MR. JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.The question before us, on writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Louisiana, [Footnote 1] concerns the right of dependent unacknowledged, illegitimate children to recover under Louisiana workmen's compensation laws benefits for the death of their natural father on an equal footing with his dependent legitimate children.  We hold that Louisiana's denial of equal recovery rights to dependent unacknowledged illegitimates violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 68 (1968); Glona v. American Guarantee & Liability Insurance Co., 391 U. S. 73 (1968).On June 22, 1967, Henry Clyde Stokes died in Louisiana of injuries received during the course of his employment the previous day.  At the time of his death, Stokes resided and maintained a household with one Willie Mae Weber, to whom he was not married.  Living in the household were four legitimate minor children, born of the marriage between Stokes and Adlay Jones Stokes, who was at the time committed to a mental hospital.  Also living in the home was one unacknowledged illegitimate child born of the relationship between Stokes and Willie Mae Weber.  A second illegitimate child of Stokes and Weber was born posthumously.On June 29, 1967, Stokes' four legitimate children, through their maternal grandmother as guardian, filed a claim for their father's death under Louisiana's workmen's Page 406 U. S. 166 compensation law. [Footnote 2]  The defendant employer and its insurer impleaded Willie Mae Weber, who appeared and claimed compensation benefits for the two illegitimate children.Meanwhile, the four legitimate children had brought another suit for their father's death against a third-party tortfeasor, which was settled for an amount in excess of the maximum benefits allowable under workmen's compensation.  The illegitimate children did not share in this settlement.  Subsequently, the employer Page 406 U. S. 167 in the initial action requested the extinguishment of all parties' workmen's compensation claims by reason of the tort settlement.The trial judge awarded the four legitimate children the maximum allowable amount of compensation and declared their entitlement had been satisfied from the tort suit settlement.  Consequently, the four legitimate children dismissed their workmen's compensation claim.  Judgment was also awarded to Stokes' two illegitimate offspring to the extent that maximum compensation benefits were not exhausted by the four legitimate children.  Since such benefits had been entirely exhausted by the amount of the tort settlement, in which only the four dependent legitimate offspring participated, the two dependent illegitimate children received nothing.IFor purposes of recovery under workmen's compensation, Louisiana law defines children to include"only legitimate children, stepchildren, posthumous children, adopted children, and illegitimate children acknowledged under the provisions of Civil Code Articles 203, 204, and 205. [Footnote 3]"Thus, legitimate children and acknowledged illegitimates Page 406 U. S. 168 may recover on an equal basis.  Unacknowledged illegitimate children, however, are relegated to the lesser status of "other dependents" under § 1232(8) of the workmen's compensation statute, [Footnote 4] and may recover only if there are not enough surviving dependents in the preceding classifications to exhaust the maximum allowable benefit.  Both the Louisiana Court of Appeal [Footnote 5] and a divided Louisiana Supreme Court [Footnote 6]  sustained these statutes over petitioner's constitutional objections, holding that our decision in Levy, supra, was not controlling.We disagree.  In Levy, the Court held invalid as denying equal protection of the laws, a Louisiana statute which barred an illegitimate child from recovering for the wrongful death of its mother when such recoveries by legitimate children were authorized.  The Court there decided that the fact of a child's birth out of wedlock bore no reasonable relation to the purpose of wrongful death statutes, which compensate children for the death of a mother.  As the Court said in Levy:"Legitimacy or illegitimacy of birth has no relation to the nature of the wrong allegedly inflicted on the mother.  These children, though illegitimate, were dependent on her; she cared for them and nurtured them; they were indeed hers in the biological and in the spiritual sense; in her death, they suffered wrong in the sense that any dependent would."Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. at  391 U. S. 72. Page 406 U. S. 169The court below sought to distinguish Levy as involving a statute which absolutely excluded all illegitimates from recovery, whereas, in the compensation statute in the instant case, acknowledged illegitimates may recover equally with legitimate children and"the unacknowledged illegitimate child is not denied a right to recover compensation, he being merely relegated to a less favorable position as are other dependent relatives such as parents. . . ."Stokes v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 257 La. 424, 433-434, 242 So. 2d 567, 570 (1970).  The Louisiana Supreme Court likewise characterized Levy as a tort action where the tortfeasor escaped liability on the fortuity of the potential claimant's illegitimacy, whereas, in the present action, full compensation was rendered, and "no tortfeasor goes free because of the law."  Id. at 434, 242 So. 2d  at 570.We do not think Levy can be disposed of by such finely carved distinctions.  The Court in Levy was not so much concerned with the tortfeasor going free as with the equality of treatment under the statutory recovery scheme.  