We describe our work in the collection and analysis of massive data describing the connections between participants to online social networks. Alternative approaches to social network data collection are defined and evaluated in practice, against the popular Facebook Web site. Thanks to our ad-hoc, privacy-compliant crawlers, two large samples, comprising millions of connections, have been collected; the data is anonymous and organized as an undirected graph. We describe a set of tools that we developed to analyze specific properties of such social-network graphs, i.e., among others, degree distribution, centrality measures, scaling laws and distribution of friendship.
With respect to data collection aspects, the work by @cite_33 on OSNs (in particular on Facebook) is closely related to our work.
@cite_33
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We have seen tremendous growth in online social networks (OSNs) in recent years. These OSNs not only offer attractive means for virtual social interactions and information sharing, but also raise a number of security and privacy issues. Although OSNs allow a single user to govern access to her his data, they currently do not provide any mechanism to enforce privacy concerns over data associated with multiple users, remaining privacy violations largely unresolved and leading to the potential disclosure of information that at least one user intended to keep private. In this paper, we propose an approach to enable collaborative privacy management of shared data in OSNs. In particular, we provide a systematic mechanism to identify and resolve privacy conflicts for collaborative data sharing. Our conflict resolution indicates a tradeoff between privacy protection and data sharing by quantifying privacy risk and sharing loss. We also discuss a proof-of-concept prototype implementation of our approach as part of an application in Facebook and provide system evaluation and usability study of our methodology. Online Social Networks (OSNs) have recently emerged as one of the most effective channels for information sharing and discovery due to their ability of allowing users to read and create new content simultaneously. While this advantage provides users more rooms to decide which content to follow, it also makes OSNs fertile grounds for the wide spread of misinformation which can lead to undesirable consequences. In order to guarantee the trustworthiness of content sharing in OSNs, it is thus essential to have a strategic investigation on the first and foremost concern: the sources of misinformation. In this paper, we study k-Suspector problem which aims to identify the top k most suspected sources of misinformation. We propose two effective approaches namely ranking-based and optimization-based algorithms. We further extend our solutions to cope with the incompleteness of collected data as well as multiple attacks, which mostly occur in reality. Experimental results on real-world datasets show that our approaches achieve competitive detection ratios in a timely manner in comparison with available methods. Extensive research has been conducted on top of online social networks (OSNs), while little attention has been paid to the data collection process. Due to the large scale of OSNs and their privacy control policies, a partial data set is often used for analysis. The data set analyzed is decided by many factors including the choice of seeds, node selection algorithms, and the sample size. These factors may introduce biases and further contaminate or even skew the results. To evaluate the impact of different factors, this paper examines the OSN graph crawling problem, where the nodes are OSN users and the edges are the links (or relationship) among these users. More specifically, by looking at various factors in the crawling process, the following problems are addressed in this paper:* Efficiency: How fast different crawlers discover nodes links;* Sensitivity: How different OSNs and the number of protected users affect crawlers;* Bias: How major graph properties are skewed.To the best of our knowledge, our simulations on four real world online social graphs provide the first in-depth empirical answers to these questions. Not all of the over one billion users of online social networks (OSNs) are equally valuable to the OSNs. The current business model of monetizing advertisements targeted to users does not appear to be based on any visible grouping of the users. The primary metrics remain CPM (cost per mille---i.e., thousand impressions) and CPC (cost per click) of ads that are shown to users. However, there is significant diversity in the actions of users---some users upload interesting content triggering additional views and comments leading to further cascades of action. Beyond direct impressions, a user's action can generate indirect impressions by actions induced on friends and other users. Identifying the valuable user segments requires examination of profile data, friendships, and most importantly, their activity. Here we explore an alternate approach for measuring the value of users in OSNs by proposing a framework from the viewpoint of a popular OSN. Using a real dataset on the social network and activities of users, we show that a small subset of actions are likely to be key indicators of a user's value. Additionally, by examining the current targeting demographics available in Facebook, we are able to explore the relative (monetary) value that different users represent to the OSN. Online social networks (OSNs) have experienced tremendous growth in recent years and become a de facto portal for hundreds of millions of Internet users. These OSNs offer attractive means for digital social interactions and information sharing, but also raise a number of security and privacy issues. While OSNs allow users to restrict access to shared data, they currently do not provide any mechanism to enforce privacy concerns over data associated with multiple users. To this end, we propose an approach to enable the protection of shared data associated with multiple users in OSNs. We formulate an access control model to capture the essence of multiparty authorization requirements, along