Propaganda officials warn state media off using moniker after push to portray leader as man of the people appears to backfire 
 
 Chinese propaganda chiefs have reportedly ordered state-controlled media to refrain from using the nickname “Big Daddy Xi” to refer to the president. 
 
 
 
 Since Xi Jinping took power in 2012 the epithet has been at the centre of an energetic push to portray the Communist party leader as an omnipotent people’s president. 
 
 
 
 An entire genre of “Big Daddy Xi”-themed songs has sprung up, fuelling fears that he is attempting to build a Mao-like personality cult. 
 
 
 
 Singing Xi's praises: chorus of Chinese pop songs celebrate president Read more 
 
 However, China’s official news agency, Xinhua, and the leading 21st Century Business Herald newspaper have received instructions to steer clear of the nickname, Bloomberg reported. 
 
 One Xinhua journalist told the Guardian the news group had become cautious in its use of the nickname “Xi Dada” – which translates as Big Daddy or Uncle Xi – although they had not seen a specific written instruction to avoid the term. 
 
 
 
 The moniker has not appeared on Xinhua’s website since 27 April but did show up in a 1 May story on another party-run news website with the headline: “What Big Daddy Xi said at the Communist party’s Central Party School conference.” 
 
 
 
 It is unclear why Beijing’s propaganda officials have decided to step back from Xi’s nickname. Experts believe it may hint at growing discomfort – both in and outside China – about how the leader is portrayed as a Mao-style autocrat. 
 
 In recent weeks, Chinese officials have expressed discomfort over the perception that a cult of personality is growing around their leader. The website of the Economist was blocked in China after a cartoon on its front page showed Xi sporting a Mao-style Zhongshan suit beside the headline: “Beware the cult of Xi”. 
 
 Writing in the New York Review of Books this month, Columbia University’s Prof Andrew J Nathan accused Xi of bringing back “many of the most dangerous features of Mao’s rule: personal dictatorship, enforced ideological conformity, and arbitrary persecution”. 
 
 Kerry Brown, the author of CEO, China: The Rise of Xi Jinping, said the apparent move to purge Xi’s nickname from headlines was a possible admission that China’s portrayal of its leader had backfired. 
 
 While spin doctors had hoped to paint Xi as a respected globe-trotting world leader, Brown said, large portions of the international community and media now viewed Xi as “a big, big dictator”. 
 
 “That’s a big-time propaganda failure,” he said. “I can imagine that in their five-minute-a-month meeting with Xi Jinping, the head of publicity got told: ‘Whose bright idea was that [nickname]? Send him or her to Gansu [in China’s far west]!’” 
 
 
 
 Brown added: “They don’t want [China] to be seen as an autocracy. So this interpretation of the outside world as a Xi Jinping autocracy must be driving them absolutely nuts.” 
 
 'Rule the party strictly!': Chinese president 'Big Daddy Xi' makes rap debut Read more 
 
 Roderick MacFarquhar, a Harvard University China expert, said the apparent abandonment of the nickname was unlikely to signal a change in direction for the authoritarian leader, who has suggested is the country’s most powerful since Mao. 
 
 
 
 “My own feeling is that he may be tweaking the way he presents himself but I don’t think that he is changing his fundamental principles. [His belief remains] that if there is going to be a ‘Chinese dream’ it has got to be Xi Jinping who is in charge,” MacFarquhar said. 
 
 
 
 “I don’t know whether his spies or informants have told him that ‘Xi Dada’ has made him look rather ridiculous … but there is some talk that the propaganda chief may have been overdoing it deliberately, and maybe Xi Jinping fell for that.” 
 
 Qiao Mu, an outspoken journalism professor from the Beijing Foreign Studies University, said he was unaware of an explicit directive to avoid the nickname but said it was possible verbal orders had been given to tone down the intense media focus on Xi. The academic said he would welcome such a move. 
 
 
 
 “The members of the politburo should all be equal. So why don’t we have a ‘Big Daddy Wang’ and a ‘Big Daddy Zhang’, as well as a ‘Big Daddy Xi’?” 
 
 
 
 MacFarquhar admitted the inner workings of Chinese politics were so opaque it was hard to grasp the significance of the move. “I think there are all sorts of currents around Chinese leaders at the moment and it is difficult to tell who is on whose side,” he said. 
 
 Additional reporting by Christy Yao. ||||| It was the dream of pop stardom that convinced Zhou Dandan, a belly dancing instructor from Hubei province, to pen her paean to the Chinese president, Xi Jinping. 
 
 For Tang Jianyu it was a desire to canonise her country’s commander-in-chief. “He is the ideal husband for any girl,” gushed Tang, a 39-year-old amateur musician from Wuxi in Zhejiang province. 
 
 As Xi moves into his fourth year as president of the world’s most populous nation, the two musicians are part of a growing chorus of Chinese minstrels singing the praises of the man they call “Xi Dada” which translates as Uncle or Big Daddy Xi. 
 
 A rapidly expanding list of pop hits celebrating the president includes tracks such as Our Xi Dada, The Idol Xi Dada, If You Want to Marry, Marry Somebody Like Xi Dada, China has its Xi Dada, Be a Man Like Xi Dada and, best known of all, Xi Dada Loves Peng Mama (a reference to China’s first lady, Peng Liyuan). 
 
