From: brad@clarinet.com (Brad Templeton)
Subject: Re: Secret algorithm [Re: Clipper Chip and crypto key-escrow]
Organization: ClariNet Communications Corp.
Keywords: encryption, wiretap, clipper, key-escrow, Mykotronx
Lines: 21

In article <1993Apr18.032405.23325@magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu> jebright@magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu (James R Ebright) writes:
>In article brad@clarinet.com (Brad Templeton) writes:
>
>[...]>
>>The greatest danger of the escrow database, if it were kept on disk,
>>would be the chance that a complete copy could somehow leak out.  You
>[...]>
>>Of course then it's hard to backup.  However, I think the consequences
>>of no backup -- the data is not there when a warrant comes -- are worse
>>than the consequences of a secret backup.
>
>If the data isn't there when the warrant comes, you effectively have
>secure crypto.  If secret backups are kept...then you effectively have
>no crypto.  Thus, this poster is essentialy arguing no crypto is better
>than secure crypto.

No, the poster (me) has his brain in the wrong gear.  As you can infer
from the first sentence, I meant the consequences of no backup are *better*
than the consequences of an easy to copy database.
-- 
Brad Templeton, ClariNet Communications Corp. -- Sunnyvale, CA 408/296-0366
