MR. JUSTICE BURTON delivered the opinion of the Court.The issue before us is whether a state court, in 1952, had jurisdiction to entertain an action by an employee, who worked in an industry affecting interstate commerce, against a union and its agent, for malicious interference with such employee's lawful occupation.  In United Construction Workers v. Laburnum Corp., 347 U. S. 656,  347 U. S. 657, we held that Congress had not"given the National Labor Relations Board such exclusive jurisdiction over the subject matter of a common law tort action for damages as to preclude an appropriate state court from hearing and determining its issues where such conduct constitutes an unfair labor practice"under the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, or the National Labor Relations Act, as amended. [Footnote 1]  For the reasons hereafter stated, we uphold the jurisdiction of the state courts in this case as we did in the Laburnum case.This action was instituted in the Circuit Court of Morgan County, Alabama, in 1952, by Paul S. Russell, Page 356 U. S. 636 the respondent, against the petitioners, International Union, United Automobile, Aircraft and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, CIO, an unincorporated labor organization, here called the union, and its agent, Volk, together with other parties not now in the case.  Russell was a maintenance electrician employed by Calumet and Hecla Consolidated Copper Company (Wolverine Tube Division) in Decatur, Alabama at $1.75 an hour and earned approximately $100 a week.  The union was the bargaining agent for certain employees of that Division, but Russell was not a member of the union. nor had he applied for such membership.The allegations of his amended complaint may be summarized as follows:  the union, on behalf of the employees it represented, called a strike to commence July 18, 1951.  To prevent Russell and other hourly paid employees from entering the plant during the strike, and to thus make the strike effective, petitioners maintained a picket line from July 18 to September 24, 1951.  This line was located along and in the public street which was the only means of ingress and egress to the plant.  The line consisted of persons standing along the street or walking in a compact circle across the entire traveled portion of the street.  Such pickets, on July 18, by force of numbers, threats of bodily harm to Russell and of damage to his property, prevented him from reaching the plant gates.  At least one striker took hold of Russell's automobile.  Some of the pickets stood or walked in front of his automobile in such a manner as to block the street and make it impossible for him, and others similarly situated, to enter the plant.  The amended complaint also contained a second count to the same general effect, but alleging that petitioners unlawfully conspired with other persons to do the acts above described.The amended complaint further alleged that petitioners willfully and maliciously caused Russell to lose time from Page 356 U. S. 637 his work from July 18 to August 22, 1951, and to lose the earnings which he would have received had he and others not been prevented from going to and from the plant.  Russell, accordingly, claimed compensatory damages for his loss of earnings and for his mental anguish, plus punitive damages, in the total sum of $50,000.Petitioners filed a plea to the jurisdiction.  They claimed that the National Labor Relations Board had jurisdiction of the controversy to the exclusion of the state court.  The trial court overruled Russell's demurrer to the plea.  However, the Supreme Court of Alabama reversed the trial court and upheld the jurisdiction of that court, even though the amended complaint charged a violation of § 8(b)(1)(A) of the Federal Act. [Footnote 2]  258 Ala. 615, 64 So. 2d 384.On remand, petitioners' plea to the jurisdiction was again filed but this time Russell's demurrer to it was sustained.  The case went to trial before a jury, and resulted in a general verdict and a judgment for Russell in the amount of $10,000, including punitive damages.  On appeal, the Supreme Court of Alabama reaffirmed the Circuit Court's jurisdiction.  It also affirmed the judgment for Russell on the merits, holding that Russell had proved the tort of wrongful interference with a lawful occupation.  264 Ala. 456, 88 So. 2d 175.  Because of the importance of the jurisdictional issue, we granted certiorari.  352 U.S. 915. Page 356 U. S. 638There was much conflict in the testimony as to what took place in connection with the picketing, but those conflicts were resolved by the jury in favor of Russell. [Footnote 3]  Accepting a view of the evidence most favorable to him, the jury was entitled to conclude that petitioners did, by mass picketing and threats of violence, prevent him from entering the plant and from engaging in his employment Page 356 U. S. 639 from July 18 to August 22.  The jury could have found that work would have been available within the plant if Russell, and others desiring entry, had not been excluded by the force, or threats of force, of the strikers. [Footnote 4]  Page 356 U. S. 640 This leaves no significant issue of fact for decision here.  The principal issue of law is whether the state court had jurisdiction to entertain Russell's amended complaint, or whether that jurisdiction had been preempted by Congress and vested exclusively in the National Labor Relations Board.At the outset, we note that the union's activity in this case clearly was not protected by federal law.  Indeed the strike was conducted in such a manner that it could have been enjoined by Alabama courts.  Youngdahl v. Rainfair, Inc., 355 U. S. 131; Auto Workers v. Wisconsin Board, 351 U. S. 266.In the Laburnum case, supra, the union, with intimidation and threats of violence, demanded recognition to which it was not entitled.  In that manner, the union prevented the employer from using its regular employees and forced it to abandon a construction contract with a consequent loss of profits.  