JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court.In Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U. S. 477 (1981), we held that an accused person in custody who has"expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police."Id. at  451 U. S. 484-485.  In Solem v. Stumes, 465 U. S. 638 (1984), we reiterated that "Edwards established a bright-line rule to safeguard preexisting rights," id. at  465 U. S. 646:  "once a suspect has invoked the right to counsel, any subsequent conversation must be initiated by him."  Id. at  465 U. S. 641.The question presented by these two cases is whether the same rule applies to a defendant who has been formally charged with a crime and who has requested appointment of counsel at his arraignment.  In both cases, the Michigan Supreme Court held that postarraignment confessions were improperly obtained -- and the Sixth Amendment violated -- because the defendants had"requested counsel during their arraignments, but were not afforded an opportunity to consult with counsel before the police initiated further interrogations."421 Mich. 39, 67-68, 365 N.W.2d 56, 69 (1984).  We agree with that holding.IThe relevant facts may be briefly stated.  Respondent Bladel was convicted of the murder of three railroad employees at the Amtrak Station in Jackson, Michigan, on December Page 475 U. S. 627 31, 1978.  Bladel, a disgruntled former employee, was arrested on January 1, 1979, and, after being questioned on two occasions, was released on January 3.  He was arrested again on March 22, 1979, and agreed to talk to the police that evening without counsel.  On the following morning, Friday, March 23, 1979, Bladel was arraigned.  He requested that counsel be appointed for him because he was indigent.  The detective in charge of the Bladel investigation was present at the arraignment.  A notice of appointment was promptly mailed to a law firm, but the law firm did not receive it until Tuesday, March 27.  In the interim, on March 26, 1979, two police officers interviewed Bladel in the county jail and obtained a confession from him.  Prior to that questioning, the officers properly advised Bladel of his Miranda rights. [Footnote 1]  Although he had inquired about his representation several times since the arraignment, Bladel was not told that a law firm had been appointed to represent him.The trial court overruled Bladel's objection to the admissibility of all four statements.  On appeal from his conviction and sentence, Bladel challenged only the postarraignment confession.  The Michigan Court of Appeals first rejected that challenge and affirmed the conviction, 106 Mich.  App. 397, 308 N.W.2d 230 (1981), but, after reconsideration in the light of a recent decision by the State Supreme Court, it reversed and remanded for a new trial.  118 Mich.  App. 498, 325 N.W.2d 421 (1982).  The Michigan Supreme Court then granted the prosecutor's application for leave to appeal, and considered the case with respondent Jackson's appeal of his conviction.  421 Mich. 39, 365 N.W.2d 56 (1984). Page 475 U. S. 628Respondent Jackson was convicted of second-degree murder and conspiracy to commit second-degree murder.  He was one of four participants in a wife's plan to have her husband killed on July 12, 1979.  Arrested on an unrelated charge on July 30, 1979, he made a series of six statements in response to police questioning prior to his arraignment at 4:30 p.m. on August 1.  During the arraignment, Jackson requested that counsel be appointed for him.  The police involved in his investigation were present at the arraignment.  On the following morning, before he had an opportunity to consult with counsel, two police officers obtained another statement from Jackson to "confirm" that he was the person who had shot the victim.  As was true of the six prearraignment statements, the questioning was preceded by advice of his Miranda rights and Jackson's agreement to proceed without counsel being present.The Michigan Court of Appeals held that the seventh statement was properly received in evidence.  114 Mich.App. 649, 319 N.W.2d 613 (1982).  It distinguished Edwards on the ground that Jackson's request for an attorney had been made at his arraignment, whereas Edwards' request had been made during a custodial interrogation by the police.  Accordingly, it affirmed Jackson's conviction of murder, although it set aside the conspiracy conviction on unrelated grounds.The Michigan Supreme Court held that the postarraignment statements in both cases should have been suppressed.  Noting that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attached at the time of the arraignments, the court concluded that the Edwards rule"applies by analogy to those situations where an accused requests counsel before the arraigning magistrate.  Once this request occurs, the police may not conduct further interrogations until counsel has been made available to the accused, unless the accused initiates further communications, exchanges, or conversations with the police. . . .  The police cannot simply ignore a defendant's unequivocal request for counsel."421 Mich. at 66-67, 365 N.W.2d  at 68-69 Page 475 U. S. 629 (footnote omitted).  We granted certiorari, 471 U.S. 1124 (1985), and we now affirm. [Footnote 2]IIThe question is not whether respondents had a right to counsel at their postarraignment, custodial interrogations.  The existence of that right is clear.  It has two sources.  The Fifth Amendment protection against compelled self-incrimination provides the right to counsel at custodial interrogations.  Edwards, 451 U.S. at  451 U. S. 482; Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436,  384 U. S. 470 (1966).  The Sixth Amendment guarantee of the assistance of counsel also provides the right to counsel at postarraignment interrogations.  The arraignment signals "the initiation of adversary judicial proceedings," and thus the attachment of the Sixth Amendment, United States v. Gouveia, 467 U. S. 180,  467 U. S. 187,  467 U. S. 188 (1984); [Footnote 3] thereafter, Page 475 U. S. 630 government efforts to elicit information from the accused, including interrogation, represent "critical stages" at which the Sixth Amendment applies.  