A U.S. initiative to spend hundreds of millions of dollars on construction projects in Afghanistan, originally pitched as a vital tool in the military campaign against the Taliban, is running so far behind schedule that it will not yield benefits until most U.S. combat forces have departed the country, according to a government inspection report to be released Monday. 
 
 The report, by the special inspector general for Afghanistan reconstruction, also concludes that the Afghan government will not have the money or skill to maintain many of the projects, creating an “expectations gap�? among the population that could harm overall stabilization efforts. 
 
 “Implementing projects that the Afghan government is unable to sustain may be counter­productive�? to the U.S. counterinsurgency mission, the inspector general wrote. “If goals are set and not achieved, both the U.S. and Afghan governments can lose the populace’s support.�? 
 
 The study calls into question a fundamental premise of the U.S. strategy to counter the Taliban insurgency — that expensive new roads and power plants can be funded and constructed quickly enough to help turn the tide of war — and it poses a sobering, counterintuitive question for policymakers in Washington: whether the massive influx of American spending in Afghanistan is actually making problems worse. 
 
 Many U.S. military commanders, diplomats and reconstruction experts have long believed that large infrastructure projects were essential to fixing Iraq and Afghanistan. Now-retired Gen. David H. Petraeus, the former top commander in both wars who is now director of the CIA, used to say that cash was one of his most important weapons. 
 
 But the latest report adds new weight to the argument — voiced by independent development specialists and even a few government officials — that the United States attempted to build too much in a country with limited means to assume responsibility for those projects. All U.S. combat forces are expected to be withdrawn from Afghanistan by the end of 2014. 
 
 Until now, most critiques have asserted only that the massive U.S. foreign assistance program has led to waste and fueled corruption. The new report goes further by suggesting that some projects may ultimately prove detrimental. 
 
 In a written response to the report, the U.S. Embassy in Kabul said it was “speculative�? for the inspector general to conclude that some of the projects would have adverse effects. The top Pentagon official responsible for Afghanistan called the report premature and insisted that the announcement of the projects, even though they have not been completed, has generated goodwill and excitement among the Afghan people. 
 
 The inspector general’s examination focuses on the Afghan Infrastructure Fund, which was authorized by Congress in 2010 in part to prevent the Defense Department from dipping into a discretionary account for military commanders to bankroll large projects. The infrastructure fund was supposed to allow the Defense and State departments to collaboratively plan and pool money for large infrastructure improvements aimed at supporting the U.S. counter­insurgency campaign. 
 
 Since then, Congress has poured $800 million into the fund and the State Department has committed about $1 billion of its funds to related infrastructure programs. 
 
 Among the projects criticized by the inspector general is a plan to use costly diesel generators to provide electricity to residents of Kandahar, the country’s second-largest city, until the U.S. Agency for International Development and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers install a new hydropower turbine at a dam in the violence-plagued hills of neighboring Helmand province. Purchasing diesel to run the generators, which produce about 25 megawatts of electricity each — enough to power about 2,500 Afghan homes or small businesses — is projected to cost U.S. taxpayers about $220 million through 2013. 
 
 Senior U.S. commanders argued that increasing electricity through the “Kandahar Bridging Solution�? would be an important part of the overall American military effort to beat back the Taliban in Kandahar province. Those commanders asserted that more power to operate lights, television sets and fans would please residents and lead many of them to throw their support behind the Afghan government. 
 
 But other civilian and military officials have questioned that logic. When U.S. Army Maj. Gen. Kenneth Dahl was the deputy commander of U.S. forces in Kandahar last year, he said he could not find any evidence that the additional electricity was yielding greater employment, stability or support for the government. “This is a bridge to nowhere,�? he declared to his staff in 2011. 
 
 Back then, Dahl also noticed a disturbing disparity: The installation of the turbine at the dam, which will not occur for at least two more years, will produce significantly less power than the city receives from the generators. Since the Afghan government will not have the financial ability to buy diesel for the generators, that means the city’s power supply will inevitably ebb once the turbine is operational and U.S. funding for diesel ends. 
 
 That gap was seized upon by the inspector general. “While the Kandahar Bridging Solution may achieve some immediate [counter­insurgency] benefits because — as stated by USAID officials — ‘people like having their lights on,’ the U.S. government may be building an expectations gap that cannot be met in a timely manner,�? the report states. 
 
