Peer grading systems work well only if users have incentives to grade truthfully. An example of non-truthful grading, that we observed in classrooms, consists in students assigning the maximum grade to all submissions. With a naive grading scheme, such as averaging the assigned grades, all students would receive the maximum grade. In this paper, we develop three grading schemes that provide incentives for truthful peer grading. In the first scheme, the instructor grades a fraction p of the submissions, and penalizes students whose grade deviates from the instructor grade. We provide lower bounds on p to ensure truthfulness, and conclude that these schemes work only for moderate class sizes, up to a few hundred students. To overcome this limitation, we propose a hierarchical extension of this supervised scheme, and we show that it can handle classes of any size with bounded (and little) instructor work, and is therefore applicable to Massive Open Online Courses (MOOCs). Finally, we propose unsupervised incentive schemes, in which the student incentive is based on statistical properties of the grade distribution, without any grading required by the instructor. We show that the proposed unsupervised schemes provide incentives to truthful grading, at the price of being possibly unfair to individual students.
Providing incentives to human agents to return thuthful responses is a central challenge of crowdsourcing algorithms and applications @cite_9 .
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A challenge with the programmatic access of human talent via crowdsourcing platforms is the specification of incentives and the checking of the quality of contributions. Methodologies for checking quality include providing a payment if the work is approved by the task owner and hiring additional workers to evaluate contributors' work. Both of these approaches place a burden on people and on the organizations commissioning tasks, and may be susceptible to manipulation by workers and task owners. Moreover, neither a task owner nor the task market may know the task well enough to be able to evaluate worker reports. Methodologies for incentivizing workers without external quality checking include rewards based on agreement with a peer worker or with the final output of the system. These approaches are vulnerable to strategic manipulations by workers. Recent experiments on Mechanical Turk have demonstrated the negative influence of manipulations by workers and task owners on crowdsourcing systems [3]. We address this central challenge by introducing incentive mechanisms that promote truthful reporting in crowdsourcing and discourage manipulation by workers and task owners without introducing additional overhead. We initiate the study of incentives in a general machine learning framework. We focus on a game-theoretic regression learning setting where private information is elicited from multiple agents with different, possibly conflicting, views on how to label the points of an input space. This conflict potentially gives rise to untruthfulness on the part of the agents. In the restricted but important case when every agent cares about a single point, and under mild assumptions, we show that agents are motivated to tell the truth. In a more general setting, we study the power and limitations of mechanisms without payments. We finally establish that, in the general setting, the VCG mechanism goes a long way in guaranteeing truthfulness and economic efficiency. Incentive mechanisms for crowdsourcing have been extensively studied under the framework of all-pay auctions. Along a distinct line, this paper proposes to use Tullock contests as an alternative tool to design incentive mechanisms for crowdsourcing. We are inspired by the conduciveness of Tullock contests to attracting user entry (yet not necessarily a higher revenue) in other domains. In this paper, we explore a new dimension in optimal Tullock contest design, by superseding the contest prize — which is fixed in conventional Tullock contests — with a prize function that is dependent on the (unknown) winner's contribution, in order to maximize the crowdsourcer's utility. We show that this approach leads to attractive practical advantages: (a) it is well-suited for rapid prototyping in fully distributed web agents and smartphone apps; (b) it overcomes the disincentive to participate caused by players' antagonism to an increasing number of rivals. Furthermore, we optimize conventional, fixed-prize Tullock contests to construct the most superior benchmark to compare against our mechanism. Through extensive evaluations, we show that our mechanism significantly outperforms the optimal benchmark, by over three folds on the crowdsourcer's utility cum profit and up to nine folds on the players' social welfare. Crowdsourcing systems allocate tasks to a group of workers over the Internet, which have become an effective paradigm for human-powered problem solving such as image classification, optical character recognition and proofreading. In this paper, we focus on incentivizing crowd workers to label a set of binary tasks under strict budget constraint. We properly profile