The class QMA(k), introduced by , consists of all languages that can be verified using k unentangled quantum proofs. Many of the simplest questions about this class have remained embarrassingly open: for example, can we give any evidence that k quantum proofs are more powerful than one? Does QMA(k)=QMA(2) for k>=2? Can QMA(k) protocols be amplified to exponentially small error? In this paper, we make progress on all of the above questions. First, we give a protocol by which a verifier can be convinced that a 3SAT formula of size n is satisfiable, with constant soundness, given O(sqrt(n)) unentangled quantum witnesses with O(log n) qubits each. Our protocol relies on the existence of very short PCPs. Second, we show that assuming a weak version of the Additivity Conjecture from quantum information theory, any QMA(2) protocol can be amplified to exponentially small error, and QMA(k)=QMA(2) for all k>=2. Third, we prove the nonexistence of "perfect disentanglers" for simulating multiple Merlins with one.
In 2003, Kobayashi, Matsumoto, and Yamakami @cite_20 defined a generalization of @math called @math . Here there are @math Merlins, who send Arthur @math quantum proofs @math respectively that are guaranteed to be unentangled with each other. (Thus @math .) Notice that in the classical case, this generalization is completely uninteresting: we have @math for all @math , since we can always simulate @math Merlins by a single Merlin who sends Arthur a concatenation of the @math proofs. In the quantum case, however, a single Merlin could cheat by the @math proofs, and we know of no general way to detect such entanglement.
@cite_20
2951054288 2949754091 2115164346 2947949186 2807350215 2163684974 1596450573 2085180799 2096390054 2006290558 2949369157 2119098193 2761821748 2148488235 2232305496 2079729767 1480296433 2547753369 2341328795 2012492277
This paper introduces quantum multiple-Merlin''-Arthur proof systems in which Arthur receives multiple quantum proofs that are unentangled with each other. Although classical multi-proof systems are obviously equivalent to classical single-proof systems (i.e., usual Merlin-Arthur proof systems), it is unclear whether or not quantum multi-proof systems collapse to quantum single-proof systems (i.e., usual quantum Merlin-Arthur proof systems). This paper presents a necessary and sufficient condition under which the number of quantum proofs is reducible to two. It is also proved that, in the case of perfect soundness, using multiple quantum proofs does not increase the power of quantum Merlin-Arthur proof systems. We consider the scenario where Alice wants to send a secret (classical) @math -bit message to Bob using a classical key, and where only one-way transmission from Alice to Bob is possible. In this case, quantum communication cannot help to obtain perfect secrecy with key length smaller then @math . We study the question of whether there might still be fundamental differences between the case where quantum as opposed to classical communication is used. In this direction, we show that there exist ciphers with perfect security producing quantum ciphertext where, even if an adversary knows the plaintext and applies an optimal measurement on the ciphertext, his Shannon uncertainty about the key used is almost maximal. This is in contrast to the classical case where the adversary always learns @math bits of information on the key in a known plaintext attack. We also show that there is a limit to how different the classical and quantum cases can be: the most probable key, given matching plain- and ciphertexts, has the same probability in both the quantum and the classical cases. We suggest an application of our results in the case where only a short secret key is available and the message is much longer. In this paper, we show that all languages in NP have logarithmic-size quantum proofs which can be verified provided that two unentangled copies are given. More formally, we introduce the complexity class QMAlog(2) and show that 3COL E QMAlog(2). To obtain this strong and surprising result we have to relax the usual requirements: the completeness is one but the soundness is 1-1 poly. Since the natural classical equivalent of QMAlog(2) is uninteresting (it would be equal to P), this result, like many others, stresses the fact that quantum information is fundamentally different from classical information. It also contributes to our understanding of entanglement since QMAlog = BQP[7]. We study the problem of approximating the commuting-operator value of a two-player non-local game. It is well-known that it is @math -complete to decide whether the classical value of a non-local game is 1 or @math . Furthermore, as long as @math is small enough, this result does not depend on the gap @math . In contrast, a recent result of Fitzsimons, Ji, Vidick, and Yuen shows that the complexity of computing the quantum value grows without bound as the gap @math decreases. In this paper, we show that this also holds for the commuting-operator