Recent developments have brought the possibility of achieving scalable quantum networks and quantum devices closer. From the computational point of view these emerging technologies become relevant when they are no longer classically simulatable. Hence a pressing challenge is the construction of practical methods to verify the correctness of the outcome produced by universal or non-universal quantum devices. A promising approach that has been extensively explored is the scheme of verification via encryption through blind quantum computation. We present here a new construction that simplifies the required resources for any such verifiable protocol. We obtain an overhead that is linear in the size of the input (computation), while the security parameter remains independent of the size of the computation and can be made exponentially small (with a small extra cost). Furthermore our construction is generic and could be applied to any universal or non-universal scheme with a given underlying graph.
Finally a composable definition of @cite_23 is given in @cite_5 , while a limited computational model (one-pure-qubit) is examined in @cite_3 . Due to the generic nature of our construction these results would be applicable to our protocol as well.
@cite_5 @cite_3 @cite_23
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While building a universal quantum computer remains challenging, devices of restricted power such as the so-called one pure qubit model have attracted considerable attention. An important step in the construction of these limited quantum computational devices is the understanding of whether the verification of the computation within these models could be also performed in the restricted scheme. Encoding via blindness (a cryptographic protocol for delegated computing) has proven successful for the verification of universal quantum computation with a restricted verifier. In this paper, we present the adaptation of this approach to the one pure qubit model, and present the first feasible scheme for the verification of delegated one pure qubit model of quantum computing. It is known that evaluating a certain approximation to the Jones polynomial for the plat closure of a braid is a BQP-complete problem. That is, this problem exactly captures the power of the quantum circuit model[13, 3, 1]. The one clean qubit model is a model of quantum computation in which all but one qubit starts in the maximally mixed state. One clean qubit computers are believed to be strictly weaker than standard quantum computers, but still capable of solving some classically intractable problems [21]. Here we show that evaluating a certain approximation to the Jones polynomial at a fifth root of unity for the trace closure of a braid is a complete problem for the one clean qubit complexity class. That is, a one clean qubit computer can approximate these Jones polynomials in time polynomial in both the number of strands and number of crossings, and the problem of simulating a one clean qubit computer is reducible to approximating the Jones polynomial of the trace closure of a braid. Delegating difficult computations to remote large computation facilities, with appropriate security guarantees, is a possible solution for the ever growing needs of personal computing power. For delegated computation protocols to be usable in a larger context – or simply to securely run two protocols in parallel – the security definitions need to be composable. Here, we define composable security for delegated quantum computation. We distinguish between protocols which provide only blindness – the computation is hidden from the server – and those that are also verifiable – the client can check that it has received the correct result. We show that the composable security definition capturing both these notions can be reduced to a combination of several distinct “trace distance type” criteria – which are, individually, non composable security definitions. A traditional counterexample to a linear-time safety property shows the values of all signals at all times prior to the error. However, some signals may not be critical to causing the failure. A succinct explanation may help human understanding as well as speed up algorithms that have to analyze many such traces. In Bounded Model Checking (BMC), a counterexample is constructed from a satisfying assignment to a Boolean formula, typically in CNF. Modern SAT solvers usually assign values to all variables when the input formula is satisfiable. Deriving minimal satisfying assignments from such complete assignments does not lead to concise explanations of counterexamples because of how CNF formulae are derived from the models. Hence, we formulate the extraction of a succinct counterexample as the problem of finding a minimal assignment that, together with the Boolean formula describing the model, implies an objective. We present a two-stage algorithm for this problem, such that the result of each stage contributes to identify the “interesting” events that cause the failure. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach with an example and with experimental results.