 “I want to sing Big Daddy Xi’s praises,” explained Zhou, 29, who is from the city of Xiangyang and uses the stage name “A Yi Mi La”. “There are millions of reports telling Xi’s story so it struck me I should write a song about him.” 
 
 She added: “I think he is a very ambitious [leader]. He is very bold but at the same time cautious.” 
 
 Part of the fast-growing Xi repertoire seems to be genuinely spontaneous tributes to a leader whose high-profile anti-corruption campaign has won him many fans. 
 
 Other works – such as a big budget television song and dance extravaganza that was reportedly bankrolled by the government of Hunan province – appear part of a coordinated propaganda push to bolster Xi’s standing. 
 
 “We are in your hearts! You are in our hearts! You love us, the people! We the people deeply love you!” the performers of that state-backed song chant. 
 
 Some detect a troubling attempt to build a Mao-esque personality cult around Xi. 
 
 Carl Minzner, an expert in Chinese governance at New York’s Fordham University, said Xi’s time in office had seen an increasingly intense and fawning focus on the Communist party chief in the media and some sections of the arts. 
 
 “You put all those things together … and it’s a budding cult of personality. And the fear about that is that this has echoes that go back to the Maoist era and you just wonder how that might get used,” he said. 
 
 In a recent interview with the Wall Street Journal, the revered China scholar David Shambaugh said: “I thought the Chinese system had moved beyond one-man-rule and personality cults.” 
 
 He added: “Xi has obviously reversed this carefully crafted norm, and I do not think it is good for China. This is not the 1960s.” 
 
 Daniel Leese, author of Mao Cult: Rhetoric and Ritual in China’s Cultural Revolution, said Xi had a long way to go before emulating Mao’s cult following. However, he too saw hints of a personality cult developing around Xi. 
 
 Unlike the portrayal of Mao Zedong, Xi was not depicted as a god-like figure. “He is not superhuman,” Leese said. 
 
 Rather, propaganda chiefs sought to craft the image of an approachable public servant who boasted both supreme leadership skills and the ability to act as a detached and influential political referee. 
 
 Budding poets are also attempting to get in on the act, including Pu Liye, the author of one recent ode to Xi. “General secretary, my eyes follow in your wake. And in these eyes my verse takes shape,” reads one of the poem’s opening lines. 
 
 Pu, a journalist at the state-run Xinhua news agency, declined to discuss his homage to Xi, which was received with widespread derision on the internet, but he confirmed that he wrote the politically-charged stanzas. 
 
 “I don’t want to say much,” he said. “Is that OK?” 
 
 Additional reporting by Christy Yao ||||| A push to rein in a popular nickname for Chinese President Xi Jinping signals his image-makers are refining their effort to portray him as a populist hero of the masses. 
 
 In recent weeks, news outlets including the official Xinhua News Agency and the 21st Century Business Herald have been cautioned against using “Xi Dada” in reports and on social media, according to people with knowledge of the matter. 
 
 QuickTake China's Pain Points 
 
 Xinhua employees were told last Friday not to refer to Xi as "Dada," said one of the people, who asked not to be identified discussing internal policies. The Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission received a similar order for its publications, according to another person. 
 
 Since Xi came to power more than three years ago, the name -- literally Xi Big Big, or Big Daddy Xi in his hometown vernacular -- has proliferated on social media, with videos, songs and poetry praising him as an affable father figure. While that image has helped offset perceptions of his privileged upbringing as the "princeling" son of a revolutionary leader, it’s fueled criticism that the Communist Party was building a new personality cult like the one blamed for political turmoil under Mao Zedong. 
 
 Edicts banning the use of the name by state-controlled media show authorities feel they need to tone down the rhetoric, said Zhang Lifan, a Beijing-based historian and political commentator. 
 
 "The deification effort has hit a snag," Zhang said. "The approach was a bit too crude and went overboard, and it met with resistance and even sparked repulsion. The propaganda team needs something different to accentuate Xi’s authority." 
 
 Fan Club 
 
 The name "Xi Dada" dates back to the early days of his ascension as party secretary, with a verified fan club using it in a December 2012 post on the Twitter-like Weibo, according to the website of the party’s People’s Daily newspaper. It’s a term used in Shaanxi, the northwestern region where Xi’s father was born and where the future president toiled as a "sent-down youth" during Mao’s Cultural Revolution. 
 
 Tourists pose for photos at the Qing-Feng Steamed Dumpling Shop in Beijing on Dec. 29, 2013, a day after Xi Jinping dropped in unexpectedly and ordered a simple lunch meal. Photographer: Ng Han Guan/AP Photo 
 
 Xi personally endorsed the nickname in September 2014, when he gave a school teacher visiting Beijing from the southwest province of Guizhou permission to address him by it. "Xi Dada" became a central feature of a social media campaign encouraged by state-controlled media, including smiling cartoons of Xi and photos of his impromptu visit to a Beijing dumpling shop. 
 
 Before Xi’s visit to the U.S. last September, the People’s Daily posted the online video "Who Is Xi Dada?" featuring foreign students expressing admiration for the "cute" leader. A song with the lyric, "If you want to marry, marry someone like Xi Dada, a man full of heroism, with a strong backbone," was circulated widely this year. 
 
 Personality Politics 
 
 Such imagery struck others as a regression to personality politics. Deleted Weibo posts collected by the U.S.-based China Digital Times website include protests against the term, with one August 2014 post describing it as "only used by prostrating lackeys hungry for a daddy." 
 
