United States District Court Western District of Michigan (Southern Division (1)) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG

League of Independent Fitness Facilities and Trainers, Date Filed: 05/22/2020

Inc. et al v. Whitmer et al

Jury Demand: Plaintiff

Assigned to: District Judge Paul L. Maloney

Nature of Suit: 440 Civil Rights:

Referred to: Magistrate Judge Phillip J. Green (events as Other

ordered)

Jurisdiction: Federal Question

Case in other court: the Sixth Circuit, 20-01581

Cause: 42:1983 Other Civil Rights

plaintiff
Leauge of Independent Fitness Facilities and Trainers, Inc.

represented by Scott M. Erskine The Erskine Law Group, P.C. 612 W University Dr. Rochester, MI 48307 (248) 601-4497 Email: serskine@erskinelawgroup.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

plaintiff Baseline Fitness LLC

Carly Ann Van Thomme 612 W University Dr. Rochester, MI 48307 (248) 601-4499 Email: cvanthomme@erskinelaw.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Carly Ann Van Thomme (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

plaintiff Building Your Temple LLC

Scott M. Erskine (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Carly Ann Van Thomme (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

plaintiff BYT Fitness 247 LLC
plaintiff H3 Fitness LLC
plaintiff JKP Fitness, LLC
plaintiff JPF Enterprises, LLC
plaintiff

Scott M. Erskine (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Carly Ann Van Thomme (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Scott M. Erskine The Erskine Law Group, P.C. 612 W University Dr. Rochester, MI 48307 (248) 601-4499 Email: serskine@erskinelawgroup.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Carly Ann Van Thomme (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Scott M. Erskine (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Carly Ann Van Thomme (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Scott M. Erskine (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Carly Ann Van Thomme (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Scott M. Erskine (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Nascot Enterprises, LLC
plaintiff 24/7 Bootcamp and Boxing Inc.
plaintiff Fenton Athletic Club, Inc.
plaintiff 4 Seasons Gym, LLC
plaintiff MH & AB LLC
plaintiff Fenton Karate, LLC

represented by Carly Ann Van Thomme (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Scott M. Erskine (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Carly Ann Van Thomme (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Scott M. Erskine (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Carly Ann Van Thomme (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Scott M. Erskine (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Carly Ann Van Thomme (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Scott M. Erskine (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Carly Ann Van Thomme (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Scott M. Erskine (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Carly Ann Van Thomme (See above for address)

plaintiff RMP Fitness Inc.
plaintiff Fusion Fitness 24/7 LLC
plaintiff D-Lux Karate University LLC
plaintiff Prison City Physique LLC
plaintiff Motor City CF - St. Clair Shores, LLC

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Scott M. Erskine (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Carly Ann Van Thomme (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Scott M. Erskine (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Carly Ann Van Thomme (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Scott M. Erskine (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Carly Ann Van Thomme (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Scott M. Erskine (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Carly Ann Van Thomme (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Scott M. Erskine (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Carly Ann Van Thomme (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

plaintiff Clawson Fitness, LLC
plaintiff Strength Beyond LLC
plaintiff M Fitness Club, LLC
plaintiff Clinton Fitness, Inc.
plaintiff I Fitness Personal Training, Inc.

Scott M. Erskine (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Carly Ann Van Thomme (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Scott M. Erskine (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Carly Ann Van Thomme (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Scott M. Erskine (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Carly Ann Van Thomme (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Scott M. Erskine (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Carly Ann Van Thomme (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Scott M. Erskine (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Carly Ann Van Thomme (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Scott M. Erskine

V. defendant Gretchen E. Whitmer

(See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Andrew J. Jurgensen Michigan Department of Attorney General State Operations Division P.O. Box 30754 Lansing, MI 48909 (517) 335-7573 Fax: (517) 335-7578 Email: jurgensenA2@michigan.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Christopher M. Allen MI Dept Attorney General (Solicitor General) 525 W Ottawa St. P.O. Box 30212 Lansing, MI 48909 (517) 335-7628 Email: allenc28@michigan.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John G. Fedynsky Michigan Department of Attorney General Civil Litigation, Employment & Elections 525 W Ottawa St. P.O. Box 30736 Lansing, MI 48909 (517) 335-3055 Fax: (517) 335-7157 Email: fedynskyj@michigan.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joseph T. Froehlich MI Dept Attorney General (State Operations) State Operations Division P.O. Box 30754 Lansing, MI 48909

defendant Robert Gordon

(517) 335-7573 Fax: (517) 335-7157 Email: froehlichj1@michigan.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joshua O. Booth MI Dept Attorney General (Licensing/Regulation) Licensing and Regulation Division 525 W Ottawa St., 3rd Floor P.O. Box 30758 Lansing, MI 48909 (517) 335-7569 Email: Boothj2@michigan.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Andrew J. Jurgensen (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Christopher M. Allen (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
John G. Fedynsky (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joseph T. Froehlich (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Joshua O. Booth (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 05/22/2020

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief against All Defendants filed by JKP Fitness, LLC, Building Your Temple LLC, JPF Enterprises, LLC, Baseline Fitness LLC, Nascot Enterprises, LLC, BYT Fitness 247 LLC, League of Independent Fitness Facilities and Trainers, Inc., H3 Fitness LLC (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Anderson Economic Report, # 2 Exhibit Planet Fitness Letter, # 3 Exhibit Michigan Fitness

05/22/2020
05/22/2020 05/22/2020 05/22/2020 05/22/2020 05/22/2020 05/22/2020 05/22/2020 05/22/2020 05/22/2020 05/22/2020 05/22/2020 05/22/2020

Clubs Association Letter, # 4 Exhibit LIFFT Letter to Governor) (Erskine, Scott) Modified text on 5/27/2020 (clw). (Entered: 05/22/2020)

FILING FEE PAID re 1 by plaintiffs JKP Fitness, LLC, Building Your Temple LLC, JPF Enterprises, LLC, Baseline Fitness LLC, Nascot Enterprises, LLC, BYT Fitness 247 LLC, League of Independent Fitness Facilities and Trainers, Inc., H3 Fitness LLC in the amount of $400, receipt number AMIWDC-5270934 (Erskine, Scott) Modified text on 5/27/2020 (clw). (Entered: 05/22/2020)

2 PROPOSED SUMMONS to be issued re 1 (Entered: 05/22/2020)

(Erskine, Scott)

3 PROPOSED SUMMONS to be issued re 1 (Entered: 05/22/2020)

(Erskine, Scott)

4 CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT by Baseline Fitness LLC (Erskine, Scott) Modified text on 5/27/2020 (clw). (Entered: 05/22/2020)

5 CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT by Building Your Temple LLC (Erskine, Scott) Modified text on 5/27/2020 (clw). (Entered: 05/22/2020)

6 CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT by BYT Fitness 247 LLC (Erskine, Scott) Modified text on 5/27/2020 (clw). (Entered: 05/22/2020)

7 CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT by H3 Fitness LLC (Erskine, Scott) Modified text on 5/27/2020 (clw). (Entered: 05/22/2020)

8 CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT by JKP Fitness, LLC (Erskine, Scott) Modified text on 5/27/2020 (clw). (Entered: 05/22/2020)

9 CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT by JPF Enterprises, LLC (Erskine, Scott) Modified text on 5/27/2020 (clw). (Entered: 05/22/2020)

10 CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT by League of Independent Fitness Facilities and Trainers, Inc. (Erskine, Scott) Modified text on 5/27/2020 (clw). (Entered: 05/22/2020)

11 CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT by Nascot Enterprises, LLC (Erskine, Scott) Modified text on 5/27/2020 (clw). (Entered: 05/22/2020)

12 PROPOSED SUMMONS to be issued re 1 (Entered: 05/22/2020)

(Erskine, Scott)

13 PROPOSED SUMMONS to be issued re 1 (Entered: 05/22/2020)

(Erskine, Scott)

05/22/2020
05/27/2020 05/27/2020

(NON-DOCUMENT) ATTORNEY APPEARANCE of Carly Ann Van Thomme on behalf of plaintiffs JKP Fitness, LLC, Building Your Temple LLC, JPF Enterprises, LLC, Baseline Fitness LLC, Nascot Enterprises, LLC, BYT Fitness 247 LLC, League of Independent Fitness Facilities and Trainers, Inc., H3 Fitness LLC (Van Thomme, Carly) Modified text on 5/27/2020 (clw). (Entered: 05/22/2020)
14 NOTICE that this case has been assigned Paul L. Maloney (clw) (Entered: 05/27/2020)
15 SUMMONS ISSUED as to defendants Robert Gordon, Gretchen E. Whitmer (clw) (Entered: 05/27/2020)

05/28/2020 05/28/2020 05/28/2020 05/28/2020 05/28/2020 06/01/2020
06/01/2020

(NON-DOCUMENT) ATTORNEY APPEARANCE of John G. Fedynsky on behalf of defendants Robert Gordon, Gretchen E. Whitmer (Fedynsky, John) (Entered: 05/28/2020)
(NON-DOCUMENT) ATTORNEY APPEARANCE of Andrew J. Jurgensen on behalf of defendants Robert Gordon, Gretchen E. Whitmer (Jurgensen, Andrew) (Entered: 05/28/2020)
(NON-DOCUMENT) ATTORNEY APPEARANCE of Joseph T. Froehlich on behalf of defendants Robert Gordon, Gretchen E. Whitmer (Froehlich, Joseph) (Entered: 05/28/2020)
(NON-DOCUMENT) ATTORNEY APPEARANCE of Joshua O. Booth on behalf of defendants Robert Gordon, Gretchen E. Whitmer (Booth, Joshua) (Entered: 05/28/2020)
(NON-DOCUMENT) ATTORNEY APPEARANCE of Christopher M. Allen on behalf of defendants Robert Gordon, Gretchen E. Whitmer (Allen, Christopher) (Entered: 05/28/2020)
16 FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief against Robert Gordon, Gretchen E. Whitmer filed by JPF Enterprises, LLC, Baseline Fitness LLC, Leauge of Independent Fitness Facilities and Trainers, Inc., JKP Fitness, LLC, Building Your Temple LLC, Nascot Enterprises, LLC, BYT Fitness 247 LLC, H3 Fitness LLC, 24/7 Bootcamp and Boxing Inc., Fenton Athletic Club Inc., 4 Seasons Gym LLC, MH & AB LLC, Fenton Karate LLC, RMP Fitness Inc., Fusion Fitness 24/7 LLC, D-Lux Karate University LLC, Prison City Physique LLC, Motor City CF - St. Clair Shores LLC, Clawson Fitness LLC, Strength Beyond LLC, M Fitness Club LLC, Clinton Fitness Inc., I Fitness Personal Training Inc. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit 4) (Erskine, Scott) (Entered: 06/01/2020)
(NON-DOCUMENT) ATTORNEY APPEARANCE of Carly Ann Van Thomme on behalf of plaintiffs 24/7 Bootcamp and Boxing Inc., 4 Seasons Gym LLC, Clawson Fitness LLC, Clinton Fitness Inc., D-Lux

06/01/2020 06/01/2020 06/01/2020 06/01/2020 06/01/2020 06/01/2020
06/01/2020 06/01/2020 06/01/2020
06/01/2020 06/01/2020 06/01/2020
06/01/2020 06/01/2020 06/01/2020

Karate University LLC, Fenton Athletic Club Inc., Fenton Karate LLC, Fusion Fitness 24/7 LLC, I Fitness Personal Training Inc., M Fitness Club LLC, MH & AB LLC, Motor City CF - St. Clair Shores LLC, Prison City Physique LLC, RMP Fitness Inc., Strength Beyond LLC (Van Thomme, Carly) (Entered: 06/01/2020)
17 CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT by 4 Seasons Gym, LLC (Erskine, Scott) Modified text on 6/3/2020 (clw). (Entered: 06/01/2020)
18 CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT by 24/7 Bootcamp and Boxing Inc. (Erskine, Scott) (Entered: 06/01/2020)
19 CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT by Clawson Fitness, LLC (Erskine, Scott) Modified text on 6/3/2020 (clw). (Entered: 06/01/2020)
20 CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT by Clinton Fitness, Inc. (Erskine, Scott) Modified text on 6/3/2020 (clw). (Entered: 06/01/2020)
21 CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT by D-Lux Karate University LLC (Erskine, Scott) (Entered: 06/01/2020)
22 CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT by Fenton Athletic Club, Inc. (Erskine, Scott) Modified text on 6/3/2020 (clw). (Entered: 06/01/2020)
23 CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT by Fenton Karate, LLC (Erskine, Scott) Modified text on 6/3/2020 (clw). (Entered: 06/01/2020)
24 CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT by Fusion Fitness 24/7 LLC (Erskine, Scott) (Entered: 06/01/2020)
25 CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT by I Fitness Personal Training, Inc. (Erskine, Scott) Modified text on 6/3/2020 (clw). (Entered: 06/01/2020)
26 CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT by M Fitness Club, LLC (Erskine, Scott) Modified text on 6/3/2020 (clw). (Entered: 06/01/2020)
27 CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT by MH & AB LLC (Erskine, Scott) (Entered: 06/01/2020)
28 CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT by Motor City CF - St. Clair Shores, LLC (Erskine, Scott) Modified text on 6/3/2020 (clw). (Entered: 06/01/2020)
29 CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT by Prison City Physique LLC (Erskine, Scott) (Entered: 06/01/2020)
30 CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT by RMP Fitness Inc. (Erskine, Scott) (Entered: 06/01/2020)
31 CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT by Strength Beyond LLC (Erskine, Scott) (Entered: 06/01/2020)

06/08/2020 06/08/2020
06/09/2020 06/12/2020

32 EMERGENCY MOTION for preliminary injunction with Proof of Service by plaintiffs 24/7 Bootcamp and Boxing Inc., 4 Seasons Gym, LLC, BYT Fitness 247 LLC, Baseline Fitness LLC, Building Your Temple LLC, Clawson Fitness, LLC, Clinton Fitness, Inc., D-Lux Karate University LLC, Fenton Athletic Club, Inc., Fenton Karate, LLC, Fusion Fitness 24/7 LLC, H3 Fitness LLC, I Fitness Personal Training, Inc., JKP Fitness, LLC, JPF Enterprises, LLC, Leauge of Independent Fitness Facilities and Trainers, Inc., M Fitness Club, LLC, MH & AB LLC, Motor City CF - St. Clair Shores, LLC, Nascot Enterprises, LLC, Prison City Physique LLC, RMP Fitness Inc., Strength Beyond LLC; (Erskine, Scott) (Entered: 06/08/2020)
33 BRIEF in support of EMERGENCY MOTION for preliminary injunction with Proof of Service 32 with Proof of Service filed by 24/7 Bootcamp and Boxing Inc., 4 Seasons Gym, LLC, BYT Fitness 247 LLC, Baseline Fitness LLC, Building Your Temple LLC, Clawson Fitness, LLC, Clinton Fitness, Inc., D-Lux Karate University LLC, Fenton Athletic Club, Inc., Fenton Karate, LLC, Fusion Fitness 24/7 LLC, H3 Fitness LLC, I Fitness Personal Training, Inc., JKP Fitness, LLC, JPF Enterprises, LLC, Leauge of Independent Fitness Facilities and Trainers, Inc., M Fitness Club, LLC, MH & AB LLC, Motor City CF - St. Clair Shores, LLC, Nascot Enterprises, LLC, Prison City Physique LLC, RMP Fitness Inc., Strength Beyond LLC (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit 4, # 5 Exhibit 5, # 6 Exhibit 6, # 7 Exhibit 7, # 8 Exhibit 8, # 9 Exhibit 9, # 10 Exhibit 10, # 11 Exhibit 11, # 12 Exhibit 12, # 13 Exhibit 13, # 14 Exhibit 14, # 15 Exhibit 15, # 16 Exhibit 16, # 17 Exhibit 17, # 18 Exhibit 18, # 19 Exhibit 19) (Erskine, Scott) (Entered: 06/08/2020)
34 ORDER regarding response to Motion for Preliminary Injunction 32 ; responses due by 12:00 p.m. (noon) on 6/12/2020; a hearing on the motion is scheduled for 6/17/2020 at 9:00 a.m., 174 Federal Building, Kalamazoo, Michigan; signed by District Judge Paul L. Maloney (Judge Paul L. Maloney, acr) (Entered: 06/09/2020)
35 RESPONSE TO EMERGENCY MOTION for preliminary injunction with Proof of Service 32 filed by Robert Gordon, Gretchen E. Whitmer (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit A: Opinion and Order Denying Plaintiffs Motion, # 3 Exhibit B: Summary Order, South Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Gavin, # 4 Exhibit C: Modes of transmission of virus causing COVID-19, # 5 Exhibit D: Social Distancing, Quarantine, and Isolation, # 6 Exhibit E: Flattening the Coronavirus Curve, # 7 Exhibit F: E.O. No. 2020-4, # 8 Exhibit G: E.O. No. 2020-5, # 9 Exhibit H: E.O. No. 2020-9, # 10 Exhibit I: E.O. No. 2020-11, # 11 Exhibit J: E.O. No. 2020-21, # 12 Exhibit K: E.O. No. 2020-110, # 13 Exhibit L: E.O. No. 2020-115) (Fedynsky, John) (Entered: 06/12/2020)

06/12/2020 06/15/2020 06/16/2020
06/17/2020

36 CERTIFICATE of compliance re word count for Response to Motion 35
filed by Robert Gordon, Gretchen E. Whitmer (Fedynsky, John) Modified text on 6/15/2020 (clw). (Entered: 06/12/2020)
37 REPLY to response to motion 32 with Certificate of Compliance and Proof of Service filed by 24/7 Bootcamp and Boxing Inc., 4 Seasons Gym, LLC, BYT Fitness 247 LLC, Baseline Fitness LLC, Building Your Temple LLC, Clawson Fitness, LLC, Clinton Fitness, Inc., D-Lux Karate University LLC, Fenton Athletic Club, Inc., Fenton Karate, LLC, Fusion Fitness 24/7 LLC, H3 Fitness LLC, I Fitness Personal Training, Inc., JKP Fitness, LLC, JPF Enterprises, LLC, Leauge of Independent Fitness Facilities and Trainers, Inc., M Fitness Club, LLC, MH & AB LLC, Motor City CF - St. Clair Shores, LLC, Nascot Enterprises, LLC, Prison City Physique LLC, RMP Fitness Inc., Strength Beyond LLC (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 20, # 2 Exhibit 21, # 3 Exhibit 22, # 4 Exhibit 23) (Erskine, Scott) (Entered: 06/15/2020)
38 MOTION for leave to file excess pages Exceed Word Limit by defendants Robert Gordon, Gretchen E. Whitmer; (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1: Defs. Whitmer and Gordon's Motion to Dismiss, # 2 Defendants' Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss, # 3 Index of Exhibits, # 4 Exhibit A: Unsuccessful State Court Challenges to Executive Orders, # 5 Exhibit B: May 29, 2020 Summary Order, South Bay United Pentecostal, # 6 Exhibit C: Social Distancing, Quarantine and Isolation, # 7 Exhibit D: Flattening the Coronavirus Curve, # 8 Exhibit E: E.O. No. 2020-4, # 9 Exhibit F: E.O. No. 2020-5, # 10 Exhibit G: E.O. No. 2020-9, # 11 Exhibit H: E.O. No. 2020-11, # 12 Exhibit I: E.O. No. 2020-21, # 13 Exhibit J: E.O. No. 2020-110, # 14 Exhibit K: E.O. No. 2020-115, # 15 Exhibit L: Governors Bypass Application to the Michigan Supreme Court) (Fedynsky, John) Modified text on 6/17/2020 (clw). (Entered: 06/16/2020)
39 MINUTES of motion hearing re 32 EMERGENCY MOTION for preliminary injunction filed by 24/7 Bootcamp and Boxing Inc., 4 Seasons Gym, LLC, Fusion Fitness 24/7 LLC, JPF Enterprises, LLC, Fenton Karate, LLC, H3 Fitness LLC, Motor City CF - St. Clair Shores, LLC, Fenton Athletic Club, Inc., Clawson Fitness, LLC, Building Your Temple LLC, D-Lux Karate University LLC, Prison City Physique LLC, I Fitness Personal Training, Inc., JKP Fitness, LLC, MH & AB LLC, RMP Fitness Inc., Leauge of Independent Fitness Facilities and Trainers, Inc., Clinton Fitness, Inc., Nascot Enterprises, LLC, BYT Fitness 247 LLC, Baseline Fitness LLC, Strength Beyond LLC, M Fitness Club, LLC; opinion and order to issue; held before District Judge Paul L. Maloney (Court Reporter: Kathleen Thomas) (Judge Paul L. Maloney, acr) (Entered: 06/17/2020)

06/17/2020 06/17/2020
06/19/2020 06/19/2020 06/19/2020 06/19/2020 06/19/2020 06/19/2020 06/20/2020 06/22/2020

40 ORDER granting 38 motion for leave to file excess pages/exceed word limits; the Clerk of Court shall accept the proposed document for filing; signed by District Judge Paul L. Maloney (Judge Paul L. Maloney, acr) (Entered: 06/17/2020)
41 MOTION to dismiss by defendants Robert Gordon, Gretchen E. Whitmer; (Attachments: # 1 Brief in Support, # 2 Index, # 3 Exhibit A, # 4 Exhibit B, # 5 Exhibit C, # 6 Exhibit D, # 7 Exhibit E, # 8 Exhibit F, # 9 Exhibit G, # 10 Exhibit H, # 11 Exhibit I, # 12 Exhibit J, # 13 Exhibit K, # 14 Exhibit L) (clw) (Entered: 06/18/2020)
42 OPINION AND ORDER granting 32 motion for preliminary injunction; signed by District Judge Paul L. Maloney (Judge Paul L. Maloney, cmc) (Entered: 06/19/2020)
43 NOTICE OF APPEAL re 42 by defendants Robert Gordon, Gretchen E. Whitmer (Fedynsky, John) (Entered: 06/19/2020)
44 EMERGENCY MOTION for stay pending appeal by defendants Robert Gordon, Gretchen E. Whitmer; (Fedynsky, John) Modified text on 6/22/2020 (clw). (Entered: 06/19/2020)
45 BRIEF in support of EMERGENCY MOTION for stay pending
appeal 44 filed by Robert Gordon, Gretchen E. Whitmer (Fedynsky, John) Modified text on 6/22/2020 (clw). (Entered: 06/19/2020)
APPEAL FEE PAID re 43 by defendants Robert Gordon, Gretchen E. Whitmer in the amount of $505, receipt number AMIWDC-5373540 (Fedynsky, John) (Entered: 06/19/2020)
46 ORDER regarding response to motion to stay 44 ; responses due by 10:00 a.m. on 6/22/2020; signed by District Judge Paul L. Maloney (Judge Paul L. Maloney, acr) (Entered: 06/19/2020)
47 CERTIFICATE of compliance re word count for Brief in Support of a
Motion 45 filed by Robert Gordon, Gretchen E. Whitmer (Fedynsky, John) (Entered: 06/20/2020)
48 RESPONSE in opposition to EMERGENCY MOTION to stay pending
appeal 44 with Proof of Service filed by 24/7 Bootcamp and Boxing Inc., 4 Seasons Gym, LLC, BYT Fitness 247 LLC, Baseline Fitness LLC, Building Your Temple LLC, Clawson Fitness, LLC, Clinton Fitness, Inc., D-Lux Karate University LLC, Fenton Athletic Club, Inc., Fenton Karate, LLC, Fusion Fitness 24/7 LLC, H3 Fitness LLC, I Fitness Personal Training, Inc., JKP Fitness, LLC, JPF Enterprises, LLC, Leauge

06/22/2020
06/22/2020
06/22/2020 06/22/2020 06/22/2020

of Independent Fitness Facilities and Trainers, Inc., M Fitness Club, LLC, MH & AB LLC, Motor City CF - St. Clair Shores, LLC, Nascot Enterprises, LLC, Prison City Physique LLC, RMP Fitness Inc., Strength Beyond LLC (Erskine, Scott) (Entered: 06/22/2020)
49 RESPONSE in opposition to EMERGENCY MOTION to stay pending
appeal 44 (Brief in Opposition) with Proof of Service filed by 24/7 Bootcamp and Boxing Inc., 4 Seasons Gym, LLC, BYT Fitness 247 LLC, Baseline Fitness LLC, Building Your Temple LLC, Clawson Fitness, LLC, Clinton Fitness, Inc., D-Lux Karate University LLC, Fenton Athletic Club, Inc., Fenton Karate, LLC, Fusion Fitness 24/7 LLC, H3 Fitness LLC, I Fitness Personal Training, Inc., JKP Fitness, LLC, JPF Enterprises, LLC, Leauge of Independent Fitness Facilities and Trainers, Inc., M Fitness Club, LLC, MH & AB LLC, Motor City CF - St. Clair Shores, LLC, Nascot Enterprises, LLC, Prison City Physique LLC, RMP Fitness Inc., Strength Beyond LLC (Erskine, Scott) (Entered: 06/22/2020)
50 CERTIFICATE of compliance re word count for Response in
Opposition,, 49 with Proof of Service filed by 24/7 Bootcamp and Boxing Inc., 4 Seasons Gym, LLC, BYT Fitness 247 LLC, Baseline Fitness LLC, Building Your Temple LLC, Clawson Fitness, LLC, Clinton Fitness, Inc., D-Lux Karate University LLC, Fenton Athletic Club, Inc., Fenton Karate, LLC, Fusion Fitness 24/7 LLC, H3 Fitness LLC, I Fitness Personal Training, Inc., JKP Fitness, LLC, JPF Enterprises, LLC, Leauge of Independent Fitness Facilities and Trainers, Inc., M Fitness Club, LLC, MH & AB LLC, Motor City CF - St. Clair Shores, LLC, Nascot Enterprises, LLC, Prison City Physique LLC, RMP Fitness Inc., Strength Beyond LLC (Erskine, Scott) (Entered: 06/22/2020)
CASE NUMBER 20-1581 assigned by the Sixth Circuit to appeal 43 (mkc) (Entered: 06/22/2020)
51 ORDER denying 44 motion to stay pending appeal; signed by District Judge Paul L. Maloney (Judge Paul L. Maloney, cmc) (Entered: 06/22/2020)
52 LETTER FROM CCA regarding appeal 43 indicating Civil Case Docketed (clw) (Entered: 06/23/2020)

06/24/2020

53 ORDER of USCA (certified copy) re appeal 43 The motion for an emergency stay is GRANTED (clw) (Entered: 06/25/2020)

07/07/2020 07/16/2020 07/30/2020
08/10/2020

54 ORDER of USCA (certified copy) re appeal 43 DENYING Appellees' motion to reconsider the order filed 6/24/2020 filed by Ms. Carly Ann Van Thomme (clw) (Entered: 07/08/2020)
55 RESPONSE in opposition to MOTION to dismiss 41 with Proof of Service filed by 24/7 Bootcamp and Boxing Inc., 4 Seasons Gym, LLC, BYT Fitness 247 LLC, Baseline Fitness LLC, Building Your Temple LLC, Clawson Fitness, LLC, Clinton Fitness, Inc., D-Lux Karate University LLC, Fenton Athletic Club, Inc., Fenton Karate, LLC, Fusion Fitness 24/7 LLC, H3 Fitness LLC, I Fitness Personal Training, Inc., JKP Fitness, LLC, JPF Enterprises, LLC, Leauge of Independent Fitness Facilities and Trainers, Inc., M Fitness Club, LLC, MH & AB LLC, Motor City CF - St. Clair Shores, LLC, Nascot Enterprises, LLC, Prison City Physique LLC, RMP Fitness Inc., Strength Beyond LLC (Erskine, Scott) (Entered: 07/16/2020)
56 REPLY to response to motion 41 to Dismiss filed by Robert Gordon, Gretchen E. Whitmer (Attachments: # 1 Index of Exhibits, # 2 Exhibit 1: LIFFT v. Whitmer, et al., ___ F.3d ___ (slip opinion), Sixth Cir. No. 201581 (June 24, 2020), # 3 Exhibit 2: Opinion and Order Denying Plaintiffs Motion for Preliminary Injunction, CH Royal Oak, LLC v. Whitmer, et al., W.D. Mich. No. 20-cv-570 (July 16, 2020), # 4 Exhibit 3: Order Denying Plaintiffs Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Baker Events, LLC v. Whitmer, et al, W.D. Mich. No. 20-cv-654 (July 23, 2020), # 5 Exhibit 4: Sports Illustrated article: Michigan State the Latest and Most Significant Victim of College Footballs Biggest Obstacle (July 24, 2020), # 6 Exhibit 5: Los Angeles Times article: Marlins coronavirus outbreak has sports world on edge (July 27, 2020)) (Fedynsky, John) (Entered: 07/30/2020)
57 APPEAL TRANSCRIPT of the Hearing on Emergency Motion for Preliminary Injunction held June 17, 2020, before the Honorable Paul L. Maloney; re appeal 43 ; NOTE: this transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the release of transcript restriction date; after that date it may be obtained through PACER; under the Policy Regarding Transcripts the parties have 14 days within which to file a Notice of Intent to redact, and 21 days within which to file a Redaction Request; if no Transcript Redaction Request is filed, the court will assume redaction of personal identifiers is not necessary and this transcript will be made available via PACER after the release of transcript restriction set for 11/9/2020 ; redaction request due 8/31/2020 (Court ReporterTranscriptionist: K. Thomas, (269) 808-6116) (Entered: 08/10/2020)

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 </s> Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 1 filed 05/22/20 PageID.1 Page 1 of 45

DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

_____________________________________________________

LEAGUE OF INDPENDENT FITNESS FACITLITIES AND TRAINERS, INC., BASELINE FITNESS LLC, BUILDING YOUR TEMPLE LLC, BYT FITNESS 247 LLC, H3 FITNESS LLC, JKP FITNESS, LLC, JPF ENTERPRISES, LLC, and NASCOT ENTERPRISES, LLC,
Plaintiffs, v. GRETCHEN E. WHITMER and ROBERT GORDON,
Defendants. _____________________________________________________
ERSKINE LAW, PC Scott M. Erskine (P54734) Carly Van Thomme (P59706) Attorneys for Plaintiffs 612 W. University Rochester, MI. 48307 (248) 601-4499 serskine@erskinelaw.com _____________________________________________________

Civil No. Hon.
COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

Plaintiffs allege as follows:

INTRODUCTION

1. Based on speculative modeling on the infectiousness and lethality of a new

coronavirus, Governor Whitmer has issued executive orders that have shuttered civil

society, placed 10 million people under house arrest, and taken jobs away from nearly 1.2

million people, all without due process of law. The Governor has not disclosed and/or

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disclosed only a minimal amount of the data or methodology used to create the modeling that purportedly justifies this extreme action. At the same time, through Executive Order 2020-38, she has suspended the Freedom of Information Act through June 4, 2020, preventing any independent assessment of whether the modeling used to justify locking down the entire State is reliable.
2. The Governor’s initial Executive Order was premised on the perceived need to “flatten the curve” so as to avoid overwhelming the State’s hospitals and healthcare centers, not to eradicate the virus. Although the curve has been flattened, the Governor has nonetheless issued stricter and confusing executive orders that unreasonably and unnecessarily interfere with Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights.
3. Governor Whitmer’s executive orders are unprecedented. For the first time in our State’s history—indeed, in our nation’s history—the State government is mass quarantining healthy people instead of the sick. As a free people, we have the unalienable right to pursue happiness, which includes the freedom to make our own choices about our safety and welfare without unconstitutional interference. In the face of the coronavirus, it means the freedom to choose whether to stay at home, or to keep calm and carry on with the things that make life worth living.
4. Plaintiffs are affected by the Governor’s orders. Under threat of criminal penalties, they have been forced to close or significantly restrict their businesses, depriving them of their liberty and property interests without due process. At the same time, without offering any justification, the Governor has allowed, and is still allowing, other businesses deemed “critical” to stay open, even though: (a) “critical” businesses must adhere to guidance from the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”) on “social

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distancing”; and (b) Plaintiffs are fully capable of adhering to those same guide-lines if allowed to reopen.
5. Although Michigan, like all States in the Union, is expressly guaranteed a republican form of government under Article IV, Section 4 of the U.S. Constitution, the Governor has unilaterally suspended civil liberties and announced that this state of affairs will continue even over the Legislature’s objection. When the Legislature announced bills to limit unilateral action and ensure constitutional government remains intact, Governor Whitmer said “I’m not going to sign any bill that takes power away from me or any future governor.”
6. Government by executive order and executive directives —over 90 of them so far—stirs echoes of royal prerogative.
7. Ours is a constitutional republic that empowers government to act within defined limits. Those limits apply at all times and under all circumstances. In war, in peace, and in pandemics. “No doctrine, involving more pernicious consequences, was ever invented by the wit of man than that any of its provisions can be suspended during any of the great exigencies of government. Such a doctrine leads directly to anarchy or despotism....” Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 120–122 (1866).
8. Plaintiffs seek a judicial declaration that the executive orders keeping people in their homes and away from their businesses—and all other orders, rules, and enforcement activity related to them—are unconstitutional under the Dormant Commerce Clause, the Privileges and Immunities Clause, the Privileges or Immunities Clause, the Due Process Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, and State law. Such a declaration, and a corresponding

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injunction, will yield a more rational, pragmatic response to the virus that saves lives, saves livelihoods, and preserves constitutional norms all at the same time.
9. In short, Plaintiffs bring this lawsuit to define the limits of a State’s police power. Whatever its limits, this legal term of art is not some shibboleth that unlocks absolute executive power and casts our Constitution to the wind. The issues raised in this Complaint are novel, and they will not be rendered moot if the executive order is lifted before the Court issues judgment. The issues presented are capable of repetition and are of such importance that they cannot evade judicial review.
PARTIES 10. Plaintiff League of Independent Fitness Facilities and Trainers, Inc. (“LIFFT”) is a domestic non-profit 501(c)(4) organization with its principal place of business in Oakland County, Michigan. It has over four hundred members throughout the State of Michigan, including but not limited to: Allegan County, Kent County, Kalamazoo County, Macomb County, Oakland County, Ottawa County, and Wayne County, that engage in foreign, interstate, and intrastate commerce. At least 119 of its members operate a fitness studio, with members working out and attending fitness classes in Michigan. Because of Governor Whitmer’s executive orders and Director Gordon’s Emergency Order and Emergency Rule, every single one of LIFFT’s members have been forced to close or stop training operations since March 16, 2020 through the date of the filing of this Complaint. 11. Plaintiff Baseline Fitness LLC is a Michigan Limited Liability company with its principal place of business in Oakland County. It engages in foreign, interstate, and intrastate commerce. Baseline Fitness operates as a fitness studio, with members working out and attending fitness classes in Michigan. Because of the Governor Whitmer’s executive orders

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and Director Gordon’s Emergency Order and Emergency Rule, Baseline Fitness has been forced to close since March 16, 2020 through the date of the filing of this Complaint
12. Plaintiff Building Your Temple LLC is a Michigan Limited Liability company with its principal place of business in Oakland County. It engages in foreign, interstate, and intrastate commerce. Building Your Temple operates as a fitness studio, with members working out and attending fitness classes in Michigan. Because of the Governor Whitmer’s executive orders and Director Gordon’s Emergency Order and Emergency Rule, Building Your Temple has been forced to close since March 16, 2020 through the date of the filing of this Complaint.
13. Plaintiff BYT Fitness 247 LLC is a Michigan Limited Liability company with its principal place of business in Oakland County. It engages in foreign, interstate, and intrastate commerce. BYT Fitness 247 operates as a fitness studio, with members working out and attending fitness classes in Michigan. Because of the Governor Whitmer’s executive orders and Director Gordon’s Emergency Order and Emergency Rule, BYT Fitness 247 has been forced to close since March 16, 2020 through the date of the filing of this Complaint.
14. Plaintiff H3 Fitness LLC is a Michigan Limited Liability company with its principal place of business in Ottawa County. It engages in foreign, interstate, and intrastate commerce. H3 Fitness operates as a fitness studio, with members working out and attending fitness classes in Michigan. Because of the Governor Whitmer’s executive orders and Director Gordon’s Emergency Order and Emergency Rule, H3 Fitness has been forced to close since March 16, 2020 through the date of the filing of this Complaint.
15. Plaintiff JKP Fitness is a Michigan Limited Liability Company with its principal place of business in Kent County. It engages in foreign, interstate, and intrastate commerce.

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JPF Enterprises operates as a fitness studio, with members working out and attending fitness classes in Michigan. Because of the Governor Whitmer’s executive orders and Director Gordon’s Emergency Order and Emergency Rule, JPF Enterprises has been forced to close since March 16, 2020 through the date of the filing of this Complaint.
16. Plaintiff JPF Enterprises is a Michigan Limited Liability Company with its principal place of business in Kent County. It engages in foreign, interstate, and intrastate commerce. JPF Enterprises operates as a fitness studio, with members working out and attending fitness classes in Michigan. Because of the Governor Whitmer’s executive orders and Director Gordon’s Emergency Order and Emergency Rule, JPF Enterprises has been forced to close since March 16, 2020 through the date of the filing of this Complaint.
17. Plaintiff Nascot Enterprises is a Michigan Limited Liability Company with its principal place of business in Oakland County, Michigan. It engages in foreign, interstate, and intrastate commerce. Nascot Enterprises operates fitness studios in Oakland and Macomb Counties, with members attending workouts and classes in Michigan. Because of the Governor Whitmer’s executive orders and Director Gordon’s Emergency Order and Emergency Rule, Nascot Enterprises has been forced to close since March 16, 2020 through the date of the filing of this Complaint.
18. According to IHRSA (International Health & Racquet Sports Association), which is the national governing body that oversees the fitness and gym industry, there are over 1,100 gyms and fitness centers with over 1.5 million members in Michigan as of 2019.
19. Many businesses who have either remained open or are in the process of opening are businesses that are open to the general public. In contrast, Plaintiffs are

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member-based fitness facilities and do not receive nearly the amount, if any, of “walk-in” business that retailers, restaurants or other businesses rely on for profit.
20. Defendant Gretchen E. Whitmer is the Governor of the State of Michigan. Plaintiffs sue her in her official capacity only.
21. Defendant Robert Gordon is the Director of the Michigan Department of Health and Human Services. Plaintiffs sue him in his official capacity only.
JURISDICTION 22. This action challenges Governor Whitmer’s Executive Orders 2020-43 through 2020-96 (and their predecessors and future iterations of these orders) (the “EOs”) and Director Gordon’s Emergency Order and Emergency Rule (all collectively, the “Lockdown Orders”), related to the closure of Plaintiffs’ businesses, which Plaintiffs believe violate the following clauses of the U.S. Constitution:
(a) Dormant Commerce Clause of Article I, Section 8; (b) Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 1; (c) Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; (d) Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; and (e) Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 23. The Court therefore has federal-question jurisdiction under Article III of the U.S. Constitution and 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 24. Plaintiffs seek declaratory relief and a preliminary and permanent injunction against the Lockdown Orders and similarly crafted orders and rules issued in the future. Accordingly, they bring this action under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201– 2202, and the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651.

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25. Plaintiffs also challenge the EOs as exceeding the Governor’s authority under the separation-of-powers doctrine enshrined in Article III, Section 2 of the Michigan Constitution of 1963; the Emergency Powers of the Governor Act (“Emergency Powers Act”), Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 10.31–10.33; and the Emergency Management Act, Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 30.401–30.421. Accordingly, Plaintiffs also invoke the Court’s supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

VENUE 26. Governor Whitmer is a resident of, and the principal office of the Governor is located in, Lansing, Michigan. 27. Director Gordon’s principal office is located in Lansing, Michigan. 28. A substantial part of the events giving rise to the claims in this Complaint occurred in Lansing, Michigan. 29. The city of Lansing is the seat of government for the State of Michigan. Michigan Const. art. III, § 1 (1963). It is located within Ingham County, which is within the territorial jurisdiction of the Western District of Michigan. 28 U.S.C. § 102(b)(1). This Court is therefore a proper venue for this action under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1)–(2).

Executive Orders

EXECUTIVE ACTION

30. The Emergency Powers Act permits a governor, “during times of great public crisis, disaster, rioting, catastrophe, or similar public emergency within the State, or reasonable apprehension of immediate danger of a public emergency of that kind, when public safety is imperiled, ... [to] proclaim a state of emergency and designate the area

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involved ... [and to] promulgate reasonable orders, rules, and regulations as he or she considers necessary to protect life or property or to bring the emergency situation within the affected area under control.” Mich. Comp. Laws § 10.31(1) (emphasis added). Executive orders issued under this Act have the force of law.
31. The Emergency Management Act permits a governor, upon the declaration of an emergency or a disaster, to compel evacuation, to control entry to, exit from, and the occupancy of premises within, the affected area, among other things. Mich. Comp. Laws § 30.405(1). Executive orders issued under this Act have the force of law.
32. On March 11, 2020, Governor Whitmer issued Executive Order 2020-04, which declared a “state of emergency” under both Acts based upon two presumptive diagnoses of coronavirus disease (“COVID-19”), a respiratory illness caused by virus named the severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus two (“SARS-CoV-2” or the “coronavirus”).
33. On March 16, 2020 Governor Whitmer issued Executive Order 2020-09 under both Acts. This order closed to the public, restaurants, food courts, cafes, coffee houses, and other places of accommodation. Under this order, “gymnasiums, fitness centers, recreation centers, indoor sports facilities, indoor exercise facilities, exercise studios, and spas” were also forced to close. A willful violation of EO 2020-09 is a misdemeanor for which a person can be imprisoned for up to 90 days and fined up to $500. Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 10.33 and 30.405(3). All Plaintiffs complied with Executive Order 2020-09 and closed their doors.
34. On March 22, 2020, the Governor issued Executive Order 2020-20 under both Acts. This order closed to the public a wide range of public accommodations, including all restaurants, food courts, cafes, coffeehouses, and other places of public accommodation

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offering food or beverages for on-site consumption. A willful violation of EO 2020-20 is a misdemeanor for which a person can be imprisoned for up to 90 days and fined up to $500. Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 10.33, 30.405(3), and 750.504; EO 2020-20(6).
35. On March 23, 2020, the Governor issued Executive Order 2020-21 under both Acts. This order prohibits all in-person work that the Governor deems “not necessary to sustain or protect life.” A willful violation of EO 2020-21 is a misdemeanor for which a person can be imprisoned for up to 90 days and fined up to $500. Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 10.33, 30.405(3), and 750.504; EO 2020-20(6).
36. On April 9, 2020, the Governor issued Executive Order 2020-42 under both Acts. This order extends EO 2020-21 through April 30, 2020, while imposing even greater restrictions on the general public than before. A willful violation of EO 2020-42 is a misdemeanor for which a person can be imprisoned for up to 90 days and fined up to $500. Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 10.33, 30.405(3), and 750.504; EO 2020-42(17).
37. On April 13, 2020, the Governor issued Executive Order 2020-43 under both Acts. This order extends EO 2020-20 through April 30, 2020. A willful violation of EO 202043 is a misdemeanor for which a person can be imprisoned for up to 90 days and fined up to $500. Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 10.33, 30.405(3), and 750.504; EO 2020-42(7).
38. On April 24, 2020, the Governor issued Executive Order 2020-59 under both Acts. This Order extends EO 2020-42 through May 15, 2020. It purports to loosen some restrictions imposed under EO 2020-42 as part of a phased reopening of the economy. A willful violation of EO 2020-59 is a misdemeanor for which a person can be imprisoned for up to 90 days and fined up to $500. Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 10.33, 30.405(3), and 750.504; EO 2020-59(20).

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39. On April 30, 2020, the Governor issued Executive Order 2020-66, terminating the state of emergency under the Emergency Management Act which was set to expire when the state legislature did not approve of an extension of the Act under the terms proposed by the Governor.
40. One minute after terminating the state of emergency under the Emergency Management Act on April 30, 2020, the Governor issued Executive Orders 2020-67 and 2020-68. In Executive Order 2020-67 the Governor declared a new state of emergency under the Emergency Powers of the Governors Act. In Executive Order 2020-68, the Governor declared a new state of emergency under the Emergency Management Act. A willful violation of either EO 2020-67 or 2020-68 is a misdemeanor for which a person can be imprisoned for up to 90 days and fined up to $500. Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 10.33, 30.405(3), and 750.504; EO 2020-59(20).
41. On May 7, 2020, the Governor issued Executive Order 2020-77 under both Acts. EO 2020-77 started opening the economy slowly, allowing landscapers, the manufacturing sector, garden stores and nurseries, bicycle repair shops, real estate companies, moving companies, a limited amount of retail with major restrictions and construction to reopen with many restrictions. All other sectors, including fitness centers and gyms, remained closed. A willful violation of EO 2020-59 is a misdemeanor for which a person can be imprisoned for up to 90 days and fined up to $500. Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 10.33, 30.405(3), and 750.504; EO 2020-59(20).
42. On May 18, 2020, the Governor issued Executive Order 2020-92 under both Acts. EO 2020-92 divided the state into eight regions. Further, the EO 2020-92 continued opening the economy slowly, allowing restaurants and bars to reopen at 50% capacity in

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Regions 6 and 8 only (the Upper Peninsula and small parts of the northern Lower Peninsula), subject to other provisions of Executive Order 2020-91 which was issued the same day. For Regions 6 and 8 only, EO 2020-92 allowed individuals to gather in a social gathering of up to 10 people, allowed business offices to open if workers cannot work remotely, and allowed retail to return in limited capacity. All other sectors, including fitness centers and gyms, remained closed. A willful violation of EO 2020-59 is a misdemeanor for which a person can be imprisoned for up to 90 days and fined up to $500. Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 10.33, 30.405(3), and 750.504; EO 2020-59(20).
43. On May 21, 2020, the Governor issued Executive Order 2020-96 under both Acts. EO 2020-96 made hotels and motel workers statewide part of the “critical infrastructure,” but did not allow hotels or motels to open gyms, pools, spas, or dining and entertainment areas. Further, the EO allows auto dealerships to open in a limited capacity statewide as of May 26, 2020. The EO further allows retail stores to open in a limited capacity statewide on May 26, 2020. Finally, the EO will allow non-emergency medical, dental and veterinary services to resume on May 29, 2020. All other sectors, including fitness centers and gyms, which were the first businesses shuttered by the Governor, remained closed. A willful violation of EO 2020-59 is a misdemeanor for which a person can be imprisoned for up to 90 days and fined up to $500. Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 10.33, 30.405(3), and 750.504; EO 2020-59(20).
Action by MDHHS 44. On April 2, 2020, Director Gordon issued an Emergency Order under the
Michigan Public Health Code. Mich. Comp. Laws § 333.2253(1). This order requires every

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person in Michigan to comply with EO 2020-20 and EO 2020-21, and authorizes police and prosecutors to enforce those EOs as incorporated through the Emergency Order. See https:// perma.cc/K6ZH-HS6N. This order also applies to EOs 2020-42, 2020-43, and 2020-59. A violation of an MDHHS order is a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for up to six months and a fine of $200, or both. Mich. Comp. Laws § 333.2261. Thus, Director Gordon’s Emergency Order effectively doubles the period of incarceration authorized under the Governor’s executive orders.
45. At the same time, Director Gordon issued an Emergency Rule establishing a $1,000 civil penalty for violations of Director Gordon’s Emergency Order. See https://perma.cc/ 8W5C-E98N.
46. Since April 2, 2020, any person who violates Governor Whitmer’s EOs (and thereby automatically violates Director Gordon’s Emergency Order and the Emergency Rule) can now be imprisoned for up to six months, assessed a penal fine of up to $500, and assessed a civil fine of up to $1,000.
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 47. Although the coronavirus is highly contagious, it does not invariably result in COVID-19. For those who do develop COVID-19, the mortality rate is low. As of May 21, 2020, the State reported on its official coronavirus webpage 53,510 confirmed cases of COVID-19, which is roughly .54% of the State population. As of that same date, the State reported 5,129 deaths related to COVID-19. As a result, only 0.05% of the State’s population has succumbed to the virus. 48. In all likelihood, the survival rate in Michigan is far higher. Recent antibody testing conducted in New York State and a study in Los Angeles suggest that millions more

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have been infected with the coronavirus than previously known, and that the supermajority of those previously infected were either asymptomatic or experienced mild reactions to it. In New York, this new information has dropped the mortality rate to 0.5%—i.e., a survival rate of 99.5%. In Los Angeles, it dropped the mortality rate to 0.1–0.3%—i.e., a survival rate of 99.7–99.9%. There is no reason to believe that Michigan is exempt from this good news. As more Michiganders are tested, increases in positive tests will yield a higher survival rate.
49. The number of deaths caused by COVID-19, while unquestionably tragic, is not “unprecedented,” as routinely claimed. What is unprecedented is Governor Whitmer’s response to it.
50. In 1918, the deadly Spanish Flu swept the globe, infecting over 500 million people (roughly one third of the world population, killing between 20 million and 50 million people worldwide. Over 675,000 people in the United States lost their lives to the flu. With a population of 3.7 million people, nearly 15,000 Michiganders died in the pandemic. In response to the Spanish Flu, Governor Albert Sleeper issued an order closing places of public amusement. Individual cities decided whether to close schools. Work continued. Governor Sleeper wisely balanced public health while preserving commerce. The current executive orders fail to do so, overreaching to such extent that the State’s economy is spiraling toward a depression.
51. In the 1940s and the early 1950s, annual summer polio epidemics killed thousands of children before a vaccine was found. Even under such dire circumstances, several Michigan governors of both parties, including Governor G. Mennen Williams, refrained from violating constitutional norms with excessive executive orders during those years.

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52. In the late 1960s, the Hong Kong Flu swept across the globe killing more than 1 million people. The CDC estimated that 100,000 people died in the U.S. Michigan, like other States, was affected. Governor George Romney did not place residents under house arrest or shutdown the economy then, either.
53. Governor Whitmer repeatedly states that decisions must be made on data and science. Yet, despite the positive State-specific data, the Governor tightened restrictions through an executive order that the Wall Street Journal described as the “most excessive” in the country.
54. Among other enhancements, the new order imposed harsher restrictions on the ability to travel and banned people from visiting their families, working, and purchasing a variety of everyday items at stores. The new order was announced at 3:00 p.m. on April 9th, and became effective at 12:01 a.m. on April 10th—i.e., on less than 12 hours’ notice. The Governor timed EO 2020-42 to prohibit families from gathering to celebrate Easter Sunday and Passover.
55. Although her previous order allowed “critical infrastructure workers” to perform in-person work—defined as those workers described as critical by the director of the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Agency (“CISA”) in guidance issued March 19th— in compliance with CDC guidance on “social distancing,” Governor Whitmer has expressly, arbitrarily, and capriciously refused to adopt CISA’s updated definition of “critical infrastructure workers,” in EO 2020-42 and EO 2020-59. Other governors who have issued similar executive orders have adopted the updated federal definitions. Governor Whitmer has never explained why these new definitions have not been, and cannot be, adopted in

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Michigan. This is further evidence that the Governor is unreasonably keeping more Michiganders locked up in their homes than necessary.
56. Taking Governor Whitmer at her word that she wants to make decisions based on data, and lacking confidence in the Governor’s modeling because the underlying data and methodology is unavailable to the public, a group of businesses (not named in this lawsuit) hired Anderson Economic Group (“AEG”) to analyze the infection curve and the economic effects of her EOs, and they provided the expert’s report to the Governor on April 13, 2020. The Governor has not responded. At a press conference on April 27, 2020, the Governor confirmed that she has not read the expert’s report in the two weeks since it was delivered.
57. An economic depression is predictable following the shutdown of civil society caused by the Lockdown Orders. Businesses around Michigan are permanently closing because they cannot pay employees and vendors. More will be forced to permanently close the longer that the Lockdown Orders and any similarly drafted successor orders are in place.
58. Consistent with the assessments in the AEG report, in the first month of the lockdown order, nearly 1.2 million Michiganders reportedly filed for unemployment, the largest number of unemployment claims in the State’s history. Michigan is among the top five worst states for unemployment. See Exhibit 1, AEG Report. According to Jeff Donofrio, Director of the Michigan Department of Labor and Economic Opportunity, this means more than 25% of Michigan’s workforce filed for unemployment in the span of four weeks because of the Lockdown Orders. For context, the national average unemployment rate during the Great Depression of 1929 was 26%.
59. Employers fund unemployment benefits. Mich. Comp. Laws § 421.13. The Governor offered scant insight on how the unemployment system can keep paying benefits

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if employers can’t operate their businesses. If businesses can’t operate, then they can’t generate revenue. And, if they can’t generate revenue, then they have no way of paying into the unemployment fund.
60. According to the U.S. Department of the Treasury, as of March 31, 2020, Michigan’s unemployment trust fund balance was $4.55 billion. State officials predict that the fund will be drained in July. See https://perma.cc/R54P-GTMU. One recent prediction is that the Michigan Unemployment Trust Fund will be drained within two months and incur a $15 billion deficit. Taxes on businesses may double to pay back the loans that the State would require to keep paying unemployment. This will leave less money for businesses to rehire workers and prolong the economic devastation.
61. Unemployment is not the only factor in play. For those fortunate enough to remain employed during this time, many of them are subject to furloughs, pay cuts, and mandatory sick leave. According to a recent study by the Anderson Economic Group, nearly 1.5 million Michiganders will lose significant income because of the coronavirus and the Governor’s orders by the end of April. Exhibit 1, AEG Report.
62. Plaintiffs want to reopen their business to help their current and former employees (whom they hope to rehire) put food on their tables, keep roofs over their heads, and clothes on their backs. Governor Whitmer and Director Gordon forbid them from doing so under pain of criminal punishment and civil fines. Plaintiffs should not be forced to choose between risking criminal prosecution and economic sanctions on the one hand or exercising their constitutional rights on the other.
63. Plaintiffs also want to reopen their businesses to help the public in general (and their members specifically) in their ability to fight COVID-19. It is well documented that

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obesity, diabetes and hypertension are some of the highest risk factors that can lead to a poorer outcome for Michiganders that are infected with and contract COVID-19. See https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/need-extra-precautions/groups-at-higherrisk.html. Physical exercise, both cardiovascular exercise and strength training help improve those with at-risk factors associated with COVID-19. See, eg, https://www.norwalkhospital.org/newsroom/article-listing/adults-exercise-andcovid19.
64. Further, Plaintiffs are in a unique position to help those who have not contracted and may never contract COVID-19, but who are nonetheless struggling during these challenging times. Physical exercise has been proven to assist people with their mental health. Researchers have found that exercise helps with both depression and anxiety, two mental conditions that people across Michigan are struggling with in the face of Defendants’ lock down orders, social distancing, job loss, and dealing with unwell family members. See https://www.ted.com/talks/wendy_suzuki_the_brain_changing_benefits_of_exercise?language=en; See also https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/what-works-and-why/201803/how-yourmental-health-reaps-the-benefits-exercise.
65. On April 15, 2020, Planet Fitness sent a letter to Governor Whitmer outlining the economic impact that the closures have had on its business, the benefit that gyms have to the health and well-being to the citizens of Michigan, and outlining a comprehensive plan for reopening safely. See Exhibit 2, Letter from Planet Fitness to Governor Whitmer, dated April 15, 2020.
66. Likewise, on May 15, 2020, the Michigan Fitness Clubs Association sent a letter to Governor Whitmer. This letter also outlined the economic impact that the closures have

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had on its business, the benefit that gyms have to the health and well-being to the citizens of Michigan and outlining a comprehensive plan for reopening safely. See Exhibit 3, Letter from MFCA to Governor Whitmer, dated May 15, 2020.
67. Also on May 15, 2020, Plaintiff LIFFT, Inc. sent a letter to Governor Whitmer. As with the previous two letters, the letter from LIFFT to the Governor outlined the economic impact that the closures have had on its members, the benefit that gyms have to the health and well-being to the citizens of Michigan and outlining a comprehensive plan for reopening safely. See Exhibit 4, Letter from LIFFT, Inc. to Governor Whitmer, dated May 15, 2020.
68. Upon information and belief, there has been no response from the Governor’s Office to any of the correspondence outlined in paragraphs 65 through 67.
69. Plaintiffs incorporate all of the foregoing paragraphs into each of the following causes of action.
COUNT I DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE 70. “Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 71. The Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution grants Congress the power “[t]o regulate commerce with foreign Nations, among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.

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72. In its dormant state, often called the Dormant Commerce Clause, the Commerce Clause precludes States from enacting legislation that discriminates against or impermissibly burdens interstate commerce. State laws that facially discriminate against interstate commerce are invalid per se under the Commerce Clause. This is true also of State laws that are facially neutral, if they impermissibly burden interstate commerce in practice. West Lynn Creamery v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 194–195 (1994).
73. Although the Dormant Commerce Clause is usually invoked to challenge protectionist laws that favor in-state businesses over out-of-state businesses, the Clause has a broader function: to guarantee for all citizens the right to access and participate in interstate commerce. Just as no State can prevent out-of-staters from engaging in commerce with its residents, no State may prevent its residents from participating in commerce with those located in another State.
74. The Lockdown Orders impermissibly restrict Plaintiffs from exercising the right to engage in interstate commerce:
a. LIFFT. A portion of LIFFT’s members’ annual business involves customers who pay drop-in rates to workout at their fitness studio. This may and does include guests from outside of Michigan who are in town vacationing or seeing family and friends who are members of the studio. The Lockdown Orders have prevented, and still prevent, LIFFT’s members’ from operating their facilities at all, including selling services to customers from out-of-state customers because the Lockdown Orders categorically prohibit LIFFT’s members from operating their fitness facilities. LIFFT’s members’ have suffered a significant decrease in revenue and have lost business opportunities because of the Lockdown Orders.

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b. Baseline Fitness LLC. A portion of Baseline Fitness’ annual business involves customers who pay drop-in rates to workout at the fitness studio. This may and does include guests from outside of Michigan who are in town vacationing or seeing family and friends who are members of the studio. The Lockdown Orders have prevented, and still prevent, Baseline Fitness from operating its facility at all, including selling services to customers from out-of- state customers because the Lockdown Orders categorically prohibit Baseline Fitness’ facility from operating. Baseline Fitness has suffered a decrease in revenue and has lost business opportunities because of the Lockdown Orders.
c. Building Your Temple LLC. A portion of Building Your Temple’s annual business involves customers who pay drop-in rates to workout at the fitness studio. This may and does include guests from outside of Michigan who are in town vacationing or seeing family and friends who are members of the studio. The Lockdown Orders have prevented, and still prevent, Building Your Temple’s facility from operating at all, including selling services to customers from out-of- state customers because the Lockdown Orders categorically prohibit Building Your Temple’s facility from operating. Building Your Temple has suffered a decrease in revenue and has lost business opportunities because of the Lockdown Orders.
d. BYT Fitness 247 LLC. A portion of BYT Fitness 247’s annual business involves customers who pay drop-in rates to workout at the fitness studio. This may and does include guests from outside of Michigan who are in town vacationing or seeing family and friends who are members of the studio. The Lockdown Orders have prevented, and still prevent, BYT Fitness 247’s facility from operating at all, including selling services to customers from out-of- state customers because the Lockdown Orders categorically prohibit

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BYT Fitness 247’s facility from operating. BYT Fitness 247 has suffered a decrease in revenue and has lost business opportunities because of the Lockdown Orders.
e. H3 Fitness LLC. A portion of H3 Fitness’ annual business involves customers who pay drop-in rates to workout at the fitness studio. This may and does include guests from outside of Michigan who are in town vacationing or seeing family and friends who are members of the studio. The Lockdown Orders have prevented, and still prevent, H3 Fitness’ facility from operating at all, including selling services to customers from out-ofstate customers because the Lockdown Orders categorically prohibit H3 Fitness from operating its facility. H3 Fitness has suffered a decrease in revenue and has lost business opportunities because of the Lockdown Orders.
f. JKP Fitness. A portion of JKP Fitness’ annual business involves customers who pay drop-in rates to workout at the fitness studio. This may and does include guests from outside of Michigan who are in town vacationing or seeing family and friends who are members of the studio. The Lockdown Orders have prevented, and still prevent, JKP Fitness’ facility from operating at all, including selling services to customers from out-ofstate customers because the Lockdown Orders categorically prohibit JKP Fitness from operating its facility. JKP Enterprises has suffered a decrease in revenue and has lost business opportunities because of the Lockdown Orders.
g. JPF Enterprises. A portion of JPF Enterprises’ annual business involves customers who pay drop-in rates to workout at the fitness studio. This may and does include guests from outside of Michigan who are in town vacationing or seeing family and friends who are members of the studio. The Lockdown Orders have prevented, and still prevent, JPF Enterprises from operating its facility at all, including selling services to customers from out-

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of- state customers because the Lockdown Orders categorically prohibit JPF Enterprises’ facility from operating. JPF Enterprises has suffered lost business opportunities because of the Lockdown Orders.
h. Nascot Enterprises. A portion of Nascot Enterprises’ annual business involves customers who pay drop-in rates to workout at the fitness studios. This may and does include guests from outside of Michigan who are in town vacationing or seeing family and friends who are members of the studio. The Lockdown Orders have prevented, and still prevent, Nascot Enterprises from operating its facilities at all, including selling services to customers from out-of- state customers, because the Lockdown Orders categorically prohibit Nascot Enterprises from operating its facilities. Nascot Enterprises has suffered a decrease in revenue and has lost business opportunities because of the Lockdown Orders.
75. Governor Whitmer and Director Gordon acted under color of State law in an official capacity and within the scope of their official duties when issuing the Lockdown Orders.
76. Plaintiffs seek a declaration that the Lockdown Orders violate the Dormant Commerce Clause, and an injunction against further infringements of their rights under this Clause as described in the Prayer for Relief.
COUNT II PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES CLAUSE 77. “Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or

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immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
78. The Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV of the U.S. Constitution provides that “[t]he citizens of each State shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States.” U.S. Const. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1.
79. The Privileges and Immunities Clause protects a citizen’s right to pursue a livelihood in a State other than the State in which he is a resident. Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm’n of Montana, 436 U.S. 371 (1978).
80. By June 1, fitness studios in the following states have opened or will be open: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, West Virginia, and Wyoming. Notably, Michigan’s three bordering states of Indiana, Ohio and Wisconsin have also been or about to be opened.
81. The Lockdown Orders impermissibly restrict Plaintiffs from exercising their rights under the Privileges and Immunities Clause:
a. LIFFT. The Lockdown Orders have prevented, and continue to prevent, LIFFT’s members from seeking clients located outside of Michigan. They also categorically prohibit LIFFT’s members from opening their doors to keep people fit and health (mentally and physically), even though fitness studios like LIFFT’s members that are located in other States have been, and remain, free to do so.
b. Baseline Fitness LLC. The Lockdown Orders have prevented, and continue to prevent, Baseline Fitness from seeking clients located outside of Michigan. They

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also categorically prohibit Baseline Fitness from opening its doors to keep people fit and healthy (mentally and physically), even though fitness studios like Baseline Fitness that are located in other States have been, and remain, free to do so.
c. Building Your Temple LLC. The Lockdown Orders have prevented, and continue to prevent, Building Your Temple from seeking clients located outside of Michigan. They also categorically prohibit BYT Fitness 247 from opening its doors to keep people fit and healthy (mentally and physically), even though fitness studios like Building Your Temple that are located in other States have been, and remain, free to do so.
d. BYT Fitness 247. The Lockdown Orders have prevented, and continue to prevent, BYT Fitness 247 from seeking clients located outside of Michigan. They also categorically prohibit BYT Fitness 247 from opening its doors to keep people fit and healthy (mentally and physically), even though fitness studios like BYT Fitness 247 that are located in other States have been, and remain, free to do so.
e. H3 Fitness LLC. The Lockdown Orders have prevented, and continue to prevent, H3 Fitness from seeking clients located outside of Michigan. They also categorically prohibit H3 Fitness from opening its doors to keep people fit and healthy (mentally and physically), even though fitness studios like H3 Fitness that are located in other States have been, and remain, free to do so.
f. JKP Fitness. The Lockdown Orders have prevented, and continue to prevent, JKP Fitness from seeking clients located outside of Michigan. They also categorically prohibit JKP Fitness from opening its doors to keep people fit and healthy (mentally and physically), even though fitness studios like JKP Fitness that are located in other States have been, and remain, free to do so.

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g. JPF Enterprises. The Lockdown Orders have prevented, and continue to prevent, JPF Enterprises from seeking clients located outside of Michigan. They also categorically prohibit JPF Enterprises from opening its doors to keep people fit and healthy (mentally and physically), even though fitness studios like JPF Enterprises that are located in other States have been, and remain, free to do so.
h. Nascot Enterprises. The Lockdown Orders have prevented, and continue to prevent, Nascot Enterprises from seeking clients located outside of Michigan. They also categorically prohibit Nascot Enterprises from opening its doors to keep people fit and healthy (mentally and physically), even though fitness studios like Nascot Enterprises that are located in other States have been, and remain, free to do so.
82. Governor Whitmer and Director Gordon acted under color of State law in an official capacity and within the scope of their official duties when issuing the Lockdown Orders.
83. Plaintiffs seek a declaration that the Lockdown Orders violate the Privileges and Immunities Clause, and an injunction against further infringements of their rights under this Clause as described in the Prayer for Relief.
COUNT III PRIVILEGES OR IMMUNITIES CLAUSE 84. “Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

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85. The Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that “[n]o State [can] make or enforce any law [that] abridge[s] the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.” U.S. Const. am. XIV, § 1, cl. 2.
86. By June 1, fitness studios in the following states have opened or will be open: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, West Virginia, and Wyoming. Notably, Michigan’s three bordering states of Indiana, Ohio and Wisconsin have also been or about to be opened.
87. The Lockdown Orders impermissibly restrict Plaintiffs from exercising these rights:
a. LIFFT. The Lockdown Orders have prevented, and continue to prevent, LIFFT’s members from seeking clients located inside and outside of Michigan. They also categorically prohibit LIFFT’s members from opening their doors to keep people fit and health (mentally and physically), even though fitness studios like their members that are located in other States have been, and remain, free to do so. In fact, fitness studios in bordering states Indiana, Ohio and Wisconsin have been or about to be opened.
b. Baseline Fitness LLC. The Lockdown Orders have prevented, and continue to prevent, Baseline Fitness from seeking clients located inside and outside of Michigan. They also categorically prohibit Baseline Fitness from opening its doors to keep people fit and health (mentally and physically), even though fitness studios like Baseline Fitness that are located in other States have been, and remain, free to do so. In fact, fitness studios in bordering states Indiana, Ohio and Wisconsin have been or about to be opened.

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c. Building Your Temple LLC. The Lockdown Orders have prevented, and continue to prevent, Building Your Temple from seeking clients located inside and outside of Michigan. They also categorically prohibit Building Your Temple from opening its doors to keep people fit and health (mentally and physically), even though fitness studios like Building Your Temple that are located in other States have been, and remain, free to do so. In fact, fitness studios in bordering states Indiana, Ohio and Wisconsin have been or about to be opened.
d. BYT Fitness 247 LLC. The Lockdown Orders have prevented, and continue to prevent, BYT Fitness 247 from seeking clients located inside and outside of Michigan. They also categorically prohibit BYT Fitness 247 from opening its doors to keep people fit and health (mentally and physically), even though fitness studios like BYT Fitness 247 that are located in other States have been, and remain, free to do so. In fact, fitness studios in bordering states Indiana, Ohio and Wisconsin have been or about to be opened.
e. H3 Fitness LLC. The Lockdown Orders have prevented, and continue to prevent, H3 Fitness from seeking clients located inside and outside of Michigan. They also categorically prohibit H3 Fitness from opening its doors to keep people fit and health (mentally and physically), even though fitness studios like H3 Fitness that are located in other States have been, and remain, free to do so. In fact, fitness studios in bordering states Indiana, Ohio and Wisconsin have been or about to be opened.
f. JKP Fitness. The Lockdown Orders have prevented, and continue to prevent, JKP Fitness from seeking clients located inside and outside of Michigan. They also categorically prohibit JKP Fitness from opening its doors to keep people fit and health (mentally and physically), even though fitness studios like JKP Fitness that are located in

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other States have been, and remain, free to do so. In fact, fitness studios in bordering states Indiana, Ohio and Wisconsin have been or about to be opened.
g. JPF Enterprises. The Lockdown Orders have prevented, and continue to prevent, JPF Enterprises from seeking clients located inside and outside of Michigan. They also categorically prohibit JPF Enterprises from opening its doors to keep people fit and health (mentally and physically), even though fitness studios like JPF Enterprises that are located in other States have been, and remain, free to do so. In fact, fitness studios in bordering states Indiana, Ohio and Wisconsin have been or about to be opened.
h. Nascot Enterprises. The Lockdown Orders have prevented, and continue to prevent, Nascot Enterprises from seeking clients located inside and outside of Michigan. They also categorically prohibit Nascot Enterprises from opening its doors to keep people fit and health (mentally and physically), even though fitness studios like Nascot Enterprises that are located in other States have been, and remain, free to do so. In fact, fitness studios in bordering states Indiana, Ohio and Wisconsin have been or about to be opened.
88. Governor Whitmer and Director Gordon acted under color of State law in an official capacity and within the scope of their official duties when issuing the Lockdown Orders.
89. Plaintiffs seek a declaration that the Lockdown Orders violate the Privileges or Immunities Clause, and an injunction against further infringements of their rights under this Clause as described in the Prayer for Relief.

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COUNT IV PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS 90. “Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 91. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that no State can “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 3. 92. The procedural component of the Due Process Clause prohibits government from depriving Plaintiffs of liberty and property interests without providing any process before or after the deprivations occurred. 93. To establish a procedural due process claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must show that (1) it had a life, liberty, or property interest protected by the Due Process Clause; (2) it was deprived of this protected interest; and (3) the state did not afford it adequate procedural rights. See Daily Servs., LLC v. Valentino, 756 F.3d 893, 904 (CA6 2014). 94. Plaintiffs have a protected liberty interest in the right to live without arbitrary governmental interference with their liberty and property interests. County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 845 (1988). 95. Liberty “denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges

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long recognized . . . as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.” Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572 (1972) (emphases added).
96. Plaintiffs had protected liberty and property interests, which Defendants infringed through the Lockdown Orders:
a. LIFFT’s members have been, and are being, denied the right to intrastate travel and the right to engage in commerce, to-wit: operating fitness studios for their members.
b. Baseline Fitness LLC has been, and is being, denied the right to intrastate travel and the right to engage in commerce, to-wit: operating a fitness studio for its members.
c. Building Your Temple LLC has been, and is being, denied the right to intrastate travel and the right to engage in commerce, to-wit: operating a fitness studio for its members.
d. BYT Fitness 247 LLC has been, and is being, denied the right to intrastate travel and the right to engage in commerce, to-wit: operating a fitness studio for its members.
e. H3 Fitness LLC has been, and is being, denied the right to intrastate travel and the right to engage in commerce, to-wit: operating a fitness studio for its members.
f. JKP Fitness has been, and is being, denied the right to intrastate travel and the right to engage in commerce, to-wit: operating a fitness studio for its members.
g. JPF Enterprises has been, and is being, denied the right to intrastate travel and the right to engage in commerce, to-wit: operating a fitness studio for its members.

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h. Nascot Enterprises has been, and is being, denied the right to intrastate travel and the right to engage in commerce, to-wit: operating a fitness studio for its members.
97. Neither Governor Whitmer nor Director Gordon provided any procedural due process before issuing the Lockdown Orders. Nor do the Lockdown Orders provide any mechanism for post-deprivation review.
98. Governor Whitmer and Director Gordon acted under color of State law in an official capacity and within the scope of their official duties when issuing the Lockdown Orders.
99. As a direct and proximate cause of the failure to provide any pre- or postdeprivation process, Plaintiffs suffered prejudice under threat of criminal and civil sanctions.
100. These orders and rules acknowledge that so-called “critical” businesses and those “noncritical” can safely operate by adhering to “social distancing” rules delineated in Section 11 of EO 2020-59, including the arbitrary “enhanced social distancing” rules that apply only to the “noncritical” businesses allowed to resume operations.
101. Plaintiffs can operate in full compliance with all of these rules. 102. By failing to provide any pre- or post-deprivation review of the orders and rules shuttering their businesses, Plaintiffs are suffering substantial losses of liberty and property:
a. LIFFT. LIFFT’s members have lost significant revenue over the ten weeks since the Lockdown Orders went into effect. LIFFT’s members will continue to experience financial losses in the second quarter of 2020 and beyond because of the Lockdown Orders, due to individuals cancelling memberships at LIFFT’s members’ fitness

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facilities that would not otherwise have done so, as well as lost business opportunities for new members.
b. Baseline Fitness LLC. Baseline Fitness LLC has lost significant revenue over the ten weeks since the Lockdown Orders went into effect. Baseline Fitness LLC will continue to experience significant financial losses in the second quarter of 2020 and beyond because of the Lockdown Orders due to its members cancelling memberships that would not otherwise have done so, as well as lost business opportunities for new members.
c. Building Your Temple LLC. Building Your Temple LLC has lost significant revenue over the ten weeks since the Lockdown Orders went into effect. Building Your Temple will continue to experience significant financial losses in the second quarter of 2020 and beyond because of the Lockdown Orders due to its members cancelling memberships that would not otherwise have done so, as well as lost business opportunities for new members.
d. BYT Fitness 247 LLC. BYT Fitness 247 has lost significant revenue over the ten weeks since the Lockdown Orders went into effect. BYT Fitness 247 will continue to experience significant financial losses in the second quarter of 2020 and beyond because of the Lockdown Orders due to its members cancelling memberships that would not otherwise have done so, as well as lost business opportunities for new members.
e. H3 Fitness LLC. H3 Fitness has lost significant revenue over the ten weeks since the Lockdown Orders went into effect. H3 Fitness will continue to experience significant financial losses in the second quarter of 2020 and beyond because of the Lockdown Orders due to its members cancelling memberships that would not otherwise have done so, as well as lost business opportunities for new members.

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f. JKP Fitness. JKP Fitness has lost significant revenue over the ten weeks since the Lockdown Orders went into effect. JKP Fitness will continue to experience significant financial losses in the second quarter of 2020 and beyond because of the Lockdown Orders due to its members cancelling memberships that would not otherwise have done so, as well as lost business opportunities for new members.
g. JPF Enterprises. JPF Enterprises has lost membership revenue over the ten weeks since the Lockdown Orders went into effect. JPF Enterprises will continue to experience significant financial losses in the second quarter of 2020 and beyond, as well as lost business opportunities for new members.
h. Nascot Enterprises. Nascot Enterprises has lost significant revenue over the ten weeks since the Lockdown Orders went into effect. Nascot Enterprises will continue to experience significant financial losses in the second quarter of 2020 and beyond because of the Lockdown Orders due to its members cancelling memberships that would not otherwise have done so, as well as lost business opportunities for new members.
103. The prejudice each Plaintiff has suffered would not have occurred but for Defendants’ deprivations of their liberty and property interests.
104. Plaintiffs seek a declaration that the Lockdown Orders violate the procedural component of the Due Process Clause, and an injunction against further infringements of their rights under this Clause as described in the Prayer for Relief.
COUNT V SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESSS 105. “Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or

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other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
106. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that no State can “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 3.
107. The substantive component of the Due Process Clause prohibits government from taking action that “shocks the conscience” or “interferes with rights implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.” United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987) (cleaned up).
108. Plaintiffs have a protected liberty interest in the right to live without arbitrary governmental interference with their liberty and property interests. County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 845 (1988).
109. Liberty “denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized . . . as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.” Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572 (1972) (emphases added).
110. The Lockdown Orders shock the conscience and interfere with Plaintiffs’ deeply-rooted liberty and property rights, including the to work, right to contract, and right to engage in commerce, for all of the reasons described in the General Allegations and in each of the Counts of this Complaint, which are incorporated into this Paragraph by reference.

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111. Each Plaintiff could and can conduct business in full compliance with all of the rules imposed on businesses allowed to operate under the Lockdown Orders, or reasonably equivalent and equally safe measures tailored to the unique nature of the in-person operations. Thus, the Lockdown Orders are not narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling governmental interest.
112. Nor is there any rational basis to deprive Plaintiffs of their liberty and property interests in performing services for willing customers when they can do so safely and in the same (or reasonably safe equivalent) manner as other businesses allowed to operate (such as manufacturing, restaurants, and bars).
113. In the alternative, the Lockdown Orders are not reasonably related to a legitimate governmental interest.
114. Governor Whitmer and Director Gordon acted under color of State law in an official capacity and within the scope of their official duties when issuing the Lockdown Orders.
115. Plaintiffs seek a declaration that the Lockdown Orders violate the substantive component of the Due Process Clause, and an injunction against further infringements of their rights under this Clause as described in the Prayer for Relief.
COUNT V EQUAL PROTECTION 116. “Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or

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immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
117. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that no State can “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 4.
118. The Lockdown Orders deprive Plaintiffs of the equal protection of the law because they allow some businesses to operate but not Plaintiffs’ businesses, even though they are similarly situated.
119. Each Plaintiff could and can conduct business in full compliance with all of the rules imposed on businesses allowed to operate under the Lockdown Orders, or reasonably equivalent and equally safe measures tailored to the unique nature of the in-person operations. Thus, the Lockdown Orders are not narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling governmental interest.
120. Nor is there any rational basis to deprive Plaintiffs of their liberty and property interests in performing services for willing customers when they can do so safely and in the same (or reasonably safe equivalent) manner as other businesses allowed to operate.
121. In the alternative, the Lockdown Orders are not reasonably related to a legitimate governmental interest.
122. Governor Whitmer and Director Gordon acted under color of State law in an official capacity and within the scope of their official duties when issuing the Lockdown Orders.

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123. Plaintiffs seek a declaration that the Lockdown Orders violate the Equal Protection Clause, and an injunction against further infringements of their rights under this Clause as described in the Prayer for Relief.
COUNT VI DECLARATORY JUDGMENT VOID FOR VAGUENESS 124. There is an actual and present controversy between the parties. 125. Plaintiffs contend that the Lockdown Orders are unconstitutionally vague under the void-for-vagueness doctrine under the U.S. and Michigan constitutions. 126. The void-for-vagueness doctrine requires penal laws to define criminal conduct with sufficient precision that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited, and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357–358 (1983). This doctrine flows from the Due Process Clause. Michigan Dep’t of State Compliance & Rules Div. v. Michigan Educ. Ass’n, 251 Mich. App. 110, 116 (2002); U.S Const., am. XIV; Mich. Const. (1963), art. I, § 17. 127. The Lockdown Orders purport to carry the force of law and (with the exception of Director Gordon’s Emergency Rule) makes any willful violation of their terms a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment or a fine. It is therefore subject to the void-forvagueness doctrine. 128. EO 2020-42 through EO 2020-96 allow certain businesses to continue operations if they fall within certain “sectors” of the economy, but it does not identify any criteria by which a business owner can safely determine whether his or her business falls within that sector. Incongruities are evident within the order.

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129. The very fact that the Governor needs a webpage to answer “frequently asked questions” about the scope of the order shows that it’s vague. Michiganders are smart people. If “ordinary people” could understand the Lockdown Order, then there would be no need for 927 FAQs on these orders on the State’s coronavirus webpage. The orders are also constantly being “clarified” in news articles, press conferences, and revised orders. Still, pervasive confusion remains each time a new order is released.
130. On information and belief, Governor Whitmer and Director Gordon deny these contentions.
131. Plaintiffs seek a judicial declaration that the Lockdown Orders are void for vagueness, and an injunction against enforcement or adoption of these and similar orders and rules in the future as described in the Prayer for Relief.
COUNT VII DECLARATORY JUDGMENT SEPARATION OF POWERS 132. There is an actual and present controversy between the parties. 133. Plaintiffs contend that EO 2020-43 through EO 2020-96 (and their predecessors) related to the closure of Plaintiffs’ businesses violate the Separation of Powers Clause in Article III, Section 2 of the Michigan Constitution of 1963, and that the EOs prohibit them—directly through the executive order itself and indirectly through Director Gordon’s Emergency Order and Emergency Rule—from engaging activities in which they would otherwise be free to engage under threat of criminal sanction. 134. The Separation of Powers Clause provides that “[t]he powers of government are divided into three branches: legislative, executive, and judicial. No person exercising

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powers of one branch shall exercise powers properly belonging to another branch except as expressly provided in this constitution.” Mich. Const. (1963) art. III, § 2.
135. The Emergency Powers Act violates the Separation of Powers Clause because it vests governors with total legislative power whenever a governor asserts the existence of an emergency.
136. The Emergency Management Act does not violate the Separation of Powers Clause on its face, but it does as Governor Whitmer has applied it. As the Governor appears to construe it, the Emergency Management Act gives her limitless powers equal in scope to the Emergency Powers Act. The language of the Act does not confer such unlimited powers on the Governor.
137. On information and belief, Governor Whitmer and Director Gordon deny these contentions.
138. Plaintiffs seek a judicial declaration that the Lockdown Orders violate the Separation of Powers Clause, and an injunction against enforcement or adoption of these and similar orders and rules in the future as described in the Prayer for Relief.
COUNT VIII DECLARATORY JUDGMENT UNLAWFUL EXERCISE OF EMERGENCY POWERS ACT 139. There is an actual and present controversy between the parties. 140. Plaintiffs contend that EO 2020-43 and EO 2020-59 (and their predecessors) violate the Emergency Powers Act, if they pass constitutional muster. 141. Viruses, like SARS-CoV-2, and the diseases they can cause, like COVID-19, are not the kind of emergencies contemplated under the Emergency Powers Act, which applies “[d]uring times of great public crisis, disaster, rioting, catastrophe, or similar public

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emergency within the state, or reasonable apprehension of immediate danger of a public emergency of that kind, when public safety is imperiled....” Mich. Comp. Laws § 10.31.
142. Public health and public safety are distinct legal concepts. Governor Whitmer has not identified a public safety emergency in any of the EOs. Instead, she has only selectively quoted from the portion of the Act that allows her to issue orders necessary to protect life or property or to bring the emergency under control. EO 2020-42, Preamble ¶ 4. Absent a public safety emergency, the Governor has no power to issue orders under the Emergency Powers Act at all. Neither SARS-CoV-2 nor COVID-19 have presented a public safety emergency.
143. Alternatively, even if SARS-CoV-2 or COVID-19 qualify as a public safety emergency, the Emergency Powers Act does not authorize the de facto statewide house arrest imposed under the EOs. The Act says a governor may “designat[e] specific zones within the area in which occupancy and use of buildings and ingress and egress of persons and vehicles may be prohibited or regulated.” Mich. Comp. Laws § 10.31(1). Governor Whitmer, however, has regulated occupancy and use of buildings statewide. The EOs violate the Act because it is not limited to specific zones within Michigan.
144. Alternatively, the Emergency Powers Act only authorizes a governor to issue reasonable orders that are considered necessary to protect life or property or to bring the emergency under control. Mich. Comp. Laws § 10.31(1).
145. The EOs are objectively unreasonable. There can be nothing more unreasonable than keeping 10 million people under house arrest because 0.38% of the population has contracted a disease that has killed less than 0.03% of the population.

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146. Likewise, it is unreasonable to cause nearly 1.2 million men and women to lose their jobs virtually overnight, or to cripple businesses, or to cause businesses to permanently close on those same facts, especially when many of these people reside in counties with less than 25 cases and far fewer (or even no) deaths.
147. Michigan has 83 counties. As of May 16, 2020, three counties in Michigan still had no confirmed cases, and 32 counties had fewer than 25 cases. As of that same date, 21 counties had no deaths, and 57 counties had less than 10 deaths.
148. Similarly, it is unreasonable to maintain these EOs when the policies contained within them have plunged the State into Depression-level unemployment.
149. On information and belief, Governor Whitmer and Director Gordon deny these contentions.
150. Plaintiffs seek a judicial declaration that the Eos violate the Emergency Powers Act, an injunction against enforcement of the Lockdown Orders, and an injunction against similar orders and rules in the future as described in the Prayer for Relief.
COUNT IX DECLARATORY JUDGMENT UNLAWFUL EXERCISE OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT ACT 151. There is an actual and present controversy between the parties. 152. Plaintiffs contend that EO 2020-43 and EO 2020-59 (and their predecessors) violate the Emergency Management Act, if they pass constitutional muster. 153. The Emergency Management Act permits a governor to declare a disaster in response to the occurrence of threat of widespread loss of life resulting from natural causes, including an epidemic. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 30.402(e) (including epidemics in the list of

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 1 filed 05/22/20 PageID.43 Page 43 of 45
causes of disasters). Thus, infectious diseases by themselves are not a permissible reason to invoke the Act—the disease must reach or threaten to reach epidemic status.
154. Although the World Health Organization has classified SARS-CoV-2 as a pandemic, that is not controlling under Michigan law. The existence of an epidemic must be determined solely from the perspective of the facts as they exist on the ground in Michigan.
155. With confirmed infections affecting only 0.38% of the State as of the date of this Complaint, no epidemic actually exists throughout all of Michigan. While a regional epidemic likely exists in a few densely populated areas, one does not exist in all 83 counties in Michigan, as demonstrated by persistently low numbers of infections and deaths in the majority of Michigan’s counties.
156. In addition, the Emergency Management Act does not contemplate declaring the entire State a disaster area. Among other things, the Act allows a governor to issue orders affecting a “stricken” or “threatened” area, including mandatory evacuation orders, controlling ingress and egress from that area, and the occupancy of premises within that area. Mich. Comp. Laws § 30.405(1)(e)–(g).
157. Moreover, even when grounds exist to declare a disaster, the executive order must indicate, among other things, the nature of the conditions permitting the termination of the state of disaster. Mich. Comp. Laws § 30.403(3). None of Governor Whitmer’s executive orders have articulated objective conditions that, when satisfied, would permit the termination of the state of disaster.
158. On information and belief, Governor Whitmer and Director Gordon deny these contentions.

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159. Plaintiffs seek a judicial declaration that the EOs violate the Emergency Management Act, an injunction against enforcement the Lockdown Orders, and an injunction against similar orders and rules in the future as described in the Prayer for Relief.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully ask the Court to grant them the following relief:

a. A declaratory judgment that the Lockdown Orders: b. violate Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights as set forth in this Complaint; c. are void for vagueness; and/or d. violate the Separation of Powers Clause of the Michigan Constitution, the Emergency Powers Act, and/or the Emergency Management Act; e. Enjoin Governor Whitmer and Director Gordon from enforcing the Lockdown Orders and from issuing any future orders or rules similar to the invalid ones described in this action; f. Award Plaintiffs their reasonable attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and any other applicable law; and g. Any other such further relief to which Plaintiffs may be entitled as a matter of law or equity, or which the Court determines to be just and proper.

JURY DEMAND Under the Seventh Amendment to the U.S Constitution and Rule 38(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiffs demand trial by jury on all issues so triable.

Dated: May 22, 2020

Respectfully submitted,

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/s/ Scott M. Erskine_________________ SCOTT M. ERSKINE (P54714) CARLY VAN THOMME (P59706) ERSKINE LAW, PC Attorneys for Plaintiffs 612 West University Drive Rochester, Michigan 48307 (248) 601-4497 serskine@erskinelaw.com

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DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

_____________________________________________________

LEAGUE OF INDPENDENT FITNESS FACITLITIES AND TRAINERS, INC., BASELINE FITNESS LLC, BUILDING YOUR TEMPLE LLC, BYT FITNESS 247 LLC, H3 FITNESS LLC, JKP FITNESS, LLC JPF ENTERPRISES, LLC, and NASCOT ENTERPRISES, LLC,
Plaintiffs, v. GRETCHEN E. WHITMER and ROBERT GORDON,
Defendants. _____________________________________________________
ERSKINE LAW, PC Scott M. Erskine (P54734) Carly Van Thomme (P59706) Attorneys for Plaintiffs 612 W. University Rochester, MI. 48307 (248) 601-4499 serskine@erskinelaw.com _____________________________________________________

Civil No. Hon.
COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

EXHIBIT 1 ANDERSON ECONOMIC REPORT

m CaseC1a:2s0e-c1v:2-000-c4v5-80-0P3L6M0-PEJCGF NEoC.F1N-1of.il1e-d10fi4le/2d80/250/22P/2a0gePIDa.g3e5IDP.4a7geP5aogfe428 of 45 ANDERSON ECONOMIC GROUP

Memorandum

Date:

April 13, 2020

To: From:
Re:

Daniel McCarthy, Shareholder, Butzel Long
Patrick Anderson, Principal Brian Peterson, Consultant
COVID-19 Progression and Effects of Business Closures on Michigan's Workers

Purpose of this Memorandum
The COVID-19 pandemic has created unprecedented public health and economic disturbances across the globe. Michigan has been one of the most affected states in America, with over 22,600 cases reported as of Friday, April 10. Michigan's response (including the first Executive Order issued on March 10), the dramatic efforts of many health care workers, and the extraordinary actions of many employers and volunteers have also been significant.
We all recognize two serious problems: First, we face a severe public health crisis, with tremendous human costs to its victims as well as to the many people who care for them. Second, we are enduring unprecedented costs of travel and gathering restrictions, business closures, prohibitions on work, and cancellations of both private and public events.
Given these twin threats, it is critical that the State's leaders have the best information available to project spread of the virus; to consider the impact of preventative measures such as social distancing and "stay at home" orders; and to understand the scale of the effect of the prohibitions on work and other restrictions on Michigan's workers and our ability to produce the goods and services we need.
Anderson Economic Group has been retained to summarize the best information now available on both the course of the COVID-19 epidemic and its effects on the Michigan economy. In this memorandum, we provide a summary ofCOVID-19's progression, discuss the impact of the virus and stay at home orders on Michigan's economy, and identify large variances between the identification of "critical" and "essential" workers during this emergency.

Anderson Economic Group LLC • www.AndersonEconomicGroup.com
1555 Watertower Place, Suite I 00 • East Lansing, Ml 48823 • Tel: (517) 333-6984 East Lansing | Chicago

CaseC1a:2s0e-c1v:2-000-c4v5-80-0P3L6M0-PEJCGF NEoC.F1N-1of.il1e-d10fi4le/2d80/250/22P/2a0gePIDa.g3e6IDP.4a8geP6aogfe438 of 45 Daniel McCarthy, Shareholder, Butzel Long, April 13, 2020, page 2
Approach
Epidemiology Model. Modeling the spread of COVID-19 is a challenging endeavor. Data on the virus are nearly always incomplete, and our ability to test and diagnose people is inconsistent. However, we now have several weeks of consistent, daily data on cases from independent sources. These provide a solid basis for an assessment of the current situation.
We provide below a modeling of the epidemic in the State of Michigan, using daily data and the widely-used SIR epidemiological model. Subject to the limitations of this and every model, we present the evidence on the current situation in Michigan and do so in a manner that provides a superior level of transparency and credibility.
We also identify comparisons from the small number of similar analyses that are now available, including the IHME projections widely presented in the United States. We note that the most recent IHME projections for Michigan are very close to the results we present here.
We provide additional information about the data, the SIR model, and our methodology in "Appendix B: Methodology and Data" on page 17.
Employment Effects Analysis. In order to estimate the economic impacts of COVID-19 and stay at home orders, we created a custom model that predicts the economy-wide impacts of the virus and emergency orders, done on a state-by-state basis. Our model estimates not only the impact on job losses, but also the impact on workers across each state who are at risk of losing income-a much larger group than just those who file for unemployment.
This analysis is based on a review of stay at home orders for each state, as well as data from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, and U.S. Department of Labor. Consistent with our intention to provide credible, transparent information, we also reference projections of the impact of these restrictions that were released in mid-March, as well as the unemployment claims figures released in the subsequent weeks, which corroborate these projections.
State Executive Orders and Federal Homeland Security Classifications. We review the Department of Homeland Security's memo and subsequent guidance on critical workers during this emergency and compare it with a similar classification of workers in two Michigan executive orders. We note the significant differences between these two that affect Michigan workers and the residents.

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Findings
Our analysis and review led to the following findings.
1. Epidemiological models and current data suggest that COVID-19 infections have peaked in Michigan.
Epidemiological evidence strongly suggests that Michigan has reached its peak COVID-19 infection rate for the current wave of the epidemic. This evidence includes both our own assessment-using an industry-standard SIR model and U.S.-only data-and the IHME assessment ofApril 8, which utilizes both U.S. and China data and a unique model IHME developed for this purpose.
Michigan Results, Standard SIR Model. The daily Michigan case data used in our analysis was collected by the New York Times from State sources and selected because of its consistency and reliability across multiple states. 1 We estimated a standard SIR model using these data, using an iterative re-estimating procedure to reveal both the current projection of the path ofthe outbreak and the changes in the estimated parameters over time.
For approximately one week now, the data have consistently indicated that the infection rate began slowly, accelerated, and then reached a peak rate in the past week. Ifthis pattern continues, we can expect the number of new cases to slowly drop over time during the current wave of the epidemic.
This pattern-which produces the distinctive "S" curve-is consistent with both theory, and decades of experience across the globe with numerous epidemics. These data strongly indicate the path ofthe epidemic has begun to slow down, suggesting that social distancing and other mitigation efforts have been effective. The peak number of people infected, shown in the Anderson Economic Group analysis, and the peak hospital utilization, shown in the IHME analysis, both appear to have passed in the week that began April 5, 2020.
See Figure 1 on page 5.
Note that these analyses pre-date the reports from the Easter weekend, which may have been incomplete but which also show a declining number of cases. Furthermore, these analyses focus on the current wave of the epidemic, which is the only wave for which any data are available.
Comparison with Other Epidemiological Models. This result is consistent with that of other entities that have modeled Michigan's epidemiology, including those oflHME (as reported April 8) and others. In particular, the most recent IHME results show a nearly identical pattem.2
1. There are minor discrepancies between the NYT compilation, and the daily-reported numbers from the Michigan DHS. These discrepancies are usually under 1%.

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Variation Across Michigan Counties; Results in Detroit Metro Area. There is significant variation in the intensity of the outbreak across the state. In particular, many counties have reported total cases of less than a dozen. At the same time, Wayne, Oakland, and Macomb Counties have intensive epidemics. Corroborating our results for the State as a whole, each of these three counties, all with large number of cases, demonstrates a similar pattern of acceleration in the number of cases in February and March, and then an apparent peak in the first half ofApril.
We show similar analyses for these counties in case counts in "Appendix A: Additional Figures" on page 13. See in particular Figure 6 on page 16.
Limitations of these Data and Epidemiological Models. We also note the limitations of these data and every epidemiological model in "Appendix B: Methodology and Data" on page 17.
Among these limitations, please note that, for many counties in Michigan, the number of case counts is so small that we do not have enough data to model the course of an epidemic at this point. We, of course, hope the numbers remain small in many such counties. However, we do expect that case numbers in some counties will grow enough to allow later estimation in these counties as well.

2. As noted in the appendix, the IHME model uses a mixture of U.S. and China-reported data, and a unique model that focuses on hospital usage rather than cases. Furthermore, the IHME results have varied significantly over time. This comparison is with the most recently-released results.

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CaseC1a:2s0e-c1v:2-000-c4v5-80-0P3L6M0-PEJCGF NEoC.F1N-1of.il1e-d10fi4le/2d80/250/22P/2a0gePIDa.g3e9IDP.5a1geP9aogfe468 of 45 Daniel McCarthy, Shareholder, Butzel Long, April 13, 2020, page 5

FIGURE 1. COVID-19 Total Infections, Infection Rate, and Growth Rate in Michigan

MICHIGAN: coronavirus epidemic (SIR model): 10-Apr-2020
a- = 1.95 Tc= 2.01 Tr= 3.93 N = 39210 Cend = 30681 Send = 8528 RMSE = 212
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CaseC1a:s2e0-1c:v2-00-0c4v5-080-P36L0M-PEJCGF NEoC. F1-N1ofi.le1d-10f4il/e2d8/0250/22P/a2g0eIPDa.4g0eIDP.a5g2e P10agoef 478of 45 Daniel McCarthy, Shareholder, Butzel Long, April 13, 2020, page 6

2. Michigan s "stay at home" order, along with decisions made by private citizens and employers, has resulted in a severe contraction in the States economy.

We now have Depression-level unemployment in Michigan, with over 16% of our workforce becoming unemployed in just three weeks. This will grow more severe as time passes and likely affect the incomes of 1.4 million Michigan workers and their families.
Executive Orders Restricting Work and Travel. On March 23, Michigan Governor Gretchen Whitmer issued a "stay at home" order requiring all nonessential workers to stay home and not go their workplace. At the time, Michigan had more reported COVID-19 cases than any other state save for New York and New Jersey. This order-already the second on the epidemic-became effective March 24 and was effective through April 13.3 The purpose of this order was to suppress the spread of COVID-19, prevent the state's healthcare system from being overwhelmed, and allow time for the state to procure necessary medical equipment needed to "prevent needless deaths." On April 9, the governor extended the stay at home order until April 30, strengthened some of the restrictions, and noted that the original stay at home order was effective, but that COVID19 was still "aggressive and persistent."4

On March 17, Anderson Economic Group estimated that, as a result of COVID-19 and the stay at home orders in this and other states, an unprecedented number ofAmericans would lose income due to layoffs, furloughs, pay cuts, and mandatory sick leave. We estimated that 1.5 million Michiganders could lose two or more days worth of income, along with 2.0 million workers in Illinois and 3.3 million workers in New York. These estimates are shown in Table 1 below.5

TABLE 1. Projection of Workers Losing Significant Income due to COVID-19 and Stay-at-home Orders, March-April 2020

State

Estimated Number of Workers Losing Significant
Income

Michigan

1,468,720

Illinois

1,958,468

NewYork

3,327,870

Source: Anderson Economic Group estimates, March 19, 2020.

3. Michigan Governor Executive Order 2020-21, "Temporary requirements to suspend activities that are not necessary to sustain or protect life." See https://www.michigan.gov/whitmer/0,9309,7-38790499_90705-522626--,00.html. As noted above, the first executive order (No. 2020-4, March 10, 2020) declared a state of emergency and noted that the first case had just been identified in the State. 4. Michigan Governor Executive Order 2020-42, "Temporary requirement to suspend activities that are not necessary to sustain or protect life, Rescission of Executive order 2020-21." See https://www.michigan.gov/whitmer/0,9309,7-387-90499_90705-525182--,00.html.

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Immediate and Large Loss of Employment. Over the past three weeks, the impact of the stay at home order on the state's economy has become apparent. Unfortunately, the most recent data in Michigan and other states indicate that our mid-March estimates were probably conservative.
Since March 28, Michigan has recorded over 815,000 unemployment claims. The number ofjobless workers has overwhelmed the State's unemployment offices, underlining the scale of the job loss and suggesting that many more are unemployed than have been able to claim benefits. Even counting only those that filed indicates that approximately 16.5% of the state's labor force has filed for unemployment in less than three weeks-an unprecedented occurrence. Counting those already filed as of last week, and those already attempting to file this week, Michigan now has depression-level unemployment.
Nationwide, Michigan has been one of the hardest hit states, as shown in Figure 2 below.
FIGURE 2. Three-Week Initial Unemployment Claims as a Percentage of Total Workforce Size as of April 4, 2020

,, .,J

D a.5%-5% - 5.1%-7.5% - 1.6% -10%

10.1%- 12.5% - 12.6%- 16.5%

Source: Anderson Economic Group analysis of base data from the U.S. Department of Labor, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.

5. See the Anderson Economic Group's website for most recent estimates of affected workers. https:// www.AndersonEconomicGroup.com/.

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Impact Throughout Multiple Industries. While the unemployment claims numbers provide some insight into the current state of the Michigan economy, the impact of COVID-19 extends well beyond just those who were able to file for unemployment in the last three weeks.
Across the Midwest, workers in nearly all industries outside of government are being furloughed, asked to take a pay cut, or are taking mandatory paid time off. The U.S. Department of Labor's three most recent unemployment insurance claims press releases note that, in Michigan, significant increases in unemployment claims are coming from nearly every industry in the state, including food service; manufacturing; construction; retail trade; administrative, support, waste management, and remediation services; health care and social assistance; arts, entertainment and recreation; transportation and warehousing; real estate; professional services; and educational services.6
The impact has been especially severe on small business, with many owners struggling to keep their doors open. Although Congress authorized a number of small business lending programs aimed at helping small businesses make it through the epidemic, very few funds have actually been dispersed even though Michigan businesses have been shut down for nearly one month. Small business owners who have applied for relief have encountered a plethora of challenges, including technical glitches, overwhelmed banks, and slow processing times, adding to the already high level of anxiety that small business owners were facing as policymakers ordered all nonessential businesses shut down.
A recent forecast from the University of Michigan Research Seminar in Quantitative Economics predicts that Michigan's unemployment rate in the second quarter of 2020 will average 23 percent-even higher than the forecasted U.S. quarterly peak of 14 percent.7

6. U.S. Department ofLabor Unemployment Insurance Weekly Claims report for April 9, 2020, April 2, 2020, and March 26, 2020. See https://www.dol.gov/. The comments on individual states are attributed to the state unemployment agencies. 7. Gabriel Ehrlich, George Fulton, and Saul Hymans, "Update April 9: The U.S. and Michigan Economic Outlook for 2020-2022," University ofMichigan Ann Arbor Research Seminar in Quantitative Economics." See: https://lsa.umich.edu/econ/rsqe/forecasts.html.

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3. The US. Department ofHomeland Security's memorandum on "essential" workers during the COVID-19 pandemic explicitly recognizes many workers that are not recognized in Michigan 's Executive Order.
On March 19, the Department Homeland Security (DHS) issued a memorandum on the identification of "essential infrastructure workers" during the COVID-19 response. 8 The following guidance from the memorandum is of particular importance:
• The memorandum states that those who work in critical infrastructure industries "have a special responsibility to maintain [their] normal work schedule."
• The memorandum lists a range of "operations and services that are essential to continued critical infrastructure viability." These include management, call centers, construction, telecommunications, information technology, food, agriculture, transportation, energy, wastewater, manufacturing and logistics, and health care workers.
• The memorandum states that "all organizations should implement business continuity plans," and that in the "modem economy, reliance on technology and just-in-time supply chains means that certain workers must be able to access certain sites, facilities, and assets to continue continuity of functions."
On March 28, DHS released a revised memorandum identifying a larger set of essential industries and workers.9 The occupations and industries identified in this revised document include workers in some of Michigan's most important economic sectors. For example, Trade, Transportation, and Utilities is Michigan's largest sector by employment, with over 800,000 workers, and the State's Manufacturing sector employs 625,000 workers. 10
These memos note the following items that are especially germane to key industries in Michigan:
• The DHS memo explicitly notes the importance oftransportation, logistics, and automotive repair and maintenance.
• The DHS memo classifies "central office personnel" who "maintain and operate central office, data centers, and other network office facilities" as essential employees.
• The DHS memo also notes the essential nature of"workers necessary for the manufacturing of materials and products needed for medical supply chains, transportation, energy, communications, food and agriculture... " and many other products.
• The March 28 DHS memo expands its definition of essential workers to a variety of industries, including some that are particularly important to Michigan's economy, such as transportation and manufacturing.
Need to Recognize True Extent of Critical and Essential Workers. As was apparent at the onset of this emergency, and consistent with the guidance from the U.S. government that was cited in Michigan Executive Order 2020-42 and prior orders, it is critical to support
8. Christopher Krebs, "Memorandum on Identification of Essential Critical Infrastructure Workers During COVID-19 Response," March 19, 2020. 9. Christopher Krebs, "Advisory Memorandum on Identification of Essential Critical Infrastructure Workers During COVID-19 Response," March 28, 2020. 10. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, "Economy At a Glance: Michigan," https://www.bls.gov/.

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"essential" workers in a range of industries. The purpose of the DHS memo was to highlight the importance of these workers and "help State and local officials ensure continuity of functions critical to public health and safety." However, Michigan Executive Order 2020-42 explicitly states that it does not adopt any of the guidance issued by DHS subsequent to the March 19 memorandum, meaning that the Governor's order excludes those additional industries and workers identified as essential by the DHS as of March
28. 11
The March 19 DHS memo was issued at a time when stay at home orders were anticipated to be short-term affairs. Since then, stay at home orders across the country have been extended. It is important to recognize that the longer these stay at home orders are in effect, the more workers must be classified as essential in order to maintain supply chains and perform essential services.
The DHS memorandum fully anticipates that changes in conditions over time and differences in the intensity of the outbreak will be taken into account by State and local governments, as well as private sector organizations. Consistent with this explicit guidance, Michigan and other states should take notice of differing infection rates within our state; as well as how changes in the course of the epidemic impact which workers and industries should be classified as essential.

11. Paragraph 8 of Michigan's Executive Order 2020-42 states: "For purposes ofthis order, critical infrastructure workers are those workers described by the Director of the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency in his guidance ofMarch 19, 2020 on the COVID-19 response (available here). This order does not adopt any subsequent guidance document released by this same agency." [Emphasis in original.]

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CaseC1a:2s0e-c1v:2-000-c4v5-80-0P3L6M0-PEJCGF NEoC.F1N-1of.il1e-d10fi4le/2d80/250/22P/2a0gePIDa.g4e5IDP.5a7geP1a5goef 1428 of 45 Daniel McCarthy, Shareholder, Butzel Long, April 13, 2020, page 11
About the Authors Patrick L. Anderson. Mr. Patrick L. Anderson founded Anderson Economic Group in 1996, and serves as the company's principal and CEO. A nationally-recognized expert in business economics and a sought-after speaker, Mr. Anderson has led several major public policy initiatives in his home state. He was awarded both the Michigan Chamber of Commerce's Leadership Michigan award and the University of Michigan's Neal Staebler award for civic leadership. His writing has earned five prestigious national awards from the National Association of Business Economics.
Brian R Peterson. Mr. Peterson is a consultant and director of public policy and economic analysis with Anderson Economic Group. His work focuses on economic and fiscal impact modeling, actuarial analysis, and environmental economics. Prior to joining AEG, Mr. Peterson worked as a policy analyst in regional economic development and transportation planning in the Chicago region.
Contributors
The authors wish to recognize the contribution of the following individuals: • Andrew Miller, Senior Analyst, Anderson Economic Group • Sarp Mertdogan, Analyst, Supported Intelligence LLC • Milan Batista, Professor at the University of Ljubljana, Slovenia
The conclusions in this memorandum are, of course, those of the authors.
About Anderson Economic Group LLC
Founded in 1996, Anderson Economic Group is a boutique research and consulting firm, with offices in East Lansing, Michigan, and Chicago, Illinois. The experts at AEG have extensive experience in public policy and economic analysis. Clients ofAnderson Economic Group include nearly every major institution in the State ofMichigan, including colleges, manufacturers, labor unions, state and local governments, and trade associations. Relevant publications from our firm include:
• Annual State Business Tax Burden Rankings, published since 2007. • "Economic and Fiscal Impacts of the United Auto Works GM Strike," published in 2019. • "Economic and Fiscal Impacts of a 1332 Affordable Care Act Waiver in Georgia," published
in 2019. • "Michigan Economic Competitiveness Benchmarking Report," published since 2012. • "Anderson Economic Group Amazon HQ2 Index," published in 2017. •"AndCan® Index Estimates of National and State-level Cannabis Demand," updated
regularly since 2017. • Numerous benchmarking, comparison, and economic update analyses.
For more information about Anderson Economic Group, please visit our website at https://www.AndersonEconomicGroup.com.

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About Supported Intelligence LLC
Supported Intelligence, LLC is a decision intelligence and data analytics company founded in 2012. Supported Intelligence pioneered a innovative class of decision intelligence technology, which is covered by three U.S. patents as well as patents pending in the U.S. and other countries.
Consultants at Supported Intelligence assembled the data and created the analytics facility to bring in daily reports from numerous sources, including at the state and county level in the United States; analyze the data using the methods identified in this document; and generate the decision intelligence reports highlighted here.
Please visit https://www.Supportedintelligence.com for more information.

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CaseC1a:2s0e-c1v:2-000-c4v5-80-0P3L6M0-PEJCGF NEoC.F1N-1of.il1e-d10fi4le/2d80/250/22P/2a0gePIDa.g4e7IDP.5a9geP1a7goef 1448 of 45 Daniel McCarthy, Shareholder, Butzel Long, April 13, 2020, page 13

Appendix A: Additional Figures
FIGURE 3. COVID-19 Total Infections, Infection Rate, and Growth Rate in Macomb County, Michigan

5
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MACOMB_MICH IGAN : coronavirus epidemic (S IR model): 10-Apr-2020 \sigma= 2.1 T_c = 2 .07 T_r = 4 .34 N = 4914 C_{end} = 4045 S_{end} = 869 RMSE = 32

--------------- ---------------------- ---- - -- -

- - Prediction • Actual

0 Mar-15 Mar-20 Mar-25 Mar-30 Apr-04

Apr-09 Date

Ap r-14

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-

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0

0 0

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• Actual
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FIGURE 4. COVID-19 Total Infections, Infection Rate, and Growth Rate in Oakland County, Michigan

OAKLAND_MICHIGAN: coronavirus epidemic (SIR model): 10-Apr-2020 \sigma= 1.62 T_c= 1.82 T_r= 2.96 N= 9918 C_{end}= 6496 S_{end}= 3422 RMSE= 58 8

------ ------ ------ -----------------¢---~----~---~-- ~~~~

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FIGURE 5. COVID-19 Total Infections, Infection Rate, and Growth Rate in Wayne County, Michigan

WAYNE_ MICHIGAN: coronavirus epidemic (SIR model): 10-Apr-2020

~sigma = 1

1.31 T_c = 0.94 T_r=

1.24 N= 29942

C_{end} =

13091

S_{end} =

16851

RMSE=

84

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FIGURE 6. COVID-19 Total Infections, Infection Rate, and Growth Rate in the Detroit Metropolitan Statistical Area

25
00 :)l 20 cu o
25 15
.0.--x :;;' 10
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DETROIT MSA : coronavirus epidemic (S IR model): 10-Apr-2020
u = 1.2 T c = 0 .69 Tr= 0.82 N = 72148 Cend = 22650 Send = 49498 RMSE = 117
------- ---------- - ----------- ~---- --- --!!-ie-;i-i!;Ei~-~~-
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CaseC1a:2s0e-c1v:2-000-c4v5-80-0P3L6M0-PEJCGF NEoC.F1N-1of.il1e-d10fi4le/2d80/250/22P/2a0gePIDa.g5e1IDP.6a3geP2a1goef 1488 of 45 Daniel McCarthy, Shareholder, Butzel Long, April 13, 2020, page 17
Appendix B: Methodology and Data Data. The state-level data we used in this analysis were collected by the New York Times organization from state and local sources. We selected this data source after reviewing multiple alternatives, and recognizing the benefits ofthe consistency and data checking this organization brought to the effort.
The NYT website for these data is: https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/us/ coronavirus-us-cases.html.
The NYT data repository on GitHub is: https://github.com/nytimes/covid-19-data.
Model. We used a SIR model to forecast the impacts of COVID-19 on states across the U.S. We chose this model after conducting an extensive review of available epidemiological models.
Our review confirmed that the standard SIR model, when consistent daily data are available, often provides the most reliable and understandable assessments. This judgement is based partially on the decades of experience across a wide number of countries and epidemics. The SIR model has been recognized and used as a basis for the diffusion of ideas and other transmissions, as well as for epidemiological studies, since at least 1964.12 It is also widely described in academic and professional settings, including having many easily-accessible resources, such as an online teaching version provided by the Mathematics Association ofAmerica.13

12.An influential article in this development was Goffman W, Newill V. "Generalization ofepidemic theory." Nature. 1964;204(4955):225-228. doi: 10.1038/204225a0. This article outlined the now standard nomenclature of "susceptible-infected-removed" subgroups of a population, and stated the standard assumptions such as a homogenous population and regular "mixing" of it. (The "R" portion is now commonly called "recovered.") The intellectual roots of this model date back to the early 1900s, in which the first "compartmented" mathematical models, separating population cohorts, were developed. See, e.g. Sooknanan, J., Comissiong, D.M.G. "When behaviour turns contagious: the use of deterministic epidemiological models in modeling social contagion phenomena." Int. J. Dynam. Control 5, 1046--1050 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s40435-016-0271-9. A 1927 article by W.O.Kermack and A.G. McKendrick, "A Contribution to the Mathematical Theory of Epidemics," Proceedings of the Royal Society A, vol. 115 no. 772, is often credited as the first to identify the underlying mathematics ofthe path of an epidemic. In this 1927 article, they plot the deaths from an epidemic in "the island of Bombay" from December 1905 to July 1906. It followed a bell-shaped curve ofthe shape shown in SIR and other models a century later. 13.The MAA teaching version, authored by David Smith and Lang Moore, is available at: https://www.maa.org/press/periodicals/loci/joma/the-sir-model-for-spread-of-disease-the-differential-equation-model. An overview of this and many variants is presented in H.W. Hethcote, "The Mathematics oflnfectious Diseases," SIAM Review 42 (4) (2000).

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It is also based on our assessment of how this model and the available data had performed in assessing the COVID-19 outbreak in Italy, Germany, Lombardy (a province in Italy), the United States, New York City, Ohio, Michigan, Illinois, the Detroit metropolitan area and counties, and other areas.
We use the data from various states and a specific implementation of the SIR model to fit the data, and estimate parameters such as RO (discussed further below). We use these parameters to estimate a future curve, which represents the prediction based on past data and the assumptions of the model. As noted below, our implementation of the SIR model provides for iterative re-estimating of RO values and estimates of the epidemic size and susceptible population.
Inclusion ofDiagnostic Information. Our implementation ofthe standard SIR model includes a number of features that allow for inspection of the results, and for a better understanding of the reliability of the model's estimated parameters. These include:
• Our complete results allow for the inspection of prediction errors, allowing readers to compare our historical estimates against historical data.
• Using innovations developed by researchers cited below, we also iteratively re-estimate the model over time, capturing the evolution of model parameters as more data become available.
• We fully disclose the model data and parameters, allowing the results to be replicated by other researchers.
• We explicitly note the known limitations of the model and data.
Elements of the SIR Model. The typical curve generated by an SIR model that estimates the number of people infected per day is an "S" shaped curve in which the number of new infections per day begins slowly, then grow exponentially larger before reaching a "peak" point. Following the peak, number of cases per day decrease and slowly reach zero, or the neutral level.
Parameters. A key element of the model is known as "RO," (sometimes called "R nought") or the reproduction rate of the infection. In the SIR model, if RO equals 2, that means for each time period of the outbreak, 1 infected person is expected to infect 2 others.
In actual epidemics, we expect the reproduction rate to be a dynamic value that changes over time. In its initial stages, the RO value of the epidemic is small, but grows quickly. As the epidemic slows, the RO value declines and ultimately decreases to near zero.
Known Limitations and Common Assumptions in Epidemiological Models. There are known limitations of this and other epidemiological models. We state the most important ones here: 1. This and other epidemiological models presume that, after some time, the population acquires
"herd immunity" that limits further spread ofthe disease. Users ofthese models also recognize the likelihood of subsequent waves of the same disease, though of lesser magnitude. For example, numerous variations of influenza cause illness and deaths each year, and are related to similar prior outbreaks.

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2. "Comorbidity" causes difficulty in assigning properly both cases and the number recovering and perishing from a disease. In particular, the number of deaths due to influenza each year is very large, and this cannot always be distinguished (especially in the early stages ofthe epidemic) from the specific disease being studied.
3. In general, these models assume a certain amount of "mixing" of the population. The mathematical treatment ofthis interaction is never accurate in small settings or specific short time periods, and usable models require significant data and enough time to allow for patterns across entire societies to develop. The amount of mixing also varies by age, and varies across social groups and among areas within a country.
4. In addition, all models rely upon data that are collected with reporting and measurement errors. In this epidemic, differences in testing, and in some countries pressure to mis-report or fail to report results, have clearly caused some difficulties in obtaining accurate data.
5. All statistical models involve uncertainty, and all projections resulting from these models carry with them this uncertainty.
6. This is a new disease. It will react in unpredictable ways with different populations.
7. The population itself changes its behavior over time. This is perhaps the largest unknown at the early stage of a severe epidemic in which a strong change in behavior, and new forms of treatment, occur.
Because of these inherent limitations, we present the model and data along with the available diagnostic and related information, to allow an informed decision. We urge policymakers to consider this information, and additional information, before making their decisions.
Implementation of Model. Supported Intelligence adapted an SIR model authored by Milan Batista, Professor at the University of Ljubljana in Slovenia. Mr. Batista and his colleagues describe this model, provide a public file exchange for the code, and apply it to the Coronavirus outbreak in the following publication and websites:
• Batista, Milan. (2020). Estimation of the final size of the coronavirus epidemic by the SIR model. Monograph found at ResearchGate.
• A file exchange version is maintained for review by other researchers; it is here: https://www.mathworks.com/matlabcentral/fileexchange/74658-fitviruscovid19.
• Related work using this same model for other countries and with different data sources is available here: https://www.fpp.uni-lj.si/en/research/researh-laboratories-and-the-programme-team/ research-programme-team/ As of the date of this memo, a comparison analysis of the United States (using an April 10 dataset, from a different source than we use in our analysis) is presented. It is consistent with the results we obtain using our data for the United States.
The version used by Supported Intelligence is modified to include the following improvements for the purposes of our work:

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1. Supported Intelligence built a data assembly routine that gathers live data on cases reported per day from the New York Times
2. We provide additional diagnostic information, and have created different data visualizations for the purpose of presenting the results.
3. We clarify a number ofterms, and adjust the presentation to date formats common in the United States, to avoid ambiguity and misunderstanding.

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To: From: Re:
Date:

Daniel McCarthy, Shareholder, Butzel Long
Patrick Anderson, Principal Brian Peterson, Consultant
COVID-19 Progression & Effects of Business Closures on Michigan’s Workers (Revised with data through midApril)
April 22, 2020

mm
ANDERSON ECONOMIC GROUP

Purpose of this Memorandum
The COVID-19 pandemic has created unprecedented public health and economic disturbances across the globe. Michigan has been one of the most affected states in America, with over 22,600 cases reported as of Friday, April 10. Michigan's response (including the first Executive Order issued on March 10), the dramatic efforts of many health care workers, and the extraordinary actions of many employers and volunteers have also been significant.
We all recognize two serious problems: First, we face a severe public health crisis, with tremendous human costs to its victims as well as to the many people who care for them. Second, we are enduring unprecedented costs of travel and gathering restrictions, business closures, prohibitions on work, and cancellations of both private and public events.
Given these twin threats, it is critical that the State’s leaders have the best information available to project spread of the virus; to consider the impact of preventative measures such as social distancing and “stay at home” orders; and to understand the scale of the effect of the prohibitions on work and other restrictions on Michigan’s workers and our ability to produce the goods and services we need.
Anderson Economic Group has been retained to summarize the best information now available on both the course of the COVID-19 epidemic and its effects on the Michigan economy. In this memorandum, we provide a summary of COVID-19’s progression, discuss the impact of the virus and stay at home orders on Michigan’s economy, and identify large variances between the identification of “critical” and “essential” workers during this emergency.
Approach
Epidemiology Model. Modeling the spread of COVID-19 is a challenging endeavor. Data on the virus are nearly always incomplete, and our ability to test and diagnose people is inconsistent. However, we now have several weeks of consistent, daily data on cases from independent sources. These provide a solid basis for an assessment of the current situation.

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We provide below a modeling of the epidemic in the State of Michigan, using daily data and the widely-used SIR epidemiological model. Subject to the limitations of this and every model, we present the evidence on the current situation in Michigan and do so in a manner that provides a superior level of transparency and credibility.
We also identify comparisons from the small number of similar analyses that are now available, including the IHME projections widely presented in the United States. We note that the most recent IHME projections for Michigan are very close to the results we present here.
We provide additional information about the data, the SIR model, and our methodology in “Appendix B: Data, Methodology, and Limitations” on page 18.
Employment Effects Analysis. In order to estimate the economic impacts of COVID-19 and stay at home orders, we created a custom model that predicts the economy-wide impacts of the virus and emergency orders, done on a state-by-state basis. Our model estimates not only the impact on job losses, but also the impact on workers across each state who are at risk of losing income—a much larger group than just those who file for unemployment.
This analysis is based on a review of stay at home orders for each state, as well as data from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, and U.S. Department of Labor. Consistent with our intention to provide credible, transparent information, we also reference projections of the impact of these restrictions that were released in mid-March, as well as the unemployment claims figures released in the subsequent weeks, which corroborate these projections.
State Executive Orders and Federal Homeland Security Classifications. We review the Department of Homeland Security’s memo and subsequent guidance on critical workers during this emergency and compare it with a similar classification of workers in two Michigan executive orders. We note the significant differences between these two that affect Michigan workers and the residents.

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Findings
Our analysis and review led to the following findings.
1. Epidemiological models and current data suggest that COVID-19 infections have peaked in Michigan.
Epidemiological evidence strongly suggests that Michigan has reached its peak COVID-19 infection rate for the current wave of the epidemic. This evidence includes both our own assessment—using an industry-standard SIR model and U.S.-only data—and the IHME assessment of April 8, which utilizes both U.S. and China data and a unique model IHME developed for this purpose.
Update: This was our conclusion in the original memo dated April 13. With over a week of additional data, this conclusion is now buttressed by results from both Metro Detroit, the State of Michigan, and a number of other counties that we have analyzed.
Michigan Results, Standard SIR Model. The daily Michigan case data used in our analysis was collected by the New York Times from State sources and selected because of its consistency and reliability across multiple states.1 We estimated a standard SIR model using these data, using an iterative re-estimating procedure to reveal both the current projection of the path of the outbreak and the changes in the estimated parameters over time.
For approximately one week now, the data have consistently indicated that the infection rate began slowly, accelerated, and then reached a peak rate in the past week. If this pattern continues, we can expect the number of new cases to slowly drop over time during the current wave of the epidemic.
This pattern—which produces the distinctive “S” curve—is consistent with both theory, and decades of experience across the globe with numerous epidemics. These data strongly indicate the path of the epidemic has begun to slow down, suggesting that social distancing and other mitigation efforts have been effective. The peak number of people infected, shown in the Anderson Economic Group analysis, and the peak hospital utilization, shown in the IHME analysis, both appear to have passed in the week that began April 5, 2020.
See Figure 1 on page 6.
Note that these analyses pre-date the reports from the Easter weekend, which may have been incomplete but which also show a declining number of cases. Furthermore, these analyses focus on the current wave of the epidemic, which is the only wave for which any data are available.

1. There are minor discrepancies between the NYT compilation, and the daily-reported numbers from the Michigan DHS. These discrepancies are usually under 1%.

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Comparison with Other Epidemiological Models. This result is consistent with that of other entities that have modeled Michigan's epidemiology, including those of IHME (as reported April 8) and others. In particular, the most recent IHME results show a nearly identical pattern.2
Variation Across Michigan Counties; Results in Detroit Metro Area. There is significant variation in the intensity of the outbreak across the state. In particular, many counties have reported total cases of less than a dozen. At the same time, Wayne, Oakland, and Macomb Counties have intensive epidemics. Corroborating our results for the State as a whole, each of these three counties, all with large number of cases, demonstrates a similar pattern of acceleration in the number of cases in February and March, and then an apparent peak in the first half of April.
We show similar analyses for these counties in case counts in “Appendix A: Additional Figures” on page 12. See in particular Figure 1 on page 13.
Limitations of these Data and Epidemiological Models. We also note the limitations of these data and every epidemiological model in “Appendix B: Data, Methodology, and Limitations” on page 18.
Among these limitations, please note that, for many counties in Michigan, the number of case counts is so small that we do not have enough data to model the course of an epidemic at this point. We, of course, hope the numbers remain small in many such counties. However, we do expect that case numbers in some counties will grow enough to allow later estimation in these counties as well.

2. As noted in the appendix, the IHME model uses a mixture of U.S. and China-reported data, and a unique model that focuses on hospital usage rather than cases. Furthermore, the IHME results have varied significantly over time. This comparison is with the most recently-released results.

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CasDeaCn1ia:e2sl0eM-c1cCv:2-a00r0t-hc4yv,5-S80h-0aP3rLe6hM0ol-dPeEJr,CGBFutzNEeoCl L.Fo1nN-g1o, fA.ilp1er-di1l 02f2i4le,/22d0820/0250/22P/2a0gePIDa.g5e9IDP.7a1geP2a9goef 2468 of 45

2. Michigan’s “stay at home” order, along with decisions made by private citizens and employers, has resulted in a severe contraction in the State’s economy.

We now have Depression-level unemployment in Michigan, with over 16% of our workforce becoming unemployed in just three weeks. This will grow more severe as time passes and likely affect the incomes of 1.4 million Michigan workers and their families.
Executive Orders Restricting Work and Travel. On March 23, Michigan Governor Gretchen Whitmer issued a “stay at home” order requiring all nonessential workers to stay home and not go their workplace. At the time, Michigan had more reported COVID-19 cases than any other state save for New York and New Jersey. This order—already the second on the epidemic—became effective March 24 and was effective through April 13.3 The purpose of this order was to suppress the spread of COVID-19, prevent the state’s healthcare system from being overwhelmed, and allow time for the state to procure necessary medical equipment needed to “prevent needless deaths.” On April 9, the governor extended the stay at home order until April 30, strengthened some of the restrictions, and noted that the original stay at home order was effective, but that COVID19 was still “aggressive and persistent.”4

On March 17, Anderson Economic Group estimated that, as a result of COVID-19 and the stay at home orders in this and other states, an unprecedented number of Americans would lose income due to layoffs, furloughs, pay cuts, and mandatory sick leave. We estimated that 1.5 million Michiganders could lose two or more days worth of income, along with 2.0 million workers in Illinois and 3.3 million workers in New York. These estimates are
shown in Table 1 below.5

TABLE 1. Projection of Workers Losing Significant Income due to COVID-19 and Stay-at-home Orders, March-April 2020

State

Estimated Number of Workers Losing Significant
Income

Michigan

1,468,720

Illinois

1,958,468

New York

3,327,870

Source: Anderson Economic Group estimates, March 19, 2020.

3. Michigan Governor Executive Order 2020-21, “Temporary requirements to suspend activities that are not necessary to sustain or protect life.” See https://www.michigan.gov/whitmer/ 0,9309,7-387-90499_90705-522626--,00.html. As noted above, the first executive order (No. 2020-4, March 10, 2020) declared a state of emergency and noted that the first case had just been identified in the State. 4. Michigan Governor Executive Order 2020-42, “Temporary requirement to suspend activities that are not necessary to sustain or protect life, Rescission of Executive order 2020-21.” See https://www.michigan.gov/whitmer/0,9309,7-387-90499_90705-525182--,00.html.

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Immediate and Large Loss of Employment. Over the past three weeks, the impact of the stay at home order on the state’s economy has become apparent. Unfortunately, the most recent data in Michigan and other states indicate that our mid-March estimates were probably conservative.
Since March 28, Michigan has recorded over 815,000 unemployment claims.
Update. Since the April 13 memo was released, Michigan recorded another 219,000 initial unemployment claims. After accounting for recent revisions by the Department of Labor, Michigan now has experienced over 910,000 unemployment claims since March 28, and now has over 1 million unemployed workers. The share of Michigan workers now unemployed is 21.2%. As previously noted, michigan now has depression-level unemployment rates.
Nationwide, Michigan has been one of the hardest hit states, as shown in Figure 1 below.
FIGURE 1. Three-Week Initial Unemployment Claims as a Percentage of Total Workforce Size as of April 4, 2020

4.9% - 5%

5.1% - 7.5%

7.6% - 10%

10.1% - 12.5%

12.6% - 21.7%

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5. See the Anderson Economic Group’s website for most recent estimates of affected workers. https://www.AndersonEconomicGroup.com/.

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Impact Throughout Multiple Industries. While the unemployment claims numbers provide some insight into the current state of the Michigan economy, the impact of COVID-19 extends well beyond just those who were able to file for unemployment in the last three weeks.
Across the Midwest, workers in nearly all industries outside of government are being furloughed, asked to take a pay cut, or are taking mandatory paid time off. The U.S. Department of Labor’s three most recent unemployment insurance claims press releases note that, in Michigan, significant increases in unemployment claims are coming from nearly every industry in the state, including food service; manufacturing; construction; retail trade; administrative, support, waste management, and remediation services; health care and social assistance; arts, entertainment and recreation; transportation and warehousing; real estate; professional services; and educational services.6
The impact has been especially severe on small business, with many owners struggling to keep their doors open. Although Congress authorized a number of small business lending programs aimed at helping small businesses make it through the epidemic, very few funds have actually been dispersed even though Michigan businesses have been shut down for nearly one month. Small business owners who have applied for relief have encountered a plethora of challenges, including technical glitches, overwhelmed banks, and slow processing times, adding to the already high level of anxiety that small business owners were facing as policymakers ordered all nonessential businesses shut down.
A recent forecast from the University of Michigan Research Seminar in Quantitative Economics predicts that Michigan’s unemployment rate in the second quarter of 2020 will average 23 percent—even higher than the forecasted U.S. quarterly peak of 14 percent.7

6. U.S. Department of Labor Unemployment Insurance Weekly Claims report for April 9, 2020, April 2, 2020, and March 26, 2020. See https://www.dol.gov/. The comments on individual states are attributed to the state unemployment agencies. 7. Gabriel Ehrlich, George Fulton, and Saul Hymans, “Update April 9: The U.S. and Michigan Economic Outlook for 2020-2022,” University of Michigan Ann Arbor Research Seminar in Quantitative Economics.” See: https://lsa.umich.edu/econ/rsqe/forecasts.html.

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3. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s memorandum on “essential” workers during the COVID-19 pandemic explicitly recognizes many workers that are not recognized in Michigan’s Executive Order.
On March 19, the Department Homeland Security (DHS) issued a memorandum on the identification of “essential infrastructure workers” during the COVID-19 response.8 The following guidance from the memorandum is of particular importance:
• The memorandum states that those who work in critical infrastructure industries “have a special responsibility to maintain [their] normal work schedule.”
• The memorandum lists a range of “operations and services that are essential to continued critical infrastructure viability.” These include management, call centers, construction, telecommunications, information technology, food, agriculture, transportation, energy, wastewater, manufacturing and logistics, and health care workers.
• The memorandum states that “all organizations should implement business continuity plans,” and that in the “modern economy, reliance on technology and just-in-time supply chains means that certain workers must be able to access certain sites, facilities, and assets to continue continuity of functions.”
On March 28, DHS released a revised memorandum identifying a larger set of essential industries and workers.9 The occupations and industries identified in this revised document include workers in some of Michigan’s most important economic sectors. For example, Trade, Transportation, and Utilities is Michigan’s largest sector by employment, with over 800,000 workers, and the State’s Manufacturing sector employs 625,000 workers.10
These memos note the following items that are especially germane to key industries in Michigan:
• The DHS memo explicitly notes the importance of transportation, logistics, and automotive repair and maintenance.
• The DHS memo classifies “central office personnel” who “maintain and operate central office, data centers, and other network office facilities” as essential employees.
• The DHS memo also notes the essential nature of “workers necessary for the manufacturing of materials and products needed for medical supply chains, transportation, energy, communications, food and agriculture…” and many other products.
• The March 28 DHS memo expands its definition of essential workers to a variety of industries, including some that are particularly important to Michigan’s economy, such as transportation and manufacturing.
Need to Recognize True Extent of Critical and Essential Workers. As was apparent at the onset of this emergency, and consistent with the guidance from the U.S. government that
8. Christopher Krebs, “Memorandum on Identification of Essential Critical Infrastructure Workers During COVID-19 Response,” March 19, 2020. 9. Christopher Krebs, “Advisory Memorandum on Identification of Essential Critical Infrastructure Workers During COVID-19 Response,” March 28, 2020. 10. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, “Economy At a Glance: Michigan,” https://www.bls.gov/.

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was cited in Michigan Executive Order 2020-42 and prior orders, it is critical to support “essential” workers in a range of industries. The purpose of the DHS memo was to highlight the importance of these workers and “help State and local officials ensure continuity of functions critical to public health and safety.” However, Michigan Executive Order 2020-42 explicitly states that it does not adopt any of the guidance issued by DHS subsequent to the March 19 memorandum, meaning that the Governor’s order excludes those additional industries and workers identified as essential by the DHS as of March 28.11
The March 19 DHS memo was issued at a time when stay at home orders were anticipated to be short-term affairs. Since then, stay at home orders across the country have been extended. It is important to recognize that the longer these stay at home orders are in effect, the more workers must be classified as essential in order to maintain supply chains and perform essential services.
The DHS memorandum fully anticipates that changes in conditions over time and differences in the intensity of the outbreak will be taken into account by State and local governments, as well as private sector organizations. Consistent with this explicit guidance, Michigan and other states should take notice of differing infection rates within our state; as well as how changes in the course of the epidemic impact which workers and industries should be classified as essential.

11. Paragraph 8 of Michigan’s Executive Order 2020-42 states: “For purposes of this order, critical infrastructure workers are those workers described by the Director of the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency in his guidance of March 19, 2020 on the COVID-19 response (available here). This order does not adopt any subsequent guidance document released by this same agency.” [Emphasis in original.]

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CasDeaCn1ia:e2sl0eM-c1cCv:2-a00r0t-hc4yv,5-S80h-0aP3rLe6hM0ol-dPeEJr,CGBFutzNEeoCl L.Fo1nN-g1o, fA.ilp1er-di1l 02f2i4le,/22d0820/0250/22P/2a0gePIDa.g6e4IDP.7a6geP3a4goef 3418 of 45
About the Authors
Patrick L. Anderson. Mr. Patrick L. Anderson founded Anderson Economic Group in 1996, and serves as the company’s principal and CEO. A nationally-recognized expert in business economics and a sought-after speaker, Mr. Anderson has led several major public policy initiatives in his home state. He was awarded both the Michigan Chamber of Commerce’s Leadership Michigan award and the University of Michigan’s Neal Staebler award for civic leadership. His writing has earned five prestigious national awards from the National Association of Business Economics.
Brian R Peterson. Mr. Peterson is a consultant and director of public policy and economic analysis with Anderson Economic Group. His work focuses on economic and fiscal impact modeling, actuarial analysis, and environmental economics. Prior to joining AEG, Mr. Peterson worked as a policy analyst in regional economic development and transportation planning in the Chicago region.
Contributors
The authors wish to recognize the contribution of the following individuals:
• Andrew Miller, Senior Analyst, Anderson Economic Group • Sarp Mertdogan, Analyst, Supported Intelligence LLC • Milan Batista, Professor at the University of Ljubljana, Slovenia
The conclusions in this memorandum are, of course, those of the authors.
About Anderson Economic Group LLC
Founded in 1996, Anderson Economic Group is a boutique research and consulting firm, with offices in East Lansing, Michigan, and Chicago, Illinois. The experts at AEG have extensive experience in public policy and economic analysis. Clients of Anderson Economic Group include nearly every major institution in the State of Michigan, including colleges, manufacturers, labor unions, state and local governments, and trade associations. Relevant publications from our firm include:
• Annual State Business Tax Burden Rankings, published since 2007. • “Economic and Fiscal Impacts of the United Auto Works GM Strike,” published in 2019. • “Economic and Fiscal Impacts of a 1332 Affordable Care Act Waiver in Georgia,” published
in 2019. • “Michigan Economic Competitiveness Benchmarking Report,” published since 2012. • “Anderson Economic Group Amazon HQ2 Index,” published in 2017. • “AndCan® Index Estimates of National and State-level Cannabis Demand,” updated
regularly since 2017. • Numerous benchmarking, comparison, and economic update analyses.
For more information about Anderson Economic Group, please visit our website at https://www.AndersonEconomicGroup.com.

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CasDeaCn1ia:e2sl0eM-c1cCv:2-a00r0t-hc4yv,5-S80h-0aP3rLe6hM0ol-dPeEJr,CGBFutzNEeoCl L.Fo1nN-g1o, fA.ilp1er-di1l 02f2i4le,/22d0820/0250/22P/2a0gePIDa.g6e5IDP.7a7geP3a5goef 3428 of 45
About Supported Intelligence LLC
Supported Intelligence, LLC is a decision intelligence and data analytics company founded in 2012. Supported Intelligence pioneered a innovative class of decision intelligence technology, which is covered by three U.S. patents as well as patents pending in the U.S. and other countries.
Consultants at Supported Intelligence assembled the data and created the analytics facility to bring in daily reports from numerous sources, including at the state and county level in the United States; analyze the data using the methods identified in this document; and generate the decision intelligence reports highlighted here.
Please visit https://www.SupportedIntelligence.com for more information.

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CasDeaCn1ia:e2sl0eM-c1cCv:2-a00r0t-hc4yv,5-S80h-0aP3rLe6hM0ol-dPeEJr,CGBFutzNEeoCl L.Fo1nN-g1o, fA.ilp1ep-de1n0fdi4ilex/2dA8:0/A25d0/d2i2tiP/o2na0agleFPIDigau.g6ree6sIDP.7a8geP3a6goef 3438 of 45
Appendix A: Additional Figures
• “COVID-19 Total Infections, Infection Rate, and Growth Rate in Michigan” on page 13 • “COVID-19 Total Infections, Infection Rate, and Growth Rate in Macomb County,
Michigan” on page 14 • “COVID-19 Total Infections, Infection Rate, and Growth Rate in Oakland County,
Michigan” on page 15 • “COVID-19 Total Infections, Infection Rate, and Growth Rate in Wayne County, Michigan”
on page 16 • “COVID-19 Total Infections, Infection Rate, and Growth Rate in the 3-County Detroit
Metropolitan Area (Wayne, Oakland, Macomb)” on page 17

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CaseC1a:2s0e-c1v:2-000-c4v5-80-0P3L6M0-PEJCGF NEoC.F1N-1of.il1e-d10fi4le/2d80/250/22P/2a0gePIDa.g6e7IDP.7a9geP3a7goef 3448 of 45
Daniel McCarthy, Shareholder, Butzel Long, Appendix A: Additional Figures

FIGURE 1. COVID-19 Total Infections, Infection Rate, and Growth Rate in Michigan

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(3 = 0.429 'Y = 0.217 R2 = 0.9987 RMSE = 449
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Analysis by Anderson Economic Group LLC using data compiled from state reports and methods described in memorandum. These data will be revised regularly and are subject to reporting and other errors.

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© COPYRIGHT 2020, ANDERSON ECONOMIC GROUP LLC

PAGE 13 OF 24

CaseC1a:2s0e-c1v:2-000-c4v5-80-0P3L6M0-PEJCGF NEoC.F1N-1of.il1e-d10fi4le/2d80/250/22P/2a0gePIDa.g6e8IDP.8a0geP3a8goef 3458 of 45
Daniel McCarthy, Shareholder, Butzel Long, Appendix A: Additional Figures
FIGURE 2. COVID-19 Total Infections, Infection Rate, and Growth Rate in Macomb County, Michigan
Macomb Michigan : Coronavirus Epidemic (SIR Model): 21-Apr-2020 (3 = 0.441 1 = 0.238 R2 = 0.9984 RMSE = 67
Cumulative Cases 6

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Analysis by Anderson Economic Group LLC using data compiled from state reports and methods described in memorandum. These data will be revised regularly and are subject to reporting and other errors.

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© COPYRIGHT 2020, ANDERSON ECONOMIC GROUP LLC

Apr-26 Apr-26 Apr 26

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PAGE 14 OF 24

CaseC1a:2s0e-c1v:2-000-c4v5-80-0P3L6M0-PEJCGF NEoC.F1N-1of.il1e-d10fi4le/2d80/250/22P/2a0gePIDa.g6e9IDP.8a1geP3a9goef 3468 of 45
Daniel McCarthy, Shareholder, Butzel Long, Appendix A: Additional Figures

FIGURE 3. COVID-19 Total Infections, Infection Rate, and Growth Rate in Oakland County, Michigan

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Cumulative Cases

Mar-22

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Apr-12 Infection Rate

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Analysis by Anderson Economic Group LLC using data compiled from state reports and methods described in memorandum. These data will be revised regularly and are subject to reporting and other errors.

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CaseC1a:2s0e-c1v:2-000-c4v5-80-0P3L6M0-PEJCGF NEoC.F1N-1of.il1e-d10fi4le/2d80/250/22P/2a0gePIDa.g7e0IDP.8a2geP4a0goef 3478 of 45
Daniel McCarthy, Shareholder, Butzel Long, Appendix A: Additional Figures

FIGURE 4. COVID-19 Total Infections, Infection Rate, and Growth Rate in Wayne County, Michigan

Wayne Michigan : Coronavirus Epidemic (SIR Model): 21-Apr-2020
(3 = 0.382 'Y = 0.166 R2 = 0.9956 RMSE = 364

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Analysis by Anderson Economic Group LLC using data compiled from state reports and methods described in memorandum. These data will be revised regularly and are subject to reporting and other errors.

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© COPYRIGHT 2020, ANDERSON ECONOMIC GROUP LLC

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Daniel McCarthy, Shareholder, Butzel Long, Appendix A: Additional Figures

FIGURE 5. COVID-19 Total Infections, Infection Rate, and Growth Rate in the 3-County Detroit Metropolitan Area (Wayne, Oakland, Macomb)

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Detroit MSA : Coronavirus Epidemic (SIR Model): 21-Apr-2020
(3 = 0.431 'Y = 0.212 R2 = 0.9991 RMSE = 283
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-
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Apr-05

Apr-12 Infection Rate

Apr-19

Apr-26

May-03

May-10

C=::l Actu al

-

Prediction

Variance in Prediction

0
~ 10
0::
.c
j
0
c'5 101

Mar-15 0

Mar-22

Mar-29

Apr-05

Apr-12

Apr-19

Growth rate: Reported vs Predicted

Apr-26

May-03

May-10

-
0

Predict io n Actual

- - - 5% Threshold

Mar 15

Mar 22

Mar 29

Apr05

Apr12

Analysis by Anderson Economic Group LLC using data compiled from state reports and methods described in memorandum. These data will be revised regularly and are subject to reporting and other errors.

Apr19

Apr26

May 03

May 10

© COPYRIGHT 2020, ANDERSON ECONOMIC GROUP LLC

PAGE 17 OF 24

CasDeaCn1ia:e2sl0eM-c1cCv:2-a00r0t-hc4yv,5-S80h-0aP3rLe6hM0ol-dPeEJr,CGBFutzNEeoCl L.Fo1nN-g1o, fA.ilp1ep-de1n0fdi4ilex/2dB8:0/A25p0/r2i2l P2/22a0,g2e0PI2D0a.g7e2IDP.8a4geP4a2goef 3498 of 45
Appendix B: Data, Methodology, and Limitations
April 22, 2020
Terms of Use
All users of this information must acknowledge the purpose, limitations, and lack of warranty for this analysis and the related data, and accept the requirement to disclose these terms to any person to whom they provide this information:
1. Purpose. Our purpose is to provide information useful to others who may face a decision regarding their activities in the coming months. The purpose is not to diagnose or treat any disease; provide health advice; provide legal advice; or even to make unconditional forecasts of the number of cases or patients.
2. Known Limitations and Errors in Data. This analysis relies upon data that have known errors, omissions, and limitations. These include:
• The diagnosis and classification of those afflicted with Covid-19 has been inconsistent across jurisdictions, and across time.
• Daily case counts are subject to reporting and compilation errors. • The proper location for a case is often unclear, particularly with travelers and people
who live near borders. • In some situations, governments have retroactively re-classified cases. • In some areas of the world, governments have censored, suppressed, or otherwise
failed to report accurately the relevant data. • Given the volume of data and the frequency with which it is revised, some
inadvertent errors are certain to arise. • The underlying data, and therefore the estimated parameters and the estimated and
projected paths, will change over time.
3. Known Limitations of Epidemiological Models. Every model is an approximation of reality. Like every other model, the one used here will never completely represent the underlying behavior, and will often distort some portion of it.
4. No Warranty on Information. There is NO WARRANTY provided for any of this information, including no warranty of merchantability or fitness.
5. Requirement to Disclose these Terms. If you provide this information to any other person, you must disclose to them these terms and provide a copy of this statement.
If you do not acknowledge and accept these terms, then you should not read, share, or rely upon this information.

© COPYRIGHT 2020, ANDERSON ECONOMIC GROUP LLC

PAGE 18 OF 24

CasDeaCn1ia:e2sl0eM-c1cCv:2-a00r0t-hc4yv,5-S80h-0aP3rLe6hM0ol-dPeEJr,CGBFutzNEeoCl L.Fo1nN-g1o, fA.ilp1ep-de1n0fdi4ilex/2dB8:0/A25p0/r2i2l P2/22a0,g2e0PI2D0a.g7e3IDP.8a5geP4a3goef 4408 of 45
Data
Data. The state-level data we used in this analysis were collected by the New York Times organization from state and local sources. We selected this data source after reviewing multiple alternatives, and recognizing the benefits of the consistency and data checking this organization brought to the effort.
• The NYT website for these data is: https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/us/ coronavirus-us-cases.html.
• The NYT data repository on GitHub is: https://github.com/nytimes/covid-19-data.
Discrepancies in Data Sources; Revisions over Time. There are discrepancies among sources for data, even for the same areas. These discrepancies arise for a number of reasons, including lapses in reporting; differences in classification; and ambiguities regarding the location of the persons. Furthermore, government entities routinely revise these data, and in many cases have retroactively reclassified patients. For these reasons, users of these data should expect that analyses prepared on different dates will often show different historical data, as well as different projected data.
Comparison and Alternative Sources of Data and Analysis
There are multiple other sources of data, as well as alternative sources of analysis. These have widely-varying quality, and some are sponsored by organizations that advocate for specific policies as well as report data.
We urge readers of our analyses to compare the information they have obtained from us with information from other sources. Here are an example of comparison sources of information, for the State of Michigan in the United States:
• https://covid19.healthdata.org/united-states-of-america/michigan
• https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/cases-updates/cases-in-us.html#epicurve
• https://www.uofmhealth.org/covid-19-update
• https://www.michigan.gov/coronavirus
Model
We used a SIR model to forecast the impacts of COVID-19 on states across the U.S. We chose this model after conducting an extensive review of available epidemiological models.
Our review confirmed that the standard SIR model, when consistent daily data are available, often provides a reliable and understandable assessment. This judgement is based partially on the decades of experience across a wide number of countries and epidemics.

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CasDeaCn1ia:e2sl0eM-c1cCv:2-a00r0t-hc4yv,5-S80h-0aP3rLe6hM0ol-dPeEJr,CGBFutzNEeoCl L.Fo1nN-g1o, fA.ilp1ep-de1n0fdi4ilex/2dB8:0/A25p0/r2i2l P2/22a0,g2e0PI2D0a.g7e4IDP.8a6geP4a4goef 4418 of 45
It is also based on our assessment of how this model and the available data had performed in assessing the COVID-19 outbreak in Italy, Germany, Lombardy (a province in Italy), the United States, New York City, Ohio, Michigan, Illinois, the Detroit metropolitan area and counties, and other areas.
The SIR model is a “compartmentalized” model, meaning that it presumes the population can be classified as if they are in different “compartments,” and can move among them when they become infected with a disease and when they recover or perish from it. The acronym comes from “Susceptible-Infected-Removed.”
We use the data from various states and a specific implementation of the SIR model to fit the data, and estimate parameters such as R0 (discussed further below). We use these parameters to estimate a future curve, which represents the prediction based on past data and the assumptions of the model. As noted below, our implementation of the SIR model provides for iterative re-estimating of R0 values and estimates of the epidemic size and susceptible population.
History of the Use of the SIR Model. The SIR model has been recognized and used as a basis for the diffusion of ideas and other transmissions, as well as for epidemiological studies, since at least 1964.1 The model was originally published in 1927, in an article that helped establish the basis for modern studies of epidemiology.2
It is also widely described in academic and professional settings, including having many easily-accessible resources, such as an online teaching version provided by the Mathematics Association of America.3
1.An influential article in this development was Goffman W, Newill V. “Generalization of epidemic theory.” Nature. 1964;204(4955):225–228. doi: 10.1038/204225a0. This article outlined the now standard nomenclature of “susceptible-infected-removed” subgroups of a population, and stated the standard assumptions such as a homogenous population and regular “mixing” of it. (The “R” portion is now commonly called “recovered.”) The intellectual roots of this model date back to the early 1900s, in which the first “compartmented” mathematical models, separating population cohorts, were developed. See, e.g. Sooknanan, J., Comissiong, D.M.G. “When behaviour turns contagious: the use of deterministic epidemiological models in modeling social contagion phenomena.” Int. J. Dynam. Control 5, 1046–1050 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s40435-016-0271-9. 2.The 1927 article by W.O.Kermack and A.G. McKendrick, “A Contribution to the Mathematical Theory of Epidemics,” Proceedings of the Royal Society A, vol. 115 no. 772, outlined the SIR model, is often credited as the first to identify the underlying mathematics of the path of an epidemic. In this 1927 article, they plot the deaths from an epidemic in “the island of Bombay” from December 1905 to July 1906. It followed a bell-shaped curve of the shape shown in SIR and other models a century later. 3.The MAA teaching version, authored by David Smith and Lang Moore, is available at: https://www.maa.org/press/periodicals/loci/joma/the-sir-model-for-spread-of-disease-the-differential-equation-model. An overview of this and many variants is presented in H.W. Hethcote, “The Mathematics of Infectious Diseases,” SIAM Review 42 (4) (2000).

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CasDeaCn1ia:e2sl0eM-c1cCv:2-a00r0t-hc4yv,5-S80h-0aP3rLe6hM0ol-dPeEJr,CGBFutzNEeoCl L.Fo1nN-g1o, fA.ilp1ep-de1n0fdi4ilex/2dB8:0/A25p0/r2i2l P2/22a0,g2e0PI2D0a.g7e5IDP.8a7geP4a5goef 4428 of 45
Alternatives and Limitations of the SIR Model. Every model is an approximation to reality, and all have limitations. In the case of the SIR model, known limitations include:
• The model only focuses on one wave of an epidemic.
• The model assumes that “removed” individuals attain immunity from the disease. For some novel diseases, this has not been demonstrated.
• The model relies on certain assumptions (such as homogenous population and consistent mixing of the population) that are rarely accurate.
Furthermore, all models rely upon data—and the available data are never perfect in epidemiological studies.
There are alternatives to this model, many of which are variations on it. As with alternative sources of data, readers should consider whether an alternative model should be also be considered.
Inclusion of Diagnostic Information. Our implementation of the standard SIR model includes a number of features that allow for inspection of the results, and for a better understanding of the reliability of the model’s estimated parameters. These include:
• Our complete results allow for the inspection of prediction errors, allowing readers to compare our historical estimates against historical data.
• Using innovations developed by researchers cited below, we also iteratively reestimate the model over time, capturing the evolution of model parameters as more data become available.
• We fully disclose the model data and parameters, allowing the results to be replicated by other researchers.
• We explicitly note the known limitations of the model and data.
Elements of the SIR Model. The typical curve generated by an SIR model that estimates the number of people infected per day is an “S” shaped curve in which the number of new infections per day begins slowly, then grow exponentially larger before reaching a “peak” point. Following the peak, number of cases per day decrease and slowly reach zero, or the neutral level.
Parameters. A key element of the model is known as “R0,” (sometimes called “R nought”) or the reproduction rate of the infection. In the SIR model, if R0 equals 2, that means for each time period of the outbreak, 1 infected person is expected to infect 2 others.
In actual epidemics, we expect the reproduction rate to be a dynamic value that changes over time. In its initial stages, the R0 value can grow quickly. As the epidemic slows, the R0 value declines and ultimately decreases to near zero.
• See “Exhibit: Key Variables in SIR Model ” on page 22.

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CasDeaCn1ia:e2sl0eM-c1cCv:2-a00r0t-hc4yv,5-S80h-0aP3rLe6hM0ol-dPeEJr,CGBFutzNEeoCl L.Fo1nN-g1o, fA.ilp1ep-de1n0fdi4ilex/2dB8:0/A25p0/r2i2l P2/22a0,g2e0PI2D0a.g7e6IDP.8a8geP4a6goef 4438 of 45
Exhibit: Key Variables in SIR Model Reproduction Rate
• R = Reproduction number, number of people infected by each infected person • R0 = Basic reproduction number (“R nought”)
calculated by Beta/Gamma (with scale factors) • Beta = Average contact frequency • Gamma = Average removal frequency Population and Epidemic Size • N = Population size (approximate initial size of susceptible population) • Cend = Epidemic size (total recovered population) • Send = Final number of susceptible individuals left Implied Timing • Day = epidemy day number • date0 = start day Errors, Uncertainty, and Model Fit • RMSE = Root mean square error • AdjR2 -- adjusted R2 (“R squared”) statistic Data • C = reported case data • Ce = projected case data, given the model, data, and parameters • Diff = difference between reported and projected cases

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CasDeaCn1ia:e2sl0eM-c1cCv:2-a00r0t-hc4yv,5-S80h-0aP3rLe6hM0ol-dPeEJr,CGBFutzNEeoCl L.Fo1nN-g1o, fA.ilp1ep-de1n0fdi4ilex/2dB8:0/A25p0/r2i2l P2/22a0,g2e0PI2D0a.g7e7IDP.8a9geP4a7goef 4448 of 45
Known Limitations and Common Assumptions in Epidemiological Models
There are known limitations of this and other epidemiological models. We state the most important ones here:
1. This and other epidemiological models presume that, after some time, the population acquires “herd immunity” that limits further spread of the same strain of the disease.
2. There is a likelihood of subsequent waves of the same disease. These are typically of lesser magnitude. For example, numerous variations of influenza cause illness and deaths each year, and are related to similar prior outbreaks. In general, only one wave is represented by this type of model.
3. “Comorbidity” causes difficulty in assigning properly both cases and the number recovering and perishing from a disease. In particular, the number of deaths due to influenza each year is very large, and this cannot always be distinguished (especially in the early stages of the epidemic) from the specific disease being studied.
4. In general, these models assume a certain amount of “mixing” of the population. The mathematical treatment of this interaction is never accurate in small settings or specific short time periods, and usable models require significant data and enough time to allow for patterns across entire societies to develop. The amount of mixing also varies by age, and varies across social groups and among areas within a country.
5. In addition, all models rely upon data that are collected with reporting and measurement errors. In this epidemic, differences in testing, and in some countries pressure to mis-report or fail to report results, have clearly caused some difficulties in obtaining accurate data.
6. All statistical models involve uncertainty, and all projections resulting from these models carry with them this uncertainty.
7. This is a new disease. It will react in unpredictable ways with different populations.
8. The population itself changes its behavior over time. This is perhaps the largest unknown at the early stage of a severe epidemic in which a strong change in behavior, and new forms of treatment, occur.
Because of these inherent limitations, we present the model and data along with the available diagnostic and related information, to allow an informed decision. We urge policymakers to consider this information, and additional information, before making their decisions.

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Implementation of Model
Supported Intelligence adapted an SIR model authored by Milan Batista, Professor at the University of Ljubljana in Slovenia. Mr. Batista and his colleagues describe this model, provide a public file exchange for the code, and apply it to the Coronavirus outbreak in the following publication and websites:
• Batista, Milan. (2020). Estimation of the final size of the coronavirus epidemic by the SIR model. Monograph found at ResearchGate.
• A file exchange version is maintained for review by other researchers; it is here: https://www.mathworks.com/matlabcentral/fileexchange/74658-fitviruscovid19.
• Related work using this same model for other countries and with different data sources is available here: https://www.fpp.uni-lj.si/en/research/researh-laboratories-and-the-programme-team/ research-programme-team/ As of the date of this memo, a comparison analysis of the United States (using an April 10 dataset, from a different source than we use in our analysis) is presented. It is consistent with the results we obtain using our data for the United States.
The version used by Supported Intelligence is modified to include the following improvements for the purposes of our work:
1. Supported Intelligence built a data assembly routine that gathers live data on cases reported per day from the New York Times.
2. We provide additional diagnostic information, and have created different data visualizations for the purpose of presenting the results.
3. We clarify a number of terms, and adjust the presentation to date formats common in the United States, to avoid ambiguity and misunderstanding.

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Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 1-2 filed 05/22/20 PageID.91 Page 1 of 3

DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

_____________________________________________________

LEAGUE OF INDPENDENT FITNESS FACITLITIES AND TRAINERS, INC., BASELINE FITNESS LLC, BUILDING YOUR TEMPLE LLC, BYT FITNESS 247 LLC, H3 FITNESS LLC, JKP FITNESS, LLC, JPF ENTERPRISES, LLC, and NASCOT ENTERPRISES, LLC,
Plaintiffs, v. GRETCHEN E. WHITMER and ROBERT GORDON,
Defendants. _____________________________________________________
ERSKINE LAW, PC Scott M. Erskine (P54734) Carly Van Thomme (P59706) Attorneys for Plaintiffs 612 W. University Rochester, MI. 48307 (248) 601-4499 serskine@erskinelaw.com _____________________________________________________

Civil No. Hon.
COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

EXHIBIT 2 APRIL 15, 2020 LETTER TO GOVERNOR WHITMER

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 1-2 filed 05/22/20 PageID.92 Page 2 of 3

April 15, 2020
The Honorable Gretchen Whitmer Governor of Michigan 111 S. Capitol Ave. Lansing, Ml 48909

Dear Governor Whitmer:

On behalf of our 1,300 Michigan-based employees and 667,000 members across our 80 Planet Fitness clubs located throughout Michigan, we applaud you for your decisive measures to mitigate the spread of COVID-19 in our state. As you consider measures to re-open the economy of our great state, we would like to urge you to make gyms a priority in the first tranche. As you know, the fitness industry plays a significant role in our economy and an even more vital role in the health and well-being of Michiganders. It has been well documented that exercise helps improve the immune system, helps with anxiety and depression and is proven to reduce the occurrence of many chronic diseases. By providing a safe and clean environment for our members to exercise, we are helping them achieve these greater levels of wellness.

To help you understand the economic impact of our business, the following is a summary of the last twelve months ending March 2020:

$33.4m $0.44m $2.46m $1.82m $0.20m $18.7m $57.02m

in total employee wages in state unemployment insurance in real estate taxes paid in personal property taxes in sales and use tax in construction supporting hundreds of trades people in Ml
in total support of Michigan's economy

These statistics are exclusive to Planet Fitness and do not contemplate the rest of the gym industry in Michigan. According to IHRSA (International Health & Racquet Sports Association), which is the governing body that oversees the fitness and gym industry, there are over 1,000 gyms and fitness centers with over 1.5 million members in Michigan as of 2019.

In addition, and more importantly, the safety and well-being of our members and staff are our highest priority. As the single largest purveyor of health and fitness in the State of Michigan, we feel that we are well positioned to address operating guidelines not only for our business, but for gyms and fitness centers in general. To that end, we have put together an overview of our recommendations for your consideration. The attached document outlines many of the current standards that are followed in our club operations along with a number of new and/or

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 1-2 filed 05/22/20 PageID.93 Page 3 of 3

enhanced recommendations focused on sanitation and physical distancing protocols. The safety and well-being of members and staff is paramount.
The procedures and guidelines attached, and other best practices, would be implemented to protect all employees, members and the public during the current pandemic. Furthermore, these procedures and guidelines would remain in effect until Executive Order 2020-42 (COVID-19) is cancelled and beyond, if needed.
Thank you for your consideration and we look forward to working with you to arrive at the best possible solution to re-opening our businesses.
Respectfully, Planet Fitness Franchisees of Michigan

,.,._ p IJII, tr= �
Adam Willaeys Chief Executive Officer Impact Fitness, LLC
Elaine Berry CEO/Owner Planet Fitness Berry, Inc.

7Mh-UU-�
Thomas Purther Chief Executive Officer Cambridge Fitness, LLC

}Jn;u';3� Ke11. JJu'Eusscher
Lonni Bhirdo/Ken DeBusscher
Managing Partners
Slim Cherry, LLC

Bryan'Rief Chief Executive Officer PF Michigan Group, LLC

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 1-3 filed 05/22/20 PageID.94 Page 1 of 3

DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

_____________________________________________________

LEAGUE OF INDPENDENT FITNESS FACITLITIES AND TRAINERS, INC., BASELINE FITNESS LLC, BUILDING YOUR TEMPLE LLC, BYT FITNESS 247 LLC, H3 FITNESS LLC, JKP FITNESS, LLC, JPF ENTERPRISES, LLC, and NASCOT ENTERPRISES, LLC,
Plaintiffs, v. GRETCHEN E. WHITMER and ROBERT GORDON,
Defendants. _____________________________________________________
ERSKINE LAW, PC Scott M. Erskine (P54734) Carly Van Thomme (P59706) Attorneys for Plaintiffs 612 W. University Rochester, MI. 48307 (248) 601-4499 serskine@erskinelaw.com _____________________________________________________

Civil No. Hon.
COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

EXHIBIT 3 MAY 15, 2020 LETTER TO GOVERNOR WHITMER

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 1-3 filed 05/22/20 PageID.95 Page 2 of 3
Michigan Fitness Clubs Association
Michigan Fitness Clubs Association 133 W. Main Street Suite 266 Northville, MI 48167
May 15, 2020
The Honorable Gretchen Whitmer Governor of Michigan 111 S. Capitol Ave. Lansing, MI 48909
Dear Governor Whitmer:
On behalf of health clubs and fitness studios across Michigan, thank you for your commitment to protecting public health and supporting the economy during this challenging time. While we are all competitors, when it comes to the health, safety and wellness of our employees and the people of Michigan, we are in total agreement and speak as one voice.
As various sectors open and you consider measures to re-open others, we would like to urge you to make health clubs and fitness studios a priority. As you know, the fitness industry plays a significant role in our economy and an even more vital role in the health and well-being of Michiganders. While it is well documented that exercise helps improve the immune system, helps with anxiety and depression, reduces the likelihood and impact of many chronic diseases, and lowers medical expenses, in the case of Covid19, fitness is Michigan’s path out of this pandemic. By providing a safe and clean environment for our members to exercise, we help Michigan achieve greater levels of wellness and the strength to survive this pandemic.
Candidly, a vaccine being at least 12 months away, the only way for Michigan’s people, businesses and government to return to normalcy in the foreseeable future is to achieve herd immunity (meaning 70-80% of the population must be exposed to the coronavirus). According to the CDC, the leading factor in Covid-19 hospitalizations and complications is obesity, meaning Michigan has to get fit to survive the pandemic.
The CDC confirms, the majority of patients being hospitalized have one or more underlying conditions with the most common being hypertension (49.7%) and obesity (48.3%). Among patients aged 18–49 years, obesity was the most prevalent underlying condition. https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/69/wr/mm6915e3.htm
“BMI [obesity] is the Achilles’ heel for American [Covid] patients. . . .” states Jennifer Lighter, an epidemiologist at New York University’s Langone School of Medicine.
Sanjum Sethi, a cardiologist at Columbia University Medical Center, says his hospital is seeing a surprising number of younger patients with obesity, but no other conditions such as diabetes or high blood pressure. On April 12, he tweeted that, for obese patients, “the prognosis is extremely grim. They are NOT dying from comorbidities. They are dying from COVID-19.” https://www.sciencenews.org/article/coronavirus-covid19-obesity-risk-factor

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 1-3 filed 05/22/20 PageID.96 Page 3 of 3

Regrettably, these statistics are repeatedly confirmed in multiple studies—59% of hospitalized patients are obese with an average BMI of 33. Patients with a BMI of 30-34 were twice as likely to get admitted to the hospital, and patients with a BMI of 35 or higher were three times as likely to end up in the intensive care unit. https://www.webmd.com/lung/news/20200429/obesity-new-risk-factors-for-young-covid-patients

Regarding the economic impact of our business, the following is a summary of recent figures:

$150.3m $2.0m $11.07m $8.19m $0.90m $84.15m $257.02m

in total employee wages in state unemployment insurance in real estate taxes paid in personal property taxes in sales and use tax in construction supporting hundreds of trades people in MI in total support of Michigan’s economy

According to IHRSA (International Health & Racquet Sports Association), which is the national governing body that oversees the fitness and gym industry, there are over 1,100 gyms and fitness centers with over 1.5 million members in Michigan as of 2019.

Finally, and more importantly, the safety and well-being of our members and staff are our highest priority. To that end, we have put together an overview of our recommendations for your consideration. The attached document outlines many of the current standards that are followed in our club operations along with a number of new and/or enhanced recommendations focused on sanitation and physical distancing protocols. The safety and well-being of members and staff is paramount.

The procedures and guidelines attached, and other best practices, would be implemented to protect all employees, members and the public during the current pandemic. Furthermore, these procedures and guidelines would remain in effect until Executive Order 2020-42 (COVID-19) is cancelled and beyond if needed.
Thank you for your consideration and we look forward to working with you to arrive at the best possible solution to re-opening our businesses. We are not just a significant contributor to Michigan’s economy, our industry is critical to Michigan’s plan to survive this pandemic.

Sincerely,

Bryan Rief & Donald Jordan
Michigan Fitness Clubs Association

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 1-4 filed 05/22/20 PageID.97 Page 1 of 5

DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

_____________________________________________________

LEAGUE OF INDPENDENT FITNESS FACITLITIES AND TRAINERS, INC., BASELINE FITNESS LLC, BUILDING YOUR TEMPLE LLC, BYT FITNESS 247 LLC, H3 FITNESS LLC, JKP FITNESS, LLC, JPF ENTERPRISES, LLC, and NASCOT ENTERPRISES, LLC,
Plaintiffs, v. GRETCHEN E. WHITMER and ROBERT GORDON,
Defendants. _____________________________________________________
ERSKINE LAW, PC Scott M. Erskine (P54734) Carly Van Thomme (P59706) Attorneys for Plaintiffs 612 W. University Rochester, MI. 48307 (248) 601-4499 serskine@erskinelaw.com _____________________________________________________

Civil No. Hon.
COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

EXHIBIT 4 MAY 15, 2020 LETTER TO GOVERNOR WHITMER

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 </s> Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 16 filed 06/01/20 PageID.117 Page 1 of 69

DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

_____________________________________________________

LEAGUE OF INDPENDENT FITNESS FACITLITIES AND TRAINERS, INC., BASELINE FITNESS LLC, BUILDING YOUR TEMPLE LLC, BYT FITNESS 247 LLC, CLAWSON FITNESS, LLC, CLINTON FITNESS, INC., D-LUX KARATE UNIVERSITY LLC, FENTON ATHLETIC CLUB, INC., FENTON KARATE, LLC, FUSION FITNESS 24/7 LLC, H3 FITNESS LLC, I FITNESS PERSONAL TRAINING, INC., JKP FITNESS, LLC, JPF ENTERPRISES, LLC, M FITNESS CLUB, LLC, MH & AB LLC, MOTOR CITY CF - ST. CLAIR SHORES, LLC, NASCOT ENTERPRISES, LLC, PRISON CITY PHYSIQUE LLC, RMP FITNESS INC., STRENGTH BEYOND LLC, 24/7 BOOTCAMP AND BOXING INC., and 4 SEASONS GYM, LLC,
Plaintiffs, v. GRETCHEN E. WHITMER and ROBERT GORDON,
Defendants. _____________________________________________________
ERSKINE LAW, PC Scott M. Erskine (P54734) Carly Van Thomme (P59706) Attorneys for Plaintiffs 612 W. University

Civil No. 1:20-cv-00458 Hon. Paul L. Maloney
FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

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Rochester, MI. 48307 (248) 601-4499 serskine@erskinelaw.com _____________________________________________________ For their First Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs allege as follows:
INTRODUCTION 1. Based on speculative modeling on the infectiousness and lethality of a new coronavirus, Governor Whitmer has issued executive orders that have shuttered civil society, placed 10 million people under house arrest, and taken jobs away from nearly 1.2 million people, all without due process of law. The Governor has not disclosed and/or disclosed only a minimal amount of the data or methodology used to create the modeling that purportedly justifies this extreme action. At the same time, through Executive Order 2020-38, she has suspended the Freedom of Information Act through June 4, 2020, preventing any independent assessment of whether the modeling used to justify locking down the entire State is reliable. 2. The Governor’s initial Executive Order was premised on the perceived need to “flatten the curve” so as to avoid overwhelming the State’s hospitals and healthcare centers, not to eradicate the virus. Although the curve has been flattened, the Governor has nonetheless issued stricter and confusing executive orders that unreasonably and unnecessarily interfere with Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. 3. Governor Whitmer’s executive orders are unprecedented. For the first time in our State’s history—indeed, in our nation’s history—the State government is mass quarantining healthy people instead of the sick. As a free people, we have the unalienable right to pursue happiness, which includes the freedom to make our own choices about our safety and welfare without unconstitutional interference. In the face of the coronavirus, it

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means the freedom to choose whether to stay at home, or to keep calm and carry on with the things that make life worth living.
4. Plaintiffs are affected by the Governor’s orders. Under threat of criminal penalties, they have been forced to close or significantly restrict their businesses, depriving them of their liberty and property interests without due process. At the same time, without offering any justification, the Governor has allowed, and is still allowing, other businesses deemed “critical” to stay open, even though: (a) “critical” businesses must adhere to guidance from the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”) on “social distancing”; and (b) Plaintiffs are fully capable of adhering to those same guide-lines if allowed to reopen.
5. Although Michigan, like all States in the Union, is expressly guaranteed a republican form of government under Article IV, Section 4 of the U.S. Constitution, the Governor has unilaterally suspended civil liberties and announced that this state of affairs will continue even over the Legislature’s objection. When the Legislature announced bills to limit unilateral action and ensure constitutional government remains intact, Governor Whitmer said “I’m not going to sign any bill that takes power away from me or any future governor.”
6. Government by executive order and executive directives —over 90 of them so far—stirs echoes of royal prerogative.
7. Ours is a constitutional republic that empowers government to act within defined limits. Those limits apply at all times and under all circumstances. In war, in peace, and in pandemics. “No doctrine, involving more pernicious consequences, was ever invented by the wit of man than that any of its provisions can be suspended during any of the great

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exigencies of government. Such a doctrine leads directly to anarchy or despotism....” Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 120–122 (1866).
8. Plaintiffs seek a judicial declaration that the executive orders keeping people in their homes and away from their businesses—and all other orders, rules, and enforcement activity related to them—are unconstitutional under the Dormant Commerce Clause, the Privileges and Immunities Clause, the Privileges or Immunities Clause, the Due Process Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, and State law. Such a declaration, and a corresponding injunction, will yield a more rational, pragmatic response to the virus that saves lives, saves livelihoods, and preserves constitutional norms all at the same time.
9. In short, Plaintiffs bring this lawsuit to define the limits of a State’s police power. Whatever its limits, this legal term of art is not some shibboleth that unlocks absolute executive power and casts our Constitution to the wind. The issues raised in this Complaint are novel, and they will not be rendered moot if the executive order is lifted before the Court issues judgment. The issues presented are capable of repetition and are of such importance that they cannot evade judicial review.
PARTIES 10. Plaintiff League of Independent Fitness Facilities and Trainers, Inc. (“LIFFT”) is a domestic non-profit 501(c)(4) organization with its principal place of business in Wayne County, Michigan. It has over four hundred members throughout the State of Michigan, including but not limited to: Allegan County, Kent County, Kalamazoo County, Macomb County, Oakland County, Ottawa County, and Wayne County, that engage in foreign, interstate, and intrastate commerce. At least 130 of its members operate a fitness facility, with members working out and attending fitness classes in Michigan. Because of Governor

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Whitmer’s executive orders and Director Gordon’s Emergency Order and Emergency Rule, every single one of LIFFT’s members have been forced to close or stop training operations since March 16, 2020 through the date of the filing of this Complaint.
11. Plaintiff Baseline Fitness LLC is a Michigan Limited Liability company with its principal place of business in Oakland County. It engages in foreign, interstate, and intrastate commerce. Baseline Fitness operates as a fitness facility in Oakland County, with members working out and attending fitness classes in Michigan. Because of the Governor Whitmer’s executive orders and Director Gordon’s Emergency Order and Emergency Rule, Baseline Fitness has been forced to close since March 16, 2020 through the date of the filing of this Complaint
12. Plaintiff Building Your Temple LLC is a Michigan Limited Liability company with its principal place of business in Oakland County. It engages in foreign, interstate, and intrastate commerce. Building Your Temple operates as a fitness facility in Oakland County, with members working out and attending fitness classes in Michigan. Because of the Governor Whitmer’s executive orders and Director Gordon’s Emergency Order and Emergency Rule, Building Your Temple has been forced to close since March 16, 2020 through the date of the filing of this Complaint.
13. Plaintiff BYT Fitness 247 LLC is a Michigan Limited Liability company with its principal place of business in Oakland County. It engages in foreign, interstate, and intrastate commerce. BYT Fitness 247 operates as a fitness facility in Oakland County, with members working out and attending fitness classes in Michigan. Because of the Governor Whitmer’s executive orders and Director Gordon’s Emergency Order and Emergency Rule, BYT Fitness

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247 has been forced to close since March 16, 2020 through the date of the filing of this Complaint.
14. Plaintiff Clawson Fitness, LLC is a Michigan Limited Liability company with its principal place of business in Oakland County. It engages in foreign, interstate, and intrastate commerce. Clawson Fitness operates as a fitness facility in Oakland County, with members working out and attending fitness classes in Michigan. Because of the Governor Whitmer’s executive orders and Director Gordon’s Emergency Order and Emergency Rule, Clawson Fitness has been forced to close since March 16, 2020 through the date of the filing of this Complaint.
15. Plaintiff Clinton Fitness, Inc. is a Michigan corporation with its principal place of business in Macomb County. It engages in foreign, interstate, and intrastate commerce. Clinton Fitness operates as a fitness facility in Macomb County, with members working out and attending fitness classes in Michigan. Because of the Governor Whitmer’s executive orders and Director Gordon’s Emergency Order and Emergency Rule, Clinton Fitness has been forced to close since March 16, 2020 through the date of the filing of this Complaint.
16. Plaintiff D-Lux Karate University LLC is a Michigan Limited Liability company with its principal place of business in Macomb County. It engages in foreign, interstate, and intrastate commerce. D-Lux Karate University operates as a fitness facility in Macomb County, with members working out and attending fitness classes in Michigan. Because of the Governor Whitmer’s executive orders and Director Gordon’s Emergency Order and Emergency Rule, D-Lux Karate University has been forced to close since March 16, 2020 through the date of the filing of this Complaint.

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17. Plaintiff Fenton Athletic Club, Inc. is a Michigan corporation with its principal place of business in Genesee County. It engages in foreign, interstate, and intrastate commerce. Fenton Athletic Club operates as a fitness facility in Genesee County, with members working out and attending fitness classes in Michigan. Because of the Governor Whitmer’s executive orders and Director Gordon’s Emergency Order and Emergency Rule, Fenton Athletic Club has been forced to close since March 16, 2020 through the date of the filing of this Complaint.
18. Plaintiff Fenton Karate, LLC is a Michigan Limited Liability company with its principal place of business in Genesee County. It engages in foreign, interstate, and intrastate commerce. Fenton Karate operates as a fitness facility in Genesee County, with members working out and attending fitness classes in Michigan. Because of the Governor Whitmer’s executive orders and Director Gordon’s Emergency Order and Emergency Rule, Fenton Karate has been forced to close since March 16, 2020 through the date of the filing of this Complaint.
19. Plaintiff Fusion Fitness 24/7 LLC is a Michigan Limited Liability company with its principal place of business in Wayne County. It engages in foreign, interstate, and intrastate commerce. Fusion Fitness 24/7 operates as a fitness facility in Wayne County, with members working out and attending fitness classes in Michigan. Because of the Governor Whitmer’s executive orders and Director Gordon’s Emergency Order and Emergency Rule, Fusion Fitness 24/7 has been forced to close since March 16, 2020 through the date of the filing of this Complaint.
20. Plaintiff H3 Fitness LLC is a Michigan Limited Liability company with its principal place of business in Ottawa County. It engages in foreign, interstate, and intrastate

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commerce. H3 Fitness operates as a fitness facility in Ottawa County, with members working out and attending fitness classes in Michigan. Because of the Governor Whitmer’s executive orders and Director Gordon’s Emergency Order and Emergency Rule, H3 Fitness has been forced to close since March 16, 2020 through the date of the filing of this Complaint.
21. Plaintiff I Fitness Personal Training is the d/b/a of a Michigan corporation with its principal place of business in Oakland County. It engages in foreign, interstate, and intrastate commerce. I Fitness Personal Training operates as a fitness facility in Oakland County, with members working out and attending fitness classes in Michigan. Because of the Governor Whitmer’s executive orders and Director Gordon’s Emergency Order and Emergency Rule, I Fitness Personal Training has been forced to close since March 16, 2020 through the date of the filing of this Complaint.
22. Plaintiff JKP Fitness is a Michigan Limited Liability Company with its principal place of business in Kent County. It engages in foreign, interstate, and intrastate commerce. JKP Enterprises operates as a fitness facility in Kent County, with members working out and attending fitness classes in Michigan. Because of the Governor Whitmer’s executive orders and Director Gordon’s Emergency Order and Emergency Rule, JKP Enterprises has been forced to close since March 16, 2020 through the date of the filing of this Complaint.
23. Plaintiff JPF Enterprises is a Michigan Limited Liability Company with its principal place of business in Kent County. It engages in foreign, interstate, and intrastate commerce. JPF Enterprises operates as a fitness facility in Kent County, with members working out and attending fitness classes in Michigan. Because of the Governor Whitmer’s executive orders and Director Gordon’s Emergency Order and Emergency Rule, JPF

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Enterprises has been forced to close since March 16, 2020 through the date of the filing of this Complaint.
24. Plaintiff M Fitness Club, LLC is a Michigan Limited Liability Company with its principal place of business in Macomb County. It engages in foreign, interstate, and intrastate commerce. M Fitness Club operates as a fitness facility in Macomb County, with members working out and attending fitness classes in Michigan. Because of the Governor Whitmer’s executive orders and Director Gordon’s Emergency Order and Emergency Rule, M Fitness Club has been forced to close since March 16, 2020 through the date of the filing of this Complaint.
25. Plaintiff MH & AB LLC is a Michigan Limited Liability Company with its principal place of business in Macomb County. It engages in foreign, interstate, and intrastate commerce. MH & AB operates as a fitness facility in Macomb County, with members working out and attending fitness classes in Michigan. Because of the Governor Whitmer’s executive orders and Director Gordon’s Emergency Order and Emergency Rule, MH & AB has been forced to close since March 16, 2020 through the date of the filing of this Complaint.
26. Plaintiff Motor City CF – St. Clair Shores, LLC is a Michigan Limited Liability Company with its principal place of business in Macomb County. It engages in foreign, interstate, and intrastate commerce. Motor City CF – St. Clair Shores operates as a fitness facility in Macomb County, with members working out and attending fitness classes in Michigan. Because of the Governor Whitmer’s executive orders and Director Gordon’s Emergency Order and Emergency Rule, Motor City CF – St. Clair Shores has been forced to close since March 16, 2020 through the date of the filing of this Complaint.

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27. Plaintiff Nascot Enterprises is a Michigan Limited Liability Company with its principal place of business in Oakland County, Michigan. It engages in foreign, interstate, and intrastate commerce. Nascot Enterprises operates fitness facilities in Oakland, Macomb, and Wayne Counties, with members attending workouts and classes in Michigan. Because of the Governor Whitmer’s executive orders and Director Gordon’s Emergency Order and Emergency Rule, Nascot Enterprises has been forced to close since March 16, 2020 through the date of the filing of this Complaint.
28. Plaintiff Prison City Physique LLC is a Michigan Limited Liability Company with its principal place of business in Jackson County, Michigan. It engages in foreign, interstate, and intrastate commerce. Prison City Physique operates as a fitness facility in Jackson County, with members attending workouts and classes in Michigan. Because of the Governor Whitmer’s executive orders and Director Gordon’s Emergency Order and Emergency Rule, Prison City Physique has been forced to close since March 16, 2020 through the date of the filing of this Complaint.
29. Plaintiff RMP Fitness Inc. is a Michigan corporation with its principal place of business in Macomb County, Michigan. It engages in foreign, interstate, and intrastate commerce. RMP Fitness operates as a fitness facility in Macomb County, with members attending workouts and classes in Michigan. Because of the Governor Whitmer’s executive orders and Director Gordon’s Emergency Order and Emergency Rule, RMP Fitness has been forced to close since March 16, 2020 through the date of the filing of this Complaint.
30. Plaintiff Strength Beyond LLC is a Michigan Limited Liability Company with its principal place of business in Kalamazoo County, Michigan. It engages in foreign, interstate, and intrastate commerce. Strength Beyond operates as a fitness facility in Kalamazoo

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County, with members attending workouts and classes in Michigan. Because of the Governor Whitmer’s executive orders and Director Gordon’s Emergency Order and Emergency Rule, Strength Beyond has been forced to close since March 16, 2020 through the date of the filing of this Complaint.
31. Plaintiff 24/7 Fitness Bootcamp and Boxing Inc. is a Michigan corporation with its principal place of business in Ingham County, Michigan. It engages in foreign, interstate, and intrastate commerce. 24/7 Fitness Bootcamp and Boxing operates as a fitness facility in Ingham County, with members attending workouts and classes in Michigan. Because of the Governor Whitmer’s executive orders and Director Gordon’s Emergency Order and Emergency Rule, 24/7 Fitness Bootcamp and Boxing has been forced to close since March 16, 2020 through the date of the filing of this Complaint.
32. Plaintiff 4 Seasons Gym is a Michigan Limited Liability Company with its principal place of business in Gratiot County, Michigan. It engages in foreign, interstate, and intrastate commerce. 4 Seasons Gym operates as a fitness facility in Gratiot County, with members attending workouts and classes in Michigan. Because of the Governor Whitmer’s executive orders and Director Gordon’s Emergency Order and Emergency Rule, 4 Seasons Gym has been forced to close since March 16, 2020 through the date of the filing of this Complaint.
33. According to IHRSA (International Health & Racquet Sports Association), which is the national governing body that oversees the fitness and gym industry, there are over 1,100 gyms and fitness centers with over 1.5 million members in Michigan as of 2019.
34. Many businesses who have either remained open or are in the process of opening are businesses that are open to the general public. In contrast, Plaintiffs are

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member-based fitness facilities and do not receive nearly the amount, if any, of “walk-in” business that retailers, restaurants or other businesses rely on for profit.
35. Defendant Gretchen E. Whitmer is the Governor of the State of Michigan. Plaintiffs sue her in her official capacity only.
36. Defendant Robert Gordon is the Director of the Michigan Department of Health and Human Services. Plaintiffs sue him in his official capacity only.
JURISDICTION 37. This action challenges Governor Whitmer’s Executive Orders 2020-43 through 2020-96 (and their predecessors and future iterations of these orders) (the “EOs”), and Director Gordon’s Emergency Order and Emergency Rule (all collectively, the “Lockdown Orders”), related to the closure of Plaintiffs’ businesses, which Plaintiffs believe violate the following clauses of the U.S. Constitution:
(a) Dormant Commerce Clause of Article I, Section 8; (b) Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 1; (c) Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; (d) Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; and (e) Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 38. The Court therefore has federal-question jurisdiction under Article III of the U.S. Constitution and 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 39. Plaintiffs seek declaratory relief and a preliminary and permanent injunction against the Lockdown Orders and similarly crafted orders and rules issued in the future. Accordingly, they bring this action under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201– 2202, and the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651.

