Next generation Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) must reliably avoid moving obstacles. Existing dynamic collision avoidance methods are effective where obstacle trajectories are linear or known, but such restrictions are not accurate to many real-world UAV applications. We propose an efficient method of predicting an obstacle's motion based only on recent observations, via online training of an LSTM neural network. Given such predictions, we define a Nonlinear Probabilistic Velocity Obstacle (NPVO), which can be used select a velocity that is collision free with a given probability. We take a step towards formal verification of our approach, using statistical model checking to approximate the probability that our system will mispredict an obstacle's motion. Given such a probability, we prove upper bounds on the probability of collision in multiagent and reciprocal collision avoidance scenarios. Furthermore, we demonstrate in simulation that our method avoids collisions where state-of-the-art methods fail.
Finally, we take an important step towards rigorous verification of our framework. Existing results for formal verification of systems based on techniques like LSTM are highly limited @cite_18 @cite_13 @cite_6 , but formal guarantees are of vital importance for safety-critical applications like collision avoidance. We propose a novel statistical model checking formulation to approximate the probability that an obstacle will remain within certain bounds. Along the way, we demonstrate that predictions generated by our algorithm are robust to perception uncertainty in the form of additive Gaussian noise.
@cite_18 @cite_13 @cite_6
1980772307 2033118636 2963995490 2798356176
Security is a prerequisite for successfully establishing Car-to-X technology on the market. Sender authentication, message integrity as well as plausibility of the message content represent one of the key aspects in this domain. While the first two requirements are covered by means of cryptography, the latter is still subject to current research. Recent works in the area of vehicle behavior analysis include promising approaches, but are still prone to errors in case of highly dynamic driving maneuvers. In this work we present a novel two-stage verification process for reliable Car-to-X mobility data verification. The first stage consists of a mobility estimator realized by a Kalman filter. The Kalman filter is thereby used to evaluate received mobility data with respect to the path history of vehicles. In the second stage a plausibility check for highly dynamic traffic situations is applied using probabilistic traffic maneuver recognition based on Hidden Markov Models. The overall framework is implemented and its effectiveness is evaluated by means of real world experiments. This paper presents a methodology for safety verification of continuous and hybrid systems in the worst-case and stochastic settings. In the worst-case setting, a function of state termed barrier certificate is used to certify that all trajectories of the system starting from a given initial set do not enter an unsafe region. No explicit computation of reachable sets is required in the construction of barrier certificates, which makes it possible to handle nonlinearity, uncertainty, and constraints directly within this framework. In the stochastic setting, our method computes an upper bound on the probability that a trajectory of the system reaches the unsafe set, a bound whose validity is proven by the existence of a barrier certificate. For polynomial systems, barrier certificates can be constructed using convex optimization, and hence the method is computationally tractable. Some examples are provided to illustrate the use of the method. Motivated by the need to simultaneously guarantee safety and stability of safety-critical dynamical systems, we construct permissive barrier certificates in this paper that explicitly maximize the region where the system can be stabilized without violating safety constraints. An iterative search algorithm is developed to search for the maximum volume barrier certified region of safe stabilization. The barrier certified region, which is allowed to take any arbitrary shape, is proved to be strictly larger than safe regions generated with Lyapunov sublevel set based methods. The proposed approach effectively unites a Lyapunov function with multiple barrier functions that might not be compatible with each other. Simulation results of the iterative search algorithm demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed method. Due to the increasing deployment of Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) in real-world security-critical domains including autonomous vehicles and collision avoidance systems, formally checking security properties of DNNs, especially under different attacker capabilities, is becoming crucial. Most existing security testing techniques for DNNs try to find adversarial examples without providing any formal security guarantees about the non-existence of adversarial examples. Recently, several projects have used different types of Satisfiability Modulo Theory (SMT) solvers to formally check security properties of DNNs. However, all of these approaches are limited by the high overhead caused by the solver. In this paper, we present a new direction for formally checking security properties of DNNs without using SMT solvers. Instead, we leverage interval arithmetic to formally check security properties by computing rigorous bounds on the DNN outputs. Our approach, unlike existing solver-based approaches, is easily parallelizable. We further present symbolic interval analysis along with several other optimizations to minimize overestimations. We design, implement, and evaluate our approach as part of ReluVal, a system for formally checking security properties of Relu-based DNNs. Our extensive empirical results show that ReluVal outperforms Reluplex, a state-of-the-art solver-based system, by 200 times on average for the same security properties. ReluVal is able to prove a security property within 4 hours on a single 8-core machine without GPUs, while Reluplex deemed inconclusive due to timeout (more than 5 days). Our experiments demonstrate that symbolic interval analysis is a promising new direction towards rigorously analyzing different security properties of DNNs.