 Why authorities are now reining in the term is unclear. A 21st Century Business Herald journalist, who was informed about the policy recently and asked not to be identified, said the name was overused and probably seen as counterproductive. While media and government agencies have been told not to use the nickname, there’s no indication it’s being blocked from Internet searches or scrubbed from web pages and social media accounts. 
 
 One contributing factor may have been public criticism of the Lunar New Year Gala in February, an event watched by 690 million people, according to China Central Television. Stages symbolizing steps in Xi’s political career and sequences extolling his leadership of last year’s military parade led Internet users to dismiss the show as politicized and an extended version of CCTV’s state-managed nightly news broadcast. 
 
 "My guess is that Xi doesn’t want his image to be too familiar and warm," said Perry Link, author of "An Anatomy of Chinese: Rhythm, Metaphor, Politics," and a professor of Chinese studies at the University of California at Riverside. "He would rather it be imposing and awe-inspiring, like Mao’s." ||||| Image copyright AFP/Weibo Image caption This meme showing Xi Jinping and former US President Barack Obama began circulating in 2013 
 
 The blocking of Winnie the Pooh might seem like a bizarre move by the Chinese authorities but it is part of a struggle to restrict clever bloggers from getting around their country's censorship. 
 
 When is a set of wrist watches not just a set of wrist watches? When is a river crab not just a river crab? Inside the Great Firewall of China of course. 
 
 Winnie the Pooh has joined a line of crazy, funny internet references to China's top leaders. 
 
 The Chinese name for and images of the plump, cute cartoon character are being blocked on social media sites here because bloggers have been comparing him to China's president. 
 
 When Xi Jinping and Japan's Prime Minister Shinzo Abe endured one of the more awkward handshakes in history netizens responded with Winnie the Pooh and Eeyore shaking hands. 
 
 Image copyright Weibo/AFP 
 
 And then there was the time President Xi popped his head out of the roof of his special Red Flag limousine to inspect the troops - a photo appeared online of a toy Winnie the Pooh popping out of his own little car. 
 
 Image copyright Empics 
 
 It is not only that China's censors will not tolerate ridicule of the country's leader, they do not want this beloved children's character becoming a kind of online euphemism for the Communist Party's general secretary. 
 
 In other countries such comparisons might be thought of as harmless enough and some might even think that having Winnie as your mascot could even be quite endearing: not in China. 
 
 Here the president is Mr Grey. He doesn't do silly things; he has no quirky elements; he makes no mistakes and that is why he is above the population and unable to be questioned. 
 
 The previous Chinese Leader Hu Jintao had a catchphrase of "promoting a harmonious society" or, in Chinese, hexie 和谐. 
 
 Bloggers started to refer to being censored as having been "harmonised" - bei hexie le 被和谐了 - but, by changing the tones in Chinese or changing the characters, you can fudge the meaning. So another hexie is river crab 河蟹。In other words, when you see an image of a river crab on the internet in China, it is likely to be a reference to something having been censored. 
 
 Another Chinese leader Jiang Zemin came up with a political theory called Three Represents, san ge daibiao 三个代表。If you switch that around a bit it becomes dai san ge biao 带三个表, or wear three watches. So the wearing of three watches became a cheeky way of referring to his contribution to China's socialism "with Chinese characteristics". 
 
 You may also like: 
 
 It is not necessarily easy to get around China's censors though. 
 
 For example they have been extremely successful at virtually wiping out the existence of the country's number one dissident Liu Xiaobo - the winner of the Nobel Peace Prize who died in custody here last week - at least as far as the general public goes. 
 
 Most Chinese citizens have simply never heard of him. 
 
 Image copyright AFP/Getty Images Image caption Liu Xiaobo was better known abroad than he was in China 
 
 If you have anything to do with China at all here is a way of testing the censorship regime for yourself. 
 
 Everybody in China uses the Wechat (Weixin 微信) App… and I do mean pretty much everybody. 
 
 Sit down next to a friend who also has Wechat on their phone. Now try and send them a text message using the name "Liu Xiaobo". 
 
 On your phone it will appear as if you have sent the message but your friend will not get it. 
 
 The Chinese authorities can just punch certain words or phrases into whatever blocking mechanism they use and shut down discussion of a topic. 
 
 Wechat is a privately owned company but China's tech giants must toe the Party line. 
 
 Winnie the Pooh has actually fallen foul of the authorities here before. This renewed push against online Pooh is because we are now in the run-up to the Communist Party Congress this autumn. 
 
 The meeting takes place every five years and, amongst other things, sees the appointment of the new Politburo Standing Committee: the now seven-member group at the top of the Chinese political system. 
 
 Xi Jinping will also be using the Congress, which marks the beginning of his second term in office, to further solidify his grip on power by promoting allies and sidelining those seen as a threat. 
 
 It had been thought that China has transformed into a system of two-term governance for the country's supreme leader but this is merely a recent convention rather than a rule. 
 
 So, because President Xi has made so many enemies within the Party as a result of his widespread anti-corruption crackdown, many have questioned whether he can afford to give up power after the next five-year term. 
 
 In order to stay on he will believe that he needs to ensure there are no cracks in the absolute loyalty he demands. 
 
 And, in this climate, there is seen to be no room for even the most frivolous challenges to his supreme authority. ||||| Xi Jinping, who has been confirmed as the man who will lead China for the next decade, cuts a contrasting figure to his predecessor, Hu Jintao. 
 
