MR. JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.This case involves a nontax criminal prosecution in which the Government introduced petitioner's income tax returns to prove the offense against him.  The question is whether the introduction of this evidence, over petitioner's Fifth Amendment objection, violated the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination when petitioner made the incriminating disclosures on his returns instead of then claiming the privilege.IPetitioner, Roy Garner, was indicated for a conspiracy involving the use of interstate transportation and communication facilities to "fix" sporting contests, to transmit bets and information assisting in the placing of bets, and to distribute the resultant illegal proceeds.  18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 224, 1084, 1952. [Footnote 1]  The Government's case was that conspirators bet on horse races either having fixed them or while in possession of other information unavailable to the general public.  Garner's role in this scheme was the furnishing of inside information.  The case against him included the testimony of other conspirators and telephone toll records that showed calls from Garner to other conspirators before various bets were placed.The Government also introduced, over Garner's Fifth Amendment objection, the Form 1040 income tax returns that Garner had filed for 1965, 1966, and 1967.  In the 1965 return, Garner had reported his occupation as "professional Page 424 U. S. 650 gambler," and in each return he reported substantial income from "gambling" or "wagering."  The prosecution relied on Garner's familiarity with "the business of wagering and gambling," as reflected in his returns, to help rebut his claim that his relationships with other conspirators were innocent ones.The jury returned a guilty verdict.  Garner appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, contending that the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination entitled him to exclude the tax returns despite his failure to claim the privilege on the returns instead of making disclosures.  Sitting en banc the Court of Appeals held that Garner's failure to assert the privilege on his returns defeated his Fifth Amendment claim.  501 F.2d 236. [Footnote 2]  We agree.IIIn United States v. Sullivan, 274 U. S. 259 (1927), the Court held that the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination is not a defense to prosecution for failing to file a return at all.  But the Court indicated that the privilege could be claimed against specific disclosures sought on a return, saying:"If the form of return provided called for answers that the defendant was privileged from making he could have raised the objection in the return, but could not on that account refuse to make any return at all."Id. at  274 U. S. 263. [Footnote 3] Page 424 U. S. 651Had Garner invoked the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination on his tax returns in lieu of supplying the information used against him, the Internal Revenue Service could have proceeded in either or both of two ways.  First, the Service could have sought to have Garner criminally prosecuted under § 7203 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (Code), 26 U.S.C. § 7203, which proscribes, among other things, the willful failure to make a return. [Footnote 4]  Second, the Service could have sought to complete Garner's returns administratively "from [its] own knowledge and from such information as [it could] obtain through testimony or otherwise."  26 U.S.C. § 6020(b)(1).  Section 7602(2) of the Code authorizes the Service in such circumstances to summon the taxpayer to appear and to produce records or give testimony.  26 Page 424 U. S. 652 U.S.C. § 7602(2). [Footnote 5]  If Garner had persisted in his claim when summoned, the Service could have sued for enforcement in district court, subjecting Garner to the threat of the court's contempt power.  26 U.S.C. § 7604. [Footnote 6]Given Sullivan, it cannot fairly be said that taxpayers are "volunteers" when they file their tax returns.  The Government compels the filing of a return much as it compels, for example, the appearance of a "witness" [Footnote 7] before a grand jury.  The availability to the Service of § 7203 prosecutions and the summons procedure also induces taxpayers to disclose unprivileged information on their Page 424 U. S. 653 returns.  The question, however, is whether the Government can be said to have compelled Garner to incriminate himself with regard to specific disclosures made on his return when he could have claimed the Fifth Amendment privilege instead.IIIWe start from the fundamental proposition:"[A] witness protected by the privilege may rightfully refuse to answer unless and until he is protected at least against the use of his compelled answers and evidence derived therefrom in any subsequent criminal case in which he is a defendant.  Kastigar v. United States, 406 U. S. 441 (1972).  Absent such protection, if he is nevertheless compelled to answer, his answers are inadmissible against him in a later criminal prosecution.  Bram v. United States, [168 U.S. 532 (1897)]; Boyd v. United States, [116 U.S. 616 (1886)]."Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U. S. 70,  414 U. S. 78 (1973).  See Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U. S. 52,  378 U. S. 57 n. 6 (1964).Because the privilege protects against the use of compelled statements as well as guarantees the right to remain silent absent immunity, the inquiry in a Fifth Amendment case is not ended when an incriminating statement is made in lieu of a claim of privilege.  Nor, however, is failure to claim the privilege irrelevant.The Court has held that an individual under compulsion to make disclosures as a witness who revealed information instead of claiming the privilege lost the benefit of the privilege.  