MR. JUSTICE POWELL announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which THE CHIEF JUSTICE, MR. JUSTICE STEWART, and MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST joined.These appeals present a challenge to the constitutionality of a state statute regulating the access of minors to abortions.  They require us to continue the inquiry we began in Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U. S. 52 (1976), and Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U. S. 132 (1976). Page 443 U. S. 625IAOn August 2, 1974, the Legislature of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts passed, over the Governor's veto, an Act pertaining to abortions performed within the State.  1974 Mass. Acts, ch. 706.  According to its title, the statute was intended to regulate abortions "within present constitutional limits."  Shortly before the Act was to go into effect, the class action from which these appeals arise was commenced in the District Court [Footnote 1] to enjoin, as unconstitutional, the provision of the Act now codified as Mass Gen.Laws Ann., ch. 112, 12S (West Supp. 1979). [Footnote 2]Section 12S provides in part:"If the mother is less than eighteen years of age and has not married, the consent of both the mother and her parents [to an abortion to be performed on the mother] is required.  If one or both of the mother's parents refuse such consent, consent may be obtained by order of a judge of the superior court for good cause shown, after such hearing as he deems necessary.  Such a hearing will not require the appointment of a guardian for the mother.  If one of the parents has died or has deserted his or her family, consent by the remaining parent is sufficient.  If both parents have died or have deserted their family, consent of the mother's guardian or other Page 443 U. S. 626 person having duties similar to a guardian, or any person who had assumed the care and custody of the mother is sufficient.  The commissioner of public health shall prescribe a written form for such consent.  Such form shall be signed by the proper person or persons and given to the physician performing the abortion who shall maintain it in his permanent files."Physicians performing abortions in the absence of the consent required by § 12S are subject to injunctions and criminal penalties.  See Mass.Gen.Laws Ann., ch. 112, §§ 12Q, 12T, and 12U (West Supp. 1979).A three-judge District Court was convened to hear the case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1970 ed.), repealed by Pub.L. 94-381, § 1, 90 Stat. 1119. [Footnote 3]  Plaintiffs in the suit, appellees in both the cases before us now, were William Baird; Parents Aid Society, Inc. (Parents Aid), of which Baird is founder and director; Gerald Zupnick, M.D., who regularly performs abortions at the Parents Aid clinic; and an unmarried minor, identified by the pseudonym "Mary Moe," who, at the commencement of the suit, was pregnant, residing at home with her parents, and desirous of obtaining an abortion without informing them. [Footnote 4]Mary Moe was permitted to represent the "class of unmarried minors in Massachusetts who have adequate capacity to give a valid and informed consent [to abortion], and who do not wish to involve their parents."  Baird v. Bellotti, 393 F. Supp. 847, 850 (Mass.1975) (Baird I).  Initially there was some confusion whether the rights of minors who wish abortions without parental involvement but who lack "adequate capacity" to give such consent also could be adjudicated in Page 443 U. S. 627 the suit.  The District Court ultimately determined that Dr. Zupnick was entitled to assert the rights of these minors.  See Baird v. Bellotti, 450 F. Supp. 997, 1001, and n. 6 (Mass.1978). [Footnote 5]Planned Parenthood League of Massachusetts and Crittenton Hastings House & Clinic, both organizations that provide counseling to pregnant adolescents, and Phillip Stubblefield, M.D. (intervenors), [Footnote 6] appeared as amici curiae on behalf of the plaintiffs.  The District Court "accepted [this group] in a status something more than amici because of reservations about the adequacy of plaintiffs' representation [of the plaintiff classes in the suit]."  Id. at 999 n. 3.Defendants in the suit, appellants here in No. 78-329, were the Attorney General of Massachusetts and the District Attorneys of all counties in the State.  Jane Hunerwadel was permitted to intervene as a defendant and representative of the class of Massachusetts parents having unmarried minor daughters who then were, or might become, pregnant.  She and the class she represents are appellants in No. 78-330. [Footnote 7]Following three days of testimony, the District Court issued an opinion invalidating § 12S.  Baird I, supra.  The court rejected appellees' argument that all minors capable of becoming pregnant also are capable of giving informed consent Page 443 U. S. 628 to an abortion, or that it always is in the best interests of a minor who desires an abortion to have one.  See 393 F. Supp.  at 854.  But the court was convinced that "a substantial number of females under the age of 18 are capable of forming a valid consent," id. at 855, and "that a significant number of [these] are unwilling to tell their parents."  Id. at 853.In its analysis of the relevant constitutional principles, the court stated that"there can be no doubt but that a female's constitutional right to an abortion in the first trimester does not depend upon her calendar age."Id. at 855-856.  The court found no justification for the parental consent limitation placed on that right by § 12S, since it concluded that the statute was "cast not in terms of protecting the minor, . . . but in recognizing independent rights of parents."  