JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court.The question presented for decision is whether, under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), a fiduciary to an employee benefit plan may be held personally liable to a plan participant or beneficiary for extracontractual compensatory or punitive damages caused by improper or untimely processing of benefit claims.Respondent Doris Russell, a claims examiner for petitioner Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Company (hereafter petitioner), is a beneficiary under two employee benefit plans administered by petitioner for eligible employees.  Both plans are funded from the general assets of petitioner, and both are governed by ERISA.In May, 1979, respondent became disabled with a back ailment.  She received plan benefits until October 17, 1979, when, based on the report of an orthopedic surgeon, petitioner's disability committee terminated her benefits.  On October 22, 1979, she requested internal review of that decision and, on November 27, 1979, submitted a report from her own psychiatrist indicating that she suffered from a psychosomatic disability with physical manifestations, rather than an orthopedic illness.  After an examination by a second psychiatrist on February 15, 1980, had confirmed that respondent was temporarily disabled, the plan administrator reinstated her benefits on March 11, 1980.   Two days later, retroactive benefits were paid in full. [Footnote 1]Although respondent has been paid all benefits to which she is contractually entitled, she claims to have been injured by the improper refusal to pay benefits from October 17, 1979, when her benefits were terminated, to March 11, 1980, when her eligibility was restored.  Among other allegations, she asserts that the fiduciaries administering petitioner's employee benefit plans are high-ranking company officials who Page 473 U. S. 137 (1) ignored readily available medical evidence documenting respondent's disability, (2) applied unwarrantedly strict eligibility standards, and (3) deliberately took 132 days to process her claim, in violation of regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Labor. [Footnote 2]  The interruption of benefit payments allegedly forced respondent's disabled husband to cash out his retirement savings which, in turn, aggravated the psychological condition that caused respondent's back ailment.  Accordingly, she sued petitioner in the California Superior Court pleading various causes of action based on state law and on ERISA.Petitioner removed the case to the United States District Court for the Central District of California, and moved for summary judgment.  The District Court granted the motion, holding that the state law claims were preempted by ERISA and that"ERISA bars any claims for extra-contractual damages and punitive damages arising out of the original denial of plaintiff's claims for benefits under the Salary Continuance Plan and the subsequent review thereof."App. to Pet. for Cert. 29a.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part.  722 F.2d 482 (1983).  Although it agreed with the District Court that respondent's state law causes of action were preempted by ERISA, it held that her complaint alleged a cause of action under ERISA.  See id. at 487-492.  The court reasoned that the 132 days [Footnote 3] petitioner took to process respondent's claim violated the fiduciary's obligation to process claims in good faith and in a fair and diligent manner.  Id. at Page 473 U. S. 138 488.  The court concluded that this violation gave rise to a cause of action under § 409(a) that could be asserted by a plan beneficiary pursuant to § 502(a)(2).  Id. at 489-490.  It read the authorization in § 409(a) of "such other equitable or remedial relief as the court may deem appropriate" as giving it "wide discretion as to the damages to be awarded," including compensatory and punitive damages.  Id. at 490-491.According to the Court of Appeals, the award of compensatory damages shall "remedy the wrong and make the aggrieved individual whole," which meant not merely contractual damages for loss of plan benefits, but relief"that will compensate the injured party for all losses and injuries sustained as a direct and proximate cause of the breach of fiduciary duty,"including "damages for mental or emotional distress."  Id. at 490.  Moreover, the liability under § 409(a) "is against the fiduciary personally, not the plan."  Id. at 490, n. 8.The Court of Appeals also held that punitive damages could be recovered under § 409(a), although it decided that such an award is permitted only if the fiduciary "acted with actual malice or wanton indifference to the rights of a participant or beneficiary."  Id. at 492.  The court believed that this result was supported by the text of § 409(a) and by the congressional purpose to provide broad remedies to redress and prevent violations of the Act.We granted certiorari, 469 U.S. 816 (1984), to review both the compensatory and punitive components of the Court of Appeals' holding that § 409 authorizes recovery of extracontractual damages. [Footnote 4]  Respondent defends the judgment of the Court of Appeals both on its reasoning that § 409 provides an express basis for extracontractual damages, as well as by arguing that, in any event, such a private remedy should be inferred under the analysis employed in Cort v. Ash, 422 U. S. 66,  473 U. S. 78 (1975).  