The interconnectivity of cyber and physical systems and Internet of things has created ubiquitous concerns of cyber threats for enterprise system managers. It is common that the asset owners and enterprise network operators need to work with cybersecurity professionals to manage the risk by remunerating them for their efforts that are not directly observable. In this paper, we use a principal-agent framework to capture the service relationships between the two parties, i.e., the asset owner (principal) and the cyber risk manager (agent). Specifically, we consider a dynamic systemic risk management problem with asymmetric information where the principal can only observe cyber risk outcomes of the enterprise network rather than directly the efforts that the manager expends on protecting the resources. Under this information pattern, the principal aims to minimize the systemic cyber risks by designing a dynamic contract that specifies the compensation flows and the anticipated efforts of the manager by taking into account his incentives and rational behaviors. We formulate a bi-level mechanism design problem for dynamic contract design within the framework of a class of stochastic differential games. We show that the principal has rational controllability of the systemic risk by designing an incentive compatible estimator of the agent's hidden efforts. We characterize the optimal solution by reformulating the problem as a stochastic optimal control program which can be solved using dynamic programming. We further investigate a benchmark scenario with complete information and identify conditions that yield zero information rent and lead to a new certainty equivalence principle for principal-agent problems. Finally, case studies over networked systems are carried out to illustrate the theoretical results obtained.
Cybersecurity becomes a critical issue due to the large-scale deployment of smart devices and their integration with information and communication techologies (ICTs) @cite_6 @cite_54 . Hence, security risk management is an important task which has been investigated in different research fields, such as communications and infrastructures @cite_29 @cite_43 , cloud computing @cite_33 and IoT @cite_16 . The interconnections between nodes and devices make the risk management a challenge problem as the cyber risk can propogate and escalate into systemic risk @cite_35 , and hence the interdependent security risk analysis is necessary @cite_37 . Managing systemic risk is nontrivial as demonstrated in financial systems @cite_39 , critical infrastructures @cite_44 , and communication networks @cite_42 . In a network with a small number of agents, graph-theoretic methods have been widely adopted to model the strategic interactions and risk interdependencies between agents @cite_39 @cite_24 . When the number of nodes becomes large, @cite_7 has proposed a mean-field game approach where a representative agent captures the system dynamics. Different from @cite_51 @cite_17 in minimizing the static systemic risk at equilibrium, we focus in this paper on a mechanism design problem that can reduce the systemic risks by understanding the system dynamics.
@cite_35 @cite_37 @cite_33 @cite_7 @cite_54 @cite_29 @cite_42 @cite_6 @cite_39 @cite_44 @cite_43 @cite_24 @cite_16 @cite_51 @cite_17
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The massive proliferation of information and communications technologies (hardware and software) into the heart of modern critical infrastructures has given birth to a unique technological ecosystem. Despite the many advantages brought about by modern information and communications technologies, the shift from isolated environments to "systems-of-systems" integrated with massive information and communications infrastructures (e.g., the Internet) exposes critical infrastructures to significant cyber threats. Therefore, it is imperative to develop approaches for identifying and ranking assets in complex, large-scale and heterogeneous critical infrastructures. To address these challenges, this paper proposes a novel methodology for assessing the impacts of cyber attacks on critical infrastructures. The methodology is inspired by research in system dynamics and sensitivity analysis. The proposed behavioral analysis methodology computes the covariances of the observed variables before and after the execution of a specific intervention involving the control variables. Metrics are proposed for quantifying the significance of control variables and measuring the impact propagation of cyber attacks.Experiments conducted on the IEEE 14-bus and IEEE 300-bus electric grid models, and on the well-known Tennessee Eastman chemical process demonstrate the efficiency, scalability and cross-sector applicability of the proposed methodology in several attack scenarios. The advantages of the methodology over graph-theoretic and electrical centrality metric approaches are demonstrated using several test cases. Finally, a novel, stealthy cyber-physical attack is demonstrated against a simulated power grid; this attack can be used to analyze the precision of anomaly detection systems. In this paper, we consider a delegated dynamic systemic cyber risk management problem between a resource owner (principal) and a risk manager (agent). The principal