with a multiparty policy specification scheme and a policy enforcement mechanism. Besides, we present a logical representation of our access control model that allows us to leverage the features of existing logic solvers to perform various analysis tasks on our model. We also discuss a proof-of-concept prototype of our approach as part of an application in Facebook and provide usability study and system evaluation of our method. The emergence of online social networks (OSNs) and the accompanying availability of large amounts of data, pose a number of new natural language processing (NLP) and computational challenges. Data from OSNs is different to data from traditional sources (e.g. newswire). The texts are short, noisy and conversational. Another important issue is that data occurs in a real-time streams, needing immediate analysis that is grounded in time and context. In this paper we describe a new open-source framework for efficient text processing of streaming OSN data (available at www.trendminer-project.eu). Whilst researchers have made progress in adapting or creating text analysis tools for OSN data, a system to unify these tasks has yet to be built. Our system is focused on a real world scenario where fast processing and accuracy is paramount. We use the MapReduce framework for distributed computing and present running times for our system in order to show that scaling to online scenarios is feasible.We describe the components of the system and evaluate their accuracy. Our system supports easy integration of future modules in order to extend its functionality. Due to the amount of personally identiable information shared by users of online social networks (OSNs) and the often not adequately adjusted privacy settings, it is possible to identify a user’s several OSN proles. In this paper, we illustrate that third parties just have to take a small step to link OSN proles of a user and, consequently, to aggregate various pieces of information shared in several OSNs. Particularly, based on statistical results we illustrate how the often publicly available friends lists can be exploited to link several OSN proles of a single natural person. The results presented in this paper show that proles can be linked even at low cost, i.e., without complex correlation techniques or high computational power. To assess the risk of privacy leakage by prole linking, we, additionally, report how often specic pieces of information are made publicly available by users in four of the most popular OSNs. We show that users tend to publish dierent pieces of information in dierent OSNs and, thereby, demonstrate that by linking friends lists more information about a user can be gained than the user shared in a single OSN. For the study we analyzed more than 180,000 user proles and compared more than seven million pairs of proles to investigate prole linkability. In the last decade, Online Social Networks (OSNs) have taken the world by storm. They range from superficial to professional, from focused to general-purpose, and, from free-form to highly structured. Numerous people have multiple accounts within the same OSN and even more people have an account on more than one OSN. Since all OSNs involve some amount of user input, often in written form, it is natural to consider whether multiple incarnations of the same person in various OSNs can be effectively correlated or linked. One intuitive means of linking accounts is by using stylometric analysis. This paper reports on (what we believe to be) the first trilateral large-scale stylometric OSN linkability study. Its outcome has important implications for OSN privacy. The study is trilateral since it involves three OSNs with very different missions: (1) Yelp, known primarily for its user-contributed reviews of various venues, e.g, dining and entertainment, (2) Twitter, popular for its pithy general-purpose micro-blogging style, and (3) Flickr, used exclusively for posting and labeling (describing) photographs. As our somewhat surprising results indicate, stylometric linkability of accounts across these heterogeneous OSNs is both viable and quite effective. The main take-away of this work is that, despite OSN heterogeneity, it is very challenging for one person to maintain privacy across multiple active accounts on different OSNs. Several efforts have been made for more privacy aware Online Social Networks (OSNs) to protect personal data against various privacy threats. However, despite the relevance of these proposals, we believe there is still the lack of a conceptual model on top of which privacy tools have to be designed. Central to this model should be the concept of risk. Therefore, in this paper, we propose a risk measure for OSNs. The aim is to associate a risk level with social network users in order to provide other users with a measure of how much it might be risky, in terms of disclosure of private information, to have interactions with them. We compute risk levels based on similarity and benefit measures, by also taking into account the user risk attitudes. In particular, we adopt an active learning approach for risk estimation, where user risk attitude is learned from few required user interactions. The risk estimation process discussed in this paper has been developed into a Facebook application and tested on real data. The experiments show the effectiveness of our proposal. Online Social Networks (OSNs) are popular platforms for interaction, communication and collaboration between friends. In this paper we develop and present a new platform to make interactions in OSNs accessible. Most of today's social networks, including Facebook, Twitter, and Google+ provide support for third party applications to use their social network graph and content. Such applications are strongly dependent on the set of software tools and libraries provided by the OSNs for their own development and growth. For example, third party companies like CNN provide recommendation materials based on user interactions and user's relationship graph. One of the limitations with this graph (or APIs) is the segregation from the shared content. We believe, and present in this paper, that the content shared