Knowing the reflection of game theory and ethics, we develop a mathematical representation to bridge the gap between the concepts in moral philosophy (e.g., Kantian and Utilitarian) and AI ethics industry technology standard (e.g., IEEE P7000 standard series for Ethical AI). As an application, we demonstrate how human value can be obtained from the experimental game theory (e.g., trust game experiment) so as to build an ethical AI. Moreover, an approach to test the ethics (rightness or wrongness) of a given AI algorithm by using an iterated Prisoner's Dilemma Game experiment is discussed as an example. Compared with existing mathematical frameworks and testing method on AI ethics technology, the advantages of the proposed approach are analyzed.
For the technology of taking human value from experiment practically, we have illustrated an approach to take the human value (trust and trustworthy) from human subjects experiment. These parameters can be transit to AI in similar non-cooperation game condition, avoiding AI to be too tough. Though it is well known that there exists the human value(e.g., fairness, justices) in the experimental game theory @cite_0 @cite_21 @cite_4 , our approach is the first to take the human value quantitatively as AI ethics controlling parameter for AI design.
@cite_0 @cite_21 @cite_4
2337798556 2127508398 2765782498 938188971 1948149164 1967445478 378366556 2604175534 2738456714 2119249434 2181918151 1986761989 2902208421 2788842311 2963689090 2912501354 64088143 2099720195 2950959228 2767437859
We propose a hybrid model for automatically acquiring a policy for a complex game, which combines online learning with mining knowledge from a corpus of human game play. Our hypothesis is that a player that learns its policies by combining (online) exploration with biases towards human behaviour that's attested in a corpus of humans playing the game will outperform any agent that uses only one of the knowledge sources. During game play, the agent extracts similar moves made by players in the corpus in similar situations, and approximates their utility alongside other possible options by performing simulations from its current state. We implement and assess our model in an agent playing the complex win-lose board game Settlers of Catan, which lacks an implementation that would challenge a human expert. The results from the preliminary set of experiments illustrate the potential of such a joint model. We consider a task of scheduling with a common deadline on a single machine. Every player reports to a scheduler the length of his job and the scheduler needs to finish as many jobs as possible by the deadline. For this simple problem, there is a truthful mechanism that achieves maximum welfare in dominant strategies. The new aspect of our work is that in our setting players are uncertain about their own job lengths, and hence are incapable of providing truthful reports (in the strict sense of the word). For a probabilistic model for uncertainty we show that even with relatively little uncertainty, no mechanism can guarantee a constant fraction of the maximum welfare. To remedy this situation, we introduce a new measure of economic efficiency, based on a notion of a fair share of a player, and design mechanisms that are Ω(1)-fair. In addition to its intrinsic appeal, our notion of fairness implies good approximation of maximum welfare in several cases of interest. In our mechanisms the machine is sometimes left idle even though there are jobs that want to use it. We show that this unfavorable aspect is unavoidable, unless one gives up other favorable aspects (e.g., give up Ω(1)-fairness). We also consider a qualitative approach to uncertainty as an alternative to the probabilistic quantitative model. In the qualitative approach we break away from solution concepts such as dominant strategies (they are no longer well defined), and instead suggest an axiomatic approach, which amounts to listing desirable properties for mechanisms. We provide a mechanism that satisfies these properties. Cooperative games with partial observability are a challenging domain for AI research, especially when the AI should cooperate with a human player. In this paper we investigate one such game, the award-winning card game Hanabi, which has been studied by other researchers before. We present an agent designed to play better with a human cooperator than these previous results by basing it on communication theory and psychology research. To demonstrate that our agent performs better with a human cooperator we ran an experiment in which 224 participants played one or more games of Hanabi with different AIs, and will show that our AI scores higher than previously published work in such a setting. There is a long history in game theory on the topic of Bayesian or "rational" learning, in which each player maintains beliefs over a set of alternative behaviours, or types, for the other players. This idea has gained increasing interest in the artificial intelligence (AI) community, where it is used as a method to control a single agent in a system composed of multiple agents with unknown behaviours. The idea is to hypothesise a set of types, each specifying a possible behaviour for the other agents, and to plan our own actions with respect to those types which we believe are most likely, given the observed actions of the agents. The game theory literature studies this idea primarily in the context of equilibrium attainment. In contrast, many AI applications have a focus on task completion and payoff maximisation. With this perspective in mind, we identify and address a spectrum of questions pertaining to belief and truth in hypothesised