MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court.This case presents important questions of construction and administration of the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500. [Footnote 1]  Page 425 U. S. 97 That statute provides that, in a federal criminal prosecution, after a witness called by the United States has testified on direct examination, the court, on motion of the defendant, shall order the United States to produce any "statement," as defined in the Act, in the possession of the United States that relates to the subject matter as to which the witness has testified.  The definition of "statement" in § 3500(e) pertinent to this case is:  "(1) a written statement made by said witness and signed or otherwise adopted or approved by him."At petitioner's trial in the District Court for the District of Arizona on charges of mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341, the trial judge sustained the Government's contention that certain writings of Government lawyers of conversations with the Government's key witness Page 425 U. S. 98 were "the work product of counsel," although the judge had not examined the writings.  The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, but on a different ground.  In an unpublished memorandum opinion, the Court of Appeals stated:"Apart from the question whether such notes were exempt from the Jencks Act . . . as 'work product,' they were not statements of the [witness] within the meaning of  3500(e). [Footnote 2]"We granted certiorari limited to the Jencks Act question, 422 U.S. 1006. [Footnote 3]We hold that a writing prepared by a Government lawyer relating to the subject matter of the testimony of a Government witness that has been "signed or otherwise adopted or approved" by the Government witness is producible under the Jencks Act, and is not rendered nonproducible because a Government lawyer interviews the witness and writes the "statement."  We hold further that, in the circumstances of this case, the Court of Appeals erred in determining in the first instance that the writings in question were not "statements."  We therefore vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand Page 425 U. S. 99 the case to the District Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion, following the procedure in Campbell v. United States, 365 U. S. 85 (1961) (Campbell I).IPetitioner, with Edwin S. Newman and three other codefendants, was charged in a multiple count indictment with using the mails to defraud by means of a fraudulent scheme, which may be briefly summarized.  The Financial Security Life Insurance Co., of which petitioner was president, issued single-premium annuities to various individuals; the policies purported to be fully prepaid and were used as collateral for loans.  Promissory notes were accepted in lieu of the premiums, and interest on the notes was the only money paid to the company.  Further, the policies were misrepresented as being free of liens or encumbrances.  In fact, the policies were valueless.  Petitioner concealed these facts from lenders who accepted the policies as collateral; indeed, the company refused payment of the proceeds of the policies to the lenders upon the ground of nonpayment of premiums.  The three codefendants were charged with using the annuities as collateral to obtain loans.  Petitioner used these "sales" of annuities to inflate the assets of the company on paper, intending eventually to sell the company.Of the five defendants, only petitioner and Newman worked for the company.  Newman agreed to plead guilty to a single count of the indictment and to testify as a Government witness.  Thereupon his case was severed prior to petitioner's trial. [Footnote 4]  He was the key prosecution witness, revealing in great detail the operation of the fraudulent scheme and the transactions alleged Page 425 U. S. 100 in the indictment.  Newman signed all of the correspondence with lenders, but testified that at all times he acted pursuant to instructions from petitioner.  The Government's case against petitioner consisted primarily of Newman's testimony.Prior to the trial, which covered seven weeks starting May 22, 1973, the Government delivered to petitioner a copy of Newman's testimony before the grand jury, a memorandum of an interview with Newman conducted by a postal inspector over three years earlier, and a reporter's transcript of an interview with Newman conducted by two Government lawyers on May 11, 1973.  The May 11 transcript indicated that the lawyers intended to conduct further interviews with Newman concerning other transactions.  At the trial, on cross-examination on June 27, Newman disclosed that he had met with the lawyers on May 13, June 9 and 10, and part of each day from June 16 through June 27.  Unlike the May 11 meeting, no reporter was present.  Newman's forthcoming trial testimony was the subject of the discussion, but the notes of the interview were handwritten by the lawyers.  Significantly, however, Newman testified, speaking of the May 13 interview:"Q. And as they took notes, did they sometimes question you about what you had just said to make sure that they got it down correctly?""A. They may have.  I don't really remember that that was part of the pattern."And again, speaking of the June 9 and June 10 interviews, Newman testified:"Q. As you were explaining -- or discussing your testimony, did anyone take notes?""A. The two gentlemen took notes.""Q. Were they occasionally read back to you to Page 425 U. S. 101 see whether or not they correctly understood what you were saying?""A. Probably from time to time.""Q. All right, sir.  Did you either correct them or say, 'Yes, that's right,' or 'No, that's not right, because it went this way, I believe,' words to that effect?""A. Yes, that would happen."Finally, he described this as the pattern followed at all remaining meetings with the lawyers.At this point, petitioner moved, pursuant to § 3500(b), for an order directing the United States to deliver the notes to the defense.  