Underground online forums are platforms that enable trades of illicit services and stolen goods. Carding forums, in particular, are known for being focused on trading financial information. However, little evidence exists about the sellers that are present on carding forums, the precise types of products they advertise, and the prices buyers pay. Existing literature mainly focuses on the organisation and structure of the forums. Furthermore, studies on carding forums are usually based on literature review, expert interviews, or data from forums that have already been shut down. This paper provides first-of-its-kind empirical evidence on active forums where stolen financial data is traded. We monitored 5 out of 25 discovered forums, collected posts from the forums over a three-month period, and analysed them quantitatively and qualitatively. We focused our analyses on products, prices, seller prolificacy, seller specialisation, and seller reputation.
Looking at the products sold per seller, several studies found evidence of specialisation amongst sellers. Derived from literature review and expert interviews, Kraemer- @cite_30 , for example, promote an ecosystem perspective to understand the actions of underground traders. Comparable to the legitimate business community, underground ecosystems includes actors that compete against each other, targeting competitive advantage. They try to reach this advantage by specialising in a particular type of product @cite_30 .
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Many online games have their own ecosystems, where players can purchase in-game assets using game money. Players can obtain game money through active participation or “real money trading” through official channels: converting real money into game money. The unofficial market for real money trading gave rise to gold farming groups (GFGs), a phenomenon with serious impact in the cyber and real worlds. GFGs in massively multiplayer online role-playing games (MMORPGs) are some of the most interesting underground cyber economies because of the massive nature of the game. To detect GFGs, there have been various studies using behavioral traits. However, they can only detect gold farmers, not entire GFGs with internal hierarchies. Even worse, GFGs continuously develop techniques to hide, such as forming front organizations, concealing cyber-money, and changing trade patterns when online game service providers ban GFGs. In this paper, we analyze the characteristics of the ecosystem of a large-scale MMORPG, and devise a method for detecting GFGs. We build a graph that characterizes virtual economy transactions, and trace abnormal trades and activities. We derive features from the trading graph and physical networks used by GFGs to identify them in their entirety. Using their structure, we provide recommendations to defend effectively against GFGs while not affecting the existing virtual ecosystem. Over the last decade, the nature of cybercrime has transformed from naive vandalism to profit-driven, leading to the emergence of a global underground economy. A noticeable trend which has surfaced in this economy is the repeated use of forums to operate online stolen data markets. Using interaction data from three prominent carding forums: Shadowcrew, Cardersmarket and Darkmarket, this study sets out to understand why forums are repeatedly chosen to operate online stolen data markets despite numerous successful infiltrations by law enforcement in the past. Drawing on theories from criminology, social psychology, economics and network science, this study has identified four fundamental socio-economic mechanisms offered by carding forums: (1) formal control and coordination; (2) social networking; (3) identity uncertainty mitigation; (4) quality uncertainty mitigation. Together, they give rise to a sophisticated underground market regulatory system that facilitates underground trading over the Internet and thus drives the expansion of the underground economy. Aim of this paper is to introduce the complex system perspective into retail market analysis. Currently, to understand the retail market means to search for local patterns at the micro level, involving the segmentation, separation and profiling of diverse groups of consumers. In other contexts, however, markets are modelled as complex systems. Such strategy is able to uncover emerging regularities and patterns that make markets more predictable, e.g. enabling to predict how much a country’s GDP will grow. Rather than isolate actors in homogeneous groups, this strategy requires to consider the system as a whole, as the emerging pattern can be detected only as a result of the interaction between its self-organizing parts. This assumption holds also in the retail market: each customer can be seen as an independent unit maximizing its own utility function. As a consequence, the global behaviour of the retail market naturally emerges, enabling a novel description of its properties, complementary to the local pattern approach. Such task demands for a data-driven empirical framework. In this paper, we analyse a unique transaction database, recording the micro-purchases of a million customers observed for several years in the stores of a national supermarket chain. We show the emergence of the fundamental pattern of this complex system, connecting the products’ volumes of sales with the customers’ volumes of purchases. This pattern has a number of applications. We provide three of them. By enabling us to evaluate the sophistication of needs that a customer has and a product satisfies, this pattern has been applied to the task of uncovering the hierarchy of needs of the customers, providing a hint about what is the next product a customer could be interested in buying and predicting in which shop she is likely to go to buy it. Cybercrime activities are supported by infrastructures and services originating