MR. JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.Joan Stanley lived with Peter Stanley intermittently for 18 years, during which time they had three children. [Footnote 1]  When Joan Stanley died, Peter Stanley lost not only her but also his children.  Under Illinois law, the children of unwed fathers become wards of the State upon the death of the mother.  Accordingly, upon Joan Stanley's death, in a dependency proceeding instituted by the State of Illinois, Stanley's children [Footnote 2] were declared wards of the State and placed with court-appointed guardians.  Stanley appealed, claiming that he had never been shown to be an unfit parent and that, since married fathers and unwed mothers could not be deprived of their children without such a showing, he had been deprived of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed him by the Fourteenth Amendment.  The Illinois Supreme Court accepted the fact that Stanley's own unfitness had not been established, but rejected the equal protection claim, holding that Stanley could properly be separated from his children upon proof of the single fact that he and the dead mother Page 405 U. S. 647 had not been married.  Stanley's actual fitness as a father was irrelevant.  In re Stanley, 45 Ill. 2d 132, 256 N.E.2d 814 (1970).Stanley presses his equal protection claim here.  The State continues to respond that unwed fathers are presumed unfit to raise their children, and that it is unnecessary to hold individualized hearings to determine whether particular fathers are, in fact, unfit parents before they are separated from their children.  We granted certiorari, 400 U.S. 1020 (1971), to determine whether this method of procedure by presumption could be allowed to stand in light of the fact that Illinois allows married fathers -- whether divorced, widowed, or separated -- and mothers -- even if unwed -- the benefit of the presumption that they are fit to raise their children.IAt the outset, we reject any suggestion that we need not consider the propriety of the dependency proceeding that separated the Stanleys because Stanley might be able to regain custody of his children as a guardian or through adoption proceedings.  The suggestion is that, if Stanley has been treated differently from other parents, the difference is immaterial and not legally cognizable for the purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment.  This Court has not, however, embraced the general proposition that a wrong may be done if it can be undone.  Cf. Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U. S. 337 (1969).  Surely, in the case before us, if there is delay between the doing and the undoing, petitioner suffers from the deprivation of his children, and the children suffer from uncertainty and dislocation.It is clear, moreover, that Stanley does not have the means at hand promptly to erase the adverse consequences of the proceeding in the course of which his children were declared wards of the State.  It is first Page 405 U. S. 648 urged that Stanley could act to adopt his children.  But under Illinois law, Stanley is treated not as a parent, but as a stranger to his children, and the dependency proceeding has gone forward on the presumption that he is unfit to exercise parental rights.  Insofar as we are informed, Illinois law affords him no priority in adoption proceedings.  It would be his burden to establish not only that he would be a suitable parent, but also that he would be the most suitable of all who might want custody of the children.  Neither can we ignore that in the proceedings from which this action developed, the "probation officer," see App. 17, the assistant state's attorney, see id. at 29-30, and the judge charged with the case, see id. at 16-18, 23, made it apparent that Stanley, unmarried and impecunious as he is, could not now expect to profit from adoption proceedings. [Footnote 3]  The Illinois Supreme Court apparently recognized some or all of these considerations, because it did not suggest that Stanley's case was undercut by his failure to petition for adoption.  Before us, the State focuses on Stanley's failure to petition for "custody and control" -- the second route by which, it is urged, he might regain authority for his children.  Passing the obvious issue whether it would be futile or burdensome for an unmarried father -- without funds and already once presumed unfit -- to petition for custody, this suggestion overlooks the fact that legal custody is not parenthood or adoption.  A person appointed guardian in an action for custody and control is subject to removal at any time without such Page 405 U. S. 649 cause as must be shown in a neglect proceeding against a parent.  Ill.Rev.Stat., c. 37, § 705.  He may not take the children out of the jurisdiction without the court's approval.  He may be required to report to the court as to his disposition of the children's affairs.  Ill.Rev.Stat., c. 37, § 705.  Obviously then, even if Stanley were a mere step away from "custody and control," to give an unwed father only "custody and control" would still be to leave him seriously prejudiced by reason of his status.We must therefore examine the question that Illinois would have us avoid:  is a presumption that distinguishes and burdens all unwed fathers constitutionally repugnant?  