MR. JUSTICE BLACK delivered the opinion of the Court.We must decide whether § 315 of the Federal Communications Act of 1934 bars a broadcasting station from removing defamatory statements contained in speeches broadcast by legally qualified candidates for public office, and, if so, whether that section grants the station a federal immunity from liability for libelous statements so broadcast.  Section 315 reads:"(a) If any licensee shall permit any person who is a legally qualified candidate for any public office to use a broadcasting station, he shall afford equal opportunities to all other such candidates for that office in the use of such broadcasting station:  Provided, That such licensee shall have no power of censorship over the material broadcast under the provisions of this section.  No obligation is imposed upon any licensee to allow the use of its station by any such candidate. [Footnote 1]"This suit for libel arose as a result of a speech made over the radio and television facilities of respondent, WDAY, Inc., by A. C. Townley -- a legally qualified candidate in the 1956 United States senatorial race in North Dakota.  Because it felt compelled to do so by the requirements of § 315, WDAY permitted Townley to broadcast his speech, uncensored in any respect, as a reply to previous speeches made over WDAY by two other senatorial candidates.  Townley's speech, in substance, accused his opponents, together with petitioner, Farmers Educational and Cooperative Union of America, of conspiring to "establish Page 360 U. S. 527 a Communist Farmers Union Soviet right here in North Dakota."  Farmers Union then sued Townley and WDAY for libel in a North Dakota State District Court.  That court dismissed the complaint against WDAY on the ground that § 315 rendered the station immune from liability for the defamation alleged.  The Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed, stating:"Section 315 imposes a mandatory duty upon broadcasting stations to permit all candidates for the same office to use their facilities if they have permitted one candidate to use them.  Since power of censorship of political broadcasts is prohibited, it must follow as a corollary that the mandate prohibiting censorship includes the privilege of immunity from liability for defamatory statements made by the speakers."For this reason, it held that the state libel laws could not apply to WDAY.  89 N.W.2d 102, 110.  We granted certiorari because the questions decided are important to the administration of the Federal Communications Act.  358 U.S. 810.IPetitioner argues that § 315's prohibition against censorship leaves broadcasters free to delete libelous material from candidates' speeches, and that therefore no federal immunity is granted a broadcasting station by that section.  The term censorship, however, as commonly understood, connotes any examination of thought or expression in order to prevent publication of "objectionable" material.  We find no clear expression of legislative intent, nor any other convincing reason, to indicate Congress meant to give "censorship" a narrower meaning in § 315.  In arriving at this view, we note that petitioner's interpretation has not generally been favored in previous considerations of the section.  Although the first, and for years the only, judicial decision dealing with the censorship provision did hold that a station may remove Page 360 U. S. 528 defamatory statements from political broadcasts, [Footnote 2] subsequent judicial interpretations of § 315 have, with considerable uniformity, recognized that an individual licensee has no such power. [Footnote 3]  And while, for some years, the Federal Communications Commission's views on this matter were not clearly articulated, [Footnote 4] since 1948, it has continuously held that licensees cannot remove allegedly libelous matter from speeches by candidates. [Footnote 5]  Similarly, the legislative history of the measure, both prior to its first enactment in 1927 and subsequently, shows a deep hostility to censorship either by the Commission or by a licensee. [Footnote 6] Page 360 U. S. 529More important, it is obvious that permitting a broadcasting station to censor allegedly libelous remarks would undermine the basic purpose for which § 315 was passed -- full and unrestricted discussion of political issues by legally qualified candidates.  That section dates back to, and was adopted verbatim from, the Radio Act of 1927.  In that Act, Congress provided for the first time a comprehensive federal plan for regulating the new and expanding art of radio broadcasting.  Recognizing radio's potential importance as a medium of communication of political ideas, Congress sought to foster its broadest possible utilization by encouraging broadcasting stations to make their facilities available to candidates for office without discrimination, and by insuring that these candidates, when broadcasting, were not to be hampered by censorship of the issues they could discuss.  Thus, expressly applying this country's tradition of free expression to the field of radio broadcasting, Congress has, from the Page 360 U. S. 530 first, emphatically forbidden the Commission to exercise any power of censorship over radio communication. [Footnote 7]  It is in line with this same tradition that the individual licensee has consistently been denied "power of censorship" in the vital area of political broadcasts.The decision a broadcasting station would have to make in censoring libelous discussion by a candidate is far from easy.  Whether a statement is defamatory is rarely clear.  Whether such a statement is actionably libelous is an even more complex question, involving, as it does, consideration of various legal defenses such as "truth" and the privilege of fair comment.  Such issues have always troubled courts.  Yet, under petitioner's view of the statute, they would have to be resolved by an individual licensee during the stress of a political campaign, often, necessarily, without adequate consideration of basis for decision.  Quite possibly, if a station were held responsible for the broadcast of libelous material, all remarks even faintly objectionable would be excluded out of an excess of caution.  Moreover, if any censorship were permissible, a station so inclined could intentionally inhibit a candidate's legitimate presentation under the guise of lawful censorship of libelous matter.  Because of the time limitation inherent in a political campaign, erroneous decisions by a station could not be corrected by the courts promptly enough to permit the candidate to bring improperly excluded matter before the public.  It follows from all this that allowing censorship, even of the attenuated type advocated here, would almost inevitably force a candidate to avoid controversial issues during political debates over radio and television, and hence restrict the coverage of consideration relevant to intelligent Page 360 U. S. 531 political decision.  