 The inspector general’s report also questions whether a new $23 million road in Helmand province will have adverse effects because the Afghan government has not compensated landowners for the destruction of their property. In addition, the report reveals that four electricity projects — costing a total of more than $300 million from the infrastructure fund — have not yet been awarded to contractors, despite claims from the military and USAID that they will have important counterinsurgency benefits. 
 
 Sen. Claire McCaskill (D-Mo.), a frequent critic of Afghan reconstruction efforts, said the report raises fundamental questions about the strategic rationale of U.S. development programs in the war-torn nation. “There’s no data that shows these major projects have changed the security environment in the country,�? she said. “We cannot just throw money at a country like this and expect it to have a good ending.�? 
 
 In its response to the report, the U.S. Embassy defended the importance of large-scale development initiatives. “These critical infrastructure projects have signaled to Afghan populations the U.S. government’s long term commitment to Afghanistan.�? 
 
 Although the United States has spent almost $90 billion on Afghan reconstruction and development over the past decade, such examinations traditionally had not been conducted by the special inspector general’s office, which was more interested in contracting waste and fraud. This report was approved by a new inspector, former federal prosecutor John F. Sopko, who took charge of the office this month. He has vowed to scrutinize how projects are conceptualized and designed, not just how they are implemented. ||||| WASHINGTON A $7.3 million base camp built to house 175 Afghan Border Police was sitting virtually empty two months after it was handed over to Afghan authorities, and some equipment like wood-burning stoves had been dismantled, U.S. inspectors reported on Tuesday. 
 
 The facility, located in Kunduz Province, consisted of 12 buildings, including a dining hall, that were contracted by the Army Corps of Engineers and completed September 3, 2012, according to a report by the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction. 
 
 Inspectors who visited the site to ensure construction by Omran Construction, Consulting and Engineering Co was carried out according to contract found only a dozen Afghan personnel at the camp and nearly all of the buildings locked, SIGAR reported. 
 
 "These findings are similar to a July 2012 inspection of Afghan Border Police facilities in Nangarhar province, where we noted that $19 million was spent to construct four Border Police sites, yet the facilities were unoccupied or not being used as intended," SIGAR reported. "As a result, we question the need to construct a site of this size and design at this location." 
 
 The inspectors found no major construction quality issues, the report said, but they were only able to inspect three of the buildings because the caretakers did not have keys for most of the site. The 12 Afghan personnel said they were not aware of any plans to move additional staff to the facility, SIGAR said. 
 
 The NATO Training Mission for Afghanistan said in response that the Afghan Border Police had decided to reduce the size of its force in the area to 59 by the time the camp had been completed. Most of the force would be dispersed throughout the region for daily operations, so the camp would rarely be at full capacity, the report said. 
 
 The inspectors said most of the buildings "appeared unused" and wood-burning stoves made of brick near the base dining facility had been dismantled. The SIGAR report included a photo of piles of bricks outside the empty building where the stoves had stood two months earlier when the camp was completed. 
 
 The NATO training mission, in a response, said the police had dismantled the stoves because the pots they were using were larger than the available cooking area on the stoves provided. The Afghans have now built a new larger stove and are using that, the report said. 
 
 The Border Police camp was built based on plans to grow the size of Afghan military and police forces to 352,000 people. The Afghan force is later expected to shrink to a more sustainable size. 
 
 The special inspector general recommended the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and the NATO training mission re-evaluate plans for constructing Afghan police facilities and determine whether contracts are appropriately sized for the force they plan. 
 
 Inspectors also determined that sustaining the Border Police facility would require people with the skills needed to do maintenance on electrical generators, fueling stations, water treatment systems and heating and air conditioning systems. 
 
 "There is neither an operation and maintenance contract nor a plan to train Afghan personnel to operate and maintain equipment," the SIGAR report concluded. "This raises questions about the Afghan government's ability to sustain the facility." 
 
 (Editing by Eric Walsh) ||||| The Kajaki Dam and power station, a project begun by the U.S. in 1953 to bring development to southern Afghanistan. Though it's still not running at capacity, it is considered important to the long-term development of Helmand and Kandahar. The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction announced it has launched an initiative to examine how money is spent on installation of the final turbine at the Kajaki Dam project. 
 
