To establish secure (point-to-point and or broadcast) communication channels among the nodes of a wireless sensor network is a fundamental task. To this end, a plethora of (socalled) key pre-distribution schemes have been proposed in the past. All these schemes, however, rely on shared secret(s), which are assumed to be somehow pre-loaded onto the sensor nodes. In this paper, we propose a novel method for secure initialization of sensor nodes based on a visual out-of-band channel. Using the proposed method, the administrator of a sensor network can distribute keys onto the sensor nodes, necessary to bootstrap key pre-distribution. Our secure initialization method requires only a little extra cost, is efficient and scalable with respect to the number of sensor nodes. Moreover, based on a usability study that we conducted, the method turns out to be quite user-friendly and easy to use by naive human users.
Balfanz, et al @cite_23 extended the above approach through the use of infrared as an OOB channel -- the devices exchange their public keys over the wireless channel followed by exchanging (at least @math -bits long) hashes of their respective public keys over infrared. Most sensor motes do not possess infrared transmitters. Also, infrared is not easily perceptible by humans. Based on the protocol of @cite_23 , proposed the Seeing-is-Believing'' (SiB) scheme @cite_20 . SiB involves establishing two unidirectional visual OOB channels -- one device encodes the data into a two-dimensional barcode and the other device reads it using a photo camera. To apply SiB for sensor node initialization, one would need to affix a static barcode (during the manufacturing phase) on each sensor node, which can be captured by a camera on the sink node. However, this will only provide unidirectional authentication, since the sensor nodes can not afford to have a camera each. Note that it will also not be possible to manually input on each sensor node the hash of the public key of the sink, since most sensor nodes do not possess keypads and even if they do, this will not scale.
@cite_20 @cite_23
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In the wireless sensor networks (WSNs), sensor nodes may be deployed in the hostile areas. The eavesdropper can intercept the messages in the public channel and the communication between the nodes is easily monitored. Furthermore, any malicious intermediate node can act as a legal receiver to alter the passing messages. Hence, message protection and sensor node identification become important issues in WSN. In this paper, we propose a novel scheme providing unconditional secure communication based on the quantum characteristics, including no-cloning and teleportation. We present a random EPR-pair allocation scheme that is designed to overcome the vulnerability caused by possible compromised nodes. EPR pairs are pre-assigned to sensor nodes randomly and the entangled qubits are used by the nodes with the quantum teleportation scheme to form a secure link. We also show a scheme on how to resist the man-in-the-middle attack. In the framework, the qubits are allocated to each node before deployment and the adversary is unable to create the duplicated nodes. Even if the malicious nodes are added to the network to falsify the messages transmitting in the public channel, the legal nodes can easily detect the fake nodes that have no entangled qubits and verify the counterfeit messages. In addition, we prove that one node sharing EPR pairs with a certain amount of neighbor nodes can teleport information to any node in the sensor network if there are sufficient EPR pairs in the qubits pool. The proposal shows that the distributed quantum wireless sensor network gains better security than classical wireless sensor network and centralized quantum wireless network. To achieve security in wireless sensor networks, it is important to be able to encrypt and authenticate messages sent between sensor nodes. Before doing so, keys for performing encryption and authentication must be agreed upon by the communicating parties. Due to resource constraints, however, achieving key agreement in wireless sensor networks is nontrivial. Many key agreement schemes used in general networks, such as Diffie-Hellman and other public-key based schemes, are not suitable for wireless sensor networks due to the limited computational abilities of the sensor nodes. Predistribution of secret keys for all pairs of nodes is not viable due to the large amount of memory this requires when the network size is large.In this paper, we provide a framework in which to study the security of key predistribution schemes, propose a new key predistribution scheme which substantially improves the resilience of the network compared to previous schemes, and give an in-depth analysis of our scheme in terms of network resilience and associated overhead. Our scheme exhibits a nice threshold property: when the number of compromised nodes is less than the threshold, the probability that communications between any additional nodes are compromised is close to zero. This desirable property lowers the initial payoff of smaller-scale network breaches to an adversary, and makes it necessary for the adversary to attack a large fraction of the network before it can achieve any significant gain. To achieve security in wireless sensor networks, it is important to he able to encrypt messages sent among sensor nodes. Keys for encryption purposes must he agreed upon by communicating nodes. Due to resource constraints, achieving such key agreement in wireless sensor networks is nontrivial. Many key agreement schemes used in general networks, such as Diffie-Hellman and public-key based schemes, are not suitable for wireless sensor networks. Pre-distribution of secret keys for all pairs of nodes is not viable due to the large amount of memory used when the network size is large. Recently, a random key pre-distribution scheme and its improvements have been proposed. A common assumption made by these random key pre-distribution schemes is that no deployment knowledge is available. Noticing that in many practical scenarios, certain deployment knowledge may be available a priori, we propose a novel random key pre-distribution scheme that exploits deployment knowledge and avoids unnecessary key assignments. We show that the performance (including connectivity, memory usage, and network resilience against node capture) of sensor networks can he substantially improved with the use of our proposed scheme. The scheme and its detailed performance evaluation are presented in this paper. It may not be feasible for sensor networks monitoring nature and inaccessible geographical regions to include powered sinks with Internet connections. We consider the scenario where sinks are not present in large-scale sensor networks, and unreliable sensors have to collectively resort to storing sensed data over time on themselves. At a time of convenience, such cached data from a small subset of live sensors may be collected by a centralized (possibly mobile) collector. In this paper, we propose a decentralized algorithm using fountain codes to guarantee the persistence and reliability of cached data on unreliable sensors. With fountain codes, the collector is able to recover all data as long as a sufficient number of sensors are alive. We use random walks to disseminate data from a sensor to a random subset of sensors in the network. Our algorithms take advantage of the low decoding complexity of fountain codes, as well as the scalability of the dissemination process via random walks. We have proposed two algorithms based on random walks. Our theoretical analysis and simulation-based studies have shown that, the first algorithm maintains the same level of fault tolerance as the original centralized fountain code, while introducing lower overhead than naive random-walk based implementation in the dissemination process. Our second algorithm has lower level of fault tolerance than the original centralized fountain code, but consumes much lower dissemination cost.