MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court.Petitioner was convicted of failing to submit to induction and other violations of the draft laws.  His principal defense involves the contention that he had been incorrectly classified by his local Selective Service board.  The Court of Appeals ruled that this defense was barred because petitioner had failed to pursue and exhaust his administrative remedies.  We granted certiorari, 400 U.S. 864 (1970), to consider the applicability of the "exhaustion of administrative remedies" doctrine in the circumstances of this case.IIn February, 1966, while attending the University of Rochester, petitioner applied to his local Selective Service board for conscientious objector status.  In support of his claim to that exemption, he submitted the special form for conscientious objectors (SSS Form 150), setting forth his views concerning participation in war. [Footnote 1]  The board continued petitioner's existing classification -- student deferment Page 402 U. S. 481 -- and advised him that the conscientious objector claim would be passed upon when student status no longer applied.In April, 1967, petitioner wrote to President Johnson, enclosing the charred remnants of his draft cards and declaring his conviction that he must "sever every link with violence and war."  The letter included a statement that petitioner had "already been accepted for graduate study in a program where I would probably qualify for the theological deferment."  A copy of the letter was forwarded to the local board; the board continued petitioner's student deferment.  Petitioner graduated in June, 1967, and thereafter the board sent him a current information questionnaire (SSS Form 127), which asked inter alia for specific information concerning his future educational plans and generally for any information he thought should be called to the board's attention.  Petitioner returned the questionnaire unanswered and announced in a cover letter that henceforth he would adhere to a policy of noncooperation with the Selective Service System.In September, 1967, the board reviewed petitioner's file, rejected the pending conscientious objector claim, [Footnote 2] and reclassified petitioner I-A.  In response to his reclassification, petitioner sought neither a personal appearance before the local board nor review by the appeal board.  Indeed, pursuant to his policy of noncooperation, he returned to the board, unopened, the communication notifying him of the reclassification and of his right to appear before the local board, to confer with the Government appeal agent, and to appeal.  Petitioner did not appear for a physical examination ordered to take place in October, 1967.  He did respond to an order to appear Page 402 U. S. 482 for induction in January, 1968, and he took a physical examination at that time.  However, he refused to submit to induction.Petitioner was prosecuted, under § 12(a) of the Military Selective Service Act of 1967, 62 Stat. 622, as amended, 50 U.S.C.App. § 462(a) (1964 ed., Supp. V) and applicable Selective Service regulations, [Footnote 3] for failing to submit to induction (count I), failing to report for a pre-induction physical examination (count II), failing to keep possession of a valid classification notice (count III), and failing to submit requested information relevant to his draft status (count IV).  Petitioner was convicted on all four counts and sentenced to two years' imprisonment on each count, the sentences to run concurrently.  Petitioner's principal defense to liability for refusing induction [Footnote 4] was that the local board had erred in classifying him I-A. [Footnote 5]  The Court of Appeals, with one judge dissenting, held that the defense of incorrect classification was barred because petitioner had failed to exhaust the administrative remedies available for correction of such an error.  The conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Page 402 U. S. 483IITwo Terms ago, in McKart v. United States, 395 U. S. 185 (1969), the Court surveyed the place of the exhaustion doctrine in Selective Service cases, and the policies that underpin the doctrine.  As it has evolved since Falbo v. United States, 320 U. S. 549 (1944), and Estep v. United States, 327 U. S. 114 (1946), the doctrine, when properly invoked, operates to restrict judicial scrutiny of administrative action having to do with the classification of a registrant, in the case of a registrant who has failed to pursue normal administrative remedies, and thus has sidestepped a corrective process which might have cured or rendered moot the very defect later complained of in court.  Cf. Oestereich v. Selective Service Board, 393 U. S. 233,  393 U. S. 235-236, n. 5 (1968); Gibson v. United States, 329 U. S. 338,  329 U. S. 349-350 (1946).  