Influential users have great potential for accelerating information dissemination and acquisition on Twitter. How to measure the influence of Twitter users has attracted significant academic and industrial attention. Existing influence measurement techniques are vulnerable to sybil users that are thriving on Twitter. Although sybil defenses for online social networks have been extensively investigated, they commonly assume unique mappings from human-established trust relationships to online social associations and thus do not apply to Twitter where users can freely follow each other. This paper presents TrueTop, the first sybil-resilient system to measure the influence of Twitter users. TrueTop is rooted in two observations from real Twitter datasets. First, although non-sybil users may incautiously follow strangers, they tend to be more careful and selective in retweeting, replying to, and mentioning other users. Second, influential users usually get much more retweets, replies, and mentions than non-influential users. Detailed theoretical studies and synthetic simulations show that TrueTop can generate very accurate influence measurement results with strong resilience to sybil attacks.
There is significant effort to explore social networks for effective sybil defenses in various distributed systems, such as SybilGuard @cite_3 and SybilLimit @cite_22 for P2P networks, SumUp @cite_18 for online voting systems, and SybilInfer @cite_0 , SybilDefense @cite_35 , and SybilRank @cite_39 for online social networks. A common assumption is that each node can be mapped into one in an undirected social network graph where every edge corresponds to a human-established trust relation. Although the attacker can create many sybil accounts, he cannot establish an arbitrarily large number of social trust relations with non-sybil users. Moreover, all schemes assume that the honest region is fast mixing and separate from the sybil region. Built upon these two key insights, these schemes conduct varying community detection methods @cite_43 to limit the number of sybil users admitted into or their impact in various application scenarios.
@cite_35 @cite_18 @cite_22 @cite_3 @cite_39 @cite_0 @cite_43
2118765159 2110801527 2101890615 2153305401
Distributed systems without trusted identities are particularly vulnerable to sybil attacks, where an adversary creates multiple bogus identities to compromise the running of the system. This paper presents SybilDefender, a sybil defense mechanism that leverages the network topologies to defend against sybil attacks in social networks. Based on performing a limited number of random walks within the social graphs, SybilDefender is efficient and scalable to large social networks. Our experiments on two 3,000,000 node real-world social topologies show that SybilDefender outperforms the state of the art by one to two orders of magnitude in both accuracy and running time. SybilDefender can effectively identify the sybil nodes and detect the sybil community around a sybil node, even when the number of sybil nodes introduced by each attack edge is close to the theoretically detectable lower bound. Besides, we propose two approaches to limiting the number of attack edges in online social networks. The survey results of our Facebook application show that the assumption made by previous work that all the relationships in social networks are trusted does not apply to online social networks, and it is feasible to limit the number of attack edges in online social networks by relationship rating. Open-access distributed systems such as peer-to-peer systems are particularly vulnerable to sybil attacks, where a malicious user creates multiple fake identities (called sybil nodes). Without a trusted central authority that can tie identities to real human beings, defending against sybil attacks is quite challenging. Among the small number of decentralized approaches, our recent SybilGuard protocol leverages a key insight on social networks to bound the number of sybil nodes accepted. Despite its promising direction, SybilGuard can allow a large number of sybil nodes to be accepted. Furthermore, SybilGuard assumes that social networks are fast-mixing, which has never been confirmed in the real world. This paper presents the novel SybilLimit protocol that leverages the same insight as SybilGuard, but offers dramatically improved and near-optimal guarantees. The number of sybil nodes accepted is reduced by a factor of Θ(√n), or around 200 times in our experiments for a million-node system. We further prove that SybilLimit's guarantee is at most a log n factor away from optimal when considering approaches based on fast-mixing social networks. Finally, based on three large-scale real-world social networks, we provide the first evidence that real-world social networks are indeed fast-mixing. This validates the fundamental assumption behind SybilLimit's and SybilGuard's approach. Peer-to-peer and other decentralized,distributed systems are known to be particularly vulnerable to sybil attacks. In a sybil attack,a malicious user obtains multiple fake identities and pretends to be multiple, distinct nodes in the system. By controlling a large fraction of the nodes in the system,the malicious user is able to "out vote" the honest users in collaborative tasks such as Byzantine failure defenses. This paper presents SybilGuard, a novel protocol for limiting the corruptive influences of sybil attacks.Our protocol is based on the "social network "among user identities, where an edge between two identities indicates a human-established trust relationship. Malicious users can create many identities but few trust relationships. Thus, there is a disproportionately-small "cut" in the graph between the sybil nodes and the honest nodes. SybilGuard exploits this property to bound the number of identities a malicious user can create.We show the effectiveness of SybilGuard both analytically and experimentally. Peer-to-peer and other decentralized, distributed systems are known to be particularly vulnerable to sybil attacks. In a sybil attack, a malicious user obtains multiple fake identities and pretends to be multiple, distinct nodes in the system. By controlling a large fraction of the nodes in the system, the malicious user is able to ldquoout voterdquo the honest users in collaborative tasks such as Byzantine failure defenses. This paper presents SybilGuard, a novel protocol for limiting the corruptive influences of sybil attacks. Our protocol is based on the ldquosocial networkrdquo among user identities, where an edge between two identities indicates a human-established trust relationship. Malicious users can create many identities but few trust relationships. Thus, there is a disproportionately small ldquocutrdquo in the graph between the sybil nodes and the honest nodes. SybilGuard exploits this property to bound the number of identities a malicious user can create. We show the effectiveness of SybilGuard both analytically and experimentally.