MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court.The present phase of this prolonged litigation concerns the propriety of a federal court's enjoining a municipality from permitting the use of public park recreational facilities by private segregated school groups and by other non-school groups that allegedly discriminate in their membership on the basis of race.  We granted certiorari to consider this important issue.  414 U.S. 907 (1973).IPetitioners are Negro citizens of Montgomery, Alabama.  In December, 1958, now over 15 years ago, they instituted this class action to desegregate Montgomery's public parks.  The defendants are the city, its Board of Commissioners and the members thereof, the Parks and Recreation Board and its members, and the Superintendent of the Parks and Recreational Program.By their original complaint, the petitioners specifically challenged, on Fourteenth Amendment due process and Page 417 U. S. 559 equal protection grounds, a Montgomery ordinance (No. 21-57, adopted June 4, 1957) which made it a misdemeanor, subject to fine and imprisonment,"for white and colored persons to enter upon, visit, use or in any way occupy public parks or other public houses or public places, swimming pools, wadding [sic] pools, beaches, lakes or ponds except those assigned to their respective races."Both declaratory and injunctive relief were requested. [Footnote 1]  On September 9, 1959, the District Court entered its judgment that the ordinance was unconstitutional and enjoined the defendants from enforcing the ordinance"or any custom, practice, policy or usage which may require plaintiffs, or any other Negroes similarly situated, to submit to enforced segregation solely because of race or color in their use of any public parks owned and operated by the City of Montgomery, Alabama."The judgment was accompanied by a memorandum opinion.  176 F. Supp. 776 (MD Ala.1959).  On appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed but ordered the judgment modified to provide that the District Court retain jurisdiction.  277 F.2d 364, 368 (1960).  The trial court, accordingly, ruled Page 417 U. S. 560 that it "will and does hereby retain jurisdiction of this cause until further order." [Footnote 2]In 1970, the petitioners sought to reopen the litigation.  They filed a motion asking, among other relief, that the respondents be cited for contempt "for deliberately avoiding and violating this Court's Judgment and Order in this case." [Footnote 3]  The motion contained allegations that some of the municipal parks had been reopened "in such a manner to avoid the total and full integration of said parks"; that the city had conspired with the Montgomery YMCA to segregate swimming and other recreational facilities and programs; that recreational facilities were unequally allocated as between white and Negro neighborhoods; and that the city discriminated in its employment of personnel in recreational programs.  The basis for these claims arose from other, separate litigation initiated in 1969 and resulting in the granting of affirmative relief to the plaintiffs in that suit.  See Smith v. Young Men's Christian Assn., 316 F. Supp. 899 (MD Ala.1970), aff'd as modified, 462 F.2d 634 (CA5 1972).  In that action the District Court found that the "coordinated effort" of the city and of the YMCA, 316 F. Supp.  at 908, and an agreement between them, reached shortly before the closing of the city parks and the entry of the court's 1959 decree, had effectuated "the perpetuation of segregated recreational facilities and programs in the City of Montgomery," id. at 909, and that it was"unmistakably clear that its purpose was to circumvent the Supreme Court's Page 417 U. S. 561 and this Court's desegregation rulings in the area of public recreation."Id. at 908. [Footnote 4]  As summarized by the Court of Appeals, the District Court concluded:"[T]he YMCA, as a result of the cooperative agreement, has been performing a statutorily declared 'public function;' the Montgomery Park and Recreation Board has, in effect, transferred some of its statutory authority and responsibility to the YMCA, thereby investing the YMCA with a municipal character; and therefore the YMCA has been serving as a municipal, rather than a private, agency in assisting the Park Board in providing recreational programs for the city.""*    *    *    * Page 417 U. S. 562" "[T]he YMCA's discriminatory conduct denied the plaintiffs their Fourteenth Amendment rights to Equal Protection of the law; under the facts of this case, the plaintiffs' showing of 'state action' satisfies the requirement under Title 42, U.S.C. Section 1983 that the YMCA's conduct be 'under color of law.'"462 F.2d  at 641-642.  The modification by the Court of Appeals related only to the disapproval of a provision in the District Court's order directing a specific Negro-white ratio in the YMCA's board and executive committee.  No review was sought here.The claims raised by the petitioners in their 1970 motion were settled by agreement dated January 29, 1971. [Footnote 5]  On July 29, the respondents filed their first written progress report.  On September 8, the petitioner filed a "Motion for Supplemental Relief."  App. 15. This motion forms the basis for the present phase of the litigation.  The petitioners complained that the city was permitting racially segregated schools and other segregated private groups and clubs to use city parks and recreational facilities.  