In this paper we define the overflow problem of a network coding storage system in which the encoding parameter and the storage parameter are mismatched. Through analyses and experiments, we first show the impacts of the overflow problem in a network coding scheme, which not only waste storage spaces, but also degrade coding efficiency. To avoid the overflow problem, we then develop the network coding based secure storage (NCSS) scheme. Thanks to considering both security and storage requirements in encoding procedures and distributed architectures, the NCSS can improve the performance of a cloud storage system from both the aspects of storage cost and coding processing time. We analyze the maximum allowable stored encoded data under the perfect secrecy criterion, and provide the design guidelines for the secure cloud storage system to enhance coding efficiency and achieve the minimal storage cost.
Another research area of network coding is to prevent data being eavesdropped during transmission. The information-theoretical security problem for an untrusted channel was first discussed in @cite_9 . A network coding system was built to prove that a wiretapper cannot obtain any information from the transmitted message @cite_22 . A weaker type of security issue was investigated in @cite_6 , where a node can decode packets only after receiving sufficient linear independent encoded data. The construction of a secure linear network code for a wiretap network was presented in @cite_3 .
@cite_9 @cite_3 @cite_22 @cite_6
2006947308 2152303628 68293075 2106570206 2136395129 2211831180 2139416652 2164586990 2949730520 2124071994 2130507035 2072475112 2050536468 2175927535 2581074253 1992741808 1514396891 2613932151 2159384192 18139138
In the paradigm of network coding, the nodes in a network are allowed to encode the information received from the input links. With network coding, the full capacity of the network can be utilized. In this paper, we propose a model, call the wiretap network, that incorporates information security with network coding. In this model, a collection of subsets of the channels in the network is given, and a wiretapper is allowed to access any one (but not more than one) of these subsets without being able to obtain any information about the message transmitted. Our model includes secret sharing in classical cryptography as a special case. We present a construction of secure linear network codes that can be used provided a certain graph-theoretic condition is satisfied. We also prove the necessity of this condition for the special case that the wiretapper may choose to access any subset of channels of a fixed size. The optimality of our code construction is established for this special case. Finally, we extend our results to the scenario when the wiretapper is allowed to obtain a controlled amount of information about the message. The problem of securing a network coding communication system against an eavesdropper is considered. The network implements linear network coding to deliver n packets from source to each receiver, and the adversary can eavesdrop on μ arbitrarily chosen links. The objective is to provide reliable communication to all receivers, while guaranteeing that the source information remains information-theoretically secure from the adversary. A coding scheme is proposed that can achieve the maximum possible rate of n - μ packets. The scheme, which is based on rank-metric codes, has the distinctive property of being universal: it can be applied on top of any communication network without requiring knowledge of or any modifications on the underlying linear network code. The only requirement of the scheme is that the packet length be at least n, which is shown to be strictly necessary for universal communication at the maximum rate. A further scenario is considered where the adversary is allowed not only to eavesdrop but also to inject up to t erroneous packets into the network, and the network may suffer from a rank deficiency of at most ρ. In this case, the proposed scheme can be extended to achieve the rate of n - ρ - 2t - μ packets. This rate is shown to be optimal under the assumption of zero-error communication. In this work we consider the problem of secure data transmission on an acyclic multicast network. A new information theoretic model for security is proposed that defines the system as secure if an eavesdropper is unable to get any “meaningful” information about the source. The “wiretap” network model by Cai and Yeung in which no information of the source is made available to the eavesdropper is a special case in the new model. We consider the case when the number of independent messages available to the eavesdropper is less than the multicast capacity of the network. We show that under the new security requirements communication is possible at the multicast capacity. A linear transformation is provided for networks with a given linear code to make the system secure. The transformation needs to be done only at the source and the operations at the intermediate nodes remain unchanged. We also show that if random coding scheme is used the probability of the system being secure can be made arbitrarily close to one by coding over a large enough field. We consider the problem of securing a multicast network against a wiretapper that can eavesdrop on the packets on a limited number of network edges of its choice. We assume that the network employs network coding to simultaneously deliver the packets available at the source to all the destinations. We show that this problem can be looked at as a network generalization of the wiretap channel of type II introduced in a seminal paper by Ozarow and Wyner. In particular, we show that the transmitted information can be secured by using the Ozarow-Wyner approach of coset coding at the source on top of the existing network code. This way, we quickly and transparently recover some of the results available in the literature on secure network coding for wiretap networks. Moreover, we use this framework to derive new bounds on the code alphabet size that are independent of the network size, and provide algorithms for explicit