We examine the problem of adversarial reinforcement learning for multi-agent domains including a rule-based agent. Rule-based algorithms are required in safety-critical applications for them to work properly in a wide range of situations. Hence, every effort is made to find failure scenarios during the development phase. However, as the software becomes complicated, finding failure cases becomes difficult. Especially in multi-agent domains, such as autonomous driving environments, it is much harder to find useful failure scenarios that help us improve the algorithm. We propose a method for efficiently finding failure scenarios; this method trains the adversarial agents using multi-agent reinforcement learning such that the tested rule-based agent fails. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposed method using a simple environment and autonomous driving simulator.
The relationship among multiple agents can be categorized into cooperative, competitive, and both. Most previous work on MARL addresses cooperative tasks, in which the cumulative reward is maximized as a group . In particular, @cite_0 proposed a method with a centralized critic for a fully cooperative multi-agent task.
@cite_0
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We consider the problem of multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL), where the agents are located at the nodes of a time-varying communication network. Specifically, we assume that the reward functions of the agents might correspond to different tasks, and are only known to the corresponding agent. Moreover, each agent makes individual decisions based on both the information observed locally and the messages received from its neighbors over the network. Within this setting, the collective goal of the agents is to maximize the globally averaged return over the network through exchanging information with their neighbors. To this end, we propose two decentralized actor-critic algorithms with function approximation, which are applicable to large-scale MARL problems where both the number of states and the number of agents are massively large. Under the decentralized structure, the actor step is performed individually by each agent with no need to infer the policies of others. For the critic step, we propose a consensus update via communication over the network. Our algorithms are fully incremental and can be implemented in an online fashion. Convergence analyses of the algorithms are provided when the value functions are approximated within the class of linear functions. Extensive simulation results with both linear and nonlinear function approximations are presented to validate the proposed algorithms. Our work appears to be the first study of fully decentralized MARL algorithms for networked agents with function approximation, with provable convergence guarantees. Coordinated multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) provides a promising approach to scaling learning in large cooperative multi-agent systems. Distributed constraint optimization (DCOP) techniques have been used to coordinate action selection among agents during both the learning phase and the policy execution phase (if learning is off-line) to ensure good overall system performance. However, running DCOP algorithms for each action selection through the whole system results in significant communication among agents, which is not practical for most applications with limited communication bandwidth. In this paper, we develop a learning approach that generalizes previous coordinated MARL approaches that use DCOP algorithms and enables MARL to be conducted over a spectrum from independent learning (without communication) to fully coordinated learning depending on agents' communication bandwidth. Our approach defines an interaction measure that allows agents to dynamically identify their beneficial coordination set (i.e., whom to coordinate with) in different situations and to trade off its performance and communication cost. By limiting their coordination set, agents dynamically decompose the coordination network in a distributed way, resulting in dramatically reduced communication for DCOP algorithms without significantly affecting overall learning performance. Essentially, our learning approach conducts co-adaptation of agents' policy learning and coordination set identification, which outperforms approaches that sequence them. Cooperative multi-agent systems can be naturally used to model many real world problems, such as network packet routing and the coordination of autonomous vehicles. There is a great need for new reinforcement learning methods that can efficiently learn decentralised policies for such systems. To this end, we propose a new multi-agent actor-critic method called counterfactual multi-agent (COMA) policy gradients. COMA uses a centralised critic to estimate the Q-function and decentralised actors to optimise the agents' policies. In addition, to address the challenges of multi-agent credit assignment, it uses a counterfactual baseline that marginalises out a single agent's action, while keeping the other agents' actions fixed. COMA also uses a critic representation that allows the counterfactual baseline to be computed efficiently in a single forward pass. We evaluate COMA in the testbed of StarCraft unit micromanagement, using a decentralised variant with significant partial observability. COMA significantly improves average performance over other multi-agent actor-critic methods in this setting, and the best performing agents are competitive with state-of-the-art centralised controllers that get access to the full state. Cooperative multi-agent systems (MAS) are ones in which several agents attempt, through their interaction, to jointly solve tasks or to maximize utility. Due to the interactions among the agents, multi-agent problem complexity can rise rapidly with the number of agents or their behavioral sophistication. The challenge this presents to the task of programming solutions to MAS problems has spawned increasing interest in machine learning techniques to automate the search and optimization process. We provide a broad survey of the cooperative multi-agent learning literature. Previous surveys of this area have