From: TSOS@uni-duesseldorf.de (Detlef Lannert)
Subject: Re: Facinating facts: 30 bit serial number, possibly fixed S1 and S2
Organization: Universitaetsrechenzentrum, Heinrich-Heine-Universitaet, Duesseldorf
Lines: 40
NNTP-Posting-Host: lannert.rz.uni-duesseldorf.de

In article <PMETZGER.93Apr20065402@snark.shearson.com> pmetzger@snark.shearson.com (Perry E. Metzger) writes:

>Hmmm. We must assume that generating the unit key U from the serial
>number N rather than generating it from a randomly selected U1 and U2
>is an intentional way of assuring a "fail safe" for the government --
>U is completedly determined given S1, S2 and N. 
 [...]
>If S1 and S2 do not change, even if they remain secret I wonder if
>they can somehow be back-derived given enough unit key/serial number
>pairs. [...]

Maybe 300 such pairs suffice to reconstruct S1 and S2? By such a back-
door (in the encryption algorithm perhaps) it would be possible (for  
the manufacturer) to get the keys of all chips that were programmed in 
one session. This would not, btw, enable anybody else to retrieve the 
keys in the same way because they'll never get a bunch of 300 (N,U) 
pairs with identical S1 and S2. (Note that these have to be constant 
for the whole batch by the very nature of the procedure, i.e., they 
have to be typed in manually by the `random number supplying agents'!)

And I was wondering why they'll always do 300 chips in one session ... 
Since the procedure described by Ms Denning imposes high costs on the 
production of every chip (at least three persons for one hour each, 
plus the cost of a laptop finally blown to pieces in a spectacular, 
Hollywood-like bonfire; add travelling expenses, drinks and lighting, 
divide the sum by 300) there won't be a larger demand -- not from the 
private sector anyway. 

And let me mention one other thought that certainly has occurred to all 
the notoriously paranoid people in this group before: Who is going to 
verify that _no_ interested party will perform tempest attacks on the 
vault?? 

Where there's so much smoke and mirrors -- there can't be a nice, honest 
fire but something really worth hiding ... 
--
Detlef Lannert       DC3EK       E-Mail: tsos@rz.uni-duesseldorf.de
PGP 2.2 key via server or finger lannert@clio.rz.uni-duesseldorf.de
"I am Psmith." - "Oh, you're Smith, are you?" - "With a preliminary
P. Which, however, is not sounded."                   P.G.Wodehouse
