A significant amount of connection establishments on the web require a prior domain name resolution by the client. Especially on high-latency access networks, these DNS lookups cause a significant delay on the client's connection establishment with a server. To reduce the overhead of QUIC's connection establishment with prior DNS lookup on these networks, we propose a novel QuicSocks proxy. Basically, the client delegates the domain name resolution towards the QuicSocks proxy. Our results indicate, that colocating our proxy with real-world ISP-provided DNS resolvers provides great performance gains. For example, 10 of our 474 sample nodes distributed across ISP's in Germany would save at least 30ms per QUIC connection establishment. The design of our proposal aims to be readily deployable on the Internet by avoiding IP address spoofing, anticipating Network Address Translators and using the standard DNS and QUIC protocols. In summary, our proposal fosters a faster establishment of QUIC connections for clients on high-latency access networks.
The ASAP @cite_16 protocol piggybacks the first transport packet within the client's DNS query and the DNS server forwards it to the web server after resolving the IP address. However, this approach requires the DNS server to spoof the clients IP address which leads to a violation of the Best Current Practice RFC 2827 @cite_7 . Furthermore, a deployment of ASAP requires significant infrastructural changes to the Internet because it uses a custom transport protocol.
@cite_16 @cite_7
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For interactive networked applications like web browsing, every round-trip time (RTT) matters. We introduce ASAP, a new naming and transport protocol that reduces latency by shortcutting DNS requests and eliminating TCP's three-way handshake, while ensuring the key security property of verifiable provenance of client requests. ASAP eliminates between one and two RTTs, cutting the delay of small requests by up to two-thirds. Users of highly popular Web sites may experience long delays when accessing information. Upgrading content site infrastructure from a single node to a locally distributed Web cluster composed by multiple server nodes provides limited relief, because the cluster wide-area connectivity may become the bottleneck. A better solution is to distribute Web clusters over the Internet by placing content nodes in strategic locations. A geographically distributed architecture where the Domain Name System (DNS) servers evaluate network proximity and users are served from the closest cluster reduces network impact on response time. On the other hand, serving closest requests only may cause unbalanced servers and may increase system impact on response time. To achieve a scalable Web system, we propose to integrate DNS proximity scheduling with an HTTP request redirection mechanism that any Web server can activate. We demonstrate through simulation experiments that this further dispatching mechanism augments the percentage of requests with guaranteed response time, thereby enhancing the Quality of Service of geographically distributed Web sites. However, HTTP request redirection should be used selectively because the additional round-trip increases network impact on latency time experienced by users. As a further contribution, this paper proposes and compares various mechanisms to limit reassignments with no negative consequences on load balancing. Current Internet is reaching the limits of its capabilities due to its function transition from host-to-host communication to content dissemination. Named Data Networking (NDN) – an instantiation of Content-Centric Networking approach, embraces this shift by stressing the content itself, rather than where it locates. NDN tries to provide better security and privacy than current Internet does, and resilience to Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) is a significant issue. In this paper, we present a specific and concrete scenario of DDoS attack in NDN, where perpetrators make use of NDN’s packet forwarding rules to send out Interest packets with spoofed names as attacking packets. Afterwards, we identify the victims of NDN DDoS attacks include both the hosts and routers. But the largest victim is not the hosts, but the routers, more specifically, the Pending Interest Table (PIT) within the router. PIT brings NDN many elegant features, but it suffers from vulnerability. We propose Interest traceback as a counter measure against the studied NDN DDoS attacks, which traces back to the originator of the attacking Interest packets. At last, we assess the harmful consequences brought by these NDN DDoS attacks and evaluate the Interest traceback counter measure. Evaluation results reveal that the Interest traceback method effectively mitigates the NDN DDoS attacks studied in this paper Denial of service (DoS) attack on the Internet has become a pressing problem. In this paper, we describe and evaluate route-based distributed packet filtering (DPF), a novel approach to distributed DoS (DDoS) attack prevention. We show that DPF achieves proactiveness and scalability, and we show that there is an intimate relationship between the effectiveness of DPF at mitigating DDoS attack and power-law network topology.The salient features of this work are two-fold. First, we show that DPF is able to proactively filter out a significant fraction of spoofed packet flows and prevent attack packets from reaching their targets in the first place. The IP flows that cannot be proactively curtailed are extremely sparse so that their origin can be localized---i.e., IP traceback---to within a small, constant number of candidate sites. We show that the two proactive and reactive performance effects can be achieved by implementing route-based filtering on less than 20 of Internet autonomous system (AS) sites. Second, we show that the two complementary performance measures are dependent on the properties of the underlying AS graph. In particular, we show that the power-law structure of Internet AS topology leads to connectivity properties which are crucial in facilitating the observed performance effects. Dealing with network failures effectively is a major operational challenge for Internet