One of the ways in which attackers try to steal sensitive information from corporations is by sending spearphishing emails. This type of emails typically appear to be sent by one of the victim's coworkers, but have instead been crafted by an attacker. A particularly insidious type of spearphishing emails are the ones that do not only claim to come from a trusted party, but were actually sent from that party's legitimate email account that was compromised in the first place. In this paper, we propose a radical change of focus in the techniques used for detecting such malicious emails: instead of looking for particular features that are indicative of attack emails, we look for possible indicators of impersonation of the legitimate owners. We present IdentityMailer, a system that validates the authorship of emails by learning the typical email-sending behavior of users over time, and comparing any subsequent email sent from their accounts against this model. Our experiments on real world e-mail datasets demonstrate that our system can effectively block advanced email attacks sent from genuine email accounts, which traditional protection systems are unable to detect. Moreover, we show that it is resilient to an attacker willing to evade the system. To the best of our knowledge, IdentityMailer is the first system able to identify spearphishing emails that are sent from within an organization, by a skilled attacker having access to a compromised email account.
Another category of spam detection techniques looks at the way in which spammers use the TCP or SMTP protocol @cite_40 @cite_33 . These techniques work well in practice against most spam, but are focused on detecting hosts that belong to a botnet, and are therefore useless in detecting the type of attacks that is designed to prevent.
@cite_40 @cite_33
9904157 1537207920 2108214308 2306432270
Traditional spam detection systems either rely on content analysis to detect spam emails, or attempt to detect spammers before they send a message, (i.e., they rely on the origin of the message). In this paper, we introduce a third approach: we present a system for filtering spam that takes into account how messages are sent by spammers. More precisely, we focus on the email delivery mechanism, and analyze the communication at the SMTP protocol level. We introduce two complementary techniques as concrete instances of our new approach. First, we leverage the insight that different mail clients (and bots) implement the SMTP protocol in slightly different ways. We automatically learn these SMTP dialects and use them to detect bots during an SMTP transaction. Empirical results demonstrate that this technique is successful in identifying (and rejecting) bots that attempt to send emails. Second, we observe that spammers also take into account server feedback (for example to detect and remove non-existent recipients from email address lists). We can take advantage of this observation by returning fake information, thereby poisoning the server feedback on which the spammers rely. The results of our experiments show that by sending misleading information to a spammer, it is possible to prevent recipients from receiving subsequent spam emails from that same spammer. Botnets are a significant source of abusive messaging (spam, phishing, etc) and other types of malicious traffic. A promising approach to help mitigate botnet-generated traffic is signal analysis of transport-layer (i.e. TCP IP) characteristics, e.g. timing, packet reordering, congestion, and flow-control. Prior work [4] shows that machine learning analysis of such traffic features on an SMTP MTA can accurately differentiate between botnet and legitimate sources. We make two contributions toward the real-world deployment of such techniques: i) an architecture for real-time on-line operation; and ii) auto-learning of the unsupervised model across different environments without human labeling (i.e. training). We present a "SpamFlow" SpamAssassin plugin and the requisite auxiliary daemons to integrate transport-layer signal analysis with a popular open-source spam filter. Using our system, we detail results from a production deployment where our auto-learning technique achieves better than 95 percent accuracy, precision, and recall after reception of ≈ 1,000 emails. Spam filters often use the reputation of an IP address (or IP address range) to classify email senders. This approach worked well when most spam originated from senders with fixed IP addresses, but spam today is also sent from IP addresses for which blacklist maintainers have outdated or inaccurate information (or no information at all). Spam campaigns also involve many senders, reducing the amount of spam any particular IP address sends to a single domain; this method allows spammers to stay "under the radar". The dynamism of any particular IP address begs for blacklisting techniques that automatically adapt as the senders of spam change. This paper presents SpamTracker, a spam filtering system that uses a new technique called behavioral blacklisting to classify email senders based on their sending behavior rather than their identity. Spammers cannot evade SpamTracker merely by using "fresh" IP addresses because blacklisting decisions are based on sending patterns, which tend to remain more invariant. SpamTracker uses fast clustering algorithms that react quickly to changes in sending patterns. We evaluate SpamTracker's ability to classify spammers using email logs for over 115 email domains; we find that SpamTracker can correctly classify many spammers missed by current filtering techniques. Although our current datasets prevent us from confirming SpamTracker's ability to completely distinguish spammers from legitimate senders, our evaluation shows that SpamTracker can identify a significant fraction of spammers that current IP-based blacklists miss. SpamTracker's ability to identify spammers before existing blacklists suggests that it can be used in conjunction with existing techniques (e.g., as an input to greylisting). SpamTracker is inherently distributed and can be easily replicated; incorporating it into existing email filtering infrastructures requires only small modifications to mail server configurations. Proposing a novel model to detect spam reviews efficiently.Demonstrating the integral role of burst patterns in detection of spam reviews.Comparing the approach with two common methods to show how significant it is. Today's e-commerce is highly depended on increasingly growing online customers' reviews posted in opinion sharing websites. This fact, unfortunately, has tempted spammers to target opinion sharing websites in order to promote and demote products. To date, different types of opinion spam detection methods have been proposed in order to provide reliable resources for customers, manufacturers and researchers. However, supervised approaches suffer from imbalance data due to scarcity of spam reviews in datasets, rating deviation based filtering systems are easily cheated by smart spammers, and content based methods are very expensive and majority of them have not been tested on real data hitherto.The aim of this paper is to propose a robust review spam detection system wherein the rating deviation, content based factors and activeness of reviewers are employed efficiently. To overcome the aforementioned drawbacks, all these factors are synthetically investigated in suspicious time intervals captured from time series of reviews by a pattern recognition technique. The proposed method could be a great asset in online spam filtering systems and could be used in data mining and knowledge discovery tasks as a standalone system to purify product review datasets. These systems can reap benefit from our method in terms of time efficiency and high accuracy. Empirical analyses on real dataset show that the proposed approach is able to successfully detect spam reviews. Comparison with two of the current common methods, indicates that our method is able to achieve higher detection accuracy (F-Score: 0.86) while removing the need for having specific fields of Meta data and reducing heavy computation required for investigation purposes.