Justice MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court.The issue in this case is whether a person who knowingly procures genuine vehicle titles that incorporate fraudulently tendered odometer readings receives those titles "knowing [them] to have been falsely made."  18 U.S.C. § 2314 (emphasis added).  We conclude that he does.IPetitioner Raymond Moskal participated in a "title washing" scheme.  Moskal's confederates purchased used cars in Pennsylvania, rolled back the cars' odometers, and altered their titles to reflect those lower mileage figures.  The altered titles were then sent to an accomplice in Virginia, who submitted them to Virginia authorities.  Those officials, Page 498 U. S. 106 unaware of the alterations, issued Virginia titles incorporating the false mileage figures.  The "washed" titles were then sent back to Pennsylvania, where they were used in connection with car sales to unsuspecting buyers.  Moskal played two roles in this scheme:  he sent altered titles from Pennsylvania to Virginia; he received "washed" titles when they were returned.The Government indicted and convicted Moskal under 18 U.S.C. § 2314 for receiving two washed titles, each recording a mileage figure that was 30,000 miles lower than the true number.  Section 2314 imposes fines or imprisonment on anyone who,"with unlawful or fraudulent intent, transports in interstate . . . commerce any falsely made, forged, altered, or counterfeited securities . . . , knowing the same to have been falsely made, forged, altered or counterfeited."On appeal, Moskal maintained that the washed titles were nonetheless genuine, and thus not "falsely made."  The Court of Appeals disagreed, finding that""the purpose of the term "falsely made" was to . . . prohibit the fraudulent introduction into commerce of falsely made documents regardless of the precise method by which the introducer or his confederates effected their lack of authenticity.'"" United States v. Davis, 888 F.2d 283, 285 (CA3 1989), quoting United States v. Mitchell, 588 F.2d 481, 484 (CA5), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 940 (1979), quoting United States v. Huntley, 535 F.2d 1400, 1402 (CA5 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 929 (1977).Notwithstanding the narrowness of this issue, we granted certiorari to resolve a divergence of opinion among the courts of appeals.  494 U.S.  (1990).  See United States v. Sparrow, 635 F.2d 794 (CA10 1980) (en banc), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1004 (1981) (washed automobile titles are not "falsely made" within the meaning of § 2314).  We now affirm petitioner's conviction.IIAs indicated, § 2314 prohibits the knowing transportation of "falsely made, forged, altered or counterfeited securities" Page 498 U. S. 107 in interstate commerce. [Footnote 1]  Moskal acknowledges that he could have been charged with violating this provision when he sent the Pennsylvania titles to Virginia, since those titles were "altered" within the meaning of § 2314.  But he insists that he did not violate the provision in subsequently receiving the washed titles from Virginia because, although he was participating in a fraud (and thus no doubt had the requisite intent under § 2314), the washed titles themselves were not "falsely made."  He asserts that, when a title is issued by appropriate state authorities who do not know of its falsity, the title is "genuine" or valid as the state document it purports to be, and therefore not "falsely made."Whether a valid title that contains fraudulently tendered odometer readings may be a "falsely made" security for purposes of § 2314 presents a conventional issue of statutory construction, and we must therefore determine what scope Congress intended § 2314 to have.  Moskal, however, suggests a shortcut in that inquiry.  Because it is possible to read the statute as applying only to forged or counterfeited securities, and because some courts have so read it, Moskal suggests we should simply resolve the issue in his favor under the doctrine of lenity.  See, e.g., Lewis v. United States, 401 U. S. 808,  401 U. S. 812 (1971).In our view, this argument misconstrues the doctrine.  We have repeatedly "emphasized that the touchstone' of the rule of lenity `is statutory ambiguity.'"  Bifulco v. United States, 447 U. S. 381,  447 U. S. 387 (1980), quoting Lewis v. Page 498 U. S. 108 United States, 445 U. S. 55,  445 U. S. 65 (1980).  Stated at this level of abstraction, of course, the rule"provides little more than atmospherics, since it leaves open the crucial question -- almost invariably present -- of how much ambiguousness constitutes . . . ambiguity."United States v. Hansen, 249 U.S.App.D.C. 22, 30, 772 F.2d 940, 948 (1985) (Scalia, J.) (emphasis added), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1045 (1986).  Because the meaning of language is inherently contextual, we have declined to deem a statute "ambiguous" for purposes of lenity merely because it was possible to articulate a construction more narrow than that urged by the Government.  See, e.g., McEIroy v. United States, 455 U. S. 642,  455 U. S. 657-658 (1982).  