The trial judge, without waiting to hear from the Government, denied the motion on the ground that the material was "attorney's work product."  Petitioner renewed the motion the following day, coupling the motion with a request that the Government be ordered to deliver the material for in camera inspection by the court.  The motions were denied, but with leave to submit a memorandum in support of the motions.  Petitioner's memorandum argued against the existence of a "work product" exception and renewed the request for an order directing delivery of the material for in camera inspection.  Thereafter, the Government orally argued that the material in question was not producible as "the work product of counsel," and the judge again denied petitioner's motions.  On appeal, the material, which totaled 237 pages and was not part of the District Court record, was lodged with the Court of Appeals.IIWe see nothing in the Jencks Act or its legislative history that excepts from production otherwise producible statements on the ground that they constitute "work Page 425 U. S. 102 product" of Government lawyers.  It is not clear from its brief that the Government argues to the contrary; [Footnote 5] rather, the Government's principal contention seems to be that, in any event, the principles underlying the "work product" doctrine suggest a narrow construction of "statement" as not to include a lawyer's "work product" even though it fits the statutory definition of a producible statement.  We reject the argument, since the plain language of the statute, fully buttressed by legislative history, allows no room for the tendered exception.The Government maintains that the Act can be read to include only statements given to a Government investigative or law enforcement agent during an investigation, and not those given to a Government trial attorney in preparation for trial.  This contention rests in part on the original language of § 3500(a), which postponed discovery, until after a witness' direct examination, of statements of the witness made "to an agent of the Government." [Footnote 6]  But nothing in the Act even remotely suggests Page 425 U. S. 103 that "an agent of the Government" excludes Government lawyers. [Footnote 7]  In any event, § 3500(b) requires production of "any statement (as hereinafter defied) of the witness in the possession of the United States," without any limitation to statements made "to an agent of the Government."  Section 3500(e)(1) defines a producible statement as one "made by said witness and signed or otherwise adopted or approved by him," with no limitation that it be a statement made "to an agent of the Government."The Government also suggests that Congress enacted the Jencks Act to limit the scope of this Court's decision Page 425 U. S. 104 in Jencks v. United States, 353 U. S. 657 (1957), and since Jencks involved statements to an investigative agency -- the Federal Bureau of Investigation -- Congress intended to require production only of statements of witnesses made to investigative agencies, not those given to prosecutors in preparation for trial.That the Act was not intended to limit the Jencks decision is apparent from its legislative history.  Rather than limiting, the Act"reaffirms [Jencks] in its holding that a defendant on trial in a criminal prosecution is entitled to relevant and competent reports and statements in possession of the Government touching the events and activities as to which a Government witness has testified at the trial."S.Rep. No. 981, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1957).  See H.R.Rep. No. 700, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., 4 (1957); Campbell I, 365 U.S. at  365 U. S. 92.  Moreover, Congress was concerned not with the Jencks decision itself, but with "misinterpretations and misunderstandings" in application of Jencks in district courts and courts of appeals.  S.Rep. No. 981, supra at 3-5, 7-12; H.R.Rep. No. 700, supra at 2-3, 6.  The concern was that misapplication of Jencks would permit defendants "to rove at will through Government files."  S.Rep. No. 569, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1957).  See Palermo v. United States, 360 U. S. 343,  360 U. S. 350 (1959).  The House committee expressed its goal as that of preventing defendants from "rummag[ing] through confidential information containing matters of public interest, safety, welfare, and national security."  H.R.Rep. No. 700, supra, at 4. [Footnote 8]  Page 425 U. S. 105 The objective of preventing "rummaging" plainly adds no support to the argument that Congress meant that distinctions should be made based upon the occupation of the Government official to whom the witness gave the statement. [Footnote 9]The Government urges as a "primary reason" for adopting its construction that it is unfair to allow defense counsel to impeach a witness by using a statement that "could not fairly be said to be the witness' own, rather than the product of the investigator's selections, interpretations and interpolations."  Palermo v. United States, supra at  360 U. S. 350.  The short answer to that argument is that writings must be produced only to the extent they are "statements" as defined; further, § 3500(c) expressly provides a procedure for excising any matter not relevant to the witness' direct testimony.For the same reasons, we see no merit in the Government's argument that, without an exception, disclosure of statements taken by Government lawyers may undermine the policies that gave rise to the work product doctrine.  See United States v. Nobles, 422 U. S. 225,  422 U. S. 236-239 Page 425 U. S. 106 (1975); Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U. S. 495 (1947).  