Network Creation Games are a well-known approach for explaining and analyzing the structure, quality and dynamics of real-world networks like the Internet and other infrastructure networks which evolved via the interaction of selfish agents without a central authority. In these games selfish agents which correspond to nodes in a network strategically buy incident edges to improve their centrality. However, past research on these games has only considered the creation of networks with unit-weight edges. In practice, e.g. when constructing a fiber-optic network, the choice of which nodes to connect and also the induced price for a link crucially depends on the distance between the involved nodes and such settings can be modeled via edge-weighted graphs. We incorporate arbitrary edge weights by generalizing the well-known model by [PODC'03] to edge-weighted host graphs and focus on the geometric setting where the weights are induced by the distances in some metric space. In stark contrast to the state-of-the-art for the unit-weight version, where the Price of Anarchy is conjectured to be constant and where resolving this is a major open problem, we prove a tight non-constant bound on the Price of Anarchy for the metric version and a slightly weaker upper bound for the non-metric case. Moreover, we analyze the existence of equilibria, the computational hardness and the game dynamics for several natural metrics. The model we propose can be seen as the game-theoretic analogue of a variant of the classical Network Design Problem. Thus, low-cost equilibria of our game correspond to decentralized and stable approximations of the optimum network design.
Also related are network formation games where not centrality but some other property is the goal of each agent. There are games where agents simply want to be connected to all other agents, e.g. @cite_3 @cite_37 @cite_19 . Among them, the work by @cite_15 is closely related to our work. In their wireline strong connectivity game agents are points in the Euclidian plane who strategically buy incident edges to create a connected network. The edge price equals the length of the edge. This is similar to our model in the Euclidian plane with @math but the focus on connectivity changes the game completely. Another related geometric game was proposed by @cite_45 . Also there the agents are points in some metric space but agents pay a fixed price for each edge and try to minimize the total stretch towards all other agents. Guly 'a @cite_12 considered a network formation game in the hyperbolic plane where agents strive for maximum navigability. This is also a geometric model but drastically different from our approach.
@cite_37 @cite_3 @cite_19 @cite_45 @cite_15 @cite_12
2221218932 2007583146 2143039680 1974040162 2132936659 2032349632 2100580556 2121907157 1592266906 2128634904 419599686 2087097376 1985266912 1998168096 2172882040 2107820636 2013391976 2033899984 1498202041 2949981324
Strategic network formation arises in settings where agents receive some benefit from their connectedness to other agents, but also incur costs for forming these links. We consider a new network formation game that incorporates an adversarial attack, as well as immunization or protection against the attack. An agent's network benefit is the expected size of her connected component post-attack, and agents may also choose to immunize themselves from attack at some additional cost. Our framework can be viewed as a stylized model of settings where reachability rather than centrality is the primary interest as in many technological networks such as the Internet, and vertices may be vulnerable to attacks such as viruses, but may also reduce risk via potentially costly measures such as an anti-virus software. Our main theoretical contributions include a strong bound on the edge density at equilibrium. In particular, we show that under a very mild assumption on the adversary's attack model, every equilibrium network contains at most only @math 2n-4 edges for @math ni¾?4, where n denotes the number of agents and this upper bound is tight. We also show that social welfare does not significantly erode: every non-trivial equilibrium with respect to several adversarial attack models asymptotically has social welfare at least as that of any equilibrium in the original attack-free model. We complement our sharp theoretical results by a behavioral experiment on our game with over 100 participants, where despite the complexity of the game, the resulting network was surprisingly close to equilibrium. We study network design games where @math self-interested agents have to form a network by purchasing links from a given set of edges. We consider Shapley cost sharing mechanisms that split the cost of an edge in a fair manner among the agents using the edge. It is well known that the price of anarchy of these games is as high as @math . Another line of research has focused on evaluating the price of stability, i.e., the cost of the best Nash equilibrium relative to the social optimum. In this paper we investigate to which extent coordination among agents can improve the quality of solutions. We resort to the concept of strong Nash equilibria, which were introduced by Aumann and are resilient to deviations by coalitions of agents. We analyze the price of anarchy of strong Nash equilibria and develop lower and upper bounds for unweighted and weighted games in both directed and undirected