CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered the opinion of the Court.The question presented is whether it was error for the Court of Appeals to hold that the state trial court violated respondent's Sixth Amendment right to counsel by denying respondent's motion for a continuance until the Deputy Public Defender initially assigned to defend him was available.  We granted certiorari, 456 U.S. 904 (1982), and we reverse.The issues raised arise out of two trials in the state court, the second trial having been held on two counts on which the first jury could not agree.  Respondent was convicted of robbery, burglary, and false imprisonment in the first trial; he was convicted of rape and forcible oral copulation in the second.  On review of all five counts, the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, affirmed the convictions, and the California Supreme Court denied review.  Thereafter, the United States District Court denied respondent's petition for a writ of habeas corpus.  This denial was reversed by the United States Court of Appeals, which held that the Sixth Amendment guarantees a right to counsel with whom the accused has a "meaningful attorney-client relationship," Page 461 U. S. 4 and that the trial judge abused his discretion and violated this right by denying a motion for a continuance based on the substitution of appointed counsel six days before trial.  649 F.2d 718 (CA9 1981).Respondent's pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court set forth two grounds for relief:  (a) that the state"[t]rial court abused its discretion by failing to order a substitution of counsel after [respondent and counsel became] embroiled in irreconcilable conflict,"Record 3; and (b) that the trial court had not permitted him to testify in his own behalf in the second trial.  Ibid.  The facts shown by the record conclusively rebut both these claims, and are alone dispositive, independent of the correctness of the novel Sixth Amendment guarantee announced by the Court of Appeals.AAfter midnight on July 7, 1976, the victim, a young woman, left her apartment to shop at a nearby grocery store in San Francisco.  There she was accosted by respondent, and when she complained to the store manager, he ordered respondent to leave.  Respondent waited for the victim outside; when the victim left the store, respondent threw a beer bottle at her.  She asked the store manager to call the police, but he told her just to walk away.  She then walked home, taking the long way around the block, but when she entered her apartment house, respondent was waiting for her in the lobby.  From this fact, the jury could have inferred that respondent had been stalking the victim from the time she first left her apartment.  Respondent forced the victim into the basement, where, she testified, he raped and sodomized her and then robbed her.The victim managed to escape from respondent and fled from the building into a nearby all-night diner, where she was sheltered until the police came.  She gave the police a Page 461 U. S. 5 description of her assailant; he was apprehended two blocks away.  He was wearing the green fatigue jacket with fur-trimmed hood and the "Afro" style wig that the victim had described to the police.  On his person, the police found jewelry taken from the victim.  The respondent told the booking officer that he had been given the jewelry by a woman whose last name he did not recall and whose address he did not know.  Police found the victim's clothing scattered on the floor of the basement of her apartment building and a button from respondent's jacket on the basement steps.Respondent was charged in San Francisco Superior Court with five felonies. [Footnote 1]  The court appointed the San Francisco Public Defender's Office to represent respondent, and Deputy Public Defender Harvey Goldfine was assigned to defend the accused. Goldfine represented respondent at the preliminary hearing and supervised an extensive investigation.  The trial was scheduled for Thursday, September 23, 1976.  Shortly prior to trial, however, Goldfine was hospitalized for emergency surgery. On Friday, September 17, six days before the scheduled trial date, the Public Defender assigned Bruce Hotchkiss, a senior trial attorney in the Public Defender's Office, to represent respondent.On the day he was assigned the case, Hotchkiss interviewed respondent in jail and advised him of the substitution.  Between that date and the following Tuesday, September 21, Hotchkiss reviewed the files and investigation prepared by his colleague.  On Tuesday, he conferred with respondent for three hours; on the following day, he again met with respondent in the morning and afternoon. Page 461 U. S. 6(A) First Day of First TrialThe first trial began as scheduled on Thursday, September 23.  At the opening of trial, respondent told the court:I only have this P. D. [Public Defender] for a day and a half, we have not had time to prepare this case.  He came in Tuesday night, last Tuesday night was the first time I saw him. . . .  