Nor have we deemed a division of judicial authority automatically sufficient to trigger lenity.  See, e.g., United States v. Rodgers, 466 U. S. 475,  466 U. S. 484 (1984).  If that were sufficient, one court's unduly narrow reading of a criminal statute would become binding on all other courts, including this one.  Instead, we have always reserved lenity for those situations in which a reasonable doubt persists about a statute's intended scope even after resort to "the language and structure, legislative history, and motivating policies" of the statute.  Bifulco v. United States, supra, 447 U.S. at  447 U. S. 387; see also United States v. Bass, 404 U. S. 336,  404 U. S. 347 (1971) (court should rely on lenity only if, "[a]fter seiz[ing] every thing from which aid can be derived,'" it is "left with an ambiguous statute," quoting United States v. Fisher, 2 Cranch 358,  6 U. S. 386 (1805) (Marshall, C.J.)).  Examining these materials, we conclude that § 2314 unambiguously applies to Moskal's conduct.A"In determining the scope of a statute, we look first to its language," United States v. Turkette, 452 U. S. 576,  452 U. S. 580 (1981), giving the "words used" their "ordinary meaning," Richards v. United States, 369 U. S. 1,  369 U. S. 9 (1962).  We think Page 498 U. S. 109 that the words of § 2314 are broad enough, on their face, to encompass washed titles containing fraudulently tendered odometer readings.  Such titles are "falsely made" in the sense that they are made to contain false, or incorrect, information.Moskal resists this construction of the language on the ground that the state officials responsible for issuing the washed titles did not know that they were incorporating false odometer readings.  We see little merit in this argument.  As used in § 2314, "falsely made" refers to the character of the securities being transported.  In our view, it is perfectly consistent with ordinary usage to speak of the security as being "falsely made" regardless of whether the party responsible for the physical production of the document knew that he was making a security in a manner that incorporates false information.  Indeed, we find support for this construction in the nexus between the actus reus and mens rea elements of § 2314.  Because liability under the statute depends on transporting the "falsely made" security with unlawful or fraudulent intent, there is no reason to infer a scienter requirement for the act of falsely making itself. [Footnote 2]Short of construing "falsely made" in this way, we are at a loss to give any meaning to this phrase independent of the other terms in § 2314, such as "forged" or "counterfeited."  By seeking to exclude from § 2314's scope any security that is "genuine" or valid, Moskal essentially equates "falsely made" with "forged" or "counterfeited." [Footnote 3]  His construction therefore violates the established principle that a court should "give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute.'"  Page 498 U. S. 110 United States v. Menasche, 348 U. S. 528,  348 U. S. 538-539 (1955), quoting Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 U. S. 147,  107 U. S. 152 (1883); see also Pennsylvania Dept. of Public Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U. S. 552,  495 U. S. 562 (1990).Our conclusion that "falsely made" encompasses genuine documents containing false information is supported by Congress' purpose in enacting § 2314.  Inspired by the proliferation of interstate schemes for passing counterfeit securities, see 84 Cong. Rec. 9412 (statement of Sen. O'Mahoney), Congress in 1939 added the clause pertaining to "falsely made, forged, altered or counterfeited securities" as an amendment to the National Stolen Property Act.  53 Stat. 1178.  Our prior decisions have recognized Congress' "general intent" and "broad purpose" to curb the type of trafficking in fraudulent securities that often depends for its success on the exploitation of interstate commerce.  In United States v. Sheridan, 329 U. S. 379 (1946), we explained that Congress enacted the relevant clause of § 2314 [Footnote 4] in order to"com[e] to the aid of the states in detecting and punishing criminals whose offenses are complete under state law, but who utilize the channels of interstate commerce to make a successful getaway and thus make the state's detecting and punitive processes impotent."Id. at  329 U. S. 384.  This, we concluded, "was indeed one of the most effective ways of preventing further frauds."  Ibid.; see also McElroy v. United States, 455 U. S. 642,  455 U. S. 655 (1982) (rejecting a narrow reading of § 2314 that was at odds with Congress' "broad purpose" and that would "undercut sharply . . . federal prosecutors in their effort to combat crime in interstate commerce").We think that "title washing" operations are a perfect example of the "further frauds" that Congress sought to halt in enacting § 2314.  As Moskal concedes, his title-washing scheme is a clear instance of fraud involving securities.  And Page 498 U. S. 111 as the facts of this case demonstrate, title washes involve precisely the sort of fraudulent activities that are dispersed among several States in order to elude state detection.Moskal draws a different conclusion from this legislative history.  