They requested injunctive relief against"the use of City owned and operated recreational facilities by any private school group, club, or organization Page 417 U. S. 563 which is racially segregated or which has a racially discriminatory admissions policy."The District Court granted the petitioners the relief they requested.  337 F. Supp. 22 (MD Ala.1972).  The court reasoned that Montgomery officials were under an affirmative duty to bring about and to maintain a desegregated public school system.  Providing recreational facilities to de facto or de jure segregated private schools was inconsistent with that duty because such aid enhanced the attractiveness of those schools, generated capital savings that could be used to improve their private educational offerings, and provided means to raise other revenue to support the institutions, all to the detriment of establishing the constitutionally mandated unitary public school system.  The court, consequently, enjoined the city and its officials"from permitting or in any way sanctioning the use of city owned or operated recreational facilities by any private school, or private school affiliated group, if such school or group is racially segregated or if it has a racially discriminatory admissions policy."Id. at 26.  The court went on, however, with sparse findings and brief discussion, and similarly enjoined the city and its officials from permitting or sanctioning the use of city recreational facilities"by any private group, club or organization which is not affiliated with a private school and which has a racially discriminatory admissions policy."Ibid. [Footnote 6]On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed in part and remanded the case with directions.  473 F.2d 832 (CA5 Page 417 U. S. 564 1973).  It sustained that part of the injunction which restrained the use of city facilities by segregated private schools when that use was "exclusive" and not in common with other citizens.  Id. at 837.  The court ruled, however, that "nonexclusive enjoyment" of those facilities by private school children"was not proven to present a sufficient threat to desegregated public education to support an injunction restraining the clear personal right of the affected children to enjoy such usage in common with the rest of the public."Ibid.  With respect to that portion of the District Court's order concerning other private non-school groups, the Court of Appeals held that there was no "symbiotic relationship" of the kind present and condemned in Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U. S. 715 (1961).  Consequently, it held that, under Moose Lodge No. 17 v. Irvis, 407 U. S. 163 (1972), that portion of the District Court's order dealing with Page 417 U. S. 565 non-school groups had to be reversed because the injunction impermissibly intruded upon the freedom of association of citizens who were members of private groups.  The court, accordingly, ordered deletion of certain paragraphs of the injunctive order and the clarification of others.  473 F.2d  at 839-840.  The District Court complied with that mandate and, in particular, added the following paragraph to its injunctive order:"The injunction issued by this Court does not prohibit the City of Montgomery from permitting non-exclusive access to public recreational facilities and general government services by private schools or school affiliated groups."The plaintiffs petitioned for certiorari; the defendants did not cross-petition.IIThe Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not prohibit the "[i]ndividual invasion of individual rights."  Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S. 3,  109 U. S. 11 (1883).  It does proscribe, however, state action "of every kind" that operates to deny any citizen the equal protection of the laws.  Ibid.  This proscription on state action applies de facto as well as de jure, because"[c]onduct that is formally 'private' may become so entwined with governmental policies or so impregnated with a governmental character as to become subject to the constitutional limitations placed upon state action."Evans v. Newton, 382 U. S. 296,  382 U. S. 299 (1966).  In the present case, we must determine whether the city of Montgomery engaged in discriminatory activity violative of the parks desegregation order.  We must also decide whether the city's involvement in the alleged discriminatory activity of segregated private schools and other private groups, Page 417 U. S. 566 through its providing recreational facilities, constitutes "state action" subject to constitutional limitation.AThe Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court insofar as the latter enjoined the"exclusive possession of public recreational facilities such as football stadiums, baseball diamonds, basketball courts, and tennis courts for official athletic contests and similar functions sponsored by racially segregated private schools."473 F.2d  at 836 837.  The boundaries of this "exclusive" use approach, however, are not self-evident.  We find the concept helpful not so much as a controlling legal principle, but as a description of a type of use and, in the context of this case, suggestive of a means of allocating public recreational facilities.  