JUSTICE BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court.The United States seeks reinstatement of a judgment of contempt against a newspaper and its executive editor for Page 485 U. S. 695 violating an invalid temporary restraining order against publication.  Having concluded that the court-appointed prosecutor who sought certiorari and briefed and argued the case without the authorization of the Solicitor General may not represent the United States before this Court, we dismiss the writ of certiorari.IOn November 8, 1985, Raymond J. Patriarca, son of Raymond L. S. Patriarca, by then deceased, filed suit against the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), its Director, the Department of Justice, the Attorney General of the United States, the Providence Journal Company (Journal), and WJAR Television Ten (WJAR), seeking to enjoin further dissemination of logs and memoranda compiled from 1962 to 1965 during the course of illegal electronic surveillance, see Providence Journal Co. v. FBI, 602 F.2d 1010, 1013 (CA1 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1071 (1980), of the plaintiff's father.  The complaint, as amended, was based on the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1982 ed., and Supp. IV), Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (Title III), 18 U.S.C. § 2510 et seq. (1982 ed., and Supp. IV), and the Fourth Amendment, and alleged that the FBI had improperly released the logs and memoranda to the Journal and WJAR pursuant to a FOIA request following the death of the senior Patriarca.  The summons, complaint, and a motion for a temporary restraining order were served on the Journal on November 12, 1985.  The next day, counsel for the various parties gathered for a conference with the Chief Judge of the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island.  During that conference, of which, apparently, there is no transcript, the Chief Judge entered a temporary restraining order barring publication of the logs and memoranda and set a hearing for Friday, Page 485 U. S. 696 November 15. [Footnote 1]  Counsel for both the Journal and the federal defendants objected to the order.During the evening of November 13, respondent Charles M. Hauser, executive editor of the Journal, was first advised of the restraining order.  After discussing with other Journal executives the perils of noncompliance, Hauser decided to publish a story based on the logs and memoranda.  The following day, November 14, the Journal published one article about the Patriarcas and another about the "clash" between the District Court and the Journal.  See App. 39, 18.  Patriarca forthwith filed a motion to have the Journal and Hauser adjudged in criminal contempt. [Footnote 2]  Id. at 223.Patriarca, however, declined to prosecute the contempt motion, [Footnote 3] and the District Court decided not to ask the United States Attorney to pursue the matter, because of his representation of the federal defendants in the underlying civil action. [Footnote 4]  Invoking Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 42(b), Page 485 U. S. 697 the District Court appointed William A. Curran of the Rhode Island Bar as "prosecuting attorney with full authority to prosecute" the pending contempt motion.  App. 237-238.  On Curran's application, the District Court then ordered respondents to show cause why they should not be adjudged in criminal contempt.  Id. at 31-32.Following a hearing on February 10, 1986, the District Court found respondents in criminal contempt of the order entered on November 13.  The court concluded that it had jurisdiction to consider whether Patriarca's statutory and Fourth Amendment claims had merit, and whether his privacy interest outweighed the Journal's First Amendment interest in publication, and thus that the temporary restraining order entered to preserve the status quo pending consideration of significant legal issues was valid, even though it subsequently had been vacated.  The District Court fined the Journal $100,000 and suspended a jail sentence for Hauser, placing him on probation for 18 months and ordering that he perform 200 hours of public service.  Id. at 194-197.Respondents appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed the judgment of contempt.  In re Providence Journal Co., 820 F.2d 1342 (1986).  The court found that the temporary restraining order was "transparently invalid" under the First Amendment, and thus its constitutionality could be collaterally challenged in the contempt proceedings.  Id. at 1353.  According to the court, none of the grounds asserted in support of the order, including FOIA, Title III, and the Fourth Amendment, provided even a colorable basis for the prior restraint ordered by the District Court. Page 485 U. S. 698The Court of Appeals, then sitting en banc, summarily modified the panel's opinion, holding that even those subject to a transparently invalid order must make a good faith effort to seek emergency appellate relief.  