Seizing upon the references to counterfeit securities, petitioner finds no evidence that "the 1939 amendment had anything at all to do with odometer rollback schemes."  Reply Brief for Petitioner 6.  We think petitioner misconceives the inquiry into legislative purpose by failing to recognize that Congress sought to attack a category of fraud.  At the time that Congress amended the National Stolen Property Act, counterfeited securities no doubt constituted (and may still constitute) the most prevalent form of such interstate fraud.  The fact remains, however, that Congress did not limit the statute's reach to "counterfeit securities," but instead chose the broader phrase "falsely made, forged, altered or counterfeited securities," which was consistent with its purpose to reach a class of frauds that exploited interstate commerce.This Court has never required that every permissible application of a statute be expressly referred to in its legislative history.  Thus, for example, in United States v. Turkette, 452 U. S. 576 (1981), we recognized that "the major purpose" of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations statute was "to address the infiltration of legitimate business by organized crime."  Id. at  452 U. S. 591.  Yet, we concluded from the statute's broad language and legislative purpose that the key term "enterprise" must include not only legitimate businesses but also criminal associations.  Ibid.; see also United States v. Naftalin, 441 U. S. 768,  441 U. S. 775 (1979) (Securities Act of 1933 covers fraud against brokers as well as investors, since "neither this Court nor Congress has ever suggested that investor protection was the sole purpose of [that] Act" (emphasis in original)).Our precedents concerning § 2314 specifically reject constructions of the statute that limit it to instances of fraud, Page 498 U. S. 112 rather than the class of fraud encompassed by its language.  For example, in United States v. Sheridan, supra, the defendant cashed checks at a Michigan bank, drawn on a Missouri account, with a forged signature.  The Court found that such conduct was proscribed by § 2314.  In reaching that conclusion, the Court noted Congress' primary objective of reaching counterfeiters of corporate securities, but nonetheless found that the statute covered check forgeries "done by little fellows' who perhaps were not the primary aim of the congressional fire."  329 U.S. at  329 U. S. 390.  "Whether or not Congress had in mind primarily such small-scale transactions as Sheridan's," we held,"his operation was covered literally, and we think purposively.  Had this not been intended, appropriate exception could easily have been made."Ibid.  In explaining that conclusion, we stated further:"Drawing the [forged] check upon an out-of-state bank, knowing it must be sent there for presentation, is an obviously facile way to delay and often defeat apprehension, conviction and restoration of the ill-gotten gain.  There are sound reasons therefore why Congress would wish not to exclude such persons [from the statute's reach], among them the very ease with which they may escape the state's grasp."Id. at  329 U. S. 391.In McElroy v. United States, supra, we similarly rejected a narrow construction of § 2314.  The defendant used blank checks that had been stolen in Ohio to buy a car and a boat in Pennsylvania.  Defendant conceded that the checks he had thus misused constituted "forged securities," but maintained his innocence under the federal statute because the checks were not yet forged when they were transported across state boundaries.  The Court acknowledged that "Congress could have written the statute to produce this result," id. 455 U.S. at  455 U. S. 656, but rejected such a reading as inconsistent with Congress' "broad purpose," since it would permit "a patient forger easily [to] evade the reach of federal law," id. at  455 U. S. 655.  Moreover, because we found the defendant's interpretation to be contradicted Page 498 U. S. 113 by Congress' intent in § 2314 and its predecessors, we also rejected the defendant's plea for lenity:"although 'criminal statutes are to be construed strictly, . . . this does not mean that every criminal statute must be given the narrowest possible meaning in complete disregard of the purpose of the legislature.'"Id. at  455 U. S. 658, quoting United States v. Bramblett, 348 U. S. 503,  348 U. S. 509-510 (1955) (footnote omitted).  We concluded that the defendant had failed to"raise significant questions of ambiguity, for the statutory language and legislative history . . . indicate that Congress defined the term 'interstate commerce' more broadly than the petitioner contends."Ibid.Thus, in both Sheridan and McElroy, defendants who admittedly circulated fraudulent securities among several States sought to avoid liability by offering a reading of § 2314 that was narrower than the scope of its language and of Congress' intent, and in each instance we rejected the proffered interpretation.  