We consider multi-agent systems where agents' preferences are aggregated via sequential majority voting: each decision is taken by performing a sequence of pairwise comparisons where each comparison is a weighted majority vote among the agents. Incompleteness in the agents' preferences is common in many real-life settings due to privacy issues or an ongoing elicitation process. In addition, there may be uncertainty about how the preferences are aggregated. For example, the agenda (a tree whose leaves are labelled with the decisions being compared) may not yet be known or fixed. We therefore study how to determine collectively optimal decisions (also called winners) when preferences may be incomplete, and when the agenda may be uncertain. We show that it is computationally easy to determine if a candidate decision always wins, or may win, whatever the agenda. On the other hand, it is computationally hard to know wheth er a candidate decision wins in at least one agenda for at least one completion of the agents' preferences. These results hold even if the agenda must be balanced so that each candidate decision faces the same number of majority votes. Such results are useful for reasoning about preference elicitation. They help understand the complexity of tasks such as determining if a decision can be taken collectively, as well as knowing if the winner can be manipulated by appropriately ordering the agenda.
Pini prove that computing the possible and necessary winners for the STV rule is NP-hard @cite_6 . They show it is NP-hard even to approximate these sets within some constant factor in size. They also give a preference elicitation procedure which focuses just on the set of possible winners.
@cite_6
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Many NP-hard winner determination problems admit polynomial-time algorithms when restricting inputs to be single-peaked. Commonly, such algorithms employ dynamic programming along the underlying axis. We introduce a new technique: carefully chosen integer linear programming (IP) formulations for certain voting problems admit an LP relaxation which is totally unimodular if preferences are single-peaked, and which thus admits an integral optimal solution. This technique gives fast algorithms for finding optimal committees under the PAV and Chamberlin-Courant voting rules under single-peaked preferences, as well as for certain OWA-based rules. Under single-crossing preferences, Young scores can also be calculated. An advantage of this technique is that no special-purpose algorithm needs to be used to exploit structure in the input preferences: any standard IP solver will terminate in the first iteration if the input is single-peaked, and will continue to work otherwise. We study the manipulation of voting schemes, where a voter lies about their preferences in the hope of improving the election's outcome. All voting schemes are potentially manipulable. However, some, such as the Single Transferable Vote (STV) scheme used in Australian elections, are resistant to manipulation because it is NP-hard to compute the manipulating vote(s). We concentrate on STV and some natural generalisations of it called Scoring Elimination Protocols. We show that the hardness result for STV is true only if both the number of voters and the number of candidates are unbounded---we provide algorithms for a manipulation if either of these is fixed. This means that manipulation would not be hard in practice when either number is small. Next we show that the weighted version of the manipulation problem is NP-hard for all Scoring Elimination Protocols except one, which we provide an algorithm for manipulating. Finally we experimentally test a heuristic for solving the manipulation problem and conclude that it would not usually be effective. We investigate the extent to which it is possible to compute the probability of a particular candidate winning an election, given imperfect information about the preferences of the electorate. We assume that for each voter, we have a probability distribution over a set of preference orderings. Thus, for each voter, we have a number of possible preference orderings - we do not know which of these orderings actually represents the preferences of the voter, but for each ordering, we know the probability that it does. For the case where the number of candidates is a constant, we are able to give a polynomial time algorithm to compute the probability that a given candidate will win. We present experimental results obtained with an implementation of the algorithm, illustrating how the [email protected]?s performance in practice is better than its predicted theoretical bound. However, when the number of candidates is not bounded, we prove that the problem becomes #P-hard for the Plurality, k-approval, Borda, Copeland, and Bucklin voting rules. We further show that even evaluating if a candidate has any chance of winning is NP-complete for the Plurality voting rule in the case where voters may have different weights. With