graphs. These bounds are tight or nearly tight for many scenarios. It shows that, by using coordination, the price of anarchy drops from linear to logarithmic bounds. We complement these results by also proving the first superconstant lower bound on the price of stability of standard equilibria (without coordination) in undirected graphs. More specifically, we show a lower bound of @math for weighted games, where @math is the total weight of all the agents. This almost matches the known upper bound of @math . Our results imply that, for most settings, the worst-case performance ratios of strong coordinated equilibria are essentially always as good as the performance ratios of the best equilibria achievable without coordination. These settings include unweighted games in directed graphs as well as weighted games in both directed and undirected graphs. We consider computational aspects of a game theoretic approach to network reliability. Consider a network where failure of one node may disrupt communication between two other nodes. We model this network as a simple coalitional game, called the vertex Connectivity Game (CG). In this game, each agent owns a vertex, and controls all the edges going to and from that vertex. A coalition of agents wins if it fully connects a certain subset of vertices in the graph, called the primary vertices. We show that power indices, which express an agent's ability to affect the outcome of the vertex connectivity game, can be used to identify significant possible points of failure in the communication network, and can thus be used to increase network reliability. We show that in general graphs, calculating the Banzhaf power index is #P-complete, but suggest a polynomial algorithm for calculating this index in trees. We also show a polynomial algorithm for computing the core of a CG, which allows a stable division of payments to coalition agents. In this paper, we study a basic network design game in which n self-interested agents, each having individual connectivity requirements, wish to build a network by purchasing links from a given set of edges. A fundamental cost-sharing mechanism is Shapley cost-sharing, which splits the cost of an edge in a fair manner among the agents using the edge. It is well known that in such games, the price of anarchy is n, while the price of stability is H(n), where H(n) denotes the nth harmonic number. We investigate whether an optimal minimum-cost network represents an attractive, relatively stable state that agents might want to purchase: what extra cost does an agent incur compared to a possible strategy deviation? We employ the concept of α-approximate Nash equilibria, in which no agent can reduce its cost by a factor of more than α. We prove that for single-source games in undirected graphs, every optimal network represents an H(n)-approximate Nash equilibrium. We show that this bound is tight by presenting a... We consider a network creation game in which, each player (vertex) has a limited budget to establish links to other players. In our model, each link has a unit cost and each agent tries to minimize its cost which is its local diameter or its total distance to other players in the (undirected) underlying graph of the created network. Two variants of the game are studied: in the MAX version, the cost incurred to a vertex is the maximum distance between that vertex and other vertices, and in the SUM version, the cost incurred to a vertex is the sum of distances between that vertex and other vertices. We prove that in both versions pure Nash equilibria exist, but the problem of finding the best response of a vertex is NP-hard. Next, we study the maximum possible diameter of an equilibrium graph with n vertices in various cases. For infinite numbers of n, we construct an equilibrium tree with diameter Θ(n) in the MAX version. Also, we prove that the diameter of any equilibrium tree is O(log n) in the SUM version and this bound is tight. When all vertices have unit budgets (i.e. can establish link to just one vertex), the diameter in both versions is O(1). We give an example of equilibrium graph in MAX version, such that all vertices have positive budgets and yet the diameter is as large as Ω(√log n). This interesting result shows that the diameter does not decrease necessarily and may increase as the budgets are increased. For the SUM version, we prove that every equilibrium graph has diameter 2O(√log n) when all vertices have positive budgets. Moreover, if the budget of every players is at least k, then every equilibrium graph with diameter more than 3 is k-connected. We study a network creation game recently proposed by Fabrikant, Luthra, Maneva, Papadimitriou and Shenker. In this game, each player (vertex) can create links (edges) to other players at a cost of α per edge. The goal of every player is to minimize the sum consisting of (a) the cost of the links he has created and (b) the sum of the distances to all other players. conjectured that there exists a constant A such that, for any α > A, all non-transient Nash equilibria graphs are trees. They showed that if a Nash equilibrium is a tree, the price of anarchy is constant. In this paper we disprove the tree conjecture. More precisely, we show that for any positive integer n 0 , there exists a graph built by n ≥ n 0 players which contains cycles and forms a non-transient Nash equilibrium, for any α with 1 < α ≤ √n 2. Our construction makes