 While Hu is determinedly anonymous, Xi is "a big personality", according to those who have met him. Standing over 6ft tall, he is confident and affable. He boasts a ready smile and a glamorous second wife – the renowned People's Liberation Army singer Peng Liyuan. He has expressed his fondness for US war movies and, perhaps more surprisingly, praised the edgy independent film-maker Jia Zhangke. 
 
 This is, in part, a generational and social shift. Xi is 59 and, like the other rising stars in Chinese politics, grew up in the era of reform and opening. 
 
 While Hu's first visit to the US was in 2002, Xi and his peers have travelled frequently and several have personal links with the west. Xi's daughter is studying at Harvard and a sister is thought to live in Canada. And like many of his peers, he is a "princeling" – someone who has experienced both privilege and prejudice as the child of a powerful Communist party figure. 
 
 Xi was born in 1953 to Xi Zhongxun, a Long March hero who later became a vice-premier, and Qi Xin. He grew up in the relative comfort of Zhongnanhai, the party elite's red-walled Beijing compound. 
 
 Loneliness 
 
 But when he was only nine his father fell from grace with Mao Zedong. Six years later, as the cultural revolution wreaked havoc, young Xi was dispatched to the dusty, impoverished north-western province of Shaanxi to "learn from the masses". 
 
 He spent seven years living in a cave home in Liangjiahe village. "I ate a lot more bitterness than most people," he once told a Chinese magazine. He has described struggling with the fleas, the hard physical labour and the sheer loneliness. 
 
 There is, of course, a well-established Communist iconography of learning to serve the people. But political commentator Li Datong suggests this "double background" has proved genuinely formative for princelings such as Xi and might even lead them to bolder policy-making. 
 
 "One aspect is their family background as children of the country's founders and the other is their experience of being sent to the countryside, which made them understand China's real situation better. It gives this generation a strong tradition of idealism and the courage to do something big," he said. 
 
 Although he has openly criticised the cultural revolution, Xi embraced the party; in a WikiLeaks cable an academic who knew Xi as a young man suggested he "chose to survive by becoming redder than red". 
 
 Family links helped him to win a place studying chemical engineering at the elite Tsinghua University, followed by a post as aide to a powerful military leader, Geng Biao – the beginning of his useful People's Liberation Army (PLA) connections. 
 
 Next came a more surprising move – his choice, says political expert Zhang Xiaojin – to an unglamorous post in Hebei province. He may have hoped to shake off suggestions of benefiting from his family name. 
 
 It was as deputy secretary of Zhengding county that he visited Muscatine, a US town of 23,000 until now best known for its melons and Mark Twain's brief sojourn there in 1855. 
 
 "He was a very polite and kind guy. I could see someone very devoted to his work – there was no golfing on that trip, that's for sure," said Eleanor Dvorchak, who hosted Xi in her son's old room, where he slept amid football wallpaper and Star Trek figurines. "He was serious. He was a man on a mission." 
 
 Sarah Lande, who organised the trip, said his confidence was obvious even through a translator. 
 
 "You could tell he was in charge … he seemed relaxed and welcoming and able to handle things," she said. "He had the words he wanted to express himself easily." 
 
 The acquaintance who spoke to WikiLeaks claimed Xi always had his "eye on the prize" of a major party post. He transferred to southern Fujian province in 1985, climbing steadily upwards over 17 years. Most of his experience has been earned in China's relatively prosperous, entrepreneurial coastal areas, where he courted investors and built up business, proving willing to adopt new ideas. The former US treasury secretary Hank Paulson called him "the kind of guy who knows how to get things over the goal line". 
 
 After the toppling of Shanghai's party secretary, Chen Liangyu, in a corruption scandal, Xi took charge of the city in 2007. Barely six months later his elevation to the politburo standing committee – the top political body – signalled that he was expected to succeed Hu. In October 2010 his appointment as vice-chair of the central military commission cemented his position. 
 
 He describes his own thinking as pragmatic, and throughout his rise he has cultivated a down-to-earth image; in the provinces he ate in government canteens and often dressed down. 
 
 In a burst of publicity shortly before his 2007 promotion his wife lauded his humble nature and devotion to duty, revealing that on their second date he warned her he would not have much time for family life. And in a system known for corruption, he also has a clean reputation. One friend told the LA Times the worst the paper was likely to find were overdue library books. 
 
 But while Xi is well-liked and adept at glad-handing, he appears to give little of importance away. Even his popular wife has retreated into the background as he has assumed increasing prominence. 
 
 The US ambassador, Gary Locke, recently observed that he was "very personable" but that US officials "really don't know that much about him". 
 
 Close association with particular policies or factions has its dangers. Becoming general secretary of the party, and thus leader of China, is "an issue of who opposes you rather than who supports you", said Kerry Brown, head of the Asia programme at Chatham House. 
 
 Beyond his openness to economic reforms, Xi is known primarily as a figure who appeals to different groupings and as a safe pair of hands. 
 
 "In recent years he has taken care of large-scale events, including Olympics and anniversaries, and there haven't been any big mistakes. Xi has steadily been through these tests," said Zhang. 
 
 In 2007 he leapfrogged Li Keqiang – until then seen as likely to succeed Hu, but seen perhaps as too much Hu's protege – as the consensus candidate in a system built on collective decision-making. 
 
