Hanabi is a cooperative card game with hidden information that has won important awards in the industry and received some recent academic attention. A two-track competition of agents for the game will take place in the 2018 CIG conference. In this paper, we develop a genetic algorithm that builds rule-based agents by determining the best sequence of rules from a fixed rule set to use as strategy. In three separate experiments, we remove human assumptions regarding the ordering of rules, add new, more expressive rules to the rule set and independently evolve agents specialized at specific game sizes. As result, we achieve scores superior to previously published research for the mirror and mixed evaluation of agents.
All agents described so far (other than Eger's human evaluation) have in common that they assume they will be playing with agents following a similar strategy. Walton-Rivers . @cite_13 address the problem of playing with a diverse population of agents with different strategies. They use several rule-based agents, including reimplementations of Osawa and Van den Berg, along with MCTS agents which either receive a model of the other agents' behavior or assume random play. They evaluate their agents by pairing them with a fixed set of baseline agents, and their best performing agent is called Piers, which achieves a score of 11.8 with that specific test pool. Because this paper was written by the author of the Java framework being used and by the organizer of the CIG competition, it is central to our work and will sometimes be referred to as the original paper article''.
@cite_13
2065339974 2574227367 2514333820 2088375330
In this paper, Monte Carlo tree search (MCTS) is introduced for controlling the Pac-Man character in the real-time game Ms Pac-Man. MCTS is used to find an optimal path for an agent at each turn, determining the move to make based on the results of numerous randomized simulations. Several enhancements are introduced in order to adapt MCTS to the real-time domain. Ms Pac-Man is an arcade game, in which the protagonist has several goals but no conclusive terminal state. Unlike games such as Chess or Go there is no state in which the player wins the game. Instead, the game has two subgoals, 1) surviving and 2) scoring as many points as possible. Decisions must be made in a strict time constraint of 40 ms. The Pac-Man agent has to compete with a range of different ghost teams, hence limited assumptions can be made about their behavior. In order to expand the capabilities of existing MCTS agents, four enhancements are discussed: 1) a variable-depth tree; 2) simulation strategies for the ghost team and Pac-Man; 3) including long-term goals in scoring; and 4) reusing the search tree for several moves with a decay factor γ. The agent described in this paper was entered in both the 2012 World Congress on Computational Intelligence (WCCI'12, Brisbane, Qld., Australia) and the 2012 IEEE Conference on Computational Intelligence and Games (CIG'12, Granada, Spain) Pac-Man Versus Ghost Team competitions, where it achieved second and first places, respectively. In the experiments, we show that using MCTS is a viable technique for the Pac-Man agent. Moreover, the enhancements improve overall performance against four different ghost teams. Real world applications of artificial intelligence often require agents to sequentially choose actions from continuous action spaces with execution uncertainty. When good actions are sparse, domain knowledge is often used to identify a discrete set of promising actions. These actions and their uncertain effects are typically evaluated using a recursive search procedure. The reduction of the problem to a discrete search problem causes severe limitations, notably, not exploiting all of the sampled outcomes when evaluating actions, and not using outcomes to help find new actions outside the original set. We propose a new Monte Carlo tree search (MCTS) algorithm specifically designed for exploiting an execution model in this setting. Using kernel regression, it generalizes the information about action quality between actions and to unexplored parts of the action space. In a high fidelity simulator of the Olympic sport of curling, we show that this approach significantly outperforms existing MCTS methods. Abstract Several competing human behavior models have been proposed to model boundedly rational adversaries in repeated Stackelberg Security Games (SSG). However, these existing models fail to address three main issues which are detrimental to defender performance. First, while they attempt to learn adversary behavior models from adversaries' past actions (“attacks on targets”), they fail to take into account adversaries' future adaptation based on successes or failures of these past actions. Second, existing algorithms fail to learn a reliable model of the adversary unless there exists sufficient data collected by exposing enough of the attack surface – a situation that often arises in initial rounds of the repeated SSG. Third, current leading models have failed to include probability weighting functions, even though it is well known that human beings' weighting of probability is typically nonlinear. To address these limitations of existing models, this article provides three main contributions. Our first contribution is a new human behavior model, SHARP, which mitigates these three limitations as follows: (i) SHARP reasons based on success or failure of the adversary's past actions on exposed portions of the attack surface to model adversary adaptivity; (ii) SHARP reasons about similarity between exposed and unexposed areas of the attack surface, and also incorporates a discounting parameter to mitigate adversary's lack of exposure to enough of the attack surface; and (iii) SHARP integrates a non-linear probability weighting function to capture the adversary's true weighting of probability. Our second contribution is a first “repeated measures study” – at least in the context of SSGs – of competing human behavior models. This study, where each experiment lasted a period of multiple weeks with individual sets of human subjects on the Amazon Mechanical Turk platform, illustrates the strengths and weaknesses of different models and shows the advantages of SHARP. Our third major contribution is to demonstrate SHARP's superiority by conducting real-world human subjects experiments at the Bukit Barisan Seletan National Park in Indonesia against wildlife security experts. Imitating successful behavior is a natural and frequently applied approach when facing scenarios for which we have little or no experience upon which we can base our decision. In this paper, we consider such behavior in atomic congestion games. We propose to study concurrent imitation dynamics that emerge when each player samples another player and possibly imitates this agents' strategy if the anticipated latency gain is sufficiently large. Our main focus is on convergence properties. Using a potential function argument, we show that these dynamics converge in a monotonic fashion to stable states. In such a state none of the players can improve their latency by imitating others. As our main result, we show rapid convergence to approximate equilibria. At an approximate equilibrium only a small fraction of agents sustains a latency significantly above or below average. In particular, imitation dynamics behave like fully polynomial time approximation schemes (FPTAS). Fixing all other parameters, the convergence time depends only in a logarithmic fashion on the number of agents. Since imitation processes are not innovative they cannot discover unused strategies. Furthermore, strategies may become extinct with non-zero probability. For the case of singleton games, we show that the probability of this event occurring is negligible. Additionally, we prove that the social cost of a stable state reached by our dynamics is not much worse than an optimal state in singleton congestion games with linear latency functions. While we concentrate on the case of symmetric network congestion games, most of our results do not explicitly use the network structure. They continue to hold accordingly for general symmetric and asymmetric congestion games when each player samples within his commodity.