JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.It is a federal crime under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 to make any false or fraudulent statement in any matter within the jurisdiction of a federal agency. [Footnote 1]  To establish a violation of § 1001, the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the statement was made with knowledge of its falsity.  This case presents the question whether the Government Page 468 U. S. 65 also must prove that the false statement was made with actual knowledge of federal agency jurisdiction.IRespondent Esmail Yermian was convicted in the District Court of Central California on three counts of making false statements in a matter within the jurisdiction of a federal agency, in violation of § 1001.  The convictions were based on false statements respondent supplied his employer in connection with a Department of Defense security questionnaire.  Respondent was hired in 1979 by Gulton Industries, a defense contractor.  Because respondent was to have access to classified material in the course of his employment, he was required to obtain a Department of Defense Security Clearance.  To this end, Gulton's security officer asked respondent to fill out a "Worksheet For Preparation of Personnel Security Questionnaire."In response to a question on the worksheet asking whether he had ever been charged with any violation of law, respondent failed to disclose that, in 1978, he had been convicted of mail fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341.  In describing his employment history, respondent falsely stated that he had been employed by two companies that had in fact never employed him.  The Gulton security officer typed these false representations onto a form entitled "Department of Defense Personnel Security Questionnaire."  Respondent reviewed the typed document for errors and signed a certification stating that his answers were "true, complete, and correct to the best of [his] knowledge," and that he understood "that any misrepresentation or false statement . . . may subject [him] to prosecution under section 1001 of the United States Criminal Code."  App. 33.After witnessing respondent's signature, Gulton's security officer mailed the typed form to the Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office for processing.  Government investigators subsequently discovered that respondent had submitted Page 468 U. S. 66 false statements on the security questionnaire.  Confronted with this discovery, respondent acknowledged that he had responded falsely to questions regarding his criminal record and employment history.  On the basis of these false statements, respondent was charged with three counts in violation of § 1001.At trial, respondent admitted to having actual knowledge of the falsity of the statements he had submitted in response to the Department of Defense security questionnaire.  He explained that he had made the false statements so that information on the security questionnaire would be consistent with similar fabrications he had submitted to Gulton in his employment application.  Respondent's sole defense at trial was that he had no actual knowledge that his false statements would be transmitted to a federal agency. [Footnote 2]Consistent with this defense, respondent requested a jury instruction requiring the Government to prove not only that he had actual knowledge that his statements were false at the time they were made, but also that he had actual knowledge that those statements were made in a matter within the jurisdiction of a federal agency. [Footnote 3]  The District Court rejected that request, and instead instructed the jury that the Government must prove that respondent "knew or should have known Page 468 U. S. 67 that the information was to be submitted to a government agency." [Footnote 4]  Respondent's objection to this instruction was overruled, and the jury returned convictions on all three counts charged in the indictment.The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the District Court had erred in failing to give respondent's requested instruction.  708 F.2d 365 (1983).  The Court of Appeals read the statutory terms "knowingly and willfully" to modify both the conduct of making false statements and the circumstance that they be made "in any matter within the jurisdiction of [a federal agency]."  The court therefore concluded that. "as an essential element of a section 1001 violation, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knew at the time he made the false statement that it was made in a matter within the jurisdiction of a federal agency."  Id. at 371 (footnotes omitted).  The Court of Appeals rejected the Government's argument that the "reasonably foreseeable" standard provided by the District Court's jury instructions satisfied any element of intent possibly associated with the requirement that false statements be made within federal agency jurisdiction.  Id. at 371-372.The decision of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit conflicts with decisions by the three other Courts of Appeals Page 468 U. S. 68 that have considered the issue.  United States v. Baker, 626 F.2d 512 (CA5 1980); United States v. Lewis, 587 F.2d 854 (CA6 1978) (per curiam); United States v. Stanford, 589 F.2d 285 (CA7 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 983 (1979).  We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict, 464 U.S. 991 (1983), and now reverse.IIThe only issue presented in this case is whether Congress intended the terms "knowingly and willfully" in § 1001 to modify the statute's jurisdictional language, thereby requiring the Government to prove that false statements were made with actual knowledge of federal agency jurisdiction. [Footnote 5]  The issue thus presented is one of statutory interpretation.  Accordingly, we turn first to the language of the statute.AThe relevant language of § 1001 provides:"Whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States knowingly and willfully . . . makes any false, fictitious or fraudulent statements or representations, . . . shall be fined. . . ."The statutory language requiring that knowingly false statements be made "in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States" is a jurisdictional requirement.  Its primary purpose is to identify the factor that makes the false statement an appropriate subject for federal concern.  