We introduce the classified stable matching problem, a problem motivated by academic hiring. Suppose that a number of institutes are hiring faculty members from a pool of applicants. Both institutes and applicants have preferences over the other side. An institute classifies the applicants based on their research areas (or any other criterion), and, for each class, it sets a lower bound and an upper bound on the number of applicants it would hire in that class. The objective is to find a stable matching from which no group of participants has reason to deviate. Moreover, the matching should respect the upper lower bounds of the classes. In the first part of the paper, we study classified stable matching problems whose classifications belong to a fixed set of order types.'' We show that if the set consists entirely of downward forests, there is a polynomial-time algorithm; otherwise, it is NP-complete to decide the existence of a stable matching. In the second part, we investigate the problem using a polyhedral approach. Suppose that all classifications are laminar families and there is no lower bound. We propose a set of linear inequalities to describe stable matching polytope and prove that it is integral. This integrality allows us to find various optimal stable matchings using Ellipsoid algorithm. A further ramification of our result is the description of the stable matching polytope for the many-to-many (unclassified) stable matching problem. This answers an open question posed by Sethuraman, Teo and Qian.
Fleiner @cite_18 studied the many-many stable matching in a much more general context. Using a fixed-point approach, he proved that stable matchings always exist provided that the preference of each entity is a . Roughly speaking, such a function can be realized by imposing a matroid over a linear order of elements. In , supposing that there is no lower bound on the classes, then each laminar family is equivalent to a partition matroid. We prove that stable matchings always exist in this situation. Hence, our algorithm in Section 2 can be seen as a constructive proof of a special case of Fleiner's existence theorem.
@cite_18
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We describe a fixed-point based approach to the theory of bipartite stable matchings. By this, we provide a common framework that links together seemingly distant results, like the stable marriage theorem of Gale and Shapley, the Mendelsohn-Dulmage theorem, the Kundu-Lawler theorem, Tarski's fixed-point theorem, the Cantor-Bernstein theorem, Pym's linking theorem, or the monochromatic path theorem of In this framework, we formulate a matroid-generalization of the stable marriage theorem and study the lattice structure of generalized stable matchings. Based on the theory of lattice polyhedra and blocking polyhedra, we extend results of Vande Vate and Rothblum on the bipartite stable matching polytope. Both rematching proof and strong equilibrium outcomes are stable with respect to the true preferences in the marriage problem. We show that not all rematching proof or strong equilibrium outcomes are stable in the college admissions problem. But we show that both rematching proof and strong equilibrium outcomes in truncations at the match point are all stable in the college admissions problem. Further, all true stable matchings can be achieved in both rematching proof and strong equilibrium in truncations at the match point. We show that any Nash equilibrium in truncations admits one and only one matching, stable or not. Therefore, the core at a Nash equilibrium in truncations must be small. But examples exist such that the set of stable matchings with respect to a Nash equilibrium may contain more than one matching. Nevertheless, each Nash equilibrium can only admit at most one true stable matching. If, indeed, there is a true stable matching at a Nash equilibrium, then the only possible equilibrium outcome will be the true stable matching, no matter how different are players' equilibrium strategies from the true preferences and how many other unstable matchings are there at that Nash equilibrium. Thus, we show that a necessary and sufficient condition for the stable matching rule to be implemented in a subset of Nash equilibria by the direct revelation game induced by a stable mechanism is that every Nash equilibrium profile in that subset admits one and only one true stable matching. Vande Vate 1989 described the polytope whose extreme points are the stable core matchings in the Marriage Problem. Rothblum 1989 simplified and extended this result. This paper explores a corresponding linear program, its dual and consequences of the fact that the dual solutions have an unusually direct relation to the primal solutions. This close relationship allows us to provide simple proofs both of Vande Vate and Rothblum's results and of other important results about the core of marriage markets. These proofs help explain the structure shared by the marriage problem without sidepayments and the assignment game with sidepayments. The paper further explores "fractional" matchings, which may be interpreted as lotteries over possible matches or as time-sharing arrangements. We show that those fractional matchings in the Stable Marriage Polytope form a lattice with respect to a partial ordering that involves stochastic dominance. Thus, all expected utility functions corresponding to the same ordinal preferences will agree on the relevant comparisons. Finally, we provide linear programming proofs of slightly stronger versions of known incentive compatibility results. An instance of the classical Stable Roommates problem (sr) need not admit a stable matching. This motivates the problem of finding a matching that is “as stable as possible”, i.e. admits the fewest number of blocking pairs. In this paper we prove that, given an sr instance with n agents, in which all preference lists are complete, the problem of finding a matching with the fewest number of