McKart stands for the proposition that the doctrine is not to be applied inflexibly in all situations, but that decision also plainly contemplates situations where a litigant's claims will lose vitality because the litigant has failed to contest his rights in an administrative forum.  The result in a criminal context is no doubt a substantial detriment to the defendant whose claims are barred.  Still this unhappy result may be justified in particular circumstances by considerations relating to the integrity of the Selective Service classification process and the limited role of the courts in deciding the proper classification of draft registrants. [Footnote 6] Page 402 U. S. 484AAfter McKart, the task for the courts, in deciding the applicability of the exhaustion doctrine to the circumstances of a particular case, is to ask"whether allowing all similarly situated registrants to bypass [the administrative avenue in question] would seriously impair the Selective Service System's ability to perform its functions."395 U.S. at  395 U. S. 197.  McKart specified the salient interests that may be jeopardized by a registrant's failure to pursue administrative remedies.  Certain failures to exhaust may deny the administrative system important opportunities "to make a factual record" for purposes of classification, or "to exercise its discretion or apply its expertise" in the course of decisionmaking.  Id. at  395 U. S. 194.  There may be a danger that relaxation of exhaustion requirements, in certain circumstances, would induce "frequent and deliberate flouting of administrative processes," thereby undermining the scheme of decisionmaking that Congress has created.  Id. at  395 U. S. 195.  And, of course, a strict exhaustion requirement tends to ensure that the agency have additional opportunities "to discover and correct its own errors," and thus may help to obviate all occasion for judicial review.  Ibid.To be weighed against the interests in exhaustion is the harsh impact of the doctrine when it is invoked to bar any judicial review of a registrant's claims. Surely an insubstantial procedural default by a registrant should Page 402 U. S. 485 not shield an invalid order from judicial correction, simply because the interest in time-saving self-correction by the agency is involved.  That single interest is conceivably slighted by any failure to exhaust, however innocuous the bypass in other respects, and McKart recognizes that the exhaustion requirement is not to be applied "blindly in every case."  Id. at  395 U. S. 201.  McKart also acknowledges that the fear of "frequent and deliberate flouting" can easily be overblown, since in the normal case a registrant would be "foolhardy" indeed to withhold a valid claim from administrative scrutiny.  Id. at  395 U. S. 200.  Thus, the contention that the rigors of the exhaustion doctrine should be relaxed is not to be met by mechanical recitation of the broad interests usually served by the doctrine, but rather should be assessed in light of a discrete analysis of the particular default in question, to see whether there is "a governmental interest compelling enough" to justify the forfeiting of judicial review.  Id. at  395 U. S. 197.In the McKart case, the focal interest for purposes of analysis was the interest in allowing the agency "to make a factual record, or to exercise its discretion or apply its expertise."  There, the registrant had failed to take an administrative appeal from the local board's denial of "sole surviving son" status.  Later, the issue of McKart's entitlement to that exempt status arose in a criminal context, and the Court held that the claim should be heard as a defense to liability despite the failure to exhaust.  The validity of the claim was a question "solely . . . of statutory interpretation."  Id. at  395 U. S. 197-198.  McKart's failure to exhaust did not inhibit the making of an administrative record -- all the relevant facts had been presented.  Id. at  395 U. S. 198 n. 15.  The issue was not one of fact, and thus its resolution would not have been aided by the exercise of special administrative expertise; and proper interpretation of the statutory provision in question was not a matter for agency discretion. Page 402 U. S. 486In the present case, the same interest is pivotal -- but here it is apparent that McGee's failure to exhaust did jeopardize the interest in full administrative fact gathering and utilization of agency expertise, rather than the contrary.  Unlike the dispute about statutory interpretation involved in McKart, McGee's claims to exempt status -- as a ministerial student or a conscientious objector -- depended on the application of expertise by administrative bodies in resolving underlying issues of fact.  