Developing classification algorithms that are fair with respect to sensitive attributes of the data is an important problem due to the increased deployment of classification algorithms in societ al contexts. Several recent works have focused on studying classification with respect to specific fairness metrics, modeled the corresponding fair classification problem as constrained optimization problems, and developed tailored algorithms to solve them. Despite this, there still remain important metrics for which there are no fair classifiers with theoretical guarantees; primarily because the resulting optimization problem is non-convex. The main contribution of this paper is a meta-algorithm for classification that can take as input a general class of fairness constraints with respect to multiple non-disjoint and multi-valued sensitive attributes, and which comes with provable guarantees. In particular, our algorithm can handle non-convex "linear fractional" constraints (which includes fairness constraints such as predictive parity) for which no prior algorithm was known. Key to our results is an algorithm for a family of classification problems with convex constraints along with a reduction from classification problems with linear fractional constraints to this family. Empirically, we observe that our algorithm is fast, can achieve near-perfect fairness with respect to various fairness metrics, and the loss in accuracy due to the imposed fairness constraints is often small.
@cite_52 @cite_0 also provide a general framework to handle multiple fairness constraints. Quadrianto and Sharmanska @cite_0 encode fairness constraints as a distance between the distributions for different values of a single binary sensitive attribute, and then use the privileged learning framework to optimize loss with respect to fairness constraints. While this results in an interesting heuristic, they do not provide theoretical guarantees for their approach. @cite_52 give a method to compute a nearly optimal fair classifier with respect to linear fairness constraints, like demographic parity or equalized odds, by the Lagrangian method. However their framework does not support constraints on predictive parity (see Remark ).
@cite_0 @cite_52
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We consider the problem of online learning in the linear contextual bandits setting, but in which there are also strong individual fairness constraints governed by an unknown similarity metric. These constraints demand that we select similar actions or individuals with approximately equal probability (arXiv:1104.3913), which may be at odds with optimizing reward, thus modeling settings where profit and social policy are in tension. We assume we learn about an unknown Mahalanobis similarity metric from only weak feedback that identifies fairness violations, but does not quantify their extent. This is intended to represent the interventions of a regulator who "knows unfairness when he sees it" but nevertheless cannot enunciate a quantitative fairness metric over individuals. Our main result is an algorithm in the adversarial context setting that has a number of fairness violations that depends only logarithmically on @math , while obtaining an optimal @math regret bound to the best fair policy. We tackle the problem of algorithmic fairness, where the goal is to avoid the unfairly influence of sensitive information, in the general context of regression with possible continuous sensitive attributes. We extend the framework of fair empirical risk minimization to this general scenario, covering in this way the whole standard supervised learning setting. Our generalized fairness measure reduces to well known notions of fairness available in literature. We derive learning guarantees for our method, that imply in particular its statistical consistency, both in terms of the risk and the fairness measure. We then specialize our approach to kernel methods and propose a convex fair estimator in that setting. We test the estimator on a commonly used benchmark dataset (Communities and Crime) and on a new dataset collected at the University of Genova, containing the information of the academic career of five thousand students. The latter dataset provides a challenging real case scenario of unfair behaviour of standard regression methods that benefits from our methodology. The experimental results show that our estimator is effective at mitigating the trade-off between accuracy and fairness requirements. The most prevalent notions of fairness in machine learning are statistical definitions: they fix a small collection of pre-defined groups, and then ask for parity of some statistic of the classifier across these groups. Constraints of this form are susceptible to intentional or inadvertent "fairness gerrymandering", in which a classifier appears to be fair on each individual group, but badly violates the fairness constraint on one or more structured subgroups defined over the protected attributes. We propose instead to demand statistical notions of fairness across exponentially (or infinitely) many subgroups, defined by a structured class of functions over the protected attributes. This interpolates between statistical definitions of fairness and recently proposed individual notions of fairness, but raises several computational challenges. It is no longer clear how to audit a fixed classifier to see if it satisfies such a strong definition of fairness. We prove that the computational problem of auditing subgroup fairness for both equality of false positive rates and statistical parity is equivalent to the problem of weak agnostic learning, which means it is computationally hard in the worst case, even for simple structured subclasses. We then derive two algorithms that provably converge to the best fair classifier, given access to oracles which can solve the agnostic learning problem. The