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Victor Viramontes* Jorge M. Castillo* MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FUND 634 S. Spring Street, 11th Floor Los Angeles, CA 90014 T: 213.629.2512 vviramontes@maldef.org jcastillo@maldef.org Burth López* MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FUND 1016 16th Street, Suite 100, Washington, D.C. 20036 T: 202.572.0695 blopez@maldef.org

Sarah Schoettle* MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FUND 11 E. Adams Street, Suite 700 Chicago, IL 60603 T: 312. 427.0701 sschoettle@maldef.org
*Pro hac application to be filed Nathan Horsley Mark Begnaud HORSLEY BEGNAUD LLC 750 Hammond Drive, Building 12, Suite 300 Atlanta GA 30328 T: 770.765.5559 nhorsley@gacivilrights.com mbegnaud@gacivilrights.com Attorneys for Plaintiffs

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION

GEORGIA LATINO ALLIANCE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, an organization, LORENA GUILLEN, an individual, and KARLA LOPEZ, an individual,

CASE NO. COMPLAINT

Plaintiffs, v.

C. DEAN ALFORD, member of the Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia, in his individual and official capacity; W. PAUL BOWERS,

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member of the Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia, in his individual and official capacity; LORI DURDEN, member of the Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia, in her individual and official capacity; LARRY R. ELLIS, member of the Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia, in his individual and official capacity; RUTLEDGE A. GRIFFIN, JR., member of the Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia, in his individual and official capacity; C. THOMAS HOPKINS, Jr., member of the Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia, in his individual and official capacity; JAMES M. HULL, member of the Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia, in his individual and official capacity; DONALD M. LEEBERN, JR., member of the Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia, in his individual and official capacity; DOREEN STILES POITEVINT, member of the Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia, in her individual and official capacity; NEIL L. PRUITT, JR, member of the Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia, in his individual and official capacity; SACHIN SHAILENDRA, member of the Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia, in his individual and official capacity; E. SCOTT SMITH, member of the Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia, in his individual and official capacity; KESSEL D.
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STELLING, JR., member of the Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia, in his individual and official capacity; BENJAMIN J. TARBUTTON, III, member of the Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia, in his individual and official capacity; RICHARD L. TUCKER, member of the Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia, in his individual and official capacity; THOMAS ROGERS WADE, member of the Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia, in his individual and official capacity; LARRY WALKER, member of the Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia, in his individual and official capacity; DON L. WATERS, member of the Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia, in his individual and official capacity; PHILIP A. WILHEIT, SR., member of the Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia, in his individual and official capacity; DR. DAVID C. BRIDGES, President of Abraham Baldwin Agricultural College, in his individual and official capacity; DR. ARTHUR N. DUNNING, President of Albany State University, in his individual and official capacity; DR. LINDA BLEICKEN, President of Armstrong State University, in her individual and official capacity; DR. GARY A. MCGAHA, President of Atlanta Metropolitan State College, in his individual and official capacity; SHAWN MCGEE, President of Bainbridge State College, in his individual and official
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capacity; DR. THOMAS J. “TIM” HYNES, President of Clayton State University, in his individual and official capacity; DR. GREGORY F. ALOIA, President of College of Coastal Georgia, in his individual and official capacity; DR. CHRIS MARKWOOD, President of Columbus State University, in his individual and official capacity; DR. MARGARET VENABLE, President of Dalton State College, in her individual and official capacity; DR. RICHARD CARVAJAL, President of Darton State College, in his individual and official capacity; DR. ROBERT G. BOEHMER, President of East Georgia State College, in his individual and official capacity, DR. PAUL JONES, President of Fort Valley State University, in his individual and official capacity; DR. STAS PRECZEWSKI, President of Georgia Gwinnett College, in his individual and official capacity; DR. DONALD GREEN, President of Georgia Highlands College, in his individual and official capacity; DR. JEAN BARTELS, President of Georgia Southern University, in her individual and official capacity; DR. CHARLES PATTERSON, President of Georgia Southwestern State University, in his individual and official capacity; DR. MARK P. BECKER, President of Georgia State University, in his individual and official capacity; DR. MAX BURNS, President of Gordon State College, in his individual and official capacity; DR. DANIEL S. PAPP, President of Kennesaw State University, in his
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individual and official capacity; DR. CHRISTOPHER BLAKE, President of Middle Georgia State University, in his individual and official capacity; DR. CHERYL DAVENPORT DOZIER, President of Savannah State University, in her individual and official capacity; DR. VIRGINIA CARSON, President of South Georgia State College, in her individual and official capacity; DR. BONITA JACOBS, President of University of North Georgia, in her individual and official capacity; DR. KYLE MARRERO, President of University of West Georgia, in his individual and official capacity; and DR. CECIL STATON, President of Valdosta State University, in his individual and official capacity
Defendants.
INTRODUCTION
1. This action challenges Defendants’ policy of denying in-state tuition to
certain non U.S. citizens who are legally present in the United States. Specifically,
Defendants deny in-state tuition to individuals who have been granted immigration
relief in the form of deferred action.
2. Deferred action recipients are permitted to stay in the United States for a
period of time designated by the federal government, are shielded from removal
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proceedings during that time, and may be granted work authorization and a Social Security Number.
3. Defendants’ acts, which deny in-state tuition to deferred action grantees, violate the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution because they are preempted by federal immigration law and the federal government’s exclusive authority to regulate immigration.
4. Defendants’ acts also violate the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause because they deny in-state tuition to DACA recipients without any valid justification.
5. Plaintiff Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights (GLAHR) has redirected resources to address Defendants’ illegal acts, which deny in-state tuition to eligible individuals. GLAHR’s mission has further been compromised because Defendant’s illegal acts negatively affect the constituency it serves, and undermines GLAHR’s educational mission, among other reasons.
6. Plaintiff Lorena Guillen is a deferred action recipient, attending a University System of Georgia institution. She is paying an out-of- state tuition rate, yet, she resides in Georgia.
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7. Plaintiff Karla Lopez is a deferred action recipient, attending a University System of Georgia institution. She is paying an out-of-state tuition rate, yet, she resides in Georgia.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 8. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343 over Plaintiffs’ claims under the U.S. Constitution. The Court has authority to grant declaratory relief under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202. 9. Venue is proper in this district under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). All Defendants are sued in their individual and official capacity and most have official places of business located within this District. Events giving rise to this Complaint also occurred within this District.
PARTIES Plaintiffs
10. Plaintiff GLAHR is a non-profit organization in Georgia. GLAHR educates, organizes, and empowers Latinos in Georgia to defend and advance their civil and human rights. GLAHR’s mission includes making education, including higher education, a human right available to all in Georgia. GLAHR’s employees and volunteers work to further GLAHR’s mission. GLAHR has developed a program to assist eligible individuals with deferred action applications. In that
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capacity, GLAHR informs prospective and current students attending or considering attending the University System of Georgia about paying for schooling. Because of Defendants’ illegal acts, which bar deferred action recipients from receiving in-state tuition, GLAHR must redirect time and resources towards informing students about alternative options for paying for college. Rather than assisting in the processing of additional deferred action applications, GLAHR is forced to redirect resources toward addressing Defendant’s illegal instate tuition actions.
11. Plaintiff Lorena Guillen is a resident of Georgia and graduated from a Georgia high school. She is a deferred action recipient; as such she is lawfully present in the U.S. and has federal work authorization. She attends Perimeter College, a University System of Georgia institution. Defendants deny her in-state tuition because they classify her as not lawfully present, and, except for Defendants’ improper classification, she is eligible for in-state tuition. Plaintiff Guillen pays out-of-state tuition rates. She has restricted her major because she has to pay elevated out-of-state tuition rates. She is contemplating discontinuing her studies because of her inability to pay out-of-state rates.
12. Plaintiff Karla Lopez is a resident of Georgia and graduated from a Georgia high school. She is a deferred action recipient; as such she is lawfully
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present in the U.S. and has federal work authorization. She attends Perimeter College, a University System of Georgia institution. Ms. Lopez is currently majoring in pre-medical studies and hopes to become a medical doctor. Defendants deny her in-state tuition because they classify her as not lawfully present, and, except for Defendants’ improper classification, she is eligible for instate tuition. Plaintiff Lopez pays out-of-state tuition rates. She has restricted the number of credit hours she takes each year because of the cost of the elevated tuition rates. As a result, it will take her longer than four years to graduate with a bachelor’s degree. Defendant Members of the Board of Regents
13. Defendant C. Dean Alford is a member of the Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia (“Board of Regents”). As a member of the Board of Regents, Defendant Alford governs, controls, and manages the public colleges and universities that comprise the University System of Georgia, and is responsible for implementing and enforcing the practice of assessing a higher tuition rate for students classified as out-of-state students under Official Code of Georgia Annotated (O.C.G.A.) §§ 20-3-66 and 50-36-1, and Board of Regents Policies 4.3.2.3., 4.3.4., and 7.3.4.
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14. Defendant W. Paul Bowers is a member of the Board of Regents. As a member of the Board of Regents, Defendant Bowers governs, controls, and manages the public colleges and universities that comprise the University System of Georgia, and is responsible for implementing and enforcing the practice of assessing a higher tuition rate for students classified as out-of-state students under O.C.G.A. §§ 20-3-66 and 50-36-1, and Board of Regents Policies 4.3.2.3., 4.3.4., and 7.3.4.
15. Defendant Lori Durden is a member of the Board of Regents. As a member of the Board of Regents, Defendant Durden governs, controls, and manages the public colleges and universities that comprise the University System of Georgia, and is responsible for implementing and enforcing the practice of assessing a higher tuition rate for students classified as out-of-state students under O.C.G.A. §§ 20-3-66 and 50-36-1, and Board of Regents Policies 4.3.2.3., 4.3.4., and 7.3.4.
16. Defendant Larry R. Ellis is a member of the Board of Regents. As a member of the Board of Regents, Defendant Ellis governs, controls, and manages the public colleges and universities that comprise the University System of Georgia, and is responsible for implementing and enforcing the practice of assessing a higher tuition rate for students classified as out-of-state students under
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O.C.G.A. §§ 20-3-66 and 50-36-1, and Board of Regents Policies 4.3.2.3., 4.3.4., and 7.3.4.
17. Defendant Rutledge A. Griffin, Jr. is a member of the Board of Regents. As a member of the Board of Regents, Defendant Griffin governs, controls, and manages the public colleges and universities that comprise the University System of Georgia, and is responsible for implementing and enforcing the practice of assessing a higher tuition rate for students classified as out-of-state students under O.C.G.A. §§ 20-3-66 and 50-36-1, and Board of Regents Policies 4.3.2.3., 4.3.4., and 7.3.4.
18. Defendant C. Thomas Hopkins, Jr. is a member of the Board of Regents. As a member of the Board of Regents, Defendant Hopkins governs, controls, and manages the public colleges and universities that comprise the University System of Georgia, and is responsible for implementing and enforcing the practice of assessing a higher tuition rate for students classified as out-of-state students under O.C.G.A. §§ 20-3-66 and 50-36-1, and Board of Regents Policies 4.3.2.3., 4.3.4., and 7.3.4.
19. Defendant James M. Hull is a member of the Board of Regents. As a member of the Board of Regents, Defendant Hull governs, controls, and manages the public colleges and universities that comprise the University System
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of Georgia, and is responsible for implementing and enforcing the practice of assessing a higher tuition rate for students classified as out-of-state students under O.C.G.A. §§ 20-3-66 and 50-36-1, and Board of Regents Policies 4.3.2.3., 4.3.4., and 7.3.4.
20. Defendant Donald M. Leebern, Jr., is a member of the Board of Regents. As a member of the Board of Regents, Defendant Leebern governs, controls, and manages the public colleges and universities that comprise the University System of Georgia, and is responsible for implementing and enforcing the practice of assessing a higher tuition rate for students classified as out-of-state students under O.C.G.A. §§ 20-3-66 and 50-36-1, and Board of Regents Policies 4.3.2.3., 4.3.4., and 7.3.4.
21. Defendant Doreen Stiles Poitevint is a member of the Board of Regents. As a member of the Board of Regents, Defendant Poitevint governs, controls, and manages the public colleges and universities that comprise the University System of Georgia, and is responsible for implementing and enforcing the practice of assessing a higher tuition rate for students classified as out-of-state students under O.C.G.A. §§ 20-3-66 and 50-36-1, and Board of Regents Policies 4.3.2.3., 4.3.4., and 7.3.4.
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22. Defendant Neil L. Pruitt, Jr., is a member of the Board of Regents. As a member of the Board of Regents, Defendant Pruitt governs, controls, and manages the public colleges and universities that comprise the University System of Georgia, and is responsible for implementing and enforcing the practice of assessing a higher tuition rate for students classified as out-of-state students under O.C.G.A. §§ 20-3-66 and 50-36-1, and Board of Regents Policies 4.3.2.3., 4.3.4., and 7.3.4.
23. Defendant Sachin Shailendra is a member of the Board of Regents. As a member of the Board of Regents, Defendant Shailendra governs, controls, and manages the public colleges and universities that comprise the University System of Georgia, and is responsible for implementing and enforcing the practice of assessing a higher tuition rate for students classified as out-of-state students under O.C.G.A. §§ 20-3-66 and 50-36-1, and Board of Regents Policies 4.3.2.3., 4.3.4., and 7.3.4.
24. Defendant E. Scott Smith is a member of the Board of Regents. As a member of the Board of Regents, Defendant Smith governs, controls, and manages the public colleges and universities that comprise the University System of Georgia, and is responsible for implementing and enforcing the practice of assessing a higher tuition rate for students classified as out-of-state students under
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O.C.G.A. §§ 20-3-66 and 50-36-1, and Board of Regents Policies 4.3.2.3., 4.3.4., and 7.3.4.
25. Defendant Kessel D. Stelling, Jr. is a member of the Board of Regents. As a member of the Board of Regents, Defendant Stelling governs, controls, and manages the public colleges and universities that comprise the University System of Georgia, and is responsible for implementing and enforcing the practice of assessing a higher tuition rate for students classified as out-of-state students under O.C.G.A. §§ 20-3-66 and 50-36-1, and Board of Regents Policies 4.3.2.3., 4.3.4., and 7.3.4.
26. Defendant Benjamin J. Tarbutton, III is a member of the Board of Regents. As a member of the Board of Regents, Defendant Tarbutton governs, controls, and manages the public colleges and universities that comprise the University System of Georgia, and is responsible for implementing and enforcing the practice of assessing a higher tuition rate for students classified as out-of-state students under O.C.G.A. §§ 20-3-66 and 50-36-1, and Board of Regents Policies 4.3.2.3., 4.3.4., and 7.3.4.
27. Defendant Richard L. Tucker is a member of the Board of Regents. As a member of the Board of Regents, Defendant Tucker governs, controls, and manages the public colleges and universities that comprise the University System
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of Georgia, and is responsible for implementing and enforcing the practice of assessing a higher tuition rate for students classified as out-of-state students under O.C.G.A. §§ 20-3-66 and 50-36-1, and Board of Regents Policies 4.3.2.3., 4.3.4., and 7.3.4.
28. Defendant Thomas Rogers Wade is a member of the Board of Regents. As a member of the Board of Regents, Defendant Wade governs, controls, and manages the public colleges and universities that comprise the University System of Georgia, and is responsible for implementing and enforcing the practice of assessing a higher tuition rate for students classified as out-of-state students under O.C.G.A. §§ 20-3-66 and 50-36-1, and Board of Regents Policies 4.3.2.3., 4.3.4., and 7.3.4.
29. Defendant Larry Walker is a member of the Board of Regents. As a member of the Board of Regents, Defendant Walker governs, controls, and manages the public colleges and universities that comprise the University System of Georgia, and is responsible for implementing and enforcing the practice of assessing a higher tuition rate for students classified as out-of-state students under O.C.G.A. §§ 20-3-66 and 50-36-1, and Board of Regents Policies 4.3.2.3., 4.3.4., and 7.3.4.
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30. Defendant Don L. Waters is a member of the Board of Regents. As a member of the Board of Regents, Defendant Waters governs, controls, and manages the public colleges and universities that comprise the University System of Georgia, and is responsible for implementing and enforcing the practice of assessing a higher tuition rate for students classified as out-of-state students under O.C.G.A. §§ 20-3-66 and 50-36-1, and Board of Regents Policies 4.3.2.3., 4.3.4., and 7.3.4.
31. Defendant Philip A. Wilheit, Sr. is a member of the Board of Regents. As a member of the Board of Regents, Defendant Wilheit governs, controls, and manages the public colleges and universities that comprise the University System of Georgia, and is responsible for implementing and enforcing the practice of assessing a higher tuition rate for students classified as out-of-state students under O.C.G.A. §§ 20-3-66 and 50-36-1, and Board of Regents Policies 4.3.2.3., 4.3.4., and 7.3.4. Defendant Presidents
32. Defendant Dr. David C. Bridges is the president of Abraham Baldwin Agricultural College. Defendant Bridges is the executive head of Abraham Baldwin Agricultural College and of all its departments, and directs, supervises, and otherwise affects the operation of Abraham Baldwin Agricultural College.
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Defendant Bridges is responsible to the Board of Regents for the operation and management of Abraham Baldwin Agricultural College and for the execution of all directives of the Board and the Chancellor, including implementing Defendants’ policies to grant or deny requests for in-state tuition. Defendant Bridges is responsible for implementing and enforcing the practice of assessing a higher tuition rate for students classified as out-of-state students under O.C.G.A. §§ 20-366 and 50-36-1, and Board of Regents Policies 4.3.2.3., 4.3.4., and 7.3.4.
33. Defendant Dr. Arthur N. Dunning is the president of Albany State University. Defendant Dunning is the executive head of Albany State University and of all its departments, and directs, supervises, and otherwise affects the operation of Albany State University. Defendant Dunning is responsible to the Board of Regents for the operation and management of Albany State University and for the execution of all directives of the Board and the Chancellor, including implementing Defendants’ policies to grant or deny requests for in-state tuition. Defendant Dunning is responsible for implementing and enforcing the practice of assessing a higher tuition rate for students classified as out-of-state students under O.C.G.A. §§ 20-3-66 and 50-36-1, and Board of Regents Policies 4.3.2.3., 4.3.4., and 7.3.4.
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34. Defendant Dr. Linda Bleicken is the president of Armstrong State University. Defendant Bleicken is the executive head of Armstrong State University and of all its departments, and directs, supervises, and otherwise affects the operation of Armstrong State University. Defendant Bleicken is responsible to the Board of Regents for the operation and management of Armstrong State University and for the execution of all directives of the Board and the Chancellor, including implementing Defendants’ policies to grant or deny requests for in-state tuition. Defendant Bleicken is responsible for implementing and enforcing the practice of assessing a higher tuition rate for students classified as out-of-state students under O.C.G.A. §§ 20-3-66 and 50-36-1, and Board of Regents Policies 4.3.2.3., 4.3.4., and 7.3.4.
35. Defendant Dr. Gary A. McGaha is the president of Atlanta Metropolitan State College. Defendant McGaha is the executive head of Atlanta Metropolitan State College and of all its departments, and directs, supervises, and otherwise affects the operation of Atlanta Metropolitan State College. Defendant McGaha is responsible to the Board of Regents for the operation and management of Atlanta Metropolitan State College and for the execution of all directives of the Board and the Chancellor, including implementing Defendants’ policies to grant or deny requests for in-state tuition. Defendant McGaha is responsible for implementing
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and enforcing the practice of assessing a higher tuition rate for students classified as out-of-state students under O.C.G.A. §§ 20-3-66 and 50-36-1, and Board of Regents Policies 4.3.2.3., 4.3.4., and 7.3.4.
36. Defendant Shawn McGee is the president of Bainbridge State College. Defendant McGee is the executive head of Bainbridge State College and of all its departments, and directs, supervises, and otherwise affects the operation of Bainbridge State College. Defendant McGee is responsible to the Board of Regents for the operation and management of Bainbridge State College and for the execution of all directives of the Board and the Chancellor, including implementing Defendants’ policies to grant or deny requests for in-state tuition. Defendant McGee is responsible for implementing and enforcing the practice of assessing a higher tuition rate for students classified as out-of-state students under O.C.G.A. §§ 20-3-66 and 50-36-1, and Board of Regents Policies 4.3.2.3., 4.3.4., and 7.3.4.
37. Defendant Dr. Thomas J. “Tim” Hynes is the president of Clayton State University. Defendant Hynes is the executive head of Clayton State University and of all its departments, and directs, supervises, and otherwise affects the operation of Clayton State University. Defendant Hynes is responsible to the Board of Regents for the operation and management of Clayton State University
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and for the execution of all directives of the Board and the Chancellor, including implementing Defendants’ policies to grant or deny requests for in-state tuition. Defendant Hynes is responsible for implementing and enforcing the practice of assessing a higher tuition rate for students classified as out-of-state students under O.C.G.A. §§ 20-3-66 and 50-36-1, and Board of Regents Policies 4.3.2.3., 4.3.4., and 7.3.4.
38. Defendant Dr. Gregory F. Aloia is the president of the College of Coastal Georgia. Defendant Aloia is the executive head of the College of Coastal Georgia and of all its departments, and directs, supervises, and otherwise affects the operation of the College of Coastal Georgia. Defendant Aloia is responsible to the Board of Regents for the operation and management of the College of Coastal Georgia and for the execution of all directives of the Board and the Chancellor, including implementing Defendants’ policies to grant or deny requests for in-state tuition. Defendant Aloia is responsible for implementing and enforcing the practice of assessing a higher tuition rate for students classified as out-of-state students under O.C.G.A. §§ 20-3-66 and 50-36-1, and Board of Regents Policies 4.3.2.3., 4.3.4., and 7.3.4.
39. Defendant Dr. Chris Markwood is the president of Columbus State University. Defendant Markwood is the executive head of Columbus State
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University and of all its departments, and directs, supervises, and otherwise affects the operation of Columbus State University. Defendant Markwood is responsible to the Board of Regents for the operation and management of Columbus State University and for the execution of all directives of the Board and the Chancellor, including implementing Defendants’ policies to grant or deny requests for in-state tuition. Defendant Markwood is responsible for implementing and enforcing the practice of assessing a higher tuition rate for students classified as out-of-state students under O.C.G.A. §§ 20-3-66 and 50-36-1, and Board of Regents Policies 4.3.2.3., 4.3.4., and 7.3.4.
40. Defendant Dr. Margaret Venable is the president of Dalton State College. Defendant Venable is the executive head of Dalton State College and of all its departments, and directs, supervises, and otherwise affects the operation of Dalton State College. Defendant Venable is responsible to the Board of Regents for the operation and management of Dalton State College and for the execution of all directives of the Board and the Chancellor, including implementing Defendants’ policies to grant or deny requests for in-state tuition. Defendant Venable is responsible for implementing and enforcing the practice of assessing a higher tuition rate for students classified as out-of-state students under O.C.G.A. §§ 20-366 and 50-36-1, and Board of Regents Policies 4.3.2.3., 4.3.4., and 7.3.4.
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41. Defendant Dr. Richard Carvajal is the president of Darton State College. Defendant Carvajal is the executive head of Darton State College and of all its departments, and directs, supervises, and otherwise affects the operation of Darton State College. Defendant Carvajal is responsible to the Board of Regents for the operation and management of Darton State College and for the execution of all directives of the Board and the Chancellor, including implementing Defendants’ policies to grant or deny requests for in-state tuition. Defendant Carvajal is responsible for implementing and enforcing the practice of assessing a higher tuition rate for students classified as out-of-state students under O.C.G.A. §§ 20-366 and 50-36-1, and Board of Regents Policies 4.3.2.3., 4.3.4., and 7.3.4.
42. Defendant Dr. Robert G. Boehmer is the president of East Georgia State College. Defendant Boehmer is the executive head of East Georgia State College and of all its departments, and directs, supervises, and otherwise affects the operation of East Georgia State College. Defendant Boehmer is responsible to the Board of Regents for the operation and management of East Georgia State College and for the execution of all directives of the Board and the Chancellor, including implementing Defendants’ policies to grant or deny requests for in-state tuition. Defendant Boehmer is responsible for implementing and enforcing the practice of assessing a higher tuition rate for students classified as out-of-state students under
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O.C.G.A. §§ 20-3-66 and 50-36-1, and Board of Regents Policies 4.3.2.3., 4.3.4., and 7.3.4.
43. Defendant Dr. Paul Jones is the president of Fort Valley State University. Defendant Jones is the executive head of Fort Valley State University and of all its departments, and directs, supervises, and otherwise affects the operation of Fort Valley State University. Defendant Jones is responsible to the Board of Regents for the operation and management of Fort Valley State University and for the execution of all directives of the Board and the Chancellor, including implementing Defendants’ policies to grant or deny requests for in-state tuition. Defendant Jones is responsible for implementing and enforcing the practice of assessing a higher tuition rate for students classified as out-of-state students under O.C.G.A. §§ 20-3-66 and 50-36-1, and Board of Regents Policies 4.3.2.3., 4.3.4., and 7.3.4.
44. Defendant Dr. Stas Preczewski is the president of Georgia Gwinnett College. Defendant Preczewski is the executive head of Georgia Gwinnett College and of all its departments, and directs, supervises, and otherwise affects the operation of Georgia Gwinnett College. Defendant Preczewski is responsible to the Board of Regents for the operation and management of Georgia Gwinnett College and for the execution of all directives of the Board and the Chancellor,
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including implementing Defendants’ policies to grant or deny requests for in-state tuition. Defendant Preczewski is responsible for implementing and enforcing the practice of assessing a higher tuition rate for students classified as out-of-state students under O.C.G.A. §§ 20-3-66 and 50-36-1, and Board of Regents Policies 4.3.2.3., 4.3.4., and 7.3.4.
45. Defendant Dr. Donald Green is the president of Georgia Highlands College. Defendant Green is the executive head of Georgia Highlands College and of all its departments, and directs, supervises, and otherwise affects the operation of Georgia Highlands College. Defendant Green is responsible to the Board of Regents for the operation and management of Georgia Highlands College and for the execution of all directives of the Board and the Chancellor, including implementing Defendants’ policies to grant or deny requests for in-state tuition. Defendant Green is responsible for implementing and enforcing the practice of assessing a higher tuition rate for students classified as out-of-state students under O.C.G.A. §§ 20-3-66 and 50-36-1, and Board of Regents Policies 4.3.2.3., 4.3.4., and 7.3.4.
46. Defendant Dr. Jean Bartels is the president of Georgia Southern University. Defendant Bartels is the executive head of Georgia Southern University and of all its departments, and directs, supervises, and otherwise affects
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the operation of Georgia Southern University. Defendant Bartels is responsible to the Board of Regents for the operation and management of Georgia Southern University and for the execution of all directives of the Board and the Chancellor, including implementing Defendants’ policies to grant or deny requests for in-state tuition. Defendant Bartels is responsible for implementing and enforcing the practice of assessing a higher tuition rate for students classified as out-of-state students under O.C.G.A. §§ 20-3-66 and 50-36-1, and Board of Regents Policies 4.3.2.3., 4.3.4., and 7.3.4.
47. Defendant Dr. Charles Patterson is the president of Georgia Southwestern State University. Defendant Patterson is the executive head of Georgia Southwestern State University and of all its departments, and directs, supervises, and otherwise affects the operation of Georgia Southwestern State University. Defendant Patterson is responsible to the Board of Regents for the operation and management of Georgia Southwestern State University and for the execution of all directives of the Board and the Chancellor, including implementing Defendants’ policies to grant or deny requests for in-state tuition. Defendant Patterson is responsible for implementing and enforcing the practice of assessing a higher tuition rate for students classified as out-of-state students under O.C.G.A. §§ 20-366 and 50-36-1, and Board of Regents Policies 4.3.2.3., 4.3.4., and 7.3.4.
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48. Defendant Dr. Mark P. Becker is the president of the Georgia State University. Defendant Becker is the executive head of Georgia State University and of all its departments, and directs, supervises, and otherwise affects the operation of Georgia State University. Defendant Becker is responsible to the Board of Regents for the operation and management of Georgia State University and for the execution of all directives of the Board and the Chancellor, including implementing Defendants’ policies to grant or deny requests for in-state tuition. Defendant Becker is responsible for implementing and enforcing the practice of assessing a higher tuition rate for students classified as out-of-state students under O.C.G.A. §§ 20-3-66 and 50-36-1, and Board of Regents Policies 4.3.2.3., 4.3.4., and 7.3.4.
49. Defendant Dr. Max Burns is the president of Gordon State College. Defendant Burns is the executive head of Gordon State College and of all its departments, and directs, supervises, and otherwise affects the operation of Gordon State College. Defendant Burns is responsible to the Board of Regents for the operation and management of Gordon State College and for the execution of all directives of the Board and the Chancellor, including implementing Defendants’ policies to grant or deny requests for in-state tuition. Defendant Burns is responsible for implementing and enforcing the practice of assessing a higher
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tuition rate for students classified as out-of-state students under O.C.G.A. §§ 20-366 and 50-36-1, and Board of Regents Policies 4.3.2.3., 4.3.4., and 7.3.4.
50. Defendant Dr. Daniel S. Papp is the president of Kennesaw State University. Defendant Papp is the executive head of Kennesaw State University and of all its departments, and directs, supervises, and otherwise affects the operation of Kennesaw State University. Defendant Papp is responsible to the Board of Regents for the operation and management of Kennesaw State University and for the execution of all directives of the Board and the Chancellor, including implementing Defendants’ policies to grant or deny requests for in-state tuition. Defendant Papp is responsible for implementing and enforcing the practice of assessing a higher tuition rate for students classified as out-of-state students under O.C.G.A. §§ 20-3-66 and 50-36-1, and Board of Regents Policies 4.3.2.3., 4.3.4., and 7.3.4.
51. Defendant Dr. Christopher Blake is the president of Middle Georgia State University. Defendant Blake is the executive head of Middle Georgia State University and of all its departments, and directs, supervises, and otherwise affects the operation of Middle Georgia State University. Defendant Blake is responsible to the Board of Regents for the operation and management of Middle Georgia State University and for the execution of all directives of the Board and the Chancellor,
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including implementing Defendants’ policies to grant or deny requests for in-state tuition. Defendant Blake is responsible for implementing and enforcing the practice of assessing a higher tuition rate for students classified as out-of-state students under O.C.G.A. §§ 20-3-66 and 50-36-1, and Board of Regents Policies 4.3.2.3., 4.3.4., and 7.3.4.
52. Defendant Dr. Cheryl Davenport Dozier is the president of Savannah State University. Defendant Dozier is the executive head of Savannah State University and of all its departments, and directs, supervises, and otherwise affects the operation of Savannah State University. Defendant Dozier is responsible to the Board of Regents for the operation and management of Savannah State University and for the execution of all directives of the Board and the Chancellor, including implementing Defendants’ policies to grant or deny requests for in-state tuition. Defendant Dozier is responsible for implementing and enforcing the practice of assessing a higher tuition rate for students classified as out-of-state students under O.C.G.A. §§ 20-3-66 and 50-36-1, and Board of Regents Policies 4.3.2.3., 4.3.4., and 7.3.4.
53. Defendant Dr. Virginia Carson is the president of South Georgia State College. Defendant Carson is the executive head of South Georgia State College and of all its departments, and directs, supervises, and otherwise affects the
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operation of South Georgia State College. Defendant Carson is responsible to the Board of Regents for the operation and management of South Georgia State College and for the execution of all directives of the Board and the Chancellor, including implementing Defendants’ policies to grant or deny requests for in-state tuition. Defendant Carson is responsible for implementing and enforcing the practice of assessing a higher tuition rate for students classified as out-of-state students under O.C.G.A. §§ 20-3-66 and 50-36-1, and Board of Regents Policies 4.3.2.3., 4.3.4., and 7.3.4.
54. Defendant Dr. Bonita Jacobs is the president of the University of North Georgia. Defendant Jacobs is the executive head of the University of North Georgia and of all its departments, and directs, supervises, and otherwise affects the operation of the University of North Georgia. Defendant Jacobs is responsible to the Board of Regents for the operation and management of the University of North Georgia and for the execution of all directives of the Board and the Chancellor, including implementing Defendants’ policies to grant or deny requests for in-state tuition. Defendant Jacobs is responsible for implementing and enforcing the practice of assessing a higher tuition rate for students classified as out-of-state students under O.C.G.A. §§ 20-3-66 and 50-36-1, and Board of Regents Policies 4.3.2.3., 4.3.4., and 7.3.4.
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55. Defendant Dr. Kyle Marrero is the president of the University of West Georgia. Defendant Marrero is the executive head of the University of West Georgia and of all its departments, and directs, supervises, and otherwise affects the operation of the University of West Georgia. Defendant Marrero is responsible to the Board of Regents for the operation and management of the University of West Georgia and for the execution of all directives of the Board and the Chancellor, including implementing Defendants’ policies to grant or deny requests for in-state tuition. Defendant Marrero is responsible for implementing and enforcing the practice of assessing a higher tuition rate for students classified as out-of-state students under O.C.G.A. §§ 20-3-66 and 50-36-1, and Board of Regents Policies 4.3.2.3., 4.3.4., and 7.3.4.
56. Defendant Dr. Cecil Staton is the president of the Valdosta State University. Defendant Staton is the executive head of Valdosta State University and of all its departments, and directs, supervises, and otherwise affects the operation of Valdosta State University. Defendant Staton is responsible to the Board of Regents for the operation and management of Valdosta State University and for the execution of all directives of the Board and the Chancellor, including implementing Defendants’ policies to grant or deny requests for in-state tuition. Defendant Staton is responsible for implementing and enforcing the practice of
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assessing a higher tuition rate for students classified as out-of-state students under O.C.G.A. §§ 20-3-66 and 50-36-1, and Board of Regents Policies 4.3.2.3., 4.3.4., and 7.3.4.
57. All Defendants deny in-state tuition to deferred action recipients.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Deferred Action 58. The Supreme Court has long recognized that the Executive’s discretion
over removal policy stems from Congressional authority, but also inherently from the executive power. See United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542 (1950) (citations omitted). The Executive has exercised this policy discretion repeatedly over the last century--most frequently over removal policy by granting discretionary relief from removal to undocumented immigrants, often through what is referred to as “deferred action.”
59. Originally known as “nonpriority status,” deferred action is a form of discretionary relief, developed internally by INS, under which the agency “may decline to institute proceedings, terminate proceedings, or decline to execute a final order of deportation.” Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525
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U.S. 471, 483-84 (1999) (quoting 6 Charles Gordon et al., Immigration Law and Procedure § 72.03[2][h] (1998)).
60. Deferred action recipients are authorized to remain in the United States for the period of the grant. Additionally, deferred action recipients who are granted employment authorization are authorized not only to reside in the United States but to work here. Defendants’ Illegal Acts
61. Defendants, Members of the Board of Regents for the University System of Georgia, must “set forth, policies or regulations or both regarding postsecondary benefits that comply with federal law….” O.C.G.A. § 50-36-1(d)(7).
62. Defendant Members of the Board of Regents for the University System of Georgia, must further “. . . comply with federal law as provided in 8 U.S.C. Section 1623.” O.C.G.A. § 50-36-1(e).
63. Under their authority, Defendant Members of the Board of Regents promulgated policies including but not limited to Policy 4.3.4. regarding in-state tuition for non-citizens.
64. Under Policy 4.3.4. and related polices, the Defendant Members of the Board of Regents direct that “Each University System institution shall verify the
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lawful presence in the United States of every successfully admitted person applying for resident tuition status….”
65. In an application of its own residency policies, Defendant Members of the Board of Regents have determined that a student who is granted deferred action by the federal government is not lawfully present.
66. In addition to the above mentioned policies, the Members of the Board of Regents’ Office of Student Affairs administer the policies through a Manual for Determining Tuition Classification And Awarding Out-of-State Tuition Waivers, (“Handbook”) for the purpose of “defin[ing] the parameters within which institutions can classify students as in-state and award out-of-state tuition waivers.” Handbook at p. 5.
67. Pursuant to the Handbook, the Members of the Board of Regents direct that University staff “should be aware that they may have to defend a tuition classification or waiver to a supervisor or auditor.” Handbook at p. 5.
68. The Members of the Board of Regents further direct the institutions that comprise the University System of Georgia that their own internal policies regarding tuition classification “must align with O.C.G.A. § 20-3-66, the relevant BoR policies listed above [including Policy 4.3.4], and the information provided in this Manual.” Handbook at p. 5.
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69. Defendant Members of the Board of Regents, through the Handbook, have directed that individuals granted deferred action are not lawfully present in the United States.
70. Defendant Members of the Board of Regents deny in-state tuition to deferred action recipients who are otherwise eligible for in-state tuition because they categorize deferred action recipients as not lawfully present in the United States.
71. Defendant Presidents deny in-state tuition to deferred action recipients who are otherwise eligible for in-state tuition because they categorize deferred action recipients as not lawfully present in the United States.
72. Defendant Presidents are required to deny in-state tuition to deferred action recipients by developing and instituting their institution’s own “procedure manual of established institution business practices related to making tuition classification decisions and awarding out-of-state tuition waivers” which must align with the Handbook administered by the Members Board of Regents. Pursuant to the Handbook, “Institutions should be prepared to provide a copy of their institution procedure manual during an audit.” Handbook at p. 5.
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73. Defendants impose immigration-related burdens and misclassify deferred action recipients when they classify deferred action recipients as not lawfully present in the U.S.
74. Defendants impose illegal burdens on Individual Plaintiffs by denying them equal protection under the law, and cause GLAHR to redirect resources to address these illegal acts. Defendants’ policies and practices treat Individual Plaintiffs, and all deferred action recipients, disparately without sufficient basis to do so when compared to other similarly situated individuals who are lawfully present in the United States.
75. As a result of Defendants’ illegal acts, Individual Plaintiffs have been wrongfully required to pay out-of-state tuition rates even though they are lawfully present in the United States and are otherwise qualified for in-state tuition rates.
76. Plaintiff GLAHR redirects resources toward counseling deferred action recipients because Defendants treat deferred action recipients as if they have no lawful presence when deciding in-state tuition eligibility.
77. Plaintiffs suffer irreparable harm.
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FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF (Supremacy Clause, Article VI, Clause 2, of the United States Constitution; 42
U.S.C. § 1983) 78. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate all of the allegations contained in the previous paragraphs of this complaint as though fully set forth here. 79. The Supremacy Clause, Article VI, Clause 2, of the United States Constitution, provides that the U.S. “Constitution and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme law of the land.” 80. Defendants’ classification of deferred action recipients as ineligible for in-state tuition benefits conflicts with, frustrates, and serves as an obstacle to federal immigration law, goals, and policies and thus is preempted by federal law. 81. The Supremacy Clause, Article VI, Clause 2, of the U.S. Constitution, mandates that federal law preempts state law where Congress expressly or impliedly has reserved exclusive authority to the federal government, including where state law conflicts or interferes with federal law. Similarly, the Supremacy Clause constitutionally reserves exclusive authority to the federal government regarding the regulation of immigration, among other areas.
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82. Defendants’ further misclassification of deferred recipients as not being lawfully present in the United States conflicts with federal law and is thus preempted.
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF (Equal Protection Clause, Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution; 42
U.S.C. § 1983) 83. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate all of the allegations contained in the previous paragraphs of this complaint as though fully set forth here. 84. The Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that “[n]o State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” 85. Defendants’ denial of in-state tuition to individuals granted deferred action violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 86. Defendants’ acts permit noncitizens and citizens who are similarly situated to deferred action recipients to establish eligibility for in-state tuition yet discriminate against deferred action recipients by barring their eligibility for instate tuition. Defendants cannot establish that their policies and practices have any valid justification to withstand constitutional scrutiny. 87. Individual Plaintiffs seek compensatory damages for economic harms resulting from Defendants’ unlawful misclassification.
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PRAYER FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for the following relief:
A. A preliminary and permanent injunction enjoining Defendants, their officials, agents, employees, assigns, and all persons acting in concert or participating with them from implementing or enforcing the state’s policy and practice of denying in-state tuition to deferred action recipients;
B. A declaration pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202 that Defendants’ policy and practice of denying in-state tuition to deferred action recipients is unlawful and invalid;
C. Compensatory damages for economic harms suffered by Individual Plaintiffs.
D. Restitution of tuition fees and other costs wrongfully obtained from Individual Plaintiffs.
E. An order awarding Plaintiffs costs of suit, and reasonable attorneys’ fees and expenses pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and any other applicable law; and
F. Such other and further relief as the Court deems equitable, just, and proper.
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Dated this 9th day of March, 2016 /s/ Mark Begnaud Mark Begnaud Georgia Bar No. 217641 markbegnaud@hotmail.com Nathanael A. Horsley Georgia Bar No. 367832 nhorsleylaw@hotmail.com Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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Victor Viramontes* Jorge M. Castillo* MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FUND 634 S. Spring Street, 11th Floor Los Angeles, CA 90014 T: 213.629.2512 vviramontes@maldef.org jcastillo@maldef.org Burth López* MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FUND 1016 16th Street, Suite 100, Washington, D.C. 20036 T: 202.572.0695 blopez@maldef.org