unweighted voters, we give a polynomial algorithm for Plurality, and show that the problem is hard for many other voting rules. Finally, we give a Monte Carlo approximation algorithm for computing the probability of a candidate winning in any settings, with an error that is as small as desired. We investigate two systems of fully proportional representation suggested by Chamberlin & Courant and Monroe. Both systems assign a representative to each voter so that the "sum of misrepresentations" is minimized. The winner determination problem for both systems is known to be NP-hard, hence this work aims at investigating whether there are variants of the proposed rules and or specific electorates for which these problems can be solved efficiently. As a variation of these rules, instead of minimizing the sum of misrepresentations, we considered minimizing the maximal misrepresentation introducing effectively two new rules. In the general case these "minimax" versions of classical rules appeared to be still NP-hard. We investigated the parameterized complexity of winner determination of the two classical and two new rules with respect to several parameters. Here we have a mixture of positive and negative results: e.g., we proved fixed-parameter tractability for the parameter the number of candidates but fixed-parameter intractability for the number of winners. For single-peaked electorates our results are overwhelmingly positive: we provide polynomial-time algorithms for most of the considered problems. The only rule that remains NP-hard for single-peaked electorates is the classical Monroe rule. We develop new techniques for deriving very strong computational lower bounds for a class of well-known NP-hard problems, including weighted satisfiability , dominating set , hitting set , set cover , clique , and independent set . For example, although a trivial enumeration can easily test in time O(nk) if a given graph of n vertices has a clique of size k, we prove that unless an unlikely collapse occurs in parameterized complexity theory, the problem is not solvable in time f(k) no(k) for any function f, even if we restrict the parameter value k to be bounded by an arbitrarily small function of n. Under the same assumption, we prove that even if we restrict the parameter values k to be Θ(μ(n)) for any reasonable function μ, no algorithm of running time no(k) can test if a graph of n vertices has a clique of size k. Similar strong lower bounds are also derived for other problems in the above class. Our techniques can be extended to derive computational lower bounds on approximation algorithms for NP-hard optimization problems. For example, we prove that the NP-hard distinguishing substring selection problem, for which a polynomial time approximation scheme has been recently developed, has no polynomial time approximation schemes of running time f(1 e)no(1 e) for any function f unless an unlikely collapse occurs in parameterized complexity theory. Aggregating the preferences of self-interested agents is a key problem for multiagent systems, and one general method for doing so is to vote over the alternatives (candidates). Unfortunately, the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem shows that when there are three or more candidates, all reasonable voting rules are manipulable (in the sense that there exist situations in which a voter would benefit from reporting its preferences insincerely). To circumvent this impossibility result, recent research has investigated whether it is possible to make finding a beneficial manipulation computationally hard. This approach has had some limited success, exhibiting rules under which the problem of finding a beneficial manipulation is NP-hard, #P-hard, or even PSPACE-hard. Thus, under these rules, it is unlikely that a computationally efficient algorithm can be constructed that always finds a beneficial manipulation (when it exists). However, this still does not preclude the existence of an efficient algorithm that often finds a successful manipulation (when it exists). There have been attempts to design a rule under which finding a beneficial manipulation is usually hard, but they have failed. To explain this failure, in this paper, we show that it is in fact impossible to design such a rule, if the rule is also required to satisfy another property: a large fraction of the manipulable instances are both weakly monotone, and allow the manipulators to make either of exactly two candidates win. We argue why one should expect voting rules to have this property, and show experimentally that common voting rules clearly satisfy it. We also discuss approaches for potentially circumventing this impossibility result. Kemeny proposed a voting scheme which is distinguished by the fact that it is the unique voting scheme that is neutral, consistent, and Condorcet. Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick showed that determining the winner in Kemeny's system is NP-hard. We provide a stronger lower bound and an upper bound matching the lower bound, namely, we show that determining the winner in Kemeny's system is complete for P||NP, the class of sets solvable via parallel access to NP. The voting rules proposed by Dodgson and Young are both designed to find an alternative closest to being a Condorcet winner, according to two different notions of proximity; the score of a given alternative is known to be hard to compute under either rule. In this paper, we put forward two algorithms for approximating the Dodgson score: a combinatorial, greedy algorithm and an LP-based algorithm, both of which yield an approximation ratio of H"m"-"1, where m is the number of alternatives and H"m"-"1 is the (m-1)st harmonic number. We also prove that our algorithms are optimal within a factor of 2, unless problems in NP have quasi-polynomial-time algorithms. Despite the intuitive appeal of the greedy algorithm, we argue that the LP-based algorithm has an advantage from a social choice point of view. Further, we demonstrate that computing any reasonable approximation of the ranking produced by Dodgson@?s rule is NP-hard. This result provides a complexity-theoretic explanation of sharp discrepancies that have been observed in the social choice theory literature when comparing Dodgson elections with simpler voting rules. Finally, we show that the problem of calculating the Young score is NP-hard to approximate by any factor. This leads to an inapproximability result for the Young ranking. We propose a new approach for understanding the algorithm-specific empiricalh ardness of NP-Hard problems. In this work we focus on the empirical hardness of the winner determination problem--an optimization problem arising in combinatorial auctions--when solved by ILOG's CPLEX software. We consider nine widely-used problem distributions and sample randomly from a continuum of parameter settings for each distribution. We identify a large number of distribution-nonspecific features of data instances and use statisticalregression techniques to learn, evaluate and interpret a function from these features to the predicted hardness of an instance. We prove a structure theorem for the feasible solutions of the Arora-Rao-Vazirani SDP relaxation on low threshold rank graphs and on small-set expanders. We show that if G is a graph of bounded threshold rank or a small-set expander, then an optimal solution of the Arora-Rao-Vazirani relaxation (or of any stronger version of it) can be almost entirely covered by a small number of balls of bounded radius. Then, we show that, if k is the number of balls, a solution of this form can be rounded with an approximation factor of O(sqrt log k ) in the case of the Arora-Rao-Vazirani relaxation, and with a constant-factor approximation in the case of the k-th round of the Sherali-Adams hierarchy starting at the Arora-Rao-Vazirani relaxation. The structure theorem and the rounding scheme combine to prove the following result, where G=(V,E) is a graph of expansion (G), is the k-th smallest eigenvalue of the normalized Laplacian of G, and (G) = disjoint S_1,...,S_k 1 > log^ 2.5 k phi(G) or k (G) >> log k sqrt log n loglog n (G), then the Arora-Rao-Vazirani relaxation can be rounded in polynomial time with an approximation ratio O(sqrt log k ). Stronger approximation guarantees are achievable in time exponential in k via relaxations in the Lasserre hierarchy. Guruswami and Sinop [GS13] and Arora, Ge and Sinop [AGS13] prove that 1+eps approximation is achievable in time 2^ O(k) poly(n) if either > (G) poly(eps), or if SSE_ n k > sqrt log k log n (G) poly(eps), where SSE_s is the minimal expansion of sets of size at most s. We study the complexity of winner determination in single-crossing elections under two classic fully proportional representation rules-Chamberlin-Courant's rule and Monroe's rule. Winner determination for these rules is known to be NP-hard for unrestricted preferences. We show that for single-crossing preferences this problem admits a polynomial-time algorithm for Chamberlin-Courant's rule, but remains NP-hard for Monroe's rule. Our algorithm for Chamberlin-Courant's rule can be modified to work for elections with bounded single-crossing width. We then consider elections that are both single-peaked and single-crossing, and develop an efficient algorithm for the egalitarian variant of Monroe's rule for such elections. While [3] have recently presented a polynomial-time algorithm for this rule under single-peaked preferences, our algorithm has considerably better worst-case running time than that of We investigate manipulation of the Borda voting rule, as well as two elimination style voting rules, Nanson's and Baldwin's voting rules, which are based on Borda voting. We argue that these rules have a number of desirable computational properties. For unweighted Borda voting, we prove that it is NP-hard for a coalition of two manipulators to compute a manipulation. This resolves a long-standing open problem in the computational complexity of manipulating common voting rules. We prove that manipulation of Baldwin's