We study the inverse power index problem for weighted voting games: the problem of finding a weighted voting game in which the power of the players is as close as possible to a certain target distribution. Our goal is to find algorithms that solve this problem exactly. Thereto, we study various subclasses of simple games, and their associated representation methods. We survey algorithms and impossibility results for the synthesis problem, i.e., converting a representation of a simple game into another representation. We contribute to the synthesis problem by showing that it is impossible to compute in polynomial time the list of ceiling coalitions (also known as shift-maximal losing coalitions) of a game from its list of roof coalitions (also known as shift-minimal winning coalitions), and vice versa. Then, we proceed by studying the problem of enumerating the set of weighted voting games. We present first a naive algorithm for this, running in doubly exponential time. Using our knowledge of the synthesis problem, we then improve on this naive algorithm, and we obtain an enumeration algorithm that runs in quadratic exponential time (that is, O(2^(n^2) p(n)) for a polynomial p). Moreover, we show that this algorithm runs in output-polynomial time, making it the best possible enumeration algorithm up to a polynomial factor. Finally, we propose an exact anytime algorithm for the inverse power index problem that runs in exponential time. This algorithm is straightforward and general: it computes the error for each game enumerated, and outputs the game that minimizes this error. By the genericity of our approach, our algorithm can be used to find a weighted voting game that optimizes any exponential time computable function. We implement our algorithm for the case of the normalized Banzhaf index, and we perform experiments in order to study performance and error convergence.
Leech proposes in @cite_48 @cite_8 an approach that largely resembles the method of : it is the same, with the exception that a different updating rule is used. The method that Leech uses for computing the Banzhaf index is not mentioned. The focus in this paper is on the results that are obtained after applying the method to the 15-member EU council (also see @cite_43 ), and to the board of governors of the International Monetary Fund.
@cite_48 @cite_43 @cite_8
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The Banzhaf index of power in a voting situation depends on the number of ways in which each voter can effect a “swing” in the outcome. It is comparable---but not actually equivalent---to the better-known Shapley-Shubik index, which depends on the number of alignments or “orders of support” in which each voter is pivotal. This paper investigates some properties of the Banzhaf index, the main topics being its derivation from axioms and its behavior in weighted-voting models when the number of small voters tends to infinity. These matters have previously been studied from the Shapley-Shubik viewpoint, but the present work reveals some striking differences between the two indices. The paper also attempts to promote better communication and less duplication of mathematical effort by identifying and describing several other theories, formally equivalent to Banzhaf’s, that are found in fields ranging from sociology to electrical engineering. An extensive bibliography is provided. In general in an organisation whose system of governance involves weighted voting, a member's weight in terms of the number of votes and the formal power it represents differ. Power indices provide a means of analysing this difference. The paper uses new algorithms for computing power indices for large games. Three analyses are carried out: (1) the distribution of Banzhaf voting power among members in 1999; the results show that the United States has considerably more power over ordinary decisions than its weight of 17 but that the use of special supermajorities limits its power; (2) the effect of varying the majority requirement on the power of the IMF to act and the powers of members to prevent and initiate action (Coleman indices); the results show the effect of supermajorities severely limits the power to act and therefore renders the voting system ineffective in democratic terms, also the sovereignty of the United States within the IMF is effectively limited to just the power of veto; (3) the paper proposes the determination of the weights instrumentally by means of an iterative algorithm to give the required power distribution; this would be a useful procedure for determining appropriate changes in weights consequent on changes to individual countries' quotas; this is applied to the 1999 data. Policy recommendations are, first, that the IMF use only simple majority voting, and discontinue using special supermajorities, and, second, allocate voting weight instrumentally using power indices. An important aspect of mechanism design in social choice protocols and multiagent systems is to discourage insincere and manipulative behaviour. We examine the computational complexity of false-name manipulation in weighted voting games which are an important class of coalitional voting games. Weighted voting games have received increased interest in the multiagent community due to their compact representation and ability to model coalitional formation scenarios. Bachrach and Elkind in their AAMAS 2008 paper examined divide and conquer false-name manipulation in weighted voting games from the point of view of Shapley-Shubik index. We analyse the corresponding case of the Banzhaf index and check how much the Banzhaf index of a player increases or decreases if it splits up into sub-players. A pseudo-polynomial algorithm to find the optimal split is also provided. Bachrach and Elkind also mentioned manipulation via merging as an open problem. In the paper, we examine the cases where a player annexes other players or merges with them to