In this paper, we consider lightweight decentralised algorithms for achieving consensus in distributed systems. Each member of a distributed group has a private value from a fixed set consisting of, say, two elements, and the goal is for all members to reach consensus on the majority value. We explore variants of the voter model applied to this problem. In the voter model, each node polls a randomly chosen group member and adopts its value. The process is repeated until consensus is reached. We generalize this so that each member polls a (deterministic or random) number of other group members and changes opinion only if a suitably defined super-majority has a different opinion. We show that this modification greatly speeds up the convergence of the algorithm, as well as substantially reducing the probability of it reaching consensus on the incorrect value.
Consensus can also be reached without using variants of voter models. Instead, agents could simply count the number of agents with values 0 and 1, and thereby choose the majority. It is shown in @cite_4 that such counting problems can be approximated using a gossip algorithm which involves propagating real numbers rather than values from a finite set. If the approximation error in counting is smaller than the margin between the 0 and 1 votes, then this leads to the correct decision regarding the initial majority value. The time required by this approximate counting algorithm is shown in @cite_4 to scale logarithmically in the number of nodes in complete graphs, whereas on general graphs, it can be bounded in terms of the expansion properties of the graph.
@cite_4
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In multiagent settings where the agents have different preferences, preference aggregation is a central issue. Voting is a general method for preference aggregation, but seminal results have shown that all general voting protocols are manipulable. One could try to avoid manipulation by using protocols where determining a beneficial manipulation is hard. Especially among computational agents, it is reasonable to measure this hardness by computational complexity. Some earlier work has been done in this area, but it was assumed that the number of voters and candidates is unbounded. Such hardness results lose relevance when the number of candidates is small, because manipulation algorithms that are exponential only in the number of candidates (and only slightly so) might be available. We give such an algorithm for an individual agent to manipulate the Single Transferable Vote (STV) protocol, which has been shown hard to manipulate in the above sense. This motivates the core of this article, which derives hardness results for realistic elections where the number of candidates is a small constant (but the number of voters can be large). The main manipulation question we study is that of coalitional manipulation by weighted voters. (We show that for simpler manipulation problems, manipulation cannot be hard with few candidates.) We study both constructive manipulation (making a given candidate win) and destructive manipulation (making a given candidate not win). We characterize the exact number of candidates for which manipulation becomes hard for the plurality, Borda, STV, Copeland, maximin, veto, plurality with runoff, regular cup, and randomized cup protocols. We also show that hardness of manipulation in this setting implies hardness of manipulation by an individual in unweighted settings when there is uncertainty about the others' votes (but not vice-versa). To our knowledge, these are the first results on the hardness of manipulation when there is uncertainty about the others' votes. We consider the following distributed consensus problem: Each node in a complete communication network of size n initially holds an opinion, which is chosen arbitrarily from a finite set Σ. The system must converge toward a consensus state in which all, or almost all nodes, hold the same opinion. Moreover, this opinion should be valid, i.e., it should be one among those initially present in the system. This condition should be met even in the presence of a malicious adversary who can modify the opinions of a bounded subset of nodes, adaptively chosen in every round. We consider the 3-majority dynamics: At every round, every node pulls the opinion from three random neighbors and sets his new opinion to the majority one (ties are broken arbitrarily). Let k be the number of valid opinions. We show that, if k ≤ nα, where α is a suitable positive constant, the 3-majority dynamics converges in time polynomial in k and log n with high probability even in the presence of an adversary who can affect up to o([EQUATION]) nodes at each round. Previously, the convergence of the 3-majority protocol was known for |Σ| = 2 only, with an argument that is robust to adversarial errors. On the other hand, no anonymous, uniform-gossip protocol that is robust to adversarial errors was known for |Σ| > 2. Distributed voting is a fundamental topic in distributed computing. In the standard model of pull voting, at each step every vertex chooses a neighbour uniformly at random and adopts its opinion. The voting is completed when all vertices hold the same opinion. In