It ruled, however, that the publisher may proceed to publish and challenge the constitutionality of the order in the contempt proceeding if timely access to the appellate court is not available or if a timely decision is not forthcoming.  The court was not convinced that respondents could have obtained emergency relief before the publisher had to make a final decision whether to run the story the following day, and found it unfair to subject respondents to substantial sanctions for failing to follow the newly announced procedures.  In re Providence Journal Co., 820 F.2d 1354 (1987).Because of the importance of the issues, we granted certiorari. 484 U.S. 814 (1987).IIBefore we can decide whether respondents could properly be held in contempt for violating the District Court's subsequently invalidated restraining order, we must consider respondents' motion to dismiss the writ of certiorari.  It appears that the manner in which this unusual case reached us departed significantly from established practice.  After the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of contempt and, sitting en banc, modified the panel's opinion, the special prosecutor sought authorization from the Solicitor General to file a petition here for a writ of certiorari.  By letter dated July 2, 1987, the Solicitor General denied that authorization.  See App. to Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae in Response to Respondents' Motion to Dismiss 1a-2a (SG Letter).  Respondents argue that, without this permission, the special prosecutor cannot proceed before this Court.  While denying authorization to the special prosecutor to file or to appear on behalf of the United States, the Solicitor General questioned whether our recent decision in Young v. United States ex rel. Page 485 U. S. 699 Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U. S. 787 (1987), rendered such authorization unnecessary in a case concerning a criminal contempt charge prosecuted by private counsel appointed pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 42(b).  See SG Letter.  See also Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 2, n. 2.  We find no such implication in our decision in Young, and we conclude that the special prosecutor lacks the authority to represent the United States before this Court.  Because he is not a party entitled to petition for certiorari under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1), we must dismiss the heretofore-granted writ of certiorari for want of jurisdiction. [Footnote 5]ATitle 28 U.S.C. § 518(a) provides in relevant part:"Except when the Attorney General in a particular case directs otherwise, the Attorney General and the Solicitor General shall conduct and argue suits and appeals in the Supreme Court . . . in which the United States is interested."The Attorney General by regulation has delegated authority to the Solicitor General:"The following-described matters are assigned to, and shall be conducted, handled, or supervised by, the Solicitor General, in consultation with each agency or official concerned:""(a) Conducting, or assigning and supervising, all Supreme Court cases, including appeals, petitions for Page 485 U. S. 700 and in opposition to certiorari, briefs and arguments, and . . . settlement thereof."28 CFR § 0.20 (1987).  Thus, unless this is a case other than one "in which the United States is interested," § 518(a), it must be conducted and argued in this Court by the Solicitor General or his designee.  Cf. United States v. Winston, 170 U. S. 522,  170 U. S. 524-525 (1898); Confiscation Cases, 7 Wall. 454,  74 U. S. 458 (1869).BThe present case clearly is one "in which the United States is interested."  The action was initiated in vindication of the "judicial Power of the United States," U.S.Const., Art. III, § 1 (emphasis added), and it is that interest, unique to the sovereign, that continues now to be litigated in this Court.  The special prosecutor seeks to reinstate a judgment of criminal contempt in a federal court, including a possible prison sentence for the individual defendant and a substantial fine for the newspaper defendant.  The fact that the allegedly criminal conduct concerns the violation of a court order instead of common law or a statutory prohibition does not render the prosecution any less an exercise of the sovereign power of the United States.  Indeed, just last Term, in a case much like the present one, involving a prosecution for criminal contempt under 18 U.S.C. § 401(3), [Footnote 6] we flatly stated:  "Private attorneys appointed to prosecute a criminal contempt action represent the United States. . . ."  Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. at  481 U. S. 804 (emphasis added).  See also Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U. S. 418,  221 U. S. 445 (1911) ("[P]roceedings at law for criminal contempt are between the public and the defendant. . . ."). Page 485 U. S. 701The special prosecutor and the Solicitor General argue that this case is not one "in which the United States is interested" because that phrase, as used in § 518(a), refers solely to those cases where the interests of the Executive Branch of the United States are at issue.  