We present a system for generating inconspicuous-looking textures that, when displayed in the physical world as digital or printed posters, cause visual object tracking systems to become confused. For instance, as a target being tracked by a robot's camera moves in front of such a poster, our generated texture makes the tracker lock onto it and allows the target to evade. This work aims to fool seldom-targeted regression tasks, and in particular compares diverse optimization strategies: non-targeted, targeted, and a new family of guided adversarial losses. While we use the Expectation Over Transformation (EOT) algorithm to generate physical adversaries that fool tracking models when imaged under diverse conditions, we compare the impacts of different conditioning variables, including viewpoint, lighting, and appearances, to find practical attack setups with high resulting adversarial strength and convergence speed. We further showcase textures optimized solely using simulated scenes can confuse real-world tracking systems.
CAMOU is a attack that also applied EOT to find adversarial textures for a car's 3-D model, such that object detection networks would ignore it in images produced by a photo-realistic rendering engine. CAMOU approximated the gradient of an adversarial objective through both the complex rendering process and opaque victim network, by using a learned surrogate mapping @cite_8 from the texture space directly onto the detector's confidence score. Despite their success, this method was not tested in real-world settings, and also incurs high computational costs and potential instability risks by alternating between the optimizations of the surrogate model and adversarial perturbations.
@cite_8
2783882201 2797328537 2479644247 2906586812
We propose a new real-world attack against the computer vision based systems of autonomous vehicles (AVs). Our novel Sign Embedding attack exploits the concept of adversarial examples to modify innocuous signs and advertisements in the environment such that they are classified as the adversary's desired traffic sign with high confidence. Our attack greatly expands the scope of the threat posed to AVs since adversaries are no longer restricted to just modifying existing traffic signs as in previous work. Our attack pipeline generates adversarial samples which are robust to the environmental conditions and noisy image transformations present in the physical world. We ensure this by including a variety of possible image transformations in the optimization problem used to generate adversarial samples. We verify the robustness of the adversarial samples by printing them out and carrying out drive-by tests simulating the conditions under which image capture would occur in a real-world scenario. We experimented with physical attack samples for different distances, lighting conditions, and camera angles. In addition, extensive evaluations were carried out in the virtual setting for a variety of image transformations. The adversarial samples generated using our method have adversarial success rates in excess of 95 in the physical as well as virtual settings. Given the ability to directly manipulate image pixels in the digital input space, an adversary can easily generate imperceptible perturbations to fool a Deep Neural Network (DNN) image classifier, as demonstrated in prior work. In this work, we tackle the more challenging problem of crafting physical adversarial perturbations to fool image-based object detectors like Faster R-CNN. Attacking an object detector is more difficult than attacking an image classifier, as it needs to mislead the classification results in multiple bounding boxes with different scales. Extending the digital attack to the physical world adds another layer of difficulty, because it requires the perturbation to be robust enough to survive real-world distortions due to different viewing distances and angles, lighting conditions, and camera limitations. We show that the Expectation over Transformation technique, which was originally proposed to enhance the robustness of adversarial perturbations in image classification, can be successfully adapted to the object detection setting. Our approach can generate adversarially perturbed stop signs that are consistently mis-detected by Faster R-CNN as other objects, posing a potential threat to autonomous vehicles and other safety-critical computer vision systems. In this paper, we propose a novel method for image inpainting based on a Deep Convolutional Generative Adversarial Network (DCGAN). We define a loss function consisting of two parts: (1) a contextual loss that preserves similarity between the input corrupted image and the recovered image, and (2) a perceptual loss that ensures a perceptually realistic output image. Given a corrupted image with missing values, we use back-propagation on this loss to map the corrupted image to a smaller latent space. The mapped vector is then passed through the generative model to predict the missing content. The proposed framework is evaluated on the CelebA and SVHN datasets for two challenging inpainting tasks with random 80 corruption and large blocky corruption. Experiments show that our method can successfully predict semantic information in the missing region and achieve pixel-level photorealism, which is impossible by almost all existing methods. In this paper, we proposed the first practical adversarial attacks against object detectors in realistic situations: the adversarial examples are placed in different angles and distances, especially in the long distance (over 20m) and wide angles 120 degree. To improve the robustness of adversarial examples, we proposed the nested adversarial examples and introduced the image transformation techniques. Transformation methods aim to simulate the variance factors such as distances, angles, illuminations, etc., in the physical world. Two kinds of attacks were implemented on YOLO V3, a state-of-the-art real-time object detector: hiding attack that fools the detector unable to recognize the object, and appearing attack that fools the detector to recognize the non-existent object. The adversarial examples are evaluated in three environments: indoor lab, outdoor environment, and the real road, and demonstrated to achieve the success rate up to 92.4 based on the distance range from 1m to 25m. In particular, the real road testing of hiding attack on a straight road and a crossing road produced the success rate of 75 and 64 respectively, and the appearing attack obtained the success rates of 63 and 81 respectively, which we believe, should catch the attention of the autonomous driving community.