We design an expected polynomial-time, truthful-in-expectation, (1-1 e)-approximation mechanism for welfare maximization in a fundamental class of combinatorial auctions. Our results apply to bidders with valuations that are m matroid rank sums (MRS), which encompass most concrete examples of submodular functions studied in this context, including coverage functions, matroid weighted-rank functions, and convex combinations thereof. Our approximation factor is the best possible, even for known and explicitly given coverage valuations, assuming P != NP. Ours is the first truthful-in-expectation and polynomial-time mechanism to achieve a constant-factor approximation for an NP-hard welfare maximization problem in combinatorial auctions with heterogeneous goods and restricted valuations. Our mechanism is an instantiation of a new framework for designing approximation mechanisms based on randomized rounding algorithms. A typical such algorithm first optimizes over a fractional relaxation of the original problem, and then randomly rounds the fractional solution to an integral one. With rare exceptions, such algorithms cannot be converted into truthful mechanisms. The high-level idea of our mechanism design framework is to optimize directly over the (random) output of the rounding algorithm, rather than over the input to the rounding algorithm. This approach leads to truthful-in-expectation mechanisms, and these mechanisms can be implemented efficiently when the corresponding objective function is concave. For bidders with MRS valuations, we give a novel randomized rounding algorithm that leads to both a concave objective function and a (1-1 e)-approximation of the optimal welfare.
The aforementioned works @cite_15 @cite_9 are precursors to our general design framework that optimizes directly over the output of a randomized rounding algorithm. In the framework of Lavi and Swamy @cite_9 , the input to and output of the rounding algorithm are assumed to coincide up to a scaling factor, so optimizing over its input (as they do) is equivalent to optimizing over its output (as we do). In the result of @cite_15 , optimizing with respect to their proxy bidders'' is equivalent to optimizing over the output of a particular randomized rounding algorithm.
@cite_9 @cite_15
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We design an expected polynomial time, truthful in expectation, (1-1 e)-approximation mechanism for welfare maximization in a fundamental class of combinatorial auctions. Our results apply to bidders with valuations that are matroid rank sums (MRS), which encompass most concrete examples of submodular functions studied in this context, including coverage functions and matroid weighted-rank functions. Our approximation factor is the best possible, even for known and explicitly given coverage valuations, assuming P ≠ NP. Ours is the first truthful-in-expectation and polynomial-time mechanism to achieve a constant-factor approximation for an NP-hard welfare maximization problem in combinatorial auctions with heterogeneous goods and restricted valuations. Our mechanism is an instantiation of a new framework for designing approximation mechanisms based on randomized rounding algorithms. A typical such algorithm first optimizes over a fractional relaxation of the original problem, and then randomly rounds the fractional solution to an integral one. With rare exceptions, such algorithms cannot be converted into truthful mechanisms. The high-level idea of our mechanism design framework is to optimize directly over the (random) output of the rounding algorithm, rather than over the input to the rounding algorithm. This approach leads to truthful-in-expectation mechanisms, and these mechanisms can be implemented efficiently when the corresponding objective function is concave. For bidders with MRS valuations, we give a novel randomized rounding algorithm that leads to both a concave objective function and a (1-1 e)-approximation of the optimal welfare. We study a generic framework that provides a unified view on two important classes of problems: (i) extensions of the k-median problem where clients are interested in having multiple facilities in their vicinity (e.g., due to the fact that, with some small probability, the closest facility might be malfunctioning and so might not be available for using), and (ii) finding winners according to some appealing multiwinner election rules, i.e., election system aimed for choosing representatives bodies, such as parliaments, based on preferences of a population of voters over individual candidates. Each problem in our framework is associated with a vector of weights: we show that the approximability of the problem depends on structural properties of these vectors. We specifically focus on the harmonic sequence of weights for which the objective function interpreted in a multiwinner election setup reflects to the well-known Proportional Approval Voting (PAV) rule. Our main result is that, due to the specific (harmonic) structure of weights, the problem allows constant factor approximation. This is surprising since the problem can be interpreted as a variant of the k-median problem where we do not