We have not had enough time to prepare this case.App. 7.Construing respondent's remarks as a motion for a continuance, the court denied the motion, noting that the case had been assigned to Hotchkiss the previous Friday, six days before the trial date, and that Hotchkiss stated he had "investigated the case, [and] studied it."  Id. at 8.  In reply, respondent repeated his claim that Hotchkiss had only been on the case for a day and a half.Respondent then stated:"[T]his past Tuesday was the first time [Hotchkiss interviewed me.]  He said he was busy, and he couldn't make it up there.  He only [sic] been on this case one day and a half, your Honor, he can't possibly have had enough time to investigate all these things in this case.  Some of the major issues have not been investigated.  It's impossible for him to have time enough to take care of this case to represent this case properly, the way it should be represented."Ibid.Hotchkiss explained Goldfine's absence and stated that he was prepared to try the case on the basis of his study of the investigation made by Goldfine and his conferences with respondent.  "I feel that I am prepared.  My own feeling is that a further continuance would not benefit me in presenting the case."  Id. at 11.  Respondent replied that he was "satisfied with the Public Defender, but it's just no way, no possible way, that he has had enough time to prepare this case."  Id. at 12 (emphasis added).The trial judge repeated that he was confident that the Public Defender's Office was representing respondent adequately, Page 461 U. S. 7 and that Hotchkiss was an experienced counsel; the court again denied a continuance.  Id. at 9.(b) Second Day of First TrialAt the start of the second day of trial, on Friday, September 24, 1976, respondent again complained that Hotchkiss was not prepared.  When the court expressed its confidence in Hotchkiss, respondent said:"I don't mean he's not a good P.D., I don't have anything against him.  It's just that he didn't have time to prepare the case, one day and a half."Id. at 18 (emphasis added).  The trial judge again stated that he was satisfied that the case had been "well prepared" by Goldfine, and that Hotchkiss had been assigned to the case the previous week, had read the transcript of the preliminary hearing, and had "prepared the case, reviewed all the matters, obtained the pictures, and other items that he intends to produce into evidence."  Ibid.  In conclusion, the trial judge stated:  "I am satisfied . . . that Mr. Hotchkiss is doing a more than adequate job, a very fine job."  Id. at 18-19.When respondent continued to complain that Hotchkiss had not adequately investigated the case, Hotchkiss told the court:"My feeling is that all investigation that needed to be done and that should be done and quite possibly that could have been done has been done."Id. at 21-22.  Finally, Hotchkiss pointed out that he would have the weekend between the close of the prosecution's case and the beginning of the defense's case for further conferences with respondent.  Id. at 22-23.At this time -- on the second day of the first trial -- respondent first mentioned Goldfine's name.  After complaining again about Hotchkiss' alleged lack of time for preparation, respondent said:"Mr. Harvey Goldfine was my attorney, he was my attorney, and he still is.  I haven't seen him in five Page 461 U. S. 8 weeks, because he's in the hospital."Id. at 24.  Respondent then claimed that not even Goldfine had had enough time to prepare the case:  "Mr. Harvey Goldfine didn't even have enough time to go over my case with me, he didn't even have time."  Ibid.  Respondent concluded these remarks with additional complaints about Hotchkiss' preparation.(c) Third Day of First TrialTrial resumed four days later, on Tuesday, September 28, 1976.  Out of the presence of the jury, respondent presented the court with a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that he was unrepresented by counsel.  In support of his petition, respondent claimed that Goldfine, not Hotchkiss, was his attorney.  Specifically, he said that the writ should be granted on"the grounds that my attorney's in the hospital, and I don't legally have no attorney, and this P.D. here told me, this P.D., Mr. Hotchkiss, Bruce Hotchkiss, told me I didn't have no defense to my charges."Id. at 29 (emphasis added).  Hotchkiss disputed this charge.  The trial court treated the petition as a renewal of respondent's motion for a continuance, and denied it.Following the court's ruling, respondent announced that he would not cooperate at all in the trial, and asked to be returned to his cell.  The court urged respondent to cooperate, but respondent refused, claiming that Hotchkiss did not represent him:  "I don't have any Counsel, I just got through telling you,  I don't have no Counsel."  Id. at 32.  However, respondent remained in the courtroom, and the trial proceeded.Later, respondent renewed his attack:"What do I have to say to get through to you, your Honor, what do I have to say to make you understand.  I have told you two or three times, and then you keep telling me about talking to my Counsel.  I don't have Page 461 U. S. 9 no attorney, I told you I don't have no attorney.  