Lurking is a complex user-behavioral phenomenon that occurs in all large-scale online communities and social networks. It generally refers to the behavior characterizing users that benefit from the information produced by others in the community without actively contributing back to the production of social content. The amount and evolution of lurkers may strongly affect an online social environment, therefore understanding the lurking dynamics and identifying strategies to curb this trend are relevant problems. In this regard, we introduce the Lurker Game, i.e., a model for analyzing the transitions from a lurking to a non-lurking (i.e., active) user role, and vice versa, in terms of evolutionary game theory. We evaluate the proposed Lurker Game by arranging agents on complex networks and analyzing the system evolution, seeking relations between the network topology and the final equilibrium of the game. Results suggest that the Lurker Game is suitable to model the lurking dynamics, showing how the adoption of rewarding mechanisms combined with the modeling of hypothetical heterogeneity of users' interests may lead users in an online community towards a cooperative behavior.
@cite_6 @cite_29 , the authors developed the first computational approach to lurker mining, focusing on ranking problems. To this purpose, they proposed a topology-driven definition of lurking behavior, based on principles of overconsumption, authoritativeness of the information received, and non-authoritativeness of the information produced. Quantitative and qualitative evaluation results showed how the proposed methods are effective in identifying and ranking lurkers in real-world OSNs.
@cite_29 @cite_6
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The massive presence of silent members in online communities, the so-called lurkers, has long attracted the attention of researchers in social science, cognitive psychology, and computer-human interaction. However, the study of lurking phenomena represents an unexplored opportunity of research in data mining, information retrieval and related fields. In this paper, we take a first step towards the formal specification and analysis of lurking in social networks. Particularly, focusing on the network topology, we address the new problem of lurker ranking and propose the first centrality methods specifically conceived for ranking lurkers in social networks. Using Twitter and FriendFeed as cases in point, our methods' performance was evaluated against data-driven rankings as well as existing centrality methods, including the classic PageRank and alpha-centrality. Empirical evidence has shown the significance of our lurker ranking approach, which substantially differs from other methods in effectively identifying and ranking lurkers. The massive presence of silent members in online communities, the so-called lurkers, has long attracted the attention of researchers in social science, cognitive psychology, and computer–human interaction. However, the study of lurking phenomena represents an unexplored opportunity of research in data mining, information retrieval and related fields. In this paper, we take a first step towards the formal specification and analysis of lurking in social networks. We address the new problem of lurker ranking and propose the first centrality methods specifically conceived for ranking lurkers in social networks. Our approach utilizes only the network topology without probing into text contents or user relationships related to media. Using Twitter, Flickr, FriendFeed and GooglePlus as cases in point, our methods’ performance was evaluated against data-driven rankings as well as existing centrality methods, including the classic PageRank and alpha-centrality. Empirical evidence has shown the significance of our lurker ranking approach, and its uniqueness in effectively identifying and ranking lurkers in an online social network. Lurkers are silent members of a social network (SN) who gain benefit from others' information without significantly giving back to the community. The study of lurking behaviors in SNs is nonetheless important, since these users acquire knowledge from the community, and as such they are social capital holders. Within this view, a major goal is to delurk such users, i.e., to encourage them to more actively be involved in the SN. Despite delurking strategies have been conceptualized in social science and human-computer interaction research, no computational approach has been so far defined to turn lurkers into active participants in the SN. In this work we fill this gap by presenting a delurking-oriented targeted influence maximization problem under the linear threshold (LT) model. We define a novel objective function, in terms of the lurking scores associated with the nodes in the final active set, and we show it is monotone and submodular. We provide an approximate solution by developing a greedy algorithm, named DEvOTION, which computes a k- node set that maximizes the value of the delurking-capital-based objective function, for a given minimum lurking score threshold. Results on SN datasets of different sizes have demonstrated the significance of our delurking approach via LT-based targeted influence maximization. The probability that a user will click a search result depends both on its relevance and its position on the results page. The position based model explains this behavior by ascribing to every item an attraction probability, and to every position an examination probability. To be clicked, a result must be both attractive and examined. The probabilities of an item-position pair being clicked thus form the entries of a rank- @math matrix. We propose the learning problem of a Bernoulli rank- @math bandit where at each step, the learning agent chooses a pair of row and column arms, and receives the product of their Bernoulli-distributed values as a reward. This is a special case of the stochastic rank- @math bandit problem considered in recent work that proposed an elimination based algorithm Rank1Elim, and showed that Rank1Elim's regret scales linearly with the number of rows and columns on "benign" instances. These are the instances where the minimum of the average row and column rewards @math is bounded away from zero. The issue with Rank1Elim is that it fails to be competitive with straightforward bandit strategies as @math . In this paper we propose Rank1ElimKL which simply replaces the (crude) confidence intervals of Rank1Elim with confidence intervals based on Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergences, and with the help of a novel result concerning the scaling of KL divergences we prove that with this change, our algorithm will be competitive no matter the value of @math . Experiments with synthetic data confirm that on benign instances the performance of Rank1ElimKL is significantly better than that of even Rank1Elim, while experiments with models derived from real data confirm that the improvements are significant across the board, regardless of whether the data is benign or not.