assume that the connection costs satisfy the triangle inequality. The algorithm we propose is based on dependent rounding [Srinivasan, FOCS'01] applied to the solution of a natural LP-relaxation of the problem. The rounding process is well known to produce distributions over integral solutions satisfying Negative Correlation (NC), which is usually sufficient for the analysis of approximation guarantees offered by rounding procedures. In our analysis, however, we need to use the fact that the carefully implemented rounding process satisfies a stronger property, called Negative Association (NA), which allows us to apply standard concentration bounds for conditional random variables. The Lova´sz local lemma due to Erdods and Lova´sz (Infinite and Finite Sets, Colloq. Math. Soc. J. Bolyai 11, 1975, pp. 609-627) is a powerful tool in proving the existence of rare events. We present an extension of this lemma, which works well when the event to be shown to exist is a conjunction of individual events, each of which asserts that a random variable does not deviate much from its mean. As applications, we consider two classes of NP-hard integer programs: minimax and covering integer programs. A key technique, randomized rounding of linear relaxations, was developed by Raghavan and Thompson (Combinatorica, 7 (1987), pp. 365-374) to derive good approximation algorithms for such problems. We use our extension of the local lemma to prove that randomized rounding produces, with nonzero probability, much better feasible solutions than known before, if the constraint matrices of these integer programs are column-sparse (e.g., routing using short paths, problems on hypergraphs with small dimension degree). This complements certain well-known results from discrepancy theory. We also generalize the method of pessimistic estimators due to Raghavan (J. Comput. System Sci., 37 (1988), pp. 130-143), to obtain constructive (algorithmic) versions of our results for covering integer programs. Several important NP-hard combinatorial optimization problems can be posed as packing covering integer programs; the randomized rounding technique of Raghavan and Thompson is a powerful tool with which to approximate them well. We present one elementary unifying property of all these integer linear programs and use the FKG correlation inequality to derive an improved analysis of randomized rounding on them. This yields a pessimistic estimator, thus presenting deterministic polynomial-time algorithms for them with approximation guarantees that are significantly better than those known. We consider the problem of maximizing welfare when allocating m items to n players with subadditive utility functions. Our main result is a way of rounding any fractional solution to a linear programming relaxation to this problem so as to give a feasible solution of welfare at least half that of the value of the fractional solution. This approximation ratio of 1 2 improves over an Ω(1 log m) ratio of Dobzinski, Nisan and Schapira [STOC 2005]. We also show an approximation ratio of 1 - 1 e when utility functions are fractionally subadditive. A result similar to this last result was previously obtained by Dobzinski and Schapira [Soda 2006], but via a different rounding technique that requires the use of a so called "XOS oracle".The randomized rounding techniques that we use are oblivious in the sense that they only use the primal solution to the linear program relaxation, but have no access to the actual utility functions of the players. This allows us to suggest new incentive compatible mechanisms for combinatorial auctions, extending previous work of Lavi and Swamy [FOCS 2005]. We consider positive covering integer programs, which generalize set cover and which have attracted a long line of research developing (randomized) approximation algorithms. Srinivasan (2006) gave a rounding algorithm based on the FKG inequality for systems which are "column-sparse." This algorithm may return an integer solution in which the variables get assigned large (integral) values; Kolliopoulos & Young (2005) modified this algorithm to limit the solution size, at the cost of a worse approximation ratio. We develop a new rounding scheme based on the Partial Resampling variant of the Lovasz Local Lemma developed by Harris & Srinivasan (2013). This achieves an approximation ratio of 1 + ln([EQUATION]), where amin is the minimum covering constraint and Δ1 is the maximum e1-norm of any column of the covering matrix (whose entries are scaled to lie in [0, 1]); we also show nearly-matching inapproximability and integrality-gap lower bounds. Our approach improves asymptotically, in several different ways, over known results. First, it replaces Δ0, the maximum number of nonzeroes in any column (from the result of Srinivasan) by Δ1 which is always - and can be much - smaller than Δ0; this is the first such result in this context. Second, our algorithm automatically handles multi-criteria programs; we achieve improved approximation ratios compared to the algorithm of Srinivasan, and give, for the first time when the number of objective functions is large, polynomial-time algorithms with good multi-criteria approximations. We