largely focused on issues common to specific subareas (for example, reinforcement learning, RL or robotics). In this survey we attempt to draw from multi-agent learning work in a spectrum of areas, including RL, evolutionary computation, game theory, complex systems, agent modeling, and robotics. We find that this broad view leads to a division of the work into two categories, each with its own special issues: applying a single learner to discover joint solutions to multi-agent problems (team learning), or using multiple simultaneous learners, often one per agent (concurrent learning). Additionally, we discuss direct and indirect communication in connection with learning, plus open issues in task decomposition, scalability, and adaptive dynamics. We conclude with a presentation of multi-agent learning problem domains, and a list of multi-agent learning resources. Despite the increasing interest in multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) in the community, understanding its theoretical foundation has long been recognized as a challenging problem. In this work, we make an attempt towards addressing this problem, by providing finite-sample analyses for fully decentralized MARL. Specifically, we consider two fully decentralized MARL settings, where teams of agents are connected by time-varying communication networks, and either collaborate or compete in a zero-sum game, without any central controller. These settings cover many conventional MARL settings in the literature. For both settings, we develop batch MARL algorithms that can be implemented in a fully decentralized fashion, and quantify the finite-sample errors of the estimated action-value functions. Our error analyses characterize how the function class, the number of samples within each iteration, and the number of iterations determine the statistical accuracy of the proposed algorithms. Our results, compared to the finite-sample bounds for single-agent RL, identify the involvement of additional error terms caused by decentralized computation, which is inherent in our decentralized MARL setting. To our knowledge, our work appears to be the first finite-sample analyses for MARL, which sheds light on understanding both the sample and computational efficiency of MARL algorithms. Procuring multiple agents with different ability levels to independently solve the same task is common in labor markets, crowdsourcing environments and research and development projects due to two reasons: some agents may fail to provide a satisfactory solution, and the redundancy increases the quality of the best solution found. However, incentivizing large number of agents to compete for one task is difficult; agents need fair ex-ante guaranteed payoffs that consider their ability levels and failure rates to exert efforts. We model such domains as a cooperative game called the Max-Game, where each agent has a weight representing its ability level, and the value of an agent coalition is the maximal weight of the agents in the coalition. When agents may fail, we redefine the value of a coalition as the expected maximal weight of its surviving members. We analyze the core, the Shapley value, and the Banzhaf index as methods of payoff division. Surprisingly, the latter two, which are usually computationally hard, can be computed in polynomial time. Finally, we initiate the study of a new form of sabotage where agents may be incentivized to influence the failure probabilities of their peers, and show that no such incentive is present in a restricted case of Max-Games. Multiagent systems are rapidly finding applications in a variety of domains, including robotics, distributed control, telecommunications, and economics. The complexity of many tasks arising in these domains makes them difficult to solve with preprogrammed agent behaviors. The agents must, instead, discover a solution on their own, using learning. A significant part of the research on multiagent learning concerns reinforcement learning techniques. This paper provides a comprehensive survey of multiagent reinforcement learning (MARL). A central issue in the field is the formal statement of the multiagent learning goal. Different viewpoints on this issue have led to the proposal of many different goals, among which two focal points can be distinguished: stability of the agents' learning dynamics, and adaptation to the changing behavior of the other agents. The MARL algorithms described in the literature aim---either explicitly or implicitly---at one of these two goals or at a combination of both, in a fully cooperative, fully competitive, or more general setting. A representative selection of these algorithms is discussed in detail in this paper, together with the specific issues that arise in each category. Additionally, the benefits and challenges of MARL are described along with some of the problem domains where the MARL techniques have been applied. Finally, an outlook for the field is provided. Multi-agent systems (MAS) are a field of study of growing interest in a variety of domains such as robotics or distributed controls. The article focuses on decentralized reinforcement learning (RL) in cooperative MAS, where a team of independent learning robots (IL) try to coordinate their individual behavior to reach a coherent joint behavior. We assume that each robot has no information about its teammates' actions. To date, RL approaches for such ILs did not guarantee convergence to the optimal joint policy in scenarios where the coordination is difficult. We report an investigation of existing algorithms for the learning of coordination in cooperative MAS, and suggest a Q-learning extension for ILs, called hysteretic Q-learning. This algorithm does not require any additional communication between robots. Its advantages are showing off and compared to other methods on various applications: bi-matrix games, collaborative ball balancing task and pursuit domain. In the framework of fully cooperative multi-agent systems, independent (non-communicative) agents that learn by reinforcement must overcome several difficulties to manage to coordinate. This paper identifies several challenges responsible for the non-coordination of independent agents: Pareto-selection, non-stationarity, stochasticity, alter-exploration