In cooperative multi-agent sequential decision making under uncertainty, agents must coordinate to find an optimal joint policy that maximises joint value. Typical algorithms exploit additive structure in the value function, but in the fully-observable multi-agent MDP setting (MMDP) such structure is not present. We propose a new optimal solver for transition-independent MMDPs, in which agents can only affect their own state but their reward depends on joint transitions. We represent these dependencies compactly in conditional return graphs (CRGs). Using CRGs the value of a joint policy and the bounds on partially specified joint policies can be efficiently computed. We propose CoRe, a novel branch-and-bound policy search algorithm building on CRGs. CoRe typically requires less runtime than the available alternatives and finds solutions to problems previously unsolvable.
This is part of another line of work that has not sacrificed optimality, but instead targets sub-classes of problems with properties that can be exploited @cite_28 @cite_22 @cite_0 @cite_23 . In particular, several methods that exploit the same type of additive structure in the value function have been shown exact, simply because value functions of the sub-class of problems they address are guaranteed to have such shape @cite_26 @cite_1 @cite_10 . However, all these approaches are for decentralised models in which actions are conditioned only on observations. Consequentially, optimal policies for decentralised models typically yield lower value than the optimal policies for their fully-observable counterparts (shown in our experiments).
@cite_26 @cite_22 @cite_28 @cite_1 @cite_0 @cite_23 @cite_10
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We study the problem of fair allocation for indivisible goods. We use the the maxmin share paradigm introduced by Budish as a measure for fairness. Procacciafirst (EC'14) were first to investigate this fundamental problem in the additive setting. In contrast to what real-world experiments suggest, they show that a maxmin guarantee (1- @math allocation) is not always possible even when the number of agents is limited to 3. While the existence of an approximation solution (e.g. a @math - @math allocation) is quite straightforward, improving the guarantee becomes subtler for larger constants. Procaccia provide a proof for existence of a @math - @math allocation and leave the question open for better guarantees. Our main contribution is an answer to the above question. We improve the result of ! to a @math factor in the additive setting. The main idea for our @math - @math allocation method is clustering the agents. To this end, we introduce three notions and techniques, namely reducibility, matching allocation, and cycle-envy-freeness, and prove the approximation guarantee of our algorithm via non-trivial applications of these techniques. Our analysis involves coloring and double counting arguments that might be of independent interest. One major shortcoming of the current studies on fair allocation is the additivity assumption on the valuations. We alleviate this by extending our results to the case of submodular, fractionally subadditive, and subadditive settings. More precisely, we give constant approximation guarantees for submodular and XOS agents, and a logarithmic approximation for the case of subadditive agents. Furthermore, we complement our results by providing close upper bounds for each class of valuation functions. Finally, we present algorithms to find such allocations for additive, submodular, and XOS settings in polynomial time. We consider the problem of maximizing welfare when allocating m items to n players with subadditive utility functions. Our main result is a way of rounding any fractional solution to a linear programming relaxation to this problem so as to give a feasible solution of welfare at least half that of the value of the fractional solution. This approximation ratio of 1 2 improves over an Ω(1 log m) ratio of Dobzinski, Nisan and Schapira [STOC 2005]. We also show an approximation ratio of 1 - 1 e when utility functions are fractionally subadditive. A result similar to this last result was previously obtained by Dobzinski and Schapira [Soda 2006], but via a different rounding technique that requires the use of a so called "XOS oracle".The randomized rounding techniques that we use are oblivious in the sense that they only use the primal solution to the linear program relaxation, but have no access to the actual utility functions of the players. This allows us to suggest new incentive compatible mechanisms for combinatorial auctions, extending previous work of Lavi and Swamy [FOCS 2005]. We revisit the classic problem of fair division from a mechanism design perspective and provide an elegant truthful mechanism that yields surprisingly good approximation guarantees for the widely used solution of Proportional Fairness. This solution, which is closely related to Nash bargaining and the competitive equilibrium, is known to be not implementable in a truthful fashion, which has been its main drawback. To alleviate this issue, we propose a new mechanism, which we call the Partial Allocation mechanism, that discards a carefully chosen fraction of the allocated resources in order to incentivize the agents to be truthful in reporting their valuations. This mechanism introduces a way to implement interesting truthful outcomes in settings where monetary payments are not an option. For a multi-dimensional domain with an arbitrary number of agents and items, and for the very large class of homogeneous valuation functions, we prove that our mechanism provides every agent with at least a 1 e ≈ 0.368 fraction of her Proportionally Fair valuation. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first result that gives a constant factor approximation to every agent for the Proportionally Fair solution. To complement this result, we show that no truthful mechanism can guarantee more than 0.5 approximation, even for the restricted class of additive linear valuations. In addition to this, we uncover a connection between the Partial Allocation mechanism and VCG-based mechanism design. We also ask whether better approximation ratios are possible in more restricted settings. In particular, motivated by the massive privatization auction in the Czech republic in the early 90s we provide another mechanism for additive linear valuations that works really well when all the items are highly demanded. Motivated by the problem of querying and communicating bidders' valuations in combinatorial auctions, we study how well different classes of set functions can be sketched. More formally, let f be a function mapping subsets of some ground set [n] to the non-negative real numbers. We say that f' is an α-sketch of f if for every set S, the value f'(S) lies between f(S) α and f(S), and f' can be specified by poly(n) bits. We show that for every subadditive function f there exists an α-sketch where α = n1 2. O(polylog(n)). Furthermore, we provide an algorithm that finds these sketches with a polynomial number of demand queries. This is essentially the best we can hope for since: 1. We show that there exist subadditive functions (in fact, XOS functions) that do not admit an o(n1 2) sketch. (Balcan and Harvey [3] previously showed that there exist functions belonging to the class of substitutes valuations that do not admit an O(n1 3) sketch.) 2. We prove that every deterministic algorithm that accesses the function via value queries only cannot guarantee a sketching ratio better than n1−e. We also show that coverage functions, an interesting subclass of submodular functions, admit arbitrarily good sketches. Finally, we show an interesting connection between sketching and learning. We show that for every class of valuations, if the class admits an α-sketch, then it can be α-approximately learned in the PMAC model of Balcan and Harvey. The bounds we prove are only information-theoretic and do not imply the existence of computationally efficient learning algorithms in general.