can only observe cyber risk outcomes of the network rather than the efforts that the agent spends on protecting the resources. Under this asymmetric information, the principal aims to minimize the systemic cyber risks by designing a dynamic contract that specifies the compensation flows and the anticipated efforts of the manager by taking into account his incentives and rational behaviors. We formulate a bi-level mechanism design problem for dynamic contract design which can be seen as a special class of differential game. We show that the principal has rational controllability of the systemic risk by designing an incentive compatible estimator of the agent's hidden efforts. We characterize the optimal mechanism design by reformulating the problem into a stochastic optimal control program and derive the solution explicitly. We further reveal a separation principle for dynamic risk management where the effort estimation and the compensation design can be achieved separately. With the increasing connectivity enabled by the Internet of Things (IoT), security becomes a critical concern, and users should invest to secure their IoT applications. Due to the massive devices in the IoT network, users cannot be aware of the security policies taken by all its connected neighbors. Instead, a user makes security decisions based on the cyber risks that he perceives by observing a selected number of nodes. To this end, we propose a model which incorporates the limited attention or bounded rationality nature of players in the IoT. Specifically, each individual builds a sparse cognitive network of nodes to respond to. Based on this simplified cognitive network representation, each user then determines his security management policy by minimizing his own real-world security cost. The bounded rational decision-makings of players and their cognitive network formations are interdependent and thus should be addressed in a holistic manner. We establish a games-in-games framework and propose a Gestalt Nash equilibrium (GNE) solution concept to characterize the decisions of agents and quantify their risk of bounded perception due to the limited attention. In addition, we design a proximal-based iterative algorithm to compute the GNE. With case studies of smart communities, the designed algorithm can successfully identify the critical users whose decisions need to be taken into account by the other users during the security management. The integration of modern information and communication technologies (ICTs) into critical infrastructures (CIs) improves its connectivity and functionalities yet also brings cyber threats. It is thus essential to understand the risk of ICTs on CIs holistically as a cyber-physical system and design efficient security hardening mechanisms. To this end, we capture the system behaviors of the CIs under malicious attacks and the protection strategies by a zero-sum game. We further propose a computationally tractable approximation for large-scale networks which builds on the factored graph that exploits the dependency structure of the nodes of CIs and the approximate dynamic programming tools for stochastic Markov games. This work focuses on a localized information structure and the single-controller game solvable by linear programming. Numerical results illustrate the proper tradeoff of the approximation accuracy and computation complexity in the new design paradigm and show the proactive security at the time of unanticipated attacks. With the increasing connectivity enabled by the Internet of Things (IoT), security becomes a critical concern, and the users should invest to secure their IoT applications. Due to the massive devices in the IoT network, users cannot be aware of the security policies taken by all its connected neighbors. Instead, a user makes security decisions based on the cyber risks he perceives by observing a selected number of nodes. To this end, we propose a model which incorporates the limited attention or bounded rationality nature of players in the IoT. Specifically, each individual builds a sparse cognitive network which includes the users to respond to. Based on this simplified cognitive network representation, each user then determines his security investment policy by minimizing his own real-world security cost. The bounded rational decision-makings of players and their cognitive network formations are interdependent, and thus should be addressed in a holistic manner. We propose a Gestalt Nash equilibrium (GNE) solution concept to characterize the decisions of agents. Then, we design a proximal-based iterative algorithm to compute the GNE and show its convergence. With case studies to smart home communities, the designed algorithm can successfully identify the critical users whose decisions need to be taken into account by the other users during the security investment. This paper presents the application of cybersecurity to the operation and control of distributed electric power systems. In particular, the paper emphasizes the role of cybersecurity in the operation of microgrids and analyzes the dependencies of microgrid control and operation on information and communication technologies for cybersecurity. The paper discusses common cyber vulnerabilities in distributed electric power systems and presents the