algorithms are based on a formulation of subgroup fairness as a two-player zero-sum game between a Learner and an Auditor. Our first algorithm provably converges in a polynomial number of steps. Our second algorithm enjoys only provably asymptotic convergence, but has the merit of simplicity and faster per-step computation. We implement the simpler algorithm using linear regression as a heuristic oracle, and show that we can effectively both audit and learn fair classifiers on real datasets. Motivated by settings in which predictive models may be required to be non-discriminatory with respect to certain attributes (such as race), but even collecting the sensitive attribute may be forbidden or restricted, we initiate the study of fair learning under the constraint of differential privacy. We design two learning algorithms that simultaneously promise differential privacy and equalized odds, a 'fairness' condition that corresponds to equalizing false positive and negative rates across protected groups. Our first algorithm is a private implementation of the equalized odds post-processing approach of [, 2016]. This algorithm is appealingly simple, but must be able to use protected group membership explicitly at test time, which can be viewed as a form of 'disparate treatment'. Our second algorithm is a differentially private version of the oracle-efficient in-processing approach of [, 2018] that can be used to find the optimal fair classifier, given access to a subroutine that can solve the original (not necessarily fair) learning problem. This algorithm is more complex but need not have access to protected group membership at test time. We identify new tradeoffs between fairness, accuracy, and privacy that emerge only when requiring all three properties, and show that these tradeoffs can be milder if group membership may be used at test time. We conclude with a brief experimental evaluation. We address the problem of algorithmic fairness: ensuring that sensitive variables do not unfairly influence the outcome of a classifier. We present an approach based on empirical risk minimization, which incorporates a fairness constraint into the learning problem. It encourages the conditional risk of the learned classifier to be approximately constant with respect to the sensitive variable. We derive both risk and fairness bounds that support the statistical consistency of our approach. We specify our approach to kernel methods and observe that the fairness requirement implies an orthogonality constraint which can be easily added to these methods. We further observe that for linear models the constraint translates into a simple data preprocessing step. Experiments indicate that the method is empirically effective and performs favorably against state-of-the-art approaches. Equipping machine learning models with ethical and legal constraints is a serious issue; without this, the future of machine learning is at risk. This paper takes a step forward in this direction and focuses on ensuring machine learning models deliver fair decisions. In legal scholarships, the notion of fairness itself is evolving and multi-faceted. We set an overarching goal to develop a unified machine learning framework that is able to handle any definitions of fairness, their combinations, and also new definitions that might be stipulated in the future. To achieve our goal, we recycle two well-established machine learning techniques, privileged learning and distribution matching, and harmonize them for satisfying multi-faceted fairness definitions. We consider protected characteristics such as race and gender as privileged information that is available at training but not at test time; this accelerates model training and delivers fairness through unawareness. Further, we cast demographic parity, equalized odds, and equality of opportunity as a classical two-sample problem of conditional distributions, which can be solved in a general form by using distance measures in Hilbert Space. We show several existing models are special cases of ours. Finally, we advocate returning the Pareto frontier of multi-objective minimization of error and unfairness in predictions. This will facilitate decision makers to select an operating point and to be accountable for it. We revisit the classic problem of fair division from a mechanism design perspective and provide an elegant truthful mechanism that yields surprisingly good approximation guarantees for the widely used solution of Proportional Fairness. This solution, which is closely related to Nash bargaining and the competitive equilibrium, is known to be not implementable in a truthful fashion, which has been its main drawback. To alleviate this issue, we propose a new mechanism, which we call the Partial Allocation mechanism, that discards a carefully chosen fraction of the allocated resources in order to incentivize the agents to be truthful in reporting their valuations. This mechanism introduces a way to implement interesting truthful outcomes in settings where monetary payments are not an option. For a multi-dimensional domain with an arbitrary number of agents and items, and for the very large class of homogeneous valuation functions, we prove that our mechanism provides every agent with at least a 1 e ≈ 0.368 fraction of her Proportionally Fair valuation. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first result that gives a constant factor approximation to every agent for the Proportionally Fair solution. To complement this result, we show that no truthful mechanism can guarantee more than 0.5 approximation, even for the restricted class of additive linear valuations. In addition to this, we uncover a connection between the Partial Allocation mechanism and VCG-based mechanism design. We also ask whether better approximation ratios are possible in more restricted settings. In particular, motivated by the massive privatization auction in the Czech republic in the early 90s we provide another mechanism for additive linear valuations that works really well when all the items are highly demanded. We consider a task of scheduling with a common deadline on a single machine. Every player reports to a scheduler the length of his job and the scheduler needs to finish as many jobs as possible by the deadline. For this simple problem, there is a truthful mechanism that achieves maximum welfare in dominant strategies. The new aspect of our work is that in our setting players are uncertain about their own job lengths, and hence are incapable of providing truthful reports (in the strict sense of the word). For a probabilistic model for uncertainty we show that even with relatively little uncertainty, no mechanism can guarantee a constant fraction of the maximum welfare. To remedy this situation, we introduce a new measure of economic efficiency, based on a notion of a fair share of a player, and design mechanisms that are Ω(1)-fair. In addition to its intrinsic appeal, our notion of fairness implies good approximation of maximum welfare in several cases of interest. In our mechanisms the machine is sometimes left idle even though there are jobs that want to use it. We show that this unfavorable aspect is unavoidable, unless one gives up other favorable aspects (e.g., give up Ω(1)-fairness). We also consider a qualitative approach to uncertainty as an alternative to the probabilistic quantitative model. In the qualitative approach we break away from solution concepts such as dominant strategies (they are no longer well defined), and instead suggest an axiomatic approach, which amounts to listing desirable properties for mechanisms. We provide a mechanism that satisfies these properties. We study binary classification in the presence of class-conditional random noise, where the learner gets to see labels that are flipped independently with some probability, and where the flip probability depends on the class. Our goal is to devise learning algorithms that are efficient and statistically consistent with respect to commonly used utility measures. In particular, we look at a family of measures motivated by their application in domains where cost-sensitive learning is necessary (for example, when there is class imbalance). In contrast to most of the existing literature on consistent classification that are limited to the classical 0-1 loss, our analysis includes more general utility measures such as the AM measure (arithmetic mean of True Positive Rate and True Negative Rate). For this problem of cost-sensitive learning under class-conditional random noise, we develop two approaches that are based on suitably modifying surrogate losses. First, we provide a simple unbiased estimator of any loss, and obtain performance bounds for empirical utility maximization in the presence of i.i.d. data with noisy labels. If the loss function satis_es a simple symmetry condition, we show that using unbiased estimator leads to an efficient algorithm for empirical maximization. Second, by leveraging a reduction of risk minimization under noisy labels to classification with weighted 0-1 loss, we suggest the use of a simple weighted surrogate loss, for which we are able to obtain strong utility bounds. This approach implies that methods already used in practice, such as biased SVM and weighted logistic regression, are provably noise-tolerant. For two practically important measures in our family, we show that the proposed methods are competitive with respect to recently proposed methods for dealing with label noise in several benchmark data sets. The potential lack of fairness in the outputs of machine learning algorithms has recently gained attention both within the research community as well as in society more broadly. Surprisingly, there is no prior work developing tree-induction algorithms for building fair decision trees or fair random forests. These methods have widespread popularity as they are one of the few to be simultaneously interpretable, non-linear, and easy-to-use. In this paper we develop, to our knowledge, the first technique for the induction of fair decision trees. We show that our "Fair Forest" retains the benefits of the tree-based approach, while providing both greater accuracy and fairness than other alternatives, for both "group fairness" and "individual fairness.'" We also introduce new measures for fairness which are able to handle multinomial and continues attributes as well as regression problems, as opposed to binary attributes and labels only. Finally, we demonstrate a new, more robust evaluation procedure for algorithms that considers the dataset in its entirety rather than only a specific protected attribute. We generalize the classic problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods to the problem of fair public decision making, in which a decision must be made on several social issues simultaneously, and, unlike the classic setting, a decision can provide positive utility to multiple players. We extend the popular fairness notion of proportionality (which is not guaranteeable) to our more general setting, and introduce three novel relaxations --- proportionality up to one issue, round robin share, and pessimistic proportional share --- that are also interesting in the classic goods allocation setting. We show that the Maximum Nash Welfare solution, which is known to satisfy appealing fairness properties in the classic setting, satisfies or approximates all three relaxations in our framework. We also provide polynomial time algorithms and hardness results for finding allocations satisfying these axioms, with or without insisting on Pareto optimality. When it is ethical and legal to use a sensitive attribute (such as gender or race) in machine learning systems, the question remains how to do so. We show that the naive application of machine