Developing classification algorithms that are fair with respect to sensitive attributes of the data is an important problem due to the increased deployment of classification algorithms in societ al contexts. Several recent works have focused on studying classification with respect to specific fairness metrics, modeled the corresponding fair classification problem as constrained optimization problems, and developed tailored algorithms to solve them. Despite this, there still remain important metrics for which there are no fair classifiers with theoretical guarantees; primarily because the resulting optimization problem is non-convex. The main contribution of this paper is a meta-algorithm for classification that can take as input a general class of fairness constraints with respect to multiple non-disjoint and multi-valued sensitive attributes, and which comes with provable guarantees. In particular, our algorithm can handle non-convex "linear fractional" constraints (which includes fairness constraints such as predictive parity) for which no prior algorithm was known. Key to our results is an algorithm for a family of classification problems with convex constraints along with a reduction from classification problems with linear fractional constraints to this family. Empirically, we observe that our algorithm is fast, can achieve near-perfect fairness with respect to various fairness metrics, and the loss in accuracy due to the imposed fairness constraints is often small.
Beyond group fairness, recent works also proposed other fairness definitions concerned in classification. @cite_2 and @cite_40 discussed a notion of that similar individuals should be treated similarly. @cite_5 defined based on the concepts of fair division and envy-freeness in economics. Moreover, Grgi 'c -Hla c @cite_23 @cite_26 discussed that investigates which input features are fair to use in the decision process and how including or excluding the features would affect outcomes. Finally, Chouldechova @cite_12 and @cite_20 investigated the inherent tradeoff between equalized odds and predictive parity (called well-calibrated in their papers).
@cite_26 @cite_40 @cite_23 @cite_2 @cite_5 @cite_20 @cite_12
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The most prevalent notions of fairness in machine learning are statistical definitions: they fix a small collection of pre-defined groups, and then ask for parity of some statistic of the classifier across these groups. Constraints of this form are susceptible to intentional or inadvertent "fairness gerrymandering", in which a classifier appears to be fair on each individual group, but badly violates the fairness constraint on one or more structured subgroups defined over the protected attributes. We propose instead to demand statistical notions of fairness across exponentially (or infinitely) many subgroups, defined by a structured class of functions over the protected attributes. This interpolates between statistical definitions of fairness and recently proposed individual notions of fairness, but raises several computational challenges. It is no longer clear how to audit a fixed classifier to see if it satisfies such a strong definition of fairness. We prove that the computational problem of auditing subgroup fairness for both equality of false positive rates and statistical parity is equivalent to the problem of weak agnostic learning, which means it is computationally hard in the worst case, even for simple structured subclasses. We then derive two algorithms that provably converge to the best fair classifier, given access to oracles which can solve the agnostic learning problem. The algorithms are based on a formulation of subgroup fairness as a two-player zero-sum game between a Learner and an Auditor. Our first algorithm provably converges in a polynomial number of steps. Our second algorithm enjoys only provably asymptotic convergence, but has the merit of simplicity and faster per-step computation. We implement the simpler algorithm using linear regression as a heuristic oracle, and show that we can effectively both audit and learn fair classifiers on real datasets. The adoption of automated, data-driven decision making in an ever expanding range of applications has raised concerns about its potential unfairness towards certain social groups. In this context, a number of recent studies have focused on defining, detecting, and removing unfairness from data-driven decision systems. However, the existing notions of fairness, based on parity (equality) in treatment or outcomes for different social groups, tend to be quite stringent, limiting the overall decision making accuracy. In this paper, we draw inspiration from the fair-division and envy-freeness literature in economics and game theory and propose preference-based notions of fairness -- given the choice between various sets of decision treatments or outcomes, any group of users would collectively prefer its treatment or outcomes, regardless of the (dis)parity as compared to the other groups. Then, we introduce tractable proxies to design margin-based classifiers that satisfy these preference-based notions of fairness. Finally, we experiment with a variety of synthetic and real-world datasets and show that preference-based fairness allows for greater decision accuracy than parity-based fairness. Discrimination via algorithmic decision making has received