Job interview simulation with a virtual agents aims at improving people's social skills and supporting professional inclusion. In such simulators, the virtual agent must be capable of representing and reasoning about the user's mental state based on social cues that inform the system about his her affects and social attitude. In this paper, we propose a formal model of Theory of Mind (ToM) for virtual agent in the context of human-agent interaction that focuses on the affective dimension. It relies on a hybrid ToM that combines the two major paradigms of the domain. Our framework is based on modal logic and inference rules about the mental states, emotions and social relations of both actors. Finally, we present preliminary results regarding the impact of such a model on natural interaction in the context of job interviews simulation.
From the philosophical point of view, a debate about how ToM is processed by human adults opposes two theories. The (TT) argues for a folk-psychology reasoning, i.e. a set of rules one acquires regarding human mind functioning. @cite_5 . The (ST) @cite_27 defends a mirroring or projection process allowing for taking someone else's perspective. Various research demonstrated that neither pure TT nor pure ST were realistic @cite_23 and both theorists and simulationists turn toward more hybrid models @cite_5 @cite_27 .
@cite_5 @cite_27 @cite_23
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Abstract Human self-consciousness as the metarepresentation of ones own mental states and the so-called theory of mind (TOM) capacity, which requires the ability to model the mental states of others, are closely related higher cognitive functions. We address here the issue of whether taking the self-perspective (SELF) or modeling the mind of someone else (TOM) employ the same or differential neural mechanisms. A TOM paradigm was used and extended to include stimulus material that involved TOM and SELF capacities in a two-way factorial design. A behavioral study in 42 healthy volunteers showed that TOM and SELF induced differential states of mind: subjects assigned correctly first or third person pronouns when providing responses to the stimuli. Following the behavioral study, we used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) in eight healthy, right-handed males to study the common and differential neural mechanisms underlying TOM and SELF. The main factor TOM led to increased neural activity in the anterior cingulate cortex and left temporopolar cortex. The main factor SELF led to increased neural activity in the right temporopariet al junction and in the anterior cingulate cortex. A significant interaction of both factors TOM and SELF was observed in the right prefrontal cortex. These divergent neural activations in response to TOM and SELF suggest that these important differential mental capacities of human self-consciousness are implemented at least in part in distinct brain regions. We propose a relevance feedback system for retrieving a mental face picture from a large image database. This scenario differs from standard image retrieval since the target image exists only in the mind of the user, who responds to a sequence of machine-generated queries designed to display the person in mind as quickly as possible. At each iteration the user declares which of several displayed faces is “closest” to his target. The central limiting factor is the “semantic gap” between the standard intensity-based features which index the images in the database and the higher-level representation in the mind of the user which drives his answers. We explore a Bayesian, information-theoretic framework for choosing which images to display and for modeling the response of the user. The challenge is to account for psycho-visual factors and sources of variability in human decision-making. We present experiments with real users which illustrate and validate the proposed algorithms. This article discusses a formal belief, desire, intention (BDI)-based agent model for theory of mind (ToM). The model uses BDI concepts to describe the reasoning process of an agent that reasons about the reasoning process of another agent, which is also based on BDI concepts. We discuss three different application areas and illustrate how the model can be applied to each of them. We explore a case study for each of the application areas and apply our model to it. For each case study, a number of simulation experiments are described, and their results are discussed. Abstract In this article we propose an account of the early development of children's knowledge about the mind and report two studies designed to test a part of it. According to this “connections-representations” account, young children begin their discovery of the mental world by learning that they and other people have internal experiences or mental states that connect them cognitively to external objects and events-experiences such as seeing them, hearing them, and wanting them. Later, they realize that the same object can be seriously (other than in pretense) mentally represented in different, seemingly contradictory ways: for example, as A in appearance, B in reality, C according to their perceptual or conceptual perspective, and D according to another person's. The results of both studies confirmed the prediction that 3-year-olds would perform well on appearance-reality and perceptual perspective-taking tasks requiring only an understanding of cognitive connections, but perform poorly on tasks requiring an understanding of seemingly-contrary-to-fact mental representations. To illustrate, children of this age had little difficulty determining that they could hear but could not see a noise-making object located on the experimenter's side of a barrier, and that the experimenter could see it (connections-level tasks). In contrast, they were largely unable to say, for instance, that a toy bear held behind a large elephant mask and emitting a cat sound looked like an elephant, sounded like a cat, and really was a toy bear (representations-level tasks)—even though the experimenter had actually told them previously what it looked like, sounded like, and really was. The article concludes with speculations about the possible origins of connections and representations knowledge and observations about the significance of these