the simplest case, each vertex initially holds one of two different opinions. This partitions the vertices into arbitrary sets A and B. For many graphs, including regular graphs and irrespective of their expansion properties, if both A and B are sufficiently large sets, then pull voting requires @math expected steps, where n is the number of vertices of the graph. In this paper we consider a related class of voting processes based on sampling two opinions. In the simplest case, every vertex v chooses two random neighbours at each step. If both these neighbours have the same opinion, then v adopts this opinion. Otherwise, v keeps its own opinion. Let G be a connected graph with n vertices and m edges. Let P be the transition matrix of a simple random walk on G with second largest eigenvalue @math . We show that if the initial imbalance in degree between the two opinions satisfies @math , then with high probability voting completes in @math steps, and the opinion with the larger initial degree wins. The condition that @math , or only a bound on the conductance of the graph is known, the sampling process can be modified so that voting still provably completes in @math steps with high probability. The modification uses two sampling based on probing to a fixed depth @math from any vertex. In its most general form our voting process allows vertices to bias their sampling of opinions among their neighbours to achieve a desired outcome. This is done by allocating weights to edges. We describe and analyze a 3-state one-way population protocol for approximate majority in the model in which pairs of agents are drawn uniformly at random to interact. Given an initial configuration of x's, y's and blanks that contains at least one non-blank, the goal is for the agents to reach consensus on one of the values x or y. Additionally, the value chosen should be the majority non-blank initial value, provided it exceeds the minority by a sufficient margin. We prove that with high probability n agents reach consensus in O(n log n) interactions and the value chosen is the majority provided that its initial margin is at least ω(√n log n). This protocol has the additional property of tolerating Byzantine behavior in o(√n) of the agents, making it the first known population protocol that tolerates Byzantine agents. Turning to the register machine construction from [2], we apply the 3-state approximate majority protocol and other techniques to speed up the per-step parallel time overhead of the simulation from O(log4 n) to O(log2 n). To increase the robustness of the phase clock at the heart of the register machine, we describe a consensus version of the phase clock and present encouraging simulation results; its analysis remains an open problem. The adoption of everyday decisions in public affairs, fashion, movie-going, and consumer behavior is now thoroughly believed to migrate in a population through an influential network. The same diffusion process when being imitated by intention is called viral marketing. This process can be modeled by a (directed) graph G=(V,E) with a threshold t(v) for every vertex v?V, where v becomes active once at least t(v) of its (in-)neighbors are already active. A Perfect Target Set is a set of vertices whose activation will eventually activate the entire graph, and the Perfect Target Set Selection Problem (PTSS) asks for the minimum such initial set. It is known (Chen (2008) 6) that PTSS is hard to approximate, even for some special cases such as bounded-degree graphs, or majority thresholds.We propose a combinatorial model for this dynamic activation process, and use it to represent PTSS and its variants by linear integer programs. This allows one to use standard integer programming solvers for solving small-size PTSS instances. We also show combinatorial lower and upper bounds on the size of the minimum Perfect Target Set. Our upper bound implies that there are always Perfect Target Sets of size at most |V| 2 and 2|V| 3 under majority and strict majority thresholds, respectively, both in directed and undirected graphs. This improves the bounds of 0.727|V| and 0.7732|V| found recently by Chang and Lyuu (2010) 5 for majority and strict majority thresholds in directed graphs, and matches their bound under majority thresholds in undirected graphs. Furthermore, our proof is much simpler, and we observe that some of these bounds are tight. One interesting and perhaps surprising implication of our lower bound for undirected graphs, is that it is easy to get a constant factor approximation for PTSS for “relatively balanced” graphs (e.g., bounded-degree graphs, nearly regular graphs) with a “more than majority” threshold (that is, t(v)=??deg(v), for every v?V and some constant ?