considerable attention. Prior work largely focuses on defining conditions for fairness, but does not define satisfactory measures of algorithmic unfairness. In this paper, we focus on the following question: Given two unfair algorithms, how should we determine which of the two is more unfair? Our core idea is to use existing inequality indices from economics to measure how unequally the outcomes of an algorithm benefit different individuals or groups in a population. Our work offers a justified and general framework to compare and contrast the (un)fairness of algorithmic predictors. This unifying approach enables us to quantify unfairness both at the individual and the group level. Further, our work reveals overlooked tradeoffs between different fairness notions: using our proposed measures, the overall individual-level unfairness of an algorithm can be decomposed into a between-group and a within-group component. Earlier methods are typically designed to tackle only between-group un- fairness, which may be justified for legal or other reasons. However, we demonstrate that minimizing exclusively the between-group component may, in fact, increase the within-group, and hence the overall unfairness. We characterize and illustrate the tradeoffs between our measures of (un)fairness and the prediction accuracy. Two food banks catering to populations of different sizes with different needs must divide among themselves a donation of food items. What constitutes a "fair" allocation of the items among them? Competitive equilibrium from equal incomes (CEEI) is a classic solution to the problem of fair and efficient allocation of goods among equally entitled agents [Foley 1967, Varian 1974]. Every agent (foodbank) receives an equal endowment of artificial currency with which to "purchase" bundles of goods (food items). Prices for the goods are set high enough such that the agents can simultaneously get their favorite within-budget bundle, and low enough such that all goods are allocated (no waste). A CEEI satisfies mathematical notions of fairness like fair-share, and also has built-in transparency -- prices can be published so the agents can verify they're being treated equally. However, a CEEI is not guaranteed to exist when the items are indivisible. We study competitive equilibrium from generic incomes (CEGI), which is based on the idea of slightly perturbed endowments, and enjoys similar fairness, efficiency and transparency properties as CEEI. We show that when the two agents have almost equal endowments and additive preferences for the items, a CEGI always exists. We then consider agents who are a priori non-equal (like different-sized foodbanks); we formulate a new notion of fair allocation among non-equals satisfied by CEGI, and show existence in cases of interest (like when the agents have identical preferences). Experiments on simulated and Spliddit data (a popular fair division website) indicate more general existence. Our results open opportunities for future research on fairness through generic endowments, and on fair treatment of non-equals. Abstract We study the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods to groups of agents. Agents in the same group share the same set of goods even though they may have different preferences. Previous work has focused on unanimous fairness, in which all agents in each group must agree that their group's share is fair. Under this strict requirement, fair allocations exist only for small groups. We introduce the concept of democratic fairness, which aims to satisfy a certain fraction of the agents in each group. This concept is better suited to large groups such as cities or countries. We present protocols for democratic fair allocation among two or more arbitrarily large groups of agents with monotonic, additive, or binary valuations. For two groups with arbitrary monotonic valuations, we give an efficient protocol that guarantees envy-freeness up to one good for at least 1 2 of the agents in each group, and prove that the 1 2 fraction is optimal. We also present other protocols that make weaker fairness guarantees to more agents in each group, or to more groups. Our protocols combine techniques from different fields, including combinatorial game theory, cake cutting, and voting. We consider the problem of fairly dividing a collection of indivisible goods among a set of players. Much of the existing literature on fair division focuses on notions of individual fairness. For instance, envy-freeness requires that no player prefer the set of goods allocated to another player to her own allocation. We observe that an algorithm satisfying such individual fairness notions can still treat groups of players unfairly, with one group desiring the goods allocated to another. Our main contribution is a notion of group fairness, which implies most existing notions of individual fairness. Group fairness (like individual fairness) cannot be satisfied exactly with indivisible goods. Thus, we introduce two “up to one good” style relaxations. We show that, somewhat surprisingly, certain local optima of the Nash welfare function satisfy both relaxations and can be computed in pseudo-polynomial time by local search. Our experiments reveal faster computation and stronger fairness guarantees in practice. Motivated by settings in which predictive models may be required to be non-discriminatory with respect to