We present a model for the diffusion of management fads and other technologies which lack clear objective evidence about their merits. The choices made by non-Bayesian adopters reflect both their own evaluations and the social in°uence of their peers. We show, both analytically and computationally, that the dynamics lead to outcomes that appear to be deterministic in spite of being governed by a stochastic process. In other words, when the objective evidence about a technology is weak, the evolution of this process quickly settles down to a fraction of adopters that is not predetermined. When the objective evidence is strong, the proportion of adopters is determined by the quality of the evidence and the adopters'competence.
In this paper we propose a model that is consistent with all of Camerer's observations and so is an alternative to canonical herding models. Thus our agents exhibit normatively desirable and empirically plausible monotonicity properties: in particular, the more the social cues favor innovation A over B, the more likely it is that an agent will select A, ceteris paribus. Yet the reasoning that underlies such choices is adaptively rational rather than fully rational. Moreover, unlike many adaptive models of fads, the present model generates analytical solutions, not just computational ones. Many---perhaps most---adaptive models of fads are what has come to be called agent-based models'' and it is virtually a defining feature of such models that they be computational. (For a survey of agent-based models, including several applied to fads, see @cite_12 .)
@cite_12
2143933215 2950700385 1535719876 1654194294
This paper deals with Bayesian selection of models that can be specified using inequality constraints among the model parameters. The concept of encompassing priors is introduced, that is, a prior distribution for an unconstrained model from which the prior distributions of the constrained models can be derived. It is shown that the Bayes factor for the encompassing and a constrained model has a very nice interpretation: it is the ratio of the proportion of the prior and posterior distribution of the encompassing model in agreement with the constrained model. It is also shown that, for a specific class of models, selection based on encompassing priors will render a virtually objective selection procedure. The paper concludes with three illustrative examples: an analysis of variance with ordered means; a contingency table analysis with ordered odds-ratios; and a multilevel model with ordered slopes. 1 Inequality constrained statistical models Researchers often have one or more (competing) theories about their field of research. Consider, for example, theories about the effect of behavioral therapy versus medication for children with an attention deficit disorder (ADD). Some researchers in this area believe medication is the only effective treatment for ADD, some believe strongly in behavioral therapy, and others may expect an additive effect of both therapies. To test or compare the plausibility of these theories they need to be translated into statistical models. Subsequently, empirical data can be used to determine which model is best. Inequality constraints on model parameters can be useful in the specification of statistical models. This paper deals with competing models that have the same parameter vector, but in one or more of the models parameters are subjected to inequality constraints. To continue the example, consider an experiment where children with ADD are randomly assigned to one of four conditions: no treatment (1), behavioral therapy (2), medication (3), and behavioral therapy plus medication (4). Let the outcome Topic models, such as Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA), posit that documents are drawn from admixtures of distributions over words, known as topics. The inference problem of recovering topics from admixtures, is NP-hard. Assuming separability, a strong assumption, [4] gave the first provable algorithm for inference. For LDA model, [6] gave a provable algorithm using tensor-methods. But [4,6] do not learn topic vectors with bounded @math error (a natural measure for probability vectors). Our aim is to develop a model which makes intuitive and empirically supported assumptions and to design an algorithm with natural, simple components such as SVD, which provably solves the inference problem for the model with bounded @math error. A topic in LDA and other models is essentially characterized by a group of co-occurring words. Motivated by this, we introduce topic specific Catchwords, group of words which occur with strictly greater frequency in a topic than any other topic individually and are required to have high frequency together rather than individually. A major contribution of the paper is to show that under this more realistic assumption, which is empirically verified on real corpora, a singular value decomposition (SVD) based algorithm with a crucial pre-processing step of thresholding, can provably recover the topics from a collection of documents drawn from Dominant admixtures. Dominant admixtures are convex combination of distributions in which one distribution has a significantly higher contribution than others. Apart from the simplicity of the algorithm, the sample complexity has near optimal dependence on @math , the lowest probability that a topic is dominant, and is better than [4]. Empirical evidence shows that on several real world corpora, both Catchwords and Dominant admixture assumptions hold and the proposed algorithm substantially outperforms the state of the art [5]. We incorporate strategic complementarities into a multi-agent sequential choice model with observable actions and private information. In this framework agents are concerned with learning from predecessors, signalling to successors, and coordinating their actions with those of others. Coordination problems have hitherto been studied using static coordination games which do not allow for learning behavior. Social learning has been examined using games of sequential action under uncertainty, but in the absence of strategic complementarities (herding models). Our model captures the strategic behavior of static coordination games, the social learning aspect of herding models, and the signalling behavior missing from both of these classes of models in one unified framework. In sequential action problems with incomplete information, agents exhibit herd behavior if later decision makers assign too little importance to their private information, choosing instead to imitate their predecessors. In our setting we demonstrate that agents may exhibit either strong herd behavior (complete imitation) or weak herd behavior (overoptimism) and characterize the informational requirements for these distinct outcomes. We also characterize the informational requirements to ensure the possibility of coordination upon a risky but socially optimal action in a game with finite but unboundedly large numbers of players. We study the problem of maximizing the expected spread of an innovation or behavior within a social network, in the presence of “word-of-mouth” referral. Our work builds on the observation that individuals’ decisions to purchase a product or adopt an innovation are strongly influenced by recommendations from their friends and acquaintances. Understanding and leveraging this influence may thus lead to a much larger spread of the innovation than the traditional view of marketing to individuals in isolation. In this paper, we define a natural and general model of influence propagation that we term the decreasing cascade model, generalizing models used in the sociology and economics communities. In this model, as in related ones, a behavior spreads in a cascading fashion according to a probabilistic rule, beginning with a set of initially “active” nodes. We study the target set selection problem: we wish to choose a set of individuals to target for initial activation, such that the cascade beginning with this active set is as large as possible in expectation. We show that in the decreasing cascade model, a natural greedy algorithm is a 1-1 e-e approximation for selecting a target set of size k.