The employer filed a tort action in a Virginia court and received a judgment for about $30,000 Page 356 U. S. 641 compensatory damages plus $100,000 punitive damages.  On petition for certiorari, we upheld the state court's jurisdiction and affirmed its judgment.  We assumed that the conduct of the union constituted a violation of § 8(b)(1)(A) of the Federal Act.  Nevertheless, we held that the Federal Act did not expressly or impliedly deprive the employer of its common law right of action in tort for damages.This case is similar to Laburnum in many respects.  In each, a state court awarded compensatory and punitive damages against a union for conduct which was a tort and also assumed to be an unfair labor practice.  The situations are comparable except that, in the instant case, the Board is authorized, under § 10(c) of the Federal Act, to award back pay to employees under certain circumstances.  We assume, for the purpose of argument, that the Board would have had authority to award back pay to Russell. [Footnote 5]  Petitioners assert that the possibility of partial relief distinguishes the instant case from Laburnum.  It is our view, that Congress has not made such a distinction and that is has not, in either case, deprived a victim of the Page 356 U. S. 642 kind of conduct here involved of common law rights of action for all damages suffered.Section 10(c) of the Federal Act, upon which petitioners must rely, gives limited authority to the Board to award back pay to employees.  The material provisions are the following:"If, upon the preponderance of the testimony taken, the Board shall be of the opinion that any person named in the complaint has engaged in or is engaging in any such unfair labor practice, then the Board shall state its findings of fact and shall issue and cause to be served on such person an order requiring such person to cease and desist from such unfair labor practice, and to take such affirmative action including reinstatement of employees with or without back pay, as will effectuate the policies of this Act:  Provided, That where an order directs reinstatement of an employee, back pay may be required of the employer or labor organization, as the case may be, responsible for the discrimination suffered by him. . . ."61 Stat. 147, 29 U.S.C. § 160(c).If an award of damages by a state court for conduct such as is involved in the present case is not otherwise prohibited by the Federal Acts, it certainly is not prohibited by the provisions of § 10(c).  This section is far from being an express grant of exclusive jurisdiction superseding common law actions, by either an employer or an employee, to recover damages caused by the tortious conduct of a union.  To make an award, the Board must first be convinced that the award would "effectuate the policies" of the Act.  "The remedy of back pay, it must be remembered, is entrusted to the Board's discretion; it is not mechanically compelled by the Act."  Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Labor Board, 313 U. S. 177,  313 U. S. 198.  The power to order affirmative relief under Page 356 U. S. 643 § 10(c) is merely incidental to the primary purpose of Congress to stop and to prevent unfair labor practices.  Congress did not establish a general scheme authorizing the Board to award full compensatory damages for injuries caused by wrongful conduct.  United Construction Workers v. Laburnum Corp., 347 U. S. 656,  347 U. S. 666-667.  In Virginia Electric & Power Co. v. Labor Board, 319 U. S. 533,  319 U. S. 543, in speaking of the Board's power to grant affirmative relief, we said:"The instant reimbursement order [which directs reimbursement by an employer of dues checked off for a dominated union] is not a redress for a private wrong.  Like a back pay order, it does restore to the employees in some measure what was taken from them because of the Company's unfair labor practices.  In this, both these types of monetary awards somewhat resemble compensation for private injury, but it must be constantly remembered that both are remedies created by statute -- the one explicitly and the other implicitly in the concept of effectuation of the policies of the Act -- which are designed to aid in achieving the elimination of industrial conflict.  They vindicate public, not private, rights.  Cf. Agwilines, Inc. v. Labor Board, 87 F.2d 146, 150, 151; Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Labor Board, 313 U. S. 177.  For this reason, it is erroneous to characterize this reimbursement order as penal, or as the adjudication of a mass tort.  It is equally wrong to fetter the Board's discretion by compelling it to observe conventional common law or chancery principles in fashioning such an order, or to force it to inquire into the amount of damages actually sustained.  Whether and to what extent such matters should be considered is a complex problem for the Board to decide in the light of its administrative experience and knowledge. "Page 356 U. S. 644In Laburnum, in distinguishing Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U. S. 485, we said:"To the extent that Congress prescribed preventive procedure against unfair labor practices, that case recognized that the Act excluded conflicting state procedure to the same end.  To the extent, however, that Congress has not prescribed procedure for dealing with the consequences of tortious conduct already committed, there is no ground for concluding that existing criminal penalties or liabilities for tortious conduct have been eliminated. The care we took in the Garner case to demonstrate the existing conflict between state and federal administrative remedies in that case was itself a recognition that, if no conflict had existed, the state procedure would have survived."347 U.S. at  347 U. S. 665.In this case, there is a possibility that both the Board and the state courts have jurisdiction to award lost pay.  However, that possibility does not create the kind of "conflict" of remedies referred to in Laburnum.  Our cases which hold that state jurisdiction is preempted are distinguishable.  