use of some interesting results on finite affine planes. On the other hand we show that, for α ≥ 12n[log n], every Nash equilibrium forms a tree.Without relying on the tree conjecture, proved an upper bound on the price of anarchy of O(√α), where α ∈ [2, n2]. We improve this bound. Specifically, we derive a constant upper bound for α ∈ O(√n) and for α ≥ 12n[log n]. For the intermediate values we derive an improved bound of O(1 + (min α2 n, n2 α )1 3).Additionally, we develop characterizations of Nash equilibria and extend our results to a weighted network creation game as well as to scenarios with cost sharing. Two mobile agents (robots) with distinct labels have to meet in an arbitrary, possibly infinite, unknown connected graph or in an unknown connected terrain in the plane. Agents are modeled as points, and the route of each of them only depends on its label and on the unknown environment. The actual walk of each agent also depends on an asynchronous adversary that may arbitrarily vary the speed of the agent, stop it, or even move it back and forth, as long as the walk of the agent in each segment of its route is continuous, does not leave it and covers all of it. Meeting in a graph means that both agents must be at the same time in some node or in some point inside an edge of the graph, while meeting in a terrain means that both agents must be at the same time in some point of the terrain. Does there exist a deterministic algorithm that allows any two agents to meet in any unknown environment in spite of this very powerful adversary? We give deterministic rendezvous algorithms for agents starting at arbitrary nodes of any anonymous connected graph (finite or infinite) and for agents starting at any interior points with rational coordinates in any closed region of the plane with path-connected interior. While our algorithms work in a very general setting - agents can, indeed, meet almost everywhere - we show that none of the above few limitations imposed on the environment can be removed. On the other hand, our algorithm also guarantees the following approximate rendezvous for agents starting at arbitrary interior points of a terrain as above: agents will eventually get at an arbitrarily small positive distance from each other. We introduce a simple network design game that models how independent selfish agents can build or maintain a large network. In our game every agent has a specific connectivity requirement, i.e. each agent has a set of terminals and wants to build a network in which his terminals are connected. Possible edges in the network have costs and each agent's goal is to pay as little as possible. Determining whether or not a Nash equilibrium exists in this game is NP-complete. However, when the goal of each player is to connect a terminal to a common source, we prove that there is a Nash equilibrium as cheap as the optimal network, and give a polynomial time algorithm to find a (1+e)-approximate Nash equilibrium that does not cost much more. For the general connection game we prove that there is a 3-approximate Nash equilibrium that is as cheap as the optimal network, and give an algorithm to find a (4.65+e)-approximate Nash equilibrium that does not cost much more. In this paper we study efficient rendezvous of two mobile agents moving asynchronously in the Euclidean 2d-space. Each agent has limited visibility, permitting it to see its neighborhood at unit range from its current location. Moreover, it is assumed that each agent knows its own initial position in the plane given by its coordinates. The agents, however, are not aware of each others position. The agents possess coherent compasses and the same unit of length, which permit them to consider their current positions within the same system of coordinates. The cost of the rendezvous algorithm is the sum of lengths of the trajectories of both agents. This cost is taken as the maximum over all possible asynchronous movements of the agents, controlled by the adversary. We propose an algorithm that allows the agents to meet in a local neighborhood of diameter O(d), where d is the original distance between the agents. This seems rather surprising since each agent is unaware of the possible location of the other agent. In fact, the cost of our algorithm is O(d2+e), for any constant e > 0. This is almost optimal, since a lower bound of Ω(d2) is straightforward. The only up to date paper [12] on asynchronous rendezvous of bounded-visibility agents in the plane provides the feasibility proof for rendezvous, proposing a solution exponential in the distance d and in the labels of the agents. In contrast, we show here that, when the identity of the agent is based solely on its original location, an almost optimal solution is possible. An integral component of our solution is the construction of a novel type of non-simple space-filling curves that preserve locality. An infinite curve of this type visits specific grid points in the plane and provides a route that can be adopted by the mobile agents in search for one another. This new concept may also appear counter-intuitive in view of the result from [22] stating that for any simple space-filling curve, there always exists a pair of close points in the plane, such that their distance along the space-filling curve is arbitrarily large. A team consisting of an unknown number of mobile agents, starting from different nodes of an unknown network, have to meet at the