We study large-scale distributed cooperative systems that use optimistic replication. We represent a system as a graph of actions (operations) connected by edges that reify semantic constraints between actions. Constraint types include conflict, execution order, dependence, and atomicity. The local state is some schedule that conforms to the constraints; because of conflicts, client state is only tentative. For consistency, site schedules should converge; we designed a decentralised, asynchronous commitment protocol. Each client makes a proposal, reflecting its tentative and or preferred schedules. Our protocol distributes the proposals, which it decomposes into semantically-meaningful units called candidates, and runs an election between comparable candidates. A candidate wins when it receives a majority or a plurality. The protocol is fully asynchronous: each site executes its tentative schedule independently, and determines locally when a candidate has won an election. The committed schedule is as close as possible to the preferences expressed by clients.
Generalized Paxos @cite_10 and Generic Broadcast @cite_4 take commutativity relations into account and compute a partial order. They do not consider any other semantic relations. Both Generalized Paxos @cite_10 and our algorithm make progress when a majority is not reached, although through different means. Generalized Paxos starts a new election instance, whereas our algorithm waits for a plurality decision.
@cite_10 @cite_4
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This paper describes the design and implementation of Egalitarian Paxos (EPaxos), a new distributed consensus algorithm based on Paxos. EPaxos achieves three goals: (1) optimal commit latency in the wide-area when tolerating one and two failures, under realistic conditions; (2) uniform load balancing across all replicas (thus achieving high throughput); and (3) graceful performance degradation when replicas are slow or crash. Egalitarian Paxos is to our knowledge the first protocol to achieve the previously stated goals efficiently---that is, requiring only a simple majority of replicas to be non-faulty, using a number of messages linear in the number of replicas to choose a command, and committing commands after just one communication round (one round trip) in the common case or after at most two rounds in any case. We prove Egalitarian Paxos's properties theoretically and demonstrate its advantages empirically through an implementation running on Amazon EC2. In computational social choice, one important problem is to take the votes of a subelectorate (subset of the voters), and summarize them using a small number of bits. This needs to be done in such a way that, if all that we know is the summary, as well as the votes of voters outside the subelectorate, we can conclude which of the m alternatives wins. This corresponds to the notion of compilation complexity, the minimum number of bits required to summarize the votes for a particular rule, which was introduced by [IJCAI-09]. We study three different types of compilation complexity. The first, studied by , depends on the size of the subelectorate but not on the size of the complement (the voters outside the subelectorate). The second depends on the size of the complement but not on the size of the subelectorate. The third depends on both. We first investigate the relations among the three types of compilation complexity. Then, we give upper and lower bounds on all three types of compilation complexity for the most prominent voting rules. We show that for l-approval (when l ≤ m 2), Borda, and Bucklin, the bounds for all three types are asymptotically tight, up to a multiplicative constant; for l-approval (when l > m 2), plurality with runoff, all Condorcet consistent rules that are based on unweighted majority graphs (including Copeland and voting trees), and all Condorcet consistent rules that are based on the order of pairwise elections (including ranked pairs and maximin), the bounds for all three types are asymptotically tight up to a multiplicative constant when the sizes of the subelectorate and its complement are both larger than m1+∊ for some ∊ > 0. We study a generic framework that provides a unified view on two important classes of problems: (i) extensions of the k-median problem where clients are interested in having multiple facilities in their vicinity (e.g., due to the fact that, with some small probability, the closest facility might be malfunctioning and so might not be available for using), and (ii) finding winners according to some appealing multiwinner election rules, i.e., election system aimed for choosing representatives bodies, such as parliaments, based on preferences of a population of voters over individual candidates. Each problem in our framework is associated with a vector of weights: we show that the approximability of the problem depends on structural properties of these vectors. We specifically focus on the harmonic sequence of weights for which the objective function interpreted in a multiwinner election setup reflects to the well-known Proportional Approval Voting (PAV) rule. Our main result is that, due to the specific (harmonic) structure of weights, the problem allows constant factor approximation. This is surprising since the problem can be interpreted as a variant of the k-median problem where we do not assume that the connection costs satisfy the triangle inequality. The algorithm we propose is based on dependent rounding [Srinivasan, FOCS'01] applied to the solution of a natural LP-relaxation of the problem. The rounding process is well known to produce distributions over integral solutions satisfying Negative Correlation (NC), which is usually sufficient for the analysis of approximation guarantees offered by rounding procedures. In our analysis, however, we need to use the fact that the carefully implemented rounding process satisfies a stronger property, called Negative Association (NA), which allows us to apply standard concentration bounds for conditional random variables. In citepapa, Papadimitriou formalized the notion of routing stability in BGP as the following coalitional game theoretic problem: Given a network with a multicommodity flow satisfying node capacity and demand constraints, the payoff of a node is the total flow originated or terminated at it. A payoff allocation is in the core if and only if there is no subset of nodes that can increase their payoff by seceding from the network. We answer one of the open problems in citepapa by proving that for any network, the core is non-empty in both the transferable (where the nodes can compensate each other with side payments) and the non-transferable case. In the transferable case we show that such an allocation can be computed in polynomial time. We also generalize this result to the case where a strictly concave utility function is associated with each commodity.