from an underground economy. The current understanding of this phenomenon is that the cybercrime economy ought to be fraught with information asymmetry and adverse selection problems. They should make the effects that we observe every day impossible to sustain. In this paper, we show that the market structure and design used by cyber criminals have evolved toward a market design that is similar to legitimate, thriving, online forum markets such as eBay. We illustrate this evolution by comparing the market regulatory mechanisms of two underground forum markets: 1) a failed market for credit cards and other illegal goods and 2) another, extremely active marketplace for vulnerabilities, exploits, and cyber attacks in general. The comparison shows that cybercrime markets evolved from unruly, scam for scammers market mechanisms to mature, regulated mechanisms that greatly favors trade efficiency. We study the optimal pricing of a finite quantity of a fashion-like seasonal good in the presence of forward-looking (strategic) customers. We distinguish between two classes of pricing strategies: contingent and announced fixed-discount. In both cases, the seller acts as a Stackelberg leader announcing his pricing strategy, while consumers act as followers taking the seller's strategy as given and determining their purchasing behavior. In each case, we identify a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium and show that given the seller's strategy, the equilibrium in the consumer subgame is unique and consists of symmetric threshold purchasing policies. For both cases, we develop a benchmark model in which customers are nonstrategic (myopic). We conduct a comprehensive numerical study to explore the impact of strategic consumer behavior on pricing policies and expected revenue performance. We show that strategic customer behavior suppresses the benefits of price segmentation, particularly under medium-to-high values of heterogeneity and modest rates of decline in valuations. However, when the level of consumer heterogeneity is small, the rate of decline is medium-to-high, and the seller can optimally choose the time of discount in advance, segmentation can be used quite effectively even with strategic consumers. We find that the seller cannot avoid the adverse impact of strategic consumer behavior even under low levels of initial inventory. We argue that while the seller expects customers to be more concerned about product availability at discount time, he cannot use high-price “betting” strategies as he would in the case of low inventory and myopic customers. Under certain qualifications, announced fixed-discount strategies perform essentially the same as contingent pricing policies in the case of myopic consumers. However, under strategic consumer behavior, announced pricing policies can be advantageous to the seller, compared to contingent pricing schemes. Interestingly, those cases that announced discount strategies offer a significant advantage compared to contingent pricing policies. They appear to offer only a minimal advantage in comparison to fixed-pricing policies. Finally, when the seller incorrectly assumes that strategic customers are myopic in their purchasing decisions, it can be quite costly, reaching potential revenue losses of about 20 . This paper examines social structures underlying economic activity in Second Life (SL), a massively multiplayer virtual world that allows users to create and trade virtual objects and commodities. We find that users conduct many of their transactions both within their social networks and within groups. Using frequency of chat as a proxy of tie strength, we observe that free items are more likely to be exchanged as the strength of the tie increases. Social ties particularly play a significant role in paid transactions for sellers with a moderately sized customer base. We further find that sellers enjoying repeat business are likely to be selling to niche markets, because their customers tend to be contained in a smaller number of groups. But while social structure and interaction can help explain a seller's revenues and repeat business, they provide little information in the forecasting a seller's future performance. Our quantitative analysis is complemented by a novel method of visualizing the transaction activity of a seller, including revenue, customer base growth, and repeat business. The ecological principle of competitive exclusion asserts that two species cannot indefinitely occupy the same niche [Sj. Attempts have been made to state this principle as a mathematical theorem. A standard example is due to Volterra [14]. (See Example 2.1 below.) He constructed a model of two species competing for a single resource and showed that one of the species must go extinct. Although the concept of niche is rather vague, it is generally agreed that Volterra’s model is an example of two species competing for the same niche and is therefore an illustration of the principle of competitive exclusion. The generalizations of Volterra’s model have dealt largely with the introduction of more realistic assumptions about the interactions between species. These assumptions have led to some interesting mathematical problems, many of them unsolved. The purpose of this paper is to state these problems precisely, to give proofs of the known results, and to indicate the unanswered questions. The basic object of study is an idealized ecological community consisting of a certain number of species living together in an isolated geographical area. We shall assume that the community interactions are independent of both space and time and that each species is distributed uniformly over the region. The basic variables are the population densities of each of the species. The In Amazon EC2, cloud resources are sold through a combination of an on-demand market, in which customers buy resources at a fixed price, and a spot