By expanding the connection of objects to the Internet and their entry to human life, the issue of security and privacy has become important. In order to enhance security and privacy on the Internet, many security protocols have been developed. Unfortunately, the security analyzes that have been carried out on these protocols show that they are vulnerable to one or few attacks, which eliminates the use of these protocols. Therefore, the need for a security protocol on the Internet of Things (IoT) has not yet been resolved. Recently, Khor and Sidorov cryptanalyzed the protocol and presented an improved version of it. In this paper, at first, we show that this protocol also does not have sufficient security and so it is not recommended to be used in any application. More precisely, we present a full secret disclosure attack against this protocol, which extracted the whole secrets of the protocol by two communication with the target tag. In addition, recently proposed an ultralightweight mutual authentication RFID protocol for blockchain enabled supply chains, supported by formal and informal security proofs. However, we present a full secret disclosure attack against this protocol as well.
Reviewing the proposed mechanisms and designing new models that are compatible with IoT-based devices are also very important. Given that an IoT system can include many objects with limited resources, it requires special protocols to ensure that privacy and security are guaranteed. Therefore, with the further development of IoT, its security concerns are expected to receive more attention. So far, several security protocols have been proposed to ensure IoT security, e.g. @cite_14 @cite_26 @cite_2 @cite_22 @cite_12 , however, most of them have failed in providing their security goals @cite_8 @cite_4 @cite_0 @cite_30 @cite_9 @cite_29 and various attacks, such as the protocol's secret values disclosure, DoS, traceability, impersonation and etc. were reported against them. The presentation of these attacks resulted in the development of the protocol's designing knowledge and the protocol designers are designing their protocols in such a way as to be as safe as the published attacks so far. Unfortunately, there are still attacks against newly designed protocols, and this science has not yet matured.
@cite_30 @cite_14 @cite_26 @cite_22 @cite_4 @cite_8 @cite_9 @cite_29 @cite_0 @cite_2 @cite_12
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Abstract The safety of medical data and equipment plays a vital role in today’s world of Medical Internet of Things (MIoT). These IoT devices have many constraints (e.g., memory size, processing capacity, and power consumption) that make it challenging to use cost-effective and energy-efficient security solutions. Recently, researchers have proposed a few Radio-Frequency Identification (RFID) based security solutions for MIoT. The use of RFID technology in securing IoT systems is rapidly increasing because it provides secure and lightweight safety mechanisms for these systems. More recently, authors have proposed a lightweight RFID mutual authentication (LRMI) protocol. The authors argue that LRMI meets the necessary security requirements for RFID systems, and the same applies to MIoT applications as well. In this paper, our contribution has two-folds, firstly we analyze the LRMI protocol’s security to demonstrate that it is vulnerable to various attacks such as secret disclosure, reader impersonation, and tag traceability. Also, it is not able to preserve the anonymity of the tag and the reader. Secondly, we propose a new secure and lightweight mutual RFID authentication (SecLAP) protocol, which provides secure communication and preserves privacy in MIoT systems. Our security analysis shows that the SecLAP protocol is robust against de-synchronization, replay, reader tag impersonation, and traceability attacks, and it ensures forward and backward data communication security. We use Burrows-Abadi-Needham (BAN) logic to validate the security features of SecLAP. Moreover, we compare SecLAP with the state-of-the-art and validate its performance through a Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) implementation, which shows that it is lightweight, consumes fewer resources on tags concerning computation functions, and requires less number of flows. Internet of Things (IoT) has stimulated great interest in many researchers owing to its capability to connect billions of physical devices to the internet via heterogeneous access network. Security is a paramount aspect of IoT that needs to be addressed urgently to keep sensitive data private. However, from previous research studies, a number of security flaws in terms of keeping data private can be identified. Tewari and Gupta proposed an ultra-lightweight mutual authentication pRotocol that utilizes bitwise operation to achieve security in IoT networks that use RFID tags. The pRotocol is improved by Wang et. al. to prevent a full key disclosure attack. However, this paper shows that both of the pRotocols are susceptible to full disclosure, man-in-the-middle, tracking, and de-synchronization attacks. A detailed security analysis is conducted and results are presented to prove their vulnerability. Based on the aforementioned analysis, the pRotocol is modified and improved using a three pass mutual authentication. GNY logic is used to formally verify the security of the pRotocol. Abstract In large-scale Internet of Things (IoT) systems, huge volumes of data are collected from anywhere at any time, which may invade people’s privacy, especially when the systems are used in medical or daily living environments. Preserving privacy is an important issue, and higher privacy demands usually tend to require weaker identity. However, previous research has indicated that strong security tends to demand strong identity, especially in authentication processes. Thus, defining a good tradeoff between privacy and security remains a challenging problem. This motivates us to develop a privacy-preserving and accountable authentication protocol for IoT end-devices with weaker identity, which integrates an adapted construction of short group signatures and Shamir’s secret sharing scheme. We analyze the security properties of our protocol in the context of six typical attacks and verify the formal security using the Proverif tool. Experiments using our implementation in MacBook Pro and Intel Edison development platforms show that our authentication protocol is feasible in practice. In recent years, RFID (radio-frequency identification) systems are widely used in many applications. One of the most important applications for this technology is the Internet of things (IoT). Therefore, researchers have proposed several authentication protocols that can be employed in RFID-based IoT systems, and they have claimed that their protocols can satisfy all security requirements of these systems. However, in RFID-based IoT systems we have mobile readers that can be compromised by the adversary. Due to this attack, the adversary can compromise a legitimate reader and obtain its secrets. So, the protocol designers must consider the security of their proposals even in the reader compromised scenario. In this paper, we consider the security of the ultra-lightweight RFID mutual authentication (ULRMAPC) protocol recently proposed by They claimed that their protocol could be applied in the IoT systems and provide strong security. However, in this paper we show that their protocol is vulnerable to denial of service, reader and tag impersonation and de-synchronization attacks. To provide a solution, we present a new authentication protocol, which is more secure than the ULRMAPC protocol and also can be employed in RFID-based IoT systems.