We introduce a setting for learning possibilistic logic theories from defaults of the form "if alpha then typically beta". We first analyse this problem from the point of view of machine learning theory, determining the VC dimension of possibilistic stratifications as well as the complexity of the associated learning problems, after which we present a heuristic learning algorithm that can easily scale to thousands of defaults. An important property of our approach is that it is inherently able to handle noisy and conflicting sets of defaults. Among others, this allows us to learn possibilistic logic theories from crowdsourced data and to approximate propositional Markov logic networks using heuristic MAP solvers. We present experimental results that demonstrate the effectiveness of this approach.
Reasoning with defaults of the form if @math then typically @math '', denoted as @math , has been widely studied @cite_2 @cite_0 @cite_8 @cite_14 @cite_27 @cite_23 . A central problem in this context is to determine what other defaults can be derived from a given input set. Note, however, that the existing approaches for reasoning about default rules all require some form of consistency (e.g. the input set cannot contain both @math and @math ). As a result, these approaches cannot directly be used for reasoning about noisy crowdsourced defaults.
@cite_14 @cite_8 @cite_0 @cite_27 @cite_23 @cite_2
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The need to make default assumptions is frequently encountered in reasoning about incompletely specified worlds. Inferences sanctioned by default are best viewed as beliefs which may well be modified or rejected by subsequent observations. It is this property which leads to the non-monotonicity of any logic of defaults. In this paper we propose a logic for default reasoning. We then specialize our treatment to a very large class of commonly occuring defaults. For this class we develop a complete proof theory and show how to interface it with a top down resolution theorem prover. Finally, we provide criteria under which the revision of derived beliefs must be effected. This paper deals with the extraction of default rules from a database of examples. The proposed approach is based on a special kind of probability distributions, called "big-stepped probabilities", which are known to provide a semantics for non-monotonic reasoning. The rules which are learnt are genuine default rules, which could be used (under some conditions) in a non-monotonic reasoning system and can be encoded in possibilistic logic. Abstract We present an abstract framework for default reasoning, which includes Theorist, default logic, logic programming, autoepistemic logic, non-monotonic modal logics, and certain instances of circumscription as special cases. The framework can be understood as a generalisation of Theorist. The generalisation allows any theory formulated in a monotonic logic to be extended by a defeasible set of assumptions. An assumption can be defeated (or “attacked”) if its “contrary” can be proved, possibly with the aid of other conflicting assumptions. We show that, given such a framework, the standard semantics of most logics for default reasoning can be understood as sanctioning a set of assumptions, as an extension of a given theory, if and only if the set of assumptions is conflict-free (in the sense that it does not attack itself) and it attacks every assumption not in the set. We propose a more liberal, argumentation-theoretic semantics, based upon the notion of admissible extension in logic programming. We regard a set of assumptions, in general, as admissible if and only if it is conflict-free and defends itself (by attacking) every set of assumptions which attacks it. We identify conditions for the existence of extensions and for the equivalence of different semantics. Abstract In this paper, we address the issue of how Gelfond and Lifschitz's answer set semantics for extended logic programs can be suitably modified to handle prioritized programs. In such programs an ordering on the program rules is used to express preferences. We show how this ordering can be used to define preferred answer sets and thus to increase the set of consequences of a program. We define a strong and a weak notion of preferred answer sets. The first takes preferences more seriously, while the second guarantees the existence of a preferred answer set for programs possessing at least one answer set. Adding priorities to rules is not new, and has been explored in different contexts. However, we show that many approaches to priority handling, most of which are inherited from closely related formalisms like default logic, are not suitable and fail on intuitive examples. Our approach, which obeys abstract, general principles that any approach to prioritized knowledge representation should satisfy, handles them in the expected way. Moreover, we investigate the complexity of our approach. It appears that strong preference on answer sets does not add on the complexity of the principal reasoning tasks, and weak preference leads only to a mild increase in complexity.