In this paper, we identify a new form of attack, called the Balance attack, against proof-of-work blockchain systems. The novelty of this attack consists of delaying network communications between multiple subgroups of nodes with balanced mining power. Our theoretical analysis captures the precise tradeoff between the network delay and the mining power of the attacker needed to double spend in Ethereum with high probability. We quantify our probabilistic analysis with statistics taken from the R3 consortium, and show that a single machine needs 20 minutes to attack the consortium. Finally, we run an Ethereum private chain in a distributed system with similar settings as R3 to demonstrate the feasibility of the approach, and discuss the application of the Balance attack to Bitcoin. Our results clearly confirm that main proof-of-work blockchain protocols can be badly suited for consortium blockchains.
The attacks become harder if the external action is taken after the transaction is committed by the blockchain. Rosenfeld's attack @cite_0 consists of issuing a transaction to a merchant. The attacker then starts solo-mining a longer branch while waiting for @math blocks to be appended so that the merchant takes an external action in response to the commit. The attack success probability depends on the number @math of blocks the merchant waits before taking an external action and the attacker mining power. However, when the attacker has more mining power than the rest of the system, the attack, also called or , is guaranteed successful, regardless of the value @math . To make the attack successful when the attacker owns only a quarter of the mining power, the attacker can incentivize other miners to form a coalition @cite_32 until the coalition owns more than half of the total mining power.
@cite_0 @cite_32
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Several new services incentivize clients to compete in solving large computation tasks in exchange for financial rewards. This model of competitive distributed computation enables every user connected to the Internet to participate in a game in which he splits his computational power among a set of competing pools -- the game is called a computational power splitting game. We formally model this game and show its utility in analyzing the security of pool protocols that dictate how financial rewards are shared among the members of a pool. As a case study, we analyze the Bitcoin crypto currency which attracts computing power roughly equivalent to billions of desktop machines, over 70 of which is organized into public pools. We show that existing pool reward sharing protocols are insecure in our game-theoretic analysis under an attack strategy called the "block withholding attack". This attack is a topic of debate, initially thought to be ill-incentivized in today's pool protocols: i.e., causing a net loss to the attacker, and later argued to be always profitable. Our analysis shows that the attack is always well-incentivized in the long-run, but may not be so for a short duration. This implies that existing pool protocols are insecure, and if the attack is conducted systematically, Bitcoin pools could lose millions of dollars worth in months. The equilibrium state is a mixed strategy -- that is -- in equilibrium all clients are incentivized to probabilistically attack to maximize their payoffs rather than participate honestly. As a result, the Bitcoin network is incentivized to waste a part of its resources simply to compete. There has been increasing interest in the problem of building accurate data mining models over aggregate data, while protecting privacy at the level of individual records. One approach for this problem is to randomize the values in individual records, and only disclose the randomized values. The model is then built over the randomized data, after first compensating for the randomization (at the aggregate level). This approach is potentially vulnerable to privacy breaches: based on the distribution of the data, one may be able to learn with high confidence that some of the randomized records satisfy a specified property, even though privacy is preserved on average.In this paper, we present a new formulation of privacy breaches, together with a methodology, "amplification", for limiting them. Unlike earlier approaches, amplification makes it is possible to guarantee limits on privacy breaches without any knowledge of the distribution of the original data. We instantiate this methodology for the problem of mining association rules, and modify the algorithm from [9] to limit privacy breaches without knowledge of the data distribution. Next, we address the problem that the amount of randomization required to avoid privacy breaches (when mining association rules) results in very long transactions. By using pseudorandom generators and carefully choosing seeds such that the desired items from the original transaction are present in the randomized transaction, we can send just the seed instead of the