Abstract We introduce a game-theoretic model to investigate the strategic interaction between a cyber insurance policyholder whose premium depends on her self-reported security level and an insurer with the power to audit the security level upon receiving an indemnity claim. Audits can reveal fraudulent (or simply careless) policyholders not following reported security procedures, in which case the insurer can refuse to indemnify the policyholder. However, the insurer has to bear an audit cost even when the policyholders have followed the prescribed security procedures. As audits can be expensive, a key problem insurers face is to devise an auditing strategy to deter policyholders from misrepresenting their security levels to gain a premium discount. This decision-making problem was motivated by conducting interviews with underwriters and reviewing regulatory filings in the US; we discovered that premiums are determined by security posture, yet this is often self-reported and insurers are concerned by whether security procedures are practised as reported by the policyholders. To address this problem, we model this interaction as a Bayesian game of incomplete information and devise optimal auditing strategies for the insurers considering the possibility that the policyholder may misrepresent her security level. To the best of our knowledge, this work is the first theoretical consideration of post-incident claims management in cyber security. Our model captures the trade-off between the incentive to exaggerate security posture during the application process and the possibility of punishment for non-compliance with reported security policies. Simulations demonstrate that common sense techniques are not as efficient at providing effective cyber insurance audit decisions as the ones computed using game theory.
The literature on economic theory of insurance fraud has developed two main approaches: and @cite_2 . The costly state falsification approach assesses the client's behaviour towards a claim. We consider the costly state verification approach, which focuses on the insurer identifying fraudulent claims. The insurer can verify the claims via auditing but has to bear a verification cost. The optimal claim handling usually involves random auditing @cite_30 .
@cite_30 @cite_2
1587323911 1963731024 2889445070 2038939444 2333568743 2031397756 2074923226 2117732769 2235660311 2077180684 2016647770 1957644519 2964154091 2140213624 2133469585 2036745441 2892015031 2950731906 187340461 17135747
We survey recent developments in the economic analysis of insurance fraud. The paper first sets out the two main approaches to insurance fraud that have been developped in the literature, namely the costly state verification and the costly state falsification. Under costly state verification, the insurer can verify claims at some cost. Claims' verification may be deterministic or random, and it can be conditioned on fraud signals perceived by insurers. Under costly state falsification, the policyholder expends resources for the building-up of his or her claim not to be detected. We also consider the effects of adverse selection, in a context where insurers cannot distinguish honest policyholders from potential defrauders, as well as the consequences of credibility constraints on anti-fraud policies. Finally, we focus attention on the risk of collusion between policyholders and insurance agents or service providers. Abstract This paper characterizes the equilibrium of an insurance market where opportunist policyholders may file fraudulent claims. We assume that insurance policies are traded in a competitive market where insurers cannot distinguish honest policyholders from opportunists. The insurer-policyholder relationship is modelled as an incomplete information game, in which the insurer decides to audit or not. The market equilibrium depends on whether insurers can credibly commit or not to their audit strategies. We show that a no commitment equilibrium results in a welfare loss for honest individuals, which may even be so large that the insurance market completely shuts down. We also show that transferring monitoring costs to a budget-balanced common agency would mitigate the commitment problem. An insurer has to know the risks faced by a potential client to accurately determine an insurance premium offer. However, while the potential client might have a good understanding of its own security practices, it may also have an incentive not to disclose them honestly since the resulting information asymmetry could work in its favor. This information asymmetry engenders adverse selection, which can result in unfair premiums and reduced adoption of cyber-insurance. To overcome information asymmetry, insurers often require potential clients to self-report their risks. Still, clients do not have any incentive to perform thorough self-audits or to provide comprehensive reports. As a result, insurers have to complement self-reporting with external security audits to verify the clients’ reports. Since these audits can be very expensive, a key problem faced by insurers is to devise an auditing strategy that deters clients from dishonest reporting using a minimal number of audits. To solve this problem, we model the interactions between a potential client and an insurer as a two-player signaling game. One player represents the client, who knows its actual security-investment level, but may report any level to the insurer. The other player represents the insurer, who knows only the random distribution from which the security level was drawn, but may discover the actual level using an expensive audit. We study the players’ equilibrium strategies and provide numerical illustrations. We consider a model for price calculations based on three components: a fair premium; price loadings reflecting general expenses and solvency requirements; and profit. The first two components are typically evaluated on a yearly basis, while the third is viewed from a longer perspective. When considering the value of customers over a period of several years, and examining policy renewals and cross-selling in relation to price adjustments, many insurers may prefer to reduce their short-term benefits so as to focus on their most profitable customers and the long-term value. We show how models of personalized treatment learning can be used to select the policy holders that should be