JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.In this case, we decide whether our decision in Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U. S. 320 (1985), provided cause for respondent's failure to challenge the trial court's instructions in accordance with state procedures.Respondent Aubrey Dennis Adams, Jr., was charged with the first-degree murder of 8-year-old Trisa Gail Thornley, and the State sought to impose the death penalty.  At the start of jury selection for respondent's trial, the trial judge Page 489 U. S. 403 undertook to instruct the prospective jurors on their "advisory" role under Florida law. [Footnote 1]  The judge informed the initial panel of prospective jurors:"The Court is not bound by your recommendation.  The ultimate responsibility for what this man gets is not on your shoulders.  It's on my shoulders.  You are merely an advisory group to me in Phase Two.  You can come back and say, Judge, we think you ought to give the man life.  I can say, I disregard the recommendation of the Jury, and I give him death.  You can come back and say, Judge, we think he ought to be put to death.  I can say, I disregard your recommendation, and give him life.  So that this conscience part of it, as to whether or not you're going to put the man to death or not, that is not your decision to make.  That's only my decision to make, and it has to be on my conscience.  It cannot be on yours."App.19-20.  Page 489 U. S. 404 The judge had intended to give this explanation to the entire venire before beginning the selection process, but forgot to do so, and so he gave a similar explanation each time new prospective jurors were seated.  As a result, each of the jurors ultimately selected heard the explanation at least once, and several heard it a number of times.  In addition, the judge interrupted counsel's voir dire on two occasions to repeat that the court, not the jury, was responsible for sentencing, and again instructed the jury to that effect before it began its deliberations.  Defense counsel did not object at any point to these instructions.On October 20, 1978, the jury found respondent guilty of first-degree murder.  After a separate sentencing hearing, the jury recommended that he be sentenced to death, and the trial judge imposed a death sentence. [Footnote 2]  The Florida Supreme Court affirmed respondent's conviction and sentence on direct appeal, Adams v. State, 412 So. 2d 850 (1982), and this Court denied certiorari, 459 U.S. 882 (1982).  Respondent did not allege as error, on either state or federal grounds, the trial judge's instructions to the jurors on their responsibility for the sentence they would recommend.In September, 1984, the Florida Supreme Court affirmed the denial of respondent's first motion for postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850.  Adams v. State, 456 So. 2d 888 (1984).  Again, respondent did not challenge the trial judge's statements to the jurors on their responsibility for the death sentence.  Respondent next filed his first federal habeas petition in District Court; once again, he did not challenge the trial judge's instructions.  The District Page 489 U. S. 405 Court denied his habeas petition on September 18, 1984, Adams v. Wainwright, No. 84-170-Civ-Oc-16 (MD Fla.), the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, 764 F.2d 1356 (1985), and this Court denied certiorari, 474 U. S. 1073 (1986).On June 11, 1985, Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U. S. 320, was decided.  The Court there held that remarks by the prosecutor in a capital case that misinformed the jury as to the role of appellate review violated the Eighth Amendment.  Id. at  472 U. S. 336 (plurality opinion); id. at  472 U. S. 341-342 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).  Based on Caldwell, respondent filed a second motion for postconviction relief under Florida Rule 3.850, challenging for the first time the trial judge's statements to the jurors that they were not responsible for the sentence they recommended, and arguing that the judge's instructions violated the Eighth Amendment by misinforming the jury of its role under Florida law.  According to respondent, although the Florida death penalty statute provided that the jury's recommendation was only advisory, the Florida Supreme Court had held that a trial judge could only override the jury's verdict if the facts were "so clear and convincing that virtually no reasonable person could differ."  Tedder v. State, 322 So. 2d 908, 910 (1975) (per curiam).  Since the trial judge in this case told the jurors that the sentencing responsibility was solely his, and failed to tell them that he could override their verdict only under limited circumstances, respondent argued, the judge misled the jury in violation of Caldwell.  The Florida Supreme Court refused to address respondent's argument on the merits, however, because respondent had failed to raise the argument on direct appeal.  Adams v. State, 484 So. 2d 1216, 1217, cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1103 (1986).The Caldwell claim was then raised in respondent's second federal habeas petition.  The District Court held that the claim was procedurally barred, and that, alternatively, respondent's Caldwell claim was meritless.  Adams v. Wainwright, No. 86-64-Civ-Oc-16 (MD Fla., Mar. 7, 1986), p. 9, Page 489 U. S. 406 App. to Pet. for Cert. A-43, A-56-A-60.  The Eleventh Circuit reversed.  Adams v. Wainwright, 804 F.2d 1526 (1986), modified on denial of rehearing, 816 F.2d 1493 (1987).  The Court of Appeals held that respondent's Caldwell claim"was so novel at the time of [his] trial in October, 1978, and his sentencing and appeal in early 1979 that its legal basis was not reasonably available at that time;"therefore, he had established cause for his procedural default.  816 F.2d  at 1498.  The court then proceeded to address the merits of respondent's Caldwell claim, concluding that the trial judge's instructions violated the Eighth Amendment.  