Id. at 856.  The "independent" parental rights protected by § 12S, as the court understood them, were wholly distinct from the best interests of the minor. [Footnote 8]BAppellants sought review in this Court, and we noted probable jurisdiction.  Bellotti v. Baird, 423 U.S. 982 (1975)After briefing and oral argument, it became apparent that § 12S was susceptible of a construction that "would avoid or substantially modify the federal constitutional challenge to the statute."  Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U. S. 132,  428 U. S. 148 (1976) (Bellotti I).  We therefore vacated the judgment of the District Court, concluding that it should have abstained and certified to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts appropriate questions concerning the meaning of § 12S, pursuant to existing Page 443 U. S. 629 procedure in that State.  See Mass.Sup.Jud.Ct. Rule 3:21.On remand, the District Court certified nine questions to the Supreme Judicial Court. [Footnote 9]  These were answered in an Page 443 U. S. 630 opinion styled Baird v. Attorney General, 371 Mass. 741, 360 N.E.2d 288 (1977) (Attorney General).  Among the more important aspects of § 12S, as authoritatively construed by the Supreme Judicial Court, are the following:1. In deciding whether to grant consent to their daughter's abortion, parents are required by § 12S to consider exclusively what will serve her best interests.  See id. at 746-747, 360 N.E.2d  at 292-293.2. The provision in § 12S that judicial consent for an abortion shall be granted, parental objections notwithstanding, "for good cause shown" means that such consent shall be granted if found to be in the minor's best interests.  The judge "must disregard all parental objections, and other considerations, which are not based exclusively" on that standard.  Id. at 748, 360 N.E.2d  at 293.3. Even if the judge in a § 12S proceeding finds "that the minor is capable of making, and has made, an informed and reasonable decision to have an abortion," he is entitled to withhold consent "in circumstances where he determines that the best interests of the minor will not be served by an abortion."  Ibid., 360 N.E.2d  at 293.4. As a general rule, a minor who desires an abortion may not obtain judicial consent without first seeking both parents' consent.  Exceptions to the rule exist when a parent is not available or when the need for the abortion constitutes "an emergency requiring immediate action.'" [Footnote 10]  Id. at 750, 360 N.E.2d  at 294.  Unless a parent is not available, he must be notified of any judicial proceedings brought under § 12S.  Id. at 755-756, 360 N.E.2d  at 297. Page 443 U. S. 6315. The resolution of § 12S cases and any appeals that follow can be expected to be prompt.  The name of the minor and her parents may be held in confidence.  If need be, the Supreme Judicial Court and the superior courts can promulgate rules or issue orders to ensure that such proceedings are handled expeditiously.  Id. at 756-758, 360 N.E.2d  at 297-298.6. Massachusetts Gen.Laws Ann., ch. 112, § 12F (West Supp. 1979), which provides, inter alia, that certain classes of minors may consent to most kinds of medical care without parental approval, does not apply to abortions, except as to minors who are married, widowed, or divorced.  See 371 Mass. at 758-762, 360 N.E.2d  at 298-300.  Nor does the State's common law "mature minor rule" create an exception to § 12S.  Id. at 749-750, 360 N.E.2d  at 294.  See n 27, infra.CFollowing the judgment of the Supreme Judicial Court, appellees returned to the District Court and obtained a stay of the enforcement of § 12S until its constitutionality could be determined.  Baird v. Bellotti, 428 F. Supp. 854 (Mass.1977) (Baird II).  After permitting discovery by both sides, holding a pretrial conference, and conducting further hearings, the District Court again declared § 12S unconstitutional and enjoined its enforcement.  Baird v. Bellotti, 450 F. Supp. 997 (Mass.1978) (Baird III).  The court identified three particular aspects of the statute which, in its view, rendered it unconstitutional.First, as construed by the Supreme Judicial Court, § 12S requires parental notice in virtually every ease where the parent is available.  The court believed that the evidence warranted a finding"that many, perhaps a large majority of 17-year olds are capable of informed consent, as are a not insubstantial number of 16-year olds, and some even younger."Id. at 1001.  In addition, the court concluded that it would not be in Page 443 U. S. 632 the best interests of some "immature" minors -- those incapable of giving informed consent -- even to inform their parents of their intended abortions.  Although the court declined to decide whether the burden of requiring a minor to take her parents to court was, per se, an impermissible burden on her right to seek an abortion, it concluded that Massachusetts could not constitutionally insist that parental permission be sought or notice given"in those cases where a court, if given free rein, would find that it was to the minor's best interests that one or both of her parents not be informed . . ."Id. at 1002.Second, the District Court held that § 12S was defective in permitting a judge to veto the abortion decision of a minor found to be capable of giving informed consent.  The court reasoned that, upon a finding of maturity and informed consent, the State no longer was entitled to impose legal restrictions upon this decision.  Id. at 1003.  