construction of secure network codes. We also analyze the amount of information that can be leaked to the wiretapper as a function of the number of wiretapped edges. Recent work on network coding renders a new view on multicasting in a network. In the paradigm of network coding, the nodes in a network are allowed to encode the information received from the input links. The usual function of switching at a node is a special case of network coding. The advantage of network coding is that the full capacity of the network can be utilized. In this paper, we propose a new model which incorporates network coding and information security. Specifically, a collection of subsets of links is given, and a wiretapper is allowed to access any one (but not more than one) of these subsets without being able to obtain any information about the message transmitted. Our model includes secret sharing as a special case. We present a construction of secure linear network codes provided a certain graph-theoretic sufficient condition is satisfied. Suppose that Alice wishes to send messages to Bob through a communication channel C1, but her transmissions also reach an eavesdropper Eve through another channel C2. This is the wiretap channel model introduced by Wyner in 1975. The goal is to design a coding scheme that makes it possible for Alice to communicate both reliably and securely. Reliability is measured in terms of Bob's probability of error in recovering the message, while security is measured in terms of the mutual information between the message and Eve's observations. Wyner showed that the situation is characterized by a single constant Cs, called the secrecy capacity, which has the following meaning: for all e >; 0, there exist coding schemes of rate R ≥ Cs-e that asymptotically achieve the reliability and security objectives. However, his proof of this result is based upon a random-coding argument. To date, despite consider able research effort, the only case where we know how to construct coding schemes that achieve secrecy capacity is when Eve's channel C2 is an erasure channel, or a combinatorial variation thereof. Polar codes were recently invented by Arikan; they approach the capacity of symmetric binary-input discrete memoryless channels with low encoding and decoding complexity. In this paper, we use polar codes to construct a coding scheme that achieves the secrecy capacity for a wide range of wiretap channels. Our construction works for any instantiation of the wiretap channel model, as long as both C1 and C2 are symmetric and binary-input, and C2 is degraded with respect to C1. Moreover, we show how to modify our construction in order to provide strong security, in the sense defined by Maurer, while still operating at a rate that approaches the secrecy capacity. In this case, we cannot guarantee that the reliability condition will also be satisfied unless the main channel C1 is noiseless, although we believe it can be always satisfied in practice. The problem of error-control in random linear network coding is considered. A ldquononcoherentrdquo or ldquochannel obliviousrdquo model is assumed where neither transmitter nor receiver is assumed to have knowledge of the channel transfer characteristic. Motivated by the property that linear network coding is vector-space preserving, information transmission is modeled as the injection into the network of a basis for a vector space V and the collection by the receiver of a basis for a vector space U. A metric on the projective geometry associated with the packet space is introduced, and it is shown that a minimum-distance decoder for this metric achieves correct decoding if the dimension of the space V capU is sufficiently large. If the dimension of each codeword is restricted to a fixed integer, the code forms a subset of a finite-field Grassmannian, or, equivalently, a subset of the vertices of the corresponding Grassmann graph. Sphere-packing and sphere-covering bounds as well as a generalization of the singleton bound are provided for such codes. Finally, a Reed-Solomon-like code construction, related to Gabidulin's construction of maximum rank-distance codes, is described and a Sudan-style ldquolist-1rdquo minimum-distance decoding algorithm is provided. We consider distributed storage over two untrusted networks, whereby coding is used as a means to achieve a prescribed level of confidentiality. The key idea is to exploit the algebraic structure of the Vandermonde matrix to mix the input blocks, before they are stored in different locations. The proposed scheme ensures that eavesdroppers with access to only one of the networks are unable to decode any symbol even if they are capable of guessing some of the missing blocks. Information-theoretic techniques allow us to quantify the achievable level of confidentiality. Moreover, the proposed approach is shown to offer low complexity and optimal rate. We consider the level of information security provided by random linear network coding in network scenarios in which all nodes comply with the communication protocols yet are assumed to be potential eavesdroppers (i.e. "nice but curious"). For this setup, which differs from wiretapping scenarios considered previously, we develop a natural algebraic security criterion, and prove several of its key properties. A preliminary analysis of the impact of network topology on the overall network coding security, in particular for complete directed acyclic graphs, is also included. Secure communications can be impeded by eavesdroppers in conventional relay systems. This paper proposes cooperative jamming strategies for two-hop relay networks where the eavesdropper can wiretap the relay channels in both hops. In these approaches, the normally inactive nodes in the relay network can be used as cooperative jamming sources to confuse the eavesdropper. Linear precoding schemes are investigated for two scenarios where single or multiple data streams are transmitted via a decode-and-forward (DF) relay, under the assumption that global channel state information (CSI) is available. For the case of single data stream transmission, we derive closed-form jamming beamformers and the