 Xi's networks are unusually broad, according to Brown: "Provincially; through his family; and with the military through Geng Biao. His elevation is in the interests of the widest group of people and opposed by the smallest group." It is the same relatively small elite who will determine what he can do with the job. 
 
 Liberal 
 
 Some hope he shares his father's liberal sympathies: Xi senior was not only a noted economic reformer, but an ally of reformist leader Hu Yaobang. Some say he criticised the military crackdown on Tiananmen Square's pro-democracy protests in 1989. 
 
 They say that grassroots organisations burgeoned during the vice-president's stint in Zhejiang, and there was progress in the election of independent candidates at local polls. But the Chinese Human Rights Defenders network has argued the province also saw "zealous persecution" of dissidents, underground Christians and activists: "His track record does not bode well," it wrote. Other China watchers point to shattered hopes that Hu might prove politically liberal. 
 
 Nor does Xi's confidence in overseas dealings necessarily indicate a more emollient approach to foreign relations. His most-quoted remark to date was made on a trip to Mexico in 2009: "There are some well fed foreigners who have nothing better to do than point fingers at our affairs. China does not, first, export revolution; second, export poverty and hunger; third, cause troubles for you. What else is there to say?" 
 
 In any case, to read Xi as a man in sole control of the agenda is to fundamentally misunderstand the Chinese political system. He will be "first among equals" in the nine-member standing committee, say analysts. Hu and other former leaders will still exert influence; and 2011's five-year plan has plotted the immediate course. 
 
 The system "is in favour of moderation, and nothing can change quickly. Steady as it goes. The political rhythm first has to be installed … significant shifts will come later," said Dr David Kelly, director of the Beijing-based political thinktank China Policy. 
 
 Some think Xi's networks may allow him to strike out more confidently than Hu. Others think he will struggle to win support for bold decisions needed to tackle the country's mounting challenges. "I think he's a more instinctive and gut-driven politician and may surprise us. Others say the system and the vested interests around him are too strong," said Brown. 
 
 His leadership will be shaped by his colleagues and framed by external forces. "What's very important is the capacity to be on the right side of history," said Cheng Li of the Brookings Institution in Washington. "He himself probably does not know what he will do." 
 
 Pocket profile 
 
 Born June 1953 
 
 Career His father was a revolutionary hero and a steady rise through party ranks, aided by expert networking, is set to take Xi to the very top. His family background has dogged him at times but also speeded him on his course. 
 
 High point Emerging as heir apparent to Hu Jintao at the 17th party congress in 2007. Many had expected Li Keqiang – now expected to become premier – to take the position. 
 
 Low point Coming last in the vote for membership of the central committee in 1997, amid hostility to princelings. Connections won him a place as an alternate. 
 
 What he says "Are you trying to give me a fright?" (when asked by a reporter, in 2002, whether he would be a top leader within the decade). 
 
 What they say "He's more assertive than Hu Jintao. When he enters the room, you know there is a significant presence here … [But] when they rise through their hierarchy, it serves no purpose to indicate differences or even alternative directions." (Henry Kissinger) ||||| Advertising stamps surround the doorway of an apartment in Beijing linked to a Chinese man whom the Islamic State group says it has executed, Thursday, Nov. 19, 2015. Associated Press 
 
 Before he ended up as a hostage of Islamic State, Fan Jinghui hoped to one day win an award for China at a Cannes advertising festival. 
 
 In a 2001 interview, Mr. Fan—whose death at the hands of the militant group was announced Thursday by the Chinese government—described himself as a drifter, someone who had spent time working alternately as a teacher and in advertising, and for a time at China’s national broadcaster as well. In the segment, which featured Mr. Fan alongside another interviewee and involved a searching conversation about aspirations and life choices, he described himself as someone motivated by dreams and ideals who had spurned a regular workaday life. 
 
 Asked by the moderator how long he thought it would take him to achieve his goal of winning at the Cannes Lions International Festival of Creativity, Mr. Fan said he didn’t know. 
 
 But he said he wasn’t troubled by a sense of insecurity about his life. “I’ve deliberately pursued a sense of insecurity,” he said, “because it can give me a thrill, because many young people all like to read those martial arts novels, all the killing, that feeling of being itinerant—that kind of feeling, to many youth, has a great deal of temptation. It’s just that they are constrained by pressure that comes from life, from reality, from the environment, the family, so they don’t make these sorts of choices,” he said. 
 
 People walk through an apartment complex in Beijing linked to a Chinese man that Islamic State says it has taken hostage, as seen Thursday, Sept. 10, 2015. Associated Press 
 
 He added, “But if one day, they also were able to basically have a guarantee for their life, I believe that a great deal of people would also make the choice to be drifters.” 
 
 On Thursday, snippets of the interview circulated widely on social media, even as censors stepped in to quell chatter about Mr. Fan, who was listed by Islamic State as aged 50. China’s government regularly censors commentary in the wake of major news events, and Mr. Fan’s death proved no exception. 
 
 Should memorialization of Mr. Fan gather momentum, it might pose a challenge for the government, said Chen Dingding, founding president of the Intellisia Institute, a Shenzhen-based think tank. “It may create tremendous pressure on the government to do something, and I don’t think they’re ready yet,” he said. “If that happens, they won’t have a lot of room to maneuver.” 
 