>1 2), whereas no polylogarithmic approximation exists for “more than majority” graphs. This paper investigates one of the possible weakening of the (too demanding) assumptions of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem. Namely we deal with a class of voting schemes where at the same time the domain of possible preference preordering of any agent is limited to single-peaked preferences, and the message that this agent sends to the central authority is simply its ‘peak’ — his best preferred alternative. In this context we have shown that strategic considerations justify the central role given to the Condorcet procedure which amounts to elect the ‘median’ peak: namely all strategy-proof anonymous and efficient voting schemes can be derived from the Condorcet procedure by simply adding some fixed ballots to the agent's ballots (with the only restriction that the number of fixed ballots is strictly less than the number of agents). Voting is a general method for aggregating the preferences of multiple agents. Each agent ranks all the possible alternatives, and based on this, an aggregate ranking of the alternatives (or at least a winning alternative) is produced. However, when there are many alternatives, it is impractical to simply ask agents to report their complete preferences. Rather, the agents' preferences, or at least the relevant parts thereof, need to be elicited. This is done by asking the agents a (hopefully small) number of simple queries about their preferences, such as comparison queries, which ask an agent to compare two of the alternatives. Prior work on preference elicitation in voting has focused on the case of unrestricted preferences. It has been shown that in this setting, it is sometimes necessary to ask each agent (almost) as many queries as would be required to determine an arbitrary ranking of the alternatives. In contrast, in this paper, we focus on single-peaked preferences. We show that such preferences can be elicited using only a linear number of comparison queries, if either the order with respect to which preferences are single-peaked is known, or at least one other agent's complete preferences are known. We show that using a sublinear number of queries does not suffice. We also consider the case of cardinally single-peaked preferences. For this case, we show that if the alternatives' cardinal positions are known, then an agent's preferences can be elicited using only a logarithmic number of queries; however, we also show that if the cardinal positions are not known, then a sublinear number of queries does not suffice. We present experimental results for all elicitation algorithms. We also consider the problem of only eliciting enough information to determine the aggregate ranking, and show that even for this more modest objective, a sublinear number of queries per agent does not suffice for known ordinal or unknown cardinal positions. Finally, we discuss whether and how these techniques can be applied when preferences are almost single-peaked. We consider the special case of approval voting when the set of agents and the set of alternatives coincide. This captures situations in which the members of an organization want to elect a president or a committee from their ranks, as well as a variety of problems in networked environments, for example in internet search, social networks like Twitter, or reputation systems like Epinions. More precisely, we look at a setting where each member of a set of n agents approves or disapproves of any other member of the set and we want to select a subset of k agents, for a given value of k, in a strategyproof and approximately efficient way. Here, strategyproofness means that no agent can improve its own chances of being selected by changing the set of other agents it approves. A mechanism is said to provide an approximation ratio of α for some α ≥ 1 if the ratio between the sum of approval scores of any set of size k and that of the set selected by the mechanism is always at most α. We show that for k ∈ 1, 2,..., n − 1 , no deterministic strategyproof mechanism can provide a finite approximation ratio. We then present a randomized strategyproof mechanism that provides an approximation ratio that is bounded from above by four for any value of k, and approaches one as k grows. Aggregating the preferences of self-interested agents is a key problem for multiagent systems, and one general method for doing so is to vote over the alternatives (candidates). Unfortunately, the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem shows that when there are three or more candidates, all reasonable voting rules are manipulable (in the sense that there exist situations in which a voter would benefit from reporting its preferences insincerely). To circumvent this impossibility result, recent research has investigated whether it is possible to make finding a beneficial manipulation computationally hard. This approach has had some limited success, exhibiting rules under which the problem of finding a beneficial manipulation is NP-hard, #P-hard, or even PSPACE-hard. Thus, under these rules, it is unlikely that a computationally efficient algorithm can be constructed that always finds a beneficial manipulation (when it exists). However, this still does not preclude the existence of an efficient algorithm that often finds a successful manipulation (when it exists). There have been attempts to design a rule under which finding a beneficial manipulation is usually hard, but they have failed. To explain this failure, in this paper, we show that it is in fact impossible to design such a rule, if the rule is also required to satisfy another property: a large fraction of the manipulable instances are both weakly monotone, and