This paper establishes a fundamental theory of secure clock synchronization. Accurate clock synchronization is the backbone of systems managing power distribution, financial transactions, telecommunication operations, database services, etc. Some clock synchronization (time transfer) systems, such as the global navigation satellite systems, are based on one-way communication from a master to a slave clock. Others, such as the network transport protocol, and the IEEE 1588 precision time protocol (PTP), involve two-way communication between the master and slave. This paper shows that all one-way time transfer protocols are vulnerable to replay attacks that can potentially compromise timing information. A set of conditions for secure two-way clock synchronization is proposed and proved to be necessary and sufficient. It is shown that IEEE 1588 PTP, although a two-way synchronization protocol, is not compliant with these conditions, and is therefore insecure. Requirements for secure IEEE 1588 PTP are proposed, and a second example protocol is offered to illustrate the range of compliant systems.
In @cite_1 , it is remarked that the clock offset computed between multiple master clocks over a symmetric channel must be zero, and thus, if multiple master clocks are available, they can detect any malicious delay introduced by an adversary. However, this defense does not consider the possibility that the adversary may only delay the packets sent to the slave nodes.
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Most commercial multi-core processors incorporate hardware coherence protocols to support efficient data transfers and updates between their constituent cores. While hardware coherence protocols provide immense benefits for application performance by removing the burden of software-based coherence, we note that understanding the security vulnerabilities posed by such oft-used, widely-adopted processor features is critical for secure processor designs in the future. In this paper, we demonstrate a new vulnerability exposed by cache coherence protocol states. We present novel insights into how adversaries could cleverly manipulate the coherence states on shared cache blocks, and construct covert timing channels to illegitimately communicate secrets to the spy. We demonstrate 6 different practical scenarios for covert timing channel construction. In contrast to prior works, we assume a broader adversary model where the trojan and spy can either exploit explicitly shared read-only physical pages (e.g., shared library code), or use memory deduplication feature to implicitly force create shared physical pages. We demonstrate how adversaries can manipulate combinations of coherence states and data placement in different caches to construct timing channels. We also explore how adversaries could exploit multiple caches and their associated coherence states to improve transmission bandwidth with symbols encoding multiple bits. Our experimental results on commercial systems show that the peak transmission bandwidths of these covert timing channels can vary between 700 to 1100 Kbits sec. To the best of our knowledge, our study is the first to highlight the vulnerability of hardware cache coherence protocols to timing channels that can help computer architects to craft effective defenses against exploits on such critical processor features. In the wireless sensor networks (WSNs), sensor nodes may be deployed in the hostile areas. The eavesdropper can intercept the messages in the public channel and the communication between the nodes is easily monitored. Furthermore, any malicious intermediate node can act as a legal receiver to alter the passing messages. Hence, message protection and sensor node identification become important issues in WSN. In this paper, we propose a novel scheme providing unconditional secure communication based on the quantum characteristics, including no-cloning and teleportation. We present a random EPR-pair allocation scheme that is designed to overcome the vulnerability caused by possible compromised nodes. EPR pairs are pre-assigned to sensor nodes randomly and the entangled qubits are used by the nodes with the quantum teleportation scheme to form a secure link. We also show a scheme on how to resist the man-in-the-middle attack. In the framework, the qubits are allocated to each node before deployment and the adversary is unable to create the duplicated nodes. Even if the malicious nodes are added to the network to falsify the messages transmitting in the public channel, the legal nodes can easily detect the fake nodes that have no entangled qubits and verify the counterfeit messages. In addition, we prove that one node sharing EPR pairs with a certain amount of neighbor nodes can teleport information to any node in the sensor network if there are sufficient EPR pairs in the qubits pool. The proposal shows that the distributed quantum wireless sensor network gains better security than classical wireless sensor network and centralized quantum wireless network. We consider the problem of computing a maximal independent set (MIS) in an extremely harsh broadcast model that relies only on carrier sensing. The model consists of an anonymous broadcast network in which nodes have no knowledge about the topology of the network or even an upper bound on its size. Furthermore, it is assumed that an adversary chooses at which time slot each node wakes up. At each time slot a node can either beep, that is, emit a signal, or be silent. At a particular time slot, beeping nodes receive no feedback, while silent nodes can only differentiate between none of its neighbors beeping, or at least one of its neighbors beeping. We start by proving a