Biometrics make human identification possible with a sample of a biometric trait and an associated database. Classical identification techniques lead to privacy concerns. This paper introduces a new method to identify someone using his biometrics in an encrypted way. Our construction combines Bloom Filters with Storage and Locality-Sensitive Hashing. We apply this error-tolerant scheme, in a Hamming space, to achieve biometric identification in an efficient way. This is the first non-trivial identification scheme dealing with fuzziness and encrypted data.
Security of biometric systems is widely studied -- cf. @cite_30 @cite_35 @cite_43 -- and although a lot of vulnerabilities are now well understood and controlled, it is still difficult to achieve an end-to-end system which satisfies all constraints. In particular, biometric template privacy is an important issue due to the non-revocability and non-renewability of biometric features.
@cite_30 @cite_35 @cite_43
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Biometric recognition is an integral component of modern identity management and access control systems. Due to the strong and permanent link between individuals and their biometric traits, exposure of enrolled users? biometric information to adversaries can seriously compromise biometric system security and user privacy. Numerous techniques have been proposed for biometric template protection over the last 20 years. While these techniques are theoretically sound, they seldom guarantee the desired noninvertibility, revocability, and nonlinkability properties without significantly degrading the recognition performance. The objective of this work is to analyze the factors contributing to this performance divide and highlight promising research directions to bridge this gap. The design of invariant biometric representations remains a fundamental problem, despite recent attempts to address this issue through feature adaptation schemes. The difficulty in estimating the statistical distribution of biometric features not only hinders the development of better template protection algorithms but also diminishes the ability to quantify the noninvertibility and nonlinkability of existing algorithms. Finally, achieving nonlinkability without the use of external secrets (e.g., passwords) continues to be a challenging proposition. Further research on the above issues is required to cross the chasm between theory and practice in biometric ?template protection. Biometric recognition offers a reliable solution to the problem of user authentication in identity management systems. With the widespread deployment of biometric systems in various applications, there are increasing concerns about the security and privacy of biometric technology. Public acceptance of biometrics technology will depend on the ability of system designers to demonstrate that these systems are robust, have low error rates, and are tamper proof. We present a high-level categorization of the various vulnerabilities of a biometric system and discuss countermeasures that have been proposed to address these vulnerabilities. In particular, we focus on biometric template security which is an important issue because, unlike passwords and tokens, compromised biometric templates cannot be revoked and reissued. Protecting the template is a challenging task due to intrauser variability in the acquired biometric traits. We present an overview of various biometric template protection schemes and discuss their advantages and limitations in terms of security, revocability, and impact on matching accuracy. A template protection scheme with provable security and acceptable recognition performance has thus far remained elusive. Development of such a scheme is crucial as biometric systems are beginning to proliferate into the core physical and information infrastructure of our society. We present a theoretical framework for the analysis of privacy and security trade-offs in secure biometric authentication systems. We use this framework to conduct a comparative information-theoretic analysis of two biometric systems that are based on linear error correction codes, namely fuzzy commitment and secure sketches. We derive upper bounds for the probability of false rejection (PFR) and false acceptance (PFA) for these systems. We use mutual information to quantify the information leaked about a user's biometric identity, in the scenario where one or multiple biometric enrollments of the user are fully or partially compromised. We also quantify the probability of successful attack (PSA) based on the compromised information. Our analysis reveals that fuzzy commitment and secure sketch systems have identical PFR, PFA, PSA, and information leakage, but secure sketch systems have lower storage requirements. We analyze both single-factor (keyless) and two-factor (key-based) variants of secure biometrics, and consider the most general scenarios in which a single user may provide noisy biometric enrollments at several access control devices, some of which may be subsequently compromised by an attacker. Our analysis highlights the revocability and reusability properties of key-based systems and exposes a subtle design trade-off between reducing information leakage from compromised systems and preventing successful attacks on systems whose data have not been compromised. Recent years have seen an exponential growth in the use of various biometric technologies for trusted automatic recognition of humans. With the rapid adaptation of biometric systems, there is a growing concern that biometric technologies may compromise the privacy and anonymity of individuals. Unlike credit cards and passwords, which can be revoked and reissued when compromised, biometrics are permanently associated with a user and cannot be replaced. To prevent the theft of biometric patterns, it is desirable to modify them through revocable and noninvertible transformations to produce cancelable biometric templates. In this article, we provide an