proposed a Brain-Computer-Interface (BCI) -based attack in which an adversary is able to infer private information about a user, such as their bank or area-of-living, by analyzing the user's brain activities. However, a key limitation of the above attack is that it is intrusive, requiring user cooperation, and is thus easily detectable and can be reported to other users. In this paper, we identify and analyze a more serious threat for users of BCI devices. We propose a it subliminal attack in which the victim is attacked at the levels below his cognitive perception. Our attack involves exposing the victim to visual stimuli for a duration of 13.3 milliseconds -- a duration usually not sufficient for conscious perception. The attacker analyzes subliminal brain activity in response to these short visual stimuli to infer private information about the user. If carried out carefully, for example by hiding the visual stimuli within screen content that the user expects to see, the attack may remain undetected. As a consequence, the attacker can scale it to many victims and expose them to the attack for a long time. We experimentally demonstrate the feasibility of our subliminal attack via a proof-of-concept study carried out with 27 subjects. We conducted experiments on users wearing Electroencephalography-based BCI devices, and used portrait pictures of people as visual stimuli which were embedded within the background of an innocuous video for a time duration not exceeding 13.3 milliseconds. Our experimental results show that it is feasible for an attacker to learn relevant private information about the user, such as whether the user knows the identity of the person for which the attacker is probing.
use to train coercion-resistant passwords to users @cite_9 . Through repeated execution of specific tasks the user learns behavioral patterns without being aware of what these patterns are. While the user is unable to tell about these patterns a computer system can validate if the user subconsciously 'knows' these patterns.
@cite_9
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Cryptographic systems often rely on the secrecy of cryptographic keys given to users. Many schemes, however, cannot resist coercion attacks where the user is forcibly asked by an attacker to reveal the key. These attacks, known as rubber hose cryptanalysis, are often the easiest way to defeat cryptography. We present a defense against coercion attacks using the concept of implicit learning from cognitive psychology. Implicit learning refers to learning of patterns without any conscious knowledge of the learned pattern. We use a carefully crafted computer game to plant a secret password in the participant's brain without the participant having any conscious knowledge of the trained password. While the planted secret can be used for authentication, the participant cannot be coerced into revealing it since he or she has no conscious knowledge of it. We performed a number of user studies using Amazon's Mechanical Turk to verify that participants can successfully re-authenticate over time and that they are unable to reconstruct or even recognize short fragments of the planted secret. Common authentication methods based on passwords, tokens, or fingerprints perform one-time authentication and rely on users to log out from the computer terminal when they leave. Users often do not log out, however, which is a security risk. The most common solution, inactivity timeouts, inevitably fail security (too long a timeout) or usability (too short a timeout) goals. One solution is to authenticate users continuously while they are using the terminal and automatically log them out when they leave. Several solutions are based on user proximity, but these are not sufficient: they only confirm whether the user is nearby but not whether the user is actually using the terminal. Proposed solutions based on behavioral biometric authentication (e.g., keystroke dynamics) may not be reliable, as a recent study suggests. To address this problem we propose Zero-Effort Bilateral Recurring Authentication (ZEBRA). In ZEBRA, a user wears a bracelet (with a built-in accelerometer, gyroscope, and radio) on her dominant wrist. When the user interacts with a computer terminal, the bracelet records the wrist movement, processes it, and sends it to the terminal. The terminal compares the wrist movement with the inputs it receives from the user (via keyboard and mouse), and confirms the continued presence of the user only if they correlate. Because the bracelet is on the same hand that provides inputs to the terminal, the accelerometer and gyroscope data and input events received by the terminal should correlate because their source is the same - the user's hand movement. In our experiments ZEBRA performed continuous authentication with 85 accuracy in verifying the correct user and identified all adversaries within 11s. For a different threshold that trades security for usability, ZEBRA correctly verified 90 of users and identified all adversaries within 50s. Knowledge-based authentication systems generally rely upon users' explicit recollection of passwords, facts, or personal preferences. These