Given such a finding, the court could see "no reasonable basis" for distinguishing between a minor and an adult, and it therefore concluded that § 12S was not only "an undue burden in the due process sense, [but] a discriminatory denial of equal protection [as well]."  Id. at 1004.Finally, the court decided that § 12S suffered from what it termed "formal overbreadth," ibid., because the statute failed explicitly to inform parents that they must consider only the minor's best interests in deciding whether to grant consent.  The court believed that, despite the Supreme Judicial Court's construction of § 12S, parents naturally would infer from the statute that they were entitled to withhold consent for other, impermissible reasons.  This was thought to create a "chilling effect" by enhancing the possibility that parental consent would be denied wrongfully and that the minor would have to proceed in court.Having identified these flaws in § 12S, the District Court considered whether it should engage in "judicial repair."  Id. at 1005.  It declined either to sever the statute or to give Page 443 U. S. 633 it a construction different from that set out by the Supreme Judicial Court, as that tribunal arguably had invited it to do.  See Attorney General, 371 Mass. at 745-746, 360 N.E.2d  at 292.  The District Court therefore adhered to its previous position, declaring § 12S unconstitutional and permanently enjoining its enforcement. [Footnote 11]  Appellants sought review in this Court a second time, and we again noted probable jurisdiction.  439 U.S. 925 (1978).IIA child, merely on account of his minority, is not beyond the protection of the Constitution.  As the Court said in In re Gault, 387 U. S. 1,  387 U. S. 13 (1967), "whatever may be their precise impact, neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone." [Footnote 12]  This observation, of course, is but the beginning of the analysis.  The Court long has recognized that the status of minors under the law is unique in many respects.  As Mr. Justice Frankfurter aptly put it:"Children have a very special place in life which law should reflect.  Legal theories and their phrasing in other cases readily lead to fallacious reasoning if uncritically transferred to determination Page 443 U. S. 634 of a State's duty towards children."May v. Anderson, 345 U. S. 528,  345 U. S. 536 (1953) (concurring opinion).  The unique role in our society of the family, the institution by which "we inculcate and pass down many of our most cherished values, moral and cultural," Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U. S. 494,  431 U. S. 503-504 (1977) (plurality opinion), requires that constitutional principles be applied with sensitivity and flexibility to the special needs of parents and children.  We have recognized three reasons justifying the conclusion that the constitutional rights of children cannot be equated with those of adults:  the peculiar vulnerability of children; their inability to make critical decisions in an informed, mature manner; and the importance of the parental role in child rearing.AThe Court's concern for the vulnerability of children is demonstrated in its decisions dealing with minors' claims to constitutional protection against deprivations of liberty or property interests by the State.  With respect to many of these claims, we have concluded that the child's right is virtually coextensive with that of an adult.  For example, the Court has held that the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee against the deprivation of liberty without due process of law is applicable to children in juvenile delinquency proceedings.  In re Gault, supra.  In particular, minors involved in such proceedings are entitled to adequate notice, the assistance of counsel, and the opportunity to confront their accusers.  They can be found guilty only upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and they may assert the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination.  In re Winship, 397 U. S. 358 (1970); In re Gault, supra. See also Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651,  430 U. S. 674 (1977) (corporal punishment of schoolchildren implicates constitutionally protected liberty interest); cf. Breed v. Jones, 421 U. S. 519 (1975) (Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits prosecuting juvenile as an adult after an adjudicatory finding in juvenile court that he had violated a criminal statute).  Page 443 U. S. 635 Similarly, in Goss v. Lopez, 419 U. S. 565 (1975), the Court held that children may not be deprived of certain property interests without due process.These rulings have not been made on the uncritical assumption that the constitutional rights of children are indistinguishable from those of adults.  Indeed, our acceptance of juvenile courts distinct from the adult criminal justice system assumes that juvenile offenders constitutionally may be treated differently from adults.  In order to preserve this separate avenue for dealing with minors, the Court has said that hearings in juvenile delinquency cases need not necessarily "conform with all of the requirements of a criminal trial or even of the usual administrative hearing.'"  In re Gault, supra at  387 U. S. 30, quoting Kent v. United States, 383 U. S. 541,  383 U. S. 562 (1966).  Thus, juveniles are not constitutionally entitled to trial by jury in delinquency adjudications.  McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U. S. 528 (1971).  Viewed together, our cases show that, although children generally are protected by the same constitutional guarantees against governmental deprivations as are adults, the State is entitled to adjust its legal system to account for children's vulnerability and their needs for "concern, . . . sympathy, and . . . paternal attention."  