WeChat is a mobile messaging application that has 549 million active users as of Q1 2015, and “WeChat Moments” (WM) serves its social-networking function that allows users to post share links of web pages. WM differs from the other social networks as it imposes many restrictions on the information diffusion process to mitigate the information overload. In this paper, we conduct a measurement study on information diffusion in the WM network by crawling and analyzing the spreading statistics of more than 160,000 pages that involve approximately 40 million users. Specifically, we identify the relationship of the number of posted pages and the number of views, the diffusion path length, the similarity and distribution of users' locations as well as their connections with the GDP of the users' province. For each individual WM page, we measure its temporal characteristics (e.g., the life time, the popularity within a time period); for each individual user, we evaluate how many of, or how likely, one's friends will view his posted pages. Our results will help the business to decide when and how to release the marketing pages over WM for better publicity.
Anonymous social networks provide users with a platform to post messages and communicate without showing their real identity. Some researchers have focused on studying many anonymous communicating platforms such as Whispers @cite_17 , Yik Yak @cite_13 and YouBeMom @cite_16 . Unlike the open social networks, these anonymous platforms well support the protection for users' privacy, as there is no way to figure out the real identify of any user when the information diffusion between two users is established via their weak ties'' such as on their location, interests, or friends in common, rather than the real-world friend relationship. However, such a relationship over weak ties may discourage the users to share a post or even disrupt the diffusion process of a message.
@cite_16 @cite_13 @cite_17
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Social interactions and interpersonal communication has undergone significant changes in recent years. Increasing awareness of privacy issues and events such as the Snowden disclosures have led to the rapid growth of a new generation of anonymous social networks and messaging applications. By removing traditional concepts of strong identities and social links, these services encourage communication between strangers, and allow users to express themselves without fear of bullying or ret aliation. Despite millions of users and billions of monthly page views, there is little empirical analysis of how services like Whisper have changed the shape and content of social interactions. In this paper, we present results of the first large-scale empirical study of an anonymous social network, using a complete 3-month trace of the Whisper network covering 24 million whispers written by more than 1 million unique users. We seek to understand how anonymity and the lack of social links affect user behavior. We analyze Whisper from a number of perspectives, including the structure of user interactions in the absence of persistent social links, user engagement and network stickiness over time, and content moderation in a network with minimal user accountability. Finally, we identify and test an attack that exposes Whisper users to detailed location tracking. We have notified Whisper and they have taken steps to address the problem. In order to address privacy concerns, many social media websites allow users to hide their personal profiles from the public. In this work, we show how an adversary can exploit an online social network with a mixture of public and private user profiles to predict the private attributes of users. We map this problem to a relational classification problem and we propose practical models that use friendship and group membership information (which is often not hidden) to infer sensitive attributes. The key novel idea is that in addition to friendship links, groups can be carriers of significant information. We show that on several well-known social media sites, we can easily and accurately recover the information of private-profile users. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work that uses link-based and group-based classification to study privacy implications in social networks with mixed public and private user profiles. The use of new technologies along with the popularity of social networks has given the power of anonymity to the users. The ability to create an alter-ego with no relation to the actual user, creates a situation in which no one can certify the match between a profile and a real person. This problem generates situations, repeated daily, in which users with fake accounts, or at least not related to their real identity, publish news, reviews or multimedia material trying to discredit or attack other people who may or may not be aware of the attack. These acts can have great impact on the affected victims’ environment generating situations in which virtual attacks escalate into fatal consequences in real life. In this paper, we present a methodology to detect and associate fake profiles on Twitter social network which are employed for defamatory activities to a real profile within the same network by analysing the content of comments generated by both profiles. Accompanying this approach we also present a successful real life use case in which this methodology was applied to detect and stop a cyberbullying situation in a real elementary school. Online Social Networks (OSNs) encourage users to create an online presence that reflects their offline identity. OSNs create the illusion that these online accounts correspond to the correct offline person, but in reality the OSN lacks the resources to detect impersonation. We propose that OSN users identify each other based on interaction and experience. We believe that impersonation can be thwarted by users who possess exclusive shared knowledge, secret information shared only between a pair of OSN friends. We describe existing protocols that use shared secrets to exchange public keys without revealing those secrets to attackers. We present results from a user study on Facebook to show that users do share exclusive knowledge with their Facebook friends and attackers are rarely able to guess that knowledge. Finally, we show that friend identification can be extended using a web of trust built on the OSN friend graph.