Factfinding for purposes of Selective Service classification is committed primarily to the administrative process, with very limited judicial review to ascertain whether there is a "basis in fact," for the administrative determination.  See 50 U.S.C.App. § 460(b)(3) (1964 ed., Supp. V); Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. at  327 U. S. 122-123; cf. Witmer v. United States, 348 U. S. 375,  348 U. S. 380-381 (1955).  McKart expressly noted that as to classification claims turning on the resolution of particularistic fact questions,"the Selective Service System and the courts may have a stronger interest in having the question decided in the first instance by the local board and then by the appeal board, which considers the question anew."395 U.S. at  395 U. S. 198 n. 16.  See id. at  395 U. S. 200-201.  This "stronger interest," in the circumstances of the present case, has become compelling and fully sufficient to justify invocation of the exhaustion doctrine.BPetitioner argues that denial of exemption as a ministerial student was erroneous, but he had never requested that classification, nor had he submitted information that would have been pertinent to such a claim.  In regard to his entitlement to this exempt status, McGee made no effort to invoke administrative processes for factfinding, classification, and review.  It is true that vagrant bits of information may have come to the attention of the local Page 402 U. S. 487 board raising a bare possibility that petitioner might qualify as a ministerial student, [Footnote 7] but this hardly changes the picture of a thoroughgoing attempt to sidestep the administrative process and make the first serious case for an exemption later in court.Such a default directly jeopardizes the functional autonomy of the administrative bodies on which Congress has conferred the primary responsibility to decide questions of fact relating to the proper classification of Selective Service registrants. [Footnote 8]  See McKart v. United States, Page 402 U. S. 488 395 U. S. 185,  395 U. S. 198 n. 15 (1969); cf. 32 CFR § 1622.1(c).  Here, the bypass was deliberate and without excuse, and this is not a case where entitlement to an exemption would be automatically made out, given a minimal showing by the registrant or minimal investigatory effort by the local board. [Footnote 9]  The exhaustion requirement is properly imposed where, as here, the claim to exemption depend on careful factual analysis and where the registrant has completely sidestepped the administrative process designed to marshal relevant facts and resolve factual issues in the first instance.  Cf. Dickinson v. United States, 346 U. S. 389,  346 U. S. 395-396 (1953).CPetitioner did claim exemption as a conscientious objector to war.  He filled out and returned the special form for conscientious objectors (SSS Form 150), and appended a further statement of beliefs, thereby making out a prima facie case for the exempt status.  Since, at that Page 402 U. S. 489 time -- 1966 -- petitioner held an undergraduate student deferment, the board postponed consideration of the claim to a "higher" classification.  See 32 CFR § 1623.2.  In 1967, after petitioner had graduated, the pending conscientious objector claim was reviewed [Footnote 10] and rejected, and petitioner was classified I-A.  Petitioner contends that denial of conscientious objector status was erroneous, but, after the claim was rejected, he did not invoke the administrative processes available to correct the error.  He did not seek a personal appearance before the local board, [Footnote 11] nor did he take an administrative appeal to contest the denial before the appeal board, which classifies de novo. [Footnote 12]That petitioner's failure to exhaust should cut off judicial review of his conscientious objector claim may seem too hard a result, assuming, as the Government admits, that the written information available to the board provided no basis in fact for denial of the exemption, and, as the Court of Appeals ruled, that neither did petitioner's conduct in relation to the conscription system or other acts that came into view.  See 426 F.2d 691, 697 (CA2 1970); id. at 700-701 (dissenting opinion).  But even assuming the above, petitioner's dual failure to exhaust -- his failure either to secure a personal appearance or to take an administrative appeal -- implicates decisively the policies served by the exhaustion requirement, especially the purpose of ensuring that the Selective Service System have full opportunity to "make Page 402 U. S. 490 a factual record" and "apply its expertise" in relation to a registrant's claims.  When a claim to exemption depends ultimately on the careful gathering and analysis of relevant facts, the interest in full airing of the facts within the administrative system is prominent, and as the Court of Appeals noted, the exhaustion requirement "cannot properly be limited to those persons whose claims would fail in court anyway."  