A ubiquitous computing environment consists of many resources that need to be identified by users and applications. Users and developers require some way to identify resources by human readable names. In addition, ubiquitous computing environments impose additional requirements such as the ability to work well with ad hoc situations and the provision of names that depend on context. The Non-anchored Unified Naming (NUN) system was designed to satisfy these requirements. It is based on relative naming among resources and provides the ability to name arbitrary types of resources. By having resources themselves take part in naming, resources are able to able contribute their specialized knowledge into the name resolution process, making context-dependent mapping of names to resources possible. The ease of which new resource types can be added makes it simple to incorporate new types of contextual information within names. In this paper, we describe the naming system and evaluate its use.
INS @cite_13 identifies network services using intentional names, which specify the kind of network service desired instead of the network address. It supports the lazy binding of names to resources by combining naming and transport. Network services must have access to all relevant contextual information when registering an intentional name. INS uses a network of intentional name resolvers as its infrastructure.
@cite_13
2125855750 2083158002 1981293710 2092433893 2151972741 1954903228 2170810185 2076441874 2469760695 2018505857 2024375092 2103376620 2008427387 2159285576 2118695882 2112316694 2089219361 2031535643 2082550445 1969314716
This paper presents the design and implementation of the Intentional Naming System (INS), a resource discovery and service location system for dynamic and mobile networks of devices and computers. Such environments require a naming system that is (i) expressive, to describe and make requests based on specific properties of services, (ii) responsive, to track changes due to mobility and performance, (iii) robust, to handle failures, and (iv) easily configurable. INS uses a simple language based on attributes and values for its names. Applications use the language to describe what they are looking for (i.e., their intent), not where to find things (i.e., not hostnames). INS implements a late binding mechanism that integrates name resolution and message routing, enabling clients to continue communicating with end-nodes even if the name-to-address mappings change while a session is in progress. INS resolvers self-configure to form an application-level overlay network, which they use to discover new services, perform late binding, and maintain weak consistency of names using soft-state name exchanges and updates. We analyze the performance of the INS algorithms and protocols, present measurements of a Java-based implementation, and describe three applications we have implemented that demonstrate the feasibility and utility of INS. Name services are critical for mapping logical resource names to physical resources in large-scale distributed systems. The Domain Name System (DNS) used on the Internet, however, is slow, vulnerable to denial of service attacks, and does not support fast updates. These problems stem fundamentally from the structure of the legacy DNS.This paper describes the design and implementation of the Cooperative Domain Name System (CoDoNS), a novel name service, which provides high lookup performance through proactive caching, resilience to denial of service attacks through automatic load-balancing, and fast propagation of updates. CoDoNS derives its scalability, decentralization, self-organization, and failure resilience from peer-to-peer overlays, while it achieves high performance using the Beehive replication framework. Cryptographic delegation, instead of host-based physical delegation, limits potential malfeasance by namespace operators and creates a competitive market for namespace management. Backwards compatibility with existing protocols and wire formats enables CoDoNS to serve as a backup for legacy DNS, as well as a complete replacement. Performance measurements from a real-life deployment of the system in PlanetLab shows that CoDoNS provides fast lookups, automatically reconfigures around faults without manual involvement and thwarts distributed denial of service attacks by promptly redistributing load across nodes. This paper presents an overview of the MobilityFirst network architecture, currently under development as part of the US National Science Foundation's Future Internet Architecture (FIA) program. The proposed architecture is intended to directly address the challenges of wireless access and mobility at scale, while also providing new services needed for emerging mobile Internet application scenarios. After briefly outlining the original design goals of the project, we provide a discussion of the main architectural concepts behind the network design, identifying key features such as separation of names from addresses, public-key based globally unique identifiers (GUIDs) for named objects, global name resolution service (GNRS) for dynamic binding of names to addresses, storage-aware routing and late binding, content- and context-aware services, optional in-network compute layer, and so on. This is followed by a brief description of the MobilityFirst protocol stack as a whole, along with an explanation of how the protocol works at end-user devices and inside network routers. Example of specific advanced services supported by the