JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.The issue here is whether and to what extent the Georgia statutes bearing on the garnishment of funds due to participants in ERISA employee welfare benefit plans are preempted by the federal statute which governs such plans.IPetitioners are the trustees of an employee benefit plan that provides vacation and holiday benefits to eligible employees in several southeastern States.  The covered workers draw their vacation benefits from the plan annually.  The plan is an "employee welfare benefit plan" as defined by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1). [Footnote 1]Respondent is a collection agency.  It sought and obtained money judgments Page 486 U. S. 828 against 23 plan participants who owed money to clients of respondent.  To collect these money judgments, respondent instituted an action in a Georgia trial court seeking to garnish the debtors' plan benefits.  The trial court granted the garnishment request.   App. to Pet. for Cert. A-21.  The Georgia Court of Appeals reversed, holding that a Georgia statute, Ga.Code Ann. § 18-4-22.1 (1982), [Footnote 2] barring the garnishment of "[f]unds or benefits of [an] . . . employee benefit plan or program subject to . . . [ERISA]," exempted plan benefits from garnishment.  178 Ga.App. 467, 470, 343 S.E.2d 492, 495 (1986).The Georgia Supreme Court reversed.  256 Ga. 499, 350 S.E.2d 439 (1986).  It agreed that § 18-4-22.1, by its terms, barred this garnishment action, but concluded that the section was preempted by ERISA "since it purports to regulate garnishment of ERISA funds and benefits, a matter specifically provided for" in the federal scheme.  Id. at 501, 350 S.E.2d  at 442.  Through an analysis of ERISA's preemption provisions, the Georgia Supreme Court concluded that Congress had not barred garnishment of employee welfare benefits, even though employee pension benefits were so protected.  See 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d) (1982 ed. and Supp. IV).  Since § 18-4-22.1 "prohibits that which the federal statute permits," the Georgia Supreme Court held, the state law was "in conflict with" the federal scheme, and therefore preempted by it.  256 Ga. at 501, 350 S.E.2d  at 442.  Consequently, the plan was subject to garnishment under the general state garnishment law, Ga.Code Ann. § 18-4-20 et seq. (1982 and Supp.1987).Because of conflicting decisions among the courts on the questions presented here, we granted certiorari.  483 U.S. Page 486 U. S. 829 1004 (1987).  We now affirm the Georgia Supreme Court's judgment. [Footnote 3]IIERISA § 514(a) preempts "any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan" covered by the statute.  29 U.S.C. § 1144(a).  We believe that, under our precedents, Ga.Code Ann. § 18-4-22.1 is such a state law.The Georgia statute at issue here expressly refers to -- indeed, solely applies to -- ERISA employee benefit plans.  See n 2, supra."A law 'relates to' an employee benefit plan, in the normal sense of the phrase, if it has a connection with or reference to such a plan."Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U. S. 85,  463 U. S. 96-97 (1983) (emphasis added).  On several occasions since our decision in Shaw, we have reaffirmed this rule, concluding that state laws which make "reference to" ERISA plans are laws that "relate to" those plans within the meaning of § 514(a).  See, e.g., Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U. S. 41,  481 U. S. 47-48 (1987);  471 U. S. S. 830� Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U. S. 724,  471 U. S. 739 (1985).  In fact, we have virtually taken it for granted that state laws which are "specifically designed to affect employee benefit plans" are preempted under § 514(a).  Cf. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, supra, at  481 U. S. 47-48; Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., supra, at  463 U. S. 98.The possibility that § 18-4-22.1 was enacted by the Georgia Legislature to help effectuate ERISA's underlying purposes -- the view of the Georgia Court of Appeals below, see 178 Ga.App. at 467, 343 S.E.2d  at 493 -- is not enough to save the state law from preemption."The preemption provision [of § 514(a)] . . . displace[s] all state laws that fall within its sphere, even including state laws that are consistent with ERISA's substantive requirements."Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, supra, at  471 U. S. 739.  The decision in Shaw particularly underscores this point.  There, we found a New York antidiscrimination statute preempted under § 514(a), even though Congress had not expressed any intent in ERISA to approve of the employment practices that the State had banned by its statute.  Shaw, supra, at  463 U. S. 97, n. 15,  463 U. S. 98-99.  Legislative "good intentions" do not save a state law within the broad preemptive scope of § 514(a).Consequently, adhering to our precedents in this area, we hold that Ga.Code Ann. § 18-4-22.1, which singles out ERISA employee welfare benefit plans for different treatment under state garnishment procedures, [Footnote 4] is preempted under § 514(a).  