targeted in a company’s marketing strategies. An empirical application of the causal conditional inference tree method illustrates how best to implement a personalized cross-sell marketing campaign in this framework. Abstract For many data mining problems, obtaining labels is costly and time consuming, if not practically infeasible. In addition, unlabeled data often includes categorical or ordinal features which, compared with numerical features, can present additional challenges. We propose a new unsupervised spectral ranking method for anomaly (SRA). We illustrate that the spectral optimization in SRA can be viewed as a relaxation of an unsupervised SVM problem. We demonstrate that the first non-principal eigenvector of a Laplacian matrix is linked to a bi-class classification strength measure which can be used to rank anomalies. Using the first non-principal eigenvector of the Laplacian matrix directly, the proposed SRA generates an anomaly ranking either with respect to the majority class or with respect to two main patterns. The choice of the ranking reference can be made based on whether the cardinality of the smaller class (positive or negative) is sufficiently large. Using an auto insurance claim data set but ignoring labels when generating ranking, we show that our proposed SRA significantly surpasses existing outlier-based fraud detection methods. Finally we demonstrate that, while proposed SRA yields good performance for a few similarity measures for the auto insurance claim data, notably ones based on the Hamming distance, choosing appropriate similarity measures for a fraud detection problem remains crucial. This paper examines techniques for finding falsifying trajectories of hybrid systems using an approach that we call trajectory splicing. Many formal verification techniques for hybrid systems, including flowpipe construction, can identify plausible abstract counterexamples for property violations. However, there is often a gap between the reported abstract counterexamples and the concrete system trajectories. Our approach starts with a candidate sequence of disconnected trajectory segments, each segment lying inside a discrete mode. However, such disconnected segments do not form concrete violations due to the gaps that exist between the ending state of one segment and the starting state of the subsequent segment. Therefore, trajectory splicing uses local optimization to minimize the gap between these segments, effectively splicing them together to form a concrete trajectory. We demonstrate the use of our approach for falsifying safety properties of hybrid systems using standard optimization techniques. As such, our approach is not restricted to linear systems. We compare our approach with other falsification approaches including uniform random sampling and a robustness guided falsification approach used in the tool S-Taliro. Our preliminary evaluation clearly shows the potential of our approach to search for candidate trajectory segments and use them to find concrete property violations. Corporate fraud represents a huge cost to the current economy. Academic literature has demonstrated how data mining techniques can be of value in the fight against fraud. This research has focused on fraud detection, mostly in a context of external fraud. In this paper, we discuss the use of a data mining approach to reduce the risk of internal fraud. Reducing fraud risk involves both detection and prevention. Accordingly, a descriptive data mining strategy is applied as opposed to the widely used prediction data mining techniques in the literature. The results of using a multivariate latent class clustering algorithm to a case company's procurement data suggest that applying this technique in a descriptive data mining approach is useful in assessing the current risk of internal fraud. The same results could not be obtained by applying a univariate analysis. 4A bstract. Despite all attempts to prevent fraud, it continues to be a major threat to industry and government. Traditionally, organizations have focused on fraud prevention rather than detection, to combat fraud. In this paper we present a role mining inspired approach to represent user behaviour in Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) systems, primarily aimed at detecting opportunities to commit fraud or potentially suspicious activities. We have adapted an approach which uses set theory to create transaction profiles based on analysis of user activity records. Based on these transaction profiles, we propose a set of (1) anomaly types to detect potentially suspicious user behaviour and (2) scenarios to identify inadequate segregation of duties in an ERP environment. In addition, we present two algorithms to construct a directed acyclic graph to represent relationships between transaction profiles. Experiments were conducted using a real dataset obtained from a teaching environment and a demonstration dataset, both using SAP R 3, presently the most predominant ERP system. The results of this empirical research demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed approach. The rise of crowdsourcing brings new types of malpractices in Internet advertising. One can easily hire web workers through malicious crowdsourcing platforms to attack other advertisers. Such human generated crowd frauds are hard to detect by conventional fraud detection methods. In this paper, we carefully examine the characteristics of the group behaviors of crowd fraud and identify three persistent patterns, which are moderateness, synchronicity and dispersivity. Then we propose an effective crowd fraud detection method for search engine advertising based on these patterns, which consists of a constructing stage, a clustering stage and a filtering stage. At the constructing stage, we remove irrelevant data and reorganize the click logs into a surfer-advertiser inverted list; At the clustering stage, we define the sync-similarity between surfers' click histories and transform the coalition detection to a clustering problem, solved by a nonparametric algorithm; and finally we build a dispersity filter to remove false alarm clusters. The nonparametric nature of our method ensures that we can find an unbounded number of coalitions with nearly no human interaction. We also provide a parallel solution to make the method scalable to Web data and conduct extensive experiments. The