Recently, the field of adversarial machine learning has been garnering attention by showing that state-of-the-art deep neural networks are vulnerable to adverserial examples, stemming from small perturbations being added to the input image. Adversarial examples are generated by a malicious adversary by obtaining access to the model parameters, such as gradient information, to alter the input or by attacking a substitute model and transferring those malicious examples over to attack the victim model. Specifically, one of these attack algorithms, Robust Physical Perturbations ( @math ), generates adverserial images of stop signs with black and white stickers to achieve high targeted misclassification rates against standard-architecture traffic sign classifiers. In this paper, we propose BlurNet, a defense against the @math attack. First, we motivate the defense with a frequency analysis of the first layer feature maps of the network on the LISA dataset by demonstrating high frequency noise is introduced into the input image by the @math algorithm. To alleviate the high frequency, we introduce a depthwise convolution layer of standard blur kernels after the first layer. Finally, we present a regularization scheme to incorporate this low-pass filtering behavior into the training regime of the network.
is the technique of injecting adverserial examples and the corresponding gold standard labels into the training set @cite_8 @cite_18 @cite_12 . The motivation of this methodology is that the network will learn the adverserial perturbations introduced by the attacker. The problem with adverserial training is that it doubles the training time of the classifier as new examples need to be generated. Moreover, as shown by , adversarial training needs all types of adverserial examples produced by all known attacks, as the training process is non-adaptive @cite_25 . Our method can be paired with any of these types of defenses.
@cite_18 @cite_25 @cite_12 @cite_8
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Standard adversarial attacks change the predicted class label of an image by adding specially tailored small perturbations to its pixels. In contrast, a universal perturbation is an update that can be added to any image in a broad class of images, while still changing the predicted class label. We study the efficient generation of universal adversarial perturbations, and also efficient methods for hardening networks to these attacks. We propose a simple optimization-based universal attack that reduces the top-1 accuracy of various network architectures on ImageNet to less than 20 , while learning the universal perturbation 13X faster than the standard method. To defend against these perturbations, we propose universal adversarial training, which models the problem of robust classifier generation as a two-player min-max game. This method is much faster and more scalable than conventional adversarial training with a strong adversary (PGD), and yet yields models that are extremely resistant to universal attacks, and comparably resistant to standard (per-instance) black box attacks. We also discover a rather fascinating side-effect of universal adversarial training: attacks built for universally robust models transfer better to other (black box) models than those built with conventional adversarial training. Adversarial examples are typically constructed by perturbing an existing data point within a small matrix norm, and current defense methods are focused on guarding against this type of attack. In this paper, we propose a new class of adversarial examples that are synthesized entirely from scratch using a conditional generative model, without being restricted to norm-bounded perturbations. We first train an Auxiliary Classifier Generative Adversarial Network (AC-GAN) to model the class-conditional distribution over data samples. Then, conditioned on a desired class, we search over the AC-GAN latent space to find images that are likely under the generative model and are misclassified by a target classifier. We demonstrate through human evaluation that these new kind of adversarial images, which we call Generative Adversarial Examples, are legitimate and belong to the desired class. Our empirical results on the MNIST, SVHN, and CelebA datasets show that generative adversarial examples can bypass strong adversarial training and certified defense methods designed for traditional adversarial attacks. Adversarial examples are perturbed inputs designed to fool machine learning models. Adversarial training injects such examples into training data to increase robustness. To scale this technique to large datasets, perturbations are crafted using fast single-step methods that maximize a linear approximation of the model's loss. We show that this form of adversarial training converges to a degenerate global minimum, wherein small curvature artifacts near the data points obfuscate a linear approximation of the loss. The model thus learns to generate weak perturbations, rather than defend against strong ones. As a result, we find that adversarial training remains vulnerable to black-box attacks, where we transfer perturbations computed on undefended models, as well as to a powerful novel single-step attack that escapes the non-smooth vicinity of the input data via a small random step. We further introduce Ensemble Adversarial Training, a technique that augments training data with perturbations transferred from other models. On ImageNet, Ensemble Adversarial Training yields models with strong robustness to black-box attacks. In particular, our most robust model won the first round of the NIPS 2017 competition on