United States v. Kordel, 397 U. S. 1,  397 U. S. 7-10 (1970).  Although Kordel appears to be the only square holding to this effect, the Court frequently has recognized the principle in dictum.  Maness v. Meyers, 419 U. S. 449,  419 U. S. 466 (1975); Rogers v. United States, 340 Page 424 U. S. 654 U.S. 367,  340 U. S. 370-371 (1951); Smith v. United States, 337 U. S. 137,  337 U. S. 150 (1949); United States v. Monia, 317 U. S. 424,  317 U. S. 427 (1943); Vajtauer v. Commissioner of Immigration, 273 U. S. 103,  273 U. S. 112-113 (1927). [Footnote 8]  These decisions stand for the proposition that, in the ordinary case, if a witness under compulsion to testify makes disclosures instead of claiming the privilege, the government has not "compelled" him to incriminate himself. [Footnote 9]"The Amendment speaks of compulsion.  It does not preclude a witness from testifying voluntarily in matters which may incriminate him.  If, therefore, he desires the protection of the privilege, he Page 424 U. S. 655 must claim it or he will not be considered to have been 'compelled' within the meaning of the Amendment."United States v. Monia, supra at  317 U. S. 427 (footnote omitted).In their insistence upon a claim of privilege, Kordel and the older witness cases reflect an appropriate accommodation of the Fifth Amendment privilege and the generally applicable principle that governments have the right to everyone's testimony.  Mason v. United States, 244 U. S. 362,  244 U. S. 364-365 (1917); see, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U. S. 665,  408 U. S. 688 (1972); Kastigar v. United States, 406 U. S. 441,  406 U. S. 443-445 (1972).  Despite its cherished position, the Fifth Amendment addresses only a relatively narrow scope of inquiries.  Unless the government seeks testimony that will subject its giver to criminal liability, the constitutional right to remain silent absent immunity does not arise.  An individual therefore properly may be compelled to give testimony, for example, in a noncriminal investigation of himself.  See, e.g., Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U. S. 273,  392 U. S. 278 (1968).  Unless a witness objects, a government ordinarily may assume that its compulsory processes are not eliciting testimony that he deems to be incriminating.  Only the witness knows whether the apparently innocent disclosure sought may incriminate him, and the burden appropriately lies with him to make a timely assertion of the privilege.  If, instead, he discloses the information sought, any incriminations properly are viewed as not compelled.In addition, the rule that a witness must claim the privilege is consistent with the fundamental purpose of the Fifth Amendment -- the preservation of an adversary system of criminal justice.  See Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U. S. 406,  382 U. S. 415 (1966).  That system is undermined when a government deliberately seeks to Page 424 U. S. 656 avoid the burdens of independent investigation by compelling self-incriminating disclosures.  In areas where a government cannot be said to be compelling such information, however, there is no such circumvention of the constitutionally mandated policy of adversary criminal proceedings.  Cf. Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U. S. 547,  142 U. S. 562-565 (1892); California v. Byers, 402 U. S. 424,  402 U. S. 456-458 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in judgment).IVThe information revealed in the preparation and filing of an income tax return is, for purposes of Fifth Amendment analysis, the testimony of a "witness," as that term is used herein.  Since Garner disclosed information on his returns instead of objecting, his Fifth Amendment claim would be defeated by an application of the general requirement that witnesses must claim the privilege.  Garner, however, resists the application of that requirement, arguing that incriminating disclosures made in lieu of objection are "compelled" in the tax-return context.  He relies specifically on three situations in which incriminatory disclosures have been considered compelled despite a failure to claim the privilege. [Footnote 10]  But in each of these narrowly defined situations, some factor not present here made inappropriate the general rule that the privilege Page 424 U. S. 657 must be claimed.  In each situation the relevant factor was held to deny the individual a "free choice to admit, to deny, or to refuse to answer."  Lisenba v. California, 314 U. S. 219,  314 U. S. 241 (1941).  For the reasons stated below, we conclude that no such factor deprived Garner of that free choice.AGarner relies first on cases dealing with coerced confessions, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966), where the Court has required the exclusion of incriminating statements unless there has been a knowing and intelligent waiver of the privilege regardless of whether the privilege has been claimed.  Id. at  384 U. S. 467-469,  384 U. S. 475-477.  Garner notes that it has not been shown that his failure to claim the privilege was such a waiver.It is evident that these cases have little to do with disclosures on a tax return.  The coerced confession cases present the entirely different situation of custodial interrogation.  See id. at  384 U. S. 467.  It is presumed that, without proper safeguards, the circumstances of custodial interrogation deny an individual the ability freely to choose to remain silent.  See ibid.  At the same time, the inquiring government is acutely aware of the potentially incriminatory nature of the disclosures sought.  Thus, any pressures inherent in custodial interrogation are compulsions to incriminate, not merely compulsions to make unprivileged disclosures.  