Maine v. Moulton, 474 U. S. 159 (1985); United States v. Henry, 447 U. S. 264 (1980); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U. S. 387 (1977); Massiah v. United States, 377 U. S. 201 (1964).  The question in these cases is whether respondents validly waived their right to counsel at the postarraignment custodial interrogations.In Edwards, the request for counsel was made to the police during custodial interrogation, and the basis for the Court's holding was the Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination.  The Court noted the relevance of various Sixth Amendment precedents, 451 U.S. at  451 U. S. 484, n. 8, but found it unnecessary to rely on the possible applicability of the Sixth Amendment.  Id. at  451 U. S. 480, n. 7.  In these cases, the request for counsel was made to a judge during arraignment, and the basis for the Michigan Supreme Court opinion was the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of the assistance of counsel. [Footnote 4]  The State argues that the Edwards rule should not apply to these circumstances, because there are legal differences in the basis for the claims; because there are Page 475 U. S. 631 factual differences in the contexts of the claims; and because respondents signed valid waivers of their right to counsel at the postarraignment custodial interrogations.  We consider these contentions in turn.The State contends that differences in the legal principles underlying the Fifth and Sixth Amendments compel the conclusion that the Edwards rule should not apply to a Sixth Amendment claim.  Edwards flows from the Fifth Amendment's right to counsel at custodial interrogations, the State argues; its relevance to the Sixth Amendment's provision of the assistance of counsel is far less clear, and thus the Edwards principle for assessing waivers is unnecessary and inappropriate.In our opinion, however, the reasons for prohibiting the interrogation of an uncounseled prisoner who has asked for the help of a lawyer are even stronger after he has been formally charged with an offense than before.  The State's argument misapprehends the nature of the pretrial protections afforded by the Sixth Amendment.  In United States v. Gouveia, we explained the significance of the formal accusation, and the corresponding attachment of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel:"[G]iven the plain language of the Amendment and its purpose of protecting the unaided layman at critical confrontations with his adversary, our conclusion that the right to counsel attaches at the initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings 'is far from a mere formalism.'  Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. at  406 U. S. 689.  It is only at that time""that the government has committed itself to prosecute, and only then that the adverse positions of government and defendant have solidified.  It is then that a defendant finds himself faced with the prosecutorial forces of organized society, and immersed in the intricacies of substantive and procedural criminal law."467 U.S. at  467 U. S. 189. Page 475 U. S. 632  As a result, the"Sixth Amendment guarantees the accused, at least after the initiation of formal charges, the right to rely on counsel as a 'medium' between him and the State."Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. at  474 U. S. 176.  Thus, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel at a postarraignment interrogation requires at least as much protection as the Fifth Amendment right to counsel at any custodial interrogation.Indeed, after a formal accusation has been made -- and a person who had previously been just a "suspect" has become an "accused" within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment -- the constitutional right to the assistance of counsel is of such importance that the police may no longer employ techniques for eliciting information from an uncounseled defendant that might have been entirely proper at an earlier stage of their investigation.  Thus, the surreptitious employment of a cellmate, see United States v. Henry, 447 U. S. 264 (1980), or the electronic surveillance of conversations with third parties, see Maine v. Moulton, supra; Massiah v. United States, 377 U. S. 201 (1964), may violate the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel even though the same methods of investigation might have been permissible before arraignment or indictment. [Footnote 5]  Far from undermining the Edwards rule, the difference between the legal basis for the rule applied in Edwards and the Sixth Amendment claim asserted in these cases actually provides additional support for the application of the rule in these circumstances.The State also relies on the factual differences between a request for counsel during custodial interrogation and a request for counsel at an arraignment.  The State maintains that respondents may not have actually intended their request Page 475 U. S. 633 for counsel to encompass representation during any further questioning by the police.  This argument, however, must be considered against the backdrop of our standard for assessing waivers of constitutional rights.  Almost a half century ago, in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458 (1938), a case involving an alleged waiver of a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel, the Court explained that we should "indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights."  Id. at  304 U. S. 464.  For that reason, it is the State that has the burden of establishing a valid waiver.  Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. at  430 U. S. 404.  Doubts must be resolved in favor of protecting the constitutional claim.  