The state statute's express reference to ERISA plans suffices to bring it within the federal law's preemptive reach.IIIA more complex question is posed by the argument of petitioners, rejected by the Georgia Supreme Court, that the entire Georgia garnishment procedure is preempted by ERISA.  We reserved decision on the issue in Franchise Tax Board of California v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust for Southern California, 463 U. S. 1,  463 U. S. 7,  463 U. S. 26, n. 30 (1983); the question, which is one of federal law, [Footnote 5] is a close Page 486 U. S. 831 one.  We believe, however, that petitioners' contention misapprehends ERISA's preemptive scope.AUnlike the Georgia antigarnishment provision discussed above, Georgia's general garnishment statute does not single out or specially mention ERISA plans of any kind.  But as we have recognized, the preemptive force of § 514(a) is not limited to such state laws.  See, e.g., Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, supra, at  481 U. S. 47-48, and Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., supra, at  463 U. S. 98.  Consequently, we must decide whether § 514(a) preempts Georgia's general garnishment law because it "relates to" the ERISA welfare benefit plans that petitioners direct.In arguing for preemption, petitioners assert that, when an employee welfare benefit plan is garnisheed under Georgia law by a creditor of a participant, plan trustees are served with a garnishment summons, become parties to a suit, and must respond and deposit the demanded funds due the beneficiary-debtor -- funds that otherwise they are required to hold and pay out to those beneficiaries.  At the very least, petitioners contend, benefit plans subjected to garnishment will incur substantial administrative burdens and costs.  Because garnishment will involve and affect the plan and its trustees in these ways, petitioners submit the Georgia garnishment law necessarily "relates to" such ERISA welfare benefit plans, and is therefore preempted by § 514(a).Unfortunately, ERISA itself offers no express answer as to whether welfare benefit plan trustees must comply with garnishment orders like those respondent is seeking to enforce.  In our view, however, certain ERISA provisions, and several aspects of the statute's structure, indicate that Congress did not intend to forbid the use of state law mechanisms of executing judgments against ERISA welfare benefit plans, even when those mechanisms prevent plan partici Page 486 U. S. 832 pants from receiving their benefits.  Consequently, we join the virtually unanimous view of federal and state courts which have faced this question, and hold that federal law does not bar a garnishment action like respondent's. [Footnote 6]At the outset, we consider the several types of civil suits that can be brought against ERISA welfare benefit plans.  First, ERISA's § 502 provides that civil enforcement actions may be brought by particular persons against ERISA plans, to secure specified relief, including the recovery of plan benefits.  Suits for benefits or to enforce a participant's rights under a plan may be brought in either federal or state court.  29 U.S.C. § 1132(e).  Section 502, which provides that a plan may "sue or be sued" as an entity in § 502 actions, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(d)(1), clearly contemplates the enforcement of money judgments against benefit plans, 29 U.S.C. Page 486 U. S. 833 § 1132(d)(2). [Footnote 7]  See also H.R.Conf.Rep. No. 93-1280, p. 327 (1974).ERISA plans may be sued in a second type of civil action, as well.  These cases -- lawsuits against ERISA plans for run-of-the-mill state law claims such as unpaid rent, failure to pay creditors, or even torts committed by an ERISA plan -- are relatively commonplace. [Footnote 8]  Petitioners and the United States (appearing here as amicus curiae) concede that these suits, although obviously affecting and involving ERISA plans and their trustees, are not preempted by ERISA § 514(a).  See Tr. of Oral Arg. 6, 11-12, 15.ERISA does not provide an enforcement mechanism for collecting judgments won in either of these two types of actions.  Thus, while § 502(d), the "sue and be sued" provision, contemplates execution of judgments won against plans in civil actions, it does not provide mechanisms to do so.  Moreover, Page 486 U. S. 834 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 69(a), which would apply when either type of civil suit discussed above is brought against an ERISA plan in federal court, defers to state law to provide methods for collecting judgments.  Cf. also Huron Holding Corp. v. Lincoln Mine Operating Co., 312 U. S. 183,  312 U. S. 188-194 (1941).  Consequently, state law methods for collecting money judgments must, as a general matter, remain undisturbed by ERISA; otherwise, there would be no way to enforce such a judgment won against an ERISA plan.  