lower bound that shows that in this model, it is not possible to locally converge to an MIS in sub-polynomial time. We then study four different relaxations of the model which allow us to circumvent the lower bound and find an MIS in polylogarithmic time. First, we show that if a polynomial upper bound on the network size is known, it is possible to find an MIS in ( O ( ^3 n) ) time. Second, if we assume sleeping nodes are awoken by neighboring beeps, then we can also find an MIS in ( O ( ^3 n) ) time. Third, if in addition to this wakeup assumption we allow sender-side collision detection, that is, beeping nodes can distinguish whether at least one neighboring node is beeping concurrently or not, we can find an MIS in ( O ( ^2 n) ) time. Finally, if instead we endow nodes with synchronous clocks, it is also possible to find an MIS in ( O ( ^2 n) ) time. We present a novel approach to proving the absence of timing channels. The idea is to partition the programâ s execution traces in such a way that each partition component is checked for timing attack resilience by a time complexity analysis and that per-component resilience implies the resilience of the whole program. We construct a partition by splitting the program traces at secret-independent branches. This ensures that any pair of traces with the same public input has a component containing both traces. Crucially, the per-component checks can be normal safety properties expressed in terms of a single execution. Our approach is thus in contrast to prior approaches, such as self-composition, that aim to reason about multiple (kâ � 2) executions at once. We formalize the above as an approach called quotient partitioning, generalized to any k-safety property, and prove it to be sound. A key feature of our approach is a demand-driven partitioning strategy that uses a regex-like notion called trails to identify sets of execution traces, particularly those influenced by tainted (or secret) data. We have applied our technique in a prototype implementation tool called Blazer, based on WALA, PPL, and the brics automaton library. We have proved timing-channel freedom of (or synthesized an attack specification for) 24 programs written in Java bytecode, including 6 classic examples from the literature and 6 examples extracted from the DARPA STAC challenge problems. Recent advances in miniaturization and low-cost, low-power design have led to active research in large-scale networks of small, wireless, low-power sensors and actuators. Time synchronization is critical in sensor networks for diverse purposes including sensor data fusion, coordinated actuation, and power-efficient duty cycling. Though the clock accuracy and precision requirements are often stricter than in traditional distributed systems, strict energy constraints limit the resources available to meet these goals.We present Reference-Broadcast Synchronization, a scheme in which nodes send reference beacons to their neighbors using physical-layer broadcasts. A reference broadcast does not contain an explicit timestamp; instead, receivers use its arrival time as a point of reference for comparing their clocks. In this paper, we use measurements from two wireless implementations to show that removing the sender's nondeterminism from the critical path in this way produces high-precision clock agreement (1.85 ± 1.28μsec, using off-the-shelf 802.11 wireless Ethernet), while using minimal energy. We also describe a novel algorithm that uses this same broadcast property to federate clocks across broadcast domains with a slow decay in precision (3.68 ± 2.57μsec after 4 hops). RBS can be used without external references, forming a precise relative timescale, or can maintain microsecond-level synchronization to an external timescale such as UTC. We show a significant improvement over the Network Time Protocol (NTP) under similar conditions. We consider decentralized estimation of a noise-corrupted deterministic signal in a bandwidth-constrained sensor network communicating through an insecure medium. Each sensor collects a noise-corrupted version, performs a local quantization, and transmits a 1-bit message to an ally fusion center through a wireless medium where the sensor outputs are vulnerable to unauthorized observation from enemy third-party fusion centers. In this paper, we introduce an encrypted wireless sensor network (eWSN) concept where stochastic enciphers operating on binary sensor outputs are introduced to disguise the sensor outputs, creating an eWSN scheme. Noting that the plaintext (original) and ciphertext (disguised) messages are constrained to a single bit due to bandwidth constraints, we consider a binary channel-like scheme to probabilistically encipher (i.e., flip) the sensor outputs. We first consider a symmetric key encryption case where the "0" and "1" enciphering probabilities are equal. The key is represented by the bit enciphering probability. Specifically, we derive the optimal estimator of the deterministic signal approached from a maximum-likelihood perspective and the Cramer-Rao lower bound for the estimation problem utilizing the key. Furthermore, we analyze the effect of the considered cryptosystem on enemy fusion centers that are unaware of the fact that the WSN is encrypted (i.e., we derive the bias, variance, and mean square error (MSE) of the enemy fusion center). We then extend the cryptosystem to admit unequal enciphering schemes for "0" and "1", and analyze the estimation problem from both the prospectives of ally (that has access to the enciphering keys) and (third-party) enemy fusion centers. The results show that when designed properly, a significant amount of bias and MSE can be introduced to an enemy fusion center