Many basic key distribution schemes specifically tuned to wireless sensor networks have been proposed in the literature. Recently, several researchers have proposed schemes in which they have used group-based deployment models and assumed predeployment knowledge of the expected locations of nodes. They have shown that these schemes achieve better performance than the basic schemes, in terms of connectivity, resilience against node capture and storage requirements. But in many situations expected locations of nodes are not available. In this paper we propose a solution which uses the basic scheme, but does not use group-based deployment model and predeployment knowledge of the locations of nodes, and yet performs better than schemes which make the aforementioned assumptions. In our scheme, groups are formed after deployment of sensor nodes, on the basis of their physical locations, and the nodes sample keys from disjoint key pools. Compromise of a node affects secure links with other nodes that are part of its group only. Because of this reason, our scheme performs better than the basic schemes and the schemes using predeployment knowledge, in terms of connectivity, storage requirement, and security. Moreover, the post-deployment key generation process completes sooner than in schemes like LEAP+.
Various key distribution schemes have been proposed in the literature for wireless sensor networks, keeping in view the resource-constrained devices used in these networks. Eschenauer and Gligor @cite_14 proposed a scheme in which for every node, keys are picked randomly (with replacement) from a key pool and assigned to it before deployment; this scheme is known as the basic or EG scheme. After key discovery, two neighbor nodes that have a common key use that as the key for secure communication. Based on this basic scheme, several schemes with enhanced security features have been suggested in @cite_4 @cite_2 @cite_3 @cite_9 @cite_0 .
@cite_14 @cite_4 @cite_9 @cite_3 @cite_0 @cite_2
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To achieve security in wireless sensor networks, it is important to he able to encrypt messages sent among sensor nodes. Keys for encryption purposes must he agreed upon by communicating nodes. Due to resource constraints, achieving such key agreement in wireless sensor networks is nontrivial. Many key agreement schemes used in general networks, such as Diffie-Hellman and public-key based schemes, are not suitable for wireless sensor networks. Pre-distribution of secret keys for all pairs of nodes is not viable due to the large amount of memory used when the network size is large. Recently, a random key pre-distribution scheme and its improvements have been proposed. A common assumption made by these random key pre-distribution schemes is that no deployment knowledge is available. Noticing that in many practical scenarios, certain deployment knowledge may be available a priori, we propose a novel random key pre-distribution scheme that exploits deployment knowledge and avoids unnecessary key assignments. We show that the performance (including connectivity, memory usage, and network resilience against node capture) of sensor networks can he substantially improved with the use of our proposed scheme. The scheme and its detailed performance evaluation are presented in this paper. We consider the network reliability problem in secure wireless sensor networks that employ a heterogeneous random key predistribution scheme. This scheme is introduced recently, as a generalization of the Eschenauer-Gligor scheme, to account for the cases when the network comprises sensors with varying level of resources or connectivity requirements; e.g., regular nodes vs. cluster heads. The scheme induces the inhomogeneous random key graph, denoted G(n;μ,K, P ), where each of the n nodes are independently assigned to one of r classes according to a probability distribution μ = (μ1, . . . , μr) and then a class-i node is assigned Ki keys uniformly at random from a pool of size P ; two nodes that share a key are then connected by an edge. We analyze the reliability of G(n;μ,K, P ) against random link failures. Namely, we consider G(n;μ,K, P, α) formed by deleting each edge of G(n;μ,K, P ) independently with probability 1 − α, and study the probability that the resulting graph i) has no isolated node; and ii) is connected. We present scaling conditions on K , P , and α such that both events take place with probability zero or one, respectively, as the number of nodes gets large. We also present numerical results to support these zero-one laws in the finite-node regime. We introduce a new random key predistribution scheme for securing heterogeneous wireless sensor networks. Each of the @math sensors in the network is classified into @math classes according to some probability distribution @math . Before deployment, a class- @math sensor is assigned @math cryptographic keys that are selected uniformly at random from a common pool of @math keys. Once deployed, a pair of sensors can communicate securely if and only if they have a key in common. We model the communication topology of this network by a newly defined inhomogeneous random key graph. We establish scaling conditions on the parameters @math and @math so that this graph: 1) has no isolated nodes and 2) is connected, both with high probability. The results are given in the form of zero-one laws with the number of sensors @math growing unboundedly large; critical scalings are identified and shown to coincide for both graph properties. Our results are shown to complement and improve those given by and for the same model, therein referred to as the general random intersection graph. Many key pre-distribution techniques have been developed recently to establish pairwise keys for wireless sensor networks. To further improve these schemes, researchers have proposed to take advantage of sensors' expected locations to help pre-distributing keying materials. However, it is usually very difficult, and sometimes impossible, to guarantee the knowledge of sensors' expected locations. In order to remove the dependency on expected locations, this paper proposes a practical deployment model, where sensor nodes are deployed in groups, and the nodes in the same group are close to each other after the deployment. Based on this model, the paper develops a novel group-based key pre-distribution framework, which can be combined with any of existing key pre-distribution techniques. A distinguishing property of this framework is that it does not require the knowledge of sensors' expected locations and greatly simplifies the deployment of sensor networks. The analysis also shows that the framework can substantially improve the security as well as the performance of existing key pre-distribution techniques.