My attorney's name is Mr. P. D. Goldfine, Harvey Goldfine, that's my attorney, he's in the hospital."Id. at 37-38.Ultimately, respondent refused to take the stand, ignoring Hotchkiss' advice that he testify.  The jury returned a verdict of guilty on the robbery, burglary, and false imprisonment counts, but failed to reach a verdict on the rape and oral copulation counts.(d) Second TrialA week later, a second trial was held on the charges left unresolved as a result of the mistrial, and Hotchkiss again appeared for respondent.  Once more, respondent ignored Hotchkiss' advice and refused to take the stand. [Footnote 2]  Indeed, respondent refused to cooperate with or even speak to Hotchkiss.  The second jury returned a guilty verdict on the sexual assault counts.  The California Court of Appeal affirmed respondent's convictions on all five counts; the California Supreme Court denied review.BThe United States District Court for the Northern District of California (Peckham, J.) construed the pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus liberally as including a claim that the trial court abused its discretion both in denying a continuance to allow Hotchkiss additional time to prepare and in denying a continuance to permit Goldfine to defend respondent.  In denying the writ, the District Court stated:"The record supports the trial judge's conclusion that Hotchkiss had adequate time to prepare for the trials Page 461 U. S. 10 and that he presented an able defense despite [respondent's] lack of cooperation with him."App. to Pet. for Cert. D3-D4.The District Court also rejected respondent's claim that the trial court should have granted the continuance to permit Goldfine to represent respondent, stating that"it was not unreasonable to conclude that the efficient administration of justice required that petitioner be represented by Hotchkiss, rather than Goldfine, after the latter had fully recovered from surgery."Id. at D4-D5.  The District Court thus rejected any claim that the state trial judge had abused his discretion in denying a continuance. [Footnote 3]In reversing the District Court's denial of the writ, the Court of Appeals acknowledged that "an indigent defendant does not have an unqualified right to the appointment of counsel of his own choosing," but argued that respondent was not seeking appointment of counsel of his own choosing; rather, he "was merely seeking a continuance of the trial date so that his attorney [Goldfine] would be able to represent him at trial."  649 F.2d  at 720.The Court of Appeals went on to announce a new component of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.  The Sixth Amendment right, it held, would"be without substance if it did not include the right to a meaningful attorney-client relationship."Ibid. (emphasis added).  The court seems to have determined, solely on the basis of respondent's confusing and contradictory remarks on the subject, that respondent had developed such a "meaningful attorney-client relationship" with Goldfine but not with Hotchkiss. Page 461 U. S. 11The Court of Appeals next stated that the trial court, having failed to inquire about the probable length of Goldfine's absence, could not have weighed respondent's interest in continued representation by Goldfine against the State's interest in proceeding with the scheduled trial.  The Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court's failure to conduct this balancing test ignored respondent's Sixth Amendment right to a "meaningful attorney-client relationship," and hence violated respondent's right to counsel; [Footnote 4] this violation was held to require reversal without any need to show prejudice.  The Court of Appeals directed that the writ issue unless respondent received a new trial on all five counts.IINot every restriction on counsel's time or opportunity to investigate or to consult with his client or otherwise to prepare for trial violates a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel.  See Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U. S. 42,  399 U. S. 53-54 (1970).  Trial judges necessarily require a great deal of latitude in scheduling trials.  Not the least of their problems is that of assembling the witnesses, lawyers, and jurors at the same place at the same time, and this burden counsels against continuances except for compelling reasons.  Consequently, broad discretion must be granted trial courts on matters of continuances; only an unreasoning and arbitrary "insistence upon expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable Page 461 U. S. 12 request for delay" violates the right to the assistance of counsel. Unar v. Sarafite, 376 U. S. 575,  376 U. S. 589 (1964).We have set out at greater length than usual the record facts showing Hotchkiss' prompt action in taking Goldfine's place, his prompt study of the investigation, his careful review of the materials prepared by Goldfine for trial, his conferences with respondent, and his representation to the court that "a further continuance would not benefit me in presenting the case," App. 11.  In the face of the unequivocal and uncontradicted statement by a responsible officer of the court that he was fully prepared and "ready" for trial, it was far from an abuse of discretion to deny a continuance.  