Cloud business intelligence is an increasingly popular choice to deliver decision support capabilities via elastic, pay-per-use resources. However, data security issues are one of the top concerns when dealing with sensitive data. In this paper, we propose a novel approach for securing cloud data warehouses by flexible verifiable secret sharing, fVSS. Secret sharing encrypts and distributes data over several cloud service providers, thus enforcing data privacy and availability. fVSS addresses four shortcomings in existing secret sharing-based approaches. First, it allows refreshing the data warehouse when some service providers fail. Second, it allows on-line analysis processing. Third, it enforces data integrity with the help of both inner and outer signatures. Fourth, it helps users control the cost of cloud warehousing by balancing the load among service providers with respect to their pricing policies. To illustrate fVSS' efficiency, we thoroughly compare it with existing secret sharing-based approaches with respect to security features, querying power and data storage and computing costs.
In the first family of approaches @cite_15 @cite_7 @cite_6 @cite_1 @cite_3 , each table is encrypted into @math shared tables, each of which is stored at one given CSP (Figure ). Recall that only @math of @math shared tables are sufficient to reconstruct the original table. Most of these approaches assume that CSPs are not malicious and that connections between CSPs and users are secure. Only one @cite_7 includes a data verification process that exploits hash-generated signatures: an inner signature (incorporated to the shares) to verify whether CSPs are malicious, and an outer signature that helps detect incorrect or erroneous (lost, damaged, alternative...) data before decryption and prevents useless data transfers. Both signatures are stored at CSPs.
@cite_7 @cite_1 @cite_3 @cite_6 @cite_15
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The emerging use of the Internet for remote storage and backup has led to the problem of verifying that storage sites in a distributed system indeed store the data; this must often be done in the absence of knowledge of what the data should be. We use m n erasure-correcting coding to safeguard the stored data and use algebraic signatures hash functions with algebraic properties for verification. Our scheme primarily utilizes one such algebraic property: taking a signature of parity gives the same result as taking the parity of the signatures. To make our scheme collusionresistant, we blind data and parity by XORing them with a pseudo-random stream. Our scheme has three advantages over existing techniques. First, it uses only small messages for verification, an attractive property in a P2P setting where the storing peers often only have a small upstream pipe. Second, it allows verification of challenges across random data without the need for the challenger to compare against the original data. Third, it is highly resistant to coordinated attempts to undetectably modify data. These signature techniques are very fast, running at tens to hundreds of megabytes per second. Because of these properties, the use of algebraic signatures will permit the construction of large-scale distributed storage systems in which large amounts of storage can be verified with minimal network bandwidth. Users of content-based publish subscribe systems (CBPS) are interested in receiving data items with values that satisfy certain conditions. Each user submits a list of subscription specifications to a broker, which routes data items from publishers to users. When a broker receives a notification that contains a value from a publisher, it forwards it only to the subscribers whose requests match the value. However, in many applications, the data published are confidential, and their contents must not be revealed to brokers. Furthermore, a user's subscription may contain sensitive information that must be protected from brokers. Therefore, a difficult challenge arises: how to route publisher data to the appropriate subscribers without the intermediate brokers learning the plain text values of the notifications and subscriptions. To that extent, brokers must be able to perform operations on top of the encrypted contents of subscriptions and notifications. Such operations may be as simple as equality match, but often require more complex operations such as determining inclusion of data in a value interval. Previous work attempted to solve this problem by using one-way data mappings or specialized encryption functions that allow evaluation of conditions on ciphertexts. However, such operations are computationally expensive, and the resulting CBPS lack scalability. As fast dissemination is an important requirement in many applications, we focus on a new data transformation method called Asymmetric Scalar-product Preserving Encryption (ASPE) [1]. We devise methods that build upon ASPE to support private evaluation of several types of conditions. We also suggest techniques for secure aggregation of notifications, supporting functions such as sum, minimum, maximum and count. Our experimental evaluation shows that ASPE-based CBPS incurs 65 less overhead for exact-match filtering and 50 less overhead for range filtering compared to the state-of-the-art. This paper describes a cryptographic protocol for securing self-organized data storage through periodic verifications. The proposed verification protocol, which goes beyond simple integrity checks and proves data conservation, is