market, in which customers bid for an uncertain supply of excess resources. Standard market environments suggest that an optimal design uses just one type of market. We show the prevalence of a dual market system can be explained by heterogeneous risk attitudes of customers. In our stylized model, we consider unit demand risk-averse bidders. We show the model admits a unique equilibrium, with higher revenue and higher welfare than using only spot markets. Furthermore, as risk aversion increases, the usage of the on-demand market increases. We conclude that risk attitudes are an important factor in cloud resource allocation and should be incorporated into models of cloud markets. Customer preferences for products are drifting over time. Product perception and popularity are constantly changing as new selection emerges. Similarly, customer inclinations are evolving, leading them to ever redefine their taste. Thus, modeling temporal dynamics should be a key when designing recommender systems or general customer preference models. However, this raises unique challenges. Within the eco-system intersecting multiple products and customers, many different characteristics are shifting simultaneously, while many of them influence each other and often those shifts are delicate and associated with a few data instances. This distinguishes the problem from concept drift explorations, where mostly a single concept is tracked. Classical time-window or instance-decay approaches cannot work, as they lose too much signal when discarding data instances. A more sensitive approach is required, which can make better distinctions between transient effects and long term patterns. The paradigm we offer is creating a model tracking the time changing behavior throughout the life span of the data. This allows us to exploit the relevant components of all data instances, while discarding only what is modeled as being irrelevant. Accordingly, we revamp two leading collaborative filtering recommendation approaches. Evaluation is made on a large movie rating dataset by Netflix. Results are encouraging and better than those previously reported on this dataset. We consider the problem of a monopolist seller who wants to sell some items to a set of buyers. The buyers are strategic, unit-demand, and connected by a social network. Furthermore, the utility of a buyer is a decreasing function of the number of neighbors who do not own the item. In other words, they exhibit negative externalities, deriving utility from being unique in their purchases. In this model, any fixed setting of the price induces a sub-game on the buyers. We show that it is an exact potential game which admits multiple pure Nash Equilibria. A natural problem is to compute those pure Nash equilibria that raise the most and least revenue for the seller. These correspond respectively to the most optimistic and most pessimistic revenues that can be raised. We show that the revenues of both the best and worst equilibria are hard to approximate within sub-polynomial factors. Given this hardness, we consider a relaxed notion of pricing, where the price for the same item can vary within a constant factor for different buyers. We show a 4-approximation to the pessimistic revenue when the prices are relaxed by a factor of 4. The interesting aspect of this algorithm is that it uses a linear programming relaxation that only encodes part of the strategic behavior of the buyers in its constraints, and rounds this relaxation to obtain a starting configuration for performing relaxed Nash dynamics. Finally, for the maximum revenue Nash equilibrium, we show a 2-approximation for bipartite graphs (without price relaxation), and complement this result by showing that the problem is NP-Hard even on trees. Buyers often search across sellers to learn which product best fits their needs. We study how sellers manage these search incentives through their disclosure strategies (e.g., product trials, reviews, and recommendations) and ask how competition affects information provision. If sellers can observe the beliefs of buyers or can coordinate their strategies, then there is an equilibrium in which sellers provide the "monopoly level" of information. In contrast, if buyers' beliefs are private, then there is an equilibrium in which sellers provide full information as search costs vanish. Anonymity and coordination thus play important roles in understanding how advice markets work. Consider a typical recommendation problem. A company has historical records of products sold to a large customer base. These records may be compactly represented as a sparse customer-times-product who-bought-what" binary matrix. Given this matrix, the goal is to build a model that provides recommendations for which products should be sold next to the existing customer base. Such problems may naturally be formulated as collaborative filtering tasks. However, this is a one-class setting, that is, the only known entries in the matrix are one-valued. If a customer has not bought a product yet, it does not imply that the customer has a low propensity to potentially be interested in that product. In the absence of entries explicitly labeled as negative examples, one may resort to considering unobserved customer-product pairs as either missing data or as surrogate negative instances. In this paper, we propose an approach to explicitly deal with this kind of ambiguity by instead treating the unobserved entries as optimization variables. These variables are optimized in conjunction with learning a weighted, low-rank non-negative matrix factorization (NMF) of the customer-product matrix, similar to how Transductive SVMs implement the low-density separation principle for semi-supervised learning. Experimental results show that our approach gives significantly better recommendations in comparison to various competing alternatives on one-class collaborative filtering tasks. February 