Defenses against Adversarial Attacks. Adversarial examples are perturbed inputs designed to fool machine learning models. Adversarial training injects such examples into training data to increase robustness. To scale this technique to large datasets, perturbations are crafted using fast single-step methods that maximize a linear approximation of the model's loss. We show that this form of adversarial training converges to a degenerate global minimum, wherein small curvature artifacts near the data points obfuscate a linear approximation of the loss. The model thus learns to generate weak perturbations, rather than defend against strong ones. As a result, we find that adversarial training remains vulnerable to black-box attacks, where we transfer perturbations computed on undefended models, as well as to a powerful novel single-step attack that escapes the non-smooth vicinity of the input data via a small random step. We further introduce Ensemble Adversarial Training, a technique that augments training data with perturbations transferred from other models. On ImageNet, Ensemble Adversarial Training yields models with strong robustness to black-box attacks. In particular, our most robust model won the first round of the NIPS 2017 competition on Defenses against Adversarial Attacks. Machine learning classifiers are known to be vulnerable to inputs maliciously constructed by adversaries to force misclassification. Such adversarial examples have been extensively studied in the context of computer vision applications. In this work, we show adversarial attacks are also effective when targeting neural network policies in reinforcement learning. Specifically, we show existing adversarial example crafting techniques can be used to significantly degrade test-time performance of trained policies. Our threat model considers adversaries capable of introducing small perturbations to the raw input of the policy. We characterize the degree of vulnerability across tasks and training algorithms, for a subclass of adversarial-example attacks in white-box and black-box settings. Regardless of the learned task or training algorithm, we observe a significant drop in performance, even with small adversarial perturbations that do not interfere with human perception. Videos are available at this http URL. We propose a method to learn deep ReLU-based classifiers that are provably robust against norm-bounded adversarial perturbations (on the training data; for previously unseen examples, the approach will be guaranteed to detect all adversarial examples, though it may flag some non-adversarial examples as well). The basic idea of the approach is to consider a convex outer approximation of the set of activations reachable through a norm-bounded perturbation, and we develop a robust optimization procedure that minimizes the worst case loss over this outer region (via a linear program). Crucially, we show that the dual problem to this linear program can be represented itself as a deep network similar to the backpropagation network, leading to very efficient optimization approaches that produce guaranteed bounds on the robust loss. The end result is that by executing a few more forward and backward passes through a slightly modified version of the original network (though possibly with much larger batch sizes), we can learn a classifier that is provably robust to any norm-bounded adversarial attack. We illustrate the approach on a toy 2D robust classification task, and on a simple convolutional architecture applied to MNIST, where we produce a classifier that provably has less than 8.4 test error for any adversarial attack with bounded @math norm less than @math . This represents the largest verified network that we are aware of, and we discuss future challenges in scaling the approach to much larger domains. We propose a novel technique to make neural network robust to adversarial examples using a generative adversarial network. We alternately train both classifier and generator networks. The generator network generates an adversarial perturbation that can easily fool the classifier network by using a gradient of each image. Simultaneously, the classifier network is trained to classify correctly both original and adversarial images generated by the generator. These procedures help the classifier network to become more robust to adversarial perturbations. Furthermore, our adversarial training framework efficiently reduces overfitting and outperforms other regularization methods such as Dropout. We applied our method to supervised learning for CIFAR datasets, and experimantal results show that our method significantly lowers the generalization error of the network. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first method which uses GAN to improve supervised learning. We introduce an adversarial learning framework, which we named KBGAN, to improve the performances of a wide range of existing knowledge graph embedding models. Because knowledge graph datasets typically only contain positive facts, sampling useful negative training examples is a non-trivial task. Replacing the head or tail entity of a fact with a uniformly randomly selected entity is a conventional method for generating negative facts used by many previous works, but the majority of negative facts generated in this way can be easily discriminated from positive facts, and will contribute little towards the training. Inspired by generative adversarial networks (GANs), we use one knowledge graph embedding model as a negative sample generator to assist the training of our desired model, which acts as the discriminator in GANs. The objective of the generator is to