types. We formulate three basic ways to incorporate evidence into posterior beliefs and show when the resulting beliefs are correct, and when they may fail to be correct. Moreover, we demonstrate that prior beliefs can have a significant impact on our ability to maximise payoffs in the long-term, and that they can be computed automatically with consistent performance effects. Furthermore, we analyse the conditions under which we are able complete our task optimally, despite inaccuracies in the hypothesised types. Finally, we show how the correctness of hypothesised types can be ascertained during the interaction via an automated statistical analysis. Studies in experimental economics have consistently demonstrated that Nash equilibrium is a poor description of human players' behavior in unrepeated normal-form games. Behavioral game theory offers alternative models that more accurately describe human behavior in these settings. These models typically depend upon the values of exogenous parameters, which are estimated based on experimental data. We describe methods for deriving and analyzing the posterior distributions over the parameters of such models, and apply these techniques to study two popular models (Poisson-CH and QLk), the latter of which we previously showed to be the best-performing existing model in a comparison of four widely-studied behavioral models [22]. Drawing on a large set of publicly available experimental data, we derive concrete recommendations for the parameters that should be used with Poisson-CH, contradicting previous recommendations in the literature. We also uncover anomalies in QLk that lead us to develop a new, simpler, and better-performing family of models. In this paper, we want to introduce experimental economics to the field of data mining and vice versa. It continues related work on mining deterministic behavior rules of human subjects in data gathered from experiments. Game-theoretic predictions partially fail to work with this data. Equilibria also known as game-theoretic predictions solely succeed with experienced subjects in specific games - conditions, which are rarely given. Contemporary experimental economics offers a number of alternative models apart from game theory. In relevant literature, these models are always biased by philosophical plausibility considerations and are claimed to fit the data. An agnostic data mining approach to the problem is introduced in this paper - the philosophical plausibility considerations follow after the correlations are found. No other biases are regarded apart from determinism. The dataset of the paper Social Learning in Networks" by 2012 is taken for evaluation. As a result, we come up with new findings. As future work, the design of a new infrastructure is discussed. Recent deployments of Stackelberg security games (SSG) have led to two competing approaches to handle boundedly rational human adversaries: (1) integrating models of human (adversary) decision-making into the game-theoretic algorithms, and (2) applying robust optimization techniques that avoid adversary modeling. A recent algorithm (MATCH) based on the second approach was shown to outperform the leading modeling-based algorithm even in the presence of significant amount of data. Is there then any value in using human behavior models in solving SSGs? Through extensive experiments with 547 human subjects playing 11102 games in total, we emphatically answer the question in the affirmative, while providing the following key contributions: (i) we show that our algorithm, SU-BRQR, based on a novel integration of human behavior model with the subjective utility function, significantly outperforms both MATCH and its improvements; (ii) we are the first to present experimental results with security intelligence experts, and find that even though the experts are more rational than the Amazon Turk workers, SU-BRQR still outperforms an approach assuming perfect rationality (and to a more limited extent MATCH); (iii) we show the advantage of SU-BRQR in a new, large game setting and demonstrate that sufficient data enables it to improve its performance over MATCH. Since Alan Turing envisioned artificial intelligence, technical progress has often been measured by the ability to defeat humans in zero-sum encounters (e.g., Chess, Poker, or Go). Less attention has been given to scenarios in which human–machine cooperation is beneficial but non-trivial, such as scenarios in which human and machine preferences are neither fully aligned nor fully in conflict. Cooperation does not require sheer computational power, but instead is facilitated by intuition, cultural norms, emotions, signals, and pre-evolved dispositions. Here, we develop an algorithm that combines a state-of-the-art reinforcement-learning algorithm with mechanisms for signaling. We show that this algorithm can cooperate with people and other algorithms at levels that rival human cooperation in a variety of two-player repeated stochastic games. These results indicate that general human–machine cooperation is achievable using a non-trivial, but ultimately simple, set of algorithmic mechanisms. When it is ethical and legal to use a sensitive attribute (such as gender or race) in machine learning systems, the question remains how to do so. We show that the naive application of machine learning algorithms using sensitive features leads to an inherent tradeoff in accuracy between groups. We provide a simple and efficient decoupling technique, that can be added on top of any black-box machine learning algorithm, to learn different classifiers for different groups. Transfer learning is used to mitigate the problem of having too little data