increase their Banzhaf index or Shapley-Shubik index payoff. We characterize the computational complexity of such manipulations and provide limits to the manipulation. The annexation non-monotonicity paradox is also discovered in the case of the Banzhaf index. The results give insight into coalition formation and manipulation. This paper examines the system of Qualified Majority Voting, used by the Council of the European Union, from the perspective of enlargement of the Union. It uses an approach based on power indices due to Penrose (1946), Banzhaf (1965) and Coleman (1971) to make two analyses: (1) the question of the voting power of member countries from the point of view of fairness, and (2) the question of how the threshold number of votes required for QMV should be determined. It studies two scenarios for change from 2005 onwards envisaged by the Nice Treaty: (1) no enlargement, the EU comprising 15 member countries, and (2) full enlargement to 27 members by the accession of all the present twelve candidates. The proposal is made that fair weights be determined algorithmically as a technical or routine matter as the membership changes. The analysis of how the threshold affects power shows the trade-offs that countries face between their blocking power and the power of the Council to act. The main findings are: (1) that the weights laid down in the Nice Treaty are close to being fair, the only significant discrepancies being the under-representation of Germany and Romania, and the over-representation of Spain and Poland; (2) the threshold required for a decision is set too high for the Council to be an effective decision making body. Preference aggregation is used in a variety of multiagent applications, and as a result, voting theory has become an important topic in multiagent system research. However, power indices (which reflect how much "real power" a voter has in a weighted voting system) have received relatively little attention, although they have long been studied in political science and economics. The Banzhaf power index is one of the most popular; it is also well-defined for any simple coalitional game. In this paper, we examine the computational complexity of calculating the Banzhaf power index within a particular multiagent domain, a network flow game. Agents control the edges of a graph; a coalition wins if it can send a flow of a given size from a source vertex to a target vertex. The relative power of each edge agent reflects its significance in enabling such a flow, and in real-world networks could be used, for example, to allocate resources for maintaining parts of the network. We show that calculating the Banzhaf power index of each agent in this network flow domain is #P-complete. We also show that for some restricted network flow domains there exists a polynomial algorithm to calculate agents' Banzhaf power indices. Preference aggregation is used in a variety of multiagent applications, and as a result, voting theory has become an important topic in multiagent system research. However, power indices (which reflect how much "real power" a voter has in a weighted voting system) have received relatively little attention, although they have long been studied in political science and economics. We consider a particular multiagent domain, a threshold network flow game. Agents control the edges of a graph; a coalition wins if it can send a flow that exceeds a given threshold from a source vertex to a target vertex. The relative power of each edge agent reflects its significance in enabling such a flow, and in real-world networks could be used, for example, to allocate resources for maintaining parts of the network. We examine the computational complexity of calculating two prominent power indices, the Banzhaf index and the Shapley-Shubik index, in this network flow domain. We also consider the complexity of calculating the core in this domain. The core can be used to allocate, in a stable manner, the gains of the coalition that is established. We show that calculating the Shapley-Shubik index in this network flow domain is NP-hard, and that calculating the Banzhaf index is #P-complete. Despite these negative results, we show that for some restricted network flow domains there exists a polynomial algorithm for calculating agents' Banzhaf power indices. We also show that computing the core in this game can be performed in polynomial time. Let f be a random Boolean formula that is an instance of 3-SAT. We consider the problem of computing the least real number k such that if the ratio of the number of clauses over the number of variables of f strictly exceeds k , then f is almost certainly unsatisfiable. By a well-known and more or less straightforward argument, it can be shown that kF5.191. This upper bound was improved by to 4.758 by first providing new improved bounds for the occupancy problem. There is strong experimental evidence that the value of k is around 4.2. In this work, we define, in terms of the random formula f, a decreasing sequence of random variables such that, if the expected value of any one of them converges to zero, then f is almost certainly unsatisfiable. By letting the expected value of the first term of the sequence converge to zero, we obtain, by simple and elementary computations, an upper bound for k equal to 4.667. From the expected value of the second term of the sequence, we get the value 4.601q . In general, by letting the U This work was performed while the first author was visiting the School of Computer Science, Carleton Ž University, and was partially supported by NSERC Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council . of Canada , and by a grant from the University of Patras for sabbatical leaves. The second and third Ž authors were supported in part by grants from NSERC Natural Sciences and Engineering Research . Council of Canada . During the last stages of this research, the first and last authors were also