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40. Plaintiffs also challenge that the EOs as exceeding the Governor’s authority under the separation-of-powers doctrine enshrined in Article III, Section 2 of the Michigan Constitution of 1963; the Emergency Powers of the Governor Act (“Emergency Powers Act”), Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 10.31–10.33; and the Emergency Management Act, Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 30.401–30.421. Accordingly, Plaintiffs also invoke the Court’s supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

VENUE 41. Governor Whitmer is a resident of, and the principal office of the Governor is located in, Lansing, Michigan. 42. Director Gordon’s principal office is located in Lansing, Michigan. 43. A substantial part of the events giving rise to the claims in this Complaint occurred in Lansing, Michigan. 44. The city of Lansing is the seat of government for the State of Michigan. Michigan Const. art. III, § 1 (1963). It is located within Ingham County, which is within the territorial jurisdiction of the Western District of Michigan. 28 U.S.C. § 102(b)(1). This Court is therefore a proper venue for this action under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1)–(2).

Executive Orders

EXECUTIVE ACTION

45. The Emergency Powers Act permits a governor, “during times of great public crisis, disaster, rioting, catastrophe, or similar public emergency within the State, or reasonable apprehension of immediate danger of a public emergency of that kind, when public safety is imperiled, ... [to] proclaim a state of emergency and designate the area

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involved ... [and to] promulgate reasonable orders, rules, and regulations as he or she considers necessary to protect life or property or to bring the emergency situation within the affected area under control.” Mich. Comp. Laws § 10.31(1) (emphasis added). Executive orders issued under this Act have the force of law.
46. The Emergency Management Act permits a governor, upon the declaration of an emergency or a disaster, to compel evacuation, to control entry to, exit from, and the occupancy of premises within, the affected area, among other things. Mich. Comp. Laws § 30.405(1). Executive orders issued under this Act have the force of law.
47. On March 11, 2020, Governor Whitmer issued Executive Order 2020-04, which declared a “state of emergency” under both Acts based upon two presumptive diagnoses of coronavirus disease (“COVID-19”), a respiratory illness caused by virus named the severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus two (“SARS-CoV-2” or the “coronavirus”).
48. On March 16, 2020 Governor Whitmer issued Executive Order 2020-09 under both Acts. This order closed to the public, restaurants, food courts, cafes, coffee houses, and other places of accommodation. Under this order, “gymnasiums, fitness centers, recreation centers, indoor sports facilities, indoor exercise facilities, exercise studios, and spas” were also forced to close. A willful violation of EO 2020-09 is a misdemeanor for which a person can be imprisoned for up to 90 days and fined up to $500. Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 10.33 and 30.405(3). All Plaintiffs complied with Executive Order 2020-09 and closed their doors.
49. On March 22, 2020, the Governor issued Executive Order 2020-20 under both Acts. This order closed to the public a wide range of public accommodations, including all restaurants, food courts, cafes, coffeehouses, and other places of public accommodation

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offering food or beverages for on-site consumption. A willful violation of EO 2020-20 is a misdemeanor for which a person can be imprisoned for up to 90 days and fined up to $500. Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 10.33, 30.405(3), and 750.504; EO 2020-20(6).
50. On March 23, 2020, the Governor issued Executive Order 2020-21 under both Acts. This order prohibits all in-person work that the Governor deems “not necessary to sustain or protect life.” A willful violation of EO 2020-21 is a misdemeanor for which a person can be imprisoned for up to 90 days and fined up to $500. Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 10.33, 30.405(3), and 750.504; EO 2020-20(6).
51. On April 9, 2020, the Governor issued Executive Order 2020-42 under both Acts. This order extends EO 2020-21 through April 30, 2020, while imposing even greater restrictions on the general public than before. A willful violation of EO 2020-42 is a misdemeanor for which a person can be imprisoned for up to 90 days and fined up to $500. Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 10.33, 30.405(3), and 750.504; EO 2020-42(17).
52. On April 13, 2020, the Governor issued Executive Order 2020-43 under both Acts. This order extends EO 2020-20 through April 30, 2020. A willful violation of EO 202043 is a misdemeanor for which a person can be imprisoned for up to 90 days and fined up to $500. Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 10.33, 30.405(3), and 750.504; EO 2020-42(7).
53. On April 24, 2020, the Governor issued Executive Order 2020-59 under both Acts. This Order extends EO 2020-42 through May 15, 2020. It purports to loosen some restrictions imposed under EO 2020-42 as part of a phased reopening of the economy. A willful violation of EO 2020-59 is a misdemeanor for which a person can be imprisoned for up to 90 days and fined up to $500. Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 10.33, 30.405(3), and 750.504; EO 2020-59(20).

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54. On April 30, 2020, the Governor issued Executive Order 2020-66, terminating the state of emergency under the Emergency Management Act which was set to expire when the state legislature did not approve of an extension of the Act under the terms proposed by the Governor.
55. One minute after terminating the state of emergency under the Emergency Management Act on April 30, 2020, the Governor issued Executive Orders 2020-67 and 2020-68. In Executive Order 2020-67 the Governor declared a new state of emergency under the Emergency Powers of the Governors Act. In Executive Order 2020-68, the Governor declared a new state of emergency under the Emergency Management Act. A willful violation of either EO 2020-67 or 2020-68 is a misdemeanor for which a person can be imprisoned for up to 90 days and fined up to $500. Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 10.33, 30.405(3), and 750.504; EO 2020-59(20).
56. On May 7, 2020, the Governor issued Executive Order 2020-77 under both Acts. EO 2020-77 started opening the economy slowly, allowing landscapers, the manufacturing sector, garden stores and nurseries, bicycle repair shops, real estate companies, moving companies, a limited amount of retail with major restrictions and construction to reopen with many restrictions. All other sectors, including fitness centers and gyms, remained closed. A willful violation of EO 2020-59 is a misdemeanor for which a person can be imprisoned for up to 90 days and fined up to $500. Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 10.33, 30.405(3), and 750.504; EO 2020-59(20).
57. On May 18, 2020, the Governor issued Executive Order 2020-92 under both Acts. EO 2020-92 divided the state into eight regions. Further, the EO 2020-92 continued opening the economy slowly, allowing restaurants and bars to reopen at 50% capacity in

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Regions 6 and 8 only (the Upper Peninsula and small parts of the northern Lower Peninsula), subject to other provisions of Executive Order 2020-91 which was issued the same day. For Regions 6 and 8 only, EO 2020-92 allowed individuals to gather in a social gathering of up to 10 people, allowed business offices to open if workers cannot work remotely, and allowed retail to return in limited capacity. All other sectors, including fitness centers and gyms, remained closed. A willful violation of EO 2020-59 is a misdemeanor for which a person can be imprisoned for up to 90 days and fined up to $500. Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 10.33, 30.405(3), and 750.504; EO 2020-59(20).
58. On May 21, 2020, the Governor issued Executive Order 2020-96 under both Acts. EO 2020-96 made hotels and motel workers statewide part of the “critical infrastructure,” but did not allow hotels or motels to open gyms, pools, spas, or dining and entertainment areas. Further, the EO allows auto dealerships to open in a limited capacity statewide as of May 26, 2020. The EO further allows retail stores to open in a limited capacity statewide on May 26, 2020. Finally, the EO will allow non-emergency medical, dental and veterinary services to resume on May 29, 2020. All other sectors, including fitness centers and gyms, which were the first businesses shuttered by the Governor, remained closed. A willful violation of EO 2020-59 is a misdemeanor for which a person can be imprisoned for up to 90 days and fined up to $500. Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 10.33, 30.405(3), and 750.504; EO 2020-59(20).
Action by MDHHS 59. On April 2, 2020, Director Gordon issued an Emergency Order under the
Michigan Public Health Code. Mich. Comp. Laws § 333.2253(1). This order requires every

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person in Michigan to comply with EO 2020-20 and EO 2020-21, and authorizes police and prosecutors to enforce those EOs as incorporated through the Emergency Order. See https:// perma.cc/K6ZH-HS6N. This order also applies to EOs 2020-42, 2020-43, and 2020-59. A violation of an MDHHS order is a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for up to six months and a fine of $200, or both. Mich. Comp. Laws § 333.2261. Thus, Director Gordon’s Emergency Order effectively doubles the period of incarceration authorized under the Governor’s executive orders.
60. At the same time, Director Gordon issued an Emergency Rule establishing a $1,000 civil penalty for violations of Director Gordon’s Emergency Order. See https://perma.cc/ 8W5C-E98N.
61. Since April 2, 2020, any person who violates Governor Whitmer’s EOs (and thereby automatically violates Director Gordon’s Emergency Order and the Emergency Rule) can now be imprisoned for up to six months, assessed a penal fine of up to $500, and assessed a civil fine of up to $1,000.
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 62. Although the coronavirus is highly contagious, it does not invariably result in COVID-19. For those who do develop COVID-19, the mortality rate is low. As of May 31, 2020, the State reported on its official coronavirus webpage 57,397 confirmed cases of COVID-19 (including those who no longer have COVID-19), which is roughly .57% of the State population. As of that same date, the State reported 5,747 deaths related to COVID-19. As a result, only 0.057% of the State’s population has succumbed to the virus. 63. More important than the total number of cases is that, as of May 31, 2020, Michigan has only 13,807 active COVID-19 cases, which includes at least 1,800 cases

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involving prisoners in Michigan (who by their very nature cannot spread the virus as easily as someone who is not incarcerated). Michigan currently ranks 18th in states with known active cases. See https://www.worldometers.info/coronavirus/country/us/. The 13,807 known active cases represents .14 percent of the population who are capable of spreading the virus to other residents.
64. In all likelihood, the survival rate in Michigan is far higher than discussed in Paragraph 62 above. Recent antibody testing conducted in New York State and a study in Los Angeles suggest that millions more have been infected with the coronavirus than previously known, and that the supermajority of those previously infected were either asymptomatic or experienced mild reactions to it. In New York, this new information has dropped the mortality rate to 0.5%—i.e., a survival rate of 99.5%. In Los Angeles, it dropped the mortality rate to 0.1–0.3%—i.e., a survival rate of 99.7–99.9%. There is no reason to believe that Michigan is exempt from this good news. Further, the most recent CDC projections in the U.S. show a mortality rate of .2 to .4%. See https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/hcp/planningscenarios.html As more Michiganders are tested, increases in positive tests will yield a higher survival rate.
65. The number of deaths caused by COVID-19, while unquestionably tragic, is not “unprecedented,” as routinely claimed. What is unprecedented is Governor Whitmer’s response to it.
66. In 1918, the deadly Spanish Flu swept the globe, infecting over 500 million people (roughly one third of the world population, killing between 20 million and 50 million people worldwide. Over 675,000 people in the United States lost their lives to the flu. With a population of 3.7 million people, nearly 15,000 Michiganders died in the pandemic. In

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response to the Spanish Flu, Governor Albert Sleeper issued an order closing places of public amusement. Individual cities decided whether to close schools. Work continued. Governor Sleeper wisely balanced public health while preserving commerce. The current executive orders fail to do so, overreaching to such extent that the State’s economy is spiraling toward a depression.
67. In the 1940s and the early 1950s, annual summer polio epidemics killed thousands of children before a vaccine was found. Even under such dire circumstances, several Michigan governors of both parties, including Governor G. Mennen Williams, refrained from violating constitutional norms with excessive executive orders during those years.
68. In the late 1960s, the Hong Kong Flu swept across the globe killing more than 1 million people. The CDC estimated that 100,000 people died in the U.S. Michigan, like other States, was affected. Governor George Romney did not place residents under house arrest or shutdown the economy then, either.
69. Governor Whitmer repeatedly states that decisions must be made on data and science. Yet, despite the positive State-specific data, the Governor tightened restrictions through an executive order that the Wall Street Journal described as the “most excessive” in the country.
70. Among other enhancements, the new order imposed harsher restrictions on the ability to travel and banned people from visiting their families, working, and purchasing a variety of everyday items at stores. The new order was announced at 3:00 p.m. on April 9th, and became effective at 12:01 a.m. on April 10th—i.e., on less than 12 hours’ notice. The

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Governor timed EO 2020-42 to prohibit families from gathering to celebrate Easter Sunday and Passover.
71. Although her previous order allowed “critical infrastructure workers” to perform in-person work—defined as those workers described as critical by the director of the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Agency (“CISA”) in guidance issued March 19th— in compliance with CDC guidance on “social distancing,” Governor Whitmer has expressly, arbitrarily, and capriciously refused to adopt CISA’s updated definition of “critical infrastructure workers,” in EO 2020-42 and EO 2020-59. Other governors who have issued similar executive orders have adopted the updated federal definitions. Governor Whitmer has never explained why these new definitions have not been, and cannot be, adopted in Michigan. This is further evidence that the Governor is unreasonably keeping more Michiganders locked up in their homes than necessary.
72. Taking Governor Whitmer at her word that she wants to make decisions based on data, and lacking confidence in the Governor’s modeling because the underlying data and methodology is unavailable to the public, a group of businesses (not named in this lawsuit) hired Anderson Economic Group (“AEG”) to analyze the infection curve and the economic effects of her EOs, and they provided the expert’s report to the Governor on April 13, 2020. The Governor has not responded. At a press conference on April 27, 2020, the Governor confirmed that she has not read the expert’s report in the two weeks since it was delivered.
73. An economic depression is predictable following the shutdown of civil society caused by the Lockdown Orders. Businesses around Michigan are permanently closing because they cannot pay employees and vendors. More will be forced to permanently close the longer that the Lockdown Orders and any similarly drafted successor orders are in place.

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74. Consistent with the assessments in the AEG report, in the first month of the lockdown order, nearly 1.2 million Michiganders reportedly filed for unemployment, the largest number of unemployment claims in the State’s history. Michigan is among the top five worst states for unemployment. See Exhibit 1, AEG Report. According to Jeff Donofrio, Director of the Michigan Department of Labor and Economic Opportunity, this means more than 25% of Michigan’s workforce filed for unemployment in the span of four weeks because of the Lockdown Orders. For context, the national average unemployment rate during the Great Depression of 1929 was 26%.
75. Employers fund unemployment benefits. Mich. Comp. Laws § 421.13. The Governor offered scant insight on how the unemployment system can keep paying benefits if employers can’t operate their businesses. If businesses can’t operate, then they can’t generate revenue. And, if they can’t generate revenue, then they have no way of paying into the unemployment fund.
76. According to the U.S. Department of the Treasury, as of March 31, 2020, Michigan’s unemployment trust fund balance was $4.55 billion. State officials predict that the fund will be drained in July. See https://perma.cc/R54P-GTMU. One recent prediction is that the Michigan Unemployment Trust Fund will be drained within two months and incur a $15 billion deficit. Taxes on businesses may double to pay back the loans that the State would require to keep paying unemployment. This will leave less money for businesses to rehire workers and prolong the economic devastation.
77. Unemployment is not the only factor in play. For those fortunate enough to remain employed during this time, many of them are subject to furloughs, pay cuts, and mandatory sick leave. According to a recent study by the Anderson Economic Group, nearly

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1.5 million Michiganders will lose significant income because of the coronavirus and the Governor’s orders by the end of April. Exhibit 1, AEG Report.
78. Plaintiffs want to reopen their business to help their current and former employees (whom they hope to rehire) put food on their tables, keep roofs over their heads, and clothes on their backs. Governor Whitmer and Director Gordon forbid them from doing so under pain of criminal punishment and civil fines. Plaintiffs should not be forced to choose between risking criminal prosecution and economic sanctions on the one hand or exercising their constitutional rights on the other.
79. Plaintiffs also want to reopen their businesses to help the public in general (and their members specifically) in their ability to fight COVID-19. It is well documented that obesity, diabetes and hypertension are some of the highest risk factors that can lead to a poorer outcome for Michiganders that are infected with and contract COVID-19. See https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/need-extra-precautions/groups-at-higherrisk.html. Physical exercise, both cardiovascular exercise and strength training help improve those with at-risk factors associated with COVID-19. See, eg, https://www.norwalkhospital.org/newsroom/article-listing/adults-exercise-andcovid19.
80. Further, Plaintiffs are in a unique position to help those who have not contracted and may never contract COVID-19, but who are nonetheless struggling during these challenging times. Physical exercise has been proven to assist people with their mental health. Researchers have found that exercise helps with both depression and anxiety, two mental conditions that people across Michigan are struggling with in the face of Defendants’ lock down orders, social distancing, job loss, and dealing with unwell family members. See

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https://www.ted.com/talks/wendy_suzuki_the_brain_changing_benefits_of_exercise?language=en; See also https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/what-works-and-why/201803/how-yourmental-health-reaps-the-benefits-exercise.
81. On April 15, 2020, Planet Fitness sent a letter to Governor Whitmer outlining the economic impact that the closures have had on its business, the benefit that gyms have to the health and well-being to the citizens of Michigan, and outlining a comprehensive plan for reopening safely. See Exhibit 2, Letter from Planet Fitness to Governor Whitmer, dated April 15, 2020.
82. Likewise, on May 15, 2020, the Michigan Fitness Clubs Association sent a letter to Governor Whitmer. This letter also outlined the economic impact that the closures have had on its business, the benefit that gyms have to the health and well-being to the citizens of Michigan and outlining a comprehensive plan for reopening safely. See Exhibit 3, Letter from MFCA to Governor Whitmer, dated May 15, 2020.
83. Also on May 15, 2020, Plaintiff LIFFT, Inc. sent a letter to Governor Whitmer. As with the previous two letters, the letter from LIFFT to the Governor outlined the economic impact that the closures have had on its members, the benefit that gyms have to the health and well-being to the citizens of Michigan and outlining a comprehensive plan for reopening safely. See Exhibit 4, Letter from LIFFT, Inc. to Governor Whitmer, dated May 15, 2020.
84. Upon information and belief, there has been no response from the Governor’s Office to any of the correspondence outlined in paragraphs 81 through 83.
85. On Friday, May 22, 2020, the initial Complaint was filed in this action. Service was accepted on behalf of Defendants on Tuesday, May 26, 2020.

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86. Plaintiffs incorporate all of the foregoing paragraphs into each of the following causes of action.
COUNT I DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE 87. “Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 88. The Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution grants Congress the power “[t]o regulate commerce with foreign Nations, among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 89. In its dormant state, often called the Dormant Commerce Clause, the Commerce Clause precludes States from enacting legislation that discriminates against or impermissibly burdens interstate commerce. State laws that facially discriminate against interstate commerce are invalid per se under the Commerce Clause. This is true also of State laws that are facially neutral, if they impermissibly burden interstate commerce in practice. West Lynn Creamery v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 194–195 (1994). 90. Although the Dormant Commerce Clause is usually invoked to challenge protectionist laws that favor in-state businesses over out-of-state businesses, the Clause has a broader function: to guarantee for all citizens the right to access and participate in interstate commerce. Just as no State can prevent out-of-staters from engaging in commerce

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with its residents, no State may prevent its residents from participating in commerce with those located in another State.
91. The Lockdown Orders impermissibly restrict Plaintiffs from exercising the right to engage in interstate commerce:
a. LIFFT. A portion of LIFFT’s members’ annual business involves customers who pay drop-in rates to workout at their fitness facilities. This may and does include guests from outside of Michigan who are in town vacationing or seeing family and friends who are members of the facilities. The Lockdown Orders have prevented, and still prevent, LIFFT’s members’ from operating their facilities at all, including selling services to customers from out-of-state customers because the Lockdown Orders categorically prohibit LIFFT’s members from operating their fitness facilities. LIFFT’s members’ have suffered a significant decrease in revenue and have lost business opportunities because of the Lockdown Orders.
b. Baseline Fitness LLC. A portion of Baseline Fitness’ annual business involves customers who pay drop-in rates to workout at the fitness facility. This may and does include guests from outside of Michigan who are in town vacationing or seeing family and friends who are members of the facility. The Lockdown Orders have prevented, and still prevent, Baseline Fitness from operating its facility at all, including selling services to customers from out-of- state customers because the Lockdown Orders categorically prohibit Baseline Fitness’ facility from operating. Baseline Fitness has suffered a decrease in revenue and has lost business opportunities because of the Lockdown Orders.
c. Building Your Temple LLC. A portion of Building Your Temple’s annual business involves customers who pay drop-in rates to workout at the fitness facility. This

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may and does include guests from outside of Michigan who are in town vacationing or seeing family and friends who are members of the facility. The Lockdown Orders have prevented, and still prevent, Building Your Temple’s facility from operating at all, including selling services to customers from out-of- state customers because the Lockdown Orders categorically prohibit Building Your Temple’s facility from operating. Building Your Temple has suffered a decrease in revenue and has lost business opportunities because of the Lockdown Orders.
d. BYT Fitness 247 LLC. A portion of BYT Fitness 247’s annual business involves customers who pay drop-in rates to workout at the fitness facility. This may and does include guests from outside of Michigan who are in town vacationing or seeing family and friends who are members of the facility. The Lockdown Orders have prevented, and still prevent, BYT Fitness 247’s facility from operating at all, including selling services to customers from out-of- state customers because the Lockdown Orders categorically prohibit BYT Fitness 247’s facility from operating. BYT Fitness 247 has suffered a decrease in revenue and has lost business opportunities because of the Lockdown Orders.
e. Clawson Fitness. A portion of Clawson Fitness’ annual business involves customers who pay drop-in rates to workout at the fitness facility. This may and does include guests from outside of Michigan who are in town vacationing or seeing family and friends who are members of the facility. The Lockdown Orders have prevented, and still prevent, Clawson Fitness’ facility from operating at all, including selling services to customers from out-of- state customers because the Lockdown Orders categorically prohibit Clawson Fitness’ facility from operating. Clawson Fitness has suffered a decrease in revenue and has lost business opportunities because of the Lockdown Orders.

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f. Clinton Fitness. A portion of Clinton Fitness’ annual business involves customers who pay drop-in rates to workout at the fitness facility. This may and does include guests from outside of Michigan who are in town vacationing or seeing family and friends who are members of the facility. The Lockdown Orders have prevented, and still prevent, Clinton Fitness’ facility from operating at all, including selling services to customers from out-of- state customers because the Lockdown Orders categorically prohibit Clinton Fitness’ facility from operating. Clinton Fitness has suffered a decrease in revenue and has lost business opportunities because of the Lockdown Orders.
g. D-Lux Karate University. A portion of D-Lux Karate University’s annual business involves customers who pay drop-in rates to workout at the fitness facility. This may and does include guests from outside of Michigan who are in town vacationing or seeing family and friends who are members of the facility. The Lockdown Orders have prevented, and still prevent, D-Lux Karate University’s facility from operating at all, including selling services to customers from out-of- state customers because the Lockdown Orders categorically prohibit D-Lux Karate University’s facility from operating. D-Lux Karate University has suffered a decrease in revenue and has lost business opportunities because of the Lockdown Orders.
h. Fenton Athletic Club, Inc. A portion of Fenton Athletic Club’s annual business involves customers who pay drop-in rates to workout at the fitness facility. This may and does include guests from outside of Michigan who are in town vacationing or seeing family and friends who are members of the facility. The Lockdown Orders have prevented, and still prevent, Fenton Athletic Club’s facility from operating at all, including selling services to customers from out-of- state customers because the Lockdown Orders

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categorically prohibit Fenton Athletic Club’s facility from operating. Fenton Athletic Club has suffered a decrease in revenue and has lost business opportunities because of the Lockdown Orders.
i. Fenton Karate, LLC. A portion of Fenton Karate’s annual business involves customers who pay drop-in rates to workout at the fitness facility. This may and does include guests from outside of Michigan who are in town vacationing or seeing family and friends who are members of the facility. The Lockdown Orders have prevented, and still prevent, Fenton Karate’s facility from operating at all, including selling services to customers from out-of- state customers because the Lockdown Orders categorically prohibit Fenton Karate’s facility from operating. Fenton Karate has suffered a decrease in revenue and has lost business opportunities because of the Lockdown Orders.
j. Fusion Fitness 24/7. A portion of Fusion Fitness 24/7’s annual business involves customers who pay drop-in rates to workout at the fitness facility. This may and does include guests from outside of Michigan who are in town vacationing or seeing family and friends who are members of the facility. The Lockdown Orders have prevented, and still prevent, Fusion Fitness 24/7’s facility from operating at all, including selling services to customers from out-of- state customers because the Lockdown Orders categorically prohibit Fusion Fitness 24/7’s facility from operating. Fusion Fitness 24/7 has suffered a decrease in revenue and has lost business opportunities because of the Lockdown Orders.
k. H3 Fitness LLC. A portion of H3 Fitness’ annual business involves customers who pay drop-in rates to workout at the fitness facility. This may and does include guests from outside of Michigan who are in town vacationing or seeing family and friends who are members of the facility. The Lockdown Orders have prevented, and still prevent, H3

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Fitness’ facility from operating at all, including selling services to customers from out-ofstate customers because the Lockdown Orders categorically prohibit H3 Fitness from operating its facility. H3 Fitness has suffered a decrease in revenue and has lost business opportunities because of the Lockdown Orders.
l. I Fitness Personal Training. A portion of I Fitness Personal Training’s annual business involves customers who pay drop-in rates to workout at the fitness facility. This may and does include guests from outside of Michigan who are in town vacationing or seeing family and friends who are members of the facility. The Lockdown Orders have prevented, and still prevent, I Fitness Personal Training’s facility from operating at all, including selling services to customers from out-of- state customers because the Lockdown Orders categorically prohibit I Fitness Personal Training from operating its facility. I Fitness Personal Training has suffered a decrease in revenue and has lost business opportunities because of the Lockdown Orders.
m. JKP Fitness. A portion of JKP Fitness’ annual business involves customers who pay drop-in rates to workout at the fitness facility. This may and does include guests from outside of Michigan who are in town vacationing or seeing family and friends who are members of the facility. The Lockdown Orders have prevented, and still prevent, JKP Fitness’ facility from operating at all, including selling services to customers from out-ofstate customers because the Lockdown Orders categorically prohibit JKP Fitness from operating its facility. JKP Enterprises has suffered a decrease in revenue and has lost business opportunities because of the Lockdown Orders.
n. JPF Enterprises. A portion of JPF Enterprises’ annual business involves customers who pay drop-in rates to workout at the fitness facility. This may and does include

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guests from outside of Michigan who are in town vacationing or seeing family and friends who are members of the facility. The Lockdown Orders have prevented, and still prevent, JPF Enterprises from operating its facility at all, including selling services to customers from outof- state customers because the Lockdown Orders categorically prohibit JPF Enterprises’ facility from operating. JPF Enterprises has suffered lost business opportunities because of the Lockdown Orders.
o. M Fitness Club, LLC. A portion of M Fitness Club’s annual business involves customers who pay drop-in rates to workout at the fitness facilities. This may and does include guests from outside of Michigan who are in town vacationing or seeing family and friends who are members of the facilities. The Lockdown Orders have prevented, and still prevent, M Fitness Club from operating its facilities at all, including selling services to customers from out-of- state customers, because the Lockdown Orders categorically prohibit M Fitness Club from operating its facilities. M Fitness Club has suffered a decrease in revenue and has lost business opportunities because of the Lockdown Orders.
p. MH & AB LLC. A portion of MH & AB’s annual business involves customers who pay drop-in rates to workout at the fitness facilities. This may and does include guests from outside of Michigan who are in town vacationing or seeing family and friends who are members of the facilities. The Lockdown Orders have prevented, and still prevent, MH & AB from operating its facilities at all, including selling services to customers from out-of- state customers, because the Lockdown Orders categorically prohibit MH & AB from operating its facilities. MH & AB has suffered a decrease in revenue and has lost business opportunities because of the Lockdown Orders.

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q. Motor City CF – St. Clair Shores, LLC. A portion of Motor City CF-St. Clair Shores’ annual business involves customers who pay drop-in rates to workout at the fitness facility. This may and does include guests from outside of Michigan who are in town vacationing or seeing family and friends who are members of the facility. The Lockdown Orders have prevented, and still prevent, Motor City CF-St. Clair Shores from operating its facilities at all, including selling services to customers from out-of- state customers, because the Lockdown Orders categorically prohibit Motor City CF-St. Clair Shores from operating its facilities. Motor City CF-St. Clair Shores has suffered a decrease in revenue and has lost business opportunities because of the Lockdown Orders.
r. Nascot Enterprises. A portion of Nascot Enterprises’ annual business involves customers who pay drop-in rates to workout at the fitness facilities. This may and does include guests from outside of Michigan who are in town vacationing or seeing family and friends who are members of the facilities. The Lockdown Orders have prevented, and still prevent, Nascot Enterprises from operating its facilities at all, including selling services to customers from out-of- state customers, because the Lockdown Orders categorically prohibit Nascot Enterprises from operating its facilities. Nascot Enterprises has suffered a decrease in revenue and has lost business opportunities because of the Lockdown Orders.
s. Prison City Physique. A portion of Prison City Physique’s annual business involves customers who pay drop-in rates to workout at the fitness facility. This may and does include guests from outside of Michigan who are in town vacationing or seeing family and friends who are members of the facility. The Lockdown Orders have prevented, and still prevent, Prison City Physique from operating its facilities at all, including selling services to customers from out-of- state customers, because the Lockdown Orders

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categorically prohibit Prison City Physique from operating its facilities. Prison City Physique has suffered a decrease in revenue and has lost business opportunities because of the Lockdown Orders.
t. RMP Fitness. A portion of RMP Fitness’ annual business involves customers who pay drop-in rates to workout at the fitness facility. This may and does include guests from outside of Michigan who are in town vacationing or seeing family and friends who are members of the facility. The Lockdown Orders have prevented, and still prevent, RMP Fitness from operating its facilities at all, including selling services to customers from out-of- state customers, because the Lockdown Orders categorically prohibit RMP Fitness from operating its facilities. RMP Fitness has suffered a decrease in revenue and has lost business opportunities because of the Lockdown Orders.
u. Strength Beyond LLC. A portion of Strength Beyond’s annual business involves customers who pay drop-in rates to workout at the fitness facility. This may and does include guests from outside of Michigan who are in town vacationing or seeing family and friends who are members of the facility. The Lockdown Orders have prevented, and still prevent, Strength Beyond from operating its facilities at all, including selling services to customers from out-of- state customers, because the Lockdown Orders categorically prohibit Strength Beyond from operating its facilities. Strength Beyond has suffered a decrease in revenue and has lost business opportunities because of the Lockdown Orders.
v. 24/7 Fitness Bootcamp and Boxing, Inc. A portion of 24/7 Fitness Bootcamp and Boxing’s annual business involves customers who pay drop-in rates to workout at the fitness facility. This may and does include guests from outside of Michigan who are in town vacationing or seeing family and friends who are members of the facility.

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The Lockdown Orders have prevented, and still prevent, 24/7 Fitness Bootcamp and Boxing from operating its facilities at all, including selling services to customers from out-of- state customers, because the Lockdown Orders categorically prohibit it from operating its facilities. 24/7 Fitness Bootcamp and Boxing has suffered a decrease in revenue and has lost business opportunities because of the Lockdown Orders.
w. 4 Seasons Gym. A portion of 4 Seasons Gym’s annual business involves customers who pay drop-in rates to workout at the fitness facility. This may and does include guests from outside of Michigan who are in town vacationing or seeing family and friends who are members of the facility. The Lockdown Orders have prevented, and still prevent, 4 Seasons Gym from operating its facilities at all, including selling services to customers from out-of- state customers, because the Lockdown Orders categorically prohibit 4 Seasons Gym from operating its facilities. 4 Seasons Gym has suffered a decrease in revenue and has lost business opportunities because of the Lockdown Orders.
92. Governor Whitmer and Director Gordon acted under color of State law in an official capacity and within the scope of their official duties when issuing the Lockdown Orders.
93. Plaintiffs seek a declaration that the Lockdown Orders violate the Dormant Commerce Clause, and an injunction against further infringements of their rights under this Clause as described in the Prayer for Relief.
COUNT II PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES CLAUSE 94. “Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or

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other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
95. The Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV of the U.S. Constitution provides that “[t]he citizens of each State shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States.” U.S. Const. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1.
96. The Privileges and Immunities Clause protects a citizen’s right to pursue a livelihood in a State other than the State in which he is a resident. Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm’n of Montana, 436 U.S. 371 (1978).
97. By June 1, fitness facilities in forty-two states have opened or will be open with restrictions: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming. Notably, gyms in Michigan’s three bordering states of Indiana, Ohio and Wisconsin have also been opened.
98. The Lockdown Orders impermissibly restrict Plaintiffs from exercising their rights under the Privileges and Immunities Clause:
a. LIFFT. The Lockdown Orders have prevented, and continue to prevent, LIFFT’s members from seeking clients located outside of Michigan. They also categorically prohibit LIFFT’s members from opening their doors to keep people fit and health (mentally and physically), even though fitness facilities like LIFFT’s members that are located in other States have been, and remain, free to do so.

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b. Baseline Fitness LLC. The Lockdown Orders have prevented, and continue to prevent, Baseline Fitness from seeking clients located outside of Michigan. They also categorically prohibit Baseline Fitness from opening its doors to keep people fit and healthy (mentally and physically), even though fitness facilities like Baseline Fitness that are located in other States have been, and remain, free to do so.
c. Building Your Temple LLC. The Lockdown Orders have prevented, and continue to prevent, Building Your Temple from seeking clients located outside of Michigan. They also categorically prohibit Building Your Temple from opening its doors to keep people fit and healthy (mentally and physically), even though fitness facilities like Building Your Temple that are located in other States have been, and remain, free to do so.
d. BYT Fitness 247. The Lockdown Orders have prevented, and continue to prevent, BYT Fitness 247 from seeking clients located outside of Michigan. They also categorically prohibit BYT Fitness 247 from opening its doors to keep people fit and healthy (mentally and physically), even though fitness facilities like BYT Fitness 247 that are located in other States have been, and remain, free to do so.
e. Clawson Fitness. The Lockdown Orders have prevented, and continue to prevent, Clawson Fitness from seeking clients located outside of Michigan. They also categorically prohibit Clawson Fitness from opening its doors to keep people fit and healthy (mentally and physically), even though fitness facilities like Clawson Fitness that are located in other States have been, and remain, free to do so.
f. Clinton Fitness. The Lockdown Orders have prevented, and continue to prevent, Clinton Fitness from seeking clients located outside of Michigan. They also categorically prohibit Clinton Fitness from opening its doors to keep people fit and healthy

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(mentally and physically), even though fitness facilities like Clinton Fitness that are located in other States have been, and remain, free to do so.
g. D-Lux Karate University. The Lockdown Orders have prevented, and continue to prevent, D-Lux Karate University from seeking clients located outside of Michigan. They also categorically prohibit D-Lux Karate University from opening its doors to keep people fit and healthy (mentally and physically), even though fitness facilities like DLux Karate University that are located in other States have been, and remain, free to do so.
h. Fenton Athletic Club. The Lockdown Orders have prevented, and continue to prevent, Fenton Athletic Club from seeking clients located outside of Michigan. They also categorically prohibit Fenton Athletic Club from opening its doors to keep people fit and healthy (mentally and physically), even though fitness facilities like Fenton Athletic Club that are located in other States have been, and remain, free to do so.
i. Fenton Karate. The Lockdown Orders have prevented, and continue to prevent, Fenton Karate from seeking clients located outside of Michigan. They also categorically prohibit Fenton Karate from opening its doors to keep people fit and healthy (mentally and physically), even though fitness facilities like Fenton Karate that are located in other States have been, and remain, free to do so.
j. Fusion Fitness 24/7. The Lockdown Orders have prevented, and continue to prevent, Fusion Fitness 24/7 from seeking clients located outside of Michigan. They also categorically prohibit Fusion Fitness 24/7 from opening its doors to keep people fit and healthy (mentally and physically), even though fitness facilities like Fusion Fitness 24/7 that are located in other States have been, and remain, free to do so.

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k. H3 Fitness LLC. The Lockdown Orders have prevented, and continue to prevent, H3 Fitness from seeking clients located outside of Michigan. They also categorically prohibit H3 Fitness from opening its doors to keep people fit and healthy (mentally and physically), even though fitness facilities like H3 Fitness that are located in other States have been, and remain, free to do so.
l. I Fitness Personal Training. The Lockdown Orders have prevented, and continue to prevent, I Fitness Personal Training from seeking clients located outside of Michigan. They also categorically prohibit I Fitness Personal Training from opening its doors to keep people fit and healthy (mentally and physically), even though fitness facilities like I Fitness Personal Training that are located in other States have been, and remain, free to do so.
m. JKP Fitness. The Lockdown Orders have prevented, and continue to prevent, JKP Fitness from seeking clients located outside of Michigan. They also categorically prohibit JKP Fitness from opening its doors to keep people fit and healthy (mentally and physically), even though fitness facilities like JKP Fitness that are located in other States have been, and remain, free to do so.
n. JPF Enterprises. The Lockdown Orders have prevented, and continue to prevent, JPF Enterprises from seeking clients located outside of Michigan. They also categorically prohibit JPF Enterprises from opening its doors to keep people fit and healthy (mentally and physically), even though fitness facilities like JPF Enterprises that are located in other States have been, and remain, free to do so.
o. M Fitness Club. The Lockdown Orders have prevented, and continue to prevent, M Fitness Club from seeking clients located outside of Michigan. They also

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categorically prohibit M Fitness Club from opening its doors to keep people fit and healthy (mentally and physically), even though fitness facilities like M Fitness Club that are located in other States have been, and remain, free to do so.
p. MH & AB. The Lockdown Orders have prevented, and continue to prevent, MH & AB from seeking clients located outside of Michigan. They also categorically prohibit MH & AB from opening its doors to keep people fit and healthy (mentally and physically), even though fitness facilities like MH & AB that are located in other States have been, and remain, free to do so.
q. Motor City CF – St. Clair Shores. The Lockdown Orders have prevented, and continue to prevent, Motor City CF – St. Clair Shores from seeking clients located outside of Michigan. They also categorically prohibit Motor City CF – St. Clair Shores from opening its doors to keep people fit and healthy (mentally and physically), even though fitness facilities like Motor City CF – St. Clair Shores that are located in other States have been, and remain, free to do so.
r. Nascot Enterprises. The Lockdown Orders have prevented, and continue to prevent, Nascot Enterprises from seeking clients located outside of Michigan. They also categorically prohibit Nascot Enterprises from opening its doors to keep people fit and healthy (mentally and physically), even though fitness facilities like Nascot Enterprises that are located in other States have been, and remain, free to do so.
s. Prison City Physique. The Lockdown Orders have prevented, and continue to prevent, Prison City Physique from seeking clients located outside of Michigan. They also categorically prohibit Prison City Physique from opening its doors to keep people

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fit and healthy (mentally and physically), even though fitness facilities like Prison City Physique that are located in other States have been, and remain, free to do so.
t. RMP Fitness. The Lockdown Orders have prevented, and continue to prevent, RMP Fitness from seeking clients located outside of Michigan. They also categorically prohibit RMP Fitness from opening its doors to keep people fit and healthy (mentally and physically), even though fitness facilities like RMP Fitness that are located in other States have been, and remain, free to do so.
u. Strength Beyond. The Lockdown Orders have prevented, and continue to prevent, Strength Beyond from seeking clients located outside of Michigan. They also categorically prohibit Strength Beyond from opening its doors to keep people fit and healthy (mentally and physically), even though fitness facilities like Strength Beyond that are located in other States have been, and remain, free to do so.
v. 24/7 Fitness Bootcamp and Boxing. The Lockdown Orders have prevented, and continue to prevent, 24/7 Fitness Bootcamp and Boxing from seeking clients located outside of Michigan. They also categorically prohibit it from opening its doors to keep people fit and healthy (mentally and physically), even though fitness facilities like 24/7 Fitness Bootcamp and Boxing that are located in other States have been, and remain, free to do so.
w. 4 Seasons Gym. The Lockdown Orders have prevented, and continue to prevent, 4 Seasons Gym from seeking clients located outside of Michigan. They also categorically prohibit 4 Seasons Gym from opening its doors to keep people fit and healthy (mentally and physically), even though fitness facilities like 4 Seasons Gym that are located in other States have been, and remain, free to do so.

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99. Governor Whitmer and Director Gordon acted under color of State law in an official capacity and within the scope of their official duties when issuing the Lockdown Orders.
100. Plaintiffs seek a declaration that the Lockdown Orders violate the Privileges and Immunities Clause, and an injunction against further infringements of their rights under this Clause as described in the Prayer for Relief.
COUNT III PRIVILEGES OR IMMUNITIES CLAUSE 101. “Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 102. The Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that “[n]o State [can] make or enforce any law [that] abridge[s] the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.” U.S. Const. am. XIV, § 1, cl. 2. 103. By June 1, fitness facilities in the following states have opened or will be open: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, West Virginia, and Wyoming. Notably, gyms in Michigan’s three bordering states of Indiana, Ohio and Wisconsin have also been opened.

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104. The Lockdown Orders impermissibly restrict Plaintiffs from exercising these rights:
a. LIFFT. The Lockdown Orders have prevented, and continue to prevent, LIFFT’s members from seeking clients located inside and outside of Michigan. They also categorically prohibit LIFFT’s members from opening their doors to keep people fit and health (mentally and physically), even though fitness facilities like their members that are located in other States have been, and remain, free to do so. In fact, fitness facilities in bordering states Indiana, Ohio and Wisconsin have been opened.
b. Baseline Fitness LLC. The Lockdown Orders have prevented, and continue to prevent, Baseline Fitness from seeking clients located inside and outside of Michigan. They also categorically prohibit Baseline Fitness from opening its doors to keep people fit and health (mentally and physically), even though fitness facilities like Baseline Fitness that are located in other States have been, and remain, free to do so. In fact, fitness facilities in bordering states Indiana, Ohio and Wisconsin have been opened.
c. Building Your Temple LLC. The Lockdown Orders have prevented, and continue to prevent, Building Your Temple from seeking clients located inside and outside of Michigan. They also categorically prohibit Building Your Temple from opening its doors to keep people fit and health (mentally and physically), even though fitness facilities like Building Your Temple that are located in other States have been, and remain, free to do so. In fact, fitness facilities in bordering states Indiana, Ohio and Wisconsin have been opened.
d. BYT Fitness 247 LLC. The Lockdown Orders have prevented, and continue to prevent, BYT Fitness 247 from seeking clients located inside and outside of Michigan. They also categorically prohibit BYT Fitness 247 from opening its doors to keep

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people fit and health (mentally and physically), even though fitness facilities like BYT Fitness 247 that are located in other States have been, and remain, free to do so. In fact, fitness facilities in bordering states Indiana, Ohio and Wisconsin have been opened.
e. Clawson Fitness. The Lockdown Orders have prevented, and continue to prevent, Clawson Fitness from seeking clients located inside and outside of Michigan. They also categorically prohibit Clawson Fitness from opening its doors to keep people fit and health (mentally and physically), even though fitness facilities like Clawson Fitness that are located in other States have been, and remain, free to do so. In fact, fitness facilities in bordering states Indiana, Ohio and Wisconsin have been opened.
f. Clinton Fitness. The Lockdown Orders have prevented, and continue to prevent, Clinton Fitness from seeking clients located inside and outside of Michigan. They also categorically prohibit Clinton Fitness from opening its doors to keep people fit and health (mentally and physically), even though fitness facilities like Clinton Fitness that are located in other States have been, and remain, free to do so. In fact, fitness facilities in bordering states Indiana, Ohio and Wisconsin have been opened.
g. D-Lux Karate University. The Lockdown Orders have prevented, and continue to prevent, D-Lux Karate University from seeking clients located inside and outside of Michigan. They also categorically prohibit D-Lux Karate University from opening its doors to keep people fit and health (mentally and physically), even though fitness facilities like DLux Karate University that are located in other States have been, and remain, free to do so. In fact, fitness facilities in bordering states Indiana, Ohio and Wisconsin have been opened.
h. Fenton Athletic Club. The Lockdown Orders have prevented, and continue to prevent, Fenton Athletic Club from seeking clients located inside and outside of

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Michigan. They also categorically prohibit Fenton Athletic Club from opening its doors to keep people fit and health (mentally and physically), even though fitness facilities like Fenton Athletic Club that are located in other States have been, and remain, free to do so. In fact, fitness facilities in bordering states Indiana, Ohio and Wisconsin have been opened.
i. Fenton Karate. The Lockdown Orders have prevented, and continue to prevent, Fenton Karate from seeking clients located inside and outside of Michigan. They also categorically prohibit Fenton Karate from opening its doors to keep people fit and health (mentally and physically), even though fitness facilities like Fenton Karate that are located in other States have been, and remain, free to do so. In fact, fitness facilities in bordering states Indiana, Ohio and Wisconsin have been opened.
j. Fusion Fitness 24/7. The Lockdown Orders have prevented, and continue to prevent, Fusion Fitness 24/7 from seeking clients located inside and outside of Michigan. They also categorically prohibit Fusion Fitness 24/7 from opening its doors to keep people fit and health (mentally and physically), even though fitness facilities like Fusion Fitness 24/7 that are located in other States have been, and remain, free to do so. In fact, fitness facilities in bordering states Indiana, Ohio and Wisconsin have been opened.
k. H3 Fitness LLC. The Lockdown Orders have prevented, and continue to prevent, H3 Fitness from seeking clients located inside and outside of Michigan. They also categorically prohibit H3 Fitness from opening its doors to keep people fit and health (mentally and physically), even though fitness facilities like H3 Fitness that are located in other States have been, and remain, free to do so. In fact, fitness facilities in bordering states Indiana, Ohio and Wisconsin have been opened.

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l. I Fitness Personal Training, Inc. The Lockdown Orders have prevented, and continue to prevent, I Fitness Personal Training from seeking clients located inside and outside of Michigan. They also categorically prohibit I Fitness Personal Training from opening its doors to keep people fit and health (mentally and physically), even though fitness facilities like I Fitness Personal Training that are located in other States have been, and remain, free to do so. In fact, fitness facilities in bordering states Indiana, Ohio and Wisconsin have been opened.
m. JKP Fitness. The Lockdown Orders have prevented, and continue to prevent, JKP Fitness from seeking clients located inside and outside of Michigan. They also categorically prohibit JKP Fitness from opening its doors to keep people fit and health (mentally and physically), even though fitness facilities like JKP Fitness that are located in other States have been, and remain, free to do so. In fact, fitness facilities in bordering states Indiana, Ohio and Wisconsin have been opened.
n. JPF Enterprises. The Lockdown Orders have prevented, and continue to prevent, JPF Enterprises from seeking clients located inside and outside of Michigan. They also categorically prohibit JPF Enterprises from opening its doors to keep people fit and health (mentally and physically), even though fitness facilities like JPF Enterprises that are located in other States have been, and remain, free to do so. In fact, fitness facilities in bordering states Indiana, Ohio and Wisconsin have been opened.
o. M Fitness Club. The Lockdown Orders have prevented, and continue to prevent, M Fitness Club from seeking clients located inside and outside of Michigan. They also categorically prohibit M Fitness Club from opening its doors to keep people fit and health (mentally and physically), even though fitness facilities like M Fitness Club that are

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located in other States have been, and remain, free to do so. In fact, fitness facilities in bordering states Indiana, Ohio and Wisconsin have been opened.
p. MH & AB. The Lockdown Orders have prevented, and continue to prevent, MH & AB from seeking clients located inside and outside of Michigan. They also categorically prohibit MH & AB from opening its doors to keep people fit and health (mentally and physically), even though fitness facilities like MH & AB that are located in other States have been, and remain, free to do so. In fact, fitness facilities in bordering states Indiana, Ohio and Wisconsin have been opened.
q. Motor City CF – St. Clair Shores. The Lockdown Orders have prevented, and continue to prevent, Motor City CF – St. Clair Shores from seeking clients located inside and outside of Michigan. They also categorically prohibit Motor City CF – St. Clair Shores from opening its doors to keep people fit and health (mentally and physically), even though fitness facilities like Motor City CF – St. Clair Shores that are located in other States have been, and remain, free to do so. In fact, fitness facilities in bordering states Indiana, Ohio and Wisconsin have been opened.
r. Nascot Enterprises. The Lockdown Orders have prevented, and continue to prevent, Nascot Enterprises from seeking clients located inside and outside of Michigan. They also categorically prohibit Nascot Enterprises from opening its doors to keep people fit and health (mentally and physically), even though fitness facilities like Nascot Enterprises that are located in other States have been, and remain, free to do so. In fact, fitness facilities in bordering states Indiana, Ohio and Wisconsin have been opened.
s. Prison City Physique. The Lockdown Orders have prevented, and continue to prevent, Prison City Physique from seeking clients located inside and outside of

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Michigan. They also categorically prohibit Prison City Physique from opening its doors to keep people fit and health (mentally and physically), even though fitness facilities like Prison City Physique that are located in other States have been, and remain, free to do so. In fact, fitness facilities in bordering states Indiana, Ohio and Wisconsin have been opened.
t. RMP Fitness. The Lockdown Orders have prevented, and continue to prevent, RMP Fitness from seeking clients located inside and outside of Michigan. They also categorically prohibit RMP Fitness from opening its doors to keep people fit and health (mentally and physically), even though fitness facilities like RMP Fitness that are located in other States have been, and remain, free to do so. In fact, fitness facilities in bordering states Indiana, Ohio and Wisconsin have been opened.
u. Strength Beyond. The Lockdown Orders have prevented, and continue to prevent, Strength Beyond from seeking clients located inside and outside of Michigan. They also categorically prohibit Strength Beyond from opening its doors to keep people fit and health (mentally and physically), even though fitness facilities like Strength Beyond that are located in other States have been, and remain, free to do so. In fact, fitness facilities in bordering states Indiana, Ohio and Wisconsin have been opened.
v. 24/7 Fitness Bootcamp and Boxing. The Lockdown Orders have prevented, and continue to prevent, 24/7 Fitness Bootcamp and Boxing from seeking clients located inside and outside of Michigan. They also categorically prohibit it from opening its doors to keep people fit and health (mentally and physically), even though fitness facilities like 24/7 Fitness Bootcamp and Boxing that are located in other States have been, and remain, free to do so. In fact, fitness facilities in bordering states Indiana, Ohio and Wisconsin have been opened.

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w. 4 Seasons Gym. The Lockdown Orders have prevented, and continue to prevent, 4 Seasons Gym from seeking clients located inside and outside of Michigan. They also categorically prohibit 4 Seasons Gym from opening its doors to keep people fit and health (mentally and physically), even though fitness facilities like 4 Seasons Gym that are located in other States have been, and remain, free to do so. In fact, fitness facilities in bordering states Indiana, Ohio and Wisconsin have been opened.
105. Governor Whitmer and Director Gordon acted under color of State law in an official capacity and within the scope of their official duties when issuing the Lockdown Orders.
106. Plaintiffs seek a declaration that the Lockdown Orders violate the Privileges or Immunities Clause, and an injunction against further infringements of their rights under this Clause as described in the Prayer for Relief.
COUNT IV PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS 107. “Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 108. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that no State can “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 3.

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109. The procedural component of the Due Process Clause prohibits government from depriving Plaintiffs of liberty and property interests without providing any process before or after the deprivations occurred.
110. To establish a procedural due process claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must show that (1) it had a life, liberty, or property interest protected by the Due Process Clause; (2) it was deprived of this protected interest; and (3) the state did not afford it adequate procedural rights. See Daily Servs., LLC v. Valentino, 756 F.3d 893, 904 (CA6 2014).
111. Plaintiffs have a protected liberty interest in the right to live without arbitrary governmental interference with their liberty and property interests. County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 845 (1988).
112. Liberty “denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized . . . as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.” Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572 (1972) (emphases added).
113. Plaintiffs had protected liberty and property interests, which Defendants infringed through the Lockdown Orders:
a. LIFFT’s members have been, and are being, denied the right to intrastate travel and the right to engage in commerce, to-wit: operating fitness facilities for their members.

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b. Baseline Fitness LLC has been, and is being, denied the right to intrastate travel and the right to engage in commerce, to-wit: operating a fitness studio for its members.
c. Building Your Temple LLC has been, and is being, denied the right to intrastate travel and the right to engage in commerce, to-wit: operating a fitness studio for its members.
d. BYT Fitness 247 LLC has been, and is being, denied the right to intrastate travel and the right to engage in commerce, to-wit: operating a fitness studio for its members.
e. Clawson Fitness, LLC has been, and is being, denied the right to intrastate travel and the right to engage in commerce, to-wit: operating a fitness studio for its members.
f. Clinton Fitness, Inc. has been, and is being, denied the right to intrastate travel and the right to engage in commerce, to-wit: operating a fitness studio for its members.
g. D-Lux Karate University, LLC has been, and is being, denied the right to intrastate travel and the right to engage in commerce, to-wit: operating a fitness studio for its members.
h. Fenton Athletic Club, Inc. has been, and is being, denied the right to intrastate travel and the right to engage in commerce, to-wit: operating a fitness studio for its members.
i. Fenton Karate, LLC has been, and is being, denied the right to intrastate travel and the right to engage in commerce, to-wit: operating a fitness studio for its members.

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j. Fusion Fitness 24/7 LLC has been, and is being, denied the right to intrastate travel and the right to engage in commerce, to-wit: operating a fitness studio for its members.
k. H3 Fitness LLC has been, and is being, denied the right to intrastate travel and the right to engage in commerce, to-wit: operating a fitness studio for its members.
l. I Fitness Personal Training, Inc. has been, and is being, denied the right to intrastate travel and the right to engage in commerce, to-wit: operating a fitness studio for its members.
m. JKP Fitness has been, and is being, denied the right to intrastate travel and the right to engage in commerce, to-wit: operating a fitness studio for its members.
n. JPF Enterprises has been, and is being, denied the right to intrastate travel and the right to engage in commerce, to-wit: operating a fitness studio for its members.
o. M Fitness Club has been, and is being, denied the right to intrastate travel and the right to engage in commerce, to-wit: operating a fitness studio for its members.
p. MH & AB has been, and is being, denied the right to intrastate travel and the right to engage in commerce, to-wit: operating a fitness studio for its members.
q. Motor City CF – St. Clair Shores has been, and is being, denied the right to intrastate travel and the right to engage in commerce, to-wit: operating a fitness studio for its members.
r. Nascot Enterprises has been, and is being, denied the right to intrastate travel and the right to engage in commerce, to-wit: operating a fitness studio for its members.

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s. Prison City Physique has been, and is being, denied the right to intrastate travel and the right to engage in commerce, to-wit: operating a fitness studio for its members.
t. RMP Fitness has been, and is being, denied the right to intrastate travel and the right to engage in commerce, to-wit: operating a fitness studio for its members.
u. Strength Beyond has been, and is being, denied the right to intrastate travel and the right to engage in commerce, to-wit: operating a fitness studio for its members.
v. 24/7 Fitness Bootcamp and Boxing has been, and is being, denied the right to intrastate travel and the right to engage in commerce, to-wit: operating a fitness studio for its members.
w. 4 Seasons Gym has been, and is being, denied the right to intrastate travel and the right to engage in commerce, to-wit: operating a fitness studio for its members.
114. Neither Governor Whitmer nor Director Gordon provided any procedural due process before issuing the Lockdown Orders. Nor do the Lockdown Orders provide any mechanism for post-deprivation review.
115. Governor Whitmer and Director Gordon acted under color of State law in an official capacity and within the scope of their official duties when issuing the Lockdown Orders.
116. As a direct and proximate cause of the failure to provide any pre- or postdeprivation process, Plaintiffs suffered prejudice under threat of criminal and civil sanctions.
117. These orders and rules acknowledge that so-called “critical” businesses and those “noncritical” can safely operate by adhering to “social distancing” rules delineated in

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Section 11 of EO 2020-59, including the arbitrary “enhanced social distancing” rules that apply only to the “noncritical” businesses allowed to resume operations.
118. Plaintiffs can operate in full compliance with all of these rules. 119. By failing to provide any pre- or post-deprivation review of the orders and rules shuttering their businesses, Plaintiffs are suffering substantial losses of liberty and property:
a. LIFFT. LIFFT’s members have lost significant revenue over the eleven weeks since the Lockdown Orders went into effect. LIFFT’s members will continue to experience financial losses in the second quarter of 2020 and beyond because of the Lockdown Orders, due to individuals cancelling memberships at LIFFT’s members’ fitness facilities that would not otherwise have done so, as well as lost business opportunities for new members.
b. Baseline Fitness LLC. Baseline Fitness LLC has lost significant revenue over the eleven weeks since the Lockdown Orders went into effect. Baseline Fitness LLC will continue to experience significant financial losses in the second quarter of 2020 and beyond because of the Lockdown Orders due to its members cancelling memberships that would not otherwise have done so, as well as lost business opportunities for new members.
c. Building Your Temple LLC. Building Your Temple LLC has lost significant revenue over the eleven weeks since the Lockdown Orders went into effect. Building Your Temple will continue to experience significant financial losses in the second quarter of 2020 and beyond because of the Lockdown Orders due to its members cancelling memberships that would not otherwise have done so, as well as lost business opportunities for new members.

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d. BYT Fitness 247 LLC. BYT Fitness 247 has lost significant revenue over the eleven weeks since the Lockdown Orders went into effect. BYT Fitness 247 will continue to experience significant financial losses in the second quarter of 2020 and beyond because of the Lockdown Orders due to its members cancelling memberships that would not otherwise have done so, as well as lost business opportunities for new members.
e. Clawson Fitness, LLC. Clawson Fitness has lost significant revenue over the eleven weeks since the Lockdown Orders went into effect. Clawson Fitness will continue to experience significant financial losses in the second quarter of 2020 and beyond because of the Lockdown Orders due to its members cancelling memberships that would not otherwise have done so, as well as lost business opportunities for new members.
f. Clinton Fitness, Inc. Clinton Fitness has lost significant revenue over the eleven weeks since the Lockdown Orders went into effect. Clinton Fitness will continue to experience significant financial losses in the second quarter of 2020 and beyond because of the Lockdown Orders due to its members cancelling memberships that would not otherwise have done so, as well as lost business opportunities for new members.
g. D-Lux Karate University, LLC. D-Lux Karate University has lost significant revenue over the eleven weeks since the Lockdown Orders went into effect. DLux Karate University will continue to experience significant financial losses in the second quarter of 2020 and beyond because of the Lockdown Orders due to its members cancelling memberships that would not otherwise have done so, as well as lost business opportunities for new members.
h. Fenton Athletic Club, Inc. Fenton Athletic Club has lost significant revenue over the eleven weeks since the Lockdown Orders went into effect. Fenton Athletic

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Club will continue to experience significant financial losses in the second quarter of 2020 and beyond because of the Lockdown Orders due to its members cancelling memberships that would not otherwise have done so, as well as lost business opportunities for new members.
i. Fenton Karate, LLC. Fenton Karate has lost significant revenue over the eleven weeks since the Lockdown Orders went into effect. Fenton Karate will continue to experience significant financial losses in the second quarter of 2020 and beyond because of the Lockdown Orders due to its members cancelling memberships that would not otherwise have done so, as well as lost business opportunities for new members.
j. Fusion Fitness 24/7 LLC. Fusion Fitness 24/7 LLC has lost significant revenue over the eleven weeks since the Lockdown Orders went into effect. Fusion Fitness 24/7 will continue to experience significant financial losses in the second quarter of 2020 and beyond because of the Lockdown Orders due to its members cancelling memberships that would not otherwise have done so, as well as lost business opportunities for new members.
k. H3 Fitness LLC. H3 Fitness has lost significant revenue over the eleven weeks since the Lockdown Orders went into effect. H3 Fitness will continue to experience significant financial losses in the second quarter of 2020 and beyond because of the Lockdown Orders due to its members cancelling memberships that would not otherwise have done so, as well as lost business opportunities for new members.
l. I Fitness Personal Training. I Fitness Personal Training has lost significant revenue over the eleven weeks since the Lockdown Orders went into effect. I Fitness Personal Training will continue to experience significant financial losses in the

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second quarter of 2020 and beyond because of the Lockdown Orders due to its members cancelling memberships that would not otherwise have done so, as well as lost business opportunities for new members.
m. JKP Fitness. JKP Fitness has lost significant revenue over the eleven weeks since the Lockdown Orders went into effect. JKP Fitness will continue to experience significant financial losses in the second quarter of 2020 and beyond because of the Lockdown Orders due to its members cancelling memberships that would not otherwise have done so, as well as lost business opportunities for new members.
n. JPF Enterprises. JPF Enterprises has lost membership revenue over the eleven weeks since the Lockdown Orders went into effect. JPF Enterprises will continue to experience significant financial losses in the second quarter of 2020 and beyond, as well as lost business opportunities for new members.
o. M Fitness Club. M Fitness Club has lost significant revenue over the eleven weeks since the Lockdown Orders went into effect. M Fitness Club will continue to experience significant financial losses in the second quarter of 2020 and beyond because of the Lockdown Orders due to its members cancelling memberships that would not otherwise have done so, as well as lost business opportunities for new members.
p. MH & AB. MH & AB has lost significant revenue over the eleven weeks since the Lockdown Orders went into effect. MH & AB will continue to experience significant financial losses in the second quarter of 2020 and beyond because of the Lockdown Orders due to its members cancelling memberships that would not otherwise have done so, as well as lost business opportunities for new members.

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q. Motor City CF – St. Clair Shores. Motor City CF – St. Clair Shores has lost significant revenue over the eleven weeks since the Lockdown Orders went into effect. Motor City CF – St. Clair Shores will continue to experience significant financial losses in the second quarter of 2020 and beyond because of the Lockdown Orders due to its members cancelling memberships that would not otherwise have done so, as well as lost business opportunities for new members.
r. Nascot Enterprises. Nascot Enterprises has lost significant revenue over the eleven weeks since the Lockdown Orders went into effect. Nascot Enterprises will continue to experience significant financial losses in the second quarter of 2020 and beyond because of the Lockdown Orders due to its members cancelling memberships that would not otherwise have done so, as well as lost business opportunities for new members.
s. Prison City Physique. Prison City Physique has lost significant revenue over the eleven weeks since the Lockdown Orders went into effect. Prison City Physique will continue to experience significant financial losses in the second quarter of 2020 and beyond because of the Lockdown Orders due to its members cancelling memberships that would not otherwise have done so, as well as lost business opportunities for new members.
t. RMP Fitness. RMP Fitness has lost significant revenue over the eleven weeks since the Lockdown Orders went into effect. RMP Fitness will continue to experience significant financial losses in the second quarter of 2020 and beyond because of the Lockdown Orders due to its members cancelling memberships that would not otherwise have done so, as well as lost business opportunities for new members.
u. Strength Beyond. Strength Beyond has lost significant revenue over the eleven weeks since the Lockdown Orders went into effect. Strength Beyond will continue to

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experience significant financial losses in the second quarter of 2020 and beyond because of the Lockdown Orders due to its members cancelling memberships that would not otherwise have done so, as well as lost business opportunities for new members.
v. 24/7 Fitness Bootcamp and Boxing. 24/7 Fitness Bootcamp and Boxing has lost significant revenue over the eleven weeks since the Lockdown Orders went into effect. 24/7 Fitness Bootcamp and Boxing will continue to experience significant financial losses in the second quarter of 2020 and beyond because of the Lockdown Orders due to its members cancelling memberships that would not otherwise have done so, as well as lost business opportunities for new members.
w. 4 Seasons Gym. 4 Seasons Gym has lost significant revenue over the eleven weeks since the Lockdown Orders went into effect. 4 Seasons Gym will continue to experience significant financial losses in the second quarter of 2020 and beyond because of the Lockdown Orders due to its members cancelling memberships that would not otherwise have done so, as well as lost business opportunities for new members.
120. The prejudice each Plaintiff has suffered would not have occurred but for Defendants’ deprivations of their liberty and property interests.
121. Plaintiffs seek a declaration that the Lockdown Orders violate the procedural component of the Due Process Clause, and an injunction against further infringements of their rights under this Clause as described in the Prayer for Relief.
COUNT V SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESSS 122. “Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or

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other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
123. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that no State can “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 3.
124. The substantive component of the Due Process Clause prohibits government from taking action that “shocks the conscience” or “interferes with rights implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.” United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987) (cleaned up).
125. Plaintiffs have a protected liberty interest in the right to live without arbitrary governmental interference with their liberty and property interests. County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 845 (1988).
126. Liberty “denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized . . . as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.” Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572 (1972) (emphases added).
127. The Lockdown Orders shock the conscience and interfere with Plaintiffs’ deeply-rooted liberty and property rights, including the to work, right to contract, and right to engage in commerce, for all of the reasons described in the General Allegations and in each of the Counts of this Complaint, which are incorporated into this Paragraph by reference.

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 16 filed 06/01/20 PageID.176 Page 60 of 69
128. Each Plaintiff could and can conduct business in full compliance with all of the rules imposed on businesses allowed to operate under the Lockdown Orders, or reasonably equivalent and equally safe measures tailored to the unique nature of the in-person operations. Thus, the Lockdown Orders are not narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling governmental interest.
129. Nor is there any rational basis to deprive Plaintiffs of their liberty and property interests in performing services for willing customers when they can do so safely and in the same (or reasonably safe equivalent) manner as other businesses allowed to operate (such as manufacturing, restaurants, bars, and retail).
130. In the alternative, the Lockdown Orders are not reasonably related to a legitimate governmental interest.
131. Governor Whitmer and Director Gordon acted under color of State law in an official capacity and within the scope of their official duties when issuing the Lockdown Orders.
132. Plaintiffs seek a declaration that the Lockdown Orders violate the substantive component of the Due Process Clause, and an injunction against further infringements of their rights under this Clause as described in the Prayer for Relief.
COUNT V EQUAL PROTECTION 133. “Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 16 filed 06/01/20 PageID.177 Page 61 of 69
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
134. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that no State can “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 4.
135. The Lockdown Orders deprive Plaintiffs of the equal protection of the law because they allow some businesses to operate but not Plaintiffs’ businesses, even though they are similarly situated.
136. For example, under EO 2020-96, dentists are now allowed to provide all services safely statewide, according to the Governor, even though the patients cannot wear masks during dental procedures or routine cleanings, and employees will necessarily stand within inches to two feet from their patients’ mouths. The designation that dentists can safely perform routine cleanings and fittings for bite guards is completely arbitrary, considering that other industries that can maintain strict social distancing are not allowed to re-open and in fact can be criminalized for doing so.
137. Each Plaintiff could and can conduct business in full compliance with all of the rules imposed on businesses allowed to operate under the Lockdown Orders, or reasonably equivalent and equally safe measures tailored to the unique nature of the in-person operations. Thus, the Lockdown Orders are not narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling governmental interest.
138. Nor is there any rational basis to deprive Plaintiffs of their liberty and property interests in performing services for willing customers when they can do so safely and in the same (or reasonably safe equivalent) manner as other businesses allowed to operate.

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 16 filed 06/01/20 PageID.178 Page 62 of 69
139. In the alternative, the Lockdown Orders are not reasonably related to a legitimate governmental interest.
140. Governor Whitmer and Director Gordon acted under color of State law in an official capacity and within the scope of their official duties when issuing the Lockdown Orders.
141. Plaintiffs seek a declaration that the Lockdown Orders violate the Equal Protection Clause, and an injunction against further infringements of their rights under this Clause as described in the Prayer for Relief.
COUNT VI DECLARATORY JUDGMENT VOID FOR VAGUENESS 142. There is an actual and present controversy between the parties. 143. Plaintiffs contend that the Lockdown Orders are unconstitutionally vague under the void-for-vagueness doctrine under the U.S. and Michigan constitutions. 144. The void-for-vagueness doctrine requires penal laws to define criminal conduct with sufficient precision that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited, and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357–358 (1983). This doctrine flows from the Due Process Clause. Michigan Dep’t of State Compliance & Rules Div. v. Michigan Educ. Ass’n, 251 Mich. App. 110, 116 (2002); U.S Const., am. XIV; Mich. Const. (1963), art. I, § 17. 145. The Lockdown Orders purport to carry the force of law and (with the exception of Director Gordon’s Emergency Rule) makes any willful violation of their terms a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment or a fine. It is therefore subject to the void-forvagueness doctrine.

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 16 filed 06/01/20 PageID.179 Page 63 of 69
146. EO 2020-42 through EO 2020-96 allow certain businesses to continue operations if they fall within certain “sectors” of the economy, but it does not identify any criteria by which a business owner can safely determine whether his or her business falls within that sector. Incongruities are evident within the order.
147. The very fact that the Governor needs a webpage to answer “frequently asked questions” about the scope of the order shows that it’s vague. Michiganders are smart people. If “ordinary people” could understand the Lockdown Order, then there would be no need for 969 FAQs on these orders on the State’s coronavirus webpage. The orders are also constantly being “clarified” in news articles, press conferences, and revised orders. Still, pervasive confusion remains each time a new order is released.
148. On information and belief, Governor Whitmer and Director Gordon deny these contentions.
149. Plaintiffs seek a judicial declaration that the Lockdown Orders are void for vagueness, and an injunction against enforcement or adoption of these and similar orders and rules in the future as described in the Prayer for Relief.
COUNT VII DECLARATORY JUDGMENT SEPARATION OF POWERS 150. There is an actual and present controversy between the parties. 151. Plaintiffs contend that EO 2020-43 through EO 2020-96 (and their predecessors) related to the closure of Plaintiffs’ businesses violate the Separation of Powers Clause in Article III, Section 2 of the Michigan Constitution of 1963, and that the EOs prohibit them—directly through the executive order itself and indirectly through Director Gordon’s

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Emergency Order and Emergency Rule—from engaging activities in which they would otherwise be free to engage under threat of criminal sanction.
152. The Separation of Powers Clause provides that “[t]he powers of government are divided into three branches: legislative, executive, and judicial. No person exercising powers of one branch shall exercise powers properly belonging to another branch except as expressly provided in this constitution.” Mich. Const. (1963) art. III, § 2.
153. The Emergency Powers Act violates the Separation of Powers Clause because it vests governors with total legislative power whenever a governor asserts the existence of an emergency.
154. The Emergency Management Act does not violate the Separation of Powers Clause on its face, but it does as Governor Whitmer has applied it. As the Governor appears to construe it, the Emergency Management Act gives her limitless powers equal in scope to the Emergency Powers Act. The language of the Act does not confer such unlimited powers on the Governor.
155. On information and belief, Governor Whitmer and Director Gordon deny these contentions.
156. Plaintiffs seek a judicial declaration that the Lockdown Orders violate the Separation of Powers Clause, and an injunction against enforcement or adoption of these and similar orders and rules in the future as described in the Prayer for Relief.
COUNT VIII DECLARATORY JUDGMENT UNLAWFUL EXERCISE OF EMERGENCY POWERS ACT 157. There is an actual and present controversy between the parties.

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158. Plaintiffs contend that EO 2020-43 and EO 2020-96 (and their predecessors and subsequent EOs) violate the Emergency Powers Act, if they pass constitutional muster.
159. Viruses, like SARS-CoV-2, and the diseases they can cause, like COVID-19, are not the kind of emergencies contemplated under the Emergency Powers Act, which applies “[d]uring times of great public crisis, disaster, rioting, catastrophe, or similar public emergency within the state, or reasonable apprehension of immediate danger of a public emergency of that kind, when public safety is imperiled....” Mich. Comp. Laws § 10.31.
160. Public health and public safety are distinct legal concepts. Governor Whitmer has not identified a public safety emergency in any of the EOs. Instead, she has only selectively quoted from the portion of the Act that allows her to issue orders necessary to protect life or property or to bring the emergency under control. EO 2020-42, Preamble ¶ 4. Absent a public safety emergency, the Governor has no power to issue orders under the Emergency Powers Act at all. Neither SARS-CoV-2 nor COVID-19 have presented a public safety emergency.
161. Alternatively, even if SARS-CoV-2 or COVID-19 qualify as a public safety emergency, the Emergency Powers Act does not authorize the de facto statewide house arrest imposed under the EOs. The Act says a governor may “designat[e] specific zones within the area in which occupancy and use of buildings and ingress and egress of persons and vehicles may be prohibited or regulated.” Mich. Comp. Laws § 10.31(1). Governor Whitmer, however, has regulated occupancy and use of buildings statewide. The EOs violate the Act because it is not limited to specific zones within Michigan.

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162. Alternatively, the Emergency Powers Act only authorizes a governor to issue reasonable orders that are considered necessary to protect life or property or to bring the emergency under control. Mich. Comp. Laws § 10.31(1).
163. The EOs are objectively unreasonable. There can be nothing more unreasonable than keeping 10 million people under house arrest because 0.38% of the population has contracted a disease that has killed less than 0.03% of the population.
164. Likewise, it is unreasonable to cause nearly 1.2 million men and women to lose their jobs virtually overnight, or to cripple businesses, or to cause businesses to permanently close on those same facts, especially when many of these people reside in counties with less than 25 cases and far fewer (or even no) deaths.
165. Michigan has 83 counties. As of May 16, 2020, three counties in Michigan still had no confirmed cases, and 32 counties had fewer than 25 cases. As of that same date, 21 counties had no deaths, and 57 counties had less than 10 deaths.
166. Similarly, it is unreasonable to maintain these EOs when the policies contained within them have plunged the State into Depression-level unemployment.
167. On information and belief, Governor Whitmer and Director Gordon deny these contentions.
168. Plaintiffs seek a judicial declaration that the Eos violate the Emergency Powers Act, an injunction against enforcement of the Lockdown Orders, and an injunction against similar orders and rules in the future as described in the Prayer for Relief.
COUNT IX DECLARATORY JUDGMENT UNLAWFUL EXERCISE OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT ACT 169. There is an actual and present controversy between the parties.

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 16 filed 06/01/20 PageID.183 Page 67 of 69
170. Plaintiffs contend that EO 2020-43 and EO 2020-96 (and their predecessors and subsequent EOs) violate the Emergency Management Act, if they pass constitutional muster.
171. The Emergency Management Act permits a governor to declare a disaster in response to the occurrence of threat of widespread loss of life resulting from natural causes, including an epidemic. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 30.402(e) (including epidemics in the list of causes of disasters). Thus, infectious diseases by themselves are not a permissible reason to invoke the Act—the disease must reach or threaten to reach epidemic status.
172. Although the World Health Organization has classified SARS-CoV-2 as a pandemic, that is not controlling under Michigan law. The existence of an epidemic must be determined solely from the perspective of the facts as they exist on the ground in Michigan.
173. With confirmed infections affecting only 0.38% of the State as of the date of this Complaint, no epidemic actually exists throughout all of Michigan. While a regional epidemic likely exists in a few densely populated areas, one does not exist in all 83 counties in Michigan, as demonstrated by persistently low numbers of infections and deaths in the majority of Michigan’s counties.
174. In addition, the Emergency Management Act does not contemplate declaring the entire State a disaster area. Among other things, the Act allows a governor to issue orders affecting a “stricken” or “threatened” area, including mandatory evacuation orders, controlling ingress and egress from that area, and the occupancy of premises within that area. Mich. Comp. Laws § 30.405(1)(e)–(g).
175. Moreover, even when grounds exist to declare a disaster, the executive order must indicate, among other things, the nature of the conditions permitting the termination

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 16 filed 06/01/20 PageID.184 Page 68 of 69
of the state of disaster. Mich. Comp. Laws § 30.403(3). None of Governor Whitmer’s executive orders have articulated objective conditions that, when satisfied, would permit the termination of the state of disaster.
176. On information and belief, Governor Whitmer and Director Gordon deny these contentions.
177. Plaintiffs seek a judicial declaration that the EOs violate the Emergency Management Act, an injunction against enforcement the Lockdown Orders, and an injunction against similar orders and rules in the future as described in the Prayer for Relief.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully ask the Court to grant them the following relief:
a. A declaratory judgment that the Lockdown Orders: b. violate Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights as set forth in this Complaint; c. are void for vagueness; and/or d. violate the Separation of Powers Clause of the Michigan Constitution, the Emergency Powers Act, and/or the Emergency Management Act; e. Enjoin Governor Whitmer and Director Gordon from enforcing the Lockdown Orders and from issuing any future orders or rules similar to the invalid ones described in this action; f. Award Plaintiffs their reasonable attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and any other applicable law; and g. Any other such further relief to which Plaintiffs may be entitled as a matter of law or equity, or which the Court determines to be just and proper.

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 16 filed 06/01/20 PageID.185 Page 69 of 69

JURY DEMAND Under the Seventh Amendment to the U.S Constitution and Rule 38(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiffs demand trial by jury on all issues so triable.

Dated: June 1, 2020

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Scott M. Erskine_________________ SCOTT M. ERSKINE (P54714) CARLY VAN THOMME (P59706) ERSKINE LAW, PC Attorneys for Plaintiffs 612 West University Drive Rochester, Michigan 48307 (248) 601-4497 serskine@erskinelaw.com

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 16-1 filed 06/01/20 PageID.186 Page 1 of 45

DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

_____________________________________________________

LEAGUE OF INDPENDENT FITNESS FACITLITIES AND TRAINERS, INC., BASELINE FITNESS LLC, BUILDING YOUR TEMPLE LLC, BYT FITNESS 247 LLC, CLAWSON FITNESS, LLC, CLINTON FITNESS, INC., D-LUX KARATE UNIVERSITY LLC, FENTON ATHLETIC CLUB, INC., FENTON KARATE, LLC, FUSION FITNESS 24/7 LLC, H3 FITNESS LLC, I FITNESS PERSONAL TRAINING, INC., JKP FITNESS, LLC, JPF ENTERPRISES, LLC, M FITNESS CLUB, LLC, MH & AB LLC, MOTOR CITY CF - ST. CLAIR SHORES, LLC, NASCOT ENTERPRISES, LLC, PRISON CITY PHYSIQUE LLC, RMP FITNESS INC., STRENGTH BEYOND LLC, 24/7 BOOTCAMP AND BOXING INC., and 4 SEASONS GYM, LLC,
Plaintiffs, v. GRETCHEN E. WHITMER and ROBERT GORDON,
Defendants. _____________________________________________________
ERSKINE LAW, PC Scott M. Erskine (P54734) Carly Van Thomme (P59706) Attorneys for Plaintiffs 612 W. University

Civil No. 1:20-cv-00458 Hon. Paul L. Maloney
FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

Exhibit 1

m Case 1C:2a0s-ecv1-:02004-c5v8--0P0L3M60-PJEGCFENCoF. N1-o1. f1il6e-d10fi4le/2d80/260/01P/2a0gePIDa.g3e5IDP.1a8g7e 5Poafg4e82 of 45 ANDERSON ECONOMIC GROUP

Memorandum

Date:

April 13, 2020

To: From:
Re:

Daniel McCarthy, Shareholder, Butzel Long
Patrick Anderson, Principal Brian Peterson, Consultant
COVID-19 Progression and Effects of Business Closures on Michigan's Workers

Purpose of this Memorandum
The COVID-19 pandemic has created unprecedented public health and economic disturbances across the globe. Michigan has been one of the most affected states in America, with over 22,600 cases reported as of Friday, April 10. Michigan's response (including the first Executive Order issued on March 10), the dramatic efforts of many health care workers, and the extraordinary actions of many employers and volunteers have also been significant.
We all recognize two serious problems: First, we face a severe public health crisis, with tremendous human costs to its victims as well as to the many people who care for them. Second, we are enduring unprecedented costs of travel and gathering restrictions, business closures, prohibitions on work, and cancellations of both private and public events.
Given these twin threats, it is critical that the State's leaders have the best information available to project spread of the virus; to consider the impact of preventative measures such as social distancing and "stay at home" orders; and to understand the scale of the effect of the prohibitions on work and other restrictions on Michigan's workers and our ability to produce the goods and services we need.
Anderson Economic Group has been retained to summarize the best information now available on both the course of the COVID-19 epidemic and its effects on the Michigan economy. In this memorandum, we provide a summary ofCOVID-19's progression, discuss the impact of the virus and stay at home orders on Michigan's economy, and identify large variances between the identification of "critical" and "essential" workers during this emergency.

Anderson Economic Group LLC • www.AndersonEconomicGroup.com
1555 Watertower Place, Suite I 00 • East Lansing, Ml 48823 • Tel: (517) 333-6984 East Lansing | Chicago

Case 1C:2a0s-ecv1-:02004-c5v8--0P0L3M60-PJEGCFENCoF. N1-o1. f1il6e-d10fi4le/2d80/260/01P/2a0gePIDa.g3e6IDP.1a8g8e 6Poafg4e83 of 45 Daniel McCarthy, Shareholder, Butzel Long, April 13, 2020, page 2
Approach
Epidemiology Model. Modeling the spread of COVID-19 is a challenging endeavor. Data on the virus are nearly always incomplete, and our ability to test and diagnose people is inconsistent. However, we now have several weeks of consistent, daily data on cases from independent sources. These provide a solid basis for an assessment of the current situation.
We provide below a modeling of the epidemic in the State of Michigan, using daily data and the widely-used SIR epidemiological model. Subject to the limitations of this and every model, we present the evidence on the current situation in Michigan and do so in a manner that provides a superior level of transparency and credibility.
We also identify comparisons from the small number of similar analyses that are now available, including the IHME projections widely presented in the United States. We note that the most recent IHME projections for Michigan are very close to the results we present here.
We provide additional information about the data, the SIR model, and our methodology in "Appendix B: Methodology and Data" on page 17.
Employment Effects Analysis. In order to estimate the economic impacts of COVID-19 and stay at home orders, we created a custom model that predicts the economy-wide impacts of the virus and emergency orders, done on a state-by-state basis. Our model estimates not only the impact on job losses, but also the impact on workers across each state who are at risk of losing income-a much larger group than just those who file for unemployment.
This analysis is based on a review of stay at home orders for each state, as well as data from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, and U.S. Department of Labor. Consistent with our intention to provide credible, transparent information, we also reference projections of the impact of these restrictions that were released in mid-March, as well as the unemployment claims figures released in the subsequent weeks, which corroborate these projections.
State Executive Orders and Federal Homeland Security Classifications. We review the Department of Homeland Security's memo and subsequent guidance on critical workers during this emergency and compare it with a similar classification of workers in two Michigan executive orders. We note the significant differences between these two that affect Michigan workers and the residents.

ANDERSON ECONOMIC GROUP LLC

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Case 1C:2a0s-ecv1-:02004-c5v8--0P0L3M60-PJEGCFENCoF. N1-o1. f1il6e-d10fi4le/2d80/260/01P/2a0gePIDa.g3e7IDP.1a8g9e 7Poafg4e84 of 45 Daniel McCarthy, Shareholder, Butzel Long, April 13, 2020, page 3
Findings
Our analysis and review led to the following findings.
1. Epidemiological models and current data suggest that COVID-19 infections have peaked in Michigan.
Epidemiological evidence strongly suggests that Michigan has reached its peak COVID-19 infection rate for the current wave of the epidemic. This evidence includes both our own assessment-using an industry-standard SIR model and U.S.-only data-and the IHME assessment ofApril 8, which utilizes both U.S. and China data and a unique model IHME developed for this purpose.
Michigan Results, Standard SIR Model. The daily Michigan case data used in our analysis was collected by the New York Times from State sources and selected because of its consistency and reliability across multiple states. 1 We estimated a standard SIR model using these data, using an iterative re-estimating procedure to reveal both the current projection of the path ofthe outbreak and the changes in the estimated parameters over time.
For approximately one week now, the data have consistently indicated that the infection rate began slowly, accelerated, and then reached a peak rate in the past week. Ifthis pattern continues, we can expect the number of new cases to slowly drop over time during the current wave of the epidemic.
This pattern-which produces the distinctive "S" curve-is consistent with both theory, and decades of experience across the globe with numerous epidemics. These data strongly indicate the path ofthe epidemic has begun to slow down, suggesting that social distancing and other mitigation efforts have been effective. The peak number of people infected, shown in the Anderson Economic Group analysis, and the peak hospital utilization, shown in the IHME analysis, both appear to have passed in the week that began April 5, 2020.
See Figure 1 on page 5.
Note that these analyses pre-date the reports from the Easter weekend, which may have been incomplete but which also show a declining number of cases. Furthermore, these analyses focus on the current wave of the epidemic, which is the only wave for which any data are available.
Comparison with Other Epidemiological Models. This result is consistent with that of other entities that have modeled Michigan's epidemiology, including those oflHME (as reported April 8) and others. In particular, the most recent IHME results show a nearly identical pattem.2
1. There are minor discrepancies between the NYT compilation, and the daily-reported numbers from the Michigan DHS. These discrepancies are usually under 1%.

ANDERSON ECONOMIC GROUP LLC

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Case 1C:2a0s-ecv1-:02004-c5v8--0P0L3M60-PJEGCFENCoF. N1-o1. f1il6e-d10fi4le/2d80/260/01P/2a0gePIDa.g3e8IDP.1a9g0e 8Poafg4e85 of 45 Daniel McCarthy, Shareholder, Butzel Long, April 13, 2020, page 4
Variation Across Michigan Counties; Results in Detroit Metro Area. There is significant variation in the intensity of the outbreak across the state. In particular, many counties have reported total cases of less than a dozen. At the same time, Wayne, Oakland, and Macomb Counties have intensive epidemics. Corroborating our results for the State as a whole, each of these three counties, all with large number of cases, demonstrates a similar pattern of acceleration in the number of cases in February and March, and then an apparent peak in the first half ofApril.
We show similar analyses for these counties in case counts in "Appendix A: Additional Figures" on page 13. See in particular Figure 6 on page 16.
Limitations of these Data and Epidemiological Models. We also note the limitations of these data and every epidemiological model in "Appendix B: Methodology and Data" on page 17.
Among these limitations, please note that, for many counties in Michigan, the number of case counts is so small that we do not have enough data to model the course of an epidemic at this point. We, of course, hope the numbers remain small in many such counties. However, we do expect that case numbers in some counties will grow enough to allow later estimation in these counties as well.

2. As noted in the appendix, the IHME model uses a mixture of U.S. and China-reported data, and a unique model that focuses on hospital usage rather than cases. Furthermore, the IHME results have varied significantly over time. This comparison is with the most recently-released results.

ANDERSON ECONOMIC GROUP LLC

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Case 1C:2a0s-ecv1-:02004-c5v8--0P0L3M60-PJEGCFENCoF. N1-o1. f1il6e-d10fi4le/2d80/260/01P/2a0gePIDa.g3e9IDP.1a9g1e 9Poafg4e86 of 45 Daniel McCarthy, Shareholder, Butzel Long, April 13, 2020, page 5

FIGURE 1. COVID-19 Total Infections, Infection Rate, and Growth Rate in Michigan

MICHIGAN: coronavirus epidemic (SIR model): 10-Apr-2020
a- = 1.95 Tc= 2.01 Tr= 3.93 N = 39210 Cend = 30681 Send = 8528 RMSE = 212
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May-09

Date

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1500
>,
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ANDERSON ECONOMIC GROUP LLC

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2. Michigan s "stay at home" order, along with decisions made by private citizens and employers, has resulted in a severe contraction in the States economy.

We now have Depression-level unemployment in Michigan, with over 16% of our workforce becoming unemployed in just three weeks. This will grow more severe as time passes and likely affect the incomes of 1.4 million Michigan workers and their families.
Executive Orders Restricting Work and Travel. On March 23, Michigan Governor Gretchen Whitmer issued a "stay at home" order requiring all nonessential workers to stay home and not go their workplace. At the time, Michigan had more reported COVID-19 cases than any other state save for New York and New Jersey. This order-already the second on the epidemic-became effective March 24 and was effective through April 13.3 The purpose of this order was to suppress the spread of COVID-19, prevent the state's healthcare system from being overwhelmed, and allow time for the state to procure necessary medical equipment needed to "prevent needless deaths." On April 9, the governor extended the stay at home order until April 30, strengthened some of the restrictions, and noted that the original stay at home order was effective, but that COVID19 was still "aggressive and persistent."4

On March 17, Anderson Economic Group estimated that, as a result of COVID-19 and the stay at home orders in this and other states, an unprecedented number ofAmericans would lose income due to layoffs, furloughs, pay cuts, and mandatory sick leave. We estimated that 1.5 million Michiganders could lose two or more days worth of income, along with 2.0 million workers in Illinois and 3.3 million workers in New York. These estimates are shown in Table 1 below.5

TABLE 1. Projection of Workers Losing Significant Income due to COVID-19 and Stay-at-home Orders, March-April 2020

State

Estimated Number of Workers Losing Significant
Income

Michigan

1,468,720

Illinois

1,958,468

NewYork

3,327,870

Source: Anderson Economic Group estimates, March 19, 2020.

3. Michigan Governor Executive Order 2020-21, "Temporary requirements to suspend activities that are not necessary to sustain or protect life." See https://www.michigan.gov/whitmer/0,9309,7-38790499_90705-522626--,00.html. As noted above, the first executive order (No. 2020-4, March 10, 2020) declared a state of emergency and noted that the first case had just been identified in the State. 4. Michigan Governor Executive Order 2020-42, "Temporary requirement to suspend activities that are not necessary to sustain or protect life, Rescission of Executive order 2020-21." See https://www.michigan.gov/whitmer/0,9309,7-387-90499_90705-525182--,00.html.

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Case C1:a2s0e-c1v:-2000-4c5v8-0-P03L6M0-PJEGCFENCoF. 1N-1o.fi1le6d-10f4il/e2d8/0260/01P/a2g0eIPDa.4g1eIDP.a1g9e3 1P1 aogf e488 of 45 Daniel McCarthy, Shareholder, Butzel Long, April 13, 2020, page 7
Immediate and Large Loss of Employment. Over the past three weeks, the impact of the stay at home order on the state's economy has become apparent. Unfortunately, the most recent data in Michigan and other states indicate that our mid-March estimates were probably conservative.
Since March 28, Michigan has recorded over 815,000 unemployment claims. The number ofjobless workers has overwhelmed the State's unemployment offices, underlining the scale of the job loss and suggesting that many more are unemployed than have been able to claim benefits. Even counting only those that filed indicates that approximately 16.5% of the state's labor force has filed for unemployment in less than three weeks-an unprecedented occurrence. Counting those already filed as of last week, and those already attempting to file this week, Michigan now has depression-level unemployment.
Nationwide, Michigan has been one of the hardest hit states, as shown in Figure 2 below.
FIGURE 2. Three-Week Initial Unemployment Claims as a Percentage of Total Workforce Size as of April 4, 2020

,, .,J

D a.5%-5% - 5.1%-7.5% - 1.6% -10%

10.1%- 12.5% - 12.6%- 16.5%

Source: Anderson Economic Group analysis of base data from the U.S. Department of Labor, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.

5. See the Anderson Economic Group's website for most recent estimates of affected workers. https:// www.AndersonEconomicGroup.com/.

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Case C1:a2s0e-c1v:-2000-4c5v8-0-P03L6M0-PJEGCFENCoF. 1N-1o.fi1le6d-10f4il/e2d8/0260/01P/a2g0eIPDa.4g2eIDP.a1g9e4 1P2 aogf e489 of 45 Daniel McCarthy, Shareholder, Butzel Long, April 13, 2020, page 8
Impact Throughout Multiple Industries. While the unemployment claims numbers provide some insight into the current state of the Michigan economy, the impact of COVID-19 extends well beyond just those who were able to file for unemployment in the last three weeks.
Across the Midwest, workers in nearly all industries outside of government are being furloughed, asked to take a pay cut, or are taking mandatory paid time off. The U.S. Department of Labor's three most recent unemployment insurance claims press releases note that, in Michigan, significant increases in unemployment claims are coming from nearly every industry in the state, including food service; manufacturing; construction; retail trade; administrative, support, waste management, and remediation services; health care and social assistance; arts, entertainment and recreation; transportation and warehousing; real estate; professional services; and educational services.6
The impact has been especially severe on small business, with many owners struggling to keep their doors open. Although Congress authorized a number of small business lending programs aimed at helping small businesses make it through the epidemic, very few funds have actually been dispersed even though Michigan businesses have been shut down for nearly one month. Small business owners who have applied for relief have encountered a plethora of challenges, including technical glitches, overwhelmed banks, and slow processing times, adding to the already high level of anxiety that small business owners were facing as policymakers ordered all nonessential businesses shut down.
A recent forecast from the University of Michigan Research Seminar in Quantitative Economics predicts that Michigan's unemployment rate in the second quarter of 2020 will average 23 percent-even higher than the forecasted U.S. quarterly peak of 14 percent.7

6. U.S. Department ofLabor Unemployment Insurance Weekly Claims report for April 9, 2020, April 2, 2020, and March 26, 2020. See https://www.dol.gov/. The comments on individual states are attributed to the state unemployment agencies. 7. Gabriel Ehrlich, George Fulton, and Saul Hymans, "Update April 9: The U.S. and Michigan Economic Outlook for 2020-2022," University ofMichigan Ann Arbor Research Seminar in Quantitative Economics." See: https://lsa.umich.edu/econ/rsqe/forecasts.html.

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Case 1C:2a0s-ecv1-:02004-c5v8--0P0L3M60-PJEGCFENCoF. N1-o1. f1il6e-d10fi4le/2d80/260/01P/2a0gePIDa.g4e3IDP.1a9g5e 1P3aogfe4180 of 45 Daniel McCarthy, Shareholder, Butzel Long, April 13, 2020, page 9
3. The US. Department ofHomeland Security's memorandum on "essential" workers during the COVID-19 pandemic explicitly recognizes many workers that are not recognized in Michigan 's Executive Order.
On March 19, the Department Homeland Security (DHS) issued a memorandum on the identification of "essential infrastructure workers" during the COVID-19 response. 8 The following guidance from the memorandum is of particular importance:
• The memorandum states that those who work in critical infrastructure industries "have a special responsibility to maintain [their] normal work schedule."
• The memorandum lists a range of "operations and services that are essential to continued critical infrastructure viability." These include management, call centers, construction, telecommunications, information technology, food, agriculture, transportation, energy, wastewater, manufacturing and logistics, and health care workers.
• The memorandum states that "all organizations should implement business continuity plans," and that in the "modem economy, reliance on technology and just-in-time supply chains means that certain workers must be able to access certain sites, facilities, and assets to continue continuity of functions."
On March 28, DHS released a revised memorandum identifying a larger set of essential industries and workers.9 The occupations and industries identified in this revised document include workers in some of Michigan's most important economic sectors. For example, Trade, Transportation, and Utilities is Michigan's largest sector by employment, with over 800,000 workers, and the State's Manufacturing sector employs 625,000 workers. 10
These memos note the following items that are especially germane to key industries in Michigan:
• The DHS memo explicitly notes the importance oftransportation, logistics, and automotive repair and maintenance.
• The DHS memo classifies "central office personnel" who "maintain and operate central office, data centers, and other network office facilities" as essential employees.
• The DHS memo also notes the essential nature of"workers necessary for the manufacturing of materials and products needed for medical supply chains, transportation, energy, communications, food and agriculture... " and many other products.
• The March 28 DHS memo expands its definition of essential workers to a variety of industries, including some that are particularly important to Michigan's economy, such as transportation and manufacturing.
Need to Recognize True Extent of Critical and Essential Workers. As was apparent at the onset of this emergency, and consistent with the guidance from the U.S. government that was cited in Michigan Executive Order 2020-42 and prior orders, it is critical to support
8. Christopher Krebs, "Memorandum on Identification of Essential Critical Infrastructure Workers During COVID-19 Response," March 19, 2020. 9. Christopher Krebs, "Advisory Memorandum on Identification of Essential Critical Infrastructure Workers During COVID-19 Response," March 28, 2020. 10. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, "Economy At a Glance: Michigan," https://www.bls.gov/.

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"essential" workers in a range of industries. The purpose of the DHS memo was to highlight the importance of these workers and "help State and local officials ensure continuity of functions critical to public health and safety." However, Michigan Executive Order 2020-42 explicitly states that it does not adopt any of the guidance issued by DHS subsequent to the March 19 memorandum, meaning that the Governor's order excludes those additional industries and workers identified as essential by the DHS as of March
28. 11
The March 19 DHS memo was issued at a time when stay at home orders were anticipated to be short-term affairs. Since then, stay at home orders across the country have been extended. It is important to recognize that the longer these stay at home orders are in effect, the more workers must be classified as essential in order to maintain supply chains and perform essential services.
The DHS memorandum fully anticipates that changes in conditions over time and differences in the intensity of the outbreak will be taken into account by State and local governments, as well as private sector organizations. Consistent with this explicit guidance, Michigan and other states should take notice of differing infection rates within our state; as well as how changes in the course of the epidemic impact which workers and industries should be classified as essential.

11. Paragraph 8 of Michigan's Executive Order 2020-42 states: "For purposes ofthis order, critical infrastructure workers are those workers described by the Director of the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency in his guidance ofMarch 19, 2020 on the COVID-19 response (available here). This order does not adopt any subsequent guidance document released by this same agency." [Emphasis in original.]

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Case 1C:2a0s-ecv1-:02004-c5v8--0P0L3M60-PJEGCFENCoF. N1-o1. f1il6e-d10fi4le/2d80/260/01P/2a0gePIDa.g4e5IDP.1a9g7e 1P5aogfe4182 of 45 Daniel McCarthy, Shareholder, Butzel Long, April 13, 2020, page 11
About the Authors Patrick L. Anderson. Mr. Patrick L. Anderson founded Anderson Economic Group in 1996, and serves as the company's principal and CEO. A nationally-recognized expert in business economics and a sought-after speaker, Mr. Anderson has led several major public policy initiatives in his home state. He was awarded both the Michigan Chamber of Commerce's Leadership Michigan award and the University of Michigan's Neal Staebler award for civic leadership. His writing has earned five prestigious national awards from the National Association of Business Economics.
Brian R Peterson. Mr. Peterson is a consultant and director of public policy and economic analysis with Anderson Economic Group. His work focuses on economic and fiscal impact modeling, actuarial analysis, and environmental economics. Prior to joining AEG, Mr. Peterson worked as a policy analyst in regional economic development and transportation planning in the Chicago region.
Contributors
The authors wish to recognize the contribution of the following individuals: • Andrew Miller, Senior Analyst, Anderson Economic Group • Sarp Mertdogan, Analyst, Supported Intelligence LLC • Milan Batista, Professor at the University of Ljubljana, Slovenia
The conclusions in this memorandum are, of course, those of the authors.
About Anderson Economic Group LLC
Founded in 1996, Anderson Economic Group is a boutique research and consulting firm, with offices in East Lansing, Michigan, and Chicago, Illinois. The experts at AEG have extensive experience in public policy and economic analysis. Clients ofAnderson Economic Group include nearly every major institution in the State ofMichigan, including colleges, manufacturers, labor unions, state and local governments, and trade associations. Relevant publications from our firm include:
• Annual State Business Tax Burden Rankings, published since 2007. • "Economic and Fiscal Impacts of the United Auto Works GM Strike," published in 2019. • "Economic and Fiscal Impacts of a 1332 Affordable Care Act Waiver in Georgia," published
in 2019. • "Michigan Economic Competitiveness Benchmarking Report," published since 2012. • "Anderson Economic Group Amazon HQ2 Index," published in 2017. •"AndCan® Index Estimates of National and State-level Cannabis Demand," updated
regularly since 2017. • Numerous benchmarking, comparison, and economic update analyses.
For more information about Anderson Economic Group, please visit our website at https://www.AndersonEconomicGroup.com.

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Case 1C:2a0s-ecv1-:02004-c5v8--0P0L3M60-PJEGCFENCoF. N1-o1. f1il6e-d10fi4le/2d80/260/01P/2a0gePIDa.g4e6IDP.1a9g8e 1P6aogfe4183 of 45 Daniel McCarthy, Shareholder, Butzel Long, April 13, 2020, page 12
About Supported Intelligence LLC
Supported Intelligence, LLC is a decision intelligence and data analytics company founded in 2012. Supported Intelligence pioneered a innovative class of decision intelligence technology, which is covered by three U.S. patents as well as patents pending in the U.S. and other countries.
Consultants at Supported Intelligence assembled the data and created the analytics facility to bring in daily reports from numerous sources, including at the state and county level in the United States; analyze the data using the methods identified in this document; and generate the decision intelligence reports highlighted here.
Please visit https://www.Supportedintelligence.com for more information.

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Case 1C:2a0s-ecv1-:02004-c5v8--0P0L3M60-PJEGCFENCoF. N1-o1. f1il6e-d10fi4le/2d80/260/01P/2a0gePIDa.g4e7IDP.1a9g9e 1P7aogfe4184 of 45 Daniel McCarthy, Shareholder, Butzel Long, April 13, 2020, page 13

Appendix A: Additional Figures
FIGURE 3. COVID-19 Total Infections, Infection Rate, and Growth Rate in Macomb County, Michigan

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MACOMB_MICH IGAN : coronavirus epidemic (S IR model): 10-Apr-2020 \sigma= 2.1 T_c = 2 .07 T_r = 4 .34 N = 4914 C_{end} = 4045 S_{end} = 869 RMSE = 32

--------------- ---------------------- ---- - -- -

- - Prediction • Actual

0 Mar-15 Mar-20 Mar-25 Mar-30 Apr-04

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FIGURE 4. COVID-19 Total Infections, Infection Rate, and Growth Rate in Oakland County, Michigan

OAKLAND_MICHIGAN: coronavirus epidemic (SIR model): 10-Apr-2020 \sigma= 1.62 T_c= 1.82 T_r= 2.96 N= 9918 C_{end}= 6496 S_{end}= 3422 RMSE= 58 8

------ ------ ------ -----------------¢---~----~---~-- ~~~~

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Case 1C:2a0s-ecv1-:02004-c5v8--0P0L3M60-PJEGCFENCoF. N1-o1. f1il6e-d10fi4le/2d80/260/01P/2a0gePIDa.g4e9IDP.2a0g1e 1P9aogfe4186 of 45 Daniel McCarthy, Shareholder, Butzel Long, April 13, 2020, page 15

FIGURE 5. COVID-19 Total Infections, Infection Rate, and Growth Rate in Wayne County, Michigan

WAYNE_ MICHIGAN: coronavirus epidemic (SIR model): 10-Apr-2020

~sigma = 1

1.31 T_c = 0.94 T_r=

1.24 N= 29942

C_{end} =

13091

S_{end} =

16851

RMSE=

84

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Case 1C:2a0s-ecv1-:02004-c5v8--0P0L3M60-PJEGCFENCoF. N1-o1. f1il6e-d10fi4le/2d80/260/01P/2a0gePIDa.g5e0IDP.2a0g2e 2P0aogfe4187 of 45 Daniel McCarthy, Shareholder, Butzel Long, April 13, 2020, page 16

FIGURE 6. COVID-19 Total Infections, Infection Rate, and Growth Rate in the Detroit Metropolitan Statistical Area

25
00 :)l 20 cu o
25 15
.0.--x :;;' 10
2 u Sf! 5
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DETROIT MSA : coronavirus epidemic (S IR model): 10-Apr-2020
u = 1.2 T c = 0 .69 Tr= 0.82 N = 72148 Cend = 22650 Send = 49498 RMSE = 117
------- ---------- - ----------- ~---- --- --!!-ie-;i-i!;Ei~-~~-
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Case 1C:2a0s-ecv1-:02004-c5v8--0P0L3M60-PJEGCFENCoF. N1-o1. f1il6e-d10fi4le/2d80/260/01P/2a0gePIDa.g5e1IDP.2a0g3e 2P1aogfe4188 of 45 Daniel McCarthy, Shareholder, Butzel Long, April 13, 2020, page 17
Appendix B: Methodology and Data Data. The state-level data we used in this analysis were collected by the New York Times organization from state and local sources. We selected this data source after reviewing multiple alternatives, and recognizing the benefits ofthe consistency and data checking this organization brought to the effort.
The NYT website for these data is: https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/us/ coronavirus-us-cases.html.
The NYT data repository on GitHub is: https://github.com/nytimes/covid-19-data.
Model. We used a SIR model to forecast the impacts of COVID-19 on states across the U.S. We chose this model after conducting an extensive review of available epidemiological models.
Our review confirmed that the standard SIR model, when consistent daily data are available, often provides the most reliable and understandable assessments. This judgement is based partially on the decades of experience across a wide number of countries and epidemics. The SIR model has been recognized and used as a basis for the diffusion of ideas and other transmissions, as well as for epidemiological studies, since at least 1964.12 It is also widely described in academic and professional settings, including having many easily-accessible resources, such as an online teaching version provided by the Mathematics Association ofAmerica.13

12.An influential article in this development was Goffman W, Newill V. "Generalization ofepidemic theory." Nature. 1964;204(4955):225-228. doi: 10.1038/204225a0. This article outlined the now standard nomenclature of "susceptible-infected-removed" subgroups of a population, and stated the standard assumptions such as a homogenous population and regular "mixing" of it. (The "R" portion is now commonly called "recovered.") The intellectual roots of this model date back to the early 1900s, in which the first "compartmented" mathematical models, separating population cohorts, were developed. See, e.g. Sooknanan, J., Comissiong, D.M.G. "When behaviour turns contagious: the use of deterministic epidemiological models in modeling social contagion phenomena." Int. J. Dynam. Control 5, 1046--1050 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s40435-016-0271-9. A 1927 article by W.O.Kermack and A.G. McKendrick, "A Contribution to the Mathematical Theory of Epidemics," Proceedings of the Royal Society A, vol. 115 no. 772, is often credited as the first to identify the underlying mathematics ofthe path of an epidemic. In this 1927 article, they plot the deaths from an epidemic in "the island of Bombay" from December 1905 to July 1906. It followed a bell-shaped curve ofthe shape shown in SIR and other models a century later. 13.The MAA teaching version, authored by David Smith and Lang Moore, is available at: https://www.maa.org/press/periodicals/loci/joma/the-sir-model-for-spread-of-disease-the-differential-equation-model. An overview of this and many variants is presented in H.W. Hethcote, "The Mathematics oflnfectious Diseases," SIAM Review 42 (4) (2000).

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Case 1C:2a0s-ecv1-:02004-c5v8--0P0L3M60-PJEGCFENCoF. N1-o1. f1il6e-d10fi4le/2d80/260/01P/2a0gePIDa.g5e2IDP.2a0g4e 2P2aogfe4189 of 45 Daniel McCarthy, Shareholder, Butzel Long, April 13, 2020, page 18
It is also based on our assessment of how this model and the available data had performed in assessing the COVID-19 outbreak in Italy, Germany, Lombardy (a province in Italy), the United States, New York City, Ohio, Michigan, Illinois, the Detroit metropolitan area and counties, and other areas.
We use the data from various states and a specific implementation of the SIR model to fit the data, and estimate parameters such as RO (discussed further below). We use these parameters to estimate a future curve, which represents the prediction based on past data and the assumptions of the model. As noted below, our implementation of the SIR model provides for iterative re-estimating of RO values and estimates of the epidemic size and susceptible population.
Inclusion ofDiagnostic Information. Our implementation ofthe standard SIR model includes a number of features that allow for inspection of the results, and for a better understanding of the reliability of the model's estimated parameters. These include:
• Our complete results allow for the inspection of prediction errors, allowing readers to compare our historical estimates against historical data.
• Using innovations developed by researchers cited below, we also iteratively re-estimate the model over time, capturing the evolution of model parameters as more data become available.
• We fully disclose the model data and parameters, allowing the results to be replicated by other researchers.
• We explicitly note the known limitations of the model and data.
Elements of the SIR Model. The typical curve generated by an SIR model that estimates the number of people infected per day is an "S" shaped curve in which the number of new infections per day begins slowly, then grow exponentially larger before reaching a "peak" point. Following the peak, number of cases per day decrease and slowly reach zero, or the neutral level.
Parameters. A key element of the model is known as "RO," (sometimes called "R nought") or the reproduction rate of the infection. In the SIR model, if RO equals 2, that means for each time period of the outbreak, 1 infected person is expected to infect 2 others.
In actual epidemics, we expect the reproduction rate to be a dynamic value that changes over time. In its initial stages, the RO value of the epidemic is small, but grows quickly. As the epidemic slows, the RO value declines and ultimately decreases to near zero.
Known Limitations and Common Assumptions in Epidemiological Models. There are known limitations of this and other epidemiological models. We state the most important ones here: 1. This and other epidemiological models presume that, after some time, the population acquires
"herd immunity" that limits further spread ofthe disease. Users ofthese models also recognize the likelihood of subsequent waves of the same disease, though of lesser magnitude. For example, numerous variations of influenza cause illness and deaths each year, and are related to similar prior outbreaks.

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Case 1C:2a0s-ecv1-:02004-c5v8--0P0L3M60-PJEGCFENCoF. N1-o1. f1il6e-d10fi4le/2d80/260/01P/2a0gePIDa.g5e3IDP.2a0g5e 2P3aogfe4280 of 45 Daniel McCarthy, Shareholder, Butzel Long, April 13, 2020, page 19
2. "Comorbidity" causes difficulty in assigning properly both cases and the number recovering and perishing from a disease. In particular, the number of deaths due to influenza each year is very large, and this cannot always be distinguished (especially in the early stages ofthe epidemic) from the specific disease being studied.
3. In general, these models assume a certain amount of "mixing" of the population. The mathematical treatment ofthis interaction is never accurate in small settings or specific short time periods, and usable models require significant data and enough time to allow for patterns across entire societies to develop. The amount of mixing also varies by age, and varies across social groups and among areas within a country.
4. In addition, all models rely upon data that are collected with reporting and measurement errors. In this epidemic, differences in testing, and in some countries pressure to mis-report or fail to report results, have clearly caused some difficulties in obtaining accurate data.
5. All statistical models involve uncertainty, and all projections resulting from these models carry with them this uncertainty.
6. This is a new disease. It will react in unpredictable ways with different populations.
7. The population itself changes its behavior over time. This is perhaps the largest unknown at the early stage of a severe epidemic in which a strong change in behavior, and new forms of treatment, occur.
Because of these inherent limitations, we present the model and data along with the available diagnostic and related information, to allow an informed decision. We urge policymakers to consider this information, and additional information, before making their decisions.
Implementation of Model. Supported Intelligence adapted an SIR model authored by Milan Batista, Professor at the University of Ljubljana in Slovenia. Mr. Batista and his colleagues describe this model, provide a public file exchange for the code, and apply it to the Coronavirus outbreak in the following publication and websites:
• Batista, Milan. (2020). Estimation of the final size of the coronavirus epidemic by the SIR model. Monograph found at ResearchGate.
• A file exchange version is maintained for review by other researchers; it is here: https://www.mathworks.com/matlabcentral/fileexchange/74658-fitviruscovid19.
• Related work using this same model for other countries and with different data sources is available here: https://www.fpp.uni-lj.si/en/research/researh-laboratories-and-the-programme-team/ research-programme-team/ As of the date of this memo, a comparison analysis of the United States (using an April 10 dataset, from a different source than we use in our analysis) is presented. It is consistent with the results we obtain using our data for the United States.
The version used by Supported Intelligence is modified to include the following improvements for the purposes of our work:

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1. Supported Intelligence built a data assembly routine that gathers live data on cases reported per day from the New York Times
2. We provide additional diagnostic information, and have created different data visualizations for the purpose of presenting the results.
3. We clarify a number ofterms, and adjust the presentation to date formats common in the United States, to avoid ambiguity and misunderstanding.

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To: From: Re:
Date:

Daniel McCarthy, Shareholder, Butzel Long
Patrick Anderson, Principal Brian Peterson, Consultant
COVID-19 Progression & Effects of Business Closures on Michigan’s Workers (Revised with data through midApril)
April 22, 2020

mm
ANDERSON ECONOMIC GROUP

Purpose of this Memorandum
The COVID-19 pandemic has created unprecedented public health and economic disturbances across the globe. Michigan has been one of the most affected states in America, with over 22,600 cases reported as of Friday, April 10. Michigan's response (including the first Executive Order issued on March 10), the dramatic efforts of many health care workers, and the extraordinary actions of many employers and volunteers have also been significant.
We all recognize two serious problems: First, we face a severe public health crisis, with tremendous human costs to its victims as well as to the many people who care for them. Second, we are enduring unprecedented costs of travel and gathering restrictions, business closures, prohibitions on work, and cancellations of both private and public events.
Given these twin threats, it is critical that the State’s leaders have the best information available to project spread of the virus; to consider the impact of preventative measures such as social distancing and “stay at home” orders; and to understand the scale of the effect of the prohibitions on work and other restrictions on Michigan’s workers and our ability to produce the goods and services we need.
Anderson Economic Group has been retained to summarize the best information now available on both the course of the COVID-19 epidemic and its effects on the Michigan economy. In this memorandum, we provide a summary of COVID-19’s progression, discuss the impact of the virus and stay at home orders on Michigan’s economy, and identify large variances between the identification of “critical” and “essential” workers during this emergency.
Approach
Epidemiology Model. Modeling the spread of COVID-19 is a challenging endeavor. Data on the virus are nearly always incomplete, and our ability to test and diagnose people is inconsistent. However, we now have several weeks of consistent, daily data on cases from independent sources. These provide a solid basis for an assessment of the current situation.

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We provide below a modeling of the epidemic in the State of Michigan, using daily data and the widely-used SIR epidemiological model. Subject to the limitations of this and every model, we present the evidence on the current situation in Michigan and do so in a manner that provides a superior level of transparency and credibility.
We also identify comparisons from the small number of similar analyses that are now available, including the IHME projections widely presented in the United States. We note that the most recent IHME projections for Michigan are very close to the results we present here.
We provide additional information about the data, the SIR model, and our methodology in “Appendix B: Data, Methodology, and Limitations” on page 18.
Employment Effects Analysis. In order to estimate the economic impacts of COVID-19 and stay at home orders, we created a custom model that predicts the economy-wide impacts of the virus and emergency orders, done on a state-by-state basis. Our model estimates not only the impact on job losses, but also the impact on workers across each state who are at risk of losing income—a much larger group than just those who file for unemployment.
This analysis is based on a review of stay at home orders for each state, as well as data from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, and U.S. Department of Labor. Consistent with our intention to provide credible, transparent information, we also reference projections of the impact of these restrictions that were released in mid-March, as well as the unemployment claims figures released in the subsequent weeks, which corroborate these projections.
State Executive Orders and Federal Homeland Security Classifications. We review the Department of Homeland Security’s memo and subsequent guidance on critical workers during this emergency and compare it with a similar classification of workers in two Michigan executive orders. We note the significant differences between these two that affect Michigan workers and the residents.

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Findings
Our analysis and review led to the following findings.
1. Epidemiological models and current data suggest that COVID-19 infections have peaked in Michigan.
Epidemiological evidence strongly suggests that Michigan has reached its peak COVID-19 infection rate for the current wave of the epidemic. This evidence includes both our own assessment—using an industry-standard SIR model and U.S.-only data—and the IHME assessment of April 8, which utilizes both U.S. and China data and a unique model IHME developed for this purpose.
Update: This was our conclusion in the original memo dated April 13. With over a week of additional data, this conclusion is now buttressed by results from both Metro Detroit, the State of Michigan, and a number of other counties that we have analyzed.
Michigan Results, Standard SIR Model. The daily Michigan case data used in our analysis was collected by the New York Times from State sources and selected because of its consistency and reliability across multiple states.1 We estimated a standard SIR model using these data, using an iterative re-estimating procedure to reveal both the current projection of the path of the outbreak and the changes in the estimated parameters over time.
For approximately one week now, the data have consistently indicated that the infection rate began slowly, accelerated, and then reached a peak rate in the past week. If this pattern continues, we can expect the number of new cases to slowly drop over time during the current wave of the epidemic.
This pattern—which produces the distinctive “S” curve—is consistent with both theory, and decades of experience across the globe with numerous epidemics. These data strongly indicate the path of the epidemic has begun to slow down, suggesting that social distancing and other mitigation efforts have been effective. The peak number of people infected, shown in the Anderson Economic Group analysis, and the peak hospital utilization, shown in the IHME analysis, both appear to have passed in the week that began April 5, 2020.
See Figure 1 on page 6.
Note that these analyses pre-date the reports from the Easter weekend, which may have been incomplete but which also show a declining number of cases. Furthermore, these analyses focus on the current wave of the epidemic, which is the only wave for which any data are available.

1. There are minor discrepancies between the NYT compilation, and the daily-reported numbers from the Michigan DHS. These discrepancies are usually under 1%.

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Comparison with Other Epidemiological Models. This result is consistent with that of other entities that have modeled Michigan's epidemiology, including those of IHME (as reported April 8) and others. In particular, the most recent IHME results show a nearly identical pattern.2
Variation Across Michigan Counties; Results in Detroit Metro Area. There is significant variation in the intensity of the outbreak across the state. In particular, many counties have reported total cases of less than a dozen. At the same time, Wayne, Oakland, and Macomb Counties have intensive epidemics. Corroborating our results for the State as a whole, each of these three counties, all with large number of cases, demonstrates a similar pattern of acceleration in the number of cases in February and March, and then an apparent peak in the first half of April.
We show similar analyses for these counties in case counts in “Appendix A: Additional Figures” on page 12. See in particular Figure 1 on page 13.
Limitations of these Data and Epidemiological Models. We also note the limitations of these data and every epidemiological model in “Appendix B: Data, Methodology, and Limitations” on page 18.
Among these limitations, please note that, for many counties in Michigan, the number of case counts is so small that we do not have enough data to model the course of an epidemic at this point. We, of course, hope the numbers remain small in many such counties. However, we do expect that case numbers in some counties will grow enough to allow later estimation in these counties as well.

2. As noted in the appendix, the IHME model uses a mixture of U.S. and China-reported data, and a unique model that focuses on hospital usage rather than cases. Furthermore, the IHME results have varied significantly over time. This comparison is with the most recently-released results.

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2. Michigan’s “stay at home” order, along with decisions made by private citizens and employers, has resulted in a severe contraction in the State’s economy.

We now have Depression-level unemployment in Michigan, with over 16% of our workforce becoming unemployed in just three weeks. This will grow more severe as time passes and likely affect the incomes of 1.4 million Michigan workers and their families.
Executive Orders Restricting Work and Travel. On March 23, Michigan Governor Gretchen Whitmer issued a “stay at home” order requiring all nonessential workers to stay home and not go their workplace. At the time, Michigan had more reported COVID-19 cases than any other state save for New York and New Jersey. This order—already the second on the epidemic—became effective March 24 and was effective through April 13.3 The purpose of this order was to suppress the spread of COVID-19, prevent the state’s healthcare system from being overwhelmed, and allow time for the state to procure necessary medical equipment needed to “prevent needless deaths.” On April 9, the governor extended the stay at home order until April 30, strengthened some of the restrictions, and noted that the original stay at home order was effective, but that COVID19 was still “aggressive and persistent.”4

On March 17, Anderson Economic Group estimated that, as a result of COVID-19 and the stay at home orders in this and other states, an unprecedented number of Americans would lose income due to layoffs, furloughs, pay cuts, and mandatory sick leave. We estimated that 1.5 million Michiganders could lose two or more days worth of income, along with 2.0 million workers in Illinois and 3.3 million workers in New York. These estimates are
shown in Table 1 below.5

TABLE 1. Projection of Workers Losing Significant Income due to COVID-19 and Stay-at-home Orders, March-April 2020

State

Estimated Number of Workers Losing Significant
Income

Michigan

1,468,720

Illinois

1,958,468

New York

3,327,870

Source: Anderson Economic Group estimates, March 19, 2020.

3. Michigan Governor Executive Order 2020-21, “Temporary requirements to suspend activities that are not necessary to sustain or protect life.” See https://www.michigan.gov/whitmer/ 0,9309,7-387-90499_90705-522626--,00.html. As noted above, the first executive order (No. 2020-4, March 10, 2020) declared a state of emergency and noted that the first case had just been identified in the State. 4. Michigan Governor Executive Order 2020-42, “Temporary requirement to suspend activities that are not necessary to sustain or protect life, Rescission of Executive order 2020-21.” See https://www.michigan.gov/whitmer/0,9309,7-387-90499_90705-525182--,00.html.

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Immediate and Large Loss of Employment. Over the past three weeks, the impact of the stay at home order on the state’s economy has become apparent. Unfortunately, the most recent data in Michigan and other states indicate that our mid-March estimates were probably conservative.
Since March 28, Michigan has recorded over 815,000 unemployment claims.
Update. Since the April 13 memo was released, Michigan recorded another 219,000 initial unemployment claims. After accounting for recent revisions by the Department of Labor, Michigan now has experienced over 910,000 unemployment claims since March 28, and now has over 1 million unemployed workers. The share of Michigan workers now unemployed is 21.2%. As previously noted, michigan now has depression-level unemployment rates.
Nationwide, Michigan has been one of the hardest hit states, as shown in Figure 1 below.
FIGURE 1. Three-Week Initial Unemployment Claims as a Percentage of Total Workforce Size as of April 4, 2020

4.9% - 5%

5.1% - 7.5%

7.6% - 10%

10.1% - 12.5%

12.6% - 21.7%

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5. See the Anderson Economic Group’s website for most recent estimates of affected workers. https://www.AndersonEconomicGroup.com/.

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Impact Throughout Multiple Industries. While the unemployment claims numbers provide some insight into the current state of the Michigan economy, the impact of COVID-19 extends well beyond just those who were able to file for unemployment in the last three weeks.
Across the Midwest, workers in nearly all industries outside of government are being furloughed, asked to take a pay cut, or are taking mandatory paid time off. The U.S. Department of Labor’s three most recent unemployment insurance claims press releases note that, in Michigan, significant increases in unemployment claims are coming from nearly every industry in the state, including food service; manufacturing; construction; retail trade; administrative, support, waste management, and remediation services; health care and social assistance; arts, entertainment and recreation; transportation and warehousing; real estate; professional services; and educational services.6
The impact has been especially severe on small business, with many owners struggling to keep their doors open. Although Congress authorized a number of small business lending programs aimed at helping small businesses make it through the epidemic, very few funds have actually been dispersed even though Michigan businesses have been shut down for nearly one month. Small business owners who have applied for relief have encountered a plethora of challenges, including technical glitches, overwhelmed banks, and slow processing times, adding to the already high level of anxiety that small business owners were facing as policymakers ordered all nonessential businesses shut down.
A recent forecast from the University of Michigan Research Seminar in Quantitative Economics predicts that Michigan’s unemployment rate in the second quarter of 2020 will average 23 percent—even higher than the forecasted U.S. quarterly peak of 14 percent.7

6. U.S. Department of Labor Unemployment Insurance Weekly Claims report for April 9, 2020, April 2, 2020, and March 26, 2020. See https://www.dol.gov/. The comments on individual states are attributed to the state unemployment agencies. 7. Gabriel Ehrlich, George Fulton, and Saul Hymans, “Update April 9: The U.S. and Michigan Economic Outlook for 2020-2022,” University of Michigan Ann Arbor Research Seminar in Quantitative Economics.” See: https://lsa.umich.edu/econ/rsqe/forecasts.html.

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3. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s memorandum on “essential” workers during the COVID-19 pandemic explicitly recognizes many workers that are not recognized in Michigan’s Executive Order.
On March 19, the Department Homeland Security (DHS) issued a memorandum on the identification of “essential infrastructure workers” during the COVID-19 response.8 The following guidance from the memorandum is of particular importance:
• The memorandum states that those who work in critical infrastructure industries “have a special responsibility to maintain [their] normal work schedule.”
• The memorandum lists a range of “operations and services that are essential to continued critical infrastructure viability.” These include management, call centers, construction, telecommunications, information technology, food, agriculture, transportation, energy, wastewater, manufacturing and logistics, and health care workers.
• The memorandum states that “all organizations should implement business continuity plans,” and that in the “modern economy, reliance on technology and just-in-time supply chains means that certain workers must be able to access certain sites, facilities, and assets to continue continuity of functions.”
On March 28, DHS released a revised memorandum identifying a larger set of essential industries and workers.9 The occupations and industries identified in this revised document include workers in some of Michigan’s most important economic sectors. For example, Trade, Transportation, and Utilities is Michigan’s largest sector by employment, with over 800,000 workers, and the State’s Manufacturing sector employs 625,000 workers.10
These memos note the following items that are especially germane to key industries in Michigan:
• The DHS memo explicitly notes the importance of transportation, logistics, and automotive repair and maintenance.
• The DHS memo classifies “central office personnel” who “maintain and operate central office, data centers, and other network office facilities” as essential employees.
• The DHS memo also notes the essential nature of “workers necessary for the manufacturing of materials and products needed for medical supply chains, transportation, energy, communications, food and agriculture…” and many other products.
• The March 28 DHS memo expands its definition of essential workers to a variety of industries, including some that are particularly important to Michigan’s economy, such as transportation and manufacturing.
Need to Recognize True Extent of Critical and Essential Workers. As was apparent at the onset of this emergency, and consistent with the guidance from the U.S. government that
8. Christopher Krebs, “Memorandum on Identification of Essential Critical Infrastructure Workers During COVID-19 Response,” March 19, 2020. 9. Christopher Krebs, “Advisory Memorandum on Identification of Essential Critical Infrastructure Workers During COVID-19 Response,” March 28, 2020. 10. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, “Economy At a Glance: Michigan,” https://www.bls.gov/.

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was cited in Michigan Executive Order 2020-42 and prior orders, it is critical to support “essential” workers in a range of industries. The purpose of the DHS memo was to highlight the importance of these workers and “help State and local officials ensure continuity of functions critical to public health and safety.” However, Michigan Executive Order 2020-42 explicitly states that it does not adopt any of the guidance issued by DHS subsequent to the March 19 memorandum, meaning that the Governor’s order excludes those additional industries and workers identified as essential by the DHS as of March 28.11
The March 19 DHS memo was issued at a time when stay at home orders were anticipated to be short-term affairs. Since then, stay at home orders across the country have been extended. It is important to recognize that the longer these stay at home orders are in effect, the more workers must be classified as essential in order to maintain supply chains and perform essential services.
The DHS memorandum fully anticipates that changes in conditions over time and differences in the intensity of the outbreak will be taken into account by State and local governments, as well as private sector organizations. Consistent with this explicit guidance, Michigan and other states should take notice of differing infection rates within our state; as well as how changes in the course of the epidemic impact which workers and industries should be classified as essential.

11. Paragraph 8 of Michigan’s Executive Order 2020-42 states: “For purposes of this order, critical infrastructure workers are those workers described by the Director of the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency in his guidance of March 19, 2020 on the COVID-19 response (available here). This order does not adopt any subsequent guidance document released by this same agency.” [Emphasis in original.]

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About the Authors
Patrick L. Anderson. Mr. Patrick L. Anderson founded Anderson Economic Group in 1996, and serves as the company’s principal and CEO. A nationally-recognized expert in business economics and a sought-after speaker, Mr. Anderson has led several major public policy initiatives in his home state. He was awarded both the Michigan Chamber of Commerce’s Leadership Michigan award and the University of Michigan’s Neal Staebler award for civic leadership. His writing has earned five prestigious national awards from the National Association of Business Economics.
Brian R Peterson. Mr. Peterson is a consultant and director of public policy and economic analysis with Anderson Economic Group. His work focuses on economic and fiscal impact modeling, actuarial analysis, and environmental economics. Prior to joining AEG, Mr. Peterson worked as a policy analyst in regional economic development and transportation planning in the Chicago region.
Contributors
The authors wish to recognize the contribution of the following individuals:
• Andrew Miller, Senior Analyst, Anderson Economic Group • Sarp Mertdogan, Analyst, Supported Intelligence LLC • Milan Batista, Professor at the University of Ljubljana, Slovenia
The conclusions in this memorandum are, of course, those of the authors.
About Anderson Economic Group LLC
Founded in 1996, Anderson Economic Group is a boutique research and consulting firm, with offices in East Lansing, Michigan, and Chicago, Illinois. The experts at AEG have extensive experience in public policy and economic analysis. Clients of Anderson Economic Group include nearly every major institution in the State of Michigan, including colleges, manufacturers, labor unions, state and local governments, and trade associations. Relevant publications from our firm include:
• Annual State Business Tax Burden Rankings, published since 2007. • “Economic and Fiscal Impacts of the United Auto Works GM Strike,” published in 2019. • “Economic and Fiscal Impacts of a 1332 Affordable Care Act Waiver in Georgia,” published
in 2019. • “Michigan Economic Competitiveness Benchmarking Report,” published since 2012. • “Anderson Economic Group Amazon HQ2 Index,” published in 2017. • “AndCan® Index Estimates of National and State-level Cannabis Demand,” updated
regularly since 2017. • Numerous benchmarking, comparison, and economic update analyses.
For more information about Anderson Economic Group, please visit our website at https://www.AndersonEconomicGroup.com.

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About Supported Intelligence LLC
Supported Intelligence, LLC is a decision intelligence and data analytics company founded in 2012. Supported Intelligence pioneered a innovative class of decision intelligence technology, which is covered by three U.S. patents as well as patents pending in the U.S. and other countries.
Consultants at Supported Intelligence assembled the data and created the analytics facility to bring in daily reports from numerous sources, including at the state and county level in the United States; analyze the data using the methods identified in this document; and generate the decision intelligence reports highlighted here.
Please visit https://www.SupportedIntelligence.com for more information.

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Appendix A: Additional Figures
• “COVID-19 Total Infections, Infection Rate, and Growth Rate in Michigan” on page 13 • “COVID-19 Total Infections, Infection Rate, and Growth Rate in Macomb County,
Michigan” on page 14 • “COVID-19 Total Infections, Infection Rate, and Growth Rate in Oakland County,
Michigan” on page 15 • “COVID-19 Total Infections, Infection Rate, and Growth Rate in Wayne County, Michigan”
on page 16 • “COVID-19 Total Infections, Infection Rate, and Growth Rate in the 3-County Detroit
Metropolitan Area (Wayne, Oakland, Macomb)” on page 17

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Daniel McCarthy, Shareholder, Butzel Long, Appendix A: Additional Figures

FIGURE 1. COVID-19 Total Infections, Infection Rate, and Growth Rate in Michigan

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Daniel McCarthy, Shareholder, Butzel Long, Appendix A: Additional Figures
FIGURE 2. COVID-19 Total Infections, Infection Rate, and Growth Rate in Macomb County, Michigan
Macomb Michigan : Coronavirus Epidemic (SIR Model): 21-Apr-2020 (3 = 0.441 1 = 0.238 R2 = 0.9984 RMSE = 67
Cumulative Cases 6

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Analysis by Anderson Economic Group LLC using data compiled from state reports and methods described in memorandum. These data will be revised regularly and are subject to reporting and other errors.

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© COPYRIGHT 2020, ANDERSON ECONOMIC GROUP LLC

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Daniel McCarthy, Shareholder, Butzel Long, Appendix A: Additional Figures

FIGURE 3. COVID-19 Total Infections, Infection Rate, and Growth Rate in Oakland County, Michigan

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103
~ 102
0::
.c
j
0
c'5 101

Mar-15

Mar-22

0
0 0 0

Mar-29

Apr-05

Apr-12

Apr-19

Growth rate: Reported vs Predicted

Apr-26

-
0

Prediction Actual Variance in Prediction

May-03

May-10

C=::l Actual

-

Prediction

Variance in Prediction

May-03

May-10

-
0

Prediction Actual

- - - 5% Threshold

Mar 15

Mar22

Mar29

Apr05

Apr12

Analysis by Anderson Economic Group LLC using data compiled from state reports and methods described in memorandum. These data will be revised regularly and are subject to reporting and other errors.

Apr19

Apr26

May 03

May 10

© COPYRIGHT 2020, ANDERSON ECONOMIC GROUP LLC

PAGE 15 OF 24

Case 1C:2a0s-ecv1-:02004-c5v8--0P0L3M60-PJEGCFENCoF. N1-o1. f1il6e-d10fi4le/2d80/260/01P/2a0gePIDa.g7e0IDP.2a2g2e 4P0aogfe4387 of 45
Daniel McCarthy, Shareholder, Butzel Long, Appendix A: Additional Figures

FIGURE 4. COVID-19 Total Infections, Infection Rate, and Growth Rate in Wayne County, Michigan

Wayne Michigan : Coronavirus Epidemic (SIR Model): 21-Apr-2020
(3 = 0.382 'Y = 0.166 R2 = 0.9956 RMSE = 364

20
-;;,
Q)
~ 15
0 0 0
~ 10
~
"'Cl
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.E
C

Cumulative Cases

-
0

Prediction Actual Variance in Prediction

1000
» 800
Cll
0
al 600
C. f/J
:Jl 400
Cll
0 200
0
103
~ 102
0::
.c
j
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Mar-15

Mar-22

Mar-15

Mar-22

0
Oo ooo

Mar-29

Apr-05

Apr-12 Infection Rate

Mar-29

Apr-05

Apr-12

Growth rate: Reported vs Predicted

0

Mar 15

Mar 22

Mar 29

Apr05

Apr 12

Analysis by Anderson Economic Group LLC using data compiled from state reports and methods described in memorandum. These data will be revised regularly and are subject to reporting and other errors.

Apr-19
Apr-19
0
Apr 19

Apr-26

May-03

C=::l Actual

-

Prediction

Variance in Prediction

Apr-26

May-03

-
0

Prediction Actual

- - - 5% Threshold

Apr26

May 03

© COPYRIGHT 2020, ANDERSON ECONOMIC GROUP LLC

PAGE 16 OF 24

Case 1C:2a0s-ecv1-:02004-c5v8--0P0L3M60-PJEGCFENCoF. N1-o1. f1il6e-d10fi4le/2d80/260/01P/2a0gePIDa.g7e1IDP.2a2g3e 4P1aogfe4388 of 45
Daniel McCarthy, Shareholder, Butzel Long, Appendix A: Additional Figures

FIGURE 5. COVID-19 Total Infections, Infection Rate, and Growth Rate in the 3-County Detroit Metropolitan Area (Wayne, Oakland, Macomb)

30
-;;,
Q) (/) Cll
0 20
0 0 0
~
~
aul 10
.E
C
1500
>, Cll
0 1000
al
C.
(/) Q)
J(/) 500

Mar-15

Detroit MSA : Coronavirus Epidemic (SIR Model): 21-Apr-2020
(3 = 0.431 'Y = 0.212 R2 = 0.9991 RMSE = 283
Cumulative Cases

-
0

Prediction Actual Variance in Prediction

Mar-22

Mar-29

Apr-05

Apr-12 Infection Rate

Apr-19

Apr-26

May-03

May-10

C=::l Actu al

-

Prediction

Variance in Prediction

0
~ 10
0::
.c
j
0
c'5 101

Mar-15 0

Mar-22

Mar-29

Apr-05

Apr-12

Apr-19

Growth rate: Reported vs Predicted

Apr-26

May-03

May-10

-
0

Predict io n Actual

- - - 5% Threshold

Mar 15

Mar 22

Mar 29

Apr05

Apr12

Analysis by Anderson Economic Group LLC using data compiled from state reports and methods described in memorandum. These data will be revised regularly and are subject to reporting and other errors.

Apr19

Apr26

May 03

May 10

© COPYRIGHT 2020, ANDERSON ECONOMIC GROUP LLC

PAGE 17 OF 24

CaseD1aCn:2iae0sl-eMcv1c-C:02a00r4t-hc5yv,8-S-0hP0aL3rMe6h0-oPldJeEGr,CBFuEtzNCeolFL. oN1n-og1., fA1ilp6ep-de1n0fdi4ilex/2dB8:0/A26p0/r0i1l P2/22a0,g2e0PI2D0a.g7e2IDP.2a2g4e 4P2aogfe4389 of 45
Appendix B: Data, Methodology, and Limitations
April 22, 2020
Terms of Use
All users of this information must acknowledge the purpose, limitations, and lack of warranty for this analysis and the related data, and accept the requirement to disclose these terms to any person to whom they provide this information:
1. Purpose. Our purpose is to provide information useful to others who may face a decision regarding their activities in the coming months. The purpose is not to diagnose or treat any disease; provide health advice; provide legal advice; or even to make unconditional forecasts of the number of cases or patients.
2. Known Limitations and Errors in Data. This analysis relies upon data that have known errors, omissions, and limitations. These include:
• The diagnosis and classification of those afflicted with Covid-19 has been inconsistent across jurisdictions, and across time.
• Daily case counts are subject to reporting and compilation errors. • The proper location for a case is often unclear, particularly with travelers and people
who live near borders. • In some situations, governments have retroactively re-classified cases. • In some areas of the world, governments have censored, suppressed, or otherwise
failed to report accurately the relevant data. • Given the volume of data and the frequency with which it is revised, some
inadvertent errors are certain to arise. • The underlying data, and therefore the estimated parameters and the estimated and
projected paths, will change over time.
3. Known Limitations of Epidemiological Models. Every model is an approximation of reality. Like every other model, the one used here will never completely represent the underlying behavior, and will often distort some portion of it.
4. No Warranty on Information. There is NO WARRANTY provided for any of this information, including no warranty of merchantability or fitness.
5. Requirement to Disclose these Terms. If you provide this information to any other person, you must disclose to them these terms and provide a copy of this statement.
If you do not acknowledge and accept these terms, then you should not read, share, or rely upon this information.

© COPYRIGHT 2020, ANDERSON ECONOMIC GROUP LLC

PAGE 18 OF 24

CaseD1aCn:2iae0sl-eMcv1c-C:02a00r4t-hc5yv,8-S-0hP0aL3rMe6h0-oPldJeEGr,CBFuEtzNCeolFL. oN1n-og1., fA1ilp6ep-de1n0fdi4ilex/2dB8:0/A26p0/r0i1l P2/22a0,g2e0PI2D0a.g7e3IDP.2a2g5e 4P3aogfe4480 of 45
Data
Data. The state-level data we used in this analysis were collected by the New York Times organization from state and local sources. We selected this data source after reviewing multiple alternatives, and recognizing the benefits of the consistency and data checking this organization brought to the effort.
• The NYT website for these data is: https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/us/ coronavirus-us-cases.html.
• The NYT data repository on GitHub is: https://github.com/nytimes/covid-19-data.
Discrepancies in Data Sources; Revisions over Time. There are discrepancies among sources for data, even for the same areas. These discrepancies arise for a number of reasons, including lapses in reporting; differences in classification; and ambiguities regarding the location of the persons. Furthermore, government entities routinely revise these data, and in many cases have retroactively reclassified patients. For these reasons, users of these data should expect that analyses prepared on different dates will often show different historical data, as well as different projected data.
Comparison and Alternative Sources of Data and Analysis
There are multiple other sources of data, as well as alternative sources of analysis. These have widely-varying quality, and some are sponsored by organizations that advocate for specific policies as well as report data.
We urge readers of our analyses to compare the information they have obtained from us with information from other sources. Here are an example of comparison sources of information, for the State of Michigan in the United States:
• https://covid19.healthdata.org/united-states-of-america/michigan
• https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/cases-updates/cases-in-us.html#epicurve
• https://www.uofmhealth.org/covid-19-update
• https://www.michigan.gov/coronavirus
Model
We used a SIR model to forecast the impacts of COVID-19 on states across the U.S. We chose this model after conducting an extensive review of available epidemiological models.
Our review confirmed that the standard SIR model, when consistent daily data are available, often provides a reliable and understandable assessment. This judgement is based partially on the decades of experience across a wide number of countries and epidemics.

© COPYRIGHT 2020, ANDERSON ECONOMIC GROUP LLC

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CaseD1aCn:2iae0sl-eMcv1c-C:02a00r4t-hc5yv,8-S-0hP0aL3rMe6h0-oPldJeEGr,CBFuEtzNCeolFL. oN1n-og1., fA1ilp6ep-de1n0fdi4ilex/2dB8:0/A26p0/r0i1l P2/22a0,g2e0PI2D0a.g7e4IDP.2a2g6e 4P4aogfe4481 of 45
It is also based on our assessment of how this model and the available data had performed in assessing the COVID-19 outbreak in Italy, Germany, Lombardy (a province in Italy), the United States, New York City, Ohio, Michigan, Illinois, the Detroit metropolitan area and counties, and other areas.
The SIR model is a “compartmentalized” model, meaning that it presumes the population can be classified as if they are in different “compartments,” and can move among them when they become infected with a disease and when they recover or perish from it. The acronym comes from “Susceptible-Infected-Removed.”
We use the data from various states and a specific implementation of the SIR model to fit the data, and estimate parameters such as R0 (discussed further below). We use these parameters to estimate a future curve, which represents the prediction based on past data and the assumptions of the model. As noted below, our implementation of the SIR model provides for iterative re-estimating of R0 values and estimates of the epidemic size and susceptible population.
History of the Use of the SIR Model. The SIR model has been recognized and used as a basis for the diffusion of ideas and other transmissions, as well as for epidemiological studies, since at least 1964.1 The model was originally published in 1927, in an article that helped establish the basis for modern studies of epidemiology.2
It is also widely described in academic and professional settings, including having many easily-accessible resources, such as an online teaching version provided by the Mathematics Association of America.3
1.An influential article in this development was Goffman W, Newill V. “Generalization of epidemic theory.” Nature. 1964;204(4955):225–228. doi: 10.1038/204225a0. This article outlined the now standard nomenclature of “susceptible-infected-removed” subgroups of a population, and stated the standard assumptions such as a homogenous population and regular “mixing” of it. (The “R” portion is now commonly called “recovered.”) The intellectual roots of this model date back to the early 1900s, in which the first “compartmented” mathematical models, separating population cohorts, were developed. See, e.g. Sooknanan, J., Comissiong, D.M.G. “When behaviour turns contagious: the use of deterministic epidemiological models in modeling social contagion phenomena.” Int. J. Dynam. Control 5, 1046–1050 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s40435-016-0271-9. 2.The 1927 article by W.O.Kermack and A.G. McKendrick, “A Contribution to the Mathematical Theory of Epidemics,” Proceedings of the Royal Society A, vol. 115 no. 772, outlined the SIR model, is often credited as the first to identify the underlying mathematics of the path of an epidemic. In this 1927 article, they plot the deaths from an epidemic in “the island of Bombay” from December 1905 to July 1906. It followed a bell-shaped curve of the shape shown in SIR and other models a century later. 3.The MAA teaching version, authored by David Smith and Lang Moore, is available at: https://www.maa.org/press/periodicals/loci/joma/the-sir-model-for-spread-of-disease-the-differential-equation-model. An overview of this and many variants is presented in H.W. Hethcote, “The Mathematics of Infectious Diseases,” SIAM Review 42 (4) (2000).

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CaseD1aCn:2iae0sl-eMcv1c-C:02a00r4t-hc5yv,8-S-0hP0aL3rMe6h0-oPldJeEGr,CBFuEtzNCeolFL. oN1n-og1., fA1ilp6ep-de1n0fdi4ilex/2dB8:0/A26p0/r0i1l P2/22a0,g2e0PI2D0a.g7e5IDP.2a2g7e 4P5aogfe4482 of 45
Alternatives and Limitations of the SIR Model. Every model is an approximation to reality, and all have limitations. In the case of the SIR model, known limitations include:
• The model only focuses on one wave of an epidemic.
• The model assumes that “removed” individuals attain immunity from the disease. For some novel diseases, this has not been demonstrated.
• The model relies on certain assumptions (such as homogenous population and consistent mixing of the population) that are rarely accurate.
Furthermore, all models rely upon data—and the available data are never perfect in epidemiological studies.
There are alternatives to this model, many of which are variations on it. As with alternative sources of data, readers should consider whether an alternative model should be also be considered.
Inclusion of Diagnostic Information. Our implementation of the standard SIR model includes a number of features that allow for inspection of the results, and for a better understanding of the reliability of the model’s estimated parameters. These include:
• Our complete results allow for the inspection of prediction errors, allowing readers to compare our historical estimates against historical data.
• Using innovations developed by researchers cited below, we also iteratively reestimate the model over time, capturing the evolution of model parameters as more data become available.
• We fully disclose the model data and parameters, allowing the results to be replicated by other researchers.
• We explicitly note the known limitations of the model and data.
Elements of the SIR Model. The typical curve generated by an SIR model that estimates the number of people infected per day is an “S” shaped curve in which the number of new infections per day begins slowly, then grow exponentially larger before reaching a “peak” point. Following the peak, number of cases per day decrease and slowly reach zero, or the neutral level.
Parameters. A key element of the model is known as “R0,” (sometimes called “R nought”) or the reproduction rate of the infection. In the SIR model, if R0 equals 2, that means for each time period of the outbreak, 1 infected person is expected to infect 2 others.
In actual epidemics, we expect the reproduction rate to be a dynamic value that changes over time. In its initial stages, the R0 value can grow quickly. As the epidemic slows, the R0 value declines and ultimately decreases to near zero.
• See “Exhibit: Key Variables in SIR Model ” on page 22.

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CaseD1aCn:2iae0sl-eMcv1c-C:02a00r4t-hc5yv,8-S-0hP0aL3rMe6h0-oPldJeEGr,CBFuEtzNCeolFL. oN1n-og1., fA1ilp6ep-de1n0fdi4ilex/2dB8:0/A26p0/r0i1l P2/22a0,g2e0PI2D0a.g7e6IDP.2a2g8e 4P6aogfe4483 of 45
Exhibit: Key Variables in SIR Model Reproduction Rate
• R = Reproduction number, number of people infected by each infected person • R0 = Basic reproduction number (“R nought”)
calculated by Beta/Gamma (with scale factors) • Beta = Average contact frequency • Gamma = Average removal frequency Population and Epidemic Size • N = Population size (approximate initial size of susceptible population) • Cend = Epidemic size (total recovered population) • Send = Final number of susceptible individuals left Implied Timing • Day = epidemy day number • date0 = start day Errors, Uncertainty, and Model Fit • RMSE = Root mean square error • AdjR2 -- adjusted R2 (“R squared”) statistic Data • C = reported case data • Ce = projected case data, given the model, data, and parameters • Diff = difference between reported and projected cases

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CaseD1aCn:2iae0sl-eMcv1c-C:02a00r4t-hc5yv,8-S-0hP0aL3rMe6h0-oPldJeEGr,CBFuEtzNCeolFL. oN1n-og1., fA1ilp6ep-de1n0fdi4ilex/2dB8:0/A26p0/r0i1l P2/22a0,g2e0PI2D0a.g7e7IDP.2a2g9e 4P7aogfe4484 of 45
Known Limitations and Common Assumptions in Epidemiological Models
There are known limitations of this and other epidemiological models. We state the most important ones here:
1. This and other epidemiological models presume that, after some time, the population acquires “herd immunity” that limits further spread of the same strain of the disease.
2. There is a likelihood of subsequent waves of the same disease. These are typically of lesser magnitude. For example, numerous variations of influenza cause illness and deaths each year, and are related to similar prior outbreaks. In general, only one wave is represented by this type of model.
3. “Comorbidity” causes difficulty in assigning properly both cases and the number recovering and perishing from a disease. In particular, the number of deaths due to influenza each year is very large, and this cannot always be distinguished (especially in the early stages of the epidemic) from the specific disease being studied.
4. In general, these models assume a certain amount of “mixing” of the population. The mathematical treatment of this interaction is never accurate in small settings or specific short time periods, and usable models require significant data and enough time to allow for patterns across entire societies to develop. The amount of mixing also varies by age, and varies across social groups and among areas within a country.
5. In addition, all models rely upon data that are collected with reporting and measurement errors. In this epidemic, differences in testing, and in some countries pressure to mis-report or fail to report results, have clearly caused some difficulties in obtaining accurate data.
6. All statistical models involve uncertainty, and all projections resulting from these models carry with them this uncertainty.
7. This is a new disease. It will react in unpredictable ways with different populations.
8. The population itself changes its behavior over time. This is perhaps the largest unknown at the early stage of a severe epidemic in which a strong change in behavior, and new forms of treatment, occur.
Because of these inherent limitations, we present the model and data along with the available diagnostic and related information, to allow an informed decision. We urge policymakers to consider this information, and additional information, before making their decisions.

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CaseD1aCn:2iae0sl-eMcv1c-C:02a00r4t-hc5yv,8-S-0hP0aL3rMe6h0-oPldJeEGr,CBFuEtzNCeolFL. oN1n-og1., fA1ilp6ep-de1n0fdi4ilex/2dB8:0/A26p0/r0i1l P2/22a0,g2e0PI2D0a.g7e8IDP.2a3g0e 4P8aogfe4485 of 45
Implementation of Model
Supported Intelligence adapted an SIR model authored by Milan Batista, Professor at the University of Ljubljana in Slovenia. Mr. Batista and his colleagues describe this model, provide a public file exchange for the code, and apply it to the Coronavirus outbreak in the following publication and websites:
• Batista, Milan. (2020). Estimation of the final size of the coronavirus epidemic by the SIR model. Monograph found at ResearchGate.
• A file exchange version is maintained for review by other researchers; it is here: https://www.mathworks.com/matlabcentral/fileexchange/74658-fitviruscovid19.
• Related work using this same model for other countries and with different data sources is available here: https://www.fpp.uni-lj.si/en/research/researh-laboratories-and-the-programme-team/ research-programme-team/ As of the date of this memo, a comparison analysis of the United States (using an April 10 dataset, from a different source than we use in our analysis) is presented. It is consistent with the results we obtain using our data for the United States.
The version used by Supported Intelligence is modified to include the following improvements for the purposes of our work:
1. Supported Intelligence built a data assembly routine that gathers live data on cases reported per day from the New York Times.
2. We provide additional diagnostic information, and have created different data visualizations for the purpose of presenting the results.
3. We clarify a number of terms, and adjust the presentation to date formats common in the United States, to avoid ambiguity and misunderstanding.

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Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 16-2 filed 06/01/20 PageID.231 Page 1 of 3

DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

_____________________________________________________

LEAGUE OF INDPENDENT FITNESS FACITLITIES AND TRAINERS, INC., BASELINE FITNESS LLC, BUILDING YOUR TEMPLE LLC, BYT FITNESS 247 LLC, CLAWSON FITNESS, LLC, CLINTON FITNESS, INC., D-LUX KARATE UNIVERSITY LLC, FENTON ATHLETIC CLUB, INC., FENTON KARATE, LLC, FUSION FITNESS 24/7 LLC, H3 FITNESS LLC, I FITNESS PERSONAL TRAINING, INC., JKP FITNESS, LLC, JPF ENTERPRISES, LLC, M FITNESS CLUB, LLC, MH & AB LLC, MOTOR CITY CF - ST. CLAIR SHORES, LLC, NASCOT ENTERPRISES, LLC, PRISON CITY PHYSIQUE LLC, RMP FITNESS INC., STRENGTH BEYOND LLC, 24/7 BOOTCAMP AND BOXING INC., and 4 SEASONS GYM, LLC,
Plaintiffs, v. GRETCHEN E. WHITMER and ROBERT GORDON,
Defendants. _____________________________________________________
ERSKINE LAW, PC Scott M. Erskine (P54734) Carly Van Thomme (P59706) Attorneys for Plaintiffs 612 W. University

Civil No. 1:20-cv-00458 Hon. Paul L. Maloney
FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

Exhibit 2

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 16-2 filed 06/01/20 PageID.232 Page 2 of 3

April 15, 2020
The Honorable Gretchen Whitmer Governor of Michigan 111 S. Capitol Ave. Lansing, Ml 48909

Dear Governor Whitmer:

On behalf of our 1,300 Michigan-based employees and 667,000 members across our 80 Planet Fitness clubs located throughout Michigan, we applaud you for your decisive measures to mitigate the spread of COVID-19 in our state. As you consider measures to re-open the economy of our great state, we would like to urge you to make gyms a priority in the first tranche. As you know, the fitness industry plays a significant role in our economy and an even more vital role in the health and well-being of Michiganders. It has been well documented that exercise helps improve the immune system, helps with anxiety and depression and is proven to reduce the occurrence of many chronic diseases. By providing a safe and clean environment for our members to exercise, we are helping them achieve these greater levels of wellness.

To help you understand the economic impact of our business, the following is a summary of the last twelve months ending March 2020:

$33.4m $0.44m $2.46m $1.82m $0.20m $18.7m $57.02m

in total employee wages in state unemployment insurance in real estate taxes paid in personal property taxes in sales and use tax in construction supporting hundreds of trades people in Ml
in total support of Michigan's economy

These statistics are exclusive to Planet Fitness and do not contemplate the rest of the gym industry in Michigan. According to IHRSA (International Health & Racquet Sports Association), which is the governing body that oversees the fitness and gym industry, there are over 1,000 gyms and fitness centers with over 1.5 million members in Michigan as of 2019.

In addition, and more importantly, the safety and well-being of our members and staff are our highest priority. As the single largest purveyor of health and fitness in the State of Michigan, we feel that we are well positioned to address operating guidelines not only for our business, but for gyms and fitness centers in general. To that end, we have put together an overview of our recommendations for your consideration. The attached document outlines many of the current standards that are followed in our club operations along with a number of new and/or

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 16-2 filed 06/01/20 PageID.233 Page 3 of 3

enhanced recommendations focused on sanitation and physical distancing protocols. The safety and well-being of members and staff is paramount.
The procedures and guidelines attached, and other best practices, would be implemented to protect all employees, members and the public during the current pandemic. Furthermore, these procedures and guidelines would remain in effect until Executive Order 2020-42 (COVID-19) is cancelled and beyond, if needed.
Thank you for your consideration and we look forward to working with you to arrive at the best possible solution to re-opening our businesses.
Respectfully, Planet Fitness Franchisees of Michigan

,.,._ p IJII, tr= �
Adam Willaeys Chief Executive Officer Impact Fitness, LLC
Elaine Berry CEO/Owner Planet Fitness Berry, Inc.

7Mh-UU-�
Thomas Purther Chief Executive Officer Cambridge Fitness, LLC

}Jn;u';3� Ke11. JJu'Eusscher
Lonni Bhirdo/Ken DeBusscher
Managing Partners
Slim Cherry, LLC

Bryan'Rief Chief Executive Officer PF Michigan Group, LLC

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 16-3 filed 06/01/20 PageID.234 Page 1 of 3

DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

_____________________________________________________

LEAGUE OF INDPENDENT FITNESS FACITLITIES AND TRAINERS, INC., BASELINE FITNESS LLC, BUILDING YOUR TEMPLE LLC, BYT FITNESS 247 LLC, CLAWSON FITNESS, LLC, CLINTON FITNESS, INC., D-LUX KARATE UNIVERSITY LLC, FENTON ATHLETIC CLUB, INC., FENTON KARATE, LLC, FUSION FITNESS 24/7 LLC, H3 FITNESS LLC, I FITNESS PERSONAL TRAINING, INC., JKP FITNESS, LLC, JPF ENTERPRISES, LLC, M FITNESS CLUB, LLC, MH & AB LLC, MOTOR CITY CF - ST. CLAIR SHORES, LLC, NASCOT ENTERPRISES, LLC, PRISON CITY PHYSIQUE LLC, RMP FITNESS INC., STRENGTH BEYOND LLC, 24/7 BOOTCAMP AND BOXING INC., and 4 SEASONS GYM, LLC,
Plaintiffs, v. GRETCHEN E. WHITMER and ROBERT GORDON,
Defendants. _____________________________________________________
ERSKINE LAW, PC Scott M. Erskine (P54734) Carly Van Thomme (P59706) Attorneys for Plaintiffs 612 W. University

Civil No. 1:20-cv-00458 Hon. Paul L. Maloney
FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

Exhibit 3

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 16-3 filed 06/01/20 PageID.235 Page 2 of 3
Michigan Fitness Clubs Association
Michigan Fitness Clubs Association 133 W. Main Street Suite 266 Northville, MI 48167
May 15, 2020
The Honorable Gretchen Whitmer Governor of Michigan 111 S. Capitol Ave. Lansing, MI 48909
Dear Governor Whitmer:
On behalf of health clubs and fitness studios across Michigan, thank you for your commitment to protecting public health and supporting the economy during this challenging time. While we are all competitors, when it comes to the health, safety and wellness of our employees and the people of Michigan, we are in total agreement and speak as one voice.
As various sectors open and you consider measures to re-open others, we would like to urge you to make health clubs and fitness studios a priority. As you know, the fitness industry plays a significant role in our economy and an even more vital role in the health and well-being of Michiganders. While it is well documented that exercise helps improve the immune system, helps with anxiety and depression, reduces the likelihood and impact of many chronic diseases, and lowers medical expenses, in the case of Covid19, fitness is Michigan’s path out of this pandemic. By providing a safe and clean environment for our members to exercise, we help Michigan achieve greater levels of wellness and the strength to survive this pandemic.
Candidly, a vaccine being at least 12 months away, the only way for Michigan’s people, businesses and government to return to normalcy in the foreseeable future is to achieve herd immunity (meaning 70-80% of the population must be exposed to the coronavirus). According to the CDC, the leading factor in Covid-19 hospitalizations and complications is obesity, meaning Michigan has to get fit to survive the pandemic.
The CDC confirms, the majority of patients being hospitalized have one or more underlying conditions with the most common being hypertension (49.7%) and obesity (48.3%). Among patients aged 18–49 years, obesity was the most prevalent underlying condition. https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/69/wr/mm6915e3.htm
“BMI [obesity] is the Achilles’ heel for American [Covid] patients. . . .” states Jennifer Lighter, an epidemiologist at New York University’s Langone School of Medicine.
Sanjum Sethi, a cardiologist at Columbia University Medical Center, says his hospital is seeing a surprising number of younger patients with obesity, but no other conditions such as diabetes or high blood pressure. On April 12, he tweeted that, for obese patients, “the prognosis is extremely grim. They are NOT dying from comorbidities. They are dying from COVID-19.” https://www.sciencenews.org/article/coronavirus-covid19-obesity-risk-factor

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Regrettably, these statistics are repeatedly confirmed in multiple studies—59% of hospitalized patients are obese with an average BMI of 33. Patients with a BMI of 30-34 were twice as likely to get admitted to the hospital, and patients with a BMI of 35 or higher were three times as likely to end up in the intensive care unit. https://www.webmd.com/lung/news/20200429/obesity-new-risk-factors-for-young-covid-patients

Regarding the economic impact of our business, the following is a summary of recent figures:

$150.3m $2.0m $11.07m $8.19m $0.90m $84.15m $257.02m

in total employee wages in state unemployment insurance in real estate taxes paid in personal property taxes in sales and use tax in construction supporting hundreds of trades people in MI in total support of Michigan’s economy

According to IHRSA (International Health & Racquet Sports Association), which is the national governing body that oversees the fitness and gym industry, there are over 1,100 gyms and fitness centers with over 1.5 million members in Michigan as of 2019.

Finally, and more importantly, the safety and well-being of our members and staff are our highest priority. To that end, we have put together an overview of our recommendations for your consideration. The attached document outlines many of the current standards that are followed in our club operations along with a number of new and/or enhanced recommendations focused on sanitation and physical distancing protocols. The safety and well-being of members and staff is paramount.

The procedures and guidelines attached, and other best practices, would be implemented to protect all employees, members and the public during the current pandemic. Furthermore, these procedures and guidelines would remain in effect until Executive Order 2020-42 (COVID-19) is cancelled and beyond if needed.
Thank you for your consideration and we look forward to working with you to arrive at the best possible solution to re-opening our businesses. We are not just a significant contributor to Michigan’s economy, our industry is critical to Michigan’s plan to survive this pandemic.

Sincerely,

Bryan Rief & Donald Jordan
Michigan Fitness Clubs Association

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DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

_____________________________________________________

LEAGUE OF INDPENDENT FITNESS FACITLITIES AND TRAINERS, INC., BASELINE FITNESS LLC, BUILDING YOUR TEMPLE LLC, BYT FITNESS 247 LLC, CLAWSON FITNESS, LLC, CLINTON FITNESS, INC., D-LUX KARATE UNIVERSITY LLC, FENTON ATHLETIC CLUB, INC., FENTON KARATE, LLC, FUSION FITNESS 24/7 LLC, H3 FITNESS LLC, I FITNESS PERSONAL TRAINING, INC., JKP FITNESS, LLC, JPF ENTERPRISES, LLC, M FITNESS CLUB, LLC, MH & AB LLC, MOTOR CITY CF - ST. CLAIR SHORES, LLC, NASCOT ENTERPRISES, LLC, PRISON CITY PHYSIQUE LLC, RMP FITNESS INC., STRENGTH BEYOND LLC, 24/7 BOOTCAMP AND BOXING INC., and 4 SEASONS GYM, LLC,
Plaintiffs, v. GRETCHEN E. WHITMER and ROBERT GORDON,
Defendants. _____________________________________________________
ERSKINE LAW, PC Scott M. Erskine (P54734) Carly Van Thomme (P59706) Attorneys for Plaintiffs 612 W. University

Civil No. 1:20-cv-00458 Hon. Paul L. Maloney
FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

Exhibit 4

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 </s> Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 32 filed 06/08/20 PageID.257 Page 1 of 4

DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

_____________________________________________________

LEAGUE OF INDPENDENT FITNESS

Civil No. 1:20-cv-00458

FACITLITIES AND TRAINERS, INC., BASELINE FITNESS LLC,

Hon. Paul L. Maloney

BUILDING YOUR TEMPLE LLC,

BYT FITNESS 247 LLC,

CLAWSON FITNESS, LLC,

CLINTON FITNESS, INC.,

D-LUX KARATE UNIVERSITY LLC,

FENTON ATHLETIC CLUB, INC.,

FENTON KARATE, LLC,

FUSION FITNESS 24/7 LLC,

H3 FITNESS LLC,

I FITNESS PERSONAL TRAINING, INC.,

JKP FITNESS, LLC,

JPF ENTERPRISES, LLC,

M FITNESS CLUB, LLC,

MH & AB LLC,

MOTOR CITY CF - ST. CLAIR SHORES,

LLC,

NASCOT ENTERPRISES, LLC,

PRISON CITY PHYSIQUE LLC,

RMP FITNESS INC.,

STRENGTH BEYOND LLC,

24/7 BOOTCAMP AND BOXING INC., and

4 SEASONS GYM, LLC,

Plaintiffs,

v.

GRETCHEN E. WHITMER and

ROBERT GORDON,

Defendants.

_____________________________________________________

ERSKINE LAW, PC Scott M. Erskine (P54734) Carly Van Thomme (P59706) Attorneys for Plaintiffs

1

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612 W. University Rochester, MI. 48307 (248) 601-4499 serskine@erskinelaw.com _____________________________________________________
* * * EXPEDITED CONSIDERATION REQUESTED * * * MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
Pursuant to Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiffs move this Court for a Preliminary Injunction. Specifically, Plaintiffs seek an order enjoining Defendants from either directly or indirectly:
1. Enforcing against the Plaintiffs Executive Order 2020-17; 2. Enforcing against the Plaintiffs Executive Order 2020-96 or any similar subsequent Stay
Home, Stay Safe order promulgated by Governor Whitmer; and 3. Enforcing against the Plaintiffs the emergency order issued on April 2, 2020 by Robert
Gordon, the Director of the Michigan Department of Health and Human Services.
The basis for this motion is set forth in the attached memorandum in support, and
in the Complaint.
Expedited consideration of this motion is necessary because the relief requested may well be rendered moot before the motion is briefed under the usual briefing schedule. See W.D. Mich. LCivR 7.1(e). Defendants’ Executive Orders prohibit the vast majority of the business and activities provided by the Plaintiffs. If the motion is briefed and heard in accordance with the ordinary briefing schedule, these Plaintiffs may be forced to permanently close their operations
2

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which have already been shuttered since March 16, 2020, thereby suffering irreparable harm that will be unable to remedy through injunctive relief.

Further, the Executive Orders prohibit these Plaintiffs from providing important services to any of their members. Each of these Plaintiffs has members who struggle with obesity, hypertension and diabetes, all co-morbidities that greatly increase the severity of those who contract COVID-19, including an increased chance of death. Each of these Plaintiffs has other members who are struggling with depression, anxiety, and stress, all of which can become debilitating to otherwise healthy people. If the motion is briefed and heard in accordance with the ordinary briefing schedule, members’ physical and mental health may deteriorate in the interim, causing potentially dangerous conditions and unnecessary suffering that requires medical care. This motion should be heard and decided on an expedited basis in order to permit these Plaintiffs to provide their members with beneficial fitness services pending final resolution of this matter.

In compliance with W.D. L.R. 7.1(d), Plaintiffs sought concurrence with the relief requested herein by sending a detailed email correspondence to all defense counsel of record, explaining the legal basis of this motion and the relief sought, on June 5, 2020. To date, Defendants’ counsel have not responded.

Dated: June 8, 2020

Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Scott M. Erskine_________________ SCOTT M. ERSKINE (P54714) CARLY VAN THOMME (P59706) ERSKINE LAW, PC Attorneys for Plaintiffs 612 West University Drive Rochester, Michigan 48307 (248) 601-4497 serskine@erskinelaw.com

3

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PROOF OF SERVICE I hereby certify that on June 8, 2020, I presented the foregoing paper to the Clerk of the Court for filing and uploading to the ECF system, which will send notification of such filing to the attorneys of record listed herein and I hereby certify that I have mailed by US Postal Service the document to the involved non participants. s/ Scott M. Erskine_________________ SCOTT M. ERSKINE (P54714) CARLY VAN THOMME (P59706) ERSKINE LAW, PC Attorneys for Plaintiffs 612 West University Drive Rochester, Michigan 48307 (248) 601-4497 serskine@erskinelaw.com cvanthomme@erskinelaw.com
4

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DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

______________________________________________________________________________

LEAGUE OF INDPENDENT FITNESS

Civil No. 1:20-cv-00458

FACITLITIES AND TRAINERS, INC., BASELINE FITNESS LLC,

Hon. Paul L. Maloney

BUILDING YOUR TEMPLE LLC,

BYT FITNESS 247 LLC,

CLAWSON FITNESS, LLC,

CLINTON FITNESS, INC.,

D-LUX KARATE UNIVERSITY LLC,

FENTON ATHLETIC CLUB, INC.,

FENTON KARATE, LLC,

FUSION FITNESS 24/7 LLC,

H3 FITNESS LLC,

I FITNESS PERSONAL TRAINING, INC.,

JKP FITNESS, LLC,

JPF ENTERPRISES, LLC,

M FITNESS CLUB, LLC,

MH & AB LLC,

MOTOR CITY CF - ST. CLAIR SHORES,

LLC,

NASCOT ENTERPRISES, LLC,

PRISON CITY PHYSIQUE LLC,

RMP FITNESS INC.,

STRENGTH BEYOND LLC,

24/7 BOOTCAMP AND BOXING INC., and

4 SEASONS GYM, LLC,

Plaintiffs,

v.

GRETCHEN E. WHITMER and

ROBERT GORDON,

Defendants.

