In this paper, we present a link between preference-based and multiobjective sequential decision-making. While transforming a multiobjective problem to a preference-based one is quite natural, the other direction is a bit less obvious. We present how this transformation (from preference-based to multiobjective) can be done under the classic condition that preferences over histories can be represented by additively decomposable utilities and that the decision criterion to evaluate policies in a state is based on expectation. This link yields a new source of multiobjective sequential decision-making problems (i.e., when reward values are unknown) and justifies the use of solving methods developed in one setting in the other one.
Another approach related to the first one is to consider refinements of Pareto dominance, such as Lorenz dominance (which models a certain notion of fairness) or lexicographic order @cite_2 @cite_5 . In fact, with Lorenz dominance, the set of optimal value functions may still be exponential in the size of the state and action spaces. Again, one may therefore prefer to determine its @math -cover @cite_22 in practice.
@cite_5 @cite_22 @cite_2
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This paper deals with fair assignment problems in decision contexts involving multiple agents. In such problems, each agent has its own evaluation of costs and we want to find a fair compromise solution between individual point of views. Lorenz dominance is a standard decision model used in Economics to refine Pareto dominance while favoring solutions that fairly share happiness among agents. In order to enhance the discrimination possibilities offered by Lorenz dominance, we introduce here a new model called infinite order Lorenz dominance. We establish a representation result for this model using an ordered weighted average with decreasing weights. Hence we exhibit some properties of infinite order Lorenz dominance that explain how fairness is achieved in the aggregation of individual preferences. Then we explain how to solve fair assignment problems of m items to n agents, using infinite order Lorenz dominance and other models used for measuring inequalities. We show that this problem can be reformulated as a 0--1 non-linear optimization problems that can be solved, after a linearization step, by standard LP solvers. We provide numerical results showing the efficiency of the proposed approach on various instances of the paper assignment problem. This paper is devoted to fair optimization in Multiobjective Markov Decision Processes (MOMDPs). A MOMDP is an extension of the MDP model for planning under uncertainty while trying to optimize several reward functions simultaneously. This applies to multiagent problems when rewards define individual utility functions, or in multicriteria problems when rewards refer to different features. In this setting, we study the determination of policies leading to Lorenz-non-dominated tradeoffs. Lorenz dominance is a refinement of Pareto dominance that was introduced in Social Choice for the measurement of inequalities. In this paper, we introduce methods to efficiently approximate the sets of Lorenz-non-dominated solutions of infinite-horizon, discounted MOMDPs. The approximations are polynomial-sized subsets of those solutions. We consider a task of scheduling with a common deadline on a single machine. Every player reports to a scheduler the length of his job and the scheduler needs to finish as many jobs as possible by the deadline. For this simple problem, there is a truthful mechanism that achieves maximum welfare in dominant strategies. The new aspect of our work is that in our setting players are uncertain about their own job lengths, and hence are incapable of providing truthful reports (in the strict sense of the word). For a probabilistic model for uncertainty we show that even with relatively little uncertainty, no mechanism can guarantee a constant fraction of the maximum welfare. To remedy this situation, we introduce a new measure of economic efficiency, based on a notion of a fair share of a player, and design mechanisms that are Ω(1)-fair. In addition to its intrinsic appeal, our notion of fairness implies good approximation of maximum welfare in several cases of interest. In our mechanisms the machine is sometimes left idle even though there are jobs that want to use it. We show that this unfavorable aspect is unavoidable, unless one gives up other favorable aspects (e.g., give up Ω(1)-fairness). We also consider a qualitative approach to uncertainty as an alternative to the probabilistic quantitative model. In the qualitative approach we break away from solution concepts such as dominant strategies (they are no longer well defined), and instead suggest an axiomatic approach, which amounts to listing desirable properties for mechanisms. We provide a mechanism that satisfies these properties. Top-k dominating queries combine the natural idea of selecting the k best items with a comprehensive “goodness” criterion based on dominance. A point p1 dominates p2 if p1 is as good as p2 in all attributes and is strictly better in at least one. Existing works address the problem in settings where data objects are multidimensional points. However, there are domains where we only have access to the distance between two objects. In cases like these, attributes reflect distances from a set of input objects and are dynamically generated as the input objects change. Consequently, prior works from the literature cannot be applied, despite the fact that the dominance relation is still meaningful and valid. For this reason, in this work, we present the first study for processing top-k dominating queries over distance-based dynamic attribute vectors, defined over a metric space. We propose four progressive algorithms that utilize the properties of the underlying metric space to efficiently solve