In contrast to today's IP-based host-oriented Internet architecture, Information-Centric Networking (ICN) emphasizes content by making it directly addressable and routable. Named Data Networking (NDN) architecture is an instance of ICN that is being developed as a candidate next-generation Internet architecture. By opportunistically caching content within the network, NDN appears to be well-suited for large-scale content distribution and for meeting the needs of increasingly mobile and bandwidth-hungry applications that dominate today's Internet. One key feature of NDN is the requirement for each content object to be digitally signed by its producer. Thus, NDN should be, in principle, immune to distributing fake (aka "poisoned") content. However, in practice, this poses two challenges for detecting fake content in NDN routers: (1) overhead due to signature verification and certificate chain traversal, and (2) lack of trust context, i.e., determining which public keys are trusted to verify which content. Because of these issues, NDN does not force routers to verify content signatures, which makes the architecture susceptible to content poisoning attacks. This paper explores root causes of, and some cures for, content poisoning attacks in NDN. In the process, it becomes apparent that meaningful mitigation of content poisoning is contingent upon a network-layer trust management architecture, elements of which we construct, while carefully justifying specific design choices. This work represents the initial effort towards comprehensive trust management for NDN.
Prior work on Denial of Service (DoS) attacks on NDN includes @cite_33 and @cite_27 . Both results addressed a specific DoS attack type -- Interest Flooding -- based on inundating routers with spurious interest messages. Content poisoning was identified in @cite_19 , which also sketched out some tentative countermeasures. Subsequently, @cite_14 proposed the first concrete (however, only probabilistic) countermeasure based on analyzing exclusion patterns for cached content.
@cite_19 @cite_27 @cite_14 @cite_33
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Current Internet is reaching the limits of its capabilities due to its function transition from host-to-host communication to content dissemination. Named Data Networking (NDN) – an instantiation of Content-Centric Networking approach, embraces this shift by stressing the content itself, rather than where it locates. NDN tries to provide better security and privacy than current Internet does, and resilience to Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) is a significant issue. In this paper, we present a specific and concrete scenario of DDoS attack in NDN, where perpetrators make use of NDN’s packet forwarding rules to send out Interest packets with spoofed names as attacking packets. Afterwards, we identify the victims of NDN DDoS attacks include both the hosts and routers. But the largest victim is not the hosts, but the routers, more specifically, the Pending Interest Table (PIT) within the router. PIT brings NDN many elegant features, but it suffers from vulnerability. We propose Interest traceback as a counter measure against the studied NDN DDoS attacks, which traces back to the originator of the attacking Interest packets. At last, we assess the harmful consequences brought by these NDN DDoS attacks and evaluate the Interest traceback counter measure. Evaluation results reveal that the Interest traceback method effectively mitigates the NDN DDoS attacks studied in this paper Denial-of-service (DoS) detection techniques - such as activity profiling, change-point detection, and wavelet-based signal analysis - face the considerable challenge of discriminating network-based flooding attacks from sudden increases in legitimate activity or flash events. This survey of techniques and testing results provides insight into our ability to successfully identify DoS flooding attacks. Although each detector shows promise in limited testing, none completely solve the detection problem. Combining various approaches with experienced network operators most likely produce the best results. Denial of service (DoS) attack on the Internet has become a pressing problem. In this paper, we describe and evaluate route-based distributed packet filtering (DPF), a novel approach to distributed DoS (DDoS) attack prevention. We show that DPF achieves proactiveness and scalability, and we show that there is an intimate relationship between the effectiveness of DPF at mitigating DDoS attack and power-law network topology.The salient features of this work are two-fold. First, we show that DPF is able to proactively filter out a significant fraction of spoofed packet flows and prevent attack packets from reaching their targets in the first place. The IP flows that cannot be proactively curtailed are extremely sparse so that their origin can be localized---i.e., IP traceback---to within a small, constant number of candidate sites. We show that the two proactive and reactive performance effects can be achieved by implementing route-based filtering on less than 20 of Internet autonomous system (AS) sites. Second, we show that the two complementary performance measures are dependent on the properties of the underlying AS graph. In particular, we show that the power-law structure of Internet AS topology leads to connectivity properties which are crucial in facilitating the observed performance effects. Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks are an ongoing problem in today's Internet, where packets from a large number of compromised hosts thwart the paths to the victim site and or overload the victim machines. In a newly proposed future Internet architecture, Named Data Networking (NDN), end users request desired data by sending Interest packets, and the network delivers Data packets upon request only, effectively eliminating many existing DDoS attacks. However, an NDN network can be subject to a new type of DDoS attack, namely Interest packet flooding. In this paper we investigate effective solutions to mitigate Interest flooding. We show that NDN's inherent properties of storing per packet state on each router and maintaining flow balance (i.e., one Interest packet retrieves at most one Data packet) provides the basis for effective DDoS mitigation algorithms. Our evaluation through simulations shows that the solution can quickly and effectively respond and mitigate Interest flooding.