corresponding optimal power allocation. Generalized singular value decomposition (GSVD)-based secure relaying schemes are proposed for the transmission of multiple data streams. The optimal power allocation is found for the GSVD relaying scheme via geometric programming. Based on this result, a GSVD-based cooperative jamming scheme is proposed that shows significant improvement in terms of secrecy rate compared to the approach without jamming. Furthermore, the case involving an eavesdropper with unknown CSI is also investigated in this paper. Simulation results show that the secrecy rate is dramatically increased when inactive nodes in the relay network participate in cooperative jamming. Motivated by a problem of transmitting supplemental data over broadcast channels (Birk and Kol, INFOCOM 1998), we study the following coding problem: a sender communicates with n receivers R1,..., Rn. He holds an input x ∈ 0,01l n and wishes to broadcast a single message so that each receiver Ri can recover the bit xi. Each Ri has prior side information about x, induced by a directed graph Grain nodes; Ri knows the bits of a; in the positions j | (i,j) is an edge of G .G is known to the sender and to the receivers. We call encoding schemes that achieve this goal INDEXcodes for 0,1 n with side information graph G. In this paper we identify a measure on graphs, the minrank, which exactly characterizes the minimum length of linear and certain types of nonlinear INDEX codes. We show that for natural classes of side information graphs, including directed acyclic graphs, perfect graphs, odd holes, and odd anti-holes, minrank is the optimal length of arbitrary INDEX codes. For arbitrary INDEX codes and arbitrary graphs, we obtain a lower bound in terms of the size of the maximum acyclic induced subgraph. This bound holds even for randomized codes, but has been shown not to be tight. Motivated by a problem of transmitting data over broadcast channels (Birk and Kol, INFOCOM 1998), we study the following coding problem: a sender communicates with n receivers R_1, . . . , R_n. He holds an input x 0, 1 ^n and wishes to broadcast a single message so that each receiver R_i can recover the bit x_i. Each R_i has prior side information about x, induced by a directed graph G on n nodes; R_i knows the bits of x in the positions j | (i, j) is an edge of G . We call encoding schemes that achieve this goal INDEX codes for 0, 1 ^n with side information graph G. In this paper we identify a measure on graphs, the minrank, which we conjecture to exactly characterize the minimum length of INDEX codes. We resolve the conjecture for certain natural classes of graphs. For arbitrary graphs, we show that the minrank bound is tight for both linear codes and certain classes of non-linear codes. For the general problem, we obtain a (weaker) lower bound that the length of an INDEX code for any graph G is at least the size of the maximum acyclic induced subgraph of G. We consider the problem of direct data exchange among a group of wireless clients in the presence of an eavesdropper. An instance of this problem includes a set of packets X and a set of clients, such that each client has an access to a subset of packets and requests the rest of the packets in X. The clients use a lossless broadcast channel to transmit packets to other clients in the group. All transmitted packets can be observed by an eavesdropper that might have prior side information about the packets exchanged by the clients. Our goal is to construct a coding scheme that prevents the eavesdropper from decoding any individual packet in X (beyond those it already knowns). In weakly secure schemes, the more packets the eavesdropper has, the harder it is to construct a scheme that prevents the eavesdropper from obtaining additional packets. Thus, it is natural to measure the degree of secrecy by the maximum number of packets that can be held by the eavesdropper. Accordingly, our goal is to construct a coding scheme that can handle an eavesdropper that has as many packets as possible. We also present randomized and deterministic solutions for this problem and analyze their performance. We also establish a tight upper bound on the maximum degree of secrecy that a weakly secure scheme can provide for each instance of the problem. Researchers show that network coding can greatly improve the quality of service in P2P live streaming systems (e.g., IPTV). However, network coding is vulnerable to pollution attacks where malicious nodes inject into the network bogus data blocks that will be combined with other legitimate blocks at downstream nodes, leading to incapability of decoding the original blocks and degradation of network performance. In this paper, we propose a novel approach to limiting pollution attacks by identifying malicious nodes. In our scheme, the malicious nodes can be rapidly identified and isolated, so that the system can quickly recover from pollution attacks. Our scheme can fully satisfy the requirements of live streaming systems, and achieves much higher efficiency than previous schemes. Each node in our scheme only needs to perform several hash computations for an incoming block, incurring very small computational latency in the range of several microseconds. The space overhead added to each block is only 20 bytes. The verification information given to each node is independent of the streaming content and thus does not need to be redistributed. The simulation results based on real PPLive channel overlays show that the process of identifying malicious nodes only takes a few seconds even in the presence of a large number of malicious nodes. Achieving information-theoretic security using explicit coding scheme in which unlimited computational power for eavesdropper is assumed, is one of the main topics is security consideration. It is shown that polar codes are capacity achieving codes and have a low complexity in encoding and decoding. It has been proven that polar codes reach to secrecy capacity in the binary-input wiretap channels in symmetric settings for which the wiretapper's channel is degraded with respect to the main channel. The first task of this paper is to