We propose a modeling framework for generating security protocol specifications. The generated protocol specifications rely on the use of a sequential and a semantical component. The first component defines protocol properties such as preconditions, effects, message sequences and it is developed as a WSDL-S specification. The second component defines the semantic aspects corresponding to the messages included in the first component by the use of ontological constructions and it is developed as an OWL-based specification. Our approach was validated on 13 protocols from which we mention: the ISO9798 protocol, the CCITTX.509 data transfer protocol and the Kerberos symmetric key protocol.
The authors from @cite_12 propose a security ontology for resource annotation. The proposed ontology defines concepts for security and authorization, for cryptographic algorithms and for credentials. This proposal was designed to be used in the process of security protocol description and selection based on several criteria. In contrast, our ontologies, have a more detailed construction. For example, the ontology from @cite_12 defines a collection of cryptographic algorithms, however, it does not define the algorithm mode, which is a more implementation-specific information. In addition, we did not only propose an ontology, but also a set of rules to construct a specification.
@cite_12
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Annotation with security-related metadata enables discovery of resources that meet security requirements. This paper presents the NRL Security Ontology, which complements existing ontologies in other domains that focus on annotation of functional aspects of resources. Types of security information that could be described include mechanisms, protocols, objectives, algorithms, and credentials in various levels of detail and specificity. The NRL Security Ontology is more comprehensive and better organized than existing security ontologies. It is capable of representing more types of security statements and can be applied to any electronic resource. The class hierarchy of the ontology makes it both easy to use and intuitive to extend. We applied this ontology to a Service Oriented Architecture to annotate security aspects of Web service descriptions and queries. A refined matching algorithm was developed to perform requirement-capability matchmaking that takes into account not only the ontology concepts, but also the properties of the concepts. The use of ontologies for representing knowledge provides us with organization, communication and reusability. Information security is a serious requirement which must be carefully considered. Concepts and relations managed by any scientific community need to be formally defined and ontological engineering supports their definition. In this paper, the method of systematic review is applied with the purpose of identifying, extracting and analyzing the main proposals for security ontologies. The main identified proposals are compared using a formal framework and we conclude by stating their early state of development and the need of additional research efforts. Security of a cryptographic protocol for a bounded number of sessions is usually expressed as a symbolic trace reachability problem. We show that symbolic trace reachability for well-defined protocols is decidable in presence of the exclusive or theory in combination with the homomorphism axiom. These theories allow us to model basic properties of important cryptographic operators This trace reachability problem can be expressed as a system of symbolic deducibility constraints for a certain inference system describing the capabilities of the attacker. One main step of our proof consists in reducing deducibility constraints to constraints for deducibility in one step of the inference system. This constraint system, in turn, can be expressed as a system of quadratic equations of a particular form over ℤ 2ℤ[h], the ring of polynomials in one indeterminate over the finite field ℤ 2ℤ. We show that satisfiability of such systems is decidable We present decidability results for the verification of cryptographic protocols in the presence of equational theories corresponding to xor and Abelian groups. Since the perfect cryptography assumption is unrealistic for cryptographic primitives with visible algebraic properties such as xor, we extend the conventional Dolev-Yao model by permitting the intruder to exploit these properties. We show that the ground reachability problem in NP for the extended intruder theories in the cases of xor and Abelian groups. This result follows from a normal proof theorem. Then, we show how to lift this result in the xor case: we consider a symbolic constraint system expressing the reachability (e.g., secrecy) problem for a finite number of sessions. We prove that such a constraint system is decidable, relying in particular on an extension of combination algorithms for unification procedures. As a corollary, this enables automatic symbolic verification of cryptographic protocols employing xor for a fixed number of sessions.