Privacy is of the utmost importance in genomic matching. Therefore a number of privacy-preserving protocols have been presented using secure computation. Nevertheless, none of these protocols prevents inferences from the result. Goodrich has shown that this resulting information is sufficient for an effective attack on genome databases. In this paper we present an approach that can detect and mitigate such an attack on encrypted messages while still preserving the privacy of both parties. Note that randomization, e.g. using differential privacy, will almost certainly destroy the utility of the matching result. We combine two known cryptographic primitives -- secure computation of the edit distance and fuzzy commitments -- in order to prevent submission of similar genome sequences. Particularly, we contribute an efficient zero-knowledge proof that the same input has been used in both primitives. We show that using our approach it is feasible to preserve privacy in genome matching and also detect and mitigate Goodrich's attack.
Further attacks on privacy mechanisms in genomic computing have to be considered. Bloom filter matching using the approach of @cite_19 (keyed cryptographic hash functions instead of regular hash functions) is insecure @cite_22 . A sophisticated attack can infer information from a Bloom filter with unknown hash functions using environmental information, such as the space of all genomes. We therefore use homomorphic encryption to protect the Bloom filter and are not susceptible to this attack. Anonymization techniques have also been found to be insecure @cite_3 .
@cite_19 @cite_22 @cite_3
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In this paper we propose a new approach to privately compute the set-union cardinality and the set-intersection cardinality among multiple honest-but-curious parties. Our approach is inspired by a proposal of Ashok and Mukkamala (DBSec’14) which deploys Bloom filters to approximate the size tightly. One advantage of their solution is that it avoids ample public-key cryptography. Unfortunately, we show here that their protocol is vulnerable to actual attacks. We therefore propose a new Bloom filter based protocol, also forgoing heavy cryptography, and prove its security. We propose a privacy protection framework for large-scale content-based information retrieval. It offers two layers of protection. First, robust hash values are used as queries to prevent revealing original content or features. Second, the client can choose to omit certain bits in a hash value to further increase the ambiguity for the server. Due to the reduced information, it is computationally difficult for the server to know the client’s interest. The server has to return the hash values of all possible candidates to the client. The client performs a search within the candidate list to find the best match. Since only hash values are exchanged between the client and the server, the privacy of both parties is protected. We introduce the concept oftunable privacy, where the privacy protection level can be adjusted according to a policy. It is realized through hash-based piecewise inverted indexing. The idea is to divide a feature vector into pieces and index each piece with a subhash value. Each subhash value is associated with an inverted index list. The framework has been extensively tested using a large image database. We have evaluated both retrieval performance and privacy-preserving performance for a particular content identification application. Two different constructions of robust hash algorithms are used. One is based on random projections; the other is based on the discrete wavelet transform. Both algorithms exhibit satisfactory performance in comparison with state-of-the-art retrieval schemes. The results show that the privacy enhancement slightly improves the retrieval performance. We consider the majority voting attack for estimating the query category and identification. Experiment results show that this attack is a threat when there are near-duplicates, but the success rate decreases with the number of omitted bits and the number of distinct items. Hashing-based approximate nearest neighbor (ANN) search in huge databases has become popular due to its computational and memory efficiency. The popular hashing methods, e.g., Locality Sensitive Hashing and Spectral Hashing, construct hash functions based on random or principal projections. The resulting hashes are either not very accurate or are inefficient. Moreover, these methods are designed for a given metric similarity. On the contrary, semantic similarity is usually given in terms of pairwise labels of samples. There exist supervised hashing methods that can handle such semantic similarity, but they are prone to overfitting when labeled data are small or noisy. In this work, we propose a semi-supervised hashing (SSH) framework that minimizes empirical error over the labeled set and an information theoretic regularizer over both labeled and unlabeled sets. Based on this framework, we present three different semi-supervised hashing methods, including orthogonal hashing, nonorthogonal hashing, and sequential hashing. Particularly, the sequential hashing method generates robust codes in which each hash function is designed to correct the errors made by the previous ones. We further show that the sequential learning paradigm can be extended to unsupervised domains where no labeled pairs are available. Extensive experiments on four large datasets (up to 80 million samples) demonstrate the superior performance of the proposed SSH methods over state-of-the-art supervised and unsupervised hashing techniques. We present a version of the Bloom filter data structure that supports not only the insertion, deletion, and lookup of key-value pairs, but also allows a complete listing of its contents with high probability, as long the number of key-value pairs is below a designed threshold. Our structure allows the number of key-value pairs to greatly exceed this threshold during normal operation. Exceeding the threshold simply temporarily prevents content listing and reduces the probability of a successful lookup. If later entries are deleted to return the structure below the threshold, everything again functions appropriately. We also show that simple variations of our structure are robust to certain standard errors, such as the deletion of a key without a corresponding insertion or the insertion of two distinct values for a key. The properties of our structure make it suitable for several applications, including database and networking applications that we highlight.