empirical results demonstrate that our method is accurate and scalable. Despite all attempts to prevent fraud, it continues to be a major threat to industry and government. Traditionally, organizations have focused on fraud prevention rather than detection, to combat fraud. In this paper we present a role mining inspired approach to represent user behaviour in Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) systems, primarily aimed at detecting opportunities to commit fraud or potentially suspicious activities. We have adapted an approach which uses set theory to create transaction profiles based on analysis of user activity records. Based on these transaction profiles, we propose a set of (1) anomaly types to detect potentially suspicious user behaviour, and (2) scenarios to identify inadequate segregation of duties in an ERP environment. In addition, we present two algorithms to construct a directed acyclic graph to represent relationships between transaction profiles. Experiments were conducted using a real dataset obtained from a teaching environment and a demonstration dataset, both using SAP R 3, presently the predominant ERP system. The results of this empirical research demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed approach. Many mal-practices in stock market trading--e.g., circular trading and price manipulation--use the modus operandi of collusion. Informally, a set of traders is a candidate collusion set when they have "heavy trading" among themselves, as compared to their trading with others. We formalize the problem of detection of collusion sets, if any, in the given trading database. We show that naive approaches are inefficient for real-life situations. We adapt and apply two well-known graph clustering algorithms for this problem. We also propose a new graph clustering algorithm, specifically tailored for detecting collusion sets. A novel feature of our approach is the use of Dempster---Schafer theory of evidence to combine the candidate collusion sets detected by individual algorithms. Treating individual experiments as evidence, this approach allows us to quantify the confidence (or belief) in the candidate collusion sets. We present detailed simulation experiments to demonstrate effectiveness of the proposed algorithms. We apply a general deep learning framework to address the non-factoid question answering task. Our approach does not rely on any linguistic tools and can be applied to different languages or domains. Various architectures are presented and compared. We create and release a QA corpus and setup a new QA task in the insurance domain. Experimental results demonstrate superior performance compared to the baseline methods and various technologies give further improvements. For this highly challenging task, the top-1 accuracy can reach up to 65.3 on a test set, which indicates a great potential for practical use. We apply a general deep learning framework to address the non-factoid question answering task. Our approach does not rely on any linguistic tools and can be applied to different languages or domains. Various architectures are presented and compared. We create and release a QA corpus and setup a new QA task in the insurance domain. Experimental results demonstrate superior performance compared to the baseline methods and various technologies give further improvements. For this highly challenging task, the top-1 accuracy can reach up to 65.3 on a test set, which indicates a great potential for practical use. The aim of this work is to explore the possible types of phenomena that simple macroeconomic Agent-Based models (ABMs) can reproduce. We propose a methodology, inspired by statistical physics, that characterizes a model through its “phase diagram” in the space of parameters. Our first motivation is to understand the large macro-economic fluctuations observed in the “Mark I” ABM devised by Delli Gatti and collaborators. In this regard, our major finding is the generic existence of a phase transition between a “good economy” where unemployment is low, and a “bad economy” where unemployment is high. We then introduce a simpler framework that allows us to show that this transition is robust against many modifications of the model, and is generically induced by an asymmetry between the rate of hiring and the rate of firing of the firms. The unemployment level remains small until a tipping point, beyond which the economy suddenly collapses. If the parameters are such that the system is close to this transition, any small fluctuation is amplified as the system jumps between the two equilibria. We have explored several natural extensions of the model. One is to introduce a bankruptcy threshold, limiting the firms maximum level of debt-to-sales ratio. This leads to a rich phase diagram with, in particular, a region where acute endogenous crises occur, during which the unemployment rate shoots up before the economy can recover. We also introduce simple wage policies. This leads to inflation (in the “good” phase) or deflation (in the “bad” phase), but leaves the overall phase diagram of the model essentially unchanged. We have also explored the effect of simple monetary policies that attempt to contain rising unemployment and defang crises. We end the paper with general comments on the usefulness of ABMs to model macroeconomic phenomena, in particular in view of the time needed to reach a steady state that raises the issue of ergodicity in these models. This paper presents a critique of expected utility theory as a descriptive model of decision making under risk, and develops an alternative model, called prospect theory. Choices among risky prospects exhibit several pervasive effects that are inconsistent with the basic tenets of utility theory. In particular, people underweight outcomes that are merely probable in comparison with outcomes that are obtained with certainty. This tendency, called the certainty effect, contributes to risk aversion in choices involving sure gains and to risk seeking in choices involving sure losses. In addition, people generally discard components that are shared by all prospects under consideration. This tendency, called the isolation effect, leads to inconsistent preferences when the same choice is presented in different forms. An alternative theory of choice is developed, in which value is assigned to gains and losses rather than to final assets