the tasks' difficulty levels and workers' quality in crowdsourcing systems, where the collected labels are aggregated with sequential Bayesian approach. To stimulate workers to undertake crowd labeling tasks, the interaction between workers and the platform is modeled as a reverse auction. We reveal that the platform utility maximization could be intractable, for which an incentive mechanism that determines the winning bid and payments with polynomial-time computation complexity is developed. Moreover, we theoretically prove that our mechanism is truthful, individually rational and budget feasible. Through extensive simulations, we demonstrate that our mechanism utilizes budget efficiently to achieve high platform utility with polynomial computation complexity. We consider schemes for obtaining truthful reports on a common but hidden signal from large groups of rational, self-interested agents. One example are online feedback mechanisms, where users provide observations about the quality of a product or service so that other users can have an accurate idea of what quality they can expect. However, (i) providing such feedback is costly, and (ii) there are many motivations for providing incorrect feedback. Both problems can be addressed by reward schemes which (i) cover the cost of obtaining and reporting feedback, and (ii) maximize the expected reward of a rational agent who reports truthfully. We address the design of such incentive-compatible rewards for feedback generated in environments with pure adverse selection. Here, the correlation between the true knowledge of an agent and her beliefs regarding the likelihoods of reports of other agents can be exploited to make honest reporting a Nash equilibrium. In this paper we extend existing methods for designing incentive-compatible rewards by also considering collusion. We analyze different scenarios, where, for example, some or all of the agents collude. For each scenario we investigate whether a collusion-resistant, incentive-compatible reward scheme exists, and use automated mechanism design to specify an algorithm for deriving an efficient reward mechanism. With the prosperity of smart devices, crowdsourcing has emerged as a new computing networking paradigm. Through the crowdsourcing platform, service requesters can buy service from service providers. An important component of crowdsourcing is its incentive mechanism. We study three models of crowdsourcing, which involve cooperation and competition among the service providers. Our simplest model generalizes the well-known user-centric model studied in a recent Mobicom paper. We design an incentive mechanism for each of the three models, and prove that these incentive mechanisms are individually rational, budget-balanced, computationally efficient, and truthful. In crowdsensing, appropriate rewards are always expected to compensate the participants for their consumptions of physical resources and involvements of manual efforts. While continuous low quality sensing data could do harm to the availability and preciseness of crowdsensing based services, few existing incentive mechanisms have ever addressed the issue of sensing data's quality. The design of quality based incentive mechanism is motivated by its potential to avoid inefficient sensing and unnecessary rewards. In this paper, we incorporate the consideration of data quality into the design of incentive mechanism for crowdsensing, and propose to pay the participants as how well they do, to motivate the rational participants to perform data sensing efficiently. This mechanism estimates the quality of sensing data, and offers each participant a reward based on her effective contribution. We also implement the mechanism and evaluate the improvements in terms of quality of service and profit of service provider. The evaluation results show that our mechanism achieves superior performance when compared to the uniform pricing scheme. Crowdsourcing has attracted significant attention from the database community in recent years and several crowdsourced databases have been proposed to incorporate human power into traditional database systems. One big issue in crowdsourcing is to achieve high quality because workers may return incorrect answers. A typical solution to address this problem is to assign each question to multiple workers and combine workers’ answers to generate the final result. One big challenge arising in this strategy is to infer worker’s quality. Existing methods usually assume each worker has a fixed quality and compute the quality using qualification tests or historical performance. However these methods cannot accurately estimate a worker’s quality. To address this problem, we propose a worker model and devise an incremental inference strategy to accurately compute the workers’ quality. We also propose a question model and develop two efficient strategies to combine the worker’s model to compute the question’s result. We implement our method and compare with existing inference approaches on real crowdsourcing platforms using real-world datasets, and the experiments indicate that our method achieves high accuracy and outperforms