JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court.In Atkinson v. Sinclair Refining Co., 370 U. S. 238 (1962), the Court held that § 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 Stat. 156, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a), does not authorize a damages action against individual union officers and members when their union is liable for violating a no-strike clause in a collective bargaining agreement.  We expressly reserved the question whether an employer might maintain a suit for damages against "individual defendants acting not in behalf of the union, but in their personal and nonunion capacity" where their "unauthorized, individual action" violated the no-strike provision of the collective bargaining agreement.  370 U.S. at  370 U. S. 249, n. 7.  We granted certiorari to decide this important question of federal labor law.  449 U.S. 898 (1980).IPetitioners are three companies engaged in the transportation by truck of motor vehicles.  All three are parties to a collective bargaining agreement with the Teamsters Union that covers operations at their respective facilities in Flint, Page 451 U. S. 403 Mich.  Respondents are employees of petitioners and members of Teamsters Local Union No. 332.  The collective bargaining agreement contains a no-strike clause [Footnote 1] and subjects all disputes to a binding grievance and arbitration procedure.On June 8, 1976, respondents commenced a wildcat strike, because they believed that "the union was not properly representing them in . . . negotiations for amendments to the collective bargaining agreement."  614 F.2d 1110, 1111 (CA6 1980).  Soon thereafter, petitioners brought this § 301(a) action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, seeking injunctive relief and "damages against the [employee], in their individual capacity, for all losses arising out of the unlawful work stoppage and for attorneys fees."  App. 21.  Petitioners alleged that the strike was neither authorized nor approved by the union, and, therefore, sought no damages from the union.  See 614 F.2d  at 1115; App. 18, 20-21.  After a hearing, the District Court found that "the issue which had caused the work stoppage was not arbitrable" because it was "an internal dispute between factions in the Local," App. to Pet. for Cert. 15a-16a, and accordingly denied preliminary injunctive relief, citing Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks, 398 U. S. 235 (1970). [Footnote 2]  Page 451 U. S. 404 Following additional hearings and settlement of the "internal dispute," the District Court concluded that"the work stoppage continued only because of a dispute between the Local and [petitioners] over amnesty for the strikers [and that] this issue was arbitrable."App. to Pet. for Cert. 16a.  The court therefore issued a preliminary injunction, enjoining continuation of the strike.  Respondents obeyed the order and returned to work on June 21, 1976.Nine months later, respondents moved to dissolve the preliminary injunction and to dismiss the complaint for damages.  Relying on this Court's intervening decision in Buffalo Forge Co. v. Steelworkers, 428 U. S. 397 (1976), [Footnote 3] the District Court dissolved the injunction on the ground that the work stoppage was not precipitated by an arbitrable issue.  App. to Pet. for Cert. 18a.  The court also dismissed petitioners' claim for damages, holding that"an employer may not sue his employees for monetary relief for breach of the collective bargaining agreement . . . whether or not the union may also be liable."Id. at 16a.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the District Court's dissolution of the injunction, holding that an injunction may be granted even where the issue which precipitated the strike was nonarbitrable provided an arbitrable issue, other than the simple legality of the strike itself, caused the continuation of the strike with Page 451 U. S. 405 the purpose of "compel[ling] the employer to concede on the arbitrable issue."  614 F.2d  at 1114.  Petitioners do not seek review of this part of the Court of Appeals' ruling. [Footnote 4]The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's dismissal of petitioners' claim for damages from the individual union members.  Relying principally on the legislative history of § 301, the Court of Appeals concluded that Congress had not intended through § 301 to "create a cause of action for damages against individual union members for breach of a no-strike agreement."  614 F.2d  at 1116.  We agree.IISince Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U. S. 448 (1957), it has been settled that § 301(a) [Footnote 5] does more than confer jurisdiction on federal courts to decide lawsuits alleging violations of collective bargaining agreements.  Section 301(a) also "authorizes federal courts to fashion a body of federal law for the enforcement of these collective bargaining agreements."  Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at  353 U. S. 451. Page 451 U. S. 406 Lincoln Mills defined the mode of analysis for fashioning this body of federal law as follows:"The Labor Management Relations Act expressly furnishes some substantive law.  It points out what the parties may or may not do in certain situations.  