on any one group. The method can apply to a range of fairness criteria. In particular, we require the application designer to specify as joint loss function that makes explicit the trade-off between fairness and accuracy. Our reduction is shown to efficiently find the minimum loss as long as the objective has a certain natural monotonicity property which may be of independent interest in the study of fairness in algorithms. How do we build multiagent algorithms for agent interactions with human adversaries? Stackelberg games are natural models for many important applications that involve human interaction, such as oligopolistic markets and security domains. In Stackelberg games, one player, the leader, commits to a strategy and the follower makes their decision with knowledge of the leader's commitment. Existing algorithms for Stackelberg games efficiently find optimal solutions (leader strategy), but they critically assume that the follower plays optimally. Unfortunately, in real-world applications, agents face human followers (adversaries) who --- because of their bounded rationality and limited observation of the leader strategy --- may deviate from their expected optimal response. Not taking into account these likely deviations when dealing with human adversaries can cause an unacceptable degradation in the leader's reward, particularly in security applications where these algorithms have seen real-world deployment. To address this crucial problem, this paper introduces three new mixed-integer linear programs (MILPs) for Stackelberg games to consider human adversaries, incorporating: (i) novel anchoring theories on human perception of probability distributions and (ii) robustness approaches for MILPs to address human imprecision. Since these new approaches consider human adversaries, traditional proofs of correctness or optimality are insufficient; instead, it is necessary to rely on empirical validation. To that end, this paper considers two settings based on real deployed security systems, and compares 6 different approaches (three new with three previous approaches), in 4 different observability conditions, involving 98 human subjects playing 1360 games in total. The final conclusion was that a model which incorporates both the ideas of robustness and anchoring achieves statistically significant better rewards and also maintains equivalent or faster solution speeds compared to existing approaches. This thesis investigates risk-sensitive sequential decision-making problems in an uncertain environment. We rst introduce the axiomatic concept of valuation functions that generalize known concepts of risk measures in mathematical nance to cover most of the existing risk related models in various elds, in particular, behavioral economics and cognitive neuroscience. By applying this concept to Markov processes, we construct valuation maps and develop thereby a uni ed framework for incorporating risk into Markov decision processes on general spaces. Within the framework, we study mainly two types of in nite-horizon risk-sensitive criteria, discounted and average valuations, and solve the associated optimization problems by value iteration. For the discounted case, we propose a new discount scheme, which is di erent from the conventional form but consistent with existing literature, while for the average criterion, we state Lyapunov-type stability conditions that generalize known conditions for Markov chains to ensure the existence of solutions to the optimality equation and a geometric convergence rate for the value iteration. Applying a set of valuation functions, called utility-based shortfall, we derive a family of model-free risk-sensitive reinforcement learning algorithms for solving the optimization problems corresponding to risk-sensitive valuations. In addition, we nd that when appropriate utility functions are chosen, agents’ behaviors express key features of human behavior as predicted by prospect theory, for example, di erent risk preferences for gains and losses, as well as the shape of subjective probability curves. As a proof of principle for the applicability of the new algorithms, we apply them to two tasks, 1) to quantify human behavior in a sequential investment task and 2) to perform risk control in simulated algorithmic trading of stocks. In the rst task, the risk-sensitive variant provides a signi cantly better t to the behavioral data and it leads to an interpretation of the subject’s responses which is indeed consistent with prospect theory. The analysis of simultaneously measured fMRI signals show a signi cant correlation of the risk-sensitive temporal di erence error with BOLD signal change in the ventral striatum. In the second task, our algorithm outperforms the risk-neutral reinforcement learning algorithm by keeping the trading cost at a substantially low level at the spot when the 2010 Flash Crash happened, and signi cantly reducing the risk over the whole test period. We study the design of truthful mechanisms that do not use payments for the generalized assignment problem (GAP) and its variants. An instance of the GAP consists of a bipartite graph with jobs on one side and machines on the other. Machines have capacities and edges have values and sizes; the goal is to construct a welfare maximizing feasible assignment. In our model of private valuations, motivated by impossibility results, the value and sizes on all job-machine pairs are public information; however, whether an edge exists or not in the bipartite graph is a job's private information. That is, the selfish agents in our model are the jobs, and their private information is their edge set. We want to design mechanisms that