blocking pairs is NP-hard and not approximable within @math , for any e>0, unless P=NP. If the preference lists contain ties, we improve this result to n1−e. Also, we show that, given an integer K and an sr instance I in which all preference lists are complete, the problem of deciding whether I admits a matching with exactly K blocking pairs is NP-complete. By contrast, if K is constant, we give a polynomial-time algorithm that finds a matching with at most (or exactly) K blocking pairs, or reports that no such matching exists. Finally, we give upper and lower bounds for the minimum number of blocking pairs over all matchings in terms of some properties of a stable partition, given an sr instance I. Abstract A parallel algorithm for the stable matching problem is presented. The algorithm is based on the primal-dual interior path-following method for linear programming. The main result is that a stable matching can be found in O ∗ ( m ) time by a polynomial number of processors, where m is the total length of preference lists of individuals. In an instance G = (A union B, E) of the stable marriage problem with strict and possibly incomplete preference lists, a matching M is popular if there is no matching M0 where the vertices that prefer M' to M outnumber those that prefer M to M'. All stable matchings are popular and there is a simple linear time algorithm to compute a maximum-size popular matching. More generally, what we seek is a min-cost popular matching where we assume there is a cost function c : E -> Q. However there is no polynomial time algorithm currently known for solving this problem. Here we consider the following generalization of a popular matching called a popular half-integral matching: this is a fractional matching x = (M_1 + M_2) 2, where M1 and M2 are the 0-1 edge incidence vectors of matchings in G, such that x satisfies popularity constraints. We show that every popular half-integral matching is equivalent to a stable matching in a larger graph G^*. This allows us to solve the min-cost popular half-integral matching problem in polynomial time. We show that the ratio of matched individuals to blocking pairs grows linearly with the number of propose–accept rounds executed by the Gale–Shapley algorithm for the stable marriage problem. Consequently, the participants can arrive at an almost stable matching even without full information about the problem instance; for each participant, knowing only its local neighbourhood is enough. In distributed-systems parlance, this means that if each person has only a constant number of acceptable partners, an almost stable matching emerges after a constant number of synchronous communication rounds. We apply our results to give a distributed (2+e)-approximation algorithm for maximum-weight matching in bicoloured graphs and a centralised randomised constant-time approximation scheme for estimating the size of a stable matching. We study two-sided matching markets with couples and show that for a natural preference domain for couples, the domain of weakly responsive preferences, stable outcomes can always be reached by means of decentralized decision making. Starting from an arbitrary matching, we construct a path of matchings obtained from satisfying' blocking coalitions that yields a stable matching. Hence, we establish a generalization of Roth and Vande Vate's (1990) result on path convergence to stability for decentralized singles markets. Furthermore, we show that when stable matchings exist, but preferences are not weakly responsive, for some initial matchings there may not exist any path obtained from satisfying' blocking coalitions that yields a stable matching. Baiou and Balinski characterized the stable admissions polytope using a system of linear inequalities. The structure of feasible solutions to this system of inequalities---fractional stable matchings---is the focus of this paper. The main result associates a geometric structure with each fractional stable matching. This insight appears to be interesting in its own right, and can be viewed as a generalization of the lattice structure (for integral stable matchings) to fractional stable matchings. In addition to obtaining simple proofs of many known results, the geometric structure is used to prove the following two results: First, it is shown that assigning each agent their “median” choice among all stable partners results in a stable matching, which can be viewed as a “fair” compromise; second, sufficient conditions are identified under which stable matchings exist in a problem with externalities, in particular, in the stable matching problem with couples. In this paper, we propose a new approach, parallel iterative improvement (PII), to solving the stable matching problem. This approach treats the stable matching problem as an optimization problem with all possible matchings forming its solution space. Since a stable matching always exists for any stable matching problem instance, finding a stable matching is equivalent to finding a matching with the minimum number (which is always zero) of unstable pairs. A particular PII algorithm is presented to show the effectiveness of this approach by constructing a new matching from an existing matching and using techniques such as randomization and greedy selection to speedup the convergence process. Simulation results show that the PII algorithm has better average performance compared with the classical stable matching algorithms and converges in n iterations with high probability. The proposed algorithm is also useful for some real-time applications with stringent time constraint. We introduce a restriction of the stable roommates problem in which roommate pairs are ranked globally. In contrast to the unrestricted problem, weakly stable matchings are guaranteed to exist, and additionally, they can be found in polynomial time. However, it is still the case that strongly stable matchings may not exist, and so we consider the complexity of finding