From: tclock@orion.oac.uci.edu (Tim Clock)
Subject: Re: "Conventional Proposales": Israel & Palestinians
Nntp-Posting-Host: orion.oac.uci.edu
Organization: University of California, Irvine
Lines: 117

In article <2BCA3DC0.13224@news.service.uci.edu> tclock@orion.oac.uci.edu (Tim Clock) writes:
>
>The latest Israeli "proposal", first proposed in February of 1992, contains 
>the following assumptions concerning the nature of any "interim status" refering to the WB and Gaza, the Palestinians, implemented by negotiations. It
>states that:    
>   >Israel will remain the existing source of authority until "final status"
>    is agreed upon;
>   >Israel will negiotiate the delegation of power to the organs of the 
>    Interim Self-Government Arrangements (ISGA);
>   >The ISGA will apply to the "Palestinian inhabitants of the territories"
>    under Israeli military administration. The arrangements will not have a 
>    territorial application, nor will they apply to the Israeli population 
>    of the territories or to the Palestinian inhabitants of Jerusalem;
>   >Residual powers not delegated under the ISGA will be reserved by Israel;
>   >Israelis will continue to live and settle in the territoriesd;
>   >Israel alone will have responsibility for security in all its aspects-
>    external, internal- and for the maintenance of public order;
>   >The organs of the ISGA will be of an administrative-functional nature;
>   >The exercise of powers under the ISGA will be subject to cooperation and 
>    coordination with Israel. 
>   >Israel will negotiate delegation of powers and responsibilities in the 
>    areas of administration, justice, personnel, agriculture, education,
>    business, tourism, labor and social welfare, local police,
>    local transportation and communications, municipal affairs and religious
>    affairs.
>
>The Palestinian counterproposal of March 1992:
>   >The establishment of a Palestinian Interim Self-Governing Authority 
>    (PISGA) whose authority is vested by the Palestinian people;
>   >Its (PISGA) powers cannot be delegated by Israel;
>   >In the interim phase the Israeli military government and civil adminis-
>    tration will be abolished, and the PISGA will asume the powers previous-
>    ly enjoyed by Israel;
>   >There will be no limitations on its (PISGA) powers and responsibilities 
>    "except those which derive from its character as an interim arrangement";
>   >By the time PISGA is inaugurated, the Israeli armed forces will have 
>    completed their withdrawal to agreed points along the borders of the 
>    Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT). The OPT includes Jerusalem;
>   >The jurisdiction of the PISGA shall extend to all of the OPT, including 
>    its land, water and air space;
>   >The PISGA shall have legislative powers to enact, amend and abrogate laws;
>   >It will wield executive power withput foreign control;
>   >It shall determine the nature of its cooperation with any state or 
>    international body, and shall be empowered to conclude binding coopera-
>    tive agreements free of any control by Israel;
>   >The PISGA shall administer justice throughout the OPT and will have sole
>    and exclusive jruisdiction;
>   >It will have a strong police force responsible for security and public
>    order in the OPT;
>   >It can request the assistance of a UN peacekeeping force;
>   >Disputes with Israel over self-governing arrangements will be settled by 
>    a committee composed of representatives of the five permanent members of
>    the UN Security Council, the Secretary General (of the UN), the PISGA, 
>    Jordan, Egypt, Syria and Israel.
>
>But perhaps the "bargaining" attitude behind these very different visions
>of the "interim stage" is wrong? For two reasons: 1) the present Palestinian 
>and Israeli leadership are *as moderate* as is likely to exist for many years,
>so the present opportunity may be the last for a significant period, 2) since
>these negotiations *are not* designed to, or even attempting to, resolve the 
>conflict, attention to issues dealing with a desired "final status" are mis-
>placed and potentially destructive.
>
>Given this, how should proposals (from either side) be altered to temper
>their "maximalist" approaches as stated above? How can Israeli worries ,and 
>desire for some "interim control", be addressed while providing for a very 
>*real* interim Palestinian self-governing entity?
>
>Tim
>                                                       
April 13, 1993 response by Al Moore (L629159@LMSC5.IS.LMSC.LOCKHEED.COM):

Basically the problem is that Israel may remain, or leave, the occupied 
territories; it cannot do both, it cannot do neither. So far, Israe 
continues to propose that they remain. The Palestinians propose that they 
leave. Why should either change their view? It is worth pointing out that 
the only area of compromise accomodating both views seems to require a
reduction in the Israeli presence. Israel proposes no such reduction....
and in fact may be said to *not* be negotiating.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Tim: 

There seem to be two perceptions that **have to be addressed**. The
first is that of Israel, where there is little trust for Arab groups, so
there is little support for Israel giving up **tangible** assets in 
exchange for pieces of paper, "expectations", "hopes", etc. The second
is that of the Arab world/Palestinians, where there is the demand that
these "tangible concessions" be made by Israel **without** it receiving
anything **tangible** back.  Given this, the gap between the two stances
seems to be the need by Israel of receiving some ***tangible*** returns
for its expected concessions. By "tangible" is meant something that
1) provides Israel with "comparable" protection (from the land it is to 
give up), 2) in some way ensures that the Arab states and Palestine 
**will be** accountable and held actively (not just "diplomatically) 
responsible for the upholding of all actions on its territory (by citizens 
or "visitors").

In essence I do not believe that Israel objections to Palestinian
statehood would be anywhere near as strong as they are now IF Israel
was assured that any new Palestinian state *would be committed to** 
co-existing with Israel and held responsible for ALL attacks on Israel 
from its territory.
	Aside from some of the rather slanted proposals above,
	how *could* such "guarantees" be instilled? For example,
	how could such "guarantees"/"controls" be added to the
	Palestinian PISGA proposals?

Israel is hanging on largely because it is scared stiff that the minute
it lets go (gives lands back to Arab states, no more "buffer zone", gives
full autonomy to Palestinians), ANY and/or ALL of the Arab parties
could (and *would*, if not "controlled" somehow) EASILY return to the 
traditional anti-Israel position. The question then is HOW to *really*
ensure that that will not happen.

Tim