Sarah Schoettle* MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FUND 11 E. Adams Street, Suite 700 Chicago, IL 60603 T: 312. 427.0701 sschoettle@maldef.org
*Admitted pro hac vice Nathan Horsley Mark Begnaud HORSLEY BEGNAUD LLC 750 Hammond Drive, Building 12, Suite 300 Atlanta GA 30328 T: 770.765.5559 nhorsley@gacivilrights.com mbegnaud@gacivilrights.com
Thomas G. Sampson Miguel A. Dominguez Thomas Kennedy Sampson & Tompkins LLP 3355 Main Street Atlanta, Georgia 30337 T: 404 688-4503 t.sampson@tkstlaw.com m.dominguez@tkstlaw.com Attorneys for Plaintiffs

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION

GEORGIA LATINO ALLIANCE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, an organization, FREEDOM UNIVERSITY, an

CIVIL ACTION No.: 1:16-cv-757 (WCO) FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

Case 1:16-cv-00757-RWS Document 55 Filed 04/21/16 Page 2 of 46
organization, LORENA GUILLEN, an individual, KARLA LOPEZ, an individual, MAYELA SALAZAR, an individual, JORGE SAN JUAN, an individual, and ARTURO MARTINEZ del RELLO, an individual,
Plaintiffs, v.
C. DEAN ALFORD, member of the Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia, in his individual and official capacity; W. PAUL BOWERS, member of the Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia, in his individual and official capacity; LORI DURDEN, member of the Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia, in her individual and official capacity; LARRY R. ELLIS, member of the Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia, in his individual and official capacity; RUTLEDGE A. GRIFFIN, JR., member of the Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia, in his individual and official capacity; C. THOMAS HOPKINS, Jr., member of the Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia, in his individual and official capacity; JAMES M. HULL, member of the Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia, in his individual and official capacity; DONALD M. LEEBERN, JR., member of the Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia, in his
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individual and official capacity; DOREEN STILES POITEVINT, member of the Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia, in her individual and official capacity; NEIL L. PRUITT, JR, member of the Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia, in his individual and official capacity; SACHIN SHAILENDRA, member of the Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia, in his individual and official capacity; E. SCOTT SMITH, member of the Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia, in his individual and official capacity; KESSEL D. STELLING, JR., member of the Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia, in his individual and official capacity; BENJAMIN J. TARBUTTON, III, member of the Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia, in his individual and official capacity; RICHARD L. TUCKER, member of the Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia, in his individual and official capacity; THOMAS ROGERS WADE, member of the Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia, in his individual and official capacity; LARRY WALKER, member of the Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia, in his individual and official capacity; DON L. WATERS, member of the Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia, in his individual and official capacity; PHILIP A. WILHEIT, SR., member of the Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia, in his
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individual and official capacity; DR. DAVID C. BRIDGES, President of Abraham Baldwin Agricultural College, in his individual and official capacity; DR. ARTHUR N. DUNNING, President of Albany State University, in his individual and official capacity; DR. LINDA BLEICKEN, President of Armstrong State University, in her individual and official capacity; DR. GARY A. MCGAHA, President of Atlanta Metropolitan State College, in his individual and official capacity; SHAWN MCGEE, President of Bainbridge State College, in his individual and official capacity; DR. THOMAS J. “TIM” HYNES, President of Clayton State University, in his individual and official capacity; DR. GREGORY F. ALOIA, President of College of Coastal Georgia, in his individual and official capacity; DR. CHRIS MARKWOOD, President of Columbus State University, in his individual and official capacity; DR. MARGARET VENABLE, President of Dalton State College, in her individual and official capacity; DR. RICHARD CARVAJAL, President of Darton State College, in his individual and official capacity; DR. ROBERT G. BOEHMER, President of East Georgia State College, in his individual and official capacity, DR. PAUL JONES, President of Fort Valley State University, in his individual and official capacity; DR. STAS PRECZEWSKI, President of Georgia Gwinnett College, in his individual and official capacity; DR. DONALD GREEN,
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President of Georgia Highlands College, in his individual and official capacity; DR. JEAN BARTELS, President of Georgia Southern University, in her individual and official capacity; DR. CHARLES PATTERSON, President of Georgia Southwestern State University, in his individual and official capacity; DR. MARK P. BECKER, President of Georgia State University, in his individual and official capacity; DR. MAX BURNS, President of Gordon State College, in his individual and official capacity; DR. DANIEL S. PAPP, President of Kennesaw State University, in his individual and official capacity; DR. CHRISTOPHER BLAKE, President of Middle Georgia State University, in his individual and official capacity; DR. CHERYL DAVENPORT DOZIER, President of Savannah State University, in her individual and official capacity; DR. VIRGINIA CARSON, President of South Georgia State College, in her individual and official capacity; DR. BONITA JACOBS, President of University of North Georgia, in her individual and official capacity; DR. PETER LYONS, Vice Provost of Georgia State University and Dean of the Georgia Perimeter College, in his individual and official capacity; DR. KYLE MARRERO, President of University of West Georgia, in his individual and official capacity; DR. CECIL STATON, President of Valdosta State University, in his individual and official capacity; and ROBERT E. WATTS, Interim President
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of Georgia Perimeter College, in his individual and official capacity,
Defendants.
INTRODUCTION 1. This action challenges Defendants’ policy of denying in-state tuition to certain non U.S. citizens who are legally present in the United States. Specifically, Defendants deny in-state tuition to individuals who have been granted immigration relief in the form of deferred action. 2. Deferred action recipients are permitted to stay in the United States for a period of time designated by the federal government, are shielded from removal proceedings during that time, and may be granted work authorization and a Social Security Number. 3. Defendants’ acts, which deny in-state tuition to deferred action grantees, violate the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution because they are preempted by federal immigration law and the federal government’s exclusive authority to regulate immigration.
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4. Defendants’ acts also violate the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause because they deny in-state tuition to DACA recipients without any valid justification.
5. Plaintiff Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights (GLAHR) has redirected resources to address Defendants’ illegal acts, which deny in-state tuition to eligible individuals. GLAHR’s mission has further been compromised because Defendant’s illegal acts negatively affect the constituency it serves, and undermines GLAHR’s educational mission, among other reasons.
6. Plaintiff Freedom University has redirected resources to address Defendant’s illegal acts, which deny in-state tuition to eligible individuals. Freedom University’s mission has been further compromised because Defendants’ illegal acts negatively affect the constituency it serves, and undermine Freedom University’s educational mission, among other reasons. Additionally, Freedom University members include deferred action recipients who are residents of Georgia but are illegally classified as out-of-state students under Defendants’ tuition policy and are denied access to in-state tuition rates.
7. Plaintiff Lorena Guillen is a deferred action recipient, attending a University System of Georgia institution. She is paying an out-of- state tuition rate, yet, she resides in Georgia.
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8. Plaintiff Karla Lopez is a deferred action recipient, attending a University System of Georgia institution. She is paying an out-of-state tuition rate, yet, she resides in Georgia.
9. Plaintiff Mayela Salazar is a deferred action recipient who is unable to afford a Georgia University System college or university. She cannot afford to attend a Georgia University System school because of the Regents’ policy, which requires her to pay out-of-state tuition rates despite the fact that she resides in Georgia.
10. Plaintiff Jorge San Juan is a deferred action recipient, attending a technical college in Georgia that is not a Georgia University System college or university. He cannot afford to attend a Georgia University System school because of the Regents’ policy, which requires him to pay out-of-state tuition rates despite the fact that he resides in Georgia.
11. Plaintiff Arturo Martinez del Rello is a deferred action recipient. He is not currently attending any accredited college or university. He cannot afford to attend a University System of Georgia institution because of the Regents’ policy, which requires him to pay out-of-state tuition rates despite the fact that he resides in Georgia.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
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12. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343 over Plaintiffs’ claims under the U.S. Constitution. The Court has authority to grant declaratory relief under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202.
13. Venue is proper in this district under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). All Defendants are sued in their individual and official capacity and most have official places of business located within this District. Events giving rise to this Complaint also occurred within this District.
PARTIES Plaintiffs
14. Plaintiff GLAHR is a non-profit organization in Georgia. GLAHR educates, organizes, and empowers Latinos in Georgia to defend and advance their civil and human rights. GLAHR’s mission includes making education, including higher education, a human right available to all in Georgia. GLAHR’s employees and volunteers work to further GLAHR’s mission. GLAHR has developed a program to assist eligible individuals with deferred action applications. In that capacity, GLAHR informs prospective and current students attending or considering attending the University System of Georgia about paying for schooling. Because of Defendants’ illegal acts, which bar deferred action recipients from receiving in-state tuition, GLAHR must redirect time and resources
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towards informing students about alternative options for paying for college. Rather than assisting in the processing of additional deferred action applications, GLAHR is forced to redirect resources toward addressing Defendant’s illegal instate tuition actions.
15. Plaintiff Freedom University is a non-profit in Georgia. Freedom University’s mission involves promoting higher education as a universal right, providing higher education to students whose access to Georgia universities is compromised by high tuition rates, and collaborating with documented and undocumented students to facilitate equal access to higher education. Freedom University’s members include deferred action recipients who are residents of Georgia but are classified as out-of-state students under Defendants’ tuition policy. As a result of Defendants’ illegal policies, these members are forced to pay out-ofstate tuition rates although they are lawfully present in the United States. These members must abandon their studies at University System institutions because Defendants require them to pay higher out-of-state tuition rates, and they cannot afford it. As part of its organizational mission, Freedom University provides college-level courses, scholarship assistance, leadership training, and movement skill-building to undocumented students who are denied in-state tuition and admission at Georgia universities. Freedom University’s faculty, staff, and
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volunteers work to further these assistance programs. As a result of Defendants’ illegal acts, which classify deferred action recipients as unlawfully present and deny them in-state tuition, Freedom University must redirect time and resources toward providing these assistance programs to deferred action recipients rather than serving additional undocumented students. In practice, Freedom University must educate the lawfully present individuals that Georgia excludes from its colleges by the practice of forcing them to pay out-of-state tuition.
16. Plaintiff Lorena Guillen is a resident of Georgia and graduated from a Georgia high school. She is a deferred action recipient; as such she is lawfully present in the U.S. and has federal work authorization. She attends Perimeter College, a University System of Georgia institution. Defendants deny her in-state tuition because they classify her as not lawfully present, and, except for Defendants’ improper classification, she is eligible for in-state tuition. Plaintiff Guillen pays out-of-state tuition rates. She has restricted her major because she has to pay elevated out-of-state tuition rates. She is contemplating discontinuing her studies because of her inability to pay out-of-state rates.
17. Plaintiff Karla Lopez is a resident of Georgia and graduated from a Georgia high school. She is a deferred action recipient; as such she is lawfully present in the U.S. and has federal work authorization. She attends Perimeter
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College, a University System of Georgia institution. Ms. Lopez is currently majoring in pre-medical studies and hopes to become a medical doctor. Defendants deny her in-state tuition because they classify her as not lawfully present, and, except for Defendants’ improper classification, she is eligible for in-state tuition. Plaintiff Lopez pays out-of-state tuition rates. She has restricted the number of credit hours she takes each year because of the cost of the elevated tuition rates. As a result, it will take her longer than four years to graduate with a bachelor’s degree.
18. Plaintiff Mayela Salazar is a resident of Georgia and graduated from a Georgia high school. She is a deferred action recipient; as such she is lawfully present in the U.S. and has federal work authorization. She attends a two-year technical college in Georgia. Ms. Salazar is currently pursuing an associate’s degree in accounting at a technical school. Defendants deny her in-state tuition because they classify her as not lawfully present, and, except for Defendants’ improper classification, she is eligible for in-state tuition. Plaintiff Salazar cannot afford to attend a Georgia University System school. Instead, she attends a nonUniversity System school. Plaintiff would attend a University System school if she could pay in-state tuition rates.
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19. Plaintiff Jorge San Juan is a resident of Georgia and graduated from a Georgia high school. He is a deferred action recipient; as such he is lawfully present in the U.S. He has federal work authorization. He attends a two-year technical college in Georgia. He is currently pursuing an associate’s degree in accounting. Defendants deny Plaintiff San Juan in-state tuition because they classify him as not lawfully present, and except for Defendants’ improper classification, he is eligible for in-state tuition. Plaintiff San Juan cannot afford to attend a Georgia University System school at out-of-state rates. Instead, he attends a non-University System school. Plaintiff San Juan would attend a University System school if he could pay in-state rates
20. Plaintiff Arturo Martinez del Rello is a resident of Georgia and graduated from a Georgia high school. He is a deferred action recipient; as such he is lawfully present in the U.S. He has federal work authorization. Defendants deny Plaintiff Martinez del Rello in-state tuition because they classify him as not lawfully present, and except for Defendants’ improper classification, he is eligible for in-state tuition. Plaintiff Martinez del Rello cannot afford to attend any Georgia University System school because the Regents’ in-state tuition policies require that he pay out-of-state tuition rates instead of in-state tuition rates, despite the fact that he is a Georgia resident. As a result, Mr. Martinez del Rello is not
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currently enrolled in any degree-granting institution of higher education. Plaintiff Martinez del Rello would attend a University System school if he could pay instate tuition rates. Defendant Members of the Board of Regents
21. Defendant C. Dean Alford is a member of the Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia (“Board of Regents”). As a member of the Board of Regents, Defendant Alford governs, controls, and manages the public colleges and universities that comprise the University System of Georgia, and is responsible for implementing and enforcing the practice of assessing a higher tuition rate for students classified as out-of-state students under Official Code of Georgia Annotated (O.C.G.A.) §§ 20-3-66 and 50-36-1, and Board of Regents Policies 4.3.2.3., 4.3.4., and 7.3.4.
22. Defendant W. Paul Bowers is a member of the Board of Regents. As a member of the Board of Regents, Defendant Bowers governs, controls, and manages the public colleges and universities that comprise the University System of Georgia, and is responsible for implementing and enforcing the practice of assessing a higher tuition rate for students classified as out-of-state students under O.C.G.A. §§ 20-3-66 and 50-36-1, and Board of Regents Policies 4.3.2.3., 4.3.4., and 7.3.4.
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23. Defendant Lori Durden is a member of the Board of Regents. As a member of the Board of Regents, Defendant Durden governs, controls, and manages the public colleges and universities that comprise the University System of Georgia, and is responsible for implementing and enforcing the practice of assessing a higher tuition rate for students classified as out-of-state students under O.C.G.A. §§ 20-3-66 and 50-36-1, and Board of Regents Policies 4.3.2.3., 4.3.4., and 7.3.4.
24. Defendant Larry R. Ellis is a member of the Board of Regents. As a member of the Board of Regents, Defendant Ellis governs, controls, and manages the public colleges and universities that comprise the University System of Georgia, and is responsible for implementing and enforcing the practice of assessing a higher tuition rate for students classified as out-of-state students under O.C.G.A. §§ 20-3-66 and 50-36-1, and Board of Regents Policies 4.3.2.3., 4.3.4., and 7.3.4.
25. Defendant Rutledge A. Griffin, Jr. is a member of the Board of Regents. As a member of the Board of Regents, Defendant Griffin governs, controls, and manages the public colleges and universities that comprise the University System of Georgia, and is responsible for implementing and enforcing the practice of assessing a higher tuition rate for students classified as out-of-state students under
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O.C.G.A. §§ 20-3-66 and 50-36-1, and Board of Regents Policies 4.3.2.3., 4.3.4., and 7.3.4.
26. Defendant C. Thomas Hopkins, Jr. is a member of the Board of Regents. As a member of the Board of Regents, Defendant Hopkins governs, controls, and manages the public colleges and universities that comprise the University System of Georgia, and is responsible for implementing and enforcing the practice of assessing a higher tuition rate for students classified as out-of-state students under O.C.G.A. §§ 20-3-66 and 50-36-1, and Board of Regents Policies 4.3.2.3., 4.3.4., and 7.3.4.
27. Defendant James M. Hull is a member of the Board of Regents. As a member of the Board of Regents, Defendant Hull governs, controls, and manages the public colleges and universities that comprise the University System of Georgia, and is responsible for implementing and enforcing the practice of assessing a higher tuition rate for students classified as out-of-state students under O.C.G.A. §§ 20-3-66 and 50-36-1, and Board of Regents Policies 4.3.2.3., 4.3.4., and 7.3.4.
28. Defendant Donald M. Leebern, Jr., is a member of the Board of Regents. As a member of the Board of Regents, Defendant Leebern governs, controls, and manages the public colleges and universities that comprise the University System
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of Georgia, and is responsible for implementing and enforcing the practice of assessing a higher tuition rate for students classified as out-of-state students under O.C.G.A. §§ 20-3-66 and 50-36-1, and Board of Regents Policies 4.3.2.3., 4.3.4., and 7.3.4.
29. Defendant Doreen Stiles Poitevint is a member of the Board of Regents. As a member of the Board of Regents, Defendant Poitevint governs, controls, and manages the public colleges and universities that comprise the University System of Georgia, and is responsible for implementing and enforcing the practice of assessing a higher tuition rate for students classified as out-of-state students under O.C.G.A. §§ 20-3-66 and 50-36-1, and Board of Regents Policies 4.3.2.3., 4.3.4., and 7.3.4.
30. Defendant Neil L. Pruitt, Jr., is a member of the Board of Regents. As a member of the Board of Regents, Defendant Pruitt governs, controls, and manages the public colleges and universities that comprise the University System of Georgia, and is responsible for implementing and enforcing the practice of assessing a higher tuition rate for students classified as out-of-state students under O.C.G.A. §§ 20-3-66 and 50-36-1, and Board of Regents Policies 4.3.2.3., 4.3.4., and 7.3.4.
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31. Defendant Sachin Shailendra is a member of the Board of Regents. As a member of the Board of Regents, Defendant Shailendra governs, controls, and manages the public colleges and universities that comprise the University System of Georgia, and is responsible for implementing and enforcing the practice of assessing a higher tuition rate for students classified as out-of-state students under O.C.G.A. §§ 20-3-66 and 50-36-1, and Board of Regents Policies 4.3.2.3., 4.3.4., and 7.3.4.
32. Defendant E. Scott Smith is a member of the Board of Regents. As a member of the Board of Regents, Defendant Smith governs, controls, and manages the public colleges and universities that comprise the University System of Georgia, and is responsible for implementing and enforcing the practice of assessing a higher tuition rate for students classified as out-of-state students under O.C.G.A. §§ 20-3-66 and 50-36-1, and Board of Regents Policies 4.3.2.3., 4.3.4., and 7.3.4.
33. Defendant Kessel D. Stelling, Jr. is a member of the Board of Regents. As a member of the Board of Regents, Defendant Stelling governs, controls, and manages the public colleges and universities that comprise the University System of Georgia, and is responsible for implementing and enforcing the practice of assessing a higher tuition rate for students classified as out-of-state students under
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O.C.G.A. §§ 20-3-66 and 50-36-1, and Board of Regents Policies 4.3.2.3., 4.3.4., and 7.3.4.
34. Defendant Benjamin J. Tarbutton, III is a member of the Board of Regents. As a member of the Board of Regents, Defendant Tarbutton governs, controls, and manages the public colleges and universities that comprise the University System of Georgia, and is responsible for implementing and enforcing the practice of assessing a higher tuition rate for students classified as out-of-state students under O.C.G.A. §§ 20-3-66 and 50-36-1, and Board of Regents Policies 4.3.2.3., 4.3.4., and 7.3.4.
35. Defendant Richard L. Tucker is a member of the Board of Regents. As a member of the Board of Regents, Defendant Tucker governs, controls, and manages the public colleges and universities that comprise the University System of Georgia, and is responsible for implementing and enforcing the practice of assessing a higher tuition rate for students classified as out-of-state students under O.C.G.A. §§ 20-3-66 and 50-36-1, and Board of Regents Policies 4.3.2.3., 4.3.4., and 7.3.4.
36. Defendant Thomas Rogers Wade is a member of the Board of Regents. As a member of the Board of Regents, Defendant Wade governs, controls, and manages the public colleges and universities that comprise the University System
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of Georgia, and is responsible for implementing and enforcing the practice of assessing a higher tuition rate for students classified as out-of-state students under O.C.G.A. §§ 20-3-66 and 50-36-1, and Board of Regents Policies 4.3.2.3., 4.3.4., and 7.3.4.
37. Defendant Larry Walker is a member of the Board of Regents. As a member of the Board of Regents, Defendant Walker governs, controls, and manages the public colleges and universities that comprise the University System of Georgia, and is responsible for implementing and enforcing the practice of assessing a higher tuition rate for students classified as out-of-state students under O.C.G.A. §§ 20-3-66 and 50-36-1, and Board of Regents Policies 4.3.2.3., 4.3.4., and 7.3.4.
38. Defendant Don L. Waters is a member of the Board of Regents. As a member of the Board of Regents, Defendant Waters governs, controls, and manages the public colleges and universities that comprise the University System of Georgia, and is responsible for implementing and enforcing the practice of assessing a higher tuition rate for students classified as out-of-state students under O.C.G.A. §§ 20-3-66 and 50-36-1, and Board of Regents Policies 4.3.2.3., 4.3.4., and 7.3.4.
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39. Defendant Philip A. Wilheit, Sr. is a member of the Board of Regents. As a member of the Board of Regents, Defendant Wilheit governs, controls, and manages the public colleges and universities that comprise the University System of Georgia, and is responsible for implementing and enforcing the practice of assessing a higher tuition rate for students classified as out-of-state students under O.C.G.A. §§ 20-3-66 and 50-36-1, and Board of Regents Policies 4.3.2.3., 4.3.4., and 7.3.4. Defendant Presidents
40. Defendant Dr. David C. Bridges is the president of Abraham Baldwin Agricultural College. Defendant Bridges is the executive head of Abraham Baldwin Agricultural College and of all its departments, and directs, supervises, and otherwise affects the operation of Abraham Baldwin Agricultural College. Defendant Bridges is responsible to the Board of Regents for the operation and management of Abraham Baldwin Agricultural College and for the execution of all directives of the Board and the Chancellor, including implementing Defendants’ policies to grant or deny requests for in-state tuition. Defendant Bridges is responsible for implementing and enforcing the practice of assessing a higher tuition rate for students classified as out-of-state students under O.C.G.A. §§ 20-366 and 50-36-1, and Board of Regents Policies 4.3.2.3., 4.3.4., and 7.3.4.
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41. Defendant Dr. Arthur N. Dunning is the president of Albany State University. Defendant Dunning is the executive head of Albany State University and of all its departments, and directs, supervises, and otherwise affects the operation of Albany State University. Defendant Dunning is responsible to the Board of Regents for the operation and management of Albany State University and for the execution of all directives of the Board and the Chancellor, including implementing Defendants’ policies to grant or deny requests for in-state tuition. Defendant Dunning is responsible for implementing and enforcing the practice of assessing a higher tuition rate for students classified as out-of-state students under O.C.G.A. §§ 20-3-66 and 50-36-1, and Board of Regents Policies 4.3.2.3., 4.3.4., and 7.3.4.
42. Defendant Dr. Linda Bleicken is the president of Armstrong State University. Defendant Bleicken is the executive head of Armstrong State University and of all its departments, and directs, supervises, and otherwise affects the operation of Armstrong State University. Defendant Bleicken is responsible to the Board of Regents for the operation and management of Armstrong State University and for the execution of all directives of the Board and the Chancellor, including implementing Defendants’ policies to grant or deny requests for in-state tuition. Defendant Bleicken is responsible for implementing and enforcing the
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practice of assessing a higher tuition rate for students classified as out-of-state students under O.C.G.A. §§ 20-3-66 and 50-36-1, and Board of Regents Policies 4.3.2.3., 4.3.4., and 7.3.4.
43. Defendant Dr. Gary A. McGaha is the president of Atlanta Metropolitan State College. Defendant McGaha is the executive head of Atlanta Metropolitan State College and of all its departments, and directs, supervises, and otherwise affects the operation of Atlanta Metropolitan State College. Defendant McGaha is responsible to the Board of Regents for the operation and management of Atlanta Metropolitan State College and for the execution of all directives of the Board and the Chancellor, including implementing Defendants’ policies to grant or deny requests for in-state tuition. Defendant McGaha is responsible for implementing and enforcing the practice of assessing a higher tuition rate for students classified as out-of-state students under O.C.G.A. §§ 20-3-66 and 50-36-1, and Board of Regents Policies 4.3.2.3., 4.3.4., and 7.3.4.
44. Defendant Shawn McGee is the president of Bainbridge State College. Defendant McGee is the executive head of Bainbridge State College and of all its departments, and directs, supervises, and otherwise affects the operation of Bainbridge State College. Defendant McGee is responsible to the Board of Regents for the operation and management of Bainbridge State College and for the
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execution of all directives of the Board and the Chancellor, including implementing Defendants’ policies to grant or deny requests for in-state tuition. Defendant McGee is responsible for implementing and enforcing the practice of assessing a higher tuition rate for students classified as out-of-state students under O.C.G.A. §§ 20-3-66 and 50-36-1, and Board of Regents Policies 4.3.2.3., 4.3.4., and 7.3.4.
45. Defendant Dr. Thomas J. “Tim” Hynes is the president of Clayton State University. Defendant Hynes is the executive head of Clayton State University and of all its departments, and directs, supervises, and otherwise affects the operation of Clayton State University. Defendant Hynes is responsible to the Board of Regents for the operation and management of Clayton State University and for the execution of all directives of the Board and the Chancellor, including implementing Defendants’ policies to grant or deny requests for in-state tuition. Defendant Hynes is responsible for implementing and enforcing the practice of assessing a higher tuition rate for students classified as out-of-state students under O.C.G.A. §§ 20-3-66 and 50-36-1, and Board of Regents Policies 4.3.2.3., 4.3.4., and 7.3.4.
46. Defendant Dr. Gregory F. Aloia is the president of the College of Coastal Georgia. Defendant Aloia is the executive head of the College of Coastal Georgia
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and of all its departments, and directs, supervises, and otherwise affects the operation of the College of Coastal Georgia. Defendant Aloia is responsible to the Board of Regents for the operation and management of the College of Coastal Georgia and for the execution of all directives of the Board and the Chancellor, including implementing Defendants’ policies to grant or deny requests for in-state tuition. Defendant Aloia is responsible for implementing and enforcing the practice of assessing a higher tuition rate for students classified as out-of-state students under O.C.G.A. §§ 20-3-66 and 50-36-1, and Board of Regents Policies 4.3.2.3., 4.3.4., and 7.3.4.
47. Defendant Dr. Chris Markwood is the president of Columbus State University. Defendant Markwood is the executive head of Columbus State University and of all its departments, and directs, supervises, and otherwise affects the operation of Columbus State University. Defendant Markwood is responsible to the Board of Regents for the operation and management of Columbus State University and for the execution of all directives of the Board and the Chancellor, including implementing Defendants’ policies to grant or deny requests for in-state tuition. Defendant Markwood is responsible for implementing and enforcing the practice of assessing a higher tuition rate for students classified as out-of-state
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students under O.C.G.A. §§ 20-3-66 and 50-36-1, and Board of Regents Policies 4.3.2.3., 4.3.4., and 7.3.4.
48. Defendant Dr. Margaret Venable is the president of Dalton State College. Defendant Venable is the executive head of Dalton State College and of all its departments, and directs, supervises, and otherwise affects the operation of Dalton State College. Defendant Venable is responsible to the Board of Regents for the operation and management of Dalton State College and for the execution of all directives of the Board and the Chancellor, including implementing Defendants’ policies to grant or deny requests for in-state tuition. Defendant Venable is responsible for implementing and enforcing the practice of assessing a higher tuition rate for students classified as out-of-state students under O.C.G.A. §§ 20-366 and 50-36-1, and Board of Regents Policies 4.3.2.3., 4.3.4., and 7.3.4.
49. Defendant Dr. Richard Carvajal is the president of Darton State College. Defendant Carvajal is the executive head of Darton State College and of all its departments, and directs, supervises, and otherwise affects the operation of Darton State College. Defendant Carvajal is responsible to the Board of Regents for the operation and management of Darton State College and for the execution of all directives of the Board and the Chancellor, including implementing Defendants’ policies to grant or deny requests for in-state tuition. Defendant Carvajal is
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responsible for implementing and enforcing the practice of assessing a higher tuition rate for students classified as out-of-state students under O.C.G.A. §§ 20-366 and 50-36-1, and Board of Regents Policies 4.3.2.3., 4.3.4., and 7.3.4.
50. Defendant Dr. Robert G. Boehmer is the president of East Georgia State College. Defendant Boehmer is the executive head of East Georgia State College and of all its departments, and directs, supervises, and otherwise affects the operation of East Georgia State College. Defendant Boehmer is responsible to the Board of Regents for the operation and management of East Georgia State College and for the execution of all directives of the Board and the Chancellor, including implementing Defendants’ policies to grant or deny requests for in-state tuition. Defendant Boehmer is responsible for implementing and enforcing the practice of assessing a higher tuition rate for students classified as out-of-state students under O.C.G.A. §§ 20-3-66 and 50-36-1, and Board of Regents Policies 4.3.2.3., 4.3.4., and 7.3.4.
51. Defendant Dr. Paul Jones is the president of Fort Valley State University. Defendant Jones is the executive head of Fort Valley State University and of all its departments, and directs, supervises, and otherwise affects the operation of Fort Valley State University. Defendant Jones is responsible to the Board of Regents for the operation and management of Fort Valley State University and for the
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execution of all directives of the Board and the Chancellor, including implementing Defendants’ policies to grant or deny requests for in-state tuition. Defendant Jones is responsible for implementing and enforcing the practice of assessing a higher tuition rate for students classified as out-of-state students under O.C.G.A. §§ 20-3-66 and 50-36-1, and Board of Regents Policies 4.3.2.3., 4.3.4., and 7.3.4.
52. Defendant Dr. Stas Preczewski is the president of Georgia Gwinnett College. Defendant Preczewski is the executive head of Georgia Gwinnett College and of all its departments, and directs, supervises, and otherwise affects the operation of Georgia Gwinnett College. Defendant Preczewski is responsible to the Board of Regents for the operation and management of Georgia Gwinnett College and for the execution of all directives of the Board and the Chancellor, including implementing Defendants’ policies to grant or deny requests for in-state tuition. Defendant Preczewski is responsible for implementing and enforcing the practice of assessing a higher tuition rate for students classified as out-of-state students under O.C.G.A. §§ 20-3-66 and 50-36-1, and Board of Regents Policies 4.3.2.3., 4.3.4., and 7.3.4.
53. Defendant Dr. Donald Green is the president of Georgia Highlands College. Defendant Green is the executive head of Georgia Highlands College and
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of all its departments, and directs, supervises, and otherwise affects the operation of Georgia Highlands College. Defendant Green is responsible to the Board of Regents for the operation and management of Georgia Highlands College and for the execution of all directives of the Board and the Chancellor, including implementing Defendants’ policies to grant or deny requests for in-state tuition. Defendant Green is responsible for implementing and enforcing the practice of assessing a higher tuition rate for students classified as out-of-state students under O.C.G.A. §§ 20-3-66 and 50-36-1, and Board of Regents Policies 4.3.2.3., 4.3.4., and 7.3.4.
54. Defendant Dr. Jean Bartels is the president of Georgia Southern University. Defendant Bartels is the executive head of Georgia Southern University and of all its departments, and directs, supervises, and otherwise affects the operation of Georgia Southern University. Defendant Bartels is responsible to the Board of Regents for the operation and management of Georgia Southern University and for the execution of all directives of the Board and the Chancellor, including implementing Defendants’ policies to grant or deny requests for in-state tuition. Defendant Bartels is responsible for implementing and enforcing the practice of assessing a higher tuition rate for students classified as out-of-state
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students under O.C.G.A. §§ 20-3-66 and 50-36-1, and Board of Regents Policies 4.3.2.3., 4.3.4., and 7.3.4.
55. Defendant Dr. Charles Patterson is the president of Georgia Southwestern State University. Defendant Patterson is the executive head of Georgia Southwestern State University and of all its departments, and directs, supervises, and otherwise affects the operation of Georgia Southwestern State University. Defendant Patterson is responsible to the Board of Regents for the operation and management of Georgia Southwestern State University and for the execution of all directives of the Board and the Chancellor, including implementing Defendants’ policies to grant or deny requests for in-state tuition. Defendant Patterson is responsible for implementing and enforcing the practice of assessing a higher tuition rate for students classified as out-of-state students under O.C.G.A. §§ 20-366 and 50-36-1, and Board of Regents Policies 4.3.2.3., 4.3.4., and 7.3.4.
56. Defendant Dr. Mark P. Becker is the president of the Georgia State University. Defendant Becker is the executive head of Georgia State University and of all its departments, and directs, supervises, and otherwise affects the operation of Georgia State University. Defendant Becker is responsible to the Board of Regents for the operation and management of Georgia State University and for the execution of all directives of the Board and the Chancellor, including
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implementing Defendants’ policies to grant or deny requests for in-state tuition. Defendant Becker is responsible for implementing and enforcing the practice of assessing a higher tuition rate for students classified as out-of-state students under O.C.G.A. §§ 20-3-66 and 50-36-1, and Board of Regents Policies 4.3.2.3., 4.3.4., and 7.3.4.
57. Defendant Dr. Max Burns is the president of Gordon State College. Defendant Burns is the executive head of Gordon State College and of all its departments, and directs, supervises, and otherwise affects the operation of Gordon State College. Defendant Burns is responsible to the Board of Regents for the operation and management of Gordon State College and for the execution of all directives of the Board and the Chancellor, including implementing Defendants’ policies to grant or deny requests for in-state tuition. Defendant Burns is responsible for implementing and enforcing the practice of assessing a higher tuition rate for students classified as out-of-state students under O.C.G.A. §§ 20-366 and 50-36-1, and Board of Regents Policies 4.3.2.3., 4.3.4., and 7.3.4.
58. Defendant Dr. Daniel S. Papp is the president of Kennesaw State University. Defendant Papp is the executive head of Kennesaw State University and of all its departments, and directs, supervises, and otherwise affects the operation of Kennesaw State University. Defendant Papp is responsible to the
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Board of Regents for the operation and management of Kennesaw State University and for the execution of all directives of the Board and the Chancellor, including implementing Defendants’ policies to grant or deny requests for in-state tuition. Defendant Papp is responsible for implementing and enforcing the practice of assessing a higher tuition rate for students classified as out-of-state students under O.C.G.A. §§ 20-3-66 and 50-36-1, and Board of Regents Policies 4.3.2.3., 4.3.4., and 7.3.4.
59. Defendant Dr. Christopher Blake is the president of Middle Georgia State University. Defendant Blake is the executive head of Middle Georgia State University and of all its departments, and directs, supervises, and otherwise affects the operation of Middle Georgia State University. Defendant Blake is responsible to the Board of Regents for the operation and management of Middle Georgia State University and for the execution of all directives of the Board and the Chancellor, including implementing Defendants’ policies to grant or deny requests for in-state tuition. Defendant Blake is responsible for implementing and enforcing the practice of assessing a higher tuition rate for students classified as out-of-state students under O.C.G.A. §§ 20-3-66 and 50-36-1, and Board of Regents Policies 4.3.2.3., 4.3.4., and 7.3.4.
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60. Defendant Dr. Cheryl Davenport Dozier is the president of Savannah State University. Defendant Dozier is the executive head of Savannah State University and of all its departments, and directs, supervises, and otherwise affects the operation of Savannah State University. Defendant Dozier is responsible to the Board of Regents for the operation and management of Savannah State University and for the execution of all directives of the Board and the Chancellor, including implementing Defendants’ policies to grant or deny requests for in-state tuition. Defendant Dozier is responsible for implementing and enforcing the practice of assessing a higher tuition rate for students classified as out-of-state students under O.C.G.A. §§ 20-3-66 and 50-36-1, and Board of Regents Policies 4.3.2.3., 4.3.4., and 7.3.4.
61. Defendant Dr. Virginia Carson is the president of South Georgia State College. Defendant Carson is the executive head of South Georgia State College and of all its departments, and directs, supervises, and otherwise affects the operation of South Georgia State College. Defendant Carson is responsible to the Board of Regents for the operation and management of South Georgia State College and for the execution of all directives of the Board and the Chancellor, including implementing Defendants’ policies to grant or deny requests for in-state tuition. Defendant Carson is responsible for implementing and enforcing the
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practice of assessing a higher tuition rate for students classified as out-of-state students under O.C.G.A. §§ 20-3-66 and 50-36-1, and Board of Regents Policies 4.3.2.3., 4.3.4., and 7.3.4.
62. Defendant Dr. Bonita Jacobs is the president of the University of North Georgia. Defendant Jacobs is the executive head of the University of North Georgia and of all its departments, and directs, supervises, and otherwise affects the operation of the University of North Georgia. Defendant Jacobs is responsible to the Board of Regents for the operation and management of the University of North Georgia and for the execution of all directives of the Board and the Chancellor, including implementing Defendants’ policies to grant or deny requests for in-state tuition. Defendant Jacobs is responsible for implementing and enforcing the practice of assessing a higher tuition rate for students classified as out-of-state students under O.C.G.A. §§ 20-3-66 and 50-36-1, and Board of Regents Policies 4.3.2.3., 4.3.4., and 7.3.4.
63. Defendant Dr. Cecil Staton is the president of the Valdosta State University. Defendant Staton is the executive head of Valdosta State University and of all its departments, and directs, supervises, and otherwise affects the operation of Valdosta State University. Defendant Staton is responsible to the Board of Regents for the operation and management of Valdosta State University
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and for the execution of all directives of the Board and the Chancellor, including implementing Defendants’ policies to grant or deny requests for in-state tuition. Defendant Staton is responsible for implementing and enforcing the practice of assessing a higher tuition rate for students classified as out-of-state students under O.C.G.A. §§ 20-3-66 and 50-36-1, and Board of Regents Policies 4.3.2.3., 4.3.4., and 7.3.4.
64. Defendant Dr. Peter Lyons is the Vice Provost and Dean of Perimeter College at Georgia State University. Defendant Lyons is the executive head of Perimeter College at Georgia State University and of all its departments, and directs, supervises, and otherwise affects the operation of Perimeter College at Georgia State University. Defendant Lyons is responsible to the Board of Regents for the operation and management of Perimeter College at Georgia State University and for the execution of all directives of the Board and the Chancellor, including implementing Defendants’ policies to grant or deny requests for in-state tuition. Defendant Lyons is responsible for implementing and enforcing the practice of assessing a higher tuition rate for students classified as out-of-state students under O.C.G.A. §§ 20-3-66 and 50-36-1, and Board of Regents Policies 4.3.2.3., 4.3.4., and 7.3.4.
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65. Defendant Dr. Kyle Marrero is the president of the University of West Georgia. Defendant Marrero is the executive head of the University of West Georgia and of all its departments, and directs, supervises, and otherwise affects the operation of the University of West Georgia. Defendant Marrero is responsible to the Board of Regents for the operation and management of the University of West Georgia and for the execution of all directives of the Board and the Chancellor, including implementing Defendants’ policies to grant or deny requests for in-state tuition. Defendant Marrero is responsible for implementing and enforcing the practice of assessing a higher tuition rate for students classified as out-of-state students under O.C.G.A. §§ 20-3-66 and 50-36-1, and Board of Regents Policies 4.3.2.3., 4.3.4., and 7.3.4.
66. Defendant Dr. Cecil Staton is the president of the Valdosta State University. Defendant Staton is the executive head of Valdosta State University and of all its departments, and directs, supervises, and otherwise affects the operation of Valdosta State University. Defendant Staton is responsible to the Board of Regents for the operation and management of Valdosta State University and for the execution of all directives of the Board and the Chancellor, including implementing Defendants’ policies to grant or deny requests for in-state tuition. Defendant Staton is responsible for implementing and enforcing the practice of
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assessing a higher tuition rate for students classified as out-of-state students under O.C.G.A. §§ 20-3-66 and 50-36-1, and Board of Regents Policies 4.3.2.3., 4.3.4., and 7.3.4.
67. Defendant Robert E. Watts is the interim president of the Georgia Perimeter College. Defendant Watts is the executive head of Georgia Perimeter College and of all its departments, and directs, supervises, and otherwise affects the operation of Georgia Perimeter College. Defendant Watts is responsible to the Board of Regents for the operation and management of Georgia Perimeter College and for the execution of all directives of the Board and the Chancellor, including implementing Defendants’ policies to grant or deny requests for in-state tuition. Defendant Watts is responsible for implementing and enforcing the practice of assessing a higher tuition rate for students classified as out-of-state students under O.C.G.A. §§ 20-3-66 and 50-36-1, and Board of Regents Policies 4.3.2.3., 4.3.4., and 7.3.4.
68. All Defendants deny in-state tuition to deferred action recipients. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Deferred Action 69. The Supreme Court has long recognized that the Executive’s discretion
over removal policy stems from Congressional authority, but also inherently from
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the executive power. See United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542 (1950) (citations omitted). The Executive has exercised this policy discretion repeatedly over the last century--most frequently over removal policy by granting discretionary relief from removal to undocumented immigrants, often through what is referred to as “deferred action.”
70. Originally known as “nonpriority status,” deferred action is a form of discretionary relief, developed internally by INS, under which the agency “may decline to institute proceedings, terminate proceedings, or decline to execute a final order of deportation.” Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 483-84 (1999) (quoting 6 Charles Gordon et al., Immigration Law and Procedure § 72.03[2][h] (1998)).
71. Deferred action recipients are authorized to remain in the United States for the period of the grant. Additionally, deferred action recipients who are granted employment authorization are authorized not only to reside in the United States but to work here. Defendants’ Illegal Acts
72. Defendants, Members of the Board of Regents for the University System of Georgia, must “set forth, policies or regulations or both regarding postsecondary benefits that comply with federal law….” O.C.G.A. § 50-36-1(d)(7).
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73. Defendant Members of the Board of Regents for the University System of Georgia, must further “. . . comply with federal law as provided in 8 U.S.C. Section 1623.” O.C.G.A. § 50-36-1(e).
74. Under their authority, Defendant Members of the Board of Regents promulgated policies including but not limited to Policy 4.3.4. regarding in-state tuition for non-citizens.
75. Under Policy 4.3.4. and related polices, the Defendant Members of the Board of Regents direct that “Each University System institution shall verify the lawful presence in the United States of every successfully admitted person applying for resident tuition status….”
76. In an application of its own residency policies, Defendant Members of the Board of Regents have determined that a student who is granted deferred action by the federal government is not lawfully present.
77. In addition to the above mentioned policies, the Members of the Board of Regents’ Office of Student Affairs administer the policies through a Manual for Determining Tuition Classification And Awarding Out-of-State Tuition Waivers, (“Handbook”) for the purpose of “defin[ing] the parameters within which institutions can classify students as in-state and award out-of-state tuition waivers.” Handbook at p. 5.
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78. Pursuant to the Handbook, the Members of the Board of Regents direct that University staff “should be aware that they may have to defend a tuition classification or waiver to a supervisor or auditor.” Handbook at p. 5.
79. The Members of the Board of Regents further direct the institutions that comprise the University System of Georgia that their own internal policies regarding tuition classification “must align with O.C.G.A. § 20-3-66, the relevant BoR policies listed above [including Policy 4.3.4], and the information provided in this Manual.” Handbook at p. 5.
80. Defendant Members of the Board of Regents, through the Handbook, have directed that individuals granted deferred action are not lawfully present in the United States.
81. Defendant Members of the Board of Regents deny in-state tuition to deferred action recipients who are otherwise eligible for in-state tuition because they categorize deferred action recipients as not lawfully present in the United States.
82. Defendant Presidents deny in-state tuition to deferred action recipients who are otherwise eligible for in-state tuition because they categorize deferred action recipients as not lawfully present in the United States.
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83. Defendant Presidents are required to deny in-state tuition to deferred action recipients by developing and instituting their institution’s own “procedure manual of established institution business practices related to making tuition classification decisions and awarding out-of-state tuition waivers” which must align with the Handbook administered by the Members Board of Regents. Pursuant to the Handbook, “Institutions should be prepared to provide a copy of their institution procedure manual during an audit.” Handbook at p. 5.
84. Defendants impose immigration-related burdens and misclassify deferred action recipients when they classify deferred action recipients as not lawfully present in the U.S.
85. Defendants impose illegal burdens on Individual Plaintiffs by denying them equal protection under the law, and cause GLAHR to redirect resources to address these illegal acts. Defendants’ policies and practices treat Individual Plaintiffs, and all deferred action recipients, disparately without sufficient basis to do so when compared to other similarly situated individuals who are lawfully present in the United States.
86. As a result of Defendants’ illegal acts, Individual Plaintiffs have been wrongfully required to pay out-of-state tuition rates even though they are lawfully present in the United States and are otherwise qualified for in-state tuition rates.
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87. Plaintiff GLAHR redirects resources toward counseling deferred action recipients because Defendants treat deferred action recipients as if they have no lawful presence when deciding in-state tuition eligibility.
88. Plaintiffs suffer irreparable harm. FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Supremacy Clause, Article VI, Clause 2, of the United States Constitution; 42 U.S.C. § 1983)
89. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate all of the allegations contained in the previous paragraphs of this complaint as though fully set forth here.
90. The Supremacy Clause, Article VI, Clause 2, of the United States Constitution, provides that the U.S. “Constitution and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme law of the land.”
91. Defendants’ classification of deferred action recipients as ineligible for in-state tuition benefits conflicts with, frustrates, and serves as an obstacle to federal immigration law, goals, and policies and thus is preempted by federal law.
92. The Supremacy Clause, Article VI, Clause 2, of the U.S. Constitution, mandates that federal law preempts state law where Congress expressly or impliedly has reserved exclusive authority to the federal government, including where state law conflicts or interferes with federal law. Similarly, the Supremacy
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Clause constitutionally reserves exclusive authority to the federal government regarding the regulation of immigration, among other areas.
93. Defendants’ further misclassification of deferred recipients as not being lawfully present in the United States conflicts with federal law and is thus preempted.
94. Plaintiffs move for relief on this claim directly under the Constitution and as an action seeking redress of the deprivation of statutory rights under the color of state law, also under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF (Equal Protection Clause, Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution; 42
U.S.C. § 1983) 95. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate all of the allegations contained in the previous paragraphs of this complaint as though fully set forth here. 96. The Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that “[n]o State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” 97. Defendants’ denial of in-state tuition to individuals granted deferred action violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 98. Defendants’ acts permit noncitizens and citizens who are similarly situated to deferred action recipients to establish eligibility for in-state tuition yet
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discriminate against deferred action recipients by barring their eligibility for instate tuition. Defendants cannot establish that their policies and practices have any valid justification to withstand constitutional scrutiny.
99. Individual Plaintiffs seek compensatory damages for economic harms resulting from Defendants’ unlawful misclassification.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for the following relief:
A. A preliminary and permanent injunction enjoining Defendants, their officials, agents, employees, assigns, and all persons acting in concert or participating with them from implementing or enforcing the state’s policy and practice of denying in-state tuition to deferred action recipients;
B. A declaration pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202 that Defendants’ policy and practice of denying in-state tuition to deferred action recipients is unlawful and invalid;
C. Compensatory damages for economic harms suffered by Individual Plaintiffs.
D. Restitution of tuition fees and other costs wrongfully obtained from Individual Plaintiffs.
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E. An order awarding Plaintiffs costs of suit, and reasonable attorneys’ fees and expenses pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and any other applicable law; and
F. Such other and further relief as the Court deems equitable, just, and proper.