the problem and present an extensive, comparative evaluation on both synthetic and real-world datasets. Our objective is to investigate the implications of the “replacement principle” for the fair allocation of an infinitely divisible commodity among agents with single-peaked preferences. The principle says that when one of the components of the data entering the description of the problem to be solved changes, all of the relevant agents should be affected in the same direction: they all gain or they all lose. We apply it to situations in which the preferences of one of the agents may change, under the name ofwelfare-domination under preference-replacement. We show that there is no selection from the no-envy and Pareto solution satisfying it. Then, we weaken it by limiting its application to situations in which the change is not so disruptive that it turns the economy from one in which there is “too little” of the commodity to one in which there is “too much,” or conversely. We show that there is only one selection from the no-envy and Pareto solution satisfying this property andreplication-invariance. It is the “uniform rule,” a solution that has played a central role in previous analyses of the problem.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: D51, D63, D70. Consider a Markov decision process (MDP) that admits a set of state-action features, which can linearly express the process's probabilistic transition model. We propose a parametric Q-learning algorithm that finds an approximate-optimal policy using a sample size proportional to the feature dimension @math and invariant with respect to the size of the state space. To further improve its sample efficiency, we exploit the monotonicity property and intrinsic noise structure of the Bellman operator, provided the existence of anchor state-actions that imply implicit non-negativity in the feature space. We augment the algorithm using techniques of variance reduction, monotonicity preservation, and confidence bounds. It is proved to find a policy which is @math -optimal from any initial state with high probability using @math sample transitions for arbitrarily large-scale MDP with a discount factor @math . A matching information-theoretical lower bound is proved, confirming the sample optimality of the proposed method with respect to all parameters (up to polylog factors). In this article, we are interested in general techniques for designing mechanisms that approximate the social welfare in the presence of selfish rational behavior. We demonstrate our results in the setting of Combinatorial Auctions (CA). Our first result is a general deterministic technique to decouple the algorithmic allocation problem from the strategic aspects, by a procedure that converts any algorithm to a dominant-strategy ascending mechanism. This technique works for any single value domain, in which each agent has the same value for each desired outcome, and this value is the only private information. In particular, for “single-value CAs”, where each player desires any one of several different bundles but has the same value for each of them, our technique converts any approximation algorithm to a dominant strategy mechanism that almost preserves the original approximation ratio. Our second result provides the first computationally efficient deterministic mechanism for the case of single-value multi-minded bidders (with private value and private desired bundles). The mechanism achieves an approximation to the social welfare which is close to the best possible in polynomial time (unless PeNP). This mechanism is an algorithmic implementation in undominated strategies, a notion that we define and justify, and is of independent interest. In this paper, we introduce a novel approach for reducing the k-item n-bidder auction with additive valuation to k-item 1-bidder auctions. This approach, called the Best-Guess reduction, can be applied to address several central questions in optimal revenue auction theory such as the relative strength of simple versus complex mechanisms, the power of randomization, and Bayesian versus dominant-strategy implementations. First, when the items have independent valuation distributions, we present a deterministic mechanism called Deterministic Best-Guess that yields at least a constant fraction of the optimal revenue by any randomized mechanism. This also gives the first simple mechanism that achieves constant fraction optimal revenue for such multi-buyer multi-item auctions. Second, if all the nk valuation random variables are independent, the optimal revenue achievable in dominant strategy incentive compatibility (DSIC) is shown to be at least a constant fraction of that achievable in Bayesian incentive compatibility (BIC). Third, when all the nk values are identically distributed according to a common one-dimensional distribution F, the optimal revenue is shown to be expressible in the closed form Θ(k(r + ∫0mr(1 − F(x)n)dx)) where r = supx≥0 x(1 − F(x)n) and m = lk nr; this revenue is achievable by a simple mechanism called 2nd-Price Bundling. All our results apply to arbitrary distributions, regular or irregular. We consider the problem of online learning in the linear contextual bandits setting, but in which there are also strong individual fairness constraints governed by an unknown similarity metric. These constraints demand that we select similar actions or individuals with approximately equal probability (arXiv:1104.3913), which may be at odds with optimizing reward, thus modeling settings where profit and social policy are in tension. We assume we learn about an unknown Mahalanobis similarity metric from only weak feedback that identifies fairness violations, but does not quantify their extent. This is intended to represent the interventions of a regulator who "knows unfairness when he sees it" but nevertheless cannot enunciate a quantitative fairness metric over