MR. JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.The issue before us in this case is whether, consistently with the First and Fourteenth Amendments, a State may extend a cause of action for damages for invasion of privacy caused by the publication of the name of a deceased rape victim which was publicly revealed in connection with the prosecution of the crime.IIn August, 1971, appellee's 17-year-old daughter was the victim of a rape, and did not survive the incident.  Six youths were soon indicted for murder and rape.  Although there was substantial press coverage of the crime and of subsequent developments, the identity of the victim was not disclosed pending trial, perhaps because of Ga.Code Ann. § 26-9901 (1972), [Footnote 1] which makes Page 420 U. S. 472 it a misdemeanor to publish or broadcast the name or identity of a rape victim.  In April, 1972, some eight months later, the six defendants appeared in court.  Five pleaded guilty to rape or attempted rape, the charge of murder having been dropped.  The guilty pleas were accepted by the court, and the trial of the defendant pleading not guilty was set for a later date.In the course of the proceedings that day, appellant Wassell, [Footnote 2] a reporter covering the incident for his employer, learned the name of the victim from an examination of the indictments which were made available for his inspection in the courtroom. [Footnote 3]  That the name of the Page 420 U. S. 473 victim appears in the indictments, and that the indictments were public records available for inspection are not disputed. [Footnote 4]  Later that day, Wassell broadcast over the facilities of station WSB-TV, a television station owned by appellant Cox Broadcasting Corp., a news report concerning Page 420 U. S. 474 the court proceedings.  The report named the victim of the crime and was repeated the following day. [Footnote 5]In May, 1972, appellee brought an action for money damages against appellants, relying on § 26-9901 and claiming that his right to privacy had been invaded by the television broadcasts giving the name of his deceased daughter.  Appellants admitted the broadcasts, but claimed that they were privileged under both state law and the First and Fourteenth Amendments.  The trial court, rejecting appellants' constitutional claims and holding that the Georgia statute gave a civil remedy to those injured by its violation, granted summary judgment to appellee as to liability, with the determination of. damages to await trial by jury.On appeal, the Georgia Supreme Court, in its initial opinion, held that the trial court had erred in construing 26-9901 to extend a civil cause of action for invasion of privacy, and thus found it unnecessary to consider the constitutionality of the statute.  231 Ga. 60, 200 S.E.2d 127 (1973).  The court went on to rule, however, that the complaint stated a cause of action "for the invasion of the appellee's right of privacy, or for the tort of public disclosure" -- a "common law tort exist[ing] in this jurisdiction without the help of the statute that the trial judge in this case relied on."  Id. at 62, 200 S.E.2d  at 130.  Although the privacy invaded was not that of the deceased victim, the father was held to have stated a Page 420 U. S. 475 claim for invasion of his own privacy by reason of the publication of his daughter's name.  The court explained, however, that liability did not follow as a matter of law, and that summary judgment was improper; whether the public disclosure of the name actually invaded appellee's "zone of privacy," and if so, to what extent, were issues to be determined by the trier of fact.  Also,"in formulating such an issue for determination by the factfinder, it is reasonable to require the appellee to prove that the appellants invaded his privacy with willful or negligent disregard for the fact that reasonable men would find the invasion highly offensive."Id. at 64, 200 S.E.2d  at 131.  The Georgia Supreme Court did agree with the trial court, however, that the First and Fourteenth Amendments did not, as a matter of law, require judgment for appellants.  The court concurred with the statement in Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Assn., Inc., 4 Cal. 3d 529, 541, 483 P.2d 34, 42 (1971), that"the rights guaranteed by the First Amendment do not require total abrogation of the right to privacy.  The goals sought by each may be achieved with a minimum of intrusion upon the other."Upon motion for rehearing, the Georgia court countered the argument that the victim's name was a matter of public interest, and could be published with impunity by relying on § 26-9901 as an authoritative declaration of state policy that the name of a rape victim was not a matter of public concern.  This time the court felt compelled to determine the constitutionality of the statute, and sustained it as a "legitimate limitation on the right of freedom of expression contained in the First Amendment."  