JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court.The question presented is whether respondent Falcon, who complained that petitioner did not promote him because he is a Mexican-American, was properly permitted to maintain a class action on behalf of Mexican-American applicants for employment whom petitioner did not hire.IIn 1969, petitioner initiated a special recruitment and training program for minorities.  Through that program, respondent Falcon was hired in July, 1969, as a groundman, and within a year he was twice promoted, first to lineman and then to lineman-in-charge.  He subsequently refused a promotion to installer-repairman.  In October, 1972, he applied for the job of field inspector; his application was denied even though the promotion was granted several white employees with less seniority.Falcon thereupon filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission stating his belief that he had been passed over for promotion because of his national origin, and that petitioner's promotion policy operated against Mexican-Americans as a class.  Falcon v. General Telephone Co. of Southwest, 626 F.2d 369, 372, n. 2 (CA5 1980).  In due Page 457 U. S. 150 course he received a right-to-sue letter from the Commission, and, in April, 1975, he commenced this action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 253, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. IV), in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas.  His complaint alleged that petitioner maintained"a policy, practice, custom, or usage of:  (a) discriminating against [Mexican-Americans] because of national origin and with respect to compensation, terms, conditions, and privileges of employment, and (b) . . . subjecting [Mexican-Americans] to continuous employment discrimination. [Footnote 1]"Respondent claimed that, as a result of this policy, whites with less qualification and experience and lower evaluation scores than respondent had been promoted more rapidly.  The complaint contained no factual allegations concerning petitioner's hiring practices.Respondent brought the action "on his own behalf and on behalf of other persons similarly situated, pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." [Footnote 2]  The class Page 457 U. S. 151 identified in the complaint was"composed of Mexican-American persons who are employed, or who might be employed, by GENERAL TELEPHONE COMPANY at its place of business located in Irving, Texas, who have been and who continue to be or might be adversely affected by the practices complained of herein. [Footnote 3]"After responding to petitioner's written interrogatories, [Footnote 4] respondent filed a memorandum in favor of certification of"the class of all hourly Mexican American employees who have been employed, are employed, or may in the future be employed and all those Mexican Americans who have applied or would have applied for employment had the Defendant not practiced racial discrimination in its employment practices."App. 46-47.  His position was supported by the ruling of the Page 457 U. S. 152 United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122 (1969), that any victim of racial discrimination in employment may maintain an "across the board" attack on all unequal employment practices alleged to have been committed by the employer pursuant to a policy of racial discrimination.  Without conducting an evidentiary hearing, the District Court certified a class including Mexican-American employees and Mexican-American applicants for employment who had not been hired. [Footnote 5]Following trial of the liability issues, the District Court entered separate findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect first to respondent and then to the class.  The District Court found that petitioner had not discriminated against respondent in hiring, but that it did discriminate against him in its promotion practices.  App. to Pet. for Cert. 35a, 37a.  The court reached converse conclusions about the class, finding no discrimination in promotion practices, but concluding that petitioner had discriminated against Mexican-Americans at its Irving facility in its hiring practices.  Id. at 39a-40a. [Footnote 6]After various post-trial proceedings, the District Court ordered petitioner to furnish respondent with a list of all Mexican-Americans who had applied for employment at the Irving Page 457 U. S. 153 facility during the period between January 1, 1973, and October 18, 1976.  Respondent was then ordered to give notice to those persons advising them that they might be entitled to some form of recovery.  Evidence was taken concerning the applicants who responded to the notice, and backpay was ultimately awarded to 13 persons, in addition to respondent Falcon.  The total recovery by respondent and the entire class amounted to $67,925.49, plus costs and interest. [Footnote 7]Both parties appealed.  The Court of Appeals rejected respondent's contention that the class should have encompassed all of petitioner's operations in Texas, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Arkansas. [Footnote 8]  On the other hand, the court also rejected petitioner's argument that the class had been defined too broadly.  For, under the Fifth Circuit's across-the-board rule, it is permissible for"an employee complaining of one employment practice to represent another complaining of another practice, if the plaintiff and the members of the class suffer from essentially the same injury.  In this case, all of the claims are based on discrimination because of national origin."626 F.2d  at 375. [Footnote 9]  The court relied on Payne v. Page 457 U. S. 154 Travenol Laboratories, Inc., 565 F.2d 895 (1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 835, in which the Fifth Circuit stated:"Plaintiffs' action is an 'across the board' attack on unequal employment practices alleged to have been committed by Travenol pursuant to a policy of racial discrimination.  