If attachment of ERISA plan funds does not "relate to" an ERISA plan in any of these circumstances, we do not see how respondent's proposed garnishment order would do so. [Footnote 9]It is thus clear enough that money judgments against ERISA welfare benefit plans, based on state or federal law, won in state or federal court, must be collectible in some way; garnishment is one permissible method.  In fact, while petitioners' brief argued that any garnishment of an ERISA plan was preempted, see Brief for Petitioners 14, under questioning at oral argument, petitioners conceded that garnishment is among the state law enforcement mechanisms that may used in certain types of cases involving ERISA welfare benefit plans.  See Tr. of Oral Arg. 6-7. [Footnote 10] Page 486 U. S. 835Nonetheless, petitioners and the United States insist that ERISA § 514(a) bars enforcement of the particular garnishment orders at issue here.  The Solicitor General rests this claim on his view that § 514(a) prohibits ERISA welfare benefit plans from complying with state law enforcement orders (like garnishment) only where these orders affect "whether benefits will be paid to a plan participant."  See Tr. of Oral Arg. 15-16.  Under this view of § 514(a), state law enforcement mechanisms can be used to collect judgments from plan funds when they are won by general creditors of the plan, but not by creditors of plan participants.The problem with this proposed interpretation of § 514(a) is that it has no basis whatsoever in the language of the statute.  Section 514(a) preempts State laws "insofar as they . . . relate to . . . employee benefit plan[s]";  no distinction is made between plan funds generally and those funds due a particular participant at a particular time.  As the amicus curiae Page 486 U. S. 836 appointed by this Court put it,"there is simply no logical way to construe the English language so that garnishment or attachment laws 'relate to' benefit plans when they are invoked by creditors of the beneficiaries, but not when they are invoked by beneficiaries or creditors of the [plan] itself."Brief of Amicus Curiae in Support of Judgment Below 24.  If § 514(a) allows a creditor of a plan to employ state law procedures to attach plan funds (to collect a judgment it has won against the plan) -- if such an action does not "relate to" a benefit plan -- we do not see how § 514(a) bars a participant's creditor from employing the same state law mechanisms.Where Congress intended in ERISA to preclude a particular method of state law enforcement of judgments, or extend anti-alienation protection to a particular type of ERISA plan, it did so expressly in the statute.  Specifically, ERISA § 206(d)(1) bars (with certain enumerated exceptions) the alienation or assignment of benefits provided for by ERISA pension benefit plans.  29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1).  Congress did not enact any similar provision applicable to ERISA welfare benefit plans, such as the one at issue in this case.  Section 206(d)(1) is doubly instructive.First, § 206(d)(1) expressly includes a distinction that the Solicitor General would have us read into § 514(a).  Section 206(d)(1) bars the assignment or alienation of pension plan benefits, and thus prohibits the use of state enforcement mechanisms only insofar as they prevent those benefits from being paid to plan participants.  As discussed above, § 514(a), by contrast, deals with state laws as they relate to plans.  The Solicitor General asks us to read § 514(a) as protecting only benefits -- but not plans as a whole -- from state law attachment orders (recognizing the numerous problems that would arise if we were to conclude that welfare benefit plans could in no way be subjected to state law attachment).  But by adopting § 206(d)(1), Congress demonstrated that it could, where it wished to, stay the operation of state law as it affects only benefits and not plans.  The Solicitor General asks Page 486 U. S. 837 us to imply a limitation on a preemption provision in one portion of the statute that Congress made express in another portion of ERISA (§ 206(d)(1)).  We see no basis for construing the statute in this manner, and therefore, in light of § 206(d)(1), reject the Solicitor General's suggested interpretation of § 514(a).Section 206(d)(1) also supports our conclusion in another way.  If we were to give ERISA § 514(a) the meaning which petitioners and the Solicitor General attribute to it -- barring garnishment of all ERISA plan benefits -- we would render § 206(d)(1) substantially redundant with § 514(a), as they concede.  See Tr. of Oral Arg. 8-9, 14.  As our cases have noted in the past, we are hesitant to adopt an interpretation of a congressional enactment which renders superfluous another portion of that same law. [Footnote 11]Ultimately, in examining §§ 206(d)(1) and 514(a), there is no ignoring the fact that, when Congress was adopting ERISA, it had before it a provision to bar the alienation or garnishment of ERISA plan benefits, and chose to impose that limitation only with respect to ERISA pension benefit plans, and not ERISA welfare benefit plans.  