______________________________________________________________________________

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 33 filed 06/08/20 PageID.262 Page 2 of 36

ERSKINE LAW, PC

Joseph T. Froehlich (P71887)

Scott M. Erskine (P54734)

Christopher M. Allen (P75329)

Carly Van Thomme (P59706)

Joshua O. Booth (P53847)

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

John G. Fedynsky (P65232)

612 W. University

Andrew J. Jurgensen (P81123)

Rochester, MI. 48307

Assistant Attorney General

(248) 601-4499

Michigan Department of Attorney General

serskine@erskinelaw.com

Attorneys for Defendants

cvanthomme@erskinelaw.com

525 West Ottawa Street

P.O. Box 30754

Lansing, MI 48909

(517) 335-7573

froehlichj1@michigan.gov

allenc28@michigan.gov

Boothj2@michigan.gov

fedynskyj@michigan.gov

jurgensenA2@michigan.gov

______________________________________________________________________________

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS………………………………………………………………………..i-ii
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES.......................................................................................................iii-v
INTRODUCTION...........................................................................................................................1
STATEMENT OF FACTS..............................................................................................................1
A. The Plaintiffs Are Fitness Centers, Each of Whom Is Prevented by the Defendants’ Executive Orders from Providing Preventative Physical and Mental Health…………………………………………………………………………….......1

B. Governor Whitmer Issues Executive Orders Declaring a State of Emergency…........4

C. Governor Whitmer Issues Several Executive Orders, ALL Prohibiting Business Operations of Gyms Where Even One Gym Member is in the Entire Studio…...…...5

D. Governor Whitmer Issues Several Orders Prohibiting Most In-Person Business Operations, Including the Operations of Gyms With Only One Member………...….5

E. The Governor Lifts (Almost) All Restrictions……………………………….……….6

F. The Governor Lifts Even More Restrictions on June 5, 2020……………………...….7

G. Governor Whitmer’s Executive Orders Cause Enormous Confusion………...………7

1. Governor’s Orders Cause Confusion………………………………..……..…7

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2. The Governor’s Executive Orders are Arbitrary………………………..…….9 ARGUMENT…………………………………………….………………………………..……..12
A. Plaintiffs Are Likely to Succeed on the Merits of Their Claims……………………12 1. The Executive Orders are Unconstitutional…………………………...……13 2. Governor Whitmer’s Lockdown Orders Have Wholly Deprived Plaintiffs of Their Constitutional Rights to Procedural Due Process………………….…14 a. Plaintiffs Possess Liberty and Property Interests that are Entitled to the Constitutional Protections of Due Process………………….…..15 b. The Governor’s Lockdown Orders Have Deprived and Continue to Improperly Deprive Plaintiffs of Their Protected Liberty and Property Interests……………………………………………………….….…16 c. The Governor’s Shutdown Orders are Completely Want of Any Process at All, While Improperly Depriving Plaintiffs of Their Protected Liberty and Property Interests……………………...…….18 3. Governor Whitmer’s Arbitrary and Irrational Executive Orders Have Violated and Continue to Violate Plaintiffs’ Equal Protection Rights…...…21 4. Governor Whitmer’s Lockdown Orders Have Violated Plaintiffs’ Interstate Commerce Rights……………………………………...……………………24 a. The Dormant Commerce Clause Prohibits State Interference with Interstate Commerce……………………………………………..….24 b. The Orders Violate the Dormant Commerce Clause because the Burden They Impose is Excessive in Relation to the Putative Benefits and/or because they have no Rational Basis……………………..…25
B. The Plaintiffs Will Suffer Irreparable Harm…………………………….………….27 C. The Public Interest and the Balance of Equities Favor Preliminary Injunctive
Relief………………………………………………………………………………..28 CONCLUSION .............................................................................................................................29 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE…………………………………………………………….30
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CASES

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

Basicomputer Corp. v. Scott, 973 F.2d 507 (6th Cir. 1992) ………. ............................................28

Board of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564; 92 S. Ct. 2701; 33 L. Ed. 2d 548 (1972) ..................................................................................................................................................15, 18

Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535; 91 S. Ct. 1586; 29 L. Ed. 2d 90 (1971)………. .............................13

Bd of Trustees v. Garrett, 531 US 356; 121 S Ct 955; 148 L Ed 2d 866 (2001)...........................21

Brandeis Machinery & Supply Corp. and State Equipment Co. v. Barber-Geene Co., 503 F.2d 503 (6th Cir. 1974).........................................................................................................................12

C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383; 114 S Ct 1677; 128 L Ed 2d 399 (1994) ............................................................................................................................................24

Cavel Int'l, Inc. v. Madigan, 500 F3d 551(7th Cir. 2007) .............................................................27

Certified Restoration Dry Cleaining Network, LLC v. Tenke Corp., 511 F.3d 535 (6th Cir. 2007) ........................................................................................................................................................27

City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432; 105 S. Ct. 3249; 87 L. Ed. 2d 313 (1985) ..................................................................................................................................................21, 22

Comptroller of the Am Treasury v. Wynne, 575 U.S. 542; 135 S Ct 1787; 191 L Ed 2d 813 (2015) ............................................................................................................................................24

CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of., 481 U.S. 69; 107 S Ct 1637; 95 L Ed 2d 67 (1987) .........24, 27

Department of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328; 128 S Ct 1801; 170 L Ed 2d 685 (2008) ........................................................................................................................................................24

Friends of Devito v. Wolf, ___A3d___; 2020 Pa. LEXIS 1987 (Apr. 13, 2020); (Docket No. 68NM2020) ……….................................................................................................................19, 20

G & V Lounge, Inc. v. Mich. Liquor Control Comm’n, 23 F.3d 1071 (6th Cir. 1994)..................29

Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924; 117 S. Ct. 1807; 138 L. Ed. 2d 120 (1997)………. ..................18

Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460; 125 S. Ct. 1885; 161 L. Ed. 2d 796 (2005) ………...............24

Huish Detergents, Inc. v. Warren Co., 214 F3d 707 (6th Cir. 2000) ………...........................24, 26

In re Abbott, 954 F.3d 772 (5th Cir. 2020)………. ........................................................................22

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Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11; 25 S. Ct. 358; 49 L. Ed. 643 (1905) ................13, 14, 22 Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144; 83 S. Ct. 554; 9 L. Ed. 2d 644 (1963) ................13 Maryville Baptist Church, Inc., v. Beshear, 957 F.3d 610; 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 2020 Fed. App. 0136P (6th Cir.) (Decided May 2, 2020); (Docket No. 205427) ......................................1, 28 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319; 96 S. Ct. 893; 47 L. Ed. 2d 18 (1976) ....................14, 18, 20 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399-400; 43 S. Ct. 625; 67 L. Ed. 1042 (1923) ...............14, 15 Mich. Bell Telephone Co. v. Engler, 257 F.3d 587 (6th Cir. 2001) ..............................................28 Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471; 33 L. Ed. 2d 484; 92 S. Ct. 2593 (1972) .............................18 Overstreet v. Lexington-Fayette Urban Cty. Gov’t, 305 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2002) ......................28 Performance Unlimited, Inc. v. Questar Publishers Inc., 52 F.3d 1373 (6th Cir. 1995) ..............27 Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137; 25 L. Ed. 2d 174; 90 S. Ct. 844 (1970) ...............24, 26 Robinson v. Attorney Gen., 957 F.3d 1171; 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 13096; 28 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 1059 (11th Cir.) Filed April 23, 2020 (Docket No. 2011401B)..........................................13 Roso-Lino Beverage Distributors, Inc. v. Coca- Cola Bottling Co. of New York, Inc., 749 F.2d 124 (2d Circ. 1984) .......................................................................................................................27 Roth v. Bank of Commonwealth, 583 F.2d 527 (6th Cir. 1978).....................................................12 Sanderson v. Village of Greenhills, 726 F.2d 284 (6th Cir. 1984) ................................................16 Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761 (1945).........................................27 United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. 43; 126 L. Ed. 2d 490, 114 S. Ct. 492 (1993) ......................................................................................................................................18 Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, 455 U.S. 489; 102 S Ct 1186; 71 L Ed 2d 362 (1982) ...23 Winter v. NRDC, Inc., 555 U.S. 7; 129 S Ct 365; 172 L Ed 2d 249 (2008) .................................12 Women's Med. Prof'l Corp. v. Baird, 438 F.3d 595 (6th Cir. 2006)..................................15, 16, 18 Wilkerson v. Johnson, 699 F.2d 325 (6th Cir. 1983) .....................................................................15 Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113; 110 S Ct 975; 108 L Ed 2d 100 (1990) .................................18
iv

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 33 filed 06/08/20 PageID.266 Page 6 of 36 CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, cl. 3………................................................................................................24 U.S. Const. Amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 3………. ..................................................................................14 U.S. Const. Amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 4………. ..................................................................................21 STATUTES Mich. Comp. Laws § 30.403………................................................................................................4 Mich. Comp. Laws § 10.31………..................................................................................................4
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PLAINTIFFS’ BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION **ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED** I. INTRODUCTION
In early March 2020, this state was faced with a threat that caused unease and uncertainty on a scale that has not been witnessed in many years. The COVID-19 pandemic, which had moved quickly through Asia and Europe, had arrived in Michigan. There is no question that Michigan, like the rest of the country, was ill-prepared to meet the rising demands for hospital supplies and hospital beds for the sick, or that the novel coronavirus was spreading rapidly. Michigan’s Governor, with the support of the state legislature, acted swiftly in declaring a state of emergency in order to, in the Governor’s words, “flatten the curve.”
However, after initially ordering fitness centers and a few other industries shuttered on March 16, 2020, and after shutting down the entire state economy for months (far past when the curve had been flattened) a short time later, the initial response to the pandemic by our state has continued. Now those damaging, unconstitutional actions must finally be addressed, and it is up to the judiciary to act. “While the law may take periodic naps during a pandemic, [the courts] will not let it sleep through one.” Maryville Baptist Church, Inc., v. Beshear, 957 F.3d 610; 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS’ 2020 Fed. App. 0136P (6th Cir.) Decided May 2, 2020 (Docket No. 205427)
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS A. The Plaintiffs Are Fitness Centers, Each of Whom Is Prevented by the Defendants’
Executive Orders from Providing Preventative Physical and Mental Health Plaintiffs in this case are 22 individual companies that own and operate businesses, some in multiple locations, in the fitness industry, and the League of Independent Fitness Facilities and Trainers, Inc. (“LIFFT”), which is a trade organization with over 150 fitness centers across the
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state as members. It is estimated that statewide, 1.5 million Michiganders belong to a health clubs, and many of these are members of Plaintiffs’ businesses.
The fitness industry as a whole, and Plaintiffs in particular, have been severely impacted in the twelve weeks since Governor Whitmer’s order closing the entire industry on March 16, 2020. Some of the Plaintiffs in this lawsuit may never reopen due to their inability to get any meaningful financial assistance to cover the complete loss of revenue. While revenue for most Plaintiffs has fallen by 80% or more, rent payments, utility payments, and many other vendor payments have continued. Some Plaintiffs were able to apply for and received grants and aid under the Federal CARES Act, but those funds dried up weeks ago and needed to be spent over an eightweek period. All Plaintiffs (those who received federal money and those who were not eligible or otherwise could not get funding), are now once again in a position of not being able to keep the lights on in their facilities without draining personal savings accounts, borrowing from friends or relatives, or otherwise going into steep debt in order to try to survive what has turned out to be the whim of the Governor as to when they can reopen. If Plaintiffs’ businesses remain shuttered, many—if not most of them—will stay closed forever.
One of the many reasons that Plaintiffs want to reopen their businesses is to help the public in general (and their members specifically) in their ability to fight COVID-19. It is well documented that obesity, diabetes and hypertension are some of the highest risk factors that lead to a poorer outcome for Michiganders who contract COVID-19.1 Physical exercise, both
1 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention – Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) “Groups at Higher Risk for Severe Illness” (Content source: National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases (NCIRD) - Division of Viral Diseases) available at: https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/need-extra-precautions/groups-at-higher-risk.html (last reviewed May 14, 2020).
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cardiovascular exercise and strength training, help improve the immune systems of those with atrisk factors associated with COVID-19.
Further, Plaintiffs are in a unique position to help those who have not contracted and may never contract COVID-19, but who are nonetheless struggling during these challenging times. Physical exercise has been proven to help people with their mental and emotional health. Researchers have found that exercise helps with both depression and anxiety, two mental conditions that people across Michigan are struggling with in the face of Defendants’ lock down orders, social distancing, job loss, and coping with unwell family members. 2 Then too, a simple Google search will show that there have been no reported outbreaks at fitness centers throughout the United States. Yet in Michigan, the fitness industry has been deliberately closed by the Governor under threat of criminal prosecution, longer than any other industry.
If permitted to reopen, there is no question that Plaintiffs will take all necessary precautions to prevent the transmission of COVID-19. In fact, two of the three letters sent to the Governor by the fitness industry (and attached to Plaintiffs’ Complaint and First Amended Complaint) outlined potential plans for safely reopening with many restrictions. One such letter was sent by Plaintiff LIFFT (Exhibit 1, letter from LIFFT). Signed by Tina Kinsley, MD, the President of LIFFT, the letter detailed at least 12 such guidelines. Among them were that all workouts will be conducted with stringent social distancing in place, dependent on the square footage of the space; all
2 Wendy Suzuki, The Brain-Changing Benefits of Exercise, TED Conferences, LLC, November 2017, available at: https://www.ted.com/talks/wendy_suzuki_the_brain_changing_benefits_of_exercise?language=e n; See also Sarah Gingell, Ph.D., How Your Mental Health Reaps Benefits of Exercise, Psychology Today, posted March 22, 2018, available at: https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/what-works-and-why/201803/how-your-mentalhealth-reaps-the-benefits-exercise.
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equipment, flooring and surfaces would be constantly cleaned with a disinfectant cleaner; employees will wear masks and, in some cases, face shields; members will have access to disinfecting materials to wipe down their workout areas before and after exercise; members will complete health assessment checks before working out; classes will be staggered if the facility is a class-based gym so that there would not be overlap between members; and finally, since many gym members check in before working out (unlike in many other industries), the fitness industry would keep records to assist with contact tracing in the event that a member tested positive. B. Governor Whitmer Issues Executive Orders Declaring a State of Emergency
On March 11, 2020, Governor Whitmer issued Executive Order 2020-04, which proclaimed a state of emergency under both the Emergency Management Act (“EMA”), Mich. Comp. Laws § 30.403, and the Emergency Powers of the Governor Act of 1945 (“EPGA”), Mich. Comp. Laws § 10.31. (Exhibit 2). The order identified the COVID-19 pandemic as the basis for her declaration of a state of emergency under both statutory regimes.
On April 1, 2020, Governor Whitmer issued Executive Order 2020-33, which replaced Executive Order 2020-04, declared a state of emergency pursuant to the EPGA, and proclaimed a state of disaster and a state of emergency under the EMA. (Exhibit 3). These declarations were based on the same circumstances—that is, the dangers posed by the virus that causes COVID-19— that formed the basis of Executive Order 2020-04.
On April 1, 2020, Governor Whitmer also requested that the Michigan Legislature extend the state of emergency by an additional 70 days, as contemplated by the EMA (until June 11, 2020). On April 7, 2020, the Michigan Senate and Michigan House of Representatives denied Governor Whitmer’s request to extend the state of emergency for an additional 70 days (until June
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11, 2020). Instead, the Michigan Legislature extended the state of emergency declared by Governor Whitmer until April 30, 2020, but not beyond. C. Governor Whitmer Issues Several Executive Orders, ALL Prohibiting Business
Operations of Gyms Where Even One Gym Member is in the Entire Studio Meanwhile, Governor Whitmer issued many additional Executive Orders, invoking emergency powers that the Governor claims flow from the state of emergency declared under Executive Orders 2020-04 and 2020-33. As of June 2, 2020, Governor Whitmer has issued 111 Executive Orders related to the COVID-19 pandemic, creating and changing substantive state law and regulations that impact and burden wide swaths of the economy. D. Governor Whitmer Issues Several Orders Prohibiting Most In-Person Business Operations, Including the Operations of Gyms With Only One Member On March 16, 2020, a mere five days after issuing Executive Order 2020-4 declaring a State of Emergency, Governor Whitmer issued Executive Order 2020-9, titled “Temporary Restrictions on Places of Public Accommodation” (Exhibit 4), her first of many Executive Orders closing gyms. After her initial Executive Order closing gyms and along with her myriad of other Executive Orders, Governor Whitmer issued three more iterations of Executive Orders to prohibit the uses of public accommodation, specifically Executive Orders 2020-20, 2020-43, and 2020-69 (Exhibits 5, 6, and 7). These Executive Orders all applied to and made certain that gyms could not reopen. Further, amongst the “Frequently Asked Questions” on the state’s coronavirus webpage, the Governor’s office answered the following question four times in response to Executive Orders 2020-09, 2020-20, 2020-43, and 2020-69:3
3 See Michigan.gov, Frequently Asked COVID-19 Questions, available at: https://www.michigan.gov/coronavirus/0,9753,7-406-98810--,00.html?page=1&limit=100&filterCategories=&searchQuery= (last visited on June 5, 2020).
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Q: Can gyms that offer service by private appointment remain open? A: All gyms are included in the definition of public accommodation under this Executive Order and are closed to ingress, egress, use, and occupancy by members of the public, including for private appointments. In other words, even the largest gyms cannot operate a single personal training program for one trainer and one member, regardless of how many feet the two stood apart. The Governor also issued six iterations of “Stay Home, Stay Safe” orders, specifically Executive Orders 2020-21, 2020-42, 2020-59, 2020-70, 2020-77, 2020-92, and 2020-96. (Exhibits 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 and 14). These Executive Orders were all titled “Temporary Requirement to Suspend Certain Activities That Are Not Necessary to Sustain or Protect Life.” Each of the orders imposed sweeping limitations on Michigan citizens’ ability to travel and prohibited countless numbers of employees in Michigan from reporting to work, including gym employees. Under all of the Stay Home, Stay Safe orders, a willful violation of the Executive Orders was a criminal misdemeanor. E. The Governor Lifts (Almost) All Restrictions On June 1, 2020, Governor Whitmer rescinded both Executive Order 2020-69 (the latest iteration of the Temporary Restrictions on Places of Public Accommodation Orders) and 2020-96 (the latest iteration of the Orders styled Temporary Requirement to Suspend Certain Activities That Are Not Necessary to Sustain or Protect Life) and issued Executive Order 2020-110, titled “Temporary Restriction on Certain Events, Gatherings and Businesses.” (Exhibit 15) Among other things, the Order rescinds the travel restrictions on Michigan residents, allows for outdoor gatherings of up to 100 people, allows indoor gatherings of up to 10 people, and allows restaurants, bars, and most other industries to open in some capacity. However, amongst the very few businesses still shuttered under her latest Order are indoor gyms (which, by definition, pertains to virtually all gyms). The Order even allows outdoor workouts and allows children to return to
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summer day camps. However, it is still a misdemeanor for a gym to hold any fitness classes—no matter how socially distanced—in their brick and mortar locations. F. The Governor Lifts Even More Restrictions on June 5, 2020
On June 5, 2020, Governor Whitmer lifted even more restrictions in Michigan, but is still inexplicably keeping gyms closed throughout most of state, and still makes it a crime for most gyms to reopen. Governor Whitmer’s latest Executive Order 2020-115 (Exhibit 16) allows gyms and other still-shuttered businesses to open on June 10, 2020 in the Upper Peninsula and a small portion of the northern part of the Lower Peninsula. On June 15, 2020, the Governor will allow hair salons, nail salons, tattoo parlors, massage therapists, and other “personal touch” businesses to finally re-open. Gyms must remain closed. G. Governor Whitmer’s Executive Orders Cause Enormous Confusion
1. Governor's Orders Cause Confusion Almost immediately after her first stay-home order (Executive Order 2020-21) was issued, the Attorney General and the Governor were inundated with requests for clarification of the order. On March 24, 2020, Governor Whitmer observed, “We knew that there would be confusion, there always is.”4 On March 25, the Attorney General’s office admitted, “I think it’s a difficult executive order to really wrap your arms around.”5 The Attorney General’s office explained that its process
4 Mikenzie Frost, Gov. Whitmer says she understands confusion surrounding stay-at-home, urging patience, WWMT, Mar. 24, 2020, available at https://wwmt.com/news/state/govwhitmer-says-she-understands-confusion-surrounding-stay-at-home-urging-patience (last visited June 4, 2020). 5 Malachi Barrett, Michigan Attorney General asks local law enforcement to handle violations of coronavirus stay home order, MLive, Mar. 25, 2020, available at https://www.mlive.com/publicinterest/2020/03/michigan-attorney-general-asks-local-law-enforcement-to-handle-violations-ofcoronavirus-stay-home-order.html (last visited June 4, 2020).
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of clarifying the meaning of the order occurred on an ad hoc, case-by-case basis: “Every instance we get a call asking about whether or not businesses essential is being first reviewed by our office and then shared with the governor’s office so that we can begin to get some clarity around the executive order.” Despite the admitted confusion created by the orders, the Attorney General’s office reiterated that violating the order could result in criminal penalties and forced closure of a business by law enforcement. 67 In fact, the 111 Executive Orders related to COVID-19 are so confusing that they are virtually impossible to understand. There are currently, as of June 5, 2020, a total of 979 “Frequently Asked Questions” regarding the various orders.8
Neither Governor Whitmer nor her spokeswoman appeared to know what the Executive Orders say on June 4, 2020. The Detroit News reported that the Governor appeared to be violating her own social distancing rules at a protest march in Detroit and asked for a comment from the Governor’s office about her marching “shoulder to shoulder” with protesters, some of whom were not wearing masks. (Exhibit 17). Tiffany Brown, responding to the Detroit News, claimed that the Governor was not violating Executive Order 2020-110, stating that “[n]othing in this order shall be taken to abridge protections guaranteed by the state or federal constitution.” (Exhibit 17). However, in the “Frequently Asked Questions” section of the Executive Order, it states as follows:
Q: Does Executive Order 2020-110 prohibit persons from engaging in outdoor activities that are protected by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution?
6 Virginia Gordan, Local police to handle reports of violations of Gov. Whitmer’s stay-at-home order, Michigan Radio, Mar. 25, 2020, available at https://www.michiganradio.org/post/localpolice-handle-reports-violations-gov-whitmers-stay-home-order (last visited June 4, 2020). 7 As noted in the Plaintiffs’ complaint, Defendant Gordon also issued an emergency order on April 2, 2020 (the “HHS order). The validity of the HHS order also relies upon the validity of the Governor’s emergency declarations. 8 See Michigan.gov, Frequently Asked COVID-19 Questions, available at: https://www.michigan.gov/coronavirus/0,9753,7-406-98810--,00.html?page=1&limit=25&filterCategories=&searchQuery= (last visited June 5, 2020).
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A: No. Persons may engage in expressive activities protected by the First Amendment within the State of Michigan, but must adhere to social distancing measures recommended by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, including remaining at least six feet from people from outside the person’s household.9 Subsequent to the protest march, Governor Whitmer admitted that she was not able to social distance at the protest.10 Further, there are photos of her kneeling shoulder to shoulder with people who were not wearing any masks at all.11 Therefore, if our Governor is signing Executive Orders that she is not following (or “cannot follow”), and her staff does not know how the Governor’s Orders are applied, there is a very high likelihood of confusion for the 10,000,000 other residents of Michigan. In fact, pursuant to Executive Order 2020-110, the conduct of the Governor is a misdemeanor if it was a “willful violation.” 2. The Governor’s Executive Orders are Arbitrary The Governor’s Executive Orders that permit some industries to reopen, on top of being vague and confusing, are entirely arbitrary. People have been allowed to patronize recreational marijuana dispensaries, liquor stores, and purchase lotto tickets the entire time that Michigan state
9 See Michigan.gov, Executive Order 2020-110 FAQs, available at: https://www.michigan.gov/coronavirus/0,9753,7-406-98178_98455-530654--,00.html (last viewed June 4, 2020). 10 See Justin P. Hicks, Gov. Whitmer responds to lack of social distancing at protests against police brutality, MLive, June 5, 2020, available at: https://www.mlive.com/publicinterest/2020/06/gov-whitmer-responds-to-lack-of-social-distancing-at-protests-against-policebrutality.html (last updated June 5, 2020). 11 See Craig Mauger and James David Dickenson, With little social distancing, Whitmer marches with protesters, The Detroit News, June 4, 2020, available at: https://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/local/michigan/2020/06/04/whitmer-appears-breaksocial-distance-rules-highland-park-march/3146244001/ (last updated on June 4, 2020; last visited on June 7, 2020).
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has been under a state of emergency.12 People can also gather in groups of 10 indoors, as long as they socially distance. Accordingly, 10 friends can now get together in someone’s living room and perform the same workout together that they would do at a professional gym, as long as they are six feet apart. But still, under Executive Order 2020-115, gyms are closed.13 People can visit a strip club, have their teeth bleached, get Botox, lip injections, and even liposuction (all previously considered “non-essential” and which are not conducive to any social distancing of any kind). But they cannot go to a gym. Starting June 15, 2020, Michigan residents can get their hair cut, their nails manicured, get a tattoo, and even get a massage. Again, none of these industries can operate with any kind of social distancing. People can gather in groups of 100 outdoors, visit a bicycle repair shop, and buy clothes at a mall. People may now go swimming at their favorite public or private pool, practice recreational team sports, and kids can attend camp. But gyms, whose owners are experts at knowing how to sterilize and open their businesses safely, cannot perform the same business services that ordinary citizens are allowed to do with others at home. Gyms cannot even sell clothing or other health items, even though the rest of the economy is open.
The Governor was also critical of “choirs” at a recent news conference as a potential cause of an outbreak. Nonetheless, under her current Executive Order, choirs can resume in churches, up to 100 people can gather outdoors for a choir practice, and up to 10 people can gather indoors for a choir practice. Meanwhile, it is a crime for those same people to leave choir practice and go to a gym. They can go to a bar, go out to eat at a restaurant, go clothes and shoe shopping, and go
12 Liquor sales and lottery ticket sales also happen to also be an enormous source of revenue for the state. 13 Although the Governor’s Orders 2020-110 and 2020-115 allow for “outdoor” workouts, Michigan’s weather, as well as the costs and fees for park permits render the “permission” entirely useless. Further, Plaintiffs submit that the Governor cannot unilaterally change their business models under the United States Constitution.
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golfing while riding in a golf cart next to another person, but it is still a crime for a gym owner to open his or her facility to help citizens improve their physical and mental health.
The Governor claims that she is following “data and science” to make her reopening decisions. However, at a recent press conference on June 1, 2020, the Governor stated as follows: “In the early days, I often would observe because some of the best science was saying COVID19 can stay active and can be picked up from a stainless-steel surface for days. That was the original science. That’s what they were saying. Now that seems less certain.”14 The reason for that admission was simple. The Center for Disease Control has updated their research results and no longer believes that touching surfaces is nearly as dangerous as it initially reported in March 2020.15 However, despite her admission that the data and science has changed since her initial closure of gyms, she refuses to reopen them in the bulk of the lower peninsula, leaving tens of thousands of people out of work, and keeping over a million of Michigan citizens from one of the most important pieces of overall physical and emotional health.
The Governor’s rationale is that by keeping gyms closed, she is keeping people safer. That is a fallacy. There is no data or science to support this proposition, particularly when she has reopened nearly all of the other industries that she initially considered an immediate danger to the public health. The data that the Governor believed to be true about the virus easily spreading on surfaces has largely been debunked. The staggering death tolls that experts predicted in March
14 Michigan Governor Gretchen Whitmer Press Conference Transcript June 1, available at: https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/michigan-governor-gretchen-whitmer-press-conferencetranscript-june-1 (last visited June 8, 2020). 15 See Julia Ries, CDC Gives New Recommendations to Safely Reopen Amid COVID-19, Healthline, May 21, 2020 (fact checked by Jennifer Chesak) available at: https://www.healthline.com/health-news/new-cdc-guidelines-say-covid-19-unlikely-to-spreadvia-contaminated-surfaces#Restaurants-and-bars.
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have not come even close to reality. There is no data or science backing her position that keeping gyms shuttered longer than strip clubs, bars, restaurants, massage studios, tattoo parlors, dentists, marijuana dispensaries, or aestheticians, is keeping Michigan residents safe. In fact, the opposite is true: Michigan’s mental and physical health is declining by the day. The only scientific certainty is that the Michigan residents are becoming more susceptible to severe complications of COVD19 and are becoming more depressed, anxious, and stressed. Economically, she has put an entire industry in such financial peril that many gyms and fitness centers will never recover.
III. ARGUMENT A. Plaintiffs Are Likely to Succeed on the Merits of Their Claims
“A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter v. NRDC, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). Each of these factors is met here.
To satisfy the first prong of the preliminary-injunction analysis, the Plaintiffs must only demonstrate that the legal issues they raise are substantial enough to constitute “fair ground[s] for litigation and thus [require] more deliberate investigation.” Roth v. Bank of Commonwealth, 583 F.2d 527, 537 (6th Cir. 1978). “It will ordinarily be enough that the plaintiff has raised questions going to the merits so serious, substantial, difficult and doubtful, as to make them a fair ground for litigation and thus for mere deliberate investigation.” Brandeis Machinery & Supply Corp. and State Equipment Co. v. Barber-Geene Co., 503 F.2d 503, 505 (6th Cir. 1974). The Plaintiffs’ claims meet this standard.
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1. The Executive Orders are Unconstitutional The concurrence of individual constitutional rights amid the declared COVID-19 pandemic has certainly prompted a national issue.16 The federal government and all fifty States have declared states of emergency. However, while most states are opening or have opened their economies, Michigan has been inexplicably slow at doing so. Constitutional rights do not wholly evaporate in times of emergency. See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 29; 25 S. Ct. 358; 49 L. Ed. 643 (1905). Indeed, the law has long been settled that all essential liberties remain protected at all times, even during the gravest of emergencies. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 542; 91 S. Ct. 1586; 29 L. Ed. 2d 90 (1971); Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 164-65; 83 S. Ct. 554; 9 L. Ed. 2d 644 (1963). While States may implicate police powers to take swift action necessary to protect public health and safety, those powers are not limitless, and are subject to judicial review. See Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 31, 38-39; Robinson v. Attorney Gen., 957 F.3d 1171, 1179 (11th Cir. 2020) (‘while constitutional rights have limits, so does a state’s power to issue executive orders limiting such rights in times of emergency’). Generally, courts apply a deferential standard of review when reviewing a State’s implication of its police powers to preserve public health during a declared state of emergency. See, e.g., Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 28. “[I]f a statute purporting to have been enacted to protect the public health, the public morals, or the public safety, has no real or substantial relation to those
16 See, e.g., Presidential Proclamation of Donald J. Trump, Proclamation on Declaring a National Emergency Concerning the Novel Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) Outbreak, 85 Fed. Reg. 15337 Issued March 13, 2020) available at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidentialactions/proclamation-declaring-national-emergency-concerning-novel-coronavirus-diseasecovid-19-outbreak/ (last visited June 5, 2020).
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objects, or is, beyond all question, a plain, palpable invasion of rights secured by the fundamental law, it is the duty of courts to so adjudge, and thereby give effect to the Constitution.” Id. at 31. In Jacobson, the Court explained that State action may improperly deviate from having a “real or substantial relation” to the public health if it is “exercised in particular circumstances and in references to particular persons . . . in an arbitrary, unreasonable manner.” Id. at 28. For example (and as more thoroughly explored in Plaintiffs’ Equal Protection argument), rules that now allow outdoor social gatherings and fitness classes of up to 100 people while maintaining a 6-foot distance, but not indoor fitness classes of any size under any circumstances, is a red flag that the Governor’s Executive Orders are improperly arbitrary and bears “no real or substantial relation” to its proffered public health end.
A public health crisis state of emergency does not entitle the Governor to cast away constitutional rights and protections full throttle with arbitrary and discriminatory Executive Orders. As further outlined below, the Governor’s issuance of such patently arbitrary orders under the contrived guise of “mitigating the spread of COVID-19, protecting the public health, and providing essential protections to vulnerable Michiganders” is undoubtedly an improper constraint on Plaintiffs’ (and countless others) protected Constitutional rights. (See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399-400; 43 S. Ct. 625; 67 L. Ed. 1042 (1923); see also Exhibits 2 through 16).
2. Governor Whitmer’s Lockdown Orders Have Wholly Deprived Plaintiffs of Their Constitutional Rights to Procedural Due Process
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that no State can “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. Amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 3. Procedural due process imposes constraints on governmental decisions that deprive individuals of "liberty" or "property" interests within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332; 96 S. Ct. 893; 47 L. Ed. 2d 18,
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31 (1976). Accordingly, a procedural due process claim is achieved upon showing: (1) a life, liberty, or property interest requiring protection under the Due Process Clause; (2) a deprivation of that interest; (3) without adequate process. Women's Med. Prof'l Corp. v. Baird, 438 F.3d 595, 611 (6th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted).
a. Plaintiffs Possess Liberty and Property Interests that are Entitled to the Constitutional Protections of Due Process.
To begin with, liberty interests categorically include "the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life . . . and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized . . . as essential to the ordinary pursuit of happiness by free men." Women's Med Prof’l Corp, 438 F.3d at 611 (citing Board of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572; 92 S. Ct. 2701; 33 L. Ed. 2d 548 (1972) (therein quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399; 43 S. Ct. 625; 67 L. Ed. 1042 (1923)). Property interests are those that one has already acquired in specific benefits. Board of Regents, 408 U.S. at 576.
Fundamentally, property interests "are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law--rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those benefits." Women's Med Prof’l Corp, 438 F.3d at 611 (citing Board of Regents, 408 U.S. at 577). Meanwhile, the Constitution protects one’s liberty to choose his or her career or occupation. Women's Med Prof’l Corp, 438 F.3d at 612. Consequently, “[l]iberty and property interests are intricately related in our system of political economy, a system based on free choice of careers and occupations, private property, and the right to compete." Id. (citing Wilkerson v. Johnson, 699 F.2d 325, 328 (6th Cir. 1983). In taking all the above-mentioned case law together, the Court in Women’s Med Prof’l Corp unequivocally held that the continued operation of an existing business is an interest that is afforded due process protections. Id. at 611.
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Here, all Plaintiffs are established businesses that were fully operational prior to the Governor’s Lockdown Orders. Thus, Plaintiffs clearly have property interests in the businesses themselves, as well as liberty interests in the right to intrastate travel and the freedom to engage in the operation of their businesses. Accordingly, the first element of Plaintiffs’ procedural due process claim is met.
b. The Governor’s Lockdown Orders Have Deprived and Continue to Improperly Deprive Plaintiffs of Their Protected Liberty and Property Interests.
Notably, neither liberty nor property interests may be obstructed by a legislative action that is under the guise of protecting the public interest yet is “arbitrary or without reasonable relation to some purpose within the competency of the State to effect.” Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399-400 (emphasis added). The Sixth Circuit in Women’s Med Prof’l Corp recognized that, while there is merit to the contention that there is no unfettered freedom to engage in a business that may be properly regulated under a state’s general police power, such contention does not resolve the issue of whether one’s clear liberty to engage in that business was properly constrained under the state’s police power. Id. (citing Sanderson v. Village of Greenhills, 726 F.2d 284, 285 (6th Cir. 1984). It therefore follows that, regardless of the validity of the Governor’s police powers and resulting Shutdown Orders in times of emergency, the Governor cannot improperly deprive Plaintiffs of their liberty and property interests without due process.
Undoubtedly, Plaintiffs here have been – and continue to indefinitely be – deprived of their protected liberty and property interests under the improper restraints of the Shutdown Orders. Beginning March 16, 2020, the Governor’s Orders abruptly forced the immediate closure of “places of public accommodation,” including gymnasiums, fitness centers, recreation centers, indoor sports facilities, indoor exercise facilities, exercise studios, and spas. (Exhibits 2 through
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16). All Plaintiffs immediately closed, ceased all operations, and to date, remain closed under threat of significant criminal penalties and civil fines.
Meanwhile, without any rationalization, the Governor simultaneously exempted a list of designated “essential” places of public accommodation from the Shutdown Orders, while continuing to restrict all “non-essential personal care services . . . that require individuals to be within six feet of each other;” non-essential “[p]lace[s] of public accommodation;” and “[p]lace[s] of public amusement.” (Exhibits 2 through 16). Yet, many of the businesses deemed essential that have remained open, as well as non-essential businesses that have since reopened or are in the process of reopening, are either businesses that are open to the general public and/or unable to maintain the prescribed social distancing (or “enhanced social distancing”) protocol by the very nature of the business’s engagement. This is true even as actual (not hypothetical) outbreaks of COVID-19 occurred, in places such as state-wide grocery store chains.
In contrast to many of the businesses that have been or are currently permitted to operate, Plaintiffs operate member-based fitness facilities; they do not receive the influx of “walk-in” and anonymous business that retailers, restaurants or other allowed businesses rely on for profit. Plaintiffs are completely capable of implementing and adhering to not only the CDC social distancing protocols, but also additional preventative measures that were clearly outlined in at least three letters to the Governor (Exhibits 2 - 4 to Plaintiffs’ Complaint). Simply put, the Shutdown Orders arbitrarily and improperly deprive Plaintiffs of their rights and freedoms to engage in their business operations, while allowing others to open and attempt to rise from the ashes of this State’s current economy. Accordingly, the second element of Plaintiffs’ procedural due process claim is met.
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c. The Governor’s Shutdown Orders are Completely Want of Any Process at All, While Improperly Depriving Plaintiffs of Their Protected Liberty and Property Interests.
The fundamental requirement of procedural due process is the opportunity to be heard “at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner,” so as to allow vindication of the protected interests that are being improperly restricted. Mathews v Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 319; Board of Regents, 408 U.S. at 577. A due process violation is not established when the deprivation of a constitutionally interest occurs; rather, the deprivation occurs when the State fails to provide due process of law. Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125; 110 S Ct 975; 108 L Ed 2d 100, 114 (1990) (citation omitted). Procedural due process is not meant to protect persons from the deprivation itself, but from the mistaken or unjustified deprivation of the protected liberty and property interests. Id. at 125-26. Therefore, to determine whether a constitutional violation has occurred, it is necessary to ask what process the State provided, and whether it was constitutionally adequate. Id. at 126.
The United States Supreme Court has long established that due process is a flexible concept that calls for varying procedural protections according to the demands of the particular situation. Id. at 127; Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481; 33 L. Ed. 2d 484; 92 S. Ct. 2593 (1972). Additionally, where the State must act swiftly, or where it would be impractical to provide a pre-deprivation process, due process may be satisfied, so long as the State provides a postdeprivation process. See, e.g., Women's Med. Prof'l Corp. 438 F.3d at 613; see also Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. at 128 (collecting cases); Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 930; 117 S. Ct. 1807; 138 L. Ed. 2d 120, 127 (1997); United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. 43, 53, 126 L. Ed. 2d 490, 114 S. Ct. 492 (1993) (additional citations omitted).
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Recently, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania (Middle District) ruled on a similarly-situated case involving Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process and equal protection claims brought by four businesses and one individual who had been forced to close their businesses under the state Governor’s police powers, amid the current COVID-19 concerns. Friends of Devito v. Wolf, ___A3d___; 2020 Pa. LEXIS 1987 (Apr. 13, 2020) (Exhibit 18). In Devito, the petitioners operated businesses, which the State classified as “non-life-sustaining.” Id. at *1, 12-15. Petitioners asserted claims that the Governor lacked statutory authority to issue the Executive Order, and that the forced closure of their businesses infringed upon their Constitutional rights. Of particular import is the court’s holding regarding the procedural due process claims.
In Devito, the petitioners claimed that the Executive Order, which listed and distinguished the permissible operation of “life-sustaining” businesses from the impermissible operation of “non-life-sustaining” businesses, took effect without providing petitioners with pre-deprivation notice and an opportunity to be heard with respect to their classification as non-life-sustaining businesses. Id. at *52. Meanwhile, the Governor announced and provided a waiver application process, which afforded businesses the (post-deprivation) opportunity to challenge the Governor's placement of their business on the non-life-sustaining list. Id. at *57. Still, petitioners argued that any waiver process provided by the State “must accord applicants procedural due process prior to final determinations, including, e.g., the right to know the applicable standards to be applied, to present and/or cross-examine witnesses, and to the availability of an appeal from an adverse result.” Id.
The court acknowledged that, even in times of emergency, petitioners were absolutely entitled to procedural due process protections. Id. at *55-56. The court’s holding hinged on whether petitioners’ liberty and property interests were afforded adequate process via the post-
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deprivation waiver process. See id., generally at *52-63. In its analysis, the court applied the threepart balancing test established in Mathews v. Eldridge to consider (1) the private interest affected by the governmental action; (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation together with the value of additional or substitute safeguards; and (3) the state interest involved, including the administrative burden the additional or substitute procedural requirements would impose on the state. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334-35.
Ultimately, the court held that, given the circumstances of an ongoing disaster emergency, a full evidentiary proceeding was not a viable post-deprivation procedural process, whereas the waiver process was indeed adequate. Devito at *61. The court found that the waiver process functioned as a review process, in providing businesses an opportunity to challenge – and the Governor's office to reconsider – the propriety of the non-life-sustaining categorization. Id. at *57. The court concluded that the Governor's efforts to correct mis-categorizations of certain businesses is an entirely proper focus of procedural due process. Id. at *57-58.
Significantly, however, what glaringly distinguishes Devito from the instant case is that neither Governor Whitmer, Director Gordon, nor any of the Shutdown Orders at issue have attempted to provide any procedural due process safeguards at all. Likewise, absolutely no mechanism of any kind has been announced or provided for post-deprivation review. Thus, this Court cannot even consider whether process was adequate under a Matthews three-part balancing test because there is no process available at all. Thus, by utterly failing to provide any pre- or postdeprivation review of the orders and rules shuttering Plaintiffs’ business, Plaintiffs are suffering substantial losses of liberty and property. Accordingly, the third and final element of Plaintiffs’ procedural due process claim is met.
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3. Governor Whitmer’s Arbitrary and Irrational Executive Orders Have Violated and Continue to Violate Plaintiffs’ Equal Protection Rights
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that no State can “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 4. Accordingly, State action that regulates economic activity in a discriminatory manner violates the Equal Protection Clause unless the State can show a “rational relationship between the disparity of treatment,” along with some “legitimate governmental purpose.” Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 366-67; (2001). Under no circumstances can a State “rely on a classification whose relationship to an asserted goal is so attenuated as to render the distinction arbitrary or irrational.” City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 446; 105 S. Ct. 3249; 87 L. Ed. 2d 313, 324 (1985) (citation omitted); see also United States Dept. of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 535-38 (1973) (holding that the classification at issue was not only ‘imprecise,’ but was utterly want of any rational basis).
The Supreme Court’s decision in City of Cleburne exemplifies how such arbitrariness or irrationality may be identified. In Cleburne, the Supreme Court struck down a zoning ordinance that required a special use permit for a home for individuals with disabilities (“Featherstone Home”), but did not require the same special use permit “for apartment houses, multiple dwellings, boarding and lodging houses, fraternity or sorority houses, dormitories, apartment hotels, hospitals, sanitariums, nursing homes for convalescents or the aged . . ., private clubs or fraternal orders and other specified uses.” City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 447.
The Court acknowledged that, while individuals with intellectual disabilities may have unique needs, such difference is patently irrelevant unless the Featherstone Home and its occupants would threaten legitimate city interests in a way that other permitted uses such as boarding houses, fraternity or sorority houses, etc. would not. Id. at 448. In conclusion, the Court found that the
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record did not reveal “any rational basis for believing that the Featherstone Home would pose any special threat to the city’s legitimate interests.” Id.
In this case, while responding to a health crisis is a legitimate governmental purpose, such purpose does not rationalize any and all state action. To be sure, if a statute is purportedly enacted “to protect the public health, the public morals or the public safety” has no “real or substantial relation” to such efforts; or is a “plain, palpable” violation of equal protection principles; or is so “arbitrary and oppressive,” it is the duty of the courts to so adjudge, “to prevent wrong and oppression.” Jacobson 197 US at 31 & 38 (citations omitted); see also In re Abbott, 954 F.3d 772, 784-85 (5th Cir. 2020) (recently-decided case ruling on issues concerning State police power in relation to Constitutional rights and protections amid COVID-19).
To begin with, the services Plaintiffs provide to their members are vital, life-sustaining, and life-improving. Yet, the Governor’s Shutdown Orders arbitrarily prevent Plaintiffs from offering these beneficial services to their members, despite such services being in need now more than ever, in a time of public health crisis. Notably, there is no data-supported justification in any of the Executive Orders whatsoever to designate Plaintiffs’ businesses as being any less essential than those businesses that were initially allowed to stay open under social distancing guidelines, and certainly not less essential than those “personal touch” businesses that were allowed to open in the most recent order, beginning on June 15.
In fact, Plaintiffs submit that gyms are more essential than liquor stores, recreational marijuana dispensaries and places that sell lotto tickets (all businesses that have remained open through the entire pandemic), as well as strip clubs, bars, massage parlors, tattoo parlors, aestheticians, and nail salons, which will be permitted to reopen as of June 15. Certainly, with the well-known health benefits of gyms, they certainly are more valuable than many types of
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businesses already open. However, the Governor has not yet even meaningfully engaged the fitness industry with respect to reopening (even though she already reopened gyms in Regions 6 and 8). Rather, the Governor has merely provided a website 17 to answer nearly 1,000 and counting “frequently asked questions” to clarify concerns related to the scope of the Lockdown Orders – a clear indication that the Lockdown Orders are arbitrary, vague and void for depriving its citizens of Constitutional rights and protections. When a regulation imposes criminal penalties, vagueness concerns are enhanced. Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, 455 U.S. 489, 498-99 (1982).18
The Governor’s Shutdown Orders have deprived and continue to deprive Plaintiffs of the equal protection of the laws under the United States Constitution. Plaintiffs have identified what are unmistakably arbitrary and discriminatory distinctions among similarly situated businesses (and even those that cannot maintain social distancing by the very nature of the business) in the State of Michigan. Because the Governor’s Shutdown Orders are arbitrary and oppressive, and because they continue to restrict Plaintiffs’ businesses in an arbitrary and irrational manner, judicial action is necessary to strike down the restrictions, to prevent the wrong and oppression.
17 See Michigan.gov, Frequently Asked COVID-19 Questions, available at: https://www.michigan.gov/coronavirus/0,9753,7-406-98810--,00.html?page=1&limit=100&filterCategories=&searchQuery= (last visited on June 5, 2020) 18 Plaintiffs anticipate that Defendants will point to the Governor’s recent fitness “workgroup,” which is scheduled to meet for the first time the week of June 8. On information and belief, this “workgroup” is led by Mr. Randall Harrison, an investigator of the Wage and Hour Division in Michigan’s Department of Labor and Economic Opportunity. The “workgroup” is also too little, too late, and it is hard to see it as anything but a red herring, considering that it only comes after the instant lawsuit was filed, two months after the first of at least three very comprehensive plans were sent to the Governor’s office for the safe reopening of gyms, and that gyms in Regions 6 and 8 have already been opened.
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4. Governor Whitmer’s Lockdown Orders Have Violated Plaintiffs’ Interstate Commerce Rights a. The Dormant Commerce Clause Prohibits State Interference with Interstate Commerce.
The “dormant” Commerce Clause19 restricts state regulation of the flow of interstate commerce. Huish Detergents, Inc. v Warren Co., 214 F3d 707, 712 (6th Cir. 2000), citing CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 87 (1987). A state’s regulation of interstate commerce is prohibited under the dormant Commerce Clause if it imposes a burden on interstate commerce that is "'clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits'" even in the absence of discrimination against out-of-state business interests in favor of in-state business interests. Huish Detergents, Inc. v Warren Co., 214 F3d at 713, citing C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, New York, 511 U.S. 383, 390 (1994)(quoting Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142, 25 L. Ed. 2d 174, 90 S. Ct. 844 (1970)).
If a state’s regulation interferes with interstate commerce in a manner that violates the dormant Commerce Clause, the regulation is invalid whether the challenging Plaintiffs are domiciled in-state or out-of-state. See Comptroller of the Treasury v Wynne, 575 US 542 (2015); Department of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 336 (2008); Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 469 (2005).
19 The Commerce Clause (U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3) states that Congress has the power to regulate commerce among the states. The Supreme Court has interpreted this to restrict states’ ability to regulate interstate commerce, and this interpretation has become known as the “dormant” Commerce Clause.
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b. The Orders Violate the Dormant Commerce Clause because the Burden They Impose is Excessive in Relation to the Putative Benefits and/or because they have no Rational Basis.
As detailed in the above Statement of Facts and preceding arguments, as well as in the First Amended Complaint (PageID.134-150), the EOs place an excessive burden on the fitness industry, including but not limited to Plaintiffs. Specifically, the Shutdown Orders have forced gyms in Michigan to remain closed since March 16, 2020. (PageID.121-127). This has resulted in a devastating loss of revenue, as well as the permanent closure of a number of fitness facilities— and as long as the Shutdown Orders continue to obstruct business operations, that number will continue to increase. (PageID.137, 182). The extreme burden on this entire industry in Michigan is plain to see.
Though COVID-19 exists across the nation (and though Michigan ranked only 18th in the country with respect to active cases as of May 31, 2020), gyms in at least 43 other states are open for business while Michigan’s are not. (PageID.97, 134-135). Notably, gyms are open in Michigan’s three bordering states of Indiana, Ohio, and Wisconsin. Meanwhile, the latest Shutdown Orders have allowed a wide variety of other Michigan businesses to reopen—including manufacturing, restaurants, bars, retail and, as of June 15, all “personal touch” businesses. (PageID.176). There is no scientific data and no sound reasoning for allowing these other businesses to reopen while forcing gyms to remain closed.20 To the contrary, the very purpose of gyms is to prevent illness and improve the health of its clientele. (PageID.139-140).
Defendants will argue that this extreme burden is justified in order to control the spread of COVID-19. However, the goal of the Shutdown Orders from the outset was to “flatten the curve.”
20 Plaintiffs in this case cannot prove a negative, which is that there is no data or science that identify fitness studios as the source of an outbreak anywhere in the United States.
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The data demonstrates, and the Governor admitted on April 27, 2020, the “flattening” occurred many weeks ago.21 Thus, the “putative local benefits” of the imposed Shutdown Orders when weighed against the burden on Michigan gyms are spurious at best—and more likely altogether nonexistent in light of all of the public and private places in which Michigan residents currently are able to interact.
Here, Plaintiffs businesses engage in interstate commerce in that they have a number of visiting clients from out-of-state. (PageID.142-150). Moreover, they have been unable to take delivery of any purchased equipment and supplies from out-of-state businesses during the time that they have been closed. Thus, there is an interstate commerce component to the Shutdown Orders’ impact on gyms.
Plaintiffs do not contend that the Shutdown Orders discriminate against their out-of-state clients; indeed, neither Michigan residents nor non-residents can go to gyms under the Shutdown Orders. Rather, Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits of their dormant Commerce Clause claim because the Shutdown Orders impose a clearly excessive burden on gyms in relation to any possible benefit of their continued closure at this juncture. Huish Detergents, Inc. v Warren Co., 214 F3d at 713; Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, New York, 511 U.S. at 390; Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. at 142.
Put another way, to the extent that the Shutdown Orders require gyms in Michigan to remain closed, they are invalid because they lack any rational basis. As the Seventh Circuit has described:
21 Michigan Governor Gretchen Whitmer Press Conference Transcript April 27, available at https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/michigan-governor-gretchen-whitmer-press-conferencetranscript-april-27 (“[A]nd so we’ve flattened it…” at 45:53) (last visited June 8, 2020).
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[E]ven in the absence of discrimination, a burden on interstate commerce that had no rational justification would be invalid. An example is the Illinois mudguard law invalidated in Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520, 79 S. Ct. 962, 3 L. Ed. 2d 1003 (1959). The law required all trucks in the state, thus including those traveling interstate, to be equipped with curved mudguards that the district court had found not only conferred "no" safety benefits over straight ones but actually created "hazards previously unknown." Id. at 525. The law impeded interstate commerce--though maybe local commerce just as much--and because it lacked a rational basis it was invalid despite the lack of proof of a disparate impact. Cavel Int'l, Inc v Madigan, 500 F3d 551, 556 (7th Cir. 2007) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added) (Exhibit 19). See also Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761 (1945); CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69 (1987). There can be no serious dispute that the continued closure of gyms is excessively burdensome, lacks any rational justification, and violates the dormant Commerce Clause. Accordingly, Plaintiffs have a high likelihood of success on the merits of Count I of the First Amended Complaint. B. The Plaintiffs Will Suffer Irreparable Harm The Plaintiffs will suffer immeasurable and irreparable harm if the executive orders are enforced against them. Irreparable harm is “the kind of injury for which monetary damages are difficult to calculate.” Certified Restoration Dry Cleaining Network, LLC v. Tenke Corp., 511 F.3d 535, 550 (6th Cir. 2007). Irreparable harm exists where a plaintiff’s business is threatened with insolvency or its financial viability is threatened. See Performance Unlimited, Inc. v. Questar Publishers Inc., 52 F.3d 1373, 1382 (6th Cir. 1995). Entity-destroying losses differ from mere damages and constitute irreparable harm. See, e.g., Roso-Lino Beverage Distributors, Inc. v. CocaCola Bottling Co. of New York, Inc., 749 F.2d 124, 125 (2d Circ. 1984).
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The Plaintiffs will suffer irreparable injury from loss of customers, goodwill, and future business. Further, the harm today to the Plaintiffs grows daily for two reasons. First, Governor has had this specific industry shut down longer than nearly any industry in the State when there has not been one single reported outbreak in the United States at a fitness center either before the “Stay Home” orders began or after over 40 states have allowed the reopening of gyms. Second, our Governor’s refusal to reengage the fitness industry into the state economy, when nearly all other businesses are open, sends the false message that the fitness industry is unsafe to reopen, which will certainly further damage the industry as a whole (and these Plaintiffs specifically).
The Sixth Circuit has held that a moving party will suffer irreparable harm if it loses customers, goodwill, or future business. See Mich. Bell Telephone Co. v. Engler, 257 F.3d 587, 599 (6th Cir. 2001); Basicomputer Corp. v. Scott, 973 F.2d 507, 512 (6th Cir. Cir. 1992). Mr. Gulick will suffer irreparable harm in the form of the deprivation of his constitutional rights. See Maryville Baptist Church, Inc. v. Beshear, ___ F.3d ___, 2020 WL 2111316, at *4 (6th Cir. May 2, 2020); Overstreet v. Lexington-Fayette Urban Cty. Gov’t, 305 F.3d 566, 578 (6th Cir. 2002). C. The Public Interest and the Balance of Equities Favor Preliminary Injunctive Relief
The remaining factors also weigh in favor of a preliminary injunction. First, the balance of harms favors the Plaintiffs. The fitness center Plaintiffs have been unable to see their members for over 12 weeks, causing unprecedented disruptions to their members’ physical and mental health. Many of the fitness studio Plaintiffs have had to lay off all or some of their staff, have little to no income, and yet still need to keep paying rent and utilities on their facilities. These layoffs and enormous financial losses are impacting the fitness industry’s ability to effectively respond to the very comorbidities that have caused complications with COVID-19 itself. Permitting the fitness industry to reengage with its members does not pose a significant risk of exacerbating the
28

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transmission of COVID-19, as there have been no known outbreaks at fitness facilities across the United States. Further, the fitness industry is well-qualified to take steps to ensure sanitation and appropriate protocol with respect to member interaction and safety. The fitness industry has described in detail how they will do so.
These concerns dovetail with the general public interest. “[I]t is always in the public interest to prevent violation of a party’s constitutional rights.” G & V Lounge, Inc. v. Mich. Liquor Control Comm’n, 23 F.3d 1071, 1079 (6th Cir. 1994). The wider public interest also favors a limited injunction in this case, due to the significant mental and physical health benefits of fitness and the work performed by Plaintiffs in the health and wellness industry. Thus, the remaining factors also dictate that an injunction is appropriate in this case.
IV. CONCLUSION

A preliminary injunction should be entered, enjoining the Defendants from applying EO 2020-110, EO 2020-115, and the HHS order to preclude the Plaintiffs’ activities.

Dated: June 8, 2020

Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Scott M. Erskine_________________ SCOTT M. ERSKINE (P54714) CARLY VAN THOMME (P59706) ERSKINE LAW, PC Attorneys for Plaintiffs 612 West University Drive Rochester, Michigan 48307 (248) 601-4497 serskine@erskinelaw.com cvanthomme@erskinelaw.com

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Certificate of Compliance 1. This brief complies with the type-volume limitation of W.D. Mich. LCivR 7.3(b)(i) because this brief contains 8,708 words, excluding the parts of the brief exempted by W.D. Mich. LCivR 7.3(b)(i).

2. This brief has been prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface using Microsoft Office Word 2010 for Windows in 12-point Times New Roman font.

Dated: June 8, 2020

Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Scott M. Erskine_________________ SCOTT M. ERSKINE (P54714) CARLY VAN THOMME (P59706) ERSKINE LAW, PC Attorneys for Plaintiffs 612 West University Drive Rochester, Michigan 48307 (248) 601-4497 serskine@erskinelaw.com cvanthomme@erskinelaw.com

PROOF OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on June 8, 2020, I presented the foregoing paper to the Clerk of the Court for filing and uploading to the ECF system, which will send notification of such filing to the attorneys of record listed herein and I hereby certify that I have mailed by US Postal Service the document to the involved non participants.
s/ Scott M. Erskine_________________ SCOTT M. ERSKINE (P54714) CARLY VAN THOMME (P59706) ERSKINE LAW, PC Attorneys for Plaintiffs 612 West University Drive Rochester, Michigan 48307 (248) 601-4497 serskine@erskinelaw.com cvanthomme@erskinelaw.com

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Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 33-1 filed 06/08/20 PageID.297 Page 1 of 5

DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

_____________________________________________________

LEAGUE OF INDPENDENT FITNESS FACITLITIES AND TRAINERS, INC., BASELINE FITNESS LLC, BUILDING YOUR TEMPLE LLC, BYT FITNESS 247 LLC, CLAWSON FITNESS, LLC, CLINTON FITNESS, INC., D-LUX KARATE UNIVERSITY LLC, FENTON ATHLETIC CLUB, INC., FENTON KARATE, LLC, FUSION FITNESS 24/7 LLC, H3 FITNESS LLC, I FITNESS PERSONAL TRAINING, INC., JKP FITNESS, LLC, JPF ENTERPRISES, LLC, M FITNESS CLUB, LLC, MH & AB LLC, MOTOR CITY CF - ST. CLAIR SHORES, LLC, NASCOT ENTERPRISES, LLC, PRISON CITY PHYSIQUE LLC, RMP FITNESS INC., STRENGTH BEYOND LLC, 24/7 BOOTCAMP AND BOXING INC., and 4 SEASONS GYM, LLC,
Plaintiffs, v. GRETCHEN E. WHITMER and ROBERT GORDON,
Defendants. _____________________________________________________
ERSKINE LAW, PC Scott M. Erskine (P54734) Carly Van Thomme (P59706) Attorneys for Plaintiffs 612 W. University
Exhibit 1

Civil No. 1:20-cv-00458 Hon. Paul L. Maloney

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 33-1 filed 06/08/20 PageID.298 Page 2 of 5

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 33-1 filed 06/08/20 PageID.299 Page 3 of 5

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 33-1 filed 06/08/20 PageID.300 Page 4 of 5

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 33-1 filed 06/08/20 PageID.301 Page 5 of 5

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 33-2 filed 06/08/20 PageID.302 Page 1 of 2

DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

_____________________________________________________

LEAGUE OF INDPENDENT FITNESS FACITLITIES AND TRAINERS, INC., BASELINE FITNESS LLC, BUILDING YOUR TEMPLE LLC, BYT FITNESS 247 LLC, CLAWSON FITNESS, LLC, CLINTON FITNESS, INC., D-LUX KARATE UNIVERSITY LLC, FENTON ATHLETIC CLUB, INC., FENTON KARATE, LLC, FUSION FITNESS 24/7 LLC, H3 FITNESS LLC, I FITNESS PERSONAL TRAINING, INC., JKP FITNESS, LLC, JPF ENTERPRISES, LLC, M FITNESS CLUB, LLC, MH & AB LLC, MOTOR CITY CF - ST. CLAIR SHORES, LLC, NASCOT ENTERPRISES, LLC, PRISON CITY PHYSIQUE LLC, RMP FITNESS INC., STRENGTH BEYOND LLC, 24/7 BOOTCAMP AND BOXING INC., and 4 SEASONS GYM, LLC,
Plaintiffs, v. GRETCHEN E. WHITMER and ROBERT GORDON,
Defendants. _____________________________________________________
ERSKINE LAW, PC Scott M. Erskine (P54734) Carly Van Thomme (P59706) Attorneys for Plaintiffs 612 W. University
Exhibit 2

Civil No. 1:20-cv-00458 Hon. Paul L. Maloney

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 33-2 filed 06/08/20 PageID.303 Page 2 of 2
THE OFFICE OF
GOVERNOR GRETCHEN WHITMER

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Executive Order 2020-04 - Declaration of State of Emergency

EXECUTIVE ORDER

No. 2020-4

Declaration of State of Emergency

The novel coronavirus (COVID-19) is a respiratory disease that can result in serious illness or death. It is caused by a new strain of coronavirus that had not been previously identi!ed in humans and can easily spread from person to person.
COVID-19 has been identi!ed as the cause of an outbreak of respiratory illness !rst detected in Wuhan City in the Hubei Province of China. Person-to-person spread of the virus has occurred in the United States, with some of those occurring in people with no travel history and no known source of exposure. On January 31, 2020, the United States Department of Health and Human Services Secretary Alex Azar declared a public health emergency for COVID-19, and a"ected state and local governments have also declared states of emergency.

The State of Michigan has been taking proactive steps to prevent and prepare for the spread of this disease. On February 3, 2020, the Michigan Department of Health and Human Services (MDHHS) activated the Community Health Emergency Coordination Center, and has been working diligently with local health departments, health systems, and medical providers throughout Michigan to make sure appropriate screening and preparations for COVID-19 are being made. On February 28, 2020, I activated the State Emergency Operations Center to maximize coordination with state, local and federal agencies, as well as private partners, and to help prevent the spread of the disease. On March 3, 2020, I created four task forces comprising key state government agencies to coordinate the state’s response and work closely with the appropriate community and nongovernmental stakeholders to combat the spread of COVID-19 and assess the impact it may have on Michiganders’ day-to-day lives. And throughout this time, the State has been working with schools, businesses, medical providers, local health departments, and residents to make sure they have the information they need to prepare for potential cases.
On March 10, 2020, MDHHS identi!ed the !rst two presumptive-positive cases of COVID-19 in Michigan.
Section 1 of article 5 of the Michigan Constitution of 1963 vests the executive power of the State of Michigan in the governor.

The Emergency Management Act, 1976 PA 390, as amended, MCL 30.403(4), provides that “[t]he governor shall, by executive order or proclamation, declare a state of emergency if he or she !nds that an emergency has occurred or that the threat of an emergency exists.”
The Emergency Powers of the Governor Act of 1945, 1945 PA 302, as amended, MCL 10.31(1), provides that “[d]uring times of great public crisis, disaster, rioting, catastrophe, or similar public emergency within the state, or reasonable apprehension of immediate danger of a public emergency of that kind, . . . the governor may proclaim a state of emergency and designate the area involved.”
Acting under the Michigan Constitution of 1963 and Michigan law, I order the following:
1. A state of emergency is declared across the State of Michigan.
2. The Emergency Management and Homeland Security Division of the Department of State Police must coordinate and maximize all state e"orts that may be activated to state service to assist local governments and o#cials and may call upon all state departments to utilize available resources to assist.
3. The state of emergency is terminated when emergency conditions no longer exist and appropriate programs have been implemented to recover from any e"ects of the emergency conditions, consistent with the legal authorities upon which this declaration is based and any limits on duration imposed by those authorities.
Given under my hand and the Great Seal of the State of Michigan.
MICHIGAN.GOV HOME ADA MICHIGAN NEWS POLICIES COPYRIGHT 2020 STATE OF MICHIGAN

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 33-3 filed 06/08/20 PageID.304 Page 1 of 2

DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

_____________________________________________________

LEAGUE OF INDPENDENT FITNESS FACITLITIES AND TRAINERS, INC., BASELINE FITNESS LLC, BUILDING YOUR TEMPLE LLC, BYT FITNESS 247 LLC, CLAWSON FITNESS, LLC, CLINTON FITNESS, INC., D-LUX KARATE UNIVERSITY LLC, FENTON ATHLETIC CLUB, INC., FENTON KARATE, LLC, FUSION FITNESS 24/7 LLC, H3 FITNESS LLC, I FITNESS PERSONAL TRAINING, INC., JKP FITNESS, LLC, JPF ENTERPRISES, LLC, M FITNESS CLUB, LLC, MH & AB LLC, MOTOR CITY CF - ST. CLAIR SHORES, LLC, NASCOT ENTERPRISES, LLC, PRISON CITY PHYSIQUE LLC, RMP FITNESS INC., STRENGTH BEYOND LLC, 24/7 BOOTCAMP AND BOXING INC., and 4 SEASONS GYM, LLC,
Plaintiffs, v. GRETCHEN E. WHITMER and ROBERT GORDON,
Defendants. _____________________________________________________
ERSKINE LAW, PC Scott M. Erskine (P54734) Carly Van Thomme (P59706) Attorneys for Plaintiffs 612 W. University
Exhibit 3

Civil No. 1:20-cv-00458 Hon. Paul L. Maloney

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 33-3 filed 06/08/20 PageID.305 Page 2 of 2
THE OFFICE OF
GOVERNOR GRETCHEN WHITMER

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Executive Order 2020-33 (COVID-19)

EXECUTIVE ORDER

No. 2020-33

Expanded emergency and disaster declaration

On March 10, 2020, I issued Executive Order 2020-4, which declared a state of emergency in Michigan to address the COVID-19 pandemic. This new disease, caused by a novel coronavirus not previously identi!ed in humans, can easily spread from person to person and can result in serious illness or death. There is currently no approved vaccine or antiviral treatment.
Scarcely three weeks later, the virus has spread across Michigan. To date, the state has 9,334 con!rmed cases of COVID-19 and 337 people have died of the disease. Many thousands more are infected but have not been tested. Hospitals in Oakland, Macomb, Wayne, and Washtenaw counties are reporting that they are full or nearly full to capacity. Ventilators and personal protective equipment are in short supply and high demand. Michigan needs more medical personnel than are currently available to care for COVID-19 patients. Dormitories and a convention center are being converted to temporary !eld hospitals.
The best way to slow the spread of COVID-19 is for people to stay home and keep their distance from others. To that end, and pursuant to the recommendations of public health experts, I have restricted access to places of public accommodation and school buildings in Executive Orders 2020-20 and 2020-11, respectively. And in Executive Order 2020-21, I have limited gatherings and travel, and have required all workers who are not necessary to sustain or protect life to remain at home.
Social distancing, though necessary to combat COVID-19, has harsh economic consequences. Almost overnight, businesses and government agencies have had to dramatically adjust how they work. Where working from home is not possible, businesses have closed or signi!cantly restricted their normal operations. Michiganders are losing their jobs in record numbers: over the past two weeks alone, nearly a half-million of them submitted claims for unemployment insurance. That is more claims than were !led in the entirety of the prior calendar year.

The economic damage—already severe—will compound with time. On March 19, 2020, economists at the University of Michigan forecasted that as many as 1 in 10 Michiganders could be unemployed by the fall and that economic sectors that feature substantial social interaction could contract by as much as 50%. As a result, many families in Michigan will struggle to pay their bills or even put food on the table.
My administration has already taken aggressive measures to mitigate the economic harms of this pandemic. In Executive Order 2020-18, we placed strict rules on businesses to prevent price gouging. In Executive Order 2020-19, we put a temporary hold on evictions for families that cannot make their rent. And in Executive Order 2020-24, we expanded eligibility for unemployment bene!ts.
Nonetheless, the COVID-19 pandemic has disrupted and will continue to disrupt our economy, our homes, and our educational, civic, social, and religious institutions. School closures have made it harder to educate our children and have increased strain on parents, many of whom continue to work from home. The closure of museums and theaters will limit people’s ability to enrich themselves through the arts. And curtailing gatherings has left many seeking new ways to connect with their community during these challenging times.
The health, economic, and social harms of the COVID-19 pandemic are widespread and severe, and they demand we do more.
Section 1 of article 5 of the Michigan Constitution of 1963 vests the executive power of the State of Michigan in the governor.
The Emergency Management Act, 1976 PA 390, as amended, MCL 30.403(3)-(4), provides that “[t]he governor shall, by executive order or proclamation, declare a state of emergency” and/or a “state of disaster” upon !nding that an emergency and/or disaster has occurred or is threatening to occur.
The Emergency Powers of the Governor Act of 1945, 1945 PA 302, as amended, MCL 10.31(1), provides that “[d]uring times of great public crisis, disaster, rioting, catastrophe, or similar public emergency within the state . . . the governor may proclaim a state of emergency and designate the area involved.”

Acting under the Michigan Constitution of 1963 and Michigan law, I order the following:
1. A state of emergency and a state of disaster are both declared across the State of Michigan.
2. The Emergency Management and Homeland Security Division of the Department of State Police must coordinate and maximize all state e"orts that may be activated to state service to assist local governments and o#cials and may call upon all state departments to utilize available resources to assist.
3. The state of emergency and the state of disaster will terminate when emergency and disaster conditions no longer exist and appropriate programs have been implemented to recover from any e"ects of the statewide emergency and disaster, consistent with the legal authorities upon which this declaration is based and any limits imposed by those authorities, including section 3 of the Emergency Management Act, 1976 PA 390, as amended, MCL 30.403.
4. Executive Order 2020-4 is rescinded and replaced. All previous orders that rested on Executive Order 2020-4 now rest on this order.
Given under my hand and the Great Seal of the State of Michigan.
MICHIGAN.GOV HOME ADA MICHIGAN NEWS POLICIES COPYRIGHT 2020 STATE OF MICHIGAN

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 33-4 filed 06/08/20 PageID.306 Page 1 of 2

DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

_____________________________________________________

LEAGUE OF INDPENDENT FITNESS FACITLITIES AND TRAINERS, INC., BASELINE FITNESS LLC, BUILDING YOUR TEMPLE LLC, BYT FITNESS 247 LLC, CLAWSON FITNESS, LLC, CLINTON FITNESS, INC., D-LUX KARATE UNIVERSITY LLC, FENTON ATHLETIC CLUB, INC., FENTON KARATE, LLC, FUSION FITNESS 24/7 LLC, H3 FITNESS LLC, I FITNESS PERSONAL TRAINING, INC., JKP FITNESS, LLC, JPF ENTERPRISES, LLC, M FITNESS CLUB, LLC, MH & AB LLC, MOTOR CITY CF - ST. CLAIR SHORES, LLC, NASCOT ENTERPRISES, LLC, PRISON CITY PHYSIQUE LLC, RMP FITNESS INC., STRENGTH BEYOND LLC, 24/7 BOOTCAMP AND BOXING INC., and 4 SEASONS GYM, LLC,
Plaintiffs, v. GRETCHEN E. WHITMER and ROBERT GORDON,
Defendants. _____________________________________________________
ERSKINE LAW, PC Scott M. Erskine (P54734) Carly Van Thomme (P59706) Attorneys for Plaintiffs 612 W. University
Exhibit 4

Civil No. 1:20-cv-00458 Hon. Paul L. Maloney

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 33-4 filed 06/08/20 PageID.307 Page 2 of 2
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Executive Order 2020-09 (COVID-19)

EXECUTIVE ORDER

No. 2020-9

Temporary restrictions on the use of places of public accommodation

The novel coronavirus (COVID-19) is a respiratory disease that can result in serious illness or death. It is caused by a new strain of coronavirus not previously identi!ed in humans and easily spread from person to person. There is currently no approved vaccine or antiviral treatment for this disease.
On March 10, 2020, the Michigan Department of Health and Human Services identi!ed the !rst two presumptive-positive cases of COVID-19 in Michigan. On that same day, I issued Executive Order 2020-4. This order declared a state of emergency across the state of Michigan under section 1 of article 5 of the Michigan Constitution of 1963, the Emergency Management Act, 1976 PA 390, as amended, MCL 30.401-.421, and the Emergency Powers of the Governor Act of 1945, 1945 PA 302, as amended, MCL 10.31-.33.
The Emergency Management Act vests the governor with broad powers and duties to “cop[e] with dangers to this state or the people of this state presented by a disaster or emergency,” which the governor may implement through “executive orders, proclamations, and directives having the force and e"ect of law.” MCL 30.403(1)-(2). Similarly, the Emergency Powers of the Governor Act of 1945, provides that, after declaring a state of emergency, “the governor may promulgate reasonable orders, rules, and regulations as he or she considers necessary to protect life and property or to bring the emergency situation within the a"ected area under control.” MCL 10.31(1).
To mitigate the spread of COVID-19, protect the public health, and provide essential protections to vulnerable Michiganders, it is reasonable and necessary to impose limited and temporary restrictions on the use of places of public accommodation.
Acting under the Michigan Constitution of 1963 and Michigan law, I order the following:
1. Beginning as soon as possible but no later than March 16, 2020 at 3:00 pm, and continuing until March 30, 2020 at 11:59 pm, the following places of public accommodation are closed to ingress, egress, use, and occupancy by members of the public:
a. Restaurants, food courts, cafes, co"eehouses, and other places of public accommodation o"ering food or beverage for on-premises consumption;
b. Bars, taverns, brew pubs, breweries, microbreweries, distilleries, wineries, tasting rooms, special licensees, clubs, and other places of public accommodation o"ering alcoholic beverages for on-premises consumption;
c. Hookah bars, cigar bars, and vaping lounges o"ering their products for on-premises consumption;
d. Theaters, cinemas, and indoor and outdoor performance venues;
e. Libraries and museums;
f. Gymnasiums, !tness centers, recreation centers, indoor sports facilities, indoor exercise facilities, exercise studios, and spas;
g. Casinos licensed by the Michigan Gaming Control Board, racetracks licensed by the Michigan Gaming Control Board, and Millionaire Parties licensed by the Michigan Gaming Control Board; and
h. Places of public amusement not otherwise listed above.
Places of public accommodation subject to this section are encouraged to o"er food and beverage using delivery service, window service, walk-up service, drive-through service, or drive-up service, and to use precautions in doing so to mitigate the potential transmission of COVID-19, including social distancing. In o"ering food or beverage, a place of public accommodation subject to this section may permit up to !ve members of the public at one time in the place of public accommodation for the purpose of picking up their food or beverage orders, so long as those individuals are at least six feet apart from one another while on premises.
This section does not prohibit an employee, contractor, vendor, or supplier of a place of public accommodation from entering, exiting, using, or occupying that place of public accommodation in their professional capacity.
2. The restrictions imposed by this order do not apply to any of the following:
a. Places of public accommodation that o"er food and beverage not for on-premises consumption, including grocery stores, markets, convenience stores, pharmacies, drug stores, and food pantries, other than those portions of the place of public accommodation subject to the requirements of section 1;
b. Health care facilities, residential care facilities, congregate care facilities, and juvenile justice facilities;
c. Crisis shelters or similar institutions; and d. Food courts inside the secured zones of airports.
3. For purposes of this order:
a. “Place of public accommodation” means a business, or an educational, refreshment, entertainment, or recreation facility, or an institution of any kind, whether licensed or not, whose goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations are extended, o"ered, sold, or otherwise made available to the public. Place of public accommodation also includes the facilities of private clubs, including country clubs, golf clubs, boating or yachting clubs, sports or athletic clubs, and dining clubs.
b. “Place of public amusement” means a place of public accommodation that o"ers indoor services or facilities, or outdoor services or facilities involving close contact of persons, for amusement or other recreational or entertainment purposes. A place of public amusement includes an amusement park, arcade, bingo hall, bowling alley, indoor climbing facility, skating rink, trampoline park, and other similar recreational or entertainment facilities.
4. The director of the Department of Health and Human Services, the Michigan Liquor Control Commission, and the executive director of the Michigan Gaming Control Board must issue orders and directives and take other actions pursuant to law as necessary to implement this order.
5. This order does not alter any of the obligations under law of an employer a"ected by this order to its employees or to the employees of another employer.
6. Consistent with MCL 10.33 and MCL 30.405(3), a willful violation of this order is a misdemeanor.
Given under my hand and the Great Seal of the State of Michigan.
MICHIGAN.GOV HOME ADA MICHIGAN NEWS POLICIES COPYRIGHT 2020 STATE OF MICHIGAN

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 33-5 filed 06/08/20 PageID.308 Page 1 of 2

DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

_____________________________________________________

LEAGUE OF INDPENDENT FITNESS FACITLITIES AND TRAINERS, INC., BASELINE FITNESS LLC, BUILDING YOUR TEMPLE LLC, BYT FITNESS 247 LLC, CLAWSON FITNESS, LLC, CLINTON FITNESS, INC., D-LUX KARATE UNIVERSITY LLC, FENTON ATHLETIC CLUB, INC., FENTON KARATE, LLC, FUSION FITNESS 24/7 LLC, H3 FITNESS LLC, I FITNESS PERSONAL TRAINING, INC., JKP FITNESS, LLC, JPF ENTERPRISES, LLC, M FITNESS CLUB, LLC, MH & AB LLC, MOTOR CITY CF - ST. CLAIR SHORES, LLC, NASCOT ENTERPRISES, LLC, PRISON CITY PHYSIQUE LLC, RMP FITNESS INC., STRENGTH BEYOND LLC, 24/7 BOOTCAMP AND BOXING INC., and 4 SEASONS GYM, LLC,
Plaintiffs, v. GRETCHEN E. WHITMER and ROBERT GORDON,
Defendants. _____________________________________________________
ERSKINE LAW, PC Scott M. Erskine (P54734) Carly Van Thomme (P59706) Attorneys for Plaintiffs 612 W. University
Exhibit 5

Civil No. 1:20-cv-00458 Hon. Paul L. Maloney

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 33-5 filed 06/08/20 PageID.309 Page 2 of 2
THE OFFICE OF
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Executive Order 2020-20 (COVID-19)

EXECUTIVE ORDER

No. 2020-20

Temporary restrictions on the use of places of public accommodation

Rescission of Executive Order 2020-9

The novel coronavirus (COVID-19) is a respiratory disease that can result in serious illness or death. It is caused by a new strain of coronavirus not previously identi!ed in humans and easily spread from person to person. There is currently no approved vaccine or antiviral treatment for this disease.
On March 10, 2020, the Michigan Department of Health and Human Services identi!ed the !rst two presumptive-positive cases of COVID-19 in Michigan. On that same day, I issued Executive Order 2020-4. This order declared a state of emergency across the state of Michigan under section 1 of article 5 of the Michigan Constitution of 1963, the Emergency Management Act, 1976 PA 390, as amended, MCL 30.401-.421, and the Emergency Powers of the Governor Act of 1945, 1945 PA 302, as amended, MCL 10.31-.33.
The Emergency Management Act vests the governor with broad powers and duties to “cop[e] with dangers to this state or the people of this state presented by a disaster or emergency,” which the governor may implement through “executive orders, proclamations, and directives having the force and e"ect of law.” MCL 30.403(1)-(2). Similarly, the Emergency Powers of the Governor Act of 1945, provides that, after declaring a state of emergency, “the governor may promulgate reasonable orders, rules, and regulations as he or she considers necessary to protect life and property or to bring the emergency situation within the a"ected area under control.” MCL 10.31(1).
To mitigate the spread of COVID-19, protect the public health, and provide essential protections to vulnerable Michiganders, it is reasonable and necessary to impose limited and temporary restrictions on the use of places of public accommodation.
Executive Order 2020-9 imposed such restrictions. This order changes those restrictions by clarifying their application to facilities o"ering non-essential personal care services. When the restrictions in this order take e"ect, Executive Order 2020-9 is rescinded.

Acting under the Michigan Constitution of 1963 and Michigan law, I order the following:
1. Beginning as soon as possible but no later than March 22, 2020 at 9:00 am, and continuing until April 13, 2020 at 11:59 pm, the following places of public accommodation are closed to ingress, egress, use, and occupancy by members of the public:
a. Restaurants, food courts, cafes, co"eehouses, and other places of public accommodation o"ering food or beverage for on-premises consumption;
b. Bars, taverns, brew pubs, breweries, microbreweries, distilleries, wineries, tasting rooms, special licensees, clubs, and other places of public accommodation o"ering alcoholic beverages for on-premises consumption;
c. Hookah bars, cigar bars, and vaping lounges o"ering their products for on-premises consumption;
d. Theaters, cinemas, and indoor and outdoor performance venues;
e. Libraries and museums;
f. Gymnasiums, !tness centers, recreation centers, indoor sports facilities, indoor exercise facilities, exercise studios, and facilities o"ering non-essential personal care services;
g. Casinos licensed by the Michigan Gaming Control Board, racetracks licensed by the Michigan Gaming Control Board, and Millionaire Parties licensed by the Michigan Gaming Control Board; and
h. Places of public amusement not otherwise listed above.
Places of public accommodation subject to this section are encouraged to o"er food and beverage using delivery service, window service, walk-up service, drive-through service, or drive-up service, and to use precautions in doing so to mitigate the potential transmission of COVID-19, including social distancing. In o"ering food or beverage, a place of public accommodation subject to this section may permit up to !ve members of the public at one time in the place of public accommodation for the purpose of picking up their food or beverage orders, so long as those individuals are at least six feet apart from one another while on premises.
This section does not prohibit an employee, contractor, vendor, or supplier of a place of public accommodation from entering, exiting, using, or occupying that place of public accommodation in their professional capacity.
2. The restrictions imposed by this order do not apply to any of the following:
a. Places of public accommodation that o"er food and beverage not for on-premises consumption, including grocery stores, markets, convenience stores, pharmacies, drug stores, and food pantries, other than those portions of the place of public accommodation subject to the requirements of section 1;
b. Health care facilities, residential care facilities, congregate care facilities, and juvenile justice facilities;
c. Crisis shelters or similar institutions; and d. Food courts inside the secured zones of airports.
3. For purposes of this order:
a. “Non-essential personal care services” includes but is not limited to hair, nail, tanning, massage, traditional spa, tattoo, body art, and piercing services, and similar personal care services that require individuals to be within six feet of each other. This does not include services necessary for medical treatment as determined by a licensed medical provider.
b. “Place of public accommodation” means a business, or an educational, refreshment, entertainment, or recreation facility, or an institution of any kind, whether licensed or not, whose goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations are extended, o"ered, sold, or otherwise made available to the public. Place of public accommodation also includes the facilities of private clubs, including country clubs, golf clubs, boating or yachting clubs, sports or athletic clubs, and dining clubs.
c. “Place of public amusement” means a place of public accommodation that o"ers indoor services or facilities, or outdoor services or facilities involving close contact of persons, for amusement or other recreational or entertainment purposes. A place of public amusement includes an amusement park, arcade, bingo hall, bowling alley, indoor climbing facility, skating rink, trampoline park, and other similar recreational or entertainment facilities.
4. The director of the Department of Health and Human Services, the Michigan Liquor Control Commission, and the executive director of the Michigan Gaming Control Board must issue orders and directives and take other actions pursuant to law as necessary to implement this order.
5. This order does not alter any of the obligations under law of an employer a"ected by this order to its employees or to the employees of another employer.
6. Consistent with MCL 10.33 and MCL 30.405(3), a willful violation of this order is a misdemeanor.
7. On March 22, 2020 at 9:00 am, Executive Order 2020-9 is rescinded.
Given under my hand and the Great Seal of the State of Michigan.
MICHIGAN.GOV HOME ADA MICHIGAN NEWS POLICIES COPYRIGHT 2020 STATE OF MICHIGAN

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 33-6 filed 06/08/20 PageID.310 Page 1 of 2

DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

_____________________________________________________

LEAGUE OF INDPENDENT FITNESS FACITLITIES AND TRAINERS, INC., BASELINE FITNESS LLC, BUILDING YOUR TEMPLE LLC, BYT FITNESS 247 LLC, CLAWSON FITNESS, LLC, CLINTON FITNESS, INC., D-LUX KARATE UNIVERSITY LLC, FENTON ATHLETIC CLUB, INC., FENTON KARATE, LLC, FUSION FITNESS 24/7 LLC, H3 FITNESS LLC, I FITNESS PERSONAL TRAINING, INC., JKP FITNESS, LLC, JPF ENTERPRISES, LLC, M FITNESS CLUB, LLC, MH & AB LLC, MOTOR CITY CF - ST. CLAIR SHORES, LLC, NASCOT ENTERPRISES, LLC, PRISON CITY PHYSIQUE LLC, RMP FITNESS INC., STRENGTH BEYOND LLC, 24/7 BOOTCAMP AND BOXING INC., and 4 SEASONS GYM, LLC,
Plaintiffs, v. GRETCHEN E. WHITMER and ROBERT GORDON,
Defendants. _____________________________________________________
ERSKINE LAW, PC Scott M. Erskine (P54734) Carly Van Thomme (P59706) Attorneys for Plaintiffs 612 W. University
Exhibit 6

Civil No. 1:20-cv-00458 Hon. Paul L. Maloney

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 33-6 filed 06/08/20 PageID.311 Page 2 of 2
THE OFFICE OF
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Executive Order 2020-43 (COVID-19)

EXECUTIVE ORDER

No. 2020-43

Temporary restrictions on the use of places of public accommodation

Rescission of Executive Order 2020-20

The novel coronavirus (COVID-19) is a respiratory disease that can result in serious illness or death. It is caused by a new strain of coronavirus not previously identi!ed in humans and easily spread from person to person. There is currently no approved vaccine or antiviral treatment for this disease.
On March 10, 2020, the Michigan Department of Health and Human Services identi!ed the !rst two presumptive-positive cases of COVID-19 in Michigan. On that same day, I issued Executive Order 2020-4. This order declared a state of emergency across the state of Michigan under section 1 of article 5 of the Michigan Constitution of 1963, the Emergency Management Act, 1976 PA 390, as amended, MCL 30.401 et seq., and the Emergency Powers of the Governor Act of 1945, 1945 PA 302, as amended, MCL 10.31 et seq.
In the three weeks that followed, the virus spread across Michigan, bringing deaths in the hundreds, con!rmed cases in the thousands, and deep disruption to this state’s economy, homes, and educational, civic, social, and religious institutions. On April 1, 2020, in response to the widespread and severe health, economic, and social harms posed by the COVID-19 pandemic, I issued Executive Order 2020-33. This order expanded on Executive Order 2020-4 and declared both a state of emergency and a state of disaster across the State of Michigan under section 1 of article 5 of the Michigan Constitution of 1963, the Emergency Management Act, and the Emergency Powers of the Governor Act of 1945.
The Emergency Management Act vests the governor with broad powers and duties to “cop[e] with dangers to this state or the people of this state presented by a disaster or emergency,” which the governor may implement through “executive orders, proclamations, and directives having the force and e!ect of law.” MCL 30.403(1)-(2). Similarly, the Emergency Powers of the Governor Act of 1945 provides that, after declaring a state of emergency, “the governor may promulgate reasonable orders, rules, and regulations as he or she considers necessary to protect life and property or to bring the emergency situation within the a!ected area under control.” MCL 10.31(1).
To mitigate the spread of COVID-19, protect the public health, and provide essential protections to vulnerable Michiganders, it is reasonable and necessary to impose limited and temporary restrictions on the use of places of public accommodation.
Executive Order 2020-20 imposed such restrictions, which were then supplemented by the restrictions on in-person work, travel, and gatherings imposed by Executive Order 2020-42. Because these restrictions on places of public accommodation remain reasonable and necessary to suppress the spread of COVID-19 and protect the public health and safety of this state and its residents, this order extends their duration to April 30, 2020, to match the duration of the further restrictions imposed by Executive Order 2020-42. With this order, Executive Order 2020-20 is rescinded.
Acting under the Michigan Constitution of 1963 and Michigan law, I order the following:
1. E"ective immediately and continuing until April 30, 2020 at 11:59 pm, the following places of public accommodation are closed to ingress, egress, use, and occupancy by members of the public:
a. Restaurants, food courts, cafes, co"eehouses, and other places of public accommodation o"ering food or beverage for on-premises consumption;
b. Bars, taverns, brew pubs, breweries, microbreweries, distilleries, wineries, tasting rooms, special licensees, clubs, and other places of public accommodation o"ering alcoholic beverages for on-premises consumption;
c. Hookah bars, cigar bars, and vaping lounges o"ering their products for on-premises consumption;
d. Theaters, cinemas, and indoor and outdoor performance venues;
e. Libraries and museums;
f. Gymnasiums, !tness centers, recreation centers, indoor sports facilities, indoor exercise facilities, exercise studios, and facilities o"ering non-essential personal care services;
g. Casinos licensed by the Michigan Gaming Control Board, racetracks licensed by the Michigan Gaming Control Board, and Millionaire Parties licensed by the Michigan Gaming Control Board; and
h. Places of public amusement not otherwise listed above.
Places of public accommodation subject to this section are encouraged to o"er food and beverage using delivery service, window service, walk-up service, drive-through service, or drive-up service, and must use precautions in doing so to mitigate the potential transmission of COVID-19, including social distancing. In o"ering food or beverage, a place of public accommodation subject to this section may permit up to !ve members of the public at one time in the place of public accommodation for the purpose of picking up their food or beverage orders, so long as those individuals are at least six feet apart from one another while on premises.
This section does not prohibit an employee, contractor, vendor, or supplier of a place of public accommodation from entering, exiting, using, or occupying that place of public accommodation in their professional capacity.
2. The restrictions imposed by this order do not apply to any of the following:
a. Places of public accommodation that o"er food and beverage not for on-premises consumption, including grocery stores, markets, convenience stores, pharmacies, drug stores, and food pantries, other than those portions of the place of public accommodation subject to the requirements of section 1;
b. Health care facilities, residential care facilities, congregate care facilities, and juvenile justice facilities;
c. Crisis shelters or similar institutions; and d. Food courts inside the secured zones of airports.
3. For purposes of this order:
a. “Non-essential personal care services” includes but is not limited to hair, nail, tanning, massage, traditional spa, tattoo, body art, and piercing services, and similar personal care services that require individuals to be within six feet of each other. This does not include services necessary for medical treatment as determined by a licensed medical provider.
b. “Place of public accommodation” means a business, or an educational, refreshment, entertainment, or recreation facility, or an institution of any kind, whether licensed or not, whose goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations are extended, o"ered, sold, or otherwise made available to the public. Place of public accommodation also includes the facilities of private clubs, including country clubs, golf clubs, boating or yachting clubs, sports or athletic clubs, and dining clubs.
c. “Place of public amusement” means a place of public accommodation that o"ers indoor services or facilities, or outdoor services or facilities involving close contact of persons, for amusement or other recreational or entertainment purposes. A place of public amusement includes an amusement park, arcade, bingo hall, bowling alley, indoor climbing facility, skating rink, trampoline park, and other similar recreational or entertainment facilities.
4. The director of the Department of Health and Human Services, the Michigan Liquor Control Commission, and the executive director of the Michigan Gaming Control Board must issue orders and directives and take other actions pursuant to law as necessary to implement this order.
5. This order does not alter any of the obligations under law of an employer a"ected by this order to its employees or to the employees of another employer.
6. The restrictions and requirements imposed by this order supplement, and must not be construed to diminish or relax in any way, the restrictions and requirements imposed by Executive Order 2020-42 or any executive order that may follow from it.
7. Consistent with MCL 10.33 and MCL 30.405(3), a willful violation of this order is a misdemeanor.
8. Executive Order 2020-20 is rescinded.
Given under my hand and the Great Seal of the State of Michigan.
MICHIGAN.GOV HOME ADA MICHIGAN NEWS POLICIES COPYRIGHT 2020 STATE OF MICHIGAN

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 33-7 filed 06/08/20 PageID.312 Page 1 of 2

DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

_____________________________________________________

LEAGUE OF INDPENDENT FITNESS FACITLITIES AND TRAINERS, INC., BASELINE FITNESS LLC, BUILDING YOUR TEMPLE LLC, BYT FITNESS 247 LLC, CLAWSON FITNESS, LLC, CLINTON FITNESS, INC., D-LUX KARATE UNIVERSITY LLC, FENTON ATHLETIC CLUB, INC., FENTON KARATE, LLC, FUSION FITNESS 24/7 LLC, H3 FITNESS LLC, I FITNESS PERSONAL TRAINING, INC., JKP FITNESS, LLC, JPF ENTERPRISES, LLC, M FITNESS CLUB, LLC, MH & AB LLC, MOTOR CITY CF - ST. CLAIR SHORES, LLC, NASCOT ENTERPRISES, LLC, PRISON CITY PHYSIQUE LLC, RMP FITNESS INC., STRENGTH BEYOND LLC, 24/7 BOOTCAMP AND BOXING INC., and 4 SEASONS GYM, LLC,
Plaintiffs, v. GRETCHEN E. WHITMER and ROBERT GORDON,
Defendants. _____________________________________________________
ERSKINE LAW, PC Scott M. Erskine (P54734) Carly Van Thomme (P59706) Attorneys for Plaintiffs 612 W. University
Exhibit 7

Civil No. 1:20-cv-00458 Hon. Paul L. Maloney

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 33-7 filed 06/08/20 PageID.313 Page 2 of 2
THE OFFICE OF
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Executive Order 2020-69 (COVID-19)

EXECUTIVE ORDER

No. 2020-69

Temporary restrictions on the use of places of public accommodation

Rescission of Executive Order 2020-43

The novel coronavirus (COVID-19) is a respiratory disease that can result in serious illness or death. It is caused by a new strain of coronavirus not previously identi!ed in humans and easily spread from person to person. There is currently no approved vaccine or antiviral treatment for this disease.
On March 10, 2020, the Department of Health and Human Services identi!ed the !rst two presumptive-positive cases of COVID-19 in Michigan. On that same day, I issued Executive Order 2020-4. This order declared a state of emergency across the state of Michigan under section 1 of article 5 of the Michigan Constitution of 1963, the Emergency Management Act, 1976 PA 390, as amended, MCL 30.401 et seq., and the Emergency Powers of the Governor Act of 1945, 1945 PA 302, as amended, MCL 10.31 et seq.
Since then, the virus spread across Michigan, bringing deaths in the thousands, con!rmed cases in the tens of thousands, and deep disruption to this state’s economy, homes, and educational, civic, social, and religious institutions. On April 1, 2020, in response to the widespread and severe health, economic, and social harms posed by the COVID-19 pandemic, I issued Executive Order 2020-33. This order expanded on Executive Order 2020-4 and declared both a state of emergency and a state of disaster across the State of Michigan under section 1 of article 5 of the Michigan Constitution of 1963, the Emergency Management Act, and the Emergency Powers of the Governor Act of 1945. And on April 30, 2020, !nding that COVID-19 had created emergency and disaster conditions across the State of Michigan, I issued Executive Order 2020-67 to continue the emergency declaration under the Emergency Powers of the Governor Act, as well as Executive Order 2020-68 to issue new emergency and disaster declarations under the Emergency Management Act.
The Emergency Management Act vests the governor with broad powers and duties to “cop[e] with dangers to this state or the people of this state presented by a disaster or emergency,” which the governor may implement through “executive orders, proclamations, and directives having the force and e"ect of law.” MCL 30.403(1)-(2). Similarly, the Emergency Powers of the Governor Act of 1945 provides that, after declaring a state of emergency, “the governor may promulgate reasonable orders, rules, and regulations as he or she considers necessary to protect life and property or to bring the emergency situation within the a"ected area under control.” MCL 10.31(1).
To mitigate the spread of COVID-19, protect the public health, and provide essential protections to vulnerable Michiganders, it is reasonable and necessary to impose limited and temporary restrictions on the use of places of public accommodation.
Executive Order 2020-20 imposed such restrictions, which were then supplemented by the restrictions on in-person work, travel, and gatherings imposed by Executive Order 2020-42. Executive Orders 2020-20 and 2020-42 were then replaced by Executive Orders 2020-43 and 2020-59, respectively. Because these restrictions on places of public accommodation remain reasonable and necessary to suppress the spread of COVID-19 and protect the public health and safety of this state and its residents, this order extends their duration to May 28, 2020. With this order, Executive Order 2020-43 is rescinded.
Acting under the Michigan Constitution of 1963 and Michigan law, I order the following:
1. E"ective immediately and continuing until May 28, 2020 at 11:59 pm, the following places of public accommodation are closed to ingress, egress, use, and occupancy by members of the public:
a. Restaurants, food courts, cafes, co"eehouses, and other places of public accommodation o"ering food or beverage for on-premises consumption;
b. Bars, taverns, brew pubs, breweries, microbreweries, distilleries, wineries, tasting rooms, special licensees, clubs, and other places of public accommodation o"ering alcoholic beverages for on-premises consumption;
c. Hookah bars, cigar bars, and vaping lounges o"ering their products for on-premises consumption;
d. Theaters, cinemas, and indoor and outdoor performance venues;
e. Libraries and museums;
f. Gymnasiums, !tness centers, recreation centers, indoor sports facilities, indoor exercise facilities, exercise studios, and facilities o"ering non-essential personal care services;
g. Casinos licensed by the Michigan Gaming Control Board, racetracks licensed by the Michigan Gaming Control Board, and Millionaire Parties licensed by the Michigan Gaming Control Board; and
h. Places of public amusement not otherwise listed above.
Places of public accommodation subject to this section are encouraged to o"er food and beverage using delivery service, window service, walk-up service, drive-through service, or drive-up service, and must use precautions in doing so to mitigate the potential transmission of COVID-19, including social distancing. In o"ering food or beverage, a place of public accommodation subject to this section may permit up to !ve members of the public at one time in the place of public accommodation for the purpose of picking up their food or beverage orders, so long as those individuals are at least six feet apart from one another while on premises.
This section does not prohibit an employee, contractor, vendor, or supplier of a place of public accommodation from entering, exiting, using, or occupying that place of public accommodation in their professional capacity.
2. The restrictions imposed by this order do not apply to any of the following:
a. Places of public accommodation that o"er food and beverage not for on-premises consumption, including grocery stores, markets, convenience stores, pharmacies, drug stores, and food pantries, other than those portions of the place of public accommodation subject to the requirements of section 1;
b. Health care facilities, residential care facilities, congregate care facilities, and juvenile justice facilities;
c. Crisis shelters or similar institutions; and d. Food courts inside the secured zones of airports.
3. For purposes of this order:
a. “Non-essential personal care services” includes but is not limited to hair, nail, tanning, massage, traditional spa, tattoo, body art, and piercing services, and similar personal care services that require individuals to be within six feet of each other. This does not include services necessary for medical treatment as determined by a licensed medical provider.
b. “Place of public accommodation” means a business, or an educational, refreshment, entertainment, or recreation facility, or an institution of any kind, whether licensed or not, whose goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations are extended, o"ered, sold, or otherwise made available to the public. Place of public accommodation also includes the facilities of private clubs, including country clubs, golf clubs, boating or yachting clubs, sports or athletic clubs, and dining clubs.
c. “Place of public amusement” means a place of public accommodation that o"ers indoor services or facilities, or outdoor services or facilities involving close contact of persons, for amusement or other recreational or entertainment purposes. A place of public amusement includes an amusement park, arcade, bingo hall, bowling alley, indoor climbing facility, skating rink, trampoline park, and other similar recreational or entertainment facilities.
4. The director of the Department of Health and Human Services, the Michigan Liquor Control Commission, and the executive director of the Michigan Gaming Control Board must issue orders and directives and take other actions pursuant to law as necessary to implement this order.
5. This order does not alter any of the obligations under law of an employer a"ected by this order to its employees or to the employees of another employer.
6. The restrictions and requirements imposed by this order supplement, and must not be construed to diminish or relax in any way, the restrictions and requirements imposed by Executive Order 2020-59 or any executive order that may follow from it.
7. Consistent with MCL 10.33 and MCL 30.405(3), a willful violation of this order is a misdemeanor.
8. Executive Order 2020-43 is rescinded.
Given under my hand and the Great Seal of the State of Michigan.
MICHIGAN.GOV HOME ADA MICHIGAN NEWS POLICIES COPYRIGHT 2020 STATE OF MICHIGAN

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 33-8 filed 06/08/20 PageID.314 Page 1 of 2

DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

_____________________________________________________

LEAGUE OF INDPENDENT FITNESS FACITLITIES AND TRAINERS, INC., BASELINE FITNESS LLC, BUILDING YOUR TEMPLE LLC, BYT FITNESS 247 LLC, CLAWSON FITNESS, LLC, CLINTON FITNESS, INC., D-LUX KARATE UNIVERSITY LLC, FENTON ATHLETIC CLUB, INC., FENTON KARATE, LLC, FUSION FITNESS 24/7 LLC, H3 FITNESS LLC, I FITNESS PERSONAL TRAINING, INC., JKP FITNESS, LLC, JPF ENTERPRISES, LLC, M FITNESS CLUB, LLC, MH & AB LLC, MOTOR CITY CF - ST. CLAIR SHORES, LLC, NASCOT ENTERPRISES, LLC, PRISON CITY PHYSIQUE LLC, RMP FITNESS INC., STRENGTH BEYOND LLC, 24/7 BOOTCAMP AND BOXING INC., and 4 SEASONS GYM, LLC,
Plaintiffs, v. GRETCHEN E. WHITMER and ROBERT GORDON,
Defendants. _____________________________________________________
ERSKINE LAW, PC Scott M. Erskine (P54734) Carly Van Thomme (P59706) Attorneys for Plaintiffs 612 W. University
Exhibit 8

Civil No. 1:20-cv-00458 Hon. Paul L. Maloney

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 33-8 filed 06/08/20 PageID.315 Page 2 of 2
THE OFFICE OF
GOVERNOR GRETCHEN WHITMER

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NEWS

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WHITMER / NEWS / EXECUTIVE ORDERS

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APPOINTMENTS

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Executive Order 2020-21 (COVID-19)

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LT GOVERNOR

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EXECUTIVE ORDER
No. 2020-21
Temporary requirement to suspend activities that are not necessary to sustain or protect life
The novel coronavirus (COVID-19) is a respiratory disease that can result in serious illness or death. It is caused by a new strain of coronavirus not previously identi!ed in humans and easily spread from person to person. Older adults and those with chronic health conditions are at particular risk, and there is an increased risk of rapid spread of COVID-19 among persons in close proximity to one another. There is currently no approved vaccine or antiviral treatment for this disease.
On March 10, 2020, the Michigan Department of Health and Human Services identi!ed the !rst two presumptive-positive cases of COVID-19 in Michigan. On that same day, I issued Executive Order 2020-4. This order declared a state of emergency across the state of Michigan under section 1 of article 5 of the Michigan Constitution of 1963, the Emergency Management Act, 1976 PA 390, as amended, MCL 30.401-.421, and the Emergency Powers of the Governor Act of 1945, 1945 PA 302, as amended, MCL 10.31-.33.
The Emergency Management Act vests the governor with broad powers and duties to “cop[e] with dangers to this state or the people of this state presented by a disaster or emergency,” which the governor may implement through “executive orders, proclamations, and directives having the force and e"ect of law.” MCL 30.403(1)-(2). Similarly, the Emergency Powers of the Governor Act of 1945, provides that, after declaring a state of emergency, “the governor may promulgate reasonable orders, rules, and regulations as he or she considers necessary to protect life and property or to bring the emergency situation within the a"ected area under control.” MCL 10.31(1).
To suppress the spread of COVID-19, to prevent the state’s health care system from being overwhelmed, to allow time for the production of critical test kits, ventilators, and personal protective equipment, and to avoid needless deaths, it is reasonable and necessary to direct residents to remain at home or in their place of residence to the maximum extent feasible.
This order takes e"ect on March 24, 2020 at 12:01 am, and continues through April 13, 2020 at 11:59 pm.
Acting under the Michigan Constitution of 1963 and Michigan law, I order the following:
1. This order must be construed broadly to prohibit in-person work that is not necessary to sustain or protect life.
2. Subject to the exceptions in section 7, all individuals currently living within the State of Michigan are ordered to stay at home or at their place of residence. Subject to the same exceptions, all public and private gatherings of any number of people occurring among persons not part of a single household are prohibited.
3. All individuals who leave their home or place of residence must adhere to social distancing measures recommended by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, including remaining at least six feet from people from outside the individual’s household to the extent feasible under the circumstances.
4. No person or entity shall operate a business or conduct operations that require workers to leave their homes or places of residence except to the extent that those workers are necessary to sustain or protect life or to conduct minimum basic operations.
a. For purposes of this order, workers who are necessary to sustain or protect life are de!ned as “critical infrastructure workers,” as described in sections 8 and 9.
b. For purposes of this order, workers who are necessary to conduct minimum basic operations are those whose in-person presence is strictly necessary to allow the business or operation to maintain the value of inventory and equipment, care for animals, ensure security, process transactions (including payroll and employee bene!ts), or facilitate the ability of other workers to work remotely. Businesses and operations must determine which of their workers are necessary to conduct minimum basic operations and inform such workers of that designation. Businesses and operations must make such designations in writing, whether by electronic message, public website, or other appropriate means. Such designations, however, may be made orally until March 31, 2020 at 11:59 pm.
5. Businesses and operations that employ critical infrastructure workers may continue in-person operations, subject to the following conditions:
a. Consistent with sections 8 and 9, businesses and operations must determine which of their workers are critical infrastructure workers and inform such workers of that designation. Businesses and operations must make such designations in writing, whether by electronic message, public website, or other appropriate means. Such designations, however, may be made orally until March 31, 2020 at 11:59 pm. Businesses and operations need not designate:
1. Workers in health care and public health.
2. Workers who perform necessary government activities, as described in section 6.
3. Workers and volunteers described in section 9(d).
b. In-person activities that are not necessary to sustain or protect life must be suspended until normal operations resume.
c. Businesses and operations maintaining in-person activities must adopt social distancing practices and other mitigation measures to protect workers and patrons. Those practices and measures include, but are not limited to:
1. Restricting the number of workers present on premises to no more than is strictly necessary to perform the business’s or operation’s critical infrastructure functions.
2. Promoting remote work to the fullest extent possible.
3. Keeping workers and patrons who are on premises at least six feet from one another to the maximum extent possible, including for customers who are standing in line.
4. Increasing standards of facility cleaning and disinfection to limit worker and patron exposure to COVID-19, as well as adopting protocols to clean and disinfect in the event of a positive COVID-19 case in the workplace.
5. Adopting policies to prevent workers from entering the premises if they display respiratory symptoms or have had contact with a person who is known or suspected to have COVID-19.
6. Any other social distancing practices and mitigation measures recommended by the Centers for Disease Control.
6. All in-person government activities at whatever level (state, county, or local) that are not necessary to sustain or protect life, or to supporting those businesses and operations that are necessary to sustain or protect life, are suspended.
a. For purposes of this order, necessary government activities include activities performed by critical infrastructure workers, including workers in law enforcement, public safety, and !rst responders.
b. Such activities also include, but are not limited to, public transit, trash pick-up and disposal, activities necessary to manage and oversee elections, operations necessary to enable transactions that support the work of a business’s or operation’s critical infrastructure workers, and the maintenance of safe and sanitary public parks so as to allow for outdoor recreation.
c. For purposes of this order, necessary government activities include minimum basic operations, as described in section 4(b). Workers performing such activities need not be designated.
d. Any in-person government activities must be performed consistently with the social distancing practices and other mitigation measures to protect workers and patrons described in section 5(c).
7. Exceptions. a. Individuals may leave their home or place of residence, and travel as necessary: 1. To engage in outdoor activity, including walking, hiking, running, cycling, or any other recreational activity consistent with remaining at least six feet from people from outside the individual’s household.
2. To perform their jobs as critical infrastructure workers after being so designated by their employers. (Critical infrastructure workers who need not be designated under section 5(a) may leave their home for work without a designation.)
3. To conduct minimum basic operations, as described in section 4(b), after being designated to perform such work by their employers.
4. To perform necessary government activities, as described in section 6.
5. To perform tasks that are necessary to their health and safety, or to the health and safety of their family or household members (including pets). Individuals may, for example, leave the home or place of residence to secure medication or to seek medical or dental care that is necessary to address a medical emergency or to preserve the health and safety of a household or family member (including procedures that, in accordance with a duly implemented nonessential procedures postponement plan, have not been postponed).
6. To obtain necessary services or supplies for themselves, their family or household members, and their vehicles. Individuals must secure such services or supplies via delivery to the maximum extent possible. As needed, however, individuals may leave the home or place of residence to purchase groceries, take-out food, gasoline, needed medical supplies, and any other products necessary to maintain the safety, sanitation, and basic operation of their residences.
7. To care for a family member or a family member’s pet in another household.
8. To care for minors, dependents, the elderly, persons with disabilities, or other vulnerable persons.
9. To visit an individual under the care of a health care facility, residential care facility, or congregate care facility, to the extent otherwise permitted.
10. To attend legal proceedings or hearings for essential or emergency purposes as ordered by a court.
11. To work or volunteer for businesses or operations (including both and religious and secular nonpro!t organizations) that provide food, shelter, and other necessities of life for economically disadvantaged or otherwise needy individuals, individuals who need assistance as a result of this emergency, and people with disabilities.
b. Individuals may also travel: 1. To return to a home or place of residence from outside this state. 2. To leave this state for a home or residence elsewhere.
3. To travel between two residences in this state. 4. As required by law enforcement or a court order, including the transportation of children pursuant to a custody agreement.
8. For purposes of this order, critical infrastructure workers are those workers described by the Director of the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency in his guidance of March 19, 2020 on the COVID-19 response (available here). Such workers include some workers in each of the following sectors:
a. Health care and public health.
b. Law enforcement, public safety, and !rst responders.
c. Food and agriculture.
d. Energy.
e. Water and wastewater.
f. Transportation and logistics.
g. Public works.
h. Communications and information technology, including news media.
i. Other community-based government operations and essential functions.
j. Critical manufacturing.
k. Hazardous materials.
l. Financial services.
m. Chemical supply chains and safety.
n. Defense industrial base.
9. For purposes of this order, critical infrastructure workers also include:
a. Child care workers (including workers at disaster relief child care centers), but only to the extent necessary to serve the children or dependents of critical infrastructure workers as de!ned in this order. This category includes individuals (whether licensed or not) who have arranged to care for the children or dependents of critical infrastructure workers.
b. Workers at designated suppliers and distribution centers, as described below.
1. A business or operation that employs critical infrastructure workers may designate suppliers, distribution centers, or service providers whose continued operation is necessary to enable, support, or facilitate the work of its critical infrastructure workers.
2. Such suppliers, distribution centers, or service providers may designate workers as critical infrastructure workers only to the extent those workers are necessary to enable, support, or facilitate the work of the original operation’s or business’s critical infrastructure workers.
3. Designated suppliers, distribution centers, and service providers may in turn designate additional suppliers, distribution centers, and service providers whose continued operation is necessary to enable, support, or facilitate the work of their critical infrastructure workers.
4. Such additional suppliers, distribution centers, and service providers may designate workers as critical infrastructure workers only to the extent that those workers are necessary to enable, support, or facilitate the work of the critical infrastructure workers at the supplier, distribution center, or service provider that has designated them.
5. Businesses, operations, suppliers, distribution centers, and service providers must make all designations in writing to the entities they are designating, whether by electronic message, public website, or other appropriate means. Such designations may be made orally until March 31, 2020 at 11:59 pm.
6. Businesses, operations, suppliers, distribution centers, and service providers that abuse their designation authority shall be subject to sanctions to the fullest extent of the law.
c. Workers in the insurance industry, but only to the extent that their work cannot be done by telephone or remotely.
d. Workers and volunteers for businesses or operations (including both and religious and secular nonpro!t organizations) that provide food, shelter, and other necessities of life for economically disadvantaged or otherwise needy individuals, individuals who need assistance as a result of this emergency, and people with disabilities.
e. Workers who perform critical labor union functions, including those who administer health and welfare funds and those who monitor the well-being and safety of union members who are critical infrastructure workers, provided that any administration or monitoring should be done by telephone or remotely where possible.
10. Nothing in this order should be taken to supersede another executive order or directive that is in e"ect, except to the extent this order imposes more stringent limitations on in-person work, activities, and interactions. Consistent with prior guidance, a place of religious worship, when used for religious worship, is not subject to penalty under section 14.
11. Nothing in this order should be taken to interfere with or infringe on the powers of the legislative and judicial branches to perform their constitutional duties or exercise their authority.
12. This order takes e"ect on March 24, 2020 at 12:01 am, and continues through April 13, 2020 at 11:59 pm.
13. The governor will evaluate the continuing need for this order prior to its expiration. In determining whether to maintain, intensify, or relax its restrictions, she will consider, among other things, (1) data on COVID-19 infections and the disease’s rate of spread; (2) whether su#cient medical personnel, hospital beds, and ventilators exist to meet anticipated medical need; (3) the availability of personal protective equipment for the health-care workforce; (4) the state’s capacity to test for COVID-19 cases and isolate infected people; and (5) economic conditions in the state.
14. Consistent with MCL 10.33 and MCL 30.405(3), a willful violation of this order is a misdemeanor.
Given under my hand and the Great Seal of the State of Michigan.
RELATED CONTENT
Executive Order 2020-114 (COVID-19) (June 5, 2020) Executive Order 2020-115 (COVID-19) (June 5, 2020) Executive Order 2020-116 (COVID-19) (June 5, 2020) Executive Order 2020-113 (COVID-19) (June 4, 2020) Executive Order 2020-112 (COVID-19) (June 3, 2020) Executive Order 2020-111 (COVID-19) (June 1, 2020) Executive Order 2020-108 (May 29, 2020) Executive Order 2020-109 (May 29, 2020) Executive Order 2020-110 (COVID-19) (June 1, 2020) Executive Order 2020-106 (COVID-19) (May 28, 2020) Executive Order 2020-107 (May 29, 2020) Executive Order 2020-99 (COVID-19) (May 22, 2020) - Declaration of State of Emergency Executive Order 2020-100 (COVID-19) (May 22, 2020) Executive Order 2020-101 (COVID-19) (May 22, 2020) Executive Order 2020-102 (COVID-19) (May 22, 2020) Executive Order 2020-103 (COVID-19) (May 22, 2020) Executive Order 2020-104 (COVID-19) (May 26, 2020) Executive Order 2020-105 (May 26, 2020) - Declaration of State of Emergency Executive Order 2020-98 (May 22, 2020) - Declaration of State of Emergency Executive Order 2020-95 (COVID-19) (May 21, 2020)
MICHIGAN.GOV HOME | ADA | MICHIGAN NEWS | POLICIES COPYRIGHT 2020 STATE OF MICHIGAN

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 33-9 filed 06/08/20 PageID.316 Page 1 of 2

DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

_____________________________________________________

LEAGUE OF INDPENDENT FITNESS FACITLITIES AND TRAINERS, INC., BASELINE FITNESS LLC, BUILDING YOUR TEMPLE LLC, BYT FITNESS 247 LLC, CLAWSON FITNESS, LLC, CLINTON FITNESS, INC., D-LUX KARATE UNIVERSITY LLC, FENTON ATHLETIC CLUB, INC., FENTON KARATE, LLC, FUSION FITNESS 24/7 LLC, H3 FITNESS LLC, I FITNESS PERSONAL TRAINING, INC., JKP FITNESS, LLC, JPF ENTERPRISES, LLC, M FITNESS CLUB, LLC, MH & AB LLC, MOTOR CITY CF - ST. CLAIR SHORES, LLC, NASCOT ENTERPRISES, LLC, PRISON CITY PHYSIQUE LLC, RMP FITNESS INC., STRENGTH BEYOND LLC, 24/7 BOOTCAMP AND BOXING INC., and 4 SEASONS GYM, LLC,
Plaintiffs, v. GRETCHEN E. WHITMER and ROBERT GORDON,
Defendants. _____________________________________________________
ERSKINE LAW, PC Scott M. Erskine (P54734) Carly Van Thomme (P59706) Attorneys for Plaintiffs 612 W. University
Exhibit 9

Civil No. 1:20-cv-00458 Hon. Paul L. Maloney

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 33-9 filed 06/08/20 PageID.317 Page 2 of 2
THE OFFICE OF
GOVERNOR GRETCHEN WHITMER

ABOUT

"

NEWS

"

WHITMER / NEWS / EXECUTIVE ORDERS

ISSUES

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APPOINTMENTS

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Executive Order 2020-42 (COVID-19)

EXECUTIVE ORDER 2020-42 FAQs EXECUTIVE ORDER

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No. 2020-42

Temporary requirement to suspend activities that are not necessary to sustain or protect life

Rescission of Executive Order 2020-21

The novel coronavirus (COVID-19) is a respiratory disease that can result in serious illness or death. It is caused by a new strain of coronavirus not previously identi!ed in humans and easily spread from person to person. There is currently no approved vaccine or antiviral treatment for this disease.
On March 10, 2020, the Michigan Department of Health and Human Services identi!ed the !rst two presumptive-positive cases of COVID-19 in Michigan. On that same day, I issued Executive Order 2020-4. This order declared a state of emergency across the state of Michigan under section 1 of article 5 of the Michigan Constitution of 1963, the Emergency Management Act, 1976 PA 390, as amended, MCL 30.401 et seq., and the Emergency Powers of the Governor Act of 1945, 1945 PA 302, as amended, MCL 10.31 et seq.
In the three weeks that followed, the virus spread across Michigan, bringing deaths in the hundreds, con!rmed cases in the thousands, and deep disruption to this state’s economy, homes, and educational, civic, social, and religious institutions. On April 1, 2020, in response to the widespread and severe health, economic, and social harms posed by the COVID-19 pandemic, I issued Executive Order 2020-33. This order expanded on Executive Order 2020-4 and declared both a state of emergency and a state of disaster across the State of Michigan under section 1 of article 5 of the Michigan Constitution of 1963, the Emergency Management Act, and the Emergency Powers of the Governor Act of 1945.
The Emergency Management Act vests the governor with broad powers and duties to “cop[e] with dangers to this state or the people of this state presented by a disaster or emergency,” which the governor may implement through “executive orders, proclamations, and directives having the force and e"ect of law.” MCL 30.403(1)-(2). Similarly, the Emergency Powers of the Governor Act of 1945 provides that, after declaring a state of emergency, “the governor may promulgate reasonable orders, rules, and regulations as he or she considers necessary to protect life and property or to bring the emergency situation within the a"ected area under control.” MCL 10.31(1).
To suppress the spread of COVID-19, to prevent the state’s health care system from being overwhelmed, to allow time for the production of critical test kits, ventilators, and personal protective equipment, and to avoid needless deaths, it is reasonable and necessary to direct residents to remain at home or in their place of residence to the maximum extent feasible. To that end, on March 23, 2020, I issued Executive Order 2020-21, ordering all people in Michigan to stay home and stay safe. The order limited gatherings and travel, and required workers who are not necessary to sustain or protect life to stay home.
The measures put in place by Executive Order 2020-21 have been e"ective, but this virus is both aggressive and persistent: on April 8, 2020, Michigan reported 20,346 con!rmed cases of COVID-19 and 959 deaths from it. To win this !ght, and to protect the health and safety of our state and each other, we must be just as aggressive and persistent. Though we have all made sacri!ces, we must be steadfast. Accordingly, with this order, I !nd it reasonable and necessary to rea#rm the measures set forth in Executive Order 2020-21, clarify them, and extend their duration to April 30, 2020. This order takes e"ect on April 9, 2020 at 11:59 pm. When this order takes e"ect, Executive Order 2020-21 is rescinded.

Acting under the Michigan Constitution of 1963 and Michigan law, I order the following:
1. This order must be construed broadly to prohibit in-person work that is not necessary to sustain or protect life.
2. Subject to the exceptions in section 7 of this order, all individuals currently living within the State of Michigan are ordered to stay at home or at their place of residence. Subject to the same exceptions, all public and private gatherings of any number of people occurring among persons not part of a single household are prohibited.
3. All individuals who leave their home or place of residence must adhere to social distancing measures recommended by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”), including remaining at least six feet from people from outside the individual’s household to the extent feasible under the circumstances.
4. No person or entity shall operate a business or conduct operations that require workers to leave their homes or places of residence except to the extent that those workers are necessary to sustain or protect life or to conduct minimum basic operations.
a. For purposes of this order, workers who are necessary to sustain or protect life are de!ned as “critical infrastructure workers,” as described in sections 8 and 9 of this order.
b. For purposes of this order, workers who are necessary to conduct minimum basic operations are those whose in-person presence is strictly necessary to allow the business or operation to maintain the value of inventory and equipment, care for animals, ensure security, process transactions (including payroll and employee bene!ts), or facilitate the ability of other workers to work remotely.
Businesses and operations must determine which of their workers are necessary to conduct minimum basic operations and inform such workers of that designation. Businesses and operations must make such designations in writing, whether by electronic message, public website, or other appropriate means. Workers need not carry copies of their designations when they leave the home or place of residence for work.
Any in-person work necessary to conduct minimum basic operations must be performed consistently with the social distancing practices and other mitigation measures described in section 10 of this order.
5. Businesses and operations that employ critical infrastructure workers may continue in-person operations, subject to the following conditions:
a. Consistent with sections 8 and 9 of this order, businesses and operations must determine which of their workers are critical infrastructure workers and inform such workers of that designation. Businesses and operations must make such designations in writing, whether by electronic message, public website, or other appropriate means. Workers need not carry copies of their designations when they leave the home or place of residence for work. Businesses and operations need not designate:
1. Workers in health care and public health.
2. Workers who perform necessary government activities, as described in section 6 of this order.
3. Workers and volunteers described in section 9(d) of this order.
b. In-person activities that are not necessary to sustain or protect life must be suspended until normal operations resume.
c. Businesses and operations maintaining in-person activities must adopt social distancing practices and other mitigation measures to protect workers and patrons, as described in section 10 of this order. Stores that are open to the public must also adhere to the rules described in section 11 of this order.
6. All in-person government activities at whatever level (state, county, or local) that are not necessary to sustain or protect life, or to support those businesses and operations that are necessary to sustain or protect life, are suspended.
a. For purposes of this order, necessary government activities include activities performed by critical infrastructure workers, including workers in law enforcement, public safety, and !rst responders.
b. Such activities also include, but are not limited to, public transit, trash pick-up and disposal (including recycling and composting), activities necessary to manage and oversee elections, operations necessary to enable transactions that support the work of a business’s or operation’s critical infrastructure workers, and the maintenance of safe and sanitary public parks so as to allow for outdoor activity permitted under this order.
c. For purposes of this order, necessary government activities include minimum basic operations, as described in section 4(b) of this order. Workers performing such activities need not be designated.
d. Any in-person government activities must be performed consistently with the social distancing practices and other mitigation measures to protect workers and patrons described in section 10 of this order.
7. Exceptions. a. Individuals may leave their home or place of residence, and travel as necessary: 1. To engage in outdoor physical activity, consistent with remaining at least six feet from people from outside the individual’s household. Outdoor physical activity includes walking, hiking, running, cycling, kayaking, canoeing, or other similar physical activity, as well as any comparable activity for those with limited mobility.
2. To perform their jobs as critical infrastructure workers after being so designated by their employers. (Critical infrastructure workers who need not be designated under section 5(a) of this order may leave their home for work without being designated.)
3. To conduct minimum basic operations, as described in section 4(b) of this order, after being designated to perform such work by their employers.
4. To perform necessary government activities, as described in section 6 of this order.
5. To perform tasks that are necessary to their health and safety, or to the health and safety of their family or household members (including pets). Individuals may, for example, leave the home or place of residence to secure medication or to seek medical or dental care that is necessary to address a medical emergency or to preserve the health and safety of a household or family member (including procedures that, in accordance with a duly implemented nonessential procedures postponement plan, have not been postponed).
6. To obtain necessary services or supplies for themselves, their family or household members, their pets, and their vehicles.
A. Individuals must secure such services or supplies via delivery to the maximum extent possible. As needed, however, individuals may leave the home or place of residence to purchase groceries, take-out food, gasoline, needed medical supplies, and any other products necessary to maintain the safety, sanitation, and basic operation of their residences. Individuals may also leave the home to drop o" a vehicle to the extent permitted under section 9(i) of this order.
B. Individuals should limit, to the maximum extent that is safe and feasible, the number of household members who leave the home for any errands.
7. To care for a family member or a family member’s pet in another household.
8. To care for minors, dependents, the elderly, persons with disabilities, or other vulnerable persons.
9. To visit an individual under the care of a health care facility, residential care facility, or congregate care facility, to the extent otherwise permitted.
10. To attend legal proceedings or hearings for essential or emergency purposes as ordered by a court.
11. To work or volunteer for businesses or operations (including both religious and secular nonpro!t organizations) that provide food, shelter, and other necessities of life for economically disadvantaged or otherwise needy individuals, individuals who need assistance as a result of this emergency, and people with disabilities.
12. To attend a funeral, provided that no more than 10 people are in attendance at the funeral.
b. Individuals may also travel: 1. To return to a home or place of residence from outside this state. 2. To leave this state for a home or residence elsewhere.
3. Between two residences in this state, through April 10, 2020. After that date, travel between two residences is not permitted.
4. As required by law enforcement or a court order, including the transportation of children pursuant to a custody agreement.
c. All other travel is prohibited, including all travel to vacation rentals.
8. For purposes of this order, critical infrastructure workers are those workers described by the Director of the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency in his guidance of March 19, 2020 on the COVID-19 response (available here). This order does not adopt any subsequent guidance document released by this same agency.
Consistent with the March 19, 2020 guidance document, critical infrastructure workers include some workers in each of the following sectors:
a. Health care and public health.
b. Law enforcement, public safety, and !rst responders.
c. Food and agriculture.
d. Energy.
e. Water and wastewater.
f. Transportation and logistics.
g. Public works.
h. Communications and information technology, including news media.
i. Other community-based government operations and essential functions.
j. Critical manufacturing.
k. Hazardous materials.
Financial services.
m. Chemical supply chains and safety.
Defense industrial base.
9. For purposes of this order, critical infrastructure workers also include:
a. Child care workers (including workers at disaster relief child care centers), but only to the extent necessary to serve the children or dependents of workers required to perform in-person work as permitted under this order. This category includes individuals (whether licensed or not) who have arranged to care for the children or dependents of such workers.
b. Workers at suppliers, distribution centers, or service providers, as described below.
1. Any suppliers, distribution centers, or service providers whose continued operation is necessary to enable, support, or facilitate another business’s or operation’s critical infrastructure work may designate their workers as critical infrastructure workers, provided that only those workers whose in-person presence is necessary to enable, support, or facilitate such work may be so designated.
2. Any suppliers, distribution centers, or service providers whose continued operation is necessary to enable, support, or facilitate the necessary work of suppliers, distribution centers, or service providers described in subprovision (1) of this subsection may designate their workers as critical infrastructure workers, provided that only those workers whose in-person presence is necessary to enable, support, or facilitate such work may be so designated.
3. Consistent with the scope of work permitted under subprovision (2) of this subsection, any suppliers, distribution centers, or service providers further down the supply chain whose continued operation is necessary to enable, support, or facilitate the necessary work of other suppliers, distribution centers, or service providers may likewise designate their workers as critical infrastructure workers, provided that only those workers whose in-person presence is necessary to enable, support, or facilitate such work may be so designated.
4. Suppliers, distribution centers, and service providers that abuse their designation authority under this subsection shall be subject to sanctions to the fullest extent of the law.
c. Workers in the insurance industry, but only to the extent that their work cannot be done by telephone or remotely.
d. Workers and volunteers for businesses or operations (including both religious and secular nonpro!t organizations) that provide food, shelter, and other necessities of life for economically disadvantaged or otherwise needy individuals, individuals who need assistance as a result of this emergency, and people with disabilities.
e. Workers who perform critical labor union functions, including those who administer health and welfare funds and those who monitor the well-being and safety of union members who are critical infrastructure workers, provided that any administration or monitoring should be done by telephone or remotely where possible.
f. Workers at retail stores who sell groceries, medical supplies, and products necessary to maintain the safety, sanitation, and basic operation of residences, including convenience stores, pet supply stores, auto supplies and repair stores, hardware and home maintenance stores, and home appliance retailers.
g. Workers at laundromats, coin laundries, and dry cleaners.
h. Workers at hotels and motels, provided that the hotels or motels do not o"er additional in-house amenities such as gyms, pools, spas, dining, entertainment facilities, meeting rooms, or like facilities.
i. Workers at motor vehicle dealerships who are necessary to facilitate remote and electronic sales or leases, or to deliver motor vehicles to customers, provided that showrooms remain closed to in-person tra#c.
10. Businesses, operations, and government agencies that continue in-person work must adhere to sound social distancing practices and measures, which include but are not limited to:
a. Developing a COVID-19 preparedness and response plan, consistent with recommendations in Guidance on Preparing Workplaces for COVID-19, developed by the Occupational Health and Safety Administration and available here. Such plan must be available at company headquarters or the worksite.
b. Restricting the number of workers present on premises to no more than is strictly necessary to perform the business’s, operation’s, or government agency’s critical infrastructure functions or its minimum basic operations.
c. Promoting remote work to the fullest extent possible.
d. Keeping workers and patrons who are on premises at least six feet from one another to the maximum extent possible.
e. Increasing standards of facility cleaning and disinfection to limit worker and patron exposure to COVID-19, as well as adopting protocols to clean and disinfect in the event of a positive COVID-19 case in the workplace.
f. Adopting policies to prevent workers from entering the premises if they display respiratory symptoms or have had contact with a person with a con!rmed diagnosis of COVID-19.
g. Any other social distancing practices and mitigation measures recommended by the CDC.
11. Any store that remains open for in-person sales under section 5 or 9(f) of this order must:
a. Establish lines to regulate entry in accordance with subsections (c) and (d) of this section, with markings for patrons to enable them to stand at least six feet apart from one another while waiting. Stores should also explore alternatives to lines, including by allowing customers to wait in their cars for a text message or phone call, to enable social distancing and to accommodate seniors and those with disabilities.
b. Consider establishing curbside pick-up to reduce in-store tra#c and mitigate outdoor lines.
c. For stores of less than 50,000 square feet of customer $oor space, limit the number of people in the store (including employees) to 25% of the total occupancy limits established by the State Fire Marshal or a local !re marshal.
d. For stores of more than 50,000 square feet:
1. Limit the number of customers in the store at one time (excluding employees) to 4 people per 1,000 square feet of customer $oor space. The amount of customer $oor space must be calculated to exclude store areas that are closed under subprovision (2) of this subsection.
2. Close areas of the store—by cordoning them o", placing signs in aisles, posting prominent signs, removing goods from shelves, or other appropriate means—that are dedicated to the following classes of goods:
A. Carpet or $ooring.
B. Furniture.
C. Garden centers and plant nurseries.
D. Paint.
3. By April 13, 2020, refrain from the advertising or promotion of goods that are not groceries, medical supplies, or items that are necessary to maintain the safety, sanitation, and basic operation of residences.
4. Create at least two hours per week of dedicated shopping time for vulnerable populations, which for purposes of this order are people over 60, pregnant women, and those with chronic conditions like heart disease, diabetes, and lung disease.
e. The director of the Department of Health and Human Services is authorized to issue an emergency order varying the capacity limits described in subsections (c) and (d) of this section as necessary to protect the public health.
12. No one shall advertise or rent a short-term vacation property except as necessary to assist in housing a health care professional or volunteer aiding in the response to the COVID-19 crisis.
13. Nothing in this order should be taken to supersede another executive order or directive that is in e"ect, except to the extent this order imposes more stringent limitations on in-person work, activities, and interactions. Consistent with prior guidance, a place of religious worship, when used for religious worship, is not subject to penalty under section 17 of this order.
14. Nothing in this order should be taken to interfere with or infringe on the powers of the legislative and judicial branches to perform their constitutional duties or exercise their authority.
15. This order takes e"ect on April 9, 2020 at 11:59 pm and continues through April 30, 2020 at 11:59 pm. When this order takes e"ect, Executive Order 2020-21 is rescinded. All references to that order in other executive orders, agency rules, letters of understanding, or other legal authorities shall be taken to refer to this order.
16. I will evaluate the continuing need for this order prior to its expiration. In determining whether to maintain, intensify, or relax its restrictions, I will consider, among other things, (1) data on COVID-19 infections and the disease’s rate of spread; (2) whether su#cient medical personnel, hospital beds, and ventilators exist to meet anticipated medical need; (3) the availability of personal protective equipment for the health-care workforce; (4) the state’s capacity to test for COVID-19 cases and isolate infected people; and (5) economic conditions in the state.
17. Consistent with MCL 10.33 and MCL 30.405(3), a willful violation of this order is a misdemeanor.
Given under my hand and the Great Seal of the State of Michigan.

MICHIGAN.GOV HOME | ADA | MICHIGAN NEWS | POLICIES COPYRIGHT 2020 STATE OF MICHIGAN

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 33-10 filed 06/08/20 PageID.318 Page 1 of 2

DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

_____________________________________________________

LEAGUE OF INDPENDENT FITNESS FACITLITIES AND TRAINERS, INC., BASELINE FITNESS LLC, BUILDING YOUR TEMPLE LLC, BYT FITNESS 247 LLC, CLAWSON FITNESS, LLC, CLINTON FITNESS, INC., D-LUX KARATE UNIVERSITY LLC, FENTON ATHLETIC CLUB, INC., FENTON KARATE, LLC, FUSION FITNESS 24/7 LLC, H3 FITNESS LLC, I FITNESS PERSONAL TRAINING, INC., JKP FITNESS, LLC, JPF ENTERPRISES, LLC, M FITNESS CLUB, LLC, MH & AB LLC, MOTOR CITY CF - ST. CLAIR SHORES, LLC, NASCOT ENTERPRISES, LLC, PRISON CITY PHYSIQUE LLC, RMP FITNESS INC., STRENGTH BEYOND LLC, 24/7 BOOTCAMP AND BOXING INC., and 4 SEASONS GYM, LLC,
Plaintiffs, v. GRETCHEN E. WHITMER and ROBERT GORDON,
Defendants. _____________________________________________________
ERSKINE LAW, PC Scott M. Erskine (P54734) Carly Van Thomme (P59706) Attorneys for Plaintiffs 612 W. University
Exhibit 10

Civil No. 1:20-cv-00458 Hon. Paul L. Maloney

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 33-10 filed 06/08/20 PageID.319 Page 2 of 2
THE OFFICE OF
GOVERNOR GRETCHEN WHITMER

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Executive Order 2020-59 (COVID-19)

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EXECUTIVE ORDER
No. 2020-59
Temporary requirement to suspend activities that are not necessary to sustain or protect life
Rescission of Executive Order 2020-42
The novel coronavirus (COVID-19) is a respiratory disease that can result in serious illness or death. It is caused by a new strain of coronavirus not previously identi!ed in humans and easily spread from person to person. There is currently no approved vaccine or antiviral treatment for this disease.
On March 10, 2020, the Department of Health and Human Services identi!ed the !rst two presumptive-positive cases of COVID-19 in Michigan. On that same day, I issued Executive Order 2020-4. This order declared a state of emergency across the state of Michigan under section 1 of article 5 of the Michigan Constitution of 1963, the Emergency Management Act, 1976 PA 390, as amended, MCL 30.401 et seq., and the Emergency Powers of the Governor Act of 1945, 1945 PA 302, as amended, MCL 10.31 et seq.
In the three weeks that followed, the virus spread across Michigan, bringing deaths in the hundreds, con!rmed cases in the thousands, and deep disruption to this state’s economy, homes, and educational, civic, social, and religious institutions. On April 1, 2020, in response to the widespread and severe health, economic, and social harms posed by the COVID-19 pandemic, I issued Executive Order 2020-33. This order expanded on Executive Order 2020-4 and declared both a state of emergency and a state of disaster across the state of Michigan under section 1 of article 5 of the Michigan Constitution of 1963, the Emergency Management Act, and the Emergency Powers of the Governor Act of 1945.
The Emergency Management Act vests the governor with broad powers and duties to “cop[e] with dangers to this state or the people of this state presented by a disaster or emergency,” which the governor may implement through “executive orders, proclamations, and directives having the force and e"ect of law.” MCL 30.403(1)-(2). Similarly, the Emergency Powers of the Governor Act of 1945, provides that, after declaring a state of emergency, “the governor may promulgate reasonable orders, rules, and regulations as he or she considers necessary to protect life and property or to bring the emergency situation within the a"ected area under control.” MCL 10.31(1).
To suppress the spread of COVID-19, to prevent the state’s health care system from being overwhelmed, to allow time for the production of critical test kits, ventilators, and personal protective equipment, to establish the public health infrastructure necessary to contain the spread of infection, and to avoid needless deaths, it is reasonable and necessary to direct residents to remain at home or in their place of residence to the maximum extent feasible. To that end, on March 23, 2020, I issued Executive Order 2020-21, ordering all people in Michigan to stay home and stay safe, and then extended that order through April 30, 2020, with Executive Order 2020-42. The orders limited gatherings and travel, and required all workers who are not necessary to sustain or protect life to stay home.
The measures put in place by Executive Orders 2020-21 and 2020-42 have been e"ective: the number of new con!rmed cases each day has started to drop. Although the virus remains aggressive and persistent—on April 23, 2020, Michigan reported 35,291 con!rmed cases and 2,977 deaths—the strain on our health care system has begun to relent, even as our testing capacity has increased. We can now start the process of gradually resuming in-person work and activities that were temporarily suspended under my prior orders. But in doing so, we must move with care, patience, and vigilance, recognizing the grave harm that this virus continues to in#ict on our state and how quickly our progress in suppressing it can be undone. Accordingly, with this order, I !nd it reasonable and necessary to rea$rm the measures set forth in Executive Order 2020-42, amend their scope, and extend their duration to May 15, 2020, unless modi!ed earlier. With this order, Executive Order 2020-42 is rescinded.
Acting under the Michigan Constitution of 1963 and Michigan law, I order the following:
1. This order must be construed broadly to prohibit in-person work that is not necessary to sustain or protect life. 2. Subject to the exceptions in section 7 of this order, all individuals currently living within the State of Michigan are ordered to stay at home
or at their place of residence. Subject to the same exceptions, all public and private gatherings of any number of people occurring among persons not part of a single household are prohibited. 3. All individuals who leave their home or place of residence must adhere to social distancing measures recommended by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”), including remaining at least six feet from people from outside the individual’s household to the extent feasible under the circumstances. 4. No person or entity shall operate a business or conduct operations that require workers to leave their homes or places of residence except to the extent that those workers are necessary to sustain or protect life, to conduct minimum basic operations, or to perform a resumed activity within the meaning of this order.
a. For purposes of this order, workers who are necessary to sustain or protect life are de!ned as “critical infrastructure workers,” as described in sections 8 and 9 of this order.
b. For purposes of this order, workers who are necessary to conduct minimum basic operations are those whose in-person presence is strictly necessary to allow the business or operation to maintain the value of inventory and equipment, care for animals, ensure security, process transactions (including payroll and employee bene!ts), or facilitate the ability of other workers to work remotely.
Businesses and operations must determine which of their workers are necessary to conduct minimum basic operations and inform such workers of that designation. Businesses and operations must make such designations in writing, whether by electronic message, public website, or other appropriate means. Workers need not carry copies of their designations when they leave the home or place of residence for work.
Any in-person work necessary to conduct minimum basic operations must be performed consistently with the social distancing practices and other mitigation measures described in section 11 of this order. c. Workers who perform resumed activities are de!ned in section 10 of this order. 5. Businesses and operations that employ critical infrastructure workers or workers who perform resumed activities may continue in-person operations, subject to the following conditions: a. Consistent with sections 8, 9, and 10 of this order, businesses and operations must determine which of their workers are critical infrastructure workers or workers who perform resumed activities and inform such workers of that designation. Businesses and operations must make such designations in writing, whether by electronic message, public website, or other appropriate means. Workers need not carry copies of their designations when they leave the home or place of residence for work. Businesses and operations need not designate:
1. Workers in health care and public health. 2. Workers who perform necessary government activities, as described in section 6 of this order. 3. Workers and volunteers described in section 9(d) of this order. b. In-person activities that are not necessary to sustain or protect life or to perform a resumed activity must be suspended. c. Businesses and operations maintaining in-person activities must adopt social distancing practices and other mitigation measures to protect workers and patrons, as described in section 11 of this order. Stores that are open for in-person sales must also adhere to the rules described in section 12 of this order. d. Any business or operation that employs workers who perform resumed activities under section 10(a) of this order, but that does not sell necessary supplies, may sell any goods through remote sales via delivery or at the curbside. Such a business or operation, however, must otherwise remain closed to the public. 6. All in-person government activities at whatever level (state, county, or local) that are not necessary to sustain or protect life, or to support those businesses and operations that are maintaining in-person activities under this order, are suspended. a. For purposes of this order, necessary government activities include activities performed by critical infrastructure workers, including workers in law enforcement, public safety, and !rst responders. b. Such activities also include, but are not limited to, public transit, trash pick-up and disposal (including recycling and composting), activities necessary to manage and oversee elections, operations necessary to enable transactions that support the work of a business’s or operation’s critical infrastructure workers, and the maintenance of safe and sanitary public parks so as to allow for outdoor activity permitted under this order. c. For purposes of this order, necessary government activities include minimum basic operations, as described in section 4(b) of this order. Workers performing such activities need not be designated. d. Any in-person government activities must be performed consistently with the social distancing practices and other mitigation measures to protect workers and patrons described in section 11 of this order.
7. Exceptions.
a. Individuals may leave their home or place of residence, and travel as necessary:
1. To engage in outdoor recreational activity, consistent with remaining at least six feet from people from outside the individual’s household. Outdoor recreational activity includes walking, hiking, running, cycling, boating, gol!ng, or other similar activity, as well as any comparable activity for those with limited mobility.
2. To perform their jobs as critical infrastructure workers after being so designated by their employers. (Critical infrastructure workers who need not be designated under section 5(a) of this order may leave their home for work without being designated.)
3. To conduct minimum basic operations, as described in section 4(b) of this order, after being designated to perform such work by their employers.
4. To perform resumed activities, as described in section 10 of this order, after being designated to perform such work by their employers.
5. To perform necessary government activities, as described in section 6 of this order.
6. To perform tasks that are necessary to their health and safety, or to the health and safety of their family or household members (including pets). Individuals may, for example, leave the home or place of residence to secure medication or to seek medical or dental care that is necessary to address a medical emergency or to preserve the health and safety of a household or family member (including in-person procedures or veterinary services that, in accordance with a duly implemented nonessential procedure or veterinary services postponement plan, have not been postponed).
7. To obtain necessary services or supplies for themselves, their family or household members, their pets, and their motor vehicles.
A. Individuals must secure such services or supplies via delivery to the maximum extent possible. As needed, however, individuals may leave the home or place of residence to purchase groceries, take-out food, gasoline, needed medical supplies, and any other products necessary to maintain the safety, sanitation, and basic operation of their residences or motor vehicles.
B. Individuals may also leave the home to pick up or return a motor vehicle as permitted under section 9(i) of this order, or to have a motor vehicle or bicycle repaired or maintained.
C. Individuals should limit, to the maximum extent that is safe and feasible, the number of household members who leave the home for any errands.
8. To pick up non-necessary supplies at the curbside from a store that must otherwise remain closed to the public.
9. To care for a family member or a family member’s pet in another household.
10. To care for minors, dependents, the elderly, persons with disabilities, or other vulnerable persons.
11. To visit an individual under the care of a health care facility, residential care facility, or congregate care facility, to the extent otherwise permitted.
12. To visit a child in out-of-home care, or to facilitate a visit between a parent and a child in out-of-home care, when there is agreement between the child placing agency, the parent, and the caregiver about a safe visitation plan, or when, failing such agreement, the individual secures an exception from the executive director of the Children’s Services Agency.
13. To attend legal proceedings or hearings for essential or emergency purposes as ordered by a court.
14. To work or volunteer for businesses or operations (including both religious and secular nonpro!t organizations) that provide food, shelter, and other necessities of life for economically disadvantaged or otherwise needy individuals, individuals who need assistance as a result of this emergency, and people with disabilities.
15. To attend a funeral, provided that no more than 10 people are in attendance.
16. To attend a meeting of an addiction recovery mutual aid society, provided that no more than 10 people are in attendance.
b. Individuals may also travel:
1. To return to a home or place of residence from outside this state. 2. To leave this state for a home or residence elsewhere.
3. Between two residences in this state, including moving to a new residence.
4. As required by law enforcement or a court order, including the transportation of children pursuant to a custody agreement.
c. All other travel is prohibited, including all travel to vacation rentals.
8. For purposes of this order, critical infrastructure workers are those workers described by the Director of the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency in his guidance of March 19, 2020 on the COVID-19 response (available here). This order does not adopt any subsequent guidance document released by this same agency.
​Consistent with the March 19, 2020 guidance document, critical infrastructure workers include some workers in each of the following sectors:
a. Health care and public health. b. Law enforcement, public safety, and !rst responders. c. Food and agriculture. d. Energy. e. Water and wastewater. f. Transportation and logistics. g. Public works. h. Communications and information technology, including news media. i. Other community-based government operations and essential functions. j. Critical manufacturing. k. Hazardous materials. l. Financial services. m. Chemical supply chains and safety. n. Defense industrial base. 9. For purposes of this order, critical infrastructure workers also include:
a. Child care workers (including workers at disaster relief child care centers), but only to the extent necessary to serve the children or dependents of critical infrastructure workers, workers who conduct minimum basic operations, workers who perform necessary government activities, or workers who perform resumed activities. This category includes individuals (whether licensed or not) who have arranged to care for the children or dependents of such workers.
b. Workers at suppliers, distribution centers, or service providers, as described below.
1. Any suppliers, distribution centers, or service providers whose continued operation is necessary to enable, support, or facilitate another business’s or operation’s critical infrastructure work may designate their workers as critical infrastructure workers, provided that only those workers whose in-person presence is necessary to enable, support, or facilitate such work may be so designated.
2. Any suppliers, distribution centers, or service providers whose continued operation is necessary to enable, support, or facilitate the necessary work of suppliers, distribution centers, or service providers described in subprovision (1) of this subsection may designate their workers as critical infrastructure workers, provided that only those workers whose in-person presence is necessary to enable, support, or facilitate such work may be so designated.
3. Consistent with the scope of work permitted under subprovision (2) of this subsection, any suppliers, distribution centers, or service providers further down the supply chain whose continued operation is necessary to enable, support, or facilitate the necessary work of other suppliers, distribution centers, or service providers may likewise designate their workers as critical infrastructure workers, provided that only those workers whose in-person presence is necessary to enable, support, or facilitate such work may be so designated.
4. Suppliers, distribution centers, and service providers that abuse their designation authority under this subsection shall be subject to sanctions to the fullest extent of the law.
c. Workers in the insurance industry, but only to the extent that their work cannot be done by telephone or remotely.
d. Workers and volunteers for businesses or operations (including both religious and secular nonpro!t organizations) that provide food, shelter, and other necessities of life for economically disadvantaged or otherwise needy individuals, individuals who need assistance as a result of this emergency, and people with disabilities.
e. Workers who perform critical labor union functions, including those who administer health and welfare funds and those who monitor the well-being and safety of union members who are critical infrastructure workers, provided that any administration or monitoring should be done by telephone or remotely where possible.
f. Workers at retail stores who sell groceries, medical supplies, and products necessary to maintain the safety, sanitation, and basic operation of residences or motor vehicles, including convenience stores, pet supply stores, auto supplies and repair stores, hardware and home maintenance stores, and home appliance retailers.
g. Workers at laundromats, coin laundries, and dry cleaners.
h. Workers at hotels and motels, provided that the hotels or motels do not o"er additional in-house amenities such as gyms, pools, spas, dining, entertainment facilities, meeting rooms, or like facilities.
i. Workers at motor vehicle dealerships who are necessary to facilitate remote and electronic sales or leases, or to deliver motor vehicles to customers, provided that showrooms remain closed to in-person tra$c.
10. For purposes of this order, workers who perform resumed activities are de!ned as follows: a. Workers who process or ful!ll remote orders for goods for delivery or curbside pick-up. b. Workers who perform bicycle maintenance or repair. c. Workers for garden stores, nurseries, and lawn care, pest control, and landscaping operations, subject to the enhanced socialdistancing rules described in section 11(h) of this order. d. Maintenance workers and groundskeepers who are necessary to maintain the safety and sanitation of places of outdoor recreation not otherwise closed under Executive Order 2020-43 or any order that may follow from it, provided that the places and their workers do not provide goods, equipment, supplies, or services to individuals, and subject to the enhanced social-distancing rules described in section 11(h) of this order. e. Workers for moving or storage operations, subject to the enhanced social-distancing rules described in section 11(h) of this order.
11. Businesses, operations, and government agencies that remain open for in-person work must adhere to sound social distancing practices and measures, which include but are not limited to: a. Developing a COVID-19 preparedness and response plan, consistent with recommendations in Guidance on Preparing Workplaces for COVID-19, developed by the Occupational Health and Safety Administration and available here. Such plan must be available at company headquarters or the worksite. b. Restricting the number of workers present on premises to no more than is strictly necessary to perform the in-person work permitted under this order. c. Promoting remote work to the fullest extent possible. d. Keeping workers and patrons who are on premises at least six feet from one another to the maximum extent possible. e. Increasing standards of facility cleaning and disinfection to limit worker and patron exposure to COVID-19, as well as adopting protocols to clean and disinfect in the event of a positive COVID-19 case in the workplace. f. Adopting policies to prevent workers from entering the premises if they display respiratory symptoms or have had contact with a person with a con!rmed diagnosis of COVID-19. g. Any other social distancing practices and mitigation measures recommended by the CDC. h. For businesses and operations whose in-person work is permitted under sections 10(c) through 10(e) of this order, the following additional measures must also be taken: 1. Barring gatherings of any size in which people cannot maintain six feet of distance from one another. 2. Limiting in-person interaction with clients and patrons to the maximum extent possible, and barring any such interaction in which people cannot maintain six feet of distance from one another. 3. Providing personal protective equipment such as gloves, goggles, face shields, and face masks as appropriate for the activity being performed. 4. Adopting protocols to limit the sharing of tools and equipment to the maximum extent possible and to ensure frequent and thorough cleaning of tools, equipment, and frequently touched surfaces.
12. Any store that remains open for in-store sales under section 9(f) or section 10(c) of this order: a. Must establish lines to regulate entry in accordance with subsection (b) of this section, with markings for patrons to enable them to stand at least six feet apart from one another while waiting. Stores should also explore alternatives to lines, including by allowing customers to wait in their cars for a text message or phone call, to enable social distancing and to accommodate seniors and those with disabilities. b. Must adhere to the following restrictions: 1. For stores of less than 50,000 square feet of customer #oor space, must limit the number of people in the store (including employees) to 25% of the total occupancy limits established by the State Fire Marshal or a local !re marshal. 2. For stores of more than 50,000 square feet, must: A. Limit the number of customers in the store at one time (excluding employees) to 4 people per 1,000 square feet of customer #oor space. B. Create at least two hours per week of dedicated shopping time for vulnerable populations, which for purposes of this order are people over 60, pregnant women, and those with chronic conditions like heart disease, diabetes, and lung disease. 3. The director of the Department of Health and Human Services is authorized to issue an emergency order varying the capacity limits described in this subsection as necessary to protect the public health. c. May continue to sell goods other than necessary supplies if the sale of such goods is in the ordinary course of business. d. Must consider establishing curbside pick-up to reduce in-store tra$c and mitigate outdoor lines.
13. No one shall rent a short-term vacation property except as necessary to assist in housing a health care professional aiding in the response to the COVID-19 pandemic or a volunteer who is aiding the same.
14. Michigan state parks remain open for day use, subject to any reductions in services and speci!c closures that, in the judgment of the director of the Department of Natural Resources, are necessary to minimize large gatherings and to prevent the spread of COVID-19.
15. E"ective on April 26, 2020 at 11:59 pm: a. Any individual able to medically tolerate a face covering must wear a covering over his or her nose and mouth—such as a homemade mask, scarf, bandana, or handkerchief—when in any enclosed public space. b. All businesses and operations whose workers perform in-person work must, at a minimum, provide non-medical grade face coverings to their workers. c. Supplies of N95 masks and surgical masks should generally be reserved, for now, for health care professionals, !rst responders (e.g., police o$cers, !re !ghters, paramedics), and other critical workers who interact with the public. d. The protections against discrimination in the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act, 1976 PA 453, as amended, MCL 37.2101 et seq., and any other protections against discrimination in Michigan law, apply in full force to persons who wear a mask under this order.
16. Nothing in this order should be taken to supersede another executive order or directive that is in e"ect, except to the extent this order imposes more stringent limitations on in-person work, activities, and interactions. Consistent with prior guidance, neither a place of religious worship nor its owner is subject to penalty under section 20 of this order for allowing religious worship at such place. No individual is subject to penalty under section 20 of this order for violating section 15(a) of this order.
17. Nothing in this order should be taken to interfere with or infringe on the powers of the legislative and judicial branches to perform their constitutional duties or exercise their authority.
18. This order takes e"ect immediately, unless otherwise speci!ed in this order, and continues through May 15, 2020 at 11:59 pm. Executive Order 2020-42 is rescinded. All references to that order in other executive orders, agency rules, letters of understanding, or other legal authorities shall be taken to refer to this order.
19. I will evaluate the continuing need for this order prior to its expiration. In determining whether to maintain, intensify, or relax its restrictions, I will consider, among other things, (1) data on COVID-19 infections and the disease’s rate of spread; (2) whether su$cient medical personnel, hospital beds, and ventilators exist to meet anticipated medical need; (3) the availability of personal protective equipment for the health care workforce; (4) the state’s capacity to test for COVID-19 cases and isolate infected people; and (5) economic conditions in the state.
20. Consistent with MCL 10.33 and MCL 30.405(3), a willful violation of this order is a misdemeanor.
Given under my hand and the Great Seal of the State of Michigan.
Signed: Gretchen Whitmer, Governor Date: April 24, 2020 Time: 11:00 am

Related Documents Executive Order 2020-59

MICHIGAN.GOV HOME | ADA | MICHIGAN NEWS | POLICIES COPYRIGHT 2020 STATE OF MICHIGAN

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 33-11 filed 06/08/20 PageID.320 Page 1 of 2

DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

_____________________________________________________

LEAGUE OF INDPENDENT FITNESS FACITLITIES AND TRAINERS, INC., BASELINE FITNESS LLC, BUILDING YOUR TEMPLE LLC, BYT FITNESS 247 LLC, CLAWSON FITNESS, LLC, CLINTON FITNESS, INC., D-LUX KARATE UNIVERSITY LLC, FENTON ATHLETIC CLUB, INC., FENTON KARATE, LLC, FUSION FITNESS 24/7 LLC, H3 FITNESS LLC, I FITNESS PERSONAL TRAINING, INC., JKP FITNESS, LLC, JPF ENTERPRISES, LLC, M FITNESS CLUB, LLC, MH & AB LLC, MOTOR CITY CF - ST. CLAIR SHORES, LLC, NASCOT ENTERPRISES, LLC, PRISON CITY PHYSIQUE LLC, RMP FITNESS INC., STRENGTH BEYOND LLC, 24/7 BOOTCAMP AND BOXING INC., and 4 SEASONS GYM, LLC,
Plaintiffs, v. GRETCHEN E. WHITMER and ROBERT GORDON,
Defendants. _____________________________________________________
ERSKINE LAW, PC Scott M. Erskine (P54734) Carly Van Thomme (P59706) Attorneys for Plaintiffs 612 W. University
Exhibit 11

Civil No. 1:20-cv-00458 Hon. Paul L. Maloney

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 33-11 filed 06/08/20 PageID.321 Page 2 of 2
THE OFFICE OF
GOVERNOR GRETCHEN WHITMER

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NEWS

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WHITMER / NEWS / EXECUTIVE ORDERS

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Executive Order 2020-70 (COVID-19)

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LT GOVERNOR

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EXECUTIVE ORDER
No. 2020-70
Temporary requirement to suspend activities that are not necessary to sustain or protect life
Rescission of Executive Order 2020-59
The novel coronavirus (COVID-19) is a respiratory disease that can result in serious illness or death. It is caused by a new strain of coronavirus not previously identi!ed in humans and easily spread from person to person. There is currently no approved vaccine or antiviral treatment for this disease.
On March 10, 2020, the Department of Health and Human Services identi!ed the !rst two presumptive-positive cases of COVID-19 in Michigan. On that same day, I issued Executive Order 2020-4. This order declared a state of emergency across the state of Michigan under section 1 of article 5 of the Michigan Constitution of 1963, the Emergency Management Act, 1976 PA 390, as amended, MCL 30.401 et seq., and the Emergency Powers of the Governor Act of 1945, 1945 PA 302, as amended, MCL 10.31 et seq.
In the weeks that followed, the virus spread across Michigan, bringing deaths in the thousands, con!rmed cases in the tens of thousands, and deep disruption to this state’s economy, homes, and educational, civic, social, and religious institutions. On April 1, 2020, in response to the widespread and severe health, economic, and social harms posed by the COVID-19 pandemic, I issued Executive Order 2020-33. This order expanded on Executive Order 2020-4 and declared both a state of emergency and a state of disaster across the State of Michigan under section 1 of article 5 of the Michigan Constitution of 1963, the Emergency Management Act, and the Emergency Powers of the Governor Act of 1945. And on April 30, 2020, !nding that COVID-19 had created emergency and disaster conditions across the State of Michigan, I issued Executive Order 2020-67 to continue the emergency declaration under the Emergency Powers of the Governor Act, as well as Executive Order 2020-68 to issue new emergency and disaster declarations under the Emergency Management Act.
The Emergency Management Act vests the governor with broad powers and duties to “cop[e] with dangers to this state or the people of this state presented by a disaster or emergency,” which the governor may implement through “executive orders, proclamations, and directives having the force and e"ect of law.” MCL 30.403(1)-(2). Similarly, the Emergency Powers of the Governor Act of 1945 provides that, after declaring a state of emergency, “the governor may promulgate reasonable orders, rules, and regulations as he or she considers necessary to protect life and property or to bring the emergency situation within the a"ected area under control.” MCL 10.31(1).
To suppress the spread of COVID-19, to prevent the state’s health care system from being overwhelmed, to allow time for the production of critical test kits, ventilators, and personal protective equipment, to establish the public health infrastructure necessary to contain the spread of infection, and to avoid needless deaths, it is reasonable and necessary to direct residents to remain at home or in their place of residence to the maximum extent feasible. To that end, on March 23, 2020, I issued Executive Order 2020-21, ordering all people in Michigan to stay home and stay safe. In Executive Orders 2020-42 and 2020-59, I extended that initial order, modifying its scope as needed and appropriate to match the ever-changing circumstances presented by this pandemic.
The measures put in place by Executive Orders 2020-21, 2020-42, and 2020-59 have been e"ective: the number of new con!rmed cases each day has started to drop. Although the virus remains aggressive and persistent—on April 30, 2020, Michigan reported 41,379 con!rmed cases and 3,789 deaths—the strain on our health care system has begun to relent, even as our testing capacity has increased. We can now start the process of gradually resuming in-person work and activities that were temporarily suspended under my prior orders. In so doing, however, we must move with care, patience, and vigilance, recognizing the grave harm that this virus continues to in#ict on our state and how quickly our progress in suppressing it can be undone.
Accordingly, with this order, I !nd it reasonable and necessary to rea$rm the measures set forth in Executive Order 2020-59 and amend their scope. With Executive Order 2020-59, I ordered that certain previously suspended work and activities could resume, based on an evaluation of public health metrics and an assessment of the statewide risks and bene!ts. That evaluation remains ongoing, and based upon it, I !nd that we will soon be positioned to allow another segment of previously suspended work to resume. This work is permitted to resume on May 7, 2020, and includes construction, real-estate activities, and work that is traditionally and primarily performed outdoors. This work, like the resumed activities allowed under Executive Order 2020-59, will be subject to stringent precautionary measures. This partial and incremental reopening will allow my public health team to evaluate the e"ects of allowing these activities to resume, to assess the capacity of the health care system to respond adequately to any increases in infections, and to prepare for any increase in patients presenting to a health-care facility or provider. With this order, Executive Order 2020-59 is rescinded. This order will remain in e"ect until May 15, 2020.
Acting under the Michigan Constitution of 1963 and Michigan law, I order the following:
1. This order must be construed broadly to prohibit in-person work that is not necessary to sustain or protect life.
2. Subject to the exceptions in section 7 of this order, all individuals currently living within the State of Michigan are ordered to stay at home or at their place of residence. Subject to the same exceptions, all public and private gatherings of any number of people occurring among persons not part of a single household are prohibited.
3. All individuals who leave their home or place of residence must adhere to social distancing measures recommended by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”), including remaining at least six feet from people from outside the individual’s household to the extent feasible under the circumstances.
4. No person or entity shall operate a business or conduct operations that require workers to leave their homes or places of residence except to the extent that those workers are necessary to sustain or protect life, to conduct minimum basic operations, or to perform a resumed activity within the meaning of this order.
a. For purposes of this order, workers who are necessary to sustain or protect life are de!ned as “critical infrastructure workers,” as described in sections 8 and 9 of this order.
b. For purposes of this order, workers who are necessary to conduct minimum basic operations are those whose in-person presence is strictly necessary to allow the business or operation to maintain the value of inventory and equipment, care for animals, ensure security, process transactions (including payroll and employee bene!ts), or facilitate the ability of other workers to work remotely.
Businesses and operations must determine which of their workers are necessary to conduct minimum basic operations and inform such workers of that designation. Businesses and operations must make such designations in writing, whether by electronic message, public website, or other appropriate means. Workers need not carry copies of their designations when they leave the home or place of residence for work.
Any in-person work necessary to conduct minimum basic operations must be performed consistently with the social distancing practices and other mitigation measures described in section 11 of this order.
c. Workers who perform resumed activities are de!ned in section 10 of this order.
5. Businesses and operations that employ critical infrastructure workers or workers who perform resumed activities may continue in-person operations, subject to the following conditions:
a. Consistent with sections 8, 9, and 10 of this order, businesses and operations must determine which of their workers are critical infrastructure workers or workers who perform resumed activities and inform such workers of that designation. Businesses and operations must make such designations in writing, whether by electronic message, public website, or other appropriate means. Workers need not carry copies of their designations when they leave the home or place of residence for work. Businesses and operations need not designate:
1. Workers in health care and public health.
2. Workers who perform necessary government activities, as described in section 6 of this order.
3. Workers and volunteers described in section 9(d) of this order.
b. In-person activities that are not necessary to sustain or protect life or to perform a resumed activity must be suspended.
c. Businesses and operations maintaining in-person activities must adopt social distancing practices and other mitigation measures to protect workers and patrons, as described in section 11 of this order. Stores that are open for in-person sales must also adhere to the rules described in section 12 of this order.
d. Any business or operation that employs workers who perform resumed activities under section 10(a) of this order, but that does not sell necessary supplies, may sell any goods through remote sales via delivery or at the curbside. Such a business or operation, however, must otherwise remain closed to the public.
6. All in-person government activities at whatever level (state, county, or local) are suspended unless:
a. They are performed by critical infrastructure workers, including workers in law enforcement, public safety, and !rst responders, as de!ned in sections 8 and 9 of this order.
b. They are performed by workers who are permitted to resume work under section 10 of this order.
c. They are necessary to support the activities of workers described in sections 8, 9, and 10 of this order, or to enable transactions that support businesses or operations that employ such workers.
d. They involve public transit, trash pick-up and disposal (including recycling and composting), the management and oversight of elections, and the maintenance of safe and sanitary public parks so as to allow for outdoor activity permitted under this order.
e. For purposes of this order, necessary government activities include minimum basic operations, as described in section 4(b) of this order. Workers performing such activities need not be designated.
f. Any in-person government activities must be performed consistently with the social distancing practices and other mitigation measures to protect workers and patrons described in section 11 of this order.
7. Exceptions.
a. Individuals may leave their home or place of residence, and travel as necessary:
1. To engage in outdoor recreational activity, consistent with remaining at least six feet from people from outside the individual’s household. Outdoor recreational activity includes walking, hiking, running, cycling, boating, gol!ng, or other similar activity, as well as any comparable activity for those with limited mobility.
2. To perform their jobs as critical infrastructure workers after being so designated by their employers. (Critical infrastructure workers who need not be designated under section 5(a) of this order may leave their home for work without being designated.)
3. To conduct minimum basic operations, as described in section 4(b) of this order, after being designated to perform such work by their employers.
4. To perform resumed activities, as described in section 10 of this order, after being designated to perform such work by their employers.
5. To perform necessary government activities, as described in section 6 of this order.
6. To perform tasks that are necessary to their health and safety, or to the health and safety of their family or household members (including pets). Individuals may, for example, leave the home or place of residence to secure medication or to seek medical or dental care that is necessary to address a medical emergency or to preserve the health and safety of a household or family member (including in-person procedures or veterinary services that, in accordance with a duly implemented nonessential procedure or veterinary services postponement plan, have not been postponed).
7. To obtain necessary services or supplies for themselves, their family or household members, their pets, and their motor vehicles.
A. Individuals must secure such services or supplies via delivery to the maximum extent possible. As needed, however, individuals may leave the home or place of residence to purchase groceries, take-out food, gasoline, needed medical supplies, and any other products necessary to maintain the safety, sanitation, and basic operation of their residences or motor vehicles.
B. Individuals may also leave the home to pick up or return a motor vehicle as permitted under section 9(i) of this order, or to have a motor vehicle or bicycle repaired or maintained.
C. Individuals should limit, to the maximum extent that is safe and feasible, the number of household members who leave the home for any errands.
8. To pick up non-necessary supplies at the curbside from a store that must otherwise remain closed to the public.
9. To care for a family member or a family member’s pet in another household.
10. To care for minors, dependents, the elderly, persons with disabilities, or other vulnerable persons.
11. To visit an individual under the care of a health care facility, residential care facility, or congregate care facility, to the extent otherwise permitted.
12. To visit a child in out-of-home care, or to facilitate a visit between a parent and a child in out-of-home care, when there is agreement between the child placing agency, the parent, and the caregiver about a safe visitation plan, or when, failing such agreement, the individual secures an exception from the executive director of the Children’s Services Agency.
13. To attend legal proceedings or hearings for essential or emergency purposes as ordered by a court.
14. To work or volunteer for businesses or operations (including both religious and secular nonpro!t organizations) that provide food, shelter, and other necessities of life for economically disadvantaged or otherwise needy individuals, individuals who need assistance as a result of this emergency, and people with disabilities.
15. To attend a funeral, provided that no more than 10 people are in attendance.
16. To attend a meeting of an addiction recovery mutual aid society, provided that no more than 10 people are in attendance.
17. To view a real-estate listing by appointment, as permitted under section 10(h) of this order.
b. Individuals may also travel:
1. To return to a home or place of residence from outside this state.
2. To leave this state for a home or residence elsewhere.
3. Between two residences in this state, including moving to a new residence.
4. As required by law enforcement or a court order, including the transportation of children pursuant to a custody agreement.
c. All other travel is prohibited, including all travel to vacation rentals.
8. For purposes of this order, critical infrastructure workers are those workers described by the Director of the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency in his guidance of March 19, 2020 on the COVID-19 response (available here). This order does not adopt any subsequent guidance document released by this same agency.
Consistent with the March 19, 2020 guidance document, critical infrastructure workers include some workers in each of the following sectors:
a. Health care and public health.
b. Law enforcement, public safety, and !rst responders.
c. Food and agriculture.
d. Energy.
e. Water and wastewater.
f. Transportation and logistics.
g. Public works.
h. Communications and information technology, including news media.
i. Other community-based government operations and essential functions.
j. Critical manufacturing.
k. Hazardous materials.
l. Financial services.
m. Chemical supply chains and safety.
n. Defense industrial base.
9. For purposes of this order, critical infrastructure workers also include:
a. Child care workers (including workers at disaster relief child care centers), but only to the extent necessary to serve the children or dependents of critical infrastructure workers, workers who conduct minimum basic operations, workers who perform necessary government activities, or workers who perform resumed activities. This category includes individuals (whether licensed or not) who have arranged to care for the children or dependents of such workers.
b. Workers at suppliers, distribution centers, or service providers, as described below.
1. Any suppliers, distribution centers, or service providers whose continued operation is necessary to enable, support, or facilitate another business’s or operation’s critical infrastructure work may designate their workers as critical infrastructure workers, provided that only those workers whose in-person presence is necessary to enable, support, or facilitate such work may be so designated.
2. Any suppliers, distribution centers, or service providers whose continued operation is necessary to enable, support, or facilitate the necessary work of suppliers, distribution centers, or service providers described in subprovision (1) of this subsection may designate their workers as critical infrastructure workers, provided that only those workers whose in-person presence is necessary to enable, support, or facilitate such work may be so designated.
3. Consistent with the scope of work permitted under subprovision (2) of this subsection, any suppliers, distribution centers, or service providers further down the supply chain whose continued operation is necessary to enable, support, or facilitate the necessary work of other suppliers, distribution centers, or service providers may likewise designate their workers as critical infrastructure workers, provided that only those workers whose in-person presence is necessary to enable, support, or facilitate such work may be so designated.
4. Suppliers, distribution centers, and service providers that abuse their designation authority under this subsection shall be subject to sanctions to the fullest extent of the law.
c. Workers in the insurance industry, but only to the extent that their work cannot be done by telephone or remotely.
d. Workers and volunteers for businesses or operations (including both religious and secular nonpro!t organizations) that provide food, shelter, and other necessities of life for economically disadvantaged or otherwise needy individuals, individuals who need assistance as a result of this emergency, and people with disabilities.
e. Workers who perform critical labor union functions, including those who administer health and welfare funds and those who monitor the well-being and safety of union members who are critical infrastructure workers, provided that any administration or monitoring should be done by telephone or remotely where possible.
f. Workers at retail stores who sell groceries, medical supplies, and products necessary to maintain the safety, sanitation, and basic operation of residences or motor vehicles, including convenience stores, pet supply stores, auto supplies and repair stores, hardware and home maintenance stores, and home appliance retailers.
g. Workers at laundromats, coin laundries, and dry cleaners.
h. Workers at hotels and motels, provided that the hotels or motels do not o"er additional in-house amenities such as gyms, pools, spas, dining, entertainment facilities, meeting rooms, or like facilities.
i. Workers at motor vehicle dealerships who are necessary to facilitate remote and electronic sales or leases, or to deliver motor vehicles to customers, provided that showrooms remain closed to in-person tra$c.
10. For purposes of this order, workers who perform resumed activities are de!ned as follows:
a. Workers who process or ful!ll remote orders for goods for delivery or curbside pick-up.
b. Workers who perform bicycle maintenance or repair.
c. Workers for garden stores, nurseries, and lawn care, pest control, and landscaping operations, subject to the enhanced socialdistancing rules described in section 11(h) of this order.
d. Maintenance workers and groundskeepers who are necessary to maintain the safety and sanitation of places of outdoor recreation not otherwise closed under Executive Order 2020-69 or any order that may follow from it, provided that the places and their workers do not provide goods, equipment, supplies, or services to individuals, and subject to the enhanced social-distancing rules described in section 11(h) of this order.
e. Workers for moving or storage operations, subject to the enhanced social-distancing rules described in section 11(h) of this order.
f. E"ective at 12:01 am on May 7, 2020, and subject to the enhanced social-distancing rules described in section 11(h) of this order, workers who perform work that is traditionally and primarily performed outdoors, including but not limited to forestry workers, outdoor power equipment technicians, parking enforcement workers, and similar workers.
g. E"ective at 12:01 am on May 7, 2020, workers in the construction industry, including workers in the building trades (plumbers, electricians, HVAC technicians, and similar workers), subject to the enhanced social-distancing rules described in section 11(i) of this order.
h. E"ective at 12:01 am on May 7, 2020, workers in the real-estate industry, including agents, appraisers, brokers, inspectors, surveyors, and registers of deeds, provided that:
1. Any showings, inspections, appraisals, photography or videography, or !nal walk-throughs must be performed by appointment and must be limited to no more than four people on the premises at any one time. No in-person open houses are permitted.
2. Private showings may only be arranged for owner-occupied homes, vacant homes, vacant land, commercial property, and industrial property.
i. E"ective at 12:01 am on May 7, 2020, workers necessary to the manufacture of goods that support workplace modi!cation to forestall the spread of COVID-19 infections.
11. Businesses, operations, and government agencies that remain open for in-person work must, at a minimum:
a. Develop a COVID-19 preparedness and response plan, consistent with recommendations in Guidance on Preparing Workplaces for COVID-19, developed by the Occupational Health and Safety Administration and available here. Such plan must be available at company headquarters or the worksite.
b. Restrict the number of workers present on premises to no more than is strictly necessary to perform the in-person work permitted under this order.
c. Promote remote work to the fullest extent possible.
d. Keep workers and patrons who are on premises at least six feet from one another to the maximum extent possible.
e. Increase standards of facility cleaning and disinfection to limit worker and patron exposure to COVID-19, as well as adopting protocols to clean and disinfect in the event of a positive COVID-19 case in the workplace.
f. Adopt policies to prevent workers from entering the premises if they display respiratory symptoms or have had contact with a person with a con!rmed diagnosis of COVID-19.
g. Adopt any other social distancing practices and mitigation measures recommended by the CDC.
h. Businesses or operations whose in-person work is permitted under sections 10(c) through 10(f) of this order must also:
1. Prohibit gatherings of any size in which people cannot maintain six feet of distance from one another.
2. Limit in-person interaction with clients and patrons to the maximum extent possible, and barring any such interaction in which people cannot maintain six feet of distance from one another.
3. Provide personal protective equipment such as gloves, goggles, face shields, and face masks as appropriate for the activity being performed.
4. Adopt protocols to limit the sharing of tools and equipment to the maximum extent possible and to ensure frequent and thorough cleaning of tools, equipment, and frequently touched surfaces.
i. Businesses or operations in the construction industry must also:
1. Adhere to all of the provisions in subsection (h) of this section.
2. Designate a site-speci!c supervisor to monitor and oversee the implementation of COVID-19 control strategies developed under subsection (a) of this section. The supervisor must remain on-site at all times during activities. An on-site worker may be designated to perform the supervisory role.
3. Conduct a daily entry screening protocol for workers and visitors entering the worksite, including a questionnaire covering symptoms and exposure to people with possible COVID-19, together with, if possible, a temperature screening.
4. Create dedicated entry point(s) at every worksite, if possible, for daily screening as provided in subprovision (3) of this subsection, or in the alternative issue stickers or other indicators to workers to show that they received a screening before entering the worksite that day.
5. Require face shields or masks to be worn when workers cannot consistently maintain six feet of separation from other workers.
6. Provide instructions for the distribution of personal protective equipment and designate on-site locations for soiled masks.
7. Encourage or require the use of work gloves, as appropriate, to prevent skin contact with contaminated surfaces.
8. Identify choke points and high-risk areas where workers must stand near one another (such as hallways, hoists and elevators, break areas, water stations, and buses) and control their access and use (including through physical barriers) so that social distancing is maintained.
9. Ensure there are su$cient hand-washing or hand-sanitizing stations at the worksite to enable easy access by workers.
10. Notify contractors (if a subcontractor) or owners (if a contractor) of any con!rmed COVID-19 cases among workers at the worksite.
11. Restrict unnecessary movement between project sites.
12. Create protocols for minimizing personal contact upon delivery of materials to the worksite.
12. Any store that remains open for in-store sales under section 9(f) or section 10(c) of this order:
a. Must establish lines to regulate entry in accordance with subsection (b) of this section, with markings for patrons to enable them to stand at least six feet apart from one another while waiting. Stores should also explore alternatives to lines, including by allowing customers to wait in their cars for a text message or phone call, to enable social distancing and to accommodate seniors and those with disabilities.
b. Must adhere to the following restrictions:
1. For stores of less than 50,000 square feet of customer #oor space, must limit the number of people in the store (including employees) to 25% of the total occupancy limits established by the State Fire Marshal or a local !re marshal.
2. For stores of more than 50,000 square feet, must:
A. Limit the number of customers in the store at one time (excluding employees) to 4 people per 1,000 square feet of customer #oor space.
B. Create at least two hours per week of dedicated shopping time for vulnerable populations, which for purposes of this order are people over 60, pregnant women, and those with chronic conditions like heart disease, diabetes, and lung disease.
3. The director of the Department of Health and Human Services is authorized to issue an emergency order varying the capacity limits described in this subsection as necessary to protect the public health.
c. May continue to sell goods other than necessary supplies if the sale of such goods is in the ordinary course of business.
d. Must consider establishing curbside pick-up to reduce in-store tra$c and mitigate outdoor lines.
13. No one shall rent a short-term vacation property except as necessary to assist in housing a health care professional aiding in the response to the COVID-19 pandemic or a volunteer who is aiding the same.
14. Michigan state parks remain open for day use, subject to any reductions in services and speci!c closures that, in the judgment of the director of the Department of Natural Resources, are necessary to minimize large gatherings and to prevent the spread of COVID-19.
15. Rules governing face coverings.
a. Any individual able to medically tolerate a face covering must wear a covering over his or her nose and mouth—such as a homemade mask, scarf, bandana, or handkerchief—when in any enclosed public space.
b. All businesses and operations whose workers perform in-person work must, at a minimum, provide non-medical grade face coverings to their workers.
c. Supplies of N95 masks and surgical masks should generally be reserved, for now, for health care professionals, !rst responders (e.g., police o$cers, !re !ghters, paramedics), and other critical workers who interact with the public.
d. The protections against discrimination in the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act, 1976 PA 453, as amended, MCL 37.2101 et seq., and any other protections against discrimination in Michigan law, apply in full force to individuals who wear a face covering under this order.
16. Nothing in this order should be taken to supersede another executive order or directive that is in e"ect, except to the extent this order imposes more stringent limitations on in-person work, activities, and interactions. Consistent with prior guidance, neither a place of religious worship nor its owner is subject to penalty under section 20 of this order for allowing religious worship at such place. No individual is subject to penalty under section 20 of this order for violating section 15(a) of this order.
17. Nothing in this order should be taken to interfere with or infringe on the powers of the legislative and judicial branches to perform their constitutional duties or exercise their authority.
18. This order takes e"ect immediately, unless otherwise speci!ed in this order, and continues through May 15, 2020 at 11:59 pm. Executive Order 2020-59 is rescinded. All references to that order in other executive orders, agency rules, letters of understanding, or other legal authorities shall be taken to refer to this order.
19. I will evaluate the continuing need for this order prior to its expiration. In determining whether to maintain, intensify, or relax its restrictions, I will consider, among other things, (1) data on COVID-19 infections and the disease’s rate of spread; (2) whether su$cient medical personnel, hospital beds, and ventilators exist to meet anticipated medical need; (3) the availability of personal protective equipment for the health care workforce; (4) the state’s capacity to test for COVID-19 cases and isolate infected people; and (5) economic conditions in the state.
20. Consistent with MCL 10.33 and MCL 30.405(3), a willful violation of this order is a misdemeanor.