Other problems will lie in the penumbra of express statutory mandates.  Some will lack express statutory sanction, but will be solved by looking at the policy of the legislation and fashioning a remedy that will effectuate that policy.  The range of judicial inventiveness will be determined by the nature of the problem."Id. at  353 U. S. 457.  Of course,"Lincoln Mills did not envision any free-wheeling inquiry into what the federal courts might find to be the most desirable rule, irrespective of congressional pronouncements."Howard Johnson Co. v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees, 417 U. S. 249,  417 U. S. 255 (1974).  Rather, it is clear that, in fashioning federal law under § 301(a), substantial deference should be paid to revealed congressional intention.  See Atkinson v. Sinclair Refining Co., 370 U.S. at  370 U. S. 248-249.In Atkinson, the Court relied on the intent of Congress in passing § 301(b) to hold that individual union members may not be sued for damages where the union has breached the no-strike provision of its collective bargaining agreement.  Section 301(b) states in pertinent part that"[a]ny money judgment against a labor organization . . . shall be enforceable only against the organization as an entity and against its assets, and shall not be enforceable against any individual member or his assets."Thus, in Atkinson, we noted that,"in discharging the duty Congress imposed on us to formulate the federal law to govern § 301(a) suits, we are strongly guided by, and do not give a niggardly reading to, § 301(b)."Ibid.  Accordingly, we consulted and relied on the legislative history of § 301(b), which made it"clear that th[e] third clause [of § 301(b)] was a deeply felt congressional reaction against the Danbury Hatters case . . . and an expression Page 451 U. S. 407 of legislative determination that the aftermath . . . of that decision was not to be permitted to recur."Id. at  370 U. S. 248. [Footnote 6]  Similarly, in deciding the question presented in this case, we "discharg[e] the duty Congress imposed on us to formulate the federal law to govern § 301(a) suits," id. at  370 U. S. 248-249, by looking to the "penumbra" of § 301(b), 353 U.S. at  353 U. S. 457, as informed by its legislative history.  See Howard Johnson Co. v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees, supra, at  417 U. S. 255.Section 301(b), by its terms, prohibits a money judgment entered against a union from being enforced against individual union members.  See Atkinson v. Sinclair Refining Co., supra.  It is a mistake to suppose that Congress thereby suggested by negative implication that employees should be held liable where their union is not liable for the strike.  See Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers, 452 F.2d 49, 52 (CA7 1971).  Although lengthy and complex, the legislative history of § 301 clearly reveals Congress' intent to shield individual employees from liability for damages arising from their breach of the no-strike clause of a collective bargaining agreement, whether or not the union participated in or authorized the illegality.  Indeed, Congress intended this result even though it might leave the employer unable Page 451 U. S. 408 to recover for his losses.  See Atkinson v. Sinclair Refining Co., supra, at  370 U. S. 248.The legislative history of § 301 begins with a review of congressional efforts in the year prior to adoption of the Labor Management Relations Act.  Section 10 of the Case bill, H.R. 4908, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946), passed by both Houses of Congress, but vetoed by the President in 1946, was "the direct antecedent of § 301."  Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Cortney, 368 U. S. 502,  368 U. S. 509 (1962).  Since § 10 "contained provisions substantially the same . . . as the provisions of § 301," ibid., its legislative history is highly relevant in ascertaining congressional intent with respect to § 301, see id. at  368 U. S. 511-512.The purpose of § 10 was "to establish a mutual responsibility when the collective bargaining process has resulted in a contract."  92 Cong.Rec. 838 (1946) (remarks of Rep. Case).  As introduced in the House, § 10 provided for collective bargaining agreements to be enforceable "against each of the parties thereto." [Footnote 7]  The Senate adopted a bill which Page 451 U. S. 409 encompassed the purposes of § 10 of the House version and which, in addition, explicitly permitted an employer to discharge an employee who participated in a strike which was not authorized by the union. [Footnote 8]  Senator Taft, principal proponent of the provision, explained:"If the union violates its collective bargaining agreement, it is responsible, but no individual member is responsible, and he can in no way be deprived of his rights.  But if the union tries to keep its contract and, in violation of its undertaking, some of its members proceed to strike, then the employer may fire those members and they do not have the protection of the Wagner Act."92 Cong.Rec. 5705-5706 (1946).  Thus, the Senator stopped short of proposing that individual Page 451 U. S. 410 employees be held liable in damages for engaging in unauthorized strikes.The House's subsequent consideration of the Senate's version reflected its clear understanding of the Senate's limitation on employers' remedies.  