 'Growing gap' between policy, reality in Afghanistan, SIGAR reports 
 
 KABUL — Less than 18 months before all foreign combat troops are to leave Afghanistan, there are still billions of U.S. tax dollars at risk of being wasted — or worse, funneled to insurgents and terrorists — if the American government doesn’t do more to ensure reconstruction money is spent properly, according to a quarterly report from the top government watchdog agency in Afghanistan. 
 
 “There appears to be a growing gap between the policy objectives of Washington and the reality of achieving them in Afghanistan, especially when the government must hire and oversee contractors to perform its mission,” said Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) John Sopko in a letter introducing the report. 
 
 The report reiterated that some U.S. contract money is going to insurgents and terrorists. 
 
 The inspector general recommended 43 companies and individuals be suspended or blocked from receiving government contracts because of ties to insurgents or terrorists but the Army rejected each suggestion, the report said. 
 
 “I am deeply troubled that the U.S. military can pursue, attack, and even kill terrorists and their supporters, but that some in the U.S. government believe we cannot prevent these same people from receiving a government contract,” Sopko said in his introduction letter. “I feel such a position is not only legally wrong, it is contrary to good public policy and contrary to our national security goals in Afghanistan.” 
 
 Army spokesman Matthew Bourke said, “Quite simply, the Army Procurement Fraud Branch did receive and review the 43 recommendations late last year, but the report did not include enough supporting evidence to initiate suspension and debarment under Federal Acquisition Regulations.” 
 
 In addition, the inspector general’s office announced it has launched an initiative to examine how money is spent on installation of the final turbine at the Kajaki Dam project. The turbine would provide power to perpetually electricity-starved Kandahar, the cradle of the Taliban and a strategic city for Afghanistan. 
 
 The effort to install a third turbine on the key hydroelectricity producer in the volatile province of Helmand has been in the works almost since the outset of the war in 2001 and is still not complete, despite the U.S. spending tens of millions of dollars on the project. It is often pointed to as one of the signature failures of America’s aid program in Afghanistan. 
 
 Earlier this year, the U.S. abruptly dropped plans for the U.S. Agency for International Development to complete the work, deciding instead to give $75 million directly to Afghanistan’s national utility to finish the project. 
 
 “SIGAR’s prior work has raised concerns about the readiness of the Afghan government to handle direct assistance, which is why we remain concerned about the prospects of success at Kajaki,” Sopko said in his letter. 
 
 In a prepared statement, a USAID official said the Afghan national utility, Da Afghanistan Breshna Sherkat (DABS), has proved effective in managing its assets, pointing to a 67 percent increase in payment collection from 2010 to 2012. 
 
 “USAID conducted a rigorous financial management assessment of the organization and determined that DABS has the ability to effectively manage the Kajaki Dam project,” Gordon Weynand, acting assistant to the administrator in the Office of Afghanistan and Pakistan Affairs, said in an emailed response to Stripes questions. 
 
 Among other findings highlighted in the report: 
 
 -- The Defense Department is moving forward with a $771.8 million purchase of aircraft the Afghan National Army cannot operate or maintain. 
 
 -- USAID’s main stabilization program has suffered from repeated delays and is failing to meet critical contract objectives. 
 
 -- Fuel destined for the U.S. military was illegally held at the border with Uzbekistan because of a dispute with the Afghan Ministry of Finance. 
 
 The inspector general’s office also announced the launch of the “SIGAR High-Risk List,” which “will call attention to programs, projects, and practices in Afghanistan that SIGAR finds especially vulnerable to waste, fraud, and abuse.” 
 
 druzin.heath@stripes.com 
 
 Twitter: @Druzin_Stripes
– When US inspectors looked at four border police bases in Afghanistan—funded by the US at a cost of almost $19 million—they found most of the facilities on three of those bases had either been abandoned or weren't being used as intended, the Wall Street Journal reports. The report from the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, a US government watchdog agency, uncovered numerous examples of poor construction work: One base has no water supply, a second is experiencing sewage overflow, some are missing drainpipes, others have leaking fuel lines or broken doors. One even includes a well house being used as … a chicken coop. The US Army Corps of Engineers says it is working on fixing the issues. The report also finds that the US plan to fund hundreds of millions of dollars worth of infrastructure projects in the country is extremely behind schedule—and that some of the ambitious plans may actually hurt the country, the Washington Post adds. The report raises concerns about the 2014 withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan and questions whether local forces are prepared to take over security duties—and whether this new infrastructure can be successfully maintained by a country with limited resources. The Post digs into a $220 million electricity project in Kandahar that it cites as a prime example.