transaction, resulting in a dramatic drop in communication and storage cost. Finally, we define new information measures that take privacy breaches into account when quantifying the amount of privacy preserved by randomization. Bitcoin was recently introduced as a peer-to-peer electronic currency in order to facilitate transactions outside the traditional financial system. The core of Bitcoin, the Blockchain, is the history of the transactions in the system maintained by all miners as a distributed shared register. New blocks in the Blockchain contain the last transactions in the system and are added by miners after a block mining process that consists in solving a resource consuming proof-of-work (cryptographic puzzle). The reward is a motivation for mining process but also could be an incentive for attacks such as selfish mining. In this paper we propose a solution for one of the major problems in Bitcoin : selfish mining or block-withholding attack. This attack is conducted by adversarial or selfish miners in order to either earn undue rewards or waste the computational power of honest miners. Contrary to recent solutions, our solution, ZeroBlock, prevents block-withholding using a technique free of timestamp that can be forged. Moreover, we show that our solution is compliant with nodes churn. Bitcoin is without a doubt the most successful cryptocurrency in circulation today, making it an extremely valuable target for attackers. Indeed, many studies have highlighted ways to compromise one or several Bitcoin nodes. In this paper, we take a different perspective and study the effect of large-scale network-level attacks such as the ones that may be launched by Autonomous Systems (ASes). We show that attacks that are commonly believed to be hard, such as isolating 50 of the mining power, are actually within the reach of anyone with access to a BGP-enabled network and hijacking less than 900 prefixes. Once on path, AS-level adversaries can then partition the Bitcoin network or delay block propagation significantly. The key factors that enable these attacks are the extreme centralization of Bitcoin, both from a routing and a mining perspective, along with the fact that Bitcoin messages are sent unencrypted, without integrity guarantees. We demonstrate the feasibility of large-scale attacks in practice against the deployed Bitcoin software and quantify their disruptive network-wide impact. The potential damage to Bitcoin is severe. By isolating a part of the network or delaying the propagation of blocks, network-level attackers can cause a significant amount of mining power to be wasted, leading to revenue losses and enabling a wide range of attacks such as double spending. We provide several suggestions on approaches to mitigate such attacks employing both short-term and long-term measures. The mining process in blockchain requires solving a proof-of-work puzzle, which is resource expensive to implement in mobile devices due to the high computing power and energy needed. In this paper, we, for the first time, consider edge computing as an enabler for mobile blockchain. In particular, we study edge computing resource management and pricing to support mobile blockchain applications in which the mining process of miners can be offloaded to an edge computing service provider. We formulate a two-stage Stackelberg game to jointly maximize the profit of the edge computing service provider and the individual utilities of the miners. In the first stage, the service provider sets the price of edge computing nodes. In the second stage, the miners decide on the service demand to purchase based on the observed prices. We apply the backward induction to analyze the sub-game perfect equilibrium in each stage for both uniform and discriminatory pricing schemes. For the uniform pricing where the same price is applied to all miners, the existence and uniqueness of Stackelberg equilibrium are validated by identifying the best response strategies of the miners. For the discriminatory pricing where the different prices are applied to different miners, the Stackelberg equilibrium is proved to exist and be unique by capitalizing on the Variational Inequality theory. Further, the real experimental results are employed to justify our proposed model. Abrupt changes in the miner hash rate applied to a proof-of-work (PoW) blockchain can adversely affect user experience and security. Because different PoW blockchains often share hashing algorithms, miners face a complex choice in deciding how to allocate their hash power among chains. We present an economic model that leverages Modern Portfolio Theory to predict a miner’s allocation over time using price data and inferred risk tolerance. The model matches actual allocations with mean absolute error within 20 for four out of the top five miners active on both Bitcoin (BTC) and Bitcoin Cash (BCH) blockchains. A model of aggregate allocation across those four miners shows excellent agreement in magnitude with the actual aggregate as well a