Jurisdictional language need not contain the same culpability requirement as other elements of the offense.  Indeed, we have held that"the existence of the fact Page 468 U. S. 69 that confers federal jurisdiction need not be one in the mind of the actor at the time he perpetrates the act made criminal by the federal statute."United States v. Feola, 420 U. S. 671,  420 U. S. 676-677, n. 9 (1975).  Certainly in this case, the statutory language makes clear that Congress did not intend the terms "knowingly and willfully" to establish the standard of culpability for the jurisdictional element of § 1001.  The jurisdictional language appears in a phrase separate from the prohibited conduct modified by the terms "knowingly and willfully."  Any natural reading of § 1001, therefore, establishes that the terms "knowingly and willfully" modify only the making of "false, fictitious or fraudulent statements," and not the predicate circumstance that those statements be made in a matter within the jurisdiction of a federal agency. [Footnote 6]  Once this is clear, there is no basis for requiring proof that the defendant had actual knowledge of federal agency jurisdiction.  The statute contains no language suggesting any additional element of intent, such as a requirement that false statements be "knowingly made in a matter within federal agency jurisdiction," or "with the intent to deceive the Federal Government."  On its face, therefore, § 1001 requires that the Government prove that false statements were made knowingly and willfully, and it unambiguously dispenses with any requirement that the Government also prove that those statements were made with actual knowledge - of federal Page 468 U. S. 70 agency jurisdiction. [Footnote 7]  Respondent's argument that the legislative history of the statute supports a contrary interpretation is unpersuasive.BThe first federal criminal statute prohibiting the making of a false statement in matters within the jurisdiction of any federal agency was the Act of October 23, 1918 (1918 Act), ch.194, 40 Stat. 1015. [Footnote 8]  That Act provided in pertinent part:"[W]hoever, . . . for the purpose and with the intent of cheating and swindling or defrauding the Government of the United States, or any department thereof, . . . shall knowingly and willfully . . . make . . . any false or fraudulent statements or representations . . . shall be fined. . . ."Interpreting that provision in United States v. Cohn, 270 U. S. 339 (1926), this Court held that only false statements made with intent to cause "pecuniary or property loss" to the Federal Government were prohibited.  Id. at  270 U. S. 346-347.  The Court rejected the Government's argument that the Page 468 U. S. 71 terms "with the intent of . . . defrauding" the Federal Government"should be construed as being used not merely in its primary sense of cheating the Government out of property or money, but also in the secondary sense of interfering with or obstructing one of its lawful governmental functions by deceitful and fraudulent means."Id. at 346.  The Court reasoned that, if Congress had intended to prohibit all intentional deceit of the Federal Government, it would have used the broad language then employed in § 37 of the Penal Code, which,"by its specific terms, extends broadly to every conspiracy 'to defraud the United States in any manner and for any purpose,' with no words of limitation whatsoever."Ibid.Concerned that the 1918 Act, as thus narrowly construed, was insufficient to protect the authorized functions of federal agencies from a variety of deceptive practices, Congress undertook to amend the federal false statements statute in 1934. [Footnote 9]  The 1934 provision finally enacted, however, rejected the language suggested in Cohn, and evidenced a conscious choice not to limit the prohibition to false statements made with specific intent to deceive the Federal Government.The first attempt to amend the false statements statute was unsuccessful.  After debates in both Houses, Congress passed H.R. 8046.  That bill provided in pertinent part:"[E]very person who with the intent to defraud the United States knowingly or willfully makes . . . any false or fraudulent . . . statement, . . . concerning or pertaining to any matter within the jurisdiction of any department, establishment, administration, agency, office, board, or commission of the United States, . . . shall be punished by . . . fine . . . or by imprisonment . . or by Page 468 U. S. 72 both. . . ."78 Cong.Rec. 3724 (1934) (emphasis added). [Footnote 10]  President Roosevelt, however, vetoed the bill because it prohibited only those offenses already covered by the 1918 Act, while reducing the penalties. [Footnote 11]  This was hardly the measure needed to increase the protection of federal agencies from the variety of deceptive practices plaguing the New Deal administration.To remedy the President's concerns, Congress quickly passed a second bill that broadened the scope of the federal false statements statute by omitting the specific intent language of the prior bill.  The 1934 provision finally enacted into law provided in pertinent part:"[W]hoever shall knowingly and willfully falsify or conceal or cover up by any trick, scheme, or device a material fact, or make . . . any false or fraudulent statements or representations, . . . in any matter within the jurisdiction Page 468 U. S. 73 of any department or agency of the United States . . . shall be fined. . . ."Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 587, 48 Stat. 996.  Noticeably lacking from this enactment is any requirement that the prohibited conduct be undertaken with specific intent to deceive the Federal Government, or with actual knowledge that false statements were made in a matter within federal agency jurisdiction.  If Congress had intended to impose either requirement, it would have modified the prior bill by replacing the phrase "with intent to defraud the United States" with the phrase "with intent to deceive the United States," [Footnote 12] or by inserting the phrase "knowing such statements to be in any matter within the jurisdiction of any federal agency."  That Congress did not include such language, either in the 1934 enactment or in the 1948 revision, provides convincing evidence that the statute does not require actual knowledge of federal involvement. [Footnote 13]Finally, there is no support in the legislative history for respondent's argument that the terms "knowingly and willfully" modify the phrase "in any matter within the jurisdiction of [a federal agency]."  