In this paper we explore the usage of rule engines in a graphical framework for visualising dynamic access control policies. We use the Drools rule engine to dynamically compute permissions, following the Category-Based Access Control metamodel.
Several extensions of RBAC, which deal with dynamic permissions, have been proposed. These models allow permissions to change according to internal or external conditions such as time, location, or context-based properties (see, for example, @cite_5 @cite_20 @cite_9 ). All these extensions can be modeled as instances of CBAC.
@cite_5 @cite_9 @cite_20
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In this paper we present a context-aware RBAC (CARBAC) model for pervasive computing applications. The design of this model has been guided by the context-based access control requirements of such applications. These requirements are related to users' memberships in roles, permission executions by role members, and context-based dynamic integration of services in the environment with an application. Context information is used in role admission policies, in policies related to permission executions by role members, and in policies related to accessing of dynamically interfaced services by role members. The dynamic nature of context information requires model-level support for revocations of role memberships and permission activations when certain context conditions fail to hold. Based on this model we present a programming framework for building context-aware applications, providing mechanisms for specifying and enforcing context-based access control requirements. Access control policies are often partly static, i.e. no dependence on any run-time information, and partly dynamic. However, they are usually enforced dynamically - even the static parts. We propose a new hybrid approach to policy enforcement using the Category-Based Access Control (CBAC) meta-model. We build on previous work, which established a static system for the enforcement of (static) hierarchical Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) policies. We modify the previous policy language, JPol, to specify static and dynamic categories. We establish an equivalence between static categories and static roles (in RBAC), therefore we are able to use the previous design patterns and static verification algorithm, with some changes, to enforce static categories. For dynamic categories, we propose a new design methodology and generate code in the target program to do the necessary run-time checks. Role-based access control (RBAC) models have generated a great interest in the security community as a powerful and generalized approach to security management. In many practical scenarios, users may be restricted to assume roles only at predefined time periods. Furthermore, roles may only be invoked on prespecified intervals of time depending upon when certain actions are permitted. To capture such dynamic aspects of a role, a temporal RBAC (TRBAC) model has been recently proposed. However, the TRBAC model addresses the role enabling constraints only. In This work, we propose a generalized temporal role-based access control (GTRBAC) model capable of expressing a wider range of temporal constraints. In particular, the model allows expressing periodic as well as duration constraints on roles, user-role assignments, and role-permission assignments. In an interval, activation of a role can further be restricted as a result of numerous activation constraints including cardinality constraints and maximum active duration constraints. The GTRBAC model extends the syntactic structure of the TRBAC model and its event and trigger expressions subsume those of TRBAC. Furthermore, GTRBAC allows expressing role hierarchies and separation of duty (SoD) constraints for specifying fine-grained temporal semantics. Several models for incorporating spatial constraints into role-based access control (RBAC) have been proposed, and researchers are now focusing on the challenge of ensuring such policies are enforced correctly. However, existing approaches have a major shortcoming, as they assume the server is trustworthy and require complete disclosure of sensitive location information by the user. In this work, we propose a novel framework and a set of protocols to solve this problem. Specifically, in our scheme, a user provides a service provider with role and location tokens along with a request. The service provider consults with a role authority and a location authority to verify the tokens and evaluate the policy. However, none of the servers learn the requesting user's identity, role, or location. In this paper, we define the protocols and the policy enforcement scheme, and present a formal proof of a number of security properties.