page 13 of 28 PageID #:957 13
previous recommendation that the parties explore the availability of space in the Criminal Courts Building at 2600 South California Avenue, where civilian witnesses and police officers could be afforded easy access in an environment that provides appropriate security for all~:oncerned.
A few attorneys have also participated in these hearings, but these remain relatively rare occurrences. We observed one case in which an attorney was permitted access to the Receiving Room for a hearing at CCDOC, although he was unable to remain for the hearing because of a significant delay in transporting the inmate !rom Division XI, across the street from the main jail complex.7 As noted in our last report, no requests for attorney participation by phone have been received in recent months.
Hearing Accommodations
Hearings conducted at CCDOC take place in the Receiving Room, located in the basement of Division V. This location has a number of drawbacks and can only be described as minimally adequate. It is, however, one of the only areas within the vast jail complex that is readily available to inmates from all I 0 divisions. The King Hearing Officer uses a booth normally used for intake screening. The booth provides a modicum of auditory privacy but little more. Inmates scheduled for King hearings are held in a nearby bullpen. IDOC Parole Agents participating in these hearings occupy adjacent booths and respond to questions from the Hearing Officer. Only the individuals participating in the hearings are normally within earshot of the hearing, although Correctional Officers are stationed in the general area.
7 Delays in transporting inmates from Division XI to the Receiving Room appear to <>ccur with some regularity, affecting a number of King hearings.

Case: 1:06-cv-00204 Document #: 114 Filed: 01/23/08 Page 14 of 28 PageID #:958 14
At NRC, the King hearings continue to occur in an area designed as a classroom but being converted into a law library in one of the cellblocks in the facility. The area includes ample desk space and seating for the Hearing Officer, Parole Agents, and the inmate/parolee. Inmates awaiting hearings are lined up outside the hearing room and, although the door to the room is left open, the inmates are at sufficient distance from the door that there is reasonable privacy for discussions of potentially sensitive matters. Other than those persons participating in the hearings, only a Correctional Officer is present in the room during hearings, for security
reasons.
CROWDING AT CCDOC AND INMATE TRANSFERS
As the court monitor in Duran v. Sheahan et al., John Howard Association staff are thoroughly familiar with the status of inmate population and crowding at CCOOC. In addition to court monitoring reports, JHA issues monthly updates on inmate population, crowding, and the utilization of release mechanisms to reduce the level of crowding. As documented in our most recent update, dated January 11,2008 (attached M Appendix A), the size of the overflow population at the jail began to increase in May 2007 and remained at fairly highly levels (averaging more than 550 inmates sleeping on floors nightly) from August 2007 through October 2007. The jail's overflow population decreased in November 2007 and December 2007, following a predictable seasonal pattern observed for many years, hut this pattern already
appears to be ending by mid-January 2008. Despite the changes noted, the level of crowding at CCDOC would be higher still but for the fact that a number of inmates from Cook County, ranging from approximately 50 to 180, remain in custody in Kankakee and Jefferson Counties under a contractual arrangement that bas existed for some time. In addition to this population,

Case: 1:06-cv-00204 Document #: 114 Filed: 01/23/08 Page 15 of 28 PageID #:959 15
several hundred inmates facing criminal charges in Cook County courts are incarcerated at NRC on any given day, many awaiting reinstatement of parole by the PRB at which time they are rdurned to fu!Hime custody at CCDOC.
As we noted in our previous reports, crowding at CCDOC has been affected by fiscal constraints as well as policy decisions made by Sheriff Thomas Dart. As previously described, the Office of the Sheriff of Cook County, like other Cook County agencies, experienced significant cuts in the FY 2007 (December I, 2006 -November 30, 2007) budget. The Cook County Department of Community Supervision and Intervention, which operates most of the release mechanisms developed to reduce crowding in the jail, was affected by significant budget cuts. In addition to these reductions, Sheriff Dart restricted eligibility criteria for relea~e of pretrial detainees and began efforts to transfer responsibility for deciding which inmates should be released to the Circuit Court of Cook County. The rationale for this proposal is that Sheriffs personnel do not have access to a full range of information on inmates, including complete criminal histories, whereas this information is readily available to the courts, where prosecutors and defense counsel can debate the merits of this information and a judge can make a decision based on a more comprehensive set of facts than is available to the Sheriff. While this debate between the Sheriff and the Circuit Court of Cook County is as yet unresolved, the Sheriff continues to operate a range of release mechanisms whose caseloads or populations have decreased steadily and drastically since January 2006. The size of these programs is described in the table entitled Cook County Release Mechanisms: Average Daily Caseloads/ Population, contained in the attached appendix.

Case: 1:06-cv-00204 Document #: 114 Filed: 01/23/08 Page 16 of 28 PageID #:960 16
As noted abow, CCDOC administrators have continued to expedite the transfer of inmates with unexpired sentences of confinement since the beginning of 2007. The transfer of inmates with pre-existing sentences back to !DOC was authorized in an order by Judge George M. Marovich in Duran v. Sheahan et al. issued October 30,2003, permitting the Sheriff to transfer persons housed at CCDOC who had been previously sentenced to IDOC for an unexpired sentence of confinement. This order was precipitated by recurring episodes of increased crowding at CCDOC aggravated by the presence of hundreds of IDOC inmates still serving prison sentences who had been housed at CCDOC on court writs and by the presence of as many as I,600 pretrial detainees with parole holds or warrants. In years past, it was common practice for parole "holds" or warrants to be issued whenever parolees were arrested on new charges, making them ineligible for releuHe by the Sheriff of Cook County. As mentioned in previous status hearings in this case, Judge Marovich's order was clearly intended to apply to
inmates still serving prison sentences who were only residing at CCDOC by virtue of writs issued by Judges of the Circuit Court of Cook County and not parolees. Following the entry of Judge Marovich's order, former Sheriff Michael F. Sheahan returned hundreds of inmates to IDOC custody, who were still serving prison sentences. Long after this task was accomplished, SheritTs Sheahan and Dart began the process of transporting inmates still under parole
supervision at the time of their arrest on new charges back to moe.
The IDOC currently transports scores of inmates from NRC to the Criminal Courts Building on a daily basis, and the costs of transportation have remained extremely high. In addition to this substantial added expense, the inmates transferred to NRC are less readily

Case: 1:06-cv-00204 Document #: 114 Filed: 01/23/08 Page 17 of 28 PageID #:961 17
accessible to their attorneys, most of whom are Cook County Assistant Public Defenders, as well a~ their relatives and friends, for whom visiting becomes more difficult and costly; in addition, opportunities for exercise and programming are extremely limited during their confinement at the Northern Reception Center. The conditions of confinement at NRC for these inmates, many of whom served prison sentences for non-violent crime~ and now face relatively minor criminal charges, are essentially more restrictive than those that exist at !DOC's maximum-security facilities. In addition to the restrictive confinement experienced by these inmates, the continuing presence of this population has contributed to a situation in which NRC is operating at approximately 95% of its capacity.
In addition to the added costs of housing and transporting these inmates borne by IDOC, CCDOC has incurred some additional costs involved with transporting some of these inmates back to the jail, which also occurs on a regular basis. While these transportation costs are considerably less than the costs of confinement, thll added expense may prove to be a significant factor in the future as both state and county budgets continue to face extreme pressures.
Since the lru.t Status Hearing in this case on November 29, 2007, !DOC and CCDOC administrators have met once in early December 2007 with Charles A. Fasano to discuss issues arising from King and Duran. In addition, Mr. Fasano met via teleconference with IDOC parole administrators and counsel later that month for an extended discussion of issues relating to this litigation. The first meeting resulted in no progress toward the objectiw of increasing the number of inmates released from !DOC and CCDOC custody under various forms of supervision

Case: 1:06-cv-00204 Document #: 114 Filed: 01/23/08 Page 18 of 28 PageID #:962 18
(such as electronic monitoring), which could have a signitkant effect on members of the plaintiff class in this litigation. In fact, CCDOC officials raised the possibility of increasing the number of inmates transferred back to IDOC custody by reducing the time until their next court appearance from 10 days to 3 days.
The process of identifying and tracking inmates at CCDOC who are potential members of the plaintiff class in this litigation has been facilitated by IDOC officials who have developed database records of individuals facing possible parole revocation. These weekly reports enumerating the number of parolees incarcerated at CCDOC, which list the number of inmates on whom warrants have been issued and those where no warrant has been issued. These reports, dating back to late August 2007, clearly indicate that only a small percentage of a rather significant number of parolees facing new criminal charges also face parole warrants. Since August 29,2007, the total number of parolees held at CCDOC has ranged from 1,346 to 1,537, but the total number with parole warrants has only ranged from 53 (3.9%) to 99 (7.1 %). These data provide significant corroboration for the contention that parole warrants are being issued very selectively, in contrast to the practice in years past.
Although IDOC ofticials did agree to provide these reports to CCDOC officials on a regular basis, this has not occurred. As of January 10, 2008, CCDOC officials reported that they had received only one such report since early December 2007. IDOC officials have informed the Monitor that their efforts to generate these voluminous reports (listing more than 1,400 individuals) have been impeded by their lack of access to CCDOC's computer &)'Stem (CJMIS),

Case: 1:06-cv-00204 Document #: 114 Filed: 01/23/08 Page 19 of 28 PageID #:963 19
which CCDOC officials promised to provide at a meeting in November 2007. This failure to collaborate as previously agreed does not serve the legitimate interests of either IDOC or CCDOC and should be rectified without further delay. As w"' noted in our report of November 20, 2007, these systems interfaces and other forms of information sharing can enhance the process whereby the parties can identify candidates for appropriate and timely diwrsion. This process may include (1) expedittld approval of placement on electronic monitoring, which requires PRB approval for inmates still on parole, (2) more timely placement of technical parole violators into community-based programs, and (3) tlfforts to expedite requests for restoration of good time, which must also be approved by the PRI3. These initiatives, representing collaborative efforts by IDOC, CCDOC, and the PRB, otTer a realistic hope (lf decreasing both the number of inmates in CCDOC and IDOC custody and the length of stay for many of these inmates.
The ability of tho: PRB to sustain the efforts achieved thus far appears to depend in significant part on their success in obtaining an immediate increase in funding from the State of Illinois. As we noted in our most recent report, the no:ed for additional funding to provide King hearings and community placements consistently and in timely fashion had already been clearly established.
The monitor met with IDOC parole administrators and other officials via teleconference on December 18, 2007, at which time stat<: officials articulated a wide variety of actions that may not have received recognition in previous monitoring reports. The Monitor does wish to bring to th.e attention of the Court and the parties the dedication of significant resources on the part of

Case: 1:06-cv-00204 Document #: 114 Filed: 01/23/08 Page 20 of 28 PageID #:964 20
dedicated parole agents, both those serving as King inwstigators and others supervising parolees, supervisors, administrators, and others who have contributed to the achievement of substantial compliance with the provisions of the Consent Decree in this litigation.
JUVENILE PAROLE VIOLATORS As noted in our prcviou~ reports, a smalJ number of King cases involved individuals
charged with crimes who were still under juvenile parole supervision. These individuals had been housed at CCDOC, based on their age at the time of the most recent adult offense, prior to their transfer to the Illinois Department of Juvenile Justice. Most of the individuals in this category were transferred to lDJJ's maximum-security facility, the Illinois Youth Center- Joliet, shortly after completing the reception process at St. Charles. Our observations have concluded that the parole status of these persons relating to the provisions of this Consent Decree been handled in the same fashion as those of their older colleagues, and JDOC and PRB staff have managed to achieve substantial compliance with regard to thestl youthful offenders.
Their situation in TDJJ facilities, however, remains problematic. The Monitor recognize that these concerns arc outside the parameters ofthis case, but we wish to inform the Court and the parties of our plans to continue meeting with IDJJ and PRB officials to discuss strategies to ameliorate the problems affecting these individuals and their more youthful colleagues in state juvenile facilities.

Case: 1:06-cv-00204 Document #: 114 Filed: 01/23/08 Page 21 of 28 PageID #:965 21
CONCLUSIONS
Despite a decrease from the levels achieved during previous months during November 2007 and December 2007, the number of King hearings conducted to date has remained substantial. As the data indicate, PRB and !DOC staff has managed to conduct timely hearings in the vast majority of these cases, regardless of the location ofthe hearings. The Monitor remains concerned, however, about the ability of both agencies to sustain this level of performance over time, which we believe will require additional resources.
The Monitor also wishes to restate our belief that the problem of continuances requested at King hearings remains linked to the pace of criminal case processing in the Circuit Court of Cook County. We continue to believe that, since the Criminal Division of the Circuit Court now utilizes a differential case processing system, cases involving defendants on parole, particularly juvenile parole, receive expedited handling, at least insofar as the timing of preliminary hearings is concerned. If hearings in these cases could be expedited without compromising the rights of the state or the defendant, it might reduce the number of King continuances, enabling more rapid dbpositions of many of these cases.
King hearing officers continue to scrutinize the information pres.,ntcd by the King investigators. The Monitor has concerned to review hearing reports in which arrest reports and/or parole violation reports appear insufficient to establish probable cause, as well as those situations in which arresting officers provide no additional corroboration, and Hearing Offict!rs have entered findings of no probable cause on this basis. These efforts are well documented in

Case: 1:06-cv-00204 Document #: 114 Filed: 01/23/08 Page 22 of 28 PageID #:966 22
the reports generated by the Hearing Officers. In the opinion of the Monitors, these activities signifY ongoing efforts to maintain substantial compliance with the provisions of the Consent Decree in this case.
RECOMMENDATIONS
I. For hearings conducted in Cook County, more suitable space remains an unmet need. We urge Cook County officials to identify such space either within CCDOC or at the Criminal Courts Building. Meanwhile, CCDOC officials should take steps to ensure that inmates from Division XI are transported in timely fashion to the Receiving Room for these hearings.
2. Additional technical resources, including more laptop computers with wireless internet capability and portable printers, should be available at all hearings at both CCDOC and NRC.
3. IDOC administrators should consult with local law enforcement administrators to enlist their cooperation in notifYing officers of the need to provide corroboration and/or additional information in response to requests from King investigators.
4. The Monitor urges the Court and parties to emphasize to state officials the importance of the PRB's request for funding f(lr additional statfto conduct King hearings, establish timely placements into community-based programs for parolees, and other essential tasks, which may well increase in the near future. It is doubtful whether the PRB will be able to fulfill these expanding responsibilities without additional appropriations, but these will be far less costly than the enormous expenditures already occurring because of the housing and transportation of thousands of defendants.

Case: 1:06-cv-00204 Document #: 114 Filed: 01/23/08 Page 23 of 28 PageID #:967 23
5. The situation involving juvenile parolees might be susceptible to amelioration if decisions to terminate parole were made in appropriate cases (e.g -those involving very serious charges with significant evidence of guilt). The Monitor urges IDJJ officials to review these cases to determine which, if any, warrant such a recommendation.
CONCLUSION
As the monitoring activities described in the three reports submitted in this case have documented, the Illinois Department of Corrections has achieved substantial compliance with the provisions of the Consent Decree in this litigation. This has been achieved with considerable effort on their part and, in no small measure, on the part of the Prisoner Review Board and the Cook County Department of Corrections. Work remains to be done, and some of the progress achieved to date is based, in many respects, on temporary arrangements that do not inspire confidence that they can be sustained over any significant period of time.
The efforts to achieve compliance have involved enormous expenditures on the part of
moe, which has borne the expense of housing hundreds of inmates shipped back to state
custody pursuant to Cook County's interpretation of the order issued by Judge Marovich in Duran; in addition, IDOC has dedicated the work of numerous staff to the task of conducting King hearings that, in the opinion of the Monitor, have achieved substantial compliance with the provisions of the Consent Decree in this case.

Case: 1:06-cv-00204 Document #: 114 Filed: 01/23/08 Page 24 of 28 PageID #:968 24
The transfer of inmates between state and county facilities and thdr extended stays in a restrictive reception center not designed for such lengthy confinement have been two of the most noteworthy unintended consequences of this litigation. The Monitor intends to continue working with Cook County and Illinois officials on these issues to ensure that inmates' legal rights are not violated as a result of the new arrangements resulting from these cases.

Case: 1:06-cv-00204 Document #: 114 Filed: 01/23/08 Page 25 of 28 PageID #:969 25
POPULATION AND CAPACITY SUMMARY COOK COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
THROUGH DECEMBER 31, 2007
January 11, 2008
Duran v. Sheahan et al.
74 c 2949
The Honorable Virginia M. Kendall United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois Eastern Division
John Howard Association 300 West Adams, Suite 423
Chicago, lllinois 60606 312-782-1901
e-mail: info@john-howard.org

Case: 1:06-cv-00204 Document #: 114 Filed: 01/23/08 Page 26 of 28 PageID #:970 26
Cook County Department of Corrections 2007 POPULATION AND CAPACITY SUMMARY

Available Beds

Jan

9803

Feb

9820

Mar

9754

Apr

9803

May

9790

Jun

9713

Ju1

9792

Aug

9819

Sep

9930

Oct

9954

Nov

9775

Dec

9746

Average Daily Population

Overflow

ADP/C 8

Population

Aggregate

<Daily Average) Release Mechanisms

No. of Days
of
Overcrowding

9548.5

501.6

1901.1

31/31

9314.3

364.8

1789.8

28/28

9429.9

410.2

1688.4

31/31

9520.2

458.9

1706.4

30/30

9354.6

317.6

1594.3

31/31

9478.3

363.5

1537.8

29/30

9607.9

441.6

1516.9

31/31

9878.5

574.9

1465.5

31131

10088.2

564.8

1468.0

30/30

10048.8

586.3

1425.5

31/31

9741.6

419.2

1418.4

30/30

9185.6

145.1

1384.3

28/31

YEAR~TO­

DATE

TOTAL

na

DAILY
AVERAGE

9824.8

na 9600.9

na 429.3

na

na

1573.4

362/365

JOHN HOWARD ASSOCIATION

' ADP/C; average daily population or caseload.

1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
2005 2006 2007

Case: 1:06-cv-00204 Document #: 114 Filed: 01/23/08 Page 27 of 28 PageID #:971 27

Cook County Department of Corrections INSTITUTIONAL GROWTH: 1988 • 2007

Average Daily
Population

Year-to Year
Growth

Year-to Available Year
Beds Growth

Occupancy Level

Year-to Overflow Year Population Growth

5327 6492 6827 7590 8789 8881 8907 8751 9035 9153 9475 9492 9953 10642 Jl 082 10664 10536
9776 9360 9601

na + 21.9% + 5.2% + 11.2%
+ 15.8% + 1.0% + 0.3%
- 1.8%
+ 3.2% + 1.3% + 3.5% + 0.2% + 4.9% + 6.9% + 4.1%
- 3.8% - 1.2%
. 7.2%
- 4.3%
+ 2.6%

5571 na 6150 +10.4%
6217 - 1.1% 6173 - 0.7%
6623 + 6.6% 7953 +20.1%
7927 - 0.3% 7683 - 3.1%
8857 +15.3% 9262 + 4.6% 9360 + 1.1% 9639 + 3.0% 9721 + 0.9% 9720 - 0.0% 9827 + 1.1% 10100 + 2.8%
9932 - 1.6% 9641 - 2.9%
9838 + 2.0%
- 9825 0.1%

95.6% 105.6% 109.8% 123.0% 132.7% 111.7% 112.4% 113.9% 102.0%
98.8% 101.2%
98.5% 102.4% 109.5% 112.8% 105.6% 106.1% 101.4%
95.1% 97.7%

138.7 na
582.8 +320.2%
806.0 + 38.3%
1499.4 + 86.0%
2443.0 + 62.9%
- 1543.4 36.8%
1455.7 - 5.7% 1360.4 - 6.5% 624.7 - 54.1% 414.1 - 33.7%
531.9 + 28.4%
304.3 - 42.8%
535.4 + 75.9% 1147.1 +114.3%
1419.6 + 23.8%
990.3 - 30.2%
- 950.4 4.0%
643.7 - 32.3%
266.5 58.6%
429.3 +61.1%

Cumulative Growth + 4274

+ 80.2%

+ 4254 +76.4%

+ 2.1% + 290.6 + 209.5% JOHN HOWARD ASSOCIATION

JAN2006 FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC
:X (2006J
JAN 2007 FEB MAR APR MAY JUN flJL AUG
SEP
OCT NOV DEC
-
X (2007)

EMP
1521 1481 1433 1365 1129 792 605
809 967 1013 1034 926
1089.6
917 855 908 848 743 675 649 570 552 487 478 449
677.6

Cook County Release Mechanisms AVERAGE DAILY CASELOADSIPOPULATION
Jan 2006- Dec 2007

NON-CUSTODIAL

DRP

SFFP/ AGGREGATE

CCDAW DLYCSLD

431

180.3

418

169.4

398

166.2

435

152.7

461

160.4

447

156.1

381

148.8

287

154.4

253

158.7

231

138.0

296

159.0

330

147.5

2132 2068 1997 1953 1750 1395 I 135 1250 1379 1382 1489 1404

364.0

157.6

1611.2

281

133.9

250

122.4

184

143.4

140

146.2

141

140.0

153

138.2

159

141.4

I 75

147.9

197

151.3

2(}4

166.2

205

163.6

203

158.3

1332 1227 1235 1141 1027 966 949 893 900 857 847 810

191.0
-

146.1
··--

1015.3
-

CUSTODIAL

PRC WJSRP MOMS

AGGREGATE

DAILY POP

437.7 114.5

15.6

440.7 116.8

13.7

441.2 109.8

12.6

440.5 108.6

14.2

441.3 111.5

15.6

439.7 111.0

16.2

440.6 107.6

14.7

438.1 116.0

14.1

4413 116.5

13.0

440.2 115.7

12.5

434.4 102.7

12.3

438.1 111.5

15.2

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Case: 1:06-cv-00204 Document #: 114 Filed: 01/23/08 Page 28 of 28 PageID #:972

 </s> Case: 1:06-cv-00204 Document #: 8 Filed: 01/13/06 Page 1 of 6 PageID #:29

'
FILED

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JAN 1 3 2006

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

MICMA&L W. DOIIBINS
t'UI!IIK, U.t, DIITIIIOf gl)yNT

CHARLES KING and ANDRE BROWN, Plaintiffs,
v.
ROGER E. WALKER, Director of Illinois Department of Corrections, JESSE MONTGOMERY, Deputy Director of Parole, Operations,
Defendants.

)

)

)
) No.

06C

0204

)

)

)

)

JUDGE GETTLEMAN

)

) )

.GEMRAA1CDiJtNSH-f3§A"61,Pi...rJlj~JirRYg• ~. N

MEMORANDUM TN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION
Plaintiffs submit this memorandum in support of their motion for class certification under Rules 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. I. INTRODUCTION AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs are adult, Cook County parolees who arc charged with violating their paroles. After !heir unrelated arrests, they were taken to the Cook County Jail. As alleged parole violators, they are not eligible for bond. Pursuant to Defendant's policy, PlaintitTs only remained in the Cook County Jail long enough for arrangements to be made to ship them to Joliet. They were not afforded the opportunity to proceed to a preliminary parole revocation hearing while in the Cook County Jail.

' ·•

Case: 1:06-cv-00204 Document #: 8 Filed: 01/13/06 Page 2 of 6 PageID #:30

After Plaintiffs were transported to Joliet, they were detained for additional time (more than 10 business days) without preliminary parole revocation hearings. furthermore, when preliminary hearings finally are conducted, Plaintiffs, like all other parolees, are- or will be- denied their constitutional right to present favorable evidence and to cross examine adverse witnesses. In fact, Defendants, in direct violation of two prior consent decrees, summarily find probable cause to revoke parole based entirely on police reports. But see, attached court decisions. No testimony is presented to prove the alleged violations and Cook County parolees never are allowed to present favorable testimony from their witnesses. As a result of Defendants' policy, it is all but impossible for parolees to even contact their witnesses about the preliminary parole revocation hearing. Parolees have little, if any, access to phones, and they are not given sufficient advance notice of the date and location of the preliminary parole revocation hearing. Consequently parolees cannot make arrangements for their witnesses to appear at the preliminary revocation hearing. 11. PLAINTIFFS' ALLEGATIONS MEET THE THRESHOLD
REQUIREMENTS FOR CLASS CERTIFICATIONS. A. The Proposed Class Definition Is Sufficiently .Precise. The proposed class is limited to adult Cook County parolees who are taken into custody at the Cook County Jail. As to all such parolees, past, present and future, Defendants' policy is the S[flUC. Plaintiffs must allege the existence of a readily identifiable class ( Amchen

2

Case: 1:06-cv-00204 Document #: 8 Filed: 01/13/06 Page 3 of 6 PageID #:31
'
l'roduc!s. Inc., v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 138 L. Ed.2d 689 ( 1997); Simpson v. Miller, 93 F.R.D. 540, 545 n. II (N.D. Til. 1982)), and the class representatives must be members of the class. Whitlock v. Johnson, 153 f'.3d 380, 383-84 (7th Cir. 1998); Hendrix v. Faulkner, 525 F. Supp. 435,442 (N.D. Ind. 1981), cert. den.ied, 468 U.S. 1217 (1984). A proposed class definition does not require absolute identity of all possible class members. Alexander v. O.'f.S. Coruoration, 1999 WL 573358 at 5, 7 (N.D. Til. July 30,1999). As long as the operative facts arc similar enough to suggest that many people will be affected in the same way, the class definition satisfies Rule 23. Joneek v. Local 714 International Teamsters, 1999 WL 755051 (N.D. Ill Sept. 3, 1999, Judge Gettlcman); National Organization For Women. Inc.. v. Scheidler, 172 F.R.D. 351, 357 (N.D. Ill 1997).
Here, the proposed class is precise and unambiguous. Cook County Teachers Union, Locall600 v. Byrd, 456 F.2d 81!2 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 84ll ( 1973). It includes only those persons who a) are alleged adult parole violators from Cook County and b) they were transported from the Cook County Jail to Joliet without having been afforded a preliminary parole revocation hearing. B. The Proposed Class Satisfies The Numerosity Requirement.
The identified class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. Gaspar v. l.invatev, 167 F.R.D. 51 (N.D. Ill. 1996); Swanson v. American Consumer Industries. Inc., 415 F.2d 1326, 1333 (7th Cir. 1969). Impracticability is detennined by considering: (1) the size of the class; (2) the geographic dispersion of members; (3) the
3

Case: 1:06-cv-00204 Document #: 8 Filed: 01/13/06 Page 4 of 6 PageID #:32 •
nature of relief sought; (4) the ability of individuals to press their own claims; and (5) the practicality of forcing re-litigation of common issues. Gomez v. Illinois State Bd. of Educ., 117 F.R.D. 394,399 (N.D. Ill. 1987); Rosario v. Cook Countv, 101 F.R.D. 659, 661 (N.D. Til. 1983); 7A Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d § 1762 (1986). The exact number of class members or their precise identities is not essential to class certification as long as there is a defined class which is sufficiently numerous. Evans v. United States Pipe <md Foundry Co., 696 F.2d 925, 930 (lith Cir. 1983); Toney v. Rosewood Care Center Inc. of Joliet, 1999 WL 199249 (N.D. Ill, March, 1999).
Here, the alleged policy affects hundreds, if not thousands, of parolees every year. Classes involving thr fewer putative members are routinely certified. Williams v. Brown, 214 F.R.D. 484 (N.D. Ill. 2003)- a class of three hundred certified; Patrykus v. Gomilla, 121 F.R.D. 357, 361 (N.D. Ill. 1988)-class offewer than 50 putative members certified. Furthermore, litigation, by thousands of individuals, of a common core of facts arising from the same unlawful conduct is an extreme waste ofjudicial resources, precisely the result that the class certification is designed to prevent. Carnegie, 376 F.3d at 660-662: Johns v. DeLeonardis, 145 F.R.D. 480, 483 (N.D. Ill. 1992).
C. Common Questions of Law and Fact Are Controlling. The commonality requirement of Rule 23 is satistled when the factual and legal issues relate to standardized conduct by the defendants toward members of the proposed
4

Case: 1:06-cv-00204 Document #: 8 Filed: 01/13/06 Page 5 of 6 PageID #:33
class. Whitlock v. Johnson, 153 F.3d 380 (7'h Cir. 1998). Because the Defendants engaged in a single course of conduct resulting in injury to the class as a whole, a conunon core of operative facts is present, and Rule 23(a)(2) is satisfied. Johns, 145 F.R.D. at 483, (citing Patrykus v. Gomila, 121 F.R.D. 357,361 (N.D. Ill. 1988)). Once common issues of fact or law are alleged, it makes no difference whether the speciiic activities relating to each class member vary slightly. Williams, 214 F.R.D. at 489~93; Alliance to End Repression v. Rochford, 565 F.2d 975, 977 (7th Cir. 1977); Retired Chicago Police Ass'n v. Citv of Chicago, 141 F.R.D. 477, 485 (N.D. Ill. 1992).
D. The Typicality Requirement Is Satisfied. Plaintiffs' claims have the "same essential characteristics as the claims of the class at large," so the typicality requirement of Rule 23(a)(3) also is met. De La Puente v. Stokely-Van Camp. Inc., 713 F.2d 225, 232 (7th Cir. 1983). In Edmondson v. Simon, 86 F.R.D. 375, 380 (N.D. ll1. 1980), the Court held that where the named-plaintiffs claims arise !rom the same practice or course of conduct and are based on the same legal theory, the typicality requirement is met. See National Organization For Women v. Scheidler, 172 P.R.D. 351 (N.D.lll. 1997); Johns, 145 P.R.D. at 483. E. Plaintiffs Fairly and Adequately Represent the Class. The Court must determine adequacy of representation under Rule 23 by examining: (I) whether conflicts of interest exist between the named representatives and the rest of the class members, and (2) whether the named plaintiffs' counsel will
5

Case: 1:06-cv-00204 Document #: 8 Filed: 01/13/06 Page 6 of 6 PageID #:34
•
adequately protect the interests of the class. Secretary of Labor v. Fitzsimmons, !105 F.2d 682, 697 (7th Cir. 1986). There arc no conflicts between the named class representatives and the remainder of the class. Nor are Plaintiffs' interests antagonistic to the class.
When the class' attorneys "have been found to be adequate in the past, it is persuasive evidence that they will be adequate again." Beckless v. Heckler, 622 F. Supp. 715,721 (N.D. lll. 1985) In this litigation, the attorneys representing the interests ofthe Plaintiff class members have successfully represented civil rights claimants in other class actions. Sec May v. Sheahan, 226 F.3d 876 (7'h Cir. 2000); Faheem v. Klincar, 841 F.2d 712 (7'h Cir. 1988), Whitlock v. Johnson, 153 F.3d 380 (7'11 Cir. I 998); Gates v. Towery, 2004 WL 2583905 (N.D. Til. 2004); Williams v. Brown, 214 F.R.D. 484 (N.D. Ill.2003); and Patzykus v. Gomilla, 121 F.R.D. 357, 301 (N.D. Ill. 1988). Plaintiffs, therefore, have satis!1ed all the core clements for (h)(3) certification. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs respectfully request that this cause be maintained as a class action and that the Court certify the class as herein defined under Rule 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Respectfully submitted,
('~
THO AS PETERS--t)""-----==---ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFFS 407 S. Dearborn, Suite 1675 Chicago, IL 60605 (312) 697-0022
6

 </s> Case: 1:06-cv-00204 Document #: 48 Filed: 05/08/06 Page 1 of 25 PageID #:547

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

CHARLES KING, ANDRE BROWN,

)

CHOIKE HILL, THOMAS GILBERT,

)

NELSON MUNIZ, ANTHONY SMITH,

)

and ANDRE McGREGG,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

No. 06 C 204

v.

)

)

Judge Robert W. Gettleman

ROGER E. WALKER, Director of

)

Illinois Department of Corrections,

)

JESSE MONTGOMERY, Deputy Director of

)

Parole Operations,

)

)

Defendants.

)

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiffs filed an eight-count amended class action complaint seeking injunctive relief

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of plaintiffs’ constitutional rights under the

Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiffs, parolees from the Illinois

Department of Corrections (“IDOC”), allege that defendants’ policies and practices deprive class

members of the right to a prompt preliminary parole revocation hearing near the site of the

alleged parole violation. Plaintiffs filed a motion for class certification on January 17, 2006.

Defendants have filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6),

and they oppose class certification. Plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary injunction on

January 24, 2006, which defendants also oppose. For the reasons explained below, defendants’

motion to dismiss is denied, plaintiffs’ motion for class certification is granted, and plaintiffs’

motion for a preliminary injunction is granted.