We conclude that, as a matter of due process of law, Stanley was entitled to a hearing on his fitness as a parent before his children were taken from him, and that, by denying him a hearing and extending it to all other parents whose custody of their children is challenged, the State denied Stanley the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.IIIllinois has two principal methods of removing nondelinquent children from the homes of their parents.  In a dependency proceeding, it may demonstrate that the children are wards of the State because they have no surviving parent or guardian.  Ill.Rev.Stat., c. 37, §§ 702-1, 702-5.  In a neglect proceeding, it may show that children should be wards of the State because the present parent(s) or guardian does not provide suitable care.  Ill.Rev.Stat., c. 37, §§ 702-1, 702.The State's right -- indeed, duty -- to protect minor children through a judicial determination of their interests in a neglect proceeding is not challenged here.  Rather, we are faced with a dependency statute that empowers state officials to circumvent neglect proceedings Page 405 U. S. 650 on the theory that an unwed father is not a "parent" whose existing relationship with his children must be considered. [Footnote 4]  "Parents," says the State,"means the father and mother of a legitimate child, or the survivor of them, or the natural mother of an illegitimate child, and includes any adoptive parent,"Ill.Rev.Stat., c. 37, § 701-14, but the term does not include unwed fathers.Under Illinois law, therefore, while the children of all parents can be taken from them in neglect proceedings, that is only after notice, hearing, and proof of such unfitness as a parent as amounts to neglect, an unwed father is uniquely subject to the more simplistic dependency proceeding.  By use of this proceeding, the State, on showing that the father was not married to the mother, need not prove unfitness in fact, because it is presumed at law.  Thus, the unwed father's claim of parental qualification is avoided as "irrelevant."In considering this procedure under the Due Process Clause, we recognize, as we have in other cases, that due process of law does not require a hearing "in every conceivable case of government impairment of private interest."  Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U. S. 886,  367 U. S. 894 (1961).  That case explained that "[t]he very nature of due process negates any concept of inflexible procedures universally applicable to every imaginable situation," and firmly established that"what procedures due process may require under any given set of circumstances must begin with a determination of the precise nature of the government function involved, as well as of the private interest that has been affected by governmental Page 405 U. S. 651 action."Id. at  367 U. S. 895; Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S. 254,  397 U. S. 263 (1970).The private interest here, that of a man in the children he has sired and raised, undeniably warrants deference and, absent a powerful countervailing interest, protection.  It is plain that the interest of a parent in the companionship, care, custody, and management of his or her children"come[s] to this Court with a momentum for respect lacking when appeal is made to liberties which derive merely from shifting economic arrangements."Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U. S. 77,  336 U. S. 95 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).The Court has frequently emphasized the importance of the family.  The rights to conceive and to raise one's children have been deemed "essential," Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390,  262 U. S. 399 (1923), "basic civil rights of man," Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U. S. 535,  316 U. S. 541 (1942), and "[r]ights far more precious . . . than property rights," May v. Anderson, 345 U. S. 528,  345 U. S. 533 (1953)."It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder."Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 158,  321 U. S. 166 (1944).  The integrity of the family unit has found protection in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Meyer v. Nebraska, supra, at  262 U. S. 399, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Skinner v. Oklahoma, supra, at  316 U. S. 541, and the Ninth Amendment, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479,  381 U. S. 496 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring).Nor has the law refused to recognize those family relationships unlegitimized by a marriage ceremony.  The Court has declared unconstitutional a state statute denying natural, but illegitimate, children a wrongful death action for the death of their mother, emphasizing that Page 405 U. S. 652 such children cannot be denied the right of other children because familial bonds in such cases were often as warm, enduring, and important as those arising within a more formally organized family unit.  Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 68,  391 U. S. 71-72 (1968)."To say that the test of equal protection should be the 'legal,' rather than the biological, relationship is to avoid the issue.  For the Equal Protection Clause necessarily limits the authority of a State to draw such 'legal' lines as it chooses."Glona v. American Guarantee Co., 391 U. S. 73,  391 U. S. 75-76 (1968).These authorities make it clear that, at the least, Stanley's interest in retaining custody of his children is cognizable and substantial.For its part, the State has made its interest quite plain:  Illinois has declared that the aim of the Juvenile Court Act is to protect "the moral, emotional, mental, and physical welfare of the minor and the best interests of the community" and to"strengthen the minor's family ties whenever possible, removing him from the custody of his parents only when his welfare or safety or the protection of the public cannot be adequately safeguarded without removal. . . ."Ill.Rev.Stat., c. 37, § 701-2.  These are legitimate interests, well within the power of the State to implement.  We do not question the assertion that neglectful parents may be separated from their children.But we are here not asked to evaluate the legitimacy of the state ends -- rather, to determine whether the means used to achieve these ends are constitutionally defensible.  What is the state interest in separating children from fathers without a hearing designed to determine whether the father is unfit in a particular disputed case?  We observe that the State registers no gain towards its declared goals when it separates children from the custody of fit parents.  Indeed, if Stanley is a Page 405 U. S. 653 fit father, the State spites its own articulated goals when it needlessly separates him from his family.In Bell v. Burson, 402 U. S. 535 (1971), we found a scheme repugnant to the Due Process Clause because it deprived a driver of his license without reference to the very factor (there, fault in driving, here, fitness as a parent) that the State itself deemed fundamental to its statutory scheme.  Illinois would avoid the self-contradiction that rendered the Georgia license suspension system invalid by arguing that Stanley and all other unmarried fathers can reasonably be presumed to be unqualified to raise their children. [Footnote 5] Page 405 U. S. 654It may be, as the State insists, that most unmarried fathers are unsuitable and neglectful parents. [Footnote 6]  It may also be that Stanley is such a parent, and that his children should be placed in other hands.  But all unmarried fathers are not in this category; some are wholly suited to have custody of their children. [Footnote 7]  This much the State Page 405 U. S. 655 readily concedes, and nothing in this record indicates that Stanley is or has been a neglectful father who has not cared for his children.  Given the opportunity to make his case, Stanley may have been seen to be deserving of custody of his offspring.  Had this been so, the State's statutory policy would have been furthered by leaving custody in him.Carrington v. Rash, 380 U. S. 89 (1965), dealt with a similar situation.  There, we recognized that Texas had a powerful interest in restricting its electorate to bona fide residents.  It was not disputed that most servicemen stationed in Texas had no intention of remaining in the State; most, therefore, could be deprived of a vote in state affairs.  But we refused to tolerate a blanket exclusion depriving all servicemen of the vote, when some servicemen clearly were bona fide residents and when "more precise tests," id. at  380 U. S. 95, were available to distinguish members of this latter group.  "By forbidding a soldier ever to controvert the presumption of nonresidence," id. at  380 U. S. 96, the State, we said, unjustifiably effected a substantial deprivation.  It viewed people one-dimensionally (as servicemen), when a finer perception could readily have been achieved by assessing a serviceman's claim to residency on an individualized basis."We recognize that special problems may be involved in determining whether servicemen have actually acquired a new domicile in a State for franchise purposes.  We emphasize that Texas is free to take reasonable and adequate steps, as have other States, to see that all applicants for the vote actually fulfill the requirements of bona fide residence.  But [the challenged] provision goes beyond such rules. Page 405 U. S. 656 ""[T]he presumption here created is . . . definitely conclusive -- incapable of being overcome by proof of the most positive character."Id. at  380 U. S. 96.  "All servicemen not residents of Texas before induction," we concluded, "come within the provision's sweep.  Not one of them can ever vote in Texas, no matter" what their individual qualifications.  Ibid.  We found such a situation repugnant to the Equal Protection Clause.Despite Bell and Carrington, it may be argued that unmarried fathers are so seldom fit that Illinois need not undergo the administrative inconvenience of inquiry in any case, including Stanley's.  The establishment of prompt efficacious procedures to achieve legitimate state ends is a proper state interest worthy of cognizance in constitutional adjudication.  