Given under my hand and the Great Seal of the State of Michigan.
Gretchen Whitmer, Governor Date: May 1, 2020 Time: 2:49 pm

Related Documents EO 2020-70 MI Safe Start

MICHIGAN.GOV HOME | ADA | MICHIGAN NEWS | POLICIES COPYRIGHT 2020 STATE OF MICHIGAN

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 33-12 filed 06/08/20 PageID.322 Page 1 of 2

DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

_____________________________________________________

LEAGUE OF INDPENDENT FITNESS FACITLITIES AND TRAINERS, INC., BASELINE FITNESS LLC, BUILDING YOUR TEMPLE LLC, BYT FITNESS 247 LLC, CLAWSON FITNESS, LLC, CLINTON FITNESS, INC., D-LUX KARATE UNIVERSITY LLC, FENTON ATHLETIC CLUB, INC., FENTON KARATE, LLC, FUSION FITNESS 24/7 LLC, H3 FITNESS LLC, I FITNESS PERSONAL TRAINING, INC., JKP FITNESS, LLC, JPF ENTERPRISES, LLC, M FITNESS CLUB, LLC, MH & AB LLC, MOTOR CITY CF - ST. CLAIR SHORES, LLC, NASCOT ENTERPRISES, LLC, PRISON CITY PHYSIQUE LLC, RMP FITNESS INC., STRENGTH BEYOND LLC, 24/7 BOOTCAMP AND BOXING INC., and 4 SEASONS GYM, LLC,
Plaintiffs, v. GRETCHEN E. WHITMER and ROBERT GORDON,
Defendants. _____________________________________________________
ERSKINE LAW, PC Scott M. Erskine (P54734) Carly Van Thomme (P59706) Attorneys for Plaintiffs 612 W. University
Exhibit 12

Civil No. 1:20-cv-00458 Hon. Paul L. Maloney

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 33-12 filed 06/08/20 PageID.323 Page 2 of 2
THE OFFICE OF
GOVERNOR GRETCHEN WHITMER

ABOUT

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NEWS

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WHITMER / NEWS / EXECUTIVE ORDERS

ISSUES

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APPOINTMENTS

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Executive Order 2020-77 (COVID-19)

HOME CONTACT ! SEARCH

LT GOVERNOR

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EXECUTIVE ORDER
No. 2020-77
Temporary requirement to suspend certain activities that are not necessary to sustain or protect life
Rescission of Executive Order 2020-70
The novel coronavirus (COVID-19) is a respiratory disease that can result in serious illness or death. It is caused by a new strain of coronavirus not previously identi!ed in humans and easily spread from person to person. There is currently no approved vaccine or antiviral treatment for this disease.
On March 10, 2020, the Department of Health and Human Services identi!ed the !rst two presumptive-positive cases of COVID-19 in Michigan. On that same day, I issued Executive Order 2020-4. This order declared a state of emergency across the state of Michigan under section 1 of article 5 of the Michigan Constitution of 1963, the Emergency Management Act, 1976 PA 390, as amended, MCL 30.401 et seq., and the Emergency Powers of the Governor Act of 1945, 1945 PA 302, as amended, MCL 10.31 et seq.
Since then, the virus spread across Michigan, bringing deaths in the thousands, con!rmed cases in the tens of thousands, and deep disruption to this state’s economy, homes, and educational, civic, social, and religious institutions. On April 1, 2020, in response to the widespread and severe health, economic, and social harms posed by the COVID-19 pandemic, I issued Executive Order 2020-33. This order expanded on Executive Order 2020-4 and declared both a state of emergency and a state of disaster across the State of Michigan under section 1 of article 5 of the Michigan Constitution of 1963, the Emergency Management Act, and the Emergency Powers of the Governor Act of 1945. And on April 30, 2020, !nding that COVID-19 had created emergency and disaster conditions across the State of Michigan, I issued Executive Order 2020-67 to continue the emergency declaration under the Emergency Powers of the Governor Act, as well as Executive Order 2020-68 to issue new emergency and disaster declarations under the Emergency Management Act.
The Emergency Management Act vests the governor with broad powers and duties to “cop[e] with dangers to this state or the people of this state presented by a disaster or emergency,” which the governor may implement through “executive orders, proclamations, and directives having the force and e"ect of law.” MCL 30.403(1)-(2). Similarly, the Emergency Powers of the Governor Act of 1945 provides that, after declaring a state of emergency, “the governor may promulgate reasonable orders, rules, and regulations as he or she considers necessary to protect life and property or to bring the emergency situation within the a"ected area under control.” MCL 10.31(1).
To suppress the spread of COVID-19, to prevent the state’s health care system from being overwhelmed, to allow time for the production of critical test kits, ventilators, and personal protective equipment, to establish the public health infrastructure necessary to contain the spread of infection, and to avoid needless deaths, it is reasonable and necessary to direct residents to remain at home or in their place of residence to the maximum extent feasible. To that end, on March 23, 2020, I issued Executive Order 2020-21, ordering all people in Michigan to stay home and stay safe. In Executive Orders 2020-42, 2020-59, and 2020-70, I extended that initial order, modifying its scope as needed and appropriate to match the ever-changing circumstances presented by this pandemic.
The measures put in place by Executive Orders 2020-21, 2020-42, 2020-59, and 2020-70 have been e"ective: the number of new con!rmed cases each day has started to drop. Although the virus remains aggressive and persistent—on May 6, 2020, Michigan reported 45,054 con!rmed cases and 4,250 deaths—the strain on our health care system has begun to relent, even as our testing capacity has increased. We can now start the process of gradually resuming in-person work and activities that were temporarily suspended under my prior orders. In so doing, however, we must move with care, patience, and vigilance, recognizing the grave harm that this virus continues to in#ict on our state and how quickly our progress in suppressing it can be undone.
Accordingly, with this order, I !nd it reasonable and necessary to rea$rm the measures set forth in Executive Order 2020-70 and amend their scope. With Executive Order 2020-70, I ordered that certain previously suspended work and activities could resume, based on an evaluation of public health metrics and an assessment of the statewide risks and bene!ts. That evaluation remains ongoing, and based upon it, I !nd that we will soon be positioned to allow another segment of previously suspended work to resume: manufacturing work. This work, like the resumed activities allowed under Executive Order 2020-70, will be subject to stringent precautionary measures. This partial and incremental reopening will allow my public health team to evaluate the e"ects of allowing these activities to resume, to assess the capacity of the health care system to respond adequately to any increases in infections, and to prepare for any increase in patients presenting to a health-care facility or provider. With this order, Executive Order 2020-70 is rescinded. This order will remain in e"ect until May 28, 2020.
Acting under the Michigan Constitution of 1963 and Michigan law, I order the following:
1. This order must be construed broadly to prohibit in-person work that is not necessary to sustain or protect life.
2. Subject to the exceptions in section 7 of this order, all individuals currently living within the State of Michigan are ordered to stay at home or at their place of residence. Subject to the same exceptions, all public and private gatherings of any number of people occurring among persons not part of a single household are prohibited.
3. All individuals who leave their home or place of residence must adhere to social distancing measures recommended by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”), including remaining at least six feet from people from outside the individual’s household to the extent feasible under the circumstances.
4. No person or entity shall operate a business or conduct operations that require workers to leave their homes or places of residence except to the extent that those workers are necessary to sustain or protect life, to conduct minimum basic operations, or to perform a resumed activity within the meaning of this order.
a. For purposes of this order, workers who are necessary to sustain or protect life are de!ned as “critical infrastructure workers,” as described in sections 8 and 9 of this order.
b. For purposes of this order, workers who are necessary to conduct minimum basic operations are those whose in-person presence is strictly necessary to allow the business or operation to maintain the value of inventory and equipment, care for animals, ensure security, process transactions (including payroll and employee bene!ts), or facilitate the ability of other workers to work remotely. Businesses and operations must determine which of their workers are necessary to conduct minimum basic operations and inform such workers of that designation. Businesses and operations must make such designations in writing, whether by electronic message, public website, or other appropriate means. Workers need not carry copies of their designations when they leave the home or place of residence for work. Any in-person work necessary to conduct minimum basic operations must be performed consistently with the social distancing practices and other mitigation measures described in section 11 of this order.
c. Workers who perform resumed activities are de!ned in section 10 of this order.
5. Businesses and operations that employ critical infrastructure workers or workers who perform resumed activities may continue in-person operations, subject to the following conditions:
a. Consistent with sections 8, 9, and 10 of this order, businesses and operations must determine which of their workers are critical infrastructure workers or workers who perform resumed activities and inform such workers of that designation. Businesses and operations must make such designations in writing, whether by electronic message, public website, or other appropriate means. Workers need not carry copies of their designations when they leave the home or place of residence for work. Businesses and operations need not designate:
1. Workers in health care and public health.
2. Workers who perform necessary government activities, as described in section 6 of this order.
3. Workers and volunteers described in section 9(d) of this order.
b. In-person activities that are not necessary to sustain or protect life or to perform a resumed activity must be suspended.
c. Businesses and operations maintaining in-person activities must adopt social distancing practices and other mitigation measures to protect workers and patrons, as described in section 11 of this order. Stores that are open for in-person sales must also adhere to the rules described in section 12 of this order.
d. Any business or operation that employs workers who perform resumed activities under section 10(a) of this order, but that does not sell necessary supplies, may sell any goods through remote sales via delivery or at the curbside. Such a business or operation, however, must otherwise remain closed to the public.
6. All in-person government activities at whatever level (state, county, or local) are suspended unless:
a. They are performed by critical infrastructure workers, including workers in law enforcement, public safety, and !rst responders, as de!ned in sections 8 and 9 of this order.
b. They are performed by workers who are permitted to resume work under section 10 of this order.
c. They are necessary to support the activities of workers described in sections 8, 9, and 10 of this order, or to enable transactions that support businesses or operations that employ such workers.
d. They involve public transit, trash pick-up and disposal (including recycling and composting), the management and oversight of elections, and the maintenance of safe and sanitary public parks so as to allow for outdoor activity permitted under this order.
e. For purposes of this order, necessary government activities include minimum basic operations, as described in section 4(b) of this order. Workers performing such activities need not be designated.
f. Any in-person government activities must be performed consistently with the social distancing practices and other mitigation measures to protect workers and patrons described in section 11 of this order.
7. Exceptions.
a. Individuals may leave their home or place of residence, and travel as necessary:
1. To engage in outdoor recreational activity, consistent with remaining at least six feet from people from outside the individual’s household. Outdoor recreational activity includes walking, hiking, running, cycling, boating, gol!ng, or other similar activity, as well as any comparable activity for those with limited mobility.
2. To perform their jobs as critical infrastructure workers after being so designated by their employers. (Critical infrastructure workers who need not be designated under section 5(a) of this order may leave their home for work without being designated.)
3. To conduct minimum basic operations, as described in section 4(b) of this order, after being designated to perform such work by their employers.
4. To perform resumed activities, as described in section 10 of this order, after being designated to perform such work by their employers.
5. To perform necessary government activities, as described in section 6 of this order.
6. To perform tasks that are necessary to their health and safety, or to the health and safety of their family or household members (including pets). Individuals may, for example, leave the home or place of residence to secure medication or to seek medical or dental care that is necessary to address a medical emergency or to preserve the health and safety of a household or family member (including in-person procedures or veterinary services that, in accordance with a duly implemented nonessential procedure or veterinary services postponement plan, have not been postponed).
7. To obtain necessary services or supplies for themselves, their family or household members, their pets, and their motor vehicles.
a. Individuals must secure such services or supplies via delivery to the maximum extent possible. As needed, however, individuals may leave the home or place of residence to purchase groceries, take-out food, gasoline, needed medical supplies, and any other products necessary to maintain the safety, sanitation, and basic operation of their residences or motor vehicles.
b. Individuals may also leave the home to pick up or return a motor vehicle as permitted under section 9(i) of this order, or to have a motor vehicle or bicycle repaired or maintained.
c. Individuals should limit, to the maximum extent that is safe and feasible, the number of household members who leave the home for any errands.
8. To pick up non-necessary supplies at the curbside from a store that must otherwise remain closed to the public.
9. To care for a family member or a family member’s pet in another household.
10. To care for minors, dependents, the elderly, persons with disabilities, or other vulnerable persons.
11. To visit an individual under the care of a health care facility, residential care facility, or congregate care facility, to the extent otherwise permitted.
12. To visit a child in out-of-home care, or to facilitate a visit between a parent and a child in out-of-home care, when there is agreement between the child placing agency, the parent, and the caregiver about a safe visitation plan, or when, failing such agreement, the individual secures an exception from the executive director of the Children’s Services Agency.
13. To attend legal proceedings or hearings for essential or emergency purposes as ordered by a court.
14. To work or volunteer for businesses or operations (including both religious and secular nonpro!t organizations) that provide food, shelter, and other necessities of life for economically disadvantaged or otherwise needy individuals, individuals who need assistance as a result of this emergency, and people with disabilities.
15. To attend a funeral, provided that no more than 10 people are in attendance.
16. To attend a meeting of an addiction recovery mutual aid society, provided that no more than 10 people are in attendance.
17. To view a real-estate listing by appointment, as permitted under section 10(g) of this order.
18. To participate in training, credentialing, or licensing activities permitted under section 10(i) of this order.
b. Individuals may also travel:
1. To return to a home or place of residence from outside this state.
2. To leave this state for a home or residence elsewhere.
3. Between two residences in this state, including moving to a new residence.
4. As required by law enforcement or a court order, including the transportation of children pursuant to a custody agreement.
c. All other travel is prohibited, including all travel to vacation rentals.
8. For purposes of this order, critical infrastructure workers are those workers described by the Director of the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency in his guidance of March 19, 2020 on the COVID-19 response (available here). This order does not adopt any subsequent guidance document released by this same agency.
Consistent with the March 19, 2020 guidance document, critical infrastructure workers include some workers in each of the following sectors:
a. Health care and public health.
b. Law enforcement, public safety, and !rst responders.
c. Food and agriculture.
d. Energy.
e. Water and wastewater.
f. Transportation and logistics.
g. Public works.
h. Communications and information technology, including news media.
i. Other community-based government operations and essential functions.
j. Critical manufacturing.
k. Hazardous materials.
l. Financial services.
m. Chemical supply chains and safety.
n. Defense industrial base.
9. For purposes of this order, critical infrastructure workers also include:
a. Child care workers (including workers at disaster relief child care centers), but only to the extent necessary to serve the children or dependents of critical infrastructure workers, workers who conduct minimum basic operations, workers who perform necessary government activities, or workers who perform resumed activities. This category includes individuals (whether licensed or not) who have arranged to care for the children or dependents of such workers.
b. Workers at suppliers, distribution centers, or service providers, as described below.
1. Any suppliers, distribution centers, or service providers whose continued operation is necessary to enable, support, or facilitate another business’s or operation’s critical infrastructure work may designate their workers as critical infrastructure workers, provided that only those workers whose in-person presence is necessary to enable, support, or facilitate such work may be so designated.
2. Any suppliers, distribution centers, or service providers whose continued operation is necessary to enable, support, or facilitate the necessary work of suppliers, distribution centers, or service providers described in subprovision (1) of this subsection may designate their workers as critical infrastructure workers provided that only those workers whose in-person presence is necessary to enable, support, or facilitate such work may be so designated.
3. Consistent with the scope of work permitted under subprovision (2) of this subsection, any suppliers, distribution centers, or service providers further down the supply chain whose continued operation is necessary to enable, support, or facilitate the necessary work of other suppliers, distribution centers, or service providers may likewise designate their workers as critical infrastructure workers, provided that only those workers whose in-person presence is necessary to enable, support, or facilitate such work may be so designated.
4. Suppliers, distribution centers, and service providers that abuse their designation authority under this subsection shall be subject to sanctions to the fullest extent of the law.
c. Workers in the insurance industry, but only to the extent that their work cannot be done by telephone or remotely.
d. Workers and volunteers for businesses or operations (including both religious and secular nonpro!t organizations) that provide food, shelter, and other necessities of life for economically disadvantaged or otherwise needy individuals, individuals who need assistance as a result of this emergency, and people with disabilities.
e. Workers who perform critical labor union functions, including those who administer health and welfare funds and those who monitor the well-being and safety of union members who are critical infrastructure workers, provided that any administration or monitoring should be done by telephone or remotely where possible.
f. Workers at retail stores who sell groceries, medical supplies, and products necessary to maintain the safety, sanitation, and basic operation of residences or motor vehicles, including convenience stores, pet supply stores, auto supplies and repair stores, hardware and home maintenance stores, and home appliance retailers.
g. Workers at laundromats, coin laundries, and dry cleaners.
h. Workers at hotels and motels, provided that the hotels or motels do not o"er additional in-house amenities such as gyms, pools, spas, dining, entertainment facilities, meeting rooms, or like facilities.
i. Workers at motor vehicle dealerships who are necessary to facilitate remote and electronic sales or leases, or to deliver motor vehicles to customers, provided that showrooms remain closed to in-person tra$c.
10. For purposes of this order, workers who perform resumed activities are de!ned as follows:
a. Workers who process or ful!ll remote orders for goods for delivery or curbside pick-up.
b. Workers who perform bicycle maintenance or repair.
c. Workers for garden stores, nurseries, and lawn care, pest control, and landscaping operations, subject to the enhanced socialdistancing rules described in section 11(i) of this order.
d. Workers for moving or storage operations, subject to the enhanced social-distancing rules described in section 11(i) of this order.
e. Subject to the enhanced social-distancing rules described in section 11(i) of this order, workers who perform work that is traditionally and primarily performed outdoors, including but not limited to forestry workers, outdoor power equipment technicians, parking enforcement workers, and outdoor workers at places of outdoor recreation not otherwise closed under Executive Order 2020-69 or any order that may follow from it.
f. Workers in the construction industry, including workers in the building trades (plumbers, electricians, HVAC technicians, and similar workers), subject to the workplace safeguards described in section 11(j) of this order.
g. Workers in the real-estate industry, including agents, appraisers, brokers, inspectors, surveyors, and registers of deeds, provided that:
1. Any showings, inspections, appraisals, photography or videography, or !nal walk-throughs must be performed by appointment and must be limited to no more than four people on the premises at any one time. No in-person open houses are permitted.
2. Private showings may only be arranged for owner-occupied homes, vacant homes, vacant land, commercial property, and industrial property.
h. Workers necessary to the manufacture of goods that support workplace modi!cation to forestall the spread of COVID-19 infections.
i. Workers necessary to train, credential, and license !rst responders (e.g., police o$cers, !re !ghters, paramedics) and health-care workers, including certi!ed nursing assistants, provided that as much instruction as possible is provided remotely.
j. Workers necessary to perform start-up activities at manufacturing facilities, including activities necessary to prepare the facilities to follow the workplace safeguards described in section 11(k) of this order.
k. E"ective at 12:01 am on May 11, 2020, workers necessary to perform manufacturing activities, subject to the workplace safeguards described in section 11(k) of this order. Manufacturing work may not commence under this subsection until the facility at which the work will be performed has been prepared to follow the workplace safeguards described in section 11(k) of this order.
l. Consistent with section 9(b) of this order, workers at suppliers, distribution centers, or service providers whose in-person presence is necessary to enable, support, or facilitate another business’s or operation’s resumed activities, including workers at suppliers, distribution centers, or service providers along the supply chain whose in-person presence is necessary enable, support, or facilitate the necessary work of another supplier, distribution center, or service provider in enabling, supporting, or facilitating another business’s or operation’s resumed activities. Suppliers, distribution centers, and service providers that abuse their designation authority under this subsection shall be subject to sanctions to the fullest extent of the law.
11. Businesses, operations, and government agencies that remain open for in-person work must, at a minimum:
a. Develop a COVID-19 preparedness and response plan, consistent with recommendations in Guidance on Preparing Workplaces for COVID-19, developed by the Occupational Health and Safety Administration and available here. Such plan must be available at company headquarters or the worksite.
b. Restrict the number of workers present on premises to no more than is strictly necessary to perform the in-person work permitted under this order.
c. Promote remote work to the fullest extent possible.
d. Keep workers and patrons who are on premises at least six feet from one another to the maximum extent possible.
e. Require masks to be worn when workers cannot consistently maintain six feet of separation from other individuals in the workplace, and consider face shields when workers cannot consistently maintain three feet of separation from other individuals in the workplace.
f. Increase standards of facility cleaning and disinfection to limit worker and patron exposure to COVID-19, as well as adopting protocols to clean and disinfect in the event of a positive COVID-19 case in the workplace.
g. Adopt policies to prevent workers from entering the premises if they display respiratory symptoms or have had contact with a person with a con!rmed diagnosis of COVID-19.
h. Adopt any other social distancing practices and mitigation measures recommended by the CDC.
i. Businesses or operations whose in-person work is permitted under sections 10(c) through 10(e) of this order must also:
1. Prohibit gatherings of any size in which people cannot maintain six feet of distance from one another.
2. Limit in-person interaction with clients and patrons to the maximum extent possible, and bar any such interaction in which people cannot maintain six feet of distance from one another.
3. Provide personal protective equipment such as gloves, goggles, face shields, and face masks as appropriate for the activity being performed.
4. Adopt protocols to limit the sharing of tools and equipment to the maximum extent possible and to ensure frequent and thorough cleaning and disinfection of tools, equipment, and frequently touched surfaces.
j. Businesses or operations in the construction industry must also:
1. Adhere to all of the provisions in subsection (i) of this section.
2. Designate a site-speci!c supervisor to monitor and oversee the implementation of COVID-19 control strategies developed under subsection (a) of this section. The supervisor must remain on-site at all times during activities. An on-site worker may be designated to perform the supervisory role.
3. Conduct a daily entry screening protocol for workers, contractors, suppliers, and any other individuals entering a worksite, including a questionnaire covering symptoms and suspected or con!rmed exposure to people with possible COVID-19, together with, if possible, a temperature screening.
4. Create dedicated entry point(s) at every worksite, if possible, for daily screening as provided in subprovision (3) of this subsection, or in the alternative issue stickers or other indicators to workers to show that they received a screening before entering the worksite that day.
5. Provide instructions for the distribution of personal protective equipment and designate on-site locations for soiled masks.
6. Encourage or require the use of work gloves, as appropriate, to prevent skin contact with contaminated surfaces.
7. Identify choke points and high-risk areas where workers must stand near one another (such as hallways, hoists and elevators, break areas, water stations, and buses) and control their access and use (including through physical barriers) so that social distancing is maintained.
8. Ensure there are su$cient hand-washing or hand-sanitizing stations at the worksite to enable easy access by workers.
9. Notify contractors (if a subcontractor) or owners (if a contractor) of any con!rmed COVID-19 cases among workers at the worksite.
10. Restrict unnecessary movement between project sites.
11. Create protocols for minimizing personal contact upon delivery of materials to the worksite.
k. Manufacturing facilities must also:
1. Conduct a daily entry screening protocol for workers, contractors, suppliers, and any other individuals entering the facility, including a questionnaire covering symptoms and suspected or con!rmed exposure to people with possible COVID-19, together with temperature screening as soon as no-touch thermometers can be obtained.
2. Create dedicated entry point(s) at every facility for daily screening as provided in subprovision (1) of this subsection, and ensure physical barriers are in place to prevent anyone from bypassing the screening.
3. Suspend all non-essential in-person visits, including tours.
4. Train workers on, at a minimum:
A. Routes by which the virus causing COVID-19 is transmitted from person to person.
B. Distance that the virus can travel in the air, as well as the time it remains viable in the air and on environmental surfaces.
C. Symptoms of COVID-19.
D. Steps the worker must take to notify the business or operation of any symptoms of COVID-19 or a suspected or con!rmed diagnosis of COVID-19.
E. Measures that the facility is taking to prevent worker exposure to the virus, as described in the COVID-19 preparedness and response plan required under section 11(a) of this order.
F. Rules that the worker must follow in order to prevent exposure to and spread of the virus.
G. The use of personal protective equipment, including the proper steps for putting it on and taking it o".
5. Reduce congestion in common spaces wherever practicable by, for example, closing salad bars and bu"ets within cafeterias and kitchens, requiring individuals to sit at least six feet from one another, placing markings on the #oor to allow social distancing while standing in line, o"ering boxed food via delivery or pick-up points, and reducing cash payments.
6. Implement rotational shift schedules where possible (e.g., increasing the number of shifts, alternating days or weeks) to reduce the number of workers in the facility at the same time.
7. Stagger start times and meal times.
8. Install temporary physical barriers, where practicable, between work stations and cafeteria tables.
9. Create protocols for minimizing personal contact upon delivery of materials to the facility.
10. Adopt protocols to limit the sharing of tools and equipment to the maximum extent possible.
11. Frequently and thoroughly clean and disinfect high-touch surfaces, paying special attention to parts, products, and shared equipment (e.g., tools, machinery, vehicles).
12. Ensure there are su$cient hand-washing or hand-sanitizing stations at the worksite to enable easy access by workers, and discontinue use of hand dryers.
13. Notify plant leaders and potentially exposed individuals upon identi!cation of a positive case of COVID-19 in the facility, as well as maintain a central log for symptomatic workers or workers who received a positive test for COVID-19.
14. Send potentially exposed individuals home upon identi!cation of a positive case of COVID-19 in the facility.
15. Encourage workers to self-report to plant leaders as soon as possible after developing symptoms of COVID-19.
16. Shut areas of the manufacturing facility for cleaning and disinfection, as necessary, if a worker goes home because he or she is displaying symptoms of COVID-19.
12. Any store that remains open for in-store sales under section 9(f) or section 10(c) of this order:
a. Must establish lines to regulate entry in accordance with subsection (b) of this section, with markings for patrons to enable them to stand at least six feet apart from one another while waiting. Stores should also explore alternatives to lines, including by allowing customers to wait in their cars for a text message or phone call, to enable social distancing and to accommodate seniors and those with disabilities.
b. Must adhere to the following restrictions:
1. For stores of less than 50,000 square feet of customer #oor space, must limit the number of people in the store (including employees) to 25% of the total occupancy limits established by the State Fire Marshal or a local !re marshal.
2. For stores of more than 50,000 square feet, must:
A. Limit the number of customers in the store at one time (excluding employees) to 4 people per 1,000 square feet of customer #oor space.
B. Create at least two hours per week of dedicated shopping time for vulnerable populations, which for purposes of this order are people over 60, pregnant women, and those with chronic conditions like heart disease, diabetes, and lung disease.
3. The director of the Department of Health and Human Services is authorized to issue an emergency order varying the capacity limits described in this subsection as necessary to protect the public health.
c. May continue to sell goods other than necessary supplies if the sale of such goods is in the ordinary course of business.
d. Must consider establishing curbside pick-up to reduce in-store tra$c and mitigate outdoor lines.
13. No one shall rent a short-term vacation property except as necessary to assist in housing a health care professional aiding in the response to the COVID-19 pandemic or a volunteer who is aiding the same.
14. Michigan state parks remain open for day use, subject to any reductions in services and speci!c closures that, in the judgment of the director of the Department of Natural Resources, are necessary to minimize large gatherings and to prevent the spread of COVID-19.
15. Rules governing face coverings.
a. Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, any individual able to medically tolerate a face covering must wear a covering over his or her nose and mouth—such as a homemade mask, scarf, bandana, or handkerchief—when in any enclosed public space.
b. An individual may be required to temporarily remove a face covering upon entering an enclosed public space for identi!cation purposes.
c. All businesses and operations whose workers perform in-person work must, at a minimum, provide non-medical grade face coverings to their workers.
d. Supplies of N95 masks and surgical masks should generally be reserved, for now, for health care professionals, !rst responders (e.g., police o$cers, !re !ghters, paramedics), and other critical workers who interact with the public.
e. The protections against discrimination in the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act, 1976 PA 453, as amended, MCL 37.2101 et seq., and any other protections against discrimination in Michigan law, apply in full force to individuals who wear a face covering under this order.
16. Nothing in this order should be taken to supersede another executive order or directive that is in e"ect, except to the extent this order imposes more stringent limitations on in-person work, activities, and interactions. Consistent with prior guidance, neither a place of religious worship nor its owner is subject to penalty under section 20 of this order for allowing religious worship at such place. No individual is subject to penalty under section 20 of this order for engaging in or traveling to engage in religious worship at a place of religious worship, or for violating section 15(a) of this order.
17. Nothing in this order should be taken to interfere with or infringe on the powers of the legislative and judicial branches to perform their constitutional duties or exercise their authority. Similarly, nothing in this order shall be taken to abridge protections guaranteed by the state or federal constitution under these emergency circumstances.
18. This order takes e"ect immediately, unless otherwise speci!ed in this order, and continues through May 28, 2020 at 11:59 pm. Executive Order 2020-70 is rescinded. All references to that order in other executive orders, agency rules, letters of understanding, or other legal authorities shall be taken to refer to this order.
19. I will evaluate the continuing need for this order prior to its expiration. In determining whether to maintain, intensify, or relax its restrictions, I will consider, among other things, (1) data on COVID-19 infections and the disease’s rate of spread; (2) whether su$cient medical personnel, hospital beds, and ventilators exist to meet anticipated medical need; (3) the availability of personal protective equipment for the health care workforce; (4) the state’s capacity to test for COVID-19 cases and isolate infected people; and (5) economic conditions in the state.
20. Consistent with MCL 10.33 and MCL 30.405(3), a willful violation of this order is a misdemeanor.
Given under my hand and the Great Seal of the State of Michigan.
Gretchen Whitmer, Governor
Date: May 7, 2020 Time: 3:00 pm
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Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 33-13 filed 06/08/20 PageID.324 Page 1 of 2

DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

_____________________________________________________

LEAGUE OF INDPENDENT FITNESS FACITLITIES AND TRAINERS, INC., BASELINE FITNESS LLC, BUILDING YOUR TEMPLE LLC, BYT FITNESS 247 LLC, CLAWSON FITNESS, LLC, CLINTON FITNESS, INC., D-LUX KARATE UNIVERSITY LLC, FENTON ATHLETIC CLUB, INC., FENTON KARATE, LLC, FUSION FITNESS 24/7 LLC, H3 FITNESS LLC, I FITNESS PERSONAL TRAINING, INC., JKP FITNESS, LLC, JPF ENTERPRISES, LLC, M FITNESS CLUB, LLC, MH & AB LLC, MOTOR CITY CF - ST. CLAIR SHORES, LLC, NASCOT ENTERPRISES, LLC, PRISON CITY PHYSIQUE LLC, RMP FITNESS INC., STRENGTH BEYOND LLC, 24/7 BOOTCAMP AND BOXING INC., and 4 SEASONS GYM, LLC,
Plaintiffs, v. GRETCHEN E. WHITMER and ROBERT GORDON,
Defendants. _____________________________________________________
ERSKINE LAW, PC Scott M. Erskine (P54734) Carly Van Thomme (P59706) Attorneys for Plaintiffs 612 W. University
Exhibit 13

Civil No. 1:20-cv-00458 Hon. Paul L. Maloney

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Executive Order 2020-92 (COVID-19)

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EXECUTIVE ORDER
No. 2020-92
Temporary requirement to suspend certain activities that are not necessary to sustain or protect life
Rescission of Executive Orders 2020-77 and 2020-90
The novel coronavirus (COVID-19) is a respiratory disease that can result in serious illness or death. It is caused by a new strain of coronavirus not previously identi!ed in humans and easily spread from person to person. There is currently no approved vaccine or antiviral treatment for this disease.
On March 10, 2020, the Department of Health and Human Services identi!ed the !rst two presumptive-positive cases of COVID-19 in Michigan. On that same day, I issued Executive Order 2020-4. This order declared a state of emergency across the state of Michigan under section 1 of article 5 of the Michigan Constitution of 1963, the Emergency Management Act, 1976 PA 390, as amended, MCL 30.401 et seq., and the Emergency Powers of the Governor Act of 1945, 1945 PA 302, as amended, MCL 10.31 et seq.
Since then, the virus spread across Michigan, bringing deaths in the thousands, con!rmed cases in the tens of thousands, and deep disruption to this state’s economy, homes, and educational, civic, social, and religious institutions. On April 1, 2020, in response to the widespread and severe health, economic, and social harms posed by the COVID-19 pandemic, I issued Executive Order 2020-33. This order expanded on Executive Order 2020-4 and declared both a state of emergency and a state of disaster across the State of Michigan under section 1 of article 5 of the Michigan Constitution of 1963, the Emergency Management Act, and the Emergency Powers of the Governor Act of 1945. And on April 30, 2020, !nding that COVID-19 had created emergency and disaster conditions across the State of Michigan, I issued Executive Order 2020-67 to continue the emergency declaration under the Emergency Powers of the Governor Act, as well as Executive Order 2020-68 to issue new emergency and disaster declarations under the Emergency Management Act.
The Emergency Management Act vests the governor with broad powers and duties to “cop[e] with dangers to this state or the people of this state presented by a disaster or emergency,” which the governor may implement through “executive orders, proclamations, and directives having the force and e"ect of law.” MCL 30.403(1)-(2). Similarly, the Emergency Powers of the Governor Act of 1945 provides that, after declaring a state of emergency, “the governor may promulgate reasonable orders, rules, and regulations as he or she considers necessary to protect life and property or to bring the emergency situation within the a"ected area under control.” MCL 10.31(1).
To suppress the spread of COVID-19, to prevent the state’s health care system from being overwhelmed, to allow time for the production of critical test kits, ventilators, and personal protective equipment, to establish the public health infrastructure necessary to contain the spread of infection, and to avoid needless deaths, it is reasonable and necessary to direct residents to remain at home or in their place of residence to the maximum extent feasible. To that end, on March 23, 2020, I issued Executive Order 2020-21, ordering all people in Michigan to stay home and stay safe. In Executive Orders 2020-42, 2020-59, 2020-70, and 2020-77, I extended that initial order, modifying its scope as needed and appropriate to match the ever-changing circumstances presented by this pandemic.
The measures put in place by Executive Orders 2020-21, 2020-42, 2020-59, 2020-70, and 2020-77 have been e"ective: the number of new con!rmed cases each day has started to drop. Although the virus remains aggressive and persistent—on May 17, 2020, Michigan reported 51,142 con!rmed cases and 4,891 deaths—the strain on our health care system has begun to relent, even as our testing capacity has increased. We can now start the process of gradually resuming in-person work and activities that were temporarily suspended under my prior orders. In so doing, however, we must move with care, patience, and vigilance, recognizing the grave harm that this virus continues to in#ict on our state and how quickly our progress in suppressing it can be undone.
Accordingly, with this order, I !nd it reasonable and necessary to rea$rm the measures set forth in Executive Order 2020-77. The order is being reissued to omit worker safeguards that were included in prior versions of this order but which have now been adopted in Executive Order 2020-91, a standalone order on worker protection. It has also been amended to allow, in two regions, social gatherings of up to 10 people and to permit the reopening of retail stores, o$ces, and restaurants and bars with limited seating. Finally, the order incorporates and replaces Executive Order 2020-90, which allowed research laboratories to resume activities.
Acting under the Michigan Constitution of 1963 and Michigan law, I order the following:
1. This order must be construed broadly to prohibit in-person work that is not necessary to sustain or protect life.
2. For purposes of this order, Michigan comprises eight separate regions:
a. Region 1 includes the following counties: Monroe, Washtenaw, Livingston, Genesee, Lapeer, Saint Clair, Oakland, Macomb, and Wayne.
b. Region 2 includes the following counties: Mason, Lake, Osceola, Clare, Oceana, Newaygo, Mecosta, Isabella, Muskegon, Montcalm, Ottawa, Kent, and Ionia.
c. Region 3 includes the following counties: Allegan, Barry, Van Buren, Kalamazoo, Calhoun, Berrien, Cass, Saint Joseph, and Branch.
d. Region 4 includes the following counties: Oscoda, Alcona, Ogemaw, Iosco, Gladwin, Arenac, Midland, Bay, Saginaw, Tuscola, Sanilac, and Huron.
e. Region 5 includes the following counties: Gratiot, Clinton, Shiawassee, Eaton, and Ingham.
f. Region 6 includes the following counties: Manistee, Wexford, Missaukee, Roscommon, Benzie, Grand Traverse, Kalkaska, Crawford, Leelanau, Antrim, Otsego, Montmorency, Alpena, Charlevoix, Cheboygan, Presque Isle, and Emmet.
g. Region 7 includes the following counties: Hillsdale, Lenawee, and Jackson.
h. Region 8 includes the following counties: Gogebic, Ontonagon, Houghton, Keweenaw, Iron, Baraga, Dickinson, Marquette, Menominee, Delta, Alger, Schoolcraft, Luce, Mackinac, and Chippewa.
3. Subject to the exceptions in section 8 of this order, all individuals currently living within the State of Michigan are ordered to stay at home or at their place of residence. Subject to the same exceptions, all public and private gatherings of any number of people occurring among persons not part of a single household are prohibited.
4. All individuals who leave their home or place of residence must adhere to social distancing measures recommended by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”), including remaining at least six feet from people from outside the individual’s household to the extent feasible under the circumstances.
5. No person or entity shall operate a business or conduct operations that require workers to leave their homes or places of residence except to the extent that those workers are necessary to sustain or protect life, to conduct minimum basic operations, or to perform a resumed activity within the meaning of this order.
a. For purposes of this order, workers who are necessary to sustain or protect life are de!ned as “critical infrastructure workers,” as described in sections 9 and 10 of this order.
b. For purposes of this order, workers who are necessary to conduct minimum basic operations are those whose in-person presence is strictly necessary to allow the business or operation to maintain the value of inventory and equipment, care for animals, ensure security, process transactions (including payroll and employee bene!ts), or facilitate the ability of other workers to work remotely.
Businesses and operations must determine which of their workers are necessary to conduct minimum basic operations and inform such workers of that designation. Businesses and operations must make such designations in writing, whether by electronic message, public website, or other appropriate means. Workers need not carry copies of their designations when they leave the home or place of residence for work.
Any in-person work necessary to conduct minimum basic operations must be performed consistently with the social distancing practices and other mitigation measures described in Executive Order 2020-91 and any orders that follow or replace it.
c. Workers who perform resumed activities are de!ned in section 11 of this order.
6. Businesses and operations that employ critical infrastructure workers or workers who perform resumed activities may continue in-person operations, subject to the following conditions:
a. Consistent with sections 9, 10, and 11 of this order, businesses and operations must determine which of their workers are critical infrastructure workers or workers who perform resumed activities and inform such workers of that designation. Businesses and operations must make such designations in writing, whether by electronic message, public website, or other appropriate means. Workers need not carry copies of their designations when they leave the home or place of residence for work. Businesses and operations need not designate:
1. Workers in health care and public health.
2. Workers who perform necessary government activities, as described in section 7 of this order.
3. Workers and volunteers described in section 10(d) of this order.
b. In-person activities that are not necessary to sustain or protect life or to perform a resumed activity must be suspended.
c. Businesses and operations maintaining in-person activities must adopt social distancing practices and other mitigation measures to protect workers and patrons, as described in Executive Order 2020-91 and any orders that follow or replace it.
d. Any business or operation that employs workers who perform resumed activities under section 11(a) of this order, but that does not sell necessary supplies, may sell any goods through remote sales via delivery or at the curbside. Such a business or operation, however, must otherwise remain closed to the public.
7. All in-person government activities at whatever level (state, county, or local) are suspended unless:
a. They are performed by critical infrastructure workers, including workers in law enforcement, public safety, and !rst responders, as de!ned in sections 9 and 10 of this order.
b. They are performed by workers who are permitted to resume work under section 11 of this order.
c. They are necessary to support the activities of workers described in sections 9, 10, and 11 of this order, or to enable transactions that support businesses or operations that employ such workers.
d. They involve public transit, trash pick-up and disposal (including recycling and composting), the management and oversight of elections, and the maintenance of safe and sanitary public parks so as to allow for outdoor activity permitted under this order.
e. For purposes of this order, necessary government activities include minimum basic operations, as described in 5(b) of this order. Workers performing such activities need not be designated.
f. Any in-person government activities must be performed consistently with the social distancing practices and other mitigation measures to protect workers and patrons described in Executive Order 2020-91 and any orders that follow or replace it.
8. Exceptions.
a. Individuals may leave their home or place of residence, and travel as necessary:
1. To engage in outdoor recreational activity, consistent with remaining at least six feet from people from outside the individual’s household. Outdoor recreational activity includes walking, hiking, running, cycling, boating, gol!ng, or other similar activity, as well as any comparable activity for those with limited mobility.
2. To perform their jobs as critical infrastructure workers after being so designated by their employers. (Critical infrastructure workers who need not be designated under section 6(a) of this order may leave their home for work without being designated.)
3. To conduct minimum basic operations, as described in section 5(b) of this order, after being designated to perform such work by their employers.
4. To perform resumed activities, as described in section 11 of this order, after being designated to perform such work by their employers.
5. To perform necessary government activities, as described in section 7 of this order.
6. To perform tasks that are necessary to their health and safety, or to the health and safety of their family or household members (including pets). Individuals may, for example, leave the home or place of residence to secure medication or to seek medical or dental care that is necessary to address a medical emergency or to preserve the health and safety of a household or family member (including in-person procedures or veterinary services that, in accordance with a duly implemented nonessential procedure or veterinary services postponement plan, have not been postponed).
7. To obtain necessary services or supplies for themselves, their family or household members, their pets, and their motor vehicles.
A. Individuals must secure such services or supplies via delivery to the maximum extent possible. As needed, however, individuals may leave the home or place of residence to purchase groceries, take-out food, gasoline, needed medical supplies, and any other products necessary to maintain the safety, sanitation, and basic operation of their residences or motor vehicles.
B. Individuals may also leave the home to pick up or return a motor vehicle as permitted under section 10(i) of this order, or to have a motor vehicle or bicycle repaired or maintained.
C. Individuals should limit, to the maximum extent that is safe and feasible, the number of household members who leave the home for any errands.
8. To pick up non-necessary supplies at the curbside from a store that must otherwise remain closed to the public.
9. To care for a family member or a family member’s pet in another household.
10. To care for minors, dependents, the elderly, persons with disabilities, or other vulnerable persons.
11. To visit an individual under the care of a health care facility, residential care facility, or congregate care facility, to the extent otherwise permitted.
12. To visit a child in out-of-home care, or to facilitate a visit between a parent and a child in out-of-home care, when there is agreement between the child placing agency, the parent, and the caregiver about a safe visitation plan, or when, failing such agreement, the individual secures an exception from the executive director of the Children’s Services Agency.
13. To attend legal proceedings or hearings for essential or emergency purposes as ordered by a court.
14. To work or volunteer for businesses or operations (including both religious and secular nonpro!t organizations) that provide food, shelter, and other necessities of life for economically disadvantaged or otherwise needy individuals, individuals who need assistance as a result of this emergency, and people with disabilities.
15. To attend a funeral, provided that no more than 10 people are in attendance.
16. To attend a meeting of an addiction recovery mutual aid society, provided that no more than 10 people are in attendance.
17. To view a real-estate listing by appointment, as permitted under section 11(g) of this order.
18. To participate in training, credentialing, or licensing activities permitted under section 11(i) of this order.
19. For individuals in Regions 6 or 8, to go to a restaurant or a retail store or to attend a social gathering of up to 10 people.
b. Individuals may also travel:
1. To return to a home or place of residence from outside this state.
2. To leave this state for a home or residence elsewhere.
3. Between two residences in this state, including moving to a new residence.
4. As required by law enforcement or a court order, including the transportation of children pursuant to a custody agreement.
c. All other travel is prohibited, including all travel to vacation rentals.
9. For purposes of this order, critical infrastructure workers are those workers described by the Director of the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency in his guidance of March 19, 2020 on the COVID-19 response (available here). This order does not adopt any subsequent guidance document released by this same agency.
Consistent with the March 19, 2020 guidance document, critical infrastructure workers include some workers in each of the following sectors:
a. Health care and public health.
b. Law enforcement, public safety, and !rst responders.
c. Food and agriculture.
d. Energy.
e. Water and wastewater.
f. Transportation and logistics.
g. Public works.
h. Communications and information technology, including news media.
i. Other community-based government operations and essential functions.
j. Critical manufacturing.
k. Hazardous materials.
l. Financial services.
m. Chemical supply chains and safety.
n. Defense industrial base.
10. For purposes of this order, critical infrastructure workers also include:
a. Child care workers (including workers at disaster relief child care centers), but only to the extent necessary to serve the children or dependents of critical infrastructure workers, workers who conduct minimum basic operations, workers who perform necessary government activities, or workers who perform resumed activities. This category includes individuals (whether licensed or not) who have arranged to care for the children or dependents of such workers.
b. Workers at suppliers, distribution centers, or service providers, as described below.
1. Any suppliers, distribution centers, or service providers whose continued operation is necessary to enable, support, or facilitate another business’s or operation’s critical infrastructure work may designate their workers as critical infrastructure workers, provided that only those workers whose in-person presence is necessary to enable, support, or facilitate such work may be so designated.
2. Any suppliers, distribution centers, or service providers whose continued operation is necessary to enable, support, or facilitate the necessary work of suppliers, distribution centers, or service providers described in sub-provision (1) of this subsection may designate their workers as critical infrastructure workers provided that only those workers whose in-person presence is necessary to enable, support, or facilitate such work may be so designated.
3. Consistent with the scope of work permitted under sub-provision (2) of this subsection, any suppliers, distribution centers, or service providers further down the supply chain whose continued operation is necessary to enable, support, or facilitate the necessary work of other suppliers, distribution centers, or service providers may likewise designate their workers as critical infrastructure workers, provided that only those workers whose in-person presence is necessary to enable, support, or facilitate such work may be so designated.
4. Suppliers, distribution centers, and service providers that abuse their designation authority under this subsection shall be subject to sanctions to the fullest extent of the law.
c. Workers in the insurance industry, but only to the extent that their work cannot be done by telephone or remotely.
d. Workers and volunteers for businesses or operations (including both religious and secular nonpro!t organizations) that provide food, shelter, and other necessities of life for economically disadvantaged or otherwise needy individuals, individuals who need assistance as a result of this emergency, and people with disabilities.
e. Workers who perform critical labor union functions, including those who administer health and welfare funds and those who monitor the well-being and safety of union members who are critical infrastructure workers, provided that any administration or monitoring should be done by telephone or remotely where possible.
f. Workers at retail stores who sell groceries, medical supplies, and products necessary to maintain the safety, sanitation, and basic operation of residences or motor vehicles, including convenience stores, pet supply stores, auto supplies and repair stores, hardware and home maintenance stores, and home appliance retailers.
g. Workers at laundromats, coin laundries, and dry cleaners.
h. Workers at hotels and motels, provided that the hotels or motels do not o"er additional in-house amenities such as gyms, pools, spas, dining, entertainment facilities, meeting rooms, or like facilities.
i. Workers at motor vehicle dealerships who are necessary to facilitate remote and electronic sales or leases, or to deliver motor vehicles to customers, provided that showrooms remain closed to in-person tra$c.
11. For purposes of this order, workers who perform resumed activities are de!ned as follows:
a. Workers who process or ful!ll remote orders for goods for delivery or curbside pick-up.
b. Workers who perform bicycle maintenance or repair.
c. Workers for garden stores, nurseries, and lawn care, pest control, and landscaping operations.
d. Workers for moving or storage operations.
e. Workers who perform work that is traditionally and primarily performed outdoors, including but not limited to forestry workers, outdoor power equipment technicians, parking enforcement workers, and outdoor workers at places of outdoor recreation not otherwise closed under Executive Order 2020-69 or any order that may follow from it.
f. Workers in the construction industry, including workers in the building trades (plumbers, electricians, HVAC technicians, and similar workers).
g. Workers in the real-estate industry, including agents, appraisers, brokers, inspectors, surveyors, and registers of deeds, provided that:
1. Any showings, inspections, appraisals, photography or videography, or !nal walk-throughs must be performed by appointment and must be limited to no more than four people on the premises at any one time. No in-person open houses are permitted.
2. Private showings may only be arranged for owner-occupied homes, vacant homes, vacant land, commercial property, and industrial property.
h. Workers necessary to the manufacture of goods that support workplace modi!cation to forestall the spread of COVID-19 infections.
i. Workers necessary to train, credential, and license !rst responders (e.g., police o$cers, !re !ghters, paramedics) and health-care workers, including certi!ed nursing assistants, provided that as much instruction as possible is provided remotely.
j. Workers necessary to perform manufacturing activities. Manufacturing work may not commence under this subsection until the facility at which the work will be performed has been prepared to follow the workplace safeguards described in section 4 of Executive Order 2020-91 and any orders that follow or replace it.
k. Workers necessary to conduct research activities in a laboratory setting.
l. For Regions 6 and 8, beginning at 12:01 am on May 22, workers necessary to perform retail activities. For purposes of this order, retail activities are de!ned to exclude those places of public accommodation that are closed under Executive Order 2020-69 and any orders that follow or replace it.
m. For Regions 6 and 8, beginning at 12:01 am on May 22, workers who work in an o$ce setting, but only to the extent that such work is not capable of being performed remotely.
n. For Regions 6 and 8, beginning at 12:01 am on May 22, workers in restaurants or bars, subject to the capacity constraints and workplace standards described in Executive Order 2020-91. Nothing in this subsection should be taken to abridge or otherwise modify the existing power of a local government to impose further restrictions on restaurants or bars.
o. Workers necessary to prepare a workplace to follow the workplace standards described in Executive Order 2020-91.
p. Consistent with section 10(b) of this order, workers at suppliers, distribution centers, or service providers whose in-person presence is necessary to enable, support, or facilitate another business’s or operation’s resumed activities, including workers at suppliers, distribution centers, or service providers along the supply chain whose in-person presence is necessary to enable, support, or facilitate the necessary work of another supplier, distribution center, or service provider in enabling, supporting, or facilitating another business’s or operation’s resumed activities. Suppliers, distribution centers, and service providers that abuse their designation authority under this subsection shall be subject to sanctions to the fullest extent of the law.
12. Any store that is open for in-store sales under section 10(f) or section 11(c) of this executive order:
a. May continue to sell goods other than necessary supplies if the sale of such goods is in the ordinary course of business.
b. Must consider establishing curbside pick-up to reduce in-store tra$c and mitigate outdoor lines.
13. No one shall rent a short-term vacation property except as necessary to assist in housing a health care professional aiding in the response to the COVID-19 pandemic or a volunteer who is aiding the same.
14. Michigan state parks remain open for day use, subject to any reductions in services and speci!c closures that, in the judgment of the director of the Department of Natural Resources, are necessary to minimize large gatherings and to prevent the spread of COVID-19.
15. Rules governing face coverings.
a. Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, any individual able to medically tolerate a face covering must wear a covering over his or her nose and mouth—such as a homemade mask, scarf, bandana, or handkerchief—when in any enclosed public space.
b. An individual may be required to temporarily remove a face covering upon entering an enclosed public space for identi!cation purposes or while seated at a restaurant or bar.
c. All businesses and operations whose workers perform in-person work must, at a minimum, provide non-medical grade face coverings to their workers.
d. Supplies of N95 masks and surgical masks should generally be reserved, for now, for health care professionals, !rst responders (e.g., police o$cers, !re !ghters, paramedics), and other critical workers who interact with the public.
e. The protections against discrimination in the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act, 1976 PA 453, as amended, MCL 37.2101 et seq., and any other protections against discrimination in Michigan law, apply in full force to individuals who wear a face covering under this order.
16. Nothing in this order should be taken to supersede another executive order or directive that is in e"ect, except to the extent this order imposes more stringent limitations on in-person work, activities, and interactions. Consistent with prior guidance, neither a place of religious worship nor its owner is subject to penalty under section 20 of this order for allowing religious worship at such place. No individual is subject to penalty under section 20 of this order for engaging in or traveling to engage in religious worship at a place of religious worship, or for violating section 15(a) of this order.
17. Nothing in this order should be taken to interfere with or infringe on the powers of the legislative and judicial branches to perform their constitutional duties or exercise their authority. Similarly, nothing in this order shall be taken to abridge protections guaranteed by the state or federal constitution under these emergency circumstances.
18. This order takes e"ect immediately, unless otherwise speci!ed in this order, and continues through May 28, 2020 at 11:59 pm. Executive Orders 2020-77 and 2020-90 are rescinded. All references to those orders in other executive orders, agency rules, letters of understanding, or other legal authorities shall be taken to refer to this order.
19. I will evaluate the continuing need for this order prior to its expiration. In determining whether to maintain, intensify, or relax its restrictions, I will consider, among other things, (1) data on COVID-19 infections and the disease’s rate of spread; (2) whether su$cient medical personnel, hospital beds, and ventilators exist to meet anticipated medical need; (3) the availability of personal protective equipment for the health care workforce; (4) the state’s capacity to test for COVID-19 cases and isolate infected people; and (5) economic conditions in the state.
20. Consistent with MCL 10.33 and MCL 30.405(3), a willful violation of this order is a misdemeanor.

Given under my hand and the Great Seal of the State of Michigan.
GRETCHEN WHITMER GOVERNOR
Date: May 18, 2020 Time: 1:15 pm

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Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 33-14 filed 06/08/20 PageID.326 Page 1 of 2

DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

_____________________________________________________

LEAGUE OF INDPENDENT FITNESS FACITLITIES AND TRAINERS, INC., BASELINE FITNESS LLC, BUILDING YOUR TEMPLE LLC, BYT FITNESS 247 LLC, CLAWSON FITNESS, LLC, CLINTON FITNESS, INC., D-LUX KARATE UNIVERSITY LLC, FENTON ATHLETIC CLUB, INC., FENTON KARATE, LLC, FUSION FITNESS 24/7 LLC, H3 FITNESS LLC, I FITNESS PERSONAL TRAINING, INC., JKP FITNESS, LLC, JPF ENTERPRISES, LLC, M FITNESS CLUB, LLC, MH & AB LLC, MOTOR CITY CF - ST. CLAIR SHORES, LLC, NASCOT ENTERPRISES, LLC, PRISON CITY PHYSIQUE LLC, RMP FITNESS INC., STRENGTH BEYOND LLC, 24/7 BOOTCAMP AND BOXING INC., and 4 SEASONS GYM, LLC,
Plaintiffs, v. GRETCHEN E. WHITMER and ROBERT GORDON,
Defendants. _____________________________________________________
ERSKINE LAW, PC Scott M. Erskine (P54734) Carly Van Thomme (P59706) Attorneys for Plaintiffs 612 W. University
Exhibit 14

Civil No. 1:20-cv-00458 Hon. Paul L. Maloney

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Executive Order 2020-96 (COVID-19) (May 21, 2020)

EXECUTIVE ORDER
No. 2020-96
Temporary requirement to suspend certain activities that are not necessary to sustain or protect life
Rescission of Executive Orders 2020-17, 2020-34, and 2020-92
The novel coronavirus (COVID-19) is a respiratory disease that can result in serious illness or death. It is caused by a new strain of coronavirus not previously identi!ed in humans and easily spread from person to person. There is currently no approved vaccine or antiviral treatment for this disease.
On March 10, 2020, the Department of Health and Human Services identi!ed the !rst two presumptive-positive cases of COVID-19 in Michigan. On that same day, I issued Executive Order 2020-4. This order declared a state of emergency across the state of Michigan under section 1 of article 5 of the Michigan Constitution of 1963, the Emergency Management Act, 1976 PA 390, as amended, MCL 30.401 et seq., and the Emergency Powers of the Governor Act of 1945, 1945 PA 302, as amended, MCL 10.31 et seq.
Since then, the virus spread across Michigan, bringing deaths in the thousands, con!rmed cases in the tens of thousands, and deep disruption to this state’s economy, homes, and educational, civic, social, and religious institutions. On April 1, 2020, in response to the widespread and severe health, economic, and social harms posed by the COVID-19 pandemic, I issued Executive Order 2020-33. This order expanded on Executive Order 2020-4 and declared both a state of emergency and a state of disaster across the State of Michigan under section 1 of article 5 of the Michigan Constitution of 1963, the Emergency Management Act, and the Emergency Powers of the Governor Act of 1945. And on April 30, 2020, !nding that COVID-19 had created emergency and disaster conditions across the State of Michigan, I issued Executive Order 2020-67 to continue the emergency declaration under the Emergency Powers of the Governor Act, as well as Executive Order 2020-68 to issue new emergency and disaster declarations under the Emergency Management Act.
The Emergency Management Act vests the governor with broad powers and duties to “cop[e] with dangers to this state or the people of this state presented by a disaster or emergency,” which the governor may implement through “executive orders, proclamations, and directives having the force and e"ect of law.” MCL 30.403(1)-(2). Similarly, the Emergency Powers of the Governor Act of 1945 provides that, after declaring a state of emergency, “the governor may promulgate reasonable orders, rules, and regulations as he or she considers necessary to protect life and property or to bring the emergency situation within the a"ected area under control.” MCL 10.31(1).
To suppress the spread of COVID-19, to prevent the state’s health care system from being overwhelmed, to allow time for the production of critical test kits, ventilators, and personal protective equipment, to establish the public health infrastructure necessary to contain the spread of infection, and to avoid needless deaths, it is reasonable and necessary to direct residents to remain at home or in their place of residence to the maximum extent feasible. To that end, on March 23, 2020, I issued Executive Order 2020-21, ordering all people in Michigan to stay home and stay safe. In Executive Orders 2020-42, 2020-59, 2020-70, 2020-77, and 2020-92, I extended that initial order, modifying its scope as needed and appropriate to match the ever-changing circumstances presented by this pandemic.
The measures put in place by these executive orders have been e"ective: the number of new con!rmed cases each day has started to drop. Although the virus remains aggressive and persistent—on May 20, 2020, Michigan reported 53,009 con!rmed cases and 5,060 deaths—the strain on our health care system has begun to relent, even as our testing capacity has increased. We can now start the process of gradually resuming in-person work and activities that were temporarily suspended under my prior orders. In so doing, however, we must move with care, patience, and vigilance, recognizing the grave harm that this virus continues to in#ict on our state and how quickly our progress in suppressing it can be undone.
With this order, I !nd it reasonable and necessary to rea$rm the measures set forth in Executive Order 2020-92, while also allowing gatherings of no more than ten people statewide, e"ective immediately, and permitting retailers and motor vehicle dealerships to see customers by appointment, beginning on May 26, 2020. In addition, because our health-care capacity has improved with respect to personal protective equipment, available beds, personnel, ventilators, and necessary supplies, I !nd it reasonable to rescind Executive Orders 2020-17 and 2020-34, which required health-care and veterinary facilities to implement plans to postpone some medical and dental procedures. Those rescissions will take e"ect on May 29.
Acting under the Michigan Constitution of 1963 and Michigan law, I order the following:
1. This order must be construed broadly to prohibit in-person work that is not necessary to sustain or protect life. 2. For purposes of this order, Michigan comprises eight separate regions:
a. Region 1 includes the following counties: Monroe, Washtenaw, Livingston, Genesee, Lapeer, Saint Clair, Oakland, Macomb, and Wayne.
b. Region 2 includes the following counties: Mason, Lake, Osceola, Clare, Oceana, Newaygo, Mecosta, Isabella, Muskegon, Montcalm, Ottawa, Kent, and Ionia.
c. Region 3 includes the following counties: Allegan, Barry, Van Buren, Kalamazoo, Calhoun, Berrien, Cass, Saint Joseph, and Branch. d. Region 4 includes the following counties: Oscoda, Alcona, Ogemaw, Iosco, Gladwin, Arenac, Midland, Bay, Saginaw, Tuscola, Sanilac,
and Huron. e. Region 5 includes the following counties: Gratiot, Clinton, Shiawassee, Eaton, and Ingham. f. Region 6 includes the following counties: Manistee, Wexford, Missaukee, Roscommon, Benzie, Grand Traverse, Kalkaska, Crawford,
Leelanau, Antrim, Otsego, Montmorency, Alpena, Charlevoix, Cheboygan, Presque Isle, and Emmet. g. Region 7 includes the following counties: Hillsdale, Lenawee, and Jackson. h. Region 8 includes the following counties: Gogebic, Ontonagon, Houghton, Keweenaw, Iron, Baraga, Dickinson, Marquette,
Menominee, Delta, Alger, Schoolcraft, Luce, Mackinac, and Chippewa. 3. Subject to the exceptions in section 8 of this order, all individuals currently living within the State of Michigan are ordered to stay at home
or at their place of residence. Subject to the same exceptions, all public and private gatherings of any number of people occurring among persons not part of a single household are prohibited. 4. All individuals who leave their home or place of residence must adhere to social distancing measures recommended by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”), including remaining at least six feet from people from outside the individual’s household to the extent feasible under the circumstances. 5. No person or entity shall operate a business or conduct operations that require workers to leave their homes or places of residence except to the extent that those workers are necessary to sustain or protect life, to conduct minimum basic operations, or to perform a resumed activity within the meaning of this order.
a. For purposes of this order, workers who are necessary to sustain or protect life are de!ned as “critical infrastructure workers,” as described in sections 9 and 10 of this order.
b. For purposes of this order, workers who are necessary to conduct minimum basic operations are those whose in-person presence is strictly necessary to allow the business or operation to maintain the value of inventory and equipment, care for animals, ensure security, process transactions (including payroll and employee bene!ts), or facilitate the ability of other workers to work remotely. Businesses and operations must determine which of their workers are necessary to conduct minimum basic operations and inform such workers of that designation. Businesses and operations must make such designations in writing, whether by electronic message, public website, or other appropriate means. Workers need not carry copies of their designations when they leave the home or place of residence for work. Any in-person work necessary to conduct minimum basic operations must be performed consistently with the social distancing practices and other mitigation measures described in Executive Order 2020-97 and any orders that may follow from it.
c. Workers who perform resumed activities are de!ned in section 11 of this order. 6. Businesses and operations that employ critical infrastructure workers or workers who perform resumed activities may continue in-person
operations, subject to the following conditions: a. Consistent with sections 9, 10, and 11 of this order, businesses and operations must determine which of their workers are critical infrastructure workers or workers who perform resumed activities and inform such workers of that designation. Businesses and operations must make such designations in writing, whether by electronic message, public website, or other appropriate means. Workers need not carry copies of their designations when they leave the home or place of residence for work. Businesses and operations need not designate: 1. Workers in health care and public health. 2. Workers who perform necessary government activities, as described in section 7 of this order. 3. Workers and volunteers described in section 10(d) of this order. b. In-person activities that are not necessary to sustain or protect life or to perform a resumed activity must be suspended. c. Businesses and operations maintaining in-person activities must adopt social distancing practices and other mitigation measures to protect workers and patrons, as described in Executive Order 2020-97 and any orders that may follow from it. d. Any business or operation that employs workers who perform resumed activities under section 11(a) of this order, but that does not sell necessary supplies, may sell any goods through remote sales via delivery or at the curbside. Such a business or operation, however, must otherwise remain closed to the public.
7. All in-person government activities at whatever level (state, county, or local) are suspended unless: a. They are performed by critical infrastructure workers, including workers in law enforcement, public safety, and !rst responders, as de!ned in sections 9 and 10 of this order. b. They are performed by workers who are permitted to resume work under section 11 of this order. c. They are necessary to support the activities of workers described in sections 9, 10, and 11 of this order, or to enable transactions that support businesses or operations that employ such workers. d. They involve public transit, trash pick-up and disposal (including recycling and composting), the management and oversight of elections, and the maintenance of safe and sanitary public parks so as to allow for outdoor activity permitted under this order. e. For purposes of this order, necessary government activities include minimum basic operations, as described in 5(b) of this order. Workers performing such activities need not be designated. f. Any in-person government activities must be performed consistently with the social distancing practices and other mitigation measures to protect workers and patrons described in Executive Order 2020-97 and any orders that may follow from it.
8. Exceptions. a. Individuals may leave their home or place of residence, and travel as necessary: 1. To engage in outdoor recreational activity, consistent with remaining at least six feet from people from outside the individual’s household. Outdoor recreational activity includes walking, hiking, running, cycling, boating, gol!ng, or other similar activity, as well as any comparable activity for those with limited mobility. 2. To perform their jobs as critical infrastructure workers after being so designated by their employers. (Critical infrastructure workers who need not be designated under section 6(a) of this order may leave their home for work without being designated.) 3. To conduct minimum basic operations, as described in section 5(b) of this order, after being designated to perform such work by their employers. 4. To perform resumed activities, as described in section 11 of this order, after being designated to perform such work by their employers. 5. To perform necessary government activities, as described in section 7 of this order. 6. To perform tasks that are necessary to their health and safety, or to the health and safety of their family or household members (including pets). Individuals may, for example, leave the home or place of residence to secure medication or to seek medical or dental care for themselves or a household or family member. 7. To obtain necessary services or supplies for themselves, their family or household members, their pets, and their motor vehicles. A. Individuals must secure such services or supplies via delivery to the maximum extent possible. As needed, however, individuals may leave the home or place of residence to purchase groceries, take-out food, gasoline, needed medical supplies, and any other products necessary to maintain the safety, sanitation, and basic operation of their residences or motor vehicles. B. Individuals may also leave the home to pick up or return a motor vehicle as permitted under section 10(i) of this order, or to go to a motor vehicle dealership showroom by appointment, as permitted under section 11(p) of this order. C. Individuals may leave the home to have a bicycle repaired or maintained. D. Individuals should limit, to the maximum extent that is safe and feasible, the number of household members who leave the home for any errands. 8. To pick up non-necessary supplies at the curbside from a store that must otherwise remain closed to the public. 9. To care for a family member or a family member’s pet in another household. 10. To care for minors, dependents, the elderly, persons with disabilities, or other vulnerable persons. 11. To visit an individual under the care of a health care facility, residential care facility, or congregate care facility, to the extent otherwise permitted. 12. To visit a child in out-of-home care, or to facilitate a visit between a parent and a child in out-of-home care, when there is agreement between the child placing agency, the parent, and the caregiver about a safe visitation plan, or when, failing such agreement, the individual secures an exception from the executive director of the Children’s Services Agency. 13. To attend legal proceedings or hearings for essential or emergency purposes as ordered by a court. 14. To work or volunteer for businesses or operations (including both religious and secular nonpro!t organizations) that provide food, shelter, and other necessities of life for economically disadvantaged or otherwise needy individuals, individuals who need assistance as a result of this emergency, and people with disabilities. 15. To attend a funeral, provided that no more than 10 people are in attendance. 16. To attend a meeting of an addiction recovery mutual aid society, provided that no more than 10 people are in attendance. 17. To view a real-estate listing by appointment, as permitted under section 11(g) of this order. 18. To participate in training, credentialing, or licensing activities permitted under section 11(i) of this order. 19. For individuals in Regions 6 or 8, to go to a restaurant or a retail store. 20. To go to a retail store by appointment, as permitted under section 11(q) of this order. 21. To attend a social gathering of no more than 10 people. b. Individuals may also travel: 1. To return to a home or place of residence from outside this state. 2. To leave this state for a home or residence elsewhere. 3. Between two residences in this state, including moving to a new residence. 4. As required by law enforcement or a court order, including the transportation of children pursuant to a custody agreement. c. All other travel is prohibited, including all travel to vacation rentals.
9. For purposes of this order, critical infrastructure workers are those workers described by the Director of the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency in his guidance of March 19, 2020 on the COVID-19 response (available here). This order does not adopt any subsequent guidance document released by this same agency. Consistent with the March 19, 2020 guidance document, critical infrastructure workers include some workers in each of the following sectors: a. Health care and public health. b. Law enforcement, public safety, and !rst responders. c. Food and agriculture. d. Energy. e. Water and wastewater. f. Transportation and logistics. g. Public works. h. Communications and information technology, including news media. i. Other community-based government operations and essential functions. j. Critical manufacturing. k. Hazardous materials. l. Financial services. m. Chemical supply chains and safety. n. Defense industrial base.
10. For purposes of this order, critical infrastructure workers also include: a. Child care workers (including workers at disaster relief child care centers), but only to the extent necessary to serve the children or dependents of critical infrastructure workers, workers who conduct minimum basic operations, workers who perform necessary government activities, or workers who perform resumed activities. This category includes individuals (whether licensed or not) who have arranged to care for the children or dependents of such workers. b. Workers at suppliers, distribution centers, or service providers, as described below. 1. Any suppliers, distribution centers, or service providers whose continued operation is necessary to enable, support, or facilitate another business’s or operation’s critical infrastructure work may designate their workers as critical infrastructure workers, provided that only those workers whose in-person presence is necessary to enable, support, or facilitate such work may be so designated. 2. Any suppliers, distribution centers, or service providers whose continued operation is necessary to enable, support, or facilitate the necessary work of suppliers, distribution centers, or service providers described in sub-provision (1) of this subsection may designate their workers as critical infrastructure workers provided that only those workers whose in-person presence is necessary to enable, support, or facilitate such work may be so designated. 3. Consistent with the scope of work permitted under sub-provision (2) of this subsection, any suppliers, distribution centers, or service providers further down the supply chain whose continued operation is necessary to enable, support, or facilitate the necessary work of other suppliers, distribution centers, or service providers may likewise designate their workers as critical infrastructure workers, provided that only those workers whose in-person presence is necessary to enable, support, or facilitate such work may be so designated. 4. Suppliers, distribution centers, and service providers that abuse their designation authority under this subsection shall be subject to sanctions to the fullest extent of the law. c. Workers in the insurance industry, but only to the extent that their work cannot be done by telephone or remotely. d. Workers and volunteers for businesses or operations (including both religious and secular nonpro!t organizations) that provide food, shelter, and other necessities of life for economically disadvantaged or otherwise needy individuals, individuals who need assistance as a result of this emergency, and people with disabilities. e. Workers who perform critical labor union functions, including those who administer health and welfare funds and those who monitor the well-being and safety of union members who are critical infrastructure workers, provided that any administration or monitoring should be done by telephone or remotely where possible. f. Workers at retail stores who sell groceries, medical supplies, and products necessary to maintain the safety, sanitation, and basic operation of residences or motor vehicles, including convenience stores, pet supply stores, auto supplies and repair stores, hardware and home maintenance stores, and home appliance retailers. g. Workers at laundromats, coin laundries, and dry cleaners. h. Workers at hotels and motels, provided that the hotels or motels do not o"er additional in-house amenities such as gyms, pools, spas, dining, entertainment facilities, meeting rooms, or like facilities. i. Workers at motor vehicle dealerships who are necessary to facilitate remote and electronic sales or leases, or to deliver motor vehicles to customers, provided that showrooms remain closed to in-person tra$c until May 26, 2020 at 12:01 am.
11. For purposes of this order, workers who perform resumed activities are de!ned as follows: a. ​Workers who process or ful!ll remote orders for goods for delivery or curbside pick-up. b. Workers who perform bicycle maintenance or repair. c. Workers for garden stores, nurseries, and lawn care, pest control, and landscaping operations. d. Workers for moving or storage operations. e. Workers who perform work that is traditionally and primarily performed outdoors, including but not limited to forestry workers, outdoor power equipment technicians, parking enforcement workers, and outdoor workers at places of outdoor recreation not otherwise closed under Executive Order 2020-69 or any order that may follow from it. f. Workers in the construction industry, including workers in the building trades (plumbers, electricians, HVAC technicians, and similar workers). g. Workers in the real-estate industry, including agents, appraisers, brokers, inspectors, surveyors, and registers of deeds, provided that: 1. Any showings, inspections, appraisals, photography or videography, or !nal walk-throughs must be performed by appointment and must be limited to no more than four people on the premises at any one time. No in-person open houses are permitted. 2. Private showings may only be arranged for owner-occupied homes, vacant homes, vacant land, commercial property, and industrial property. h. Workers necessary to the manufacture of goods that support workplace modi!cation to forestall the spread of COVID-19 infections. i. Workers necessary to train, credential, and license !rst responders (e.g., police o$cers, !re !ghters, paramedics) and health-care workers, including certi!ed nursing assistants, provided that as much instruction as possible is provided remotely. j. Workers necessary to perform manufacturing activities. Manufacturing work may not commence under this subsection until the facility at which the work will be performed has been prepared to follow the workplace safeguards described in section 4 of Executive Order 2020-97 and any orders that may follow from it. k. Workers necessary to conduct research activities in a laboratory setting. l. For Regions 6 and 8, beginning at 12:01 am on May 22, 2020, workers necessary to perform retail activities. For purposes of this order, retail activities are de!ned: 1. As the selling of goods and the rendering of services incidental to the sale of the goods (e.g., any packaging and processing to allow for or facilitate the sale and delivery of the goods). 2. To exclude those places of public accommodation that are closed under Executive Order 2020-69 and any orders that may follow from it. m. For Regions 6 and 8, beginning at 12:01 am on May 22, 2020, workers who work in an o$ce setting, but only to the extent that such work is not capable of being performed remotely. n. For Regions 6 and 8, beginning at 12:01 am on May 22, 2020, workers in restaurants or bars, subject to the capacity constraints and workplace standards described in Executive Order 2020-97. Nothing in this subsection should be taken to abridge or otherwise modify the existing power of a local government to impose further restrictions on restaurants or bars. For restaurants and bars subject to this subsection, this subsection supersedes the limitations placed on those restaurants and bars by Executive Order 202069 and any order that may follow from it. o. Workers necessary to prepare a workplace to follow the workplace standards described in Executive Order 2020-97 and to otherwise ready the workplace for reopening. p. Beginning at 12:01 am on May 26, 2020, workers at motor vehicle dealerships, provided that showrooms are open only by appointment. q. Beginning at 12:01 am on May 26, 2020, workers necessary to perform retail activities by appointment, provided that the store is limited to 10 customers at any one time. For purposes of this order, retail activities are de!ned: 1. As the selling of goods and the rendering of services incidental to the sale of the goods (e.g., any packaging and processing to allow for or facilitate the sale and delivery of the goods). 2. To exclude those places of public accommodation that are closed under Executive Order 2020-69 and any orders that may follow from it. r. Consistent with section 10(b) of this order, workers at suppliers, distribution centers, or service providers whose in-person presence is necessary to enable, support, or facilitate another business’s or operation’s resumed activities, including workers at suppliers, distribution centers, or service providers along the supply chain whose in-person presence is necessary to enable, support, or facilitate the necessary work of another supplier, distribution center, or service provider in enabling, supporting, or facilitating another business’s or operation’s resumed activities. Suppliers, distribution centers, and service providers that abuse their designation authority under this subsection shall be subject to sanctions to the fullest extent of the law.
12. Any store that is open for in-store sales under section 10(f), section 11(c), or section 11(q) of this executive order: a. May continue to sell goods other than necessary supplies if the sale of such goods is in the ordinary course of business. b. Must consider establishing curbside pick-up to reduce in-store tra$c and mitigate outdoor lines.
13. No one shall rent a short-term vacation property except as necessary to assist in housing a health care professional aiding in the response to the COVID-19 pandemic or a volunteer who is aiding the same.
14. Michigan state parks remain open for day use, subject to any reductions in services and speci!c closures that, in the judgment of the director of the Department of Natural Resources, are necessary to minimize large gatherings and to prevent the spread of COVID-19.
15. Rules governing face coverings. a. Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, any individual able to medically tolerate a face covering must wear a covering over his or her nose and mouth—such as a homemade mask, scarf, bandana, or handkerchief—when in any enclosed public space. b. An individual may be required to temporarily remove a face covering upon entering an enclosed public space for identi!cation purposes. An individual may also remove a face covering while seated at a restaurant or bar. c. All businesses and operations whose workers perform in-person work must, at a minimum, provide non-medical grade face coverings to their workers. d. Supplies of N95 masks and surgical masks should generally be reserved, for now, for health care professionals, !rst responders (e.g., police o$cers, !re !ghters, paramedics), and other critical workers who interact with the public. e. The protections against discrimination in the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act, 1976 PA 453, as amended, MCL 37.2101 et seq., and any other protections against discrimination in Michigan law, apply in full force to individuals who wear a face covering under this order.
16. Except as otherwise expressly stated in this order, nothing in this order should be taken to supersede another executive order or directive that is in e"ect, except to the extent this order imposes more stringent limitations on in-person work, activities, and interactions. Consistent with prior guidance, neither a place of religious worship nor its owner is subject to penalty under section 22 of this order for allowing religious worship at such place. No individual is subject to penalty under section 22 of this order for engaging in or traveling to engage in religious worship at a place of religious worship, or for violating section 15(a) of this order.
17. Nothing in this order should be taken to interfere with or infringe on the powers of the legislative and judicial branches to perform their constitutional duties or exercise their authority. Similarly, nothing in this order shall be taken to abridge protections guaranteed by the state or federal constitution under these emergency circumstances.
18. This order takes e"ect immediately, unless otherwise speci!ed in this order, and continues through May 28, 2020 at 11:59 pm. 19. Executive Order 2020-17, which imposed temporary requirements regarding the postponement of non-essential medical and dental
procedures, is rescinded as of May 28, 2020 at 11:59 pm. Executive Order 2020-34, which imposed temporary requirements regarding the postponement of veterinary services, is rescinded as of May 28, 2020 at 11:59 pm. Outpatient health-care facilities, including veterinary o$ces, are subject to the workplace safety rules described in Executive Order 2020-97. 20. Executive Orders 2020-92 is rescinded. All references to that order in other executive orders, agency rules, letters of understanding, or other legal authorities shall be taken to refer to this order. 21. I will evaluate the continuing need for this order prior to its expiration. In determining whether to maintain, intensify, or relax its restrictions, I will consider, among other things, (1) data on COVID-19 infections and the disease’s rate of spread; (2) whether su$cient medical personnel, hospital beds, and ventilators exist to meet anticipated medical need; (3) the availability of personal protective equipment for the health care workforce; (4) the state’s capacity to test for COVID-19 cases and isolate infected people; and (5) economic conditions in the state. 22. Consistent with MCL 10.33 and MCL 30.405(3), a willful violation of this order is a misdemeanor.
Given under my hand and the Great Seal of the State of Michigan.
GRETCHEN WHITMER GOVERNOR
Date: May 21 2020
Time: 9:49 am

RELATED CONTENT
Executive Order 2020-114 (COVID-19) (June 5, 2020) Executive Order 2020-115 (COVID-19) (June 5, 2020) Executive Order 2020-116 (COVID-19) (June 5, 2020) Executive Order 2020-113 (COVID-19) (June 4, 2020) Executive Order 2020-112 (COVID-19) (June 3, 2020) Executive Order 2020-111 (COVID-19) (June 1, 2020) Executive Order 2020-108 (May 29, 2020) Executive Order 2020-109 (May 29, 2020) Executive Order 2020-110 (COVID-19) (June 1, 2020) Executive Order 2020-106 (COVID-19) (May 28, 2020) Executive Order 2020-107 (May 29, 2020) Executive Order 2020-99 (COVID-19) (May 22, 2020) - Declaration of State of Emergency Executive Order 2020-100 (COVID-19) (May 22, 2020) Executive Order 2020-101 (COVID-19) (May 22, 2020) Executive Order 2020-102 (COVID-19) (May 22, 2020) Executive Order 2020-103 (COVID-19) (May 22, 2020) Executive Order 2020-104 (COVID-19) (May 26, 2020) Executive Order 2020-105 (May 26, 2020) - Declaration of State of Emergency Executive Order 2020-98 (May 22, 2020) - Declaration of State of Emergency Executive Order 2020-95 (COVID-19) (May 21, 2020)

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Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 33-15 filed 06/08/20 PageID.328 Page 1 of 2

DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

_____________________________________________________

LEAGUE OF INDPENDENT FITNESS FACITLITIES AND TRAINERS, INC., BASELINE FITNESS LLC, BUILDING YOUR TEMPLE LLC, BYT FITNESS 247 LLC, CLAWSON FITNESS, LLC, CLINTON FITNESS, INC., D-LUX KARATE UNIVERSITY LLC, FENTON ATHLETIC CLUB, INC., FENTON KARATE, LLC, FUSION FITNESS 24/7 LLC, H3 FITNESS LLC, I FITNESS PERSONAL TRAINING, INC., JKP FITNESS, LLC, JPF ENTERPRISES, LLC, M FITNESS CLUB, LLC, MH & AB LLC, MOTOR CITY CF - ST. CLAIR SHORES, LLC, NASCOT ENTERPRISES, LLC, PRISON CITY PHYSIQUE LLC, RMP FITNESS INC., STRENGTH BEYOND LLC, 24/7 BOOTCAMP AND BOXING INC., and 4 SEASONS GYM, LLC,
Plaintiffs, v. GRETCHEN E. WHITMER and ROBERT GORDON,
Defendants. _____________________________________________________
ERSKINE LAW, PC Scott M. Erskine (P54734) Carly Van Thomme (P59706) Attorneys for Plaintiffs 612 W. University
Exhibit 15

Civil No. 1:20-cv-00458 Hon. Paul L. Maloney

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 33-15 filed 06/08/20 PageID.329 Page 2 of 2
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Executive Order 2020-110 (COVID-19) (June 1, 2020)

EXECUTIVE ORDER

No. 2020-110

Temporary restrictions on certain events, gatherings, and businesses

Rescission of Executive Orders 2020-69 and 2020-96

The novel coronavirus (COVID-19) is a respiratory disease that can result in serious illness or death. It is caused by a new strain of coronavirus not previously identi!ed in humans and easily spread from person to person. There is currently no approved vaccine or antiviral treatment for this disease.
On March 10, 2020, the Department of Health and Human Services identi!ed the !rst two presumptive-positive cases of COVID-19 in Michigan. On that same day, I issued Executive Order 2020-4. This order declared a state of emergency across the state of Michigan under section 1 of article 5 of the Michigan Constitution of 1963, the Emergency Management Act, 1976 PA 390, as amended (EMA), MCL 30.401 et seq., and the Emergency Powers of the Governor Act of 1945, 1945 PA 302, as amended (EPGA), MCL 10.31 et seq.
Since then, the virus spread across Michigan, bringing deaths in the thousands, con!rmed cases in the tens of thousands, and deep disruption to this state’s economy, homes, and educational, civic, social, and religious institutions. On April 1, 2020, in response to the widespread and severe health, economic, and social harms posed by the COVID-19 pandemic, I issued Executive Order 2020-33. This order expanded on Executive Order 2020-4 and declared both a state of emergency and a state of disaster across the State of Michigan under section 1 of article 5 of the Michigan Constitution of 1963, the Emergency Management Act, and the Emergency Powers of the Governor Act of 1945. And on April 30, 2020, !nding that COVID-19 had created emergency and disaster conditions across the State of Michigan, I issued Executive Order 2020-67 to continue the emergency declaration under the Emergency Powers of the Governor Act, as well as Executive Order 2020-68 to issue new emergency and disaster declarations under the Emergency Management Act.
Those executive orders have been challenged in Michigan House of Representatives and Michigan Senate v Whitmer. On May 21, 2020, the Court of Claims ruled that Executive Order 2020-67 is a valid exercise of authority under the Emergency Powers of the Governor Act but that Executive Order 2020-68 is not a valid exercise of authority under the Emergency Management Act. Both of those rulings are being challenged on appeal.

On May 22, 2020, I issued Executive Order 2020-99, again !nding that the COVID-19 pandemic constitutes a disaster and emergency throughout the State of Michigan. That order constituted a state of emergency declaration under the Emergency Powers of the Governor Act of 1945. And, to the extent the governor may declare a state of emergency and a state of disaster under the Emergency Management Act when emergency and disaster conditions exist yet the legislature has declined to grant an extension request, that order also constituted a state of emergency and state of disaster declaration under that act.
The Emergency Powers of the Governor Act provides a su"cient legal basis for issuing this executive order. In relevant part, it provides that, after declaring a state of emergency, “the governor may promulgate reasonable orders, rules, and regulations as he or she considers necessary to protect life and property or to bring the emergency situation within the a#ected area under control.” MCL 10.31(1).
Nevertheless, subject to the ongoing litigation and the possibility that current rulings may be overturned or otherwise altered on appeal, I also invoke the Emergency Management Act as a basis for executive action to combat the spread of COVID-19 and mitigate the e#ects of this emergency on the people of Michigan, with the intent to preserve the rights and protections provided by the EMA. The EMA vests the governor with broad powers and duties to “cop[e] with dangers to this state or the people of this state presented by a disaster or emergency,” which the governor may implement through “executive orders, proclamations, and directives having the force and e#ect of law.” MCL 30.403(1)–(2). This executive order falls within the scope of those powers and duties, and to the extent the governor may declare a state of emergency and a state of disaster under the Emergency Management Act when emergency and disaster conditions exist yet the legislature has not granted an extension request, they too provide a su"cient legal basis for this order.
To suppress the spread of COVID-19, to prevent the state’s health care system from being overwhelmed, to allow time for the production of critical test kits, ventilators, and personal protective equipment, to establish the public health infrastructure necessary to contain the spread of infection, and to avoid needless deaths, it was reasonable and necessary to direct residents to remain at home or in their place of residence to the maximum extent feasible. To that end, on March 23, 2020, I issued Executive Order 2020-21, ordering all people in Michigan to stay home and stay safe. In Executive Orders 2020-42, 2020-59, 2020-70, 2020-77, 2020-92, and 2020-96, I extended that initial order, modifying its scope as needed and appropriate to match the ever-changing circumstances presented by this pandemic.
The measures put in place by these executive orders have been e#ective: the number of new con!rmed cases each day continues to drop. Although the virus remains aggressive and persistent—on May 31, 2020, Michigan reported 57,397 con!rmed cases and 5,491 deaths—the strain on our health care system has begun to relent, even as our testing capacity has increased. We are now in the process of gradually resuming in-person work and activities. In so doing, however, we must move with care, patience, and vigilance, recognizing the grave harm that this virus continues to in$ict on our state and how quickly our progress in suppressing it can be undone.
With this order, I !nd it reasonable and necessary to move the state to Stage 4 of the Michigan Safe Start Plan. As a result, Michiganders are no longer required to stay home. Instead, certain businesses will remain closed and speci!c activities that present a heightened risk of infection will remain prohibited. Any work that is capable of being performed remotely must be performed remotely.
Under this order, retailers will be allowed to resume operations on June 4. Restaurants and bars may reopen fully on June 8. Swimming pools and day camps for kids will also be permitted to reopen on the same day. Those businesses and activities will be subject to safety guidance to mitigate the risk of infection. Other businesses and activities that necessarily involve close contact and shared surfaces, including gyms, hair salons, indoor theaters, tattoo parlors, casinos, and similar establishments, will remain closed for the time being.
Michiganders must continue to wear face coverings when in enclosed public spaces and should continue to take all reasonable precautions to protect themselves, their co-workers, their loved ones, and their communities. Indoor social gatherings and events of more than 10 people are prohibited. Outdoor social gatherings and events are permitted so long as people maintain six feet of distance from one another and the assemblage consists of no more than 100 people.

Acting under the Michigan Constitution of 1963 and Michigan law, I order the following:
1. For purposes of this order, Michigan comprises eight separate regions.
a. Region 1 includes the following counties: Monroe, Washtenaw, Livingston, Genesee, Lapeer, Saint Clair, Oakland, Macomb, and Wayne.
b. Region 2 includes the following counties: Mason, Lake, Osceola, Clare, Oceana, Newaygo, Mecosta, Isabella, Muskegon, Montcalm, Ottawa, Kent, and Ionia.
c. Region 3 includes the following counties: Allegan, Barry, Van Buren, Kalamazoo, Calhoun, Berrien, Cass, Saint Joseph, and Branch.
d. Region 4 includes the following counties: Oscoda, Alcona, Ogemaw, Iosco, Gladwin, Arenac, Midland, Bay, Saginaw, Tuscola, Sanilac, and Huron.
e. Region 5 includes the following counties: Gratiot, Clinton, Shiawassee, Eaton, and Ingham.
f. Region 6 includes the following counties: Manistee, Wexford, Missaukee, Roscommon, Benzie, Grand Traverse, Kalkaska, Crawford, Leelanau, Antrim, Otsego, Montmorency, Alpena, Charlevoix, Cheboygan, Presque Isle, and Emmet.
g. Region 7 includes the following counties: Hillsdale, Lenawee, and Jackson.
h. Region 8 includes the following counties: Gogebic, Ontonagon, Houghton, Keweenaw, Iron, Baraga, Dickinson, Marquette, Menominee, Delta, Alger, Schoolcraft, Luce, Mackinac, and Chippewa.

2. Any work that is capable of being performed remotely (i.e., without the worker leaving his or her home or place of residence) must be performed remotely.
3. Any business or operation that requires its employees to leave their home or place of residence for work is subject to the rules on workplace safeguards in Executive Order 2020-97 or any order that may follow from it.
4. Any individual who leaves his or her home or place of residence must:
a. Follow social distancing measures recommended by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”), including remaining at least six feet from people from outside the individual’s household to the extent feasible under the circumstances.
b. Wear a face covering over his or her nose and mouth—such as a homemade mask, scarf, bandana, or handkerchief—when in any enclosed public space, unless the individual is unable medically to tolerate a face covering.
1. An individual may be required to temporarily remove a face covering upon entering an enclosed public space for identi!cation purposes. An individual may also remove a face covering to eat or drink when seated at a restaurant or bar.
2. Businesses and building owners, and those authorized to act on their behalf, are permitted to deny entry or access to any individual who refuses to comply with the rule in this subsection (b). Businesses and building owners will not be subject to a claim that they have violated the covenant of quiet enjoyment, to a claim of frustration of purpose, or to similar claims for denying entry or access to a person who refuses to comply with this subsection (b).
3. Supplies of N95 masks and surgical masks should generally be reserved, for now, for health care professionals, !rst responders (e.g., police o"cers, !re !ghters, paramedics), and other critical workers who interact with the public.
4. The protections against discrimination in the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act, 1976 PA 453, as amended, MCL 37.2101 et seq., and any other protections against discrimination in Michigan law, apply in full force to individuals who wear a face covering under this order.
5. Indoor social gatherings and events among persons not part of a single household are permitted, but may not exceed 10 people.
6. Outdoor social gatherings and events among persons not part of a single household are permitted, but only to the extent that:
a. The gathering or event does not exceed 100 people, and
b. People not part of the same household maintain six feet of distance from one another.

7. Unless otherwise prohibited by local regulation, outdoor parks and recreational facilities may be open, provided that they make any reasonable modi!cations necessary to enable employees and patrons not part of the same household to maintain six feet of distance from one another, and provided that areas in which social distancing cannot be maintained be closed, subject to guidance issued by the Department of Health and Human Services.
8. Unless otherwise prohibited by local regulation, public swimming pools, as de!ned by MCL 333.12521(d), may open as of June 8, 2020, provided that they are outdoors and limit capacity to 50% of the bather capacity limits described in Rule 325.2193 of the Michigan Administrative Code, and subject to guidance issued by the Department of Health and Human Services. Indoor public swimming pools must remain closed.
9. Day camps for children, as de!ned by Rule 400.11101(i) of the Michigan Administrative Code, may open as of June 8, 2020, subject to guidance issued by the Department of Licensing and Regulatory A#airs. Residential, travel, and troop camps within the meaning of Rule 400.11101(n), (p), or (q) of the Michigan Administrative Code must remain closed for the time being.
10. Unless otherwise prohibited by local regulation, libraries and museums may open as of June 8, 2020, subject to the rules governing retail stores described in Executive Order 2020-97 or any order that may follow from it.
11. Stores that were closed under Executive Order 2020-96 (or that were open only by appointment under the same order) must remain closed to the public (or open only by appointment) until June 4 at 12:01 am. Such stores may then resume normal operations, subject to local regulation and to the capacity constraints and workplace standards described in Executive Order 2020-97 or any order that may follow from it.
12. Subject to the exceptions in section 14, the following places are closed to ingress, egress, use, and occupancy by members of the public:
a. Indoor theaters, cinemas, and performance venues.
b. Indoor gymnasiums, !tness centers, recreation centers, sports facilities, exercise facilities, exercise studios, and the like.
c. Facilities o#ering non-essential personal care services, including hair, nail, tanning, massage, traditional spa, tattoo, body art, and piercing services, and similar personal care services that involve close contact of persons.
d. Casinos licensed by the Michigan Gaming Control Board, racetracks licensed by the Michigan Gaming Control Board, and Millionaire Parties licensed by the Michigan Gaming Control Board.
e. Indoor services or facilities, or outdoor services or facilities involving close contact of persons, for amusement or other recreational or entertainment purposes, such as amusement parks, arcades, bingo halls, bowling alleys, indoor climbing facilities, indoor dance areas, skating rinks, trampoline parks, and other similar recreational or entertainment facilities.
13. Unless otherwise prohibited by local regulation, restaurants, food courts, cafes, co#eehouses, bars, taverns, brew pubs, breweries, microbreweries, distilleries, wineries, tasting rooms, special licensees, clubs, and like places may be open to the public as follows:
a. For delivery service, window service, walk-up service, drive-through service, or drive-up service, and may permit up to !ve members of the public at one time for the purpose of picking up their food or beverage orders, so long as those individuals are at least six feet apart from one another while on premises.
b. In Regions 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 7, beginning at 12:01 am on June 8, 2020, for outdoor and indoor seating, subject to the capacity constraints and workplace standards described in Executive Order 2020-97 or any order that may follow from it.
c. In Regions 6 and 8, for outdoor and indoor seating, subject to the capacity constraints and workplace standards described in Executive Order 2020-97 or any order that may follow from it.
14. The restrictions imposed by sections 12 and 13 of this order do not apply to any of the following:
a. Outdoor !tness classes, athletic practices, training sessions, or games, provided that coaches, spectators, and participants not from the same household maintain six feet of distance from one another at all times during such activities, and that equipment and supplies are shared to the minimum extent possible and are subject to frequent and thorough disinfection and cleaning.
b. Services necessary for medical treatment as determined by a licensed medical provider.
c. Health care facilities, residential care facilities, congregate care facilities, and juvenile justice facilities.
d. Crisis shelters or similar institutions.
e. Food courts inside the secured zones of airports.
f. Employees, contractors, vendors, or suppliers who enter, use, or occupy the places described in section 12 of this order in their professional capacity.
15. Nothing in this order should be taken to interfere with or infringe on the powers of the legislative and judicial branches to perform their constitutional duties or exercise their authority. Similarly, nothing in this order shall be taken to abridge protections guaranteed by the state or federal constitution under these emergency circumstances.
16. Consistent with prior guidance, neither a place of religious worship nor its owner is subject to penalty under section 19 of this order for allowing religious worship at such place. No individual is subject to penalty under section 19 of this order for engaging in religious worship at a place of religious worship, or for violating the face covering requirement of section 4(b) of this order.
17. Executive Orders 2020-69 and 2020-96 are rescinded. Except as speci!ed, nothing in this order supersedes any other executive order. This order takes e#ect immediately unless otherwise speci!ed.
18. In determining whether to maintain, intensify, or relax the restrictions in this order, I will consider, among other things, (1) data on COVID19 infections and the disease’s rate of spread; (2) whether su"cient medical personnel, hospital beds, and ventilators exist to meet anticipated medical need; (3) the availability of personal protective equipment for the health care workforce; (4) the state’s capacity to test for COVID-19 cases and isolate infected people; and (5) economic conditions in the state.
19. Consistent with MCL 10.33 and MCL 30.405(3), a willful violation of this order is a misdemeanor.
Given under my hand and the Great Seal of the State of Michigan.

MICHIGAN.GOV HOME | ADA | MICHIGAN NEWS | POLICIES COPYRIGHT 2020 STATE OF MICHIGAN

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 33-16 filed 06/08/20 PageID.330 Page 1 of 2

DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

_____________________________________________________

LEAGUE OF INDPENDENT FITNESS FACITLITIES AND TRAINERS, INC., BASELINE FITNESS LLC, BUILDING YOUR TEMPLE LLC, BYT FITNESS 247 LLC, CLAWSON FITNESS, LLC, CLINTON FITNESS, INC., D-LUX KARATE UNIVERSITY LLC, FENTON ATHLETIC CLUB, INC., FENTON KARATE, LLC, FUSION FITNESS 24/7 LLC, H3 FITNESS LLC, I FITNESS PERSONAL TRAINING, INC., JKP FITNESS, LLC, JPF ENTERPRISES, LLC, M FITNESS CLUB, LLC, MH & AB LLC, MOTOR CITY CF - ST. CLAIR SHORES, LLC, NASCOT ENTERPRISES, LLC, PRISON CITY PHYSIQUE LLC, RMP FITNESS INC., STRENGTH BEYOND LLC, 24/7 BOOTCAMP AND BOXING INC., and 4 SEASONS GYM, LLC,
Plaintiffs, v. GRETCHEN E. WHITMER and ROBERT GORDON,
Defendants. _____________________________________________________
ERSKINE LAW, PC Scott M. Erskine (P54734) Carly Van Thomme (P59706) Attorneys for Plaintiffs 612 W. University
Exhibit 16

Civil No. 1:20-cv-00458 Hon. Paul L. Maloney

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 33-16 filed 06/08/20 PageID.331 Page 2 of 2
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Executive Order 2020-115 (COVID-19) (June 5, 2020)

EXECUTIVE ORDER
No. 2020-115
Temporary restrictions on certain events, gatherings, and businesses
The novel coronavirus (COVID-19) is a respiratory disease that can result in serious illness or death. It is caused by a new strain of coronavirus not previously identi!ed in humans and easily spread from person to person. There is currently no approved vaccine or antiviral treatment for this disease.
On March 10, 2020, the Department of Health and Human Services identi!ed the !rst two presumptive-positive cases of COVID-19 in Michigan. On that same day, I issued Executive Order 2020-4. This order declared a state of emergency across the state of Michigan under section 1 of article 5 of the Michigan Constitution of 1963, the Emergency Management Act, 1976 PA 390, as amended (EMA), MCL 30.401 et seq., and the Emergency Powers of the Governor Act of 1945, 1945 PA 302, as amended (EPGA), MCL 10.31 et seq.
Since then, the virus spread across Michigan, bringing deaths in the thousands, con!rmed cases in the tens of thousands, and deep disruption to this state’s economy, homes, and educational, civic, social, and religious institutions. On April 1, 2020, in response to the widespread and severe health, economic, and social harms posed by the COVID-19 pandemic, I issued Executive Order 2020-33. This order expanded on Executive Order 2020-4 and declared both a state of emergency and a state of disaster across the State of Michigan under section 1 of article 5 of the Michigan Constitution of 1963, the Emergency Management Act, and the Emergency Powers of the Governor Act of 1945. And on April 30, 2020, !nding that COVID-19 had created emergency and disaster conditions across the State of Michigan, I issued Executive Order 2020-67 to continue the emergency declaration under the Emergency Powers of the Governor Act, as well as Executive Order 2020-68 to issue new emergency and disaster declarations under the Emergency Management Act.
Those executive orders have been challenged in Michigan House of Representatives and Michigan Senate v Whitmer. On May 21, 2020, the Court of Claims ruled that Executive Order 2020-67 is a valid exercise of authority under the Emergency Powers of the Governor Act but that Executive Order 2020-68 is not a valid exercise of authority under the Emergency Management Act. Both of those rulings are being challenged on appeal.
On May 22, 2020, I issued Executive Order 2020-99, again !nding that the COVID-19 pandemic constitutes a disaster and emergency throughout the State of Michigan. That order constituted a state of emergency declaration under the Emergency Powers of the Governor Act of 1945. And, to the extent the governor may declare a state of emergency and a state of disaster under the Emergency Management Act when emergency and disaster conditions exist yet the legislature has declined to grant an extension request, that order also constituted a state of emergency and state of disaster declaration under that act.
The Emergency Powers of the Governor Act provides a su"cient legal basis for issuing this executive order. In relevant part, it provides that, after declaring a state of emergency, “the governor may promulgate reasonable orders, rules, and regulations as he or she considers necessary to protect life and property or to bring the emergency situation within the a#ected area under control.” MCL 10.31(1).
Nevertheless, subject to the ongoing litigation and the possibility that current rulings may be overturned or otherwise altered on appeal, I also invoke the Emergency Management Act as a basis for executive action to combat the spread of COVID-19 and mitigate the e#ects of this emergency on the people of Michigan, with the intent to preserve the rights and protections provided by the EMA. The EMA vests the governor with broad powers and duties to “cop[e] with dangers to this state or the people of this state presented by a disaster or emergency,” which the governor may implement through “executive orders, proclamations, and directives having the force and e#ect of law.” MCL 30.403(1)–(2). This executive order falls within the scope of those powers and duties, and to the extent the governor may declare a state of emergency and a state of disaster under the Emergency Management Act when emergency and disaster conditions exist yet the legislature has not granted an extension request, they too provide a su"cient legal basis for this order.
To suppress the spread of COVID-19, to prevent the state’s health care system from being overwhelmed, to allow time for the production of critical test kits, ventilators, and personal protective equipment, to establish the public health infrastructure necessary to contain the spread of infection, and to avoid needless deaths, it was reasonable and necessary to direct residents to remain at home or in their place of residence to the maximum extent feasible. To that end, on March 23, 2020, I issued Executive Order 2020-21, ordering all people in Michigan to stay home and stay safe. In Executive Orders 2020-42, 2020-59, 2020-70, 2020-77, 2020-92, and 2020-96, I extended that initial order, modifying its scope as needed and appropriate to match the ever-changing circumstances presented by this pandemic.
The measures put in place by these executive orders have been e#ective: the number of new con!rmed cases each day continues to drop. Although the virus remains aggressive and persistent—on June 4, 2020, Michigan reported 58,241 con!rmed cases and 5,595 deaths—the strain on our health care system has begun to relent, even as our testing capacity has increased. We are now in the process of gradually resuming in-person work and activities. In so doing, however, we must move with care, patience, and vigilance, recognizing the grave harm that this virus continues to in$ict on our state and how quickly our progress in suppressing it can be undone.
Regions 6 and 8 have signi!cantly fewer new cases per million each day than other regions in the state and have not shown an increase in viral activity in response to earlier relaxations of my orders. Taking into account the public health data and the ongoing costs of continued restrictions, I !nd it reasonable and necessary to move Regions 6 and 8 to Stage 5 of the Michigan Safe Start Plan as of June 10. Gyms, hair salons, indoor theaters, tattoo parlors, and similar establishments will be permitted to reopen, subject to strict workplace safeguards. Indoor social gatherings and organized events of up to 50 people will be allowed, as will outdoor social gatherings and organized events of up to 250 people.
In addition, I !nd it reasonable and necessary to allow personal care services—including hair and nail salons—to reopen statewide as of June 15. This constitutes a partial step along the path of an orderly transition to Stage 5 for those parts of the state outside Regions 6 and 8.
Acting under the Michigan Constitution of 1963 and Michigan law, I order the following:
1. For purposes of this order, Michigan comprises eight separate regions.
a. Region 1 includes the following counties: Monroe, Washtenaw, Livingston, Genesee, Lapeer, Saint Clair, Oakland, Macomb, and Wayne.
b. Region 2 includes the following counties: Mason, Lake, Osceola, Clare, Oceana, Newaygo, Mecosta, Isabella, Muskegon, Montcalm, Ottawa, Kent, and Ionia.
c. Region 3 includes the following counties: Allegan, Barry, Van Buren, Kalamazoo, Calhoun, Berrien, Cass, Saint Joseph, and Branch.
d. Region 4 includes the following counties: Oscoda, Alcona, Ogemaw, Iosco, Gladwin, Arenac, Midland, Bay, Saginaw, Tuscola, Sanilac, and Huron.
e. Region 5 includes the following counties: Gratiot, Clinton, Shiawassee, Eaton, and Ingham.
f. Region 6 includes the following counties: Manistee, Wexford, Missaukee, Roscommon, Benzie, Grand Traverse, Kalkaska, Crawford, Leelanau, Antrim, Otsego, Montmorency, Alpena, Charlevoix, Cheboygan, Presque Isle, and Emmet.
g. Region 7 includes the following counties: Hillsdale, Lenawee, and Jackson.
h. Region 8 includes the following counties: Gogebic, Ontonagon, Houghton, Keweenaw, Iron, Baraga, Dickinson, Marquette, Menominee, Delta, Alger, Schoolcraft, Luce, Mackinac, and Chippewa.
2. As of 12:01 am on June 15, 2020, subsection 12(c) of Executive Order 2020-110, which restricts the operation of facilities o#ering nonessential personal care services, is rescinded.
3. As of 12:01 am on June 10, 2020, individuals and businesses in Regions 6 and 8 are no longer subject to Executive Order 2020-110 and are instead subject to the rules described in this order.
4. Work that can be performed remotely (i.e., without the worker leaving his or her home or place of residence) should be performed remotely.
5. Any business or operation that requires its employees to leave their home or place of residence for work is subject to the rules on workplace safeguards in Executive Order 2020-114 or any order that may follow from it.
6. Any individual who leaves his or her home or place of residence must:
a. Follow social distancing measures recommended by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”), including remaining at least six feet from people from outside the individual’s household to the extent feasible under the circumstances
b. Wear a face covering over his or her nose and mouth—such as a homemade mask, scarf, bandana, or handkerchief—when in any enclosed public space, unless the individual is unable medically to tolerate a face covering.
1. An individual may be required to temporarily remove a face covering upon entering an enclosed public space for identi!cation purposes. An individual may also remove a face covering to eat or drink when seated at a restaurant or bar.
2. Businesses and building owners, and those authorized to act on their behalf, are permitted to deny entry or access to any individual who refuses to comply with the rule in this subsection (b). Businesses and building owners will not be subject to a claim that they have violated the covenant of quiet enjoyment, to a claim of frustration of purpose, or to similar claims for denying entry or access to a person who refuses to comply with this subsection (b).
3. Supplies of N95 masks and surgical masks should generally be reserved, for now, for health care professionals, !rst responders (e.g., police o"cers, !re !ghters, paramedics), and other critical workers who interact with the public
4. The protections against discrimination in the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act, 1976 PA 453, as amended, MCL 37.2101 et seq., and any other protections against discrimination in Michigan law, apply in full force to individuals who wear a face covering under this order.
7. Rules on Gatherings, Performances, and Events
a. A social gathering or organized event among persons not part of the same household is permitted, but only to the extent that:
1. Persons not part of the same household maintain six feet of distance from one another.
2. If it is indoors, the gathering or event does not exceed 50 people.
3. If it is outdoors, the gathering or event does not exceed 250 people.
b. Notwithstanding the restrictions in subsection (a), an arcade, bowling alley, cinema, climbing facility, convention center, performance space, meeting hall, night club, sports arena, theater, or similar venue may, if it is indoors, be open to spectators or patrons, but only to the extent that it:
1. Enables persons not part of the same household to maintain six feet of distance from one another at all times while in the venue.
2. Limits the number of people in the venue to 25% of its maximum capacity or to 250, whichever is smaller. For purposes of this order, each separate auditorium or screening room is a separate venue.
c. Notwithstanding the restrictions in subsection (a), a concert space, race track, sports arena, stadium, or similar venue may, if it is outdoors, be open to spectators or patrons, but only to the extent that it:
1. Enables persons not part of the same household to maintain six feet of distance from one another at all times while in the venue.
2. Limits the number of people in the venue to 25% of its maximum capacity or to 500, whichever is smaller.
d. Subsection (a) does not apply to the incidental gathering of persons in a shared space, including an airport, bus station, factory $oor, restaurant, shopping mall, public pool, or workplace.
8. Unless otherwise prohibited by local regulation, outdoor parks and recreational facilities may be open, provided that they make any reasonable modi!cations necessary to enable employees and patrons not part of the same household to maintain six feet of distance from one another, and provided that areas in which social distancing cannot be maintained be closed, subject to guidance issued by the Department of Health and Human Services.
9. Unless otherwise prohibited by local regulation, public swimming pools, as de!ned by MCL 333.12521(d), may be open, subject to guidance issued by the Department of Health and Human Services, provided that:
a. If they are outdoors, they limit capacity to 50% of the bather capacity limits described in Rule 325.2193 of the Michigan Administrative Code.
b. If they are indoors, they limit capacity to 25% of the bather capacity limits described in Rule 325.2193 of the Michigan Administrative Code.
10. Residential, travel, and troop camps within the meaning of Rule 400.11101(n), (p), or (q) of the Michigan Administrative Code remain closed for the time being.
11. Nothing in this order should be taken to interfere with or infringe on the powers of the legislative and judicial branches to perform their constitutional duties or exercise their authority. Similarly, nothing in this order shall be taken to abridge protections guaranteed by the state or federal constitution under these emergency circumstances.
12. Consistent with prior guidance, neither a place of religious worship nor its owner is subject to penalty under section 15 of this order for allowing religious worship at such place. No individual is subject to penalty under section 15 of this order for engaging in religious worship at a place of religious worship, or for violating the face covering requirement of section 6(b) of this order
13. Except as speci!ed, nothing in this order supersedes any other executive order. This order takes e#ect immediately unless otherwise speci!ed.
14. In determining whether to maintain, intensify, or relax the restrictions in this order, I will consider, among other things, (1) data on COVID19 infections and the disease’s rate of spread; (2) whether su"cient medical personnel, hospital beds, and ventilators exist to meet anticipated medical need; (3) the availability of personal protective equipment for the health care workforce; (4) the state’s capacity to test for COVID-19 cases and isolate infected people; and (5) economic conditions in the state.
15. Consistent with MCL 10.33 and MCL 30.405(3), a willful violation of this order is a misdemeanor.
Given under my hand and the Great Seal of the State of Michigan.
GRETCHEN WHITMER GOVERNOR
Date: June 5, 2020
Time: 10:32 am

RELATED CONTENT
Executive Order 2020-114 (COVID-19) (June 5, 2020) Executive Order 2020-116 (COVID-19) (June 5, 2020) Executive Order 2020-113 (COVID-19) (June 4, 2020) Executive Order 2020-112 (COVID-19) (June 3, 2020) Executive Order 2020-111 (COVID-19) (June 1, 2020) Executive Order 2020-108 (May 29, 2020) Executive Order 2020-109 (May 29, 2020) Executive Order 2020-110 (COVID-19) (June 1, 2020) Executive Order 2020-106 (COVID-19) (May 28, 2020) Executive Order 2020-107 (May 29, 2020) Executive Order 2020-99 (COVID-19) (May 22, 2020) - Declaration of State of Emergency Executive Order 2020-100 (COVID-19) (May 22, 2020) Executive Order 2020-101 (COVID-19) (May 22, 2020) Executive Order 2020-102 (COVID-19) (May 22, 2020) Executive Order 2020-103 (COVID-19) (May 22, 2020) Executive Order 2020-104 (COVID-19) (May 26, 2020) Executive Order 2020-105 (May 26, 2020) - Declaration of State of Emergency Executive Order 2020-98 (May 22, 2020) - Declaration of State of Emergency Executive Order 2020-95 (COVID-19) (May 21, 2020) Executive Order 2020-96 (COVID-19) (May 21, 2020) - Rescinded

MICHIGAN.GOV HOME | ADA | MICHIGAN NEWS | POLICIES COPYRIGHT 2020 STATE OF MICHIGAN

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 33-17 filed 06/08/20 PageID.332 Page 1 of 2

DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

_____________________________________________________

LEAGUE OF INDPENDENT FITNESS FACITLITIES AND TRAINERS, INC., BASELINE FITNESS LLC, BUILDING YOUR TEMPLE LLC, BYT FITNESS 247 LLC, CLAWSON FITNESS, LLC, CLINTON FITNESS, INC., D-LUX KARATE UNIVERSITY LLC, FENTON ATHLETIC CLUB, INC., FENTON KARATE, LLC, FUSION FITNESS 24/7 LLC, H3 FITNESS LLC, I FITNESS PERSONAL TRAINING, INC., JKP FITNESS, LLC, JPF ENTERPRISES, LLC, M FITNESS CLUB, LLC, MH & AB LLC, MOTOR CITY CF - ST. CLAIR SHORES, LLC, NASCOT ENTERPRISES, LLC, PRISON CITY PHYSIQUE LLC, RMP FITNESS INC., STRENGTH BEYOND LLC, 24/7 BOOTCAMP AND BOXING INC., and 4 SEASONS GYM, LLC,
Plaintiffs, v. GRETCHEN E. WHITMER and ROBERT GORDON,
Defendants. _____________________________________________________
ERSKINE LAW, PC Scott M. Erskine (P54734) Carly Van Thomme (P59706) Attorneys for Plaintiffs 612 W. University
Exhibit 17

Civil No. 1:20-cv-00458 Hon. Paul L. Maloney

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 33-17 filed 06/08/20 PageID.333 Page 2 of 2 HOME NEWS SPORTS BUSINESS AUTOS LIFE + HOME ENTERTAINMENT MORE

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With little social distancing, Whitmer marches with protesters
Craig Mauger and James David Dickson, The Detroit News Published 4:14 p.m. ET June 4, 2020 | Updated 9:26 p.m. ET June 4, 2020

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Highland Park — Gov. Gretchen Whitmer, who's voiced concerns about other demonstrations potentially spreading COVID-19 in recent weeks, participated Thursday in a civil rights march in Highland Park with hundreds of people who did not follow social distancing rules.

Whitmer drew criticism after she stood shoulder to shoulder with some march participants, who included Detroit Mayor Mike Duggan. From the front line to last, the marchers started at Highland Park city hall and were a rolling quarter-mile of humanity traveling southbound on Woodward, with the skyline of downtown Detroit in the distance ahead, as a caravan of Detroit and Highland Park police vehicles escorted them while a helicopter buzzed overhead.

"Social distancing is critical to stop the spread of COVID-19 — unless you have a great photo op," state Rep. Lynn Afenoudlis, R-Grand Rapids Township, tweeted.

Whitmer spokeswoman Tiffany Brown denied the governor had violated her own executive order issued Monday that says people should remain six feet apart if participating in public gatherings.

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Gov.Gretchen Whitmer, center, prays with clergy including Bishop Charles Ellis of Greater Grace Church, right, on the corner of Woodward and Warren during a rally in honor of George Floyd, Thursday, June 4, 2020. (Photo: Clarence Tabb Jr., The Detroit News)
Contrary to the administration's own guidance posted online, Brown said the unity march didn't violate her latest order because it states, "Nothing in this order shall be taken to abridge protections guaranteed by the state or federal constitution."
"That includes the right to peaceful protest," she said.
However, a page of frequently asked questions about the order on the governor's website specifically says, "Persons may engage in expressive activities protected by the First Amendment within the State of Michigan but must adhere to social distancing measures recommended by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, including remaining at least six feet from people from outside the person’s household."

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Gov. Gretchen Whitmer elbow bumps with Marlo Franklin of SEIU before the start of a rally in Highland Park in honor of George Floyd on Thursday, June 4, 2020. (Photo: Clarence Tabb Jr., The Detroit News)
While many of the hundreds of participants on Thursday wore masks, including the governor, the six-feet distancing policy wasn't followed.
At the march that went through Highland Park and Detroit, Whitmer urged participants not to lose heart in the face of the COVID-19 pandemic and the death of George Floyd, and to work for change.
“Elections matter," Whitmer said during the march. "We cannot be defeated. We must move forward together. When we do that, we cannot be defeated.”
Floyd's death, which occurred after a Minneapolis police officer held his knee on the man's neck for more than eight minutes, has sparked protests across the country, including the past seven days in Detroit.
Joining Whitmer was Lt. Gov. Garlin Gilchrist II, who told The Detroit News that police brutality is “one of the most important issues of our generation.”
“We're talking about the fact that we need to reframe and restructure the relationship between law enforcement and the community, particularly between law enforcement in the black community. What we're saying is that not only do black lives matter but black futures matter and black potential matters,” Gilchrist said.
Duggan echoed the call for unity, noting what he described as an unprecedented coming-together of Detroit’s top business leaders, against racism, in Detroit City Council chambers.
“These are extraordinary times,” the mayor said.
Detroit City Council President Brenda Jones said she came up to Detroit from Birmingham, Alabama, another flashpoint in the black struggle for civil rights, as Detroit was in the midst of the 1967 riot.
“We are coming together. We are uniting, and we are showing that it's not time for racism,” Jones said. “It’s not time for police brutality. It's time for change.”
Jones said she is co-sponsoring a resolution, expected to be taken up next Tuesday by city council, encouraging Michigan to pass a law requiring implicit bias training for police. Whitmer had asked for the legislation Wednesday, and on Thursday the Senate approved the bill unanimously.
Jones pleaded for more peaceful rallies like Thursday morning's gatherings.
“Unfortunately, we have seen protests that have not been peaceful protests,” she said. “Most of those people were not from the city of Detroit. So I say to them: If you do not want a peaceful protest, go back to your own backyard and protest, because here we are protesting peacefully.”
Bishop Charles Ellis III, pastor of Greater Grace Temple, said the march would be replicated in several Michigan cities, including Saginaw and Kalamazoo, and hailed it as a return to the days when “the black church created the nonviolent civil rights movement in America.”
Highland Park police, Detroit police, state police and the Wayne County Sheriff’s Office all had a presence, representing law enforcement. Members of the Jewish and Chaldean communities also planned to partake in the protest, Ellis said.
Marchers young and old said they wanted to see changes in race relations and to have the needs of minorities addressed.
"You have to deal with the root cause of racism that has existed for hundreds of years in the country," said Ron Johnson, 60, of Detroit. "Education, access to health care, jobs, opportunities. Those problems exist more in urban and poor areas.”
Oten Wyatt IV, 16, of Detroit said he joined the march to be part of a movement for change.
"Put justice in place no matter who they are,” Wyatt said. “A human is a human and they all deserve justice, no matter who they are and no matter their place in society.”
Guidance from Gov. Gretchen Whitmer's office says people should adhere to social distancing measures during First Amendment-protected activities. (Photo: Screenshot)
On Monday, Whitmer said she had a "high level" of concern about the protests, specifically participants not wearing masks, potentially spreading COVID-19.
In past weeks, the governor repeatedly criticized protests against her stay-at-home orders for potentially spreading the virus. During an appearance on "The View" on May 13 — 22 days ago — Whitmer said the protests at the time made it "much more precarious" for the state to continue reopening its economy.
Rep. Lynn Afendoulis
@LynnAfendoulis
Social distancing is critical to stop the spread of COVID-19— unless you have a great photo op. ​And control.

118 3:19 PM - Jun 4, 2020 98 people are talking about this
"The fact of the matter is these protests, in a perverse way, make it likelier that we are going to have to stay in a stay-home posture," Whitmer said then. "The whole point of them, supposedly, is that they don’t want to be doing that.” cmauger@detroitnews.com

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Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 33-18 filed 06/08/20 PageID.334 Page 1 of 29

DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

_____________________________________________________

LEAGUE OF INDPENDENT FITNESS FACITLITIES AND TRAINERS, INC., BASELINE FITNESS LLC, BUILDING YOUR TEMPLE LLC, BYT FITNESS 247 LLC, CLAWSON FITNESS, LLC, CLINTON FITNESS, INC., D-LUX KARATE UNIVERSITY LLC, FENTON ATHLETIC CLUB, INC., FENTON KARATE, LLC, FUSION FITNESS 24/7 LLC, H3 FITNESS LLC, I FITNESS PERSONAL TRAINING, INC., JKP FITNESS, LLC, JPF ENTERPRISES, LLC, M FITNESS CLUB, LLC, MH & AB LLC, MOTOR CITY CF - ST. CLAIR SHORES, LLC, NASCOT ENTERPRISES, LLC, PRISON CITY PHYSIQUE LLC, RMP FITNESS INC., STRENGTH BEYOND LLC, 24/7 BOOTCAMP AND BOXING INC., and 4 SEASONS GYM, LLC,
Plaintiffs, v. GRETCHEN E. WHITMER and ROBERT GORDON,
Defendants. _____________________________________________________
ERSKINE LAW, PC Scott M. Erskine (P54734) Carly Van Thomme (P59706) Attorneys for Plaintiffs 612 W. University
Exhibit 18

Civil No. 1:20-cv-00458 Hon. Paul L. Maloney

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 33-18 filed 06/08/20 PageID.335 Page 2 of 29

Last updated June 03, 2020 08:12:59 am GMT

Friends of Devito v. Wolf

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania April 13, 2020, Decided No. 68 MM 2020

Reporter 2020 Pa. LEXIS 1987 *
FRIENDS OF DANNY DEVITO, KATHY GREGORY, B&J LAUNDRY, LLC, BLUEBERRY HILL PUBLIC GOLF COURSE & LOUNGE, AND CALEDONIA LAND COMPANY, Petitioners v. TOM WOLF, GOVERNOR, AND RACHEL LEVINE, SECRETARY OF PA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, Respondents
Subsequent History: Petition for certiorari filed at, 04/27/2020
Stay denied by Friends of DeVito v. Wolf, 2020 U.S. LEXIS 2638 (U.S., May 6, 2020)

the pandemic qualified as a "natural disaster" under 35 Pa.C.S. § 7102, thereby triggering the Governor's powers under 35 Pa.C.S. § 7301; [2]-Petitioners had not shown that a regulatory taking occurred under U.S. Const. amend. V or Pa. Const. art. I, § 10, as the order resulted in only a temporary loss of the use of their business premises; [3]-The order did not violate the right to free speech or assembly under U.S. Const. amend. XIV and Pa. Const. art. I, §§ 7 and 20 as it was tailored to meet the exigencies of the pandemic by restricting inperson gatherings to promote social distancing and did not prohibit alternative means of communication or virtual gathering.

Core Terms

Outcome The court denied petitioners' claim for relief.

Emergency, disaster, executive order, Pennsylvania, Petitioners', police power, Assembly, non-life-sustaining, spread, disease, regulation, life-sustaining, deprivation, mitigation, closure, https, distancing, powers, coronavirus, prevention, pandemic, procedural due process, due process, cases, public health, Supplemental, natural disaster, golf course, proclamations, constitutes

LexisNexis® Headnotes

Case Summary

Constitutional Law > ... > Jurisdiction > Subject Matter Jurisdiction > Jurisdiction Over Actions
Governments > Courts > Creation & Organization

Overview

Constitutional Law > The Judiciary

HOLDINGS: [1]-The Governor had the authority to issue an executive order compelling the closure of the physical operations of all non-life-sustaining business to reduce the spread of the novel coronavirus disease, as

HN1[ ] Subject Matter Jurisdiction, Jurisdiction Over Actions
Pa. Const. art. V, § 2 provides, in part, that the Supreme

Chris Long

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2020 Pa. LEXIS 1987, *1987

Court of Pennsylvania shall be the highest court of the Commonwealth and in the court shall be reposed the supreme judicial power of the Commonwealth, § 2(a), and further provides that the supreme court shall have such jurisdiction as shall be provided by law. § 2(c).
Governments > Courts > Authority to Adjudicate
HN2[ ] Courts, Authority to Adjudicate
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's King's Bench authority is generally invoked to review an issue of public importance that requires timely intervention by the court of last resort to avoid the deleterious effects arising from delays incident to the ordinary process of law. The supreme court may exercise King's Bench powers over matters where no dispute is pending in a lower court.
Governments > State & Territorial Governments > Employees & Officials

Employees & Officials
The General Assembly imbedded in the Emergency Management Services Code, 35 Pa.C.S. §§ 710179a31, its purposes, which include to reduce vulnerability of people and communities of the Commonwealth to damage, injury and loss of life and property resulting from disasters; to prepare for prompt and efficient rescue, care and treatment of persons victimized or threatened by disaster; to clarify and strengthen the roles of the Governor, Commonwealth agencies and local government in prevention of, preparation for, response to and recovery from disasters; to authorize and provide for cooperation in disaster prevention, preparedness, response and recovery and to supplement, without in any way limiting, authority conferred by previous statutes of the Commonwealth. 35 Pa.C.S. §§ 7103(1), (2), (4), (5), (9). The Code further declares that it does not intend to limit, modify or abridge the authority of the Governor to proclaim martial law or exercise any other powers vested in him under the Constitution, statutes or common law of the Commonwealth. 35 Pa.C.S. § 7104(3).

Public Health & Welfare Law > Social Services > Emergency Services
HN3[ ] State & Territorial Governments, Employees & Officials
The Governor derives broad authority from the Pennsylvania Constitution, as it vests him with supreme executive power and directs him to take care that the laws be faithfully executed. Pa. Const. art. IV, § 2. As the Commonwealth's chief executive officer, the Governor has primary responsibility for protecting the public safety and welfare of the people of Pennsylvania in times of actual or imminent disasters where public safety and welfare are threatened. 35 Pa.C.S. § 7301(a). As such, the Governor is vested with broad emergency management powers under the Emergency Management Services Code, 35 Pa.C.S. §§ 710179a31.
Governments > State & Territorial Governments > Employees & Officials
Public Health & Welfare Law > Social Services > Emergency Services
HN4[ ] State & Territorial Governments,

Governments > State & Territorial Governments > Employees & Officials
Public Health & Welfare Law > Social Services > Emergency Services
HN5[ ] State & Territorial Governments, Employees & Officials
35 Pa.C.S. § 7301, entitled "General authority of Governor," clarifies the nature of the Governor's powers and responsibilities in disaster situations. First and foremost, the Governor is responsible for meeting the dangers to the Commonwealth and people presented by disasters. § 7301(a). He is further empowered to issue, amend and rescind executive orders, proclamations and regulations which shall have the force and effect of law. § 7301(b). The Governor may, by proclamation or executive order, declare a state of disaster emergency, § 7301(b), upon finding that a disaster has occurred or that the occurrence or the threat of a disaster is imminent. § 7301(c). This state of disaster emergency shall continue until the Governor finds that the threat or danger has passed or that emergency conditions no longer exist, but may not continue for longer than ninety days unless renewed by the Governor. § 7301(c). As a

Chris Long

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2020 Pa. LEXIS 1987, *1987

counterbalance to the exercise of the broad powers granted to the Governor, the Emergency Management Services Code, 35 Pa.C.S. §§ 7101-79a31, provides that the General Assembly by concurrent resolution may terminate a state of disaster emergency at any time. § 7301(c).
Governments > State & Territorial Governments > Employees & Officials
Public Health & Welfare Law > Social Services > Emergency Services
HN6[ ] State & Territorial Governments, Employees & Officials
Upon the declaration of a disaster emergency, the Emergency Management Services Code, 35 Pa.C.S. §§ 7101-79a31, vests with the Governor expansive emergency management powers, including to suspend the provisions of any regulatory statute prescribing the procedures for conduct of Commonwealth business, or the orders, rules or regulations of any Commonwealth agency, if strict compliance with the provisions of any statute, order, rule or regulation would prevent, hinder or delay necessary action in coping with the emergency; to utilize all available resources of the Commonwealth and each political subdivision of the Commonwealth as reasonably necessary to cope with the disaster emergency; to transfer the direction, personnel or functions of Commonwealth agencies or units thereof for the purpose of performing or facilitating emergency services; to direct and compel the evacuation of all or part of the population from any stricken or threatened area within the Commonwealth if the action is necessary for the preservation of life or other disaster mitigation, response or recovery; to control ingress and egress to and from a disaster area, the movement of persons within the area and the occupancy of premises therein; and to suspend or limit the sale, dispensing or transportation of alcoholic beverages, firearms, explosives and combustibles. 35 Pa.C.S. § 7301(f)(1), (2), (3), (7), (8).
Governments > State & Territorial Governments > Employees & Officials
Public Health & Welfare Law > Social Services > Emergency Services

Governments > Police Powers
HN7[ ] State & Territorial Governments, Employees & Officials
The broad powers granted to the Governor in the Emergency Management Services Code, 35 Pa.C.S. §§ 7101-79a31, are firmly grounded in the Commonwealth's police power. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has defined the Commonwealth's police power as the power to promote the public health, morals or safety and the general well-being of the community. It has described the police power as the state's inherent power of a body politic to enact and enforce laws for the protection of the general welfare, and thus, it is both one of the most essential powers of the government and its least limitable power. The police power is fundamental because it enables civil society to respond in an appropriate and effective fashion to changing political, economic, and social circumstances, and thus to maintain its vitality and order. The police power of the state must therefore be as comprehensive as the demands of society require under the circumstances. Of necessity, then, the police power is a broad and flexible power.
Governments > Legislation > Interpretation
HN8[ ] Legislation, Interpretation
When consideration of arguments requires that the court engage in statutory interpretation, its duty is to give effect to the legislature's intent, and the best indication of legislative intent is the plain language of the statute. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(a).
Governments > State & Territorial Governments > Employees & Officials
Public Health & Welfare Law > Social Services > Emergency Services
HN9[ ] State & Territorial Governments, Employees & Officials
Upon finding that a disaster has occurred, the Governor is required to declare a disaster emergency, 35 Pa.C.S. § 7301(c).

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2020 Pa. LEXIS 1987, *1987

Governments > State & Territorial Governments > Employees & Officials
Public Health & Welfare Law > Social Services > Emergency Services
HN10[ ] State & Territorial Governments, Employees & Officials
Upon the declaration of a disaster emergency, the Governor gains broad powers, including, inter alia, controlling the ingress and egress to and from a disaster area, the movement of person within the area and the occupancy of premises therein. 35 Pa.C.S. § 7301(f)(7).
Governments > Legislation > Interpretation
HN11[ ] Legislation, Interpretation
Under the statutory construction doctrine of ejusdem generis ("of the same kind or class"), where general words follow the enumeration of particular classes of persons or things, the general words will be construed as applicable only to persons or things of the same general nature or class as those enumerated.

Employees & Officials
By setting forth a general list of catastrophes and then including the language "other catastrophe which results in substantial damage to property, hardship, suffering or possible loss of life," it is clear that the General Assembly intended to expand the list of disaster circumstances that would provide the Governor with the necessary powers to respond to exigencies involving vulnerability and loss of life. There is nothing in the Emergency Management Services Code, 35 Pa.C.S. §§ 7101-79a31, to indicate that the General Assembly intended in any way to narrow the operation of the statute or the Governor's authority. To the contrary, the General Assembly's stated goals, as set forth in the Emergency Code, were to, inter alia, reduce vulnerability of people and communities of the Commonwealth to damage, injury and loss of life and property resulting from disasters, and to strengthen the Governor's role in prevention of, preparation for, response to and recovery from disasters. 35 Pa.C.S. § 7103(1), (4).
Governments > State & Territorial Governments > Employees & Officials

Governments > Legislation > Interpretation

Public Health & Welfare Law > Social Services > Emergency Services

HN12[ ] Legislation, Interpretation
While ejusdem generis is a useful tool of statutory construction, such tools are used for the sole purpose of determining the intent of the General Assembly. Ejusdem generis must yield in any instance in which its effect would be to confine the operation of a statute within narrower limits that those intended by the General Assembly when it was enacted. The general words will not be restricted in meaning if upon a consideration of the context and the purpose of the particular statutory provisions as a whole it is clear that the general words were not used in the restrictive sense.

HN14[ ] State & Territorial Governments, Employees & Officials
The Emergency Management Services Code, 35 Pa.C.S. §§ 7101-79a31, provides that, upon the declaration of a disaster emergency, the Governor has expansive emergency management powers including to direct and compel the evacuation of all or part of the population from any stricken or threatened area within the Commonwealth if this action is necessary for the preservation of life or other disaster mitigation, response or recovery. 35 Pa.C.S. § 7301(f)(3).

Governments > State & Territorial Governments > Employees & Officials
Public Health & Welfare Law > Social Services > Emergency Services
HN13[ ] State & Territorial Governments,

Governments > State & Territorial Governments > Employees & Officials
Public Health & Welfare Law > Social Services > Emergency Services
HN15[ ] State & Territorial Governments, Employees & Officials

Chris Long

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 33-18 filed 06/08/20 PageID.339 PagPeag6eo5fo2f928
2020 Pa. LEXIS 1987, *1987

The Emergency Management Services Code, 35 Pa.C.S. §§ 7101-79a31, specifically recognizes that under its auspices, the Governor has the authority to issue executive orders and proclamations which shall have the full force of law. 35 Pa.C.S. § 7301(b). Moreover, the General Assembly, by and through its enactment of the Emergency Code, specifically and expressly authorizes the Governor to declare a disaster emergency and thereafter to control the ingress and egress to and from a disaster area, the movement of persons within the area and the occupancy of premises therein. § 7301(c), (f)(7). Inherent in that authorization is the Governor's ability to identify the areas where movement of persons must be abated and which premises will be restricted in order to mitigate the disaster. That the Governor utilizes business classifications to determine the appropriate areas and premises to be directly impacted by disaster mitigation is likewise inherent in the broad powers authorized by the General Assembly.
Constitutional Law > ... > Fundamental Rights > Procedural Due Process > Scope of Protection
HN16[ ] Procedural Due Process, Scope of Protection
An entity's entitlement to procedural due process cannot be determined in a static environment, since due process is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstance. Not all situations calling for procedural safeguards call for the same kind of procedure, and the amount of due process that is due in any particular circumstance is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.

(2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation together with the value of additional or substitute safeguards; and (3) the state interest involved, including the administrative burden the additional or substitute procedural requirements would impose on the state. Whether predeprivation notice is required largely depends upon the second Mathews factor. While there is a general preference that procedural safeguards apply in the predeprivation timeframe, the controlling inquiry in this regard is whether the state is in a position to provide for pre-deprivation process.
Constitutional Law > ... > Fundamental Rights > Procedural Due Process > Scope of Protection
HN18[ ] Procedural Due Process, Scope of Protection
The United States Supreme Court has held that at all times, even when the country is at war, essential liberties remain in effect. It is fundamental that the great powers of Congress to conduct war and to regulate the Nation's foreign relations are subject to the constitutional requirements of due process. The imperative necessity for safeguarding these rights to procedural due process under the gravest of emergencies has existed throughout our constitutional history, for it is then, under the pressing exigencies of crisis, that there is the greatest temptation to dispense with fundamental constitutional guarantees which, it is feared, will inhibit governmental action. The Constitution of the United States is a law for rulers and people, equally in war and in peace, and covers with the shield of its protection all classes of men, at all times, and under all circumstances.

Constitutional Law > ... > Fundamental Rights > Procedural Due Process > Scope of Protection
HN17[ ] Procedural Due Process, Scope of Protection
The amount of process that is due in any particular circumstance must be determined by application of the three-part balancing test first established in Mathews v. Eldridge. This balancing test considers three factors: (1) the private interest affected by the governmental action;

Constitutional Law > ... > Fundamental Rights > Procedural Due Process > Scope of Protection
HN19[ ] Procedural Due Process, Scope of Protection
The United States Supreme Court has acknowledged that a different level of process may be sufficient in times of emergency. Protection of the health and safety of the public is a paramount governmental interest which justifies summary administrative action. Indeed, deprivation of property to protect the public health and

Chris Long

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 33-18 filed 06/08/20 PageID.340 PagPeag7eo6fo2f928
2020 Pa. LEXIS 1987, *1987

safety is one of the oldest examples' of permissible

summary action.

Constitutional Law > ... > Fundamental

Rights > Procedural Due Process > Scope of

Constitutional Law > ... > Fundamental

Protection

Rights > Procedural Due Process > Scope of Protection

HN22[ ] Procedural Due Process, Scope of Protection

HN20[ ] Procedural Due Process, Scope of Protection
A plaintiff may not assert a procedural due process claim if he has not availed himself of an available grievance procedure. In order to state a claim for failure to provide due process, a plaintiff must have taken advantage of the processes that are available to him or her, unless those processes are unavailable or patently inadequate. A state cannot be held to have violated due process requirements when it has made procedural protection available and the plaintiff has simply refused to avail himself of them. A due process violation is not complete when the deprivation occurs; it is not complete unless and until the State fails to provide due process. If there is a process on the books that appears to provide due process, the plaintiff cannot skip that process and use the federal courts as a means to get back what he wants.

Under the circumstances of an ongoing disaster emergency, a full evidentiary proceeding is not a viable post-deprivation procedural process.
Constitutional Law > ... > Fundamental Rights > Procedural Due Process > Scope of Protection
HN23[ ] Procedural Due Process, Scope of Protection
A lack of transparency, while perhaps a sign of lack of good government practices, does not constitute a violation of procedural due process.
Administrative Law > Judicial Review > Reviewability

Constitutional Law > ... > Fundamental Rights > Procedural Due Process > Scope of Protection
HN21[ ] Procedural Due Process, Scope of Protection
Procedural due process is geared toward protecting individuals from the mistaken deprivation of life, liberty or property. As the United States Supreme Court explained in Carey v. Piphus: Procedural due process rules are meant to protect persons not from the deprivation, but from the mistaken or unjustified deprivation of life, liberty, or property. Thus, in deciding what process constitutionally is due in various contexts, the Court repeatedly has emphasized that procedural due process rules are shaped by the risk of error inherent in the truthfinding process. Such rules minimize substantively unfair or mistaken deprivations of life, liberty, or property by enabling persons to contest the basis upon which a state proposes to deprive them of protected interests.

Governments > State & Territorial Governments > Employees & Officials
HN24[ ] Judicial Review, Reviewability
Neither the Governor nor the Secretary of the Pennsylvania Department of Health is an administrative agency. Pa. Const. art. V, § 9 does not confer a right of appeal from an executive decision of the Governor or the Secretary.
Constitutional Law > Equal Protection > Nature & Scope of Protection
HN25[ ] Equal Protection, Nature & Scope of Protection
While the Equal Protection Clause assures that all similarly situated persons are treated alike, it does not obligate the government to treat all persons identically.

Chris Long

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 33-18 filed 06/08/20 PageID.341 PagPeag8eo7fo2f928
2020 Pa. LEXIS 1987, *1987

Constitutional Law > ... > Fundamental Freedoms > Judicial & Legislative Restraints > Time, Place & Manner Restrictions
HN26[ ] Judicial & Legislative Restraints, Time, Place & Manner Restrictions
Constitutional rights to free speech and assembly are not absolute, and states may place content-neutral time, place, and manner regulations on speech and assembly so long as they are designed to serve a substantial governmental interest and do not unreasonably limit alternative avenues of communication. The principal inquiry in determining content neutrality is whether the government has adopted a regulation of speech because of disagreement with the message it conveys.
Judges: [*1] JUSTICE DONOHUE. Justices Baer, Todd and Wecht join the opinion. Chief Justice Saylor files a concurring and dissenting opinion in which Justices Dougherty and Mundy join.
Opinion by: DONOHUE

Extraordinary Relief (the "Emergency Application") filed on March 24, 2020, Petitioners raise a series of statutory and constitutional challenges to the Executive Order, contending that the Governor lacked any statutory authority to issue it and that, even if he did have such statutory authority, it violates various of their constitutional rights. Petitioners assert that the exercise of this Court's King's Bench jurisdiction is not only warranted but essential given the unprecedented scope and consequence of the Executive Order on businesses in the Commonwealth. Petitioners' Brief at [*2] 12-13. They request further that this Court issue an order vacating or striking down the Executive Order. Respondents, Governor Tom Wolf ("Governor") and Rachel Levine, the Secretary of the Pennsylvania Department of Health ("Secretary") (collectively, "Respondents") respond that the Petitioners rely on an unduly narrow interpretation of the Commonwealth's inherent police powers and a flawed reading of the specific statutory provisions that the General Assembly enacted to supplement that power. Respondents' Brief at 2. Respondents further argue that the Executive Order comports with all constitutional requirements. Respondents agree with Petitioners that the circumstances warrant the exercise of this Court's King's Bench jurisdiction and urge this Court to exercise that jurisdiction to decide the issues presented. Respondents' Brief at 7.

Opinion

For the reasons discussed in this opinion, we hereby exercise our King's Bench jurisdiction. After consideration of the arguments of the parties, we conclude that Petitioners are not entitled to relief.

JUSTICE DONOHUE

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Petitioners are four Pennsylvania businesses and one individual seeking extraordinary relief from Governor Wolf's March 19, 2020 order (the "Executive Order") compelling the closure of the physical operations of all non-life-sustaining business to reduce the spread of the novel coronavirus disease ("COVID-19"). The businesses of the Petitioners were classified as non-lifesustaining.1 In an Emergency Application for
1 Respondents contend that any claims of Petitioners B&J Laundry and Caledonia Land Company are moot, as their businesses have been removed from the non-life-sustaining category. Respondents' Brief at 6 n.13. Petitioners respond that these claims are not moot, as this Court may consider moot issues of great importance when they are capable of repetition yet evade review. Petitioners' Brief at 48 n.17 (citing,

A. COVID-19, and the Executive Proclamation and the Order of the Governor
A novel coronavirus began infecting [*3] humans in China in December 2019. As of March 11, 2020, the
e.g., Association of Pennsylvania State College and University Faculties v. PLBR, 607 Pa. 461, 8 A.3d 300, 305 (Pa. 2010)). Excluding B&J Laundry and Caledonia Land Company, the claims of the remaining Petitioners adequately present the issues of public importance for which we grant King's Bench review. The claims of Petitioners B&J Laundry and Caledonia Land Company are thus considered moot and "Petitioners" will henceforth refer to DeVito Committee, Kathy Gregory and Blueberry Hill Public Golf Course & Lounge.

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2020 Pa. LEXIS 1987, *3

World Health Organization ("WHO") announced that the coronavirus, which had spread into at least 144 countries including the United States, had infected at least 118,000 people, and had killed more than 4,000 people, was officially a pandemic. WHO DirectorGeneral, "WHO Director-General's opening remarks at the media briefing on COVID-19," World Health Organization, https://www.who.int/dg/speeches/detail/who-directorgeneral-s-opening-remarks-at-the-media-briefing-oncovid-19---11-march-2020. In the midst of the emerging crisis, on March 6, 2020, Governor Wolf issued the following proclamation:
PROCLAMATION OF DISASTER EMERGENCY
WHEREAS, a novel coronavirus (now known as "COVID-19") emerged in Wuhan, China, began infecting humans in December 2019, and has since spread to 89 countries, including the United States; and
WHEREAS, the World Health Organization and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention ("CDC") have declared COVID-19 a "public health emergency of international concern," and the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services ("HHS") Secretary has declared that COVID-19 creates a public health emergency; and WHEREAS, [*4] the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania ("Commonwealth") has been working in collaboration with the CDC, HHS, and local health agencies since December 2019 to monitor and plan for the containment and subsequent mitigation of COVID-19; and
WHEREAS, on February 1, 2020, the Commonwealth's Department of Health activated its Department Operations Center at the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency's headquarters to conduct public health and medical coordination for COVID-19 throughout the Commonwealth; and
WHEREAS, on March 4, 2020, the Director of the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency ordered the activation of its Commonwealth Response Coordination Center in support of the Department of Health's Department Operations Center, to maintain situational awareness and coordinate the response to any potential COVID-19 impacts across the Commonwealth; and
WHEREAS, as of March 6, 2020, there are 233 confirmed and/or presumed positive cases of

COVID-19 in the United States, including 2 presumed positive cases in the Commonwealth; and
WHEREAS, while it is anticipated that a high percentage of those affected by COVID- 19 will experience mild influenza-like symptoms, COVID19 is a disease capable of [*5] causing severe symptoms or loss of life, particularly to older populations and those individuals with pre- existing conditions; and
WHEREAS, it is critical to prepare for and respond to suspected or confirmed cases in the Commonwealth and to implement measures to mitigate the spread of COVID-19; and
WHEREAS, with 2 presumed positive cases in the Commonwealth as of March 6, 2020, the possible increased threat from COVID-19 constitutes a threat of imminent disaster to the health of the citizens of the Commonwealth; and
WHEREAS, this threat of imminent disaster and emergency has already caused schools to close, and will likely prompt additional local measures, including affected county and municipal governments to declare local disaster emergencies because of COVID-19; and
WHEREAS, this threat of imminent disaster and emergency situation throughout the Commonwealth is of such magnitude and severity as to render essential the Commonwealth's supplementation of emergency resources and mutual aid to the county and municipal governments of this Commonwealth and to require the activation of all applicable state, county, and municipal emergency response plans.
NOW THEREFORE, pursuant to the provisions [*6] of Subsection 7301(c) of the Emergency Management Services Code, 35 Pa. C.S. § 7101, et seq., I do hereby proclaim the existence of a disaster emergency throughout the Commonwealth. Governor Wolf, "Proclamation of Disaster Emergency," (Mar. 6, 2020), Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Office of the Governor, https://www.governor.pa.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2020/03/20200306-COVID19-DigitalProclamation.pdf ("Governor's Proclamation").
Thereafter, on March 19, 2020, Governor Wolf issued the following Executive Order, closing all businesses deemed to be non-life-sustaining:

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2020 Pa. LEXIS 1987, *6

ORDER OF THE GOVERNOR OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA REGARDING THE CLOSURE OF ALL BUSINESSES THAT ARE NOT LIFE SUSTAINING
WHEREAS, the World Health Organization and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention ("CDC") have declared a novel coronavirus ("COVID-19") a "public health emergency of international concern," and the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services ("HHS") Secretary has declared that COVID-19 creates a public health emergency; and
WHEREAS, as of March 6, 2020, I proclaimed the existence of a disaster emergency throughout the Commonwealth pursuant to 35 Pa. C.S. § 7301(c); and
WHEREAS, I am charged with the responsibility to address dangers facing the [*7] Commonwealth of Pennsylvania that result from disasters. 35 Pa. C.S. § 7301(a); and
WHEREAS, in addition to general powers, during a disaster emergency I am authorized specifically to control ingress and egress to and from a disaster area and the movement of persons within it and the occupancy of premises therein; and suspend or limit the sale, dispensing, or transportation of alcoholic beverages, firearms, and combustibles. 35 Pa. C.S. § 7301(f); and
WHEREAS, in executing the extraordinary powers outlined above, I am further authorized during a disaster emergency to issue, amend and rescind executive orders, proclamations and regulations and those directives shall have the force and effect of law. 35 Pa. C.S. § 7301(b); and
WHEREAS, in addition to my authority, my Secretary of Health has the authority to determine and employ the most efficient and practical means for the prevention and suppression of disease. 71 P.S. § 532(a), 71 P.S. 1403(a); and

vested in me and my Administration by the laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, I do hereby ORDER and PROCLAIM as follows: Section 1: Prohibition on Operation of Businesses that are not Life Sustaining
All prior [*8] orders and guidance regarding business closures are hereby superseded. No person or entity shall operate a place of business in the Commonwealth that is not a life sustaining business regardless of whether the business is open to members of the public. This prohibition does not apply to virtual or telework operations (e.g., work from home), so long as social distancing and other mitigation measures are followed in such operations. Life sustaining businesses may remain open, but they must follow, at a minimum, the social distancing practices and other mitigation measures defined by the Centers for Disease Control to protect workers and patrons. A list of life sustaining businesses that may remain open is attached to and incorporated into this Order. Enforcement actions will be taken against nonlife sustaining businesses that are out of compliance effective March 21, 2020, at 12:01 a.m. Section 2: Prohibition on Dine-In Facilities including Restaurants and Bars All restaurants and bars previously have been ordered to close their dine in facilities to help stop the spread of COVID-19.
Businesses that offer carry-out, delivery, and drive-through food and beverage service may continue, so long as social [*9] distancing and other mitigation measures are employed to protect workers and patrons. Enforcement actions will be taken against businesses that are out of compliance effective March 19, 2020, at 8 p.m.2 Section 3: Effective Date and Duration This order is effective immediately and will remain in effect until further notice. Governor Wolf, "Order of the Governor of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Regarding the Closure

WHEREAS, these means include isolation, quarantine, and any other control measure needed. 35 P.S. § 521.5.
NOW THEREFORE, pursuant to the authority

2 The Governor later revised the enforcement date to Monday, March 23, at 8 a.m. See "Waiver Extension, Revised Timing Of Enforcement: Monday, March 23 at 8:00 AM", available at https://www.governor.pa.gov/newsroom/waiver-extensionrevised-timing-ofenforcement-monday-march-23-at-800-am/.

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of All Businesses that are not Life Sustaining," (Mar. 19,

2020)

https://www.governor.pa.gov/wp-

content/uploads/2020/03/20200319-TWW-COVID-19-

business-closure-order.pdf ("Executive Order"). The

original five page attached list of businesses deemed to

be life-sustaining, or not, which as noted herein has

been amended from time to time, may be found at

https://www.governor.pa.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2020/0

3/20200319-Life-Sustaining-Business.pdf.

In compiling the list, the Governor used the North

American Industry Classification System ("NAICS"), a

code developed by the Office of Management and

Budget and utilized by the U.S. Census Bureau to group

similarly situated entities together for classification

purposes, to serve as the basis for an initial list of

business sectors. Respondents' [*10] Brief at 47 (citing

U.S. Census Bureau, North American Industry

Classification

System,

https://www.census.gov/eos/www/naics/ (last visited

4/8/2020)). The Governor explains that he used this

classification system to "ensure[] that similarly situated

entities would be treated the same." Id. The Governor

and Department of Community and Economic

Development ("DCED") then generally conformed its

categorizations of certain sectors, and businesses

therein, as life-sustaining versus non-life-sustaining

business to make them consistent with an advisory

issued by the Department of Homeland Security's

Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency

("CISA"). Gov. Tom Wolf, "Life Sustaining Business

Frequently Asked Questions", DCED.PA.GOV,

https://www.scribd.com/document/452553495/UPDATE

D-4-00pm-April-1-2020-Life-Sustaining-Business-FAQs

(last visited Apr. 8, 2020) (citing CISA Advisory Version

1.1, as amended March 23, 2020). According to CISA,

"[t]here are 16 critical infrastructure sectors whose

assets, systems, and networks, whether physical or

virtual, are considered so vital to the United States that

their incapacitation or destruction would have a

debilitating effect on security, national [*11] economic

security, national public health or safety, or any

combination thereof." CISA, "Identifying Critical

Infrastructure

During

COVID-19,"

https://www.cisa.gov/identifying-critical-infrastructure-

during-covid-19 (last visited Apr. 8, 2020). The Advisory

includes within each of the sectors, operations that

provide essential services to the identified sectors.

distancing.3 In issuing the Executive Order, the Governor invoked three statutory grounds for his and his administration's authority to do so: the Emergency Management Services Code (the "Emergency Code"), 35 Pa.C.S. § 7101-79a31; sections 532(a) and 1403(a) of the Administrative Code, 71 P.S. § 532; 71 P.S. § 1403(a); and the Disease Prevention and Control Law (the "Disease Act"), 35 P.S. § 521.1-521.25. The Governor, with the assistance of the DCED, determined which types of Pennsylvania businesses are "lifesustaining" and which are "non-life-sustaining." Those in the latter category were forced to shutter their physical operations4 under threat of criminal prosecution. A waiver process has been established for businesses [*12] to request relief.5 A successful request for waiver results in a business being recategorized as life-sustaining or offering support to lifesustaining businesses.6
B. The Parties
Petitioner Friends of Danny DeVito ("DeVito Committee") is a Pennsylvania candidate committee with a physical business address in Carnegie (Allegheny County). It was formed to operate and administer the

3 "Social distancing is a public health practice that aims to

prevent sick people from coming in contact with healthy

people in order to reduce opportunities for disease

transmission." OU Medicine, "Social Distancing and Stopping

the

Spread,"

https://www.oumedicine.com/coronavirus/protecting-your-

health/social-distancing (last visited 4/9/2020). Social

distancing is essential to limiting the death toll from COVID-19

because this pandemic spreads primarily through person to

person contact, as many as 25% of those infected are

asymptomatic, and the virus has an incubation period of up to

fourteen days. The virus can remain on surfaces for days and

can spread through the air within confined areas and

structures. Respondents' Brief at 3-4 (citations omitted).

4 The Executive Order does not preclude non-life-sustaining businesses from virtual operations, e.g., online internet activities or work-from-home arrangements.

5 Richard E. Coe, "Pennsylvania Grants Waivers Allowing

Non-'Life-Sustaining' Businesses to Resume Operations,"

(Apr.

1,

2020),

https://www.natlawreview.com/article/pennsylvania-grants-

waivers-allowing-non-life-sustaining-businesses-to-resume.

By its terms, the Executive Order compels the closure of all businesses in the state deemed to be non-lifesustaining to prevent the spread of COVID-19 by limiting person-to-person interactions through social

6 Gov. Tom Wolf, "Life Sustaining Business Frequently Asked

Questions",

DCED.PA.GOV,

https://www.scribd.com/document/452553495/UPDATED-4-

00pm-April-1-2020-Life-Sustaining-Business-FAQs

(last

visited Apr. 8, 2020).

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candidacy of Danny DeVito, a candidate for the 45th District of the Pennsylvania State House of Representatives. Emergency Application, ¶ 61. DeVito Committee complains that the district offices of the opponent for the 45th District seat in the upcoming election, the incumbent Representative Anita Kulik, are not subject to the Executive Order and, therefore, she retains access to her office, staff and office equipment. Id., ¶ 62. DeVito Committee, however, does not have access to its office and, therefore, cannot conduct DeVito's campaign. Id., ¶ 63. It argues that this "dissimilar and unequal treatment" of candidates infringes on candidate DeVito's right to equal protection. Id., ¶ 62. If permitted to reopen the campaign office, it asserts that it "will incorporate COVID-19 prevention protocol" similar to those [*13] employed by agencies under the Governor's jurisdiction. Id., ¶ 64.
Petitioner Kathy Gregory ("Gregory") is a licensed real estate agent with a physical business address in Bethlehem (Northampton County). Id., ¶ 65. Gregory is licensed through Better Homes and Gardens R.E., a real estate brokerage franchise. Id., ¶ 66. Pursuant to Pennsylvania law, she can only buy and sell real estate through her broker/franchisor. Her broker/franchisor has, however, closed the office and will not apply for a waiver, and thus she cannot apply for a waiver. Id., ¶ 68-69. Gregory complains that, because the Executive Order put "Office of Real Estate Agents and Activities Related to Real Estate Agents" on the non-lifesustaining list, she cannot work at her office or from her home. Id., ¶ 67. In contrast, she contends, many other professionals are permitted to work from virtual offices, and insurance agents and brokers, who are on the lifesustaining list, are permitted to continue their physical business operations. Id. She explains that many of her clients have sold their homes and need to depart by the end of June; thus, she needs to be able to find them replacement homes, which requires her to show [*14] clients potential properties. Id., ¶ 71. If permitted to resume working, Gregory avers that she will implement the COVID-19 prevention and mitigation protocols put in place by the National Association of Realtors. Id., ¶ 74.
Petitioner Blueberry Hill Public Golf Court & Lounge ("Blueberry Hill") operates a public golf course and restaurant (now take-out only) in Russell (Warren County). Id., ¶ 83; Petitioners' Brief at 49. It avers that the Executive Order has resulted in financial harm to its business. Specifically, despite being closed for business, Blueberry Hill must expend significant sums to maintain the fairways and greens. Emergency Petition, ¶ 85. Without paying customers, Blueberry Hill does not

have the income to conduct spring fertilization and pest control of the course, and it has had to lay off wait staff, cooks, and professional staff. Id. Blueberry Hill is unable to perform its obligations under contracts for the purchase of new or replacement equipment for the 2020 thirty-week golf season, which means it does not have the equipment necessary to perform required operations. Id. Because the golf course business is competitive and Blueberry Hill has been working on a [*15] slim budget for over a decade, the loss of business will compromise its ability to make its April 2020 payment on a promissory note. Id., ¶¶ 87-89. Moreover, the loss of spring cash flow will undermine its efforts to save revenue for the winter months. Id., ¶ 90. Citing the Governor's and Secretary's admonition and advice that Pennsylvanians need to be outside and breathe in fresh air, Blueberry Hill proposes to operate with COVID-19 prevention protocols in place, as are golf courses in Ohio. Id., ¶¶ 91-92.
Respondents are the Governor of Pennsylvania, Tom Wolf and the Secretary of the Pennsylvania Department of Health, Rachel Levine.
C. Procedural History of the Case
This matter commenced on March 24, 2020, when Petitioners filed the Emergency Application in this Court, challenging the Executive Order which prohibited all businesses deemed non-life-sustaining from continued operation of their physical locations during the COVID19 pandemic. The same day, the Prothonotary of this Court issued a letter advising Respondents that an answer to the Application was due on March 26, 2020, by 4:00 p.m.
After Respondents filed their answer, Petitioners filed an ancillary application for relief [*16] on March 26, 2020, asking this Court to allow briefing and oral argument on the Application. On March 27, 2020, this Court granted the request for briefing (but not oral argument) and set an expedited briefing schedule.
In compliance with this Court's briefing schedule, Petitioners filed their brief and reproduced record on March 31, 2020, and Respondents filed their brief on April 3, 2020. In the interim, Petitioners Gregory and Blueberry Hill each filed Supplemental Applications for Relief on April 2, 2020 (the "Supplemental Applications"), requesting that this Court enter an order directing the Governor to move them from the non-lifesustaining list to the life-sustaining list. Gregory argued that she should be permitted to resume her real estate

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business in light of a "Memorandum on Identification of Essential Critical Infrastructure Workers During the COVID-19 Response" issued by CISA, which memorandum deemed as essential residential and real estate services. Supplemental Application of Gregory, 4/2/2020, ¶¶ 11, 12. Blueberry Hill argued that it should be permitted to resume its business based on the facts that three other states with "stay at home" orders have allowed golf courses [*17] to reopen, provided they do so with COVID-19 prevention and mitigation protocols, and Respondents have identified outdoor activities— subject to social distancing—as permissible under Pennsylvania's "stay-at-home" order. Supplemental Petition of Blueberry Hill, 4/2/2020, ¶¶ 10, 12, 13, 16. Respondents filed an answer to the Supplemental Applications on April 3, 2020. [68 MM 2020] - 13
Additionally, on April 3, 2020, and April 6, 2002, respectively, the Cities of Philadelphia and Pittsburgh filed amicus briefs on behalf of Respondents. In their amicus briefs, the Cities of Philadelphia and Pittsburgh both offer strong support for the Governor's Executive Order. The City of Philadelphia notes that given the size and density of its population, it is especially vulnerable to the rapid spread of the disease. It argues that by ordering non-life-sustaining businesses to close, it permits the City to enforce necessary social distancing restrictions. The alternative of attempting to enforce social distancing in all stores and businesses in Philadelphia would be both unsafe and impossible, as the City faces incredible barriers to maintaining sufficient personal protective equipment and manpower [*18] to safely monitor business owners' and residents' adherence to physical distancing and hygiene requirements. The City of Pittsburgh indicates that even though the southwest region of Pennsylvania has eighteen hospitals, the rapid spread of COVID-19 would likely lead to an overwhelming of the health care resources available to Pittsburghers and residents of the surrounding areas. It urges the Court to grant King's Bench jurisdiction and to act for the well-being of all of the citizenry in this time of risk and contagion.

Pennsylvanians life-sustaining services that must be maintained even in time of public health crisis. PAR indicates that the undue delay in processing [*19] waiver requests has rendered the administrative process utterly ineffective. Further, the administration's position that it has the authority to create and destroy such administrative review process at any moment and at will, thereafter leaving tens of thousands of PAR members without any avenue of administrative or even judicial relief from the shutdown of their businesses, is contrary to the Pennsylvania Constitution and risks opening the floodgates to litigation in the Unified Judicial System.
On April 13, 2020, this Court granted leave to accept the filing of an amicus brief by the Home Builders Association of Bucks and Montgomery Counties and the Home Builders Association of Chester and Delaware Counties.
D. Summary of the Arguments of the Parties
In their Emergency Application, Petitioners contend that the Governor lacks any statutory authority to issue the Executive Order and further claim that it violates their constitutional rights under the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions. Petitioners claim that the Executive Order places businesses throughout Pennsylvania at extreme risk of financial hardship and threatens the jobs of hundreds of thousands of our citizens. Petitioners' [*20] Brief at 12 ("The severe disruption of the economy has already and will continue to create enormous dislocation and financial strain on the government, businesses and workers; over 650,000 Pennsylvanians have applied for unemployment compensation benefits since the Governor proclaimed his Order[.]"). Petitioners further argue that the Executive Order is unnecessary, as their businesses may be operated to "employ COVID-19 prevention and mitigation practices in their physical offices." Emergency Application, ¶ 25.

On April 3, 2002, the Pennsylvania Association of Realtors ("PAR") filed an amicus brief on behalf of Gregory. PAR argues that it provides vital, lifesustaining services to millions of Pennsylvanians, and that the Governor has improperly prohibited the offering of these services to the public. PAR contends that while this decision was ostensibly made in conjunction with the guidance from CISA, the decision is in fact in contradiction of such guidance. According to PAR, the Governor's decision arbitrarily denies to millions of

Respondents reject Petitioners' statutory and constitutional arguments, positing that the Pennsylvania Constitution and the above-referenced statutory enactments charge the Executive Branch of the state government with combating public health emergencies and providing it with broad powers to do so.7
7 In Civil Rights Defense Firm v. Governor Tom Wolf, 63 MM 2020, 2020 Pa. LEXIS 1585 (per curiam order dated March

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Respondents' Brief at 8. Respondents insist that strict application of social distancing practices is the only potentially effective means for reducing the spread of the disease and saving hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of Pennsylvania lives. Id. Closure of businesses is one such necessary practice to advance social distancing in order to prevent and suppress transmission. [*21] The selection of which businesses to close requires that a balance be struck: close too few businesses and the disease will spread uninterrupted, while closing too many will make it impossible for people to access life-sustaining goods and services. Id. Striking that balance, Respondents emphasize, constitutes a proper exercise of the Commonwealth's police powers and provides any due process required under the law, and even if some due process requirement is implicated, a waiver program has been established. Id. at 8-9.
II. JURISDICTION
HN1[ ] Article V, Section 2 of the Pennsylvania Constitution provides, in relevant part, that the Supreme Court "shall be the highest court of the Commonwealth and in this court shall be reposed the supreme judicial power of the Commonwealth," Pa. Const. art. V, § 2(a), and further provides that the Supreme Court "shall have such jurisdiction as shall be provided by law." Id. at 2(c). The General Assembly has codified our King's Bench authority: "The Supreme Court shall have and exercise the powers vested in it by the Constitution of Pennsylvania, including the power generally to minister justice to all persons and to exercise the powers of the court, as fully and amply, to all intents and purposes, as the [*22] justices of the Court of King's Bench, Common Pleas and Exchequer, at Westminster, or any of them, could or might do on May 22, 1722." 42 Pa.C.S. § 502. This Court has observed that HN2[ ] "our King's Bench authority is generally invoked to review an issue of public importance that requires timely intervention by the court of last resort to avoid the

deleterious effects arising from delays incident to the ordinary process of law." Commonwealth v. Williams, 634 Pa. 290, 129 A.3d 1199, 1205-06 (Pa. 2015); see also In re Bruno, 627 Pa. 505, 101 A.3d 635, 670 (Pa. 2014). We may "exercise King's Bench powers over matters where no dispute is pending in a lower court."8Williams, 129 A.3d at 1206 (citing In re Assignment of Avellino, 547 Pa. 385, 690 A.2d 1138, 1140 (Pa. 1997)).
Both Petitioners and Respondents agree that the present action presents an issue of immense public concern and requires immediate judicial resolution. Petitioners' Brief at 13 ("As [Petitioners] challenge the Commonwealth's ability to address the pandemic, these matters present precisely the type of far reaching, public policy concerns that warrant this Court's use of its extraordinary powers."); Respondents' Brief at 7. The Respondents in fact urge this Court to exercise both our King's Bench and extraordinary jurisdiction. Id. We agree that this case presents issues of immediate and immense public importance impacting virtually all Pennsylvanians and thousands [*23] of Pennsylvania businesses, and that continued challenges to the Executive Order will cause further uncertainty. This Court hereby invokes its King's Bench powers to decide the statutory and constitutional challenges to the Executive Order presented in Petitioners' Emergency Application.
III. RESPONDENTS' STATUTORY AUTHORITY TO ISSUE THE EXECUTIVE ORDER
HN3[ ] The Governor derives broad authority from our Constitution, as it vests him with "supreme executive power" and directs him to "take care that the laws be faithfully executed." Pa. Const. art IV, § 2. As the Commonwealth's chief executive officer, the Governor has primary responsibility for protecting the public safety and welfare of the people of Pennsylvania in times of

22, 2020), this Court denied an Emergency Ex-Parte Application for Emergency Relief pursuant to this Court's King's Bench jurisdiction, which application was based, in part, on the same statutory authority for, and the constitutionality of, the Governor's Executive Order as advanced in the present Emergency Application. We do not agree with the Respondents' suggestion that our refusal to exercise our King's Bench authority in the former challenge has a dispositive impact on our consideration of the issues presented here. Respondents' Brief at n.15.

8 An action similar to this Emergency Application is pending (but stayed) in the original jurisdiction of the Commonwealth Court. While generally presenting the same legal claims, there is not an identity of the petitioners in that case with those in this action. Petitioners briefly suggest that as an alternative to granting King's Bench jurisdiction here, we could exercise our extraordinary jurisdiction powers in 42 Pa.C.S. § 726 to assume jurisdiction of the Commonwealth Court action. Petitioners' Brief at 13-14. Under the circumstances, we grant King's Bench jurisdiction to decide the issue raised in the Emergency Application.

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actual or imminent disasters where public safety and welfare are threatened. 35 Pa.C.S. § 7301(a). As such, the Governor is vested with broad emergency management powers under the Emergency Code. HN4[
] The General Assembly imbedded in the Code its purposes, which include to "[r]educe vulnerability of people and communities of this Commonwealth to damage, injury and loss of life and property resulting from disasters;" to "[p]repare for prompt and efficient rescue, care and treatment of persons victimized or threatened [*24] by disaster;" to "[c]larify and strengthen the roles of the Governor, Commonwealth agencies and local government in prevention of, preparation for, response to and recovery from disasters;" to "[a]uthorize and provide for cooperation in disaster prevention, preparedness, response and recovery" and to "[s]upplement, without in any way limiting, authority conferred by previous statutes of this Commonwealth ... ." 35 Pa.C.S. §§ 7103(1), (2), (4), (5), (9). The Code further declares that it does not intend to "[l]imit, modify or abridge the authority of the Governor to proclaim martial law or exercise any other powers vested in him under the Constitution, statutes or common law of this Commonwealth." 35 Pa.C.S. §7104(3).
HN5[ ] Section 7301, entitled "General authority of Governor," clarifies the nature of the Governor's powers and responsibilities in disaster situations. First and foremost, the Governor is "responsible for meeting the dangers to this Commonwealth and people presented by disasters." 35 Pa.C.S. § 7301(a). He is further empowered to "issue, amend and rescind executive orders, proclamations and regulations which shall have the force and effect of law." 35 Pa.C.S. § 7301(b). The Governor may, by proclamation or executive order, declare a state of disaster emergency, 35 Pa.C.S. § 3701(b), "upon finding [*25] that a disaster has occurred or that the occurrence or the threat of a disaster is imminent." 35 Pa.C.S. § 7301(c). This state of disaster emergency shall continue until the Governor finds that the threat or danger has passed or that emergency conditions no Governor. Id. As a counterbalance to the exercise of the broad powers granted to the Governor, the Emergency Code provides that the General Assembly by concurrent resolution may terminate a state of disaster emergency at any time. Id.longer exist, but may not continue for longer than ninety days9 unless renewed by the

HN6[ ] Upon the declaration of a disaster emergency, the Emergency Code vests with the Governor expansive emergency management powers, including, inter alia, to "[s]uspend the provisions of any regulatory statute prescribing the procedures for conduct of Commonwealth business, or the orders, rules or regulations of any Commonwealth agency, if strict compliance with the provisions of any statute, order, rule or regulation would in any way prevent, hinder or delay necessary action in coping with the emergency;" to "[u]tilize all available resources of the Commonwealth Government and each political subdivision of this Commonwealth as reasonably [*26] necessary to cope with the disaster emergency;" to "[t]ransfer the direction, personnel or functions of Commonwealth agencies or units thereof for the purpose of performing or facilitating emergency services;" to "[d]irect and compel the evacuation of all or part of the population from any stricken or threatened area within this Commonwealth if this action is necessary for the preservation of life or other disaster mitigation, response or recovery;" to "[c]ontrol ingress and egress to and from a disaster area, the movement of persons within the area and the occupancy of premises therein;" and to "[s]uspend or limit the sale, dispensing or transportation of alcoholic beverages, firearms, explosives and combustibles." 35 Pa.C.S. §§ 7301(f)(1),(2),(3),(7),(8).10

change to the text of section 7301(c), namely to extend the

duration of the period of the Governor's declared disaster

emergency from thirty days to ninety days. The National

Governors Association notes that ten states require that

emergency declarations expire in less than thirty days, sixteen

states do not permit emergency declarations to exceed 30

days, and just five states allow emergency declarations to last

sixty days or more. See National Governors Association

Center for Best Practices, The Governor's Guide to Homeland

Security

at

14

(2007),

http://www.nga.org/files/live/sites/NGA/files/pdf/0703GOVGUI

DEHS.PDF. As such, Pennsylvania's Governor has the

authority to declare one of the longest emergency declarations

of any governor in the United States. Patricia Sweeney, JD,

MPH, RN, Ryan Joyce, JD, Gubernatorial Emergency

Management Powers: Testing the Limits in Pennsylvania,

6 Pitt. J. Envtl Pub. Health L. 149, 177 (2012).

With this revision to section 7301(c), the Emergency Code passed by unanimous votes in both chambers of the General Assembly. H. Journal, 162nd Gen. Assemb., vol. 5, at 3662-63 (Pa. Nov. 14, 1978) (190-0). S. Journal, 162nd Gen. Assemb., vol. 2, at 1167 (Pa. Nov. 15, 1978) (47-0).

9 During the General Assembly's consideration of passage of the Emergency Code in 1977, it made only one significant

10 As detailed in this Opinion, our analysis of the Emergency Code and our statutory construction of the provisions implicated by Petitioners leads us to conclude that it provides

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HN7[ ] The broad powers granted to the Governor in the Emergency Code are firmly grounded in the Commonwealth's police power. See generally Rufo v. Board of License and Inspection Review, 192 A.3d 1113, 1120 (Pa. 2018). This Court has defined the Commonwealth's police power as the power "to promote the public health, morals or safety and the general wellbeing of the community." Pa. Restaurant & Lodging Ass'n v. City of Pittsburgh, 211 A.3d 810, 817 (Pa. 2019). In Nat'l Wood Preservers, Inc. v. Dep't of Envt'l Protection, 489 Pa. 221, 414 A.2d 37, 42 (Pa. 1980), we described the police power as the state's "inherent power of a body politic to enact and enforce laws for the protection of the general welfare," and thus, it is [*27] both one of the "most essential powers of the government" and its "least limitable power." Id. at 42-43.
The police power is fundamental because it enables "civil society" to respond in an appropriate and effective fashion to changing political, economic, and social circumstances, and thus to maintain its vitality and order. See, e. g., Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 8 S. Ct. 273, 31 L. Ed. 205 (1887). The police power of the state [must therefore be] ... as comprehensive as the demands of society require under the circumstances. Comm. v. Barnes & Tucker II, 472 Pa. 115, 371 A.2d 461, 467 (Pa. 1977). Of necessity, then, the police power is a broad and flexible power. See, e. g., Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 75 S. Ct. 98, 99 L. Ed. 27 (1954); Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 47 S. Ct. 114, 71 L. Ed. 303, 4 Ohio Law Abs. 816 (1926).
Id.; see also Grime v. Dep't of Instruction, 324 Pa. 371, 188 A. 337, 341 (Pa. 1936) ("[B]usiness can be regulated under the police power because of its relation to health").

these powers in response to a viral illness like COVID19, and further contend that even if there is any applicability, no power has been conferred that would permit Respondents to close their businesses. Petitioners' Brief at 21. HN8[ ] Because consideration of Petitioners' arguments require that we engage in statutory interpretation, we note that when doing so a court's duty is to give effect [*28] to the legislature's intent and that the best indication of legislative intent is the plain language of the statute. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(a); Roverano v. John Crane, Inc., 2020 Pa. LEXIS 1035, 2020 WL 808186, at *7 (Pa. Feb. 19, 2020); Matter of Private Sale of Prop. by Millcreek Twp. Sch. Dist., 646 Pa. 339, 185 A.3d 282, 290-91 (Pa. 2018).
The provisions of the Emergency Code apply to "disasters." The Emergency Code defines "disaster" as "[a] man-made disaster, natural disaster or war-caused disaster."11 35 Pa.C.S. § 7102. Of relevance here, "natural disaster" is defined as follows:
Any hurricane, tornado, storm, flood, high water, wind-driven water, tidal wave, earthquake, landslide, mudslide, snowstorm, drought, fire, explosion or other catastrophe which results in substantial damage to property, hardship, suffering or possible loss of life.
Id. (emphasis added). HN9[ ] Upon finding that a disaster has occurred, the Governor is required to declare a disaster emergency, 35 Pa.C.S. § 7301(c), which the statute defines as:
Those conditions which may by investigation made, be found, actually or likely, to:
(1) affect seriously the safety, health or welfare of a substantial number of citizens of this Commonwealth or prelude the operation or use of essential public facilities;

Petitioners do not challenge that there are far-reaching powers granted to the Governor under the Emergency Code. Instead, Petitioners challenge the applicability of
the authority for the Governor's issuance of the Executive Order. Thus, we will not discuss the parties' arguments based on the Administrative Code or the Disease Act. While we recognize the vital role played by the Secretary and her department in advising the Governor of the public health implications of COVID-19 and the most appropriate methods to suppress and contain it, we find ample support in the Emergency Code's direct authorization of the promulgation of the Executive Order without the necessity of an interpretation of the Department of Health's authority under the Disease Act or Administrative Code.

11 The Emergency Code defines a "man-made disaster" as "[a]ny industrial, nuclear or transportation accident, explosion, conflagration, power failure, natural resource shortage or other condition, except enemy action, resulting from man-made causes, such as oil spills and other injurious environmental contamination, which threatens or causes substantial damage to property, human suffering, hardship or loss of life." 35 Pa. C.S. § 7102. A "war-caused disaster" is any "condition following an attack upon the United States resulting in substantial damage to property or injury to persons in the United States caused by use of bombs, missiles, shellfire, nuclear, radiological, chemical or biological means, or other weapons or overt paramilitary actions, or other conditions such as sabotage." Id.

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(2) be of such magnitude or severity as to render essential State supplementation of county and local efforts or resources exerted or utilized in alleviating the danger, damage, [*29] suffering or hardship faced; and (3) have been caused by forces beyond the control of man, by reason of civil disorder, riot or disturbance, or by factors not foreseen and not known to exist when appropriation bills were enacted.

35 Pa.C.S. § 7102 (definitions). HN10[ ] Upon the declaration of a disaster emergency, the Governor gains broad powers, including, inter alia, controlling the "ingress and egress to and from a disaster area, the movement of person within the area and the occupancy of premises therein." 35 Pa.C.S. § 7301(f)(7).

Petitioners contend that the COVID-19 pandemic is not a natural disaster as defined by the Emergency Code. They raise an ambiguity in the statute, thus, they argue, triggering our resort to the principles of statutory construction. Petitioners argue that although the definition uses the phrase "and other catastrophes," because viral illness is not included in the list of applicable disasters, COVID-19 cannot be a natural disaster because it is not of the same type or kind as those on the list. Petitioners' Brief at 15. While implicitly acknowledging that a viral illness like COVID-19 might qualify under the definition's reference to "other catastrophes," Petitioners insist that the Court must apply [*30] the contextual canon of ejusdem generis ("of the same kind"), which prevents the expansion of a list of specific items to include other items not "of the same kind" as those expressly listed. Id. at 16-18. Respondents disagree, contending that the COVID-19 pandemic "unquestionably fits the definitions of 'disaster' and 'disaster emergency', and is precisely the circumstance that the General Assembly had in mind with it enacted the statute." Respondents' Brief at 15. Respondents contend that the term "other catastrophe"' is expansive and is not limited by the specifically enumerated items on the list. Id. at 15-16.

As of this writing, 24,199 of Pennsylvania's citizens have

been confirmed by testing to have been infected with

COVID-19; 524 have died. Department of Health,

"COVID-19

Data

for

Pennsylvania,"

https://www.health.pa.gov/topics/disease/coronavirus/P

ages/Cases.aspx (last accessed 4/8/2020). COVID-19's

spread is exponential as demonstrated by the fact that

there were 851 confirmed cases on March 24, 2020, the

date this Application was filed. Id. It is beyond dispute

that the COVID-19 pandemic is unquestionably a catastrophe that "results in ... hardship, suffering or possible loss of life." The issue, [*31] then, is whether it nevertheless may not be classified as a "natural disaster" caused by unforeseen factors based upon the application of the doctrine of ejusdem generis. This Court has described the doctrine as follows:
HN11[ ] Under the statutory construction doctrine of ejusdem generis ("of the same kind or class"), where general words follow the enumeration of particular classes of persons or things, the general words will be construed as applicable only to persons or things of the same general nature or class as those enumerated.
Indep. Oil & Gas Ass'n of Pa. v. Bd. of Assessment Appeals, 572 Pa. 240, 814 A.2d 180, 184 (Pa. 2002).
We agree with Respondents that the COVID-19 pandemic qualifies as a "natural disaster" under the Emergency Code for at least two reasons. First, the specific disasters in the definition of "natural disaster" themselves lack commonality, as while some are weather related (e.g., hurricane, tornado, storm), several others are not (tidal wave, earthquake, fire, explosion). To the contrary, the only commonality among the disparate types of specific disasters referenced is that they all involve "substantial damage to property, hardship, suffering or possible loss of life." In this respect, the COVID-19 pandemic is of the "same general nature or class as those specifically [*32] enumerated," and thus is included, rather than excluded, as a type of "natural disaster."
We further note that HN12[ ] while ejusdem generis is a useful tool of statutory construction, such tools are used for the sole purpose of determining the intent of the General Assembly. Ejusdem generis must yield in any instance in which its effect would be to confine the operation of a statute within narrower limits that those intended by the General Assembly when it was enacted. See Dep't of Assess. & Tax. v. Belcher, 315 Md. 111, 553 A.2d 691, 696 (Md. 1989) ("[T]he general words will not be restricted in meaning if upon a consideration of the context and the purpose of the particular statutory provisions as a whole it is clear that the general words were not used in the restrictive sense."). See also Danganon v. Guardian Protective Services, 645 Pa. 181, 179 A.3d 9 (Pa. 2018) (Consumer Protection Law which has "and includes" in definition of trade and commerce interpreted broadly along with liberal interpretation of CPL as remedial legislation). HN13[ ]

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By setting forth a general list of catastrophes and then including the language "other catastrophe which results in substantial damage to property, hardship, suffering or possible loss of life," it is clear that the General Assembly intended to expand the list of disaster [*33] circumstances that would provide Respondents with the necessary powers to respond to exigencies involving vulnerability and loss of life. There is nothing in the Emergency Code to indicate that the General Assembly intended in any way to narrow the operation of the statute or the Governor's authority. To the contrary, the General Assembly's stated goals, as set forth in the Emergency Code, were to, inter alia, "[r]educe vulnerability of people and communities of this Commonwealth to damage, injury and loss of life and property resulting from disasters," and to "strengthen" the Governor's role "in prevention of, preparation for, response to and recovery from disasters." 35 Pa.C.S. § 7103(1),(4). The COVID-19 pandemic is, by all definitions, a natural disaster and a catastrophe of massive proportions. Its presence in and movement through Pennsylvania triggered the Governor's authority under the Emergency Code.

Petitioners alternatively argue that even if the COVID-19

pandemic constitutes a "disaster" under the Emergency

Code, the power granted to the Governor under 35

Pa.C.S. § 7301(f)(7) to "[c]ontrol ingress and egress to

and from a disaster area, the movement of persons

within the area and the occupancy of premises therein"

does [*34] not include any ability to close their

businesses. Petitioners' Brief at 21. Petitioners contend

that this provision only authorizes the Governor to act in

a "disaster area," and there have been no disasters in

the areas in which their businesses are located. Id. at

22. We find no merit in this argument. First,

Respondents correctly note that COVID-19 cases have

been reported in the counties in which Petitioners'

businesses are located (Allegheny, Northampton and

Warren Counties). Respondents' Brief at 24. In fact,

COVID-19 cases have now been reported in all counties

in the Commonwealth. Department of Health, "COVID-

19

Data

for

Pennsylvania,"

https://www.health.pa.gov/topics/disease/coronavirus/P

ages/Cases.aspx (last accessed 4/8/2020). More

fundamentally, Petitioners' argument ignores the nature

of this virus and the manner in which it is transmitted.

The virus spreads primarily through person-to-person

contact, has an incubation period of up to fourteen days,

one in four carriers of the virus are asymptomatic, and

the virus can live on surfaces for up to four days. Thus,

any location (including Petitioners' businesses) where

two or more people can congregate is within the

disaster area.
We [*35] further note that HN14[ ] the Emergency Code provides that, upon the declaration of a disaster emergency (as occurred here), the Governor has expansive emergency management powers including to "direct and compel the evacuation of all or part of the population from any stricken or threatened area within this Commonwealth if this action is necessary for the preservation of life or other disaster mitigation, response or recovery." 35 Pa.C.S. §§ 7301(f)(3). While the Governor took far less extreme measures with the closure of certain businesses, to the extent Petitioners are suggesting that the Governor lacked the authority to do so, this statutory authorization of a much more drastic measure disproves the point. Thus, the Executive Order's closure of non-essential businesses in
Pennsylvania is authorized by Section 7301(f)(7) of the Emergency Code. Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the COVID-19 pandemic triggered the Governor's authority under the Emergency Code and that as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Governor had the authority under the Emergency Code to declare the entirety of the Commonwealth a disaster area.
Finally, in addition to their challenges based on the statutory language of the Emergency Code, Petitioners [*36] argue that Respondents, by ordering closure of all businesses deemed to be non-lifesustaining, have exceeded the permissible scope of their police powers. Petitioners cite the United States Supreme Court's decision in Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 14 S. Ct. 499, 38 L. Ed. 385 (1894), for the "police powers" test:
To justify the state in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear — First, that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require such interference; and, second, that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.
Lawton, 152 U.S. at 137 (cited by Nat'l Wood Preservers v. Comm. Dept. of Envtl Res., 489 Pa. 221, 414 A.2d 37, 43 (Pa. 1980)). Petitioners make three arguments to demonstrate that Respondents exceeded their authorized police power. First, Petitioners claim that the public's interests are not served by the mass closure of businesses, as the public has an interest in

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continuing to receive the goods and services of these businesses. Petitioners' Brief at 24. Second, Petitioners insist that shuttering their businesses is unnecessary for the prevention of the spread of COVID-19 where the disease has not been detected at their places of business. Id. Third, Petitioners contend that closing their businesses [*37] was unduly burdensome to them and was, in fact "just about the most burdensome thing that can happen to a business, particularly businesses such as golf courses which cannot function anywhere but from their physical places of business." Id. at 24-25.
Under the exigencies created by the spread of the coronavirus and the critical interests of the public, generally, Petitioners cannot prevail in their arguments. As to the predicate requirements that the interests of the public justify the Governor's assertion of its authority, the nature of this emergency supports it. COVID-19 spreads "exponentially." Respondents report that in Pennsylvania, from the date they filed their answer to the Emergency Application (March 26, 2020) to the date they filed their brief (April 3, 2020) the number of reported cases increased from 1,687 to 7,016 and the number of deaths increased from 16 to 90. Respondents' Brief at 2. To punctuate the point and as noted previously (supra at 23), as of this writing, 24,199 of Pennsylvania's citizens have been confirmed to have been infected and 524 have died. The enforcement of social distancing to suppress transmission of the disease is currently the only mitigation tool. Department of Health, [*38] "COVID-19 Data for Pennsylvania," https://www.health.pa.gov/topics/disease/coronavirus/P ages/Cases.aspx (last accessed 4/8/2020). Recent models for the COVID-19 pandemic predict that about 60,000 Americans will die. Peter Baker, "Trump Confronts a New Reality Before an Expected Wave of Disease and Death," The New York Times (Apr. 1, 2020) https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/01/us/politics/coronav irus-trump.html (60,400 deaths predicted). Although a staggering death toll, it is lower than earlier predictions that between 100,000 and 240,000 Americans would die — even if the nation abided by social distancing. Respondents' Brief at 2-3 (citing Peter Baker, "Trump Confronts a New Reality Before an Expected Wave of Disease and Death." Id. The reason for the drop in the death toll projection is the enforcement of social distancing mechanisms and citizen's compliance with them. Quint Forgey, "Trump's top health officials predict diminished coronavirus death toll," Politico (Apr. 7, 2020) https://www.politico.com/news/2020/04/07/trumps-tophealth-officials-predict-diminished-coronavirus-death-

toll-171456.

Against this backdrop, Petitioners suggest that the public interest would best be served [*39] by keeping businesses open to maintain the free flow of business. Although they cite to none, we are certain that there are some economists and social scientists who support that policy position. But the policy choice in this emergency was for the Governor and the Secretary to make and so long as the means chosen to meet the emergency are reasonably necessary for the purpose of combating the ravages of COVID-19, it is supported by the police power. The choice made by the Respondents was tailored to the nature of the emergency and utilized a recognized tool, business closures, to enforce social distancing to mitigate and suppress the continued spread of COVID-19. See Respondents' Answer at 3.

Petitioners' second argument, namely that there is no

significant risk of the spread of COVID-19 in locations

where the disease has not been detected (including at

their places of business), is similarly unpersuasive. As

previously discussed, COVID-19 does not spread

because the virus is "at" a particular location. Instead it

spreads because of person-to-person contact, as it has

an incubation period of up to fourteen days and that one

in four carriers of the virus are asymptomatic.

Respondents' [*40] Brief at 4 (citing Coronavirus

Disease

2019,

"Symptoms,"

CDC,

https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/symptoms-

testing/symptoms.html (last accessed 4/9/2020)). The

virus can live on surfaces for up to four days and can

remain in the air within confined areas and structures.

Id. (citing National Institutes of Health, "Study suggests

new coronavirus may remain on surfaces for days,"

(Mar. 27, 2020) https://www.nih.gov/news-events/nih-

research-matters/study-suggests-new-coronavirus-may-

remain-surfaces-days (last accessed 4/9/2020) and

Joshua Rabinowitz and Caroline Bartman, "These

Coronavirus Exposures Might be the Most Dangerous,"

The New York Times (Apr. 1, 2020)

https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/01/opinion/coronaviru

s-viral-dose.html).

Finally, Petitioners contend that their businesses should be permitted to remain open because of the burden placed on them. We recognize the serious and significant economic impact of the closure of Petitioners' businesses. However, the question is whether it is unduly oppressive, thus negating the utilization of the police power. Faced with protecting the health and lives of 12.8 million Pennsylvania citizens, we find that the impact of the closure of [*41] these businesses caused

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by the exercise of police power is not unduly oppressive. The protection of the lives and health of millions of Pennsylvania residents is the sine qua non of a proper exercise of police power.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES
Petitioners advance five intermingled constitutional arguments in support of their claim that the Executive Order should be vacated even if the Governor was authorized to issue it. Petitioners contend that the Executive Order violates the separation of powers doctrine; that the Executive Order constitutes a taking requiring just compensation; that Petitioners were not accorded procedural due process in the compilation of the list of life-sustaining and non-life-sustaining businesses or in the waiver process and that both are arbitrary, capricious and vague; that it violates equal protection principles; and that the Executive Order interferes with DeVito Committee's right of free speech and assembly. We address these arguments in turn.

The Emergency Code belies Petitioners' position. HN15[ ] The Emergency Code specifically recognizes that
under its auspices, the Governor has the authority to issue executive orders and proclamations which shall have the full force of law. 35 Pa.C.S. § 7301(b). Moreover, as previously explained, the General Assembly, by and through its enactment of the Emergency Code, specifically [*43] and expressly authorizes the Governor to declare a disaster emergency and thereafter to control the "ingress and egress to and from a disaster area, the movement of persons within the area and the occupancy of premises therein." 35 Pa.C.S. § 7301(c), (f)(7). Inherent in that authorization is the Governor's ability to identify the areas where movement of persons must be abated and which premises will be restricted in order to mitigate the disaster. That the Governor utilized business classifications to determine the appropriate areas and premises to be directly impacted by the disaster mitigation is likewise inherent in the broad powers authorized by the General Assembly. Accordingly, the Executive Order does not violate the Separation of Powers Doctrine.

1. Separation of Powers
The entirety of the Petitioners' challenge to the Executive Order as a violation of the Separation of Powers Doctrine follows:
Executive orders can be classified into three permissible types: [*42] (1) proclamations for ceremonial purposes; (2) directives to subordinate officials for the execution of executive branch duties; and (3) interpretation of statutory or other law. Markham v. Wolf, 647 Pa. 642, 190 A.3d 1175 (2018). Type 3 is implicated in this matter. "[A]ny executive order that, in essence, creates law, is unconstitutional." Id. at 656. The governor's comprehensive, detailed determination of which types of businesses "may continue physical operations" constitutes an attempt at legislation, which is the exclusive province of the legislative branch of government. Id. ("Foundationally, the legislature creates the laws. Pa. Const. art. II, § 1"). The governor, in attempting to legislate which businesses may operate from their physical locations and which may not, has violated the principles of separation of powers articulated and applied by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Markham. Petitioners' Brief at 37.

2. Takings Without Compensation
Petitioners claim that because the Executive Order prohibits them from using their property12 "at all," it resulted in a taking of private property for public use without the payment of just compensation, in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution13
12 Blueberry Hill is the owner of the property upon which the business is conducted. Emergency Application, ¶ 83. While Blueberry Hill claims that it is deprived of the use of its property in total, we note that it continues to operate on a takeout basis, the restaurant located on the property. Petitioners' Brief at 49. The record here does not establish what property interests, if any, that Petitioners DeVito Committee and/or Gregory purport to hold. Accordingly, as one petitioner (Blueberry Hill) has standing to assert a takings claim, we will proceed to consider the issue on its merits.
13 The Fifth Amendment provides:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be

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and Article I, Section 10 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.14 According to Petitioners, a taking need not involve a physical taking of the property to implicate the constitutional protections requiring just compensation. Petitioners' Brief at 41. Instead, referring [*44] to the Executive Order as a government regulation, Petitioners argue that it is sufficient if a governmental regulation "deprive[s] an owner of all economically beneficial or productive use of land..." Id. (citing Machipongo Land & Coal Co. v. Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 569 Pa. 3, 799 A.2d 751, 754 (Pa. 2002)).
Respondents point out that there is a critical distinction between the exercise of the police power, as here, and takings pursuant to eminent domain. They cite to a long line of Pennsylvania cases holding that the payment of just compensation is not required where the regulation of property involves the exercise of the Commonwealth's police power. Beginning with Appeal of White, 287 Pa. 259, 134 A. 409 (Pa. 1926), this Court made the distinction:
Under eminent domain, compensation is given for property taken, injured, or destroyed, while under the police power no payment is made for a diminution in use, even though it amounts to an actual taking or destruction of property. Under the Fourteenth Amendment, property cannot be taken except by due process of law. Regulation under a proper exercise of the police power is due process, even though a property in whole or in part is taken or destroyed. The conditions on which its legitimate exercise is predicated [*46] should actually exist or their happening be so likely
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.
14 Article 1, Section 10 provides:
[N]o person shall, for any indictable offense, be proceeded against criminally by information, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual service, in time of war or public danger, or by leave of the court for oppression or misdemeanor in office. Each of the several courts of common pleas may, with the approval of the Supreme Court, provide for the initiation [*45] of criminal proceedings therein by information filed in the manner provided by law. No person shall, for the same offense, be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall private property be taken or applied to public use, without authority of law and without just compensation being first made or secured.

that restraint is necessary, similar to a court issuing a restraining order for injuries done or threatened to persons or property. Likewise, there should be a reasonable and substantial relation between the thing acted on and the end to be attained[.]
Id. at 411 (emphasis added).
Following White, this Court in Balent v. City of WilkesBarre, 542 Pa. 555, 669 A.2d 309 (Pa. 1995), again indicated that where governmental regulation restricting activity on private property is implemented pursuant to an exercise of police power, rather than through the government's power of eminent domain, no just compensation is due:
Eminent domain is the power to take property for public use. The City must provide just compensation for any property taken pursuant to this power. The police power, on the other hand, involves the regulation of property to promote the health, safety and general welfare of the people. White's Appeal, 287 Pa. 259, 134 A. 409 (1926). It does not require that the City provide compensation to the property owner, even if the property is damaged or destroyed. Id.
Id. at 314 (emphasis added); see also Estate of Blose ex rel. Blose v. Borough of Punxsutawney, 889 A.2d 653, 657—58 (Pa. Commw. 2005); Commonwealth v. Hinds, 2001 PA Super 121, 775 A.2d 859, 864 (Pa. Super. 2001).
The Balent case, however, differed in one important respect from the allegations made by Petitioners here. In Balent, the city of Wilkes-Barre demolished a structure [*47] that had been partially destroyed by fire. Balent, 669 A.2d at 311-12. While the structure was lost, the owners retained ownership of the property. Thus, unlike Petitioners' claim here, in Balent, there was no claim that the governmental action resulted in a loss of "all economically beneficial or productive use of land." Petitioners' Brief at 45 ("The Governor's Order ... is a restriction or interruption of the common and necessary use and enjoyment of property as it deprives Petitioners from using or operating their businesses at their physical location[.]") (citing Andress v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 410 Pa. 77, 85, 188 A.2d 709 (Pa. 1963) ("[A]ny destruction, restriction or interruption of the common and necessary use and enjoyment of property in a lawful manner may constitute a taking for which compensation must be made to the owner of the property[.]")).

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Based upon this distinction, Petitioners insist that the principle governing their claims is found in the United States Supreme Court's decision in Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 120 L. Ed. 2d 798 (1992). In Lucas, petitioner Lucas bought two residential lots on a South Carolina barrier island, intending to build single-family homes such as those on the immediately adjacent parcels. Before construction, however, the state legislature enacted a new law barring the erection of any [*48] permanent habitable structures on the parcels he had purchased. Lucas filed suit, arguing that even if the new legislation constituted a lawful exercise of the State's police power, the ban on construction deprived him of all "economically viable use" of his property and therefore effected a "taking" requiring the payment of just compensation. Noting Justice Holmes' prior opinion in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 43 S. Ct. 158, 67 L. Ed. 322 (1922), that "if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking," id. at 415, the Court in Lucas held that generally when a regulation deprives an owner of "all economically beneficial uses" of the land, it constitutes a regulatory taking requiring the payment of just compensation. Id. at 1016.
We do not find that either Balent or Lucas is controlling. Instead, we rely on a subsequent Supreme Court decision, Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 122 S. Ct. 1465, 152 L. Ed. 2d 517 (2002), for our disposition. In that case, respondent Tahoe Regional Planning Agency ("TRPA") imposed two moratoria, totaling thirty-two months, on development in the Lake Tahoe Basin while formulating a comprehensive land-use plan for the area. Petitioners, real estate owners affected by the moratoria and an association representing such owners, filed parallel suits, later consolidated, claiming that TRPA's actions had taken [*49] all viable economic uses of their property without compensation. Rather than apply its prior decision in Lucas, however, the Court recognized that while the regulation in Lucas stated that the ban on development "was unconditional and permanent," the regulations at issue in the case before it were merely temporary measures, which specifically stated that they would terminate. Id. at 329. As a result, the High Court affirmed the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit's decision that because the regulations had only a temporary impact on petitioners' fee interest, no categorical taking had occurred. Id. at 342 (noting that "the duration of the restriction is one of the important factors that a court must consider in the appraisal of a regulatory takings claim"). In so holding, the Court stated that "the extreme categorical rule that

any deprivation of all economic use, no matter how brief, constitutes a compensable taking surely cannot be sustained," as it would apply to numerous "normal delays in obtaining building permits, changes in zoning ordinances, variances, and the like, as well as to orders temporarily prohibiting access to crime scenes, businesses that violate health codes, firedamaged [*50] buildings, or other areas that we cannot now foresee ... which have long been considered permissible exercises of the police power, which do not entitle the individuals affected to compensation." Id. at 334-35.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit relied upon Tahoe-Sierra in a case involving an emergency situation bearing similarities to the present disaster crisis. In Nat'l Amusements Inc. v. Borough of Palmyra, 716 F.3d 57 (3d Cir. 2013), the Borough of Palmyra ordered closed for five months an open-air flea market, owned and operated by National Amusements, Inc. ("NAI"), due to safety concerns posed by unexploded munitions left behind when the site had been used as a weapons-testing facility for the United States Army. Relying on the holding in Tahoe-Sierra, the court of appeals categorically denied that a regulatory taking had occurred requiring the payment of just compensation:
It is difficult to imagine an act closer to the heartland of a state's traditional police power than abating the danger posed by unexploded artillery shells. Palmyra's emergency action to temporarily close the Market therefore constituted an exercise of its police power that did not require just compensation.
Id. at 63.
Applying Tahoe-Sierra and Nat'l Amusements Inc. to the present [*51] facts, we conclude that Petitioners have not established that a regulatory taking has occurred. The Executive Order results in only a temporary loss of the use of the Petitioners' business premises, and the Governor's reason for imposing said restrictions on the use of their property, namely to protect the lives and health of millions of Pennsylvania citizens, undoubtedly constitutes a classic example of the use of the police power to "protect the lives, health, morals, comfort, and general welfare of the people[.]" Manigault v. Springs, 199 U.S. 473, 480, 26 S. Ct. 127, 50 L. Ed. 274 (1905). We note that the Emergency Code temporarily limits the Executive Order to ninety days unless renewed and provides the General Assembly with the ability to

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terminate the order at any time. 35 Pa.C.S. § 7301(c). Moreover, the public health rationale for imposing the restrictions in the Executive Order, to suppress the spread of the virus throughout the Commonwealth, is a stop-gap measure and, by definition, temporary. While the duration of COVID-19 as a natural disaster is currently unknown, the development of a vaccine to prevent future outbreaks, the development of an immunity in individuals previously infected and the availability of widespread testing and contact tracing are all viewed [*52] as the basis for ending the COVID-19 disaster.15

3. Procedural Due Process
Petitioners next contend that they have been deprived of procedural due process.16 Petitioners claim that the Executive Order, with its list distinguishing between lifesustaining and non-life-sustaining businesses, took effect without providing them with notice and an

15 See remarks by Dr. Anthony Fauci, Director of the National

Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases: National Institute

of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, "NIH Clinical Trial of

Investigational Vaccine for COVID-19 Begins," NIH (Mar. 16,

2020) https://www.niaid.nih.gov/news-events/nih-clinical-trial-

investigational-vaccine-covid-19-begins; Peter Sullivan,

"Fauci: Improved testing and tracing can help reopen country,"

The

Hill

(Apr.