Moskal's interpretation in the present case rests on a similarly cramped reading of the statute's words, and we think it should likewise be rejected as inconsistent with Congress' general purpose to combat interstate fraud.  "[F]ederal statutes that are intended to fill a void in local law enforcement should be construed broadly."  Bell v. United States, 462 U. S. 356,  462 U. S. 362 (1983) (STEVENS, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). [Footnote 5] Page 498 U. S. 114To summarize our conclusions as to the meaning of "falsely made" in § 2314, we find both in the plain meaning of those words and in the legislative purpose underlying them ample reason to apply the law to a fraudulent scheme for washing vehicle titles. [Footnote 6]BPetitioner contends that such a reading of § 2314 is nonetheless precluded by a further principle of statutory construction."[W]here a federal criminal statute uses a common law term of established meaning without otherwise defining it, the general practice is to give that term its common law meaning."United States v. Turley, 352 U. S. 407,  352 U. S. 411 (1957).  Petitioner argues that, at the time Congress enacted the relevant clause of § 2314, the term "falsely made" had an established common law meaning equivalent to forgery.  As so defined, "falsely made" excluded authentic or genuine documents that were merely false in content.  Petitioner maintains that Congress should be presumed to have adopted this common law definition when it amended the National Stolen Property Act in 1939, and that § 2314 therefore should be deemed not to cover washed vehicle titles that merely contain false odometer readings.  We disagree for two reasons. Page 498 U. S. 115First, Moskal has failed to demonstrate that there was, in fact, an "established" meaning of "falsely made" at common law.  Rather, it appears that there were divergent views on this issue in American courts.  Petitioner and respondent agree that many courts interpreted "falsely made" to exclude documents that were false only in content.  The opinion in United States v. Wentworth, 11 F. 52 (CCNH 1882), typifies that view.  There, the defendants were prosecuted for having "falsely made" affidavits that they submitted to obtain a pension.  The defendants did sign the affidavits, but the facts recited therein were false.  The court concluded that this would support a charge of perjury, but not false making, because "to falsely make an affidavit is one thing; to make a false affidavit is another."  Id. at 55. [Footnote 7]But the Wentworth view -- that "falsely made" excluded documents "genuinely" issued by the person purporting to make them and false only in content -- was not universal.  For example, in United States v. Hartman, 65 F. 490 (ED Mo.1894), the defendant procured a "notary certificate" containing falsehoods.  Finding that this conduct fell within the conduct proscribed by a statute barring certain "falsely made, forged, altered or counterfeited" writings, the judge stated"I cannot conceive how any significance can be given to the words 'falsely make' unless they shall be construed to mean the statements in a certificate which in fact are untrue.  'Falsely' means in opposition to the truth.  'Falsely makes' means to state in a certificate that which is not true. . . ."Id. at 491 Page 498 U. S. 116Other common law courts, accepting the equation of "falsely making" with "forgery," treated as "forged" otherwise genuine documents fraudulently procured from innocent makers.  In State v. Shurtliff, 18 Me. 368 (1841), a landowner signed a deed conveying his farm under the misapprehension that the deed pertained to a different land parcel.  Although this deed was "genuine" in the sense that the owner had signed it, the court held it was "falsely made" by the grantee, who had tendered this deed for the owner's signature instead of one previously agreed upon by the parties.  Id. at 371.  In concluding that the deed was falsely made, the court explained,"[i]t is not necessary that the act [of falsely making] should be done, in whole or in part, by the hand of the party charged.  It is sufficient if he cause or procure it to be done."Ibid.  Similarly, In re Count de Toulouse Lautrec, 102 F. 878 (CA7 1900), upheld the extradition on forgery charges of a defendant who misused sample copies of corporate bond interest coupons that were printed in good faith by the company's printers.  The court noted:"the authorities establish numerous instances wherein forgery is found, apart from the manual making or signing, as in the fraudulent procurement and use of a signature or writing as an obligation when it is not so intended or understood by the maker."Id. at 881 (emphasis added).  See also Annot., Genuine Making of Instrument for Purpose of Defrauding as Constituting Forgery, 41 A.L.R. 229, 247 (1926).This plurality of definitions of "falsely made" substantially undermines Moskal's reliance on the "common law meaning" principle.  That rule of construction, after all, presumes simply that Congress accepted the one meaning for an undefined statutory term that prevailed at common law.  