correlation coefficient of 0.649. The accuracy of the aggregate allocation model is also sufficient to explain major historical changes in inter-block time (IBT) for BCH. Because estimates of miner risk are not time-dependent and our model is otherwise price-driven, we are able to use it to anticipate the effect of a major price shock on hash allocation and IBT in the BCH blockchain. Using a Monte Carlo simulation, we show that, despite mitigation by the new difficulty adjustment algorithm, a price drop of 50 could increase the IBT by 50 for at least a day, with a peak delay of 100 . In this paper, we examine the issue of mining association rules among items in a large database of sales transactions. The mining of association rules can be mapped into the problem of discovering large itemsets where a large itemset is a group of items which appear in a sufficient number of transactions. The problem of discovering large itemsets can be solved by constructing a candidate set of itemsets first and then, identifying, within this candidate set, those itemsets that meet the large itemset requirement. Generally this is done iteratively for each large k-itemset in increasing order of k where a large k-itemset is a large itemset with k items. To determine large itemsets from a huge number of candidate large itemsets in early iterations is usually the dominating factor for the overall data mining performance. To address this issue, we propose an effective hash-based algorithm for the candidate set generation. Explicitly, the number of candidate 2-itemsets generated by the proposed algorithm is, in orders of magnitude, smaller than that by previous methods, thus resolving the performance bottleneck. Note that the generation of smaller candidate sets enables us to effectively trim the transaction database size at a much earlier stage of the iterations, thereby reducing the computational cost for later iterations significantly. Extensive simulation study is conducted to evaluate performance of the proposed algorithm. As the most successful cryptocurrency to date, Bitcoin constitutes a target of choice for attackers. While many attack vectors have already been uncovered, one important vector has been left out though: attacking the currency via the Internet routing infrastructure itself. Indeed, by manipulating routing advertisements (BGP hijacks) or by naturally intercepting traffic, Autonomous Systems (ASes) can intercept and manipulate a large fraction of Bitcoin traffic. This paper presents the first taxonomy of routing attacks and their impact on Bitcoin, considering both small-scale attacks, targeting individual nodes, and large-scale attacks, targeting the network as a whole. While challenging, we show that two key properties make routing attacks practical: (i) the efficiency of routing manipulation; and (ii) the significant centralization of Bitcoin in terms of mining and routing. Specifically, we find that any network attacker can hijack few (<100) BGP prefixes to isolate 50 of the mining power---even when considering that mining pools are heavily multi-homed. We also show that on-path network attackers can considerably slow down block propagation by interfering with few key Bitcoin messages. We demonstrate the feasibility of each attack against the deployed Bitcoin software. We also quantify their effectiveness on the current Bitcoin topology using data collected from a Bitcoin supernode combined with BGP routing data. The potential damage to Bitcoin is worrying. By isolating parts of the network or delaying block propagation, attackers can cause a significant amount of mining power to be wasted, leading to revenue losses and enabling a wide range of exploits such as double spending. To prevent such effects in practice, we provide both short and long-term countermeasures, some of which can be deployed immediately. One of the biggest setbacks in traditional frequent pattern mining is that overwhelmingly many of the discovered patterns are redundant. A prototypical example of such redundancy is a freerider pattern where the pattern contains a true pattern and some additional noise events. A technique for filtering freerider patterns that has proved to be efficient in ranking itemsets is to use a partition model where a pattern is divided into two subpatterns and the observed support is compared to the expected support under the assumption that these two subpatterns occur independently. In this paper we develop a partition model for episodes, patterns discovered from sequential data. An episode is essentially a set of events, with possible restrictions on the order of events. Unlike with itemset mining, computing the expected support of an episode requires surprisingly sophisticated methods. In order to construct the model, we partition the episode into two subepisodes. We then model how likely the events in each subepisode occur close to each other. If this probability is high--which is often the case if the subepisode has a high support--then we can expect that when one