The court could discern"no public interest or general concern about the identity of the victim of such a crime as will make the right to disclose the identity of the victim rise to the level of First Amendment protection."231 Ga. at 68, 200 S.E.2d  at 134. Page 420 U. S. 476We postponed decision as to our jurisdiction over this appeal to the hearing on the merits.  415 U.S. 912 (1974).  We conclude that the Court has jurisdiction, and reverse the judgment of the Georgia Supreme Court.IIAppellants invoke the appellate jurisdiction of this Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2), and, if that jurisdictional basis is found to be absent, through a petition for certiorari under 28 U.S.C. § 2103.  Two questions concerning our jurisdiction must be resolved:  (1) whether the constitutional validity of § 26-9901 was "drawn in question," with the Georgia Supreme Court upholding its validity, and (2) whether the decision from which this appeal has been taken is a "[f]inal judgment or decree."AAppellants clearly raised the issue of the constitutionality of § 26-9901 in their motion for rehearing in the Georgia Supreme Court.  In denying that motion, that court held:  "A majority of this court does not consider this statute to be in conflict with the First Amendment."  231 Ga. at 68, 200 S.E.2d  at 134.  Since the court relied upon the statute as a declaration of the public policy of Georgia that the disclosure of a rape victim's name was not to be protected expression, the statute was drawn in question in a manner directly bearing upon the merits of the action, and the decision in favor of its constitutional validity invokes this Court's appellate jurisdiction.  Cf. Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U. S. 493,  385 U. S. 495-496 (1967).BSince 1789, Congress has granted this Court appellate jurisdiction with respect to state litigation only after the highest state court in which judgment could be had has Page 420 U. S. 477 rendered a "[f]inal judgment or decree."  Title 28 U.S.C. § 1257 retains this limitation on our power to review cases coming from state courts.  The Court has noted that "[c]onsiderations of English usage as well as those of judicial policy" would justify an interpretation of the final judgment rule to preclude review"where anything further remains to be determined by a State court, no matter how dissociated from the only federal issue that has finally been adjudicated by the highest court of the State."Radio Station WOW, Inc. v. Johnson, 326 U. S. 120,  326 U. S. 124 (1945).  But the Court there observed that the rule had not been administered in such a mechanical fashion, and that there were circumstances in which there has been "a departure from this requirement of finality for federal appellate jurisdiction."  Ibid.These circumstances were said to be "very few," ibid.; but, as the cases have unfolded, the Court has recurringly encountered situations in which the highest court of a State has finally determined the federal issue present in a particular case, but in which there are further proceedings in the lower state courts to come.  There are now at least four categories of such cases in which the Court has treated the decision on the federal issue as a final judgment for the purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1257 and has taken jurisdiction without awaiting the completion of the additional proceedings anticipated in the lower state courts.  In most, if not all, of the cases in these categories, these additional proceedings would not require the decision of other federal questions that might also require review by the Court at a later date, [Footnote 6] and immediate, Page 420 U. S. 478 rather than delayed, review would be the best way to avoid "the mischief of economic waste and of delayed justice," Radio Station WOW, Inc. v. Johson, supra, at  326 U. S. 124, as well as precipitate interference with state litigation. [Footnote 7]  In the cases in the first two categories considered below, the federal issue would not be mooted or otherwise affected by the proceedings yet to be had, because those proceedings have little substance, their outcome is certain, or they are wholly unrelated to the federal question.  In the other two categories, however, the federal issue would be mooted if the petitioner or appellant seeking to bring the action here prevailed on the merits in the later state court proceeding, but there is nevertheless Page 420 U. S. 479 sufficient justification for immediate review of the federal question finally determined in the state courts.In the first category are those cases in which there are further proceedings -- even entire trials -- yet to occur in the state courts, but where, for one reason or another, the federal issue is conclusive or the outcome of further proceedings preordained.  In these circumstances, because the case is, for all practical purposes, concluded, the judgment of the state court on the federal issue is deemed final.  In Mills v. Alabama, 384 U. S. 214 (1966), for example, a demurrer to a criminal complaint was sustained on federal constitutional grounds by a state trial court.  The State Supreme Court reversed, remanding for jury trial.  This Court took jurisdiction on the reasoning that the appellant had no defense other than his federal claim, and could not prevail at trial on the facts or any nonfederal ground.  