and Nanson's rules is computationally more difficult than manipulation of Borda, as it is NP-hard for a single manipulator to compute a manipulation. In addition, for Baldwin's and Nanson's rules with weighted votes, we prove that it is NP-hard for a coalition of manipulators to compute a manipulation with a small number of candidates.Because of these NP-hardness results, we compute manipulations using heuristic algorithms that attempt to minimise the number of manipulators. We propose several new heuristic methods. Experiments show that these methods significantly outperform the previously best known heuristic method for the Borda rule. Our results suggest that, whilst computing a manipulation of the Borda rule is NP-hard, computational complexity may provide only a weak barrier against manipulation in practice. In contrast to the Borda rule, our experiments with Baldwin's and Nanson's rules demonstrate that both of them are often more difficult to manipulate in practice. These results suggest that elimination style voting rules deserve further study. We prove the following about the Nearest Lattice Vector Problem (in any l sub p norm), the Nearest Code-word Problem for binary codes, the problem of learning a halfspace in the presence of errors, and some other problems. 1. Approximating the optimum within any constant factor is NP-hard. 2. If for some spl epsiv >0 there exists a polynomial time algorithm that approximates the optimum within a factor of 2 sup log(0.5- spl epsiv ) sup n then NP is in quasi-polynomial deterministic time: NP spl sube DTIME(n sup poly(log sup n) ). Moreover, we show that result 2 also holds for the Shortest Lattice Vector Problem in the l sub spl infin norm. Improving the factor 2 sup log(0.5- spl epsiv ) sup n to spl radic (dim) for either of the lattice problems would imply the hardness of the Shortest Vector Problem in l sub 2 norm; an old open problem. Our proofs use reductions from few-prover, one-round interactive proof systems, either directly, or through a set-cover problem. > We study the Stochastic Gradient Langevin Dynamics (SGLD) algorithm for non-convex optimization. The algorithm performs stochastic gradient descent, where in each step it injects appropriately scaled Gaussian noise to the update. We analyze the algorithm's hitting time to an arbitrary subset of the parameter space. Two results follow from our general theory: First, we prove that for empirical risk minimization, if the empirical risk is point-wise close to the (smooth) population risk, then the algorithm achieves an approximate local minimum of the population risk in polynomial time, escaping suboptimal local minima that only exist in the empirical risk. Second, we show that SGLD improves on one of the best known learnability results for learning linear classifiers under the zero-one loss. par>We prove some non-approximability results for restrictions of basic combinatorial optimization problems to instances of bounded “degreeror bounded “width.” Specifically: We prove that the Max 3SAT problem on instances where each variable occurs in at most B clauses, is hard to approximate to within a factor @math , unless @math . H stad [18] proved that the problem is approximable to within a factor @math in polynomial time, and that is hard to approximate to within a factor @math . Our result uses a new randomized reduction from general instances of Max 3SAT to bounded-occurrences instances. The randomized reduction applies to other Max SNP problems as well. We observe that the Set Cover problem on instances where each set has size at most B is hard to approximate to within a factor @math unless @math . The result follows from an appropriate setting of parameters in Feige's reduction [11]. This is essentially tight in light of the existence of @math -approximate algorithms [20, 23, 9] We present a new PCP construction, based on applying parallel repetition to the inner verifier,'' and we provide a tight analysis for it. Using the new construction, and some modifications to known reductions from PCP to Hitting Set, we prove that Hitting Set with sets of size B is hard to approximate to within a factor @math . The problem can be approximated to within a factor B [19], and it is the Vertex Cover problem for B =2. The relationship between hardness of approximation and set size seems to have not been explored before. We observe that the Independent Set problem on graphs having degree at most B is hard to approximate to within a factor @math , unless P = NP . This follows from a comination of results by Clementi and Trevisan [28] and Reingold, Vadhan and Wigderson [27]. It had been observed that the problem is hard to approximate to within a factor @math unless P = NP [1]. An algorithm achieving factor @math is also known [21, 2, 30, 16 . We present parallel and sequential dense QR factorization algorithms that are both optimal (up to polylogarithmic factors) in the amount of communication they perform and just as stable as Householder QR. We prove optimality by deriving new