learning algorithms using sensitive features leads to an inherent tradeoff in accuracy between groups. We provide a simple and efficient decoupling technique, that can be added on top of any black-box machine learning algorithm, to learn different classifiers for different groups. Transfer learning is used to mitigate the problem of having too little data on any one group. The method can apply to a range of fairness criteria. In particular, we require the application designer to specify as joint loss function that makes explicit the trade-off between fairness and accuracy. Our reduction is shown to efficiently find the minimum loss as long as the objective has a certain natural monotonicity property which may be of independent interest in the study of fairness in algorithms. We study a generic framework that provides a unified view on two important classes of problems: (i) extensions of the k-median problem where clients are interested in having multiple facilities in their vicinity (e.g., due to the fact that, with some small probability, the closest facility might be malfunctioning and so might not be available for using), and (ii) finding winners according to some appealing multiwinner election rules, i.e., election system aimed for choosing representatives bodies, such as parliaments, based on preferences of a population of voters over individual candidates. Each problem in our framework is associated with a vector of weights: we show that the approximability of the problem depends on structural properties of these vectors. We specifically focus on the harmonic sequence of weights for which the objective function interpreted in a multiwinner election setup reflects to the well-known Proportional Approval Voting (PAV) rule. Our main result is that, due to the specific (harmonic) structure of weights, the problem allows constant factor approximation. This is surprising since the problem can be interpreted as a variant of the k-median problem where we do not assume that the connection costs satisfy the triangle inequality. The algorithm we propose is based on dependent rounding [Srinivasan, FOCS'01] applied to the solution of a natural LP-relaxation of the problem. The rounding process is well known to produce distributions over integral solutions satisfying Negative Correlation (NC), which is usually sufficient for the analysis of approximation guarantees offered by rounding procedures. In our analysis, however, we need to use the fact that the carefully implemented rounding process satisfies a stronger property, called Negative Association (NA), which allows us to apply standard concentration bounds for conditional random variables. We study the problem of fair allocation for indivisible goods. We use the the maxmin share paradigm introduced by Budish as a measure for fairness. Procacciafirst (EC'14) were first to investigate this fundamental problem in the additive setting. In contrast to what real-world experiments suggest, they show that a maxmin guarantee (1- @math allocation) is not always possible even when the number of agents is limited to 3. While the existence of an approximation solution (e.g. a @math - @math allocation) is quite straightforward, improving the guarantee becomes subtler for larger constants. Procaccia provide a proof for existence of a @math - @math allocation and leave the question open for better guarantees. Our main contribution is an answer to the above question. We improve the result of ! to a @math factor in the additive setting. The main idea for our @math - @math allocation method is clustering the agents. To this end, we introduce three notions and techniques, namely reducibility, matching allocation, and cycle-envy-freeness, and prove the approximation guarantee of our algorithm via non-trivial applications of these techniques. Our analysis involves coloring and double counting arguments that might be of independent interest. One major shortcoming of the current studies on fair allocation is the additivity assumption on the valuations. We alleviate this by extending our results to the case of submodular, fractionally subadditive, and subadditive settings. More precisely, we give constant approximation guarantees for submodular and XOS agents, and a logarithmic approximation for the case of subadditive agents. Furthermore, we complement our results by providing close upper bounds for each class of valuation functions. Finally, we present algorithms to find such allocations for additive, submodular, and XOS settings in polynomial time. In this paper, we introduce the Fairness GAN, an approach for generating a dataset that is plausibly similar to a given multimedia dataset, but is more fair with respect to protected attributes in allocative decision making. We propose a novel auxiliary classifier GAN that strives for demographic parity or equality of opportunity and show empirical results on several datasets, including the CelebFaces Attributes (CelebA) dataset, the Quick, Draw! dataset, and a dataset of soccer player images and the offenses they were called for. The proposed formulation is well-suited to absorbing unlabeled data; we leverage this to augment the soccer dataset with the much larger CelebA dataset. The methodology tends to improve demographic parity and equality of opportunity while generating plausible images. Our objective is to investigate the implications of the “replacement principle” for the fair allocation of an infinitely divisible commodity among agents with single-peaked preferences. The principle says that when one of the components of the data entering the description of the problem to be solved changes, all of the relevant agents should be affected in the same direction: they all gain or they all lose. We apply it to situations in which the preferences of one of the agents may change, under the name ofwelfare-domination under preference-replacement. We show that there is no selection from the no-envy and Pareto solution satisfying it. Then, we weaken it by limiting its application to situations in which the change is not so disruptive that it turns the economy from one in which there is “too little” of the commodity to one in which there is “too much,” or conversely. We show that there is only one selection from the no-envy and Pareto solution satisfying this property andreplication-invariance. It is the “uniform rule,” a solution that has played a central role in previous analyses of the problem.