 In a statement Thursday, China’s foreign ministry said it had made “all-out efforts” to rescue Mr. Fan, and condemned the killing. “The Chinese government strongly condemns this inhumane action and will definitely hold the perpetrators accountable,” the statement said. 
 
 Mr. Fan’s abduction was first announced by Islamic State in a notice printed in the group’s magazine two months ago, which read “Chinese prisoner for sale” and accused the Chinese government of failing to take sufficient steps to secure his ransom. At the time, numerous local reporters descended on the address listed in the magazine in search of information regarding Mr. Fan, who was described as a freelance consultant in the Islamic State notice and was shown photographed in a yellow jumpsuit. 
 
 On Thursday, though, the rain-beaten apartment complex was chilly and largely deserted. Inside the dim corridor outside what was purportedly Mr. Fan’s apartment, a row of cabbages lined the wall, which was littered with ads for plumbers and locksmiths. Residents queried said they didn’t know Mr. Fan or his wife, a teacher at a nearby school, and had no impression of the couple. Attendants staffing the gate suggested that reporters take their queries elsewhere. 
 
 Calls to Mr. Fan’s wife went unanswered Thursday. Reached by phone, a colleague of hers said that teachers had been told not to discuss the case, but added that Mr. Fan’s wife was a very strong person, and was coming to an acceptance of what happened. 
 
 –Te-Ping Chen, with contributions by Olivia Geng. Follow Te-Ping on Twitter @tepingchen. ||||| Disclosures show how havens such as British Virgin Islands hide links between big business and relatives of top politicians 
 
 The eight members of China’s Communist party elite whose family members used offshore companies are revealed in the Panama Papers. 
 
 The documents show the granddaughter of a powerful Chinese leader became the sole shareholder in two British Virgin Islands companies while still a teenager. Jasmine Li had just begun studying at Stanford University in the US when the companies were registered in her name in December 2010. Her grandfather Jia Qinglin was at that time the fourth-ranked politician in China. 
 
 Other prominent figures who have taken advantage of offshore companies include the brother-in-law of the president, Xi Jinping, and the son-in-law of Zhang Gaoli, another member of China’s top political body, the politburo standing committee. 
 
 
 
 Facebook Twitter Pinterest Jasmine Li (centre) at the Crillon debutante ball for Vanity Fair magazine in Paris, France. Photograph: Jonathan Becker/Contour by Getty Images 
 
 They are part of the “red nobility”, whose influence extends well beyond politics. Others include the daughter of Li Peng, who oversaw the brutal retaliation against Tiananmen Square protesters; and Gu Kailai, wife of Bo Xilai, the ex-politburo member jailed for life for corruption and power abuses. 
 
 The French villa at the heart of a Chinese scandal Read more 
 
 The relatives had companies that were clients of the offshore law firm Mossack Fonseca. There is nothing in the documents to suggest that the politicians in question had any beneficial interest in the companies connected to their family members. 
 
 
 
 Since Monday, China’s censors have been blocking access to the unfolding revelations about its most senior political families. There are now reports of censors deleting hundreds of posts on the social networks Sina Weibo and Wechat, and some media organisations including CNN say parts of their websites have been blocked. 
 
 
 
 The disclosures come amid Xi Jinping’s crackdown on behaviour that could embarrass the Communist party. 
 
 Two more well-connected figures – the brother of former vice-president Zeng Qinghong and the son of former politburo member Tian Jiyun – are directors of a single offshore company. They have previously been linked in a court case that highlighted how some Chinese “princelings” have used political connections for financial gain. 
 
 Facebook Twitter Pinterest Jia Qinglin is Jasmine Li’s grandfather. Photograph: Scott Barbour/Getty Images 
 
 They have emerged from the internal data of the offshore law firm Mossack Fonseca, obtained by the German newspaper Süddeutsche Zeitung and shared by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ) in Washington with the Guardian, the BBC and other media. 
 
 China and Hong Kong were Mossack Fonseca’s biggest sources of business, with clients from these jurisdictions linked to a total of 40,000 companies past and present. About a quarter of these are thought to be live: in 2015, records show the firm was collecting fees for nearly 10,000 companies linked to Hong Kong and China. The Mossack Fonseca franchise now has offices in eight Chinese cities, according to its website. 
 
 There are many legitimate reasons to use offshore companies. Individuals living in multiple jurisdictions find them convenient, and in China they are often used as a way to attract and safeguard investment from overseas. While there is no indication of any wrongdoing, the leaks draw unwelcome attention to the wealth of leaders’ families. In some cases, they show how secrecy havens are being used to create and hide potentially lucrative connections between big business and politics in the world’s second-largest economy. 
 
 Even as officials advertise their zeal in targeting corruption by hunting assets overseas and checking on the relatives of officials, they remain highly sensitive to the disclosure of the business interests of top leaders’ families. 
 
 In 2014, the websites of the Guardian and several other media outlets were blocked for several months after revealing such offshore holdings. Xi’s brother-in-law Deng Jiagui and Li’s daughter Li Xiaolin were named in those leaks, too. The new documents therefore indicate multiple offshore holdings. 
 
 Facebook Twitter Pinterest Tian Jiyun is a former politburo member whose son is linked to an offshore company. Photograph: Robyn Beck/AFP/Getty Images 
 
 Xi’s harsh anti-corruption drive has brought down a host of high-ranking figures. In December, he urged politburo members “to strictly educate and supervise their children and other family members as well as subordinates, and to rectify their problems in a timely manner”. He urged members of the 25-strong body to not only have integrity but “stay away from vulgar taste and set good examples for other cadres and the general public”. In other words, avoiding wrongdoing is not enough, impressions count, too. 
 