protocol stack, including multi-homing, mobility with disconnection, and content retrieval caching are given for illustration. Further design details of two key protocol components, the GNRS name resolution service and the GSTAR routing protocol, are also described along with sample results from evaluation. In conclusion, a brief description of an ongoing multi-site experimental proof-of-concept deployment of the MobilityFirst protocol stack on the GENI testbed is provided. Several projects propose an information-centric approach to the network of the future. Such an approach makes efficient content distribution possible by making information retrieval host-independent and integrating into the network storage for caching information. Requests for particular content can, thus, be satisfied by any host or server holding a copy. The current security model based on host authentication is not applicable in this context. Basic security functionality must instead be attached directly to the data and its naming scheme. A naming scheme to name content and other objects that enables verification of data integrity as well as owner authentication and identification is here presented. The naming scheme is designed for flexibility and extensibility, e.g., to integrate other security properties like access control. At the same time, the naming scheme offers persistent IDs even though the content, content owner and or owner's organizational structure, or location change. The requirements for the naming scheme and an analysis showing how the proposed scheme fulfills them are presented. Experience with prototyping the naming scheme is also discussed. The naming scheme builds the foundation for a secure information-centric network infrastructure that can also solve some of the main security problems of today's Internet. The Internet consists of rapidly increasing number of hosts interconnected by constantly evolving networks of links and routers. Interdomain routing in the Internet is coordinated by the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP). The BGP allows each autonomous system (AS) to choose its own administrative policy in selecting routes and propagating reachability information to others. These routing policies are constrained by the contractual commercial agreements between administrative domains. For example, an AS sets its policy so that it does not provide transit services between its providers. Such policies imply that AS relationships are an important aspect of the Internet structure. We propose an augmented AS graph representation that classifies AS relationships into customer-provider, peering, and sibling relationships. We classify the types of routes that can appear in BGP routing tables based on the relationships between the ASs in the path and present heuristic algorithms that infer AS relationships from BGP routing tables. The algorithms are tested on publicly available BGP routing tables. We verify our inference results with AT&T internal information on its relationship with neighboring ASs. As much as 99.1 of our inference results are confirmed by the AT&T internal information. We also verify our inferred sibling relationships with the information acquired from the WHOIS lookup service. More than half of our inferred sibling-to-sibling relationships are confirmed by the WHOIS lookup service. To the best of our knowledge, there has been no publicly available information about AS relationships and this is the first attempt in understanding and inferring AS relationships in the Internet. We show evidence that some routing table entries stem from router misconfigurations. The domain name service (DNS) plays an important role in the operation of the Internet, providing a two-way mapping between domain names and their numerical identifiers. Given its fundamental role, it is not surprising that a wide variety of malicious activities involve the domain name service in one way or another. For example, bots resolve DNS names to locate their command and control servers, and spam mails contain URLs that link to domains that resolve to scam servers. Thus, it seems beneficial to monitor the use of the DNS system for signs that indicate that a certain name is used as part of a malicious operation. In this paper, we introduce EXPOSURE, a system that employs large-scale, passive DNS analysis techniques to detect domains that are involved in malicious activity. We use 15 features that we extract from the DNS traffic that allow us to characterize different properties of DNS names and the ways that they are queried. Our experiments with a large, real-world data set consisting of 100 billion DNS requests, and a real-life deployment for two weeks in an ISP show that our approach is scalable and that we are able to automatically identify unknown malicious domains that are misused in a variety of malicious activity (such as for botnet command and control, spamming, and phishing). This paper presents a new distributed approach to detecting DDoS (distributed denial of services) flooding attacks at the traffic-flow level The new defense system is suitable for efficient implementation over the core networks operated by Internet service providers (ISPs). At the early stage of a DDoS attack, some traffic fluctuations are detectable at Internet routers or at the gateways of edge networks. We develop a distributed change-point detection (DCD) architecture using change aggregation trees (CAT). The idea is to detect abrupt traffic changes across multiple network domains at the earliest time. Early