The term "exclusive use" implies that an entire facility is exclusively, and completely, in the possession, control, and use of a private group. [Footnote 7]  It also implies, without mandating, a decisionmaking role for the city in allocating such facilities among private and, for that matter, public groups.Upon this understanding of the term, we agree with petitioners that the city's policy of allocating facilities to segregated private schools, in the context of the 1959 parks desegregation order and subsequent history, created, in effect, "enclaves of segregation," and deprived petitioners of equal access to parks and recreational facilities.  The city was under an affirmative constitutional Page 417 U. S. 567 duty to eliminate every "custom, practice, policy or usage" reflecting an "impermissible obeisance to the now thoroughly discredited doctrine of separate but equal.'"  Watson v. Memphis, 373 U. S. 526,  373 U. S. 538 (1963).  This obviously meant that discriminatory practices in Montgomery parks and recreational facilities were to be eliminated "root and branch," to use the phrase employed in Green v. County School Board of New Kent County, 391 U. S. 430,  391 U. S. 438 (1968).Instead of prompt and orderly compliance with the District Court's mandate, however, the city of Montgomery engaged in an elaborate subterfuge to anticipate and circumvent the court's order.  Segregated recreational programs continued to be presented through the conveniently cooperating private agency of the local YMCA.  All public swimming pools were closed, allegedly to prevent the mixing of races.  Facilities in Negro neighborhoods were not maintained equally with those in white neighborhoods.  In light of these facts, made part of the record in this case, [Footnote 8] it was entirely appropriate for the District Court carefully to scrutinize any practice or policy that would tend to abandon to segregated private groups facilities normally open to members of all races on an equal basis.  Here, the exclusive use and control of city recreational facilities, however temporary, by private segregated schools were little different from the city's agreement with the YMCA to run a "coordinated" but, in effect, segregated recreational program.  Such use and control carried the brand of "separate but equal" and, in Page 417 U. S. 568 the circumstances of this case, were properly terminated by the District Court.Particularly important is the fact that the city's policies operated directly to contravene an outstanding school desegregation order.  See Carr v. Montgomery County Board of Education, 232 F. Supp. 705 (MD Ala.1964); 253 F. Supp. 306 (1966); 289 F. Supp. 647 (1968), aff'd as modified, 400 F.2d 1 and 402 F.2d 782, 784, 787 (CA5 1968), rev'd and remanded sub nom. United States v. Montgomery County Board of Education, with directions to affirm the judgment of the District Court, 395 U. S. 225 (1969). [Footnote 9]  Certainly, the city's officials were aware of this order, and were responsible for seeing that no actions on their part would significantly impede the progress of school desegregation in the city.  Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U. S. 1 (1958); Green v. County School Board of New Kent County, 391 U.S. at  391 U. S. 437-438; Alexander v. Holmes County Board of Education, 396 U. S. 19,  396 U. S. 20 (1969).  Any arrangement, implemented by state officials at any level, which significantly tends to perpetuate a dual school system, in whatever manner, is constitutionally impermissible."[T]he constitutional rights of children not to be discriminated against . . . can neither be nullified openly and directly by state legislators or state executive or judicial officers, nor nullified indirectly by them through evasive schemes for segregation whether attempted 'ingeniously or ingenuously.'"Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. at  358 U. S. 17.  This means that any tangible state assistance, outside the generalized services government might provide to private segregated schools in common with other schools, and with all citizens, is constitutionally Page 417 U. S. 569 prohibited if it has "a significant tendency to facilitate, reinforce, and support private discrimination."  Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U. S. 455,  413 U. S. 466 (197).  The constitutional obligation of the State"requires it to steer clear not only of operating the old dual system of racially segregated schools, but also of giving significant aid to institutions that practice racial or other invidious discrimination."Id. at  413 U. S. 467.Here, the city's actions significantly enhanced the attractiveness of segregated private schools, formed in reaction against the federal court school order, by enabling them to offer complete athletic programs.  The city's provision of stadiums and recreational fields resulted in capital savings for those schools and enabled them to divert their own funds to other educational programs.  It also provided the opportunity for the schools to operate concessions that generated revenue.  We are persuaded, as were both the District Court and the Court of Appeals, that this assistance significantly tended to undermine the federal court order mandating the establishment and maintenance of a unitary school system in Montgomery.  It therefore was wholly proper for the city to be enjoined from permitting exclusive access to public recreational facilities by segregated private schools and by groups affiliated with such schools.BAlthough the Court of Appeals ruled out the exclusive use of city facilities by private schools, it went on to modify the District Court order"to make clear that the City of Montgomery is not prohibited from permitting nonexclusive access to public recreational facilities and general government services by private schools or school-affiliated groups,"473 F.2d  at 840, or from permitting access to these facilities by private organizations that have a racially discriminatory admissions policy.  