generate difficult negative samples that can maximize their likeliness determined by the discriminator, while the discriminator minimizes its training loss. This framework is independent of the concrete form of generator and discriminator, and therefore can utilize a wide variety of knowledge graph embedding models as its building blocks. In experiments, we adversarially train two translation-based models, TransE and TransD, each with assistance from one of the two probability-based models, DistMult and ComplEx. We evaluate the performances of KBGAN on the link prediction task, using three knowledge base completion datasets: FB15k-237, WN18 and WN18RR. Experimental results show that adversarial training substantially improves the performances of target embedding models under various settings. Although the recent progress is substantial, deep learning methods can be vulnerable to the maliciously generated adversarial examples. In this paper, we present a novel training procedure and a thresholding test strategy, towards robust detection of adversarial examples. In training, we propose to minimize the reverse cross-entropy (RCE), which encourages a deep network to learn latent representations that better distinguish adversarial examples from normal ones. In testing, we propose to use a thresholding strategy as the detector to filter out adversarial examples for reliable predictions. Our method is simple to implement using standard algorithms, with little extra training cost compared to the common cross-entropy minimization. We apply our method to defend various attacking methods on the widely used MNIST and CIFAR-10 datasets, and achieve significant improvements on robust predictions under all the threat models in the adversarial setting. Recent development in the field of Deep Learning have exposed the underlying vulnerability of Deep Neural Network (DNN) against adversarial examples. In image classification, an adversarial example is a carefully modified image that is visually imperceptible to the original image but can cause DNN model to misclassify it. Training the network with Gaussian noise is an effective technique to perform model regularization, thus improving model robustness against input variation. Inspired by this classical method, we explore to utilize the regularization characteristic of noise injection to improve DNN's robustness against adversarial attack. In this work, we propose Parametric-Noise-Injection (PNI) which involves trainable Gaussian noise injection at each layer on either activation or weights through solving the min-max optimization problem, embedded with adversarial training. These parameters are trained explicitly to achieve improved robustness. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work that uses trainable noise injection to improve network robustness against adversarial attacks, rather than manually configuring the injected noise level through cross-validation. The extensive results show that our proposed PNI technique effectively improves the robustness against a variety of powerful white-box and black-box attacks such as PGD, C & W, FGSM, transferable attack and ZOO attack. Last but not the least, PNI method improves both clean- and perturbed-data accuracy in comparison to the state-of-the-art defense methods, which outperforms current unbroken PGD defense by 1.1 and 6.8 on clean test data and perturbed test data respectively using Resnet-20 architecture. We introduce two tactics to attack agents trained by deep reinforcement learning algorithms using adversarial examples, namely the strategically-timed attack and the enchanting attack. In the strategically-timed attack, the adversary aims at minimizing the agent's reward by only attacking the agent at a small subset of time steps in an episode. Limiting the attack activity to this subset helps prevent detection of the attack by the agent. We propose a novel method to determine when an adversarial example should be crafted and applied. In the enchanting attack, the adversary aims at luring the agent to a designated target state. This is achieved by combining a generative model and a planning algorithm: while the generative model predicts the future states, the planning algorithm generates a preferred sequence of actions for luring the agent. A sequence of adversarial examples is then crafted to lure the agent to take the preferred sequence of actions. We apply the two tactics to the agents trained by the state-of-the-art deep reinforcement learning algorithm including DQN and A3C. In 5 Atari games, our strategically timed attack reduces as much reward as the uniform attack (i.e., attacking at every time step) does by attacking the agent 4 times less often. Our enchanting attack lures the agent toward designated target states with a more than 70 success rate. Videos are available at this http URL The main contribution of this paper is a simple semi-supervised pipeline that only uses the original training set without collecting extra data. It is challenging in 1) how to obtain more training data only from the training set and 2) how to use the newly generated data. In this work, the generative adversarial network (GAN) is used to generate unlabeled samples. We propose the label smoothing regularization for outliers (LSRO). This method assigns a uniform label distribution to the unlabeled images, which regularizes the supervised model and improves the baseline. We verify the proposed method on a practical problem: person re-identification (re-ID). This task aims to retrieve a query person from other cameras. We adopt the deep convolutional generative adversarial network (DCGAN) for sample generation, and