implications of cyber incidents on physical processes in microgrids. The paper examines the impacts of potential risks attributed to cyberattacks on microgrids and presents the affordable technologies for mitigating such risks. In addition, the paper presents a minimax-regret approach for minimizing the impending risks in managing microgrids. The paper also presents the opportunities provided by software-defined networking technologies to enhance the security of microgrid operations. It is concluded that cybersecurity could play a significant role in managing microgrid operations as microgrids strive for a higher degree of resilience as they supply power services to customers. Cyber security is one of the most significant technical challenges in current times. Detecting adversarial activities, prevention of theft of intellectual properties and customer data is a high priority for corporations and government agencies around the world. Cyber defenders need to analyze massive-scale, high-resolution network flows to identify, categorize, and mitigate attacks involving networks spanning institutional and national boundaries. Many of the cyber attacks can be described as subgraph patterns, with prominent examples being insider infiltrations (path queries), denial of service (parallel paths) and malicious spreads (tree queries). This motivates us to explore subgraph matching on streaming graphs in a continuous setting. The novelty of our work lies in using the subgraph distributional statistics collected from the streaming graph to determine the query processingstrategy. Weintroducea“Lazy Search"algorithmwhere the search strategy is decided on a vertex-to-vertex basis depending on the likelihood of a match in the vertex neighborhood. We also propose a metric named “Relative Selectivity" that is used to select between different query processing strategies. Our experiments performed on real online news, network traffic stream and a synthetic social network benchmark demonstrate 10-100x speedups over selectivity agnostic approaches. Cyber insurance is a valuable approach to mitigate further the cyber risk and its loss in addition to the deployment of technological cyber defense solutions, such as intrusion detection systems and firewalls. An effective cyber insurance policy can reduce the number of successful cyber attacks by incentivizing the adoption of preventative measures and the implementation of best practices of the users. To study cyber insurance in a holistic manner, we first establish a bi-level game-theoretic model that nests a zero-sum game in a moral-hazard type of principal-agent game to capture complex interactions between a user, an attacker, and the insurer. The game framework provides an integrative view of the cyber insurance and enables a systematic design of incentive compatible and attack-aware insurance policy. The framework is further extended to study a network of users and their risk interdependencies. We completely characterize the equilibrium solutions of the bi-level game. Our analytical results provide a fundamental limit on insurability, predict the Peltzman effect, and reveal the principles of zero operating profit and the linear insurance policy of the insurer. We provide analytical results and numerical experiments to corroborate the analytical results and demonstrate the network effects as a result of the strategic interactions among the three types of players. The complex interconnections between various critical infrastructure sectors make the system of systems (SoS) vulnerable to failures and highlight the importance of robustness and resilience. To this end, we first establish holistic probabilistic networks to model the interdependencies between infrastructure components. To capture the underlying failure and recovery dynamics, we further propose a Markov decision processes (MDP) model in which the response policy determines a long-term performance. To address the challenge of a large dimensionality, we exploit the sparsity of the network interconnections and solve an approximate linear program by the variable elimination, which leads to a distributed control policy under mild assumptions. Finally, we use a case study of the interdependent power and subway systems to corroborate the results and show that the optimal resilience resource planning and allocation can reduce the failure probability and mitigate the impact of failures caused by natural or artificial disasters. Getting new security features and protocols to be widely adopted and deployed in the Internet has been a continuing challenge. There are several reasons for this, in particular economic reasons arising from the presence of network externalities. Indeed, like the Internet itself, the technologies to secure it exhibit network effects: their value to individual users changes as other users decide to adopt them or not. In particular, the benefits felt by early adopters of security solutions might fall significantly below the cost of adoption, making it difficult for those solutions to gain attraction and get deployed at a large scale. Our goal in this paper is to model and quantify the impact of such externalities on the adoptability and deployment of security features and protocols in the Internet. We study a network of interconnected agents, which