804 F.2d  at 1532-1533.We granted certiorari to review the Eleventh Circuit's holding that Caldwell provides cause for respondent's procedural default, [Footnote 3] 485 U.S. 933 (1988), and we now reverse.In Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U. S. 72,  433 U. S. 87 (1977), this Court required that habeas petitioners show "cause" and "prejudice" before federal courts will review claims that the state courts have found procedurally defaulted.  We have reaffirmed this requirement on several occasions.  See Murray v. Carrier, 477 U. S. 478,  477 U. S. 494-495 (1986); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U. S. 107,  456 U. S. 129 (1982).  We have, however, "left open for Page 489 U. S. 407 resolution in future decisions the precise definition'" of cause and prejudice.  Amadeo v. Zant, 486 U. S. 214,  486 U. S. 221 (1988) (quoting Sykes, supra, at  433 U. S. 87).  See also Reed v. Ross, 468 U. S. 1,  468 U. S. 13 (1984).Reed v. Ross held that one way a petitioner can establish cause is by showing that "a constitutional claim is so novel that its legal basis is not reasonably available to counsel."  Id. at  468 U. S. 16.  The Eleventh Circuit, relying on Reed, held in this case that "Eighth Amendment jurisprudence at the time of [respondent's] procedural default did not provide a reasonable basis" on which to raise a Caldwell claim.  816 F.2d  at 1499.  The Court of Appeals reviewed our prior cases and concluded that none of them indicated that statements such as the ones made by the trial judge here "implicated the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment."  Ibid.  The Court also noted that it could find no decisions by other courts suggesting that "this type of Eighth Amendment claim was being raised at that time."  Ibid.We believe that the Eleventh Circuit failed to give sufficient weight to a critical fact that leads us to conclude, without passing on the Court of Appeals' historical analysis, that Caldwell does not provide cause for respondent's procedural default.  As we have noted, the decision in"Caldwell is relevant only to certain types of comment -- those that mislead the jury as to its role in the sentencing process in a way that allows the jury to feel less responsible than it should for the sentencing decision."Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U. S. 168,  477 U. S. 184, n. 16 (1986).  As respondent conceded at oral argument, if the challenged instructions accurately described the role of the jury under state law, there is no basis for a Caldwell claim.  To establish a Caldwell violation, a defendant necessarily must show that the remarks to the jury improperly described the role assigned to the jury by local law.  See, e.g., Tr. of Oral Arg. 29, 32, 33, and 36-37.  Respondent therefore must be asserting in this case that the trial court's remarks Page 489 U. S. 408 violated state law, and, in finding a Caldwell violation in this case, the Court of Appeals must have concluded that the remarks in question were error under Florida law. [Footnote 4]If respondent and the Court of Appeals are correct in this regard, respondent plainly had the basis for an objection and an argument on appeal that the instructions violated state law.  See Pait v. State, 112 So. 2d 380, 383-384 (Fla.1959) (holding that misinforming the jury of its role constitutes reversible error); Blackwell v. State, 79 So. 731, 735-736 (Fla.1918) (same). [Footnote 5]  Yet, despite the availability of this claim under state law, respondent did not object to the remarks at trial or challenge them on appeal.  As a result, Florida law bars respondent from raising the issue in later state proceedings.  See, e.g., Adams, 484 So. 2d  at 1217.Respondent offers no excuse for his failure to challenge the remarks on state law grounds, and we discern none that would amount to good cause in a federal habeas corpus proceeding.  Had respondent objected at the time and asserted error under state law, and had the trial or appellate court sustained his objection, the error would have been corrected in the state system.  Had his objection been overruled and that ruling sustained on appeal, we would very likely know that the instruction was an accurate reflection of state law.  In either event, it is doubtful that the later decision in Caldwell would have provoked the filing of a second habeas corpus petition.  In these circumstances, the fact that it turns out that the trial court's remarks were objectionable on federal as well as state grounds is not good cause for his failure to follow Florida procedural rules. Page 489 U. S. 409Reed v. Ross is of no help to respondent.  In that case, the defendant failed to challenge on appeal an instruction that was plainly valid under the settled law of the State.  Six years later, it was held, in Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U. S. 684 (1975), that such an instruction violated the Due Process Clause of the Federal Constitution.  We held that there was a good cause for the procedural default because a challenge to the instruction was "so novel that its legal basis [was] not reasonably available to counsel."  468 U.S. at  468 U. S. 16.  Hence, there was no reason for suspecting that defense counsel was flouting state procedures for tactical or other reasons.  But here respondent claims that the court's remarks were invalid under state law at the time; yet those remarks were not objected to, nor were they challenged on appeal.  Unlike Reed, the legal basis for a challenge was plainly available, and it would not be safe to assume that the failure to object was not for tactical or other reasons that will not excuse the default in a habeas corpus proceeding.  Indeed, at the time of respondent's trial, there was some suggestion that comments such as those by the trial judge would incline the jury toward leniency, rather than toward recommending a death sentence.  See Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U. S. 282,  432 U. S. 294, and n. 7 (1977).  