service providers. Commonly deployed link state routing protocols such as OSPF react to link failures through global (i.e., network-wide) link state advertisements and routing table recomputations, causing significant forwarding discontinuity after a failure. The drawback with these protocols is that they need to trade off routing stability and forwarding continuity. To improve failure resiliency without jeopardizing routing stability, we propose a proactive local rerouting based approach called failure insensitive routing (FIR). The proposed approach prepares for failures using interface-specific forwarding, and upon a failure, suppresses the link state advertisement and instead triggers local rerouting using a backwarding table. In this paper, we prove that when no more than one link failure notification is suppressed, FIR always finds a loop-free path to a destination if one such path exists. We also formally analyze routing stability and network availability under both proactive and reactive approaches, and show that FIR provides better stability and availability than OSPF. We present and evaluate an implementation of a prototype scalable web server consisting of a load-balanced cluster of hosts that collectively accept and service TCP connections. The host IP addresses are advertised using round robin DNS (RR-DNS) technique, allowing any host to receive requests from any client. Once a client attempts to establish a TCP connection with one of the hosts, a decision is made as to whether or not the connection should be redirected to a different host-namely, the host with the lowest number of established connections. We use the low-overhead Distributed Packet Rewriting (DPR) technique to redirect TCP connections. In our prototype, each host keeps information about the remaining hosts in the system. Load information is maintained using periodic multicast amongst the cluster hosts. Performance measurements suggest that our prototype outperforms both pure RR-DNS and the stateless DPR solutions. Content Delivery Networks (CDNs) rely on the Domain Name System (DNS) for replica server selection. DNS-based server selection builds on the assumption that, in the absence of information about the client's actual network location, the location of a client's DNS resolver provides a good approximation. The recent growth of remote DNS services breaks this assumption and can negatively impact client's web performance. In this paper, we assess the end-to-end impact of using remote DNS services on CDN performance and present the first evaluation of an industry-proposed solution to the problem. We find that remote DNSusage can indeed significantly impact client's web performance and that the proposed solution, if available, can effectively address the problem for most clients. Considering the performance cost of remote DNS usage and the limited adoption base of the industry-proposed solution, we present and evaluate an alternative approach, Direct Resolution, to readily obtain comparable performance improvements without requiring CDN or DNS participation. Because the Internet has been widely applied in various fields, more and more network security issues emerge and catch people's attention. However, adversaries often hide themselves by spoofing their own IP addresses and then launch attacks. For this reason, researchers have proposed a lot of traceback schemes to trace the source of these attacks. Some use only one packet in their packet logging schemes to achieve IP tracking. Others combine packet marking with packet logging and therefore create hybrid IP traceback schemes demanding less storage but requiring a longer search. In this paper, we propose a new hybrid IP traceback scheme with efficient packet logging aiming to have a fixed storage requirement for each router (under 320 KB, according to CAIDA's skitter data set) in packet logging without the need to refresh the logged tracking information and to achieve zero false positive and false negative rates in attack-path reconstruction. In addition, we use a packet's marking field to censor attack traffic on its upstream routers. Lastly, we simulate and analyze our scheme, in comparison with other related research, in the following aspects: storage requirement, computation, and accuracy. Attackers can render distributed denial-of-service attacks more difficult to defend against by bouncing their flooding traffic off of reflectors; that is, by spoofing requests from the victim to a large set of Internet servers that will in turn send their combined replies to the victim. The resulting dilution of locality in the flooding stream complicates the victim's abilities both to isolate the attack traffic in order to block it, and to use traceback techniques for locating the source of streams of packets with spoofed source addresses, such as ITRACE [Be00a], probabilistic packet marking [SWKA00], [SP01], and SPIE [S+01]. We discuss a number of possible defenses against reflector attacks, finding that most prove impractical, and then assess the degree to which different forms of reflector traffic will have characteristic signatures that the victim can use to identify and filter out the attack traffic. Our analysis indicates that three types of reflectors pose particularly significant threats: DNS and Gnutella servers, and TCP-based servers (particularly Web servers) running on TCP implementations that suffer from predictable initial sequence numbers. We argue in conclusion in support of "reverse ITRACE" [Ba00] and for the utility of packet traceback techniques that work even for low volume flows, such as SPIE. When a DNS (domain name system) client needs to look up a name, it queries DNS servers to resolve the name on the Internet. The query information from the client was passed through one or more DNS servers. While useful, in the whole query transmission, we say it can leak potentially sensitive information: what a client wants to connect to, or what the client is always paying attention to. From the definition, the privacy problem is to prove that none of the private data can be inferred from the information which is made public. We first analyzed the complete DNS query process now in use; then, from each step of the DNS query process, we discussed the privacy