systems impose a cognitive burden that often results in forgotten secrets or secrets with poor entropy. We propose an authentication system that instead draws on implicit memory - that is, the unconscious encoding and usage of information. In such a system, a user is initially presented with images of common objects in a casual familiarization task. When the user later authenticates, she is asked to perform a task involving a set of degraded images, some of which are based upon the images in the familiarization task. The prior exposure to those images influences the user's responses in the task, thereby eliciting authentication information. We ran a user study to investigate the plausibility of our system design. Our results suggest that implicit memory has potential as a basis for low-cognitive-overhead, high-stability, knowledge-based authentication. This paper describes a testing methodology for quantitatively assessing the risk that rare or unique training-data sequences are unintentionally memorized by generative sequence models---a common type of machine-learning model. Because such models are sometimes trained on sensitive data (e.g., the text of users' private messages), this methodology can benefit privacy by allowing deep-learning practitioners to select means of training that minimize such memorization. In experiments, we show that unintended memorization is a persistent, hard-to-avoid issue that can have serious consequences. Specifically, for models trained without consideration of memorization, we describe new, efficient procedures that can extract unique, secret sequences, such as credit card numbers. We show that our testing strategy is a practical and easy-to-use first line of defense, e.g., by describing its application to quantitatively limit data exposure in Google's Smart Compose, a commercial text-completion neural network trained on millions of users' email messages. Can we secure user authentication against eavesdropping adversaries, relying on human cognitive functions alone, unassisted by any external computational device? To accomplish this goal, we propose challenge response protocols that rely on a shared secret set of pictures. Under the considered brute-force attack the protocols are safe against eavesdropping, in that a modestly powered adversary who fully records a series of successful interactions cannot compute the user's secret. Moreover, the protocols can be tuned to any desired level of security against random guessing, where security can be traded-off with authentication time. The proposed protocols have two drawbacks: First, training is required to familiarize the user with the secret set of pictures. Second, depending on the level of security required, entry time can be significantly longer than with alternative methods. We describe user studies showing that people can use these protocols successfully, and quantify the time it takes for training and for successful authentication. We show evidence that the secret can be maintained for a long time (up to a year) with relatively low loss. In this paper, we propose and evaluate Use Your Illusion, a novel mechanism for user authentication that is secure and usable regardless of the size of the device on which it is used. Our system relies on the human ability to recognize a degraded version of a previously seen image. We illustrate how distorted images can be used to maintain the usability of graphical password schemes while making them more resilient to social engineering or observation attacks. Because it is difficult to mentally "revert" a degraded image, without knowledge of the original image, our scheme provides a strong line of defense against impostor access, while preserving the desirable memorability properties of graphical password schemes. Using low-fidelity tests to aid in the design, we implement prototypes of Use Your Illusion as i) an Ajax-based web service and ii) on Nokia N70 cellular phones. We conduct a between-subjects usability study of the cellular phone prototype with a total of 99 participants in two experiments. We demonstrate that, regardless of their age or gender, users are very skilled at recognizing degraded versions of self-chosen images, even on small displays and after time periods of one month. Our results indicate that graphical passwords with distorted images can achieve equivalent error rates to those using traditional images, but only when the original image is known. It is an interesting problem how a human can prove its identity to a trustworthy (local or remote) computer with untrustworthy input devices and via an insecure channel controlled by adversaries. Any input devices and auxiliary devices are untrustworthy under the following assumptions: the adversaries can record humans’ operations on the devices, and can access the devices to replay the recorded operations. Strictly, only the common brain intelligence is available for the human. In this paper, such an identication system is called SecHCI as the abbreviation Secure Human-Computer Identication (or Interface). In the real world, SecHCI means the peeping attacks to widely-used xed passwords: an adversary can observe your password via his own eyes or