But the Constitution recognizes higher values than speed and efficiency. [Footnote 8]  Indeed, one might fairly say of the Bill of Rights in general, and the Due Process Clause in particular, that they were designed to protect the fragile values of a vulnerable citizenry from the overbearing concern for efficiency and efficacy that may characterize praiseworthy government officials no less, and perhaps more, than mediocre ones.Procedure by presumption is always cheaper and easier Page 405 U. S. 657 than individualized determination.  But when, as here, the procedure forecloses the determinative issues of competence and care, when it explicitly disdains present realities in deference to past formalities, it needlessly risks running roughshod over the important interests of both parent and child.  It therefore cannot stand. [Footnote 9]Bell v. Burson held that the State could not, while purporting to be concerned with fault in suspending a driver's license, deprive a citizen of his license without a hearing that would assess fault.  Absent fault, the State's declared interest was so attenuated that administrative convenience was insufficient to excuse a hearing where evidence of fault could be considered.  That drivers involved in accidents, as a statistical matter, might be very likely to have been wholly or partially at fault did not foreclose hearing and proof in specific cases before licenses were suspended.We think the Due Process Clause mandates a similar result here.  The State's interest in caring for Stanley's children is de minimis if Stanley is shown to be a fit Page 405 U. S. 658 father.  It insists on presuming, rather than proving, Stanley's unfitness solely because it is more convenient to presume than to prove.  Under the Due Process Clause, that advantage is insufficient to justify refusing a father a hearing when the issue at stake is the dismemberment of his family.IIIThe State of Illinois assumes custody of the children of married parents, divorced parents, and unmarried mothers only after a hearing and proof of neglect.  The children of unmarried fathers, however, are declared dependent children without a hearing on parental fitness and without proof of neglect.  Stanley's claim in the state courts and here is that failure to afford him a hearing on his parental qualifications while extending it to other parents denied him equal protection of the laws.  We have concluded that all Illinois parents are constitutionally entitled to a hearing on their fitness before their children are removed from their custody.  It follows that denying such a hearing to Stanley and those like him, while granting it to other Illinois parents, is inescapably contrary to the Equal Protection Clause. [Footnote 10] Page 405 U. S. 659The judgment of the Supreme Court of Illinois is reversed, and the case is remanded to that court for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.It is so ordered
U.S. Supreme CourtStanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972)Stanley v. IllinoisNo. 70-5014Argued October 19, 1971Decided April 3, 1972405 U.S. 645SyllabusPetitioner, an unwed father whose children, on the mother's death, were declared state wards and placed in guardianship, attacked the Illinois statutory scheme as violative of equal protection.  Under that scheme, the children of unmarried fathers, upon the death of the mother, are declared dependents without any hearing on parental fitness and without proof of neglect, though such hearing and proof are required before the State assumes custody of children of married or divorced parents and unmarried mothers.  The Illinois Supreme Court, holding that petitioner could properly be separated from his children upon mere proof that he and the dead mother had not been married and that petitioner's fitness as a father was irrelevant, rejected petitioner's claim.Held:1. Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment petitioner was entitled to a hearing on his fitness as a parent before his children were taken from him.  Pp.  405 U. S. 647-658.(a) The fact that petitioner can apply for adoption or for custody and control of his children does not bar his attack on the dependency proceeding.  Pp.  405 U. S. 647-649.(b) The State cannot, consistently with due process requirements, merely presume that unmarried fathers in general, and petitioner, in particular, are unsuitable and neglectful parents.  Parental unfitness must be established on the basis of individualized proof.  See Bell v. Burson, 402 U. S. 535.  Pp.  405 U. S. 649-658.2. The denial to unwed fathers of the hearing on fitness accorded to all other parents whose custody of their children is challenged by the State constitutes a denial of equal protection of the laws.  P.  405 U. S. 658.45 Ill. 2d 132, 256 N.E.2d 814, reversed and remanded.WHITE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BRENNAN, STEWART, and MARSHALL, JJ., joined, and in Parts I and II of which DOUGLAS, J., joined.  BURGER, C.J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BLACKMUN, J., joined, post, p.  405 U. S. 659.  POWELL and REHNQUIST, JJ., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. Page 405 U. S. 646