event from a subepisode occurs, then the remaining events occur also close by. This approach increases the expected support of the episode, and if this increase explains the observed support, then we can deem the episode uninteresting. We demonstrate in our experiments that using the partition model can effectively and efficiently reduce the redundancy in episodes. Abstract Cryptographic assets such as Bitcoin and Ethereum provide distributed consensus with a Proof-of-Work protocol and incentive-based engineering. The consensus is inherently dependent on the value of the asset due to the incentives. The value of these assets frequently fluctuates, which in turn influences the incentive component of the consensus mechanism. For a proof-of-work consensus to be secure, the participation reward must have a perceived real-world value. The future of this perception is not at all clear. The recent 70 drop in the value of Bitcoin versus the US Dollar may be precipitating a circle of declining security of the platform which we explore in depth in this paper. In this paper, we analyze the impact of fluctuations on the security of Bitcoin now, and in the future. We introduce a novel method to examine the rationale of a miner based on the price fluctuations. We integrate our method with an existing security evaluation framework and simulator. Using our approach, we determine and report on the impact of the value of the cryptographic asset on the security of the blockchain given the miner’s rationale. Our method allows us to evaluate the impact of different methods of incentive manipulation such as reduced block-reward and transaction fees, by simulation. The Bitcoin protocol requires nodes to quickly distribute newly created blocks. Strong nodes can, however, gain higher payoffs by withholding blocks they create and selectively postponing their publication. The existence of such selfish mining attacks was first reported by Eyal and Sirer, who have demonstrated a specific deviation from the standard protocol (a strategy that we name SM1). Side-channel attacks are usually performed by employing the "divide-and-conquer" approach, meaning that leaking information is collected in a divide step, and later on exploited in the conquer step. The idea is to extract as much information as possible during the divide step, and to exploit the gathered information as efficiently as possible within the conquer step. Focusing on both of these steps, we discuss potential enhancements of Bernstein's cache-timing attack against the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). Concerning the divide part, we analyze the impact of attacking different key-chunk sizes, aiming at the extraction of more information from the overall encryption time. Furthermore, we analyze the most recent improvement of time-driven cache attacks, presented by Aly and ElGayyar, according to its applicability on ARM Cortex-A platforms. For the conquer part, we employ the optimal key-enumeration algorithm as proposed by Veyrat-Charvillonaet al to significantly reduce the complexity of the exhaustive key-search phase compared to the currently employed threshold-based approach. This in turn leads to more practical attacks. Additionally, we provide extensive experimental results of the proposed enhancements on two Android-based smartphones, namely a Google Nexus S and a Samsung Galaxy SII. Most popular blockchain solutions, like Bitcoin, rely on proof-of-work, guaranteeing that the output of the consensus is agreed upon with high probability. However, this probability depends on the delivery of messages and that the computational power of the system is sufficiently scattered among pools of nodes in the network so that no pool can mine more blocks faster than the crowd. New approaches, like Ethereum, generalise the proof-of-work approach by letting individuals deploy their own private blockchain with high transaction throughput. As companies are starting to deploy private chains, it has become crucial to better understand the guarantees blockchains offer in such a small and controlled environment. In this paper, we present the , an execution that we experienced when building our private chain at NICTA Data61. Even though this anomaly has never been acknowledged before, it may translate into dramatic consequences for the user of blockchains. Named after the infamous Paxos anomaly, this anomaly makes dependent transactions, like "Bob sends money to Carole after he received money from Alice" impossible. This anomaly relies on the fact that existing blockchains do not ensure consensus safety deterministically: there is no way for Bob to make sure that Alice actually sent him coins without Bob using an external mechanism, like converting these coins into a fiat currency that allows him to withdraw. We also explore smart contracts as a potential alternative to transactions in order to freeze coins, and show implementations of smart contract that can suffer from the Blockchain anomaly and others that may cope with it. In