From: viking@iastate.edu (Dan Sorenson)
Subject: Re: Nuclear/heavy weapons and the Militia [Long]
Organization: Iowa State University, Ames IA
Lines: 194

fcrary@ucsu.Colorado.EDU (Frank Crary) writes:

	Down to 170-some odd lines.  We must be making progress!
On an ironic note, where I deleted lines Emacs continually gave me
the message "Garbage collecting... Done."  Think it's trying to
tell me something?

>viking@iastate.edu (Dan Sorenson) writes:

>And thank you: It's a great change from the same tired old debates...

	You lurkers can join in at any time, you know!  Ahhh..
Talk.politics.guns -- the kindler, gentler newsgroup.  Who would
have thought?

>No, not exactly: The only reason for this sort of restriction is
>the possible endangerment of others. A poorly maintained 
>rifle is dangerous, but only to the user; since it doesn't
>endanger others, there is no justification for such restrictions.

	I remind you of shrapnel.  I consider 5' a reasonable space
limitation, but make no mistake a gun blowing up is a hazard to
those nearby, say in the next lane at the range.  My point was at
what distance, or level of threat, we draw the line.  Is it the
endangerment of others, so we do a 5' restriction, or the possibility
of being shot, hence we draw a 1.5 mile restriction, or a nuke and
draw a 5 mile restriction?  To me they al suffer from the fundamental
flaw that they restrict based upon the instrument rather than placing
the responsibility for usage squarely upon the shoulders of the user.
Perhaps Sen. Metzenbaum declaring the Barrett Light Fifty an assault
rifle has made this more apparent to me, since the Barrett has
only range and acurracy going for it.

>They have determined that their lives are worth the effort to
>protect their homes and families. Using nuclear weapons close 
>to home will not accomplish this.

	I disagree, on the grounds that a house can be rebuilt much
more easily than my family once I have died.  I assume that word
would get to the citizens that such an attack was planned.  If this
is not the case, the tactical and strategic implications change
quite a bit.  Personally, my home is worth, say, twenty Martians
intent on taking over the world.  My family?  All of them.  The
balancing act here is hard to judge sitting at my desk.

>There is, however, another problem: In any case of civil war,
>the strength of the militias fighting on each side should
>reflect the popular will. If the public is split 67% versus
>33%, then the minorities' militias should be at a 2:1 disadvantage.
>Such a need for popular support would, hopefully, prevent 
>insurrections unless the people really were behind the rebels.
>But heavy weapons owned by a small fraction of the militia 
>could distort this: What if the 33% minority included all the
>tank and artillery owners?

	That seems to be the case already, given that heavy
weapons aren't commonly owned by the citizenry.  With such low
numbers, obviously due to cost, I don't think the superior
weapons are going to be of great effect against a numerically
superior foe.  Furthermore, it is even more doubtful their training
includes proper tactical movements that best utilize tanks,
whereas the commonly rifleman is not so hampered in effectiveness.

>I think it is vital to avoid such a situation, where a small 
>minority would have a reasonable chance of gaining political power
>through violence. To prevent this, it may be necessary to give 
>control of heavy weapons (e.g. those which only a small number
>of individuals would own _and_ whose firepower would grossly 
>distort the relation between popular support and military 
>strength) to someone other that individual militiamen. This is
>certainly not a good thing, but I think it is the lesser of two evils.
>Whoever controls these weapons must be a democratic body,
>responsive to the will of the people.

	I had envisioned that the armorer, perhaps the officers
of a select group, and the like would exercise control over the
heavier, more complex weapons.  But, if Joe Bob owns an old Sherman
tank I certainly wouldn't ask him to give it up.  Follow orders
from the officers, yes.  Since the expense of a tank is so large,
though, chances are it would be jointly purchased and should
therefore be jointly maintained and operated.

>Here, I think we have to be carefull about _which_ "state" we
>are talking about: Certainly one role of the militia is to
>overthrow a repressive government, and it would be completely
>destructive to that end for that same government to control 
>the militia's arms. But the United States have several levels
>of government, each able to act independently, but not all
>likely targets of rebelion.
>As such, rebelions against state and
>local governments are very unlikely. I think, therefore, that the
>state (or possibly local) governments could safely be allowed to
>keep the select militia's heavy weapons. The risk of abuse, while
>still something to consider, is far less than the similar risk
>were the federal government in control.