In this litigation, the argument goes, the special prosecutor acted in support of the power of the Judicial Branch, rather than in furtherance of the Executive's constitutional responsibility, U.S.Const., Art. II, § 3, to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed."  This suggested interpretation of § 518(a), however, presumes that there is more than one "United States" that may appear before this Court, and that the United States is something other than "the sovereign composed of the three branches. . . ."  United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683,  418 U. S. 696 (1974).We find such a proposition somewhat startling, particularly when supported by the office whose authority would be substantially diminished by its adoption, and we reject that construction as inconsistent with the plain meaning of § 518(a).  It seems to be elementary that, even when exercising distinct and jealously separated powers, the three branches are but "co-ordinate parts of one government."  J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U. S. 394,  276 U. S. 406 (1928).  Congress is familiar enough with the language of separation of powers that we shall not assume it intended, without saying so, to exclude the Judicial Branch when it referred to the "interest of the United States."  Moreover, while there may well be matters that are uniquely Executive Branch concerns, we do not think they would be fairly described by the broad statutory language of § 518(a).In Young, we reaffirmed the inherent authority of a federal court to initiate a criminal contempt proceeding for disobedience of its order, and its ability to appoint a private attorney to prosecute the contempt action.  481 U.S. at  481 U. S. 793.  This power, considered to be a part of the judicial function, is grounded first and foremost upon necessity:"The ability to punish disobedience to judicial orders is regarded as Page 485 U. S. 702 essential to ensuring that the Judiciary has a means to vindicate its own authority without complete dependence on other branches."Id. at  481 U. S. 796.  The special prosecutor claims his appearance before this Court is necessary for the vindication of the District Court's authority.  For just as the District Court would be "at the mercy of another branch in deciding whether such proceedings should be initiated," ibid., if it lacked the power to appoint a private attorney to prosecute a contempt charge, the judgment vindicating the District Court's authority would be vulnerable to the Attorney General's withholding of authorization to defend it.  This argument, however, overlooks the circumstances under which the special prosecutor actually came to be in a position to seek review in this Court.When, as here, a district court's judgment of contempt has been reversed on appeal, a special prosecutor may decide to seek a writ of certiorari on the basis of his professional judgment that the court of appeals' decision merits review.  See generally this Court's Rule 17.  Sometimes, as apparently occurred here, the special prosecutor and the Solicitor General will disagree with respect to whether the case presents issues worthy of review by this Court.  That kind of disagreement actually arises on a regular basis between the Solicitor General and attorneys representing various agencies of the United States. [Footnote 7]  But that disagreement does not interfere Page 485 U. S. 703 with the Judiciary's power to protect itself.  In this very case, before the consent of the Solicitor General ever became relevant, members of the Judiciary had decided that the District Judge erred in adjudging the defendants in contempt.  Where the majority of a panel of a court of appeals or perhaps, as here, a majority of an en banc court, itself has decided in favor of the alleged contemnor, the necessity that required the appointment of an independent prosecutor has faded and, indeed, is no longer present. [Footnote 8]When, on the other hand, a district court has adjudged a party in contempt, and the appellate court has affirmed, a special prosecutor has little need of the services of this Court to fulfill his or her duties.  It is only if the contemnor petitions this Court for a writ of certiorari that the Solicitor General need be consulted and his authorization or participation obtained to oppose the petition and defend the judgment.  Under such circumstances, if the Solicitor General declines to authorize a defense of the judgment, and if § 518(a) prevented the special prosecutor from proceeding, the independent ability of the Judiciary to vindicate its authority might appear to be threatened: both courts would have agreed that the contemnor had disobeyed an order of the court, but the Executive's judgment to the contrary would threaten to undermine those judicial decisions.  