partially Ž . supported by EU ESPRIT Long-Term Research Project ALCOM-IT Project No. 20244 . †An extended abstract of this paper was published in the Proceedings of the Fourth Annual European Ž Symposium on Algorithms, ESA’96, September 25]27, 1996, Barcelona, Spain Springer-Verlag, LNCS, . pp. 27]38 . That extended abstract was coauthored by the first three authors of the present paper. Correspondence to: L. M. Kirousis Q 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. CCC 1042-9832r98r030253-17 253 A simple game is a pair consisting of a finite set N of players and a set of winning coalitions. (Vector-) weighted majority games ((V) WMG) are a special case of simple games, in which an integer (vector) weight can be assigned to each player and there is a quota which a coalition has to achieve in order to win. Binary decision diagrams (BDDs) are used as compact representations for Boolean functions and sets of subsets. This paper shows, how a quasi-reduced and ordered BDD (QOBDD) of the winning coalitions of a (V) WMG can be build, how one can compute the minimal winning coalitions and how one can easily compute the Banzhaf, Shapley-Shubik, Holler-Packel and Deegan-Packel indices of the players. E.g. in case of weighted majority games it is shown that the Banzhaf and Holler-Packel indices of all players can be computed in expected time and in general, the Banzhaf indices can be computed in time linear in the size of the QOBDD representation of the winning coalitions. Other running times are proven as well. The algorithms were tested on some real world games, e.g. the International Monetary Fund and the EU Treaty of Nice. Let ( F ) be a family of subsets of the ground set [n] = 1, 2, . . . , n . For each ( i [n] ) we let ( p( F ,i) ) be the number of pairs of subsets that differ in the element i and exactly one of them is in ( F ). We interpret ( p( F ,i) ) as the influence of that element. The normalized Banzhaf vector of ( F ), denoted ( B( F ) ), is the vector ( (B( F ,1), ,B( F ,n)) ), where ( B( F ,i)= p( F ,i) p( F ) ) and ( p( F ) ) is the sum of all ( p( F ,i) ). The Banzhaf vector has been studied in the context of measuring voting power in voting games as well as in Boolean circuit theory. In this paper we investigate which non-negative vectors of sum 1 can be closely approximated by Banzhaf vectors of simple voting games. In particular, we show that if a vector has most of its weight concentrated in k < n coordinates, then it must be essentially the Banzhaf vector of some simple voting game with n − k dummy voters. We propose a novel schedulability analysis for verifying the feasibility of large periodic task sets under the rate monotonic algorithm when the exact test cannot be applied on line due to prohibitively long execution times. The proposed test has the same complexity as the original Liu and Layland (1973) bound, but it is less pessimistic, thus allowing it to accept task sets that would be rejected using the original approach. The performance of the proposed approach is evaluated with respect to the classical Liu and Layland method and theoretical bounds are derived as a function of n (the number of tasks) and for the limit case of n tending to infinity. The analysis is also extended to include aperiodic servers and blocking times due to concurrency control protocols. Extensive simulations on synthetic tasks sets are presented to compare the effectiveness of the proposed test with respect to the Liu and Layland method and the exact response time analysis. Weighted voting is a classic model of cooperation among agents in decision-making domains. In such games, each player has a weight, and a coalition of players wins the game if its total weight meets or exceeds a given quota. A player's power in such games is usually not directly proportional to his weight, and is measured by a power index, the most prominent among which are the Shapley-Shubik index and the Banzhaf index. In this paper, we investigate by how much a player can change his power, as measured by the Shapley-Shubik index or the Banzhaf index, by means of a false-name manipulation, i.e., splitting his weight among two or more identities. For both indices, we provide upper and lower bounds on the effect of weight-splitting. We then show that checking whether a beneficial split exists is NP-hard, and discuss efficient algorithms for restricted cases of this problem, as well as randomized algorithms for the general case. We also provide an experimental evaluation of these algorithms. Finally, we examine related forms of manipulative behavior, such as annexation, where a player subsumes other players, or merging, where several players unite into one. We characterize the computational complexity of such manipulations and provide limits on their effects. For the Banzhaf index, we describe a new paradox, which we term the Annexation Non-monotonicity Paradox. Continuous-time stochastic volatility models are becoming an increasingly popular way to describe moderate and high-frequency financial data. Barndorff-Nielsen and Shephard (2001a) proposed a class of models where the volatility behaves according to an Ornstein–Uhlenbeck (OU) process, driven by a positive Levy process without Gaussian component. These models introduce discontinuities, or jumps, into the volatility process. They also consider superpositions of such processes and we extend that to the inclusion of a jump component in the returns. In addition, we allow for leverage effects and we introduce separate risk pricing for the volatility components. We design and implement practically relevant inference methods for such models, within the Bayesian paradigm. The algorithm is based on Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods and we use a series representation of Levy processes. MCMC methods for such models are complicated by the fact that parameter changes will often induce a change in the distribution of the