MR. JUSTICE STEWART delivered the opinion of the Court.The 1970 election for the office of United States Senator was the closest in Indiana history.  The incumbent, Senator R. Vance Hartke (Hartke), was declared the winner by a plurality of 4,383 votes -- a margin of approximately one vote per state precinct.  On November 16, 1970, 13 days after the election, the Indiana Secretary of State certified to the Governor that Hartke Page 405 U. S. 17 had been reelected.  On the following day, candidate Richard L. Roudebush (Roudebush) filed in the Superior Court of Marion County a timely petition for  recount. [Footnote 1]  Hartke moved in that court to dismiss the petition, arguing that the state recount procedure conflicted with the Indiana and Federal Constitutions.  On December 1, the state court denied the motion to dismiss and granted the petition for a recount.  It appointed a three-man recount commission and directed it to begin its task on December 8.Hartke then filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana asking for an injunction against the recount.  He invoked federal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3), [Footnote 2] and claimed that the recount was prohibited by Art. I, § 5, of the Constitution of the United States, which delegates to the Senate the power to judge the elections, returns, and qualifications of its members. [Footnote 3]  A single district Page 405 U. S. 18 judge issued an order temporarily restraining the recount pending decision by a three-judge district court.  The Attorney General of Indiana then moved successfully to intervene as a defendant, and a three-judge court was convened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2284.  After taking testimony and hearing argument, the court ruled in Hartke's favor and issued an interlocutory injunction, 321 F. Supp. 1370, one judge dissenting.  Roudebush and the Attorney General both brought direct appeals to this Court. [Footnote 4]On January 21, 1971, shortly after the jurisdictional statements were filed, the Senate administered the oath of office to Hartke, who had been issued a certificate of election by the Governor.  Hartke was seated, however,"without prejudice to the outcome of an appeal pending in the Supreme Court of the United States, and without prejudice to the outcome of any recount that the Supreme Court might order. . . . [Footnote 5]"Following the Senate's decision to seat him, Hartke moved to dismiss the appeals as moot.  We consolidated both appeals and postponed further consideration of questions of jurisdiction to the hearing of the cause on the merits.  401 U.S. 972.IWe consider first the claim that these appeals are moot.  This claim is based upon the proposition, as stated in appellee Hartke's brief, that the "basic issue" before the Court is "whether appellee Hartke or appellant Roudebush is entitled to the office of United States Senator from Indiana."  Since the Senate has now seated Hartke, and since this Court is without power to alter the Senate's Page 405 U. S. 19 judgment, [Footnote 6] it follows, the argument goes, that the cause is moot.The difficulty with this argument is that it is based on an erroneous statement of the "basic issue."  Which candidate is entitled to be seated in the Senate is, to be sure, a nonjusticiable political question -- a question that would not have been the business of this Court even before the Senate acted. [Footnote 7]  The actual question before us, however, is a different one.  It is whether an Indiana recount of the votes in the 1970 election is a valid exercise of the State's power, under Art. I, § 4, to prescribe the times, places, and manner of holding elections, [Footnote 8] or is a forbidden infringement upon the Senate's power under Art. I, § 5.That question is not moot, because the Senate has postponed making a final determination of who is entitled to the office of Senator pending the outcome of this lawsuit.  Once this case is resolved and the Senate is assured that it has received the final Indiana tally, the Senate will be free to make an unconditional and final judgment under Art. I, § 5.  Until that judgment is made, this controversy remains alive, and we are obliged to consider it. [Footnote 9] Page 405 U. S. 20IIIt is the position of the appellants that, quite apart from the merits of the controversy, the three-judge District Court was barred from issuing an injunction by reason of 28 U.S.C. § 2283, which prohibits a federal court from enjoining state court proceedings except in a few specific instances. [Footnote 10]  This argument has weight, of course, only if the Indiana statutory recount procedure is a "proceeding in a State court" within the meaning of § 2283.  This Court has said of a predecessor to § 2283, [Footnote 11]"The provision expresses on its face the duty of 'hands off' by the federal courts in the use of the injunction to stay litigation in a state court. [Footnote 12]"More recently, we characterized the statute as designed to assure "the maintenance of state judicial systems for the decision of legal controversies." [Footnote 13]We have in the past recognized that not every state court function involves "litigation" or "legal controversies."  In the case of Prentis v. Atlantic Coast line R. Co., 211 U. S. 210, the Court reviewed a federal injunction preventing a state commission from fixing passenger rail rates.  