same node. Agents move in synchronous rounds. Each agent has a different label. Up to f of the agents are Byzantine. We consider two levels of Byzantine behavior. A strongly Byzantine agent can choose an arbitrary port when it moves and it can convey arbitrary information to other agents, while a weakly Byzantine agent can do the same, except changing its label. What is the minimum number of good agents that guarantees deterministic gathering of all of them, with terminationq We solve exactly this Byzantine gathering problem in arbitrary networks for weakly Byzantine agents and give approximate solutions for strongly Byzantine agents, both when the size of the network is known and when it is unknown. It turns out that both the strength versus the weakness of Byzantine behavior and the knowledge of network size significantly impact the results. For weakly Byzantine agents, we show that any number of good agents permits solving the problem for networks of known size. If the size is unknown, then this minimum number is fp2. More precisely, we show a deterministic polynomial algorithm that gathers all good agents in an arbitrary network, provided that there are at least fp2 of them. We also provide a matching lower bound: we prove that if the number of good agents is at most fp1, then they are not able to gather deterministically with termination in some networks. For strongly Byzantine agents, we give a lower bound of fp1, even when the graph is known: we show that f good agents cannot gather deterministically in the presence of f Byzantine agents even in a ring of known size. On the positive side, we give deterministic gathering algorithms for at least 2fp1 good agents when the size of the network is known and for at least 4fp2 good agents when it is unknown. We consider a model of influence with a set of non-strategic agents and two strategic agents. The non-strategic agents have initial opinions and are linked through a simply connected network. They update their opinions as in the DeGroot model. The two strategic agents have fixed opinions, 1 and 0 respectively, and are characterized by the magnitude of the impact they can exert on non-strategic agents. Each strategic agent forms a link with one non-strategic agent in order to alter the average opinion that eventually emerges in the network. This procedure defines a zero-sum game whose players are the two strategic agents and whose strategy set is the set of non-strategic agents. We focus on the existence and the characterization of equilibria in pure strategy in this setting. Simple examples show that the existence of a pure strategy equilibrium does depend on the structure of the network. The characterization of equilibrium we obtain emphasizes on the one hand the influenceability of target agents and on the other hand their centrality whose natural measure in our context defines a new concept, related to betweenness centrality, that we call intermediacy. We also show that in the case where the two strategic agents have the same impact, symmetric equilibria emerge as natural solutions whereas in the case where the impacts are uneven, the strategic players generally have differentiated equilibrium targets, the high-impacts agent focusing on centrality and the low-impact agent on influenceability. Consider a team of mobile software agents deployed to capture a (possibly hostile) intruder in a network. All agents, including the intruder move along the network links; the intruder could be arbitrarily fast, and aware of the positions of all the agents. The problem is to design the agents' strategy for capturing the intruder. The main efficiency parameter is the size of the team. This is an instance of the well known graph-searching problem whose many variants have been extensively studied in the literature. In all existing solutions, and in all the variants of the problem, it is assumed that agents can be removed from their current location and placed in another network site arbitrarily and at any time. As a consequence, the existing optimal strategies cannot be employed in situations for which agents cannot access the network at any point, or cannot "jump" across the network, or cannot reach an arbitrary point of the network via an internal travel through insecure zones. This motivates the contiguous search problem in which agents cannot be removed from the network, and clear links must form a connected sub-network at any time, providing safety of movements. This new problem is NP-complete in general. We study it for tree networks, and we consider its more general version, the weighted case, which arises naturally when considering networks whose nodes and links are of different nature and thus require a different number of agents to be explored. We give a linear-time algorithm that computes, for any tree @math , the minimum number of agents to capture the intruder, and the corresponding search strategy. Beside its optimality in time, our algorithm is naturally distributed: if @math is a processor-network, then the minimal search strategy for @math can be computed by @math in a decentralized manner, using a linear number of messages. We study topology control problems in ad hoc networks where network nodes get to choose their power levels in order to ensure desired connectivity properties. Unlike most other work on this topic, we assume that the network nodes are owned by different entities, whose only goal is to maximize their