individuals. Our main result is an algorithm in the adversarial context setting that has a number of fairness violations that depends only logarithmically on @math , while obtaining an optimal @math regret bound to the best fair policy. We consider the problem of maximizing a (non-monotone) submodular function subject to a cardinality constraint. In addition to capturing well-known combinatorial optimization problems, e.g., Max-k-Coverage and Max-Bisection, this problem has applications in other more practical settings such as natural language processing, information retrieval, and machine learning. In this work we present improved approximations for two variants of the cardinality constraint for non-monotone functions. When at most k elements can be chosen, we improve the current best 1 e -- o(1) approximation to a factor that is in the range [1 e + 0.004, 1 2], achieving a tight approximation of 1 2 -- o(1) for k = n 2 and breaking the 1 e barrier for all values of k. When exactly k elements must be chosen, our algorithms improve the current best 1 4 -- o(1) approximation to a factor that is in the range [0.356, 1 2], again achieving a tight approximation of 1 2 -- o(1) for k = n 2. Additionally, some of the algorithms we provide are very fast with time complexities of O(nk), as opposed to previous known algorithms which are continuous in nature, and thus, too slow for applications in the practical settings mentioned above. Our algorithms are based on two new techniques. First, we present a simple randomized greedy approach where in each step a random element is chosen from a set of "reasonably good" elements. This approach might be considered a natural substitute for the greedy algorithm of Nemhauser, Wolsey and Fisher [45], as it retains the same tight guarantee of 1--1 e for monotone objectives and the same time complexity of O(nk), while giving an approximation of 1 e for general non-monotone objectives (while the greedy algorithm of Nemhauser et. al. fails to provide any constant guarantee). Second, we extend the double greedy technique, which achieves a tight 1 2 approximation for unconstrained submodular maximization, to the continuous setting. This allows us to manipulate the natural rates by which elements change, thus bounding the total number of elements chosen. We study digital-goods auctions for items in unlimited supply introduced by Goldberg, Hartline and Wright. Since no deterministic algorithms are competitive for this class of auctions, one of the central research issues is how to obtain a nice probabilistic distribution over truthful algorithms. In this paper, we introduce a rather systematic approach to this goal: Consider for example the Sampling Cost Share (SCS) auction. It is well known that SCS works well if the the current bid vector produces many winners against F(2), the standard benchmark algorithm for competitive analysis. In fact, its competitive ratio is approaching to 2.0 as k (= the number of F(2) winners) grows. On the other hand, its competitive ratio becomes as bad as 4.0 for k = 2. Our new approach is to develop a sequence of similar cost-share type algorithms, DCSk, which work well for small k. Now we choose a sufficiently large constant N and run DCS1, DCS2, ..., DCSN and SCS with probabilities p1, p2, ..., pN and q, respectively. It should be noted that we can use LP to obtain optimal p1, p2,..., pN and q. By this averaging method, we can improve the competitive ratio of SCS from 4.0 to 3.531 and that of the currently best Aggregated γ3 algorithm due to Hartline and McGrew from 3.243 to 3.119. The pre-dominant approach to language modeling to date is based on recurrent neural networks. Their success on this task is often linked to their ability to capture unbounded context. In this paper we develop a finite context approach through stacked convolutions, which can be more efficient since they allow parallelization over sequential tokens. We propose a novel simplified gating mechanism that outperforms (2016b) and investigate the impact of key architectural decisions. The proposed approach achieves state-of-the-art on the WikiText-103 benchmark, even though it features long-term dependencies, as well as competitive results on the Google Billion Words benchmark. Our model reduces the latency to score a sentence by an order of magnitude compared to a recurrent baseline. To our knowledge, this is the first time a non-recurrent approach is competitive with strong recurrent models on these large scale language tasks. This paper introduces a model of ‘theory of mind’, namely, how we represent the intentions and goals of others to optimise our mutual interactions. We draw on ideas from optimum control and game theory to provide a ‘game theory of mind’. First, we consider the representations of goals in terms of value functions that are prescribed by utility or rewards. Critically, the joint value functions and ensuing behaviour are optimised recursively, under the assumption that I represent your value function, your representation of mine, your representation of my representation of yours, and so on ad infinitum. However, if we assume that the degree of recursion is bounded, then players need to estimate the opponent's degree of recursion (i.e., sophistication) to respond optimally. This induces a problem of inferring the opponent's sophistication, given behavioural exchanges. We show it is possible to deduce whether players make inferences about each other and quantify their sophistication on the basis of choices in sequential games. This rests on comparing generative models of choices with, and without, inference. Model comparison is demonstrated using simulated and real data from a ‘stag-hunt’. Finally, we note that exactly the same sophisticated behaviour can be achieved by optimising the utility function itself (through prosocial utility), producing unsophisticated but apparently altruistic agents. This may