Because of the danger that custodial interrogation posed to the adversary system favored by the privilege, the Court in Miranda was impelled to adopt the extraordinary safeguard of excluding statements made without a knowing and intelligent waiver of the privilege.  Id. at  384 U. S. 467,  384 U. S. 475-476; see Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U. S. 96,  423 U. S. 97 (1975); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U. S. 218,  412 U. S. 246-247 (1973).  Nothing in this case suggests the need for a similar presumption Page 424 U. S. 658 that a taxpayer makes disclosures on his return, rather than claims the privilege, because his will is overborne.  In fact, a taxpayer, who can complete his return at leisure and with legal assistance, is even less subject to the psychological pressures at issue in Miranda than a witness who has been called to testify in judicial proceedings.  Cf. United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. at  397 U. S. 9-10; Miranda, supra at  384 U. S. 461.BGarner relies next on Mackey v. United States, 401 U. S. 667 (1971), the relevance of which can be understood only in light of Marchetti v. United States, 390 U. S. 39 (1968), and Grosso v. United States, 390 U. S. 62 (1968).  In the latter cases the Court considered whether the Fifth Amendment was a defense in prosecutions for failure to file the returns required of gamblers in connection with the federal occupational and excise taxes on gambling.  The Court found that any disclosures made in connection with the payment of those taxes tended to incriminate because of the pervasive criminal regulation of gambling activities.  Marchetti, supra at  390 U. S. 449; Grosso, supra at  390 U. S. 66-67.  Since submitting a claim of privilege in lieu of the returns also would incriminate, the Court held that the privilege could be exercised by simply failing to file. [Footnote 11] Page 424 U. S. 659In Mackey, the disclosures required in connection with the gambling excise tax had been made before Marchetti and Grosso were decided.  Mackey's returns were introduced in a criminal prosecution for income tax evasion.  Although a majority of the Court considered the disclosures on the returns to have been compelled incriminations, 401 U.S. at  401 U. S. 672 (plurality opinion); id. at  401 U. S. 704-705 (BRENNAN, J., concurring in judgment); id. at  401 U. S. 713 (Douglas, J., dissenting), Mackey was not immunized against their use because Marchetti and Grosso were held nonretroactive.  401 U.S. at  401 U. S. 674-675 (plurality opinion); id. at  401 U. S. 700-701 (Harlan, J., concurring in judgment). [Footnote 12] Garner assumes that, if Mackey had made his disclosures after Marchetti and Grosso, they could not have been used against him.  He then concludes that, since Mackey would have been privileged to file no returns at all, Mackey stands for the proposition that an objection at trial always suffices to preserve the privilege even if disclosures have been made previously.Assuming that Garner otherwise reads Mackey correctly, [Footnote 13] we do not think that case should be applied in Page 424 U. S. 660 this context.  The basis for the holdings in Marchetti and Grosso was that the occupational and excise taxes on gambling required disclosures only of gamblers, the great majority of whom were likely to incriminate themselves by responding.  Marchetti, supra at  390 U. S. 48-49,  390 U. S. 57; Grosso, supra at  390 U. S. 66-68.  Therefore, as in the coerced confession cases, any compulsion to disclose was likely to compel self-incrimination. [Footnote 14]  Garner is differently situated.  Although he disclosed himself to be a gambler, federal income tax returns are not directed at those "inherently suspect of criminal activities.'"  Marchetti, supra at  390 U. S. 52.  As noted in Albertson v. SACB, 382 U. S. 70,  382 U. S. 79 (1965), "the questions in [an] income tax return [are] neutral on their face, and directed at the public at Page 424 U. S. 661 large."  The great majority of persons who file income tax returns do not incriminate themselves by disclosing their occupation.  The requirement that such returns be completed and filed simply does not involve the compulsion to incriminate considered in Mackey. [Footnote 15]CGarner's final argument relies on Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U. S. 493 (1967).  There, policemen summoned during an investigation of police corruption were informed that they could claim the privilege, but that they would be discharged for doing so.  The disclosures they made were introduced against them in subsequent criminal prosecutions.  The Court held that the penalty of discharge for reliance on the privilege foreclosed a free choice to remain silent, and therefore had the effect of compelling the incriminating testimony given by the policemen.  Garner notes that a taxpayer who claims the privilege on his return faces the possibility of a criminal prosecution under § 7203 for failure to make a return.  He argues that the possibility of prosecution, like the threat of discharge in Garrity, compels a taxpayer to make incriminating disclosures rather than claim the privilege.  This contention is not entirely without force, but we find it unpersuasive. Page 424 U. S. 662The policemen in Garrity were threatened with punishment for a concededly valid exercise of the privilege, but one in Garner's situation is at no such disadvantage.  A § 7203 conviction cannot be based on a valid exercise of the privilege.  This is implicit in the dictum of United States v. Sullivan, 274 U. S. 259 (1927), that the privilege may be claimed on a return. [Footnote 16]  Furthermore, the Court has held that an individual summoned by the Service to provide documents or testimony can rely on the privilege to defend against a § 7203 prosecution for failure to "supply any information."  