To dismiss the appeal"would not only be an inexcusable delay of the benefits Congress intended to grant by providing for appeal to this Court, but it would also result in a completely unnecessary waste of time and energy in judicial systems already troubled by delays due to congested dockets."Id. at  384 U. S. 217-218 (footnote omitted). [Footnote 8] Page 420 U. S. 480Second, there are cases such as Radio Station WOW, supra, and Brady v. Maryland, 373 U. S. 83 (1963), in which the federal issue, finally decided by the highest court in the State, will survive and require decision regardless of the outcome of future state court proceedings.  In Radio Station WOW, the Nebraska Supreme Court directed the transfer of the properties of a federally licensed radio station and ordered an accounting, rejecting the claim that the transfer order would interfere with the federal license.  The federal issue was held reviewable here despite the pending accounting on the"presupposition . . . that the federal questions that could come here have been adjudicated by the State court, and that the accounting which remains to be taken could not remotely give rise to a federal question . . . that may later come here. . . ."326 U.S. at  326 U. S. 127.  The judgment rejecting the federal claim and directing the transfer was deemed "dissociated from a provision for an accounting even though that is decreed in the same order."  Id. at  326 U. S. 126.  Nothing that could happen in the course of the accounting, short of settlement of the case, would foreclose or make unnecessary decision on the federal question.  Older cases in the Court had reached the same result on similar facts.  Carondelet Canal & Nav. Co. v. Louisiana, 233 U. S. 362 (1914); Forgay v. Conrad, 6 How. 201 (1848).  In the latter case, the Court, in an opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Taney, stated that the Court had not understood the final judgment rule,"in this strict and technical sense, but has given [it] a more liberal, and, as we think, a more reasonable construction, Page 420 U. S. 481 and one more consonant to the intention of the legislature."Id. at  47 U. S. 203. [Footnote 9]In the third category are those situations where the federal claim has been finally decided, with further proceedings on the merits in the state courts to come, but in which later review of the federal issue cannot be had, whatever the ultimate outcome of the case.  Thus, in these cases, if the party seeking interim review ultimately prevails on the merits, the federal issue will be mooted; if he were to lose on the merits, however, the governing state law would not permit him again to present his federal claims for review.  The Court has taken jurisdiction in these circumstances prior to completion of the case in the state courts.  California v. Stewart, 384 U. S. 436 (1966) (decided with Miranda v. Arizona), epitomizes this category.  There, the state court reversed a conviction on federal constitutional grounds and remanded for a new trial.  Although the State might have prevailed at trial, we granted its petition for certiorari and affirmed, explaining that the state judgment was "final," since an acquittal of the defendant at trial would preclude, under state law, an appeal by the State.  Id. at  384 U. S. 498 n. 71.A recent decision in this category is North Dakota State Board of Pharmacy v. Snyder's Drug Stores, Inc., 414 U. S. 156 (1973), in which the Pharmacy Board rejected an application for a pharmacy operating permit relying on a state statute specifying ownership requirements which the applicant did not meet.  The State Supreme Page 420 U. S. 482 Court held the statute unconstitutional and remanded the matter to the Board for further consideration of the application, freed from the constraints of the ownership statute.  The Board brought the case here, claiming that the statute was constitutionally acceptable under modern cases.  After reviewing the various circumstances under which the finality requirement has been deemed satisfied despite the fact that litigation had not terminated in the state courts, we entertained the case over claims that we had no jurisdiction.  The federal issue would not survive the remand, whatever the result of the state administrative proceedings.  The Board might deny the license on state law grounds, thus foreclosing the federal issue, and the Court also ascertained that, under state law, the Board could not bring the federal issue here in the event the applicant satisfied the requirements of state law except for the invalidated ownership statute.  Under these circumstances, the issue was ripe for review. [Footnote 10]Lastly, there are those situations where the federal issue has been finally decided in the state courts with further proceedings pending in which the party seeking review here might prevail on the merits on nonfederal grounds, thus rendering unnecessary review of the federal issue by this Court, and where reversal of the state court on the federal issue would be preclusive of any further Page 420 U. S. 483 litigation on the relevant cause of action, rather than merely controlling the nature and character of, or determining the admissibility of evidence in, the state proceedings still to come.  