2011 saw the emergence of Silk Road, the first successful online anonymous marketplace, in which buyers and sellers could transact with anonymity properties far superior to those available in alternative online or offline means of commerce. Business on Silk Road, primarily involving narcotics trafficking, rapidly boomed, and competitors emerged. At the same time, law enforcement did not sit idle, and eventually managed to shut down Silk Road in October 2013 and arrest its operator. Far from causing the demise of this novel form of commerce, the Silk Road take-down spawned an entire, dynamic, online anonymous marketplace ecosystem, which has continued to evolve to this day. This paper presents a long-term measurement analysis of a large portion of this online anonymous marketplace ecosystem, including 16 different marketplaces, over more than two years (2013- 2015). By using long-term measurements, and combining our own data collection with publicly available previous efforts, we offer a detailed understanding of the growth of the online anonymous marketplace ecosystem. We are able to document the evolution of the types of goods being sold, and assess the effect (or lack thereof) of adversarial events, such as law enforcement operations or large-scale frauds, on the overall size of the economy. We also provide insights into how vendors are diversifying and replicating across marketplaces, and how vendor security practices (e.g., PGP adoption) are evolving. These different aspects help us understand how traditional, physical-world criminal activities are developing an online presence, in the same manner traditional commerce diversified online in the 1990s. E-commerce web-sites such as Ebay as well as advertising exchanges (AdX) such as DoubleClick's, RightMedia, or AdECN work as intermediaries who sell items (e.g. page-views) on behalf of a seller (e.g. a publisher) to buyers on the opposite side of the market (e.g., advertisers). These platforms often use fixed-percentage sharing schemes, according to which (i) the platform runs an auction amongst buyers, and (ii) gives the seller a constant-fraction (e.g., 80 ) of the auction proceeds. In these settings, the platform faces asymmetric information regarding both the valuations of buyers for the item (as in a standard auction environment) as well as about the seller's opportunity cost of selling the item. Moreover, platforms often face intense competition from similar market places, and such competition is likely to favor auction rules that secure high payoffs to sellers. In such an environment, what selling mechanism should platforms employ? Our goal in this paper is to study optimal mechanism design in settings plagued by competition and two-sided asymmetric information, and identify conditions under which the current practice of employing constant cuts is indeed optimal. In particular, we first show that for a large class of competition games, platforms behave in equilibrium as if they maximize a a convex combination of seller's payoffs and platform's revenue, with weight α on the seller's payoffs (which is proxy for the intensity of competition in the market). We generalize the analysis of Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983), and derive the optimal direct-revelation mechanism for each α. As expected, the optimal mechanism applies a reserve price which is decreasing in α. Next, we present an indirect implementation based on sharing schemes". We show that constant cuts are optimal if and only if the opportunity cost of the seller has a power-form distribution, and derive a simple formula for computing the optimal constant cut as a function of the sellers' distribution of opportunity costs, and the market competition proxy α. Finally, for completeness, we study the case of a seller's optimal auction with a fixed profit for the platform, and derive the optimal direct and indirect implementations in this setting. During social interactions in a community, there are often sub-communities that behave in opposite manner. These antagonistic sub-communities could represent groups of people with opposite tastes, factions within a community distrusting one another, etc. Taking as input a set of interactions within a community, we develop a novel pattern mining approach that extracts for a set of antagonistic sub-communities. In particular, based on a set of user specified thresholds, we extract a set of pairs of sub-communities that behave in opposite ways with one another. To prevent a blow up in these set of pairs, we focus on extracting a compact lossless representation based on the concept of closed patterns. To test the scalability of our approach, we built a synthetic data generator and experimented on the scalability of the algorithm when the size of the dataset and mining parameters are varied. Case studies on an Amazon book rating dataset show the efficiency of our approach and the utility of our technique in extracting interesting information on antagonistic sub-communities. Customer preferences for products are drifting over time. Product perception and popularity are constantly changing as new selection emerges. Similarly, customer inclinations are evolving, leading them to ever redefine their taste. Thus, modeling temporal dynamics is essential for designing recommender systems or general customer preference models. However, this raises unique challenges. Within the ecosystem intersecting multiple products and customers, many different characteristics are shifting simultaneously, while many of them influence each other and often those shifts are delicate and associated with a few data instances. This distinguishes the problem from concept drift explorations, where mostly a single concept is tracked. Classical time-window or instance decay approaches cannot work, as they lose too many signals when discarding data instances. A more sensitive approach is required, which