deterministic, efficient, and scalable. The security of this scheme relies both on the ECDLP intractability assumption and on the difficulty of finding the order of some specific elliptic curve over Zn. The protocol also makes it possible to personalize replicas and to delegate verification without revealing any secret information. Restoration of writing order from a single-stroked handwriting image can be seen as the problem of finding the smoothest path in its graph representation. In this paper, a 3-phase approach to restore a writing order is proposed within the framework of the edge continuity relation (ECR). In the initial, local phase, in order to obtain possible ECRs at an even-degree node, a neural network is used for the node of degree 4 and a theoretical approach is presented for the node of degree higher than 4 by introducing certain reasonable assumptions. In the second phase, we identify double-traced lines by employing maximum weighted matching. This makes it possible to transform the problem of obtaining possible ECRs at odd-degree node to that at even-degree node. In the final, global phase, we find all the candidates of single-stroked paths by depth first search and select the best one by evaluating SLALOM smoothness. Experiments on static images converted from online data in the Unipen database show that our method achieves a restoration rate of 96.0 percent We present an offline signature verification system using three different pseudo-dynamic features, two different classifier training approaches and two datasets. One of the most difficult problems of off-line signature verification is that the signature is just a static image while losing a lot of useful dynamic information. Three separate pseudo-dynamic features based on gray level: local binary pattern (LBP), gray level co-occurrence matrix (GLCM) and histogram of oriented gradients (HOG) are used. The classification is performed using writer-dependent Support Vector Machine (SVMs) classifiers and Global Real Adaboost method, where two different approaches to train the classifier. In the first mode, each SVM is trained with the feature vectors obtained from the reference signatures of the corresponding user and those random forgeries for each signer while the global Adaboost classifier is trained using genuine and random forgery signatures of signers that are excluded from the test set. The fusion of all features achieves the best result of 7.66 and 9.94 equal error rate in GPDS while 7.55 and 11.55 equal error rate in CSD respectively. We provide formal definitions and efficient secure techniques for turning noisy information into keys usable for any cryptographic application, and, in particular, reliably and securely authenticating biometric data. Our techniques apply not just to biometric information, but to any keying material that, unlike traditional cryptographic keys, is (1) not reproducible precisely and (2) not distributed uniformly. We propose two primitives: a fuzzy extractor reliably extracts nearly uniform randomness @math from its input; the extraction is error-tolerant in the sense that @math will be the same even if the input changes, as long as it remains reasonably close to the original. Thus, @math can be used as a key in a cryptographic application. A secure sketch produces public information about its input @math that does not reveal @math and yet allows exact recovery of @math given another value that is close to @math . Thus, it can be used to reliably reproduce error-prone biometric inputs without incurring the security risk inherent in storing them. We define the primitives to be both formally secure and versatile, generalizing much prior work. In addition, we provide nearly optimal constructions of both primitives for various measures of “closeness” of input data, such as Hamming distance, edit distance, and set difference. A state-of-art offline signature verification system is presented.Complementary approaches and features are fused at multiple levels.Useful local binary patterns are selected for offline signature verification.In-depth analysis of the effects of alignment for registering signatures is done.A new feature is proposed from SIFT keypoint alignment. Offline signature verification is a task that benefits from matching both the global shape and local details; as such, it is particularly suitable to a fusion approach. We present a system that uses a score-level fusion of complementary classifiers that use different local features (histogram of oriented gradients, local binary patterns and scale invariant feature transform descriptors), where each classifier uses a feature-level fusion to represent local features at coarse-to-fine levels. For classifiers, two different approaches are investigated, namely global and user-dependent classifiers. User-dependent classifiers are trained separately for each user, to learn to differentiate that users genuine signatures from other signatures; while a single global classifier is trained with difference vectors of query and reference signatures of all users in the training set, to learn the importance of different types of dissimilarities.The fusion of all classifiers achieves a state-of-the-art performance with 6.97 equal error rate in skilled forgery tests using the public GPDS-160 signature database. The proposed system does not require skilled forgeries of the enrolling user, which is essential for real life applications. In this paper, the fundamental insecurities hampering a scalable, wide-spread deployment of biometric authentication