In these circumstances, if a refusal immediately to review the state court decision might seriously erode federal policy, the Court has entertained and decided the federal issue, which itself has been finally determined by the state courts for purposes of the state litigation.In Construction Laborers v. Curry, 371 U. S. 542 (1963), the state courts temporarily enjoined labor union picketing over claims that the National Labor Relations Board had exclusive jurisdiction of the controversy.  The Court took jurisdiction for two independent reasons.  First, the power of the state court to proceed in the face of the preemption claim was deemed an issue separable from the merits and ripe for review in this Court, particularly"when postponing review would seriously erode the national labor policy requiring the subject matter of respondents' cause to be heard by the . . . Board, not by the state courts."Id. at  371 U. S. 550.  Second, the Court was convinced that, in any event, the union had no defense to the entry of a permanent injunction other than the preemption claim that had already been ruled on in the state courts.  Hence, the case was, for all practical purposes, concluded in the state tribunals.In Mercantile National Bank v. Langdeau, 371 U. S. 555 (1963), two national banks were sued, along with others, in the courts of Travis County, Tex.  The claim asserted was conspiracy to defraud an insurance company.  The banks, as a preliminary matter, asserted that a special federal venue statute immunized them from suit in Travis County, and that they could properly be sued only in another county.  Although trial was still to be had and the banks might well prevail on the merits, the Court, relying on Curry, entertained the issue as a "separate Page 420 U. S. 484 and independent matter, anterior to the merits and not enmeshed in the factual and legal issues comprising the plaintiff's cause of action."  Id. at  371 U. S. 558.  Moreover, it would serve the policy of the federal statute"to determine now in which state court appellants may be tried, rather than to subject them . . . to long and complex litigation which may all be for naught if consideration of the preliminary question of venue is postponed until the conclusion of the proceedings."Ibid.Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U. S. 241 (1974), is the latest case in this category. [Footnote 11]  There, a candidate for public office sued a newspaper for refusing, allegedly contrary to a state statute, to carry his reply to the paper's editorial critical of his qualifications.  The trial court held the act unconstitutional, denying both injunctive relief and damages.  The State Supreme Court reversed, sustaining the statute against the challenge based upon the First and Fourteenth Amendments and remanding the case for a trial and appropriate relief, including damage.  The newspaper brought the case here.  We sustained our jurisdiction, relying on the principles elaborated in the North Dakota case and observing:"Whichever way we were to decide on the merits, it Page 420 U. S. 485 would be intolerable to leave unanswered, under these circumstances, an important question of freedom of the press under the First Amendment; an uneasy and unsettled constitutional posture of § 104.38 could only further harm the operation of a free press.  Mills v. Alabama, 384 U. S. 214,  384 U. S. 221-222 (1966) (DOUGLAS, J., concurring).  See also Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U. S. 415,  402 U. S. 418 n. (1971)."418 U.S. at  418 U. S. 247 n. 6. [Footnote 12]In light of the prior cases, we conclude that we have jurisdiction to review the judgment of the Georgia Supreme Court rejecting the challenge under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the state law authorizing damage suits against the press for publishing the name of a rape victim whose identity is revealed in the course of a public prosecution.  The Georgia Supreme Court's judgment is plainly final on the federal issue, and is not subject to further review in the state courts.  Appellants will be liable for damages if the elements of the state cause of action are proved.  They may prevail at trial on nonfederal grounds, it is true, but if the Georgia court erroneously upheld the statute, there should be no trial at all.  Moreover, even if appellants prevailed at trial and made unnecessary further consideration of the constitutional question, there would remain in effect the unreviewed decision of the State Supreme Court that a civil action for publishing the name of a rape victim disclosed in a public judicial proceeding may go forward despite the First and Fourteenth Amendments.  Delaying final Page 420 U. S. 486 decision of the First Amendment claim until after trial will "leave unanswered . . . an important question of freedom of the press under the First Amendment," "an uneasy and unsettled constitutional posture [that] could only further harm the operation of a free press."  