In this paper, we propose a framework to study a general class of strategic behavior in voting, which we call vote operations. We prove the following theorem: if we fix the number of alternatives, generate @math votes i.i.d. according to a distribution @math , and let @math go to infinity, then for any @math , with probability at least @math , the minimum number of operations that are needed for the strategic individual to achieve her goal falls into one of the following four categories: (1) 0, (2) @math , (3) @math , and (4) @math . This theorem holds for any set of vote operations, any individual vote distribution @math , and any integer generalized scoring rule, which includes (but is not limited to) almost all commonly studied voting rules, e.g., approval voting, all positional scoring rules (including Borda, plurality, and veto), plurality with runoff, Bucklin, Copeland, maximin, STV, and ranked pairs. We also show that many well-studied types of strategic behavior fall under our framework, including (but not limited to) constructive destructive manipulation, bribery, and control by adding deleting votes, margin of victory, and minimum manipulation coalition size. Therefore, our main theorem naturally applies to these problems.
Our results has both negative and positive implications. On the negative side, our results provide yet another evidence that computational complexity is not a strong barrier against strategic behavior, because the strategic individual now has some information about the number of operations that are needed, without spending any computational cost or even without looking at the input instance. Although the estimation of our theorem may not be very precise (because we do not know which of the four cases a given instance belongs to), such estimation may be explored to designing effective algorithms that facilitate strategic behavior. On the positive side, this easiness of computation is not always a bad thing: sometimes we want to do such computation in order to test how robust a given preference-profile is. For example, computing the margin of victory is an important component in designing novel risk-limiting audit methods @cite_36 @cite_50 @cite_51 @cite_9 @cite_1 @cite_4 @cite_42 @cite_37 .
@cite_37 @cite_4 @cite_36 @cite_9 @cite_42 @cite_1 @cite_50 @cite_51
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We present a formulation of deep learning that aims at producing a large margin classifier. The notion of margin, minimum distance to a decision boundary, has served as the foundation of several theoretically profound and empirically successful results for both classification and regression tasks. However, most large margin algorithms are applicable only to shallow models with a preset feature representation; and conventional margin methods for neural networks only enforce margin at the output layer. Such methods are therefore not well suited for deep networks. In this work, we propose a novel loss function to impose a margin on any chosen set of layers of a deep network (including input and hidden layers). Our formulation allows choosing any norm on the metric measuring the margin. We demonstrate that the decision boundary obtained by our loss has nice properties compared to standard classification loss functions. Specifically, we show improved empirical results on the MNIST, CIFAR-10 and ImageNet datasets on multiple tasks: generalization from small training sets, corrupted labels, and robustness against adversarial perturbations. The resulting loss is general and complementary to existing data augmentation (such as random adversarial input transform) and regularization techniques (such as weight decay, dropout, and batch norm). In this work, we study the notion of competing campaigns in a social network and address the problem of influence limitation where a "bad" campaign starts propagating from a certain node in the network and use the notion of limiting campaigns to counteract the effect of misinformation. The problem can be summarized as identifying a subset of individuals that need to be convinced to adopt the competing (or "good") campaign so as to minimize the number of people that adopt the "bad" campaign at the end of both propagation processes. We show that this optimization problem is NP-hard and provide approximation guarantees for a greedy solution for various definitions of this problem by proving that they are submodular. We experimentally compare the performance of the greedy method to various heuristics. The experiments reveal that in most cases inexpensive heuristics such as degree centrality compare well with the greedy approach. We also study the influence limitation problem in the presence of missing data where the current states of nodes in the network are only known with a certain probability and show that prediction in this setting is a supermodular problem. We propose a prediction algorithm that is based on generating random spanning trees and evaluate the performance of this approach. The experiments reveal that using the prediction algorithm, we are able to tolerate about 90 missing data before the performance of the algorithm starts degrading and even with large amounts of missing data the performance degrades only to 75 of the performance that would be achieved with complete data. In this paper, we propose a framework to study a general class of strategic behavior in voting, which we call vote operations. We prove the following theorem: if we fix the number of alternatives, generate @math votes i.i.d. according to a distribution @math , and let @math go to infinity, then for any @math , with probability at least @math , the minimum number of operations that are needed for the strategic individual to achieve her goal falls into one of the following four categories: (1) 0, (2) @math , (3) @math , and (4) @math . This theorem holds for any set of vote operations, any individual vote distribution @math , and any integer generalized scoring rule, which includes (but is not limited to) almost all commonly studied voting rules, e.g., approval voting, all positional scoring rules (including Borda, plurality, and veto), plurality with runoff, Bucklin, Copeland, maximin, STV, and ranked pairs. We also show that many well-studied types of strategic behavior fall under our framework, including (but not limited to) constructive destructive manipulation, bribery, and control by adding deleting votes, margin of victory, and minimum manipulation coalition size. Therefore, our main theorem naturally applies to these problems. We consider the problem of learning an unknown large-margin halfspace in the context of parallel computation, giving both positive and negative results. As our main positive result, we give a parallel algorithm for learning a large-margin half-space, based on an algorithm of Nesterov's that performs gradient descent with a momentum term. We show that this algorithm can learn an unknown γ-margin halfspace over n dimensions using n ċ poly(1 γ) processors and running in time O(1 γ)+O(log n). In contrast, naive parallel algorithms that learn a γ-margin halfspace in time that depends polylogarithmically on n have an inverse quadratic running time dependence on the margin parameter γ. Our negative result deals with boosting, which is a standard approach to learning large-margin halfspaces. We prove that in the original PAC framework, in which a weak learning algorithm is provided as an oracle that is called by the booster, boosting cannot be parallelized. More precisely, we show that, if the algorithm is allowed to call the weak learner multiple times in parallel within a single boosting stage, this ability does not reduce the overall number of successive stages of boosting needed for learning by even a single stage. Our proof is information-theoretic and does not rely on unproven assumptions.