Aggregate location statistics are used in a number of mobility analytics to express how many people are in a certain location at a given time (but not who). However, prior work has shown that an adversary with some prior knowledge of a victim's mobility patterns can mount membership inference attacks to determine whether or not that user contributed to the aggregates. In this paper, we set to understand why such inferences are successful and what can be done to mitigate them. We conduct an in-depth feature analysis, finding that the volume of data contributed and the regularity and particularity of mobility patterns play a crucial role in the attack. We then use these insights to adapt defenses proposed in the location privacy literature to the aggregate setting, and evaluate their privacy-utility trade-offs for common mobility analytics. We show that, while there is no silver bullet that enables arbitrary analysis, there are defenses that provide reasonable utility for particular tasks while reducing the extent of the inference.
Membership inference on aggregate locations. As discussed in , @cite_24 model MIAs against aggregate locations using a distinguishability game, and train a classifier to differentiate aggregates including the data of a target from those that do not. While our analysis is based on their attacks, our research objective is substantially different. 's main goal is to investigate the feasibility of inference attacks; whereas, we aim to gain a deeper understanding about the reasons behind the attacks' success, providing insights about locations and times that ease inference and the characteristics of the users that are affected more than others. Moreover, @cite_24 only studies the utility-privacy trade-off provided by differential privacy @cite_12 @cite_2 , while we use the insights obtained in our analysis to select potential mitigation approaches, which we evaluate, both in terms of privacy and utility, in the context of various spatio-temporal analytics tasks.
@cite_24 @cite_12 @cite_2
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Aggregate location data is often used to support smart services and applications, e.g., generating live traffic maps or predicting visits to businesses. In this paper, we present the first study on the feasibility of membership inference attacks on aggregate location time-series. We introduce a game-based definition of the adversarial task, and cast it as a classification problem where machine learning can be used to distinguish whether or not a target user is part of the aggregates. We empirically evaluate the power of these attacks on both raw and differentially private aggregates using two mobility datasets. We find that membership inference is a serious privacy threat, and show how its effectiveness depends on the adversary's prior knowledge, the characteristics of the underlying location data, as well as the number of users and the timeframe on which aggregation is performed. Although differentially private mechanisms can indeed reduce the extent of the attacks, they also yield a significant loss in utility. Moreover, a strategic adversary mimicking the behavior of the defense mechanism can greatly limit the protection they provide. Overall, our work presents a novel methodology geared to evaluate membership inference on aggregate location data in real-world settings and can be used by providers to assess the quality of privacy protection before data release or by regulators to detect violations. Machine learning models leak information about the datasets on which they are trained. An adversary can build an algorithm to trace the individual members of a model's training dataset. As a fundamental inference attack, he aims to distinguish between data points that were part of the model's training set and any other data points from the same distribution. This is known as the tracing (and also membership inference) attack. In this paper, we focus on such attacks against black-box models, where the adversary can only observe the output of the model, but not its parameters. This is the current setting of machine learning as a service in the Internet. We introduce a privacy mechanism to train machine learning models that provably achieve membership privacy: the model's predictions on its training data are indistinguishable from its predictions on other data points from the same distribution. We design a strategic mechanism where the privacy mechanism anticipates the membership inference attacks. The objective is to train a model such that not only does it have the minimum prediction error (high utility), but also it is the most robust model against its corresponding strongest inference attack (high privacy). We formalize this as a min-max game optimization problem, and design an adversarial training algorithm that minimizes the classification loss of the model as well as the maximum gain of the membership inference attack against it. This strategy, which guarantees membership privacy (as prediction indistinguishability), acts also as a strong regularizer and significantly generalizes the model. We evaluate our privacy mechanism on deep neural networks using different benchmark datasets. We show that our min-max strategy can mitigate the risk of membership inference attacks (close to the random guess) with a negligible cost in terms of the classification error. We quantitatively investigate how machine learning models leak information about the individual data records on which they were trained. We focus on the basic membership inference attack: given a data record and black-box access to a model, determine if the record was in the model's training dataset. To perform membership inference against a target model, we make adversarial use of machine learning and train our own inference model to recognize differences in the target model's predictions on the inputs that it trained on versus the inputs that it did not train on. We empirically evaluate our inference techniques on classification models trained by commercial "machine learning as a service" providers such as Google and Amazon. Using realistic datasets and classification tasks, including a hospital discharge dataset whose membership is sensitive from the privacy perspective, we show that these models can be vulnerable to membership inference attacks. We then investigate the factors that influence this leakage and evaluate mitigation strategies. We quantitatively investigate how machine learning models leak information about the individual data records on which they were trained. We focus on the basic membership inference attack: given a data record and black-box access to a model, determine if the record was in the model's training dataset. To perform membership inference against a target model, we make adversarial use of machine learning and train our own inference model to recognize differences in the target model's predictions on the inputs that it trained on versus the inputs that it did not train on. We empirically evaluate our inference techniques on classification models trained by commercial "machine learning as a service" providers such as Google and Amazon. Using realistic datasets and classification tasks, including a hospital discharge dataset whose membership is sensitive from the privacy perspective, we show that these models can be vulnerable to membership inference attacks. We then investigate the factors that influence this leakage and evaluate mitigation strategies.