detection of DDoS attacks minimizes the floe cling damages to the victim systems serviced by the provider. The system is built over attack-transit routers, which work together cooperatively. Each ISP domain has a CAT server to aggregate the flooding alerts reported by the routers. CAT domain servers collaborate among themselves to make the final decision. To resolve policy conflicts at different ISP domains, a new secure infrastructure protocol (SIP) is developed to establish mutual trust or consensus. We simulated the DCD system up to 16 network domains on the Cyber Defense Technology Experimental Research (DETER) testbed, a 220-node PC cluster for Internet emulation experiments at the University of Southern California (USC) Information Science Institute. Experimental results show that four network domains are sufficient to yield a 98 percent detection accuracy with only 1 percent false-positive alarms. Based on a 2006 Internet report on autonomous system (AS) domain distribution, we prove that this DDoS defense system can scale well to cover 84 AS domains. This security coverage is wide enough to safeguard most ISP core networks from real-life DDoS flooding attacks. In a social community, multiple persons may share the same name, phone number or some other identifying attributes. This, along with other phenomena, such as name abbreviation, name misspelling, and human error lead to erroneous aggregation of records of multiple persons under a single reference. Such mistakes affect the performance of document retrieval, web search, database integration, and more importantly, improper attribution of credit (or blame). The task of entity disambiguation partitions the records belonging to multiple persons with the objective that each partition is composed of records of a unique person. Existing solutions to this task use either biographical attributes, or auxiliary features that are collected from external sources, such as Wikipedia. However, for many scenarios, such auxiliary features are not available, or they are costly to obtain. Besides, the attempt of collecting biographical or external data sustains the risk of privacy violation. In this work, we propose a method for solving entity disambiguation task from timestamped link information obtained from a collaboration network. Our method is non-intrusive of privacy as it uses only the graph topology of an anonymized network. Experimental results on two real-life academic collaboration networks show that the proposed method has satisfactory performance. The sharp rise of OTT application services in recent years has called for greater application-to-network visibility. These dynamic application services represent a foremost drive in the communication ecosystem changes. However, the tight coupling between network services and network infrastructures pose challenges for network providers. They need more dynamicity in their network architectures to meet the requirements of application services. SDN and NFV is the combination of networking technologies that facilitate such an evolution. But is it sufficient to allow dynamic application-to-network interactions? In this paper, we rely on SDN-enabled NFV assets as a strong foundation to propose a dynamic and adaptable “Network-as-a-Service” architecture. We leverage our NaaS proposal with a resilient Network Exposition Layer allowing to express offers and demands of network services. To demonstrate the offered features, we propose three architecture deployment models: broad, customized and event-based dynamic model. We then instantiate our architecture within the WebRTC-based communication services, illustrating the collaboration between network providers and Communication Service Providers (CSPs). Attacks against Internet routing are increasing in number and severity. Contributing greatly to these attacks is the absence of origin authentication: there is no way to validate claims of address ownership or location. The lack of such services enables not only attacks by malicious entities, but indirectly allow seemingly inconsequential miconfigurations to disrupt large portions of the Internet. This paper considers the semantics, design, and costs of origin authentication in interdomain routing. We formalize the semantics of address delegation and use on the Internet, and develop and characterize broad classes of origin authentication proof systems. We estimate the address delegation graph representing the current use of IPv4 address space using available routing data. This effort reveals that current address delegation is dense and relatively static: as few as 16 entities perform 80 of the delegation on the Internet. We conclude by evaluating the proposed services via traced based simulation. Our simulation shows the enhanced proof systems can reduce significantly reduce resource costs associated with origin authentication. Current ICN research favors a key-value-store view of the network, where location agnostic names typically resolve to documents, data blocks or sensor values. We believe that names should not only refer to data but also to functions and computation tasks. In Named Function Networking (NFN) the network's role becomes to resolve names to computations, par example by reducing λ-expressions. In doing so, the network starts acting like a computing machine, capable of not only caching content but also computation results. We present basic concepts of NFN and report on our implementation that embeds the name resolution logic of CCNx in a generic resolver of λ-expressions. We