Let @math be a simple connected graph and @math an ordered subset of vertices. The metric representation of a vertex @math with respect to @math is the @math -vector @math , where @math represents the length of a shortest @math path in @math . The set @math is called a resolving set for @math if @math implies @math for every @math . The smallest cardinality of a resolving set is the metric dimension of @math . In this article we propose, to the best of our knowledge, a new problem in Graph Theory that resembles to the aforementioned metric dimension problem. We call @math a @math -antiresolving set if @math is the largest positive integer such that for every vertex @math there exist other @math different vertices @math with @math , , @math and @math have the same metric representation with respect to @math . The @math -metric antidimension of @math is the minimum cardinality among all the @math -antiresolving sets for @math . In this article, we introduce a novel privacy measure, named @math -anonymity and based on the @math -metric antidimension problem, aimed at evaluating the resistance of social graphs to active attacks. We, therefore, propose a true-biased algorithm for computing the @math -metric antidimension of random graphs. The success rate of our algorithm, according to empirical results, is above @math and @math when looking for a @math -antiresolving basis and a @math -antiresolving set respectively. We also investigate theoretical properties of the @math -antiresolving sets and the @math -metric antidimension of graphs. In particular, we focus on paths, cycles, complete bipartite graphs and trees.
Other types of active attacks exist. For instance, the maximal vertex coverage (MVC) attack consists in attacking a few nodes so as to delete as many edges of the network as possible. In this attack, the attacker tries to convince some users to leave the social network in order to reduce the number of residual social ties. Metrics to quantify the impact of MVC attacks have been studied in @cite_20 . MVC is not a privacy attack, though.
@cite_20
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Measuring the impact of network attack is an important issue in network science. In this paper, we study the impact of maximal vertex coverage (MVC) attack in large complex networks, where the attacker aims at deleting as many edges of the network as possible by attacking a small fraction of nodes. First, we present two metrics to measure the impact of MVC attack. To compute these metrics, we propose an efficient randomized greedy algorithm with near-optimal performance guarantee. Second, we generalize the MVC attack into an uncertain setting, in which a node is deleted by the attacker with a prior probability. We refer to the MVC attack under such uncertain environment as the probabilistic MVC attack. Based on the probabilistic MVC attack, we propose two adaptive metrics, and then present an adaptive greedy algorithm for calculating such metrics accurately and efficiently. Finally, we conduct extensive experiments on 20 real datasets. The results show that P2P and co-authorship networks are extremely robust under the MVC attack while both the online social networks and the Email communication networks exhibit vulnerability under the MVC attack. In addition, the results demonstrate the efficiency and effectiveness of the proposed algorithms for computing the proposed metrics. Serious concerns on privacy protection in social networks have been raised in recent years; however, research in this area is still in its infancy. The problem is challenging due to the diversity and complexity of graph data, on which an adversary can use many types of background knowledge to conduct an attack. One popular type of attacks as studied by pioneer work [2] is the use of embedding subgraphs. We follow this line of work and identify two realistic targets of attacks, namely, NodeInfo and LinkInfo. Our investigations show that k-isomorphism, or anonymization by forming k pairwise isomorphic subgraphs, is both sufficient and necessary for the protection. The problem is shown to be NP-hard. We devise a number of techniques to enhance the anonymization efficiency while retaining the data utility. A compound vertex ID mechanism is also introduced for privacy preservation over multiple data releases. The satisfactory performance on a number of real datasets, including HEP-Th, EUemail and LiveJournal, illustrates that the high symmetry of social networks is very helpful in mitigating the difficulty of the problem. Abstract We consider the max-vertex-cover (MVC) problem, i.e., find k vertices from an undirected and edge-weighted graph G =( V , E ), where | V |= n ⩾ k , such that the total edge weight covered by the k vertices is maximized. There is a 3 4-approximation algorithm for MVC, based on a linear programming relaxation. We show that the guaranteed ratio can be improved by a simple greedy algorithm for k >(3 4) n , and a simple randomized algorithm for k >(1 2) n . Furthermore, we study a semidefinite programming (SDP) relaxation based approximation algorithms for MVC. We show that, for a range of k , our SDP-based algorithm achieves the best performance guarantee among the four types of algorithms mentioned in this paper. Given a simple undirected graph @math and a positive integer @math , the maximum vertex coverage problem (MVC) is the problem of finding a set @math of @math vertices of @math such that the number of edges having at least one endpoint in @math is as large as possible. The problem is NP-hard even in bipartite graphs, as shown in two recent papers [N. Apollonio and B. Simeone, Discrete Appl. Math., 165 (2014), pp. 37--48; G. Joret and A. Vetta, Reducing the Rank of a Matroid, preprint, arXiv:1211.4853v1 [cs.DS], 2012]. By exploiting the structure of the fractional optimal solutions of a linear programming formulation for the maximum coverage problem, we provide a @math -approximation algorithm for the problem. The algorithm immediately extends to the weighted version of MVC. We study the response of complex networks subject to attacks on vertices and edges. Several existing