As parties who have allegedly been aggrieved by some of those discriminatory practices, plaintiffs have demonstrated a sufficient nexus to enable them to represent other class members suffering from different practices motivated by the same policies."565 F.2d  at 900, quoted in 626 F.2d  at 375.On the merits, the Court of Appeals upheld respondent's claim of disparate treatment in promotion, [Footnote 10] but held that the District Court's findings relating to disparate impact in hiring were insufficient to support recovery on behalf of the class. [Footnote 11]  Page 457 U. S. 155 After this Court decided Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U. S. 248, we vacated the judgment of the Court of Appeals and directed further consideration in the light of that opinion.  General Telephone Co. of Southwest v. Falcon, 450 U.S. 1036.  The Fifth Circuit thereupon vacated the portion of its opinion addressing respondent's promotion claim, but reinstated the portions of its opinion approving the District Court's class certification.  647 F.2d 633 (1981).  With the merits of both respondent's promotion claim and the class hiring claims remaining open for reconsideration in the District Court on remand, we granted certiorari to decide whether the class action was properly maintained on behalf of both employees who were denied promotion and applicants who were denied employment.IIThe class action device was designed as "an exception to the usual rule that litigation is conducted by and on behalf of the individual named parties only."  Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U. S. 682,  442 U. S. 700-701.  Class relief is "peculiarly appropriate" when the "issues involved are common to the class as a whole" and when they "turn on questions of law applicable in the same manner to each member of the class."  Id. at  442 U. S. 701.  For in such cases,"the class action device saves the resources of both the courts and the parties by permitting an issue potentially affecting every [class member] to be litigated in an economical fashion under Rule 23."Ibid.Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, authorizes the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to sue in its own name to secure relief for individuals aggrieved Page 457 U. S. 156 by discriminatory practices forbidden by the Act.  See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1).  In exercising this enforcement power, the Commission may seek relief for groups of employees or applicants for employment without complying with the strictures of Rule 23.  General Telephone Co. of Northwest v. EEOC, 446 U. S. 318.  Title VII, however, contains no special authorization for class suits maintained by private parties.  An individual litigant seeking to maintain a class action under Title VII must meet "the prerequisites of numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation" specified in Rule 23(a).  Id. at  446 U. S. 330.  These requirements effectively "limit the class claims to those fairly encompassed by the named plaintiff's claims."  Ibid.We have repeatedly held that "a class representative must be part of the class and possess the same interest and suffer the same injury' as the class members."  East Texas Motor Freight System, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U. S. 395,  431 U. S. 403 (quoting Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War, 418 U. S. 208,  418 U. S. 216).  In East Texas Motor Freight, a Title VII action brought by three Mexican-American city drivers, the Fifth Circuit certified a class consisting of the trucking company's black and Mexican-American city drivers allegedly denied on racial or ethnic grounds transfers to more desirable line-driver jobs.  We held that the Court of Appeals had "plainly erred in declaring a class action."  431 U.S. at  431 U. S. 403.  Because at the time the class was certified it was clear that the named plaintiffs were not qualified for line-driver positions,"they could have suffered no injury as a result of the allegedly discriminatory practices, and they were, therefore, simply not eligible to represent a class of persons who did allegedly suffer injury."Id. at  413 U. S. 403-404.Our holding in East Texas Motor Freight was limited; we noted that"a different case would be presented if the District Court had certified a class and only later had it appeared that the named plaintiffs were not class members or were otherwise inappropriate class representatives."Id. at  413 U. S. 406, n. 12.  Page 457 U. S. 157 We also recognized the theory behind the Fifth Circuit's across-the-board rule, noting our awareness "that suits alleging racial or ethnic discrimination are often by their very nature class suits, involving classwide wrongs," and that "[c]ommon questions of law or fact are typically present."  Id. at  413 U. S. 405.  In the same breath, however, we reiterated that "careful attention to the requirements of Fed.Rule Civ.Proc. 23 remains nonetheless indispensable," and that the"mere fact that a complaint alleges racial or ethnic discrimination does not, in itself, ensure that the party who has brought the lawsuit will be an adequate representative of those who may have been the real victims of that discrimination."Id. at  413 U. S. 405-406.We cannot disagree with the proposition underlying the across-the-board rule -- that racial discrimination is, by definition, class discrimination. [Footnote 12]  But the allegation that such discrimination has occurred neither determines whether a class action may be maintained in accordance with Rule 23 nor defines the class that may be certified.  