Dated this 21st day of April, 2016

By: __/s/Nathanael A. Horsley___
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
Nathanael A. Horsley Georgia Bar No. 367832 nhorsley@gacivilrights.com
Mark Begnaud Georgia Bar No. 217641 mbegnaud@gacivilrights.com Thomas G. Sampson Georgia Bar No. 623601 t.sampson@tkstlaw.com Miguel A. Dominguez Georgia Bar No. 301860 m.dominguez@tkstlaw.com

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on April 21, 2016, I electronically filed the foregoing
FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT with the Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF
system which will automatically send email notification of such filing to the
following attorneys of record:
Deborah Nolan Gore Attorney General's Office-Atl 40 Capitol Square, SW Atlanta, GA 30334 404-463-8850 dgore@law.ga.gov
Devon Orland Office of State Attorney General 40 Capitol Square, S.W. Atlanta, GA 30334-1300 404-463-8850 404-651-5304 (fax) dorland@law.ga.gov
/s/ Nathanael A. Horsley Nathanael A. Horsley Georgia Bar No. 367832 Attorney for Plaintiffs HORSLEY BEGNAUD LLC 750 Hammond Drive, Building 12, Suite 300 Atlanta GA 30328 T: 770.765.5559 nhorsley@gacivilrights.com
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION

GEORGIA LATINO ALLIANCE FOR CASE No. 1:16-cv-00757-WCO HUMAN RIGHTS, et. al.,

Plaintiffs, v.

PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

C. DEAN ALFORD, et al.,

Defendants.

