We study the spammablility of ranking functions on the web. Although graph-theoretic ranking functions, such as Hubs and Authorities and PageRank exist, there is no graph theoretic notion of how spammable such functions are. We introduce a very general cost model that only depends on the observation that changing the links of a page that you own is free, whereas changing the links on pages owned by others requires effort or money. We define spammability to be the ratio between the amount of benefit one receives for one's spamming efforts and the amount of effort money one must spend to spam. The more effort money it takes to get highly ranked, the less spammable the function. Our model helps explain why both hubs and authorities and standard PageRank are very easy to spam. Although standard PageRank is easy to spam, we show that there exist spam-resistant PageRanks. Specifically, we propose a ranking method, Min-k-PPR, that is the component-wise min of a set of personalized PageRanks centered on k trusted sites. Our main results are that Min-k-PPR is, itself, a type of PageRank and that it is expensive to spam. We elucidate a surprisingly elegant algebra for PageRank. We define the space of all possible PageRanks and show that this space is closed under some operations. Most notably, we show that PageRanks are closed under (normalized) component-wise min, which establishes that (normalized) Min-k-PPRis a PageRank. This algebraic structure is also key to demonstrating the spam resistance of Min-k-PPR.
Link-spam detection may be useful for excluding pages from the calculation, but better than building a fortress is to make the attack futile, that is, to develop techniques that yield spam resistance. Towards that end, some work limits or assign reset probability selectively @cite_20 @cite_33 . These approaches are generalizations of Personalized @cite_35 .
@cite_35 @cite_33 @cite_20
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Proposing a novel model to detect spam reviews efficiently.Demonstrating the integral role of burst patterns in detection of spam reviews.Comparing the approach with two common methods to show how significant it is. Today's e-commerce is highly depended on increasingly growing online customers' reviews posted in opinion sharing websites. This fact, unfortunately, has tempted spammers to target opinion sharing websites in order to promote and demote products. To date, different types of opinion spam detection methods have been proposed in order to provide reliable resources for customers, manufacturers and researchers. However, supervised approaches suffer from imbalance data due to scarcity of spam reviews in datasets, rating deviation based filtering systems are easily cheated by smart spammers, and content based methods are very expensive and majority of them have not been tested on real data hitherto.The aim of this paper is to propose a robust review spam detection system wherein the rating deviation, content based factors and activeness of reviewers are employed efficiently. To overcome the aforementioned drawbacks, all these factors are synthetically investigated in suspicious time intervals captured from time series of reviews by a pattern recognition technique. The proposed method could be a great asset in online spam filtering systems and could be used in data mining and knowledge discovery tasks as a standalone system to purify product review datasets. These systems can reap benefit from our method in terms of time efficiency and high accuracy. Empirical analyses on real dataset show that the proposed approach is able to successfully detect spam reviews. Comparison with two of the current common methods, indicates that our method is able to achieve higher detection accuracy (F-Score: 0.86) while removing the need for having specific fields of Meta data and reducing heavy computation required for investigation purposes. Spammers intend to increase the PageRank of certain spam pages by creating a large number of links pointing to them. We propose a novel method based on the concept of personalized PageRank that detects pages with an undeserved high PageRank value without the need of any kind of white or blacklists or other means of human intervention. We assume that spammed pages have a biased distribution of pages that contribute to the undeserved high PageRank value. We define SpamRank by penalizing pages that originate a suspicious PageRank share and personalizing PageRank on the penalties. Our method is tested on a 31 M page crawl of the .de domain with a manually classified 1000-page stratified random sample with bias towards large PageRank values. Linking network flows is an important problem in intrusion detection as well as anonymity. Passive traffic analysis can link flows but requires long periods of observation to reduce errors. Watermarking techniques allow for better precision and blind detection, but they do so by introducing significant delays to the traffic flow, enabling attacks that detect and remove the mark, while at the same time slowing down legitimate traffic. We propose a new, non-blind watermarking scheme called RAINBOW that is able to use delays hundreds of times smaller than existing watermarks by eliminating the interference caused by the flow in the blind case. As a result, our watermark is invisible to detection, as confirmed by experiments using information-theoretic detection tools. We analyze the error rates of our scheme based on a mathematical model of network traffic and jitter. We also validate the analysis using an implementation running on PlanetLab. We find that our scheme generates orders of magnitudes lower rates of false errors than passive traffic analysis, while using only a few hundred observed packets. We also extend our scheme so that it is robust to packet drops and repacketization and show that flows can still be reliably linked, though at the cost of somewhat longer observation periods. Launching a denial of service (DoS) attack is trivial, but detection and response is a painfully slow and often a manual process. Automatic classification of attacks as single- or multi-source can help focus a response, but current packet-header-based approaches are susceptible to spoofing. This paper introduces a framework for classifying DoS attacks based on header content, and novel techniques such as transient ramp-up behavior and spectral analysis. Although headers are easily forged, we show that characteristics of attack ramp-up and attack spectrum are more difficult to spoof. To evaluate our framework we monitored access links of a regional ISP detecting 80 live attacks. Header analysis identified the number of attackers in 67 attacks, while the remaining 13 attacks were classified based on ramp-up and spectral analysis. We validate our results through monitoring at a second site, controlled experiments, and simulation. We use experiments and simulation to understand the underlying reasons for the characteristics observed. In addition to helping understand attack dynamics, classification mechanisms such as ours are important for the development of realistic models of DoS traffic, can be packaged as an automated tool to aid in rapid response to attacks, and can also be used to estimate the level of DoS activity on the Internet.