value of a game. Specifically, in the language of multi-prover interactive proofs, we show that the power of @math (proofs with two provers, one round, completeness probability @math , soundness probability @math , and commuting-operator strategies) can increase without bound as the gap @math gets arbitrarily small. Our results also extend naturally in two ways, to perfect zero-knowledge protocols, and to lower bounds on the complexity of computing the approximately-commuting value of a game. Thus we get lower bounds on the complexity class @math - @math of perfect zero-knowledge multi-prover proofs with approximately-commuting operator strategies, as the gap @math gets arbitrarily small. While we do not know any computable time upper bound on the class @math , a result of the first author and Vidick shows that for @math and @math , the class @math , with constant communication from the provers, is contained in @math . We give a lower bound of @math (ignoring constants inside the function) for this class, which is tight up to polynomial factors assuming the exponential time hypothesis. We show that any language in nondeterministic time @math , where the number of iterated exponentials is an arbitrary function @math , can be decided by a multiprover interactive proof system with a classical polynomial-time verifier and a constant number of quantum entangled provers, with completeness @math and soundness @math , where the number of iterated exponentials is @math and @math is a universal constant. The result was previously known for @math and @math ; we obtain it for any time-constructible function @math . The result is based on a compression technique for interactive proof systems with entangled provers that significantly simplifies and strengthens a protocol compression result of Ji (STOC'17). As a separate consequence of this technique we obtain a different proof of Slofstra's recent result (unpublished) on the uncomputability of the entangled value of multiprover games. Finally, we show that even minor improvements to our compression result would yield remarkable consequences in computational complexity theory and the foundations of quantum mechanics: first, it would imply that the class MIP* contains all computable languages; second, it would provide a negative resolution to a multipartite version of Tsirelson's problem on the relation between the commuting operator and tensor product models for quantum correlations. We show that any number of parties can coherently exchange any one pure quantum state for another, without communication, given prior shared entanglement. Two applications of this fact to the study of multi-prover quantum interactive proof systems are given. First, we prove that there exists a one-round two-prover quantum interactive proof system for which no finite amount of shared entanglement allows the provers to implement an optimal strategy. More specifically, for every fixed input string, there exists a sequence of strategies for the provers, with each strategy requiring more entanglement than the last, for which the probability for the provers to convince the verifier to accept approaches 1. It is not possible, however, for the provers to convince the verifier to accept with certainty with a finite amount of shared entanglement. The second application is a simple proof that multi-prover quantum interactive proofs can be transformed to have near-perfect completeness by the addition of one round of communication. In the generalized Russian cards problem, we have a card deck @math of @math cards and three participants, Alice, Bob, and Cathy, dealt @math , @math , and @math cards, respectively. Once the cards are dealt, Alice and Bob wish to privately communicate their hands to each other via public announcements, without the advantage of a shared secret or public key infrastructure. Cathy should remain ignorant of all but her own cards after Alice and Bob have made their announcements. Notions for Cathy's ignorance in the literature range from Cathy not learning the fate of any individual card with certainty (weak @math -security) to not gaining any probabilistic advantage in guessing the fate of some set of @math cards (perfect @math -security). As we demonstrate, the generalized Russian cards problem has close ties to the field of combinatorial designs, on which we rely heavily, particularly for perfect security notions. Our main result establishes an equivalence between perfectly @math -secure strategies and @math -designs on @math points with block size @math , when announcements are chosen uniformly at random from the set of possible announcements. We also provide construction methods and example solutions, including a construction that yields perfect @math -security against Cathy when @math . We leverage a known combinatorial design to construct a strategy with @math , @math , and @math that is perfectly @math -secure. Finally, we consider a variant of the problem that yields solutions that are easy to construct and optimal with respect