certain attributes (such as race), but even collecting the sensitive attribute may be forbidden or restricted, we initiate the study of fair learning under the constraint of differential privacy. We design two learning algorithms that simultaneously promise differential privacy and equalized odds, a 'fairness' condition that corresponds to equalizing false positive and negative rates across protected groups. Our first algorithm is a private implementation of the equalized odds post-processing approach of [, 2016]. This algorithm is appealingly simple, but must be able to use protected group membership explicitly at test time, which can be viewed as a form of 'disparate treatment'. Our second algorithm is a differentially private version of the oracle-efficient in-processing approach of [, 2018] that can be used to find the optimal fair classifier, given access to a subroutine that can solve the original (not necessarily fair) learning problem. This algorithm is more complex but need not have access to protected group membership at test time. We identify new tradeoffs between fairness, accuracy, and privacy that emerge only when requiring all three properties, and show that these tradeoffs can be milder if group membership may be used at test time. We conclude with a brief experimental evaluation. We study fairness in classification, where individuals are classified, e.g., admitted to a university, and the goal is to prevent discrimination against individuals based on their membership in some group, while maintaining utility for the classifier (the university). The main conceptual contribution of this paper is a framework for fair classification comprising (1) a (hypothetical) task-specific metric for determining the degree to which individuals are similar with respect to the classification task at hand; (2) an algorithm for maximizing utility subject to the fairness constraint, that similar individuals are treated similarly. We also present an adaptation of our approach to achieve the complementary goal of "fair affirmative action," which guarantees statistical parity (i.e., the demographics of the set of individuals receiving any classification are the same as the demographics of the underlying population), while treating similar individuals as similarly as possible. Finally, we discuss the relationship of fairness to privacy: when fairness implies privacy, and how tools developed in the context of differential privacy may be applied to fairness. We study fairness in classification, where individuals are classified, e.g., admitted to a university, and the goal is to prevent discrimination against individuals based on their membership in some group, while maintaining utility for the classifier (the university). The main conceptual contribution of this paper is a framework for fair classification comprising (1) a (hypothetical) task-specific metric for determining the degree to which individuals are similar with respect to the classification task at hand; (2) an algorithm for maximizing utility subject to the fairness constraint, that similar individuals are treated similarly. We also present an adaptation of our approach to achieve the complementary goal of "fair affirmative action," which guarantees statistical parity (i.e., the demographics of the set of individuals receiving any classification are the same as the demographics of the underlying population), while treating similar individuals as similarly as possible. Finally, we discuss the relationship of fairness to privacy: when fairness implies privacy, and how tools developed in the context of differential privacy may be applied to fairness. In the context of fair allocation of indivisible items, fairness concepts often compare the satisfaction of an agent to the satisfaction she would have from items that are not allocated to her: in particular, envy-freeness requires that no agent prefers the share of someone else to her own share. We argue that these notions could also be defined relative to the knowledge that an agent has on how the items that she does not receive are distributed among other agents. We define a family of epistemic notions of envy-freeness, parameterized by a social graph, where an agent observes the share of her neighbours but not of her non-neighbours. We also define an intermediate notion between envy-freeness and proportionality, also parameterized by a social graph. These weaker notions of envy-freeness are useful when seeking a fair allocation, since envy-freeness is often too strong. We position these notions with respect to known ones, thus revealing new rich hierarchies of fairness concepts. Finally, we present a very general framework that covers all the existing and many new fairness concepts. We consider the problem of online learning in the linear contextual bandits setting, but in which there are also strong individual fairness constraints governed by an unknown similarity metric. These constraints demand that we select similar actions or individuals with approximately equal probability (arXiv:1104.3913), which may be at odds with optimizing reward, thus modeling settings where profit and social policy are in tension. We assume we learn about an unknown Mahalanobis similarity metric from only weak feedback that identifies fairness violations, but does not quantify their extent. This is intended to represent the interventions of a regulator who "knows unfairness when he sees it" but nevertheless cannot enunciate a quantitative fairness metric over individuals. Our main result is an algorithm in the adversarial context setting that has a number of fairness violations that depends only logarithmically on @math , while obtaining an optimal @math regret bound to the best fair policy. The potential lack of fairness in the outputs of machine learning algorithms has recently gained attention both within the research community as well as in society more broadly. Surprisingly, there is no prior work developing tree-induction algorithms for building fair decision trees or fair random forests. These methods have widespread popularity as they are one of the few to be simultaneously interpretable, non-linear, and easy-to-use. In this paper we develop, to our knowledge, the first technique for the induction of fair decision trees. We show that our "Fair Forest" retains the benefits of the tree-based approach, while providing both greater accuracy and fairness than other alternatives, for both "group fairness" and "individual fairness.'" We also introduce new measures for fairness which are able to handle multinomial and continues attributes as well as regression problems, as opposed to binary attributes and labels only. Finally, we demonstrate a new, more robust evaluation procedure for algorithms that considers the dataset in its entirety rather than only a specific protected attribute. In this work, we define and solve the Fair Top-k Ranking problem, in which we want to determine a subset of k candidates from a large pool of n » k candidates, maximizing utility (i.e., select the "best" candidates) subject to group fairness criteria. Our ranked group fairness definition extends group fairness using the standard notion of protected groups and is based on ensuring that the proportion of protected candidates in every prefix of the top-k ranking remains statistically above or indistinguishable from a given minimum. Utility is operationalized in two ways: (i) every candidate included in the top-k should be more qualified than every candidate not included; and (ii) for every pair of candidates in the top-k, the more qualified candidate should be ranked above. An efficient algorithm is presented for producing the Fair Top-k Ranking, and tested experimentally on existing datasets as well as new datasets released with this paper, showing that our approach yields small distortions with respect to rankings that maximize utility without considering fairness criteria. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first algorithm grounded in statistical tests that can mitigate biases in the representation of an under-represented group along a ranked list. Quantifying the notion of fairness is underexplored when there are multiple types of resources and users request different ratios of the different resources. A typical example is data centers processing jobs with heterogeneous resource requirements on CPU, memory, network bandwidth, etc. In such cases, a tradeoff arises between equitability, or "fairness," and efficiency. This paper develops a unifying framework addressing the fairness-efficiency tradeoff in light of multiple types of resources. We develop two families of fairness functions that provide different tradeoffs, characterize the effect of user requests' heterogeneity, and prove conditions under which these fairness measures satisfy the Pareto efficiency, sharing incentive, and envy-free properties. Intuitions behind the analysis are explained in two visualizations of multiresource allocation. We also investigate people's fairness perceptions through an online survey of allocation preferences. We propose a learning algorithm for fair classification that achieves both group fairness (the proportion of members in a protected group receiving positive classification is identical to the proportion in the population as a whole), and individual fairness (similar individuals should be treated similarly). We formulate fairness as an optimization problem of finding a good representation of the data with two competing goals: to encode the data as well as possible, while simultaneously obfuscating any information about membership in the protected group. We show positive results of our algorithm relative to other known techniques, on three datasets. Moreover, we demonstrate several advantages to our approach. First, our intermediate representation can be used for other classification tasks (i.e., transfer learning is possible); secondly, we take a step toward learning a distance metric which can find important dimensions of the data for classification. The concept of fair division is as old as civil society itself. Aristotle's "equal treatment of equals" was the first step toward a formal definition of distributive fairness. The concept of collective welfare, more than two centuries old, is a pillar of modern economic analysis. Reflecting fifty years of research, this book examines the contribution of modern microeconomic thinking to distributive justice. Taking the modern axiomatic approach, it compares normative arguments of distributive justice and their relation to efficiency and collective welfare. The book begins with the epistemological status of the axiomatic approach and the four classic principles of distributive justice: compensation, reward, exogenous rights, and fitness. It then