Id. at 839.  Page 417 U. S. 570 Upon this record, we are unable to draw a conclusion as to whether the use of zoos, museums, parks, and other recreational facilities by private school groups in common with others, and by private non-school organizations, involves government so directly in the actions of those users as to warrant court intervention on constitutional grounds.It would be improper to determine at this stage the appropriateness of further relief in all the many and varied situations where facilities are used in common by school groups or used exclusively or in common by private groups.  It is possible that certain uses of city facilities will be judged to be in contravention of the parks desegregation order or the school desegregation order, or in some way to constitute impermissible "state action" ascribing to the city the discriminatory actions of the groups.  The record before us does not contain sufficient facts upon which to predicate legal judgments of this kind.  The questions to be resolved and the decisions to be made rest upon careful identification of the different types of city facilities that are available and the various uses to which they might be put by private groups. [Footnote 10] Page 417 U. S. 571The difficulties that confront us on this record are readily apparent.  Under appropriate circumstances, the District Court might conclude, as it did in the instance of exclusive use by private schools, that access in common to city facilities by private school groups would indeed contravene the school desegregation order.  For example, all-white private school basketball teams might be invited to participate in a tournament conducted on public recreational facilities with desegregated private and public school teams.  Because "discriminatory treatment exerts a pervasive influence on the entire educational process," Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. at  413 U. S. 469, citing Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483 (1954), such assistance, although proffered in common with fully desegregated groups, might so directly impede the progress of court-ordered school desegregation within the city that it would be appropriate to fashion equitable relief "adjusting and reconciling public and private needs."  Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U. S. 294,  349 U. S. 300 (1955).  The essential finding justifying further relief would be a showing of direct impairment of an outstanding school desegregation order.  Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. at  358 U. S. 17; Bush v. Orleans Parish School Board, 364 U. S. 500 (1960); Brown v. South Carolina State Board of Education, 296 F. Supp. 199 (SC), aff'd, 393 U. S. 222 (1968); Poindexter v. Page 417 U. S. 572 Louisiana Financial Assistance Comm'n, 275 F. Supp. 833 (ED La.1967), aff'd, 389 U. S. 571 (1968); Lee v. Macon County Board of Education, 267 F. Supp. 458 (MD Ala.), aff'd sub nom. Wallace v. United States, 389 U. S. 215 (1967); Norwood v. Harrison, supra.Relief would also be appropriate if a particular use constitutes a vestige of the type of state-sponsored racial segregation in public recreational facilities that was prohibited in the parks decree and likewise condemned in Watson v. Memphis, 373 U. S. 526 (1963).  See also Dawson v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 220 F.2d 386 (CA4), aff'd, 350 U.S. 877 (1955); Muir v. Louisville Park Theatrical Assn., 347 U.S. 971 (1954); Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955); New Orleans City Park Improvement Assn. v. Detiege, 358 U. S. 54 (1958).  For example, the record contains indications that there are all-white private and all-Negro public Dixie Youth and Babe Ruth baseball leagues for children, all of which use city-provided ballfields and lighting, balls, bats, mitts, and other aid.  Were the District Court to determine that this dual system came about as a means of evading the parks decree, or of serving to perpetuate the separate but equal use of city facilities on the basis of race, through the aid and assistance of the city, further relief would be appropriate.The problem of private group use is much more complex.  The Court of Appeals relied on Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U. S. 163 (1972), in concluding that the use of city facilities by private clubs did not reflect a "symbiotic relationship" between government and those groups so as to constitute state action.  473 F.2d  at 838-839.We feel that Moose Lodge is not fully applicable here.  In that case, we generally followed the approach taken Page 417 U. S. 573 in Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, supra, where it was stated:"Owing to the very 'largeness' of government, a multitude of relationships might appear to some to fall within the Amendment's embrace, but that, it must be remembered, can be determined only in the framework of the peculiar facts or circumstances present."365 U.S. at  365 U. S. 725-726.  In Moose Lodge, the litigation was directly against a private organization, and it was alleged that the organization's racially discriminatory policies constituted state action.  We held that there was no state action in the mere fact that the fraternal organization's beverage bar was licensed and regulated by the State.  