to both the number of announcements and level of security achieved. Moreover, this is the first method obtaining weak @math -security that allows Alice to hold an arbitrary number of cards and Cathy to hold a set of @math cards. Alternatively, the construction yields solutions for arbitrary @math , @math and any @math . It is well known that probabilistic boolean decision trees cannot be much more powerful than deterministic ones (N. Nisan, SIAM J. Comput.20, No. 6 (1991), 999?1007). Motivated by a question if randomization can significantly speed up a nondeterministic computation via a boolean decision tree, we address structural properties of Arthur?Merlin games in this model and prove some lower bounds. We consider two cases of interest, the first when the length of communication between the players is limited and the second, if it is not. While in the first case we can carry over the relations between the corresponding Turing complexity classes, in the second case we observe in contrast with Turing complexity that a one-round Merlin?Arthur protocol is as powerful as a general interactive proof system and, in particular, can simulate a one-round Arthur?Merlin protocol. Moreover, we show that sometimes a Merlin?Arthur protocol can be more efficient than an Arthur?Merlin protocol and than a Merlin?Arthur protocol with limited communication. This is the case for a boolean function whose set of zeroes is a code with high minimum distance and a natural uniformity condition. Such functions provide an example when the Merlin?Arthur complexity is 1 with one-sided error ??(23, 1), but at the same time the nondeterministic decision tree complexity is ?(n). The latter should be contrasted with another fact we prove. Namely, if a function has Merlin?Arthur complexity 1 with one-sided error probability ??(0, 23, then its nondeterministic complexity is bounded by a constant. Other results of the paper include connections with the block sensitivity and related combinatorial properties of a boolean function. In a previous paper [BS] we proved, using the elements of the theory of nilpotent groups , that some of the fundamental computational problems in matriz groups belong to NP . These problems were also shown to belong to coNP , assuming an unproven hypothesis concerning finite simple groups . The aim of this paper is to replace most of the (proven and unproven) group theory of [BS] by elementary combinatorial arguments. The result we prove is that relative to a random oracle B , the mentioned matrix group problems belong to ( NP∩coNP ) B . The problems we consider are membership in and order of a matrix group given by a list of generators. These problems can be viewed as multidimensional versions of a close relative of the discrete logarithm problem. Hence NP∩coNP might be the lowest natural complexity class they may fit in. We remark that the results remain valid for black box groups where group operations are performed by an oracle. The tools we introduce seem interesting in their own right. We define a new hierarchy of complexity classes AM ( k ) “just above NP ”, introducing Arthur vs. Merlin games , the bounded-away version of Papdimitriou's Games against Nature . We prove that in spite of their analogy with the polynomial time hierarchy, the finite levels of this hierarchy collapse to AM=AM (2). Using a combinatorial lemma on finite groups [BE], we construct a game by which the nondeterministic player (Merlin) is able to convince the random player (Arthur) about the relation [ G ]= N provided Arthur trusts conclusions based on statistical evidence (such as a Slowly-Strassen type “proof” of primality). One can prove that AM consists precisely of those languages which belong to NP B for almost every oracle B . Our hierarchy has an interesting, still unclarified relation to another hierarchy, obtained by removing the central ingredient from the User vs. Expert games of Goldwasser, Micali and Rackoff. Recently a great deal of attention has been focused on quantum computation following a sequence of results [Bernstein and Vazirani, in Proc. 25th Annual ACM Symposium Theory Comput., 1993, pp. 11--20, SIAM J. Comput., 26 (1997), pp. 1277--1339], [Simon, in Proc. 35th Annual IEEE Symposium Foundations Comput. Sci., 1994, pp. 116--123, SIAM J. Comput., 26 (1997), pp. 1340--1349], [Shor, in Proc. 35th Annual IEEE Symposium Foundations Comput. Sci., 1994, pp. 124--134] suggesting that quantum computers are more powerful than classical probabilistic computers. Following Shor's result that factoring and the extraction of discrete logarithms are both solvable in quantum polynomial time, it is natural to ask whether all of @math can be efficiently solved in quantum polynomial time. In this paper, we address this question by proving that relative to an oracle chosen uniformly at random with probability 1 the class @math cannot be solved on a quantum Turing machine (QTM) in time @math . We also show that relative to a permutation oracle chosen uniformly at random with probability 