A UK-based online questionnaire investigating aspects of usage of user-generated media (UGM), such as Facebook, LinkedIn and Twitter, attracted 587 participants. Results show a high degree of engagement with social networking media such as Facebook, and a significant engagement with other media such as professional media, microblogs and blogs. Participants who experience information overload are those who engage less frequently with the media, rather than those who have fewer posts to read. Professional users show different behaviours to social users. Microbloggers complain of information overload to the greatest extent. Two thirds of Twitter-users have felt that they receive too many posts, and over half of Twitter-users have felt the need for a tool to filter out the irrelevant posts. Generally speaking, participants express satisfaction with the media, though a significant minority express a range of concerns including information overload and privacy.
As well as enforced reciprocity, Facebook and LinkedIn differ from Twitter in that they involve a privacy system. Whereas all tweets are public, posts to Facebook and LinkedIn can be seen only by those to whom permission has been granted. Despite this, privacy is more of an issue among Facebook users than Twitter users, perhaps because some kind of decision-making process is entailed. Hoadly @cite_21 investigate the reaction among users when Facebook, in 2006, introduced the news feed, in which information users previously would have had to seek out by going to each others' pages was now aggregated into a time-ordered digest and placed front and centre on the site. "Perceived control" and "ease of information access" were determined to be factors in how comfortable a person feels with privacy aspects of using Facebook. Anecdotally, people seem far more likely to run into trouble with privacy on Facebook than on Twitter; in the UK for example, there have been several convictions resulting from criminal evidence posted by offenders @cite_20 . There is also some suggestion that privacy settings, despite correct use by users, may be overcome relatively easily, making privacy relatively illusory @cite_14 .
@cite_14 @cite_21 @cite_20
1980767298 1602027763 2004710253 2045802490
We performed a laboratory experiment to study the privacy tradeoff offered by Facebook Connect: disclosing Facebook profile data to third-party websites for the convenience of logging in without creating separate accounts. We controlled for trustworthiness and amount of information each website requested, as well as the consent dialog layout. We discovered that these factors had no observable effects, likely because participants did not read the dialogs. Yet, 15 still refused to use Facebook Connect, citing privacy concerns. A likely explanation for subjects ignoring the dialogs while also understanding the privacy tradeoff - our exit survey indicated that 88 broadly understood what data would be collected - is that subjects were already familiar with the dialogs prior to the experiment. We discuss how our results demonstrate informed consent, but also how habituation prevented subjects from understanding the nuances between individual websites' data collection policies. As the popularity of social networks expands, the information users expose to the public has potentially dangerous implications for individual privacy. While social networks allow users to restrict access to their personal data, there is currently no mechanism to enforce privacy concerns over content uploaded by other users. As group photos and stories are shared by friends and family, personal privacy goes beyond the discretion of what a user uploads about himself and becomes an issue of what every network participant reveals. In this paper, we examine how the lack of joint privacy controls over content can inadvertently reveal sensitive information about a user including preferences, relationships, conversations, and photos. Specifically, we analyze Facebook to identify scenarios where conflicting privacy settings between friends will reveal information that at least one user intended remain private. By aggregating the information exposed in this manner, we demonstrate how a user's private attributes can be inferred from simply being listed as a friend or mentioned in a story. To mitigate this threat, we show how Facebook's privacy model can be adapted to enforce multi-party privacy. We present a proof of concept application built into Facebook that automatically ensures mutually acceptable privacy restrictions are enforced on group content. Twitter has become one of the most popular microblogging sites for people to broadcast (or "tweet") their thoughts to the world in 140 characters or less. Since these messages are available for public consumption, one may expect these tweets not to contain private or incriminating information. Nevertheless we observe a large number of users who unwittingly post sensitive information about themselves and other people for whom there may be negative consequences. While some awareness exists of such privacy issues on social networks such as Twitter and Facebook, there has been no quantitative, scientific study addressing this problem. In this paper we make three major contributions. First, we characterize the nature of privacy leaks on Twitter to gain an understanding of what types of private information people are revealing on it. We specifically analyze three types of leaks: divulging vacation plans, tweeting under the influence of alcohol, and revealing medical conditions. Second, using this characterization we build automatic classifiers to detect incriminating tweets for these three topics in real time in order to demonstrate the real threat posed to users by, e.g., burglars and law enforcement. Third, we characterize who leaks information and how. We study both self- incriminating primary leaks and secondary leaks that reveal sensitive information about others, as well as the prevalence of leaks in status updates and conversation tweets. We also conduct a cross-cultural study to investigate the prevalence of leaks in tweets originating from the United States, United Kingdom and Singapore. Finally, we discuss how our classification system can be used as a defense mechanism to alert users of potential privacy leaks. We measure users' attitudes toward interpersonal privacy concerns on Facebook and measure users' strategies for reconciling their concerns with their desire to share content online. To do this, we recruited 260 Facebook users to install a Facebook application that surveyed their privacy concerns, their friend network compositions, the sensitivity of posted content, and their privacy-preserving strategies. By asking participants targeted questions about people randomly selected from their friend network and posts shared on their profiles, we were able to quantify the extent to which users trust their "friends" and the likelihood that their content was being viewed by unintended audiences. We found that while strangers are the most concerning audience, almost 95 of our participants had taken steps to mitigate those concerns. At the same time, we observed that 16.5 of participants had at least one post that they were uncomfortable sharing with a specific friend---someone who likely already had the ability to view it---and that 37 raised more general concerns with sharing their content with friends. We conclude that the current privacy controls allow users to effectively manage the outsider threat, but that they are unsuitable for mitigating concerns over the insider threat---members of the friend network who dynamically become inappropriate audiences based on the context of a post.