are subject to epidemic risks such as those caused by propagating viruses and worms, and which can decide whether or not to invest some amount to deploy security solutions. Agents experience negative externalities from other agents, as the risks faced by an agent depend not only on the choices of that agent (whether or not to invest in self-protection), but also on those of the other agents. Expectations about choices made by other agents then influence investments in self-protection, resulting in a possibly suboptimal outcome overall. We present and solve an analytical model where the agents are connected according to a variety of network topologies. Borrowing ideas and techniques used in statistical physics, we derive analytic solutions for sparse random graphs, for which we obtain asymptotic results. We show that we can explicitly identify the impact of network externalities on the adoptability and deployment of security features. In other words, we identify both the economic and network properties that determine the adoption of security technologies. Therefore, we expect our results to provide useful guidance for the design of new economic mechanisms and for the development of network protocols likely to be deployed at a large scale. The spread of epidemics and malware is commonly modeled by diffusion processes on networks. Protective interventions such as vaccinations or installing anti-virus software are used to contain their spread. Typically, each node in the network has to decide its own strategy of securing itself, and its benefit depends on which other nodes are secure, making this a natural game-theoretic setting. There has been a lot of work on network security game models, but most of the focus has been either on simplified epidemic models or homogeneous network structure. We develop a new formulation for an epidemic containment game, which relies on the characterization of the SIS model in terms of the spectral radius of the network. We show in this model that pure Nash equilibria (NE) always exist, and can be found by a best response strategy. We analyze the complexity of finding NE, and derive rigorous bounds on their costs and the Price of Anarchy or PoA (the ratio of the cost of the worst NE to the optimum social cost) in general graphs as well as in random graph models. In particular, for arbitrary power-law graphs with exponent β > 2, we show that the PoA is bounded by O(T2(β -1))), where T = γ α is the ratio of the recovery rate to the transmission rate in the SIS model. We prove that this bound is tight up to a constant factor for the Chung-Lu random power-law graph model. We study the characteristics of Nash equilibria empirically in different real communication and infrastructure networks, and find that our analytical results can help explain some of the empirical observations. The field of convention emergence studies how agents involved in repeated coordination games can reach consensus through only local interactions. The literature on this topic is vast and is motivated by human societies, mainly addressing coordination problems between human agents, such as who gets to redial after a dropped telephone call. In contrast, real-world engineering problems, such as coordination in wireless sensor networks, involve agents with limited resources and knowledge and thus pose certain restrictions on the complexity of the coordination mechanisms. Due to these restrictions, strategies proposed for human coordination may not be suitable for engineering applications and need to be further explored in the context of real-world application domains. In this article we take the role of designers of large decentralized multi-agent systems. We investigate the factors that speed up the convergence process of agents arranged in different static and dynamic topologies and under different interaction models, typical for engineering applications. We also study coordination problems both under partial observability and in the presence of faults (or noise). The main contributions of this article are that we propose an approach for emergent coordination, motivated by highly constrained devices, such as wireless nodes and swarm bots, in the absence of a central entity and perform extensive theoretical and empirical studies. Our approach is called Win-Stay Lose-probabilistic-Shift, generalizing two well-known strategies in game theory that have been applied in other domains. We demonstrate that our approach performs well in different settings under limited information and imposes minimal system requirements, due to its simplicity. Moreover, our technique outperforms state-of-the-art coordination mechanisms, guarantees full convergence in any topology and has the property that all convention states are absorbing. Security breaches and attacks are critical problems in today’s networking. A key-point is that the security of each host depends not only on the protection strategies it chooses to adopt but also on those chosen by other hosts in the network. The spread of Internet worms and viruses is only one example. This class of problems has two aspects. First, it deals with epidemic processes, and as such calls for the employment of epidemic theory. Second, the distributed and autonomous nature of decision-making in major classes of networks (e.g., P2P, adhoc, and most notably the Internet) call for the employment of game theoretical approaches. Accordingly, we propose a unified framework that combines the N-intertwined, SIS epidemic model with a noncooperative game model. We determine the existence of a Nash equilibrium of the respective game and characterize its properties. We show that its quality, in terms of overall network security, largely depends on the underlying topology. We then provide a bound on the level of system inefficiency due to the noncooperative behavior, namely, the “price of anarchy” of the game. We observe that the price of anarchy may be prohibitively high, hence we propose a scheme for steering users towards socially efficient behavior. Our modern era is characterized by a large-scale web of interconnected and interdependent economic and infrastructure systems, coupled with threats of terrorism. This paper demonstrates the value of introducing interdependency analysis into various phases of risk assessment and management through application of the Inoperability Input–Output Model (IIM). The IIM estimates the cascading inoperability and economic losses that result from interdependencies within large-scale economic and infrastructure systems. Based on real data and the Nobel Prize-winning W. Leontief economic model, the IIM is a computationally efficient, inexpensive, holistic method for estimating economic impacts. Three illustrative case studies are presented. The first and second illustrate how the supply- and demand-side IIM is used to calculate higher-order effects from attacks to vulnerabilities and implementation of risk management policies in large-scale economic systems. The final case study illustrates a more general use for interdependency analysis: to evaluate risk management options against multiple objectives. This study calculates a Pareto-optimal or efficient frontier of solutions by integrating a simplified model of the costs of recovery to the Power sector derived from open-source data with the IIM. Through these case studies, which use a database from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, we illustrate the value of interdependency analysis in the risk assessment and management process as an integral part of systems engineering. © 2005 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Syst Eng 8: 323–341, 2005 Managing security risks in the Internet has so far mostly involved methods to reduce the risks and the severity of the damages. Those methods (such as firewalls, intrusion detection and prevention, etc) reduce but do not eliminate risk, and the question remains on how to handle the residual risk. In this paper, we take a new approach to the problem of Internet security and advocate managing this residual risk by buying insurance against it. Using insurance in the Internet raises several questions because entities in the Internet face correlated risks, which means that insurance claims will likely be correlated, making those entities less attractive to insurance companies. Furthermore, risks are interdependent, meaning that the decision by an entity to invest in security and self-protect affects the risk faced by others. We analyze the impact of these externalities on the security investments of users using a simple 2-agent model. Our key results are that there are sound economic reasons for agents to not invest much in self-protection, and that insurance is a desirable incentive mechanism which pushes agents over a threshold into a desirable state where they all invest in self-protection. In other words, insurance increases the level of self-protection, and therefore the level of security, in the Internet. Therefore, we believe that insurance should become an important component of risk management in the Internet. Due to the dynamic, distributed, and heterogeneous nature of today's networks, intrusion detection systems (IDSs) have become a necessary addition to the security infrastructure and are widely deployed as a complementary line of defense to classical security approaches. In this paper, we address the intrusion detection problem in heterogeneous networks consisting of nodes with different noncorrelated security assets. In our study, two crucial questions are: What are the expected behaviors of rational attackers? What is the optimal strategy of the defenders (IDSs)? We answer the questions by formulating the network intrusion detection as a noncooperative game and performing an in-depth analysis on the Nash equilibrium and the engineering implications behind. Based on our game theoretical analysis, we derive the expected behaviors of rational attackers, the minimum monitor resource requirement, and the optimal strategy of the defenders. We then provide guidelines for IDS design and deployment. We also show how our game theoretical framework can be applied to configure the intrusion detection strategies in realistic scenarios via a case study. Finally, we evaluate the proposed game theoretical framework via simulations. The simulation results show both the correctness of the analytical results and the effectiveness of the proposed guidelines. The evolution and sophistication of cyber-attacks need resilient and evolving cybersecurity schemes. As an emerging technology, the Internet of Things (IoT) inherits