and shadowed equilibria. A selection of multi-agent domains is classified according to those challenges: matrix games, Boutilier's coordination game, predators pursuit domains and a special multi-state game. Moreover, the performance of a range of algorithms for independent reinforcement learners is evaluated empirically. Those algorithms are Q-learning variants: decentralized Q-learning, distributed Q-learning, hysteretic Q-learning, recursive frequency maximum Q-value and win-or-learn fast policy hill climbing. An overview of the learning algorithms' strengths and weaknesses against each challenge concludes the paper and can serve as a basis for choosing the appropriate algorithm for a new domain. Furthermore, the distilled challenges may assist in the design of new learning algorithms that overcome these problems and achieve higher performance in multi-agent applications. Much emphasis in multiagent reinforcement learning (MARL) research is placed on ensuring that MARL algorithms (eventually) converge to desirable equilibria. As in standard reinforcement learning, convergence generally requires sufficient exploration of strategy space. However, exploration often comes at a price in the form of penalties or foregone opportunities. In multiagent settings, the problem is exacerbated by the need for agents to "coordinate" their policies on equilibria. We propose a Bayesian model for optimal exploration in MARL problems that allows these exploration costs to be weighed against their expected benefits using the notion of value of information. Unlike standard RL models, this model requires reasoning about how one's actions will influence the behavior of other agents. We develop tractable approximations to optimal Bayesian exploration, and report on experiments illustrating the benefits of this approach in identical interest games. Increasing teamwork between agents typically increases the performance of a multi-agent system, at the cost of increased communication and higher computational complexity. This work examines joint actions in the context of a multi-agent optimization problem where agents must cooperate to balance exploration and exploitation. Surprisingly, results show that increased teamwork can hurt agent performance, even when communication and computation costs are ignored, which we term the team uncertainty penalty. This paper introduces the above phenomena, analyzes it, and presents algorithms to reduce the effect of the penalty in our problem setting. We present an algorithm for coordinated decision making in cooperative multiagent settings, where the agents' value function canbe represented as a sum of context-specific value rules. The task of finding an optimal joint action in this setting leads to an algorithm where the coordination structure between agents depends on the current state of the system and even on the actual mmaerical values assigned to the value rules. We apply this framework to the task of multiagent planning in dynamic systems, showing how a joint value function of the associated Markov Decision Process can be approximated as a set of value rules using an efficient linear programming algorithm. The agents then apply the coordination graph algorithm at each iteration of the process to decide on the highest-value joint action, potentially leading to a different coordination pattern at each step of the plan. We consider schemes for obtaining truthful reports on a common but hidden signal from large groups of rational, self-interested agents. One example are online feedback mechanisms, where users provide observations about the quality of a product or service so that other users can have an accurate idea of what quality they can expect. However, (i) providing such feedback is costly, and (ii) there are many motivations for providing incorrect feedback. Both problems can be addressed by reward schemes which (i) cover the cost of obtaining and reporting feedback, and (ii) maximize the expected reward of a rational agent who reports truthfully. We address the design of such incentive-compatible rewards for feedback generated in environments with pure adverse selection. Here, the correlation between the true knowledge of an agent and her beliefs regarding the likelihoods of reports of other agents can be exploited to make honest reporting a Nash equilibrium. In this paper we extend existing methods for designing incentive-compatible rewards by also considering collusion. We analyze different scenarios, where, for example, some or all of the agents collude. For each scenario we investigate whether a collusion-resistant, incentive-compatible reward scheme exists, and use automated mechanism design to specify an algorithm for deriving an efficient reward mechanism. Evolution of cooperation and competition can appear when multiple adaptive agents share a biological, social, or technological niche. In the present work we study how cooperation and competition emerge between autonomous agents that learn by reinforcement while using only their raw visual input as the state representation. In particular, we extend the Deep Q-Learning framework to multiagent environments to investigate the interaction between two learning agents in the well-known video game Pong. By manipulating the classical rewarding scheme of Pong we show how competitive and collaborative behaviors emerge. We also describe the progression from competitive to collaborative behavior when the incentive to cooperate is increased. Finally we show how learning by playing against another adaptive agent, instead of against a hard-wired algorithm, results in more robust strategies. The present work shows that Deep Q-Networks can become a useful tool for studying decentralized learning of multiagent systems coping with high-dimensional environments. We investigate synergy, or lack thereof, between agents in co-operative games, building on the popular notion of Shapley value. We think of a pair of agents as synergistic (resp., antagonistic) if the Shapley value of one agent when the other agent participates in a joint effort is higher (resp. lower) than when the other agent does not participate. Our main theoretical result is that any graph specifying synergistic and antagonistic pairs