Proper application of the Act will not compel disclosure of a Government lawyer's recordation of mental impressions, personal beliefs, trial strategy, legal conclusions, or anything else that "could not fairly be said to be the witness' own" statement."If a government attorney has recorded only his own thoughts in his interview notes, the notes would seem both to come within the work product immunity and to fall without the statutory definition of a 'statement.'"Saunders v United States, 114 U.S.App.D.C. 345, 349, 316 F.2d 346, 350 (1963) (Reed, J). [Footnote 10]  Furthermore, if a witness has for some reason "adopted or approved" a writing containing trial strategy or similar matter, such matter would be excised under § 3500(c) as not relating to the subject matter of the witness' testimony or direct examination.  Thus, the primary policy underlying the work product doctrine -- i.e., protection of the privacy of an attorney's mental processes, United States v. Nobles, supra at  422 U. S. 238 -- is adequately safeguarded by the Jencks Act itself.The Government contends that production of statements written by Government lawyers "forces the attorney to testify as to what he remembers or what he saw fit to write down regarding witness' remarks."  Hickman v. Taylor, supra at  329 U. S. 513.  Although the risk of such testimony supported approbation of the work product doctrine in Hickman, the nature of the disclosure provided by the Jencks Act differs significantly.  In Hickman, the Court concluded that there was no showing of necessity strong enough to justify the requested disclosure:  there was a danger of inaccuracy and untrustworthiness, there Page 425 U. S. 107 was "[n]o legitimate purpose," and use of the attorney's words for impeachment would have made the attorney a witness, rather than an officer of the court.  329 U.S. at  329 U. S. 512-513.  First, although there is some risk that a witness' words will be distorted in notes taken by a Government lawyer, see Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. at  360 U. S. 352, there is no such danger where a witness has adopted or approved the lawyer's notes.  Second, there is a clearly legitimate -- and congressionally recognized -- purpose for disclosure under the Jencks Act.  The Act requires disclosure of all statements for use in impeaching witnesses and "is thus designed to further the fair and just administration of criminal justice."  Campbell I, 365 U.S. at  365 U. S. 92.  Third, the lawyer is not called upon to be a witness, since statements are produced only where they can "fairly be said to be the witness' own."  Finally, we cannot accept the Government's claims that defense counsel will have a right to call Government lawyers as witnesses to "authenticate" their notes, [Footnote 11] nor do we find realistic the Government's fear that a lawyer will "feel impelled" to take the stand. [Footnote 12] Page 425 U. S. 108We therefore conclude that the District Court erred in holding that the work product doctrine bars production of writings otherwise producible under the Jencks Act. [Footnote 13]IIIThe Court of Appeals erred in undertaking to make the initial determination whether the materials constituted producible "statements."  If that function may ever be properly undertaken by a court of appeals, the Court of Appeals should not have attempted to make the determination in this case.  Campbell v. United States, 373 U. S. 487,  373 U. S. 493 (1963) (Campbell II).We have recognized that a Government objection to production may require that the trial court inspect documents or hold a hearing to gather extrinsic evidence bearing on the extent to which the documents are statements producible under § 3500. [Footnote 14]  Campbell I, supra at Page 425 U. S. 109 92-93; Palermo v. United States, supra at  360 U. S. 354-355; cf. Campbell II, supra at  373 U. S. 493.  In Campbell I, the Court unanimously concluded that the trial judge was obliged to conduct some inquiry into the circumstances of the witness' interview there in question.  365 U.S. at  365 U. S. 95; id. at  365 U. S. 107-108 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting in part and concurring in result in part).  The circumstances of this case compel the same conclusion.  Newman's testimony raised a sufficient question under the Act to require the trial judge to conduct such an inquiry, and since we hold that the trial judge erred in exempting the material from production as attorneys' "work product," a remand for such an inquiry by the District Court is required to determine whether petitioner's motion should have been granted. [Footnote 15]The necessity for a hearing in the District Court is highlighted by developments since our grant of the petition for certiorari.  The Solicitor General has discovered that 40 of the 237 pages of material are not notes of Government lawyers, but handwritten statements of Newman himself. [Footnote 16]  Petitioner contends that the failure of the Government to turn over those 40 pages constitutes error requiring reversal of his conviction without more. [Footnote 17]  Page 425 U. S. 110 The Government, although conceding that these 40 pages contain "statements," argues that they nevertheless were not producible.  The Government contends that Newman wrote the 40 pages after completing his direct testimony in order to aid the prosecution's cross-examination of a defense witness, and thus are not producible because not in existence at the time of petitioner's motion to produce, [Footnote 18] but the Government admits that these assertions are not based on facts in the record.  Any inquiry regarding them is not for this Court, but for the District Court on remand.  The same is true of the claim that, in any event, the contents of the 40 pages deal largely, if not entirely, with matter other than Newman's direct testimony.As to the remainder of the 237 pages, there are other issues to be resolved on remand.  For example, it will be necessary to determine whether the prosecutors' notes were actually read back to Newman and whether he adopted or approved them. [Footnote 19]  In addition, the court may Page 425 U. S. 111 have to consider.whether the notes were in existence at the time of petitioner's motion. [Footnote 20]We of course intimate no view whether production of any of the 237 pages of material was required in this case.  