allow the manipulators to make either of exactly two candidates win. We argue why one should expect voting rules to have this property, and show experimentally that common voting rules clearly satisfy it. We also discuss approaches for potentially circumventing this impossibility result. Social networks are increasingly being used to conduct polls. We introduce a simple model of such social polling. We suppose agents vote sequentially, but the order in which agents choose to vote is not necessarily fixed. We also suppose that an agent's vote is influenced by the votes of their friends who have already voted. Despite its simplicity, this model provides useful insights into a number of areas including social polling, sequential voting, and manipulation. We prove that the number of candidates and the network structure affect the computational complexity of computing which candidate necessarily or possibly can win in such a social poll. For social networks with bounded treewidth and a bounded number of candidates, we provide polynomial algorithms for both problems. In other cases, we prove that computing which candidates necessarily or possibly win are computationally intractable. Preference aggregation is used in a variety of multiagent applications, and as a result, voting theory has become an important topic in multiagent system research. However, power indices (which reflect how much "real power" a voter has in a weighted voting system) have received relatively little attention, although they have long been studied in political science and economics. The Banzhaf power index is one of the most popular; it is also well-defined for any simple coalitional game. In this paper, we examine the computational complexity of calculating the Banzhaf power index within a particular multiagent domain, a network flow game. Agents control the edges of a graph; a coalition wins if it can send a flow of a given size from a source vertex to a target vertex. The relative power of each edge agent reflects its significance in enabling such a flow, and in real-world networks could be used, for example, to allocate resources for maintaining parts of the network. We show that calculating the Banzhaf power index of each agent in this network flow domain is #P-complete. We also show that for some restricted network flow domains there exists a polynomial algorithm to calculate agents' Banzhaf power indices. Abstract The paper studies effective approximate solutions to combinatorial counting and unform generation problems. Using a technique based on the simulation of ergodic Markov chains, it is shown that, for self-reducible structures, almost uniform generation is possible in polynomial time provided only that randomised approximate counting to within some arbitrary polynomial factor is possible in polynomial time. It follows that, for self-reducible structures, polynomial time randomised algorithms for counting to within factors of the form (1 + n − β ) are available either for all β ϵ R or for no β ϵ R . A substantial part of the paper is devoted to investigating the rate of convergence of finite ergodic Markov chains, and a simple but powerful characterisation of rapid convergence for a broad class of chains based on a structural property of the underlying graph is established. Finally, the general techniques of the paper are used to derive an almost uniform generation procedure for labelled graphs with a given degree sequence which is valid over a much wider range of degrees than previous methods: this in turn leads to randomised approximate counting algorithms for these graphs with very good asymptotic behaviour. We consider distributed plurality consensus in a complete graph of size @math with @math initial opinions. We design an efficient and simple protocol in the asynchronous communication model that ensures that all nodes eventually agree on the initially most frequent opinion. In this model, each node is equipped with a random Poisson clock with parameter @math . Whenever a node's clock ticks, it samples some neighbors, uniformly at random and with replacement, and adjusts its opinion according to the sample. A prominent example is the so-called two-choices algorithm in the synchronous model, where in each round, every node chooses two neighbors uniformly at random, and if the two sampled opinions coincide, then that opinion is adopted. This protocol is very efficient and well-studied when @math . If @math for some small @math , we show that it converges to the initial plurality opinion within @math rounds, w.h.p., as long as the initial difference between the largest and second largest opinion is @math . On the other side, we show that there are cases in which @math rounds are needed, w.h.p. One can beat this lower bound in the synchronous model by combining the two-choices protocol with randomized broadcasting. Our main contribution is a non-trivial adaptation of this approach to the asynchronous model. If the support of the most frequent opinion is at least @math times that of the second-most frequent one and @math , then our protocol achieves the best possible run time of @math , w.h.p. We relax full synchronicity by allowing @math nodes to be poorly synchronized, and the well synchronized