MR. JUSTICE HARLAN delivered the opinion of the Court.The questions presented by this case are similar to those involved in No. 28, Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, decided today, ante, p.  366 U. S. 36.In 1954, petitioner, George Anastaplo, an instructor and research assistant at the University of Chicago, having previously passed his Illinois bar examinations, was denied admission to the bar of that State by the Illinois Supreme Court. [Footnote 1]  The denial was based upon his refusal to answer Page 366 U. S. 84 questions of the Committee on Character and Fitness as to whether he was a member of the Communist Party. [Footnote 2]  This Court, two Justices dissenting, refused review.  348 U.S. 946.  In 1957, following this Court's decisions in the earlier Konigsberg case, 353 U. S. 252, and in Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners of New Mexico, 353 U. S. 232, Anastaplo sought to have the Character Committee rehear his application for certification.  The Committee, by a divided vote, refused, but the State Supreme Court reversed and directed rehearing. [Footnote 3] Page 366 U. S. 85The ensuing lengthy proceedings before the Committee, [Footnote 4] at which Anastaplo was the only witness, are perhaps best described as a wide-ranging exchange between the Committee and Anastaplo in which the Committee sought to explore Anastaplo's ability conscientiously to swear support of the Federal and State Constitutions, as required by the Illinois attorneys' oath, and Anastaplo undertook to expound and defend, on historical and ideological premises, his abstract belief in the "right of revolution," and to resist, on grounds of asserted constitutional right and scruple, Committee questions which he deemed improper. [Footnote 5]  The Committee already had before it uncontroverted evidence as to Anastaplo's "good moral character," in the form of written statements or affidavits Page 366 U. S. 86 furnished by persons of standing acquainted with him, and the record on rehearing contains nothing which could properly be considered as reflecting adversely upon his character or reputation or on the sincerity of the beliefs he espoused before the Committee. [Footnote 6]  Anastaplo persisted, however, in refusing to answer, among other inquiries, [Footnote 7] the Committee's questions as to his possible membership in the Communist Party or in other allegedly related organizations.Thereafter the Committee, by a vote of 11 to 6, again declined to certify Anastaplo because of his refusal to answer such questions, the majority stating in its report to the Illinois Supreme Court:"his [Anastaplo's] failure to reply, in our view, (1) obstructs the lawful processes of the Committee, (ii) prevents inquiry into subjects which bear intimately upon the issue of character and fitness, such as loyalty to our basic institutions, belief in representative government and bona fides of the attorney's oath and (iii) results in his failure to meet the burden of establishing that he possesses the good moral character and fitness to practice law, which are conditions to the granting of a license to practice law.""We draw no inference of disloyalty or subversion from applicant's continued refusal to answer questions concerning Communist or other subversive affiliations.  We do, however, hold that there is a strong public interest in our being free to question applicants for admission to the bar on their adherence to our basic institutions and form of government Page 366 U. S. 87 and that such public interest in the character of its attorneys overrides an applicant's private interest in keeping such views to himself.  By failing to respond to this higher public interest, we hold that the applicant has obstructed the proper functions of the Committee. . . .  We cannot certify the applicant as worthy of the trust and confidence of the public when we do not know that he is so worthy and when he has prevented us from finding out."At the same time, the full Committee acknowledged that Anastaplo"is well regarded by his academic associates, by professors who had taught him in school and by members of the Bar who know him personally . . . ;"that it had"not been supplied with any information by any third party which is derogatory to Anastaplo's character or general reputation . . . ;"and that it had"received no information from any outside source which would cast any doubt on applicant's loyalty or which would tend to connect him in any manner with any subversive group."Further, the majority found that Anastaplo's views"with respect to the right to overthrow the government by force or violence, while strongly libertarian and expressed with an intensity and fervor not necessarily shared by all good citizens, are not inconsistent with those held by many patriotic Americans both at the present