acquisitions for the child's development. A new class of visuomotor neuron has been recently discovered in the monkey’s premotor cortex: mirror neurons. These neurons respond both when a particular action is performed by the recorded monkey and when the same action, performed by another individual, is observed. Mirror neurons appear to form a cortical system matching observation and execution of goal-related motor actions. Experimental evidence suggests that a similar matching system also exists in humans. What might be the functional role of this matching system? One possible function is to enable an organism to detect certain mental states of observed conspecifics. This function might be part of, or a precursor to, a more general mind-reading ability. Two different accounts of mindreading have been suggested. According to ‘theory theory’, mental states are represented as inferred posits of a naive theory. According to ‘simulation theory’, other people’s mental states are represented by adopting their perspective: by tracking or matching their states with resonant states of one’s own. The activity of mirror neurons, and the fact that observers undergo motor facilitation in the same muscular groups as those utilized by target agents, are findings that accord well with simulation theory but would not be predicted by theory theory. Abstract The discovery of mirror neurons in the macaque monkey and the discovery of a homologous “mirror system for grasping” in Broca’s area in the human brain has revived the gestural origins theory of the evolution of the human capability for language, enriching it with the suggestion that mirror neurons provide the neurological core for this evolution. However, this notion of “mirror neuron support for the transition from grasp to language” has been worked out in very different ways in the Mirror System Hypothesis model [Arbib, M.A., 2005a. From monkey-like action recognition to human language: an evolutionary framework for neurolinguistics (with commentaries and author’s response). Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28, 105–167; Rizzolatti, G., Arbib, M.A., 1998. Language within our grasp. Trends in Neuroscience 21(5), 188–194] and the Embodied Concept model [Gallese, V., Lakoff, G., 2005. The brain’s concepts: the role of the sensory-motor system in reason and language. Cognitive Neuropsychology 22, 455–479]. The present paper provides a critique of the latter to enrich analysis of the former, developing the role of schema theory [Arbib, M.A., 1981. Perceptual structures and distributed motor control. In: Brooks, V.B. (Ed.), Handbook of Physiology – The Nervous System II. Motor Control. American Physiological Society, pp. 1449–1480]. We report the implementation and evaluation of a Simulation Theory (ST) approach to the Theory of Mind in intelligent graphical agents driven by an affective agent architecture FAtiMA. The existing cognitive appraisal mechanism is adapted to produce a second appraisal cycle, a double appraisal, in order to evaluate the emotional impact of possible actions. The action with the greatest emotional impact is selected as a means of producing more interesting dramatic actions. A variant in which the actual minds of characters present are used is also implemented and evaluated. Results show that these mechanisms do produce more interesting stories. This paper presents a new two-stage multi-view framework for the analysis of human interactions and activities. The analysis is performed in a distributed multi-view vision system that synergistically integrates track- and body-level processing. The proposed framework is geared toward versatile and easily-deployable systems that do not require careful camera calibration. The main contributions of the paper are as follows; (1) context-dependent view switching for occlusion handling, (2) a method for switching the two-stage analysis between the track- and body-level processing, and (3) a hypothesis-verification paradigm for top-down feedback that exploits the spatio-temporal constraints inherent in human interaction. An experimental evaluation shows the efficacy of the proposed system for analyzing multi-person interactions. This article tackles a new challenging task in computational argumentation. Given a pair of two arguments to a certain controversial topic, we aim to directly assess qualitative properties of the arguments in order to explain why one argument is more convincing than the other one. We approach this task in a fully empirical manner by annotating 26k explanations written in natural language. These explanations describe convincingness of arguments in the given argument pair, such as their strengths or flaws. We create a new crowd-sourced corpus containing 9,111 argument pairs, multi-labeled with 17 classes, which was cleaned and curated by employing several strict quality measures. We propose two tasks on this data set, namely (1) predicting the full label distribution and (2) classifying types of flaws in less convincing arguments. Our experiments with feature-rich SVM learners and Bidirectional LSTM neural networks with convolution and attention mechanism reveal that such a novel fine-grained analysis of Web argument convincingness is a very challenging task. We release the new UKPConvArg2 corpus and software under permissive licenses to the research community. Abstract To support our reasoning abilities perception must recover environmental regularities—e.g., rigidity, “objectness,” axes of symmetry—for later use by cognition. To create a theory of how our perceptual apparatus can produce meaningful cognitive primitives from an array of image intensities we require a representation whose elements may be lawfully related to important physical regularities, and that correctly describes the perceptual organization people impose on the stimulus. Unfortunately, the representations that are currently available were originally developed for other purposes (e.g., physics, engineering) and have so far proven unsuitable for the problems of perception or common-sense reasoning. In answer to this problem we present a representation that has proven competent to accurately describe an extensive variety of natural forms (e.g., people, mountains, clouds, trees), as well as man-made forms, in a succinct and natural manner. The approach taken in this representational