In a comprehensive regulatory scheme like ERISA, such omissions are significant ones.  Cf. Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U. S. 134,  473 U. S. 147 (1985).  Once Congress was sufficiently aware of the prospect that ERISA plan benefits could be attached and/or garnisheed -- as evidenced by its adoption of § 206(d)(1) -- Congress' decision to remain silent concerning the attachment or garnishment of ERISA welfare plan benefits "acknowledged and accepted the practice, rather than prohibiting it."  Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 Page 486 U. S. 838 U.S. 504,  451 U. S. 516 (1981).  We therefore conclude that Congress did not intend to preclude state law attachment of ERISA welfare plan benefits. [Footnote 12]BIn support of his reading of § 514(a), the Solicitor General relies heavily on a 1984 amendment to ERISA, the Retirement Equity Act of 1984, Pub.L. 98-397, 98 Stat. 1426.  The 1984 Act included several changes in ERISA which Congress felt were necessary to guarantee that the Nation's private retirement-income system provided fair treatment for women.  See S.Rep. No. 98-575, p. 1 (1984); H.R.Rep. No. 98-655, p. 1 (1984).  Among the Act's provisions were amendments to ERISA which insured that the statute's antigarnishment and preemption provisions could not be used to block the enforcement of "qualified domestic relations orders" -- generally, court orders providing for child support and alimony payments by ERISA plan participants.  See 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3) (1982 ed., Supp. IV); 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(7) (1982 ed., Supp. IV).  While the primary focus of this portion of the 1984 Act was removing § 206(d)(1)'s antigarnishment protection from pension plan benefits when spouses sought enforcement of domestic support orders, Congress at the same time also amended § 514(a)'s preemption provision.  It apparently adopted the latter amendments in response to lower court rulings that had interpreted § 514(a) to bar state law garnishment for the purpose of enforcing domestic relations orders. [Footnote 13] Page 486 U. S. 839Petitioners and the Solicitor General argue that the 1984 amendment to § 514(a) makes clear that the section, as originally enacted, generally preempts state attachment and garnishment procedures.  Otherwise, they contend, there would have been no necessity to amend § 514(a) to save domestic relation orders from preemption.  There is, however, another plausible construction of Congress' action in 1984, namely, that Congress thought that some courts had erroneously construed § 514(a) as preempting such orders.  In this view, the 1984 amendment served the purpose of correcting the error, thus clarifying the original meaning of the section. [Footnote 14]  Cf. Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U. S. 568,  485 U. S. 585 (1988); United Airlines, Inc. v. Page 486 U. S. 840 McMann, 434 U. S. 192,  434 U. S. 218 (1977) (MARSHALL, J., dissenting.)  Moreover, even if the Solicitor General is correct, and Congress in 1984 thought that § 514(a) as originally enacted preempted domestic relations orders directed at ERISA plans -- and other state law attachments and garnishments as well -- the opinion of this later Congress as to the meaning of a law enacted 10 years earlier does not control the issue.  United Airlines, Inc. v. McMann, supra, at  434 U. S. 200, n. 7.  "[T]he views of a subsequent Congress form a hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an earlier one."  United States v. Price, 361 U. S. 304,  361 U. S. 313 (1960). [Footnote 15]Much the same is to be said about the sentence in the relevant House Committee Report on which the Solicitor General relies:"[T]he Committee reasserts that a state tax levy on employee welfare benefit plans is preempted by ERISA (see the holding of the 9th Circuit in Franchise Tax Board . . .)."H.R.Rep. No. 98-655, pt. 1, supra, at 42.  This statement does suggest that the House Committee in 1984 thought that § 514(a) foreclosed state law attachment orders akin to those at issue here.  But again, these views -- absent an amendment to the original language of the section -- do not direct our resolution of this case.  Instead, we must look at the language of ERISA and its structure, to determine the intent of the Congress that originally enacted the provision in question.  "It is the intent of the Congress that enacted [the section] . . . that controls."  Teamsters v. United States, 431 U. S. 324,  431 U. S. 354, n. 39 (1977).  This inquiry supports our reading of § 514(a), which is the reading given it by every other court that has considered the issue in this context (save the Ninth Circuit in a decision that was vacated by this Court). Page 486 U. S. 841IVAccordingly, we hold that ERISA does not forbid garnishment of an ERISA welfare benefit plan, even where the purpose is to collect judgments against plan participants.  Moreover, since we agree with the Georgia Supreme Court that the Georgia antigarnishment provision found in Ga.Code Ann. § 18-4-22.1 (1982) is preempted by ERISA, the judgment below isAffirmed
