We propose that by integrating behavioural biometric gestures---such as drawing figures on a touch screen---with challenge-response based cognitive authentication schemes, we can benefit from the properties of both. On the one hand, we can improve the usability of existing cognitive schemes by significantly reducing the number of challenge-response rounds by (partially) relying on the hardness of mimicking carefully designed behavioural biometric gestures. On the other hand, the observation resistant property of cognitive schemes provides an extra layer of protection for behavioural biometrics; an attacker is unsure if a failed impersonation is due to a biometric failure or a wrong response to the challenge. We design and develop an instantiation of such a "hybrid" scheme, and call it BehavioCog. To provide security close to a 4-digit PIN---one in 10,000 chance to impersonate---we only need two challenge-response rounds, which can be completed in less than 38 seconds on average (as estimated in our user study), with the advantage that unlike PINs or passwords, the scheme is secure under observation.
A number of touch-based behavioural biometric schemes have been proposed for user authentication @cite_49 @cite_45 @cite_39 @cite_34 . Most of these schemes rely on simple gestures on smartphones such as swipes. We have argued that if we were to use simple gestures then a much larger number of them need to be accumulated to get good accuracy. Also, swipes are prone to observation attacks @cite_59 . The work of @cite_52 does indeed include more complex (free-form) gestures and partly inspired our symbol set of complex figures. However, their gestures are only known to resist shoulder-surfing attacks and not video based observation attacks where the attacker has full control over the playback. attacks. The closest work similar to ours is by Toan et. al. @cite_32 . Their scheme authenticates users on the basis of how they write their PINs on the smartphone touch screen using @math coordinates. In comparison, we do a more detailed feature selection process to identify features, which are repeatable and resilient against observation attacks. Furthermore, they report an equal error rate (EER) of 6.7
@cite_52 @cite_32 @cite_39 @cite_45 @cite_59 @cite_49 @cite_34
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Touch input implicit authentication ( touch IA'') employs behavioural biometrics like touch location and pressure to continuously and transparently authenticate smartphone users. We provide the first ever evaluation of targeted mimicry attacks on touch IA and show that it fails against shoulder surfing and offline training attacks. Based on experiments with three diverse touch IA schemes and 256 unique attacker-victim pairs, we show that shoulder surfing attacks have a bypass success rate of 84 with the majority of successful attackers observing the victim's behaviour for less than two minutes. Therefore, the accepted assumption that shoulder surfing attacks on touch IA are infeasible due to the hidden nature of some features is incorrect. For offline training attacks, we created an open-source training app for attackers to train on their victims' touch data. With this training, attackers achieved bypass success rates of 86 , even with only partial knowledge of the underlying features used by the IA scheme. Previous work failed to find these severe vulnerabilities due to its focus on random, non-targeted attacks. Our work demonstrates the importance of considering targeted mimicry attacks to evaluate the security of an implicit authentication scheme. Based on our results, we conclude that touch IA is unsuitable from a security standpoint. Authentication methods can be improved by considering implicit, individual behavioural cues. In particular, verifying users based on typing behaviour has been widely studied with physical keyboards. On mobile touchscreens, the same concepts have been applied with little adaptations so far. This paper presents the first reported study on mobile keystroke biometrics which compares touch-specific features between three different hand postures and evaluation schemes. Based on 20.160 password entries from a study with 28 participants over two weeks, we show that including spatial touch features reduces implicit authentication equal error rates (EER) by 26.4 - 36.8 relative to the previously used temporal features. We also show that authentication works better for some hand postures than others. To improve applicability and usability, we further quantify the influence of common evaluation assumptions: known attacker data, training and testing on data from a single typing session, and fixed hand postures. We show that these practices can lead to overly optimistic evaluations. In consequence, we describe evaluation recommendations, a probabilistic framework to handle unknown hand postures, and ideas for further improvements. Touch-based verification --- the use of touch gestures (e.g., swiping, zooming, etc.) to authenticate users of touch screen devices --- has recently been widely evaluated for its potential to serve as a second layer of defense to the PIN lock mechanism. In all performance evaluations of touch-based authentication systems however, researchers have assumed naive (zero-effort) forgeries in which the attacker makes no effort to mimic a given gesture pattern. In this paper we demonstrate that a simple "Lego" robot driven by input gleaned from general population swiping statistics can generate forgeries that achieve alarmingly high penetration rates against touch-based authentication systems. Using the best classification algorithms in touch-based authentication, we rigorously explore the effect of the attack, finding that it increases the Equal Error Rates of the classifiers by between 339 and 1004 depending on parameters such as the failure-to-enroll threshold and the type of touch stroke generated by the robot. The paper calls into question the zero-effort impostor testing approach used to benchmark the performance of touch-based authentication systems. We propose a new behavioral biometric modality based on multi-touch gestures. We define a canonical set of multi-touch gestures based on the movement characteristics of the palm and fingertips being used to perform the gesture. We developed an algorithm to generate and verify multi-touch gesture templates. We tested our techniques on a set of 22 different gestures. Employing a matching algorithm for a multi-touch verification system with a k-NN classifier we achieved 1.28 Equal Error Rate (EER). With score-based classifiers where only the first five samples of a genuine subject were considered as templates, we achieved 4.46 EER. Further, with the combination of three commonly used gestures: pinch, zoom, and rotate, using all five fingers, 1.58 EER was achieved using a score-based classifier. These results are encouraging and point to the possibility of touch based biometric systems in real world applications like user verification and active authentication.