In them, we have been concerned lest one forum would enjoin, as illegal, conduct which the other forum would find legal, or that the state courts would restrict the exercise of rights guaranteed by the Federal Acts. [Footnote 6] Page 356 U. S. 645In the instant case, there would be no "conflict" even if one forum awarded back pay and the other did not.  There is nothing inconsistent in holding that an employee may recover lost wages as damages in a tort action under state law, and also holding that the award of such damages is not necessary to effectuate the purposes of the Federal Act.In order to effectuate the policies of the Act, Congress has allowed the Board, in its discretion, to award back pay.  Such awards may incidentally provide some compensatory relief to victims of unfair labor practices.  This does not mean that Congress necessarily intended this discretionary relief to constitute an exclusive pattern of money damages for private injuries.  Nor do we think that the Alabama tort remedy, as applied in this case, altered rights and duties affirmatively established by Congress.To the extent that a back-pay award may provide relief for victims of an unfair labor practice, it is a partial alternative to a suit in the state courts for loss of earnings.  If the employee's common law rights of action against a union tortfeasor are to be cut off, that would, in effect, grant to unions a substantial immunity from the consequences of mass picketing or coercion such as was employed during the strike in the present case.The situation may be illustrated by supposing, in the instant case, that Russell's car had been turned over, resulting in damage to the car and personal injury to him.  Under state law, presumably, he could have recovered for Page 356 U. S. 646 medical expenses, pain and suffering, and property damages.  Such items of recovery are beyond the scope of present Board remedial orders.  Following the reasoning adopted by us in the Laburnum case, we believe that state jurisdiction to award damages for these items is not preempted.  Cf. International Assn. of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U. S. 617.  Nor can we see any difference, significant for present purposes, between tort damages to recover medical expenses and tort damages to recover lost wages.  We conclude that an employee's right to recover, in the state courts, all damages caused him by this kind of tortious conduct cannot fairly be said to be preempted without a clearer declaration of congressional policy than we find here.  Of course, Russell could not collect duplicate compensation for lost pay from the state courts and the Board.Punitive damages constitute a well settled form of relief under the law of Alabama when there is a willful and malicious wrong.  Penney v. Warren, 217 Ala. 120, 115 So. 16.  To the extent that such relief is penal in its nature, it is all the more clearly not granted to the Board by the Federal Acts.  Republic Steel Corp. v. Labor Board, 311 U. S. 7,  311 U. S. 10-12.  The power to impose punitive sanctions is within the jurisdiction of the state courts, but not within that of the Board.  In Laburnum, we approved a judgment that included $100,000 in punitive damages.  For the exercise of the police power of a State over such a case as this, see also Youngdahl v. Rainfair, Inc., 355 U. S. 131; Auto Workers v. Wisconsin Board, 351 U. S. 266,  351 U. S. 274, note 12.Accordingly, the judgment for the Supreme Court of Alabama is affirmed.Affirmed
U.S. Supreme CourtAutomobile Workers v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634 (1958)International Union, United Automobile, Aircraft and AgriculturalImplement Workers of America (UAW-CIO) v. RussellNo. 21Argued December 11-12, 1957Decided May 26, 1958356 U.S. 634SyllabusIn 1952, respondent, a nonunion employee in an industry affecting interstate commerce, brought a common law tort action in a state court against a labor union and its agent to recover compensatory and punitive damages for malicious interference with his lawful occupation, alleging that, by mass picketing and threats of violence during a strike, they prevented him from entering the plant where he was employed and from engaging in his employment for over a month.  It is assumed that such action also constituted an unfair labor practice under § 8(b)(1)(A) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, for which the National Labor Relations Board could have awarded respondent back pay under §10(c).Held:  the Act did not give the Board such exclusive jurisdiction over the subject matter as to preclude the state court from entertaining the action and awarding compensatory and punitive damages.  Pp.  356 U. S. 635-646.(a) The union's activity in this case clearly was not protected by federal law.  P.  356 U. S. 640.(b) Congress has not deprived a victim of the kind of tortious conduct here involved of his common law rights of action for all damages suffered.  United Workers v. Laburnum Corp., 347 U. S. 656.  Pp.  356 U. S. 640-642.(c) That, under § 10(c) of the Federal Act, the Board had limited power to award back pay to respondent does not create such a conflict as to deprive the state courts of jurisdiction to award common law damages for lost pay.  Pp.  356 U. S. 642-645.(d) To hold that the limited power of the Board under § 10(c) to award back pay in its discretion excludes the power of the State to enforce the employee's common law rights of action would, in effect, grant to unions a substantial immunity from the consequences of mass picketing or coercion such as was employed here.  Pp.  356 U. S. 645-646. Page 356 U. S. 635(e) An employee's right to recover in the state courts all damages caused him by this kind of tortious conduct cannot fairly be said to be preempted without a clearer declaration of congressional policy than is found here.  P.  356 U. S. 646.(f) The power to award punitive damages is within the jurisdiction of the state courts, but not within that of the Board.  P.  356 U. S. 646.264 Ala. 456, 88 So. 2d 175, affirmed.