Case 1:16-cv-00757-RWS Document 64 Filed 05/03/16 Page 2 of 62
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION...............................................................................................1 II. BACKGROUND.................................................................................................2
A. Georgia Policy Provides In-State Tuition to Lawfully Present Noncitizens. ................................................................................................2
B. Deferred Action Recipients, Who Receive Relief Only After a Thorough Vetting, Are Lawfully Present in the United States. .................3
C. Defendants Deny In-State Tuition to Deferred Action Recipients Despite Their Lawful Presence. .................................................................5
D. Deferred Action Recipients Must Pay 358% of In-State Rates, on Average, Diminishing Their Educational and Life Opportunities. ............7
III. LEGAL STANDARD.........................................................................................8 IV. ARGUMENT ......................................................................................................8
A. Plaintiffs Are Likely to Succeed on Their Preemption Claim. ..................8 1. Individuals Granted Deferred Action Have Lawful Presence to Be in the United States. ......................................................................9 2. Defendants Have Impermissibly Regulated Immigration by Creating Their Own Immigrant Classification That Is Preempted by the Constitution and Field Preempted by the INA. ..................................................................................................12 a. Defendants Unlawfully Invade the Federal Government’s Constitutionally Granted Power to Regulate Immigration, Which Includes the Power to Classify Immigrants. .................13 b. Congress’s Comprehensive Immigration Scheme Leaves No Room for Defendants to Make Immigration Classifications. ..........................................................................16 3. Defendants Define Deferred Action Recipients as Not Lawfully Present, Which Conflicts with Federal Immigration Law. ..................................................................................................19
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a. Defendants’ Treatment of Deferred Action Recipients As Not Lawfully Present Is Irreconcilable with the Federal Government’s Actions. .............................................................20
b. Defendants’ In-State Tuition Rules Contravene Congress’s Decision to Delegate Immigration Discretion to the Federal Executive............................................................22
B. Plaintiffs are Likely to Succeed on the Merits of their Equal Protection Claim. ......................................................................................25 1. Alienage Classifications, Such as Georgia’s Policy in this Case, are Subject to Strict Scrutiny. .................................................25 2. Alternatively, Heightened Scrutiny Is Appropriate Because Defendants Deprive a Politically Vulnerable Group of Access to Education. .....................................................................................27 3. Defendants’ Illegal Classification Fails Strict or Heightened Scrutiny. ............................................................................................31 4. The Regents and Presidents’ Policies Fails Even Rational Basis Review Because Defendants Have No Legitimate Interest in Making Their Own Immigration Classifications. ...........32 a. Deferred Action Recipients Are Similarly Situated to Other Lawfully Present Georgia Residents Eligible for InState Tuition. .............................................................................33 b. Georgia’s Disparate Treatment of Deferred Action Recipients Is Not Supported by a Legitimate State Interest .....35
C. Plaintiffs Suffer Irreparable Harms. .........................................................38 1. Plaintiffs Suffer Life-Altering Injuries to Their Educational and Career Prospects.........................................................................38 2. Organizational Plaintiffs Are Suffering Irreparable Harms. ............46
D. The Balance of Equities and Public Interest Strongly Favor Plaintiffs. ..49 V. CONCLUSION .................................................................................................50
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Federal Cases Aaron v. Clark,
342 F. Supp. 898 (N.D. Ga. 1972) ......................................................... 39, 41, 45 Arizona v. United States,
132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012). ............................................................................... passim Ariz. DREAM Act Coal. v. Brewer,
757 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 2014) ............................................................. 9, 28, 36, 41 Ariz. DREAM Act Coal. v. Brewer,
81 F.Supp.3d 795 (D. Ariz. 2015) ........................................................................11 Ariz. DREAM Act Coal. v. Brewer,
No. 15-15307, 2016 WL 1358378 (9th Cir. Apr. 5, 2016) ............... 15, 18, 21, 28 Barnes v. Zaccari,
669 F.3d 1295 (11th Cir. 2012) ...........................................................................29 Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover,
359 U.S. 500 (1959) ..............................................................................................8 Bloodworth v. Oxford Vill. Townhouses, Inc.,
377 F. Supp. 709 (N.D. Ga. 1974) ......................................................................45 Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White,
548 U.S. 53 (2006) ..............................................................................................42 Cent. Alabama Fair Hous. Ctr. v. Magee,
No. 2:11CV982-MHT, 2011 WL 5878363 (M.D. Ala. Nov. 23, 2011) .............14 Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Whiting,
563 U.S. 582, 131 S.Ct. 1968 (2011) ..................................................................17 City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr.,
473 U.S. 432 (1985). .................................................................................... 28, 32 Dandamundi v. Tisch,
686 F.3d 66 (2d Cir. 2012) ..................................................................... 26, 28, 33 DeCanas v. Bica,
424 U.S. 351 (1976) .................................................................................... passim
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Dixon v. Ala. State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961) ...............................................................................30
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) ............................................................................................38
Equal Access Educ. v. Merten, 305 F. Supp. 2d 585 (E.D. Va. 2004) ........................................................... 16, 21
F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412 (1920) ............................................................................................32
Fla. Businessmen for Free Enter. v. City of Hollywood, 648 F.2d 956 (5th Cir. 1981) ...............................................................................50
Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 529 U.S. 861 ........................................................................................................20
Gent v. CUNA Mut. Ins. Soc’y, 611 F.3d 79 (1st Cir. 2010) ....................................................................................4
Gilio ex rel. J.G. v. Sch. Bd. of Hillsborough Cty., Fla., 905 F. Supp. 2d 1262 (M.D. Fla. 2012) ..............................................................49
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) ............................................................................... 25, 26, 27
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) ..................................................................................... 30, 31
Guerrero-Morales, 512 F. Supp. 1328 (D. Minn. 1981) ....................................................................10
Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976) ..............................................................................................28
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941) ................................................................................. 17, 18, 20
Hispanic Interest Coal. of Ala. v. Bentley, No. 5:11–CV–2484–SLB, 2011 WL 5516953 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 28, 2011) ....... 10, 15,16, 21
Hispanic Interest Coal. of Ala. v. Bentley, 691 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 2012) ......................................................... 10, 27, 31, 48
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Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Ga., 263 F.3d 1234 (11th Cir. 2001) ...........................................................................31
Juarez v. Nw. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 69 F. Supp. 3d 364 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) ............................................................ 10, 29
KH Outdoor, LLC v. City of Trussville, 458 F.3d 1261 (11th Cir.2006) ............................................................................49
Klopfenstein v. Deutsche Bank Sec., Inc., 592 F. App’x 812 (11th Cir. 2014).........................................................................4
League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755 (C.D. Cal. 1995)......................................................................16
Lebron v. Wilkins, 820 F.Supp.2d 1273 (M.D. Fla. 2011) ................................................................49
Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 724 F.3d 297 (3d Cir. 2013) ......................................................................... 16, 19
MacGinnitie v. Hobbs Group LLC, 420 F.3d 1234 (2005) ..........................................................................................41
Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976) ............................................................................................32
Mesa Air Grp., Inc. v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 573 F.3d 1124 (11th Cir. 2009).............................................................................8
Nat’l Auto Lenders, Inc. v. SysLOCATE, Inc., 753 F. Supp. 2d 1233 (S.D. Fla. 2010)................................................................45
Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651 (1892) ............................................................................................13
Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1 (1992) ................................................................................................33
Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1 (1977) ........................................................................................ passim
Planned Parenthood Se., Inc. v. Bentley, No. 2:15CV620-MHT, 2015 WL 6517875 (M.D. Ala. 2015) ............................50
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) .................................................................................... passim
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R.W. v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 114 F. Supp. 3d 1260 (N.D. Ga. 2015) .................................................. 43, 44, 45
Reynolds v. Roberts, 207 F.3d 1288 (11th Cir. 2000).............................................................................8
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) ..................................................................................... 33, 37
Ruiz v. Robinson, 892 F. Supp. 2d 1321 (S.D. Fla. 2012)......................................................... 30, 39
Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 403 F.3d 1223 (11th Cir. 2005).............................................................................8
Scott v. Tribune Co., No. 6:04-CV-1145ORL22DAB, 2006 WL 888129 (N.D. Fla. Mar. 3, 2006)....42
Smart v. City of Miami Beach, 1 F. Supp. 3d 1350 (S.D. Fla. 2014)....................................................................42
Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948) ............................................................................................26
Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915) ..............................................................................................13
U. S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973) ..................................................................................... 32, 37
United States v. Alabama, 691 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 2012) ........................................................ 16, 18, 19, 24
United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938) ..................................................................................... 28, 29
United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) ............................................................................................31
United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) ................................................................................. 27, 38
Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471 (1999) ..................................................................................... passim
Valle del Sol Inc. v. Whiting, 732 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2013) ...................................................................... 15, 48
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Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952) ............................................................................................30
Agency Decisions In re Monreal-Aguinaga,
23 I&N Dec. 56 (BIA 2001)................................................................................12 In re Pena-Diaz,
20 I&N Dec. 841 (BIA 1994)..............................................................................12 In re Quintero,
18 I&N Dec. 348 (BIA 1982)..............................................................................12
Federal Statutes 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1)...............................................................................................23 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B) .........................................................................................11 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(ii) ................................................................................3, 10 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) ...................................................................................................23 26 U.S.C. § 7701(b)(1)(a) ........................................................................................33 49 U.S.C. § 30301 ............................................................................................. 10, 34 REAL ID Act, Pub.L.No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 302 (2005) .........................................10 U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, cl. 3, 4..................................................................................13 U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, cl. 4......................................................................................18
State Statutes O.C.G.A. § 40-5-1................................................................................................5, 34 O.C.G.A. § 40-5-21.1.................................................................................................5 O.C.G.A. § 40-5-21.1(a) ................................................................................... 12, 34 Illegal Immigration Reform & Enforcement Act of 2011, 2011 Georgia Laws Act 252 (H.B. 87) ............................................................. 12, 34
Federal Regulations 6 C.F.R. § 37.3 .........................................................................................................10 8 C.F.R. § 1.3(a)(4)(vi) ................................................................................. 3, 11, 33
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8 C.F.R. § 214.14(d)(3)..................................................................................... 10, 11 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(c)(14) ............................................................................. 3, 11, 33 28 C.F.R. § 1100.35(b) ............................................................................................11 28 C.F.R. § 1100.35(b)(2)................................................................................. 10, 11
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I. INTRODUCTION Defendants have no authority to make their own immigration classifications.
Yet, in defining and implementing eligibility rules for in-state tuition, Defendants create an idiosyncratic and unconstitutional immigration classification that departs from federal immigration law. Specifically, Defendants must identify those noncitizens who are “lawfully present in the United States” for eligibility for instate tuition. Despite federal law to the contrary, Defendants classify deferred action recipients like Student Plaintiffs and Freedom University members as not lawfully present. This illegal departure from federal law results in multiple constitutional violations.
The Eleventh Circuit, the United States Congress, the Department of Homeland Security, and the Board of Immigration Appeals all agree that deferred action recipients are lawfully present in the United States. In fact, deferred action recipients are eligible for both federal work authorization and social security numbers. Even the Georgia Legislature, in the driver’s license context, agrees that deferred action recipients have permission from the federal government to be present in the United States.
First, Defendants’ attempt to rewrite federal immigration law is preempted. Initially, Defendants’ treatment of deferred action recipients constitutes a state-
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based immigrant classification which departs from the federal government’s, an act that the constitution itself preempts, and is field preempted by the Immigration and Naturalization Act (“INA”). Similarly, Defendants’ misclassification of deferred action recipients conflicts with (i) the federal government’s own classifications and (ii) the Executive’s discretion to administer and enforce immigration laws. Second, Defendants unconstitutionally discriminate against deferred action recipients when compared to other Georgia residents who are lawfully present in the United States, including parolees, refugees, and asylees. The inequity is, at best, premised on a flawed understanding of federal immigration law or, at worst, driven by the base desire to harm a vulnerable group. Either way, Defendants should be enjoined.
II. BACKGROUND A. Georgia Policy Provides In-State Tuition to Lawfully Present
Noncitizens. Board of Regents Policy 4.3.2.3 classifies noncitizen students as “in-state” for tuition purposes when they are “legally in this state.” Board of Regents Policy Manual 4.3.2.3 (“Policy Manual”).1 The policy manual requires that “[e]ach University System Institution shall verify the lawful presence in the United States
1 Board of Regents Policies are available at http://www.usg.edu/policymanual/ (last visited Apr. 29, 2016).
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of every successfully admitted person applying for resident tuition status.” Policy Manual at 4.3.4 (emphasis added).
B. Deferred Action Recipients, Who Receive Relief Only After a Thorough Vetting, Are Lawfully Present in the United States. As described more fully below, see infra Part IV.A.1., deferred action is a
form of prosecutorial discretion under federal immigration law, and its recipients are lawfully present in the United States. Recipients are eligible to receive work authorization and social security numbers, and do not accrue unlawful presence for immigration purposes. 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(c)(14) (work authorization); 8 C.F.R. § 1.3(a)(4)(vi) (social security benefits); 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(ii) (setting out exceptions to unlawful presence).
As the Supreme Court acknowledged, the federal government has long engaged in a regular practice of prosecutorial discretion in enforcing the INA. See Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. (“AADC”), 525 U.S. 471, 483-84 & n.8 (1999). This history includes authorizing the grant of deferred action to (i) foreign students affected by Hurricane Katrina, and (ii) to certain widows and widowers of U.S. citizens. See Ex. A to Viramontes Decl.,2 U.S. Citizenship and
2 All references to exhibits are attached to the Viramontes Declaration, filed concurrently. Plaintiffs request that the Court take judicial notice of Exs. A, B, C, D, G, H, and I. These are publicly available government documents that are a matter of public record and are “not subject to reasonable dispute” because they (1)
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Immigration Services (“USCIS”), Interim Relief for Certain Foreign Academic Students Adversely Affected by Hurricane Katrina: Frequently Asked Questions at 1 (Nov. 25, 2005); Ex. B, Mem. from Donald Neufeld, Acting Associate Director at USCIS, “Guidance Regarding Surviving Spouses of Deceased U.S. Citizens and Their Children” at 1 (Sept. 4, 2009). More recently, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) announced Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (“DACA”) to grant relief to certain young immigrants who “have already contributed to our country in significant ways.” See Ex. D, Mem. from Janet Napolitano, DHS Secretary, “Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United States as Children” at 2 (June 15, 2012).
DACA recipients must submit to an extensive screening to ensure they meet the age and residency requirements, show their education and/or military service, pass a criminal background check, and pose no threat to national security or public safety. Id. Meeting these requirements, however, does not automatically lead to a grant of deferred action. As DHS makes clear, requests for deferred action under
are generally known in the jurisdiction or (2) can be readily determined from a source whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. F.R.E. 201(b); see Klopfenstein v. Deutsche Bank Sec., Inc., 592 F. App’x 812, 816 (11th Cir. 2014) (holding “district court may take judicial notice of matters of public record”); Gent v. CUNA Mut. Ins. Soc’y, 611 F.3d 79, 84 n.5 (1st Cir. 2010) (taking judicial notice of information from official government website).
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DACA “are to be decided on a case by case basis.” Id. The federal government does similarly rigorous evaluations of other potential deferred action recipients. 3
Georgia law also recognizes that deferred action provides lawful presence in the United States in a statute authorizing deferred action recipients to obtain driver’s licenses and state-issued IDs. O.C.G.A. § 40-5-1. “[A]lien[s] with legal authorization from the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service” are eligible for driver’s licenses, O.C.G.A. § 40-5-1, which includes deferred action recipients “during the period of time of the applicant’s authorized stay in the United States[.]” O.C.G.A. § 40-5-21.1.
C. Defendants Deny In-State Tuition to Deferred Action Recipients Despite Their Lawful Presence. Despite policies that permit lawfully present noncitizens to receive in-state
tuition, the Regents require that a person granted “deferred action … cannot be considered lawfully present in the United States[.]” Ex. E, Bd. of Regents, Manual for Determining Tuition Classification & Awarding Out-of-State Tuition Waivers (“Tuition Manual”) at 16 (July 9, 2015). To support its conclusion, the Tuition Manual cites to a one-page memorandum from the Regents’ Vice Chancellor of
3 For example, the Violence Against Women Act provides for deferred action for persons “of good moral character.” See Ex. C, “Battered Spouse, Children & Parents,” USCIS (Feb. 16, 2016).
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Legal Affairs, Burns Newsome (“Regents Memo”), published just one month after DHS announced the DACA Program. Id.; see Ex. F, Regents Memo.
The Regents Memo concludes that deferred action recipients are not lawfully present in the United States, citing only DHS’s “Consideration of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals … Frequently Asked Questions” (“DHS 2012 FAQs”). See Regents Memo. However, the DHS 2012 FAQs provides, “an individual whose case is deferred will not be considered to be accruing unlawful presence in the United States during the period deferred action is in effect.” Ex. G, DHS 2012 FAQs. The Regents Memo ignores this portion of the DHS 2012 FAQs, which directly undermines the memorandum’s conclusion. See Regents Memo.
On January 18, 2013, DHS provided an updated FAQ that makes the Regents’ conflict with federal law even more explicit. The DHS 2013 FAQs provides that “[a]n individual who has received deferred action is authorized by DHS to be present in the United States, and is therefore considered by DHS to be lawfully present during the period deferred action is in effect.” Ex. H, DHS 2013 FAQs 2. The Board of Regents has not revisited its conclusion nor has it cited to the updated federal guidance.
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D. Deferred Action Recipients Must Pay 358% of In-State Rates, on Average, Diminishing Their Educational and Life Opportunities. As a result of Defendants’ classification, deferred action recipients who
attend University System of Georgia (“USG”) institutions are required to pay outof-state tuition rates even though they live in Georgia. See Tuition Manual 16. Tuition is, on average, 358% more expensive for students required to pay out-ofstate rates than in-state rates. See Ex. I, Univ. Sys. of Ga., Undergraduate Tuition Rates Per Semester – Fiscal Year 2016; see also Ex. J, Chart Comparing Tuition Rates. For example, Plaintiffs who to attend Georgia Perimeter College must pay undergraduate out-of-state tuition of approximately $10,194.00 per year rather than in-state tuition of $2,693.00 per year. Id.
The dramatically increased cost of college means that Plaintiffs Lorena Guillen, Karla Lopez, Mayela Salazar, Jorge San Juan, and Arturo Martinez del Rello (“Student Plaintiffs”) and Freedom University members cannot attend college at all, cannot obtain degrees in their chosen careers, and suffer both delays in obtaining degrees and a severely reduced quality of the college experience. See infra Part IV.C.1. The need to respond to Defendants’ misclassification diverts limited resources from Plaintiffs Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights (“GLAHR”) and Freedom University (“Organizational Plaintiffs”) and frustrates their core missions. See infra Part IV.C.2.
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III. LEGAL STANDARD To obtain a preliminary injunction, the moving party must establish four
prerequisites: “(1) substantial likelihood of success, (2) irreparable harm, (3) that the balance of equities favors granting the injunction, and (4) that the public interest would not be harmed by the injunction.” Mesa Air Grp., Inc. v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 573 F.3d 1124, 1128 (11th Cir. 2009). A court will grant a preliminary injunction “to prevent the plaintiff from being injured, and where there is no adequate remedy at law.” Reynolds v. Roberts, 207 F.3d 1288, 1299 (11th Cir. 2000) (citing Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 506–07 (1959)).
A court need not place equal emphasis on all four prerequisites. Rather, the Eleventh Circuit has held that a substantial likelihood of success on the merits is generally the most important of the four prerequisites. Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 403 F.3d 1223, 1232 (11th Cir. 2005). The moving party satisfies this requirement by showing merely that success is “likely or probable, rather than certain.” Id.
IV. ARGUMENT A. Plaintiffs Are Likely to Succeed on Their Preemption Claim.
Defendants concede that deciding whether deferred action recipients have “[l]awful presence is, of course, a question of federal law[.]” Regents Memo.
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Federal law classifies noncitizens with deferred action as lawfully present in the United States and Georgia. Despite this, and despite Georgia law and policy that purports to authorize the grant of in-state tuition to those who are lawfully present in the United States, Defendants misclassify deferred action recipients as being not lawfully present and deny them in-state tuition. In so doing, Defendants encroach on the exclusive federal authority to regulate immigration, and create an idiosyncratic immigration classification that is superseded by the INA and conflicts with well-established federal law.
1. Individuals Granted Deferred Action Have Lawful Presence to Be in the United States.
The Eleventh Circuit has already held that a noncitizen “currently classified under ‘deferred action’ status . . . remains permissibly in the United States.” Ga. Latino Alliance for Human Rights v. Governor of Ga. (“GLAHR”), 691 F.3d 1250, 1258-59 (11th Cir. 2012). This conclusion is shared by other Courts of Appeals like the Ninth Circuit, which recently held deferred action “authorizes certain immigrants who came to the United States as children … to remain in the United States[.]” Ariz. DREAM Act Coal. v. Brewer (“ADAC I”), 757 F.3d 1053, 1057 (9th Cir. 2014). A District Court in this Circuit—and District Courts throughout the country—held the same, confirming that deferred action recipients are persons “whom the federal government has authorized to remain in the United States[.]”
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Hispanic Interest Coal. of Ala. v. Bentley (“HICA I”), No. 5:11–CV–2484–SLB, 2011 WL 5516953, at *20 n.11 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 28, 2011), vacated as moot, 691 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 2012) (“HICA II”); see also Juarez v. Nw. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 69 F. Supp. 3d 364, 368 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (deferred action recipients are “a subclass of lawfully present aliens”); In re Guerrero-Morales, 512 F. Supp. 1328, 1329 (D. Minn. 1981) (deferred action is a decision “whether to permit an alien to remain in the United States”).
Congress reinforced the lawful presence of deferred action recipients through its passage of the REAL ID Act of 2005. Pub.L.No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 302 (2005). There, Congress provided that “approved deferred action status” constitutes “[a] period of . . . authorized stay in the United States” that enables recipients to obtain driver’s licenses valid for federal identification. 49 U.S.C. § 30301 note, Sec. 202(c)(2)(B)(viii), (C)(ii); see also 6 C.F.R. § 37.3 (same).
DHS regulations confirm their lawful presence. The INA states that a noncitizen present in the United States beyond a “period of stay authorized by the Attorney General” or without being admitted or paroled is “deemed to be unlawfully present in the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(ii). DHS established that deferred action recipients do not accrue this “unlawful presence.” 8 C.F.R. § 214.14(d)(3); 28 C.F.R. § 1100.35(b)(2). Because such recipients are
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present without being admitted or paroled, their stay is considered “authorized by the Attorney General.” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B); accord 8 C.F.R. § 214.14(d)(3); 28 C.F.R. § 1100.35(b)(2). Other DHS regulations likewise verify that deferred action is a form of lawful presence. For example, 8 C.F.R. § 1.3(a)(4)(vi) notes that persons “currently in deferred action status” are “permitted to remain in” and “lawfully present in the United States” for purposes of social security benefits.
In addition, DHS regulations authorize noncitizens granted deferred action to receive employment authorization, 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(c)(14), and in some cases requires them to apply for it. DHS 2013 FAQs 3, 14. The grant of work authorization further reinforces that DHS has authorized these individuals to be present to live and work in the United States. See Ariz. DREAM Act Coal. (“ADAC II”) , 81 F. Supp. 3d 795, 803 (D. Ariz. 2015) aff’d, No. 15-15307, 2016 WL 1358378 (9th Cir. Apr. 5, 2016). The Departments of Justice and of State regulations likewise define deferred action as an “authorized form of continued presence.” 28 C.F.R. § 1100.35(b) (regarding relief for human trafficking victims).
Consistent with these authorities, the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), a branch of the Department of Justice and the highest administrative body for interpreting and applying immigration laws, has long held that “deferred action status is . . . permission to remain in this country.” In re Quintero, 18 I&N Dec.
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348, 349 (BIA 1982); see also, e.g., In re Pena-Diaz, 20 I&N Dec. 841, 846 (BIA 1994) (deferred action status “affirmatively permit[s] the alien to remain”); In re Monreal-Aguinaga, 23 I&N Dec. 56, 62 n.3 (BIA 2001) (same).
Thus, the Eleventh Circuit, federal statutes, federal regulations, and administrative law precedent all demonstrate that deferred action recipients are lawfully present in the United States for a period of time. The Supreme Court has held states may at most “borrow the federal [immigrant] classification” or “follow the federal direction.” Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 219 n.19, 226 (1982). Indeed, Georgia’s Legislature appears to recognize that individuals with “approved deferred action status” are “lawfully present” and “authorized” to stay in the United States, and thus eligible for driving privileges. O.C.G.A. § 40-5-21.1(a).
2. Defendants Have Impermissibly Regulated Immigration by Creating Their Own Immigrant Classification That Is Preempted by the Constitution and Field Preempted by the INA.
Rather than accept the federal determination, the Defendants have created their own immigrant classification for deferred action recipients. As a result, Defendants have intruded on the federal government’s exclusive power to regulate immigration, a field that the Constitution reserves for the federal government and Congress has occupied with comprehensive and complex regulations.
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a. Defendants Unlawfully Invade the Federal Government’s Constitutionally Granted Power to Regulate Immigration, Which Includes the Power to Classify Immigrants.
The Constitution gives the federal government exclusive power to regulate immigration. DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 354 (1976); Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 42 (1915). This exclusive and “broad undoubted power over the subject of immigration and the status of aliens” derives from the Constitution’s grant to the federal government of the power to “establish a uniform Rule of Naturalization” and to “regulate Commerce with foreign Nations,” U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, cl. 3, 4, as well as from the national government’s “inherent power as sovereign.” Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2498 (2012); see also Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892) (recognizing inherent power of sovereign nation to control its borders).
The Supreme Court has explained that “Congress, as an aspect of its broad power over immigration and naturalization, enjoys rights to distinguish among aliens that are not shared by the States.” Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 7 n.8 (1977). The power to classify noncitizens is central to the exclusive federal power to regulate immigration because “alienage classifications may be intimately related to the conduct of foreign policy, to the federal prerogative to control access to the United States, and to the plenary federal power to determine who has sufficiently
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manifested his allegiance to become a citizen of the Nation.” Plyler, 457 U.S. at 219 n.19; see Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2506-07 (holding same). Because the power to classify constitutes a regulation of immigration, “‘[t]he States enjoy no power with respect to the classification of aliens.’” Cent. Ala. Fair Hous. Ctr. v. Magee, No. 2:11CV982-MHT, 2011 WL 5878363, at *2 (M.D. Ala. Nov. 23, 2011) (quoting Plyler, 457 U.S. at 225).
As a result, the Supreme Court recognized that a state or local law that constitutes a “regulation of immigration [is] per se pre-empted by this constitutional power, whether latent or exercised.”4 DeCanas, 424 U.S. at 355 (emphasis added). As the Court explained, “the existence vel non of federal regulation is wholly irrelevant if the Constitution of its own force requires preemption of such state regulation.” Id. at 355 (emphasis added). Thus, “any direct regulation of immigration—‘which is essentially a determination of who should or should not be admitted into the country, and the conditions under which a legal entrant may remain’—is constitutionally proscribed[.]” Valle del Sol Inc. v. Whiting, 732 F.3d 1006, 1023 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting DeCanas, 424 U.S. at 354-
4 DeCanas relies on a number of early Supreme Court cases that invalidated state laws seeking to regulate immigration even before Congress enacted a comprehensive national immigration scheme. See DeCanas, 424 U.S. at 354-55. As described below, Congress has exercised this constitutional power in the form of the comprehensive INA and related regulations.
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55)). In short, the U.S. Constitution prohibits states from creating immigrant classifications.
Since DeCanas, federal courts have regularly invalidated state attempts to create their own immigration classifications, holding they are impermissible regulations of immigration. This year, the Ninth Circuit ruled that Arizona’s decision to classify a subset of deferred action recipients as unauthorized under federal law was preempted because it “usurps the authority of the federal government to create immigrant classification.” Ariz. DREAM Act Coal. v. Brewer (“ADAC III”), No. 15-15307, 2016 WL 1358378 at *14 (9th Cir. Apr. 5, 2016). . In this Circuit, a District Court enjoined an Alabama law because it created an idiosyncratic state classification of immigrants who are “not lawfully present,” emphasizing that “only Congress may classify aliens.” HICA I, 2011 WL 5516953, at *23. Similarly, another District Court enjoined portions of a California voter-approved initiative found to be an impermissible regulation of immigration because the state’s “classification of persons as (1) citizens; (2) lawfully admitted as a permanent resident or (3) lawfully admitted for a temporary period is not in any way tied to federal standards.” League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755, 772 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (emphasis in original); see also, e.g., Equal Access Educ. v. Merten, 305 F. Supp. 2d 585, 602-03 (E.D.
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Va. 2004) (noting higher education admissions policy would be preempted as a regulation of immigration if Virginia had departed from the federal standard).
Here, Defendants have independently classified deferred action recipients as not authorized to be present. The Constitution forbids Defendants from making this determination. See DeCanas, 424 U.S. at 354-55. Even in areas of traditional state concern, state acts are void if they are a regulation of immigration. See United States v. Alabama, 691 F.3d 1269, 1292-96 (11th Cir. 2012) (state law prohibiting courts from recognizing contracts involving unlawfully present aliens was preempted as “a thinly veiled attempt to regulate immigration under the guise of contract law”); see also Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 724 F.3d 297, 315-17 (3d Cir. 2013) (same, enjoining housing ordinances that regulate residence based on immigration status). While Defendants have the authority to operate a state university system, they cannot create their own immigration classifications to do so. HICA I, 2011 WL 5516953, at *23 (holding state college admissions policy preempted). Defendants’ independent classification cannot stand.
b. Congress’s Comprehensive Immigration Scheme Leaves No Room for Defendants to Make Immigration Classifications.
Preemption applies with particular force where Congress has determined that a particular field must be subject to exclusive federal regulation. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2501-02 (“States may not enter, in any respect, an area the Federal
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Government has reserved for itself.”). In such cases, all state law must yield to the federal prerogative, even where the state regulation complements federal goals. Id. at 2502; Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 66-67 (1941). Courts infer Congress’s intent to occupy a regulatory field from “the federal statute itself, read in the light of its constitutional setting and its legislative history.” GLAHR, 691 F.3d at 1262. In particular, field preemption applies where federal interests dominate or where Congress has adopted a complex, pervasive framework that forecloses state regulation on the subject. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2501.
The Supreme Court has indicated that the INA creates a pervasive framework with regard to the admission, removal, and presence of aliens. See Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Whiting, 563 U.S. 582, 131 S.Ct. 1968, 1973 (2011) (quoting DeCanas, 424 U.S. at 353, 359); see also Arizona, 132 S.Ct. at 2499 (“Federal governance of immigration and alien status is extensive and complex.”). As noted above, the Constitution explicitly confers upon Congress the power to regulate immigration and create immigrant classifications. See U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, cl. 4; Plyler, 457 U.S. at 225. Congress has exercised its constitutional power by adopting a comprehensive scheme of immigration regulation that leaves no room for state-created immigration classifications. Hines, 312 U.S. at 69, 72-73. Congress’s extensive regulation “illustrates an
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overwhelmingly dominant federal interest in the field.” GLAHR, 691 F.3d at 1264; see also Alabama, 691 F.3d at 1295 (“Congress intended that the Executive Branch determine who must be removed and who may permissibly remain.”).
In assessing whether states have interfered in a field of exclusive federal regulation, courts look to the practical effect of the law rather than the method the state has adopted. Alabama, 691 F.3d at 1296. Most on point, the Ninth Circuit recently struck down a policy that classified deferred action recipients as not authorized to be present in the United States for the purposes of obtaining driver’s licenses. ADAC III, 2016 WL 1358378, at *9. The Court held, “Because Arizona created a new immigration classification when it adopted its policy regarding driver's license eligibility, it impermissibly strayed into the exclusive domain of the INA.” Id., at *9 (also holding the policy field preempted). Similarly, this Circuit in United States v. Alabama overturned a law that prohibited Alabama courts from enforcing or recognizing contracts between a party and unlawfully present noncitizens, holding that that “Congress’s comprehensive statutory framework governing alien removal” determined who may lawfully remain in the United States, and the state had no power to make independent judgments on the same. 691 F.3d at 1292-94. The Third Circuit has also affirmed that a “state or locality may not determine who should or should not be admitted into the country, and the
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conditions under which a legal entrant may remain,” and held provisions barring rental houses to aliens without lawful status “field preempted because they intrude on the regulation of residency and presence of aliens in the United States.” Lozano, 724 F.3d at 317 (internal edits and citations omitted).
The Board of Regents and University Presidents continue down this failed path. By classifying deferred action recipients as unlawfully present, Defendants intrude on the field of alien classification that Congress, through the INA’s comprehensive framework, has reserved for itself. The Defendants create their own classification of deferred action recipients through their in-state tuition policy and practices. This violates the Supremacy Clause and is thus preempted.
3. Defendants Define Deferred Action Recipients as Not Lawfully Present, Which Conflicts with Federal Immigration Law.
The Constitution requires a uniform immigration system, as “[d]ecisions of this nature touch on foreign relations.” Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2506-07. “[S]tate laws are preempted when they conflict with federal law.” Id. at 2501. Conflict is present when the state law “‘stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress—whether that ‘obstacle’ goes by the name of ‘conflicting; contrary to; . . . repugnance; difference; irreconcilability; inconsistency; violation; curtailment; . . . interference,’ or the
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like.” Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 529 U.S. 861, 873 (quoting Hines, 312 U.S. at 67); see e.g., Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2501; DeCanas, 424 U.S. at 363.
Defendants’ classification of deferred action recipients as not lawfully present is conflict preempted in two ways. First, Defendants’ classification directly conflicts with the federal government’s treatment of deferred action recipients. Second, Defendants’ acts undermine Congress’s delegation of discretion to the Executive Branch to determine whether a noncitizen is lawfully present in the United States.
a. Defendants’ Treatment of Deferred Action Recipients as Not Lawfully Present Is Irreconcilable with the Federal Government’s Actions.
Defendants implement an immigration category that conflicts with binding precedent, federal statutes, federal regulations, BIA decisions, and DHS guidance, all of which demonstrate that a deferred action recipient is lawfully present in the United States under federal law. See supra Part I.A. Yet because States have no independent power to create immigration classifications that conflict with federal law, they may at most “borrow the federal classification” or “follow the federal direction.” See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 219 n.19, 226. Defendants have done neither here. See, e.g., DeCanas, 424 U.S. at 364 (indicating a conflict would arise if the
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state’s definition of noncitizens eligible for work conflicted with class federally authorized to work).
Federal courts regularly strike down state policies that implement immigrant classifications that conflict with the federal government’s own classifications. For example, a District Court in this Circuit blocked a state law, holding Alabama “cannot, without conflicting with federal law, exclude unlawfully-present aliens from its postsecondary institutions if its definition of unlawfully present aliens conflicts with Congress’s definition[.]” HICA I, 2011 WL 5516953 at *24 n.13. Similarly, another District Court reasoned that “a policy that classifies [a noncitizen] as an illegal alien, although he . . . is lawfully present in the United States under federal law, directly conflicts with federal laws defining categories of persons lawfully or unlawfully present in the United States[.]” Merten, 305 F. Supp. 2d at 608. As noted above, the Ninth Circuit struck down Arizona’s policy that denied DACA recipients driver’s licenses, holding that it “distinguishes between noncitizens based on its own definition of ‘authorized presence,’ one that neither mirrors nor borrows from the federal classification scheme.” ADAC III, 2016 WL 1358378, at *11 (9th Cir. 2016) (emphasis in original).
Similarly, in Toll v. Moreno the Supreme Court struck down Maryland’s policy that restricted in-state tuition to a subset of lawfully present aliens
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depending on a state-law definition of “residence” and excluded G-4 aliens from eligibility. The Court held that state policies that create “ancillary ‘burden[s] not contemplated by Congress’” are preempted. Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 14 (1982). Congress had not precluded G-4 visaholders from establishing domicile as it had other noncitizens, and state laws imposing this additional burden solely on the basis of their immigration status were preempted. Toll, 456 U.S. at 14.
In summary, Georgia may not create its own immigration categories that conflict and interfere with those of the federal government in order to deny in-state tuition to lawfully present non-citizens. Id. Defendants’ treatment of Student Plaintiffs as unlawfully present in the United States is preempted because federal law says the opposite.
b. Defendants’ In-State Tuition Rules Contravene Congress’s Decision to Delegate Immigration Discretion to the Federal Executive.
Defendants’ treatment of deferred action recipients as not lawfully present in the United States conflicts with Congress’s intent that the Executive Branch exercise discretion in the enforcement and administration of the immigration laws, including deciding whether a noncitizen should be authorized to be present in the United States. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1) (granting to the DHS Secretary authority over “administration and enforcement” of the INA, including the power
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to “perform such . . . acts as he deems necessary for carrying out his authority”); see also, e.g., id. at §§ 1103(a)(2)-(3), 1103(g). The Supreme Court emphasized that “[a] principal feature of [Congress’s] removal system is the broad discretion exercised by immigration officials.” Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2499. Significantly, the Supreme Court instructed that Congress’s authority includes the discretion to not to pursue the removal of a noncitizen and to authorize such persons to remain in the United States. See id.
As the Supreme Court explained, “At each stage, the Executive has discretion to abandon” the deportation process, including through the “regular practice … known as ‘deferred action.’” AADC, 525 U.S. at 483-84; see also Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2499 (“[f]ederal officials” have discretion to “decide whether it makes sense to pursue removal at all”). Congress has even passed legislation protecting the Executive’s deferred action decisions, among other discretionary determinations, from judicial review. See id. at 483-85 (discussing 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g)).
Here, DHS has exercised its authority to allow a category of otherwise removable noncitizens to remain in the United States by granting them deferred action. Defendants’ treatment of those noncitizens as unlawfully present under federal law impermissibly frustrates Congress’s intent to vest discretion over such
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decisions in the federal Executive. Defendants may not treat particular noncitizens as unauthorized contrary to the federal government’s determination.
For example, the Supreme Court struck down an Arizona law that authorized state officials to make determinations about who is lawfully permitted to be in the United States. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2506-07. The Court held that allowing state officers to decide for themselves whether a particular noncitizen should be arrested for being removable—regardless of whether “federal officials determine [the noncitizen] should not be removed”—was conflict preempted because it “violates the principle that the removal process is entrusted to the discretion of the Federal Government.” Id.
Similarly, in striking down an Alabama provision that invalidated contracts entered into by unlawfully present immigrants, the Eleventh Circuit held that the state law conflicted with “Congress[’s] inten[t] that the Executive Branch determine who must be removed and who may permissibly remain.” Alabama, 691 F.3d at 1295. There, the court recognized that it is “obvious from the statutory scheme that Congress intends the Executive Branch to retain discretion over expulsion decisions and applications for relief.” Id.
Here, Defendants’ use idiosyncratic immigration designations that conflict with the federal government’s exclusive discretion to determine “whether it is
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appropriate to allow a foreign national to continue living in the United States.” Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2506. Defendants are preempted from doing so.
B. Plaintiffs are Likely to Succeed on the Merits of their Equal Protection Claim. Georgia’s policy denies in-state tuition rates to deferred action recipients,
who are lawfully present in the United States, while providing in-state rates to similarly situated groups. State alienage classifications such as this are subject to strict scrutiny or, at minimum, heightened scrutiny. However, the court need not decide what level of scrutiny applies in this case. Because Georgia’s policy arbitrarily distinguishes between similarly situated groups without any legitimate justification, it cannot survive even the most deferential rational basis review.
1. Alienage Classifications, Such as Georgia’s Policy in this Case, are Subject to Strict Scrutiny.
The Supreme Court has consistently held that strict scrutiny applies to state action that discriminates against noncitizens authorized to be present in the United States. See Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1 (1977); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971). “The Fourteenth Amendment . . . embod[ies] a general policy that all persons lawfully in this country shall abide ‘in any state’ on an equality of legal privileges with all citizens under non-discriminatory laws.” Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948). Like classifications based on race,
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state classifications based on alienage are “inherently suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny.” Graham, 403 U.S. at 372.
The Supreme Court has invoked two considerations to support the systematic application of strict scrutiny to alienage classifications. First, the Court held noncitizens are “a prime example of a ‘discrete and insular’ minority” lacking the normal protections of the political process. Id. Second, the federal government’s exclusive power to regulate immigration means that state classifications based on alienage will be legitimate only in rare cases. Takahashi, 334 U.S. at 420 (“[T]he power of a state to apply its laws exclusively to its alien inhabitants as a class is confined within narrow limits”). With these considerations in mind, the Supreme Court has applied strict scrutiny and ultimately struck down state policies that distinguished between classes of aliens based on eligibility or intent to naturalize—Nyquist, 432 U.S. at 7-9, Takahashi, 334 U.S. at 413—or length of residence—Graham, 403 U.S. at 376. See also Dandamundi v. Tisch, 686 F.3d 66, 76-77 (2d Cir. 2012) (applying strict scrutiny to statute that discriminated against nonimmigrants granted lawful presence for a limited time).
Here, Defendants attempt to distinguish between noncitizens who are lawfully present in the United States, by singling out DACA and other deferred action recipients for disparate treatment. These noncitizens, such as Student
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Plaintiffs, are a “‘discrete and insular’ minority,” and Defendants’ classification based on alienage is “inherently suspect.” Graham, 403 U.S. at 372. Accordingly, Defendants’ discrimination is subject to strict scrutiny.
2. Alternatively, Heightened Scrutiny Is Appropriate Because Defendants Deprive a Politically Vulnerable Group of Access to Education.
At a minimum, Defendants’ deprivation of in-state tuition to DACA and other deferred action recipients is subject to heightened scrutiny because it (i) targets a politically vulnerable group and (ii) burdens students’ ability to pay for and attend college. The Supreme Court has applied heightened scrutiny where classifications, while not inherently suspect, target politically vulnerable groups or burden important rights. See, e.g. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 223-24 (restrictions on elementary education); United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013) (same-sex marriage classifications). In the same vein, the Eleventh Circuit held that “the specific interplay between the types of individuals affected by the statute and the deprivation at issue” may trigger “a heightened level of scrutiny to uphold the categorization.” HICA II, 691 F.3d at 1245.
Discriminatory classifications directed at politically vulnerable groups demand “more searching judicial inquiry” where the ordinary checks of the political process are insufficient to protect such groups. United States v. Carolene
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Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 (1938). Political powerlessness may also indicate “social and cultural isolation that gives the majority little reason to respect or be concerned with that group’s interests and needs.” City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 472 (1985). Deferred action recipients in this matter are a politically vulnerable group because as noncitizens they are unable to vote and excluded from the political process. Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 102-03 (1976); Toll, 458 U.S. at 23 (Blackmun, J., concurring); Dandamudi, 686 F.3d at 77.
Since DACA was announced in 2012, deferred action recipients have been uniquely targeted for discrimination nationally. For example, Arizona denied driver’s licenses to deferred action recipients in a policy that was enjoined for violating both the supremacy clause and equal protection clauses. See ADAC III, 2016 WL 1358378 (preemption); ADAC I, 757 F.3d 1053 (equal protection). Similarly, a national employer foreclosed deferred action recipients from working at any of their locations throughout the country. See Juarez, 69 F. Supp. 3d at 368.
State officials in Georgia, too, have targeted deferred action recipients. The Regents singled out a group of young Georgia residents and students only one month after DACA was announced, making it harder for them to obtain an education. See Regents Memo. They devote a whole subsection in their Tuition
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Manual to the discriminatory treatment of deferred action recipients. Tuition Manual at 16. Meanwhile, the Georgia legislature has twice considered bills that would either strip deferred action recipients of the right to drive or provide them distinct permits identifying them as “Illegal Alien” or similar designation. See Ex. K, Elly Yu, “Ga. Senator Wants Separate Driver Cards for ‘Illegal Aliens,’” WABE (Feb. 8, 2016). A group with even a modicum of political power would not be targeted by state educators and lawmakers with policies to deny them access to basic benefits. See Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. at 153 (discussing failure of political system to protect discrete and insular minorities).5
Defendants’ misclassification also impacts Student Plaintiffs’ access to higher education, which courts have identified as a critical interest central to both individual advancement and civil society. Dixon v. Ala. State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 157 (5th Cir. 1961); see Barnes v. Zaccari, 669 F.3d 1295, 1305 (11th Cir. 2012). Higher education provides individuals an essential basis “to earn an
5 If Defendants’ misclassification of deferred action recipients were valid, it could subject these noncitizens to a host of laws that create additional restrictions. For example, the Georgia legislature recently passed immigration enforcement laws in 2011, and later considered an expansion of immigration enforcement in higher education. See Illegal Immigration Reform & Enforcement Act of 2011, 2011 Georgia Laws Act 252 (H.B. 87); Ex. L, Senate Votes to Ban Illegal Immigrants from Georgia’s Public Colleges, Atlanta J. Const. (Mar. 6, 2012). Classifying deferred action recipients as “not lawfully present” potentially places them within the reach of those laws, increasing their vulnerability.
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adequate livelihood, to enjoy life to the fullest, or to fulfill as completely as possible the duties and responsibilities of good citizens” and deprivations thus require heightened concern for those affected interests. Dixon, 294 F.2d at 157. “[T]he importance of post-secondary education cannot be overlooked.” Ruiz v. Robinson, 892 F. Supp. 2d 1321, 1328-29 (S.D. Fla. 2012).
More broadly, the principle that a nation governed by the people depends for its existence on an educated populace animates courts’ heightened consideration of regulations touching on higher education. See, e.g., Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 196 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (regulation of university professors); Dixon, 294 F.2d at 157 (due process in expulsion from public colleges); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 329 (2003) (affirmative action in universities). Indeed, the Court has emphasized that maintaining public universities open to qualified individuals supports the diverse participation in civic life that is “essential if the dream of one Nation, indivisible, is to be realized.” Grutter, 539 U.S. at 331-32.
Defendants’ classification curtails individuals’ access to higher education based on their membership in a politically vulnerable group, which triggers heightened scrutiny.
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3. Defendants’ Illegal Classification Fails Strict or Heightened Scrutiny. To survive strict scrutiny, the state must show that its alienage classification is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest. Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Ga., 263 F.3d 1234, 1244 (11th Cir. 2001); see Nyquist, 432 U.S. at 7 (classification must be “necessary and precisely drawn” to achieve a “legitimate and substantial” state interest). To pass heightened scrutiny, the state must demonstrate that its policy furthers a “substantial state interest.” HICA II, 691 F.3d at 1248. Under either level of scrutiny, the state bears the burden of proving that its policy is constitutional, id. at 1248, based on the actual state purpose in creating the policy rather than post hoc justifications. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 535-36 (1996). Here, Defendants’ decision to classify deferred action recipients as not lawfully present plainly fails either inquiry. As noted above, states have no power to make their own immigration categories, and both the Regents and University Presidents must defer to federal classifications. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 225-26. Thus, the state actors can prove no narrow tailoring since they lack any authority to make immigration classifications at all. Id. Similarly, there is no compelling government interest to make Georgia-specific immigration classifications because state entities
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have no legal interest at stake here. Id. Finally, there is no substantial state interest for the Regents and Presidents to create their own immigration categories. Id.
4. The Regents and Presidents’ Policies Fails Even Rational Basis Review Because Defendants Have No Legitimate Interest in Making Their Own Immigration Classifications.
Defendants treat deferred action recipients differently than similarly situated individuals without reasonable justification, violating equal protection even under deferential rational basis review. Equal protection requires at a minimum that “[a] classification must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object or the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.” F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920). Rational basis review is not “toothless.” Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 510 (1976). Rather, the Constitution requires that state policy bear a rational relation to a legitimate government interest. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 446; U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 533 (1973); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996) (“[E]ven in the ordinary equal protection case calling for the most deferential of standards, we insist on knowing the relation between the classification adopted and the object to be attained.”).
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a. Deferred Action Recipients Are Similarly Situated to Other Lawfully Present Georgia Residents Eligible for In-State Tuition.
Student Plaintiffs and deferred action students of Freedom University are similarly situated to refugees, asylees, parolees, and other lawfully present individuals who have made Georgia their home, and who are similar in all ways relevant to the granting of in-state tuition. See Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 10 (1992) (defining similarly situated). Like refugees, parolees, asylees, and all other lawfully present residents of Georgia, deferred action recipients are lawfully present in the U.S. during their period of stay authorized by the Attorney General. See generally supra Part IV.A.1. They live and work with authorization in the state, and are eligible for certain Social Security benefits on the same basis as refugees, asylees, and other noncitizens with federal documentation evincing lawful status. 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(c)(14) (work authorization); 8 C.F.R. § 1.3(a)(4)(vi) (social security benefits). They are likewise obligated to pay income taxes on the same basis as other noncitizens, 26 U.S.C. § 7701(b)(1)(a); Dandamudi, 686 F.3d at 77, not to mention sales and other local taxes. They even meet the same stringent requirements of the REAL ID Act, 49 U.S.C. § 30301 note, Sec. 202(c)(2)(B)(viii), (C)(ii), as well as the state law equivalent. O.C.G.A. §§ 40-5-1; 40-5-21.1.
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Indeed, these deferred action students are similarly situated to all individuals who are defined as lawfully present under federal law with respect to Georgia’s driver’s license law and otherwise meet tuition residency requirements. See O.C.G.A. § 40-5-21.1(a). Deferred action recipients live, work, and contribute to Georgia society on an equal basis with refugees, parolees, asylees, and all other lawfully present residents.
Defendants treat these similarly situated refugees, parolees, and asylees and others differently by recognizing they have lawful presence and permitting them to receive in-state tuition, while denying the same to deferred action students. Indeed, Defendants irrationally make even out-of-state students eligible for in-state tuition waivers while categorically denying in-state tuition to longtime Georgia residents and high school graduates like Student Plaintiffs and Freedom University members. See Tuition Manual at 42-75 (detailing out-of-state tuition waivers).
Here, Defendants need only make a binary decision: either an individual is “lawfully present in the United States” or is not. Yet, they have placed deferred action recipients in the wrong category. As described more fully below, Defendants’ disparate treatment of deferred action students is arbitrary, irrational, and unconstitutional. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at, 446.
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b. Georgia’s Disparate Treatment of Deferred Action Recipients Is Not Supported by a Legitimate State Interest
On their faces, the Regents Memo and Tuition Manual purport to deny instate tuition to deferred action recipients in order to comply with federal immigration law, but, on the contrary, they actually contravene it. The Regents Memo does address the key question at issue here, whether deferred action confers lawful presence in the United States. Regents Memo. The Memo concedes that “[l]awful presence is, of course, a question of federal law.” Id. However, the Regents Memo determines that deferred action recipients do not have lawful presence, even though its only citation to federal authority actually supports the opposite result. Id.; DHS 2012 FAQs 2. This, alone, is sufficient to overturn the practice because, instead of complying with federal law, Defendants have created an arbitrary immigration classification that is untethered to federal law. Under rational basis review, a state may not use a classification “whose relationship to an asserted goal is so attenuated as to render the distinction arbitrary or irrational.” Cleburne, 473 U.S. at, 446.
Under similar conditions, the Ninth Circuit held deferred action recipients were similarly situated to other noncitizens who were authorized to be present in the United States under federal law and whom Arizona allowed to obtain driver’s licenses. ADAC I, 757 F.3d at 1064. The Court of Appeals found no legitimate
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state interests based in federal law or otherwise for defendants’ “decision to treat DACA recipients disparately from [other] noncitizens . . . [whose] ‘presence . . . is authorized under federal law.’” Id. at 1065 (citation omitted); see also id. (“Instead, in purporting to distinguish between these categories, Arizona assumes for itself the federal prerogative of classifying noncitizens . . . .”).
The record indicates an additional reason for Defendants’ practice, animus towards DACA and deferred action recipients. The DHS guidance cited by the Regents Memo reads, “an individual whose case is deferred will not be considered to be accruing unlawful presence in the United States during the period deferred action is in effect.” DHS 2012 FAQs 2. Defendants use this authority to conclude that deferred action recipients are not lawfully present, even when the DHS 2012 FAQs directly refute that conclusion. They also ignored and failed to cite any of the relevant federal law authority available to them at that time or since. See supra Part IV.A.1. Defendants also have not altered the Regents Memo or provide any other contrary guidance since DHS published the 2013 FAQs, which unequivocally provide that deferred action recipients are lawfully present in the United States. DHS 2013 FAQs 2 (“An individual who has received deferred action is authorized to by [DHS] to be present in the United States, and is therefore considered by DHS to be lawfully present during the period deferred action is in effect[.]”). This
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smacks of an attempt to engineer the exclusion of deferred action recipients rather than an even-handed attempt to discern federal law, and supports that animus toward deferred action recipients motivated the policy. Romer, 517 U.S. at 634; see also Part IV.B.2. (describing Georgia’s targeting of deferred action recipients).
Unquestionably, “a bare … desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest.” Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534; see also Romer, 517 U.S. at 633 (holding that classifications cannot be adopted “for the purpose of disadvantaging the group burdened by the law”). Even where a desire to harm is not so explicit, classifications that are unusual or unprecedented “raise the inevitable inference that the disadvantage imposed is born of animosity toward the class of persons affected.” Romer, 517 U.S. at 634. Courts looks with particular suspicion upon classifications that upset the traditional federal-state division of powers. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 633 (“Discriminations of an unusual character especially suggest careful consideration to determine whether they are obnoxious to the constitutional provision.”); Plyler, 457 U.S. at 225 (exclusive federal immigration powers preclude states from creating alien classifications); cf. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2692 (holding that a federal statute that invades a state’s historical power to define marriage requires “careful consideration”).
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Here, the Regents and Presidents have illegally singled out deferred action recipients, a group of noncitizens whom the federal government classifies as lawfully present. State classifications based on alienage are rarely legitimate. See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 225 (“The States enjoy no power with respect to the classification of aliens.”). Defendants’ failure to follow federal law, as they admit they must do, confirms their discrimination is irrational. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 446-55 (1972) (rejecting irrational discrimination against unmarried persons).
C. Plaintiffs Suffer Irreparable Harms. 1. Plaintiffs Suffer Life-Altering Injuries to Their Educational and Career Prospects. By limiting deferred action students’ access to in-state tuition rates, the
Regents’ Policy irreparably harms the educational opportunities and career prospects of Student Plaintiffs and Freedom University members. The inflated cost prevents many students from going to college, significantly increases the time it takes for students to graduate, and effectively limits what degrees they may pursue. It also creates significant hurdles, some insurmountable, for these students to start their professional lives in their chosen careers. Finally, Defendants’ policies have a detrimental impact on the college experience itself. No amount of money can compensate for these injuries.
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First, paying elevated tuition rates excludes many students from attending college at all. For decades Courts have recognized that a college education “is as important as primary and secondary education”. Aaron v. Clark, 342 F. Supp. 898, 901 (N.D. Ga. 1972). However, Defendants’ denial of in-state tuition has left Mr. Martinez and each of the deferred action students of Freedom University without access to college, forcing them to completely forego a college education. Martinez Decl. ¶ 8; Soltis Decl. ¶ 8. The need is so severe that Freedom University, an unaccredited school in the freedom school tradition, is compelled to fill this void by offering college level classes to deferred action students. Soltis Decl. ¶ 9.
Second, Defendants’ acts harm Student Plaintiffs’ abilities to obtain fouryear college degrees in their desired fields of study. A District Court in this circuit recently recognized that “the needs of the labor force have changed dramatically and the importance of post-secondary education has increased significantly.” Ruiz, 892 F. Supp. 2d at 1329. The ability to obtain a bachelor’s degree has a marked impact on unemployment rates and median weekly earnings. Id. Stunting access to these degrees thus will have a lasting impact on employment opportunities and earning potential.
For the Plaintiffs who can attend some college, their educational and professional goals have been derailed. For example, Plaintiff Salazar wanted to
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pursue a bachelor’s degree in business, but can only afford to attend a technical college pursuing an associate degree in accounting. Salazar Decl. ¶¶ 6, 10. Plaintiff San Juan wished to but could not afford to attend Georgia Southern University, attended but could not finish at East Georgia State College because of the price of out-of-state rates, and is on track to finish an associate degree from a technical college six years after graduating high school. San Juan Decl. ¶¶ 3-12. He currently cannot plan to finish his bachelor’s degree due to the cost of out-ofstate tuition. Id. at 15. Plaintiff Guillen cannot afford to pursue the four-year degree to become a doctor or accountant, and has had to instead pursue a two-year degree in business administration from a community college. Guillen Decl at ¶ 10. Even with the support of her family, she cannot continue to pay to study fulltime and will not get a bachelor’s degree in the standard four-year track. Guillen Decl. ¶¶ 17-20. Similarly, Plaintiff Lopez was unable to afford out-of-state tuition for a four-year degree with pre-medical concentration, but must rather attend school part time and work full-time. Lopez Decl. ¶¶ 6-7, 11-12. If she can afford to finish college—much less seek a post-graduate or professional degree—it will take her approximately seven years to graduate with her bachelor’s degree. Lopez Decl. ¶¶ 17, 22. There is no adequate remedy for lost time Defendants cause, or for how Defendants’ practice interferes with Student Plaintiffs’ pursuit of their
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college degree of choice– “an absolute necessity in life.” Aaron, 342 F. Supp. at 901. These harms are irreparable.
Third, the Defendants’ policy irreparably harms Student Plaintiffs’ ability to begin their careers. “Unquestionably a college degree has become a prerequisite for a variety of jobs and professions and people . . . often depend on that degree for economic survival”. Aaron, 342 F. Supp. at 901. “Setbacks early in their careers are likely to haunt Plaintiffs for the rest of their lives. Thus, a delay, even if only a few months, pending trial represents productive time irretrievably lost” to these young Plaintiffs. ADAC I, 757 F.3d at 1068; cf. MacGinnitie v. Hobbs Group LLC, 420 F.3d 1234, 143 (11th Cir. 2005) (holding that lost employment opportunities caused by illegal restrictive covenants are irreparable).
The Regents’ denial of access to in-state tuition delays each Student Plaintiff’s entry into their desired career field. Mr. Martinez is four years out of high school and wants a career in computer science, but he cannot afford to attend any college to even begin down that path. Martinez Decl. ¶¶ 5, 8. Similarly, Plaintiffs Salazar and San Juan are associate degree students in their twenties, placing them substantially behind their high school peers who had access to instate tuition. Salazar Decl. ¶ 2; San Juan Decl. ¶ 16. As noted above, Plaintiff Guillen is unable to pursue careers in accounting or medicine, while Plaintiff
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Lopez will, at best, be applying to medical school when classmates in her high school graduating class might be finishing it because of how long it will take her to obtain a bachelor’s degree. Guillen Decl. ¶ 10; Lopez Decl. ¶ 17.
Fourth, Defendants’ policy financially burdens Plaintiffs in a manner that irreversibly impacts the overall quality of the college experience. Each of these injuries is independently irreparable. Among other things, Defendants’ policy irreparably:
 Forecloses opportunities to obtain more comprehensive and prestigious educations. The Supreme Court has recognized that harm to prestige in the workplace is actionable in the employment discrimination context. See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 71 (2006); see also Smart v. City of Miami Beach, 1 F. Supp. 3d 1350 (S.D. Fla. 2014) (employment action reasonably seen as adverse to prestige may be actionable.); Scott v. Tribune Co., No. 6:04-CV-1145ORL22DAB, 2006 WL 888129, at *11 (N.D. Fla. Mar. 3, 2006) (missed opportunity for a more prestigious position, among other things, suffices to prove plaintiff suffered an adverse action.). In the same way, the relative prestige of a college can impact a student’s ability to go to graduate school or obtain a job, and
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remains on a student’s resume for a lifetime. Here, Student Plaintiffs were admitted to more selective, more prestigious University System Schools, forced to turn them down because they could not afford to attend. See Guillen Decl. ¶ 7-9 (admitted to Abraham Baldwin Agricultural College and Kennesaw State University, had to attend Perimeter College because of costs); Lopez Decl. ¶ 7-9 (admitted to Armstrong State University, had to attend Perimeter College because of costs); Salazar Decl. ¶ 8-10 (admitted to Armstrong State University and East Georgia State College, had to attend a technical college because of costs); Martinez Decl. ¶ 6-7 (admitted to Georgia Perimeter College, had to attend Freedom University because of costs). By imposing out-of-state rates on Student Plaintiffs, Defendants price out of reach the better regarded institutions in Georgia’s University System to which they were accepted.  Restrains opportunities to benefit from one of the quintessential college experiences—dorm living. Unjustifiably denying a student the ability to live in college housing is an irreparable harm. R.W. v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 114 F. Supp. 3d 1260, 1287 (N.D. Ga. 2015) (holding that loss of college living experience is an
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irreparable harm). Student Plaintiffs live at home instead of on campus at more comprehensive institutions within the University System because increased tuition costs put room and board costs out of reach. See Guillen Decl. ¶ 12; Lopez Decl. ¶ 14; see also Salazar Decl. ¶ 9; San Juan Decl. ¶ 9; Martinez Decl. ¶ 6-7.  Limits participation in extra-curricular activities. Extra-curriculars such as “participation in competitive [school] athletics ha[ve] emotional and psychological benefits that could not be easily quantified.” R.W., 114 F. Supp. 3d at 1287-88 (citation omitted). Defendants’ policy causes deferred action students to forgo valuable extra-curricular activities so that they can work to pay elevated tuition rates. For example, Plaintiff Lopez had to choose between cheerleading and cello or working two jobs to pay for college. Lopez Decl. ¶¶ 15-16.  Negatively impacts academic performance. Defendants cause irreparable harm because their illegal actions are traceable to suffering academic performance. See R.W., 114 F. Supp. 3d at 1290 (proceeding to trial on a claim that illegal discrimination made it difficult to study, leading to bad grades and loss of scholarship).
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Plaintiff Lopez has extremely limited hours she can study due to fulltime work obligations needed to pay for college. Lopez Decl. ¶ 1820. As a result, her approximate 3.0 GPA is well below the 3.9 GPA she achieved in high school. Id. at ¶ 19. Lower grades may inhibit her job prospects and competitiveness for graduate programs. See Aaron, 342 F. Supp. at 901 (completing college degree pre-requisite for entry into certain jobs and professions).
* ** The injuries described above are the foreseeable, proximate, and irreparable consequences of Defendants’ actions—consequences that money cannot undue. Each of these harms, whether taken individually or together, meets the irreparable harm requirement for a preliminary injunction. See e.g., Bloodworth v. Oxford Vill. Townhouses, Inc., 377 F. Supp. 709, 719 (N.D. Ga. 1974) (cumulative effects of monetary loss on plaintiffs ability to maintain housing can be irreparable); Nat’l Auto Lenders, Inc. v. SysLOCATE, Inc., 753 F. Supp. 2d 1233, 1237 (S.D. Fla. 2010) (considering magnitude of monetary loss, impact on credit, and potential to drive plaintiff out of business).
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2. Organizational Plaintiffs Are Suffering Irreparable Harms. Both GLAHR and Freedom University must divert resources from their core missions in order to address the impact Defendants’ illegal misclassification has on their constituents. GLAHR “educates, organizes, and empowers Latinos in Georgia to defend and advance their civil and human rights.” Ex. M, GLAHR Mission Statement. As part of that mission, GLAHR works with college-bound students and college students through its deferred action program and its state-wide comite meetings to combat various areas of injustice relevant to the Latino immigrant community, including racial discrimination, police abuse, federal immigration policy and to defend and campaign for their rights and human dignity. Nicholls Decl. ¶ 2-3. A substantial portion of GLAHR’s constituents are students who have received or are eligible to receive deferred action. Id. at ¶ 2. Defendants’ policy impedes GLAHR’s ability to carry out its mission because it has forced GLAHR to expend resources to explain the Georgia policy to students and assist its constituents in finding ways to pay elevated tuition rates. Id. at ¶¶ 6-7. Among other things, GLAHR advises students and their families about the implications of the Regents’ policy on tuition rates and assists them in figuring out ways to access higher education. Id. at ¶ 8. Additionally, GLAHR regularly
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fields phone calls and inquiries from asambleas populares from distressed families on how to address the Regents’ tuition policies and how to pay for college. Id. at ¶¶ 4, 7-8. The time and effort spent on this issue takes resources from GLAHR’s focus on federal immigration policy and programs such as processing deferred action applicants, maintaining a list of scholarships and other funding information on the organization’s web-page, and other issues that address GLAHR’s core issues such as police abuse and racial profiling. Id. at ¶¶ 7-10. This diversion frustrates GLAHR’s core purpose of “empower[ing] Latino immigrants across Georgia to defend and advance their civil and human rights.” Id. at ¶¶ 3-9.
Similarly, Defendants’ policy frustrates Freedom University’s mission to “empower undocumented youth by fulfilling their human right to education.” Soltis Decl. ¶ 2. Freedom University began providing “rigorous college-level classes, scholarship assistance, and leadership development for undocumented students in Georgia” in response to the Regents’ ban of undocumented students from certain state institutions. Ex. N Freedom University Mission Statement. Freedom University relies extensively on volunteers to accomplish its mission. Soltis Decl. ¶¶ 4, 9.
By requiring the organization to divert services from undocumented students to serve the lawfully present students with deferred action who cannot afford
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Georgia schools at out-of-state rates, Freedom University is less able to provide “program[ing] for undocumented students who cannot otherwise access higher education in Georgia.” Id. at ¶¶ 2, 9. For example, volunteers must spend time counseling deferred action recipients on how to make college affordable instead of focusing on where undocumented students can attend and pay for college. Id. at ¶ 11. Additionally, Freedom University has limited capacity in its classrooms, and each seat occupied by a deferred action recipient is one less seat for an undocumented student. Id. at ¶ 10. Defendants’ illegal policy causes Freedom University to divert its limited resources from helping undocumented students in order to make education available to deferred action students who might otherwise afford a college education. Id. at 13.
The diversion of resources and frustration of each Organizational Plaintiff’s core mission are irreparable and continuing injuries. See HICA II, 691 F.3d 1236 (holding irreparable harm to organization diverting resources to address substantially likely unconstitutional State action interfering with right to elementary school education); see also Valle del Sol Inc. v. Whiting, 732 F.3d 1006, 1018 (9th Cir. 2013) (finding irreparable harm where organization had to “divert resources to educate its members” about an unconstitutional criminal provision). Injunctive relief is appropriate.
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D. The Balance of Equities and Public Interest Strongly Favor Plaintiffs. The harm to Plaintiffs strongly outweighs the harm to Defendants. Most
importantly, Defendants have “‘no legitimate interest in enforcing an unconstitutional’ regulation.” Gilio ex rel. J.G. v. Sch. Bd. of Hillsborough Cty., Fla., 905 F. Supp. 2d 1262, 1275 (M.D. Fla. 2012) (quoting KH Outdoor, LLC v. City of Trussville, 458 F.3d 1261, 1272 (11th Cir.2006)). Moreover, denying deferred action recipients like Student Plaintiff and other Freedom University members in-state tuition interferes with their access to education, choice of study, and ultimately career choice, which impedes their ability to function fully as participating members of society. See supra Parts IV.B.2. & IV.C.1. Additionally, Defendants’ acts cause Plaintiff Organizations to divert resources to deal with the effects of the policy and ultimately frustrates their core missions. See supra Part IV.C.2. In comparison, any hardship to Defendants from an injunction would be minimal, as the injunction would merely require Defendants to follow federal law.
Similarly, the public’s interest is firmly aligned with that of Plaintiffs. “Imposing an injunction would serve the public interest by protecting [Plaintiffs] from the harm caused by infringement of their constitutional right.” Lebron v. Wilkins, 820 F.Supp.2d 1273, 1292 (M.D. Fla. 2011) (internal citations and quotations omitted.); accord, Planned Parenthood Se., Inc. v. Bentley, No.
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2:15CV620-MHT, 2015 WL 6517875, at *14 (M.D. Ala. 2015) (holding “the issuance of an injunction is in the public interest” because it protects “a right explicitly and emphatically protected under federal law”). On the other hand, “public interest does not support the [Defendants’] expenditure of time, money, and effort in attempting to enforce an ordinance that may well be held unconstitutional.” Fla. Businessmen for Free Enter. v. City of Hollywood, 648 F.2d 956, 959 (5th Cir. 1981).
V. CONCLUSION It is unconstitutional for Defendants to misclassify deferred action recipients
and arbitrarily deny them access to in-state tuition benefits. The Court should grant Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction.