This settled approach to questions of waiver requires us to give a broad, rather than a narrow, interpretation to a defendant's request for counsel -- we presume that the defendant requests the lawyer's services at every critical stage of the prosecution. [Footnote 6]  We thus reject the State's suggestion that respondents' requests for the appointment of counsel should be construed to apply only to representation in formal legal proceedings. [Footnote 7] Page 475 U. S. 634The State points to another factual difference:  the police may not know of the defendant's request for attorney at the arraignment.  That claimed distinction is similarly unavailing.  In the cases at bar, in which the officers in charge of the investigations of respondents were present at the arraignments, the argument is particularly unconvincing.  More generally, however, Sixth Amendment principles require that we impute the State's knowledge from one state actor to another.  For the Sixth Amendment concerns the confrontation between the State and the individual. [Footnote 8]  One set of state actors (the police) may not claim ignorance of defendants' unequivocal request for counsel to another state actor (the court).The State also argues that, because of these factual differences, the application of Edwards in a Sixth Amendment context will generate confusion.  However, we have frequently emphasized that one of the characteristics of Edwards is its clear, "bright-line" quality.  See, e.g., Smith v. Illinois, 469 U. S. 91,  469 U. S. 98 (1984); Solem v. Stumes, 465 U.S. at  465 U. S. 646; Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U. S. 1039,  462 U. S. 1044 (1983) (plurality opinion); id. at  462 U. S. 1054, n. 2 (MARSHALL, J., dissenting).  We do not agree that applying the rule when the accused requests counsel at an arraignment, rather than in the police station, somehow diminishes that clarity.  To the extent that there may have been any doubts about interpreting a request Page 475 U. S. 635 for counsel at an arraignment, or about the police responsibility to know of and respond to such a request, our opinion today resolves them.Finally, the State maintains that each of the respondents made a valid waiver of his Sixth Amendment rights by signing a postarraignment confession after again being advised of his constitutional rights.  In Edwards, however, we rejected the notion that, after a suspect's request for counsel, advice of rights and acquiescence in police-initiated questioning could establish a valid waiver.  451 U.S. at  451 U. S. 484.  We find no warrant for a different view under a Sixth Amendment analysis.  Indeed, our rejection of the comparable argument in Edwards was based, in part, on our review of earlier Sixth Amendment cases. [Footnote 9]  Just as written waivers are insufficient to justify police-initiated interrogations after the request for counsel in a Fifth Amendment analysis, so too they are insufficient to justify police-initiated interrogations after the request for counsel in a Sixth Amendment analysis. [Footnote 10] Page 475 U. S. 636IIIEdwards is grounded in the understanding that "the assertion of the right to counsel [is] a significant event," 451 U.S. at  451 U. S. 485, and that "additional safeguards are necessary when the accused asks for counsel."  Id. at  451 U. S. 484.  We conclude that the assertion is no less significant, and the need for additional safeguards no less clear, when the request for counsel is made at an arraignment and when the basis for the claim is the Sixth Amendment.  We thus hold that, if police initiate interrogation after a defendant's assertion, at an arraignment or similar proceeding, of his right to counsel, any waiver of the defendant's right to counsel for that police-initiated interrogation is invalid.Although the Edwards decision itself rested on the Fifth Amendment and concerned a request for counsel made during custodial interrogation, the Michigan Supreme Court correctly perceived that the reasoning of that case applies with even greater force to these cases.  The judgments are accordingly affirmed.It is so ordered
U.S. Supreme CourtMichigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625 (1986)Michigan v. JacksonNo. 84-1531Argued December 9, 1985Decided April 1, 1986475 U.S. 625*SyllabusRespondents, at separate arraignments in a Michigan trial court on unrelated murder charges, each requested appointment of counsel.  But before respondents had an opportunity to consult with counsel, police officers, after advising respondents of their Miranda rights, questioned them and obtained confessions.  Both respondents were convicted over objections to the admission of the confessions in evidence.  The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed and remanded in one case, but affirmed in the other.  The Michigan Supreme Court considered both cases together, and held that the confessions were improperly obtained in violation of the Sixth Amendment.Held:  The confessions should have been suppressed.  Although the rule of Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U. S. 477, that once a suspect has invoked his right to counsel, police may not initiate interrogation until counsel has been made available to the suspect, rested on the Fifth Amendment and concerned a request for counsel made during custodial interrogation, the reasoning of that case applies with even greater force to these cases.  The assertion of the right to counsel is no less significant, and the need for additional safeguards no less clear, when that assertion is made at an arraignment and when the basis for it is the Sixth Amendment.  If police initiate an interrogation after a defendant's assertion of his right to counsel at an arraignment or similar proceeding, as in these cases, any waiver of that right for that police-initiated interrogation is invalid.  Pp.  475 U. S. 629-635.421 Mich. 39, 365 N.W.2d 56, affirmed.STEVENS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court in which BRENNAN, WHITE, MARSHALL, and BLACKMUN, JJ., joined.  BURGER, C.J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p.  475 U. S. 636.  REHNQUIST, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which POWELL and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined, post, p.  475 U. S. 637. Page 475 U. S. 626