We study a security game over a network played between a @math and @math @math . Every attacker chooses, probabilistically, a node of the network to damage. The defender chooses, probabilistically as well, a connected induced subgraph of the network of @math nodes to scan and clean.Each attacker wishes to maximize the probability of escaping her cleaning by the defender. On the other hand, the goal of the defender is to maximize the expected number of attackers that she catches. This game is a generalization of the model from the seminal paper of "The price of defense" (MFCS'06). We are interested in Nash equilibria (NE) of this game, as well as in characterizing @math - @math networks which allow for the best @math @math @math , termed Price of Defense; this is the ratio of @math over the expected number of attackers that the defender catches in a NE. We provide characterizations of the NEs of this game and defense-optimal networks. This allows us to show that the NEs of the game coincide independently from the coordination or not of the attackers. In addition, we give an algorithm for computing NEs. Our algorithm requires exponential time in the worst case, but it is polynomial-time for @math constantly close to 1 or @math . For the special case of tree-networks, we refine our characterization which allows us to derive a polynomial-time algorithm for deciding whether a tree is defense-optimal and if this is the case it computes a defense-optimal NE. On the other hand, we prove that it is NP-hard to find a best-defense strategy if the tree is not defense-optimal. We complement this negative result with a polynomial-time constant-approximation algorithm that computes solutions that are close to optimal ones for general graphs. Finally, we provide asymptotically (almost) tight bounds for the Price of Defense for any @math .
A game on a weighted graph with two players, the and the , was studied by @cite_4 . At each play, the tree player chooses a spanning tree and the edge player chooses an edge of the graph, and the payoffs of the players depend on whether the chosen edge belongs in the spanning tree. investigate the theoretical aspects of the above game and its connections to the and .
@cite_4
1981859328 2032349632 2762058341 2161199320
This paper investigates a zero-sum game played on a weighted connected graph @math between two players, the tree player and the edge player. At each play, the tree player chooses a spanning tree @math and the edge player chooses an edge @math . The payoff to the edge player is @math , defined as follows: If @math lies in the tree @math then @math ; if @math does not lie in the tree then @math , where @math is the weight of edge @math and @math is the weight of the unique cycle formed when edge @math is added to the tree @math . The main result is that the value of the game on any @math -vertex graph is bounded above by @math . It is conjectured that the value of the game is @math . The game arises in connection with the @math -server problem on a road network; i.e., a metric space that can be represented as a multigraph @math in which each edge @math represents a road of length @math . It is shown that, if the value of the game on @math is @math , then there is a randomized strategy that achieves a competitive ratio of @math against any oblivious adversary. Thus, on any @math -vertex road network, there is a randomized algorithm for the @math -server problem that is @math competitive against oblivious adversaries. At the heart of the analysis of the game is an algorithm that provides an approximate solution for the simple network design problem. Specifically, for any @math -vertex weighted, connected multigraph, the algorithm constructs a spanning tree @math such that the average, over all edges @math , of @math is less than or equal to @math . This result has potential application to the design of communication networks. It also improves substantially known estimates concerning the existence of a sparse basis for the cycle space of a graph. We study a network creation game recently proposed by Fabrikant, Luthra, Maneva, Papadimitriou and Shenker. In this game, each player (vertex) can create links (edges) to other players at a cost of α per edge. The goal of every player is to minimize the sum consisting of (a) the cost of the links he has created and (b) the sum of the distances to all other players. conjectured that there exists a constant A such that, for any α > A, all non-transient Nash equilibria graphs are trees. They showed that if a Nash equilibrium is a tree, the price of anarchy is constant. In this paper we disprove the tree conjecture. More precisely, we show that for any positive integer n 0 , there exists a graph built by n ≥ n 0 players which contains cycles and forms a non-transient Nash equilibrium, for any α with 1 < α ≤ √n 2. Our construction makes use of some interesting results on finite affine planes. On the other hand we show that, for α ≥ 12n[log n], every Nash equilibrium forms a tree.Without relying on the tree conjecture, proved an upper bound on the price of anarchy of O(√α), where α ∈ [2, n2]. We improve this bound. Specifically, we derive a constant upper bound for α ∈ O(√n) and for α ≥ 12n[log n]. For the intermediate values we derive an improved bound of O(1 + (min α2 n, n2 α )1 3).Additionally, we develop characterizations of Nash equilibria and extend our results to a weighted network creation game as well as to scenarios with cost sharing. We consider a one-round two-player network pricing game, the Stackelberg Minimum Spanning Tree game or StackMST. The game is played on a graph (representing a network), whose edges are colored either red or blue, and where the red edges have a given fixed cost (representing the competitor’s prices). The first player chooses an assignment of prices to the blue edges, and the second player then buys the cheapest possible minimum spanning tree, using any combination of red and blue edges. The goal of the first player is to maximize the total price of purchased blue edges. This game is the minimum spanning tree analog of the well-studied Stackelberg shortest-path game. We analyze the complexity and approximability of the first player’s best strategy in StackMST. In particular, we prove that the problem is APX-hard even if there are only two different red costs, and give an approximation algorithm whose approximation ratio is at most min k,1+ln b,1+ln W , where k is the number of distinct red costs, b is the number of blue edges, and W is the maximum ratio between red costs. We also give a natural integer linear programming formulation of the problem, and show that the integrality gap of the fractional relaxation asymptotically matches the approximation guarantee of our algorithm. We initiate the study of game dynamics in the Sum Basic Network Creation Game, which was recently introduced by [SPAA'10]. In this game players are associated to vertices in a graph and are allowed to "swap" edges, that is to remove an incident edge and insert a new incident edge. By performing such moves, every player tries to minimize her connection cost, which is the sum of distances to all other vertices. When played on a tree, we prove that this game admits an ordinal potential function, which implies guaranteed convergence to a pure Nash Equilibrium. We show a cubic upper bound on the number of steps needed for any improving response dynamic to converge to a stable tree and propose and analyse a best response dynamic, where the players having the highest cost are allowed to move. For this dynamic we show an almost tight linear upper bound for the convergence speed. Furthermore, we contrast these positive results by showing that, when played on general graphs, this game allows best response cycles. This implies that there cannot exist an ordinal potential function and that fundamentally different techniques are required for analysing this case. For computing a best response we show a similar contrast: On the one hand we give a linear-time algorithm for computing a best response on trees even if players are allowed to swap multiple edges at a time. On the other hand we prove that this task is NP-hard even on simple general graphs, if more than one edge can be swapped at a time. The latter addresses a proposal by .