a baseline convolutional neural network (CNN) for representation learning. Experiments show that adding the GAN-generated data effectively improves the discriminative ability of learned CNN embeddings. On three large-scale datasets, Market-1501, CUHK03 and DukeMTMC-reID, we obtain +4.37 , +1.6 and +2.46 improvement in rank-1 precision over the baseline CNN, respectively. We additionally apply the proposed method to fine-grained bird recognition and achieve a +0.6 improvement over a strong baseline. The code is available at this https URL In recent years, defending adversarial perturbations to natural examples in order to build robust machine learning models trained by deep neural networks (DNNs) has become an emerging research field in the conjunction of deep learning and security. In particular, MagNet consisting of an adversary detector and a data reformer is by far one of the strongest defenses in the black-box oblivious attack setting, where the attacker aims to craft transferable adversarial examples from an undefended DNN model to bypass an unknown defense module deployed on the same DNN model. Under this setting, MagNet can successfully defend a variety of attacks in DNNs, including the high-confidence adversarial examples generated by the Carlini and Wagner's attack based on the @math distortion metric. However, in this paper, under the same attack setting we show that adversarial examples crafted based on the @math distortion metric can easily bypass MagNet and mislead the target DNN image classifiers on MNIST and CIFAR-10. We also provide explanations on why the considered approach can yield adversarial examples with superior attack performance and conduct extensive experiments on variants of MagNet to verify its lack of robustness to @math distortion based attacks. Notably, our results substantially weaken the assumption of effective threat models on MagNet that require knowing the deployed defense technique when attacking DNNs (i.e., the gray-box attack setting). Data poisoning is a type of adversarial attack on machine learning models wherein the attacker adds examples to the training set to manipulate the behavior of the model at test time. This paper explores a broad class of poisoning attacks on neural nets. The proposed attacks use "clean-labels"; they don't require the attacker to have any control over the labeling of training data. They are also targeted; they control the behavior of the classifier on a specific test instance without noticeably degrading classifier performance on other instances. For example, an attacker could add a seemingly innocuous image (that is properly labeled) to a training set for a face recognition engine, and control the identity of a chosen person at test time. Because the attacker does not need to control the labeling function, poisons could be entered into the training set simply by putting them online and waiting for them to be scraped by a data collection bot. We present an optimization-based method for crafting poisons, and show that just one single poison image can control classifier behavior when transfer learning is used. For full end-to-end training, we present a "watermarking" strategy that makes poisoning reliable using multiple ( 50) poisoned training instances. We demonstrate our method by generating poisoned frog images from the CIFAR dataset and using them to manipulate image classifiers. The existence of evasion attacks during the test phase of machine learning algorithms represents a significant challenge to both their deployment and understanding. These attacks can be carried out by adding imperceptible perturbations to inputs to generate adversarial examples and finding effective defenses and detectors has proven to be difficult. In this paper, we step away from the attack-defense arms race and seek to understand the limits of what can be learned in the presence of a test-time adversary. In particular, we extend the Probably Approximately Correct (PAC)-learning framework to account for the presence of an adversary. We first define corrupted hypothesis classes which arise from standard binary hypothesis classes in the presence of an evasion adversary and derive the Vapnik-Chervonenkis (VC)-dimension for these, denoted as the Adversarial VC-dimension. We then show that a corresponding Fundamental Theorem of Statistical learning can be proved for evasion adversaries, where the sample complexity is controlled by the Adversarial VC-dimension. We then explicitly derive the Adversarial VC-dimension for halfspace classifiers in the presence of a sample-wise norm-constrained adversary of the type commonly studied for evasion attacks and show that it is the same as the standard VC-dimensiont, closing an open question. Finally, we prove that the Adversarial VC-dimension can be either larger or smaller than the standard VC-dimension depending on the hypothesis class and adversary, making it an interesting object of study in its own right. Adversarial perturbations of normal images are usually imperceptible to humans, but they can seriously confuse state-of-the-art machine learning models. What makes them so special in the eyes of image classifiers? In this paper, we show empirically that adversarial examples mainly lie in the low probability regions of the training distribution, regardless of attack types and targeted models. Using statistical hypothesis testing, we find that modern neural density models are surprisingly good at detecting imperceptible image perturbations. Based on this discovery, we devised PixelDefend, a new approach that purifies a maliciously perturbed image by moving it back towards the distribution seen in the