Case: 1:06-cv-00204 Document #: 48 Filed: 05/08/06 Page 2 of 25 PageID #:548
FACTS1 Defendant Roger Walker is the director of IDOC, and defendant Jesse Montgomery is the deputy director of parole operations for IDOC. The seven named plaintiffs are parolees from various IDOC institutions in Illinois. Each named plaintiff was arrested in Cook County, Illinois between August 2005 and February 2006 for an alleged parole violation based on a new criminal charge,2 and taken to the Cook County Jail. Each named plaintiff denies that he committed a parole violation. Plaintiffs allege that it is defendants’ policy and practice to transfer alleged parole violators from the Cook County Jail to Stateville Correctional Center (“Stateville”) in Joliet, Illinois, and then to transfer them to the institution from which they were paroled. According to plaintiffs, this creates a “system which guarantees that no Cook County parolee will receive a prompt preliminary parole revocation hearing at or near the site of the alleged parole violation,” and that Cook County parolees “will not have counsel or favorable witnesses present when the preliminary parole revocation is finally held.” Plaintiffs Charles King (“King”), Chioke Hill (“Hill”), Thomas Gilbert (“Gilbert”), Anthony Smith (“Smith”), Nelson Muniz (“Muniz”), and Andre McGregg (“McGregg”)3 allege that within 10 days of their arrests they were transferred to Stateville without receiving a
1For the purposes of a motion to dismiss, the court accepts all well-pleaded allegations as true and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Travel All Over the World, Inc. v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 73 F.3d 1423, 1428 (7th Cir. 1996).
2Plaintiffs do not state in the amended complaint that each named plaintiff’s alleged parole violation was a new criminal charge, but they concede this in their briefs.
3The court notes that Smith, Muniz, and McGregg allege that they were transferred to Stateville“within days” of arrest.
2

Case: 1:06-cv-00204 Document #: 48 Filed: 05/08/06 Page 3 of 25 PageID #:549
preliminary hearing and without waiving their right to a preliminary hearing.4 Several named plaintiffs were then transferred from Stateville to more remote IDOC facilities without receiving a preliminary hearing. Gilbert and King were transferred from Stateville to the Logan Correctional Center in Lincoln, Illinois, which is approximately 165 miles from Chicago. Hill was transferred to Western Illinois Correctional Center in Mount Sterling, Illinois, which is in excess of 100 miles from the site of his alleged parole violation. Plaintiff Andre Brown (“Brown”) fails to allege when he was transferred from the Cook County Jail, but at the time of the filing of the amended complaint he was incarcerated at the Big Muddy Correctional Center in Ina, Illinois. Plaintiffs’ brief in support of a preliminary injunction asserts that Brown was transferred to Stateville after “a few days” in the Cook County Jail.
King, Brown, Hill, Muniz, and McGregg allege that they have been in custody for more than 10 business days without receiving a preliminary parole revocation hearing. McGregg has been in custody for more than 150 days without a preliminary or final parole revocation hearing. Gilbert had not received or waived a preliminary hearing at the time he was transferred to Logan, where he remains incarcerated. Smith was arrested for an alleged parole violation on February 3, 2006, and has not waived his right to a preliminary parole revocation hearing. Plaintiffs fail to allege that Smith and Gilbert had not received preliminary hearings at the time the amended complaint was filed on February 14, 2006.
The criminal charges against Hill were dismissed based on a finding of no probable cause and dismissed on January 17, 2006. At the time of the filing of the amended complaint more
4The court notes that Counts II through VIII each re-allege paragraphs 1 through 30 of Count I. Some of paragraphs 1 through 30 contain general allegations. Others, however, contain allegations specific to King only, and cannot apply to the other named plaintiffs.
3

Case: 1:06-cv-00204 Document #: 48 Filed: 05/08/06 Page 4 of 25 PageID #:550
than a month later, Hill remained incarcerated at the Western Illinois Correctional Center on his alleged parole violation. The criminal charges against King were dismissed on December 28, 2005. King never received a preliminary parole revocation hearing, and remained in custody until February 21, 2006, after his full parole revocation hearing at which he was found not to be a parole violator.
Plaintiffs seek to certify a class of plaintiffs defined as Cook County Parolees “who have been or will be arrested for parole violations in Cook County, Illinois and who will then be: a) taken into custody at Cook County Jail; b) transferred from Cook County Jail within 10 days without a preliminary parole revocation hearing; c) transferred from the Cook County Jail to the Illinois Department of Corrections; and d) held without a preliminary parole revocation hearing for more than 60 days.” The court notes that although the putative class definition states that it applies to individuals held longer than 60 days, plaintiffs’ amended complaint alleges that, “Absent exigent circumstances, a preliminary parole revocation hearing should be held within 10 days of arrest and the hearing should be held at or near the site of the allege violation, but in no case in excess of 60 miles from the site of the alleged violation.” Plaintiffs’ briefs suggest that they intend to include anyone held more than 10 business days without a parole hearing. In addition, several of the named plaintiffs were held more than 10 days but fewer than 60, further suggesting a typographical error in the class definition.5 The court considers the class definition
5The court notes that on the date amended complaint was filed, Smith had been in custody for fewer than 10 business days. Similarly, plaintiffs fail to allege that Gilbert was held for more than 10 business days without a preliminary parole revocation hearing, although they do allege that he was transferred to Stateville within 10 days of his arrest without a hearing.
4

Case: 1:06-cv-00204 Document #: 48 Filed: 05/08/06 Page 5 of 25 PageID #:551
to include individuals held without a preliminary parole revocation hearing for more than 10 business days.
DISCUSSION I. Motion to dismiss
In ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court accepts the allegations of the complaint as true and views the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Travel All Over the World, 73 F.3d at 1428. A complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless there is no doubt that the plaintiff cannot prove a set of facts that would entitled her to relief based on her claim. Pressalite Corp. v. Matsushita Electric Corp. of America, 2003 WL 1811530, at *2 (N.D.Ill. Apr. 4, 2003).
Plaintiffs argue that their re-incarcerations on alleged parole violations without a preliminary parole revocation hearing violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Supreme Court’s decision in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972). According to plaintiffs, parolees are held for weeks or even months before receiving a preliminary hearing, and that when the preliminary hearing is finally held, they are significantly limited in their ability to prepare and present a defense to the alleged violation. The lengthy delay creates a risk of stale evidence, and holding the hearings as much as 200 miles from the site of alleged violations limits parolees’ ability to call favorable witnesses. Defendants argue that plaintiffs’ amended complaint should be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) because they provide the process required under Morrissey. For the reasons stated below, defendants’ motion to dismiss is denied.
5

Case: 1:06-cv-00204 Document #: 48 Filed: 05/08/06 Page 6 of 25 PageID #:552
Morrissey and its progeny establish a two-tiered system to safeguard parolees’ due process rights in the revocation process. Although Morrissey does not set forth precise guidelines for a preliminary parole revocation hearing, the Supreme Court held that the preliminary hearing must provide “some minimal inquiry” and must be conducted “at or reasonably near the place of the alleged parole violation or arrest and as promptly as convenient after arrest.” 408 U.S. at 485. The Court explained, “Such an inquiry should be seen as in the nature of a ‘preliminary hearing’ to determine whether there is probable cause or reasonable grounds to believe that the arrested parolee has committed acts that would constitute a violation of parole conditions.” Id. According to Morrissey, a preliminary parole revocation hearing must be held “while information is fresh and sources are available” because of the frequently substantial lag time between arrest and final revocation, and the fact that parolees may be held far away from the site of arrest. Id. The preliminary hearing need not be held by a judicial officer, but may be conducted by any “independent officer,” including a probation officer other than the officer assigned to the parolee. Id. at 486.
In the instant case, defendants argue that preliminary parole revocation hearings are unnecessary because parolees’ constitutional rights are sufficiently protected by probable cause hearings held for warrantless arrestees under Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975). Gerstein holds that the Fourth Amendment requires a determination of probable cause by a judicial officer “promptly” after a warrantless arrest. Defendants also assert that “they are under court order to take custody and control of parolees from Cook County,” pursuant to a October 30, 2003, order issued by Judge Marovich in Duran v. Sheahan, case No. 74 C 2949, modifying a consent decree
6

Case: 1:06-cv-00204 Document #: 48 Filed: 05/08/06 Page 7 of 25 PageID #:553
regarding pre-trial detainees held at the Cook County Department of Corrections (“CCDOC”). According to defendants, the instant suit creates a risk of inconsistent judgments with Duran.
Defendants’ second argument is easily disposed of by reading Judge Marovich’s order in Duran, which does not direct defendants to do anything. Instead, Judge Marovich modified the Duran consent decree to permit the Sheriff of Cook County, “at his discretion,” to transfer to the custody of IDOC any person housed at the CCDOC who has been previously sentenced to IDOC for an unexpired sentence of confinement. Alleged parole violators, including plaintiffs in the instant case, are considered to have unexpired sentences of confinement. Parolees are not directly at issue in Duran, and the Duran consent decree, as modified, does not require that alleged parole violators be transferred to IDOC at any point. Moreover, Duran does not excuse the failure to provide timely preliminary parole revocation hearings prior to transferring parolees to IDOC, or IDOC’s failure to provide hearings within 10 days of a parolee’s arrest.
Both parties cite extensively to prior lawsuits, opinions, settlements, and consent decrees from this district addressing claims similar to those presented here. Several of these cases involve IDOC, parolees arrested in Cook County, and the same plaintiffs’ counsel as the instant case. Although plaintiffs do not seek to enforce any of them directly, they attach several consent decrees to their complaint and the stipulated dismissal of Willard v. Snyder. Willard, case No. 01 C 1884, was filed on September 18, 2001, and assigned to Judge Kennelly. The class plaintiffs in Willard were “technical” parole violators – parolees charged with violating administrative conditions of their parole – who made allegations similar to plaintiffs’ allegations in the instant case. The Willard plaintiffs dismissed that case pursuant to IDOC’s agreement that alleged technical parole violators will be held within 60 miles of Cook County, provided a
7

Case: 1:06-cv-00204 Document #: 48 Filed: 05/08/06 Page 8 of 25 PageID #:554
preliminary parole revocation hearing within 10 business days of imprisonment, and given the opportunity to present witness testimony live or through a telephonic link. It appears that defendants’ conduct as alleged in the instant case may violate agreements referenced in the stipulation to dismiss in Willard. Plaintiffs here, however, were not parties to Willard, which was not a certified class action and ended in a non-enforceable stipulated dismissal rather than a consent decree or settlement agreement. Plaintiffs are thus not required to reinstate Willard or to attempt to enforce the other consent decrees to proceed with their claims here.6
Plaintiffs also attach three additional consent decrees from this district, entered in Pinzon v. Lane, case No. 87 C 4542, Kareem Faheem-El v. Klincar, case No. 84 C 2561, and Downie v. Klincar, case No. 89 C 2937. Without specifically arguing that any of these decrees requires dismissal of the instant case, defendants argue that the instant case creates the risk of inconsistent verdicts and that plaintiffs should be required to join their claims to one of the earlier suits. Downie is not relevant here because it applies to final revocation hearings only. Although the other earlier cases certainly address similar issues and, as plaintiffs assert, suggest that defendants have long been aware of the significant constitutional complaints concerning the parole revocation system, neither the Faheem nor the Pinzon decree precludes the instant lawsuit because neither is directly on point with the claims here.
The Pinzon decree requires preliminary hearings within 10 business days of a parolee’s arrest, but the decree applies to parolees who are detained in Cook County pending a final parole
6Indeed, in their brief in support of the motion to dismiss, defendants ask the court to “strike [Willard] from the record” because the stipulation contains a confidentiality provision that defendants claim plaintiffs violated by attaching it to their complaint. This court seriously doubts the enforceability of such a confidentiality provision in an agreement by a public official, but as stated above concurs that Willard is largely irrelevant to the instant case.
8

Case: 1:06-cv-00204 Document #: 48 Filed: 05/08/06 Page 9 of 25 PageID #:555
revocation hearing. Plaintiffs in the instant case were held at Cook County Jail only for a short period of time before being transferred to IDOC facilities outside Cook County to await their revocation hearings. Regarding preliminary hearings, the Faheem decree establishes the due process to which a parolee is entitled, including the opportunity call and confront witnesses, but it does not establish a time-frame for preliminary hearings. In addition, neither the Pinzon nor the Faheem decree places geographic limits on the location of the preliminary hearing, and plaintiffs’ claims in the instant case are based in part on defendants’ policy of moving parolees to remote facilities prior to the preliminary hearing.
Accordingly, none of the prior court orders and other filings in separate litigations, require dismissal of the instant case.
Defendants’ legal argument in support of their motion to dismiss is that a Gerstein probable cause hearing, which determines whether a suspect arrested without a warrant may be detained, is a constitutionally valid substitute for a Morrissey probable cause hearing, which determines whether an alleged parole violator may be detained. Cook County General Order No. 86-1 requires Gerstein probable cause hearings to detain individuals arrested without a warrant. According to defendants, “To require both a Gerstein hearing and the preliminary [Morrissey] hearing creates an unnecessary redundancy that would burden an already overburdened criminal justice system for no ascertainable reason.” Defendants fail to cite any case law in support of their novel, and ultimately unpersuasive, assertion that the two due process requirements are constitutionally equivalent.
Plaintiffs do not challenge they were provided sufficient Gerstein hearings within 10 days of their arrest and that they were not prevented from presenting evidence to counter a finding of
9

Case: 1:06-cv-00204 Document #: 48 Filed: 05/08/06 Page 10 of 25 PageID #:556
Gerstein probable cause. Plaintiffs argue, however, that Gerstein hearings are not Constitutional substitutes for Morrissey hearings because Morrissey hearings, unlike Gerstein hearings, are adversarial and Morrissey requires greater due process protections than Gerstein, including the opportunity to call witnesses and the right to cross examine adverse witnesses. For the reasons discussed below, the court agrees.
The Supreme Court held in Gerstein that a state must provide “a fair and reasonable determination of probable cause as a condition for any significant pretrial restraint of liberty, and this determination must be made by a judicial officer either before or promptly after arrest.” 420 U.S. at 125. Gerstein does not require the adversarial safeguards of counsel, confrontation, cross-examination, and compulsory process of witnesses at probable cause hearings. Id. at 11922. It is also not constitutionally required that an arrestee be present at the Gerstein hearing, and an unverified police report may be sufficient to detain an arrestee. Id. at 120. Plaintiffs in the instant case allege that no witnesses are called at the Gerstein hearings to prove the parole revocation allegations and that hearing officers rely on the investigative report as conclusive proof of the alleged parole violations. Plaintiffs also claim that they were denied the opportunity to call witnesses on their behalf.
Although a preliminary parole revocation hearing is, like a Gerstein hearing, less formal than a full trial or a final revocation hearing, the Supreme Court in Morrissey set the due process floor higher than in Gerstein. Under Morrissey, in addition to notice of the preliminary hearing and the alleged parole violations, there must be some provision for live testimony. 408 U.S. at 486-87. “At the hearing the parolee may appear and speak on his own behalf; he may bring letters, documents, or individuals who can give relevant information to the hearing officer.” The
10

Case: 1:06-cv-00204 Document #: 48 Filed: 05/08/06 Page 11 of 25 PageID #:557
parolee may also request that a person who has given adverse information on which the parole revocation is to be based is made available for questioning in his presence. Id.
Indeed, the Supreme Court recognized in Gerstein that Morrissey requires greater due process protections for parole revocation than probable cause to detain hearings under the Fourth Amendment, including permitting the parolee an opportunity to collect favorable evidence while it is fresh and accessible. Referring to the parole revocation process established in Morrissey, the Gerstein Court noted, “That preliminary hearing, more than the probable cause determination required by the Fourth Amendment, serves the purpose of gathering and preserving live testimony, since the final revocation hearing frequently is held at some distance from the place where the violation occurred.” Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 121 n.22.
Plaintiffs cite several opinions and consent decrees in similar cases that have distinguished between probable cause for purposes of the Fourth Amendment and for purposes of the Due Process Clause. For example, regarding preliminary hearings, the Faheem decree requires that, “At the preliminary parole revocation hearing parolees shall have the opportunity to call witnesses in accordance with [Morrissey]” and to “confront and cross examine adverse witnesses who have testified or presented evidence against the parolee, unless the hearing officer specifically finds good cause for not allowing confrontation.” The Faheem decree thus undermines defendants’ argument that an adversarial Morrissey hearing is not required.
In addition to the distinction between the Fourth Amendment and Due Process Clause precedent, Gerstein and Morrissey hearings are distinguishable based on the result of each. A finding in a Gerstein hearing of probable cause to detain an arrestee does not prevent release on bail. A finding of probable cause in a Morrissey hearing, in contrast, extinguishes a parolee’s
11

Case: 1:06-cv-00204 Document #: 48 Filed: 05/08/06 Page 12 of 25 PageID #:558
right to judicially set bail. Faheem-El v. Klincar, 841 F.2d 712, 727-29 (7th Cir. 1988). This supports plaintiffs’ argument that preliminary parole hearings must provide more robust due process protections because the loss of liberty is potentially greater. Although each involve a “probable cause” determination, Gerstein and Morrissey hearings serve separate purposes and protect distinct constitutional rights, and thus require different levels of process. Defendants’ argument that Gerstein hearings fulfill the due process mandate of Morrissey therefore fails.
In support of their argument that Gerstein hearings alone are sufficient, defendants rely on an Illinois statute that states that a preliminary parole hearing within 10 days is not required when an individual’s parole is revoked pursuant to new criminal charges and there has been a judicial finding of probable cause. 730 ILCS § 5/3-3-9(c).7 Defendants also point to the Pinzon consent decree, which states that a preliminary hearing need not be held within 10 business days if there has been a finding of probable cause under the predecessor statute to § 5/3-3-9. Plaintiffs do not directly challenge the constitutionality of 730 ILCS § 5/3-3-9. According to plaintiffs, there is not necessarily a conflict between § 5/3-3-9 and Morrissey because “probable cause” as used in § 5/3-3-9(c) and Pinzon should be read as requiring an adversarial preliminary hearing as required by 725 ILCS § 5/109-38, rather than a Gerstein probable cause determination.
7“A person charged with violating a condition of parole or mandatory supervised release shall have a preliminary hearing before a hearing officer designated by the Board to determine if there is cause to hold the person for a revocation hearing. However, no preliminary hearing need be held when revocation is based upon new criminal charges and a court finds probable cause on the new criminal charges or when the revocation is based upon a new criminal conviction and a certified copy of the conviction is available.” 730 ILCS 5/3-3-9(c).
8Ill. Rev. Stat. ch 38, § 109-1 et seq., cited in the Pinzon consent decree, is the same as 725 ILCS § 5/109 et seq. of the current Illinois Criminal Code. Section 5/109-3 describes preliminary hearings for warrantless arrestees. It includes the opportunity to cross examine witnesses and requires the prosecution to present evidence under oath. 725 ILCS § 5/109-3.
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Defendants do not directly address the distinction between an adversarial § 109-1 hearing and a Gerstein hearing, and they fail to challenge the distinction drawn by plaintiffs. Plaintiffs do not argue that a § 109-1 hearing would be insufficient under Morrissey. In fact, plaintiffs suggest that a proper § 109-1 hearing may be an acceptable substitute. The court need not resolve this issue because a state statute, of course, cannot trump the Constitution. In addition, defendants assert that parolees receive Gerstein hearings, not § 109-1 hearings, and thus the constitutionality of preliminary parole revocation based on a § 109-1 hearing is not before the court.
Defendants attempt to further conflate probable cause for revocation purposes under Morrissey with probable cause to detain by asserting that several of the named plaintiffs were indicted by a grand jury. Defendants fail, however, to cite any support for their suggestion that a grand jury proceeding, at which a defendant is not present, is any more a valid substitute for a Morrissey hearing than a Gerstein hearing. Defendants also attach significant portions of the named plaintiffs’ IDOC files and criminal records to the motion to dismiss, and refer to them throughout the briefs. Defendants’ suggestion that guilt or innocence is relevant to a due process inquiry ignores a bedrock principle of constitutional law, and unnecessarily attempts to insert extraneous and inflammatory details about the named plaintiffs’ alleged crimes and criminal history. None of this information is relevant to the constitutionality of defendants’ parole revocation procedures, and the court will not consider it.
In addition, defendants’ actions regarding named plaintiffs King and Hill contradict the argument that the two probable cause determinations, and the Morrissey and Gerstein standards, are equivalent. King remained incarcerated for nearly two months after the charges against him, for which he was arrested and charged with a violation of his parole, were dropped. Similarly, at
13

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the time the amended complaint was filed on February 14, 2006, more than a month after the charges against him were dismissed based on a finding of no probable cause, Hill remained incarcerated. Hill and King’s continued incarceration bolster plaintiffs’ claims that parolees’ constitutional rights are compromised by defendants’ policies and practices that disregard Morrissey, and that Gerstein and Morrissey probable cause findings are distinct.
Plaintiffs also claim that defendants’ policies and practices prevent parolees from receiving sufficient preliminary parole hearings when they are finally held. The Morrissey Court’s recognition of the factors of time and distance that require a prompt and close preliminary hearing to permit alleged violators a meaningful opportunity to challenge their revocation proves prescient here. See 408 U.S. at 485. Plaintiffs assert that after being transferred to IDOC custody parolees have little, if any access to telephones, and they are not given sufficient notice of the time and the location of the preliminary parole revocation hearing. As a result, parolees cannot make arrangements for witnesses to appear at the remote hearings or otherwise prepare their revocation defense. The significant time lapse between the alleged violation and the hearing also hinders parolees’ defense. Defendants assert that arrestees are given the opportunity to “appear, speak, and present evidence regarding the issue of probable cause,” and are permitted to be represented by counsel at preliminary parole hearings. It is therefore a question of fact if the delay and distance prevents parolees from receiving sufficient Morrissey hearings. Defendants do not, however, deny that, in violation of Morrissey, it may be weeks or months after arrest before a parolee receives a preliminary parole hearing, or that the hearings are held in prisons far remote from the place of the alleged violation.
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Accordingly, the court denies defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ amended complaint. II. Class certification
Plaintiffs to seek to certify a class under Rule 23(b)(2) for declaratory and injunctive relief.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, which governs class actions, requires a two-step analysis to determine if class certification is appropriate. First, plaintiffs must satisfy all four requirements of Rule 23(a): (1) numerosity; (2) commonality; (3) typicality; and (4) adequacy of representation. Harriston v. Chicago Tribune Co., 992 F.2d 697, 703 (7th Cir. 1993). These elements are a prerequisite to certification, and failure to meet any one of them precludes certification of a class. Second, the action must also satisfy one of the conditions of Rule 23(b). Joncek v. Local 714 International of Teamsters Health and Welfare Fund, 1999 WL 755051, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 3, 1999) (and cases cited therein). Relevant to the instant case, a class can be certified under Rule 23(b)(2) if “the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole.”
In the instant case, defendants do not challenge the adequacy of representation of the named plaintiffs9 or putative class counsel. Most of defendants’ objections to class certification are premised on the argument that Gerstein hearings are sufficient for parole revocation
9As noted above, however, it is not clear from the complaint that Brown, Gilbert, and Smith are members of the putative class. The complaint fails to allege that Smith and Gilbert were held for more than 10 business days without a preliminary hearing, or that Brown was transferred from Cook County Jail to an IDOC facility within 10 days of his arrest.
15

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purposes. In particular, defendants argue that the proposed class lacks typicality and commonality because it includes parolees who are accused of technical violations of the administrative conditions of their parole and parolees arrested on new crimes. The former group of parolees would not receive Gerstein hearings, but are entitled to parole revocation hearings. Gerstein hearings, however, as discussed above, are not sufficient substitutes for preliminary parole revocation hearings as provided in Morrissey. The putative class claims are thus typical of technical and non-technical alleged violators because they arise from defendants’ generally applicable parole revocation policies, which plaintiffs allege delay preliminary parole hearings for extended periods of time and impede parolees’ ability to prepare and present a defense to the alleged violations.
There are also questions of law and fact common to the proposed class. All class members allege that they were denied a preliminary parole revocation hearing in contravention of Morrissey as a result of defendants’ policies and practices. Defendants assert that factual differences between proposed class members, such as the type of alleged violation and each plaintiff’s status in the revocation process, require individual determinations. Such facts are not material to the constitutional issue. That is, neither the events that precipitated a parolee’s revocation charge nor the ultimate disposition of the underlying charges or the parole revocation are necessary to determining whether a parolee’s due process rights were violated during the revocation. Pursuant to the proposed class definition, putative class members share common material facts, including: (1) more than 10 days without a Morrissey hearing; (2) transfer to IDOC facilities that deny a parolee a real opportunity to present favorable evidence; (3) hearings
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without an opportunity to cross examine the source of the evidence of the alleged parole violation; and (4) hearings without any witness testimony.
Defendants’ argument that the proposed class does not share a common legal issue is equally without merit. Defendants argue that the inclusion of technical and non-technical violators in the proposed class defeats commonality because parolees arrested on new charges receive hearings pursuant to Gerstein and technical violators receive hearings under the stipulated dismissal in Willard.10 Defendants assert that proving the named plaintiffs’ claims would not prove the claims of all proposed class members because technical violators do not receive Gerstein hearings. In fact, this argument cuts against defendants because if a Gerstein hearing is not sufficient, thus violating the due process rights non-technical violators, then the due process rights of technical violators, who do not even receive Gerstein hearings, are being violated as well. Similarly, any constitutional injury caused by holding parolees far away from the site of the alleged violation and the actual procedures of Morrissey hearings would apply to all parolees. Morrissey does not distinguish between technical and non-technical violators, and thus both types of violators are entitled to constitutional protections established by the Supreme Court.
Defendants’ argument that the proposed class lacks definiteness because it includes “parole violators who have been or will be arrested for parole violations in Cook County” is also unpersuasive. A sufficiently definite class exists if its members can be ascertained by reference to objective criteria. Wallace v. Chicago Housing Auth., 224 F.R.D. 420, 425 (N.D.Ill. 2004).
10The court notes that the stipulation to dismiss in Willard was signed by the parties to that case only; it is not a consent decree or an enforceable order from the court.
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In the instant case, the proposed class is clearly defined by objective criteria, including the length of time a parolee is held without a preliminary parole hearing and if a parolee is transferred to IDOC custody. Including future parolees does not destroy the definiteness of the class because future class members must also meet the class definition, and whether to include them will not require individual determinations by the court. Plaintiffs are thus correct that if defendants’ policies violate the Due Process Clause and they remain in force, the class expands daily.
Defendants’ final challenge to class certification is based on the other litigations in this district, including Willard and Duran. As discussed above, although these suits address parole revocation procedure, they do not preclude plaintiffs’ claims here or prevent the certification of a class in the instant case. The only case that might arguably have an impact here is Willard, which applies to technical violators. Even if Willard were somehow relevant to the instant case, the court notes that defendants do not assert that they are in compliance with Willard. If some or all technical violators receive the due process agreed to in Willard, they would not be members of the proposed class because they would have had preliminary revocation hearings within 10 business days of arrest, and the class includes parolees who are held for more than 10 days without a hearing. If technical violators do not receive the due process agreed to in Willard, they are members of the proposed class here and defendants’ failure to honor the agreement in Willard certainly does not rescue them from the constitutional claims in the instant case.
Accordingly, the court grants plaintiffs’ motion to certify a class defined as: Cook County Parolees who have been or will be arrested for parole violations in Cook County, Illinois and who will then be: a) taken into custody at Cook County Jail; b) transferred from Cook County Jail within 10 days without a preliminary parole revocation hearing; c) transferred from
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the Cook County Jail to the Illinois Department of Corrections; and d) held without a preliminary parole revocation hearing for more than 10 days. The court certifies King, Hill, Muniz and McGregg as class representatives, and certifies plaintiffs’ counsel as class counsel.11 III. Preliminary injunction
Plaintiffs seek an injunction, but fail to submit a proposed injunction and offer several versions of possible injunctions. In the amended complaint, plaintiffs ask the court to “issue a preliminary injunction barring defendants from continuing their policy of transferring parolees from the Cook County Jail before the parolee has had, or waived, a preliminary parole revocation hearing” and to permanently enjoin defendants from continuing their policy as alleged. In their motion for a preliminary injunction plaintiffs seek to require defendants to hold preliminary hearings within 10 business days of arrest. In the reply in support of the motion for preliminary injunction, plaintiffs seek to require defendants “to submit a plan that provides for a preliminary hearing within 10 business days of arrests” that includes “some provision for witness testimony” at the preliminary hearing, and that defendants be “enjoined from their current practice of relying on agent reports or Gerstein hearings.” The descriptions of the injunctions in the motions and briefs, however, do not address the location of the preliminary hearing or transfer from Cook County Jail. For the reasons discussed below, plaintiffs are entitled to a preliminary injunction prohibiting defendants’ current parole revocation practices during the pendency of this case, and are granted leave to file a proposed preliminary injunction order consistent with this opinion.
11For the reasons discussed previously, the amended complaint does not allege that the remaining defendants (Brown, Gilbert, and Smith) meet the class definition. Defendants have not challenged plaintiffs’ counsels’ qualifications to serve as class counsel.
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To obtain a preliminary injunction, the movant must demonstrate: (1) some likelihood of success on the merits; (2) absence of an adequate remedy at law; and (3) that it will suffer irreparable harm absent injunctive relief. Foodcom International v. Barry, 328 F.3d 300, 303 (7th Cir. 2003); Publications International, Ltd. v. Meredith Corp., 88 F.3d 473, 478 (7th Cir. 1996). After these threshold requirements are met, the district court then balances the irreparable harm to the movant against the harm that would be suffered by the non-movant, as well as non-parties, if preliminary injunctive relief were granted. Id. See also Ty. Inc. v. GMA Accessories, Inc., 959 F.Supp. 936, 939 (N.D.Ill. 1997), aff’d 132 F.3d 1167 (7th Cir. 1998). In balancing the harms to parties and the public, the court uses a “sliding scale” approach, so that “the more likely it is the movant will succeed on the merits, the less the balance of irreparable harms need weigh toward its side....” Abbott Lab. v. Mead Johnson & Co., 971 F.2d 6, 12 (7th Cir. 1992).
The Seventh Circuit has noted that the threshold for demonstrating a likelihood of success on the merits is low. See Cooper v. Salazar, 196 F.3d 809, 813 (7th Cir. 1999). Plaintiffs need only demonstrate a “better than negligible chance of succeeding.” Id. (citations omitted). A court must first determine whether the plaintiff has been deprived of a protected interest, and then determine what process is due. Sonnleitner v. York, 304 F.3d 704, 711 (7th Cir. 2002); Townsend v. Vallas, 256 F.3d 661, 673 (7th Cir. 2001).
In the instant case, plaintiffs have cleared this hurdle. Defendants do not deny that parolees are systematically denied a preliminary parole revocation hearing for weeks, and that the practice of transferring parolees to IDOC facilities within a few days of their arrest results in parolees being incarcerated at least 60 miles, and as many as 250 miles, from Cook County, prior to receiving a preliminary or final parole revocation hearing. Defendants’ established policy of
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considering a Gerstein hearing a valid substitute for a Morrissey hearing denies a parolee any possibility of release on bail because defendants interpret the Gerstein finding of probable cause to detain to be sufficient to automatically find probable cause on the parole violation. As discussed above, a Gerstein hearing is not a substitute for a preliminary parole revocation hearing, and the findings of such a hearing do not necessarily control a probable cause determination under Morrissey. In addition, transferring parolees out of Cook County almost immediately and holding preliminary hearings at great physical and temporal distance from the time and place of alleged conduct prevents parolees from effectively contesting their revocation with witnesses, consulting with defense counsel, and further investigating still-fresh information. As the Supreme Court noted in Gerstein and Morrissey, distance and time lapses put parolees at a distinct disadvantage.
Plaintiffs offer several affidavits from experienced criminal defense attorneys detailing the typical proceedings, or lack therefore, at Gerstein hearings. According to the affidavits, in nearly every case, after the case is called and the attorneys identify themselves, the judge holds, “finding of probable cause to detain based on signed complaints.” No witness testifies and there is no opportunity to challenge the investigative reports used to satisfy Gerstein. This perfunctory process is confirmed by dozens of transcripts of Gerstein hearings in Cook County attached by plaintiffs to their reply in support of the motion for preliminary injunction, and flouts Morrissey. Plaintiffs also assert that officers conducting preliminary parole hearings have no knowledge of the Gerstein hearing, which further undercuts defendants’ claim that a Gerstein finding is a proper substitute for a preliminary parole revocation hearing under Morrissey. Accordingly,
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plaintiffs have demonstrated a more than reasonable likelihood of success on the issue of unconstitutionality of defendants’ existing practices.
Plaintiffs must also make a threshold showing that any remedy at law would be inadequate. The Seventh Circuit has noted, “In using the term ‘inadequate’ we do not meant wholly ineffectual, we mean seriously deficient as a remedy for the harm suffered.” Cooper v. Salazar, 196 F.3d 809, 817 (7th Cir. 1999). In the instant case, plaintiffs argue that there is no adequate remedy at law because defendants have absolute immunity under federal law. Defendants assert that because there is “no bar” to plaintiffs bringing their suit in a court where immunity would not attach, plaintiffs have failed to make the required threshold showing of inadequate legal remedies. Defendants’ argument misses the mark because even if damages were available in another forum - and defendants do not identify such a forum - damages are often inadequate remedies for constitutional violations. As Judge Shadur noted in Pinzon v. Lane, which involved due process claims regarding parole revocation hearings, “Even if plaintiffs could ultimately collect damages for defendants’ unconstitutional conduct in keeping plaintiffs in custody without a hearing, they cannot be compelled thus to sell their rights to liberty for some amount in damages.” 675 F.Supp 429, 431 (N.D.Ill. 1987)
Defendants’ argument that plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate irreparable harm is also without merit. Plaintiffs allege that they were held on alleged parole violations in violation of their Due Process rights. As the Supreme Court noted in Morrissey, “the liberty of a parolee, although indeterminate, includes many of the core values of unqualified liberty and its termination inflicts a ‘grievous loss’ on the parolee and often on others.” 408 U.S. at 482 (reimprisonment strains or severs whatever family and employment ties the parolee has established
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while on parole). Stripping a parolee of these rights for any period of time clearly causes irreparable harm to the parolee and, as the Morrissey Court highlighted, causes great harm to the parolee’s family and community. Defendants argue that the named plaintiffs cannot demonstrate any harm because two have been released after full parole board revocation hearings, and five have been indicted. Neither of these occurrences, however, makes amends for the failure to provide a Morrissey hearing. In addition, defendants do not contest that the same policies and practices that violated the named plaintiffs’ constitutional rights remain in place. Each time a parolee is incarcerated on the basis of a Gerstein hearing alone, therefore, another individual is harmed. Even if complying with the Constitution could be considered a “harm” to defendants, it is perforce outweighed by the harms to plaintiff. See Pinzon, 675 F.Supp at 432.
In support of their final argument that the public interest weighs against a preliminary injunction, defendants cite the Morrissey Court’s description of the State’s interest in incarcerating parolees who are charged with new criminal charges as “overwhelming,” 408 U.S. at 483. Defendants, however, ignore the next line of Morrissey, in which the Supreme Court makes clear that the State’s important interests do not override the individual’s due process rights, even the conditional liberty rights of a parolee. “Yet, the State has no interest in revoking parole without some informal procedural guarantees.” Id.; see also Pinzon, 675 F. Supp at 435 (affirming constitutionally protected interest in remaining at liberty on parole). In addition, revoking parole without proper constitutional protections also reduces the chance that a parolee will complete his period of parole successfully and remain in the community as a productive and law-abiding citizen, which is in the public’s best interest.
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Contrary to defendants’ suggestion that plaintiffs are attempting to interfere with the State’s ability to incarcerate parole violators, plaintiffs do not challenge the State’s right to revoke parole based on new criminal charges, and they do not seek to dismiss the parole revocation charges against any plaintiff or otherwise grant anyone his liberty. Instead, they merely seek the constitutional due process protections to which they are entitled as parolees, which include the right under Morrissey to have a prompt preliminary parole revocation hearing at or near the place of the alleged parole violation or arrest. Defendants’ argument that procedural protections beyond a Gerstein hearing are redundant and inefficient, like the presumption of unfitness rejected in Stanley, “runs roughshod” over critical interests and places individuals’ due process rights in peril. 405 U.S. at 657. In the instant case, King and Hill’s continued incarceration without a preliminary parole revocation hearing for more than a month after the new charges against each were dropped is an example of the dire consequences of defendants bypassing a required and crucial procedural step. As the Supreme Court has made clear, constitutional rights cannot be sacrificed in favor of cheaper and easier procedures, and government agencies may be required to expend additional resources to ensure sufficient constitutional protections. Id. The balance of harms, therefore, does not favor defendants.
Accordingly, plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction is granted, and plaintiffs are directed to submit a proposed preliminary injunction order on or before May 26, 2006.
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Case: 1:06-cv-00204 Document #: 48 Filed: 05/08/06 Page 25 of 25 PageID #:571 CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, defendants’ motion to dismiss is denied. Plaintiffs’ motions for class certification and a preliminary injunction are granted. Plaintiffs shall submit to the court a proposed preliminary injunction order on or before May 26, 2006. The matter is set for status hearing on June 1, 2006, 9:30 a.m. For that hearing, the parties are directed to confer and discuss appropriate class notice. ENTER: May 8, 2006
____________________________________ Robert W. Gettleman United States District Judge
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 </s> Case: 1:06-cv-00204 Document #: 19 Filed: 02/13/06 Page 1 of 14 PageID #:64

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION ________________________________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________________________

CHARLES KING, ANDRE BROWN,

)

CHIOKE HILL, THOMAS GILBERT,

)

NELSON MUNIZ, ANTHONY SMITH, )

and ANDRE McGREGG,

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

) No. 06 C 0204

)

ROG ER E. WALKER, Director of

) Magistrate Judge Geraldine

Illinois Department of Corrections,

) Soat Brown

JESSE MONTGOMERY, Deputy

)

Director of Parole,

) Judge Gettleman

Operations,

)

Defendants.