and in which probabilities are replaced by decision weights. The value function is normally concave for gains, commonly convex for losses, and is generally steeper for losses than for gains. Decision weights are generally lower than the corresponding probabilities, except in the range of low prob- abilities. Overweighting of low probabilities may contribute to the attractiveness of both insurance and gambling. EXPECTED UTILITY THEORY has dominated the analysis of decision making under risk. It has been generally accepted as a normative model of rational choice (24), and widely applied as a descriptive model of economic behavior, e.g. (15, 4). Thus, it is assumed that all reasonable people would wish to obey the axioms of the theory (47, 36), and that most people actually do, most of the time. The present paper describes several classes of choice problems in which preferences systematically violate the axioms of expected utility theory. In the light of these observations we argue that utility theory, as it is commonly interpreted and applied, is not an adequate descriptive model and we propose an alternative account of choice under risk. 2. CRITIQUE Many object detectors, such as AdaBoost, SVM and deformable part-based models (DPM), compute additive scoring functions at a large number of windows scanned over image pyramid, thus computational efficiency is an important consideration beside accuracy performance. In this paper, we present a framework of learning cost-sensitive decision policy which is a sequence of two-sided thresholds to execute early rejection or early acceptance based on the accumulative scores at each step. A decision policy is said to be optimal if it minimizes an empirical global risk function that sums over the loss of false negatives (FN) and false positives (FP), and the cost of computation. While the risk function is very complex due to high-order connections among the two-sided thresholds, we find its upper bound can be optimized by dynamic programming (DP) efficiently and thus say the learned policy is near-optimal. Given the loss of FN and FP and the cost in three numbers, our method can produce a policy on-the-fly for Adaboost, SVM and DPM. In experiments, we show that our decision policy outperforms state-of-the-art cascade methods significantly in terms of speed with similar accuracy performance. This paper develops search-theoretic models in which it is individually rational for firms to engage in obfuscation. It considers oligopoly competition between firms selling a homogeneous good to a population of rational consumers who incur search costs to learn each firm's price. Search costs are endogenized: obfuscation is equated with unobservable actions that make it more time-consuming to inspect a product and learn its price. We note two mechanisms by which obfuscation can affect consumer beliefs about future search costs: a direct effect that applies when search costs are convex in time spent searching and a signal-jamming effect that applies when an informational link is present. As long as obfuscation is costless for firms, the presence of either of these mechanisms guarantees that obfuscation must occur in equilibrium, unless consumer search costs are already so high that consumers are willing to purchase at the highest equilibrium price in the absence of obfuscation. Changes in consumer search costs are at least partially offset by changes in the equilibrium level of obfuscation, raising doubts about whether reductions in consumer search costs must make markets more competitive. We also examine patterns of obfuscation and show that higher markups are usually associated with more obfuscation. (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) In this paper, we consider the problem of estimating a potentially sensitive (individually stigmatizing) statistic on a population. In our model, individuals are concerned about their privacy, and experience some cost as a function of their privacy loss. Nevertheless, they would be willing to participate in the survey if they were compensated for their privacy cost. These cost functions are not publicly known, however, nor do we make Bayesian assumptions about their form or distribution. Individuals are rational and will misreport their costs for privacy if doing so is in their best interest. Ghosh and Roth recently showed in this setting, when costs for privacy loss may be correlated with private types, if individuals value differential privacy, no individually rational direct revelation mechanism can compute any non-trivial estimate of the population statistic. In this paper, we circumvent this impossibility result by proposing a modified notion of how individuals experience cost as a function of their privacy loss, and by giving a mechanism which does not operate by direct revelation. Instead, our mechanism has the ability to randomly approach individuals from a population and offer them a take-it-or-leave-it offer. This is intended to model the abilities of a surveyor who may stand on a street corner and approach passers-by. Models of customer churn are based on historical data and are used to predict the probability that a client switches to another company. We address customer retention in insurance. Rather than concentrating on those customers with high probability of leaving, we propose a new procedure that can be used to identify the target customers who are likely to respond positively to a retention activity. Our approach is based on random forests and can be useful to anticipate the success of marketing actions aimed at reducing customer attrition. We also discuss the type of insurance portfolio database that can be used for this purpose. We present an algorithm for falsifying safety properties of hybrid systems, i.e., for finding a trajectory to an unsafe state. The approach is to approximate how close a point is to being an initial point of an error trajectory using a real-valued quality function, and then to use numerical optimisation to search for an optimum of this function. The function is computed by running simulations, where information coming from abstractions computed by a verification algorithm is exploited to determine whether a simulation looks promising and should be continued or cancelled. This information becomes more reliable as the abstraction becomes more refined. We thus interleave falsification and verification attempts.