Dynamic Epistemic Logic makes it possible to model and reason about information change in multi-agent systems. Information change is mathematically modeled through epistemic action Kripke models introduced by Also, van Ditmarsch interprets the information change as a relation between epistemic states and sets of epistemic states and to describe it formally, he considers a special constructor LB called learning operator. Inspired by this, it seems natural to us that the basic source of information change in a multi-agent system should be learning an announcement by some agents together, privately, concurrently or even wrongly. Hence moving along this path, we introduce the notion of a learning program and prove that all finite K45 action models can be described by our learning programs
In @cite_0 , an epistemic action is interpreted as a between @math epistemic states and sets of @math epistemic states. There are two main differences between the interpretation of epistemic action in concurrent dynamic epistemic logic and epistemic learning programs.
@cite_0
2159131252 1500025499 2155318727 1518725080
Dynamic Epistemic Logic is the logic of knowledge change. This is not about one logical system, but about a whole family of logics that allows us to specify static and dynamic aspects of multi-agent systems. This book provides various logics to support such formal specifications, including proof systems. Concrete examples and epistemic puzzles enliven the exposition. The book also contains exercises including answers and is eminently suitable for graduate courses in logic. A sweeping chapter-wise outline of the content of this book is the following. The chapter 'Introduction' informs the reader about the history of the subject, and its relation to other disciplines. 'Epistemic Logic' is an overview of multi-agent epistemic logic - the logic of knowledge - including modal operators for groups, such as general and common knowledge. 'Belief Revision' is an overview on how to model belief revision, both in the 'traditional' way and in a dynamic epistemic setting. 'Public Announcements' is a detailed and comprehensive introduction into the logic of knowledge to which dynamic operators for truthful public announcement are added. Many interesting applications are also presented in this chapter: a form of cryptography for ideal agents also known as 'the russian cards problem', the sum-and-product riddle, etc. 'Epistemic Actions' introduces a generalization of public announcement logic to more complex epistemic actions. A different perspective on that matter is independently presented in 'Action Models'. 'Completeness' gives details on the completeness proof for the logics introduced in 'Epistemic Logic', 'Public Announcements', and 'Action Models'. 'Expressivity' discusses various results on the expressive power of the logics presented. When giving an analysis of knowledge in multiagent systems, one needs a framework in which higher-order information and its dynamics can both be represented. A recent tradition starting in original work by Plaza treats all of knowledge, higher-order knowledge, and its dynamics on the same foot. Our work is in that tradition. It also fits in approaches that not only dynamize the epistemics, but also epistemize the dynamics: the actions that (groups of) agents perform are epistemic actions. Different agents may have different information about which action is taking place, including higher-order information. We demonstrate that such information changes require subtle descriptions. Our contribution is to provide a complete axiomatization for an action language of van Ditmarsch, where an action is interpreted as a relation between epistemic states (pointed models) and sets of epistemic states. The applicability of the framework is found in every context where multiagent strategic decision making is at stake, and already demonstrated in game-like scenarios such as Cluedo and card games. Abstract Two currently active strands of research on logics for multi-agent systems are dynamic epistemic logic, focusing on the epistemic consequences of actions, and logics of coalitional ability, focusing on what coalitions of agents can achieve by cooperating strategically. In this paper we bridge these topics by considering the question: “what can a coalition achieve by making public announcements?”. We propose an extension of public announcement logic with constructs of the form 〈 G 〉 ϕ , where G is a group of agents, with the intuitive meaning that G can jointly execute a publicly observable action such that ϕ will be true afterwards. Actions here are taken to be truthful public announcements, but turn out also to include sequences of such joint actions as well as protocols with alternating actions by different agents, in response to the actions of others. We also study in detail the difference between ‘knowing how’ (knowing de re) and ‘knowing that’ (knowing de dicto) in our framework: both can elegantly be expressed in the single-agent case. We present several meta-logical properties of this Group Announcement Logic, including a sound and complete axiomatization, expressivity and the complexity of model checking. This paper presents a logical system in which various group-level epistemic actions are incorporated into the object language. That is, we consider the standard modeling of knowledge among a set of agents by multi-modal Kripke structures. One might want to consider actions that take place, such as announcements to groups privately, announcements with suspicious outsiders, etc. In our system, such actions correspond to additional modalities in the object language. That is, we do not add machinery on top of models (as in [1], but we reify aspects of the machinery in the logical language. The first case of the kind of logics we consider appears in Gerbrandy and Groeneveld [3]. They introduced a language in which one can faithfully represent all of the reasoning in examples such as the Muddy Children scenario. In that paper we find operators for updating worlds via announcements to groups of agents who are isolated from all others. We advance this by considering many more actions; and by using a more general semantics. Our logic contains the infinitary operators used in the standard modeling of common knowledge. We present a sound and complete logical system for the logic, and we study its expressive power.