The terms "knowingly and willfully" appeared in the 1918 Act, but the phrase "in any matter within the jurisdiction of [a federal agency]" did not.  It is clear, therefore, that in the 1918 Act, the terms "knowingly Page 468 U. S. 74 and willfully" did not require proof of actual knowledge of federal involvement.  Nor does the legislative history suggest that, by adding the jurisdictional prerequisite to the current provision, Congress intended to extend the scope of those two terms.  The jurisdictional language was added to the current provision solely to limit the reach of the false statements statute to matters of federal interest.By requiring proof of specific intent to defraud the United States, Congress limited the 1918 prohibition to matters pertaining to federal concern.  There was no reason, therefore, to include the phrase "in any matter within the jurisdiction of [a federal agency]."  Once the specific intent language of the 1918 Act was eliminated, however, the current jurisdictional phrase was necessary to ensure that application of the federal prohibition remained limited to issues of federal concern.  There is no indication that the addition of this phrase was intended also to change the meaning of the terms "knowingly and willfully" to require proof of actual knowledge of federal involvement.  As this Court observed in United States v. Bramblett, 348 U. S. 503 (1955), the 1934 enactment "deleted all words as to purpose," and inserted the phrase "in any matter within the jurisdiction" of a federal agency "simply to compensate for the deleted language as to purpose -- to indicate that not all falsifications, but only those made to government organs, were reached."  Id. at  348 U. S. 506,  348 U. S. 507-508.IIIRespondent argues that, absent proof of actual knowledge of federal agency jurisdiction, § 1001 becomes a "trap for the unwary," imposing criminal sanctions on "wholly innocent conduct."  Whether or not respondent fairly may characterize the intentional and deliberate lies prohibited by the statute (and manifest in this case) as "wholly innocent conduct," this argument is not sufficient to overcome the express statutory language of § 1001.  Respondent does not argue that Congress lacks the power to impose criminal sanctions for Page 468 U. S. 75 deliberately false statements submitted to a federal agency, regardless of whether the person who made such statements actually knew that they were being submitted to the Federal Government.  Cf. Feola, 420 U.S. at  420 U. S. 676, n. 9.  That is precisely what Congress has done here.  In the unlikely event that § 1001 could be the basis for imposing an unduly harsh result on those who intentionally make false statements to the Federal Government, it is for Congress, and not this Court, to amend the criminal statute. [Footnote 14]IVBoth the plain language and the legislative history establish that proof of actual knowledge of federal agency jurisdiction is not required under 1001.  Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals to the contrary.It is so ordered
U.S. Supreme CourtUnited States v. Yermian, 468 U.S. 63 (1984)United States v. YermianNo. 83-346Argued March 27, 1984Decided June 27, 1984468 U.S. 63SyllabusTitle 18 U.S.C. § 1001 provides that"[w]hoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States knowingly and willfully . . . makes any false, fictitious or fraudulent statements . . . shall be fined. . . ."Respondent was convicted in Federal District Court of violating § 1001 on the basis of false statements he furnished his defense contractor employer in connection with a Department of Defense security questionnaire.  At trial, respondent admitted having actual knowledge of the falsity of the statements, but requested a jury instruction requiring the Government to prove not only that he had actual knowledge of the falsity but also that he had actual knowledge that the statements were made in a matter within the jurisdiction of a federal agency.  The District Court rejected this request and instead, over respondent's objection, instructed the jury that the Government must prove that respondent "knew or should have known" that the information was to be submitted to a federal agency.  The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the District Court erred in failing to give respondent's requested instruction.Held:  Both the plain language and legislative history of § 1001 establish that proof of actual knowledge of federal agency jurisdiction is not required to obtain a conviction under the statute.  Pp.  468 U. S. 68-75.(a) Any natural reading of § 1001 establishes that the terms "knowingly and willfully" modify only the making of "false, fictitious or fraudulent statements," and not the predicate circumstance that those statements be made in a matter within the jurisdiction of a federal agency.  Once this is clear, there is no basis for requiring proof that the defendant had actual knowledge of federal agency jurisdiction.  Pp.  468 U. S. 68-70.(b) The legislative history supports the plain language of the statute.  That Congress, when it amended the statute in 1934 and 1948, did not include any requirement that the prohibited conduct be undertaken with specific intent to deceive the Government, or with actual knowledge that false statements were made in a matter within federal agency jurisdiction, provides convincing evidence that the statute does not require actual knowledge of federal involvement.  Nor is there any support in the legislative history that the term "knowingly and willfully" modifies Page 468 U. S. 64 the phrase "in any matter within the jurisdiction of [a federal] agency."  Pp.  468 U. S. 70-74.(c) Respondent's argument that, absent proof of actual knowledge of federal agency jurisdiction, § 1001 becomes a "trap for the unwary," imposing criminal sanctions on innocent conduct, is not sufficient to overcome the express statutory language of § 1001, and does not authorize this Court to amend the statute in a manner unintended by Congress.  Pp.  468 U. S. 74-75.708 F.2d 365, reversed.POWELL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J., and WHITE, MARSHALL, and BLACKMUN, JJ., joined.  REHNQUIST, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN, STEVENS, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined, post, p.  468 U. S. 75.