Online Social Network (OSN) is one of the most hottest services in the past years. It preserves the life of users and provides great potential for journalists, sociologists and business analysts. Crawling data from social network is a basic step for social network information analysis and processing. As the net- work becomes huge and information on the network updates faster than web pages, crawling is more dicult because of the limitations of band-width, po- liteness etiquette and computation power. To extract fresh information from social network eciently and eectively, this paper presents a novel crawling method and discusses parallelization architecture of social network. To dis- cover the feature of social network, we gather data from real social network, analyze them and build a model to describe the discipline of users' behavior. With the modeled behavior, we propose methods to predict users' behavior. According to the prediction, we schedule our crawler more reasonably and ex- tract more fresh information with parallelization technologies. Experimental results demonstrate that our strategies could obtain information from OSN eciently and eectively.
Whitelist accounts were once available on Twitter. crawled the entire Twitter site successfully, including 41.7 million user profiles and 106 million tweets by Twitter API @cite_2 . However, whitelist accounts are no longer available now. It is the same for @cite_0 . As the API has rate-limiting now, we propose algorithms to improve the crawl efficiency.
@cite_0 @cite_2
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In this work we present a characterization of spam on Twitter. We find that 8 of 25 million URLs posted to the site point to phishing, malware, and scams listed on popular blacklists. We analyze the accounts that send spam and find evidence that it originates from previously legitimate accounts that have been compromised and are now being puppeteered by spammers. Using clickthrough data, we analyze spammers' use of features unique to Twitter and the degree that they affect the success of spam. We find that Twitter is a highly successful platform for coercing users to visit spam pages, with a clickthrough rate of 0.13 , compared to much lower rates previously reported for email spam. We group spam URLs into campaigns and identify trends that uniquely distinguish phishing, malware, and spam, to gain an insight into the underlying techniques used to attract users. Given the absence of spam filtering on Twitter, we examine whether the use of URL blacklists would help to significantly stem the spread of Twitter spam. Our results indicate that blacklists are too slow at identifying new threats, allowing more than 90 of visitors to view a page before it becomes blacklisted. We also find that even if blacklist delays were reduced, the use by spammers of URL shortening services for obfuscation negates the potential gains unless tools that use blacklists develop more sophisticated spam filtering. Which seems more suspicious: 5,000 tweets from 200 users on 5 IP addresses, or 10,000 tweets from 500 users on 500 IP addresses but all with the same trending topic and all in 10 minutes? The literature has many methods that try to find dense blocks in matrices, and, recently, tensors, but no method gives a principled way to score the suspiciouness of dense blocks with different numbers of modes and rank them to draw human attention accordingly. Dense blocks are worth inspecting, typically indicating fraud, emerging trends, or some other noteworthy deviation from the usual. Our main contribution is that we show how to unify these methods and how to give a principled answer to questions like the above. Specifically, (a) we give a list of axioms that any metric of suspicousness should satisfy, (b) we propose an intuitive, principled metric that satisfies the axioms, and is fast to compute, (c) we propose CROSSSPOT, an algorithm to spot dense regions, and sort them in importance ("suspiciousness") order. Finally, we apply CROSSSPOT to real data, where it improves the F1 score over previous techniques by 68 and finds retweet-boosting in a real social dataset spanning 0.3 billion posts. Twitter has changed the way of communication and getting news for people's daily life in recent years. Meanwhile, due to the popularity of Twitter, it also becomes a main target for spamming activities. In order to stop spammers, Twitter is using Google SafeBrowsing to detect and block spam links. Despite that blacklists can block malicious URLs embedded in tweets, their lagging time hinders the ability to protect users in real-time. Thus, researchers begin to apply different machine learning algorithms to detect Twitter spam. However, there is no comprehensive evaluation on each algorithms' performance for real-time Twitter spam detection due to the lack of large groundtruth. To carry out a thorough evaluation, we collected a large dataset of over 600 million public tweets. We further labelled around 6.5 million spam tweets and extracted 12 light-weight features, which can be used for online detection. In addition, we have conducted a number of experiments on six machine learning algorithms under various conditions to better understand their effectiveness and weakness for timely Twitter spam detection. We will make our labelled dataset for researchers who are interested in validating or extending our work. As web services such as Twitter, Facebook, Google, and Yahoo now dominate the daily activities of Internet users, cyber criminals have adapted their monetization strategies to engage users within these walled gardens. To facilitate access to these sites, an underground market has emerged where fraudulent accounts - automatically generated credentials used to perpetrate scams, phishing, and malware - are sold in bulk by the thousands. In order to understand this shadowy economy, we investigate the market for fraudulent Twitter accounts to monitor prices, availability, and fraud perpetrated by 27 merchants over the course of a 10-month period. We use our insights to develop a classifier to retroactively detect several million fraudulent accounts sold via this marketplace, 95 of which we disable with Twitter's help. During active months, the 27 merchants we monitor appeared responsible for registering 10-20 of all accounts later flagged for spam by Twitter, generating $127-459K for their efforts.