Respectfully submitted this 3rd day of May, 2016,

Victor Viramontes* Jorge M. Castillo* MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FUND 634 S. Spring Street, 11th Floor Los Angeles, CA 90014 T: 213.629.2512 vviramontes@maldef.org jcastillo@maldef.org

By: /s/ Mark Begnaud
Nathan Horsley Mark Begnaud HORSLEY BEGNAUD LLC 750 Hammond Drive , Bldg 12, Ste 300 Atlanta, GA 30328 T: 770.765.5559 Nhorsley@gacivilrights.com Mbegnaud@gacivilrights.com

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Case 1:16-cv-00757-RWS Document 64 Filed 05/03/16 Page 60 of 62

Burth López* MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FUND 1016 16th Street, Suite 100, Washington, D.C. 20036 T: 202.572.0695 blopez@maldef.org
Sarah Schoettle* MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FUND 11 E. Adams Street, Ste. 700 Chicago, IL 60603 T: 312. 427.0701 sschoettle@maldef.org
* Admitted pro hac vice

Thomas G. Sampson Miguel A. Dominguez THOMAS KENNEDY SAMPSON & TOMPKINS LLP 3355 Main Street Atlanta, GA 30337 T: 404 688-4503 t.sampson@tkstlaw.com m.dominguez@tkstlaw.com
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

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LOCAL RULE 7.1(D) CERTIFICATION

In compliance with Local Rule 7.1.(D), Plaintiffs’ counsel certifies that they prepared this brief in compliance with all the formatting requirements of Local Rule 5.1, including using one of the font and point selections approved by the court in Local Rule 5.1(C).

Date: May 3, 2016

/s/ Mark Begnaud Mark Begnaud

Case 1:16-cv-00757-RWS Document 64 Filed 05/03/16 Page 62 of 62

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on May 3, 2016, I electronically filed the foregoing
PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION with the Clerk of
Court using the CM/ECF system and that I served the same on the following by
ECF and/or by placing a copy in the United States Mail with adequate postage to
ensure delivery:
Deborah Nolan Gore Attorney General’s Office-Atl 40 Capitol Square, SW Atlanta, GA 30334 404-463-8850 dgore@law.ga.gov
Devon Orland Office of State Attorney General 40 Capitol Square, S.W. Atlanta, GA 30334-1300 404-463-8850 dorland@law.ga.gov

Date: May 3, 2016

/s/ Mark Begnaud Mark Begnaud

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 </s> Case 1:16-cv-00757-RWS Document 94 Filed 02/16/17 Page 1 of 2

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION

GEORGIA LATINO ALLIANCE FOR :

HUMAN RIGHTS, LORENA

:

GUILLEN, and KARLA LOPEZ,

:

:

Plaintiffs,

:

:

vs.

:

:

C. DEAN ALFORD, ET AL.,

:

:

Defendants.

:

CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:16-cv-00757-WCO

ORDER

This case is before the court on plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary

injunction [64], defendants’ motion to dismiss1 [65], and plaintiffs’ motion to stay

proceedings [92]. The court has delayed ruling on this matter in light of repeated

indications that the President intended to take some action regarding Deferred Action

for Childhood Arrivals (“DACA”). The Fulton County Superior Court decision

granting similar tuition relief to DACA participants via writ of mandamus

strengthened this inclination, and that case is now before the Supreme Court of

Georgia.

1 By some omission, defendant Dr. Cecil Staton does not appear to join defendants’ motion to dismiss.

Case 1:16-cv-00757-RWS Document 94 Filed 02/16/17 Page 2 of 2
This court heard from the parties on the issue of staying this case pending the Supreme Court of Georgia’s ruling, and, after arguments by both sides as to whether defendants’ policy should be considered a matter of state or federal interpretation, the court granted the motion to stay via teleconference held on February 14, 2017. This order serves to memorialize that ruling.
Accordingly, defendants’ motion to stay proceedings [92] is hereby GRANTED. Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction is hereby DENIED without prejudice. Defendants’ motion to dismiss is hereby DENIED without prejudice. Defendants’ deadline to answer the complaint is hereby extended until May 1, 2017. Either party may renew their previously pending motion at any time, including with it any supplemental briefing in light of actions that may have been taken by the President or the Supreme Court of Georgia.
IT IS SO ORDERED, this 16th day of February, 2017.
s/William C. O’Kelley
William C. O'Kelley Senior United States District Judge
2

 </s> Memorandum on Rescission Of DACA

https://www.dhs.gov/news/2017/09/05/memorandum-rescission-daca

MEMORANDUM FOR:
James W. McCament Acting Director U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
Thomas D. Homan Acting Director U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
Kevin K. McAleenan Acting Commissioner U.S. Customs and Border Protection
Joseph B. Maher Acting General Counsel
Ambassador James D. Nealon Assistant Secretary, International Engagement
Julie M. Kirchner Citizenship and Immigration Services Ombudsman
FROM:
Elaine C. Duke Acting Secretary
SUBJECT:
Rescission of the June 15, 2012 Memorandum Entitled “Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United States as Children”
This memorandum rescinds the June 15, 2012 memorandum entitled “Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United States as Children,” which established the program known as Deferred Action for Childhood

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Memorandum on Rescission Of DACA

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Arrivals (“DACA”). For the reasons and in the manner outlined below, Department of Homeland Security personnel shall take all appropriate actions to execute a winddown of the program, consistent with the parameters established in this memorandum.
Background
The Department of Homeland Security established DACA through the issuance of a memorandum on June 15, 2012. The program purported to use deferred action—an act of prosecutorial discretion meant to be applied only on an individualized case-bycase basis—to confer certain benefits to illegal aliens that Congress had not otherwise acted to provide by law.[1] Specifically, DACA provided certain illegal aliens who entered the United States before the age of sixteen a period of deferred action and eligibility to request employment authorization.
On November 20, 2014, the Department issued a new memorandum, expanding the parameters of DACA and creating a new policy called Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents (“DAPA”). Among other things—such as the expansion of the coverage criteria under the 2012 DACA policy to encompass aliens with a wider range of ages and arrival dates, and lengthening the period of deferred action and work authorization from two years to three—the November 20, 2014 memorandum directed USCIS “to establish a process, similar to DACA, for exercising prosecutorial discretion through the use of deferred action, on a case-bycase basis,” to certain aliens who have “a son or daughter who is a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident.”
Prior to the implementation of DAPA, twenty-six states—led by Texas—challenged the policies announced in the November 20, 2014 memorandum in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas. In an order issued on February 16, 2015, the district court preliminarily enjoined the policies nationwide.[2] The district court held that the plaintiff states were likely to succeed on their claim that the DAPA program did not comply with relevant authorities.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that Texas and the other states had demonstrated a substantial likelihood of success on the merits and satisfied the other requirements for a preliminary injunction.[3] The Fifth Circuit concluded that the Department’s DAPA policy conflicted with the discretion authorized by Congress. In considering the DAPA program, the court noted that the

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Memorandum on Rescission Of DACA

https://www.dhs.gov/news/2017/09/05/memorandum-rescission-daca

Immigration and Nationality Act “flatly does not permit the reclassification of millions of illegal aliens as lawfully present and thereby make them newly eligible for a host of federal and state benefits, including work authorization.” According to the court, “DAPA is foreclosed by Congress’s careful plan; the program is ‘manifestly contrary to the statute’ and therefore was properly enjoined.”
Although the original DACA policy was not challenged in the lawsuit, both the district and appellate court decisions relied on factual findings about the implementation of the 2012 DACA memorandum. The Fifth Circuit agreed with the lower court that DACA decisions were not truly discretionary,[4] and that DAPA and expanded DACA would be substantially similar in execution. Both the district court and the Fifth Circuit concluded that implementation of the program did not comply with the Administrative Procedure Act because the Department did not implement it through notice-and-comment rulemaking.
The Supreme Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit’s ruling by equally divided vote (4-4).[5] The evenly divided ruling resulted in the Fifth Circuit order being affirmed. The preliminary injunction therefore remains in place today. In October 2016, the Supreme Court denied a request from DHS to rehear the case upon the appointment of a new Justice. After the 2016 election, both parties agreed to a stay in litigation to allow the new administration to review these issues.
On January 25, 2017, President Trump issued Executive Order No. 13,768, “Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United States.” In that Order, the President directed federal agencies to “[e]nsure the faithful execution of the immigration laws . . . against all removable aliens,” and established new immigration enforcement priorities. On February 20, 2017, then Secretary of Homeland Security John F. Kelly issued an implementing memorandum, stating “the Department no longer will exempt classes or categories of removable aliens from potential enforcement,” except as provided in the Department’s June 15, 2012 memorandum establishing DACA,[6] and the November 20, 2014 memorandum establishing DAPA and expanding DACA.[7]
On June 15, 2017, after consulting with the Attorney General, and considering the likelihood of success on the merits of the ongoing litigation, then Secretary John F. Kelly issued a memorandum rescinding DAPA and the expansion of DACA—but temporarily left in place the June 15, 2012 memorandum that initially created the DACA program.

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Memorandum on Rescission Of DACA

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Then, on June 29, 2017, Texas, along with several other states, sent a letter to Attorney General Sessions asserting that the original 2012 DACA memorandum is unlawful for the same reasons stated in the Fifth Circuit and district court opinions regarding DAPA and expanded DACA. The letter notes that if DHS does not rescind the DACA memo by September 5, 2017, the States will seek to amend the DAPA lawsuit to include a challenge to DACA.
The Attorney General sent a letter to the Department on September 4, 2017, articulating his legal determination that DACA “was effectuated by the previous administration through executive action, without proper statutory authority and with no established end-date, after Congress' repeated rejection of proposed legislation that would have accomplished a similar result. Such an open-ended circumvention of immigration laws was an unconstitutional exercise of authority by the Executive Branch.” The letter further stated that because DACA “has the same legal and constitutional defects that the courts recognized as to DAPA, it is likely that potentially imminent litigation would yield similar results with respect to DACA.” Nevertheless, in light of the administrative complexities associated with ending the program, he recommended that the Department wind it down in an efficient and orderly fashion, and his office has reviewed the terms on which our Department will do so.
Rescission of the June 15, 2012 DACA Memorandum
Taking into consideration the Supreme Court’s and the Fifth Circuit’s rulings in the ongoing litigation, and the September 4, 2017 letter from the Attorney General, it is clear that the June 15, 2012 DACA program should be terminated. In the exercise of my authority in establishing national immigration policies and priorities, except for the purposes explicitly identified below, I hereby rescind the June 15, 2012 memorandum.
Recognizing the complexities associated with winding down the program, the Department will provide a limited window in which it will adjudicate certain requests for DACA and associated applications meeting certain parameters specified below. Accordingly, effective immediately, the Department:
Will adjudicate—on an individual, case-by-case basis—properly filed pending DACA initial requests and associated applications for Employment Authorization Documents that have been accepted by the Department as of the date of this

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memorandum.
Will reject all DACA initial requests and associated applications for Employment Authorization Documents filed after the date of this memorandum.
Will adjudicate—on an individual, case by case basis—properly filed pending DACA renewal requests and associated applications for Employment Authorization Documents from current beneficiaries that have been accepted by the Department as of the date of this memorandum, and from current beneficiaries whose benefits will expire between the date of this memorandum and March 5, 2018 that have been accepted by the Department as of October 5, 2017.
Will reject all DACA renewal requests and associated applications for Employment Authorization Documents filed outside of the parameters specified above.
Will not terminate the grants of previously issued deferred action or revoke Employment Authorization Documents solely based on the directives in this memorandum for the remaining duration of their validity periods.
Will not approve any new Form I-131 applications for advance parole under standards associated with the DACA program, although it will generally honor the stated validity period for previously approved applications for advance parole. Notwithstanding the continued validity of advance parole approvals previously granted, CBP will—of course—retain the authority it has always had and exercised in determining the admissibility of any person presenting at the border and the eligibility of such persons for parole. Further, USCIS will—of course—retain the authority to revoke or terminate an advance parole document at any time.
Will administratively close all pending Form I-131 applications for advance parole filed under standards associated with the DACA program, and will refund all associated fees.
Will continue to exercise its discretionary authority to terminate or deny deferred action at any time when immigration officials determine termination or denial of deferred action is appropriate.
This document is not intended to, does not, and may not be relied upon to create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law by any party in any administrative, civil, or criminal matter. Likewise, no limitations are placed by this guidance on the otherwise lawful enforcement or litigation prerogatives of DHS.

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[1] Significantly, while the DACA denial notice indicates the decision to deny is made in the unreviewable discretion of USCIS, USCIS has not been able to identify specific denial cases where an applicant appeared to satisfy the programmatic categorical criteria as outlined in the June 15, 2012 memorandum, but still had his or her application denied based solely upon discretion.
[2] Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591 (S.D. Tex. 2015).
[3] Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015).
[4] Id.
[5] United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (per curiam).
[6] Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Secretary, DHS to David Aguilar, Acting Comm’r, CBP, et al., “Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United States as Children” (June 15, 2012).
[7] Memorandum from Jeh Johnson, Secretary, DHS, to Leon Rodriguez, Dir., USCIS, et al., “Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United States as Children and with Respect to Certain Individuals Whose Parents are U.S. Citizens or Permanent Residents” (Nov. 20, 2014).
Last Published Date: September 5, 2017

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 </s> 917 F.3d 1298 (2019)
Elly Marisol ESTRADA, Salvador Alvarado, Diana Umana, Each an Individual, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v.
Mark BECKER, President of Georgia State University, in His Individual and Official Capacity, Steve Michael Dorman, President of Georgia College and State University, in His Individual and Official Capacity,
Brooks A. Keel, President of Augusta University, in His Individual and Official Capacity, Jere W. Morehead, President of the University of Georgia, in His Individual and Official Capacity, G.P. Bud Peterson,
President of the Georgia Institute of Technology, in His Individual and Official Capacity, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
No. 17-12668.
United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.
March 6, 2019.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, D.C. Docket No. 1:16-cv-03310-TWT.
Victor Viramontes, Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund, LOS ANGELES, CA, Mark Andrew Begnaud, Nathanael A. Horsley, Horsley Begnaud, LLC, SANDY SPRINGS, GA, Burth Gilbert Lopez, Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund, WASHINGTON, DC, Sarah Schoettle, Mexican American Legal Defense & Educational Fund, CHICAGO, IL, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.
1301*1301 Deborah Nolan Gore, Andrew Alan Pinson, Attorney General's Office, ATLANTA, GA, for Defendants-Appellees MARK BECKER, STEVE MICHAEL DORMAN, BROOKS A. KEEL, JERE W. MOREHEAD and G. P. PETERSON.
Andrew Alan Pinson, Attorney General's Office, ATLANTA, GA, for Defendants-Appellees H. HUCKABY, C. ALFORD, W. BOWERS, L. DURDEN, L. ELLIS, R. GRIFFIN, C. HOPKINS, J. HULL, D. LEEBERN and D. POITEVINT.
Before TJOFLAT and JORDAN, Circuit Judges, and HUCK,[*] District Judge.
1300*1300 TJOFLAT, Circuit Judge:
This case is about a Policy[1] that the Georgia Board of Regents ("Regents") set. The Policy requires Georgia's three most selective colleges and universities to verify the "lawful presence" of all the students they admit. Under the Policy, applicants who received deferred action pursuant to the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals memorandum ("DACA Memo") cannot attend Georgia's selective schools. Appellants are students who are otherwise

qualified to attend these schools, and they filed suit to challenge the Policy. At the heart of their suit is whether they are "lawfully present" in the United States. They say they are lawfully present based on the DACA Memo. Thus, appellants claim the Regents' Policy is preempted by federal law, and they argue the Policy violates their equal protection rights. The District Court found that appellants are not lawfully present, and it dismissed the suit.
After careful consideration of the record, and with the benefit of oral argument, we affirm the District Court's decision.
I.
Back in 2012, the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") issued the DACA Memo, which encouraged government officials not to enforce federal immigration laws against certain children who came to the United States before age 16. Instead, officials were encouraged to exercise their "prosecutorial discretion" and to focus on higher-priority cases. The DACA Memo explicitly pointed out that it "confer[red] no substantive right, immigration status or pathway to citizenship. Only the Congress, acting through its legislative authority, c[ould] confer these rights." The DACA Memo simply set forth a policy that would guide officials when exercising discretion.
The individuals who meet the DACA Memo's criteria qualify for what is called "deferred action." We refer to those individuals who ultimately get deferred action as "DACA recipients." Under the Regents' Policy (explained below), DACA recipients cannot attend Georgia's most selective colleges and universities.
Under Georgia law, the Regents set the policies that govern the University System of Georgia. O.C.G.A. § 50-36-1(d)(7). The Policy at issue here limits who can attend the more selective schools in the University System. It prevents any person "who is not lawfully in the United States" from attending any school that "did not admit all academically qualified applicants"—in other words, the selective schools—"for the two most recent academic years."[2]
1302*1302 The Policy then requires these selective schools to verify the lawful presence of every student it admits. There are several ways that a school can verify lawful presence.[3] The Policy explicitly says that DACA recipients "are not considered lawfully present in the United States."
Appellants are DACA recipients[4] who are qualified to attend and want to apply to these selective schools, but the Policy prevents them from doing so. They filed suit against the selective schools' presidents and the Regents and allege two causes of action. Appellants allege that the Policy violates the Supremacy Clause based on three theories: the Policy is an unconstitutional regulation of immigration, the Policy is conflict preempted, and the Policy is field preempted. Appellants also allege that the Policy violates the Equal Protection Clause.
The District Court dismissed the case. It rejected appellants' regulation of immigration claim and field preemption claim because it found that the Policy adopts the immigration

classifications that Congress set out in the Immigration and Nationality Act ("Act"). The District Court rejected the conflict preemption claim because the DACA Memo conferred no substantive rights, and the Policy is thus consistent with federal immigration law. Finally, the District Court rejected the equal protection claim because it found that appellants are not similarly situated to other noncitizens who are eligible to attend the selective schools. The District Court noted that appellants have no lawful status and are not lawfully present in the United States. By contrast, the other noncitizens who are eligible have lawful status or otherwise are lawfully present.
This appeal followed, and appellants challenge the dismissal of both causes of action. We address each in turn.
II.
We review de novo the District Court's order dismissing appellants' complaint for failure to state a claim. Mills v. Foremost Ins. Co., 511 F.3d 1300, 1303 (11th Cir. 2008). "To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter ... to `state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1974, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). We assume the factual allegations of the complaint are true, and we construe them in the light most favorable to appellants. Id. We do not assume that any legal conclusions are true. Id.
A.
Under the Supremacy Clause, the Constitution and the laws of the United States "shall be the supreme Law of the Land." U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2. From this Clause we have the preemption doctrine, and any state law that "interfere[s] with, or [is] contrary to," federal law is preempted. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 211, 6 L.Ed. 23, 82 (1824).
1303*1303 There are at least three ways Congress may preempt state law. First, Congress may pass a statute with an express preemption provision. Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 399, 132 S.Ct. 2492, 2500-01, 183 L.Ed.2d 351 (2012). Second, Congress may decide that a field will be regulated exclusively by the federal government. Id. In that case, there is no express preemption provision. Instead, we may infer an "intent to displace state law altogether" where "a framework of regulation [is] `so pervasive ... that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it' or where there is a `federal interest ... so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject.'" Id., 132 S.Ct. at 2501 (second and third alterations in original) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230, 67 S.Ct. 1146, 1152, 91 L.Ed. 1447 (1947)). Third, federal law preempts state law when the two conflict. Id. That is, when "compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility," id. (quoting Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-143, 83 S.Ct. 1210, 1218, 10 L.Ed.2d 248 (1963)), or when "state law `stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress,'" id. (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67, 61 S.Ct. 399, 404, 85 L.Ed. 581 (1941)).