system is to describe scene structure at a scale that is similar to our naive perceptual notion of “a part,” by use of descriptions that reflect a possible formative history of the object, e.g., how the object might have been constructed from lumps of clay. For this representation to be useful it must be possible to recover such descriptions from image data; we show that the primitive elements of such descriptions may be recovered in an overconstrained and therefore reliable manner. We believe that this descriptive system makes an important contribution towards solving current problems in perceiving and reasoning about natural forms by allowing us to construct accurate descriptions that are extremely compact and that capture people's intuitive notions about the part structure of three-dimensional forms. The purpose of this paper is to study the fundamental mechanism, humans use in argumentation, and to explore ways to implement this mechanism on computers. We do so by first developing a theory for argumentation whose central notion is the acceptability of arguments. Then we argue for the “correctness” or “appropriateness” of our theory with two strong arguments. The first one shows that most of the major approaches to nonmonotonic reasoning in AI and logic programming are special forms of our theory of argumentation. The second argument illustrates how our theory can be used to investigate the logical structure of many practical problems. This argument is based on a result showing that our theory captures naturally the solutions of the theory of n-person games and of the well-known stable marriage problem. By showing that argumentation can be viewed as a special form of logic programming with negation as failure, we introduce a general logic-programming-based method for generating meta-interpreters for argumentation systems, a method very much similar to the compiler-compiler idea in conventional programming. Keyword: Argumentation; Nonmonotonic reasoning; Logic programming; n-person games; The stable marriage problem A fundamental claim associated with parallel distributed processing (PDP) theories of cognition is that knowledge is coded in a distributed manner in mind and brain. This approach rejects the claim that knowledge is coded in a localist fashion, with words, objects, and simple concepts (e.g. “dog”), that is, coded with their own dedicated representations. One of the putative advantages of this approach is that the theories are biologically plausible. Indeed, advocates of the PDP approach often highlight the close parallels between distributed representations learned in connectionist models and neural coding in brain and often dismiss localist (grandmother cell) theories as biologically implausible. The author reviews a range a data that strongly challenge this claim and shows that localist models provide a better account of single-cell recording studies. The author also contrast local and alternative distributed coding schemes (sparse and coarse coding) and argues that common rejection of grandmother cell theories in neuroscience is due to a misunderstanding about how localist models behave. The author concludes that the localist representations embedded in theories of perception and cognition are consistent with neuroscience; biology only calls into question the distributed representations often learned in PDP models. An adequate natural language description of developments in a real-world scene can be taken as proof of "understanding what is going on." An algorithmic system that generates natural language descriptions from video recordings of road traffic scenes can be said to "understand" its input to the extent that algorithmically generated text is acceptable to the humans judging it. A fuzzy metrictemporal Horn logic (FMTHL) provides a formalism for representing both schematic and instantiated conceptual knowledge about the depicted scene and its temporal development. The resulting conceptual representation mediates in a systematic manner between the spatiotemporal geometric descriptions extracted from video input and a module that generates natural language text. This article outlines a 30-year effort to create such a cognitive vision system, indicates its current status, summarizes lessons learned along the way, and discusses open problems against this background. Summary In highly social species such as humans, faces have evolved to convey rich information for social interaction, including expressions of emotions and pain [1–3]. Two motor pathways control facial movement [4–7]: a subcortical extrapyramidal motor system drives spontaneous facial expressions of felt emotions, and a cortical pyramidal motor system controls voluntary facial expressions. The pyramidal system enables humans to simulate facial expressions of emotions not actually experienced. Their simulation is so successful that they can deceive most observers [8–11]. However, machine vision may be able to distinguish deceptive facial signals from genuine facial signals by identifying the subtle differences between pyramidally and extrapyramidally driven movements. Here, we show that human observers could not discriminate real expressions of pain from faked expressions of pain better than chance, and after training human observers, we improved accuracy to a modest 55 . However, a computer vision system that automatically measures facial movements and performs pattern recognition on those movements attained 85 accuracy. The machine system's superiority is attributable to its ability to differentiate the dynamics of genuine expressions from faked expressions. Thus, by revealing the dynamics of facial action through machine vision systems, our approach has the potential to elucidate behavioral fingerprints of neural control systems involved in emotional signaling. We describe a neural network-based system for text-to-speech (TTS) synthesis that is able to generate speech audio in the voice of many different speakers, including those unseen during training. Our system consists of three independently trained components: (1) a speaker encoder network, trained on a speaker verification task using an independent dataset of noisy speech from thousands of speakers without transcripts, to generate a fixed-dimensional embedding vector from seconds of reference speech from a target speaker; (2) a