In this paper, we study how an agent's belief is affected by her neighbors in a social network. We first introduce a general framework, where every agent has an initial belief on a statement, and updates her belief according to her and her neighbors' current beliefs under some belief evolution functions, which, arguably, should satisfy some basic properties. Then, we focus on the majority rule belief evolution function, that is, an agent will (dis)believe the statement iff more than half of her neighbors (dis)believe it. We consider some fundamental issues about majority rule belief evolution, for instance, whether the belief evolution process will eventually converge. The answer is no in general. However, for random asynchronous belief evolution, this is indeed the case.
The majority rule evolution function is named from the same well known approach in voting system @cite_10 . Generally speaking, belief evolution can be considered as voting in a social network for two opposite candidates. However, in belief evolution, the majority rule voting is performed locally, individually, distributedly and iteratively, while in voting system, it is performed globally, wholly, contralizedly and only once.
@cite_10
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Distributed voting is a fundamental topic in distributed computing. In the standard model of pull voting, at each step every vertex chooses a neighbour uniformly at random and adopts its opinion. The voting is completed when all vertices hold the same opinion. In the simplest case, each vertex initially holds one of two different opinions. This partitions the vertices into arbitrary sets A and B. For many graphs, including regular graphs and irrespective of their expansion properties, if both A and B are sufficiently large sets, then pull voting requires @math expected steps, where n is the number of vertices of the graph. In this paper we consider a related class of voting processes based on sampling two opinions. In the simplest case, every vertex v chooses two random neighbours at each step. If both these neighbours have the same opinion, then v adopts this opinion. Otherwise, v keeps its own opinion. Let G be a connected graph with n vertices and m edges. Let P be the transition matrix of a simple random walk on G with second largest eigenvalue @math . We show that if the initial imbalance in degree between the two opinions satisfies @math , then with high probability voting completes in @math steps, and the opinion with the larger initial degree wins. The condition that @math , or only a bound on the conductance of the graph is known, the sampling process can be modified so that voting still provably completes in @math steps with high probability. The modification uses two sampling based on probing to a fixed depth @math from any vertex. In its most general form our voting process allows vertices to bias their sampling of opinions among their neighbours to achieve a desired outcome. This is done by allocating weights to edges. Plurality voting is perhaps the most commonly used way to aggregate the preferences of multiple voters. The purpose of this paper is to provide a comprehensive study of people's voting behaviour in various online settings under the Plurality rule. Our empirical methodology consisted of a voting game in which participants vote for a single candidate out of a given set. We implemented voting games that replicate two common real-world voting scenarios: In the first, a single voter votes once after seeing a large pre-election poll. In the second game, several voters play simultaneously, and change their vote as the game progresses, as in small committees. The winning candidate in each game (and hence the subject's payment) is determined using the plurality rule. For each of these settings we generated hundreds of game instances, varying conditions such as the number of voters and their preferences. We show that people can be classified into at least three groups, two of which are not engaged in any strategic behavior. The third and largest group tends to select the natural "default" action when there is no clear strategic alternative. When an active strategic decision can be made that improves their immediate payoff, people usually choose that strategic alternative. Our study has insight for multi-agent system designers in uncovering patterns that provide reasonable predictions of voters' behaviors, which may facilitate the design of agents that support people or act autonomously in voting systems. Voting is a commonly applied method for the aggregation of the preferences of multiple agents into a joint decision. If preferences are binary, i.e., "yes" and "no", every voting system can be described by a (monotone) Boolean function @math . However, its naive encoding needs @math bits. The subclass of threshold functions, which is sufficient for homogeneous agents, allows a more succinct representation using @math weights and one threshold. For heterogeneous agents, one can represent @math as an intersection of @math threshold functions. Taylor and Zwicker have constructed a sequence of examples requiring @math and provided a construction guaranteeing @math . The magnitude of the worst-case situation was thought to be determined by in 2008, but the analysis unfortunately turned out to be wrong. Here we uncover a relation to coding theory that allows the determination of the minimum number @math for a subclass of voting systems. As an application, we give a construction for @math , i.e., there is no gain from a representation complexity point of view. Nowadays, in the world of limited attention, the techniques that maximize the spread of social influence are more than welcomed. Companies try to maximize their profits on sales by providing customers with free samples believing in the power of word-of-mouth marketing, governments and non-governmental organizations often want to introduce positive changes in the society by appropriately selecting individuals or election candidates want to spend least budget yet still win the election. In this work we propose the use of evolutionary algorithm as a mean for selecting seeds in social networks. By framing the problem as genetic algorithm challenge we show that it is possible to outperform well-known greedy algorithm in the problem of influence maximization for the linear threshold model in both: quality (up to 16 better) and efficiency (up to 35 times faster). We implemented these two algorithms by using GPGPU approach showing that also the evolutionary algorithm can benefit from GPU acceleration making it efficient and scaling better than the greedy algorithm. As the experiments conducted by using three real world datasets reveal, the evolutionary approach proposed in this paper outperforms the greedy algorithm in terms of the outcome and it also scales much better than the greedy algorithm when the network size is increasing. The only drawback in the GPGPU approach so far is the maximum size of the network that can be processed - it is limited by the memory of the GPU card. We believe that by showing the superiority of the evolutionary approach over the greedy algorithm, we will motivate the scientific community to look for an idea to overcome this limitation of the GPU approach - we also suggest one of the possible paths to explore. Since the proposed approach is based only on topological features of the network, not on the attributes of nodes, the applications of it are broader than the ones that are dataset-specific.