In the immigration context, there is another preemption consideration. The Supreme Court has said that the "[p]ower to regulate immigration is unquestionably exclusively a federal power," and any state law that "regulat[es] ... immigration" is unconstitutional. DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 354-55, 96 S.Ct. 933, 936, 47 L.Ed.2d 43 (1976). That is, unlike field preemption, the Constitution itself preempts any state effort to regulate immigration, even if Congress has not expressly or impliedly preempted the state regulation. See id. at 355, 96 S.Ct. at 936. "[A] regulation of immigration ... is essentially a determination of who should or should not be admitted into the country, and the conditions under which a legal entrant may remain." Id.
Appellants make three arguments: (1) the Policy amounts to an unconstitutional regulation of immigration, (2) the Policy is field preempted, and (3) the Policy is conflict preempted.
1.
The Supreme Court has said that a law is a "regulation of immigration" if it "essentially ... determin[es]" (1) "who should or should not be admitted into the country" or (2) "the conditions under which a legal entrant may remain." Id. Appellants claim the Policy does both.
First, appellants argue the Policy is an unconstitutional regulation of immigration because it "classif[ies] noncitizens in a manner that does not conform to federal immigration classifications."[5] Appellants claim they are "lawfully present" under the Act, but they are not considered "lawfully present" under the Policy. Thus, appellants 1304*1304 conclude, the Policy's classification of "lawfully present" is inconsistent with federal classifications. And the Supreme Court has instructed that "[t]he States enjoy no power with respect to the classification of aliens." Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 225, 102 S.Ct. 2382, 2399, 72 L.Ed.2d 786 (1982).[6]
We begin by noting that "lawfully present" is not a standalone immigration classification, and it is not defined anywhere in the Act. Nor does the Policy define "lawfully present."[7] Instead, the Policy instructs the selective schools to "verify" a person's lawful status based on determinations made by Congress.[8] That is, the Policy borrows from federal standards to verify lawful presence.
For example, a covered institution may use an applicant's eligibility for federal student aid to verify his or her lawful status. But Congress, not the State of Georgia, set the eligibility standard for federal student aid. 20 U.S.C. § 1091.[9] A selective school may also use an applicant's status as a naturalized citizen, immigrant, or nonimmigrant to verify his or her lawful status. Again, Congress decided who is eligible to become a naturalized citizen, see, e.g., 8 U.S.C. §§ 1421-1459; to receive an immigrant visa, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(15), 1201(a)(1)(A), 1202(a)-(b); and to receive a nonimmigrant visa, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(15), 1201(a)(1)(B), 1202(c)-(d). The Policy clearly looks to federal standards to verify lawful presence, and it does not require a state agent to make any independent determination. See, e.g., League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F.Supp. 755, 772 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (finding that a subsection of a state statute is an impermissible regulation of immigration because the state classification "is not in any way tied to federal standards"), on reconsideration in part, 997 F.Supp. 1244 (C.D. Cal. 1997); see also

id. (explaining that the same subsection requires state agents to make independent determinations based on "state-created criteria").
Appellants rely on a discrete definition of "unlawful presence" in the Act to support their argument, and the argument proceeds in two steps. First, appellants argue the Act delegates to the DHS the authority to enforce the statute. As part of 1305*1305 this delegation, appellants say, the Executive has authority to issue discretionary grants of deferred action. In support, appellants cite 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(3), which allows the DHS Secretary to "perform such other acts as he deems necessary for carrying out his authority under the provisions of this chapter." Of course, this provision does not explicitly allow DHS to issue discretionary grants of deferred action, but it is well known that "[a] principal feature of the removal system is the broad discretion exercised by immigration officials," Arizona, 567 U.S. at 396, 132 S.Ct. at 2499. Second, appellants argue that aliens are lawfully present in the United States—under the Act—if they have been granted deferred action by the Executive Branch.
Appellants rely on 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(ii) to support their deferred-action-meanslawful-presence argument. Section 1182 is titled "Inadmissible aliens," and the relevant part provides the following:
(a) Classes of aliens ineligible for visas or admission ... (9) Aliens previously removed ... (B) Aliens unlawfully present ... (ii) Construction of unlawful presence For purposes of this paragraph, an alien is deemed to be unlawfully present in the United States if the alien is present in the United States after the expiration of the period of stay authorized by the Attorney General or is present in the United States without being admitted or paroled.
(emphasis added). Section 1182(a)(9)(B)(ii) does not stand for the broad proposition that appellants say it does.
Under § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i), aliens who are "unlawfully present in the United States" for a period of time, leave the United States, then seek admission to the United States before certain periods of time have passed are inadmissible. At best, clause (ii) simply means that these aliens—those "previously removed"—are lawfully present during a period of stay authorized by the Attorney General.[10] But this part of the statute does not even apply to appellants because they have not previously been removed.
Instead, appellants are inadmissible and subject to removal proceedings. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) ("An alien present in the United States without being admitted or paroled, or who arrives in the United States at any time or place other than as designated by the Attorney General, is inadmissible."); id. § 1229a(a)(2) (noting that inadmissible aliens are removable). As DACA recipients, they simply were given a reprieve from potential removal; that does not mean they are in any way "lawfully present" under the Act. See Ga. Latino All.

for Human Rights v. Governor of Ga., 691 F.3d 1250, 1258 n.2 (11th Cir. 2012) ("Deferred action status, also known as `non-priority status,' amounts to, in practical application, a reprieve for deportable aliens. No action (i.e., no deportation) will be taken ... against an alien having deferred action status." (alteration in original) (quoting Pasquini v. Morris, 700 F.2d 658, 661 (11th Cir.1983))).
1306*1306 So, appellants have not shown that they are lawfully present under the Act. Nor have they shown that the Policy's classifications are inconsistent with federal immigration classifications. It is quite the opposite: the Policy borrows from federal standards.
Next, appellants argue the Policy is an unconstitutional regulation of immigration because it regulates the "conditions" in which aliens may remain in the United States. They say the Policy creates its own standards for "lawful presence," and that itself is a regulation of immigration under DeCanas. This repackaged argument fails because it rests on a faulty premise—the Policy does not create standards for lawful presence. As we explained above, the Policy merely instructs selective schools to verify lawful presence using federal standards.
Then, appellants get to the heart of their argument. They claim the Policy intrudes on the "conditions" of their presence in the United States because it prevents them from attending the three selective schools. It is true that the states "can neither add to nor take from the conditions lawfully imposed by Congress upon admission, naturalization and residence of aliens in the United States or the several states." DeCanas, 424 U.S. at 358 n.6, 96 S.Ct. at 938 n.6. But appellants fail to show how the Policy relates, in any way, to conditions that Congress has imposed on their residence in the United States. It is not as though Congress has given deferred action holders the right to attend state universities or colleges. And Congress has not required deferred action holders to attend college if they want to remain in the United States. Appellants really seem to be saying the Policy is a regulation of immigration simply because aliens are one subject of the Policy. But as DeCanas made clear, "that aliens are the subject of a state statute does not render it a regulation of immigration." Id. at 355, 96 S.Ct. at 936. Appellants' broad view of what amounts to a "condition under which a legal entrant should remain" in the United States would gut DeCanas's warning that a law is not automatically a regulation of immigration simply because it deals with aliens. See id.
We hold that the Policy does not regulate immigration.
2.
Second, appellants argue that the Policy is field preempted because Congress occupies the field of federal immigrant classifications. Recall, when dealing with field preemption, we may infer an "intent to displace state law altogether" where "a framework of regulation [is] `so pervasive... that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it' or where there is a `federal interest ... so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject.'" Arizona, 567 U.S. at 399, 132 S.Ct. at 2501 (second and third alterations in original) (quoting Rice, 331 U.S. at 230, 67 S.Ct. at 1152).

"To discover the boundaries [of a particular field] we look to the federal statute itself, read in the light of its constitutional setting and its legislative history." DeCanas, 424 U.S. at 360 n.8, 96 S.Ct. at 938 n.8 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 78-79, 61 S.Ct. 399, 410, 85 L.Ed. 581 (1941) (Stone, J., dissenting)). We must also decide what the state law or policy actually regulates to see whether the state regulation touches on the field that Congress has occupied. See, e.g., id. at 356-57, 96 S.Ct. at 937-38 (describing a state law that prevented employers from hiring aliens who were not entitled to lawful residence in the United States as a regulation of the "employment of illegal aliens").
1307*1307 Here, the Policy regulates who can attend Georgia's three most selective schools. And "States historically have been sovereign" in the area of education. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564, 115 S.Ct. 1624, 1632, 131 L.Ed.2d 626 (1995). We find nothing in the Act that allows us to infer an "intent to displace state law altogether," Arizona, 567 U.S. at 399, 132 S.Ct. at 2501, in the field of undocumented immigrant education. In fact, appellants do not even argue that the Act occupies that field. Instead, they argue that the appropriate field is a much broader one: immigration classification. But as we explained above, the Policy does not create a new immigration classification—quite the opposite. The Policy requires selective schools to verify lawful presence by using federally created standards. Nor is undocumented immigrant education within the central aim of federal regulation simply because the Act comprehensively regulates immigration itself. See DeCanas, 424 U.S. at 359, 96 S.Ct. at 938 ("The comprehensiveness of the [Act's] scheme for regulation of immigration and naturalization, without more, cannot be said to draw in the employment of illegal aliens as `plainly within... (that) central aim of federal regulation.'" (second and third alterations in original) (quoting San Diego Unions v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 244, 79 S.Ct. 773, 779, 3 L.Ed.2d 775 (1959))).
Next, appellants argue that Congress showed a clear intent to occupy the field by assigning discretionary decisions to the Executive and by largely insulating those decisions from judicial review. According to appellants, this shows congressional "intent to achieve flexibility in immigration enforcement while establishing the [E]xecutive's word as final in discretionary matters." But again, this argument focuses on the wrong field: the Policy has nothing at all to do with immigration enforcement. Even if we assume that Congress does occupy the field of immigration enforcement, that does nothing to help appellants because the Policy is unrelated to immigration enforcement. Nor does the Policy in any way deal with immigration issues over which the Executive has discretion.[11]
We hold that the Policy is not field preempted.
3.
Third, appellants argue the Policy is conflict preempted. State law and federal law conflict when it is physically impossible to comply with both or when the state law "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress." Arizona, 567 U.S. at 399, 132 S.Ct. at 2501 (quoting Hines, 312 U.S. at 67, 61 S.Ct. at 404). Appellants focus on the second type of conflict preemption and claim the Policy 1308*1308 stands as an obstacle to Congress's purposes and objectives.

"What is a sufficient obstacle is a matter of judgment, to be informed by examining the federal statute as a whole and identifying its purpose and intended effects ...." Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 373, 120 S.Ct. 2288, 2294, 147 L.Ed.2d 352 (2000). "If the purpose of the [federal] act cannot otherwise be accomplished—if its operation within its chosen field else must be frustrated and its provisions be refused their natural effect—the state law must yield to the regulation of Congress within the sphere of its delegated power." Id. (quoting Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501, 533, 32 S.Ct. 715, 726, 56 L.Ed. 1182 (1912)).
Appellants argue that one purpose of the Act is to give the Executive discretion over the removal of aliens, and they claim the Policy conflicts with this purpose. Appellants correctly point out that the Executive has discretion over the removal process, see Arizona, 567 U.S. at 396, 132 S.Ct. at 2499, and deferred action is one example of that discretion, Reno, 525 U.S. at 483-84, 119 S.Ct. at 943. But the Policy—which deals only with admission to Georgia's selective schools—does not obstruct this purpose. This argument fails.
Next, appellants note that the Executive has a historical practice of adopting policies that make deferred action available to large groups. But the Policy does not invalidate the DACA Memo or interfere with deferred action in any way. In fact, the Policy says nothing about the validity of deferred action and limits itself only to college and university admission at Georgia's three most selective schools.
In sum, the Policy prevents DACA recipients from attending Georgia's three most selective schools, and appellants have not alleged any congressional purpose or objective in conflict with the Policy.[12] See, e.g., Arizona, 567 U.S. at 409, 132 S.Ct. at 2506 (holding a state law that "authoriz[ed] state officers to decide whether an alien should be detained for being removable" was conflict preempted because it "violates the principle that the removal process is entrusted to the discretion of the Federal Government").
We hold that the Policy is not conflict preempted.
B.
Under the Equal Protection Clause, "No state shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. The Clause does not prohibit classifications altogether, Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 10, 112 S.Ct. 2326, 2331, 120 L.Ed.2d 1 (1992), and the applicable level of scrutiny drives our analysis, see, e.g., Armour v. City of Indianapolis, 566 U.S. 673, 680, 132 S.Ct. 2073, 2079-80, 182 L.Ed.2d 998 (2012).
If a classification neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, rational basis review applies. See Armour, 566 U.S. at 680, 132 S.Ct. at 2080. Here, the Policy deals with postsecondary education, and the Supreme Court has never said that education is a fundamental right. See Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Sch., 487 U.S. 450, 458, 108 S.Ct. 2481, 2487-88, 101 L.Ed.2d 399 (1988). The Policy does not classify applicants based on a suspect classification because "[u]ndocumented 1309*1309 aliens cannot be treated as a suspect class." Plyler, 457 U.S. at 223, 102 S.Ct. at 2398;[13] see also LeClerc v. Webb, 419 F.3d 405, 416 (5th Cir. 2005) ("The [Supreme] Court has never applied strict scrutiny review

to a state law affecting any... alienage classifications [except for those involving resident aliens or permanent resident aliens], e.g., illegal aliens, the children of illegal aliens, or nonimmigrant aliens."). While the Supreme Court has said that "classifications based on alienage... are inherently suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny," Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372, 91 S.Ct. 1848, 1852, 29 L.Ed.2d 534 (1971), it has never "held that all limitations on aliens are suspect," Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 294, 98 S.Ct. 1067, 1070, 55 L.Ed.2d 287 (1978) (emphasis added), let alone limitations on illegal aliens.
Appellants argue that strict scrutiny applies, and they rely on two Supreme Court cases for support. In Nyquist v. Mauclet, the Supreme Court applied "close judicial scrutiny," 432 U.S. 1, 7, 97 S.Ct. 2120, 2124, 53 L.Ed.2d 63 (1977), and struck down a law that barred resident aliens[14] from receiving state financial assistance for higher education, id. at 12, 97 S.Ct. at 2127. In Graham v. Richardson, the Supreme Court applied "strict judicial scrutiny" and struck down a state law that denied resident aliens disability benefits. 403 U.S. 365, 376, 91 S.Ct. 1848, 1854, 29 L.Ed.2d 534 (1971).
At first glance, this case seems similar to Nyquist and Graham. In Nyquist and Graham, the challengers were lawfully admitted to the United States as resident aliens. Nyquist, 432 U.S. at 4, 97 S.Ct. at 2123; Graham, 403 U.S. at 369, 91 S.Ct. at 1850. Here, appellants were granted deferred status. In Nyquist and Graham, the challengers were denied some statesponsored benefit. Nyquist, 432 U.S. at 5, 97 S.Ct. at 2123 (financial assistance for higher education); Graham, 403 U.S. at 369, 91 S.Ct. at 1850 (disability benefits). And here, appellants are denied admission to Georgia's selective colleges and universities.
But are there two important differences between this case and Nyquist and Graham. First, Nyquist and Graham involved state laws that affected resident aliens, not illegal aliens. Second, as the Supreme Court later clarified, the state laws at issue in Nyquist and Graham "struck at the noncitizens' ability to exist in the community, a position seemingly inconsistent with the congressional determination to admit the alien to permanent residence." See Foley, 435 U.S. at 295, 98 S.Ct. at 1070. Here, the Policy neither strikes at appellants' ability to exist in the community nor conflicts with any congressional determination. Appellants may pursue postsecondary 1310*1310 education outside these three schools, and the Policy in no way undermines appellants' deferred action status. Thus, "[w]e decline to extend the Supreme Court's decisions concerning resident aliens to different alien categories." LeClerc, 419 F.3d at 419.
Alternatively, appellants argue that heightened scrutiny should apply for two reasons.
First, appellants claim heightened scrutiny applies because they cannot vote or rely on the political process. Indeed, the Supreme Court has noted that a "more searching judicial inquiry" may be needed when a state law targets "discrete and insular minorities" who have no direct voice in the political process. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4, 58 S.Ct. 778, 784 n.4, 82 L.Ed. 1234 (1938). And the Supreme Court has in fact found that resident aliens are the type of "discrete and insular" minorities who have no political voice and thus qualify for heightened scrutiny. See, e.g., Foley, 435 U.S. at 294, 98 S.Ct. at 1070 ("[T]he Court has treated certain restrictions on aliens with `heightened judicial solicitude,' a treatment deemed necessary since aliens— pending their eligibility for

citizenship— have no direct voice in the political processes." (citation omitted) (quoting Graham, 403 U.S. at 372, 91 S.Ct. at 1852) (citing Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 152-53 n.4, 58 S.Ct. at 783-84 n.4)).
But here, appellants' lack of legal voice is tied to their illegal presence. Remember, they are inadmissible and thus removable. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(6)(A)(i), 1229a(a)(2). By contrast, "[c]haracterizing resident aliens as a Carolene Products minority reconciles the breadth of rights and responsibilities they enjoy with their lack of political capacity." LeClerc, 419 F.3d at 417. Unlike resident aliens, appellants— who are here illegally and were given a reprieve from removal—are not the sort of minority that is entitled to strict scrutiny protection under Carolene Products.
Second, appellants say education is an important right that triggers heightened scrutiny. Yet they point to no Supreme Court or Eleventh Circuit case that applies heightened scrutiny to a classification that burdens education.[15] Thus, we decline to extend heightened scrutiny to a classification that allegedly burdens postsecondary education.
We are left with rational basis review, and the Policy easily survives. Under rational basis review, a classification does not violate the Equal Protection Clause so long as "there is a rational relationship between the disparity of treatment and some legitimate governmental purpose." Armour, 566 U.S. at 680, 132 S.Ct. at 2080 (quoting Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319-20, 113 S.Ct. 2637, 2642, 125 L.Ed.2d 257 (1993)). "[A] classification 1311*1311 `must be upheld against equal protection challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification.'" Heller, 509 U.S. at 320, 113 S.Ct. at 2642 (emphasis added) (quoting FCC v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313, 113 S.Ct. 2096, 2101, 124 L.Ed.2d 211 (1993)). We assume the classification is constitutional, and the appellants—as the challengers —must "negative every conceivable basis which might support" the classification. See id., 113 S.Ct. at 2643 (quoting Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 364, 93 S.Ct. 1001, 1006, 35 L.Ed.2d 351 (1973)).
The Policy applies only to selective schools that did not admit all qualified applicants in the last two years. Because the schools cannot admit all qualified applicants, the Georgia System Regents must prioritize which students to admit. The Regents could have decided to prioritize those students who are more likely to stay in Georgia after graduation, and the Regents might have decided that DACA recipients are less likely to do so because they are removable at any time. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(6)(A)(i), 1229a(a)(2). That is, the Regents could have reasonably concluded that it would be unwise to invest state resources in DACA recipients. Thus, the Policy is rationally related to the state's legitimate interest in responsibly investing state resources.
Appellants allege that the Policy allows similarly situated individuals—refugees, parolees, and asylees—to enroll in the selective schools. But refugees, parolees, and asylees are not similarly situated to DACA recipients. They all are eligible for federal student aid. See 1 U.S. Dep't of Educ., Federal Student Aid Handbook 1-34 to 1-35 (2017-2018 ed.) [hereinafter Handbook].[16] And to be eligible for federal aid, a student must be "in the United States for other than a temporary purpose with the intention of becoming a citizen or permanent resident."[17] 20 U.S.C. § 1091(a)(5); 34 C.F.R. § 668.33(a). Plus, refugees "are

required to apply for Lawful Permanent Residency (LPR) status after one year." Handbook, supra, at 1-34; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1159; 8 C.F.R. § 209.1. As the status suggests, lawful permanent residents are lawfully authorized to live permanently in the United States. Similarly, parolees "must provide evidence ... that they are in the U.S. for other than a temporary purpose and intend to become a citizen or permanent resident." Handbook, supra, at 1-34 to 1-35. Finally, asylees can apply for permanent residency after one year. Id. at 1-34; see also 8 C.F.R. § 209.2(a)(1)(ii). These three groups have more permanent ties to the United States than DACA recipients, and it would be rational for the Regents to conclude refugees, parolees, and asylees are more likely to stay in Georgia after graduation.[18]
Appellees offer another interest that the Policy serves: it allocates limited state resources to U.S. citizens and to those whom Congress has affirmatively allowed to remain in the United States. As explained above, appellants are not lawfully present 1312*1312 in the United States. By contrast, the non-citizens who are eligible for admission under the Policy are either lawfully admitted under the Act or they have a statutory designation that allows them to remain in the United States. The Policy is rationally related to that legitimate state interest.
We hold that the Policy is rationally related to a legitimate government interest, and appellants alleged no facts that would show the classification is irrational.
III.
The District Court's decision is
AFFIRMED.
[*] Honorable Paul C. Huck, United States District Judge for the Southern District of Florida, sitting by designation.
[1] Technically, there are two separate policies. But because the policies work together, we will refer to them simply as "the Policy" for convenience.
[2] At the time appellants brought this lawsuit, the Policy applied to five schools: Georgia State University, Georgia College and State University, Augusta University, the University of Georgia, and the Georgia Institute of Technology. Now, the parties seem to agree that it applies just to Georgia College and State University, the University of Georgia, and the Georgia Institute of Technology.
[3] A student's lawful presence is verified if he or she (1) is eligible for federal student aid; (2) has an F, J, or M visa, which allows the selective schools to verify using the Student and Exchange Visitor Program; or (3) is a naturalized citizen, immigrant, or nonimmigrant, which allows the selective schools to verify using the Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements Program or by looking to documentation provided by the student.
[4] The Savannah Undocumented Youth Alliance organization was a party below, but it is not a party on appeal.
[5] Appellants seem to assume that a state's inconsistent immigration classification—without any additional harm— automatically satisfies the DeCanas definition of "regulation of immigration." They rely on a Ninth Circuit decision and a district court decision to support that assumption. See Ariz. Dream Act Coal. v. Brewer, 855 F.3d 957, 977 (9th Cir. 2017) (amended opinion), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 138 S.Ct. 1279, 200 L.Ed.2d 468 (2018); Hispanic Interest Coal. of Ala. v. Bentley, No. 5:11-CV-2484-SLB, 2011 WL 5516953, at *23 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 28, 2011), aff'd in part, vacated in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Hispanic Interest Coal. of Ala. v. Governor of Ala., 691 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir.

2012). Because we find that the Policy is consistent with federal immigration classifications, we need not decide whether appellants' assumption is correct.
[6] We do point out that Plyler is not a preemption case. See, e.g., Brewer, 855 F.3d at 961 (Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) ("Justice Brennan's 1982 majority opinion—a 5-4 opinion that garnered three individual concurrences and has been questioned continuously since publication—never once mentions preemption.").
[7] As we explained above, the Policy does say that DACA recipients are not considered lawfully present in the United States. But that language just means the selective schools cannot use DACA status to verify lawful presence. This is because the Policy instructs the selective schools to verify lawful presence by looking to federal immigration classifications. And under federal immigration classifications, DACA recipients are not lawfully present.
[8] At first glance, one verification procedure is different from the rest. The selective schools may verify a student's lawful presence if the student provides a Georgia driver's license or state-issued ID that was issued by the State of Georgia after January 1, 2008. But the Policy explicitly notes that a "limited term license" or ID "is not acceptable." This procedure is functionally equivalent to proving U.S. citizenship because noncitizens may only get licenses or IDs that are "limited term" in that the license or ID is valid only during the applicant's authorized stay in the United States. See O.C.G.A. §§ 40-5-21.1(a).
[9] Among other things, a student must
be a citizen or national of the United States, a permanent resident of the United States, or able to provide evidence from the Immigration and Naturalization Service that he or she is in the United States for other than a temporary purpose with the intention of becoming a citizen or permanent resident.
20 U.S.C. § 1091(a)(5).
[10] But "[e]ven if it were true that an immigrant was `unlawfully present' if he stayed beyond a period approved by the Attorney General, this doesn't mean he would be `lawfully present' if he didn't stay beyond such a period. In formal logic, the inverse of a conditional cannot be inferred from the conditional." Brewer, 855 F.3d at 960 n.3 (Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
[11] For example, appellants cite Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, 525 U.S. 471, 486-87, 119 S.Ct. 936, 945, 142 L.Ed.2d 940 (1999), to support their proposition that Congress assigned discretionary decisions to the Executive and insulated those decisions from judicial review. In turn, Reno cites examples where the Act gives the Executive discretion and insulates it from review: "8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(A) (limiting review of any claim arising from the inspection of aliens arriving in the United States); § 1252(a)(2)(B) (barring review of denials of discretionary relief authorized by various statutory provisions); § 1252(a)(2)(C) (barring review of final removal orders against criminal aliens); § 1252(b)(4)(D) (limiting review of asylum determinations for resident aliens)." 525 U.S. at 486-87, 119 S.Ct. at 945.
But the Policy is totally unrelated to inspecting aliens, discretionary relief, final removal orders, and asylum determinations. So the Policy in no way upsets the Executive's discretionary decisions because it has nothing to do with those decisions. This exposes the problem with appellants' argument: it relies on a field that the Policy does not regulate.
[12] If anything, the Policy is consistent with 8 U.S.C. § 1621(a). In § 1621, Congress decided which aliens are eligible for state and local benefits, including postsecondary education benefits. See 8 U.S.C. § 1621(c)(1)(B). Only the following aliens are eligible: (1) qualified aliens, (2) nonimmigrants, and (3) aliens paroled into the United States. Id. § 1621(a). DACA recipients are not eligible.
[13] In Plyler, the Court did apply some type of heightened rational basis review. 457 U.S. at 224, 102 S.Ct. at 2398 (noting that the state law could "hardly be considered rational unless it furthers some substantial goal of the State" (emphasis added)). But the level of review was not based on a suspect class. Indeed, the Court was very clear that "[u]ndocumented aliens cannot be treated as a suspect class." Id. at 223, 102 S.Ct. at 2398. Instead, the Court seemed to apply heightened scrutiny because the state law, by denying the children of undocumented aliens a "basic education," "impose[d] a lifetime hardship on a discrete class of children not accountable for their disabling

status." Id. But the Court has not extended the holding in Plyler beyond the "unique circumstances" in that case. Kadrmas, 487 U.S. at 459, 108 S.Ct. at 2488 (quoting Plyler, 457 U.S. at 239, 102 S.Ct. at 2406 (Powell, J., concurring)).
[14] The state law did not use the term "resident alien," but in light of other federal laws, the Supreme Court explained that the state law was "of practical significance only to resident aliens." Id. at 4, 97 S.Ct. at 2123.
[15] Appellants do cite a district court case that applied heightened scrutiny, but it is distinguishable. In Ruiz v. Robinson, the District Court applied heightened scrutiny to a Florida regulation that denied in-state (and thus cheaper) tuition to U.S. citizens because they were unable to prove their parents' federal immigration status. 892 F.Supp.2d 1321, 1325-26 (S.D. Fla. 2012). The Court explained that "the State regulations deny a benefit to Plaintiffs and impinge Plaintiffs' ability to attain post-secondary education at the State's public institutions solely by virtue of their parents' undocumented status, and in a very real way the regulations punish the citizen children for the acts of their parents." Id. at 1330. Here, the Policy does not affect appellants' ability to get a postsecondary education in the same way the Florida regulation did in Ruiz. Appellants are prevented from attending just three schools in Georgia. By contrast, the plaintiffs in Ruiz could not get in-state tuition at any public school in Florida. Id. at 1325-26. There is also one other relevant difference: appellants are not citizens, but the plaintiffs in Ruiz are. Id. at 1323-24.
[16] The Handbook may be accessed here: https://ifap.ed.gov/fsahandbook/attachments/1718FSAHbkVol1Master.pdf.
[17] Alternatively, a student is also eligible if he or she is a citizen, a national, or a permanent resident of the United States. 20 U.S.C. § 1091(a)(5); 34 C.F.R. § 668.33(a). But appellants do not explicitly argue that they are similarly situated to these groups.
[18] Nor is the Policy necessarily irrational if the Regents' conclusion is wrong, see, e.g., Beach Commc'ns, Inc., 508 U.S. at 315-16, 113 S.Ct. at 2102, or if the Policy is "both underinclusive and overinclusive," Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 108, 99 S.Ct. 939, 948, 59 L.Ed.2d 171 (1979).

 </s> Case 1:16-cv-00757-RWS Document 115 Filed 03/12/19 Page 1 of 2

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION

GEORGIA LATINO ALLIANCE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, et al.,
Plaintiffs, v. C. DEAN ALFORD, et al., Defendants.

: : : : : CIVIL ACTION NO. : 1:16-CV-00757-RWS : : : :

ORDER

This case comes before the Court following notice of the Eleventh

Circuit’s opinion in Estrada v. Becker, Appeal No. 17-12668-K. (See Dkt.

[114].) The Court previously stayed this case pending resolution of Estrada

since—as the parties agreed—the Eleventh Circuit’s decision there would

likely impact the claims at issue here. (Order, Dkt. [112].) And that is because

both cases involve challenges to the University System of Georgia’s policies

related to individuals who received deferred action status under the federal

Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals policy, or DACA. The district judge in

Estrada found that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim as a matter of law,

Estrada v. Becker, No. 1:16-CV-3310-TWT, 2017 WL 2062078 (N.D. Ga. May

AO 72A (Rev.8/82)

Case 1:16-cv-00757-RWS Document 115 Filed 03/12/19 Page 2 of 2
15, 2017), and the Eleventh Circuit has now affirmed that ruling, (Dkt. [1141]). Plaintiffs are therefore ORDERED to SHOW CAUSE within 14 days why this case should not be dismissed. After Plaintiffs submit their position, Defendants may then file a response within 14 days.
SO ORDERED, this 12th day of March, 2019. ________________________________ RICHARD W. STORY United States District Judge
2
AO 72A (Rev.8/82)

 </s> 4months,CLOSED
U.S. District Court Northern District of Georgia (Atlanta) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:16−cv−00757−RWS

Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights et al v. Alford et al Assigned to: Judge Richard W. Story Cause: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act
Plaintiff

Date Filed: 03/09/2016 Date Terminated: 03/28/2019 Jury Demand: None Nature of Suit: 440 Civil Rights: Other Jurisdiction: Federal Question

Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights an organization

represented by Burth Lopez Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund−DC Suite 100 1016 16th Street NW Washington, DC 20036 202−572−0695 Fax: . Email: blopez@maldef.org LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Mark Andrew Begnaud Horsley Begnaud, LLC Building 12, Suite 300 750 Hammond Drive Atlanta, GA 30328 770−818−0000 Email: mbegnaud@gacivilrights.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Nathanael A. Horsley Horsley Begnaud, LLC Building 12, Suite 300 750 Hammond Drive Atlanta, GA 30328 706−765−5559 Email: nhorsley@gacivilrights.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Sarah Schoettle Mexican American Legal Defense & Educational Fund (MALDEF) Suite 700 11 E. Adams Street Chicago, IL 60603 312−427−0701 Email: sschoettle@maldef.org TERMINATED: 09/19/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY

Victor Viramontes Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund (MALDEF) 634 South Spring Street 11th Floor Los Angeles, CA 90014 213−629−2512 Email: vviramontes@maldef.org

Plaintiff Lorena Guillen an individual
Plaintiff Karla Lopez an individual

TERMINATED: 11/30/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY
Jorge M. Castillo Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund (MALDEF) 634 South Spring Street 11th Floor Los Angeles, CA 90014 213−629−2512 Email: jcastillo@maldef.org TERMINATED: 07/01/2016
represented by Burth Lopez (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Mark Andrew Begnaud (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Nathanael A. Horsley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sarah Schoettle (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/19/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY
Victor Viramontes (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/30/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY
Jorge M. Castillo (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/01/2016
represented by Burth Lopez (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Mark Andrew Begnaud (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Nathanael A. Horsley (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sarah Schoettle (See above for address) TERMINATED: 09/19/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY

Plaintiff Arturo Martinez del Rello
Plaintiff Freedom University TERMINATED: 06/15/2018
Plaintiff Mayela Salazar
Plaintiff Jorge San Juan
V. Defendant C. Dean Alford member of the Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia, in his individual and official capacity

Victor Viramontes (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/30/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY
Jorge M. Castillo (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/01/2016
represented by Mark Andrew Begnaud Horsley Begnaud, LLC Building 12, Suite 300 750 Hammond Drive Atlanta, GA 30328 770−765−5559 Email: mbegnaud@gacivilrights.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Nathanael A. Horsley (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Mark Andrew Begnaud (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Nathanael A. Horsley (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Mark Andrew Begnaud (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Nathanael A. Horsley (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Mark Andrew Begnaud (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Nathanael A. Horsley (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Deborah Nolan Gore Attorney General's Office−Atl 40 Capitol Square, SW Atlanta, GA 30334 404−463−8850 Email: dgore@law.ga.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant W. Paul Bowers member of the Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia, in his individual and official capacity.
Defendant Lori Durden member of the Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia, in her individual and official capacity
Defendant Larry R. Ellis member of the Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia, in his individual and official capacity
Defendant Rutledge A. Griffin, Jr. member of the Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia, in his

Devon Orland Georgia Department of Law Office of the Attorney General 40 Capitol Square, S.W. Atlanta, GA 30334−1300 404−885−1234 Fax: 404−378−0031 Email: dorland@thegao.org TERMINATED: 04/21/2017
Roger A. Chalmers State Law Department −Atl 40 Capitol Square, SW Atlanta, GA 30334 404−463−8850 Fax: 404−651−5304 Email: rchalmers@law.ga.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Deborah Nolan Gore (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Devon Orland (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/21/2017
Roger A. Chalmers (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Deborah Nolan Gore (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Devon Orland (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/21/2017
Roger A. Chalmers (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Deborah Nolan Gore (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Devon Orland (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/21/2017
Roger A. Chalmers (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Deborah Nolan Gore (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

individual and official capacity
Defendant C. Thomas Hopkins, Jr. member of the Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia, in his individual and official capacity
Defendant James M. Hull member of the Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia, in his individual and official capacity
Defendant Donald M. Leebern, Jr. member of the Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia, in his individual and official capacity
Defendant Doreen Stiles Poitevint member of the Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia, in her individual and official capacity
Defendant

Devon Orland (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/21/2017
Roger A. Chalmers (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Deborah Nolan Gore (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Devon Orland (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/21/2017
Roger A. Chalmers (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Deborah Nolan Gore (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Devon Orland (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/21/2017
Roger A. Chalmers (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Deborah Nolan Gore (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Devon Orland (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/21/2017
Roger A. Chalmers (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Deborah Nolan Gore (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Devon Orland (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/21/2017
Roger A. Chalmers (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Neil L. Pruitt, Jr. member of the Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia, in his individual and official capacity
Defendant Sachin Shailendra member of the Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia, in his individual and official capacity
Defendant E. Scott Smith member of the Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia, in his individual and official capacity
Defendant Kessel D. Stelling, Jr. member of the Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia, in his individual and official capacity
Defendant Benjamin J. Tarbutton, III member of the Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia, in his individual and official capacity

represented by Deborah Nolan Gore (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Devon Orland (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/21/2017
Roger A. Chalmers (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Deborah Nolan Gore (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Devon Orland (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/21/2017
Roger A. Chalmers (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Deborah Nolan Gore (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Devon Orland (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/21/2017
Roger A. Chalmers (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Deborah Nolan Gore (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Devon Orland (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/21/2017
Roger A. Chalmers (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Deborah Nolan Gore (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Devon Orland (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/21/2017
Roger A. Chalmers (See above for address)