Id. at  403 U. S. 550 (plurality opinion).BSecond, the Court has held that the States validly may limit the freedom of children to choose for themselves in the making of important, affirmative choices with potentially serious consequences.  These rulings have been grounded in the recognition that, during the formative years of childhood and adolescence, minors often lack the experience, perspective, and judgment to recognize and avoid choices that could be detrimental to them. [Footnote 13] Page 443 U. S. 636Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U. S. 629 (1968), illustrates well the Court's concern over the inability of children to make mature choices, as the First Amendment rights involved are clear examples of constitutionally protected freedoms of choice.  At issue was a criminal conviction for selling sexually oriented magazines to a minor under the age of 17 in violation of a New York state law.  It was conceded that the conviction could not have stood under the First Amendment if based upon a sale of the same material to an adult.  Id. at  390 U. S. 634.  Notwithstanding the importance the Court always has attached to First Amendment rights, it concluded that,"even where there is an invasion of protected freedoms, 'the power of the state to control the conduct of children reaches beyond the scope of its authority over adults . . . ,'"id. at  390 U. S. 638, quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 158,  321 U. S. 170 (1944). [Footnote 14]  The Court was convinced that the New York Legislature rationally could conclude that the sale to children of the magazines in question presented a danger against which they should be guarded.  Ginsberg, supra, at  390 U. S. 641.  It therefore rejected the Page 443 U. S. 637 argument that the New York law violated the constitutional rights of minors. [Footnote 15]CThird, the guiding role of parents in the upbringing of their children justifies limitations on the freedoms of minors.  The State commonly protects its youth from adverse governmental action and from their own immaturity by requiring parental consent to or involvement in important decisions by minors. [Footnote 16]  But an additional and more important justification for state deference to parental control over children is that"[t]he child is not the mere creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations."Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510,  268 U. S. 535 (1925)."The duty to prepare the child for 'additional obligations' . . . Page 443 U. S. 638 must be read to include the inculcation of moral standards, religious beliefs, and elements of good citizenship."Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U. S. 205,  406 U. S. 233 (1972).  This affirmative process of teaching, guiding, and inspiring by precept and example is essential to the growth of young people into mature, socially responsible citizens.We have believed in this country that this process, in large part, is beyond the competence of impersonal political institutions.  Indeed, affirmative sponsorship of particular ethical, religious, or political beliefs is something we expect the State not to attempt in a society constitutionally committed to the ideal of individual liberty and freedom of choice.  Thus,"[i]t is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder."Prince v. Massachusetts, supra at  321 U. S. 166 (emphasis added).Unquestionably, there are many competing theories about the most effective way for parents to fulfill their central role in assisting their children on the way to responsible adulthood.  While we do not pretend any special wisdom on this subject, we cannot ignore that central to many of these theories, and deeply rooted in our Nation's history and tradition, is the belief that the parental role implies a substantial measure of authority over one's children.  Indeed,"constitutional interpretation has consistently recognized that the parents' claim to authority in their own household to direct the rearing of their children is basic in the structure of our society."Ginsberg v. New York, supra at  390 U. S. 639.Properly understood, then, the tradition of parental authority is not inconsistent with our tradition of individual liberty; rather, the former is one of the basic presuppositions of the latter.  Legal restrictions on minors, especially those supportive of the parental role, may be important to the child's chances for the full growth and maturity that make eventual Page 443 U. S. 639 participation in a free society meaningful and rewarding. [Footnote 17]  Under the Constitution, the State can"properly conclude that parents and others, teachers for example, who have [the] primary responsibility for children's wellbeing are entitled to the support of laws designed to aid discharge of that responsibility."Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. at  390 U. S. 639. [Footnote 18]IIIWith these principles in mind, we consider the specific constitutional questions presented by these appeals.  In § 12S, Massachusetts has attempted to reconcile the constitutional right of a woman, in consultation with her physician, to choose to terminate her pregnancy as established by Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113 (1973), and Doe v. Bolton, 410 U. S. 179 (1973), with the special interest of the State in encouraging an unmarried pregnant minor to seek the advice of her parents in making the important decision whether or not to bear a child.  