 A world of hidden wealth: why we are shining a light offshore Read more 
 
 Xi’s daughter, Xi Mingze, studied at Harvard but kept a low profile, living under an assumed name. In contrast, Jasmine Li came to public attention when Vogue featured her in a floor-length Carolina Herrera gown at the Hotel de Crillon’s annual debutante ball in Paris in 2009. She was presented alongside Lady Kitty Spencer, niece of Diana, Princess of Wales, and the daughter of Clint Eastwood. 
 
 The following year, shortly after beginning a course in international relations at Stanford, she was recorded as the sole shareholder of two entities registered in the British Virgin Islands, Harvest Sun Trading Limited and Xin Sheng Investments Limited. These companies established at least two businesses in Beijing, with a combined registered capital of £200,000, described on the register as specialising in “investment and consulting”. 
 
 The leaked data reveals Harvest Sun was incorporated in July 2009 and that its first shareholder was someone apparently unconnected to Li: a 57-year-old Hong Kong entrepreneur known as the King of Watches. 
 
 Cheung Yu Ping’s firm, Hengdeli, is valued at $470m on the Hong Kong stock exchange and is one of the world’s biggest sellers of Swiss watches by volume. It supplies pieces by Cartier and TAG Heuer to China’s new rich. 
 
 Facebook Twitter Pinterest Li Peng, the father of Li Xiaolin. Photograph: Sportsphoto/Allstar 
 
 In December 2010, Cheung passed his shares in Harvest Sun to Li for just $1. A lawyer for Cheung said the company had contained no assets at the time of transfer. He explained: “Our client had no relationship with Ms Li, who was introduced to our client by some business partners for taking up the company without the need to set up another shell company herself. Our client considered the consideration of the transfer reasonable as the company was only a shell company with no assets inside.” 
 
 Li did not respond to requests for comment. 
 
 Politically exposed persons – or PEPs, public officials, their families and known associates – are considered high risk clients by those providing offshore services. Mossack Fonseca said: “We have duly established policies and procedures to identify and handle those cases where individuals either qualify as PEPs or are related to them … Enhanced due diligence procedures apply in these cases.” 
 
 The president’s brother-in-law 
 
 Facebook Twitter Pinterest Xi Jinping attends a meeting with foreign experts at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing. Photograph: Ed Jones/AFP/Getty Images 
 
 Xi Jinping’s brother-in-law Deng Jiagui was a shareholder in two BVI companies, Wealth Ming International and Best Effect Enterprises. 
 
 Deng appeared on the shareholder registers of both companies in September 2009. They both existed for roughly 18 months before being closed in April 2011 and October 2010 respectively. 
 
 The previous leak of offshore documents revealed Deng owned a 50% stake in the BVI-incorporated Excellence Effort Property Development. Ownership of the remainder of the company has been traced back to two Chinese property tycoons. 
 
 Deng is married to Xi’s older sister, and together they built a fortune through investments in property and natural resources. In 2012, they were reported to hold stakes in companies with total assets of $376m, and an indirect 18% share in a minerals company worth $2bn. Since Xi became president, they have pulled out of many of their investments. 
 
 Thanks to his close connection to the centre of Chinese power, Deng qualifies as a PEP. Banks, registered agents and professionals such as lawyers are obliged to carry out detailed checks on the source of funds when managing money for politicians, public officials, their families and close associates. 
 
 Deng was the named shareholder and had given the firm his Hong Kong identity papers. But Mossack Fonseca’s files did not list him as a PEP, raising questions about whether detailed checks were made on what his offshore vehicles were used for. Deng did not respond to requests for comment. 
 
 The power queen 
 
 Facebook Twitter Pinterest Li Xiaolin in March 2011 in Beijing. Photograph: Feng Li/Getty Images 
 
 Former premier Li Peng is known by his detractors as the “butcher of Beijing” for his part in the bloody crackdown on the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests. In 1994, a BVI company called Cofic Investments Limited, ultimately owned by his daughter Li Xiaolin, was incorporated. 
 
 Her fortune has been estimated at $550m, and she has made a name as China’s “power queen” after a career spent running electricity-generating businesses. She is vice-president of state-owned power group China Datang Corporation. 
 
 Li is noted in China for conspicuous consumption – her appearance in a pink Pucci trouser suit at the annual meeting of a top government advisory body prompted a widely shared social media post that suggested the 12,000 yuan (£1,300) price tag was equivalent to warm clothes for 200 poor children. 
 
 All mention of Panama Papers banned from Chinese websites Read more 
 
 Previous ICIJ investigations have linked her to two other BVI companies, and to Swiss bank accounts. Li and her husband, Liu Zhiyuan, were revealed as the beneficiaries of five bank accounts that together held as much as $2.48m in 2006-07. 
 
 Li’s identity became known to Mossack Fonseca when BVI regulators asked for information about Cofic in 2015, and inquiries were made with the Geneva law firm that represented it. Cofic’s directors at this time were two partners in the firm, Charles-André Junod and Alain Bruno Lévy. Its shareholder, however, was a secretive Liechtenstein entity called Fondation Silo, whose beneficial owners were named by Junod as Li and her husband. 
 