In contrast, here, as in Burton, the question of the existence of state action centers in the extent of the city's involvement in discriminatory actions by private agencies using public facilities, and in whether that involvement makes the city"a joint participant in the challenged activity, which, on that account, cannot be considered to have been so 'purely private' as to fall without the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment."365 U.S. at  365 U. S. 725.  Because the city makes city property available for use by private entities, this case is more like Burton than Moose Lodge.  The question then is whether there is significant state involvement in the private discrimination alleged.  Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U. S. 369 (1967); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, supra; Evans v. Newton, 382 U. S. 296 (1966); Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, supra."The Court has never held, of course, that discrimination by an otherwise private entity would be violative of the Equal Protection Clause if the private entity receives any sort of benefit or service at all from the State, or if it is subject to state regulation in any degree whatever.  Page 417 U. S. 574 407 U.S. at  407 U. S. 173.  Traditional state monopolies, such as electricity, water, and police and fire protection -- all generalized governmental services -- do net by their mere provision constitute a showing of state involvement in invidious discrimination.  Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. at  413 U. S. 465; Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. at  407 U. S. 173.  The same is true of a broad spectrum of municipal recreational facilities:  parks, playgrounds, athletic facilities, amphitheaters, museums, zoos, and the like.  Cf. Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. at  382 U. S. 302.  It follows, therefore, that the portion of the District Court's order prohibiting the mere use of such facilities by any segregated 'private group, club or organization' is invalid because it was not predicated upon a proper finding of state action."If, however, the city or other governmental entity rations otherwise freely accessible recreational facilities, the case for state action will naturally be stronger than if the facilities are simply available to all comers without condition or reservation.  Here, for example, petitioners allege that the city engages in scheduling softball games for an all-white church league and provides balls, equipment, fields, and lighting.  The city's role in that situation would be dangerously close to what was found to exist in Burton, where the city had "elected to place its power, property and prestige behind the admitted discrimination."  365 U.S. at  365 U. S. 725.  We are reminded, however, that the Court has never attempted to formulate "an infallible test for determining whether the State . . . has become significantly involved in private discriminations" so as to constitute state action.  Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. at  387 U. S. 378."'Only by sifting facts and weighing circumstances' on a case-by-case basis can a 'nonobvious involvement of the State in private conduct be attributed its true significance.'"Ibid., quoting Burton, 365 U.S. at  365 U. S. 722.  This is the task for the District Court on remand. Page 417 U. S. 575IIIWe close with this word of caution.  It should be obvious that the exclusion of any person or group -- all-Negro, all-Oriental, or all-white -- from public facilities infringes upon the freedom of the individual to associate as he chooses.  MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS emphasized this in his dissent, joined by MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL, in Moose Lodge.  He observed:"The associational rights which our system honors permit all-white, all-black, all-brown, and all-yellow clubs to be formed.  They also permit all-Catholic, all-Jewish, or all-agnostic clubs to be established.  Government may not tell a man or woman who his or her associates must be.  The individual can be as selective as he desires."407 U.S. at  407 U. S. 179-180.  The freedom to associate applies to the beliefs we share, and to those we consider reprehensible.  It tends to produce the diversity of opinion that oils the machinery of democratic government and insures peaceful, orderly change.  Because its exercise is largely dependent on the right to own or use property, Healy v. James, 408 U. S. 169,  408 U. S. 181-183 (1972), any denial of access to public facilities must withstand close scrutiny and be carefully circumscribed.  Certainly, a person's mere membership in an organization which possesses a discriminatory admissions policy would not, alone, be ground for his exclusion from public facilities.  Having said this, however, we must also be aware that the very exercise of the freedom to associate by some may serve to infringe that freedom for others.  Invidious discrimination takes its own toll on the freedom to associate, and it is not subject to affirmative constitutional protection when it involves state action.  Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. at  413 U. S. 470.The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore reversed in part.  The case is remanded to that court Page 417 U. S. 576 with directions to remand it in turn to the District Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.It is so ordered