existing approaches. To ensure quality results from crowdsourced tasks, requesters often aggregate worker responses and use one of a plethora of strategies to infer the correct answer from the set of noisy responses. However, all current models assume prior knowledge of all possible outcomes of the task. While not an unreasonable assumption for tasks that can be posited as multiple-choice questions (e.g. n-ary classification), we observe that many tasks do not naturally fit this paradigm, but instead demand a free-response formulation where the outcome space is of infinite size (e.g. audio transcription). We model such tasks with a novel probabilistic graphical model, and design and implement LazySusan, a decision-theoretic controller that dynamically requests responses as necessary in order to infer answers to these tasks. We also design an EM algorithm to jointly learn the parameters of our model while inferring the correct answers to multiple tasks at a time. Live experiments on Amazon Mechanical Turk demonstrate the superiority of LazySusan at solving SAT Math questions, eliminating 83.2 of the error and achieving greater net utility compared to the state-ofthe-art strategy, majority-voting. We also show in live experiments that our EM algorithm outperforms majority-voting on a visualization task that we design. Crowdsourcing platforms enable to propose simple human intelligence tasks to a large number of participants who realise these tasks. The workers often receive a small amount of money or the platforms include some other incentive mechanisms, for example they can increase the workers reputation score, if they complete the tasks correctly. We address the problem of identifying experts among participants, that is, workers, who tend to answer the questions correctly. Knowing who are the reliable workers could improve the quality of knowledge one can extract from responses. As opposed to other works in the literature, we assume that participants can give partial or incomplete responses, in case they are not sure that their answers are correct. We model such partial or incomplete responses with the help of belief functions, and we derive a measure that characterizes the expertise level of each participant. This measure is based on precise and exactitude degrees that represent two parts of the expertise level. The precision degree reflects the reliability level of the participants and the exactitude degree reflects the knowledge level of the participants. We also analyze our model through simulation and demonstrate that our richer model can lead to more reliable identification of experts. We consider crowdsourcing problems where the users are asked to provide evaluations for items; the user evaluations are then used directly, or aggregated into a consensus value. Lacking an incentive scheme, users have no motive in making effort in completing the evaluations, providing inaccurate answers instead. We propose incentive schemes that are truthful and cheap: truthful as the optimal user behavior consists in providing accurate evaluations, and cheap because the truthfulness is achieved with little overhead cost. We consider both discrete evaluation tasks, where an evaluation can be done either correctly, or incorrectly, with no degrees of approximation in between, and quantitative evaluation tasks, where evaluations are real numbers, and the error is measured as distance from the correct value. For both types of tasks, we propose hierarchical incentive schemes that can be effected with a small amount of additional evaluations, and that scale to arbitrarily large crowd sizes: they have the property that the strength of the incentive does not weaken with increasing hierarchy depth. Interestingly, we show that for these schemes to work, the only requisite is that workers know their place in the hierarchy in advance. Crowdsourcing services, such as Amazon Mechanical Turk, allow for easy distribution of small tasks to a large number of workers. Unfortunately, since manually verifying the quality of the submitted results is hard, malicious workers often take advantage of the verification difficulty and submit answers of low quality. Currently, most requesters rely on redundancy to identify the correct answers. However, redundancy is not a panacea. Massive redundancy is expensive, increasing significantly the cost of crowdsourced solutions. Therefore, we need techniques that will accurately estimate the quality of the workers, allowing for the rejection and blocking of the low-performing workers and spammers. However, existing techniques cannot separate the true (unrecoverable) error rate from the (recoverable) biases that some workers exhibit. This lack of separation leads to incorrect assessments of a worker's quality. We present algorithms that improve the existing state-of-the-art techniques, enabling the separation of bias and error. Our algorithm generates a scalar score representing the inherent quality of each worker. We illustrate how to incorporate cost-sensitive classification errors in the overall framework and how to seamlessly integrate unsupervised and supervised techniques for inferring the quality