also significantly improve upon the upper-bounds of Kolliopoulos & Young when the integer variables are required to be within (1 + e) of some given upper-bounds, and show nearly-matching inapproximability. This paper deals with the design of efficiently computable incentive-compatible mechanisms for combinatorial optimization problems with single-minded agents each possibly having multiple private parameters. We focus on approximation algorithms for NP-hard mechanism design problems. These algorithms need to satisfy certain monotonicity properties to ensure truthfulness. Since most of the known approximation techniques do not fulfill these properties, we study alternative techniques. Our first contribution is a quite general method to transform a pseudopolynomial algorithm into a monotone fully polynomial time approximation scheme (FPTAS). This can be applied to various problems like, e.g., knapsack, constrained shortest path, or job scheduling with deadlines. For example, the monotone FPTAS for the knapsack problem gives a very efficient, truthful mechanism for single-minded multiunit auctions. The best previous result for such auctions was a 2-appro-xi-ma-tion. In addition, we present a monotone PTAS for the generalized assignment problem with any constant number of private parameters per agent. The most efficient way to solve packing integer programs (PIPs) is linear programming-based randomized rounding, which also is in general not monotone. We show that primal-dual greedy algorithms achieve almost the same approximation ratios for PIPs as randomized rounding. The advantage is that these algorithms are inherently monotone. This way, we can significantly improve the approximation ratios of truthful mechanisms for various fundamental mechanism design problems like single-minded combinatorial auctions (CAs), unsplittable flow routing, and multicast routing. Our primal-dual approximation algorithms can also be used for the winner determination in CAs with general bidders specifying their bids through an oracle. This paper deals with the design of efficiently computable incentive compatible, or truthful, mechanisms for combinatorial optimization problems with multi-parameter agents. We focus on approximation algorithms for NP-hard mechanism design problems. These algorithms need to satisfy certain monotonicity properties to ensure truthfulness. Since most of the known approximation techniques do not fulfill these properties, we study alternative techniques.Our first contribution is a quite general method to transform a pseudopolynomial algorithm into a monotone FPTAS. This can be applied to various problems like, e.g., knapsack, constrained shortest path, or job scheduling with deadlines. For example, the monotone FPTAS for the knapsack problem gives a very efficient, truthful mechanism for single-minded multi-unit auctions. The best previous result for such auctions was a 2-approximation. In addition, we present a monotone PTAS for the generalized assignment problem with any bounded number of parameters per agent.The most efficient way to solve packing integer programs (PIPs) is LP-based randomized rounding, which also is in general not monotone. We show that primal-dual greedy algorithms achieve almost the same approximation ratios for PIPs as randomized rounding. The advantage is that these algorithms are inherently monotone. This way, we can significantly improve the approximation ratios of truthful mechanisms for various fundamental mechanism design problems like single-minded combinatorial auctions (CAs), unsplittable flow routing and multicast routing. Our approximation algorithms can also be used for the winner determination in CAs with general bidders specifying their bids through an oracle. Motivated by multi-budgeted optimization and other applications, we consider the problem of randomly rounding a fractional solution x in the (non-bipartite graph) matching and matroid intersection polytopes. We show that for any fixed Δ > 0, a given point x can be rounded to a random solution R such that E[1R] = (1 − Δ)x and any linear function of x satisfies dimension-free Chernoff-Hoeffding concentration bounds (the bounds depend on Δ and the expectation μ). We build on and adapt the swap rounding scheme in our recent work [9] to achieve this result. Our main contribution is a non-trivial martingale based analysis framework to prove the desired concentration bounds. In this paper we describe two applications. We give a randomized PTAS for matroid intersection and matchings with any fixed number of budget constraints. We also give a deterministic PTAS for the case of matchings. The concentration bounds also yield related results when the number of budget constraints is not fixed. As a second application we obtain an algorithm to compute in polynomial time an ∈-approximate Pareto-optimal set for the multi-objective variants of these problems, when the number of objectives is a fixed constant. We rely on a result of Papadimitriou and Yannakakis [26]. We consider the makespan-minimization problem on unrelated machines in the context of algorithmic mechanism design. No truthful mechanisms with non-trivial approximation guarantees