 When asked about his clients, Junod sent their passports to Mossack Fonseca with the following explanation: “Regarding the source of funds, it is business profits: my clients have provided, through Cofic, services to other clients of my office who were exporting heavy industrial equipment from Europe to China.” 
 
 Cofic held a Swiss bank account at UBS and another with the asset manager Mirelis InvesTrust, the files show. Junod said: “In our activity, we have always been acting in full compliance with laws and regulations governing our profession.” 
 
 Li did not respond to requests for comment. 
 
 The Hong Kong lobbyists 
 
 Facebook Twitter Pinterest Zeng Qinghong, whose younger brother has been linked to tax havens. Photograph: Reuters/CORBIS 
 
 Zeng Qinghong was China’s vice-president until 2008. His younger brother, Zeng Qinghuai, is well known in Hong Kong, having worked there as an envoy for the ministry of culture. He was a consultant to Beginning of the Great Revival, a state-produced propaganda movie which, according to the New York Times, “exemplified the hand-in-glove relationship between business and politics”. Government offices and schools were ordered to buy tickets and any criticism was censored. State support ensured it was one of 2011’s top grossing films. 
 
 The Panama Papers reveal that Zeng Qinghuai is a director of a company called Chinese Cultural Exchange Association Ltd, registered first in the tiny South Pacific island of Niue, then in Samoa. He sits on the board alongside another princeling, Tian Chenggang, son of the former vice-premier and politburo member Tian Jiyun. 
 
 A 2012 court case, in which Tian Chenggang unsuccessfully sued a developer called Beijing Henderson Properties, shed new light on the business dealings of the red nobility. The court in Hong Kong heard that Tian and a company linked to Zeng had been separately engaged to lobby regulators on behalf of Henderson when it was under investigation for breaching foreign exchange regulations in 2006. An exchange of letters disclosed in court suggested Tian’s father had written to the regulators to plead leniency. In the event, the fine imposed was smaller than expected. 
 
 Companies linked to Zeng received fees of $2.1m and $650,000. Henderson rejected Tian’s demand for $5.5m, so Tian sued for the money but lost. The judge’s summing up said of him: “He tried to project an air of superiority … His attitude was contemptuous and disrespectful.” 
 
 Zeng and Tian did not respond to requests for comment. 
 
 
 
 The others 
 
 Facebook Twitter Pinterest Zhang Gaoli is one of China’s seven most powerful politicians. Photograph: How Hwee Young/EPA 
 
 Also in the data are Hu Dehua, the businessman son of Hu Yaobang, the Communist party’s general secretary ousted in 1987 because he was seen as too liberal – and, some sympathisers say, for his attempts to root out corruption among leaders’ families. Hu has interests in technology and energy, and is registered as sole shareholder of a BVI entity called Fortalent International Holdings. Hu did not respond to requests for comment. 
 
 The Hong Kong businessman Lee Shing Put is married to the adoptive daughter of Zhang Gaoli, who is China’s senior vice-premier. As a member of the politburo standing committee, he is one of the seven most powerful politicians in China. 
 
 
 
 His son-in-law Lee worked for Xinyi, a glass, plastics and solar power manufacturer founded by Lee’s father, but resigned in 2008, according to the company. He is listed as a shareholder in Sino Reliance Networks Corporation, now closed, Glory Top Investments and Zennon Capital Management. 
 
 At the time of his father-in-law’s elevation to the politburo, Lee, who did not respond to requests for comment, was a director of 17 Hong Kong companies, the South China Morning Post reported. 
 
 Panama Papers reporting team: Juliette Garside, Luke Harding, Holly Watt, David Pegg, Helena Bengtsson, Simon Bowers, Owen Gibson and Nick Hopkins
– It seemed a good idea at the time, but China's propaganda officials are now reportedly walking back one particular attempt to paint President Xi Jinping as the "people's president" by asking state media to stop referring to him by his nickname, per the Guardian. That nickname is "Xi Dada," or "Big Daddy Xi," and while the intent of the moniker was, as another Guardian article frames it, to "craft the image of an approachable public servant," it seems to have instead created a cult of personality that some fear is reminiscent of Mao Zedong. Sources tell Bloomberg that both the Xinhua News Agency and the 21st Century Business Herald were "cautioned" last month about using "Xi Dada," even though the name doesn't appear to have been blocked from online searches or scrubbed online, and no explicit written ban seems to have been issued. The nickname got its start after a fan club started circulating it in 2012, per the People's Daily, and Xi himself gave it the thumbs-up in 2014. There's even a series of songs that have been dedicated to Big Daddy Xi, including "Our Xi Dada" and "Xi Dada Loves Peng Mama" (referring to his wife). "I thought the Chinese system had moved beyond one-man-rule and personality cults," noted Chinese scholar David Shambaugh scoffs to the Guardian. "I do not think it is good for China. This is not the 1960s." Experts speculate it's that sort of thinking that may have caused officials to try to pull back the name, even blocking the Economist website for posting a cartoon Xi in a Mao-style getup next to the headline, "Beware the cult of Xi." Some say Xi is likely not pleased. "That's a big-time propaganda failure," the author of a book on Xi's rise tells the Guardian. "I can imagine that in their five-minute-a-month meeting with Xi Jinping, the head of publicity got told: 'Whose bright idea was that [nickname]? Send him or her to Gansu [in China's far west]!'" (Did Taiwan's president call him "Big Daddy Xi" during their historic handshake?)