and the actions taken on the content, creates a Social Interaction Network (SIN). As such, we extend Facebook's current API in order to allow applications to retrieve a weighted graph instead of Facebooks unweighted graph. Finally, we evaluate the proposed platform based on completeness and speed of the crawled results from selected community pages. We also give a few example uses of our API on how it can be used by third party applications. Online Social Networks (OSNs) have already attracted more than half a billion users. However, our understanding of which OSN features attract and keep the attention of these users is poor. Studies thus far have relied on surveys or interviews of OSN users or focused on static properties, e. g., the friendship graph, gathered via sampled crawls. In this paper, we study how users actually interact with OSNs by extracting clickstreams from passively monitored network traffic. Our characterization of user interactions within the OSN for four different OSNs (Facebook, LinkedIn, Hi5, and StudiVZ) focuses on feature popularity, session characteristics, and the dynamics within OSN sessions. We find, for example, that users commonly spend more than half an hour interacting with the OSNs while the byte contributions per OSN session are relatively small. Online social networks (OSNs) like Facebook, and Myspace recommend new friends to registered users based on local features of the graph (i.e. based on the number of common friends that two users share). However, OSNs do not exploit the whole structure of the network. Instead, they consider only pathways of maximum length 2 between a user and his candidate friends. On the other hand, there are global approaches, which detect the overall path structure in a network, being computationally prohibitive for huge-size social networks. In this paper, we define a basic node similarity measure that captures effectively local graph features. We also exploit global graph features introducing transitive node similarity. Moreover, we derive variants of our method that apply in signed networks. We perform extensive experimental comparison of the proposed method against existing recommendation algorithms using synthetic and real data sets (Facebook, Hi5 and Epinions). Our experimental results show that our FriendTNS algorithm outperforms other approaches in terms of accuracy and it is also time efficient. We show that a significant accuracy improvement can be gained by using information about both positive and negative edges. Online Social Networks (OSNs) have attracted millions of active users and have become an integral part of today's web ecosystem. Unfortunately, in the wrong hands, OSNs can be used to harvest private user data, distribute malware, control botnets, perform surveillance, spread misinformation, and even influence algorithmic trading. Usually, an adversary starts off by running an infiltration campaign using hijacked or adversary-owned OSN accounts, with an objective to connect with a large number of users in the targeted OSN. In this article, we evaluate how vulnerable OSNs are to a large-scale infiltration campaign run by socialbots: bots that control OSN accounts and mimic the actions of real users. We adopted the design of a traditional web-based botnet and built a prototype of a Socialbot Network (SbN): a group of coordinated programmable socialbots. We operated our prototype on Facebook for 8weeks, and collected data about user behavior in response to a large-scale infiltration campaign. Our results show that (1) by exploiting known social behaviors of users, OSNs such as Facebook can be infiltrated with a success rate of up to 80 , (2) subject to user profile privacy settings, a successful infiltration can result in privacy breaches where even more private user data are exposed, (3) given the economics of today's underground markets, running a large-scale infiltration campaign might be profitable but is still not particularly attractive as a sustainable and independent business, (4) the security of socially-aware systems that use or integrate OSN platforms can be at risk, given the infiltration capability of an adversary in OSNs, and (5) defending against malicious socialbots raises a set of challenges that relate to web automation, online-offline identity binding, and usable security. Online social networks (OSNs) recommend new friends to registered users based on local-based features of the graph (i.e. based on the number of common friends that two users share). However, OSNs do not exploit all different length paths of the network. Instead, they consider only pathways of maximum length 2 between a user and his candidate friends. On the other hand, there are global-based approaches, which detect the overall path structure in a network, being computationally prohibitive for huge-sized social networks. In this paper we provide friend recommendations, also known as the link prediction problem, by traversing all paths of a limited length, based on the ''algorithmic small world hypothesis''. As a result, we are able to provide more accurate and faster friend recommendations. We also derive variants of our method that apply to different types of networks (directed undirected and signed unsigned). We perform an extensive experimental comparison of the proposed method against existing link prediction algorithms, using synthetic and three real data sets (Epinions, Facebook and Hi5). We also show that a significant accuracy improvement can be gained by using information about both positive and negative edges. Finally, we discuss extensively various experimental considerations, such as a possible MapReduce implementation of FriendLink algorithm to achieve scalability. Increasingly, millions of people, especially youth, post personal information in online social networks (OSNs). In September 2006, one of the most popular sites—Facebook.com—introduced the features of News Feed and Mini Feed, revealing no more information than before, but resulting in immediate criticism from users. To investigate the privacy controversy, we conducted a survey among 172 current Facebook users in a large US university to explore their usage behaviors and privacy