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: D51, D63, D70. Machine learning is now being used to make crucial decisions about people's lives. For nearly all of these decisions there is a risk that individuals of a certain race, gender, sexual orientation, or any other subpopulation are unfairly discriminated against. Our recent method has demonstrated how to use techniques from counterfactual inference to make predictions fair across different subpopulations. This method requires that one provides the causal model that generated the data at hand. In general, validating all causal implications of the model is not possible without further assumptions. Hence, it is desirable to integrate competing causal models to provide counterfactually fair decisions, regardless of which causal "world" is the correct one. In this paper, we show how it is possible to make predictions that are approximately fair with respect to multiple possible causal models at once, thus mitigating the problem of exact causal specification. We frame the goal of learning a fair classifier as an optimization problem with fairness constraints entailed by competing causal explanations. We show how this optimization problem can be efficiently solved using gradient-based methods. We demonstrate the flexibility of our model on two real-world fair classification problems. We show that our model can seamlessly balance fairness in multiple worlds with prediction accuracy. The adoption of automated, data-driven decision making in an ever expanding range of applications has raised concerns about its potential unfairness towards certain social groups. In this context, a number of recent studies have focused on defining, detecting, and removing unfairness from data-driven decision systems. However, the existing notions of fairness, based on parity (equality) in treatment or outcomes for different social groups, tend to be quite stringent, limiting the overall decision making accuracy. In this paper, we draw inspiration from the fair-division and envy-freeness literature in economics and game theory and propose preference-based notions of fairness -- given the choice between various sets of decision treatments or outcomes, any group of users would collectively prefer its treatment or outcomes, regardless of the (dis)parity as compared to the other groups. Then, we introduce tractable proxies to design margin-based classifiers that satisfy these preference-based notions of fairness. Finally, we experiment with a variety of synthetic and real-world datasets and show that preference-based fairness allows for greater decision accuracy than parity-based fairness. We study mechanism design problems in the ordinal setting wherein the preferences of agents are described by orderings over outcomes, as opposed to specific numerical values associated with them. This setting is relevant when agents can compare outcomes, but aren't able to evaluate precise utilities for them. Such a situation arises in diverse contexts including voting and matching markets. Our paper addresses two issues that arise in ordinal mechanism design. To design social welfare maximizing mechanisms, one needs to be able to quantitatively measure the welfare of an outcome which is not clear in the ordinal setting. Second, since the impossibility results of Gibbard and Satterthwaite Gibbard73,Satterthwaite75 force one to move to randomized mechanisms, one needs a more nuanced notion of truthfulness. We propose rank approximation as a metric for measuring the quality of an outcome, which allows us to evaluate mechanisms based on worst-case performance, and lex-truthfulness as a notion of truthfulness for randomized ordinal mechanisms. Lex-truthfulness is stronger than notions studied in the literature, and yet flexible enough to admit a rich class of mechanisms circumventing classical impossibility results . We demonstrate the usefulness of the above notions by devising lex-truthful mechanisms achieving good rank-approximation factors, both in the general ordinal setting, as well as structured settings such as (one-sided) matching markets , and its generalizations, matroid and scheduling markets. Abstract We study the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods to groups of agents. Agents in the same group share the same set of goods even though they may have different preferences. Previous work has focused on unanimous fairness, in which all agents in each group must agree that their group's share is fair. Under this strict requirement, fair allocations exist only for small groups. We introduce the concept of democratic fairness, which aims to satisfy a certain fraction of the agents in each group. This concept is better suited to large groups such as cities or countries. We present protocols for democratic fair allocation among two or more arbitrarily large groups of agents with monotonic, additive, or binary valuations. For two groups with arbitrary monotonic valuations, we give an efficient protocol that guarantees envy-freeness up to one good for at least 1 2 of the agents in each group, and prove that the 1 2 fraction is optimal. We also present other protocols that make weaker fairness guarantees to more agents in each group, or to more groups. Our protocols combine techniques from different fields, including combinatorial game theory, cake cutting, and voting.