propose a coding scheme to achieve secrecy capacity in asymmetric nonbinary-input channels while keeping reliability and security conditions satisfied. Our assumption is that the wiretap channel is stochastically degraded with respect to the main channel and message distribution is unspecified. The main idea is to send information set over good channels for Bob and bad channels for Eve and send random symbols for channels that are good for both. In this scheme the frozen vector is defined over all possible choices using polar codes ensemble concept. We proved that there exists a frozen vector for which the coding scheme satisfies reliability and security conditions. It is further shown that uniform distribution of the message is the necessary condition for achieving secrecy capacity. We focus on secure data exchange among a group of wireless clients. The clients exchange data by broadcasting linear combinations of packets over a lossless channel. The data exchange is performed in the presence of an eavesdropper who has access to the channel and can obtain all transmitted data. Our goal is to develop a weakly secure coding scheme that prevents the eavesdropper from being able to decode any of the original packets held by the clients. We present a randomized algorithm based on Generalized Reed-Solomon (GRS) codes. The algorithm has two key advantages over the previous solutions: it operates over a small (polynomial-size) finite field and provides a way to verify that constructed code is feasible. In contrast, the previous approaches require exponential field size and do not provide an efficient (polynomial-time) algorithm to verify the secrecy properties of the constructed code. We formulate an algebraic-geometric conjecture that implies the correctness of our algorithm and prove its validity for special cases. Our simulation results indicate that the algorithm is efficient in practical settings. We study random linear network coding for broadcasting in time division duplexing channels. We assume a packet erasure channel with nodes that cannot transmit and receive information simultaneously. The sender transmits coded data packets back-to-back before stopping to wait for the receivers to acknowledge the number of degrees of freedom, if any, that are required to decode correctly the information. We study the mean time to complete the transmission of a block of packets to all receivers. We also present a bound on the number of stops to wait for acknowledgement in order to complete transmission with probability at least 1 − e, for any e ≫ 0. We present analysis and numerical results showing that our scheme outperforms optimal scheduling policies for broadcast, in terms of the mean completion time. We provide a simple heuristic to compute the number of coded packets to be sent before stopping that achieves close to optimal performance with the advantage of a considerable reduction in the search time. In the literature, there exist analytical expressions for the probability of a receiver decoding a transmitted source message that has been encoded using random linear network coding. In this letter, we look into the probability that the receiver will decode at least a fraction of the source message, and present an exact solution to this problem for both non-systematic and systematic network coding. Based on the derived expressions, we investigate the potential of these two implementations of network coding for information-theoretic secure communication and progressive recovery of data. A new random linear network coding scheme for reliable communications for time division duplexing channels is proposed. The setup assumes a packet erasure channel and that nodes cannot transmit and receive information simultaneously. The sender transmits coded data packets back-to-back before stopping to wait for the receiver to acknowledge (ACK) the number of degrees of freedom, if any, that are required to decode correctly the information. We provide an analysis of this problem to show that there is an optimal number of coded data packets, in terms of mean completion time, to be sent before stopping to listen. This number depends on the latency, probabilities of packet erasure and ACK erasure, and the number of degrees of freedom that the receiver requires to decode the data. This scheme is optimal in terms of the mean time to complete the transmission of a fixed number of data packets. We show that its performance is very close to that of a full duplex system, while transmitting a different number of coded packets can cause large degradation in performance, especially if latency is high. Also, we study the throughput performance of our scheme and compare it to existing half-duplex Go-back-N and Selective Repeat ARQ schemes. Numerical results, obtained for different latencies, show that our scheme has similar performance to the Selective Repeat in most cases and considerable performance gain when latency and packet error probability is high. We consider the problem of using a multicast network code to transmit information securely in the presence of a “wire-tap” adversary who can eavesdrop on a bounded number of network edges. Cai & Yeung (ISIT, 2002) gave a method to alter any given linear network code into a new code that is secure. However, their construction is in general inefficient, and requires a very large field size; in many cases this is much greater than the field size required by standard network code construction algorithms to achieve the min-cut capacity (without a security guarantee). In this paper we generalize and simplify the method of Cai & Yeung, and show that the problem of making a linear network code secure is equivalent to the problem of finding a linear code with certain generalized distance properties. We show that if we give up a small amount of overall capacity, then a random code achieves these properties using a much smaller field size — in some cases a field of constant size suffices — than the construction of Cai & Yeung. We add further support to this approach by showing that if we are not willing to give up any capacity, then a large field size may sometimes be required to achieve security.