time and throughout the course of this country's history, and do not, in and of themselves, reveal any adherence to subversive doctrines. "Page 366 U. S. 88Upon review, the Illinois Supreme Court, over three dissents, [Footnote 8] confirmed the Committee's report and refusal to certify Anastaplo, reaffirming in its per curiam opinion the court's". . . earlier conclusion that a determination as to whether an applicant can in good conscience take the attorney's oath to support and defend the constitutions of the United States and the State of Illinois is impossible where he refuses to state whether he is a member of a group dedicated to the overthrow of the government of the United States by force and violence."18 Ill. 2d 182, 200�201, 163 N.E.2d 429, 439.  We granted certiorari, 362 U.S. 968, and set the matter for argument along with the Konigsberg case, p.  366 U. S. 36, and Cohen v. Hurley, post, p.  366 U. S. 117.Two of the basic issues in this litigation have been settled by our contemporary Konigsberg opinion.  We have there held it not constitutionally impermissible for a State, legislatively or through court-made regulation as here and in Konigsberg, to adopt a rule that an applicant will not be admitted to the practice of law if, and so long as, by refusing to answer material questions, he obstructs a bar examining committee in its proper functions of interrogating and cross-examining him upon his qualifications.  That such was a proper function of the Illinois Character Committee is incontestably established by the opinions of the State Supreme Court in this case.  3 Ill.2d Page 366 U. S. 89 at 476, 121 N.E.2d  at 829; 18 Ill. 2d  at 188, 163 N.E.2d  at 432. [Footnote 9]We have also held in Konigsberg that the State's interest in enforcing such a rule as applied to refusals to answer questions about membership in the Communist Party outweighs any deterrent effect upon freedom of speech and association, and hence that such state action does not offend the Fourteenth Amendment. [Footnote 10]  We think that, in this respect, no valid constitutional distinction can be based on the circumstance that, in Konigsberg, there was some, though weak, independent evidence that the applicant had once been connected with the Communist Party, while here, there was no such evidence as to Page 366 U. S. 90 Anastaplo.  Where, as with membership in the bar, the State may withhold a privilege available only to those possessing the requisite qualifications, it is of no constitutional significance whether the State's interrogation of an applicant on matters relevant to these qualifications -- in this case, Communist Party membership -- is prompted by information which it already has about him from other sources, or arises merely from a good faith belief in the need for exploratory or testing questioning of the applicant.  Were it otherwise, a bar examining committee such as this, having no resources of its own for independent investigation, might be placed in the untenable position of having to certify an applicant without assurance as to a significant aspect of his qualifications which the applicant himself is best circumstanced to supply.  The Constitution does not so unreasonably fetter the States. [Footnote 11]Two issues, however, do arise upon this record which are not disposed of by Konigsberg.  The first is whether Anastaplo was given adequate warning as to the consequences of his refusal to answer the Committee's questions relating to Communist Party membership.  The second is whether his exclusion from the bar on this ground was, in the circumstances of this case, arbitrary or discriminatory.IThe opinions below reflect full awareness on the part of the Character Committee and the Illinois Supreme Court of Anastaplo's constitutional right to be warned in advance of the consequences of his refusal to answer. [Footnote 12]  Page 366 U. S. 91 Cf. Konigsberg v. State Bar, at  353 U. S. 261.  On the part of Anastaplo, he stands in the unusual position of one who had already been clearly so warned as a result of his earlier exclusion from the bar for refusal to answer the very question which was again put to him on rehearing.  See note 2 supra.  Anastaplo nevertheless, contends, in effect, that he was lulled into a false sense of security by various occurrences at the Committee hearings:  (1) several statements by Committee members indicating that all questions asked and refused an answer should not be considered as bearing the same level of importance in the eyes of the Committee; [Footnote 13] and (2) a statement by one of the principal Committee members that Illinois had no "per se" rule of exclusion, that is that Anastaplo's refusal to answer would not automatically operate to exclude him from the bar. [Footnote 14] Page 366 U. S. 92These suggestions, whether taken separately or together, can only be viewed as insubstantial.  