MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.The District Court for the Eastern District of New York originally dismissed respondent's complaint seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against a regulation promulgated by petitioner limiting the length of a policeman's hair.  On respondent's appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, that judgment was reversed, and on remand, the District Court took testimony and thereafter granted the relief sought by respondent.  The Court of Appeals affirmed, and we granted certiorari, 421 U.S. 987 (1975), to consider the constitutional doctrine embodied in the rulings of the Court of Appeals.  We reverse.IIn 1971, respondent's predecessor, individually and as president of the Suffolk County Patrolmen's Benevolent Association, brought this action under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against petitioner's predecessor, the Commissioner of the Suffolk County Police Department.  The Commissioner had promulgated Order No. 71-1, which established hair-grooming standards applicable to male members of the police force. [Footnote 1]  The Page 425 U. S. 240 regulation was directed at the style and length of hair, sideburns, and mustaches; beards and goatees were prohibited, except for medical reasons; and wigs conforming to the regulation could be worn for cosmetic reasons.  The regulation was attacked as violative of respondent patrolman's right of free expression under the First Amendment and his guarantees of due process and equal Page 425 U. S. 241 protection under the Fourteenth Amendment, in that it was "not based upon the generally accepted standard of grooming in the community," and placed "an undue restriction" upon his activities therein.The Court of Appeals held that cases characterizing the uniformed civilian services as "paramilitary," and sustaining hair regulations on that basis, were not soundly grounded historically. [Footnote 2]  It said that the fact that a police force is organized "with a centralized administration and a disciplined rank and file for efficient conduct of its affairs" did not foreclose respondent's claim, but instead bore only upon "the existence of a legitimate state interest to be reasonably advanced by the regulation."  Dwen v. Barry, 483 F.2d 1126, 1128-1129 (1973).  The Court of Appeals went on to decide that "choice of personal appearance is an ingredient of an individual's personal liberty" [Footnote 3] and is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.  It further held that the police department had "failed to make the slightest showing of the relationship between its regulation and the legitimate interest it sought to promote."  Id. at 1130-1131.  On the basis of this reasoning, it concluded that neither dismissal nor summary judgment in the District Court was appropriate, since the department "has the burden of establishing Page 425 U. S. 242 a genuine public need for the regulation."  Id. at 1131.  Thereafter, the District Court, under the compulsion of the remand from the Court of Appeals, took testimony on the question of whether or not there was a "genuine public need."  The sole witness was the Deputy Commissioner of the Suffolk County Police Department, petitioner's subordinate, who testified as to the police department's concern for the safety of the patrolmen, and the need for some standards of uniformity in appearance. [Footnote 4]  The District Court held that "[n]o proof" was offered to support any claim of the need for the protection of the police officer, and that, while "proper grooming" is an ingredient of a good police department's esprit de Page 425 U. S. 243 corps, petitioner's standards did not establish a public need because they ultimately reduced to "[u]niformity for uniformity's sake." [Footnote 5]  The District Court granted the Page 425 U. S. 244 relief prayed for by respondent, and, on petitioner's appeal, that judgment was affirmed without opinion by the Court of Appeals.  508 F.2d 836.IISection 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in pertinent part:"No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."This section affords not only a procedural guarantee against the deprivation of "liberty," but likewise protects substantive aspects of liberty against unconstitutional restrictions by the State.  Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U. S. 564,  408 U. S. 572 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479,  381 U. S. 502 (1965) (WHITE, J., concurring).The "liberty" interest claimed by respondent here, of course, is distinguishable from the interests protected by the Court in Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U. S. 438 (1972); Stanley v Illinois, 405 U. S. 645 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, supra; and Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390 (1923).  Each of those cases involved a substantial claim of infringement on the individual's freedom of choice with respect to certain basic matters of procreation, marriage, and family life.  But whether the citizenry at large has some sort of "liberty" interest within the Fourteenth Amendment in matters of personal appearance is a question on which this Court's cases offer little, if any, guidance.  