In peer-to-peer systems, attrition attacks include both traditional, network-level denial of service attacks as well as application-level attacks in which malign peers conspire to waste loyal peers' resources. We describe several defenses for LOCKSS, a peer-to-peer digital preservation system, that help ensure that application-level attacks even from powerful adversaries are less effective than simple network-level attacks, and that network-level attacks must be intense, wide-spread, and prolonged to impair the system.
Related to first-hand reputation is the use of game-theoretic analysis of peer behavior by @cite_7 to show that a reciprocative strategy in admission control policy can motivate cooperation among selfish peers.
@cite_7
1506509256 1913214437 2125545976 2164146906
We commonly use the experience of others when taking decisions. Reputation mechanisms aggregate in a formal way the feedback collected from peers and compute the reputation of products, services, or providers. The success of reputation mechanisms is however conditioned on obtaining true feedback. Side-payments (i.e. agents get paid for submitting feedback) can make honest reporting rational (i.e. Nash equilibrium). Unfortunately, known schemes also have other Nash equilibria that imply lying. In this paper we analyze the equilibria of two incentive-compatible reputation mechanisms and investigate how undesired equilibrium points can be eliminated by using trusted reports. Some misbehavior detection and reputation systems in mobile ad-hoc networks rely on the dissemination of information of observed behavior, which makes them vulnerable to false accusations. This vulnerability could be removed by forbidding the dissemination of information on observed behavior in the first place, but, as we show here, this has more drawbacks than a solution that allows dissemination and copes with false accusations. We propose a method for reducing the impact of false accusations. In our approach, nodes collect first-hand information about the behavior of other nodes by direct observation. In addition, nodes maintain a rating about every other node that they care about, in the form of a continuous variable per node. From time to time nodes exchange their first-hand information with others, but, using the Bayesian approach we designed and present in this paper, only second-hand information that is not incompatible with the current rating is accepted. Ratings are slightly modified by accepted information. The reputation of a given node is the collection of ratings maintained by others about this node. By means of simulation we evaluated the robustness of our approach against several types of adversaries that spread false information, and its efficiency at detecting malicious nodes. The simulation results indicate that our system largely reduces the impact of false accusations, while still benefiting from the accelerated detection of malicious nodes provided by second-hand information. We also found that when information dissemination is not used, the time until malicious nodes are detected can be unacceptable. There are two perspectives on the role of reputation in collaborative online projects such as Wikipedia or Yahoo! Answers. One, user reputation should be minimized in order to increase the number of contributions from a wide user base. Two, user reputation should be used as a heuristic to identify and promote high quality contributions. The current study examined how offline and online reputations of contributors affect perceived quality in MathOverflow, an online community with 3470 active users. On MathOverflow, users post high-level mathematics questions and answers. Community members also rate the quality of the questions and answers. This study is unique in being able to measure offline reputation of users. Both offline and online reputations were consistently and independently related to the perceived quality of authors' submissions, and there was only a moderate correlation between established offline and newly developed online reputation. Reputation systems rate the contributions to participatory sensing campaigns from each user by associating a reputation score. The reputation scores are used to weed out incorrect sensor readings. However, an adversary can deanonmyize the users even when they use pseudonyms by linking the reputation scores associated with multiple contributions. Since the contributed readings are usually annotated with spatiotemporal information, this poses a serious breach of privacy for the users. In this paper, we address this privacy threat by proposing a framework called IncogniSense. Our system utilizes periodic pseudonyms generated using blind signature and relies on reputation transfer between these pseudonyms. The reputation transfer process has an inherent trade-off between anonymity protection and loss in reputation. We investigate by means of extensive simulations several reputation cloaking schemes that address this tradeoff in different ways. Our system is robust against reputation corruption and a prototype implementation demonstrates that the associated overheads are minimal.