are truthful without money (henceforth strategyproof), and produce assignments whose welfare is a good approximation to the optimal omniscient welfare. We study several variants of the GAP starting with matching. For the unweighted version, we give an optimal strategyproof mechanism. For maximum weight bipartite matching, we show that no strategyproof mechanism, deterministic or randomized, can be optimal, and present a 2-approximate strategyproof mechanism along with a matching lowerbound. Next we study knapsack-like problems, which, unlike matching, are NP-hard. For these problems, we develop a general LP-based technique that extends the ideas of Lavi and Swamy [14] to reduce designing a truthful approximate mechanism without money to designing such a mechanism for the fractional version of the problem. We design strategyproof approximate mechanisms for the fractional relaxations of multiple knapsack, size-invariant GAP, and value-invariant GAP, and use this technique to obtain, respectively, 2, 4 and 4-approximate strategyproof mechanisms for these problems. We then design an O(log n)-approximate strategyproof mechanism for the GAP by reducing, with logarithmic loss in the approximation, to our solution for the value-invariant GAP. Our technique may be of independent interest for designing truthful mechanisms without money for other LP-based problems. Motivated by settings in which predictive models may be required to be non-discriminatory with respect to certain attributes (such as race), but even collecting the sensitive attribute may be forbidden or restricted, we initiate the study of fair learning under the constraint of differential privacy. We design two learning algorithms that simultaneously promise differential privacy and equalized odds, a 'fairness' condition that corresponds to equalizing false positive and negative rates across protected groups. Our first algorithm is a private implementation of the equalized odds post-processing approach of [, 2016]. This algorithm is appealingly simple, but must be able to use protected group membership explicitly at test time, which can be viewed as a form of 'disparate treatment'. Our second algorithm is a differentially private version of the oracle-efficient in-processing approach of [, 2018] that can be used to find the optimal fair classifier, given access to a subroutine that can solve the original (not necessarily fair) learning problem. This algorithm is more complex but need not have access to protected group membership at test time. We identify new tradeoffs between fairness, accuracy, and privacy that emerge only when requiring all three properties, and show that these tradeoffs can be milder if group membership may be used at test time. We conclude with a brief experimental evaluation. We consider the problem of online learning in the linear contextual bandits setting, but in which there are also strong individual fairness constraints governed by an unknown similarity metric. These constraints demand that we select similar actions or individuals with approximately equal probability (arXiv:1104.3913), which may be at odds with optimizing reward, thus modeling settings where profit and social policy are in tension. We assume we learn about an unknown Mahalanobis similarity metric from only weak feedback that identifies fairness violations, but does not quantify their extent. This is intended to represent the interventions of a regulator who "knows unfairness when he sees it" but nevertheless cannot enunciate a quantitative fairness metric over individuals. Our main result is an algorithm in the adversarial context setting that has a number of fairness violations that depends only logarithmically on @math , while obtaining an optimal @math regret bound to the best fair policy. Humanity faces numerous problems of common-pool resource appropriation. This class of multi-agent social dilemma includes the problems of ensuring sustainable use of fresh water, common fisheries, grazing pastures, and irrigation systems. Abstract models of common-pool resource appropriation based on non-cooperative game theory predict that self-interested agents will generally fail to find socially positive equilibria---a phenomenon called the tragedy of the commons. However, in reality, human societies are sometimes able to discover and implement stable cooperative solutions. Decades of behavioral game theory research have sought to uncover aspects of human behavior that make this possible. Most of that work was based on laboratory experiments where participants only make a single choice: how much to appropriate. Recognizing the importance of spatial and temporal resource dynamics, a recent trend has been toward experiments in more complex real-time video game-like environments. However, standard methods of non-cooperative game theory can no longer be used to generate predictions for this case. Here we show that deep reinforcement learning can be used instead. To that end, we study the emergent behavior of groups of independently learning agents in a partially observed Markov game modeling common-pool resource appropriation. Our experiments highlight the importance of trial-and-error learning in common-pool resource appropriation and shed light on the relationship between exclusion, sustainability, and inequality. We tackle the problem of algorithmic fairness, where the goal is to avoid the unfairly influence of sensitive information, in the general context of regression with possible continuous sensitive attributes. We extend the framework of fair empirical risk minimization to this general scenario, covering in this way the whole standard supervised learning setting. Our generalized