Where, however, no fixed usage existed at common law, we think it more appropriate to inquire which of the common law readings of the term best accords with the overall purposes of the statute, Page 498 U. S. 117 rather than simply assume, for example, that Congress adopted the reading that was followed by the largest number of common law courts.  "Sound rules of statutory interpretation exist to discover, and not to direct, the Congressional will.'"  Huddleston v. United States, 415 U. S. 814,  415 U. S. 831 (1974), quoting United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U. S. 537,  317 U. S. 542 (1943).  See also United States v. Turley, 352 U. S. 407,  352 U. S. 412 (1957) (declining to assume that Congress equated "stolen" with the common law meaning of "larceny" in light of varying historic usages of the terms "steal" or "stolen").Our second reason for rejecting Moskal's reliance on the "common law meaning" rule is that, as this Court has previously recognized, Congress' general purpose in enacting a law may prevail over this rule of statutory construction.  In Taylor v. United States, 495 U. S. 575 (1990), we confronted the question whether "burglary," when used in a sentence enhancement statute, was intended to take its common law meaning.  We declined to apply the "common law meaning" rule, in part, because the common law meaning of burglary was inconsistent with congressional purpose.  "The arcane distinctions embedded in the common law definition [of burglary]," we noted, "have little relevance to modern law enforcement concerns."  Id. at  495 U. S. 593 (footnote omitted).  See also Bell v. United States, 462 U. S. 356,  462 U. S. 360-361 (1983) (declining to apply the common law meaning of "takes and carries away," as inconsistent with other provisions of the Bank Robbery Act).We reach a similar conclusion here.  The position of those common law courts that defined "falsely Page 498 U. S. 118 made" to exclude documents that are false only in content does not accord with Congress' broad purpose in enacting § 2314 -- namely, to criminalize trafficking in fraudulent securities that exploits interstate commerce.  We conclude, then, that it is far more likely that Congress adopted the common law view of "falsely made" that encompasses "genuine" documents that are false in content.CFinally, Moskal offers two policy arguments for narrowly construing "falsely made."  First, noting that thousands of automobile titles are "washed" every year, petitioner argues that"to invalidate all of these automobile titles because they contain an incorrect mileage figure may well result in havoc in the stream of automobile commerce."Brief for Petitioner 19 (emphasis added).  Even if we were inclined to credit this concern as a reason for narrowing the statute, the argument -- so far as we can discern -- rests on a faulty premise.  There is no evidence in the record to suggest that States will deem washed titles automatically invalid simply because federal law punishes those responsible for introducing such fraudulent securities into the streams of commerce.Secondly, Moskal suggests that construing "falsely made" to apply to securities that contain false information will criminalize a broad range of "innocent" conduct.  This contention, too, is unfounded.  A person who transports such a security in interstate commerce violates § 2314 only if he does so with unlawful or fraudulent intent and if the false information is itself material. [Footnote 8]  A person whose conduct satisfies these tests will be acting no more "innocently" than was Moskal when he engaged in the concededly fraudulent title-washing scheme at issue in this case.For all of the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Court of Appeals isAffirmed
U.S. Supreme CourtMoskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103 (1990)Moskal v. United StatesNo. 89-964Argued Oct. 1, 1990Decided Dec. 3, 1990498 U.S. 103SyllabusPetitioner participated in a "title washing" scheme in which automobile titles that had been altered to reflect rolled-back odometer mileage figures were sent from Pennsylvania to Virginia.  After Virginia authorities, unaware of the alterations, issued Virginia titles incorporating the false figures, Moskal received the "washed" titles in Pennsylvania, where they were used in connection with car sales to unsuspecting buyers.  Moskal was convicted of receiving two washed titles under 18 U.S.C. § 2314, which prohibits the knowing transportation of "falsely made, forged, altered, or counterfeited securities" in interstate commerce.  (Emphasis added.)  In affirming Moskal's conviction, the Court of Appeals rejected his contention that, because the washed titles were genuine, inasmuch as the Virginia officials who issued them did not know of the falsity, the titles therefore were not "falsely made."Held:  A person who receives genuine vehicle titles, knowing that they incorporate fraudulently tendered odometer readings, receives those titles knowing them to have been "falsely made" in violation of § 2314.  Pp.  498 U. S. 106-118.(a) Moskal misconstrues the doctrine of lenity when he contends that because it is possible to read § 2314 as applying only to forged or counterfeited securities, and because some courts have so read it, this Court should simply resolve the issue in his favor under that doctrine.  