We cannot believe, and we certainly are unwilling to assume, that Congress intended any such result.IIPetitioner alternatively argues that § 315 does not grant a station immunity from liability for defamatory statements made during a political broadcast, even though the section prohibits the station from censoring allegedly libelous matter.  Again, we cannot agree.  For, under this interpretation, unless a licensee refuses to permit any candidate to talk at all, the section would sanction the unconscionable result of permitting civil and perhaps criminal liability to be imposed for the very conduct the statute demands of the licensee.  Accordingly, judicial interpretations reaching the issue have found an immunity implicit in the section. [Footnote 8]  And, in all those cases concluding that a licensee had no immunity, § 315 had been construed -- improperly, as we hold -- to permit a station to censor potentially actionable material. [Footnote 9]  In no case has a court even implied that the licensee would not be rendered immune were it denied the power to censor libelous material.Petitioner contends, however, that the legislative history of § 315 shows that Congress did not intend to grant an immunity.  Some of the history supports such an inference.  As it reached the Senate, the provision which became § 18 of the Radio Act of 1927 provided in part that, if a station permitted one candidate to use its facilities, it Page 360 U. S. 532 should "be deemed a common carrier in interstate commerce . . . ," and could not discriminate against other political candidates or censor material broadcast by them. [Footnote 10]  In the Senate, Senator Dill -- the bill's floor manager -- introduced an amendment to this provision which, among other things, specifically granted a station immunity from civil and criminal liability for "any uncensored utterances thus broadcast." [Footnote 11]  The amendment was adopted by the Senate, but its provision expressly granting immunity was removed by the Conference Committee without any explanation. [Footnote 12]  Section 18 was incorporated into the Communications Act of 1934 with no explanatory discussion.  Subsequently, a great deal of pressure built up for legislation to remove all possible doubt as to broadcasters' liability for libel either by granting them a power to censor libelous statements or by providing an express legislative immunity.  Many legislative proposals were made to accomplish these purposes, [Footnote 13] but no legislation providing either was ever enacted.  Thus, whatever adverse inference may be drawn from the failure of Congress to legislate an express immunity is offset by its refusal to permit stations to avoid liability by censoring broadcasts.  And more than balancing any adverse inferences drawn from congressional failure Page 360 U. S. 533 to legislate an express immunity is the fact that the Federal Communications Commission -- the body entrusted with administering the provisions of the Act -- has long interpreted § 315 as granting stations an immunity. [Footnote 14]  Not only has this interpretation been adhered to despite many subsequent legislative proposals to modify § 315, but, with full knowledge of the Commission's interpretation, Congress has since made significant additions to that section without amending it to depart from the Commission's view. [Footnote 15]  In light of this contradictory legislative background, we do not feel compelled to reach a result which seems so in conflict with traditional concepts of fairness.Petitioner nevertheless urges that broadcasters do not need a specific immunity to protect themselves from liability for defamation, since they may either insure against any loss or, in the alternative, deny all political candidates Page 360 U. S. 534 use of station facilities. [Footnote 16]  We have no means of knowing to what extent insurance is available to broadcasting stations, or what it would cost them.  Moreover, since § 315 expressly prohibits stations from charging political candidates higher rates than they charge for comparable time used for other purposes, any cost of insurance would probably have to be absorbed by the stations themselves.  Petitioner's reliance on the stations' freedom from obligation "to allow use of its station by any such candidate" seems equally misplaced.  While denying all candidates us of stations would protect broadcasters from liability, it would also effectively withdraw political discussion from the air.  Instead, the thrust of § 315 is to facilitate political debate over radio and television.  Recognizing this, the Communications Commission considers the carrying of political broadcasts a public service criterion to be considered both in license renewal proceedings and in comparative contests for a radio or television construction permit. [Footnote 17]  Certainly Congress knew the obvious -- that, if a licensee could protect Page 360 U. S. 535 himself from liability in no other way but by refusing to broadcast candidates' speeches, the necessary effect would be to hamper the congressional plan to develop broadcasting as a political outlet, rather than to foster it. [Footnote 18]We are aware that causes of action for libel are widely recognized throughout the States.  But we have not hesitated to abrogate state law where satisfied that its enforcement would stand "as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress." [Footnote 19]  Here, petitioner is asking us to attribute to § 315 a meaning which would either frustrate the underlying purposes for which it was enacted or, alternatively, impose unreasonable burdens on the parties governed by that legislation.  In the absence of clear expression by Congress, we will not assume that it desired such a result.  Agreeing with the state courts of North Dakota that § 315 grants a licensee an immunity from liability for libelous material it broadcasts, we merely read § 315 in accordance with what we believe to be its underlying purpose.Affirmed
U.S. Supreme CourtFarmers Educ. & Co-op. Union v. WDAY, Inc., 360 U.S. 525 (1959)Farmers Educational & Cooperative Union of America v. WDAY, Inc.No. 248Argued March 23, 1959Decided June 29, 1959360 U.S. 525SyllabusSection 315(a) of the Federal Communications Act of 1934 provides, in effect, that, if anyone licensed to operate a radio broadcasting station shall permit any person who is a legally qualified candidate for public office to broadcast over such station, he shall "afford equal opportunities" to all other such candidates for that office, and "shall have no power of censorship" over the material broadcast under this section.Held:1. Such a licensee may not delete material from a candidate's radio speech on the ground that such material may be defamatory.  Pp.  360 U. S. 527-531.2. Regardless of state law, such a licensee is not liable for defamatory statements made in a speech broadcast over his station by a candidate for public office under § 315(a).  Pp.  360 U. S. 531-535.89 N.W.2d 102 affirmed. Page 360 U. S. 526