are known for this multidimensional domain. We study a well-motivated special case (also a multidimensional domain), where the processing time of a job on each machine is either "low" or "high." We give a general technique to convert any c-approximation algorithm (in a black-box fashion) to a 3c-approximation truthful-in-expectation mechanism. Our construction uses fractional truthful mechanisms as a building block, and builds upon a technique of Lavi and Swamy [Lavi, R., Swamy, C., 2005. Truthful and near-optimal mechanism design via linear programming. In: Proc. 46th FOCS, pp. 595-604]. When all jobs have identical low and high values, we devise a deterministic 2-approximation truthful mechanism. The chief novelty of our results is that we do not utilize explicit price definitions to prove truthfulness. Instead we design algorithms that satisfy cycle monotonicity [Rochet, J., 1987. A necessary and sufficient condition for rationalizability in a quasilinear context. J. Math. Econ. 16, 191-200], a necessary and sufficient condition for truthfulness in multidimensional settings; this is the first work that leverages this characterization. We consider the problem of approximating an integer program by first solving its relaxation linear program and "rounding" the resulting solution. For several packing problems, we prove probabilistically that there exists an integer solution close to the optimum of the relaxation solution. We then develop a methodology for converting such a probabilistic existence proof to a deterministic approximation algorithm. The methodology mimics the existence proof in a very strong sense. Let f be a random Boolean formula that is an instance of 3-SAT. We consider the problem of computing the least real number k such that if the ratio of the number of clauses over the number of variables of f strictly exceeds k , then f is almost certainly unsatisfiable. By a well-known and more or less straightforward argument, it can be shown that kF5.191. This upper bound was improved by to 4.758 by first providing new improved bounds for the occupancy problem. There is strong experimental evidence that the value of k is around 4.2. In this work, we define, in terms of the random formula f, a decreasing sequence of random variables such that, if the expected value of any one of them converges to zero, then f is almost certainly unsatisfiable. By letting the expected value of the first term of the sequence converge to zero, we obtain, by simple and elementary computations, an upper bound for k equal to 4.667. From the expected value of the second term of the sequence, we get the value 4.601q . In general, by letting the U This work was performed while the first author was visiting the School of Computer Science, Carleton Ž University, and was partially supported by NSERC Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council . of Canada , and by a grant from the University of Patras for sabbatical leaves. The second and third Ž authors were supported in part by grants from NSERC Natural Sciences and Engineering Research . Council of Canada . During the last stages of this research, the first and last authors were also partially Ž . supported by EU ESPRIT Long-Term Research Project ALCOM-IT Project No. 20244 . †An extended abstract of this paper was published in the Proceedings of the Fourth Annual European Ž Symposium on Algorithms, ESA’96, September 25]27, 1996, Barcelona, Spain Springer-Verlag, LNCS, . pp. 27]38 . That extended abstract was coauthored by the first three authors of the present paper. Correspondence to: L. M. Kirousis Q 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. CCC 1042-9832r98r030253-17 253 We study an online assignment problem, motivated by Adwords Allocation, in which queries are to be assigned to bidders with budget constraints. We analyze the performance of the Greedy algorithm (which assigns each query to the highest bidder) in a randomized input model with queries arriving in a random permutation. Our main result is a tight analysis of Greedy in this model showing that it has a competitive ratio of 1 - 1 e for maximizing the value of the assignment. We also consider the more standard i.i.d. model of input, and show that our analysis holds there as well. This is to be contrasted with the worst case analysis of [MSVV05] which shows that Greedy has a ratio of 1 2, and that the optimal algorithm presented there has a ratio of 1 - 1 e. The analysis of Greedy is important in the Adwords setting because it is the natural allocation algorithm for an auction-style process. From a theoretical perspective, our result simplifies and generalizes the classic algorithm of Karp, Vazirani and Vazirani for online bipartite matching. Our results include a new proof to show that the Ranking alforithm of [KVV90] has a ratio of 1 - 1 e in the worst case. It has been recently discovered [KV07] (independent of our results) that one of the crucial lemmas in [KVV90], related to a certain reduction, is incorrect. Our proof is direct, in that it does not go via such a reduction, which also enables us to generalize the analysis to our online assignment problem. We give efficient algorithms for volume sampling, i.e., for