U.S. Supreme CourtGilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556 (1974)Gilmore v. City of MontgomeryNo. 72-1517Argued January 15-16, 1974Decided June 17, 1974417 U.S. 556SyllabusPetitioners, Negro citizens of Montgomery, Ala., brought this class action in 1958 to desegregate the city's public parks, and, in 1959, the District Court ordered the parks desegregated.  The Court of Appeals affirmed, and ordered the District Court to retain jurisdiction.  Thereafter, however, segregated recreational programs were continued by the city in cooperation with the YMCA, public swimming pools were closed allegedly to prevent the mixing of races, and recreational facilities in Negro neighborhoods were not maintained equally with those in white neighborhoods.  The petitioners by motion in 1970 reopened the litigation based on facts developed in Smith v. YMCA, 316 F. Supp. 899 (MD Ala.1970), in which relief was obtained against the "coordinated effort" of the city and the YMCA to perpetuate the segregated parks.  The claims raised by the 1970 motion were settled by agreement.  In 1971 the petitioners filed the "Motion for Supplemental Relief," which forms the basis for the present phase of the litigation, complaining that the city was permitting racially segregated schools and other segregated private groups and clubs to use city parks and recreational facilities.  The District Court enjoined the city and its officials from permitting or sanctioning the use of city recreational facilities by any racially segregated private school or affiliated group, or by any private non-school group, club, or organization that has a racially discriminatory admissions policy.  The Court of Appeals sustained the injunction insofar as the use of city facilities by segregated private schools was "exclusive" and not in common with other citizens, but reversed the injunction as it applied to "nonexclusive" use by segregated private schools and to use by non-school groups.  The court found an insufficient threat to desegregated public education to support an injunction restraining nonexclusive use by private school groups, and no "symbiotic relationship" between the city and non-school groups so that the injunction impermissibly Page 417 U. S. 557 intruded upon the freedom of association of citizens who were members of such groups.Held:1. The city was properly enjoined from permitting exclusive access to its recreational facilities by segregated private schools and by groups affiliated with such schools.  Pp.  417 U. S. 566-569.(a) Using the term "exclusive use" as implying that an entire facility is exclusively and completely in the possession, control, and use of a private group, and as also implying, without mandating, a decisionmaking role for the city in allocating such facilities among private and public groups, the city's policy of allocating facilities to segregated private schools, in the context of the 1959 order and subsequent history, created, in effect, "enclaves of segregation" and deprived petitioners of equal access to parks and recreational facilities.  Pp.  417 U. S. 566-567.(b) The exclusive use and control of city recreational facilities, however, temporary, by private segregated schools were little different from the city's agreement with the YMCA to run a "coordinated" but, in effect, segregated recreational program.  This use carried the brand of "separate but equal," and, in the circumstances of this case, was properly terminated by the District Court.  Pp.  417 U. S. 567-568.(c) More importantly, the city's policies operated directly to contravene an outstanding school desegregation order, and any arrangement, implemented by state officials at any level, that significantly tends to perpetuate a dual school system, in whatever manner, is constitutionally impermissible.  Pp.  417 U. S. 568-569.2. On the record, it is not possible to determine whether the use of the city's recreational facilities by private school groups in common with others, and by private non-school organizations, involved the city so directly in the action of those users as to warrant court intervention on constitutional grounds.  Pp.  417 U. S. 569-574.(a) The record does not contain sufficient facts upon which to predicate legal judgment as to whether certain uses of city facilities in common by private school groups or exclusively or in common by non-school groups contravened the parks desegregation order or the school desegregation order, or in some way constitute "state action" ascribing to the city the discriminatory actions of the groups in question.  P.  417 U. S. 570.(b) The portion of the District Court's order prohibiting the mere use of city recreational facilities by any segregated "private group, club or organization" is invalid because it was not predicated Page 417 U. S. 558 upon a proper finding of state action.  Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U. S. 163, distinguished.  Pp.  417 U. S. 572-574.473 F.2d 832, reversed in part, and remanded.BLACKMUN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J., and STEWART, POWELL, and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined.  MARSHALL, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, post, p.  417 U. S. 576.  BRENNAN, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p.  417 U. S. 577.  WHITE, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which DOUGLAS, J., joined, post, p.  417 U.S. 581.