fairness measure reduces to well known notions of fairness available in literature. We derive learning guarantees for our method, that imply in particular its statistical consistency, both in terms of the risk and the fairness measure. We then specialize our approach to kernel methods and propose a convex fair estimator in that setting. We test the estimator on a commonly used benchmark dataset (Communities and Crime) and on a new dataset collected at the University of Genova, containing the information of the academic career of five thousand students. The latter dataset provides a challenging real case scenario of unfair behaviour of standard regression methods that benefits from our methodology. The experimental results show that our estimator is effective at mitigating the trade-off between accuracy and fairness requirements. Predicting human behavior from a small amount of training examples is a challenging machine learning problem. In this thesis, we introduce the principle of maximum causal entropy, a general technique for applying information theory to decision-theoretic, game-theoretic, and control settings where relevant information is sequentially revealed over time. This approach guarantees decision-theoretic performance by matching purposeful measures of behavior (Abbeel & Ng, 2004), and or enforces game-theoretic rationality constraints (Aumann, 1974), while otherwise being as uncertain as possible, which minimizes worst-case predictive log-loss (Grunwald & Dawid, 2003). We derive probabilistic models for decision, control, and multi-player game settings using this approach. We then develop corresponding algorithms for efficient inference that include relaxations of the Bellman equation (Bellman, 1957), and simple learning algorithms based on convex optimization. We apply the models and algorithms to a number of behavior prediction tasks. Specifically, we present empirical evaluations of the approach in the domains of vehicle route preference modeling using over 100,000 miles of collected taxi driving data, pedestrian motion modeling from weeks of indoor movement data, and robust prediction of game play in stochastic multi-player games. Game theoretic models have found widespread use in the analysis and design of radio resource management algorithms for a wide variety of systems such as cellular, ad hoc and sensor networks. The fundamental principle behind such models and much of game theory has been the reliance on expected utility theory (EUT). In this paper, we consider a simple wireless random access game where instead of following the precepts of EUT, the players follow the precepts of Prospect Theory (PT), a theory developed by Kahneman and Tversky to explain real-life decision making that often deviates from the behavior expected under EUT. Specifically, we consider a game where selfish players adjust their transmission probabilities over a collision channel according to rewards received for successful transmission while incurring energy and delay costs. We compare and contrast the Nash equilibria achieved under both EUT and PT and highlight the differences in them. Users like sharing personal photos with others through social media. At the same time, they might want to make automatic identification in such photos difficult or even impossible. Classic obfuscation methods such as blurring are not only unpleasant but also not as effective as one would expect. Recent studies on adversarial image perturbations (AIP) suggest that it is possible to confuse recognition systems effectively without unpleasant artifacts. However, in the presence of counter measures against AIPs, it is unclear how effective AIP would be in particular when the choice of counter measure is unknown. Game theory provides tools for studying the interaction between agents with uncertainties in the strategies. We introduce a general game theoretical framework for the user-recogniser dynamics, and present a case study that involves current state of the art AIP and person recognition techniques. We derive the optimal strategy for the user that assures an upper bound on the recognition rate independent of the recogniser's counter measure. Code is available at this https URL. Equipping machine learning models with ethical and legal constraints is a serious issue; without this, the future of machine learning is at risk. This paper takes a step forward in this direction and focuses on ensuring machine learning models deliver fair decisions. In legal scholarships, the notion of fairness itself is evolving and multi-faceted. We set an overarching goal to develop a unified machine learning framework that is able to handle any definitions of fairness, their combinations, and also new definitions that might be stipulated in the future. To achieve our goal, we recycle two well-established machine learning techniques, privileged learning and distribution matching, and harmonize them for satisfying multi-faceted fairness definitions. We consider protected characteristics such as race and gender as privileged information that is available at training but not at test time; this accelerates model training and delivers fairness through unawareness. Further, we cast demographic parity, equalized odds, and equality of opportunity as a classical two-sample problem of conditional distributions, which can be solved in a general form by using distance measures in Hilbert Space. We show several existing models are special cases of ours. Finally, we advocate returning the Pareto frontier of multi-objective minimization of error and unfairness in predictions. This will facilitate decision makers to select an operating point and to be accountable for it.