picking @math -subsets of the rows of any given matrix with probabilities proportional to the squared volumes of the simplices defined by them and the origin (or the squared volumes of the parallelepipeds defined by these subsets of rows). In other words, we can efficiently sample @math -subsets of @math with probabilities proportional to the corresponding @math by @math principal minors of any given @math by @math positive semi definite matrix. This solves an open problem from the monograph on spectral algorithms by Kannan and Vempala (see Section @math of KV , also implicit in BDM, DRVW ). Our first algorithm for volume sampling @math -subsets of rows from an @math -by- @math matrix runs in @math arithmetic operations (where @math is the exponent of matrix multiplication) and a second variant of it for @math -approximate volume sampling runs in @math arithmetic operations, which is almost linear in the size of the input (i.e., the number of entries) for small @math . Our efficient volume sampling algorithms imply the following results for low-rank matrix approximation: (1) Given @math , in @math arithmetic operations we can find @math of its rows such that projecting onto their span gives a @math -approximation to the matrix of rank @math closest to @math under the Frobenius norm. This improves the @math -approximation of Boutsidis, Drineas and Mahoney BDM and matches the lower bound shown in DRVW . The method of conditional expectations gives a algorithm with the same complexity. The running time can be improved to @math at the cost of losing an extra @math in the approximation factor. (2) The same rows and projection as in the previous point give a @math -approximation to the matrix of rank @math closest to @math under the spectral norm. In this paper, we show an almost matching lower bound of @math , even for @math . In this paper we develop an easily applicable algorithmic technique tool for developing approximation schemes for certain types of combinatorial optimization problems. Special cases that are covered by our result show up in many places in the literature. For every such special case, a particular rounding trick has been implemented in a slightly different way, with slightly different arguments, and with slightly different worst case estimations. Usually, the rounding procedure depended on certain upper or lower bounds on the optimal objective value that have to be justified in a separate argument. Our easily applied result unifies many of these results, and sometimes it even leads to a simpler proof. We demonstrate how our result can be easily applied to a broad family of combinatorial optimization problems. As a special case, we derive the existence of an FPTAS for the scheduling problem of minimizing the weighted number of late jobs under release dates and preemption on a single machine. The approximability status of this problem has been open for some time. Neural network pruning techniques can reduce the parameter counts of trained networks by over 90 , decreasing storage requirements and improving computational performance of inference without compromising accuracy. However, contemporary experience is that the sparse architectures produced by pruning are difficult to train from the start, which would similarly improve training performance. We find that a standard pruning technique naturally uncovers subnetworks whose initializations made them capable of training effectively. Based on these results, we articulate the "lottery ticket hypothesis:" dense, randomly-initialized, feed-forward networks contain subnetworks ("winning tickets") that - when trained in isolation - reach test accuracy comparable to the original network in a similar number of iterations. The winning tickets we find have won the initialization lottery: their connections have initial weights that make training particularly effective. We present an algorithm to identify winning tickets and a series of experiments that support the lottery ticket hypothesis and the importance of these fortuitous initializations. We consistently find winning tickets that are less than 10-20 of the size of several fully-connected and convolutional feed-forward architectures for MNIST and CIFAR10. Above this size, the winning tickets that we find learn faster than the original network and reach higher test accuracy. We study network optimization that considers power minimization as an objective. Studies have shown that mechanisms such as speed scaling can significantly reduce the power consumption of telecommunication networks by matching the consumption of each network element to the amount of processing required for its carried traffic. Most existing research on speed scaling focuses on a single network element in isolation. We aim for a network-wide optimization. Specifically, we study a routing problem with the objective of provisioning guaranteed speed bandwidth for a given demand matrix while minimizing power consumption. Optimizing the routes critically relies on the characteristic of the speed-power curve f(s), which is how power is consumed as a function of the processing speed s. If f is superadditive, we show that there is no bounded approximation