Federations among sets of Cloud Providers (CPs), whereby a set of CPs agree to mutually use their own resources to run the VMs of other CPs, are considered a promising solution to the problem of reducing the energy cost. In this paper, we address the problem of federation formation for a set of CPs, whose solution is necessary to exploit the potential of cloud federations for the reduction of the energy bill. We devise a distributed algorithm, based on cooperative game theory, that allows a set of CPs to cooperatively set up their federations in such a way that their individual profit is increased with respect to the case in which they work in isolation, and we show that, by using our algorithm and the proposed CPs' utility function, they are able to self-organize into Nash-stable federations and, by means of iterated executions, to adapt themselves to environmental changes. Numerical results are presented to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed algorithm.
In @cite_6 , the problem of sharing unused capacity in a federation of CPs for VM spot market is formulated as a non-cooperative repeated game. Specifically, by using a Markov model to predict future non-spot workload, the authors introduce a set of capacity sharing strategies that maximize the federation's long-term revenue and propose a dynamic programming algorithm to find the allocation rules needed to achieve it. Our work can complement this approach by providing a solution to the formation of CP federations for non-spot VM instances.
@cite_6
2087455320 2038973419 2614461528 2065752649
This paper presents a novel economic model to regulate capacity sharing in a federation of hybrid cloud providers (CPs). The proposed work models the interactions among the CPs as a repeated game among selfish players that aim at maximizing their profit by selling their unused capacity in the spot market but are uncertain of future workload fluctuations. The proposed work first establishes that the uncertainty in future revenue can act as a participation incentive to sharing in the repeated game. We, then, demonstrate how an efficient sharing strategy can be obtained via solving a simple dynamic programming problem. The obtained strategy is a simple update rule that depends only on the current workloads and a single variable summarizing past interactions. In contrast to existing approaches, the model incorporates historical and expected future revenue as part of the virtual machine (VM) sharing decision. Moreover, these decisions are not enforced neither by a centralized broker nor by predefined agreements. Rather, the proposed model employs a simple grim trigger strategy where a CP is threatened by the elimination of future VM hosting by other CPs. Simulation results demonstrate the performance of the proposed model in terms of the increased profit and the reduction in the variance in the spot market VM availability and prices. Distributed resource allocation is a very important and complex problem in emerging horizontal dynamic cloud federation (HDCF) platforms, where different cloud providers (CPs) collaborate dynamically to gain economies of scale and enlargements of their virtual machine (VM) infrastructure capabilities in order to meet consumer requirements. HDCF platforms differ from the existing vertical supply chain federation (VSCF) models in terms of establishing federation and dynamic pricing. There is a need to develop algorithms that can capture this complexity and easily solve distributed VM resource allocation problem in a HDCF platform. In this paper, we propose a cooperative game-theoretic solution that is mutually beneficial to the CPs. It is shown that in non-cooperative environment, the optimal aggregated benefit received by the CPs is not guaranteed. We study two utility maximizing cooperative resource allocation games in a HDCF environment. We use price-based resource allocation strategy and present both centralized and distributed algorithms to find optimal solutions to these games. Various simulations were carried out to verify the proposed algorithms. The simulation results demonstrate that the algorithms are effective, showing robust performance for resource allocation and requiring minimal computation time. Optimizing shared vehicle systems (bike-sharing car-sharing ride-sharing) is more challenging compared to traditional resource allocation settings due to the presence of complex network externalities. In particular, changes in the demand supply at any location (via dynamic pricing, rebalancing of empty vehicles, etc.) affect future supply throughout the system within short timescales. Such externalities are well captured by steady-state Markovian models, which are therefore widely used to analyze and design shared vehicle systems. However, using such models to design pricing control policies is computationally difficult since the resulting optimization problems are high-dimensional and non-convex. To this end, we develop a general approximation framework for designing pricing policies in shared vehicle systems, based on a novel convex relaxation which we term elevated flow relaxation. Our approach provides the first efficient algorithms with rigorous approximation guarantees for a wide range of objective functions (throughput, revenue, welfare). For any shared vehicle system with @math stations and m vehicles, our framework provides a pricing policy with an approximation ratio of 1+(n-1) m. This guarantee is particularly meaningful when m n, the average number of vehicles per station is large, as is often the case in practice. Further, the simplicity of our approach allows us to extend it to more complex settings. Apart from pricing, shared vehicle systems enable other control levers for modulating demand and supply, e.g. rebalancing empty vehicles, redirecting riders to nearby vehicles, etc. Our approach yields efficient algorithms with the same approximation guarantees for all these problems, and in the process, obtains as special cases several existing heuristics and asymptotic guarantees. We also extend our approach to obtain bi-criterion guarantees in multi-objective settings; we illustrate this with the example of Ramsey pricing. From a technical perspective, our work develops a new approach for obtaining control policies with approximation guarantees in steady-state Markovian models. Our approach can be distilled into the following three-step program: (i) construct an upper bound via a relaxation to the original problem that encodes essential conservation laws of the system, (ii) identify a family of control policies inducing known steady-state distributions that achieve the value of the relaxed solution in an appropriate scaling limit (in our case, state-independent policies in the limit m++), and (iii) characterize the performance loss between the finite system (i.e. fixed m) and the scaling limit. This technique may be of independent interest for other settings. Cloud resources are usually priced in multiple markets with different service guarantees. For example, Amazon EC2 prices virtual instances under three pricing schemes -- the subscription option (a.k.a., Reserved Instances), the pay-as-you-go offer (a.k.a., On-Demand Instances), and an auction-like spot market (a.k.a., Spot Instances) -- simultaneously. There arises a new problem of capacity segmentation: how can a provider allocate resources to different categories of pricing schemes, so that the total revenue is maximized? In this paper, we consider an EC2-like pricing scheme with traditional pay-as-you-go pricing augmented by an auction market, where bidders periodically bid for resources and can use the instances for as long as they wish, until the clearing price exceeds their bids. We show that optimal periodic auctions must follow the design of m+1-price auction with seller's reservation price. Theoretical analysis also suggests the connections between periodic auctions and EC2 spot market. Furthermore, we formulate the optimal capacity segmentation strategy as a Markov decision process over some demand prediction window. To mitigate the high computational complexity of the conventional dynamic programming solution, we develop a near-optimal solution that has significantly lower complexity and is shown to asymptotically approach the optimal revenue.