some hidden device (such as min-camera) when your input them on your keyboard or with your mouse. Compared with human-computer identications with the aid of trustworthy hardware devices, only a few contributions have devoted to the design and analysis of SecHCI. The most systematic works are made by N. J. Hopper & M. Blum recently: some formal denitions are given and the feasibility is shown by several SecHCI protocols with acceptable security (but usability is not very good because of their inherent limitations). In this paper, we give comprehensive investigations on SecHCI, from both theoretical and practical viewpoint, and with both system-oriented and usercentered methods. A user study is made to show problems of xed passwords, the signicance of peeping attack and some design principles of human-computer identications. All currently known SecHCI protocols and some related works (such as visual graphical passwords and CAPTCHAs) are surveyed in detail. In addition, we also give our opinions on future research and suggest a new prototype protocol as a possible solution to this problem. Knowledge about computer users is very beneficial for assisting them, predicting their future actions or detecting masqueraders. In this paper, a new approach for creating and recognizing automatically the behavior profile of a computer user is presented. In this case, a computer user behavior is represented as the sequence of the commands she he types during her his work. This sequence is transformed into a distribution of relevant subsequences of commands in order to find out a profile that defines its behavior. Also, because a user profile is not necessarily fixed but rather it evolves changes, we propose an evolving method to keep up to date the created profiles using an Evolving Systems approach. In this paper, we combine the evolving classifier with a trie-based user profiling to obtain a powerful self-learning online scheme. We also develop further the recursive formula of the potential of a data point to become a cluster center using cosine distance, which is provided in the Appendix. The novel approach proposed in this paper can be applicable to any problem of dynamic evolving user behavior modeling where it can be represented as a sequence of actions or events. It has been evaluated on several real data streams. We report on a user study that provides evidence that spaced repetition and a specific mnemonic technique enable users to successfully recall multiple strong passwords over time. Remote research participants were asked to memorize 4 Person-Action-Object (PAO) stories where they chose a famous person from a drop-down list and were given machine-generated random action-object pairs. Users were also shown a photo of a scene and asked to imagine the PAO story taking place in the scene (e.g., Bill Gates---swallowing---bike on a beach). Subsequently, they were asked to recall the action-object pairs when prompted with the associated scene-person pairs following a spaced repetition schedule over a period of 127+ days. While we evaluated several spaced repetition schedules, the best results were obtained when users initially returned after 12 hours and then in @math increasing intervals: 77 of the participants successfully recalled all 4 stories in 10 tests over a period of 158 days. Much of the forgetting happened in the first test period (12 hours): 89 of participants who remembered their stories during the first test period successfully remembered them in every subsequent round. These findings, coupled with recent results on naturally rehearsing password schemes, suggest that 4 PAO stories could be used to create usable and strong passwords for 14 sensitive accounts following this spaced repetition schedule, possibly with a few extra upfront rehearsals. In addition, we find that there is an interference effect across multiple PAO stories: the recall rate of 100 (resp. 90 ) for participants who were asked to memorize 1 PAO story (resp. 2 PAO stories) is significantly better than the recall rate for participants who were asked to memorize 4 PAO stories. These findings yield concrete advice for improving constructions of password management schemes and future user studies. Recurrent Neural Networks can be trained to produce sequences of tokens given some input, as exemplified by recent results in machine translation and image captioning. The current approach to training them consists of maximizing the likelihood of each token in the sequence given the current (recurrent) state and the previous token. At inference, the unknown previous token is then replaced by a token generated by the model itself. This discrepancy between training and inference can yield errors that can accumulate quickly along the generated sequence. We propose a curriculum learning strategy to gently change the training process from a fully guided scheme using the true previous token, towards a less guided scheme which mostly uses the generated token instead. Experiments on several sequence prediction tasks show that this approach yields significant improvements. Moreover, it was used successfully in our winning entry to the MSCOCO image captioning challenge, 