attitudes toward the Online Social Networks (OSNs) have become an integral part of today's Web. Politicians, celebrities, revolutionists, and others use OSNs as a podium to deliver their message to millions of active web users. Unfortunately, in the wrong hands, OSNs can be used to run astroturf campaigns to spread misinformation and propaganda. Such campaigns usually start off by infiltrating a targeted OSN on a large scale. In this paper, we evaluate how vulnerable OSNs are to a large-scale infiltration by socialbots: computer programs that control OSN accounts and mimic real users. We adopt a traditional web-based botnet design and built a Socialbot Network (SbN): a group of adaptive socialbots that are orchestrated in a command-and-control fashion. We operated such an SbN on Facebook---a 750 million user OSN---for about 8 weeks. We collected data related to users' behavior in response to a large-scale infiltration where socialbots were used to connect to a large number of Facebook users. Our results show that (1) OSNs, such as Facebook, can be infiltrated with a success rate of up to 80 , (2) depending on users' privacy settings, a successful infiltration can result in privacy breaches where even more users' data are exposed when compared to a purely public access, and (3) in practice, OSN security defenses, such as the Facebook Immune System, are not effective enough in detecting or stopping a large-scale infiltration as it occurs. Online social networks (OSNs) have become popular destinations for connecting friends and sharing information. Recent statistics suggest that OSN users regularly share contents from video sites, and a significant amount of requests of the video sites are indeed from them nowadays. These behaviors have substantially changed the workload of online video services. To better understand this paradigm shift, we conduct a long-term and extensive measurement of video sharing in RenRen, the largest Facebook-like OSN in China. In this paper, we focus on the video popularity distribution and evolution. In particular, we find that the video popularity distribution exhibits perfect power-law feature (while videos in YouTube exhibit a power-law waist with a long truncated tail). Moreover, we observe that the requests for the new published videos generally experience two or three days latency to reach the peak value, and then change dynamically with a series of unpredictable bursts (while in YouTube, videos reach the global peak immediately after introduction to the system, and then the accesses generally decrease overtime, except possibly on some special days). These differences can raise new challenges to content providers. For example, the video popularity is now hard to predict based on their historical requests. We further develop a simple yet effective model to simulate user requests process across videos in OSNs. Trace-based simulation shows that it can well capture the observed features. We present analytical models and simulation results that characterize the impacts of the following factors on the propagation of cross-site scripting (XSS) worms in online social networks (OSNs): 1) user behaviors, namely, the probability of visiting a friend's profile versus a stranger's; 2) the highly clustered structure of communities; and 3) community sizes. Our analyses and simulation results show that the clustered structure of a community and users' tendency to visit their friends more often than strangers help slow down the propagation of XSS worms in OSNs. We then present a study of selective monitoring schemes that are more resource efficient than the exhaustive checking approach used by the Facebook detection system which monitors every possible read and write operation of every user in the network. The studied selective monitoring schemes take advantage of the characteristics of OSNs such as the highly clustered structure and short average distance to select only a subset of strategically placed users to monitor, thus minimizing resource usage while maximizing the monitoring coverage. We present simulation results to show the effectiveness of the studied selective monitoring schemes for XSS worm detection. Online social networks (OSNs) are immensely popular, with some claiming over 200 million users. Users share private content, such as personal information or photographs, using OSN applications. Users must trust the OSN service to protect personal information even as the OSN provider benefits from examining and sharing that information. We present Persona, an OSN where users dictate who may access their information. Persona hides user data with attribute-based encryption (ABE), allowing users to apply fine-grained policies over who may view their data. Persona provides an effective means of creating applications in which users, not the OSN, define policy over access to private data. We demonstrate new cryptographic mechanisms that enhance the general applicability of ABE. We show how Persona provides the functionality of existing online social networks with additional privacy benefits. We describe an implementation of Persona that replicates Facebook applications and show that Persona provides acceptable performance when browsing privacy-enhanced web pages, even on mobile devices. Online Social Networks (OSNs) encourage users to create an online presence that reflects their offline identity. OSNs create the illusion that these online accounts correspond to the correct offline person, but in reality the OSN lacks the resources to detect impersonation. We propose that OSN users identify each other based on interaction and experience. We believe that impersonation can be thwarted by users who possess exclusive shared knowledge, secret information shared only between a pair of OSN friends. We describe existing protocols that use shared secrets to exchange public keys without revealing those secrets to attackers. We present results from a user study on Facebook to show that users do share exclusive knowledge with their Facebook friends and attackers are rarely able to guess that knowledge. Finally, we show that friend identification can be extended using a web of trust built on the OSN friend graph.