are examined, and a cryptosystem capable of using fingerprint data as its key is presented. For our application, we focus on situations where a private key stored on a smartcard is used for authentication in a networked environment, and we assume an attacker can launch o -line attacks against a stolen card.Juels and Sudan's fuzzy vault is used as a starting point for building and analyzing a secure authentication scheme using fingerprints and smartcards called a figerprint vault. Fingerprint minutiae coordinates mi are encoded as elements in a nite eld F and the secret key is encoded in a polynomial f(x) over F[x]. The polynomial is evaluated at the minutiae locations, and the pairs (mi, f(mi)) are stored along with random (ci, di) cha points such that di ≠ f(ci). Given a matching fingerprint, a valid user can seperate out enough true points from the cha points to reconstruct f(x), and hence the original secret key.The parameters of the vault are selected such that the attacker's vault unlocking complexity is maximized, subject to zero unlocking complexity with a matching fingerprint and a reasonable amount of error. For a feature location measurement variance of 9 pixels, the optimal vault is 269 times more difficult to unlock for an attacker compared to a user posessing a matching fingerprint, along with approximately a 30 chance of unlocking failure. We study a fingerprinting game in which the number of colluders and the collusion channel are unknown. The encoder embeds fingerprints into a host sequence and provides the decoder with the capability to trace back pirated copies to the colluders. Fingerprinting capacity has recently been derived as the limit value of a sequence of maximin games with mutual information as their payoff functions. However, these games generally do not admit saddle-point solutions and are very hard to solve numerically. Here under the so-called Boneh-Shaw marking assumption, we reformulate the capacity as the value of a single two-person zero-sum game, and show that it is achieved by a saddle-point solution. If the maximal coalition size is k and the fingerprinting alphabet is binary, we show that capacity decays quadratically with k. Furthermore, we prove rigorously that the asymptotic capacity is 1 (k221n2) and we confirm our earlier conjecture that Tardos' choice of the arcsine distribution asymptotically maximizes the mutual information payoff function while the interleaving attack minimizes it. Along with the asymptotics, numerical solutions to the game for small k are also presented. When formalizing security protocols, different specification languages support very different reasoning methodologies, whose results are not directly or easily comparable. Therefore, establishing clear mappings among different frameworks is highly desirable, as it permits various methodologies to cooperate by interpreting theoretical and practical results of one system in another. In this paper, we examine the non-trivial relationship between two general verification frameworks: multiset rewriting (MSR) and a process algebra (PA) inspired to CCS and the π-calculus. Although defining a simple and general bijection between MSR and PA appears difficult, we show that the sublanguages needed to specify a large class of cryptographic protocols (immediate decryption protocols) admits an effective translation that is not only bijective and trace-preserving, but also induces a weak form of bisimulation across the two languages. In particular, the correspondence sketched in this abstract permits transferring several important trace-based properties such as secrecy and many forms of authentication. We initiate a study of when the value of mathematical relaxations such as linear and semi-definite programs for constraint satisfaction problems (CSPs) is approximately preserved when restricting the instance to a sub-instance induced by a small random subsample of the variables. Let C be a family of CSPs such as 3SAT, Max-Cut, etc., and let Π be a mathematical program that is a relaxation for C, in the sense that for every instance P ∈ C, Π(P) is a number in [0, 1] upper bounding the maximum fraction of satisfiable constraints of P. Loosely speaking, we say that subsampling holds for C and Π if for every sufficiently dense instance P ∈ C and every e > 0, if we let P' be the instance obtained by restricting P to a sufficiently large constant number of variables, then Π(P') ∈ (1 ± e)Π(P). We say that weak subsampling holds if the above guarantee is replaced with Π(P') = 1 − θ(γ) whenever Π(P) = 1 − γ, where θ hides only absolute constants. We obtain both positive and negative results, showing that: 1. Subsampling holds for the BasicLP and BasicSDP programs. BasicSDP is a variant of the semi-definite program considered by Raghavendra (2008), who showed it gives an optimal approximation factor for every constraint-satisfaction problem under the unique games conjecture. BasicLP is the linear programming analog of BasicSDP. 