with the cost to the ally fusion center being a marginal increase [factor of (1-Omega1-Omega0 )-2, where 1-Omegaj, j=0, 1 is the "j" enciphering probability in the estimation variance (compared to the variance of a fusion center estimate operating in a vulnerable WSN). In this paper specific variants of delay attacks are examined. First, the Network Time Protocol is regarded. Second, delay attacks and implications on the time synchronization of the Precise Time Protocol are described. In particular, consequences for the offset calculation O prox are regarded. At the end of the paper possible countermeasurements are described. We propose two protocols that provide scalable causal consistency for both partitioned and replicated data stores using dependency matrices (DM) and physical clocks. The DM protocol supports basic read and update operations and uses two-dimensional dependency matrices to track dependencies in a client session. It utilizes the transitivity of causality and sparse matrix encoding to keep dependency metadata small and bounded. The DM-Clock protocol extends the DM protocol to support read-only transactions using loosely synchronized physical clocks. We implement the two protocols in Orbe, a distributed key-value store, and evaluate them experimentally. Orbe scales out well, incurs relatively small overhead over an eventually consistent key-value store, and outperforms an existing system that uses explicit dependency tracking to provide scalable causal consistency. This two-part paper considers an uplink massive device communication scenario in which a large number of devices are connected to a base station (BS), but user traffic is sporadic so that in any given coherence interval, only a subset of users is active. The objective is to quantify the cost of active user detection and channel estimation and to characterize the overall achievable rate of a grant-free two-phase access scheme in which device activity detection and channel estimation are performed jointly using pilot sequences in the first phase and data is transmitted in the second phase. In order to accommodate a large number of simultaneously transmitting devices, this paper studies an asymptotic regime where the BS is equipped with a massive number of antennas. The main contributions of Part I of this paper are as follows. First, we note that as a consequence of having a large pool of potentially active devices but limited coherence time, the pilot sequences cannot all be orthogonal. However, despite the nonorthogonality, this paper shows that in the asymptotic massive multiple-input multiple-output regime, both the missed device detection and the false alarm probabilities for activity detection can always be made to go to zero by utilizing compressed sensing techniques that exploit sparsity in the user activity pattern. Part II of this paper further characterizes the achievable rates using the proposed scheme and quantifies the cost of using nonorthogonal pilot sequences for channel estimation in achievable rates. This paper demonstrates the improved power and electromagnetic (EM) side-channel attack (SCA) resistance of 128-bit Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) engines in 130-nm CMOS using random fast voltage dithering (RFVD) enabled by integrated voltage regulator (IVR) with the bond-wire inductors and an on-chip all-digital clock modulation (ADCM) circuit. RFVD scheme transforms the current signatures with random variations in AES input supply while adding random shifts in the clock edges in the presence of global and local supply noises. The measured power signatures at the supply node of the AES engines show upto 37 @math reduction in peak for higher order test vector leakage assessment (TVLA) metric and upto 692 @math increase in minimum traces required to disclose (MTD) the secret encryption key with correlation power analysis (CPA). Similarly, SCA on the measured EM signatures from the chip demonstrates a reduction of upto 11.3 @math in TVLA peak and upto 37 @math increase in correlation EM analysis (CEMA) MTD. Emergence of side channel security attacks has challenged the classic assumptions regarding what data is publicly available. As demonstrated repeatedly, statistical analysis of information collected by measuring completion time of hardware designs can reveal confidential information. Even though timing-based side channel leakage can be easily exploited to breach data privacy, conventional hardware verification tools are not yet suited to assess these vulnerabilities. To acquaint the hardware design process with formal security evaluations, we introduce a model for tracking timing-based information flows through HDL codes. Based on this model, we have developed Clepsydra, a tool for automatically generating circuitry for tracking timing flows and generic logical flows within hardware designs in two distinct channels. The circuit generated by Clepsydra can be analyzed by EDA tools to detect timing leakage or formally prove constant execution time. We present proofs regarding soundness and precision of the proposed model along with results of employing Clepsydra to verify security properties on a variety of hardware units including crypto cores, bus architectures, caches and arithmetic modules. In a cognitive radio network, the secondary users are allowed to utilize the frequency bands of primary users when these bands are not currently being used. To support this spectrum reuse functionality, the secondary users are required to sense the radio frequency environment, and once the primary users are found to be active, the secondary users are required to vacate the channel within a certain amount of time. Therefore, spectrum sensing is