This paper describes BlockPKI, a blockchain-based public-key infrastructure that enables an automated, resilient, and transparent issuance of digital certificates. Our goal is to address several shortcomings of the current TLS infrastructure and its proposed extensions. In particular, we aim at reducing the power of individual certification authorities and make their actions publicly visible and accountable, without introducing yet another trusted third party. To demonstrate the benefits and practicality of our system, we present evaluation results and describe our prototype implementation.
BKI @cite_22 is a blockchain-based PKI that involves an adjustable number of CAs to issue certificates, but it does not make use of multi-signatures to make certificate verification more scalable (as does). Moreover, BKI requires that all clients contact a third party (a blockchain-based log maintainer'') during certificate verification, which is problematic for latency and privacy reasons. also improves upon BKI by allowing CAs to get remunerated automatically through smart contracts. SCPKI @cite_38 is another blockchain-based PKI, but it departs from the CA model used by TLS and relies instead on a web-of-trust model to solve a range of identity-related problems. Doing away with CAs entirely to instead rely upon individuals to certify the authenticity of public keys is a model that may be appropriate for user-to-user interactions, but it is not adapted to today's web. Therefore, the assumptions and objectives underlying SCPKI are vastly different from those of .
@cite_38 @cite_22
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Traditional PKIs face a well-known vulnerability that caused by compromised Certificate Authorities (CA) issuing bogus certificates. Several solutions like AKI and ARPKI have been proposed to address this vulnerability. However, they require complex interactions and synchronization among related entities, and their security has not been validated with wide deployment. We propose an accountable, flexible and efficient decentralized PKI to achieve the same goal using the blockchain technology of Bitcoin, which has been proven to be secure and reliable. The proposed scheme, called BKI, realizes certificate issuance, update and revocation with transactions on a special blockchain that is managed by multiple trusted maintainers. BKI achieves accountability and is easy to check certificate validity, and it is also more secure than centralized PKIs. Moreover, the certificate status update interval of BKI is in seconds, significantly reducing the vulnerability window. In addition, BKI is more flexible than AKI and ARPKI in that the number of required CAs to issue certificates is tunable for different applications. We analyze BKI’s security and performance, and present details on implementation of BKI. Experiments using Ethereum show that certificate issuance update revocation cost 2.38 ms 2.39 ms 1.59 ms respectively. The Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) in use today on the Internet to secure communications has several drawbacks arising from its centralised and non-transparent design. In the past there has been instances of certificate authorities publishing rogue certificates for targeted attacks, and this has been difficult to immediately detect as certificate authorities are not transparent about the certificates they issue. Furthermore, the centralised selection of trusted certificate authorities by operating system and browser vendors means that it is not practical to untrust certificate authorities that have issued rogue certificates, as this would disrupt the TLS process for many other hosts. SCPKI is an alternative PKI system based on a decentralised and transparent design using a web-of-trust model and a smart contract on the Ethereum blockchain, to make it easily possible for rogue certificates to be detected when they are published. The web-of-trust model is designed such that an entity or authority in the system can verify (or vouch for) fine-grained attributes of another entity's identity (such as company name or domain name), as an alternative to the centralised certificate authority identity verification model. Recent trends in public-key infrastructure research explore the tradeoff between decreased trust in Certificate Authorities (CAs), resilience against attacks, communication overhead (bandwidth and latency) for setting up an SSL TLS connection, and availability with respect to verifiability of public key information. In this paper, we propose AKI as a new public-key validation infrastructure, to reduce the level of trust in CAs. AKI integrates an architecture for key revocation of all entities (e.g., CAs, domains) with an architecture for accountability of all infrastructure parties through checks-and-balances. AKI efficiently handles common certification operations, and gracefully handles catastrophic events such as domain key loss or compromise. We propose AKI to make progress towards a public-key validation infrastructure with key revocation that reduces trust in any single entity. The current Transport Layer Security (TLS) Public-Key Infrastructure (PKI) is based on a weakest-link security model that depends on over a thousand trust roots. The recent history of malicious and compromised Certification Authorities has fueled the desire for alternatives. Creating a new, secure infrastructure is, however, a surprisingly challenging task due to the large number of parties involved and the many ways that they can interact. A principled approach to its design is therefore mandatory, as humans cannot feasibly consider all the cases that can occur due to the multitude of interleavings of actions by legitimate parties and attackers, such as private key compromises (e.g., domain, Certification Authority, log server, other trusted entities), key revocations, key updates, etc. We present ARPKI, a PKI architecture that ensures that certificate-related operations, such as certificate issuance, update, revocation, and validation, are transparent and accountable. ARPKI efficiently supports these operations, and gracefully handles catastrophic events such as domain key loss or compromise. Moreover ARPKI is the first PKI architecture that is co-designed with a formal model, and we verify its core security property using the TAMARIN prover. We prove that ARPKI offers extremely strong security guarantees, where compromising even n 1 trusted signing and verifying entities is insufficient to launch a man-in-the-middle attack. Moreover, ARPKI’s use deters misbehavior as all operations are publicly visible. Finally, we present a proof-of-concept implementation that provides all the features required for deployment. Our experiments indicate that ARPKI efficiently handles the certification process with low overhead. It does not incur additional latency to TLS, since no additional round trips are required.