disclosure problem in each step of the query: client side, query transmission process and DNS server side. Finally, we proposed a simple and flexible privacy-preserving query scheme "range query", which could maximally decrease privacy disclosure in the whole DNS query process. And we also discuss efficiency and implementation on the range query. This paper describes a technique for tracing anonymous packet flooding attacks in the Internet back towards their source. This work is motivated by the increased frequency and sophistication of denial-of-service attacks and by the difficulty in tracing packets with incorrect, or spoofed'', source addresses. In this paper we describe a general purpose traceback mechanism based on probabilistic packet marking in the network. Our approach allows a victim to identify the network path(s) traversed by attack traffic without requiring interactive operational support from Internet Service Providers (ISPs). Moreover, this traceback can be performed post-mortem'' -- after an attack has completed. We present an implementation of this technology that is incrementally deployable, (mostly) backwards compatible and can be efficiently implemented using conventional technology. Replication of information among multiple World Wide Web servers is necessary to support high request rates to popular Web sites. A clustered Web server organization is preferable to multiple independent mirrored servers because it maintains a single interface to the users and has the potential to be more scalable, fault-tolerant and better load-balanced. In this paper, we propose a Web cluster architecture in which the Domain Name System (DNS) server, which dispatches the user requests among the servers through the URL name to the IP address mapping mechanism, is integrated with a redirection request mechanism based on HTTP. This should alleviate the side-effect of caching the IP address mapping at intermediate name servers. We compare many alternative mechanisms, including synchronous vs. asynchronous activation and centralized vs. distributed decisions on redirection. Moreover, we analyze the reassignment of entire domains or individual client requests, different types of status information and different server selection policies for redirecting requests. Our results show that the combination of centralized and distributed dispatching policies allows the Web server cluster to handle high load skews in the WWW environment. Multihop data delivery through vehicular ad hoc networks is complicated by the fact that vehicular networks are highly mobile and frequently disconnected. To address this issue, we adopt the idea of carry and forward, where a moving vehicle carries a packet until a new vehicle moves into its vicinity and forwards the packet. Being different from existing carry and forward solutions, we make use of predictable vehicle mobility, which is limited by traffic pattern and road layout. Based on the existing traffic pattern, a vehicle can find the next road to forward the packet to reduce the delay. We propose several vehicle-assisted data delivery (VADD) protocols to forward the packet to the best road with the lowest data-delivery delay. Experimental results show that the proposed VADD protocols outperform existing so- lutions in terms of packet-delivery ratio, data packet delay, and protocol overhead. Among the proposed VADD protocols, the Hybrid Probe (H-VADD) protocol has a much better performance. Geo-replicated services need an effective way to direct client requests to a particular location, based on performance, load, and cost. This paper presents DONAR, a distributed system that can offload the burden of replica selection, while providing these services with a sufficiently expressive interface for specifying mapping policies. Most existing approaches for replica selection rely on either central coordination (which has reliability, security, and scalability limitations) or distributed heuristics (which lead to suboptimal request distributions, or even instability). In contrast, the distributed mapping nodes in DONAR run a simple, efficient algorithm to coordinate their replica-selection decisions for clients. The protocol solves an optimization problem that jointly considers both client performance and server load, allowing us to show that the distributed algorithm is stable and effective. Experiments with our DONAR prototype--providing replica selection for CoralCDN and the Measurement Lab--demonstrate that our algorithm performs well "in the wild." Our prototype supports DNS- and HTTP-based redirection, IP anycast, and a secure update protocol, and can handle many customer services with diverse policy objectives. DNS is widely abused by Internet criminals in order to provide reliable communication within malicious network infrastructure as well as flexible and resilient hosting of malicious content. This paper presents a novel detection method that can be used for identifying potentially compromised clients based on DNS traffic analysis. The proposed method identifies suspicious agile DNS mappings, i.e., mappings characterized by fast changing domain names or and IP addresses, often used by malicious services. The approach discovers clients that have queried domains contained within identified suspicious domain-to-IP mappings, thus assisting in pinpointing potentially compromised clients within the network. The proposed approach targets compromised clients in large-scale operational networks. We have evaluated the proposed approach using an extensive set of DNS traffic traces from different operational ISP networks. The evaluation illustrates a great potential of accurately identifying suspicious domain-to-IP mappings and potentially compromised clients. Furthermore, the achieved performance indicate that the novel detection approach is promising in view of the adoption in operational ISP networks. Finally, the proposed approach targets both Fast-flux and Domain-flux, thus having an advantage over existing detection methods that identify compromised clients. Sources of a Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack can be identified by the traffic they generate using the IP traceback technique. Because of its relevance, the Probabilistic Packet Marking (PPM) schemes for IP traceback is an intensively researched field. In these schemes, routers are given the extra function of randomly selecting packets from those that go through them, to embed their address information in those selected packets. During or after the attack, the paths that were traversed by the attack traffic can be identified based on the router information in the marked packets. Since these schemes require a large number of received packets to trace an attacker successfully, they usually demand a high time and space complexity to trace many attackers as is the case in DDoS attacks. This is partly because the marking scheme allows remarking, where routers can overwrite previous marking information in a selected packet, which leads to data loss. We present the Prediction Based Scheme (PBS), which is an addition to the PPM schemes for IP tracetrack. The proposed approach consists of two parts: (a) a marking scheme, that reduces the number of packets required to trace a DoS attacker and (b) an extension to a traceback algorithm, whose main feature is to return a complete attack graph with fewer received packets than the traditional algorithm. The proposed marking scheme alleviates the problem of data loss by ensuring previous marking information is not overwritten. Additionally, the proposed traceback algorithm uses graphs built using legitimate traffic to predict the path taken by attack traffic. Results show that the marking scheme in PBS, compared to PPM, ensures that traceback is possible with about 54 as many total packets to achieve complete attack path construction, while the traceback algorithm takes about 33 as many marked packets. Distributed denial of service attacks continue to pose major threats to the Internet. In order to traceback attack sources (i.e., IP addresses), a well studied approach is probabilistic packet marking (PPM), where each intermediate router of a packet marks it with a certain probability, enabling a victim host to traceback the attack source. In a recent study, we showed how attackers can take advantage of probabilistic nature of packet markings in existing PPM schemes to create spoofed marks, hence compromising traceback. In this paper, we propose a new PPM scheme called TTL-based PPM (TPM) scheme, where each packet is marked with a probability inversely proportional to the distance traversed by the packet so far. Thus, packets that have to traverse longer distances are marked with higher probability, compared to those that have to traverse shorter distances. This ensures that a packet is marked with much higher probability by intermediate routers than by traditional mechanisms, hence reducing the effectiveness of spoofed packets reaching victims. Using formal analysis and simulations using real Internet topology maps, we show how our TPM scheme can effectively trace DDoS attackers even in presence of spoofing when compared to existing schemes. The Web relies on the Domain Name System (DNS) to resolve the hostname portion of URLs into IP addresses. This marriage-of-convenience enabled the Web's meteoric rise, but the resulting entanglement is now hindering both infrastructures--the Web is overly constrained by the limitations of DNS, and DNS is unduly burdened by the demands of the Web. There has been much commentary on this sad state-of-affairs, but dissolving the ill-fated union between DNS and the Web requires a new way to resolve Web references. To this end, this paper describes the design and implementation of Semantic Free Referencing (SFR), a reference resolution infrastructure based on distributed hash tables (DHTs). This document describes the messages and procedures of the Negative- ACKnowledgment (NACK) Oriented Reliable Multicast (NORM) Protocol. This protocol is designed to provide end-to-end reliable transport of bulk data objects or streams over generic IP multicast routing and forwarding services. NORM uses a selective, negative acknowledgment mechanism for transport reliability and offers additional protocol mechanisms to allow for operation with minimal a priori coordination among senders and receivers. A congestion control scheme is specified to allow the NORM protocol to fairly share available network bandwidth with other transport protocols such as Transmission Control Protocol (TCP). It is capable of operating with both reciprocal multicast routing among senders and receivers and with asymmetric connectivity (possibly a unicast return path) between the senders and receivers. The protocol offers a number of features to allow different types of applications or possibly other higher level transport protocols to utilize its service in different ways. The protocol leverages the use of FEC-based repair and other IETF reliable multicast transport (RMT) building blocks in its design. An increasing number of countries are passing laws that facilitate the mass surveillance of Internet traffic. In response, governments and citizens are increasingly paying attention to the countries that their Internet traffic traverses. In some cases, countries are taking extreme steps, such as building new Internet Exchange Points (IXPs), which allow networks to interconnect directly, and encouraging local interconnection to keep local traffic local. We find that although many of these efforts are extensive, they are often futile, due to the inherent lack of hosting and route diversity for many popular sites. By measuring the country-level paths to popular domains, we characterize transnational routing detours. We find that traffic is traversing known surveillance states, even when the traffic originates and ends in a country that does not conduct mass surveillance. Then, we investigate how clients can use overlay network relays and the open DNS resolver infrastructure to prevent their traffic from traversing certain jurisdictions. We find that 84 of paths originating in Brazil traverse the United States, but when relays are used for country avoidance, only 37 of Brazilian paths traverse the United States. Using the open DNS resolver infrastructure allows Kenyan clients to avoid the United States on 17 more paths. Unfortunately, we find that some of the more prominent surveillance states (e.g., the U.S.) are also some of the least avoidable countries.