)

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

The Plaintiffs, CHARLES KING, ANDRE BROWN, CHIOKE HILL, THOMAS

GILBERT, NELSON MUNIZ, ANTHONY SMITH, and ANDRE McGREGG, through

their attorneys, THOMAS PETERS and KEVIN PETERS, state as follows:

COUNT I

PARTIES, JURISDICTION AND VENUE

1. Plaintiff King is a citizen of the United States and an Illinois parolee who

currently is in custody at the Logan Correctional Center.

2. Plaintiff Brown is a citizen of the United States and an Illinois parolee who

Case: 1:06-cv-00204 Document #: 19 Filed: 02/13/06 Page 2 of 14 PageID #:65
currently is in custody at the Big Muddy Correctional Center. 3. Defendant Walker is the Director of the Illinois Department of Corrections. In
that capacity, he sets the policies and practices relating to parolees and he is sued in his individual and his official capacity.
4. Defendant Montgomery is the Deputy Director of Parole for the Illinois Department of Corrections. In that capacity, he implements the policies of Defendant Walker and trains other IDOC employees in accordance with those policies and practices, and Montgomery is sued in his individual and his official capacities.
5. All of the acts and omissions alleged in this complaint were made under color of state law.
6. This action is brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983 for violations of Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
7. All of the Defendants maintain offices and do business in or near Chicago, Illinois.
8. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1331, 1334 and 2201. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
9. Charles King (No. B68682) was paroled from the Logan Correctional Center. 10. Following his release on parole, Plaintiff King was assigned a parole agent in Cook County, Illinois. 11. In mid-December 2005, Plaintiff King was arrested in Chicago for an alleged
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violation of parole (Case No. 05-4013982-01). 12. Plaintiff King denies that he committed a parole violation at any time prior to
his arrest in December, 2005. 13. Within a few hours of his arrest, Plaintiff King was taken to the Cook County
Jail. 14. Plaintiff King was transferred to the Stateville Correctional Center within 10
days of his arrest. 15. Case number 05-4013982-01 was dismissed on the motion of the Cook
County State’s Attorney’s Office on December 28, 2005. 16. Plaintiff King had not waived his right to a preliminary parole revocation
hearing, at or near the site of the alleged violation, when he was transferred to the Stateville Correctional Center, Joliet, Illinois.
17. It is, and was, at all relevant times, the policy and practice of Defendants, Walker and Montgomery, to return alleged parole violators to the institution from which they were paroled.
18. As a direct result of that policy of Defendants Walker and Montgomery, Plaintiff King was transferred from the Stateville Correctional Center to the Logan Correctional Center.
19. The Logan Correctional Center is located in Lincoln, Illinois. 20. Lincoln is approximately 165 miles from Chicago.
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21. Plaintiff King did not waive his constitutional right to a prompt preliminary parole revocation hearing at any time prior to his transfer from the Stateville Correctional Center to the Logan Correctional Center.
22. Plaintiff King has been in custody for more than 30 days, and he still has not had a preliminary parole revocation hearing.
23. Plaintiff King has a well-established constitutional right to a prompt preliminary parole revocation hearing.
24. Plaintiff King has a well-established constitutional right to a preliminary parole revocation hearing near the site of the alleged parole violation.
25. Plaintiff King has a well-established constitutional right to retain counsel, to call witnesses, and to confront and cross examine witnesses at his preliminary parole revocation hearing.
26. Defendants’ policies and practices as applied to Plaintiff King violated Plaintiff King’s constitutional rights as identified in paragraphs 22-25 above.
27. Defendants’ policy of shipping alleged parole violators out of the Cook County Jail to the Stateville Correctional Center and then to the institution from which the parole was granted, creates a system which guarantees that no Cook County parolee will receive a prompt preliminary parole revocation hearing at or near the site of the alleged parole violation.
28. Defendants’ policy of shipping alleged parole violators out of the Cook
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County Jail to the Stateville Correctional Center and then to the institution from which the parole was granted creates a system which guarantees that Cook County parolees will not have counsel or favorable witnesses present when a preliminary parole revocation hearing finally is held.
29. Absent exigent circumstances, a preliminary parole revocation hearing should be held within ten (10) days of a parolee’s arrest and the hearing should be held at or near the site of the alleged violation, but in no case in excess of 60 miles from the site of the alleged violation.
30. Defendant’s policy of shipping alleged parole violators out of the Cook County Jail to Joliet Correctional Center and then to the institution from which the parolee was granted is in direct contradiction to the agreed settlement in Willard v. Snyder, 01 C 1884 (see attached Exhibits A and B).
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff King prays the Court will a) issue a preliminary injunction barring Defendants from continuing their policy of transferring parolees from the Cook County Jail before the parolee has had, or waived, a preliminary parole revocation hearing; b) permanently enjoining Defendants from continuing their police as alleged herein; c) award costs and attorney’s fees.
COUNT II 1-30. Plaintiff Brown re-alleges paragraphs 1-30 of Count I as paragraphs 1-30 of Count II.
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31. Plaintiff Brown (No. S00309) was paroled from the Big Muddy Correctional Center.
32 . On or about January 4, 2006, Plaintiff Brown was arrested for a parole violation.
33. Plaintiff Brown denies that he violated any condition of his parole on the day of his arrest or on any other day.
34. Plaintiff Brown was not served with notice of the parole violation charges, has not waived his right to a prompt preliminary parole revocation hearing, and has not had a parole revocation hearing.
35. Plaintiff Brown has been in custody for more than 10 business days, and he still has not had a preliminary parole violation hearing.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Brown prays the Court will a) issue a preliminary injunction barring Defendants from continuing their policy of transferring parolees from the Cook County Jail before the parolee has had, or waived, a preliminary parole revocation hearing; b) permanently enjoining Defendants from continuing their policy as alleged herein; c) award costs and attorney’s fees.
COUNT III 1-30. Plaintiff Hill re-allege paragraphs 1-30 of Count I as paragraphs 1-30 of Count III. 31. Plaintiff Hill (No. K69594) was paroled from the Illinois Department of
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Corrections on or about June 3, 2005. 32. On or about December 20, 2005, Plaintiff Hill was arrested for a parole
violation (Case No. 05-6020474-01). 33. Within 10 days of his arrest, Plaintiff Hill was transferred from Cook County
Jail to Stateville Correctional Center. 34. Case number 05-6020474-01 resulted in a finding of no probable cause and
dismissed against the Plaintiff on January 17, 2006. 35. Plaintiff Hill denies that he committed a parole violation at any time prior to
his arrest of December 20, 2005, or since his arrest. 36. Plaintiff Hill had not waived his right to a preliminary parole revocation
hearing, at or near the site of the alleged violation, when he was transferred to the Stateville Correctional Center, Joliet, Illinois.
37. Shortly after his transfer to Stateville Correctional Center, Plaintiff was transferred to Western Illinois Correctional Center where he is currently incarcerated.
38. Plaintiff Hill was not served with notice of the parole violation charges, has not waived his right to a prompt preliminary parole revocation hearing, and has not had a parole revocation hearing.
39. Western Illinois Correctional Center is in excess of 100 miles from the site of the alleged parole violation.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Hill prays the Court will a) issue a preliminary injunction
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barring Defendants from continuing their policy of transferring parolees from the Cook County Jail before the parolee has had, or waived, a preliminary parole revocation hearing; b) permanently enjoining Defendants from continuing their policy as alleged herein; c) award costs and attorney’s fees.
COUNT IV 1-30. Plaintiff Thomas Gilbert realleges paragraphs 1-30 of Count I as paragraphs 1-30 of Count IV. 31. Plaintiff Gilbert (No. B37469) was paroled from the Illinois Department of Corrections on or about November 30, 2004. 32. On or about August 30, 2005, Plaintiff Gilbert was arrested for a parole violation in Chicago, Illinois. 33. Plaintiff Gilbert denies that he violated any condition of his parole before his arrest, on the day of his arrest, or since his arrest of August 30, 2005. 34. Within a few hours of his arrest, Plaintiff Gilbert was taken to the Cook County Jail. 35. With 10 days, Plaintiff Gilbert was transferred to Stateville Correctional Center in Joliet, Illinois. 36. Shortly after his arrival at Stateville Correctional Center, Plaintiff Gilbert was transferred to Logan Correctional Center where he remains incarcerated. 37. Plaintiff Gilbert had not waived his right to a preliminary parole revocation
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hearing at or near the site of the alleged violation when he was transferred to Logan from Stateville.
38. Logan Correctional Center is in excess of 100 miles from the site of Plaintiff Gilbert’s alleged parole violation.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Gilbert prays the Court will a) issue a preliminary injunction barring Defendants from continuing their policy of transferring parolees from the Cook County Jail before the parolee has had, or waived, a preliminary parole revocation hearing; b) permanently enjoining Defendants from continuing their policy as alleged herein; c) award costs and attorney’s fees.
COUNT V 1-30. Plaintiff Muniz realleges paragraphs 1-30 of Count I as paragraphs 1-30 of Count V. 31. Plaintiff Muniz was paroled from the Illinois Department of Corrections on or about November 8, 2003. 32. On or about January 21, 2006, Plaintiff Muniz was arrested in Chicago for an alleged parole violation. 33. Shortly after his arrest, Plaintiff Muniz was taken to Cook County Jail. 34. Within days, Plaintiff Muniz was transferred to Stateville Correctional Center in Joliet, Illinois, where he is currently incarcerated. 35. Plaintiff Muniz denies that he violated any condition of his parole on the day
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of his arrest or since that day. 36. Plaintiff Muniz was not served with notice of the parole violation charges, has
not waived his right to a prompt preliminary parole revocation hearing, and has not had a parole revocation hearing.
37. Plaintiff Muniz has been in custody for more than 10 days, and he still has not had a preliminary parole revocation hearing.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Muniz prays the Court will a) issue a preliminary injunction barring Defendants from continuing their policy of transferring parolees from the Cook County Jail before the parolee has had, or waived, a preliminary parole revocation hearing; b) permanently enjoining Defendants from continuing their policy as alleged herein; c) award costs and attorney’s fees.
COUNT VI 1-30. Plaintiff Smith realleges Counts 1-30 of Count I as paragraphs 1-30 of Count VI. 31. Plaintiff Smith (No. R27627) was paroled from the Illinois Department of Corrections on or about June 23, 2004. 32. On or about February 3, 2006, Plaintiff Smith was arrested for a parole violation in Chicago, Illinois. 33. Plaintiff Smith denies that he violated any condition of his parole before his arrest, on the day of his arrest, or since his arrest of February 3, 2006.
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34. Within hours of his arrest Plaintiff Smith was taken to Cook County Jail. 35. Within days of his incarceration at Cook County Jail, Plaintiff Smith was transferred to Stateville Correctional Center in Joliet, Illinois. 36. Plaintiff Smith has not waived his right to a prompt (within 10 days) preliminary parole revocation hearing at or near the site of the alleged violation. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Muniz prays the Court will a) issue a preliminary injunction barring Defendants from continuing their policy of transferring parolees from the Cook County Jail before the parolee has had, or waived, a preliminary parole revocation hearing; b) permanently enjoining Defendants from continuing their policy as alleged herein; c) award costs and attorney’s fees.
COUNT VII 1-30. Plaintiff McGregg realleges paragraphs 1-30 of Count I as paragraphs 1-30 of Count VII. 31. Plaintiff McGregg (No. S00405) was paroled from the Illinois Department of Corrections on or about August 3, 2004. 32. Plaintiff McGregg was arrested for an alleged parole violation on or about September 12, 2005, in Chicago, Illinois. 33. Plaintiff McGregg denies that he violated any condition of his parole since being paroled in August of 2004. 34. Within hours of his arrest, Plaintiff McGregg was incarcerated at Cook
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County Jail. 35. Within days of his arrest Plaintiff McGregg was transferred to Stateville
Correctional Center in Joliet, Illinois. 36. Plaintiff McGregg has not waived his right to a prompt preliminary parole
revocation hearing at or near the site of the alleged violation. 37. Plaintiff McGregg has been in custody for more than 150 days without a
preliminary, or final, parole revocation hearing. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff McGregg prays the Court will a) issue a preliminary
injunction barring Defendants from continuing their policy of transferring parolees from the Cook County Jail before the parolee has had, or waived, a preliminary parole revocation hearing; b) permanently enjoining Defendants from continuing their policy as alleged herein; c) award costs and attorney’s fees.
COUNT VIII CLASS ACTION 1-30. Plaintiffs re-allege paragraphs 1-30 of Count I as paragraphs 1-30 of Count VIII. 31. Defendants’ policies and practices have been in effect for more than a year. 32. The number of Cook County parolees who have been adversely affected by Defendants’ policies during the last two years exceeds five hundred. 33. Plaintiffs represent a class of Cook County parolees who have been or will be
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arrested for parole violations in Cook County, Illinois and who will then be: a) taken into custody at the Cook County Jail; b) transferred from the Cook County Jail within 10 days without a preliminary parole revocation hearing; c) transferred from the Cook County Jail to the Illinois Department of Corrections; and d) held without a preliminary parole revocation hearing for more than 60 days.
34. The class, as so defined, is too numerous to make joinder of all class members practicable.
35. Defendants have established a unified policy that affects all Cook County parolees charged with violations in the same way.
36. Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the claims of all class members. 37. Common issues of law and fact predominate over any minor differences in treatment. 38. Plaintiffs’ counsel can fairly and adequately represent the class. 39. The constitutional rights of all class members are being violated by Defendants’ polices and practices as described herein. WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray the Court will a) issue a preliminary injunction barring Defendants from continuing their policy of transferring parolees from the Cook
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Case: 1:06-cv-00204 Document #: 19 Filed: 02/13/06 Page 14 of 14 PageID #:77 County Jail before the parolee has had, or waived, a preliminary parole revocation hearing; b) permanently enjoining Defendants from continuing their police as alleged herein; c) award costs and attorney’s fees.
Respectfully Submitted, S/Thomas Peters THOMAS PETERS, ONE OF THE ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFFS 407 S. Dearborn, Suite 1675 Chicago, IL 60605 312-697-0022
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 </s> Case: 1:06-cv-00204 Document #: 176 Filed: 10/22/13 Page 1 of 22 PageID #:1550

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

CHARLES KING, ANDREW BROWN, )

CHIOKE HILL, THOMAS GILBERT, )

NELSON MUNIZ, ANTHONY SMITH )

and ANDRE McGREGG,

)

)

Plaintiffs, )

)

v.

)

)

ROGER E. WALKER and

)

JESSE MONTGOMERY,

)

)

Defendants. )

No. 06 C 204 Hon. Robert W. Gettleman

PLAINTIFFS’ PRE-HEARING BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION FOR A RULE TO SHOW CAUSE

INTRODUCTION

The Plaintiffs seek to enforce the Consent Decree in this matter, which was intended by

the Parties to protect parolees from arbitrary imprisonment without due process. Specifically, the

Decree requires a fair hearing to determine if probable cause exists to detain parolees on an

alleged violation of their conditions of parole. See Consent Decree (Pls. Ex. A) at Section III,

Part 1 (“Defendants shall take the following measures, intended to provide each Parole Violator

with an opportunity to have a preliminary parole hearing which protects their due process rights

under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution . . . .”). An evidentiary

hearing in this matter is scheduled for October 30–31, 2013.

The evidence developed in this case—which includes over 340 parole files, testimony

from the key stakeholders in the preliminary hearing process, interviews with class members,

and expert observation of over 90 hearings—supports only one conclusion: the Defendants are

in violation of the King Decree and fail to provide parolees the most basic guarantees of due

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process. During the preliminary parole process, Defendants do not provide parolees adequate notice of the charges against them. The notice that is provided to parolees is both incomprehensible and inaccurate on two fronts. First, the notice contains misleading information about hearing procedures. Second, the hearing does not contain a full description of the charges alleged against the parolees. What the Defendants refer to as a preliminary parole hearing contains none of the hallmarks of due process. Defendants’ policies and practices bar parolees from speaking on their own behalf, calling witnesses, confronting their accusers, and examining the evidence used against them. During the hearing, parolees are forced to make admissions against their interests. King Investigators, whose positions were created by the Decree to protect the rights of parolees, have deteriorated into quasi-prosecutors—they perceive their mission to be ensuring that the hearing officer makes a finding of probable cause. And they are the only individuals who are effectively permitted to provide any evidence at the so-called hearings.
The Defendants’ violations of the King Decree have inflicted a tremendous toll on the Plaintiff class. As a result of the Defendants’ failure to adhere to its obligations, people are ripped away from their families, their communities and their jobs. They are imprisoned for months and sometimes years at a time—often based on a mere unsubstantiated allegation that they committed a new criminal charge or that they violated a non-criminal technical violation of their parole. The protections that were intended for the parolees through the King Decree have become a chimera and some provisions of the King Decree affirmatively harm class members.
The failures of this Decree to achieve its stated purpose—to protect parolee’s due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution during the preliminary parole process—have far reaching consequences beyond the constitutional rights of the Plaintiff class. A preliminary parole hearing is supposed to sift out the meritless alleged parole violations.
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In a working system, this process would serve as a control to ensure that people are not needlessly imprisoned. Illinois has one of the most overcrowded prison systems in the country— and approximately 40% of those incarcerated in Illinois prisons are behind bars as a consequence of alleged parole violations. The broken preliminary parole system and the Defendants’ violations of the King Decree have over-taxed the prison system and placed a tremendous burden on Illinois’ taxpayers.
The Plaintiffs seek an order from this Court requiring that the Defendants comply with the Decree and that the Decree fulfills its stated purpose: to ensure that the preliminary parole hearing process comports with the U.S. Constitution. Changed circumstances may require some aspects of the Decree to be modified. “When parties state, as they did here, that a consent decree is designed to achieve a particular result and it fails to obtain that result, that unforeseen failure can be a significant changed circumstance[].” Northeast Ohio Coalition for the Homeless v. Husted, No. 2:06-cv-896, 2013 WL 4008758, at *9 (S.D. Ohio 2013); see also Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 393 (1992) (“Under the flexible standard we adopt today, a party seeking modification of a consent decree must establish that a significant change in facts or law warrants revision of the decree and that the proposed modification is suitably tailored to the changed circumstance.”). But the Plaintiffs seek no more than what the King Decree promises on its face: a preliminary parole hearing process that comports with the U.S. Constitution.
VIOLATIONS OF THE CONSENT DECREE. I. NOTICE OF CHARGES AND RIGHTS A. Parolees Receive Inadequate Notice of the Charges Against Them. The King Decree adopts the basic due process protection that parolees receive adequate notice of the charges against them, as required by the U.S. Constitution. See Consent Decree
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(Pls. Ex. A) at Section III, Part 5(b). Adequate notice includes, at a minimum, “written notice of the claimed violations of parole” and “disclosure to the parolee of evidence against him.” Morrissey 408 U.S. 471, 488–89 (1972). Thus, the form provided to the parolee notifying him or her of the preliminary hearing “should state what parole violations have been alleged.” Id. at 487. The Defendants persistently violate these most basic due process rights and deny parolees adequate notice of all the charges and evidence that will leveled against them during the preliminary revocation hearing.
The Parole Violation Report (“PVR”) constitutes the only “notice” that is provided to parolees concerning what charges and evidence will be brought against them at their preliminary hearing. See Young Report (Pls. Ex. F) at 19–25. Parolees proffer witnesses, obtain documents, and shape their defense based on the information provided them in the PVR. However, as a regular practice, King investigators insert charges and evidence at parolees’ preliminary hearings that are not contained in the PVR. They interject “new or additional allegations” that are “outside the []scope of the allegations in the PVR” and “for which the parolee had no notice[.]” Id. at 37.
King investigator McCray testified that she brings information pertaining to a new arrest and other technical violations that are not listed in the parole violation report to the attention of the hearing officer during the preliminary hearing. McCray Dep. (Pls. Ex. H) at 53. Moscato stated that she will alert the Hearing Officer to information that is not contained in the PVR in a variety of circumstances: “If I find other arrests, I can bring those up that are in relation to or the same that he was just arrested for. If he hasn’t been doing his check-ins or been seen for months.” Moscato Dep. (Pls. Ex. L) at 37; see also id. at 38 (testifying that she will raise any prior arrests occurring in the parole period with the Board.); see also James Dep. (Pls. Ex. M-1) at CE 45 (acknowledging he has testified about arrests that were not the subject of the parole
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violation). The Prisoner Review Board (“PRB”) Hearing Officer, Shunique Joiner, confirmed that King investigators will allege additional parole violations that are not set forth in the PVR against the parolee at the preliminary hearing. See Joiner Dep. (Pls. Ex. I) at 71–72. In fact, she testified that the purpose of the King investigator is “[t]o provide any additional information that may not actually be in the [violation] report[.]” Id. at 39.
During their investigations, King investigators gather information from various electronic databases, which track parolees’ court dates, criminal charges, arrests, and compliance with the terms of their parole. Moscato Dep. (Pls. Ex. L) at 12–15; James Dep. (Pls. Ex. M) at 26–27, 52; McCray Dep. (Pls. Ex. H) at 11–12, 45. They utilize these same databases to gather information pertaining to additional criminal charges and evidence that is not contained in the parolee’s PVR, which they then bring to the attention of the Hearing Officer; parolees do not have access to these databases. See Moscato Dep. (Pls. Ex. L) at 51 (parolees do not have access to investigative databases, which includes information pertaining to prior arrests that could be introduced at the hearings); McCray Dep. (Pls. Ex. H) at 51; James Dep. (Pls. Ex. M) at 65. As a result, parolees are unable to prepare for or contest the additional violations lodged against them for the first time at the preliminary hearing, and which may be used to send them to the Board for a final revocation hearing. See Joiner Dep. (Pls. Ex. I) at 104–105.
A quintessential tenet of due process is the right to have notice of the charges and evidence against you. See Consent Decree (Pls. Ex. A) at Section III, Part 5(b). As a result of the King investigators’ practice of introducing outside information into the hearings and the Hearing Officer’s willingness to consider this information in her determinations of probable cause, parolees are regularly denied this most basic of protections.
B. The Notice of Rights and Parole Violation Report Are Incomprehensible.
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Most commonly, parolees are personally served their parole papers by Illinois Department of Corrections (“IDOC”) employees—all of whom are parole agents—in the basement of Division 5 of Cook County Jail within approximately one day of being arrested on a parole warrant. See Young Report (Pls. Ex. F) at 17. The service processers provide parolees with their Parole Violation Report, which includes a section titled “Notice of Charges of Alleged Parole or Mandatory Supervised Release,” and lists a set of 16 potential violations that the parole agent checks off as applicable. The Notice of Charges does not contain any charge-specific detail. For instance, where the parolee is alleged to have committed a new crime, the Notice of Charges does not actually state which criminal statute the parolee is alleged to have violated—it states, only, that the parolee violated condition number one (pertaining to violation of a criminal statute). See Pls. Ex. C; Young Report (Pls. Ex. F) at 20–21. The notice certainly does not serve as “a bill of particulars.” See Young Report (Pls. Ex. F) at 20. Furthermore, the Notice does not provide basic information concerning the substance of the violation, including the time of day that the violation occurred or the identity of the third-party complainant whose report led to the parolee’s arrest and violation, a particularly common issue in domestic violence cases, which constitute a significant percentage of the Hearing Officer’s docket. See id. at 19–20; Pls. Summary of Evidence (Ex. E).
The notice itself is also difficult to read and comprehend, particularly for the average parolee. The PVR contains dense paragraphs, and is riddled with abbreviations and less-thanperfect syntax, making it difficult to understand for a parolee who reads poorly, is cognitively impaired or is not English-literate. See Young Report (Pls. Ex. F) at 20. The PVR “has an average grade level equivalent of 12.5. This means that a reader would require having an educational equivalent to [a] student midway through his or her senior year in high school to be
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able to read the form.” Krezmien Dec. (Pls. Ex. V) at 5. In contrast, adult prisoners have, on average, middle school-level reading comprehension skills. Krezmien Dec. (Pls. Ex. V) at 8.
The Notice of Charges also contains a section that requires parolees to waive, postpone, or schedule their preliminary hearing. See Pls. Ex. C. The servers, as a matter of IDOC policy, do not explain the consequences of waiving or postponing the hearing or answer questions parolees may have about the preliminary revocation process. See Norton Dep. (Pls. Ex. J) at 43–44; Shipinski Dep. (Pls. Ex. K) at 68–69. Based on the complexity of the form and the reading comprehension of the average person in prison, as well as the circumstances in which the parolees must read these documents, most parolees cannot understand these options or comprehend the consequences of waiving or postponing their hearings. Krezmien Dec. (Pls. Ex. V) at 9-10; see also Brandy Bruce Dec. (Pls. Ex. R) at 1–2 (“I didn't understand the papers. I didn't understand the waive box or what the hearings were. I asked the lady who gave me my papers to explain what they meant. She said couldn’t do that. She said I had to read it on my own. I didn’t read the papers because they were too long and confusing.”); see also Young Report (Pls. Ex. F) at 24 (describing interview with parolee who had no concept of what it meant to “waive” his preliminary hearing). If a parolee voices confusion about the process, the servers are trained merely to direct the parolees to “reread the document that’s been provided . . . and make the best decision you can.” Shipinski Dep. (Pls. Ex. K) at 69.
In addition to the PVR and Notice of Charges, parolees are also served with the Notice of Rights attached to the King Decree. This document informs parolees, among other things, that they have the following rights: (1) to appear at the hearing and speak on their own behalf; (2) to hire an attorney; (3) to present written evidence; (4) to call and cross-examine witnesses; (5) to receive a written decision of whether probable cause exists with 72 hours of the hearing; and (6)
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to request that the hearing officer recommend to the PRB that the parole violation warrant be withdrawn pending a final parole revocation hearing. See Pls. Ex. B. The Notice of Rights also signals parolees to provide the contact information for the witnesses they want to appear on their behalf at the preliminary hearing. Id.
Like the PVR, the Notice of Rights is a dense document, requiring a college-level education for full comprehension. See Krezmien Dec. (Pls. Ex. V) at 4 (The Notice of Rights “has an average grade level equivalent of 15.0. This means that a reader would require having an education equivalent to an incoming senior in college to be able to read the form.”). By way of comparison, the average grade level for the novel Tom Sawyer is 5.6 and the average grade level for the Chicago Tribune is 8.7. Id. at 7. As a result of the service procedures, which prevent processers from explaining complicated information to parolees, parolees often do not understand either the charges against them or their rights under the King Decree. See Young Report (Pls. Ex. F) at 22–26. This problem is particularly evident in the context of parolees’ right to call witnesses; many parolees do not realize they are entitled to ask that witnesses appear on their behalf at the preliminary hearing. See Brandy Bruce Dec. (Pls. Ex. R) at 2; Ronnie Walker Dec. (Pls. Ex. Q) at 2. Moreover, even those parolees who do know they can call witnesses are unable to do so because they do not have their witness information memorized so as to be able to provide it to the service processer at the time of service. See Young Report (Pls. Ex. F) at 17-18, 21-22. Parolees cannot provide witness information after their brief interaction with the service processer. See Shipinski Dep. (Pls. Ex. K) at 71 (“I don't think that they can alter the [witness] form once it's been signed and turned over.”).
Because many parolees cannot comprehend the complex notice provided to them, and because the IDOC servers are barred from explaining or interpreting these forms, parolees are
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unable to navigate the parole process, effectively defend themselves on the charges, and take advantage of the rights guaranteed to them by the King Decree. The Plaintiffs recognize that the proposed notice form was originally agreed to by the parties. But this fact should not bar modification now that the form has proven unworkable and unable to fulfill its intended purpose. “Modification is [] appropriate when a decree proves to be unworkable because of unforeseen obstacles[.]” Rufo, 502 U.S. at 384.
II. INVESTIGATION INTO THE ALLEGED VIOLATION A. King Investigators Do Not Investigate the “Facts and Circumstances” of the Alleged
Parole Violation. The King Investigators were “an innovation introduced” by the King Decree (see Young Report (Pls. Ex. F) at 8), which states that a King investigation “shall be defined as an investigation conducted by an employee or agent of the Illinois Department of Corrections into the facts and circumstances surrounding the Parole Violator’s alleged violation.” Consent Decree (Pls. Ex. A) at Section II-A, Part 4. It states that the investigation “shall include, at a minimum, a review of the police report and any supporting documentation and an interview of the arresting officer(s).” Id. King Investigators are assigned “to obtain information from which the Hearing Officer could independently determine the reliability and trustworthiness of police reports . . . .” Young Report (Pls. Ex. F) at 8. “In lieu of calling police officers to testify in person, the parties and court agreed that the King Investigators would verify information in police reports, inquire past the police reports and. . . amplify or confirm relevant information about the alleged violation or the parolees who appeared for preliminary parole revocation hearings.” Id. Currently, King investigators make no such inquiry “past the police reports” or otherwise investigate the “facts and circumstances” surrounding the alleged violation beyond what is minimally required by the Decree. The minimum requirements have become the maximum
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investigation performed by these IDOC employees. However the minimum requirements are not sufficient to protect parolees’ due process rights to a fair hearing.
Mr. Young concluded that the King investigators’ testimony merely “repeat[ed] what the police offer told the King investigator over the telephone, quite possibly while the police officer was reading from his or her own arrest report.” Id. at 47. The investigators never “spoke directly to witnesses or complainants to amplify or verify information provided . . . by the police. . . .[or] pursued incomplete information, such as the results of drug or forensic tests or the reason that a complaining witness failed to appear in court.” Id. The King investigators did not “refer to a single supporting document, apart from information and reports from parole agents that are apparently available on computers in the hearing locations or in IDOC offices.” Id.
Mr. Young’s findings are bolstered by the testimony of the King investigators themselves, who acknowledge they do not interview witnesses listed in the arrest report, PVR or by the parolee in their Notice of Rights, or interview the parolee himself about the alleged violation. See Moscato Dep. (Pls. Ex. L) at 32–33 (stating that she did not conduct such interviews because “[i]t’s not my job description.”); James Dep. (Pls. Ex. M) at 33–34 (“That’s not the training we have been through. That’s not what I do as an investigator.”); McCray Dep. (Pls. Ex. H) at 40–41 (same). The investigators do not conduct these interviews even when a third-party complaint, for instance, by a victim alleging domestic violence, serves as the entire basis of the alleged violation. See James Dep. (Pls. Ex. M) at 40–41 (“My training did not consist of doing interviews with those individuals.”); Moscato Dep. (Pls. Ex. L) at 31 (testifying that she “never” interviews the alleged victim in domestic violence cases).
The King investigators perceive that their function is to confirm the accounts provided by the parole agents and police officers by collecting a limited set of documents relating to the
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alleged violation (or prior violations), namely the PVR and arrest report, and speaking to the officers whose reports serve as the basis for the violation. See Moscato Dep. (Pls. Ex. L) at 12– 13, 23–25, 33–35. The parole agents and police officers inevitably stand by their reports. Id. at 24, 28; see also James Dep. (Pls. Ex. M) at 19–20. King investigators do not assess the credibility of witnesses, including third party witnesses, the arresting officer, or violating parole agent. See Moscato Dep. (Pls. Ex. L) at 28–29 (“That’s not my job”); James Dep. (Pls. Ex. M) at 45 (“Q. So your interviews [with police and parole agents] are to confirm that the paperwork is correct? A. Correct.”). To the contrary, the King Investigators testified that they considered it their job to gather information enabling the Hearing Officer to find probable cause. Moscato Dep. (Pls. Ex. L) at 48; Young Report (Pls. Ex. F) at 48; see also Section I, Part A, supra.
B. The King Investigators Do Not Assist the Hearing Officer. Because of the investigators’ failure to conduct any semblance of an actual investigation
into the facts and circumstances surrounding the alleged violation, they are not perceived by either the Hearing Officer, parolees, or IDOC staff as serving a useful purpose in the preliminary hearing process. See Joiner Dep. (Pls. Ex. I) at 39–40 (Q. And does the King investigator testimony help you make a probable cause determination? A. No); Ronnie Walker Dec. (Pls. Ex. Q) at 2 (“The investigator doesn’t investigate anything. He went off what the police report said.”); Shipinski Dep. (Pls. Ex. K) at 43-44 (“Q. “[H]ow can [the King investigators] verify the facts of the arrest the arrest report when the officer didn’t witness the alleged violation? A. They can’t. They can only speak to the person who is filling out the arrest report.”).
The King investigators have clearly failed to provide any protection to the Plaintiff class. To the contrary, this provision of the Decree has functioned to affirmative harm parolees, as
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described above. As a result, the provision of the Decree governing King investigators must be modified in order to prevent further harm to the Plaintiff class.
III. PRELIMINARY PAROLE REVOCATION HEARING The underlying purpose of the Decree is to ensure that the Plaintiff class receives a fair and just preliminary parole hearing. See Consent Decree (Pls. Ex. A) at Section III, Part 1. Such proceedings are currently not taking place. A. The Hearing Officer Is Not An Independent and Objective Fact-Finder. The Hearing Officer does not use her power “to exercise independent judgment and a fair consideration of evidence.” Young Report (Pls. Ex. F) at 2. On the contrary, in a significant percentage of cases, the Hearing Officer fails to conduct any kind of examination into the circumstances surrounding the alleged violation, effectively resulting in the systematic denial of a right to a preliminary hearing for scores of parolees. Id. at 9–10. The Hearing Officer has enters automatic findings of probable cause in set categories of cases, including where parolees are charged with domestic violence offenses or with being “AWOL” (out of contact with his parole officer). See Young Report (Pls. Ex. F) at 11–12. Such cases comprised at least 28% of those observed by Mr. Young. See Young Report (Pls. Ex. F) at 14. Automatic probable cause findings were entered even where the underlying domestic battery charge had been dismissed by the criminal court. See Pls. Summary of Evidence (Ex. E); Young Report (Pls. Ex. F) at 11–12; Eric Delgadillo Dec. (Pls. Ex. P); Frankie Rushing Dec. (Pls. Ex. N). In this same vein, the Hearing Officer testified that she entered findings of probable cause—even in cases where she did not believe probable cause existed—if she determined that the parolee presented a public safety concern. See Joiner Dep. (Pls. Ex. I) at 103–104. (“Q. So does that mean that people can get sent to the Board because of a public safety concern even if
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there’s not probable cause to believe they committed the alleged parole violation? A. Yes.”). In making this safety determination, the Hearing Officer stated that she reviews the violation report and considers the parolees’ “other arrests” and history of parole compliance, even if this information does not serve as the basis of the alleged parole violation. Id. at 104–105; see also Section I, Part A, supra. Parolees are not notified that they could be subject to a final revocation hearing based on the Hearing Officer’s determination that they constitute a public safety risk. Nor is any such standard sanctioned by the King Decree.
B. Parolees Do Not Have the Ability to Present or Cross-Examine Witnesses. Contrary to what is contained in the Notice of Rights (Pls. Ex. B), parolees neither have
the ability to present witnesses on their behalf nor confront adverse witnesses at their preliminary hearing. Mr. Young reports that “the Notice of Rights is misleading because, contrary to the assurances and directions it provides parolees, there is no mechanism in place by which witnesses are notified, instructed on how to attend, or extended an opportunity to participate by telephone or video in preliminary hearings.” Young Report (Pls. Ex. F) at 40. He “saw no evidence of equipment or accommodations that would be necessary to support participation in person, by teleconference, or by video conference at the Cook County jail or at the NRC.” Id. at 40–41. And during the period of time he observed the hearings at both the NRC and Cook County, Mr. Young did not see a single witness appear on behalf of the parolee or observe the Hearing Officer inquire whether the parolee had witnesses to present. Id. at 41. The absence of live witness testimony in preliminary hearings was undisputed by each of the witnesses who testified in this case, despite the fact that the Hearing Officer estimated that at least 30% of parolees list witnesses on their Notice of Rights, indicating they wanted witnesses to appear at the hearing. Joiner Dep. (Pls. Ex. I) at 33; Young Report (Pls. Ex. F) at 41; see also James Dep.
13