This threat, however, is inconsequential, for it is this Court, a part of the Judicial Branch, that must decide whether to exercise its discretion to review Page 485 U. S. 704 the judgment below, and it is well within this Court's authority to appoint an amicus curiae to file briefs and present oral argument in support of that judgment.  See, e.g., Bob Jones University v. United States, 456 U.S. 922 (1982) (order appointing amicus curiae in support of judgment); United States v. Fausto, 480 U.S. 904 (1987) (same).The Solicitor General argues that § 518(a) does not apply to a contempt proceeding that is initiated unilaterally by a federal court, because, in Young, this Court sustained the power of the court to appoint a private attorney to prosecute a criminal contempt charge, despite the fact that 28 U.S.C. § 516, in language certainly somewhat similar to that of § 518(a), requires such litigation to be conducted by a Government attorney:"Except as otherwise authorized by law, the conduct of litigation in which the United States, an agency, or officer thereof is a party, or is interested, . . . is reserved to officers of the Department of Justice, under the direction of the Attorney General."Also, 28 U.S.C. § 547 requires:"Except as otherwise provided by law, each United States attorney, within his district, shall . . . prosecute for all offenses against the United States."The Solicitor General concludes that Young necessarily implies that these broadly worded reservations of litigating authority, including § 518(a), do not apply to the case at hand.Young neither expressed nor implied any such special consideration for a judicially initiated contempt proceeding.  Both statutes implicated but not discussed in Young provide for the Attorney General's exclusive control over specified litigation except as otherwise provided or authorized by law.  A fair reading of Young indicates that a federal court's inherent authority to punish disobedience and vindicate its authority is an excepted provision or authorization within the meaning of §§ 516 and 547.  The "power to punish for contempts is inherent in all courts,'" and was not first recognized by this Page 485 U. S. 705 Court in Young; rather, it "`has been many times decided and may be regarded as settled law.'"  Young, 481 U.S. at  481 U. S. 795, quoting Michaelson v. United States ex rel. Chicago, St. P., M. & O. R. Co., 266 U. S. 42,  266 U. S. 65-66 (1924).  Thus, contrary to the Solicitor General's intimation, Young did not read an exception into §§ 516 and 547; instead, Young is consistent with the plain language of the provisos to those sections.  Section 518(a), by way of vivid contrast, contains no such proviso. [Footnote 9] Page 485 U. S. 706CIf the plain statutory language of § 518(a) were not reason enough to persuade us to accept respondents' objections and dismiss the writ of certiorari, we observe that the salutary policies that support § 518(a) could be undermined by, and anomalous consequences could result from, the approach urged upon the Court by the special prosecutor and the Solicitor General.  Among the reasons for reserving litigation in this Court to the Attorney General and the Solicitor General is the concern that the United States usually should speak with one voice before this Court, and with a voice that reflects not the parochial interests of a particular agency, but the common interests of the Government, and therefore of all the people.  Without the centralization of the decision whether to seek certiorari, this Court might well be deluged with petitions from every federal prosecutor, agency, or instrumentality, urging as the position of the United States, a variety of inconsistent positions shaped by the immediate demands of the case sub judice, rather than by longer-term interests in the development of the law.Under the procedures set out in Young, it seems evident that the majority of contempt cases will be prosecuted by the United States Attorney.  See 481 U.S. at  481 U. S. 801.  Under the special prosecutor's interpretation of § 518(a), whereby a Page 485 U. S. 707 contempt citation initiated by a district court is not a case "in which the United States is interested," the United States Attorney would be free to file a petition for a writ of certiorari in this Court without the authorization of the Solicitor General.  We need not speculate how a United States Attorney would resolve the conflict between his duty "to the preservation of respect for judicial authority," United States Attorneys' Manual § 9-39.318 (1984), and his duty to his superiors at the Department of Justice, [Footnote 10] because we reject out of hand the interpretation of § 518(a) that creates the potential for such a conflict.  Similarly, if the United States Attorney concluded that a court of appeals' decision reversing a judgment of contempt did not merit further review, and declined to file a petition with this Court, it would seem to follow from the Solicitor General's interpretation that the district judge could then appoint another special prosecutor solely for purposes of seeking certiorari and, if the writ were granted, litigating the case before this Court.  