It has been widely recognized that the performance of a multi-agent system is highly affected by its organization. A large scale system may have billions of possible ways of organization, which makes it impractical to find an optimal choice of organization using exhaustive search methods. In this paper, we propose a genetic algorithm aided optimization scheme for designing hierarchical structures of multi-agent systems. We introduce a novel algorithm, called the hierarchical genetic algorithm, in which hierarchical crossover with a repair strategy and mutation of small perturbation are used. The phenotypic hierarchical structure space is translated to the genome-like array representation space, which makes the algorithm genetic-operator-literate. A case study with 10 scenarios of a hierarchical information retrieval model is provided. Our experiments have shown that competitive baseline structures which lead to the optimal organization in terms of utility can be found by the proposed algorithm during the evolutionary search. Compared with the traditional genetic operators, the newly introduced operators produced better organizations of higher utility more consistently in a variety of test cases. The proposed algorithm extends of the search processes of the state-of-the-art multi-agent organization design methodologies, and is more computationally efficient in a large search space.
Another organization designer, KB-ORG, which also incorporates quantitative utility as a user evaluation criterion, was proposed for multi-agent systems in @cite_18 . It uses both application-level and coordination-level organization design knowledge to explore the search space of candidate organizations selectively. This approach significantly reduces the exploration effort required to produce effective designs as compared to modeling and evaluation-based approaches that do not incorporate designer expertise.
@cite_18
2144804481 2064567069 2039048406 2951605358
The ability to create effective multi-agent organizations is key to the development of larger, more diverse multi-agent systems. In this article we present KB-ORG: a fully automated, knowledge-based organization designer for multi-agent systems. Organization design is the process that accepts organizational goals, environmental expectations, performance requirements, role characterizations, and agent descriptions and assigns roles to each agent. These long-term roles serve as organizational-control guidelines that are used by each agent in making moment-to-moment operational control decisions. An important aspect of KB-ORG is its efficient, knowledge-informed search process for designing multi-agent organizations. KB-ORG uses both application-level and coordination-level organization design knowledge to explore the combinatorial search space of candidate organizations selectively. KB-ORG also delays making coordination-level organizational decisions until it has explored and elaborated candidate application-level agent roles. This approach significantly reduces the exploration effort required to produce effective designs as compared to modeling and evaluation-based approaches that do not incorporate design expertise. KB-ORG designs are not restricted to a single organization form such as a hierarchy, and the organization designs described here contain both hierarchical and peer-to-peer elements. We use examples from the distributed sensor network (DSN) domain to show how KB-ORG uses situational parameters as well as application-level and coordination-level knowledge to generate organization designs. We also show that KB-ORG designs effective, yet substantially different, organizations when given different organizational requirements and environmental expectations. As the scale and scope of distributed and multi-agent systems grow, it becomes increasingly important to design and manage the participants' interactions. The potential for bottlenecks, intractably large sets of coordination partners, and shared bounded resources can make individual and high-level goals difficult to achieve. To address these problems, many large systems employ an additional layer of structuring, known as an organizational design, that assigns agents different roles, responsibilities and peers. These additional constraints can allow agents to operate more efficiently within the system by limiting the options they must consider. Different designs applied to the same problem will have different performance characteristics, therefore it is important to understand the behavior of competing candidate designs. In this article, we describe a new representation for capturing such designs, and in particular we show how quantitative information can form the basis of a flexible, predictive organizational model. The representation is capable of capturing a wide range of multi-agent characteristics in a single, succinct model. We demonstrate the language's capabilities and efficacy by comparing a range of metrics predicted by detailed models of a distributed sensor network and information retrieval system to empirical results. These same models also describe the space of possible organizations in those domains and several search techniques are described that can be used to explore this space, using those quantitative predictions and context-specific definitions of utility to evaluate alternatives. The results of such a search process can be used to select the organizational design most appropriate for a given situation. Many researchers have demonstrated that the organizational design employed by an agent system can have a significant, quantitative effect on its performance characteristics. A range of organizational strategies have emerged from this line of research, each with different strengths and weaknesses. In this article we present a survey of the major organizational paradigms used in multi-agent systems. These include hierarchies, holarchies, coalitions, teams, congregations, societies, federations, markets, and matrix organizations. We will provide a description of each, discuss their advantages and disadvantages, and provide examples of how they may be instantiated and maintained. This summary will facilitate the comparative evaluation of organizational styles, allowing designers to first recognize the spectrum of possibilities, and then guiding the selection of an appropriate organizational design for a particular domain and environment. In many social computing applications such as online Q&A forums, the best contribution for each task receives some high reward, while all remaining contributions receive an identical, lower reward irrespective of their actual qualities. Suppose a mechanism designer (site owner) wishes to optimize an objective that is some function of the number and qualities of received contributions. When potential contributors are strategic agents, who decide whether to contribute or not to selfishly maximize their own utilities, is such a "best contribution" mechanism, M_B, adequate to implement an outcome that is optimal for the mechanism designer? We first show that in settings where a contribution's value is determined primarily by an agent's expertise, and agents only strategically choose whether to contribute or not, contests can implement optimal outcomes: for any reasonable objective, the rewards for the best and remaining contributions in M_B can always be chosen so that the outcome in the unique symmetric equilibrium of M_B maximizes the mechanism designer's utility. We also show how the mechanism designer can learn these optimal rewards when she does not know the parameters of the agents' utilities, as might be the case in practice. We next consider settings where a contribution's value depends on both the contributor's expertise as well as her effort, and agents endogenously choose how much effort to exert in addition to deciding whether to contribute. Here, we show that optimal outcomes can never be implemented by contests if the system can rank the qualities of contributions perfectly. However, if there is noise in the contributions' rankings, then the mechanism designer can again induce agents to follow strategies that maximize his utility. Thus imperfect rankings can actually help achieve implementability of optimal outcomes when effort is endogenous and influences quality.