See United States v. Murdock, 290 U. S. 389 (1933) (Murdock II); United States v. Murdock, 284 U. S. 141 (1931) (Murdock I), disapproved on other grounds, Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U. S. 52 (1964). [Footnote 17]  The Fifth Amendment itself guarantees Page 424 U. S. 663 the taxpayer's insulation against liability imposed on the basis of a valid and timely claim of privilege, a protection broadened by § 7203's statutory standard of "willfulness." [Footnote 18]Since a valid claim of privilege cannot be the basis for a § 7203 conviction, Garner can prevail only if the possibility that a claim made on the return will be tested in a criminal prosecution suffices in itself to deny him freedom to claim the privilege.  He argues that it does so, noting that, because of the threat of prosecution under § 7203, a taxpayer contemplating a claim of privilege on his return faces a more difficult choice than does a witness contemplating a claim of privilege in a judicial proceeding.  If the latter claims the protection of the Fifth Amendment, he receives a judicial ruling at that time on the validity of his claim, and he has an opportunity to reconsider it before being held in contempt for refusal to answer.  Cf. Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. at  419 U. S. 460-461.  Page 424 U. S. 664 A § 7203 prosecution, however, may be brought without a preliminary judicial ruling on a claim of privilege that would allow the taxpayer to reconsider. [Footnote 19]In essence, Garner contends that the Fifth Amendment guarantee requires such a preliminary ruling procedure for testing the validity of an asserted privilege.  It may be that such a procedure would serve the best interests of the Government, as well as of the taxpayer, cf. Emspak v. United States, 349 U. S. 190,  349 U. S. 213-214 (1955) (Harlan, J., dissenting), but we certainly cannot say that the Constitution requires it.  The Court previously has considered Fifth Amendment claims in the context of a criminal prosecution where the defendant did not have the benefit of a preliminary judicial ruling on a claim of privilege.  It has never intimated that such a procedure is other than permissible.  Indeed, the Court has given some measure of endorsement to it.  In Murdock I, supra, an individual was prosecuted under predecessors of § 7203 for refusing to make disclosures after being summoned by the Bureau of Internal Revenue. [Footnote 20]  In this Court, he contended, apparently on statutory grounds, that there could be no prosecution without a prior judicial enforcement suit to allow presentation of his claim of privilege to a court for a preliminary ruling.  The Court said:"While undoubtedly the right of a witness to refuse to answer lest he incriminate himself may be tested in proceedings to compel answer, there is no support for the contention that there must be such a determination Page 424 U. S. 665 of that question before prosecution for the willful failure so denounced."284 U.S. at  284 U. S. 148.  See also Quinn v. United States, 349 U. S. 155,  349 U. S. 167-170 (1955); Emspak v. United States, supra at  349 U. S. 213-214 (Harlan, J., dissenting).We are satisfied that Murdock I states the constitutional standard.  What is at issue here is principally a matter of timing and procedure.  As long as a valid and timely claim of privilege is available as a defense to a taxpayer prosecuted for failure to make a return, the taxpayer has not been denied a free choice to remain silent merely because of the absence of a preliminary judicial ruling on his claim.  We therefore do not agree that Garner was deterred from claiming the privilege in the sense that was true of the policemen in Garrity.VIn summary, we conclude that, since Garner made disclosures instead of claiming the privilege on his tax returns, his disclosures were not compelled incriminations. [Footnote 21]  He therefore was foreclosed from invoking the privilege when such information was later introduced as evidence against him in a criminal prosecution.The judgment isAffirmed
U.S. Supreme CourtGarner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648 (1976)Garner v. United StatesNo. 74-100Argued November 4, 1975Decided March 23, 1976424 U.S. 648SyllabusPetitioner's income tax returns, in which he revealed himself to be a gambler, were introduced in evidence, over his Fifth Amendment objection, as proof of the federal gambling conspiracy offense with which he was charged.Held:  Petitioner's privilege against compulsory self-incrimination was not violated.  Since petitioner made incriminating disclosures on his tax returns instead of claiming the privilege, as he had the right to do, his disclosures were not compelled incriminations.  Here, where there is no factor depriving petitioner of the free choice to refuse to answer, the general rule applies that, if a witness does not claim the privilege, his disclosures will not be considered as having been "compelled" within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment.  United States v. Sullivan, 274 U. S. 259.  Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436; Mackey v. United States, 401 U. S. 667; Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U. S. 493, distinguished.  Pp.  424 U. S. 650-655.501 F.2d 228, affirmed.POWELL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J., and STEWART, WHITE, BLACKMUN, and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined.  MARSHALL, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which BRENNAN, J., joined, post, p.  424 U. S. 666.  STEVENS, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. Page 424 U. S. 649