Tornillo, supra, at  418 U. S. 247 n. 6.  On the other hand, if we now hold that the First and Fourteenth Amendments bar civil liability for broadcasting the victim's name, this litigation ends.  Given these factors -- that the litigation could be terminated by our decision on the merits [Footnote 13] and that a failure to decide the question now will leave the press in Georgia operating in the shadow of the civil and criminal sanctions of a rule of law and a statute the constitutionality of which is in serious doubt -- we find that reaching the merits is consistent with the pragmatic approach that we have followed in the past in determining finality.  Page 420 U. S. 487 See Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U. S. 148 (1964); Radio Station WOW, Inc. v. Johnson, 326 U.S. at  326 U. S. 124; Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. at  384 U. S. 221-222 (DOUGLAS, J., concurring). [Footnote 14]IIIGeorgia stoutly defends both § 29901 and the State's common law privacy action challenged here.  Its claims are not without force, for powerful arguments can be made, and have been made, that however it may be ultimately defined, there s a zone of privacy surrounding every individual, a zone within which the State may protect him from intrusion by the press, with all its attendant publicity. [Footnote 15]  Indeed, the central thesis of the root article by Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv.L.Rev.193, 196 (1890), was that the press was overstepping its prerogatives by publishing essentially private information, and that there should be a remedy for the alleged abuses. [Footnote 16] Page 420 U. S. 488More compellingly, the century has experienced a strong tide running in favor of the so-called right of privacy.  In 1967, we noted that "[i]t has been said that a right of privacy' has been recognized at common law in 30 States plus the District of Columbia and by statute in four States."  Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U. S. 374,  385 U. S. 383 n. 7.  We there cited the 1964 edition of Prosser's Law of Torts.  The 1971 edition of that same source states that, "[i]n one form or another, the right of privacy is by this time recognized and accepted in all but a very few jurisdictions."  W. Prosser, Law of Torts 804 (4th ed.) (footnote omitted).  Nor is it irrelevant Page 420 U. S. 489 here that the right of privacy is no recent arrival in the jurisprudence of Georgia, which has embraced the right in some form since 1905, when the Georgia Supreme Court decided the leading case of Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga.190, 50 S.E. 68.These are impressive credentials for a right of privacy, [Footnote 17] but we should recognize that we do not have at issue here an action for the invasion of privacy involving the appropriation of one's name or photograph, a physical or other tangible intrusion into a private area, or a publication of otherwise private information that is also false, although perhaps not defamatory.  The version of the privacy tort now before US -- termed in Georgia "the tort of public disclosure" -- 231 Ga. at 60, 200 S.E.2d  at 13, is that in which the plaintiff claims the right to be free from unwanted publicity about his private affairs, which, although wholly true, would be offensive to a person of ordinary sensibilities.  Because the gravamen of the claimed injury is the publication of information, whether true or not, the dissemination of which is embarrassing or otherwise painful to an individual, it is here that claims of privacy most directly confront the constitutional freedoms of speech and press.  The face-off is apparent, and the appellants urge upon us the broad holding that the press may not be made criminally or civilly liable for publishing information that is neither false nor misleading but absolutely accurate, however damaging it may be to reputation or individual sensibilities.It is true that, in defamation actions, where the protected interest is personal reputation, the prevailing view is that truth is a defense, [Footnote 18] and the message of New York Page 420 U. S. 490 Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254 (1964); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 64 (1964); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U. S. 130 (1967), and like cases is that the defense of truth is constitutionally required where the subject of the publication is a public official or public figure.  What is more, the defamed public official or public figure must prove not only that the publication is false, but that it was knowingly so, or was circulated with reckless disregard for its truth or falsity.  Similarly, where the interest at issue is privacy, rather than reputation, and the right claimed is to be free from the publication of false or misleading information about one's affairs, the target of the publication must prove knowing or reckless falsehood where the materials published, although assertedly private, are "matters of public interest."  