Representative Case explained the Senate amendment on the floor of the House:"Individual members of a union are not made liable for any money judgment, I might point out, but only the union as an entity.  If employees strike in violation of their agreement, the only individual penalty that can be employed is the forfeiture of their right to employment under that contract which is cured when the employer reemploys them."Id. at 5930-5931 (emphasis added). [Footnote 9]  The House then passed the Senate version.  In doing so, the House, like the Senate, clearly intended to protect employees from the sanction of a suit for damages for a strike in breach of the collective bargaining agreement, whether or not the union participated in or authorized the strike.  It is true that the President vetoed this bill, and that his veto was sustained.  Nevertheless, the substantial similarity between the pertinent language of the Case bill as passed by Congress and of § 301 as it reads today makes the legislative history of the Case bill vitally significant to a full understanding of the policy behind § 301 (b).Six months after the veto, Congress began work on the legislation which became § 301. [Footnote 10]  The bill ultimately passed Page 451 U. S. 411 by the House created a federal cause of action for breach of a collective bargaining agreement. [Footnote 11]  The Committee Report explained that "actions and proceedings involving violations of contracts between employers and labor organizations may be brought by either party."  H.R.Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 45-46 (1947).  Section 302 (b) also contained express language precluding enforcement against individuals Page 451 U. S. 412 of judgments entered against unions. [Footnote 12]  In addition, the bill included an amendment to § 7 of the National Labor Relations Act providing that "violations of collective bargaining agreements" would not be protected under the Act, H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947), § 7 (a), thereby allowing employers to discharge wildcat strikers. [Footnote 13]  The House bill also included a provision, however, which allowed an employer to recover damages from individual employees.  Section 12 created a damages action against any person engaging in an unlawful concerted activity.  The bill defined "unlawful concerted activities" to include, inter alia, jurisdictional strikes, sympathy strikes, and certain picketing activities.Significantly, however, the Senate rejected the House's imposition in § 12 of damages liability against individuals for unlawful concerted activity, and a Conference Committee adopted the Senate version. [Footnote 14]  The Senate counterpart to Page 451 U. S. 413 § 12 of the House bill was § 303.  Senator Taft offered a floor amendment to § 303 which would have established a damages action against individuals who engage in certain types of unlawful concerted activity, such as secondary boycotts and jurisdictional strikes.  93 Cong.Rec. 4900 (1947).  In a critical exchange during the debate on the proposed amendment, Senator Taft altered the language to limit damages actions to claims against unions, in order to conform with § 301(b) and bar imposition of individual damages liability against employees:"Mr. MORSE:  [T]he proposal of the Senator from Ohio would open wide the doors of the Federal courts to damage suits against any person who engaged in a strike or attempted to persuade other employees to engage in a strike for one of the prohibited objectives.""The proposal would very definitely take us back at least 40 years, and we would again have the spectacle of mass suits against employees, similar to the infamous Danbury Hatters case.  Senators will recall that, in that case, some 150 members of the union were sued by their employer and the Supreme Court of the United States sustained a judgment against them in the neighborhood of a quarter million dollars. . . .""It also should be pointed out that the substitute proposal is inconsistent with the present provision in the bill allowing a union to be sued for breach of contract.  Section 301 of the bill permits suits against labor organizations Page 451 U. S. 414 only, whereas the substitute proposal allows damage suits against 'any person.'  Also, section 301 limits recovery to the assets of the union; the substitute allows the attachment of employees' bank accounts and all their property.""*    *    *    *" "Mr. TAFT:  On request by . . . Senator [Ives] from New York and others who raised the point, I am amending the proposal by striking out the word 'person,' in the second line and inserting, in lieu thereof, 'labor organization,' so the action will be open only against labor organizations promoting this type of strike."Id. at 4839-4841. [Footnote 15]  The Senate passed this version of the bill, foreclosing individual damages liability in both § 301 and § 303 lawsuits.At conference, the Conference Committee squarely rejected § 12 of the House bill in favor of § 303 of the Senate bill, thereby refusing to create a damages action against individual employees for the conduct prohibited in that section.  