2. For tighter versions of BasicSDP obtained by adding additional constraints from the Lasserre hierarchy, weak subsampling holds for CSPs of unique games type. 3. There are non-unique CSPs for which even weak subsampling fails for the above tighter semi-definite programs. Also there are unique CSPs for which (even weak) subsampling fails for the Sherali-Adams linear programming hierarchy. As a corollary of our weak subsampling for strong semi-definite programs, we obtain a polynomial-time algorithm to certify that random geometric graphs (of the type considered by Feige and Schechtman, 2002) of max-cut value 1 − γ have a cut value at most 1 − γ 10. More generally, our results give an approach to obtaining average-case algorithms for CSPs using semi-definite programming hierarchies. We consider the problem of threshold secret sharing in groups with hierarchical structure. In such settings, the secret is shared among a group of participants that is partitioned into levels. The access structure is then determined by a sequence of threshold requirements: a subset of participants is authorized if it has at least k0 0 members from the highest level, as well as at least k1 > k0 members from the two highest levels and so forth. Such problems may occur in settings where the participants differ in their authority or level of confidence and the presence of higher level participants is imperative to allow the recovery of the common secret. Even though secret sharing in hierarchical groups has been studied extensively in the past, none of the existing solutions addresses the simple setting where, say, a bank transfer should be signed by three employees, at least one of whom must be a department manager. We present a perfect secret sharing scheme for this problem that, unlike most secret sharing schemes that are suitable for hierarchical structures, is ideal. As in Shamir's scheme, the secret is represented as the free coefficient of some polynomial. The novelty of our scheme is the usage of polynomial derivatives in order to generate lesser shares for participants of lower levels. Consequently, our scheme uses Birkhoff interpolation, i.e., the construction of a polynomial according to an unstructured set of point and derivative values. A substantial part of our discussion is dedicated to the question of how to assign identities to the participants from the underlying finite field so that the resulting Birkhoff interpolation problem will be well posed. In addition, we devise an ideal and efficient secret sharing scheme for the closely related hierarchical threshold access structures that were studied by Simmons and Brickell. Processing queries on encrypted data protects sensitive data stored in cloud databases. CryptDB has introduced the approach of adjustable encryption for such processing. A database column is adjusted to the necessary level of encryption, e.g. order-preserving, for the set of executed queries, but never reversed. This has the drawback that long running cloud databases will eventually transform into only order-preserving encrypted databases. In this paper we propose searchable encryption as an alternative in order to reduce this encryption degradation. It maintains security while only marginally impacting performance when applied only to infrequently used queries for searching. We present a budget-based encryption selection algorithm as part of query planning for making the appropriate choice between searchable and deterministic or order-preserving encryption. We evaluate our algorithm on a long-tail distributed TPC-C benchmark on an experimental implementation of encrypted queries in an in-memory database. In one choice of parameters our algorithm incurs only a (1.5 ) performance penalty, but one of 15 columns is not decrypted to order-preserving or deterministic encryption. Our selection algorithm is configurable, such that higher security gains are possible at the cost of performance. Cloud storage services enable users to remotely access data in a cloud anytime and anywhere, using any device, in a pay-as-you-go manner. Moving data into a cloud offers great convenience to users since they do not have to care about the large capital investment in both the deployment and management of the hardware infrastructures. However, allowing a cloud service provider (CSP), whose purpose is mainly for making a profit, to take the custody of sensitive data, raises underlying security and privacy issues. To keep user data confidential against an untrusted CSP, a natural way is to apply cryptographic approaches, by disclosing the data decryption key only to authorized users. However, when a user wants to retrieve files containing certain keywords using a thin client, the adopted encryption system should not only support keyword searching over encrypted data, but also provide high performance. In this paper, we investigate the characteristics of cloud storage services and propose a secure and privacy preserving keyword searching (SPKS) scheme, which allows the CSP to participate in the decipherment, and to return only files containing certain keywords specified by the users, so as to reduce both the computational and communication overhead in decryption for users, on the condition of preserving user data privacy and user querying privacy. Performance analysis shows that the SPKS scheme is applicable to a cloud environment. We formulate and study a privacy guarantee to data owners, who share information with clients by publishing views of a proprietary database. The owner identi.es the sensitive proprietary data using a secret query against the proprietary database. Given an extra view, the privacy guarantee ensures that potential attackers will not learn any information about the secret that could not already be obtained from the existing views. We de.ne “learning” as the modi.cation of the attacker's a-priori probability distribution on the set of possible secrets. We assume arbitrary a-priori distributions (including distributions that correlate the existence of particular tuples) and solve the problem when secret and views are expressed as