1,

2020)

https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/490713-fauci-

improved-testing-and-tracing-can-help-reopen-country;

Hayden Bird, "5 important points from Dr. Anthony Fauci's

interview on 'The Daily,'" Boston.com (Apr. 2, 2020)

https://www.boston.com/news/health/2020/04/02/5-important-

points-from-dr-faucis-interview-on-the-daily.

16 Petitioners' brief does not indicate whether the due process claim asserted is in the nature of one for procedural due process or substantive due process. In responding to Petitioners' arguments, Respondents understood Petitioners to be asserting infringements of only their procedural due process rights. Respondents' Brief at 33 n.18. We agree, as Petitioners cite to cases identifying the fundamental hallmarks of procedural due process ("notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard"), see Petitioners' Brief at 40 (citing Harris v. City of Phila., 47 F.3d 1333, 1335 (3d Cir. 1995)), and the types of procedural safeguards typically available (e.g., notice, a neutral arbitrator, an opening statement, an opportunity to present and cross-examine witnesses, representation by counsel, and a decision on the record stating the reasons for the result), see Rogin v. Bensalem Twp., 616 F.2d 680, 694 (3d Cir. 1980)). Accordingly, we will proceed to consider the procedural due process claims raised by Petitioners.

opportunity to be heard with respect to their placement on the list. Petitioners' Brief at 40, 46. Petitioners further argue that any waiver process must accord applicants procedural due process prior to final determinations, including, e.g., the right to know the applicable standards to be applied, to present and/or crossexamine witnesses, and to the availability of an appeal from an adverse result. Id. at 52.
From the Petitioners' arguments, we discern three procedural due process issues for our consideration. First, were Petitioners entitled to pre-deprivation notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to the Governor's entry of the Executive Order containing the list placing them in the non-life-sustaining category requiring the closure of their physical business operations. Second, if Petitioners were not entitled to pre-deprivation due [*53] process, were they entitled to postdeprivation due process protections. Finally, if the answer to the second issue is in the affirmative, does the Governor's waiver process constitute sufficient postdeprivation due process under the circumstances presented here.
With respect to the first issue, Petitioners, without any argument or citation to authority, insist that they were entitled to the full panoply of procedural due process rights to challenge the Executive Order (containing the list placing them in the non-life-sustaining category) prior to its entry. Petitioners' Brief at 46 ("[T]he placing of Petitioners' businesses on the non-life-sustaining list and forcing their closing constituted a deprivation of the property interests of the Petitioners, and as such the Governor was required to provide Petitioners with due process before the taking.") (emphasis in original). HN16[ ] An entity's entitlement to procedural due process, however, cannot be determined in a static environment, since due process is "not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstance." Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 930, 117 S. Ct. 1807, 138 L. Ed. 2d 120 (1997). "[N]ot all situations calling for procedural safeguards call for the same kind of procedure," [*54] Commonwealth v. Batts, 640 Pa. 401, 163 A.3d 410, 455 (Pa. 2017), and the "amount of due process that is due in any particular circumstance is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands." Comm. Dep't of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing v. Clayton, 546 Pa. 342, 684 A.2d 1060, 1064 (Pa. 1996).
In In re Fortieth Statewide Investigating Grand Jury, 197 A.3d 712 (Pa. 2018), this Court recently reaffirmed that HN17[ ] the amount of process that is due in any

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particular circumstance must be determined by application of the three-part balancing test first established in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S. Ct. 893, 47 L. Ed. 2d 18 (1976). Id. at 717. This balancing test considers three factors: (1) the private interest affected by the governmental action; (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation together with the value of additional or substitute safeguards; and (3) the state interest involved, including the administrative burden the additional or substitute procedural requirements would impose on the state. Id.
In Bundy v. Wetzel, 646 Pa. 248, 184 A.3d 551 (Pa. 2018), this Court also clarified that whether predeprivation notice is required largely depends upon the second Mathews factor. Id. at 557. We indicated that while there is a general preference that procedural safeguards apply in the pre-deprivation timeframe, Pa. Coal Mining Ass'n v. Ins. Dep't, 471 Pa. 437, 370 A.2d 685, 692 (Pa. 1977); Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 127-28, the "controlling inquiry" in this regard is "whether the state is in a position to provide for pre-deprivation process." Id. (citing Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 534, 104 S. Ct. 3194, 82 L. Ed. 2d 393 (1984)); see also Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 436, 102 S. Ct. 1148, 71 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1982) ("'[T]he necessity of quick action by the State or the impracticality [*55] of providing any pre-deprivation process' may mean that a post-deprivation remedy is constitutionally adequate.").

debate."). HN18[ ] The Supreme Court has held that at all times, even when the country is at war, essential liberties remain in effect. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 542, 91 S. Ct. 1586, 29 L. Ed. 2d 90 (1971).
It is fundamental that the great powers of Congress to conduct war and to regulate the Nation's foreign relations are subject to the constitutional requirements of due process. The imperative necessity for safeguarding these rights to procedural due process under the gravest of emergencies has existed throughout our constitutional history, for it is then, under the pressing exigencies of crisis, that there is the greatest temptation to dispense with fundamental constitutional guarantees which, it is feared, will inhibit governmental action. "The Constitution of the United States is a law for rulers and people, equally in war and in peace, and covers with the shield of its protection all classes of men, at all times, and under all circumstances."
Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 164-65, 83 S. Ct. 554, 9 L. Ed. 2d 644 (1963).
While procedural due process is required even in times of emergency, we conclude that the waiver process provides sufficient due process under the circumstances presented here.17 HN19[ ] The Supreme Court has

Under the circumstances presented here, namely the onset of the rapid spread of COVID-19 and the urgent need to act quickly to protect the citizens of the Commonwealth from sickness and death, the Governor was not in a position to provide for pre-deprivation notice and an opportunity to be heard by Petitioners (and every other business in the state on the non-lifesustaining list). The result would have been to delay the entry of the Executive Order by weeks, months, or even years, an entirely untenable result given the duties and obligations placed on the Governor under the Emergency Code to abate the looming disaster. As such, Petitioners were not entitled to pre-deprivation notice and an opportunity to be heard.
We cannot agree, however, with Respondents' contention that Petitioners were not entitled to any procedural due process, either before or after the entry of the Executive Order. Respondents' Brief at 35 ("Viewing the present public health emergency through a Mathews lens, it is apparent what balance is to be struck. — No additional safeguards are feasible, and [*56] the countervailing public interest is beyond

17 We agree with Respondents' contention that HN20[ ] an appellant may not assert a procedural due process claim if he has not availed himself of an available grievance procedure. Respondents' Brief at 32-33. In Alvin v. Suzuki, 227 F.3d 107, 116 (3d Cir. 2000), the Third Circuit held, "In order to state a claim for failure to provide due process, a plaintiff must have taken advantage of the processes that are available to him or her, unless those processes are unavailable or patently inadequate." Id. at 116. The court of appeals stated that "a state cannot be held to have violated due process requirements when it has made procedural protection available and the plaintiff has simply refused to avail himself of them." Id. (quoting Dusanek v. Hannon, 677 F.2d 538, 543 (7th Cir.1982)). According to the federal court, a due process violation "is not complete when the deprivation occurs; it is not complete unless and until the State fails to provide due process." Id. (quoting Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 110 S. Ct. 975, 108 L. Ed. 2d 100 (1990)). If there is a process on the books that appears to provide due process, the plaintiff cannot skip that process and use the federal courts as a means to get back what he wants. Id.
Here Gregory has not filed a waiver application. Blueberry Hill filed a waiver application on March 23, 2020, but has to date received no response. Petitioners' Brief at 7-8 n.1. DeVito

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acknowledged that a different level of process may be sufficient in times [*57] of emergency. Bell, 402 U.S. at 542. As the High Court acknowledged in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Min. & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 101 S. Ct. 2352, 69 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1981), "[p]rotection of the health and safety of the public is a paramount governmental interest which justifies summary administrative action. Indeed, deprivation of property to protect the public health and safety is '[o]ne of the oldest examples' of permissible summary action." Id. at 300-01.

The waiver process provides precisely that, namely a

summary procedure that provides businesses with an

opportunity to challenge the Governor's placement of

their business on the non-life-sustaining list. Seen in this

light, it is clear that the term "waiver" is a misnomer in

the present context. Instead, the "waiver" process is in

actuality a review process that provides businesses an

opportunity to challenge, and the Governor's office to

reconsider, whether the placement of a business on the

non-life-sustaining list was a proper categorization.

According to public announcements by the Governor,

businesses categorized as non-life-sustaining may file a

"waiver" application in which they can attempt to

demonstrate either that they provide goods or services

that are necessary to maintain operations at a business

on the life-sustaining list or that they [*58] belong in one

of the critical infrastructure categories outlined in the

CISA. Richard E. Coe, "Pennsylvania Grants Waivers

Allowing Non-'Life-Sustaining' Businesses to Resume

Operations,"

(Apr.

1,

2020),

https://www.natlawreview.com/article/pennsylvania-

grants-waivers-allowingnon- life-sustaining-businesses-

to-resume. This procedure establishes the criteria to

defeat the categorization as a non-life-sustaining

business. The "waiver" process does not exist to provide

waivers to businesses that are not life-sustaining, but

rather constitutes an attempt to identify businesses that

may have been mis-categorized as nonlife- sustaining.

The Governor's efforts to correct mis-categorizations of certain businesses is an entirely proper focus of procedural due process. HN21[ ] Procedural due process is geared toward protecting individuals from the

Committee filed a waiver application on March 31, 2020 and received a denial letter on April 3, 2020. Supplemental Application for Relief on behalf of DeVito Committee, ¶ 16. Because one of the Petitioners (DeVito Committee) has standing to assert a procedural due process challenge to the waiver process, we will proceed to consider the issue on its merits.

mistaken deprivation of life, liberty or property. As the United States Supreme Court explained in Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 98 S. Ct. 1042, 55 L. Ed. 2d 252 (1978):
Procedural due process rules are meant to protect persons not from the deprivation, but from the mistaken or unjustified deprivation of life, liberty, or property. Thus, in deciding what process constitutionally is due in various contexts, the Court repeatedly [*59] has emphasized that "procedural due process rules are shaped by the risk of error inherent in the truthfinding process . . . ." Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 344, 96 S. Ct. 893, 47 L. Ed. 2d 18 (1976). Such rules "minimize substantively unfair or mistaken deprivations of" life, liberty, or property by enabling persons to contest the basis upon which a State proposes to deprive them of protected interests. Fuentes v. Shevin, supra, 407 U.S., at 81, 92 S.Ct., at 1994.
Id. at 259-60.
Petitioners contend the "waiver" process by way of a summary administrative proceeding is arbitrary and capricious because they are denied a formal hearing, at which they may, inter alia, make opening presentations, enter evidence, and present and cross-examine witnesses. Petitioners' Brief at 52. As of the filing of the Respondents' brief, however, more than 34,000 waiver applications have been filed, Michael Rubinkam and Mark Scolforo, "Deadline Looms for Pennsylvania VirusShutdown Waivers," Associated Press (Apr. 2, 2020) https://www.usnews.com/news/beststates/pennsylvania/articles/2020-04-02/state-setsdeadline-for-exemptions-from-wolf-shutdown-order, and it would be impossible, given available resources, to provide the level of due process suggested by Petitioners to every applicant (or any significant percentage of them) and to reach final determinations [*60] with respect to the merits of those applications in a timeframe commensurate with the existence of the disaster so that relief could be afforded.
In this regard, we consider the appropriateness of the due process afforded in light of the fact that the loss of Petitioner' property rights are temporary and find this significant. The temporary deprivation impact effects each of the factors in the Mathews balancing test. While the private interest, the closure of the business, is important, the risk of erroneous temporary deprivation does not outweigh the value of additional or substitute safeguards which could not be provided within a realistic

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timeframe. The government interest in focusing on mitigation and suppression of the disaster outweighs the massive administrative burden of the additional procedural requirements demanded by Petitioners. These procedural requirements would overwhelm an entire department of government otherwise involved with disaster mitigation.
We make the further observation that the summary procedure of a review of an application for a waiver meets the exigency of this disaster — social distancing. As conceived by the Petitioners, due process requires in person [*61] testimonials, cross-examination and oral argument. Thus, not only would massive numbers of staff be necessary (who would be working from home) but troves of telecommunication devices would be necessary to accomplish it. The near impossibility of such procedures contrasted with the temporary deprivation at issue here drives the conclusion that the waiver process, as designed, provides an adequate opportunity for Petitioners to make their case for reclassification. HN22[ ] Under the circumstances of an ongoing disaster emergency, a full evidentiary proceeding is not a viable post-deprivation procedural process.18
Petitioners claim that they are entitled to judicial review of the denial of a waiver application. However, we find no basis for a right of appeal under the Pennsylvania Constitution in this circumstance. Article V, Section 9 states:
There shall be a right of appeal in all cases to a court of record from a court not of record; and there shall also be a right of appeal from a court of record or from an administrative agency to a court of
18 Our conclusion that the summary procedure for review of written requests for waiver is constitutionally adequate is not a suggestion that the procedure is not without flaws. Much of the Petitioners' written submissions to this Court reflect a frustration with the lack of transparency with the procedure. For example, why are some waivers granted and others denied? While, as described, the criteria for consideration of a re-classification are set forth in communications from the Governor, businesses that have been denied a waiver receive a form letter advising of such determination. The lack of transparency in this process, while explainable because of time constraints, has caused a level of discontent above that of owning a shuttered business. However, HN23[ ] a lack of transparency, while perhaps a sign of lack of good government practices, does not constitute a violation of procedural due process.

record or to an appellate court, the selection of such court to be as provided by law; and there shall be such other rights of appeal as may be provided by law.
Pa. Const. art. V, § 9 (emphasis [*62] added). Attached to the Supplemental Application for Relief by Petitioner Kathy Gregory is a letter, on the Governor's letterhead and signed by both the Governor and Secretary Levine, granting a waiver request by another real estate brokerage company. Supplemental Application, ¶ 15 (Exhibit A). The letter was attached to the Supplemental Application to demonstrate that "[b]y the approval of this waiver, the Governor has determined that real estate services are life-sustaining." Id., ¶ 16. While it is clear that specific requests are reviewed by employees of the DCED, Respondents' Answer at 24, the decision to grant the waiver was that of Governor Wolf and Secretary Levine and was not an administrative adjudication of the DCED.19 The grant letter does not even reference the DCED's participation in the review process. HN24[ ] Neither the Governor nor the Secretary is an "administrative agency." Because Article V, Section 9 does not confer a right of appeal from an executive decision of the Governor or the Secretary, no right of appeal lies in this instance.
4. Equal Protection
Petitioners contend that the Executive Order violates the equal protection clauses of the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions. U.S. Const. amend. XIV; Pa. Const. art. I, § 26. In Commonwealth v. Bullock, 590 Pa. 480, 913 A.2d 207 (Pa. 2006), this Court held that HN25[ ] "[w]hile [*63] the Equal Protection Clause assures that all similarly situated persons are treated alike, it does not obligate the government to treat all persons identically." Id. at 215. Petitioners contend that the Executive Order prevents DeVito Committee from using its principle place of business for operations in running Mr. DeVito's political campaign. Petitioners' Brief at 57. In contrast, they argue that elected officials,
19 The DCED has adjudicatory bodies that make administrative determinations, including for example the State Board of Property. The work of reviewing and deciding waiver requests is, however, not the work of an adjudicatory body with the DCED, but rather that of about fifty DCED employees familiar with the NAICS code. Madasyn Lee, "Nearly 10K Pennsylvania businesses apply for closure waivers," TribLive (Mar. 22, 2020) https://triblive.com/local/regional/nearly-10kpennsylvania-businesses-apply-for-closure-waivers/.

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including the state representative against whom Mr. Devito is running, are permitted to continue to use their offices, staff, equipment and supplies at their discretion. Id. Mr. Devito further contends that he is similarly situated to both his political opponent and social advocacy organizations in that they all advocate for social and political causes, but elected officials and social advocacy groups are identified in the Executive Order as life-sustaining and thus are not barred from their physical place of operations. Id.

makes no distinction between public and municipal golf courses. To the extent that municipal golf courses remained open because they were subject to local control, i.e., municipal governments, Respondent cites to a growing list of municipal golf courses that are closed by reason of efforts to mitigate COVID-19. Id. at 45.
For these reasons, the Executive Order does not violate constitutional equal protection principles.

Campaign offices and legislative offices are not similarly situated. When legislators, like Mr. DeVito's political opponent, use their district offices, they do so as government officials, not as candidates. Indeed, it is a crime for public officials to use public resources including [*64] taxpayer funded offices, staff, or equipment—to run for reelection. See e.g., 18 Pa.C.S. § 3926 (theft of services); 18 Pa.C.S. § 4113 (misapplication of government property); 65 Pa.C.S. § 1103 (conflict of interest). As the Respondents correctly note, while the legislative office of Mr. DeVito's opponent remains open, albeit without public visitations, its operations are limited to serving the public during this pandemic and to voting remotely on legislation. Respondents' Brief at 57. But all candidates' physical offices, whether incumbent or challenger, must be closed. Id. The Executive Order thus does not advantage or disadvantage any candidate or campaign committee. Id.
Furthermore, DeVito Committee is not similarly situated to social advocacy groups. Social advocacy groups advocate for vulnerable individuals during this time of disaster. While Mr. DeVito personally may similarly advocate for worthy social and political causes, there is no indication that DeVito Committee does so nor is it the primary focus of the operation. To the contrary, in the Emergency Application, Petitioners alleged that DeVito Committee's political candidate committee was formed to operate and administer a political campaign, and to that end, its members [*65] meet with volunteers, supporters, potential media, vendors and other persons or parties instrumental to conducting a political campaign, as well as conducting direct mail activities, press conferences and other promotions. Emergency Application ¶¶ 61, 63.
Finally, Petitioners indicate that Blueberry Hill is similarly situated to municipal golf courses, but that the Executive Order has closed public, but not municipal, golf courses. Petitioners' Brief at 55. As Respondents properly indicate, however, the list of life-sustaining businesses

5. First Amendment Rights
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution states that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble." U.S. Const. Amend. I. [*66] Further, Article I, Sections 7 and 20 of the Pennsylvania Constitution provide, in pertinent part, that "every citizen may freely speak, write and print on any subject, being responsible for the abuse of that liberty" and "citizens have a right in a peaceable manner to assemble together for their common good..." Pa. Const. Art. 1, §§ 7, 20. DeVito Committee argues the Executive Order impinges upon these constitutional guarantees, as it interferes with the right to peacefully assemble, as it closed a "place of physical operations" they wish to use to "hold meetings and to engage in speech and advocacy." Petitioners' Brief at 58.
HN26[ ] Constitutional rights to free speech and assembly, however, are not absolute, and states may place content neutral time, place, and manner regulations on speech and assembly "so long as they are designed to serve a substantial governmental interest and do not unreasonably limit alternative avenues of communication." City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 46-47, 106 S. Ct. 925, 89 L. Ed. 2d 29 (1986); Grace United Methodist Church v. City of Cheyenne, 451 F.3d 643, 658 (10th Cir. 2006) (the right of assembly and expressive association are "'no more absolute than the right of free speech or any other right; consequently there may be countervailing principles that prevail over the right of association'") (quoting Walker v. City of Kansas City, 911 F.2d 80, 89 n. 11 (8th Cir. 1990)); Duquesne v. Fincke, 269 Pa. 112, 112 A. 130, 132 (Pa. 1920) (Article 20 does not grant "the right to assemble [*67] with others, and to speak wherever he and they choose to go"). "The principal inquiry in determining content neutrality ... is whether

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the government has adopted a regulation of speech because of disagreement with the message it conveys." Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791, 109 S. Ct. 2746, 105 L. Ed. 2d 661 (1989).
There is no question that the containment and suppression of COVID-19 and the sickness and death it causes is a substantial governmental interest. As to whether the Executive Order unreasonably limits alternative avenues of communication, it does not.
The Executive Order does not place a restriction on supporters of DeVito Committee to assemble with each other and speak to each other, it only forecloses doing so in the physical campaign office. It does not in any respect limit the ability to speak or assemble, however, as it does not in any respect prohibit operations by telephone, video-conferencing, or on-line through websites and otherwise. In this era, cyberspace in general and social media in particular have become the lifeblood for the exercise of First Amendment rights. See Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S.Ct. 1730, 1735, 198 L. Ed. 2d 273 (2017).

It is not for this Court, but rather for the Governor pursuant to the powers conferred upon him by the Emergency Code, to make determinations as to what businesses, or types of businesses, are properly placed in either [*69] category. This Court's grant of King's Bench jurisdiction here was expressly limited to deciding the statutory and constitutional challenges to the Executive Order presented in Petitioners' Emergency Application. See supra at 15. As the Supplemental Applications lack any jurisdictional basis, they are dismissed.
VI. Disposition
We grant the request to exercise our King's Bench jurisdiction. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we conclude that Respondents had the statutory authority to issue the Executive Order and that Petitioners have not established any basis for relief based upon their constitutional challenges. The claim for relief requested in the Application, to vacate or strike the Executive Order, is therefore denied.

Finally, "the principle inquiry in determining content neutrality — is whether the government has adopted a regulation of speech because of disagreement with the message it conveys." [*68] Ward, 491 U.S. at 791. Respondents argue that the Executive Order is content neutral. It does not regulate speech at all, let alone based on content. It applies to a large number of nonlife sustaining businesses regardless of message, whether "campaign office, rock concerts, or haberdasheries." Respondents' Brief at 41. We agree. The Executive Order is tailored to meet the exigencies of COVID-19 restricting in-person gatherings to promote social distancing. It does not otherwise prohibit alternative means of communication or virtual gathering.

Justices Baer, Todd and Wecht join the opinion. Chief Justice Saylor files a concurring and dissenting opinion in which Justices Dougherty and Mundy join. Concur by: SAYLOR
Dissent by: SAYLOR
Dissent

Accordingly, we conclude that the Executive Order does not violate the First Amendment to the United States Constitution or Article I, Sections 7 and 20 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.

CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION CHIEF JUSTICE SAYLOR

V. The Supplemental Applications of Gregory and Blueberry Hill
Subsequent to the filing of the Emergency Application, Petitioners Gregory and Blueberry Hill filed supplemental applications for relief, requesting that this Court enter orders directing the Governor to move them from the non-life-sustaining list to the life-sustaining list.

Respectfully, I would refrain from exercising discretion to grant King's Bench jurisdiction, albeit I agree with the majority that the circumstances are extraordinary and matters of great public importance are involved. I find, however, that several material [*70] aspects of the petitioners' claims may involve issues of disputed fact. And it also appears to me that some of the majority's conclusions have mixed legal and factual overtones.

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For these reasons -- and in light of the ongoing public health crisis -- I believe there is much to be said for treating the executive branch's actions as presumptively valid for now, while not foreclosing colorable challenges from moving forward in the appropriate court of original jurisdiction, i.e., the Commonwealth Court. Importantly, that court, unlike this one, is organized to support orderly fact-finding. Thus, it can more appropriately administer the necessary judicial consideration in the first instance, subject to appellate review by this Court if necessary.
That said, since the merits are now being explored, I lend my support to the majority's conclusion that the present public-health crisis may properly be regarded as a "disaster emergency," triggering the Governor's special powers to respond. See Majority Opinion, slip op. at 23-26 (citing 35 Pa.C.S. §7102). While there are factual aspects attending the majority's reasoning on this point, I believe judicial notice can appropriately be taken concerning the severity of the current [*71] emergency and the need for strong countermeasures.
I am less confident, however, in the majority's conclusion that "summary administrative action" by the executive branch to close many businesses throughout the Commonwealth must evade judicial review as a check against arbitrariness. Majority Opinion, slip op. at 42. While the majority repeatedly stresses that such closure is temporary, see id., this may in fact not be so for businesses that are unable to endure the associated revenue losses. Additionally, the damage to surviving businesses may be vast. Significantly, moreover, the Supreme Court of the United States has admonished that the impermanent nature of a restriction "should not be given exclusive significance one way or the other" in determining whether it is a proper exercise of police power. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 337, 122 S. Ct. 1465, 1486, 152 L. Ed. 2d 517 (2002).
The majority opines that "[t]he protection of the lives and health of millions of Pennsylvania residents is the sine qua non of a proper exercise of police power." Id. at 30. I believe, however, that greater account must be given to the specific nature of the exercise, and that arbitrariness cannot be tolerated, particularly when the livelihoods of citizens are being impaired to the degree presently asserted. [*72]
To me, the majority allocates too much weight to temporariness to defeat developed allegations of a lack of due process in the executive branch's determination

of which businesses must close and which must remain closed. See Majority Opinion, slip op. at 37-38.1 Again, there seems to be a factual dynamic that should not be dismissed out of hand. Certainly, the executive branch may engage in proper exercises of police power in a disaster emergency, and a fair amount of deference to its decisions may be in order. At least short of martial law, however -- relative to the broad-scale closure of Pennsylvania business for a prolonged period -- I don't believe the executive's determinations of propriety can go untested in the face of the present allegations of inconsistency and irrationality.2
In summary, in my considered judgment, the matters raised in the emergency application for [*73] extraordinary relief -- especially those related to alleged inconsistency and arbitrariness in the waiver process -should be left to the Commonwealth Court, in the first instance, as the court of original jurisdiction invested with fact-finding capabilities.
Justices Dougherty and Mundy join this concurring and dissenting opinion.
End of Document
1 Such allegations include the following: It is not clear why some businesses are on the lifesustaining list[.] For example, why are "beer, wine, and liquor stores," determined to be non-life-sustaining, but "beer distributors" are determined to be "life-sustaining?" Why are "department stores" non-life-sustaining, but "other general merchandise stores" life-sustaining?
Brief for Petitioners at 48 (footnote omitted).
2 The majority observes that the General Assembly has the ability to terminate the Governor's order. See Majority Opinion, slip op. at 37 (citing 35 Pa.C.S. §7301(c)). Although I agree with the majority that this serves as one check on executive power, I note that the Constitution serves as another.

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DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

_____________________________________________________

LEAGUE OF INDPENDENT FITNESS FACITLITIES AND TRAINERS, INC., BASELINE FITNESS LLC, BUILDING YOUR TEMPLE LLC, BYT FITNESS 247 LLC, CLAWSON FITNESS, LLC, CLINTON FITNESS, INC., D-LUX KARATE UNIVERSITY LLC, FENTON ATHLETIC CLUB, INC., FENTON KARATE, LLC, FUSION FITNESS 24/7 LLC, H3 FITNESS LLC, I FITNESS PERSONAL TRAINING, INC., JKP FITNESS, LLC, JPF ENTERPRISES, LLC, M FITNESS CLUB, LLC, MH & AB LLC, MOTOR CITY CF - ST. CLAIR SHORES, LLC, NASCOT ENTERPRISES, LLC, PRISON CITY PHYSIQUE LLC, RMP FITNESS INC., STRENGTH BEYOND LLC, 24/7 BOOTCAMP AND BOXING INC., and 4 SEASONS GYM, LLC,
Plaintiffs, v. GRETCHEN E. WHITMER and ROBERT GORDON,
Defendants. _____________________________________________________
ERSKINE LAW, PC Scott M. Erskine (P54734) Carly Van Thomme (P59706) Attorneys for Plaintiffs 612 W. University
Exhibit 19

Civil No. 1:20-cv-00458 Hon. Paul L. Maloney

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 33-19 filed 06/08/20 PageID.364 Page 2 of 10

Caution As of: June 2, 2020 6:22 PM Z

Cavel Int'l, Inc. v. Madigan

United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit August 16, 2007, Argued; September 21, 2007, Decided
No. 07-2658

Reporter 500 F.3d 551 *; 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 22510 **
CAVEL INTERNATIONAL, INC., et al., PlaintiffsAppellants, v. LISA MADIGAN, et al., DefendantsAppellees.

Court for the Northern District of Illinois, which declined to issue a preliminary injunction barring the enforcement of an amendment to the Illinois Horse Meat Act (Illinois Act), 225 Ill. Comp. Stat. 635. The slaughterhouse argued that the Illinois Act violated both the federal Meat Inspection Act and the commerce clause.

Subsequent History: US Supreme Court certiorari denied by Cavel Int'l v. Madigan, 2008 U.S. LEXIS 4938 (U.S., June 16, 2008)

Overview

Prior History: [**1] Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Western Division. No. 07 C 50100--Frederick J. Kapala, Judge.
Cavel Int'l, Inc. v. Madigan, 500 F.3d 544, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 18654 (7th Cir. Ill., 2007)
Core Terms
horses, meat, slaughter, human consumption, Inspection, foreign commerce, slaughterhouses, export, animals, state law, consumers, importing, interstate, regulation, killed, plants, Zoos, interstate commerce, horse-meat, invalid, cases, shut, eat
Case Summary

The Illinois Act was amended to make it unlawful for any person in the state either to slaughter a horse for human consumption, or to import into or export from Illinois horse meat to be used for human consumption. The slaughterhouse operated the only facility in the United States for slaughtering horses. The slaughterhouse first pointed to the Meat Inspection Act's preemption clause and argued that it signified Congress's decision to sweep aside any state law that would render the federal requirements inapplicable to the slaughterhouse by forbidding horses to be slaughtered. However, the court held that when the Meat Inspection Act was passed, it was not a decision that states had to allow horses to be slaughtered for human consumption. The more difficult question was whether the Illinois Act violated the commerce clause as interpreted to prohibit state regulations that unduly interfered with the foreign commerce of the United States. The court held that the curtailment of foreign commerce by the amendment was slight and the court was reluctant to condemn a state law, supported by a legitimate state interest--that being the treatment of animals in Illinois.

Procedural Posture Appellant foreign-owned horse slaughterhouse appealed from the order of the United States District Outcome
Chris Long

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The district court's judgment was affirmed, the slaughterhouse's suit was dismissed with prejudice, and the injunction that the court granted pending appeal was dissolved.

HN3[ ] Agriculture & Food, Meat Inspections
The Meat Inspection Act, 21 U.S.C.S. § 606, is concerned with inspecting premises at which meat is produced for human consumption, rather than with preserving the production of particular types of meat for people to eat.

LexisNexis® Headnotes

Constitutional Law > Congressional Duties & Powers > Commerce Clause > General Overview

Business & Corporate Compliance > ... > Governments > Agriculture & Food > Meat Inspections
Governments > Agriculture & Food > Animal Protection

HN4[ ] Congressional Duties & Powers, Commerce Clause
The clearest case of a state law that violates the commerce clause is a law that discriminates in favor of local firms.

HN1[ ] Agriculture & Food, Meat Inspections

Constitutional Law > Congressional Duties & Powers > Commerce Clause > General Overview

The Illinois Horse Meat Act, 225 Ill. Comp. Stat. 635, has been amended to make it unlawful for any person in the state either to slaughter a horse if that person knows or should know that any of the horse meat will be used for human consumption, 225 Ill. Comp. Stat. 635/1.5(a), or to import into or export from Illinois, or to sell, buy, give away, hold, or accept any horse meat if that person knows or should know that the horse meat will be used for human consumption. 225 Ill. Comp. Stat. 635/1.5(b).

HN5[ ] Congressional Duties & Powers, Commerce Clause
The absence of outright discrimination does not terminate inquiry into a possible violation of the commerce clause.
Constitutional Law > ... > Commerce Clause > Interstate Commerce > Tests

Constitutional Law > Congressional Duties & Powers > Commerce Clause > Commerce With Other Nations
HN2[ ] Commerce Clause, Commerce With Other Nations
The commerce clause in U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, merely empowers Congress to regulate interstate and foreign commerce but has been interpreted to limit the power of states to regulate interstate and foreign commerce even in the absence of federal legislation inconsistent with the state regulation.

HN6[ ] Interstate Commerce, Tests
Where a statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has expressed doubt that even this tough test is available to plaintiffs unless they show at least "mild" discrimination against interstate commerce; precedent seems to require that at least "incidental" effects on interstate commerce be shown.

Business & Corporate Compliance > ... > Governments > Agriculture & Food > Meat Inspections

Constitutional Law > ... > Commerce Clause > Interstate Commerce > Tests

Chris Long

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HN7[ ] Interstate Commerce, Tests

Other Nations

Even in the absence of discrimination, a burden on interstate commerce that has no rational justification would be invalid.

International Trade Law > State Legislation > General Overview
HN11[ ] Commerce Clause, Commerce With Other Nations

Constitutional Law > Congressional Duties & Powers > Commerce Clause > General Overview
Constitutional Law > Substantive Due Process > Scope
HN8[ ] Congressional Duties & Powers, Commerce Clause
Any law that irrationally burdens property rights can, quite apart from the commerce clause, be challenged as a deprivation of property without due process of law.

Quite apart from economic consequences, an interference by a state with foreign commerce can complicate the nation's foreign relations, which are a monopoly of the federal government; states are not permitted to have their own foreign policy, their own embassies and consuls and ambassadors, and so forth. Foreign commerce is preeminently a matter of national concern. In international relations and with respect to foreign intercourse and trade the people of the United States act through a single government with unified and adequate national power.

Constitutional Law > Substantive Due Process > Scope

Civil Procedure > Appeals > Reviewability of Lower Court Decisions > Preservation for Review

Criminal Law & Procedure > ... > Miscellaneous Offenses > Cruelty to Animals > General Overview

HN12[ ] Reviewability of Lower Court Decisions, Preservation for Review

HN9[ ] Constitutional Law, Substantive Due Process
States have a legitimate interest in prolonging the lives of animals that their population happens to like. They can ban bullfights and cockfights and the abuse and neglect of animals.

Where the merits have been fully briefed and argued and there are no unresolved factual issues the resolution of which in a trial would alter the result, in such a case, courts treat an appeal as if it were from a final judgment.

Criminal Law & Procedure > ... > Miscellaneous Offenses > Cruelty to Animals > General Overview
HN10[ ] Miscellaneous Offenses, Cruelty to Animals
It is permitted to balance a state's interest in horses' welfare against the other interests of its (human) population; and it is also permitted to take one step at a time on a road toward the humane treatment of our fellow animals.

Counsel: For CAVEL INTERNATIONAL, INCORPORATED, Plaintiff - Appellant: J. Philip Calabrese, SQUIRE SANDERS & DEMPSEY, Cleveland, OH.
For JAMES D. TUCKER, Plaintiff - Appellant: J. Philip Calabrese, SQUIRE SANDERS & DEMPSEY, Cleveland, OH USA.
For RANDY BEASLEY, Plaintiff - Appellant: J. Philip Calabrese, SQUIRE SANDERS & DEMPSEY, Cleveland, OH USA.

Constitutional Law > Congressional Duties & Powers > Commerce Clause > Commerce With

For ANGELA FABRIS, Plaintiff - Appellant: J. Philip Calabrese, SQUIRE SANDERS & DEMPSEY,

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Cleveland, OH USA.

Texas For Dining in Europe," Wall St. J., Sept. 21, 2005, p. 1.

For RUBEN GONZALEZ, Plaintiff - Appellant: J. Philip Calabrese, SQUIRE SANDERS & DEMPSEY, Cleveland, OH USA.
For RON MATEKAITIS, Defendant - Appellee: John E. Farrell, DEKALB COUNTY STATE'S ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, Sycamore, IL.

Cavel International, the plaintiff in this case, owns and operates the only facility in the United States for slaughtering horses. Until recently it was one of three such facilities, but the other two, both in Texas, stopped slaughtering horses after the Fifth Circuit upheld a Texas law similar to the Illinois law challenged in this case. Empacadora de Carnes de Fresnillo, S.A. de C.V. v. Curry, 476 F.3d 326, 336-37 (5th Cir. 2007).

For LISA MADIGAN, Defendant - Appellee: Mary E. Welsh, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, Civil Appeals Division, Chicago, IL USA.
For CHARLES A. HARTKE, Defendant - Appellee: Mary E. Welsh, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, Civil Appeals Division, Chicago, IL USA.
For HORSEMEN'S COUNCIL OF ILLINOIS, Amicus Curiae: Robert C. Pottinger, BARRICK, SWITZER, LONG, BALSLEY & VAN EVERA, Rockford, IL [**2] USA.
Judges: Before EASTERBROOK, Chief Judge, and POSNER and ROVNER, Circuit Judges.
Opinion by: POSNER

Cavel's slaughterhouse, [**3] located in DeKalb, Illinois, near Chicago, has some sixty employees and slaughters some 40,000 to 60,000 horses a year, out of a total of about 700,000 horses that either are killed or die of natural causes in the United States annually. Cavel buys its horses for about $ 300 apiece from brokers who obtain them at auctions. The company has been in operation for 20 years and has some $ 20 million in annual revenues.
Horses are the only animals that Cavel slaughters, and it represented to us without contradiction that if it loses this case it will have to shut down. The Texas slaughterhouses were more eclectic--they slaughtered, besides horses, such sources of "atypical meat products" as bison and ostrich. But they too represented to the courts that if forbidden to slaughter horses they would have to shut down, though it appears that after a brief shutdown they reopened, adding cattle to their menu, as it were. Illinois House Bill 1711, Bill for an Act Concerning Horses, 95th General Assembly 16 (April 18, 2007) (statement of Representative Molaro).

Opinion
[*552] POSNER, Circuit Judge. Horse meat was until recently an accepted part of the American diet--the Harvard Faculty Club served horse-meat steaks until the 1970s. No longer is horse meat eaten by Americans, Christa Weil, "We Eat Horses, Don't We?," New York Times, Mar. 5, 2007, p. A19, though it is eaten by people in a number of other countries, including countries in Europe; in some countries it is a delicacy. Meat from American horses is especially prized because our ample grazing land enables them to eat natural grasses, which enhances the flavor of their meat. Mary Jacoby, "Why Belgians Shoot Horses in

In the United States, horses are killed in slaughterhouses only when the horses' [*553] flesh is destined for eating by human beings or (a detail [**4] to be considered later) zoo animals. The flesh of horses that is intended for pet food is obtained from the corpses hauled to rendering plants for disposal; the plants also produce glue and other products from the carcasses. (All these businesses are in terminal decline. Jeffrey McMurray, "Some Horses Left to Starve as Market for Meat Shrivels," Chi. Tribune, Mar. 15, 2007, p. 3.) Unlike Cavel's slaughterhouse, a rendering plant's methods of producing meat from dead horses do not have to comply with the requirements that the federal Meat Inspection Act, 21 U.S.C. § 601, prescribes for the production of meat, expressly including horse meat, §§ 601(j), (w), intended for human consumption. The Act is fully applicable to Cavel, see 21 U.S.C. § 617, even though, because there is no U.S. domestic market for

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horse meat as a human food, Cavel's entire output is exported to such countries as Belgium, France, and Japan. Indeed, Cavel is the subsidiary of a Belgian company.
On May 24 of this year, HN1[ ] the Illinois Horse Meat Act, 225 ILCS 635, was amended to make it unlawful for any person in the state either "to slaughter a horse if that person knows or should know that any of the horse meat will [**5] be used for human consumption," § 635/1.5(a), or "to import into or export from this State, or to sell, buy, give away, hold, or accept any horse meat if that person knows or should know that the horse meat will be used for human consumption." § 635/1.5(b). (Prior to the amendment, the statute merely required a license to slaughter horses and imposed various inspection, labeling, and other regulatory restrictions on licensees. The prohibition has made these provisions academic). Cavel claims that the amendment violates both the federal Meat Inspection Act and HN2[ ] the commerce clause--the provision in Article I, section 8, of the federal Constitution that in terms merely empowers Congress to regulate interstate and foreign commerce but that has been interpreted to limit the power of states to regulate interstate and foreign commerce even in the absence of federal legislation inconsistent with the state regulation. Willson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245, 252, 7 L. Ed. 412 (1829) (Marshall, C.J.); United Haulers Ass'n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Management Authority, 127 S. Ct. 1786, 1792-93, 167 L. Ed. 2d 655 (2007).
Cavel moved for a preliminary injunction against the enforcement of the amendment. [**6] The district court declined to issue it, on the ground that Cavel had failed to make a strong showing that it was likely to prevail on the merits. Cavel appealed, and we enjoined the application of the amendment to Cavel pending our decision of its appeal, 500 F.3d 544, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 18654, 2007 WL 2239215 (7th Cir. July 18, 2007), Chief Judge Easterbook dissenting.
The challenge based on the Meat Inspection Act need detain us only briefly. Cavel points to the Act's preemption clause--"requirements within the scope of this Act with respect to premises, facilities and operations of any establishment at which inspection is provided under title I of this Act [including facilities at which horses are slaughtered, 21 U.S.C. §§ 601(d), (j)] which are in addition to, or different than those made under this Act may not be imposed by any State or Territory or the District of Columbia," § 678--and argues that it signifies Congress's decision to sweep aside any

state law that would render the federal requirements inapplicable to Cavel's slaughterhouse by forbidding horses to be slaughtered. The argument confuses a premise with a conclusion. When the Meat Inspection Act was passed (and indeed to this day), it was lawful in some [**7] states to produce horse [*554] meat for human consumption, and since the federal government has a legitimate interest in regulating the production of human food whether intended for domestic consumption or for export--exporting meat unfit for human consumption would be highly damaging to the nation's foreign commerce--it was natural to make the Act applicable to horse meat. That was not a decision that states must allow horses to be slaughtered for human consumption. The government taxes income from gambling that violates state law; that doesn't mean the state must permit the gambling to continue. Given that horse meat is produced for human consumption, its production must comply with the Meat Inspection Act. But if it is not produced, there is nothing, so far as horse meat is concerned, for the Act to work upon.
Of course in a literal sense a state law that shuts down any "premises, facilities and operations of any establishment at which inspection is provided" is "different" from the federal requirements for such premises, but so literal a reading is untenable. If despite its title the Meat Inspection Act were intended to forbid states to shut down slaughterhouses, it would have to set forth [**8] standards and procedures for determining whether a particular slaughterhouse or class of slaughterhouses should be shut down; and it does not.HN3[ ] The Act is concerned with inspecting premises at which meat is produced for human consumption, see, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 606, rather than with preserving the production of particular types of meat for people to eat. Empacadora de Carnes de Fresnillo, S.A. de C.V. v. Curry, supra, 476 F.3d at 333.
The more difficult question is whether the horse-meat amendment violates the commerce clause as interpreted to prohibit state regulations that unduly interfere with the foreign commerce of the United States. Cavel fastens on subsection (b) of the Illinois amendment, which forbids the importing and exporting of horse meat for human consumption. But that provision is not addressed to Cavel; it is addressed to a middleman who having procured horse meat from Cavel tries to export it, or that imports horse meat to Illinois hoping to induce Americans to eat it. (We assume that the terms "import" and "export" refer to bringing horse meat into Illinois from another state, or shipping it to another state, as well as to importing horse meat from

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and exporting it [**9] to a foreign country.) The provision directed at Cavel is subsection (a), which forbids the slaughtering of horses for human consumption. If that subsection is valid, Cavel loses its case.
HN4[ ] The clearest case of a state law that violates the commerce clause is a law that discriminates in favor of local firms. E.g., Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334, 112 S. Ct. 2009, 119 L. Ed. 2d 121 (1992); Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enterprises, Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 108 S. Ct. 2218, 100 L. Ed. 2d 896 (1988); American Trucking Ass'ns v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266, 107 S. Ct. 2829, 97 L. Ed. 2d 226 (1987); Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 521-22, 55 S. Ct. 497, 79 L. Ed. 1032 (1935) (Cardozo, J.). Suppose a state passed a law that forbade the importation of wild baitfish. That would be a discrimination against interstate and foreign commerce. This would not make the law unconstitutional per se, because the state might be able to prove that it needed the law in order to protect "unique and fragile fisheries" from parasites prevalent in out-of-state fisheries and that there was "no satisfactory way to inspect shipments of live baitfish" for those parasites--that is Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 141, 106 S. Ct. 2440, 91 L. Ed. 2d 110 (1986). The case turned on factual [*555] issues of a kind that a court can resolve without undue risk of error.
There [**10] is no discrimination in the present case insofar as the prohibition against slaughter is concerned. If a local firm (remember that Cavel is foreign-owned) wanted to slaughter horses, it could not do so. No local merchant or producer benefits from the ban on slaughter. Compare Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 97 S. Ct. 2434, 53 L. Ed. 2d 383 (1977), with Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117, 98 S. Ct. 2207, 57 L. Ed. 2d 91 (1978).
HN5[ ] The absence of outright discrimination does not terminate inquiry into a possible violation of the commerce clause. There are situations in which states by ostensibly local regulations distort the operation of interstate markets. An example is a severance tax on a raw material, such as oil or coal, of which the state (perhaps in conjunction with other states) has a monopoly or near monopoly and which is almost entirely exported rather than consumed locally. The incidence of the tax will fall on the consumers in other states, who have no voice in the politics of the producing state, and the result may be a level of taxation and resulting price

to consumers that greatly exceeds the cost of the services the state provides to producers of the raw material, and that by doing so burdens [**11] the export of the raw material to other states. Or imagine a state's imposing onerous taxes on all trucks that use its highways, knowing that almost all the truck traffic originates and terminates in other states and exploiting a locational monopoly to shift the costs of public services unrelated to highway maintenance to suppliers and consumers in other states.
Such cases present more difficult factual issues than cases of outright discrimination. Plaintiffs have sometimes prevailed, at least if the impact on commerce is evident. E.g., Raymond Motor Transportation, Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 98 S. Ct. 787, 54 L. Ed. 2d 664 (1978); Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 664, 101 S. Ct. 1309, 67 L. Ed. 2d 580 (1981); but see South Carolina State Highway Department v. Barnwell Bros., Inc., 303 U.S. 177, 58 S. Ct. 510, 82 L. Ed. 734 (1938). But in the case of the severance tax the "local" character of the activity taxed, although it does not immunize the tax from scrutiny, Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 617, 101 S. Ct. 2946, 69 L. Ed. 2d 884 (1981), causes a judicial hiccup, see id. at 618-19, even though the incidence of the tax is not local. In this case, too, the activity restricted by the state--the slaughter of horses in Illinois--has a local character but primarily foreign [**12] consequences. There can be harmful effects on free trade among the states that do not stem from even a mild disparity in treatment--as in this case, or the highway cases that we cited earlier, where there is no discrimination in favor of a local supplier. But the plaintiff has a steep hill to climb. HN6[ ] "Where the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits." Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142, 90 S. Ct. 844, 25 L. Ed. 2d 174 (1970) (emphasis added); see also Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 471-74, 101 S. Ct. 715, 66 L. Ed. 2d 659 (1981).
We have expressed doubt that even this tough test is available to plaintiffs unless they show at least "mild" discrimination against interstate commerce; Pike seems to require that at least "incidental" "effects on interstate commerce be shown." National Paint & Coatings Ass'n v. City of [*556] Chicago, 45 F.3d 1124, 1131 (7th Cir. 1995); Grant's Dairy-Maine, LLC v. Commissioner of Maine Dep't of Agriculture, Food & Rural Resources,

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232 F.3d 8, 18 (1st Cir. 2000); Automated Salvage Transport, Inc. v. Wheelabrator Environmental Systems, Inc., 155 F.3d 59, 75 (2d Cir. 1998); [**13] Instructional Systems, Inc. v. Computer Curriculum Corp., 35 F.3d 813, 825-26 (3d Cir. 1994). Some cases disagree, and take "even-handedly" at face value, Eastern Kentucky Resources v. Fiscal Court, 127 F.3d 532, 544-45 (6th Cir. 1997); American Target Advertising, Inc. v. Giani, 199 F.3d 1241, 1254 (10th Cir. 2000), heartened by a footnote in GMC v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 299 n. 12, 117 S. Ct. 811, 136 L. Ed. 2d 761 (1997), in which the Supreme Court noted that "a small number of our [i.e., the Supreme Court's] cases have invalidated state laws under the dormant Commerce Clause that appear to have been genuinely nondiscriminatory, in the sense that they did not impose disparate treatment on similarly situated in-state and out-of-state interests, where such laws undermined a compelling need for national uniformity in regulation."
There may be no real disagreement in the case law. National Paint & Coatings Ass'n acknowledges that HN7[ ] even in the absence of discrimination, a burden on interstate commerce that had no rational justification would be invalid. 45 F.3d at 1131. An example is the Illinois mudguard law invalidated in Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520, 79 S. Ct. 962, 3 L. Ed. 2d 1003 (1959). The law required all trucks in the state, [**14] thus including those traveling interstate, to be equipped with curved mudguards that the district court had found not only conferred "no" safety benefits over straight ones but actually created "hazards previously unknown." Id. at 525. The law impeded interstate commerce--though maybe local commerce just as much--and because it lacked a rational basis it was invalid despite the lack of proof of a disparate impact. National Paint & Coatings Ass'n v. City of Chicago, supra, 45 F.3d at 1131; Norfolk Southern Corp. v. Oberly, 822 F.2d 388, 404-05 (3d Cir. 1987).
HN8[ ] Any law, moreover, that irrationally burdens property rights can, quite apart from the commerce clause, be challenged as a deprivation of property without due process of law. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 540-45, 125 S. Ct. 2074, 161 L. Ed. 2d 876 (2005); Greater Chicago Combine & Center, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 431 F.3d 1065, 1071-72 (7th Cir. 2005). That makes us wonder just what work Pike does, but that is not an issue we need pursue.
Cavel argues, in the spirit of Bibb, that Illinois's ban on slaughtering horses for human consumption serves no purpose at all. The horses will be killed anyway when

they are too old to be useful and what difference [**15] does it make whether they are eaten by people or by cats and dogs? But the horse meat used in pet food is produced by rendering plants from carcasses rather than by the slaughter of horses, and the difference bears on the effect of the Illinois statute. Cavel pays for horses; rendering plants do not. If your horse dies, or if you have it euthanized, you must pay to have it hauled to the rendering plant, and you must also pay to have it euthanized if it didn't just die on you. So when your horse is no longer useful to you, you have a choice between selling it for slaughter and either keeping it until it dies or having it killed. The option of selling the animal for slaughter is thus financially more advantageous to the owner, and this makes it likely that many horses (remember that Cavel slaughters between 40,000 and 60,000 a year) die sooner than they otherwise would because [*557] they can be killed for their meat. HN9[ ] States have a legitimate interest in prolonging the lives of animals that their population happens to like. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 337, 99 S. Ct. 1727, 60 L. Ed. 2d 250 (1979); cf. 7 U.S.C. § 2131; Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 538, 113 S. Ct. 2217, 124 L. Ed. 2d 472 (1993); Hoctor v. U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, 82 F.3d 165, 168 (7th Cir. 1996). [**16] They can ban bullfights and cockfights and the abuse and neglect of animals.

Of course Illinois could do much more for horses than it does--could establish old-age pastures for them, so that they would never be killed (except by a stray cougar), or provide them with free veterinary care. HN10[ ] But it is permitted to balance its interest in horses' welfare against the other interests of its (human) population; and it is also permitted to take one step at a time on a road toward the humane treatment of our fellow animals. E.g., Greater Chicago Combine & Center, Inc. v. City of Chicago, supra, 431 F.3d at 1073; cf. Bowen v. Owens, 476 U.S. 340, 346-47, 106 S. Ct. 1881, 90 L. Ed. 2d 316 (1986); Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 488-89, 75 S. Ct. 461, 99 L. Ed. 563 (1955); Milner v. Apfel, 148 F.3d 812, 818-19 (7th Cir. 1998); Johnson v. Daley, 339 F.3d 582, 596 (7th Cir. 2003).

There is a wrinkle in this analysis, however, though

unremarked by the parties. Zoos feed a considerable

amount of horse meat to their charges. Brad Haynes,

"Zoos in a Pickle Over Horse Meat," Seattle Times, Aug.

14,

2007,

http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews/20038

35227_horsemeat14m.html (visited Sept. 18, 2007). For

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living proof, we reproduce a photograph [**17] from Haynes's article, with its caption:
[SEE PHOTOGRAPH IN ORIGINAL] "Kwanzaa, a young South African lion at Cameron Park Zoo in Waco, Texas, celebrates his birthday with a cake made from 10 pounds of horse meat, plus whipped cream and a carrot."
As the article explains, American zoos, seeing the handwriting on the wall so far as the domestic slaughter of horses is concerned, are shifting to importing horse meat. So the slaughter of horses will continue. For all we know, Cavel may seek out a new market in America's zoos. We do not know why, with the cessation of horse slaughtering at the Texas slaughterhouses, Cavel has not done so already.
But even if no horses live longer as a result of the new law, a state is permitted, within reason, to express disgust at what people do with the dead, whether dead human beings or dead animals. There would be an uproar if restaurants in Chicago started serving cat and dog steaks, even though millions of stray cats and dogs are euthanized in animal shelters. A follower of John Stuart Mill would disapprove of a law that restricted the activities of other people (in this case not only Cavel's owners and employees but also its foreign consumers) on the [**18] basis merely of distaste, but American governments are not constrained by Mill's doctrine.
The careful reader will have noted that we have so far been discussing the legal principles governing state burdens on interstate commerce, though the Illinois statute burdens foreign commerce. HN11[ ] Quite [*558] apart from economic consequences, an interference by a state with foreign commerce can complicate the nation's foreign relations, which are a monopoly of the federal government; states are not permitted to have their own foreign policy, their own embassies and consuls and ambassadors, and so forth. "Foreign commerce is preeminently a matter of national concern. 'In international relations and with respect to foreign intercourse and trade the people of the United States act through a single government with unified and adequate national power.' Board of Trustees v. United States, 289 U.S. 48, 59, 53 S. Ct. 509, 77 L. Ed. 1025, Treas. Dec. 46306 (1933)." Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 448-51, 99 S. Ct. 1813, 60 L. Ed. 2d 336 (1979); see also Itel Containers Int'l Corp. v. Huddleston, 507 U.S. 60, 113 S. Ct. 1095, 122 L. Ed. 2d 421 (1993).
Suppose Cavel were the only source of horse meat for

human consumption in Europe and the law provoked European governments into remonstrating with our State [**19] Department, which in response submitted to us an amicus curiae brief denouncing the law. See Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Board, 463 U.S. 159, 195, 103 S. Ct. 2933, 77 L. Ed. 2d 545 (1983). True, a Japan Line challenge failed in Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298, 324-28, 114 S. Ct. 2268, 129 L. Ed. 2d 244 (1994), even though a number of our trading partners complained loudly about a state law that increased the costs to foreign companies of filing U.S. tax returns. But the case was special because Congress had repeatedly refused to grant the relief sought by those companies. Although Congress had not explicitly authorized the state practice, the Court ruled that Congress's lengthy consideration, followed by inaction, was an implicit authorization that defeated the commerce-clause challenge.
But assuming therefore that the doctrine of Japan Line survives the Barclays Bank case, this cannot help Cavel, which did not tell the district court and has not told us what percentage of the horse meat consumed by Europeans it supplies and thus whether its being closed down is likely to have a big effect on the price of horse meat in Europe. And while it is true that the foreign minister of Belgium wrote a letter to Governor Blagojevich [**20] inquiring about the status of the bill that became the horse-meat amendment, he did not say that his government was opposing the bill. So far as we know, there was no follow-up (we have not been told whether the letter was answered and if so what it said); and we have heard nothing from any other foreign government or from the State Department.
The curtailment of foreign commerce by the amendment is slight and we are naturally reluctant to condemn a state law, supported if somewhat tenuously by a legitimate state interest, on grounds as slight as presented by Cavel. Yet we are not entirely happy about having to uphold the Illinois statute. That the company is foreign-owned and its entire output exported means that the shareholders and consumers harmed by the amendment have no influence in Illinois politics, though there is no hint in the history of the amendment of local hostility to foreigners but only of indifference to them, in the remark of the state's agriculture director that "there is no domestic market for horsemeat and, therefore, no need for this practice to continue in Illinois." Governor's Office Press Release, "Gov. Blagojevich Signs Legislation Banning the Slaughter of [**21] Horses in Illinois for Human Consumption," May 24, 2007,

Chris Long

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 33-19 filed 06/08/20 PageID.372 PageP1a0geo9f o1f09
500 F.3d 551, *558; 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 22510, **21
www.illinois.gov/ PressReleases/ShowPressRelease.cfm?SubjectID=3& RecNum=5995 (visited Sept. 5, 2007) (emphasis added). [*559] The fact that the governor's signing statement acknowledges the role of the Hollywood actress Bo Derek, author of the book Riding Lessons: Everything That Matters in Life I Learned From Horses (2002), in outlawing the slaughtering of horses could be thought to inject a frivolous note into a law that forces the closing of a business that has very little to do with the people of Illinois. But this is not a basis for invalidating a nondiscriminatory statute that interferes minimally with the nation's foreign commerce and cannot be said to have no rational basis.
Although the appeal is from the denial of a preliminary injunction, HN12[ ] the merits of Cavel's challenge to the horse-meat law have been fully briefed and argued and there are no unresolved factual issues the resolution of which in a trial would alter the result. In such a case, courts treat the appeal as if it were from a final judgment. Mast, Foos & Co. v. Stover Mfg. Co., 177 U.S. 485, 494-95, 20 S. Ct. 708, 44 L. Ed. 856, 1900 Dec. Comm'r Pat. 285 (1900); Illinois Council On Long Term Care v. Bradley, 957 F.2d 305, 309-10 (7th Cir 1992); [**22] Amandola v. Town of Babylon, 251 F.3d 339, 343-44 (2d Cir. 2001) (per curiam); Solantic, LLC v. City of Neptune Beach, 410 F.3d 1250, 1272-74 (11th Cir. 2005). So the judgment is affirmed, the suit dismissed with prejudice, and the injunction that we granted pending appeal dissolved.
End of Document
Chris Long

 </s> Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 35 filed 06/12/20 PageID.374 Page 1 of 39

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

LEAGUE OF INDEPENDENT FITNESS FACILITIES AND TRAINERS, INC., BASELINE FITNESS LLC, BUILDING YOUR TEMPLE LLC, BYT FITNESS 247 LLC, CLAWSON FITNESS, LLC, CLINTON FITNESS, INC., D-LUX KARATE UNIVERSITY, LLC, FENTON ATHLETIC CLUB, INC., FENTON KARATE, LLC, FUSION FITNESS 24/7 LLC, H3 FITNESS LLC, I FITNESS PERSONAL TRAINING, INC., JKP FITNESS, LLC, JPF ENTERPRISES, LLC, M FITNESS CLUB, LLC, MH & AB LLC, MOTOR CITY CF – ST. CLAIR SHORES, LLC, NASCOT ENTERPRISES, LLC, PRISON CITY PHYSIQUE, LLC, FMP FITNESS INC., STRENGTH BEYOND LLC, 24/7 BOOTCAMP AND BOXING, INC., and 4 SEASONS GYM, LLC,

No. 20-cv-00458
HON. PAUL L. MALONEY
DEFENDANTS’ RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

Plaintiffs,

v

GRETCHEN E. WHITMER and ROBERT E. GORDON,

Defendants.

Scott M. Erskine (P54734) Carly Van Thomme (P59706) Erskine Law, P.C. Attorneys for Plaintiffs 612 W. University Rochester, MI 48307

John G. Fedynsky (P65232) Andrew J. Jurgensen (P81123) Joseph T. Froehlich (P71887) Joshua O. Booth (P53847) Christopher M. Allen (P75329) Assistant Attorneys General

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(248) 601-4499 serskine@erskinelaw.com cvanthomme@erskinelaw.com

Attorneys for Defendants Michigan Dep’t of Attorney General State Operations Division P.O. Box 30754 Lansing, MI 48909 (517) 335-7573 fedynskyj@michigan.gov jurgensena2@michigan.gov froehlichj1@michigan.gov boothj2@michigan.gov allenc28@michigan.gov

DEFENDANTS WHITMER AND GORDON’S RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

Dated: June 12, 2020

John G. Fedynsky (P65232) Andrew J. Jurgensen (P81123) Joseph T. Froehlich (P71887) Joshua O. Booth (P53847) Christopher M. Allen (P75329) Assistant Attorneys General Attorneys for Defendants Michigan Dep’t of Attorney General State Operations Division P.O. Box 30754 Lansing, MI 48909 (517) 335-7573 fedynskyj@michigan.gov jurgensena2@michigan.gov froehlichj1@michigan.gov boothj2@michigan.gov allenc28@michigan.gov

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TABLE OF CONTENTS Page
Table of Contents ............................................................................................................ i Concise Statement of Issues Presented ........................................................................ ii Controlling or Most Appropriate Authority.................................................................iii Introduction ................................................................................................................... 1 Statement of Facts......................................................................................................... 4 Standard for Preliminary Injunction ........................................................................... 9 Argument ..................................................................................................................... 10
Plaintiffs’ claims are not justiciable. ................................................................ 10 Plaintiffs lack standing to bring their pre-enforcement claims. .......... 10 Plaintiff LIFFT lacks organizational standing. .................................... 11
Plaintiffs are not likely to succeed on the merits. ........................................... 12 The States have wide latitude in dealing with great dangers to public health. .......................................................................................... 12 Jacobson v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts ........................... 13 Application of Jacobson to the current health crisis and the restrictions challenged by Plaintiffs. .................................... 18 Plaintiffs do not have a viable procedural due process claim............... 24 Plaintiffs do not have a viable equal protection claim.......................... 26 Plaintiffs do not have a viable dormant commerce clause claim. ........ 29
Plaintiffs make an inadequate showing of irreparable harm. ........................ 31 A preliminary injunction would not serve the public interest. ....................... 32 Conclusion and Relief Requested ................................................................................ 33
i

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 35 filed 06/12/20 PageID.377 Page 4 of 39 CONCISE STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED
1. Do Plaintiffs present justiciable claims? 2. Are Plaintiffs likely to succeed on the merits of their due process, equal
protection, and dormant commerce clause claims? 3. In the absence of a preliminary injunction, will Plaintiffs suffer
irreparable harm? 4. Will a preliminary injunction serve the public interest?
ii

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 35 filed 06/12/20 PageID.378 Page 5 of 39 CONTROLLING OR MOST APPROPRIATE AUTHORITY
Authority: Chafin v. Chafin, 568 U.S. 165 (2013). FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307 (1993). Jacobson v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905). Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). McKay v. Federspiel, 823 F.3d 862 (6th Cir. 2016). Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
iii

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INTRODUCTION In a pandemic involving person-to-person spread of a novel, potentially fatal virus that spreads easily and aggressively, particularly through respiratory droplets, does it make sense to restrict indoor fitness activity? By its nature, such activity – sustained heavy breathing, common ventilation, sharing of equipment and other objects and spaces – significantly increases the risk of spread. Thus, it makes eminent sense to restrict this activity. Under settled law, the government may temporarily restrict commercial activity when sufficient public health concerns take priority. The seriousness of the current pandemic is beyond dispute. The temporary nature of the narrow restrictions that Plaintiffs have challenged in this case is also undisputed. Plaintiffs’ claims should fail for lack of standing, including lack of organizational standing for the lead Plaintiff. This Court should deny preliminary injunctive relief for those reasons alone. On their merits, Plaintiffs’ claims fare no better. Claims similar to those raised by the Plaintiffs have already been evaluated and rejected as unlikely to be successful on the merits in other federal courts as well as the Michigan Court of Claims. The Court of Claims’ reasoned analysis applies just as well in this case, recognizing the significant judicial deference due to the reasonable and temporary measures challenged here.1
1 Martinko, et. al. v. Governor Whitmer, et. al., Michigan Court of Claims Case No. 20-62-MM, April 29, 2020 Opinion and Order Denying Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, p. 14 (Attached as Exhibit A).
1

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It is well established that, “[u]pon the principle of self-defense, of paramount necessity, a community has the right to protect itself against an epidemic of disease which threatens the safety of its members.” Jacobson v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 27 (1905). To that end, “[t]he possession and enjoyment of all rights are subject to such reasonable conditions as may be deemed by the governing authority of the country essential to the safety, health, peace, good order, and morals of the community.” Id. at 26. As Chief Justice Roberts reasoned in a case concerning a regulation issued to address the COVID-19 pandemic, the broad authority given to and duly exercised by state officials should not be “subject to second-guessing by an ‘unelected federal judiciary,’ which lacks the background, competence, and expertise to assess public health and is not accountable to the people.” South Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Gavin Newsom, Governor of California, 509 U.S. ___ (2020) slip op., p. 2 (summary order released May 29, 2020) (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (quoting Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 545 (1985)). (Exhibit B.)
The well-settled rule of law from Jacobson permits a state, in times of public health crises, to reasonably restrict the rights of business and individuals alike in order to secure the safety of the community. The scourge of COVID-19—a novel virus that quickly spread across the entire planet, infecting millions, and killing over four hundred thousand—presents such a crisis. Jurisdictions across the globe have had to take action to ensure that healthcare systems are not overwhelmed. Schools were shuttered, gatherings postponed, and business operations curtailed.
2

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Michigan is one of the states hardest hit by the pandemic. As of June 11, 2020, there have been 65,449 persons confirmed infected and 5.985 have died, all in about three months. There is no dispute that in the absence of any vaccine, social distancing has been the most effective way to combat the virus and keep these numbers from escalating. Recognizing this, Defendant Governor Gretchen Whitmer and Director Robert Gordon have taken bold, yet reasonable and necessary, steps to prioritize social distancing in Michigan.
In a series of executive orders, Governor Whitmer exercised her authority under Michigan law to put measures in place to suppress the spread of the virus and protect the public health. The restrictions that Plaintiffs challenge here are part of this broader network of response efforts to suppress the spread of COVID-19, protect the State’s health care resources from rapid depletion, and avoid many needless deaths. As a result of these restrictions, countless lives have been saved, the curve of the virus’s spread has been flattening, and the Governor has been able to gradually and correspondingly lift a number of the previously imposed restrictions—including the very ones challenged here.
The judicial creation of exceptions to these public health measures on a caseby-case, piecemeal basis infringes on the state’s authority to act in a public health crisis and threatens its overarching plan to cope with the dangers and protect the lives and welfare of all Michiganders. Even if they were justiciable, the claims Plaintiffs raise lack merit and they should be dismissed.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS The nature of the COVID-19 pandemic.
The facts surrounding the COVID-19 pandemic are well established. SARSCoV-2 is similar to other coronaviruses (a large family of viruses that cause respiratory illnesses), but the strain is novel. There is no general or natural immunity built up in the population (meaning everyone is susceptible), no vaccine, and no known treatment to combat the virus itself (as opposed to treatment to mitigate its symptoms).
It is widely known and accepted that COVID-19, the disease that results from the virus, is highly contagious, spreading easily from person to person via “respiratory droplets.”2 Experts agree that being anywhere within six feet of an infected person puts you at a high risk of contracting the disease.3 But even following that advice is not a sure-fire way to prevent infection. The respiratory droplets from an infected person can land on surfaces, and be transferred many hours later to the eyes, mouth, or nose of others who touch the surface. Moreover, since many of those infected experience only mild symptoms, a person could spread the disease before he even realizes he is sick. Most alarmingly, a person with
2 World Health Organization, Modes of transmission of virus causing COVID-19, available at https://www.who.int/news-room/commentaries/detail/modes-oftransmission-of-virus-causing-covid-19-implications-for-ipc-precautionrecommendations. (Attached as Exhibit C). 3 Centers for Disease Control, Social Distancing, Quarantine, and Isolation, available at https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/prevent-getting-sick/socialdistancing.html. (Attached as Exhibit D).
4

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COVID-19 could be not yet symptomatic, but still spread the disease.4 Everyone is vulnerable either as a potential victim of this scourge or a carrier of it to a potential victim.
Because there is no way to immunize or treat for COVID-19, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention have indicated the best way to prevent illness is to “avoid being exposed.”5 And as experience from prior pandemics such as smallpox and the 1918 Spanish Influenza indicates, early intervention to slow COVID-19’s transmission is critical.
In keeping with this advice, governmental entities have stressed the critical import of “social distancing,” the practice of avoiding public spaces and limiting movement.6 The objective of social distancing is what has been termed “flattening the curve,” that is, reducing the speed at which COVID-19 spreads. If the disease spreads too quickly, the limited resources of our healthcare system could easily become overwhelmed.7
On March 10, 2020, in response to the growing pandemic in Michigan, Governor Whitmer declared a state of emergency and invoked the emergency
4 (Id.) 5 (Id.) 6 (Id.) 7 See New York Times, Flattening the Coronavirus Curve (March 27, 2020), available at https://www.nytimes.com/article/flatten-curve-coronavirus.html. (Attached as Exhibit E). Take Italy, for example, where the healthcare system was so overloaded in just three weeks of dealing with the virus that it could not treat all patients infected, essentially leaving some to die.
5

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powers available to the Governor under Michigan law.8 On March 13, 2020, Governor Whitmer issued Executive Order 2020-5, prohibiting assemblages of 250 or more people in a single shared space with limited exceptions, and ordering the closure of all K-12 school buildings.9 Yet, even in the face of the social distancing recommendations and the six-foot rule, on Saturday, March 14, the public was out in droves.
On March 16, 2020, the Governor ordered various places of public accommodation, like restaurants, bars, and exercise facilities, to close their premises to the public.10 And on March 17, 2020, the Governor issued an order rescinding Executive Order 2020-5, changing the cap on assemblages to fifty persons in a single shared indoor space, and expanding the scope of exceptions from that cap.11 The Governor issues and continually revises Stay Home orders to stem the tide of COVID-19 infections.
On March 23, 2020, Governor Whitmer issued Executive Order 2020-21, which essentially ordered all persons not performing essential or critical infrastructure job functions to stay in their place of residence, other than to obtain groceries, care for loved ones, engage in outdoor activity consistent with social
8 E.O. No. 2020-4, available at https://www.michigan.gov/whitmer/0,9309,7-38790499_90705-521576--,00.html. (Attached as Exhibit F). 9 E.O. No. 2020-5, available at https://www.michigan.gov/whitmer/0,9309,7-38790499_90705-521595--,00.html. (Attached as Exhibit G). 10 E.O. No. 2020-9, available at https://www.michigan.gov/whitmer/0,9309,7-38790499_90705-521789--,00.html. (Attached as Exhibit H). 11 E.O. No. 2020-11, available at https://www.michigan.gov/whitmer/0,9309,7-38790499_90705-521890--,00.html. (Attached as Exhibit I).
6

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distancing, and other limited exceptions.12 The order also prohibited, with limited
exceptions, all public and private gatherings of any number of people that are not
part of a single household.13
Over the weeks that followed, the Governor reissued that Stay Home order
periodically, adjusting its scope as needed and appropriate to match the ever-
changing circumstances presented by this pandemic. The complementary
restrictions on access to certain places of public accommodation also remained in
place.14
On June 1, 2020, the Governor issued another executive order, E.O. 2020-
110, (Exhibit K), which continued the incremental and data-driven reopening of the
State by rescinding the latest iterations of the Stay Home and public-
accommodations orders – E.O.s 2020-69 and 2020-96 – and replacing their
restrictions with narrower and more permissive limitations on certain gatherings,
events, and businesses. This order leaves in place the restriction that certain places
12 E.O. No. 2020-21, available at https://www.michigan.gov/whitmer/0,9309,7-38790499_90705-522626--,00.html. (Attached as Exhibit J). 13 (Id.) 14 See E.O. Nos. 2020-42, 2020-59, 2020-70, 2020-77, 2020-92, and 2020-96 (Stay Home orders); 2020-20, 2020-43, and 2020-69 (public accommodations orders). Alongside these executive orders, Director Gordon, acting pursuant to his authority under MCL 333.2253, issued emergency orders concluding that COVID-19 had reached epidemic status in Michigan and that the measures imposed in the Stay Home orders and certain related executive orders were necessary to control the epidemic and protect the public health. The first of these emergency orders was issued on April 2, 2020, with subsequent versions rescinding and replacing the prior versions of the order issued May 18, 2020 and May 21, 2020. As presented, Plaintiffs’ challenges appear directed primarily at the Governor’s executive orders and only nominally against Director Gordon’s April 2 Order.
7

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of public accommodation – including indoor gyms, fitness centers, and the like, as well as indoor entertainment and recreational facilities such as trampoline parks, climbing facilities, dance halls, and the like – remain “closed to ingress, egress, use, and occupancy by members of the public.” It also, however, makes clear (as the prior public-accommodations orders did) that employees of these businesses were permitted on site, and further provides that the following outdoor services and activities were permitted:
Outdoor fitness classes, athletic practices, training sessions, or games, provided that coaches, spectators, and participants not from the same household maintain six feet of distance from one another at all times during such activities, and that equipment and supplies are shared to the minimum extent possible and are subject to frequent and thorough disinfection and cleaning. E.O. 2020-110(14)(a). In addition, the order does not prevent gyms and similar businesses from offering online and certain in-home services to their clients, or from selling products via delivery, curbside pickup, or at outdoor classes and the like. On June 5, 2020, the Governor issued E.O. 2020-115, (Exhibit L), which lifted many restrictions in Regions 6 (northern Lower Peninsula) and 8 (Upper Peninsula), including on indoor fitness activity, permitting gyms and similar businesses to fully resume in-person operations subject to certain safety measures. In taking this next step toward reopening, the Governor noted that these two regions of the State “have significantly fewer new cases [of COVID-19] per million each day than other regions in the state and have not shown an increase in viral activity in response to earlier relaxations of my orders.” (E.O. 2020-115, Preamble.) Subject to her ongoing assessment of statewide data and the advice of public health
8

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experts, the Governor has publicly stated that her goal is to be in a position to take this same step with the rest of the State by July 4, 2020. Plaintiffs and the claims for which they seek preliminary injunctive relief.
Plaintiff League of Independent Fitness Facilities and Trainers, Inc. (“LIFFT”) is a non-profit organization based in Wayne County, with about 400 members, of which at least 130 operate a fitness facility. (First Am. Compl., ¶ 10.) The remaining twenty-two Plaintiffs are individual fitness industry businesses that operate at least one location in Michigan. (Pl.’s Br. at 1, Page ID.267.) For purposes of preliminary injunction relief, they rely on the following claims:
1. procedural due process, 2. equal protection, and 3. dormant commerce clause.15 Threshold issues of justiciability stand in the way of each of these claims. And on their merits, each theory of constitutional violation is unfounded. For the reasons stated below, denying preliminary injunctive relief is appropriate.
STANDARD FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION In deciding whether to grant a preliminary injunction, a court weighs four factors: “(1) whether the movant has a strong likelihood of success on the merits; (2) whether the movant would suffer irreparable injury absent the injunction; (3)
15 The first amended complaint includes additional claims (substantive due process, privileges and/or immunities, void for vagueness, and the declaratory state law claims) that Plaintiffs omitted from their arguments in support of a preliminary injunction.
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whether the injunction would cause substantial harm to others; and (4) whether the public interest would be served by the issuance of an injunction.” Bays v. City of Fairborn, 668 F.3d 814, 818–19 (6th Cir. 2012).
Importantly, “[t]he party seeking the preliminary injunction bears the burden of justifying such relief, including showing irreparable harm and likelihood of success,” and faces a “much more stringent [standard] than the proof required to survive a summary judgment motion” because a preliminary injunction is “an extraordinary remedy.” McNeilly v. Land, 684 F.3d 611, 615 (6th Cir. 2012). It is “reserved only for cases where it is necessary to preserve the status quo until trial.” Hall v. Edgewood Partners, 878 F.3d 524, 526 (6th Cir. 2017).
ARGUMENT Here, not only do the traditional factors weigh against providing the Plaintiffs with a preliminary injunction, but, as an initial matter, there also are threshold jurisdictional and prudential legal reasons not to grant such relief. In particular, standing is lacking because of the pre-enforcement posture of this case. And the lead Plaintiff lacks organizational standing. Plaintiffs’ claims are not justiciable.
Plaintiffs lack standing to bring their pre-enforcement claims. To have Article III standing, a plaintiff must have a personal stake in the outcome of a controversy, and that stake must be in the form of an injury that is “concrete and particularized” and “actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149, 158 (2014). An allegation of future injury may suffice only if the threatened injury is “certainly
10

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impending,” or there is a “‘substantial risk’ that the harm will occur.” Id. And as the Supreme Court has made clear, when—as here—the merits of a constitutional question pit the judiciary to pass on the constitutionality of the other branches of government, the standing inquiry is “especially rigorous.” Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 408 (2013).
Plaintiffs bring their claims in a pre-enforcement posture. As such, to satisfy the “injury-in-fact” requirement of Article III standing, they must allege (1) an intention to engage in the conduct they claim is unconstitutionally proscribed and (2) a credible threat of prosecution. McKay v. Federspiel, 823 F.3d 862, 867 (6th Cir. 2016). Here, Plaintiffs have alleged neither. In fact, Plaintiffs commendably acknowledge that they have not violated the orders and give no reason to believe that they intend to. Plaintiffs’ standing cannot the “especially rigorous” scrutiny that applies to their claims. Clapper, 568 U.S. at 408. As a result, Plaintiffs lack of Article III standing.
Plaintiff LIFFT lacks organizational standing. For additional reasons, the lead Plaintiff LIFFT lacks standing. An organization can establish standing two ways. First, it may assert “organizational standing” on its own behalf because it has suffered a palpable injury as a result of the defendants’ actions. MX Group, Inc. v. City of Covington, 293 F.3d 326, 332–33 (6th Cir. 2002). Second, an organization may claim standing as a representative of its members who would have standing to sue individually. Id. Here, LIFFT primarily alleges derivative injuries based on claims about its members. It alleges no direct injury coupled with a causal connection between the
11

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injury and the executive orders. As a result, any claim of injury is conjecture and insufficient to establish standing.
Further, regardless of whether LIFFT is asserting standing on its own behalf or on behalf of its members, LIFFT, for the reasons already discussed, has failed to allege facts sufficient to establish the injury-in-fact requirement for the preenforcement claims it seeks to bring. As a result, LIFFT lacks standing. See Loren v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan, 505 F.3d 598, 607 (6th Cir. 2007) (“If Plaintiffs cannot establish constitutional standing, their claims must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.”)
Plaintiffs are not likely to succeed on the merits. Even if Plaintiffs’ claims were justiciable, they fail to state any viable claim for relief. First, the restrictions in the Governor’s executive orders are a proper exercise of the authority given to the States to combat a public health crisis. Second, even if the Court were not evaluating the claims under the deferential standard set forth in Jacobson v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905), but instead under a more standard analysis of the alleged constitutional violations, the restrictions pass muster.
The States have wide latitude in dealing with great dangers to public health. The worldwide impact of COVID-19 is recognized by all. Such an extraordinary circumstance requires extraordinary governmental measures. The measures taken in the Governor’s executive orders were necessary to meet the
12

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demands of these extraordinary times and are reasonable and constitutional. Accordingly, judicial invalidation of those orders is not warranted.
Jacobson v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts Faced with “great danger[ ],” state actors are permitted great latitude to secure the public health. Jacobson v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 29 (1905). And in this time of crisis, securing the public health requires temporary sacrifices by each of us: “Real liberty for all could not exist under the operation of a principle which recognizes the right of each individual person to use his own, whether in respect of his person or his property, regardless of the injury that may be done to others.” Id. at 26. In Jacobson, the U.S. Supreme Court considered a claim that the state’s mandatory vaccination law, which applied to every person in Cambridge, Massachusetts, due to a growing smallpox epidemic, violated the defendant’s Fourteenth Amendment right “to care for his own body and health in such way as to him seems best.” Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 26. The Supreme Court upheld this sweeping, invasive measure as a proper exercise of the States’ police power because of the exigencies and dangerousness of the public health crisis. It affirmed that “a community has the right to protect itself against an epidemic of disease which threatens the safety of its members.” Id. at 27. As the Court stated, in every well-ordered society charged with the duty of conserving the safety of its members the rights of the individual in respect of his liberty may at times, under the pressure of great dangers, be subjected to such restraint, to be enforced by reasonable regulations, as the safety of the general public may demand. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 29.
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Jacobson even highlighted the circumstance, without hesitation, in which seemingly healthy people were quarantined against their will aboard a ship on which others had cases of serious diseases. Id. at 29. The Court noted that such a drastic measure was reasonable “until it be ascertained by inspection, conducted with due diligence, that the danger of the spread of the disease among the community at large has disappeared.” Id. Recognizing the separation of powers, and the limits on the judiciary to invade the authority of a co-equal branch, the Court refused to “usurp the functions of another branch of government” by secondguessing the executive’s exercise of police power in such circumstances. Id. at 28.
Of course, constitutional rights do not disappear in the face of a public health crisis, but the analysis of the government’s action changes. Review is “only” available if the challenged action “has no real or substantial relation to those objects [of securing public health and safety], or is, beyond all question, a plain, palpable invasion of rights secured by the fundamental law.” Id. at 31 (emphasis added).
Jacobson’s principle is no outlier. See, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166–67 (1944) (“The right to practice religion freely does not include liberty to expose the community or the child to communicable disease or the latter to ill health or death.”); Compagnie Francaise de Navigation a Vapeur v. La State Bd of Health, 186 U.S. 380, 393 (1902) (upholding Louisiana’s right to quarantine even apparently healthy passengers aboard a vessel over a due process challenge).
And Jacobson not only remains good law, see, e.g., Kansas v Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 356 (1997) (block quoting Jacobson in support of the proposition that “an
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individual’s constitutionally protected interest in avoiding physical restraint may be
overridden even in the civil context”), but federal circuits have recently had occasion
to apply Jacobson to COVID-19-related regulations, upholding certain restrictions
that burden a fundamental right. See, e.g., In re Abbott, 954 F.3d 772, 786 (5th Cir.,
April 7, 2020) (“Jacobson instructs that all constitutional rights may be reasonably
restricted to combat a public health emergency.”) (emphasis in original); In re
Rutledge, 956 F.3d 1018 (8th Cir., April 22, 2020).16
Recently, the Sixth Circuit has confirmed that Jacobson is the proper
starting point for considering restrictions promulgated in response to the COVID-19
crisis that touch upon constitutional rights. See Adams & Boyle, P.C. v. Slatery, 956
F.3d 913 (6th Cir. 2020); Maryville Baptist Church, Inc. v. Beshear, 957 F.3d 610
(6th Cir. 2020); Roberts v. Neace, 958 F.3d 409 (6th Cir. 2020). In those cases, the
16 Numerous other federal courts across the country have recognized that Jacobson is the proper starting point for considering restrictions promulgated in response to the COVID-19 crisis that touch upon constitutional rights. And those courts have routinely held, across a wide range of challenges, that state actions like those at issue here were an appropriate and constitutional response to the scourge of COVID-19. See, e.g., Open Our Oregon v. Brown, No. 6:20-CV-773-MC, 2020 WL 2542861 (D. Or. May 19, 2020); Amato v. Elicker, No. 3:20-CV-464 (MPS), 2020 WL 2542788 (D. Conn. May 19, 2020); Geller v. de Blasio, No. 20CV3566 (DLC), 2020 WL 2520711 (S.D.N.Y. May 18, 2020); McGhee v. City of Flagstaff, 2020 WL 2308479 (D. Ariz., May 8, 2020); Givens v. Newsom, 2020 WL 2307224 (E.D. Cal., May 8, 2020); SH3 Health Consulting, LLC v. St. Louis County Exec., 2020 WL 2308444 (E.D. Mo., May 8, 2020); Cross Culture Christian Center v. Newsom, 2020 WL 2121111 (E.D. Cal., May 5, 2020); Lighthouse Fellowship Church v. Northam, 2020 WL 2110416 (E.D. Va., May 1, 2020); Shows v. Curtis, 2020 WL 1953621 (W.D. N.C., April 23, 2020); Gish v. Newsom, 2020 WL 1979970 (C.D. Cal. April 23, 2020); Robinson v. Attorney General, 957 F.3d 1171 (11th Cir. April 23, 2020); Hartman v. Acton, No. 2:20-CV-1952, 2020 WL 1932896 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 21, 2020); Lawrence v. Colorado, No. 120CV00862DDDSKC, 2020 WL 2737811 (D. Colo. Apr. 19, 2020); Legacy Church, Inc. v. Kunkel, 2020 WL 1905586 (D. N.M. April 17, 2020).
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Court determined that despite the very deferential standard of Jacobson, the Plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their claims challenging a complete abortion ban in Tennessee and a total ban on group religious services in Kentucky.
Quite plainly, the restrictions considered by the Sixth Circuit in Adams & Boyle, Maryville Baptist Church, Inc., and Roberts were different in kind and severity than the limited and temporary (and now partially rescinded) restrictions challenged by the Plaintiffs in this case. Unlike those cases, this case does not involve a complete ban on the exercise of fundamental constitutional rights. Instead, the Plaintiffs challenge temporary and partial restrictions on certain commercial activity—none of which comes close to plainly or palpably invading a fundamental right beyond all question, and all of which had a real and substantial relation to stopping the spread of the virus, preventing the overwhelming of this state’s health care system, and avoiding needless deaths.17
Recently, the U.S. Supreme Court refused to grant injunctive relief for a party challenging under the First Amendment a California executive order that created limitations on public gatherings, including those of public worship, based on
17 It is also worth noting that Governor Whitmer’s orders have not sought to place restrictions on the fundamental constitutional rights asserted by the Plaintiffs in Adams & Boyle and Maryville Baptist Church, Inc. – abortion and free exercise of religion. And when courts have evaluated constitutional challenges of the sort at issue here – i.e., to restrictions on business activities – they have consistently rejected those challenges. See, e.g., Open Our Oregon v. Brown, No. 6:20-CV-773MC, 2020 WL 2542861 (D. Or. May 19, 2020); Amato v. Elicker, No. 3:20-CV-464 (MPS), 2020 WL 2542788 (D. Conn. May 19, 2020); SH3 Health Consulting, LLC v. St. Louis County Exec., 2020 WL 2308444 (E.D. Mo., May 8, 2020); Hartman v. Acton, No. 2:20-CV-1952, 2020 WL 1932896 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 21, 2020).
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considerations of health and safety. South Bay United Pentecostal Church, et al. v. Gavin Newsom, Governor of California, 509 U.S. ___ (2020) (summary order released May 29, 2020). In his opinion concurring in the denial of relief, Chief Justice Roberts expressly relied on Jacobson in explaining that the Constitution “principally entrusts” these questions of safety to “the politically accountable officials of the States.” Id. at slip op., p. 2 (citing Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 38). Notably, as here, when those officials act “in areas fraught with medical and scientific uncertainties,” Chief Justice Roberts explained that “their latitude ‘must be especially broad.’” Id. (quoting Marshall v. United States, 414 U.S. 417, 427 (1974)). And when operating within those broad limits, he explained, these officials “should not be subject to second-guessing” by the federal judiciary, which lacks comparable expertise in public health. Id. (quoting Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 545 (1985).)
There is no viable path for Plaintiffs around Jacobson’s well-settled rule of law. Plaintiffs cannot dispute the gravity of the pandemic in Michigan. It is a oncein-a-century kind of epidemiological public health crisis caused by a potentially fatal virus that remains easily transmittable and still lacks adequate treatment, let alone a vaccine. In such times, the State has wide plenary authority to temporarily restrict activity that presents a diffuse but real threat to the public health.
Thus, under Jacobson and applicable principles of separation of powers, judicial deference to the Governor’s authority responding to the crisis is paramount.
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Indeed, the Michigan Court of Claims has recognized as much in denying a motion
for a preliminary injunction. As so aptly stated by the Michigan Court of Claims:
The role courts play under Jacobson and Lansing Bd of Ed is not to “second-guess the state’s policy choices in crafting emergency public health measures,” In re Abbott, 954 F3d at 784, but is instead to determine whether the state regulation has a “real or substantial relation to the public health crisis and are not ‘beyond all question, a plain, palpable invasion of rights secured by the fundamental law.’” Id., quoting in part Jacobson, 197 US at 31. Part of this review includes looking to whether any exceptions apply for emergent situations, the duration of any rule, and whether the measures are pretextual. Id. at 785.
(Ex A, p. 11.) As will be discussed in more detail, Plaintiffs’ claims cannot survive
this settled standard. Therefore, they are not likely to succeed.
Application of Jacobson to the current health crisis and the restrictions challenged by Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs allege the they should be permitted as a matter of constitutional
law to resume their indoor fitness business activities. This claim plainly fails under
Jacobson’s duly deferential review.
Under Jacobson, in the face of the current public health crisis, the Governor’s
executive orders are entitled to great deference, despite any impingement on
individual rights, and must be upheld unless there is “no real or substantial
relation” to the public health crisis, or the orders were, “beyond all question, a plain,
palpable invasion of rights secured by the fundamental law.”
With this standard in mind, Jacobson requires that the Governor’s
challenged executive orders be upheld in their entirety. While the impact of any
restriction on some aspect of normalcy outside of a pandemic is no doubt important,
the restrictions are temporary and in specific response to a widespread public 18

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health crisis. The Court should view each restriction through the lens of the general public health justifications and the over-arching and urgent goal of limiting the spread of this novel virus. A myopic, activity-specific framing of any issue is not a proper part of the analysis. Appropriate understanding of the nature of the pandemic and the four corners of the executive orders is adequate to the task before the Court.
While no line-drawing is immune to disagreement, judicial deference is owed to the Governor’s assessment of how to most effectively limit the spread of the virus while not unduly restricting life-sustaining activity and services. That assessment has included consideration of the temporary nature of any restriction and what as a general matter could be endured while flattening the curve and then containing the virus’s spread.
The point is not to imagine how each specific activity of daily life might be accomplished safely by using social distancing and other recommended prophylactic measures. In a drought, where the point is to avoid uncontrolled wildfires, there can be no allowance for those who promise to be really careful with their campfire. In a deadly pandemic such as this, the point—the necessity—is to only allow those risks to public health that can and must be taken; the stakes are too high to do otherwise.
To wit, a simple trip to an indoor fitness business for a workout might appear both innocuous and inoculated for purposes of the virus.
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But appearances are deceiving. Customers and employees all share space, breathe the same air, and touch common surfaces. For these factors, the context of an indoor fitness facility is critical. Why? Because even the most ventilated indoor facility is susceptible to respiratory spread of the virus. The danger is only amplified when people congregate (even with social distancing) in a confined space and work out. By its nature, working out is sustained vigorous physical activity, which necessarily means heavy breathing and sweating and, therefore, acute, propulsive bursts of virus shedding by anyone in that confined space who might be infected.18 Apart from individual exercisers in proximity, there is the added risk of individuals working out together or organized groups working out for extended trainer-led sessions. And the risk of viral spread is only heightened further by the sharing of exercise equipment among many different people over the course of the day, even when good-faith efforts are made to clean that equipment after each use.
At a fitness center, these factors merge to significantly increase the incidence of this highly contagious and asymptomatically transmittable virus spreading. Like innumerable small breezes against a sail, enough will push a sailboat over a waterfall if the course is not changed and the sail not brought under control. Use of
18 See CDC Research Paper, Cluster of Coronavirus Disease Associated with Fitness Dance Classes, South Korea, available at https://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/article/26/8/200633_article; see also USA Today, Is group exercise safe? Study raises questions about coronavirus risk in gyms (June 5, 2020), available at https://www.today.com/health/coronavirus-group-exercise-are-classes-safecoronavirus-risk-gyms-t183428 (summarizing South Korea study of 112 infections linked to fitness dance classes at twelve gyms); New York Times, Is It Safe to Go Back to the Gym? (May 13, 2020), available at https://www.ytimes.com/2020/05/13/well/move/coronavirus-gym-safety.html
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personal protective equipment (PPE), sanitizers, and the like will only do so much to avoid these harms and presents the downside of depleting resources critically needed to provide emergency care to those afflicted by COVID-19 and other conditions immediately threatening their health and safety.
This last point merits emphasis. Until recently, Michigan, like other states, had been in the throes of an impending and dangerous shortage of health care resources available to handle the steep and immediate demands created by this pandemic, from PPE for medical professionals (and other critical infrastructure workers), to ventilators and other necessary medical supplies, to hospital beds. As the virus began to ravage the State, health systems were quickly reaching or exceeding their capacity. Medical supplies were dwindling, and beds in intensive care units were in short supply. There was a very real and imminent danger that hospitals could be completely overrun. Indeed, the TCF Center (formerly Cobo Center) – typically the home of auto shows and black-tie galas – was retrofitted as a makeshift field hospital in anticipation of local bed shortages.19 That it has not seen thousands of patients is a blessing, and a result of the carefully calibrated measures put in place to stem the tide.
19 Detroit Free Press, TCF Center transformation ahead of schedule, ready for patients April 8 (April 4, 2020), available at https://www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/2020/04/04/coronavirus-covid-19tcf-center-field-hospital/2948726001/
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Accordingly, there is ample good reason to temporarily regulate fitness centers, as the executive orders challenged here do.20 And there is ample good reason for those regulations to remain in place longer than those that restrict activity that does not pose the same level of risk of infection and spread—such as activity that is outdoors or more sedentary or isolated. The restrictions at issue serve to protect the public health of the State and its residents, and to prevent its health care system from collapsing under the strain of easily transmittable, potentially fatal, and still untreatable virus. They—like the broader set of measures regarding travel and in-person work and activities that were put in place by the Governor’s emergency orders—are temporary, tailored, and aimed at guiding the state as swiftly and safely as possible through the severe dangers posed by this pandemic.
Plaintiffs complain that the restrictions they challenge are lasting too long. But adequate time must be given for the public health goals to be served and a transition to economic normalcy to return—and due deference must be given under Jacobson to the Governor’s assessment and actions in that regard.21 See, e.g., South Bay United Pentecostal Church, 509 U.S. ___ (Roberts, C.J., concurring in summary
20 Plaintiffs refer to an alleged national absence of any outbreak connected to a fitness center. Even if true, that would only stand to show the effectiveness of the lockdown orders and social distancing practices. It would not imply the absence of a rational basis to order the temporary shutdown of indoor commercial fitness activity. 21 The incubation period of the virus and its duration of contagion are other important variables not yet fully understood. Accordingly, a variable dial approach to reopening should be preferred over the flipping of a switch that Plaintiffs’ legal position might suggest.
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denial order) (explaining that “[t]he precise question of when restrictions on particular social activities should be lifted during the pandemic is a dynamic and fact-intensive matter subject to reasonable disagreement,” and the judgment of “the politically accountable officials” to whom those decisions are entrusted “should not be subject to second-guessing” by the courts).
And indeed, this careful and gradual transition is exactly what has been happening with the rescission of various executive orders and the promulgation of new, narrower ones. While circumstances rapidly escalated and the virus began to ravage the State, more restrictive measures were necessary to combat the spread and save lives. As circumstances have improved and the number of infections and deaths have trended downward, the restrictive measures have eased, sometimes on a regional basis, based on the best available data and the advice of public-health experts. This is the very essence of the emergency management authority afforded the Governor under the principles announced in Jacobson.
Judicial deference is appropriate not just on the substance of this challenge but the timing as well. As a matter of separation of powers, distinctions between essential and non-essential and safe and unsafe are best left to the branch designed for and equipped to make those calls. The Governor’s executive orders should not be undercut by disparate preliminary judicial carveouts in the wake of a particular litigant’s race to the courthouse.
In sum, the limited and temporary restrictions in the Governor’s orders have been necessary and appropriate, with a “real [and] substantial relation” to stopping
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the spread of the virus, and they most certainly do not constitute, “beyond all question, a plain, palpable invasion of rights secured by the fundamental law.” Jacobson, 197 US at 31. As stated by the Michigan Court of Claims:
What the Court must do—and can only do—is determine whether the Governor’s orders are consistent with the law. Under the applicable standards, they are. (Martinko Opinion, Ex A, p. 14, citation omitted). Accordingly, Plaintiffs cannot overcome Jacobson and their claims fail as a matter of law.
Plaintiffs do not have a viable procedural due process claim. The same is true of Plaintiffs’ claims even absent Jacobson’s deferential standard. First, Plaintiffs have failed to state a viable procedural due process claim. The general touchstone for such claims is notice and an opportunity to be heard on a pre- or post-deprivation basis. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332–33 (1976). But under the holding of Mathews, none of the instant Plaintiffs have suffered a final deprivation of any protected interest. The challenged executive orders contain temporary restrictions, not final ones. Additionally, Mathews concerned termination of disability benefits and not a generally applicable emergency order in a pandemic that need only be disseminated to the public through the usual media channels. Indeed, due process is “flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.” Morissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972). Here, Plaintiffs seem to be seeking some sort of process by which they could challenge a determination that their commercial activity is “non-essential.” But they fail to present a viable claim that any additional process was due here to
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commercial fitness businesses or organizations. Many millions of individuals, businesses, and enterprises were all subject to the same general, temporary orders. Plaintiffs have offered nothing in the federal constitution or cases construing it that would have required any more here than general promulgation of the temporary executive orders issued under emergency authority. See, e.g., Hartman v Acton, No. 2:20-CV-1952, 2020 WL 1932896, at *6-10 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 21, 2020) (in the context of a TRO, rejecting a plaintiff business owner’s procedural due process challenge to Ohio’s COVID-19-related “Stay-at-home order” that “direct[ed] non-essential businesses to cease operating their physical locations”).
Plaintiffs rely on non-binding authority from Pennsylvania. Friends of Danny DeVito v. Wolf, __ A.3d ___ (Penn., Apr. 13, 2020), 2020 WL 1847100. Plaintiffs suggest that a waiver process for a post-deprivation challenge of essential versus non-essential designations like the one in Pennsylvania should be required in Michigan. But one state’s policy choice is not another state’s constitutional mandate. DeVito included no such holding, nor did it hold that procedural due process requires that businesses be afforded the opportunity to dispute the State’s determinations regarding what categories of businesses may be open.
To the contrary, DeVito emphasized that, under settled law, the purpose of post-deprivation process is to protect individuals and businesses from “mistaken or unjustified” deprivations. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 259 (1978). And DeVito recognized that Pennsylvania’s “waiver” process was sufficient to meet this standard, because it provided a way for individual businesses to demonstrate that
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they did not, in fact, fall within one of the categories of businesses deemed “non-lifesustaining” and thus closed under Pennsylvania’s order. See 2020 WL 1847100 at *20-21. As DeVito made clear, however, this “waiver” process did not provide a mechanism for businesses that did fall within one of the closed categories to challenge that categorical closure decision or to secure an exemption from it—nor did procedural due process require any such thing. See id.
Here, Plaintiffs do not claim that they were mistakenly classified as falling within a certain category of businesses under the Governor’s orders. They simply disagree with how that category of businesses is treated under the orders. That disagreement is not enough to ground a viable procedural due process claim. There is no claim that any of the Plaintiffs were mistakenly or finally deprived of anything. The restrictions on Plaintiffs are temporary, and the public health concerns justifying them are compelling and paramount. Plaintiffs can point to nothing to indicate that, given this “particular situation,” due process would “demand[]” that they be afforded any further “procedural protections.” Morissey, 408 U.S. at 481. Accordingly, Plaintiffs have not shown a substantial likelihood of success on this claim.
Plaintiffs do not have a viable equal protection claim. Plaintiffs also fall far short of establishing an equal protection claim. “[E]qual protection is not a license for courts to judge the wisdom, fairness, or logic of legislative choices.” FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993). “In areas of social and economic policy, a statutory classification that neither proceeds along suspect lines nor infringes fundamental constitutional rights
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must be upheld against equal protection challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification.” Id. Courts apply a “strong presumption” that a challenged law is valid and plaintiffs have the heavy burden of negating “every conceivable basis” which might support the law. Id. at 314-15.
For the reasons already stated, each challenged restriction has a rational basis. During this pandemic, it makes eminent sense to adopt measures that require social distancing, limit person to person contact, and preserve valuable health care resources. This unsurprisingly has meant different things for different businesses. For fitness centers, it means adapting and doing as much as can be done – again, temporarily – remotely via technology or outdoors.
Plaintiffs incorrectly presume that their businesses are indistinguishable from different businesses that are now subject to looser restrictions. Not so.
Even in a lockdown, people have to eat. So it is both rational and expected that grocery stores and food businesses would continue limited in-person operations while Plaintiffs could not. Plaintiffs, however, stress that they too provide a means to engage in life-sustaining activity, and decry the opening of businesses that, in their view, are not comparably beneficial, such as nail salons and massage parlors.
The health benefits of exercise are well recognized. Indeed, that this why the Stay Home Order, from its first iteration, has consistently permitted outdoor activity like “walking, hiking, running, cycling or any other recreational activity.” See E.O. 2020-21, § 7(a)(1). For the reasons already discussed, however, indoor
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commercial fitness activity is another matter altogether that can be and has been reasonably restricted due to the pandemic. It is a particular species of exercise that logically and legally need not fall within the same exception for types of exercise that do not pose the same combination of heightened risks of infection and spread.22 Likewise, that combination of heightened risks sets Plaintiffs apart from other businesses that have been permitted to resume providing in-person, indoor services more fully at this point. Meanwhile, businesses that tend to present a risk profile more comparable to Plaintiffs’, such as indoor places of recreation, remain subject to
the same operational restrictions as Plaintiffs.
Simply put, there are multiple, readily apparent rational bases that inform and support the restrictions that have been put in place and when and how they have been lifted. Plaintiffs’ mere disagreement with this reasoning and the lines that have been drawn from it does not negate the many “reasonably conceivable state[s] of facts” that support it or overcome the “strong presumption” that it is constitutionally valid. FCC, 508 U.S. at 313–14. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ equal protection challenge is not likely to succeed.
22 To the extent that Plaintiffs raise the health concerns of their customers, Plaintiffs have failed to cite any recognized theory of third party standing that would apply here. Even with such standing, alternative means of exercise that are permitted would mean no injury in fact and no redressability here. Furthermore, Plaintiffs have failed to acknowledge or address the various ways in which they can still serve the health needs of their customers, such as through remote, outdoor, or in-home services.
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Plaintiffs do not have a viable dormant commerce clause claim. By empowering Congress to regulate interstate commerce, the Commerce Clause is interpreted to, correspondingly, prohibit states from interfering with the same. U.S. Const., Art. I, s. 8, cl. 3. This negative implication, commonly known as the “dormant commerce clause,” “prohibit[s] outright economic protectionism or regulatory measures designed to benefit in-state economic actors by burdening outof-state actors.” E. Ky. Res. v. Fiscal Court, 127 F.3d 532, 540 (6th Cir. 1997). A two-tiered analysis applies to such claims. “The first prong targets the core concern of the dormant commerce clause, protectionism – that is ‘differential treatment of in-state and out-of-state economic interests that benefits the former and burdens the latter.’” Tenn. Scrap Recyclers Ass’n v. Bredesen, 556 F.3d 442, 449 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Or. Waste Sys. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994)). The second applies where, as here, the order invokes no inkling of in-state protectionism but, instead, applies to all businesses operating with this state. In this situation, the order is presumed valid unless its burden on interstate commerce is “clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.” Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). Plaintiffs bear the burden of demonstrating this second prong weighs in their favor. It is a burden they cannot meet here. Any burden of the executive orders on interstate commerce or out-of-state actors is minuscule compared to the benefit to the state and local communities as a whole. The challenges presented by the spread of COVID-19 have required swift and nimble action throughout Michigan to stop the spread of a highly contagious and deadly disease. This includes the complained-of restrictions on indoor
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commercial fitness activity raised in Plaintiffs’ amended complaint. Many businesses and individuals throughout the State have faced these necessary and temporary restrictions.
But nothing in the executive orders regulates interstate commerce as interstate commerce. Impacts on such commerce may be inevitable, but that is not the focus of any of the challenged restrictions. This factor alone distinguishes this case from recognized dormant commerce clause challenges. Additionally, none of the challenged orders seek to regulate any conduct outside of the State of Michigan. While Plaintiffs were impacted by the restrictions and presumably engaged in some measure of interstate commerce, those factors alone fall far short of a viable commerce clause challenge.
Further, in Pike, the Supreme Court specifically recognized that its holding was influenced by the fact that it was not dealing with “state legislation in the field of safety where the propriety of local regulation has long been recognized.” Pike, 397 U.S. at 143. This is not the case here. Dealing with public health in general and a pandemic in particular fall squarely within deeply rooted local and state police powers, and Plaintiffs offer nothing to show that the limited and temporary restrictions they challenge are somehow “clearly excessive” in comparison to the critical protections those restrictions provided to the residents, communities and health care system of this State during this pandemic. Therefore, Plaintiffs’ claim for relief under dormant commerce clause doctrine is not likely to succeed.
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Plaintiffs make an inadequate showing of irreparable harm. Not only have Plaintiffs failed to show a likelihood of success on the merits of their claims, they have also failed to show, as they must, that they will suffer irreparable injury without the preliminary injunction they request. Tumblebus, Inc. v. Cranmer, 399 F.3d 754, 760 (6th Cir. 2005). “A plaintiff’s harm from the denial of a preliminary injunction is irreparable if it is not fully compensable by monetary damages.” Overstreet v. Lexington–Fayette Urban County Gov’t, 305 F.3d 566, 578 (6th Cir. 2002). As demonstrated in the preceding sections, Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights are not being violated, and their bald assertions about insolvency, loss of customers, goodwill, and future business do not amount to irreparable harm. Plaintiffs’ failure to offer any evidentiary support for their vague assertions of injury cannot be ignored in light of the heavy burden upon them. Nor is it appropriate to presume such injury from the existence of the Executive Orders in recent months. The fact that the need for social distancing has impacted some of the services Plaintiffs offer does not automatically translate into the doomsday outcomes they postulate. Society is adapting to mitigate the impact of COVID-19. The fitness industry is no exception. Plaintiffs also say nothing about the adjustments and accommodations they have made to provide supportive services, such as online, outdoor, or in-home training, to their customers while the temporary limitations on their normal operations are in place. Technology in the form of video, audio, and web-based services can mitigate the closure of physical facilities. The same is true for outdoor
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classes and trainer input for individually executed remote participation. And Plaintiffs remain free to sell any products they may carry via delivery or curbside pickup, or at any outdoor classes they may offer.
Loss of goodwill, further, is speculative and unwarranted. Customer blame, if any, would be directed at the pandemic or at government response to it, and not to any specific fitness center subject to the same industry-wide restrictions impacting its friends and competitors alike.
In the absence of evidence to the contrary, this factor favors Defendants. A preliminary injunction would not serve the public interest. The third and fourth factors are similar—whether an injunction will cause substantial harm to third parties, and whether it would serve the public interest. In regard to the fourth factor, the public interest “will not be as important as the other factors considered in the award of preliminary injunctive relief in actions involving only private interests, [but] it will be prominently considered in actions implicating government policy or regulation, or other matters of public concern.” 13 Moore’s Federal Practice § 65.22 (Matthew Bender 3d. ed). Here, issuing an injunction that precludes enforcement of any part of the Governor’s executive orders would harm third parties and would not benefit the public. The orders were put in place after careful consideration of the unique nature of the threat facing Michigan and the advice of numerous individuals and entities with unique expertise. A piecemeal lifting of restrictions by this Court, without regard to the State’s carefully considered, deliberate, ongoing plan to combat the crisis and safely transition back to normalcy, increases the risk and
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potential harm to everyone. For the reasons already briefed, a particular party’s race to the courthouse should not control who is and is not excepted, particularly in a time of great public need when all in Michigan must grab hold of an oar and row in the same direction. As a result, the third and fourth factors favor Defendants as well.

CONCLUSION AND RELIEF REQUESTED Defendants Whitmer and Gordon respectfully request that the Court deny Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction and grant any other appropriate relief to Defendants.
Respectfully submitted,

Dated: June 12, 2020

/s/ John G. Fedynsky John G. Fedynsky (P65232) Assistant Attorney General Attorney for Defendants Whitmer and Gordon Michigan Dep’t of Attorney General State Operations Division P.O. Box 30754 Lansing, MI 48909 517.335.7573 fednyskyj@michigan.gov P65232

33

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 35 filed 06/12/20 PageID.412 Page 39 of 39 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on June 12, 2020, I electronically filed the foregoing papers with the Clerk of the Court using the ECF system, which will provide electronic copies to counsel of record, and I certify that my secretary has mailed by U.S. Postal Service the papers to any non-ECF participant.
/s/ John G. Fedynsky John G. Fedynsky (P65232) Assistant Attorney General
34

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 35-1 filed 06/12/20 PageID.413 Page 1 of 3

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

LEAGUE OF INDEPENDENT FITNESS FACILITIES AND TRAINERS, INC., BASELINE FITNESS LLC, BUILDING YOUR TEMPLE LLC, BYT FITNESS 247 LLC, CLAWSON FITNESS, LLC, CLINTON FITNESS, INC., D-LUX KARATE UNIVERSITY, LLC, FENTON ATHLETIC CLUB, INC., FENTON KARATE, LLC, FUSION FITNESS 24/7 LLC, H3 FITNESS LLC, I FITNESS PERSONAL TRAINING, INC., JKP FITNESS, LLC, JPF ENTERPRISES, LLC, M FITNESS CLUB, LLC, MH & AB LLC, MOTOR CITY CF – ST. CLAIR SHORES, LLC, NASCOT ENTERPRISES, LLC, PRISON CITY PHYSIQUE, LLC, FMP FITNESS INC., STRENGTH BEYOND LLC, 24/7 BOOTCAMP AND BOXING, INC., and 4 SEASONS GYM, LLC,

No. 20-cv-00458 HON. PAUL L. MALONEY
Index of Exhibits

Plaintiffs,

v

GRETCHEN E. WHITMER and ROBERT E. GORDON,

Defendants.

Scott M. Erskine (P54734) Carly Van Thomme (P59706) Erskine Law, P.C. Attorneys for Plaintiffs 612 W. University Rochester, MI 48307

John G. Fedynsky (P65232) Andrew J. Jurgensen (P81123) Joseph T. Froehlich (P71887) Joshua O. Booth (P53847) Christopher M. Allen (P75329) Assistant Attorneys General

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 35-1 filed 06/12/20 PageID.414 Page 2 of 3

(248) 601-4499 serskine@erskinelaw.com cvanthomme@erskinelaw.com

Attorneys for Defendants Michigan Dep’t of Attorney General State Operations Division P.O. Box 30754 Lansing, MI 48909 (517) 335-7573 fedynskyj@michigan.gov jurgensena2@michigan.gov froehlichj1@michigan.gov boothj2@michigan.gov allenc28@michigan.gov

Index of Exhibits

Exhibit

Description

A

Opinion and Order Denying Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Preliminary

Injunction, Martinko, et. al. v. Governor Whitmer, et. al.,

Michigan Court of Claims Case No. 20-62-MM, April 29, 2020

B

Summary Order, South Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Gavin

Newsom, Governor of California, 509 U.S. ___ (2020) (released

May 29, 2020)

C

Modes of transmission of virus causing COVID-19, World Health

Organization, available at https://www.who.int/news-

room/commentaries/detail/modes-of-transmission-of-virus-

causing-covid-19-implications-for-ipc-precaution-

recommendations

D

Social Distancing, Quarantine, and Isolation, Centers for

Disease Control, available at

https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/prevent-getting

sick/social-distancing.html

E

Flattening the Coronavirus Curve, New York Times (March 27,

2020), available at https://www.nytimes.com/article/flatten-

curve-coronavirus.html

F

E.O. No. 2020-4

G

E.O. No. 2020-5

H

E.O. No. 2020-9

2

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 35-1 filed 06/12/20 PageID.415 Page 3 of 3

I

E.O. No. 2020-11

J

E.O. No. 2020-21

K

E.O. No. 2020-110

L

E.O. No. 2020-115

3

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 35-2 filed 06/12/20 PageID.416 Page 1 of 20

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

LEAGUE OF INDEPENDENT FITNESS FACILITIES AND TRAINERS, INC., BASELINE FITNESS LLC, BUILDING YOUR TEMPLE LLC, BYT FITNESS 247 LLC, CLAWSON FITNESS, LLC, CLINTON FITNESS, INC., D-LUX KARATE UNIVERSITY, LLC, FENTON ATHLETIC CLUB, INC., FENTON KARATE, LLC, FUSION FITNESS 24/7 LLC, H3 FITNESS LLC, I FITNESS PERSONAL TRAINING, INC., JKP FITNESS, LLC, JPF ENTERPRISES, LLC, M FITNESS CLUB, LLC, MH & AB LLC, MOTOR CITY CF – ST. CLAIR SHORES, LLC, NASCOT ENTERPRISES, LLC, PRISON CITY PHYSIQUE, LLC, FMP FITNESS INC., STRENGTH BEYOND LLC, 24/7 BOOTCAMP AND BOXING, INC., and 4 SEASONS GYM, LLC,

No. 20-cv-00458 HON. PAUL L. MALONEY EXHIBIT A

Plaintiffs,

v

GRETCHEN E. WHITMER and ROBERT E. GORDON,

Defendants.

Scott M. Erskine (P54734) Carly Van Thomme (P59706) Erskine Law, P.C. Attorneys for Plaintiffs 612 W. University Rochester, MI 48307

John G. Fedynsky (P65232) Andrew J. Jurgensen (P81123) Joseph T. Froehlich (P71887) Joshua O. Booth (P53847) Christopher M. Allen (P75329) Assistant Attorneys General

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 35-2 filed 06/12/20 PageID.417 Page 2 of 20

(248) 601-4499 serskine@erskinelaw.com cvanthomme@erskinelaw.com

Attorneys for Defendants Michigan Dep’t of Attorney General State Operations Division P.O. Box 30754 Lansing, MI 48909 (517) 335-7573 fedynskyj@michigan.gov jurgensena2@michigan.gov froehlichj1@michigan.gov boothj2@michigan.gov allenc28@michigan.gov
EXHIBIT A

2

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STATE OF MICHIGAN COURT OF CLAIMS

STEVE MARTINKO, et al, Plaintiffs,

OPINION AND ORDER REGARDING PLAINTIFFS’ APRIL 23, 2020 MOTION FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

v

Case No. 20-00062-MM

GRETCHEN WHITMER, in her official capacity as Governor of the State of Michigan, DANIEL EICHINGER, in his official capacity as Director of the Michigan Department of Natural Resources, and DANA NESSEL, in her official capacity as the Attorney General for the State of Michigan,

Hon. Christopher M. Murray

Defendants. ___________________________/

I. INTRODUCTION

This matter was filed by five Michigan residents who claim that three of Governor

Whitmer’s executive orders, Executive Orders 2020-21 and 2020-42,1 and now Executive Order

2020-59, infringe on their constitutional rights to procedural due process and substantive due

1 Plaintiffs recognize that EO 2020-21 was rescinded by EO 2020-42, and they claim that EO 2020-42 “extended the timeline originally set by [EO] 2020-21 and grossly expands its restrictions on businesses’ and individuals’ fundamental rights.” After the verified complaint was filed, EO 2020-42 was rescinded by EO 2020-59, which (among other things) eliminated the prohibitions on traveling intrastate to another residence, from not using motorized boats on the waterways, and to an extent allows the re-opening of some businesses and state parks. Although plaintiffs challenge the same restrictions set forth in EO 2020-42, the Court will for clarity sake refer to the restrictions within the current executive order, EO 2020-59, unless the timing period is relevant to any issue.
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process. Specifically, plaintiffs’ verified complaint alleges that the “mandatory quarantine” imposed by EO 2020-59 violates their right to both procedural due process (Count I) and substantive due process (Count II), and that the intrastate travel restrictions contained in EO 202042 also violate their rights to procedural due process (Count III) and substantive due process (Count IV). They also allege in Count V of their verified complaint that the Emergency Management Act, MCL 30.401 et seq., is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to the Governor. Plaintiffs have requested the Court issue a preliminary injunction—but not a permanent one—restraining these defendants from continuing to implement the provisions of EO 2020-59.2 Once restrained, plaintiffs seek a declaration that the challenged restrictions and the EMA are invalid.3
II. JURISDICTION Defendants first argue that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because plaintiffs seek only injunctive relief based upon federal constitutional claims, which deprives the Court of jurisdiction to decide the matter. Defendants rely upon MCL 600.6440, which provides:
No claimant may be permitted to file claim in said court against the state nor any department, commission, board, institution, arm or agency thereof who has an adequate remedy upon his claim in the federal courts, but it is not necessary in the complaint filed to allege that claimant has no such adequate remedy, but that fact may be put in issue by the answer or motion filed by the state or the department, commission, board, institution, arm or agency thereof.
2 On April 23, 2020, the Court denied plaintiffs’ motion for an ex parte temporary restraining order on the ground that plaintiffs had not shown the threat of immediate and irreparable harm of physical injury or loss of property. 3 The Court appreciates the speed at which counsel submitted briefs, and for the high caliber of the briefs submitted.
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Because a federal court can exercise jurisdiction against state officers in their official capacity when seeking only prospective injunctive relief, defendants argue, MCL 600.6440 applies and the Court lacks jurisdiction to decide the matter.
The legal principles put forward by defendants are sound, but they do not apply to plaintiffs’ case. First, the statute refers to claims filed in the Court of Claims against the state, its departments, agencies, etc., and does not pertain to claims brought in this Court against individuals, as plaintiffs have done here. Thus, it is irrelevant whether claims against state officers in their official capacity brought in federal court might essentially be considered claims against the state. Second, with respect to defendants’ argument, plaintiffs seek declaratory rulings on each of their three challenges, and one of those challenges—the claim that the EMA violates the separation of powers doctrine—is based upon state law. So too is their challenge to the intrastate ban on travel to vacation rentals. Additionally, in their complaint plaintiffs seek “other and further relief as the Court deems appropriate,” which whatever that could end up being, it would go beyond the declaratory and limited injunctive relief requested in the complaint, and could include damages, even if only nominal. Because plaintiffs’ claims and forms of relief do not meet all the requirements of MCL 600.6440, this Court does not lack subject matter jurisdiction.
III. MOOTNESS Defendants also argue that plaintiffs’ case is moot because they only challenge EO 202021 and EO 2020-42, which have been rescinded, and EO 2020-59 is the only existing executive order containing these restrictions. True enough, but as defendants seem to recognize, it was after plaintiffs’ filing last week that the Governor issued EO 2020-59, and plaintiffs have not had time to seek to amend their complaint, and several of plaintiffs’ challenges to the prior EOs—the stayat-home provision and the ban on intrastate travel to vacation rentals—remain within EO 2020-
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59. Those two challenges are therefore not moot, as the Court can still render complete relief against those provisions. See CD Barnes Assoc, Inc v Star Haven, LLC, 300 Mich App 389, 406; 834 NW2d 878 (2013). The remainder of the challenges to EOs 2020-21 and 2020-42, as well as to the Department of Natural Resources rule4, have been removed by EO 2020-59, and are now moot.
The Court therefore concludes that the only remaining ripe challenges to the executive orders are (1) the stay-at-home provision, (2) the prohibition of traveling to a third-party vacation rental, and (3) the limited public access to certain public land. And, of course, plaintiffs’ challenge to the constitutionality of the EMA remains a live controversy.
IV. STANDARDS FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION “The objective of a preliminary injunction is to maintain the status quo pending a final hearing regarding the parties’ rights.” Alliance for the Mentally Ill of Mich v Dep’t of Community Health, 231 Mich App 647, 655–656; 588 NW2d 133 (1998). The status quo has been defined as “ ‘the last actual, peaceable, noncontested status which preceded the pending controversy.’ ” Buck v Thomas Cooley Law School, 272 Mich App 93, 98 n 4; 725 NW2d 485 (2006), quoting Psychological Services of Bloomfield, Inc v Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan, 144 Mich App 182, 185; 375 NW2d 382 (1985). In Mich AFSCME Council 25 v Woodhaven–Brownstown Sch
4 Specifically, plaintiffs challenge a Department of Natural Resources rule, implemented in furtherance of EO 2020-42, that “restricts the use of powerboats on public waterways yet allows sailboats and kayaks.” Plaintiffs likewise question a DNR rule, also implemented in furtherance of EO 2020-42, that “further restricted access to public lands, parks and trails to residents of ‘local communities.’ ” Much to the pleasure of outdoor enthusiasts, EO 2020-59 seems to have eliminated the restrictions on use of powerboats and use of state parks during certain hours of the day.
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Dist, 293 Mich App 143, 146; 809 NW2d 444 (2011), the Court of Appeals instructed that, “[w]hen deciding whether to grant an injunction under traditional equitable principles,
a court must consider (1) the likelihood that the party seeking the injunction will prevail on the merits, (2) the danger that the party seeking the injunction will suffer irreparable harm if the injunction is not issued, (3) the risk that the party seeking the injunction would be harmed more by the absence of an injunction than the opposing party would be by the granting of the relief, and (4) the harm to the public interest if the injunction is issued.[5] Not surprisingly, the Court will first turn to the initial consideration, i.e., whether plaintiffs have shown a likelihood of prevailing on the merits. Though plaintiffs do not have to prove they will succeed on the merits, they do have to prove that they have a substantial likelihood of success on the merits. Int’l Union v Michigan, 211 Mich App 20, 25; 535 NW2d 210 (1995).
V. THE MERITS A. BACKGROUND AND FACTS Michigan residents, like all other Americans, cherish their liberty. We always have, though the liberties and freedoms we seek to protect have changed over time. At and before our founding, our forefathers fought for the inalienable right to own property, freely engage in commerce, represent ourselves through our own elected representatives, worship where and how we wanted, etc. The Declaration of Independence’s list of grievances against the King of England prove as much, as do several of the amendments to the United States Constitution, and in particular, the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
5Quoting in part Alliance for the Mentally Ill, 231 Mich App at 655–656. -5-

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Today we have all the freedoms and liberties that the founders fought for, and our branches of government exist in large part to ensure that those rights remain intact. See Declaration, ¶ 2.6
The liberty and freedoms at stake in this matter do not in large part involve those rights and liberties
the founders fought so hard for; instead, plaintiffs focus on the right to freely move about one’s
community and state, to do commerce when one pleases, and to travel about the state for vacation
purposes. It is the restrictions to those activities within EO 2020-59 that plaintiffs challenge here.
As any reader of this opinion knows, the challenged executive orders were issued to address
the public health crisis occasioned by the world-wide spread of the novel coronavirus, which hit
our great state in early March. Specifically, on March 10, 2020, was when the first two cases of the virus were diagnosed in our state7, while the first death resulting from the virus occurred on March 18, 2020.8 As a result of the quick spread of the virus within our state borders, and to meet
the myriad challenges that immediately arose Governor Whitmer issued numerous executive
orders, including EO 2020-21, EO 2020-42 and EO 2020-59. The main element of the executive
6 The Court realizes that the Declaration is a political document, not a legal one, but it is good evidence of the founding political theories and objectives. See Troxel v Granville, 530 US 57, 91; 120 S Ct 2054; 147 L Ed 2d 49 (2000)(SCALIA, J., dissenting)(“The Declaration of Independence ... is not a legal prescription conferring powers upon the courts[.]”); Derden v McNeel, 978 F2d 1453, 1456 n4 (CA 5, 1992)(“[G]eneral statements about inalienable rights ... tell us little about the prerogatives of an individual in concrete factual situations.”); Coffey v United States, 939 F Supp 185, 191 (EDNY, 1996)(“While the Declaration of Independence states that all men are endowed certain unalienable rights including ‘Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness,’ it does not grant rights that may be pursued through the judicial system.” (citation omitted)). 7 Executive Order No, 2020-21; Detroit Free Press, Coronavirus Timeline https://www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/2020/03/18/coronavirus-timeline-first-casemichigan-first-death/5069676002/ (accessed April 28, 2020). This article contains a compilation of information from the state Department of Health and Human Services. 8 Detroit Free Press, First Michigan Death Due to Coronavirus is Southgate Man in his 50s https://www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/wayne/2020/03/18/coronavirus-deathsmichigan/5054788002/ (accessed April 28, 2020).
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orders is the requirement that most residents remain in their home unless engaging in certain essential activities, or certain limited outdoor activities. The result of the order, from an economic standpoint, was thousands of Michigan residents being unable to work unless they could do so remotely, the closing of all restaurants, bars, and other small and large businesses.9
At the time the first stay-at-home order was issued on March 23, 2020—only 13 days since the first confirmed case in this state—there were already 1,328 confirmed cases and 15 deaths.10 Today, just over one month later, Michigan has over 36,000 confirmed cases of the virus and over 3,000 related deaths.
B. THE MERITS In their complaint, plaintiffs do not challenge the Governor’s authority to issue the executive orders on this subject-matter. Instead, plaintiffs challenge the scope of the order through separate claims based on procedural due process and substantive due process. Although these claims entail different considerations and standards, see In re Forfeiture of 2000 GMC Denali and Contents, 316 Mich App 562, 573-574; 892 NW2d 388 (2016), the Court will address the claims together since, under these circumstances, each protected right is subject to the same overriding principle. In other words, the constitutional right asserted does not make a difference when considering this issue, because both are subject to a balancing with the state’s interest to protect the public health. This holds true because, and perhaps contrary to common knowledge, most, if not all, individual constitutional rights are not absolute and are subject to a balancing with the
9 Michigan was not alone in this regard. The Court takes notice that the worldwide economy has come to a virtual standstill as a result of state and national actions taken to control the virus. 10 Detroit Free Press, Michigan Coronavirus Cases, Tracking the Pandemic, https://www.freep.com/in-depth/news/nation/coronavirus/2020/04/11/michigan-coronaviruscases-tracking-covid-19-pandemic/5121186002/ (accessed April 28, 2020).
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countervailing state interest. See New Rider v Board of Ed of Independent School Dist No 1, 480
F2d 693, 696 (CA 10, 1973) (“Constitutional rights, including First Amendment rights, are not
absolutes.”) and In re Abbott, 954 F3d 772, 784 (CA 5, 2020) (Recognizing, when addressing
Texas emergency rules during the coronavirus pandemic, that individual rights secured by the
Constitution could be reasonably restricted during a health crisis).
As can be seen, then, there are two competing constitutional principles at play. First, as
plaintiffs note in their verified complaint, in Ex Parte Milligan, 71 US 2, 120-121; 18 L Ed 281
(1866), the United States Supreme Court recognized—in a case that arose during the height of the
Civil War—that our rights enshrined in the Constitution do not become less important or
enforceable because of exigent circumstances:
The Constitution of the United States is a law for rulers and people, equally in war and in peace, and covers with the shield of its protection all classes of men, at all times, and under all circumstances. No doctrine, involving more pernicious consequences, was ever invented by the wit of man than that any of its provisions can be suspended during any of the great exigencies of government. Such a doctrine leads directly to anarchy or despotism, but the theory of necessity on which it is based is false; for the government, within the Constitution, has all the powers granted to it, which are necessary to preserve its existence; as has been happily proved by the result of the great effort to throw off its just authority. Though our individual constitutional rights cannot be suspended or eliminated, they are, as noted,
subject to reasonable regulation by the state. And, when it comes to the power of the state to act
in the best interests of the public health when faced with a serious contagious disease, which is the
state interest acted upon by the Governor,
“[w]e are plowing no virgin field in considering the questions here involved. Numerous decisions, both federal and state, have considered the questions now before us. They are not all in accord and in some instances are not reconcilable. There is, however, a very marked trend in them in one direction, that which upholds the right of the state, in the exercise of its police power and in the interest of the public health, to enact such laws, such rules and regulations, as will prevent the spread of this dread disease.” [People ex rel Hill v Lansing Bd of Ed, 224 Mich
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388, 390; 195 NW 95 (1923). See, also, Jacobsen v Commonwealth of Mass, 197 US 11, 25-26; 25 S Ct 358; 49 L Ed 643 (1905) (upholding state’s power to require vaccination over plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest to not be told what to do), and In re Abbott, 954 F3d at 784-785.] As noted earlier, plaintiffs’ due process claims set out in Counts I and III are challenges to the quarantine11 requirement and (as amended by the changes contained in EO 2020-59), the prohibition on intrastate travel to a vacation rental. Plaintiffs’ specific assertion is that, although the state may have the ability to quarantine those who are infected with the virus, the state cannot quarantine everyone without some showing that the individual(s) are infected. Because EO 202059 does so, the executive order violates their right to procedural due process. The same holds true, they argue, for the prohibition of intrastate travel to a third parties’ vacation home.12
In addressing this argument, it is imperative to recognize the limited question the Court is empowered to decide. Except in limited circumstances mentioned later, it is not for the courts to pass on the wisdom of state action that is granted to it by the general police power or by statute. Certainly the state cannot simply ignore the individual rights enshrined in our federal (or state) constitution in the name of a public health threat. Judicial review of state actions is therefore (and quite obviously) appropriate and necessary. But the depth of that review is limited, and does not include delving deep into the pros and cons of what is the better plan of action between two reasonable alternatives. This point was well-made by three concurring Justices in Rock v Carney,
11 Plaintiffs characterize the “stay-at-home” provision as a quarantine, which defendants quarrel with, but quarantine is defined as “a restraint upon the activities or communications of persons … designed to prevent the spread of disease or pests.” Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (11th Ed). 12 Plaintiffs have not asserted that they own a second home in Michigan or that they had rented a third parties’ vacation home for use during a time in which any executive order remained in place.
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216 Mich 280, 283; 185 NW 798 (1921), a case involving the state’s response to the spread of
venereal diseases during World War I:
The questions involved in this litigation are of supreme importance, not only to the individuals composing this commonwealth, but also to the numerous boards of health and to the state itself. We approach their consideration with a due regard of their importance. Neither a desire to sustain the state, nor a supersensitiveness prompted by the delicacy of the examination here involved, should in any way enter into or control our decision. Policies adopted by the legislative and executive branches of the state government are not submitted to this branch for approval as to their wisdom. They stand or fall in this court because valid or invalid under the law, and their wisdom or want of wisdom in no way rests with us. If valid, they must be upheld by this court; if invalid, they must be so declared by this court. If these defendants have transcended their power, they must be held liable, and they may not be excused from liability by the fact that their motives were of the highest. If they had not transcended their power, they are not liable, and supersensitiveness or preconceived notions of proprieties, no matter of how long standing, do not render them liable. The case must be determined by the application of cold rules of law. Thus, whether and to what extent this Court agrees with policy implemented in the executive orders
is of no moment or consideration. Instead, the Court must dutifully apply the “cold rules of law”
to determine the validity of the challenged provisions of the executive order.
Binding authority from the United States Supreme Court and the Michigan Supreme Court
compels this Court to conclude that plaintiffs do not have a substantial likelihood of success on
the merits. This is not because the rights asserted by plaintiffs are not fundamental—being forced
(with some important exceptions) by the state to remain in one’s home, in turn causing many
residents to be unable to work, visit elderly relatives, and to generally move about the state. But
those liberty interests are, and always have been, subject to society’s interests—society being our
fellow residents. They—our fellow residents—have an interest to remain unharmed by a highly
communicable and deadly virus, and since the state entered the Union in 1837, it has had the broad
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power to act for the public health of the entire state when faced with a public crisis. As the
Jacobsen Court so aptly held:
The defendant insists that his liberty is invaded when the state subjects him to fine or imprisonment for neglecting or refusing to submit to vaccination; that a compulsory vaccination law is unreasonable, arbitrary, and oppressive, and, therefore, hostile to the inherent right of every freeman to care for his own body and health in such way as to him seems best; and that the execution of such a law against one who objects to vaccination, no matter for what reason, is nothing short of an assault upon his person. But the liberty secured by the Constitution of the United States to every person within its jurisdiction does not import an absolute right in each person to be, at all times and in all circumstances, wholly freed from restraint. There are manifold restraints to which every person is necessarily subject for the common good. On any other basis organized society could not exist with safety to its members. Society based on the rule that each one is a law unto himself would soon be confronted with disorder and anarchy. Real liberty for all could not exist under the operation of a principle which recognizes the right of each individual person to use his own, whether in respect of his person or his property, regardless of the injury that may be done to others. This court has more than once recognized it as a fundamental principle that ‘persons and property are subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the state; of the perfect right of the legislature to do which no question ever was, or upon acknowledged general principles ever can be, made, so far as natural persons are concerned.’ In Crowley v Christensen, 137 US 86, 89; 34 L Ed 620, 621; 11 S Ct 13 (we said: ‘The possession and enjoyment of all rights are subject to such reasonable conditions as may be deemed by the governing authority of the country essential to the safety, health, peace, good order, and morals of the community. Even liberty itself, the greatest of all rights, is not unrestricted license to act according to one’s own will. It is only freedom from restraint under conditions essential to the equal enjoyment of the same right by others. It is, then, liberty regulated by law.’ [Jacobson, 197 US at 26; citations omitted in part; emphasis supplied.]
The role courts play under Jacobson and Lansing Bd of Ed is not to “second-guess the state’s
policy choices in crafting emergency public health measures,” In re Abbott, 954 F3d at 784, but is
instead to determine whether the state regulation has a “real or substantial relation to the public
health crisis and are not ‘beyond all question, a plain, palpable invasion of rights secured by the
fundamental law.’ ” Id., quoting in part Jacobson, 197 US at 31. Part of this review includes
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looking to whether any exceptions apply for emergent situations, the duration of any rule, and whether the measures are pretextual. Id. at 785.13
Turning to plaintiffs’ specific challenges, the stay-at-home provision, the most restrictive portion of the executive order, was first implemented by the Governor on March 23, 2020, thirteen days after the first case of COVID-19 was diagnosed in the state. Though there were at that point approximately 1,328 cases in the state and 15 reported deaths, Governor Witmer was not acting on a blank slate. Instead, it was common knowledge that the virus had already rapidly spread throughout the state of Washington, was prevalent in several other states, and was devastating parts of Italy, China, and other countries. Indeed, the speed at which the virus spread was well known at the time the stay-at-home provision was implemented. It is true that this measure is a severe one, and greatly restricts each of our liberties to move about as we see fit, as we do in normal times. But the governor determined that severe measures were necessary, and had to be quickly implemented to prevent the uncontrolled spreading of the virus. As noted, Michigan was not alone in this regard:
To be sure, [the order] is a drastic measure, but that aligns it with the numerous drastic measures Petitioners and other states have been forced to take in response to the coronavirus pandemic. Faced with exponential growth of COVID-19 cases, states have closed schools, sealed off nursing homes, banned social gatherings, quarantined travelers, prohibited churches from holding public worship services, and locked down entire cities. These measures would be constitutionally intolerable in ordinary times, but are recognized as appropriate and even necessary responses to the present crisis. [In re Abbott, 954 F3d at 787.]
13 Plaintiffs’ correctly note that Jacobson did not involve a state-wide requirement to stay at home, and instead addressed an involuntary vaccination program. But most cases have different facts, and it is the legal principle set forth in the decision that guides future courts. Thus, despite some factual differences, the Court relies (as did the In re Abbott court) upon Jacobson as it is the most relevant decision on this issue from the Supreme Court.
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Plaintiffs suggest that the better—and more constitutionally sound decision—would have been to quarantine only those who have the virus. It may have been a better option to some, as doing so may have had a less severe impact on the movement of the Michigan population, and may have reduced unemployment. Or, as plaintiffs argue, a more narrowly tailored order by region may have been more reasonable for the entire state. But some of that is simply hindsight, and to accept it would be to impermissibly delve too deep into the choices made. Additionally, the Governor’s concerns were not limited to what was most convenient or palatable at the time, as she also had to protect, to the extent possible, the health and safety of all Michigan residents and to not overburden the health care system. The introduction to EO 2020-59 outlines some of the other serious considerations that went into issuing the stringent order:
To suppress the spread of COVID-19, to prevent the state’s health care system from being overwhelmed, to allow time for the production of critical test kits, ventilators, and personal protective equipment, to establish the public health infrastructure necessary to contain the spread of infection, and to avoid needless deaths, it is reasonable and necessary to direct residents to remain at home or in their place of residence to the maximum extent feasible. And, contrary to plaintiffs’ arguments, the Supreme Court has upheld, against a constitutional challenge, a state’s quarantine of individuals even when they are not infected with the disease being controlled. See Compagnie Francaise de Navigation a Vapeur v Louisiana, 186 US 380, 393; 22 S Ct 811; 46 L Ed 1209 (1902).
As noted, the Court’s role is not to pick which alternative may be more reasonable, more preferential, or more narrowly tailored, as the latter is in deciding some constitutional cases. Monday morning quarterbacking is the role of sports fans, not courts reviewing the factual basis supporting executive action to protect the public health. Instead, it is the role of the executive and legislative branches to determine what steps are necessary when faced with a public health crisis.
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In re Abbott, 954 F3d at 792 (“Such authority [to determine what measures are best to take] properly belongs to the legislative and executive branches of the governing authority”); Rock, 216 Mich at 296; Lansing Bd of Ed, 224 Mich at 397.14 Under federalism principles, it is the States that retained the police power, and that power—though not unlimited—is quite broad. See Nat’l Federation of Independent Business v Sebelius, 567 US 519, 536; 132 S Ct 2566; 183 L Ed 2d 450 (2012) (“The States thus can and do perform many of the vital functions of modern government— punishing street crime, running public schools, and zoning property for development, to name but a few—even though the Constitution’s text does not authorize any government to do so. Our cases refer to this general power of governing, possessed by the States but not by the Federal Government, as the “police power”) and Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich v Governor, 422 Mich 1, 73; 367 NW2d 1 (1985) (discussing the scope of the police power and how that power extends to enacting regulations to promote public health, safety, and welfare, and providing that regulations “passed pursuant to the police power carry with them a strong presumption of constitutionality.”).
What the Court must do—and can only do—is determine whether the Governor’s orders are consistent with the law. Rock, 216 Mich at 283. Under the applicable standards, they are. The undisputed facts known at the time the first stay-at-home order was made, and the undisputed facts known today, compel the conclusion that the order had a real and substantial relation to the public health crisis. The challenged measures relate to limiting human interaction which helps control the spread of a virus considered to be extremely communicable. To make it voluntary, or more limited in scope, were perhaps other avenues to pursue, but even accepting that proposition does
14 As will be discussed shortly, the Legislature has also spoken on the issue of how to address emergent situations. MCL 10.21; MCL 30.401 et seq. Additionally, the Court takes notice that the Legislature recently established an oversight committee to review the measures implemented through the Governor’s various executive orders.
-14-

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 35-2 filed 06/12/20 PageID.432 Page 17 of 20
not make what the Governor reasonably chose to do invalid. Instead, the Governor’s determination as to the speed and ease with which the virus spreads, and the potential impact that spread would have on the health care system, and the threat it had to the lives of thousands of Michigan residents in a short period of time, allows for the conclusion that the two challenged provisions had a real and substantial relation to the public health crisis. Jacobson, 197 US at 31. There is nothing presented to the Court to draw any other legal conclusion.15
Nor is there any evidence (or even a suggestion) that the stay-at-home provision was a pretext to accomplish some other objective. Additionally, the record is clear that these measures are temporary, and limited in time to address the speed at which the virus spreads, the status of the available health care system, and the need to get Michigan residents back to enjoying their liberties. Indeed, since this lawsuit was filed last week, the Governor issued EO 2020-59, easing some of the very restrictions challenged by plaintiffs, and has indicated more lifting of restrictions are imminent. Plaintiffs have not shown a substantial likelihood of success on the merits in their challenge to the executive order restrictions.
C. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE EMA16 Turning again to In re Forfeiture of 2000 GMC Denali and Contents, the Court set forth the rather difficult standards governing a challenge to the constitutionality of a state statute:
A party challenging the constitutionality of a statute has the burden of proving the law's invalidity. Gillette Commercial Operations North America & Subsidiaries v
15 Plaintiffs submitted documentary evidence which, if believed, could allow a governor to issue a more narrowly tailored order. But because this Governor made a different conclusion that was likewise based on other supporting evidence related to the virus, her decision had a real and substantial relation to the public health crisis. 16 Plaintiffs do not challenge the Governor’s exercise of authority under either statute, nor whether she needs legislative approval to continue her emergency declaration.
-15-

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Dep’t of Treasury, 312 Mich App 394, 414-415; 878 NW2d 891 (2015). The challenging party must overcome a heavy burden because “[s]tatutes are presumed to be constitutional, and we have a duty to construe a statute as constitutional unless its unconstitutionality is clearly apparent.” Mayor of Cadillac v Blackburn, 306 Mich App 512, 516; 857 NW2d 529 (2014). When interpreting a statute, our primary goal is to “give effect to the intent of the Legislature.” Superior Hotels, LLC v Mackinaw Twp, 282 Mich App 621, 628; 765 NW2d 31 (2009). To do so, we examine the plain language of the statute itself, and “[i]f the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the statute must be enforced as written and no further judicial construction is permitted.” Whitman v City of Burton, 493 Mich 303, 311; 831 NW2d 223 (2013). [In re Forfeiture of 2000 GMC Denali and Contents, 316 Mich App at 569.]
As far as the Court can discern, plaintiffs’ challenge to the EMA is an as-applied one:
A constitutional challenge to the validity of a statute can be brought in one of two ways: by either a facial challenge or an as-applied challenge. This is an as-applied challenge, meaning that claimant has alleged “ ‘a present infringement or denial of a specific right or of a particular injury in process of actual execution’ of government action.” Bonner v City of Brighton, 495 Mich 209, 223 n 27; 848 NW2d 380 (2014), quoting Village of Euclid v Ambler Realty Co, 272 US 365, 395; 47 S Ct 114; 71 L Ed 303 (1926). “The practical effect of holding a statute unconstitutional ‘as applied’ is to prevent its future application in a similar context, but not to render it utterly inoperative.” Ada v Guam Society of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 506 US 1011, 1012; 113 S Ct 633; 121 L Ed 2d 564 (1992) (SCALIA, J., dissenting). See also United States v Frost, 125 F3d 346, 370 (CA 6, 1997). [In re Forfeiture of 2000 GMC Denali and Contents, 316 Mich App at 569-570.]
Plaintiffs’ challenge to the delegation of power from the Legislature to the executive will
likely not succeed. It is certainly true that the Legislature cannot grant some vague, unfettered
discretion to the executive to carry out what is a legislative function. But if the challenged
legislation contains sufficient guidance to the executive on how to execute the law to further the
Legislature’s policy, it does not violate the non-delegation doctrine. City of Ann Arbor v Nat’l Ctr
for Mfg Sciences, Inc, 204 Mich App 303, 308; 514 NW2d 224 (1994) (“[T]he standards must be
sufficiently broad to permit efficient administration so that the policy of the Legislature may be
complied with, but not so broad as to give uncontrolled and arbitrary power to the
administrators.”).
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As defendants point out, plaintiffs allege in their complaint that the powers granted to the Governor are “limited,” and none of the provisions in the act are such that the executive would have “uncontrolled, arbitrary power.” Dep’t of Natural Resources v Seaman, 396 Mich 299, 308; 240 NW2d 206 (1976). The provisions of the EMA are not vague, and contain specific procedures and criteria for the Governor to declare a state of disaster or emergency, and what conditions qualify as a disaster or emergency. See MCL 30.402(e) and (h); MCL 30.403(3) and (4). The EMA also grants the Governor additional, specific duties and powers when addressing any declared disaster or emergency, MCL 30.405, and sets for a comprehensive state and local jurisdictional system to address declared state-wide disasters or emergencies. MCL 30.407-MCL 30.411. As a result, plaintiffs are unable to establish a likelihood of success on the merits on this claim.
D. HARM TO THE PUBLIC INTEREST Finally, and for many of the same reasons, the Court concludes that entry of a preliminary injunction would be more detrimental to the public than it would to plaintiffs. Although the Court is painfully aware of the difficulties of living under the restrictions of these executive orders, those difficulties are temporary, while to those who contract the virus and cannot recover (and to their family members and friends), it is all too permanent. That is not to say that every new virus will require the action taken here, but given the authority of the Governor to do so in the face of these circumstances, the Court must conclude issuing injunctive relief would not serve the public interest, despite the temporary harm to plaintiffs’ constitutional rights.
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Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 35-2 filed 06/12/20 PageID.435 Page 20 of 20 VI. CONCLUSION
For these reasons, plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction is DENIED.

Date: April 29, 2020

__________________________________ Christopher M. Murray Judge, Court of Claims

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Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 35-3 filed 06/12/20 PageID.436 Page 1 of 8

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

LEAGUE OF INDEPENDENT FITNESS FACILITIES AND TRAINERS, INC., BASELINE FITNESS LLC, BUILDING YOUR TEMPLE LLC, BYT FITNESS 247 LLC, CLAWSON FITNESS, LLC, CLINTON FITNESS, INC., D-LUX KARATE UNIVERSITY, LLC, FENTON ATHLETIC CLUB, INC., FENTON KARATE, LLC, FUSION FITNESS 24/7 LLC, H3 FITNESS LLC, I FITNESS PERSONAL TRAINING, INC., JKP FITNESS, LLC, JPF ENTERPRISES, LLC, M FITNESS CLUB, LLC, MH & AB LLC, MOTOR CITY CF – ST. CLAIR SHORES, LLC, NASCOT ENTERPRISES, LLC, PRISON CITY PHYSIQUE, LLC, FMP FITNESS INC., STRENGTH BEYOND LLC, 24/7 BOOTCAMP AND BOXING, INC., and 4 SEASONS GYM, LLC,

No. 20-cv-00458 HON. PAUL L. MALONEY EXHIBIT B

Plaintiffs,

v

GRETCHEN E. WHITMER and ROBERT E. GORDON,

Defendants.

Scott M. Erskine (P54734) Carly Van Thomme (P59706) Erskine Law, P.C. Attorneys for Plaintiffs 612 W. University Rochester, MI 48307

John G. Fedynsky (P65232) Andrew J. Jurgensen (P81123) Joseph T. Froehlich (P71887) Joshua O. Booth (P53847) Christopher M. Allen (P75329) Assistant Attorneys General

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 35-3 filed 06/12/20 PageID.437 Page 2 of 8

(248) 601-4499 serskine@erskinelaw.com cvanthomme@erskinelaw.com

Attorneys for Defendants Michigan Dep’t of Attorney General State Operations Division P.O. Box 30754 Lansing, MI 48909 (517) 335-7573 fedynskyj@michigan.gov jurgensena2@michigan.gov froehlichj1@michigan.gov boothj2@michigan.gov allenc28@michigan.gov
EXHIBIT B

2

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 35-3 filed 06/12/20 PageID.438 Page 3 of 8

Cite as: 590 U. S. (2020)

1

ROBERTS, C. J., concurring
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 19A1044
SOUTH BAY UNITED PENTECOSTAL CHURCH, ET AL. v. GAVIN NEWSOM, GOVERNOR OF CALIFORNIA, ET AL.
ON APPLICATION FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
[May 29, 2020]
The application for injunctive relief presented to JUSTICE KAGAN and by her referred to the Court is denied.
JUSTICE THOMAS, JUSTICE ALITO, JUSTICE GORSUCH, and JUSTICE KAVANAUGH would grant the application.
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS, concurring in denial of application for injunctive relief.
The Governor of California’s Executive Order aims to limit the spread of COVID–19, a novel severe acute respiratory illness that has killed thousands of people in California and more than 100,000 nationwide. At this time, there is no known cure, no effective treatment, and no vaccine. Because people may be infected but asymptomatic, they may unwittingly infect others. The Order places temporary numerical restrictions on public gatherings to address this extraordinary health emergency. State guidelines currently limit attendance at places of worship to 25% of building capacity or a maximum of 100 attendees.
Applicants seek to enjoin enforcement of the Order. “Such a request demands a significantly higher justification than a request for a stay because, unlike a stay, an injunction does not simply suspend judicial alteration of the status quo but grants judicial intervention that has been withheld by lower courts.” Respect Maine PAC v. McKee, 562 U. S. 996 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). This

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 35-3 filed 06/12/20 PageID.439 Page 4 of 8
2 SOUTH BAY UNITED PENTECOSTAL CHURCH v. NEWSOM
ROBERTS, C. J., concurring
power is used where “the legal rights at issue are indisputably clear” and, even then, “sparingly and only in the most critical and exigent circumstances.” S. Shapiro, K. Geller, T. Bishop, E. Hartnett & D. Himmelfarb, Supreme Court Practice §17.4, p. 17-9 (11th ed. 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted) (collecting cases).
Although California’s guidelines place restrictions on places of worship, those restrictions appear consistent with the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. Similar or more severe restrictions apply to comparable secular gatherings, including lectures, concerts, movie showings, spectator sports, and theatrical performances, where large groups of people gather in close proximity for extended periods of time. And the Order exempts or treats more leniently only dissimilar activities, such as operating grocery stores, banks, and laundromats, in which people neither congregate in large groups nor remain in close proximity for extended periods.
The precise question of when restrictions on particular social activities should be lifted during the pandemic is a dynamic and fact-intensive matter subject to reasonable disagreement. Our Constitution principally entrusts “[t]he safety and the health of the people” to the politically accountable officials of the States “to guard and protect.” Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U. S. 11, 38 (1905). When those officials “undertake[ ] to act in areas fraught with medical and scientific uncertainties,” their latitude “must be especially broad.” Marshall v. United States, 414 U. S. 417, 427 (1974). Where those broad limits are not exceeded, they should not be subject to second-guessing by an “unelected federal judiciary,” which lacks the background, competence, and expertise to assess public health and is not accountable to the people. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U. S. 528, 545 (1985).
That is especially true where, as here, a party seeks

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 35-3 filed 06/12/20 PageID.440 Page 5 of 8

Cite as: 590 U. S. (2020)

3

ROBERTS, C. J., concurring
emergency relief in an interlocutory posture, while local officials are actively shaping their response to changing facts on the ground. The notion that it is “indisputably clear” that the Government’s limitations are unconstitutional seems quite improbable.

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 35-3 filed 06/12/20 PageID.441 Page 6 of 8

Cite as: 590 U. S. (2020)

1

KAVANAUGH, J., dissenting
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 19A1044
SOUTH BAY UNITED PENTECOSTAL CHURCH, ET AL. v. GAVIN NEWSOM, GOVERNOR OF CALIFORNIA, ET AL.
ON APPLICATION FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
[May 29, 2020]
JUSTICE KAVANAUGH, with whom JUSTICE THOMAS and JUSTICE GORSUCH join, dissenting from denial of application for injunctive relief.
I would grant the Church’s requested temporary injunction because California’s latest safety guidelines discriminate against places of worship and in favor of comparable secular businesses. Such discrimination violates the First Amendment.
In response to the COVID–19 health crisis, California has now limited attendance at religious worship services to 25% of building capacity or 100 attendees, whichever is lower. The basic constitutional problem is that comparable secular businesses are not subject to a 25% occupancy cap, includ-
ing factories, offices, supermarkets, restaurants, retail stores, pharmacies, shopping malls, pet grooming shops, bookstores, florists, hair salons, and cannabis dispensaries.
South Bay United Pentecostal Church has applied for temporary injunctive relief from California’s 25% occupancy cap on religious worship services. Importantly, the Church is willing to abide by the State’s rules that apply to comparable secular businesses, including the rules regarding social distancing and hygiene. But the Church objects to a 25% occupancy cap that is imposed on religious worship services but not imposed on those comparable secular businesses.

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 35-3 filed 06/12/20 PageID.442 Page 7 of 8
2 SOUTH BAY UNITED PENTECOSTAL CHURCH v. NEWSOM
KAVANAUGH, J., dissenting
In my view, California’s discrimination against religious worship services contravenes the Constitution. As a general matter, the “government may not use religion as a basis of classification for the imposition of duties, penalties, privileges or benefits.” McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U. S. 618, 639 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment). This Court has stated that discrimination against religion is “odious to our Constitution.” Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 582 U. S. , (2017) (slip op., at 15); see also, e.g., Good News Club v. Milford Central School, 533 U. S. 98 (2001); Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U. S. 819 (1995); Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U. S. 520 (1993); Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School Dist., 508 U. S. 384 (1993); McDaniel, 435 U. S. 618.
To justify its discriminatory treatment of religious worship services, California must show that its rules are “justified by a compelling governmental interest” and “narrowly tailored to advance that interest.” Lukumi, 508 U. S., at 531–532. California undoubtedly has a compelling interest in combating the spread of COVID–19 and protecting the health of its citizens. But “restrictions inexplicably applied to one group and exempted from another do little to further these goals and do much to burden religious freedom.” Roberts v. Neace, 958 F. 3d 409, 414 (CA6 2020) (per curiam). What California needs is a compelling justification for distinguishing between (i) religious worship services and (ii) the litany of other secular businesses that are not subject to an occupancy cap.
California has not shown such a justification. The Church has agreed to abide by the State’s rules that apply to comparable secular businesses. That raises important questions: “Assuming all of the same precautions are taken, why can someone safely walk down a grocery store aisle but not a pew? And why can someone safely interact with a brave deliverywoman but not with a stoic minister?” Ibid.

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 35-3 filed 06/12/20 PageID.443 Page 8 of 8

Cite as: 590 U. S. (2020)

3

KAVANAUGH, J., dissenting
The Church and its congregants simply want to be treated equally to comparable secular businesses. California already trusts its residents and any number of businesses to adhere to proper social distancing and hygiene practices. The State cannot “assume the worst when people go to worship but assume the best when people go to work or go about the rest of their daily lives in permitted social settings.” Ibid.
California has ample options that would allow it to combat the spread of COVID–19 without discriminating against religion. The State could “insist that the congregants adhere to social-distancing and other health requirements and leave it at that—just as the Governor has done for comparable secular activities.” Id., at 415. Or alternatively, the State could impose reasonable occupancy caps across the board. But absent a compelling justification (which the State has not offered), the State may not take a looser approach with, say, supermarkets, restaurants, factories, and offices while imposing stricter requirements on places of worship.
The State also has substantial room to draw lines, especially in an emergency. But as relevant here, the Constitution imposes one key restriction on that line-drawing: The State may not discriminate against religion.
In sum, California’s 25% occupancy cap on religious worship services indisputably discriminates against religion, and such discrimination violates the First Amendment. See Ohio Citizens for Responsible Energy, Inc. v. NRC, 479 U. S. 1312 (1986) (Scalia, J., in chambers). The Church would suffer irreparable harm from not being able to hold services on Pentecost Sunday in a way that comparable secular businesses and persons can conduct their activities. I would therefore grant the Church’s request for a temporary injunction. I respectfully dissent.

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 35-4 filed 06/12/20 PageID.444 Page 1 of 8

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

LEAGUE OF INDEPENDENT FITNESS FACILITIES AND TRAINERS, INC., BASELINE FITNESS LLC, BUILDING YOUR TEMPLE LLC, BYT FITNESS 247 LLC, CLAWSON FITNESS, LLC, CLINTON FITNESS, INC., D-LUX KARATE UNIVERSITY, LLC, FENTON ATHLETIC CLUB, INC., FENTON KARATE, LLC, FUSION FITNESS 24/7 LLC, H3 FITNESS LLC, I FITNESS PERSONAL TRAINING, INC., JKP FITNESS, LLC, JPF ENTERPRISES, LLC, M FITNESS CLUB, LLC, MH & AB LLC, MOTOR CITY CF – ST. CLAIR SHORES, LLC, NASCOT ENTERPRISES, LLC, PRISON CITY PHYSIQUE, LLC, FMP FITNESS INC., STRENGTH BEYOND LLC, 24/7 BOOTCAMP AND BOXING, INC., and 4 SEASONS GYM, LLC,

No. 20-cv-00458 HON. PAUL L. MALONEY EXHIBIT C

Plaintiffs,

v

GRETCHEN E. WHITMER and ROBERT E. GORDON,

Defendants.

Scott M. Erskine (P54734) Carly Van Thomme (P59706) Erskine Law, P.C. Attorneys for Plaintiffs 612 W. University Rochester, MI 48307

John G. Fedynsky (P65232) Andrew J. Jurgensen (P81123) Joseph T. Froehlich (P71887) Joshua O. Booth (P53847) Christopher M. Allen (P75329) Assistant Attorneys General

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 35-4 filed 06/12/20 PageID.445 Page 2 of 8

(248) 601-4499 serskine@erskinelaw.com cvanthomme@erskinelaw.com

Attorneys for Defendants Michigan Dep’t of Attorney General State Operations Division P.O. Box 30754 Lansing, MI 48909 (517) 335-7573 fedynskyj@michigan.gov jurgensena2@michigan.gov froehlichj1@michigan.gov boothj2@michigan.gov allenc28@michigan.gov
EXHIBIT C

2

Modes of transmission of virus causing COVID-19: implications for IPC precaution recommendations
Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 35-4 filed 06/12/20 PageID.446 Page 3 of 8

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Modes of transmission of virus causing COVID-19: implications for IPC precaution recommendations

Scientific brief

29 March 2020 ‫ العربية‬中文

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This version updates the 27 March publication by providing definitions of droplets by particle size and adding three relevant publications.
Modes of transmission of the COVID-19 virus
Respiratory infections can be transmitted through droplets of different sizes: when the droplet particles are >5-10 μm in diameter they are referred to as respiratory droplets, and when then are <5μm in diameter, they are referred to as droplet nuclei.1 According to current evidence, COVID-19 virus is primarily transmitted between people through respiratory droplets and contact routes.2-7 In an analysis of 75,465 COVID-19 cases in China, airborne transmission was not reported.8
Droplet transmission occurs when a person is in in close contact (within 1 m) with someone who has respiratory symptoms (e.g., coughing or sneezing) and is therefore at risk of having his/her mucosae (mouth and nose) or conjunctiva (eyes) exposed to potentially infective respiratory droplets. Transmission may also occur through fomites in the immediate environment around the infected person.8 Therefore,
https://www.who.int/...mmentaries/detail/modes-of-transmission-of-virus-causing-covid-19-implications-for-ipc-precaution-recommendations[4/21/2020 1:35:23 PM]

Modes of transmission of virus causing COVID-19: implications for IPC precaution recommendations
Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 35-4 filed 06/12/20 PageID.447 Page 4 of 8 transmission of the COVID-19 virus can occur by direct contact with infected people and indirect contact with surfaces in the immediate environment or with objects used on the infected person (e.g., stethoscope or thermometer).
Airborne transmission is different from droplet transmission as it refers to the presence of microbes within droplet nuclei, which are generally considered to be particles <5μm in diameter, can remain in the air for long periods of time and be transmitted to others over distances greater than 1 m.
In the context of COVID-19, airborne transmission may be possible in specific circumstances and settings in which procedures or support treatments that generate aerosols are performed; i.e., endotracheal intubation, bronchoscopy, open suctioning, administration of nebulized treatment, manual ventilation before intubation, turning the patient to the prone position, disconnecting the patient from the ventilator, noninvasive positive-pressure ventilation, tracheostomy, and cardiopulmonary resuscitation.
There is some evidence that COVID-19 infection may lead to intestinal infection and be present in faeces. However, to date only one study has cultured the COVID-19 virus from a single stool specimen.9 There have been no reports of faecal−oral transmission of the COVID-19 virus to date.
Implications of recent findings of detection of COVID-19 virus from air sampling
To date, some scientific publications provide initial evidence on whether the COVID-19 virus can be detected in the air and thus, some news outlets have suggested that there has been airborne transmission. These initial findings need to be interpreted carefully.
A recent publication in the New England Journal of Medicine has evaluated virus persistence of the COVID-19 virus.10 In this experimental study, aerosols were generated using a three-jet Collison nebulizer and fed into a Goldberg drum under controlled laboratory conditions. This is a high-powered machine that does not reflect normal human cough conditions. Further, the finding of COVID-19 virus in aerosol particles up to 3 hours does not reflect a clinical setting in which aerosol-generating procedures are performed—that is, this was an experimentally induced aerosol-generating procedure.
There are reports from settings where symptomatic COVID-19 patients have been admitted and in which
https://www.who.int/...mmentaries/detail/modes-of-transmission-of-virus-causing-covid-19-implications-for-ipc-precaution-recommendations[4/21/2020 1:35:23 PM]

Modes of transmission of virus causing COVID-19: implications for IPC precaution recommendations
Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 35-4 filed 06/12/20 PageID.448 Page 5 of 8 no COVID-19 RNA was detected in air samples.11-12 WHO is aware of other studies which have evaluated the presence of COVID-19 RNA in air samples, but which are not yet published in peer-reviewed journals. It is important to note that the detection of RNA in environmental samples based on PCR-based assays is not indicative of viable virus that could be transmissible. Further studies are needed to determine whether it is possible to detect COVID-19 virus in air samples from patient rooms where no procedures or support treatments that generate aerosols are ongoing. As evidence emerges, it is important to know whether viable virus is found and what role it may play in transmission.
Conclusions
Based on the available evidence, including the recent publications mentioned above, WHO continues to recommend droplet and contact precautions for those people caring for COVID-19 patients. WHO continues to recommend airborne precautions for circumstances and settings in which aerosol generating procedures and support treatment are performed, according to risk assessment.13 These recommendations are consistent with other national and international guidelines, including those developed by the European Society of Intensive Care Medicine and Society of Critical Care Medicine14 and those currently used in Australia, Canada, and United Kingdom.15-17
At the same time, other countries and organizations, including the US Centers for Diseases Control and Prevention and the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, recommend airborne precautions for any situation involving the care of COVID-19 patients, and consider the use of medical masks as an acceptable option in case of shortages of respirators (N95, FFP2 or FFP3).18-19
Current WHO recommendations emphasize the importance of rational and appropriate use of all PPE,20 not only masks, which requires correct and rigorous behavior from health care workers, particularly in doffing procedures and hand hygiene practices.21 WHO also recommends staff training on these recommendations,22 as well as the adequate procurement and availability of the necessary PPE and other supplies and facilities. Finally, WHO continues to emphasize the utmost importance of frequent hand hygiene, respiratory etiquette, and environmental cleaning and disinfection, as well as the importance of maintaining physical distances and avoidance of close, unprotected contact with people with fever or respiratory symptoms.
WHO carefully monitors emerging evidence about this critical topic and will update this scientific brief as more information becomes available.
https://www.who.int/...mmentaries/detail/modes-of-transmission-of-virus-causing-covid-19-implications-for-ipc-precaution-recommendations[4/21/2020 1:35:23 PM]

Modes of transmission of virus causing COVID-19: implications for IPC precaution recommendations
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References
1. World Health Organization. Infection prevention and control of epidemic- and pandemic-prone acute respiratory infections in health care. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2014 Available from: https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/112656/9789241507134_eng.pdf?sequence=1
2. Liu J, Liao X, Qian S et al. Community transmission of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2, Shenzhen, China, 2020. Emerg Infect Dis 2020 doi.org/10.3201/eid2606.200239
3. Chan J, Yuan S, Kok K et al. A familial cluster of pneumonia associated with the 2019 novel coronavirus indicating person-to-person transmission: a study of a family cluster. Lancet 2020 doi: 10.1016/S01406736(20)30154-9
4. Li Q, Guan X, Wu P, et al. Early transmission dynamics in Wuhan, China, of novel coronavirus-infected pneumonia. N Engl J Med 2020; doi:10.1056/NEJMoa2001316.
5. Huang C, Wang Y, Li X, et al. Clinical features of patients infected with 2019 novel coronavirus in Wuhan, China. Lancet 2020; 395: 497–506.
6. Burke RM, Midgley CM, Dratch A, Fenstersheib M, Haupt T, Holshue M,et al. Active monitoring of persons exposed to patients with confirmed COVID-19 — United States, January–February 2020. MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep. 2020 doi : 10.15585/mmwr.mm6909e1external icon
7. World Health Organization. Report of the WHO-China Joint Mission on Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) 16-24 February 2020 [Internet]. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2020 Available from: https://www.who.int/docs/default- source/coronaviruse/who-china-joint-mission-on-covid-19-finalreport.pdf
8. Ong SW, Tan YK, Chia PY, Lee TH, Ng OT, Wong MS, et al. Air, surface environmental, and personal protective equipment contamination by severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) from a symptomatic patient. JAMA. 2020 Mar 4 [Epub ahead of print].
9. Zhang Y, Chen C, Zhu S et al. [Isolation of 2019-nCoV from a stool specimen of a laboratory-confirmed case of the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19)]. China CDC Weekly. 2020;2(8):123–4. (In Chinese)
10. van Doremalen N, Morris D, Bushmaker T et al. Aerosol and Surface Stability of SARS-CoV-2 as compared with SARS-CoV-1. New Engl J Med 2020 doi: 10.1056/NEJMc2004973
11. Cheng V, Wong S-C, Chen J, Yip C, Chuang V, Tsang O, et al. Escalating infection control response to the rapidly evolving epidemiology of the Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) due to SARS-CoV-2 in Hong Kong. Infect Control Hosp Epidemiol. 2020 Mar 5 [Epub ahead of print].
https://www.who.int/...mmentaries/detail/modes-of-transmission-of-virus-causing-covid-19-implications-for-ipc-precaution-recommendations[4/21/2020 1:35:23 PM]

Modes of transmission of virus causing COVID-19: implications for IPC precaution recommendations
Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 35-4 filed 06/12/20 PageID.450 Page 7 of 8 12. Ong SW, Tan YK, Chia PY, Lee TH, Ng OT, Wong MS, et al. Air, surface environmental, and personal
protective equipment contamination by severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) from a symptomatic patient. JAMA. 2020
13. WHO Infection Prevention and Control Guidance for COVID-19 available at https://www.who.int/emergencies/diseases/novel-coronavirus-2019/technical-guidance/infectionprevention-and-control
14. Surviving Sepsis Campaign: Guidelines on the Management of Critically Ill Adults with Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19). Intensive Care Medicine DOI: 10.1007/s00134-020-06022-5 https://www.sccm.org/SurvivingSepsisCampaign/Guidelines/COVID-19
15. Interim guidelines for the clinical management of COVID-19 in adults Australasian Society for Infectious Diseases Limited (ASID) https://www.asid.net.au/documents/item/1873
16. Coronavirus disease (COVID-19): For health professionals. https://www.canada.ca/en/publichealth/services/diseases/2019-novel-coronavirus-infection/health-professionals.html
17. Guidance on infection prevention and control for COVID-19 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/wuhan-novel-coronavirus-infection-prevention-and-control
18. Interim Infection Prevention and Control Recommendations for Patients with Suspected or Confirmed Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) in Healthcare Settings. https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019ncov/infection-control/control-recommendations.html
19. Infection prevention and control for COVID-19 in healthcare settings https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/publications-data/infection-prevention-and-control-covid-19-healthcaresettings
20. Rational use of PPE for COVID-19. https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/331498/WHO-2019nCoV-IPCPPE_use-2020.2-eng.pdf
21. Risk factors of Healthcare Workers with Corona Virus Disease 2019: A Retrospective Cohort Study in a Designated Hospital of Wuhan in China. https://academic.oup.com/cid/advancearticle/doi/10.1093/cid/ciaa287/5808788
22. Infection Prevention and Control (IPC) for Novel Coronavirus (COVID-19) Course. https://openwho.org/courses/COVID-19-IPC-EN
WHO continues to monitor the situation closely for any changes that may affect this interim guidance. Should any factors change, WHO will issue a further update. Otherwise, this scientific brief will expire 2 years after the date of publication.
https://www.who.int/...mmentaries/detail/modes-of-transmission-of-virus-causing-covid-19-implications-for-ipc-precaution-recommendations[4/21/2020 1:35:23 PM]

Modes of transmission of virus causing COVID-19: implications for IPC precaution recommendations
Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 35-4 filed 06/12/20 PageID.451 Page 8 of 8 © World Health Organization 2020. Some rights reserved. This work is available under the CC BY-NC-SA 3.0 IGO license.
WHO reference number: WHO/2019-nCoV/Sci_Brief/Transmission_modes/2020.2
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Modes of transmission of virus causing COVID-19
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Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 35-5 filed 06/12/20 PageID.452 Page 1 of 6

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

LEAGUE OF INDEPENDENT FITNESS FACILITIES AND TRAINERS, INC., BASELINE FITNESS LLC, BUILDING YOUR TEMPLE LLC, BYT FITNESS 247 LLC, CLAWSON FITNESS, LLC, CLINTON FITNESS, INC., D-LUX KARATE UNIVERSITY, LLC, FENTON ATHLETIC CLUB, INC., FENTON KARATE, LLC, FUSION FITNESS 24/7 LLC, H3 FITNESS LLC, I FITNESS PERSONAL TRAINING, INC., JKP FITNESS, LLC, JPF ENTERPRISES, LLC, M FITNESS CLUB, LLC, MH & AB LLC, MOTOR CITY CF – ST. CLAIR SHORES, LLC, NASCOT ENTERPRISES, LLC, PRISON CITY PHYSIQUE, LLC, FMP FITNESS INC., STRENGTH BEYOND LLC, 24/7 BOOTCAMP AND BOXING, INC., and 4 SEASONS GYM, LLC,

No. 20-cv-00458 HON. PAUL L. MALONEY EXHIBIT D

Plaintiffs,

v

GRETCHEN E. WHITMER and ROBERT E. GORDON,

Defendants.

Scott M. Erskine (P54734) Carly Van Thomme (P59706) Erskine Law, P.C. Attorneys for Plaintiffs 612 W. University Rochester, MI 48307

John G. Fedynsky (P65232) Andrew J. Jurgensen (P81123) Joseph T. Froehlich (P71887) Joshua O. Booth (P53847) Christopher M. Allen (P75329) Assistant Attorneys General

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 35-5 filed 06/12/20 PageID.453 Page 2 of 6

(248) 601-4499 serskine@erskinelaw.com cvanthomme@erskinelaw.com

Attorneys for Defendants Michigan Dep’t of Attorney General State Operations Division P.O. Box 30754 Lansing, MI 48909 (517) 335-7573 fedynskyj@michigan.gov jurgensena2@michigan.gov froehlichj1@michigan.gov boothj2@michigan.gov allenc28@michigan.gov
EXHIBIT D

2

Social Distancing, Quarantine, and Isolation
Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 35-5 filed 06/12/20 PageID.454 Page 3 of 6
Search


Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19)
Social Distancing

Keep Your Distance to Slow the Spread
OOtthherr LLaanngguaugaegses PPrriinnt PPaaggee
Limiting face-to-face contact with others is the best way to reduce the spread of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19).
What is social distancing?
Social distancing, also called “physical distancing,” means keeping space between yourself and other people outside of your home. To practice social or physical distancing:
Stay at least 6 feet (2 meters) from other people Do not gather in groups Stay out of crowded places and avoid mass gatherings
In addition to everyday steps to prevent COVID-19, keeping space between you and others is one of the best tools we have to avoid being exposed to this virus and slowing its spread locally and across the country and world.
When COVID-19 is spreading in your area, everyone should limit close contact with individuals outside your household in indoor and outdoor spaces. Since people can spread the virus before they know they are sick, it is important to stay away from others when possible, even if you have no symptoms. Social distancing is especially important for people who are at higher risk of getting very sick.

Why practice social distancing?
COVID-19 spreads mainly among people who are in close contact (within about 6 feet) for a
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/prevent-getting-sick/social-distancing.html[4/21/2020 1:36:26 PM]

Social Distancing, Quarantine, and Isolation
Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 35-5 filed 06/12/20 PageID.455 Page 4 of 6 prolonged period. Spread happens when an infected person coughs, sneezes, or talks, and droplets from their mouth or nose are launched into the air and land in the mouths or noses of people nearby. The droplets can also be inhaled into the lungs. Recent studies indicate that people who are infected but do not have symptoms likely also play a role in the spread of COVID-19.
It may be possible that a person can get COVID-19 by touching a surface or object that has the virus on it and then touching their own mouth, nose, or eyes. However, this is not thought to be the main way the virus spreads. COVID-19 can live for hours or days on a surface, depending on factors such as sun light and humidity. Social distancing helps limit contact with infected people and contaminated surfaces.
Although the risk of severe illness may be different for everyone, anyone can get and spread COVID-19. Everyone has a role to play in slowing the spread and protecting themselves, their family, and their community.
Tips for social distancing
Follow guidance from authorities where you live. If you need to shop for food or medicine at the grocery store or pharmacy, stay at least 6 feet away from others.
Use mail-order for medications, if possible. Consider a grocery delivery service. Cover your mouth and nose with a cloth face cover when around others, including when you have to go out in public, for example to the grocery store.
Stay at least 6 feet between yourself and others, even when you wear a face covering.
Avoid large and small gatherings in private places and public spaces, such a friend’s house, parks, restaurants, shops, or any other place. This advice applies to people of any age, including teens and younger adults. Children should not have in-person playdates while school is out. To help maintain social connections while social distancing, learn tips to keep children healthy while school’s out. Work from home when possible. If possible, avoid using any kind of public transportation, ridesharing, or taxis. If you are a student or parent, talk to your school about options for digital/distance learning.
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/prevent-getting-sick/social-distancing.html[4/21/2020 1:36:26 PM]

Social Distancing, Quarantine, and Isolation
Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 35-5 filed 06/12/20 PageID.456 Page 5 of 6 Stay connected while staying away. It is very important to stay in touch with friends and family that don’t live in your home. Call, video chat, or stay connected using social media. Everyone reacts differently to stressful situations and having to socially distance yourself from someone you love can be difficult. Read tips for stress and coping.
What is the difference between quarantine and isolation?
Quarantine
Quarantine is used to keep someone who might have been exposed to COVID-19 away from others. Someone in self-quarantine stays separated from others, and they limit movement outside of their home or current place. A person may have been exposed to the virus without knowing it (for example, when traveling or out in the community), or they could have the virus without feeling symptoms. Quarantine helps limit further spread of COVID-19.
Isolation
Isolation is used to separate sick people from healthy people. People who are in isolation should stay home. In the home, anyone sick should separate themselves from others by staying in a specific “sick” bedroom or space and using a different bathroom (if possible).
What should I do if I might have been exposed? If I feel sick? Or have confirmed COVID-19?
If you think you have been exposed to COVID-19, read about symptoms.
If you or someone in your home might have been exposed
Self-Monitor
Be alert for symptoms. Watch for fever,* cough, or shortness of breath.
Take your temperature if symptoms develop.
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/prevent-getting-sick/social-distancing.html[4/21/2020 1:36:26 PM]

Social Distancing, Quarantine, and Isolation
Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 35-5 filed 06/12/20 PageID.457 Page 6 of 6 Practice social distancing. Maintain 6 feet of distance from others, and stay out of crowded places. Follow CDC guidance if symptoms develop.
If you feel healthy but: Recently had close contact with a person with COVID-19, or Recently traveled from somewhere outside the U.S. or on a cruise ship or river boat
Self-Quarantine Check your temperature twice a day and watch for symptoms. Stay home for 14 days and selfmonitor. If possible, stay away from people who are high-risk for getting very sick from COVID-19.
If you: Have been diagnosed with COVID-19, or Are waiting for test results, or Have symptoms such as cough, fever, or shortness of breath
Self-Isolate
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/prevent-getting-sick/social-distancing.html[4/21/2020 1:36:26 PM]

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 35-6 filed 06/12/20 PageID.458 Page 1 of 8

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

LEAGUE OF INDEPENDENT FITNESS FACILITIES AND TRAINERS, INC., BASELINE FITNESS LLC, BUILDING YOUR TEMPLE LLC, BYT FITNESS 247 LLC, CLAWSON FITNESS, LLC, CLINTON FITNESS, INC., D-LUX KARATE UNIVERSITY, LLC, FENTON ATHLETIC CLUB, INC., FENTON KARATE, LLC, FUSION FITNESS 24/7 LLC, H3 FITNESS LLC, I FITNESS PERSONAL TRAINING, INC., JKP FITNESS, LLC, JPF ENTERPRISES, LLC, M FITNESS CLUB, LLC, MH & AB LLC, MOTOR CITY CF – ST. CLAIR SHORES, LLC, NASCOT ENTERPRISES, LLC, PRISON CITY PHYSIQUE, LLC, FMP FITNESS INC., STRENGTH BEYOND LLC, 24/7 BOOTCAMP AND BOXING, INC., and 4 SEASONS GYM, LLC,

No. 20-cv-00458 HON. PAUL L. MALONEY EXHIBIT E

Plaintiffs,

v

GRETCHEN E. WHITMER and ROBERT E. GORDON,

Defendants.