overview of various cancelable biometric schemes for biometric template protection. We discuss the merits and drawbacks of available cancelable biometric systems and identify promising avenues of research in this rapidly evolving field. In this paper, we propose a ranking based locality sensitive hashing inspired two-factor cancelable biometrics, dubbed “Index-of-Max” (IoM) hashing for biometric template protection. With externally generated random parameters, IoM hashing transforms a real-valued biometric feature vector into discrete index (max ranked) hashed code. We demonstrate two realizations from IoM hashing notion, namely Gaussian Random Projection based and Uniformly Random Permutation based hashing schemes. The discrete indices representation nature of IoM hashed codes enjoy several merits. Firstly, IoM hashing empowers strong concealment to the biometric information. This contributes to the solid ground of non-invertibility guarantee. Secondly, IoM hashing is insensitive to the features magnitude, hence is more robust against biometric features variation. Thirdly, the magnitude-independence trait of IoM hashing makes the hash codes being scale-invariant, which is critical for matching and feature alignment. The experimental results demonstrate favorable accuracy performance on benchmark FVC2002 and FVC2004 fingerprint databases. The analyses justify its resilience to the existing and newly introduced security and privacy attacks as well as satisfy the revocability and unlinkability criteria of cancelable biometrics. Biometrics is commonly used in many automated verification systems offering several advantages over traditional verification methods. Since biometric features are associated with individuals, their leakage will violate individuals’ privacy, which can cause serious and continued problems as the biometric data from a person are irreplaceable. To protect the biometric data containing privacy information, a number of privacy-preserving biometric schemes (PPBSs) have been developed over the last decade, but they have various drawbacks. The aim of this paper is to provide a comprehensive overview of the existing PPBSs and give guidance for future privacy-preserving biometric research. In particular, we explain the functional mechanisms of popular PPBSs and present the state-of-the-art privacy-preserving biometric methods based on these mechanisms. Furthermore, we discuss the drawbacks of the existing PPBSs and point out the challenges and future research directions in PPBSs. Government agencies are investing a considerable amount of resources into improving security systems as result of recent terrorist events that dangerously exposed flaws and weaknesses in today's safety mechanisms. Badge or password-based authentication procedures are too easy to hack. Biometrics represents a valid alternative but they suffer of drawbacks as well. Iris scanning, for example, is very reliable but too intrusive; fingerprints are socially accepted, but not applicable to non-consentient people. On the other hand, face recognition represents a good compromise between what's socially acceptable and what's reliable, even when operating under controlled conditions. In last decade, many algorithms based on linear nonlinear methods, neural networks, wavelets, etc. have been proposed. Nevertheless, Face Recognition Vendor Test 2002 shown that most of these approaches encountered problems in outdoor conditions. This lowered their reliability compared to state of the art biometrics. This paper provides an ''ex cursus'' of recent face recognition research trends in 2D imagery and 3D model based algorithms. To simplify comparisons across different approaches, tables containing different collection of parameters (such as input size, recognition rate, number of addressed problems) are provided. This paper concludes by proposing possible future directions. Due to biometric template characteristics that are susceptible to non-revocable and privacy invasion, cancellable biometrics has been introduced to tackle these issues. In this paper, we present a two-factor cancellable formulation for speech biometrics, which we refer as probabilistic random projection (PRP). PRP offers strong protection on speech template by hiding the actual speech feature through the random subspace projection process. Besides, the speech template is replaceable and can be reissued when it is compromised. Our proposed method enables the generation of different speech templates from the same speech feature, which means linkability is not exited between the speech templates. The formulation of the cancellable biometrics retains its performance as for the conventional biometric. Besides that, we also propose 2D subspace projection techniques for speech feature extraction, namely 2D Principle Component Analysis (2DPCA) and 2D CLAss-Featuring Information Compression (2DCLAFIC) to accommodate the requirements of PRP formulation. Recently, a kind of lightweight and resource-efficient biometrics-based security solutions were proposed for the emerging body sensor network (BSN). In such security solutions, physiological characteristics that can be captured by individual sensors of BSN were proposed to generate entity identifiers (EIs) for securing keying materials by a biometric approach. In this study, the authors focus on an improved key distribution solution with the energy distribution information of physiological signals (EDPSs) -based EIs. Firstly, different EDPS-based EI generation schemes are studied. Based on the existing multi-windows Fourier transform scheme, a modified one with single-window is proposed to improve the identification performance of the generated EIs. Then, a different method based on the discrete cosine transform of the autocorrelation sequence of physiological signals is proposed aiming for a significant increase in identification rates. The performances of time-varying randomness and identification rates are evaluated to examine EI's feasibility in securing the transmission