this paper, we propose an algorithm for constructing guess-and-determine attacks on keystream generators and apply it to the cryptanalysis of the alternating step generator (ASG) and two its modifications (MASG and MASG0). In a guess-and-determine attack, we first “guess” some part of an initial state and then apply some procedure to determine, if the guess was correct and we can use the guessed information to solve the problem, thus performing an exhaustive search over all possible assignments of bits forming a chosen part of an initial state. We propose to use in the “determine” part the algorithms for solving Boolean satisfiability problem (SAT). It allows us to consider sets of bits with nontrivial structure. For each such set it is possible to estimate the runtime of a corresponding guess-and-determine attack via the Monte-Carlo method, so we can search for a set of bits yielding the best attack via a black-box optimization algorithm augmented with several SAT-specific features. We constructed and implemented such attacks on ASG, MASG, and MASG0 to prove that the constructed runtime estimations are reliable. We show, that the constructed attacks are better than the trivial ones, which imply exhaustive search over all possible states of the control register, and present the results of experiments on cryptanalysis of ASG and MASG MASG0 with total registers length of 72 and 96, which have not been previously published in the literature. A major approach to overcoming the performance and scalability limitations of current blockchain protocols is to use sharding which is to split the overheads of processing transactions among multiple, smaller groups of nodes. These groups work in parallel to maximize performance while requiring significantly smaller communication, computation, and storage per node, allowing the system to scale to large networks. However, existing sharding-based blockchain protocols still require a linear amount of communication (in the number of participants) per transaction, and hence, attain only partially the potential benefits of sharding. We show that this introduces a major bottleneck to the throughput and latency of these protocols. Aside from the limited scalability, these protocols achieve weak security guarantees due to either a small fault resiliency (e.g., 1 8 and 1 4) or high failure probability, or they rely on strong assumptions (e.g., trusted setup) that limit their applicability to mainstream payment systems. We propose RapidChain, the first sharding-based public blockchain protocol that is resilient to Byzantine faults from up to a 1 3 fraction of its participants, and achieves complete sharding of the communication, computation, and storage overhead of processing transactions without assuming any trusted setup. RapidChain employs an optimal intra-committee consensus algorithm that can achieve very high throughputs via block pipelining, a novel gossiping protocol for large blocks, and a provably-secure reconfiguration mechanism to ensure robustness. Using an efficient cross-shard transaction verification technique, our protocol avoids gossiping transactions to the entire network. Our empirical evaluations suggest that RapidChain can process (and confirm) more than 7,300 tx sec with an expected confirmation latency of roughly 8.7 seconds in a network of 4,000 nodes with an overwhelming time-to-failure of more than 4,500 years. We design and implement TwinsCoin, the first cryptocurrency based on a provably secure and scalable public blockchain design using both proof-of-work and proof-of-stake mechanisms. Different from the proof-of-work based Bitcoin, our construction uses two types of resources, computing power and coins (i.e., stake). The blockchain in our system is more robust than that in a pure proof-of-work based system; even if the adversary controls the majority of mining power, we can still have the chance to secure the system by relying on honest stake. In contrast, Bitcoin blockchain will be insecure if the adversary controls more than 50 of mining power. Our design follows a recent provably secure proof-of-work proof-of-stake hybrid blockchain[11]. In order to make our construction practical, we considerably enhance its design. In particular, we introduce a new strategy for difficulty adjustment in the hybrid blockchain and provide a theoretical analysis of it. We also show how to construct a light client for proof-of-stake cryptocurrencies and evaluate the proposal practically. We implement our new design. Our implementation uses a recent modular development framework for blockchains, called Scorex. It allows us to change only certain parts of an application leaving other codebase intact. In addition to the blockchain implementation, a testnet is deployed. Source code is publicly available. Paul Kocher recently developped attacks based on the electric consumption of chips that perform cryptographic computations. Among those attacks, the "Differential Power Analysis" (DPA) is probably one of the most impressive and