Scott M. Erskine (P54734) Carly Van Thomme (P59706) Erskine Law, P.C. Attorneys for Plaintiffs 612 W. University Rochester, MI 48307

John G. Fedynsky (P65232) Andrew J. Jurgensen (P81123) Joseph T. Froehlich (P71887) Joshua O. Booth (P53847) Christopher M. Allen (P75329) Assistant Attorneys General

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 35-6 filed 06/12/20 PageID.459 Page 2 of 8

(248) 601-4499 serskine@erskinelaw.com cvanthomme@erskinelaw.com

Attorneys for Defendants Michigan Dep’t of Attorney General State Operations Division P.O. Box 30754 Lansing, MI 48909 (517) 335-7573 fedynskyj@michigan.gov jurgensena2@michigan.gov froehlichj1@michigan.gov boothj2@michigan.gov allenc28@michigan.gov
EXHIBIT E

2

How to Flatten the Curve on Coronavirus - The New York Times
Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 35-6 filed 06/12/20 PageID.460 Page 3 of 8
SCIENCE |
SUBSSCUBSRCRIIBBE NEOWNOWAccount
› The Coronavirus Outbreak

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Flattening the Coronavirus Curve
One chart explains why slowing the spread of the infection is nearly as important as stopping it.
https://www.nytimes.com/article/flatten-curve-coronavirus.html[4/21/2020 1:37:03 PM]

How to Flatten the Curve on Coronavirus - The New York Times
Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 35-6 filed 06/12/20 PageID.461 Page 4 of 8
The longer it takes for coronavirus to spread the population, the more time hospitals have to prepare. Drew Harris
By Siobhan Roberts March 27, 2020
At the end of February, Drew Harris, a population health analyst at Thomas Jefferson University in Philadelphia, had just flown across the country to visit his daughter in Eugene, Ore., when he saw an article on his Google news feed. It was from The Economist, and was about limiting the damage of the coronavirus. The accompanying art, by the visual-data journalist Rosamund Pearce, based on a graphic that had appeared in a C.D.C. paper titled “Community Mitigation Guidelines to Prevent Pandemic Influenza,” showed what Dr. Harris called two epi curves. One had a steep peak indicating a surge of coronavirus outbreak in the near term; the other had a flatter slope, indicating a more gradual rate of infection over a longer period of time. The gentler curve results in fewer people infected at this critical moment in time — preventing a surge that would inundate the healthcare system and ultimately, one hopes, resulting in fewer deaths. “What we need to do is flatten that down,” said Dr. Anthony Fauci, director of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, during the coronavirus task force briefing at the White House on a Tuesday evening in early March. “You do that with trying to interfere with the natural flow of the outbreak.” The infographic reminded Dr. Harris of something similar that he had designed years earlier for a pandemic preparedness training program. “Folks in the preparedness and public health community have been
https://www.nytimes.com/article/flatten-curve-coronavirus.html[4/21/2020 1:37:03 PM]

How to Flatten the Curve on Coronavirus - The New York Times
Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 35-6 filed 06/12/20 PageID.462 Page 5 of 8
thinking about all of these issues for many years,” Dr. Harris said in an email. “Understanding and managing surge is an important part of preparedness.” But during the training course, Dr. Harris’s students had struggled with the concept of reducing the epidemic curve, so he added a dotted line indicating hospital capacity — “to make clear what was at stake,” he said.
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After his visit with his daughter, Dr. Harris was waiting for his return flight in Portland when the first Oregon coronavirus case was announced; he had dinner at a busy airport bar and thought about how quiet the place would be in a week or two when the reality of the outbreak set in. Once home, he recreated his graphic and posted it on Twitter and LinkedIn, and was pleased to see the enthusiastic interest in flattening the curve.
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“Now I know what going viral means,” Dr. Harris said. (For a more detailed analysis, see a recent paper in The Lancet, “How will country-based mitigation measures influence the course of the COVID-19 epidemic?”)
Help us report in critical moments. Subscribe today to support The Times
The following is an edited version of our email conversation.
https://www.nytimes.com/article/flatten-curve-coronavirus.html[4/21/2020 1:37:03 PM]

How to Flatten the Curve on Coronavirus - The New York Times
Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 35-6 filed 06/12/20 PageID.463 Page 6 of 8
What does it mean to “flatten the curve”?
The ideal goal in fighting an epidemic or pandemic is to completely halt the spread. But merely slowing it — mitigation — is critical. This reduces the number of cases that are active at any given time, which in turn gives doctors, hospitals, police, schools and vaccine-manufacturers time to prepare and respond, without becoming overwhelmed. Most hospitals can function with 10 percent reduction in staff, but not with half their people out at once. Some commentators have argued for getting the outbreak over with quickly. That is a recipe for panic, unnecessary suffering and death. Slowing and spreading out the tidal wave of cases will save lives. Flattening the curve keeps society going.
What exactly do those two curves show?
Both curves add up the number of new cases over time. The more people reporting with the virus on a given day, the higher the curve; a high curve means the virus is spreading fast. A low curve shows that the virus is spreading slower — fewer people are diagnosed with the disease on any given day. Keeping the curve down — diminishing the rate at which new cases occur — prevents overtaxing the finite resources (represented by the dotted line) available to treat it.
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Think of the health care system capacity as a subway car that can only hold so many people at once. During rush hour, that capacity is not enough to handle the demand, so people must wait on the platform for their turn to ride. Staggering work hours diminishes the rush hour and increases the likelihood that you will get on the train and maybe even get a seat. Avoiding a surge of coronavirus cases can ensure that anyone who needs care will find it at the hospital.
Sign up to receive an email when we publish a new story about the coronavirus outbreak. SigSignn UUp p
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How to Flatten the Curve on Coronavirus - The New York Times
Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 35-6 filed 06/12/20 PageID.464 Page 7 of 8
What sorts of mitigation measures help transform the red curve into the blue curve?
Diseases spread when one person gives it to one or more others, who go on to give it to more people, and so on. How fast this occurs depends on many factors, including how contagious the disease is, how many people are vulnerable and how quickly they get sick.
The difference between seasonal flu and coronavirus is that many people have full or partial immunity to the flu virus because they have had it before or were vaccinated against it. Far more people are vulnerable to coronavirus, so it has many more targets of opportunity to spread. Keeping people apart in time and space with social distancing measures, selfisolation and actual quarantine decreases opportunities for transmission.
To take the subway example again, a packed car — or a packed subway platform — is a great place to spread the virus. But reducing the number of people on the train or platform, by asking people to work from home or to stagger their working hours, enables individuals to stay farther apart, limiting the spread of the virus. That is social distancing in action.
Mitigation efforts keep people farther apart, making every transmission opportunity marginally less likely. This slows the spread. We should, and will, take the most vulnerable people out of the population altogether by keeping them totally separate. This is what Washington State is trying to do by limiting visitors to nursing homes. Think of this as a reverse quarantine.
What are you doing day-to-day in response to these unusual times?
Like most everyone else, I’m more aware of my surroundings and behaviors. I try to use a sleeve or elbow to open doors, and I wash my hands or use hand sanitizers after I touch a surface that might be contaminated. And I made sure to have a good supply of my prescription and nonprescription medications, just in case any shortages occur after the shutdown of Chinese pharmaceutical suppliers. I’m following the lead of my public health officials here in Philadelphia, where there is only one case as of Tuesday, and travel isn’t restricted. I’m avoiding crowds and sick people. I am going out, and will continue to do so unless a quarantine is ordered or public places are closed.
I know there is a good chance that I will catch the virus before a vaccine becomes available, but I also believe I’m very likely to do fine. I’m not in any high-risk group. But I worry about the more vulnerable folks and want
https://www.nytimes.com/article/flatten-curve-coronavirus.html[4/21/2020 1:37:03 PM]

How to Flatten the Curve on Coronavirus - The New York Times
Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 35-6 filed 06/12/20 PageID.465 Page 8 of 8
to do what I can to prevent the spread. I also worry about people who lack the resources I have. What happens to the self-employed, hourly workers and people in the gig economy when business stops? What about the homeless who depend upon charity and services for support? It’s these second-order effects that could be just as devastating if this epidemic really takes off.
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Coronavirus and statistics The Exponential Power of Now March 13, 2020
The Coronavirus, by the Numbers March 5, 2020
https://www.nytimes.com/article/flatten-curve-coronavirus.html[4/21/2020 1:37:03 PM]

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 35-7 filed 06/12/20 PageID.466 Page 1 of 4

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

LEAGUE OF INDEPENDENT FITNESS FACILITIES AND TRAINERS, INC., BASELINE FITNESS LLC, BUILDING YOUR TEMPLE LLC, BYT FITNESS 247 LLC, CLAWSON FITNESS, LLC, CLINTON FITNESS, INC., D-LUX KARATE UNIVERSITY, LLC, FENTON ATHLETIC CLUB, INC., FENTON KARATE, LLC, FUSION FITNESS 24/7 LLC, H3 FITNESS LLC, I FITNESS PERSONAL TRAINING, INC., JKP FITNESS, LLC, JPF ENTERPRISES, LLC, M FITNESS CLUB, LLC, MH & AB LLC, MOTOR CITY CF – ST. CLAIR SHORES, LLC, NASCOT ENTERPRISES, LLC, PRISON CITY PHYSIQUE, LLC, FMP FITNESS INC., STRENGTH BEYOND LLC, 24/7 BOOTCAMP AND BOXING, INC., and 4 SEASONS GYM, LLC,

No. 20-cv-00458 HON. PAUL L. MALONEY EXHIBIT F

Plaintiffs,

v

GRETCHEN E. WHITMER and ROBERT E. GORDON,

Defendants.

Scott M. Erskine (P54734) Carly Van Thomme (P59706) Erskine Law, P.C. Attorneys for Plaintiffs 612 W. University Rochester, MI 48307

John G. Fedynsky (P65232) Andrew J. Jurgensen (P81123) Joseph T. Froehlich (P71887) Joshua O. Booth (P53847) Christopher M. Allen (P75329) Assistant Attorneys General

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 35-7 filed 06/12/20 PageID.467 Page 2 of 4

(248) 601-4499 serskine@erskinelaw.com cvanthomme@erskinelaw.com

Attorneys for Defendants Michigan Dep’t of Attorney General State Operations Division P.O. Box 30754 Lansing, MI 48909 (517) 335-7573 fedynskyj@michigan.gov jurgensena2@michigan.gov froehlichj1@michigan.gov boothj2@michigan.gov allenc28@michigan.gov
EXHIBIT F

2

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Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 35-8 filed 06/12/20 PageID.470 Page 1 of 4

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

LEAGUE OF INDEPENDENT FITNESS FACILITIES AND TRAINERS, INC., BASELINE FITNESS LLC, BUILDING YOUR TEMPLE LLC, BYT FITNESS 247 LLC, CLAWSON FITNESS, LLC, CLINTON FITNESS, INC., D-LUX KARATE UNIVERSITY, LLC, FENTON ATHLETIC CLUB, INC., FENTON KARATE, LLC, FUSION FITNESS 24/7 LLC, H3 FITNESS LLC, I FITNESS PERSONAL TRAINING, INC., JKP FITNESS, LLC, JPF ENTERPRISES, LLC, M FITNESS CLUB, LLC, MH & AB LLC, MOTOR CITY CF – ST. CLAIR SHORES, LLC, NASCOT ENTERPRISES, LLC, PRISON CITY PHYSIQUE, LLC, FMP FITNESS INC., STRENGTH BEYOND LLC, 24/7 BOOTCAMP AND BOXING, INC., and 4 SEASONS GYM, LLC,

No. 20-cv-00458 HON. PAUL L. MALONEY EXHIBIT G

Plaintiffs,

v

GRETCHEN E. WHITMER and ROBERT E. GORDON,

Defendants.

Scott M. Erskine (P54734) Carly Van Thomme (P59706) Erskine Law, P.C. Attorneys for Plaintiffs 612 W. University Rochester, MI 48307

John G. Fedynsky (P65232) Andrew J. Jurgensen (P81123) Joseph T. Froehlich (P71887) Joshua O. Booth (P53847) Christopher M. Allen (P75329) Assistant Attorneys General

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 35-8 filed 06/12/20 PageID.471 Page 2 of 4

(248) 601-4499 serskine@erskinelaw.com cvanthomme@erskinelaw.com

Attorneys for Defendants Michigan Dep’t of Attorney General State Operations Division P.O. Box 30754 Lansing, MI 48909 (517) 335-7573 fedynskyj@michigan.gov jurgensena2@michigan.gov froehlichj1@michigan.gov boothj2@michigan.gov allenc28@michigan.gov
EXHIBIT G

2

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Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 35-9 filed 06/12/20 PageID.474 Page 1 of 5

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

LEAGUE OF INDEPENDENT FITNESS FACILITIES AND TRAINERS, INC., BASELINE FITNESS LLC, BUILDING YOUR TEMPLE LLC, BYT FITNESS 247 LLC, CLAWSON FITNESS, LLC, CLINTON FITNESS, INC., D-LUX KARATE UNIVERSITY, LLC, FENTON ATHLETIC CLUB, INC., FENTON KARATE, LLC, FUSION FITNESS 24/7 LLC, H3 FITNESS LLC, I FITNESS PERSONAL TRAINING, INC., JKP FITNESS, LLC, JPF ENTERPRISES, LLC, M FITNESS CLUB, LLC, MH & AB LLC, MOTOR CITY CF – ST. CLAIR SHORES, LLC, NASCOT ENTERPRISES, LLC, PRISON CITY PHYSIQUE, LLC, FMP FITNESS INC., STRENGTH BEYOND LLC, 24/7 BOOTCAMP AND BOXING, INC., and 4 SEASONS GYM, LLC,

No. 20-cv-00458 HON. PAUL L. MALONEY EXHIBIT H

Plaintiffs,

v

GRETCHEN E. WHITMER and ROBERT E. GORDON,

Defendants.

Scott M. Erskine (P54734) Carly Van Thomme (P59706) Erskine Law, P.C. Attorneys for Plaintiffs 612 W. University Rochester, MI 48307

John G. Fedynsky (P65232) Andrew J. Jurgensen (P81123) Joseph T. Froehlich (P71887) Joshua O. Booth (P53847) Christopher M. Allen (P75329) Assistant Attorneys General

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 35-9 filed 06/12/20 PageID.475 Page 2 of 5

(248) 601-4499 serskine@erskinelaw.com cvanthomme@erskinelaw.com

Attorneys for Defendants Michigan Dep’t of Attorney General State Operations Division P.O. Box 30754 Lansing, MI 48909 (517) 335-7573 fedynskyj@michigan.gov jurgensena2@michigan.gov froehlichj1@michigan.gov boothj2@michigan.gov allenc28@michigan.gov
EXHIBIT H

2

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Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 35-9 filed 06/12/20 PageID.477 Page 4 of 5

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 35-9 filed 06/12/20 PageID.478 Page 5 of 5

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 35-10 filed 06/12/20 PageID.479 Page 1 of 5

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

LEAGUE OF INDEPENDENT FITNESS FACILITIES AND TRAINERS, INC., BASELINE FITNESS LLC, BUILDING YOUR TEMPLE LLC, BYT FITNESS 247 LLC, CLAWSON FITNESS, LLC, CLINTON FITNESS, INC., D-LUX KARATE UNIVERSITY, LLC, FENTON ATHLETIC CLUB, INC., FENTON KARATE, LLC, FUSION FITNESS 24/7 LLC, H3 FITNESS LLC, I FITNESS PERSONAL TRAINING, INC., JKP FITNESS, LLC, JPF ENTERPRISES, LLC, M FITNESS CLUB, LLC, MH & AB LLC, MOTOR CITY CF – ST. CLAIR SHORES, LLC, NASCOT ENTERPRISES, LLC, PRISON CITY PHYSIQUE, LLC, FMP FITNESS INC., STRENGTH BEYOND LLC, 24/7 BOOTCAMP AND BOXING, INC., and 4 SEASONS GYM, LLC,

No. 20-cv-00458 HON. PAUL L. MALONEY EXHIBIT I

Plaintiffs,

v

GRETCHEN E. WHITMER and ROBERT E. GORDON,

Defendants.

Scott M. Erskine (P54734) Carly Van Thomme (P59706) Erskine Law, P.C. Attorneys for Plaintiffs 612 W. University Rochester, MI 48307

John G. Fedynsky (P65232) Andrew J. Jurgensen (P81123) Joseph T. Froehlich (P71887) Joshua O. Booth (P53847) Christopher M. Allen (P75329) Assistant Attorneys General

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 35-10 filed 06/12/20 PageID.480 Page 2 of 5

(248) 601-4499 serskine@erskinelaw.com cvanthomme@erskinelaw.com

Attorneys for Defendants Michigan Dep’t of Attorney General State Operations Division P.O. Box 30754 Lansing, MI 48909 (517) 335-7573 fedynskyj@michigan.gov jurgensena2@michigan.gov froehlichj1@michigan.gov boothj2@michigan.gov allenc28@michigan.gov
EXHIBIT I

2

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Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 35-10 filed 06/12/20 PageID.483 Page 5 of 5

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 35-11 filed 06/12/20 PageID.484 Page 1 of 10

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

LEAGUE OF INDEPENDENT FITNESS FACILITIES AND TRAINERS, INC., BASELINE FITNESS LLC, BUILDING YOUR TEMPLE LLC, BYT FITNESS 247 LLC, CLAWSON FITNESS, LLC, CLINTON FITNESS, INC., D-LUX KARATE UNIVERSITY, LLC, FENTON ATHLETIC CLUB, INC., FENTON KARATE, LLC, FUSION FITNESS 24/7 LLC, H3 FITNESS LLC, I FITNESS PERSONAL TRAINING, INC., JKP FITNESS, LLC, JPF ENTERPRISES, LLC, M FITNESS CLUB, LLC, MH & AB LLC, MOTOR CITY CF – ST. CLAIR SHORES, LLC, NASCOT ENTERPRISES, LLC, PRISON CITY PHYSIQUE, LLC, FMP FITNESS INC., STRENGTH BEYOND LLC, 24/7 BOOTCAMP AND BOXING, INC., and 4 SEASONS GYM, LLC,

No. 20-cv-00458 HON. PAUL L. MALONEY EXHIBIT J

Plaintiffs,

v

GRETCHEN E. WHITMER and ROBERT E. GORDON,

Defendants.

Scott M. Erskine (P54734) Carly Van Thomme (P59706) Erskine Law, P.C. Attorneys for Plaintiffs 612 W. University Rochester, MI 48307

John G. Fedynsky (P65232) Andrew J. Jurgensen (P81123) Joseph T. Froehlich (P71887) Joshua O. Booth (P53847) Christopher M. Allen (P75329) Assistant Attorneys General

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 35-11 filed 06/12/20 PageID.485 Page 2 of 10

(248) 601-4499 serskine@erskinelaw.com cvanthomme@erskinelaw.com

Attorneys for Defendants Michigan Dep’t of Attorney General State Operations Division P.O. Box 30754 Lansing, MI 48909 (517) 335-7573 fedynskyj@michigan.gov jurgensena2@michigan.gov froehlichj1@michigan.gov boothj2@michigan.gov allenc28@michigan.gov
EXHIBIT J

2

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Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 35-12 filed 06/12/20 PageID.494 Page 1 of 9

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

LEAGUE OF INDEPENDENT FITNESS FACILITIES AND TRAINERS, INC., BASELINE FITNESS LLC, BUILDING YOUR TEMPLE LLC, BYT FITNESS 247 LLC, CLAWSON FITNESS, LLC, CLINTON FITNESS, INC., D-LUX KARATE UNIVERSITY, LLC, FENTON ATHLETIC CLUB, INC., FENTON KARATE, LLC, FUSION FITNESS 24/7 LLC, H3 FITNESS LLC, I FITNESS PERSONAL TRAINING, INC., JKP FITNESS, LLC, JPF ENTERPRISES, LLC, M FITNESS CLUB, LLC, MH & AB LLC, MOTOR CITY CF – ST. CLAIR SHORES, LLC, NASCOT ENTERPRISES, LLC, PRISON CITY PHYSIQUE, LLC, FMP FITNESS INC., STRENGTH BEYOND LLC, 24/7 BOOTCAMP AND BOXING, INC., and 4 SEASONS GYM, LLC,

No. 20-cv-00458 HON. PAUL L. MALONEY EXHIBIT K

Plaintiffs,

v

GRETCHEN E. WHITMER and ROBERT E. GORDON,

Defendants.

Scott M. Erskine (P54734) Carly Van Thomme (P59706) Erskine Law, P.C. Attorneys for Plaintiffs 612 W. University Rochester, MI 48307

John G. Fedynsky (P65232) Andrew J. Jurgensen (P81123) Joseph T. Froehlich (P71887) Joshua O. Booth (P53847) Christopher M. Allen (P75329) Assistant Attorneys General

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 35-12 filed 06/12/20 PageID.495 Page 2 of 9

(248) 601-4499 serskine@erskinelaw.com cvanthomme@erskinelaw.com

Attorneys for Defendants Michigan Dep’t of Attorney General State Operations Division P.O. Box 30754 Lansing, MI 48909 (517) 335-7573 fedynskyj@michigan.gov jurgensena2@michigan.gov froehlichj1@michigan.gov boothj2@michigan.gov allenc28@michigan.gov
EXHIBIT K

2

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 35-12 filed 06/12/20 PageID.496 Page 3 of 9
EXECUTIVE ORDER
No. 2020-110
Temporary restrictions on certain events, gatherings, and businesses
Rescission of Executive Orders 2020-69 and 2020-96
The novel coronavirus (COVID-19) is a respiratory disease that can result in serious illness or death. It is caused by a new strain of coronavirus not previously identified in humans and easily spread from person to person. There is currently no approved vaccine or antiviral treatment for this disease.
On March 10, 2020, the Department of Health and Human Services identified the first two presumptive-positive cases of COVID-19 in Michigan. On that same day, I issued Executive Order 2020-4. This order declared a state of emergency across the state of Michigan under section 1 of article 5 of the Michigan Constitution of 1963, the Emergency Management Act, 1976 PA 390, as amended (EMA), MCL 30.401 et seq., and the Emergency Powers of the Governor Act of 1945, 1945 PA 302, as amended (EPGA), MCL 10.31 et seq.
Since then, the virus spread across Michigan, bringing deaths in the thousands, confirmed cases in the tens of thousands, and deep disruption to this state’s economy, homes, and educational, civic, social, and religious institutions. On April 1, 2020, in response to the widespread and severe health, economic, and social harms posed by the COVID-19 pandemic, I issued Executive Order 2020-33. This order expanded on Executive Order 2020-4 and declared both a state of emergency and a state of disaster across the State of Michigan under section 1 of article 5 of the Michigan Constitution of 1963, the Emergency Management Act, and the Emergency Powers of the Governor Act of 1945. And on April 30, 2020, finding that COVID-19 had created emergency and disaster conditions across the State of Michigan, I issued Executive Order 2020-67 to continue the emergency declaration under the Emergency Powers of the Governor Act, as well as Executive Order 2020-68 to issue new emergency and disaster declarations under the Emergency Management Act.
Those executive orders have been challenged in Michigan House of Representatives and Michigan Senate v Whitmer. On May 21, 2020, the Court of Claims ruled that Executive Order 2020-67 is a valid exercise of authority under the Emergency Powers of the Governor Act but that Executive Order 2020-68 is not a valid exercise of authority under the Emergency Management Act. Both of those rulings are being challenged on appeal.
GEORGE W. ROMNEY BUILDING • 111 SOUTH CAPITOL AVENUE • LANSING, MICHIGAN 48909 www.michigan.gov
PRINTED IN-HOUSE

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 35-12 filed 06/12/20 PageID.497 Page 4 of 9
On May 22, 2020, I issued Executive Order 2020-99, again finding that the COVID-19 pandemic constitutes a disaster and emergency throughout the State of Michigan. That order constituted a state of emergency declaration under the Emergency Powers of the Governor Act of 1945. And, to the extent the governor may declare a state of emergency and a state of disaster under the Emergency Management Act when emergency and disaster conditions exist yet the legislature has declined to grant an extension request, that order also constituted a state of emergency and state of disaster declaration under that act.
The Emergency Powers of the Governor Act provides a sufficient legal basis for issuing this executive order. In relevant part, it provides that, after declaring a state of emergency, “the governor may promulgate reasonable orders, rules, and regulations as he or she considers necessary to protect life and property or to bring the emergency situation within the affected area under control.” MCL 10.31(1).
Nevertheless, subject to the ongoing litigation and the possibility that current rulings may be overturned or otherwise altered on appeal, I also invoke the Emergency Management Act as a basis for executive action to combat the spread of COVID-19 and mitigate the effects of this emergency on the people of Michigan, with the intent to preserve the rights and protections provided by the EMA. The EMA vests the governor with broad powers and duties to “cop[e] with dangers to this state or the people of this state presented by a disaster or emergency,” which the governor may implement through “executive orders, proclamations, and directives having the force and effect of law.” MCL 30.403(1)–(2). This executive order falls within the scope of those powers and duties, and to the extent the governor may declare a state of emergency and a state of disaster under the Emergency Management Act when emergency and disaster conditions exist yet the legislature has not granted an extension request, they too provide a sufficient legal basis for this order.
To suppress the spread of COVID-19, to prevent the state’s health care system from being overwhelmed, to allow time for the production of critical test kits, ventilators, and personal protective equipment, to establish the public health infrastructure necessary to contain the spread of infection, and to avoid needless deaths, it was reasonable and necessary to direct residents to remain at home or in their place of residence to the maximum extent feasible. To that end, on March 23, 2020, I issued Executive Order 2020-21, ordering all people in Michigan to stay home and stay safe. In Executive Orders 2020-42, 2020-59, 2020-70, 202077, 2020-92, and 2020-96, I extended that initial order, modifying its scope as needed and appropriate to match the ever-changing circumstances presented by this pandemic.
The measures put in place by these executive orders have been effective: the number of new confirmed cases each day continues to drop. Although the virus remains aggressive and persistent—on May 31, 2020, Michigan reported 57,397 confirmed cases and 5,491 deaths— the strain on our health care system has begun to relent, even as our testing capacity has increased. We are now in the process of gradually resuming in-person work and activities. In so doing, however, we must move with care, patience, and vigilance, recognizing the grave harm that this virus continues to inflict on our state and how quickly our progress in suppressing it can be undone.
With this order, I find it reasonable and necessary to move the state to Stage 4 of the Michigan Safe Start Plan. As a result, Michiganders are no longer required to stay home. Instead, certain businesses will remain closed and specific activities that present a
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heightened risk of infection will remain prohibited. Any work that is capable of being performed remotely must be performed remotely.
Under this order, retailers will be allowed to resume operations on June 4. Restaurants and bars may reopen fully on June 8. Swimming pools and day camps for kids will also be permitted to reopen on the same day. Those businesses and activities will be subject to safety guidance to mitigate the risk of infection. Other businesses and activities that necessarily involve close contact and shared surfaces, including gyms, hair salons, indoor theaters, tattoo parlors, casinos, and similar establishments, will remain closed for the time being.
Michiganders must continue to wear face coverings when in enclosed public spaces and should continue to take all reasonable precautions to protect themselves, their co-workers, their loved ones, and their communities. Indoor social gatherings and events of more than 10 people are prohibited. Outdoor social gatherings and events are permitted so long as people maintain six feet of distance from one another and the assemblage consists of no more than 100 people.
Acting under the Michigan Constitution of 1963 and Michigan law, I order the following:
1. For purposes of this order, Michigan comprises eight separate regions.
(a) Region 1 includes the following counties: Monroe, Washtenaw, Livingston, Genesee, Lapeer, Saint Clair, Oakland, Macomb, and Wayne.
(b) Region 2 includes the following counties: Mason, Lake, Osceola, Clare, Oceana, Newaygo, Mecosta, Isabella, Muskegon, Montcalm, Ottawa, Kent, and Ionia.
(c) Region 3 includes the following counties: Allegan, Barry, Van Buren, Kalamazoo, Calhoun, Berrien, Cass, Saint Joseph, and Branch.
(d) Region 4 includes the following counties: Oscoda, Alcona, Ogemaw, Iosco, Gladwin, Arenac, Midland, Bay, Saginaw, Tuscola, Sanilac, and Huron.
(e) Region 5 includes the following counties: Gratiot, Clinton, Shiawassee, Eaton, and Ingham.
(f) Region 6 includes the following counties: Manistee, Wexford, Missaukee, Roscommon, Benzie, Grand Traverse, Kalkaska, Crawford, Leelanau, Antrim, Otsego, Montmorency, Alpena, Charlevoix, Cheboygan, Presque Isle, and Emmet.
(g) Region 7 includes the following counties: Hillsdale, Lenawee, and Jackson.
(h) Region 8 includes the following counties: Gogebic, Ontonagon, Houghton, Keweenaw, Iron, Baraga, Dickinson, Marquette, Menominee, Delta, Alger, Schoolcraft, Luce, Mackinac, and Chippewa.
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2. Any work that is capable of being performed remotely (i.e., without the worker leaving his or her home or place of residence) must be performed remotely.
3. Any business or operation that requires its employees to leave their home or place of residence for work is subject to the rules on workplace safeguards in Executive Order 2020-97 or any order that may follow from it.
4. Any individual who leaves his or her home or place of residence must:
(a) Follow social distancing measures recommended by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”), including remaining at least six feet from people from outside the individual’s household to the extent feasible under the circumstances.
(b) Wear a face covering over his or her nose and mouth—such as a homemade mask, scarf, bandana, or handkerchief—when in any enclosed public space, unless the individual is unable medically to tolerate a face covering.
(1) An individual may be required to temporarily remove a face covering upon entering an enclosed public space for identification purposes. An individual may also remove a face covering to eat or drink when seated at a restaurant or bar.
(2) Businesses and building owners, and those authorized to act on their behalf, are permitted to deny entry or access to any individual who refuses to comply with the rule in this subsection (b). Businesses and building owners will not be subject to a claim that they have violated the covenant of quiet enjoyment, to a claim of frustration of purpose, or to similar claims for denying entry or access to a person who refuses to comply with this subsection (b).
(3) Supplies of N95 masks and surgical masks should generally be reserved, for now, for health care professionals, first responders (e.g., police officers, fire fighters, paramedics), and other critical workers who interact with the public.
(4) The protections against discrimination in the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act, 1976 PA 453, as amended, MCL 37.2101 et seq., and any other protections against discrimination in Michigan law, apply in full force to individuals who wear a face covering under this order.
5. Indoor social gatherings and events among persons not part of a single household are permitted, but may not exceed 10 people.
6. Outdoor social gatherings and events among persons not part of a single household are permitted, but only to the extent that:
(a) The gathering or event does not exceed 100 people, and
(b) People not part of the same household maintain six feet of distance from one another.
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7. Unless otherwise prohibited by local regulation, outdoor parks and recreational facilities may be open, provided that they make any reasonable modifications necessary to enable employees and patrons not part of the same household to maintain six feet of distance from one another, and provided that areas in which social distancing cannot be maintained be closed, subject to guidance issued by the Department of Health and Human Services.
8. Unless otherwise prohibited by local regulation, public swimming pools, as defined by MCL 333.12521(d), may open as of June 8, 2020, provided that they are outdoors and limit capacity to 50% of the bather capacity limits described in Rule 325.2193 of the Michigan Administrative Code, and subject to guidance issued by the Department of Health and Human Services. Indoor public swimming pools must remain closed.
9. Day camps for children, as defined by Rule 400.11101(i) of the Michigan Administrative Code, may open as of June 8, 2020, subject to guidance issued by the Department of Licensing and Regulatory Affairs. Residential, travel, and troop camps within the meaning of Rule 400.11101(n), (p), or (q) of the Michigan Administrative Code must remain closed for the time being.
10. Unless otherwise prohibited by local regulation, libraries and museums may open as of June 8, 2020, subject to the rules governing retail stores described in Executive Order 2020-97 or any order that may follow from it.
11. Stores that were closed under Executive Order 2020-96 (or that were open only by appointment under the same order) must remain closed to the public (or open only by appointment) until June 4 at 12:01 am. Such stores may then resume normal operations, subject to local regulation and to the capacity constraints and workplace standards described in Executive Order 2020-97 or any order that may follow from it.
12. Subject to the exceptions in section 14, the following places are closed to ingress, egress, use, and occupancy by members of the public:
(a) Indoor theaters, cinemas, and performance venues.
(b) Indoor gymnasiums, fitness centers, recreation centers, sports facilities, exercise facilities, exercise studios, and the like.
(c) Facilities offering non-essential personal care services, including hair, nail, tanning, massage, traditional spa, tattoo, body art, and piercing services, and similar personal care services that involve close contact of persons.
(d) Casinos licensed by the Michigan Gaming Control Board, racetracks licensed by the Michigan Gaming Control Board, and Millionaire Parties licensed by the Michigan Gaming Control Board.
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(e) Indoor services or facilities, or outdoor services or facilities involving close contact of persons, for amusement or other recreational or entertainment purposes, such as amusement parks, arcades, bingo halls, bowling alleys, indoor climbing facilities, indoor dance areas, skating rinks, trampoline parks, and other similar recreational or entertainment facilities.
13. Unless otherwise prohibited by local regulation, restaurants, food courts, cafes, coffeehouses, bars, taverns, brew pubs, breweries, microbreweries, distilleries, wineries, tasting rooms, special licensees, clubs, and like places may be open to the public as follows:
(a) For delivery service, window service, walk-up service, drive-through service, or drive-up service, and may permit up to five members of the public at one time for the purpose of picking up their food or beverage orders, so long as those individuals are at least six feet apart from one another while on premises.
(b) In Regions 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 7, beginning at 12:01 am on June 8, 2020, for outdoor and indoor seating, subject to the capacity constraints and workplace standards described in Executive Order 2020-97 or any order that may follow from it.
(c) In Regions 6 and 8, for outdoor and indoor seating, subject to the capacity constraints and workplace standards described in Executive Order 2020-97 or any order that may follow from it.
14. The restrictions imposed by sections 12 and 13 of this order do not apply to any of the following:
(a) Outdoor fitness classes, athletic practices, training sessions, or games, provided that coaches, spectators, and participants not from the same household maintain six feet of distance from one another at all times during such activities, and that equipment and supplies are shared to the minimum extent possible and are subject to frequent and thorough disinfection and cleaning.
(b) Services necessary for medical treatment as determined by a licensed medical provider.
(c) Health care facilities, residential care facilities, congregate care facilities, and juvenile justice facilities.
(d) Crisis shelters or similar institutions.
(e) Food courts inside the secured zones of airports.
(f) Employees, contractors, vendors, or suppliers who enter, use, or occupy the places described in section 12 of this order in their professional capacity.
15. Nothing in this order should be taken to interfere with or infringe on the powers of the legislative and judicial branches to perform their constitutional duties or exercise their authority. Similarly, nothing in this order shall be taken to abridge
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protections guaranteed by the state or federal constitution under these emergency circumstances.
16. Consistent with prior guidance, neither a place of religious worship nor its owner is subject to penalty under section 19 of this order for allowing religious worship at such place. No individual is subject to penalty under section 19 of this order for engaging in religious worship at a place of religious worship, or for violating the face covering requirement of section 4(b) of this order.
17. Executive Orders 2020-69 and 2020-96 are rescinded. Except as specified, nothing in this order supersedes any other executive order. This order takes effect immediately unless otherwise specified.
18. In determining whether to maintain, intensify, or relax the restrictions in this order, I will consider, among other things, (1) data on COVID-19 infections and the disease’s rate of spread; (2) whether sufficient medical personnel, hospital beds, and ventilators exist to meet anticipated medical need; (3) the availability of personal protective equipment for the health care workforce; (4) the state’s capacity to test for COVID-19 cases and isolate infected people; and (5) economic conditions in the state.
19. Consistent with MCL 10.33 and MCL 30.405(3), a willful violation of this order is a misdemeanor.
Given under my hand and the Great Seal of the State of Michigan.

Date: June 1, 2020 Time: 2:27 pm

___________________________________ GRETCHEN WHITMER GOVERNOR
By the Governor:
___________________________________ SECRETARY OF STATE
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

LEAGUE OF INDEPENDENT FITNESS FACILITIES AND TRAINERS, INC., BASELINE FITNESS LLC, BUILDING YOUR TEMPLE LLC, BYT FITNESS 247 LLC, CLAWSON FITNESS, LLC, CLINTON FITNESS, INC., D-LUX KARATE UNIVERSITY, LLC, FENTON ATHLETIC CLUB, INC., FENTON KARATE, LLC, FUSION FITNESS 24/7 LLC, H3 FITNESS LLC, I FITNESS PERSONAL TRAINING, INC., JKP FITNESS, LLC, JPF ENTERPRISES, LLC, M FITNESS CLUB, LLC, MH & AB LLC, MOTOR CITY CF – ST. CLAIR SHORES, LLC, NASCOT ENTERPRISES, LLC, PRISON CITY PHYSIQUE, LLC, FMP FITNESS INC., STRENGTH BEYOND LLC, 24/7 BOOTCAMP AND BOXING, INC., and 4 SEASONS GYM, LLC,

No. 20-cv-00458 HON. PAUL L. MALONEY EXHIBIT L

Plaintiffs,

v

GRETCHEN E. WHITMER and ROBERT E. GORDON,

Defendants.

Scott M. Erskine (P54734) Carly Van Thomme (P59706) Erskine Law, P.C. Attorneys for Plaintiffs 612 W. University Rochester, MI 48307

John G. Fedynsky (P65232) Andrew J. Jurgensen (P81123) Joseph T. Froehlich (P71887) Joshua O. Booth (P53847) Christopher M. Allen (P75329) Assistant Attorneys General

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(248) 601-4499 serskine@erskinelaw.com cvanthomme@erskinelaw.com

Attorneys for Defendants Michigan Dep’t of Attorney General State Operations Division P.O. Box 30754 Lansing, MI 48909 (517) 335-7573 fedynskyj@michigan.gov jurgensena2@michigan.gov froehlichj1@michigan.gov boothj2@michigan.gov allenc28@michigan.gov
EXHIBIT L

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OFFICIAL WEBSITE OF MICHIGAN.GOV

THE OFFICE OF
GOVERNOR GRETCHEN WHITMER

Í

WHITMER / NEWS / EXECUTIVE ORDERS

Executive Order 2020-115 (COVID-19) (June 5, 2020)

EXECUTIVE ORDER
No. 2020-115
Temporary restrictions on certain events, gatherings, and businesses
The novel coronavirus (COVID-19) is a respiratory disease that can result in serious illness or death. It is caused by a new strain of coronavirus not previously identified in humans and easily spread from person to person. There is currently no approved vaccine or antiviral treatment for this disease.
On March 10, 2020, the Department of Health and Human Services identified the first two presumptive-positive cases of COVID-19 in Michigan. On that same day, I issued Executive Order 2020-4. This order declared a state of emergency across the state of Michigan under section 1 of article 5 of the Michigan Constitution of 1963, the Emergency Management Act, 1976 PA 390, as amended (EMA), MCL 30.401 et seq., and the Emergency Powers of the Governor Act of 1945, 1945 PA 302, as amended (EPGA), MCL 10.31 et seq.
Since then, the virus spread across Michigan, bringing deaths in the thousands, confirmed cases in the tens of thousands, and deep disruption to this state’s economy, homes, and educational, civic, social, and religious institutions. On April 1, 2020, in response to the widespread and severe health, economic, and social harms posed by the COVID-19 pandemic, I issued Executive Order 2020-33. This order expanded on Executive Order 2020-4 and declared both a state of emergency and a state of disaster across the State of Michigan under section 1 of article 5 of the Michigan Constitution of 1963, the Emergency Management Act, and the Emergency Powers of the Governor Act of 1945. And on April 30, 2020, finding that COVID-19 had created emergency and disaster conditions across the State of Michigan, I issued Executive Order 2020-67 to

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continue the emergency declaration under the Emergency Powers of the Governor Act, as well as Executive Order 2020-68 to issue new emergency and disaster declarations under the Emergency Management Act.
Those executive orders have been challenged in Michigan House of Representatives and Michigan Senate v Whitmer. On May 21, 2020, the Court of Claims ruled that Executive Order 2020-67 is a valid exercise of authority under the Emergency Powers of the Governor Act but that Executive Order 2020-68 is not a valid exercise of authority under the Emergency Management Act. Both of those rulings are being challenged on appeal.
On May 22, 2020, I issued Executive Order 2020-99, again finding that the COVID-19 pandemic constitutes a disaster and emergency throughout the State of Michigan. That order constituted a state of emergency declaration under the Emergency Powers of the Governor Act of 1945. And, to the extent the governor may declare a state of emergency and a state of disaster under the Emergency Management Act when emergency and disaster conditions exist yet the legislature has declined to grant an extension request, that order also constituted a state of emergency and state of disaster declaration under that act.
The Emergency Powers of the Governor Act provides a sufficient legal basis for issuing this executive order. In relevant part, it provides that, after declaring a state of emergency, “the governor may promulgate reasonable orders, rules, and regulations as he or she considers necessary to protect life and property or to bring the emergency situation within the affected area under control.” MCL 10.31(1).
Nevertheless, subject to the ongoing litigation and the possibility that current rulings may be overturned or otherwise altered on appeal, I also invoke the Emergency Management Act as a basis for executive action to combat the spread of COVID-19 and mitigate the effects of this emergency on the people of Michigan, with the intent to preserve the rights and protections provided by the EMA. The EMA vests the governor with broad powers and duties to “cop[e] with dangers to this state or the people of this state presented by a disaster or emergency,” which the governor may implement through “executive orders, proclamations, and directives having the force and effect of law.” MCL 30.403(1)–(2). This executive order falls within the scope of those powers and duties, and to the extent the governor may declare a state of emergency and a state of disaster under the Emergency Management Act when emergency and disaster conditions exist yet the legislature has not granted an extension request, they too provide a sufficient legal basis for this order.

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To suppress the spread of COVID-19, to prevent the state’s health care system from being overwhelmed, to allow time for the production of critical test kits, ventilators, and personal protective equipment, to establish the public health infrastructure necessary to contain the spread of infection, and to avoid needless deaths, it was reasonable and necessary to direct residents to remain at home or in their place of residence to the maximum extent feasible. To that end, on March 23, 2020, I issued Executive Order 2020-21, ordering all people in Michigan to stay home and stay safe. In Executive Orders 2020-42, 2020-59, 2020-70, 2020-77, 2020-92, and 2020-96, I extended that initial order, modifying its scope as needed and appropriate to match the ever-changing circumstances presented by this pandemic.
The measures put in place by these executive orders have been effective: the number of new confirmed cases each day continues to drop. Although the virus remains aggressive and persistent—on June 4, 2020, Michigan reported 58,241 confirmed cases and 5,595 deaths—the strain on our health care system has begun to relent, even as our testing capacity has increased. We are now in the process of gradually resuming in-person work and activities. In so doing, however, we must move with care, patience, and vigilance, recognizing the grave harm that this virus continues to inflict on our state and how quickly our progress in suppressing it can be undone.
Regions 6 and 8 have significantly fewer new cases per million each day than other regions in the state and have not shown an increase in viral activity in response to earlier relaxations of my orders. Taking into account the public health data and the ongoing costs of continued restrictions, I find it reasonable and necessary to move Regions 6 and 8 to Stage 5 of the Michigan Safe Start Plan as of June 10. Gyms, hair salons, indoor theaters, tattoo parlors, and similar establishments will be permitted to reopen, subject to strict workplace safeguards. Indoor social gatherings and organized events of up to 50 people will be allowed, as will outdoor social gatherings and organized events of up to 250 people.
In addition, I find it reasonable and necessary to allow personal care services—including hair and nail salons—to reopen statewide as of June 15. This constitutes a partial step along the path of an orderly transition to Stage 5 for those parts of the state outside Regions 6 and 8.
Acting under the Michigan Constitution of 1963 and Michigan law, I order the following:
1. For purposes of this order, Michigan comprises eight separate regions.
a. Region 1 includes the following counties: Monroe, Washtenaw, Livingston, Genesee, Lapeer, Saint Clair, Oakland, Macomb, and Wayne.

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b. Region 2 includes the following counties: Mason, Lake, Osceola, Clare, Oceana, Newaygo, Mecosta, Isabella, Muskegon, Montcalm, Ottawa, Kent, and Ionia.
c. Region 3 includes the following counties: Allegan, Barry, Van Buren, Kalamazoo, Calhoun, Berrien, Cass, Saint Joseph, and Branch.
d. Region 4 includes the following counties: Oscoda, Alcona, Ogemaw, Iosco, Gladwin, Arenac, Midland, Bay, Saginaw, Tuscola, Sanilac, and Huron.
e. Region 5 includes the following counties: Gratiot, Clinton, Shiawassee, Eaton, and Ingham.
f. Region 6 includes the following counties: Manistee, Wexford, Missaukee, Roscommon, Benzie, Grand Traverse, Kalkaska, Crawford, Leelanau, Antrim, Otsego, Montmorency, Alpena, Charlevoix, Cheboygan, Presque Isle, and Emmet.
g. Region 7 includes the following counties: Hillsdale, Lenawee, and Jackson.
h. Region 8 includes the following counties: Gogebic, Ontonagon, Houghton, Keweenaw, Iron, Baraga, Dickinson, Marquette, Menominee, Delta, Alger, Schoolcraft, Luce, Mackinac, and Chippewa.
2. As of 12:01 am on June 15, 2020, subsection 12(c) of Executive Order 2020-110, which restricts the operation of facilities offering non-essential personal care services, is rescinded.
3. As of 12:01 am on June 10, 2020, individuals and businesses in Regions 6 and 8 are no longer subject to Executive Order 2020-110 and are instead subject to the rules described in this order.
4. Work that can be performed remotely (i.e., without the worker leaving his or her home or place of residence) should be performed remotely.
5. Any business or operation that requires its employees to leave their home or place of residence for work is subject to the rules on workplace safeguards in Executive Order 2020-114 or any order that may follow from it.
6. Any individual who leaves his or her home or place of residence must:
a. Follow social distancing measures recommended by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”), including remaining at least six feet from people from outside the individual’s household to the extent feasible under the circumstances
b. Wear a face covering over his or her nose and mouth—such as a homemade mask, scarf, bandana, or handkerchief—when in any enclosed

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public space, unless the individual is unable medically to tolerate a face covering.
1. An individual may be required to temporarily remove a face covering upon entering an enclosed public space for identification purposes. An individual may also remove a face covering to eat or drink when seated at a restaurant or bar.
2. Businesses and building owners, and those authorized to act on their behalf, are permitted to deny entry or access to any individual who refuses to comply with the rule in this subsection (b). Businesses and building owners will not be subject to a claim that they have violated the covenant of quiet enjoyment, to a claim of frustration of purpose, or to similar claims for denying entry or access to a person who refuses to comply with this subsection (b).
3. Supplies of N95 masks and surgical masks should generally be reserved, for now, for health care professionals, first responders (e.g., police officers, fire fighters, paramedics), and other critical workers who interact with the public
4. The protections against discrimination in the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act, 1976 PA 453, as amended, MCL 37.2101 et seq., and any other protections against discrimination in Michigan law, apply in full force to individuals who wear a face covering under this order.
7. Rules on Gatherings, Performances, and Events
a. A social gathering or organized event among persons not part of the same household is permitted, but only to the extent that:
1. Persons not part of the same household maintain six feet of distance from one another.
2. If it is indoors, the gathering or event does not exceed 50 people.
3. If it is outdoors, the gathering or event does not exceed 250 people.
b. Notwithstanding the restrictions in subsection (a), an arcade, bowling alley, cinema, climbing facility, convention center, performance space, meeting hall, night club, sports arena, theater, or similar venue may, if it is indoors, be open to spectators or patrons, but only to the extent that it:
1. Enables persons not part of the same household to maintain six feet of distance from one another at all times while in the venue.

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2. Limits the number of people in the venue to 25% of its maximum capacity or to 250, whichever is smaller. For purposes of this order, each separate auditorium or screening room is a separate venue.
c. Notwithstanding the restrictions in subsection (a), a concert space, race track, sports arena, stadium, or similar venue may, if it is outdoors, be open to spectators or patrons, but only to the extent that it:
1. Enables persons not part of the same household to maintain six feet of distance from one another at all times while in the venue.
2. Limits the number of people in the venue to 25% of its maximum capacity or to 500, whichever is smaller.
d. Subsection (a) does not apply to the incidental gathering of persons in a shared space, including an airport, bus station, factory floor, restaurant, shopping mall, public pool, or workplace.
8. Unless otherwise prohibited by local regulation, outdoor parks and recreational facilities may be open, provided that they make any reasonable modifications necessary to enable employees and patrons not part of the same household to maintain six feet of distance from one another, and provided that areas in which social distancing cannot be maintained be closed, subject to guidance issued by the Department of Health and Human Services.
9. Unless otherwise prohibited by local regulation, public swimming pools, as defined by MCL 333.12521(d), may be open, subject to guidance issued by the Department of Health and Human Services, provided that:
a. If they are outdoors, they limit capacity to 50% of the bather capacity limits described in Rule 325.2193 of the Michigan Administrative Code.
b. If they are indoors, they limit capacity to 25% of the bather capacity limits described in Rule 325.2193 of the Michigan Administrative Code.
10. Residential, travel, and troop camps within the meaning of Rule 400.11101(n), (p), or (q) of the Michigan Administrative Code remain closed for the time being.
11. Nothing in this order should be taken to interfere with or infringe on the powers of the legislative and judicial branches to perform their constitutional duties or exercise their authority. Similarly, nothing in this order shall be taken to abridge protections guaranteed by the state or federal constitution under these emergency circumstances.
12. Consistent with prior guidance, neither a place of religious worship nor its owner is subject to penalty under section 15 of this order for allowing religious worship at such place. No individual is subject to penalty under section 15 of this order

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for engaging in religious worship at a place of religious worship, or for violating the face covering requirement of section 6(b) of this order
13. Except as specified, nothing in this order supersedes any other executive order. This order takes effect immediately unless otherwise specified.
14. In determining whether to maintain, intensify, or relax the restrictions in this order, I will consider, among other things, (1) data on COVID-19 infections and the disease’s rate of spread; (2) whether sufficient medical personnel, hospital beds, and ventilators exist to meet anticipated medical need; (3) the availability of personal protective equipment for the health care workforce; (4) the state’s capacity to test for COVID-19 cases and isolate infected people; and (5) economic conditions in the state.
15. Consistent with MCL 10.33 and MCL 30.405(3), a willful violation of this order is a misdemeanor.
Given under my hand and the Great Seal of the State of Michigan.
GRETCHEN WHITMER GOVERNOR
Date: June 5, 2020
Time: 10:32 am

RELATED CONTENT
Executive Order 2020-117 (COVID-19) (June 9, 2020) Executive Order 2020-114 (COVID-19) (June 5, 2020) Executive Order 2020-116 (COVID-19) (June 5, 2020) Executive Order 2020-113 (COVID-19) (June 4, 2020) Executive Order 2020-112 (COVID-19) (June 3, 2020) Executive Order 2020-111 (COVID-19) (June 1, 2020) Executive Order 2020-108 (May 29, 2020) Executive Order 2020-109 (May 29, 2020) Executive Order 2020-110 (COVID-19) (June 1, 2020)

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Executive Order 2020-106 (COVID-19) (May 28, 2020) Executive Order 2020-107 (May 29, 2020) Executive Order 2020-99 (COVID-19) (May 22, 2020) - Declaration of State of Emergency Executive Order 2020-100 (COVID-19) (May 22, 2020) Executive Order 2020-101 (COVID-19) (May 22, 2020) Executive Order 2020-102 (COVID-19) (May 22, 2020) Executive Order 2020-103 (COVID-19) (May 22, 2020) Executive Order 2020-104 (COVID-19) (May 26, 2020) Executive Order 2020-105 (May 26, 2020) - Declaration of State of Emergency Executive Order 2020-98 (May 22, 2020) - Declaration of State of Emergency Executive Order 2020-95 (COVID-19) (May 21, 2020)

MICHIGAN.GOV HOME ADA MICHIGAN NEWS POLICIES
COPYRIGHT 2020 STATE OF MICHIGAN

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DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

______________________________________________________________________________

LEAGUE OF INDPENDENT FITNESS

Civil No. 1:20-cv-00458

FACITLITIES AND TRAINERS, INC., BASELINE FITNESS LLC,

Hon. Paul L. Maloney

BUILDING YOUR TEMPLE LLC,

BYT FITNESS 247 LLC,

CLAWSON FITNESS, LLC,

CLINTON FITNESS, INC.,

D-LUX KARATE UNIVERSITY LLC,

FENTON ATHLETIC CLUB, INC.,

FENTON KARATE, LLC,

FUSION FITNESS 24/7 LLC,

H3 FITNESS LLC,

I FITNESS PERSONAL TRAINING, INC.,

JKP FITNESS, LLC,

JPF ENTERPRISES, LLC,

M FITNESS CLUB, LLC,

MH & AB LLC,

MOTOR CITY CF - ST. CLAIR SHORES,

LLC,

NASCOT ENTERPRISES, LLC,

PRISON CITY PHYSIQUE LLC,

RMP FITNESS INC.,

STRENGTH BEYOND LLC,

24/7 BOOTCAMP AND BOXING INC., and

4 SEASONS GYM, LLC,

Plaintiffs,

v.

GRETCHEN E. WHITMER and

ROBERT GORDON,

Defendants.

______________________________________________________________________________

ERSKINE LAW, PC Scott M. Erskine (P54734) Carly Van Thomme (P59706) Attorneys for Plaintiffs

Joseph T. Froehlich (P71887) Christopher M. Allen (P75329) Joshua O. Booth (P53847) John G. Fedynsky (P65232)

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612 W. University Rochester, MI. 48307 (248) 601-4499 serskine@erskinelaw.com cvanthomme@erskinelaw.com

Andrew J. Jurgensen (P81123) Assistant Attorney General Michigan Department of Attorney General Attorneys for Defendants 525 West Ottawa Street P.O. Box 30754 Lansing, MI 48909 (517) 335-7573 froehlichj1@michigan.gov allenc28@michigan.gov Boothj2@michigan.gov fedynskyj@michigan.gov jurgensenA2@michigan.gov

______________________________________________________________________________ PLAINTIFFS’ REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

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TABLE OF CONTENTS I. Plaintiffs’ Claims Are Justiciable .................................................................................................2
A. Plaintiffs Have Standing to Bring Their Pre-Enforcement Claims.................................2 B. Plaintiff LIFFT Has Organizational Standing.................................................................3 II. Plaintiffs Are Likely to Succeed on the Merits ...........................................................................3 A. Defendants Have Not Shown A Real or Substantial Relation Between Executive Order 2020-110 and the Current State of the Public Health ...............................4
1. Heavy Breathing, Sweat, Shared Equipment, and asymptomatic transmission ......................................................................................5
a. Heavy Breathing ......................................................................................6 b. Sweating...................................................................................................7 c. Shared Equipment ....................................................................................7 d. Asymptomatic Transmission ...................................................................8 B. Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on their procedural due process claim. ..........................9 C. Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on their equal protection claim. ...................................10 D. Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on their dormant commerce clause claim ....................12 III. Plaintiffs have been irreparably harmed ............................................................................13 IV. A preliminary injunction will serve the public interest .....................................................14
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 366-67; (2001) ....................................10 Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 US 67, at 86 (1972).....................................................................................9 Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905)......................................................................3, 4, 9 McKay v. Federspiel, 823 F.3d 862, 867 (6th Cir. 2016) .................................................................3 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 US 319 (1976)........................................................................................9
i

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INTRODUCTION The tone and position throughout Defendants’ Response Brief describe the pandemic in Michigan through a lens that has no bearing on the state of COVID-19 in May or June 2020. Instead, the arguments are literally “pulled from the pages” of conditions prior to early April 2020 when Michigan was struggling mightily from the novel coronavirus.1 Further, Defendants cite numerous times to Exhibits from the World Health Organization (Defendant’s Exhibit C) and the Center for Disease Control (Defendant’s Exhibit D) from March and April 2020 with no acknowledgement that the views and recommendations of both organizations has evolved since issuing those publications. In fact, the Governor’s factual position makes it seem that perhaps the entire state should still be locked down. Thankfully, the frightening scene described in detail throughout Defendant’s Response Brief is not the status of the State of Michigan today. Nor have Plaintiffs ever taken the position that COVID-19 was anything but an emergency that required quick action by the government to flatten the curve and prevent our hospitals and other first responders from becoming overwhelmed. Plaintiffs in the instant matter heeded the Governor’s Order on March 16, 2020 and closed their businesses over 13 weeks ago. This lawsuit was not filed until the end of May 2020, when it became apparent that there was no plan to allow for the reopening of Plaintiffs’ businesses whatsoever. Even then, the instant motion was not filed until it became even more apparent that, despite opening almost every sector of the economy, the Governor still has no real and concrete plans to this day to decriminalize the reopening of gyms.
1 See Defendants’ Br, PageID.383, footnote 7, New York Times article dated March 27, 2020. See also Defendants’ Br, PageID.399, footnote 19, Detroit Free Press Article dated April 4, 2020. See also Defendants’ Br, PageID.398, footnote 18, two articles discussing COVID-19 and an outbreak the first week of February 2020 in South Korea.
1

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ARGUMENT I. Plaintiffs’ Claims Are Justiciable
The Governor and Director are incorrect in their assertions that a) Plaintiffs lack standing to bring their pre-enforcement claims and b) that LIFFT lacks standing.
A. Plaintiffs Have Standing to Bring Their Pre-Enforcement Claims The Governor and Director, through their actions, have challenged the standing of the individual gym owner Plaintiffs in two ways. First, sadly the defense seeks to put the Plaintiffs in a Cornelian dilemma, giving them two choices with equally harmful effects. Choice one is to follow the law while challenging it, and face losing the lawsuit without standing and potentially lose their businesses. Choice two is to announce that they intend to or that they have already violated the law and risk prosecution by the State of Michigan. Attached as Exhibit 20 are examples of Plaintiffs’ “choice.” Plaintiffs will begin to violate what they deem to be an unconstitutional Executive Order by opening their fitness facilities if the Governor does not immediately allow them to reopen. The Plaintiffs will follow the same safety protocols established for Regions 6 and 8, where the Governor has already allowed re-opening of gyms and fitness facilities. To do otherwise will cause Plaintiffs the worse choice of following an unconstitutional Order to their own financial ruin. The second position taken by the Governor and Director is that Plaintiffs have not alleged that there is a “credible threat of prosecution.” However, it is the defense counsel’s own state agency that has threatened prosecution and they, above all, should know that the threat is real. Plaintiffs, through the news coverage of Carl the Barber to the Attorney General’s own words on the subject make it clear that the threat of prosecution is credible. In an interview with a local news program, Michigan Attorney General Dana Nessel was quoted, when asked about businesses
2

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reopening in violation of the Executive Orders: “If they make the decision to go ahead and violate the law knowing and understanding what the law is -- then, unfortunately they’ll have to pay the consequences for it[.]” (Exhibit 21). As such, Plaintiffs certainly meet the Article III standing requirements that Defendants argue are applicable in McKay v. Federspiel, 823 F.3d 862, 867 (6th Cir. 2016)(See PageID.389)
B. Plaintiff LIFFT Has Organizational Standing In this case, Plaintiff LIFFT argues that it has standing as a representative of its members who would have standing to sue individually. Accordingly, for the same reasons that the individual Plaintiffs have standing as mentioned in the previous section, so does LIFFT. II. Plaintiffs Are Likely to Succeed on the Merits The Defendants’ reliance upon Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905), is not a magic bullet in this case. The Defendants cite Jacobson in support of the argument that the State’s conduct taken in response to a pandemic is virtually unreviewable by a court. But in fact, Jacobson—which involved only a compulsory smallpox vaccination, not a months-long shutdown of the entire economic and social activity of a State—does not advocate limitless deference to the executive in an epidemic. Instead, a regulation “purporting to have been enacted to protect the public health, the public morals, or the public safety” is valid only if it has a “real or substantial relation to those objects.” Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 31. “[The] acknowledged power of a local community to protect itself against an epidemic threatening the safety of all might be exercised in particular circumstances and in reference to particular persons in such an arbitrary, unreasonable manner, or might go so far beyond what was reasonably required for the safety of the public, as to authorize or compel the courts to interfere for the protection of such persons.” Id. at 28 (emphasis
3

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added). The executive orders that are at issue in this case go well beyond the scope of permissible state action in response to an epidemic.
A. Defendants Have Not Shown A Real or Substantial Relation Between Executive Order 2020-110 and the Current State of the Public Health Defendants defend their actions under Jacobson, supra, with a sweeping generalization of potential reasons for keeping fitness centers shuttered without indicating what the Governor’s actual reasons are for shuttering Plaintiffs’ businesses for over 13 weeks. However, even the generalized potential rationale for such a decision does not pass constitutional muster under Jacobson. Prior to comparing the generalizations made by the Defendants, it is important to note that on Friday, June 12, 2020, after this Motion was filed, Governor Whitmer issued Executive Order 2020-120, which opens up even more sectors of the economy, while still leaving gyms shuttered. (Exhibit 22). Under the latest Executive Order, day camps, overnight camps, travel camps and troop camps are all allowed to be open. Further, K-12 school sports and other in-person extracurricular activities are allowed as of June 15, 2020. The only caveat for the schools is that the school “indoor exercise facilities” must remain closed. Under previous Executive Orders, including Executive Order 2020-110, indoor exercise facilities were a subpart of a larger group of facilities closed. But now, the only thing that remains shuttered are indoor exercise facilities. Specifically, Paragraph 12(b) of Executive Order 2020-110 used to read as follows: 12. Subject to the exceptions in section 14, the following places are closed to ingress, egress, use, and occupancy by members of the public:
b. Indoor gymnasiums, fitness centers, recreation centers, sports facilities, exercise facilities, exercise studios, and the like. (emphasis added)
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Now, Subsection 12(b) of Executive Order 2020-110, as modified by Executive Order 2020-120, reads as follows with respect to K-12 school sports activities and other in-person extra-curricular school activities:
12. Subject to the exceptions in section 14, the following places are closed to ingress, egress, use, and occupancy by members of the public:
b. Indoor exercise facilities. (emphasis added) Accordingly, for K-12 sports, kids are allowed to use indoor gymnasiums, recreation centers, hockey rinks to the extent that they have them, and anything other than “indoor exercise facilities.” There is no similar restriction under Executive Order 2020-120 for camps.
Therefore, as of the date of the filing this Brief, the Governor now allows kids to attend day camps and week-long overnight camps for choir, music, and art. The Governor also allows sports camps, both day and overnight, for cheerleading, volleyball, basketball, football, wrestling, baseball, tennis, gymnastics, hockey, and any other sport one can imagine that is played in school, as long as campers remain six feet apart. There is not even a prohibition on workouts in a camp gym in the new Executive Order. Further, school athletes and campers are allowed to use indoor sports facilities, eat together in the cafeteria, and sleep together in cabins and dorm rooms. The only thing that they cannot do is work out in their school gym.
1. Heavy Breathing, Sweat, Shared Equipment, and asymptomatic transmission Since the Response Brief in this matter has not shared the Defendants’ actual reasons for keeping gyms closed, Plaintiffs are left to sift through the Brief for potential support for Defendants’ position. There are four main hypothesized reasons for the Governor’s Orders in Defendants’ Brief for keeping gyms closed that the defense argues make Defendants’ Orders constitutional. Ironically, these possible reasons as stated by the Defendants further highlight that
5

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the Orders are so arbitrary and unreasonable that they make Court intervention essential. These will be discussed separately below.
a. Heavy Breathing The Governor makes the bare assertion that breathing hard is a potential reason to close down gyms. However, as discussed above and will be discussed below, the Governor allows all sorts of activities that “breathe hard” to remain open. Choir is a perfect example. When people sing, they expel air from their lungs at a much greater velocity than speaking. Under the current Executive Orders, 100 people could gather outdoors and hold a choir practice. 10 people can gather in a home and sing. An unlimited number of people can be part of a choir in a church. An entire congregation can sing at every church service, all causing the same “problem” as breathing hard. As of today, kids can attend summer day camps and overnight camps for choir and K-12 schools can have school choir practice in the school auditorium. Further, summer camps and K-12 sports practices for cheerleading, basketball, hockey, and a host of other sporting activities, all of which can be performed inside per Executive Order 2020120, also cause people to breathe harder. K-12 kids breathe hard in virtually every sport and there is no prohibition for them to do so indoors. In fact, cheerleading causes breathing hard from exercise and couples it with shouting out cheers while standing next to other cheerleaders. To add to the ridiculousness of the Governor’s Orders, a person can even hold a professional style workout in their living room and invite nine friends to join him or her and they would not be in violation of the Governor’s Executive Orders. Apparently, if breathing hard is the concern, it must only be a concern in Plaintiffs’ professionally cleaned gyms and not at indoor basketball rinks, hockey rinks, church choirs, or a person’s home, or anywhere else as mentioned above.
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b. Sweating The fact is, there is simply no science behind the notion that “sweating” has anything to do with “virus shedding” and virtually 100% of the science supports the view that sweat cannot and does not spread COVID-19.2 The science is that the disease is transmitted by respiratory droplets from talking, breathing, coughing or sneezing. The Defendants cannot and do not offer any support for the position that sweat glands can shed virus.
c. Shared Equipment Yet another of Defendants’ possible explanations for the rationale of the Governor is that “the sharing of exercise equipment” leads to a heightened risk of viral spread. (PageID.398)(See also Exhibit D of Defendants’ Response Brief) However, as Plaintiffs pointed out above (footnote 18) the Brief by Defendants cites only old and outdated information. In fact, as was pointed out in Plaintiffs’ original Brief, the Governor herself admitted in a press conference on June 1, 2020 that the “science” about viral spread from surfaces has been largely debunked. (Plaintiffs Br. PageID:277) The Governor’s comments are most likely based on the CDC updating their opinions about surface spread on May 2020. In May, the CDC has reiterated that surface spread is much less common than previously thought. (See CDC updates COVID-19 transmission webpage to clarify information about types of spread, May 22, 2020 (updated May 27, 2020) https://www.cdc.gov/media/releases/2020/s0522-cdc-updates-covid-transmission.html) (See also, Stump, Scott. Coronavirus does not spread easily from touching surfaces, CDC Now Says. May 21, 2020. https://www.today.com/health/new-cdc-guidance-coronavirus-doesn-t-spread-easily-
2 Instead of citing to the many, many articles and even interviews with Dr. Anthony Fauci which debunk the idea of COVID-19 being transmitted through sweat, Plaintiffs will simply state that it is not possible to find an article that says that one can transmit COVID-19 through sweat.
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touching-surfaces-t182194) However, even after admitting that the science behind the theory that

surface spread is much less likely than initially thought, the Defendants’ Brief continues to rely on

the old guidance as the potential for keeping gyms closed.

d. Asymptomatic Transmission

Finally, the Defendant states that “asymptomatically transmittable virus spreading” is a

final reason that the Governor may have for keeping gyms closed longer than any other industry

in the state. Once again, Defendants rely on outdated opinions, this time from the World Health

Organization. On June 8, 2020, Maria Van Kerkhove, the WHO’s technical lead for the

coronavirus response said during a media briefing that “[f]rom the data that we have, it still seems

to be rare that an asymptomatic person actually transmits onward to a secondary individual.” (See

Howard,

Jacqueline,

www.cnn.com.,

June

9,

2020.

https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/08/health/coronavirus-asymptomatic-spread-who-bn/index.html).

And while the WHO has since indicated that it’s research is far from complete and not much has

known, it is certainly not as clear of a picture as painted by Defendants in their Brief that

asymptomatic spread is poses a significant threat. Further, asymptomatic transmission, even if it

is not rare, would have no more impact on gyms than it does on the rest of society. The Governor’s

position cannot simply be that asymptomatic spread occurs only in gyms.

Finally, with respect to all four of the reasons that the Governor may have in keeping gyms

closed through most of the state, those reasons are not unique to Michigan at all. However, attached

as Exhibit 23 is a chart of all 42 states in which gyms are open, the date they opened, and a link

for verification. Defendants have not pointed to a single outbreak of COVID-19 at a gym anywhere

in the United States, either before social distancing began or after these 42 states have started

reopening their fitness facilities in early May (or in South Dakota, which never closed). For all of

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the aforementioned reasons, is cannot seriously be said that that the orders “purporting to have been enacted to protect the public health, the public morals, or the public safety” have a “real or substantial relation to those objects.” Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 31.
B. Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on their procedural due process claim. In their Response Brief, Defendants claim that since the closure of gyms for the past 13 weeks throughout much of the state is “temporary,” Plaintiffs’ claims must fail. However, a more accurate term to describe the closure of gyms is indefinite, not temporary. The reason for this is simply that the Governor has not given any timetable for the reopening of an industry that was shuttered on March 16, 2020. The Governor’s own attorneys in fact admitted in oral argument on Legislature v. Whitmer in the Michigan Court of Claims that the Governor’s power to keep the state under a State of Emergency could feasibly last her entire term in office. If that is true, then gyms could be temporarily shuttered for over two and a half more years under her “temporary” orders. Further, Defendants seem to read Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 US 319 (1976) as standing for the proposition that only if there is a final taking, as opposed to an indefinite taking, is there a right to procedural due process. However, although Mathews does state that due process is necessary for a final taking, it does not state that only a final taking is to receive procedural due process protection. In Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 US 67, at 86 (1972), the Supreme Court made it clear that property deprivations of far less than permanent deprivations fall within the Fourteenth Amendment’s procedural due process protection. The Court opined as follows: The Fourteenth Amendment draws no bright lines around three-day, 10-day or 50day deprivations of property. Any significant taking of property by the State is within the purview of the Due Process Clause. While the length and consequent severity of a deprivation may be another factor to weigh in determining the appropriate form of hearing, it is not decisive of the basic right to a prior hearing of some kind.
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Accordingly, the deprivation of a property right of Plaintiffs, which is currently at 91 days and counting, mandates a hearing.
Finally, Plaintiffs are well past the point of needing a hearing to determine whether they are “essential or non-essential” as the Defendants suggest. Plaintiffs demand notice and opportunity to be heard as to why they are being singled out with no data, science, or legitimate reason as to why they are closed and why they were and are still shuttered for so long.
C. Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on their equal protection claim. Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on their claim under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amended to the United States Constitution, as Defendants have still not provided any rational basis for the greater restrictions imposed on Plaintiffs’ businesses. As stated in Plaintiffs’ initial brief, State action that regulates economic activity in a discriminatory manner violates the Equal Protection Clause unless the State can show a “rational relationship between the disparity of treatment,” along with some “legitimate governmental purpose.” Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 366-67; (2001). In their response brief, Defendants did not even attempt to demonstrate the rational basis for imposing these greater restrictions against Plaintiffs’ businesses. In fact, Defendants have yet to provide any data-supported justification whatsoever for imposing these greater restrictions. The single “study” cited by Defendants, a research letter authored by the CDC, does not support Defendants’ implementation of these disparate, heighted restrictions on fitness centers.3 Further, the study was from February 15, 2020, in South Korea, where there were no social distancing measures in place as South Korea was just beginning to understand the threat.
3 https://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/article/26/8/20-0633_article
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Instead of providing a rational basis for these disparate, heightened restrictions, Defendants merely assert a conclusory argument that “each challenged restriction has a rational basis” before referencing a series of lesser restrictions that are not even an option for Plaintiffs: “it makes eminent sense to adopt measures that require social distancing, limit person to person contact, and preserve valuable health care resources.” (PageID.405). To be clear, Defendants’ restrictions on Plaintiffs’ businesses do not merely require social distancing, the limitation of person to person contact, or the preservation valuable health care resources. These heightened restrictions instead outright ban Plaintiffs from operating as a gym at their brick and mortar locations no matter how much the facility complies with these other, less restrictive measures.
This disparate treatment is even more apparent using Defendants’ own analogy: “[i]n a drought, where the point is to avoid uncontrolled wildfires, there can be no allowance for those who promise to be really careful with their campfire.” Id at 19. In this case, Defendants are allowing some individuals to have a campfire on their campsite if they use a fire pit and keep a hose nearby, while simultaneously barring Plaintiffs from having a campfire on their campsite under any circumstances. When Defendants are tasked with providing the rational basis for this disparate treatment and heightened restriction, Defendants argue that having a fire pit and a hose nearby are rationally based restrictions, despite the fact that Defendants do not even afford that option to Plaintiffs.
Defendants’ purported justification is even more tenuous when you consider that Plaintiffs’ businesses would not be subject to these greater restrictions if they were located in Region 6 or Region 8 of the state. On one hand, Defendants make the evidence-free argument that the indoor exercise occurring within Plaintiffs’ businesses poses a unique risk that warrants these greater restrictions, but at the exact same time Defendants are allowing the exact same type of businesses
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to operate with fewer restrictions in other regions of the state. Defendants have not provided any rational basis for why indoor exercise is more or less dangerous in one area of Michigan versus another, and these nonsensical distinctions belie any potential justification for these heightened restrictions.
Plaintiffs have a high likelihood of success on their equal protection claim as Defendants have not provided any data-supported rational basis for the heightened restrictions. While the disparate treatment is clear through the imposition of the heightened restrictions on Plaintiffs’ businesses, the rational basis for that disparate treatment is entirely absent. As such, Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits of their equal protection claim.
D. Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on their dormant commerce clause claim Defendants’ heightened restrictions violate the Dormant Commerce Clause because they impose an excessive burden in relation to the putative benefits and because they are not supported by a rational basis. As stated in Plaintiffs’ initial brief, the heightened restrictions in question certainly have had a profound effect on interstate commerce. Plaintiffs’ businesses engage in interstate commerce in that they have a number of visiting client from out-of-state and they are unable to take delivery of any purchased equipment and supplies from out-of-state businesses during the time they have been forced to close. The burden on Plaintiffs’ businesses in this case is also plainly apparent – the forced shutter of the entire fitness facility industry within most regions of the state have caused a devastating loss of revenue for Plaintiffs’ businesses. Defendants have predictably argued that this extreme, excessive burden is justified to control the spread of COVID-19, but Defendants have yet to cite any data that supports this contention. The Shutdown Orders were originally issued under the auspices of “flattening the curve,” but this goal has been met for at least a month and a half per the Governor’s own
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admission.4 As such, even if Defendants’ successfully argued that these heightened restrictions were at one time necessary to achieve the goal of flattening the curve, that is no longer an appropriate justification by today’s measures.
It is worth reiterating at this point that “a burden on interstate commerce that had no rational justification would be invalid.” Cavel Int'l, Inc v Madigan, 500 F3d 551, 556 (7th Cir. 2007) (internal citations omitted). As discussed previously, Defendants have yet to provide any datadriven rational justification for the continued forced closings of Plaintiffs’ businesses. This is especially true when you consider that identical businesses can operate under lesser restrictions in other areas of the state.
In sum, the excessive burden caused by the arbitrarily implemented heightened restrictions outweighs the putative benefit of those restrictions. Defendants have failed to introduce any evidence to the contrary, and, as such, Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on their dormant commerce clause claim. III. Plaintiffs have been irreparably harmed
At the outset, Plaintiffs would ask this Honorable Court to take Judicial Notice of the fact that closing small businesses for 91 days will have irreparable injury to those businesses. Further, the Affidavits attached to this Brief as Exhibit 20 show that at least one business has lost 100% of its revenue and another over 80% of its revenue. This lawsuit is not gamesmanship on the part of Plaintiffs. The Defendants’ executive orders have taken a devastating toll on Plaintiffs. To pretend that perhaps closing businesses for 91 days and counting has not really harmed Michigan’s small business community Plaintiffs is disingenuous on the part of Defendants to this lawsuit.
4 Michigan Governor Gretchen Whitmer Press Conference Transcript April 27, available at https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/michigan-governor-gretchen-whitmer-press-conferencetranscript-april-27 (“[A]nd so we’ve flattened it…” at 45:53) (last visited June 8, 2020).
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Further, while Plaintiffs appreciate Defendants’ efforts to turn their business models to online and outdoor classes, Plaintiffs actually built their successful businesses based on indoor workouts at clean and sanitized indoor facilities. Plaintiffs collectively have millions of dollars of indoor workout equipment and even though Bob from Hemlock, Michigan can now have nine friends at his house and can work out with them, it is still a crime for Plaintiffs to have even a single gym member workout in their facilities due to the Defendants’ Executive Orders. What Defendants have suggested would be akin to telling a restaurant that they should switch to a model where their chef offers an online cooking tips to its patrons and that should keep the restaurant afloat. IV. A preliminary injunction will serve the public interest
Plaintiffs will rely on its initial Brief in support of this argument with one caveat. Plaintiffs are contesting the portions of Executive Order 2020-115 only to the extent that Plaintiffs are closed. In other words, Plaintiffs in this case already plan to follow the guidelines for gyms in Regions 6 and 8 that the Governor has established that include social distancing, etc. In fact, many of the Plaintiffs reduced their class sizes voluntarily before the shutdown because they are responsible businesses owners.
CONCLUSION For the reasons stated in Plaintiffs’ original Motion, Brief and this Reply, Plaintiffs request that this Honorable Court grant their motion for a Preliminary Injunction.
[Signature Block Follows]
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Dated: June 15, 2020

Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Scott M. Erskine_________________ SCOTT M. ERSKINE (P54714) CARLY VAN THOMME (P59706) ERSKINE LAW, PC Attorneys for Plaintiffs 612 West University Drive Rochester, Michigan 48307 (248) 601-4497 serskine@erskinelaw.com

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Certificate of Compliance 1. This brief complies with the type-volume limitation of W.D. Mich. LCivR 7.2(c) because this brief contains 4,271 words, excluding the parts of the brief exempted by W.D. Mich. LCivR 7.2(c).

2. This brief has been prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface using Microsoft Office Word 2010 for Windows in 12-point Times New Roman font.

Dated: June 15, 2020

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Scott M. Erskine_________________ SCOTT M. ERSKINE (P54714) CARLY VAN THOMME (P59706) ERSKINE LAW, PC Attorneys for Plaintiffs 612 West University Drive Rochester, Michigan 48307 (248) 601-4497 serskine@erskinelaw.com cvanthomme@erskinelaw.com

PROOF OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on June 15, 2020, I presented the foregoing paper to the Clerk of the Court for filing and uploading to the ECF system, which will send notification of such filing to the attorneys of record listed herein and I hereby certify that I have mailed by US Postal Service the document to the involved non participants.

s/ Scott M. Erskine_________________ SCOTT M. ERSKINE (P54714) CARLY VAN THOMME (P59706) ERSKINE LAW, PC Attorneys for Plaintiffs 612 West University Drive Rochester, Michigan 48307 (248) 601-4497 serskine@erskinelaw.com cvanthomme@erskinelaw.com

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DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

_____________________________________________________

LEAGUE OF INDPENDENT FITNESS

Civil No. 1:20-cv-00458

FACITLITIES AND TRAINERS, INC., BASELINE FITNESS LLC,

Hon. Paul L. Maloney

BUILDING YOUR TEMPLE LLC,

BYT FITNESS 247 LLC,

CLAWSON FITNESS, LLC,

CLINTON FITNESS, INC.,

D-LUX KARATE UNIVERSITY LLC,

EXHIBIT 20

FENTON ATHLETIC CLUB, INC.,

FENTON KARATE, LLC,

FUSION FITNESS 24/7 LLC,

H3 FITNESS LLC,

I FITNESS PERSONAL TRAINING, INC.,

JKP FITNESS, LLC,

JPF ENTERPRISES, LLC,

M FITNESS CLUB, LLC,

MH & AB LLC,

MOTOR CITY CF - ST. CLAIR SHORES, LLC,

NASCOT ENTERPRISES, LLC,

PRISON CITY PHYSIQUE LLC,

RMP FITNESS INC.,

STRENGTH BEYOND LLC,

24/7 BOOTCAMP AND BOXING INC., and

4 SEASONS GYM, LLC,

Plaintiffs,

v.

GRETCHEN E. WHITMER and

ROBERT GORDON,

Defendants.

______________________________________________________________________________________________

ERSKINE LAW, PC Scott M. Erskine (P54734) Carly Van Thomme (P59706) Attorneys for Plaintiffs 612 W. University

Joseph T. Froehlich (P71887) Christopher M. Allen (P75329) Joshua O. Booth (P53847) John G. Fedynsky (P65232) Andrew J. Jurgensen (P81123)

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 37-1 filed 06/15/20 PageID.536 Page 2 of 22

Rochester, MI. 48307 (248) 601-4499 serskine@erskinelaw.com cvanthomme@erskinelaw.com

Assistant Attorney General Michigan Department of Attorney General Attorneys for Defendants 525 West Ottawa Street P.O. Box 30754 Lansing, MI 48909 (517) 335-7573 froehlichj1@michigan.gov allenc28@michigan.gov Boothj2@michigan.gov fedynskyj@michigan.gov jurgensenA2@michigan.gov

_______________________________________________________________________________________________

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Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 37-2 filed 06/15/20 PageID.557 Page 1 of 5

DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

_____________________________________________________

LEAGUE OF INDPENDENT FITNESS

Civil No. 1:20-cv-00458

FACITLITIES AND TRAINERS, INC., BASELINE FITNESS LLC,

Hon. Paul L. Maloney

BUILDING YOUR TEMPLE LLC,

BYT FITNESS 247 LLC,

CLAWSON FITNESS, LLC,

CLINTON FITNESS, INC.,

D-LUX KARATE UNIVERSITY LLC,

EXHIBIT 21

FENTON ATHLETIC CLUB, INC.,

FENTON KARATE, LLC,

FUSION FITNESS 24/7 LLC,

H3 FITNESS LLC,

I FITNESS PERSONAL TRAINING, INC.,

JKP FITNESS, LLC,

JPF ENTERPRISES, LLC,

M FITNESS CLUB, LLC,

MH & AB LLC,

MOTOR CITY CF - ST. CLAIR SHORES, LLC,

NASCOT ENTERPRISES, LLC,

PRISON CITY PHYSIQUE LLC,

RMP FITNESS INC.,

STRENGTH BEYOND LLC,

24/7 BOOTCAMP AND BOXING INC., and

4 SEASONS GYM, LLC,

Plaintiffs,

v.

GRETCHEN E. WHITMER and

ROBERT GORDON,

Defendants.

______________________________________________________________________________________________

ERSKINE LAW, PC Scott M. Erskine (P54734) Carly Van Thomme (P59706) Attorneys for Plaintiffs 612 W. University

Joseph T. Froehlich (P71887) Christopher M. Allen (P75329) Joshua O. Booth (P53847) John G. Fedynsky (P65232) Andrew J. Jurgensen (P81123)

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 37-2 filed 06/15/20 PageID.558 Page 2 of 5

Rochester, MI. 48307 (248) 601-4499 serskine@erskinelaw.com cvanthomme@erskinelaw.com

Assistant Attorney General Michigan Department of Attorney General Attorneys for Defendants 525 West Ottawa Street P.O. Box 30754 Lansing, MI 48909 (517) 335-7573 froehlichj1@michigan.gov allenc28@michigan.gov Boothj2@michigan.gov fedynskyj@michigan.gov jurgensenA2@michigan.gov

_______________________________________________________________________________________________

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Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 37-3 filed 06/15/20 PageID.562 Page 1 of 6

DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

_____________________________________________________

LEAGUE OF INDPENDENT FITNESS

Civil No. 1:20-cv-00458

FACITLITIES AND TRAINERS, INC., BASELINE FITNESS LLC,

Hon. Paul L. Maloney

BUILDING YOUR TEMPLE LLC,

BYT FITNESS 247 LLC,

CLAWSON FITNESS, LLC,

CLINTON FITNESS, INC.,

D-LUX KARATE UNIVERSITY LLC,

EXHIBIT 22

FENTON ATHLETIC CLUB, INC.,

FENTON KARATE, LLC,

FUSION FITNESS 24/7 LLC,

H3 FITNESS LLC,

I FITNESS PERSONAL TRAINING, INC.,

JKP FITNESS, LLC,

JPF ENTERPRISES, LLC,

M FITNESS CLUB, LLC,

MH & AB LLC,

MOTOR CITY CF - ST. CLAIR SHORES, LLC,

NASCOT ENTERPRISES, LLC,

PRISON CITY PHYSIQUE LLC,

RMP FITNESS INC.,

STRENGTH BEYOND LLC,

24/7 BOOTCAMP AND BOXING INC., and

4 SEASONS GYM, LLC,

Plaintiffs,

v.

GRETCHEN E. WHITMER and

ROBERT GORDON,

Defendants.

______________________________________________________________________________________________

ERSKINE LAW, PC Scott M. Erskine (P54734) Carly Van Thomme (P59706) Attorneys for Plaintiffs 612 W. University

Joseph T. Froehlich (P71887) Christopher M. Allen (P75329) Joshua O. Booth (P53847) John G. Fedynsky (P65232) Andrew J. Jurgensen (P81123)

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 37-3 filed 06/15/20 PageID.563 Page 2 of 6

Rochester, MI. 48307 (248) 601-4499 serskine@erskinelaw.com cvanthomme@erskinelaw.com

Assistant Attorney General Michigan Department of Attorney General Attorneys for Defendants 525 West Ottawa Street P.O. Box 30754 Lansing, MI 48909 (517) 335-7573 froehlichj1@michigan.gov allenc28@michigan.gov Boothj2@michigan.gov fedynskyj@michigan.gov jurgensenA2@michigan.gov

_______________________________________________________________________________________________

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DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

_____________________________________________________

LEAGUE OF INDPENDENT FITNESS

Civil No. 1:20-cv-00458

FACITLITIES AND TRAINERS, INC., BASELINE FITNESS LLC,

Hon. Paul L. Maloney

BUILDING YOUR TEMPLE LLC,

BYT FITNESS 247 LLC,

CLAWSON FITNESS, LLC,

CLINTON FITNESS, INC.,

D-LUX KARATE UNIVERSITY LLC,

EXHIBIT 23

FENTON ATHLETIC CLUB, INC.,

FENTON KARATE, LLC,

FUSION FITNESS 24/7 LLC,

H3 FITNESS LLC,

I FITNESS PERSONAL TRAINING, INC.,

JKP FITNESS, LLC,

JPF ENTERPRISES, LLC,

M FITNESS CLUB, LLC,

MH & AB LLC,

MOTOR CITY CF - ST. CLAIR SHORES, LLC,

NASCOT ENTERPRISES, LLC,

PRISON CITY PHYSIQUE LLC,

RMP FITNESS INC.,

STRENGTH BEYOND LLC,

24/7 BOOTCAMP AND BOXING INC., and

4 SEASONS GYM, LLC,

Plaintiffs,

v.

GRETCHEN E. WHITMER and

ROBERT GORDON,

Defendants.

______________________________________________________________________________________________

ERSKINE LAW, PC Scott M. Erskine (P54734) Carly Van Thomme (P59706) Attorneys for Plaintiffs 612 W. University

Joseph T. Froehlich (P71887) Christopher M. Allen (P75329) Joshua O. Booth (P53847) John G. Fedynsky (P65232) Andrew J. Jurgensen (P81123)

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Rochester, MI. 48307 (248) 601-4499 serskine@erskinelaw.com cvanthomme@erskinelaw.com

Assistant Attorney General Michigan Department of Attorney General Attorneys for Defendants 525 West Ottawa Street P.O. Box 30754 Lansing, MI 48909 (517) 335-7573 froehlichj1@michigan.gov allenc28@michigan.gov Boothj2@michigan.gov fedynskyj@michigan.gov jurgensenA2@michigan.gov

_______________________________________________________________________________________________

STATE Alabama Alaska Arizona Arkansas Colorado Connecticut Delaware Florida Georgia Hawaii Idaho Illinois Indiana Iowa Kansas Kentucky Louisiana Maryland Minnesota Mississippi Missouri Montana Nebraska Nevada New Hampshire New Mexico North Dakota Ohio Oklahoma Pennsylvania Rhode Island South Carolina South Dakota Tennessee Texas Utah Vermont Virginia Washington West Virginia Wisconsin Wyoming

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 37-4 filed 06/15/20 PageID.570 Page 3 of 3

DATE OPEN 5/11/20 5/8/20 5/13/20 5/4/20 6/4/20 6/17/20 6/1/20 5/18/20 4/24/20 6/19/20 5/16/20 5/29/20 5/22/20 5/15/20 5/18/20 6/15/20 5/15/20 6/19/20 6/10/20 5/11/20 6/16/20 5/15/20 5/11/20 5/29/20 6/1/20 6/1/20 5/1/20 5/15/20 5/1/20 5/29/20 6/1/20 5/18/20 never closed 5/1/20 5/18/20 5/1/20 5/29/20 6/5/20 5/19/20 5/18/20 5/22/20 5/1/20

SOURCE https://www.al.com/news/2020/05/gov-kay-ivey-to-hold-coronavirus-press-conference-today-watch-live-here.html https://www.adn.com/alaska-news/2020/05/06/alaska-bars-gyms-and-theaters-can-open-with-limited-capacity-starting-friday-under-state-plan/ https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/local/arizona-health/2020/05/12/arizona-gyms-can-reopen-may-13-heres-how/3121224001/ https://katv.com/news/coronavirus/arkansas-to-reopen-gyms-fitness-centers-on-monday https://theknow.denverpost.com/2020/06/04/gyms-reopen-colorado-coronavirus/240162/ https://ctmirror.org/2020/06/08/connecticut-businesses-ready-to-reopen-but-worried-about-whether-customers-are-coming-back/ https://6abc.com/delaware-coronavirus-covid-19-reopening-plan/6186356/ https://www.clickorlando.com/news/local/2020/05/15/florida-gyms-studios-given-green-light-to-reopen-by-gov-ron-desantis/ https://www.athleticbusiness.com/fitness-training/gyms-among-georgia-businesses-allowed-to-open-friday.html https://www.staradvertiser.com/2020/06/04/breaking-news/gyms-theaters-and-bars-on-oahu-given-go-ahead-to-reopen/ https://www.idahostatesman.com/news/politics-government/state-politics/article242706136.html https://wrex.com/2020/05/20/illinois-gyms-health-clubs-and-fitness-centers-reopen-on-may-29/ https://fox59.com/news/indiana-gyms-to-re-open-friday/ https://www.thegazette.com/subject/news/business/gyms-working-up-a-sweat-to-reopen-friday-20200514 https://www.kcur.org/news/2020-05-14/kansas-scales-back-next-phase-of-reopening-but-will-allow-haircuts-and-workouts https://kychamberbottomline.com/2020/05/08/beshear-details-when-restaurants-childcare-gyms-and-more-will-be-able-to-reopen-in-kentucky/ https://www.ksla.com/2020/05/15/louisiana-moves-phase-whats-reopening-2/ https://www.wbaltv.com/article/coronavirus-gyms-indoor-entertainment-venues-prepare-to-reopen-maryland/32852938 https://www.startribune.com/back-to-the-fitness-routine-as-gyms-reopen-in-minnesota/571159612/ https://www.wdsu.com/article/mississippi-barbershops-salons-and-gyms-can-reopen-monday/32424441 https://www.kmov.com/news/missouri-will-completely-re-open-june-16-parson-says/article_261cd95e-ac1f-11ea-bff2-2bee7309749f.html https://billingsgazette.com/news/local/montana-gyms-fitness-centers-ready-to-reopen/article_dd933066-19fa-5196-beb8-c2007d9784f4.html https://fox42kptm.com/newsletter-daily/gyms-reopening https://www.fox5vegas.com/coronavirus/gyms-bars-places-of-worship-can-reopen-in-nevadas-phase-2-beginning-friday/article_7947d286-9fc8-11ea-a80e-d3dbb7f89da2.html https://boston.cbslocal.com/2020/05/22/coronavirus-new-hampshire-beaches-gyms-open-june-1-with-restrictions/ https://www.krqe.com/health/coronavirus-new-mexico/gov-lujan-grisham-to-provide-update-on-coronavirus-response-restaurant-reopenings-thursday/ https://www.valleynewslive.com/content/news/North-Dakota--570014441.html https://abcnews.go.com/US/ohio-gyms-start-reopen-winning-legal-battle-state/story?id=70807911 https://okcfox.com/news/local/oklahoma-forward-gyms-prepare-guidelines-for-reopening https://www.wtae.com/article/pennsylvania-restaurants-bars-hair-salons-casinos-theaters-malls-gyms-can-reopen-in-green-phase/32647904# https://patch.com/rhode-island/cranston/reopening-ri-regulations-announced-gyms-phase-2 https://www.wbtv.com/2020/05/17/south-carolina-gyms-salons-other-close-contact-businesses-reopen-monday/ https://thehill.com/homenews/state-watch/498930-heres-where-your-state-falls-on-the-scale-of-most-to-least-reopened https://www.wmcactionnews5.com/2020/04/28/tennessee-gyms-fitness-centers-allowed-reopen-capacity/ https://www.kvue.com/article/news/health/coronavirus/guidelines-for-gyms-to-reopen-texas/269-3db07120-7095-4035-a893-2db9b67ec930 https://www.heraldextra.com/news/state-and-regional/utah-to-allow-reopening-of-restaurants-gyms-other-sites/article_85673896-27a1-5684-8582-fa132f38854f.html https://www.vpr.org/post/scott-allows-gyms-spas-reopen-and-announces-pilot-project-tourism-industry#stream/0 https://www.pilotonline.com/business/consumer/vp-bz-coronavirus-phase-two-blog-20200605-gme6t23e6jbjtf5jd4z6gc3oce-story.html https://patch.com/washington/seattle/inslee-releases-phase-2-guidance-gyms-real-estate https://www.wsaz.com/content/news/Gyms-and-health-clubs--570493071.html https://www.jsonline.com/story/money/business/2020/05/21/coronavirus-wisconsin-gyms-reopen-capacity-limits-disinfectant/5214667002/ https://www.kulr8.com/news/wyoming/wyoming-governor-authorizes-reopening-of-gyms-personal-care-services-under-new-health-orders/article_251ff5c4-8995-11ea-a723-035c6fe0df73.html

 </s> Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 41 filed 06/17/20 PageID.842 Page 1 of 3

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

LEAGUE OF INDEPENDENT FITNESS FACILITIES AND TRAINERS, INC., BASELINE FITNESS LLC, BUILDING YOUR TEMPLE LLC, BYT FITNESS 247 LLC, CLAWSON FITNESS, LLC, CLINTON FITNESS, INC., D-LUX KARATE UNIVERSITY, LLC, FENTON ATHLETIC CLUB, INC., FENTON KARATE, LLC, FUSION FITNESS 24/7 LLC, H3 FITNESS LLC, I FITNESS PERSONAL TRAINING, INC., JKP FITNESS, LLC, JPF ENTERPRISES, LLC, M FITNESS CLUB, LLC, MH & AB LLC, MOTOR CITY CF – ST. CLAIR SHORES, LLC, NASCOT ENTERPRISES, LLC, PRISON CITY PHYSIQUE, LLC, FMP FITNESS INC., STRENGTH BEYOND LLC, 24/7 BOOTCAMP AND BOXING, INC., and 4 SEASONS GYM, LLC,

No. 20-cv-00458
HON. PAUL L. MALONEY
DEFENDANTS WHITMER AND GORDON’S MOTION TO DISMISS

Plaintiffs,

v

GRETCHEN E. WHITMER and ROBERT E. GORDON,

Defendants.

Scott M. Erskine (P54734) Carly Van Thomme (P59706) Erskine Law, P.C. Attorneys for Plaintiffs 612 W. University Rochester, MI 48307

John G. Fedynsky (P65232) Andrew J. Jurgensen (P81123) Joseph T. Froehlich (P71887) Joshua O. Booth (P53847) Christopher M. Allen (P75329) Assistant Attorneys General

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 41 filed 06/17/20 PageID.843 Page 2 of 3

(248) 601-4499 serskine@erskinelaw.com cvanthomme@erskinelaw.com

Attorneys for Defendants Michigan Dep’t of Attorney General State Operations Division P.O. Box 30754 Lansing, MI 48909 (517) 335-7573 fedynskyj@michigan.gov jurgensena2@michigan.gov froehlichj1@michigan.gov boothj2@michigan.gov allenc28@michigan.gov

DEFENDANTS WHITMER AND GORDON’S MOTION TO DISMISS

Defendants Gretchen Whitmer and Robert Gordon, through counsel, move

this Court to dismiss Plaintiffs’ complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and (6), and

based upon the following:

1. Plaintiffs lack standing to bring this lawsuit for lack of a particularized concrete injury to remedy and for lack of organizational standing.

2. The Eleventh Amendment bars the claims under Michigan law and this Court should abstain or otherwise decline supplemental jurisdiction.

4. Jacobson gives the State broad authority to implement emergency measures when faced with a society-threatening epidemic – including the measures that Plaintiffs challenge as burdening their constitutional rights.

5. Even absent Jacobson’s deferential standard, Plaintiffs’ constitutional challenges to the Governor’s prior Orders fail.

6. Plaintiffs otherwise fail to state a claim for relief for any of the alleged federal constitutional violations.

In further support of this motion, Governor Whitmer and Director Gordon rely on

the facts, law and argument more fully developed in the attached brief in support.

2

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The undersigned certifies that on June 15, 2020, concurrence in the relief requested was sought from Plaintiffs’ Counsel, and concurrence was denied.
Respectfully submitted, Dana Nessel Attorney General /s/ John G. Fedynsky John G. Fedynsky (P65232) Assistant Attorney General Attorney for Defendants Whitmer and Gordon Michigan Dep’t of Attorney General State Operations Division P.O. Box 30754 Lansing, MI 48909 (517) 335-7573 fedynskyj@michigan.gov Dated: June 16, 2020 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I certify that on June 16, 2020, I electronically filed the foregoing papers with the Clerk of the Court using the ECF system, which will provide electronic copies to counsel of record, and I certify that my secretary has mailed by U.S. Postal Service the papers to any non-ECF participant. /s/ John G. Fedynsky John G. Fedynsky (P65232) Assistant Attorney General
3

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 41-1 filed 06/17/20 PageID.845 Page 1 of 58

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

LEAGUE OF INDEPENDENT FITNESS FACILITIES AND TRAINERS, INC., BASELINE FITNESS LLC, BUILDING YOUR TEMPLE LLC, BYT FITNESS 247 LLC, CLAWSON FITNESS, LLC, CLINTON FITNESS, INC., D-LUX KARATE UNIVERSITY, LLC, FENTON ATHLETIC CLUB, INC., FENTON KARATE, LLC, FUSION FITNESS 24/7 LLC, H3 FITNESS LLC, I FITNESS PERSONAL TRAINING, INC., JKP FITNESS, LLC, JPF ENTERPRISES, LLC, M FITNESS CLUB, LLC, MH & AB LLC, MOTOR CITY CF – ST. CLAIR SHORES, LLC, NASCOT ENTERPRISES, LLC, PRISON CITY PHYSIQUE, LLC, FMP FITNESS INC., STRENGTH BEYOND LLC, 24/7 BOOTCAMP AND BOXING, INC., and 4 SEASONS GYM, LLC,

No. 20-cv-00458
HON. PAUL L. MALONEY
DEFENDANTS’ BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS

Plaintiffs,

v

GRETCHEN E. WHITMER and ROBERT E. GORDON,

Defendants.

Scott M. Erskine (P54734) Carly Van Thomme (P59706) Erskine Law, P.C. Attorneys for Plaintiffs 612 W. University Rochester, MI 48307

John G. Fedynsky (P65232) Andrew J. Jurgensen (P81123) Joseph T. Froehlich (P71887) Joshua O. Booth (P53847) Christopher M. Allen (P75329) Assistant Attorneys General

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(248) 601-4499 serskine@erskinelaw.com cvanthomme@erskinelaw.com

Attorneys for Defendants Michigan Dep’t of Attorney General State Operations Division P.O. Box 30754 Lansing, MI 48909 (517) 335-7573 fedynskyj@michigan.gov jurgensena2@michigan.gov froehlichj1@michigan.gov boothj2@michigan.gov allenc28@michigan.gov

DEFENDANTS WHITMER AND GORDON’S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS

Dated: June 16, 2020

John G. Fedynsky (P65232) Andrew J. Jurgensen (P81123) Joseph T. Froehlich (P71887) Joshua O. Booth (P53847) Christopher M. Allen (P75329) Assistant Attorneys General Attorneys for Defendants Michigan Dep’t of Attorney General State Operations Division P.O. Box 30754 Lansing, MI 48909 (517) 335-7573 fedynskyj@michigan.gov jurgensena2@michigan.gov froehlichj1@michigan.gov boothj2@michigan.gov allenc28@michigan.gov

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TABLE OF CONTENTS Page
Table of Contents ............................................................................................................ i Concise Statement of Issues Presented .......................................................................iii Controlling or Most Appropriate Authority................................................................. iv Introduction ................................................................................................................... 1 Statement of Facts......................................................................................................... 4 Standard of Review...................................................................................................... 11 Argument ..................................................................................................................... 12
Plaintiffs’ claims are not justiciable. ................................................................ 12 Plaintiffs lack standing to bring their pre-enforcement claims. .......... 12 Plaintiff LIFFT lacks organizational standing. .................................... 13 The Eleventh Amendment bars consideration of any claims brought under Michigan law.................................................................. 14 The Court should abstain and otherwise decline supplemental jurisdiction over the novel claims brought under Michigan law and best decided in the first instance in Michigan courts. ................... 16 Abstention .................................................................................... 16 Pullman abstention .......................................................... 16 Thibodaux abstention ....................................................... 18 Colorado River abstention ................................................ 19 Supplemental Jurisdiction .......................................................... 21 This Court should decline supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(1). ........................ 23 This Court should decline supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(2). ........................ 24
i

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This Court should decline supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(4). ........................ 25 Plaintiffs otherwise fail to state any viable claims for relief. ......................... 26 The States have wide latitude in dealing with great dangers to public health. .......................................................................................... 27 Jacobson v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts ........................... 28 Application of Jacobson to the current health crisis and the restrictions challenged by Plaintiffs. .................................... 33 Plaintiffs do not have a viable procedural due process claim............... 39 Plaintiffs do not state a viable substantive due process claim............. 41 Plaintiffs do not have a viable equal protection claim.......................... 43 Plaintiffs do not have a viable dormant commerce clause claim. ........ 46 Plaintiffs do not a viable void for vagueness claim............................... 48 Plaintiffs have failed to state a viable privileges and/or immunities claim.................................................................................... 49 Conclusion and Relief Requested ................................................................................ 52
ii

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 41-1 filed 06/17/20 PageID.849 Page 5 of 58 CONCISE STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED
1. Do threshold issues of standing, Eleventh Amendment immunity, abstention, and prudential supplemental jurisdiction render this case non-justiciable?
2. Do Plaintiffs otherwise fail to state viable claims for relief for (a) procedural due process, (b) substantive due process, (c) equal protection, (d) dormant commerce clause, (e) void for vagueness, and (f) privileges and/or immunities?
iii

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 41-1 filed 06/17/20 PageID.850 Page 6 of 58 CONTROLLING OR MOST APPROPRIATE AUTHORITY
Authority: Chafin v. Chafin, 568 U.S. 165 (2013). FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307 (1993). Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972). Jacobson v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905). Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). McKay v. Federspiel, 823 F.3d 862 (6th Cir. 2016). Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928). Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984). Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970). United Bldg. & Const. Trades Council of Camden Cty. & Vicinity v. Mayor & Council of City of Camden, 465 U.S. 208 (1984).
iv

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INTRODUCTION In a pandemic involving person-to-person spread of a novel, potentially fatal virus that spreads easily and aggressively, particularly through respiratory droplets, does it make sense to restrict indoor fitness activity? By its nature, such activity – sustained heavy breathing, common ventilation, sharing of equipment and other objects and spaces – significantly increases the risk of spread. Thus, it makes eminent sense to restrict this activity. Under settled law, the State may temporarily restrict commercial activity when sufficient public health concerns require priority. The seriousness of the current pandemic is beyond dispute. The temporary nature of the narrow restrictions that Plaintiffs have challenged in this case is also undisputed. And while Plaintiffs may disagree with the continued need for these restrictions, that disagreement does not provide them with a legally viable claim of relief. As a threshold matter, Plaintiffs’ claims should fail for lack of standing. Furthermore, Plaintiffs’ state law claims should be dismissed on the basis of sovereign immunity, as well as under principles of abstention and supplemental jurisdiction. On their merits, Plaintiffs’ claims fare no better. Claims similar to those raised by the Plaintiffs have already been evaluated and rejected as unlikely to be successful on the merits in other federal courts as well as the Michigan Court of Claims. The reasoned analysis of these courts applies just as well in this case,
1

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recognizing the significant judicial deference due to the reasonable and temporary measures challenged here.1
It is well established that, “[u]pon the principle of self-defense, of paramount necessity, a community has the right to protect itself against an epidemic of disease which threatens the safety of its members.” Jacobson v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 27 (1905). To that end, “[t]he possession and enjoyment of all rights are subject to such reasonable conditions as may be deemed by the governing authority of the country essential to the safety, health, peace, good order, and morals of the community.” Id. at 26. As Chief Justice Roberts reasoned in a case concerning a regulation issued to address the COVID-19 pandemic, the broad authority given to and duly exercised by state officials should not be “subject to second-guessing by an ‘unelected federal judiciary,’ which lacks the background, competence, and expertise to assess public health and is not accountable to the people.” South Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Gavin Newsom, Governor of California, 509 U.S. ___ (2020) slip op., p. 2 (summary order released May 29, 2020) (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (quoting Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 545 (1985)). (Exhibit B.)
The well-settled rule of law from Jacobson permits a state, in times of public health crises, to reasonably restrict the rights of business and individuals alike in order to secure the safety of the community. The scourge of COVID-19—a novel
1 E.g., Martinko, et. al. v. Governor Whitmer, et. al., Michigan Court of Claims Case No. 20-62-MM, April 29, 2020 Opinion and Order Denying Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, p. 14 (Attached as part of Exhibit A).
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virus that quickly spread across the entire planet, infecting millions, and killing over four hundred thousand—presents such a crisis. Jurisdictions across the globe have had to take action to ensure that healthcare systems are not overwhelmed. Schools were shuttered, gatherings postponed, and business operations curtailed.
Michigan is one of the states hardest hit by the pandemic. As of June 15, 2020, there have been 66,085 persons confirmed infected and 6,017 have died, all in about three months. There is no dispute that in the absence of any vaccine, social distancing has been the most effective way to combat the virus and keep these numbers from escalating. Recognizing this, Defendant Governor Gretchen Whitmer and Director Robert Gordon have taken bold, yet reasonable and necessary, steps to prioritize social distancing in Michigan.
In a series of executive orders, Governor Whitmer exercised her authority under Michigan law to put measures in place to suppress the spread of the virus and protect the public health. The restrictions that Plaintiffs challenge here are part of this broader network of response efforts to suppress the spread of COVID-19, protect the State’s health care resources from rapid depletion, and avoid many needless deaths. As a result of these restrictions, countless lives have been saved, the curve of the virus’s spread has been flattening, and the Governor has been able to gradually and correspondingly lift a number of the previously imposed restrictions—including, for part of the State so far, the very ones challenged here.
The judicial creation of exceptions to these public health measures on a caseby-case, piecemeal basis infringes on the state’s authority to act in a public health
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crisis and threatens its overarching plan to cope with the dangers and protect the lives and welfare of all Michiganders. Even if they were justiciable, the claims Plaintiffs raise fail as a matter of law and they should be dismissed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS The nature of the COVID-19 pandemic.
The facts surrounding the COVID-19 pandemic are well established. COVID19 is a disease that results from the SARS-CoV-2 coronavirus. SARS-CoV-2 is similar to other coronaviruses (a large family of viruses that cause respiratory illnesses), but the strain is novel. There is no general or natural immunity built up in the population (meaning everyone is susceptible), no vaccine, and no known treatment to combat the virus itself (as opposed to treatment to mitigate its symptoms).
It is widely known and accepted that the virus is highly contagious, spreading easily from person to person via “respiratory droplets.”2 Experts agree that being anywhere within six feet of an infected person puts you at a high risk of contracting the disease.3 But even following that advice is not a sure-fire way to prevent infection. The respiratory droplets from an infected person can land on surfaces, and be transferred many hours later to the eyes, mouth, or nose of others
2 World Health Organization, Modes of transmission of virus causing COVID-19, available at https://www.who.int/news-room/commentaries/detail/modes-oftransmission-of-virus-causing-covid-19-implications-for-ipc-precautionrecommendations. (Attached as Exhibit C). 3 Centers for Disease Control, Social Distancing, Quarantine, and Isolation, available at https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/prevent-getting-sick/socialdistancing.html. (Attached as Exhibit D).
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who touch the surface. Moreover, since many of those infected experience only mild symptoms, a person could spread the disease before he even realizes he is sick. Most alarmingly, a person with COVID-19 could be not yet symptomatic, but still spread the disease.4 Everyone is vulnerable either as a potential victim of this scourge or a carrier of it to a potential victim.
Because there is no way to immunize or treat for COVID-19, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention have indicated the best way to prevent illness is to “avoid being exposed.”5 And as experience from prior pandemics such as smallpox and the 1918 Spanish Influenza indicates, early intervention to slow COVID-19’s transmission is critical.
In keeping with this advice, governmental entities have stressed the critical import of “social distancing,” the practice of avoiding public spaces and limiting movement.6 The objective of social distancing is what has been termed “flattening the curve,” that is, reducing the speed at which COVID-19 spreads. If the disease spreads too quickly, the limited resources of our healthcare system could easily become overwhelmed.7
4 (Id.) 5 (Id.) 6 (Id.) 7 See New York Times, Flattening the Coronavirus Curve (March 27, 2020), available at https://www.nytimes.com/article/flatten-curve-coronavirus.html. (Attached as Exhibit E). Take Italy, for example, where the healthcare system was so overloaded in just three weeks of dealing with the virus that it could not treat all patients infected, essentially leaving some to die.
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On March 10, 2020, in response to the growing pandemic in Michigan, Governor Whitmer declared a state of emergency and invoked the emergency powers available to the Governor under Michigan law.8 On March 13, 2020, Governor Whitmer issued Executive Order 2020-5, prohibiting assemblages of 250 or more people in a single shared space with limited exceptions, and ordering the closure of all K-12 school buildings.9 Yet, even in the face of the social distancing recommendations and the six-foot rule, on Saturday, March 14, the public was out in droves.
On March 16, 2020, the Governor ordered various places of public accommodation, like restaurants, bars, and exercise facilities, to close their premises to the public.10 And on March 17, 2020, the Governor issued an order rescinding Executive Order 2020-5, changing the cap on assemblages to fifty persons in a single shared indoor space, and expanding the scope of exceptions from that cap.11 The Governor issues and continually revises Stay Home orders to stem the tide of COVID-19 infections.
On March 23, 2020, Governor Whitmer issued Executive Order 2020-21, which essentially ordered all persons not performing essential or critical
8 E.O. No. 2020-4, available at https://www.michigan.gov/whitmer/0,9309,7-38790499_90705-521576--,00.html. (Attached as Exhibit F). 9 E.O. No. 2020-5, available at https://www.michigan.gov/whitmer/0,9309,7-38790499_90705-521595--,00.html. (Attached as Exhibit G). 10 E.O. No. 2020-9, available at https://www.michigan.gov/whitmer/0,9309,7-38790499_90705-521789--,00.html. (Attached as Exhibit H). 11 E.O. No. 2020-11, available at https://www.michigan.gov/whitmer/0,9309,7-38790499_90705-521890--,00.html. (Attached as Exhibit I).
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infrastructure job functions to stay in their place of residence, other than to obtain
groceries, care for loved ones, engage in outdoor activity consistent with social
distancing, and other limited exceptions.12 The order also prohibited, with limited
exceptions, all public and private gatherings of any number of people that are not
part of a single household.13
Over the weeks that followed, the Governor reissued that Stay Home order
periodically, adjusting its scope as needed and appropriate to match the ever-
changing circumstances presented by this pandemic. The complementary
restrictions on access to certain places of public accommodation also remained in
place.14
On June 1, 2020, the Governor issued E.O. 2020-110, (Exhibit K), which
continued the incremental and data-driven reopening of the State by rescinding the
latest iterations of the Stay Home and public-accommodations orders – E.O.s 2020-
69 and 2020-96 – and replacing their restrictions with narrower and more
12 E.O. No. 2020-21, available at https://www.michigan.gov/whitmer/0,9309,7-38790499_90705-522626--,00.html. (Attached as Exhibit J). 13 (Id.) 14 See E.O. Nos. 2020-42, 2020-59, 2020-70, 2020-77, 2020-92, and 2020-96 (Stay Home orders); 2020-20, 2020-43, and 2020-69 (public accommodations orders). Alongside these executive orders, Director Gordon, acting pursuant to his authority under MCL 333.2253, issued emergency orders concluding that COVID-19 had reached epidemic status in Michigan and that the measures imposed in the Stay Home orders and certain related executive orders were necessary to control the epidemic and protect the public health. The first of these emergency orders was issued on April 2, 2020, with subsequent versions rescinding and replacing the prior versions of the order issued May 18, 2020 and May 21, 2020. As presented, Plaintiffs’ challenges appear directed primarily at the Governor’s executive orders and only nominally against Director Gordon’s April 2 Order.
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permissive limitations on certain gatherings, events, and businesses. This order leaves in place the restriction that certain places of public accommodation – including indoor gyms, fitness centers, and the like, as well as indoor entertainment and recreational facilities such as trampoline parks, climbing facilities, dance halls, and the like – remain “closed to ingress, egress, use, and occupancy by members of the public.”
Executive Order 2020-110 also, however, makes clear (as the prior publicaccommodations orders did) that employees of these businesses are permitted on site, and further provides that the following outdoor services and activities are permitted:
Outdoor fitness classes, athletic practices, training sessions, or games, provided that coaches, spectators, and participants not from the same household maintain six feet of distance from one another at all times during such activities, and that equipment and supplies are shared to the minimum extent possible and are subject to frequent and thorough disinfection and cleaning. E.O. 2020-110(14)(a). In addition, the order does not prevent gyms and similar businesses from offering online and certain in-home services to their clients, or from selling products via delivery, curbside pickup, or at outdoor classes and the like. On June 5, 2020, the Governor issued E.O. 2020-115, (Exhibit L), which lifted many restrictions in Regions 6 (northern Lower Peninsula) and 8 (Upper Peninsula), including those on indoor fitness activity, permitting gyms and similar businesses to fully resume in-person operations subject to certain safety measures. In taking this next step toward reopening, the Governor noted that these two regions of the State “have significantly fewer new cases [of COVID-19] per million
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each day than other regions in the state and have not shown an increase in viral activity in response to earlier relaxations of my orders.” (E.O. 2020-115, Preamble.) Subject to her ongoing assessment of statewide data and the advice of public health experts, the Governor has publicly stated that her goal is to be in a position to take this same step with the rest of the State by July 4, 2020.
As the steps forward in these recent orders reflect, the emergency measures implemented by the Governor in response to the COVID-19 pandemic have worked. With Michiganders staying home and following the other response measures put in place, Michigan has been able to dramatically reduce the rate of the virus’s spread and save thousands of lives.15 And under the Governor’s incremental approach to reopening, Michigan has thus far been able to maintain this progress while continuing to improve its testing and contact-tracing capacities—critical components to sustained success in containing the virus.16
Despite this progress, the virus has inflicted a devastating toll, killing nearly 6,000 Michiganders to date, and its spread, while slowed, has not stopped. The
15 E.g., Imperial College of London, Report 23: State-Level Tracking of COVID-19 in the United States < https://www.imperial.ac.uk/media/imperialcollege/medicine/mrc-gida/2020-05-21-COVID19-Report-23.pdf> (accessed June 16, 2020); Bouffard, The Detroit News, British Study: Whitmer stay-home orders saved lives, perhaps tens of thousands <https://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/local/detroit-city/2020/06/12/studywhitmer-stay-home-orders-saved-perhaps-tens-thousands-lives/5342143002/> (accessed June 16, 2020); MI Safe Start Map Dashboard <https://www.mistartmap.info/> (accessed June 16, 2020). 16 MI Safe Start Map Dashboard < https://www.mistartmap.info/> (accessed June 16, 2020).
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State’s testing and tracing capacities require continued improvement to reach optimal levels. And as Michigan moves to fully re-engage its economy, the threat of resurgent COVID-19 infections at the workplace and in public spaces looms large, and the experiences of other states counsel continued patience and caution in lifting social distancing measures. Indeed, 19 states are currently in the midst of such surges of COVID-19 infections, and hospitalizations in 12 states have increased in June 2020.17 Plaintiffs and their claims.
Plaintiff League of Independent Fitness Facilities and Trainers, Inc. (“LIFFT”) is a non-profit organization based in Wayne County, with about 400 members, of which at least 130 operate a fitness facility. (First Am. Compl., ¶ 10.) The remaining twenty-two Plaintiffs are individual fitness industry businesses that operate at least one location in Michigan. (Pl.’s Br. at 1, Page ID.267.) The first amended complaint asserts the following ten claims:
1. dormant commerce clause, 2. privileges and immunities clause, 3. privileges or immunities clause, 4. procedural due process, 5. substantive due process,
17 Holcombe, CNN Health, 12 states see rising Covivd-19 hospitalizations as Arizona asks hospitals to activate emergency plans <https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/10/health/us-coronavirus-wednesday/index.html> (accessed June 11, 2020).
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6. equal protection,18 7. void for vagueness, 8. separation of powers under Michigan law, 9. unlawful exercise of Michigan’s Emergency Powers of the Governor Act, 10. unlawful exercise of Emergency Management Act Threshold issues of justiciability stand in the way of each of these claims. And on their merits, each claim is unfounded. For the reasons stated below, dismissal is appropriate.
STANDARD OF REVIEW In a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and (6), this Court must accept as true the allegations of the complaint and then determine whether the statements are sufficient to make out a right of relief. United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 327 (1991). However, although it must accept well-pled facts as true, the Court is not required to accept a plaintiff’s legal conclusions. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677 (2009). In evaluating the sufficiency of a plaintiff’s pleadings, this Court may make reasonable inferences in the non-moving party’s favor, “but [this Court is] not required to draw [p]laintiffs’ inference.” Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce, N.A., Inc., 416 F.3d 1242, 1248 (11th Cir. 2005). Similarly, conclusory allegations are “not entitled to be assumed true.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681.
18 This claim is incorrectly labelled as a duplicative Count V, which makes the subsequent counts incorrectly numbered as well. (First Am. Compl., R. 16, PageID.176.)
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A complaint may be dismissed if the facts as pled do not state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (explaining “only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss”).
Though this is a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the court may consider an attached document without converting the motion into one for summary judgment if the attached document is: (1) central to the plaintiff’s claim; and (2) undisputed as to authenticity. See Harris v. Ivax Corp., 182 F.3d 799, 802 n. 2 (11th Cir. 1999); Beddall v. State Street Bank and Trust Co., 137 F.3d 12, 16–17 (1st Cir. 1998); see also Commercial Money Ctr, Inc. v. Illinois Union Ins. Co., 508 F.3d 327, 336 (6th Cir. 2007).
ARGUMENT There are threshold jurisdictional and prudential legal reasons to dismiss this complaint. In particular, standing is lacking because of the pre-enforcement posture of this case. And the lead Plaintiff lacks organizational standing. For the claims brought under Michigan law, sovereign immunity stands in the way of this Court granting any relief, and this Court should otherwise decline supplemental jurisdiction. Plaintiffs’ claims are not justiciable.
Plaintiffs lack standing to bring their pre-enforcement claims. To have Article III standing, a plaintiff must have a personal stake in the outcome of a controversy, and that stake must be in the form of an injury that is “concrete and particularized” and “actual or imminent, not conjectural or
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hypothetical.” Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149, 158 (2014). An allegation of future injury may suffice only if the threatened injury is “certainly impending,” or there is a “‘substantial risk’ that the harm will occur.” Id. And as the Supreme Court has made clear, when—as here—the merits of a constitutional question pit the judiciary to pass on the constitutionality of the other branches of government, the standing inquiry is “especially rigorous.” Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 408 (2013).
Plaintiffs bring their claims in a pre-enforcement posture. As such, to satisfy the “injury-in-fact” requirement of Article III standing, they must allege (1) an intention to engage in the conduct they claim is unconstitutionally proscribed and (2) a credible threat of prosecution. McKay v. Federspiel, 823 F.3d 862, 867 (6th Cir. 2016). Here, Plaintiffs have alleged neither. In fact, Plaintiffs commendably acknowledge that they have not violated the orders and give no reason to believe that they intend to. Plaintiffs’ standing cannot the “especially rigorous” scrutiny that applies to their claims. Clapper, 568 U.S. at 408. As a result, Plaintiffs lack of Article III standing.
Plaintiff LIFFT lacks organizational standing. For additional reasons, the lead Plaintiff LIFFT lacks standing. An organization can establish standing two ways. First, it may assert “organizational standing” on its own behalf because it has suffered a palpable injury as a result of the defendants’ actions. MX Group, Inc. v. City of Covington, 293 F.3d 326, 332–33
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(6th Cir. 2002). Second, an organization may claim standing as a representative of its members who would have standing to sue individually. Id.
Here, LIFFT primarily alleges derivative injuries based on claims about its members. It alleges no direct injury coupled with a causal connection between the injury and the executive orders. As a result, any claim of injury is conjecture and insufficient to establish standing.
Further, regardless of whether LIFFT is asserting standing on its own behalf or on behalf of its members, LIFFT, for the reasons already discussed, has failed to allege facts sufficient to establish the injury-in-fact requirement for the preenforcement claims it seeks to bring. As a result, LIFFT lacks standing. See Loren v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan, 505 F.3d 598, 607 (6th Cir. 2007) (“If Plaintiffs cannot establish constitutional standing, their claims must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.”)
The Eleventh Amendment bars consideration of any claims brought under Michigan law. As the Supreme Court has explained, “[t]he ultimate guarantee of the Eleventh Amendment is that non-consenting States may not be sued by private individuals in federal court.” Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 363 (2001). Plaintiffs present state law claims regarding the scope and state constitutionality of the Michigan Emergency Powers of the Governor Act (EPGA) and the Michigan Emergency Management Act (EMA). But these state law claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
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In Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 121 (1984), the Supreme Court held that the Eleventh Amendment forbids federal courts from enjoining state institutions and state officials on the basis of state law and that the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction does not override the Eleventh Amendment. The Sixth Circuit has also emphasized that “the States’ constitutional [Eleventh Amendment] immunity from suit prohibits all state-law claims filed against a State in federal court, whether those claims are monetary or injunctive in nature.” Ernst v. Rising, 427 F.3d 351, 368 (6th Cir. 2005).
Moreover, where, as here, a claim is asserted against a state official in her official capacity, the claim is functionally equivalent to a claim asserted against the state itself. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985) (explaining that “an official capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the [governmental] entity” for which the official serves as an agent); Cady v. Arenac County, 574 F.3d 334, 342 (6th Cir. 2009) (noting that “a lawsuit against an officer in his official capacity and against the governmental entity [for which he serves] ... are functionally the same and should therefore be subjected to the same analysis”). The sole exception to this rule—i.e., an official-capacity claim for prospective injunctive relief under Ex parte Young—does not apply to claims alleging non-compliance with state law. See Ernst, 427 F.3d at 368–69; Freeman v. Michigan Department of State, 808 F.2d 1174, 1179 (6th Cir. 1987). Consequently, the Court lacks jurisdiction under the Eleventh Amendment, and the state law
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claims are subject to dismissal without prejudice. This Court should therefore dismiss all claims predicated upon alleged violations of Michigan law.
The Court should abstain and otherwise decline supplemental jurisdiction over the novel claims brought under Michigan law.
Abstention Even if the Court could hear and decide the Plaintiffs’ state law claims, it should decline to do so. The precise questions raised here under Michigan law are currently being litigated in the Michigan Courts. Identical questions about the scope and constitutionality of the EMA and EPGA are being litigated in various cases pending in the Michigan Court of Claims and Michigan Court of Appeals, including Michigan House and Senate v. Whitmer, which is currently on an expedited briefing and hearing schedule in the Michigan Court of Appeals. Given the gravity of the state law questions, and because the issues are currently being litigated in State court, this Court should abstain from consideration of the claims under three distinct theories of abstention.
Pullman abstention First, this Court should abstain under the Pullman abstention doctrine. In Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 499–500 (1941), the Supreme Court held that, when a challenged state statute requires interpretation by the judiciary, the “last word” on the meaning of the statute belongs to the state courts. The Court held: In this situation a federal court of equity is asked to decide an issue by making a tentative answer which may be displaced tomorrow by a state adjudication. The reign of law is hardly promoted if an unnecessary ruling of a federal court is thus supplanted by a
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controlling decision of a state court. The resources of equity are equal to an adjustment that will avoid the waste of a tentative decision as well as the friction of a premature constitutional adjudication. [Id. at 500] [internal citations removed]. In sum, “the federal courts should not adjudicate the constitutionality of state enactments fairly open to interpretation until the state courts have been afforded a reasonable opportunity to pass upon them.” Harrison v. Nat’l Ass’n for the Advancement of Colored People, 360 U.S. 167, 176 (1959). This “well-established procedure” promotes and protects federalism and it “spares the federal courts of unnecessary constitutional adjudication.” Id. at 176–77 (noting that Pullman abstention “is aimed at the avoidance of unnecessary interference by the federal courts with proper and validly administered state concerns, a course so essential to the balanced working of our federal system”) This Court should refrain from ruling on the cogency of the EMA and the EPGA because, for purposes of this argument, the statutes are “fairly open to interpretation” and “the state courts have [not] been afforded a reasonable opportunity to pass upon them.” Harrison, 360 U.S. at 176. Further, given the pending state court actions and the expected rapidity of their climb up the appellate ladder, a ruling by this Court on the EMA and EPGA would be “a tentative answer which may be displaced tomorrow by a state adjudication.” Pullman, 312 U.S. at 499–500.19 Such an abstention would not “involve the abdication of federal
19 See also Lake Carriers’ Ass’n v. MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498, 511 (1972) (affirming the Eastern District of Michigan’s abstention in a case where a Michigan statute “has not been construed in any Michigan court, and, as appellants themselves suggest in attacking it for vagueness, its terms are far from clear in particulars”).
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jurisdiction, but only the postponement of its exercise” while “serv[ing] the policy of comity inherent in the doctrine of abstention” and “spar[ing] the federal courts of unnecessary constitutional adjudication.” Harrison, 360 U.S. at 176–177. Because abstention is proper, all claims under Michigan law should be dismissed.
Thibodaux abstention Second, this Court should abstain under the Thibodaux abstention doctrine. While similar to Pullman abstention, Thibodaux abstention is more concerned with the type of state law at issue. See Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 27–28 (1959). The Supreme Court has advised federal district courts to invoke Thibodaux abstention “where there have been presented difficult questions of state law bearing on policy problems of substantial public import whose importance transcends the result in the case then at bar.” Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 814 (1976). In Thibodaux, the Supreme Court reviewed a Louisiana district court’s decision to abstain from ruling on the constitutionality of a Louisiana state law regarding eminent domain when the State’s Attorney General and cities in the State disagreed about the limits of eminent domain power. 360 U.S. at 30. The eminent domain power in question derived from a State statute that had never before been considered by the State courts. Id. The district court stayed the case and sought a declaratory ruling from the Louisiana Supreme Court. Id. The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the district court to abstain, reasoning that “[i]nformed local courts may find meaning not discernible to the outsider” and that rendering a decision on the scope of the State statute may bind the litigants in the
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lawsuit “whereas the rights of all other litigants would be thereafter governed by a decision of the Supreme Court of Louisiana [which could be] quite different from ours.” Id.
In this case, this Court should defer to the Michigan state courts on questions of Michigan law. Importantly, the EMA and EPGA are center on police powers, powers inherent to the sovereignty of the State. Thibodaux, 360 U.S. at 30. The statutes invoked by the Governor are thus enactments going to the core of Michigan’s sovereignty. This once-in-a-generation pandemic has had a disproportionately deadly impact on the State of Michigan. And the Governor has responded by exercising powers that have been rarely needed or reviewed.
The scope and constitutionality of those powers is a question best left to the Michigan courts. Indeed, the COVID-19 pandemic and the emergency powers utilized by the Governor “present[] difficult questions of state law bearing on policy problems of substantial public import whose importance transcends the result in the case . . . at bar.” Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 814 (emphasis added). This Court should abstain under Thibodaux, and dismiss all claims predicated on interpretations of Michigan law.
Colorado River abstention Finally, this Court should abstain under the Colorado River abstention doctrine. Colorado River abstention should be invoked when there is concurrent litigation on the same grounds, no matter the type of claim at issue. Colorado
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River, 400 U.S. at 821. The Sixth Circuit has developed abstention factors to be considered where there is similar, concurrent litigation elsewhere:
(1) whether the state court has assumed jurisdiction over any res or property; (2) whether the federal forum is less convenient to the parties; (3) avoidance of piecemeal litigation; and (4) the order in which jurisdiction was obtained . . . (5) whether the source of governing law is state or federal; (6) the adequacy of the state court action to protect the federal plaintiff’s rights; (7) the relative progress of the state and federal proceedings; and (8) the presence or absence of concurrent jurisdiction. Romine v. Compuserve Corp., 160 F.3d 337, 340-341 (6th Cir. 1998) (internal citations omitted)]. These factors are to be carefully balanced in light of the facts of each case; they are not a “mechanical checklist.” Id. at 341 (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1983)). In applying these factors, this Court should invoke Colorado River and abstain. There has been no action in this case other than the complaint and the filing of initial motion practice. This case involves important matters of State police power and authority that affect everybody in Michigan. Moreover, the Governor is a party to all the concurrent litigation related to the Governor’s Executive Orders. Colorado River, 400 U.S. at 820. In addition, the Michigan courts have assumed jurisdiction over the concurrent litigation, and the source of governing law is state law. Likewise, the litigation in the state courts will protect Plaintiffs’ rights as the relief sought is identical to the relief sought here, and Michigan Courts are the final arbiters of Michigan law. Romine, 160 F.3d at 340–41. Therefore, the factors enumerated by
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the Sixth Circuit favor this Court abstaining from adjudicating questions of Michigan law in this case. Id.
COVID-19 is a once-in-a-lifetime pandemic that threatens the safety and health of every single person in Michigan. To protect Michiganders, the Governor used statutory emergency powers to combat the spread of the virus. Michigan state courts are, right now, considering the scope and constitutionality of those powers. This Court should defer to the Michigan courts to avoid the possibility of inconsistent adjudications regarding matters of the upmost importance and immediacy, that would only add confusion and sow discord in already uncertain and trying times. This is just the sort of occasion where the friction of federalism should give way to appropriate prudential abstention doctrine. Because this Court should abstain, all claims under Michigan law should be dismissed.
Supplemental Jurisdiction Plaintiffs’ claims under Michigan law are currently awaiting decision in and/or have already been decided by the Michigan Court of Claims, and the issues are quickly percolating in the state appellate courts right now.20 Exercising supplemental jurisdiction over these state law claims would be an affront to the comity this Court owes its state court counterparts, especially where
20 See, e.g., Michigan House and Senate v. Whitmer, Michigan Court of Appeals No. 353655; Michigan United for Liberty v Whitmer, Michigan Court of Appeals No. 353643; Ostergren v. Whitmer, Michigan Court of Appeals No. 353732; and Martinko, et al. v. Whitmer, et. al., Michigan Court of Appeals No. 353604, Michigan Court of Claims No. 20-62-MM; see also Associated Builders and Contractors, Inc. of Michigan, et al. v. Whitmer, Court of Claims No. 20-92-MZ.
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several of these issues have been or will be decided in short order. Moreover, deciding such state-law questions would not promote judicial economy or the convenience of the parties.
A federal court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over each claim in an action that shares a “common nucleus of operative facts” with a claim that invokes the court’s original jurisdiction. United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966); 28 U.S.C. § 1367. But the federal court need not exercise its authority to invoke supplemental jurisdiction in every case in which it is possible to do so. Id. at 726. Supplemental jurisdiction “is a doctrine of discretion, not of plaintiff’s right.” Id.
“In deciding whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction . . . a judge must take into account concerns of comity, judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and the like.” Senra v. Smithfield, 715 F.3d 34, 41 (1st Cir. 2013). If these considerations are not present, “a federal court should hesitate to exercise jurisdiction over state claims.” Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726. Additionally, supplemental jurisdiction may be denied “if the federal claims are dismissed before trial,” if “it appears that the state issues subsequently predominate,” or “if the likelihood of jury confusion” would be strong without separation of the claims. Id. at 726–27.
A court has the discretion to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) if:
(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of state law, (2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over which the district court has original jurisdiction,
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(3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction, or (4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction. Subsections one, two, and four are relevant to the present action.
This Court should decline supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(1). A district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to § 1367(c)(1) if “the [state] claim raises a novel or complex issue of state law.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(1). In deciding whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, the “obscurity and the paucity of pertinent state judicial precedent [ ] argue[s] in favor of deferring in favor of the state courts.” Peters v. Cars to Go, Inc., 184 F.R.D. 270, 275 (W.D. Mich. Nov. 16, 1998) (quoting Scott v. Long Island Sav. Bank, FSB, 937 F.2d 738, 742 (2d Cir.1991)). Here, there is scant Michigan authority interpreting or applying the statutes considered and challenged by Plaintiffs. Indeed, it is difficult to find any applicable Michigan precedent regarding the EMA or the EPGA. To be sure, the undersigned has been unable to locate a single appellate Michigan case considering the scope or constitutionality of the EMA or EPGA under the circumstances as here. Nor are there any Michigan appellate cases considering whether the EMA and EPGA are impermissible delegations of legislative authority to the Governor. Similarly, there is no published case from a federal court that has ever attempted to resolve these legal issues.
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Importantly, as mentioned, the precise questions raised are currently being litigated in the Michigan courts. As noted above, identical questions about the scope and constitutionality of the EMA and EPGA are being litigated in multiple cases pending in the Michigan Court of Claims and Michigan Court of Appeals. Comity considerations urge declining supplemental jurisdiction here.
There is no doubt that Plaintiffs’ claims are novel questions of state law, and federal courts have an “interest in avoiding the unnecessary resolution of state law issues,” Hankins v. The Gap, Inc., 84 F.3d 797, 803 (6th Cir. 1996). See also Doe v. Sundquist, 106 F.3d 702, 708 (6th Cir. 1997) (declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s state law claim that Tennessee law regarding disclosure of adoption records violated Tennessee constitution). Accordingly, this Court should decline supplemental jurisdiction.
This Court should decline supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(2). A district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to § 1367(c)(2) if “the [state] claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over which the district court has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(2). Where “the state issues substantially predominate, whether in terms of proof, of the scope of the issues raised, or of the comprehensiveness of the remedy sought, the state claims may be dismissed without prejudice and left for resolution to state tribunals.” Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726–27. Here, the state law claims present disparate legal theories as to both claims and defenses that are wholly unrelated to the federal claims.
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Indeed, Plaintiffs present pure questions of statutory interpretation under state law and constitutionality under the Michigan Constitution. These claims are completely independent from to the federal claims. For these reasons, the state claims would predominate over the § 1983 federal claims over which this Court has original jurisdiction. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(2), this Court should not exercise supplemental jurisdiction.
This Court should decline supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(4). Section 1367(c)(4) allows a district court to “decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under subsection (a) if . . . in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(4). “Congress’s use of the word ‘other’ to modify ‘compelling reasons’ indicates that what ought to qualify as ‘compelling reasons’ for declining jurisdiction under subsection (c)(4) should be of the same nature as the reasons that gave rise to the categories listed in subsections (c)(1)-(3).” Executive Software N. Am., Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 24 F.3d 1545, 1557 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing CarnegieMellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988)). Once the court decides that there are compelling reasons to decline jurisdiction, the factors that inform this decision usually will demonstrate how the circumstances confronted are “exceptional.” Id. at 1558. Courts generally accept that “compelling reasons for the purposes of [§ 1367](c)(4) . . . should be those that lead a court to conclude that declining jurisdiction best accommodates the values of economy, convenience, fairness and
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comity.” Id. at 1557 (internal citations omitted); see also Palmer v. Hosp. Auth. of
Randolph County, 22 F.3d 1559, 1569 (11th Cir. 1994).
This is not a case where one relatively minor state law claim is brought along
with federal causes of action that dominate the matter, nor is it a case where the
federal and state causes of action parallel in terms of both elements and expected
proofs. Any advantage that may have been gained by considering all the claims
together are outweighed by the novel nature of the questions of state law presented,
the considerations of comity, and deference to the state courts in allowing these
important questions of state law to be resolved by state judicial authority in the
first instance.
Plaintiffs otherwise fail to state any viable claims for relief.
Even if Plaintiffs’ claims were justiciable, they fail to state any viable claim
for relief. 21 First, the restrictions in the Governor’s executive orders are a proper
21 This section will focus on the merits of Plaintiffs’ federal constitutional claims. The state law claims Plaintiffs raise are complex, ultimately unfounded, and properly left to another forum for the copious reasons already stated. Should the Court intend to reach the merits of those claims under Michigan law, Defendants direct the Court to the multiple decisions from the Michigan Court of Claims thus far, which are attached as Exhibit A to this brief and which have consistently rejected substantive challenges to constitutionality and scope of the EMA and EPGA like those Plaintiffs have raised here. See Michigan House and Senate v. Whitmer, Michigan House and Senate v. Gov. Whitmer, Michigan Court of Claims Case No. 20-79-MZ, May 21, 2020 Opinion and Order of Dismissal, claim of appeal pending in Michigan Court of Appeals (COA No. 353655) (rejecting constitutional challenge to the EPGA and finding no basis to conclude that any of the Governor’s executive orders are invalid for lack of statutory authority); Michigan United for Liberty v. Whitmer, Michigan Court of Claims Case No. 20-61MZ, May 19, 2020 Opinion and Order Denying Plaintiff’s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction (finding no likelihood of success on merits regarding constitutional challenges to the EMA and EPGA); Martinko et al. v. Whitmer, Michigan Court of Claims Case No. 20-62-MM, April 29, 2020 Opinion and Order Denying Plaintiffs’
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exercise of the authority given to the States to combat a public health crisis. Second, even if the Court were not evaluating the claims under the deferential
standard set forth in Jacobson v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905), but instead under a more standard analysis of the alleged constitutional
violations, the restrictions pass muster. The States have wide latitude in dealing with great dangers to public health.
The worldwide impact of COVID-19 is recognized by all. Such an extraordinary circumstance requires extraordinary governmental measures. The measures taken in the Governor’s executive orders have been necessary to meet the
demands of these extraordinary times and are reasonable and constitutional. Accordingly, judicial invalidation of those orders is not warranted.
Motion for a Preliminary Injunction (finding no likelihood of success on merits regarding constitutional challenges to the EMA); Ostergren et al. v. Whitmer, Michigan Court of Claims Case No. 20-53-MZ, Opinion and Order Granting Summary Disposition, claim of appeal pending in the Michigan Court of Appeals (COA No. 353732) (rejecting constitutional challenge to the EPGA and challenge that an executive order was outside the scope of that statute’s authorization). Additionally, and by way of further illustration, Defendants have attached as an exhibit the Governor’s bypass application to the Michigan Supreme Court in Michigan House and Senate v. Whitmer, Michigan Supreme Court No. 161377. (Exhibit M.) Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 10, Defendants adopt and incorporate by reference the arguments made therein in response to Plaintiffs’ claims under Michigan law, and will, of course, supplement the reasoning provided in the attached decisions and briefing upon this Court’s request to provide any further response to the substance of Plaintiffs’ state law claims that this Court may deem in order.
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Jacobson v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts Faced with “great danger[ ],” state actors are permitted great latitude to secure the public health. Jacobson v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 29 (1905). And in this time of crisis, securing the public health requires temporary sacrifices by each of us: “Real liberty for all could not exist under the operation of a principle which recognizes the right of each individual person to use his own, whether in respect of his person or his property, regardless of the injury that may be done to others.” Id. at 26. In Jacobson, the U.S. Supreme Court considered a claim that the state’s mandatory vaccination law, which applied to every person in Cambridge, Massachusetts, due to a growing smallpox epidemic, violated the defendant’s Fourteenth Amendment right “to care for his own body and health in such way as to him seems best.” Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 26. The Supreme Court upheld this sweeping, invasive measure as a proper exercise of the States’ police power because of the exigencies and dangerousness of the public health crisis. It affirmed that “a community has the right to protect itself against an epidemic of disease which threatens the safety of its members.” Id. at 27. As the Court stated, in every well-ordered society charged with the duty of conserving the safety of its members the rights of the individual in respect of his liberty may at times, under the pressure of great dangers, be subjected to such restraint, to be enforced by reasonable regulations, as the safety of the general public may demand. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 29. Jacobson even highlighted the circumstance, without hesitation, in which seemingly healthy people were quarantined against their will aboard a ship on
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which others had cases of serious diseases. Id. at 29. The Court noted that such a drastic measure was reasonable “until it be ascertained by inspection, conducted with due diligence, that the danger of the spread of the disease among the community at large has disappeared.” Id. Recognizing the separation of powers, and the limits on the judiciary to invade the authority of a co-equal branch, the Court refused to “usurp the functions of another branch of government” by secondguessing the executive’s exercise of police power in such circumstances. Id. at 28.
Of course, constitutional rights do not disappear in the face of a public health crisis, but the analysis of the government’s action changes. Review is “only” available if the challenged action “has no real or substantial relation to those objects [of securing public health and safety], or is, beyond all question, a plain, palpable invasion of rights secured by the fundamental law.” Id. at 31 (emphasis added).
Jacobson’s principle is no outlier. See, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166–67 (1944) (“The right to practice religion freely does not include liberty to expose the community or the child to communicable disease or the latter to ill health or death.”); Compagnie Francaise de Navigation a Vapeur v. La State Bd of Health, 186 U.S. 380, 393 (1902) (upholding Louisiana’s right to quarantine even apparently healthy passengers aboard a vessel over a due process challenge).
And Jacobson not only remains good law, see, e.g., Kansas v Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 356 (1997) (block quoting Jacobson in support of the proposition that “an individual’s constitutionally protected interest in avoiding physical restraint may be overridden even in the civil context”), but federal circuits have recently had occasion
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to apply Jacobson to COVID-19-related regulations, upholding certain restrictions
that burden even a fundamental right. See, e.g., In re Abbott, 954 F.3d 772, 786
(5th Cir., April 7, 2020) (“Jacobson instructs that all constitutional rights may be
reasonably restricted to combat a public health emergency.”) (emphasis in original);
In re Rutledge, 956 F.3d 1018 (8th Cir., April 22, 2020).22
Recently, the Sixth Circuit has confirmed that Jacobson is the proper
starting point for considering restrictions promulgated in response to the COVID-19
crisis that touch upon constitutional rights. See Adams & Boyle, P.C. v. Slatery, 956
F.3d 913 (6th Cir. 2020); Maryville Baptist Church, Inc. v. Beshear, 957 F.3d 610
(6th Cir. 2020); Roberts v. Neace, 958 F.3d 409 (6th Cir. 2020). In those cases, the
Court determined that despite the very deferential standard of Jacobson, the
22 Numerous other federal courts across the country have recognized that Jacobson is the proper starting point for considering restrictions promulgated in response to the COVID-19 crisis that touch upon constitutional rights. And those courts have routinely held, across a wide range of challenges, that state actions like those at issue here were an appropriate and constitutional response to the scourge of COVID-19. See, e.g., Open Our Oregon v. Brown, No. 6:20-CV-773-MC, 2020 WL 2542861 (D. Or. May 19, 2020); Amato v. Elicker, No. 3:20-CV-464 (MPS), 2020 WL 2542788 (D. Conn. May 19, 2020); Geller v. de Blasio, No. 20CV3566 (DLC), 2020 WL 2520711 (S.D.N.Y. May 18, 2020); McGhee v. City of Flagstaff, 2020 WL 2308479 (D. Ariz., May 8, 2020); Givens v. Newsom, 2020 WL 2307224 (E.D. Cal., May 8, 2020); SH3 Health Consulting, LLC v. St. Louis County Exec., 2020 WL 2308444 (E.D. Mo., May 8, 2020); Cross Culture Christian Center v. Newsom, 2020 WL 2121111 (E.D. Cal., May 5, 2020); Lighthouse Fellowship Church v. Northam, 2020 WL 2110416 (E.D. Va., May 1, 2020); Shows v. Curtis, 2020 WL 1953621 (W.D. N.C., April 23, 2020); Gish v. Newsom, 2020 WL 1979970 (C.D. Cal. April 23, 2020); Robinson v. Attorney General, 957 F.3d 1171 (11th Cir. April 23, 2020); Hartman v. Acton, No. 2:20-CV-1952, 2020 WL 1932896 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 21, 2020); Lawrence v. Colorado, No. 120CV00862DDDSKC, 2020 WL 2737811 (D. Colo. Apr. 19, 2020); Legacy Church, Inc. v. Kunkel, 2020 WL 1905586 (D. N.M. April 17, 2020).
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Plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their claims challenging a complete abortion ban in Tennessee and a total ban on group religious services in Kentucky.
Quite plainly, the restrictions considered by the Sixth Circuit in Adams & Boyle, Maryville Baptist Church, Inc., and Roberts were different in kind and severity than the limited and temporary (and now partially rescinded) restrictions challenged by the Plaintiffs in this case. Unlike those cases, this case does not involve a complete ban on the exercise of fundamental constitutional rights. Instead, the Plaintiffs challenge temporary and partial restrictions on certain commercial activity—none of which comes close to plainly or palpably invading a fundamental right beyond all question, and all of which had a real and substantial relation to stopping the spread of the virus, preventing the overwhelming of this state’s health care system, and avoiding needless deaths.23
Recently, the U.S. Supreme Court refused to grant injunctive relief for a party challenging under the First Amendment a California executive order that created limitations on public gatherings, including those of public worship, based on considerations of health and safety. South Bay United Pentecostal Church, et al. v.
23 It is also worth noting that Governor Whitmer’s orders have placed restrictions on the fundamental constitutional rights asserted by the Plaintiffs in Adams & Boyle and Maryville Baptist Church, Inc. – abortion and free exercise of religion. And when courts have evaluated constitutional challenges of the sort at issue here – i.e., to restrictions on business activities – they have consistently rejected those challenges. See, e.g., Open Our Oregon v. Brown, No. 6:20-CV-773-MC, 2020 WL 2542861 (D. Or. May 19, 2020); Amato v. Elicker, No. 3:20-CV-464 (MPS), 2020 WL 2542788 (D. Conn. May 19, 2020); SH3 Health Consulting, LLC v. St. Louis County Exec., 2020 WL 2308444 (E.D. Mo., May 8, 2020); Hartman v. Acton, No. 2:20-CV1952, 2020 WL 1932896 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 21, 2020).
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Gavin Newsom, Governor of California, 509 U.S. ___ (2020) (summary order released May 29, 2020). In his opinion concurring in the denial of relief, Chief Justice Roberts expressly relied on Jacobson in explaining that the Constitution “principally entrusts” these questions of safety to “the politically accountable officials of the States.” Id. at slip op., p. 2 (citing Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 38). Notably, as here, when those officials act “in areas fraught with medical and scientific uncertainties,” Chief Justice Roberts explained that “their latitude ‘must be especially broad.’” Id. (quoting Marshall v. United States, 414 U.S. 417, 427 (1974)). And when operating within those broad limits, he explained, these officials “should not be subject to second-guessing” by the federal judiciary, which lacks comparable expertise in public health. Id. (quoting Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 545 (1985).)
There is no viable path for Plaintiffs around Jacobson’s well-settled rule of law. Plaintiffs cannot dispute the gravity of the pandemic in Michigan. It is a oncein-a-century kind of epidemiological public health crisis caused by a potentially fatal virus that remains easily transmittable and still lacks adequate treatment, let alone a vaccine. In such times, the State has wide plenary authority to temporarily restrict activity that presents a diffuse but real threat to the public health.
Thus, under Jacobson and applicable principles of separation of powers, judicial deference to the Governor’s authority responding to the crisis is paramount. Indeed, the Michigan Court of Claims has recognized as much in denying a motion for a preliminary injunction. As so aptly stated by that court:
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The role courts play under Jacobson and Lansing Bd of Ed is not to “second-guess the state’s policy choices in crafting emergency public health measures,” In re Abbott, 954 F3d at 784, but is instead to determine whether the state regulation has a “real or substantial relation to the public health crisis and are not ‘beyond all question, a plain, palpable invasion of rights secured by the fundamental law.’” Id., quoting in part Jacobson, 197 US at 31. Part of this review includes looking to whether any exceptions apply for emergent situations, the duration of any rule, and whether the measures are pretextual. Id. at 785.
(Ex A, p. 11.) As will be discussed in more detail, Plaintiffs’ claims cannot survive
this settled standard, and should be dismissed.
Application of Jacobson to the current health crisis and the restrictions challenged by Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs allege the they should be permitted as a matter of constitutional
law to resume their indoor fitness business activities. This claim plainly fails under
Jacobson’s duly deferential review.
Under Jacobson, in the face of the current public health crisis, the Governor’s
executive orders are entitled to great deference, despite any impingement on
individual rights, and must be upheld unless there is “no real or substantial
relation” to the public health crisis, or the orders were, “beyond all question, a plain,
palpable invasion of rights secured by the fundamental law.”
With this standard in mind, Jacobson requires that the Governor’s
challenged executive orders be upheld in their entirety. While the impact of any
restriction on some aspect of normalcy outside of a pandemic is no doubt important,
the restrictions are temporary and in specific response to a widespread public
health crisis. The Court should view each restriction through the lens of the
general public health justifications and the over-arching and urgent goal of limiting 33

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the spread of this novel virus. A myopic, activity-specific framing of any issue is not a proper part of the analysis. Appropriate understanding of the nature of the pandemic and the four corners of the executive orders is adequate to the task before the Court.
While no line-drawing is immune to disagreement, judicial deference is owed to the Governor’s assessment of how to most effectively limit the spread of the virus while not unduly restricting life-sustaining activity and services. That assessment has included consideration of the temporary nature of any restriction and what as a general matter could be endured while flattening the curve and then containing the virus’s spread.
The point is not to imagine how each specific activity of daily life might be accomplished safely by using social distancing and other recommended prophylactic measures. In a drought, where the point is to avoid uncontrolled wildfires, there can be no automatic allowance for those who simply promise to be really careful with their campfire. In a deadly pandemic such as this, the point—the necessity—is to only allow those risks to public health that can and must be taken; the stakes are too high to do otherwise.
To wit, a simple trip to an indoor fitness business for a workout might appear both innocuous and inoculated for purposes of the virus.
But appearances are deceiving. Customers and employees all share space, breathe the same air, and touch common surfaces. For these factors, the context of an indoor fitness facility is critical. Why? Because even the most ventilated indoor
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facility is susceptible to respiratory spread of the virus. The danger is only amplified when people congregate (even with social distancing) in a confined space and work out. By its nature, working out is sustained vigorous physical activity, which necessarily means heavy breathing and sweating and, from that heavy breathing, acute, propulsive bursts of virus shedding by anyone in that confined space who might be infected—including those who display no signs of infection.24 Apart from individual exercisers in proximity, there is the added risk of individuals working out together or organized groups working out for extended trainer-led sessions. And the risk of viral spread is only heightened further by the sharing of exercise equipment among many different people over the course of the day, even when good-faith efforts are made to clean that equipment after each use.
At a fitness center, these factors merge to significantly increase the incidence of this highly contagious and asymptomatically transmittable virus spreading. Like innumerable small breezes against a sail, enough will push a sailboat over a waterfall if the course is not changed and the sail not brought under control. Use of personal protective equipment (PPE), sanitizers, and the like will only do so much to avoid these harms and presents the downside of depleting resources critically
24 See CDC Research Paper, Cluster of Coronavirus Disease Associated with Fitness Dance Classes, South Korea, available at https://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/article/26/8/200633_article; see also USA Today, Is group exercise safe? Study raises questions about coronavirus risk in gyms (June 5, 2020), available at https://www.today.com/health/coronavirus-group-exercise-are-classes-safecoronavirus-risk-gyms-t183428 (summarizing South Korea study of 112 infections linked to fitness dance classes at twelve gyms); New York Times, Is It Safe to Go Back to the Gym? (May 13, 2020), available at https://www.ytimes.com/2020/05/13/well/move/coronavirus-gym-safety.html
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needed to provide emergency care to those afflicted by COVID-19 and other conditions immediately threatening their health and safety.
This last point merits emphasis. Until recently, Michigan, like other states, had been in the throes of an impending and dangerous shortage of health care resources available to handle the steep and immediate demands created by this pandemic, from PPE for medical professionals (and other critical infrastructure workers), to ventilators and other necessary medical supplies, to hospital beds. As the virus began to ravage the State, health systems were quickly reaching or exceeding their capacity. Medical supplies were dwindling, and beds in intensive care units were in short supply. There was a very real and imminent danger that hospitals could be completely overrun. Indeed, the TCF Center (formerly Cobo Center) – typically the home of auto shows and black-tie galas – was retrofitted as a makeshift field hospital in anticipation of local bed shortages.25 That it has not seen thousands of patients is a blessing, and a result of the carefully calibrated measures put in place to stem the tide.
Accordingly, there is ample good reason to temporarily regulate fitness centers, as the executive orders challenged here do.26 And there is ample good
25 Detroit Free Press, TCF Center transformation ahead of schedule, ready for patients April 8 (April 4, 2020), available at https://www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/2020/04/04/coronavirus-covid-19tcf-center-field-hospital/2948726001/ 26 Elsewhere, Plaintiffs have referred to an alleged national absence of any outbreak connected to a fitness center. Even if true, that would only stand to show the effectiveness of the lockdown orders and social distancing practices. It would not imply the absence of a rational basis to order the temporary shutdown of indoor commercial fitness activity.
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reason for those regulations to remain in place longer than those that restrict activity that does not pose the same level of risk of infection and spread—such as activity that is outdoors or more sedentary or isolated. The restrictions at issue serve to protect the public health of the State and its residents, and to prevent its health care system from collapsing under the strain of easily transmittable, potentially fatal, and still untreatable virus. They—like the broader set of measures regarding travel and in-person work and activities that were put in place by the Governor’s emergency orders—are temporary, tailored, and aimed at guiding the state as swiftly and safely as possible through the severe dangers posed by this pandemic.
Plaintiffs complain that the restrictions they challenge are lasting too long. But adequate time must be given for the public health goals to be served and a transition to economic normalcy to return—and due deference must be given under Jacobson to the Governor’s assessment and actions in that regard.27 See, e.g., South Bay United Pentecostal Church, 509 U.S. ___ (Roberts, C.J., concurring in summary denial order) (explaining that “[t]he precise question of when restrictions on particular social activities should be lifted during the pandemic is a dynamic and fact-intensive matter subject to reasonable disagreement,” and the judgment of “the
27 The incubation period of the virus and its duration of contagion are other important variables not yet fully understood. Accordingly, a variable dial approach to reopening should be preferred over the flipping of a switch that Plaintiffs’ legal position might suggest.
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politically accountable officials” to whom those decisions are entrusted “should not be subject to second-guessing” by the courts).
And indeed, this careful and gradual transition is exactly what has been happening with the rescission of various executive orders and the promulgation of new, narrower ones. While circumstances rapidly escalated and the virus began to ravage the State, more restrictive measures were necessary to combat the spread and save lives. As circumstances have improved and the number of infections and deaths have trended downward, the restrictive measures have eased, sometimes on a regional basis, based on the best available data and the advice of public-health experts. This is the very essence of the emergency management authority afforded the Governor under the principles announced in Jacobson.
Judicial deference is appropriate not just on the substance of this challenge but the timing as well. As a matter of separation of powers, distinctions between essential and non-essential and safe and unsafe are best left to the branch designed for and equipped to make those calls. The Governor’s executive orders should not be undercut by disparate judicial carveouts in the wake of a particular litigant’s race to the courthouse.
In sum, the limited and temporary restrictions in the Governor’s orders have been necessary and appropriate, with a “real [and] substantial relation” to stopping the spread of the virus, and they most certainly do not constitute, “beyond all question, a plain, palpable invasion of rights secured by the fundamental law.” Jacobson, 197 US at 31. As stated by the Michigan Court of Claims:
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What the Court must do—and can only do—is determine whether the Governor’s orders are consistent with the law. Under the applicable standards, they are. (Martinko Opinion, Ex A, p. 14, citation omitted). Accordingly, Plaintiffs cannot overcome Jacobson and their claims fail as a matter of law.
Plaintiffs do not have a viable procedural due process claim. The same is true of Plaintiffs’ claims even absent Jacobson’s deferential standard. First, Plaintiffs fail to state a viable procedural due process claim. The general touchstone for such claims is notice and an opportunity to be heard on a pre- or post-deprivation basis. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332–33 (1976). But under the holding of Mathews, none of the instant Plaintiffs have suffered a final deprivation of any protected interest. The challenged executive orders contain temporary restrictions, not final ones. Additionally, Mathews concerned termination of disability benefits and not a generally applicable emergency order in a pandemic that need only be disseminated to the public through the usual media channels. Indeed, due process is “flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.” Morissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972). Here, Plaintiffs seem to be seeking some sort of process by which they could challenge a determination that their commercial activity is “non-essential.” But they fail to present a viable claim that any additional process was due here to commercial fitness businesses or organizations. Many millions of individuals, businesses, and enterprises were all subject to the same general, temporary orders. Plaintiffs have offered nothing in the federal constitution or cases construing it that
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would have required any more here than general promulgation of the temporary executive orders issued under emergency authority. See, e.g., Hartman v Acton, No. 2:20-CV-1952, 2020 WL 1932896, at *6-10 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 21, 2020) (in the context of a TRO, rejecting business owners’ procedural due process challenge to Ohio’s COVID-19-related “Stay-at-home order” that “direct[ed] non-essential businesses to cease operating their physical locations”).
Elsewhere, Plaintiffs have relied on non-binding authority from Pennsylvania. Friends of Danny DeVito v. Wolf, __ A.3d ___ (Penn., Apr. 13, 2020), 2020 WL 1847100. Plaintiffs suggest that a waiver process for a post-deprivation challenge of essential versus non-essential designations like the one in Pennsylvania should be required in Michigan. But one state’s policy choice is not another state’s constitutional mandate. DeVito included no such holding, nor did it hold that procedural due process requires that businesses be afforded the opportunity to dispute the State’s determinations regarding what categories of businesses may be open.
To the contrary, DeVito emphasized that, under settled law, the purpose of post-deprivation process is to protect individuals and businesses from “mistaken or unjustified” deprivations. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 259 (1978). And DeVito recognized that Pennsylvania’s “waiver” process was sufficient to meet this standard, because it provided a way for individual businesses to demonstrate that they did not, in fact, fall within one of the categories of businesses deemed “non-lifesustaining” and thus closed under Pennsylvania’s order. See 2020 WL 1847100 at
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*20-21. As DeVito made clear, however, this “waiver” process did not provide a mechanism for businesses that did fall within one of the closed categories to challenge that categorical closure decision or to secure an exemption from it—nor did procedural due process require any such thing. See id.
Here, Plaintiffs do not claim that they were mistakenly classified as falling within a certain category of businesses under the Governor’s orders. They simply disagree with how that category of businesses is treated under the orders. That disagreement is not enough to ground a viable procedural due process claim. There is no claim that any of the Plaintiffs were mistakenly or finally deprived of anything. The restrictions on Plaintiffs are temporary, and the public health concerns justifying them are compelling and paramount. Plaintiffs can point to nothing to indicate that, given this “particular situation,” due process would “demand[]” that they be afforded any further “procedural protections.” Morissey, 408 U.S. at 481. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ procedural due process claim fails as a matter of law.
Plaintiffs do not state a viable substantive due process claim. The Sixth Circuit has recognized that a substantive due process violation occurs when arbitrary and capricious government action deprives an individual of a constitutionally protected property interest. See Pearson v. City of Grand Blanc, 961 F.2d 1211, 1216, 1217 (6th Cir. 1992); see also Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 187–88 (1928) (holding that a court should not interfere unless the locality’s action “has no foundation in reason and is a mere arbitrary or irrational exercise of power having no substantial relation to the public health, the public
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morals, the public safety or the public welfare in its proper sense”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
While challenges to arbitrary and capricious government action appear most frequently in cases involving zoning and other ordinances, see, e.g., Vill. of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 8 (1974), they are not necessarily limited to such cases, see, e.g., Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 82–83 (1978) (noting that federal economic regulations will be upheld “absent proof of arbitrariness or irrationality on the part of Congress”) (citation omitted).
Here, however, there was nothing illogical, arbitrary, or capricious about the Governor’s promulgation of the executive orders. Given the characteristics of COVID-19, the restrictions ordered in the executive orders were necessary to protect the public from the rapid spread of an aggressive, untreatable, and potentially fatal disease, and to ensure this State’s health care system had the capacity and resources to manage that spread. The same is true of any of the challenged pandemic orders signed by Director Gordon. “The fundamental nature of an individual’s interest in liberty . . . may, in circumstances where the government’s interest is sufficiently weighty, be subordinated to the greater needs of society.” Salerno, 481 U.S. at 750–51. Such was the case here.
In addition, there is nothing conscience-shocking about temporary measures designed to not deplete or misdirect scarce health-care resources (PPE, drugs, emergency room capacity, ICE capacity, etc.), nor about placing temporary limitations on certain types of commercial activity within the State in order to
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strike a necessary and carefully calibrated balance between reducing in-person contact and travel—and therefore human interactions and community spread of this deadly virus throughout the State—and allowing citizens to engage in essential functions. Indeed, given the temporary and tailored nature of the challenged restrictions, and the compelling state interests they have served—mitigating the spread of this deadly pandemic, preventing the rapid depletion of critical healthcare resources, and averting countless needless deaths—the restrictions would pass muster under even the strictest level of constitutional scrutiny. There is no substantive due process issue with these measures, and Plaintiffs’ claims on that basis should be dismissed for failure to state a recognized claim for relief.
Plaintiffs do not have a viable equal protection claim. Plaintiffs also fall far short of establishing an equal protection claim. “[E]qual protection is not a license for courts to judge the wisdom, fairness, or logic of legislative choices.” FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993). “In areas of social and economic policy, a statutory classification that neither proceeds along suspect lines nor infringes fundamental constitutional rights must be upheld against equal protection challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification.” Id. Courts apply a “strong presumption” that a challenged law is valid and plaintiffs have the heavy burden of negating “every conceivable basis” which might support the law. Id. at 314-15. For the reasons already stated, each challenged restriction has a rational basis. During this pandemic, it makes eminent sense to adopt measures that
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require social distancing, limit person to person contact, and preserve valuable health care resources. This unsurprisingly has meant different things for different businesses. For fitness centers, it means adapting and doing as much as can be done – again, temporarily – through means that do not require customer use of their indoor facilities, such as remotely via technology, or outdoors.
Plaintiffs incorrectly presume that their businesses are indistinguishable from different businesses that are now subject to looser restrictions. Not so.
Even in a lockdown, people have to eat. So it is both rational and expected that grocery stores and food businesses would continue limited in-person operations while Plaintiffs could not. Plaintiffs, however, stress that they too provide a means to engage in life-sustaining activity, and decry the opening of businesses that, in their view, are not comparably beneficial, such as nail salons and massage parlors.
The health benefits of exercise are well recognized. Indeed, that this why the Stay Home Order, from its first iteration, has consistently permitted outdoor activity like “walking, hiking, running, cycling or any other recreational activity.” See E.O. 2020-21, § 7(a)(1). For the reasons already discussed, however, indoor commercial fitness activity is another matter altogether that can be and has been reasonably restricted due to the pandemic. It is a particular species of exercise that logically and legally need not fall within the same exception for types of exercise that do not pose the same combination of heightened risks of infection and spread.28
28 To the extent that Plaintiffs raise the health concerns of their customers, Plaintiffs have failed to cite any recognized theory of third party standing that would apply here. Even with such standing, alternative means of exercise that are
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Likewise, that combination of heightened risks sets Plaintiffs apart from other businesses that have been permitted to resume providing in-person, indoor services more fully at this point. Meanwhile, businesses that tend to present a risk profile more comparable to Plaintiffs’, such as indoor places of recreation, remain subject to
the same operational restrictions as Plaintiffs.29
Simply put, there are multiple, readily apparent rational bases that inform and support the restrictions that have been put in place and when and how they have been lifted. Plaintiffs’ mere disagreement with this reasoning and the lines that have been drawn from it does not negate the many “reasonably conceivable state[s] of facts” that support it or overcome the “strong presumption” that it is constitutionally valid. FCC, 508 U.S. at 313–14. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ equal protection challenge is not likely to succeed.
permitted would mean no injury in fact and no redressability here. Furthermore, Plaintiffs have failed to acknowledge or address the various ways in which they can still serve the health needs of their customers, such as through remote, outdoor, or in-home services. 29 As noted above, gyms and similar businesses located in Regions 6 and 8 of the State are no longer subject to the restrictions that Plaintiffs challenge. There is ample good reason for that distinction as well: these two regions of the State have demonstrated an ability to absorb the increased risk that attends that next step in reopening—i.e., they “have significantly fewer new cases [of COVID-19] per million each day than other regions in the state and have not shown an increase in viral activity in response to earlier relaxations of my orders.” (E.O. 2020-115, Preamble.) The experiences of these two regions in taking this next step will inform and better enable the remaining regions to do the same as safely and quickly as possible.
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Plaintiffs do not have a viable dormant commerce clause claim. By empowering Congress to regulate interstate commerce, the Commerce Clause is interpreted to, correspondingly, prohibit states from interfering with the same. U.S. Const., Art. I, s. 8, cl. 3. This negative implication, commonly known as the “dormant commerce clause,” “prohibit[s] outright economic protectionism or regulatory measures designed to benefit in-state economic actors by burdening outof-state actors.” E. Ky. Res. v. Fiscal Court, 127 F.3d 532, 540 (6th Cir. 1997). A two-tiered analysis applies to such claims. “The first prong targets the core concern of the dormant commerce clause, protectionism – that is ‘differential treatment of in-state and out-of-state economic interests that benefits the former and burdens the latter.’” Tenn. Scrap Recyclers Ass’n v. Bredesen, 556 F.3d 442, 449 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Or. Waste Sys. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994)). The second applies where, as here, the order invokes no inkling of in-state protectionism but, instead, applies to all businesses operating with this state. In this situation, the order is presumed valid unless its burden on interstate commerce is “clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.” Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). Plaintiffs bear the burden of demonstrating this second prong weighs in their favor. It is a burden they cannot meet here. Any burden of Plaintiffs’ challenged restrictions on interstate commerce or out-of-state actors is minuscule compared to the benefit to the state and local communities as a whole. The challenges presented by the spread of COVID-19 have required swift and nimble action throughout Michigan to stop the spread of a highly contagious and deadly disease. This includes the complained-of restrictions on
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indoor commercial fitness activity raised in Plaintiffs’ amended complaint. Many businesses and individuals throughout the State have faced these necessary and temporary restrictions.
But nothing in these restrictions regulates interstate commerce as interstate commerce. Impacts on such commerce may be inevitable, but that is not the focus of any of the challenged restrictions. This factor alone distinguishes this case from recognized dormant commerce clause challenges. Additionally, none of the challenged orders seek to regulate any conduct outside of the State of Michigan. While Plaintiffs were impacted by the restrictions and presumably engaged in some measure of interstate commerce, those factors alone fall far short of a viable commerce clause challenge.
Further, in Pike, the Supreme Court specifically recognized that its holding was influenced by the fact that it was not dealing with “state legislation in the field of safety where the propriety of local regulation has long been recognized.” Pike, 397 U.S. at 143. This is not the case here. Dealing with public health in general and a pandemic in particular fall squarely within deeply rooted local and state police powers, and Plaintiffs offer nothing to show that the limited and temporary restrictions they challenge are somehow “clearly excessive” in comparison to the critical protections those restrictions provided to the residents, communities and health care system of this State during this pandemic. Therefore, Plaintiffs fail to state a viable claim for relief under dormant commerce clause doctrine.
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Plaintiffs do not have a viable void for vagueness claim. Courts apply a two-part test to determine whether a law is unconstitutionally vague: first, the law must give a person of “ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that [they] may act accordingly[;]” and second, the standards of enforcement must be precise enough to avoid “involving so many factors of varying effect that neither the person to decide in advance nor the jury after the fact can safely and certainly judge the result.” Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972) (internal citation omitted); Columbia Natural Resources v. Tatum, 58 F.3d 1101, 1105 (6th Cir. 1995). There is no claim here that any of the Plaintiffs have been subject to selective enforcement or otherwise unsure about what is or is not permitted in their particular situations. Indeed, the stated purpose of their lawsuit is to fully reopen their indoor fitness businesses and resume their temporarily restricted commercial activity. At bottom, Plaintiffs are attempting to use the doctrine of vagueness to secure exemptions from executive orders they have no problem understanding, but simply disagree with and would rather not follow. This, they cannot do. See, e.g., Hartman v Acton, No. 2:20-CV-1952, 2020 WL 1932896, at *5-6 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 21, 2020) (rejecting business owners’ void for vagueness challenge to Ohio’s COVID-19related “Stay-at-home order” because they “had clear notice that their . . . business fell into the proscribed category of non-essential business operations” that had to cease operating their physical locations under the order). While the orders’ restrictions have no doubt impacted the lives of many, Plaintiffs included, that
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impact has been necessary and tailored to meet an overarching, critical public health need. There is nothing unconstitutionally vague about the content of these restrictions, and Plaintiffs have failed to state a viable void for vagueness challenge as to them.
Plaintiffs have failed to state a viable privileges and/or immunities claim. Plaintiffs bring claims under both the Privileges and Immunities Clause, U.S. Const. art. IV, Sec. 2, and the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, U.S. Const. amnd. XIV, Sec. 1.30 Plaintiffs’ claims under these clauses fail because under settled law the clauses do not provide Plaintiffs protection from the laws of their own state. The Privileges and Immunities Clause states: “The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.” U.S. Const. art. IV, Sec. 2. The Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment states: All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; . . . [U.S. Const. amnd. XIV, Sec. 1]. The Supreme Court has long held that the two clauses do not establish or protect any rights of citizens against their own states. See Paul v. State of Virginia, 75 U.S. 168, 180 (1868), overruled in part by United States v. S.-E. Underwriters
30 There is no meaningful difference between the two clauses as pled by Plaintiffs. 49

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Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944); United Bldg. & Const. Trades Council of Camden Cty. & Vicinity v. Mayor & Council of City of Camden, 465 U.S. 208, 217 (1984) (holding that in-state “residents have no claim under the Privileges and Immunities Clause” against their own state”); Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 77-78 (1872) (noting that the Privileges and Immunities Clause does not “profess to control the power of the State governments over the rights of its own citizens” and applying that restriction to the Privileges or Immunities Clause).
The reason for this is sound. The clauses are meant to protect noncitizens from discrimination by other states when they travel to those states. See Paul, 75 U.S. at 180 (“It was undoubtedly the object of the [Privileges and Immunities Clause] to place the citizens of each State upon the same footing with citizens of other States, so far as the advantages resulting from citizenship in those States are concerned.”) The clauses do not create an independent, fundamental right to travel. Instead, they facilitate travel between the states by guaranteeing certain rights to all citizens of the United States as they travel between states. See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 501 (1999) (“[B]y virtue of a person’s state citizenship, a citizen of one State who travels in other States, intending to return home at the end of his journey, is entitled to enjoy the ‘Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States’ that he visits.”)
Plaintiffs argue that the Privileges and Immunities Clause protects a citizen’s right to pursue a livelihood in a State other than the State in which he is a resident, and that the Privileges or Immunities Clause guarantees the right to
50

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travel between States and the right to engage in interstate commerce. They argue that the challenged restrictions violate their rights under these clauses.
Plaintiffs’ argument is fundamentally untenable. First, and most importantly, they do not have a claim under the clauses against their own state. Paul, 75 U.S. at 180; United Bldg. & Const. Trades Council of Camden Cty. & Vicinity, 465 U.S. at 217; Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 77-78. Second, the clauses do not guarantee the right to travel and conduct business out of state. See Saenz, 526 U.S. at 501. Indeed, Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm’n of Montana, 436 U.S. 371, 386 (1978), held that “a nonresident’s right to pursue a livelihood in a State other than his own, [is] a right that is protected by the Privileges and Immunities Clause.” Finally, even if Plaintiffs could bring a claim under the clauses, the challenged restrictions did not treat non-residents any differently than residents. Its restrictions applied to anyone and everyone in Michigan. Thus, none of the restrictions would violate the clauses even as to nonresidents. See Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 284 (1985) (requiring some level of unjustifiable discrimination against nonresidents to violate the clauses). Accordingly, the Court should dismiss these claims with prejudice as well.
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CONCLUSION AND RELIEF REQUESTED Defendants Whitmer and Gordon respectfully request that the Court (1) grant this motion, (2) grant Eleventh Amendment immunity, (3) dismiss all claims, and (4) grant any other appropriate relief to Defendants.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ John G. Fedynsky John G. Fedynsky (P65232) Assistant Attorney General Attorney for Defendants Whitmer and Gordon Michigan Dep’t of Attorney General State Operations Division P.O. Box 30754 Lansing, MI 48909 517.335.7573 fednyskyj@michigan.gov P65232 Dated: June 16, 2020 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I certify that on June 16, 2020, I electronically filed the foregoing papers with the Clerk of the Court using the ECF system, which will provide electronic copies to counsel of record, and I certify that my secretary has mailed by U.S. Postal Service the papers to any non-ECF participant. /s/ John G. Fedynsky John G. Fedynsky (P65232) Assistant Attorney General
52

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 41-2 filed 06/17/20 PageID.903 Page 1 of 3

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

LEAGUE OF INDEPENDENT FITNESS FACILITIES AND TRAINERS, INC., BASELINE FITNESS LLC, BUILDING YOUR TEMPLE LLC, BYT FITNESS 247 LLC, CLAWSON FITNESS, LLC, CLINTON FITNESS, INC., D-LUX KARATE UNIVERSITY, LLC, FENTON ATHLETIC CLUB, INC., FENTON KARATE, LLC, FUSION FITNESS 24/7 LLC, H3 FITNESS LLC, I FITNESS PERSONAL TRAINING, INC., JKP FITNESS, LLC, JPF ENTERPRISES, LLC, M FITNESS CLUB, LLC, MH & AB LLC, MOTOR CITY CF – ST. CLAIR SHORES, LLC, NASCOT ENTERPRISES, LLC, PRISON CITY PHYSIQUE, LLC, FMP FITNESS INC., STRENGTH BEYOND LLC, 24/7 BOOTCAMP AND BOXING, INC., and 4 SEASONS GYM, LLC,

No. 20-cv-00458 HON. PAUL L. MALONEY
INDEX OF EXHIBITS

Plaintiffs,

v

GRETCHEN E. WHITMER and ROBERT E. GORDON,

Defendants.

Scott M. Erskine (P54734) Carly Van Thomme (P59706) Erskine Law, P.C. Attorneys for Plaintiffs 612 W. University Rochester, MI 48307

John G. Fedynsky (P65232) Andrew J. Jurgensen (P81123) Joseph T. Froehlich (P71887) Joshua O. Booth (P53847) Christopher M. Allen (P75329) Assistant Attorneys General

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 41-2 filed 06/17/20 PageID.904 Page 2 of 3

(248) 601-4499 serskine@erskinelaw.com cvanthomme@erskinelaw.com

Attorneys for Defendants Michigan Dep’t of Attorney General State Operations Division P.O. Box 30754 Lansing, MI 48909 (517) 335-7573 fedynskyj@michigan.gov jurgensena2@michigan.gov froehlichj1@michigan.gov boothj2@michigan.gov allenc28@michigan.gov

Exhibit A

Description
Unsuccessful state court challenges to Executive Orders:
Michigan House and Senate v. Whitmer, Michigan House and Senate v. Gov. Whitmer, Michigan Court of Claims Case No. 2079-MZ, May 21, 2020 Opinion and Order of Dismissal, claim of appeal pending in Michigan Court of Appeals (COA No. 353655) (rejecting constitutional challenge to the EPGA and finding no basis to conclude that any of the Governor’s executive orders are invalid for lack of statutory authority)
Michigan United for Liberty v. Whitmer, Michigan Court of Claims Case No. 20-61-MZ, May 19, 2020 Opinion and Order Denying Plaintiff’s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction (finding no likelihood of success on merits regarding constitutional challenges to the EMA and EPGA)
Martinko et al. v. Whitmer, Michigan Court of Claims Case No. 20-62-MM, April 29, 2020 Opinion and Order Denying Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Preliminary Injunction (finding no likelihood of success on merits regarding constitutional challenges to the EMA)
Ostergren et al. v. Whitmer, Michigan Court of Claims Case No. 20-53-MZ, Opinion and Order Granting Summary Disposition, claim of appeal pending in the Michigan Court of Appeals (COA No. 353732) (rejecting constitutional challenge to the EPGA and challenge that an executive order was outside the scope of that statute’s authorization).

2

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 41-2 filed 06/17/20 PageID.905 Page 3 of 3

B

May 29, 2020 Summary Order, South Bay United Pentecostal

Church v. Gavin Newsom, Governor of California, 509 U.S. ___

(2020)

C

Social Distancing, Quarantine, and Isolation, Centers for

Disease Control, available at

https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/prevent-getting-

sick/social-distancing.html

D

Flattening the Coronavirus Curve, New York Times (March 27,

2020), available at https://www.nytimes.com/article/flatten-

curve-coronavirus.html.

E

E.O. No. 2020-4

F

E.O. No. 2020-5

G

E.O. No. 2020-9

H

E.O. No. 2020-11

I

E.O. No. 2020-21

J

E.O. No. 2020-110

K

E.O. No. 2020-115

L

Governor’s Bypass Application to the Michigan Supreme Court,

Michigan House and Senate v. Whitmer, Michigan Supreme

Court No. 161377

3

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 41-3 filed 06/17/20 PageID.906 Page 1 of 62

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

LEAGUE OF INDEPENDENT FITNESS FACILITIES AND TRAINERS, INC., BASELINE FITNESS LLC, BUILDING YOUR TEMPLE LLC, BYT FITNESS 247 LLC, CLAWSON FITNESS, LLC, CLINTON FITNESS, INC., D-LUX KARATE UNIVERSITY, LLC, FENTON ATHLETIC CLUB, INC., FENTON KARATE, LLC, FUSION FITNESS 24/7 LLC, H3 FITNESS LLC, I FITNESS PERSONAL TRAINING, INC., JKP FITNESS, LLC, JPF ENTERPRISES, LLC, M FITNESS CLUB, LLC, MH & AB LLC, MOTOR CITY CF – ST. CLAIR SHORES, LLC, NASCOT ENTERPRISES, LLC, PRISON CITY PHYSIQUE, LLC, FMP FITNESS INC., STRENGTH BEYOND LLC, 24/7 BOOTCAMP AND BOXING, INC., and 4 SEASONS GYM, LLC,

No. 20-cv-00458 HON. PAUL L. MALONEY

Plaintiffs,

v

GRETCHEN E. WHITMER and ROBERT E. GORDON,

Defendants.

Scott M. Erskine (P54734) Carly Van Thomme (P59706) Erskine Law, P.C. Attorneys for Plaintiffs 612 W. University Rochester, MI 48307

John G. Fedynsky (P65232) Andrew J. Jurgensen (P81123) Joseph T. Froehlich (P71887) Joshua O. Booth (P53847) Christopher M. Allen (P75329) Assistant Attorneys General

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 41-3 filed 06/17/20 PageID.907 Page 2 of 62

(248) 601-4499 serskine@erskinelaw.com cvanthomme@erskinelaw.com

Attorneys for Defendants Michigan Dep’t of Attorney General State Operations Division P.O. Box 30754 Lansing, MI 48909 (517) 335-7573 fedynskyj@michigan.gov jurgensena2@michigan.gov froehlichj1@michigan.gov boothj2@michigan.gov allenc28@michigan.gov

EXHIBIT A

2

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STATE OF MICHIGAN COURT OF CLAIMS

MICHIGAN HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, and MICHIGAN SENATE,
Plaintiffs,
v
GOVERNOR GRETCHEN WHITMER,
Defendant. ___________________________/

OPINION AND ORDER
Case No. 20-000079-MZ Hon. Cynthia Diane Stephens

This matter arises out of Executive Orders issued by Governor Gretchen Whitmer in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Neither the parties to this case nor any of the amici deny the emergent and widespread impact of Covid-19 on the citizenry of this state. Neither do they ask this court at this time to address the policy questions surrounding the scope and extent of contents of the approximately 90 orders issued by the Governor since the initial declaration of emergency on March 10, 2020 in Executive Order No. 2020-4. The Michigan House of Representatives and the Michigan Senate (Legislature) in their institutional capacities challenge the validity of Executive Orders 2020-67 and 2020-68, which were issued on April 30, 2020. They have asked this court to declare those Orders and all that rest upon them to be invalid and without authority as written. The orders cited two statutes, 1976 PA 390, otherwise known as the Emergency Management Act (EMA); and 1945 PA 302, otherwise known as the Emergency Powers of Governor Act (EPGA). In addition, the orders cite Const 1963, art 1, § 5, which generally vests the executive power of the state in the Governor. This court finds that:

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1. The issue of compliance with the verification language of MCL 600.6431 is abandoned. 2. The Michigan House of Representative and Michigan Senate have standing to pursue this
case. 3. Executive Order 2020-67 is a valid exercise of authority under the EPGA and plaintiffs
have not established any reason to invalidate any executive orders resting on EO 2020-67. 4. The EPGA is constitutionally valid. 5. Executive Order No. 2020-68 exceeded the authority of the Governor under the EMA.
I. BACKGROUND
The Court will dispense with a lengthy recitation of the pertinent facts and history and will instead jump to the Governor’s declaration of a state of emergency1 as well as a state of disaster2 under the EMA and the EPGA on April 1, 2020, in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Executive Order No. 2020-33. Both chambers of the Legislature adopted Senate Joint Resolution No. 24 which approved “an extension of the state of emergency and state of disaster declared by Governor Whitmer in Executive Order 2020-4 and Executive Order 2020-33 through April 30, 2020. . . .” The Senate Concurrent Resolution cited the 28-day legislative extension referenced in MCL 30.403 of the EMA.
1 The EPGA does not define the term “state of emergency.” However, the EMA defines the term as follows: “an executive order or proclamation that activates the emergency response and recovery aspects of the state, local, and interjurisdictional emergency operations plans applicable to the counties or municipalities affected.” MCL 30.402(q). 2 While the EPGA does not use, let alone define, the term “state of disaster,” the EMA defines the term as “an executive order or proclamation that activates the disaster response and recovery aspects of the state, local, and interjurisdictional emergency operations plans applicable to the counties or municipalities affected.” MCL 30.402(p).

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The public record affirms that the governor asked the legislative leadership to extend the state of disaster and emergency on April 27, 2020. The Legislature demurred and instead passed SB 858, a bill without immediate effect, which addressed some the subject matter of several of the COVID-19-related Executive Orders, but did not extend the state of emergency or disaster or the stay-at-home order. The Governor vetoed SB 858.
On April 30, 2020, the Governor issued Executive Order 2020-66 which terminated the state of emergency and disaster that had previously been declared under Executive Order 202033. The order opined that “the threat and danger posed to Michigan by the COVID-19 pandemic has by no means passed, and the disaster and emergency conditions it has created still very much exist.” Executive Order No. 2020-66 (emphasis added). However, EO 2020-66 acknowledged that 28 days “have lapsed since [the Governor] declared states of emergency and disaster under the Emergency Management Act in Executive Order 2020-33.” Id. The order declared there was a “clear and ongoing danger to the state . . . .” (Emphasis added).
On the same day, and only one minute later, the Governor issued two additional executive orders. First, she issued Executive Order No. 2020-67, which cited the EPGA. [In addition, the order contained a cursory citation to art 5, § 1.] EO 2020-67 noted the Governor’s authority under the EPGA to declare a state of emergency during “‘times of great public crisis . . . or similar public emergency within the state. . . .’” Id. quoting MCL 10.31(1). The order noted that such declaration does not have a fixed expiration date. Id. Then, and as a result of the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, EO 2020-67 declared that a “state of emergency remains declared across the State of Michigan” under the EPGA. The order stated that “[a]ll previous orders that rested on Executive Order 2020-33 now rest on this order.” Id. The order was to take immediate effect. Id.