U.S. Supreme CourtMackey v. Lanier Collection Agcy., 486 U.S. 825 (1988)Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Service, Inc.,No. 86-1387Argued April 19, 1988Decided June 17, 1988486 U.S. 825SyllabusAfter respondent collection agency obtained money judgments against participants in an "employee welfare benefit plan" covered by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), its request to garnish the debtors' plan benefits was granted by a Georgia trial court.  The State Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Ga.Code Ann. § 18-4-22.1 (1982), barring the garnishment of "[f]unds or benefits of [an] . . . employee benefit plan or program subject to . . . [ERISA]," exempted plan benefits from garnishment.  The Georgia Supreme Court reversed, concluding that § 18-4-22.1 was preempted by ERISA, and that the plan was therefore subject to garnishment under the general state garnishment law.Held:1. Section 18-4-22.1, which singles out ERISA employee welfare benefit plans for different treatment than non-ERISA welfare plans under state garnishment procedures, is preempted under § 514(a) of ERISA, which supersedes any state law insofar as it "relate[s] to" ERISA-covered plans.  The state statute's express reference to ERISA plans brings it within the federal law's preemptive reach.  Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U. S. 85.  Moreover, the possibility that § 18-4-22.1 was enacted to help effectuate ERISA's underlying purposes is not enough to save it from preemption, since § 514(a) displaces all state laws that fall within its sphere, including those that are consistent with ERISA's substantive requirements.  Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U. S. 724.  Pp.  486 U. S. 829-830.2. Congress did not intend to preempt state law garnishment of an ERISA welfare benefit plan, even where the purpose is to collect judgments against plan participants.  Pp.  486 U.S. 830-840.(a) Unlike § 18-4-22.1, Georgia's general garnishment statute does not single out or specially mention ERISA plans of any kind.  The argument that, because the general statute requires plan trustees such as petitioners to respond to garnishment orders with funds otherwise due beneficiary-debtors, and to incur substantial administrative burdens and costs, the statute consequently "relates to" the plan within the meaning of § 514(a) is refuted by certain other ERISA provisions, and by several aspects of that statute's structure.  Although § 502(d) provides that a Page 486 U. S. 826 plan may "sue or be sued" as an entity for specified relief and clearly contemplates the enforcement of money judgments against a plan, and although lawsuits against ERISA plans for run-of-the-mill state law contract or tort claims are relatively commonplace, ERISA does not provide an enforcement mechanism for collecting judgments won in either type of action.  In lieu of such a provision, state law collection methods, including garnishment, remain undisturbed by ERISA.  See Fed.Rule Civ.Proc. 69(a).  Section 514(a)'s language does not support petitioners' attempt to distinguish, as permissible, garnishment to collect plan creditors' judgments from, as impermissible, garnishment on behalf of plan participants' judgment creditors.  The fact that § 206(d)(1)'s ban on alienation or assignment is limited to pension benefits also supports the conclusion that Congress did not intend to preclude garnishment of welfare plan benefits.  Section 514(a) cannot be read to protect only benefits, but not plans, from garnishment, since § 206(d)(1) demonstrates Congress' ability to distinguish between benefits and plans when it wished, and since such a construction would render § 206(d)(1) substantially redundant with § 514(a), and therefore superfluous.  Pp.  486 U. S. 831-838.(b) Petitioners' contention that the Retirement Equity Act of 1984 -- which specified that § 514(a)'s preemption provision does not apply to "qualified domestic relations orders" -- establishes that § 514(a), as originally enacted, preempts state attachment and garnishment procedures on the theory that, otherwise, an amendment to save such orders would have been unnecessary, is not persuasive.  An equally plausible explanation for the amendment is that Congress meant to clarify the original meaning of § 514(a) by correcting court decisions that had erroneously construed the section as preempting such orders.  Even if petitioners' contention is correct, the opinion of a later Congress as to the meaning of a law enacted 10 years earlier does not control the issue.  Rather, ERISA's language and structure demonstrate the intent of the Congress that originally enacted § 514(a) not to preempt state garnishment procedures.  Pp.  486 U.S. 838-840.256 Ga. 499, 350 S.E.2d 439, affirmed.WHITE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST, C.J., and BRENNAN, MARSHALL, and STEVENS, JJ., joined.  KENNEDY, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BLACKMUN, O'CONNOR, and SCALIA, JJ., joined, post, p.  486 U. S. 841. Page 486 U. S. 827