lower bounds for the number of multiplications done by “non-Strassen-like” QR, and using these in known communication lower bounds that are proportional to the number of multiplications. We not only show that our QR algorithms attain these lower bounds (up to polylogarithmic factors), but that existing LAPACK and ScaLAPACK algorithms perform asymptotically more communication. We derive analogous communication lower bounds for LU factorization and point out recent LU algorithms in the literature that attain at least some of these lower bounds. The sequential and parallel QR algorithms for tall and skinny matrices lead to significant speedups in practice over some of the existing algorithms, including LAPACK and ScaLAPACK, for example, up to 6.7 times over ScaLAPACK. A performance model for the parallel algorithm for general rectangular matrices predicts significant speedups over ScaLAPACK. We develop new techniques for deriving strong computational lower bounds for a class of well-known NP-hard problems. This class includes weighted satisfiability, dominating set, hitting set, set cover, clique, and independent set. For example, although a trivial enumeration can easily test in time O(n^k) if a given graph of n vertices has a clique of size k, we prove that unless an unlikely collapse occurs in parameterized complexity theory, the problem is not solvable in time f(k)n^o^(^k^) for any function f, even if we restrict the parameter values to be bounded by an arbitrarily small function of n. Under the same assumption, we prove that even if we restrict the parameter values k to be of the order @Q(@m(n)) for any reasonable function @m, no algorithm of running time n^o^(^k^) can test if a graph of n vertices has a clique of size k. Similar strong lower bounds on the computational complexity are also derived for other NP-hard problems in the above class. Our techniques can be further extended to derive computational lower bounds on polynomial time approximation schemes for NP-hard optimization problems. For example, we prove that the NP-hard distinguishing substring selection problem, for which a polynomial time approximation scheme has been recently developed, has no polynomial time approximation schemes of running time f(1 @e)n^o^(^1^ ^@e^) for any function f unless an unlikely collapse occurs in parameterized complexity theory. We show that a voting scheme suggested by Lewis Carroll can be impractical in that it can be computationally prohibitive (specifically, NP-hard) to determine whether any particular candidate has won an election. We also suggest a class of “impracticality theorems” which say that any fair voting scheme must, in the worst-case, require excessive computation to determine a winner. We study computational aspects of three prominent voting rules that use approval ballots to elect multiple winners. These rules are satisfaction approval voting, proportional approval voting, and reweighted approval voting. We first show that computing the winner for proportional approval voting is NP-hard, closing a long standing open problem. As none of the rules are strategyproof, even for dichotomous preferences, we study various strategic aspects of the rules. In particular, we examine the computational complexity of computing a best response for both a single agent and a group of agents. In many settings, we show that it is NP-hard for an agent or agents to compute how best to vote given a fixed set of approval ballots from the other agents. The focus of this paper is on the public communication required for generating a maximal-rate secret key (SK) within the multiterminal source model of Csiszar and Narayan. Building on the prior work of Tyagi for the two-terminal scenario, we derive a lower bound on the communication complexity, @math , defined to be the minimum rate of public communication needed to generate a maximal-rate SK. It is well known that the minimum rate of communication for omniscience, denoted by @math , is an upper bound on @math . For the class of pairwise independent network (PIN) models defined on uniform hypergraphs, we show that a certain Type @math condition, which is verifiable in polynomial time, guarantees that our lower bound on @math meets the @math upper bound. Thus, the PIN models satisfying our condition are @math -maximal, indicating that the upper bound @math holds with equality. This allows us to explicitly evaluate @math for such PIN models. We also give several examples of PIN models that satisfy our Type @math condition. Finally, we prove that for an arbitrary multiterminal source model, a stricter version of our Type @math condition implies that communication from all terminals (omnivocality) is needed for establishing an SK of maximum rate. For three-terminal source models, the converse is also true: omnivocality is needed for generating a maximal-rate SK only if the strict Type @math condition is satisfied. However, for the source models with four or more terminals, counterexamples exist showing that the converse does not hold in general.