demonstrate its resolution power beyond mere content-pull, to also leverage code-drag and computation-push as well as generalizing CCNx protocol functions. Internet services run on multiple servers in different locations, serving clients that are often mobile and multihomed. This does not match well with today's network stack, designed for communication between fixed hosts with topology-dependent addresses. As a result, online service providers resort to clumsy and management-intensive work-arounds--forfeiting the scalability of hierarchical addressing to support virtual server migration, directing all client traffic through dedicated load balancers, restarting connections when hosts move, and so on. In this paper, we revisit the design of the network stack to meet the needs of online services. The centerpiece of our Serval architecture is a new Service Access Layer (SAL) that sits above an unmodified network layer, and enables applications to communicate directly on service names. The SAL provides a clean service-level control data plane split, enabling policy, control, and in-stack name-based routing that connects clients to services via diverse discovery techniques. By tying active sockets to the control plane, applications trigger updates to service routing state upon invoking socket calls, ensuring up-to-date service resolution. With Serval, end-points can seamlessly change network addresses, migrate flows across interfaces, or establish additional flows for efficient and uninterrupted service access. Experiments with our high-performance in-kernel prototype, and several example applications, demonstrate the value of a unified networking solution for online services. The Unmanaged Internet Architecture (UIA) provides zero-configuration connectivity among mobile devices through personal names. Users assign personal names through an ad hoc device introduction process requiring no central allocation. Once assigned, names bind securely to the global identities of their target devices independent of network location. Each user manages one namespace, shared among all the user's devices and always available on each device. Users can also name other users to share resources with trusted acquaintances. Devices with naming relationships automatically arrange connectivity when possible, both in ad hoc networks and using global infrastructure when available. A UIA prototype demonstrates these capabilities using optimistic replication for name resolution and group management and a routing algorithm exploiting the user's social network for connectivity. Replication of information among multiple World Wide Web servers is necessary to support high request rates to popular Web sites. A clustered Web server organization is preferable to multiple independent mirrored servers because it maintains a single interface to the users and has the potential to be more scalable, fault-tolerant and better load-balanced. In this paper, we propose a Web cluster architecture in which the Domain Name System (DNS) server, which dispatches the user requests among the servers through the URL name to the IP address mapping mechanism, is integrated with a redirection request mechanism based on HTTP. This should alleviate the side-effect of caching the IP address mapping at intermediate name servers. We compare many alternative mechanisms, including synchronous vs. asynchronous activation and centralized vs. distributed decisions on redirection. Moreover, we analyze the reassignment of entire domains or individual client requests, different types of status information and different server selection policies for redirecting requests. Our results show that the combination of centralized and distributed dispatching policies allows the Web server cluster to handle high load skews in the WWW environment. We present, validate, and apply an active measurement technique that ascertains whether candidate IPv4 and IPv6 server addresses are “siblings,” i.e., assigned to the same physical machine. In contrast to prior efforts limited to passive monitoring, opportunistic measurements, or end-client populations, we propose an active methodology that generalizes to all TCP-reachable devices, including servers. Our method extends prior device fingerprinting techniques to improve their feasibility in modern environments, and uses them to support measurement-based detection of sibling interfaces. We validate our technique against a diverse set of 61 web servers with known sibling addresses and find it to be over 97 accurate with 99 precision. Finally, we apply the technique to characterize the top ( )6,400 Alexa IPv6-capable web domains, and discover that a DNS name in common does not imply that the corresponding IPv4 and IPv6 addresses are on the same machine, network, or even autonomous system. Understanding sibling and non-sibling relationships gives insight not only into IPv6 deployment and evolution, but also helps characterize the potential for correlated failures and susceptibility to certain attacks. The highly successful architecture and protocols of today's Internet may operate poorly in environments characterized by very long delay paths and frequent network partitions. These problems are exacerbated by end nodes with limited power or memory resources. Often deployed in mobile and extreme environments lacking continuous connectivity, many such networks have their own specialized protocols, and do not utilize IP. To achieve interoperability between them, we propose a network architecture and application interface