Online signature verification technologies, such as those available in banks and post offices, rely on dedicated digital devices such as tablets or smart pens to capture, analyze and verify signatures. In this paper, we suggest a novel method for online signature verification that relies on the increasingly available hand-worn devices, such as smartwatches or fitness trackers, instead of dedicated ad-hoc devices. Our method uses a set of known genuine and forged signatures, recorded using the motion sensors of a hand-worn device, to train a machine learning classifier. Then, given the recording of an unknown signature and a claimed identity, the classifier can determine whether the signature is genuine or forged. In order to validate our method, it was applied on 1980 recordings of genuine and forged signatures that we collected from 66 subjects in our institution. Using our method, we were able to successfully distinguish between genuine and forged signatures with a high degree of accuracy (0.98 AUC and 0.05 EER).
Wrist-worn devices, such as smartwatches and fitness trackers, have become perhaps the most popular category of wearable devices, and many major manufacturers, including Samsung and Apple, have released their devices recently. Since these devices are worn on the wrist, they introduce a unique opportunity to both detect and understand a user's arm, hand and finger movements as shown in @cite_17 . In comparison, forearm devices such as the one presented in @cite_13 , are very limited in detecting fine gestures such as finger gestures or writing. Similarly, finger worn devices such as the one introduced in @cite_20 , can be used to understand users' finger gestures and writing. However, this is limited to the gestures of a specific finger, and gestures using other fingers can not be identified. Wrist-worn devices are less limited as they facilitate gesture recognition based on the arm, the hand and all of the fingers.
@cite_13 @cite_20 @cite_17
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Smartwatch is becoming one of the most popular wearable device with many major smartphone manufacturers such as Samsung and Apple releasing their smartwatches recently. Apart from the fitness applications, the smartwatch provides a rich user interface that has enabled many applications like instant messaging and email. Since the smartwatch is worn on the wrist, it introduces a unique opportunity to understand user's arm, hand and possibly finger movements using its accelerometer and gyroscope sensors. Although user's arm and hand gestures are likely to be identified with ease using the smartwatch sensors, it is not clear how much of user's finger gestures can be recognized. In this paper, we show that motion energy measured at the smartwatch is sufficient to uniquely identify user's hand and finger gestures. We identify essential features of accelerometer and gyroscope data that reflect the movements of tendons (passing through the wrist) when performing a finger or a hand gesture. With these features, we build a classifier that can uniquely identify 37 (13 finger, 14 hand and 10 arm) gestures with an accuracy of 98 . We further extend our gesture recognition to identify the characters written by the user with her index finger on a surface, and show that such finger-writing can also be accurately recognized with nearly 95 accuracy. Our presented results will enable many novel applications like remote control and finger-writing-based input to devices using smartwatch. Previous work on muscle activity sensing has leveraged specialized sensors such as electromyography and force sensitive resistors. While these sensors show great potential for detecting finger hand gestures, they require additional hardware that adds to the cost and user discomfort. Past research has utilized sensors on commercial devices, focusing on recognizing gross hand gestures. In this work we present Serendipity, a new technique for recognizing unremarkable and fine-motor finger gestures using integrated motion sensors (accelerometer and gyroscope) in off-the-shelf smartwatches. Our system demonstrates the potential to distinguish 5 fine-motor gestures like pinching, tapping and rubbing fingers with an average f1-score of 87 . Our work is the first to explore the feasibility of using solely motion sensors on everyday wearable devices to detect fine-grained gestures. This promising technology can be deployed today on current smartwatches and has the potential to be applied to cross-device interactions, or as a tool for research in fields involving finger and hand motion. Wearable devices, such as smartwatches, are furnished with state-of-the-art sensors that enable a range of context-aware applications. However, malicious applications can misuse these sensors, if access is left unaudited. In this paper, we demonstrate how applications that have access to motion or inertial sensor data on a modern smartwatch can recover text typed on an external QWERTY keyboard. Due to the distinct nature of the perceptible motion sensor data, earlier research efforts on emanation based keystroke inference attacks are not readily applicable in this scenario. The proposed novel attack framework characterizes wrist movements (captured by the inertial sensors of the smartwatch worn on the wrist) observed during typing, based on the relative physical position of keys and the direction of transition between pairs of keys. Eavesdropped keystroke characteristics are then matched to candidate words in a dictionary. Multiple evaluations show that our keystroke inference framework has an alarmingly high classification accuracy and word recovery rate. With the information recovered from the wrist movements perceptible by a smartwatch, we exemplify the risks associated with unaudited access to seemingly innocuous sensors (e.g., accelerometers and gyroscopes) of wearable devices. As part of our efforts towards preventing such side-channel attacks, we also develop and evaluate a novel context-aware protection framework which can be used to automatically disable (or downgrade) access to motion sensors, whenever typing activity is detected. The proliferation of wearable devices, e.g., smartwatches and activity trackers, with embedded sensors has already shown its great potential on monitoring and inferring human daily activities. This paper reveals a serious security breach of wearable devices in the context of divulging secret information (i.e., key entries) while people accessing key-based security systems. Existing methods of obtaining such secret information relies on installations of dedicated hardware (e.g., video camera or fake keypad), or training with labeled data from body sensors, which restrict use cases in practical adversary scenarios. In this work, we show that a wearable device can be exploited to discriminate mm-level distances and directions of the user's fine-grained hand movements, which enable attackers to reproduce the trajectories of the user's hand and further to recover the secret key entries. In particular, our system confirms the possibility of using embedded sensors in wearable devices, i.e., accelerometers, gyroscopes, and magnetometers, to derive the moving distance of the user's hand between consecutive key entries regardless of the pose of the hand. Our Backward PIN-Sequence Inference algorithm exploits the inherent physical constraints between key entries to infer the complete user key entry sequence. Extensive experiments are conducted with over 5000 key entry traces collected from 20 adults for key-based security systems (i.e. ATM keypads and regular keyboards) through testing on different kinds of wearables. Results demonstrate that such a technique can achieve 80 accuracy with only one try and more than 90 accuracy with three tries, which to our knowledge, is the first technique that reveals personal PINs leveraging wearable devices without the need for labeled training data and contextual information.