of significant importance in cognitive radio networks. There are two parameters associated with spectrum sensing: probability of detection and probability of false alarm. The higher the probability of detection, the better the primary users are protected. However, from the secondary users' perspective, the lower the probability of false alarm, the more chances the channel can be reused when it is available, thus the higher the achievable throughput for the secondary network. In this paper, we study the problem of designing the sensing duration to maximize the achievable throughput for the secondary network under the constraint that the primary users are sufficiently protected. We formulate the sensing-throughput tradeoff problem mathematically, and use energy detection sensing scheme to prove that the formulated problem indeed has one optimal sensing time which yields the highest throughput for the secondary network. Cooperative sensing using multiple mini-slots or multiple secondary users are also studied using the methodology proposed in this paper. Computer simulations have shown that for a 6 MHz channel, when the frame duration is 100 ms, and the signal-to-noise ratio of primary user at the secondary receiver is -20 dB, the optimal sensing time achieving the highest throughput while maintaining 90 detection probability is 14.2 ms. This optimal sensing time decreases when distributed spectrum sensing is applied. Information leakage of sensitive data has become one of the fast growing concerns among computer users. With adversaries turning to hardware for exploits, caches are frequently a target for timing channels since they present different timing profiles for cache miss and hit latencies. Such timing channels operate by having an adversary covertly communicate secrets to a spy simply through modulating resource timing without leaving any physical evidence. In this article, we demonstrate a new vulnerability exposed by cache coherence protocols where adversaries could manipulate the coherence states on certain cache blocks to alter cache access timing and communicate secrets illegitimately. Our threat model assumes the trojan and spy can either exploit explicitly shared read-only physical pages (e.g., shared library code), or use memory deduplication feature to implicitly force create shared physical pages. We demonstrate a template that adversaries may use to construct covert timing channels through manipulating combinations of coherence states and data placement in different caches. We investigate several classes of cache coherence protocols, and observe that both directory-based and snoopy protocols can be subject to covert timing channel attacks. We identify that the root cause of the vulnerability to be the existence of access latency difference for cache lines in read-only cache coherence states: Exlusive and Shared. For defense, we propose a slightly modified cache coherence scheme that will enable the last level cache to directly respond to read data requests in these read-only coherence states, and avoid any latency difference that could enable timing channels. A critical issue in applications involving networks of wireless sensors is their ability to synchronize, and mitigate the fading propagation channel effects. Especially when distributed “slave” sensors (nodes) reach-back to communicate with the “master” sensor (gateway), low power cooperative schemes are well motivated. Viewing each node as an antenna element in a multi-input multi-output (MIMO) multi-antenna system, we design pilot patterns to estimate the multiple carrier frequency offsets (CFO), and the multiple channels corresponding to each node-gateway link. Our novel pilot scheme consists of non-zero pilot symbols along with zeros, which separate nodes in a time division multiple access (TDMA) fashion, and lead to low complexity schemes because CFO and channel estimators per node are decoupled. The resulting training algorithm is not only suitable for wireless sensor networks, but also for synchronization and channel estimation of single- and multi-carrier MIMO systems. We investigate the performance of our estimators analytically, and with simulations. The ability of a receiver to determine when a transmitter has changed location is important for energy conservation in wireless sensor networks, for physical security of radio-tagged objects, and for wireless network security in detection of replication attacks. In this paper, we propose using a measured temporal link signature to uniquely identify the link between a transmitter and a receiver. When the transmitter changes location, or if an attacker at a different location assumes the identity of the transmitter, the proposed link distinction algorithm reliably detects the change in the physical channel. This detection can be performed at a single receiver or collaboratively by multiple receivers. We record over 9,000 link signatures at different locations and over time to demonstrate that our method significantly increases the detection rate and reduces the false alarm rate, in comparison to existing methods. This paper presents an efficient protocol for reliably exchanging information in a single-hop, multi-channel radio network subject to unpredictable interference. We model the interference by an adversary that can simultaneously disrupt up to t of the C available channels. We assume no shared secret keys or third-party infrastructure. The running time of our protocol depends on the gap between C and t: when the number of channels C =Omega(t^2), the running time is linear; when only C = t+1 channels are available, the running time is exponential. We prove that exponential-time is unavoidable in the latter case. At the