As noted above, § 12S was before us in Bellotti I, 428 U. S. 132 (1976), where we remanded the case for interpretation of its provisions by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.  We previously had held in Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U. S. 52 (1976), that a State could not lawfully authorize an absolute parental veto over the decision of a minor to terminate her pregnancy.  Id. at  428 U. S. 74.  In Page 443 U. S. 640 Bellotti I, supra, we recognized that § 12S could be read as "fundamentally different from a statute that creates a parental veto,'" 428 U.S. at  428 U. S. 145, thus "avoid[ing] or substantially modify[ing] the federal constitutional challenge to the statute."  Id. at  428 U. S. 148.  The question before us -- in light of what we have said in the prior cases -- is whether § 12S, as authoritatively interpreted by the Supreme Judicial Court, provides for parental notice and consent in a manner that does not unduly burden the right to seek an abortion.  See id. at  428 U. S. 147.Appellees and intervenors contend that, even as interpreted by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts § 12S does unduly burden this right.  They suggest, for example, that the mere requirement of parental notice constitutes such a burden.  As stated in  443 U. S.  above, however, parental notice and consent are qualifications that typically may be imposed by the State on a minor's right to make important decisions.  As immature minors often lack the ability to make fully informed choices that take account of both immediate and long-range consequences, a State reasonably may determine that parental consultation often is desirable and in the best interest of the minor. [Footnote 19]  It may further determine, as a general proposition, that such consultation is particularly desirable with respect to the abortion decision -- one that for some people raises profound moral and religious concerns. [Footnote 20]  As MR. JUSTICE STEWART wrote in concurrence in Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, supra, at  428 U. S. 91:"There can be little doubt that the State furthers a constitutionally permissible end by encouraging an unmarried Page 443 U. S. 641 pregnant minor to seek the help and advice of her parents in making the very important decision whether or not to bear a child.  That is a grave decision, and a girl of tender years, under emotional stress, may be ill-equipped to make it without mature advice and emotional support.  It seems unlikely that she will obtain adequate counsel and support from the attending physician at an abortion clinic, where abortions for pregnant minors frequently take place."(Footnote omitted.) [Footnote 21] Page 443 U. S. 642But we are concerned here with a constitutional right to seek an abortion.  The abortion decision differs in important ways from other decisions that may be made during minority.  The need to preserve the constitutional right and the unique nature of the abortion decision, especially when made by a minor, require a State to act with particular sensitivity when it legislates to foster parental involvement in this matter.AThe pregnant minor's options are much different from those facing a minor in other situations, such as deciding whether to marry.  A minor not permitted to marry before the age of majority is required simply to postpone her decision.  She and her intended spouse may preserve the opportunity for later marriage should they continue to desire it.  A pregnant adolescent, however, cannot preserve for long the possibility of aborting, which effectively expires in a matter of weeks from the onset of pregnancy.Moreover, the potentially severe detriment facing a pregnant woman, see Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at  410 U. S. 153, is not mitigated by her minority.  Indeed, considering her probable education, employment skills, financial resources, and emotional maturity, unwanted motherhood may be exceptionally burdensome for a minor.  In addition, the fact of having a child brings with it adult legal responsibility, for parenthood, like attainment of the age of majority, is one of the traditional criteria for the termination of the legal disabilities of minority.  In sum, there are few situations in which denying a minor the right to make an important decision will have consequences so grave and indelible.Yet an abortion may not be the best choice for the minor.  The circumstances in which this issue arises will vary widely.  In a given case, alternatives to abortion, such as marriage to the father of the child, arranging for its adoption, or assuming the responsibilities of motherhood with the assured support of Page 443 U. S. 643 family, may be feasible and relevant to the minor's best interests.  Nonetheless, the abortion decision is one that simply cannot be postponed, or it will be made by default, with far-reaching consequences.For these reasons, as we held in Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. at  428 U. S. 74,"the State may not impose a blanket provision . . . requiring the consent of a parent or person in loco parentis as a condition for abortion of an unmarried minor during the first 12 weeks of her pregnancy."Although, as stated in  443 U. S.  supra, such deference to parents may be permissible with respect to other choices facing a minor, the unique nature and consequences of the abortion decision make it inappropriate"to give a third party an absolute, and possibly arbitrary, veto over the decision of the physician and his patient to terminate the patient's pregnancy, regardless of the reason for withholding the consent."428 U.S. at  428 U. S. 74.  