The Court assumed that the commission had the powers of a state court, and that the predecessor of § 2283 governed any attempt by a federal court to enjoin the exercise of the commission's judicial powers.  Page 405 U. S. 21 Nevertheless, the Court concluded that ratemaking could be enjoined because it was legislative in nature.  Hence, the Court held that § 2283 does not restrict a federal court from enjoining a state court when it is involved in a nonjudicial function.To determine whether an Indiana court engages in a judicial function in connection with an election recount, we turn to the law of that State. [Footnote 14]  In Indiana, every candidate has a right to a recount, and can obtain one by merely filing a timely petition in the circuit or superior court of the appropriate county.  If the petition is correct as to form, the state court "shall . . . grant such petition . . . and order the recount. . . ."  When it grants a petition, the court is required to appoint three commissioners to carry out the recount.  Once these appointments are made, the Indiana court has no other responsibilities or powers. [Footnote 15]The exercise of these limited responsibilities does not constitute a court proceeding under § 2283 within the test of Prentis:"A judicial inquiry investigates, declares and enforces liabilities as they stand on present or past facts and under laws supposed already to exist.  That is its purpose and end."211 U.S. at  211 U. S. 226.  The state courts' duties in connection with a recount may be characterized as ministerial, or perhaps administrative, but they clearly do not fall within this definition of a "judicial inquiry."  The process of determining that the recount petition is correct as to form -- that it contains the proper information, such as the names and addresses of all candidates, and is timely filed -- is clearly not a judicial proceeding.  Nonjudicial functionaries Page 405 U. S. 22 continually make similar determination in the processing of all kinds of applications. [Footnote 16]And finally, Hartke's complaint in this cause did not ask the three-judge federal court to restrain the action of the Indiana court as such.  It did not seek to enjoin the state court from ruling on the formal correctness of the petition; it did not even seek to enjoin the state court's appointive function.  It sought, rather, to enjoin the recount commission from proceeding after the court had appointed the members of the commission. [Footnote 17] Page 405 U. S. 23We conclude that the three-judge District Court was not prohibited by § 2283 from issuing, and had power under 28 U.S.C. § 2281 to issue, an injunction in this cause.IIIWe turn, therefore, to the merits of the District Court's decision.  The Indiana Election Code calls for the vote to be initially counted, in each precinct, by an election board.  After recording the voting machine totals, the board seals the machines.  Paper ballots, including absentee ballots, are then counted and tallied.  Counted ballots are placed in a bag and sealed.  Ballots that bear distinguishing marks or are mutilated or do not clearly reveal the voter's choice are not counted.  These rejected ballots are sealed in a separate bag.  Both bags are preserved for six months, and may not be opened except in the case of a recount. [Footnote 18]If a recount is conducted in any county, the voting machine tallies are checked and the sealed bags containing the paper ballots are opened.  The recount commission may make new and independent determinations as to which ballots shall be counted.  In other words, it may reject ballots initially counted and count ballots initially rejected.  Disputes within the commission are settled by a majority vote.  When the commission finishes its task, it seals the ballots it counted in one bag, and the ballots it rejected in another.  Once the recount is completed, all previous returns are superseded. [Footnote 19]The District Court held these procedures to be contrary to the Constitution in two ways.  First, the court found that, in making judgments as to which ballots to Page 405 U. S. 24 count, the recount commission would be judging the qualifications of a member of the Senate.  It held this would be a usurpation of a power that only the Senate could exercise.  Second, it found that the Indiana ballots and other election paraphernalia would be essential evidence that the Senate might need to consider in judging Hartke's qualifications.  The court feared that the recount might endanger the integrity of those materials and increase the hazard of their accidental destruction.  Thus, the court held that, even if the commission would not be usurping the Senate's exclusive power, it would be hindering the Senate's exercise of that power.We cannot agree with the District Court on either ground. [Footnote 20]  Unless Congress acts, Art. I, § 4, empowers the States to regulate the conduct of senatorial elections. [Footnote 21]  This Court has recognized the breadth of those powers:"It cannot be doubted that these comprehensive words embrace authority to provide a complete code for congressional elections, not only as to times and places, but in relation to notices, registration, supervision of voting, protection of voters, prevention of fraud and corrupt practices, counting of votes, duties of inspectors and canvassers, and making and publication of election returns; in short, to enact the numerous requirements as to procedure and safeguards which experience shows are necessary in order to enforce the Page 405 U. S. 25 fundamental right involved."Smiley v. Holm, 285 U. S. 355,  285 U. S. 366.Indiana has found, along with many other States, that one procedure necessary to guard against irregularity and error in the tabulation of votes is the availability of a recount.  