Time, Inc. v. Hill, supra, at  385 U. S. 387-388. [Footnote 19]The Court has nevertheless carefully left open the question whether the First and Fourteenth Amendments require that truth be recognized as a defense in a defamation action brought by a private person, as distinguished from a public official or public figure.  Garrison held that, where criticism is of a public official and his conduct of public business,"the interest in private reputation is overborne Page 420 U. S. 491 by the larger public interest, secured by the Constitution, in the dissemination of truth,"379 U.S. at  379 U. S. 73 (footnote omitted), but recognized that"different interests may be involved where purely private libels, totally unrelated to public affairs are concerned; therefore, nothing we say today is to be taken as intimating any views as to the impact of the constitutional guarantees in the discrete area of purely private libels."Id. at  379 U. S. 72 n. 8.  In similar fashion, Time, Inc. v. Hill, supra, expressly saved the question whether truthful publication of very private matters unrelated to public affairs could be constitutionally proscribed.  385 U.S. at  385 U. S. 383 n. 7.Those precedents, as well as other considerations, counsel similar caution here.  In this sphere of collision between claims of privacy and those of the free press, the interests on both sides are plainly rooted in the traditions and significant concerns of our society.  Rather than address the broader question whether truthful publications may ever be subjected to civil or criminal liability consistently with the First and Fourteenth Amendments, or, to put it another way, whether the State may ever define and protect an area of privacy free from unwanted publicity in the press, it is appropriate to focus on the narrower interface between press and privacy that this case presents, namely, whether the State may impose sanctions on the accurate publication of the name of a rape victim obtained from public records -- more specifically, from judicial records which are maintained in connection with a public prosecution and which themselves are open to public inspection.  We are convinced that the State may not do so.In the first place, in a society in which each individual has but limited time and resources with which to observe at first hand the operations of his government, he relies necessarily upon the press to bring to him in convenient form the facts of those operations.  Great responsibility Page 420 U. S. 492 is accordingly placed upon the news media to report fully and accurately the proceedings of government, and official records and documents open to the public are the basic data of governmental operations.  Without the information provided by the press, most of us and many of our representatives would be unable to vote intelligently or to register opinions on the administration of government generally.  With respect to judicial proceedings, in particular, the function of the press serves to guarantee the fairness of trials and to bring to bear the beneficial effects of public scrutiny upon the administration of justice.  See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U. S. 333,  384 U. S. 350 (1966).Appellee has claimed in this litigation that the efforts of the press have infringed his right to privacy by broadcasting to the world the fact that his daughter was a rape victim.  The commission of crime, prosecutions resulting from it, and judicial proceedings arising from the prosecutions, however, are, without question, events of legitimate concern to the public, and consequently fall within the responsibility of the press to report the operations of government.The special protected nature of accurate reports of judicial proceedings has repeatedly been recognized.  This Court, in an opinion written by MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, has said:"A trial is a public event.  What transpires in the court room is public property.  If a transcript of the court proceedings had been published, we suppose none would claim that the judge could punish the publisher for contempt.  And we can see no difference though the conduct of the attorneys, of the jury, or even of the judge himself, may have reflected on the court.  Those who see and hear what transpired can report it with impunity.  There is no special perquisite of the judiciary which enables Page 420 U. S. 493 it, as distinguished from other institutions of democratic government, to suppress, edit, or censor events which transpire in proceedings before it."Craig v. Harney, 331 U. S. 367,  331 U. S. 374 (1947) (emphasis added).  See also Sheppard v. Maxwell, supra, at  384 U. S. 362-363; Estes v. Texas, 381 U. S. 532,  381 U. S. 541-542 (1965); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U. S. 331 (1946); Bridges v. California, 314 U. S. 252 (1941).The developing law surrounding the tort of invasion of privacy recognizes a privilege in the press to report the events of judicial proceedings.  