nodes are only required to be within a certain time difference from one another. We enforce this synchronicity by introducing a novel gadget into the protocol. Voting is an essential mechanism that allows multiple agents to reach a joint decision. The joint decision, representing a function over the preferences of all agents, is the winner among all possible (candidate) decisions. To compute the winning candidate, previous work has typically assumed that voters send their complete set of preferences for computation, and in fact this has been shown to be required in the worst case. However, in practice, it may be infeasible for all agents to send a complete set of preferences due to communication limitations and willingness to keep as much information private as possible. The goal of this paper is to empirically evaluate algorithms to reduce communication on various sets of experiments. Accordingly, we propose an iterative algorithm that allows the agents to send only part of their preferences, incrementally. Experiments with simulated and real-world data show that this algorithm results in an average of 35 savings in communications, while guaranteeing that the actual winning candidate is revealed. A second algorithm applies a greedy heuristic to save up to 90 of communications. While this heuristic algorithm cannot guarantee that a true winning candidate is found, we show that in practice, close approximations are obtained. Usually a voting rule requires agents to give their preferences as linear orders. However, in some cases it is impractical for an agent to give a linear order over all the alternatives. It has been suggested to let agents submit partial orders instead. Then, given a voting rule, a profile of partial orders, and an alternative (candidate) c, two important questions arise: first, is it still possible for c to win, and second, is c guaranteed to win? These are the possible winner and necessary winner problems, respectively. Each of these two problems is further divided into two sub-problems: determining whether c is a unique winner (that is, c is the only winner), or determining whether c is a co-winner (that is, c is in the set of winners). We consider the setting where the number of alternatives is unbounded and the votes are unweighted. We completely characterize the complexity of possible necessary winner problems for the following common voting rules: a class of positional scoring rules (including Borda), Copeland, maximin, Bucklin, ranked pairs, voting trees, and plurality with runoff. Voting is a simple mechanism to combine together the preferences of multiple agents. Unfortunately, agents may try to manipulate the result by mis-reporting their preferences. One barrier that might exist to such manipulation is computational complexity. In particular, it has been shown that it is NP-hard to compute how to manipulate a number of different voting rules. However, NP-hardness only bounds the worst-case complexity. Recent theoretical results suggest that manipulation may often be easy in practice. In this paper, we show that empirical studies are useful in improving our understanding of this issue. We consider two settings which represent the two types of complexity results that have been identified in this area: manipulation with unweighted votes by a single agent, and manipulation with weighted votes by a coalition of agents. In the first case, we consider Single Transferable Voting (STV), and in the second case, we consider veto voting. STV is one of the few voting rules used in practice where it is NP-hard to compute how a single agent can manipulate the result when votes are unweighted. It also appears one of the harder voting rules to manipulate since it involves multiple rounds. On the other hand, veto voting is one of the simplest representatives of voting rules where it is NP-hard to compute how a coalition of weighted agents can manipulate the result. In our experiments, we sample a number of distributions of votes including uniform, correlated and real world elections. In many of the elections in our experiments, it was easy to compute how to manipulate the result or to prove that manipulation was impossible. Even when we were able to identify a situation in which manipulation was hard to compute (e.g. when votes are highly correlated and the election is "hung"), we found that the computational difficulty of computing manipulations was somewhat precarious (e.g. with such "hung" elections, even a single uncorrelated voter was enough to make manipulation easy to compute). This paper addresses the problem of counting the size of a network where i processes have the same identifiers anonymous nodes and ii the network topology constantly changes dynamic network. Changes are driven by a powerful adversary that can look at internal process states and add and remove edges in order to contrast the convergence of the algorithm to the correct count. The paper proposes two leader-based counting algorithms. Such algorithms are based on a technique that mimics an energy-transfer between network nodes. The first algorithm assumes that the adversary cannot generate either disconnected network graphs or network graphs where nodes have degree greater than D. In such