Defendant Richard L. Tucker member of the Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia, in his individual and official capacity
Defendant Thomas Rogers Wade member of the Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia, in his individual and official capacity
Defendant Larry Walker member of the Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia, in his individual and official capacity
Defendant Don L. Waters member of the Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia, in his individual and official capacity
Defendant Philip A. Wilheit, Sr. member of the Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia, in his individual and official capacity

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Deborah Nolan Gore (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Devon Orland (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/21/2017
Roger A. Chalmers (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Deborah Nolan Gore (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Devon Orland (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/21/2017
Roger A. Chalmers (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Deborah Nolan Gore (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Devon Orland (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/21/2017
Roger A. Chalmers (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Deborah Nolan Gore (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Devon Orland (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/21/2017
Roger A. Chalmers (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Deborah Nolan Gore (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Devon Orland (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/21/2017

Defendant Dr. David C. Bridges President of Abraham Baldwin Agricultural College, in his individual and official capacity
Defendant Dr. Arthur Dunning President of Albany State University, in his individual and official capacity
Defendant Dr. Linda Bleicken President of Armstrong State University, in her individual and official capacity
Defendant Dr. Gary A. McGaha President of Atlanta Metropolitan State College, in his individual and official capacity
Defendant Shawn McGee President of Bainbridge State College in his individual and official capacity

Roger A. Chalmers (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Deborah Nolan Gore (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Devon Orland (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/21/2017
Roger A. Chalmers (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Deborah Nolan Gore (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Devon Orland (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/21/2017
Roger A. Chalmers (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Deborah Nolan Gore (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Devon Orland (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/21/2017
Roger A. Chalmers (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Deborah Nolan Gore (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Devon Orland (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/21/2017
Roger A. Chalmers (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Deborah Nolan Gore (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Dr. Thomas J. "Tim" Hynes President of Clayton State University, in his individual and official capacity.
Defendant Dr. Gregory F. Aloia President of College of Coastal Georgia, in his individual and official capacity
Defendant Dr. Chris Markwood President of Columbus State University, in his individual and official capacity
Defendant Dr. Margaret Venable President of Dalton State College, in her individual and official capacity
Defendant

Devon Orland (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/21/2017
Roger A. Chalmers (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Deborah Nolan Gore (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Devon Orland (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/21/2017
Roger A. Chalmers (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Deborah Nolan Gore (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Devon Orland (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/21/2017
Roger A. Chalmers (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Deborah Nolan Gore (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Devon Orland (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/21/2017
Roger A. Chalmers (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Deborah Nolan Gore (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Devon Orland (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/21/2017
Roger A. Chalmers (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by

Dr. Richard Carvajal President of Darton State College, in his individual and official capacity
Defendant Dr. Robert G. Boehmer President of East Georgia State College in his individual and official capacity
Defendant Dr. Paul Jones President of Fort Valley State University, in his individual and official capacity
Defendant Dr. Stas Preczewski President of Georgia Gwinnett College, in his individual and official capacity
Defendant Dr. Donald Green President of Georgia Highlands College, in his individual and official capacity

Deborah Nolan Gore (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Devon Orland (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/21/2017
Roger A. Chalmers (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Deborah Nolan Gore (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Devon Orland (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/21/2017
Roger A. Chalmers (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Deborah Nolan Gore (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Devon Orland (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/21/2017
Roger A. Chalmers (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Deborah Nolan Gore (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Devon Orland (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/21/2017
Roger A. Chalmers (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Deborah Nolan Gore (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Devon Orland (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/21/2017
Roger A. Chalmers (See above for address)

Defendant Dr. Jean Bartels President of Georgia Southern University, in her individual and official capacity
Defendant Dr. Charles Patterson President of Georgia Southwestern State University in his individual and official capacity
Defendant Dr. Mark P. Becker President of Georgia State University, in his individual and official capacity
Defendant Dr. Max Burns President of Gordon State College, in his individual and official capacity
Defendant Dr. Daniel S. Papp President of Kennesaw State University, in his individual and official capacity

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Deborah Nolan Gore (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Devon Orland (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/21/2017
Roger A. Chalmers (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Deborah Nolan Gore (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Devon Orland (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/21/2017
Roger A. Chalmers (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Deborah Nolan Gore (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Devon Orland (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/21/2017
Roger A. Chalmers (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Deborah Nolan Gore (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Devon Orland (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/21/2017
Roger A. Chalmers (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Deborah Nolan Gore (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Devon Orland (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/21/2017

Defendant Dr. Christopher Blake President of Middle Georgia State University, in his individual and official capacity
Defendant Dr. Cheryl Davenport Dozier President of Savannah State University, in her individual and official capacity
Defendant Dr. Virginia Carson President of South Georgia State College, in her individual and official capacity
Defendant Dr. Bonita Jacobs President of University of North Georgia, in her individual and official capacity;
Defendant Dr. Kyle Marrero President of University of West Georgia, in his individual and official capacity

Roger A. Chalmers (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Deborah Nolan Gore (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Devon Orland (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/21/2017
Roger A. Chalmers (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Deborah Nolan Gore (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Devon Orland (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/21/2017
Roger A. Chalmers (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Deborah Nolan Gore (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Devon Orland (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/21/2017
Roger A. Chalmers (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Deborah Nolan Gore (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Devon Orland (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/21/2017
Roger A. Chalmers (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Deborah Nolan Gore (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Dr. Cecil Staton President of Valdosta State University, in his individual and official capacity
Defendant Dr. Peter Lyons Vice Provost of Georgia State University and Dean of the Georgia Perimeter College, in his individual and official capacity
Defendant Robert E. Watts Interim President of Georgia Perimeter College, in his individual and official capacity

Devon Orland (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/21/2017
Roger A. Chalmers (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Devon Orland (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/21/2017
Roger A. Chalmers (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Deborah Nolan Gore (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Devon Orland (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/21/2017
Roger A. Chalmers (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Deborah Nolan Gore (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Devon Orland (See above for address) TERMINATED: 04/21/2017
Roger A. Chalmers (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 03/09/2016
03/10/2016

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT filed by Karla Lopez, Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights, and Lorena Guillen. ( Filing fee $ 400 receipt number 113E−6333824.) (Attachments: # 1 Civil Cover Sheet)(bnw) Please visit our website at http://www.gand.uscourts.gov/commonly−used−forms to obtain Pretrial Instructions which includes the Consent To Proceed Before U.S. Magistrate form. (Entered: 03/10/2016)
2 Electronic Summons Issued as to C. Dean Alford, Gregory F. Aloia, Jean Bartels, Mark P. Becker, Christopher Blake, Linda Bleicken, Robert G. Boehmer, W. Paul Bowers, David C. Bridges, Max Burns, Virginia Carson, Richard Carvajal, Cheryl Davenport Dozier, Arthur Dunning, Lori Durden, Larry R. Ellis, Donald Green, Rutledge A. Griffin, Jr, C. Thomas Hopkins, Jr, James M. Hull, Thomas J. "Tim" Hynes, Bonita Jacobs, Paul Jones, Donald M. Leebern, Jr, Chris Markwood, Kyle Marrero, Gary A. McGaha, Shawn McGee, Daniel S. Papp, Charles Patterson, Doreen Stiles Poitevint, Stas Preczewski, Neil L. Pruitt, Jr, Sachin Shailendra, E. Scott Smith, Cecil Staton, Kessel D. Stelling, Jr, Benjamin J. Tarbutton, III, Richard L. Tucker, Margaret Venable, Thomas Rogers Wade, Larry Walker, Don L. Waters, Philip A.

03/15/2016
03/15/2016 03/15/2016 03/15/2016 03/23/2016 03/23/2016 03/25/2016 03/25/2016 03/28/2016 03/29/2016
03/29/2016

Wilheit, Sr. (Attachments: # 1 Summons Dean Alford, # 2 Summons C Thomas Hopkins Jr, # 3 Summons Don L Waters, # 4 Summons Donald M Leebern Jr, # 5 Summons Doreen Stiles Poitevint, # 6 Summons Dr Arthur N Dunning, # 7 Summons Dr Bonita Jacobs, # 8 Summons Dr Cecil Staton, # 9 Summons Dr Charles Patterson, # 10 Summons Dr Cheryl Davenport Dozier, # 11 Summons Dr Chris Markwood, # 12 Summons Dr Christopher Blake, # 13 Summons Dr. Daniel S Papp, # 14 Summons Dr David C Bridges, # 15 Summons Dr Donald Green, # 16 Summons Dr E Scott Smith, # 17 Summons Dr Gary A McGaha, # 18 Summons Dr Gregory F Aloia, # 19 Summons Dr Jean Bartels, # 20 Summons Dr Kyle Marrero, # 21 Summons Dr Linda Bleicken, # 22 Summons Dr Margaret Venable, # 23 Summons Dr Mark P Becker, # 24 Summons Dr Max Burns, # 25 Summons Dr Paul Jones, # 26 Summons Dr Richard Carvajal, # 27 Summons Dr Robert G Boehmer, # 28 Summons Dr Stas Preczewski, # 29 Summons Dr Thomas J Tim Hynes, # 30 Summons Dr Virginia Carson, # 31 Summons James M Hull, # 32 Summons Kessel D Stelling Jr, # 33 Summons Larry R Ellis, # 34 Summons Larry Walker, # 35 Summons Lori Durden, # 36 Summons Neil L Pruitt Jr, # 37 Summons Phillip A Wilheit Sr, # 38 Summons Richard L Tucker, # 39 Summons Rutledge A Griffin Jr, # 40 Summons Sachin Shailendra, # 41 Summons Shawn McGee, # 42 Summons Thomas Rogers Wade, # 43 Summons W Paul Powers)(bnw) (Entered: 03/10/2016)
3 APPLICATION for Admission of Victor Viramontes Pro Hac Vice (Application fee $ 150, receipt number 113E−6344926) with Brief In Support by Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights, Lorena Guillen, Karla Lopez. (Horsley, Nathanael) (Entered: 03/15/2016)
4 APPLICATION for Admission of Sarah Schoettle Pro Hac Vice (Application fee $ 150, receipt number 113E−6345097)by Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights, Lorena Guillen, Karla Lopez. (Horsley, Nathanael) (Entered: 03/15/2016)
5 APPLICATION for Admission of Jorge Castillo Pro Hac Vice (Application fee $ 150, receipt number 113E−6345121)by Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights, Lorena Guillen, Karla Lopez. (Horsley, Nathanael) (Entered: 03/15/2016)
6 APPLICATION for Admission of Burth Lopez Pro Hac Vice (Application fee $ 150, receipt number 113E−6345130)by Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights, Lorena Guillen, Karla Lopez. (Horsley, Nathanael) (Entered: 03/15/2016)
7 Return of Service Executed by Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights. Donald Green served on 3/21/2016, answer due 4/11/2016. (Horsley, Nathanael) (Entered: 03/23/2016)
8 Return of Service Executed by Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights. Margaret Venable served on 3/17/2016, answer due 4/7/2016. (Horsley, Nathanael) (Entered: 03/23/2016)
9 Return of Service Executed by Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights. Christopher Blake served on 3/21/2016, answer due 4/11/2016. (Horsley, Nathanael) (Entered: 03/25/2016)
10 Return of Service Executed by Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights. Paul Jones served on 3/17/2016, answer due 4/7/2016. (Horsley, Nathanael) (Entered: 03/25/2016)
11 Return of Service Executed by Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights. Linda Bleicken served on 3/21/2016, answer due 4/11/2016. (Horsley, Nathanael) (Entered: 03/28/2016)
APPROVAL by Clerks Office re: 4 APPLICATION for Admission of Sarah Schoettle Pro Hac Vice (Application fee $ 150, receipt number 113E−6345097). Attorney Sarah Schoettle added appearing on behalf of Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights, Lorena Guillen, Karla Lopez (pb) (Entered: 03/29/2016)
APPROVAL by Clerks Office re: 6 APPLICATION for Admission of Burth Lopez Pro Hac Vice (Application fee $ 150, receipt number 113E−6345130). Attorney Burth Lopez added appearing on behalf of Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights, Lorena Guillen, Karla Lopez (pb) (Entered: 03/29/2016)

03/30/2016 03/30/2016 03/30/2016 03/30/2016 03/30/2016 03/30/2016 03/30/2016 03/30/2016
03/30/2016
03/30/2016 03/30/2016 03/30/2016 03/30/2016 03/30/2016 03/30/2016 03/30/2016 03/31/2016

12 Return of Service Executed by Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights. Gary A. McGaha served on 3/23/2016, answer due 4/13/2016. (Horsley, Nathanael) (Entered: 03/30/2016)
13 Return of Service Executed by Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights. Thomas J. "Tim" Hynes served on 3/23/2016, answer due 4/13/2016. (Horsley, Nathanael) (Entered: 03/30/2016)
14 Return of Service Executed by Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights. Bonita Jacobs served on 3/24/2016, answer due 4/14/2016. (Horsley, Nathanael) (Entered: 03/30/2016)
15 Return of Service Executed by Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights. Daniel S. Papp served on 3/24/2016, answer due 4/14/2016. (Horsley, Nathanael) (Entered: 03/30/2016)
16 Return of Service Executed by Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights. Kyle Marrero served on 3/28/2016, answer due 4/18/2016. (Horsley, Nathanael) (Entered: 03/30/2016)
17 Return of Service Executed by Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights. Stas Preczewski served on 3/28/2016, answer due 4/18/2016. (Horsley, Nathanael) (Entered: 03/30/2016)
18 Return of Service Executed by Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights. Mark P. Becker served on 3/28/2016, answer due 4/18/2016. (Horsley, Nathanael) (Entered: 03/30/2016)
APPROVAL by Clerks Office re: 5 APPLICATION for Admission of Jorge Castillo Pro Hac Vice (Application fee $ 150, receipt number 113E−6345121). Attorney Jorge M. Castillo added appearing on behalf of Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights, Lorena Guillen, Karla Lopez (pb) (Entered: 03/30/2016)
APPROVAL by Clerks Office re: 3 APPLICATION for Admission of Victor Viramontes Pro Hac Vice (Application fee $ 150, receipt number 113E−6344926). Attorney Victor Viramontes added appearing on behalf of Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights, Lorena Guillen, Karla Lopez (pb) (Entered: 03/30/2016)
19 Return of Service Executed by Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights. C. Dean Alford served on 3/22/2016, answer due 4/12/2016. (Horsley, Nathanael) (Entered: 03/30/2016)
20 Return of Service Executed by Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights. W. Paul Bowers served on 3/22/2016, answer due 4/12/2016. (Horsley, Nathanael) (Entered: 03/30/2016)
21 Return of Service Executed by Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights. Lori Durden served on 3/22/2016, answer due 4/12/2016. (Horsley, Nathanael) (Entered: 03/30/2016)
22 Return of Service Executed by Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights. Larry R. Ellis served on 3/22/2016, answer due 4/12/2016. (Horsley, Nathanael) (Entered: 03/30/2016)
23 Return of Service Executed by Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights. Rutledge A. Griffin, Jr served on 3/22/2016, answer due 4/12/2016. (Horsley, Nathanael) (Entered: 03/30/2016)
24 ORDER granting 6 Application for Admission Pro Hac Vice of Petitioner Burth Lopez. Signed by Judge William C. O'Kelley on 03/30/2016. (rsg) (Entered: 03/30/2016)
25 ORDER granting 4 Application for Admission Pro Hac Vice of Petitioner Sarah Schoettle. Signed by Judge William C. O'Kelley on 03/30/2016. (rsg) (Entered: 03/30/2016)
26 ORDER granting 5 Application for Admission of Jorge Castillo Pro Hac Vice. Signed by Judge William C. O'Kelley on 03/31/2016. (rsg) (Entered: 03/31/2016)

04/01/2016 04/01/2016 04/01/2016 04/01/2016 04/01/2016 04/01/2016 04/01/2016 04/01/2016 04/01/2016 04/01/2016 04/01/2016 04/01/2016 04/01/2016 04/01/2016 04/01/2016 04/01/2016 04/01/2016

27 Return of Service Executed by Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights. C. Thomas Hopkins, Jr served on 3/22/2016, answer due 4/12/2016. (Horsley, Nathanael) (Entered: 04/01/2016)
28 Return of Service Executed by Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights. James M. Hull served on 3/22/2016, answer due 4/12/2016. (Horsley, Nathanael) (Entered: 04/01/2016)
29 Return of Service Executed by Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights. Donald M. Leebern, Jr served on 3/22/2016, answer due 4/12/2016. (Horsley, Nathanael) (Entered: 04/01/2016)
30 Return of Service Executed by Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights. Doreen Stiles Poitevint served on 3/22/2016, answer due 4/12/2016. (Horsley, Nathanael) (Entered: 04/01/2016)
31 Return of Service Executed by Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights. Neil L. Pruitt, Jr served on 3/22/2016, answer due 4/12/2016. (Horsley, Nathanael) (Entered: 04/01/2016)
32 Return of Service Executed by Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights. Sachin Shailendra served on 3/22/2016, answer due 4/12/2016. (Horsley, Nathanael) (Entered: 04/01/2016)
33 Return of Service Executed by Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights. E. Scott Smith served on 3/22/2016, answer due 4/12/2016. (Horsley, Nathanael) (Entered: 04/01/2016)
34 Return of Service Executed by Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights. Kessel D. Stelling, Jr served on 3/22/2016, answer due 4/12/2016. (Horsley, Nathanael) (Entered: 04/01/2016)
35 Return of Service Executed by Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights. Benjamin J. Tarbutton, III served on 3/22/2016, answer due 4/12/2016. (Horsley, Nathanael) (Entered: 04/01/2016)
36 Return of Service Executed by Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights. Richard L. Tucker served on 3/22/2016, answer due 4/12/2016. (Horsley, Nathanael) (Entered: 04/01/2016)
37 Return of Service Executed by Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights. Thomas Rogers Wade served on 3/22/2016, answer due 4/12/2016. (Horsley, Nathanael) (Entered: 04/01/2016)
38 ORDER granting THE 3 APPLICATION for Admission of Victor Viramontes Pro Hac Vice FOR Lorena Guillen, Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights, Karla Lopez. Signed by Judge William C. O'Kelley on 04/01/16. (sk) (Entered: 04/01/2016)
39 Return of Service Executed by Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights. Larry Walker served on 3/22/2016, answer due 4/12/2016. (Horsley, Nathanael) (Entered: 04/01/2016)
40 Return of Service Executed by Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights. Don L. Waters served on 3/22/2016, answer due 4/12/2016. (Horsley, Nathanael) (Entered: 04/01/2016)
41 Return of Service Executed by Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights. Philip A. Wilheit, Sr served on 3/22/2016, answer due 4/12/2016. (Horsley, Nathanael) (Entered: 04/01/2016)
42 Return of Service Executed by Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights. David C. Bridges served on 3/23/2016, answer due 4/13/2016. (Horsley, Nathanael) (Entered: 04/01/2016)
43 Return of Service Executed by Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights. Richard Carvajal served on 3/28/2016, answer due 4/18/2016. (Horsley, Nathanael) (Entered: 04/01/2016)

04/01/2016 04/01/2016 04/04/2016 04/04/2016 04/04/2016 04/04/2016 04/07/2016
04/07/2016
04/08/2016 04/08/2016 04/11/2016 04/11/2016

44 Return of Service Executed by Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights. Charles Patterson served on 3/24/2016, answer due 4/14/2016. (Horsley, Nathanael) (Entered: 04/01/2016)
45 MOTION for Leave to File Excess Pages by C. Dean Alford, Mark P. Becker, Christopher Blake, Linda Bleicken, W. Paul Bowers, Lori Durden, Larry R. Ellis, Donald Green, Rutledge A. Griffin, Jr, Thomas J. "Tim" Hynes, Bonita Jacobs, Paul Jones, Kyle Marrero, Gary A. McGaha, Daniel S. Papp, Stas Preczewski, Margaret Venable. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Gore, Deborah) (Entered: 04/01/2016)
46 Return of Service Executed by Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights. Arthur Dunning served on 3/29/2016, answer due 4/19/2016. (Horsley, Nathanael) (Entered: 04/04/2016)
47 Return of Service Executed by Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights. Shawn McGee served on 3/30/2016, answer due 4/20/2016. (Horsley, Nathanael) (Entered: 04/04/2016)
DOCKET ORDER GRANTING 45 Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages. Defendants are permitted to file a brief in support of a motion under FRCP 12(b) up to 35 pages in length. Plaintiffs are permitted to file a response to Defendant's motion up to 35 pages in length. Entered by Judge William C. O'Kelley on 04/04/2016. (dww) (Entered: 04/04/2016)
Clerks Certificate of Mailing re Order on Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages, to Burth Lopez, Jorge M. Castillo, Sarah Schoettle, and Victor Viramontes. Notice of street name change for the Atlanta courthouse included. (dww) (Entered: 04/04/2016)
48 MOTION to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint by C. Dean Alford, Jean Bartels, Mark P. Becker, Christopher Blake, Linda Bleicken, Robert G. Boehmer, W. Paul Bowers, David C. Bridges, Max Burns, Richard Carvajal, Arthur Dunning, Lori Durden, Larry R. Ellis, Donald Green, Rutledge A. Griffin, Jr, C. Thomas Hopkins, Jr, James M. Hull, Thomas J. "Tim" Hynes, Bonita Jacobs, Paul Jones, Donald M. Leebern, Jr, Kyle Marrero, Gary A. McGaha, Shawn McGee, Daniel S. Papp, Charles Patterson, Doreen Stiles Poitevint, Stas Preczewski, Neil L. Pruitt, Jr, Sachin Shailendra, E. Scott Smith, Kessel D. Stelling, Jr, Benjamin J. Tarbutton, III, Richard L. Tucker, Margaret Venable, Thomas Rogers Wade, Larry Walker, Don L. Waters, Philip A. Wilheit, Sr. (Attachments: # 1 Brief In Support, # 2 Exhibit A − Memo, # 3 Exhibit B − FAQ)(Orland, Devon) (Entered: 04/07/2016)
49 MOTION to Stay All Discovery−Related Activities and Brief In Support with Brief In Support by C. Dean Alford, Jean Bartels, Mark P. Becker, Christopher Blake, Linda Bleicken, Robert G. Boehmer, W. Paul Bowers, David C. Bridges, Max Burns, Richard Carvajal, Arthur Dunning, Lori Durden, Larry R. Ellis, Donald Green, Rutledge A. Griffin, Jr, C. Thomas Hopkins, Jr, James M. Hull, Thomas J. "Tim" Hynes, Bonita Jacobs, Paul Jones, Donald M. Leebern, Jr, Kyle Marrero, Gary A. McGaha, Shawn McGee, Daniel S. Papp, Charles Patterson, Doreen Stiles Poitevint, Stas Preczewski, Neil L. Pruitt, Jr, Sachin Shailendra, E. Scott Smith, Kessel D. Stelling, Jr, Benjamin J. Tarbutton, III, Richard L. Tucker, Margaret Venable, Thomas Rogers Wade, Larry Walker, Don L. Waters, Philip A. Wilheit, Sr. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Orland, Devon) (Entered: 04/07/2016)
50 Return of Service Executed by Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights. Jean Bartels served on 4/5/2016, answer due 4/26/2016. (Horsley, Nathanael) (Entered: 04/08/2016)
51 Return of Service Executed by Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights. Chris Markwood served on 3/30/2016, answer due 4/20/2016. (Horsley, Nathanael) (Entered: 04/08/2016)
52 Return of Service Executed by Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights. Cheryl Davenport Dozier served on 4/6/2016, answer due 4/27/2016. (Horsley, Nathanael) (Entered: 04/11/2016)
53 Return of Service Executed by Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights. Robert G. Boehmer served on 3/23/2016, answer due 4/13/2016. (Horsley, Nathanael) (Entered: 04/11/2016)

04/20/2016 04/21/2016 04/21/2016 04/21/2016 04/22/2016 04/22/2016 04/29/2016
04/29/2016 05/02/2016 05/02/2016 05/03/2016

54 MOTION To Adopt Defendants' Pre−Answer 49 Motion to Dimiss Plaintiff's Complaint with Brief In Support by Gregory F. Aloia, Virginia Carson, Cheryl Davenport Dozier, Chris Markwood. (Gore, Deborah) Modified on 4/20/2016 to add appropriate document link (sk). (Entered: 04/20/2016)
55 First AMENDED COMPLAINT against All Defendants, filed by Karla Lopez, Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights, Lorena Guillen, Arturo Martinez del Rello, Freedom University, Mayela Salazar, Jorge San Juan.(Horsley, Nathanael) Please visit our website at http://www.gand.uscourts.gov/commonly−used−forms to obtain Pretrial Instructions which includes the Consent To Proceed Before U.S. Magistrate form. (Entered: 04/21/2016)
56 RESPONSE in Opposition re 49 MOTION to Stay All Discovery−Related Activities and Brief In Support filed by Freedom University, Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights, Lorena Guillen, Karla Lopez, Arturo Martinez del Rello, Mayela Salazar, Jorge San Juan. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit of Sarah Schoettle, # 2 Exhibit A, # 3 Exhibit B)(Horsley, Nathanael) (Entered: 04/21/2016)
57 RESPONSE in Opposition re 48 MOTION to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint filed by Freedom University, Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights, Lorena Guillen, Karla Lopez, Arturo Martinez del Rello, Mayela Salazar, Jorge San Juan. (Begnaud, Mark) (Entered: 04/21/2016)
58 Return of Service Executed by Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights. Virginia Carson served on 4/13/2016, answer due 5/4/2016. (Horsley, Nathanael) (Entered: 04/22/2016)
59 Return of Service Executed by Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights. Max Burns served on 4/1/2016, answer due 4/22/2016. (Horsley, Nathanael) (Entered: 04/22/2016)
60 MOTION for Leave to File Excess Pages by C. Dean Alford, Gregory F. Aloia, Jean Bartels, Mark P. Becker, Christopher Blake, Linda Bleicken, Robert G. Boehmer, W. Paul Bowers, David C. Bridges, Max Burns, Virginia Carson, Richard Carvajal, Cheryl Davenport Dozier, Arthur Dunning, Lori Durden, Larry R. Ellis, Donald Green, Rutledge A. Griffin, Jr, C. Thomas Hopkins, Jr, James M. Hull, Thomas J. "Tim" Hynes, Bonita Jacobs, Paul Jones, Donald M. Leebern, Jr, Chris Markwood, Kyle Marrero, Gary A. McGaha, Shawn McGee, Daniel S. Papp, Charles Patterson, Doreen Stiles Poitevint, Stas Preczewski, Neil L. Pruitt, Jr, Sachin Shailendra, E. Scott Smith, Kessel D. Stelling, Jr, Benjamin J. Tarbutton, III, Richard L. Tucker, Margaret Venable, Thomas Rogers Wade, Larry Walker, Don L. Waters, Philip A. Wilheit, Sr. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Gore, Deborah) (Entered: 04/29/2016)
61 MOTION for Leave to File Excess Pages as to Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Memorandum of Law by Freedom University, Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights, Lorena Guillen, Karla Lopez, Arturo Martinez del Rello, Mayela Salazar, Jorge San Juan. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Horsley, Nathanael) (Entered: 04/29/2016)
62 ORDER granting 60 Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages. Defendants are permitted to file a brief in support of a motion under FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b) that is up to 40 pages in length. Plaintiffs are likewise permitted to file a response to Defendants' motion that is up to 40 pages in length. Signed by Judge William C. O'Kelley on 05/02/16. (rsg) (Entered: 05/02/2016)
63 ORDER granting 61 Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages. Plaintiffs are permitted to file a Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Supporting Memorandum that is up to 50 pages in length. Signed by Judge William C. O'Kelley on 05/02/16. (rsg) (Entered: 05/02/2016)
64 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Brief In Support by Freedom University, Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights, Lorena Guillen, Karla Lopez, Arturo Martinez del Rello, Mayela Salazar, Jorge San Juan. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit Declaration of Karla Lopez, # 2 Affidavit Declaration of Adelina Nicholls, # 3 Affidavit Declaration of Arturo Martinez del Rello, # 4 Affidavit Declaration of Jorge San Juan, # 5 Affidavit Declaration of Laura Emiko Soltis, # 6 Affidavit Declaration of Lorena Guillen Castillo, # 7 Affidavit Declaration of Mayela Salazar, # 8 Affidavit Declaration of Victor Viramontes, # 9 Exhibit Exhibit A to Viramontes Declaration, #

05/05/2016
05/05/2016
05/09/2016 05/09/2016 05/10/2016 05/10/2016 05/10/2016
05/17/2016 05/19/2016

10 Exhibit Exhibit B to Viramontes Declaration, # 11 Exhibit Exhibit C to Viramontes Declaration, # 12 Exhibit Exhibit D to Viramontes Declaration, # 13 Exhibit Exhibit E to Viramontes Declaration, # 14 Exhibit Exhibit F to Viramontes Declaration, # 15 Exhibit Exhibit G to Viramontes Declaration, # 16 Exhibit Exhibit H to Viramontes Declaration, # 17 Exhibit Exhibit I to Viramontes Declaration, # 18 Exhibit Exhibit J to Viramontes Declaration, # 19 Exhibit Exhibit K to Viramontes Declaration, # 20 Exhibit Exhibit L to Viramontes Declaration, # 21 Exhibit Exhibit M to Viramontes Declaration, # 22 Exhibit Exhibit N to Viramontes Declaration)(Begnaud, Mark) (Entered: 05/03/2016)
65 MOTION to Dismiss Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint with Brief In Support by C. Dean Alford, Gregory F. Aloia, Jean Bartels, Mark P. Becker, Christopher Blake, Linda Bleicken, Robert G. Boehmer, W. Paul Bowers, David C. Bridges, Max Burns, Virginia Carson, Richard Carvajal, Cheryl Davenport Dozier, Arthur Dunning, Lori Durden, Larry R. Ellis, Donald Green, Rutledge A. Griffin, Jr, C. Thomas Hopkins, Jr, James M. Hull, Thomas J. "Tim" Hynes, Bonita Jacobs, Paul Jones, Donald M. Leebern, Jr, Chris Markwood, Kyle Marrero, Gary A. McGaha, Shawn McGee, Daniel S. Papp, Charles Patterson, Doreen Stiles Poitevint, Stas Preczewski, Neil L. Pruitt, Jr, Sachin Shailendra, E. Scott Smith, Kessel D. Stelling, Jr, Benjamin J. Tarbutton, III, Richard L. Tucker, Margaret Venable, Thomas Rogers Wade, Don L. Waters, Philip A. Wilheit, Sr. (Attachments: # 1 Brief In Support, # 2 Exhibit A Memo, # 3 Exhibit B FAQ)(Gore, Deborah) Motion ADOPTED by Defendants Dr. Chris Markwood, Dr. Cheryl Davenport Dozier, Dr. Gregory Aloia, Dr. Virginia Carson, and Dr. Peter Lyons. See 88 Order. Modified on 8/10/2016 (sk). (Entered: 05/05/2016)
66 MOTION to Stay All Discovery−Related Activities and Brief In Support with Brief In Support by C. Dean Alford, Gregory F. Aloia, Jean Bartels, Mark P. Becker, Christopher Blake, Linda Bleicken, Robert G. Boehmer, W. Paul Bowers, David C. Bridges, Max Burns, Virginia Carson, Richard Carvajal, Cheryl Davenport Dozier, Arthur Dunning, Lori Durden, Larry R. Ellis, Donald Green, Rutledge A. Griffin, Jr, C. Thomas Hopkins, Jr, James M. Hull, Thomas J. "Tim" Hynes, Bonita Jacobs, Paul Jones, Donald M. Leebern, Jr, Chris Markwood, Kyle Marrero, Gary A. McGaha, Shawn McGee, Daniel S. Papp, Charles Patterson, Doreen Stiles Poitevint, Stas Preczewski, Neil L. Pruitt, Jr, Sachin Shailendra, E. Scott Smith, Kessel D. Stelling, Jr, Benjamin J. Tarbutton, III, Richard L. Tucker, Margaret Venable, Thomas Rogers Wade, Don L. Waters, Philip A. Wilheit, Sr. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Gore, Deborah) (Entered: 05/05/2016)
Submission of 48 MOTION to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint, submitted to District Judge William C. O'Kelley. (sk) (Entered: 05/09/2016)
Submission of 49 MOTION to Stay All Discovery−Related Activities and Brief In Support, submitted to District Judge William C. O'Kelley. (sk) (Entered: 05/09/2016)
Submission of 54 MOTION To Adopt Defendants' Pre−Answer 49 Motion to Dimiss Plaintiff's Complaint , submitted to District Judge William C. O'Kelley. (sk) (Entered: 05/10/2016)
67 ORAL MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response to 64 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction , by Counsel for the Defendants. (rsg) (Entered: 05/10/2016)
68 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge William C. O'Kelley: granting 67 Motion for Extension of Time ; Telephone Conference held on 5/10/2016. Cause came on before the Court for a Status Conference regarding the pending motions. Counsel for the defendants verbally moved for an extension of time to file their Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction up to and including Monday, May 30, 2016. After arguments, the Court VERBALLY GRANTED the motion. Motions may be set for arguments after Briefing period.(Court Reporter Andy Ashley)(rsg) (Entered: 05/10/2016)
69 Notice for Leave of Absence for the following date(s): 07/11/16−07/12/16 and 08/02/16−08/09/16, by Devon Orland. (sk) (Entered: 05/18/2016)
70 MOTION FOR EXPEDITED DISCOVERY/RESPONSE in Opposition re 66 MOTION to Stay All Discovery−Related Activities and Brief In Support and Request for Expedited Discovery filed by Freedom University, Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights, Lorena Guillen, Karla Lopez, Arturo Martinez del Rello, Mayela

05/20/2016 05/20/2016 05/23/2016 05/23/2016 05/27/2016
05/31/2016 06/02/2016
06/02/2016 06/03/2016 06/06/2016

Salazar, Jorge San Juan. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of Sarah Schoettle, # 2 Exhibit A, # 3 Exhibit B)(Begnaud, Mark) Modified on 8/9/2016 to add Motion for Expedited Discovery to event type (sk). (Entered: 05/19/2016)
71 WAIVER OF SERVICE Returned Executed by Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights. Gregory F. Aloia waiver mailed on 4/12/2016, answer due 6/13/2016. (Horsley, Nathanael) Modified on 5/23/2016 to correct waiver mailed/answer due dates (rsg). (Entered: 05/20/2016)
72 WAIVER OF SERVICE Returned Executed by Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights. Max Burns waiver mailed on 4/12/2016, answer due 6/13/2016. (Horsley, Nathanael) Modified on 5/23/2016 to correct waiver mailed/answer due dates (rsg). (Entered: 05/20/2016)
73 WAIVER OF SERVICE Returned Executed by Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights. Robert E. Watts waiver mailed on 4/22/2016, answer due 6/21/2016. (Horsley, Nathanael) (Entered: 05/23/2016)
74 RESPONSE in Opposition re 65 MOTION to Dismiss Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint filed by Freedom University, Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights, Lorena Guillen, Karla Lopez, Arturo Martinez del Rello, Mayela Salazar, Jorge San Juan. (Attachments: # 1 Lopez Declaration, # 2 Exhibit A, # 3 Exhibit B, # 4 Exhibit C)(Begnaud, Mark) (Entered: 05/23/2016)
75 RESPONSE in Opposition re 64 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction filed by C. Dean Alford, Gregory F. Aloia, Jean Bartels, Mark P. Becker, Christopher Blake, Linda Bleicken, Robert G. Boehmer, W. Paul Bowers, David C. Bridges, Max Burns, Virginia Carson, Richard Carvajal, Cheryl Davenport Dozier, Arthur Dunning, Lori Durden, Larry R. Ellis, Donald Green, Rutledge A. Griffin, Jr, C. Thomas Hopkins, Jr, James M. Hull, Thomas J. "Tim" Hynes, Bonita Jacobs, Paul Jones, Donald M. Leebern, Jr, Peter Lyons, Chris Markwood, Kyle Marrero, Gary A. McGaha, Shawn McGee, Daniel S. Papp, Charles Patterson, Doreen Stiles Poitevint, Stas Preczewski, Neil L. Pruitt, Jr, Sachin Shailendra, E. Scott Smith, Kessel D. Stelling, Jr, Benjamin J. Tarbutton, III, Richard L. Tucker, Margaret Venable, Thomas Rogers Wade, Larry Walker, Don L. Waters, Robert E. Watts, Philip A. Wilheit, Sr. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Wenham Affidavit, # 2 A−1 BOR Policy 4.3, # 3 A−2 Tuition Classification, # 4 A−3 Student Aid Handbook, # 5 Exhibit B − Fuchko Affidavit, # 6 B−1 Cost of Education)(Orland, Devon) (Entered: 05/27/2016)
76 MOTION To Adopt Defendants' Pre−Answer Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint and Brief In Support 65 MOTION to Dismiss Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint with Brief In Support by Peter Lyons. (Gore, Deborah) (Entered: 05/31/2016)
77 RESPONSE re 70 Response in Opposition to Motion, filed by C. Dean Alford, Gregory F. Aloia, Jean Bartels, Mark P. Becker, Christopher Blake, Linda Bleicken, Robert G. Boehmer, W. Paul Bowers, David C. Bridges, Max Burns, Virginia Carson, Richard Carvajal, Cheryl Davenport Dozier, Arthur Dunning, Lori Durden, Larry R. Ellis, Donald Green, Rutledge A. Griffin, Jr, C. Thomas Hopkins, Jr, James M. Hull, Thomas J. "Tim" Hynes, Bonita Jacobs, Paul Jones, Donald M. Leebern, Jr, Peter Lyons, Chris Markwood, Kyle Marrero, Gary A. McGaha, Shawn McGee, Daniel S. Papp, Charles Patterson, Doreen Stiles Poitevint, Stas Preczewski, Neil L. Pruitt, Jr, Sachin Shailendra, E. Scott Smith, Kessel D. Stelling, Jr, Benjamin J. Tarbutton, III, Richard L. Tucker, Margaret Venable, Thomas Rogers Wade, Larry Walker, Don L. Waters, Robert E. Watts, Philip A. Wilheit, Sr. (Gore, Deborah) (Entered: 06/02/2016)
79 REPLY BRIEF (within the 77 Response) in support of the 66 MOTION to Stay All Discovery−Related Activities and Brief In Support filed by Defendants. (Entered: 06/03/2016)
78 Unopposed MOTION for Leave to File Their Reply in Support of their Motion for Preliminary Injunction in Excess of the Page Limit by Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order Proposed Order)(Horsley, Nathanael) (Entered: 06/03/2016)
80 MOTION for Leave to File Excess Pages by C. Dean Alford, Gregory F. Aloia, Jean Bartels, Mark P. Becker, Christopher Blake, Linda Bleicken, Robert G. Boehmer, W.