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In addition to declaring that a state of emergency “remained” under the EPGA, the Governor simultaneously issued Executive Order No. 2020-68; this order declared a state of emergency and a state of disaster under the EMA. [In addition, like all previous orders, the order contained a vague citation to art 5, § 1 as well.] Hence, EO 2020-68 essentially reiterated the very same states of emergency and disaster that the Governor had, approximately one minute earlier, declared terminated. The order declared that the states of emergency and disaster extended through May 28, 2020 at 11:59 p.m., and that all orders that had previously relied on the prior states of emergency and disaster declaration in EO 2020-33 now rest on this order, i.e., EO 2020-68.
The House of Representative and the Senate subsequently filed this case asking for an expedited hearing and a declaration that EO 2020-67 and EO 2020-68, and any other Executive Orders deriving their authority from the same, were null and void.
COMPLIANCE WITH MCL 600.6431
The Governor noted in her reply brief that the complaint, as originally filed in this court did not meet the verification requirement of MCL 600.6431(2)(d). At oral argument the Governor acknowledged that the verification requirements were not met when the complaint was originally filed; however, a subsequent filing was notarized in accordance with the statute. The Governor also acknowledged that the failure to sign the verified pleading before a person authorized to administer oaths was not necessary for invoking this Court’s jurisdiction. Finally, the Governor agreed that she was not seeking dismissal of the action based on plaintiffs’ initial lack of compliance. For those reasons this Court will consider the issue moot and decline any analysis of the arguments predicated on MCL 600.6431.
STANDING

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The issue of standing is central to this case as it is with all litigation. Courts exist to manage actual controversies between parties to whom those controversies matter. The Legislature has cited MCR 2.605 in support of its standing to pursue this declaratory action. The Legislature asserts that it has a need for guidance from this Court in order to determine how it will proceed to protect what it articulates as its special institutional rights and responsibilities. The Governor challenges whether the Legislature has standing to bring this suit. The Governor argues that the institution of the Legislature has no more interest in the outcome of this suit than any member of the public. She further claims that the Legislature does not need the guidance of the Court to determine how to carry out its constitutional duties. It is the opinion of this Court that the Legislature has standing to pursue its claims before this Court.
Both parties cite the seminal case on the issue of standing, Lansing Schs Ed Ass’n v Lansing Bd of Ed, 487 Mich 349; 792 NW2d 686 (2010). In that case, the Supreme Court refined the concept of standing under the Michigan Constitution. In doing so, the Court rejected the federal standing analysis and articulated an analytical framework rooted the Michigan Constitution. The Lansing Schs Ed Ass’n Court looked to whether a cause of action was authorized by the Legislature. Where the Legislature did not confer a right to a specific cause of action, a plaintiff must have “a special injury or right, or substantial interest, that will be detrimentally affected in a manner different than the citizenry at large . . . .” Id. at 372.
The Governor relies heavily on the recent case of League of Women Voters of Mich v Secretary of State, __ Mich App __; __ NW2d __ (2020) (Docket Nos. 350938; 351073), which is itself now on appeal to the Michigan Supreme Court. That case, similar to the instant case, was brought under the aegis of MCR 2.605 and asked the court to declare that an Attorney General Opinion’s interpretation of a statute was invalid. The Court of Appeals majority in League of

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Women Voters examined the issue through the lens of MCR 2.605 and found that in that case the institution of the Legislature had no standing: “Given the definition of ‘actual controversy’ for the purposes of MCR 2.605, we are not convinced that the Legislature has demonstrated standing to pursue a declaratory action here. No declaratory judgement is necessary to guide the Legislature’s future conduct in order to preserve its legal rights.” Id., slip op at p. 7.
League of Women Voters was the first examination of the issue of institutional standing in Michigan. For that reason, the court focused on the logic of the Supreme Court’s decision in Dodak v State Admin Bd, 441 Mich 547; 495 NW2d 539 (1993), which analyzed a standing issue in relation to individual legislators. Dodak, like this case, presented a conflict between the executive and legislative branches of state government. That Court, like this one, is mindful that in such instances the issue of legislative standing requires a litigant to overcome “a heavy burden because, courts are reluctant to hear disputes that may interfere with the separation of powers between the branches of government.” League of Women Voters, __ Mich App at __, slip op at p. 8 (citation and quotation marks omitted; cleaned up). There must be a “personal and legally cognizable interest peculiar” to the legislative body, rather than a “generalized grievance that the law is not being followed.” Id. (citations and quotation marks omitted). In Dodak four legislators pressed a case concerning what they asserted was an abrogation of their individual rights as members of the appropriations committees when the State Administrative Board was allowed to redistribute funds allocated by the Legislature between departments of state government. Ultimately the Supreme Court found that the chair of the appropriation committee did in fact have a peculiar and special right and a potential for a personal injury sufficient to acquire standing. In Dodak, 441 Mich at 557, the Supreme Court cited with approval federal authorities holding that an individual legislator “‘only has standing if he alleges a diminution of congressional influence

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which amounts to a complete nullification of his vote, with no recourse in the legislative process.’ Dodak, 441 Mich at 557, quoting Chiles v Thornburgh, 865 F3d 1197, 1207 (CA 11, 1989). In League of Women Voters the institution claimed its right was to have a constitutionally correct interpretation of certain legislation. The League of Women Voters Court found that indeed every citizen had such a right and the Legislature once it enacted a statute had no special relationship to it. League of Women Voters, __ Mich App at __, slip op at p. 8. The case did not, remarked the Court, concern the validity of any particular legislative member’s vote. Id.
While it is a close question, this Court finds that the issue presented in this case is whether the Governor’s issuance of EO 2020-67 and/or EO 2020-68 had the effect of nullifying the Legislature’s decision to decline to extend the states of emergency/disaster. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit recently found that a legislative body under certain circumstances does have standing. See Tennessee General Assembly v United States Dep’t of State, 931 F3d 499 (CA 6, 2019). The logic of their analysis is persuasive and compatible with both Dodak and League of Women Voters. In Tennessee General Assembly, the Sixth Circuit surveyed two cases from the Supreme Court of the United States to illustrate when a legislative body, or portion thereof, may have standing. Id. at 508, citing Coleman v Miller, 307 US 433; 59 S Ct 972; 83 L 3d 1385 (1939); and Ariz State Legislature v Ariz Independent Redistricting Comm, __ US __; 135 S Ct 2652; 192 L Ed 704 (2015). Surveying Coleman and its progeny, the Sixth Circuit explained that, “legislators whose votes would have been sufficient to defeat (or enact) a specific legislative Act have standing to sue if that legislative action goes into effect (or does not go into effect), on the ground that their votes have been completely nullified.” Tennessee General Assembly, 931 F3d at 509 (citation and quotation marks omitted). The Sixth Circuit further noted that Arizona State Legislature Court also conferred standing under article III to a legislature. In

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that case, the legislature claimed that the power to redistrict accrued to them under the Arizona constitution. The challenged action in that case was “more similar to the ‘nullification’ injury in Coleman.” Tennessee General Assembly, 931 F3d at 510, citing Arizona State Legislature, __ US at __; 135 S Ct at 2665. To that end, the proposal at issue would have completely nullified any legislative vote, and there was “a sufficiently concrete injury to the Legislature’s interest in redistricting . . . that the Legislature had Article III standing.” Id., citing Arizona State Legislature, __ US at __; 135 S Ct 2665-2666.
The injury claimed in this case is that EO 2020-67 and EO 2020-68 nullified the decision of the Legislature to not extend the state of emergency or disaster. The Legislature claims this right is exclusively theirs as an institution under the EMA and this state’s Constitution. Understanding that Lansing Schs Ed Ass’n specifically departed from the Article III analysis of its predecessor cases, the nullification argument is nevertheless not incompatible with the Lansing Schs Ed Ass’n focus on “special injury.” This type of injury sounds similar in the nature of the right that was taken from the one plaintiff who had standing in Dodak, 441 Mich at 559-560, i.e., the member of the House Appropriations Committee who lost his right to approve or disapprove transfers following the Governor’s actions.
In this respect the instant matter is distinguishable from League of Women’s Voters, __ Mich App at __, slip op at 9, where the Court of Appeals remarked that “the validity of any particular legislative member’s vote is not at issue[.]” Plaintiffs have at least a credible argument that they are not merely seeking to have this Court resolve a lost political battle, nor are plaintiffs only generally alleging that the law is not being followed. Cf. id. at 8. Rather, they are alleging that the Governor eschewed the Legislature’s role under the EMA and nullified an act of the legislative body as a whole. This is an injury that is unique to the Legislature and it shows a

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substantial interest that was (allegedly) detrimentally affected in a manner different than the citizenry at large. Cf. id. at 7 (discussing standing, generally).
As a final argument on standing, the Governor contends that the Legislature does not need declaratory relief to guide its future actions. She and at least one amicus brief note that the Legislature has in fact moved toward amending the EPGA. At oral argument the Legislature was almost invited to amend either the EMA or EPGA. However, while the legislative body is well aware of its power to enact, amend, and repeal statutes, this Court believes that guidance as to the issues presented in this case will avoid a multiplicity of litigation. The parties here have pled facts of an adverse interest which necessitate the sharpening of the issues raised.
ANALYSIS OF AUTHORITIES CITED IN THE CHALLENGED EXECUTIVE ORDERS
The Executive Orders at issue cite three sources of authority: the EMA, the EPGA, and Const 1963, art 5, § 1. The Court will examine each to determine whether the Governor possessed authority to issue the challenged orders.
ARTICLE 5 OF THE MICHIGAN CONSTITUTION
The challenged orders in this case all contain a brief citation to art 5, § 1. This section of the Michigan Constitution vests “executive power” in the Governor. See Const 1963, art 5, § 1. The Governor invokes this power in claiming authority to issue the challenged Executive Orders. The Legislature has argued that Governor errs in relying on her art 5, § 1 “executive power” to issue orders in response to the pandemic. This court agrees that “Executive power” is merely the “authority exercised by that department of government which is charged with the administration or execution of the laws.” People v Salsbury, 134 Mich 537, 545; 96 NW 936 (1903). In fact, the

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Governor has not claimed in her briefing or at oral argument that she had the authority to enact EO 2020-67 or EO 2020-68 absent an enabling statute. Through two distinct acts, stated in plain and certain terms, the Legislature has granted the Governor broad but focused authority to respond to emergencies that affect the State and its people. The Governor’s challenged actions—declaring states of disaster and emergency during a worldwide public health crisis—are required by the very statutes the Legislature drafted. Thus, the focus of this opinion, is on those two distinct acts, the EMA and EPGA.
THE EPGA AUTHORIZED EO 2020-67 AND SUBSEQUENT ORDERS RELIANT THEREON
The Court will first turn its attention to the EPGA and to plaintiffs’ arguments that the EPGA did not permit the Governor to issue a statewide emergency declaration in EO 2020-67 or any subsequent orders reliant on EO 2020-67. Plaintiffs advance two arguments in support of their position: (1) first, they contend that the EPGA, unlike the EMA, does not grant authority for a statewide declaration of emergency, but instead only confers upon the Governor the authority to issue a local or regional state of emergency; (2) second, plaintiffs argue that if the EPGA does grant authority for a statewide state of emergency, the delegation of legislative authority accomplished by the act is unconstitutional. The Court rejects both of plaintiffs’ contentions regarding the EPGA and concludes that EO 2020-67, and any orders relying thereon, remain valid.
Turning first to the scope of the EPGA, the Court notes that the statute bestows broad authority on the Governor to declare a state of emergency and to take necessary action in connection with that declaration. See MCL 10.31(1). Under the EPGA, the Governor “may promulgate reasonable orders, rules, and regulations as he or she considers necessary to protect life and property or to bring the emergency situation within the affected area under control.” Id.

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The Legislature stated that its intent in enacting MCL 10.32 was to “to invest the governor with sufficiently broad power of action in the exercise of the police power of the state to provide adequate control over persons and conditions during such periods of impending or actual public crisis or disaster.” Section 2 of the EPGA continues, declaring that the provisions of the EPGA “shall be broadly construed to effectuate this purpose.” Id.
Reading the EPGA as a whole, as this Court must do, see McCahan v Brennan, 492 Mich 730, 738-739; 822 NW2d 747 (2012), the Court rejects plaintiffs’ attempt to limit the scope of the EPGA to local or regional emergencies only. Informing this decision is the statement of legislative intent in MCL 10.32, which declares that the EPGA was intended to confer “sufficiently broad power” on the Governor in order to enable her to respond to public disaster or crisis. It would be inconsistent with this intent to find that “sufficiently broad power” to respond to matters of great public crisis is constrained by contrived geographic limitations, as plaintiffs suggest. The Court also notes that this “sufficiently broad” power granted by the Legislature references “the police power of the state[.]” MCL 10.32. In general, the police power of the state refers to the state’s inherent power to “enact regulations to promote the public health, safety, and welfare” of the citizenry at large. See Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich v Milliken, 422 Mich 1, 73; 367 NW2d 1 (1985). It cannot be overlooked that the police power of the state, which undeniably pertains to the state as a whole, see, e.g., Western Mich Univ Bd of Control v State, 455 Mich 531, 536; 565 NW2d 828 (1997), was given to a state official, the Governor, who possesses the executive power of the entire state. See Const 1963, art 5, § 1. Plaintiffs’ attempts to read localized restrictions on broad, statewide authority given to this state’s highest executive official are unconvincing.
The Act has a much broader application than plaintiffs suggest. The Act repeatedly uses terms such as “great public crisis,” “public emergency,” “public crisis,” “public disaster,” and

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“public safety” when referring to the types of events that can give rise to an emergency declaration. See MCL 10.31(1); MCL 10.32. These are not terms that suggest local or regional-only authority. See Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed) (defining public safety). See also Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/public> (accessed May 11, 2020) (defining “public” to mean “of, relating to, or affecting all the people of the whole area of a nation or state”) (emphasis added). Taking these broad terms and imposing limits on them as plaintiffs suggest would run contrary to MCL 10.32’s directive to broadly construe the authority granted to the Governor under the EPGA. See Robinson v Lansing, 486 Mich 1, 15; 782 NW2d 171 (2010) (explaining that it is “well established that to discern the Legislature’s intent, statutory provisions are not to be read in isolation; rather, context matters, and thus statutory provisions are to be read as a whole.”). And in this context, it is apparent the EPGA employs broad terminology that empowers the Governor to act for the best interests of all the citizens of this state, not just the citizens of a particular county or region. It would take a particularly strained reading of the plain text of the EPGA to conclude that a grant of authority to deal with a public crisis that affects all the people of this state would somehow be constrained to a certain locality. Moreover, adopting plaintiffs’ view would require the insertion into the EPGA of artificial barriers on the Governor’s authority to act which are not apparent from the text’s plain language. To that end, even plaintiffs would surely not quibble that the broad authority bestowed on the Governor under the act would permit her to respond to an emergency situation that affected one county, or perhaps even multiple counties. Under plaintiffs’ view, if that emergency became too large and it affected the entire state, the Governor would have to pick and choose which citizens could be assisted by the powers granted by the EPGA because, according to plaintiffs, rendering emergency assistance to the state’s entire citizenry is not an option under the EPGA. While plaintiffs generally contend there

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are localized or regionalized limitations on the Governor’s authority under the EPGA, they do not explain how to demarcate the precise geographic limitations on the Governor’s authority under the EPGA—and this is for good reason: there are no such limitations.
In arguing for a contrary interpretation of the scope of the Governor’s authority under the EPGA, plaintiffs selectively rely on parts of the statute and ignore the contextual whole. For instance, they focus on the notion that a city or county official may apply for an emergency declaration in order to support their assertion that the EPGA only applies to local or regional emergency declarations. In doing so, plaintiffs ignore that the same sentence permitting local officials to apply for an emergency declaration also authorizes two state officials—one of whom is the Governor herself—to apply for or make an emergency declaration. See MCL 10.31(1). Equally unpersuasive is plaintiffs’ fixation on the word “within” as it appears in MCL 10.31(1). Plaintiffs note that MCL 10.31(1) permits the Governor to declare a state of emergency in response to “great public crisis, disaster, rioting, catastrophe, or similar public emergency within the state” (emphasis added). According to plaintiffs, the use of the word “within” means that an emergency can only be declared at a particular location within the state, and precludes the state of emergency from being declared for the entire state. However, a common understanding of the word “within,” including the same definition plaintiffs cite, demonstrates the flaw in plaintiffs’ position. The word “within” is generally used “as a function word to indicate enclosure or containment.” Merriam-Webster’s Online Dictionary, <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/within> (accessed May 20, 2020). For instance, it can refer to “the scope or sphere of” something, such as referring to that which is “within the jurisdiction of the state.” Id. In other words, the term “within” refers to the jurisdictional bounds of the state. The authority to declare an emergency “within” the state is, quite simply, the authority to declare an emergency across the entire state.

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Plaintiffs next argue that, when the EPGA is read together with the EMA, it is apparent that the EPGA is not meant to address matters of statewide concern. In general, both the EPGA and the EMA grant the Governor power to act during times of emergency. “Statutory provisions that relate to the same subject are in pari materia and should be construed harmoniously to avoid conflict.” Kazor v Dep’t of Licensing & Regulatory Affairs, 327 Mich App 420, 427; 934 NW2d 54 (2019). “The object of the in pari materia rule is to give effect to the legislative intent expressed in harmonious statutes. If statutes lend themselves to a construction that avoids conflict, that construction should control.” In re AGD, 327 Mich App 332, 344; 933 NW2d 751 (2019) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
Here, when the EMA and the EPGA are read together, it is apparent that there is no conflict between the two acts even though they address similar subjects. While plaintiffs are correct in their assertion that the EMA contains more sophisticated management tools, that does not mean that the EPGA is limited to local and regional emergencies only. Nor does the fact that both statues apply to statewide emergencies mean that one act renders the other nugatory. Instead, the Court can harmonize the two statutes, see In re AGD, 327 Mich App at 344, by recognizing that while both statutes permit the Governor to declare an emergency, the EMA equips the Governor with more sophisticated tools and options at her disposal. The use of these enhanced features comes at some cost, however, because the EMA is subject to the 28-day time limit contained in MCL 30.405(3)-(4), whereas an emergency declaration under the less sophisticated EPGA has no end date. Finally, plaintiffs’ contentions regarding a conflict between the EMA and the EPGA are belied by MCL 30.417. That section of the EMA expressly states that nothing in the EMA was intended to “Limit, modify, or abridge the authority of the governor to proclaim a state of emergency pursuant to Act No. 302 of the Public Acts of 1945, being sections 10.31 to 10.33 of

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the Michigan Compiled Laws . . . .” MCL 30.417(d). In other words, the EMA explicitly recognizes the EPGA and it recognizes that the Governor possesses similar, but different, authority under the EPGA than she does under the EMA.
Plaintiffs’ final attempt to assert that the EPGA was intended as a local or regional act is to point to what they describe as the history of the EPGA. In general, the legislative history of an act and the historical context of a statute can be considered by a court in ascertaining legislative intent; however, these sources are generally considered to have little persuasive value. See, e.g., In re AGD, 327 Mich App 342 (generally rejecting legislative history as “a feeble indicator of legislative intent and . . . therefore a generally unpersuasive tool of statutory construction”) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Here, the history cited by plaintiffs is particularly unpersuasive because, having reviewed the same, the Court concludes that it does not even address or suggest the local limit plaintiffs attempt to impose on the EPGA. Nor have plaintiffs directed the Court’s attention to a particular piece of history that expressly supports their claim; they instead rely on mere generalities and anecdotal commentary. Finally, the EPGA presents no ambiguity requiring explanation through extrinsic historical commentary.
In an alternative argument, plaintiffs argue that, assuming the Governor’s ability to act under the EPGA gives her statewide authority, the executive orders issued pursuant to the EPGA are nevertheless invalid. According to plaintiffs, the Governor’s exercise of lawmaking authority under the orders runs afoul of separation of powers principles.
Plaintiffs’ constitutional challenge to the EPGA fares no better than their attempt to limit the Act’s scope. This Court must, when weighing this constitutional challenge to the EPGA, remain mindful that a statute must be presumed constitutional, “unless its constitutionality is

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readily apparent.” Mayor of Detroit v Arms Tech, Inc, 258 Mich App 48, 59; 669 NW2d 845 (2003) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Indeed, “[t]he power to declare a law unconstitutional should be exercised with extreme caution and never where serious doubt exists with regard to the conflict.” Council of Orgs & Others for Ed About Parochiaid, Inc v Governor, 455 Mich 557, 570; 566 NW2d 208 (1997).
Const 1963, art 3, § 2 declares that “[t]he powers of government are divided into three branches: legislative, executive and judicial.” The Constitution dictates that “[n]o person exercising powers of one branch shall exercise powers properly belonging to another branch except as expressly provided in this constitution.” Id. The issue in this case concerns what plaintiffs have alleged is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to the Governor. While the Legislature cannot delegate its legislative power to the executive branch of government, the prohibition against delegation does not prevent the Legislature “from obtaining the assistance of the coordinate branches.” Taylor v Smithkline Beecham Corp, 468 Mich 1, 8; 658 NW2d 127 (2003) (citation and quotation marks omitted). As explained by our Supreme Court, “[c]hallenges of unconstitutional delegation of legislative power are generally framed in terms of the adequacy of the standards fashioned by the Legislature to channel the agency’s or individual’s exercise of the delegated power.” Blue Cross & Blue Shield v Milliken, 422 Mich 1, 51; 367 NW2d 1 (1985).
In general, the Supreme Court has recognized three “guiding principles” to be applied in non-delegation cases:
First, the act in question must be read as a whole; the provision in question should not be isolated but must be construed with reference to the entire act. Second, the standard should be as reasonably precise as the subject matter requires or permits. The preciseness of the standard will vary with the complexity and/or the degree to which subject regulated will require constantly changing regulation. The various and varying detail associated with managing the natural resources has led to

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recognition by the courts that it is impractical for the Legislature to provide specific regulations and that this function must be performed by the designated administrative officials. Third, if possible the statute must be construed in such a way as to render it valid, not invalid, as conferring administrative, not legislative power and as vesting discretionary, not arbitrary, authority. [State Conservation Dep’t v Seaman, 396 Mich 299, 309; 240 NW2d 206 (1976) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).] Any discussion of plaintiffs’ non-delegation issue must acknowledge that the policy goals and the complexity of issues presented under the EPGA do not concern ordinary, everyday issues. Rather, as the title of the act and its various provisions reflect, the EPGA is only invoked in times of emergency and of “great public crisis,” and when “public safety is imperiled[.]” MCL 10.31(1). Hence, while the Governor’s powers are not expanded by crisis, the standard by which this Court must view the standards ascribed to the delegation at issue must be informed by the complexities inherent in an emergency situation. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 422 Mich at 51; State Conservation Dep’t, 396 Mich at 309.
With that backdrop, and when viewing the EPGA in its entirety, the Court concludes that the Act contains sufficient standards and that it is not an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority. At the outset, MCL 10.31(1) provides parameters for when an emergency declaration can be made in the first instance. The power to declare an emergency only arises during “times of great public crisis, disaster, rioting, catastrophe, or similar public emergency within the state, or reasonable apprehension of immediate danger of a public emergency of that kind, when public safety is imperiled . . . .” Id. In addition, the statute provides a process for other officials, aside from the Governor, to request or aid in assessing whether an emergency should be declared. See id. (allowing input from “the mayor of a city, sheriff of a county, or the commissioner of the Michigan state police”). Therefore, the EPGA places parameters and limitations on the Governor’s power to declare a state of emergency in the first instance, which weighs against plaintiffs’

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position. Cf. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 422 Mich at 52-53 (finding an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority where there were no guidelines provided to direct the pertinent official’s response and where the power of the official was “completely open-ended.”).
Furthermore, the EPGA provides standards on what a Governor can, and cannot, do after making an emergency declaration. As for what she can do, the Governor may “promulgate reasonable orders, rules, and regulations as he or she considers necessary to protect life and property or to bring the emergency situation within the affected area under control.” MCL 10.31(1) (emphasis added). The Legislature’s use of the terms “reasonable” and “necessary” are not trivial expressions that can be cast aside as easily as plaintiffs would have the Court do. Rather than being mere abstract concepts that fail to provide a meaningful standard, the terms “reasonable” and “necessary” have historically proven to provide standards that are more than amenable to judicial review. See, e.g., MCL 500.3107(1)(a) (describing, in the context of personal injury protection insurance, “allowable expenses” that consist of “reasonable” charges incurred for “reasonably necessary products, services and accommodations . . . .”). Thus, the Court rejects any contention that these terms are too ambiguous to provide meaningful standards. See Klammer v Dep’t of Transp, 141 Mich App 253, 262; 367 NW2d 78 (1985) (concluding that a delegation of authority which permitted an administrative body to continue to employ an individual for such a period of time as was “necessary” provided a sufficient standard, under the circumstances). See also Blank v Dept’ of Corrections, 462 Mich 103, 126; 611 NW2d 530 (2000) (opinion by Kelly, J.) (finding a constitutionally permissible delegation of authority, in part, based on the enabling legislation constrained rulemaking authority to only those matters that were “necessary for the proper administration of this act.”). Finally, in addition to the above standards, the EPGA goes on to expressly list examples of that which a Governor can and cannot do under the EPGA. See MCL

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10.31(1) (providing a non-exhaustive, affirmative list of subjects on which an order may be issued); MCL 10.31(3) (containing an express prohibition on orders affecting lawfully possessed firearms). Accordingly, the EPGA contains some restrictions on the Governor’s authority and it provides standards for the exercise of authority under the Act.3
In sum, the Court concludes that plaintiffs’ challenges to the Governor’s authority to declare a state of emergency under the EPGA and to issue Executive Orders in response to a statewide emergency situation under the EPGA are meritless. Thus, and for the avoidance of doubt, while the Court concludes that the Governor’s actions under the EMA were unwarranted— see discussion below—the Court concludes that plaintiffs have failed to establish a reason to invalidate Executive Orders that rely on the EPGA.
EXECUTIVE ORDER 2020-68 WAS NOT AUTHORIZED BY THE EMA
Turning next to the Governor’s orders issued pursuant to the EMA, the Court again notes that the legitimacy of the initial declaration of emergency and disaster, Executive Order No. 202004, is unchallenged in this case. The extension of that declaration under EO 2020-33 is likewise agreed to be a legitimate exercise of gubernatorial power. This court is not asked to review the scope of myriad emergency measures authorized under either declaration. The laser focus of this case is the legitimacy of EO 2020-68, which re-declared a state of emergency and state of disaster under the EMA only one minute after EO 2020-66 cancelled the same. The Legislature contends that the issuance of EO 2020-68 was ultra vires, and this Court agrees.
3 The Court notes that Judge Kelly reached a similar conclusion, albeit in the context of denying a motion for preliminary injunction, in the case of Mich United for Liberty v Whitmer, Docket No. 20-000061-MZ.

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The EMA allows circumvention of the traditional legislative process only under extraordinary circumstances and for a finite period of time. Enacted in 1976, the EMA grants the Governor sweeping powers to cope with “dangers to this state or the people of this state presented by a disaster or emergency.” MCL 30.403(1). These powers include the authority to issue executive orders and directives that have the force and effect of law. MCL 30.403(2). The Governor may also, by executive order, “Suspend a regulatory statute, order, or rule prescribing the procedures for conduct of state business, when strict compliance with the statute, order, or rule would prevent, hinder, or delay necessary action in coping with the disaster or emergency.” MCL 30.405(1)(a). Additionally, the Governor may issue orders regarding the utilization of resources; may transfer functions of state government; may seize private property—with the payment of “appropriate compensation”—evacuate certain areas; control ingress and egress; and take “all other actions which are which are necessary and appropriate under the circumstances.” See, e.g., MCL 30.405(1)(b)-(j). This power is indeed awesome.
The question presented is whether the Governor could legally, by way of Executive Order 2020-68, declare the exact states of emergency and disaster that she had, only one minute before, terminated. The Legislature answer with an emphatic, “No,” and the Governor offers an equally emphatic, “Yes.”
As with most contracts, the Legislature asserts that time is of the essence in the limits of the extraordinary power afforded the executive under the EMA. The Act is replete with references to timing. MCL 30.403 provides as follows:
The state of disaster shall continue until the governor finds that the threat or danger has passed, the disaster has been dealt with to the extent that disaster conditions no longer exist, or until the declared state of disaster has been in effect for 28 days. After 28 days, the governor shall issue an executive order or proclamation

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declaring the state of disaster terminated, unless a request by the governor for an extension of the state of disaster for a specific number of days is approved by resolution of both houses of the legislature. An executive order or proclamation issued pursuant to this subsection shall indicate the nature of the disaster, the area or areas threatened, the conditions causing the disaster, and the conditions permitting the termination of the state of disaster. [MCL 30.403(3) (emphasis added).]
Later the act addresses the duration of a “state of emergency,” and its extension under MCL
30.403(4):
The state of emergency shall continue until the governor finds that the threat or danger has passed, the emergency has been dealt with to the extent that emergency conditions no longer exist, or until the declared state of emergency has been in effect for 28 days. After 28 days, the governor shall issue an executive order or proclamation declaring the state of emergency terminated, unless a request by the governor for an extension of the state of emergency for a specific number of days is approved by resolution of both houses of the legislature. An executive order or proclamation issued pursuant to this subsection shall indicate the nature of the emergency, the area or areas threatened, the conditions causing the emergency, and the conditions permitting the termination of the state of emergency. [Emphasis added.]
The limitation of 28 days is repeated multiple times. A state of emergency or disaster, once
declared, terminates no later than 28 days after being initially declared. The Governor can
determine that the emergent conditions have been resolved earlier than 28 days. Alternatively, the
Governor may ask the Legislature to extend the emergency powers for a period of up to 28 days
from the issuance of the extension. Nothing in Act precludes legislative extension for multiple
additional 28-day periods. In this case the Governor stated in EO 2020-66 that she expressly
terminated the previously issued states of emergency and disaster—not because the disaster or
emergency condition ceased to exist—but because a period of 28 days had expired. In fact, EO
2020-66, the order that terminated the states of disaster and emergency under the EMA, expressly
acknowledged that the emergency and/or disaster had not subsided and still remained In this
respect, EO 2020-66 complied with MCL 30.403(3) and (4)’s directives that the Governor “shall,”

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after 28 days, “issue an executive order or proclamation declaring” that the state of emergency and/or disaster terminated.
However, the Governor argues that she may continue to exercise emergency powers under the EMA without legislative authorization in this case. She argues that she has a duty and the authority to do so because the Legislature failed to grant her the requested extension despite the fact that the emergent conditions continued to exist.
Neither party to this case denies that the COVID-19 emergency was abated as of April 30. No serious argument has been offered that had the Governor not issued EO 2020-68 that all of the emergency measures authorized by EO-33 would have terminated with the signing of EO 202066 on April 30 even if had the governor not vetoed SB 858, which purported to embody several of the expiring Executive Orders and which would not have been effective until 90 days later because the Legislature did not give that bill immediate effect. The Governor asserts she had a duty to act to address the void. She argues that MCL 30.403(3) and (4) compelled her, upon the termination of the states of emergency and disaster accomplished by way of time, to declare anew both states of emergency and disaster within minutes. The Governor makes this argument by emphasizing language in MCL 30.403(3) and (4) stating that, if the Governor finds that a disaster or emergency occurs, then she “shall” issue orders declaring states of emergency or disaster. Thus, argues the Governor, when the 28-day emergency and disaster declarations ended, but the disaster and emergency conditions remained, the Governor was compelled, irrespective of legislative approval, to re-declare states of emergency and disaster.
The EMA does not prohibit a governor from declaring multiple emergencies or disasters during a term of office or even more than on disaster at the same time. Indeed, the collapse of the

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dam at the Tittabawassee River sparked the issuance of a separate state of emergency and disaster during of this lawsuit. Clearly the collapse of the dam and the subsequent flooding was a new and different circumstance from the COVID-19 pandemic. Returning to the instant case, it could also be argued that the very fact that the Legislature had neither authorized the extension of the emergency powers of the Governor under the EMA nor put in place measures to address the emergent situation was itself a new emergency justifying gubernatorial action. However, the “new” circumstance was occasioned not by a mutation of the disease into something such as “COVID-20,” a precipitous spike in infection, or any other factor, except the Legislature’s failure to grant an extension.
Thus, while the Governor emphasizes the directive that she “shall” declares states of emergency and disaster, the Court concludes that the Governor takes these directives out of context and renders meaningless the legislative extension set forth in MCL 30.403(3) and (4). The Governor’s position ignores the other crucial “shall” in the statute. “After 28 days, the governor shall issue an executive order or proclamation declaring the state of” disaster or emergency terminated, “unless a request by the governor for an extension of the state of” disaster or emergency “for a specific number of days is approved by resolution of both houses of the legislature.” See MCL 30.403(3) (as to disasters); MCL 30.403(4) (as to emergencies). The language employed here is mandatory: The Governor “shall” terminate the state of emergency or disaster unless the Legislature grants a request to extend it. See Smitter v Thornapple Twp., 494 Mich 121, 136; 833 NW2d 785 (2013) (explaining that the term “shall” denotes a mandatory directive). Stated otherwise, at the end of 28 days, the EMA contemplates only two outcomes: (1) the state of emergency and/or disaster is terminated by order of the Governor; or (2) the state of emergency/disaster continues with legislative approval. The only qualifier on the “shall terminate”

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language is an affirmative grant of an extension from the Legislature. There is no third option for the Governor to continue the state of emergency and/or disaster on her own, absent legislative approval. Nor does the statute permit the Governor to simply extend the same state of disaster and/or emergency that was otherwise due to expire. To adopt the Governor’s interpretation of the statute would render nugatory the express 28-day limit and it would require the Court to ignore the plain statutory language. Whatever the merits of that might be as a matter of policy, that position conflicts with the plain statutory language. The Governor’s attempt to read MCL 30.403(2) as providing an additional, independent source of authority to issue sweeping orders would essentially render meaningless MCL 30.405(1)’s directive that such orders only issue upon an emergency declaration. It would also read into MCL 30.403(2) broad authority not expressed in the subsection’s plain language. See Robinson, 486 Mich at 21 (explaining that, when it interprets a statute, a reviewing court must “avoid a construction that would render part of the statute surplusage or nugatory”) (citation and quotation marks omitted). See also United States Fidelity & Guarantee Co v Mich Catastrophic Claims Ass’n, 484 Mich 1, 13; 795 NW2d 101 (2009) (“As far as possible, effect should be given to every phrase, clause, and word in the statute.”). The Court is not free to “pick and choose what parts of a statute to enforce,” see Sau-Tuk Indus, Inc v Allegan Co, 316 Mich App 122, 143; 892 NW2d 33 (2016), yet that is precisely what the Governor’s position has asked the Court to do. The language of MCL 30.403(3) and (4) requiring legislative approval of an emergency or disaster declaration should not so easily be cast aside.
Finally, and contrary to the Governor’s argument, the 28-day limit in the EMA does not amount to an impermissible legislative veto. See Blank v Dept’ of Corrections, 462 Mich 103, 113-114; 611 NW2d 530 (2000) (opinion by KELLY, J.) (declaring that, once the Legislature delegates authority, it does not have the right to retain veto authority over the actions of the

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executive). The Governor’s characterization of the 28-day limit as a legislative veto is not accurate. The 28-day limit is not legislative oversight or a “veto” of the Governor’s emergency declaration; rather, it is a standard imposed on the authority so delegated. That is, the Governor is afforded with broad authority under the EMA to make rules and to issue orders; however, that authority is subject to a time limit imposed by the Legislature. The Legislature has not “vetoed” or negated any action by the executive branch by imposing a temporal limit on the Governor’s authority; instead, it limited the amount of time the Governor can act independently of the Legislature in response to a particular emergent matter.
CONCLUSION
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the relief requested in plaintiffs’ motion for immediate declaratory judgment is DENIED. While the Governor’s action of re-declaring the same emergency violated the provisions of the EMA, plaintiffs’ challenges to the EPGA and the Governor’s authority to issue Executive Orders thereunder are meritless.
This order resolves the last pending claim and closes the case.

Dated: May 21, 2020

________________________________ Cynthia Diane Stephens, Judge Court of Claims

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STATE OF MICHIGAN COURT OF CLAIMS

MICHIGAN UNITED FOR LIBERTY, Plaintiff,

OPINION AND ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

v
GOVERNOR GRETCHEN WHITMER,
Defendant. ___________________________/

Case No. 20-000061-MZ Hon. Michael J. Kelly

Pending before the Court is plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction.1 For the reasons that follow, the motion is DENIED.

I.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff’s complaint and motion for preliminary injunction challenge the authority of

defendant Governor Gretchen Whitmer to issue executive orders in response to the COVID-19

pandemic. Defendant cited two acts, the Emergency Management Act (EMA), MCL 30.401 et

seq.; and the Emergency Powers of Governor Act (EPGA), MCL 10.31 et seq. when issuing the

orders at the heart of this case. At this juncture, the facts underlying the complaint are well known

to the parties and their recitation in this opinion would serve no meaningful purpose. The Court

will instead constrain its time and attention to the legal issues presented in plaintiff’s pleadings

1 The Court notes and appreciates the parties’ compliance with the expedited briefing schedule ordered in this case.
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and briefing. Distilled to the most basic level, plaintiff is asserting that the EMA and the EPGA are unconstitutional because they represent an impermissible delegation of legislative authority to the Governor. Plaintiff has asked the Court to issue a preliminary injunction enjoining defendant from enforcing and issuing any orders under the EMA or EPGA.
II. ANALYSIS Injunctive relief “represents an extraordinary and drastic use of judicial power that should be employed sparingly and only with full conviction of its urgent necessity.” Davis v Detroit Fin Review Team, 296 Mich App 568, 613; 821 NW2d 896 (2012) (citation and quotation marks omitted). The Court utilizes four factors in determining whether to issue this extraordinary remedy:
(1) the likelihood that the party seeking the injunction will prevail on the merits, (2) the danger that the party seeking the injunction will suffer irreparable harm if the injunction is not issued, (3) the risk that the party seeking the injunction would be harmed more by the absence of an injunction than the opposing party would be by the granting of the relief, and (4) the harm to the public interest if the injunction is issued. [Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted).] A. PLAINTIFF HAS NOT DEMONSTRATED A LIKELIHOOD OF SUCCESS ON THE
MERITS Turning first to the likelihood of success on the merits, the Court begins by noting that plaintiff asserts facial challenges to the validity of the EMA and the EPGA. This type of challenge presents significant obstacles a litigant must overcome in order to succeed. Initially, statutes are presumed to be constitutional, and a court has a “duty to construe a statute as constitutional unless its unconstitutionality is clearly apparent.” Oakland Co v State, 325 Mich App 247, 260; 926 NW2d 11 (2018). A court must “exercise the power to declare a law unconstitutional with extreme caution,” and the court must not exercise that power if serious doubt exists as to the alleged constitutional invalidity. Id. (citation omitted). Instead, “[e]very reasonable presumption or
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intendment must be indulged in favor of the validity of an act, and it is only when invalidity appears so clearly as to leave no room for reasonable doubt that it violates some provision of the Constitution that a court will refuse to sustain its validity.” Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted).
Moreover, plaintiff’s facial challenge to the constitutionality of the statutes at issue requires a particularly difficult showing. A facial challenge considers the plain language of the statute at issue and it involves a “claim that the law is invalid in toto—and therefore incapable of any valid application.” League of Women Voters of Mich v Secretary of State, __ Mich App __, __; __ NW2d __ (Docket Nos. 350938; 351073), slip op at p. 10 (citation and quotation marks omitted). “To make a successful facial challenge to the constitutionality of a statute, the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the act would be valid.” Oakland Co, 325 Mich App at 260 (citation and quotation marks omitted).
Here, in order for plaintiff to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits of the claims asserted in its briefing, it must demonstrate that the challenged statutes contain constitutionally infirm delegations of legislative authority to the Governor. In general, the principle of separation of powers, see Const 1963, art 3, § 2, precludes the legislative branch from delegating its lawmaking authority to the executive or judicial branches of government, Taylor v Smithkline Beecham Corp, 468 Mich 1, 8; 658 NW2d 127 (2003). However, the separation of powers does not preclude this state’s Legislature from “obtaining the assistance of the coordinate [b]ranches.” Id. at 8-9, quoting Mistretta v United States, 488 US 361, 371; 109 S Ct 647; 102 L Ed 2d 714 (1989). Caselaw counsels that “when properly prescribed standards exist, the Legislature has not abdicated its law-making or legislative power because the agency to which the power is delegated is limited in its action by the Legislature’s prescribed will; it cannot follow its own
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uncircumscribed will.” Westervelt v Nat Resources Comm, 402 Mich 412, 441; 263 NW2d 564 (1978) (opinion by WILLIAMS, J.) (quotation marks omitted). In Taylor, the Supreme Court remarked that, historically, these types of challenges “have been uniformly unsuccessful” across federal and state jurisprudence. Taylor, 468 Mich at 9.
In order to determine whether the challenged statutes at issue in this case contain sufficient standards to survive a constitutional challenge, the Court’s analysis must be guided by the following criteria:
1) the act must be read as a whole; 2) the act carries a presumption of constitutionality; and 3) the standards must be as reasonably precise as the subject matter requires or permits. The preciseness required of the standards will depend on the complexity of the subject. [Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich v Milliken, 422 Mich 1, 51; 367 NW2d 1 (1985).] The Court will first address plaintiff’s challenges to the EMA, which makes the Governor “responsible for coping with dangers to this state or the people of this state presented by a disaster or emergency.” MCL 30.403(1). The Act permits the Governor to issue orders to implement the act and it empowers her to issue emergency and disaster declarations. MCL 30.403(3)-(4). That authority is not unchecked, however, as the statute sets forth definitions for “emergency,” and “disaster” that provide some measure of guidance for the Governor’s use of authority under the Act. See MCL 30.402(e); MCL 30.402(h). Furthermore, the EMA goes on to describe the authority and duties of the Governor under the Act, with MCL 30.405(1)(a)-(j) detailing ten subjects (nine particular subjects and one catch-all provision) on which the Governor can issue orders under the Act. Those orders can only be issued “upon the declaration of a state of disaster or a state of emergency . . . .” MCL 30.405(1).
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When viewing the statute as a whole and considering the complexity of the subject sought to be addressed, plaintiff cannot demonstrate a substantial likelihood of success on the assertion that the EMA is an unconstitutional, standard-less delegation of legislative authority to the Governor. See Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 422 Mich at 51. At the outset, the Court’s analysis on this issue must be informed by the notion that the EMA’s very purpose is to permit the Governor to deal with a highly complex emergency or disaster situation. Caselaw cautions that the more difficult a particular subject-matter is to regulate, the more impractical it is for the Legislature to provide specific, exacting standards for the delegation of authority. State Conservation Dep’t, 396 Mich at 309. Thus, generalized standards can be appropriate. Id. And here, the Court concludes that the parameters and standards set forth in the EMA, at least at this stage, are of the type that pass constitutional muster. The EMA is not an unfettered, unchecked grant of power to the Governor. Rather, the statute specifies that the Governor, in emergency or disaster situations, is to be given certain, defined authority. The fact that this authority is limited to statutorily defined “emergencies” or “disasters” provides some measure of standards. Additionally, the Legislature imposed regulations on the subject-matter to be reached by the Governor’s orders, as well as with respect to the duration of the orders. See MCL 30.405(1) (prescribing the subject-matter that can be regulated by way of executive order); MCL 30.405(3)-(4) (placing a 28-day limit on certain orders issued by the Governor). The Legislature also implemented a method by which the Governor can work with the Legislature after a certain period of time. See MCL 30.403(3)-(4). In sum, while the Court acknowledges that the authority granted under the EMA is undoubtedly broad in some respects, the grant of authority does not sound in the nature of statutes that have run afoul of the non-delegation doctrine. Cf. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 441 Mich at 55 (finding an impermissible delegation of authority where the statute contained a “lack of standards defining
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and directing” the delegated authority). A plain reading of the EMA does not support the notion that the statute contains the kind of “uncontrolled, arbitrary power” that our Supreme Court has cautioned against in non-delegation cases. See State Conservation Dep’t, 396 Mich at 308-309.2
Plaintiff’s ability to succeed on its challenge to the delegation of authority contained in the EPGA is no less dubious. While the EPGA is a much less detailed act than its subsequently enacted counterpart, it nonetheless sets some standards for the Governor’s exercise of authority. The authority exercised by the Governor under the EPGA can only be invoked if public safety is or will be imperiled. MCL 10.31(1) makes clear that authority under the Act is only bestowed on the Governor. “[d]uring times of great public crisis, disaster, rioting, catastrophe, or similar public emergency within the state, or reasonable apprehension of immediate danger of a public emergency of that kind, when public safety is imperiled . . . .” The statute continues by describing that any rules or regulations imposed by the Governor must be “reasonable” and “necessary to protect life and property or to bring the emergency situation within the affected area under control.” MCL 10.31(1). The Court concludes that the terms “reasonable” and “necessary” carry more significance than plaintiff assigns to them, particularly when they are read in light of the statute’s goals of protecting life and property and combating an emergency or disaster scenario. See Klammer v Dep’t of Transp, 141 Mich App 253, 262; 367 NW2d 78 (1985) (concluding that a delegation of authority that empowered the decisionmaker to take action that was deemed “necessary” in response to a particular situation was a sufficiently precise standard in the context of the statute at issue). Moreover, when scanning the EPGA for additional criteria, the Court notes
2 The Court notes that Judge Murray reached a similar decision when denying injunctive relief in the case of Martinko v Whitmer, Docket No. 20-00062-MM (issued April 29, 2020).
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that the statute contains a list of subjects over which the Legislature granted the Governor authority, as well as one area where the Legislature expressly stated that the Governor was not permitted to act. See MCL 10.31(1) & (3) (permitting the Governor to control matters such as traffic, transportation, places of amusement and assembly, and to establish curfews, but expressly declaring that the Governor cannot seize, take, or confiscate lawfully possessed firearms or other weapons). Finally, the Act specifies that the Governor is to exercise the state’s police power in order “to provide adequate control over persons and conditions during such periods of impending or actual public crisis or disaster.” MCL 10.32. The Court concludes at this stage of the litigation that the phrase, “adequate control,” and the reference to that control lasting only for periods of public crisis or disaster guides the Governor’s exercise of authority. Hence, the plain language of the act, contrary to plaintiff’s contentions, describes standards and limitations on the Governor’s exercise of authority under the EPGA. While the level of authority conferred upon the Governor may be broad—and at times frustrating in practice—it does not appear on plaintiff’s motion to be the type that would warrant relief under the non-delegation doctrine.
Furthermore, in evaluating the EPGA, just as it did when evaluating the EMA, the Court must remain cognizant that the situation sought to be controlled by the EPGA is an unpredictable, dangerous emergency or disaster situation. A disaster or emergency is almost assuredly a dynamic, unpredictable situation fraught with complexity. It is unreasonable to expect a demanding or precise set of legislative standards be incorporated into the EPGA in order to deal with such a demanding scenario. See State Conservation Dep’t, 396 Mich at 309 (explaining that “[t]he preciseness of the standard will vary with the complexity and/or the degree to which subject regulated will require constantly changing regulation.”).
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B. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGED IRREPARABLE HARM FALLS SHORT AS WELL Although the above analysis in and of itself would cause the Court to deny injunctive relief, the Court finds plaintiff’s assertion of irreparable harm falls short of that which is required to demonstrate entitlement to preliminary injunctive relief. A “particularized showing of irreparable harm . . . is . . . an indispensable requirement to obtain a preliminary injunction.” Pontiac Fire Fighters Union Local 376 v Pontiac, 482 Mich 1, 9; 753 NW2d 595 (2008) (citation and quotation marks omitted). The harm must be particularized; a “generalized argument that a constitutional violation would result in harm is insufficient because it is not particularized.” Hammel v Speaker of House of Representatives, 297 Mich App 641, 652; 825 NW2d 616 (2012). The problem in the instant case is that plaintiff has only generally asserted the harm it allegedly suffered by generically alleging constitutional violations. Plaintiff has not articulated particularized, individual harm. Furthermore, caselaw again cautions that, in the absence of bad faith on the part of a public body— which has not been alleged in this case—“there is no real and imminent danger of irreparable injury requiring issuance of an injunction.” Davis, 296 Mich App at 621. Plaintiff’s failure to assert a particularized irreparable injury in the absence of injunctive relief represents an independent reason to deny the motion for preliminary injunction.
III. CONCLUSION Both the EMA and the EPGA confer broad authority upon the office of the Governor. History will determine whether the Governor is judiciously exercising this authority in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. But, for the reasons stated herein:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction is DENIED.
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Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 41-3 filed 06/17/20 PageID.941 Page 36 of 62 This is not a final order and it does not resolve the last pending claim or close the case.

May 19, 2020

____________________________________ Michael J. Kelly Judge, Court of Claims

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STATE OF MICHIGAN COURT OF CLAIMS

ERIC OSTERGREN, and JASON GILLMAN, JR.,
Plaintiffs,
v GOVERNOR GRETCHEN WHITMER, and STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Defendants. ___________________________/

OPINION AND ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND GRANTING SUMMARY DISPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS
Case No. 20-000053-MZ
Hon. Cynthia Diane Stephens

Pending before the Court is plaintiff Jason Gillman Jr.’s motion for preliminary injunction, as well as the parties’ competing motions for summary disposition. For the reasons that follow, the motion for preliminary injunction and plaintiffs’ motion for summary disposition will be DENIED, and summary disposition will be GRANTED in favor of defendants.

I.

BACKGROUND

A. EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 2020-38

At the heart of this matter is Executive Order No. 2020-38 by the Governor in response to

the COVID-19 pandemic. The order, which cited the authority of the Governor under the

Emergency Management Act (EMA), MCL 30.401 et seq., as well as the Emergency Powers of

Governor Act (EPGA), MCL 10.31 et seq., pertained to deadlines associated with response times

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for requests made under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), MCL 15.231 et seq. The order
provides, in pertinent part:
To mitigate the spread of COVID-19, protect the public health, and provide essential protections to vulnerable Michiganders, it is crucial that all Michiganders limit in-person contact to the fullest extent possible. This includes practicing social distancing and restricting in-person work and interaction to only that which is strictly necessary. At the same time, and as memorialized by Michigan’s Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), 1976 PA 442, as amended, MCL 15.231 et seq., it remains the public policy of this state—and a priority of my administration—that Michiganders have access to “full and complete information regarding the affairs of government and the official acts of those who represent them as public officials and public employees,” so that they “may fully participate in the democratic process.” MCL 15.231(2). To balance this core priority with the steep and urgent demands posed by the COVID-19 pandemic, it is reasonable and necessary to provide limited and temporary extensions of certain FOIA deadlines, so that Michiganders may remain informed and involved in their government during this unprecedented crisis without unduly compromising the health and safety of this state and its residents. [Executive Order No. 2020-38 (emphasis added).] The order applies to all “public bodies” as that term is defined in FOIA; pertinent to the instant
case, “public body” refers to local public health departments. See MCL 15.232(h).
B. PLAINTIFFS’ FOIA REQUEST According to plaintiffs’ allegations, plaintiff Jason Gillman, Jr. filed a FOIA request with
the Kent County Health Department for three categories of records: (1) all communications and
responsive records relating to a certain, petition filed by Kent County Health Officer Adam
London; (2) a copy of the petition; and (3) an order issued in response to the petition by a Kent
Circuit Judge. Plaintiff sent the request on or about April 18, 2020. Within one business day of
receiving the request, the Kent County Health Department responded with an estimate regarding
the time it would take to comply. The response stated that plaintiff Gillman’s request had been
uploaded and that “The court records are available through the court and communication will be
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gathered but in accordance with the extended timelines” in EO 2020-38 because the request required on-site work.
On or about April 7, 2020, plaintiffs filed a complaint challenging the validity of EO 202038 as it concerned FOIA requests. The complaint alleges that EO 2020-38 “ordered massive suspensions and alterations of” FOIA and that these alterations and suspensions ran contrary to this state’s Constitution and FOIA. Plaintiffs further allege that neither the EMA nor the EPGA provide the Governor with authority to issue EO 2020-38.
Shortly after submitting his FOIA request plaintiff Gillman moved this Court for a preliminary injunction and show-cause order. The Court notes that at no time did plaintiff Gillman pursue a FOIA claim in Kent Circuit Court as the Act required him to do in the event he believed his rights had been violated with respect to a particular request. See MCL 15.240(1)(b). He asserts that MCL 15.235(2) requires a public body to either grant or deny a FOIA request within 5 business days of receiving the request—unless it requests a one-time, 10-day extension as permitted under MCL 15.235(2)(d). He contends that there is no exception contained within the statute for a pandemic. Plaintiff Gillman contends he has been harmed by Kent County’s decision to rely on EO 2020-38 to delay its response to his request. His motion for preliminary injunction asked the Court to enjoin “the effectiveness of Executive Order No. 2020-38 . . . as to the Freedom of Information Act abridgement as outlined herein.”
The Court held a hearing on the motion for preliminary injunction on May 8, 2020. With respect to the particular harm asserted by plaintiff Gillman, plaintiffs’ counsel conceded that his client’s access to Kent Circuit Court to challenge the timeliness of Kent County’s response was in no way hindered by the issuance of EO 2020-38. Plaintiffs’ counsel argued that the ability to
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access Kent Circuit Court to redress the particular FOIA violation alleged by plaintiff Gillman was irrelevant, however, because the irreparable injury alleged by plaintiff Gillman was a general interference with his rights under FOIA.
II. ANALYSIS—MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION A trial court must consider four factors when determining whether it is appropriate to issue preliminary injunctive relief:
(1) harm to the public interest if the injunction issues; (2) whether harm to the applicant in the absence of temporary relief outweighs the harm to the opposing party if relief is granted; (3) the likelihood that the applicant will prevail on the merits; and (4) a demonstration that the applicant will suffer irreparable injury if the relief is not granted. [Thermatool Corp v Borzym, 227 Mich App 366, 376; 575 NW2d 334 (1998).] Injunctive relief represents “an extraordinary and drastic use of judicial power that should be employed sparingly and only with full conviction of its urgent necessity.” Davis v Detroit Fin Review Team, 296 Mich App 568, 613; 821 NW2d 896 (2012) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
The extraordinary remedy of preliminary injunctive relief is not warranted in the matter at hand. Overlooking for now plaintiff Gillman’s ability or inability to succeed on the merits, the Court concludes that plaintiff Gillman’s request for preliminary injunctive relief is not ripe. The record before the Court reveals that Kent County granted plaintiff Gillman’s request, stating that it would gather the records sought. On the surface at least, this response was permitted by MCL 15.234(8), which permits a public body to give a best-efforts estimate regarding the time it will take the public body to fulfill the request. There is thus no apparent, let alone irreparable, injury to plaintiff Gillman, because he cannot establish that there was a FOIA violation, let alone a FOIA violation brought on by EO 2020-38. “The doctrine of ripeness is designed to prevent the
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adjudication of hypothetical or contingent claims before an actual injury has been sustained. A claim that rests on contingent future events is not ripe.” Shaw v City of Dearborn, __ Mich App __, __; __ NW2d __ (2020) (Docket No. 341701), slip op at 8. Plaintiff Gillman’s conjecture about whether the fulfillment of his request will be delayed such that it amounts to a denial of the request, see King v Mich State Police Dep’t, 303 Mich App 162, 189; 841 NW2d 914 (2013) (explaining that a court will look past a public body’s labeling of its FOIA response), does not amount to a live controversy. Plaintiffs’ contention rests on speculation. and he has not presented a colorable claim of a FOIA violation based on EO 2020-38. Furthermore, any assertion by plaintiff Gillman that Kent County violated FOIA could have been, and should have been, pursued in Kent Circuit Court. Plaintiff Gillman failed to pursue vindication of his rights under the statute in Kent Circuit Court, as specified in MCL 15.240(1)(b). Nor was he prevented from doing so by anything in EO 2020-38 or otherwise. Preliminary injunctive relief is not warranted on the record before the Court.
Additionally, and for the reasons stated below, plaintiff Gillman’s request for preliminary injunctive relief fails because he has no likelihood of success on the merits of his claim regarding EO 2020-38.
III. DEFENDANTS ARE ENTITLED TO SUMMARY DISPOSITION The parties’ have, also filed competing requests for summary disposition. Plaintiffs argue that neither the EMA nor the EPGA provided the authority for the Governor to issue EO 2020-38. With respect to the EPGA in particular, plaintiffs argue that the statute would be an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority if it permitted the Governor to suspend or alter portions of FOIA.
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The Court rejects plaintiffs’ contentions because, at a minimum, the EPGA authorized and continues to authorize the issuance of EO 2020-38 and because the EPGA is not an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority. Turning first to the issue of whether the EPGA authorized the issuance of EO 2020-38, the statute provides that:
During times of great public crisis, disaster, rioting, catastrophe, or similar public emergency within the state, or reasonable apprehension of immediate danger of a public emergency of that kind, when public safety is imperiled, either upon application of the mayor of a city, sheriff of a county, or the commissioner of the Michigan state police or upon his or her own volition, the governor may proclaim a state of emergency and designate the area involved. [MCL 10.31(1).] When the Governor proclaims a state of emergency based on great public crisis, public emergency, or upon the imperiling of public safety, she “may promulgate reasonable orders, rules, and regulations as he or she considers necessary to protect life and property or to bring the emergency situation within the affected area under control.” MCL 10.31(1). The EPGA states that the Legislature’s intent in passing the Act was:
to invest the governor with sufficiently broad power of action in the exercise of the police power of the state to provide adequate control over persons and conditions during such periods of impending or actual public crisis or disaster. The provisions of this act shall be broadly construed to effectuate this purpose. [MCL 10.32.] Citing public health concerns, the benefits of social distancing, and the highly communicable nature of COVID-19, defendants’ briefing argues that EO 2020-38 was, consistent with MCL 10.31(1), reasonable and necessary to protect public health and safety. Plaintiffs have not seriously challenged the existence of the Covid-19 pandemic, but instead argue that the EPGA does not, and cannot, as a matter of constitutional law, grant the Governor authority to “amend” FOIA. This assertion is unavailing. EO 2020-38 requires a response “within 10 business days” of actual receipt of a written request at the public body’s physical address. The order modifies the FOIA time line with the insertion of “actual receipt”. Presumptively this change reflects the effects
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of the stay at home order which has closed the offices of many public body’s, reduced staff in others and delayed ordinary mail service. Under FOIA, a public body already had the right to request a one-time, 10-business day extension under MCL 15.235(2)(d). While EO 2020-38 eased response times and compliance times under FOIA, it did not eliminate or fundamentally alter a public body’s FOIA obligations. Thus, in light of the unchallenged public health concerns cited by defendants, the Court concludes that the order was within the scope of the Governor’s authority granted by the EPGA because it was reasonable and necessary for the protection of life and/or to bring the spread of COVID-19 under control.
On the question of whether the EPGA occasions an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority, the Court once again disagrees with plaintiffs. For the reasons articulated more fully in the simultaneously issued decision in Mich House of Representatives v Governor, (Docket No. 20-000079-MZ), the delegation of authority to the Governor under the EPGA withstands constitutional muster. The Court adopts its pertinent analysis from the Mich House of Representatives decision and incorporates it herein.
IV. CONCLUSION IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction is DENIED. IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED that defendants’ motion for summary disposition is GRANTED pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (C)(10), and plaintiffs’ competing motion for summary disposition is DENIED.
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This order resolves the last pending claim and closes the case.

Dated: May 21, 2020

________________________________ Cynthia Diane Stephens, Judge Court of Claims

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STATE OF MICHIGAN COURT OF CLAIMS

STEVE MARTINKO, et al, Plaintiffs,

OPINION AND ORDER REGARDING PLAINTIFFS’ APRIL 23, 2020 MOTION FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

v

Case No. 20-00062-MM

GRETCHEN WHITMER, in her official capacity as Governor of the State of Michigan, DANIEL EICHINGER, in his official capacity as Director of the Michigan Department of Natural Resources, and DANA NESSEL, in her official capacity as the Attorney General for the State of Michigan,

Hon. Christopher M. Murray

Defendants. ___________________________/

I. INTRODUCTION

This matter was filed by five Michigan residents who claim that three of Governor

Whitmer’s executive orders, Executive Orders 2020-21 and 2020-42,1 and now Executive Order

2020-59, infringe on their constitutional rights to procedural due process and substantive due

1 Plaintiffs recognize that EO 2020-21 was rescinded by EO 2020-42, and they claim that EO 2020-42 “extended the timeline originally set by [EO] 2020-21 and grossly expands its restrictions on businesses’ and individuals’ fundamental rights.” After the verified complaint was filed, EO 2020-42 was rescinded by EO 2020-59, which (among other things) eliminated the prohibitions on traveling intrastate to another residence, from not using motorized boats on the waterways, and to an extent allows the re-opening of some businesses and state parks. Although plaintiffs challenge the same restrictions set forth in EO 2020-42, the Court will for clarity sake refer to the restrictions within the current executive order, EO 2020-59, unless the timing period is relevant to any issue.
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process. Specifically, plaintiffs’ verified complaint alleges that the “mandatory quarantine” imposed by EO 2020-59 violates their right to both procedural due process (Count I) and substantive due process (Count II), and that the intrastate travel restrictions contained in EO 202042 also violate their rights to procedural due process (Count III) and substantive due process (Count IV). They also allege in Count V of their verified complaint that the Emergency Management Act, MCL 30.401 et seq., is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to the Governor. Plaintiffs have requested the Court issue a preliminary injunction—but not a permanent one—restraining these defendants from continuing to implement the provisions of EO 2020-59.2 Once restrained, plaintiffs seek a declaration that the challenged restrictions and the EMA are invalid.3
II. JURISDICTION Defendants first argue that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because plaintiffs seek only injunctive relief based upon federal constitutional claims, which deprives the Court of jurisdiction to decide the matter. Defendants rely upon MCL 600.6440, which provides:
No claimant may be permitted to file claim in said court against the state nor any department, commission, board, institution, arm or agency thereof who has an adequate remedy upon his claim in the federal courts, but it is not necessary in the complaint filed to allege that claimant has no such adequate remedy, but that fact may be put in issue by the answer or motion filed by the state or the department, commission, board, institution, arm or agency thereof.
2 On April 23, 2020, the Court denied plaintiffs’ motion for an ex parte temporary restraining order on the ground that plaintiffs had not shown the threat of immediate and irreparable harm of physical injury or loss of property. 3 The Court appreciates the speed at which counsel submitted briefs, and for the high caliber of the briefs submitted.
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Because a federal court can exercise jurisdiction against state officers in their official capacity when seeking only prospective injunctive relief, defendants argue, MCL 600.6440 applies and the Court lacks jurisdiction to decide the matter.
The legal principles put forward by defendants are sound, but they do not apply to plaintiffs’ case. First, the statute refers to claims filed in the Court of Claims against the state, its departments, agencies, etc., and does not pertain to claims brought in this Court against individuals, as plaintiffs have done here. Thus, it is irrelevant whether claims against state officers in their official capacity brought in federal court might essentially be considered claims against the state. Second, with respect to defendants’ argument, plaintiffs seek declaratory rulings on each of their three challenges, and one of those challenges—the claim that the EMA violates the separation of powers doctrine—is based upon state law. So too is their challenge to the intrastate ban on travel to vacation rentals. Additionally, in their complaint plaintiffs seek “other and further relief as the Court deems appropriate,” which whatever that could end up being, it would go beyond the declaratory and limited injunctive relief requested in the complaint, and could include damages, even if only nominal. Because plaintiffs’ claims and forms of relief do not meet all the requirements of MCL 600.6440, this Court does not lack subject matter jurisdiction.
III. MOOTNESS Defendants also argue that plaintiffs’ case is moot because they only challenge EO 202021 and EO 2020-42, which have been rescinded, and EO 2020-59 is the only existing executive order containing these restrictions. True enough, but as defendants seem to recognize, it was after plaintiffs’ filing last week that the Governor issued EO 2020-59, and plaintiffs have not had time to seek to amend their complaint, and several of plaintiffs’ challenges to the prior EOs—the stayat-home provision and the ban on intrastate travel to vacation rentals—remain within EO 2020-
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59. Those two challenges are therefore not moot, as the Court can still render complete relief against those provisions. See CD Barnes Assoc, Inc v Star Haven, LLC, 300 Mich App 389, 406; 834 NW2d 878 (2013). The remainder of the challenges to EOs 2020-21 and 2020-42, as well as to the Department of Natural Resources rule4, have been removed by EO 2020-59, and are now moot.
The Court therefore concludes that the only remaining ripe challenges to the executive orders are (1) the stay-at-home provision, (2) the prohibition of traveling to a third-party vacation rental, and (3) the limited public access to certain public land. And, of course, plaintiffs’ challenge to the constitutionality of the EMA remains a live controversy.
IV. STANDARDS FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION “The objective of a preliminary injunction is to maintain the status quo pending a final hearing regarding the parties’ rights.” Alliance for the Mentally Ill of Mich v Dep’t of Community Health, 231 Mich App 647, 655–656; 588 NW2d 133 (1998). The status quo has been defined as “ ‘the last actual, peaceable, noncontested status which preceded the pending controversy.’ ” Buck v Thomas Cooley Law School, 272 Mich App 93, 98 n 4; 725 NW2d 485 (2006), quoting Psychological Services of Bloomfield, Inc v Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan, 144 Mich App 182, 185; 375 NW2d 382 (1985). In Mich AFSCME Council 25 v Woodhaven–Brownstown Sch
4 Specifically, plaintiffs challenge a Department of Natural Resources rule, implemented in furtherance of EO 2020-42, that “restricts the use of powerboats on public waterways yet allows sailboats and kayaks.” Plaintiffs likewise question a DNR rule, also implemented in furtherance of EO 2020-42, that “further restricted access to public lands, parks and trails to residents of ‘local communities.’ ” Much to the pleasure of outdoor enthusiasts, EO 2020-59 seems to have eliminated the restrictions on use of powerboats and use of state parks during certain hours of the day.
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Dist, 293 Mich App 143, 146; 809 NW2d 444 (2011), the Court of Appeals instructed that, “[w]hen deciding whether to grant an injunction under traditional equitable principles,
a court must consider (1) the likelihood that the party seeking the injunction will prevail on the merits, (2) the danger that the party seeking the injunction will suffer irreparable harm if the injunction is not issued, (3) the risk that the party seeking the injunction would be harmed more by the absence of an injunction than the opposing party would be by the granting of the relief, and (4) the harm to the public interest if the injunction is issued.[5] Not surprisingly, the Court will first turn to the initial consideration, i.e., whether plaintiffs have shown a likelihood of prevailing on the merits. Though plaintiffs do not have to prove they will succeed on the merits, they do have to prove that they have a substantial likelihood of success on the merits. Int’l Union v Michigan, 211 Mich App 20, 25; 535 NW2d 210 (1995).
V. THE MERITS A. BACKGROUND AND FACTS Michigan residents, like all other Americans, cherish their liberty. We always have, though the liberties and freedoms we seek to protect have changed over time. At and before our founding, our forefathers fought for the inalienable right to own property, freely engage in commerce, represent ourselves through our own elected representatives, worship where and how we wanted, etc. The Declaration of Independence’s list of grievances against the King of England prove as much, as do several of the amendments to the United States Constitution, and in particular, the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
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Today we have all the freedoms and liberties that the founders fought for, and our branches of government exist in large part to ensure that those rights remain intact. See Declaration, ¶ 2.6
The liberty and freedoms at stake in this matter do not in large part involve those rights and liberties
the founders fought so hard for; instead, plaintiffs focus on the right to freely move about one’s
community and state, to do commerce when one pleases, and to travel about the state for vacation
purposes. It is the restrictions to those activities within EO 2020-59 that plaintiffs challenge here.
As any reader of this opinion knows, the challenged executive orders were issued to address
the public health crisis occasioned by the world-wide spread of the novel coronavirus, which hit
our great state in early March. Specifically, on March 10, 2020, was when the first two cases of the virus were diagnosed in our state7, while the first death resulting from the virus occurred on March 18, 2020.8 As a result of the quick spread of the virus within our state borders, and to meet
the myriad challenges that immediately arose Governor Whitmer issued numerous executive
orders, including EO 2020-21, EO 2020-42 and EO 2020-59. The main element of the executive
6 The Court realizes that the Declaration is a political document, not a legal one, but it is good evidence of the founding political theories and objectives. See Troxel v Granville, 530 US 57, 91; 120 S Ct 2054; 147 L Ed 2d 49 (2000)(SCALIA, J., dissenting)(“The Declaration of Independence ... is not a legal prescription conferring powers upon the courts[.]”); Derden v McNeel, 978 F2d 1453, 1456 n4 (CA 5, 1992)(“[G]eneral statements about inalienable rights ... tell us little about the prerogatives of an individual in concrete factual situations.”); Coffey v United States, 939 F Supp 185, 191 (EDNY, 1996)(“While the Declaration of Independence states that all men are endowed certain unalienable rights including ‘Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness,’ it does not grant rights that may be pursued through the judicial system.” (citation omitted)). 7 Executive Order No, 2020-21; Detroit Free Press, Coronavirus Timeline https://www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/2020/03/18/coronavirus-timeline-first-casemichigan-first-death/5069676002/ (accessed April 28, 2020). This article contains a compilation of information from the state Department of Health and Human Services. 8 Detroit Free Press, First Michigan Death Due to Coronavirus is Southgate Man in his 50s https://www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/wayne/2020/03/18/coronavirus-deathsmichigan/5054788002/ (accessed April 28, 2020).
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orders is the requirement that most residents remain in their home unless engaging in certain essential activities, or certain limited outdoor activities. The result of the order, from an economic standpoint, was thousands of Michigan residents being unable to work unless they could do so remotely, the closing of all restaurants, bars, and other small and large businesses.9
At the time the first stay-at-home order was issued on March 23, 2020—only 13 days since the first confirmed case in this state—there were already 1,328 confirmed cases and 15 deaths.10 Today, just over one month later, Michigan has over 36,000 confirmed cases of the virus and over 3,000 related deaths.
B. THE MERITS In their complaint, plaintiffs do not challenge the Governor’s authority to issue the executive orders on this subject-matter. Instead, plaintiffs challenge the scope of the order through separate claims based on procedural due process and substantive due process. Although these claims entail different considerations and standards, see In re Forfeiture of 2000 GMC Denali and Contents, 316 Mich App 562, 573-574; 892 NW2d 388 (2016), the Court will address the claims together since, under these circumstances, each protected right is subject to the same overriding principle. In other words, the constitutional right asserted does not make a difference when considering this issue, because both are subject to a balancing with the state’s interest to protect the public health. This holds true because, and perhaps contrary to common knowledge, most, if not all, individual constitutional rights are not absolute and are subject to a balancing with the
9 Michigan was not alone in this regard. The Court takes notice that the worldwide economy has come to a virtual standstill as a result of state and national actions taken to control the virus. 10 Detroit Free Press, Michigan Coronavirus Cases, Tracking the Pandemic, https://www.freep.com/in-depth/news/nation/coronavirus/2020/04/11/michigan-coronaviruscases-tracking-covid-19-pandemic/5121186002/ (accessed April 28, 2020).
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countervailing state interest. See New Rider v Board of Ed of Independent School Dist No 1, 480
F2d 693, 696 (CA 10, 1973) (“Constitutional rights, including First Amendment rights, are not
absolutes.”) and In re Abbott, 954 F3d 772, 784 (CA 5, 2020) (Recognizing, when addressing
Texas emergency rules during the coronavirus pandemic, that individual rights secured by the
Constitution could be reasonably restricted during a health crisis).
As can be seen, then, there are two competing constitutional principles at play. First, as
plaintiffs note in their verified complaint, in Ex Parte Milligan, 71 US 2, 120-121; 18 L Ed 281
(1866), the United States Supreme Court recognized—in a case that arose during the height of the
Civil War—that our rights enshrined in the Constitution do not become less important or
enforceable because of exigent circumstances:
The Constitution of the United States is a law for rulers and people, equally in war and in peace, and covers with the shield of its protection all classes of men, at all times, and under all circumstances. No doctrine, involving more pernicious consequences, was ever invented by the wit of man than that any of its provisions can be suspended during any of the great exigencies of government. Such a doctrine leads directly to anarchy or despotism, but the theory of necessity on which it is based is false; for the government, within the Constitution, has all the powers granted to it, which are necessary to preserve its existence; as has been happily proved by the result of the great effort to throw off its just authority. Though our individual constitutional rights cannot be suspended or eliminated, they are, as noted,
subject to reasonable regulation by the state. And, when it comes to the power of the state to act
in the best interests of the public health when faced with a serious contagious disease, which is the
state interest acted upon by the Governor,
“[w]e are plowing no virgin field in considering the questions here involved. Numerous decisions, both federal and state, have considered the questions now before us. They are not all in accord and in some instances are not reconcilable. There is, however, a very marked trend in them in one direction, that which upholds the right of the state, in the exercise of its police power and in the interest of the public health, to enact such laws, such rules and regulations, as will prevent the spread of this dread disease.” [People ex rel Hill v Lansing Bd of Ed, 224 Mich
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388, 390; 195 NW 95 (1923). See, also, Jacobsen v Commonwealth of Mass, 197 US 11, 25-26; 25 S Ct 358; 49 L Ed 643 (1905) (upholding state’s power to require vaccination over plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest to not be told what to do), and In re Abbott, 954 F3d at 784-785.] As noted earlier, plaintiffs’ due process claims set out in Counts I and III are challenges to the quarantine11 requirement and (as amended by the changes contained in EO 2020-59), the prohibition on intrastate travel to a vacation rental. Plaintiffs’ specific assertion is that, although the state may have the ability to quarantine those who are infected with the virus, the state cannot quarantine everyone without some showing that the individual(s) are infected. Because EO 202059 does so, the executive order violates their right to procedural due process. The same holds true, they argue, for the prohibition of intrastate travel to a third parties’ vacation home.12
In addressing this argument, it is imperative to recognize the limited question the Court is empowered to decide. Except in limited circumstances mentioned later, it is not for the courts to pass on the wisdom of state action that is granted to it by the general police power or by statute. Certainly the state cannot simply ignore the individual rights enshrined in our federal (or state) constitution in the name of a public health threat. Judicial review of state actions is therefore (and quite obviously) appropriate and necessary. But the depth of that review is limited, and does not include delving deep into the pros and cons of what is the better plan of action between two reasonable alternatives. This point was well-made by three concurring Justices in Rock v Carney,
11 Plaintiffs characterize the “stay-at-home” provision as a quarantine, which defendants quarrel with, but quarantine is defined as “a restraint upon the activities or communications of persons … designed to prevent the spread of disease or pests.” Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (11th Ed). 12 Plaintiffs have not asserted that they own a second home in Michigan or that they had rented a third parties’ vacation home for use during a time in which any executive order remained in place.
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216 Mich 280, 283; 185 NW 798 (1921), a case involving the state’s response to the spread of
venereal diseases during World War I:
The questions involved in this litigation are of supreme importance, not only to the individuals composing this commonwealth, but also to the numerous boards of health and to the state itself. We approach their consideration with a due regard of their importance. Neither a desire to sustain the state, nor a supersensitiveness prompted by the delicacy of the examination here involved, should in any way enter into or control our decision. Policies adopted by the legislative and executive branches of the state government are not submitted to this branch for approval as to their wisdom. They stand or fall in this court because valid or invalid under the law, and their wisdom or want of wisdom in no way rests with us. If valid, they must be upheld by this court; if invalid, they must be so declared by this court. If these defendants have transcended their power, they must be held liable, and they may not be excused from liability by the fact that their motives were of the highest. If they had not transcended their power, they are not liable, and supersensitiveness or preconceived notions of proprieties, no matter of how long standing, do not render them liable. The case must be determined by the application of cold rules of law. Thus, whether and to what extent this Court agrees with policy implemented in the executive orders
is of no moment or consideration. Instead, the Court must dutifully apply the “cold rules of law”
to determine the validity of the challenged provisions of the executive order.
Binding authority from the United States Supreme Court and the Michigan Supreme Court
compels this Court to conclude that plaintiffs do not have a substantial likelihood of success on
the merits. This is not because the rights asserted by plaintiffs are not fundamental—being forced
(with some important exceptions) by the state to remain in one’s home, in turn causing many
residents to be unable to work, visit elderly relatives, and to generally move about the state. But
those liberty interests are, and always have been, subject to society’s interests—society being our
fellow residents. They—our fellow residents—have an interest to remain unharmed by a highly
communicable and deadly virus, and since the state entered the Union in 1837, it has had the broad
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power to act for the public health of the entire state when faced with a public crisis. As the
Jacobsen Court so aptly held:
The defendant insists that his liberty is invaded when the state subjects him to fine or imprisonment for neglecting or refusing to submit to vaccination; that a compulsory vaccination law is unreasonable, arbitrary, and oppressive, and, therefore, hostile to the inherent right of every freeman to care for his own body and health in such way as to him seems best; and that the execution of such a law against one who objects to vaccination, no matter for what reason, is nothing short of an assault upon his person. But the liberty secured by the Constitution of the United States to every person within its jurisdiction does not import an absolute right in each person to be, at all times and in all circumstances, wholly freed from restraint. There are manifold restraints to which every person is necessarily subject for the common good. On any other basis organized society could not exist with safety to its members. Society based on the rule that each one is a law unto himself would soon be confronted with disorder and anarchy. Real liberty for all could not exist under the operation of a principle which recognizes the right of each individual person to use his own, whether in respect of his person or his property, regardless of the injury that may be done to others. This court has more than once recognized it as a fundamental principle that ‘persons and property are subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the state; of the perfect right of the legislature to do which no question ever was, or upon acknowledged general principles ever can be, made, so far as natural persons are concerned.’ In Crowley v Christensen, 137 US 86, 89; 34 L Ed 620, 621; 11 S Ct 13 (we said: ‘The possession and enjoyment of all rights are subject to such reasonable conditions as may be deemed by the governing authority of the country essential to the safety, health, peace, good order, and morals of the community. Even liberty itself, the greatest of all rights, is not unrestricted license to act according to one’s own will. It is only freedom from restraint under conditions essential to the equal enjoyment of the same right by others. It is, then, liberty regulated by law.’ [Jacobson, 197 US at 26; citations omitted in part; emphasis supplied.]
The role courts play under Jacobson and Lansing Bd of Ed is not to “second-guess the state’s
policy choices in crafting emergency public health measures,” In re Abbott, 954 F3d at 784, but is
instead to determine whether the state regulation has a “real or substantial relation to the public
health crisis and are not ‘beyond all question, a plain, palpable invasion of rights secured by the
fundamental law.’ ” Id., quoting in part Jacobson, 197 US at 31. Part of this review includes
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looking to whether any exceptions apply for emergent situations, the duration of any rule, and whether the measures are pretextual. Id. at 785.13
Turning to plaintiffs’ specific challenges, the stay-at-home provision, the most restrictive portion of the executive order, was first implemented by the Governor on March 23, 2020, thirteen days after the first case of COVID-19 was diagnosed in the state. Though there were at that point approximately 1,328 cases in the state and 15 reported deaths, Governor Witmer was not acting on a blank slate. Instead, it was common knowledge that the virus had already rapidly spread throughout the state of Washington, was prevalent in several other states, and was devastating parts of Italy, China, and other countries. Indeed, the speed at which the virus spread was well known at the time the stay-at-home provision was implemented. It is true that this measure is a severe one, and greatly restricts each of our liberties to move about as we see fit, as we do in normal times. But the governor determined that severe measures were necessary, and had to be quickly implemented to prevent the uncontrolled spreading of the virus. As noted, Michigan was not alone in this regard:
To be sure, [the order] is a drastic measure, but that aligns it with the numerous drastic measures Petitioners and other states have been forced to take in response to the coronavirus pandemic. Faced with exponential growth of COVID-19 cases, states have closed schools, sealed off nursing homes, banned social gatherings, quarantined travelers, prohibited churches from holding public worship services, and locked down entire cities. These measures would be constitutionally intolerable in ordinary times, but are recognized as appropriate and even necessary responses to the present crisis. [In re Abbott, 954 F3d at 787.]
13 Plaintiffs’ correctly note that Jacobson did not involve a state-wide requirement to stay at home, and instead addressed an involuntary vaccination program. But most cases have different facts, and it is the legal principle set forth in the decision that guides future courts. Thus, despite some factual differences, the Court relies (as did the In re Abbott court) upon Jacobson as it is the most relevant decision on this issue from the Supreme Court.
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Plaintiffs suggest that the better—and more constitutionally sound decision—would have been to quarantine only those who have the virus. It may have been a better option to some, as doing so may have had a less severe impact on the movement of the Michigan population, and may have reduced unemployment. Or, as plaintiffs argue, a more narrowly tailored order by region may have been more reasonable for the entire state. But some of that is simply hindsight, and to accept it would be to impermissibly delve too deep into the choices made. Additionally, the Governor’s concerns were not limited to what was most convenient or palatable at the time, as she also had to protect, to the extent possible, the health and safety of all Michigan residents and to not overburden the health care system. The introduction to EO 2020-59 outlines some of the other serious considerations that went into issuing the stringent order:
To suppress the spread of COVID-19, to prevent the state’s health care system from being overwhelmed, to allow time for the production of critical test kits, ventilators, and personal protective equipment, to establish the public health infrastructure necessary to contain the spread of infection, and to avoid needless deaths, it is reasonable and necessary to direct residents to remain at home or in their place of residence to the maximum extent feasible. And, contrary to plaintiffs’ arguments, the Supreme Court has upheld, against a constitutional challenge, a state’s quarantine of individuals even when they are not infected with the disease being controlled. See Compagnie Francaise de Navigation a Vapeur v Louisiana, 186 US 380, 393; 22 S Ct 811; 46 L Ed 1209 (1902).
As noted, the Court’s role is not to pick which alternative may be more reasonable, more preferential, or more narrowly tailored, as the latter is in deciding some constitutional cases. Monday morning quarterbacking is the role of sports fans, not courts reviewing the factual basis supporting executive action to protect the public health. Instead, it is the role of the executive and legislative branches to determine what steps are necessary when faced with a public health crisis.
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In re Abbott, 954 F3d at 792 (“Such authority [to determine what measures are best to take] properly belongs to the legislative and executive branches of the governing authority”); Rock, 216 Mich at 296; Lansing Bd of Ed, 224 Mich at 397.14 Under federalism principles, it is the States that retained the police power, and that power—though not unlimited—is quite broad. See Nat’l Federation of Independent Business v Sebelius, 567 US 519, 536; 132 S Ct 2566; 183 L Ed 2d 450 (2012) (“The States thus can and do perform many of the vital functions of modern government— punishing street crime, running public schools, and zoning property for development, to name but a few—even though the Constitution’s text does not authorize any government to do so. Our cases refer to this general power of governing, possessed by the States but not by the Federal Government, as the “police power”) and Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich v Governor, 422 Mich 1, 73; 367 NW2d 1 (1985) (discussing the scope of the police power and how that power extends to enacting regulations to promote public health, safety, and welfare, and providing that regulations “passed pursuant to the police power carry with them a strong presumption of constitutionality.”).
What the Court must do—and can only do—is determine whether the Governor’s orders are consistent with the law. Rock, 216 Mich at 283. Under the applicable standards, they are. The undisputed facts known at the time the first stay-at-home order was made, and the undisputed facts known today, compel the conclusion that the order had a real and substantial relation to the public health crisis. The challenged measures relate to limiting human interaction which helps control the spread of a virus considered to be extremely communicable. To make it voluntary, or more limited in scope, were perhaps other avenues to pursue, but even accepting that proposition does
14 As will be discussed shortly, the Legislature has also spoken on the issue of how to address emergent situations. MCL 10.21; MCL 30.401 et seq. Additionally, the Court takes notice that the Legislature recently established an oversight committee to review the measures implemented through the Governor’s various executive orders.
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not make what the Governor reasonably chose to do invalid. Instead, the Governor’s determination as to the speed and ease with which the virus spreads, and the potential impact that spread would have on the health care system, and the threat it had to the lives of thousands of Michigan residents in a short period of time, allows for the conclusion that the two challenged provisions had a real and substantial relation to the public health crisis. Jacobson, 197 US at 31. There is nothing presented to the Court to draw any other legal conclusion.15
Nor is there any evidence (or even a suggestion) that the stay-at-home provision was a pretext to accomplish some other objective. Additionally, the record is clear that these measures are temporary, and limited in time to address the speed at which the virus spreads, the status of the available health care system, and the need to get Michigan residents back to enjoying their liberties. Indeed, since this lawsuit was filed last week, the Governor issued EO 2020-59, easing some of the very restrictions challenged by plaintiffs, and has indicated more lifting of restrictions are imminent. Plaintiffs have not shown a substantial likelihood of success on the merits in their challenge to the executive order restrictions.
C. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE EMA16 Turning again to In re Forfeiture of 2000 GMC Denali and Contents, the Court set forth the rather difficult standards governing a challenge to the constitutionality of a state statute:
A party challenging the constitutionality of a statute has the burden of proving the law's invalidity. Gillette Commercial Operations North America & Subsidiaries v
15 Plaintiffs submitted documentary evidence which, if believed, could allow a governor to issue a more narrowly tailored order. But because this Governor made a different conclusion that was likewise based on other supporting evidence related to the virus, her decision had a real and substantial relation to the public health crisis. 16 Plaintiffs do not challenge the Governor’s exercise of authority under either statute, nor whether she needs legislative approval to continue her emergency declaration.
-15-

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 41-3 filed 06/17/20 PageID.965 Page 60 of 62
Dep’t of Treasury, 312 Mich App 394, 414-415; 878 NW2d 891 (2015). The challenging party must overcome a heavy burden because “[s]tatutes are presumed to be constitutional, and we have a duty to construe a statute as constitutional unless its unconstitutionality is clearly apparent.” Mayor of Cadillac v Blackburn, 306 Mich App 512, 516; 857 NW2d 529 (2014). When interpreting a statute, our primary goal is to “give effect to the intent of the Legislature.” Superior Hotels, LLC v Mackinaw Twp, 282 Mich App 621, 628; 765 NW2d 31 (2009). To do so, we examine the plain language of the statute itself, and “[i]f the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the statute must be enforced as written and no further judicial construction is permitted.” Whitman v City of Burton, 493 Mich 303, 311; 831 NW2d 223 (2013). [In re Forfeiture of 2000 GMC Denali and Contents, 316 Mich App at 569.]
As far as the Court can discern, plaintiffs’ challenge to the EMA is an as-applied one:
A constitutional challenge to the validity of a statute can be brought in one of two ways: by either a facial challenge or an as-applied challenge. This is an as-applied challenge, meaning that claimant has alleged “ ‘a present infringement or denial of a specific right or of a particular injury in process of actual execution’ of government action.” Bonner v City of Brighton, 495 Mich 209, 223 n 27; 848 NW2d 380 (2014), quoting Village of Euclid v Ambler Realty Co, 272 US 365, 395; 47 S Ct 114; 71 L Ed 303 (1926). “The practical effect of holding a statute unconstitutional ‘as applied’ is to prevent its future application in a similar context, but not to render it utterly inoperative.” Ada v Guam Society of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 506 US 1011, 1012; 113 S Ct 633; 121 L Ed 2d 564 (1992) (SCALIA, J., dissenting). See also United States v Frost, 125 F3d 346, 370 (CA 6, 1997). [In re Forfeiture of 2000 GMC Denali and Contents, 316 Mich App at 569-570.]
Plaintiffs’ challenge to the delegation of power from the Legislature to the executive will
likely not succeed. It is certainly true that the Legislature cannot grant some vague, unfettered
discretion to the executive to carry out what is a legislative function. But if the challenged
legislation contains sufficient guidance to the executive on how to execute the law to further the
Legislature’s policy, it does not violate the non-delegation doctrine. City of Ann Arbor v Nat’l Ctr
for Mfg Sciences, Inc, 204 Mich App 303, 308; 514 NW2d 224 (1994) (“[T]he standards must be
sufficiently broad to permit efficient administration so that the policy of the Legislature may be
complied with, but not so broad as to give uncontrolled and arbitrary power to the
administrators.”).
-16-

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 41-3 filed 06/17/20 PageID.966 Page 61 of 62
As defendants point out, plaintiffs allege in their complaint that the powers granted to the Governor are “limited,” and none of the provisions in the act are such that the executive would have “uncontrolled, arbitrary power.” Dep’t of Natural Resources v Seaman, 396 Mich 299, 308; 240 NW2d 206 (1976). The provisions of the EMA are not vague, and contain specific procedures and criteria for the Governor to declare a state of disaster or emergency, and what conditions qualify as a disaster or emergency. See MCL 30.402(e) and (h); MCL 30.403(3) and (4). The EMA also grants the Governor additional, specific duties and powers when addressing any declared disaster or emergency, MCL 30.405, and sets for a comprehensive state and local jurisdictional system to address declared state-wide disasters or emergencies. MCL 30.407-MCL 30.411. As a result, plaintiffs are unable to establish a likelihood of success on the merits on this claim.
D. HARM TO THE PUBLIC INTEREST Finally, and for many of the same reasons, the Court concludes that entry of a preliminary injunction would be more detrimental to the public than it would to plaintiffs. Although the Court is painfully aware of the difficulties of living under the restrictions of these executive orders, those difficulties are temporary, while to those who contract the virus and cannot recover (and to their family members and friends), it is all too permanent. That is not to say that every new virus will require the action taken here, but given the authority of the Governor to do so in the face of these circumstances, the Court must conclude issuing injunctive relief would not serve the public interest, despite the temporary harm to plaintiffs’ constitutional rights.
-17-

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 41-3 filed 06/17/20 PageID.967 Page 62 of 62 VI. CONCLUSION
For these reasons, plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction is DENIED.

Date: April 29, 2020

__________________________________ Christopher M. Murray Judge, Court of Claims

-18-

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 41-4 filed 06/17/20 PageID.968 Page 1 of 8

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

LEAGUE OF INDEPENDENT FITNESS FACILITIES AND TRAINERS, INC., BASELINE FITNESS LLC, BUILDING YOUR TEMPLE LLC, BYT FITNESS 247 LLC, CLAWSON FITNESS, LLC, CLINTON FITNESS, INC., D-LUX KARATE UNIVERSITY, LLC, FENTON ATHLETIC CLUB, INC., FENTON KARATE, LLC, FUSION FITNESS 24/7 LLC, H3 FITNESS LLC, I FITNESS PERSONAL TRAINING, INC., JKP FITNESS, LLC, JPF ENTERPRISES, LLC, M FITNESS CLUB, LLC, MH & AB LLC, MOTOR CITY CF – ST. CLAIR SHORES, LLC, NASCOT ENTERPRISES, LLC, PRISON CITY PHYSIQUE, LLC, FMP FITNESS INC., STRENGTH BEYOND LLC, 24/7 BOOTCAMP AND BOXING, INC., and 4 SEASONS GYM, LLC,

No. 20-cv-00458 HON. PAUL L. MALONEY

Plaintiffs,

v

GRETCHEN E. WHITMER and ROBERT E. GORDON,

Defendants.

Scott M. Erskine (P54734) Carly Van Thomme (P59706) Erskine Law, P.C. Attorneys for Plaintiffs 612 W. University Rochester, MI 48307

John G. Fedynsky (P65232) Andrew J. Jurgensen (P81123) Joseph T. Froehlich (P71887) Joshua O. Booth (P53847) Christopher M. Allen (P75329) Assistant Attorneys General

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 41-4 filed 06/17/20 PageID.969 Page 2 of 8

(248) 601-4499 serskine@erskinelaw.com cvanthomme@erskinelaw.com

Attorneys for Defendants Michigan Dep’t of Attorney General State Operations Division P.O. Box 30754 Lansing, MI 48909 (517) 335-7573 fedynskyj@michigan.gov jurgensena2@michigan.gov froehlichj1@michigan.gov boothj2@michigan.gov allenc28@michigan.gov

EXHIBIT B

2

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 41-4 filed 06/17/20 PageID.970 Page 3 of 8

Cite as: 590 U. S. (2020)

1

ROBERTS, C. J., concurring
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 19A1044
SOUTH BAY UNITED PENTECOSTAL CHURCH, ET AL. v. GAVIN NEWSOM, GOVERNOR OF CALIFORNIA, ET AL.
ON APPLICATION FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
[May 29, 2020]
The application for injunctive relief presented to JUSTICE KAGAN and by her referred to the Court is denied.
JUSTICE THOMAS, JUSTICE ALITO, JUSTICE GORSUCH, and JUSTICE KAVANAUGH would grant the application.
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS, concurring in denial of application for injunctive relief.
The Governor of California’s Executive Order aims to limit the spread of COVID–19, a novel severe acute respiratory illness that has killed thousands of people in California and more than 100,000 nationwide. At this time, there is no known cure, no effective treatment, and no vaccine. Because people may be infected but asymptomatic, they may unwittingly infect others. The Order places temporary numerical restrictions on public gatherings to address this extraordinary health emergency. State guidelines currently limit attendance at places of worship to 25% of building capacity or a maximum of 100 attendees.
Applicants seek to enjoin enforcement of the Order. “Such a request demands a significantly higher justification than a request for a stay because, unlike a stay, an injunction does not simply suspend judicial alteration of the status quo but grants judicial intervention that has been withheld by lower courts.” Respect Maine PAC v. McKee, 562 U. S. 996 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). This

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 41-4 filed 06/17/20 PageID.971 Page 4 of 8
2 SOUTH BAY UNITED PENTECOSTAL CHURCH v. NEWSOM
ROBERTS, C. J., concurring
power is used where “the legal rights at issue are indisputably clear” and, even then, “sparingly and only in the most critical and exigent circumstances.” S. Shapiro, K. Geller, T. Bishop, E. Hartnett & D. Himmelfarb, Supreme Court Practice §17.4, p. 17-9 (11th ed. 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted) (collecting cases).
Although California’s guidelines place restrictions on places of worship, those restrictions appear consistent with the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. Similar or more severe restrictions apply to comparable secular gatherings, including lectures, concerts, movie showings, spectator sports, and theatrical performances, where large groups of people gather in close proximity for extended periods of time. And the Order exempts or treats more leniently only dissimilar activities, such as operating grocery stores, banks, and laundromats, in which people neither congregate in large groups nor remain in close proximity for extended periods.
The precise question of when restrictions on particular social activities should be lifted during the pandemic is a dynamic and fact-intensive matter subject to reasonable disagreement. Our Constitution principally entrusts “[t]he safety and the health of the people” to the politically accountable officials of the States “to guard and protect.” Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U. S. 11, 38 (1905). When those officials “undertake[ ] to act in areas fraught with medical and scientific uncertainties,” their latitude “must be especially broad.” Marshall v. United States, 414 U. S. 417, 427 (1974). Where those broad limits are not exceeded, they should not be subject to second-guessing by an “unelected federal judiciary,” which lacks the background, competence, and expertise to assess public health and is not accountable to the people. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U. S. 528, 545 (1985).
That is especially true where, as here, a party seeks

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 41-4 filed 06/17/20 PageID.972 Page 5 of 8

Cite as: 590 U. S. (2020)

3

ROBERTS, C. J., concurring
emergency relief in an interlocutory posture, while local officials are actively shaping their response to changing facts on the ground. The notion that it is “indisputably clear” that the Government’s limitations are unconstitutional seems quite improbable.

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 41-4 filed 06/17/20 PageID.973 Page 6 of 8

Cite as: 590 U. S. (2020)

1

KAVANAUGH, J., dissenting
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 19A1044
SOUTH BAY UNITED PENTECOSTAL CHURCH, ET AL. v. GAVIN NEWSOM, GOVERNOR OF CALIFORNIA, ET AL.
ON APPLICATION FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
[May 29, 2020]
JUSTICE KAVANAUGH, with whom JUSTICE THOMAS and JUSTICE GORSUCH join, dissenting from denial of application for injunctive relief.
I would grant the Church’s requested temporary injunction because California’s latest safety guidelines discriminate against places of worship and in favor of comparable secular businesses. Such discrimination violates the First Amendment.
In response to the COVID–19 health crisis, California has now limited attendance at religious worship services to 25% of building capacity or 100 attendees, whichever is lower. The basic constitutional problem is that comparable secular businesses are not subject to a 25% occupancy cap, includ-
ing factories, offices, supermarkets, restaurants, retail stores, pharmacies, shopping malls, pet grooming shops, bookstores, florists, hair salons, and cannabis dispensaries.
South Bay United Pentecostal Church has applied for temporary injunctive relief from California’s 25% occupancy cap on religious worship services. Importantly, the Church is willing to abide by the State’s rules that apply to comparable secular businesses, including the rules regarding social distancing and hygiene. But the Church objects to a 25% occupancy cap that is imposed on religious worship services but not imposed on those comparable secular businesses.

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 41-4 filed 06/17/20 PageID.974 Page 7 of 8
2 SOUTH BAY UNITED PENTECOSTAL CHURCH v. NEWSOM
KAVANAUGH, J., dissenting
In my view, California’s discrimination against religious worship services contravenes the Constitution. As a general matter, the “government may not use religion as a basis of classification for the imposition of duties, penalties, privileges or benefits.” McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U. S. 618, 639 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment). This Court has stated that discrimination against religion is “odious to our Constitution.” Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 582 U. S. , (2017) (slip op., at 15); see also, e.g., Good News Club v. Milford Central School, 533 U. S. 98 (2001); Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U. S. 819 (1995); Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U. S. 520 (1993); Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School Dist., 508 U. S. 384 (1993); McDaniel, 435 U. S. 618.
To justify its discriminatory treatment of religious worship services, California must show that its rules are “justified by a compelling governmental interest” and “narrowly tailored to advance that interest.” Lukumi, 508 U. S., at 531–532. California undoubtedly has a compelling interest in combating the spread of COVID–19 and protecting the health of its citizens. But “restrictions inexplicably applied to one group and exempted from another do little to further these goals and do much to burden religious freedom.” Roberts v. Neace, 958 F. 3d 409, 414 (CA6 2020) (per curiam). What California needs is a compelling justification for distinguishing between (i) religious worship services and (ii) the litany of other secular businesses that are not subject to an occupancy cap.
California has not shown such a justification. The Church has agreed to abide by the State’s rules that apply to comparable secular businesses. That raises important questions: “Assuming all of the same precautions are taken, why can someone safely walk down a grocery store aisle but not a pew? And why can someone safely interact with a brave deliverywoman but not with a stoic minister?” Ibid.

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 41-4 filed 06/17/20 PageID.975 Page 8 of 8

Cite as: 590 U. S. (2020)

3

KAVANAUGH, J., dissenting
The Church and its congregants simply want to be treated equally to comparable secular businesses. California already trusts its residents and any number of businesses to adhere to proper social distancing and hygiene practices. The State cannot “assume the worst when people go to worship but assume the best when people go to work or go about the rest of their daily lives in permitted social settings.” Ibid.
California has ample options that would allow it to combat the spread of COVID–19 without discriminating against religion. The State could “insist that the congregants adhere to social-distancing and other health requirements and leave it at that—just as the Governor has done for comparable secular activities.” Id., at 415. Or alternatively, the State could impose reasonable occupancy caps across the board. But absent a compelling justification (which the State has not offered), the State may not take a looser approach with, say, supermarkets, restaurants, factories, and offices while imposing stricter requirements on places of worship.
The State also has substantial room to draw lines, especially in an emergency. But as relevant here, the Constitution imposes one key restriction on that line-drawing: The State may not discriminate against religion.
In sum, California’s 25% occupancy cap on religious worship services indisputably discriminates against religion, and such discrimination violates the First Amendment. See Ohio Citizens for Responsible Energy, Inc. v. NRC, 479 U. S. 1312 (1986) (Scalia, J., in chambers). The Church would suffer irreparable harm from not being able to hold services on Pentecost Sunday in a way that comparable secular businesses and persons can conduct their activities. I would therefore grant the Church’s request for a temporary injunction. I respectfully dissent.

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 41-5 filed 06/17/20 PageID.976 Page 1 of 6

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

LEAGUE OF INDEPENDENT FITNESS FACILITIES AND TRAINERS, INC., BASELINE FITNESS LLC, BUILDING YOUR TEMPLE LLC, BYT FITNESS 247 LLC, CLAWSON FITNESS, LLC, CLINTON FITNESS, INC., D-LUX KARATE UNIVERSITY, LLC, FENTON ATHLETIC CLUB, INC., FENTON KARATE, LLC, FUSION FITNESS 24/7 LLC, H3 FITNESS LLC, I FITNESS PERSONAL TRAINING, INC., JKP FITNESS, LLC, JPF ENTERPRISES, LLC, M FITNESS CLUB, LLC, MH & AB LLC, MOTOR CITY CF – ST. CLAIR SHORES, LLC, NASCOT ENTERPRISES, LLC, PRISON CITY PHYSIQUE, LLC, FMP FITNESS INC., STRENGTH BEYOND LLC, 24/7 BOOTCAMP AND BOXING, INC., and 4 SEASONS GYM, LLC,

No. 20-cv-00458 HON. PAUL L. MALONEY

Plaintiffs,

v

GRETCHEN E. WHITMER and ROBERT E. GORDON,

Defendants.

Scott M. Erskine (P54734) Carly Van Thomme (P59706) Erskine Law, P.C. Attorneys for Plaintiffs 612 W. University Rochester, MI 48307

John G. Fedynsky (P65232) Andrew J. Jurgensen (P81123) Joseph T. Froehlich (P71887) Joshua O. Booth (P53847) Christopher M. Allen (P75329) Assistant Attorneys General

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 41-5 filed 06/17/20 PageID.977 Page 2 of 6

(248) 601-4499 serskine@erskinelaw.com cvanthomme@erskinelaw.com

Attorneys for Defendants Michigan Dep’t of Attorney General State Operations Division P.O. Box 30754 Lansing, MI 48909 (517) 335-7573 fedynskyj@michigan.gov jurgensena2@michigan.gov froehlichj1@michigan.gov boothj2@michigan.gov allenc28@michigan.gov

EXHIBIT C

2

Social Distancing, Quarantine, and Isolation
Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 41-5 filed 06/17/20 PageID.978 Page 3 of 6
Search


Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19)
Social Distancing

Keep Your Distance to Slow the Spread
OOtthherr LLaanngguaugaegses PPrriinnt PPaaggee
Limiting face-to-face contact with others is the best way to reduce the spread of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19).
What is social distancing?
Social distancing, also called “physical distancing,” means keeping space between yourself and other people outside of your home. To practice social or physical distancing:
Stay at least 6 feet (2 meters) from other people Do not gather in groups Stay out of crowded places and avoid mass gatherings
In addition to everyday steps to prevent COVID-19, keeping space between you and others is one of the best tools we have to avoid being exposed to this virus and slowing its spread locally and across the country and world.
When COVID-19 is spreading in your area, everyone should limit close contact with individuals outside your household in indoor and outdoor spaces. Since people can spread the virus before they know they are sick, it is important to stay away from others when possible, even if you have no symptoms. Social distancing is especially important for people who are at higher risk of getting very sick.

Why practice social distancing?
COVID-19 spreads mainly among people who are in close contact (within about 6 feet) for a
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/prevent-getting-sick/social-distancing.html[4/21/2020 1:36:26 PM]

Social Distancing, Quarantine, and Isolation
Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 41-5 filed 06/17/20 PageID.979 Page 4 of 6 prolonged period. Spread happens when an infected person coughs, sneezes, or talks, and droplets from their mouth or nose are launched into the air and land in the mouths or noses of people nearby. The droplets can also be inhaled into the lungs. Recent studies indicate that people who are infected but do not have symptoms likely also play a role in the spread of COVID-19.
It may be possible that a person can get COVID-19 by touching a surface or object that has the virus on it and then touching their own mouth, nose, or eyes. However, this is not thought to be the main way the virus spreads. COVID-19 can live for hours or days on a surface, depending on factors such as sun light and humidity. Social distancing helps limit contact with infected people and contaminated surfaces.
Although the risk of severe illness may be different for everyone, anyone can get and spread COVID-19. Everyone has a role to play in slowing the spread and protecting themselves, their family, and their community.
Tips for social distancing
Follow guidance from authorities where you live. If you need to shop for food or medicine at the grocery store or pharmacy, stay at least 6 feet away from others.
Use mail-order for medications, if possible. Consider a grocery delivery service. Cover your mouth and nose with a cloth face cover when around others, including when you have to go out in public, for example to the grocery store.
Stay at least 6 feet between yourself and others, even when you wear a face covering.
Avoid large and small gatherings in private places and public spaces, such a friend’s house, parks, restaurants, shops, or any other place. This advice applies to people of any age, including teens and younger adults. Children should not have in-person playdates while school is out. To help maintain social connections while social distancing, learn tips to keep children healthy while school’s out. Work from home when possible. If possible, avoid using any kind of public transportation, ridesharing, or taxis. If you are a student or parent, talk to your school about options for digital/distance learning.
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/prevent-getting-sick/social-distancing.html[4/21/2020 1:36:26 PM]

Social Distancing, Quarantine, and Isolation
Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 41-5 filed 06/17/20 PageID.980 Page 5 of 6 Stay connected while staying away. It is very important to stay in touch with friends and family that don’t live in your home. Call, video chat, or stay connected using social media. Everyone reacts differently to stressful situations and having to socially distance yourself from someone you love can be difficult. Read tips for stress and coping.
What is the difference between quarantine and isolation?
Quarantine
Quarantine is used to keep someone who might have been exposed to COVID-19 away from others. Someone in self-quarantine stays separated from others, and they limit movement outside of their home or current place. A person may have been exposed to the virus without knowing it (for example, when traveling or out in the community), or they could have the virus without feeling symptoms. Quarantine helps limit further spread of COVID-19.
Isolation
Isolation is used to separate sick people from healthy people. People who are in isolation should stay home. In the home, anyone sick should separate themselves from others by staying in a specific “sick” bedroom or space and using a different bathroom (if possible).
What should I do if I might have been exposed? If I feel sick? Or have confirmed COVID-19?
If you think you have been exposed to COVID-19, read about symptoms.
If you or someone in your home might have been exposed
Self-Monitor
Be alert for symptoms. Watch for fever,* cough, or shortness of breath.
Take your temperature if symptoms develop.
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/prevent-getting-sick/social-distancing.html[4/21/2020 1:36:26 PM]

Social Distancing, Quarantine, and Isolation
Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 41-5 filed 06/17/20 PageID.981 Page 6 of 6 Practice social distancing. Maintain 6 feet of distance from others, and stay out of crowded places. Follow CDC guidance if symptoms develop.
If you feel healthy but: Recently had close contact with a person with COVID-19, or Recently traveled from somewhere outside the U.S. or on a cruise ship or river boat
Self-Quarantine Check your temperature twice a day and watch for symptoms. Stay home for 14 days and selfmonitor. If possible, stay away from people who are high-risk for getting very sick from COVID-19.
If you: Have been diagnosed with COVID-19, or Are waiting for test results, or Have symptoms such as cough, fever, or shortness of breath
Self-Isolate
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/prevent-getting-sick/social-distancing.html[4/21/2020 1:36:26 PM]

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 41-6 filed 06/17/20 PageID.982 Page 1 of 8

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

LEAGUE OF INDEPENDENT FITNESS FACILITIES AND TRAINERS, INC., BASELINE FITNESS LLC, BUILDING YOUR TEMPLE LLC, BYT FITNESS 247 LLC, CLAWSON FITNESS, LLC, CLINTON FITNESS, INC., D-LUX KARATE UNIVERSITY, LLC, FENTON ATHLETIC CLUB, INC., FENTON KARATE, LLC, FUSION FITNESS 24/7 LLC, H3 FITNESS LLC, I FITNESS PERSONAL TRAINING, INC., JKP FITNESS, LLC, JPF ENTERPRISES, LLC, M FITNESS CLUB, LLC, MH & AB LLC, MOTOR CITY CF – ST. CLAIR SHORES, LLC, NASCOT ENTERPRISES, LLC, PRISON CITY PHYSIQUE, LLC, FMP FITNESS INC., STRENGTH BEYOND LLC, 24/7 BOOTCAMP AND BOXING, INC., and 4 SEASONS GYM, LLC,

No. 20-cv-00458 HON. PAUL L. MALONEY

Plaintiffs,

v

GRETCHEN E. WHITMER and ROBERT E. GORDON,

Defendants.

Scott M. Erskine (P54734) Carly Van Thomme (P59706) Erskine Law, P.C. Attorneys for Plaintiffs 612 W. University Rochester, MI 48307

John G. Fedynsky (P65232) Andrew J. Jurgensen (P81123) Joseph T. Froehlich (P71887) Joshua O. Booth (P53847) Christopher M. Allen (P75329) Assistant Attorneys General

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 41-6 filed 06/17/20 PageID.983 Page 2 of 8

(248) 601-4499 serskine@erskinelaw.com cvanthomme@erskinelaw.com

Attorneys for Defendants Michigan Dep’t of Attorney General State Operations Division P.O. Box 30754 Lansing, MI 48909 (517) 335-7573 fedynskyj@michigan.gov jurgensena2@michigan.gov froehlichj1@michigan.gov boothj2@michigan.gov allenc28@michigan.gov

EXHIBIT D

2

How to Flatten the Curve on Coronavirus - The New York Times
Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 41-6 filed 06/17/20 PageID.984 Page 3 of 8
SCIENCE |
SUBSSCUBSRCRIIBBE NEOWNOWAccount
› The Coronavirus Outbreak

LIVE 
Latest Updates Maps and Tracker Markets Stimulus Checks What You Can Do Newsletter
ADVERTISEMENT
Flattening the Coronavirus Curve
One chart explains why slowing the spread of the infection is nearly as important as stopping it.
https://www.nytimes.com/article/flatten-curve-coronavirus.html[4/21/2020 1:37:03 PM]

How to Flatten the Curve on Coronavirus - The New York Times
Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 41-6 filed 06/17/20 PageID.985 Page 4 of 8
The longer it takes for coronavirus to spread the population, the more time hospitals have to prepare. Drew Harris
By Siobhan Roberts March 27, 2020
At the end of February, Drew Harris, a population health analyst at Thomas Jefferson University in Philadelphia, had just flown across the country to visit his daughter in Eugene, Ore., when he saw an article on his Google news feed. It was from The Economist, and was about limiting the damage of the coronavirus. The accompanying art, by the visual-data journalist Rosamund Pearce, based on a graphic that had appeared in a C.D.C. paper titled “Community Mitigation Guidelines to Prevent Pandemic Influenza,” showed what Dr. Harris called two epi curves. One had a steep peak indicating a surge of coronavirus outbreak in the near term; the other had a flatter slope, indicating a more gradual rate of infection over a longer period of time. The gentler curve results in fewer people infected at this critical moment in time — preventing a surge that would inundate the healthcare system and ultimately, one hopes, resulting in fewer deaths. “What we need to do is flatten that down,” said Dr. Anthony Fauci, director of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, during the coronavirus task force briefing at the White House on a Tuesday evening in early March. “You do that with trying to interfere with the natural flow of the outbreak.” The infographic reminded Dr. Harris of something similar that he had designed years earlier for a pandemic preparedness training program. “Folks in the preparedness and public health community have been
https://www.nytimes.com/article/flatten-curve-coronavirus.html[4/21/2020 1:37:03 PM]

How to Flatten the Curve on Coronavirus - The New York Times
Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 41-6 filed 06/17/20 PageID.986 Page 5 of 8
thinking about all of these issues for many years,” Dr. Harris said in an email. “Understanding and managing surge is an important part of preparedness.” But during the training course, Dr. Harris’s students had struggled with the concept of reducing the epidemic curve, so he added a dotted line indicating hospital capacity — “to make clear what was at stake,” he said.
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After his visit with his daughter, Dr. Harris was waiting for his return flight in Portland when the first Oregon coronavirus case was announced; he had dinner at a busy airport bar and thought about how quiet the place would be in a week or two when the reality of the outbreak set in. Once home, he recreated his graphic and posted it on Twitter and LinkedIn, and was pleased to see the enthusiastic interest in flattening the curve.
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“Now I know what going viral means,” Dr. Harris said. (For a more detailed analysis, see a recent paper in The Lancet, “How will country-based mitigation measures influence the course of the COVID-19 epidemic?”)
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The following is an edited version of our email conversation.
https://www.nytimes.com/article/flatten-curve-coronavirus.html[4/21/2020 1:37:03 PM]

How to Flatten the Curve on Coronavirus - The New York Times
Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 41-6 filed 06/17/20 PageID.987 Page 6 of 8
What does it mean to “flatten the curve”?
The ideal goal in fighting an epidemic or pandemic is to completely halt the spread. But merely slowing it — mitigation — is critical. This reduces the number of cases that are active at any given time, which in turn gives doctors, hospitals, police, schools and vaccine-manufacturers time to prepare and respond, without becoming overwhelmed. Most hospitals can function with 10 percent reduction in staff, but not with half their people out at once. Some commentators have argued for getting the outbreak over with quickly. That is a recipe for panic, unnecessary suffering and death. Slowing and spreading out the tidal wave of cases will save lives. Flattening the curve keeps society going.
What exactly do those two curves show?
Both curves add up the number of new cases over time. The more people reporting with the virus on a given day, the higher the curve; a high curve means the virus is spreading fast. A low curve shows that the virus is spreading slower — fewer people are diagnosed with the disease on any given day. Keeping the curve down — diminishing the rate at which new cases occur — prevents overtaxing the finite resources (represented by the dotted line) available to treat it.
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Think of the health care system capacity as a subway car that can only hold so many people at once. During rush hour, that capacity is not enough to handle the demand, so people must wait on the platform for their turn to ride. Staggering work hours diminishes the rush hour and increases the likelihood that you will get on the train and maybe even get a seat. Avoiding a surge of coronavirus cases can ensure that anyone who needs care will find it at the hospital.
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https://www.nytimes.com/article/flatten-curve-coronavirus.html[4/21/2020 1:37:03 PM]

How to Flatten the Curve on Coronavirus - The New York Times
Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 41-6 filed 06/17/20 PageID.988 Page 7 of 8
What sorts of mitigation measures help transform the red curve into the blue curve?
Diseases spread when one person gives it to one or more others, who go on to give it to more people, and so on. How fast this occurs depends on many factors, including how contagious the disease is, how many people are vulnerable and how quickly they get sick.
The difference between seasonal flu and coronavirus is that many people have full or partial immunity to the flu virus because they have had it before or were vaccinated against it. Far more people are vulnerable to coronavirus, so it has many more targets of opportunity to spread. Keeping people apart in time and space with social distancing measures, selfisolation and actual quarantine decreases opportunities for transmission.
To take the subway example again, a packed car — or a packed subway platform — is a great place to spread the virus. But reducing the number of people on the train or platform, by asking people to work from home or to stagger their working hours, enables individuals to stay farther apart, limiting the spread of the virus. That is social distancing in action.
Mitigation efforts keep people farther apart, making every transmission opportunity marginally less likely. This slows the spread. We should, and will, take the most vulnerable people out of the population altogether by keeping them totally separate. This is what Washington State is trying to do by limiting visitors to nursing homes. Think of this as a reverse quarantine.
What are you doing day-to-day in response to these unusual times?
Like most everyone else, I’m more aware of my surroundings and behaviors. I try to use a sleeve or elbow to open doors, and I wash my hands or use hand sanitizers after I touch a surface that might be contaminated. And I made sure to have a good supply of my prescription and nonprescription medications, just in case any shortages occur after the shutdown of Chinese pharmaceutical suppliers. I’m following the lead of my public health officials here in Philadelphia, where there is only one case as of Tuesday, and travel isn’t restricted. I’m avoiding crowds and sick people. I am going out, and will continue to do so unless a quarantine is ordered or public places are closed.
I know there is a good chance that I will catch the virus before a vaccine becomes available, but I also believe I’m very likely to do fine. I’m not in any high-risk group. But I worry about the more vulnerable folks and want
https://www.nytimes.com/article/flatten-curve-coronavirus.html[4/21/2020 1:37:03 PM]

How to Flatten the Curve on Coronavirus - The New York Times
Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 41-6 filed 06/17/20 PageID.989 Page 8 of 8
to do what I can to prevent the spread. I also worry about people who lack the resources I have. What happens to the self-employed, hourly workers and people in the gig economy when business stops? What about the homeless who depend upon charity and services for support? It’s these second-order effects that could be just as devastating if this epidemic really takes off.
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Coronavirus and statistics The Exponential Power of Now March 13, 2020
The Coronavirus, by the Numbers March 5, 2020
https://www.nytimes.com/article/flatten-curve-coronavirus.html[4/21/2020 1:37:03 PM]

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 41-7 filed 06/17/20 PageID.990 Page 1 of 4

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

LEAGUE OF INDEPENDENT FITNESS FACILITIES AND TRAINERS, INC., BASELINE FITNESS LLC, BUILDING YOUR TEMPLE LLC, BYT FITNESS 247 LLC, CLAWSON FITNESS, LLC, CLINTON FITNESS, INC., D-LUX KARATE UNIVERSITY, LLC, FENTON ATHLETIC CLUB, INC., FENTON KARATE, LLC, FUSION FITNESS 24/7 LLC, H3 FITNESS LLC, I FITNESS PERSONAL TRAINING, INC., JKP FITNESS, LLC, JPF ENTERPRISES, LLC, M FITNESS CLUB, LLC, MH & AB LLC, MOTOR CITY CF – ST. CLAIR SHORES, LLC, NASCOT ENTERPRISES, LLC, PRISON CITY PHYSIQUE, LLC, FMP FITNESS INC., STRENGTH BEYOND LLC, 24/7 BOOTCAMP AND BOXING, INC., and 4 SEASONS GYM, LLC,

No. 20-cv-00458 HON. PAUL L. MALONEY

Plaintiffs,

v

GRETCHEN E. WHITMER and ROBERT E. GORDON,

Defendants.

Scott M. Erskine (P54734) Carly Van Thomme (P59706) Erskine Law, P.C. Attorneys for Plaintiffs 612 W. University Rochester, MI 48307

John G. Fedynsky (P65232) Andrew J. Jurgensen (P81123) Joseph T. Froehlich (P71887) Joshua O. Booth (P53847) Christopher M. Allen (P75329) Assistant Attorneys General

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 41-7 filed 06/17/20 PageID.991 Page 2 of 4

(248) 601-4499 serskine@erskinelaw.com cvanthomme@erskinelaw.com

Attorneys for Defendants Michigan Dep’t of Attorney General State Operations Division P.O. Box 30754 Lansing, MI 48909 (517) 335-7573 fedynskyj@michigan.gov jurgensena2@michigan.gov froehlichj1@michigan.gov boothj2@michigan.gov allenc28@michigan.gov

EXHIBIT E

2

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 41-7 filed 06/17/20 PageID.992 Page 3 of 4

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 41-7 filed 06/17/20 PageID.993 Page 4 of 4

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 41-8 filed 06/17/20 PageID.994 Page 1 of 4

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

LEAGUE OF INDEPENDENT FITNESS FACILITIES AND TRAINERS, INC., BASELINE FITNESS LLC, BUILDING YOUR TEMPLE LLC, BYT FITNESS 247 LLC, CLAWSON FITNESS, LLC, CLINTON FITNESS, INC., D-LUX KARATE UNIVERSITY, LLC, FENTON ATHLETIC CLUB, INC., FENTON KARATE, LLC, FUSION FITNESS 24/7 LLC, H3 FITNESS LLC, I FITNESS PERSONAL TRAINING, INC., JKP FITNESS, LLC, JPF ENTERPRISES, LLC, M FITNESS CLUB, LLC, MH & AB LLC, MOTOR CITY CF – ST. CLAIR SHORES, LLC, NASCOT ENTERPRISES, LLC, PRISON CITY PHYSIQUE, LLC, FMP FITNESS INC., STRENGTH BEYOND LLC, 24/7 BOOTCAMP AND BOXING, INC., and 4 SEASONS GYM, LLC,

No. 20-cv-00458 HON. PAUL L. MALONEY

Plaintiffs,

v

GRETCHEN E. WHITMER and ROBERT E. GORDON,

Defendants.

Scott M. Erskine (P54734) Carly Van Thomme (P59706) Erskine Law, P.C. Attorneys for Plaintiffs 612 W. University Rochester, MI 48307

John G. Fedynsky (P65232) Andrew J. Jurgensen (P81123) Joseph T. Froehlich (P71887) Joshua O. Booth (P53847) Christopher M. Allen (P75329) Assistant Attorneys General

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 41-8 filed 06/17/20 PageID.995 Page 2 of 4

(248) 601-4499 serskine@erskinelaw.com cvanthomme@erskinelaw.com

Attorneys for Defendants Michigan Dep’t of Attorney General State Operations Division P.O. Box 30754 Lansing, MI 48909 (517) 335-7573 fedynskyj@michigan.gov jurgensena2@michigan.gov froehlichj1@michigan.gov boothj2@michigan.gov allenc28@michigan.gov

EXHIBIT F

2

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 41-8 filed 06/17/20 PageID.996 Page 3 of 4

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 41-8 filed 06/17/20 PageID.997 Page 4 of 4

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 41-9 filed 06/17/20 PageID.998 Page 1 of 5

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

LEAGUE OF INDEPENDENT FITNESS FACILITIES AND TRAINERS, INC., BASELINE FITNESS LLC, BUILDING YOUR TEMPLE LLC, BYT FITNESS 247 LLC, CLAWSON FITNESS, LLC, CLINTON FITNESS, INC., D-LUX KARATE UNIVERSITY, LLC, FENTON ATHLETIC CLUB, INC., FENTON KARATE, LLC, FUSION FITNESS 24/7 LLC, H3 FITNESS LLC, I FITNESS PERSONAL TRAINING, INC., JKP FITNESS, LLC, JPF ENTERPRISES, LLC, M FITNESS CLUB, LLC, MH & AB LLC, MOTOR CITY CF – ST. CLAIR SHORES, LLC, NASCOT ENTERPRISES, LLC, PRISON CITY PHYSIQUE, LLC, FMP FITNESS INC., STRENGTH BEYOND LLC, 24/7 BOOTCAMP AND BOXING, INC., and 4 SEASONS GYM, LLC,

No. 20-cv-00458 HON. PAUL L. MALONEY

Plaintiffs,

v

GRETCHEN E. WHITMER and ROBERT E. GORDON,

Defendants.

Scott M. Erskine (P54734) Carly Van Thomme (P59706) Erskine Law, P.C. Attorneys for Plaintiffs 612 W. University Rochester, MI 48307

John G. Fedynsky (P65232) Andrew J. Jurgensen (P81123) Joseph T. Froehlich (P71887) Joshua O. Booth (P53847) Christopher M. Allen (P75329) Assistant Attorneys General

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 41-9 filed 06/17/20 PageID.999 Page 2 of 5

(248) 601-4499 serskine@erskinelaw.com cvanthomme@erskinelaw.com

Attorneys for Defendants Michigan Dep’t of Attorney General State Operations Division P.O. Box 30754 Lansing, MI 48909 (517) 335-7573 fedynskyj@michigan.gov jurgensena2@michigan.gov froehlichj1@michigan.gov boothj2@michigan.gov allenc28@michigan.gov

EXHIBIT G

2

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 41-9 filed 06/17/20 PageID.1000 Page 3 of 5

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 41-9 filed 06/17/20 PageID.1001 Page 4 of 5

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 41-9 filed 06/17/20 PageID.1002 Page 5 of 5

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 41-10 filed 06/17/20 PageID.1003 Page 1 of 5

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

LEAGUE OF INDEPENDENT FITNESS FACILITIES AND TRAINERS, INC., BASELINE FITNESS LLC, BUILDING YOUR TEMPLE LLC, BYT FITNESS 247 LLC, CLAWSON FITNESS, LLC, CLINTON FITNESS, INC., D-LUX KARATE UNIVERSITY, LLC, FENTON ATHLETIC CLUB, INC., FENTON KARATE, LLC, FUSION FITNESS 24/7 LLC, H3 FITNESS LLC, I FITNESS PERSONAL TRAINING, INC., JKP FITNESS, LLC, JPF ENTERPRISES, LLC, M FITNESS CLUB, LLC, MH & AB LLC, MOTOR CITY CF – ST. CLAIR SHORES, LLC, NASCOT ENTERPRISES, LLC, PRISON CITY PHYSIQUE, LLC, FMP FITNESS INC., STRENGTH BEYOND LLC, 24/7 BOOTCAMP AND BOXING, INC., and 4 SEASONS GYM, LLC,

No. 20-cv-00458 HON. PAUL L. MALONEY

Plaintiffs,

v

GRETCHEN E. WHITMER and ROBERT E. GORDON,

Defendants.

Scott M. Erskine (P54734) Carly Van Thomme (P59706) Erskine Law, P.C. Attorneys for Plaintiffs 612 W. University Rochester, MI 48307

John G. Fedynsky (P65232) Andrew J. Jurgensen (P81123) Joseph T. Froehlich (P71887) Joshua O. Booth (P53847) Christopher M. Allen (P75329) Assistant Attorneys General

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 41-10 filed 06/17/20 PageID.1004 Page 2 of 5

(248) 601-4499 serskine@erskinelaw.com cvanthomme@erskinelaw.com

Attorneys for Defendants Michigan Dep’t of Attorney General State Operations Division P.O. Box 30754 Lansing, MI 48909 (517) 335-7573 fedynskyj@michigan.gov jurgensena2@michigan.gov froehlichj1@michigan.gov boothj2@michigan.gov allenc28@michigan.gov

EXHIBIT H

2

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 41-10 filed 06/17/20 PageID.1005 Page 3 of 5

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 41-10 filed 06/17/20 PageID.1006 Page 4 of 5

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 41-10 filed 06/17/20 PageID.1007 Page 5 of 5

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 41-11 filed 06/17/20 PageID.1008 Page 1 of 10

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

LEAGUE OF INDEPENDENT FITNESS FACILITIES AND TRAINERS, INC., BASELINE FITNESS LLC, BUILDING YOUR TEMPLE LLC, BYT FITNESS 247 LLC, CLAWSON FITNESS, LLC, CLINTON FITNESS, INC., D-LUX KARATE UNIVERSITY, LLC, FENTON ATHLETIC CLUB, INC., FENTON KARATE, LLC, FUSION FITNESS 24/7 LLC, H3 FITNESS LLC, I FITNESS PERSONAL TRAINING, INC., JKP FITNESS, LLC, JPF ENTERPRISES, LLC, M FITNESS CLUB, LLC, MH & AB LLC, MOTOR CITY CF – ST. CLAIR SHORES, LLC, NASCOT ENTERPRISES, LLC, PRISON CITY PHYSIQUE, LLC, FMP FITNESS INC., STRENGTH BEYOND LLC, 24/7 BOOTCAMP AND BOXING, INC., and 4 SEASONS GYM, LLC,

No. 20-cv-00458 HON. PAUL L. MALONEY

Plaintiffs,

v

GRETCHEN E. WHITMER and ROBERT E. GORDON,

Defendants.

Scott M. Erskine (P54734) Carly Van Thomme (P59706) Erskine Law, P.C. Attorneys for Plaintiffs 612 W. University Rochester, MI 48307

John G. Fedynsky (P65232) Andrew J. Jurgensen (P81123) Joseph T. Froehlich (P71887) Joshua O. Booth (P53847) Christopher M. Allen (P75329) Assistant Attorneys General

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 41-11 filed 06/17/20 PageID.1009 Page 2 of 10

(248) 601-4499 serskine@erskinelaw.com cvanthomme@erskinelaw.com

Attorneys for Defendants Michigan Dep’t of Attorney General State Operations Division P.O. Box 30754 Lansing, MI 48909 (517) 335-7573 fedynskyj@michigan.gov jurgensena2@michigan.gov froehlichj1@michigan.gov boothj2@michigan.gov allenc28@michigan.gov
EXHIBIT I

2

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 41-11 filed 06/17/20 PageID.1010 Page 3 of 10

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 41-11 filed 06/17/20 PageID.1011 Page 4 of 10

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 41-11 filed 06/17/20 PageID.1012 Page 5 of 10

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 41-11 filed 06/17/20 PageID.1013 Page 6 of 10

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 41-11 filed 06/17/20 PageID.1014 Page 7 of 10

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 41-11 filed 06/17/20 PageID.1015 Page 8 of 10

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 41-11 filed 06/17/20 PageID.1016 Page 9 of 10

CCase 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 41-11 filed 06/17/20 PageID.1017 Page 10 of 100

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 41-12 filed 06/17/20 PageID.1018 Page 1 of 9

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

LEAGUE OF INDEPENDENT FITNESS FACILITIES AND TRAINERS, INC., BASELINE FITNESS LLC, BUILDING YOUR TEMPLE LLC, BYT FITNESS 247 LLC, CLAWSON FITNESS, LLC, CLINTON FITNESS, INC., D-LUX KARATE UNIVERSITY, LLC, FENTON ATHLETIC CLUB, INC., FENTON KARATE, LLC, FUSION FITNESS 24/7 LLC, H3 FITNESS LLC, I FITNESS PERSONAL TRAINING, INC., JKP FITNESS, LLC, JPF ENTERPRISES, LLC, M FITNESS CLUB, LLC, MH & AB LLC, MOTOR CITY CF – ST. CLAIR SHORES, LLC, NASCOT ENTERPRISES, LLC, PRISON CITY PHYSIQUE, LLC, FMP FITNESS INC., STRENGTH BEYOND LLC, 24/7 BOOTCAMP AND BOXING, INC., and 4 SEASONS GYM, LLC,

No. 20-cv-00458 HON. PAUL L. MALONEY

Plaintiffs,

v

GRETCHEN E. WHITMER and ROBERT E. GORDON,

Defendants.

Scott M. Erskine (P54734) Carly Van Thomme (P59706) Erskine Law, P.C. Attorneys for Plaintiffs 612 W. University Rochester, MI 48307

John G. Fedynsky (P65232) Andrew J. Jurgensen (P81123) Joseph T. Froehlich (P71887) Joshua O. Booth (P53847) Christopher M. Allen (P75329) Assistant Attorneys General

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 41-12 filed 06/17/20 PageID.1019 Page 2 of 9

(248) 601-4499 serskine@erskinelaw.com cvanthomme@erskinelaw.com

Attorneys for Defendants Michigan Dep’t of Attorney General State Operations Division P.O. Box 30754 Lansing, MI 48909 (517) 335-7573 fedynskyj@michigan.gov jurgensena2@michigan.gov froehlichj1@michigan.gov boothj2@michigan.gov allenc28@michigan.gov

EXHIBIT J

2

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 41-12 filed 06/17/20 PageID.1020 Page 3 of 9
EXECUTIVE ORDER
No. 2020-110
Temporary restrictions on certain events, gatherings, and businesses
Rescission of Executive Orders 2020-69 and 2020-96
The novel coronavirus (COVID-19) is a respiratory disease that can result in serious illness or death. It is caused by a new strain of coronavirus not previously identified in humans and easily spread from person to person. There is currently no approved vaccine or antiviral treatment for this disease.
On March 10, 2020, the Department of Health and Human Services identified the first two presumptive-positive cases of COVID-19 in Michigan. On that same day, I issued Executive Order 2020-4. This order declared a state of emergency across the state of Michigan under section 1 of article 5 of the Michigan Constitution of 1963, the Emergency Management Act, 1976 PA 390, as amended (EMA), MCL 30.401 et seq., and the Emergency Powers of the Governor Act of 1945, 1945 PA 302, as amended (EPGA), MCL 10.31 et seq.
Since then, the virus spread across Michigan, bringing deaths in the thousands, confirmed cases in the tens of thousands, and deep disruption to this state’s economy, homes, and educational, civic, social, and religious institutions. On April 1, 2020, in response to the widespread and severe health, economic, and social harms posed by the COVID-19 pandemic, I issued Executive Order 2020-33. This order expanded on Executive Order 2020-4 and declared both a state of emergency and a state of disaster across the State of Michigan under section 1 of article 5 of the Michigan Constitution of 1963, the Emergency Management Act, and the Emergency Powers of the Governor Act of 1945. And on April 30, 2020, finding that COVID-19 had created emergency and disaster conditions across the State of Michigan, I issued Executive Order 2020-67 to continue the emergency declaration under the Emergency Powers of the Governor Act, as well as Executive Order 2020-68 to issue new emergency and disaster declarations under the Emergency Management Act.
Those executive orders have been challenged in Michigan House of Representatives and Michigan Senate v Whitmer. On May 21, 2020, the Court of Claims ruled that Executive Order 2020-67 is a valid exercise of authority under the Emergency Powers of the Governor Act but that Executive Order 2020-68 is not a valid exercise of authority under the Emergency Management Act. Both of those rulings are being challenged on appeal.
GEORGE W. ROMNEY BUILDING • 111 SOUTH CAPITOL AVENUE • LANSING, MICHIGAN 48909 www.michigan.gov
PRINTED IN-HOUSE

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 41-12 filed 06/17/20 PageID.1021 Page 4 of 9
On May 22, 2020, I issued Executive Order 2020-99, again finding that the COVID-19 pandemic constitutes a disaster and emergency throughout the State of Michigan. That order constituted a state of emergency declaration under the Emergency Powers of the Governor Act of 1945. And, to the extent the governor may declare a state of emergency and a state of disaster under the Emergency Management Act when emergency and disaster conditions exist yet the legislature has declined to grant an extension request, that order also constituted a state of emergency and state of disaster declaration under that act.
The Emergency Powers of the Governor Act provides a sufficient legal basis for issuing this executive order. In relevant part, it provides that, after declaring a state of emergency, “the governor may promulgate reasonable orders, rules, and regulations as he or she considers necessary to protect life and property or to bring the emergency situation within the affected area under control.” MCL 10.31(1).
Nevertheless, subject to the ongoing litigation and the possibility that current rulings may be overturned or otherwise altered on appeal, I also invoke the Emergency Management Act as a basis for executive action to combat the spread of COVID-19 and mitigate the effects of this emergency on the people of Michigan, with the intent to preserve the rights and protections provided by the EMA. The EMA vests the governor with broad powers and duties to “cop[e] with dangers to this state or the people of this state presented by a disaster or emergency,” which the governor may implement through “executive orders, proclamations, and directives having the force and effect of law.” MCL 30.403(1)–(2). This executive order falls within the scope of those powers and duties, and to the extent the governor may declare a state of emergency and a state of disaster under the Emergency Management Act when emergency and disaster conditions exist yet the legislature has not granted an extension request, they too provide a sufficient legal basis for this order.
To suppress the spread of COVID-19, to prevent the state’s health care system from being overwhelmed, to allow time for the production of critical test kits, ventilators, and personal protective equipment, to establish the public health infrastructure necessary to contain the spread of infection, and to avoid needless deaths, it was reasonable and necessary to direct residents to remain at home or in their place of residence to the maximum extent feasible. To that end, on March 23, 2020, I issued Executive Order 2020-21, ordering all people in Michigan to stay home and stay safe. In Executive Orders 2020-42, 2020-59, 2020-70, 202077, 2020-92, and 2020-96, I extended that initial order, modifying its scope as needed and appropriate to match the ever-changing circumstances presented by this pandemic.
The measures put in place by these executive orders have been effective: the number of new confirmed cases each day continues to drop. Although the virus remains aggressive and persistent—on May 31, 2020, Michigan reported 57,397 confirmed cases and 5,491 deaths— the strain on our health care system has begun to relent, even as our testing capacity has increased. We are now in the process of gradually resuming in-person work and activities. In so doing, however, we must move with care, patience, and vigilance, recognizing the grave harm that this virus continues to inflict on our state and how quickly our progress in suppressing it can be undone.
With this order, I find it reasonable and necessary to move the state to Stage 4 of the Michigan Safe Start Plan. As a result, Michiganders are no longer required to stay home. Instead, certain businesses will remain closed and specific activities that present a
2

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 41-12 filed 06/17/20 PageID.1022 Page 5 of 9
heightened risk of infection will remain prohibited. Any work that is capable of being performed remotely must be performed remotely.
Under this order, retailers will be allowed to resume operations on June 4. Restaurants and bars may reopen fully on June 8. Swimming pools and day camps for kids will also be permitted to reopen on the same day. Those businesses and activities will be subject to safety guidance to mitigate the risk of infection. Other businesses and activities that necessarily involve close contact and shared surfaces, including gyms, hair salons, indoor theaters, tattoo parlors, casinos, and similar establishments, will remain closed for the time being.
Michiganders must continue to wear face coverings when in enclosed public spaces and should continue to take all reasonable precautions to protect themselves, their co-workers, their loved ones, and their communities. Indoor social gatherings and events of more than 10 people are prohibited. Outdoor social gatherings and events are permitted so long as people maintain six feet of distance from one another and the assemblage consists of no more than 100 people.
Acting under the Michigan Constitution of 1963 and Michigan law, I order the following:
1. For purposes of this order, Michigan comprises eight separate regions.
(a) Region 1 includes the following counties: Monroe, Washtenaw, Livingston, Genesee, Lapeer, Saint Clair, Oakland, Macomb, and Wayne.
(b) Region 2 includes the following counties: Mason, Lake, Osceola, Clare, Oceana, Newaygo, Mecosta, Isabella, Muskegon, Montcalm, Ottawa, Kent, and Ionia.
(c) Region 3 includes the following counties: Allegan, Barry, Van Buren, Kalamazoo, Calhoun, Berrien, Cass, Saint Joseph, and Branch.
(d) Region 4 includes the following counties: Oscoda, Alcona, Ogemaw, Iosco, Gladwin, Arenac, Midland, Bay, Saginaw, Tuscola, Sanilac, and Huron.
(e) Region 5 includes the following counties: Gratiot, Clinton, Shiawassee, Eaton, and Ingham.
(f) Region 6 includes the following counties: Manistee, Wexford, Missaukee, Roscommon, Benzie, Grand Traverse, Kalkaska, Crawford, Leelanau, Antrim, Otsego, Montmorency, Alpena, Charlevoix, Cheboygan, Presque Isle, and Emmet.
(g) Region 7 includes the following counties: Hillsdale, Lenawee, and Jackson.
(h) Region 8 includes the following counties: Gogebic, Ontonagon, Houghton, Keweenaw, Iron, Baraga, Dickinson, Marquette, Menominee, Delta, Alger, Schoolcraft, Luce, Mackinac, and Chippewa.
3

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 41-12 filed 06/17/20 PageID.1023 Page 6 of 9
2. Any work that is capable of being performed remotely (i.e., without the worker leaving his or her home or place of residence) must be performed remotely.
3. Any business or operation that requires its employees to leave their home or place of residence for work is subject to the rules on workplace safeguards in Executive Order 2020-97 or any order that may follow from it.
4. Any individual who leaves his or her home or place of residence must:
(a) Follow social distancing measures recommended by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”), including remaining at least six feet from people from outside the individual’s household to the extent feasible under the circumstances.
(b) Wear a face covering over his or her nose and mouth—such as a homemade mask, scarf, bandana, or handkerchief—when in any enclosed public space, unless the individual is unable medically to tolerate a face covering.
(1) An individual may be required to temporarily remove a face covering upon entering an enclosed public space for identification purposes. An individual may also remove a face covering to eat or drink when seated at a restaurant or bar.
(2) Businesses and building owners, and those authorized to act on their behalf, are permitted to deny entry or access to any individual who refuses to comply with the rule in this subsection (b). Businesses and building owners will not be subject to a claim that they have violated the covenant of quiet enjoyment, to a claim of frustration of purpose, or to similar claims for denying entry or access to a person who refuses to comply with this subsection (b).
(3) Supplies of N95 masks and surgical masks should generally be reserved, for now, for health care professionals, first responders (e.g., police officers, fire fighters, paramedics), and other critical workers who interact with the public.
(4) The protections against discrimination in the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act, 1976 PA 453, as amended, MCL 37.2101 et seq., and any other protections against discrimination in Michigan law, apply in full force to individuals who wear a face covering under this order.
5. Indoor social gatherings and events among persons not part of a single household are permitted, but may not exceed 10 people.
6. Outdoor social gatherings and events among persons not part of a single household are permitted, but only to the extent that:
(a) The gathering or event does not exceed 100 people, and
(b) People not part of the same household maintain six feet of distance from one another.
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7. Unless otherwise prohibited by local regulation, outdoor parks and recreational facilities may be open, provided that they make any reasonable modifications necessary to enable employees and patrons not part of the same household to maintain six feet of distance from one another, and provided that areas in which social distancing cannot be maintained be closed, subject to guidance issued by the Department of Health and Human Services.
8. Unless otherwise prohibited by local regulation, public swimming pools, as defined by MCL 333.12521(d), may open as of June 8, 2020, provided that they are outdoors and limit capacity to 50% of the bather capacity limits described in Rule 325.2193 of the Michigan Administrative Code, and subject to guidance issued by the Department of Health and Human Services. Indoor public swimming pools must remain closed.
9. Day camps for children, as defined by Rule 400.11101(i) of the Michigan Administrative Code, may open as of June 8, 2020, subject to guidance issued by the Department of Licensing and Regulatory Affairs. Residential, travel, and troop camps within the meaning of Rule 400.11101(n), (p), or (q) of the Michigan Administrative Code must remain closed for the time being.
10. Unless otherwise prohibited by local regulation, libraries and museums may open as of June 8, 2020, subject to the rules governing retail stores described in Executive Order 2020-97 or any order that may follow from it.
11. Stores that were closed under Executive Order 2020-96 (or that were open only by appointment under the same order) must remain closed to the public (or open only by appointment) until June 4 at 12:01 am. Such stores may then resume normal operations, subject to local regulation and to the capacity constraints and workplace standards described in Executive Order 2020-97 or any order that may follow from it.
12. Subject to the exceptions in section 14, the following places are closed to ingress, egress, use, and occupancy by members of the public:
(a) Indoor theaters, cinemas, and performance venues.
(b) Indoor gymnasiums, fitness centers, recreation centers, sports facilities, exercise facilities, exercise studios, and the like.
(c) Facilities offering non-essential personal care services, including hair, nail, tanning, massage, traditional spa, tattoo, body art, and piercing services, and similar personal care services that involve close contact of persons.
(d) Casinos licensed by the Michigan Gaming Control Board, racetracks licensed by the Michigan Gaming Control Board, and Millionaire Parties licensed by the Michigan Gaming Control Board.
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(e) Indoor services or facilities, or outdoor services or facilities involving close contact of persons, for amusement or other recreational or entertainment purposes, such as amusement parks, arcades, bingo halls, bowling alleys, indoor climbing facilities, indoor dance areas, skating rinks, trampoline parks, and other similar recreational or entertainment facilities.
13. Unless otherwise prohibited by local regulation, restaurants, food courts, cafes, coffeehouses, bars, taverns, brew pubs, breweries, microbreweries, distilleries, wineries, tasting rooms, special licensees, clubs, and like places may be open to the public as follows:
(a) For delivery service, window service, walk-up service, drive-through service, or drive-up service, and may permit up to five members of the public at one time for the purpose of picking up their food or beverage orders, so long as those individuals are at least six feet apart from one another while on premises.
(b) In Regions 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 7, beginning at 12:01 am on June 8, 2020, for outdoor and indoor seating, subject to the capacity constraints and workplace standards described in Executive Order 2020-97 or any order that may follow from it.
(c) In Regions 6 and 8, for outdoor and indoor seating, subject to the capacity constraints and workplace standards described in Executive Order 2020-97 or any order that may follow from it.
14. The restrictions imposed by sections 12 and 13 of this order do not apply to any of the following:
(a) Outdoor fitness classes, athletic practices, training sessions, or games, provided that coaches, spectators, and participants not from the same household maintain six feet of distance from one another at all times during such activities, and that equipment and supplies are shared to the minimum extent possible and are subject to frequent and thorough disinfection and cleaning.
(b) Services necessary for medical treatment as determined by a licensed medical provider.
(c) Health care facilities, residential care facilities, congregate care facilities, and juvenile justice facilities.
(d) Crisis shelters or similar institutions.
(e) Food courts inside the secured zones of airports.
(f) Employees, contractors, vendors, or suppliers who enter, use, or occupy the places described in section 12 of this order in their professional capacity.
15. Nothing in this order should be taken to interfere with or infringe on the powers of the legislative and judicial branches to perform their constitutional duties or exercise their authority. Similarly, nothing in this order shall be taken to abridge
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protections guaranteed by the state or federal constitution under these emergency circumstances.
16. Consistent with prior guidance, neither a place of religious worship nor its owner is subject to penalty under section 19 of this order for allowing religious worship at such place. No individual is subject to penalty under section 19 of this order for engaging in religious worship at a place of religious worship, or for violating the face covering requirement of section 4(b) of this order.
17. Executive Orders 2020-69 and 2020-96 are rescinded. Except as specified, nothing in this order supersedes any other executive order. This order takes effect immediately unless otherwise specified.
18. In determining whether to maintain, intensify, or relax the restrictions in this order, I will consider, among other things, (1) data on COVID-19 infections and the disease’s rate of spread; (2) whether sufficient medical personnel, hospital beds, and ventilators exist to meet anticipated medical need; (3) the availability of personal protective equipment for the health care workforce; (4) the state’s capacity to test for COVID-19 cases and isolate infected people; and (5) economic conditions in the state.
19. Consistent with MCL 10.33 and MCL 30.405(3), a willful violation of this order is a misdemeanor.
Given under my hand and the Great Seal of the State of Michigan.

Date: June 1, 2020 Time: 2:27 pm

___________________________________ GRETCHEN WHITMER GOVERNOR
By the Governor:
___________________________________ SECRETARY OF STATE
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

LEAGUE OF INDEPENDENT FITNESS FACILITIES AND TRAINERS, INC., BASELINE FITNESS LLC, BUILDING YOUR TEMPLE LLC, BYT FITNESS 247 LLC, CLAWSON FITNESS, LLC, CLINTON FITNESS, INC., D-LUX KARATE UNIVERSITY, LLC, FENTON ATHLETIC CLUB, INC., FENTON KARATE, LLC, FUSION FITNESS 24/7 LLC, H3 FITNESS LLC, I FITNESS PERSONAL TRAINING, INC., JKP FITNESS, LLC, JPF ENTERPRISES, LLC, M FITNESS CLUB, LLC, MH & AB LLC, MOTOR CITY CF – ST. CLAIR SHORES, LLC, NASCOT ENTERPRISES, LLC, PRISON CITY PHYSIQUE, LLC, FMP FITNESS INC., STRENGTH BEYOND LLC, 24/7 BOOTCAMP AND BOXING, INC., and 4 SEASONS GYM, LLC,

No. 20-cv-00458 HON. PAUL L. MALONEY

Plaintiffs,

v

GRETCHEN E. WHITMER and ROBERT E. GORDON,

Defendants.

Scott M. Erskine (P54734) Carly Van Thomme (P59706) Erskine Law, P.C. Attorneys for Plaintiffs 612 W. University Rochester, MI 48307

John G. Fedynsky (P65232) Andrew J. Jurgensen (P81123) Joseph T. Froehlich (P71887) Joshua O. Booth (P53847) Christopher M. Allen (P75329) Assistant Attorneys General

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(248) 601-4499 serskine@erskinelaw.com cvanthomme@erskinelaw.com

Attorneys for Defendants Michigan Dep’t of Attorney General State Operations Division P.O. Box 30754 Lansing, MI 48909 (517) 335-7573 fedynskyj@michigan.gov jurgensena2@michigan.gov froehlichj1@michigan.gov boothj2@michigan.gov allenc28@michigan.gov

EXHIBIT K

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OFFICIAL WEBSITE OF MICHIGAN.GOV

THE OFFICE OF
GOVERNOR GRETCHEN WHITMER

Í

WHITMER / NEWS / EXECUTIVE ORDERS

Executive Order 2020-115 (COVID-19) (June 5, 2020)

EXECUTIVE ORDER
No. 2020-115
Temporary restrictions on certain events, gatherings, and businesses
The novel coronavirus (COVID-19) is a respiratory disease that can result in serious illness or death. It is caused by a new strain of coronavirus not previously identified in humans and easily spread from person to person. There is currently no approved vaccine or antiviral treatment for this disease.
On March 10, 2020, the Department of Health and Human Services identified the first two presumptive-positive cases of COVID-19 in Michigan. On that same day, I issued Executive Order 2020-4. This order declared a state of emergency across the state of Michigan under section 1 of article 5 of the Michigan Constitution of 1963, the Emergency Management Act, 1976 PA 390, as amended (EMA), MCL 30.401 et seq., and the Emergency Powers of the Governor Act of 1945, 1945 PA 302, as amended (EPGA), MCL 10.31 et seq.
Since then, the virus spread across Michigan, bringing deaths in the thousands, confirmed cases in the tens of thousands, and deep disruption to this state’s economy, homes, and educational, civic, social, and religious institutions. On April 1, 2020, in response to the widespread and severe health, economic, and social harms posed by the COVID-19 pandemic, I issued Executive Order 2020-33. This order expanded on Executive Order 2020-4 and declared both a state of emergency and a state of disaster across the State of Michigan under section 1 of article 5 of the Michigan Constitution of 1963, the Emergency Management Act, and the Emergency Powers of the Governor Act of 1945. And on April 30, 2020, finding that COVID-19 had created emergency and disaster conditions across the State of Michigan, I issued Executive Order 2020-67 to

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continue the emergency declaration under the Emergency Powers of the Governor Act, as well as Executive Order 2020-68 to issue new emergency and disaster declarations under the Emergency Management Act.
Those executive orders have been challenged in Michigan House of Representatives and Michigan Senate v Whitmer. On May 21, 2020, the Court of Claims ruled that Executive Order 2020-67 is a valid exercise of authority under the Emergency Powers of the Governor Act but that Executive Order 2020-68 is not a valid exercise of authority under the Emergency Management Act. Both of those rulings are being challenged on appeal.
On May 22, 2020, I issued Executive Order 2020-99, again finding that the COVID-19 pandemic constitutes a disaster and emergency throughout the State of Michigan. That order constituted a state of emergency declaration under the Emergency Powers of the Governor Act of 1945. And, to the extent the governor may declare a state of emergency and a state of disaster under the Emergency Management Act when emergency and disaster conditions exist yet the legislature has declined to grant an extension request, that order also constituted a state of emergency and state of disaster declaration under that act.
The Emergency Powers of the Governor Act provides a sufficient legal basis for issuing this executive order. In relevant part, it provides that, after declaring a state of emergency, “the governor may promulgate reasonable orders, rules, and regulations as he or she considers necessary to protect life and property or to bring the emergency situation within the affected area under control.” MCL 10.31(1).
Nevertheless, subject to the ongoing litigation and the possibility that current rulings may be overturned or otherwise altered on appeal, I also invoke the Emergency Management Act as a basis for executive action to combat the spread of COVID-19 and mitigate the effects of this emergency on the people of Michigan, with the intent to preserve the rights and protections provided by the EMA. The EMA vests the governor with broad powers and duties to “cop[e] with dangers to this state or the people of this state presented by a disaster or emergency,” which the governor may implement through “executive orders, proclamations, and directives having the force and effect of law.” MCL 30.403(1)–(2). This executive order falls within the scope of those powers and duties, and to the extent the governor may declare a state of emergency and a state of disaster under the Emergency Management Act when emergency and disaster conditions exist yet the legislature has not granted an extension request, they too provide a sufficient legal basis for this order.

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To suppress the spread of COVID-19, to prevent the state’s health care system from being overwhelmed, to allow time for the production of critical test kits, ventilators, and personal protective equipment, to establish the public health infrastructure necessary to contain the spread of infection, and to avoid needless deaths, it was reasonable and necessary to direct residents to remain at home or in their place of residence to the maximum extent feasible. To that end, on March 23, 2020, I issued Executive Order 2020-21, ordering all people in Michigan to stay home and stay safe. In Executive Orders 2020-42, 2020-59, 2020-70, 2020-77, 2020-92, and 2020-96, I extended that initial order, modifying its scope as needed and appropriate to match the ever-changing circumstances presented by this pandemic.
The measures put in place by these executive orders have been effective: the number of new confirmed cases each day continues to drop. Although the virus remains aggressive and persistent—on June 4, 2020, Michigan reported 58,241 confirmed cases and 5,595 deaths—the strain on our health care system has begun to relent, even as our testing capacity has increased. We are now in the process of gradually resuming in-person work and activities. In so doing, however, we must move with care, patience, and vigilance, recognizing the grave harm that this virus continues to inflict on our state and how quickly our progress in suppressing it can be undone.
Regions 6 and 8 have significantly fewer new cases per million each day than other regions in the state and have not shown an increase in viral activity in response to earlier relaxations of my orders. Taking into account the public health data and the ongoing costs of continued restrictions, I find it reasonable and necessary to move Regions 6 and 8 to Stage 5 of the Michigan Safe Start Plan as of June 10. Gyms, hair salons, indoor theaters, tattoo parlors, and similar establishments will be permitted to reopen, subject to strict workplace safeguards. Indoor social gatherings and organized events of up to 50 people will be allowed, as will outdoor social gatherings and organized events of up to 250 people.
In addition, I find it reasonable and necessary to allow personal care services—including hair and nail salons—to reopen statewide as of June 15. This constitutes a partial step along the path of an orderly transition to Stage 5 for those parts of the state outside Regions 6 and 8.
Acting under the Michigan Constitution of 1963 and Michigan law, I order the following:
1. For purposes of this order, Michigan comprises eight separate regions.
a. Region 1 includes the following counties: Monroe, Washtenaw, Livingston, Genesee, Lapeer, Saint Clair, Oakland, Macomb, and Wayne.

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b. Region 2 includes the following counties: Mason, Lake, Osceola, Clare, Oceana, Newaygo, Mecosta, Isabella, Muskegon, Montcalm, Ottawa, Kent, and Ionia.
c. Region 3 includes the following counties: Allegan, Barry, Van Buren, Kalamazoo, Calhoun, Berrien, Cass, Saint Joseph, and Branch.
d. Region 4 includes the following counties: Oscoda, Alcona, Ogemaw, Iosco, Gladwin, Arenac, Midland, Bay, Saginaw, Tuscola, Sanilac, and Huron.
e. Region 5 includes the following counties: Gratiot, Clinton, Shiawassee, Eaton, and Ingham.
f. Region 6 includes the following counties: Manistee, Wexford, Missaukee, Roscommon, Benzie, Grand Traverse, Kalkaska, Crawford, Leelanau, Antrim, Otsego, Montmorency, Alpena, Charlevoix, Cheboygan, Presque Isle, and Emmet.
g. Region 7 includes the following counties: Hillsdale, Lenawee, and Jackson.
h. Region 8 includes the following counties: Gogebic, Ontonagon, Houghton, Keweenaw, Iron, Baraga, Dickinson, Marquette, Menominee, Delta, Alger, Schoolcraft, Luce, Mackinac, and Chippewa.
2. As of 12:01 am on June 15, 2020, subsection 12(c) of Executive Order 2020-110, which restricts the operation of facilities offering non-essential personal care services, is rescinded.
3. As of 12:01 am on June 10, 2020, individuals and businesses in Regions 6 and 8 are no longer subject to Executive Order 2020-110 and are instead subject to the rules described in this order.
4. Work that can be performed remotely (i.e., without the worker leaving his or her home or place of residence) should be performed remotely.
5. Any business or operation that requires its employees to leave their home or place of residence for work is subject to the rules on workplace safeguards in Executive Order 2020-114 or any order that may follow from it.
6. Any individual who leaves his or her home or place of residence must:
a. Follow social distancing measures recommended by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”), including remaining at least six feet from people from outside the individual’s household to the extent feasible under the circumstances
b. Wear a face covering over his or her nose and mouth—such as a homemade mask, scarf, bandana, or handkerchief—when in any enclosed

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public space, unless the individual is unable medically to tolerate a face covering.
1. An individual may be required to temporarily remove a face covering upon entering an enclosed public space for identification purposes. An individual may also remove a face covering to eat or drink when seated at a restaurant or bar.
2. Businesses and building owners, and those authorized to act on their behalf, are permitted to deny entry or access to any individual who refuses to comply with the rule in this subsection (b). Businesses and building owners will not be subject to a claim that they have violated the covenant of quiet enjoyment, to a claim of frustration of purpose, or to similar claims for denying entry or access to a person who refuses to comply with this subsection (b).
3. Supplies of N95 masks and surgical masks should generally be reserved, for now, for health care professionals, first responders (e.g., police officers, fire fighters, paramedics), and other critical workers who interact with the public
4. The protections against discrimination in the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act, 1976 PA 453, as amended, MCL 37.2101 et seq., and any other protections against discrimination in Michigan law, apply in full force to individuals who wear a face covering under this order.
7. Rules on Gatherings, Performances, and Events
a. A social gathering or organized event among persons not part of the same household is permitted, but only to the extent that:
1. Persons not part of the same household maintain six feet of distance from one another.
2. If it is indoors, the gathering or event does not exceed 50 people.
3. If it is outdoors, the gathering or event does not exceed 250 people.
b. Notwithstanding the restrictions in subsection (a), an arcade, bowling alley, cinema, climbing facility, convention center, performance space, meeting hall, night club, sports arena, theater, or similar venue may, if it is indoors, be open to spectators or patrons, but only to the extent that it:
1. Enables persons not part of the same household to maintain six feet of distance from one another at all times while in the venue.

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2. Limits the number of people in the venue to 25% of its maximum capacity or to 250, whichever is smaller. For purposes of this order, each separate auditorium or screening room is a separate venue.
c. Notwithstanding the restrictions in subsection (a), a concert space, race track, sports arena, stadium, or similar venue may, if it is outdoors, be open to spectators or patrons, but only to the extent that it:
1. Enables persons not part of the same household to maintain six feet of distance from one another at all times while in the venue.
2. Limits the number of people in the venue to 25% of its maximum capacity or to 500, whichever is smaller.
d. Subsection (a) does not apply to the incidental gathering of persons in a shared space, including an airport, bus station, factory floor, restaurant, shopping mall, public pool, or workplace.
8. Unless otherwise prohibited by local regulation, outdoor parks and recreational facilities may be open, provided that they make any reasonable modifications necessary to enable employees and patrons not part of the same household to maintain six feet of distance from one another, and provided that areas in which social distancing cannot be maintained be closed, subject to guidance issued by the Department of Health and Human Services.
9. Unless otherwise prohibited by local regulation, public swimming pools, as defined by MCL 333.12521(d), may be open, subject to guidance issued by the Department of Health and Human Services, provided that:
a. If they are outdoors, they limit capacity to 50% of the bather capacity limits described in Rule 325.2193 of the Michigan Administrative Code.
b. If they are indoors, they limit capacity to 25% of the bather capacity limits described in Rule 325.2193 of the Michigan Administrative Code.
10. Residential, travel, and troop camps within the meaning of Rule 400.11101(n), (p), or (q) of the Michigan Administrative Code remain closed for the time being.
11. Nothing in this order should be taken to interfere with or infringe on the powers of the legislative and judicial branches to perform their constitutional duties or exercise their authority. Similarly, nothing in this order shall be taken to abridge protections guaranteed by the state or federal constitution under these emergency circumstances.
12. Consistent with prior guidance, neither a place of religious worship nor its owner is subject to penalty under section 15 of this order for allowing religious worship at such place. No individual is subject to penalty under section 15 of this order

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for engaging in religious worship at a place of religious worship, or for violating the face covering requirement of section 6(b) of this order
13. Except as specified, nothing in this order supersedes any other executive order. This order takes effect immediately unless otherwise specified.
14. In determining whether to maintain, intensify, or relax the restrictions in this order, I will consider, among other things, (1) data on COVID-19 infections and the disease’s rate of spread; (2) whether sufficient medical personnel, hospital beds, and ventilators exist to meet anticipated medical need; (3) the availability of personal protective equipment for the health care workforce; (4) the state’s capacity to test for COVID-19 cases and isolate infected people; and (5) economic conditions in the state.
15. Consistent with MCL 10.33 and MCL 30.405(3), a willful violation of this order is a misdemeanor.
Given under my hand and the Great Seal of the State of Michigan.
GRETCHEN WHITMER GOVERNOR
Date: June 5, 2020
Time: 10:32 am

RELATED CONTENT
Executive Order 2020-117 (COVID-19) (June 9, 2020) Executive Order 2020-114 (COVID-19) (June 5, 2020) Executive Order 2020-116 (COVID-19) (June 5, 2020) Executive Order 2020-113 (COVID-19) (June 4, 2020) Executive Order 2020-112 (COVID-19) (June 3, 2020) Executive Order 2020-111 (COVID-19) (June 1, 2020) Executive Order 2020-108 (May 29, 2020) Executive Order 2020-109 (May 29, 2020) Executive Order 2020-110 (COVID-19) (June 1, 2020)

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Executive Order 2020-106 (COVID-19) (May 28, 2020) Executive Order 2020-107 (May 29, 2020) Executive Order 2020-99 (COVID-19) (May 22, 2020) - Declaration of State of Emergency Executive Order 2020-100 (COVID-19) (May 22, 2020) Executive Order 2020-101 (COVID-19) (May 22, 2020) Executive Order 2020-102 (COVID-19) (May 22, 2020) Executive Order 2020-103 (COVID-19) (May 22, 2020) Executive Order 2020-104 (COVID-19) (May 26, 2020) Executive Order 2020-105 (May 26, 2020) - Declaration of State of Emergency Executive Order 2020-98 (May 22, 2020) - Declaration of State of Emergency Executive Order 2020-95 (COVID-19) (May 21, 2020)

MICHIGAN.GOV HOME ADA MICHIGAN NEWS POLICIES
COPYRIGHT 2020 STATE OF MICHIGAN

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

LEAGUE OF INDEPENDENT FITNESS FACILITIES AND TRAINERS, INC., BASELINE FITNESS LLC, BUILDING YOUR TEMPLE LLC, BYT FITNESS 247 LLC, CLAWSON FITNESS, LLC, CLINTON FITNESS, INC., D-LUX KARATE UNIVERSITY, LLC, FENTON ATHLETIC CLUB, INC., FENTON KARATE, LLC, FUSION FITNESS 24/7 LLC, H3 FITNESS LLC, I FITNESS PERSONAL TRAINING, INC., JKP FITNESS, LLC, JPF ENTERPRISES, LLC, M FITNESS CLUB, LLC, MH & AB LLC, MOTOR CITY CF – ST. CLAIR SHORES, LLC, NASCOT ENTERPRISES, LLC, PRISON CITY PHYSIQUE, LLC, FMP FITNESS INC., STRENGTH BEYOND LLC, 24/7 BOOTCAMP AND BOXING, INC., and 4 SEASONS GYM, LLC,

No. 20-cv-00458 HON. PAUL L. MALONEY

Plaintiffs,

v

GRETCHEN E. WHITMER and ROBERT E. GORDON,

Defendants.

Scott M. Erskine (P54734) Carly Van Thomme (P59706) Erskine Law, P.C. Attorneys for Plaintiffs 612 W. University Rochester, MI 48307

John G. Fedynsky (P65232) Andrew J. Jurgensen (P81123) Joseph T. Froehlich (P71887) Joshua O. Booth (P53847) Christopher M. Allen (P75329) Assistant Attorneys General

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(248) 601-4499 serskine@erskinelaw.com cvanthomme@erskinelaw.com

Attorneys for Defendants Michigan Dep’t of Attorney General State Operations Division P.O. Box 30754 Lansing, MI 48909 (517) 335-7573 fedynskyj@michigan.gov jurgensena2@michigan.gov froehlichj1@michigan.gov boothj2@michigan.gov allenc28@michigan.gov

EXHIBIT L

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RECEIVED by MSC 5/29/2020 2:04:04 PM

STATE OF MICHIGAN IN THE SUPREME COURT

MICHIGAN HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES and MICHIGAN SENATE,

Supreme Court No. 161377 Court of Appeals No. 353655

Plaintiffs-Appellants/ Cross-Appellees,
v
GRETCHEN WHITMER, in her official capacity as Governor of the State of Michigan,

Court of Claims No. 20-79-MZ
The appeal involves a ruling that a provision of the Constitution, a statute, rule or regulation, or other State governmental action is invalid.

Defendant-Appellee/ Cross-Appellant.
/

GOVERNOR GRETCHEN WHITMER’S EMERGENCY BYPASS APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL AND
BRIEF IN RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS’ EMERGENCY BYPASS APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL

ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED

B. Eric Restuccia Deputy Solicitor General

Dated: May 29, 2020

Christopher M. Allen (P75329) Assistant Solicitor General Joseph T. Froehlich (P71887) Joshua Booth (P53847) John Fedynsky (P65232) Assistant Attorneys General Michigan Dep’t of Attorney General Attorney for Defendant-Appellee/ Cross-Appellant P.O. Box 30212, Lansing, MI 48909 (517) 335-7628

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TABLE OF CONTENTS Page
Index of Authorities ...................................................................................................... iv Statement of Jurisdiction ............................................................................................. ix Statement of Questions Presented................................................................................ x Constitutional Provisions and Statutes Involved....................................................... xii
Constitutional Provisions ................................................................................. xii Pertinent Provisions of the Emergency Powers of the Governor Act ............ xiii Pertinent Provisions of the Emergency Management Act ............................. xiv Introduction ................................................................................................................... 1 Statement of Facts and Proceedings............................................................................. 5 Standard of Review...................................................................................................... 13 Argument ..................................................................................................................... 13 I. The Legislative Plaintiffs lack standing. ......................................................... 13 A. The Legislative Plaintiffs lack standing because they have no
special interest in challenging the executive orders of the Governor that differs in any way from the general interest of the citizenry at large. ................................................................................... 14 B. The Legislative Plaintiffs cannot meet their obligation to show that an actual controversy exists under MCR 2.605. ........................... 17 II. The Governor has the authority under the EPGA to declare a state of emergency and to issue orders to protect the health and safety of the State and its people........................................................................................... 20 A. The State is generally granted broad latitude to respond to public health crises................................................................................. 20 B. Consistent with the proper exercise of police power, the Legislature enacted the EPGA. ............................................................. 21
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1. The EPGA’s broad, but not unlimited, grant of authority supports the Governor’s declared state of emergency................ 21
2. The Legislative Plaintiffs’ narrow construction of the EPGA is not borne out by the statute’s plain language, and their heavy reliance on the alleged history of the act is misplaced.................................................................................. 23
III. The EPGA contains standards that guide the Governor’s exercise of authority concomitant with the nature of broad, developing emergencies and therefore survives a non-delegation challenge. ................... 29
A. The branches of government are not barred from working together, and sharing their authority is permitted so long as adequate guidance is given. ................................................................... 29
B. The Legislature is not best equipped to address the exigencies of an emergency. ......................................................................................... 33
IV. In the EMA, the Legislature requires the Governor declare a state of emergency and disaster if she finds certain conditions exist. ......................... 34
A. The EMA sets out a statutory game-plan for state and local emergency response, and it grants the Governor broad powers and duties to “cop[e] with dangers to the state or its people.” ............. 35
B. If the conditions warrant it, the Governor has a duty under the EMA to declare states of emergency and disaster which actuates certain emergency response mechanisms. ............................................ 36
C. Pursuant to the EMA’s mandates, the Governor terminated her earlier declarations and issued new ones because there was an undisputed “disaster” and “emergency” in Michigan............................ 39
D. The construction of the Court of Claims and the Legislative Plaintiffs adds limitations on the Governor’s authority that the Legislature did not impose..................................................................... 40
E. The Legislative Plaintiffs’ responsive arguments do not fully account for the language of the act........................................................ 43
1. No piece of the EMA is invalidated or rendered nugatory......... 43
2. The Governor’s construction does not yield absurd results. ...... 45
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Conclusion and Relief Requested ................................................................................ 50
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INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

Page

Cases
Allstate Ins Co v Hayes, 442 Mich 56 (1993) ................................................................................................... 14
Argo Oil Corp v Atwood, 274 Mich 47 (1935) ................................................................................................... 30
Ariz State Legislature v Ariz Independent Redistricting Comm, 135 S Ct 2652 (2015) .......................................................................................... 14, 15
Assoc Builders & Contractors v Dep’t of Consumer & Indus Servs Director, 472 Mich 117 (2005) ................................................................................................. 18
Blank v Department of Corrections, 462 Mich 103 (2000) ........................................................................................... 46, 47
Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan v Milliken, 422 Mich 1 (1985) ..................................................................................................... 32
City of South Haven v Van Buren Cty Bd of Comm’rs, 478 Mich 518 (2007) ................................................................................................. 18
DNR v Seaman, 396 Mich 299 (1976) ................................................................................................. 33
Dodak v State Admin Bd, 441 Mich 547 (1993) ................................................................................................. 14
G.F. Redmond & Co v Michigan Sec Comm’n, 222 Mich 1 (1923) ..................................................................................................... 31
Harsha v City of Detroit, 261 Mich 586 (1933) ................................................................................................. 30
In re Certified Question from US Court of Appeals for Sixth Circuit, 468 Mich 109 (2003) ................................................................................................. 27
INS v Chadha, 462 US 919 (1983) .............................................................................................. 47, 49

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Jacobson v Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 197 US 11 (1905) ................................................................................................ 20, 21
Johnson v Recca, 492 Mich 169 (2012) ................................................................................................. 45
Judicial Attorneys Ass’n v Mich, 459 Mich 291 (1998) ................................................................................................. 29
Lansing Sch Ed Ass’n v Lansing Bd of Ed, 487 Mich 349 (2010) ........................................................................................... 14, 18
League of Women Voters of Michigan v Secy of State, ___ Mich App ___, ____ (Docket No. 350938), slip op at *6, app for lv pending 938 NW2d 244 (Mich 2020) ..................................................... 14, 15, 17, 19
Mich Dept of Transp v Tomkins, 481 Mich 184 (2008) ................................................................................................. 13
Neal v Wilkes, 470 Mich 661 (2004) ................................................................................................. 26
People ex rel Johnson v Coffey, 237 Mich 591 (1927) ........................................................................................... 42, 44
People v Anderson, ___ Mich App ___ (2019) (No. 343272)..................................................................... 27
People v Harris, 499 Mich 332 (2016) ................................................................................................. 44
Sauder v Dist Bd of Sch Dist No 10, Royal Oak Tp, Oakland Co, 271 Mich 413 (1935) ................................................................................................. 38
SBC Health Midwest, Inc v City of Kentwood, 500 Mich 65 (2017) ................................................................................................... 27
Shavers v Attorney General, 402 Mich 554 (1978) ................................................................................................. 18
Smith v Behrendt, 278 Mich 91 (1936) ................................................................................................... 31
Soap & Detergent Ass’n v Natural Resources Comm, 415 Mich 728 (1982) ................................................................................................. 29
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Southfield Tp v Main, 357 Mich 59 (1959) ................................................................................................... 38
State Bd of Ed v Houghton Lake Cmty Sch, 430 Mich 658 (1988) ................................................................................................. 38
Straus v Governor, 459 Mich 526 (1999) ........................................................................................... 42, 44
Taylor v Smithkline Beecham Corp, 468 Mich 1 (2003) ..................................................................................................... 30
Tennessee General Assembly v US Dep’t of State, 931 F3d 499 (CA 6, 2019)................................................................................... 14, 16
Westervelt v Natural Resources Comm, 402 Mich 412 (1978) ..................................................................................... 30, 31, 32
Statutes MCL 10.31 ............................................................................................................. xiii, 26 MCL 10.31 et seq ................................................................................................. passim MCL 10.31(1) ....................................................................................................... passim MCL 10.31(2) ......................................................................................................... 22, 28 MCL 10.32 ............................................................................................................ passim MCL 30.401 et seq ............................................................................................... passim MCL 30.402(e)....................................................................................................... xiv, 37 MCL 30.402(h) ...................................................................................................... xiv, 37 MCL 30.402(j) .............................................................................................................. 25 MCL 30.402(p) .......................................................................................... xiv, 37, 38, 46 MCL 30.402(q) ...................................................................................................... xiv, 46 MCL 30.403 ................................................................................................................. xiv MCL 30.403(1) ............................................................................................................. 35 MCL 30.403(2) ............................................................................................................. 35
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MCL 30.403(3) ..................................................................................................... passim MCL 30.403(4) ..................................................................................................... passim MCL 30.404(1) ............................................................................................................. 36 MCL 30.404(2) ............................................................................................................. 36 MCL 30.405(1)(a) ......................................................................................................... 37 MCL 30.405(1)(d) ......................................................................................................... 37 MCL 30.405(1)(g) ......................................................................................................... 37 MCL 30.405(1)(j) .......................................................................................................... 37 MCL 30.408 .................................................................................................................. 35 MCL 30.408(1) ............................................................................................................. 36 MCL 30.409 .................................................................................................................. 35 MCL 30.410 .................................................................................................................. 35 MCL 30.410(1)(b) ................................................................................................... 25, 35 MCL 30.414(1) ............................................................................................................. 25 MCL 30.414(3) ............................................................................................................. 35 MCL 30.417 ................................................................................................................. xvi MCL 30.417(d) ................................................................................................. 11, 28, 36 Other Authorities 2020 SCR 24 ................................................................................................................... 8 Executive Order 2020-20 ............................................................................................... 7 Executive Order 2020-21 ............................................................................................... 7 Executive Order 2020-33 ................................................................................... 8, 10, 39 Executive Order 2020-4 ................................................................................................. 6 Executive Order 2020-42 ............................................................................................... 7
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Executive Order 2020-5 ................................................................................................. 7 Executive Order 2020-66 ..................................................................................... passim Executive Order 2020-67 ........................................................................... 10, 11, 13, 50 Executive Order 2020-68 ..................................................................................... passim Executive Order 2020-9 ................................................................................................. 7 Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (1993) ............................................... 25 Rules MCR 2.605.............................................................................................................. 14, 17 MCR 7.305(B)(1) ............................................................................................................ 4 MCR 7.305(B)(2) ....................................................................................................... ix, 4 MCR 7.305(B)(3) ............................................................................................................ 4 MCR 7.305(B)(4)(a) ........................................................................................................ 4 MCR 7.305(B)(4)(b) ........................................................................................................ 4 Constitutional Provisions Const 1963, art 3, § 1 ................................................................................................... 29 Const 1963, art 4, § 14 ................................................................................................. 34 Const 1963, art 4, § 26 ..................................................................................... xii, 19, 33 Const 1963, art 4, § 33 ........................................................................................... xii, 19 Const 1963, art 5, § 1 ........................................................................................... passim Const 1963, art 5, § 8 ................................................................................................... 15
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION The Michigan House of Representatives and Michigan Senate (Legislative Plaintiffs) sought an immediate declaratory judgment that Governor Whitmer exceeded her authority under the Emergency Powers of the Governor Act (EPGA) and the Emergency Management Act (EMA) during the COVID-19 pandemic. MCL 10.31 et seq; MCL 30.401 et seq. The Court of Claims issued an opinion denying Plaintiffs’ request for declaratory relief and entered a final order. (5/21/20 Ct of Claims Op and Order, p 25.) In its opinion, the Court of Claims found that the Governor’s declaration pf emergency and accompanying executive orders constituted a valid exercise of her authority under the EPGA. (Id. at 2.) The Court of Claims also determined that the Legislative Plaintiffs have standing in this case (id. at 4–9), and that the Governor acted outside of her authority when issuing Executive Order 2020-68 pursuant to the EMA, (id. at 2, 19–25.) The Governor seeks leave to appeal these adverse rulings. The Plaintiffs filed a claim of appeal in the Court of Appeals on May 22, 2020, and later that day, in this Court, filed an emergency application for leave to appeal the Court of Claims decision “before a decision of the Court of Appeals” (bypass application). MCR 7.305(B)(2). The Governor similarly filed a cross-claim of appeal on May 29, and here files an omnibus response to the Legislative Plaintiffs’ bypass application and bypass application regarding the two adverse rulings against her. The Governor asks this Court to grant her bypass application and the Legislative Plaintiffs’ bypass application, and to hear them on an expedited basis.
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STATEMENT OF QUESTIONS PRESENTED1

1. Legislative standing is available only where the body suffers an injury specific to it or to protect its legal rights. The House and Senate allege only injuries shared with the general citizenry, and any decision by this Court will not affect their constitutional authority to legislate. Do the Legislative Plaintiffs have standing?

Governor’s answer:

No.

Legislative Plaintiffs’ answer: Yes.

Court of Claims answer:

Yes.

Court of Appeals’ answer:

Did not answer.

2. The Emergency Powers of the Governor Act grants broad authority to the Governor to declare a state of emergency during great public crises where public safety is imperiled within the State. The Governor declared a state of emergency in response to a worldwide public health pandemic that has killed thousands of Michiganders. Did the Governor act within her statutory grant of authority?

Governor’s answer:

Yes.

Legislative Plaintiffs’ answer: No.

Court of Claims answer:

Yes.

Court of Appeals’ answer:

Did not answer.

1 Issues 2 and 3 are the subject of the Legislative Plaintiffs’ bypass application, and Issues 1 and 4 are the subject of the Governor’s bypass application as well as alternative bases to affirm the lower court’s decision in response to the Plaintiffs’ bypass application.
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3. The Emergency Powers of the Governor Act permits the Governor during public crises to issue “reasonable” orders “necessary to protect life and property” or bring the emergency under control. The Legislature may constitutionally grant broad authority to the executive branch provided there is sufficient guidance in light of the purpose of the delegation. Have the Legislative Plaintiffs proven their own law is an unconstitutional delegation?

Governor’s answer:

No.

Legislative Plaintiffs’ answer: Yes.

Court of Claims answer:

No.

Court of Appeals’ answer:

Did not answer.

4. The Emergency Management Act requires a Governor to declare a state of emergency or disaster if the conditions in the State warrant it, and to terminate those specific declarations if the Legislature does not extend them beyond 28 days by concurrent resolution. The Governor terminated unextended declarations, but issued new ones pursuant to her ongoing statutory duty. Did the Governor act within her authority under the EMA?

Governor’s answer:

Yes.

Legislative Plaintiffs’ answer: No.

Court of Claims answer:

No.

Court of Appeals’ answer:

Did not answer.