We reject both arguments. Page 473 U. S. 139IAs its caption implies, § 409(a) establishes "LIABILITY FOR BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY." [Footnote 5]  Specifically, it provides:"(a) Any person who is a fiduciary with respect to a plan who breaches any of the responsibilities, obligations, or duties imposed upon fiduciaries by this title shall be personally liable to make good to such plan any losses to the plan resulting from each such breach, and to restore to such plan any profits of such fiduciary which have been made through use of assets of the plan by the fiduciary, and shall be subject to such other equitable or remedial relief as the court may deem appropriate, including removal of such fiduciary.  A fiduciary may also be removed for a violation of section 411 of this Act. [Footnote 6]"88 Stat. 886, 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a).Sections 501 and 502 authorize, respectively, criminal and civil enforcement of the Act.  While the former section provides for criminal penalties against any person who willfully violates any of the reporting and disclosure requirements of the Act, [Footnote 7] the latter section identifies six types of civil actions Page 473 U. S. 140 that may be brought by various parties.  Most relevant to our inquiry is § 502(a), which provides in part:"A civil action may be brought -- ""(1) by a participant or beneficiary -- ""(A) for the relief provided for in subsection (c) of this section, or""(B) to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan;""(2) by the Secretary, or by a participant, beneficiary or fiduciary for appropriate relief under section 409. . . ."88 Stat. 891, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a).There can be no disagreement with the Court of Appeals' conclusion that § 502(a)(2) authorizes a beneficiary to bring an action against a fiduciary who has violated § 409.  Petitioner contends, however, that recovery for a violation of § 409 inures to the benefit of the plan as a whole.  We find this contention supported by the text of § 409, by the statutory provisions defining the duties of a fiduciary, and by the provisions defining the rights of a beneficiary.The Court of Appeals' opinion focused on the reference in § 409 to "such other equitable or remedial relief as the court may deem appropriate."  But when the entire section is examined, the emphasis on the relationship between the fiduciary and the plan as an entity becomes apparent.  Thus, not only is the relevant fiduciary relationship characterized at the outset as one "with respect to a plan," but the potential personal liability of the fiduciary is"to make good to such plan any losses to the plan . . . and to restore to such plan any profits of such fiduciary which have been made through use of assets of the plan. . . . [Footnote 8] "Page 473 U. S. 141To read directly from the opening clause of § 409(a), which identifies the proscribed acts, to the "catchall" remedy phrase at the end -- skipping over the intervening language establishing remedies benefiting, in the first instance, solely Page 473 U. S. 142 the plan -- would divorce the phrase being construed from its context and construct an entirely new class of relief available to entities other than the plan.  Cf. FMC v. Seatrain Lines, Inc., 411 U. S. 726,  411 U. S. 734 (1973); United States v. Jones, 131 U. S. 1,  131 U. S. 19 (1889).  This "blue pencil" method of statutory interpretation -- omitting all words not part of the clauses deemed pertinent to the task at hand -- impermissibly ignores the relevant context in which statutory language subsists.  See Jarecki v. G. D. Searle & Co., 367 U. S. 303,  367 U. S. 307 (1961).  In this case, this mode of interpretation would render superfluous the preceding clauses providing relief singularly to the plan, and would slight the language following after the phrase "such other equitable or remedial relief."  Congress specified that this remedial phrase includes "removal of such fiduciary" -- an example of the kind of "plan-related" relief provided by the more specific clauses it succeeds.  A fair contextual reading of the statute makes it abundantly clear that its draftsmen were primarily concerned with the possible misuse of plan assets, and with remedies that would protect the entire plan, rather than with the rights of an individual beneficiary. [Footnote 9]It is, of course, true that the fiduciary obligations of plan administrators are to serve the interest of participants and beneficiaries and, specifically, to provide them with the benefits authorized by the plan.  But the principal statutory duties imposed on the trustees relate to the proper management, administration, and investment of fund assets, the maintenance of proper records, the disclosure of specified information, Page 473 U. S. 143 and the avoidance of conflicts of interest. [Footnote 10]  Those duties are described in Part 4 of Title 1 of the Act, which is entitled "FIDUCIARY RESPONSIBILITY," see §§ 401-414, 88 Stat. 874-890, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1114, whereas the statutory provisions relating to claim procedures are found in Part 5, dealing with "ADMINISTRATION AND ENFORCEMENT."  §§ 502(a), 503, 88 Stat. 891, 893, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1132(a), 1133.  The only section that concerns review of a claim that has been denied -- § 503 -- merely specifies that every plan shall comply with certain regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Labor. [Footnote 11] Page 473 U. S. 144The Secretary's regulations contemplate that a decision"shall be made promptly, and shall not ordinarily be made later than 60 days after the plan's receipt of a request for review, unless special circumstances . . . require an extension of time for processing, in which case a decision shall be rendered as soon as possible, but not later than 120 days after receipt of a request for review."29 CFR § 2560.5031(h)(1)(i) (1984).  