be relevant ethologically in hierarchal game theory and coevolution. Let G be a graph and @t:V(G)->N be an assignment of thresholds to the vertices of G. A subset of vertices D is said to be dynamic monopoly (or simply dynamo) if the vertices of G can be partitioned into subsets D"0,D"1,...,D"k such that D"0=D and for any i=1,...,k-1 each vertex v in D"i"+"1 has at least t(v) neighbors in D"[email protected][email protected]?D"i. Dynamic monopolies are in fact modeling the irreversible spread of influence such as disease or belief in social networks. We denote the smallest size of any dynamic monopoly of G, with a given threshold assignment, by dyn(G). In this paper, we first define the concept of a resistant subgraph and show its relationship with dynamic monopolies. Then we obtain some lower and upper bounds for the smallest size of dynamic monopolies in graphs with different types of thresholds. Next we introduce dynamo-unbounded families of graphs and prove some related results. We also define the concept of a homogeneous society that is a graph with probabilistic thresholds satisfying some conditions and obtain a bound for the smallest size of its dynamos. Finally, we consider dynamic monopoly of line graphs and obtain some bounds for their sizes and determine the exact values in some special cases. The pre-dominant approach to language modeling to date is based on recurrent neural networks. Their success on this task is often linked to their ability to capture unbounded context. In this paper we develop a finite context approach through stacked convolutions, which can be more efficient since they allow parallelization over sequential tokens. We propose a novel simplified gating mechanism that outperforms (2016) and investigate the impact of key architectural decisions. The proposed approach achieves state-of-the-art on the WikiText-103 benchmark, even though it features long-term dependencies, as well as competitive results on the Google Billion Words benchmark. Our model reduces the latency to score a sentence by an order of magnitude compared to a recurrent baseline. To our knowledge, this is the first time a non-recurrent approach is competitive with strong recurrent models on these large scale language tasks. We revisit the classic problem of fair division from a mechanism design perspective and provide an elegant truthful mechanism that yields surprisingly good approximation guarantees for the widely used solution of Proportional Fairness. This solution, which is closely related to Nash bargaining and the competitive equilibrium, is known to be not implementable in a truthful fashion, which has been its main drawback. To alleviate this issue, we propose a new mechanism, which we call the Partial Allocation mechanism, that discards a carefully chosen fraction of the allocated resources in order to incentivize the agents to be truthful in reporting their valuations. This mechanism introduces a way to implement interesting truthful outcomes in settings where monetary payments are not an option. For a multi-dimensional domain with an arbitrary number of agents and items, and for the very large class of homogeneous valuation functions, we prove that our mechanism provides every agent with at least a 1 e ≈ 0.368 fraction of her Proportionally Fair valuation. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first result that gives a constant factor approximation to every agent for the Proportionally Fair solution. To complement this result, we show that no truthful mechanism can guarantee more than 0.5 approximation, even for the restricted class of additive linear valuations. In addition to this, we uncover a connection between the Partial Allocation mechanism and VCG-based mechanism design. We also ask whether better approximation ratios are possible in more restricted settings. In particular, motivated by the massive privatization auction in the Czech republic in the early 90s we provide another mechanism for additive linear valuations that works really well when all the items are highly demanded. We investigate nonparametric multiproduct pricing problems, in which we want to find revenue maximizing prices for products @math based on a set of customer samples @math . We mostly focus on the unit-demand case, in which products constitute strict substitutes and each customer aims to purchase a single product. In this setting a customer sample consists of a number of nonzero values for different products and possibly an additional product ranking. Once prices are fixed, each customer chooses to buy one of the products she can afford based on some predefined selection rule. We distinguish between the min-buying, max-buying, and rank-buying models. Some of our results also extend to single-minded pricing, in which case products are strict complements and every customer seeks to buy a single set of products, which she purchases if the sum of prices is below her valuation for that set. For the min-buying model we show that the revenue maximization problem is not approximable within factor @math for some constant @math , unless @math , thereby almost closing the gap between the known algorithmic results and previous lower bounds. We also prove inapproximability within @math , @math being an upper bound on the number of nonzero values per customer, and @math under slightly stronger assumptions and provide matching upper bounds. Surprisingly, these hardness results hold even if a price ladder constraint, i.e., a predefined order on the prices of all products, is given. Without the price ladder constraint we obtain similar hardness results for the special case of uniform valuations, i.e., the case that every customer has identical values for all the products she is interested in, assuming specific hardness of the balanced bipartite independent set problem in constant degree graphs or hardness of refuting random 3CNF formulas. Introducing a