We consider a basic resource allocation game, where the players' strategy spaces are subsets of @math and cost utility functions are parameterized by some common vector @math and, otherwise, only depend on the own strategy choice. A strategy of a player can be interpreted as a vector of resource consumption and a joint strategy profile naturally leads to an aggregate consumption vector. We assume that resources can be priced, that is, the game is augmented by a price vector @math and players have quasi-linear overall costs utilities meaning that in addition to the original costs utilities, a player needs to pay the corresponding price per consumed unit. We investigate the following question: for which aggregated consumption vectors @math can we find prices @math that induce an equilibrium realizing the targeted consumption profile? For answering this question, we develop a duality-based framework and derive a characterization of the existence of such @math and @math . We show that our characterization can help to unify parts of three largely independent streams in the literature -- tolls in transportation systems, Walrasian market equilibria and congestion control in communication networks. Besides reproving existing results we establish novel existence results by drawing connections to polyhedral combinatorics and discrete convexity.
@cite_56 proposed to model congestion control via analyzing optimal solutions of a convex optimization problem, where an aggregated bandwidth utility subject to network capacity constraints is maximized. By dualizing the problem and then decomposing terms (as we do in this paper), it is shown that Lagrangian multipliers correspond to equilibrium enforcing congestion prices. For an overview on more related work in this area, we refer to the book by Srikant @cite_39 . Kelly and Vazirani @cite_78 drew connections between market equilibrium computation and the congestion control model of Kelly. @cite_24 also studied the convex programming formulation of and established connections to the Wardrop equilibrium model. The most obvious difference of these work to ours is that they assume convex strategy spaces and concave utility functions. Our framework allows to add integrality conditions or non-convexities to the model.
@cite_24 @cite_39 @cite_78 @cite_56
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This paper considers jointly optimal design of crosslayer congestion control, routing and scheduling for ad hoc wireless networks. We first formulate the rate constraint and scheduling constraint using multicommodity flow variables, and formulate resource allocation in networks with fixed wireless channels (or single-rate wireless devices that can mask channel variations) as a utility maximization problem with these constraints. By dual decomposition, the resource allocation problem naturally decomposes into three subproblems: congestion control, routing and scheduling that interact through congestion price. The global convergence property of this algorithm is proved. We next extend the dual algorithm to handle networks with timevarying channels and adaptive multi-rate devices. The stability of the resulting system is established, and its performance is characterized with respect to an ideal reference system which has the best feasible rate region at link layer. We then generalize the aforementioned results to a general model of queueing network served by a set of interdependent parallel servers with time-varying service capabilities, which models many design problems in communication networks. We show that for a general convex optimization problem where a subset of variables lie in a polytope and the rest in a convex set, the dual-based algorithm remains stable and optimal when the constraint set is modulated by an irreducible finite-state Markov chain. This paper thus presents a step toward a systematic way to carry out cross-layer design in the framework of “layering as optimization decomposition” for time-varying channel models. In Stolyar (Queueing Systems 50 (2005) 401---457) a dynamic control strategy, called greedy primal-dual (GPD) algorithm, was introduced for the problem of maximizing queueing network utility subject to stability of the queues, and was proved to be (asymptotically) optimal. (The network utility is a concave function of the average rates at which the network generates several "commodities.") Underlying the control problem of Stolyar (Queueing Systems 50 (2005) 401---457) is a convex optimization problem subject to a set of linear constraints. In this paper we introduce a generalized GPD algorithm, which applies to the network control problem with additional convex (possibly non-linear) constraints on the average commodity rates. The underlying optimization problem in this case is a convex problem subject to convex constraints. We prove asymptotic optimality of the generalized GPD algorithm. We illustrate key features and applications of the algorithm on simple examples. One central issue in practically deploying network coding is the adaptive and economic allocation of network resource. We cast this as an optimization, where the net-utility-the difference between a utility derived from the attainable multicast throughput and the total cost of resource provisioning-is maximized. By employing the MAX of flows characterization of the admissible rate region for multicasting, this paper gives a novel reformulation of the optimization problem, which has a separable structure. The Lagrangian relaxation method is applied to decompose the problem into subproblems involving one destination each. Our specific formulation of the primal problem results in two key properties. First, the resulting subproblem after decomposition amounts to the problem of finding a shortest path from the source to each destination. Second, assuming the net-utility function is strictly concave, our proposed method enables a near-optimal primal variable to be uniquely recovered from a near-optimal dual variable. A numerical robustness analysis of the primal recovery method is also conducted. For ill-conditioned problems that arise, for instance, when the cost functions are linear, we propose to use the proximal method, which solves a sequence of well-conditioned problems obtained from the original problem by adding quadratic regularization terms. Furthermore, the simulation results confirm the numerical robustness of the proposed algorithms. Finally, the proximal method and the dual subgradient method can be naturally extended to provide an effective solution for applications with multiple multicast sessions In the traffic assignment problem, first proposed by Wardrop in 1952, commuters select the shortest available path to travel from their origins to their destinations. We study a generalization of this problem in which competitors, who may control a nonnegligible fraction of the total flow, ship goods across a network. This type of games, usually referred to as atomic games, readily applies to situations in which the competing freight companies have market power. Other applications include intelligent transportation systems, competition among telecommunication network service providers, and scheduling with flexible machines. Our goal is to determine to what extent these systems can benefit from some form of coordination or regulation. We measure the quality of the outcome of the game without centralized control by computing the worst-case inefficiency of Nash equilibria. The main conclusion is that although self-interested competitors will not achieve a fully efficient solution from the system's point of view, the loss is not too severe. We show how to compute several bounds for the worst-case inefficiency that depend on the characteristics of cost functions and on the market structure in the game. In addition, building upon the work of Catoni and Pallotino, we show examples in which market aggregation (or collusion) adversely impacts the aggregated competitors, even though their market power increases. For example, Nash equilibria of atomic network games may be less efficient than the corresponding Wardrop equilibria. When competitors are completely symmetric, we provide a characterization of the Nash equilibrium using a potential function, and prove that this counterintuitive phenomenon does not arise. Finally, we study a pricing mechanism that elicits more coordination from the players by reducing the worst-case inefficiency of Nash equilibria.