Nothing in the regulations or in the statute, however, expressly provides for a recovery from either the plan itself or from its administrators if greater time is required to determine the merits of an application for benefits.  Rather, the regulations merely state that a claim may be treated as having been denied after the 60- or 120-day period has elapsed.  See § 2560.503-1(h)(4) ("If the decision on review is not furnished within such time, the claim shall be deemed denied on review" (emphasis added)).  This provision therefore enables a claimant to bring a civil action to have the merits of his application determined, just as he may bring an action to challenge an outright denial of benefits.  Significantly, the statutory provision explicitly authorizing a beneficiary to bring an action to enforce his rights under the plan -- § 502(a)(1)(B), quoted supra, at  473 U. S. 140 -- says nothing about the recovery of extracontractual damages, or about the possible consequences of delay in the plan administrators' processing of a disputed claim.  Thus, there really is nothing at all in the statutory text to support the conclusion that such a delay gives rise to a private right of action for compensatory or punitive relief.  And the entire text of § 409 persuades us that Congress did not intend that section to authorize any relief except for the plan itself.  In short, unlike the Court of Appeals, we do not find in § 409 express authority for an award of extracontractual damages to a beneficiary. [Footnote 12] Page 473 U. S. 145IIRelying on the four-factor analysis employed by the Court in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. at  422 U. S. 78, [Footnote 13] respondent argues that a private right of action for extracontractual damages should be implied even if it is not expressly authorized by ERISA.  Two of the four Cort factors unquestionably support respondent's claim:  respondent is a member of the class for whose benefit the statute was enacted and, in view of the preemptive effect of ERISA, there is no state law impediment to implying a remedy.  But the two other factors -- legislative intent and consistency with the legislative scheme -- point in the opposite direction.  And"unless this congressional intent can be inferred from the language of the statute, the statutory structure, or some other source, the essential predicate for implication of a private remedy simply does not exist."Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers, 451 U. S. 77,  451 U. S. 94 (1981).  "The federal judiciary will not engraft a remedy on a statute, no matter how salutary, that Congress did not intend to provide."  California v. Sierra Club, 451 U. S. 287,  451 U. S. 297(1981).The voluminous legislative history of the Act contradicts respondent's position.  It is true that an early version of the Page 473 U. S. 146 statute contained a provision for "legal or equitable" relief that was described in both the Senate and House Committee Reports as authorizing "the full range of legal and equitable remedies available in both state and federal courts."  H.R.Rep. No. 93-533, p. 17 (1973), 2 Leg.Hist. 2364; S.Rep. No. 93-127, p. 35 (1973), 1 Leg.Hist. 621.  But that language appeared in Committee Reports describing a version of the bill before the debate on the floor and before the Senate-House Conference Committee had finalized the operative language. [Footnote 14]  In the bill passed by the House of Representatives and ultimately adopted by the Conference Committee, the reference to legal relief was deleted.  The language relied on by respondent and by the Court of Appeals below, therefore, is of little help in understanding whether Congress intended to make fiduciaries personally liable to beneficiaries for extracontractual damages.The six carefully integrated civil enforcement provisions found in § 502(a) of the statute as finally enacted, however, provide strong evidence that Congress did not intend to authorize other remedies that it simply forgot to incorporate expressly.  The assumption of inadvertent omission is rendered especially suspect upon close consideration of ERISA's interlocking, interrelated, and interdependent remedial scheme, which is in turn part of a "comprehensive and reticulated statute."  Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, 446 U. S. 359,  446 U. S. 361 (1980).  If in this case, for example, the plan administrator had adhered to his initial determination that respondent was not entitled to disability benefits under the plan, respondent would have had a panoply of remedial devices at her disposal.  To recover the Page 473 U. S. 147 benefits due her, she could have filed an action pursuant to § 502(a)(1)(B) to recover accrued benefits, to obtain a declaratory judgment that she is entitled to benefits under the provisions of the plan contract, and to enjoin the plan administrator from improperly refusing to pay benefits in the future.  If the plan administrator's refusal to pay contractually authorized benefits had been willful and part of a larger systematic breach of fiduciary obligations, respondent in this hypothetical could have asked for removal of the fiduciary pursuant to §§ 502(a)(2) and 409.  Finally, in answer to a possible concern that attorney's fees might present a barrier to maintenance of suits for small claims, thereby risking underenforcement of beneficiaries' statutory rights, it should be noted that ERISA authorizes the award of attorney's fees.  See § 502(g), 88 Stat. 892, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1).We are reluctant to tamper with an enforcement scheme crafted with such evident care as the one in ERISA.  