We therefore conclude that, if the State decides to require a pregnant minor to obtain one or both parents' consent to an abortion, it also must provide an alternative procedure [Footnote 22] whereby authorization for the abortion can be obtained.A pregnant minor is entitled in such a proceeding to show either:  (1) that she is mature enough and well enough informed to make her abortion decision, in consultation with her physician, independently of her parents' wishes; [Footnote 23] or Page 443 U. S. 644 (2) that even if she is not able to make this decision independently, the desired abortion would be in her best interests.  The proceeding in which this showing is made must assure that a resolution of the issue, and any appeals that may follow, will be completed with anonymity and sufficient expedition to provide an effective opportunity for an abortion to be obtained.  In sum, the procedure must ensure that the provision requiring parental consent does not, in fact, amount to the "absolute; and possibly arbitrary, veto" that was found impermissible in Danforth. Ibid.BIt is against these requirements that § 12S must be tested.  We observe initially that, as authoritatively construed by the highest court of the State, the statute satisfies some of the concerns that require special treatment of a minor's abortion decision.  It provides that, if parental consent is refused, authorization may be "obtained by order of a judge of the superior court for good cause shown, after such hearing as he deems necessary."  A superior court judge presiding over a § 12S proceeding"must disregard all parental objections, and other considerations, which are not based exclusively on what would serve the minor's best interests. [Footnote 24]"Attorney General, Page 443 U. S. 645 371 Mass. at 748, 360 N.E.2d  at 293.  The Supreme Judicial Court also stated:"Prompt resolution of a [§ 12S] proceeding may be expected. . . .  The proceeding need not be brought in the minor's name and steps may be taken, by impoundment or otherwise, to preserve confidentiality as to the minor and her parents. . . .  [W]e believe that an early hearing and decision on appeal from a judgment of a Superior Court judge may also be achieved."Id. at 757-758, 360 N.E.2d  at 298.  The court added that, if these expectations were not met, either the superior court, in the exercise of its rulemaking power, or the Supreme Judicial Court would be willing to eliminate any undue burdens by rule or order.  Ibid. [Footnote 25]Despite these safeguards, which avoid much of what was objectionable in the statute successfully challenged in Danforth, § 12S falls short of constitutional standards in certain respects.  We now consider these. Page 443 U. S. 646(1)Among the questions certified to the Supreme Judicial Court was whether § 12S permits any minors -- mature or immature -- to obtain judicial consent to an abortion without any parental consultation whatsoever.  See n 9, supra.  The state court answered that, in general, it does not."[T]he consent require by [§ 12S must] be obtained for every nonemergency abortion where the mother is less than eighteen years of age and unmarried."Attorney General, supra at 750, 360 N.E.2d  at 294.  The text of § 12S itself states an exception to this rule, making consent unnecessary from any parent who has "died or has deserted his or her family." [Footnote 26]  The Supreme Judicial Court construed the statute as containing an additional exception:  consent need not be obtained "where no parent (or statutory substitute) is available."  371 Mass. at 750, 360 N.E.2d  at 294.  The court also ruled that an available parent must be given notice of any judicial proceedings brought by a minor to obtain consent for an abortion. [Footnote 27]  Id. at 755-756, 360 N.E.2d  at 297. Page 443 U. S. 647We think that, construed in this manner, § 12S would impose an undue burden upon the exercise by minors of the right to seek an abortion.  As the District Court recognized, "there are parents who would obstruct, and perhaps altogether prevent, the minor's right to go to court."  Baird III, 450 F. Supp.  at 1001.  There is no reason to believe that this would be so in the majority of cases where consent is withheld.  But many parents hold strong views on the subject of abortion, and young pregnant minors, especially those living at home, are particularly vulnerable to their parents' efforts to obstruct both an abortion and their access to court.  It would be unrealistic, therefore, to assume that the mere existence of a legal right to seek relief in superior court provides an effective avenue of relief for some of those who need it the most.We conclude, therefore, that, under state regulation such as that undertaken by Massachusetts, every minor must have the opportunity -- if she so desires -- to go directly to a court without first consulting or notifying her parents.  If she satisfies the court that she is mature and well enough informed to make intelligently the abortion decision on her own, the court must authorize her to act without parental consultation or consent.  If she fails to satisfy the court that she is competent to make this decision independently, she must be permitted to show that an abortion nevertheless would be in her Page 443 U. S. 648 best interests.  If the court is persuaded that it is, the court must authorize the abortion.  If, however, the court is not persuaded by the minor that she is mature or that the abortion would be in her best interests, it may decline to sanction the operation.There is, however, an important state interest in encouraging a family, rather than a judicial, resolution of a minor's abortion decision.  