Here, as in Levy, there is impermissible discrimination.  An unacknowledged illegitimate child may suffer as much from the loss of a parent as a child born within wedlock or an illegitimate later acknowledged.  So far as this record shows, the dependency and natural affinity of the unacknowledged illegitimate children for their father were as great as those of the four legitimate children whom Louisiana law has allowed to recover. [Footnote 7]  The legitimate children and the illegitimate children all lived in the home of the deceased, and were Page 406 U. S. 170 equally dependent upon him for maintenance and support.  It is inappropriate, therefore, for the court below to talk of relegating the unacknowledged illegitimates "to a less favorable position as are other dependent relatives such as parents."  The unacknowledged illegitimates are not a parent or some "other dependent relative"; in this case, they are dependent children, and, as such, are entitled to rights granted other dependent children.Respondents contend that our recent ruling in Labine v. Vincent, 401 U. S. 532 (1971), controls this case.  In Labine, the Court upheld, against constitutional objections, Louisiana intestacy laws which had barred an acknowledged illegitimate child from sharing equally with legitimate children in her father's estate.  That decision reflected, in major part, the traditional deference to a State's prerogative to regulate the disposition at death of property within its borders.  Id. at  401 U. S. 538.  The Court has long afforded broad scope to state discretion in this area. [Footnote 8]  Yet the substantial state interest in providing for "the stability of . . . land titles and in the prompt and definitive determination of the valid ownership of property left by decedents," Labine v. Vincent, 229 So. 2d 449, 452 (La.App. 1969), is absent in the case at hand.Moreover, in Labine, the intestate, unlike deceased in the present action, might easily have modified his daughter's disfavored position.  As the Court there remarked:"Ezra Vincent could have left one-third of his property to his illegitimate daughter had he bothered Page 406 U. S. 171 to follow the simple formalities of executing a will.  He could, of course, have legitimated the child by marrying her mother, in which case the child could have inherited his property either by intestate succession or by will as any other legitimate child."Labine, supra, at  401 U. S. 539.  Such options, however, were not realistically open to Henry Stokes.  Under Louisiana law, he could not have acknowledged his illegitimate children even had he desired to do so. [Footnote 9]  The burdens of illegitimacy, already weighty, become doubly so when neither parent nor child can legally lighten them.Both the statute in Levy and the statute in the present case involve state-created compensation schemes, designed to provide close relatives and dependents of a deceased a means of recovery for his often abrupt and accidental death.  Both wrongful death statutes and workmen's compensation codes represent outgrowths and modifications of our basic tort law.  The former alleviated the harsh common law rule under which "no person could inherit the personal right of another to recover for Page 406 U. S. 172 tortious injuries to his body"; [Footnote 10] the latter removed difficult obstacles to recovery in work-related injuries by offering a more certain, though generally less remunerative, compensation.  In the instant case, the recovery sought under the workmen's compensation statute was in lieu of an action under the identical death statute which was at issue in Levy. [Footnote 11]  Given the similarities in the origins and purposes of thee two statutes, and the similarity of Louisiana's pattern of discrimination in recovery rights, it would require a disregard of precedent and the principles of stare decisis to hold that Levy did not control the facts of the case before us.  It makes no difference that illegitimates are not so absolutely or broadly barred here as in Levy; the discrimination remains apparent.IIHaving determined that Levy is the applicable precedent, we briefly reaffirm here the reasoning which produced that result.  The tests to determine the validity of state statutes under the Equal Protection Clause have been variously expressed, but this Court requires, at a minimum, that a statutory classification bear some rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose.  Morey v. Doud, 354 U. S. 457 (1957); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U. S. 483 (1955); Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe R. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U. S. 150 (1897); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356 (1886).  Though the latitude given state economic and social regulation is necessarily broad, when state statutory classifications approach sensitive and fundamental personal rights, this Court exercises a stricter scrutiny, Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483 (1954); Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. Page 406 U. S. 173 663 (1966).  The essential inquiry in all the foregoing cases is, however, inevitably a dual one:  what legitimate state interest does the classification promote?  What fundamental personal rights might the classification endanger?The Louisiana Supreme Court emphasized strongly the State's interest in protecting "legitimate family relationships," 257 La. at 433, 242 So. 2d  at 570, and the regulation and protection of the family unit have indeed been a venerable state concern.  We do not question the importance of that interest; what we do question is how the challenged statute will promote it.  