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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES INVOLVED
Constitutional Provisions Const 1963, art 5, § 1 provides:
Except to the extent limited or abrogated by article V, section 2, or article IV, section 6, the executive power is vested in the governor. Const 1963, art 4, § 26 provides, in pertinent part:
No bill shall be passed or become a law at any regular session of the legislature until it has been printed or reproduced and in the possession of each house for at least five days. Every bill shall be read three times in each house before the final passage thereof. No bill shall become a law without the concurrence of a majority of the members elected to and serving in each house. Const 1963, art 4, § 33 provides, in pertinent part:
Every bill passed by the legislature shall be presented to the governor before it becomes law, and the governor shall have 14 days measured in hours and minutes from the time of presentation in which to consider it. If he approves, he shall within that time sign and file it with the secretary of state and it shall become law. If he does not approve, and the legislature has within that time finally adjourned the session at which the bill was passed, it shall not become law. If he disapproves, and the legislature continues the session at which the bill was passed, he shall return it within such 14-day period with his objections, to the house in which it originated. That house shall enter such objections in full in its journal and reconsider the bill. If twothirds of the members elected to and serving in that house pass the bill notwithstanding the objections of the governor, it shall be sent with the objections to the other house for reconsideration. The bill shall become law if passed by two-thirds of the members elected to and serving in that house.
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Pertinent Provisions of the Emergency Powers of the Governor Act
MCL 10.31 provides:
(1) During times of great public crisis, disaster, rioting, catastrophe, or similar public emergency within the state, or reasonable apprehension of immediate danger of a public emergency of that kind, when public safety is imperiled, either upon application of the mayor of a city, sheriff of a county, or the commissioner of the Michigan state police or upon his or her own volition, the governor may proclaim a state of emergency and designate the area involved. After making the proclamation or declaration, the governor may promulgate reasonable orders, rules, and regulations as he or she considers necessary to protect life and property or to bring the emergency situation within the affected area under control. Those orders, rules, and regulations may include, but are not limited to, providing for the control of traffic, including public and private transportation, within the area or any section of the area; designation of specific zones within the area in which occupancy and use of buildings and ingress and egress of persons and vehicles may be prohibited or regulated; control of places of amusement and assembly and of persons on public streets and thoroughfares; establishment of a curfew; control of the sale, transportation, and use of alcoholic beverages and liquors; and control of the storage, use, and transportation of explosives or inflammable materials or liquids deemed to be dangerous to public safety.
(2) The orders, rules, and regulations promulgated under subsection (1) are effective from the date and in the manner prescribed in the orders, rules, and regulations and shall be made public as provided in the orders, rules, and regulations. The orders, rules, and regulations may be amended, modified, or rescinded, in the manner in which they were promulgated, from time to time by the governor during the pendency of the emergency, but shall cease to be in effect upon declaration by the governor that the emergency no longer exists.
MCL 10.32 provides:
It is hereby declared to be the legislative intent to invest the governor with sufficiently broad power of action in the exercise of the police power of the state to provide adequate control over persons and conditions during such periods of impending or actual public crisis or disaster. The provisions of this act shall be broadly construed to effectuate this purpose.
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Pertinent Provisions of the Emergency Management Act
MCL 30.402(e) provides:
“Disaster” means an occurrence or threat of widespread or severe damage, injury, or loss of life or property resulting from a natural or human-made cause, including, but not limited to, fire, flood, snowstorm, ice storm, tornado, windstorm, wave action, oil spill, water contamination, utility failure, hazardous peacetime radiological incident, major transportation accident, hazardous materials incident, epidemic, air contamination, blight, drought, infestation, explosion, or hostile military action or paramilitary action, or similar occurrences resulting from terrorist activities, riots, or civil disorders.
MCL 30.402(h) provides:
(h) “Emergency” means any occasion or instance in which the governor determines state assistance is needed to supplement local efforts and capabilities to save lives, protect property and the public health and safety, or to lessen or avert the threat of a catastrophe in any part of the state.
MCL 30.402(p) provides:
(p) “State of disaster” means an executive order or proclamation that activates the disaster response and recovery aspects of the state, local, and interjurisdictional emergency operations plans applicable to the counties or municipalities affected.
MCL 30.402(q) provides:
(q) “State of emergency” means an executive order or proclamation that activates the emergency response and recovery aspects of the state, local, and interjurisdictional emergency operations plans applicable to the counties or municipalities affected.
MCL 30.403 provides:
(1) The governor is responsible for coping with dangers to this state or the people of this state presented by a disaster or emergency.
(2) The governor may issue executive orders, proclamations, and directives having the force and effect of law to implement this act. Except as provided in section 7(2), an executive order, proclamation, or directive may be amended or rescinded by the governor.
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(3) The governor shall, by executive order or proclamation, declare a state of disaster if he or she finds a disaster has occurred or the threat of a disaster exists. The state of disaster shall continue until the governor finds that the threat or danger has passed, the disaster has been dealt with to the extent that disaster conditions no longer exist, or until the declared state of disaster has been in effect for 28 days. After 28 days, the governor shall issue an executive order or proclamation declaring the state of disaster terminated, unless a request by the governor for an extension of the state of disaster for a specific number of days is approved by resolution of both houses of the legislature. An executive order or proclamation issued pursuant to this subsection shall indicate the nature of the disaster, the area or areas threatened, the conditions causing the disaster, and the conditions permitting the termination of the state of disaster. An executive order or proclamation shall be disseminated promptly by means calculated to bring its contents to the attention of the general public and shall be promptly filed with the emergency management division of the department and the secretary of state, unless circumstances attendant upon the disaster prevent or impede its prompt filing.
(4) The governor shall, by executive order or proclamation, declare a state of emergency if he or she finds that an emergency has occurred or that the threat of an emergency exists. The state of emergency shall continue until the governor finds that the threat or danger has passed, the emergency has been dealt with to the extent that emergency conditions no longer exist, or until the declared state of emergency has been in effect for 28 days. After 28 days, the governor shall issue an executive order or proclamation declaring the state of emergency terminated, unless a request by the governor for an extension of the state of emergency for a specific number of days is approved by resolution of both houses of the legislature. An executive order or proclamation issued pursuant to this subsection shall indicate the nature of the emergency, the area or areas threatened, the conditions causing the emergency, and the conditions permitting the termination of the state of emergency. An executive order or proclamation shall be disseminated promptly by means calculated to bring its contents to the attention of the general public and shall be promptly filed with the emergency management division of the department and the secretary of state, unless circumstances attendant upon the emergency prevent or impede its prompt filing.
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INTRODUCTION The Legislative Plaintiffs come to the judiciary seeking only to build a constitutional crisis atop a public health crisis in Michigan. The law requires putting that effort to rest. Unfortunately, the scourge of COVID-19 will not lie down. The novel coronavirus that causes COVID-19 has rapidly spread across the planet, infecting millions, and killing hundreds of thousands in just a few months. In response, jurisdictions the world over have imposed bold measures to stem the viral tide that has overwhelmed healthcare systems. At home, Michigan is one of the states hardest hit by the pandemic. Since March 18, COVID-19 has claimed at least 5,372 lives, and countless others have suffered the excruciating health effects of the virus. Through wicked happenstance of this novel virus, many who are infected escape symptoms but unwittingly spread the virus to others, who may end up on ventilators, or worse. Such disparities still perplex medical experts, which only highlights the uncertainty ahead. In response to the threat of the pandemic, Governor Gretchen Whitmer declared states of emergency and disaster. Consistent with her duties to protect the health and welfare of the State and its citizens and respond to emergencies within its borders, the Governor put measures in place to suppress the spread of the virus, incrementally loosening restrictions as the public health permits. Because of these efforts, the disease’s spread has been slowed and countless lives have been saved. But the crisis is not over, and the virus remains highly contagious, still untreatable, and potentially poised for resurgence.
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The Legislative Plaintiffs deny none of this, but ask this Court to invalidate the Governor’s emergency response authority and declare their own delegation of this authority unconstitutional. Past Legislatures have thought better of putting a slow and fractious multi-member body in charge of responding to emergencies that demand a rapid, coordinated, and nimble response. Through two laws—the Emergency Powers of the Governor Act (EPGA) and the Emergency Management Act (EMA)—the Legislature vested such responsibility in the executive branch.
The Legislative Plaintiffs, of course, remain free to amend these laws, even over the Governor’s objection, if they are dissatisfied with the authority generations have vested in the Governor or the Governor’s due exercise of that authority. But they have not done so. The courts are not the proper branch for lawmaking, and the Legislative Plaintiffs lack standing to bring this suit. The Legislative Plaintiffs have failed to show a sufficient injury to an institutional interest, and their action against the Governor raises separation of powers concerns. Moreover, nothing in the declaratory relief they seek is necessary to guide their future conduct and preserve their legal rights—they only seek to affect the Governor’s rights.
They fare no better on the merits of their challenges to the Governor’s exercise of her emergency authority. Under the EPGA, the Legislature plainly granted the Governor authority to proclaim an emergency and reasonably guided her discretion in doing so. And while the Legislative Plaintiffs attempt to engraft limitations on this authority and cast doubt on its constitutionality, settled caselaw and the EPGA’s plainly stated text make short work of those arguments, just as the
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Court of Claims did. The Governor’s declaration and reaffirmation of an emergency under the EPGA are valid, as are the executive orders issued under that authority.
Independently, the EMA contains authority that is activated upon the Governor’s declaration of a state of emergency or disaster. Importantly, the EMA requires the Governor to issue those declarations if the conditions warrant it. If the declarations of states of emergency or disaster—which are defined by the act as “executive order[s]”—are not extended by the Legislature after 28 days, the Governor must terminate those executive orders. While the Court of Claims agreed with the Legislative Plaintiffs’ contention that the Governor ignored this limitation, she in fact adhered closely to it and the EMA’s other mandates—she timely terminated the earlier declarations and then issued new ones, consistent with her legal duty to do so when disaster or emergency conditions afflict our State.
The Legislative Plaintiffs frame the Governor’s actions—particularly her new declarations—as unprecedented. But that flips the conversation on its head. The pandemic that Michigan is facing is unprecedented, as is the Legislative Plaintiffs’ refusal to ratify the declarations the Governor issued—declarations whose factual basis they do not and cannot dispute. That refusal may be their right under the EMA, but the Governor’s responsibility to act in response to the ongoing emergency and disaster remains her duty.
Even if this Court were to find that the Governor exceeded her authority under the EMA, that leaves her declaration under the EPGA undisturbed, as the
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Court of Claims concluded. Because the Governor’s declarations here work as a belt and suspenders, even if the belt is removed, the suspenders remain.
The Legislative Plaintiffs’ overarching claim is that the Governor has acted beyond her constitutional role (despite the Legislature granting her the very authority she has invoked and exercised). Yet rather than act with their own most fundamental power—to amend the laws they now challenge—they filed suit. But there is no legal basis for this Court to upend the status quo in the midst of this public health crisis. The Constitution grants the Legislature the tools to do just that if it so chooses—to amend its own laws, by veto override if it must. This Court should not short circuit that route still available to the Legislature, one that runs through their own chambers.
This case warrant answers from this State’s highest court because the issues involve the constitutional validity of the EPGA, MCR 7.305(B)(1), have “significant public interest,” MCR 7.305(B)(2), and touch on the Governor’s emergency authority and the propriety of the Legislative Plaintiffs’ standing, MCR 7.305(B)(3). Although the status quo will not cause substantial harm to the public because the Governor’s measures to protect the public health remain valid under the decision below, MCR 7.305(B)(4)(a), the Governor’s full authority to respond to a public crisis is currently undercut by part of the Court of Claims ruling, MCR 7.305(B)(4)(b).
The Governor asks this Court to grant her bypass application, and agrees that the Court should grant Legislative Plaintiffs’ own bypass application, to decide these important and consequential questions.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS COVID-19 infects the globe.
SARS-CoV-2 is similar to other coronaviruses (a large family of viruses that cause respiratory illnesses), but the strain is “novel,” i.e., never-before-seen. This means that there is no general or natural immunity built up in the population, no vaccine, and no known treatment to combat the virus itself.
It is widely known and accepted that the virus is highly contagious, spreading easily from person to person via “respiratory droplets.”2 Experts agree that being anywhere within six feet of an infected person puts you at a high risk of contracting the disease, called COVID-19.3 But even following that advice is not a sure-fire way to prevent infection. The respiratory droplets from an infected person can land on surfaces, and be transferred many hours later to the eyes, mouth, or nose of others who touch the surface. Moreover, since many of those infected experience no symptoms or only mild ones, a person could spread the disease before he even realizes he is sick.4 Everyone is vulnerable either as a potential victim of this scourge or a carrier of it to a potential victim.
2 World Health Organization, Modes of transmission of virus causing COVID-19, available at https://www.who.int/news-room/commentaries/detail/modes-oftransmission-of-virus-causing-covid-19-implications-for-ipc-precautionrecommendations. 3 Centers for Disease Control, Social Distancing, Quarantine, and Isolation, available at https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/prevent-getting-sick/socialdistancing.html. 4 (Id.)
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Because there is no way to immunize or treat for COVID-19, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention have indicated the best way to prevent illness is to “avoid being exposed.”5 And as experience from prior pandemics such as smallpox and the 1918 Spanish Influenza have indicated, early intervention to slow transmission is critical.
In keeping with this advice, governmental entities have stressed the critical import of “social distancing,” the practice of avoiding public spaces and limiting movement.6 The objective of social distancing is what has been termed “flattening the curve,” that is, reducing the speed at which COVID-19 spreads. If the disease spreads too quickly, the limited resources of our healthcare system could easily become overwhelmed.7
Michigan is hit hard by the expanding epidemic and the Governor declares states of disaster and emergency.
On March 10, 2020, in response to the growing pandemic in Michigan, Governor Whitmer declared a state of emergency and invoked the emergency powers available to the Governor under Michigan law—pursuant to her authority under the Emergency Powers of the Governor Act (EPGA), the Emergency Management Act (EMA), and Article 5, § 1.8
5 (Id.) 6 (Id.) 7 See New York Times, Flattening the Coronavirus Curve (March 27, 2020), available at https://www.nytimes.com/article/flatten-curve-coronavirus.html. 8 Executive Order 2020-4, available at https://www.michigan.gov/whitmer/0,9309,7387-90499_90705-521576--,00.html.
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On March 13, 2020, Governor Whitmer issued an executive order prohibiting
assemblages of 250 or more people in a single shared space with limited exceptions,
and ordering the closure of all K-12 school buildings.9 Yet, even in the face of the
social distancing recommendations and the six-foot rule of thumb, on Saturday,
March 14, the public was out in droves. On March 16, 2020, the Governor ordered
various places of public accommodation, like restaurants, bars, and exercise
facilities, to close their premises to the public.10
Subsequently, on March 23, 2020, again in response to the spreading
pandemic in Michigan, Governor Whitmer issued an executive order which
essentially ordered all persons not performing essential or critical infrastructure job
functions to stay in their place of residence, other than to obtain groceries, care for
loved ones, engage in outdoor activity consistent with social distancing, and other
limited exceptions (the Stay Home Order).11 Several other orders intended to
address the pandemic in Michigan were issued pursuant to her authority under the
EPGA and the EMA.12
9 Executive Order 2020-5, available at https://www.michigan.gov/whitmer/0,9309,7387-90499_90705-521595--,00.html. 10 Executive Order 2020-9, available at https://www.michigan.gov/whitmer/0,9309,7387-90499_90705-521789--,00.html. (Replaced by Executive Order 2020-20). 11 Executive Order 2020-21, available at https://www.michigan.gov/whitmer/0,9309,7-387-90499_90705-522626--,00.html. That order was to continue through April 13, 2020; however, on April 9, 2020, the Governor issued Executive Order 2020-42, extending the Stay Home Order through April 30, 2020, at midnight. Executive Order 2020-42, available at https://content.govdelivery.com/attachments/MIEOG/2020/04/09/file_attachments/1 423850/EO%202020-42.pdf. 12 See generally “Executive Orders” http://www.legislature.mi.gov /(S(wskfimad5qtw1lrxuwq3z3jb))/mileg.aspx?page=executiveorders
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On April 1, the Governor issued Executive Order 2020-33, which expanded upon the prior declaration of a state of emergency and, consistent with the virus’s aggressive and destructive spread, declared states of emergency and disaster across the State of Michigan. Under the EMA (though not the EPGA), the declarations must be terminated after 28 days absent resolution by both houses of the Legislature. MCL 30.403(3), (4). On April 7, the Michigan House and Senate approved an extension of the Governor’s declaration until April 30, 2020.13
As required by the EMA, the Governor terminates the states of emergency and disaster under the EMA after the Legislature refuses to extend them.
Prior to April 30, the Governor again asked the Legislature to extend the states of disaster and emergency under the EMA pursuant to MCL 30.403(3) and (4), but the Legislature did not do so. Notably, neither in public statements nor in its pleading to this Court have the Legislative Plaintiffs expressed disagreement that the conditions persist that warrant declarations of emergency and disaster.14
On April 30, 2020, then, the Governor issued three executive orders. First, in Executive Order 2020-66 (App’x A), the Governor terminated the executive orders of states of emergency and disaster declared under the EMA as required by MCL 30.403(3) and (4) because the Legislature refused to extend those executive orders.
13 2020 SCR 24. 14 To the contrary, the Senate Majority Leader, the very morning after refusing to extend the prior declarations, responded with indignation when asked if the emergency was over: “No, not at all. Hell—heck no. I’d like to know where you would even come up with that question.” See https://jtv.tv/senate-majority-leadershirkey-on-legislative-showdown/ (thirty seconds into the interview).
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Although noting that “the threat and danger posed to Michigan by the COVID-19 pandemic has by no means passed, and the disaster and emergency conditions it has created very much exist,” the Governor recognized that the Legislature— “despite the clear and ongoing emergency and disaster conditions afflicting our state—has refused to extend [the states of emergency and disaster] beyond today.” Id. Accordingly, she was required by the EMA’s plain language to issue an order “terminat[ing]” the states of emergency and disaster. Id.
Because the COVID-19 crisis persists, the EMA requires her to declare a state of disaster and emergency, which she promptly does.
After terminating the prior declarations, the Governor again declared a state of emergency and a state of disaster under the EMA. Executive Order 2020-68 (App’x B). She also explained the basis for this new declaration. Although the measures issued pursuant to her emergency authority had been working, “the need for them—like the unprecedented crisis posed by this global pandemic—is far from over.” Id. COVID-19, she said,
remains present and pervasive in Michigan, and it stands ready to quickly undo our recent progress in slowing its spread. Indeed, while COVID-19 initially hit Southeast Michigan hardest, the disease is now increasing more quickly in other parts of the state. For instance, cases in some counties in Western and Northern Michigan are now doubling every 6 days or faster. [Id.] The Governor further found, “[t]he health, economic, and social harms of the COVID-19 pandemic thus remain widespread and severe, and they continue to constitute a statewide emergency and disaster.” Id. Accordingly, the Governor stated: “I now declare a state of emergency and a state of disaster across the State
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of Michigan under the Emergency Management Act.” Id. Finally, the Governor ordered that “[a]ll previous orders that rested on Executive Order 2020-33 now rest on this order.” Id.
The Governor reaffirms her declaration of the state of emergency under the EPGA.
In the third Executive Order issued that day, the Governor reaffirmed the state of emergency under the EPGA, ordering that “[a] state of emergency remains declared across the State of Michigan under the Emergency Powers of the Governor Act of 1945.” Executive Order 2020-67 (App’x C). And like in Executive Order 2020-68, she ordered “Executive Order 2020-33 is rescinded and replaced. All previous orders that rested on Executive Order 2020-33 now rest on this order.” Id.
The Court of Claims denies declaratory relief and affirms the Governor’s authority under the EPGA.
The Legislative Plaintiffs brought suit, seeking an expedited declaratory judgment that the Governor’s authority to act under the EMA ended April 30, 2020; the EPGA does not provide authority for the Governor’s COVID-19 executive orders; the Governor has no lawmaking power under Const 1963, art 5, § 1; and the Governor’s ongoing COVID-19 executive orders violate the separation of powers. (Compl Request for Relief.)
On May 21, 2020, the Court of Claims issued an opinion and order denying the Plaintiffs’ requested relief. (5/21/20 Op and Order, p 25) (App’x D). First, the Court of Claims determined that the Legislative Plaintiffs have standing, but
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deemed it a “close question.” (Id. at 7.) The court construed the Legislative Plaintiffs’ claimed injury as being “that EO 2020-67 and EO 2020-68 nullified the decision of the Legislature to not extend the state of emergency or disaster.” (Id. at 8.) More specifically, the court found the Legislative Plaintiffs’ allegation to be “the Governor eschewed the Legislature’s role under the EMA and nullified an act of the legislative body as a whole,” an injury “unique to the Legislature.” (Id. at 8–9.)
The court also held that that Executive Order 2020-67 (the EPGA declaration) was a valid exercise of the “broad authority” by the Governor. (Id. at 10.) The court rejected the Legislative Plaintiffs’ “attempt to limit the scope of the EPGA to local or regional emergencies only,” relying heavily on the Legislature’s plain statutory purpose in MCL 10.32 to confer “ ‘sufficiently broad power’ on the Governor in order to enable her to respond to public disaster or crisis.” (Id. at 11, quoting MCL 10.32.) The court rejected the attempt to impose “artificial barriers on the Governor’s authority to act,” noting that a “particularly strained reading of the plain text of the EPGA” was required to reach the Legislative Plaintiffs’ result. (Id. at 12.) Recognizing the Legislative Plaintiffs’ “selectively rely on parts of the statute and ignore the contextual whole,” the court affirmed the Governor’s authority to issue state-wide declarations under the EPGA. (Id. at 13–14.)
The court had no difficulty squaring this reading with the existence of the EMA, explaining that “while both statutes permit the Governor to declare an emergency, the EMA equips the Governor with more sophisticated tools and options at her disposal.” (Id. at 14.) And, citing MCL 30.417(d)—which makes clear that
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the EMA does not “[l]imit, modify, or abridge the authority of the governor to proclaim a state of emergency pursuant to [the EPGA]”—the court relied on the Legislature’s own textual “explicit recognition” in refusing to narrow the EPGA or the EMA as the Legislative Plaintiffs desire. (Id. at 15.)
The court also denied the Legislative Plaintiffs’ request to declare the EPGA unconstitutional as violative of the separation of powers. The court properly balanced the complexity of the underlying subject matter—response to an unknown future emergency situation—with the sufficient guidance the Legislature provided. (Id. at 16–18.) As the court summed up, citing several Michigan decisions:
The Legislature’s use of the terms “reasonable” and “necessary” are not trivial expressions that can be cast aside as easily as plaintiffs would have the Court do. Rather than being mere abstract concepts that fail to provide a meaningful standard, the terms “reasonable” and “necessary” have historically proven to provide standards that are more than amenable to judicial review. [Id. at 18.] Given the validity of the EPGA and the validity of the Governor’s declaration under it, the Court of Claims “conclude[d] that plaintiffs have failed to establish a reason to invalidate Executive Orders that rely on the EPGA.” (Id. at 19.) The court, again, denied the relief requested by the Legislative Plaintiffs. (Id. at 25.) Even though the court denied Legislative Plaintiffs’ relief, the opinion determined that the Governor acted outside of her authority with respect to her April 30 declarations under the EMA. See Op and Order, pp 2–3 (“This court finds that . . . Executive Order No. 2020-68 exceeded the authority of the Governor under the EMA.”); p 19 (“The Legislature contends that the issuance of EO 2020-68 was ultra vires, and this Court agrees” that 2020-68 is ultra vires).
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After describing the broad authorities a Governor has under the EMA, the court accurately noted that, in Executive Order 2020-66, the Governor “expressly terminated the previously issued states of emergency and disaster—not because the disaster or emergency condition ceased to exist—but because a period of 28 days had expired,” which is consistent with the statutory language in MCL 30.403(3) and (4). As the court correctly put it, “The Governor “shall” terminate the state of emergency or disaster unless the Legislature grants a request to extend it.” (Id. at 23.) But the court found the Governor’s new declarations as contrary to that language, stating, “To adopt the Governor’s interpretation of the statute would render nugatory the express 28-day limit.” (Id. at 24.) The court also disagreed that, construed in this way, the 28-day limit is an unconstitutional legislative veto, describing it as “a standard imposed on the authority so delegated.” (Id. at 25.)
STANDARD OF REVIEW This Court reviews questions of statutory and constitutional interpretation de novo. Mich Dept of Transp v Tomkins, 481 Mich 184, 190 (2008).
ARGUMENT I. The Legislative Plaintiffs lack standing.
Dissatisfied by the Governor’s issuance of Executive Orders 2020-67 and 2020-68, the Legislative Plaintiffs have a clear, unique, and powerful remedy: they can change the law, even over the Governor’s objection. Instead, they have chosen to sue the Governor, asking for a judicial solution to a perceived legislative problem.
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This, they cannot do. The Legislative Plaintiffs cannot claim an institutional interest in the enforcement of already-enacted legislation, and have not claimed an injury distinct from the citizenry at large. This Court should determine that the Legislative Plaintiffs lack standing.
A. The Legislative Plaintiffs lack standing because they have no special interest in challenging the executive orders of the Governor that differs in any way from the general interest of the citizenry at large.
“Standing is the legal term used to denote the existence of a party’s interest in the outcome of the litigation . . . .” Allstate Ins Co v Hayes, 442 Mich 56, 68 (1993) (citations omitted). A litigant meeting the requirements of MCR 2.605 “is sufficient to establish standing to seek a declaratory judgment.” Lansing Sch Ed Ass’n v Lansing Bd of Ed, 487 Mich 349, 372 (2010). Moreover, a litigant may have standing if it “has a special injury or right, or substantial interest, that will be detrimentally affected in a manner different from the citizenry at large.” Id. at 372.
As with an individual legislator, to establish standing, a legislative body must allege that it has been deprived of a cognizable interest peculiar to the body. Tennessee General Assembly v US Dep’t of State, 931 F3d 499, 507 (CA 6, 2019), citing Ariz State Legislature v Ariz Independent Redistricting Comm, 135 S Ct 2652, 2664 (2015). Importantly, a “generalized grievance that the law is not being followed,” is insufficient to establish standing. Dodak v State Admin Bd, 441 Mich 547, 556 (1993) (citation omitted); see also League of Women Voters of Michigan v Secy of State, ___ Mich App ___, ____ (Docket No. 350938), slip op at *6, app for lv pending 938 NW2d 244 (Mich 2020).
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The Legislative Plaintiffs seek to nullify the Governor’s acts of declaring states of emergency and disaster under the EMA and the EPGA. But constraining the Governor’s executive authority will not affect the Legislature as an institution entrusted with passing laws. The Legislative Plaintiffs’ success in this case would only infringe upon the separation of powers by invalidating the Governor’s implementation of the law and her exercise of the powers vested in her by law. Indeed, that is explicitly the relief that the Legislative Plaintiffs seek. Under League of Women Voters and Dodak, they cannot obtain that relief here.
The Legislative Plaintiffs claim that the Governor’s actions violate the EPGA and the EMA. But even if that were true (it is not), such an alleged injury is not personal or unique to them. As the court noted in League of Women Voters, “once the votes of legislators have been counted and the statute enacted, their special interest as lawmakers has ceased.” ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at *7. So too here, once the Legislature passed its laws, it exercised its legislative power. Execution of the laws is the purview of the executive. Const 1963, art 5, §§ 1, 8.
The Legislative Plaintiffs fare no better by attempting to cast their claims as Michigan constitutional violations. Whether they frame the Governor’s action as allegedly unlawful or unconstitutional, they lack standing to challenge the actions for the same reasons. In either instance, the alleged injury or deprivation is no different than that accruing to the ordinary citizen.15
15 Below, Plaintiffs relied heavily on the Arizona State Legislature case for the proposition that a legislature has an interest in protecting its lawmaking power from infringement. (5/15/2020 Hr’g Tr, p 10.) But Arizona State Legislature merely
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The Legislative Plaintiffs’ case is that the Governor did not follow the EMA and EPGA when declaring states of emergency and disaster—a claim of statutory interpretation—and that their own law is unconstitutional. The Governor has not asserted an inherent authority to act with legislative authority, only that the Legislature granted her authority by statute, which she has exercised. By acting as she did, the Governor did not work any infringement upon or dilution of the Legislature’s constitutional power to pass laws, or any other constitutionally granted authority. See Tennessee Gen Assembly, 931 F3d at 512 (noting that legislative standing is proper upon an allegation of “interference with a legislative body’s specific powers . . . or a constitutionally assigned power”).
To the contrary, the Legislature admittedly introduced dozens of bills during the pandemic (Compl, ¶ 43), and is not hampered from continuing to do so. Any and all legislative tools remain on the table and available for amending or repealing the laws on the books. That the Governor may also act (per the Legislature’s own delegation), does not squeeze out the Legislature from acting concurrently.
To sum it up, per the Court of Appeals in League of Women Voters: [T]he Legislature is suing to reverse actions by the [Governor], a member of the Executive Branch. The Legislature is thus plainly challenging the actions of members of the Executive Branch. Dodak stands for the proposition that courts should not confer standing in
stands for the proposition that, where a legislative body alleges that it is effectively barred from exercising its constitutional authority, it has standing. Id. at 2663– 2664; see also Tennessee Gen Assembly, 931 F3d at 511 (explaining that state legislatures had been found to have standing when they “alleged that an action at the state legislative level had interfered with their federal constitutional prerogatives”). That is miles from this case.
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matters that have the real possibility of infringing upon the separation of powers. [League of Women Voters, slip op at *7.] And League of Women Voters is all the more persuasive on this point because, in that case, the Legislature sought to protect the constitutionality of its laws. ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at *9 (“To accept the Legislature’s argument that it has standing here would open the door for the Legislature to seek a declaratory judgment whenever the constitutionality of a statute was challenged.”). Here, the Legislative Plaintiffs ask this Court to invalidate one of its own laws, seeking a declaration that the EPGA is unconstitutional. If the Legislature lacks standing to attempt to enforce its own laws, it must lack standing to nullify them. Finally, there is no room for concern in this case that, without standing for these plaintiffs, the executive’s actions might evade judicial review.16 A private party would have standing to challenge the Governor’s declarations if the litigant could point to an alleged harm stemming from one of the Governor’s substantive executive orders premised on her declarations under the EMA and/or the EPGA. B. The Legislative Plaintiffs cannot meet their obligation to show
that an actual controversy exists under MCR 2.605. Nor can the Legislative Plaintiffs generate standing by framing their claims as requests for declaratory relief. MCR 2.605 states that “[i]n a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction, a Michigan court of record may declare the rights and other legal relations of an interested party seeking a declaratory
16 See e.g., League of Women Voters of Michigan v Secretary of State (Docket No 160907-8), March 11, 2020 Oral Argument, Viviano, J., questioning at 52:26. Available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9_AxvQNoa_4
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judgment.” Where no such actual controversy exists, a plaintiff does not have standing to bring a declaratory action. City of South Haven v Van Buren Cty Bd of Comm’rs, 478 Mich 518, 533–534 (2007).
“In general, ‘actual controversy’ exists where a declaratory judgment or decree is necessary to guide a plaintiff’s future conduct in order to preserve his legal rights.” Shavers v Attorney General, 402 Mich 554, 588 (1978) (emphasis added). See also Assoc Builders & Contractors v Dep’t of Consumer & Indus Servs Director, 472 Mich 117, 126 (2005), overruled in part on other grds, 487 Mich at 371 n 18.
Here, the gravamen of the Legislative Plaintiffs’ complaint is that they passed laws that are not being followed by the Governor, or that their own law (the EPGA) violates the Michigan Constitution. But if that were enough to create an actual controversy, the Legislature would have standing to bring a lawsuit against any government entity that has allegedly violated the Constitution or failed to enforce or comply with a statute. That outcome would be both an abuse of the court system and an improper curtailing of the legislative and political processes.
Nor do the Legislative Plaintiffs adequately explain how declaratory relief is needed here to guide their future conduct in order to preserve their legal rights. Lansing Sch Ed Ass’n, 293 Mich App at 515. To be sure, the future conduct that the Legislative Plaintiffs seek to “guide”—that is, curtail—is the that of the Governor, not the Legislature. The law does not provide standing for the Legislature to seek declaratory relief. As the Court of Appeals concluded in League of Women Voters:
No declaratory judgment is necessary to guide the Legislature’s future conduct in order to preserve its legal rights. The Legislature’s
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authority to enact laws is separate and distinct from this Court’s role in determining whether any law passes constitutional muster. These “rights” and obligations of the two separate branches of government will remain the same, no matter what the outcome in this matter, such that the preservation of the Legislature’s legal rights is not at issue. [League of Women Voters, ___ Mich App at ___, slip op at *7.] The Legislative Plaintiffs contend that they have a special right that is affected in a manner different from the citizenry at large in their right to enact legislation—but this is more spin than reality. There is nothing in the Governor’s actions that interferes with the Legislature’s ability to legislate. In fact, the complaint specifically alleges that the “Legislature has introduced almost 100 bills on COVID-19 related issues.” (Compl, ¶ 43.) The Legislative Plaintiffs’ claim for declaratory relief fails because there is no threat to their power to enact legislation, including their power to amend or repeal the very laws they challenge. 17 In sum, the Legislative Plaintiffs’ concern here is the Governor’s actions, not infringement of its own institutional rights or responsibilities. They have no special interest in challenging the Governor’s executive orders or advancing a strained interpretation of their own laws. Therefore, and in light of the separation-of-powers concerns pervading this suit, the Legislative Plaintiffs lack standing.
17 The Michigan Constitution provides that “[n]o bill shall become law without the concurrence of a majority of the members elected to and serving in each house.” Const 1963, art 4, § 26. “Every bill passed by the legislature shall be presented to the governor before it becomes law[.]” Const 1963, art 4, § 33. If the Governor vetoes a bill, the Legislature may override it by a two-thirds vote in each house. Id.
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II. The Governor has the authority under the EPGA to declare a state of emergency and to issue orders to protect the health and safety of the State and its people. Even if the Legislative Plaintiffs could seek their requested relief from this
Court, they have not shown entitlement to it. The EPGA grants the Governor broad police powers in times of public emergency to protect life and property and bring the emergency to its end.
A. The State is generally granted broad latitude to respond to public health crises.
Faced with “great danger[ ],” state actors are permitted great latitude to secure the public health. Jacobson v Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 197 US 11, 29 (1905). In Jacobson, the Supreme Court considered a claim that the Massachusetts’ mandatory vaccination law, which applied to every person in Cambridge due to a growing smallpox epidemic, violated the defendant’s Fourteenth Amendment right “to care for his own body and health in such way as to him seems best.” 197 US at 26. The Supreme Court upheld this sweeping, invasive measure as a proper exercise of the States’ police power because of the exigencies and dangerousness of the public health crisis. It affirmed that “a community has the right to protect itself against an epidemic of disease which threatens the safety of its members.” Id. at 27. As the Court stated,
in every well-ordered society charged with the duty of conserving the safety of its members the rights of the individual in respect of his liberty may at times, under the pressure of great dangers, be subjected to such restraint, to be enforced by reasonable regulations, as the safety of the general public may demand. [Id. at 29.]
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In upholding the law, the Court refused to “usurp the functions of another branch of government” by second-guessing the executive’s exercise of police power in such circumstances. Id. at 28. As Jacobson illustrates, the police power has long been recognized as a fundamental and central means by which States can respond in an effective fashion to an imminent threat to its citizens’ health and safety.
B. Consistent with the proper exercise of police power, the Legislature enacted the EPGA.
Through the EPGA, the Legislature has ensured that the Governor, who holds the executive power, has the necessary tools to deal with emergencies and disasters in this State, such as the crisis presented by COVID-19. Const 1963, art 5, § 1. The EPGA does not deprive the Legislature of any of its lawmaking tools or powers, and throughout this crisis, the Legislature has retained and been free to use them. But rather than exercise that lawmaking authority to amend the EPGA or EMA, the Legislative Plaintiffs asks this Court to misconstrue them.
1. The EPGA’s broad, but not unlimited, grant of authority supports the Governor’s declared state of emergency.
The EPGA, enacted in 1945, provides the Governor with broad powers “[d]uring times of great public crisis, disaster, rioting, catastrophe, or similar public emergency within the state.” MCL 10.31(1). The Governor “may proclaim a state of emergency” during these times, or upon “reasonable apprehension of immediate danger” of such an emergency, “when public safety is imperiled.” Id.
Upon the proclamation of a state of emergency, “the governor may promulgate reasonable orders, rules, and regulations as he or she considers necessary to protect life and property or to bring the emergency situation within the
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affected area under control.” Id. Any “orders, rules, and regulations promulgated . . . are effective from the date and in the manner prescribed in the orders, rules, and regulations.” MCL 10.31(2). And they “may be amended, modified, or rescinded . . . by the governor” and “shall cease to be in effect upon declaration by the governor that the emergency no longer exists.” Id. As a whole, the EPGA must “be broadly construed to effectuate [its] purpose,” which is to “invest the governor with sufficiently broad power of action in the exercise of the police power of the state to provide adequate control over persons and conditions during such periods of impending or actual public crisis or disaster.” MCL 10.32.
Our State is undoubtedly facing a “time[ ] of great public crisis,” “disaster,” or “similar public emergency,” wherein “public safety is imperiled.” MCL 10.31(1). The world over has been ravaged by the COVID-19 crisis, with serious, often fatal, consequences for many due to the virus’s easy and rapid transmission. States of emergency exist across our country too, with orders effectuating social distancing. Since the virus’s origin in China, it has traveled to nearly every country on Earth, killing over 350,000 people. Indeed, in April, it killed more Michiganders than heart disease and cancer combined.18 As of filing, over 5,000 have died here, and over 100,000 have died in the United States.19
18 Michigan Department of Community Health, Number of Deaths by Select Causes of Death by Month, available at https://www.mdch.state.mi.us/osr/Provisional/MontlyDxCounts.asp 19 New York Times, An Incalculable Loss (May 27, 2020), available at https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/05/24/us/us-coronavirus-deaths100000.html
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These undisputed (and undisputable) facts form the basis of the Governor’s finding that a state of emergency exists under the EPGA, and well justify the “reasonable” and “necessary” measures she has taken “to protect life” throughout the State and bring this pandemic “under control.” MCL 10.31(1).
2. The Legislative Plaintiffs’ narrow construction of the EPGA is not borne out by the statute’s plain language, and their heavy reliance on the alleged history of the act is misplaced.
In an attempt to avoid the unfavorable result that flows from the EPGA’s plain and straightforward text, the Legislative Plaintiffs strain to narrowly read their own statute, suggesting that the EPGA is limited to quelling riots and other uprisings of local concern. (Pls Bypass App, pp 20–24.) But this narrow construction is unwarranted for as many as six reasons.
First, such a limited reading is directly contrary to the Legislature’s own (duly enacted) direction, which mandates that the act be “broadly construed to effectuate [its] purpose,” which was plainly stated:
It is hereby declared to be the legislative intent to invest the governor with sufficiently broad power of action in the exercise of the police power of the state to provide adequate control over persons and conditions during such periods of impending or actual public crisis or disaster. [MCL 10.32.] Second, the Legislative Plaintiffs proffer a geographical limitation—an interpretation of the statute that limits a declaration’s reach to only local subsets of the State. (Pls Bypass App, pp 20–22) (“These words—‘area,’ ‘zone,’ and ‘section’— all establish that the Governor’s power is intended to reach some subpart of the state as a whole.”). This is an attempt to recast the intended, and plainly stated,
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flexibility of the EPGA as a limitation. The EPGA provides that, when declaring an emergency, the Governor must “designate the area involved.” MCL 10.31(1). The EPGA then provides an illustrative, and expressly non-exhaustive, list of “orders, rules, and regulations” that the Legislature suggested may be appropriate in response to an emergency—which occasionally includes reference to “zones” or “section[s],” but just as often does not. Id.
All of this wisely recognizes that public emergencies, and necessary responses to them, may come in many different shapes and sizes, depending on the nature of the threat to public safety. And none of it suggests that the Governor, when faced with a statewide threat to public safety, cannot declare a state of emergency commensurate with that threat. Here, the “area” designated by the Governor is the entire State—and rightfully so, given the nature of the threat posed to this State (indeed the world) by this highly contagious, often fatal, and still untreatable virus. See MCL 10.31(1) (permitting a declaration during a “public emergency” or “reasonable apprehension of immediate danger of a public emergency”).
Simply put, given the nature of this virus and the current limitations on our ability to test for, trace, and contain it, there is unquestionably a “reasonable apprehension of immediate danger of a public emergency” currently present in every portion of this State. MCL 10.31(1). The State is the “area involved,” and
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under the plainly stated language and intent of the EPGA, the Governor is fully authorized to designate that area and respond accordingly.20
Also, any claim that the EPGA is only designed to address local emergencies, and the EMA only statewide ones, is further belied by the language of the EMA. (Pls Bypass App, pp 15–20.) Just as the EPGA plainly accommodates emergencies statewide in scope, so too is the EMA filled with references to the authority for addressing local states of emergencies. It defines a “local state of emergency,” MCL 30.402(j), grants local officials with the authority to declare such a state of emergency, MCL 30.410(1)(b), and provides guidance where a local emergency extends “beyond the control of the county,” MCL 30.414(1). It also leads to the unfounded conclusion that, prior to the passage of the EMA in 1976, the law contemplated no means for the State to respond to a statewide emergency. The idea that the Governor would have had to issue 83 local emergency orders is not well taken, and is wholly unsupported by the text or express purpose of the EPGA. (See 5/22/20 Ct of Claims Op, p 12 (“Under plaintiffs’ view, if that emergency became too large and it affected the entire state, the Governor would have to pick and choose which citizens could be assisted by the powers granted by the EPGA[.]”).)
20 Similarly misguided is the suggestion that a statewide declaration is contrary to the EPGA because it contemplates that the Governor may act during times of public emergency “within” the State. But even adopting the Legislative Plaintiffs’ definition of “within”—“ ‘Within’ means ‘on the inside or on the inner-side’ or ‘inside the bounds of a place or region’ ” (Pls Bypass App, pp 20, ultimately quoting Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 758 (1993))—the designated area meets that definition. The entirety of the state is “inside the bounds” of the State.
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Third, like squeezing water from a stone, the Legislative Plaintiffs wish to engraft yet another limitation on the EPGA—let us call it the “rioting” limitation— in order to shrink the EPGA’s authority to reach only local emergencies of a very specific sort. (Pls Bypass App, pp 17–18, 25.) This, too, fails. While the Legislative Plaintiffs’ chosen specific term—rioting—is certainly covered by the EPGA, it sits adjacent “great public crisis,” which is quite general (and perfectly applicable), as are “disaster” and “catastrophe.” MCL 10.31. And the trusty canon of construction ejusdem generis is a handy reference, which applies “where a general term follows a series of specific terms,” requiring “the general term [to be] interpreted to include only things of the same kind, class, character, or nature as those specifically enumerated.” Neal v Wilkes, 470 Mich 661, 669 (2004) (cleaned up). With “public emergency” as the general term, the “similar” specific terms must inform the general term’s scope. The ample breadth of “public emergency” is confirmed by the distinct specific terms. The broad terms used by the Legislature, in conjunction with the liberal-construction requirement in MCL 10.32, confirm that the Governor’s declaration under the EPGA is appropriate.
Fourth, the Legislative Plaintiffs stitch together their own narrative of the history and motivations behind the enactment of the EPGA. (Pls Bypass App, pp 24–26.) Plaintiffs, of course, have told the story that helps their case, leaning heavily on a circumscribed review of prior Governors’ understanding of the law which definitionally bears little on the Legislature’s intent—the proper focus of statutory construction. As the Court of Claims found, the proffered history is
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“particularly unpersuasive” because it “does not even address or suggest the local limit plaintiffs attempt to impose on the EPGA” and “rel[ies] on mere generalities and anecdotal commentary.” (5/21/20 Ct of Claims Op and Order, p 15.)
But the accuracy or completeness of that history is fundamentally beside the point. The Legislature made its intentions in enacting the EPGA perfectly clear in the language of the statute itself, and Plaintiffs cannot rewrite those intentions to meet their own considerations. “Because the statute is clear, there is no ambiguity that would permit or justify looking outside the plain words of the statute.” In re Certified Question from US Court of Appeals for Sixth Circuit, 468 Mich 109, 116 (2003) (cleaned up). In particular, courts “do not resort to legislative history to cloud a statutory text that is clear.” Id. Lacking any ambiguity, the text of the EPGA, including its express directive to construe its terms broadly, controls.
Fifth, contrary to the Legislative Plaintiffs’ argument, the doctrine of in pari materia, which assists in reading laws on the same subject harmoniously, is generally inapplicable to statutes that are unambiguous and do not present a “patent conflict.” SBC Health Midwest, Inc v City of Kentwood, 500 Mich 65, 74 n 26 (2017). And the doctrine is most profitably applied to address statutes that do not refer to each other, so this canon is employed to make sense of their interaction. See, e.g., People v Anderson, ___ Mich App ___ (2019) (No. 343272), slip op at *3 (the doctrine applies “even if the statutes do not reference one another”).
But there is no mystery here, the second-in-time statute—the EMA— expressly explains that it does not “[l]imit, modify, or abridge the authority of the
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governor to proclaim a state of emergency pursuant [the EPGA]” or any other law in place. MCL 30.417(d). Thus, the statutes themselves unambiguously tell us that they each are—and must be read as—independent, supplementary, and nonconflicting grants of authority to the Governor. This understanding of the EMA and EPGA as overlapping authorities makes practical sense too, as the unforeseen discovery of statutory gaps in the midst of an emergency or disaster could be devastating. Better to, as the 1976 Legislature made clear with MCL 30.417(d), complement one authority with another.
The EMA provides for a more extensive structure of governmental action in response to an emergency, and a more detailed set of powers for the Governor to implement in that response. The EMA, however, expressly ensures that, underlying the mechanisms it provides for activating implementing state and local emergency response resources, there remains the EPGA and its foundational assurance that, in times of public emergency, the executive branch is empowered to exercise the police power of the State to do what is reasonable and necessary to protect life and bring the emergency under control. The law provides more than one tool in the Governor’s toolbox, without any limitation against using them in tandem.
Sixth and finally, and for these same reasons, the Legislative Plaintiffs’ attempt to engraft the EMA’s 28-day limitation period onto the EPGA must fail. There is simply nothing in the text of either statute that supports or even suggests it. The Governor’s proclamation only ceases “upon declaration by the governor that the emergency no longer exists.” MCL 10.31(2) (emphasis added). And the
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Legislature, in enacting the EMA thirty years later, wisely chose to leave that characteristic of the EPGA intact. The wisdom of this legal landscape is apparent in the case of a pandemic that respects no boundaries while impacting individuals, regional health systems, and all aspects of life in severe and unpredictable ways.
III. The EPGA contains standards that guide the Governor’s exercise of authority concomitant with the nature of broad, developing emergencies and therefore survives a non-delegation challenge. The Legislative Plaintiffs claim that the EPGA violates the separation of
powers because it lacks sufficient standards to guide the Governor’s decisionmaking, in violation of the non-delegation doctrine. Ample caselaw disagrees.
A. The branches of government are not barred from working together, and sharing their authority is permitted so long as adequate guidance is given.
The Michigan Constitution provides for the separation of powers among the three branches of state government. In particular, the Constitution provides:
The powers of government are divided into three branches: legislative, executive and judicial. No person exercising powers of one branch shall exercise powers properly belonging to another branch. [Const 1963, art 3, § 1.] But Michigan courts have never interpreted the separation of powers doctrine as meaning there can never be any overlapping of functions between branches. Soap & Detergent Ass’n v Natural Resources Comm, 415 Mich 728, 752 (1982). Rather, an overlap or sharing of power is constitutionally permissible provided that “the grant of authority to one branch is limited and specific and does not create encroachment or aggrandizement of one branch at the expense of the other.” Judicial Attorneys Ass’n v Mich, 459 Mich 291, 297 (1998); see also id. (“It is simply
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impossible for a judge to do nothing but judge; a legislator to do nothing but legislate; a governor to do nothing but execute the laws.”).
The separation of powers doctrine “ha[s] led to the constitutional discipline that is described as the nondelegation doctrine,” Taylor v Smithkline Beecham Corp, 468 Mich 1, 8 (2003), which the Legislative Plaintiffs claim the EPGA violates. While the legislative power—the power “to make, alter, and amend laws”—sits with the Legislature, Harsha v City of Detroit, 261 Mich 586, 590 (1933), both the U.S. Supreme Court and the Michigan Supreme Court “ha[ve] recognized that the separation of powers principle, and the nondelegation doctrine in particular, do not prevent Congress [or our Legislature] from obtaining the assistance of the coordinate Branches.” Taylor, 468 Mich at 8 (internal quotes omitted).
The Michigan doctrine of non-delegation has been expressed in terms of a “standards test.” Westervelt v Natural Resources Comm, 402 Mich 412, 437 (1978). Under this test, “legislation which contains a delegation of power to . . . [another branch] must contain either explicitly or by reference . . . standards prescribed for guidance . . . .” Id. at 437–438. Significantly, such standards must only be “as reasonably precise as the subject matter requires or permits.” Id. at 438.
And the statute carries a presumption of constitutionality; it “must be construed in such a way as to ‘render it valid, not invalid.’ ” Id., citing Argo Oil Corp v Atwood, 274 Mich 47, 53 (1935). In Michigan, like the federal system, successful nondelegation claims are exceedingly rare. See Taylor, 468 Mich at 9
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(“In the federal courts these improper delegation challenges to the power of federal regulatory agencies have been uniformly unsuccessful.”)
This case presents no exception to the rule; the standards set forth in the EPGA are as “reasonably as precise as the subject matter requires or permits.” Westervelt, 402 Mich at 439. The Legislature did not grant the Governor a blank check. The EPGA provides the Governor the authority, after declaring a state of emergency, to “promulgate reasonable orders, rules, and regulations as he or she considers necessary to protect life and property or to bring the emergency situation within the affected area under control.” MCL 10.31(1). Accordingly, there are several limits on the Governor’s authority. Her orders may come only upon a “public emergency” and the orders must not only be reasonable and necessary, they must be directed at protection of “life and property” or “bring[ing] the emergency situation . . . under control” in the “affected area.” Id.
Michigan courts have consistently upheld similar language as sufficiently precise to avoid any nondelegation problem. In G.F. Redmond & Co v Michigan Sec Comm’n, 222 Mich 1, 7 (1923), this Court held that “the term ‘good cause’ for revocation of the license, relating, as it does, to the conduct of the business regulated by the policy declared in the statute, is sufficiently definite.” See also Smith v Behrendt, 278 Mich 91, 97–98 (1936) (holding that allowing the executive to grant oversize loads for freeway travel in “special cases” was a limited and proper delegation of legislative authority). These examples suffice to reveal that the courts are hesitant to invalidate laws on the basis of an allegedly improper delegation
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where the Legislature provides even a modicum of direction to the executive branch. This level of trust—in the Legislature, to delegate as it sees fit, and in the executive, to follow those guidelines—justifies a strong deference from this Court to its coordinate branches.
The Legislative Plaintiffs rely on Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan v Milliken, which determined that “the power delegated to the Insurance Commissioner” regarding approval of actuarial risk factors “is completely open ended.” 422 Mich 1, 53 (1985). And for good reason—the commissioner’s authority was not guided at all. Instead, the commissioner was granted complete authority to “ ‘approve’ or ‘disapprove’ the proposed risk factors; the basis of the evaluation is not addressed.” Id. Blue Cross is a poor comparison.
And of course, the standards imposed on the Governor’s authority under the EPGA are not read in a vacuum—the “subject matter” of the delegation guides how strictly or narrowly drawn the standards must be. Westervelt, 402 Mich at 439. The context of a developing “crisis, disaster, rioting, catastrophe, or similar public emergency,” MCL 10.31(1), counsels granting substantial leeway to the decisionmaker. Public emergencies are not static events, nor do they unfold patiently or predictably. Response to such crises warrant—indeed require— nimbleness coupled with judgment to meet the needs of the moment. There is no specific one-size-fits-all response to a complex and ongoing emergency. This subject matter requires the broadest level of leeway permissible under the nondelegation doctrine. If “the management of natural resources is a difficult and complex task,”
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DNR v Seaman, 396 Mich 299, 311 (1976), surely the response to a rapidly developing and ever-changing public health crisis is even more so.
The EPGA provides the Governor substantial discretion, but limits her ability to act upon a finding of an emergency, and even then only to exercise her discretion to issue “reasonable” orders “necessary” to protect “life and property” and to bring the emergency “under control.” MCL 10.31(1). These guideposts are more than sufficient, and do not contemplate legislative or judicial second-guessing.
B. The Legislature is not best equipped to address the exigencies of an emergency.
The Legislative Plaintiffs highlight the Legislature’s “nature and design” as best situated to handle the ongoing public health crisis. (Pls Ct of Claims Br, p 44.) They offer the virtues of “consensus through rigorous parliamentary debate,” and considerable “distillation and refinement,” to make public policy choices. (Id.) As explained in painstaking detail by an amicus filing in the Court of Claims (Senate Democrats Caucus Br, pp 6–12), the road from an idea to a bill to an enactment is a long one, filled with procedural requirements—most notably, the constitutional requirement that each bill must sit, at a minimum, for five days in each chamber before it can be passed, Const 1963, art 4, § 26. Though valuable in the normal course of legislative deliberation, the response necessary to combat a fast-moving, contagious disease is agile and flexible (as well as temporary and reasonable)
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action, not Robert’s Rules of Order.21 The Legislature knows that to meet the moment, proper delegation to the executive is the wisest course, which is why it granted the authorities it did to the Governor.
This Court should honor that choice. Having extolled its virtues in making public policy choices, it is incumbent on the Legislature, not this Court, to make the changes it seeks. Bicameralism and presentment are the procedures that the Legislature designed to effectuate such choices, and if it thinks it is wise to take the reins in the middle of this crisis, it should exercise its legislative authority to do so. IV. In the EMA, the Legislature requires the Governor declare a state of
emergency and disaster if she finds certain conditions exist. In addition to her authority under the EPGA, the Governor has an independent source of emergency-response authority in the EMA. In determining that the Governor acted outside of that statutory authority under the EMA when issuing Executive Order 2020-68, the Court of Claims made its only error on the merits. That error stems from an interpretation of the EMA’s provision concerning the effect of the Legislature’s decision not to extend the Governor’s declarations of emergency and disaster. (5/22/20 Ct of Claims Op, pp 19–25.) Before review of that provision, however, an understanding of the scope of the EMA sets the background.
21 In some emergency circumstances, even the constitutionally mandated quorum necessary to do business in the Legislature could pose logistical barriers. Const 1963, art 4, § 14.
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A. The EMA sets out a statutory game-plan for state and local emergency response, and it grants the Governor broad powers and duties to “cop[e] with dangers to the state or its people.”
First enacted in 1976, the EMA sets forth several independent (though related) obligations regarding state and local responses to emergencies and disasters in the State. The Governor is not the only subject of the EMA—that act tasks county boards of commissioners, MCL 30.409, and directors in state government, MCL 30.408, among others, with emergency planning, including the designation of emergency management coordinators. See MCL 30.410. It grants those local coordinators the authority to declare a local state of emergency and permits them to, among other things, appropriate funds, provide emergency assistance to victims of a disaster, and enter into regional compacts with public and private entities to respond to the emergencies. MCL 30.410(1)(b).
Particular to the Governor, the EMA grants her the important responsibility to “cop[e] with dangers to this state or the people of this state presented by a disaster or emergency.” MCL 30.403(1). This broad charge places the Governor at the forefront of emergency and disaster responsiveness and serves as a baseline for the latitude given to her by the Legislature in times of crisis. To that end, she possesses the authority to “issues executive orders, proclamations, and directives having the force and effect of law.” MCL 30.403(2). The act grants the Governor, and only the Governor, the authority to amend or rescind those orders. Id.
This broad statement of authority is confirmed throughout the EMA. For example, MCL 30.414(3), makes clear that the EMA “shall not be construed to restrain the governor from exercising on his own initiative any of the powers set
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forth in this act.” The act also emphasizes the breadth and strength it is intended to add to the Governor’s preexisting emergency response authority, stating that it does not “[l]imit, modify, or abridge” the authority of the Governor to proclaim a state of emergency under the EPGA “or exercise any other powers vested in him or her under the state constitution of 1963, statutes, or common law of the state independent of, or in conjunction with, this act.” MCL 30.417(d). As discussed above, the EPGA confers emergency authority on the Governor without mention of legislative involvement—a characteristic the EMA expressly preserved.
B. If the conditions warrant it, the Governor has a duty under the EMA to declare states of emergency and disaster which actuates certain emergency response mechanisms.
Consistent with this broad authority, the Governor has the obligation to declare states of disaster and emergency if the pertinent conditions exist. She “shall, by executive order or proclamation, declare a state of emergency if he or she finds that an emergency has occurred or that the threat of an emergency exists.” MCL 30.403(4) (emphasis added). Similarly, she “shall, by executive order or proclamation, declare a state of disaster if he or she finds a disaster has occurred or the threat of a disaster exists.” MCL 30.403(3) (emphasis added).
Upon that order or proclamation, the law grants the Governor authority to marshal both state and federal resources to adequately deal with the danger facing the State.22 The executive order or proclamation also authorizes the Governor to
22 See, e.g., MCL 30.404(1) (authorizing deployment of forces and distribution of supplies); MCL 30.404(2) (the Governor may seek and accept federal assistance); MCL 30.408(1) (demanding cooperation among the state agencies).
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exercise additional broad powers, including “[s]uspending a regulatory statute, order, or rule prescribing the procedures for conduct of state business” in certain circumstances, “commandeer[ing] . . . private property necessary to cope with the disaster or emergency,” and “[c]ontrol[ling] ingress and egress to and from a stricken or threatened area,” and “[d]irect[ing] all other actions which are necessary and appropriate under the circumstances.” MCL 30.405(1)(a), (d), (g), (j).
And the EMA expressly defines “state of disaster” and “state of emergency” independently from “disaster” and “emergency.” “[D]isaster” and “emergency” refer to conditions that the Governor may find to exist in the State.23
Distinctly, “state of emergency” and “state of disaster”—both of which were declared in Executive Order 2020-68—are defined as types of executive orders or proclamations that the Governor must issue upon finding emergency or disaster conditions exist. Per MCL 30.402(p), “ ‘state of disaster’ means an executive order or proclamation that activates the disaster response and recovery aspects of the state, local, and interjurisdictional emergency operations plans applicable to the counties or municipalities affected.” (Emphasis added.) Similarly, “ ‘state of emergency’ means an executive order or proclamation that activates the emergency response and recovery aspects of the state, local, and interjurisdictional emergency
23 The EMA defines both “disaster” and “emergency.” Under MCL 30.402(e), “ ‘[d]isaster’ means an occurrence or threat of widespread or severe damage, injury, or loss of life or property resulting from a natural or human-made cause. . . .” “Emergency” is defined as “any occasion or instance in which the governor determines state assistance is needed to supplement local efforts and capabilities to save lives, protect property and the public health and safety, or to lessen or avert the threat of a catastrophe in any part of the state.” MCL 30.402(h).
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operations plans applicable to the counties or municipalities affected.” MCL 30.402(p) (emphasis added).
In short, “state of emergency” and “state of disaster” are species of executive orders that activate certain response efforts and resources and may—indeed, must—be issued only when “emergency” or “disaster” conditions are found to exist. These statutory definitions are important to understand the interplay between the Governor’s termination of her prior declarations and subsequent new declarations.
Importantly, “if [the Governor] finds that an emergency [or disaster] has occurred or that the threat of an emergency [or disaster] exists,” the Governor “shall” declare as such in an executive order or proclamation. MCL 30.403(3), (4). Under longstanding Michigan precedent, “the word ‘shall’ is ordinarily construed in its imperative sense, excluding the idea of discretion.” State Bd of Ed v Houghton Lake Cmty Sch, 430 Mich 658, 670 (1988).24 The Governor thus has a duty to declare a state of emergency or a state of disaster if she determines a disaster or emergency has occurred or will occur.
And just as she is required to declare a state of emergency if the real-world conditions merit it, she also has the duty to “terminate” a state of disaster or emergency, i.e., such executive orders, if the conditions cease or the Legislature refuses to extend those executive orders. MCL 30.403(3), (4).
24 See also Sauder v Dist Bd of Sch Dist No 10, Royal Oak Tp, Oakland Co, 271 Mich 413, 418 (1935) (when a statute uses “shall” and “the public are interested” that charge “is imperative”); Southfield Tp v Main, 357 Mich 59, 76 (1959) (“The use of the word ‘shall’ is mandatory and imperative and when used in a command to a public official.”).
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C. Pursuant to the EMA’s mandates, the Governor terminated her earlier declarations and issued new ones because there was an undisputed “disaster” and “emergency” in Michigan.
As April 30 approached and with it the expiration of the declared states of emergency and disaster under the EMA, see Executive Order 2020-33, the Legislature declined to extend those executive orders, despite the lack of dispute that that the conditions in our State remained dire. On April 30, then, in accordance the mandate that the Governor “terminate” the state of emergency and disaster declarations under the EMA absent legislative extension, MCL 30.403(3), (4), the Governor so terminated. Executive Order 2020-66.
Then, since the conditions on the ground undisputedly remained dire—just that day, over 100 Michiganders died from the virus and over 1,100 were confirmed infected25—the Governor found “that an emergency [or disaster] has occurred or that the threat of an emergency [or disaster] exists,” triggering her duty under the EMA to declare as such in an executive order or proclamation. MCL 30.403(3), (4); Executive Order 2020-68, Preamble.
In carrying out her statutory duty, the Governor acknowledged that the measures implemented pursuant to her authority under the EMA and the EPGA (like the Stay at Home order, among others) “have been effective, but the need for them—like the unprecedented crisis posed by this global pandemic—is far from over.” Id. She emphasized the continued lack of treatment for the virus, the ease of
25 MLive, Thursday, April 30: Latest developments on coronavirus in Michigan, available at https://www.mlive.com/public-interest/2020/04/thursday-april-30-latestdevelopments-on-coronavirus-in-michigan.html
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transmission, and the “lack [of] adequate means to fully test for it and trace its spread.” Id. Ultimately, the Governor found that “the threat and danger posed to Michigan by the COVID-19 pandemic has by no means passed, and the disaster and emergency conditions it has created still very much exist.” Id. Given her findings and the facts on the ground, the Governor was obligated to issue the declaration.
D. The construction of the Court of Claims and the Legislative Plaintiffs adds limitations on the Governor’s authority that the Legislature did not impose.
The Court of Claims erroneously ruled that the Governor was barred from issuing Executive Order 2020-68. Because the Legislature did not extend the emergency and disaster declarations set to expire on April 30, the Governor terminated them, just as she was required to do. Id. But her duty to issue states of emergency and disaster plainly remained, and was not the subject of those terminated declarations. So, because of the duty to issue such declarations whenever the conditions warrant it—the law states that she “shall” do so—she immediately issued new orders declaring states of emergency and disaster. Id.
The Legislative Plaintiffs’ position—that their refusal to extend requires not only termination of the executive orders, but bars the Governor from issuing distinct and subsequent executive orders—finds no mention in the text. (5/21/20 Ct of Claims Op at 23.) Rather, the Legislature seeks to engraft a second effect of their refusal to extend the Governor’s executive orders: the negation of her duty to respond to emergencies under the EMA.
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To illuminate the legal error (and the real-world stakes) in an all-too-possible factual context, barring the Governor from declaring a state of emergency or disaster on the same subject matter of a prior, un-extended declaration would prohibit her from activating the EMA’s emergency response resources to combat COVID-19, no matter how badly or urgently those resources are needed. How long would the Governor have to wait from the earlier termination before enough time had passed, if the Plaintiffs and the Court of Claims are correct that a minute is simply not long enough? How about a day? A week? Six months? No time period exists in the statute, and this Court should not add some extra-textual time-lapse before the Governor may fulfill her statutory duty to the State and its residents.
Nor is there any requirement in the statute, express or implied, that the Governor’s duty to declare an emergency or disaster may spring back up, but only if the conditions change. (5/21/20 Ct of Claims Op at 23.) And in the absence of any statutory guidance, how is the Governor to know, or a court to review, whether the conditions have sufficiently changed? The EMA does not contemplate this, nor would it make any sense as a matter of emergency response; the decision to declare states of emergency and disaster is entrusted to the sound discretion of the Governor and is based, as it should be, on what the existing conditions require, not on whether they have changed in some undefined and uncertain way. Imposing such extra-textual rules about how and when a Governor can reactivate needed emergency response resources is both unwarranted and dangerous.
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Public health experts warn of a possible second wave of this pandemic. The existence of such unknowns and uncertainties about the future impact of the coronavirus (as with many emergencies or disasters) further supports reading the law as it is, not as the Legislative Plaintiffs would like it to be. The Legislature wrote the law; the Governor followed it. Only the Legislature may amend it.
The Governor is not granted her emergency authority without limit, as the Legislative Plaintiffs’ seemingly warned below. Indeed, although the Governor “shall” declare an emergency or disaster “if he or she finds” that an emergency or disaster has occurred or threat of either exists, she is not empowered to declare either in the absence of the conditions precedent. MCL 30.403(3) and (4). These clear textual limitations should mute the siren-decibel lamentations of the Governor’s purported “tyranny.” (Pls Ct of Claims Br, p 41.)26
And while a Governor’s factual finding of an emergency is entitled to great deference, it is not beyond judicial review. Straus v Governor, 459 Mich 526, 533 (1999), quoting People ex rel Johnson v Coffey, 237 Mich 591, 602 (1927) (“The Governor holds an exalted office. To him, and to him alone, a sovereign people has committed the power and the right to determine the facts in the proceeding before us. His decision of disputed question of fact is final. His finding of fact, if it has
26 The Legislative Plaintiffs bludgeon the Governor’s supposed creation of “new crimes” and for criminalizing violation of her executive orders. (Pls Ct of Claims Reply Br, pp 4, 23–24.) Yet, it is the Legislature that criminalized violation of a Governor’s executive orders. MCL 30.405 (willfully disobeying or interfering with an order of the Governor is a misdemeanor); MCL 10.33 (violation of Governor’s orders “shall be punishable as a misdemeanor” where so stated).
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evidence to support it, is conclusive on this court.”) (emphasis added). If a party disputes the factual support for the Governor’s findings supporting a declaration, it may attempt redress in the courts. But, again, the Legislative Plaintiffs have agreed that emergency and disaster conditions exist.
E. The Legislative Plaintiffs’ responsive arguments do not fully account for the language of the act.
The Legislative Plaintiffs made several arguments below why the Governor’s April 30, 2020 declaration of a state of emergency and state of disaster under the EMA are void. None have merit.
1. No piece of the EMA is invalidated or rendered nugatory. The Court of Claims agreed with the Legislative Plaintiffs’ contention that, under the Governor’s reading, the concurrent-resolution procedure for extending states of emergency and disaster beyond 28 days in MCL 30.403(3) and (4) is rendered meaningless. (5/21/20 Ct of Claims Op and Order, p 24.) Not so. First, the lack of legislative extension after 28 days forces the Governor to terminate those executive orders. That is no mere technicality. This mechanism is a tool to hold the Governor accountable if the conditions supporting a declaration are questionable, or completely lacking. Recall that the declaration “shall” include an explanation of the conditions causing the disaster or emergency and the area affected. MCL 30.403(3) and (4). Therefore, by refusing to extend a declared state of emergency or disaster, the Legislature can force the Governor to prove her
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insistence that an emergency or disaster has not abated, creating an interbranch dialogue on a matter of utmost public importance.27
But that is not the circumstance before the Court—the Legislative Plaintiffs have not denied that Michigan faces a dire public health threat, nor could it in good faith do so. Nonetheless, the Legislature withheld. The statute it drafted, though, does not allow that withholding to override the Governor’s duty to declare states of disaster and emergency, and to cope with the dangers facing the State, when the conditions on the ground warrant it. And wisely so. In a wildfire, the firefighters holding the hose do not pack up if someone shuts off a ringing alarm. Instead, they fight the spread and respond to the conditions as they are.
The lack of legislative extension after 28 days also serves another purpose. It forces the Governor not only to show her work to the Legislature, but to explain to the People the grounds for any renewal of the declarations. This is because all emergency or disaster proclamations must be “disseminated promptly” to “bring its contents to the attention of the general public.” Id. Thus, at least every 28 days, her justifications must be manifest to the whole State, to whom she answers.
Of course, this Court has recognized that it “is not to second-guess those policy decisions or to change the words of a statute in order to reach a different result.” People v Harris, 499 Mich 332, 345 (2016). If the Legislative Plaintiffs now complain that the language they wrote grants them an insufficient measure of
27 Ultimately, as discussed above, this is a determination that, while subject to great deference, is within the courts’ authority to review. See Straus, 459 Mich at 533; Coffey, 237 Mich at 602.
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control over the Governor’s handling of an emergency or disaster, it is up to the Legislature, not this Court, to modify its statutes.
The Legislature had several options for writing its law differently. It could have set an expiration period on her legal duty to declare an emergency, rather than on the just the declaration. Or it could have prohibited the Governor from issuing a substantively similar declaration if the Legislature did not extend the earlier one. It could have constructed the definitions of “state of disaster” and “state of emergency” differently. But the 1976 Legislature wisely did not draft so inflexible and short-sighted a statute. Myriad unforeseen disasters and emergencies awaited future generations, so the Legislature’s words requiring the Governor to issue a declaration where the real-world implications persist was a humble acknowledgement of our predictive limitations, and a trust in the one statewide office equipped to lead a coordinated response.
2. The Governor’s construction does not yield absurd results.
Below, the Legislative Plaintiffs leaned on the concept of absurd results (Pls Ct of Claims Br, pp 21–23), arguing that the Governor issued contradictory orders by simultaneously terminating and declaring states of emergency and disaster. But this, again, shows a misunderstanding both of the Governor’s declarations and of the language of the EMA. Even if the absurd results doctrine exists in Michigan, Johnson v Recca, 492 Mich 169, 193 (2012) (questioning that premise), it involves a high standard: “[a] result is only absurd if it is quite impossible that the Legislature could have intended the result,” id. (cleaned up).
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Again, “state of emergency” and “state of disaster” are, by statutory definition, types of “executive orders.” MCL 30.402(p) and (q). And as the Governor made abundantly clear in Executive Order 2020-66, the termination of her previously declared states of emergency and disaster was not driven by any belief that the emergency and disaster conditions requiring them had ceased to exist. Rather, per the EMA, she terminated those executive orders only because the Legislature refused to extend them. MCL 30.403(3) and (4). Accordingly, Executive Order 2020-66 complies stringently with the law. The Legislature wrote the rules; the Governor followed them.
3. If the Legislative Plaintiffs are right about the authority to effectively veto the Governor’s declarations under the EMA, the Legislature retained an unconstitutional legislative veto under Chadha and Blank.
The Legislative Plaintiffs read the EMA’s concurrent-resolution extension mechanism as a means for the Legislature to force the termination not only of certain orders, but of the Governor’s substantive emergency response authority under the EMA. This reading not only goes beyond contradicting the EMA’s plain text—it is unconstitutional. As discussed above, the Legislature may share its constitutional authority with the Governor provided it prescribes standards for guidance that are reasonably precise in light of the subject matter of the delegation. But once the Legislature does so, it may not retain what amounts to a legislative veto. Blank v Department of Corrections, 462 Mich 103, 113 (2000). If the Legislative Plaintiffs are correct about their interpretation of the concurrentresolution provision, then that body has not just kept a modicum of oversight, but a
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“right to approve or disapprove” the Governor’s exercise of delegated authority—and to do so without itself abiding by constitutional requirements of bicameralism and presentment. Id. Such invasive oversight would violate our Constitution.
In INS v Chadha, 462 US 919 (1983), the U.S. Supreme Court evaluated whether the Constitution permitted Congress to delegate authority to the executive but permit one house of Congress to retain veto authority over the actions of the executive. The Court held that such a maneuver violated the principle of bicameralism and presentment. Id. at 959. Just as in Chadha, where there was “[d]isagreement with the Attorney General’s decision on Chadha‘s deportation— that is, Congress’ decision to deport Chadha,” here, the Legislative Plaintiffs disagree with the Governor’s decision to declare states of disaster and emergency in Michigan and to activate the response resources that accompany those declarations. Id. at 954. Such “determinations of policy” by legislative branches may be implemented “in only one way”: bicameral passage and presentment to the President (or Governor). Id. at 954–955. “Congress must abide by its delegation of authority until that delegation is legislatively altered or revoked.” Id. at 955.
In Blank, this Court applied the framework in Chadha in considering the constitutionality of a 1977 amendment to the Administrative Procedures Act, which required an administrative agency to “obtain the approval of a joint committee of the Legislature or the Legislature itself before enacting new administrative rules.” 462 Mich at 108 (Kelly, J.). The Court framed the issue as follows: “[W]hether the Legislature, upon delegating [rulemaking authority to an executive-branch agency],
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may retain the right to approve or disapprove rules proposed by [the agency].” Id. at 113. The plurality opinion ultimately answered that question in the negative, finding that the Legislature’s approval or disapproval of an executive-agency rule is “inherently legislative” and therefore “subject to the enactment and presentment requirements of the Michigan Constitution.” Id. at 115–116.
The same conclusion holds for any determination by the Legislature that the Governor can no longer exercise the emergency powers the Legislature has vested in her through the EMA. Effectuating such an inherently legislative determination requires legislative action, and “[w]hen the Legislature engages in ‘legislative action’ it must do so by enacting legislation.” Id. at 119. “[T]he Legislature cannot circumvent the enactment and presentment requirements [that must accompany legislative action] simply by labeling or characterizing its action as something other than ‘legislation.’ ” Id. The Legislative Plaintiffs thus cannot complain that the EMA’s concurrent-resolution procedure has not been given the effect they would like it to have, because that effect—a legislative veto of the Governor’s delegated authority—would be unconstitutional.
The Court of Claims erred in concluding that “[t]he 28-day limit is not legislative oversight or a ‘veto’ of the Governor’s emergency declaration; rather, it is a standard imposed on the authority so delegated.” (5/21/20 Ct of Claims Op and Order, p 25.) But that conclusion is a consequence of the erroneous determination that the legislative extension provision does more work than the text provides. The Legislature’s withholding only results in the termination of certain executive
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orders; it does not operate as a “stop” button on the duty the Legislature delegated to the Governor to respond to emergencies and disaster. The Legislature “must abide by its delegation of authority until that delegation is legislatively altered or revoked,” Chadha, 462 US at 955, through the means set forth in the Constitution.
* * * The Legislative Plaintiffs ask this Court to nullify the Governor’s declarations and all of the executive orders derived from them, like the incrementally loosening Stay Home Order, among others. The emergency and disaster declarations issued by the Governor were executed after careful consideration of the unique nature of the threat facing Michigan and the advice of numerous individuals and entities with unique expertise. To judicially strip the Governor of her authority, contrary to her clear legal obligations, would not just upset the separation of powers, it would work grievous harm on the State and its citizens. If asking this Court to strike down its own statute as unconstitutional is not ironic enough, the Legislative Plaintiffs come to the judiciary seeking a shortcut to do something it already has the power to do—amend the challenged laws. Because both emergency acts grant the Governor the authority she has exercised, and because she has stringently abided by the very terms the Legislature used in granting that power, this Court should hold that the Governor’s executive orders were proper.
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CONCLUSION AND RELIEF REQUESTED The Governor asks this Court to grant the bypass applications, determine that the Michigan House of Representatives and Michigan Senate do not have standing, and hold in the alternative on the merits—that the Governor’s Executive Orders 2020-66, 2020-67, and 2020-68 are validly issued orders under the EPGA and EMA.
Respectfully submitted, B. Eric Restuccia Deputy Solicitor General

Dated: May 29, 2020

/s/ Christopher M. Allen Christopher M. Allen (P75329) Assistant Solicitor General
/s/ Joseph T. Froehlich Joseph T. Froehlich (P71887) Assistant Attorney General
Joshua Booth (P53847) John Fedynsky (P65232) Assistant Attorneys General Michigan Dep’t of Attorney General Attorney for Defendant-Appellee/ Cross-Appellant P.O. Box 30212 Lansing, MI 48909 (517) 335-7628 allenc28@michigan.gov froehlichj1@michigan.gov boothj2@michigan.gov fedynksyj@michigan.gov

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

LEAGUE OF INDEPENDENT FITNESS FACILITIES )

AND TRAINERS, INC., et al.,

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

-v-

)

)

GRETCHEN WHITMER and

)

ROBERT GORDON,

)

Defendants.

)

)

No. 1:20-cv-458 Honorable Paul L. Maloney

OPINION

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction

(ECF No. 32). Plaintiffs seek to enjoin Defendants from enforcing Michigan Executive

Order (“EO”) 2020-110 and EO 2020-115.1 In effect, Plaintiffs wish to reopen their indoor

fitness facilities. The Court offered to take evidentiary proofs (none were offered) and heard

oral argument on the motion on June 17, 2020. For the reasons to be stated, the Court will

grant the motion.

I.

This case exists because of the coronavirus pandemic, which needs no introduction.

To contain the virus, Governor Gretchen Whitmer has issued over 120 executive orders.

1 Plaintiffs also seek to enjoin enforcement of an April 2, 2020 statement made by Michigan Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) Director Robert Gordon. Gordon issued an emergency order authorizing local health departments to carry out and enforce the terms of the Executive Orders “and their accompanying frequently asked questions.” Plaintiffs challenge the ability of local health departments to enforce the FAQs, given that they are subject to change informally. On May 18, 2020, Gordon filed an updated order rescinding the April 2 order, but still authorizing local health departments to carry out and enforce the terms of the Executive Orders. Given that the objectionable part of the statement has been rescinded and the HHS’s position now requires only enforcement of the Executive Orders themselves, the Court need not evaluate the HHS order separately.

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On March 16, 2020, Governor Whitmer issued EO 2020-09, titled “Temporary restrictions on the use of places of public accommodation.” (See ECF No. 33-4.) Paragraph 1(f) of that Order closed all “Gymnasiums, fitness centers, recreation centers, indoor sports facilities, indoor exercise facilities, exercise studios, and spas” (Id.). As the situation changed, so too did the Governor’s orders: several iterations of the “Temporary restriction” order have been issued, each time changing slightly to meet the moment but staying firm on the closure of indoor exercise facilities (See, e.g., EO 2020-20, ECF No. 33-5; EO 2020-43, ECF No. 336; EO 2020-69, ECF No. 33-7).
As of the time of writing, one of the operative Orders is EO 2020-110, titled “Temporary restrictions on certain events, gatherings, and businesses” (See ECF No. 33-15). Paragraph 12(b) of that order requires “Indoor gymnasiums, fitness centers, recreation centers, sports facilities, exercise facilities, exercise studios, and the like” to remain closed to ingress, egress, use, and occupancy by members of the public in most of the state (Id. at ¶ 12(b)). Paragraph 19 of that Order makes clear that a willful violation of the Order is a misdemeanor (Id. at ¶ 19).
Executive Order 2020-115, titled the same, is also presently in effect (See ECF No. 33-16). This Order repeals EO 2020-110 for the entire upper peninsula and parts of the lower peninsula (Id. at ¶ 3). That Order also allows arcades, bowling alleys, climbing facilities, night clubs, sports arenas, and other similar venues to open throughout the state, subject to capacity restrictions. (Id. at ¶ 7(b)).
The Plaintiffs in this case are 22 individual companies that own and operate fitness businesses in Michigan, as well as the League of Independent Fitness Facilities and Trainers,
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Inc., (“LIFFT”), which is a trade organization that represents over 150 fitness facilities throughout the state. On May 22, 2020, they filed this lawsuit, alleging that Defendants are violating several of their constitutional rights by forcing them to keep their businesses closed. On June 8, 2020, Plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction, seeking to enjoin Defendants from enforcing EO 2020-110 and EO 2020-115 to the extent that those orders require Plaintiffs to keep their indoor fitness facilities closed.
II. A trial court may issue a preliminary injunction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65. A district court has discretion to grant or deny preliminary injunctions. Planet Aid v. City of St. Johns, Michigan, 782 F.3d 318, 323 (6th Cir. 2015). A court must consider each of four factors: (1) whether the moving party demonstrates a strong likelihood of success on the merits; (2) whether the moving party would suffer irreparable injury without the order; (3) whether the order would cause substantial harm to others; and (4) whether the public interest would be served by the order. Ohio Republican Party v. Brunner, 543 F.3d 357, 361 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting Northeast Ohio Coalition for Homeless & Service Employees Int’l Union v. Blackwell, 467 F.3d 999, 1009 (6th Cir. 2006)). The four factors are not prerequisites that must be established at the outset but are interconnected considerations that must be balanced together. Northeast Ohio Coalition, 467 F.3d at 1009; Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action v. Granholm, 473 F.3d 237, 244 (6th Cir. 2006). “A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy which should be granted only if the movant carries his or her burden of proving that the circumstances clearly demand it.” Overstreet v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Gov’t, 305 F.3d 566, 573 (6th
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Cir. 2002) (internal citation omitted); see Patio Enclosures, Inc. v. Herbst, 39 F. App’x 964, 967 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing Leary v. Daeschner, 228 F.3d 729, 736 (6th Cir. 2000)).
The purpose of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo. Smith Wholesale Co., Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 477 F.3d 854, 873 n. 13 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting United States v. Edward Rose & Sons, 384 F.3d 258, 261 (6th Cir. 2004)). The Sixth Circuit has noted that “[a]lthough the four factors must be balanced, the demonstration of some irreparable injury is a sine qua non for issuance of an injunction.” Patio Enclosures, 39 F. App’x at 967 (citing Friendship Materials, Inc. v. Michigan Brick, Inc., 679 F.2d 100, 105 (6th Cir. 1982)).
III. A. At the outset, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs do not have standing to bring this case. In Defendants’ eyes, Plaintiffs have not suffered an “injury-in-fact” as required by Article III because they bring pre-enforcement claims. To satisfy the Constitution’s standing requirements, a plaintiff must show that it has “(1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016). On the first prong, an actual injury is not required if Plaintiffs demonstrate that they have been forced to choose between their constitutional interest and prosecution: “When an individual is subject to [the threatened enforcement of a law], an actual arrest, prosecution, or other enforcement action is not a prerequisite to challenging the law.” Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149, 158
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(2014). Pre-enforcement review is appropriate if circumstances render the threatened enforcement “sufficiently imminent.” Id. at 159. Under this standard, “a plaintiff satisfies the injury-in-fact requirement where he alleges ‘an intention to engage in a course of conduct arguably affected with a constitutional interest, but proscribed by a statute, and there exists a credible threat of prosecution thereunder.’ ” Id. (quoting Babbitt v. Farm Workers, 442 U.S. 289, 298 (1979)).
That is the case here: Plaintiffs would like to reopen their gyms, and they argue that the state of Michigan is violating their constitutional rights as long as it prevents them from doing so. Each relevant executive order notes that a willful violation of the order is a misdemeanor (See, e.g., EO 2020-115 at ¶ 15). If Plaintiffs violate the orders and open their gyms, they are faced with a credible threat of prosecution. This is underscored by Attorney General Dana Nessel’s statements that if gym owners “go ahead and violate the law knowing and understanding what the law is – then, unfortunately they’ll have to pay the consequences for it.” See Michigan attorney general issues warning to businesses violating Gov. Whitmer’s order, Click on Detroit (ECF No. 37-2). The State Attorney General’s office has requested local police departments to investigate gyms that are violating the order (Id.). Defendants’ argument that there is no credible threat of prosecution is disingenuous. Therefore, the individual Plaintiffs have standing to bring this case.
Defendants also allege that LIFFT does not have standing to sue. As a representative association, LIFFT must demonstrate associational standing, which is met when “(1) the organization’s members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (2) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization’s purpose; and (3) neither the
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claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit.” Friends of Tims Ford v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 585 F.3d 955, 967 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Hunt v. Washington State Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977) (quotation marks omitted)). This requires an association to “allege that its members, or any one of them, are suffering immediate or threatened injury as a result of the challenged action of the sort that would make out a justiciable case had them members themselves brought suit.” United Food & Commercial Workers Union Local 751 v. Brown Group, Inc., 517 U.S. 544, 552 (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 511 (1975) (quotation marks omitted)).
Defendants argue that LIFFT does not have standing because its members do not have standing. But for the same reasons that the individual Plaintiffs have standing, LIFFT’s members have standing. Therefore, LIFFT has standing as a representative association.
B. Turning, then, to Plaintiffs’ likelihood of success on the merits of their claims: Plaintiffs’ motion focuses on three alleged constitutional violations. They argue that Defendants are violating their rights to procedural due process, equal protection, and the guarantees of the dormant Commerce Clause. The three arguments present slightly different considerations, but at bottom, all of Plaintiffs’ constitutional positions argue that the continued restrictions on indoor gyms do not survive even rational basis review. “Procedural due process imposes constrains on governmental decisions that deprive individuals of ‘liberty’ or ‘property’ interests within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976). These liberty and property
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interests may not be obstructed by a legislative action under the guise of protecting the public interest if that action is “arbitrary or without some reasonable relation to some purpose with the competency of the state to effect.” Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399-400 (1923) (emphasis added). The alleged due process violation in this case is the State’s ongoing failure to provide a post-deprivation hearing; the due process claim did not arise at the outset of the deprivation. See Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 (1990). But that is only tangential to the Court’s decision today: In any event, the State cannot act without some “reasonable relation” to a government interest. Meyer, 262 U.S. 399-400.
Similarly, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that no state can “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const. Amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 4. Under this standard, a state action that regulates economic activity in a discriminatory manner violates the Equal Protection clause unless the state can show a “rational relationship between the disparity of treatment and some legitimate governmental purpose.” Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 36667 (2001) (quoting Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993)). This is not a high bar; the government’s decision must be upheld unless it is “arbitrary or irrational.” City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 446 (1985). This requires the Court to uphold any order that the State can justify with any set of facts that creates a “conceivable rational basis.” F.C.C. v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 309 (1993).
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Finally, the “dormant” Commerce Clause2 restricts states from regulating the flow of interstate commerce. Huish Detergents, Inc., v. Warren Co., Kentucky, 214 F.3d 707, 712 (6th Cir. 2000). A state’s regulation of interstate commerce is prohibited under the dormant Commerce Clause if it imposes a burden on interstate commerce that is “clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits” even in the absence of discrimination against out-ofstate business interests in favor of in-state business interest. Id. at 713 (quoting C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, New York, 511 U.S. 383, 390 (1994)). Thus, a burden on interstate commerce that had no rational justification would be invalid. Cavel Int’l, Inc., v. Madigan, 500 F.3d 551, 556 (7th Cir. 2007).
On each argument, Plaintiffs are required to show that Defendants’ actions do not have a rational relation to the stated government interest of protecting the public health.3 Plaintiffs must show that there is no conceivable set of facts from which a rational relation can be drawn. This is where the Court would begin in normal times, but it is abundantly clear that “normal times” ended in early March when the coronavirus pandemic took hold in Michigan.
When state actors are faced with “great dangers” like a pandemic, they may use their police power with great latitude to protect the health and safety of the general public. Jacobson v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 29 (1905). The state may temporarily infringe on the liberties guaranteed by the constitution to individuals in favor of
2 The Commerce Clause gives Congress the power to regulate commerce among the states. U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The Supreme Court has interpreted this to mean that states’ ability to restrict or discriminate against interstate commerce is limited; hence the term “dormant” Commerce Clause. See, e.g., Department of Revenue of Kentucky v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 337-8 (2008). 3 Plaintiffs do not challenge the legitimacy or the gravity of the State’s interest in this case.
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the common good: “Real liberty for all could not exist under the operation of a principle which recognizes the right of each individual person to use his own, whether in respect of his person or his property, regardless of the injury that may be done to others.” Id. at 26.
In Jacobson, faced with a growing smallpox epidemic, the city of Cambridge, Massachusetts enacted a mandatory vaccination law; violators were subject to a criminal fine. Id. at 12. The defendant argued that the law violated his Fourth Amendment right “to care for his own body and health in such way as to him seems best.” Id. at 26. The Supreme Court upheld the law as a proper exercise of the State’s police power, given the exigencies and the dangerousness of the public health crisis: “Upon the principle of self-defense, of paramount necessity, a community has the right to protect itself against an epidemic of disease which threatens the safety of its members.” Id. at 27. The Court recognized that generally, individual constitutional rights were inalienable, but also that
every well-ordered society charged with the duty of conserving the safety of its members the rights of the individual in respect of his liberty may at times, under the pressure of great dangers, be subjected to such restraint, to be enforced by reasonable regulations, as the safety of the general public may demand. Id. at 29. Therefore, the Court declined to “usurp the functions of another branch of government” by second-guessing the executive’s exercise of police power in the face of the pandemic. Id. at 28. However, the Jacobson Court did not give states carte blanche to infringe on the constitutional rights of their citizens under the guise of public safety. The Court noted that the state’s police power “might be exercised in particular circumstances and in reference to particular persons in such an arbitrary, unreasonable manner, or might go so far beyond what
9

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was reasonably required for the safety of the public, as to authorize or compel the courts to interfere for the protection of such persons.” Id. at 28. Thus, restrictions may be subject to judicial review if the challenged action “has no real or substantial relation to those objects [of securing public health and safety], or is beyond all question, a plain, palpable invasion of rights secured by the fundamental law.” Id. at 31.
A growing number of courts, both federal and state, have applied Jacobson to COVID-19 related regulations in the last few months, including the Sixth Circuit and the Supreme Court. The Sixth Circuit has confirmed that Jacobson is the proper starting point for evaluating restrictions promulgated in response to the pandemic that touch upon constitutional rights. See, e.g., Marysville Baptist Church, Inc. v. Beshear, 957 F.3d 610 (6th Cir. 2020); Adams & Boyle, P.C. v. Slatery, 956 F.3d 913, 922 (6th Cir. 2020). In those cases, the Circuit Court held that despite the extremely deferential standard of Jacobson, the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their claims challenging a complete abortion ban in Tennessee and a total ban on group religious services in Kentucky. These cases are useful guidance, but they are not quite parallel to the case presented here. The cases considered by the Sixth Circuit thus far have evaluated restrictions on the exercise of fundamental constitutional rights, not a restriction on the exercise of commercial activity.
The Supreme Court has also provided some guidance on the issue. South Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 140 S. Ct. 1613 (Mem) (U.S. 2020) (Roberts, C.J., concurring). In South Bay, a Supreme Court majority declined to grant injunctive relief to a party challenging a California executive order that created limitations on public gatherings, including religious worship gatherings, based on considerations of health and safety. Id. at
10

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*1. In his concurring opinion, Chief Justice Roberts relied on Jacobson to explain that the constitution “principally entrusts” question of health and safety to the “politically accountable officials of the States.” Id. (citing Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 38). When state officials act “in areas fraught with medical and scientific uncertainties,” Chief Justice Roberts explained that “their latitude must be especially broad.” Id. (citing Marshall v. United States, 414 U.S. 417, 427 (1974)). When operating within those limits, the state “should not be subject to secondguessing” by the judiciary, which lacks the “background, competence, and expertise to assess public health.” Id. (citing Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 545 (1985)). Therefore, since California’s order treated all large gatherings similarly, the Court declined to intervene to grant injunctive relief. Id.
Taking this framework and applying it to the case at hand: the Court must uphold Governor Whitmer’s orders unless they have “no real or substantial relation” to the public health crisis, or the challenged order is “beyond all question, a plain, palpable invasion of rights secured by the fundamental law.” Plaintiffs only argue the former: the continued closure of gyms is arbitrary and unreasonable because gyms are basically the only category of businesses that remain closed in Michigan, and because the State has not put forward any scientific data that supports keeping gyms closed while opening other closely similar activities and businesses, such as swimming pools, restaurants and bars, and “personal touch” services like salons.
As evidenced by South Bay, this standard of review is highly deferential to the executive branch. It is not this Court’s place to second-guess the executive’s pandemic plan, to apply its own policy judgments to that plan, or to use hindsight to craft a “better” plan.
11

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Rather, this Court must uphold the Governor’s Executive Orders as long as they are supported by some relation to the public health. Unfortunately, on the record before it, the Court has not been presented with any evidence that shows a rational relation between the continued closure of indoor gyms and the preservation of public health.
While the standard is extremely deferential here—if the Court can conceive of any set of facts that would support the Orders, it must uphold them and deny the injunction—the Orders must still connect the challenged prohibition with some fact or facts. At oral argument, the Court pressed Defendants on what data, evidence, or rationale supported the continued closure of indoor gyms. Defendants cited to the preambles of the Executive Orders and vaguely stated that indoor gyms are a “petri dish” of infection, but Defendants could not point to any facts in the record to support that statement. Defendants emphasized the low bar: all that needed to be presented was a reasonably conceivable set of facts that connected the continued closure to protecting the public health. But when asked, even counsel was unable to state a rational basis to support the position that indoor gyms must still be closed. Defendants merely reiterated that a threat of transmission exists at indoor gyms, and the threat of transmission must be minimized.
The Court accepts that statement as true, but it only carries Defendants so far. In March, when the pandemic was accelerating sharply and the science was unclear, the potential for virus transmission indoors was used to close much of the state of Michigan. The transmission and infection data, broad as it was at the time, was used to close broad swaths of the economy. But the State has begun to chip away at that broad closure and make more specific policy decisions, which at least a scintilla of evidentiary support. The Court must
12

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look at what has been chipped away from the initial closure. Many indoor venues and indoor activities are now permitted: retail is now open with some restrictions, restaurants and bars may serve patrons at limited capacity, nail and hair salons and tattoo parlors can provide grooming services, children’s camps can resume service, and even indoor gaming venues like bowling alleys, climbing facilities, and nightclubs can open subject to capacity limits. But indoor gyms and other fitness facilities remain closed.
With these changes, there is no longer a generally applicable closure of non-essential businesses. See Marysville Baptist Church, Inc. v. Beshear, 957 F.3d 610, 614 (6th Cir. 2020) (“As a rule of thumb, the more exceptions to a prohibition, the less likely it will count as a generally applicable, non-discriminatory law.”). There must be some rational relation that distinguishes gyms from these now-opened businesses. Most of Governor Whitmer’s executive orders refer to five factors that the State considers useful in evaluating changes to the pandemic response (See, e.g., EO 2020-115 at ¶ 14). The State is apparently looking at detailed data including the virus transmission rate, the availability and need for personal protective equipment, the capacity for testing, and the economy (Id.). Again, when asked at oral argument what that rational relation for continued closure of gyms is, Defendants did not refer to those five factors or any other factor. Counsel could not articulate a reason beyond the bare assertion that gyms are dangerous. This Court fully recognizes that the bar is extremely low, but it is not that low. Defendants cannot rely on the categorization of gyms as “dangerous,” without a single supporting fact, to uphold their continued closure. This is particularly true when almost all other indoor businesses have been opened, and indoor gatherings of up to 50 people are permitted—so long as they are not inside a gym. Gyms are
13

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being treated dissimilarly without any justification for the distinction, given the record before the Court.
The Court must also address Defendants’ “slippery slope” argument. Defendants argue that if this injunction is granted, a veritable flood of litigation would ensue, with each sector of the economy seeking to reopen based on this opinion. The Court notes that both it and the Michigan Courts have already been deluged with litigation seeking the same.4 The argument presented to the Court on this motion, however, points out a different slope the Defendants may create: if Defendants can open or close any sector of the economy, at will, with nothing more than a vague reference that it is “dangerous,” the potential for abuse is palpable. To be sure, the coronavirus pandemic has devastated parts of the country and the state and containing the transmission of the virus is crucial. Activities that are dangerous should be avoided, for the public health. But after more than 90 days of closure, the scientific knowledge of the virus has grown and Michigan has made great gains in containing the pandemic. At this point, the bare assertion that gyms are dangerous is not enough to demonstrate a “real or substantial” connection to public health, nor is it a set of facts establishing rational basis to justify their continued closure.
The Court must emphasize that it does not wish to disturb the choices Governor Whitmer has made. While the last few months have been painful, physically for some and
4 See, e.g., Midwest Institute of Health, PLLC, et al. v. Whitmer, et al., Case No. 1:20-cv-414 (W.D. Mich.); Mitchell v. Whitmer et al., Case No. 1:20-cv-384 (W.D. Mich.); Signature Sothbeys Int’l Realty, Inc., et al. v. Whitmer, et al., Case No. 1:20-cv-360 (W.D. Mich.); Beemer, et al. v. Whitmer, et al., Case No. 1:20-cv-323 (W.D. Mich.); House of Representatives v. Whitmer, Case No. 353655 (Mich. Ct. App.); Michigan United for Liberty v. Whitmer, Case No. 353643 (Mich. Ct. App.); Dep’t of Health & Human Services v. Manke, Case No. 353607 (Mich. Ct. App.); Martinko v. Whitmer, Case No. 353604 (Mich. Ct. App); Slis v. Michigan, Case No. 351211 (Mich. Ct. App.); Associated Builders & Contractors of Michigan v. Whitmer, Case No. 20-000092-MZ (Mich. Ct. Cl.).
14

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 42 filed 06/19/20 PageID.1120 Page 15 of 17
economically for all, the Court recognizes that Michigan has made great strides towards containing the pandemic, in great part because of the choices Governor Whitmer has made. In the Governor’s own words, those choices have been based on data and science, and the Court commends and respects that. But when asked what data, science, or even rationale supports the continued closure of indoor gyms, Defendants presented nothing beyond “trust us, they’re still dangerous.” From that vague statement and nothing more, the Court cannot create a set of facts that rationally connects the restriction with the legitimate government interest of protecting the public health.
In sum: on the record before it, the Court cannot conclude that ¶ 12(b) of EO 2020110 survives the deferential review it is due under Jacobsen: Defendants offer nothing in support of the restriction, so it appears to have no “real or substantial” basis to protecting the public health. Nor can the Court identify any set of facts on which the gym restriction has a rational relation to public health, in light of the opening of similar venues and activities like swimming pools, restaurants and bars, and “personal touch” services like salons. Therefore, Plaintiffs have demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of at least some of their claims.
C. Next, the Court must evaluate whether Plaintiffs are at risk of suffering irreparable harm. Generally, irreparable harm is harm that cannot be remedied with money damages. Certified Restoration Dry Cleaning Network, LLC v. Tenke Corp., 511 F.3d 535, 550 (6th Cir. 2007). However, irreparable harm may exist if a plaintiff’s business is threatened with insolvency or its financial viability is threatened. See Performance Unlimited, Inc. v. Questar
15

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 42 filed 06/19/20 PageID.1121 Page 16 of 17
Publishers Inc., 52 F.3d 1373, 1382 (6th Cir. 1985). The “impending loss or financial ruin” of a business constitutes irreparable injury. Id.
Many Plaintiffs are threatened with insolvency because they are small businesses that have been shut down for over 13 weeks. At least one Plaintiff has lost 100% of its revenue, and many others are facing similar drastic cuts to revenue while still paying rent and various other bills (See ECF No. 37-1 at PageID.541). Many Plaintiffs fear the complete shuttering of their businesses. The Court is satisfied that Plaintiffs have shown that they are at risk of irreparable harm if this injunction does not issue.
D. The third and fourth factors to be considered are the risk of harm to others and whether the public interest would be served by entry of the order. These blend together: the increased risk of harm to the public via transmission of the virus is effectively the inverse of the public interest in being safe from the pandemic. However, the analysis is largely answered by the first factor. Given the conclusion that the Court has not been presented with a relation between the continued closure of indoor gyms and the public health, the Court finds that the public interest will not be harmed by entry of the order.
IV. On this record, each factor in the preliminary injunction analysis favors Plaintiffs. Faced with imminent harm, Plaintiffs presented Defendants with a simple question: why must we remain closed? Defendants answered with a blanket “trust us” statement that is insufficient to uphold a no-longer-blanket rule. The Court will grant Plaintiffs’ motion and enjoin enforcement of ¶ 12(b) of Executive Order 2020-110.
16

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 42 filed 06/19/20 PageID.1122 Page 17 of 17

Because of the way Governor Whitmer has set up the system of Executive Orders,

when gyms reopen, they will be subject to the requirements set out in the operative workplace

standards Order.5 Thus, the Court need not edit or amend any of Governor Whitmer’s

practices, and the operation of gyms will begin in a modified manner that the Governor’s

office has deemed appropriate through the issuance of EO 2020-114. Further, the Court

does not wish to “flip the switch” and open gyms immediately, as that would be inconsistent

with Governor Whitmer’s practice.6 Finally, the Court does not see a need to enjoin

enforcement of any portion of Executive Order 2020-115, as nothing in that Order prevents

or inhibits the opening of indoor gyms.

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that as of 12:01 a.m. on Thursday, June 25, 2020,

Defendants are enjoined from enforcing ¶ 12(b) of Executive Order 2020-110.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: June 19, 2020

/s/ Paul L. Maloney Paul L. Maloney United States District Judge

5 At present, those standards are outlined in ¶ 13 of EO 2020-114. 6 For example, when Governor Whitmer announced that gyms would be allowed to open in part of the state, she did so on June 5 with an effective date of June 10. See EO 2020-110. The Court wishes to extend the same “grace period” to gyms in the remainder of the state.
17

 </s> Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 44 filed 06/19/20 PageID.1124 Page 1 of 3

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

LEAGUE OF INDEPENDENT FITNESS FACILITIES AND TRAINERS, INC., BASELINE FITNESS LLC, BUILDING YOUR TEMPLE LLC, BYT FITNESS 247 LLC, CLAWSON FITNESS, LLC, CLINTON FITNESS, INC., D-LUX KARATE UNIVERSITY, LLC, FENTON ATHLETIC CLUB, INC., FENTON KARATE, LLC, FUSION FITNESS 24/7 LLC, H3 FITNESS LLC, I FITNESS PERSONAL TRAINING, INC., JKP FITNESS, LLC, JPF ENTERPRISES, LLC, M FITNESS CLUB, LLC, MH & AB LLC, MOTOR CITY CF – ST. CLAIR SHORES, LLC, NASCOT ENTERPRISES, LLC, PRISON CITY PHYSIQUE, LLC, FMP FITNESS INC., STRENGTH BEYOND LLC, 24/7 BOOTCAMP AND BOXING, INC., and 4 SEASONS GYM, LLC,

No. 20-cv-00458
HON. PAUL L. MALONEY
DEFENDANTS’ EMERGENCY MOTION FOR STAY PENDING APPEAL
***IMMEDIATE CONSIDERATION REQUESTED***

Plaintiffs,

v

GRETCHEN E. WHITMER and ROBERT E. GORDON,

Defendants.

Scott M. Erskine (P54734) Carly Van Thomme (P59706) Erskine Law, P.C. Attorneys for Plaintiffs 612 W. University Rochester, MI 48307

John G. Fedynsky (P65232) Andrew J. Jurgensen (P81123) Joseph T. Froehlich (P71887) Joshua O. Booth (P53847) Christopher M. Allen (P75329) Assistant Attorneys General

1

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 44 filed 06/19/20 PageID.1125 Page 2 of 3

(248) 601-4499 serskine@erskinelaw.com cvanthomme@erskinelaw.com

Attorneys for Defendants Michigan Dep’t of Attorney General State Operations Division P.O. Box 30754 Lansing, MI 48909 (517) 335-7573 fedynskyj@michigan.gov jurgensena2@michigan.gov froehlichj1@michigan.gov boothj2@michigan.gov allenc28@michigan.gov

DEFENDANTS WHITMER AND GORDON’S EMERGENCY MOTION FOR STAY PENDING APPEAL

Defendants Gretchen Whitmer and Robert Gordon, through counsel, move

this Court under Fed. R. Civ. P. 65 to stay its preliminary injunction order pending

appeal. In further support of this motion, Governor Whitmer and Director Gordon

rely on the facts, law and argument more fully developed in the attached brief in

support.

The undersigned certifies that on June 19, 2020, concurrence in the relief

requested was sought from Plaintiffs’ Counsel, which was denied.

Respectfully submitted,

Dana Nessel Attorney General

/s/ John G. Fedynsky John G. Fedynsky (P65232) Assistant Attorney General Attorney for Defendants Whitmer and Gordon Michigan Dep’t of Attorney General State Operations Division P.O. Box 30754 Lansing, MI 48909 (517) 335-7573

2

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 44 filed 06/19/20 PageID.1126 Page 3 of 3 fedynskyj@michigan.gov
Dated: June 19, 2020 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on June 19, 2020, I electronically filed the foregoing papers with the Clerk of the Court using the ECF system, which will provide electronic copies to counsel of record, and I certify that my secretary has mailed by U.S. Postal Service the papers to any non-ECF participant.
/s/ John G. Fedynsky John G. Fedynsky (P65232) Assistant Attorney General
3

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 45 filed 06/19/20 PageID.1127 Page 1 of 20

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

LEAGUE OF INDEPENDENT FITNESS FACILITIES AND TRAINERS, INC., BASELINE FITNESS LLC, BUILDING YOUR TEMPLE LLC, BYT FITNESS 247 LLC, CLAWSON FITNESS, LLC, CLINTON FITNESS, INC., D-LUX KARATE UNIVERSITY, LLC, FENTON ATHLETIC CLUB, INC., FENTON KARATE, LLC, FUSION FITNESS 24/7 LLC, H3 FITNESS LLC, I FITNESS PERSONAL TRAINING, INC., JKP FITNESS, LLC, JPF ENTERPRISES, LLC, M FITNESS CLUB, LLC, MH & AB LLC, MOTOR CITY CF – ST. CLAIR SHORES, LLC, NASCOT ENTERPRISES, LLC, PRISON CITY PHYSIQUE, LLC, FMP FITNESS INC., STRENGTH BEYOND LLC, 24/7 BOOTCAMP AND BOXING, INC., and 4 SEASONS GYM, LLC,

No. 20-cv-00458
HON. PAUL L. MALONEY
DEFENDANTS’ BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF EMERGENCY MOTION TO STAY
***IMMEDIATE CONSIDERATION REQUESTED***

Plaintiffs,

v

GRETCHEN E. WHITMER and ROBERT E. GORDON,

Defendants.

Scott M. Erskine (P54734) Carly Van Thomme (P59706) Erskine Law, P.C. Attorneys for Plaintiffs 612 W. University Rochester, MI 48307

John G. Fedynsky (P65232) Andrew J. Jurgensen (P81123) Joseph T. Froehlich (P71887) Joshua O. Booth (P53847) Christopher M. Allen (P75329) Assistant Attorneys General

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 45 filed 06/19/20 PageID.1128 Page 2 of 20

(248) 601-4499 serskine@erskinelaw.com cvanthomme@erskinelaw.com

Attorneys for Defendants Michigan Dep’t of Attorney General State Operations Division P.O. Box 30754 Lansing, MI 48909 (517) 335-7573 fedynskyj@michigan.gov jurgensena2@michigan.gov froehlichj1@michigan.gov boothj2@michigan.gov allenc28@michigan.gov

DEFENDANTS WHITMER AND GORDON’S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF EMERGENCY MOTION TO STAY1

Dated: June 19, 2020

John G. Fedynsky (P65232) Andrew J. Jurgensen (P81123) Joseph T. Froehlich (P71887) Joshua O. Booth (P53847) Christopher M. Allen (P75329) Assistant Attorneys General Attorneys for Defendants Michigan Dep’t of Attorney General State Operations Division P.O. Box 30754 Lansing, MI 48909 (517) 335-7573 fedynskyj@michigan.gov jurgensena2@michigan.gov froehlichj1@michigan.gov boothj2@michigan.gov allenc28@michigan.gov

1 Concurrence in the relief request was sought but denied.

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 45 filed 06/19/20 PageID.1129 Page 3 of 20
TABLE OF CONTENTS Page
Table of Contents ............................................................................................................ i Index of Authorities ....................................................................................................... ii Concise Statement of Issue Presented .......................................................................... v Controlling or Most Appropriate Authority................................................................. vi Introduction ................................................................................................................... 1 Statement of Facts ......................................................................................................... 2 Standard of Review........................................................................................................ 2 Argument ....................................................................................................................... 3 I. Rather than preserve the status quo, the preliminary injunction
fundamentally alters it. ...................................................................................... 3 II. The preliminary injunction implicates substantial separation of powers
concerns. .............................................................................................................. 4 III. The Court should not have applied a heightened standard for rational
basis review. ........................................................................................................ 5 IV. The Court did not provide due deference under Jacobson v.
Commonwealth of Massachusetts. ...................................................................... 8 V. Denial of a stay would irreparably harm Defendants and not serve the
public interest. .................................................................................................. 10 VI. Grant of a stay would not substantially harm interested parties. ................. 11 Conclusion and Relief Requested ................................................................................ 12
i

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 45 filed 06/19/20 PageID.1130 Page 4 of 20

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

Page

Cases
Adams & Boyle, P.C. v. Slatery, 956 F.3d 913 (6th Cir. 2020) ...................................................................................... 9
Amato v. Elicker, No. 3:20-CV-464 (MPS), 2020 WL 2542788 (D. Conn. May 19, 2020) ..................... 9
Baker v. Adams County/Ohio Valley Sch. Bd., 310 F.3d 927 (6th Cir. 2002) ................................................................................. vi, 3
Compagnie Francaise de Navigation a Vapeur v. La State Bd of Health, 186 U.S. 380 (1902) .................................................................................................... 8
Cross Culture Christian Center v. Newsom, 2020 WL 2121111 (E.D. Cal., May 5, 2020) .............................................................. 9
Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985) .................................................................................................... 5
Geller v. de Blasio, No. 20CV3566 (DLC), 2020 WL 2520711 (S.D.N.Y. May 18, 2020) ......................... 9
Gish v. Newsom, 2020 WL 1979970 (C.D. Cal. April 23, 2020) ............................................................ 9
Givens v. Newsom, 2020 WL 2307224 (E.D. Cal., May 8, 2020) .............................................................. 9
Hall v. Edgewood Partners, 878 F.3d 524 (6th Cir. 2017) ...................................................................................... 4
Hartman v. Acton, No. 2:20-CV-1952, 2020 WL 1932896 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 21, 2020) ............................. 9
In re Abbott, 954 F.3d 772 (5th Cir., April 7, 2020)........................................................................ 8
In re Rutledge, 956 F.3d 1018 (8th Cir., April 22, 2020) .................................................................... 9

ii

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 45 filed 06/19/20 PageID.1131 Page 5 of 20
Jacobson v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) .............................................................................................. 1, 4, 8
Kansas v Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997) .................................................................................................... 8
Lawrence v. Colorado, No. 120CV00862DDDSKC, 2020 WL 2737811 (D. Colo. Apr. 19, 2020).................. 9
Legacy Church, Inc. v. Kunkel, 2020 WL 1905586 (D. N.M. April 17, 2020) .............................................................. 9
Lighthouse Fellowship Church v. Northam, 2020 WL 2110416 (E.D. Va., May 1, 2020) ............................................................... 9
Marshall v. United States, 414 U.S. 417 (1974) .................................................................................................... 5
Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1 (2012) .................................................................................................... 10
Maryville Baptist Church, Inc. v. Beshear, 957 F.3d 610 (6th Cir. 2020) ...................................................................................... 9
McGhee v. City of Flagstaff, 2020 WL 2308479 (D. Ariz., May 8, 2020) ................................................................ 9
McNeilly v. Land, 684 F.3d 611 (6th Cir. 2012) ...................................................................................... 3
New Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 434 U.S. 1345 (1977) ................................................................................................ 10
Open Our Oregon v. Brown, No. 6:20-CV-773-MC, 2020 WL 2542861 (D. Or. May 19, 2020) .............................. 9
Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott, 734 F.3d 406 (5th Cir. 2013) .................................................................................... 10
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) .................................................................................................... 8
Roberts v. Neace, 958 F.3d 409 (6th Cir. 2020) ...................................................................................... 9
Robinson v. Attorney General, 957 F.3d 1171 (11th Cir. April 23, 2020)................................................................... 9
iii

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 45 filed 06/19/20 PageID.1132 Page 6 of 20
SH3 Health Consulting, LLC v. St. Louis County Exec., 2020 WL 2308444 (E.D. Mo., May 8, 2020)............................................................... 9
Shows v. Curtis, 2020 WL 1953621 (W.D. N.C., April 23, 2020) ......................................................... 9
South Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Gavin Newsom, Governor of California, 509 U.S. ___ (2020)................................................................................................. 1, 4
Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955) .................................................................................................... 6
Rules Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c) ....................................................................................................... 2 Fed. R. Civ. P. 62(c) ....................................................................................................... 2 Fed. R. Civ. P. 65 (d)(1)................................................................................................. vi Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(c) ...................................................................................................... vi
iv

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 45 filed 06/19/20 PageID.1133 Page 7 of 20 CONCISE STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED
1. Should the Court immediately enter an order staying its preliminary injunction pending appeal?
v

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 45 filed 06/19/20 PageID.1134 Page 8 of 20
CONTROLLING OR MOST APPROPRIATE AUTHORITY Authority: Fed. R. Civ. P. 65 (d)(1) Contents: Every order granting an injunction and every restraining order must . . . (B) state its terms specifically; and (C) describe in reasonable detail – and not by referring to the complaint or other document – the act or acts restrained or required. Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(c) Security: The court may issue a preliminary injunction or a temporary restraining order only if the movant gives security in an amount that the court considers proper to pay the costs and damages sustained by any party found to have been wrongfully enjoined or restrained.2 Stay of Injunction: In determining whether a stay should be issued pending appeal, this Court balances the traditional factors governing injunctive relief: (1) Whether the moving party has a strong or substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) Whether the moving party will suffer irreparable harm if the district court proceedings are not stayed; (3) Whether staying the district court proceedings will substantially injure other interested parties; and (4) Where the public interest lies. Baker v. Adams County/Ohio Valley Sch. Bd., 310 F.3d 927, 928 (6th Cir. 2002).
2 It should be noted that the Court’s order did not address this required part of Rule 65.
vi

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INTRODUCTION The Court’s injunction should be immediately stayed pending appeal for several reasons. First, rather than preserve the status quo, the preliminary injunction fundamentally alters the status quo. It imposes substantive restrictions on core public health authority in an ongoing pandemic, contrary to all prior challenges brought in Michigan’s state and federal courts. Second, it implicates fundamental concerns about separation of powers. See South Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Gavin Newsom, Governor of California, 509 U.S. ___ (2020) slip op., p. 2 (summary order released May 29, 2020) (Roberts, C.J., concurring) Third, it is premised on a heightened form of rational basis review that is not rooted in the law. The idea that gyms – with their high levels of heavy respiratory activity, shared indoor spaces, and shared surfaces – might be one of the later businesses to come back online in the midst of this global pandemic is hardly surprising and highly sensible. Fourth, and similarly, it failed to apply due deference under the settled law of Jacobson v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 27 (1905). Fifth, if not stayed pending appeal it will present irreparable harm to Defendants and not serve the public interest. It introduces the likelihood of an unworkable patchwork of judicial and regional carveouts to a general public health response to a pandemic involving a novel virus, which will likely lead to unintended
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consequences and erosion of the common plan to fight the spread of the virus, creating the substantial risk of a second wave.
Sixth, a stay will not substantially injure other interested parties.
STATEMENT OF FACTS Defendants rely upon and adopt and incorporate by reference the factual recitations and exhibits presented in their response to Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction (R. 35 through 35–13). Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c). On June 17, 2020, the Court heard argument on Plaintiff’s emergency motion for preliminary injunction. No witnesses were presented. On June 19, 2020, the Court granted the motion and issued an injunction with the following operative language: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that as of 12:01 a.m. on Thursday, June 25, 2020, Defendants are enjoined from enforcing ¶ 12(b) of Executive Order 2020-110. On June 19, 2020, Defendants filed a notice of appeal. On June 22, 2020, they brought the instant motion for an immediate stay pending appeal. While the effective date of the injunction provides a temporary stay, Defendants bring this motion in the first instance in the district court because a longer stay during the pendency of the appeal is required.
STANDARD OF REVIEW This Court may stay an injunction pending an appeal. Fed. R. Civ. P. 62(c). In determining whether a stay should be issued pending appeal, this Court balances
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the traditional factors governing injunctive relief: (1) Whether the moving party has a strong or substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) Whether the moving party will suffer irreparable harm if the district court proceedings are not stayed; (3) Whether staying the district court proceedings will substantially injure other interested parties; and (4) Where the public interest lies. Baker v. Adams County/Ohio Valley Sch. Bd., 310 F.3d 927, 928 (6th Cir. 2002). The factors are to be balanced, and the “strength of the likelihood of success on the merits that needs to be demonstrated is inversely proportional to the amount of irreparable harm that will be suffered if a stay does not issue.” Id.
ARGUMENT The preliminary injunction is a bridge too far. It has wide-ranging implications for future cases and for the state’s public health authority to respond to an unpredictable, ongoing health crisis. However the appeal process is resolved, this case merits an immediate stay pending appeal. The last thing that anyone wishes to see is a second wave of the pandemic that may require a return of limitations that have already been relaxed. The success of the Governor’s efforts have placed Michigan in a small category of states in which the pandemic is significantly receding, and this ruling creates the risk of reversing this trend.
I. Rather than preserve the status quo, the preliminary injunction fundamentally alters it. A preliminary injunction is “an extraordinary remedy.” McNeilly v. Land,
684 F.3d 611, 615 (6th Cir. 2012). It is “reserved only for cases where it is necessary 3

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 45 filed 06/19/20 PageID.1138 Page 12 of 20
to preserve the status quo until trial.” Hall v. Edgewood Partners, 878 F.3d 524, 526 (6th Cir. 2017). Here, the Court has not entered an order that preserves the status quo. This is not a case that asked to halt the removal of a tree or the demolition of a building – classic examples of irreversible irreparable harm amenable to temporarily enjoin. Rather, Plaintiffs’ motion was a trojan horse seeking ultimate relief, which the Court has now granted in toto. For that reason alone, a stay pending the appeal is appropriate. In this circumstance, a stay would serve the salutary function of preserving the status quo while important and perhaps dispositive legal issues are decided with finality on appeal.
II. The preliminary injunction implicates substantial separation of powers concerns. Recently, the U.S. Supreme Court refused to grant injunctive relief for a
party challenging under the First Amendment a California executive order that created limitations on public gatherings, including those of public worship, based on considerations of health and safety. South Bay United Pentecostal Church, et al. v. Gavin Newsom, Governor of California, 509 U.S. ___ (2020) (summary order released May 29, 2020). In his opinion concurring in the denial of relief, Chief Justice Roberts expressly relied on Jacobson in explaining that the Constitution “principally entrusts” these questions of safety to “the politically accountable officials of the States.” Id. at slip op., p. 2 (citing Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 38).
Notably, as here, when those officials act “in areas fraught with medical and scientific uncertainties,” Chief Justice Roberts explained that “their latitude ‘must
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be especially broad.’ ” Id. (quoting Marshall v. United States, 414 U.S. 417, 427 (1974)). And when operating within those broad limits, he explained, these officials “should not be subject to second-guessing” by the federal judiciary, which lacks comparable expertise in public health. Id. (quoting Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 545 (1985).)
The Court’s opinion cites this authority yet fails to follow it. Had it applied this binding authority, the Court would not have failed to discern any conceivable rational basis for the restrictions on indoor fitness activity. The Court’s analysis glosses over the undisputed nature of the virus and how it spreads through respiratory droplets, as well as the reasons offered for why indoor fitness facilities present a particularly heightened risk of that spread. It also mentions the preambles to the executive orders but fails to engage them and the fertile ground they provide for rational bases for the challenged restrictions. In short, the injunction order runs counter to the guidance already provided in this emergent field of law by our highest court. Accordingly, a stay is appropriate under these circumstances.
III. The Court should not have applied a heightened standard for rational basis review. Because no fundamental constitutional rights are implicated here,
straightforward rational basis review should apply. Indoor commercial fitness activity – like myriad other segments of the economy – is left under longstanding precedent to the social policy discretion of state and local non-judicial authority.
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Cases about deference to legislative classification apply with equal force to the
executive order classifications challenged here. In a seminal case upholding
differential regulation of optometrists and opticians, the Supreme Court declined to
draw a different line.
The problem of legislative classification is a perennial one, admitting of no doctrinaire definition. Evils in the same field may be of different dimensions and proportions, requiring different remedies. Or so the legislature may think. Tigner v. State of Texas, 310 U.S. 141, 60 S.Ct. 879, 84 L.Ed. 1124. Or the reform may take one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the problem which seems most acute to the legislative mind. Semler v. Oregon State Board of Dental Examiners, 294 U.S. 608, 55 S.Ct. 570, 79 L.Ed. 1086. The legislature may select one phase of one field and apply a remedy there, neglecting the others. [Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955)]
Under this law, upholding the line drawn is as important and upholding who
gets to draw the line. Accordingly, federal courts are not the one to decide. Nor are
they required to embark on fact-finding inquiries aimed at examining the science or
data that may or may not support any particular classification.
In areas of social and economic policy, a statutory classification that neither proceeds along suspect lines nor infringes fundamental constitutional rights must be upheld against equal protection challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification. F.C.C. v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993).
***
[B]ecause we never require a legislature to articulate its reasons for enacting a statute, it is entirely irrelevant for constitutional purposes whether the conceived reason for the challenged distinction actually motivated the legislature . . . . Id. at 315.
***
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[A] legislative choice is not subject to courtroom fact-finding and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data. Id. at 315. In this case, the Court went beyond simple rational basis review, which plainly would have turned away Plaintiffs’ challenge. Rather, the Court’s opinion suggests something more is required than a conceivable rational basis for the challenged classification. Contrary to the law, the Court searched the record for a basis to uphold the restrictions, in spite of binding law stating that such judicial fact-finding is neither required nor desirable. Additionally, the Court’s order simplifies Defendants’ arguments at the hearing as boiling down to a “trust us” position – which is not the legal position Defendants took at the hearing or in writing. A bit of procedural history is relevant here. Plaintiffs filed their motion for a preliminary injunction on Monday, June 8, 2020. On the next day, the Court entered an order requiring a response by noon on Friday, June 12, 2020. Defendants provided this response, explaining the legal authority controlling Plaintiffs’ request and documenting the rationale for the restrictions Plaintiffs challenged. Then the hearing came three business days later, followed by an injunction this Friday. From that ruling, it seems the Court, on that timeline, expected some further showing of facts, data, science, or whatever other parol evidence – all for discrete legal questions that under the law of rational basis review have never required such a defense. Respectfully, the pace and manner of judicial process and outcome here do not add up to the kind of deference that under settled
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law applies to these types of challenges – with or without an unpredictable pandemic at hand.
IV. The Court did not provide due deference under Jacobson v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts. Faced with “great danger[ ],” state actors are permitted great latitude to
secure the public health. Jacobson v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 29 (1905). And in this time of crisis, securing the public health requires temporary sacrifices by each of us: “Real liberty for all could not exist under the operation of a principle which recognizes the right of each individual person to use his own, whether in respect of his person or his property, regardless of the injury that may be done to others.” Id. at 26.
Under Jacobson, judicial review of the executive orders is “only” available if the challenged action “has no real or substantial relation to those objects [of securing public health and safety], or is, beyond all question, a plain, palpable invasion of rights secured by the fundamental law.” Id. at 31 (emphasis added). This standard has been broadly applied, even well after Jacobson was decided, which demonstrates that its core holding should control here as well. See, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166–67 (1944); Compagnie Francaise de Navigation a Vapeur v. La State Bd of Health, 186 U.S. 380, 393 (1902); Kansas v Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 356 (1997); In re Abbott, 954 F.3d 772, 786 (5th Cir., April 7, 2020); In re
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Rutledge, 956 F.3d 1018 (8th Cir., April 22, 2020).3 The same is true in recent Sixth
Circuit decisions. Adams & Boyle, P.C. v. Slatery, 956 F.3d 913 (6th Cir. 2020);
Maryville Baptist Church, Inc. v. Beshear, 957 F.3d 610 (6th Cir. 2020); Roberts v.
Neace, 958 F.3d 409 (6th Cir. 2020).
Compared to this precedent, the preliminary injunction stands quite alone in
its non-deferential application of Jacobson. Plaintiffs do not dispute the gravity of
the pandemic in Michigan. It is a once-in-a-century kind of epidemiological public
health crisis caused by a potentially fatal virus that remains easily transmittable
and still lacks adequate treatment, let alone a vaccine. In such times, the State has
wide plenary authority to temporarily restrict activity that presents a diffuse but
real threat to the public health.
3 Numerous other federal courts across the country have recognized that Jacobson is the proper starting point for considering restrictions promulgated in response to the COVID-19 crisis that touch upon constitutional rights. And those courts have routinely held, across a wide range of challenges, that state actions like those at issue here were an appropriate and constitutional response to the scourge of COVID-19. See, e.g., Open Our Oregon v. Brown, No. 6:20-CV-773-MC, 2020 WL 2542861 (D. Or. May 19, 2020); Amato v. Elicker, No. 3:20-CV-464 (MPS), 2020 WL 2542788 (D. Conn. May 19, 2020); Geller v. de Blasio, No. 20CV3566 (DLC), 2020 WL 2520711 (S.D.N.Y. May 18, 2020); McGhee v. City of Flagstaff, 2020 WL 2308479 (D. Ariz., May 8, 2020); Givens v. Newsom, 2020 WL 2307224 (E.D. Cal., May 8, 2020); SH3 Health Consulting, LLC v. St. Louis County Exec., 2020 WL 2308444 (E.D. Mo., May 8, 2020); Cross Culture Christian Center v. Newsom, 2020 WL 2121111 (E.D. Cal., May 5, 2020); Lighthouse Fellowship Church v. Northam, 2020 WL 2110416 (E.D. Va., May 1, 2020); Shows v. Curtis, 2020 WL 1953621 (W.D. N.C., April 23, 2020); Gish v. Newsom, 2020 WL 1979970 (C.D. Cal. April 23, 2020); Robinson v. Attorney General, 957 F.3d 1171 (11th Cir. April 23, 2020); Hartman v. Acton, No. 2:20-CV-1952, 2020 WL 1932896 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 21, 2020); Lawrence v. Colorado, No. 120CV00862DDDSKC, 2020 WL 2737811 (D. Colo. Apr. 19, 2020); Legacy Church, Inc. v. Kunkel, 2020 WL 1905586 (D. N.M. April 17, 2020).
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Under Jacobson, judicial deference to the Governor’s authority responding to the crisis is paramount. Again, the Court on the surface recognized the rule of law in Jacobson but in application relied upon a heightened standard to connect the challenged restrictions to the overarching goals of the State’s response to the pandemic. Under these circumstances, a stay is appropriate.
*** For these reasons, as well as the reasons already briefed in response to the preliminary injunction motion, the appeal is likely to succeed. Therefore, the Court’s order should be stayed pending appeal.
V. Denial of a stay would irreparably harm Defendants and not serve the public interest. “ ‘[A]ny time a State is enjoined by a court from effectuating statutes enacted
by representatives of its people, it suffers a form of irreparable injury.’ ” Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1, 3 (2012) (quoting New Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 434 U.S. 1345, 1351 (1977)); see also Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott, 734 F.3d 406, 419 (5th Cir. 2013) (“When a statute is enjoined, the State necessarily suffers the irreparable harm of denying the public interest in the enforcement of its laws.”). These legal principles apply as well to Defendants’ executive orders, which were duly authorized under applicable Michigan statutory law. Pandemics are just the sort of fluid crisis that Michigan’s public health code and public emergency laws were adopted to address.
Here, the injunction represents a deep, unwarranted intrusion into Michigan’s sovereignty and its traditional police powers. The intrusion will be
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costly on a public health level and from both a federalism and separation of powers point of view. Judicial tinkering in a public health crisis will have unintended consequences that result in a patchwork of regional and industry-specific carveouts for litigants who race to the courthouse while others accept and comply with the law. The result will be more litigation, not less, as well as diminished public confidence in the pandemic response, not more. At a time when collective, coordinated action is critical, judicial off-ramps will only pull at important threads holding together the fabric of the sails pulling the proverbial ship away from the stormy scourge of this virus. Every thread that is removed or frayed will have unknown, cascading consequences for the broad goal of reaching safe harbor.
VI. Grant of a stay would not substantially harm interested parties. A stay pending appeal would preserve the status quo. Accordingly, and for
the reasons already briefed in response to the motion for preliminary injunction, a stay would not present substantial harm to Plaintiffs. In the absence of a stay, a different stay or merits outcome on appeal would potentially cause more disruption and detrimental reliance by Plaintiffs and others who would expend resources on only a fleeting lifting of restrictions under the preliminary injunction. For nonparties and the general public alike, it is desirable to not lift the restrictions and, if at all, only after a final merits determination on appeal. Piecemeal lifting of the restrictions for Plaintiffs or certain regions or types of businesses would disadvantage interested parties throughout the State of Michigan. A stay would
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thus benefit interested parties without substantially burdening the limited set of businesses seeking special exemption from the general restrictions.

CONCLUSION AND RELIEF REQUESTED Defendants Whitmer and Gordon respectfully request that the Court (1) grant this motion, (2) immediately stay the preliminary injunction pending appeal, and (3) grant any other appropriate relief to Defendants.
Respectfully submitted,

Dated: June 19, 2020

/s/ John G. Fedynsky John G. Fedynsky (P65232) Assistant Attorney General Attorney for Defendants Whitmer and Gordon Michigan Dep’t of Attorney General State Operations Division P.O. Box 30754 Lansing, MI 48909 517.335.7573 fednyskyj@michigan.gov P65232

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on June 19, 2020, I electronically filed the foregoing papers with the Clerk of the Court using the ECF system, which will provide electronic copies to counsel of record, and I certify that my secretary has mailed by U.S. Postal Service the papers to any non-ECF participant.
/s/ John G. Fedynsky John G. Fedynsky (P65232) Assistant Attorney General
12

 </s> Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 48 filed 06/22/20 PageID.1151 Page 1 of 3

DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

______________________________________________________________________________

LEAGUE OF INDPENDENT FITNESS

Civil No. 1:20-cv-00458

FACITLITIES AND TRAINERS, INC., BASELINE FITNESS LLC,

Hon. Paul L. Maloney

BUILDING YOUR TEMPLE LLC,

BYT FITNESS 247 LLC,

CLAWSON FITNESS, LLC, CLINTON FITNESS, INC.,

***ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED***

D-LUX KARATE UNIVERSITY LLC,

FENTON ATHLETIC CLUB, INC.,

FENTON KARATE, LLC,

FUSION FITNESS 24/7 LLC,

H3 FITNESS LLC,

I FITNESS PERSONAL TRAINING, INC.,

JKP FITNESS, LLC,

JPF ENTERPRISES, LLC,

M FITNESS CLUB, LLC,

MH & AB LLC,

MOTOR CITY CF - ST. CLAIR SHORES,

LLC,

NASCOT ENTERPRISES, LLC,

PRISON CITY PHYSIQUE LLC,

RMP FITNESS INC.,

STRENGTH BEYOND LLC,

24/7 BOOTCAMP AND BOXING INC., and

4 SEASONS GYM, LLC,

Plaintiffs,

v.

GRETCHEN E. WHITMER and

ROBERT GORDON,

Defendants.

______________________________________________________________________________

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 48 filed 06/22/20 PageID.1152 Page 2 of 3

ERSKINE LAW, PC

Joseph T. Froehlich (P71887)

Scott M. Erskine (P54734)

Christopher M. Allen (P75329)

Carly Van Thomme (P59706)

Joshua O. Booth (P53847)

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

John G. Fedynsky (P65232)

612 W. University

Andrew J. Jurgensen (P81123)

Rochester, MI. 48307

Assistant Attorney General

(248) 601-4499

Michigan Department of Attorney General

serskine@erskinelaw.com

Attorneys for Defendants

cvanthomme@erskinelaw.com

525 West Ottawa Street

P.O. Box 30754

Lansing, MI 48909

(517) 335-7573

froehlichj1@michigan.gov

allenc28@michigan.gov

Boothj2@michigan.gov

fedynskyj@michigan.gov

jurgensenA2@michigan.gov

______________________________________________________________________________

PLAINTIFFS’ RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR STAY

***ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED***

NOW COMES Plaintiffs, League of Independent Fitness Facilities and Trainers, Inc., by

and through their attorneys, Erskine Law, PC, for Plaintiffs’ Response in Opposition to

Defendants’ Motion for Stay. For the reasons stated in Plaintiffs’ Response Brief in Opposition to

Defendants’ Motion for Stay, Plaintiffs respectfully request that Defendants’ Motion for Stay be

denied in its entirety.

Dated: June 22, 2020

Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Scott M. Erskine_________________ SCOTT M. ERSKINE (P54714) CARLY VAN THOMME (P59706) ERSKINE LAW, PC Attorneys for Plaintiffs 612 West University Drive Rochester, Michigan 48307 (248) 601-4497 serskine@erskinelaw.com

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 48 filed 06/22/20 PageID.1153 Page 3 of 3
PROOF OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on June 22, 2020, I presented the foregoing paper to the Clerk of the Court for filing and uploading to the ECF system, which will send notification of such filing to the attorneys of record listed herein and I hereby certify that I have mailed by US Postal Service the document to the involved non participants.
s/ Scott M. Erskine_________________ SCOTT M. ERSKINE (P54714) CARLY VAN THOMME (P59706) ERSKINE LAW, PC Attorneys for Plaintiffs 612 West University Drive Rochester, Michigan 48307 (248) 601-4497 serskine@erskinelaw.com cvanthomme@erskinelaw.com

 </s> Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 49 filed 06/22/20 PageID.1154 Page 1 of 18

DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

______________________________________________________________________________

LEAGUE OF INDPENDENT FITNESS

Civil No. 1:20-cv-00458

FACITLITIES AND TRAINERS, INC., BASELINE FITNESS LLC,

Hon. Paul L. Maloney

BUILDING YOUR TEMPLE LLC,

BYT FITNESS 247 LLC,

CLAWSON FITNESS, LLC, CLINTON FITNESS, INC.,

***ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED***

D-LUX KARATE UNIVERSITY LLC,

FENTON ATHLETIC CLUB, INC.,

FENTON KARATE, LLC,

FUSION FITNESS 24/7 LLC,

H3 FITNESS LLC,

I FITNESS PERSONAL TRAINING, INC.,

JKP FITNESS, LLC,

JPF ENTERPRISES, LLC,

M FITNESS CLUB, LLC,

MH & AB LLC,

MOTOR CITY CF - ST. CLAIR SHORES,

LLC,

NASCOT ENTERPRISES, LLC,

PRISON CITY PHYSIQUE LLC,

RMP FITNESS INC.,

STRENGTH BEYOND LLC,

24/7 BOOTCAMP AND BOXING INC., and

4 SEASONS GYM, LLC,

Plaintiffs,

v.

GRETCHEN E. WHITMER and

ROBERT GORDON,

Defendants.

______________________________________________________________________________

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 49 filed 06/22/20 PageID.1155 Page 2 of 18

ERSKINE LAW, PC Scott M. Erskine (P54734) Carly Van Thomme (P59706) Attorneys for Plaintiffs 612 W. University Rochester, MI. 48307 (248) 601-4499 serskine@erskinelaw.com cvanthomme@erskinelaw.com

Joseph T. Froehlich (P71887) Christopher M. Allen (P75329) Joshua O. Booth (P53847) John G. Fedynsky (P65232) Andrew J. Jurgensen (P81123) Assistant Attorney General Michigan Department of Attorney General Attorneys for Defendants 525 West Ottawa Street P.O. Box 30754 Lansing, MI 48909 (517) 335-7573 froehlichj1@michigan.gov allenc28@michigan.gov Boothj2@michigan.gov fedynskyj@michigan.gov jurgensenA2@michigan.gov

______________________________________________________________________________

PLAINTIFFS’ RESPONSE BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR STAY ***ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED***

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION ...........................................................................................................................1

STANDARD OF REVIEW .............................................................................................................3

ARGUMENT ...................................................................................................................................3

I. The Court Correctly Effectuated the Intent of a Motion for Preliminary Injunction .......................................................................................................................4

II. The Court Properly Considered the Separation of Powers Issues in this Matter and Defendants’ Arguments are a Motion for Reconsideration ..................5

III. The Court Properly Applied the Standard of Review ....................................................7

IV. The Court Properly Applied the Jacobson Decision......................................................9

V. Denial of the Stay Does Not Serve the Public Interest ................................................10

VI. Granting of the Stay Would Substantially Harm Plaintiffs .........................................13

CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................................................14

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES American Tel & Tel Co v. Communications Workers of America, 985 F2d 855 (CA 6, 1993) ....................................................................................................................................5 Baker v. Adams Co/Ohio Valley Sch Bd, 310 F3d 927 (6th Cir. 2002) ............................................2 Canal Authority of Florida v. Callaway, 489 F.2d 567, 576 (5th Cir. 1974) ...................................4 City & Co of San Francisco v. Trump, 897 F3d 1225, 1234 (9th Cir. 2018) ...................................8 Hall v. Edgewood Partner, 878 F.3d 524, 526 (6th Cir. 2017) ........................................................4 House of Representatives v. Whitmer, Case No. 353655 (Mich. Ct. App.) ...............................7, 11 Jacobson v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) ...........................................1, 9 Marysville Baptist Church, Inc. v. Beshear, 957 F.3d 610, 614 (6th Cir. 2020) .............................7 Mich Coalition of Radioactive Material Users, Inc v. Griepentrog, 945 F2d 150 (CA 6, 1991) ....................................................................................................................................3 Midwest Institute of Health, PLLC, et al., v. Gretchen Whitmer, et al., Case No. 1:20-cv-00414 ................................................................................................................................11 South Bay United Pentecostal Church, et al. v. Gavin Newsom, Governor of California, 509 U.S. ___ (2020) ..............................................................................................1, 5, 6 Stenberg v. Cheker Oil Co., 573 F.2d 921, 925 (6th Cir. 1978) .......................................................4
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INTRODUCTION Defendants’ Motion for Immediate Stay Pending Appeal, which is primarily an improper Motion for Reconsideration, should be denied by this Honorable Court.1 At the outset, Defendants’ opening salvo in their Introduction is an improper motion for reconsideration, setting the stage for its mistaken view of the purpose of motions for preliminary injunction. Preliminary injunctions are designed to prevent irreparable injury, and if the existing status quo itself is causing one of the parties irreparable injury, it is necessary to alter the situation so as to prevent the injury. Second, Defendants relitigate the very arguments about separation of powers that they already made in response to Plaintiffs’ original motion. Defendants’ attempts to expand their arguments on the matter in a new motion should not be overlooked. Finally, the non-binding concurring opinion in South Bay is nothing more than that—a non-binding concurrence. Defendants’ third argument fails because this Court applied the correct standard of review. As will be shown below, the Court had the authority to, but did not, apply a heightened standard of review with respect to Defendants’ non-legislature-supported executive orders. Fourth, despite the Defendants’ assertions to the contrary, this Court’s Order and Opinion cites to and follows Jacobson v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905). Defendants’ issue with the Court’s ruling is that this Court’s learned reading and analysis of the entire opinion—not just the cherry-picked quotes in Defendants’ brief—leads to a different conclusion than Defendants assert.
1 The timing of the Motion and Brief, citing to 33 cases and filed at 5:48 pm on June 19, 2020, three hours after the Opinion and Order was issued, leads one to believe that all of these arguments were known to Defendants prior to the hearing on the Motion. Arguments not raised during the June 17th Motion hearing could have—and should have—been raised at that time.
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Fifth, Defendants now make an argument that they will be irreparably harmed. However, their rationale is beyond nonsensical, as the Governor’s Orders themselves are nothing but an arbitrary and irrational patchwork of regional carveouts.
Sixth, Defendants’ argument that Plaintiffs will not suffer any harm falls flat for the reasons it did in the prior motion.
Finally, Plaintiffs would be remiss if they did not point out that the real reason for the Defendants’ “no holds barred” approach to this litigation is that no one is allowed to challenge the Governor’s complete and total authority. Defendants interchange and posit alternate theories between state and federal courts with reckless abandon, claiming that the Legislature lacks standing to challenge her authority in state court, and simultaneously claiming that private citizens lack standing to challenge her authority. As the Governor stated in a press conference 30 minutes after oral argument in this case, “‘[w]e still see attempts to take away my authority to take these actions, which made it all possible in the first place. . . . I want to be very clear: Any attempt to strip away the powers of the governor during this crisis is irresponsible, dangerous and foolish.’”2
STANDARD OF REVIEW The factors for a motion for a stay pending appeal are as follows: (1) Whether the defendant has a strong or substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) whether the defendant will suffer irreparable harm if the district court proceedings are not stayed; (3) whether staying the district court proceedings will substantially injure other interested parties; and (4) where the public interest lies. Baker v. Adams Co/Ohio Valley Sch Bd, 310 F3d 927 (6th Cir. 2002). Further, “[t]hese factors
2 Hutchinson, Derek. Michigan Gov. Whitmer calls attempts to strip her powers ‘irresponsible, dangerous, foolish.’ June 17, 2020. https://www.clickondetroit.com/news/local/2020/06/17/michigan-gov-whitmer-calls-attempts-tostrip-her-powers-irresponsible-dangerous-foolish/
2

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 49 filed 06/22/20 PageID.1159 Page 6 of 18
are to be balanced. The strength of the likelihood of success on the merits that needs to be demonstrated is inversely proportional to the amount of irreparable harm that will be suffered if a stay does not issue. However, in order to justify a stay of the district court's ruling, the defendant must demonstrate at least serious questions going to the merits and irreparable harm that decidedly outweighs the harm that will be inflicted on others if a stay is granted.” Id. At 928.
ARGUMENT Before this Court is Defendants’ Motion for Stay Pending Appeal. In order for Defendants to successfully argue that a stay is warranted, Defendants have to meet the four factors set forth above. However, a closer look here at the first two factors alone, coupled with specific arguments below as to all of the factors, will show that Defendants cannot meet the high standard for success. First, this Honorable Court ruled in its Opinion and Order issued June 19, 2020 that Plaintiffs have already demonstrated a strong likelihood of success on the merits of this case. Now, for the purpose of this motion, it is incumbent upon Defendants to show a strong likelihood of success on the merits. But Defendants have not directly challenged this Court’s ruling, other than to file a notice of their claim of appeal. Instead, they are asking this Court to reverse course and order the inverse of its initial Opinion and Order. Put simply, the same day this Court ruled that “Plaintiffs have a strong likelihood of success,” Defendants filed a motion saying, “Defendants have a strong likelihood of success.” Defendants have not offered any new arguments to support their position. Second, as will be shown below, Defendants will not be “irreparably harmed” by the ruling. The courts have explained that “[i]n evaluating the harm that will occur depending upon whether or not the stay is granted, we generally look to three factors: (1) the substantiality of the injury alleged; (2) the likelihood of its occurrence; and (3) the adequacy of the proof provided.” Mich
3

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 49 filed 06/22/20 PageID.1160 Page 7 of 18
Coalition of Radioactive Material Users, Inc v. Griepentrog, 945 F2d 150 (CA 6, 1991). “[T]he
harm alleged must be both certain and immediate, rather than speculative or theoretical.” Id. at
154. Further, “in order for a reviewing court to adequately consider these four factors, the movant
must address each factor, regardless of its relative strength, providing specific facts and affidavits
supporting assertions that these factors exist.” Id.
As will be shown in depth below, Defendants do not offer anything other than speculative
harm and provide no specific facts for success on a single factor. The motion should be denied.
I. The Court Correctly Effectuated the Intent of a Motion for Preliminary Injunction
Defendants’ first argument, presumably to show a likelihood of success on the merits, must
fail as a matter of law. Although Defendants correctly cite Hall v. Edgewood Partner, 878 F.3d 524, 526 (6th Cir. 2017), Defendants fail to properly analyze the issue. In Stenberg v. Cheker Oil Co., 573 F.2d 921, 925 (6th Cir. 1978), the 6th Circuit opined as follows:
The purpose of a preliminary injunction is always to prevent irreparable injury so as to preserve the court's ability to render a meaningful decision on the merits. It often happens that this purpose is furthered by preservation of the status quo, but not always. If the currently existing status quo itself is causing one of the parties irreparable injury, it is necessary to alter the situation so as to prevent the injury, either by returning to the last uncontested status quo between the parties by the issuance of a mandatory injunction or by allowing the parties to take proposed action that the court finds will minimize the irreparable injury. The focus always must be on prevention of injury by a proper order, not merely on preservation of the status quo.
(emphasis added and internal citations omitted) Clearly, the Stenberg decision and others like it,3 when read in their entirety, serves as a
complete understanding of the purpose of injunctive relief. Accordingly, the Court’s Order is well
3 See also Canal Authority of Florida v. Callaway, 489 F.2d 567, 576 (5th Cir. 1974)(“It is often loosely stated that the purpose of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo. Indeed, some such notion may have influenced the district judge in this case, since he wrote of a "status quo that would normally be entitled to temporary protection." It must not be thought, however, that there is any particular magic in the phrase "status quo." The purpose of a preliminary
4

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 49 filed 06/22/20 PageID.1161 Page 8 of 18
within its sound discretion and in line with the very purpose of preliminary injunctions. Defendants’ argument does nothing demonstrate that Defendant has a strong likelihood of success on the merits and this argument weighs heavily in Plaintiffs’ favor.
II. The Court Properly Considered the Separation of Powers Issues in this Matter and Defendants’ Arguments are a Motion for Reconsideration
The body of much of Defendants’ second argument is virtually copied and pasted from Defendants’ response brief in opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction. (see Defendant’s Brief, PageID.395). As such, it is nothing more than a disguised Motion for Reconsideration. However, even assuming they are not seeking reconsideration, the Defendants’ argument that the court failed to follow South Bay United Pentecostal Church, et al. v. Gavin Newsom, Governor of California, 509 U.S. ___ (2020) is insincere.
First, Defendants certainly cannot mean to insinuate that this Honorable Court failed to follow the precedent set by South Bay, supra. As Defendants are well aware, in South Bay the United States Supreme Court issued a one sentence denial of an application for leave. Defendants instead cite to the non-binding concurrence, which is not precedent. See American Tel & Tel Co v. Communications Workers of America, 985 F2d 855 (CA 6, 1993).
Second, as was explained at oral argument, the facts of South Bay, supra, are dissimilar to the case at bar. The plaintiff in South Bay was not arguing that the church was closed, it was merely arguing that capacity limits set by the Governor should not apply to it. In this case, the Plaintiffs
injunction is always to prevent irreparable injury so as to preserve the court's ability to render a meaningful decision on the merits. It often happens that this purpose is furthered by preservation of the status quo, but not always. If the currently existing status quo itself is causing one of the parties irreparable injury, it is necessary to alter the situation so as to prevent the injury, either by returning to the last uncontested status quo between the parties by the issuance of a mandatory injunction, or by allowing the parties to take proposed action that the court finds will minimize the irreparable injury. The focus always must be on prevention of injury by a proper order, not merely on preservation of the status quo.”) (internal quotations omitted, emphasis added).
5

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 49 filed 06/22/20 PageID.1162 Page 9 of 18
are not permitted to open at all. Since there is no majority opinion to rely on and a very short concurrence by Justice Roberts, attributing any meaning to and extrapolating Justice Roberts’ commentary is not helpful in this context. In fact, it is not at all certain that the highest court would have denied review this case if the church was completely shuttered by the Governor’s Order.
Relying on its non-binding precedential value, Defendants nonetheless argue that this Court discarded and failed to follow the concurrence in South Bay. In reality, even despite its lack of binding precedential value, this Honorable Court dissected the entire concurrence, applied the facts to this case, and found Defendants’ position regarding the application of the concurrence to the instant matter lacking. (See (42) Opinion, PageID.1116-1117). Importantly, this Court included in its analysis of South Bay that “California’s Order treated all large gatherings similarly….” (See (42) Opinion, PageID.1116).
This Court properly reviewed and considered Defendants’ Separation of Power assertions and, as such, Defendant has failed to show that it has a strong likelihood of success on the merits with their argument.
III. The Court Properly Applied the Standard of Review The Defendants argue that the Court improperly applied a “heightened” standard for
rational basis review; however, the Court’s opinion sufficiently details its reasoning and includes no such “heightened” standard. Rather, the Court applied the framework in South Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 140 S. Ct. 1613 (Mem) (U.S. 2020) (Roberts, C.J., concurring) to the situation at hand and determined that, unlike California’s similar treatment of all large group gatherings, the state of Michigan “has begun to chip away” at what was initially a “broad closure” of businesses and
[m]any indoor venues and indoor activities are now permitted: retail is now open with some restrictions, restaurants and bars may serve patrons at limited capacity,
6

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 49 filed 06/22/20 PageID.1163 Page 10 of 18
nail and hair salons and tattoo parlors can provide grooming services, children’s camps can resume service, and even indoor gaming venues like bowling alleys, climbing facilities, and nightclubs can open subject to capacity limits. But indoor gyms and other fitness facilities remain closed. (PageID.1117-1118). The Court also followed Marysville Baptist Church, Inc. v. Beshear, noting that numerous exceptions to a prohibition remove it from the category of a “generally applicable, nondiscriminatory law.” 957 F.3d 610, 614 (6th Cir. 2020). There can be no serious dispute that this Court recognized that the standard here is “extremely deferential” to Defendants and explained that, if it could have conceived of any set of facts that would support the Defendants’ position, it would have done so. (PageID.1119). Yet, Defendants were not able to provide any rational basis for the differential treatment of gyms and fitness facilities—only the “bare assertion” that gyms are dangerous, which is insufficient given the differential treatment of many similar categories of businesses. (Id.). Even if the Court’s reasoning was based on some “heightened” version of the rational basis standard, such a standard is warranted in this case. The Michigan legislature has actively contested Defendant Governor Whitmer’s authority in issuing executive orders such as the ones at issue in this matter and continues to do so. House of Representatives v. Whitmer, Case No. 353655 (Mich. Ct. App.). Indeed, the Court, like the legislature, is rightfully concerned with the slippery slope that Defendants’ position represents: The argument presented to the Court on this motion, however, points out a different slope the Defendants may create: if Defendants can open or close any sector of the economy, at will, with nothing more than a vague reference that it is “dangerous,” the potential for abuse is palpable. (Id.).
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Along these same lines, the Court must be mindful of the fact that, unlike executive orders, legislation is a “step-by-step, deliberate and deliberative process,” and where a legislative body has “considered and thus far rejected legislation accomplishing the goals of” executive orders, demonstrating “the importance and divisiveness of the policies in play,” there is a heightened concern surrounding the fundamental constitutional principle of separation of powers4. See, e.g., City & Co of San Francisco v. Trump, 897 F3d 1225, 1234 (9th Cir. 2018). The fact that Michigan’s state legislature is suing Defendant Governor Whitmer highlights the “divisiveness of the policies in play” here and justifies a “heightened” review, if indeed the Court applied such a standard, which Plaintiffs maintain it did not.
Finally, Defendants take the position in this section of their brief that the motion process was unfair to them because they were not afforded an opportunity to present evidence or make proper arguments.5 However, Defendants never raised this perceived unfairness in their 33-page Response Brief or during the hour-and-a-half long oral argument on Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction. In fact, Defendants took the position at oral argument that the Court must try to find any conceivable rationale for Defendants’ position.
IV. The Court Properly Applied the Jacobson Decision Once again, Defendants’ criticism of this Honorable Court’s decision reads like a motion
for reconsideration. And once again, Defendants’ argument that this Honorable Court did not give
4 Like the U.S. Constitution, the state of Michigan’s Constitution provides for separation of powers at Art. III, § 2. 5 Plaintiffs point out that they were able to file a Reply brief to Defendants’ Response brief with supporting facts and affidavits in three business days, and were able to research, analyze and draft the instant brief in zero business days, all without asserting an unfair timeline. It is also necessary to point out that Defendants’ unfairness argument—lack of a meaningful ability to be heard—is ironically similar to Plaintiffs’ assertions of lack of due process in their complete closure. Except in that instance, the Defendants had over three months to afford Plaintiffs a meaningful and just hearing.
8

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 49 filed 06/22/20 PageID.1165 Page 12 of 18
the Jacobson v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) decision “due deference” is disingenuous at best.
This Honorable Court’s analysis of Jacobson was thorough and certainly much more complete than Defendants’ own analysis. For example, this Honorable Court quoted parts of the Jacobson opinion that Defendants intentionally left out regarding the limitations of police power. This Court noted the following passage from Jacobson:
[t]he state’s police power “might be exercised in particular circumstances and in reference to particular persons in such an arbitrary, unreasonable manner, or might go so far beyond what was reasonably required for the safety of the public, as to authorize or compel the courts to interfere for the protection of such persons.” Id. at 28. Thus, restrictions may be subject to judicial review if the challenged action “has no real or substantial relation to those objects [of securing public health and safety], or is beyond all question, a plain, palpable invasion of rights secured by the fundamental law.” Id. at 31.
See (42) Opinion, PageID.1114-1115. This Court also acknowledged that two recent Sixth Circuit opinions have made it clear that Jacobson is the starting point for an analysis, it is not the only analysis. Finally, after applying the correct standard and performing an analysis of the briefed arguments, as well as the arguments made by both parties at oral argument, this Court came to a conclusion that was sound; the Defendants provided the Court with nothing to reach a conclusion other than the one it reached. There is simply nowhere in the Opinion and Order to support a different conclusion. Defendant has not shown that it satisfies any of the factors with this argument. V. Denial of the Stay Does Not Serve the Public Interest Defendants string-cite several cases that stand for the proposition that in general, when a statute is enjoined, the State suffers harm. Defendants opine that public confidence in the Governor’s executive orders will erode, there will be an increase in litigation, and that increase will result in a patchwork of regional and industry specific carveouts of the orders. However,
9

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 49 filed 06/22/20 PageID.1166 Page 13 of 18
Defendants offer no facts or evidence to support their position. Defendants simply engage in speculation and conjecture of the alleged harm that they will suffer.
Defendants fail to point out that public confidence in the Governor’s Executive Orders has already been eroded throughout the state. There have been multiple protests over the last several months against the Governor’s executive orders in Lansing, to her great consternation. One protest, known as “Operation Gridlock,” drew between 3,000 and 4,000 protesters to Lansing on April 15, 2020.6 Another protest at the Capitol took place on April 30, 2020 after the Governor declared a new state of emergency in Michigan.7 A third large protest against the executive orders occurred on May 14, 2020.8 And, of course, no one can forget the great uprising over the Defendants’ relentless pursuit of Carl the Barber.9
Further eroding the public confidence in the Governor’s Orders is the Governor’s failure to abide by her own Orders. As Plaintiffs pointed out in their Brief in Support of their Motion for Preliminary Injunction, the Governor hasn’t followed her own “strict social distancing” guidelines in attending a protest, walking and kneeling shoulder to shoulder with other mask-less protesters, none of whom were observing the Order to stay six feet apart. Even more recently, the Governor

6 Smith, ‘Lock her up!’: Anti-Whitmer coronavirus lockdown protesters swarm Michigan Capitol,

NBC News (April 15, 2020)(https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/politics-news/lock-her-anti-

whitmer-coronavirus-lockdown-protestors-swarm-michigan-capitol-n1184426). 7 Beckett, Armed Protesters demonstrate against Covid-19 lockdown at Michigan Capitol, The

Guardian (April 30, 2020)(https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/apr/30/michigan-protests-

coronavirus-lockdown-armed-capitol) 8 Spangler, Whitmer: Many legislators incited Capitol protest – then didn’t want to be there,

Detroit

Free

Press

(May

15,

2020)(https://www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/2020/05/15/whitmer-stay-home-order-

michigan-coronavirus-cnn/5197074002/).

9 Eggert, 7 barbers ticketed for cutting hair at Michigan protest, The Detroit Free Press (May 20,

2020) (https://www.freep.com/story/money/business/michigan/2020/05/20/barbers-ticketed-

cutting-hair-capitol-protest-coronavirus/5233344002/).

10

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 49 filed 06/22/20 PageID.1167 Page 14 of 18
had a “photo op” at a restaurant in Detroit and failed to maintain social distancing again when she stood in immediate proximity and at times touching the other employees therein.10
Then too, the Opinion of this Honorable Court rightfully points out “that both it and the Michigan Courts have already been deluged with litigation seeking the same.” (See (42) Opinion, PageID.1119). In addition to the instant litigation, this Court’s Opinion cites ten cases challenging the Governor’s authority (and there are most likely more). In one of those cases, House of Representatives v. Whitmer, Case No. 353655 (Mich. Ct. App.) the Michigan legislature has sued the Governor claiming that the Governor doesn’t have the authority to issue executive orders under the Emergency Powers of the Governors Act (“EPGA”) or the Emergency Management Act (“EMA”). That case is currently pending in the Michigan Court of Appeals. More recently, in another case cited by this Court, Midwest Institute of Health, PLLC, et al., v. Gretchen Whitmer, et al., Case No. 1:20-cv-00414, ongoing and contentious litigation between the Governor and the plaintiffs has resulted in this Honorable Court certifying two questions of law to the Michigan Supreme Court.
Regardless of the outcome of the lawsuits challenging the Governor’s authority and regardless of the erosion of public support for the executive orders, one thing is certain: The public confidence in the executive orders was eroding and has continued to erode without any assistance from this Honorable Court’s ruling.
Likewise, there has already been piecemeal lifting of restrictions through Defendants’ own “plan” to reengage the state without the assistance of this Court or these Plaintiffs. At the motion

10 Bartkowiak, Jr., Whitmer serves up Coney dogs in Detroit: ‘We can’t let our guard down,’

clickondetroit.com

(June

18,

2020)

(https://www.clickondetroit.com/news/local/2020/06/18/whitmer-serves-up-coney-dogs-in-

detroit-we-cant-let-our-guard-down/).

11

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for preliminary injunction hearing, Plaintiffs pointed out to this Honorable Court an example of the patchwork system that the Governor has implemented. The Governor has rolled out a “plan” called “MI Safe Start.”11 However, she has not followed her own “plan.” For example, restaurants and bars were to open in Phase 5. However, the Governor has opened restaurants and bars in Phase 4 across the entire state without an explanation as to why. She also opened salons and other personal service businesses statewide, even though those businesses were in Phase 5 and the entire state—other than Regions Six and Eight (where COVID-19 does not go)—remains in Phase 4.
Further adding to the confusion, the fitness industry is not even on the “plan,” but was nonetheless opened in Phase 5 for Regions Six and Eight on June 15, 2020. However, the Governor has insinuated through her media response to this Court’s Opinion and Order and the State’s immediate appeal of that Order that while the remainder of the state “may” be placed into Phase 5 by the fourth of July, that order will not include gyms, thus removing them from Phase 5 for the state’s lower peninsula.12 While Plaintiffs are thrilled for restaurants and bars and many other sectors of the economy that are allowed to open and certainly are not advocating that they be closed, the Governor’s failure to follow her own plan leaves the citizens of this state more confused and helpless than ever by her own patchwork approach.

11 See https://www.michigan.gov/documents/whitmer/MI_SAFE_START_PLAN_689875_7.pdf

12 “With this ruling, the court is playing a dangerous role it should not play: second-guessing and

upending the data-informed decisions that have saved thousands of lives in Michigan," Whitmer

spokeswoman Tiffany Brown said. "The idea that gyms — with their high levels of heavy

respiratory activity, shared indoor spaces, and shared surfaces — might be one of the later

businesses to come back online in the midst of this global pandemic is hardly surprising and highly

sensible.” LeBlanc & Jones, Federal Judge Orders Michigan Gyms Reopened June 25; Whitmer

to

Appeal,

Detroit

Free

Press

(June

19,

2020)

(https://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/local/michigan/2020/06/19/federal-judge-orders-

michigan-gyms-reopened-june-25/3225063001/).

12

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Therefore, Plaintiffs submit that the evidence they provided, coupled with the speculation and lack of any evidence provided by Defendants, make it clear that the “irreparable harm” factor weighs heavily in favor of Plaintiffs.
VI. Granting of the Stay Would Substantially Harm Plaintiffs Finally, Defendants continue with the narrative that the Governor has not harmed gym
owners by shuttering their businesses for what will be 14 weeks on the day that this Response is filed. Now that this Honorable Court has held that Plaintiffs will suffer irreparable harm without an injunction, the Governor and Director still continue their borderline-offensive narrative that Plaintiffs—citizens of this state and the Governor’s constituents—have not been harmed.
Adding to that, Defendants now push the false “status quo” argument discussed above as a reason that a stay in this matter will continue to “not harm” the Plaintiffs. In fact, Defendants add to the argument and now claim that Plaintiffs should remain closed under a stay of this Court’s Order to protect Plaintiffs from Defendants’ certain appellate victory and forced reclosure after opening on June 25. In other words, “Trust us. We’re the government. We are really protecting you from yourselves.”
Despite all of the Defendants’ rhetoric, one thing is clear. This Honorable Court has already ruled that Plaintiffs will suffer irreparable harm without an injunction. This Motion is not seeking a reversal of that Order. The Defendants present no facts or affidavits for their assertions. Accordingly, this factor must be decided in Plaintiffs’ favor as the Court has already correctly ruled that Plaintiffs’ are at risk for irreparable harm.
CONCLUSION For the reasons stated above, Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Honorable Court deny Defendants’ Motion for Stay in its entirety.
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Dated: June 22, 2020

Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Scott M. Erskine_________________ SCOTT M. ERSKINE (P54714) CARLY VAN THOMME (P59706) ERSKINE LAW, PC Attorneys for Plaintiffs 612 West University Drive Rochester, Michigan 48307 (248) 601-4497 serskine@erskinelaw.com

14

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 49 filed 06/22/20 PageID.1171 Page 18 of 18
PROOF OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on June 22, 2020, I presented the foregoing paper to the Clerk of the Court for filing and uploading to the ECF system, which will send notification of such filing to the attorneys of record listed herein and I hereby certify that I have mailed by US Postal Service the document to the involved non participants.
s/ Scott M. Erskine_________________ SCOTT M. ERSKINE (P54714) CARLY VAN THOMME (P59706) ERSKINE LAW, PC Attorneys for Plaintiffs 612 West University Drive Rochester, Michigan 48307 (248) 601-4497 serskine@erskinelaw.com cvanthomme@erskinelaw.com

 </s> Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 51 filed 06/22/20 PageID.1175 Page 1 of 5

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

LEAGUE OF INDEPENDENT FITNESS FACILITIES )

AND TRAINERS, INC., et al.,

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

-v-

)

)

GRETCHEN WHITMER and

)

ROBERT GORDON,

)

Defendants.

)

)

No. 1:20-cv-458 Honorable Paul L. Maloney

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO STAY PENDING APPEAL

This matter is before the Court on Defendants’ emergency motion to stay pending

appeal (ECF No. 44). Defendants seek to stay the Court’s June 19, 2020 Order granting

Plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary injunction (ECF No. 42), which they have appealed (ECF

No. 43). Plaintiffs oppose the motion to stay (ECF No. 48, 49). For the reasons to be stated,

the Court will deny the motion.

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure grant district courts the power to stay an

injunction pending appeal: “While an appeal is pending from an interlocutory order or final

judgment that grants, continues, modifies, refuses, dissolves, or refuses to dissolve or modify

an injunction, the court may suspend, modify, restore, or grant an injunction on terms for

bond or other terms that secure the opposing party's rights.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 62(d). In deciding

whether to issue a stay under Rule 62(d), the Court must consider the same factors analyzed

when issuing injunctive relief:

(1) whether the defendant has a strong or substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) whether the defendant will suffer irreparable harm if the district

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 51 filed 06/22/20 PageID.1176 Page 2 of 5
court proceedings are not stayed; (3) whether staying the district court proceedings will substantially injure other interested parties; and (4) where the public interest lies. Baker v. Adams County/Ohio Valley School Bd., 310 F.3d 927, 928 (6th Cir. 2002). As with injunctive relief, the factors must be balanced, and the “strength of the likelihood of success on the merits that needs to be demonstrated is inversely proportional to the amount of irreparable harm that will be suffered if a stay does not issue.” Id. Importantly, to justify a stay, the defendant “must demonstrate at least serious questions going to the merits and irreparable harm that decidedly outweighs the harm that will be inflicted on others if a stay is granted.” Id. I. Likelihood that Defendants Will Prevail on the Merits of Their Appeal Defendants argue that they are likely to prevail on the merits of their appeal for three reasons. First, they argue that the issuance of a preliminary injunction disrupted the status quo rather than preserving it. However, there is no “particular magic in the phrase ‘status quo.’ ” Stenberg v. Cheker Oil Co., 573 F.2d 921, 925 (6th Cir. 1978). The purpose of a preliminary injunction is to prevent irreparable injury; this is often, but not always, achieved by preserving the status quo. Id. But “[i]f the currently existing status quo itself is causing one of the parties irreparable injury, it is necessary to alter the situation so as to prevent the injury.” Id. The focus must be on the prevention of injury, not merely preservation of the status quo. Second, Defendants contend that the issuance of the preliminary injunction implicates substantial separation of powers concerns. This argument appears to be a motion for reconsideration disguised as a motion for stay pending appeal. In any event, as the Court
2

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previously explained, the separation of powers concerns embodied in South Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 140 S. Ct. 1613 (Mem) (U.S. 2020) (Roberts, C.J., concurring), are highly relevant to the dispute at hand. The Court took those concerns into account and applied them to Defendants’ arguments against the motion for preliminary injunction. Nothing presented to the Court today changes the analysis set forth in the June 19, 2020 Opinion.
Third, Defendants argue that the Court improperly applied a heightened standard for rational basis review and for review under Jacobsen v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 29 (1905). Again, this is an argument more suited to a motion for reconsideration than a motion to stay pending appeal. Regardless, the Court treated Defendants’ position with the utmost deference, and sought only some rational basis for the continued closure of indoor gyms while other similar businesses may open. Defendants have not presented that to the Court, whether through argument or evidence.1
In short, Defendants’ motion to stay pending appeal presents nothing to change the likelihood of success analysis, so the Court cannot conclude that Defendants are likely to prevail on appeal.
II. Risk of Irreparable Harm to Defendants and the Public Interest Defendants maintain that the injunction is an unwarranted intrusion into the State’s
police powers, and that “judicial tinkering” in the pandemic response plan will create a
1 The Court notes that, even in their motion to stay pending appeal, Defendants do not put forth a rational basis for the distinction between gyms and other indoor gatherings. Defendants simply refer to “the reasons offered for why indoor fitness facilities present a particularly heightened risk of [virus] spread” without so much as naming those reasons. (ECF No. 45 at PageID.1139.) As the Court has previously outlined, Defendants have not proffered a reason to treat indoor gyms dissimilarly than other businesses or activities that have since been allowed to open.
3

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patchwork of “regional and industry-specific carveouts.” (ECF No. 45 at PageID.1145). Under the same heading, Defendants make a passing reference to the public interest, arguing that it is served by avoiding such a patchwork, carved-out response. However, Defendants themselves have created a patchwork response: gyms are open in parts of the state but not others, and most other industries have had their own “reopening” dates, staggered throughout the months of May and June (see, e.g., EO 2020-115, ECF No. 33-16, which eases most restrictions on the upper peninsula and parts of the lower peninsula, and allows “personal touch” businesses to open statewide). The Court is not persuaded that the issuance of an injunction adds any unwarranted “carve-outs” to the Defendants’ pandemic response, nor is it persuaded that the injunction harms the public interest.
III. Risk of Substantial Injury to Other Parties Here, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs are not subject to substantial harm if the stay is
granted, but they avoid mentioning the fact that Plaintiffs are facing grave financial harm because they have been closed for over 90 days with no reopening date in sight. Again, nothing Defendants argue today changes the Court’s conclusion that absent issuance of the injunction, Plaintiffs are at risk of irreparable harm.
IV. Conclusion Defendants have not demonstrated “serious questions going to the merits” or
“irreparable harm that decidedly outweighs the harm that will be inflicted on others if a stay is granted.” Baker, 310 F.3d at 928. Therefore, the balance of the factors again falls in Plaintiffs’ favor, and the Court concludes that its June 19, 2020 Order should not be stayed pending appeal. Accordingly,
4

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 51 filed 06/22/20 PageID.1179 Page 5 of 5

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants’ motion to stay pending appeal (ECF

No. 44) is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: June 22, 2020

/s/ Paul L. Maloney Paul L. Maloney United States District Judge

5

 </s> Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 53 filed 06/24/20 PageID.1183 Page 1 of 8

Deborah S. Hunt Clerk

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
100 EAST FIFTH STREET, ROOM 540 POTTER STEWART U.S. COURTHOUSE
CINCINNATI, OHIO 45202-3988

Tel. (513) 564-7000 www.ca6.uscourts.gov

Filed: June 24, 2020

Mr. John G. Fedynsky Mr. Christopher Mark Allen Mr. Joshua Otho Booth Mr. Joseph T. Froehlich Mr. Andrew Jurgensen Ms. Carly Ann Van Thomme Mr. Scott M. Erskine

Re: Case No. 20-1581, League of Independent Fitness, et al. v. Gretchen Whitmer, et al. Originating Case No. : 1:20-cv-00458
Dear Counsel: The Court issued the enclosed Order today in this case.
Sincerely yours,

cc: Mr. Thomas Dorwin Enclosure

s/Renee M. Jefferies On Behalf of Karen S. Fultz, Case Manager Direct Dial No. 513-564-7036

Case 1:20-cv-00458-PLM-PJG ECF No. 53 filed 06/24/20 PageID.1184 Page 2 of 8

No. 20-1581
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

FILED
Jun 24, 2020 DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk

LEAGUE OF INDEPENDENT FITNESS

)

FACILITIES AND TRAINERS, INC., et al.,

)

)

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

)

)

v.

)

)

GOVERNOR GRETCHEN WHITMER, et al.,

)

)

Defendants-Appellants.

)

O R D E R

Before: GIBBONS, COOK, and READLER, Circuit Judges. In addressing the COVID-19 outbreak, executives at the national, state, and local levels have had difficult decisions to make in honoring public health concerns while respecting individual liberties. Those decisions have now been the subject of numerous legal challenges, from coast to coast. Some involve individual rights for which precedent requires courts to apply a heightened level of scrutiny to government actions, for example, the free exercise of religion, see Maryville Baptist Church, Inc. v. Beshear, 957 F.3d 610, 614–15 (6th Cir. 2020), or access to an abortion, see Adams & Boyle, P.C. v. Slatery, 956 F.3d 913, 925–26 (6th Cir. 2020). But many other cases involve executive actions that, by precedent, are viewed only through the lens of a very modest, or “rational basis,” standard of review. And almost without exception, courts in those instances have appropriately deferred to the judgments of the executive in question. See, e.g., Tex. Democratic Party v. Abbott, 961 F.3d 389 (5th Cir. 2020); McCarthy v. Cuomo, No. 20-cv-2124

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(ARR), 2020 WL 3286530, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. June 18, 2020); Cassell v. Snyders, -- F. Supp. 3d --, 2020 WL 2112374, at *11 (N.D. Ill. May 3, 2020).
Today’s case similarly fits that deferential mold. As this case comes to the Court in the posture of a request for an emergency stay, residents of the State of Michigan have been subject to a wave of executive orders governing their rights and responsibilities since the onset of the COVID-19 crisis. Governor Gretchen Whitmer has taken an “incremental approach” to reopening sectors of the economy closed in response to COVID-19. Governor’s Motion at 7. While many states have allowed their residents to resume most traditional day-to-day activities, Michiganders do not yet enjoy those same privileges, in full. And so it is perhaps somewhat understandable that those restrictions have generated various legal challenges, including this one.
Plaintiffs here are mostly owners and operators of Michigan indoor fitness facilities closed in all but the northernmost parts of the state by order of Governor Whitmer. See § 12(b) Mich. Exec. Order No. 2020-110. Plaintiffs challenge that Order on the grounds that it violated, among other constitutional protections, the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection of the laws by treating indoor fitness facilities (which remain completely closed) differently from bars, restaurants, and salons (which may open with restrictions). Finding that the Order did not involve a fundamental right or suspect classification, the district court concluded that rational-basis review applied. Nevertheless, it found that the Order’s differential treatment of indoor fitness facilities failed even that deferential test and issued a preliminary injunction. The Governor unsuccessfully moved the district court for a stay pending appeal. She now moves this Court for an emergency stay.
Our jurisdiction over the district court’s order granting a preliminary injunction is wellestablished. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). We review four factors when evaluating whether to grant an

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injunction or stay pending appeal: “(1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing that he is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) whether the applicant will be irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) whether issuance of the stay will substantially injure the other parties interested in the proceeding; and (4) where the public interest lies.” Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 434 (2009) (quoting Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776 (1987)). First among equals are factors one and two, which we typically treat as “the most critical.” Id.; see Ohio State Conference of NAACP v. Husted, 769 F.3d 385, 387 (6th Cir. 2014). More broadly, “[t]hese factors are not prerequisites that must be met, but are interrelated considerations that must be balanced together.” A. Philip Randolph Inst. v. Husted, 907 F.3d 913, 918 (6th Cir. 2018). As the moving party, the Governor bears the burden of showing a stay is warranted. Id. She has met that burden.
We first consider the likelihood that the district court’s grant of a preliminary injunction will be reversed on appeal. All agree that the police power retained by the states empowers state officials to address pandemics such as COVID-19 largely without interference from the courts. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 29 (1905). This century-old historical principle has been reaffirmed just this year by a chorus of judicial voices, including our own. See, e.g., Elim Romanian Pentecostal Church v. Pritzker, No. 20-1811, 2020 WL 2517093, at *1 (7th Cir. May 16, 2020); Roberts v. Neace, 958 F.3d 409, 414 (6th Cir. 2020); In re Rutledge, 956 F.3d 1018, 1031–32 (8th Cir. 2020); In re Abbott, 956 F.3d 696, 704–05 (5th Cir. 2020); Geller v. de Blasio, -- F. Supp. 3d --, 2020 WL 2520711, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. May 18, 2020); McGhee v. City of Flagstaff, No. CV-20-08081-PCT-GMS, 2020 WL 2308479, at *3 (D. Ariz. May 8, 2020); Givens v. Newsom, No. 2:20-cv-00852-JAM-CKD, 2020 WL 2307224, at *3 (E.D. Cal. May 8, 2020). The police power, however, is not absolute. “While the law may take periodic naps during a pandemic, we will not let it sleep through one.” Maryville Baptist Church, 957 F.3d at 615.

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The parties agree that rational basis review is the hurdle the Governor’s Order must clear. Utilizing that legal framework, we presume the Order is constitutional, making it incumbent upon Plaintiffs to negate “every conceivable basis which might support” it. Armour v. City of Indianapolis, 566 U.S. 673, 681 (2012). That is no easy task. Plaintiffs must disprove all possible justifications for the Order regardless whether those justifications actually motivated the Governor’s decisionmaking. FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313–15 (1993) (“[B]ecause we never require a legislature to articulate its reasons for enacting a statute, it is entirely irrelevant for constitutional purposes whether the conceived reason for the challenged distinction actually motivated the legislature. Thus, the absence of ‘legislative facts’ explaining the distinction ‘on the record’ has no significance in rational-basis analysis.”) (citations omitted). Under this test, the Governor’s action “is not subject to courtroom fact-finding and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data.” Id. at 315. Especially so, we note, in the case of a public health crisis like the one presented by COVID-19, where “[Michigan’s] latitude must be especially broad.” South Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 140 S. Ct. 1613, 1613 (2020) (Mem.) (Roberts, C.J., concurring in the denial of injunctive relief) (citing Marshall v. United States, 414 U.S. 417, 427 (1974)).
The district court granted the injunction primarily because the Governor did not adequately explain during the hearing below her somewhat unique treatment of indoor fitness facilities, relying instead on conclusory statements that gyms are “dangerous.” While perhaps a fair critique of the statements made during the hearing, that observation to overlooks rationales offered by the Governor in her briefing. Governor’s Dist. Ct. Br. at 28 (describing indoor fitness facilities as presenting a “combination of heightened risks of infection and spread” of COVID-19). More to the point, unlike exacting forms of scrutiny applied in other contexts, the Governor was not

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required to explain that choice at all, let alone exhaustively. Beach Commc’ns, 508 U.S. at 313–
14. Rather, the relevant standard merely requires “rational speculation” that offers “conceivable”
support to the Governor’s order. Id. at 315.
Against the backdrop of that low bar, the Governor justifies her order as follows, citing a
CDC Research Paper for support:
[E]ven the most ventilated indoor facility is susceptible to respiratory spread of the virus. The danger is only amplified when people congregate (even with social distancing) in a confined space and work out. By its nature, working out is sustained vigorous physical activity, which necessarily means heavy breathing and sweating and, therefore, acute, propulsive bursts of virus shedding by anyone in that confined space who might be infected. Apart from individual exercisers in proximity, there is the added risk of individuals working out together or organized groups working out for extended trainer-led sessions. And the risk of viral spread is only heightened further by the sharing of exercise equipment among many different people over the course of the day, even when goodfaith efforts are made to clean that equipment after each use.
At a fitness center, these factors merge to significantly increase the incidence of this highly contagious and asymptomatically transmittable virus spreading.
Governor’s Dist. Ct. Br. at 20 (footnote omitted). The idea that heavy breathing and sweating in
an enclosed space containing many shared surfaces creates conditions likely to spread the virus is
a paradigmatic example of “rational speculation” that fairly supports the Governor’s treatment of
indoor fitness facilities. Presumably for these same reasons, some similar establishments, such as
dance halls and rock-climbing facilities, are also closed pursuant to the Order. Whether the
Governor’s Order is “unsupported by evidence or empirical data” in the record does not undermine
her decision, at least as a legal matter. Beach Commc’ns, 508 U.S. at 315. After all, we must

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“accept [the Governor’s] generalizations even when there is an imperfect fit between means and ends.” Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 321 (1993).
The district court understandably expressed frustration at the justifications underlying these executive actions. Dist. Ct. Op. at 13 (“This Court fully recognizes that the bar is extremely low, but it is not that low. Defendants cannot rely on the categorization of gyms as ‘dangerous,’ without a single supporting fact, to uphold their continued closure.”). Among other uncertainties of the decisionmaking process, the Order does not close every venue in which the virus might easily spread. Yet the Governor’s order need not be the most effective or least restrictive measure possible to attempt to stem the spread of COVID-19. Heller, 509 U.S. at 321. Shaping the precise contours of public health measures entails some difficult line-drawing. Our Constitution wisely leaves that task to officials directly accountable to the people. South Bay, 140 S. Ct. at 1613–14 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (citing Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 38) (observing that where the “broad limits” of rational basis review “are not exceeded, they should not be subject to second-guessing by an ‘unelected federal judiciary,’ which lacks the background, competence, and expertise to assess public health and is not accountable to the people”). Even if imperfect, the Governor’s Order passes muster under the rational basis test. Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955) (“The legislature may select one phase of one field and apply a remedy there, neglecting the others.”).
The remaining three stay factors follow quickly in tow. Start with harm. Enjoining the actions of elected state officials, especially in a situation where an infectious disease can and has spread rapidly, causes irreparable harm. See Maryland v. King, 567 U.S. 1301, 1301 (2012). Effects on interested parties and the public interest are closely related. Though Plaintiffs bear the very real risk of losing their businesses, the Governor’s interest in combatting COVID-19 is at

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least equally significant. To date, the disease has infected thousands of Michiganders, and it has shown the potential to infect many more. That the public interest weighs in favor of a stay is apparent for the same reason.
* * * * * We sympathize deeply with the business owners and their patrons affected by the Governor’s Order. Crises like COVID-19 can call for quick, decisive measures to save lives. Yet those measures can have extreme costs—costs that often are not borne evenly. The decision to impose those costs rests with the political branches of government, in this case, Governor Whitmer. Her motion for an emergency stay is thus GRANTED.
ENTERED BY ORDER OF THE COURT
Deborah S. Hunt, Clerk


[CONTENT] Michigan | 22 | Michigan | over 150 ||| June 19 ||| the Sixth Circuit | June 24 ||| May 22, 2020 | Michigan | the State of Michigan | the Michigan Department of Health and Human Services ||| the Declaratory Judgment Act | 28 | U.S.C. | § | the All Writs Act | 28 | 1651 ||| Constitution ||| the U.S District Court | the Western District | Michigan | Paul L Maloney ||| 22 | Michigan | the League of Independent Fitness Facilities | Trainers | LIFFT | over 150 ||| March 16 | Whitmer ||| June | Michigan Executive | 2020 |||  ||| the Fourteenth Amendment | the Dormant Commerce Clause | the Privileges and Immunities Clause | the Emergency Management Act |||  ||| Michigan ||| June 1 | 15 ||| June 8 ||| June 12 ||| LIFFT ||| June 17 ||| the same day ||| June 19 ||| 2020 WL 3421229 |||  |||  ||| the same day | the Sixth Circuit ||| June 22 ||| The same day ||| 2020 WL | 3422586 ||| June 24 | the Sixth Circuit | COVID-19 ||| 2020 WL 3468281 ||| The Sixth Circuit | State ||| the Sixth Circuit | the Sixth Circuit | July 7 ||| July 16, 2020 ||| October 17 [SUMMARY] COVID-19 Summary: This lawsuit was filed against the state of Michigan by 22 individual companies operating fitness businesses in Michigan and an organization representing over 150 fitness facilities in the state to enjoin executive orders that caused their facilities to remain closed. The court granted a preliminary injunction on June 19. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit stayed the lower court's injunction on June 24. <hr>

On May 22, 2020, owners and operators of Michigan’s indoor fitness facilities filed a suit against the Governor of the State of Michigan and the Director of the Michigan Department of Health and Human Services to enjoin orders that required the plaintiffs to keep their facilities closed. The plaintiffs brought this lawsuit as a declaratory and injunctive action under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201–2202, and the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651. The plaintiffs sought a declaration that the Lockdown Orders violated the  Constitution, an order enjoining the state from enforcing the lockdown orders, and a prohibition form issuing further orders that would require the plaintiffs to keep their businesses closed. The case filed in the U.S District Court for the Western District of Michigan and assigned to District Judge Paul L Maloney.  

The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, were comprised of 22 individual companies operating fitness businesses in Michigan, as well as the League of Independent Fitness Facilities and Trainers (LIFFT), an organization representing over 150 fitness facilities in the state. 

On March 16, Governor Whitmer issued temporary restrictions on the uses of public facilities, which included gymnasiums, fitness centers, recreation centers, and indoor sports facilities. Throughout June, the defendant incrementally re-opened sectors of the economy with Michigan Executive order 2020-110 and 2020-115. The orders lifted certain restrictions on facilities such as restaurants, bowling, and climbing facilities subject to capacity restrictions, but left indoor fitness facilities remained completely closed. The plaintiffs alleged that the differential treatment of indoor fitness facilities violated substantive and procedural due process and equal protection of the law under the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as the Dormant Commerce Clause, the Privileges and Immunities Clause, and the Emergency Management Act. Further, the plaintiffs alleged that the order was void for vagueness as the defendant did not identify the criteria for which businesses were allowed to operate during the pandemic. They also alleged that the defendant exceeded the Governor’s authority in violation of the separation of powers doctrine in the Michigan constitution.

The complaint was amended on June 1 to add 15 additional plaintiffs. On June 8, the plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction to enjoin the defendants from enforcing the orders. On June 12, the defendants filed a response to the plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction. The defendants contended that the plaintiff LIFFT lacked organizational standing as it failed to establish injury-in-fact for the pre-enforcement claim, and therefore, should be dismissed. Oral argument was held on June 17. On the same day, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss for lack of standing. 

On June 19, the preliminary injunction was granted. 2020 WL 3421229. The court found that while the state was empowered to address emergencies like pandemics largely without interference from the courts, it was subject to constitutional limitations. Because the court found that the defendant was unable to state a rational basis to support the continued closure of indoor gyms, it did not survive deferential review. 

On the same day, the defendant filed an appeal to the Sixth Circuit, and also an emergency motion for a stay pending appeal filed at the district court. On June 22, the plaintiffs filed a motion in opposition to the stay pending appeal. The same day, the district court denied the defendants’ emergency motion to stay. 2020 WL 3422586. 

On June 24, the Sixth Circuit granted the defendant’s motion for an emergency stay, contending that the public interest of combatting COVID-19 outweighed the plaintiffs’ in favor of the stay. 2020 WL 3468281. The Sixth Circuit disagreed with the district court on whether the State demonstrated a rational basis to justify the plaintiffs’ continued closure, therefore surviving deferential review. The plaintiffs filed a motion asking the Sixth Circuit to reconsider the order, but the Sixth Circuit denied the motion on July 7.

Back in the district court, the plaintiffs responded to the defendants motion to dismiss on July 16, 2020. As of October 17, the case is still ongoing.