In addition, the Committee deleted the provision in the House bill which had removed protection under § 7 of the National Labor Relations Act for concerted activity in breach of a collective bargaining agreement for the stated reason that the provision was unnecessary in light of recent decisions of the National Labor Relations Board.  Those provisions had held that"strikes in violation of collective bargaining contracts were not concerted activities protected by the act and [the NLRB had] refused to reinstate employees discharged for engaging in such activities."H.R.Conf.Rep. No. 510, 80th Page 451 U. S. 415 Cong., 1st Sess., 39 (1947).  The Committee, therefore, opted for a discharge remedy for violations of § 303 by individuals, rather than for the damages remedy that had been proposed by the House.  At the same time, it preferred discharge as the employer's remedy under § 301 where employees violate the no-strike provision of their collective bargaining agreement. [Footnote 16]Thus, while § 301(b) explicitly addresses only union-authorized violations of a collective bargaining agreement, the "penumbra" of § 301(b), Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at  353 U. S. 457, as informed by its legislative history, establishes that Congress meant to exclude individual strikers from damages liability, whether or not they were authorized by their union to strike. [Footnote 17]  The legislative debates and the process of legislative amendment demonstrate that Congress deliberately chose to allow a damages remedy for breach of the Page 451 U. S. 416 no-strike provision of a collective bargaining agreement only against unions, not individuals, and, as to unions, only when they participated in or authorized the strike.  See Carbon Fuel Co. v. Mine Workers, 444 U. S. 212,  444 U. S. 216 (1979).  Congress itself balanced the competing advantages and disadvantages inherent in the possible remedies to combat wildcat strikes, and "we are strongly guided by" its choice. [Footnote 18]  Atkinson Page 451 U. S. 417 v. Sinclair Refining Co., 370 U.S. at  370 U. S. 249.  See Howard Johnson Co. v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees, 417 U.S. at  417 U. S. 255.  Accordingly, we hold that § 301(a) does not sanction damages actions against individual employees for violating the no-strike provision of the collective bargaining agreement, whether or not their union participated in or authorized the strike.Affirmed
U.S. Supreme CourtComplete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Reis, 451 U.S. 401 (1981)Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. ReisNo. 79-1777Argued February 24, 1981Decided May 4, 1981451 U.S. 401SyllabusPetitioner trucking companies are parties to a collective bargaining agreement with the Teamsters Union that contains a no-strike clause.  Respondent employees of petitioners commenced a wildcat strike because they believed the union was not properly representing them in negotiations to amend the collective bargaining agreement.  Thereafter, petitioners brought an action against respondents in Federal District Court under § 301 (a) of the Labor Management Relations Act, which confers jurisdiction on federal district courts to decide suits alleging violations of collective bargaining agreements.  Petitioners sought, inter alia, damages against respondents in their individual capacities for all losses arising out of the wildcat strike.  The District Court dismissed the damages claim, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Congress had not intended through § 301 to create a cause of action for damages against individual union members for breach of a no-strike agreement.Held:  Section 301 (a) does not sanction damages actions by employers against individual employees for violating the no-strike provision of a collective bargaining agreement, whether or not the union participated in or authorized the strike.  The legislative history of § 301 clearly reveals Congress' intent to shield individual employees from liability for such damages, even though this results in leaving the employer unable to recover for his losses.  While § 301 (b), which provides that any money judgment against a union for violation of a collective bargaining agreement shall be enforceable only against the union, and not against any individual member, explicitly addresses only union-authorized violations, the "penumbra" of § 301 (b), as informed by its legislative history, establishes that Congress meant to exclude individual strikers from damages liability, whether or not they were authorized by their union to strike.  The history demonstrates that Congress deliberately chose to allow a damages remedy for breach of a no-strike provision only against unions, not individuals, and, as to unions, only when they participated in or authorized the illegal strike.  Pp.  451 U. S. 405 417.614 F.2d 1110, affirmed. Page 451 U. S. 402BRENNAN, J.,. delivered the opinion of the Court, in which STEWART, WHITE, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, and STEVENS, JJ., joined.  POWELL, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, post, p.  451 U. S. 417.  BURGER, C.J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which REHNQUIST, J., joined, post, p.  451 U. S. 424.