2015. Deauthentication is an important component of any authentication system. The widespread use of computing devices in daily life has underscored the need for zero-effort deauthentication schemes. However, the quest for eliminating user effort may lead to hidden security flaws in the authentication schemes. As a case in point, we investigate a prominent zero-effort deauthentication scheme, called ZEBRA, which provides an interesting and a useful solution to a difficult problem as demonstrated in the original paper. We identify a subtle incorrect assumption in its adversary model that leads to a fundamental design flaw. We exploit this to break the scheme with a class of attacks that are much easier for a human to perform in a realistic adversary model, compared to the na "ive attacks studied in the ZEBRA paper. For example, one of our main attacks, where the human attacker has to opportunistically mimic only the victim's keyboard typing activity at a nearby terminal, is significantly more successful compared to the na "ive attack that requires mimicking keyboard and mouse activities as well as keyboard-mouse movements. Further, by understanding the design flaws in ZEBRA as cases of tainted input, we show that we can draw on well-understood design principles to improve ZEBRA's security. Recurrent Neural Networks can be trained to produce sequences of tokens given some input, as exemplified by recent results in machine translation and image captioning. The current approach to training them consists of maximizing the likelihood of each token in the sequence given the current (recurrent) state and the previous token. At inference, the unknown previous token is then replaced by a token generated by the model itself. This discrepancy between training and inference can yield errors that can accumulate quickly along the generated sequence. We propose a curriculum learning strategy to gently change the training process from a fully guided scheme using the true previous token, towards a less guided scheme which mostly uses the generated token instead. Experiments on several sequence prediction tasks show that this approach yields significant improvements. Moreover, it was used succesfully in our winning entry to the MSCOCO image captioning challenge, 2015. We address the semantic gapproblem in behavioral monitoring by using hierarchical behavior graphs to infer high-level behaviors from myriad low-level events. Our experimental system traces the execution of a process, performing data-flow analysis to identify meaningful actions such as "proxying", "keystroke logging", "data leaking", and "downloading and executing a program" from complex combinations of rudimentary system calls. To preemptively address evasive malware behavior, our specifications are carefully crafted to detect alternative sequences of events that achieve the same high-level goal. We tested eleven benign programs, variants from seven malicious bot families, four trojans, and three mass-mailing worms and found that we were able to thoroughly identify high-level behaviors across this diverse code base. Moreover, we effectively distinguished malicious execution of high-level behaviors from benign by identifying remotely-initiated actions. We investigate the possibility of having someone carry out the work of executing a function for you, but without letting him learn anything about your input. Say Alice wants Bob to compute some known function f upon her input x, but wants to prevent Bob from learning anything about x. The situation arises for instance if client Alice has limited computational resources in comparison with mistrusted server Bob, or if x is an inherently mobile piece of data. Could there be a protocol whereby Bob is forced to compute ,f(x)blindly, i.e. without observing x? We provide such a blind computation protocol for the class of functions which admit an efficient procedure to generate random input–output pairs, e.g. factorization. The cheat-sensitive security achieved relies only upon quantum theory being true. The security analysis carried out assumes the eavesdropper performs individual attacks. Humans can understand and produce new utterances effortlessly, thanks to their compositional skills. Once a person learns the meaning of a new verb "dax," he or she can immediately understand the meaning of "dax twice" or "sing and dax." In this paper, we introduce the SCAN domain, consisting of a set of simple compositional navigation commands paired with the corresponding action sequences. We then test the zero-shot generalization capabilities of a variety of recurrent neural networks (RNNs) trained on SCAN with sequence-to-sequence methods. We find that RNNs can make successful zero-shot generalizations when the differences between training and test commands are small, so that they can apply "mix-and-match" strategies to solve the task. However, when generalization requires systematic compositional skills (as in the "dax" example above), RNNs fail spectacularly. We conclude with a proof-of-concept experiment in neural machine translation, suggesting that lack of systematicity might be partially responsible for neural networks' notorious training data thirst. Harnessing