of keying materials. Based on the characteristics of generated EIs, the corresponding key distribution solution, that is, user-dependent fuzzy vault, is proposed. A detailed system performance analysis in terms of half total error rate, anti-attack ability, as well as computational complexity, is conducted to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed solution. Biometrics are an important and widely used class of methods for identity verification and access control. Biometrics are attractive because they are inherent properties of an individual. They need not be remembered like passwords and are not easily lost or forged like identifying documents. At the same time, biometrics are fundamentally noisy and irreplaceable. There are always slight variations among the measurements of a given biometric, and, unlike passwords or identification numbers, biometrics are derived from physical characteristics that cannot easily be changed. The proliferation of biometric usage raises critical privacy and security concerns that, due to the noisy nature of biometrics, cannot be addressed using standard cryptographic methods. In this article, we present an overview of secure biometrics, also referred to as biometric template protection, an emerging class of methods that address these concerns. Biometric data offer a potential source of high-entropy, secret information that can be used in cryptographic protocols provided two issues are addressed: (1) biometric data are not uniformly distributed; and (2) they are not exactly reproducible. Recent work, most notably that of Dodis, Reyzin, and Smith, has shown how these obstacles may be overcome by allowing some auxiliary public information to be reliably sent from a server to the human user. Subsequent work of Boyen has shown how to extend these techniques, in the random oracle model, to enable unidirectional authentication from the user to the server without the assumption of a reliable communication channel. We show two efficient techniques enabling the use of biometric data to achieve mutual authentication or authenticated key exchange over a completely insecure (i.e., adversarially controlled) channel. In addition to achieving stronger security guarantees than the work of Boyen, we improve upon his solution in a number of other respects: we tolerate a broader class of errors and, in one case, improve upon the parameters of his solution and give a proof of security in the standard model. Human users have a tough time remembering long cryptographic keys. Hence, researchers, for so long, have been examining ways to utilize biometric features of the user instead of a memorable password or passphrase, in an effort to generate strong and repeatable cryptographic keys. Our objective is to incorporate the volatility of the user's biometric features into the generated key, so as to make the key unguessable to an attacker lacking significant knowledge of the user's biometrics. We go one step further trying to incorporate multiple biometric modalities into cryptographic key generation so as to provide better security. In this article, we propose an efficient approach based on multimodal biometrics (Iris and fingerprint) for generation of secure cryptographic key. The proposed approach is composed of three modules namely, 1) Feature extraction, 2) Multimodal biometric template generation and 3) Cryptographic key generation. Initially, the features, minutiae points and texture properties are extracted from the fingerprint and iris images respectively. Subsequently, the extracted features are fused together at the feature level to construct the multi-biometric template. Finally, a 256-bit secure cryptographic key is generated from the multi-biometric template. For experimentation, we have employed the fingerprint images obtained from publicly available sources and the iris images from CASIA Iris Database. The experimental results demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed approach. Biometrics system had been widely implemented in our daily life applications. With continuous improvement in biometrics recognition performance, biometrics security hence becomes an important topic of research as biometric template protection scheme serves as a vital part of a complete biometrics system. Besides, multimodal biometrics system is introduced to improve the recognition performance, system complexity, security and applicability of nowadays biometrics applications. In this paper, we present a new approach of feature-level fusion multimodal biometrics system using indexing-first-one (IFO) hashing and integer value mapping strategy. Indexing-first-one hashing has proven survived from several major privacy attacks such as single-hash attack (SHA), attack via record multiplicity (ARM) etc. On top of that, a weighted feature level fusion approach is proposed where multiple biometrics are given different weights based on the individual recognition result which then each biometrics will contributes to the final matching result based on their respective weights. The experiment is conducted and result is validated using a multimodal fingerprint and iris database. The vulnerabilities of face biometric authentication systems to spoofing attacks have received a significant attention during the recent years. Some of the proposed countermeasures have achieved impressive results when evaluated on intratests, i.e., the system is trained and tested on the same database. Unfortunately, most of these techniques fail to generalize well to unseen attacks, e.g., when the system is trained on one database and then evaluated on another database. This is a major concern in biometric antispoofing research that is mostly overlooked. In this letter, we propose a novel solution based on describing the facial appearance by applying Fisher vector encoding on speeded-up robust features extracted from different color spaces. The evaluation of our countermeasure on three challenging benchmark face-spoofing databases, namely the CASIA face