From: bontchev@fbihh.informatik.uni-hamburg.de (Vesselin Bontchev)
Subject: Re: Secret algorithm [Re: Clipper Chip and crypto key-escrow]
Keywords: encryption, wiretap, clipper, key-escrow, Mykotronx
Reply-To: bontchev@fbihh.informatik.uni-hamburg.de
Organization: Virus Test Center, University of Hamburg
Lines: 157

strnlght@netcom.com (David Sternlight) writes:

> Though some may argue about the nose of the camel, it's worth noting that
> the government proposal is limited to scrambled telephony. If it is only
> used for that purpose, and does not extend to electronic mail or file

As usual, David Sternlight is demonstrating his inability to read. The
proposal clearly states:

=> The initiative will involve the creation of new products to
=> accelerate the development and use of advanced and secure
=> telecommunications networks and wireless communications links.

It speaks about telecommunications in general. Read it again, David.
Maybe you'll understand it the next time... Nah, probably not.

> encryption, then it IS an improvement over the current mass-produced
> standard civilian technology which, with a few exceptions, is limited to
> easy-to-break inverters.

That's exactly what the government wants all sheep-minded people to
think. Let's look at the current situation. It allows to almost
anybody to eavesdrop almost everybody, unless secure (and I mean
secure) encryption is used. What will happen when ("if"? Ha!
optimists...) the new proposal gets accepted? Almost nobody EXCEPT
SOME will be able to eavesdrop everybody else, but the ability of
these "some" to eavesdrop will be guaranteed! The proposal emphasizes
on the former ("almost nobody") - which is clearly an improvement -
and "forgets" to mention the drawbacks of the latter ("guaranteed").
Yes, my statement assumes that the next step will be to make the
strong crypto unlawful. You think that it will not happen? Good luck.

> Note that the big issue for the feds is the continued ability to wiretap.

It's not just "continued ability". It's -guaranteed- ability.

> Before we go off the deep end with long discusions about secure crypto for
> e-mail and files, let's focus on this.

Yeah, that's exactly what your government wants you to think. Let's
take small steps, one at a time. Concentrate on the current one, don't
think about the future. Trust us.

> One question that was not asked in the release is whether this proposal is
> limited to telephony, or if the government intends to expand it.

It's not asked because the proposal clearly says that this is the
intention. They, unlike you, read what they write.

> Though I share many of the concerns expressed by some, I find the proposal
> less threatening than many others, since right now most Americans have no
> secure telephony, and any jerk with a pair of clip leads and a "goat" can
> eavesdrop. This would also plug up the security hole in cellular and
> cordless phones.

Yes, it will. It will stop the jerk who is eavesdropping now. It will
allow only to the government to eavesdrop. (If the scheme is secure,
of course, which is yet to be proven.) But how do you know that the
jerk you are fearing now will not get a government job tomorrow? The
new proposal -guarantees- him the ability to eavesdrop then. Hell,
that will even motivate him to get that job - if he indeed is that
mentally pervert...

> Reading between the lines, I infer that the system is highly secure
> without access to the keys.

Great. The Greatest Cryptographer of All Times David Sternlight (tm)
has succeeded to evaluate the new system in the absense of any
details whatsoever and has concluded that it is "highly secure". I
guess, that comes from the background of working some 50 years for the
two major crypto evaluating companies, right? Gee, now the government
can save all that money and trouble to ask a secret council of crypto
experts to secretly analyse the new secret method - for David
Sternlight has already done all the job for them...

> This would meet the needs of U.S. businesses
> confronted by rich and powerful adversaries, including French and Japanese
> security services and rich Japanese companies. It allows the NSA to make
> available some of its better stuff while protecting law enforcement needs.

"Trust us, we're from the Government and we're here to help you."

> Most legitimate U.S. corporations trust the NSA, and would be delighted to
> have a high-security system certified by them, even at the price of
> depositing keys in escrow. I see no difficulty in creating a reliable

"Those who are prepared to trade their liberties for the promises of
future safety, do not deserve either." This (or something like that; I
don't have the exact quote, but the meaning is the same) has been said
by one of your great men. Maybe you should study their works more
carefully, if you have the brains to understand them, of course.

> From my point of view this is a fair starting point. There are concerns that
> need to be addressed, including the reliability of the escrows. But in

The main question is to guarantee to availability of -really- secure
cryptography to the masses. Gee, if the proposal was saying "we
guarantee that every American will still have the full right to use
any kind of encryption s/he would like and regard this proposal as
just a default, voluntary implementation", there would have been much
less opposition... For some reason, they didn't even try to promise
you that. I wonder why... Was Orwell off only by 10 years?

> return we get access to high-security crypto.

No, in return you get crypto that is guaranteed to be crippled.

> Many have suggested that DES
> and other systems may be breakable by the NSA and hence others similarly
> skilled and endowed.

While the above is just rumors, and while even if it is true, it is
not done -easily-, the new scheme can is guaranteed to be easily
breakable by anybody who has the two keys. It might be also breakable
by somebody who does not have them but knows the right trick. Or who
has only one of them. NSA also told you that DES is secure, why don't
you simply trust them, huh?

> There is at least a good possibility (which should be
> checked) that the proposed system is not so breakable. It doesn't have to

It is -guaranteed- to be -easily- breakable - just get the keys. It
might be even easier, but until there is some evidence, this is just a
wild speculation.

> be, nor does it have to have trapdoors, if the government can get the keys

The trapdoors -are- there. In government's hands. The keys.

> pursuant to a legitimate court order. Thus they can protect legitimate
> communications against economic adversaries, while still being able to
> eavesdrop on crooks pursuant to a court order.

Legitimate? And who decides what communications are legitimate? Oh, I
guess, it's the government, right? The guys who already have the keys?
It's kinda if I have the keys from your car and I am asked to decide
who has the right to use it "legitimately"...

> In discussing this, let's try to avoid the nastiness, personal attacks and
> noise of some previous threads.

Impossible, since you are demonstrating the same level of incompetence
and ignorance as in the provious threads.

> This is a substantive and technical issue,
> and personal remarks have no place in such a discussion.

Unfortunately, I have yet to see you posting a technically competent
message.

Regards,
Vesselin
-- 
Vesselin Vladimirov Bontchev          Virus Test Center, University of Hamburg
Tel.:+49-40-54715-224, Fax: +49-40-54715-226      Fachbereich Informatik - AGN
< PGP 2.2 public key available on request. > Vogt-Koelln-Strasse 30, rm. 107 C
e-mail: bontchev@fbihh.informatik.uni-hamburg.de    D-2000 Hamburg 54, Germany