weakly stable matchings with various desirable properties. In particular, we present a polynomial-time algorithm to find a rank-maximal (weakly stable) matching. This is the first generalization of an algorithm due to [ 06] to a nonbipartite setting. Also, we describe several hardness results in an even more restricted setting for each of the problems of finding weakly stable matchings that are of maximum size, are egalitarian, have minimum regret, and admit the minimum number of weakly blocking pairs. We show that the replica symmetric solution of the matching problem (bipartite or not) with independent random distances is stable. We compute the fluctuations and get the O(1 N) corrections to the length of the optimal matching in a generic sample On montre que la solution symetrique dans les repliques du probleme d'appariement (bipartite ou pas) dans lequel les distances sont des variables aleatoires est stable. On calcule les fluctuations et on obtient les conections d'ordre 1 N pour la longueur de l'appariement optimal dans un echantillon generique We investigate the complexity of approximately counting stable matchings in the k-attribute model, where the preference lists are determined by dot products of ''preference vectors'' with ''attribute vectors'', or by Euclidean distances between ''preference points ''and ''attribute points''. Irving and Leather (1986) [14] proved that counting the number of stable matchings in the general case is #P-complete. Counting the number of stable matchings is reducible to counting the number of downsets in a (related) partial order [14] and is interreducible, in an approximation-preserving sense, to a class of problems that includes counting the number of independent sets in a bipartite graph (#BIS) ( (2004) [6]). It is conjectured that no FPRAS exists for this class of problems. We show this approximation-preserving interreducibility remains even in the restricted k-attribute setting when k>=3 (dot products) or k>=2 (Euclidean distances). Finally, we show it is easy to count the number of stable matchings in the 1-attribute dot-product setting. We prove tight upper bounds on the logarithmic derivative of the independence and matching polynomials of d-regular graphs. For independent sets, this theorem is a strengthening of Kahn's result that a disjoint union of copies of Kd;d maximizes the number of independent sets of a bipartite d-regular graph, Galvin and Tet ali's result that the independence polynomial is maximized by the same, and Zhao's extension of both results to all d-regular graphs. For matchings, this shows that the matching polynomial and the total number of matchings of a d-regular graph are maximized by a union of copies of Kd;d. Using this we prove the asymptotic upper matching conjecture of Friedland, Krop, Lundow, and Markstrom. In probabilistic language, our main theorems state that for all d-regular graphs and all �, the occupancy fraction of the hard-core model and the edge occupancy fraction of the monomer-dimer model with fugacity � are maximized by Kd;d. Our method involves constrained optimization problems over distributions of random variables and applies to all d-regular graphs directly, without a reduction to the bipartite case. Using a variant of the method we prove a lower bound on the occupancy fraction of the hard-core model on any d-regular, vertex-transitive, bipartite graph: the occupancy fraction of such a graph is strictly greater than the occupancy fraction of the unique translationinvariant hard-core measure on the infinite d-regular tree We study the behavior of random walks along the edges of the stable marriage lattice for various restricted families of allowable preference sets. In the "k-attribute model," each man is valued in each of k attributes, and each woman's ranking of the men is determined by a linear function, representing her relative ranking of those attributes; men's rankings of the women are determined similarly. We show that sampling with a random walk on the marriage lattice can take exponential time, even when k = 2. Moreover, we show that the marriage lattices arising in the k-attribute model are more restrictive than in the general setting; previously such a restriction had only been shown for the sets of preference lists. The second model we consider is the "k-range model," where each person lies in a position in [i, i + k - 1], for some i, on every preference list of the opposite sex. When k = 1 there is a unique stable marriage. When k = 2 there already can be an exponential number of stable marriages, but we show that a random walk on the stable marriage lattice always converges quickly to equilibrium. However, when k ≥ 5, there are preference sets such that the random walk on the lattice will require exponential time to converge. Lastly, we show that in the extreme case where each gender's rankings of the other are restricted to one of just a constant k possible preference lists, there are still instances for which the Markov chain mixes exponentially slowly, even when k = 4. This oversimplification of the general model helps elucidate why Markov chains based on spouse-swapping are not good approaches to sampling, even in specialized scenarios. Abstract We give an on-line deterministic algorithm for the weighted bipartite matching problem that achieves a competitive ratio of (2 n −1) in any metric space (where n is the number of vertices). This algorithm is optimal - there is no on-line deterministic algorithm that achieves a competitive ratio better than (2 n −1) in all metric spaces. We also study the stable marriage problem, where we are interested in the number of unstable pairs produced. We show that the simple “first come, first served” deterministic algorithm yields on the average O( n log n ) unstable pairs, but in the worst case no deterministic or randomized on-line algorithm can do better than ω( n 2 ) unstable pairs. This appears to be the first on-line problem for which provably one cannot do