Data from software repositories have become an important foundation for the empirical study of software engineering processes. A recurring theme in the repository mining literature is the inference of developer networks capturing e.g. collaboration, coordination, or communication, from the commit history of projects. Most of the studied networks are based on the co-authorship of software artefacts defined at the level of files, modules, or packages. While this approach has led to insights into the social aspects of software development, it neglects detailed information on code changes and code ownership, e.g. which exact lines of code have been authored by which developers, that is contained in the commit log of software projects. Addressing this issue, we introduce git2net, a scalable python software that facilitates the extraction of fine-grained co-editing networks in large git repositories. It uses text mining techniques to analyse the detailed history of textual modifications within files. This information allows us to construct directed, weighted, and time-stamped networks, where a link signifies that one developer has edited a block of source code originally written by another developer. Our tool is applied in case studies of an Open Source and a commercial software project. We argue that it opens up a massive new source of high-resolution data on human collaboration patterns.
While such a fine-grained analysis of the co-editing behaviour of developers has its advantages, it also introduces challenges that have so far limited its adoption. First and foremost, it requires a detailed analysis of file modifications and makes it necessary to identify the original author for every modified line of code affected in each commit. Requiring a potentially large number of git operations for every commit being analysed, such an analysis is both complicated to implement as well as time-consuming to perform. Compared to other approaches, which often merely require a suitable query in structured databases like ghTorrent @cite_3 @cite_12 , a tool that facilitates this task for very large repositories is still missing.
@cite_12 @cite_3
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The paper presents an adaptive approach to perform impact analysis from a given change request to source code. Given a textual change request (e.g., a bug report), a single snapshot (release) of source code, indexed using Latent Semantic Indexing, is used to estimate the impact set. Should additional contextual information be available, the approach configures the best-fit combination to produce an improved impact set. Contextual information includes the execution trace and an initial source code entity verified for change. Combinations of information retrieval, dynamic analysis, and data mining of past source code commits are considered. The research hypothesis is that these combinations help counter the precision or recall deficit of individual techniques and improve the overall accuracy. The tandem operation of the three techniques sets it apart from other related solutions. Automation along with the effective utilization of two key sources of developer knowledge, which are often overlooked in impact analysis at the change request level, is achieved. To validate our approach, we conducted an empirical evaluation on four open source software systems. A benchmark consisting of a number of maintenance issues, such as feature requests and bug fixes, and their associated source code changes was established by manual examination of these systems and their change history. Our results indicate that there are combinations formed from the augmented developer contextual information that show statistically significant improvement over stand-alone approaches. A critical aspect of malware forensics is authorship analysis. The successful outcome of such analysis is usually determined by the reverse engineer’s skills and by the volume and complexity of the code under analysis. To assist reverse engineers in such a tedious and error-prone task, it is desirable to develop reliable and automated tools for supporting the practice of malware authorship attribution. In a recent work, machine learning was used to rank and select syntax-based features such as n-grams and flow graphs. The experimental results showed that the top ranked features were unique for each author, which was regarded as an evidence that those features capture the author’s programming styles. In this paper, however, we show that the uniqueness of features does not necessarily correspond to authorship. Specifically, our analysis demonstrates that many “unique” features selected using this method are clearly unrelated to the authors’ programming styles, for example, unique IDs or random but unique function names generated by the compiler; furthermore, the overall accuracy is generally unsatisfactory. Motivated by this discovery, we propose a layered Onion Approach for Binary Authorship Attribution called OBA2. The novelty of our approach lies in the three complementary layers: preprocessing, syntax-based attribution, and semantic-based attribution. Experiments show that our method produces results that not only are more accurate but have a meaningful connection to the authors’ styles. a 2014 The Author. Published by Elsevier Ltd on behalf of DFRWS. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http: creativecommons.org licenses by-nc-nd 3.0 ). Large software systems undergo significant evolution during their lifespan, yet often individual changes are not well documented. In this work, we seek to automatically classify large changes into various categories of maintenance tasks — corrective, adaptive, perfective, feature addition, and non-functional improvement — using machine learning techniques. In a previous paper, we found that many commits could be classified easily and reliably based solely on the manual analysis of the commit metadata and commit messages (i.e., without reference to the source code). Our extension is the automation of classification by training Machine Learners on features extracted from the commit metadata, such as the word distribution of a commit message, commit author, and modules modified. We validated the results of the learners via 10-fold cross validation, which achieved accuracies consistently above 50 , indicating good to fair results. We found that the identity of the author of a commit provided much information about the maintenance class of a commit, almost as much as the words of the commit message. This implies that for most large commits, the Source Control System (SCS) commit messages plus the commit author identity is enough information to accurately and automatically categorize the nature of the maintenance task. The ability to identify authors of computer programs based on their coding style is a direct threat to the privacy and anonymity of programmers. While recent work found that source code can be attributed to authors with high accuracy, attribution of executable binaries appears to be much more difficult. Many distinguishing features present in source code, e.g. variable names, are removed in the compilation process, and compiler optimization may alter the structure of a program, further obscuring features that are known to be useful in determining authorship. We examine programmer de-anonymization from the standpoint of machine learning, using a novel set of features that include ones obtained by decompiling the executable binary to source code. We adapt a powerful set of techniques from the domain of source code authorship attribution along with stylistic representations embedded in assembly, resulting in successful de-anonymization of a large set of programmers. We evaluate our approach on data from the Google Code Jam, obtaining attribution accuracy of up to 96 with 100 and 83 with 600 candidate programmers. We present an executable binary authorship attribution approach, for the first time, that is robust to basic obfuscations, a range of compiler optimization settings, and binaries that have been stripped of their symbol tables. We perform programmer de-anonymization using both obfuscated binaries, and real-world code found "in the wild" in single-author GitHub repositories and the recently leaked Nulled.IO hacker forum. We show that programmers who would like to remain anonymous need to take extreme countermeasures to protect their privacy.