antispoofing database, the replay-attack database, and MSU mobile face spoof database, showed excellent and stable performance across all the three datasets. Most importantly, in interdatabase tests, our proposed approach outperforms the state of the art and yields very promising generalization capabilities, even when only limited training data are used. Biometric security systems based on facial characteristics face a challenging task due to variability in the intrapersonal facial appearance of subjects traced to factors such as pose, illumination, expression and aging. This paper innovates as it proposes a deep learning and set-based approach to face recognition subject to aging. The images for each subject taken at various times are treated as a single set, which is then compared to sets of images belonging to other subjects. Facial features are extracted using a convolutional neural network characteristic of deep learning. Our experimental results show that set-based recognition performs better than the singleton-based approach for both face identification and face verification. We also find that by using set-based recognition, it is easier to recognize older subjects from younger ones rather than younger subjects from older ones. A biometric system is vulnerable to a variety of attacks aimed at undermining the integrity of the authentication process. These attacks are intended to either circumvent the security afforded by the system or to deter the normal functioning of the system. We describe the various threats that can be encountered by a biometric system. We specifically focus on attacks designed to elicit information about the original biometric data of an individual from the stored template. A few algorithms presented in the literature are discussed in this regard. We also examine techniques that can be used to deter or detect these attacks. Furthermore, we provide experimental results pertaining to a hybrid system combining biometrics with cryptography, that converts traditional fingerprint templates into novel cryptographic structures. Form a privacy perspective most concerns against the common use of biometrics arise from the storage and misuse of biometric data. Biometric cryptosystems and cancelable biometrics represent emerging technologies of biometric template protection addressing these concerns and improving public confidence and acceptance of biometrics. In addition, biometric cryptosystems provide mechanisms for biometric-dependent key-release. In the last years a significant amount of approaches to both technologies have been published. A comprehensive survey of biometric cryptosystems and cancelable biometrics is presented. State-of-the-art approaches are reviewed based on which an in-depth discussion and an outlook to future prospects are given. Biometrics systems have significantly improved person identification and authentication, playing an important role in personal, national, and global security. However, these systems might be deceived (or spoofed) and, despite the recent advances in spoofing detection, current solutions often rely on domain knowledge, specific biometric reading systems, and attack types. We assume a very limited knowledge about biometric spoofing at the sensor to derive outstanding spoofing detection systems for iris, face, and fingerprint modalities based on two deep learning approaches. The first approach consists of learning suitable convolutional network architectures for each domain, whereas the second approach focuses on learning the weights of the network via back propagation. We consider nine biometric spoofing benchmarks—each one containing real and fake samples of a given biometric modality and attack type—and learn deep representations for each benchmark by combining and contrasting the two learning approaches. This strategy not only provides better comprehension of how these approaches interplay, but also creates systems that exceed the best known results in eight out of the nine benchmarks. The results strongly indicate that spoofing detection systems based on convolutional networks can be robust to attacks already known and possibly adapted, with little effort, to image-based attacks that are yet to come. This paper presents an overview of the weakness of biometric security systems and possible solutions to improve it. Different levels of attack are described, and the strengths and weaknesses of the main biometric system are emphasized. Solutions are provided with special emphasis on cryptography and watermarking techniques. Establishing identity is becoming critical in our vastly interconnected society. Questions such as "Is she really who she claims to be?," "Is this person authorized to use this facility?," or "Is he in the watchlist posted by the government?" are routinely being posed in a variety of scenarios ranging from issuing a driver's license to gaining entry into a country. The need for reliable user authentication techniques has increased in the wake of heightened concerns about security and rapid advancements in networking, communication, and mobility. Biometrics, described as the science of recognizing an individual based on his or her physical or behavioral traits, is beginning to gain acceptance as a legitimate method for determining an individual's identity. Biometric systems have now been deployed in various commercial, civilian, and forensic applications as a means of establishing identity. In this paper, we provide an overview of biometrics and discuss some of the salient research issues that need to be addressed for making biometric technology an effective tool for providing information security. The primary contribution of this overview includes: 1) examining applications where biometric scan solve issues pertaining to information security; 2) enumerating the fundamental challenges encountered by biometric systems in real-world applications; and 3) discussing solutions to address the problems of scalability and security in large-scale authentication systems.