This paper addresses the problem of constructing secure exact-repair regenerating codes at the MSR point for all feasible values of the parameters. The setting involves a passive eavesdropper who is allowed to observe the stored contents of, and the downloads into, an @math -subset of the @math nodes of a distributed storage system (DSS). The objective is to achieve perfect secrecy between the eavesdropped symbols and the file stored on the DSS. Previous secure code constructions (most notably that by ) tackle the problem only for the restricted case wherein the number, @math , of helper nodes aiding in the recovery of a failed node is equal to @math . This paper builds on Rawat's work, by combining Gabidulin pre-coding and an MSR construction by Ye and Barg to prove the achievability of secrecy capacity at the MSR point for all allowed values of @math .
The setting of the passive adversary was first discussed in @cite_3 , and an upper bound on the secrecy capacity for functional repair was derived to be where @math . Later work by @cite_8 employed the Product-Matrix (PM) code construction to design a secure MSR coding scheme that achieved a maximum file size of @math . This was improved upon in @cite_0 and @cite_10 , wherein the secrecy capacity was shown to be bounded as This upper bound was shown to be achievable in @cite_0 , for the case @math , using the concept of zigzag codes. Another achievability scheme, due to Rawat @cite_1 , uses a construction in Ye and Barg's paper @cite_7 to show the capacity upper bound in being met, again when @math . In this paper, we build upon Rawat's work to prove the achievability of the capacity upper bound in for feasible values of @math , using an alternative construction from @cite_7 .
@cite_7 @cite_8 @cite_1 @cite_3 @cite_0 @cite_10
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In this paper, we revisit the problem of characterizing the secrecy capacity of minimum storage regenerating (MSR) codes under the passive @math -eavesdropper model, where the eavesdropper has access to data stored on @math nodes and the repair data for an additional @math nodes. We study it from the information-theoretic perspective. First, some general properties of MSR codes as well as a simple and generally applicable upper bound on secrecy capacity are given. Second, a new concept of stable MSR codes is introduced, where the stable property is shown to be closely linked with secrecy capacity. Finally, a comprehensive and explicit result on secrecy capacity in the linear MSR scenario is present, which generalizes all related works in the literature and also predicts certain results for some unexplored linear MSR codes. We introduce randomized Limited View (LV) adversary codes that provide protection against an adversary that uses their partial view of the channel to construct an adversarial error vector that is added to the channel. For a codeword of length N, the adversary selects a subset of size ρrN of components to “see”, and then “adds” an adversarial error vector of weight ρwN to the codeword. Performance of the code is measured by the probability of the decoder failure in recovering the sent message. An (N, qRN, δ)-limited view adversary is a code of rate R that ensures that the success chance of the adversary in making decoder to fail is bounded by δ. Our main motivation to study these codes is providing protection for wireless communication at the physical layer of networks. We formalize the definition of adversarial error and decoder failure, construct a code with efficient encoding and decoding that allows the adversary to, depending on the code rate, read up to half of the sent codeword and add error on the same coordinates. The code is non-linear, has an efficient decoding algorithm, and is constructed using a message authentication code (MAC) and a Folded Reed-Solomon (FRS) code. The decoding algorithm uses an innovative approach that combines the list decoding algorithm of the FRS codes and the MAC verification algorithm to eliminate the exponential size of the list output from the decoding algorithm. We discuss our results and future work. In this paper, we consider the security of exact-repair regenerating codes operating at the minimum-storage-regenerating (MSR) point. The security requirement (introduced in Shah et. al.) is that no information about the stored data file must be leaked in the presence of an eavesdropper who has access to the contents of l 1 nodes as well as all the repair traffic entering a second disjoint set of l 2 nodes. We derive an upper bound on the size of a data file that can be securely stored that holds whenever l 2 ≤ d - k + 1. This upper bound proves the optimality of the product-matrix-based construction of secure MSR regenerating codes by Shah et. al. The first focus of the present paper, is on lower bounds on the sub-packetization level @math of an MSR code that is capable of carrying out repair in help-by-transfer fashion (also called optimal-access property). We prove here a lower bound on @math which is shown to be tight for the case @math by comparing with recent code constructions in the literature. We also extend our results to an @math MDS code over the vector alphabet. Our objective even here, is on lower bounds on the sub-packetization level @math of an MDS code that can carry out repair of any node in a subset of @math nodes, @math where each node is repaired (linear repair) by help-by-transfer with minimum repair bandwidth. We prove a lower bound on @math for the case of @math . This bound holds for any @math and is shown to be tight, again by comparing with recent code constructions in the literature. Also provided, are bounds for the case @math Q @math $ . It turns out interestingly, that such a code must necessarily have a coupled-layer structure, similar to that of the Ye-Barg code.