	This I'll agree with to a point.  The State having control
over the heavy weapons should not be justification for the state
to have them centrally located.  Keep them spread out, such that
the ability of the State to lock them up isn't so easy.  Otherwise,
I would have to assume that State control would rest on the
authority of the Governor and militia officers.

>That is eaxctly why I think they should be removed: The select
>militia should privide the militia's heavy weapons and highly-trained
>specialists. For the reasons I have outlines above, I think 
>these heavy weapons (tanks, artillery, aircraft, etc...) are
>better off being kept by local governments than by a small 
>number of individuals. However, local governments shouldn't
>be able to use the select militia without the support to the
>people. Ideally, the general militia, under the direct 
>control of the people, and the select militia, under the direction
>of democratic, local governments, would opperate together.
>But even in the worst case, the general militia should be able
>to functional without the select militia. Similarly, the
>select militia should be incapable of action without the
>aid of the general militia.

	I'm having a hard time seeing how these heavy weapons,
fairly few in numbers, could not be easily wielded by a few
people with government support.  Just as you argued above that
the weapons should be divvied up and under democratic control
so one side doesn't have all of them, I can't see where this
situation is alleviated in having the select militia holding
all the weapons and the unorganized militia being the infantry.
I think a better mix is called for.  But, I would argue that
the Federal army should rely upon the select militia and the
unorganized militia for the bulk of its infantry units.

>Consider, then, the effect of removing the National Guard's
>infantry and placing the Guard under the control of local
>governments. The government-controled select militia could
>not fight effectively without infantry support provided by
>the general militia (an inherently infantry organization.) 
>On the other hand, the general militia could function (although
>at a disadvantage) without the backing of local governments and
>the select militia.

	We have to assume that there would be those who would
side with the government-controlled forces, and if they've all
the equipment an infantry force 3x the size would be in trouble.
I'd like to see that heavy stuff, say tanks, offset by the
local troups having a few 105's and anti-tank weapons in their
armory.  These would be much more useful to infantry than the
tank would be when cost and training requirements are figured in.
I suppose I'm quibbling over what constitutes heavy equipment.

>>...but a mechanized infantry unit is what builds
>>dikes in times of flood, sets up disaster relief cities, and
>>the like.
>
>I would much rather see these things handled by the local, 
>general militias.

	So would I, but the resources often aren't available to
outfit local units well enough.  Thus, we will certainly have to
call in others, and a mechanized unit carries more stuff faster
than anything else.

>Perhaps the National Guard isn't as close to my conception of
>the select militia as I thought: I was considering them to 
>be the heavy weapons/armor arm of the militia, not the infantry
>arm of the regular army.

	Perhaps our ideas of heavy weapons are different?  I think
main battle tanks, self-propelled artillery, and 155mm and up
field pieces are heavy stuff.  M113 troop carriers, 2 1/2 ton
trucks, HumVee's, old M60 tanks, 105 Howitzers, are more the stuff
of a mechanized infantry.  Actually, this is what the Guard units
in Iowa are currently fielding in some units.

	Perhaps it is just my innate fear of having the real heavy
equipment under State control, with little but numbers and light
stuff to act as a deterrent.  Allowing main battle tanks to the
states should be balanced with anti-tank capability in the local
ranks.  Similarly, local units would need to band together quickly,
hence small and fast response means mechanized infantry.  Finally,
the militia is more than just fighting.  Equipment is needed for
other responses.  The Federal army, I'm convinced, should have a
very minumum of infantry, relying on the state and local militias
for these functions.

< Dan Sorenson, DoD #1066 z1dan@exnet.iastate.edu viking@iastate.edu >
<  ISU only censors what I read, not what I say.  Don't blame them.  >
<     USENET: Post to exotic, distant machines.  Meet exciting,      >
<                 unusual people.  And flame them.                   >








