We introduce knowledge flow analysis, a simple and flexible formalism for checking cryptographic protocols. Knowledge flows provide a uniform language for expressing the actions of principals, assump- tions about intruders, and the properties of cryptographic primitives. Our approach enables a generalized two-phase analysis: we extend the two-phase theory by identifying the necessary and sufficient proper- ties of a broad class of cryptographic primitives for which the theory holds. We also contribute a library of standard primitives and show that they satisfy our criteria.
The first formalisms designed for reasoning about cryptographic protocols are belief logics such as BAN logic @cite_27 , used by the Convince tool @cite_14 with the HOL theorem prover @cite_40 , and its generalizations (GNY @cite_32 , AT @cite_8 , and SVO logic @cite_37 which the C3PO tool @cite_7 employs with the Isabelle theorem prover @cite_5 ). Belief logics are difficult to use since the logical form of a protocol does not correspond to the protocol itself in an obvious way. Almost indistinguishable formulations of the same problem lead to different results. It is also hard to know if a formulation is over constrained or if any important assumptions are missing. BAN logic and its derivatives cannot deal with security flaws resulting from interleaving of protocol steps @cite_31 and cannot express any properties of protocols other than authentication @cite_23 . To overcome these limitations, the knowledge flow formalism has, like other approaches @cite_18 @cite_28 @cite_21 @cite_11 @cite_1 , a concrete operational model of protocol execution. Our model also includes a description of how the honest participants in the protocol behave and a description of how an adversary can interfere with the execution of the protocol.
@cite_37 @cite_14 @cite_18 @cite_7 @cite_8 @cite_28 @cite_21 @cite_1 @cite_32 @cite_40 @cite_27 @cite_23 @cite_5 @cite_31 @cite_11
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We present a logic for analyzing cryptographic protocols. This logic encompasses a unification of four of its predecessors in the BAN family of logics, namely those given by Li (1990); M. Abadi, M. Tuttle (1991); P.C. van Oorschot (1993); and BAN itself (M. , 1989). We also present a model-theoretic semantics with respect to which the logic is sound. The logic presented captures all of the desirable features of its predecessors and more; nonetheless, it accomplishes this with no more axioms or rules than the simplest of its predecessors. > We present an improved logic for analysing authentication properties of cryptographic protocols, based on the SVO logic of Syverson and van Oorschot (1994). Such logics are useful in electronic commerce, among other areas. We have constructed this logic in order to simplify automation, and we describe an implementation using the Isabelle theorem-proving system, and a GUI tool based on this implementation. The tool is typically operated by opening a list of propositions intended to be true, and clicking one button. Since the rules form a clean framework, the logic is easily extensible. We also present in detail a proof of soundness, using Kripke possible-worlds semantics. Since the 1980s, two approaches have been developed for analyzing security protocols. One of the approaches relies on a computational model that considers issues of complexity and probability. This approach captures a strong notion of security, guaranteed against all probabilistic polynomial-time attacks. The other approach relies on a symbolic model of protocol executions in which cryptographic primitives are treated as black boxes. Since the seminal work of Dolev and Yao, it has been realized that this latter approach enables significantly simpler and often automated proofs. However, the guarantees that it offers have been quite unclear. In this paper, we show that it is possible to obtain the best of both worlds: fully automated proofs and strong, clear security guarantees. Specifically, for the case of protocols that use signatures and asymmetric encryption, we establish that symbolic integrity and secrecy proofs are sound with respect to the computational model. The main new challenges concern secrecy properties for which we obtain the first soundness result for the case of active adversaries. Our proofs are carried out using Casrul, a fully automated tool. We are interested in the design of automated procedures for analyzing the (in)security of cryptographic protocols in the Dolev-Yao model for a bounded number of sessions when we take into account some algebraic properties satisfied by the operators involved in the protocol. This leads to a more realistic model in comparison to what we get under the perfect cryptography assumption, but it implies that protocol analysis deals with terms modulo some equational theory instead of terms in a free algebra. The main goal of this paper is to setup a general approach that works for a whole class of monoidal theories which contains many of the specific cases that have been considered so far in an ad-hoc way (e.g. exclusive or, Abelian groups, exclusive or in combination with the homomorphism axiom). We follow a classical schema for cryptographic protocol analysis which proves first a locality result and then reduces the insecurity problem to a symbolic constraint solving problem. This approach strongly relies on the correspondence between a monoidal theory E and a semiring S"E which we use to deal with the symbolic constraints. We show that the well-defined symbolic constraints that are generated by reasonable protocols can be solved provided that unification in the monoidal theory satisfies some additional properties. The resolution process boils down to solving particular quadratic Diophantine equations that are reduced to linear Diophantine equations, thanks to linear algebra results and the well-definedness of the problem. Examples of theories that do not satisfy our additional properties appear to be undecidable, which suggests that our characterization is reasonably tight.