Conceptually, there is a wide gap between (a) an individual's claim that he has been denied a promotion on discriminatory grounds and his otherwise unsupported allegation that the company has a policy of discrimination, and (b) the existence of a class of persons who have suffered the same injury as that individual, such that the individual's claim and the class claims will share common questions of law or fact and that the individual's claim will be typical of the class claims. [Footnote 13]  For respondent to Page 457 U. S. 158 bridge that gap, he must prove much more than the validity of his own claim.  Even though evidence that he was passed over for promotion when several less deserving whites were advanced may support the conclusion that respondent was denied the promotion because of his national origin, such evidence would not necessarily justify the additional inferences (1) that this discriminatory treatment is typical of petitioner's promotion practices, (2) that petitioner's promotion practices are motivated by a policy of ethnic discrimination that pervades petitioner's Irving division, or (3) that this policy of ethnic discrimination is reflected in petitioner's other employment practices, such as hiring, in the same way it is manifested in the promotion practices.  These additional inferences demonstrate the tenuous character of any presumption that the class claims are "fairly encompassed" within respondent's claim.Respondent's complaint provided an insufficient basis for concluding that the adjudication of his claim of discrimination in promotion would require the decision of any common question concerning the failure of petitioner to hire more Mexican-Americans.  Without any specific presentation identifying the questions of law or fact that were common to the claims of respondent and of the members of the class he sought to represent, [Footnote 14] it was error for the District Court to presume that respondent's claim was typical of other claims Page 457 U. S. 159 against petitioner by Mexican-American employees and applicants.  If one allegation of specific discriminatory treatment were sufficient to support an across-the-board attack, every Title VII case would be a potential company-wide class action.  We find nothing in the statute to indicate that Congress intended to authorize such a wholesale expansion of class action litigation. [Footnote 15]The trial of this class action followed a predictable course.  Instead of raising common questions of law or fact, respondent's evidentiary approaches to the individual and class claims were entirely different.  He attempted to sustain his individual claim by proving intentional discrimination.  He tried to prove the class claims through statistical evidence of disparate impact.  Ironically, the District Court rejected the class claim of promotion discrimination, which conceptually might have borne a closer typicality and commonality relationship with respondent's individual claim, but sustained the class claim of hiring discrimination.  As the District Court's bifurcated findings on liability demonstrate, the individual and class claims might as well have been tried separately.  It is clear that the maintenance of respondent's action as a class action did not advance "the efficiency and economy of litigation which is a principal purpose of the procedure."  American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah, 414 U. S. 538,  414 U. S. 553. Page 457 U. S. 160We do not, of course, judge the propriety of a class certification by hindsight.  The District Court's error in this case, and the error inherent in the across-the-board rule, is the failure to evaluate carefully the legitimacy of the named plaintiff's plea that he is a proper class representative under Rule 23(a).  As we noted in Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U. S. 463,"the class determination generally involves considerations that are 'enmeshed in the factual and legal issues comprising the plaintiff's cause of action.'"Id. at  437 U. S. 469 (quoting Mercantile Nat. Bank v. Langdeau, 371 U. S. 555,  371 U. S. 558).  Sometimes the issues are plain enough from the pleadings to determine whether the interests of the absent parties are fairly encompassed within the named plaintiff's claim, and sometimes it may be necessary for the court to probe behind the pleadings before coming to rest on the certification question.  Even after a certification order is entered, the judge remains free to modify it in the light of subsequent developments in the litigation. [Footnote 16]  For such an order, particularly during the period before any notice is sent to members of the class, "is inherently tentative."  437 U.S. at  437 U. S. 469, n. 11.  This flexibility enhances the usefulness of the class action device; actual, not presumed, conformance with Rule 23(a) remains, however, indispensable.IIIThe need to carefully apply the requirements of Rule 23(a) to Title VII class actions was noticed by a member of the Fifth Circuit panel that announced the across-the-board rule.  In a specially concurring opinion in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d  at 1125-1127, Judge Godbold emphasized the need for "more precise pleadings," id. at Page 457 U. S. 161 1125, for,"without reasonable specificity, the court cannot define the class, cannot determine whether the representation is adequate, and the employer does not know how to defend,"id. at 1126.  He termed as "most significant" the potential unfairness to the class members bound by the judgment if the framing of the class is overbroad.  Ibid.  And he pointed out the error of the "tacit assumption" underlying the across-the-board rule that "all will be well, for surely the plaintiff will win and manna will fall on all members of the class."  Id. at 1127.  With the same concerns in mind, we reiterate today that a Title VII class action, like any other class action, may only be certified if the trial court is satisfied, after a rigorous analysis, that the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) have been satisfied.The judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming the certification order is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.It is so ordered