of the workers. We present experimental results demonstrating the performance of the proposed algorithm under a variety of settings. Requesters on crowdsourcing platforms, such as Amazon Mechanical Turk, routinely insert gold questions to verify that a worker is diligent and is providing high-quality answers. However, there is no clear understanding of when and how many gold questions to insert. Typically, requesters mix a flat 10-30 of gold questions into the task stream of every worker. This static policy is arbitrary and wastes valuable budget --- the exact percentage is often chosen with little experimentation, and, more importantly, it does not adapt to individual workers, the current mixture of spamming vs. diligent workers, or the number of tasks workers perform before quitting. We formulate the problem of balancing between (1) testing workers to determine their accuracy and (2) actually getting work performed as a partially-observable Markov decision process (POMDP) and apply reinforcement learning to dynamically calculate the best policy. Evaluations on both synthetic data and with real Mechanical Turk workers show that our agent learns adaptive testing policies that produce up to 111 more reward than the non-adaptive policies used by most requesters. Furthermore, our method is fully automated, easy to apply, and runs mostly out of the box. Abstract Intelligent systems often depend on data provided by information agents, for example, sensor data or crowdsourced human computation. Providing accurate and relevant data requires costly effort that agents may not always be willing to provide. Thus, it becomes important not only to verify the correctness of data, but also to provide incentives so that agents that provide high-quality data are rewarded while those that do not are discouraged by low rewards. We cover different settings and the assumptions they admit, including sensing, human computation, peer grading, reviews, and predictions. We survey different incentive mechanisms, including proper scoring rules, prediction markets and peer prediction, Bayesian Truth Serum, Peer Truth Serum, Correlated Agreement, and the settings where each of them would be suitable. As an alternative, we also consider reputation mechanisms. We complement the game-theoretic analysis with practical examples of applications in prediction platforms, community sensin... We study the causal effects of financial incentives on the quality of crowdwork. We focus on performance-based payments (PBPs), bonus payments awarded to workers for producing high quality work. We design and run randomized behavioral experiments on the popular crowdsourcing platform Amazon Mechanical Turk with the goal of understanding when, where, and why PBPs help, identifying properties of the payment, payment structure, and the task itself that make them most effective. We provide examples of tasks for which PBPs do improve quality. For such tasks, the effectiveness of PBPs is not too sensitive to the threshold for quality required to receive the bonus, while the magnitude of the bonus must be large enough to make the reward salient. We also present examples of tasks for which PBPs do not improve quality. Our results suggest that for PBPs to improve quality, the task must be effort-responsive: the task must allow workers to produce higher quality work by exerting more effort. We also give a simple method to determine if a task is effort-responsive a priori. Furthermore, our experiments suggest that all payments on Mechanical Turk are, to some degree, implicitly performance-based in that workers believe their work may be rejected if their performance is sufficiently poor. Finally, we propose a new model of worker behavior that extends the standard principal-agent model from economics to include a worker's subjective beliefs about his likelihood of being paid, and show that the predictions of this model are in line with our experimental findings. This model may be useful as a foundation for theoretical studies of incentives in crowdsourcing markets. When rewards are sparse and action spaces large, Q-learning with @math -greedy exploration can be inefficient. This poses problems for otherwise promising applications such as task-oriented dialogue systems, where the primary reward signal, indicating successful completion of a task, requires a complex sequence of appropriate actions. Under these circumstances, a randomly exploring agent might never stumble upon a successful outcome in reasonable time. We present two techniques that significantly improve the efficiency of exploration for deep Q-learning agents in dialogue systems. First, we introduce an exploration technique based on Thompson sampling, drawing Monte Carlo samples from a Bayes-by-backprop neural network, demonstrating marked improvement over common approaches such as @math -greedy and Boltzmann exploration. Second, we show that spiking the replay buffer with experiences from a small number of successful episodes, as are easy to harvest for dialogue tasks, can make Q-learning feasible when it might otherwise fail. In crowdsourcing systems, the interests of contributing participants and system