Despite the fact that a certificate of election may be issued to the leading candidate within 30 days after the election, the results are not final if a candidate's option to compel a recount is exercised. [Footnote 22]  A recount is an integral part of the Indiana electoral process, and is within the ambit of the broad powers delegated to the States by Art. I, § 4.It is true that a State's verification of the accuracy of election results pursuant to its Art. I, § 4, powers is not totally separable from the Senate's power to judge elections and returns.  But a recount can be said to "usurp" the Senate's function only if it frustrates the Senate's ability to make an independent final judgment.  A recount does not prevent the Senate from independently evaluating the election any more than the initial count does.  The Senate is free to accept or reject the Page 405 U. S. 26 apparent winner in either count, [Footnote 23] and, if it chooses, to conduct its own recount. [Footnote 24]It would be no more than speculation to assume that the Indiana recount procedure would impair such an independent evaluation by the Senate.  The District Court's holding was based on a finding that a recount would increase the probability of election fraud and accidental destruction of ballots.  But there is no reason to suppose that a court-appointed recount commission would be less honest or conscientious in the performance of its duties than the precinct election boards that initially counted the ballots.For the reasons expressed, we conclude that Art. I, § 5, of the Constitution does not prohibit Indiana from conducting a recount of the 1970 election ballots for United States Senator.  Accordingly, the judgment of the District Court is reversed.It is so ordered
U.S. Supreme CourtRoudebush v. Hartke, 405 U.S. 15 (1972)Roudebush v. HartkeNo. 70-66Argued December 13, 1971Decided February 23, 1972*405 U.S. 15SyllabusIncumbent Senator Hartke was certified by the Indiana Secretary of State to the Governor as the winner of the close 1970 Indiana senatorial election.  Candidate Roudebush filed a timely recount petition in state court.  The state court denied Hartke's motion to dismiss on the grounds of conflict with the Indiana and Federal Constitutions, and granted the petition for a recount.  Hartke sought an injunction against the recount in United States District Court, invoking jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) and claiming that the recount was barred by Art. I, § 5, of the Federal Constitution, delegating to the Senate the power to judge the elections, returns, and qualifications of its members.  The three-judge District Court issued the requested injunction.  After appeals were filed here, the Senate seated Hartke"without prejudice to the outcome of an appeal pending in the Supreme Court . . . and without prejudice to the outcome of any recount that the Supreme Court might order."Hartke then moved to dismiss the appeals as moot.Held:1. The issue here, whether a recount is a valid exercise of the State's power to prescribe the times, places, and manner of holding elections, pursuant to Art. I, § 4, of the Constitution, or is a forbidden infringement on the Senate's power under Art. I, § 5, is not moot, as the Senate has postponed making a final determination of who is entitled to the office of Senator pending the outcome of this action.  Pp.  405 U. S. 18-19.2. The District Court was not barred from issuing an injunction by 28 U.S.C. § 2283, which generally prohibits a federal court from enjoining state court proceedings.  Pp.  405 U. S. 20-23.(a) That section does not restrict a federal court from enjoining a state court acting in a nonjudicial capacity.  P.  405 U. S. 21.(b) The state court's recount functions are nonjudicial, as they consist merely of determining that the recount petition is correct as to form and appointing recount commissioners.  Pp.  405 U. S. 21-22. Page 405 U. S. 16(c) The complaint did not seek to enjoin the action of the state court, but rather to enjoin the recount commission from proceeding after the court had appointed member of the commission.  P.  405 U. S. 22.3. Article I, § 5, does not prohibit a recount of the ballots by Indiana, as the recount will not prevent an independent Senate evaluation of the election any more than the original count did, and it would be mere speculation to assume that Indiana's procedure would impair the Senate's ability to make an independent final judgment.  Pp.  405 U. S. 23-26.321 F. Supp. 1370, reversed.STEWART, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J., and WHITE, MARSHALL, and BLACKMUN, JJ., joined.  DOUGLAS, J., filed an opinion dissenting in part, in which BRENNAN, J., joined, post, p.  405 U. S. 26.  POWELL and REHNQUIST, JJ. took no part in the consideration or decision of the cases.