U.S. Supreme CourtGeneral Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147 (1982)General Telephone Company of the Southwest v. FalconNo. 81-574Argued April 26, 1982Decided June 14, 1982457 U.S. 147SyllabusAfter being denied a promotion by petitioner employer, respondent Mexican-American filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, alleging that he had been passed over for promotion because of his national origin and that petitioner's promotion policy operated against Mexican-Americans as a class.  Subsequently, respondent received a right-to-sue letter from the Commission, and he then brought a class action in Federal District Court under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  Without conducting an evidentiary hearing, the District Court certified a class consisting of Mexican-American employees of petitioner and Mexican-American applicants who had not been hired.  As to liability, the court held that petitioner had discriminated against respondent in its promotion practices, but not in its hiring practices, and, with respect to the class, found that petitioner had discriminated against Mexican-Americans in its hiring practices, but not in its promotion practices.  Both parties appealed, and the Court of Appeals, rejecting petitioner's argument that the class had been defined too broadly, held that the District Court's class certification was proper under the Fifth Circuit's rule permitting any victim of racial discrimination in employment to maintain an "across-the-board" attack on all unequal employment practices allegedly followed by the employer pursuant to a policy of racial discrimination.  On the merits, the Court of Appeals upheld respondent's promotion claim, but held that the District Court's findings were insufficient to support recovery on behalf of the class.  Subsequently, this Court vacated the Court of Appeals' judgment and remanded the case for further consideration in light of Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U. S. 248.  The Court of Appeals then vacated its judgment as to respondent's promotion claim, but reinstated its approval of the District Court's class certification.Held:  The District Court erred in permitting respondent to maintain a class action on behalf of both employees who were denied promotion and applicants who were denied employment.  Pp.  457 U. S. 155-161.(a) An individual litigant seeking to maintain a class action under Title VII must meet Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)'s specified "prerequisites of numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation."  General Telephone Co. v. EEOC, 446 U. S. 318,  446 U. S. 330.  Page 457 U. S. 148 These requirements effectively "limit the class claims to those fairly encompassed by the named plaintiff's claim."  Ibid.  Pp.  457 U. S. 155-157.(b) There can be no disagreement with the proposition underlying the Fifth Circuit's "across-the-board" rule -- that racial discrimination is, by definition, class discrimination.  But the allegation that such discrimination has occurred neither determines whether a class action may be maintained in accordance with Rule 23 nor determines the class that may be certified.  Here, to bridge the gap between respondent's promotion claim and the existence of a class of persons who have suffered the same injury as respondent -- so that respondent's claim and the class claims share common questions of law or fact and respondent's claim is typical of the class claims -- respondent must prove much more than the validity of his own claim.  Respondent's complaint provided an insufficient basis for concluding that the adjudication of his claim would require the decision of any common question concerning petitioner's failure to hire more Mexican-Americans.  Without any specific presentation identifying the questions of law or fact that were common to the claims of respondent and of the class members he sought to represent, it was error for the District Court to presume that respondent's claim was typical of other claims against petitioner by Mexican-American employees and applicants.  Pp.  457 U. S. 157-159.(c) As the District Court's bifurcated findings on liability demonstrate, the individual and class claims might as well have been tried separately.  Thus, it is clear that the maintenance of the action as a class action did not advance "the efficiency and economy of litigation which is a principal purpose of the procedure."  American Pipe  Construction Co. v. Utah, 414 U. S. 538,  414 U. S. 553.  P.  457 U. S. 159.(d) The District Court's error, and the error inherent in the "across-the-board" rule, is the failure to evaluate carefully the legitimacy of the named plaintiff's plea that he is a proper class representative under Rule 23(a).  P.  457 U. S. 160.647 F.2d 633, reversed and remanded.STEVENS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BRENNAN, WHITE, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, POWELL, REHNQUIST, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined.  BURGER, C.J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, post, p.  457 U. S. 161. Page 457 U. S. 149