An important skill in critical thinking and argumentation is the ability to spot and recognize fallacies. Fallacious arguments, omnipresent in argumentative discourse, can be deceptive, manipulative, or simply leading to wrong moves' in a discussion. Despite their importance, argumentation scholars and NLP researchers with focus on argumentation quality have not yet investigated fallacies empirically. The nonexistence of resources dealing with fallacious argumentation calls for scalable approaches to data acquisition and annotation, for which the serious games methodology offers an appealing, yet unexplored, alternative. We present Argotario, a serious game that deals with fallacies in everyday argumentation. Argotario is a multilingual, open-source, platform-independent application with strong educational aspects, accessible at www.argotario.net.
Surprisingly, the vast majority of current works on fallacies, and especially textbooks, present only toy examples that one is unlikely to encounter in real life [p. 432] Boudry.et.al.2015 . The distinction between fallacies and acceptable inference is fuzzy and theories do not offer any practical guidance: fully-fledged fallacies are harder to find in real life than is commonly assumed @cite_12 . To this account, analysis of fallacies in actual argumentative discourse has been rather limited in scope and size. examined fallacies found in articles supporting creationism. manualy analysed fallacies in newswire editorials in major U.S. newspapers before invading Iraq in 2003. These two works rely on a list of several fallacy types, such as , , , , , and few others.
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Philosophers of science have given up on the quest for a silver bullet to put an end to all pseudoscience, as such a neat formal criterion to separate good science from its contenders has proven elusive. In the literature on critical thinking and in some philosophical quarters, however, this search for silver bullets lives on in the taxonomies of fallacies. The attractive idea is to have a handy list of abstract definitions or argumentation schemes, on the basis of which one can identify bad or invalid types of reasoning, abstracting away from the specific content and dialectical context. Such shortcuts for debunking arguments are tempting, but alas, the promise is hardly if ever fulfilled. Different strands of research on the pragmatics of argumentation, probabilistic reasoning and ecological rationality have shown that almost every known type of fallacy is a close neighbor to sound inferences or acceptable moves in a debate. Nonetheless, the kernel idea of a fallacy as an erroneous type of argument is still retained by most authors. We outline a destructive dilemma we refer to as the Fallacy Fork: on the one hand, if fallacies are construed as demonstrably invalid form of reasoning, then they have very limited applicability in real life (few actual instances). On the other hand, if our definitions of fallacies are sophisticated enough to capture real-life complexities, they can no longer be held up as an effective tool for discriminating good and bad forms of reasoning. As we bring our schematic “fallacies” in touch with reality, we seem to lose grip on normative questions. Even approaches that do not rely on argumentation schemes to identify fallacies (e.g., pragma-dialectics) fail to escape the Fallacy Fork, and run up against their own version of it. Large-scale datasets for natural language inference are created by presenting crowd workers with a sentence (premise), and asking them to generate three new sentences (hypotheses) that it entails, contradicts, or is logically neutral with respect to. We show that, in a significant portion of such data, this protocol leaves clues that make it possible to identify the label by looking only at the hypothesis, without observing the premise. Specifically, we show that a simple text categorization model can correctly classify the hypothesis alone in about 67 of SNLI (Bowman et. al, 2015) and 53 of MultiNLI (Williams et. al, 2017). Our analysis reveals that specific linguistic phenomena such as negation and vagueness are highly correlated with certain inference classes. Our findings suggest that the success of natural language inference models to date has been overestimated, and that the task remains a hard open problem. This article tackles a new challenging task in computational argumentation. Given a pair of two arguments to a certain controversial topic, we aim to directly assess qualitative properties of the arguments in order to explain why one argument is more convincing than the other one. We approach this task in a fully empirical manner by annotating 26k explanations written in natural language. These explanations describe convincingness of arguments in the given argument pair, such as their strengths or flaws. We create a new crowd-sourced corpus containing 9,111 argument pairs, multi-labeled with 17 classes, which was cleaned and curated by employing several strict quality measures. We propose two tasks on this data set, namely (1) predicting the full label distribution and (2) classifying types of flaws in less convincing arguments. Our experiments with feature-rich SVM learners and Bidirectional LSTM neural networks with convolution and attention mechanism reveal that such a novel fine-grained analysis of Web argument convincingness is a very challenging task. We release the new UKPConvArg2 corpus and software under permissive licenses to the research community. We propose a new graded semantics for abstract argumentation frameworks that is based on the constellations approach to probabilistic argumentation. Given an abstract argumentation framework, our approach assigns uniform probability to all arguments and then ranks arguments according to the probability of acceptance wrt. some classical semantics. Albeit relying on a simple idea this approach (1) is based on the solid theoretical foundations of probability theory, and (2) complies with many rationality postulates proposed for graded semantics. We also investigate an application of our approach for inconsistency measurement in argumentation frameworks and show that the measure induced by the probabilistic graded semantics also complies with the basic rationality postulates from that area.