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(Pls. Ex. M) at 60 (testifying that in the five years he has served as a King investigator, he has never seen a witness testify in person or over the phone).
The Hearing Officer acknowledged that she has the responsibility to call the witnesses the parolee indicates he would like to present at the hearing. See Joiner Dep. (Pls. Ex. I) at 21. However, she conducts these phone calls outside the presence of the parolee, prior to the hearing, and without giving the parolee the opportunity to ask questions of the witness. See id. at 22–23. The witnesses are not under oath during these informal conversations with the Hearing Officer, and these conversations are not transcribed. See id. at 25–26; see also Young Report (Pls. Ex. F) at Executive Summary iii-iv. The IDOC prohibits witnesses from testifying in the presence of the parolee during the preliminary hearings that take place at the NRC. See Joiner Dep. (Pls. Ex. I) at 26–27; Shipinski Dep. (Pls. Ex. K) at 79. The Hearing Officer also testified that, though she has the ability to have witnesses call in by telephone to the hearing, she never uses this procedure. Joiner Dep. (Pls. Ex. I) at 29–30 (stating that she has “never had that to happen.”).
In sum, the Defendants fail to allow witness testimony on the record and in the presence of the parolee, despite the fact that the Notice of Rights explicitly provides parolees with the right “to present witnesses at the hearing” and though “some of the witnesses would almost certainly have had an impact favorable to the parolee had they been called to testify in a hearing held for the purpose of determining probable cause.” Consent Decree (Pls. Ex. A) at Section III, Part 5(b); Young Report (Pls. Ex. F) at 41 (describing cases).
Parolees are also hindered in their ability to cross-examine adverse witnesses. See Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 489 (minimum due process requires “the right to confront and crossexamine adverse witnesses”). Many of the witnesses parolees list on the Notice of Rights are complaining or accusing witnesses, who the parolee wishes to confront at his or her hearing. See
14

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Young Report (Pls. Ex. F) at 44. As a result of the practices of the Hearing Officer and the policies of the IDOC, the parolee never has the opportunity to confront his or her accuser. And because the evidence presented against the parolees is limited solely to the testimony of the King investigator, who has not conducted any real investigation into the violation, and the documents presented at the hearing (the PVR and arrest report), parolees are unable to cross-examine the witnesses against them, as provided by the Decree. See Section III, Part 5(f).
C. Written Evidence Tendered by Parolees Is Not Considered by the Hearing Officer. The Decree provides that parolees may “present written evidence to the Hearing
Officer[.]” Consent Decree (Pls. Ex. A) at Section III, Part 5(g). Parolees have the right to bring written documents into the hearings; however, the Hearing Officer does not read the documents, consider them in her determination of probable cause, or enter them into the record. See Young Report (Pls. Ex. F) at 40. When parolees do present such documents, the Hearing Officer generally returns them to the parolee at the conclusion of the hearing, so that they do not become part of the official record transmitted to the Board. See id. Consequently, parolees are essentially prevented from presenting evidence for consideration to the Hearing Officer.
D. Parolees Are Unable to Effectively Speak On Their Own Behalf. As provided in the Notice of Rights, parolees have the right to appear and speak on their
behalf at the preliminary parole hearing. See Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 487. However, parolees are incapable of effectively speaking on their own behalf at the preliminary hearings for two reasons. First, the hearing structure does not enable them to present a defense. During the hearings, the Hearing Officer does not cue the parolee as to when he can make a statement, question the King investigator, rebut the statement of the investigator, or present argument. See Young Report (Pls. Ex. F) at 36. King investigators frequently interject additional evidence against parolees
15

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throughout the hearing, including while parolees are attempting to present their defense. See id. at 35–36. The Hearing Officer regularly interrupts parolees to ask questions unrelated to the substance of the King investigator’s testimony or to the underlying violation. See id. The “Hearing Officer’s and the King Officer’s interruptions invariably had the effect of derailing whatever factual defense to the principle allegation the parolee was asserting.” Id. at 37.
Second, parolees are forced to incriminate themselves during the proceedings. In the course of a given hearing, the Hearing Officer consistently asks parolees “what happened?” or “what do you have to say?”; yet she does not advise parolees of their right to remain silent. Id. at 36; see also Joiner Dep. (Pls. Ex. I) at 68 (testifying that she does not tell parolees that they do not have to answer her questions during the hearing). Parolees, who do not understand that what they say at their hearing may be used to find probable cause and eventually violate their parole, frequently make admissions against interest during the hearing. Young Report (Pls. Ex. F) at 37.
The lack of structure at these hearings, in conjunction with the fact that parolees are not warned that their admissions may be used against them, undermines their ability to present a defense and violates their right to speak on their own behalf.
E. The Preliminary Hearing Locations Are Not Fit for Quasi-Judicial Proceedings. Each of the witnesses deposed in this matter testified that the location and physical
conditions of the preliminary hearings, particularly those held at Cook County Jail—in a tunnel of the basement of Division Five—are not suitable for the conduct of quasi-judicial hearings, the purpose of which are to determine parolees’ rights to liberty. See Young Report (Pls. Ex. F) at 27; Norton Dep. (Pls. Ex. J) at 57 (testifying that he would prefer to serve parolees where there were not so many interruptions); Moscato Dep. (Pls. Ex. L) at 63–64 (testifying that the hearing location at Cook County Jail was “very loud” and that it was hard to hear what was going on in
16

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the hearings); James Dep. (Pls. Ex. M) at 77–78 (stating that the Cook County jail location is “not the optimum location to hold a hearing” because “[i]t’s busy” and “noisy”); Joiner Dep. (Pls. Ex. I) at 58 (affirming that the noise in the tunnel is so loud that it disrupts the hearings). Both the jail and NRC lack the technological equipment necessary to fulfill the due process guarantees set forth in the Notice of Rights. Neither location has telephone or speakerphone capabilities suitable for outside witness participation, neither has more than one desktop computer or photocopy equipment, and neither has equipment that could be used to take witness testimony via videoconference. See Young Report (Pls. Ex. F) at 30. The physical location of the hearings wholly prevents the fair presentation and appraisal of evidence.
F. Parolees Housed at the NRC Are Prevented From Retaining Counsel. The Decree states in plain language that parolees “shall have the right to retain counsel at
both the preliminary and the final parole revocation hearings[.]” Section III, Part 5(h). Many of the parolees subject to the King Decree are in custody at the NRC, a maximum-security prison where the inmates are held on virtual lockdown 7 days a week. See Young Report (Pls. Ex. F) at 34–35. Because of these conditions, parolees are unable to contact their attorneys (if they have them), witnesses or family members to aid in their defense at the preliminary hearing: Id. (citation omitted); see also Keith Brown Dec. (Pls. Ex. T); Enos DiMarea Dec. (Pls. Ex. S).
G. Parolees Have No Opportunity to Request the Withdrawal of the Parole Hold. Parolees have the right to ask that the Hearing Officer recommend to the Prisoner Review
Board that their parole hold be lifted or withdrawn and that they be released on “bond” pending the final revocation hearing, based on evidence adduced at the preliminary hearing, as set forth in the Consent Decree entered in Faheem-El v. Klincar, Case No. 84 C 2561 (N.D. Ill.). See Young Report (Pls. Ex. F) at 49–50. The King Notice of Rights partially encapsulates this right:
17

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If probable cause is found at the Preliminary Parole Revocation Hearing, you may request that the hearing officer recommend to the Prisoner Review Board that the parole violation warrant be withdrawn pending a final parole revocation hearing. Withdrawal of the parole violation warrant would allow you to post bond if bond had been set by a criminal court judge in connection with the new criminal charges issued against you. You may request that the hearing officer recommend to the IPRB that the warrant be withdrawn pending a final revocation hearing by marking the appropriate box on the Parole Board order and return [sic] it to the PRB at the address provided on the order. Pls. Ex. B. Currently, there is no such box on the documents that parolees receive following the preliminary hearing that they can mark to request that their parole hold be lifted. In any event, the Hearing Officer “simply den[ies] or ignore[s] requests that [she] recommend the full Board withdraw the warrant issued in the parole revocation case.” Young Report (Pls. Ex. F) at 49. When parolees request that the Hearing Officer recommend that their parole hold be lifted, the Hearing Officer “denie[s] any responsibility or authority [to make this recommendation], [does] not invoke a hearing, adduce[s] no evidence and [makes] no findings or recommendations.” Id. The Hearing Officer does not instruct parolees to submit their own request to the PRB, as set forth in the Notice of Rights. Id. Rather, if a parolee requests bond or a lifting of the parole hold, the Hearing Officer informs them that “if they have an attorney…to have the attorney [] contact the chairman of the Board.” Joiner Dep. (Pls. Ex. I) at 74–75. Joiner testified that she herself does not have the power to make the recommendation to the Board and she has never held any kind of hearing, as prescribed by Faheem-El, to determine whether lifting the parole hold is appropriate in a particular case. Id. at 75. She stated that if parolees do not have private attorneys—the vast majority of the parolees in Cook County (see Young Report (Pls. Ex. F) at 34)—then they are not eligible for bond. Joiner Dep. (Pls. Ex. I) at 75–76. Joiner’s testimony is supported by the declarations of parolees. See Enos DiMarea Dec. (Pls. Ex. S) (stating that the Hearing Officer
18

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informed him that his bond could not be lifted unless he had a private attorney); see also Keith Brown Dec. (Pls. Ex. T); Christopher Lukes Dec. (Pls. Ex. U). As a result, parolees are categorically denied bond pending their final revocation hearing, in violation of Faheem-El, and in contravention to the procedure proscribed by the King Notice of Rights.
IV. POST-HEARING RECORD A. The Hearing Officer Does Not Create an Adequate Record of “Written Findings.”
Under the Decree, the Hearing Officer is tasked with creating a record of the hearing that includes “written findings.” Consent Decree (Pls. Ex. A) at Section III, Parts 5(i) and 6; see also Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 487. These findings, referred to as a hearing report, are provided to both the parolee and the Prisoner Review Board at the conclusion of the preliminary hearing, and contain the following elements: “a list of witnesses and documents presented”; whether the Hearing Officer found probable cause, no probable cause, or continued the hearing; and “a summary of evidence presented and the basis for finding.” See Pls. Ex. D.
The current reports drafted by the Hearing Officer “provide[] nothing that explain[s] the basis for the Hearing Officer’s finding of probable cause other than an abbreviated mention of police reports and a note that the King investigator testified to speaking by telephone with a police officer on a certain date.” Young Report (Pls. Ex. F) at Executive Summary iv. Mr. Young noted that he had not “seen a Report of Finding that alludes in any way to the response of the parolee or the evidence given in support of the parolee’s position.” Id. at 48. Instead, the majority of the reports cite the abbreviations PVR (Parole Violation Report), NOC (Notice of Charges) and/or CDISPO (Court Disposition) as the sole evidence supporting probable cause. See Pls. Ex. D; see also Young Report (Pls. Ex. F) at 48. Thus, in many cases, the notice of the alleged violation is listed by the Hearing Officer as the primary evidence of that violation.
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The “record, as it is now constituted, is inadequate to the task of gathering and preserving live testimony for ultimate use by the parole board at the full hearing.” Young Report (Pls. Ex. F) at 49. The parolee is also inadequately notified as to the basis for the finding of probable cause, so as to be able to shape his defense at the final hearing. Id. Due to the lack of information and reliance on abbreviations and shorthand in these hearing reports, the written record does not serve its intended purpose, as conceived of by Morrissey and the King Decree.
CONCLUSION The Consent Decree entered in King v. Walker guarantees explicit rights in the preliminary hearing process to Cook County parolees facing revocation. The evidence developed in this case provide compelling evidence that the Defendants are failing to ensure these rights and thus are violating key components of the King Decree. WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs seek a systematic remedy from the Court, requiring that the Defendants be mandated to comply with the provisions of the Consent Decree and the attendant Notice of Rights entered in this matter.
Respectfully submitted, By: /s/ Alexa Van Brunt
Counsel for the Plaintiff class Sheila Bedi Alexa Van Brunt Roderick and Solange MacArthur Justice Center Northwestern University School of Law 375 East Chicago Avenue Chicago, Illinois 60611 (312) 503-8576
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE The undersigned, an attorney, certifies that she served the foregoing document upon all persons who have filed appearances in this case via the Court’s CM/ECF system on October 22, 2013.
/s/ Alexa Van Brunt__

Case: 1:06-cv-00204 Document #: 176 Filed: 10/22/13 Page 22 of 22 PageID #:1571
SERVICE LIST King v. Walker et al., Case No. 06cv204
Alan Mills Uptown People's Law Center 4413 North Sheridan Road Chicago, Illinois 60640 (773) 769-1410 On behalf of the Plaintiff Class
Kevin R. Peters Law Offices of Kevin Peters 53 W. Jackson Blvd. Suite 1615 Chicago, IL 60604 (312) 697-0022 On behalf of the Plaintiff Class
Andrew W Lambertson U.S. District Court (NDIL-C) 219 South Dearborn Street Chicago, IL 60604 (312) 353-5354 On behalf of the Defendants
Kevin R. Lovellette Illinois Attorney General's Office 100 West Randolph Street 13th Floor Chicago, IL 60601 (312) 814-3720 On behalf of the Defendants

 </s> Case: 1:06-cv-00204 Document #: 181 Filed: 10/22/13 Page 1 of 7 PageID #:1831

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

CHARLES KING, ANDREW BROWN, )

CHIOKE HILL, THOMAS GILBERT, )

NELSON MUNIZ, ANTHONY SMITH )

and ANDRE McGREGG,

)

)

Plaintiffs, )

)

v.

)

)

ROGER E. WALKER and

)

JESSE MONTGOMERY,

)

)

Defendants. )

No. 06 C 204 Hon. Robert W. Gettleman

DEFENDANTS’ OUTLINE OF THE CASE

The Defendants, through their attorney LISA MADIGAN, Attorney General of Illinois,

hereby submit the following for their Outline of the Case as required by the Court during the pre-

trial conference on September 27, 2013:

I. INTRODUCTION

This matter involves the Plaintiffs’ Amended Motion for Rule to Show Cause (Docket

No. 157) which seeks to hold the Defendants in contempt of court for failing to implement and/or

follow the procedures set forth in the Consent Decree entered in this matter in 2007 (“Decree”)

(Docket No. 77) regarding preliminary hearings for alleged parole violators. This litigation

should be a simple and straightforward application of the facts to the requirements set forth in the

Decree. However, the evidence will show that the Plaintiffs make numerous arguments based

upon “requirements” that are not found in the Consent Decree. The Court should disregard these

arguments as beyond the scope of the Amended Motion for Rule to Show Cause and not

supported by the facts.

Case: 1:06-cv-00204 Document #: 181 Filed: 10/22/13 Page 2 of 7 PageID #:1832
Furthermore, the Plaintiffs rely on intermingled case law analysis and sinlge, cherrypicked facts for their arguments. Out of the approximately 350 full parole files produced to the Plaintiffs, they rely on only a handful of files to support their legal claims. In fact, for many issues they rely on only one or two files, but still extrapolate that the entire system is in violation of the Decree. They rely on these small number of files to suggest that the Defendants should be held in contempt of court for competely failing to follow the requirements of the Consent Decree. The evidence will show that the Plaintiffs’ arguments lack support in the facts and are not based upon the dicatates of the Decree. II. THE DEFENDANTS ARE MEETING THE TIME FRAME TO CONDUCT THE
HEARINGS AS SET FORTH IN THE DECREE The Defendants expect that the evidence in this matter will show that the procedures set forth in the Consent Decree have been enacted and are being followed by the Illinois Department of Corrections (“IDOC”). Specifically, there will be testimony that the preliminary hearings are either: (1) occurring within the period required by the Decree; (2) being postponed by the parolee; or (3) if the hearing did not properly occur in a timely manner, pursuant to the Decree the the Hearing Officer finds no probable cause. III. THE DEFENDANTS ARE PROVIDING NOTICE OF THE CHARGES AGAINST THE PAROLEES AND NOTICE OF THEIR RIGHTS PURSUANT TO THE PROCEDURES SET FORTH IN THE DECREE The evidence will also show that proper notice is given to the parolees as to the charges against them. The specific charges against the parolees are set forth in the Parole Violation Reports. Agent Alexsei Norton is one of the parole agents assigned to serve these Reports and the Notice of Rights on parolees. He will testify that the Notice of Rights (as approved by this
2

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Court and required to be served on parolees by the Consent Decree) sets forth the parolees’ rights. He will also testify that the Notice of Rights and Parole Violation Reports are served on the parolees properly and in a timely manner. Shunique Joiner, the Hearing Officer for the King preliminary hearings, will testify that she does not consider any information outside of the charges listed in the Parole Violation Report in making her decisions. Neither the Consent Decree nor federal law requires that parolees be given notice of the evidence against them for preliminary hearings. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972). Therefore, contrary to the Plaintiffs’ position, the fact that parolees do not receive access to computer databases containing evidence against them is immaterial to this matter. IV. KING INVESTIGATIONS INCLUDE REVIEWING THE DOCUMENTS AND
CONTACTING THE ARRESTING OFFICERS, AS REQUIRED BY THE DECREE The Decree states that “[t]he King Investigation shall include, at a minimum, a review of the police report and any supporting documentation, and an interview with the arresting officer(s).” (See Decree, Section III, paragraph 5, part (d), pg. 9). Agent Eric Harris, a King Investigator, will testify that all investigators are trained to review the police reports, the Parole Violation Reports, and other documents. He will also testify that King Investigators are trained to contact the arresting officers or parole agents to ask them about the circumstances surrounding the arrest. Hearing Officer Joiner will testify that if the Investigator does not speak with the arresting officer within the relevant time period, she will find no probable cause, as contemplated by the Decree. There are no requirements in the Decree that King Investigators contact victims or the parolee’s witnesses.
3

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V. FINDINGS OF PROBABLE CAUSE ARE BASED UPON THE EVIDENCE AND ARE NOT IMPERMISSIBLY ENTERED AUTOMATICALLY All parties agree that when a court of law finds probable cause that a parolee committed a
crime, then the King Hearing Officer can enter an automatic finding of “probable cause” to hold a parolee on the parole violation. Agent Harris and Sharon Shapinski, an administrator in the Parole Division of the Illinois Department of Corrections, will testify that King Investigators are trained to distinguish between a court’s finding of probable cause and a direct indictment. When there is direct indictment, Hearing Officer Joiner will testify that she holds a King hearing and does not automatically find probable cause. Additionally, contrary to the Plaintinffs’ position, the Hearing Officer will testify that she does not automatically enter a finding of probable cause in cases involving Domestic Violence, or when a parolee has been “AWOL.” VI. THE STATEMENTS OF THE PAROLEE’S WITNESSES ARE TAKEN INTO
ACCOUNT BY THE HEARING OFFICER Parolees are entitled to list any witnesses they want to testify in their behalf on the Notice of Rights, along with the witnesses’ contact information. Prior to the King hearing, the Hearing Officer will contact the witnesses to hear their statements. At the hearing, the Hearing Officer summarizes the statements made by the parolee’s witnesses. The Hearing Officer then asks the parolee to testify if he or she wishes. This system is set up to benefit the parolees. Since hearings are held during regular buisness hours, witnesses may not be available to testify. To avoid this harsh result, the Hearing Officer can take statements at the wintesses’ convenience. VII. PAROLEES ARE ALLOWED TO CROSS EXAMINE THE KING INVESTIGATORS Parolees are given the chance to cross examine the King Investigators. The Decree does
4

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not require that arresting officers or complaining witnesses appear at the hearing. The Hearing Officer will testify that she explains to the parolees that they may question the King Investigators after the Investigators have finished testifying. Evidence will also show that the Hearing Officer informs the parolees that they can testify on their own behalf. VIII. THE HEARING OFFICER ACCEPTS PAROLEES’ WRITTEN EVIDENCE
The Hearing Officer will testify that she accepts documents given to her by parolees during the hearing. However, if the documents are not related to the alleged parole violations (such as documents regarding the offender’s original conviction) or if they are merely copies of the Parole Violation Report or other documents which she already has, she does not accept them. Such documents do not further the hearing process. The Hearing Officer will also testify that she forwards tendered documents to the Prisoner Review Board. IX. THE LOCATIONS OF THE HEARINGS DO NOT VIOLATE THE
PROCEDURES SET FORTH IN THE DECREE The evidence will show that the Northern Reception and Classification Center (“NRC”) is an approriate venue for the King Hearings. The relevant witnesses will testify that the noise level at the NRC does not impede the King hearings. The evidence will further show that the hearing area at the Cook County Jail is loud and busy. However, the Defendants have neither the ability nor authority to change the location of the hearings in the Jail. Once the remodeling of the Jail is complete, it is anticipated that the jail administration will move the location of the hearings. X. PAROLEES HAVE THE SAME ACCESS TO THEIR COUNSEL AS ALL OTHER OFFENDERS All offenders housed at the NRC, including parolees awaiting their King hearing, have access to their counsel through the same procedures. Plaintiffs’ complaint that the parolees do
5

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not have adequate time to meet with their counsel prior to the King hearing is immaterial. This time frame is set forth in the Decree and cannot be changed by the Defendants. XI. PAROLEES ARE ALLOW TO REQUEST THAT THE CHAIRMAN OF THE
PAROLE BOARD WITHDRAW THEIR PAROLE HOLD The Hearing Officer will testify that parolees can request withdrawal of the parole warrant pending their final revocation hearing before the Prisoner Review Board (“PRB”). The parolees must petition the Chairman of the PRB to make that decision. The Hearing Officer provides a recommendation to the Chairman in the form of the Report of Findings. XII. THE HEARING OFFICER’S REPORT OF FINDINGS DOCUMENTS THE RESULTS OF THE HEARING AS REQUIRED BY THE DECREE The Hearing Officer makes a Report of Findings for each parolee and gives a copy of the Report to the parolee after the hearing. The Report contains the Hearing Officer’s decision, the evidence upon which it was based, and the reasoning behind the decision. No further documentation is necessary under the Decree. XIII. CONCLUSION In essence, the Plaintiffs’ Amended Rule to Show Cause does not argue that the Defendants failed to implement or follow the procedures required by the Decree. Instead, the Plaintiffs seek to modify the Decree by changin the requirements that the parties bargained for, and the Court approved, seven years ago. The evidence in this matter will show that the Defendants are not violating the requirements of the Decree, and the Rule to Show Cause is not supported by the evidence. Accordingly, the Rule should be denied.
6

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Respectfully Submitted, /s/ Kevin Lovellette KEVIN LOVELLETTE Assistant Attorney General General Law Bureau 100 W. Randolph, 13th Floor Chicago, Illinois 60601 (312) 814-3720
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE The undersigned attorney deposes and states upon oath that a copy of the attached Defendants’ Outline of the Case was served upon all counsel of record who have filed their appearances in this matter by the Court’s CM/ECF electronic system on the 22nd day of October, 2013.
s/ Kevin Lovellette
7

 </s> Case: 1:06-cv-00204 Document #: 204 Filed: 04/24/14 Page 1 of 17 PageID #:2080
&LL

l;A

IN TTT0 UNITED STAIES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISIXIC:T OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DTVISION

CHARLES KING, ANDREI\tr BROWN, )
CHIOKE HILL, THOMAS GtrJERT, )
NEISON MUNU, ANTHOI'TY SMITI{
and ANDRB McGREGG,

v.
ROGERE IMALKER and JESSE MONTGOMERY,

Plaintiffs, )
)
)
)
)
)
) Defenda.nts. )

No.A6C2O4 Hon. RobertW. Gettleman

AMENDED FINAL CONSEI{T DECREE

The Parties hereby enter into this Amended Final Consent Decree to resolve the issuqs

raised in Plaintiffs' Motion for a Rule to Show Cause allegng violations of their Fourteenth

AmendmentDueProcessrightsasprovidedforinMorrisseyv.Braoer,40SU.S.4TT,92S.Ct.

2593, 33 L.W- 2d 484 (197 2):
I. BACKGROUND 1. The Plaintiffs initiated the underlying action on January 13, 2006, and filed an
Amended Complaint on February L3,2}A6,allegrng, inter alia, that Defendants had denied or failed to provide preliminary parole revocation hearings for the Plaintiffs and those similarly
situated, pu$uant to Marrissey, supra. Defendants are the Director and the Chief of Parole of the Illinois Departrrent of Corrections f'IDOC"), which is the agency responsible for rstaining
custody of all persons placed on parole or mandatory supervised release or released pursuant to 730 ILCS 5/3-3-10, and supervising such persons during their parole or release period in accord

Case: 1:06-cv-00204 Document #: 204 Filed: 04/24/14 Page 2 of 17 PageID #:2081

with the conditions set by &g Ilineis Prisoner Review Board ("IPRB,).I ptaintiffs filed a Motion for Class Certification with their initial Complaint and a Motion for preliminary
hrjunction on January 24, 2006.
2. By Order dated May 8,2006, this Court certified this case to proceed as a class
action pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Frocedure ?3(a) and23b)e) on behalf of "Cook County Parolees who have been or will be arrested for parole violations in Cook county, Illinois and who will be: a) taken into custody at Cook Counfy Jail; b) hansferred from Cook County Jail wiihin 10 days without a preliminary parole revocation hearing; c) transferred from the Cook counry Jail to the IDoc; and d) held without a preliminary parole revocation hearing for more than 10 days." The Court deemed only four of the class representatives proposed by the plaintiffs as acceptable under the requirements of Rule 23: Charles King, Cbioke HilI, Nelson Muniz, aud
Andre McGregg.
3- On May 8, 2006, the Court also granted Plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary
injunction' The Court found that Parolees have a constitutional right to a promp! preliminary parole revocation hearing aad that Parolees have a limited constitutional dght to confront and cross examine Persons who have provided testimony or evidence which could be used to revoke parole. The Court then concluded that Defendants were violating these constiurtional rights with respect to the certified Parolee class.
4, The Parties entered into a Einal ConsentDecree on January 25,ZW7,in ftrll and
final settlement of the Plaintiffs, claims fu this litigation. Tbrough the Fiaai Consent Decree,

I Pursuantto operatiou of F.RCP. 25(d), the current Director and Chief of parole parties in this matter. As of the enry of this Amended Final Consenr DecieeJ,t and Darryl L. Johnson is the IDOC Chief cif parole.

are automatically substituted as Ooaio", is the IDOC Director

2

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Defendants denied the allegations of the Plaintiffs' Amended Complainq further denied any violations of statutes or regulations, and made no admission of liability.
5. On November 30,?l12, the Plaintiff Class filed a'Motion for Rule to Show
Cause,o' alleging that the Defendants were in violation of the January 26,2007 ltnal Consent Decree. Defendants denied and continue to deny that they were in violation of the Final Consent Decree. On October 30 and 31, 2013, the Court conducted an evidentiary hearing on the allegations in the Motion for Rule to Show Cause.
6. The parties stated their desire to resolve this matter amicably, nnd the Court
reserved ruling on the issues raised iu the Motion For Rule to Show Cause.
7. This Amended Ffual Consent Decree constitutes full and final resolution of the
issues raised in the Motion for Rule to Show Cause. Defendants make no admission of liability, and nothing herein shall be deemed an admission of fault of any kind by Defendants. The Motion for Rule to Show Cause is withdrawn.
8. The parties agree that this Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this
case purcuant to 28 U.S.C. $$ 1331 and 1343.
9, As indicated by the signatures below, the Parties agree to the entry of this
Amended linal Consent Decree. IT IS MREtsYADruDGED, ORDERED AND DECREED:
U. DEFINMONS
For pqposes of this Amended Final Consent Decree, unless otherwise specified:
10. '?arolee" shall be defined as a person who is on parole with the IDOC and is
taken into custody for au alleged parole violation in Cook County pursuant to a warant issued by

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the IDOC under 730 ILCS 5/3-1+2(c). A person who is taken into federal custody is expressly excluded uldel this definition of '?arolee."
11. "Amended Notice of Rights" shall be the Amended Notice of Rights form that
shall include the language attached hereto as Exhibit A, which describes a Parolee's rights regarding a preliminary parole revocation hearing pursuant to this Amended Final Consent Dec.ree and M or riss ey. s up ra.
12. 'King Investigator" shall be defined as an IDOC employee or agent who performs
a King Investigation pursuant to the requirements of this Amended Final Consent Decree. The King Investigator shall not serye as an advocaie.
13. "King Investigation" shall be an objective investigation conducted by the King
Investigator into the facts and circumstances sunounding the Parolee's alleged parole violation. The purpose of the investigation is to apprise the Hearing Officer of relevant facts to allow him or her to determine whether sufficient facts and circumstances exist to support a finding of probable cause. The investigation shall include, at a minimum, a review of the police report and any supponing documentation, and an interview either in person or via the telephone of the aresting officer(s) and/or the supervising parole agetrt. The King Investigation shall be completed pursuant to the requirements of this Amended Final Consent Decree-
L4. 'T{earing Officet''shall be defined as au employee of the IPRB who is assigned to
conduct the preliminary parole revocation hearing for each Parolee.
15. "Technicai Violatof' shall be defined as a Parolee who is picked up for a violation
of the terms of his mandatory supervised release agreement, including those who are not charged with a new criminal offense. Examples of technical violations include, but are not limited to:

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failure to contact a parole officer, failure to reside in an approved location, aud testing positive for illegal drugs.
16. '?arole Violation Reporf shall be a report generated by the IDOC that lists the
Parolee's alleged violations of the conditions of his parole, along with descriptive and other information. The parole violation report will set forth the alleged parole violations using simple, clear and concise language.
17. "Served Stahts" shall be defined as the time at which a parole violatiou wafiant is
lodged or placed on record with the law erforcement entity that has physical custody of tire
Parolee.
III.IERMS
18. Defendants shall take the following measures which are intended to provide each
Parolee with an opportunity to have apreliminary parole revocation hearing in accordauce with the Foufieenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, as defined by Morrissry, supra.
19. The Parole Violation Report and Amended Notice of Rights shall be personally
served within five calendar daysto all Parolees who are apprehended and/or arrested in Cook County and who are under the control of Iocal law enforcement or the IDOC. The five calendar days shall corlmence the day after the parole violation warrant goes into Served Status.
24. Defendants shall ensure one of rhe following: a- The transfer of any Parolee shall be completed so that the Parolee is sent
to, and custody is accepted by, IDOC at the desiguated Reception and Classification Center within five calendar days of a parole violation warrant going into Served Status. This schedule shall provide that the Parolee receives adequate notice of his right to a preliminary parole revocation hearing.

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Should a transfer within five calendar days of arest prove impossible for auy Parolee, wtether due to impending coufi dates in Cook CountS Illinois, or for issues of safety and security or severe administrative hardship on behaH of Cook County or the IDOC, the Cook Couoty Sheriff shall defer transfer of any Parolee back to IDOC. In such cases, a preliminary parole revocafion hearing shail be held in an appropriate Cook County facility.
ZL. At the time rhe Parole Violation Report and the Amended Notice of Rights are
served, Parolees may choose one of the following options: (1) a preliminary parole revocation hearing, which will be scheduled within ten business days of the parole violation warrant going into Served Starus; (2) a posrponement of the preliminary parole revocation hearing for up to thirty business days from the date the parole violation warant entered Served Status; or (3) a waiver of the preliminary parole revocation hearing. Parolees who do not waive the preliminary parole revocation hearing and are uot available for their hearing within the time frame set forth in this paragraph due to concutrent court appearances, medical issues, or other legitimate reasons shall have their hearing postponed until the next available hearing date. The preliminary parolo revocation process should occur pusuant to the timeline included in Exhibit B. During service,
IDOC staff shall inform Parolees: (i) that they must decide whether to waive their preliminary parole hearing 2) when the preliminary parole hearing is scbeduled if the parolee opts not to
waive; and 3) that the Paroiee can Iist witness information on the Amended Notice of Rights
Form.
22. At ttre time of service; the Parolee may cornplete the section of the Amended
Notice of Rights to provide witness' names, contact information, the general area(s) of questioning and/or specific questions for the witnesses, and affomey contact information. The Parolee may rstum tbe Amended Notice of Rights form immediately to the IDOC employee

Case: 1:06-cv-00204 Document #: 204 Filed: 04/24/14 Page 7 of 17 PageID #:2086
providing service, or the Parolee shall be allowed an additional business day to complete this
information and retum the form to either Cook County Jail staff or IDOC staff. When parolees
are served in IDOC facilities, the Defendants will provide each parolee with an oppornniry to
return the form to the IDOC. When parolees are served in the Cook County JaiI, the Defendants
will work in good faith with Cook County Jail staffto provide each parolee with the opporludty
to return the form to the IDOC. Upon receipt of a completed Amended Notice of Rights form,
IDOC staff will forward the forrn to the IPRB prior to the Parolee's preliminary hearing.
23. Defendants, in conjunction with the IPRB and other appropriare agencies, shall
provide each Parolee witb a preliminary parole revocation hearing that protects their due process
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, as defined in
Morrissey, supra, as follows:
a. If the Parolee does not waive his or her right to a preliminary parole
revocation hearing the IDOC shall assign a King Investigator to conduct a King Investigation. The King Investigation shall includq at a minimum, a review of the police reports and any supporting documentation, and an interview with the investigating/arresting police office(s). The King Investigator may conduct such further investigatiotr as ne@ssary, in his or her discretion, to prodde the Hearing Officer designated by the IPRB with the facts and circumstances surrounding the Parolee's alleged parole violation. The King Investigator shall testify under oath at the preliminary parole revocation hearing and shall be subject to cross-examination by the Parolee or his counsel regarding the information gathered during the King Investigation. The King Investigators shall testify to updales regarding the charges brought by a law enforcement entity based upon the alleged parole violations coffained in the Parole Violation Report, including whether the charges were dismissed or amended. The IDOC will establish poiicies and procedures to ensure that the King Investigators are instructed not to resdfy regarding conduct unrelated to the alleged parcle vioiation(s) in the Parole Violation Reporl Should a King Investigator testify regarding conduct unrelated to the alleged violation(s) in the Parole Violation Reporq such testimony shall be disregarded by the Hearing Officer and shall not be used by the Hearing Offrcer as a basis for a finding of probable cause;

Case: 1:06-cv-00204 Document #: 204 Filed: 04/24/14 Page 8 of 17 PageID #:2087

b.