most difficult to avoid.In this paper, we present several ideas to resist this type of attack, and in particular we develop one of them which leads, interestingly, to rather precise mathematical analysis. Thus we show that it is possible to build an implementation that is provably DPA-resistant, in a "local" and restricted way (i.e. when - given a chip with a fixed key - the attacker only tries to detect predictable local deviations in the differentials of mean curves). We also briefly discuss some more general attacks, that are sometimes efficient whereas the "original" DPA fails. Many measures of consumption have been done on real chips to test the ideas presented in this paper, and some of the obtained curves are printed here. We introduce randomized Limited View (LV) adversary codes that provide protection against an adversary that uses their partial view of the channel to construct an adversarial error vector that is added to the channel. For a codeword of length N, the adversary selects a subset of size ρrN of components to “see”, and then “adds” an adversarial error vector of weight ρwN to the codeword. Performance of the code is measured by the probability of the decoder failure in recovering the sent message. An (N, qRN, δ)-limited view adversary is a code of rate R that ensures that the success chance of the adversary in making decoder to fail is bounded by δ. Our main motivation to study these codes is providing protection for wireless communication at the physical layer of networks. We formalize the definition of adversarial error and decoder failure, construct a code with efficient encoding and decoding that allows the adversary to, depending on the code rate, read up to half of the sent codeword and add error on the same coordinates. The code is non-linear, has an efficient decoding algorithm, and is constructed using a message authentication code (MAC) and a Folded Reed-Solomon (FRS) code. The decoding algorithm uses an innovative approach that combines the list decoding algorithm of the FRS codes and the MAC verification algorithm to eliminate the exponential size of the list output from the decoding algorithm. We discuss our results and future work. We consider decentralized estimation of a noise-corrupted deterministic signal in a bandwidth-constrained sensor network communicating through an insecure medium. Each sensor collects a noise-corrupted version, performs a local quantization, and transmits a 1-bit message to an ally fusion center through a wireless medium where the sensor outputs are vulnerable to unauthorized observation from enemy third-party fusion centers. In this paper, we introduce an encrypted wireless sensor network (eWSN) concept where stochastic enciphers operating on binary sensor outputs are introduced to disguise the sensor outputs, creating an eWSN scheme. Noting that the plaintext (original) and ciphertext (disguised) messages are constrained to a single bit due to bandwidth constraints, we consider a binary channel-like scheme to probabilistically encipher (i.e., flip) the sensor outputs. We first consider a symmetric key encryption case where the "0" and "1" enciphering probabilities are equal. The key is represented by the bit enciphering probability. Specifically, we derive the optimal estimator of the deterministic signal approached from a maximum-likelihood perspective and the Cramer-Rao lower bound for the estimation problem utilizing the key. Furthermore, we analyze the effect of the considered cryptosystem on enemy fusion centers that are unaware of the fact that the WSN is encrypted (i.e., we derive the bias, variance, and mean square error (MSE) of the enemy fusion center). We then extend the cryptosystem to admit unequal enciphering schemes for "0" and "1", and analyze the estimation problem from both the prospectives of ally (that has access to the enciphering keys) and (third-party) enemy fusion centers. The results show that when designed properly, a significant amount of bias and MSE can be introduced to an enemy fusion center with the cost to the ally fusion center being a marginal increase [factor of (1-Omega1-Omega0 )-2, where 1-Omegaj, j=0, 1 is the "j" enciphering probability in the estimation variance (compared to the variance of a fusion center estimate operating in a vulnerable WSN). Selfish mining, originally discovered by [9], is a well-known attack where a selfish miner, under certain conditions, can gain a disproportionate share of reward by deviating from the honest behavior. In this paper, we expand the mining strategy space to include novel "stubborn" strategies that, for a large range of parameters, earn the miner more revenue. Consequently, we show that the selfish mining attack is not (in general) optimal. Further, we show how a miner can further amplify its gain by non-trivially composing mining attacks with network-level eclipse attacks. We show, surprisingly, that given the attacker's best strategy, in some cases victims of an eclipse attack can actually benefit from being eclipsed!