can arise even from a restricted class of cooperative games. We also study the computational complexity of determining whether a given pair of agents is synergistic. Finally, we use the concepts developed in the paper to uncover the structure of synergies in two real-world organizations, the European Union and the International Monetary Fund. Following work on designing optimal rewards for single agents, we define a multiagent optimal rewards problem (ORP) in common-payoff (or team) settings. This new problem solves for individual agent reward functions that guide agents to better overall team performance relative to teams in which all agents guide their behavior with the same given team-reward function. We present a multiagent architecture in which each agent learns good reward functions from experience using a gradient-based algorithm in addition to performing the usual task of planning good policies (except in this case with respect to the learned rather than the given reward function). Multiagency introduces the challenge of nonstationarity: because the agents learn simultaneously, each agent's learning problem is nonstationary and interdependent on the other agents. We demonstrate on two simple domains that the proposed architecture outperforms the conventional approach in which all the agents use the same given team-reward function (even when accounting for the resource overhead of the reward learning); that the learning algorithm performs stably despite the nonstationarity; and that learning individual reward functions can lead to better specialization of roles than is possible with shared reward, whether learned or given. Fully cooperative multiagent systems--those in which agents share a joint utility model--is of special interest in AI. A key problem is that of ensuring that the actions of individual agents are coordinated, especially in settings where the agents are autonomous decision makers. We investigate approaches to learning coordinated strategies in stochastic domains where an agent's actions are not directly observable by others. Much recent work in game theory has adopted a Bayesian learning perspective to the more general problem of equilibrium selection, but tends to assume that actions can be observed. We discuss the special problems that arise when actions are not observable, including effects on rates of convergence, and the effect of action failure probabilities and asymmetries. We also use likelihood estimates as a means of generalizing fictitious play learning models in our setting. Finally, we propose the use of maximum likelihood as a means of removing strategies from consideration, with the aim of convergence to a conventional equilibrium, at which point learning and deliberation can cease. This work considers the problem of learning cooperative policies in complex, partially observable domains without explicit communication. We extend three classes of single-agent deep reinforcement learning algorithms based on policy gradient, temporal-difference error, and actor-critic methods to cooperative multi-agent systems. To effectively scale these algorithms beyond a trivial number of agents, we combine them with a multi-agent variant of curriculum learning. The algorithms are benchmarked on a suite of cooperative control tasks, including tasks with discrete and continuous actions, as well as tasks with dozens of cooperating agents. We report the performance of the algorithms using different neural architectures, training procedures, and reward structures. We show that policy gradient methods tend to outperform both temporal-difference and actor-critic methods and that curriculum learning is vital to scaling reinforcement learning algorithms in complex multi-agent domains. We present a principled and efficient planning algorithm for cooperative multiagent dynamic systems. A striking feature of our method is that the coordination and communication between the agents is not imposed, but derived directly from the system dynamics and function approximation architecture. We view the entire multiagent system as a single, large Markov decision process (MDP), which we assume can be represented in a factored way using a dynamic Bayesian network (DBN). The action space of the resulting MDP is the joint action space of the entire set of agents. Our approach is based on the use of factored linear value functions as an approximation to the joint value function. This factorization of the value function allows the agents to coordinate their actions at runtime using a natural message passing scheme. We provide a simple and efficient method for computing such an approximate value function by solving a single linear program, whose size is determined by the interaction between the value function structure and the DBN. We thereby avoid the exponential blowup in the state and action space. We show that our approach compares favorably with approaches based on reward sharing. We also show that our algorithm is an efficient alternative to more complicated algorithms even in the single agent case. There has been a resurgence of interest in multiagent reinforcement learning (MARL), due partly to the recent success of deep neural networks. The simplest form of MARL is independent reinforcement learning (InRL), where each agent treats all of its experience as part of its (non stationary) environment. In this paper, we first observe that policies learned using InRL can overfit to the other agents' policies during training, failing to sufficiently generalize during execution. We introduce a new metric, joint-policy correlation, to quantify this effect. We describe a meta-algorithm for general MARL, based on approximate best responses to mixtures of policies generated using deep reinforcement learning, and empirical game theoretic analysis to compute meta-strategies for policy selection. The meta-algorithm generalizes previous algorithms such as InRL, iterated best response, double oracle, and fictitious play. Then, we propose a scalable implementation which reduces the memory requirement using decoupled meta-solvers. Finally, we demonstrate the generality of the resulting policies in three partially observable settings: gridworld coordination problems, emergent language games, and poker.