Id. at 699.Conscientious objector claims turn on the resolution of factual questions relating to the nature of a registrant's beliefs concerning war, Gillette v. United States, 401 U. S. 437 (1971), the basis of the objection in conscience and religion, Welsh v. United States, 398 U. S. 333 (1970), and the registrant's sincerity, Witmer v. United States, 348 U. S. 375,  348 U. S. 381 (1955).  See 50 U.S.C.App. § 456(j) (1964 ed., Supp. V).  Petitioner declined to contest the denial of his conscientious objector claim before the local board by securing a personal appearance, and the Selective Service System was thereby deprived of one opportunity to supplement the record of relevant facts.  The opportunity would have been restored had petitioner sought review by the appeal board.  While the local board apparently was satisfied that classification should be made on the basis of the record it confronted, [Footnote 13] the appeal board, which classifies de novo, might have determined that the record should be supplemented by the local board. [Footnote 14]  See 32 CFR § 1626.23.  In the circumstances of this case, petitioner's failure to take an administrative appeal not only deprived the appeal board of the opportunity to "apply its expertise" in factfinding to the Page 402 U. S. 491 record that was available; it also removed an opportunity to supplement a record containing petitioner's own submissions but not containing the results of any specific inquiry into sincerity.The Government contends that, unless the exhaustion requirement is imposed to bar judicial review when the failure to exhaust has the present character, registrants would be encouraged to sidestep the administrative processes once a prima facie claim to conscientious objector status is made out by submission of a carefully drafted Form 150.  Should the claim be denied at the local board level, the claimant might be tempted to circumvent further fact-gathering processes, and take a chance on showing in court that the only administrative record available contains no basis in fact, for denial of the claim.  This somewhat extreme situation is indeed presented by the circumstances of the present case, though, of course, there is no reason to question the bona fides of McGee's own supervening policy of noncooperation with the conscription system.  It remains that McGee's failure to pursue his administrative remedies was deliberate, and without excuse.  And it is not fanciful to think that "frequent and deliberate flouting of administrative processes" might occur if McGee and others similarly situated were allowed to press their claims in court despite a dual failure to exhaust.IIIWe conclude that petitioner's failure to exhaust administrative remedies bars the defense of erroneous classification, [Footnote 15] and therefore the judgment below isAffirmed
U.S. Supreme CourtMcGee v. United States, 402 U.S. 479 (1971)McGee v. United StatesNo. 362Argued February 23, 1971Decided May 17, 1971402 U.S. 479SyllabusPetitioner applied in 1966 for conscientious objector status to his local Selective Service board, which advised him that his claim would be passed on when his student deferment expired.  His board was told in 1967 that petitioner had been accepted for a graduate program where, in petitioner's own view, he would "probably qualify" for a theological exemption.  However, no request for ministerial student status was made, nor was pertinent supporting information presented.  Petitioner refused to fill out a current information questionnaire sent to him on his graduation from college, announcing that he would not cooperate with the Selective Service System.  Following the local board's subsequent reclassification of petitioner I-A, he did not seek a personal appearance before the board or appeal board review.  Petitioner thereafter refused to submit to induction, for which, along with other draft law violations, he was prosecuted and convicted.  The Court of Appeals, rejecting petitioner's defense that the local board had erred in its classification, affirmed.Held:  Petitioner's failure to exhaust his administrative remedies jeopardized the interest of the Selective Service System, as the administrative agency responsible for classifying registrants, in developing the facts and using its expertise to assess his claims to exempt status, and thus bars petitioner's defense that he was erroneously classified.  McKart v. United States, 395 U. S. 185, factually distinguished.  Pp.  402 U. S. 483-491.426 F.2d 691, affirmed.MARSHALL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J., and BLACK, HARLAN, BRENNAN, STEWART, WHITE, and BLACKMUN, JJ., joined.  DOUGLAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p.  402 U. S. 492. Page 402 U. S. 480