better with randomization; for most on-line problems studied in the past, randomization has helped in improving the performance. The Stable Marriage Problem and its many variants have been widely studied in the literature (Gusfield and Irving, The Stable Marriage Problem: Structure and Algorithms, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1989; Roth and Sotomayor, Two-sided matching: a study in game-theoretic modeling and analysis, Econometric Society Monographs, vol. 18, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1990; Knuth, Stable Marriage and its Relation to Other Combinatorial Problems, CRM Proceedings and Lecture Notes, vol. 10, American Mathematical Society, Providence, RI, 1997), partly because of the inherent appeal of the problem, partly because of the elegance of the associated structures and algorithms, and partly because of important practical applications, such as the National Resident Matching Program (Roth, J. Political Economy 92(6) (1984) 991) and similar large-scale matching schemes. Here, we present the first comprehensive study of variants of the problem in which the preference lists of the participants are not necessarily complete and not necessarily totally ordered. We show that, under surprisingly restrictive assumptions, a number of these variants are hard, and hard to approximate. The key observation is that, in contrast to the case where preference lists are complete or strictly ordered (or both), a given problem instance may admit stable matchings of different sizes. In this setting, examples of problems that are hard are: finding a stable matching of maximum or minimum size, determining whether a given pair is stableeven if the indifference takes the form of ties on one side only, the ties are at the tails of lists, there is at most one tie per list, and each tie is of length 2; and finding, or approximating, both an egalitarian' and a minimum regret' stable matching. However, we give a 2-approximation algorithm for the problems of finding a stable matching of maximum or minimum size. We also discuss the significant implications of our results for practical matching schemes. Online matching has received significant attention over the last 15 years due to its close connection to Internet advertising. As the seminal work of Karp, Vazirani, and Vazirani has an optimal (1 - 1 epsilon) competitive ratio in the standard adversarial online model, much effort has gone into developing useful online models that incorporate some stochasticity in the arrival process. One such popular model is the "known I.I.D. model" where different customer-types arrive online from a known distribution. We develop algorithms with improved competitive ratios for some basic variants of this model with integral arrival rates, including: (a) the case of general weighted edges, where we improve the best-known ratio of 0.667 due to [Haeupler, Mirrokni and Zadimoghaddam WINE 2011] to 0.705; and (b) the vertex-weighted case, where we improve the 0.7250 ratio of [Jaillet and Lu Math. Oper. Res 2013] to 0.7299. We also consider two extensions, one is "known I.I.D." with non-integral arrival rate and stochastic rewards; the other is "known I.I.D." b-matching with non-integral arrival rate and stochastic rewards. We present a simple non-adaptive algorithm which works well simultaneously on the two extensions. One of the key ingredients of our improvement is the following (offline) approach to bipartite-matching polytopes with additional constraints. We first add several valid constraints in order to get a good fractional solution f; however, these give us less control over the structure of f. We next remove all these additional constraints and randomly move from f to a feasible point on the matching polytope with all coordinates being from the set 0, 1 k, 2 k,..., 1 for a chosen integer k. The structure of this solution is inspired by [Jaillet and Lu Math. Oper. Res 2013] and is a tractable structure for algorithm design and analysis. The appropriate random move preserves many of the removed constraints (approximately [exactly] with high probability [in expectation]). This underlies some of our improvements, and, we hope, could be of independent interest. The stable roommates problem is a well-known problem of matching n people into n2 disjoint pairs so that no two unmatched persons both prefer each other to their partners under the matching. We call such a matching “a complete stable matching.” It is known that a complete stable matching may not exist. Irving described an O(n2) algorithm that would find one complete stable matching if there is one, or would report that none exists. In this paper, we give a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a complete stable matching; namely, the non-existence of any odd party, which will be defined subsequently. We define a new structure called a “stable partition,” which generalizes the notion of a complete stable matching, and prove that every instance of the stable roommates problem has at least one such structure. We also show that a stable partition contains all the odd parties, if there are any. Finally we have an O(n2) algorithm that finds one stable partition which in turn gives all the odd parties. Couples looking for jobs in the same labor market may cause instabilities. We deter- mine a natural preference domain, the domain of weakly responsive preferences, that guarantees stability. Under a restricted unemployment aversion condition we show that this domain is maximal for the existence of stable matchings. We illustrate how small deviations from (weak) responsiveness, that model the wish of couples to be closer together, cause instability, even when we use a weaker stability notion that excludes myopic blocking. Our remaining results deal with various properties of the set of stable matchings for "responsive couples markets," viz., optimal- ity, filled positions, and manipulation. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C78; J41.