In this work, we study position-based cryptography in the quantum setting. The aim is to use the geographical position of a party as its only credential. On the negative side, we show that if adversaries are allowed to share an arbitrarily large entangled quantum state, the task of secure position-verification is impossible. To this end, we prove the following very general result. Assume that Alice and Bob hold respectively subsystems @math and @math of a (possibly) unknown quantum state @math . Their goal is to calculate and share a new state @math , where @math is a fixed unitary operation. The question that we ask is how many rounds of mutual communication are needed. It is easy to achieve such a task using two rounds of classical communication, whereas, in general, it is impossible with no communication at all. Surprisingly, in case Alice and Bob share enough entanglement to start with and we allow an arbitrarily small failure probability,...
In a subsequent paper @cite_4 , Lau and Lo use similar ideas as in @cite_19 to show the insecurity of position-verification schemes that are of a certain (yet rather restricted) form, which include the schemes from @cite_1 @cite_5 and @cite_33 . Furthermore, they propose a position-verification scheme that resists their attack, and they conjecture it secure. While these protocols might be secure if the adversaries do not pre-share entanglement, our attack shows that all of them are insecure in general.
@cite_4 @cite_33 @cite_1 @cite_19 @cite_5
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Recently, position-based quantum cryptography has been claimed to be unconditionally secure. On the contrary, here we show that the existing proposals for position-based quantum cryptography are, in fact, insecure if entanglement is shared among two adversaries. Specifically, we demonstrate how the adversaries can incorporate ideas of quantum teleportation and quantum secret sharing to compromise the security with certainty. The common flaw to all current protocols is that the Pauli operators always map a codeword to a codeword (up to an irrelevant overall phase). We propose a modified scheme lacking this property in which the same cheating strategy used to undermine the previous protocols can succeed with a rate of at most 85 . We prove the modified protocol is secure when the shared quantum resource between the adversaries is a two- or three-level system. We prove that the 1984 protocol of Bennett and Brassard (BB84) for quantum key distribution is secure. We first give a key distribution protocol based on entanglement purification, which can be proven secure using methods from Lo and Chau's proof of security for a similar protocol. We then show that the security of this protocol implies the security of BB84. The entanglement purification based protocol uses Calderbank-Shor-Steane codes, and properties of these codes are used to remove the use of quantum computation from the Lo-Chau protocol. Recently, we have improved the efficiency of the predicate abstraction scheme presented by Das, Dill and Park (1999). As a result, the number of validity checks needed to prove the necessary verification condition has been reduced. The key idea is to refine an approximate abstract transition relation based on the counter-example generated. The system starts with an approximate abstract transition relation on which the verification condition (in our case, this is a safety property) is model-checked. If the property holds then the proof is done; otherwise the model checker returns an abstract counter-example trace. This trace is used to refine the abstract transition relation if possible and start anew. At the end of the process, the system either proves the verification condition or comes up with an abstract counter-example trace which holds in the most accurate abstract transition relation possible (with the user-provided predicates as a basis). If the verification condition fails in the abstract system, then either the concrete system does not satisfy it or the abstraction predicates chosen are not strong enough. This algorithm has been used on a concurrent garbage collection algorithm and a secure contract-signing protocol. This method improved the performance on the first problem significantly, and allowed us to tackle the second problem, which the previous method could not handle. We provide a method for deciding the insecurity of cryptographic protocols in presence of the standard Dolev-Yao intruder (with a finite number of sessions) extended with so-called oracle rules, i.e., deduction rules that satisfy certain conditions. As an instance of this general framework, we ascertain that protocol insecurity is in NP for an intruder that can exploit the properties of the XOR operator. This operator is frequently used in cryptographic protocols but cannot be handled in most protocol models. An immediate consequence of our proof is that checking whether a message can be derived by an intruder (using XOR) is in P. We also apply our framework to an intruder that exploits properties of certain encryption modes such as cipher block chaining (CBC).