slightly more general problem definition in which customers are given as an explicit probability distribution, we obtain inapproximability within @math assuming @math . These results apply to single-minded pricing as well. For the max-buying model a polynomial-time approximation scheme exists if a price ladder is given. We give a matching lower bound by proving strong NP-hardness. Assuming limited product supply, we analyze a generic local search algorithm and prove that it is 2-approximate. Finally, we discuss implications for the rank-buying model. Motivated by the problem of querying and communicating bidders' valuations in combinatorial auctions, we study how well different classes of set functions can be sketched. More formally, let f be a function mapping subsets of some ground set [n] to the non-negative real numbers. We say that f' is an α-sketch of f if for every set S, the value f'(S) lies between f(S) α and f(S), and f' can be specified by poly(n) bits. We show that for every subadditive function f there exists an α-sketch where α = n1 2. O(polylog(n)). Furthermore, we provide an algorithm that finds these sketches with a polynomial number of demand queries. This is essentially the best we can hope for since: 1. We show that there exist subadditive functions (in fact, XOS functions) that do not admit an o(n1 2) sketch. (Balcan and Harvey [3] previously showed that there exist functions belonging to the class of substitutes valuations that do not admit an O(n1 3) sketch.) 2. We prove that every deterministic algorithm that accesses the function via value queries only cannot guarantee a sketching ratio better than n1−e. We also show that coverage functions, an interesting subclass of submodular functions, admit arbitrarily good sketches. Finally, we show an interesting connection between sketching and learning. We show that for every class of valuations, if the class admits an α-sketch, then it can be α-approximately learned in the PMAC model of Balcan and Harvey. The bounds we prove are only information-theoretic and do not imply the existence of computationally efficient learning algorithms in general. This paper deals with constrained optimization of Markov Decision Processes with a countable state space, compact action sets, continuous transition probabilities, and upper semicontinuous reward functions. The objective is to maximize the expected total discounted reward for one reward function, under several inequality constraints on similar criteria with other reward functions. Suppose a feasible policy exists for a problem with M constraints. We prove two results on the existence and structure of optimal policies. First, we show that there exists a randomized stationary optimal policy which requires at most M actions more than a nonrandomized stationary one. This result is known for several particular cases. Second, we prove that there exists an optimal policy which is i stationary nonrandomized from some step onward, ii randomized Markov before this step, but the total number of actions which are added by randomization is at most M, iii the total number of actions that are added by nonstationarity is at most M. We also establish Pareto optimality of policies from the two classes described above for multi-criteria problems. We describe an algorithm to compute optimal policies with properties i--iii for constrained problems. The policies that satisfy properties i--iii have the pleasing aesthetic property that the amount of randomization they require over any trajectory is restricted by the number of constraints. In contrast, a randomized stationary policy may require an infinite number of randomizations over time. In this paper, we consider the problem of designing incentive compatible auctions for multiple (homogeneous) units of a good, when bidders have private valuations and private budget constraints. When only the valuations are private and the budgets are public, [8] show that the adaptive clinching auction is the unique incentive-compatible auction achieving Pareto-optimality. They further show that this auction is not truthful with private budgets, so that there is no deterministic Pareto-optimal auction with private budgets. Our main contribution is to show the following Budget Monotonicity property of this auction: When there is only one infinitely divisible good, a bidder cannot improve her utility by reporting a budget smaller than the truth. This implies that the adaptive clinching auction is incentive compatible when over-reporting the budget is not possible (for instance, when funds must be shown upfront). We can also make reporting larger budgets suboptimal with a small randomized modification to the auction. In either case, this makes the modified auction Pareto-optimal with private budgets. We also show that the Budget Monotonicity property does not hold for auctioning indivisible units of the good, showing a sharp contrast between the divisible and indivisible cases. The Budget Monotonicity property also implies other improved results in this context. For revenue maximization, the same auction improves the best-known competitive ratio due to Abrams [1] by a factor of 4, and asymptotically approaches the performance of the optimal single-price auction. Finally, we consider the problem of revenue maximization (or social welfare) in a Bayesian setting. We allow the bidders have public size constraints (on the amount of good they are willing to buy) in addition to private budget constraints. We show a simple poly-time computable 5.83-approximation to the optimal Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism, that is implementable in dominant strategies. Our technique again crucially needs the ability to prevent bidders from over-reporting budgets via randomization. We show the approximation result via designing a rounding scheme for an LP relaxation of the problem, which may be of independent interest.