On this record, it would have been remarkable had the trial court not accepted counsel's assurances.Nor is there ay merit to the claim that the denial of a continuance prevented Hotchkiss from being fully prepared for trial.  Despite respondent's adamant -- even contumacious -- refusal to cooperate with Hotchkiss or to take the stand as Hotchkiss advised, in spite of respondent's numerous outbursts and disruptions, and in the face of overwhelming evidence of guilt, Hotchkiss succeeded in getting a "hung jury" on the two most serious charges at the first trial.  Given the undisputed and overwhelming evidence of guilt, the jury's failure at the first trial to convict the defendant on the more serious charges cannot reflect other than favorably on Hotchkiss' readiness for trial.IIIIn holding that the trial judge violated respondent's right to the assistance of counsel by arbitrarily refusing a continuance that would have permitted Goldfine to try the case, the Court of Appeals misread the record and the controlling law and announced a new constitutional standard which is unsupported by any authority.AThe Court of Appeals' first error was in reading the record as indicating that respondent timely and in good faith moved Page 461 U. S. 13 for a delay to permit Goldfine to continue to represent him.  The transcript clearly shows that respondent did not specifically assert a concern for continued representation by Goldfine until the third day of trial, 11 days after Hotchkiss had been substituted for Goldfine.  Until then, all that respondent sought was a delay to give Hotchkiss additional time that respondent, but not Hotchkiss, thought necessary to prepare for trial.  Moreover, respondent specifically disavowed any dissatisfaction with counsel; he informed the court on the first day of trial that he was "satisfied" with Hotchkiss.  Id. at 12.  On this record, we cannot fathom how the Court of Appeals could have construed these complaints about Hotchkiss' alleged lack of time in which to prepare as indicating an unspoken preference for Goldfine.On the contrary, the trial court was abundantly justified in denying respondent's midtrial motion for a continuance so as to have Goldfine represent him.  On this record, it could reasonably have concluded that respondent's belated requests to be represented by Goldfine were not made in good faith but were a transparent ploy for delay.  In our view, the record shows that the trial judge exhibited sensitive concern for the rights of the accused and extraordinary patience with a contumacious litigant. [Footnote 5]BThe Court of Appeals' conclusion that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel "would be without substance if it did not include the right to a meaningful attorney-client relationship," 649 F.2d  at 720 (emphasis added), is without basis in the law.  No authority was cited for this novel ingredient of the Sixth Amendment guarantee of counsel, and of course none could be.  No court could possibly guarantee that a defendant will develop the kind of rapport with his attorney -- privately retained or provided by the public -- that Page 461 U. S. 14 the Court of Appeals thought part of the Sixth Amendment guarantee of counsel.  Accordingly, we reject the claim that the Sixth Amendment guarantees a "meaningful relationship" between an accused and his counsel. [Footnote 6]IVWe have gone to unusual length in discussing the facts and relevant authorities in order to evaluate the claim of abuse of discretion by the trial judge and to deal with the novel idea that the Sixth Amendment guarantees an accused a "meaningful attorney-client relationship."  Had the Court of Appeals examined the record more carefully, it would have had no occasion to consider, let alone announce, a new constitutional rule under the Sixth Amendment.In its haste to create a novel Sixth Amendment right, the court wholly failed to take into account the interest of the victim of these crimes in not undergoing the ordeal of yet a third trial in this case.  Of course, inconvenience and embarrassment to witnesses cannot justify failing to enforce constitutional rights of an accused:  when prejudicial error is made that clearly impairs a defendant's constitutional rights, the burden of a new trial must be borne by the prosecution, the courts, and the witnesses; the Constitution permits nothing less.  But in the administration of criminal justice, courts may not ignore the concerns of victims.  Apart from all other factors, such a course would hardly encourage victims to report violations to the proper authorities; this is especially so when the crime is one calling for public testimony about a humiliating and degrading experience such as was involved here.  Precisely what weight should be given to the ordeal of reliving such an experience for the third time need not be decided Page 461 U. S. 15 now; but that factor is not to be ignored by the courts.  The spectacle of repeated trials to establish the truth about a single criminal episode inevitably places burdens on the system in terms of witnesses, records, and fading memories, to say nothing of misusing judicial resources.Over 75 years ago, Roscoe Pound condemned American courts for ignoring "substantive law and justice," and treating trials as sporting contests in which the "inquiry is, Have the rules of the game been carried out strictly?"  Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction With the Administration of Justice, 29 ABA Ann.Rep. 395, 406 (1906).  A criminal trial is not a "game," and nothing in the record of respondent's two trials gives any support for the conclusion that he was constitutionally entitled to a new trial.  The state courts provided respondent a fair trial, and the United States District Judge properly denied relief.The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded with directions to reinstate the judgment of the District Court.It is so ordered