The doctrine applies only to those situations in which a reasonable doubt persists about a statute's intended scope even after resort to the language and structure, legislative history, and motivating policies of the statute.  Such factors demonstrate that § 2314 unambiguously applies to Moskal's conduct.  Pp.  498 U. S. 106-108.(b) Both the plain meaning of the words "falsely made" and the legislative purpose underlying them provide ample support for applying § 2314 to a fraudulent scheme for washing vehicle titles.  The quoted words are broad enough, on their face, to encompass washed titles containing fraudulently tendered odometer readings, since such titles are made to contain false, or incorrect, information.  The fact that the state officials responsible for issuing such titles did not know that they were incorporating false readings is irrelevant, since § 2314 liability depends on transporting the "falsely made" security with unlawful or fraudulent intent, Page 498 U. S. 104 and not on the scienter of the person who physically produces the security.  Moskal's construction of § 2314 as excluding any security that is "genuine" or valid deprives the "falsely made" phrase of any meaning independent of the statutory terms "forged" and "counterfeited," and therefore violates the established principle that a court should give effect, if possible, to every clause or word of a statute.  That "falsely made" encompasses genuine documents containing false information is also supported by § 2314's purpose of curbing the type of trafficking in fraudulent securities that depends for its success on the exploitation of interstate commerce to avoid detection by individual states, such as a title washing operation. The fact that the legislative history contains references to counterfeit securities but not to odometer rollback schemes does not require a different conclusion, since, in choosing the broad phrase "falsely made, forged, altered, or counterfeited securities," Congress sought to reach a class of frauds that exploited interstate commerce.  This Court has never required that every permissible application of a statute be expressly referred to in its legislative history.  Moreover, the Court's § 2314 precedents specifically reject constructions that limit the statute to instances of fraud, rather than the class of fraud encompassed by its language.  See United States v. Sheridan, 329 U. S. 379,  329 U. S. 390,  329 U. S. 391; McElroy v. United States, 455 U. S. 642,  455 U. S. 655,  455 U. S. 656,  455 U. S. 658.   498 U. S.  108-114.(c) The foregoing reading of § 2314 is not precluded by the principle of statutory construction requiring that, where a federal criminal statute uses a common law term of established meaning without otherwise defining it, the term must generally be given that meaning.  Although, at the time Congress enacted the relevant clause of § 2314, many courts had interpreted "falsely made" to exclude documents that were false only in content, that interpretation was not universal, other courts having taken divergent views.  Where no fixed usage existed at common law, it is more appropriate to inquire which of the common law readings of the term best accords with the overall purpose of the statute, rather than simply to assume, for example, that Congress adopted the reading that was followed by the largest number of common law courts.  Moreover, Congress' general purpose in enacting a law may prevail over the "common law meaning" rule of construction.  Since the position of those common law courts that define "falsely made" to exclude documents that are false only in content does not accord with Congress' broad purpose in enacting § 2314 -- namely to criminalize trafficking in fraudulent securities that exploits interstate commerce -- it is far more likely that Congress adopted the common law view of "falsely made" that encompasses "genuine" documents that are false in content.  Pp.  498 U. S. 114-118. Page 498 U. S. 105(d) Moskal's policy arguments for narrowly construing "falsely made" are unpersuasive.  First, there is no evidence to suggest that States will deem washed titles automatically invalid -- thereby creating chaos in the stream of automobile commerce -- simply because federal law punishes those responsible for introducing such fraudulent securities into commerce.  Second, construing "falsely made" to apply to securities containing false information will not criminalize a broad range of "innocent" conduct.  A person who transports such securities in interstate commerce violates § 2314 only if he does so with unlawful or fraudulent intent and if the false information is itself material, and conduct that satisfies these tests is not "innocent."  P.  498 U. S. 118.888 F.2d 283 (CA3 1989), affirmed.MARSHALL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST, C.J., and WHITE, BLACKMUN, and STEVENS, JJ., joined.  SCALIA, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which O'CONNOR and KENNEDY, JJ., joined, post, p.  498 U. S. 119.  SOUTER, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.