See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae in Response to Respondents' Motion to Dismiss 9, n. 7.  But surely neither the force of historical practice nor the necessity of protecting the dignity of the district court -- whose judgment of contempt has been reversed on appeal -- warrants attributing such power to the district judge.IIIWe conclude that a criminal contempt prosecution brought to vindicate the authority of the Judiciary and to punish disobedience of a court order is a suit "in which the United Page 485 U. S. 708 States is interested," within the meaning of § 518(a), regardless of who is appointed by the district court to prosecute the action. [Footnote 11]  In this case, the special prosecutor filed a petition for a writ of certiorari without the authorization of the Solicitor General, and thus without authorization to appear on behalf of the United States.  Absent a proper representative of the Government as a petitioner in this criminal prosecution, jurisdiction is lacking and the writ of certiorari, heretofore granted, is now dismissed.It is so ordered
U.S. Supreme CourtUnited States v. Providence Journal Co., 485 U.S. 693 (1988)United States v. Providence Journal Co.No. 87-65Argued January 20, 1988Decided May 2, 1988485 U.S. 693SyllabusRespondents, a newspaper and its executive editor, violated a temporary restraining order issued by the District Court in a civil suit brought to enjoin dissemination of surveillance logs and memoranda concerning the plaintiff's deceased father.  Although the court subsequently vacated the order, it nevertheless appointed a private attorney to prosecute respondents for criminal contempt of the order, declining to ask the United States Attorney to pursue the matter because of his representation of the federal defendants in the underlying civil action.  The court ultimately found respondents in criminal contempt, but the Court of Appeals reversed on the ground that the order was "transparently invalid" under the First Amendment.  Although the Solicitor General denied the special prosecutor authority to represent the United States in this Court in seeking reinstatement of the contempt judgment, the prosecutor nevertheless filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, which was granted, and briefed and argued the case.Held:  Since the special prosecutor lacks authority to represent the United States before this Court, the writ of certiorari is dismissed for want of jurisdiction.  Pp.  485 U. S. 699-708.(a) Title 28 U.S.C. § 518(a) and regulations issued by the Attorney General empower the Solicitor General or his designee to conduct and argue suits in this Court "in which the United States is interested."  Pp.  485 U. S. 699-708.(b) This case is one "in which the United States is interested," within the plain meaning of § 518(a).  The action was initiated, and continues to be litigated here, in order to further the United States' unique sovereign interest in vindicating the authority of its Judiciary.  The rationale underlying Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U. S. 787 -- which affirmed the inherent authority of federal courts to appoint private attorneys to prosecute disobedience of court orders in order to assure the Judiciary an independent means of vindicating its authority -- does not necessitate the special prosecutor's appearance before this Court.  Nor does Young create an exception to 28 U.S.C. §§ 516 and 547, and therefore to the similar provisions of § 518(a).  Unlike § 518(a), both § 516 and § 547 give the Attorney General exclusive control Page 485 U. S. 694 over litigation involving the United States "except as otherwise [provided or authorized] by law."  Young simply acknowledges an excepted provision or authorization within the meaning of the statutory provisos.  Pp.  485 U. S. 700-705.(c) If a judicially initiated contempt citation were not a case "in which the United States is interested," the policies underlying § 518(a) -- that the United States speak with one voice before this Court, and that that voice reflect the common interest of the Government and the people in the development of the law, rather than a variety of parochial, inconsistent interests shaped by the immediate demands of the case sub judice -- could be undermined by, and anomalous consequences could result from, a deluge of unauthorized certiorari petitions filed by United States Attorneys or by special prosecutors at the behest of district judges.  Pp.  485 U. S. 706-707.820 F.2d 1342 and 1354, certiorari dismissed for want of jurisdiction.BLACKMUN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BRENNAN, WHITE, MARSHALL, O'CONNOR, and SCALIA, JJ., joined.  SCALIA, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p.  485 U. S. 708.  STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which REHNQUIST, C.J., joined, post, p.  485 U. S. 708.  KENNEDY, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.