The IPRB shall assigu a Hearing Officer to conduct the preliminary parole

revocation hearings pursuant to its statutory obligation under 730ILCS

513-3-9. The Illinois Deparhent of Corrections, its agents or employees,

shall not serve as the designee of the IPRB for purposes of deciding tbe

issue of probable cause at a preliminary parole revocation hearing for a

Parolee;

The Hearing Officer is required to determine whether or not probable cause exists that the Parolee commined the alleged violation(s) setforth in tbeParole Violation Report. In making this determinatio4 the Hearing OfEcer must exercise independent judgment and must evaluate tbe reliability and credibility of the evidence that is before him s1[eL Ths Hearing Officer may only make a determiuation on evidence pefiinent to
the alleged violations of and compliance with the Parolee's conditions of
par.ole;

d"

If the King Investigation has not been completed by the time of the

preliminary parole revocation hearing or if the service of the Parole

Violation Report and the Amended Notice of Rights was not completed

withiE the time frame set foflh in this Amended Enal Consent Decree, or

if the preliminary parole revocation hearing is not scheduled within the

time frame set forttr in this Amended Final Consent Decree, there shall be

x filding of no probable causen unless the hearing is continued at the

request of the Parolee or the Parolee is otherwise unavailable to attend the

hearing for reasous outside the control of the IDOC, such as being

confiaed for medical care or beiag held elsewhere for a court appearance;

e.

In the designated IDOC facilities, the Deparhent will provide a location

for the preliminary parole revocation hearings that is not excessively

noisy, where a telephone is available that can be used by the Hearing

Officor for witness testimony, and that has adequate room for the Hearing

Officer, the Pmolee, the King Investigator, and auy asorney for the

Parolee to be seated during the hearing. The IDOC and the IPRB shall

work in good taith with the Cook County Sheriffso that hearinp held at a

Cook County faeility are in a location that is not excessively noisy, where

a tele,phone is available that can be used by rhe Hearing Officer for

witness testimony, and that has adequate room for the Hearing Officer, the

Paroiee, the King Investigator, and any attomey for the Parolee to be

seaJed during the hearing;

During the preliminary parole revocation hearings, a Parolee may request a continuance for up to thirty calendar days from the date ofthat hearing;

Prior to the preliminary parole revocation hearing, the Hearing Of6cer shall attempt to contact via telephone any witnesses listed on the Amended
8

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Notice of Rigbr by the Parolee. Upon making contact with the proposed witness, the Hearing Officer shall identify bim or herself and briefly explain the reason for the call. The llearing Officer shall inform the witness that the witness may give their information to the Hearing Offlicer over the telephone at tbat timq or the witness may come in person to the facility where the relevant hearing will be conducted to give lestimony to the Hearing Officer, or the witness may provide a telephone number at which the llearing Officercan cotrtact the witness during a three-hour period of time on the day of the relevant hearing. It shall be the witness' decision whether and how to grye any testimony. The Hearing Offrcer shall record the witness' decision regarding how to give testimony on the Amended Notice of Rigbts. If the witness chooses to provide testimony to the Hearing Officer over the phone or at the facility where the relevant hearing will be conducted, the Hearing Officer will ask the witness questions regarding the area(s) of questioning and/or the specific guestions
provided by the Parolee on the Amended Notice of Rights Form. The Hearing Officerwill summarize the witnesses' responses on the same form- Information provided by the witness shali be considered by the Hearing Officer in rendering his or her decision during the hearing. Ia the event ftrat the Parolee identifies a witness or witnesses for the first tirne
during the preliminary parole revocation hearing, the Hearing Offrcer will
make one attempt to contact the witness or witnesses by telephone during the hearing. If the witness or witnesses are unavailable, the Parolee may request that the hearing be postponed for up to seven additional calendar
days to give the Hearing Officer an opporfunity to contact the witness or witnesses as set fofilt in this paragraph. Barring such postponemenf the hearing will proceed that day;

h.

The testimony, gfven on the record at the preliminary parole revocation

hearing shall include a description of the King Investigation;

During the preliminary parole revocation hearings, Parolees have the rigbt to cross examine the King Investigator, speak on their own behalf, and have witness testimony given on their behaf, as described. in this Amended Final Consent Decrec. A Parolee may remain silent during the preliminary paroie revocation hearing, and the Hearing Officer cannot use his orher silence in making a decision as to probable cause;

Parolees may also present written evidence to the Hearing Officer pursuant to 20 lll. Admin. Code 1610.140OX1), and any writteu evidence prcseuted by a Parolee will be kept by the Hearing Of6cer and shall become part of the official record of the case mainBined by the IPRB;

Case: 1:06-cv-00204 Document #: 204 Filed: 04/24/14 Page 10 of 17 PageID #:2089

k

parolees shall have the right to retain counsel at the preliminary parole

revocationhearingpursuantto20lll.Admin.Codel620(c);

l.

A statenent of the righs contained in paragraphs 23(a) through ft) of this

Amended Final Consent Decree will be included in tbe Ameuded Notice

of Rights Form- The Hearing Officer will explain the lebts described in

thesJparagraphs to the Paroiee at the beginning of each hearing using the

admonishment contained in Exhibit C;

m. If probable cause is found by the Hearing Officer, the Parolee shall have
n:;ffi mxlm*"m?""ffiHffi HxxiJi#'#fl ""
revocatioi hearing. If the Parolee makes such a request" the Hearing Off,cerwill permit the Parolee to produce any additional evidgnc_e supportingthewithdrawal of the waITanL Afterconsidering all of tlis
Hearing Officer will make a written recommendation on the "Rneidpo.nrt""o,-ftlFreindings form which shall be communicated to the IPRB; and
n. pursuant to 730 ILCS 5/3-3-9(e), a record of the hearing shall be made by the Hearing Officer on the Report of Findings form.
24. The Hearing Officer shall provide the Parolee with a copy of the Report of
I{ndings within 24 hours of the hearing. The Report of Findings must include a statement of whether probable cause for each charge a.nd/or technicai violation was found and if it was, that the matter shall proceed to afi:nal revocation hearing before the IPRB. The Report of Findinp
shall also include a brief summary of all evidence presented, a brief summary of the evidence relied on for the determination(s), a brief description of the Parolee's position, and any recommendation provided for in section Itr, 1[23(m), above. A copy of the Report of Findings shall be providedby the IPRB ro any counsel representing the Parolee at the preliminary hearing, to the parolee's parent institution within IDOC for inclusion in the Parolee's master file, and to

the Chairman of the IPRB or his or her designee.
ZS. Once a finding of probable cause has been made and the Report of Findings has
been served on the Parolee, he or she may be transferred to any appropriate facility within rhe

10

Case: 1:06-cv-00204 Document #: 204 Filed: 04/24/14 Page 11 of 17 PageID #:2090
IDOC, unless the IPRB grants a request to withdraw the parole violation warurnt, as described in section ltr, 1[23(m), above.
26. If the Hearing Officer makes a finding of no probable cause at the preliminzry
parole revocation hearing, and the preliminary parole revocation hearing is held at the designated IDOC Reception and Classification Center, the Parolee shall eitherbe rctumed to Man&itory
Supervised Release (MSr() or, for those Parolees who are the subject of pending criminal
charges, be turned over to the custody of the Cook County Sheriff in Cook County as promptly as possible by the IDOC, under appropriate terms of MSR as determined by the IPRB. The Parolee's retura to the Cook County Sheriff or release subject !o appropriate terms of MSR shall be accomplished as promptJy as is administatively possible. Additiorlally, if no probable cause is foun4 the Parclee will continue to be subjrct to the conditions of his or her MSR placed on him or her by the IPRB and by law.
27. The Amended Notice of Rights shall be distributed in conjunction with the
Parolee's MSR agreement to all inmates being released on parole or MSR.
28. For a period of one year and 90 calendar days following rhe enfty of this
Amended Einal ConsentDecree, counsel for the Parties will have tbe opportunity to observe parole hearings as follows: Plaintiffs' counsel and Defendanm' counsel shall be entitled to
observe no more than 15 parole hearings during this time frame. For purposes of this paragraph only, 'parole hearing" shall mean a1l preliminary parole revocation hearings scheduled for a grven day at any faciliry. Plaintiffs' counsel may choose no more than two (2) representatives to
be present ateach parole hearing. Plaintiffs' counsel wili adhere to all security regularions and will submit the names of the individuals who will observe the hearings at least three weels in
11

Case: 1:06-cv-00204 Document #: 204 Filed: 04/24/14 Page 12 of 17 PageID #:2091
advance of any planned observaace, in order for IDOC to ensure that the individuals have appropriate security clearances. Once IDOC has clearcd the Piaintiffs' representatives, they may observe hearings at the designated IDOC facility by providing written notice to Defendants' counsel at least ten business days in advance of the hearing. Alt parties acknowledge that they will need to seek security clearance and permission to observe hearings at any Cook County faciliry. Observations of the hearings will not be scheduled until at least 90 calendar days after the entry of an Amended Final Consent Decree in this matter. Before the start of the first hearing for each day of observation, a list of the individuals who have scheduled hearings for that day will be provided to the Plaintiffs' representatives who are observing the hearing.
Zg. After a day of observation? upon request from the Plaintiffs, the IDOC will
provide Plainffis' counsel with the Parole Violation Reports and any attachments, the Amended
Notices of Rights, any documents in its possession that were presented at the hearing, and the written determination(s) for each bearing from the day of observation
30. By October L7,ZAL ,the Defendants shalt submit a status report to the Court
regarding the implementation of the terrs of this Amended Consent Decree. Plainffis shall have until November 14,2A14 to file a respome. A status hearing is set for Novsmber 25,2014, at
10:00 a.m.
31. If the Plainffis contend that the Defendants are not in substantial compliance with
the terms of this Amended Final Consent Decr@, the Plaintiffs shall provide written notice of the issues to Counsel for the Defendants, and the Defendane shall have 21 calendar days to respond
to the Plaintiffs, including but not limited to by submitting aplan of correction if one is determined to be necessary. Plaintiffs shall not involve tbe Courtin an enforcement action
12

Case: 1:06-cv-00204 Document #: 204 Filed: 04/24/14 Page 13 of 17 PageID #:2092

without first notifying the Defendants of the alleged violations and providing them with an

opportunity to cure, as desoibed above, Both sides shali endeavor to address any disagreeuents

in good faith in order to come to resolution without further involvement of tbe Court.
32. The issue of Attorneys' fees and costs is reserved for determination by the Court

Plaintiffs do not waive their right to xequsst Attomeys' fees and costs, aud Defendants do not

waive any arguments against Attorney's fees and costs.

MV

Date

ORABIJ ROBERT W. GETTLEMAN

TINTIED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Agreed to by the parties as indicated by their counsels' signatures below:

A.BEDI VAN BRUNT
Northwestem University School of Law 375 East Chicago Avenue Chicago, Illinois 6061 1
$n)sa3-2492

Chief Irgal Counsel
IIli nois Department of Corrections 100 W. Randolph, 4h Floor
Chicago, TLlinois 60601
(312)8t+s797

13

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Exhibit A - Amended Notice of Rights and Witness Form
AMENDED NOTICE OF RIGHTS PRELIMINARY PAROLE REVOCATION HEARING

The parole revocation hearing process has two parts: (1) a p_reliminary revocation hearing during

wtrictr a hearing offrcer decidis if probable
(2) a final parole revocation hearing during

cause exists to find that which a member of the

you violated your parole and
Prisoner Review Board will

decide if your parole should be revoked. This notice focuses on the preliminary revocation

hearing.

you can complete the witness form when you receive it from the server, or you can take vp to 24 hours to comilete the witness form. If you want to have witness testimony at your preliminary hearing, you must include your witresses' names and contact informationgn the witness form. you have the option to list specific topics about which you would like each witness to testiff.

The hearing officer will contact any witness you list and ask your witness if he or she wants to talk to the hearing offrcer over the phone, come to the facility during your hearing to testiff, or testiff on the phone during the hearing. Your witness will decide how he or she will testiff.
you have the right to a preliminary hearing. Unless you decide to postpone the hearing, it will occur within the next l0 business days.
You have the right to waive (or decide not to have) your preliminary hearing. If you waive a preliminary hearing, this does not mean that you have pled gullty to your parole violation. You will still have a fulIrevocation hearing before the Prisoner Review Board.

You have a right to hire an attorney to represent you at your preliminary hearing.

During the preliminary parole revocation hearing, you have the right to:
o Tell your side of the story o Present witnesses o Ask questions of anyone who testifies at the hearing o Present documents related to the alleged parole violation.

you are not required to speak during your hearing, even if the hearing officer asks you questions.

The Departnent of Corrections has the burden to prove that probable cause exists that you committed the alleged parole violation.

During your hearing, an investigator who has performed an investigation into your alleged
violation will testiff. This investigator is not an advocate for either you or the Departrnent of
Corrections. You may ask the investigator questions during your hearing.

If the hearing officer finds probable cause to believe that you committed the alleged violation, you can reqriest that he or .h" recommend to the Prisoner Review Board that your parole hold be
"* iift"d ro yo, be released rurtil your final revocation hearing, subject to the original conditions
of your parole. Once you make this reques! you will have the chance to provide additional evidence showing that you are not a flight risk or a danger to other persons.

Within 24 hours of the hearing, you will receive a written report of the hearing officer's decision.

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WITNESS INFORMATION FORM PRELIMINARY PAROLE REVOCATION HEARING

Parolee Name and IDOC Number:

Date Witness Form Given to Parolee:

Preliminary Parole Revocation Hearing Date:

Please List Any Witnesses You Would Like to Testiff At Your Preliminary Parole Revocation
Hearing, as Well as Any Potential Questions or Topics for the Witness. You Must lnclude a Phone Number If You Would Like the Hearing Officer to Contact Your Witness.

Witness Name & Phone Number

Questions or Topics for Witness

[If YouNeed Additional Space, Please Continue on Back of This Form] FOR IIEARING OFFICER ONLY List of Witnesses Contacted and Prof[ered Testimony

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Exhibit B: Preliminary Parole Revocation Proceedings Timeline

The IDOC will serve all parolees with their Parole Violation Report and Amended Notice
of Rights within 5 calendar days of the date the parole violation warrant is entered into Served Status. "Seryed Status" shall be defined as the time at which aparole revocation warrant is lodged or placed on record with the law enforcement entity that has physical
custody of the Parolee.

ii.

After a parolee is served, he or she will have up to one business day to provide witness

information, as described in the Amended Final Consent Decree.

ll1. Unless a Parolee waives or postpones the preliminary parole revocation hearing, the
preliminary parole revocation hearing will be held within l0 business days of the date the parole violation warrant is entered into Served Status.

lv. A Parolee may ask to postpone his or her preliminary parole hearing for an amount of
time not to exceed 30 calendar days after the parole violation warrant enters into Served
Status.

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Exhibit C - Admonishment
You are here for a preliminary parole revocation hearing. During this hearing, I will decide whether probable cause exists to believe that you committed the violation alleged in your parole violation report. Before I conduct this hearing, I am going to infonn you about the rights you
have during this process:
You have the right to provide witness contact information and to have me ask questions of your
witnesses. If you provide me with the witness contact infonnation for the first time today, I wilt make one attempt to call that witness or witnesses. If the witness or witnesses are unavailable today, you may ask to postpone this hearing for an additional seven calendar days, otherwise the hearing will go forward today.
You have the right to present me with written documents.
You have the right to tell me your side of the story.
You have the right to ask questions of anyone who testifies against you.
You have the right to remain silent during this hearing and I cannot use your silence against you. You do not have to answer my questions.
If you have retained an afforney, you have a right to be represented by that attorney dwing this
hearing.
You have the right to pos@one this hearing. If you need additional time to exercise these rights
you may postpone your preliminary parole hearing.
In the event that I find against you, you can ask that I recommend that the Prisoner Review Board withdraw your warrant pending your final hearing. You can present evidence and explain to me why I should make this recommendation.
You will receive my decision in writing at the end of your hearing today.
Do you understand these rights?
Do you wish to proceed with a preliminary parole revocation hearing?

 </s> Case: 1:06-cv-00204 Document #: 125 Filed: 11/30/12 Page 1 of 18 PageID #:1063

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

CHARLES KING, ANDREW BROWN, CHIOKE HILL, THOMAS GILBERT, NELSON MUNIZ, ANTHONY SMITH and ANDRE McGREGG,
Plaintiffs;
v.
ROGER E. WALKER and JESSE MONTGOMERY,
Defendants.

) ) ) ) ) ) No. 06 C 204 ) ) The Hon. Robert W. Gettleman ) ) ) ) )

MOTION BY THE PLAINTIFF CLASS FOR A RULE TO SHOW CAUSE

Plaintiffs, by their undersigned attorneys, respectfully move this Court for entry of an

order directing the Defendants to show cause why they are not in violation of the Consent Decree

entered in this matter on January 26, 2007. In support, the Plaintiff class states:

INTRODUCTION

1. This action was brought in 2006 to redress the systemic violations of the

constitutional rights to due process of persons in Cook County serving time on parole and facing

parole revocation proceedings. The Plaintiffs alleged, individually and on behalf of the class of

Cook County parolees, that the parole revocation process deprived them of liberty without

adequate procedural protections. As a result of these violations, members of the Plaintiff class

endured imprisonment for over 30 days without any sort of hearing. See King Amended

Complaint (Doc. No. 19) at ¶¶ 21-23

2. On January 26, 2007, this Court entered a consent decree establishing certain

rights of parolees and specified obligations of state officials in order to ensure that parolees are

Case: 1:06-cv-00204 Document #: 125 Filed: 11/30/12 Page 2 of 18 PageID #:1064
not deprived of their liberty without appropriate procedural protections. Unfortunately, the entry of the decree has not produced the intended effects. The Defendants and coordinating state agencies are violating the Court’s Consent Decree and continuing to act in violation of Illinois state law and the U.S. Constitution in their administration of the parole revocation process. As a result, individuals accused of violating their parole languish behind bars for weeks or sometimes even months at a time without any hearing or inquiry into the legality of their detention. This motion asks the Court to issue a rule to show cause against the named defendants directing them to appear at an evidentiary hearing and show cause why they are not in violation of the Consent Decree.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 3. The Court’s January 26, 2007 Final Consent Decree, attached as Exhibit A, governs the rights of all “Parole Violators,” meaning any person “who is on parole and who is taken into or being held in custody for an alleged parole violation in Cook County, pursuant to a parole violation warrant issued by the Illinois Department of Corrections[.]” Ex. A at Section II, part A, subpart 1. The Decree was signed by the Plaintiffs—four named class representatives acting on behalf of the class of Cook County parolees—as well as Defendant Roger Walker, the Director of the Illinois Department of Corrections (hereinafter, IDOC), and Defendant Jesse Montgomery, the Deputy Director for Parole of the IDOC. 4. The Plaintiffs initiated the action on January 13, 2006. Shortly thereafter, on January 24, the Plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction. In an order dated May 8, 2006, this Court certified a class of “Cook County Parolees who have been or will be arrested for parole violations in Cook County, Illinois and who will be a) taken into custody at Cook County Jail; b) transferred from Cook County Jail within 10 days without a preliminary parole revocation
2

Case: 1:06-cv-00204 Document #: 125 Filed: 11/30/12 Page 3 of 18 PageID #:1065
hearing; c) transferred from the Cook County Jail to the IDOC; and d) held without a preliminary parole revocation hearing for more than 10 days.”
5. On May 8, 2006, the Court also granted the Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction, finding that the class members have a constitutional right to a prompt, preliminary revocation hearing, which includes a right to confront and cross-examine persons who have provided testimony or evidence that could be used to revoke parole. The Court concluded that the Defendants were violating these rights.
6. The Consent Decree attempted to remedy the systematic violations of parolees’ rights during preliminary parole revocation hearings—the purpose of which is to determine whether there is probable cause to hold the parolee in custody on the IDOC warrant—by imposing a variety of continuing obligations concerning the procedural rights of parolees in these hearings, both at Cook County and IDOC facilities.1 These obligations fall into two overarching categories.
7. First, the Defendants are required to distribute a “Notice of Rights” to all parole violators “within a reasonable time following their apprehension, to provide them with the ability to either waive their preliminary hearing or have it held within 10 business days.” Ex. A at Section III, part 3. Second, the Defendants, acting in conjunction with “the Illinois Prisoner Review Board and other appropriate state agencies,” are to ensure “that Parole Violators receive a preliminary parole revocation hearing which protects their due process rights under the
1 As the Court is aware, parole revocation takes place in two stages: (1) the preliminary parole revocation hearing, which is in the nature of a probable cause hearing; and (2) the final hearing, at which the parole authorities must establish the existence of a parole violation by a preponderance of the evidence. See generally Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972); see also People v. Crowell, 53 Ill.2d 447, 451 (1973). For the most part, the Consent Decree only addressed the procedural requirements for the preliminary hearing.
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Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution,” as defined by Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972). Id. at Section III, part 5.
8. Under the first category, the Notice of Rights, attached as Exhibit B, informs parolees that, among other things, they are entitled to the following in the parole process: the right to a timely preliminary hearing; the right to retain an attorney to represent them in the hearing; the right to appear at the hearing and testify on their own behalf; the right to present and cross-examine witnesses at the hearing; and the right to a written decision on whether probable cause exists within 72 hours of the hearing. The Notice also informs parolees that the IDOC retains the burden of establishing probable cause, and that the IDOC is to assign a so-called “King investigator” to conduct an investigation into the circumstances surrounding the arrest or alleged parole violation. The Decree requires all parolees’ to sign the Notice acknowledging they received the document prior to the preliminary hearing.
9. Under the second category (and in accordance with the Notice of Rights), Section III, part 5 of the Decree also establishes specific due process requirements for the protection of parolees facing preliminary hearings. These requirements include the following:
x Assigning a hearing officer, under 730 ILCS 5/3-3-9, who is not an IDOC employee or agent;
x Providing any parolee who does not waive the preliminary hearing with written instructions for presenting witness testimony at the hearing;
x For every parolee who does not waive a preliminary hearing, assigning an IDOC employee to conduct a “King investigation” that includes, at the very least, a review of the police report and supporting documentation and, where applicable, an interview of the arresting officer;
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x Requiring the IDOC employee who conducts the King investigation to testify under oath and in person at the preliminary hearing, and to provide a description of the investigation;
x Granting the parolee the right to cross-examine the IDOC employee who conducts the King investigation;
x Entering a finding of “no probable cause” at any parole revocation hearing that occurs before the King investigation is completed;
x Allowing the parolee to present written evidence under 20 Ill. Admin. Code 1610.140(b)(1);
x Allowing parolees to retain counsel for the preliminary and final revocation hearings under 20 Ill. Admin. Code 1610.140(c)2;
x Making a record of the hearing pursuant to 730 ILCS 3/3-3-9(e); and x Ensuring that the hearing officer makes written findings within 48 hours of the
hearing and that the written findings are given to the alleged violator within 24 hours of the Defendants’ receipt of them from the hearing officer. 10. The Court appointed the John Howard Association as the Monitor of the Consent Decree for a period of one year upon its entry. On January 26, 2007, the Court signed an order adopting the Consent Decree and dismissed the case with prejudice, but retained jurisdiction “to enforce the terms of this Proposed Consent Decree.” Ex. A at Section III, part 10. The last Monitor’s report was filed with the Court on January 23, 2008. While the Monitor found that the Defendants were at the time in substantial compliance with the Consent Decree, the Monitor
2 The Consent Decree mistakenly lists this obligation as falling under 20 Ill. Admin. Code 1620(c), rather than 20 Ill. Admin. Code 1610.140(c), which governs the right to retained counsel in parole revocation proceedings.
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concluded the report by noting that “work remains to be done and some of the progress achieved to date is based, in many respects, on temporary arrangements that do not inspire confidence that they can be sustained over any significant period of time.” Monitor’s Report (attached as Exhibit C) at 23. On October 12, 2011, a member of the King Class filed a pro se “Motion to Enforce Injunctive Relief” (Doc. No. 122) (hereinafter, “Briggs Motion”). The motion alleges that the class member was denied an opportunity to have a preliminary parole revocation hearing in violation of the Consent Decree. The Defendants failed to respond to the pro se motion and there has been no further action in this matter since its filing.
SYSTEMATIC AND ONGOING VIOLATIONS OF THE CONSENT DECREE 11. The Plaintiffs now seek an order for a rule to show cause, granting a hearing into
what the Plaintiffs contend are systematic and on-going violations of the Consent Decree by the Defendants. In a motion for a rule to show cause, “the moving party is asking only for a preliminary order directing the alleged contemnor to show cause why the court should not find him in contempt.” U.S. S.E.C. v. Hyatt, 621 F.3d 687, 696 (7th Cir. 2010) (emphasis in original). “The purpose of such a motion is to persuade the court that there should be a hearing at which the factfinder will ultimately evaluate whether a finding of contempt is appropriate on the evidence presented.” Sommerfield v. City of Chicago, 252 F.R.D. 407, 413 (N.D. Ill. 2008), Thus, the burden of the moving party is not to show that the non-moving party is in contempt, but rather, to offer “a preliminary assessment that the facts presented implicate that the alleged contemnors are in violation of court orders.” U.S. v. Capital Tax Corp., No. 04 CV 4138, 2012 WL 1965982, at *3 (N.D. Ill, May 31, 2012) (internal quotation and marks omitted). A district court conducts a hearing into the alleged violation of the court order “when the allegations and moving papers are sufficiently definite, specific, non-conjectural and detailed enough to
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conclude that a substantial claim is presented and that there are disputed issues of material fact which will affect the outcome of the motion.” Sommerfield, 252 F.R.D. at 414 (The moving party retains the “threshold burden of tendering evidence suggesting the need for a hearing.”) (quoting Costle v. Pacific Legal Foundation, 445 U.S. 198, 214 (1980) (emphasis omitted)).
12. There is a need for an evidentiary hearing as to whether the Defendants are engaging in systematic violations of the Court’s order governing parolees’ rights in the parole revocation process in the following ways:
a. Parolees do not make fully informed or voluntary waivers of their preliminary hearing, as required under Section III, parts 3 and 5(b) of the consent decree. The Defendants consistently require that class members sign a form indicating that they waive their preliminary hearing. These waivers are neither fully informed nor voluntary. See Declaration of Julie Biehl (attached as Exhibit D) ¶¶ 7, 11; M.H. v. Monreal, No. 12cv8523 (N.D. Ill.) Complaint (attached at Exhibit E) ¶ 23 (hereinafter, “M.H. Complaint”).3 Before they sign the waiver form, class members are not informed as to the purpose of the preliminary hearing, nor are they given guidance from either an IDOC official or an agent of the Illinois Prisoner Review Board (PRB) as to the consequences of waiving the hearing, including the fact that they will remain in prison without any consideration of the legality of their incarceration for another month or more, pending the final revocation hearing. See Declaration of Steven Lofton (attached as Exhibit F) ¶ 4; Declaration of
3 M.H. v. Monreal, No. 12cv8523 (N.D. Ill.), was filed on behalf of a putative class of children and teenagers who have been imprisoned or otherwise deprived of their liberty as a result of the unconstitutional practices and procedures of the PRB with respect to the handling of parole revocation proceedings. The case was filed on October 12, 2012, and is currently pending before The Hon. Samuel Der-Yeghiayan. Given that M.H. and King v. Walker involve similar issues of fact and law, overlapping class members, are at similar stages of litigation, and are susceptible to a shared disposition, counsel for M.H. has filed a motion seeking reassignment of the case to this Court, pursuant to Local Rule 40.4.
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Julie Biehl ¶¶ 7, 11; Briggs Motion at 2-3; M.H. Complaint ¶ 36. As a result of the Defendants’ actions and omissions, class members routinely execute involuntary and uninformed waivers of the preliminary hearing and are systematically denied their right to a determination of whether there is probable cause to hold them in custody. b. As a practical matter, parolees are unable to call witnesses at their hearings, in violation of the guarantee under Section III, part 5(b) of the Consent Decree. Parolees who do not waive their preliminary hearing and request witnesses to appear on their behalf are unable as a practical matter to obtain the attendance of these witnesses at their preliminary revocation hearing. See Declaration of Michael Fulgham (attached as Exhibit G) ¶¶ 3-4; Declaration of Rashid Evans (attached as Exhibit H) ¶¶ 3-4; Declaration of Steven Lofton ¶ 4. In some cases, the Defendants provide class members with a form on which to list the witnesses they would like to call. However, neither the Defendants nor agents of the PRB make any attempt to contact those witnesses whom parolees have identified as necessary to their defense. See id. The Defendants’ failure to facilitate the attendance of defense witnesses at preliminary hearings to the parolees who request them is a violation of Section III, part 5(b) of the Consent Decree. c. Preliminary hearings do not include testimony by appointed “King” investigators,” as required under Section III, part 5(c) of the decree and U.S. Constitutional law. The Defendants consistently fail to assign King investigators to review police reports, evaluate supporting documentation, and, where applicable, interview the arresting officer to determine whether there is probable cause to hold the class member on the alleged violation. See Declaration of Rashid Evans ¶ 4; Declaration of Michael Fulgham ¶ 4; Declaration of Samuel Miller (attached as Exhibit I) ¶ 5. Pursuant to the Consent Decree,
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Section III, parts 5(c) through 5(e), and in accordance with Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. at 485, the Defendants are responsible for appointing a King investigator to review the available evidence and then testify under oath as to the alleged violation at the preliminary hearing. In practice, the only individuals present at class members’ preliminary hearings are the PRB hearing officer, a parole agent, and the parolee himself. See id. The parole agent is typically neither the agent who supervised the parolee while he was on parole, nor the agent who issued the violation report. See id. As a result of the failure to appoint King investigators, parolees are effectively deprived of their right to cross-examine witnesses and confront evidence against them, as mandated by Section III, part 5(f) of the Consent Decree. Furthermore, under Section III, part 5(e), hearing officers must enter a “no probable cause” finding at any preliminary revocation hearing that occurs before the King investigation is completed. In contravention of this provision, hearing officers routinely enter a finding of probable cause at a preliminary hearing without the completion of a King investigation, based solely on the admission of the nontestifying parole agent’s violation report, see id., which is in and of itself insufficient to establish probable cause. See Downie v. Klincar, 759 F. Supp. 425, 428 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (granting summary judgment to plaintiff class challenging parole revocation proceedings and holding that eyewitness police reports cannot constitute conclusive evidence of a substantive violation of parole) (“[E]yewitness police reports cannot be considered conventional substitutes for live testimony, and their reliability is therefore neither automatic nor presumed.”). d. Parolees are not permitted to retain counsel for the preliminary and final revocation hearings, as required under Section III, part 5(h) of the consent decree and under 20
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Ill. Admin. Code 1610.140(c). In violation of the consent decree (as well as Illinois state law), class members who do have retained counsel are often as a practical matter unable to obtain the benefit of their attorney’s representation at either the preliminary or final revocation hearing. Parolees are regularly denied sufficient notice of their hearings in order to request that their attorneys be present. See Declaration of Samuel Miller ¶¶ 5, 7; Declaration of Rashid Evans ¶ 6. Those lawyers who undertake to represent alleged parole violators in parole proceedings face severe obstacles in their representation, as a result of the Defendants’ failure to disclose to these attorneys the notice of charges and documentary evidence supporting the alleged violation. See Declaration of Joshua Tepfer (attached as Exhibit J) ¶¶ 2, 5-8, 11. e. Parolees are not permitted to present written evidence in their defense, as required by Section III, part 5(g) of the consent decree and under 20 Ill. Admin. Code 1610.140(b)(1). Class members are regularly denied the opportunity to present evidence in their defense at their preliminary revocation hearings. Because parolees do not receive sufficient notice of when their hearings are to take place, they are unable to gather evidence on their behalf. See Declaration of Samuel Miller ¶ 5. This problem is compounded by the fact that class members by and large lack meaningful legal representation (and, as a result, the practical ability to exercise the subpoena power), and thus have no means by which to obtain evidence to present to the parole hearing officer. See Declaration of Rashid Evans ¶ 4; Declaration of Michael Fulgham ¶ 4; Declaration of Samuel Miller ¶ 5 f. The Defendants consistently fail to make any record of the preliminary hearing, as required under Section III, parts 5(i) and 6 of the consent decree and under 730
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ILCS 5/3-3-9(e). Parolees do not receive any kind of written record of the findings of the preliminary revocation hearing. See Declaration of Rashid Evans ¶ 4; Declaration of Michael Fulgham ¶ 4. As a result, class members regularly are left without any understanding as to what occurred in the hearing, see Declaration of Samuel Miller ¶ 4, and with no ability to shape their defense to the charges at the final revocation hearing. 13. These violations of the Consent decree and the guarantees of due process under federal and state law render the parole revocation process fundamentally unfair. 14. Class members are systematically being denied their right to defend themselves at their preliminary revocation hearings. They are unable to make effective use of their legal counsel. They are unable to confront the evidence against them or present witnesses and documentary evidence on their behalf. There is no oversight of the proceedings—including by King investigators or outside attorneys. In practice, a system of collusion has developed between the Defendants and the PRB whereby the authorities hold class members in custody on parole warrants and, ultimately, re-imprison them without a determination of probable cause or adequate evidence to support the violation. RAMIFICATIONS OF THE VIOLATIONS OF THE CONSENT DECREE
ON THE ENTIRE PAROLE REVOCATION SYSTEM 15. The Defendants’ on-going and systematic violations of the Consent Decree have resulted in violations of class members’ constitutional and state law rights, not only in the preliminary hearings, but also throughout the parole revocation system, including in the final revocation hearings. In other words, the Defendants’ misconduct in the preliminary stages of the parole revocation process has a snowball effect. Having first been denied the right to call witnesses, retain attorneys, obtain and present documentary evidence, and confront the evidence
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against them at their preliminary hearings, parolees are deprived of these same rights in their final revocation hearings, as outlined below:
a. The Defendants make no effort to facilitate the attendance of defense witnesses in the parole revocation process. Thus, class members who are unable to request witnesses to appear on their behalf at their preliminary hearings are also denied the opportunity to obtain the attendance of these witnesses at their final revocation hearings. See Declaration of Michael Fulgham ¶ 5; Declaration of Rashid Evans ¶ 5; Declaration of Steven Lofton ¶ 4. The denial of the right to present witnesses at the final revocation hearing constitutes a violation of both Illinois state law under 20 Ill. Admin. Code 1610.150(b) and U.S. Constitutional law under Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 489.
b. The Defendants fail to appoint objective King investigators to conduct investigations into the circumstances surrounding the class members’ alleged parole violations. The Defendants also fail to ensure the presence of testifying adverse witnesses, including parole agents, in the parole revocation process. As a result, class members are not only unable to confront the evidence used against them at their preliminary hearings, but they are similarly denied the opportunity to cross-examine the King investigator and confront adverse witnesses and other evidence in their final revocation hearings. See Declaration of Samuel Miller ¶ 9; Declaration of Rashid Evans ¶ 9; Declaration of Michael Fulgham ¶ 8. The Defendants’ failure to guarantee parolees the right to present evidence on their own behalf is in contravention of Illinois state law under 20 Ill. Admin. Code 1610.40(d) and 20 Ill. Admin. Code 1610.150(b), and U.S. Constitutional law under Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 489.
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c. Class members are consistently deprived of the right to retain counsel, not only in preliminary hearings, as alleged above, but also in the final hearings, in violation of Illinois law, 20 Ill. Admin. Code 1610.40(c), and U.S. Constitutional law, as set forth in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 270 (1970). Just as in the preliminary hearings, parolees are regularly denied sufficient notice of their final revocation hearing—often receiving notice of the hearing the morning it is to be held—which prevents them from seeking the assistance of their attorneys. See Declaration of Samuel Miller ¶ 7; Declaration of Rashid Evans ¶ 6. As a result, the vast majority of parolees proceed through their parole hearings without any representation whatsoever. The lack of representation means that parolees are unable to gather documentary evidence to present on their behalf either in their preliminary or final revocation hearings, see Declaration of Julie Biehl ¶ 3, as required by law. See 20 Ill. Admin. Code 1610.50(b); Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 489. Moreover, the failure to allow retained counsel is highly problematic since statements made in parole proceedings can be used by the State against class members in their criminal proceedings—unrepresented parolees have no choice but to comment on the record before the parole board hearing officer regarding the subject matter of the proceeding. See Declaration of Steven Lofton at ¶ 6. The Defendants also fail to provide parolees with information about the consequences a parole revocation may have on their liberty and/or on current and future criminal proceedings. See Declaration of Michael Fulgham ¶¶ 6-10.
d. Finally, just as the Defendants fail to provide parolees with a written record of the preliminary parole revocation hearing, neither do they provide parolees with any written record or transcript of the final revocation hearing. See Declaration of Rashid
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Evans ¶ 8; Declaration of Michael Fulgham ¶ 9; Declaration of Samuel Miller ¶ 9. The Defendants are required to provide parole violators with written findings from the final hearing that detail the evidence relied on and the reasons for revoking parole, in accordance with Illinois state law, see 730 ILCS 5/3-3-9(e); 20 Ill. Admin. Code 1610.140(e); 20 Ill. Admin Code 1610.150(i), and U.S. Constitutional law under Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 489. Instead, class members regularly are left without any understanding as to what occurred in the final revocation hearing, and they have no documentary evidence upon which to base an appeal of a hearing officer’s decision. See Declaration of Michael Fulgham ¶ 11; Declaration of Rashid Evans ¶ 8. There are extreme cases in which class members are being violated who have viable claims for appeal—including, for example, that they were acquitted on the underlying criminal offense that served as the basis for the parole violation. Due to the lack of written findings, as well as any established appeal process, these class members remain without any remedy to challenge the validity of their confinement. See Declaration of Samuel Miller ¶ 10; Declaration of Julie Biehl ¶ 3. 16. Thus, the Defendants’ violations of the Consent Decree have widespread and significant consequences for class members facing revocation and the deprivation of their liberty. The issuance of a rule to show cause is necessary to ensure that class members’ rights to adequate due process are protected, not only in preliminary revocation hearings, but throughout the parole revocation system.
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THERE SHOULD BE AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING INTO THE ALLEGED VIOLATIONS
17. Class counsel’s preliminary investigation has uncovered detailed facts sufficient to “implicate” the Defendants in systematic violations of the Consent Decree. See Capital Tax Corp., 2012 WL 1965982, at *3; Sommerfield, 252 F.R.D. at 413-14.
18. Consequently, the Plaintiff class is entitled to an evidentiary hearing to present evidence as to the scope and breadth of the Defendants’ violations. A hearing will also enable the parties to gather evidence to be used in crafting a just and adequate remedy for on-going and systematic violations of the Consent Decree, U.S. Constitutional law, and Illinois state law.
19. This Court should therefore grant Plaintiffs’ motion for a rule to show cause and order an evidentiary hearing on the matter of the Defendants’ violations of the Consent Decree, as well as such further relief as this Court deems necessary to protect the rights of the Plaintiff class.
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court enter an order granting their motion for rule to show cause directing the Defendants to show cause why they are not in violation of the Consent Decree, and granting an evidentiary hearing on the matter of the Defendants’ violations of the decree.
Respectfully submitted, Plaintiffs King, Hill, Muniz, and McGregg, individually and on behalf of the class of parolees they represent. By: /s/ Alexa Van Brunt
One of the class attorneys
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Case: 1:06-cv-00204 Document #: 125 Filed: 11/30/12 Page 16 of 18 PageID #:1078 Locke E. Bowman Alexa A. Van Brunt Sheila A. Bedi (Pro hac vice motion to be filed) Roderick MacArthur Justice Center Northwestern University School of Law 357 E. Chicago Avenue Chicago, Illinois 60611 (312) 503-0844 Alan Mills Uptown People’s Law Center 4413 North Sheridan Road Chicago, IL 60640 (773) 769-1410
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE The undersigned, an attorney, certifies that she served the foregoing document via the Court’s CM/ECF system on November 30, 2012.
/s/ Alexa Van Brunt

