JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.This appeal presents a facial challenge to a criminal statute that requires persons who loiter or wander on the streets to provide a "credible and reliable" identification and to account for their presence when requested by a peace officer under circumstances that would justify a stop under the standards of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968). [Footnote 1]  We conclude that the statute as it has been construed is unconstitutionally vague within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by failing to clarify what is contemplated Page 461 U. S. 354 by the requirement that a suspect provide a "credible and reliable" identification.  Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the court below.IAppellee Edward Lawson was detained or arrested on approximately 15 occasions between March, 1975, and January, 1977, pursuant to Cal.Penal Code Ann. § 647(e) (West 1970). [Footnote 2]  Lawson was prosecuted only twice, and was convicted once.  The second charge was dismissed.Lawson then brought a civil action in the District Court for the Southern District of California seeking a declaratory judgment that § 647(e) is unconstitutional, a mandatory injunction to restrain enforcement of the statute, and compensatory and punitive damages against the various officers who detained him.  The District Court found that § 647(e) was overbroad because "a person who is stopped on less than probable cause cannot be punished for failing to identify himself."  App. to Juris.Statement A-78.  The District Court enjoined enforcement of the statute, but held that Lawson could not recover damages because the officers involved acted in the good faith belief that each detention or arrest was lawful.Appellant H. A. Porazzo, Deputy Chief Commander of the California Highway Patrol, appealed the District Court decision to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.  Lawson Page 461 U. S. 355 cross-appealed, arguing that he was entitled to a jury trial on the issue of damages against the officers.  The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court determination as to the unconstitutionality of § 647(e).  658 F.2d 1362 (1981).  The appellate court determined that the statute was unconstitutional in that it violates the Fourth Amendment's proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures, it contains a vague enforcement standard that is susceptible to arbitrary enforcement, and it fails to give fair and adequate notice of the type of conduct prohibited.  Finally, the Court of Appeals reversed the District Court as to its holding that Lawson was not entitled to a jury trial to determine the good faith of the officers in his damages action against them, and remanded the case to the District Court for trial.The officers appealed to this Court from that portion of the judgment of the Court of Appeals which declared § 647(e) unconstitutional and which enjoined its enforcement.  We noted probable jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1254(2).  455 U.S. 999 (1982).IIIn the courts below, Lawson mounted an attack on the facial validity of § 647(e). [Footnote 3]"In evaluating a facial challenge to a state law, a federal court must, of course, consider any limiting construction that a state court or enforcement agency has proffered."Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U. S. 489,  455 U. S. 494, n. 5 (1982).  As construed by the California Court of Appeal, [Footnote 4] § 647(e) requires that an individual Page 461 U. S. 356 provide "credible and reliable" identification when requested by a police officer who has reasonable suspicion of criminal activity sufficient to justify a Terry detention. [Footnote 5]  People v. Solomon, 33 Cal. App. 3d 429, 108 Cal. Rptr. 867 Page 461 U. S. 357 (1973).  "Credible and reliable" identification is defined by the State Court of Appeal as identification "carrying reasonable assurance that the identification is authentic and providing means for later getting in touch with the person who has identified himself."  Id. at 438, 108 Cal. Rptr.  at 873.  In addition, a suspect may be required to "account for his presence . . . to the extent that it assists in producing credible and reliable identification. . . ." Id. at 438, 108 Cal. Rptr.  at 872.  Under the terms of the statute, failure of the individual to provide "credible and reliable" identification permits the arrest. [Footnote 6]IIIOur Constitution is designed to maximize individual freedoms within a framework of ordered liberty.  Statutory limitations on those freedoms are examined for substantive authority and content, as well as for definiteness or certainty of expression.  See generally M. Bassiouni, Substantive Criminal Law 53 (1978).As generally stated, the void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.  Hoffman Estates v. Flipide, Hoffman Estates, Inc., supra; Smith v. Goguen, 415 U. S. 566 (1974); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U. S. 104 (1972); Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U. S. 156 (1972); Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U. S. 385 (1926).  Although the doctrine focuses Page 461 U. S. 358 both on actual notice to citizens and arbitrary enforcement, we have recognized recently that the more important aspect of the vagueness doctrine"is not actual notice, but the other principal element of the doctrine -- the requirement that a legislature establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement."Smith, 415 U.S. at  415 U. S. 574.  Where the legislature fails to provide such minimal guidelines, a criminal statute may permit "a standardless sweep [that] allows policemen, prosecutors, and juries to pursue their personal predilections."  Id. at  415 U. S. 575. [Footnote 7]Section 647(e), as presently drafted and as construed by the state courts, contains no standard for determining what a suspect has to do in order to satisfy the requirement to provide a "credible and reliable" identification.  As such, the statute vests virtually complete discretion in the hands of the police to determine whether the suspect has satisfied the statute and must be permitted to go on his way in the absence of probable cause to arrest.  An individual who police may think is suspicious but do not have probable cause to believe has committed a crime is entitled to continue to walk the public streets "only at the whim of any police officer" who happens to stop that individual under § 647(e).  Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 382 U. S. 87,  382 U. S. 90 (1965).  Our concern here is based upon the "potential for arbitrarily suppressing First Amendment liberties. . . ."  Id. at  382 U. S. 91.  In addition, § 647(e) implicates consideration of the constitutional right to freedom of movement.  See Kent v. Dulles, 357 U. S. 116,  357 U. S. 126 (1958); Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U. S. 500,  378 U. S. 505-506 (1964). [Footnote 8] Page 461 U. S. 359Section 647(e) is not simply a "stop-and-identify" statute.  Rather, the statute requires that the individual provide a "credible and reliable" identification that carries a "reasonable assurance" of its authenticity, and that provides "means for later getting in touch with the person who has identified himself."  Solomon, 33 Cal. App. 3d  at 438, 108 Cal. Rptr.  at 872-873.  In addition, the suspect may also have to account for his presence "to the extent it assists in producing Page 461 U. S. 360 credible and reliable identification."  Id. at 438, 108 Cal. Rptr.  at 872.At oral argument, the appellants confirmed that a suspect violates § 647(e) unless "the officer [is] satisfied that the identification is reliable."  Tr. of Oral Arg. 6.  In giving examples of how suspects would satisfy the requirement, appellants explained that a jogger, who was not carrying identification, could, depending on the particular officer, be required to answer a series of questions concerning the route that he followed to arrive at the place where the officers detained him, [Footnote 9] or could satisfy the identification requirement simply by reciting his name and address.  See id. at 6-10.It is clear that the full discretion accorded to the police to determine whether the suspect has provided a "credible and reliable" identification necessarily "entrust[s] lawmaking to the moment-to-moment judgment of the policeman on his beat.'"  Smith, supra, at  415 U. S. 575 (quoting Gregory v. Chicago, 394 U. S. 111,  394 U. S. 120 (1969) (Black, J., concurring)).  Section 647(e)"furnishes a convenient tool for'harsh and discriminatory enforcement by local prosecuting officials, against particular groups deemed to merit their displeasure,'"Papachristou, 405 U.S. at  405 U. S. 170 (quoting Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88,  310 U. S. 97-98 (1940)), and "confers on police a virtually unrestrained power to arrest and charge persons with a violation."  Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U. S. 130,  415 U. S. 135 (1974) (POWELL, J., concurring in result).  In providing that a detention under § 647(e) may occur only where there is the level of suspicion sufficient to justify a Terry stop, the State ensures the existence of "neutral limitations on the conduct of individual officers."  Brown v. Texas, 443 Page 461 U. S. 361 U.S. at  443 U. S. 51.  Although the initial detention is justified, the State fails to establish standards by which the officers may determine whether the suspect has complied with the subsequent identification requirement.Appellants stress the need for strengthened law enforcement tools to combat the epidemic of crime that plagues our Nation.  The concern of our citizens with curbing criminal activity is certainly a matter requiring the attention of all branches of government.  As weighty as this concern is, however, it cannot justify legislation that would otherwise fail to meet constitutional standards for definiteness and clarity.  See Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U. S. 451 (1939).  Section 647(e), as presently construed, requires that "suspicious" persons satisfy some undefined identification requirement, or face criminal punishment.  Although due process does not require "impossible standards" of clarity, see United States v. Petrillo, 332 U. S. 1,  332 U. S. 7-8 (1947), this is not a case where further precision in the statutory language is either impossible or impractical.IVWe conclude § 647(e) is unconstitutionally vague on its face because it encourages arbitrary enforcement by failing to describe with sufficient particularity what a suspect must do in order to satisfy the statute. [Footnote 10]  Accordingly, the judgment of Page 461 U. S. 362 the Court of Appeals is affirmed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.It is so ordered
U.S. Supreme CourtKolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983)Kolender v. LawsonNo. 81-1320Argued November 8, 1982Decided May 2, 1983461 U.S. 352SyllabusA California statute requires persons who loiter or wander on the streets to identify themselves and to account for their presence when requested by a peace officer.  The California Court of Appeal has construed the statute to require a person to provide "credible and reliable" identification when requested by a police officer who has reasonable suspicion of criminal activity sufficient to justify a stop under the standards of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1.  The California court has defined "credible and reliable" identification as"carrying reasonable assurance that the identification is authentic and providing means for later getting in touch with the person who has identified himself."Appellee, who had been arrested and convicted under the statute, brought an action in Federal District Court challenging the statute's constitutionality.  The District Court held the statute unconstitutional and enjoined its enforcement, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.Held:  The statute, as drafted and as construed by the state court, is unconstitutionally vague on its face within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by failing to clarify what is contemplated by the requirement that a suspect provide a "credible and reliable" identification.  As such, the statute vests virtually complete discretion in the hands of the police to determine whether the suspect has satisfied the statute and must be permitted to go on his way in the absence of probable cause to arrest.  Pp.  461 U. S. 355-361.65 F.2d 1362, affirmed and remanded.O'CONNOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J., and BRENNAN, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ., joined.  BRENNAN, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p.  461 U. S. 362.  WHITE, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which REHNQUIST J., joined, post, p.  461 U. S. 369. Page 461 U. S. 353