presents the simple ideas of equal gains, equal losses, and proportional gains and losses. The book discusses three cardinal interpretations of collective welfare: Bentham's "utilitarian" proposal to maximize the sum of individual utilities, the Nash product, and the egalitarian leximin ordering. It also discusses the two main ordinal definitions of collective welfare: the majority relation and the Borda scoring method. The Shapley value is the single most important contribution of game theory to distributive justice. A formula to divide jointly produced costs or benefits fairly, it is especially useful when the pattern of externalities renders useless the simple ideas of equality and proportionality. The book ends with two versatile methods for dividing commodities efficiently and fairly when only ordinal preferences matter: competitive equilibrium with equal incomes and egalitarian equivalence. The book contains a wealth of empirical examples and exercises. The paper considers fair allocation of indivisible nondisposable items that generate disutility (chores). We assume that these items are placed in the vertices of a graph and each agent’s share has to form a connected subgraph of this graph. Although a similar model has been investigated before for goods, we show that the goods and chores settings are inherently different. In particular, it is impossible to derive the solution of the chores instance from the solution of its naturally associated fair division instance. We consider three common fair division solution concepts, namely proportionality, envy-freeness and equitability, and two individual disutility aggregation functions: additive and maximum based. We show that deciding the existence of a fair allocation is hard even if the underlying graph is a path or a star. We also present some efficiently solvable special cases for these graph topologies. We consider the problem of fairly dividing a set of items. Much of the fair division literature assumes that the items are goods' i.e., they yield positive utility for the agents. There is also some work where the items are chores' that yield negative utility for the agents. In this paper, we consider a more general scenario where an agent may have negative or positive utility for each item. This framework captures, e.g., fair task assignment, where agents can have both positive and negative utilities for each task. We show that whereas some of the positive axiomatic and computational results extend to this more general setting, others do not. We present several new and efficient algorithms for finding fair allocations in this general setting. We also point out several gaps in the literature regarding the existence of allocations satisfying certain fairness and efficiency properties and further study the complexity of computing such allocations. Algorithms are increasingly used to make important decisions about human lives, ranging from social benefit assignment to predicting risk of criminal recidivism. The sensitivity of these decisions has raised important questions about ensuring fairness in algorithmic decision making. Recent work has focused on addressing two aspects of fairness: distributional fairness, concerning the fairness of the outcomes of decision making, and procedural fairness, concerning the fairness of the decision-making process. Assessment of procedural fairness relies on human judgments, for example, about the fairness of using certain features in the algorithm making the decision. Yet to our knowledge, almost no prior work examines people’s perceptions of fairness in algorithmic decision making. We propose a framework for understanding why people perceive certain features as fair to be used in algorithms. We define a framework of eight underlying properties of features, such as relevance, volitionality and reliability, and hypothesize that people use these properties to form a heuristic for making moral judgments about the fairness of feature use in decision-making algorithms. We evaluate our framework through a series of scenario-based surveys with 576 people. We find that, based on a person’s assessment of the eight underlying properties in our exemplar scenario, we can predict if they will perceive a feature as fair to be used with at least 87 accuracy. We consider the age-old problem of allocating items among different agents in a way that is efficient and fair. Two papers, by and , have recently studied this problem in the context of computer systems. Both papers had similar models for agent preferences, but advocated different notions of fairness. We formalize both fairness notions in economic terms, extending them to apply to a larger family of utilities. Noting that in settings with such utilities efficiency is easily achieved in multiple ways, we study notions of fairness as criteria for choosing between different efficient allocations. Our technical results are algorithms for finding fair allocations corresponding to two fairness notions: Regarding the notion suggested by , we present a polynomial-time algorithm that computes an allocation for a general class of fairness notions, in which their notion is included. For the other, suggested by , we show that a competitive market equilibrium achieves the desired notion of fairness, thereby obtaining a polynomial-time algorithm that computes such a fair allocation and solving the main open problem raised by