We examine the classic "Beer-Quiche" game from Cho and Kreps (1987), and relax the assumption that the order placed by the sender is completely observable. Under the optimal degree of transparency, the receiver achieves a higher payoff than with full transparency. Partial obfuscation of the sender's choice encourages separation: committing to a less informative signal about the sender's choice affects the endogenous information generation process such that the receiver thereby secures himself more information.
Finally, there is a somewhat older literature that looks at mediation in the context of . See for instance Goltsman, H "orner, Pavlov, and Squintani (2009) @cite_13 , Ganguly and Ray (2011) @cite_6 , and Ivanov (2009) @cite_11 . In a well known paper, Forges (1990) @cite_4 considers mediation in a job-market example, in which the signals about the prospective candidate's type are cheap talk. As in the other papers in this literature, this introduction of a mediator enlarges the size of the set of equilibrium payoffs.
@cite_4 @cite_13 @cite_6 @cite_11
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In the Crawford-Sobel (uniform, quadratic utility) cheap-talk model, we consider a simple mediation scheme (a communication device) in which the informed agent reports one of N possible elements of a partition to the mediator and then the mediator suggests one of N actions to the uninformed decision-maker according to the probability distribution of the device. We show that such a simple mediated equilibrium cannot improve upon the unmediated N-partition Crawford-Sobel equilibrium when the preference divergence parameter (bias) is small. We compare three common dispute resolution processes – negotiation, mediation, and arbitration – in the framework of Crawford and Sobel [V. Crawford, J. Sobel, Strategic information transmission, Econometrica 50 (6) (1982) 1431–1451]. Under negotiation, the two parties engage in (possibly arbitrarily long) face-to-face cheap talk. Under mediation, the parties communicate with a neutral third party who makes a non-binding recommendation. Under arbitration, the two parties commit to conform to the third party recommendation. We characterize and compare the optimal mediation and arbitration procedures. Both mediators and arbitrators should optimally filter information, but mediators should also add noise to it. We find that unmediated negotiation performs as well as mediation if and only if the degree of conflict between the parties is low. Foreword by Marlene Young. Introduction: Restorative Justice Through Victim Offender Mediation. PHILOSOPHY, PRACTICE, AND CONTEXT. Humanistic Mediation: A Transformative Journey of Peacemaking. Guidelines for Victim-Sensitive Mediation and Dialogue with Offenders. The Mediation Process: Phases and Tasks. Multicultural Implications of Victim Offender Mediation. Case Studies. National Survey of Victim Offender Mediation Programs. Program Development Issues. WHAT WE ARE LEARNING FROM RESEARCH. The Impact of Victim Offender Mediation: Two Decades of Research. Cross-National Assessment of Victim Offender Mediation. Victim Offender Mediation in the United States: A Multisite Assessment. Victim Offender Mediation in Canada: A Multisite Assessment. Victim Offender Mediation in England: A Multisite Assessment. EMERGING ISSUES. Advanced Mediation and Dialogue in Crimes of Severe Violence. Potential Hazards and Opportunities. Appendix A. Resources: Organizations, Publications, Videotapes. Appendix B. Directory of VOM Programs in the United States. Appendix C. Program Profiles. Appendix D. Promising Practices and Innovations. Appendix E. Summary of Forty VOM Empirical Studies. Appendix F. Assessing Participant Satisfaction with VOM. References. Index. There are two ways of handling bilateral multi-issue negotiations -- one is to negotiate all the issues together, and the other is to negotiate them one by one. The order in which issues are negotiated in issue-by-issue negotiation is specified by the agenda, which can be defined in two ways. One way is to decide it exogenously, i.e., before negotiation begins. The other way is to let the players decide which issue they will negotiate next, during the process of negotiation, i.e., the agenda is determined endogenously. Against this background, this paper studies the effect of combining the exogenous and endogenous agendas on the players' utilities. More specifically, we determine whether, decomposing a set of N issues into k stages (for 1 ≤ k ≤ N), determining the issues to be negotiated at each stage exogenously, and negotiating each stage sequentially using an endogenous agenda can improve an agent's utility relative to the utility it gets if the agenda for all the N issues is defined endogenously. For each agent, we find the expected utility for each value of k between 1 and N. The value of k that gives an agent maximum utility is its optimal number of stages.Our study shows that, in some negotiation scenarios, the optimal value of k is identical for the two players, and is greater than one. In other words, in some negotiation scenarios, both the agents can improve their utilities by using the k-stage negotiation relative to the single stage negotiation. However, since the players have incomplete information about the negotiation parameters, they cannot identify such scenarios. We therefore present an extended alternating offers protocol, that allows the agents to identify such scenarios through a mediator, thereby resulting in improved utility to both the agents.