We introduce a new class of scheduling problems in which the optimization is performed by the worker (single "machine") who performs the tasks. A typical worker's objective is to minimize the amount of work he does (he is "lazy"), or more generally, to schedule as inefficiently (in some sense) as possible. The worker is subject to the constraint that he must be busy when there is work that he can do; we make this notion precise both in the preemptive and nonpreemptive settings. The resulting class of "perverse" scheduling preblems, which we denote "Lazy Bureaucrat Problems," gives rise to a rich set of new questions that explore the distinction between maximization and minimization in computing optimal schedules.
Recently Hepner and Stein @cite_5 published a pseudo-polynomial-time algorithm for minimizing the makespan subject to preemption constraint II, thus resolving an open problem from an earlier version of this paper @cite_3 . They also extend the LBP to the parallel setting, in which there are multiple bureaucrats.
@cite_5 @cite_3
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We study the problem of minimizing makespan for the Lazy Bureaucrat Scheduling Problem. We give a pseudopolynomial time algorithm for a preemptive scheduling problem, resolving an open problem by We also extend the definition of Lazy Bureaucrat scheduling to the multiple-bureaucrat (parallel) setting, and provide pseudopolynomial-time algorithms for problems in that model. We consider one of the basic, well-studied problems of scheduling theory, that of nonpreemptively scheduling n independent tasks on m identical, parallel processors with the objective of minimizing the “makespan,” i.e., the total timespan required to process all the given tasks. Because this problem is @math -complete and apparently intractable in general, much effort has been directed toward devising fast algorithms which find near-optimal schedules. The well-known LPT (Largest Processing Time first) algorithm always finds a schedule having makespan within @math of the minimum possible makespan, and this is the best such bound satisfied by any previously published fast algorithm. We describe a comparably fast algorithm, based on techniques from “bin-packing,” which we prove satisfies a bound of 1.220. On the basis of exact upper bounds determined for each @math , we conjecture that the best possible general bound for our algorithm is actually @math . We present a polynomial approximation scheme for the minimum makespan problem on uniform parallel processors. More specifically, the problem is to find a schedule for a set of independent jobs on a collection of machines of different speeds so that the last job to finish is completed as quickly as possible. We give a family of polynomial-time algorithms @math such that @math delivers a solution that is within a relative error @math of the optimum. This is a dramatic improvement over previously known algorithms; the best performance guarantee previously proved for a polynomial-time algorithm ensured a relative error no more than 40 percent. The technique employed is the dual approximation approach, where infeasible but superoptimal solutions for a related (dual) problem are converted to the desired feasible but possibly suboptimal solution. We consider the makespan-minimization problem on unrelated machines in the context of algorithmic mechanism design. No truthful mechanisms with non-trivial approximation guarantees are known for this multidimensional domain. We study a well-motivated special case (also a multidimensional domain), where the processing time of a job on each machine is either "low" or "high." We give a general technique to convert any c-approximation algorithm (in a black-box fashion) to a 3c-approximation truthful-in-expectation mechanism. Our construction uses fractional truthful mechanisms as a building block, and builds upon a technique of Lavi and Swamy [Lavi, R., Swamy, C., 2005. Truthful and near-optimal mechanism design via linear programming. In: Proc. 46th FOCS, pp. 595-604]. When all jobs have identical low and high values, we devise a deterministic 2-approximation truthful mechanism. The chief novelty of our results is that we do not utilize explicit price definitions to prove truthfulness. Instead we design algorithms that satisfy cycle monotonicity [Rochet, J., 1987. A necessary and sufficient condition for rationalizability in a quasilinear context. J. Math. Econ. 16, 191-200], a necessary and sufficient condition for truthfulness in multidimensional settings; this is the first work that leverages this characterization.