own utility that they get out of the network without considering the overall performance of the network. Game theory is the appropriate tool to study such selfish nodes: we define several topology control games in which the nodes need to choose power levels in order to connect to other nodes in the network to reach their communication partners while at the same time minimizing their costs. We study Nash equilibria and show that-among the games we define-these can only be guaranteed to exist if each network node is required to be connected to all other nodes (we call this the STRONG CONNECTIVITY GAME). For a variation called CONNECTIVITY GAME, where each node is only required to be connected (possibly via intermediate nodes) to a given set of nodes, we show that Nash equilibria do not necessarily exist. We further study how to find Nash equilibria with incentive-compatible algorithms and compare the cost of Nash equilibria to the cost of a social optimum, which is a radius assignment that minimizes the total cost in a network where nodes cooperate. We also study variations of the games; one where nodes not only have to be connected, but k-connected, and one that we call the REACHABILITY GAME, where nodes have to reach as many other nodes as possible, while keeping costs low. We extend our study of the STRONG CONNECTIVITY GAME and the CONNECTIVITY GAME to wireless networks with directional antennas and wireline networks, where nodes need to choose neighbors to which they will pay a link. Our work is a first step towards game-theoretic analyses of topology control in wireless and wireline networks. Two mobile agents with range of vision 1 start at arbitrary points in the plane and have to accomplish the task of approach, which consists in getting at distance at most one from each other, i.e., in getting within each other's range of vision. An adversary chooses the initial positions of the agents, their possibly different starting times, and assigns a different positive integer label and a possibly different speed to each of them. Each agent is equipped with a compass showing the cardinal directions, with a measure of length and a clock. Each agent knows its label and speed but not those of the other agent and it does not know the initial position of the other agent relative to its own. Agents do not have any global system of coordinates and they cannot communicate. Our main result is a deterministic algorithm to accomplish the task of approach, working in time polynomial in the unknown initial distance between the agents, in the length of the smaller label and in the inverse of the larger speed. The distance travelled by each agent until approach is polynomial in the first two parameters and does not depend on the third. The problem of approach in the plane reduces to a network problem: that of rendezvous in an infinite grid. We study a capacitated symmetric network design game, where each of n agents wishes to construct a path from a network's source to its sink, and the cost of each edge is shared equally among the agents using it. The uncapacitated version of this problem has been introduced by (2003) and has been extensively studied. We find that the consideration of edge capacities entails a significant effect on the quality of the obtained Nash equilibria (NE), under both the utilitarian and the egalitarian objective functions, as well as on the convergence rate to an equilibrium. The following results are established. First, we provide bounds for the price of anarchy (PoA) and the price of stability (PoS) measures with respect to the utilitarian (i.e., sum of costs) and egalitarian (i.e., maximum cost) objective functions. Our main result here is that unlike the uncapacitated version, the network topology is a crucial factor in the quality of NE. Specifically, a network topology has a bounded PoA if and only if it is series-parallel (SP), i.e., a network that is built inductively by series compositions and parallel compositions of SP networks. Second, we show that the convergence rate of best-response dynamics (BRD) may take Ω(n1.5) steps. This is in contrast to the uncapacitated version, where convergence is guaranteed within at most n iterations. Greedy navigability is a central issue in the theory of networks. However, the exogenous nature of network models do not allow for describing how greedy routable-networks emerge in reality. In turn, network formation games focus on the very emergence proess, but the applied shortest-path based cost functions exclude navigational aspects. This paper takes a frst step towards incorporating both emergence (missing in algorithmic network models) and greedy navigability (missing in network formation games) into a single framework, and proposes the Greedy Network Formation Game. Our first contribution is the game definition, where we assume a hidden metric space underneath the network, and, instead of usual shortest path metric, we use the length of greedy paths as the measure of communiation cost between players. Our main finding is that greedy-routable small worlds do not emerge on constant dimensional Eulidean grids. This simply means that the emergence of topologies on which w eunderstood the priniples of greedy forwarding cannot be explained endogenously. We also present a very brief outlook on how the situation hanges in the hyperbolic space. We study network games in which each player wishes to connect his source and