We present a simple model of a non-equilibrium self-organizing market where asset prices are partially driven by investment decisions of a bounded-rational agent. The agent acts in a stochastic market environment driven by various exogenous "alpha" signals, agent's own actions (via market impact), and noise. Unlike traditional agent-based models, our agent aggregates all traders in the market, rather than being a representative agent. Therefore, it can be identified with a bounded-rational component of the market itself, providing a particular implementation of an Invisible Hand market mechanism. In such setting, market dynamics are modeled as a fictitious self-play of such bounded-rational market-agent in its adversarial stochastic environment. As rewards obtained by such self-playing market agent are not observed from market data, we formulate and solve a simple model of such market dynamics based on a neuroscience-inspired Bounded Rational Information Theoretic Inverse Reinforcement Learning (BRIT-IRL). This results in effective asset price dynamics with a non-linear mean reversion - which in our model is generated dynamically, rather than being postulated. We argue that our model can be used in a similar way to the Black-Litterman model. In particular, it represents, in a simple modeling framework, market views of common predictive signals, market impacts and implied optimal dynamic portfolio allocations, and can be used to assess values of private signals. Moreover, it allows one to quantify a "market-implied" optimal investment strategy, along with a measure of market rationality. Our approach is numerically light, and can be implemented using standard off-the-shelf software such as TensorFlow.
Yet, to better model effects such as market liquidity, Amihud et. al. suggested that, instead of assuming competitive market equilibrium, researchers should assume an "equilibrium level of disequilibrium" @cite_2 . In physics, this is normally referred to as a non-equilibrium steady state.
@cite_2
2606123014 1562593567 2072113937 2060346604
We introduce a new class of combinatorial markets in which agents have covering constraints over resources required and are interested in delay minimization. Our market model is applicable to several settings including scheduling and communicating over a network. This model is quite different from the traditional models, to the extent that neither do the classical equilibrium existence results seem to apply to it nor do any of the efficient algorithmic techniques developed to compute equilibria. In particular, our model does not satisfy the condition of non-satiation, which is used critically to show the existence of equilibria in traditional market models and we observe that our set of equilibrium prices could be a connected, non-convex set. We give a proof of the existence of equilibria and a polynomial time algorithm for finding one, drawing heavily on techniques from LP duality and submodular minimization. Finally, we show that our model inherits many of the fairness properties of traditional equilibrium models as well as new models, such as CEEI. Continuity of the mapping from initial endowments and utilities to equilibria is an essential property for a desirable model of an economy - without continuity, small errors in the observation of parameters of the economy may lead to entirely different predicted equilibria. We show that for the linear case of Fisher's market model, the (unique) vector of equilibrium prices, p = p(m, U) is a continuous function of the initial amounts of money held by the agents, m, and their utility functions, U. Furthermore, the correspondence X(m, U), giving the set of equilibrium allocations for any specified m and U, is upper hemicontinuous, but not lower hemicontinuous. However, for a fixed U, this correspondence is lower hemicontinuous in m. In the traffic assignment problem, first proposed by Wardrop in 1952, commuters select the shortest available path to travel from their origins to their destinations. We study a generalization of this problem in which competitors, who may control a nonnegligible fraction of the total flow, ship goods across a network. This type of games, usually referred to as atomic games, readily applies to situations in which the competing freight companies have market power. Other applications include intelligent transportation systems, competition among telecommunication network service providers, and scheduling with flexible machines. Our goal is to determine to what extent these systems can benefit from some form of coordination or regulation. We measure the quality of the outcome of the game without centralized control by computing the worst-case inefficiency of Nash equilibria. The main conclusion is that although self-interested competitors will not achieve a fully efficient solution from the system's point of view, the loss is not too severe. We show how to compute several bounds for the worst-case inefficiency that depend on the characteristics of cost functions and on the market structure in the game. In addition, building upon the work of Catoni and Pallotino, we show examples in which market aggregation (or collusion) adversely impacts the aggregated competitors, even though their market power increases. For example, Nash equilibria of atomic network games may be less efficient than the corresponding Wardrop equilibria. When competitors are completely symmetric, we provide a characterization of the Nash equilibrium using a potential function, and prove that this counterintuitive phenomenon does not arise. Finally, we study a pricing mechanism that elicits more coordination from the players by reducing the worst-case inefficiency of Nash equilibria. We study markets of indivisible items in which price-based (Walrasian) equilibria often do not exist due to the discrete non-convex setting. Instead we consider Nash equilibria of the market viewed as a game, where players bid for items, and where the highest bidder on an item wins it and pays his bid. We first observe that pure Nash-equilibria of this game excatly correspond to price-based equilibiria (and thus need not exist), but that mixed-Nash equilibria always do exist, and we analyze their structure in several simple cases where no price-based equilibrium exists. We also undertake an analysis of the welfare properties of these equilibria showing that while pure equilibria are always perfectly efficient (“first welfare theorem”), mixed equilibria need not be, and we provide upper and lower bounds on their amount of inefficiency.