complex network models as well as real-world networks of scientific collaborations and Internet traffic are numerically investigated, and the network performance is quantitatively measured by the average inverse geodesic length and the size of the largest connected subgraph. For each case of attacks on vertices and edges, four different attacking strategies are used: removals by the descending order of the degree and the betweenness centrality, calculated for either the initial network or the current network during the removal procedure. It is found that the removals by the recalculated degrees and betweenness centralities are often more harmful than the attack strategies based on the initial network, suggesting that the network structure changes as important vertices or edges are removed. Furthermore, the correlation between the betweenness centrality and the degree in complex networks is studied. This paper presents a tool for assessment of security attributes and vulnerabilities in computer networks. The tool generates attack graphs (Phillips and Swiler, 1998). Each node in the attack graph represents a possible attack state. Edges represent a change of state caused by a single action taken by the attacker or unwitting assistant, and are weighted by some metric (such as attacker effort or time to succeed). Generation of the attack graph requires algorithms that match information about attack requirements (specified in attack templates) to information about the network configuration and assumed attacker capabilities (attacker profile). The set of near-optimal shortest paths indicates the most exploitable components of the system configuration. This paper presents the status of the tool and discusses implementation issues, especially focusing on the data input needs and methods for eliminating redundant paths and nodes in the graph. We apply adjacency matrix clustering to network attack graphs for attack correlation, prediction, and hypothesizing. We self-multiply the clustered adjacency matrices to show attacker reachability across the network for a given number of attack steps, culminating in transitive closure for attack prediction over all possible number of steps. This reachability analysis provides a concise summary of the impact of network configuration changes on the attack graph. Using our framework, we also place intrusion alarms in the context of vulnerability-based attack graphs, so that false alarms become apparent and missed detections can be inferred. We introduce a graphical technique that shows multiple-step attacks by matching rows and columns of the clustered adjacency matrix. This allows attack impact responses to be identified and prioritized according to the number of attack steps to victim machines, and allows attack origins to be determined. Our techniques have quadratic complexity in the size of the attack graph Many complex systems can be described by networks, in which the constituent components are represented by vertices and the connections between the components are represented by edges between the corresponding vertices. A fundamental issue concerning complex networked systems is the robustness of the overall system to the failure of its constituent parts. Since the degree to which a networked system continues to function, as its component parts are degraded, typically depends on the integrity of the underlying network, the question of system robustness can be addressed by analyzing how the network structure changes as vertices are removed. Previous work has considered how the structure of complex networks change as vertices are removed uniformly at random, in decreasing order of their degree, or in decreasing order of their betweenness centrality. Here we extend these studies by investigating the effect on network structure of targeting vertices for removal based on a wider range of non-local measures of potential importance than simply degree or betweenness. We consider the effect of such targeted vertex removal on model networks with different degree distributions, clustering coefficients and assortativity coefficients, and for a variety of empirical networks. In this paper, we address the problem of agent loss in vehicle formations and sensor networks via two separate approaches: (1) perform a ‘self-repair’ operation in the event of agent loss to recover desirable information architecture properties or (2) introduce robustness into the information architecture a priori such that agent loss does not destroy desirable properties. We model the information architecture as a graph G(V, E), where V is a set of vertices representing the agents and E is a set of edges representing information flow amongst the agents. We focus on two properties of the graph called rigidity and global rigidity, which are required for formation shape maintenance and sensor network self-localization, respectively. For the self-repair approach, we show that while previous results permit local repair involving only neighbours of the lost agent, the repair cannot always be implemented using only local information. We present new results that can be applied to make the local repair using only local information. We describe implementation and illustrate with algorithms and examples. For the robustness approach, we investigate the structure of graphs with the property that rigidity or global rigidity is preserved after removing any single vertex (we call the property as 2-vertex-rigidity or 2-vertex-global-rigidity, respectively). Information architectures with such properties would allow formation shape maintenance or self-localization to be performed even in the event of agent failure. We review a characterization of a class of 2-vertex-rigidity and develop a separate class, making significant strides towards a complete characterization. We also present a characterization of a class of 2-vertex-global-rigidity. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. This paper presents a graph-based approach to network vulnerability analysis. The method is flexible, allowing analysis of attacks from both outside and inside the network. It can analyze risks to a specific network asset, or examine the universe of possible consequences following a successful attack. The graph-based tool can identify the set of attack paths that have a high probability of success (or a low effort cost) for the attacker. The system could be used to test the effectiveness of making configuration changes, implementing an intrusion detection system, etc. The analysis system requires as input a database of common attacks, broken into atomic steps, specific network configuration and topology information, and an attacker profile. The attack information is matched with the network configuration information and an attacker profile to create a superset attack graph. Nodes identify a stage of attack, for example the class of machines the attacker has accessed and the user privilege level he or she has compromised. The arcs in the attack graph represent attacks or stages of attacks. By assigning probabilities of success on the arcs or costs representing level-of-effort for the attacker, various graph algorithms such as shortest-path algorithms can identify the attack paths with the highest probability of success. Even well administered networks are vulnerable to attack. Recent work in network security has focused on the fact that combinations of exploits are the typical means by which an attacker breaks into a network. Researchers have proposed a variety of graph-based algorithms to generate attack trees (or graphs). Either structure represents all possible sequences of exploits, where any given exploit can take advantage of the penetration achieved by prior exploits in its chain, and the final exploit in the chain achieves the attacker's goal. The most recent approach in this line of work uses a modified version of the model checker NuSMV as a powerful inference engine for chaining together network exploits, compactly representing attack graphs, and identifying minimal sets of exploits. However, it is also well known that model checkers suffer from scalability problems, and there is good reason to doubt whether a model checker can handle directly a realistic set of exploits for even a modest-sized network. In this paper, we revisit the idea of attack graphs themselves, and argue that they represent more information explicitly than is necessary for the analyst. Instead, we propose a more compact and scalable representation. Although we show that it is possible to produce attack trees from our representation, we argue that more useful information can be produced, for larger networks, while bypassing the attack tree step. Our approach relies on an explicit assumption of monotonicity, which, in essence, states that the precondition of a given exploit is never invalidated by the successful application of another exploit. In other words, the attacker never needs to backtrack. The assumption reduces the complexity of the analysis problem from exponential to polynomial, thereby bringing even very large networks within reach of analysis An attack graph is a succinct representation of all paths through a system that end in a state where an intruder has successfully achieved his goal. Today Red Teams determine the vulnerability of networked systems by drawing gigantic attack graphs by hand. Constructing attack graphs by hand is tedious, error-prone, and impractical for large systems. By viewing an attack as a violation of a safety property, we can use off-the-shelf model checking technology to produce attack graphs automatically: a successful path from the intruder's viewpoint is a counterexample produced by the model checker In this paper we present an algorithm for generating attack graphs using model checking as a subroutine. Security analysts use attack graphs for detection, defense and forensics. In this paper we present a minimization analysis technique that allows analysts to decide which minimal set of security measures would guarantee the safety of the system. We provide a formal characterization of this problem: we prove that it is polynomially equivalent to the minimum hitting set problem and we present a greedy algorithm with provable bounds. We also present a reliability analysis technique that allows analysts to perform a simple cost-benefit trade-off depending on the likelihoods of attacks. By interpreting attack graphs as Markov Decision Processes we can use the value iteration algorithm to compute the probabilities of intruder success for each attack the graph. Security models, such as an attack graph (AG), are widely adopted to assess the security of networked systems, such as utilizing various security metrics and providing a cost-effective network hardening solution. There are various methods of generating these models, but the scalability problem exists for single-layered graph-based security models when analyzing all possible attack paths. To address this problem, we propose to use a multi-layer hierarchical attack representation model (HARM) that models various components in the networked system in different layers to reduce the computational complexity. First, we formulate key questions that need to be answered to assess the scalability of security models. Second, we formally define the multi-layer HARM. Last, we conduct experiments to show the scalability of security models. Our experimental results show that using the HARM can improve the scalability of assessing the security of the networked system significantly in comparison to the single-layered security models in various network scenarios. Cyber security is one of the most significant technical challenges in current times. Detecting adversarial activities, prevention of theft of intellectual properties and customer data is a high priority for corporations and government agencies around the world. Cyber defenders need to analyze massive-scale, high-resolution network flows to identify, categorize, and mitigate attacks involving networks spanning institutional and national boundaries. Many of the cyber attacks can be described as subgraph patterns, with prominent examples being insider infiltrations (path queries), denial of service (parallel paths) and malicious spreads (tree queries). This motivates us