sequence-to-sequence synthesis network based on Tacotron 2, which generates a mel spectrogram from text, conditioned on the speaker embedding; (3) an auto-regressive WaveNet-based vocoder that converts the mel spectrogram into a sequence of time domain waveform samples. We demonstrate that the proposed model is able to transfer the knowledge of speaker variability learned by the discriminatively-trained speaker encoder to the new task, and is able to synthesize natural speech from speakers that were not seen during training. We quantify the importance of training the speaker encoder on a large and diverse speaker set in order to obtain the best generalization performance. Finally, we show that randomly sampled speaker embeddings can be used to synthesize speech in the voice of novel speakers dissimilar from those used in training, indicating that the model has learned a high quality speaker representation. This paper studies an abduction problem in formal argumentation frameworks. Given an argument, an agent verifies whether the argument is justified or not in its argumentation framework. If the argument is not justified, the agent seeks conditions to explain the argument in its argumentation framework. We formulate such abductive reasoning in argumentation semantics and provide its computation in logic programming. Next we apply abduction in argumentation frameworks to reasoning by players in debate games. In debate games, two players have their own argumentation frameworks and each player builds claims to refute the opponent. A player may provide false or inaccurate arguments as a tactic to win the game. We show that abduction is used not only for seeking counter-claims but also for building dishonest claims in debate games. To explain observations from nonmonotonic background theories, one often needs removal of some hypotheses as well as addition of other hypotheses. Moreover, some observations should not be explained, while some are to be explained. In order to formalize these situations, extended abduction was introduced by Inoue and Sakama (1995) to generalize traditional abduction in the sense that it can compute negative explanations by removing hypotheses and antidexplanations to unexplain negative observations. In this paper, we propose a computational mechanism for extended abduction. When a background theory is written in a normal logic program, we introduce its transaction program for computing extended abduction. A transaction program is a set of nonddeterministic production rules that declaratively specify addition and deletion of abductive hypotheses. Abductive explanations are then computed by the fixpoint of a transaction program using a bottomdup model generation procedure. The correctness of the proposed procedure is shown for the class of acyclic covered abductive logic programs. In the context of deductive databases, a transaction program provides a declarative specification of database update. Abstract After observing a collision between two boxes, you can immediately tell which is empty and which is full of books based on how the boxes moved. People form rich perceptions about the physical properties of objects from their interactions, an ability that plays a crucial role in learning about the physical world through our experiences. Here, we present three experiments that demonstrate people’s capacity to reason about the relative masses of objects in naturalistic 3D scenes. We find that people make accurate inferences, and that they continue to fine-tune their beliefs over time. To explain our results, we propose a cognitive model that combines Bayesian inference with approximate knowledge of Newtonian physics by estimating probabilities from noisy physical simulations. We find that this model accurately predicts judgments from our experiments, suggesting that the same simulation mechanism underlies both peoples’ predictions and inferences about the physical world around them. We present here a knowledge representation language, where defeasible and non-defeasible rules can be expressed. The language has two different negations: classical negation, which is represented by the symbol “∼” used for representing contradictory knowledge; and negation as failure, represented by the symbol “not” used for representing incomplete information. Defeasible reasoning is done using a argumentation formalism. Thus, systems for acting in a dynamic domain, that properly handle contradictory and or incomplete information can be developed with this language. An argument is used as a defeasible reason for supporting conclusions. A conclusion q will be considered justified only when the argument that supports it becomes a justification. Building a justification involves the construction of a nondefeated argument A for q. In order to establish that A is a non-defeated argument, the system looks for counterarguments that could be defeaters for A. Since defeaters are arguments, there may exist defeaters for the defeaters, and so on, thus requiring a complete dialectical analysis. The system also detects, avoids, circular argumentation. The language was implemented using an abstract machine defined and developed as an extension of the Warren Abstract Machine (wam). Abstract : Humans have the remarkable capability to infer the motivations of other people's actions, likely due to cognitive skills known in psychophysics as the theory of mind. In this paper, we strive to build a computational model that predicts the motivation behind the actions of people from images. To our knowledge, this challenging problem has not yet been extensively explored in computer vision. We present a novel learning based framework that uses high-level visual recognition to infer why people are performing an actions in images. However, the information in an image alone may not be sufficient to automatically solve this task. Since humans can rely on their own experiences to infer motivation, we propose to give computer vision systems access to some of these experiences by using recently developed natural language models to mine knowledge stored in massive amounts of text. While we are still far away from automatically inferring motivation, our results suggest that transferring knowledge from language into vision can help machines understand why a person might be performing an action in an image.