The Warren and Brandeis article, supra, noted that the proposed new right would be limited in the same manner as actions for libel and slander where such a publication was a privileged communication:"the right to privacy is not invaded by any publication made in a court of justice . . . and (at least in many jurisdictions) reports of any such proceedings would, in some measure, be accorded a like privilege. [Footnote 20]"The Restatement of Torts, § 867, embraced an action for privacy. [Footnote 21]  Tentative Draft No. 13 of the Second Restatement of Torts, §§ 652A-652E, divides the privacy tort into four branches, [Footnote 22] and, with respect to the wrong of giving unwanted publicity about private life, the commentary Page 420 U. S. 494 to § 652D states:"There is no liability when the defendant merely gives further publicity to information about the plaintiff which is already public.  Thus, there is no liability for giving publicity to facts about the plaintiff's life which are matters of public record. . . . [Footnote 23]"The same is true of the separate tort of physically or otherwise intruding upon the seclusion or private affairs of another.  Section 652B, Comment , provides that"there is no liability for the examination of a public record concerning the plaintiff, or of documents which the plaintiff is required to keep and make available for public inspection. [Footnote 24]"According to this draft, ascertaining and publishing the contents of public records are simply not within the reach of these kinds of privacy actions. [Footnote 25]Thus, even the prevailing law of invasion of privacy generally recognizes that the interests in privacy fade Page 420 U. S. 495 when the information involved already appears on the public record.  The conclusion is compelling when viewed in terms of the First and Fourteenth Amendments and in light of the public interest in a vigorous press.  The Georgia cause of action for invasion of privacy through public disclosure of the name of a rape victim imposes sanctions on pure expression -- the content of a publication -- and not conduct or a combination of speech and nonspeech elements that might otherwise be open to regulation or prohibition.  See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U. S. 367,  391 U. S. 376-377 (1968).  The publication of truthful information available on the public record contains none of the indicia of those limited categories of expression, such as "fighting" words, which"are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality."Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568,  315 U. S. 572 (1942) (footnote omitted).By placing the information in the public domain on official court records, the State must be presumed to have concluded that the public interest was thereby being served.  Public records, by their very nature, are of interest to those concerned with the administration of government, and a public benefit is performed by the reporting of the true contents of the records by the media.  The freedom of the press to publish that information appears to us to be of critical importance to our type of government, in which the citizenry is the final judge of the proper conduct of public business.  In preserving that form of government, the First and Fourteenth Amendments command nothing less than that the States may not impose sanctions on the publication of truthful information contained in official court records open to public inspection. Page 420 U. S. 496We are reluctant to embark on a course that would make public records generally available to the media but forbid their publication if offensive to the sensibilities of the supposed reasonable man.  Such a rule would make it very difficult for the media to inform citizens about the public business and yet stay within the law.  The rule would invite timidity and self-censorship and very likely lead to the suppression of many items that would otherwise be published and that should be made available to the public.  At the very least, the First and Fourteenth Amendments will not allow exposing the press to liability for truthfully publishing information released to the public in official court records.  If there are privacy interests to be protected in judicial proceedings, the States must respond by means which avoid public documentation or other exposure of private information.  Their political institutions must weigh the interests in privacy with the interests of the public to know and of the press to publish. [Footnote 26]  Once true information is disclosed in public court documents open to public inspection, the press cannot be sanctioned for publishing it.  In this instance, as in others, reliance must rest upon the judgment of those who decide what to publish or broadcast.  See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. at  418 U. S. 258.Appellant Wassell based his televised report upon notes taken during the court proceedings, and obtained the name of the victim from the indictments handed to him at his request during a recess in the hearing.  Appellee has not contended that the name was obtained in an improper fashion, or that it was not on an official court document open to public inspection.  Under these circumstances, Page 420 U. S. 497 the protection of freedom of the press provided by the First and Fourteenth Amendments bars the State of Georgia from making appellants' broadcast the basis of civil liability. [Footnote 27]Reversed