As we stated in Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U. S. 11,  444 U. S. 19 (1979):  "[W]here a statute expressly provides a particular remedy or remedies, a court must be chary of reading others into it."  See also Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U. S. 560,  442 U. S. 571-574 (1979)."The presumption that a remedy was deliberately omitted from a statute is strongest when Congress has enacted a comprehensive legislative scheme including an integrated system of procedures for enforcement."Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers, 451 U.S. at  451 U. S. 97. [Footnote 15] Page 473 U. S. 148In contrast to the repeatedly emphasized purpose to protect contractually defined benefits, [Footnote 16] there is a stark absence -- in the statute itself and in its legislative history -- of any reference to an intention to authorize the recovery of extracontractual damages. [Footnote 17]  Because"neither the statute nor the legislative history reveals a congressional intent to create a private right of action . . . we need not carry the Cort v. Ash inquiry further."Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers, 451 U.S. at  451 U. S. 94, n. 31.IIIThus, the relevant text of ERISA, the structure of the entire statute, and its legislative history all support the conclusion that, in § 409(a), Congress did not provide, and did not intend the judiciary to imply, a cause of action for extracontractual damages caused by improper or untimely processing of benefit claims.The judgment of the Court of Appeals is thereforeReversed
U.S. Supreme CourtMass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134 (1985)Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. RussellNo. 84-9Argued January 16, 1985Reargued April 24, 1985Decided June 27, 1985473 U.S. 134SyllabusRespondent, a claims examiner for petitioner insurance company (petitioner), is a beneficiary under employee benefit plans administered by petitioner and governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).  In May, 1979, respondent became disabled with a back ailment, and received plan benefits until October 17, 1979, when petitioner's disability committee terminated her benefits based on an orthopedic surgeon's report.  Respondent then requested review of that decision, and on March 11, 1980, the plan administrator reinstated her benefits based on further medical reports, and retroactive benefits were paid in full.  But claiming that she had been injured by the improper refusal to pay benefits from October 17, 1979, to March 11, 1980, respondent sued petitioner in California Superior Court, alleging various causes of action based on state law and on ERISA.  Petitioner removed the case to Federal District Court, which granted petitioner's motion for summary judgment, holding, inter alia, that ERISA barred any claims for extracontractual damages arising out of the original denial of respondent's claim for benefits.  The Court of Appeals reversed in pertinent part, holding that the 132 days that petitioner took to process respondent's claim violated the plan fiduciary's obligation to process claims in good faith and in a fair and diligent manner, and that this violation gave rise to a cause of action for damages under § 409(a) of ERISA that could be asserted by a plan beneficiary pursuant to § 502(a)(2) authorizing civil enforcement of ERISA.  Section 409(a) provides that"[a]ny person who is a fiduciary with respect to a plan who breaches any of the responsibilities, obligations, or duties imposed upon fiduciaries by this title shall be personally liable to make good to such plan any losses to the plan resulting from such breach, and to restore to such plan any profits of such fiduciary which have been made through use of assets of the plan by the fiduciary, and shall be subject to such other equitable or remedial relief as the court may deem appropriate, including removal of such fiduciary."Held:  Section 409(a) does not provide a cause of action for extracontractual damages to a beneficiary caused by improper or untimely processing of benefit claims.  Pp.  473 U. S. 139-148. Page 473 U. S. 135(a) The text of § 409(a) contains no express authority for an award of such damages, and there is nothing in the text to support the conclusion that a delay in processing a disputed claim gives rise to a private cause of action for compensatory or punitive relief.  Rather, the text shows that Congress did not intend to authorize any relief except for the plan itself.  Not only is the relevant fiduciary relationship characterized at the outset of § 409(a) as one "with respect to a plan," but the fiduciary's potential personal liability is"to make good to such plan any losses to the plan . . . and to restore to such plan any profits of such fiduciary which have been made through use of assets of the plan."Pp.  473 U. S. 139-144.(b) Nor can a private cause of action for extra-contractual damages be implied.  While respondent is a member of the class for whose benefit ERISA was enacted and, in view of the preemptive effect of ERISA, there is no state law impediment to implying a remedy, legislative intent and consistency with the legislative scheme support the conclusion that Congress did not intend the judiciary to imply such a cause of action.  The civil enforcement provisions of § 502(a) provide strong evidence that Congress did not intend to authorize other remedies that it did not incorporate expressly.  Pp.  473 U. S. 145-148.722 F.2d 482, reversed.STEVENS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J., and POWELL, REHNQUIST, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined.  BRENNAN, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which WHITE, MARSHALL, and BLACKMUN, JJ., joined, post, p.  473 U. S. 148. Page 473 U. S. 136