algorithm, the leader can count the size of the network and detect the counting termination in a finite time i.e., conscious counting algorithm. The second algorithm assumes that the adversary only keeps the network graph connected at any time and we prove that the leader can still converge to a correct count in a finite number of rounds, but it is not conscious when this convergence happens. Preference aggregation is used in a variety of multiagent applications, and as a result, voting theory has become an important topic in multiagent system research. However, power indices (which reflect how much "real power" a voter has in a weighted voting system) have received relatively little attention, although they have long been studied in political science and economics. We consider a particular multiagent domain, a threshold network flow game. Agents control the edges of a graph; a coalition wins if it can send a flow that exceeds a given threshold from a source vertex to a target vertex. The relative power of each edge agent reflects its significance in enabling such a flow, and in real-world networks could be used, for example, to allocate resources for maintaining parts of the network. We examine the computational complexity of calculating two prominent power indices, the Banzhaf index and the Shapley-Shubik index, in this network flow domain. We also consider the complexity of calculating the core in this domain. The core can be used to allocate, in a stable manner, the gains of the coalition that is established. We show that calculating the Shapley-Shubik index in this network flow domain is NP-hard, and that calculating the Banzhaf index is #P-complete. Despite these negative results, we show that for some restricted network flow domains there exists a polynomial algorithm for calculating agents' Banzhaf power indices. We also show that computing the core in this game can be performed in polynomial time. In computational social choice, one important problem is to take the votes of a subelectorate (subset of the voters), and summarize them using a small number of bits. This needs to be done in such a way that, if all that we know is the summary, as well as the votes of voters outside the subelectorate, we can conclude which of the m alternatives wins. This corresponds to the notion of compilation complexity, the minimum number of bits required to summarize the votes for a particular rule, which was introduced by [IJCAI-09]. We study three different types of compilation complexity. The first, studied by , depends on the size of the subelectorate but not on the size of the complement (the voters outside the subelectorate). The second depends on the size of the complement but not on the size of the subelectorate. The third depends on both. We first investigate the relations among the three types of compilation complexity. Then, we give upper and lower bounds on all three types of compilation complexity for the most prominent voting rules. We show that for l-approval (when l ≤ m 2), Borda, and Bucklin, the bounds for all three types are asymptotically tight, up to a multiplicative constant; for l-approval (when l > m 2), plurality with runoff, all Condorcet consistent rules that are based on unweighted majority graphs (including Copeland and voting trees), and all Condorcet consistent rules that are based on the order of pairwise elections (including ranked pairs and maximin), the bounds for all three types are asymptotically tight up to a multiplicative constant when the sizes of the subelectorate and its complement are both larger than m1+∊ for some ∊ > 0. Two mobile agents starting at different nodes of an unknown network have to meet. This task is known in the literature as rendezvous. Each agent has a different label which is a positive integer known to it, but unknown to the other agent. Agents move in an asynchronous way: the speed of agents may vary and is controlled by an adversary. The cost of a rendezvous algorithm is the total number of edge traversals by both agents until their meeting. The only previous deterministic algorithm solving this problem has cost exponential in the size of the graph and in the larger label. In this paper we present a deterministic rendezvous algorithm with cost polynomial in the size of the graph and in the length of the smaller label. Hence we decrease the cost exponentially in the size of the graph and doubly exponentially in the labels of agents. As an application of our rendezvous algorithm we solve several fundamental problems involving teams of unknown size larger than 1 of labeled agents moving asynchronously in unknown networks. Among them are the following problems: team size, in which every agent has to find the total number of agents, leader election, in which all agents have to output the label of a single agent, perfect renaming in which all agents have to adopt new different labels from the set 1,...,k , where k is the number of agents, and gossiping, in which each agent has initially a piece of information (value) and all agents have to output all the values. Using our rendezvous algorithm we solve all these problems at cost polynomial in the size of the graph and in the smallest length of all labels of participating agents.