the statistical power of neural networks to perform language understanding and symbolic reasoning is difficult, when it requires executing efficient discrete operations against a large knowledge-base. In this work, we introduce a Neural Symbolic Machine, which contains (a) a neural "programmer", i.e., a sequence-to-sequence model that maps language utterances to programs and utilizes a key-variable memory to handle compositionality (b) a symbolic "computer", i.e., a Lisp interpreter that performs program execution, and helps find good programs by pruning the search space. We apply REINFORCE to directly optimize the task reward of this structured prediction problem. To train with weak supervision and improve the stability of REINFORCE, we augment it with an iterative maximum-likelihood training process. NSM outperforms the state-of-the-art on the WebQuestionsSP dataset when trained from question-answer pairs only, without requiring any feature engineering or domain-specific knowledge. Can you securely prove your identity to a host computer by using no dedicated software at your terminal and no dedicated token at your hands? Conventional password checking schemes do not need such a software and hardware but have a disadvantage that an attacker who has correctly observed an input password by peeping or wiretapping can perfectly impersonate the corresponding user. Conventional dynamic (one-time) password schemes or zero-knowledge identification schemes can be securely implemented but require special software or hardware or memorandums. This paper develops human-friendly identification schemes such that a human prover knowing a secret key in her or his brain is asked a visual question by a machine verifier, who then checks if an answer sent from the prover matches the question with respect to the key. The novelty of these schemes lies in their ways of displaying questions. This paper also examines an application of the human identification schemes to human-computer cryptographic communication protocols. Current secure systems suffer because they neglect the importance of human factors in security. We address a fundamental weakness of knowledge-based authentication schemes, which is the human limitation to remember secure passwords. Our approach to improve the security of these systems relies on recognition-based, rather than recall-based authentication. We examine the requirements of a recognition-based authentication system and propose Deja Vu, which authenticates a user through her ability to recognize previously seen images. Deja Vu is more reliable and easier to use than traditional recall-based schemes, which require the user to precisely recall passwords or PINs. Furthermore, it has the advantage that it prevents users from choosing weak passwords and makes it difficult to write down or share passwords with others. We develop a prototype of Deja Vu and conduct a user study that compares it to traditional password and PIN authentication. Our user study shows that 90 of all participants succeeded in the authentication tests using Deja Vu while only about 70 succeeded using passwords and PINS. Our findings indicate that Deja Vu has potential applications, especially where text input is hard (e.g., PDAs or ATMs), or in situations where passwords are infrequently used (e.g., web site passwords). Despite the substantial progress in recent years, the image captioning techniques are still far from being perfect.Sentences produced by existing methods, e.g. those based on RNNs, are often overly rigid and lacking in variability. This issue is related to a learning principle widely used in practice, that is, to maximize the likelihood of training samples. This principle encourages high resemblance to the "ground-truth" captions while suppressing other reasonable descriptions. Conventional evaluation metrics, e.g. BLEU and METEOR, also favor such restrictive methods. In this paper, we explore an alternative approach, with the aim to improve the naturalness and diversity -- two essential properties of human expression. Specifically, we propose a new framework based on Conditional Generative Adversarial Networks (CGAN), which jointly learns a generator to produce descriptions conditioned on images and an evaluator to assess how well a description fits the visual content. It is noteworthy that training a sequence generator is nontrivial. We overcome the difficulty by Policy Gradient, a strategy stemming from Reinforcement Learning, which allows the generator to receive early feedback along the way. We tested our method on two large datasets, where it performed competitively against real people in our user study and outperformed other methods on various tasks. We propose a technique to reliably generate a cryptographic key from a user's voice while speaking a password. The key resists cryptanalysis even against an attacker who captures all system information related to generating or verifying the cryptographic key. Moreover, the technique is sufficiently robust to enable the user to reliably regenerate the key by uttering her password again. We describe an empirical evaluation of this technique using 250 utterances recorded from 50 users.