cyber-attacks and threats from the IT environment despite the existence of a layered defensive security mechanism. The extension of the digital world to the physical environment of IoT brings unseen attacks that require a novel lightweight and distributed attack detection mechanism due to their architecture and resource constraints. Architecturally, fog nodes can be leveraged to offload security functions from IoT and the cloud to mitigate the resource limitation issues of IoT and scalability bottlenecks of the cloud. Classical machine learning algorithms have been extensively used for intrusion detection, although scalability, feature engineering efforts, and accuracy have hindered their penetration into the security market. These shortcomings could be mitigated using the deep learning approach as it has been successful in big data fields. Apart from eliminating the need to craft features manually, deep learning is resilient against morphing attacks with high detection accuracy. This article proposes an LSTM network for distributed cyber-attack detection in fog-to-things communication. We identify and analyze critical attacks and threats targeting IoT devices, especially attacks exploiting vulnerabilities of wireless communications. The conducted experiments on two scenarios demonstrate the effectiveness and efficiency of deeper models over traditional machine learning models. In this paper, we design a secure, robust and resilient cyber-physical wind energy system (WES) from a cross-layer perspective. We establish a system-of-systems framework for the large-scale wind farm which includes the cyber and physical components. For the cyber layer, we use a game-theoretic model to capture the strategic behaviors of the network defender and the cyber attacker, and compute its mixed strategy Nash equilibria. For the physical layer, we design a robust and resilient switching controller using a Markov jump linear system model. Due to the interdependence between the cyber and physical systems, their performances are coupled and need to be designed in a holistic manner. To address this challenge, we propose an iterative algorithm to study the system-of-systems performance under the equilibrium design which jointly takes the cyber and physical layers into account. Case studies are provided to illustrate the interdependent design principles of cyber-physical WES. We address a fundamental problem that is systematically encountered when modeling real-world complex systems of societ al relevance: the limitedness of the information available. In the case of economic and financial networks, privacy issues severely limit the information that can be accessed and, as a consequence, the possibility of correctly estimating the resilience of these systems to events such as financial shocks, crises and cascade failures. Here we present an innovative method to reconstruct the structure of such partially-accessible systems, based on the knowledge of intrinsic node-specific properties and of the number of connections of only a limited subset of nodes. This information is used to calibrate an inference procedure based on fundamental concepts derived from statistical physics, which allows to generate ensembles of directed weighted networks intended to represent the real system—so that the real network properties can be estimated as their average values within the ensemble. We test the method both on synthetic and empirical networks, focusing on the properties that are commonly used to measure systemic risk. Indeed, the method shows a remarkable robustness with respect to the limitedness of the information available, thus representing a valuable tool for gaining insights on privacy-protected economic and financial systems. In the field of infrastructures’ surveillance and protection, it is important to make decisions based on activities occurring in the environment and its local context and conditions. In this paper we use an active rule based event processing architecture in order to make sense of situations from the combination of different signals received by the rule engine. However obtaining some high level information automatically is not without risks, especially in sensitive environments, and detection mistakes can happen for various reasons: the signal’s source can be defective, whether it is human—miss-interpretation of the signal—or computed—material malfunction; the aggregation rules can be wrong syntaxically, for example when a rule will never be triggered or a situation never detected; the interpretation given to the combination of signals does not correspond to the reality on the field—because the knowledge of the rule designer is subjective or because the environment evolves over-time—the rules are therefore incorrect semantically. In this paper, a new approach is proposed to avoid the third kind of error sources. We present a hybrid machine learning technique adapted to the complexity of the rules’ representation, in order to create a system more conform to reality. The proposed approach uses a combination of an Association Rule Mining algorithm and Inductive Logic Programming for rule induction. Empirical studies on simulated datasets demonstrate how our method can contribute to sensible systems such as the security of a public or semi-public place.