sink, and the cost of each edge is shared among its users either equally (in Fair Connection Games--FCG's) or arbitrarily (in General Connection Games--GCG's). We study the existence and quality of strong equilibria (SE)--strategy profiles from which no coalition can improve the cost of each of its members--in these settings. We show that SE always exist in the following games: (1) Single source and sink FCG's and GCG's. (2) Single source multiple sinks FCG's and GCG's on series parallel graphs. (3) Multi source and sink FCG's on extension parallel graphs. As for the quality of the SE, in any FCG with n players, the cost of any SE is bounded by H(n) (i.e., the harmonic sum), contrasted with the [Theta](n) price of anarchy. For any GCG, any SE is optimal. The field of convention emergence studies how agents involved in repeated coordination games can reach consensus through only local interactions. The literature on this topic is vast and is motivated by human societies, mainly addressing coordination problems between human agents, such as who gets to redial after a dropped telephone call. In contrast, real-world engineering problems, such as coordination in wireless sensor networks, involve agents with limited resources and knowledge and thus pose certain restrictions on the complexity of the coordination mechanisms. Due to these restrictions, strategies proposed for human coordination may not be suitable for engineering applications and need to be further explored in the context of real-world application domains. In this article we take the role of designers of large decentralized multi-agent systems. We investigate the factors that speed up the convergence process of agents arranged in different static and dynamic topologies and under different interaction models, typical for engineering applications. We also study coordination problems both under partial observability and in the presence of faults (or noise). The main contributions of this article are that we propose an approach for emergent coordination, motivated by highly constrained devices, such as wireless nodes and swarm bots, in the absence of a central entity and perform extensive theoretical and empirical studies. Our approach is called Win-Stay Lose-probabilistic-Shift, generalizing two well-known strategies in game theory that have been applied in other domains. We demonstrate that our approach performs well in different settings under limited information and imposes minimal system requirements, due to its simplicity. Moreover, our technique outperforms state-of-the-art coordination mechanisms, guarantees full convergence in any topology and has the property that all convention states are absorbing. We study rendezvous of two anonymous agents, where each agent knows its own initial position in the environment. Their task is to meet each other as quickly as possible. The time of the rendezvous is measured by the number of synchronous rounds that agents need to use in the worst case in order to meet. In each round, an agent may make a simple move or it may stay motionless. We consider two types of environments, finite or infinite graphs and Euclidean spaces. A simple move traverses a single edge (in a graph) or at most a unit distance (in Euclidean space). The rendezvous consists in visiting by both agents the same point of the environment simultaneously (in the same round). In this paper, we propose several asymptotically optimal rendezvous algorithms. In particular, we show that in the line and trees as well as in multidimensional Euclidean spaces and grids the agents can rendezvous in time O(d), where d is the distance between the initial positions of the agents. The problem of location-aware rendezvous was studied before in the asynchronous model for Euclidean spaces and multi-dimensional grids, where the emphasis was on the length of the adopted rendezvous trajectory. We point out that, contrary to the asynchronous case, where the cost of rendezvous is dominated by the size of potentially large neighborhoods, the agents are able to meet in all graphs of at most n nodes in time almost linear in d, namely, O(d log2 n). We also determine an infinite family of graphs in which synchronized rendezvous takes time Ω(d). We investigate a non-cooperative game-theoretic model for the formation of communication networks by selfish agents. Each agent aims for a central position at minimum cost for creating edges. In particular, the general model (, PODC'03) became popular for studying the structure of the Internet or social networks. Despite its significance, locality in this game was first studied only recently (Bil , SPAA'14), where a worst case locality model was presented, which came with a high efficiency loss in terms of quality of equilibria. Our main contribution is a new and more optimistic view on locality: agents are limited in their knowledge and actions to their local view ranges, but can probe different strategies and finally choose the best. We study the influence of our locality notion on the hardness of computing best responses, convergence to equilibria, and quality of equilibria. Moreover, we compare the strength of local versus non-local strategy-changes. Our results address the gap between the original model and the worst case locality variant. On the bright side, our efficiency results are in line with observations from the original model, yet we have a non-constant lower bound on the price of anarchy.