Case: 1:06-cv-00204 Document #: 125 Filed: 11/30/12 Page 18 of 18 PageID #:1080
SERVICE LIST King v. Walker et al., 06cv204
Alan Mills Uptown People’s Law Center 4413 North Sheridan Road Chicago, IL 60640 (773) 769-1410 On behalf of the Plaintiff Class
Kevin R. Peters Law Offices of Kevin Peters 53 W. Jackson Blvd. Suite 1615 Chicago, IL 60604 (312) 697-0022 On behalf of the Plaintiff Class
Andrew W. Lambertson U.S. District Court (NDIL-C) 219 South Dearborn Street Chicago, IL 60604 (312) 353-5354 On behalf of the Defendants

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Case: 1:06-cv-00204 Document #: 125-4 Filed: 11/30/12 Page 1 of 4 PageID #:1125

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CaseC:a1s:e0:61-c:1v2-0-c0v2-00485D2o3cuDmoceunmt #e:n1t 2#5: -15 FFiilleedd:: 1101//2330//1122 PPaaggee 11 ooff 1155 PPaaggeeIIDD ##::11129

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

M.H., on behalf of himself and on behalf of the class )

of juvenile parolees who face revocation proceedings, )

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

v.

)

)

ADAM MONREAL, Chairman of the Illinois Prisoner )

Review Board; and PAT QUINN, Governor of the )

State of Illinois,

)

)

Defendants.

)

Case No. 12CV8523

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

Plaintiff M.H., individually and on behalf of the class of all juvenile parolees who face

parole revocation proceedings, by his undersigned attorneys, for his complaint against ADAM

MONREAL, Chairman of the Illinois Prisoner Review Board, and PAT QUINN, Governor of the

State of Illinois, alleges as follows:

INTRODUCTION

1. This is a civil rights class action complaint on behalf of children and teenagers

who have been imprisoned or otherwise deprived of their liberty as a result of the unconstitutional

practices and procedures of the Illinois Prisoner Review Board (hereinafter, the PRB) with respect

to the handling of parole revocation proceedings. The PRB’s procedures disregard fairness and

due process and thereby violate the rights of the members of the Plaintiff class under the

Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and the Illinois Juvenile Court Act.

This court should declare those procedures unlawful and it should enjoin them.

2. Members of the Plaintiff class are routinely incarcerated without a preliminary

hearing to determine whether there is reason to believe that they have actually violated the

CaseC:a1s:e0:61-c:1v2-0-c0v2-00485D2o3cuDmoceunmt #e:n1t 2#5: -15 FFiilleedd:: 1101//2330//1122 PPaaggee 22 ooff 1155 PPaaggeeIIDD ##::21130
conditions of their parole. As a result, class members are detained, oftentimes for up to a month or more, without any kind of hearing into the legality of their imprisonment.
3. The full parole revocation hearings that the PRB does conduct are a sham. The PRB keeps secret the evidence it has gathered against the class members. The conditions under which the hearings occur render it impossible for the class members to present witnesses or other evidence on their own behalf, and they are denied the opportunity to confront the evidence used against them at their revocation proceedings. The PRB does not provide counsel to the Plaintiff class members—many of whom have learning disabilities, live with mental illness, and have limited educational attainment— and they are left to navigate the complex revocation proceedings without the support and guidance they obviously need in order to defend themselves.
4. These unlawful tribunals—akin to kangaroo courts— result in the arbitrary detention and imprisonment of over 1,000 young people throughout the state of Illinois each year.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 5. This action is brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to redress the deprivation under color of law of the Plaintiffs rights as secured by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 6. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367. Venue is proper in this district under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) because the events giving rise to the claims asserted in this complaint occurred in this judicial district.
PARTIES 7. M.H. is a seventeen-year-old male who is currently in the custody of the Illinois Department of Juvenile Justice (hereafter, the DJJ). He has been incarcerated since September 13, 2012, for allegedly violating the terms of his parole. He was never provided a preliminary hearing
2

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to determine whether there were reasonable grounds to believe he actually violated the conditions of his parole. As of the filing of this complaint, he is still awaiting his final parole revocation hearing.
8. Defendant Adam Monreal is the Chairman of the Illinois Prisoner Review Board, the State agency that makes decisions about juvenile parole matters. Monreal directs and supervises the activities of the PRB members, including each of the members who review juvenile parole cases and make decisions about revocation. Monreal is responsible for implementing the rules, regulations, procedures, and standards governing the parole revocation process in the State of Illinois.
9. Defendant Pat Quinn is the Governor of the State of Illinois and Chief Executive of the state government. As such, Quinn is responsible for the enforcement of State policies by which the rights of the plaintiff class are being violated, as alleged herein. Quinn appointed Mr. Monreal Chairman of the Illinois Prisoner Review Board.
CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS 10. Plaintiff M.H. brings this suit on his own behalf and on behalf of all juvenile parolees in the State of Illinois who currently or will in the future face parole revocation proceedings. 11. The class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impractical. Approximately 1,520 children and teenagers are currently on parole and the PRB conducted over 1,132 revocation hearings last year. The class also includes many future members whose names are not known, since new youth are released from detention and placed on parole daily. 12. There are questions of law and fact common to all class members, including but not limited to whether Illinois parole revocation procedures violate the due process rights of
3

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juvenile parolees, whether juvenile parolees are entitled to appointed counsel at parole revocation hearings, and whether the hearings, as they are currently being conducted, violate procedural requirements set forth in the applicable provisions of the Illinois Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (see 705 ILCS 405/1-5). Because the practices and procedures challenged in this Complaint apply with equal force to the named Plaintiff and the other members of the class, the claims of the named Plaintiff are typical of the class in general.
13. The named Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class. He possesses a strong personal interest in the subject matter of the lawsuit and is represented by experienced counsel with expertise in civil rights litigation. Counsel have the legal knowledge and resources to fairly and adequately represent the interests of all class members in this action.
14. The Defendants have acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class: their policies, procedures, practices, acts, and omissions have affected all class members. Accordingly, final injunctive and declaratory relief is appropriate to the class as a whole.
ALLEGATIONS OF FACT Characteristics of the Class 15. During their time on parole, many juvenile parolees will be charged with violations of the terms and conditions of their parole, re-imprisoned, and subjected to parole revocation proceedings in which their liberty will be at stake. 16. Children and teenagers are inherently more vulnerable and less able to effectively represent themselves in complex legal proceedings than their adult counterparts. As described more fully below, youth on parole also demonstrate significantly lower rates of educational achievement, and higher rates of mental health disorders and educational and cognitive
4

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disabilities, than non-incarcerated youth. Consequently, juvenile parolees are particularly illequipped to assert their due process rights and represent themselves in revocation proceedings.
17. Young people generally enter DJJ custody struggling with low levels of educational achievement, substance abuse problems, and mental health issues. These conditions are likely to be exacerbated during their confinement given the grossly inadequate mental health and educational services provided at DJJ facilities. According to DJJ data, 45% of youth in DJJ custody have identified special education needs, 67% of youth have not graduated from grade school, and 80% need help learning independent learning skills. Seventy-seven percent of youth in DJJ custody had poor school attendance prior to imprisonment. In addition, two-thirds of Illinois youth in custody have diagnosed psychiatric and trauma disorders and 7 out of 10 have a clinical diagnosis of drug dependency. Time spent in DJJ custody can hinder the educational and emotional development of juvenile parolees, leaving them with lower levels of maturity and reasoning skills than the same-age general population.
18. Despite the special needs and inherent vulnerabilities of children and teenagers on parole, juvenile parole proceedings in Illinois are conducted identically to adult parole proceedings. On information and belief, a number of the PRB members responsible for determining whether to revoke the parole of juvenile parolees have little to no background or training in juvenile parole matters.
Overview of Juvenile Parole Proceedings in Illinois 19. Most juvenile parolees remain under the supervision of the PRB until they reach age 21. During this time, the PRB retains authority to deprive these youth of their liberty—the agency can initiate revocation proceedings and order the imprisonment of juvenile parolees and/or impose significant restrictions on juvenile parolees’ freedom of movement. Parole revocation
5

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proceedings are initiated either for technical parole violations of stated conditions of parole or because new delinquency charges have been filed against a parolee.
20. In theory, all youth on parole in Illinois are entitled to specific due process protections in these parole revocation proceedings, as set forth under controlling United States Supreme Court precedent and under the Illinois Juvenile Court Act. These protections include:
a. The right to a preliminary hearing. All youth on parole are entitled to a timely hearing to determine whether probable cause exists to hold them on the alleged parole violation. Prior to the preliminary hearing, youth must be informed of the charges against them, as well as when and where the preliminary hearing will occur. If a youth waives his right to a preliminary hearing, that waiver must be knowing and voluntary—the youth must fully understand the right at stake and the consequences of waiving that right.
b. The right to confront witnesses and present evidence during the preliminary hearing. During the preliminary hearing, juvenile parolees are entitled to present documentary evidence and witnesses who can give relevant information to the PRB official hearing the case. Individuals who present information adverse to the youth must be present for questioning. If a juvenile parolee waives his preliminary hearing, or if the PRB determines that there are reasonable grounds to believe a parole violation did occur, then the parolee is incarcerated in a DJJ facility while he awaits his final parole revocation hearing.
c. The right to a final revocation hearing. Prior to the final revocation proceedings, a juvenile parolee has the right to examine the evidence against him. During the hearing, the parolee has the right to be present, in person, before the hearing officer, and to
6

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present witnesses and evidence on his behalf. The parolee also has the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses. PRB officials are not entitled to rely solely on third-party reports, including parole and police officer reports, in revoking parole. d. The right to counsel. Because of their immaturity, lack of educational attainment, and frequent problems with mental illness, youth on parole have a right to counsel appointed at cost to the State at both preliminary and final revocation hearings. Youth who can afford an attorney have the right to retain their own representation at these hearings. e. The right to appeal a decision of the PRB. If the PRB determines that the parolee has violated any of the terms and conditions of parole it must issue a written statement reciting the evidence upon which it relied and the reasons for this determination. The parolee is entitled to receive a copy of this statement. Additionally, youth on parole have a right to receive transcripts of the preliminary and final revocation proceedings, and may appeal the PRB’s decision in a standard review or grievance process.
Denial of Due Process in Illinois Parole Revocation Proceedings 21. In practice, PRB officials consistently disregard the due process protections listed above. As a result, members of the Plaintiff class are arbitrarily detained and deprived of their right to liberty without adequate process in derogation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and the Illinois Juvenile Court Act. 22. The PRB fails to ensure preliminary hearings for class members at the time they are alleged to have violated the conditions of their parole. As a result, class members are imprisoned without any inquiry into the legality of their detention—typically for as long as one month and sometimes for longer—while awaiting their final revocation hearing.
7

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23. As a matter of course, state officials require that class members sign a form indicating that they have waived their preliminary hearing. However, these waivers are neither fully informed nor voluntary. Prior to signing the waiver form, class members are not instructed as to the purpose of the preliminary hearing, nor are they given guidance from either an attorney or any other advocate. Parole officers regularly misinform class members that signing the waiver form will expedite the revocation process and their release from custody. Class members sign the form believing that it will allow them to return home sooner. In reality, the signature allows the PRB to avoid conducting a preliminary hearing and ensures that the youth will remain incarcerated until the final revocation hearing, regardless of the validity of the alleged parole violation charge.
24. When the PRB does schedule final parole revocation hearings, it fails to do so in a timely manner. The final revocation hearing is consistently delayed due to the DJJ’s policy and practice of transferring juveniles between correctional facilities while they await their final hearing. When they are transferred, the DJJ master files and PRB parole records for these youth frequently remain at the original point of incarceration. Final revocation hearings are further postponed while the master files and parole records are identified and transferred. Youth on parole lack any means by which to object to these transfers or request a more timely hearing, and state law prohibits juvenile offenders from requesting their own master files. The frequent transfer of juvenile parolees causes these youth to be indefinitely detained while awaiting a final revocation hearing.
25. The final revocation hearings conducted by PRB are rote affairs that contain none of the due process protections guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution and Illinois state law. PRB members make most revocation decisions based solely on the one- to three-page report prepared
8

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by the youth’s parole officer, which constitutes unreliable hearsay evidence. Hearing officers rarely, if ever, interview the parole officers. Consequently, youth on parole do not have the opportunity to cross-examine the primary (if not the only) witness who presents evidence against them.
26. The PRB also fails to provide adequate notice to class members as to their right to present evidence on their own behalf. As a result, class members are denied the opportunity to contest their parole officer’s allegations by presenting documentary and physical evidence or live witnesses who can provide mitigating or exculpatory evidence on the parolee’s behalf. To the extent some class members may be informed of their right to present such evidence, they are unable to do so in light of the PRB’s practices and procedures. As a matter of course, the revocation hearings are held in secret, often far from the location of the alleged violation, and neither the PRB hearings officers nor DJJ employees help the class members subpoena witnesses or locate documentary or other physical evidence in their favor. Juvenile parolees lack the capacity to effectively defend themselves from allegations that they violated their conditions of parole.
27. PRB officers consistently fail to inform youth that they have a right to retain counsel to help them navigate these complex adversarial proceedings. Family members and advocates are regularly denied access to the hearings and prohibited from participating on the youth’s behalf. Those attorneys or advocates who do attempt to represent the parolee are not given access to the documents used against the class member in the revocation hearings. Juvenile parolees thus lack any meaningful representation in procedurally complex proceedings in which the class members’ liberty is at stake.
9

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28. Youth on parole are denied a written explanation of the PRB’s revocation decisions. In most—if not all—cases there is no written or electronic record or transcript of the revocation proceedings. Even if a transcript of the proceedings did exist, the PRB’s revocation decisions are unreviewable. There is no appeal mechanism or grievance procedure by which juvenile parolees can seek a review of PRB decisions. The lack of an appellate process ensures the continuing insulation of the PRB’s juvenile parole revocation process and prevents parolees from challenging the procedures and the outcome of the revocation hearing.
29. Throughout this revocation process, the juvenile class members are severely hampered by their lack of development, low rates of educational achievement and literacy levels, and high rates of mental health disorders and educational and cognitive disabilities. As a consequence, these class members are unable to effectively speak for themselves at parole hearings.
30. The hearings are complex. Fairly conducted, they should involve the presentation of documentary evidence and mitigating circumstances, the cross-examination of witnesses, and oral advocacy, as described above. The juvenile class members, who are almost uniformly indigent, cannot possibly present factual defenses and mitigating evidence without the assistance of competent, fully prepared legal counsel.
31. The PRB lacks any mechanism by which youth on parole can request an appointed attorney. The State would categorically deny any request for appointed counsel because there is no system or funds in place to secure such an appointment. In the circumstances faced by the class members in Illinois juvenile parole revocation proceedings, the failure to provide appointed counsel to the class members contravenes due process.
10

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32. The systematic and on-going violations described in the preceding paragraphs result in the arbitrary imprisonment of hundreds of youth in Illinois facilities. Youth are consistently subjected to months of unreviewable detention in juvenile prisons without process or remedy. As a result of the PRB’s practices and procedures, the members of the Plaintiff class have suffered and continue to suffer well-established violations of their right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, as well as under the Illinois Juvenile Court Act, 705 ILCS 405/1-5.
M.H.’s Parole Proceedings are in Violation of His Right to Adequate Due Process, His Right to Counsel Under the Fourteenth Amendment
of the U.S. Constitution, and the Illinois Juvenile Court Act 33. Plaintiff M.H. is a seventeen-year-old male whom mental health professionals have deemed “moderately cognitively impaired” and who has been repeatedly institutionalized for substance abuse and mental health treatment. 34. From October to April 2012, M.H. was incarcerated in DJJ custody for possession of a controlled substance. The PRB granted M.H. parole on April 19, 2012. The terms of M.H.’s parole require him to enroll in an alternative high school miles from his home, attend substance abuse counseling, secure employment, meet with a caseworker once every week, meet with a mentor twice a week, and spend Friday and Saturdays engaged in “job-readiness” programs. He will remain on parole until he is 21 years old. 35. On September 7, 2012, M.H.’s parole officer made the determination that M.H. had violated the terms of parole by failing to stay in touch with his parole officer. After a warrant for M.H.’s arrest was issued, he was taken into state custody on September 13, 2012. He is currently imprisoned in the Illinois Youth Center (I.Y.C.)-Chicago while awaiting his parole revocation hearing.
11

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36. The PRB caused M.H. to involuntarily waive his right to a preliminary hearing. After M.H. was detained, a parole officer presented him with a Parole Violation Report and instructed him to sign it to indicate that he waived his preliminary hearing. M.H. did not understand the form he signed. M.H. believed that his signature would ensure the expedited scheduling of his final parole revocation hearing. M.H. signed the form because he was told it would help him return home quickly. If M.H. fully understood his rights, he would have opted to have a preliminary hearing during which he would have sought to be represented by appointed counsel.
37. M.H. has also been repeatedly denied his right to a timely final revocation hearing. Initially, his final revocation hearing was scheduled on September 20, 2012, at I.Y.C.-Saint Charles. On September 19, state officials informed him that because of an administrative error, the PRB would be unable to hear his case on September 20, but that his case would be heard at the next available PRB hearing date in early October. However, days before the early October hearing date, he was transferred I.Y.C.-Chicago, even though M.H. had informed his counselor at I.Y.C.-St. Charles that he wished to remain at the facility and proceed with the scheduled parole hearing.
38. When he arrived at I.Y.C.-Chicago, M.H.’s parole hearing was delayed an additional three weeks. He is currently scheduled to have a parole revocation hearing on October 24, 2012. By this time he will have been imprisoned without a preliminary or final revocation hearing for over 6 weeks.
39. Given the PRB’s policy of denying parolees appointed counsel, when his parole revocation hearing finally occurs, M.H. will be unrepresented. He will not have the opportunity to examine the evidence his parole officer has gathered against him, nor will be able to confront
12

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witnesses or present mitigating and exculpatory evidence. The proceedings against him will follow the pattern alleged in paragraphs 21 through 32, above.
40. As a result of the PRB’s unconstitutional parole revocation procedures, M.H.’s rights to adequate due process have been and are continuing to be violated. Due to frequent transfers and delays, he has endured weeks of unlawful imprisonment without a hearing. When he does finally receive a hearing on October 24, it will be without the guarantees of due process or right to counsel prescribed by the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Illinois state law.
41. For as long as M.H. remains on parole in Illinois he faces an ongoing imminent risk of being subjected to the PRB’s unconstitutional parole procedures.
COUNT I 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Right to Due Process 42. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth in this Count. 43. Through this Count, Plaintiff seeks injunctive and declaratory relief against all Defendants to prevent the continued violation of the rights of Plaintiff and the class he represents. 44. By continuing to conduct parole revocation proceedings in the manner alleged in this Complaint, and specifically, by failing to provide Plaintiff and the class with adequate notice of their due process rights; by failing to conduct preliminary revocation hearings and timely final revocation hearings; by prohibiting Plaintiff and the class from presenting mitigating and exculpatory evidence; by preventing the participation of parents, guardians, and retained counsel in the revocation proceedings; by denying Plaintiff and the class the right to confront adverse witnesses at their final revocation proceedings; and by denying Plaintiff and the class appointed counsel during all stages of the parole revocation proceedings, Defendants are in continuous
13

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violation of Plaintiff’s rights and the rights of the members of the class under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
COUNT II State Law – Violation of Illinois Juvenile Court Act, 705 ILCS 405/1-1 et seq. 45. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth in this Count. 46. Through this Count, Plaintiff seeks injunctive and declaratory relief against all Defendants to prevent the continued violation of the rights of Plaintiff and the class he represents. 47. By continuing to conduct parole proceedings in the manner alleged in this Complaint, and specifically, by denying Plaintiff and the class appointed counsel and adequate procedural due process during all stages of their parole revocation proceedings, Defendants are in continuous violation of Plaintiff’s rights and the rights of the members of the class under the Illinois Juvenile Court Act of 1987, 705 ILCS 405/1-1 et seq.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE, Plaintiff and the class he represents respectfully prays that this Court enter judgment in its favor and against the Defendants in the following manner: 1. Enter an Order certifying a class of all juvenile parolees in the State of Illinois who currently or will in the future face parole revocation proceedings. 2. Adjudge and declare that the policies, practices, and conduct described in this Complaint are in violation of the rights of Plaintiff and the class he represents under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and the Illinois Juvenile Court Act. 3. Preliminary and permanently enjoin the Defendants, their agents, employees, and all persons under their control from subjecting Plaintiff and the class he represents from the unlawful policies, practices, and conduct described in this Complaint.
14

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4. Retain jurisdiction of this case until such time as the Defendants have fully complied with all orders of the Court, and there is reasonable assurance that the Defendants will continue to comply in the future with these orders.
5. Award Plaintiff reasonable attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
6. Award Plaintiff and the class he represents such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.
Respectfully submitted, M.H., individually and on behalf of the class of juvenile parolees who face parole revocation proceedings
By: /s/ Alexa Van Brunt One of the class attorneys
Locke E. Bowman Alexa A. Van Brunt Sheila A. Bedi (Pro hac vice motion to be filed) Roderick MacArthur Justice Center Northwestern University School of Law 357 E. Chicago Avenue Chicago, Illinois 60611 (312) 503-0844
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 </s> ·" f ·,

Case 1:06-cv-00204 Document 67 Filed 11/02/2006 Page 1 of 14

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

CHARLES KING, ANDRE BROWN, )

CHIOKE HILL, THOMAS GILBERT, ) NELSON MUNIZ, ANTHONY SMITH, )

and ANDRE McGREGG,

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

w.

)

)

ROGER E. WALKER and

)

JESSE MONTGOMERY,

)

)

Defendants.

)

No. 06 C 204 The Honorable Robert W. Gettleman

PROPOSED CONSENT DECREE

I. Plaintiffs Charles King, Andre Brown, Chioke Hill, Thomas Gilbert,

Nelson Muniz, Anthony Smith, and Andre McGregg, on their own behalf, and Charles

King, Chioke Hill, Nelson Muniz, and .Andre McGregg on behalf of a class of others

similarly situated, and Defendants Roger E. Walker, Jr., in his official capacity as Director ofthe Jllinois Depart!l1ent of Corrections, and Jesse Montgomery, in his official capacity as Deputy Director for Parole, hereby enter into this Proposed Con~ent Decree to resolve Plaintiff.~' An'Jended Complaint alleging violations of their Fourteenth Amendment Due Process rights as provided for by Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,

92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed. 2d 484 (1972).

Case 1:06-cv-00204 Document 67 Filed 11/02/2006 Page 2 of 14

I. BACKGROUND 2. Plaintiffs arc individuals who are on parole and who were taken into or
were held lD custody for an alleged parole violation, pursuant to a parole violation warrant issued by the Illinois Department of Corrections. See 730 ILCS 5/3-14-2(c). They were taken into custody in Cook County. They were then transferred into the custody of the Illinois Departnwnt of Corrections without having waived their preliminary parole revocation hearing and without receiving any such hearing within ten business days, as required by the consent decree entered in Pinzon v. Lane, 675 F.Supp.

429 (N.D. 111.1987).

3. Defendants are the Director and the Deputy Director for Parole of the

Illinois Department of Corrections, which is the agency responsible for retaining c~1stody

of all persons placed on parole or mandatory supervised release or released pursuant to

730 ILCS 5/3-3-10, and supervising such persons during their parole or release period in

accord with the conditions set by the Prisoner Review Board of the State oflllinois.

4. The Plaintiffs initiated this action on January 13, 2006, and filed an

amended complaint on February 13, 2006, alleging, inter alia, that Defendants had denied

or failed to provide preliminary parole revocation hearings for the Plaintiffs and those

similarly situated, pursuant to Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33

L.Ed. 2d 484 (1972). Plaintiffs f1Jed a motion for elass certification with their initial

complaint and a motion for preliminary injunction on January 24, 2006.

5.

By Order dated May 8, 2006, this Court certified this case to proceed as a

class action pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a) and 23(b)(2) on behalf of

"Cook County Parolees who have been or will be arrested for parole violations in Cook

2

Case 1:06-cv-00204 Document 67 Filed 11/02/2006 Page 3 of 14

County, Illinois and who will be: a) taken into custody at Cook County Jail; b) transferred from Cook County Jail within 10 days without a preliminary parole revocation hearing; c) transferred from the Cook County Jail to the Illinois Department of Corrections; and d) held without a preliminary parole revocation hearing for more than 10 days." The Court deemed only four of the class representatives proposed by the Plaintiffs a~ acceptable under the requirements of Rule 23: Charles King, Chioke Hill,

Nelson Muniz, and Andre McGregg,

6. On May 8, 2006, the Court also granted Plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary

injunction. The Court found that parolees have a constitutional right to a prompt,

preliminary parole revocation hearing and that parolees have a limited constitutional right

to confront and cross examine persons who· have provided testimony or evidence which

could be used to revoke parole. The Court then concluded that Defendants were violating

these constitutional rights with respect to the certified parolee class.

7.

Defendants deny the allegations of the Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint and

further deny any violations of statutes or regulations. Defendants make no admission of

liability, and nothing herein shall be deemed an admission of fault of any kind by

Defendants.

8.

The parties have stated their desire to resolve this matter amicably and

without going to trial.

9.

The parties agree that this Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of

this case pursuant to 28 U.S. C. §§ 1331and 1343. 10. As indicated by their signature, the parties agree to the entry of this

Proposed Consent Decree.

3

Case 1:06-cv-00204 Document 67 Filed 11/02/2006 Page 4 of 14
IT IS HEREBY ADJUDGED, ORDERED AND DECREED that: II. DEFINITIONS A. For purposes of this Proposed Consent Decree, unless otherwise specified:
1. "Parole Violator" shall be defined as a person who is on parole and
who is taken into or being held in custody for an alleged parole ·violation in Cook County, pursuant to a parole violation warrant issued by the Illinois Department of Corrections under 73 0 ILCS 5/3-14-2(c). 2. "Notice of Class Action Settlement" shall be the document providing notice to the potential members of the class and shall contain the terms of the agreement reached by the parties, with a copy of the Notice of Rights (see section 3. below) attached. The Notice of Class Action Settlement shall be attached hereto and incorporated herein as Exhibit A.
3. "Notice of Rights" shall be the amended Notice of Parole
Violation form that shall include the language attached hereto as Exhibit B, which describes the Parole Violator's right to a preliminary parole revocation hearing pursuant to Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471.92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 LEd. 2d 484 (1972). 4. "King Investigation" shall be defined as an investigation conducted by an employee or agent of the Illinois Department of Corrections into the facts and circumstances surrounding the Parole Violator's alleged parole violation. The investigation shall
4

Case 1:06-cv-00204 Document 67 Filed 11/02/2006 Page 5 of 14
include, at a minimum, a review of the police report and any supporting documentation and an interview of the arresting officer(s). 5. "Hearing Officer" shall be defined as an employee of the Illinois Prisoner Review Board who is assigned to conduct the preliminary parole revocation hearing for each Parole Violator. 6. "Technical Violator" shall be defined as a parolee who is picked up for a violation of the terms of his mandatory supervised release agreement, but who is not charged with a new criminal offense. Examples of technical violations include, but are not limited to: failing to contact parole officer, failure to reside in an approved location, or testing positive for illegal drugs on a random drug test.
lll, TERMS l. Defendants shall take the following measures, intended to provide each
Parole Violator with an opportunity to have a preliminary parole revocation hearing which protects their due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, as defined by Morrisseyv. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 92 S.CL 2593, 33 L.Ed. 2d 484 (1972).
2. The Defendants shall publish the Notice of Class Action Settlement (Exhibit A) in each IDOC facility housing adults. The Notice shall explain to each prospective class member the settlement reached by the parties, generally, and shall refer the prospective class members to Plaintiffs' counsel for further explanation. With the
5

Case 1:06-cv-00204 Document 67 Filed 11/02/2006 Page 6 of 14

permission of the Cook County Department of Corrections, the Notice of Class Action

Settlement ~hall be posted on each gallery within the Cook County JaiL The Notice of

Class Action Settlement shall be delivered to each parolee presently on parole or on

Mandatory Supervised Release by his or her parole agent at a face to face meeting within

sixty days of entry of the Proposed Consent Decree by the court.

3.

The Defendants shall publish the Notice of Rights (Exhibit B) in each

!DOC facility housing adults upon entry of the Proposed Consent Decree. With the

pennission of the Cook County Department of Corrections, the Notice of Rights shall

also bepostcd on each gallery within the Cook County JaiL Within 60 days of entry of

this Proposed Consent Decree, Defendants shall implement use of the Notice of Rights

form, agreed to by the parties, attached hereto as Exhibit "B" and incorporated herein by

reference, at Cook County Jail as well as within the Northem Reception and

Classification Center, located at Stateville Correctional Center in Joliet, Illinois. The

Notictl of Rights form shall be distributed to all Parole Violators within a reasonable time

f(JJ!owing their apprehension, to provide them with the ability to either waive their

preliminary parole revocation hearing or to have it held within I0 business days. It shall

furtl1er be distributed to all inmates being released on parole or mandatory supervised

release with the other documents including their mandatory supervised release

agreement- Each inmate receiving the Notice of Rights form shall ~ign a receipt j()r the

form prior to release.