1 the class @math cannot be solved on a QTM in time @math . The former bound is tight since recent work of Grover [in Proc. @math th Annual ACM Symposium Theory Comput. , 1996] shows how to accept the class @math relative to any oracle on a quantum computer in time @math . Forty years ago, Wiesner pointed out that quantum mechanics raises the striking possibility of money that cannot be counterfeited according to the laws of physics. We propose the first quantum money scheme that is (1) public-key, meaning that anyone can verify a banknote as genuine, not only the bank that printed it, and (2) cryptographically secure, under a "classical" hardness assumption that has nothing to do with quantum money. Our scheme is based on hidden subspaces, encoded as the zero-sets of random multivariate polynomials. A main technical advance is to show that the "black-box" version of our scheme, where the polynomials are replaced by classical oracles, is unconditionally secure. Previously, such a result had only been known relative to a quantum oracle (and even there, the proof was never published). Even in Wiesner's original setting -- quantum money that can only be verified by the bank -- we are able to use our techniques to patch a major security hole in Wiesner's scheme. We give the first private-key quantum money scheme that allows unlimited verifications and that remains unconditionally secure, even if the counterfeiter can interact adaptively with the bank. Our money scheme is simpler than previous public-key quantum money schemes, including a knot-based scheme of The verifier needs to perform only two tests, one in the standard basis and one in the Hadamard basis -- matching the original intuition for quantum money, based on the existence of complementary observables. Our security proofs use a new variant of Ambainis's quantum adversary method, and several other tools that might be of independent interest. We address the question whether quantum memory is more powerful than classical memory. In particular, we consider a setting where information about a random n-bit string X is stored in s classical or quantum bits, for s<n, i.e., the stored information is bound to be only partial. Later, a randomly chosen predicate F about X has to be guessed using only the stored information. The maximum probability of correctly guessing F(X) is then compared for the cases where the storage device is classical or quantum mechanical, respectively. We show that, despite the fact that the measurement of quantum bits can depend arbitrarily on the predicate F, the quantum advantage is negligible already for small values of the difference n-s. Our setting generalizes the setting of who considered the problem of guessing an arbitrary bit (i.e., one of the n bits) of X. An implication for cryptography is that privacy amplification by universal hashing remains essentially equally secure when the adversary's memory is allowed to be quantum rather than only classical. Since privacy amplification is a main ingredient of many quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols, our result can be used to prove the security of QKD in a generic way. We show that it is NP-hard to approximate, to within an additive constant, the maximum success probability of players sharing quantum entanglement in a two-player game with classical questions of logarithmic length and classical answers of constant length. As a corollary, the inclusion NEXP ⊆ MIP*, first shown by Ito and Vidick (FOCS'12) with three provers, holds with two provers only. The proof is based on a simpler, improved analysis of the low-degree test of Raz and Safra (STOC'97) against two entangled provers. We give an exponential separation between one-way quantum and classical communication protocols for twopartial Boolean functions, both of which are variants of the Boolean Hidden Matching Problem of Bar- Earlier such an exponential separation was known only for a relational version of the Hidden Matching Problem. Our proofs use the Fourier coefficients inequality of Kahn, Kalai, and Linial. We give a number of applications of this separation. In particular, in the bounded-storage model of cryptography we exhibita scheme that is secure against adversaries with a certain amount of classical storage, but insecure against adversaries with a similar (or even much smaller) amount of quantum storage; in the setting of privacy amplification, we show that there are strong extractors that yield a classically secure key, but are insecure against a quantum adversary. We introduce quantum XOR games, a model of two-player, one-round games that extends the model of XOR games by allowing the referee’s questions to the players to be quantum states. We give examples showing that quantum XOR games exhibit a wide range of behaviors that are known not to exist for standard XOR games, such as cases in which the use of entanglement leads to an arbitrarily large advantage over the use of no entanglement. By invoking two deep extensions of Grothendieck’s