We consider the classical secret sharing problem in the case where all agents are selfish but rational. In recent work, Kol and Naor show that, when there are two players, in the non-simultaneous communication model, i.e. when rushing is possible, there is no Nash equilibrium that ensures both players learn the secret. However, they describe a mechanism for this problem, for any number of players, that is an epsilon-Nash equilibrium, in that no player can gain more than epsilon utility by deviating from it. Unfortunately, the Kol and Naor mechanism, and, to the best of our knowledge, all previous mechanisms for this problem require each agent to send O(n) messages in expectation, where n is the number of agents. This may be problematic for some applications of rational secret sharing such as secure multi-party computation and simulation of a mediator. We address this issue by describing mechanisms for rational secret sharing that are designed for large n. Both of our results hold for n > 2, and are Nash equilbria, rather than just epsilon-Nash equilbria. Our first result is a mechanism for n-out-of-n rational secret sharing that is scalable in the sense that it requires each agent to send only an expected O(log n) bits. Moreover, the latency of this mechanism is O(log n) in expectation, compared to O(n) expected latency for the Kol and Naor result. Our second result is a mechanism for a relaxed variant of rational m-out-of-n secret sharing where m = Theta(n). It requires each processor to send O(log n) bits and has O(log n) latency. Both of our mechanisms are non-cryptographic, and are not susceptible to backwards induction.
In @cite_19 we overcame this difficulty, providing a algorithm for rational secret sharing, in which each player only sends @math bits per round and the expected number of rounds is constant (although each round takes @math time). Moreover, following the protocol is an @math -Nash equilibrium. Unfortunately, a certain bad event with small but constant probability caused some players, when they recognized it, to deviate from the protocol so that the equilibrium is not everlasting. This paper is the full version of @cite_19 . However, we improve on the work in @cite_19 in two ways. First, we remove all probability of error for @math -out-of- @math secret sharing, and improve the probability of error for @math -out-of- @math from a constant to an inverse polynomial. Second, we show that our new protocol is a Nash equilibrium, not just an @math -Nash equilibrium, as long as @math .
@cite_19
2001578254 2591036807 2032349632 1969882998
We consider the classical secret sharing problem in the case where all agents are selfish but rational. In recent work, Kol and Naor show that in the non-simultaneous communciation model (i.e. when rushing is possible), there is no Nash equilibrium that ensures all agents learn the secret. However, they describe a mechanism for this problem that is an e-Nash equilibrium, i.e. it is close to an equilibrium in the sense that no player can gain more than e utility by deviating from it. Unfortunately, the Kol and Naor mechanism, and, to the best of our knowledge, all previous mechanisms for this problem require each agent to send O(n) messages in expectation, where n is the number of agents. This may be problematic for some applications of rational secret sharing such as secure multiparty computation and simulation of a mediator. We address this issue by describing a mechanism for rational n-out-of-n secret sharing that is an e-Nash equilibrium, and is scalable in the sense that it requires each agent to send only an expected O(1) bits. Moreover, the latency of our mechanism is O(log n) in expectation, compared to O(n) expected latency for the Kol and Naor result. We also design mechanisms for a relaxed variant of rational m-out-of-n secret sharing where m = Θ(n) that require each processor to send O(log n) bits and have O( n) latency. Our mechanisms are non-cryptographic, and are not susceptible to backwards induction. We consider distributed plurality consensus in a complete graph of size @math with @math initial opinions. We design an efficient and simple protocol in the asynchronous communication model that ensures that all nodes eventually agree on the initially most frequent opinion. In this model, each node is equipped with a random Poisson clock with parameter @math . Whenever a node's clock ticks, it samples some neighbors, uniformly at random and with replacement, and adjusts its opinion according to the sample. A prominent example is the so-called two-choices algorithm in the synchronous model, where in each round, every node chooses two neighbors uniformly at random, and if the two sampled opinions coincide, then that opinion is adopted. This protocol is very efficient and well-studied when @math . If @math for some small @math , we show that it converges to the initial plurality opinion within @math rounds, w.h.p., as long as the initial difference between the largest and second largest opinion is @math . On the other side, we show that there are cases in which @math rounds are needed, w.h.p. One can beat this lower bound in the synchronous model by combining the two-choices protocol with randomized broadcasting. Our main contribution is a non-trivial adaptation of this approach to the asynchronous model. If the support of the most frequent opinion is at least @math times that of the second-most frequent one and @math , then our protocol achieves the best possible run time of @math , w.h.p. We relax full synchronicity by allowing @math nodes to be poorly synchronized, and the well synchronized nodes are only required to be within a certain time difference from one another. We enforce this synchronicity by introducing a novel gadget into the protocol. We study a network creation game recently proposed by Fabrikant, Luthra, Maneva, Papadimitriou and Shenker. In this game, each player (vertex) can create links (edges) to other players at a cost of α per edge. The goal of every player is to minimize the sum consisting of (a) the cost of the links he has created and (b) the sum of the distances to all other players. conjectured that there exists a constant A such that, for any α > A, all non-transient Nash equilibria graphs are trees. They showed that if a Nash equilibrium is a tree, the price of anarchy is constant. In this paper we disprove the tree conjecture. More precisely, we show that for any positive integer n 0 , there exists a graph built by n ≥ n 0 players which contains cycles and forms a non-transient Nash equilibrium, for any α with 1 < α ≤ √n 2. Our construction makes use of some interesting results on finite affine planes. On the other hand we show that, for α ≥ 12n[log n], every Nash equilibrium forms a tree.Without relying on the tree conjecture, proved an upper bound on the price of anarchy of O(√α), where α ∈ [2, n2]. We improve this bound. Specifically, we derive a constant upper bound for α ∈ O(√n) and for α ≥ 12n[log n]. For the intermediate values we derive an improved bound of O(1 + (min α2 n, n2 α )1 3).Additionally, we develop characterizations of Nash equilibria and extend our results to a weighted network creation game as well as to scenarios with cost sharing. We consider the rational versions of two of the classical problems in foundations of cryptography: secret sharing and multiparty computation, suggested by Halpern and Teague (STOC 2004). Our goal is to design games and fair strategies that encourage rational participants to exchange information about their inputs for their mutual benefit, when the only mean of communication is a broadcast channel. We show that protocols for the above information exchanging tasks, where players' values come from a bounded domain, cannot satisfy some of the most desirable properties. In contrast, we provide a rational secret sharing scheme with simultaneous broadcast channel in which shares are taken from an unbounded domain, but have finite (and polynomial sized) expectation. Previous schemes (mostly cryptographic) have required computational assumptions, making them inexact and susceptible to backward induction, or used stronger communication channels. Our scheme is non-cryptographic, immune to backward induction, and satisfies a stronger rationality concept (strict Nash equilibrium). We show that our solution can also be used to construct an e-Nash equilibrium secret sharing scheme for the case of a non-simultaneous broadcast channel.