We introduce knowledge flow analysis, a simple and flexible formalism for checking cryptographic protocols. Knowledge flows provide a uniform language for expressing the actions of principals, assump- tions about intruders, and the properties of cryptographic primitives. Our approach enables a generalized two-phase analysis: we extend the two-phase theory by identifying the necessary and sufficient proper- ties of a broad class of cryptographic primitives for which the theory holds. We also contribute a library of standard primitives and show that they satisfy our criteria.
Specialized model checkers such as Casper @cite_18 , Mur @math @cite_28 , Brutus @cite_21 , TAPS @cite_24 , and ProVerif @cite_15 have been successfully used to analyze security protocols. These tools are based on state space exploration which leads to an exponential complexity. Athena @cite_11 is based on a modification of the strand space model @cite_16 . Even though it reduces the state space explosion problem, it remains exponential. Multiset rewriting @cite_19 in combination with tree automata is used in Timbuk @cite_12 . The relation between multiset rewriting and strand spaces is analyzed in @cite_41 . The relation between multiset rewriting and process algebras @cite_36 @cite_0 is analyzed in @cite_3 .
@cite_18 @cite_28 @cite_41 @cite_36 @cite_21 @cite_3 @cite_24 @cite_19 @cite_0 @cite_15 @cite_16 @cite_12 @cite_11
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We propose a new efficient automatic verification technique, Athena, for security protocol analysis. It uses a new efficient representation - our extension to the Strand Space Model, and utilizes techniques from both model checking and theorem proving approaches. Athena is fully automatic and is able to prove the correctness of many security protocols with arbitrary number of concurrent runs. The run time for a typical protocol from the literature, like the Needham-Schroeder protocol, is often a fraction of a second. Athena exploits several different techniques that enable it to analyze infinite sets of protocol runs and achieve such efficiency. Our extended Strand Space Model is a natural and efficient representation for the problem domain. The security properties are specified in a simple logic which permits both efficient proof search algorithms and has enough expressive power to specify interesting properties. The automatic proof search procedure borrows some efficient techniques from both model checking and theorem proving. We believe that it is the right combination of the new compact representation and all the techniques that actually makes Athena successful in fast and automatic verification of security protocols. In this work we study interactive proofs for tractable languages. The (honest) prover should be efficient and run in polynomial time, or in other words a "muggle". The verifier should be super-efficient and run in nearly-linear time. These proof systems can be used for delegating computation: a server can run a computation for a client and interactively prove the correctness of the result. The client can verify the result's correctness in nearly-linear time (instead of running the entire computation itself). Previously, related questions were considered in the Holographic Proof setting by Babai, Fortnow, Levin and Szegedy, in the argument setting under computational assumptions by Kilian, and in the random oracle model by Micali. Our focus, however, is on the original interactive proof model where no assumptions are made on the computational power or adaptiveness of dishonest provers. Our main technical theorem gives a public coin interactive proof for any language computable by a log-space uniform boolean circuit with depth d and input length n. The verifier runs in time (n+d) • polylog(n) and space O(log(n)), the communication complexity is d • polylog(n), and the prover runs in time poly(n). In particular, for languages computable by log-space uniform NC (circuits of polylog(n) depth), the prover is efficient, the verifier runs in time n • polylog(n) and space O(log(n)), and the communication complexity is polylog(n). Using this theorem we make progress on several questions: We show how to construct short (polylog size) computationally sound non-interactive certificates of correctness for any log-space uniform NC computation, in the public-key model. The certificates can be verified in quasi-linear time and are for a designated verifier: each certificate is tailored to the verifier's public key. This result uses a recent transformation of Kalai and Raz from public-coin interactive proofs to one-round arguments. The soundness of the certificates is based on the existence of a PIR scheme with polylog communication. Interactive proofs with public-coin, log-space, poly-time verifiers for all of P. This settles an open question regarding the expressive power of proof systems with such verifiers. Zero-knowledge interactive proofs with communication complexity that is quasi-linear in the witness, length for any NP language verifiable in NC, based on the existence of one-way functions. Probabilistically checkable arguments (a model due to Kalai and Raz) of size polynomial in the witness length (rather than the instance length) for any NP language verifiable in NC, under computational assumptions. The state explosion problem remains a major hurdle in applying symbolic model checking to large hardware designs. State space abstraction, having been essential for verifying designs of industrial complexity, is typically a manual process, requiring considerable creativity and insight.In this article, we present an automatic iterative abstraction-refinement methodology that extends symbolic model checking. In our method, the initial abstract model is generated by an automatic analysis of the control structures in the program to be verified. Abstract models may admit erroneous (or "spurious") counterexamples. We devise new symbolic techniques that analyze such counterexamples and refine the abstract model correspondingly. We describe aSMV, a prototype implementation of our methodology in NuSMV. Practical experiments including a large Fujitsu IP core design with about 500 latches and 10000 lines of SMV code confirm the effectiveness of our approach. [See the paper for the full abstract.] We show tight upper and lower bounds for time-space trade-offs for the @math -Approximate Near Neighbor Search problem. For the @math -dimensional Euclidean space and @math -point datasets, we develop a data structure with space @math and query time @math for every @math such that: This is the first data structure that achieves sublinear query time and near-linear space for every approximation factor @math , improving upon [Kapralov, PODS 2015]. The data structure is a culmination of a long line of work on the problem for all space regimes; it builds on Spherical Locality-Sensitive Filtering [Becker, Ducas, Gama, Laarhoven, SODA 2016] and data-dependent hashing [Andoni, Indyk, Nguyen, Razenshteyn, SODA 2014] [Andoni, Razenshteyn, STOC 2015]. Our matching lower bounds are of two types: conditional and unconditional. First, we prove tightness of the whole above trade-off in a restricted model of computation, which captures all known hashing-based approaches. We then show unconditional cell-probe lower bounds for one and two probes that match the above trade-off for @math , improving upon the best known lower bounds from [Panigrahy, Talwar, Wieder, FOCS 2010]. In particular, this is the first space lower bound (for any static data structure) for two probes which is not polynomially smaller than the one-probe bound. To show the result for two probes, we establish and exploit a connection to locally-decodable codes.