can make better distinctions between transient effects and long-term patterns. We show how to model the time changing behavior throughout the life span of the data. Such a model allows us to exploit the relevant components of all data instances, while discarding only what is modeled as being irrelevant. Accordingly, we revamp two leading collaborative filtering recommendation approaches. Evaluation is made on a large movie-rating dataset underlying the Netflix Prize contest. Results are encouraging and better than those previously reported on this dataset. In particular, methods described in this paper play a significant role in the solution that won the Netflix contest. We study the use of viral marketing strategies on social networks to maximize revenue from the sale of a single product. We propose a model in which the decision of a buyer to buy the product is influenced by friends that own the product and the price at which the product is offered. The influence model we analyze is quite general, naturally extending both the Linear Threshold model and the Independent Cascade model, while also incorporating price information. We consider sales proceeding in a cascading manner through the network, i.e. a buyer is offered the product via recommendations from its neighbors who own the product. In this setting, the seller influences events by offering a cashback to recommenders and by setting prices (via coupons or discounts) for each buyer in the social network. Finding a seller strategy which maximizes the expected revenue in this setting turns out to be NP-hard. However, we propose a seller strategy that generates revenue guaranteed to be within a constant factor of the optimal strategy in a wide variety of models. The strategy is based on an influence-and-exploit idea, and it consists of finding the right trade-off at each time step between: generating revenue from the current user versus offering the product for free and using the influence generated from this sale later in the process. We also show how local search can be used to improve the performance of this technique in practice. There are many situations in which a customer's proclivity to buy the product of any firm depends not only on the classical attributes of the product such as its price and quality, but also on who else is buying the same product. We model these situations as games in which firms compete for customers located in a “social network”. Nash Equilibrium (NE) in pure strategies exist and are unique. Indeed there are closed-form formulae for the NE in terms of the exogenous parameters of the model, which enables us to compute NE in polynomial time. An important structural feature of NE is that, if there are no a priori biases between customers and firms, then there is a cut-off level above which high cost firms are blockaded at an NE, while the rest compete uniformly throughout the network. We finally explore the relation between the connectivity of a customer and the money firms spend on him. This relation becomes particularly transparent when externalities are dominant: NE can be characterized in terms of the invariant measures on the recurrent classes of the Markov chain underlying the social network. While social interactions are critical to understanding consumer behavior, the relationship between social and commerce networks has not been explored on a large scale. We analyze Taobao, a Chinese consumer marketplace that is the world's largest e-commerce website. What sets Taobao apart from its competitors is its integrated instant messaging tool, which buyers can use to ask sellers about products or ask other buyers for advice. In our study, we focus on how an individual's commercial transactions are embedded in their social graphs. By studying triads and the directed closure process, we quantify the presence of information passing and gain insights into when different types of links form in the network. Using seller ratings and review information, we then quantify a price of trust. How much will a consumer pay for transaction with a trusted seller? We conclude by modeling this consumer choice problem: if a buyer wishes to purchase a particular product, how does (s)he decide which store to purchase it from? By analyzing the performance of various feature sets in an information retrieval setting, we demonstrate how the social graph factors into understanding consumer behavior. A mixed manna contains goods (that everyone likes), bads (that everyone dislikes), as well as items that are goods to some agents, but bads or satiated to others. If all items are goods and utility functions are homothetic, concave (and monotone), the Competitive Equilibrium with Equal Incomes maximizes the Nash product of utilities: hence it is welfarist (determined utility-wise by the feasible set of pro les), single-valued and easy to compute. We generalize the Gale-Eisenberg Theorem to a mixed manna. The Competitive division is still welfarist and related to the product of utilities or disutilities. If the zero utility pro le (before any manna) is Pareto dominated, the competitive pro le is unique and still maximizes the product of utilities. If the zero pro le is unfeasible, the competitive pro les are the critical points of the product of disutilities on the eciency frontier, and multiplicity is pervasive. In particular the task of dividing a mixed manna is either good news for everyone, or bad news for everyone. We re ne our results in the practically important case of linear preferences, where the axiomatic comparison between the division of goods and that of bads is especially sharp. When we divide goods and the manna improves, everyone weakly bene ts under the competitive rule; but no reasonable rule to divide bads can be similarly Resource Monotonic. Also, the much larger set of Non Envious and Ecient divisions of bads can be disconnected so that it will admit no continuous selection.