We aim to reduce the social cost of congestion in many smart city applications. In our model of congestion, agents interact over limited resources after receiving signals from a central agent that observes the state of congestion in real time. Under natural models of agent populations, we develop new signalling schemes and show that by introducing a non-trivial amount of uncertainty in the signals, we reduce the social cost of congestion, i.e., improve social welfare. The signalling schemes are efficient in terms of both communication and computation, and are consistent with past observations of the congestion. Moreover, the resulting population dynamics converge under reasonable assumptions.
Our random signals are reminiscent of perturbation schemes in repeated games, such as Follow-the-Perturbed-Leader @cite_3 , trembling-hand equilibrium @cite_4 , stochastic fictitious play @cite_12 , or the power of two choices @cite_1 . When the agents use such randomised algorithms in their decision-making, the resulting demand process has been shown to be behave rather well in theory (e.g., @cite_1 ), as well as in a number of applications, e.g., in parking @cite_0 , bike sharing @cite_6 , and charging electric vehicles @cite_21 . However, we propose a signalling and guidance scheme that combines randomization and intervals.
@cite_4 @cite_21 @cite_1 @cite_3 @cite_6 @cite_0 @cite_12
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We consider multi-player repeated games involving a large number of players with large strategy spaces and enmeshed utility structures. In these ldquolarge-scalerdquo games, players are inherently faced with limitations in both their observational and computational capabilities. Accordingly, players in large-scale games need to make their decisions using algorithms that accommodate limitations in information gathering and processing. This disqualifies some of the well known decision making models such as ldquoFictitious Playrdquo (FP), in which each player must monitor the individual actions of every other player and must optimize over a high dimensional probability space. We will show that Joint Strategy Fictitious Play (JSFP), a close variant of FP, alleviates both the informational and computational burden of FP. Furthermore, we introduce JSFP with inertia, i.e., a probabilistic reluctance to change strategies, and establish the convergence to a pure Nash equilibrium in all generalized ordinal potential games in both cases of averaged or exponentially discounted historical data. We illustrate JSFP with inertia on the specific class of congestion games, a subset of generalized ordinal potential games. In particular, we illustrate the main results on a distributed traffic routing problem and derive tolling procedures that can lead to optimized total traffic congestion. We consider the problem of 20 questions with noise for multiple players under the minimum entropy criterion in the setting of stochastic search, with application to target localization. Each player yields a noisy response to a binary query governed by a certain error probability. First, we propose a sequential policy for constructing questions that queries each player in sequence and refines the posterior of the target location. Second, we consider a joint policy that asks all players questions in parallel at each time instant and characterize the structure of the optimal policy for constructing the sequence of questions. This generalizes the single player probabilistic bisection method for stochastic search problems. Third, we prove an equivalence between the two schemes showing that, despite the fact that the sequential scheme has access to a more refined filtration, the joint scheme performs just as well on average. Fourth, we establish convergence rates of the mean-square error and derive error exponents. Finally, we obtain an extension to the case of unknown error probabilities. This framework provides a mathematical model for incorporating a human in the loop for active machine learning systems. We introduce an extended family of continuous-domain stochastic models for sparse, piecewise-smooth signals. These are specified as solutions of stochastic differential equations, or, equivalently, in terms of a suitable innovation model; the latter is analogous conceptually to the classical interpretation of a Gaussian stationary process as filtered white noise. The two specific features of our approach are 1) signal generation is driven by a random stream of Dirac impulses (Poisson noise) instead of Gaussian white noise, and 2) the class of admissible whitening operators is considerably larger than what is allowed in the conventional theory of stationary processes. We provide a complete characterization of these finite-rate-of-innovation signals within Gelfand's framework of generalized stochastic processes. We then focus on the class of scale-invariant whitening operators which correspond to unstable systems. We show that these can be solved by introducing proper boundary conditions, which leads to the specification of random, spline-type signals that are piecewise-smooth. These processes are the Poisson counterpart of fractional Brownian motion; they are nonstationary and have the same 1 ω-type spectral signature. We prove that the generalized Poisson processes have a sparse representation in a wavelet-like basis subject to some mild matching condition. We also present a limit example of sparse process that yields a MAP signal estimator that is equivalent to the popular TV-denoising algorithm. Imitating successful behavior is a natural and frequently applied approach when facing scenarios for which we have little or no experience upon which we can base our decision. In this paper, we consider such behavior in atomic congestion games. We propose to study concurrent imitation dynamics that emerge when each player samples another player and possibly imitates this agents' strategy if the anticipated latency gain is sufficiently large. Our main focus is on convergence properties. Using a potential function argument, we show that these dynamics converge in a monotonic fashion to stable states. In such a state none of the players can improve their latency by imitating others. As our main result, we show rapid convergence to approximate equilibria. At an approximate equilibrium only a small fraction of agents sustains a latency significantly above or below average. In particular, imitation dynamics behave like fully polynomial time approximation schemes (FPTAS). Fixing all other parameters, the convergence time depends only in a logarithmic fashion on the number of agents. Since imitation processes are not innovative they cannot discover unused strategies. Furthermore, strategies may become extinct with non-zero probability. For the case of singleton games, we show that the probability of this event occurring is negligible. Additionally, we prove that the social cost of a stable state reached by our dynamics is not much worse than an optimal state in singleton congestion games with linear latency functions. While we concentrate on the case of symmetric network congestion games, most of our results do not explicitly use the network structure. They continue to hold accordingly for general symmetric and asymmetric congestion games when each player samples within his commodity.