3GPP Release 15, the first 5G standard, includes protection of user identity privacy against IMSI catchers. These protection mechanisms are based on public key encryption. Despite this protection, IMSI catching is still possible in LTE networks which opens the possibility of a downgrade attack on user identity privacy, where a fake LTE base station obtains the identity of a 5G user equipment. We propose (i) to use an existing pseudonym-based solution to protect user identity privacy of 5G user equipment against IMSI catchers in LTE and (ii) to include a mechanism for updating LTE pseudonyms in the public key encryption based 5G identity privacy procedure. The latter helps to recover from a loss of synchronization of LTE pseudonyms. Using this mechanism, pseudonyms in the user equipment and home network are automatically synchronized when the user equipment connects to 5G. Our mechanisms utilize existing LTE and 3GPP Release 15 messages and require modifications only in the user equipment and home network in order to provide identity privacy. Additionally, lawful interception requires minor patching in the serving network.
Asokan @cite_9 described how public key encryption can be used to achieve identity privacy in mobile environments. In this solution, only the HN has a public private key pair and the UE is provisioned with the public key of the HN. The UE encrypts identity information using public key before sending it to the HN. K ien @cite_26 suggests using identity based encryption (IBE) to defeat IMSI catchers in LTE. Khan and Niemi @cite_15 propose the use of IBE to defeat IMSI catchers in 5G networks.
@cite_9 @cite_26 @cite_15
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In this paper we propose a way to enhance the identity privacy in LTE LTE-Advanced systems. This is achieved while minimizing the impact on the existing E-UTRAN system. This is important since proposals to modify a widely deployed infrastructure must be cost effective, both in terms of design changes and in terms of deployment cost. In our proposal, the user equipment (UE) identifies itself with a dummy identity, consisting only of the mobile nation code and the mobile network code. We use the existing signalling mechanisms in a novel way to request a special encrypted identity information element. This element is protected using identity-based encryption (IBE), with the home network (HPLMN) as the private key generator (PKG) and the visited network (VPLMN) and the private key owner. This allows the UE to protect the identity (IMSI) from external parties. To avoid tracking the “encrypted IMSI” also include a random element. We use this as an opportunity to let the UE include as subscriber-side random challenge to the network. The challenge will be bounded to the EPS authentication vector (EPS AV) and will allow use to construct an online 3-way security context. To complete our proposal we also strengthen the requirements on the use of the temporary identifier (M-TMSI). We introduce a new type of Identity-Based Encryption (IBE) scheme that we call Fuzzy Identity-Based Encryption. In Fuzzy IBE we view an identity as set of descriptive attributes. A Fuzzy IBE scheme allows for a private key for an identity, ω, to decrypt a ciphertext encrypted with an identity, ω ′, if and only if the identities ω and ω ′ are close to each other as measured by the “set overlap” distance metric. A Fuzzy IBE scheme can be applied to enable encryption using biometric inputs as identities; the error-tolerance property of a Fuzzy IBE scheme is precisely what allows for the use of biometric identities, which inherently will have some noise each time they are sampled. Additionally, we show that Fuzzy-IBE can be used for a type of application that we term “attribute-based encryption”. In this paper we present two constructions of Fuzzy IBE schemes. Our constructions can be viewed as an Identity-Based Encryption of a message under several attributes that compose a (fuzzy) identity. Our IBE schemes are both error-tolerant and secure against collusion attacks. Additionally, our basic construction does not use random oracles. We prove the security of our schemes under the Selective-ID security model. Attribute-based encryption (ABE), as introduced by Sahai and Waters, allows for fine-grained access control on encrypted data. In its key-policy flavor, the primitive enables senders to encrypt messages under a set of attributes and private keys are associated with access structures that specify which ciphertexts the key holder will be allowed to decrypt. In most ABE systems, the ciphertext size grows linearly with the number of ciphertext attributes and the only known exceptions only support restricted forms of threshold access policies. This paper proposes the first key-policy attribute-based encryption (KP-ABE) schemes allowing for non-monotonic access structures (i.e., that may contain negated attributes) and with constant ciphertext size. Towards achieving this goal, we first show that a certain class of identity-based broadcast encryption schemes generically yields monotonic KPABE systems in the selective set model. We then describe a new efficient identity-based revocation mechanism that, when combined with a particular instantiation of our general monotonic construction, gives rise to the first truly expressive KP-ABE realization with constant-size ciphertexts. The downside of these new constructions is that private keys have quadratic size in the number of attributes. On the other hand, they reduce the number of pairing evaluations to a constant, which appears to be a unique feature among expressive KP-ABE schemes. User, content, and device names as a security primitive have been an attractive approach especially in the context of Information-Centric Networking (ICN) architectures. We leverage Hierarchical Identity Based Encryption (HIBE) to build (content) name-based security mechanisms used for securely distributing content. In contrast to similar approaches, in our system each user maintains his own Private Key Generator used for generating the master secret key and the public system parameters required by the HIBE algorithm. This way our system does not suffer from the key escrow problem, which is inherent in many similar solutions. In order to disseminate the system parameters of a content owner in a fully distributed way, we use blockchains, a distributed, community managed, global list of transactions.