core of our protocol lies a combinatorial function, possibly of independent interest, described for the first time in this paper: the multi-selector. A multi-selector generates a sequence of channel assignments for each device such that every sufficiently large subset of devices is partitioned onto distinct channels by at least one of these assignments. In this paper, we propose a distributed multi-hop interference avoidance algorithm, namely, IAA to avoid co-channel interference inside a wireless body area network (WBAN). Our proposal adopts carrier sense multiple access with collision avoidance (CSMA CA) between sources and relays and a flexible time division multiple access (FTDMA) between relays and coordinator. The proposed scheme enables low interfering nodes to transmit their messages using base channel. Depending on suitable situations, high interfering nodes double their contention windows (CW) and probably use switched orthogonal channel. Simulation results show that proposed scheme has far better minimum SINR (12dB improvement) and longer energy lifetime than other schemes (power control and opportunistic relaying). Additionally, we validate our proposal in a theoretical analysis and also propose a probabilistic approach to prove the outage probability can be effectively reduced to the minimal. This paper characterizes the performance in terms of queueing stability of a network composed of multiple MIMO transmitter-receiver pairs taking into account the dynamic traffic pattern and the probing feedback cost. We adopt a centralized scheduling scheme that selects a number of active pairs in each time-slot. We consider that the transmitters apply interference alignment (IA) technique if two or more pairs are active, whereas in the special case where one pair is active point-to-point MIMO singular value decomposition (SVD) is used. We consider a time-division duplex (TDD) system where transmitters acquire their channel state information (CSI) by decoding the pilot sequences sent by the receivers. Since global CSI knowledge is required for IA, the transmitters have also to exchange their estimated CSIs over a backhaul of limited capacity (i.e. imperfect case). Under this setting, we characterize in this paper the stability region of the system under both the imperfect and perfect (i.e. unlimited backhaul) cases, then we examine the gap between these two resulting regions. Further, under each case we provide a centralized probing policy that achieves the max stability region. These stability regions and scheduling policies are given for the symmetric system, where all the path loss coefficients are equal to each other, as well as for the general system. For the symmetric system, we provide the conditions under which IA yields a queueing stability gain compared to SVD. Under the general system, the adopted scheduling policy is of a high computational complexity for moderate numbers of pairs, consequently we propose an approximate policy that has a reduced complexity but that achieves only a fraction of the system stability region. A characterization of this fraction is provided. In this paper, we investigate secure and reliable transmission strategies for multi-cell multi-user massive multiple-input multiple-output systems with a multi-antenna active eavesdropper. We consider a time-division duplex system where uplink training is required and an active eavesdropper can attack the training phase to cause pilot contamination at the transmitter. This forces the precoder used in the subsequent downlink transmission phase to implicitly beamform toward the eavesdropper, thus increasing its received signal power. Assuming matched filter precoding and artificial noise (AN) generation at the transmitter, we derive an asymptotic achievable secrecy rate when the number of transmit antennas approaches infinity. For the case of a single-antenna active eavesdropper, we obtain a closed-form expression for the optimal power allocation policy for the transmit signal and the AN, and find the minimum transmit power required to ensure reliable secure communication. Furthermore, we show that the transmit antenna correlation diversity of the intended users and the eavesdropper can be exploited in order to improve the secrecy rate. In fact, under certain orthogonality conditions of the channel covariance matrices, the secrecy rate loss introduced by the eavesdropper can be completely mitigated. The goal of this paper is to determine the data routes, subchannel schedules, and power allocations that maximize a weighted-sum rate of the data communicated over a generic OFDMA wireless network in which the nodes are capable of simultaneously transmitting, receiving and relaying data. Two instances are considered. In the first instance, subchannels are allowed to be time-shared by multiple links, whereas in the second instance, each subchannel is exclusively used by one of the links. Using a change of variables, the first problem is transformed into a convex form. In contrast, the second problem is not amenable to such a transformation and results in a complex mixed integer optimization problem. To develop insight into this problem, we utilize the first instance to obtain efficiently computable lower and upper bounds on the weighted-sum rate that can be achieved in the absence of time-sharing. Another lower bound is obtained by enforcing the scheduling constraints through additional power constraints and a monomial approximation technique to formulate the design problem as a geometric program. Numerical investigations show that the obtained rates are higher when time-sharing is allowed, and that the lower bounds on rates in the absence of time-sharing are relatively tight.