inequality, we present an efficient algorithm that gives a constant-factor approximation to the best performance that players can obtain in a given game, both in the case that they have no shared entanglement and that they share unlimited entanglement. As a byproduct of the algorithm, we prove some additional interesting properties of quantum XOR games, such as the fact that sharing a maximally entangled state of arbitrary dimension gives only a small advantage over having no entanglement at all. We investigate a general class of quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols using one-way classical communication. We show that full security can be proven by considering only collective attacks. We derive computable lower and upper bounds on the secret-key rate of those QKD protocols involving only entropies of two-qubit density operators. As an illustration of our results, we determine new bounds for the Bennett-Brassard 1984, the 6-state, and the Bennett 1992 protocols. We show that in all these cases the first classical processing that the legitimate partners should apply consists in adding noise. A quantum algorithm for an oracle problem can be understood as a quantum strategy for a player in a two-player zero-sum game in which the other player is constrained to play classically. I formalize this correspondence and give examples of games (and hence oracle problems) for which the quantum player can do better than would be possible classically. The most remarkable example is the Bernstein-Vazirani quantum search algorithm which I show creates no entanglement at any timestep. Barnum, Crepeau, Gottesman, Tapp, and Smith (quant-ph 0205128) proposed methods for authentication of quantum messages. The first method is an interactive protocol (TQA') based on teleportation. The second method is a noninteractive protocol (QA) in which the sender first encrypts the message using a protocol QEnc and then encodes the quantum ciphertext with an error correcting code chosen secretly from a set (a purity test code (PTC)). Encryption was shown to be necessary for authentication. We augment the protocol QA with an extra step which recycles the entire encryption key provided QA accepts the message. We analyze the resulting integrated protocol for quantum authentication and key generation, which we call QA+KG. Our main result is a proof that QA+KG is universal composably (UC) secure in the Ben-Or-Mayers model (quant-ph 0409062). More specifically, this implies the UC-security of (a) QA, (b) recycling of the encryption key in QA, and (c) key-recycling of the encryption scheme QEnc by appending PTC. For an m-qubit message, encryption requires 2m bits of key; but PTC can be performed using only O(log m) + O(log e) bits of key for probability of failure e. Thus, we reduce the key required for both QA and QEnc, from linear to logarithmic net consumption, at the expense of one bit of back communication which can happen any time after the conclusion of QA and before reusing the key. UC-security of QA also extends security to settings not obvious from quant-ph 0205128. Our security proof structure is inspired by and similar to that of quant-ph 0205128, reducing the security of QA to that of TQA'. In the process, we define UC-secure entanglement, and prove the UC-security of the entanglement generating protocol given in quant-ph 0205128, which could be of independent interest. Prior work has established that all problems in NP admit classical zero-knowledge proof systems, and under reasonable hardness assumptions for quantum computations, these proof systems can be made secure against quantum attacks. We prove a result representing a further quantum generalization of this fact, which is that every problem in the complexity class QMA has a quantum zero-knowledge proof system. More specifically, assuming the existence of an unconditionally binding and quantum computationally concealing commitment scheme, we prove that every problem in the complexity class QMA has a quantum interactive proof system that is zero-knowledge with respect to efficient quantum computations. Our QMA proof system is sound against arbitrary quantum provers, but only requires an honest prover to perform polynomial-time quantum computations, provided that it holds a quantum witness for a given instance of the QMA problem under consideration. The problem of quantum dice rolling (DR)—a generalization of the problem of quantum coin flipping (CF) to more than two outcomes and parties—is studied in both its weak and strong variants. We prove by construction that quantum mechanics allows for (i) weak N-sided DR admitting arbitrarily small bias for any N and (ii) two-party strong N-sided DR saturating Kitaev's bound for any N. To derive (ii) we also prove by construction that quantum mechanics allows for (iii) strong imbalanced CF saturating Kitaev's bound for any degree of imbalance. Furthermore, as a corollary of (ii) we introduce a family of optimal 2m-party strong nm-sided DR protocols for any pair m and n.