representation of the process and the associated problem of overconditioning. We avoid this problem by dependent thinning methods. An application to stock price data shows the models perform very well, even in the face of data with rapid changes, especially if a superposition of processes with different risk premiums and a leverage effect is used. Schulze's rule and ranked pairs are two Condorcet methods that both satisfy many natural axiomatic properties. Schulze's rule is used in the elections of many organizations, including the Wikimedia Foundation, the Pirate Party of Sweden and Germany, the Debian project, and the Gento Project. Both rules are immune to control by cloning alternatives, but little is otherwise known about their strategic robustness, including resistance to manipulation by one or more voters, control by adding or deleting alternatives, adding or deleting votes, and bribery. Considering computational barriers, we show that these types of strategic behavior are NP-hard for ranked pairs (both constructive, in making an alternative a winner, and destructive, in precluding an alternative from being a winner). Schulze's rule, in comparison, remains vulnerable at least to constructive manipulation by a single voter and destructive manipulation by a coalition. As the first such polynomialtime rule known to resist all such manipulations, and considering also the broad axiomatic support, ranked pairs seems worthwhile to consider for practical applications. We consider the performance of two algorithms, GUC and SC studied by M. T. Chao and J. Franco SIAM J. Comput.15(1986), 1106?1118;Inform. Sci.51(1990), 289?314 and V. Chvatal and B. Reed in“Proceedings of the 33rd IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, 1992,” pp. 620?627, when applied to a random instance ? of a boolean formula in conjunctive normal form withnvariables and ?cn? clauses of sizekeach. For the case wherek=3, we obtain the exact limiting probability that GUC succeeds. We also consider the situation when GUC is allowed to have limited backtracking, and we improve an existing threshold forcbelow which almost all ? is satisfiable. Fork?4, we obtain a similar result regarding SC with limited backtracking. Many multiagent domains where cooperation among agents is crucial to achieving a common goal can be modeled as coalitional games. However, in many of these domains, agents are unequal in their power to affect the outcome of the game. Prior research on weighted voting games has explored power indices, which reflect how much "real power" a voter has. Although primarily used for voting games, these indices can be applied to any simple coalitional game. Computing these indices is known to be computationally hard in various domains, so one must sometimes resort to approximate methods for calculating them. We suggest and analyze randomized methods to approximate power indices such as the Banzhaf power index and the Shapley---Shubik power index. Our approximation algorithms do not depend on a specific representation of the game, so they can be used in any simple coalitional game. Our methods are based on testing the game's value for several sample coalitions. We show that no approximation algorithm can do much better for general coalitional games, by providing lower bounds for both deterministic and randomized algorithms for calculating power indices. We also provide empirical results regarding our method, and show that it typically achieves much better accuracy and confidence than those required. We present a novel approach to fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) that dramatically improves performance and bases security on weaker assumptions. A central conceptual contribution in our work is a new way of constructing leveled fully homomorphic encryption schemes (capable of evaluating arbitrary polynomial-size circuits), without Gentry's bootstrapping procedure. Specifically, we offer a choice of FHE schemes based on the learning with error (LWE) or ring-LWE (RLWE) problems that have 2λ security against known attacks. For RLWE, we have: • A leveled FHE scheme that can evaluate L-level arithmetic circuits with O(λ · L3) per-gate computation -- i.e., computation quasi-linear in the security parameter. Security is based on RLWE for an approximation factor exponential in L. This construction does not use the bootstrapping procedure. • A leveled FHE scheme that uses bootstrapping as an optimization, where the per-gate computation (which includes the bootstrapping procedure) is O(λ2), independent of L. Security is based on the hardness of RLWE for quasi-polynomial factors (as opposed to the sub-exponential factors needed in previous schemes). We obtain similar results to the above for LWE, but with worse performance. Based on the Ring LWE assumption, we introduce a number of further optimizations to our schemes. As an example, for circuits of large width -- e.g., where a constant fraction of levels have width at least λ -- we can reduce the per-gate computation of the bootstrapped version to O(λ), independent of L, by batching the bootstrapping operation. Previous FHE schemes all required Ω(λ3.5) computation per gate. At the core of our construction is a much more effective approach for managing the noise level of lattice-based ciphertexts as homomorphic operations are performed, using some new techniques recently introduced by Brakerski and Vaikuntanathan (FOCS 2011). We present a novel approach to the automatic acquisition of taxonomies or concept hierarchies from a text corpus. The approach is based on Formal Concept Analysis (FCA), a method mainly used for the analysis of data, i.e. for investigating and processing explicitly given information. We follow Harris' distributional hypothesis and model the context of a certain term as a vector representing syntactic dependencies which are automatically acquired from the text corpus with a linguistic parser. On the basis of this context