U.S. Supreme CourtMorris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1 (1983)Morris v. SlappyNo. 81-1095Argued December 1, 1982Decided April 20, 1983461 U.S. 1SyllabusWhen respondent was charged in California Superior Court with various crimes, including rape, robbery, and burglary, all concerning the same female victim, the court assigned the Deputy Public Defender to defend respondent.  The Deputy Public Defender represented respondent at the preliminary hearing and supervised an extensive investigation.  Shortly before the trial, the Deputy Public Defender was hospitalized for surgery, and six days before the scheduled trial date, a senior trial attorney in the Public Defender's Office was assigned to represent respondent.  After the trial was under way, respondent moved for a continuance, claiming that his newly assigned attorney did not have time to prepare the case.  The attorney, however, told the court that he was fully prepared and "ready" for trial, and the court denied a continuance.  Respondent was convicted on some counts, but there was a mistrial on other counts on which the jury could not agree.  A second trial, during which respondent refused to cooperate with his lawyer, also resulted in convictions.  The California Court of Appeal affirmed the convictions on all counts, and the California Supreme Court denied review.  Thereafter, respondent filed a habeas corpus petition in Federal District Court, alleging that the California Superior Court abused its discretion in denying a continuance.  The District Court denied the writ.  The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the Sixth Amendment guarantees a right to counsel with whom the accused has a "meaningful attorney-client relationship," and that the state trial judge abused his discretion Page 461 U. S. 2 and violated this right by arbitrarily denying a continuance that would have permitted the Deputy Public Defender to try the case.Held:  The state trial court did not violate respondent's Sixth Amendment right to counsel by denying a continuance.  Pp.  461 U. S. 11-15.(a) Broad discretion must be granted trial courts on matters of continuances.  Here, in the face of an unequivocal and uncontradicted statement by a responsible officer of the court that he was fully prepared and "ready" for trial, it was far from an abuse of discretion to deny a continuance.  Nor is there any merit to the claim that the denial of a continuance prevented the substituted attorney from being fully prepared for trial.  Pp.  461 U. S. 11-12.(b) In holding that the trial judge violated respondent's right to counsel by arbitrarily refusing a continuance that would have permitted the Deputy Public Defender to try the case, the Court of Appeals misread the record and the controlling law and announced a new constitutional standard -- "meaningful attorney-client relationship" -- that is unsupported by any authority.  The court erred in reading the record as indicating that respondent timely and in good faith moved for a continuance to permit the Deputy Public Defender to represent him.  On the contrary, the record shows that the trial court was abundantly justified in denying respondent's midtrial motion for a continuance so as to have the Deputy Public Defender represent him.  The Sixth Amendment does not guarantee a "meaningful relationship" between an accused and his counsel.c No court could possibly guarantee that an accused will develop the kind of rapport with his attorney that the Court of Appeals thought to be part of the Sixth Amendment guarantee of counsel.  Pp.  461 U. S. 12-14.(e) In creating a novel Sixth Amendment right to counsel with whom the accused has a "meaningful relationship," and ordering retrial, the Court of Appeals failed to take into account the interest of the victim in not undergoing the ordeal of yet a third trial.  There is nothing in the record to support the conclusion that respondent was entitled to a new trial, and the District Court properly denied relief.  Pp.  461 U. S. 14-15.649 F.2d 718, reversed and remanded.BURGER, C.J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which WHITE, POWELL, REHNQUIST, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined.  BRENNAN, J., filed an opinion concurring in the result, in which MARSHALL, J., joined, post, p.  461 U. S. 15.  BLACKMUN, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which STEVENS, J., joined, post, p.  461 U. S. 29. Page 461 U. S. 3