unions of conjunctive queries with non-equalities, under integrity constraints. We consider guarantees (a) for given view extents (b) for given domain of the secret and (c) independent of the domain and extents. Fingerprinting provides a means of tracing unauthorized redistribution of digital data by individually marking each authorized copy with a personalized serial number. In order to prevent a group of users from collectively escaping identification, collusion-secure fingerprinting codes have been proposed. In this paper, we introduce a new construction of a collusion-secure fingerprinting code which is similar to a recent construction by Tardos but achieves shorter code lengths and allows for codes over arbitrary alphabets. We present results for symmetric' coalition strategies. For binary alphabets and a false accusation probability @math , a code length of @math symbols is provably sufficient, for large c 0, to withstand collusion attacks of up to c 0 colluders. This improves Tardos' construction by a factor of 10. Furthermore, invoking the Central Limit Theorem in the case of sufficiently large c 0, we show that even a code length of @math is adequate. Assuming the restricted digit model, the code length can be further reduced by moving from a binary alphabet to a q-ary alphabet. Numerical results show that a reduction of 35 is achievable for q = 3 and 80 for q = 10. Secret sharing and multiparty computation (also called "secure function evaluation") are fundamental primitives in modern cryptography, allowing a group of mutually distrustful players to perform correct, distributed computations under the sole assumption that some number of them will follow the protocol honestly. This paper investigates how much trust is necessary -- that is, how many players must remain honest -- in order for distributed quantum computations to be possible. We present a verifiable quantum secret sharing (VQSS) protocol, and a general secure multiparty quantum computation (MPQC) protocol, which can tolerate any [ n - 1 2 ] cheaters among n players. Previous protocols for these tasks tolerated [ n - 1 4 ] and [ n - 1 6 ] cheaters, respectively. The threshold we achieve is tight -- even in the classical case, "fair" multiparty computation is not possible if any set of n 2 players can cheat. Our protocols rely on approximate quantum errorcorrecting codes, which can tolerate a larger fraction of errors than traditional, exact codes. We introduce new families of authentication schemes and approximate codes tailored to the needs of our protocols, as well as new state purification techniques along the lines of those used in faulttolerant quantum circuits. In several distributed systems a user should only be able to access data if a user posses a certain set of credentials or attributes. Currently, the only method for enforcing such policies is to employ a trusted server to store the data and mediate access control. However, if any server storing the data is compromised, then the confidentiality of the data will be compromised. In this paper we present a system for realizing complex access control on encrypted data that we call ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption. By using our techniques encrypted data can be kept confidential even if the storage server is untrusted; moreover, our methods are secure against collusion attacks. Previous attribute-based encryption systems used attributes to describe the encrypted data and built policies into user's keys; while in our system attributes are used to describe a user's credentials, and a party encrypting data determines a policy for who can decrypt. Thus, our methods are conceptually closer to traditional access control methods such as role-based access control (RBAC). In addition, we provide an implementation of our system and give performance measurements. This article deals with the computation of consistent answers to queries on relational databases that violate primary key constraints. A repair of such inconsistent database is obtained by selecting a maximal number of tuples from each relation without ever selecting two distinct tuples that agree on the primary key. We are interested in the following problem: Given a Boolean conjunctive query q, compute a Boolean first-order (FO) query @j such that for every database db, @j evaluates to true on db if and only if q evaluates to true on every repair of db. Such @j is called a consistent FO rewriting of q. We use novel techniques to characterize classes of queries that have a consistent FO rewriting. In this way, we are able to extend previously known classes and discover new ones. Finally, we use an Ehrenfeucht-Fraisse game to show the non-existence of a consistent FO rewriting for @[email protected]?y(R([email protected]?,y)@?R([email protected]?,c)), where c is a constant and the first coordinate of R is the primary key. In data publishing, the owner delegates the role of satisfying user queries to a third-party publisher. As the publisher may be untrusted or susceptible to attacks, it could produce incorrect query results. In this paper, we introduce a scheme for users to verify that their query results are complete (i.e., no qualifying tuples are omitted) and authentic (i.e., all the result values originated from the owner). The scheme supports range selection on key and non-key attributes, project as well as join queries on relational databases. Moreover, the proposed scheme complies with access control policies, is computationally secure, and can be implemented efficiently.