Network coding achieves optimal throughput in multicast networks. However, throughput optimality relies on the network nodes or routers to code correctly. A Byzantine node may introduce junk packets in the network (thus polluting downstream packets and causing the sinks to receive the wrong data) or may choose coding coecients
@cite_26 , for example, discuss rate-optimal protocols that survive Byzantine attacks. Their idea is to append extra parity information to the source messages. @cite_31 provide non-linear protocols for achieving capacity in the presence of Byzantine adversaries.
@cite_31 @cite_26
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Intra-session network coding is known to be vulnerable to Byzantine attacks: malicious nodes can inject bogus packets, which get combined with legitimate blocks at downstream nodes, thus preventing decoding of original packets and degrading the overall performance. In this paper, we provide a novel approach that can identify the precise location of all Byzantine attackers in systems with intra-session network coding. A key ingredient of our approach is a novel homomorphic MAC scheme for expanding subspaces (SpaceMac) that allows to eliminate any uncertainty in identifying attackers via subspace properties. To the best of our knowledge, our scheme is the first that can identify precisely all Byzantine attackers, and at the same time has both low computation (sub- millisecond) and communication overhead (20 bytes per data block). Simulation results show that, even when there are multiple colluding attackers in a network, all of them can be successfully identified in a very short time. A team consisting of an unknown number of mobile agents, starting from different nodes of an unknown network, have to meet at the same node. Agents move in synchronous rounds. Each agent has a different label. Up to f of the agents are Byzantine. We consider two levels of Byzantine behavior. A strongly Byzantine agent can choose an arbitrary port when it moves and it can convey arbitrary information to other agents, while a weakly Byzantine agent can do the same, except changing its label. What is the minimum number of good agents that guarantees deterministic gathering of all of them, with terminationq We solve exactly this Byzantine gathering problem in arbitrary networks for weakly Byzantine agents and give approximate solutions for strongly Byzantine agents, both when the size of the network is known and when it is unknown. It turns out that both the strength versus the weakness of Byzantine behavior and the knowledge of network size significantly impact the results. For weakly Byzantine agents, we show that any number of good agents permits solving the problem for networks of known size. If the size is unknown, then this minimum number is fp2. More precisely, we show a deterministic polynomial algorithm that gathers all good agents in an arbitrary network, provided that there are at least fp2 of them. We also provide a matching lower bound: we prove that if the number of good agents is at most fp1, then they are not able to gather deterministically with termination in some networks. For strongly Byzantine agents, we give a lower bound of fp1, even when the graph is known: we show that f good agents cannot gather deterministically in the presence of f Byzantine agents even in a ring of known size. On the positive side, we give deterministic gathering algorithms for at least 2fp1 good agents when the size of the network is known and for at least 4fp2 good agents when it is unknown. We present the first protocol that reaches asynchronous Byzantine consensus in two communication steps in the common case. We prove that our protocol is optimal in terms of both number of communication steps and number of processes for two-step consensus. The protocol can be used to build a replicated state machine that requires only three communication steps per request in the common case. Further, we show a parameterized version of the protocol that is safe despite f Byzantine failures and, in the common case, guarantees two-step execution despite some number t of failures (t les f). We show that this parameterized two-step consensus protocol is also optimal in terms of both number of communication steps and number of processes This paper is on the consensus problem in asynchronous distributed systems where (up to f) processes (among n) can exhibit a Byzantine behavior, i.e., can deviate arbitrarily from their specification. One way to solve the consensus problem in such a context consists of enriching the system with additional oracles that are powerful enough to cope with the uncertainty and unpredictability created by the combined effect of Byzantine behavior and asynchrony. This paper presents two kinds of Byzantine asynchronous consensus protocols using two types of oracles, namely, a common coin that provides processes with random values and a failure detector oracle. Both allow the processes to decide in one communication step in favorable circumstances. The first is a randomized protocol for an oblivious scheduler model that assumes n > 6f. The second one is a failure detector-based protocol that assumes n > tif. These protocols are designed to be particularly simple and efficient in terms of communication steps, the number of messages they generate in each step, and the size of messages. So, although they are not optimal in the number of Byzantine processes that can be tolerated, they are particularly efficient when we consider the number of communication steps they require to decide and the number and size of the messages they use. In that sense, they are practically appealing.