U.S. Supreme CourtCox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975)Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. CohnNo. 73-938Argued November 11, 1974Decided March 3, 1975420 U.S. 469SyllabusAppellant reporter, employed by a television station owned by appellant broadcasting company, during a news report of a rape case, broadcast the deceased rape victim's name, which he had obtained from the indictments, which were public records available for inspection.  The victim's father, appellee, brought a damages action against appellants in reliance on a Georgia statute making it a misdemeanor to broadcast a rape victim's name, claiming that his right to privacy had been invaded by the broadcast of his daughter's name.  The trial court, rejecting appellants' claims that the broadcast was privileged under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, held that the Georgia statute gave a civil remedy to those injured by its violation and granted summary judgment for appellee.  On appeal, the Georgia Supreme Court initially held that, while the trial court erred in construing the Georgia statute to extend a cause of action for invasion of privacy, the complaint stated a cause of action for common law invasion of privacy, and that the First and Fourteenth Amendments did not, as a matter of law, require judgment for appellants.  On a motion for rehearing, appellants contended that a rape victim's name was a matter of public interest, and hence could be published with impunity, but the Supreme Court denied the motion on the ground that the statute declared a state policy that a rape victim's name was not a matter of public concern, and sustained the statute as a legitimate limitation on the First Amendment's freedom of expression.Held:1. This Court has jurisdiction over the appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2).  Pp.  420 U. S. 476-487.(a) The constitutionality of the Georgia statute was "drawn in question" within the meaning of § 1257(2), since, when the Georgia Supreme Court relied upon it as a declaration of state public policy, the statute was drawn in question in a manner directly bearing upon the merits of the action, and the decision upholding its constitutional validity invokes this Court's appellate jurisdiction.  P.  420 U. S. 476.(b) The Georgia Supreme Court's decision is a "final judgment or decree" within the meaning of § 1257.  It was plainly final on the federal issue of whether the broadcasts were privileged Page 420 U. S. 470 under the First and Fourteenth Amendments and is not subject to further review in the state courts; and appellants would be liable for damages if the elements of the state cause of action were proved.  Moreover, since the litigation could be terminated by this Court's decision on the merits and a failure to decide the free speech question now will leave the Georgia press operating in the shadow of civil and criminal sanctions of a rule of law and statute whose constitutionality is in serious doubt, this Court's reaching the merits comports with its past pragmatic approach in determining finality.  Pp.  420 U. S. 476-487.2. The State may not, consistently with the First and Fourteenth Amendments, impose sanctions on the accurate publication of a rape victim's name obtained from judicial records that are maintained in connection with a public prosecution and that themselves are open to public inspection.  Here, under circumstances where appellant reporter based his televised report upon notes taken during court proceedings and obtained the rape victim's name from official court documents open to public inspection, the protection of freedom of the press provided by the First and Fourteenth Amendments bars Georgia from making appellants' broadcast the basis of civil liability in a cause of action for invasion of privacy that penalizes pure expression -- the content of a publication.  Pp.  420 U. S. 487-497.(a) The commission of a crime, prosecutions resulting therefrom, and judicial proceedings arising from the prosecutions are events of legitimate concern to the public, and consequently fall within the press' responsibility to report the operations of government.  Pp.  420 U. S. 492-493.(b) The interests of privacy fade when the information involved already appears on public record, especially when viewed in terms of the First and Fourteenth Amendments and in light of the public interest in a vigorous press.  Pp.  420 U. S. 493-495.231 Ga. 60, 200 S.E.2d 127, reversed.WHITE, .J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BRENNAN, STEWART, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, and POWELL, JJ., joined.  POWELL, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p.  420 U. S. 497.  BURGER, C.J., concurred in the judgment.  DOUGLAS, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p.  420 U. S. 500.  REHNQUIST, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p.  420 U. S. 501. Page 420 U. S. 471