4_

Defendants shall enter into discussions with the Cook County Sheriff and

appropriate state agencies, and attempt to enter into a written agreement providing for

6

Case 1:06-cv-00204 Document 67 Filed 11/02/2006 Page 7 of 14
one of the two following scenarios to occur for each Parole Violator who is rcincarccrated in Cook County or at the Northern Reception and Classification Center:
a. The transfer of any Parole Violator shall be completed so that the Parole Violator is sent to, and custody is accepted by, the Jllinois Department of Corrections at the Northern Reception and Classification Center at Stateville Correctional Center within five calendar days of issuance of a parole violation warrant. This schedule shall provide thai the Parole Violator receives adequate notice of his right to a preliminary parole revocation, which shall be held by the Illinois Prisoner Review Board within I 0 business days of imprisonment pursuant to the execution of a parole violation warrant.
b. Should a transfer within five calendar days of arrest prove impossible for any Parole Violator, whether due to impending court dates in Cook County, or for issues of safety and security or severe administrative hardship on behalf of either Cook County or the Illinois Department of Corrections, the Cook County Sheriff shall deJer transfer of any Parole Violator back to TDOC. In such cases, a preliminary parole revocation hearing shall he held in an appropriate Cook County facility, unless another suitable facility in Cook County is · available, within 10 business days of imprisonment pursuant to the execution of a parole violation warrant. The availability and suitability of any facility shall he
7

Case 1:06-cv-00204 Document 67 Filed 11/02/2006 Page 8 of 14
;
determined by mutual agreement of the Cook County Sheriff and the lllinois Department of Corrections. c. Regardless of which option is invoked, either a., or b., described above, the Parole Violator shall be entitled to a preliminary parole revocation hearing within I 0 business days of imprisonment pursuant to the execution of a parole violation warrant in the manner of hearing described below in section 5. 5. Defendants, in conjunction with the Jllinois Prisoner Review Board and other appropriate state agencies, shall provide that Parole Violators receive a preliminary parole revocation hearing which protects their due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, as defined by Morrissey, as follows: a. The lllinois Prisoner Review Board shall assign a Hearing Officer to conduct the preliminary parole revocation hearings pursuant to its statutory obligation under 730 ILCS 5/3-3-9. The Illinois Department of Corrections, its agents or employees, shall not serve as the designee of the IPRB for purposes of deciding the issue of probable cause at a preliminary parole revocation hearing for a Parole Violator; b. Any Parole Violator who does not waive the preliminary parole revocation hearing shall be provided written instructions in
conjunction with the notice of charges (See Exhibit B), describing t11e process by which witnesses may appear and give testimony before the Illinois Prisoner Review Board hearing officer. If the
8

. '

Case 1:06-cv-00204 Document 67 Filed 11/02/2006 Page 9 of 14

hearing is being held in Joliet, at the Northern Reception and Classification Center, pursuant to section 4(a) of this proposed consent decree, the witness testimony may be taken by video confcrencing; c. If a Parole Violator does not waive his preliminary parole revocation hearing, the Illinois Department of Corrections shall assign an IDOC employee to conduct a King Investigation; d. The King Investigation shall include, at a minimum, a review of the police report and any supporting documentation, and an interview with the arresting officer(s); e. The !DOC employee assigned to complete the King Investigation shall testify, under oath and in person, at the preliminary parole revocation hearing held by the Hearing Officer within 10 business days of imprisonment pursuant to the execution of a parole violation warrant, unless the hearing is continued at the request of
the Parole Violator, or by agreement. The testimony, given on the record at the preliminary parole revocation bearing, shall include a description of the King Investigation. In the event that the King investigation is not completed at the time the preliminary parole revocation hearing is held, there shall be a finding of no probable cause, unless the Parole Violator requests a continuance;

9

Case 1:06-cv-00204 Document 67 Filed 11/02/2006 Page 10 of 14

f.

The Parole Violator shall have the right to cross examine the

IDOC employee regarding the King Investigation during the

prelimimuy parole revocation hearing;

g.

Parole Violators may also present written evidence to the Hearing

omcer pursuant to 20 Ill. Admin. Code 1610.140(b)(l);

h.

Parole Violators shall have the right to retain counsel at both the

preliminary and the final parole revocation hearings, pursuant to

20 Ill. Admin. Code 1620(c); and

1.

Pursuant to 730 ILCS 5/3-3-9(e), a record of the hearing shall be

made.
6. Defendants shall provide Parole Violators with a eopy of the written determination from the Hearing Officer within 24 hours of receiving the written findings
from the Hearing Officer. The Defendants shall notify the Jllinois Prisoner Review Board
that tho findi11gs should be prepared within 48 hours of the conclusion of the hearing and must include a statement of whether probable cause of a parole violation was fou11d, :md if it was, that the Parole Violator shall be held over for a final revocation hearing by the Prisoner Review Board. The Defendants shall notify the Illinois Prisoner Review Board that the findings shall include a written statement of the basis for the Hearing Ofiicer' s determination. A copy of the written determination shall be provided to the Parole Violator and any counsel retained pursuant to Section S{h) of this consent decree, to the Parole Violator's parent institution within !DOC for inclusion in the Parole Violator's inmate master file, to the Chairman of the Illinois Prisoner Review Board, and to the
Illinois Department of Corrections Deputy Director for Parole.

10

Case 1:06-cv-00204 Document 67 Filed 11/02/2006 Page 11 of 14
7. Once a finding of probable cause has been made and the written determination has. been served on the Parole Violator, he or she may be transferred to any . appropriate facility within the Illinois Department of Corrections, unless otherwise ordered by the IPRB.
8. If the Hearing Officer makes a finding of no probable cause at the preliminary parole revocation hearing, and the preliminary parole revocation hearing is held al the Northern Reception and Classification Center at Stateville Correctional Center, pursuant to Section 4(a) above, the parolee shall, for those parolees who are the subject of pending criminal charges; be turned over to the custody of the Cook County Sheriff in Cook County as promptly as possible by IDOC. Alleged technical violators shall be released under appropriate terms of Mandatory Supervised Release ( "MSR") as determined by the Illinois Prisoner Review Board. The return to Cook County Sheriff in Cook County or release subject to appropriate terms of MSR shall be accomplished as promptly as is administratively possible.
9. The Court shall appoint, by agreement of the parties, the John Howard Association as lhe monitor of this Proposed Consent Decree for a period of one year after its entry. '!be Monitor shal1 be paid for its services, according to the following schedule of rates: a) Malcolm C. Young, Executive Director, one hundred fifty dollars ($150.00) per hour, Charles A. Fasano, Director, Prisons and Jails Program, one hundred twenty five dollars ($125.00) per hour, and other staff, if necessary, one hundred dollars ($100.00) per hour to be paid by the Illinois Department of Corrections. The John Howard Association shall provide an accounting of all time and work provided while monitoring to the Illinois Department of Corrections for its review, prior to payment of
11

Case 1:06-cv-00204 Document 67 Filed 11/02/2006 Page 12 of 14
any fees. The Defendants shall provide the Monitor with reasonable access to the preliminary parole revocation hearings that are held at the Northern Reception and Classification Center at Stateville Correctional Center, pursuant to Section 4(a), above. Defendants shall work with the Illinois Prisoner Review Board and the Cook County SheriiT to provide that the Monitor is granted reasonable access to the preliminary parole revocation hearings held pursuant to Section 4(b), above. The Defendants shall also provide the Monitor reasonable access to the Parole Violators' parole files lor inspection of docnments. All information reviewed, considered or collected by the Monitor shall be kept in confidence. Such information may be disclosed only to the Court, the Parties and Counsel for the Parties. If the Monitor determines that the DtJfendants are not in compliance with the tem1s of the proposed consent decree, the monitor shall provide WI"itten notice of the deficiencies to the Counsel for the Plaintiffs and the Defendants, and the Defendants shall have 21 days to submit a plan of correction. The Monitor may discuss any matter concerning the proposed consent decree with the court. Until the Defendants have had an opportunity to correct any alleged deficiencies, Plainti!Js shall not involve the Court. If there are, during the life of the proposed consent decree, any disagreements between the parties, both sides shall endeavor to address them in good faith to come to resolution without further involvement of the court. The Monitor's responsibilities relative to this Proposed Consent Decree shall terminate one (1) year after the date of entry.
10. The Court shall retain jurisdiction to enforce the terms of this Proposed Consent Decree. The Consent Decree shall be the final judgment in the case and upon ils
12

Case 1:06-cv-00204 Document 67 Filed 11/02/2006 Page 13 of 14
entry, the case shall be dismissed with prejudice, subject to the court's retained jurisdiction to enforce the tenns of the agreement.
1I. "!be Illinois Department of Corrections shall pay to Plaintiff's counsel reasonable attorneys' fees, according to infonnation provided to Defendant, by Plaintiffs' counsel, indicating that he has spent one hundred ninety two and one half (192.5) hours of work on the case to date. The fees shall be calculated at the rate of one hundred thirty
five dollars per hour. Such fees shall be paid by moe within a reasonable time of the
entry of this proposed consent decree, and entry of an order fixing the specific dollar amount of the fees. As Plaintiffs' counsel will be required to spend time and effort moving forward, the parties agree that those. final fees in excess of the 192.5 hours paid upon entry of the proposed consent decree shall be paid at the termination of monitoring. Plaintiffs' counsel shall submit his fees to the Defendants, and the Defendants shall be entitled to bring a motion before the court reasonably objecting to any excessive fees. If
there is no objection, moe shall pay the additional fees within a reasonable time
pursuant to an order fixing the specific dollar amount of the additional fees.
13