Also, as we have observed above, parents naturally take an interest in the welfare of their children -- an interest that is particularly strong where a normal family relationship exists and where the child is living with one or both parents.  These factors properly may be taken into account by a court called upon to determine whether an abortion, in fact, is in a minor's best interests.  If, all things considered, the court determines that an abortion is in the minor's best interests, she is entitled to court authorization without any parental involvement.  On the other hand, the court may deny the abortion request of an immature minor in the absence of parental consultation if it concludes that her best interests would be served thereby, or the court may in such a case defer decision until there is parental consultation in which the court may participate.  But this is the full extent to which parental involvement may be required. [Footnote 28]  For the reasons stated above, the constitutional right to seek an abortion may not be unduly burdened by state-imposed conditions upon initial access to court.(2)Section 12S requires that both parents consent to a minor's abortion.  The District Court found it to be "custom" to perform other medical and surgical procedures on minors with the consent of only one parent, and it concluded that "nothing about abortions . . . requires the minor's interest to be treated Page 443 U. S. 649 differently."  Baird I, 393 F. Supp.  at 852.  See Baird III, supra, at 1004 n. 9.We are not persuaded that, as a general rule, the requirement of obtaining both parents' consent unconstitutionally burdens a minor's right to seek an abortion.  The abortion decision has implications far broader than those associated with most other kinds of medical treatment.  At least when the parents are together and the pregnant minor is living at home, both the father and mother have an interest -- one normally supportive -- in helping to determine the course that is in the best interests of a daughter.  Consent and involvement by parents in important decisions by minors long have been recognized as protective of their immaturity.  In the case of the abortion decision, for reasons we have stated, the focus of the parents' inquiry should be the best interests of their daughter.  As every pregnant minor is entitled in the first instance to go directly to the court for a judicial determination without prior parental notice, consultation, or consent, the general rule with respect to parental consent does not unduly burden the constitutional right.  Moreover, where the pregnant minor goes to her parents and consent is denied, she still must have recourse to a prompt judicial determination of her maturity or best interests. [Footnote 29](3)Another of the questions certified by the District Court to the Supreme Judicial Court was the following:"If the superior court finds that the minor is capable [of making], and has, in fact, made and adhered to, an informed and reasonable decision to have an abortion, may the court refuse its consent based on a finding that a parent's, or its own, contrary decision Page 443 U. S. 650 is a better one?"Attorney General, 371 Mass. at 747 n. 5, 360 N.E.2d  at 293 n. 5.  To this the state court answered:"[W]e do not view the judge's role as limited to a determination that the minor is capable of making, and has made, an informed and reasonable decision to have an abortion.  Certainly the judge must make a determination of those circumstances, but, if the statutory role of the judge to determine the best interests of the minor is to be carried out, he must make a finding on the basis of all relevant views presented to him.  We suspect that the judge will give great weight to the minor's determination, if informed and reasonable, but in circumstances where he determines that the best interests of the minor will not be served by an abortion, the judge's determination should prevail, assuming that his conclusion is supported by the evidence and adequate findings of fact."Id. at 748, 360 N.E.2d  at 293.The Supreme Judicial Court's statement reflects the general rule that a State may require a minor to wait until the age of majority before being permitted to exercise legal rights independently.  See n 23, supra.  But we are concerned here with the exercise of a constitutional right of unique character.  See supra at  443 U. S. 642-643.  As stated above, if the minor satisfies a court that she has attained sufficient maturity to make a fully informed decision, she then is entitled to make her abortion decision independently.  We therefore agree with the District Court that § 12S cannot constitutionally permit judicial disregard of the abortion decision of a minor who has been determined to be mature and fully competent to assess the implications of the choice she has made. [Footnote 30] Page 443 U. S. 651IVAlthough it satisfies constitutional standards in large part, § 12S falls short of them in two respects:  first, it permits judicial authorization for an abortion to be withheld from a minor who is found by the superior court to be mature and fully competent to make this decision independently.  Second, it requires parental consultation or notification in every instance, without affording the pregnant minor an opportunity to receive an independent judicial determination that she is mature enough to consent or that an abortion would be in her best interests. [Footnote 31]  Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the District Court insofar as it invalidates this statute and enjoins its enforcement. [Footnote 32]Affirmed
