An optimal feedback controller for a given Markov decision process (MDP) can in principle be synthesized by value or policy iteration. However, if the system dynamics and the reward function are unknown, a learning agent must discover an optimal controller via direct interaction with the environment. Such interactive data gathering commonly leads to divergence towards dangerous or uninformative regions of the state space unless additional regularization measures are taken. Prior works proposed bounding the information loss measured by the Kullback–Leibler (KL) divergence at every policy improvement step to eliminate instability in the learning dynamics. In this paper, we consider a broader family of f-divergences, and more concretely α -divergences, which inherit the beneficial property of providing the policy improvement step in closed form at the same time yielding a corresponding dual objective for policy evaluation. Such entropic proximal policy optimization view gives a unified perspective on compatible actor-critic architectures. In particular, common least-squares value function estimation coupled with advantage-weighted maximum likelihood policy improvement is shown to correspond to the Pearson χ 2 -divergence penalty. Other actor-critic pairs arise for various choices of the penalty-generating function f. On a concrete instantiation of our framework with the α -divergence, we carry out asymptotic analysis of the solutions for different values of α and demonstrate the effects of the divergence function choice on common standard reinforcement learning problems.
Apart from computational advantages, information-theoretic approaches provide a solid framework for describing and studying aspects of intelligent behavior @cite_27 , from autonomy @cite_39 and curiosity @cite_42 to bounded rationality @cite_17 and game theory @cite_11 .
@cite_11 @cite_42 @cite_39 @cite_27 @cite_17
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We develop a general game-theoretic framework for reasoning about strategic agents performing possibly costly computation. In this framework, many traditional game-theoretic results (such as the existence of a Nash equilibrium) no longer hold. Nevertheless, we can use the framework to provide psychologically appealing explanations of observed behavior in well-studied games (such as finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma and rock–paper–scissors). Furthermore, we provide natural conditions on games sufficient to guarantee that equilibria exist. Although many investigators affirm a desire to build reasoning systems that behave consistently with the axiomatic basis defined by probability theory and utility theory, limited resources for engineering and computation can make a complete normative analysis impossible. We attempt to move discussion beyond the debate over the scope of problems that can be handled effectively to cases where it is clear that there are insufficient computational resources to perform an analysis deemed as complete. Under these conditions, we stress the importance of considering the expected costs and benefits of applying alternative approximation procedures and heuristics for computation and knowledge acquisition. We discuss how knowledge about the structure of user utility can be used to control value tradeoffs for tailoring inference to alternative contexts. We address the notion of real-time rationality, focusing on the application of knowledge about the expected timewise-refinement abilities of reasoning strategies to balance the benefits of additional computation with the costs of acting with a partial result. We discuss the benefits of applying decision theory to control the solution of difficult problems given limitations and uncertainty in reasoning resources. Information theoretic active learning has been widely studied for probabilistic models. For simple regression an optimal myopic policy is easily tractable. However, for other tasks and with more complex models, such as classication with nonparametric models, the optimal solution is harder to compute. Current approaches make approximations to achieve tractability. We propose an approach that expresses information gain in terms of predictive entropies, and apply this method to the Gaussian Process Classier (GPC). Our approach makes minimal approximations to the full information theoretic objective. Our experimental performance compares favourably to many popular active learning algorithms, and has equal or lower computational complexity. We compare well to decision theoretic approaches also, which are privy to more information and require much more computational time. Secondly, by developing further a reformulation of binary preference learning to a classication problem, we extend our algorithm to Gaussian Process preference learning. We provide some examples showing how game-theoretic arguments can be used in computability theory and algorithmic information theory: unique numbering theorem (Friedberg), the gap between conditional complexity and total conditional complexity, Epstein--Levin theorem and some (yet unpublished) result of Muchnik and Vyugin