This paper introduces algorithm instance games (AIGs) as a conceptual classification applying to games in which outcomes are resolved from joint strategies algorithmically. For such games, a fundamental question asks: How do the details of the algorithm's description influence agents' strategic behavior? We analyze two versions of an AIG based on the set-cover optimization problem. In these games, joint strategies correspond to instances of the set-cover problem, with each subset (of a given universe of elements) representing the strategy of a single agent. Outcomes are covers computed from the joint strategies by a set-cover algorithm. In one variant of this game, outcomes are computed by a deterministic greedy algorithm, and the other variant utilizes a non-deterministic form of the greedy algorithm. We characterize Nash equilibrium strategies for both versions of the game, finding that agents' strategies can vary considerably between the two settings. In particular, we find that the version of the game based on the deterministic algorithm only admits Nash equilibrium in which agents choose strategies (i.e., subsets) containing at most one element, with no two agents picking the same element. On the other hand, in the version of the game based on the non-deterministic algorithm, Nash equilibrium strategies can include agents with zero, one, or every element, and the same element can appear in the strategies of multiple agents.
Finally, a number of covering games have appeared in the algorithm game theory literature in recent years @cite_9 @cite_4 @cite_15 @cite_12 @cite_18 . Although they are based on covering problems like set-cover, the work presented in these papers has little in common with AIGs or the SCIG presented in the current paper. Typically, agents in these covering games correspond to elements in the universal set, and the subsets are given as part of the specification of the game. An agent's strategy then corresponds to a selection of subsets containing their element, and the joint strategy induces a covering of the agents elements. The distinction is that, in these covering games, joint strategies correspond to to a covering problem, whereas in our work, the joint strategies correspond to of a covering problem.
@cite_18 @cite_4 @cite_9 @cite_15 @cite_12
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We propose approximation algorithms under game-theoretic considerations. We indroduce and study the general covering problem which is a natural generalization of the well-studied max-n -cover problem. In the general covering problem, we are given a universal set of weighted elements E and n collections of subsets of the elements. The task is to choose one subset from each collection such that the total weight of their union is as large as possible. In our game-theoretic setting, the choice in each collection is made by an independent player. For covering an element, the players receive a payoff defined by a non-increasing utility sharing function. This function defines the fraction that each covering player receives from the weight of the elements. We show how to construct a utility sharing function such that every Nash Equilibrium approximates the optimal solution by a factor of @math . We also prove that any sequence of unilateral improving steps is polynomially bounded. This gives rise to a polynomial-time local search approximation algorithm whose approximation ratio is best possible. An instance of the generalized partial cover problem consists of a ground set U and a family of subsets @math . Each element e∈U is associated with a profit p(e), whereas each subset @math has a cost c(S). The objective is to find a minimum cost subcollection @math such that the combined profit of the elements covered by @math is at least P, a specified profit bound. In the prize-collecting version of this problem, there is no strict requirement to cover any element; however, if the subsets we pick leave an element e∈U uncovered, we incur a penalty of π(e). The goal is to identify a subcollection @math that minimizes the cost of @math plus the penalties of uncovered elements. Although problem-specific connections between the partial cover and the prize-collecting variants of a given covering problem have been explored and exploited, a more general connection remained open. The main contribution of this paper is to establish a formal relationship between these two variants. As a result, we present a unified framework for approximating problems that can be formulated or interpreted as special cases of generalized partial cover. We demonstrate the applicability of our method on a diverse collection of covering problems, for some of which we obtain the first non-trivial approximability results. In a STACS 2003 paper, Talwar analyzes the overpayment the VCG mechanism incurs for ensuring truthfulness in auctions. Among other results, he studies k-Set Cover (given a universe U and a collection of sets S 1 , S 2 , ? , S m , each having a cost c ( S i ) and at most k elements of U, find a minimum cost subcollection - a cover - whose union equals U) and shows that the payment of the VCG mechanism is at most k ? c ( OPT ' ) , where OPT ' is the best cover disjoint from the optimum cover OPT . The VCG mechanism requires finding an optimum cover. For k ? 3 , k-Set Cover is known to be NP-hard, and thus truthful mechanisms based on approximation algorithms are desirable. We show that the payment incurred by two mechanisms based on approximation algorithms (including the Greedy algorithm) is bounded by ( k - 1 ) c ( OPT ) + k ? c ( OPT ' ) . The same approximation algorithms have payment bounded by k ( c ( OPT ) + c ( OPT ' ) ) when applied to more general set systems, which include k-Polymatroid Cover, a problem related to Steiner Tree computations. If q is such that an element in a k-Set Cover instance appears in at most q sets, we show that the total payment based on our algorithms is bounded by q ? k 2 times the total payment of the VCG mechanism. We propose a hybrid model for automatically acquiring a policy for a complex game, which combines online learning with mining knowledge from a corpus of human game play. Our hypothesis is that a player that learns its policies by combining (online) exploration with biases towards human behaviour that's attested in a corpus of humans playing the game will outperform any agent that uses only one of the knowledge sources. During game play, the agent extracts similar moves made by players in the corpus in similar situations, and approximates their utility alongside other possible options by performing simulations from its current state. We implement and assess our model in an agent playing the complex win-lose board game Settlers of Catan, which lacks an implementation that would challenge a human expert. The results from the preliminary set of experiments illustrate the potential of such a joint model.