Furthermore, because in Reed the legal basis for the claim at issue was so lacking, it could not be said that adjudicating the claim in federal court would infringe on the interest of the state courts in enforcing their procedural rules.  But here, as we have said, the State has every interest in having the defendant challenge a faulty instruction in a timely manner, so that it can correct the misstatement, and that interest does not disappear when it is later held that the instruction violates the Federal Constitution if it erroneously describes the role of the jury under state law.We agree with respondent and the Court of Appeals that the availability of a claim under state law does not, of itself, establish that a claim was available under the United States Constitution.  See 816 F.2d  at 1499, n. 6.  It is clear that Page 489 U. S. 410"mere errors of state law are not the concern of this Court unless they rise for some other reason to the level of a denial of rights protected by the United States Constitution."Barclay v. Florida, 463 U. S. 939,  463 U. S. 957-958 (1983) (plurality opinion) (citation omitted).  But the issue in this case is not whether respondent could have obtained federal habeas relief at the time of his trial for the trial judge's instructions.  Rather, the issue is whether we should exercise our equitable power to overlook respondent's state procedural default.  Reed, supra, at  468 U. S. 9.Neither do we hold that, whenever a defendant has any basis for challenging particular conduct as improper, a failure to preserve that claim under state procedural law bars any subsequently available claim arising out of the same conduct.  Indeed, respondent here could have challenged the improper remarks by the trial judge at the time of his trial as a violation of due process.  See Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U. S. 637 (1974).  Rather, what is determinative in this case is that the ground for challenging the trial judge's instructions -- that they were objectionable under state law -- was a necessary element of the subsequently available Caldwell claim.  In such a case, the subsequently available federal claim does not excuse the procedural default. [Footnote 6] Page 489 U. S. 411The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore reversed.@It is so ordered
U.S. Supreme CourtDugger v. Adams, 489 U.S. 401 (1989)Dugger v. AdamsNo. 87-121Argued November 1, 1988Decided February 28, 1989489 U.S. 401SyllabusAt the start of jury selection for respondent's Florida state court trial for first-degree murder, the trial judge instructed the prospective jurors on their responsibility for the sentence they would recommend, stating that the court, not the jury, was responsible for sentencing, and that the jury had merely an advisory role.  Defense counsel did not object to these instructions.  The jury found respondent guilty and recommended the death sentence, which the trial judge then imposed.  The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentence on direct appeal in which respondent did not allege as error, on either state or federal grounds, the above instructions.  Nor did he so allege in a subsequent unsuccessful motion in state court for postconviction relief or in a later unsuccessful federal habeas corpus petition.  Thereafter, it was held in Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U. S. 320, that the prosecutor's remarks that misinformed the jury in a capital case as to the role of appellate review violated the Eighth Amendment.  Based on Caldwell, respondent filed another motion in state court for postconviction relief, challenging for the first time the instructions in question and arguing that they violated the Eighth Amendment by misinforming the jury of its sentencing role under Florida law because the Florida Supreme Court in another case had held that a trial judge could override the jury's recommended sentence only if the facts were "so clear and convincing that virtually no reasonable person could differ," and that therefore, since the trial judge in this case had told the jurors that the sentencing responsibility was solely his, and failed to tell them that he could override their verdict only under limited circumstances, the judge misled the jury in violation of Caldwell.  On appeal, the Florida Supreme Court refused to address this argument because respondent had failed to raise it on direct appeal.  The Caldwell claim was then raised in respondent's second federal habeas petition, and the District Court held that the claim was procedurally barred.  The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the claim was so novel at the time of respondent's trial, sentencing, and appeal that its legal basis was not reasonably available, and that therefore he had established cause for his procedural default.  The court then proceeded to hold that the instructions in question violated the Eighth Amendment. Page 489 U. S. 402Held:  Caldwell does not provide cause for respondent's procedural default.  Despite the availability of a claim that the instructions in question violated state law, respondent did not object to them at trial or challenge them on appeal.  As a result, Florida law barred him from raising the issue in later state proceedings.  Respondent offered no excuse for his failure to challenge the instructions on state law grounds, and there is none that would amount to good cause in a federal habeas proceeding.  What is determinative in this case is that the ground for challenging the instructions -- that they were objectionable under state law -- was a necessary element of the subsequently available Caldwell claim.  In such a case, the subsequently available federal claim did not excuse the procedural default.  Reed v. Ross, 468 U. S. 1, distinguished.  Pp.  489 U. S. 405-410.804 F.2d 1526, and 816 F.2d 1493, reversed.WHITE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST, C.J., and O'CONNOR, SCALIA, and KENNEDY, JJ., joined.  BLACKMUN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN, MARSHALL, and STEVENS, JJ., joined, post, p.  489 U. S. 412.