Case 1:06-cv-00204 Document 67 Filed 11/02/2006 Page 14 of 14 12. ~ CoiUt preliminarily Bppl'IIWS tbe provili•~ of 1his deere:l- This
matter is set for " f;ilinesshllari.ni !lAd for filial approval 011 IIIJl!WY 19, 2007 ai 2:30 p.m.
So orden!d tbis 2.. da _ y. ofNovember, 2006. rfl ~
. . Jh29 1 N~ mE HONORABLS ltOBEllT vr. GETTLEMAN 1..lNI'TED STATES DISTIUCT JUOOE
AgZee4 ro by lhe parties as indicareel by \heir signatW:CS below. FOR PLATh/ TIFFS:
~~~(2c~
Tom Peter~
The Law Office of Tboaw Pll!m
4{)7 s_ Dearborn Street
Cbicago, Dlil'lais li0605 Attorney fo the Plailltiffs
14
TOTAL 1°. 02

 </s> Case: 1:06-cv-204 As of: 02/27/2016 05:10 PM CST 1 of 18
BROWN,PROTO,TERMED
United States District Court Northern District of Illinois − CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 6,1 (Chicago)
CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:06−cv−00204

King et al v. Walker et al Assigned to: Honorable Robert W. Gettleman Cause: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act Plaintiff Charles King
Plaintiff Andre Brown

Date Filed: 01/13/2006 Date Terminated: 01/26/2007 Jury Demand: Both Nature of Suit: 440 Civil Rights: Other Jurisdiction: Federal Question
represented by Alexa Van Brunt Roderick Macarthur Justice Center Northwestern University School Of Law 375 East Chicago Avenue Chicago, IL 60611 (312) 503−1336 Email: a−vanbrunt@law.northwestern.edu LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Thomas M. Peters Law Offices of Thomas Peters 53 W. Jackson Blvd. Suite 1615 Chicago, IL 60604 (312)697−0022 Email: tompeters9@aol.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Alan S. Mills Uptown People's Law Center 4413 North Sheridan Chicago, IL 60646 (773) 769−1411 Fax: 9773) 769−2224 Email: alanmills@comcast.net ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kevin R. Peters Law Offices of Kevin Peters 53 W. Jackson Blvd. Suite 1615 Chicago, IL 60604 (312)697−0022 Email: kp6970022@aol.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sheila A Bedi Roderick Macarthur Justice Center 375 E. Chicago Avenue Chicago, IL 60611 (312) 503−2492 Email: sheila.bedi@law.northwestern.edu PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Alexa Van Brunt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY

Case: 1:06-cv-204 As of: 02/27/2016 05:10 PM CST 2 of 18

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Thomas M. Peters (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Alan S. Mills (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kevin R. Peters (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sheila A Bedi (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Thomas Gilbert

represented by Alexa Van Brunt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Thomas M. Peters (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Alan S. Mills (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sheila A Bedi (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Chioke Hill

represented by Alexa Van Brunt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Thomas M. Peters (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Alan S. Mills (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sheila A Bedi (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Andre McGregg

represented by Alexa Van Brunt (See above for address)

Case: 1:06-cv-204 As of: 02/27/2016 05:10 PM CST 3 of 18

LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Thomas M. Peters (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Alan S. Mills (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sheila A Bedi (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Nelson Muniz

represented by Alexa Van Brunt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Thomas M. Peters (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Alan S. Mills (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sheila A Bedi (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Anthony Smith

represented by Alexa Van Brunt (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Thomas M. Peters (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Alan S. Mills (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sheila A Bedi (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff M.H.

represented by Alan S. Mills (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Case: 1:06-cv-204 As of: 02/27/2016 05:10 PM CST 4 of 18

V. Defendant Roger E Walker Director of Illinois Department of Corrections
Defendant Jesse Montgomery Deputy Director of Parole Operations
proposed Robert Cook TERMINATED: 02/16/2007
proposed Joseph Derencius TERMINATED: 12/11/2007
proposed

represented by Andrew W Lambertson U.S. District Court (NDIL−C) 219 South Dearborn Street Chicago, IL 60604 (312)353−5354 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kevin R. Lovellette Illinois Attorney General's Office 100 West Randolph Street 13th Floor Chicago, IL 60601 (312) 814−3720 Email: klovellette@atg.state.il.us LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lyle Kevin Henretty Illinois Attorney General's Office 100 W. Randolph 13th Floor Chicago, IL 60601 312−814−3327 Email: lhenretty@atg.state.il.us ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Andrew W Lambertson (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kevin R. Lovellette (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lyle Kevin Henretty (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Robert Cook B−05305 Taylorville P.O. Box 900 Taylorville, IL 62568 PRO SE
represented by Joseph Derencius B−36174 Taylorville P.O. Box 900 Taylorville, IL 62568 PRO SE

Case: 1:06-cv-204 As of: 02/27/2016 05:10 PM CST 5 of 18

William Evans

represented by William Evans 1428 S. Edgewood Chicago Heights, IL 60411 PRO SE

proposed Louis Davis

represented by Louis Davis C−10581 Menard − MND P.O. Box 711 Menard, IL 62259 PRO SE

proposed Isaac Briggs

represented by Isaac Briggs 121 Circle Creek Lane Cahokia, IL 62206 PRO SE

proposed
David Barney TERMINATED: 06/05/2007

proposed Roosevelt Bennett

represented by Roosevelt Bennett N−01181 Dixon − DIX 2600 North Brinton Avenue Dixon, IL 61021 PRO SE

Date Filed 01/13/2006 01/13/2006 01/13/2006 01/13/2006 01/13/2006 01/13/2006 01/13/2006 01/17/2006 01/17/2006 01/17/2006
01/20/2006

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT filed by Charles King, Andre Brown; Jury Demand.(lcw, ) (Entered: 01/17/2006)
2 CIVIL Cover Sheet. (lcw, ) (Entered: 01/17/2006)
3 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiffs Charles King, Andre Brown by Thomas M. Peters. (lcw, ) (Entered: 01/17/2006)
4 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiffs Charles King, Andre Brown by Kevin R. Peters. (lcw, ) (Entered: 01/17/2006)
6 SUMMONS Issued as to Defendants Roger E Walker, Jesse Montgomery. (lcw, ) (Entered: 01/17/2006)
7 MOTION by Plaintiffs for class certification. (lcw, ) (Entered: 01/17/2006)
8 MEMORANDUM by plaintiffs in Support of motion for class certification 7 . (lcw, ) (Entered: 01/17/2006)
9 MOTION by Plaintiffs Charles King, Andre Brown to certify class (Peters, Thomas) (Entered: 01/17/2006)
10 MEMORANDUM by Charles King, Andre Brown in Support of Class Certification (Peters, Thomas) (Entered: 01/17/2006)
11 NOTICE of Motion by Thomas M. Peters for presentment of motion to certify class 9 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 1/24/2006 at 09:15 AM. (Peters, Thomas) (Entered: 01/17/2006)
12 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendant Roger E Walker by Andrew William Lambertson (Lambertson, Andrew) (Entered: 01/20/2006)

Case: 1:06-cv-204 As of: 02/27/2016 05:10 PM CST 6 of 18

01/24/2006 01/24/2006 01/24/2006 02/02/2006
02/10/2006 02/10/2006 02/13/2006 02/13/2006 02/15/2006 03/06/2006 03/06/2006 03/06/2006 03/06/2006 03/06/2006
03/06/2006 03/06/2006 03/09/2006
03/10/2006 03/10/2006

13 MOTION by Plaintiffs Charles King, Andre Brown for preliminary injunction (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit)(Peters, Thomas) (Entered: 01/24/2006)
14 MEMORANDUM by Charles King, Andre Brown in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Peters, Thomas) (Entered: 01/24/2006)
15 NOTICE by Charles King, Andre Brown of Filing (Peters, Thomas) (Entered: 01/24/2006)
16 MINUTE entry before Judge Robert W. Gettleman : Set deadlines/hearing as to motion for preliminary injunction 13 , motion to certify class 7 , motion to certify class 9 : Responses due by 2/21/2006. Replies due by 3/7/2006. Ruling before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman set on 5/2/2006 at 09:00 AM. Mailed notice (gds, ) (Entered: 02/02/2006)
17 MOTION by Defendants Roger E Walker, Jesse Montgomery for extension of time Agreed Motion for Enlargement of Time in Which to File Responsive Pleadings (Lambertson, Andrew) (Entered: 02/10/2006)
18 NOTICE of Motion by Andrew William Lambertson for presentment of motion for extension of time 17 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 2/15/2006 at 09:15 AM. (Lambertson, Andrew) (Entered: 02/10/2006)
19 AMENDED complaint by Thomas Gilbert, Chioke Hill, Andre McGregg, Nelson Muniz, Anthony Smith, Charles King, Andre Brown against Roger E Walker, Jesse Montgomery (Peters, Thomas) (Entered: 02/13/2006)
20 NOTICE by all plaintiffs (Peters, Thomas) (Entered: 02/13/2006)
21 MINUTE entry before Judge Robert W. Gettleman : Defendants' motion for extension of time 17 of 14 days to answer or otherwise plead is granted. Telephone notice (gds, ) (Entered: 02/15/2006)
22 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendant Jesse Montgomery by Andrew William Lambertson (Lambertson, Andrew) (Entered: 03/06/2006)
23 MOTION by Defendants Roger E Walker, Jesse Montgomery for leave to file Motion to Dismiss (Lambertson, Andrew) (Entered: 03/06/2006)
24 MOTION by Defendants Roger E Walker, Jesse Montgomery to dismiss (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A−C# 2 Exhibit D−H)(Lambertson, Andrew) (Entered: 03/06/2006)
25 MOTION by Defendants Roger E Walker, Jesse Montgomery to stay Discovery (Lambertson, Andrew) (Entered: 03/06/2006)
26 NOTICE of Motion by Andrew William Lambertson for presentment of motion to dismiss 24 , motion to stay 25 , motion for leave to file 23 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 3/9/2006 at 09:15 AM. (Lambertson, Andrew) (Entered: 03/06/2006)
27 RESPONSE by Defendants Roger E Walker, Jesse Montgomery to memorandum in support of motion 14 , motion for preliminary injunction 13 (Lambertson, Andrew) (Entered: 03/06/2006)
28 NOTICE by Roger E Walker, Jesse Montgomery re Response 27 to Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Lambertson, Andrew) (Entered: 03/06/2006)
31 MINUTE entry before Judge Robert W. Gettleman : Defendant's motion for leave to file motion to dismiss is granted. Response to the motion to dismiss is due by 3/13/06. Reply is due by 3/24/06. Defendant's motion to stay discovery is denied. Defendant's response to plaintiff's motion for class certification is due by 3/17/06. Reply is due by 3/24/06. Mailed notice (lcw, ) (Entered: 03/14/2006)
29 RESPONSE to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1# 2 Exhibit 2# 3 Exhibit 3# 4 Exhibit 4)(Peters, Thomas) (Entered: 03/10/2006)
30 NOTICE by Charles King, Thomas Gilbert, Chioke Hill, Andre Brown, Andre McGregg, Nelson Muniz, Anthony Smith (Peters, Thomas) (Entered: 03/10/2006)

Case: 1:06-cv-204 As of: 02/27/2016 05:10 PM CST 7 of 18

03/17/2006 03/17/2006 03/20/2006
03/20/2006 03/21/2006
03/21/2006 03/22/2006 03/24/2006 03/24/2006 03/29/2006 03/29/2006 04/10/2006 04/10/2006 04/13/2006 05/01/2006 05/08/2006
05/08/2006 05/30/2006

32 MEMORANDUM by Roger E Walker, Jesse Montgomery in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion For Class Certification (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A−C)(Lambertson, Andrew) (Entered: 03/17/2006)
33 NOTICE by Roger E Walker, Jesse Montgomery re memorandum in opposition 32 to Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion For Class Certification (Lambertson, Andrew) (Entered: 03/17/2006)
34 MOTION by Plaintiffs Charles King, Thomas Gilbert, Chioke Hill, Andre Brown, Andre McGregg, Nelson Muniz, Anthony Smith to file instanter Plaintiffs' Reply in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Attachments: # 1 Reply# 2 Exhibit A# 3 Exhibit B# 4 Exhibit C)(Peters, Thomas) (Entered: 03/20/2006)
35 NOTICE by Charles King, Thomas Gilbert, Chioke Hill, Andre Brown, Andre McGregg, Nelson Muniz, Anthony Smith (Peters, Thomas) (Entered: 03/20/2006)
36 REPLY by Charles King, Thomas Gilbert, Chioke Hill, Andre Brown, Andre McGregg, Nelson Muniz, Anthony Smithin Support of MOTION by Plaintiffs Charles King, Andre Brown to certify class 9 (Peters, Thomas) (Entered: 03/21/2006)
37 NOTICE by all plaintiffs (Peters, Thomas) (Entered: 03/21/2006)
38 NOTICE of Motion by Thomas M. Peters for presentment of motion to file instanter, 34 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 3/29/2006 at 09:15 AM. (Peters, Thomas) (Entered: 03/22/2006)
39 REPLY to Response to Motion to Dismiss (Lambertson, Andrew) (Entered: 03/24/2006)
40 NOTICE by Roger E Walker, Jesse Montgomery re reply to response to motion 39 to Dismiss (Lambertson, Andrew) (Entered: 03/24/2006)
41 MINUTE entry before Judge Robert W. Gettleman : Plaintiffs' motion to file plaintiffs' reply in support of motion for preliminary injunction is granted. Telephoned notice (lcw, ) (Entered: 03/30/2006)
42 REPLY by Plaintiffs in Support of motion for preliminary injunction 13 . (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A# 2 Exhibit B# 3 Exhibit C)(lcw, ) (Entered: 03/30/2006)
43 MOTION by Defendants Roger E Walker, Jesse Montgomery for extension of time in Which to Serve Discovery Responses (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A−C)(Lambertson, Andrew) (Entered: 04/10/2006)
44 NOTICE of Motion by Andrew William Lambertson for presentment of motion for extension of time 43 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 4/13/2006 at 09:15 AM. (Lambertson, Andrew) (Entered: 04/10/2006)
45 MINUTE entry before Judge Robert W. Gettleman : Defendants' motion for extension of time 43 to serve discovery responses is granted but nly to 5/2/2006. Mailed notice (gds, ) (Entered: 04/13/2006)
46 MINUTE entry before Judge Robert W. Gettleman : Status hearing date of 5/2/2006 is stricken. The Court will rule by mail. Telephone notice (gds, ) (Entered: 05/01/2006)
47 MINUTE entry before Judge Robert W. Gettleman : Memorandum opinion and order entered. Accordingly, defendants' motion to dismiss is denied 24 . Plaintiffs' motions for class certification 7 , 9 and preliminary injunction 13 are granted. Plaintiffs' proposed order is due by 5/26/2006. Status hearing is set for 6/1/2006 at 9:30 a.m. Mailed notice (las, ) (Entered: 05/16/2006)
48 MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by Judge Robert W. Gettleman on 5/8/2006:(las, ) (Entered: 05/16/2006)
49 PROPOSED Preliminary Injunction Order by Charles King (Peters, Thomas) Modified on 5/31/2006 (air, ). (Entered: 05/30/2006)

Case: 1:06-cv-204 As of: 02/27/2016 05:10 PM CST 8 of 18

05/30/2006 06/01/2006 06/19/2006
06/19/2006 06/21/2006 06/28/2006 06/28/2006 06/28/2006
06/29/2006 07/06/2006 07/18/2006
09/06/2006 09/20/2006 10/05/2006 10/30/2006 11/01/2006 11/02/2006

50 NOTICE by Charles King re proposed pretrial order 49 (Peters, Thomas) (Entered: 05/30/2006)
51 MINUTE entry before Judge Robert W. Gettleman : Status hearing held on 6/1/2006. Response to proposed order is due by 6/26/2006. In−chambers status hearing set for 7/6/2006 at 08:00 AM. Mailed notice (gds, ) (Entered: 06/02/2006)
52 MOTION by Defendants Roger E Walker, Jesse Montgomery for protective order or In The Alternative to Stay Discovery (Emergency) (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A−1# 2 Exhibit A−2# 3 Exhibit B−D)(Lambertson, Andrew) (Entered: 06/19/2006)
53 NOTICE of Motion by Andrew William Lambertson for presentment of motion for protective order 52 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 6/21/2006 at 09:15 AM. (Lambertson, Andrew) (Entered: 06/19/2006)
54 MINUTE entry before Judge Robert W. Gettleman : Motion hearing held on 6/21/2006 regarding motion for protective order 52 which is continued to 7/6/2006, at 9:00 a.m. Mailed notice (gds, ) (Entered: 06/22/2006)
55 Defendants' Objections to Plaintiffs' Proposed Preliminary Injunctive Order by Roger E Walker, Jesse Montgomery (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A−B)(Lambertson, Andrew) (Entered: 06/28/2006)
56 Defendants' Proposed Preliminary Injunctive Order by Roger E Walker, Jesse Montgomery (Lambertson, Andrew) (Entered: 06/28/2006)
57 NOTICE by Roger E Walker, Jesse Montgomery re other 55 , other 56 Defendants' Objections to Plaintiffs' Proposed Preliminary Injunctive Order and Defendants' Proposed Preliminary Injunctive Order (Lambertson, Andrew) (Entered: 06/28/2006)
58 EXHIBIT by Defendants Roger E Walker, Jesse Montgomery Corrected Exhibits A−B − Defendants' Objections to Plaintiffs' Proposed Preliminary Injunctive Order regarding other 55 (Lambertson, Andrew) (Entered: 06/29/2006)
59 MINUTE entry before Judge Robert W. Gettleman : Status hearing held on 7/6/2006. Status hearing set for 7/18/2006 at 10:00 AM. Mailed notice (gds, ) (Entered: 07/07/2006)
60 MINUTE entry before Judge Robert W. Gettleman : Settlement conference held on 7/18/2006. The parties have tentatively agreed on the basic terms of a consent decree and are to submit a proposed decree including notices to parolees and to the class by 8/31/2006. Settlement Conference set for 9/6/2006 at 02:00 PM. Mailed notice (gds, ) (Entered: 07/19/2006)
61 MINUTE entry before Judge Robert W. Gettleman : Settlement conference held on 9/6/2006. Settlement Conference and submission of proposed consent decree set for 9/20/2006 at 01:30 AM. Mailed notice (gds, ) (Entered: 09/07/2006)
62 MINUTE entry before Judge Robert W. Gettleman : Settlement conference date of 9/20/2006 is stricken. Status hearing set for 10/5/2006 at 09:30 AM. Telephone notice (gds, ) (Entered: 09/20/2006)
63 MINUTE entry before Judge Robert W. Gettleman : Status hearing held on 10/5/2006. Parties are to submit a revised consent decree. Status hearing set for 10/30/2006 at 09:00 AM. Mailed notice (gds, ) (Entered: 10/13/2006)
64 MINUTE entry before Judge Robert W. Gettleman : Status hearing held on 10/30/2006 Settlement Conference set for 11/1/2006 at 11:00 AM. Mailed notice (gds, ) (Entered: 10/31/2006)
65 MINUTE entry before Judge Robert W. Gettleman : Status hearing held on 11/1/2006 Mailed notice (gds, ) (Entered: 11/02/2006)
66 MINUTE entry before Judge Robert W. Gettleman : Proposed Consent Decree entered. Mailed notice (lcw, ) (Entered: 11/15/2006)

Case: 1:06-cv-204 As of: 02/27/2016 05:10 PM CST 9 of 18

11/02/2006 11/02/2006 11/02/2006
11/02/2006 12/18/2006 01/18/2007
01/19/2007
01/26/2007
01/26/2007 01/26/2007
01/26/2007 02/16/2007 02/16/2007 02/28/2007 03/02/2007 03/23/2007 04/03/2007 04/16/2007 04/16/2007
04/24/2007
05/14/2007 05/14/2007

67 PROPOSED CONSENT DECREE. Signed by Judge Robert W. Gettleman on 11/2/2006.(lcw, ) (Entered: 11/15/2006)
68 NOTICE by parties of class action settlement. (lcw, ) (Entered: 11/15/2006)
69 MINUTE entry before Judge Robert W. Gettleman : The Agreed consent decree is preliminarily approved. Fairness hearing is set for 1/19/07, at 2:30 p.m. Mailed notice (lcw, ) (Entered: 11/15/2006)
70 ORDER Signed by Judge Robert W. Gettleman on 11/2/2006.(lcw, ) (Entered: 11/15/2006)
71 OBJECTION by Roosevelt Bennett to proposed settlement. (lcw, ) (Entered: 12/20/2006)
72 MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF FINAL APPROVAL OF PROPOSED CONSENT DECREE (Attachments: # 1 Notice of Filing)(Peters, Thomas) (Entered: 01/18/2007)
73 MINUTE entry before Judge Robert W. Gettleman :Fairness hearing held on 1/19/2007. Revised proposed consent decree to be submitted.Mailed notice (gds, ) (Entered: 01/25/2007)
74 MINUTE entry before Judge Robert W. Gettleman : Enter order for interim fees. The Ill. Dept. of Corrections shall pay to Thomas Peters and Kevin Peters the sum of $25,987.50.Mailed notice (lcw, ) (Entered: 02/01/2007)
75 ORDER for Interim Fees. Signed by Judge Robert W. Gettleman on 1/26/2007.(lcw, ) (Entered: 02/01/2007)
76 MINUTE entry before Judge Robert W. Gettleman : Final Consent Decree entered. Status hearing set for 7/26/07 at 09:00 AM. Civil case terminated.Mailed notice (lcw, ) (Entered: 02/02/2007)
77 FINAL CONSENT DECREE Signed by Judge Robert W. Gettleman on 1/26/2007.(lcw, ) (Entered: 02/02/2007)
78 MOTION by Robert Cook and notice for extension of time for filing notice of appeal. (lcw, ) (Entered: 02/21/2007)
79 APPLICATION by Robert Cook for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (lcw, ) (Entered: 02/21/2007)
80 LETTER from Joseph Derencius dated 2/23/07. (lcw, ) (Entered: 03/02/2007)
81 LETTER from Joseph Derencius. (lcw, ) (Entered: 03/06/2007)
82 MOTION by proposed William Evans for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (cdy, ) (Entered: 03/29/2007)
83 LETTER from Louis Davis dated 03/28/07. (lcw, ) Modified on 4/5/2007 (lcw, ). (Entered: 04/05/2007)
84 MOTION by Plaintiff Thomas Gilbert for appointment of counsel. (lcw, ) (Entered: 04/18/2007)
85 OPPOSITION by Thomas Gilbert to summary judgment and leave to proceed pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 18(a), 42 U.S.C.A. Section 1983, U.S.C.A. Amend 6, U.S.C.A. amend 5, U.S.C.A. Amend 8, US.C.A. amend 14. (lcw, ) (Entered: 04/18/2007)
86 MINUTE entry before Judge Robert W. Gettleman : Plaintiff Gilbert's motion 84 for appointment of counsel and opposition 85 to summary judgment are denied as moot. Mailed notice (lcw, ) (Entered: 04/25/2007)
87 APPLICATION by proposed Joseph Derencius for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (lcw, ) (Entered: 05/16/2007)
88 RECEIVED Complaint by Joseph Derencius. (lcw, ) (Entered: 05/16/2007)

Case: 1:06-cv-204 As of: 02/27/2016 05:10 PM CST 10 of 18

05/31/2007 06/04/2007 06/05/2007
06/11/2007 06/12/2007 06/20/2007 06/22/2007
07/03/2007 07/03/2007 07/17/2007 07/17/2007 07/24/2007 08/03/2007
08/30/2007 08/30/2007
09/20/2007 11/29/2007 11/29/2007
12/11/2007
12/11/2007 01/22/2008
01/22/2008 01/23/2008

90 REQUEST by David Barney to intervene. (Document Not Imaged) (lcw, ) (Entered: 06/07/2007)
89 MOTION by Isaac Briggs to intervene in the above captioned cause. (lcw, ) (Entered: 06/06/2007)
91 MINUTE entry before Judge Robert W. Gettleman :Petition of David Barney to intervene is denied by the Court, sua sponte.Mailed notice (lcw, ) (Entered: 06/11/2007)
92 MOTION by Joseph Derencius for appointmenr of counsel.(lcw, ) (Entered: 06/12/2007)
93 LETTER from Joseph Denencius dated 6/8/07. (lcw, ) (Entered: 06/14/2007)
94 LETTER from Joseph Derencius dated 6/15/07. (cdy, ) Modified on 8/3/2007 (cdy, ). (Entered: 06/22/2007)
95 MOTION by Joseph Derencius to reinstate the King v. Walker, et al. case no. 06 204 and to postpone the status hearing set for 7/26/07 at 9:00 a.m. (Document Not Scanned) (cdy, ) Modified on 7/17/2007 (lcw, ). (Entered: 06/26/2007)
96 LETTER from Joseph Denencius. (lcw, ) (Entered: 07/06/2007)
97 LETTER from Joseph Denencius. (lcw, ) (Entered: 07/06/2007)
98 PETITION For Status Report by Joseph Derencius. (lcw, ) (Entered: 07/19/2007)
99 REQUEST by Joseph Derencius for a report of the proceedings and transcripts. (lcw, ) (Entered: 07/19/2007)
100 MINUTE entry before Judge Robert W. Gettleman :Status hearing is re−set to 8/30/2007 at 09:30 a.m.Telephone notice (gds, ) (Entered: 07/24/2007)
101 MOTION by Joseph Derencius for extension to resubmit, motion and notice for extension of time for filing and notice of appeal as instructed by the Clerk of the Court in this letter dated 6/20/07. (lcw, ) (Entered: 08/07/2007)
102 COURT MONITOR'S REPORT dated 8/16/07 (cdy, ) (Entered: 09/04/2007)
103 MINUTE entry before Judge Robert W. Gettleman :Status hearing held on 8/30/2007. JHA report is due by 11/20/2007.Status hearing set for 11/29/2007 at 02:00 p.m.Mailed notice (gds, ) (Entered: 09/06/2007)
104 LETTER from 09/15/07 dated Joseph Derencius. (lcw, ) (Entered: 09/24/2007)
105 LETTER from John Howard Association dated 11/20/07 regarding Court Monitor's Report. (lcw, ) (Entered: 12/04/2007)
106 MINUTE entry before Judge Robert W. Gettleman: Status hearing held on 11/29/2007. John Howard Association's final report is due by 1/16/2008. Status hearing set for 1/23/2008 at 10:30 AM. Mailed notice (gds, ) (Entered: 12/05/2007)
107 MINUTE entry before Judge Robert W. Gettleman : Docket No. 87 application by proposed Joseph Derencius for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, Docket No. 88 Complaint by Joseph Derencius, Docket No. 89 motion by Isaac Briggs to intervene, Docket No. 92 motion by Joseph Derencius for appointment of counsel and Docket No. 99 request by Joseph Derencius for a report of the proceedings and transcripts are dismissed and denied sua sponte as moot.Mailed notice (lcw, ) (Entered: 12/13/2007)
108 LETTER from Joseph Derencius dated 12/6/07. (lcw, ) (Entered: 12/13/2007)
109 PETITION by Charles King, Thomas Gilbert, Chioke Hill, Andre Brown, Andre McGregg, Nelson Muniz, Anthony Smith for Attorney Fees (Peters, Kevin) (Entered: 01/22/2008)
110 NOTICE by all plaintiffs re petition 109 (Peters, Kevin) (Entered: 01/22/2008)
111 MINUTE entry before Judge Robert W. Gettleman :Status hearing held on 1/23/2008.Mailed notice (gds, ) (Entered: 01/24/2008)

Case: 1:06-cv-204 As of: 02/27/2016 05:10 PM CST 11 of 18

01/23/2008 01/23/2008 01/23/2008 01/23/2008
01/23/2008 05/23/2008 12/02/2008
12/02/2008 12/08/2008 07/16/2009 10/12/2011 10/20/2011 11/30/2012 11/30/2012
11/30/2012 11/30/2012
11/30/2012 12/04/2012 12/05/2012

112 MINUTE entry before Judge Robert W. Gettleman : The Court approves the Monitor's report dated 1/18/2008 and discharges the Monitor. Mailed notice (lcw, ) (Entered: 01/25/2008)
113 ORDER. Signed by Judge Robert W. Gettleman on 1/23/2008.(lcw, ) (Entered: 01/25/2008)
114 COURT Monitor's Report. (lcw, ) (Entered: 01/28/2008)
115 MINUTE entry before Judge Robert W. Gettleman : Enter order for supplemental attorney fees. The Ill. Dept. of Corrections shall pay to Thomas Peters and Kevin Peters the sum of $12,332.45 for their fees. Mailed notice (lcw, ) (Entered: 01/31/2008)
116 ORDER for Supplemental Attorney Fees. Signed by Judge Robert W. Gettleman on 1/23/2008.(lcw, ) (Entered: 01/31/2008)
117 NOTICE by Isaac Briggs of Change of Address. (lcw, ) (Entered: 05/29/2008)
118 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Order the Illinois Dept. of Corrections shall pay the John Howard Association of Illinois the sum of $35,840.35 representing monitoring fees. [For further detail see separate order] Mailed notice (ca, ) (Entered: 12/04/2008)
119 ORDER for Supplemental Attorney Fees Signed by the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 12/2/2008.(ca, ) (Entered: 12/04/2008)
120 LETTER from DeMarcus Barker dated 12/2/08. (ca, ) (Entered: 12/10/2008)
121 LETTER from Willie E. Lindsey. (ca, ). (Entered: 07/21/2009)
122 MOTION by Isaac Briggs to Enforce Injunctive Relief Prospectively (Exhibits). (ca, ) (Entered: 10/17/2011)
123 MOTION by Isaac Briggs to Enforce Injunctive Relief Prospectively @ Section 1983, and leave to file Supplemental Supporting Exhibits (Exhibits) (ca, ). (Docket text Modified by clerk's office on 10/27/2011 (ca, ). (Entered: 10/27/2011)
124 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiffs Andre Brown, Thomas Gilbert, Chioke Hill, Charles King, Andre McGregg, Nelson Muniz, Anthony Smith by Alexa Van Brunt (Van Brunt, Alexa) (Entered: 11/30/2012)
125 MOTION by Plaintiffs Andre Brown, Thomas Gilbert, Chioke Hill, Charles King, Andre McGregg, Nelson Muniz, Anthony Smith for rule to show cause (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A: Final Consent Decree, # 2 Exhibit B: Notice of Rights, # 3 Exhibit C: Monitor's Report, # 4 Exhibit D: Declaration of Julie Biehl, # 5 Exhibit E: M.H. v. Monreal complaint, # 6 Exhibit F: Declaration of Steven Lofton, # 7 Exhibit G: Declaration of Michael Fulgham, # 8 Exhibit H: Declaration of Rashid Evans, # 9 Exhibit I: Declaration of Samuel D. Miller, # 10 Exhibit J: Declaration of Joshua Tepfer)(Van Brunt, Alexa) (Entered: 11/30/2012)
126 NOTICE of Motion by Alexa Van Brunt for presentment of motion for rule to show cause,, 125 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 12/5/2012 at 09:15 AM. (Van Brunt, Alexa) (Entered: 11/30/2012)
127 MOTION by Plaintiff M.H. to reassign case based on relatedness (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A: M.H. v. Monreal complaint, # 2 Exhibit B: King v. Walker Final Consent Decree, # 3 Exhibit C: Motion for a Rule to Show Cause)(Van Brunt, Alexa) (Entered: 11/30/2012)
128 NOTICE of Motion by Alexa Van Brunt for presentment of motion to reassign case, 127 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 12/5/2012 at 09:15 AM. (Van Brunt, Alexa) (Entered: 11/30/2012)
129 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice Filing fee $ 50, receipt number 0752−7816022. (Bedi, Sheila) (Entered: 12/04/2012)
130 ATTORNEY Appearance for Defendants Jesse Montgomery, Roger E Walker by Kevin R. Lovellette (Lovellette, Kevin) (Entered: 12/05/2012)

Case: 1:06-cv-204 As of: 02/27/2016 05:10 PM CST 12 of 18

12/05/2012 12/05/2012 12/05/2012 12/17/2012 12/17/2012 01/15/2013
01/15/2013 01/21/2013 02/14/2013 02/28/2013 04/04/2013 04/19/2013 04/19/2013 04/19/2013 04/23/2013

131 MOTION by Plaintiffs Andre Brown, Thomas Gilbert, Chioke Hill, Charles King, Andre McGregg, Nelson Muniz, Anthony Smith for leave to appear as Class counsel (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A: Declaration of Alexa Van Brunt, # 2 Exhibit B: Declaration of Sheila Bedi)(Van Brunt, Alexa) (Entered: 12/05/2012)
132 NOTICE of Motion by Alexa Van Brunt for presentment of motion for leave to appear, 131 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 12/10/2012 at 09:00 AM. (Van Brunt, Alexa) (Entered: 12/05/2012)
133 MINUTE entry before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Motion hearing held on 12/5/2012. Motion to reassign case 127 is denied. Plaintiffs' motion 125 for rule to show cause is continued to In Court hearing set for 1/15/2013 at 9:00 a.m. Mailed notice (gds) (Entered: 12/07/2012)
134 MINUTE entry before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Motion 129 of Sheila A. Bedi for leave to appear pro hac vice is granted. Mailed notice. (mr, ) (Entered: 12/18/2012)
135 MINUTE entry before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Plaintiffs' motion 131 to appear as class counsel is granted. Mailed notice. (mr, ) (Entered: 12/18/2012)
137 MINUTE entry before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: In an in chambers conference held on 1/15/2013, regarding discovery in connection with plaintiffs' motion for a rule to show cause 125 , plaintiffs agreed to limit discovery requests at this time to the three months ending 12/31/23012, without prejudice to seeking additional discovery at a later date. The parties shall file a joint status report by 2/14/2013 regarding the progress of discovery. Status hearing is set for 2/28/2013 at 10:00 a.m. Plaintiffs' motion for a rule to show cause is continued until further order of court. Mailed notice (gds) (Entered: 01/22/2013)
138 MINUTE entry before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: The motion filed by Isaac Briggs 122 123 are denied without prejudice to class plaintiffs' motion for rule to show cause 125 . Mailed notice (gds) (Entered: 01/22/2013)
136 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiffs Andre Brown, Thomas Gilbert, Chioke Hill, Charles King, M.H., Andre McGregg, Nelson Muniz, Anthony Smith by Alan S. Mills (Mills, Alan) (Entered: 01/21/2013)
139 STATUS Report (JOINT) by Andre Brown, Thomas Gilbert, Chioke Hill, Charles King, Andre McGregg, Nelson Muniz, Anthony Smith (Van Brunt, Alexa) (Entered: 02/14/2013)
140 MINUTE entry before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Status hearing in chambers, held on 2/28/2013. In chambers conference is set for 4/4/2013 at 10:00 a.m. Mailed notice (gds) (Entered: 02/28/2013)
141 MINUTE entry before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: In chambers conference held on 4/4/2013 and is continued to 4/23/2013 at 10:45 a.m. Mailed notice (gds) (Entered: 04/08/2013)
142 Second Joint Status Report by Andre Brown, Thomas Gilbert, Chioke Hill, Charles King, Andre McGregg, Nelson Muniz, Anthony Smith (Van Brunt, Alexa) (Entered: 04/19/2013)
143 MOTION by Plaintiffs Thomas Gilbert, Chioke Hill, Charles King, Andre McGregg, Nelson Muniz, Anthony Smith to compel (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2)(Van Brunt, Alexa) (Entered: 04/19/2013)
144 NOTICE of Motion by Alexa Van Brunt for presentment of motion to compel 143 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 4/23/2013 at 10:30 AM. (Van Brunt, Alexa) (Entered: 04/19/2013)
145 MINUTE entry before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: This matter came before the court for an in−chambers conference held on 4/23/2013 on plaintiff's motion for a rule to show cause 125 . Discovery is scheduled to be completyed by 8/1/2013. The Court will conduct an evidentiary hearing on plaintiff's motion which is set for 9/18/2013 and 9/19/2013 at 10:00 a.m. A pre−hearing conference is set for 8/1/2013 at 2:00 p.m. Mailed notice (gds) (Entered: 04/24/2013)

Case: 1:06-cv-204 As of: 02/27/2016 05:10 PM CST 13 of 18

05/01/2013 05/14/2013 05/14/2013 08/01/2013
09/10/2013 09/10/2013 09/10/2013 09/10/2013 09/10/2013 09/16/2013 09/18/2013 09/18/2013
09/18/2013 09/23/2013 09/26/2013
10/02/2013
10/02/2013

146 ENTER PROTECTIVE Order Signed by the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 5/1/2013: Mailed notice (jmp, ) (Entered: 05/02/2013)
147 MINUTE entry before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Agreed order entered regarding hearings to be held and the Ill. Dept. of Corrections Northern Reception Center. Mailed notice (jmp, ) (Entered: 05/17/2013)
148 AGREED ORDER signed by the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 5/14/2013: Mailed notice (gds) (Entered: 06/21/2013)
149 Pre−hearing conference held on 8/1/2013. Evidentiary hearing date of 9/18/2013 is re−set to 10/30/2013 at 10:00 a.m. Pretrial submissions are due by 10/16/2013. Responses to discovery requests are due by 8/9/2013. All depositions will be concluded by 9/30/2013.Pre−hearing conference set for 9/27/2013 at 2:00 p.m. ORDER signed by the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 8/1/2013: Mailed notice (gds) (Entered: 08/05/2013)
150 MAIL returned for document #147 and 148 sent to Joseph Derencius as undeliverable; unable to forward. (mb, ) (Entered: 09/10/2013)
151 MAIL returned for document #147 and 148 sent to Robert Cook as undeliverable; unable to forward. (mb, ) (Entered: 09/10/2013)
152 MAIL returned for document #147 and 148 sent to Louis Davis as undeliverable; unable to forward. (mb, ) (Entered: 09/10/2013)
153 MAIL returned for document #147 and 148 sent to William Evans as undeliverable; unable to forward. REMAILED document #147 and 148 at Danville − DCR. (mb, ) (Entered: 09/10/2013)
154 MAIL returned for document #147 and 148 sent to Isaac Briggs as undeliverable; unable to forward. REMAILED document #147 and 148 to Isaac Briggs at his current address. (mb, ) (Entered: 09/10/2013)
155 MINUTE entry before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Pretrial conference date of 9/27/2013 is re−set to 10/3/2013 at 11:00 a.m. Mailed notice (gds) (Entered: 09/16/2013)
156 MOTION by Plaintiff Charles King for sanctions (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit 4, # 5 Exhibit 5, # 6 Exhibit 6)(Van Brunt, Alexa) (Entered: 09/18/2013)
157 MOTION by Plaintiff Charles King to amend/correct MOTION by Plaintiffs Andre Brown, Thomas Gilbert, Chioke Hill, Charles King, Andre McGregg, Nelson Muniz, Anthony Smith for rule to show cause 125 (Van Brunt, Alexa) (Entered: 09/18/2013)
158 NOTICE of Motion by Alexa Van Brunt for presentment of motion for sanctions 156 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 9/26/2013 at 09:15 AM. (Van Brunt, Alexa) (Entered: 09/18/2013)
159 NOTICE by All Plaintiffs Filing of Expert Report (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit)(Van Brunt, Alexa) (Entered: 09/23/2013)
160 MINUTE entry before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Motion hearing held on 9/26/2013 regarding plaintiffs' motion for sanctions 156 which is continued to 10/3/2013, at 10:00 a.m. The pretrial conference is re−set to 10/3/2013 at 10:00 a.m. − not the 10/4/2013 date announced in open court. Mailed notice (gds) (Entered: 09/27/2013)
161 ATTORNEY Appearance for Plaintiffs Andre Brown, Thomas Gilbert, Chioke Hill, Charles King, M.H., Andre McGregg, Nelson Muniz, Anthony Smith by Alexa Van Brunt (on behalf of 711 Law Student Erin L. Ramamurthy) (Van Brunt, Alexa) (Entered: 10/02/2013)
162 MOTION by Plaintiff Charles King to compel Defendants' Response to Plaintiffs Third Set of Interrogatories (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B)(Van Brunt, Alexa) (Entered: 10/02/2013)

Case: 1:06-cv-204 As of: 02/27/2016 05:10 PM CST 14 of 18

10/03/2013
10/03/2013 10/03/2013 10/18/2013 10/18/2013 10/18/2013 10/18/2013 10/21/2013 10/21/2013 10/21/2013 10/22/2013
10/22/2013 10/22/2013 10/22/2013 10/22/2013

163 ORDER signed by the Honorable Judge Gettleman on 10/3/2013: Pretrial conference held on 10/3/2013. Motion for sanctions 156 is withdrawn. Motion to compel 162 is denied. Pre−hearing briefs, witness list, exhibit list and any stipulations are due by 10/22/2013. Pretrial conference is continued to 10/29/2013 at 2:00 p.m. Mailed notice (gds) (Entered: 10/03/2013)
164 STIPULATION (Lovellette, Kevin) (Entered: 10/03/2013)
165 NOTICE by Jesse Montgomery, Roger E Walker re stipulation 164 (Lovellette, Kevin) (Entered: 10/03/2013)
166 MOTION by Plaintiffs Andre Brown, Thomas Gilbert, Chioke Hill, Charles King, Andre McGregg, Nelson Muniz, Anthony Smith for writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum (Geovany Valencia) (Van Brunt, Alexa) (Entered: 10/18/2013)
167 MOTION by Plaintiffs Andre Brown, Thomas Gilbert, Chioke Hill, Charles King, Andre McGregg, Nelson Muniz, Anthony Smith for writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum (Joaquin Rocha) (Van Brunt, Alexa) (Entered: 10/18/2013)
168 MOTION by Plaintiffs Andre Brown, Thomas Gilbert, Chioke Hill, Charles King, Andre McGregg, Nelson Muniz, Anthony Smith for writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum (Pedro Valle) (Van Brunt, Alexa) (Entered: 10/18/2013)
169 NOTICE of Motion by Alexa Van Brunt for presentment of writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum 166 , writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum 167 , writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum 168 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 10/23/2013 at 09:15 AM. (Van Brunt, Alexa) (Entered: 10/18/2013)
170 MINUTE entry before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Motions 166 167 168 to issue writs of habeas corpus ad testificandum are granted. Mailed notice (gds) (Entered: 10/21/2013)
174 MOTION by Defendants Jesse Montgomery, Roger E Walker to bar expert testimony (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B)(Lovellette, Kevin) (Entered: 10/21/2013)
175 NOTICE of Motion by Kevin R. Lovellette for presentment of motion to bar 174 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 10/23/2013 at 09:15 AM. (Lovellette, Kevin) (Entered: 10/21/2013)
176 TRIAL Brief (Pre−Hearing Brief) by Andre Brown, Thomas Gilbert, Chioke Hill, Charles King, Andre McGregg, Nelson Muniz, Anthony Smith (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A; Consent Decree, # 2 Exhibit B: Notice of Rights, # 3 Exhibit C: Parole Violation Report, # 4 Exhibit D: Hearing Report, # 5 Exhibit E: Pls' Summary of Evidence, # 6 Exhibit F: Young Report, # 7 Exhibit G: Young Dep, # 8 Exhibit H: McCray Dep, # 9 Exhibit I: Joiner Dep, # 10 Exhibit J: Norton Dep, # 11 Exhibit K: Shipinski Dep, # 12 Exhibit L: Moscato Dep, # 13 Exhibit M: James Dep, # 14 Exhibit N: Frankie Rushing Dec, # 15 Exhibit O: James Lohnes Dec, # 16 Exhibit P: Eric Delgadillo Dec, # 17 Exhibit Q: Ronnie Walker Dec, # 18 Exhibit R: Bruce Bandy Dec, # 19 Exhibit S: Enos DiMarea Dec, # 20 Exhibit T: Keith Brown Dec, # 21 Exhibit U: Christopher Lukes Dec, # 22 Exhibit V: Kremien Dec)(Van Brunt, Alexa) (Entered: 10/22/2013)
177 SEALED EXHIBIT by Plaintiffs Andre Brown, Thomas Gilbert, Chioke Hill, Charles King, Andre McGregg, Nelson Muniz, Anthony Smith Exhibit M−1 regarding trial brief,,, 176 (Van Brunt, Alexa) (Entered: 10/22/2013)
178 STIPULATION (Plaintiffs' Proposed Stipulations) (Van Brunt, Alexa) (Entered: 10/22/2013)
179 WITNESS List by Andre Brown, Thomas Gilbert, Chioke Hill, Charles King, Andre McGregg, Nelson Muniz, Anthony Smith (Van Brunt, Alexa) (Entered: 10/22/2013)
180 Exhibit List by Andre Brown, Thomas Gilbert, Chioke Hill, Charles King, Andre McGregg, Nelson Muniz, Anthony Smith. (Van Brunt, Alexa) (Entered: 10/22/2013)

Case: 1:06-cv-204 As of: 02/27/2016 05:10 PM CST 15 of 18

10/22/2013 10/22/2013 10/23/2013
10/28/2013 10/28/2013 10/28/2013
10/29/2013 10/29/2013 10/30/2013 10/31/2013
11/04/2013 11/07/2013 11/15/2013 12/13/2013 01/05/2014 01/08/2014 01/27/2014 02/11/2014

181 TRIAL Brief (Outline of the Case) by Jesse Montgomery, Roger E Walker (Lovellette, Kevin) (Entered: 10/22/2013)
182 WITNESS List by Jesse Montgomery, Roger E Walker (Lovellette, Kevin) (Entered: 10/22/2013)
183 Motion hearing held on 10/23/2013. Defendants' motion to bar 174 expert testimony is granted in part. In addition to the evidentiary hearing scheduled for 10/30/2013 and 10/31/2013, a pretrial conference is set for 10/28/2013 at 10:30 a.m. ORDER signed by the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 10/23/2013: Mailed notice (gds) (Entered: 10/24/2013)
184 STIPULATION (Parties' Agreed Joint Stipulations of Fact) (Van Brunt, Alexa) (Entered: 10/28/2013)
185 Joint Statement of Disputed Fact STATEMENT by Jesse Montgomery, Roger E Walker and Plaintiffs (Lovellette, Kevin) (Entered: 10/28/2013)
186 Pre−hearing conference hearing held on 10/28/2013. The Court will not consider the expert report or testimony of Michael Krezmien in connection with the upcoming evidentiary hearing. Pre−hearing conference scheduled for 10/29/2013 is canceled. Stipulations of uncontested and contested facts are due by 10/29/2013. ORDER signed by the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 10/28/2013: Mailed notice (gds) (Entered: 10/29/2013)
187 Exhibit List (Amended) by Andre Brown, Thomas Gilbert, Chioke Hill, Charles King, Andre McGregg, Nelson Muniz, Anthony Smith. (Van Brunt, Alexa) (Entered: 10/29/2013)
188 WITNESS List by Andre Brown, Thomas Gilbert, Chioke Hill, Charles King, Andre McGregg, Nelson Muniz, Anthony Smith (Van Brunt, Alexa) (Entered: 10/29/2013)
189 MINUTE entry before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Evidentiary hearing begins on 10/30/2013. Evidence heard in part. Evidentiary Hearing continued to 10/31/2013 at 10:00 a.m. Mailed notice (gds) (Entered: 11/01/2013)
190 MINUTE entry before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Evidentiary hearing resumed on 10/31/2013. Further evidence heard. Status hearing regarding post−hearing matters is set for 11/4/2013 at 10:00 a.m. Mailed notice (gds) (Entered: 11/01/2013)
191 MINUTE entry before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Post−hearing conference held on 11/4/2013 and is continued to 11/15/2013 at 9:30 a.m. Mailed notice (gds) (Entered: 11/05/2013)
192 STIPULATION as to the Testimony of Denine Moscato (Van Brunt, Alexa) (Entered: 11/07/2013)
193 MINUTE entry before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Post hearing conference held on 11/15/2013 and is continued to 12/13/2013 at 11:00 a.m. Mailed notice (gds) (Entered: 11/15/2013)
194 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Post−hearing conference held on 12/13/2013 and is continued to 1/27/2014 at 11:00 a.m. Mailed notice (gds) (Entered: 12/13/2013)
195 FILED on the incorrect docket. (Henretty, Lyle) (Docket Text Modified by Clerks Office.). (Entered: 01/05/2014)
196 NOTICE of Correction regarding document 195 . (tlm) (Entered: 01/08/2014)
197 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Post−hearing conference held on 1/27/2014 and is continued to 2/11/2014 at 2:00 p.m. Mailed notice (gds) (Entered: 01/31/2014)
198 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Conference held on 2/11/2014 and is continued to 3/21/2014 at 1:30 p.m. Mailed notice (gds) (Entered: 02/13/2014)

Case: 1:06-cv-204 As of: 02/27/2016 05:10 PM CST 16 of 18

02/27/2014

199 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS held on 10−30−2013 before the Honorable Ronald A. Guzman. Vol 1 of 2. Court Reporter Contact Information: Judith A. Walsh, 312.702.8865.

IMPORTANT: The transcript may be viewed at the court's public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through the Court Reporter/Transcriber or PACER. For further information on the redaction process, see the Court's web site at www.ilnd.uscourts.gov under Quick Links select Policy Regarding the Availability of Transcripts of Court Proceedings.

03/21/2014 04/07/2014 04/15/2014 04/24/2014 04/24/2014 06/27/2014
06/27/2014 06/27/2014 07/02/2014
07/29/2014 07/29/2014 07/31/2014

Redaction Request due 3/20/2014. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 3/31/2014. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 5/28/2014. (walsh, Judy) (Entered: 02/27/2014)
200 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Settlement conference held on 3/21/2014. Settlement Conference set for 4/7/2014 at 09:15 a.m. Mailed notice (gds) (Entered: 03/24/2014)
201 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Settlement Conference is re−set to 4/15/2014 at 9:30 a.m. Mailed notice (gds) (Entered: 04/07/2014)
202 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Settlement conference held on 4/15/2014. Final amended consent decree is due by 4/22/2014. The Court will inform the parties if a further conference is required. Mailed notice (gds) (Entered: 04/22/2014)
203 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Defendants' status report is due by 10/17/2014. Plaintiffs' response is due by 11/14/2014. Status hearing is set for 11/25/2014 at 10:00 a.m. Mailed notice (gds) (Entered: 04/24/2014)
204 AMENDED FINAL CONSENT ORDER Signed by the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 4/24/2014. Mailed notice (tlm) (Entered: 04/28/2014)
205 PETITION for Attorneys' Fees and Costs (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A: Correspondence Between Alexa Van Brunt and Kevin Lovelette, # 2 Exhibit B: Hours of Plaintiffs' Counsel, # 3 Exhibit C: Declarations of Class Counsel, # 4 Exhibit D: Fox v. Barnes, # 5 Exhibit E: Anderson Affidavit, # 6 Exhibit F: Cost Spreadsheet)(Van Brunt, Alexa) (Entered: 06/27/2014)
206 MOTION by Plaintiffs Andre Brown, Thomas Gilbert, Chioke Hill, Charles King, Andre McGregg, Nelson Muniz, Anthony Smith to set a briefing schedule on Plaintiffs' Petition for Attorneys' Fees and Costs (Van Brunt, Alexa) (Entered: 06/27/2014)
207 NOTICE of Motion by Alexa Van Brunt for presentment of motion by filer to set a briefing schedule 206 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 7/2/2014 at 09:15 AM. (Van Brunt, Alexa) (Entered: 06/27/2014)
208 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Motion hearing held on 7/2/2014. Plaintiffs' motion to set a briefing schedule 206 on petitioni for attorneys' fees and costs is granted. Response is due by 8/4/2014. Reply is due by 8/18/2014. Status hearing set for 10/7/2014 at 09:00 a.m. Mailed notice (gds) (Entered: 07/08/2014)
209 MOTION by Defendants Jesse Montgomery, Roger E Walker to strike order on motion to set a briefing schedule,, motion hearing,, set/reset hearings, 208 (Lovellette, Kevin) (Entered: 07/29/2014)
210 NOTICE of Motion by Kevin R. Lovellette for presentment of motion to strike, motion for relief,, 209 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 7/31/2014 at 09:15 AM. (Lovellette, Kevin) (Entered: 07/29/2014)
211 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Motion hearing held on 7/31/2014. Motion 209 to strike briefing schedule is granted. Status hearing date of 10/7/2014 is re−set to 8/21/2014 at 9:00 a.m. Mailed notice (gds) (Entered: 08/07/2014)

Case: 1:06-cv-204 As of: 02/27/2016 05:10 PM CST 17 of 18

08/21/2014 08/25/2014 09/09/2014 09/29/2014 09/30/2014 10/14/2014 10/17/2014 10/23/2014
10/23/2014 10/28/2014
10/28/2014 10/28/2014 10/28/2014
10/31/2014 10/31/2014
11/07/2014

212 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Status hearing held on 8/21/2014. Settlement conference is set for 8/25/2014 at 10:30 a.m. Mailed notice (gds) (Entered: 08/21/2014)
213 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Settlement conference held on 8/25/2014 and is continued to 9/10/2014 at 1:30 p.m. Mailed notice (gds) (Entered: 08/28/2014)
214 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Settlement conference date of 9/10/2014 is re−set to 9/30/2014 at 8:30 a.m. Mailed notice (gds) (Entered: 09/09/2014)
215 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: The time of the 9/30/2014 settlement conference is re−set to 10:30 a.m. Mailed notice (gds) (Entered: 09/29/2014)
216 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Settlement conference held on 9/30/2014 and is continued to 10/14/2014 at 2:30 p.m. Mailed notice (gds) (Entered: 10/03/2014)
217 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Settlement conference held on 10/14/2014. Settlement Conference set for 10/28/2014 at 1:30 p.m. Mailed notice (gds) (Entered: 10/17/2014)
218 STATUS Report by Jesse Montgomery, Roger E Walker (Lovellette, Kevin) (Entered: 10/17/2014)
219 MOTION by Plaintiffs Andre Brown, Thomas Gilbert, Chioke Hill, Charles King, Andre McGregg, Nelson Muniz, Anthony Smith for order Granting Plaintiffs Access to Cook County Jail (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A: Correspondence NULS and Scouffas, # 2 Exhibit B: Scouffas Letter to Class Counsel)(Van Brunt, Alexa) (SEALED) Modified on 10/28/2014 (ph, ). (Entered: 10/23/2014)
220 NOTICE of Motion by Alexa Van Brunt for presentment of motion for order, 219 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 10/28/2014 at 09:15 AM. (Van Brunt, Alexa) (Entered: 10/23/2014)
221 PETITION for Attorneys' Fees and Costs (Amended) (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A: Correspondence Between Alexa Van Brunt and Kevin Lovelette, # 2 Exhibit B: Hours of Plaintiffs' Counsel, # 3 Exhibit C: Declarations of Class Counsel, # 4 Exhibit D: Fox v. Barnes, # 5 Exhibit E: Anderson Affidavit, # 6 Exhibit F: Cost Spreadsheet)(Van Brunt, Alexa) (Entered: 10/28/2014)
222 NOTICE by Andre Brown, Thomas Gilbert, Chioke Hill, Charles King, Andre McGregg, Nelson Muniz, Anthony Smith re petition, 221 (Van Brunt, Alexa) (Entered: 10/28/2014)
223 NOTICE of Motion by Alexa Van Brunt for presentment of before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 10/31/2014 at 11:00 AM. (Van Brunt, Alexa) (Entered: 10/28/2014)
224 ORDER Entered by the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 10/28/2014: Settlement conference held. The Clerk is directed to place motion (219) to grant plaintiffs access to Cook County Jail, under seal. Plaintiffs are given leave to file a redacted copy of said motion. The motion is continued to 10/31/2014, at 11:00 a.m. Mailed notice (tlm) (Entered: 10/28/2014)
225 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Motion hearing held on 10/31/2014. Motion for order 219 to grant access to Cook County Jail is withdrawn. Mailed notice (gds) (Entered: 10/31/2014)
226 ORDER plaintiffs' amended petition for attorneys' fees is granted. A judgment is entered against the defendants ordering them to pay plaintiffs' counsel $140,000 for their attorneys' fees and costs. signed by the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 10/31/2014. Status hearing date of 11/25/2014 is stricken. Mailed notice (gds) (Entered: 10/31/2014)
232 MAIL RETURNED, for document # 224 sent to Joseph Derencius, Louise Davis, and Robert Cook returned as undeliverable, return to sender. No new contact

Case: 1:06-cv-204 As of: 02/27/2016 05:10 PM CST 18 of 18

11/17/2014 11/17/2014 11/24/2014 12/19/2014 02/18/2015

information received. (On 11/7/14 the Clerks' Office received the returned mail undeliverable. The envelope was not imaged until 1/29/16. Judicial Officer notified of delay.) (Attachments: # 1 Louis Davis, # 2 Robert Cook) (td, ) (Entered: 02/01/2016)
227 MOTION by Plaintiffs Thomas Gilbert, Chioke Hill, Charles King, Andre McGregg, Nelson Muniz, Anthony Smith for extension of time (Bedi, Sheila) (Entered: 11/17/2014)
228 NOTICE of Motion by Sheila A Bedi for presentment of extension of time 227 before Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 11/25/2014 at 09:15 AM. (Bedi, Sheila) (Entered: 11/17/2014)
229 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman: Plaintiffs' motion 227 for an extension of time to 12/19/2014 to file a status report is granted. Motion presentment date of 11/25/2014 is stricken. Mailed notice (gds) (Entered: 11/24/2014)
230 STATUS Report by Andre Brown, Thomas Gilbert, Chioke Hill, Charles King, Nelson Muniz, Anthony Smith (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit 4, # 5 Exhibit 5)(Bedi, Sheila) (Entered: 12/19/2014)
231 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS held on 10/31/2013 before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman. Volume 2. Court Reporter Contact Information: Judith A. Walsh, CSR, RDR, CRR. 312−702−8865. judith_walsh@ilnd.uscourts.gov.
IMPORTANT: The transcript may be viewed at the court's public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through the Court Reporter/Transcriber or PACER. For further information on the redaction process, see the Court's web site at www.ilnd.uscourts.gov under Quick Links select Policy Regarding the Availability of Transcripts of Court Proceedings.
Redaction Request due 3/11/2015. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 3/23/2015. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 5/19/2015. (walsh, Judy) (Docket text modified on 2/19/2015 by Clerk's Office. (tlm). (Entered: 02/18/2015)


[CONTENT] January 13, 2006 | Illinois | 42 | the U.S. District Court | the Northern District | Illinois ||| the Illinois Department of Corrections ||| the Due Process Clause | the Fourteenth Amendment | Court ||| May 8, 2006 | Robert W. Gettleman | more than 10 |||  |||  ||| November 2, 2006 | January 26, 2007 |||  ||| DOC | Hearing Officers ||| Court | one year ||| January 23, 2008 ||| Court ||| 2012 | Northwestern University | the Uptown People's Law Center ||| November 30, 2012 ||| October 30 and 31, 2013 |||  ||| second | April 24, 2014 ||| one year | 90 days | 15 ||| Court ||| 140,000 | October 31, 2014 |||  [SUMMARY] On January 13, 2006, Illinois parolees who were re-arrested for alleged parole violations filed this class action complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois.  Represented by private counsel, the plaintiffs sued the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC) arguing that they had been unconstitutionally denied a timely parole revocation hearing. For violations of their constitutional rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the plaintiffs asked the Court for preliminary and permanent injunctions.  

On May 8, 2006, the court (Judge Robert W. Gettleman) certified a class consisting of individuals held for more than 10 business days without a preliminary parole revocation hearing.  The court also granted the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction.  The court found that the parolees had a constitutional right to a prompt, preliminary parole revocation hearing and a limited constitutional right to confront and cross examine persons who had provided testimony or evidence which could be used to revoke parole. 

On November 2, 2006, the parties reached a settlement and submitted the proposed agreement to the court, which approved the consent decree on January 26, 2007.  The consent decree set specific timelines, notice provisions, and guidelines for inspections for revocation hearings. It prohibited the assignment of any DOC employee or agent from serving as Hearing Officers.  The Court also appointed a monitor to assess progress for one year after entry of the consent decree,  to be paid for his services by the defendant.  On January 23, 2008, the monitor reported that the defendants had achieved substantial compliance with the provisions of the consent decree. The Court approved the final report and discharged the monitor.

In 2012, new lawyers appeared for the plaintiff class, from the Roderick Macarthur Justice Center, at Northwestern University law school, and the Uptown People's Law Center.  On November 30, 2012, the plaintiffs moved for a rule to show cause alleging that the defendants were no longer complying with the consent decree.  On October 30 and 31, 2013, the court conducted an evidentiary hearing on the allegations.  After the hearing, the parties stated they wanted to resolve the matter via settlement, so the court reserved ruling on the motion to show cause.  The parties did reach a second settlement agreement, and on April 24, 2014, the court approved an amended consent decree.  For one year and 90 days following the entry of the amended consent decree, the plaintiffs' counsel had the opportunity to observe 15 parole hearings.  The parties reserved the determination of attorneys' fees and costs for the Court. 

After proceedings regarding attorneys' fees and costs, the court awarded the plaintiffs $140,000 for attorneys' fees and costs on October 31, 2014.  

The case is closed. 