The sum and substance of the matter is that, throughout the renewed proceedings, petitioner was fully aware that his application for admission had already once been rejected on the very ground about which he now professes to have been left in doubt, and that the Committee made manifest both that it continued to attach special importance to its Communist Party affiliation questions and that adverse Page 366 U. S. 93 consequences might well follow if Anastaplo persisted in refusing to answer them.What follows will suffice to show that statements to the effect that the Committee as a whole did not necessarily approve or adopt every question asked by any of its members can hardly be taken as having left petitioner in doubt as to the central importance and general approval of questions about Communist Party membership.  At an early state of the proceedings, Anastaplo was informed:"Now you have asked for a warning when we put a question to you that we think is a pivotal, important question in connection with your qualification.  I must tell you that we consider that question, 'Are you a member of the Communist Party,' such a question, and that the refusal to answer it may have serious consequences to your application."And at the last hearing, one of the leading Committee members responded to Anastaplo's insistence on being told even more explicitly what refusals to answer would be of significance to the Committee by pointing out that"The Supreme Court of Illinois has ruled that it is proper for us to ask you whether you are a member of the Communist Party.  You have refused to answer the question. [Footnote 15]"Further, petitioner's repeated objections throughout the hearings to the effect that there was no basis for the Committee's evident purpose to give much greater emphasis to questions about Communist Party membership than to other unanswered inquiries dispel any doubt that Page 366 U. S. 94 Anastaplo was quite aware that Communist affiliation questions were to be treated differently from other questions he had refused to answer.The other aspect of petitioner's claim on lack of adequate warning is equally untenable.  It is true that the Committee told Anastaplo that his refusal to answer questions would not ipso facto result in his exclusion from the bar, but only that it "could and might."  This, however, certainly did not give rise to constitutional infirmity.  Even as to one charged with crime, due process does not demand that he be warned as to what specific sanction will be applied to him if he violates the law.  It is enough that he know what sanction "could and might" to no more.  It is, of course, indubitable that, by reason of the original rejection of his application, Anastaplo knew of Illinois' rule of exclusion for refusal to answer relevant questions -- indeed, the very questions involved here. [Footnote 16]Petitioner having been fairly warned that exclusion from admission to practice might follow from his refusal to answer, it must be found that this requirement of due process was duly met.IIPetitioner's claim that the application of the State's exclusionary rule was arbitrary and discriminatory in the circumstances of this case must also be rejected.  It is contended (1) that Anastaplo's refusal to answer these Page 366 U. S. 95 particular questions did not obstruct the Committee's investigation because that body already had before it uncontroverted evidence establishing petitioner's good character and fitness for the practice of law, and (2) that the real reason why the State proceeded as it did was because of its disapproval of Anastaplo's constitutionally protected views on the right to resist tyrannical government.  Neither contention can be accepted.It is sufficient to say in answer to the first contention that, even though the Committee already had before it substantial character evidence altogether favorable to Anastaplo, there is nothing in the Federal Constitution which required the Committee to draw the curtain upon its investigation at that point.  It had the right to supplement that evidence, and to test the applicant's own credibility by interrogating him.  And, to those ends, the Committee could insist upon unprivileged answers to relevant questions, such as we have held in our today's Konigsberg opinion those relating to Communist affiliations were, even though, as to them, the Committee could not, as it did not, draw an unfavorable inference from refusal to answer.  Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, supra..As to the second contention, there is nothing in the record which would justify our holding that the State has invoked its exclusionary "refusal to answer" rule as a mask for its disapproval of petitioner's notions on the right to overthrow tyrannical government. [Footnote 17]  While the Committee's majority report does observe that there was "a serious question" whether Anastaplo's views on the right to resist judicial decrees would be compatible with his taking of the attorney's oath, and that "certain" members of the Committee thought that such views affirmatively Page 366 U. S. 96 demonstrated his disqualification for admission to the bar, [Footnote 18] it is perfectly clear that the Illinois Bar Committee and Supreme Court regarded petitioner's refusal to cooperate in the Committee's examination of him as the basic and only reason for a denial of certification. [Footnote 19]A different conclusion is not suggested by the circumstances that the Committee, when it reheard Anastaplo, evidenced its willingness to consider the effect of petitioner's refusal to answer in light of what might transpire at the hearings, and that it continued to explore petitioner's views on resistance and overthrow long after it became clear that he would refuse to answer Communist affiliation questions.  These factors indicate no more that that the Committee was attempting to exercise an informed judgment as to whether the situation was an appropriate one for waiver of the Committee's continuing requirement, earlier enforced after the first Anastaplo hearings, that such questions must be answered.  Finally, contrary to the assumption on which some of the arguments on behalf of Anastaplo seem to have proceeded, we do not understand that Illinois' exclusionary requirement will continue to operate to exclude Anastaplo from the bar any longer than he continues in his refusal to answer.  We Page 366 U. S. 97 find nothing to suggest that he would not be admitted now if he decides to answer, assuming, of course, that no grounds justifying his exclusion from practice resulted.  In short, petitioner holds the key to admission in his own hands.We conclude with observing that our function here is solely one of constitutional adjudication, not to pass judgment on what has been done as if we were another state court of review, still less to express any view upon the wisdom of the State's action.  With appropriate regard for the limited range of our authority, we cannot say that the State's denial of Anastaplo's application for admission to its bar offends the Federal Constitution. [Footnote 20]  The judgment of the Illinois Supreme Court must therefore beAffirmed
U.S. Supreme CourtIn re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82 (1961)In re AnastaploNo. 58Argued December 14, 1960Decided April 24, 1961366 U.S. 82SyllabusA rule of the Supreme Court of Illinois provides that applicants shall be admitted by it to the practice of law after satisfactory examination by the Board of Examiners and certification of qualification by a Committee on Character and Fitness.  In hearings before that Committee, petitioner refused to answer any questions pertaining to his membership in the Communist Party, not on the ground of possible self-incrimination, but on the ground that such inquiries violated his freedom of speech and association.  The Committee declined to certify him as qualified for admission to the Bar, solely on the ground that his refusals to answer such questions had obstructed the Committee's performance of its functions.  The State Supreme Court denied him admission to practice.Held:  denial of petitioner's application for admission to the Bar on this ground did not violate his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.  Pp.  366 U. S. 83-97.(a) It is not constitutionally impermissible for a State to adopt a rule that an applicant will not be admitted to the practice of law if, and so long as, by refusing to answer material questions, he obstructs a bar examining committee in its proper functions of interrogating and cross-examining him upon his qualifications.  Konigsberg v. State Bar, ante, p.  366 U. S. 36.  P.  366 U. S. 88.(b) Petitioner was not privileged under the Fourteenth Amendment to refuse to answer questions concerning membership in the Communist Party.  Konigsberg v. State Bar, supra.  P.  366 U. S. 89.(c) The fact that there was no independent evidence that petitioner had ever been a member of the Communist Party did not prevent the State, acting in good faith, from making this inquiry in an investigation of this kind.  Pp.  366 U. S. 89-90.(d) During the hearings before the Committee, petitioner was given adequate warning as to the consequences of his refusal to answer the Committee's questions relating to membership in the Communist Party.  Pp.  366 U. S. 90-94.(e) In the circumstances of this case, petitioner's exclusion from the Bar on the ground that he had obstructed the Committee in the performance of its duties was not arbitrary or discriminatory.  Pp.  366 U. S. 94-97.18 Ill. 2d 182, 163 N.E.2d 429, affirmed. Page 366 U. S. 83