Timing side-channel attacks pose a major threat to embedded systems due to their ease of accessibility. We propose CIDPro, a framework that relies on dynamic program diversification to mitigate timing side-channel leakage. The proposed framework integrates the widely used LLVM compiler infrastructure and the increasingly popular RISC-V FPGA soft-processor. The compiler automatically generates custom instructions in the security critical segments of the program, and the instructions execute on the RISC-V custom co-processor to produce diversified timing characteristics on each execution instance. CIDPro has been implemented on the Zynq7000 XC7Z020 FPGA device to study the performance overhead and security tradeoffs. Experimental results show that our solution can achieve 80 and 86 timing side-channel capacity reduction for two benchmarks with an acceptable performance overhead compared to existing solutions. In addition, the proposed method incurs only a negligible hardware area overhead of 1 slices of the entire RISC-V system.
@PARASPLIT The sliding window technique @cite_13 has been previously presented to reduce the effect of the hamming weight difference of keys on the execution time of the function. This technique not only improves the performance but also reduces the timing-channel leakage. However, the sliding window technique is not able to eliminate the information leakage. In particular, the residual timing leakage is notable on embedded systems with a low noise runtime environment.
@cite_13
2604967423 2021931360 2293349265 2150397765
Time variation during program execution can leak sensitive information. Time variations due to program control flow and hardware resource contention have been used to steal encryption keys in cipher implementations such as AES and RSA. A number of approaches to mitigate timing-based side-channel attacks have been proposed including cache partitioning, control-flow obfuscation and injecting timing noise into the outputs of code. While these techniques make timing-based side-channel attacks more difficult, they do not eliminate the risks. Prior techniques are either too specific or too expensive, and all leave remnants of the original timing side channel for later attackers to attempt to exploit. In this work, we show that the state-of-the-art techniques in timing side-channel protection, which limit timing leakage but do not eliminate it, still have significant vulnerabilities to timing-based side-channel attacks. To provide a means for total protection from timing-based side-channel attacks, we develop Ozone, the first zero timing leakage execution resource for a modern microarchitecture. Code in Ozone execute under a special hardware thread that gains exclusive access to a single core's resources for a fixed (and limited) number of cycles during which it cannot be interrupted. Memory access under Ozone thread execution is limited to a fixed size uncached scratchpad memory, and all Ozone threads begin execution with a known fixed microarchitectural state. We evaluate Ozone using a number of security sensitive kernels that have previously been targets of timing side-channel attacks, and show that Ozone eliminates timing leakage with minimal performance overhead. In this work, we study information leakage in timing side channels that arise in the context of shared event schedulers. Consider two processes, one of them an innocuous process (referred to as Alice) and the other a malicious one (referred to as Bob), using a common scheduler to process their jobs. Based on when his jobs get processed, Bob wishes to learn about the pattern (size and timing) of jobs of Alice. Depending on the context, knowledge of this pattern could have serious implications on Alice's privacy and security. For instance, shared routers can reveal traffic patterns, shared memory access can reveal cloud usage patterns, and suchlike. We present a formal framework to study the information leakage in shared resource schedulers using the pattern estimation error as a performance metric. In this framework, a uniform upper bound is derived to benchmark different scheduling policies. The first-come-first-serve scheduling policy is analyzed, and shown to leak significant information when the scheduler is loaded heavily. To mitigate the timing information leakage, we propose an “Accumulate-and-Serve” policy which trades in privacy for a higher delay. The policy is analyzed under the proposed framework and is shown to leak minimum information to the attacker, and is shown to have comparatively lower delay than a fixed scheduler that preemptively assigns service times irrespective of traffic patterns. This paper proposes an efficient and effective scheme to applying the sliding window approach popular in computer vision to 3D data. Specifically, the sparse nature of the problem is exploited via a voting scheme to enable a search through all putative object locations at any orientation. We prove that this voting scheme is mathematically equivalent to a convolution on a sparse feature grid and thus enables the processing, in full 3D, of any point cloud irrespective of the number of vantage points required to construct it. As such it is versatile enough to operate on data from popular 3D laser scanners such as a Velodyne as well as on 3D data obtained from increasingly popular push-broom configurations. Our approach is “embarrassingly parallelisable” and capable of processing a point cloud containing over 100K points at eight orientations in less than 0.5s. For the object classes car, pedestrian and bicyclist the resulting detector achieves best-in-class detection and timing performance relative to prior art on the KITTI dataset as well as compared to another existing 3D object detection approach. Data stream management systems may be subject to higher input rates than their resources can handle. When overloaded, the system must shed load in order to maintain low-latency query results. In this paper, we describe a load shedding technique for queries consisting of one or more aggregate operators with sliding windows. We introduce a new type of drop operator, called a "Window Drop". This operator is aware of the window properties (i.e., window size and window slide) of its downstream aggregate operators in the query plan. Accordingly, it logically divides the input stream into windows and probabilistically decides which windows to drop. This decision is further encoded into tuples by marking the ones that are disallowed from starting new windows. Unlike earlier approaches, our approach preserves integrity of windows throughout a query plan, and always delivers subsets of original query answers with minimal degradation in result quality.