stakeholders are often not fully aligned. Participants seek to learn, be entertained, and perform easy tasks, which offer them instant gratification; system stakeholders want users to complete more difficult tasks, which bring higher value to the crowdsourced application. We directly address this problem by presenting techniques that optimize the crowdsourcing process by jointly maximizing the user longevity in the system and the true value that the system derives from user participation. We first present models that predict the "survival probability" of a user at any given moment, that is, the probability that a user will proceed to the next task offered by the system. We then leverage this survival model to dynamically decide what task to assign and what motivating goals to present to the user. This allows us to jointly optimize for the short term (getting difficult tasks done) and for the long term (keeping users engaged for longer periods of time). We show that dynamically assigning tasks significantly increases the value of a crowdsourcing system. In an extensive empirical evaluation, we observed that our task allocation strategy increases the amount of information collected by up to 117.8 . We also explore the utility of motivating users with goals. We demonstrate that setting specific, static goals can be highly detrimental to the long-term user participation, as the completion of a goal (e.g., earning a badge) is also a common drop-off point for many users. We show that setting the goals dynamically, in conjunction with judicious allocation of tasks, increases the amount of information collected by the crowdsourcing system by up to 249 , compared to the existing baselines that use fixed objectives. In this paper we present and analyze a model in which users select among, and subsequently compete in, a collection of contests offering various rewards. The objective is to capture the essential features of a crowdsourcing system, an environment in which diverse tasks are presented to a large community. We aim to demonstrate the precise relationship between incentives and participation in such systems. We model contests as all-pay auctions with incomplete information; as a consequence of revenue equivalence, our model may also be interpreted more broadly as one in which users select among auctions of heterogeneous goods. We present two regimes in which we find an explicit correspondence in equilibrium between the offered rewards and the users' participation levels. The regimes respectively model situations in which different contests require similar or unrelated skills. Principally, we find that rewards yield logarithmically diminishing returns with respect to participation levels. We compare these results to empirical data from the crowdsourcing site Taskcn.com; we find that as we condition the data on more experienced users, the model more closely conforms to the empirical data. Crowdsourcing systems, in which tasks are electronically distributed to numerous "information piece-workers", have emerged as an effective paradigm for human-powered solving of large scale problems in domains such as image classification, data entry, optical character recognition, recommendation, and proofreading. Because these low-paid workers can be unreliable, nearly all crowdsourcers must devise schemes to increase confidence in their answers, typically by assigning each task multiple times and combining the answers in some way such as majority voting. In this paper, we consider a general model of such crowdsourcing tasks, and pose the problem of minimizing the total price (i.e., number of task assignments) that must be paid to achieve a target overall reliability. We give a new algorithm for deciding which tasks to assign to which workers and for inferring correct answers from the workers' answers. We show that our algorithm significantly outperforms majority voting and, in fact, is asymptotically optimal through comparison to an oracle that knows the reliability of every worker. Peer prediction mechanisms allow the truthful elicitation of private signals (e.g., experiences, or opinions) in regard to a true world state when this ground truth is unobservable. The original peer prediction method is incentive compatible for any number of agents n ≥ 2, but relies on a common prior, shared by all agents and the mechanism. The Bayesian Truth Serum (BTS) relaxes this assumption. While BTS still assumes that agents share a common prior, this prior need not be known to the mechanism. However, BTS is only incentive compatible for a large enough number of agents, and the particular number of agents required is uncertain because it depends on this private prior. In this paper, we present a robust BTS for the elicitation of binary information which is incentive compatible for every n ≥ 3, taking advantage of a particularity of the quadratic scoring rule. The robust BTS is the first peer prediction mechanism to provide strict incentive compatibility for every n ≥ 3 without relying on knowledge of the common prior. Moreover, and in contrast to the original BTS, our mechanism is numerically robust and ex post individually rational.