We can, nevertheless, assume an affirmative answer for purposes of deciding this case, because we find that assumption insufficient to carry the day for respondent's claim.Respondent has sought the protection of the Fourteenth Page 425 U. S. 245 Amendment not as a member of the citizenry at large, but, on the contrary, as an employee of the police department of Suffolk County, a subdivision of the State of New York.  While the Court of Appeals made passing reference to this distinction, it was thereafter apparently ignored.  We think, however, it is highly significant.  In Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U. S. 563,  391 U. S. 568 (1968), after noting that state employment may not be conditioned on the relinquishment of First Amendment rights, the Court stated that,"[a]t the same time, it cannot be gainsaid that the State has interests as an employer in regulating the speech of its employees that differ significantly from those it possesses in connection with regulation of the speech of the citizenry in general."More recently, we have sustained comprehensive and substantial restrictions upon activities of both federal and state employees lying at the core of the First Amendment.  CSC v. Letter Carriers, 413 U. S. 548 (1973); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U. S. 601 (1973).  If such state regulations may survive challenges based on the explicit language of the First Amendment, there is surely even more room for restrictive regulations of state employees where the claim implicates only the more general contours of the substantive liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.The hair length regulation here touches respondent as an employee of the county and, more particularly, as a policeman.  Respondent's employer has, in accordance with its well established duty to keep the peace, placed myriad demands upon the members of the police force, duties which have no counterpart with respect to the public at large.  Respondent must wear a standard uniform, specific in each detail. [Footnote 6]  When in uniform, he must Page 425 U. S. 246 salute the flag. [Footnote 7]  He may not take an active role in local political affairs by way of being a party delegate or contributing or soliciting political contributions. [Footnote 8]  He may not smoke in public. [Footnote 9]  All of these and other regulations [Footnote 10] of the Suffolk County Police Department infringe on respondent's freedom of choice in personal matters, and it was apparently the view of the Court of Appeals that the burden is on the State to prove a "genuine public need" for each and every one of these regulations.This view was based upon the Court of Appeals' reasoning that the "unique judicial deference" accorded by the judiciary to regulation of members of the military was inapplicable because there was no historical or functional justification for the characterization of the police as "paramilitary."  But the conclusion that such cases are inapposite, however correct, in no way detracts from the deference due Suffolk County's choice of an organizational structure for its police force.  Here, the county has chosen a mode of organization which it undoubtedly deems the most efficient in enabling its police to carry out the duties assigned to them under state and local law. [Footnote 11]  Such a choice necessarily gives weight to the overall need for discipline, esprit de corps, and uniformity.The county's choice of an organizational structure, therefore, does not depend for its constitutional validity on any doctrine of historical prescription.  Nor, indeed, has respondent made any such claim. His argument does Page 425 U. S. 247 not challenge the constitutionality of the organizational structure, but merely asserts that the present hair length regulation infringes his asserted liberty interest under the Fourteenth Amendment.  We believe, however, that the hair length regulation cannot be viewed in isolation, but must be rather considered in the context of the county's chosen mode of organization for its police force.The promotion of safety of persons and property is unquestionably at the core of the State's police power, and virtually all state and local governments employ a uniformed police force to aid in the accomplishment of that purpose.  Choice of organization, dress, and equipment for law enforcement personnel is a decision entitled to the same sort of presumption of legislative validity as are state choices designed to promote other aims within the cognizance of the State's police power.  Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U. S. 421,  342 U. S. 423 (1952); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 158,  321 U. S. 168-170 (1944); Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U. S. 236,  313 U. S. 246-247 (1941).  Having recognized in other contexts the wide latitude accorded the government in the "dispatch of its own internal affairs," Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U. S. 886,  367 U. S. 896 (1961), we think Suffolk County's police regulations involved here are entitled to similar weight.  Thus the question is not, as the Court of Appeals conceived it to be, whether the State can "establish" a "genuine public need" for the specific regulation.  