structured around optionally-reliable asynchronous message forwarding, with limited expectations of end-to-end connectivity and node resources. The architecture operates as an overlay above the transport layers of the networks it interconnects, and provides key services such as in-network data storage and retransmission, interoperable naming, authenticated forwarding and a coarse-grained class of service. The Domain Name System, DNS, is based on nameserver delegations, which introduce complex and subtle dependencies between names and nameservers. In this paper, we present results from a large scale survey of DNS, and show that these dependencies lead to a highly insecure naming system. We report specifically on three aspects of DNS security: the properties of the DNS trusted computing base, the extent and impact of existing vulnerabilities in the DNS infrastructure, and the ease with which attacks against DNS can be launched. The survey shows that a typical name depends on 46 servers on average, whose compromise can lead to domain hijacks, while names belonging to some countries depend on a few hundred servers. An attacker exploiting well-documented vulnerabilities in DNS nameservers can hijack more than 30 of the names appearing in the Yahoo and DMOZ.org directories. And certain nameservers, especially in educational institutions, control as much as 10 of the namespace. We consider arbitrary risk-averse users, whose costs of improving security are given by an arbitrary convex function. In our model, user probability to incur damage (from an attack) depends on both his own security and network security: thus, security is interdependent. We introduce two user types (normal and malicious), and allow one user type (malicious users) to subvert insurer monitoring, even if insurers perfectly enforce (at zero cost) security levels of normal users. We prove that with malicious users present, equilibrium contract that specifies user security fails to exist. We demonstrate, in a general setting, a failure of cyber-insurers to underwrite contracts conditioning the premiums on security. We consider arbitrary risk-averse users, whose costs of improving security are given by an arbitrary convex function. In our model, user probability to incur damage (from an attack) depends on both his own security and network security: thus, security is interdependent. We introduce two user types (normal and malicious), and allow one user type (malicious users) to subvert insurer monitoring, even if insurers perfectly enforce (at zero cost) security levels of normal users. We prove that with malicious users present, equilibrium contract that specifies user security fails to exist. We demonstrate, in a general setting, a failure of cyber-insurers to underwrite contracts conditioning the premiums on security. A wide range of malicious activities rely on the domain name service (DNS) to manage their large, distributed networks of infected machines. As a consequence, the monitoring and analysis of DNS queries has recently been proposed as one of the most promising techniques to detect and blacklist domains involved in malicious activities (e.g., phishing, spam, botnets command-and-control, etc.). EXPOSURE is a system we designed to detect such domains in real time, by applying 15 unique features grouped in four categories. We conducted a controlled experiment with a large, real-world dataset consisting of billions of DNS requests. The extremely positive results obtained in the tests convinced us to implement our techniques and deploy it as a free, online service. In this article, we present the Exposure system and describe the results and lessons learned from 17 months of its operation. Over this amount of time, the service detected over 100K malicious domains. The statistics about the time of usage, number of queries, and target IP addresses of each domain are also published on a daily basis on the service Web page. Network information distribution is a fundamental service for any anonymization network. Even though anonymization and information distribution about the network are two orthogonal issues, the design of the distribution service has a direct impact on the anonymization. Requiring each node to know about all other nodes in the network (as in Tor and AN.ON -- the most popular anonymization networks) limits scalability and offers a playground for intersection attacks. The distributed designs existing so far fail to meet security requirements and have therefore not been accepted in real networks. In this paper, we combine probabilistic analysis and simulation to explore DHT-based approaches for distributing network information in anonymization networks. Based on our findings we introduce NISAN, a novel approach that tries to scalably overcome known security problems. It allows for selecting nodes uniformly at random from the full set of all available peers, while each of the nodes has only limited knowledge about the network. We show that our scheme has properties similar to a centralized directory in terms of preventing malicious nodes from biasing the path selection. This is done, however, without requiring to trust any third party. At the same time our approach provides high scalability and adequate performance. Additionally, we analyze different design choices and come up with diverse proposals depending on the attacker model. The proposed combination of security, scalability, and simplicity, to the best of our knowledge, is not available in any other existing network information distribution system.