As was said in Glona:"[W]e see no possible rational basis . . . for assuming that, if the natural mother is allowed recovery for the wrongful death of her illegitimate child, the cause of illegitimacy will be served.  It would, indeed, be far-fetched to assume that women have illegitimate children so that they can be compensated in damages for their death."Glona v. American Guarantee & Liability Insurance Co., supra, at  391 U. S. 75.  Nor can it be thought here that persons will shun illicit relations because the offspring may not one day reap the benefits of workmen's compensation.It may perhaps be said that statutory distinctions between the legitimate and illegitimate reflect closer family relationships in that the illegitimate is more often not under care in the home of the father, nor even supported by him.  The illegitimate, so this argument runs, may thus be made less eligible for the statutory recoveries and inheritances reserved for those more likely to be within the ambit of familial care and affection.  Whatever the merits elsewhere of this contention, it is not compelling in a statutory compensation scheme where dependency on the deceased is a prerequisite to anyone's recovery, Page 406 U. S. 174 and where the acknowledgment so necessary to equal recovery rights may be unlikely to occur or legally impossible to effectuate even where the illegitimate child may be nourished and loved.Finally, we are mindful that States have frequently drawn arbitrary lines in workmen's compensation and wrongful death statutes to facilitate potentially difficult problems of proof.  Nothing in our decision would impose on state court systems a greater burden in this regard.  By limiting recovery to dependents of the deceased, Louisiana substantially lessens the possible problems of locating illegitimate children and of determining uncertain claims of parenthood. [Footnote 12]  Our decision fully Page 406 U. S. 175 respects Louisiana's choice on this matter.  It will not expand claimants for workmen's compensation beyond those in a direct blood and dependency relationship with the deceased, and it avoids altogether diffuse questions of affection and affinity which pose difficult probative problems.  Our ruling requires equality of treatment between two classes of persons the genuineness of whose claims the State might, in any event, be required to determine.The state interest in legitimate family relationships is not served by the statute; the state interest in minimizing problems of proof is not significantly disturbed by our decision.  The inferior classification of dependent unacknowledged illegitimates bears, in this instance, no significant relationship to those recognized purposes of recovery which workmen's compensation statutes commendably serve.The status of illegitimacy has expressed through the ages society's condemnation of irresponsible liaisons beyond the bonds of marriage.  But visiting this condemnation on the head of an infant is illogical and unjust. [Footnote 13]  Moreover, imposing disabilities on the illegitimate child is contrary to the basic concept of our system that legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual responsibility or wrongdoing.  Obviously, no child is responsible for his birth, and penalizing the illegitimate child is an ineffectual -- as well as an unjust -- way of deterring the parent.  Courts are powerless to prevent Page 406 U. S. 176 the social opprobrium suffered by these hapless children, but the Equal Protection Clause does enable us to strike down discriminatory laws relating to status of birth [Footnote 14] where -- as in this case -- the classification is justified by no legitimate state interest, compelling or otherwise.Reversed
U.S. Supreme CourtWeber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972)Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co.No. 70-5112Argued February 28, 1972Decided April 24, 1972406 U.S. 164SyllabusDecedent, who died as a result of injuries received during the course of his employment, had maintained a household with four legitimate minor children, one unacknowledged minor child, and petitioner, to whom he was not married.  His wife had been committed to a mental hospital.  A second illegitimate child was born posthumously.  Under Louisiana's workmen's compensation law unacknowledged illegitimate children are not within the class of "children," but are relegated to the lesser status of "other dependents," and may recover only if there are not enough surviving dependents in the preceding classes to exhaust the maximum benefits.  The four legitimate children were awarded the maximum allowable compensation, and the two illegitimate children received nothing.  The Louisiana courts sustained the statutory scheme, holding that Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 68, was not controlling.Held:  Louisiana's denial of equal recovery rights to the dependent unacknowledged illegitimate children violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, as the inferior classification of these dependent children bears no significant relationship to the recognized purposes of recovery that workmen's compensation statutes were designed to serve.  Levy v. Louisiana, supra, followed; Labine v. Vincent, 401 U. S. 532, distinguished.  Pp.  406 U. S. 167-176.257 La. 424, 242 So. 2d 567, reversed and remanded.POWELL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J., and DOUGLAS, BRENNAN, STEWART, WHITE, and MARSHALL, JJ., joined.  BLACKMUN, J., filed an opinion concurring in the result, post, p.  406 U. S. 176.  REHNQUIST, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p.  406 U. S. 177. Page 406 U. S. 165