to explore subgraph matching on streaming graphs in a continuous setting. The novelty of our work lies in using the subgraph distributional statistics collected from the streaming graph to determine the query processingstrategy. Weintroducea“Lazy Search"algorithmwhere the search strategy is decided on a vertex-to-vertex basis depending on the likelihood of a match in the vertex neighborhood. We also propose a metric named “Relative Selectivity" that is used to select between different query processing strategies. Our experiments performed on real online news, network traffic stream and a synthetic social network benchmark demonstrate 10-100x speedups over selectivity agnostic approaches. Motivated by a strongly growing interest in anonymizing social network data, we investigate the NP-hard Degree Anonymization problem: given an undirected graph, the task is to add a minimum number of edges such that the graph becomes k-anonymous. That is, for each vertex there have to be at least k-1 other vertices of exactly the same degree. The model of degree anonymization has been introduced by Liu and Terzi [ACM SIGMOD'08], who also proposed and evaluated a two-phase heuristic. We present an enhancement of this heuristic, including new algorithms for each phase which significantly improve on the previously known theoretical and practical running times. Moreover, our algorithms are optimized for large-scale social networks and provide upper and lower bounds for the optimal solution. Notably, on about 26 of the real-world data we provide (provably) optimal solutions; whereas in the other cases our upper bounds significantly improve on known heuristic solutions. A new characteristic (residual closeness) which can measure the network resistance is presented. It evaluates closeness after removal of vertices or links, hence two types are considered—vertices and links residual closeness. This characteristic is more sensitive than the well-known measures of vulnerability—it captures the result of actions even if they are small enough not to disconnect the graph. A definition for closeness is modified so it still can be used for unconnected graphs but the calculations are easier. Complex networks with a heterogeneous distribution of loads may undergo a global cascade of overload failures when highly loaded nodes or edges are removed due to attacks or failures. Since a small attack or failure has the potential to trigger a global cascade, a fundamental question regards the possible strategies of defense to prevent the cascade from propagating through the entire network. Here we introduce and investigate a costless strategy of defense based on a selective further removal of nodes and edges, right after the initial attack or failure. This intentional removal of network elements is shown to drastically reduce the size of the cascade. In this paper, we consider the problem of maximizing the spread of influence through a social network. Given a graph with a threshold value thr(v) attached to each vertex v, the spread of influence is modeled as follows: A vertex v becomes ''active'' (influenced) if at least thr(v) of its neighbors are active. In the corresponding optimization problem the objective is then to find a fixed number k of vertices to activate such that the number of activated vertices at the end of the propagation process is maximum. We show that this problem is strongly inapproximable in time f(k)@?n^O^(^1^), for some function f, even for very restrictive thresholds. In the case that the threshold of each vertex equals its degree, we prove that the problem is inapproximable in polynomial time and it becomes r(n)-approximable in time f(k)@?n^O^(^1^), for some function f, for any strictly increasing function r. Moreover, we show that the decision version parameterized by k is W[1]-hard but becomes fixed-parameter tractable on bounded degree graphs. Attack graphs are important tools for analyzing security vulnerabilities in enterprise networks. Previous work on attack graphs has not provided an account of the scalability of the graph generating process, and there is often a lack of logical formalism in the representation of attack graphs, which results in the attack graph being difficult to use and understand by human beings. Pioneer work by Sheyner, et al is the first attack-graph tool based on formal logical techniques, namely model-checking. However, when applied to moderate-sized networks, Sheyner's tool encountered a significant exponential explosion problem. This paper describes a new approach to represent and generate attack graphs. We propose logical attack graphs, which directly illustrate logical dependencies among attack goals and configuration information. A logical attack graph always has size polynomial to the network being analyzed. Our attack graph generation tool builds upon MulVAL, a network security analyzer based on logical programming. We demonstrate how to produce a derivation trace in the MulVAL logic-programming engine, and how to use the trace to generate a logical attack graph in quadratic time. We show experimental evidence that our logical attack graph generation algorithm is very efficient. We have generated logical attack graphs for fully connected networks of 1000 machines using a Pentium 4 CPU with 1GB of RAM. We study the vulnerability of complex networks under intentional attack with incomplete information, which means that one can only preferentially attack the most important nodes among a local region of a network. The known random failure and the intentional attack are two extreme cases of our study. Using the generating function method, we derive the exact value of the critical removal fraction fc of nodes for the disintegration of networks and the size of the giant component. To validate our model and method, we perform simulations of intentional attack with incomplete information in scale-free networks. We show that the attack information has an important effect on the vulnerability of scale-free networks. We also demonstrate that hiding a fraction of the nodes information is a cost-efficient strategy for enhancing the robustness of complex networks.