Digital repositories, either digital preservation systems or archival systems, periodically check the integrity of stored objects to assure users of their correctness. To do so, prior solutions calculate integrity metadata and require the repository to store it alongside the actual data objects. This integrity metadata is essential for regularly verifying the correctness of the stored data objects. To safeguard and detect damage to this metadata, prior solutions rely on widely visible media, that is unaffiliated third parties, to store and provide back digests of the metadata to verify it is intact. However, they do not address recovery of the integrity metadata in case of damage or attack by an adversary. In essence, they do not preserve this metadata. We introduce IntegrityCatalog, a system that collects all integrity related metadata in a single component, and treats them as first class objects, managing both their integrity and their preservation. We introduce a treap-based persistent authenticated dictionary managing arbitrary length key value pairs, which we use to store all integrity metadata, accessible simply by object name. Additionally, IntegrityCatalog is a distributed system that includes a network protocol that manages both corruption detection and preservation of this metadata, using administrator-selected network peers with two possible roles. Verifiers store and offer attestations on digests and have minimal storage requirements, while preservers efficiently synchronize a complete copy of the catalog to assist in recovery in case of a detected catalog compromise on the local system. We describe our prototype implementation of IntegrityCatalog, measure its performance empirically, and demonstrate its effectiveness in real-world situations, with worst measured throughput of approximately 1K insertions per second, and 2K verified search operations per second.
Our system is complementary to digital preservation and distributed storage systems and may be used as a tool by each storage node in the system to proactively verify the integrity of its contents. As such, it is more suitable to systems where the complete file is stored in different nodes, such as LOCKSS @cite_32 , FreeNet @cite_6 , FarSite @cite_41 , and Publius @cite_28 . Systems that break files in pieces, such as Venti @cite_43 , OceanStore @cite_3 , CFS @cite_5 , Pastiche @cite_2 , Samsara @cite_19 , GridSharing @cite_12 , PASIS @cite_10 , and Glacier @cite_21 can still use IntegrityCatalog to proactively validate the pieces they own.
@cite_41 @cite_28 @cite_21 @cite_32 @cite_6 @cite_3 @cite_43 @cite_19 @cite_2 @cite_5 @cite_10 @cite_12
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Existing file systems, even the most scalable systems that store hundreds of petabytes (or more) of data across thousands of machines, store file metadata on a single server or via a shared-disk architecture in order to ensure consistency and validity of the metadata. This paper describes a completely different approach for the design of replicated, scalable file systems, which leverages a high-throughput distributed database system for metadata management. This results in improved scalability of the metadata layer of the file system, as file metadata can be partitioned (and replicated) across a (shared-nothing) cluster of independent servers, and operations on file metadata transformed into distributed transactions. In addition, our file system is able to support standard file system semantics--including fully linearizable random writes by concurrent users to arbitrary byte offsets within the same file--across wide geographic areas. Such high performance, fully consistent, geographically distributed files systems do not exist today. We demonstrate that our approach to file system design can scale to billions of files and handle hundreds of thousands of updates and millions of reads per second-- while maintaining consistently low read latencies. Furthermore, such a deployment can survive entire datacenter outages with only small performance hiccups and no loss of availability. In this paper, we provide a method to safely store a document in perhaps the most challenging settings, a highly decentralized replicated storage system where up to half of the storage servers may incur arbitrary failures, including alterations to data stored in them. Using an error correcting code (ECC), e.g., a Reed?Solomon code, one can take n pieces of a document, replace each piece with another piece of size larger by a factor of nn?2t+1 such that it is possible to recover the original set even when up to t of the larger pieces are altered. For t close to n 2 the space blowup factor of this scheme is close to n, and the overhead of an ECC such as the Reed?Solomon code degenerates to that of a trivial replication code. We show a technique to reduce this large space overhead for high values of t. Our scheme blows up each piece by a factor slightly larger than two using an erasure code which makes it possible to recover the original set using n 2?O(n d) of the pieces, where d?80 is a fixed constant. Then we attach to each piece O(d log n log d) additional bits to make it possible to identify a large enough set of unmodified pieces, with negligible error probability, assuming that at least half the pieces are unmodified and with low complexity. For values of t close to n 2 we achieve a large asymptotic space reduction over the best possible space blowup of any ECC in deterministic setting. Our approach makes use of a d-regular expander graph to compute the bits required for the identification of n 2?O(n d) good pieces. An integrity checking and recovery (ICAR) system is presented here, which protects file system integrity and automatically restores modified files. The system enables files cryptographic hashes generation and verification, as well as configuration of security constraints. All of the crucial data, including ICAR system binaries, file backups and hashes database are stored in a physically write-protected storage to eliminate the threat of unauthorised modification. A buffering mechanism was designed and implemented in the system to increase operation performance. Additionally, the system supplies user tools for cryptographic hash generation and security database management. The system is implemented as a kernel extension, compliant with the Linux security model. Experimental evaluation of the system was performed and showed an approximate 10 performance degradation in secured file access compared to regular access. In this paper, we address the problem of designing a scalable, accurate query processor for peer-to-peer filesharing and similar distributed keyword search systems. Using a globally-distributed monitoring infrastructure, we perform an extensive study of the Gnutella filesharing network, characterizing its topology, data and query workloads. We observe that Gnutella's query processing approach performs well for popular content, but quite poorly for rare items with few replicas. We then consider an alternate approach based on Distributed Hash Tables (DHTs). We describe our implementation of PIERSearch, a DHT-based system, and propose a hybrid system where Gnutella is used to locate popular items, and PIERSearch for handling rare items. We develop an analytical model of the two approaches, and use it in concert with our Gnutella traces to study the trade-off between query recall and system overhead of the hybrid system. We evaluate a variety of localized schemes for identifying items that are rare and worth handling via the DHT. Lastly, we show in a live deployment on fifty nodes on two continents that it nicely complements Gnutella in its ability to handle rare items.