training data. The purified image is then run through an unmodified classifier, making our method agnostic to both the classifier and the attacking method. As a result, PixelDefend can be used to protect already deployed models and be combined with other model-specific defenses. Experiments show that our method greatly improves resilience across a wide variety of state-of-the-art attacking methods, increasing accuracy on the strongest attack from 63 to 84 for Fashion MNIST and from 32 to 70 for CIFAR-10. We present a method for transferring neural representations from label-rich source domains to unlabeled target domains. Recent adversarial methods proposed for this task learn to align features across domains by fooling a special domain critic network. However, a drawback of this approach is that the critic simply labels the generated features as in-domain or not, without considering the boundaries between classes. This can lead to ambiguous features being generated near class boundaries, reducing target classification accuracy. We propose a novel approach, Adversarial Dropout Regularization (ADR), to encourage the generator to output more discriminative features for the target domain. Our key idea is to replace the critic with one that detects non-discriminative features, using dropout on the classifier network. The generator then learns to avoid these areas of the feature space and thus creates better features. We apply our ADR approach to the problem of unsupervised domain adaptation for image classification and semantic segmentation tasks, and demonstrate significant improvement over the state of the art. We also show that our approach can be used to train Generative Adversarial Networks for semi-supervised learning. We present a method for transferring neural representations from label-rich source domains to unlabeled target domains. Recent adversarial methods proposed for this task learn to align features across domains by fooling a special domain critic network. However, a drawback of this approach is that the critic simply labels the generated features as in-domain or not, without considering the boundaries between classes. This can lead to ambiguous features being generated near class boundaries, reducing target classification accuracy. We propose a novel approach, Adversarial Dropout Regularization (ADR), to encourage the generator to output more discriminative features for the target domain. Our key idea is to replace the critic with one that detects non-discriminative features, using dropout on the classifier network. The generator then learns to avoid these areas of the feature space and thus creates better features. We apply our ADR approach to the problem of unsupervised domain adaptation for image classification and semantic segmentation tasks, and demonstrate significant improvement over the state of the art. We also show that our approach can be used to train Generative Adversarial Networks for semi-supervised learning. Adversarial examples are malicious inputs designed to fool machine learning models. They often transfer from one model to another, allowing attackers to mount black box attacks without knowledge of the target model's parameters. Adversarial training is the process of explicitly training a model on adversarial examples, in order to make it more robust to attack or to reduce its test error on clean inputs. So far, adversarial training has primarily been applied to small problems. In this research, we apply adversarial training to ImageNet. Our contributions include: (1) recommendations for how to succesfully scale adversarial training to large models and datasets, (2) the observation that adversarial training confers robustness to single-step attack methods, (3) the finding that multi-step attack methods are somewhat less transferable than single-step attack methods, so single-step attacks are the best for mounting black-box attacks, and (4) resolution of a "label leaking" effect that causes adversarially trained models to perform better on adversarial examples than on clean examples, because the adversarial example construction process uses the true label and the model can learn to exploit regularities in the construction process. Many machine learning models are vulnerable to adversarial examples: inputs that are specially crafted to cause a machine learning model to produce an incorrect output. Adversarial examples that affect one model often affect another model, even if the two models have different architectures or were trained on different training sets, so long as both models were trained to perform the same task. An attacker may therefore train their own substitute model, craft adversarial examples against the substitute, and transfer them to a victim model, with very little information about the victim. Recent work has further developed a technique that uses the victim model as an oracle to label a synthetic training set for the substitute, so the attacker need not even collect a training set to mount the attack. We extend these recent techniques using reservoir sampling to greatly enhance the efficiency of the training procedure for the substitute model. We introduce new transferability attacks between previously unexplored (substitute, victim) pairs of machine learning model classes, most notably SVMs and decision trees. We demonstrate our attacks on two commercial machine learning classification systems from Amazon (96.19 misclassification rate) and Google (88.94 ) using only 800 queries of the victim model, thereby showing that existing machine learning approaches are in general vulnerable to systematic black-box attacks regardless of their structure.