Theoretical progress in understanding the dynamics of spreading processes on graphs suggests the existence of an epidemic threshold below which no epidemics form and above which epidemics spread to a significant fraction of the graph. We have observed information cascades on the social media site Digg that spread fast enough for one initial spreader to infect hundreds of people, yet end up affecting only 0.1 of the entire network. We find that two effects, previously studied in isolation, combine cooperatively to drastically limit the final size of cascades on Digg. First, because of the highly clustered structure of the Digg network, most people who are aware of a story have been exposed to it via multiple friends. This structure lowers the epidemic threshold while moderately slowing the overall growth of cascades. In addition, we find that the mechanism for social contagion on Digg points to a fundamental difference between information spread and other contagion processes: despite multiple opportunities for infection within a social group, people are less likely to become spreaders of information with repeated exposure. The consequences of this mechanism become more pronounced for more clustered graphs. Ultimately, this effect severely curtails the size of social epidemics on Digg.
The friend saturating model we have used to describe cascades on Digg is a special case of a broader class of models called decreasing cascade models'' @cite_21 . Several works have observed similar diminishing returns from friends in social networks. @cite_30 analyzed the usefulness of product recommendations on Amazon.com. They rarely found that anyone received more than a handful of recommendations for any product, and the marginal benefit of multiple recommendations, while product dependent, was typically sublinear (i.e. two recommendations did not make someone twice as likely to buy as one recommendation). Link formation was studied in @cite_31 , where they also found diminishing returns in the probability of befriending someone with whom one shares @math mutual friends, with saturation occurring around @math . The probability of joining a group that @math friends have joined was studied in @cite_1 , with saturation occurring for @math around 10-20.
@cite_30 @cite_31 @cite_21 @cite_1
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Most recommender systems recommend a list of items. The user examines the list, from the first item to the last, and often chooses the first attractive item and does not examine the rest. This type of user behavior can be modeled by the cascade model. In this work, we study cascading bandits, an online learning variant of the cascade model where the goal is to recommend K most attractive items from a large set of L candidate items. We propose two algorithms for solving this problem, which are based on the idea of linear generalization. The key idea in our solutions is that we learn a predictor of the attraction probabilities of items from their features, as opposing to learning the attraction probability of each item independently as in the existing work. This results in practical learning algorithms whose regret does not depend on the number of items L. We bound the regret of one algorithm and comprehensively evaluate the other on a range of recommendation problems. The algorithm performs well and outperforms all baselines. We study the problem of maximizing the expected spread of an innovation or behavior within a social network, in the presence of “word-of-mouth” referral. Our work builds on the observation that individuals’ decisions to purchase a product or adopt an innovation are strongly influenced by recommendations from their friends and acquaintances. Understanding and leveraging this influence may thus lead to a much larger spread of the innovation than the traditional view of marketing to individuals in isolation. In this paper, we define a natural and general model of influence propagation that we term the decreasing cascade model, generalizing models used in the sociology and economics communities. In this model, as in related ones, a behavior spreads in a cascading fashion according to a probabilistic rule, beginning with a set of initially “active” nodes. We study the target set selection problem: we wish to choose a set of individuals to target for initial activation, such that the cascade beginning with this active set is as large as possible in expectation. We show that in the decreasing cascade model, a natural greedy algorithm is a 1-1 e-e approximation for selecting a target set of size k. We investigate nonparametric multiproduct pricing problems, in which we want to find revenue maximizing prices for products @math based on a set of customer samples @math . We mostly focus on the unit-demand case, in which products constitute strict substitutes and each customer aims to purchase a single product. In this setting a customer sample consists of a number of nonzero values for different products and possibly an additional product ranking. Once prices are fixed, each customer chooses to buy one of the products she can afford based on some predefined selection rule. We distinguish between the min-buying, max-buying, and rank-buying models. Some of our results also extend to single-minded pricing, in which case products are strict complements and every customer seeks to buy a single set of products, which she purchases if the sum of prices is below her valuation for that set. For the min-buying model we show that the revenue maximization problem is not approximable within factor @math for some constant @math , unless @math , thereby almost closing the gap between the known algorithmic results and previous lower bounds. We also prove inapproximability within @math , @math being an upper bound on the number of nonzero values per customer, and @math under slightly stronger assumptions and provide matching upper bounds. Surprisingly, these hardness results hold even if a price ladder constraint, i.e., a predefined order on the prices of all products, is given. Without the price ladder constraint we obtain similar hardness results for the special case of uniform valuations, i.e., the case that every customer has identical values for all the products she is interested in, assuming specific hardness of the balanced bipartite independent set problem in constant degree graphs or hardness of refuting random 3CNF formulas. Introducing a slightly more general problem definition in which customers are given as an explicit probability distribution, we obtain inapproximability within @math assuming @math . These results apply to single-minded pricing as well. For the max-buying model a polynomial-time approximation scheme exists if a price ladder is given. We give a matching lower bound by proving strong NP-hardness. Assuming limited product supply, we analyze a generic local search algorithm and prove that it is 2-approximate. Finally, we discuss implications for the rank-buying model. We empirically analyze five online communities: Friendster, Livejournal, Facebook, Orkut, and Myspace, to study how social networks decline. We define social resilience as the ability of a community to withstand changes. We do not argue about the cause of such changes, but concentrate on their impact. Changes may cause users to leave, which may trigger further leaves of others who lost connection to their friends. This may lead to cascades of users leaving. A social network is said to be resilient if the size of such cascades can be limited. To quantify resilience, we use the k-core analysis, to identify subsets of the network in which all users have at least k friends. These connections generate benefits (b) for each user, which have to outweigh the costs (c) of being a member of the network. If this difference is not positive, users leave. After all cascades, the remaining network is the k-core of the original network determined by the cost-to-benefit (c b) ratio. By analysing the cumulative distribution of k-cores we are able to calculate the number of users remaining in each community. This allows us to infer the impact of the c b ratio on the resilience of these online communities. We find that the different online communities have different k-core distributions. Consequently, similar changes in the c b ratio have a different impact on the amount of active users. Further, our resilience analysis shows that the topology of a social network alone cannot explain its success of failure. As a case study, we focus on the evolution of Friendster. We identify time periods when new users entering the network observed an insufficient c b ratio. This measure can be seen as a precursor of the later collapse of the community. Our analysis can be applied to estimate the impact of changes in the user interface, which may temporarily increase the c b ratio, thus posing a threat for the community to shrink, or even to collapse.