That determination is to be made by the District Court.  We therefore conclude that the proper disposition of this case is that of Campbell I, supra at  365 U. S. 98-99.  Petitioner is entitled to a redetermination of his motion for the production of the 237 pages of material.  But we do not think that this Court should vacate his conviction and order a new trial, since petitioner's rights can be fully protected by a remand to the trial court with direction to hold an inquiry consistent with this opinion.  The District Court will supplement the record with findings and enter a new final judgment of conviction if the court concludes after the inquiry to reaffirm its denial of petitioner's motion.  This procedure will preserve petitioner's opportunity to seek further appellate review on the augmented record.  On the other hand, if the court concludes that the Government should have been required to deliver the material, or part of it, to petitioner, and that the error was not harmless, [Footnote 21] the District Court will Page 425 U. S. 112 vacate the judgment of conviction and accord petitioner a new trial.The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore vacated, and the case is remanded to the District Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.It is so ordered
U.S. Supreme CourtGoldberg v. United States, 425 U.S. 94 (1976)Goldberg v. United StatesNo. 74-6293Argued January 14, 1976Decided March 30, 1976425 U.S. 94SyllabusDuring the course of petitioner's criminal trial, the chief prosecution witness (Newman) indicated on cross-examination that, on certain dates, he was interviewed by Government lawyers who took notes relating to Newman's forthcoming trial testimony, and that Newman verified the accuracy of the notes.  Petitioner thereupon moved for production of the notes pursuant to the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500, which provides that, in a federal criminal prosecution after a witness called by the Government has testified on direct examination, the court, on the defendant's motion, shall order the Government to produce any "statement" in its possession that relates to the subject matter of the witness' testimony.  In relevant part, a "statement" is defined as "a written statement made by said witness and signed or other vise adopted or approved by him."   3500(e)(1).  The trial judge denied petitioner's motion on the ground that the material was "the work product of counsel" and declined to inspect the material in camera.  The Court of Appeals affirmed on the ground that the notes were not statements of the witness within the meaning of § 3500(e).Held:1. Any writing prepared by a Government lawyer relating to the subject matter of the testimony of a Government witness that has been "signed or otherwise adopted or approved" by that witness is producible under the Jencks Act, and the writing is not rendered nonproducible because a Government lawyer interviewed the witness and wrote the statement.  Pp.  425 U. S. 101-108.(a) Nothing in the language or legislative history of the Jencks Act excepts as a lawyer's "work product" a statement within the definition of a producible statement.  Pp.  425 U. S. 101-102.(b) Nor is the Act limited to statements made to an investigative agency, as distinguished from prosecutors preparing for trial.  Though the Government's argument to the contrary is based on the asserted unfairness of allowing defense counsel to impeach a witness by a statement that is the product of the attorney's selections, rather than his own, the writings are producible only if they meet the terms of the statutory definition; Page 425 U. S. 95 the Act itself protects witnesses from this unfairness; and it also safeguards the primary policy of the work product doctrine by protecting the privacy of an attorney's mental processes.  Pp.  425 U. S. 102-106.(c) Production of statements within § 3500(e)(1) and written by Government lawyers will not force such lawyers to testify at trial.  Moreover, there is a clearly legitimate purpose for the statutory disclosure, i.e., furtherance of "the fair and just administration of criminal justice," Campbell v. United States, 365 U. S. 85,  365 U. S. 92 (Campbell I); lawyers will not become witnesses, since statements are producible only where they can fairly be said to be the witness' own; and defense counsel will have no right to call Government lawyers to authenticate their notes.  Pp.  425 U. S. 106-107.2. In the circumstances of this case, the Court of Appeals erred in making the initial determination that the writings in question were not producible statements.  Campbell v. United States, 373 U. S. 487,  373 U. S. 493 (Campbell II).  Pp.  425 U. S. 108-111.(a) Newman's testimony was sufficient to call upon the trial judge to conduct an inquiry into the producibility of the material.  Such an inquiry is now required to determine whether petitioner's Jencks Act motion should have been granted.  Campbell I, supra, at  365 U. S. 98-99.  Pp.  425 U. S. 108-110.(b) It is not necessary for this Court to vacate petitioner's conviction and order a new trial, since petitioner's rights can be fully protected by a remand to the trial court for an inquiry into the producibility of the material, the supplementing of the record with findings, and the availability of appellate review should the trial court decide that a new trial is not required.  Pp.  425 U. S. 110-111.  Vacated and remanded.BRENNAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which STEWART, WHITE, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, REHNQUIST, and STEVENS, JJ., joined.  STEVENS, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which STEWART, J., joined, post, p.  425 U. S. 112.  POWELL, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which BURGER, C.J., joined, post, p.  425 U. S. 116. Page 425 U. S. 96