06/06/2016 06/07/2016 06/07/2016 06/07/2016 06/09/2016
06/09/2016
06/13/2016 06/13/2016 06/13/2016 06/23/2016

Paul Bowers, David C. Bridges, Max Burns, Virginia Carson, Richard Carvajal, Cheryl Davenport Dozier, Arthur Dunning, Lori Durden, Larry R. Ellis, Donald Green, Rutledge A. Griffin, Jr, C. Thomas Hopkins, Jr, James M. Hull, Thomas J. "Tim" Hynes, Bonita Jacobs, Paul Jones, Donald M. Leebern, Jr, Peter Lyons, Chris Markwood, Kyle Marrero, Gary A. McGaha, Shawn McGee, Daniel S. Papp, Charles Patterson, Doreen Stiles Poitevint, Stas Preczewski, Neil L. Pruitt, Jr, Sachin Shailendra, E. Scott Smith, Kessel D. Stelling, Jr, Benjamin J. Tarbutton, III, Richard L. Tucker, Margaret Venable, Thomas Rogers Wade, Larry Walker, Don L. Waters, Robert E. Watts, Philip A. Wilheit, Sr. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Gore, Deborah) (Entered: 06/06/2016)
Submission of 66 MOTION to Stay All Discovery−Related Activities and Brief In Support, submitted to District Judge William C. O'Kelley. (sk) (Entered: 06/06/2016)
81 ORDER granting the 80 Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages. Defendants are permitted to file a Reply Brief in support of their motion that is up to 25 pages in length. Signed by Judge William C. O'Kelley on 06/07/16. (aaq) (Entered: 06/07/2016)
82 ORDER granting the 3 Application of Victor Viramontes for Admission Pro Hac Vice. Signed by Judge William C. O'Kelley on 06/07/16. (aaq) (Entered: 06/07/2016)
83 ORDER granting the Plaintiff's 78 Motion for Leave to exceed the page limit in their Reply. Plaintiffs are permitted to file a Reply in Support of their Motion for Preliminary Injunction up to twenty−five pages in length. Signed by Judge William C. O'Kelley on 06/07/16. (aaq) (Entered: 06/07/2016)
84 NOTICE Of Filing Affidavit by C. Dean Alford, Gregory F. Aloia, Jean Bartels, Mark P. Becker, Christopher Blake, Linda Bleicken, Robert G. Boehmer, W. Paul Bowers, David C. Bridges, Max Burns, Virginia Carson, Richard Carvajal, Cheryl Davenport Dozier, Arthur Dunning, Lori Durden, Larry R. Ellis, Donald Green, Rutledge A. Griffin, Jr, C. Thomas Hopkins, Jr, James M. Hull, Thomas J. "Tim" Hynes, Bonita Jacobs, Paul Jones, Donald M. Leebern, Jr, Peter Lyons, Chris Markwood, Kyle Marrero, Gary A. McGaha, Shawn McGee, Daniel S. Papp, Charles Patterson, Doreen Stiles Poitevint, Stas Preczewski, Neil L. Pruitt, Jr, Sachin Shailendra, E. Scott Smith, Kessel D. Stelling, Jr, Benjamin J. Tarbutton, III, Richard L. Tucker, Margaret Venable, Thomas Rogers Wade, Larry Walker, Don L. Waters, Robert E. Watts, Philip A. Wilheit, Sr re 75 Response in Opposition to Motion,,,, (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Wenham Affidavit)(Gore, Deborah) (Entered: 06/09/2016)
85 REPLY BRIEF re 65 MOTION to Dismiss Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint filed by C. Dean Alford, Gregory F. Aloia, Jean Bartels, Mark P. Becker, Christopher Blake, Linda Bleicken, Robert G. Boehmer, W. Paul Bowers, David C. Bridges, Max Burns, Virginia Carson, Richard Carvajal, Cheryl Davenport Dozier, Arthur Dunning, Lori Durden, Larry R. Ellis, Donald Green, Rutledge A. Griffin, Jr, C. Thomas Hopkins, Jr, James M. Hull, Thomas J. "Tim" Hynes, Bonita Jacobs, Paul Jones, Donald M. Leebern, Jr, Peter Lyons, Chris Markwood, Kyle Marrero, Gary A. McGaha, Shawn McGee, Daniel S. Papp, Charles Patterson, Doreen Stiles Poitevint, Stas Preczewski, Neil L. Pruitt, Jr, Sachin Shailendra, E. Scott Smith, Kessel D. Stelling, Jr, Benjamin J. Tarbutton, III, Richard L. Tucker, Margaret Venable, Thomas Rogers Wade, Larry Walker, Don L. Waters, Robert E. Watts, Philip A. Wilheit, Sr. (Gore, Deborah) (Entered: 06/09/2016)
Submission of 64 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction , submitted to District Judge William C. O'Kelley. (sk) (Entered: 06/13/2016)
Submission of 65 MOTION to Dismiss Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint, submitted to District Judge William C. O'Kelley. (sk) (Entered: 06/13/2016)
86 REPLY BRIEF re 64 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction filed by Freedom University, Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights, Lorena Guillen, Karla Lopez, Arturo Martinez del Rello, Mayela Salazar, Jorge San Juan. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit Supplemental Declaration of Victor Viramontes)(Begnaud, Mark) (Entered: 06/13/2016)
Submission of 76 MOTION To Adopt Defendants' Pre−Answer Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint and Brief In Support 65 MOTION to Dismiss Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint , submitted to District Judge William C. O'Kelley.

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02/14/2017 02/16/2017
04/20/2017

(sk) (Entered: 06/23/2016)
87 NOTICE by Freedom University, Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights, Lorena Guillen, Karla Lopez, Arturo Martinez del Rello, Mayela Salazar, Jorge San Juan Notice of Withdrawal of Counsel Jorge M. Castillo (Begnaud, Mark) (Entered: 06/30/2016)
88 ORDER: The motions filed by defendants Dr. Chris Markwood, Dr. CherylDavenport Dozier, Dr. Gregory Aloia, and Dr. Virginia Carson to adopt defendants pre−answer motion to dismiss plaintiffs complaint 54 and amended complaint 76 are hereby GRANTED. Defendants motions to dismiss plaintiffs pre−answer complaint 48 and stay discovery 49 are hereby DENIED as moot. Defendants motion to stay discovery 66 is hereby GRANTED. Plaintiffs motion for expedited discovery 70 is hereby DENIED. The court will conduct a hearing on August 25, 2016, at 10:00 a.m in Courtroom 1906 of the United States District Court, Northern District of Georgia, Atlanta Division. Both parties should be prepared to discuss any and all matters related to the issue of defendants still−pending motion to dismiss. To the extent applicable, parties should also be prepared to address the repercussions, if any, of the Supreme Courts recent ruling in Texas v. United States, No. 15674. Signed by Judge William C. O'Kelley on 08/09/16. (sk) (Entered: 08/09/2016)
NOTICE of Hearing on Motion re: 65 MOTION to Dismiss Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint. Motion Hearing set for 8/25/2016 at 10:00 AM in ATLA Courtroom 1906 before Judge William C. O'Kelley. (see 88 Order)(sk) (Entered: 08/09/2016)
89 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge William C. O'Kelley: Motion Hearing held on 8/25/2016 re 65 MOTION to Dismiss Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint. The Court heard arguments from counsel and took the matter under advisement. Order to follow. (Court Reporter Wynette Blathers)(sk) (Entered: 08/25/2016)
90 Notice for Leave of Absence for the following date(s): 02/16/2017−02/21/2017, 04/03/2017−04/08/2017, by Devon Orland. (Orland, Devon) (Entered: 12/08/2016)
91 NOTICE Of Filing Relevant Authority by Freedom University, Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights, Lorena Guillen, Karla Lopez, Arturo Martinez del Rello, Mayela Salazar, Jorge San Juan (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit State Court Order)(Begnaud, Mark) (Entered: 01/13/2017)
92 MOTION to Stay Proceedings with Brief In Support by C. Dean Alford, Gregory F. Aloia, Jean Bartels, Mark P. Becker, Christopher Blake, Linda Bleicken, Robert G. Boehmer, W. Paul Bowers, David C. Bridges, Max Burns, Virginia Carson, Richard Carvajal, Cheryl Davenport Dozier, Arthur Dunning, Lori Durden, Larry R. Ellis, Donald Green, Rutledge A. Griffin, Jr, C. Thomas Hopkins, Jr, James M. Hull, Thomas J. "Tim" Hynes, Bonita Jacobs, Paul Jones, Donald M. Leebern, Jr, Peter Lyons, Chris Markwood, Kyle Marrero, Gary A. McGaha, Shawn McGee, Daniel S. Papp, Charles Patterson, Doreen Stiles Poitevint, Stas Preczewski, Neil L. Pruitt, Jr, Sachin Shailendra, E. Scott Smith, Cecil Staton, Kessel D. Stelling, Jr, Benjamin J. Tarbutton, III, Richard L. Tucker, Margaret Venable, Thomas Rogers Wade, Larry Walker, Don L. Waters, Robert E. Watts, Philip A. Wilheit, Sr. (Attachments: # 1 Fulton County Court Document, # 2 Georgia Court of Appeals Document)(Orland, Devon) (Entered: 02/10/2017)
93 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge William C. O'Kelley: granting 92 Motion to Stay; Telephone Conference held on 2/14/2017. (Court Reporter Jana Colter)(rsg) (Entered: 02/14/2017)
94 ORDER that defendants 92 Motion to stay proceedings is hereby GRANTED. Plaintiffs 64 Motion for preliminary injunction is hereby DENIED without prejudice. Defendants 65 Motion to dismiss is hereby DENIED without prejudice. Defendants deadline to answer the complaint is hereby extended until May 1, 2017. Either party may renew their previously pending motion at any time, including with it any supplemental briefing in light of actions that may have been taken by the President or the Supreme Court of Georgia. Signed by Judge William C. O'Kelley on 02/16/2017. (rsg) (Entered: 02/16/2017)
95 MOTION to Withdraw Devon Orland as Attorneyby C. Dean Alford, Gregory F. Aloia, Jean Bartels, Mark P. Becker, Christopher Blake, Linda Bleicken, Robert G.

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05/01/2017
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Boehmer, W. Paul Bowers, David C. Bridges, Max Burns, Virginia Carson, Richard Carvajal, Cheryl Davenport Dozier, Arthur Dunning, Lori Durden, Larry R. Ellis, Donald Green, Rutledge A. Griffin, Jr, C. Thomas Hopkins, Jr, James M. Hull, Thomas J. "Tim" Hynes, Bonita Jacobs, Paul Jones, Donald M. Leebern, Jr, Peter Lyons, Chris Markwood, Kyle Marrero, Gary A. McGaha, Shawn McGee, Daniel S. Papp, Charles Patterson, Doreen Stiles Poitevint, Stas Preczewski, Neil L. Pruitt, Jr, Sachin Shailendra, E. Scott Smith, Cecil Staton, Kessel D. Stelling, Jr, Benjamin J. Tarbutton, III, Richard L. Tucker, Margaret Venable, Thomas Rogers Wade, Larry Walker, Don L. Waters, Robert E. Watts, Philip A. Wilheit, Sr. (Orland, Devon) (Entered: 04/20/2017)
DOCKET ORDER granting 95 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney (Devon Orland). Entered by Judge William C. O'Kelley on 04/21/2017. (dww) (Entered: 04/21/2017)
96 MOTION to Stay Proceedings − Renewed with Brief In Support by C. Dean Alford, Gregory F. Aloia, Jean Bartels, Mark P. Becker, Christopher Blake, Linda Bleicken, Robert G. Boehmer, W. Paul Bowers, David C. Bridges, Max Burns, Virginia Carson, Richard Carvajal, Cheryl Davenport Dozier, Arthur Dunning, Lori Durden, Larry R. Ellis, Donald Green, Rutledge A. Griffin, Jr, C. Thomas Hopkins, Jr, James M. Hull, Thomas J. "Tim" Hynes, Bonita Jacobs, Paul Jones, Donald M. Leebern, Jr, Peter Lyons, Chris Markwood, Kyle Marrero, Gary A. McGaha, Shawn McGee, Daniel S. Papp, Charles Patterson, Doreen Stiles Poitevint, Stas Preczewski, Neil L. Pruitt, Jr, Sachin Shailendra, E. Scott Smith, Kessel D. Stelling, Jr, Benjamin J. Tarbutton, III, Richard L. Tucker, Margaret Venable, Thomas Rogers Wade, Larry Walker, Don L. Waters, Robert E. Watts, Philip A. Wilheit, Sr. (Attachments: # 1 A − Final Order, # 2 B − Docket)(Gore, Deborah) (Entered: 04/27/2017)
97 MOTION to Dismiss Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint with Brief In Support by C. Dean Alford, Gregory F. Aloia, Jean Bartels, Mark P. Becker, Christopher Blake, Linda Bleicken, Robert G. Boehmer, W. Paul Bowers, David C. Bridges, Max Burns, Virginia Carson, Richard Carvajal, Cheryl Davenport Dozier, Arthur Dunning, Lori Durden, Larry R. Ellis, Donald Green, Rutledge A. Griffin, Jr, C. Thomas Hopkins, Jr, James M. Hull, Thomas J. "Tim" Hynes, Bonita Jacobs, Paul Jones, Donald M. Leebern, Jr, Peter Lyons, Chris Markwood, Kyle Marrero, Gary A. McGaha, Shawn McGee, Daniel S. Papp, Charles Patterson, Doreen Stiles Poitevint, Stas Preczewski, Neil L. Pruitt, Jr, Sachin Shailendra, E. Scott Smith, Kessel D. Stelling, Jr, Benjamin J. Tarbutton, III, Richard L. Tucker, Margaret Venable, Thomas Rogers Wade, Larry Walker, Don L. Waters, Robert E. Watts, Philip A. Wilheit, Sr. (Attachments: # 1 Brief in Support, # 2 A − Department of Homeland Security Memo, # 3 B − Immigration FAQ)(Gore, Deborah) (Entered: 05/01/2017)
98 RESPONSE in Opposition re 96 MOTION to Stay Proceedings − Renewed filed by Freedom University, Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights, Lorena Guillen, Karla Lopez, Arturo Martinez del Rello, Mayela Salazar, Jorge San Juan. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit Viramontes Declaration, # 2 Affidavit Lopez Declaration, # 3 Exhibit Exhibit A, # 4 Exhibit Exhibit B, # 5 Exhibit Exhibit C)(Begnaud, Mark) (Entered: 05/11/2017)
99 RESPONSE in Opposition re 97 MOTION to Dismiss Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint filed by Freedom University, Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights, Lorena Guillen, Karla Lopez, Mayela Salazar, Jorge San Juan. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit Declaration of Burth G. Lopez, # 2 Exhibit Exhibit A, # 3 Exhibit Exhibit B, # 4 Exhibit Exhibit C, # 5 Exhibit Exhibit D)(Begnaud, Mark) (Entered: 05/15/2017)
100 REPLY BRIEF re 96 MOTION to Stay Proceedings − Renewed filed by C. Dean Alford, Gregory F. Aloia, Jean Bartels, Mark P. Becker, Christopher Blake, Linda Bleicken, Robert G. Boehmer, W. Paul Bowers, David C. Bridges, Max Burns, Virginia Carson, Richard Carvajal, Cheryl Davenport Dozier, Arthur Dunning, Lori Durden, Larry R. Ellis, Donald Green, Rutledge A. Griffin, Jr, C. Thomas Hopkins, Jr, James M. Hull, Thomas J. "Tim" Hynes, Bonita Jacobs, Paul Jones, Donald M. Leebern, Jr, Peter Lyons, Chris Markwood, Kyle Marrero, Gary A. McGaha, Shawn McGee, Daniel S. Papp, Charles Patterson, Doreen Stiles Poitevint, Stas Preczewski, Neil L. Pruitt, Jr, Sachin Shailendra, E. Scott Smith, Kessel D. Stelling, Jr, Benjamin J. Tarbutton, III, Richard L. Tucker, Margaret Venable, Thomas Rogers Wade, Larry Walker, Don L. Waters, Robert E. Watts, Philip A. Wilheit, Sr. (Attachments: # 1 A − Opinion & Order)(Gore, Deborah) (Entered: 05/25/2017)

05/30/2017
05/31/2017 05/31/2017
06/07/2017 06/07/2017 06/08/2017 06/13/2017
06/27/2017 06/28/2017 08/14/2017

101 REPLY BRIEF re 97 MOTION to Dismiss Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint filed by C. Dean Alford, Gregory F. Aloia, Jean Bartels, Mark P. Becker, Christopher Blake, Linda Bleicken, Robert G. Boehmer, W. Paul Bowers, David C. Bridges, Max Burns, Virginia Carson, Richard Carvajal, Cheryl Davenport Dozier, Arthur Dunning, Lori Durden, Larry R. Ellis, Donald Green, Rutledge A. Griffin, Jr, C. Thomas Hopkins, Jr, James M. Hull, Thomas J. "Tim" Hynes, Bonita Jacobs, Paul Jones, Donald M. Leebern, Jr, Peter Lyons, Chris Markwood, Kyle Marrero, Gary A. McGaha, Shawn McGee, Daniel S. Papp, Charles Patterson, Doreen Stiles Poitevint, Stas Preczewski, Neil L. Pruitt, Jr, Sachin Shailendra, E. Scott Smith, Kessel D. Stelling, Jr, Benjamin J. Tarbutton, III, Richard L. Tucker, Margaret Venable, Thomas Rogers Wade, Larry Walker, Don L. Waters, Robert E. Watts, Philip A. Wilheit, Sr. (Attachments: # 1 A − Opinion and Order)(Gore, Deborah) (Entered: 05/30/2017)
Submission of 96 MOTION to Stay Proceedings − Renewed, 97 MOTION to Dismiss Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint, to District Judge William C. O'Kelley. (rsg) (Entered: 05/31/2017)
102 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction with Brief In Support by Freedom University, Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights, Lorena Guillen, Karla Lopez, Arturo Martinez del Rello, Mayela Salazar, Jorge San Juan. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit Guillen, # 2 Affidavit Karla Lopez, # 3 Affidavit Martinez, # 4 Affidavit Nicholls, # 5 Affidavit Burth Lopez, # 6 Affidavit Soltis, # 7 Exhibit A, # 8 Exhibit B, # 9 Exhibit C, # 10 Exhibit D, # 11 Exhibit E, # 12 Exhibit F, # 13 Exhibit G, # 14 Exhibit H, # 15 Exhibit I, # 16 Exhibit J, # 17 Exhibit K, # 18 Exhibit L, # 19 Exhibit M, # 20 Exhibit N)(Begnaud, Mark) (Entered: 05/31/2017)
Case reassigned at the direction of Chief Judge Thomas W. Thrash, Jr. from District Judge William C. O'Kelley to District Judge Richard W. Story. NOTICE TO ALL COUNSEL OF RECORD: The Judge designation in the civil action number assigned to this case has been changed to 1:16−cv−757−RWS. Please make note of this change in order to facilitate the docketing of pleadings in this case. (aaq) (Entered: 06/07/2017)
Submission of the 96 MOTION to Stay Proceedings − Renewed and 97 MOTION to Dismiss to District Judge Richard W. Story. (aaq) (Entered: 06/07/2017)
103 COURT NOTICE Of Filing: Standing Order Regarding Civil Litigation by Judge Richard W. Story. (sk) (Entered: 06/08/2017)
104 RESPONSE in Opposition re 102 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction filed by C. Dean Alford, Gregory F. Aloia, Jean Bartels, Mark P. Becker, Christopher Blake, Linda Bleicken, Robert G. Boehmer, W. Paul Bowers, David C. Bridges, Max Burns, Virginia Carson, Richard Carvajal, Cheryl Davenport Dozier, Arthur Dunning, Lori Durden, Larry R. Ellis, Donald Green, Rutledge A. Griffin, Jr, C. Thomas Hopkins, Jr, James M. Hull, Thomas J. "Tim" Hynes, Bonita Jacobs, Paul Jones, Donald M. Leebern, Jr, Peter Lyons, Chris Markwood, Kyle Marrero, Gary A. McGaha, Shawn McGee, Daniel S. Papp, Charles Patterson, Doreen Stiles Poitevint, Stas Preczewski, Neil L. Pruitt, Jr, Sachin Shailendra, E. Scott Smith, Kessel D. Stelling, Jr, Benjamin J. Tarbutton, III, Richard L. Tucker, Margaret Venable, Thomas Rogers Wade, Larry Walker, Don L. Waters, Robert E. Watts, Philip A. Wilheit, Sr. (Attachments: # 1 A−Wenham Affidavit, # 2 A−1 Polixy 4.3, # 3 A−2 Tuition Classification Handbook, # 4 A−3 Fed Student Aid Handbook, # 5 B −Fuchko Affidavit, # 6 B−1 Cost of Education, # 7 C − USCIS FAQ)(Gore, Deborah) (Entered: 06/13/2017)
105 REPLY BRIEF re 102 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction filed by Freedom University, Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights, Lorena Guillen, Karla Lopez, Arturo Martinez del Rello, Mayela Salazar, Jorge San Juan. (Attachments: # 1 Appendix Declaration of Burth Lopez, # 2 Exhibit A − Federal Student Aid Handbook, # 3 Exhibit B − Cronin Memorandum, # 4 Exhibit C − Kelly Memorandum)(Begnaud, Mark) (Entered: 06/27/2017)
Submission of 102 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction. Submitted to District Judge Richard W. Story. (bdb) (Entered: 06/28/2017)
106 MOTION Withdraw PHV Attorney Sarah Schoettle with Brief In Support by Freedom University, Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights, Lorena Guillen, Karla Lopez, Arturo Martinez del Rello, Mayela Salazar, Jorge San Juan. (Begnaud, Mark)

09/07/2017 09/19/2017 11/30/2017 02/16/2018 03/22/2018
03/22/2018 03/28/2018
06/15/2018 06/18/2018 03/07/2019
03/12/2019

(Entered: 08/14/2017)
Submission of 106 MOTION Withdraw PHV Attorney Sarah Schoettle, to District Judge Richard W. Story. (rsg) (Entered: 09/07/2017)
107 ORDER granting 106 Motion to Withdraw. Signed by Judge Richard W. Story on 09/19/2017. (dgr) (Entered: 09/19/2017)
108 NOTICE Of Filing NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL OF VICTOR VIRAMONTES AS CO−COUNSEL OF RECORD by Freedom University, Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights, Lorena Guillen, Karla Lopez, Arturo Martinez del Rello, Mayela Salazar, Jorge San Juan (Begnaud, Mark) (Entered: 11/30/2017)
109 NOTICE of Hearing: Status Conference set for 3/22/2018 at 01:30 PM in ATLANTA Courtroom 2105 before Judge Richard W. Story. (sk) (Entered: 02/16/2018)
110 NOTICE of Appearance by Roger A. Chalmers on behalf of C. Dean Alford, Gregory F. Aloia, Jean Bartels, Mark P. Becker, Christopher Blake, Linda Bleicken, Robert G. Boehmer, W. Paul Bowers, David C. Bridges, Max Burns, Virginia Carson, Richard Carvajal, Cheryl Davenport Dozier, Arthur Dunning, Lori Durden, Larry R. Ellis, Donald Green, Rutledge A. Griffin, Jr, C. Thomas Hopkins, Jr, James M. Hull, Thomas J. "Tim" Hynes, Bonita Jacobs, Paul Jones, Donald M. Leebern, Jr, Peter Lyons, Chris Markwood, Kyle Marrero, Gary A. McGaha, Shawn McGee, Daniel S. Papp, Charles Patterson, Doreen Stiles Poitevint, Stas Preczewski, Neil L. Pruitt, Jr, Sachin Shailendra, E. Scott Smith, Cecil Staton, Kessel D. Stelling, Jr, Benjamin J. Tarbutton, III, Richard L. Tucker, Margaret Venable, Thomas Rogers Wade, Larry Walker, Don L. Waters, Robert E. Watts, Philip A. Wilheit, Sr (Chalmers, Roger) (Entered: 03/22/2018)
111 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Richard W. Story: Status Conference held on 3/22/2018. The Court heard from counsel regarding the matter and the pending case in the USCA/Eleventh Circuit, Estrada, et al v. Becker, et al (l:16−cv−3310). The Court will keep the matter under advisement. Counsel will be contacted on Wednesday, March 28, for the scheduling of a telephone conference. (Court Reporter Amanda Lohnaas)(rsg) (Entered: 03/22/2018)
112 ORDER dismissing without prejudice the 96 Motion to Stay, the 97 Motion to Dismiss, and the 102 Motion for Preliminary Injunction. Accordingly, by consent of the Parties, this matter is hereby STAYED. The stay shall remain in effect only so long as the appeal in Estrada v. Becker. Appeal No. 17−12668−K remains pending before the Eleventh Circuit, and shall terminate upon the issuance of a decision by that court. The Parties are instructed to notify the Court immediately upon learning of the issuance of a decision by the Eleventh Circuit. Signed by Judge Richard W. Story on 03/28/2018. (dgr) (Entered: 03/28/2018)
113 NOTICE of Voluntary Dismissal of Freedom University (all other Plaintiffs Remain) filed by Freedom University (Begnaud, Mark) (Entered: 06/15/2018)
Clerk's Entry of Dismissal APPROVING 113 Notice of Voluntary Dismissal of Freedom University pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P.41(a)(1)(i) (dgr) (Entered: 06/18/2018)
114 NOTICE by C. Dean Alford, Gregory F. Aloia, Jean Bartels, Mark P. Becker, Christopher Blake, Linda Bleicken, Robert G. Boehmer, W. Paul Bowers, David C. Bridges, Max Burns, Virginia Carson, Richard Carvajal, Cheryl Davenport Dozier, Arthur Dunning, Lori Durden, Larry R. Ellis, Donald Green, Rutledge A. Griffin, Jr, C. Thomas Hopkins, Jr, James M. Hull, Thomas J. "Tim" Hynes, Bonita Jacobs, Paul Jones, Donald M. Leebern, Jr, Peter Lyons, Chris Markwood, Kyle Marrero, Gary A. McGaha, Shawn McGee, Daniel S. Papp, Charles Patterson, Doreen Stiles Poitevint, Stas Preczewski, Neil L. Pruitt, Jr, Sachin Shailendra, E. Scott Smith, Kessel D. Stelling, Jr, Benjamin J. Tarbutton, III, Richard L. Tucker, Margaret Venable, Thomas Rogers Wade, Larry Walker, Don L. Waters, Robert E. Watts, Philip A. Wilheit, Sr re 112 Order on Motion to Stay,,, Order on Motion to Dismiss,,, Order on Motion for Preliminary Injunction,, (Attachments: # 1 11th Circuit Opinion)(Gore, Deborah) (Entered: 03/07/2019)
115 ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE within 14 days why this case should not be dismissed. After Plaintiffs submit their position, Defendants may then file a response within 14

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days. Signed by Judge Richard W. Story on 03/12/19. (rsg) (Entered: 03/12/2019)
116 NOTICE of Voluntary Dismissal filed by Freedom University, Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights, Lorena Guillen, Karla Lopez, Arturo Martinez del Rello, Mayela Salazar, Jorge San Juan (Begnaud, Mark) Modified on 3/28/2019. Contacted Attorney to refile (dgr). (Entered: 03/26/2019)
Clerk's Entry of Dismissal APPROVING 116 Notice of Voluntary Dismissal, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P.41(a)(1)(A)(i) (dgr) (Entered: 03/28/2019)
Civil Case Terminated. (dgr) (Entered: 03/28/2019)


[CONTENT] March 9, 2016 | the Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights | the University System | Georgia | the U.S. District Court | the Northern District | Georgia ||| the Board of Regents for the University System | Georgia | the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals ||| Georgia | two ||| under 42 | 1983 | the Supremacy Clause | the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause ||| April 7, 2016 ||| GLAHR | the Eleventh Amendment | under 42 | 1983 ||| April 21, 2016 ||| May 3, 2016 | the University System’s |||  ||| two days later ||| William C. | August 25, 2016 ||| February 10, 2017 | Dean | Rigoberto Rivera Hernandez</i ||| the University System | Georgia Board of Regents | the Board of Regents ||| the Georgia Supreme Court ||| February 16, 2017 | William C. ||| Dean | Rigoberto Rivera Hernandez</i | Trump | DACA ||| first | May 1, 2017 ||| May 31, 2017 ||| June 13, 2017 ||| O’Kelley | the Trump Administration | DACA ||| March 28, 2018 | the District Court ||| Court | the Eleventh Circuit | Estrada ||| Georgia | the Georgia Board of Regents | Georgia | three ||| DACA | two ||| The District Court | the Supremacy Clause | the Equal Protection Clause ||| March 6, 2019 | the Eleventh Circuit | the District Court ||| 917 | 1298 |||  ||| the Equal Protection | the District Court | DACA ||| Richard W. Story | March 12, 2019 |||  ||| March 28, 2019 [SUMMARY] On March 9, 2016, the Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights (GLAHR) and students within the University System of Georgia filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia. The plaintiffs sued the members of the Board of Regents for the University System of Georgia for denying in-state tuition to undocumented students who had received deferred immigration action under the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program. They argued that the students were lawful residents of Georgia and that, as such, the state had created an unconstitutional two-tiered residency classification system. Plaintiffs sought injunctive and monetary relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming violations of the Supremacy Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause. 

The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on April 7, 2016. They argued that GLAHR lacked standing; the plaintiff’s official capacity claims were barred by the Eleventh Amendment and not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; plaintiffs had failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; and the defendants had qualified immunity. In response, the plaintiffs amended their complaint on April 21, 2016, adding both plaintiffs and defendants to the lawsuit and maintaining their original causes of action. They also filed a motion for a preliminary injunction on May 3, 2016, seeking enjoinment of the University System’s classification system that had been classifying deferred action recipients as not lawfully present. The plaintiffs alleged that this system was irreparably harming the educational opportunities and career prospects of the deferred action students. The defendants moved to dismiss the amended complaint two days later. Judge William C. O’Kelley heard oral arguments regarding the motion to dismiss on August 25, 2016. 

On February 10, 2017, defendants motioned to stay proceedings given a parallel proceeding in <i>Dean Alford v. Rigoberto Rivera Hernandez</i>. In that case, plaintiffs brought suit in state court against the University System of Georgia Board of Regents, arguing their denial of in-state tuition to DACA recipients violated the Board of Regents’ own policies and state statutory law concerning residency status. As that case had moved to the Georgia Supreme Court, defendants argued proceedings in this case should be stayed pending the outcome of that case. 

On February 16, 2017, Judge William C. O’Kelley granted defendant’s motion to stay proceedings and denied without prejudice the plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction and the defendants’ motion to dismiss. He explained both the parallel litigation in <i>Dean Alford v. Rigoberto Rivera Hernandez</i> and President Trump’s stated opposition to the DACA program justified the stay. 

Following the stay, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the first amended complaint on May 1, 2017. The plaintiffs filed another motion for a preliminary injunction on May 31, 2017. Defendants responded in opposition on June 13, 2017. 

Subsequent to Judge O’Kelley’s decision, the Trump Administration announced its decision to rescind the DACA program. 

On March 28, 2018, the District Court dismissed without prejudice the defendants’ motion to dismiss and the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction. The Court stayed the case pending a decision from the Eleventh Circuit in <i>Estrada v. Becker</i>. In <i>Estrada</i>, students qualified to attend Georgia’s selective schools challenged the Georgia Board of Regents’ policy requiring Georgia’s three most selective universities to verify the “lawful presence” of students admitted. Under the challenged policy, applicants with DACA could not attend schools that did not admit all academically qualified applicants for the two most recent years. The District Court in <i>Estrada</i> had dismissed plaintiffs’ challenges that the policy violated the Supremacy Clause and the Equal Protection Clause.

On March 6, 2019, the Eleventh Circuit issued its decision in <i>Estrada</i> and affirmed the District Court. 917 F.3d 1298. It found the policy did not violate the Supremacy Clause because it was not an unconstitutional regulation of immigration and the policy was not preempted. Regarding the Equal Protection claim, it agreed with the District Court that the students were not similarly situated to other noncitizens permitted to attend because unlike the other noncitizens the DACA recipients did not have lawful status. Following the decision in <i>Estrada</i>, Judge Richard W. Story issued an order to show cause on March 12, 2019, asking the plaintiffs to demonstrate why <i>GLAHR v. Alford</i> should not be dismissed. In response, the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the case. The case was closed on March 28, 2019.