in general for integral routing, i.e., each traffic demand follows a single path. This contrasts with the well-known logarithmic approximation for subadditive functions. However, for common speed-power curves such as polynomials f(s) = μsα, we are able to show a constant approximation via a simple scheme of randomized rounding. We also generalize this rounding approach to handle the case in which a nonzero startup cost σ appears in the speed-power curve, i.e., f(s) = σ + μsα, if s >; 0; 0, if s = 0. We present an O((σ μ)1 α)-approximation, and we discuss why coming up with an approximation ratio independent of the startup cost may be hard. Finally, we provide simulation results to validate our algorithmic approaches. Reducing hidden bias in the data and ensuring fairness in algorithmic data analysis has recently received significant attention. We complement several recent papers in this line of research by introducing a general method to reduce bias in the data through random projections in a fair'' subspace. We apply this method to densest subgraph and @math -means. For densest subgraph, our approach based on fair projections allows to recover both theoretically and empirically an almost optimal, fair, dense subgraph hidden in the input data. We also show that, under the small set expansion hypothesis, approximating this problem beyond a factor of @math is NP-hard and we show a polynomial time algorithm with a matching approximation bound. We further apply our method to @math -means. In a previous paper, [NIPS 2017] showed that problems such as @math -means can be approximated up to a constant factor while ensuring that none of two protected class (e.g., gender, ethnicity) is disparately impacted. We show that fair projections generalize the concept of fairlet introduced by to any number of protected attributes and improve empirically the quality of the resulting clustering. We also present the first constant-factor approximation for an arbitrary number of protected attributes thus settling an open problem recently addressed in several works. We propose a general dual-fitting technique for analyzing online scheduling algorithms in the unrelated machines setting where the objective function involves weighted flow-time, and we allow the machines of the on-line algorithm to have (1 + e)-extra speed than the offline optimum (the so-called speed augmentation model). Typically, such algorithms are analyzed using non-trivial potential functions which yield little insight into the proof technique. We propose that one can often analyze such algorithms by looking at the dual (or Lagrangian dual) of the linear (or convex) program for the corresponding scheduling problem, and finding a feasible dual solution as the on-line algorithm proceeds. As representative cases, we get the following results: • For the problem of minimizing weighted flow-time, we give an O (1 e)-competitive greedy algorithm. This is an improvement by a factor of 1 e on the competitive ratio of the greedy algorithm of Chadha-Garg-Kumar-Muralidhara. • For the problem of minimizing weighted lk norm of flow-time, we show that a greedy algorithm gives an O (1 e)-competitive ratio. This marginally improves the result of Im and Moseley. • For the problem of minimizing weighted flow-time plus energy, and when the energy function f(s) is equal to sγ, γ > 1, we show that a natural greedy algorithm is O(γ2)-competitive. Prior to our work, such a result was known for the related machines setting only (Gupta-Krishnaswamy-Pruhs). Recent work on neural network pruning indicates that, at training time, neural networks need to be significantly larger in size than is necessary to represent the eventual functions that they learn. This paper articulates a new hypothesis to explain this phenomenon. This conjecture, which we term the "lottery ticket hypothesis," proposes that successful training depends on lucky random initialization of a smaller subcomponent of the network. Larger networks have more of these "lottery tickets," meaning they are more likely to luck out with a subcomponent initialized in a configuration amenable to successful optimization. This paper conducts a series of experiments with XOR and MNIST that support the lottery ticket hypothesis. In particular, we identify these fortuitously-initialized subcomponents by pruning low-magnitude weights from trained networks. We then demonstrate that these subcomponents can be successfully retrained in isolation so long as the subnetworks are given the same initializations as they had at the beginning of the training process. Initialized as such, these small networks reliably converge successfully, often faster than the original network at the same level of accuracy. However, when these subcomponents are randomly reinitialized or rearranged, they perform worse than the original network. In other words, large networks that train successfully contain small subnetworks with initializations conducive to optimization. The lottery ticket hypothesis and its connection to pruning are a step toward developing architectures, initializations, and training strategies that make it possible to solve the same problems with much smaller networks.