It is whether respondent can demonstrate that there is no rational connection between the regulation, based as it is on the county's method of organizing its police force, and the promotion of safety of persons and property.  United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U. S. 75,  330 U. S. 100-101 (1947); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U. S. 11,  197 U. S. 30-31,  197 U. S. 35-37 (1905).We think the answer here is so clear that the District Court was quite right in the first instance to have dismissed Page 425 U. S. 248 respondent's complaint.  Neither this Court, the Court of Appeals, nor the District Court is in a position to weigh the policy arguments in favor of and against a rule regulating hairstyles as a part of regulations governing a uniformed civilian service.  The constitutional issue to be decided by these courts is whether petitioner's determination that such regulations should be enacted is so irrational that it may be branded "arbitrary," and therefore a deprivation of respondent's "liberty" interest in freedom to choose his own hairstyle.  Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U. S. 483,  348 U. S. 487-488 (1955).  The overwhelming majority of state and local police of the present day are uniformed.  This fact itself testifies to the recognition by those who direct those operations, and by the people of the States and localities who directly or indirectly choose such persons, that similarity in appearance of police officers is desirable.  This choice may be based on a desire to make police officers readily recognizable to the members of the public, or a desire for the esprit de corps which such similarity is felt to inculcate within the police force itself.  Either one is a sufficiently rational justification for regulations so as to defeat respondent's claim based on the liberty guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment.The Court of Appeals relied on Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U. S. 493 (1967), and amicus in its brief in support of respondent elaborates an argument based on the language in Garrity that "policemen, like teachers and lawyers, are not relegated to a watered-down version of constitutional rights."  Id. at  385 U. S. 500.  Garrity, of course, involved the protections afforded by the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution as made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment.  Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U. S. 1 (1964).  Certainly its language cannot be taken to suggest that the claim of a member Page 425 U. S. 249 of a uniformed civilian service based on the "liberty" interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment must necessarily be treated for constitutional purposes the same as a similar claim by a member of the general public.The regulation challenged here did not violate any right guaranteed respondent by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and the Court of Appeals was therefore wrong in reversing the District Court's original judgment dismissing the action.  The judgment of the Court of Appeals isReversed
U.S. Supreme CourtKelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238 (1976)Kelley v. JohnsonNo. 74-1269Argued December 8, 1975Decided April 5, 1976425 U.S. 238SyllabusA county regulation limiting the length of county policemen's hair held not to violate any right guaranteed respondent policeman by the Fourteenth Amendment.  Pp.  425 U. S. 244-249.(a) Respondent sought the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment, not as an ordinary citizen, but as a law enforcement employee of the county, a subdivision of the State, and this distinction is one of considerable significance, since a State has wider latitude and notably different interests in imposing restrictive regulations on its employees than it does in regulating the citizenry at large.  P.  425 U. S. 245.(b) Choice of organization, dress, and equipment for law enforcement personnel is entitled to the same sort of presumption of legislative validity as are state choices to promote other aims within the cognizance of the State's police power.  Thus, the question is not whether the State can "establish" a "genuine public need" for the specific regulation, but whether respondent can demonstrate that there is no rational connection between the regulation, based as it is on the county's method of organizing its police force, and the promotion of safety of persons and property.  P.  425 U. S. 245-247.(c) Whether a state or local government's choice to have its police uniformed reflects a desire to make police officers readily recognizable to the public or to foster the esprit de corps that similarity of garb and appearance may inculcate within the police force itself, the justification for the hair style regulation is sufficiently rational to defeat respondent's claim based on the liberty guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Pp.  425 U. S. 247-248.508 F.2d 836, reversed.REHNQUIST, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J., and STEWART, WHITE, BLACKMUN, and POWELL, JJ., joined.  POWELL, J. filed a concurring opinion, post, p.  425 U. S. 249.  MARSHALL, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN, J., joined, Page 425 U. S. 239 post, p.  425 U. S. 249.  STEVENS, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.