information, FCA produces a lattice that we convert into a special kind of partial order constituting a concept hierarchy. The approach is evaluated by comparing the resulting concept hierarchies with hand-crafted taxonomies for two domains: tourism and finance. We also directly compare our approach with hierarchical agglomerative clustering as well as with Bi-Section-KMeans as an instance of a divisive clustering algorithm. Furthermore, we investigate the impact of using different measures weighting the contribution of each attribute as well as of applying a particular smoothing technique to cope with data sparseness. In the budgeted learning problem, we are allowed to experiment on a set of alternatives (given a fixed experimentation budget) with the goal of picking a single alternative with the largest possible expected payoff. Approximation algorithms for this problem were developed by Guha and Munagala by rounding a linear program that couples the various alternatives together. In this paper we present an index for this problem, which we call the ratio index, which also guarantees a constant factor approximation. Index-based policies have the advantage that a single number (i.e. the index) can be computed for each alternative irrespective of all other alternatives, and the alternative with the highest index is experimented upon. This is analogous to the famous Gittins index for the discounted multi-armed bandit problem. The ratio index has several interesting structural properties. First, we show that it can be computed in strongly polynomial time. Second, we show that with the appropriate discount factor, the Gittins index and our ratio index are constant factor approximations of each other, and hence the Gittins index also gives a constant factor approximation to the budgeted learning problem. Finally, we show that the ratio index can be used to create an index-based policy that achieves an O(1)-approximation for the finite horizon version of the multi-armed bandit problem. Moreover, the policy does not require any knowledge of the horizon (whereas we compare its performance against an optimal strategy that is aware of the horizon). This yields the following surprising result: there is an index-based policy that achieves an O(1)-approximation for the multi-armed bandit problem, oblivious to the underlying discount factor. A problem of index coding with side information was first considered by Birk and Kol in 1998. In this study, a generalization of index coding scheme, where transmitted symbols are subject to errors, is studied. Error-correcting methods for such a scheme, and their parameters, are investigated. In particular, the following question is discussed: given the side information hypergraph of index coding scheme and the maximal number of erroneous symbols δ , what is the shortest length of a linear index code, such that every receiver is able to recover the required information? This question turns out to be a generalization of the problem of finding a shortest length error-correcting code with a prescribed error-correcting capability in the classical coding theory. The Singleton bound and two other bounds, referred to as the α-bound and the κ -bound, for the optimal length of a linear error-correcting index code (ECIC) are established. For large alphabets, a construction based on concatenation of an optimal index code with a maximum distance separable classical code is shown to attain the Singleton bound. For smaller alphabets, however, this construction may not be optimal. A random construction is also analyzed. It yields another inexplicit bound on the length of an optimal linear ECIC. Further, the problem of error-correcting decoding by a linear ECIC is studied. It is shown that in order to decode correctly the desired symbol, the decoder is required to find one of the vectors, belonging to an affine space containing the actual error vector. The syndrome decoding is shown to produce the correct output if the weight of the error pattern is less or equal to the error-correcting capability of the corresponding ECIC. Finally, the notion of static ECIC, which is suitable for use with a family of instances of an index coding problem, is introduced. Several bounds on the length of static ECICs are derived, and constructions for static ECICs are discussed. Connections of these codes to weakly resilient Boolean functions are established. This paper reports on a novel technique for literature indexing and searching in a mechanized library system. The notion of relevance is taken as the key concept in the theory of information retrieval and a comparative concept of relevance is explicated in terms of the theory of probability. The resulting technique called “Probabilistic Indexing,” allows a computing machine, given a request for information, to make a statistical inference and derive a number (called the “relevance number”) for each document, which is a measure of the probability that the document will satisfy the given request. The result of a search is an ordered list of those documents which satisfy the request ranked according to their probable relevance. The paper goes on to show that whereas in a conventional library system the cross-referencing (“see” and “see also”) is based solely on the “semantical closeness” between index terms, statistical measures of closeness between index terms can be defined and computed. Thus, given an arbitrary request consisting of one (or many) index term(s), a machine can elaborate on it to increase the probability of selecting relevant documents that would not otherwise have been selected. Finally, the paper suggests an interpretation of the whole library problem as one where the request is considered as a clue on the basis of which the library system makes a concatenated statistical inference in order to provide as an output an ordered list of those documents which most probably satisfy the information needs of the user.