In this paper, we propose a framework to study a general class of strategic behavior in voting, which we call vote operations. We prove the following theorem: if we fix the number of alternatives, generate @math votes i.i.d. according to a distribution @math , and let @math go to infinity, then for any @math , with probability at least @math , the minimum number of operations that are needed for the strategic individual to achieve her goal falls into one of the following four categories: (1) 0, (2) @math , (3) @math , and (4) @math . This theorem holds for any set of vote operations, any individual vote distribution @math , and any integer generalized scoring rule, which includes (but is not limited to) almost all commonly studied voting rules, e.g., approval voting, all positional scoring rules (including Borda, plurality, and veto), plurality with runoff, Bucklin, Copeland, maximin, STV, and ranked pairs. We also show that many well-studied types of strategic behavior fall under our framework, including (but not limited to) constructive destructive manipulation, bribery, and control by adding deleting votes, margin of victory, and minimum manipulation coalition size. Therefore, our main theorem naturally applies to these problems.
Three related papers. First, the dichotomy theorem in @cite_3 implies that, (informally) when the votes are drawn i.i.d. from some distribution, with probability that goes to @math the solution to constructive and destructive UCO is either @math or approximately @math for some favored alternatives. However, this result only works for the UCO problem and some distributions over the votes.
@cite_3
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In this paper, we propose a framework to study a general class of strategic behavior in voting, which we call vote operations. We prove the following theorem: if we fix the number of alternatives, generate @math votes i.i.d. according to a distribution @math , and let @math go to infinity, then for any @math , with probability at least @math , the minimum number of operations that are needed for the strategic individual to achieve her goal falls into one of the following four categories: (1) 0, (2) @math , (3) @math , and (4) @math . This theorem holds for any set of vote operations, any individual vote distribution @math , and any integer generalized scoring rule, which includes (but is not limited to) almost all commonly studied voting rules, e.g., approval voting, all positional scoring rules (including Borda, plurality, and veto), plurality with runoff, Bucklin, Copeland, maximin, STV, and ranked pairs. We also show that many well-studied types of strategic behavior fall under our framework, including (but not limited to) constructive destructive manipulation, bribery, and control by adding deleting votes, margin of victory, and minimum manipulation coalition size. Therefore, our main theorem naturally applies to these problems. We prove a complexity dichotomy theorem for counting weighted Boolean CSP modulo k for any positive integer k > 1. This generalizes a theorem by Faben for the unweighted setting. In the weighted setting, there are new interesting tractable problems. We first prove a dichotomy theorem for the finite field case where k is a prime. It turns out that the dichotomy theorem for the finite field is very similar to the one for the complex weighted Boolean #CSP, found by [Cai, Lu and Xia, STOC 2009]. Then we further extend the result to an arbitrary integer k. We prove a quantitative version of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem. We show that a uniformly chosen voter profile for a neutral social choice function f of q ≥ 4 alternatives and n voters will be manipulable with probability at least 10−4∈2 n −3 q −30, where ∈ is the minimal statistical distance between f and the family of dictator functions. Our results extend those of [11], which were obtained for the case of 3 alternatives, and imply that the approach of masking manipulations behind computational hardness (as considered in [4,6,9,15,7]) cannot hide manipulations completely. Our proof is geometric. More specifically it extends the method of canonical paths to show that the measure of the profiles that lie on the interface of 3 or more outcomes is large. To the best of our knowledge our result is the first isoperimetric result to establish interface of more than two bodies. where (an)n ENo is some sequence of nonnegative numbers, (Sn),nENo is the sequence of partial sums, S0 = 0, Sn = XflXk, of another sequence (Xk)kEN of i.i.d. random variables, and A c R is a fixed Borel set such as [0,1] or [0, oo). Examples of such convolution series are subordinated distributions (f=0Oan = 1) which arise as distributions of random sums, and harmonic and ordinary renewal measures (a0 = 0, an = 1 n for all n C N in the first, an = 1 for all n C NO in the second case). These examples are in turn essential for the analysis of the large time behaviour of diverse applied models such as branching and queueing processes, they are also of interest in connection with representation theorems such as the Levy representation of infinitely divisible distributions. A traditional approach to such problems is via regular variation: If the underlying random variables are nonnegative we can use Laplace transforms and the related Abelian and Tauberian theorems [see, e.g., Stam (1973) in the context of subordination and Feller (1971, XIV.3) in connection with renewal theory; Embrechts, Maejima, and Omey (1984) is a recent treatment of generalized renewal measures along these lines]. The approach of the present paper is based on the Wiener-Levy-Gel'fand theorem and has occasionally been called the Banach algebra method. In Gruibel (1983) we gave a new variant of this method for the special case of lattice distributions, showing that by using the appropriate Banach algebras of sequences, arbitrarily fine expansions are possible under certain assumptions on the higher-order differences of (P(X1 = n))fnEN. Here we give a corresponding treatment of nonlattice distributions. We restrict ourselves to an analogue of first-order differences and obtain a number of theorems which perhaps are described best as next-term results. To explain this let us consider a special case in more detail.