U.S. Supreme CourtBellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979)Bellotti v. BairdNo. 78-329Argued February 27, 1979Decided July 2, 1979*443 U.S. 622SyllabusA Massachusetts statute requires parental consent before an abortion can be performed on an unmarried woman under the age of 18.  If one or both parents refuse such consent, however, the abortion may be obtained by order of a judge of the superior court "for good cause shown."  In appellees' class action challenging the constitutionality of the statute, a three-judge District Court held it unconstitutional.  Subsequently, this Court vacated the District Court's judgment, Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U. S. 132, holding that the District Court should have abstained and certified to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court appropriate questions concerning the meaning of the statute.  On remand, the District Court certified several questions to the Supreme Judicial Court.  Among the questions certified was whether the statute permits any minors -- mature or immature -- to obtain judicial consent to an abortion without any parental consultation whatsoever.  The Supreme Judicial Court answered that, in general, it does not; that consent must be obtained for every nonemergency abortion unless no parent is available; and that an available parent must be given notice of any judicial proceedings brought by a minor to obtain consent for an abortion.  Another question certified was whether, if the superior court finds that the minor is capable of making, and has, in fact, made and adhered to, an informed and reasonable decision to have an abortion, the court may refuse its consent on a finding that a parent's, or its own, contrary decision is a better one.  The Supreme Judicial Court answered in the affirmative.  Following the Supreme Judicial Court's judgment, the District Court again declared the statute unconstitutional and enjoined its enforcement.Held:  The judgment is affirmed.  Pp.  443 U. S. 633-651;  443 U. S. 652-656.450 F. Supp. 997, affirmed.MR. JUSTICE POWELL, joined by MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER, MR. JUSTICE STEWART, and MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST, concluded that:1. There are three reasons justifying the conclusion that the constitutional Page 443 U. S. 623 rights of children cannot be equated with those of adults:  the peculiar vulnerability of children; their inability to make critical decisions in an informed, mature manner; and the importance of the guiding role of parents in the upbringing of their children.  Pp.  443 U. S. 633-639.2. The abortion decision differs in important ways from other decisions facing minors, and the State is required to act with particular sensitivity when it legislates to foster parental involvement in this matter.  Pp.  443 U. S. 639-642.3. If a State decides to require a pregnant minor to obtain one or both parents' consent to an abortion, it also must provide an alternative procedure whereby authorization for the abortion can be obtained.  A pregnant minor is entitled in such a proceeding to show either that she is mature enough and well enough informed to make her abortion decision, in consultation with her physician, independently of her parents' wishes, or that, even if she is not able to make this decision independently, the desired abortion would be in her best interests.  Such a procedure must ensure that the provision requiring parental consent does not, in fact, amount to an impermissible "absolute, and possibly arbitrary, veto."  Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U. S. 52,  428 U. S. 74.  Pp.  443 U. S. 642-644.4. The Massachusetts statute, as authoritatively interpreted by the Supreme Judicial Court, unduly burdens the right to seek an abortion.  The statute falls short of constitutional standards in two respects.  First, it permits judicial authorization for an abortion to be withheld from a minor who is found by the superior court to be mature and fully competent to make this decision independently.  Second, it requires parental consultation or notification in every instance, whether or not in the pregnant minor's best interests, without affording her an opportunity to receive an independent judicial determination that she is mature enough to consent or that an abortion would be in her best interests.  Pp.  443 U. S. 644-651.MR. JUSTICE STEVENS, joined by MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL, and MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN, concluded that the Massachusetts statute is unconstitutional because under the statute, as written and as construed by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, no minor, no matter how mature and capable of informed decisionmaking, may receive an abortion without the consent of either both parents or a superior court judge, thus making the minor's abortion decision subject in every instance to an absolute third-party veto.  Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U. S. 52, controlling.  Pp.  443 U. S. 652-656.POWELL, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which BURGER, C.J., and STEWART and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined.  Page 443 U. S. 624 REHNQUIST, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p.  443 U. S. 651.  STEVENS, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which BRENNAN, MARSHALL, and BLACKMUN, JJ., joined, post, p.  443 U. S. 652.  WHITE, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p.  443 U. S. 656.