Blame games tend to follow major disruptions, be they financial crises, natural disasters or terrorist attacks. To study how the blame game evolves and shapes the dominant crisis narratives is of great significance, as sense-making processes can affect regulatory outcomes, social hierarchies, and cultural norms. However, it takes tremendous time and efforts for social scientists to manually examine each relevant news article and extract the blame ties (A blames B). In this study, we define a new task, Blame Tie Extraction, and construct a new dataset related to the United States financial crisis (2007-2010) from The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal and USA Today. We build a Bi-directional Long Short-Term Memory (BiLSTM) network for contexts where the entities appear in and it learns to automatically extract such blame ties at the document level. Leveraging the large unsupervised model such as GloVe and ELMo, our best model achieves an F1 score of 70 on the test set for blame tie extraction, making it a useful tool for social scientists to extract blame ties more efficiently.
In blame game research, social scientists care more about a few key players instead of all the entities, and most entities in the passage are irrelevant for studying the blame game @cite_18 . Therefore, in this paper, we assume that the entities of interest are already given, and we only need to extract blame ties from these entities.
@cite_18
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This article takes the 2008–2010 financial crisis as a case study to explore the tension between responsibility and accountability in complex crises. I analyze the patterns of attribution and assumption of responsibility of thirty-three bankers in Wall Street, interviewed from fall 2008 to summer 2010. First, I show that responsibility for complex failures cannot be easily attributed or assumed: responsibility becomes diluted within the collective. Actors can only assume collective responsibility, recognizing that they belong to an institution at fault. Second, I show that blaming is a social process that should be examined contextually, relationally, and dynamically. I build on sociological theories to depart from the normative focus of philosophers, and the cognitive focus of psychologists, who have dominated the study of responsibility so far. Teamwork plays an important role in many areas of today's society, such as business activities. Thus, the question of how to form an effective team is of increasing interest. In this paper we use the team-oriented multiplayer online game Dota 2 to study cooperation within teams and the success of teams. Making use of game log data, we choose a statistical approach to identify factors that increase the chance of a team to win. The factors that we analyze are related to the roles that players can take within the game, the experiences of the players and friendship ties within a team. Our results show that such data can be used to infer social behavior patterns. Humanity faces numerous problems of common-pool resource appropriation. This class of multi-agent social dilemma includes the problems of ensuring sustainable use of fresh water, common fisheries, grazing pastures, and irrigation systems. Abstract models of common-pool resource appropriation based on non-cooperative game theory predict that self-interested agents will generally fail to find socially positive equilibria---a phenomenon called the tragedy of the commons. However, in reality, human societies are sometimes able to discover and implement stable cooperative solutions. Decades of behavioral game theory research have sought to uncover aspects of human behavior that make this possible. Most of that work was based on laboratory experiments where participants only make a single choice: how much to appropriate. Recognizing the importance of spatial and temporal resource dynamics, a recent trend has been toward experiments in more complex real-time video game-like environments. However, standard methods of non-cooperative game theory can no longer be used to generate predictions for this case. Here we show that deep reinforcement learning can be used instead. To that end, we study the emergent behavior of groups of independently learning agents in a partially observed Markov game modeling common-pool resource appropriation. Our experiments highlight the importance of trial-and-error learning in common-pool resource appropriation and shed light on the relationship between exclusion, sustainability, and inequality. Matrix games like Prisoner's Dilemma have guided research on social dilemmas for decades. However, they necessarily treat the choice to cooperate or defect as an atomic action. In real-world social dilemmas these choices are temporally extended. Cooperativeness is a property that applies to policies, not elementary actions. We introduce sequential social dilemmas that share the mixed incentive structure of matrix game social dilemmas but also require agents to learn policies that implement their strategic intentions. We analyze the dynamics of policies learned by multiple self-interested independent learning agents, each using its own deep Q-network, on two Markov games we introduce here: 1. a fruit Gathering game and 2. a Wolfpack hunting game. We characterize how learned behavior in each domain changes as a function of environmental factors including resource abundance. Our experiments show how conflict can emerge from competition over shared resources and shed light on how the sequential nature of real world social dilemmas affects cooperation.